## Page 1

104-10210-10037 is -em 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT, JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

FILE TITLE/NUSBER/VOLUTE:

CASE OF VURIY LUANOVICH

N'OSENRE: (835 PALE STUDY

(VOL: 1): PAGES /-51

(FARTS I, II, III + III)

CONTENTS,

TY

ERRATA SHEET

PCS 1-94

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

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DELETIONS, IF ANY: CUCCINE CREATINS METRIAL

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RECEIVED

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## Page 2

14-00000

TOP SECRET

The Case of Yuriy

Ivanovich NOSENKO

February 1967

TOP SECRET

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## Page 3

The Bona Fides of NOSENKO

I. INTRODUCTION

II. SUMMARY OF OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENYS

A. Introduction

B. First Geneva Phase (June 1962)

C. Secord Geneva Phase (January-February 1964)

D. Post-Defection

Handling (February 1964 to Present)

III. OPERATIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES

A. Earlier Information on NOSE:IKO in Geneva

B. Reasons for NOSENKO's Presence in Geneva

1. TDY in 1962

2. The 1964 TDY

C. Motivations and Intentions of NOSENKO

1. Introduction

2. Collaboration in 1962

a. Readiness to Report to CIA

b. Attitude Toward Defection

c. Motivation

3. Decision to Defect (Jaruary 1964)

4. The Letter of July 1964

D. Pattern of Activity in Geneva

1. Introduction

2. Official Duties in Geneva

3. Visits to the KGB Legal Residency

4. Association with TSYMBAL

5: Association with Other Soviets

6. Availability for Meetings with CIA

Bo. Timing of Defection.

E. The Recall Telegram

Pace

1

3

3

3

4

4

8

8

11

11

15

16

16

16

16

20

20

22

24

30

30

30

30

31

32

33

34

38

TOP SECRET

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G. Soviet Official Reactions

H.. Reactiong of NOSENKO's Family

I. Repercussions Within the KGB

1.

2.

SEIS IT IVE SOURCE

SEISITIVE SOURCE

3.

SOURCE

4.

KGB Handlers of Agents

IV. NON-KSB ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S LIFE

„A. Introduction

B. NOSENKO's Pre-KGB Autobiography

C. Personal Affairs Since Entering the KCB

• 1. Family Life

1 2 Venereal Disease

3. Affiliation with Comnunist Party Organs

4. Statements to Others by NOSENKO

/ D. Soviets' Statements About NOSENKO

V. NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER

A. Introduction

'B. Entry into the KGB

1. Date of Entry

2. Circumstances and Procedures of Entry

C. To June 1955 (American Department)

1. Introduction

2. Operations Against Correspondents

8.

KGB Files on SHAPIRO, GILMORE, SALISBURY, 93

and WHITNEY

b. Agents Reporting on Correspondents

c. Information from Other Sources

3. Operations Against Military Attache Personnel

8. Agents Reporting on Military Attaches

Page

40

42

44

44

46

46

47

48

48

48

79

79

80

81

82

83 - 84

85

85

86

86

89

93

93

94

95

96

98

TOP SECRET

...

1

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D. NOSENKO's Targets

(1)

MICK ELSON

(11)

(ii1)

MEARNS

RICHARDS

(1v)

FELCHLIN

(v)

BENSON

(vi)

STROUD

(vii)

MULE

(viit)

ENG Of BENSON, SIROUD and MULE

(1x)

CARDELLA

(x)

VAN LAETHEM

D. June 1955 to Jaruary 1960 (Tourist Department)

1. Introduction

2. Soviet Homosexual igents

3. Other Soviet Agents

4. Operations with Foreign Visitors

8. Attenpted Entrapment of MALIA (1955)

b. Recruitment of BURGI (1956)

c. Approach to

(1957)

d. Contact with Sitand late (1957)

e.

Recruitment off

(1957)

f. Recruitment of HARRIS (1958)

g. Compromise of KRAFT (1958)

h. Recruitment of DREW (1959)

1. Recruitment of

₽ (1959)

Recruitment of

1959)

Recruitment of

(1959)

l. Recruitment of

(1959)

Compromise of BARRETT (1959)..

n...

Compromise of WILLERFORD (1959)

Page

99

100

100

100

101

103

103

104

104

106

106

107

107

107

109

112

112

113

120

121

121

122

123

123

124

124

124

125

126

127

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E.

5. The FRIPPEL Case (1959-63)

a. NOSENKO's Infornation

b. FRIPPEL'S Information

6. Lee Harvey OSWALD (1959-60 and 1963)

a. Statements to the FBI

b. Statements to CIA

KGB Interest in OSWALD

(ii)

(iii)

KGB Interest in Marina OSNALD

OSWALD's Marriage and Departure

Page

129

129

133

136

137

141

141

142

142

from the USSR

(iv)

OSWALD's Visit to the Soviet

143

Embassy in Mexico

(v)

NOSENKO's Comments on Possible

144

KGB Involvement in the Assassination

7°

Supervisory Responsibilities and Knowledge

of Tourist Operations

145

a. Information from NOSENKO

b. KGB Knowledge from George BLAKE

c. GOLITSYN 's Tourist Document

8. TDY's to London (1957 and 1958)

January 1960 to January 1962 (American Department) 152

1. Introduction

2.

NOSENKO's Transfer to the U.S. Embassy

145

146

14T

150

152

153

Section

3.

Duties and Knowledgeability

a. Introduction

b.

Functions as Deputy Chief and Acting

157

157

i58

Chief

of Section

(i)

(11)

(111)

Access

Duties,

Additional Duties in KOVSHUK'S

Absence

158

159

163

in at.

5

Is orate!

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## Page 7

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c.

id.

Supervisor of All Code Clerk. Operations

(i) Introduction

Page

164

164

(11) Approach to STORSBERG

(a)

NOSENKO's Information

(b)

Information from STORSBERG

(c)

Information from PREISFREUND

166

168

177

179

(a)

Information from GOLITSYN

182

(e) Information from Other Sources 184

(iii)

TDY's by KOSOLAPOV on Code Clerk

• 186

Cases

(a) Introduction

(b)

False Identity for Travel

(c)

The Early 1960 TDY (JENNER

186

186

187

(a)

Tas November 1960 TDY (GARLAND 196

(iv)

KCB-Polish UB Activities Against

201

MORONE

(a) Introduction

(b)

NOSENKO's Information

(e) Information from Other Sources 205

(V)

Developmental Operation Against

201

201

209

ZUJUS

(a) Introduction

(b) Information from NOSENKO

(c) Information from Other Sources 211

(vi)

Approach to KEYSERS

209

209

213

(a) Introduction

213

(b) Information from NOSENKO

213

(c) Information from Other Sources

216

NOSENKO 's Responsibilitles for Coverage

Of ABIDIAN

. 220

(1) Introduction

220

TO SS0ARY

initi tis.

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(il) Duties as Case Officer

(111) ABIDIAN's Letter Mailings

(iv) ABIDIAN's Servicing of the Pushkin

Page

220

227

231

Street Deau Drop

e.

Supervisor of Activities Against American 236

Service Attaches

f. Knowledge of the Target

(1) Introduction

(1i) Physical Premises

(111) CIA Personnel Under Embassy Cover

9•

Electronic Operations Against the U.S.

240

240

240

242

248

Embassy

(i)

Introduction

(11) Microphones in the Chancery

(a) NOSENKO's Sources

(b)

Number and Locations of

248

248

249

252

Microphones

(c)

Receptivity and Audibility of 257

Microphones

(d) Amount, Type, and Value of

260

Production

(111) Microphones in the North wing

(1v) Monitoring/Jamming Beam

h. Handler of KGB Agents

4.

Overseas Assignments

8.

Intempt to obtain Assignment to Ethlopla 274:

b. U.S. Visa Application (1960)

c. The Cuba TDY (1960)

d. The Bulgaria TDY and the LUNT Case

267

270

272

274

274

276

279

5. Transfer to the Tourist Department

284

F. January 1962 to January 1964 (Tourist Department)

285

1. Date of Transfer

285

2. Functions and Activities

285

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## Page 9

4-00000

3. HOStitO's Agents

.

ArSenE FRIPPEL

b. Johan PREISFREIiN

c. VOLKOV and YEFRENOV

d.

LARGERA

€.

Marina RYNI!A

4. Approach to w. E. caNcaN

a. HOSENKO's Irfurmation

b. Inforiation from JOiNSON

5. Attenpt to kecruit FRAUNS

a. Information fror toSEnKo

b. Information frun ERAUNS

6. The SVENCiNiSKIY Case

a. Information fron NOSENKO

b. Information iron Other Sources

7. KOTEl's Arrest ind the KU agent SiNa

a. Information frOn: NOSENKO

Page

297

287

283

288

2F3

283

289

239

232

293

293

234

235

295

295

295

298

b. Information from Other Sources Concerning 300

KOTEN

SENSET TUE SOURCE

c. Mal Peporting on Bawa

8.

Arrest of BARGHOOR!

a. Information fro: NOSENKO

b. Information from BARGHUORN

9.

GRU Agent:

John Andrew SHUBIN

a. Introduction

b. NOSENKO's Information

c. Information from Elder Sensitive Source

d. Information from Other Sources

10.

BOLSHAKOV, Robert Kennedy, and the Cuban

302

304

304

308

310

310

310

311

312

313

Missile Crisis

a. Introduction

313

-..

TOP SECRET

.....

ii..

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## Page 10

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main tid, arrangede

Page

b. Soviet Sources During the Crisis

315

C. NOSENKO's Statements on BOLSHAKOV

316

d. Information from Wan

Sensitive Sourco 318

G.

NOSENKO'S KGB Pronotions and Awards

319

1. Ranx

319

2. Awards and Decorations

322

H.

NOSENTO'S Relationship with GRIBANOV

327

1. Information from NOSENKO

327

a. Summary

327

b. Details

327

2. Information fron finan

SEiSITIVE SUURCE

336

I.

Confirmation from Cther Sources

339

1. Introduction

338

2.

SENSITTIE SÜRCE

338

3.

4.

ANOT

5. RETHO

5.

GAMKRELIDZE

7.

COLITSYN

sensitive source

sensitive source

Source

340

341

342

342

343

Source

9. Case Officer for Robert Lee JOHNSON

10. Case Officer for gandas

11. Soviet Jourralist KOROLEV

VI. PRODUCTION

A. Positive Intelligence Information

B. Soviet Intelligence Personalities

C. KGB Headquarters

345

347

347

347

349

349

350

1. Structure and Functions

2. Modus Operandi

3. Staff Procedures

352

352

359

360

TOP SECRET

9

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## Page 11

D. KGB Activities.

1.

Operations Against Americans

2. Tabulation of American Leads

a: Successful Recruitment Approaches

b. Development Operations

c. Unsuccessful Approaches

d. Investigations

3. Selected Cases of Recruited Americans

-

"SASHA"

b.

c.

(i) NOSENKO'& Information on the

Agent

(11)

NOSENKO's Sourcing

(iji) GOLITSYN's Lead to "SASHA"

"ANDREY" (Day¿e W. SMITH)

(1) Introduction

(11) NOSENKO's Information - 1962

(111) NOSENKO's Information - 1964

(IV) NOSENKO's Sourcing

(v) Results of Investigations

KGB Agent in Paris (Sgt. Robert Lee

JOHNSON)

(1) Introduction

(11) The Lead from NOSENKO

(111) NOSENKO's sourcing

(iv)

JOHNSON and MINTKENBAUGH

(v)

Information from Other Sources

(a) JOHNSON's Statements

(b) MINTKENBAUGH's Statements

(c) Hedwig JOHNSON's Statements

(a) Mental Condition of Hedwig

JOHNSON

(e)

Soviet Concern about MIS.

JOHNSON's Illness

TOP SECRET

Page

361

361

363

363

379

398

402

411

411

411

412

4120

413

413

413

416

419

419

427

427

428

433

436

437

440

450

457

459

.460

ex sial..

sition

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## Page 12

14-00000

(vi)

Damage by JOHNSON to U.S.

Interests

4. Unsuccessful Approaches to U.S. Citizens

a. The HARMSTONE Case

(1)

Introduction

(ií) Information from NOSENKO

(lii) Information

from Other Sources

b.

Edward Ellis SMITH

13!

Information from NOSENKO

(ii) Information from SOLITSYN

(iil) Information from SMITH

c.

The BINDER Case

(1)

Information from NOSENKO

(1i) Information from BINDER

..5. Operations Involving Other Westerners

a. Tabulation

(1) Introduction

(1i)

Agent Leads

(a) Afghanistan (1)

(0) Argentina (2)

(c) Australia (1)

(a) Austria (3)

(e)

Belgium (6)

(E)

Brazil (2)

(g)

(h)

(1)

Canada (5)

Egypt (1)

Finland' (9)

France (9)

(k)

(1)

Germany (9)

Greece (1)

Ur Shir

Page

461

463

463

463

464

465

468

468

463

469

470

470

470

474

474

474

4,75

475

475

476

476

477

• 479

479

481

481

483

486

487

:

..*...

---

## Page 13

(m) India (2)

(n)

Indonesia (1)

(0)

(p)

(9)

(r)

(s)

(+)

Iran (1)

Israel (2)

Italy (6)

Japan (8)

Mexico (2)

The lietherlands (2)

Norway (1)

(v)

Peru (1)

(w) Sweden (3)

(x) Switzerland (2)

(y) Tunisia (1)

(z)

United Kingdom (7)

(aa) Uruguay (1)

(bb) Venezuela (1)

(111) Investigations and Development

Cases

b. The VASSALL Case

(1) Information from NOSENKO

(11) Information from GOLITSYN

(111) Information from VASSALL

C.

The Illegal f

(1) Introduction

(11) Information from NOSENKO

(ji1) hotivities in Germany

(iv) Operation in Canada

6: The BELITSKIY Operation

fin"

bo

Introduction

information from NOSENKO

(1)

Statements

in 1962

TOP STOlEN

Pace

488

488

488

489

490

491

493

494

494

495

495

496

496

496

498

498

499

503

503

505

507

509

509

510

510

512

517

517

517

517

-..

tami

d.

---

## Page 14

(11)

Statements in 1964

(11i) BELITSKIY Photograph

c. Information from Other sources

7. KGB Investigations

a. Compromise of POPOV

Page

520

521

522

530

530

530

(1) Introduction

(il) CIA Operation with POPOV

(iji)

Cause and Date of Compromise

530

532

(a) Information from NOSENKO

(b) Information from

532

A 50532

(c) Infromation from the

CHEREPA:OV Papers

(a) Informition from GOLITSYN

533

b. Compromise of PENKOVSKIY

(1)

Introduction

(il)

Resume of the PENKOVSKIY Case

(iil)

Statements by NOSENKO

(a)

(b) Reports on the Compromise

(iv)

Information from diantas SEISITIVE

(v)

Information from: 085287SENSITIVE

(vi)

Information from

(vii) Information from &

SOURCE

(vili) Information from

533

535

535

535

536

536

538

544

SOURCE

544

SOURCE

545 Source

545

546

(ix)

(x)

Information from Official KGB

Report

Information from WYNNE

546

546

Compromise of CHEREPANOV

(1)

Introduction

548

548

(11)

Earlier Information on CHEREPANOV

548

(111) Reports by Americans

553

13

182 22 2*

!

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## Page 15

(iv)

Information from NOSENKO

information fion drie

(vi)

information from

fian scrsitive

Engross source

(vii)

Information fron tirata

(viai) Information from insane sercitie

(ixy Conterts of CHEREPANO! Package

(x)

NOSENKO'S Comments on the

CHEREPRIDV Lipers

d. Reports on KAZAN-ÄCH HEK

(i) Introduction•

(1i)

Scatement by MUSENkO

e.

(i1l) Staterent: ly bre

ALfREd SLEEINGER: Suspected Source of

the Fbl

(i)

(i:)

Introduction

NOSENKO's Information

SEUSTIVE SOURCE

(iii)

Stals Information

(iv)

SLESINGER's Irformation.

8. Technical Penetrations o1 the West German

Embassy

a. Introduction

k. Infoination from NOSESKO

c. The late

d. Evidence of Technical Penetration

9.

Cryptologic Successes hgainst the u.s.

Embassy

a. Introduction

b. Information from NOSE KO

(1)

Braking U.S. Ciphers

(ii). Handling Deciphered Cables

(iji) Methods of Criptologic Attack.

c.

U.S. Evaluations

(i).

NSA Report

Page

554

557

559 LoreS

561

561

561

565

569

569

509

571

571

571

572

573

574

574

576

578

530

583

583

585

585

587

588

591

591

---

## Page 16

(11)

USIB Security Comittec Report

E. NOSENKO and GULITSYN

1. Introduction

2. Background Information on GOLITSAl

3. COLITSYN Leads

and Information from NOSENKO

a. Microphones in the U.S. Enrassy

b. Other Leads Corroborated by NOSENKO

c. Leads Conflicting with NOSENKO Reports

d.

Leads to Operations Against U.S. Embassy

Not Covered by NOSENKO

4.

NOSENKO's Information o: GOLITSYN

E. Surveillance of Soviets in the United States

1. Information from NOSENKO

2. Information from Other Sources

a. GOLITSYN

D. t

I sensitive source

C. CHEREPANOV Document

VII. SPECIALISTS' ASSESSMENTS OF NOSENKO

A. Opinions on Intelligence and Personality

1. Graphological Analysis

2. Reports by Psychologist

a. Psychological Testing Results

b. Alternative Psychological Explanations

c. Psychological Interrogation

3. Report by Psychiatrist

B. Views of Intelligence Personnel

1. Statement by DERYABIN

a.. Introduction

b. DERYABIN's Comments

2. Remarks by CIA Handlers

a. Introduction

TER 8ET

Pase

593

594

594

594

595

595

595

597

597

593

600

600

601

601

602

602

603

603

603

605

605

609

611

613

615

615

615

616

625

625

!

- -

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## Page 17

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Page

b.

NOSENKO's Conduct in Meetings

c.

NOSENKO'& Behavtor Under Interrogation

626

527

(1)

(11)

Irtroduction

(111)

Manner of Pecounting Events

Evasion,

Improvisation, and Other

Defenses

627

627

628

Additional Observations

(1)

630

630

(1.1)

Inquisitlieness about CIA

Acceptance of Contrary Informazion 631

from Other Sources

e.

Discussiong with NOSENKO about his orn

Performance

631

c.

Polygraph Testing

1. Test in April 1964

2. Test in October 1966 on Lee Harvey OSWALD

a. Introduction

b. Results

632

632

638

638

638

:

•N basta

Ti 35.20

...

;

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## Page 18

VIJI. NOSEIKO'S BONA FIDES:

AALYSIS AND CONCIUSIONS

* Introduction

B. Evaluation os Production

•1. Introdustion

2. KGB Orgarization, Personalities, Nethods

3. Operational Leads

a. introduction

b. Opcrations Involving Americans

(i)

Completen-ss,

Accurary,

Detail ard

consistercy of Reporting

(is)

Damage to the Soviets

(nii; importance or Usefulness

c.

Operutions Involving Other Westerrers

(i)

Introduction

(ii;

Discussion

4.

Technical Operations Against the U.S. Embassy

a. Introduction

b. Discussion

c.

Remarks

5.

The BELIlSKIY Case

a. Introduction

6.

b. DIscussion

c. Remarks

KGB Investigations

a.

Compromise of POPOV

Introduction

(i)

(ii)

Discussion

b.

(iii)

Remarks

Compromise of PENKOVSKIY

Introduction

(i)

(ii)

Discussion

(iii)

Remarks

c. Compromise of CHEREPANOV

(i)

Introduction

The Operational Plan in Draft

fii)

(jii)

The Summary on LANGELLE

(iv)

Remarks

TRO SCORET 1)

642

643

643

644

64÷

645

640

647

650

652

654

654

654

657

657

657

659

660

660

660

€61

€63

663

663

• 663

665

666

...666

:666

669

570

670

670

672

674

---

## Page 19

C.

Evaluation of Sourcig

1. Introduction

2. Discussion

3. Remarks

D. Examination oi josENko's intelligence Carrer

1. Irtroduction

2. Naval GRU Service

a. Introduction

b. Discussion

c. Henarks

3.

Entry into the KGB

a. Eligibility

b. Date of Entry

c. Circumstances of Entry

d. Remarks

4. Initial Service in the Ü.S. Embassy Section

" a. Introduction

bo Work Against American Correspondents

c. Work hgainst Army Attaches

d. Additional Reporting

c. Remarks

5. Tourist Department (June 1955 to January 1960)

a. Introduction

b. The Early Period (1955 to 1958)

(i)

(ii)

General

The BURGI Case

C. Promotion to Deputy Chief of Section

d. Knowledge of Section's Staff and Agent

Personnel

e. Knowledge of Section's Activities

(i)

BLAKE

(ii) GOLITSYN Document

(iii).. Tourist Agents

£• NOSENKO'S Tourist Paper

go The OSWALD Case

675,

675

675

677

678

678

679

679

679

681

683

683

683

684

685

686

685

686

686

690

690

692

692

692

692

.: 693

695

695

695

695

696

696

697

• 697

TOE SEGRET

!8

---

## Page 20

-.:

n.

BOSENKO'& Operätional Retivities (1959-1959)

*69%

ii) . Cereral

(i1) : The Homosexua!s YEFREMOV and VOLKOV

(rill lionosersal Ertrapment Oprratiors

(iv)

The jent FRIPPEL

638

698

699

700

i.

Renarks

702

6. U.5. Eriassy sectior 11960-19611

705

so introduction

705

iD. Entry anto the section

c. Functions

as Deputy Chief

705

706

d. Krowiedscability as Deputy and Actirg Chirf

707

•. Knowledgeability of U.S. Etassy Physical

709

security

£ .

dinowleágrab:lity cbout Anerican irtciligerce 709

Personnel

So Krowledgeability of koB Cose Clerk Ope -tions 709

(1)

The STORSBERG Case:

(i j.)

(i21)

The JENNER Case

The GARLAND Case

(iv)

The MORONE Case

(v)

The KEYSERS Case

(vi)

Other Code Clerk Cases

h.

Responsibility for and knowledge of ABIDIAN

i.

Reporting on ABIDIAl's Visit to the Pushkin

711

713

714

715

717

• 718

720

722

Street Dead Drop

j.

Responsibilaty of supervising Military Attache 725

Operations

k. TDY to sulgaria and the LUxI Case

726

The U.S. Visa and the Cusa TDY

727

1. Personal liandling of Agents

(i)

YEFREMOV ard VOLKOV

7.29

729

(iiy

FRIPPEL

729

(iii)

DMITRIYEV

RYTOVA

729

(iv)

(vi

(vi?

LAVINA

729

*729

johan PREISFREUND

: 730

(vi:)

mo Transfer to the Tourist Departmert

731

19

---

## Page 21

•14-00000

Leця

ourse yepartment*(1462-1964)

a. Introduction

h. Absences from Moscow

c. Personal Participation in Operations

(:)

The li.E. JOHNSON Provocation

(ii)

The BARGHiCORN Provocation-Arrest

(iin)

The Approach to BRAUNS

(iv;

The Arrest of KOTEN

d. Agents Handled by NOSEIKO

(i)

FRIPPEL

(ii) SVENCHANSKIY

e. The OSWALD Irvestication

f. The CHEREPAN(V Investigation

g. Remarks

E. Examination of Üther Aspects of NOSENKO's Biography

1. KGB Awards and Ranks

a.

Anaids

b.

Ranks

C. Remarks

2.

Affiliation with Comnunist Party Organs

a. Introduction

b. Discussion

c. Remarks

3.

Schooling

a. Introduction

b. Discussion

c. Remarks

F. Appraisals of NOSENKO, His Motivation, and Other

Operational Circumstances -

1. Introduction

2.

NOSENKO

•З.i

Motivation

Operational Circumstances

a. Presence in Ceneva (1962)

bo Presence in Geneva (1964)

733

733

734

734

735

736

73%

738

739

739

740

740

741

742

742

742

742

743

744

744

744

744

746

746

• 746

748

749

749

749

750

751

751

-751

79 32

2+20

---

## Page 22

c.

accLis to KGh Residency and Avalabadly

d. Timing of 1962 Contact

e. Willingness to Meet CIA

£. The Recall Ielegram

g. Remarks

G. Sources Supporting NOSENKO

1. Introdüction

2. Corrccoration of NOSENKO's Intelligence Career

3. Remaris

k. Alternative Explanatiors

1. Introduction

2. First Alternative

a. Faulty Memory

b. Selective Memory •

c.

Embellishment

do Combination at Above

e. Insanity

3. Sicond Alternative

4. Third Alternative

5.

Remarks

I. Summary of Conclusior:s

752

753

753

753

756

?56

756

757

759

759

759

759

759

761

762

763

763

763

76.4

765

TOP SECHET 21

s. inde

---

## Page 23

ILLUSTRATIONS

Photograph of NOSENKO and his father,

the Minister of Shipbuilding

Photograph of NOSENKO and NCSENKO's Family

Finnish Travel Manifests: March-April 1960

Finnish Travel Manifest: November 1960

TDY Authorization

Translation of TDY Authorization

Facing Page 11

Facing Page 43

Facing Page 194

Facing Page 197

Facing Page 319

•Facing Page 320

deore...

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 24

do

I.

INARDDUCHICK

Ints review presents the facts and observationg which bear

on the bona fides of the soviet defector Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO.

The highlighta of NOSEiXO's biography, as he has given it to

CIA, are as follows:

He was born 30 october 1927, tre first

son

of Ivar Isidorovich NOSENKO, snipyard worker who in 1939 as to

becone Soviet Minister of Shipbuilding.

After graduating in

1951

from the Institute of International Relations in Moscow, where

he specialized in international law and the English langage,

NOSENKO entered the Chief Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the

Soviet Navy,

serving first as a translator assigned to the intel-

ligence staff of the Seventr. (Far Eastern) Fleet

and then as a

senior translator and political officer at an

intelligence unit

of the Fourth (Baltic) Fleet.

In mid-March 1953,. imrediately

following STALIN's death, NOSENKO left the Naval GRU to become a

junior case officer in the KiB.

He was assigned to the U.S.

Embassy Section of the American. Department, KGB Seconä Chief

Directorate, iron 1953 to mid-1955.

During this perica he was

initially responsible for operational activity surrounding Am-

erican journalists in Moscow and later for operations against

U.S. Army Attaches at the Embassy.

when transferred to the newly

organized Tourist Departmert of

the second Chief Directorate in

1955, NOSENKO had as his targets vi-itors to the Soviet Union

from the United States and the countries of the British Common-

wealth.

Having handled a nimber of successful tourist opera-

tions, NOSENKO in 1958 was promoted to Deputy Chief of the

section responsible for operations açainst American, Eritish,

and Candian nationals.

Eighteen months later

Ni-SENKO returned

to the U.S. Embassy Section as its Deputy Chiei.

Between January

1960 and January 1962 he was second-in-charge of all KGB activ-

ities against the U,S. Embassy in Moscow and personally super-

vised operations against tre Embassy Security Officer, the

Second Chief Directorate's most important counterintelligence

target at the time, and against American code clerks, collec-

tively the Directorate's most important recruitment targets.

At the cod of December 1951 NOSENKO again was transferred to

the Tourist Department, this time as Chief of the American-

British-Canadian Section,

Six months later he was made Deputy

Chief of the Tourist Department, and in mid-1963 he became its

First Deputy Chief,

FrOM

the time he first contacted CIA in Geneva, in 1962,

NOSENKO's status has been under examination.

only now, three

years following his defection

in recruary 1964, is a definitive

study of the bona fides question possible:

the voluminous and

diverse reports by NOSENKO, coupled with collateral information,

required that much time for assimilation, correlation, investiga-

tion, and evaluation.

NOSaNKO '5 own testimony, interspersed with

representative subsidiary cases stemming from or related to his

reports,

constitutes a large part of

the evidence.

This review

also draws upon statements and actions by other

Soviets, colla-

tions with materials from other sources,

and opinions by special-

ists of various kinds.

These factual elements are presented

without comment or interpretation,

except in the penultimate

section of the review where the evidence on the bona fides of

NOSENKO is evaluated

and analyzed.

TOP SEGMET

---

## Page 25

7. 1

..

2.

Part IIs

This review ia presented in the following format:

A summary of developments in the NOSENKO case fron

1962 to the present,

including his clandestine

meetings with ClA, his defection, and the subsequent

debriefings and interrogations.

Part III:

A discussion of the operational circunstances of

NOSENKO'S 1962 contact with CIA and his defection

two years later.

Included is discussion of CIA's

information concerning NOSENKO prior to his first

contact in Geneva, NOSENKO's explanation of the

reasons for his presence in Geneva in 1962 and 1964,

NOSENKO 's motivations

first for

establishing clandes-

tine contact with imerican Intelligence and later for

defecting to the United States, NOSEUKO's pattern of

activity in Geneva in 1962 and 1964, and the reactions

of the

Soviet:, both official and unofficial, to the

defection,

Part IV:

The non-KG3 aspects of NOSENKO's life, both before

after he joined Soviet State Security Service.

as he described them and as others have reported them.

Part V:

The positions and resporsibilities of NOSENKO in the

KGB, the operations with which he

was associated,

his travels abroad

the awards and promotions which

he receives

and other Soviet sources' statements

on these points.

Part VI:

NOSENKO 5 production, especially in counterintelli-

gence matters not discussed

in the preceding section.

Key cases are discussed in detall and other leads

are summarized,

Part VII:

Specialists assessments of NOSENKO:

by the CIA

graphologist who studied his hardwriting; by the

CIA psychologist and psychiatrist who examined him;

by the former KGB officer Peter DERYABIN; by the CIA

case officers who handled him; and by the CIA poly-

graph operator who tested him.

Part VIII: Interpretation of the evidence and conclusions about

the bona fides of NOSENKO.

Part IX:

The implications of the conclusions in Part VIII for

certain other sources.

There are several sources currently or formerly associated

with the Soviet Intelligence services who are repeatedly referred

to in this review.

They include the following:

- Anatolly Mikhallovich GOLITSYN, a KGB officer who

defected in Helsinki to U.S, authorities on 15 December

1961.

sensitive. source

sensitive source

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 26

14-00000

- 13:

Alcksandr Nikolayevich CHEREPANOV, a KGB Officer .

whoce case in reviewed in Part VI.D.7.c.

ARAN

8M28228

i's the

1?49

source

former i

Directorate.

anana gara dear.

222362 222473

Tan agent of the KGE Second Chica

417799991

ill pertinent material received by CiA prior to 15 Januars

1967 has been

taken into

nicount

Of NOSETKO'S

bona fides.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 27

II. SUMMARY OF CPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

A. Introduction

Prcu tho CIA side, the NOSENKO case can be divided into

thras perioda:

che first Geneva phase of June 1962, the second

Gereva phase of January-February 1354, and the post-defection

handling of NOSENKO from Feiruary 1964 to date.

The rest of

Part II i8 separated irto these three periods accordingly.

B. First Geneva Phase (Jure 1962)

The NOSENKO case opened on 5 June 1962 in the corridors of

the Palais des Nations in Geneva during the United Nations Dis-

armament Conference.

A thier-unidentified soviet, known to him

by sight from conference reetings, approached Ü.S. Foreign Ser-

vice Officer David MARk with the suggestion that they get to

gether for a talk the folloring day.

In the late afternoon of

6 June,

the same Soviet

motioned "'ARK aside and said that he

would like to taik to

him privately as soon

as possible.

told MARK that he was "not going to pumo him for information,

but simply wanted to teli his sone things."

A luncheon neeting

was arranged for 9 June,

although the Soviet clearly preferred

an earlier date.

MARK

advised CIA of the appointment, explain-

ing that he thought the ipproach so unusual that it might be

an offer of cooperation or cefection.

He said he believed the

soviet to be yuriy Ivanovier: NOSENKO, a member of the soviet

delegation to the arns talks.

At the 9 June luncheon with MARK, NOSENKO told MARK that

he, NOSENKO, was a KGB counterintelligence officer

sent to

Geneva to ensure the security of the Soviet delegation.

He knew

that MARK had previously served in Moscow and believed he war

connected with American Irteiligence.* He needed approximately

900 Swiss francs innediately to cover KGB operational funds which

he squandered on liquor

and a prostitute ir. Gereva, and he offered

for this amount to sell

tio pieces of information to American

Intelligence.

The first of these has the identity of a former

U.S. Embassy employee in Moscow who was a KGB agent and, as of

1962, was

"near ciphers" in the hashington area; the second was

the identity of a soviet in Moscow who,

although ostensibly a

CIA agent, was actually planted on American Intelligence.

Al-

though NOSENKO at first told Mark that he would stop at

the sale

of these two items, he later stated:

"I know you won't let me

alone now." At another point NOSENKO said:

"I will not work in

Moscow, but I come out about once a year." NOSENKO also gave

MARK

brief chronological account of his personal and profes-

sional past.

MARK explained that although he was not an intel-

ligence officer,

he could place NOSENKO in contact with the

Intelligence Chief in Geneva later that same day.

MARK Introduced NOSE:KO to a CIA officer at 2000 hours that

evening, and a

followed at a CIA safehouse in

Geneva.

Describing himseif as a KGb Major experienced in opera-

tions against the American Embassy in Moscow and against tourists

and other travellers to the Soviet Union, NOSENKO told the CIA

Another Soviet source,

has also reported that the

KGB suspected MARK to be an

Axerican Intelligence officer;

although he has never served in CIA, MARK did engage in a num-

ber of operational support activities on behalf of CIA while

stationed at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.

TOP SECHET

'send disso do mirania

---

## Page 28

officer of his financial difficulties and repea:ed his offer to

sell two items of information.

He said that the need for monay

was his immediate motive for contactiry CIA, alchough in the en-

suing discussion he said also that he was dissatisfied with the

Communist regime

in the Soviet Union, HOSENKO emphasized, never-

theless, that he had no intention of beconing an imerican agent.--

this was to be a one-time transaction, and after that he would

have no further contact with CIA,

Despite this original reticence,

NOSENKO supplied consider-

biographic information on himself and

also discussed in

general terms certain

additional KGB operations as well as KGS

organization and

operational methods in Moscow,

He understocd:

told MiRk earlier in the day. that CIA rouid wart more

information than the ino items

which he originaily offered, and

he agreed to meet again two days later.

NOSENKO met CIA representatives four more times in Gereva

in June 1962.

always in the same safenouse.

with the second

meeting on l1 June.

his initial reservations disappeared almost

entirely.

He answered most questions put to him on KGB organi-

zation and operations. most of his information paing concerned

wirh the Second Chief Direitorate.

responsible for counterintel-

Ingence and security within the USSR.

NOSENKO scemed to be what

he claimed to be:

KGB officer in

₴

sensitive position with

knowledge of important KGB operations,

NOSEUKO reruined to Moscow on 15 June, having promised to

do everything within the limits imposed by personal security con-

siderations to collet information of interest: the areas of CIA

interest had been outlined

The orly restrictions he

placed on his cooperation were his absolute refusal to permit

operational contace with him inside the USSR ard his request

that no mention of nis collaboration be made in correspondence

to Moscow.

He promised to rotify CIA. Via an address he was

given, when he came to the West agair,

c.:

Second Geneva _Phase (January-February_1964)

NOSENKO accompanied the Soviet delegation to a later ses-

sion of the Disarmament Conferenie lone having gone by in the

interim

without his

participation), arriving in Geneva on

19 January

1964.

The

next day he sent a cable to his CIA accom-

modation address announcing his presence.

new

series of meetirgs on 23 January he announced that he had

decided to defect to the United States citing as reasons his

continuing disaffection with the Soviet regime and the fact that

he probably would not have further opportunities to travel to the

West in the foreseeable future.

wanted to defect as soon as possible: ne agreed to remain in

place in Geneva for at least two or three weeks while arrange-

ments for his reception were being made in washington.

NOSENKO

had brought a large amount of new information, much of it in

scribbled rotes, on KGB operational activity

collected in the

18 months since his last meeting with CIA..

Twelve

more meetings

were held in a Geneva safehouse over the next twelve days, vary-

1ng in length from one and a halt to six hours.

D..

Post-Defection Handling (February 1964-Present)

On 4 February,

four days before the date tentatively

selected for NOSENKO's defection,

he reported that a cable had

been received from KGB Headquarters ordering his immediate re-

turn to participate in a KGB conference on foreign tourism to

HE SCOne

---

## Page 29

soviet Unjon..

and NOSENKO was driven across the border to Germany that sane

sight.

Debriefings resured in a Frankfurt safehouse.

The des

cision has reached on ll february to bring. rOSENKO to the

United States, and in the early even..g of 12 February he and

his CIA escorts arrived in Washington via commercial aircrait,

thence to a safehouse in the Washington area.

At

the request of the Swiss and Soviet Governments, NOSENKO

met on 14 February with representatives of their respective

Washington Embassies in the offices of the U.S. Immigration and

Naturalization Service.

He told both that he had defected of

his own free will after careful consideration and that he had no

desire to return to the soviet Union.

In answer to the questions

of the soviet representatives, he orally renounced his status and

rights as a citizen of the USSR.

CIA completed its initial debriefings of NOSENKO on 18 Febru-

ary.

and on 24 February he was introduced to representatives of

the

FBI for questioning. At about the same time, there was a

marked decline in NOSENKO's discipline:

He became evasive and

uncooperative, refusing to answer some of the questions of his

debriefers, both CIA and FBI; his nightlife in Washington and

nearby cities was punctuated by drinking bouts, crude behavior,

and disputes with his security escort.

He explained these

actions by saying that he was under great tensich

as a

result of

his defection, abandonment of his wife and children, and the

disgrace that he had brought to his family name. It was against

this background that CIA acceded to NOSENKO's demand for a vaca-

tion.

On 12 Haron, therefore, NOSENKO left Washington with a

CIA case officer and two CIA security guards for a two-week

vacation in Hawsii. There his behavior deterioriated still fur-

ther: He drank heavily and almost

constantly; he engaged in

sexual acts with a number of prostitutes; he was loud and crude

in public places; and he spent money extravagently ($800 on

one prostitute) and conspicuously (a $100 bill for a restaurant

tip).

During NOSENKO's absence, consultations were held with

the FBI concerning

steps to be taken to restrict his movements

and activities.

agencies feared that his behavior would

bring about unwanted attention and publicity, perhaps police

arrest, and that doubts about his bona fides, which were be-

coming known to a widening group of people in the l.s. Govern-

ment, might be inadvertently revealed to NOSENKO himself.

FBI on I April said it would "not interpose objection" to the

CIA plan to limit NOSENKO's freedom of movement.

The Acting

Attorney General, the Department of State, and the White House

were also notified of the CIA pian at this time.

In the morning of 4 April NOSENKO was driven to another.

safehouse in a Washington suburb, ostensibly only. for a poly-

graph examination.

At the safehouse NOSENKO was given a rou-

tine polygraph examination, lasting over three hours; he

See Parts III E and III F for further discussions of this

cable.

192 SENS

---

## Page 30

14-11000

"reacted significantly" to questions concerning his intentiong

in defecting ts the United States and other related matters.*

He was then told that he would remain at this safehouse, which

Since this

thenceforward was his regular plaus of residence only, has been

time NOSENKO has had contacts with CIn personnel

under full-time guard, and has not been permitted access to

Detailed interrogation of NOSENKO was begun on 4 April 1964

in order to obtain information which he had been reluctant to

give in debriefings, and to clarify contradictions in that he

had already reported.

This phase of the interrogations was termi-

nated on 21 April 1964.

Despite the searching nature of the questions and the im-

plicit and explicit doubts of his veracity, NOSENKO proved him-

self willing to

answer, or to try to answer, questions put to

Because much more information pertinent to the question of

his böna fides had to

obtained, a new phase of interrogation

was begun in mid-May 1964.

Difterent interrogators were intro-

duced and questioning was

resumed in a neutral, nor-hostile man-

The period of neutral questioning continued until mid-Novem-

After further

consultations with the FBI, a new jound of

hostile interrogations begar on 26 January 1955.

NOSENKO NAS

questioned for a total of about 140 hours by individual interro-

gators

and by interrogation teams consisting of two o= three

men, and he was directly challenged on many of his previous re-

He admitted that certain of his earlier statements had

been incorrect, and that he could not explain contradictions in

his testimony.

Nevertheless, NOSENKO maintained he had been

bagically truthful, and that he had come to the United States

solely for the reasons he had originally given. This interro-

gation was broken off on 5 March 1965.

Questioning of NOSENKO during the summer and

autumn of 1964

and the interrogations of January and February 1965 concentrated

on the period of his claimed service in the U.S. Embassy Section

of the American Department,

KGB Second Chief Directorate,

January 1960 to January 1962.

Among the reasons for selecting

this particular period were the comparatively large amount of

collateral information available against which NOSENKO's state-

ments could be checked; the importance of the U.S. Embassy and

its personnel as the outstanding KGB Second Chief Directorate

targets; their importance from the standpoint of American

security; and the extent of NOSENKO's knowledge about the acti-

vities of the U.S. Embassy Section, in his capacity as its

Deputy Chief.

In keeping with Soviet practice, CIA asked NOSENKO in

February 1965 to sign a series of interrogation Ieporis, so-

called "protocols;" most of which

concern the period of his

claimed service in the

American Department.

These were written

by the CIA interrogators, and they were designed to incorporate

See Part VII.C. for a further discussion of the polygraph.

tests.

---

## Page 31

NOSENKO's exact statements and meaning on various specific sub-

jects.

The protocols were in no way presented to HOSENKO as

documentary portions of a "confesaion," but father as distilled

and final statements of what he did and did not knes concerning

particular topics. NOSENKO was asked to read each page of each

protocol carefully and to sign his name at the botton to indi-

cate that he understood and agiend with its cortents; he was

allowed the use of a dictionary and was permitted to ask any

questions and make any changes that he wished.

(Amendents were

entered by the interrogators and were initialed by NOSENKO.)

NOSENKO was asked, after reading. each

page and after completing

the entire protocol, whether he understood what was written there

and whether there were any more changes he wished to make.

He

was then

asked to sign and date the statement, "I have read and

understood this report and certify it as correct." at the end of

the final page.

With one exception, which will be noted later,

he did so calmly and without objections, although on one or two

of them he remarked that his statements were presented

in such

a manner as to make them look foolish; although invited to do

so, he was not able to suggest any changes of fact or presenta-

tion which would make them more accurate.

Conmenting on the

use of interrogation reports, NOSENKO said on 4 Narch 1965:

"My life story is absolutely

correct. Anytring I have signed

is absolutely correct. I absolutely understand what I am doing

when I am signing any paper.

This is an official document, and

I fuliy understand what I'm doing when 1 sign it as being

abso-

lutely correct."

In May 1965 a CIA psychologist questioned NOSENKO in detail

on his life from birth until 1953, when he said he entered the

KGB, in an attempt to gain additional insights irto his charac-

ter and personality.

Further questioning was conducted from 26 July until l4 August

1965 with the participation of Peter DERYABIN, a former KGB offi-

cer.

These interrogations, the first to be held in Russian,

were for the purpose of using DERYABIN's first-hand experience

in the KGB to obtain a clearer understanding of NOSENKO's per-

sonal and professional background.

There were no further debriefings or interrogations until

18 October 1966.

On this date NOSENKO was polygraphed on the

case of Lee Harvey OSWALD.

During the period 19-25 October 1966, NOSENKO was questioned ior

seven days on specific aspects of selected topics ranging from his

identity to his involvement in and knowledge of specific KGB opera-

Questioning was in both Russian and English.

0134 182 6.

---

## Page 32

OPERATIONAL CIRCUNSTANCES

Earlier Information on NOSENKO in Coneva

HOSENKO's saue 1irst camo to tho attention of ClA In October

1960 when he applied at tho American Embassy in Moscox for a visa

to enter the United

States as a selabor uf an automotiva delega-

tion.

Tbe following month CIA obtained coples of his passport

photograph at ino separate points on hia TDY route lo Cuba.

There

wAS

no indication of intelligence affiliation, and when

NOSENKO arrived under true nano with the soviet delegation in

Genova in karch 1962, he was accorded no more then the

interest

routinely given by Western intelligence services to Sovicts

travelling abroad.* After arriving in Switzerlard, however, but

before establishing contact with CIA, NOSEKO was

involved 1n

at least two incidents which brought him to the special notice

of the British, balss, americon, and possibly the rest German

services.

The

first of these occurred in April 19f2. At a cocktail

party in Geneva, NOSE"kO met a female scoretary employed by the

British Foreign Office. He saw hor several days later in

the

corridors of the Pilais des Nations and asked her to have dinner

with hia, and a date was made for several evenings later. Ac-

cording to the secretary's later account as reported by her

superiors:

"They talked about Marxism, the Chinese, Yugoslavia,

and love; NOSENKO was obviously smitten with her,

became verbally

amorous,

and told her that he would like to take her off to a.

desert islard."

The girl

felt that NOSENKO probably was not

interested in

her for intelligence purposes, but seemed to be

genuinely attracted by her.

From her conversations with JOSENKO

she was able to report that "he had been in submarines during

the war and, according to himself, had risen to the rank of

Commander.

He was a nenber of the Communist Party.

His father

waS

in the Ministry

of Shipping.

lle himself had served in the

Ministry of Foreign Alfairs in

1948 and 1949 and had apparently

visited England but had not been stationed

there."

NOSENKO

also told her that he was acquainted with stator of the

echapublishing house in London.**

When NOSENKO became too

persistent in his atteutions, the socretary reported the contact

to her superiors,

was withdrawn

immedlatoly from Switzerland,

and later resigned fron the Foreign Offies.

This same incident also brought NOSENKO to the attention

of the Swiss service,

which later reported it to CIA, without

details, as an attempt on NUSESKU's part to iccrul: the girl.

*Although NOSENKO was described in roports (held by CIA) con-

cerning recruitment approaches to incricans in

Moscow prior to

Is first arrival in Geneva, there was

no basis in those re-

ports

to identify the Soviet described as NOSENKO.

The name

NOSENKO did not appear in these earlier reports.

the 7

was one of NOSENKO's targets during a 1957 trip

to the Soviet Union.

NOSENKO used

the alias NIKOLAYEV in his

contacts with all and, in CIA debriefings, gave this. as the

reason he was forced to use the name NIKOLAYEV in the two trips

he made to London in 1957 and 1959.

by

The secretary knew NOSENKO

true name.

(See Parts V.D.3.d. and V.E.8. for discussion of

---

## Page 33

14-00000

"according-tothig-reportymafrer@.tima.de.sscase.evicent.co

NOSENKO's interest in her was not only sexual,

but also in

inforstion to which she had access in

the course of her duties."

#official in Geneva told CIA that loSenio had definitely

tried

to recruit the

secretary

and that he attempted to outain

"disarmament secrets" from

her.

At his seoond reeting witli CIA on 11 Jure 1962, HOSENKO

described the

same incident, in the context of reporting a pos-

sible KGB penetration of British counterintelligence:

"I decided

to try to take this Englisi girl to bed.

had nothing

to so with work.

No, it was simply (sex)...ind Yuria luriy

GUK, First Chief Directorate officer in Geneval said to me:

Blisten, counterine cirgena."

'Listen, Yura.

because we have people sven in

NOSENKO descrived ine incident

as follows:

"Afte: I had been here a week or two there was a

reception

for members of the delegation and at it I sai

a certain English girl.

Tien RUSK

gave a reception and

she

was there again.

I came to the receptior, she saw me,

and I went up to her.

She said that it was very nice

make my acquaintance, and that's all.

M.S. ROGOV (TSY:BAI)

was there.

He

said

to me:

'Yura, it loos to me lire you

are going

to bed with that girl.'

I. answered:

'What do

you mean, Mikhail Sreanovich?

she just interests

me.'

I hau aiready decided

to try to get her in ics... But,

listen fürther.

After this she used to go to tie Disarma-

ment Conferences.

weii, to ratn it short, I asked this

girl for a rate.

She

is Scuttish, Scottish, not English,

and works in an office.here.

ve agrocd to rees at a

restauräht.

I asxe: my frienas which restarrant here is

the best, where there isn't a crowd. We went to the restaur

rant and

sat there all evening--all alone.

there were just

the

two

of l's.

The restaurant is under the ground and is

called 'Day and Night' in russian,

"jour et liuit.'

We

sat there

and then

she asked me where he could reet again.

A day later we met again.

Again in the restaurant and then

we took a walk.

She got me bothered and then gave me the

brush-off.

I called her once.

She wasn't at home.

called again.

Again

she was

out.

I called a third time.

she wasn't there.

She thought that I was an intelligence

officer ard that I was interested in her for this reason.

This, honestly, wasn't so.

I had only one thing in rind.

She

was quite a woman...But the English girl felt that

she was being developed.

I met three times with her.

Three times we were at the restaurant and

she told them

Ther superiors) this.

She knew that I am Russian.

She

told them this and they (NOSENKO whistled, apparently sig-

nifying that they terminated the relationship) at once.

She knew from the very beginning that I am Russian, from

the very beginning.

In short, I told her a lot of

things--

well, you know-so to get her

walking on. the quay and

I said to her:

into bed. yow

Well, we were

about going

up to your place?'

she answered:

'I can't.'

'Why?' I

said,

'I'll take off my shoes and come on tiptoe.'

She

answered:

'Is it' possible for me to come to you?" I

said:

'You can't come to my place.

There would be a

knock on the door at once.

The Swiss would

tell the

Americans and that would be the end. I can't do this.'

So all I could do was have her next to the parapet.

But

the English felt--and nothing was heard about this, but

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 34

she is no longer here...

She get into trouble and def

Borty"for" her because maybe they have fired her.

Because

they--the Foreign uffice--keep. ooly...

Soeaking honestly.

as a human being, I am concerned that they might Sire

her.

Because there was nothing more to it than this one

thing."

The second

event bringing vostire to special notice occurred

at about the.

sare time that NOSENKO establishod contact with

CIA and may, in fact, have been the incident which be said drove

him to contact David MARK.

On.

15

Jine

1902 /ten days after

NOSENKO approached MARK)

22000

permanent represertative o:24d

the

Ir.

Genera, toid his

host at lurcheon, American

Ambassacor TURbY,

that tho girls

from the Ba-Ta-Clan

club, a strip-teas. bar in Geneva,

had come

to the fit consulate apparently seeking visas.

The girls

had told or

tio sovicts, one about 30 and the other atout 40,

who has visited

the club recently (no date was

provided by lit

According to the girls,

two

i Me said,

the

Soviets

had attenpted to pass themseives off as inericans

and

had

spent.

"hundreds" of francs drinking at the club.

The

name whiche

Megave Anbassador TUBBY for one of these

Soviets "soundes

-ike

LISENKOV." Fron their descriptions,

the

two Soviets were alnost certainly NOSEIO and lis

friend i.K. KIS-

LOV. " At his first meeting with CIA NOSENKO said that a week

and a half earlier he spent 1500 Swiss francs in a single night

of drinking and women with äisLov.

the necessity of repaying

this money,

caken from KGB operational funds, was the immediate

cause of his contact with CIA,

according to NOSENU.

"See Part III.D. for further information on RISLOV.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 35

B.

Keasong

POr NOSENKO's Presence in Geneva (1962 and 1964)

1.

TDY in 1962

When NOSENKD arrived in Geneva for the first time on

10 March 1962, he was listed officially as a Soviet Linistry of

Foreign Affaty's "expout" with the Delegation to the disarmament

talks.

Early durink lits second meeting with CIA on 11 June 1962,

NOSENKO was asked to oxplain precisely why he had been sent out

to Geneva.

de repllud as follows:

"Right now, I cane to pro-

vide counterintellis nce support to the Disarmament Delegation....

There is a special (iGB) department for delegations, a special

one, recently creatoo.

And - the chief

of this departrent is

simultaneously a deputy chief of the (Second Chiefl

He is both chief of the

Directorate.

department and deputy chief of the

directorate so that there will be a person who can be held re-

sponsible it anythink happens.

Understand?

The chief of the

directorate [O.M. GIANOVi hated to sign all sorts of recun-

mendations and

so on, when someone can run off in Belgium or

Wherever he may br.

This happened more than once, and he was

summoned before the ICPSU! Central Committee.

Therefore, he

decided to create a

new position.

The person holding it is

simultaneously chief of the department and deputy chief of the

directorate and personally signs off on all matters concerning

exits | from the USSHl.

This was in order to avoid being called

on the carpet...so that blame would fall not on the chief of

the directorate, but on his deputy, no is in charge of this

department and who signed off...

"This department," NOSENKO continued, "is concerned with

departures abroad, that is, it checks all Soviet citizens who

intend to travel abrond, both alone and as members of delegations.

Since GOLITSYN (deforted] in Finland, we have

an order that no

delegation is to bo lut out without an operational worker, not

a single delegation...

With me it happened as follows:

not planning to 5o.

They told me:

'You are going.'

I said:

'I can't.

I have a noction.

I have 15 people there, all

operating people.

Am I supposed to dump them?

What can I do?'

'No, you are going,'

was the reply.

'And what did the chief

order?' I asked.

The chief [NOSENKO was referring to GRIBANOV

when he spoke of the "chief"'! said:

'GROMYKO is going this

time, the Minister of Foreign Affairs is going, and somebody

on an appropriate lovul must go with him.

Not a case officer.

not a senior case officer, not a deputy, but the chief of a

section, or the deputy chief of a department, or a department

chief.'

Well, I was the nost junior section

chief.

I was

called in to my chiol, my immediate chief, who is concerned

with the Seventh Department.

They had told hin that it would

be for a month

and

on this basis he gave me permission. And

I have been here sinco 10 March."

Later during thie second meeting NOSENKO volunteered that

in addition to his

sccurity officer functions in Geneva, he had

a special

assignment

to check on P.F. SHAKHOV, a senior advisor

to the Soviet Delegation. * SHAKHOV had been noted in contact

*CIA records show that SHAKHOV has served in and visited the

United States on numorous occasions since 1942,

when he was

assigned at the Soviet Consulate General in New York. He

1820

---

## Page 36

with David MARK, belleved by the KGB to be a CIA officer,

NOSENKO reported, and on this basis the KGB suspected that

SHAKHOV might be an American age.t.

NOSENKO described the

various ways he had tested these suspicions in Geneva. He

first gave SHAKHOV disinformation and looked for indications

that he passed it on to American contacts.

Next, SHAKHOV was

told to perform countersurveillance

tasks

during & neeting by

NOSENKO with an imaginary agent, while other KGB officers

checked for signs that SHAKHOV had forewarned the Anericans

about the neeting.

Finally,

NOSENKO revealed to SHAKHOV the

location of a KGB

"dead drop" and checked back five days later

to see whether the specially prepared materials which had been

placed in it had been disturbed in any way.

ROSENKO'S con~

clusion fron all this, he told CIA, was that SHAKHOV was ab-

solutely free of suspicion, and it

was his intontion to report

this finding when he returned to KGB Headquarters.

On later occasions NOSENKO reported that SHAKHOV had

previously served with the Ministry. of Foreign Affairs in the

United States and that duriny this perlod he acted as an agent-

recruiter for the KGB.

In 1966 NOSENKO named one person whom

SHAKHOV had spotted and developed in the United States, for

SHAKHOV, according to NOSENKO,

was not and

never

haa

been a KGB officer.

Asked why SHAKHOV was permitted to

travel abroad when he was suspected of being an Auerican agent,

NOSENKO explained that since SHAKHOV belonged to the Ministry

Of Foreign Affairs, the KGB could do nothing about his trips

abroad.

"There was no proof, only suspicions,"

and furtherrore,

SHAKHOV was a member of the personal staff of the head of the

Soviet Delegation, S.K. TSARAPKIN.

NOSENKO was questioned again about his 1962 assignment to

Geneva during

the February 1965

interrogations.

His answers

were incorporated in a "protocol" which NOSENKO certified as

being correct on 26 February 1965.

The protocol states:

"GRIBANOV had nothing at all to do with my assignment to Geneva

in 1962.

I think that the fitness report written about me for

this trip was signed by[f.D.) BOBKOV, since he was the Deputy

Chief of

the Second Chief Directorate who supervised the

Seventh (Tourist) Department.

I did not personally discuss

this trip with GRIBANOV before my departure from Moscow.

Siy

candidacy for this assignment was supported by (S.G.] BANNIKOV,

the Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, who super-

vised the work of the Eleventh (Soviet Delegations, Department

which had the investigative file on SHAKHOV.

BAVNIKOV was

concerned with the question of who should go as case officer on

editin: si

attended the 1945 Conference on Interrational Organization in San

Francisco, the 1955 Paris Sumnit Conference, and many disarmament

conferences over the years, and he has attended a number of ses-

sions of the UN General Assembly.

Most recently SHAKHOV arrived

1n New York as a merber of the Soviet Mission to the UN in 1963.

The Soviet defectors PETROV and DERYABIN have reported that

SHAKHOV'g face ig lamiliar to them; RASTVOROV identified him

"employee of the

Lisa, however, di

i said that SHAKHOV is "clean, a

ure diplomat'

to his knowledge, SHAKHOV was not en-

gaged in any Soviet Intelligence

active sluree

at that time.

*For further particulars on

see

Part VI. D. 5:

sens:

LOF Storer

---

## Page 37

• 13.

this trip because SHAKHOV, who was suspected of possibly being

a lestern agent, was to be in the delegation.

When the Eleventh

Department was looking for a case officer to rake this trip

they wanted to have a chief of section because of the serious-

ness of the SHAKHOV case.

When they asked in the Seventh

Department (V.D.) CHELNOKOV agreed that I should take the as-

signment.

There was no background or neightorhood investigation

conducted on me in connection with my being approved for this

My assignment was approved by the Eleventh Department,

by the Personnel Office of the

Second Chief Directorate, by

the Central Personnel

office of the KGB and by the Certral

Committee of the CPSU."

NOSENKO was asked why he had been selected to make this

trip immediately after

assuming the duties of the Chief of the

American Tourist Section, on the eve of the tourist season,

and at a time when he had no deputy.

He explained that it

was not thought that the assignment

would last so long, and

CHEL:OKOV, his superior and friend, had decided to le= him go

as a "treat."

During interrogations of October 1966 NOSENKO was ques-

tioned further about his 1962 assignment to Seneva as a security

officer.

He said that in this capacity he would

necessarily

know the identity of all other KGb officers serving with the

Soviet Disarmament Delegation in Geneva.

There were only,

besides himself, the KGB First Chief Directorate Officers M.S.

TSYMBAL and I.S. MAYOROV.

(CIA, however, has tentatively

identified three other delegation members

as KGB staff officers:

A.K. KISLOV, observed in Washington aid in Moscow in what

appears to have been KGB operational

activity; V.G. FILATOV, who

served as an alternate handler in the KGB operation with the

NATO officer Georges PAQUES; and Oleg GRINEVSKIY,

member

of the permanent Soviet Delegation who handled a

double agent during this same conference.)

NOSENKO included

GRINEVSKIY in the list of his own agents

in Geneva in 1962

and said that,

in Moscow, GRINEVSKIY was handled by an offi-

cer of the Intelligentsia

and Correspondents Department of

the Second Chief Directorate.

KISLOV, according to NOSENKO,

was an operational contact in Moscow of the Austria-Germany-

• Scandanavia Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate

and was used in operations against the West German Embassy

there.

NOSENKO also said that KISLOV had been a KGB operational

contact during his earlier tour in the United States but was

neither then nor later a KGB officer.

He characterized FILA-

TOV as a Ministry of Foreign Affairs.official and stated that

he is "definitely not an intelligence officer."

NOSENKO was also requestioned during these interrogations

on his investigation of SHAKHOV.

After saying on the morning

of 19 October 1966 that he had been personally told by the

* NOSENKO has said that in 1960 he was turned down"

for a per-

manent assignment to Ethiopia because of his excessive drink-

(See Part V.E.f.a)

---

## Page 38

14.N B40

Deputy Chief"of the Second Chief Directorate that the SHAKHOT

investigation was the main reason for his assignment to Geneva

1n 1962, NOSENKO later in the day stated:

"My main task was to

check the security of the delegation, plus SHAKHOV. You can't.

separate these tasks. "

In this questioning NOSENKO described the basis for the

suspicions of SHAKHOV, the lack of results from

earlier inves-

tigations, and his own preparation for this assignment.

said that as a representative of the Soviet Delegations De-

partment of the Second Chief Directorate, M.G.

SITNIKOV had

conducted investigations of SHAKHOV in Geneva in 1961, but

SITNIKOV was unable to resolve the questions concerning him.

Because of the

failure of these early efforts, the KGB decided

to send "a senior guy" to the Disarmament talks in 1962, and

NOSENKO was chosen "to finish things up." Betore leaving Mos-

cow in larch 1962, NOSENKO therefore discussed the SHAKHOV

case with. SITNIKOV and with one (fnu) LYALIN, the Soviet Dele-

gations Department officer in charge of the

SHAKHOV case; he

elso read various materials on the case,

including an investi-

gative plan drawn up by LYALIN.

NOSENKO's description of these

preparations provided the basis for the questioning which

followed:

Question: Why was SHAKHOV under suspicion in June 1962?

NOSENKO:

He was working with different delegations at

different conferences and, being in Geneva,

it was noticed that there

was something which

can he described as a connection with David

MARK, who was considered a ClA officer.* Also,

little, little, little things before.

Question:

When did SHAKHOV and MARK first meet? How did

NOSENKO:

it begin?

In '60 or '61 there was a contact with MARK.

I don't remember who reported it.

The report

was maybe from SITNIKOV in Geneva. MARK was

known to the Second Chief Directorate as the

Rezident [CIA Chief of Station] in Moscow.

Arter Moscow he went to Geneva, and it was con-

sidered he must be the Rezident in Geneva.

All the KGB officers going there were told to

pay attention to him:

Question:

What about the report?

NOSENKO:

Maybe the officers saw the two going to the

toilet. Maybe there was a contact.

The file

said "maybe." I was sent to Geneva to carry

*As stated earlier, MARK was not a CIA officer in Moscow,

although he did perform certain clandestine tasks for CIA.

He

had no CIA missions in Geneva in 1962.

Within the context of

discussion of NOSENKO's security officer duties during October

1966, NOSENKO was asked to name any CIA officers he knew to be

present in Geneva during the 1962 disarmament talks. MARK waS

the only one he cited.

TSP GRU

434-

---

## Page 39

out

measures to check...

There mere many little,

littlo things.

MARK maybe turaed his head a.

certain way when SHAKHOV was talklog.

(s.4.1

GOLUBEY, formerly of the fourteenth [Counterin-

tell'gence] Department, was in the Soviet Dale-

gation with SHAKliOV.*

He noticed little details.

Then the officers in the United States decided

to terminate SHAKHOV (as an agent, they wrote

& report on hin which

said he ras liking life

in the U.S.--Amerdean products, money.

He was

pictured

as not good

and, in addition, he was

not wanting to work as an agent.

2. The 1964 TDY

NOSENKO '6 1964 trip to Geneva,

conmencing on 19 January, was

also in the capacity of security officer with the Soviet Dis-

armament Delegatlon.

He said

he was the unly security officer

for the group, which consisted of about 25 persons, and again

he was officially listed as an "expert."

NOSENKO reported that

he had three or

four agents within the delegation and an equal

number of opurational contacts.

The only person whom he was

instructed to watch in particular

waS A.A.

TKACHEY,

an inter-

preter, who had travelled to Austria ir 1960 ard 1961 and who,

the KGB had noted, was in the habit of going about by himself.

Other than this, according to NOSENKO, his responsibilitles

were general in nature.

NOSENKO explained during the February 1965 interrogations

how he was selncted for this ThY.

The protocol he signed on

26 February 1965 states:

"GRIBANOV haC

absolutely nothing to

do with my assignment to Geneva in 1964.

The fitness report

on me for this trip was signed by [F.D.) BOBKOV.

For the 1964

trip no decision of approval of the Central Committee of the

CPSU was required for me or for any other members of the dele-

gation who had been approved for the 1962 trip.

personal wish to make this trip in 1964 and I had discussed the

question with (V.D.) CHELNOKOV even in 1963 and had received

his agreement.

I had also talked about this with (M.V.l

KHLOBUSTOV. and (G.| PANCHENKO [both of the Soviet Delegations

Department).

After it had been decided that I would go,

in

about the beginning of January 196%, (N.I.) ZHARIKOV, the Chief

of the Department,

suggested

that a case officer might not be

required with this delegation.

KHLOBUSTROV, PANCHENKO, and

[A.G.| KOVALENKO [Chief of the Tourist Department and NOSENKO'S

immediate supervisor supported me for the assignment as a

personal favor to me."

With regard to GRIBANOV's knowledge of

his assignment to Geneva this second time, NOSENKO said that he

feared that if GRIBANOV learned about the TDY he would have said,

-"What, again?" and would not have permitted him to go.

for this reason that NOSENKO did not discuss the trip

with GRI-

BANOV, he said, and he did not believe that GRIBANOV, in fact,

knew

anything about it.

*GOLUBEV was also identified by

sou first Chief Directo-

rate counterintelligence officer.

According to Coathe was

one of several KGB officers forced to leave the United States

in 1964 because he wag well

known to NOSENKO.. There 1s no re-

cord in CIA files that GOLUBEV has ever been to Switzerland.

---

## Page 40

c.

Motivationg and Intentions of NOSENSO

l' Introduction

NOSENKO has not indicated that his professional status 1n

his standard of living in the Sovlet Union, or his

tamily lite prompted his to volunteer to merican Intelligence

in 1962 and to defcct to. the United States in 1.964.

He initially

told CIA that he had been unusually successful during his ten-

year carcer as a KGB counterintelligence officer; his closest

friends and the people whon he adnired most were members of the.

KGB; he enjoyed his work.

The NOSENKO fandly held a high social

position, and their econonic situation

was "luxurious by Soviet

standards."

NOSENKO described his family life as close and

harmonious.

He spoke with fondess

and pride about nis

two

daughters,

of his wife's tolerance

and understanding, of the

companionship she gave him.

He expressed love and a

sense of

responsibility for his widowed sother, who heavily depended

upon him after the death. of his father in 1956.

The

elder

NOSENKO won his son's adulation for having worked his way up

from an apprentice pipefitter in a shipyard to the position of

Soviet Minister of

Shipbuilding.

The NOSENKO name is honored

in the home town of Nikolayevsk, where the shipyard has been

retamod for the former minister and where a statue of him has

been erected in the town square.

By his own account, NOSENKO

thus had had a rewarding home life and a successful and enjoy-

able career in the KGB.

2. Collaboration in 1962

At the outset in 1962, NOSENKO said he wanted to limit his

reports to two items of information.

Before the first meeting

with CIA was over, he went beyond these two items to give de-

tails on the KGB Second Chief Director.te and nther operations,

and he offered to meet again.

(Four more meetings ensued in

1962, with NOSENKO providing additional information on the KGB.)

He would not defect, NOSENKO said, unless his personal safety

was endangered by the KGB.

Motivations in coming to American

Intelligence,

according to NOSENTO, were his financial emergency

in Geneva and his disaffection for

the Soviet regime.

a. Readiness to Report to CIA

During his 9 June neeting with David MARK, NOSENKO said he

realized, even before talking to representatives of Anerican

Intelligence, that they would not be satisfied with the two

items of information alone--he expected them to insist on more.

He was introduced by MARK to a CIA case officer later the same

day, and at the start of the meeting, the following dialogue

took place:

NOSENKO:

I am not planning to be your agent...

Case

Officer:

you in Moscow.

No. No...

As you have said,

aman intelligence officer

as are you.

•And

I think that we will understand

one another.

NOSENKO:

You want to place our relationship on an agent

basis.

12 ANCE

---

## Page 41

"17:

Case

01f1cer:

NOSENKO:

Of course.

Case

Officer:

NOSENKO:

Case

Officer:

NOSENKO:

Never in my life I will go in contact (ith

CIA| in Moscow or the USSR, never in my life.

I also know about Langelle and POPOV;* 1 know

this matter. When it was abroad it was fine,

but when you decided to meet him in loscow...

You want more than I came with the intention

of saying.

You want to change this to a long-

term relationship.

Understand

me. I am now

the chief of a section.

Before my departure

(from Moscow) a decision was being reached--

and I have just spoken with my wife in Yoscow--

I am

supposed to become the deputy chief of a

department.

Do you understand what this is?

Why are you telling me this?

Because I wanted to come [to CIAl only for a

business

deal, to give you these two cases,

to receive money for this, and that's all.

Goodbye. Perhaps, sometime, when I come

abroad, we will meet one another and perhaps

I will

give you someth. g.

God knows.

But

I don't want ti do this now.

I don't want

to and I am not prepared within myself for this...

I am biving two interesting cases.

The most

interesting ones.

I say to you honestly, the

two most interesting ones.

in the first of

them l'ANDREY"**), I took no part.

In the second

(BELITSKI'***| I took part, even

here.

I want you to understand that these two matters

that you spoke to dr. MARK about are of great

importance to us.

But I don't have to tell you

that.

You know that.

But we are not going to

play like children. You know perfectly well

that it is worth every franc...

What I want

to tell you is this:

of course I will ask you

more, and of course i want to know as much as

you know. If you refuse to answer, that's your

business.

I will tell what I am able to tell. What I

know, I will tell.

Of course, you ycmself

understand that there are things concerning our

internal system that I cannot report to you.

You yourself understand this.

*The compronise of the CIA source in the GRU, P.S. POPOV, 1s

discussed in Part VI.D.7.a.

**The case of "ANDREY," the KGB cryptonym for the agent Dayle

SMITH, is discussed in Part VI.D.3.b.

***BELITSKIY, a KGB-controlled double agent, is discussed in

Part VI.D.6

Ter

---

## Page 42

nkhen.khe.cIA.OfELCer.Bald

he understood NOSENKO had

been The the eG ance chortly atter the vat, NOSENO, vIthout

further prompting, gave a detailed statenent of his own personal

past and his professional career. In tilis statement he described

his education, his service in the GRU, his entry into the KGB

and generally

the functions and operating techniques of the

various components of the KGB Second Chief Directorate in which

he had served, along

with the inclusive dates of his service

in each.

This account

was very similar to that given MARK

earlier

in the day.

still without prompting, he discussed

several specific KGB operations against Americans inside the

Soviet Union, one involving the recruitment of a Yale University

professor on

the basis of homosexual compromise and the other

an unsuccessful attempt to recruit an American code cleif.

NOSENKO said he was personally involved in both cases.*

The question of his further assistance was then raised

again:

The CIA officer asked NOSENKO to tell more about the

Yale

professor, but NOSENKO demurred, stressing that the agree-

ment involved only two pieces of information and ignoring the

fact that he had already given

considerably more:

NOSENKO :

I have told you enough for this day, and I will

tell you only these two cases which I wanted to

tell you, and it is enough for this day.

Case

How do you imagine that this is enough? You

Officer:

know that we work much the same way.

NOSENKO: Yes.

Case

Officer:

NOSENKO:

You know what interests us, of course.

I know it.

Today I gave only two things.

Let's meet one

another (again).

Case

Officer:

Good. But let me say this: What you tell me

Is.your business.

I am not going

to try to

bring any pressure at all...There is no argu-

ment about it.

see us in Moscow, am not going to say:

'Please

I don't want to see you

in Moscow because it's too difficult.

It is

completely impossible. That's it.

No more on

that subject.

NOSENKO:

I said to David (MARK] before meeting you that

I don't want to meet anyone anymore, not anyone.

Case

All right. Agreed.

Officer:

NOSENKO:

In another place. I don't know whether I will

come back here in a month or not...I personally

don't want to, either,

because my wife will be

moaning at home.

But I am afraid they will make

me come, because I know the delegation. I know

•Richard BURGI and Joseph MORONE, see Parts V.D. at this time.

and V.E.3.c.,

respectively.

NOSENKO did not supply the names

TOP SECRET

Milies,

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## Page 43

t"":

•23004

In that case we can meet.

Case

You know that I would not bring any pressure.

Officer:.

That's something we understand because we are

both in this businass.

You and I are in the

same business, so you can't--

NOSENKO:

Let me interrupt.

Why are we bargaining so

now? so that I will say something. more to

you. I said: 'Let's meet again.'

Maybe I

will tell

(more).

Now I will

give you only

these two items because we have made a deal.

I will tell you about these two cases.

Let's

meet again,

if you insist.

I understand that

you want more.

Well, I will think a bit about

what I know.

That's all right.

Case

Officer:

NOSENKO:

We can meet when I am abroad perhaps... You must

understand

This has not come to

me simply.

I had time

to think for a long time. I thought

for a long time.

You see, it's very difficult

for me, very difficult for me.

ind after I go

it will also be very difficult for me.

Case

Officer:

But you knew that when you came. Why did you

come

to us?

Why to the American rezidentura

(CIA Station) and not to the British?

NOSENKO:

I came here because you are strong, strong..

You don't have to explain to me.

i know what

makes

me go.

•I told you it is hard for me.

I still need to think.

That's all.

But I

can no longer take a step back because the step

forward has already been taker.

I won't re-

fuse if we meet before my departure.

If you

like, on Monday, on Tuesday,

any day.

Monday

is better for me.

Not Sunday, because I have

to be there with my own (peoplel.

This exchange was followed by a lengthy description of the two

leads which NOSENKO had come to sell; the BELITSKIY and the

"ANDREY" cases.:

As NOSENKO was about to leave this first meeting, his case

officer asked when they might meet again.

NOSENKO suggested

that they meet two days later, on Monday, around noontime as

it would be easier for him to get away unnoticed at lunchtime.

He then said that the case officer was probably trying to get

everything down on tape and asked that this be stopped because

of the risk to his security resulting from such a permanent re-

cord of their conversations.

NOSENKO said:

"I will not tell

you. anything particularly.interesting.

But I can tell you some-

thing.

But not today. I can tell how LANGELLE blew POPOV--not

LANGELLE, but because of whom and why we found him--for your

future use,

so that you will know how to operate.

But LANGELLE

was not guilty.

It was not LANGELLE who was guilty.

Another

person was responsible for the compromise.

Next time."

TOP SECRET

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## Page 44

or of the degree of this cooperation was never raise aga n.

"It" the very start of the second westing, an "i teno, he paids

*I am tortured all the tire by a single thought.

pao do and i wait a the end

Everything

The slightest careless move

end of me." Although he

sometimes voiced moral compunctions, from this point on NOSENKO

expressed his primary personal concern as being his own secur

rity vis-a-vis the KGB.

D...

Attitude Toward Defection

While willing to meet with CIA representatives during

future trips outside the soviet Union, which ie estimated would

occur about once a year, NOSENKO in 1962 refused to corsider

defection except in circumstances where his

would be endangered.

His devotion to his wife

the probability that the kGs would take reprisals against

if he fled were, he said, the primary considerations

refusal.

(Without elaborating or the reasons, NOSENKO said on

another

occasion that he would not want to leave the U'SSR even

on a permanent KG3 assignment and accompanied by his family.)

Other considerations included his widowed mother's dependence

on him and his love of Russia and the Russian people, as opposed

to the regime.

For these reasons, NOSENKO said, he could not

defect as PETROV, GOLITSYN, and KHOKLO! had sone.

c. Motivation

NOSENKO told David MARK on 9 June 1962 that he wanted to

contact American Intelligence because he was in trouble over

the loss of KGB opcrational

funds, for which he had to account

prior to his imminent departure for the Soviet Union.

career would be ruined if he was caught misusing this money,

NOSENKO added, and because he had nowhere else to turn, he was

willing to sell two items of information to Mark.

The

amount

needed to cover the loss was 900 Swiss francs, or about $210,

and this was the price asked for the information.

NOSENKO's statements of motivation to his CIA case officers

during subsequent meetings are given below:

9 June 1962: In his first meeting with a CIA officer NO-

SENKO. asked whether MARK had relayed the reasons why he wanted

to meet with American Intelligence.

He then very briefly re-

peated what he had told MARk concerning the loss of his opera-

tional funds.

The case officer remarked that there must be

something more to it, upon which NOSENKO said that this was not,

in fact, his main motivation:

"I have been working in this

business' for a long time and I know what I an doing.

I have

heard more than is written lin the newspapers!.

reorganization

has been started in the USSR.

In short,

they have begun to do

away with the ministries and the sovnarkhozy.

But this is pre-

mature.

Right now our agriculture is falling apart at the seams

and our industry

is at the point of collapse because this re-

organization,

this innovition, is too early.

And this is not

just me, a young man, talking.

I mingle with ministers, with my

father's friends, and I hear what they are saying..: And how much

does a worker earn?: 600-800 rubles in old money, now 60-80.

And he doesn't sense any improvement lin his position] within the

total population.

These are

empty words only.

We have exceeded

the United States in per capita production of butter and milk.

But how can it be said that we have surpassed you when they are

TOP SECRET

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## Page 45

poH.raising.thapilcastor.buttaityou-knowyou-feetthta

internal resentment

(nadion), and you feel that some big mistakes

have been permitted, fint management as a whole is sonehow off

on the wrong track.

Also, look at the serious situation in

Czechoslovakia now, in Germany--in the GDR.

It is very seïious.

In Poland they have jut had a poor harvest. Everywhere there

they have had floods.

These rains are also very settous. It

means that the systein, the whole socialist system cannot (cope?--

one word on the tape cannot be distinguished herel.

DO YOU

understand what is wrong?

in the future is being lost.

Why have I told you this! Because under other circumstances

perhaps I would not have come to

this. So this is the reason

for what has happened to me.

This is

perhaps the incident that

drove me into contact with you. It all somehow grew within me.

God knows.

11 June 1962: During the second meeting, NOSENKO himself

raised the issue of motivation.

His case officer had just said

that CIA would respect his wishes in connection with a particu-

lar request when NOSENKO said:

"Speaking of respect, how can

there be respect? I dun't even respect myself for what I have

But, but, take the press bulletin, the communique of

the Summit

Conference in Moscow on various questions.

lies, lies, lies,

can't see

to show that we have had great successes.

them (the successes).

No, excuse me, I know somewhat

more than the rank and file Soviet man because I work

I can see what is being done and what is not being done.

more lies.

This was my mood.

I say, 'How much is it pos-

sible to deceive the people, the soviet peopie?

How far can

you go?'

Our people are very poor.

It is somewhat difficult

to arouse a people such as this.

If we stir ourselves up we

will know how to stand up for ourselves.

But I feel for my

people.

How often can you say that things will be good; how

often can you say that

we have achieved big successes?

Where

are they?

Show me them.

I can

see no trace of them.

This is

what I say...that there

is resentment in my soul.

Do you under

stand?

A terrible resentment.

I love my country. You may

say

that this is nothing.

But I tell you that I cannot act like

GOLITSYN, like KHOKLOV, like PETROY, because I want to be there.

I want to be with my

fanily.

That's all.

But I feel that not

only the government is making mistakes. I feel that there are

faults throughout the entire system of socialism.

What I mean

is that things are bad in Czechoslovakia, things are bad in Po-

land, things are bad with KADAR (in Hungaryl, they are starving

in China.

This means that there are great mistakes.

well,

that's all.

What did you want

to ask me, please?"

At the close of this meeting, NOSENKO stressed that money

was unimportant as a motive for a

continuing relationship:

"My

name must not be used anywhere, even in your offices.

Understand?

It would be the end of me.

I am not afraid of this.

The devil

with them. Because I have had such a life.

I lost my father,

everything.

Why do I say this?

I did not come to you simply

because I

money. I don't need it.

I came because.I am

resentful inside.

Do you understand this internal resentment?

I do not believe, in what is being done.

I do not believe in

this.

Listen to

Let me speak honestly.

Have I not had the

chance to live as a person should? My father was a big man.

had a dacha and a state-owned automobile.. I have my own Volga

[automobile).

My mother was given a dacha for life.., It's.

luxurious.

Her apartment is enormous--150 square meters.

America this is nothing, but for Moscow this is enormous.

..TOP SECRET

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## Page 46

Athays_had.alato.noney-especially.during.-the katana.salasy..

of 15,000 or 20,000-p1u8--25,000.

There was much money.

a rich woman.

She has paintings by Ayvazovskly, Makovskly. Even

if she had insufficient money, she could always

sell her posses..

What do. I want to say? That I've never wanted for money.

Never...As I said, perhaps

the thing which drove me to you was not

money, but this great, great resentment."

14 June 1962:

The subject of motivation was not discussed

curing the third and fourth

about to leave the Geneva safehouse after the fifth and final

session,

however. NOSENKO again touched on the economic inequi-

ties existing

inside the Soviet Union and raised a new reason for

cooperating with CIA, his basic sympathy for the American people.

NOSENKO said that he Icalized that the reason he

given for

coming to us, his need for money, was "not good."

officers parted, NOSENKO said, he wanted to em-

phasize "without attempting to justify himself" that he had

"always felt a certain sympathy toward the American people." He

explained that it was not the technical progress of the United

States which attracted him, nor was it the high standard of

living of the Americar people.

It was rather the openness and

directness with which the Americans whom he had met and seen

handled thenselves.

As examples he cited his American targets

in Moscow and Secretary of State Dean RUSK, whom he had seen in

Although NOSENKO did mention the difficult economic situa-

tion in the USSR on a tew other occasions, he did not relate

these remarks specifically to his motives for volunteering to

The above excerpts are representative of his total state-

3. Decision to Defect (January 1964)

On arrival for his first meeting with CIA during the second

Geneva phase, on 24 January 1964, NOSENKO said that after long

and careful consideration since the 1962 meeting series.

he had

decided to defect.

along the same lines as during earlier meetings, but his immedi-

ate motivation seemed to have nothing to do with this:

explained that he had recently been promoted to the position of

First Deputy Chief of the Seventh (Tourist) Department of the KGB

Second Chief Directorate, and that because of the stature and

responsibilities of his new job, there would be fw opportunities,

if any.

for him to visit the west in the future.

had decided to seize the opportunity at hand and to flee to the

United States at once, leaving his family behind.' He foresaw no

possibility of his wife and children being permitted to leave the

USSR for the "next twenty years."

hardest thing is to part with my family." He had, however, care-

fully considered their fate as the close relatives of a defector,

nd he knew that, because of his mother's position in Soviet so-:

ciety, no harm would come to them.

Whereas NOSENKO declared his intent to defect immediately,

the CIA case officers at this first meeting in 1964 persuaded

him to remain in place for at least two of three weeks on the

grounds that,

first, CIA would benefit much from this; and

second, arrangements for his transfer to and reception in the

United

States would have to be coordinated in advance with CIA

Headquarters.

TEr. SECRET

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## Page 47

During this first meeting NOSENKO made no monetary request

of CIA and asked only for reasonable assurance of a secure future

in the United States.

In this cornection, he said, he would

prefer to act as a ClA consultant, particularly or counterintel-

ligence matters because he was

specialist in

this field; he

would be able to give CIA leads and assistance in spotting and

recruiting other Soviets.

The next five meetings with NOSENKO were devoted exclusively

to debriefings on the activities of the K3B Second Chief Direc-

torate.

Althoigh his impending defection was mentioned, his

reasons for taking this step were not discussed.

In the mean-

time, NOSENKO's first CIA handler Elew to washington for dis-

cussions regarding the defection and, on his return, told

NOSENKO that the

CIA leadership had asked why,

specifically,

NOSENKO had decided

to come

to the United States at that time.

The answer was that NOSENKO, "aiter coming back and seeing that

there was no more chance to

come to the liest, or little more

chance," felt that this was his one opportunity to come and make

his life with the Americans.

Therefore, he was going to seize

the opportunity while he had it.

Askes

about this, NOSENKO con-

firmed that

this was his

reason,

and added:

"I may never have

another chance, and in addition,

I've had sufficient time since

our last meeting here in Geneva !1962) to weigh everything and to

consider everything."

Later in this same meeting, NOSENKO again

mentioned his lack of interest in money ans his

feelings about

deserting his family:

"I understand (that it will be difficult

to adjust to a new life in Anerical and know

that for some time

I will be sick within.

And I know that a certain period of

time must elapse before this can heal. I ever spoke to you

bluntly about ny (financiall security.

I am absolutely un-

mercenary and have never had any appreciation for money

wealth...My most difficult and sorest spot of all is my family.

This is the nost basic and most difficult spot of all.

know perfectly well that I must go through an

illness over

this.

For this the only and the best doctor is time.

I don't

expect to have

a new family there.

Of course, I don't know--

but at least I'm speaking from the way I feel

now.

I have a

strong liking

for children--not only

for my

own,

but for all

children and, losing my own, I

am

fully conscious how I must

suffer through this.

In time I will get used to it.

I know

one can get used to almost anything."

At this meeting, NOSENKO agreed to remain in place for

approximately another week, and

tentative date of 8 Febru-

ary was selected for the defection.

NOSENKO's motives for the defection were not. mentioned

for five more meetings. Then, on 4 February 1964, he telephoned

the Geneva safehouse to say he wanted to defect at once.

AỊ-

riving shortly thereafter, he announced that he had been or-

dered to return to Moscow

the following day and,

therefore, had

to leave Switzerland before morning.

He stated his reasons

formally in an asylum request, written at the time:

This decision was made by me, not now, at the

moment I write this I quest, but several years ago.

Having worked for many

years in the kgB and knowing

nore than the average

joviet citizen about the policy of

the Soviet government, about the direction which this

government has chosen

to take, and about the law and

order in the USSR, I have come to the decision that

TOF S03-&1

---

## Page 48

Live in this country and wosk for the welfare of

this goverment.

4. The letter of July 1954

The most complete explanation given

by NOSENKO of his

motives for first contacting clA and'later delecting to the

United States is contained in a letter to his CIA case officer

in July 1964:

He described this letter as "an exposition of

all those

reasong and roct causes which led to the decision

to leave the soviet Union" and

further explained that "every-

thing put down here is lacking in a whole series of lesser

details which to a greater or lesser degree played their

role."

Nevertheless,

he said, he had tried in this letter

"to set down the main things to show how, when, and why the

decision was born,

grew,

and hardened within me to completely

alter the course of my

life."

This letter is preserted below

in its entirety.

Most of the biosiaphical and operational

details mentioned in the letter are covered separately in other

parts of this paper.

"l.

My life, my childhood and youth passed in

very comfortable circumstances since the position of

my father gave us the opportunity to live without lacking

for anything. And the only difficult periods of my

life (before

the death of my father) were:

study in

the naval schools in kuybyshev, Baku and Leningrad;

and the beginning of my working life, the perios in

the Far East (1950-1952) •

The opportunity to be

always well-dressed, to have a sufficient amount

of money,

to have my own car, to be able to use the

car given me by my family and also my father's car,

the opportunity to travel to the South and to vaca-

tion in the best sanitariums,

dachas, and so forth;

all this unquestionably left its mark on me and be-

came something of a habit.

After the death of y

father, my successful progress in my work gave me a

higher

salary,

and although I did not have all that

which I had while my father was alive,

still I did not

experience any serious difficulties.

But already I

wanted to live still better.

"2. Up to 1953, over the course of my entire

life--at school,

in

the Institute, at work, at home

in the family--it was

always pounded into my head

that STALIN was a great genius, that he was good, keen,

etc., and the thought never occurred to me to question

his words or his deeds because everything that he

said, and everything he did, were completely axiomatic.

The arrestsand trials only involved traitors and it

was considered and explained that the people who

suffered innocently, especially in 1937 and 1938,

suffered only because at the head of the NKVD in 1937,

1938, was the betrayor of the people YEZHOV.

Not

even

the shadow of doubt fell on the name of STALIN.

Soon after STALIN's death in 1953 I read a certain

document given me by my father.

This was

a secret

letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU on the

"case of the doctors;" it was not addressed to all

communists but only to members and candidate members

of the Central Committee.

I was deeply shaken by this

letter which described in detail how these people.

:2-141

T8r, SENIST

---

## Page 49

Important spectalists in the field of medicine, were

brought to such a condition that they condemned then-

selves; that is, they corfessed to things which had

never happened, to things which they had never done.

They were

sirply forced to give the evidence which was

needed by the

Investigators: -The secret letters on

the cult of STALIN and müch that I heard is the KGB

about the reign of STALIN, all this left its mark and

forced me to think deeply

about the real truth and to

look at everything more critically.

Already I no

longer had faith

in all those ideas which for years

had been pressed into my head.

"3.

The new leaders (KHRUSICHEV and Company)

used the same

methods but already diluted with the

water of democracy, with playing up to the people

and

attempts to convince them that a new era would

arise, a new

and better lifc, and that now the Party

was always

going to concern itself with the welfare

of the people.

In fact,

it was a struggle for power

and the use of all means in this struggle, even

microphones

they listened to the conversations of

BERIYA and nis friends; later they listened to the

conversations of MOLOTOV, MALENKOV, KAGANOVICH, and

others). KHRUSHCHEV's endless blabbing about suc-

cesses,

when in fact

they didn't exist, the figures

about how

the USSR had. passed the USA ir. the produc-

tion of butter and milk, when in the stores they were

available only infrequently.

The endless promises

of a better life when

in fact nothing of the sort is

taking place.

All this similarly forced me to re-

evaluate not

only the events which were taking place

in the country, but already the entire ideology of

the Party, its external and internal course.

"4.

The events in Novocherkassk where about 20,000

to 25,000 people rose up and the way in which this

popular indignation was suppressed by troops with many

casualties.

This also made a deep impression on me.

When I was resting in the summer of 1961 in Nikolayev,

from my relatives--my father's brothers--I understood

well the real relation of the workers both to the

leadership and to the Party as a whole.

At the same

time I saw how the workers really lived, how they eat,

what they have and what they san buy with their wages.

"5. I heard a great deal from my father about

the domestic policies of KHRUSHCHEV in regard to the

development and the course of constructior in industry,

about his complete illiteracy in engineering techno-

logy and industrial economics, about incorrect deci-

sions in regard to many industries, and this was not

only the opinion of my father, but also of other impor-

tant leaders in various fields of industry (MALYSHEV,

VANNIKOV, AKOPOV, and others). But no one dared to

open his mouth and when in December 1955 my father

tried, as an engineer, to prove that a certain deci-

sion would be incorrect, he received such a rebuff

from KHRUSHCHEV. that he was profoundly shaken and in

the opinion of my mother this brought him to his ill-

ness in. 1956 and his death in August 1956.

TEY STORET

---

## Page 50

"f.*The"events 1n-Germany.and especially..ia.cu

Hungary showed with absolute clarity the bankruptcy

of communist ideology.

What was especially important

for me was the fact that in these countries it was

a protest not of individuals or groups,

but of the

entire people who could no longer indure a regime

imposed on them by force.

Here it is necessary to

emphasize that the life

of the people in these coun-

tries was much better than that of

the people in the

USSR (I saw for myself how people live in Czecho-

slovakia, in Germany, and beyond any doubt they live

better than the entire people of the Soviet Union).

"7.

The split of the international communist

movement became for me a clear fact and confirmed

my opinion that the theory of communism is a theory

built on sand and that it is practiced according to

the needs of the leadership of the Party at a given

stage of life and that in reality full material wel-

fare would never be enjoyed by the people but chly

by the leadership and the Party and

the government.

"8.

working in the KGB I

came to understand

much ard became conscious of the contradiction between

the internal and external course of the USSR.

Such

questions as disarmament, the ban on atomic weapons, the

position of the USSR in the United Nations--all these

are used only in the interest of propaganda and as

a screen for carrying out of the policies needed by

the cormunist party.

(I was myself present at the

negotiations in Geneva and saw

the

'politics' of the

Soviet delegation.

"9.

My trips abroad opened my eyes wide to the

true reality.

With my own eyes, I saw how people

live, how much they earn,

how they can dress ind live

on their wages, and I paid special attention to the

life of ordinary people and not to that of scientists,

engineers, etc.

And all the propaganda about the

enormous armies of unemployed in the countries

of the

West, about the

'heavy exploitation', and the

•un-

believably dificult life' flew immediately out of

my head.

And that which I met with in my work, the

sending of Soviet citizens abroad--who gets sent where

and how, etc.--this finally debunked this propaganda.

Many of my acquaintances--GUK, CHURANOV and others--

think back with great pleasure about life abroad.

"10.

I entered the KOMSOMOL completely without

thinking about it.

time came, the right age, and

I became a Komsomolnik like all the others. It was

different in regards to the Party: I joined the Party

in 1956 after the death of STALIN and while I was

working in the KGB and already at that time there was

a lack of faith and

indecisiveness in me.

My father

continually insisted on this, saying that without the

Party I would never move ahead and would not have

success in life.

But I myself understood and saw

that I would not be able to work in the KGB unless I

Has a member of the Party.. And if I worked somewhere

else, I would truly never move ahead in my career

10 3321462000.

T27 SES JAT

---

## Page 51

unless I entered the Party. Bue from"the very" bes

entry into the Party, I deeply hated

all the Party talmudisr. and dogmatism. All the

Party meetings were literally a torture.

Especially

I became the deputy chief of the section, the

chief of the section, and the deputy chief of the

then I had to speak at these

Because this meant to lie, to twist my

and to attempt to show myself as deeply dedi-

cated

to the Party and its course.

In 1960 my oldest girl's asthmatic attacks

The question of a change of climate

was raised.

At that time the SCD needed to send

officer to

Ethiopia for two to three years to conduct

counterintelligence work among the Soviet specialists

great deal of effort to personally

GRIBANOV into letting me

The Party

references had been confirmed, all the questionnaries

were already filled out, the photos had been

submitted;

that is, all the formalities had been accomplished.

But at the very last moment the Central Personnel of

AGB began to protest against my going with my

family to Ethiopia.

the reason

for this was that from

the house check made at my place of residence they

received information that I sometimes came nome in

a drunken condition and on this ground had quarrels

with my wife.

A tour abroad with my family was neces-

because of the health of my daughter (since 1963

the illness has become better!

and also it would

have been advantageous

fron the financial point of

From this time on

I understood

that Personnel

would not let me go abroad with my family.

"12.

Knowing many officers in the FCD, I began

to understand

that being sent abroad is entirely

determined, not by knowledge,

experience in work and

success, but only by the absolute

'cleanliness' of

the person's autobiography and complete assurance as

to his limitless dedication to the Party and the

government.

But not only being sent abroad but the

assignment

of personnel in the First and Second Chief

Directorates and the entire KGB depends on the reasons

indicated by me and also on good

relations with the

leadership and good connections with workers in Central

Personnel.

I lived about 11 years with my wife and our

life was not a hell.

It is true that there were

quarrels and basically they boiled down to the fact

that she took an extremely unfavorable attitude to-

wards my delays at work and also when I would be de-

layed with some of my friends and acquaintances after

work and would

come home with a few drinks under my

Of course, I loved and love'my children and only

the fact that they are taken

of financially until

they grow up and have received an education to some

extent consoled me in

taking the decision to leave

what do I have in nind when I speak of financial

security?

After the death of my father, the family

received a large monetary allowance, plus the money

didend sis

and tease don tri dinal e

31

---

## Page 52

that my mother had saved and valuable property, etc.

My nother many times offered to divide all this in

three parts:

for me, my brother, and for her, but I

suggested that we not do this before her death. And,

of course, my mother will not leave my children without

attention, and my share of the property and the money

will be given to my children.

"14. If the defections of PETROV, FASTVOROV and

DERYABIN passed without evoking any particular

thoughts,

the defection to the United States of GOLIT-

SYN, whom I had heard of as an intelligent person and

a capable officer, undoubtedly

caused me to think

very deeply.

Because to act thus,

it is necessary

to have not only boldness and decisiveness, but also

great. strength of will.

And already I put to myself

the question, will I be able to act thus in view of

the dissatisfactions and disillusionments which had

accumulated inside of me?

"15.

Being in Geneva in 1962,

not long before

my departure I myself of my own desire entered into

contact with you.

The reason for this was the loss

of money received by me for operational expenses.

I

would have been unable to accumulate such a sum of

money before my departure and there was nobody to

borrow from

lat this time GUk was ninself in finan-

cial difficulty

and at the same time he was already

preparing for his return home).

To

tell the truth

about the loss of the money would have meant that it

would be necessary to explain where and in what cir-

cumstances it had been lost.

This would have risked

expulsion

from the KGB and a serious reprimand from

the Party.

Not to tell the truth,

to think up some

sort of a story--they wouldn't believe, and worst of

all, they might think that I had appropriated the

money, that is,

stolen it.

And this would be for me

the worst of all and I would, of course, in such

event have told the truth.

"16.

To tell the truth,

it was only after my

return home from Geneva in 1962 that I gradually, not

immediately, began fully to realize all the seriousness

of my contact with you and its full meaning.

And

although I did not give you ary promises or assurances

about our continued contact in the future, I under-

stood that you sooner or later would set yourself the

task of continuing our contact.

And here it was that'

weighing up all the reasons and causes which I have

indicated above that in 1962 I took for myself the

decision to leave the USSR at the first opportunity

and that I started to work towards being sent on a trip

abroad.

"17.

Of course, I wanted to come abroad with some

sort of

'baggage',

that is, with materials which could

be useful and necessary for you.

In this entire period

up to January 1964

I tried to collect information which

would be of the maximum value

for you.

My assignment

-to the position of deputy chief of the Seventh Depart-

ment in July 1962 gave me a greater opportunity than

before..

But

at the same time this assignment almost

---

## Page 53

excluded the possibility of a trip abroad and it was

mly with great difficulty that I was able to got away

for the trip in January. 1964. It was necessary to con-

vince CHELVOKOV and then to ask CHELNOKOV to convince

BOBKOV and in 1963 to convince KOVALENKO.

In this i

advanced many reasons:

that I had not spent all the

money (in foreign currency); that the medicine which

I bought for my daughter had proven very successful

and that I needed to buy some more medicine to carsy

out one more series of treatments; that this trip

would not be a long one and that since I was already

the deputy chief of the Department I would not be able

to travel abroad any more and so, therefore, this trip

would probably be my last.

Of course, all this was

said at convenient moments and outside of work.

Things were easier with the Eleventh Department (which

deals with trips abroad) because I was on good terms

with PENCHENKO who covered Switzerland, besides which

when I came back from Geneva in 1962 I had brought him

a number of presents.

"18.

The publication in 1963 by the foreign press

of the VASSALI case put me on my guard since in the

newspaper Times it said outright that the English

learned about him thanks to the Americans who learned

about VASSALL in the spring of 1962.

Fortunately, the

leadership of the FCD,as I learned from GUK, CHURANCV,

and TARABRIN, came to the conclusion

that here the

Americans had been helped by GOLITSYN.

But at the

same time the FCD was not completely sure of this.

But the publication in the American press of Alsop's

articles on the CIA alarmed me extremely.

This ar-

ticle in one spot said plainly that as far as is known

the KGB does not have any gources in the CIA while at

the same time the CIA has penetrated the KGB.

From

this moment, I do not conceal this fact, I began to

feel afraid

that the KGB would somehow learn of my con-

tact with you.

This article deeply 'interested'

the

KGB.

*19.

During the closed trial of PENKOVSKIY I

got a pass in the Second Department and went in order

to look at him myself.

For sometimes it is enough

to simply look at a man, to see how he holds hiniself

and to hear how he speaks in order to form some sort

of an initial opinion of him.

Personally, I liked how

PENKOVSKIY held himself at the trial; I liked his

ap-

pearance and I understood that everything which had

been said in the KGB about him and the sort of person

they were trying to make him out to be (that he was

morally degraded, that he had descended and sunk into

a swamp) that all this was nonsense, bluff, and chatter.

And PENKOVSKIY,

the same as GOLITSYN, gave

me a feeling

of greater confidence in the correctness of the deci-

sion taken by me to leave the Soviet Union.

26 July 1964

Signed: Yu.

NOSENKO"

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 54

1. Introduction

The extent to which NOSENKO made himself available for

meetings with CIA in Coneva in 1962 and 1964 is reviewed here

in connection with his statements about the KGB duties assigred

to him for these trips, his visits to the KGB Legal Residency,

and his personal association with other Soviets.

NOSENKO was not precise about hor he spent his days and nights

in Geneva, he did indicate that he was his own

disposed

of his time as he saw

and for the most part had little to

At the first meeting with CIA in 1962 he accounted for his

freedom of movement

by saying:

and go as Ipleat

(Ambassador)

ZORIN knows who I am,

almost the

entire delegation knows who I am, because I don't need to pie..

not à Ministry of Foreign Affai:s man

Nobody pays any attention to melat the conference

They know that I

sessions).

I sit, listen,

some papers.

reason I can leave the conference at any

ar i do not come

at all, and no one will say a word to re."

CIA made no attempt

to place NOSENKO under surveillance in 1962 and 1954, and thore

is no evidence from other sources confirming or aisproving

NOSENKO's statements about his activities while away from the

CIA safehouse.

2. Official Duties in Geneva

In 1962 NOSENKO said he was the sole KGB officer in the

94-man Soviet delegation to

the Disarmament Conference and as

such he was responsible for the security and behavior of the

entire delegation.*

assist him in carrying out these security

officer functions, NOSENKO had the services of a number of

coopted informants of the KGB who were serving in the delega-

In addition, NOSENKO had the specific mission of check-

ing on suspicions

attached to one of the delegation members,

SHAKHOV** but ty the time he established contact with CIA,

he said, this assignment had already been completed.

In 1964, NOSENKO said his only operational task then was to

handle the general security

responsibilities for the Soviet

delegation, as he had done

in 1952.

There was no specific

mission such as the one concerning

SHAKHOV in 1962.

NOSENKO has described his investigations of SHAKHOV, but

he has never indicated either that he conducted security checks

of other delegation members in 1962 and 1954, or that he re-

ceived any security-type information (except on SHAKHOV) from

the KGB cooptees who were supposed to be reporting to him.

Likewise, NOSENKO has not said that he prepared communicationg

for KGB Headquarters regarding his clandestine assignments in

Geneva.

3. Visits to the KG3 Legal Residency

Virtually

every day, NOSENKO told CIA in 1962, he went to

the KGB Legal Residency in Geneva, and if he stayed away for

more than a day or two,

the Legal Resident, S. I. GAVRICHEV,

would invariably ask NOSENKO where he had been keeping himself.

I.S. MAYOROV and M.S. ISYMBAL also arrived with the delega-

rion in March 1962 but had left Geneva by the time NOSENKO

contacted CIA.

SHAKOV is discussed further in Part IIi. 3.:.

IS1 SHORES

---

## Page 55

GAVRICHEV, according to NOSENKO, treated him with deference,

and shortly after his arrival in Geneva In March 1962, NOSENKO

gave a lecture on counterintelligence to the assembled members

This lecture was given at GAVRICHEV'S

request, although it was only after some resitation on the part

of the Legal Resident that all of his subordinates were brought

together to heat NOSENKO.

(In return for helping the Legal

Residency to perform counter-surveillance on several occasions,

NOSENKO said, he was sometimes allowed by GAVRICrav to have the

use of an operational car and driver to go shopping and carry

out other private errands.)

Similarly, in 1964, NOSENKO said he was making nearly daily

visits

to the Legal Residency.

During the 1964 meetings NOSENKO

stated that it was his close relationship with M.s. TSYMBAL*

which made it possible for him to have visited the Geneva Legal

Residency so frequently, both in 1962 and 1964.

"According to

the strict rules,

" NOSENKO told CIA.

"an officer in a status

such as mine should not even go to the residency.

In this case

it is only because I am deputy chief of a department and GAV-.

RICHEV knows my position perfectly well fit is not lower than

his), and because I have such a sympathetic personal relation-

ship with TSYMBiL. "

He then went on to say that ISYMBAL "sort

of escorted me to the Residency.

They could have simply said:

"You are here or. a mission, we have our own mission, and we

have rothing in common. ""

not the case, thanks to TSYMBAL's intervention.

4. Association with TSYMBAL

At the secord meeting with CIA in 1962 NOSENKO volunteered

information on TSYMBAL'S KGB background and his current missions

in Geneva,

then alluded to his having spoken with TSYMBAL in

Geneva but without placing any particular emphasis on this

relationship.

In 1964, however, NOSENKO claimed that their relationship

was close,

explained that it was TSYMBAL (again in Geneva at

the same time) wino gained NOSENKO'S admission to the Legal

Residency,

and said that he had twice gone to see ISYMBAL off

on train

trips, once on 24 January when TSYMBAL wert to Bern

and again on 28 January when TSYMBAL left Lausanne for Rome.

NOSENKO told CIr he had been dealing with TSYMBAL since 1960

or 1961. At that time "We were looking over some candidates

for recruitment and came across some whose background would

have made them

suitable for the Special (Illegals) Director-

ate... Then when we came (here) in 1962 for the Disarmament

Conference, I got to know him a little better - more from the

human side. He seemed to take a liking to me for sore reason.

We had met in Moscow before, of course, but just in the hall:.

or in the dining room.

He used to say:

'Stop in and see me,'

and I would answer: 'Well, it's kind of awkward for me to

hang around the Special Directorate - what am I supposed to be

doing here?' He would say: 'Oh, comeon, stop in. ' But I

5eh901°

TSYMBAL appeared in Geneva under the last-name alias

"ROGOV" and was identified by NOSENKO as Chief of the

Illegals Directorate, KGB First Chief Directorate. Since

1956, TSYMBAL was known by CIA to be the true name for

ROGOV, and COLITSYN reported in 1961 that ISYMBAL was

Chief of the European Department, KGB First Chief

Directorate..

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 56

didn't." NOSENKO also said that ISYMBaL had asked him several

times to transfer to the Firet Chief Directorate and had

suggested that he might be assigned to the United States.

In

TSYMBAL's efforts in 1962 to have NOSENKO transferred and his

leaving the impression with GRIFLOV that NOSENKO (who was still

in Geneva) had agreed to this action.

Questioned in April 1964 about his association with ISYMBAL,

NOSENKO stated that he met TSYMBAL. for the first time several

days before their departure for Geneva.

Besides saying again

that he saw TSYMBAL alnost daily at the Legal Residency and

that TSYMBAL's assistance enabled him to enter tre Legal Resi-

dency, NOSENKO reported that in 1962 he went out with ISYMBAL

several times a week to

eat lunch or dinner; sometimes they were

joined by I. S. MAYOROV, * sometimes by h. K. KISLOV (see next

section),

ard sometimes the two ate alone.

During the 1966

interrogations, NOSENKO said that, while he had seen TSYMBAL

on a daily basis in 1962, he san him only twice ir 1964: once

When TSYMBAL travelled to Geneva from Bern

for ore or two days

and later when NOSENKO saw TSYMBAL off for. Rome from Lauranne.

5. Association with Other Soviets

NOSENKO said in 1962 that the other Soviets he saw most

often were A. K. KISLOV and Yu. I. Guk.

**

KISLOV, with NOSENKO

was one of the four members of the Soviet delegation staying

at the Hotel Ariane in Geneva, and was said to be head of the

American Section of TASS and a genuine correspondent *** During

the 1962 meetings with CIA, NOSENKO reported

that KISLOV was

not a KGB officer and made no reference of his having any

affiliation with the KGB.

NOSENKO dia say, however, that he

had arranged for KISLOV's name to be given the KGB double

agent B. Ye. BELITSKIY**** to use as a notional source of

information on Soviet disarmament policy; BELITSTIY was to

pass this information to his CIA contacts.

NOSENKO made

numerous references to drinking and carousing with KISLOV,

specifically with regard to a night in early Jure - when

NOSENKO was robbed of or squandered his operatioral funds,

which brought him to CIA - and on the night of 10 June 1962

when NOSENKC squandered 2000 Swiss francs (the money CIA had

given him) on wine

and women. *****

In giving NOSENKO the

money to defray these personal expenses, the CIA handlers

expressed to him their concern over the dangers to his security

arising from KISLOV's knowledge of this inexplicable source of

income..

NOSENKO replied that there was no need to be concerned

since KISLOV was "too drunk to know what is going on," and in

any event he constituted no threat.

MAYOROV, according to NOSENKO, was visiting Geneva in

order to have operational meetings with agents.

Both KISLOV and GUK are mentioned in the discussion of

the "ANDREY" case (see Part VI.D.3.b.).

GUK was also a

friend of CoLITSyN,

who reported extensively on GUK's

"career in the KC3 including his service in the United

States.

** &

In October 1966 MOSENKO named all the Soviets living at

the Ariane, without mentioning KISLOV.

The BELITSKIY case is discussed in greater length in

Part VI.D.6.

**See Parts II.B. and II.C.2.C.

TOF SURET

---

## Page 57

- 11"1964" Nosenso confirmed"that he had spent much time with

KISLOV in Geneva two years before and that they had become

very friendly.

For the first time, NCSENKO reported that

KISLOV had beer. a KGB operational contact while in the United

States, that he had been introduced to KISLOV by a KGB officer

in Moscow prior to his departure for Geneva in 1962 in order

to be able to exploit him during the Geneva Conference, and

that after returning from Geneva KISLOV had beer. recruited as.

& KGB agent on the basis of a favorable report NOSENKO had

prepared.

Often during the 1962 meetings NOSENKO spoke of his "big,

big friend" CUK, wrom he described as the Deputy Legal Resident

in Geneva and the only "strong officer" in the KGB Legal Res1-

dency.

He implied that his friendship with GUK, a former member

of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, was of longstanding. NOS-

ENKO related that he and GiK were together nearly every day in

Geneva.

They often went out together to chat and have a few

drinks, and as a corsequence, NOSENKO was able to elicit infor-

mation about some of GUK's operations there.

In 1964 NOSENKO

told CIA he found it difficult to obtain information on the

activities of the Geneva Legal Residency because he no longer

had a good friend there like GUK, who had been reassigned to

KGB Headquärters.

When questioned later in 1964 about his

relationship with GUK, NOSENKO said he hau come to know GUK

well only during his 1962 TDY in Geneva.

6. Availability for Meetings with CIA

In speaking to David MARK on 6 June 1962, NOSENKO expressed

displeasure over MARK's insistence on deferring their luncheon

(at which NOSENKO sought contact with American Intelligence)

until three days later.

When

the first meeting with CIA did

take place on 9 June 1962, NOSENKO stayed. for three hours.

and it was at his suggestion that another meeting was scheduled

for 11 June.

This second meeting in 1962 lasted seven hours.

NOSENKO remained in Geneva until 15 June, and in the interim

he met CIA officers three more times for

over seven hours

altogether.

He

offered to meet again on the day of his de-

parture,

but this proposal was rejected as needlessly endan-

gering his security.

From the first 1964 meeting on 23 January to his defection

on 4 February, NOSENKO was

met. a total of 13 times, the sessions

lasting for

five or six hours.

He was able to come to the CIA

satehouse every day but one, and this opportunity was skipped

at the request of the clA handlers.

By mutual consent, most

of the meetings started in the afternoon, but on two occasions

NOSENKO arrived as early as 0930 hours; several meetings went

on until past midnight.

• NOSENKO appeared to be totally at

the disposal of CIA,

to be the master of his time, and to have

no other demands for his attention except for the visits to

the KGB Legal Residency,

"looking in" on an occasional session

of the Disarmament Conference, and attendance at a reception.

So 1004 57000 ine

Not try

1954

TEP SECRET

---

## Page 58

34

E. Tining of Defection

After telling CIA on 24 January 1964 of his decision to

defect,

NOSENKO at the same neeting concurred when CIA gave

operational and administrative reasons for hin to stay in

place until the middle of February.

During the neok that fol-

lowed, the date of the defection was moved up to 8 february

in accordance with NOSENiO's wishes and with his reports in-

dicating that less information of value would be forthcoming

than ClA had at first thought.

On A February, howeve for a

NOSENKO reported that le was being recalled to Moscow

conference en

tureign tourism in the USSR,

and he therefore

placed himsel! in CIA custody on that date.* Details on

the tining of NOSENKO's defection are given in the following

paragraphs.

At the 24 January

iceting the CIA case officers agreed

in principle with NOSElKO's decision to defect. NOSENKO

felt that it would be best for hin to disappear from Geneva

ilthout a trace, leaving all his personal possessions be-

hind: he assu..ed

that ClA could exfiltrate hin fron Switzer.

land to the United States.

He wanted to carry out this

soon as possible,

but the CiA officers encouraged

in--and NOSENSO agreed--to renain in place for at least

three weeks more. The reasons given NOSENKO for this re-

quest were:

- The desire to get information on the local KGB

Legal Residency

and the Soviet delegation to the Dis-

armanent Conference while he still has access to this

infornation;

• The value of having NOSENKO present when O.M.

GRIBANOV mado a visit to Geneva about 7 February a

visit known to CIA only through NOSENKO; **

• The potential value to be derived from NOSENKO's

in place spotting of CIA recruitment targets among the

Soviet representation in Geneva;

- The necessity of making arrangenents, accept.

able

to NOSENKO, for his defection and resettlement.

The events which followed NOSENKO's agreement to remain

in placo for a short time longer are chronicled below:

The report of NOSENKO's recall to Moscow for the con-

ference on tourism is discussed further in Part III.F.

• GRIBANOV was in 1964 the Chief of the KGB Second Chief

Directorate and,

according to NUSENKO and other sources,

the sponsor of NOSENO's rapid

rise in State Security.

Several far moles sources, have reported that GRIBANOV

was fired from the KGB as a result of NOSENKO's de-

faction (Part Illal.).

NOSENKO's relationship with

GRIBANOV is discussed in Part V.Hl.

---

## Page 59

26 January 1964: In a three-and-a-half hour meeting,

NOSENKO emphasized that although he agreed that it was

necessary and useful for him to remain in place until the

GRIBANOV Visit to Geneva, he wanted to defect as soon as

possible thereafter.

28 January 1904:

NOSENKO reported that GRIBANOV might

not be coming to Geneva after all, for KGB Chairman

SEMICHASTNYY was apparently reluctant to permit hin to

travel beyond Vienna.

NOSENKO said that he would probably

have definite information on GRIBANOV's trip by the end

of the week.

30 January 1964: At the seventh meeting of the series,

NOSENKO said that there now appeared to be littie likeiihood

that GRIBANOV would visit Geneva or Paris.*

Therefore, he

wanted to defect right away.

As reasons

he cited the

enotional strain of any further delay

and the fact.that he

and his case officers were wasting their time working

against the local KGB Legal Residensy, which had no worth•

while or promising targets.

Ile also telt that nothing of

value could be obtained

from the Soviet delegation because

"ISARAPKIN himself doesn't know what he will

say until he

is told by Moscow the day before."

The CIA handlers, however,

delayed the defection for one week by cotaining NOSENKO's

agreement to assist in an audio operation:

Cia proposed to

install listening devices

in the offices

of the

KGB Legal

Residency,

and NOSENKO said he would check certain physical

aspects of the delegation buildings. As the best time for

the defection, he suggested Saturday morning, & febrilary.

because he probably would not be missed until the following

Monday.

This date was tentatively scheduled, and NOSENKO

again

repeated his desire

simply to "disappear without a

trace."

lie also asxed about exfiltration plans.

the proposed audio operation, which would invoive microphone

transmitters operating

on

a carrier current.

He told CIA he

had accidentally overheard in the Residency that the buildin:

used its own batteries and generator,

and therefore the

scheme would not work.

He repeated his willingness to remain

in place until the arrival of the CHEREPANOV Papers*, which

he was told were enroute from Washington. He explained that

he had felt pressure at the previous meeting because of an

imminent move by the delegation

from

its hotel to the Soviet

Villa outside Geneva; at the villa his disappearance would

be noticed more quickly.

This move, he had now learned, had

been postponed pending the arrival of a housekeeping officer

from Moscow.

From-* to 10 February 1964 GRIBANOV was in Paris, where

he was seen on the street with a Soviet identified by

NOSENKO as a KGB counterintelligence officer.. There is

no evidence. that he visited Switzerland.

no See Part VI.D.T.C for further details on CHEREPANOV.

141.8

Tor catter

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## Page 60

At NOSENKO's request, it was firmly

agreed that the

Jerection would take place

in the norning

NOSENKO said that he assumed thai exfil-

tration would

be by automobile to West Germany and thence

bu plane to the linical states a lis case officers.com.

firned that this was correct.

3. Februar: 1964:

HOSENKO reviewed the CHEREPANOV materials.

The

defcction

Stili scheduled for Saturday, s February.

4 February 1961: NOSENKO telephoned the Geneva

safe-

house from his hotel room in the carly afternoon and said:

'"I want to coine nor and not go back."

After arriving he

explained that when he dropped by the KGB Legal Residency fol-

lowing

the morning session

of the lisarmament Conference,

he read a cable ordering him to return to Moscoy innediately

to prepare for a KGB conference on

foreign tourisn in the

Soviet Union. ** The residency was arranging for a ticket for

NOSENKO to fly to loscow via laris the following day, and a

repiacement has being readied to assume NOSENKO's duties ag

security officer for the Soviet velegation in. Geneva; ho was

not told who the replacement could be.

Before he had left

for Geneva in January,

JOSENKO then related, the Soviet Govern-

nent had been Joliberating the question of expanding foreign

tourism in the USSR and had agreed to open a nunder of new

citios and tourist itineraries in this connection.

SEMICHASTNYY

had now decided that it was tine to cüll a conference

to

discuss new

"tactics and strategies" for handling the 1n-

creascú number of tourists expected.

Since NOSENKO had been

placed in charge of the entire conference, he was directed

to leave at once to prepare

a jasic report on the KGs handling

of tourists; the report wouid be read to the conference either

by himself or by soreone fron the leadership of the Kos or

the Second Chief Directorate.

OSENKO explained that he was

the only one who could do this joù as La.

Col. A.ú. KOVALENKO,

the KGB Headyuurters Department senior officer, was a rel-

atively now man in this line of operations, having been

there only four or five years, perhaps

less.

NOSEYKO also

told CIA that "by great coincidence"

he had learned, just be-

fore the cable arrived, he was being moved to the soviet

vilia on the morning of 5 February.

He had arranged for a

Soviet chauffeur to bring a car around at 0930 hours the

next morning for the move.

His absence wouid be noted at

that tire,

and therefore

"the main thing is to cross the Swiss

border before

morning."

NOSENKO felt, nowever, that there

would be considerable confusion among the Soviets in Geneva

for a time following his disappearance, and that there would

be no real concern until the evening..

To foster Soviet un-

certainty he had left his clothing lying around his hotel

IOOm

and had brought no personal effects to the CIA safe-

house.

NOSENKO estimated the first Soviet queries to Swiss

•* See Part 1l1.F.

TOP SECRET

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## Page 61

37.

authorities would probably be made late on 5 February or early

on the 6th.

NOSENKO was driven to Frankfurt the night of 4 February

and

remained in a safehouse there until ll February, when press

publicity about

immedi-

ate interview with NOSENKO prompted the Director of Central In-

telligence to order that he be brought to washington as soon as

possible. He arrived in the evening of 12 February.

TOP SECRET

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## Page 62

33.

F. The Recall Telegran

On arriving at ine salchouse at 1515 on

4 February 1964

NOCENKO

reiated that on

the preceding day, 3 February, he had

been to the

KGiB

legal besidency during the day and

again in

the elenarg.

le nud not with ciA from 1200 to 1800 hours

on 3 Fobruary.)

le relatind taot as of that time

"everything

wis quiet and peacuful,"

1n: he recolved four personal letters

from Mosco.:.

Nost said that on the morning of + Feuruary

he had ajain stoppe: in at in.

Residency, but

"othaay was

going

on.

Tator in

thre

noring, horner, after üttending

a session of the Disarmamont

confeiroo, NOSENKO learned that

the coded tolegram dacrind dove hid arrived frot MosCo%

ordcring him to retur incoutely to roscow to participate

in the it conforend: ou

tourien.

Special

inteil: gence

iriscates, however,

tiat no cable

traffic at all

was sent fron floscow to Geneva from the late

afternoon.of 3 Fobruiry 1961 until the morning of 5 February,

the day after the icection.

Two priority cables of unusual

length,

247 and 207 groups,

were transmitted to Genera at

1901 and 1915 hours Greenwich time on 3 February; there was

no traffic on 4 February; and the noxt message passed

was a

routire cable originated by ioscow at 0755 hours on 5 February.)

On 26 October 1966, while being guestioned about the

circumstances of his defection, NOSENiO

was asked about this

telegram which recalled hin to Moscow.

there was no such telegram, and that he had invented it in

order to defect as soon as

possible because he was nervous

and afraid his contacts

Anericar Intelligence in Geneva

might be roticed by Soviet autiorities.

after detailed

questioning on this point, MusLiKo voluntarily signed a

statement with the following wording..

"On 4 February 1964, I told my CIA contact in

Geneva that a telearan from KGB leadquarters

in Moscow

TOP SECRET

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## Page 63

had been roceived in the XGA Reaidancy in Geneve

rocalling no tonedistoly to Moscon.

•I sald at she

this that this talogren sald that I vas recallod

to participate in a conference to plan KGB activity

against tourists for the 1964 seagon. I maintained

this story as fact throughout subsequent interviewe

and interrogations by American authorities in 1968

and 1965.

No such telegram ever existed.

No tola-

gren nas receivod in Goneva.

I adalt that the story

Has a 11e.

I myself inventod this talogram in order

to hasten my dofection.

I was nervous and afrald

that ay contacte with American Intelligence right bo

noticed."

GAMt........

TOP SECREN

24547239

і-ф-б. ч,.я

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## Page 64

G.

Soviet Official Reactions

The Chief of the Soviet, Delegation to the Dis-

armament Conference notified the Soviet Ambassador in Bern

shortly before noon on 6 February 1964 that NOSEIKO had dis-

appeared, correctly placing the date as 4 February; they

speculated that

he might have been "poisoned" or injured in

a car acciâent.

Two more days passed without Soviet authorities

making any additional public or private statements on the subject.

Later events showing Soviet official reactions to NOSENKO's de-

fection are presented below in chronological order:

B February:

A Soviet spokesman in Geneva reported to

Swiss police that NOSENKO,

an "expert" temporarily assigned to

Geneva, had been missing for four days.

9 February:

Evening news broidcasts in Geneva carried

reports attributed to both Soviet and Swiss sources that NOSENKO

had disappeared.

10 February:

Unidentified Soviet sources were quoted in

the press as having said it was presumed that he had defected.

A U. S. Department of State press release was issued iden-

tifying NOSENKO as a KGB officer

and

acknowledging his request

for political asylum in the United States.

11 February: The Department of State was advised informally

by Amoassador DOBRYNIN in Washington that a Soviet note to be

delivered later would ask how NOSENKO had left Switzerland,

request his release, and demand an immediate interview with him.

1? February: S. K. TSARAPKIN, the head of the Soviet Dele-

gation to the Disarmament Conference, read a statement at a press

conference in which he

strongly condemned the Swiss authorities

for permitting NOSENKO'S

"kidnapping"

and for hindering efforts

to locate him.

TSARAPKIN demanded that immediate steps

be taken

to return NOSENKO to Soviet custody.

At simultaneous press conferences in Bern and Geneva, the

Swiss rejected these accusations of non-cooperation and noted

the Soviet delay in advising the police of NOSENKO's disappear-

ance and Soviet failure to cooperate with Swiss authorities in

locating NOSENKO.

The Soviet note predicted by DOBRYNIN was delivered to

the State Department, and a noncommittal reply was given to

Apparently no effort was made to notify Moscow immediately.

Special intelligence shows that no cable traffic was passed

from Geneva to Moscow from 1630 hours on 3 February until

1900 hours on 7 February:

at 1915 hours on the 7th, the

Geneva Residency transmitted a short top priority cable to

MoScoW. Likewise, after one routine cable on 4 february,

the Bern Residency sent no traffic to Moscow on 5 February.

Seven cables, at least four of which were of routine pre-

cedence, were sent to Moscow. on 6 February; thereafter there

was no traffic from Bern to Moscow until the early morning

of 10 February.

TOP, SECRET

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## Page 65

Soviet queries concerning the requested Interview and the

means of NOSENKO's departure from Switzerland.

The Swiss Enbassy asked for a meeting with NOSENKO in

order to obtain assurance that the defection had been volun-

tary.

Arrangements were made to have NOSENKO meet with Swiss

and soviet representatives in washington as soon as possible.

(NOSENKO arrived in Washington at 2130 hours this same

evening.

13 February:

NOSENKO said he had no objection to talking

to the Swiss, but he would see the sovlets only if necessary.

14 February: In Moscow, Ambassador KOHLER was summoned

to the office of Soviet Foreign Minister GROMYKO, who read

him a statement deploring the "evasive" reply of the State

Department to Soviet inquiries in Washington and terming the.

whole event of NOSENKO's disappearance a

"gross provocation

by American

Intelligance organs."

GROMYKO repeated the demand

fOI NOSENKO's immediate release from American custody.

The Counselor of the Swiss Embassy, Jean-Louis NATURAL,

Interviewed NOSENKO at the Washington offices of the U.s.

Immigration and Naturalization Service late in the afternoon.

The Soviet confrontation immediately afterwards was handled

by Mirister Counselor G. M. KORNIENKO, second to Anbassador

DOBRYNIN at the Soviet Embassy, and Third Secretary V. F.

ISAKOV, a recent arrival in Washington.

(ISAKOV had been a

member

of the Soviet Delegation to the

1962 Disarmament

Conference ir. Geneva, where NOSENKO said he had first met. him.)

NOSENKO told both the Swiss and the Soviets that he had defected

of his own free will after careful consideration and that hu

had no desire to return to the Soviet Union.

In response to

KORNIENKO's questions, he specifically renounced his status and

rights as a Soviet citizen.

TOF SEGRET

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## Page 66

42.

H. Reactions of NOSENKO's Family

Two women who said they were the mother and wife of NOSENKO

called at the Anerican Embassy in Moscow on five occasions

netween 24 February and 23 March 1964,* and NOSENKO, who on

the basis of physical descriptions confirmed their identities,

said he had no doubt that the KGB had directed them to do this

in order to pressure him to return.

The women expressed dis-

belief that NOSENKO had voluntarily betrayed his family and his

They sought a personal meeting with him in the United

or ar.ywhere else, subritted letters for him, and returned

to the Imbassy to ask whether he had replied; the younger Mrs.

NOSENKO explained that she required some definite

statement in

writing from her husband so

she could plan her own future

and that of the NoSENKO children.

NOSENKO proposed to respond to his

family's letters by

writing two of his own, one which would be intended for KG3

consumption and the other for his wife alone.

The first of

these would stäte NOSENKO's irrevocable decision to remain in

the United States and to sever all ties with his family and

homeland.

second letter would be read by Mrs. NOSENKO in

the Embassy, left there,

and not reported to the KGB; in it he

would express hope

for a reunion, ask her to wait for hin, and

tell her to

indicate her willingness to join him in the west

by writing either

"yes" or "no" on the letter itself.

Although

NOSNEKO prepared both letters, only the first was sent to his

wife; it was mailed from Washington to the NOSENKO home in

Moscow on 1 April 1964.

From March 1964 nothing was heard from NOSENKO's relatives

until mid-1966, when Yurly Dmitriyevich KOROLEV,** a Soviet

journalist, visited Paris and spoke with representatives of the

French magazine Paris Match. KOROLEV indicated that he rould

Only once before had members of a defector's family called

at a foreign embassy in boscow.

Following the defection of

Yuriy Vasilyevich KROTKOV in England in September 1963, his

wife appeared at the British Enbassy to make inquiries about

KROTKOV, an admitted agent of the KGB Second Chief

Directorate, is believed by MI-S ana CIA to remain under

** CIA records show that KOROLEV was employed at the Soviet

Pavilion of the Brussels horld's Fair in 1958 as a photo-

correspondent for the Soviet publication Sputnix.

He visited

Japan in 1963 and the United States in February-March 1965,

at the invitation of Life magazine, as a photographer

Novosti, a Soviet news agency. On the latter trip he was to

be accompanied by Feliks ivramovich ROSENTAL, an interpreter

but no record of ROSENTAL's arrival is available.

KOROLEV

is believed to be identical: with Yuriy KOROLEV who, as of

1964, was employed part-time for the United Press Inter-

national correspondent in Moscow, Henry SHAPIRO.

Both

NOSENKO and GOLITSYN have identified SHAPIRO as an agent

of the KGB Second Chief Directorate (see Part V.C.).

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 67

like to serve as a stringer for the french journal and proposed

that he begin with a story on the life of the family of a

"Sov'ot secret agent."

and English, the magazine staff did not seriously pursue the

matter at that time.

On 10 October 1966, however,

KOROLEV again appeared at the

Paris Match offices, this time with one feliks ROSEiTAL who acted

a8 his interpreter.

He displayed a photo spread showing NOSENKO'S

wife and family going about their daily affairs in Moscow, and

he submitted a one-page document in English which gave a short

account of NOSENKO's background.:

The document said in part:

"NOSENKO's family consists of a wife, 35, two daughters, 10 and

12, a mother and a younger brother.

The family is not prose-

cuted (sic) but feel very badly about the incident (the defec-

tion). Very soon the wife will apply to the International

Lawyers Organization for a divorce and compensation.

possible thät this case will be given much publicity.

has not heard from him since he defected, but it is obrious

that he is still in the USA."

The document, which was in no way

represented as coming from a Soviet Government source,

that additional photographs of NOSENKO's family in Moscow could

be obtained and that an interview with the family and with others

knowing NOSENKO could be arranged for a Paris Match correspon-

According to information available to CIA, a divorce from

a defector from the

Soviet Union, who is legally considered

to be an enemy of the state, is grantea automatically upon

the wife's request.

There is no known precedent for either

Soviet-inspired publicity or divorce difficulties in any

previous Soviet defection.

TOP SECRET

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## Page 68

Photographs submitted to PARIS MNICH (Sue Part ITI.l.)

Subject (circa

1963)

Subject's wife, elder daughter and younger daughter (circa 1965)

120-108

SECRET

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 69

Photograph of Subject from

passport used for temporary

assignments to Englani in

1957 and

1958 (see Part V.D.8)

Photograph of Subject fron pass-

port used on

assigument to Geneva

in 1964 (see Part III.B.?)

Subject (February 1964)

Subject's father,

the Minister

of Shipbuilding (1953)

SECRET

TOP SEGME?®

---

## Page 70

44.

i.

Repercussicas ilithin the KG3

sensitire sorer:

ive.

cource

1t was the "unanimois orinion" of

According to

the NGB

that

"NOSE:KO could

do a tremendous amount of hira.to the

KGB," and

that

yoars

to cone, " this denage

would be severe for "several.

As a direct

result, as than new

rogulations were promulgated

to increase Nod operational

security in Moscow and abroad.

In addition, the

defection brought abour the dismissal

the KB of

peIsons close to NOSEVNO and tie recall of

officors abroad

tat - known to and presumably compromisad by NOSENKO."

Five months after NOSENKO disappeared fron Geneva, in

July 1964, Ull Rosaid that 15 KCy officers had already been

fired. Anong then were CRIbANOvnA and a sucher of his depyties

See Part V.!!. regarding NOSENiO's relationship with

GRIBANOV•

TOP SECRET

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## Page 71

coultire source

including one General BANNIK.*

SinCE NOSENKO WaS GRIBANOV'S

personal friend and prutege,

mustated it had been decided

that GRIBANOV should have been aware of NOSENKO's plans and

was therefore ultimately responsible.

greported further

cistrosed from the KGB

and the Conmunigt Party immediately after the defection,

adi-

ding that GRIBANOV had personally authorized NOSEND'S 1964

trip to Geneva, despite the fact that he had received a sum-

mary statenent

of NOSENKO's capabilities and activities which

contained enough"compromising laterial" to prevent such a

trip under

normal conditions. " morn

Was reported

having learned that GRIBANOV was the chick of

security at

a military plant outside Moscow and is considerca a

"nothing."**

Others dismissed from the IGB included GUK and Ye.A.

TARABRIN,

Chief of the British bepartment, First Chief Directorate.****

sonsitiit

S0%-CL

..6 44. *1

* ва

According to NOSENKO in 1965'1964 trip to Geneva:

it was BANNIKOV who sup-

ported his candidacy for the

far as he knew, NOSENKO said, GRIBiNOV was not involved.

Earlier, however, NOSENKO stated that his 1961 trip had

been approved by GRIBANOV.

* * *

Reportedly GRIBANOV continued an operational contact with

a Western Ambassador in Moscow until as recently as the

autumn of 1964.

GRIBANOV was ofter engaged while serving as Chief of the

Second Chief Directorate.

**** In 1962 NOSENKO told CIA: "GRIBANOV and I are very friendly

Under interrogation in April 1964 NOSENKO was asked speci-

fically whether he had ever gone out socially with GRIBANOV

after working hours.

He replied that he had done so on one

occasion and that TARABRIN was present at the time.

In

February 1965 NOSENKO was asked

the same question and this

cime answered that he had seen GRIBANOV

three times socially,

most recently in October or: Novenber: 1963; TARABRIN, he said,..

was the only other person present on these three occasions;

all three outings began as drinking parties in Moscow res-

taurants and the latter two ended at the homes of girls

NOSENKO

Although (X23 indicated

that TARABRIN was Chief of the British Department at the

time he was fired, NOSENKO said he had held this position

only until 1963,

when he became Deputy Chief of the newly

established Service No. 2 (Counterintelligence) of the

Fist Chief Directorate.

TOP SECRET

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## Page 72

2.

source

At

the time of NOSENKO's defection,

told ClA in

1964, he was in training for

illegals

assignment in the

West,

but these plans were cancelled partly because of the

NOSEKO case and

partly for other reasons not specified

to

One of his handlers informed thats that the

NOSENKO matter was very serious, that the GB was on

"major alert" as a result, ind that all missions had been

halted

to make readjustments.

7, 74

•3.

So!irce

In Geneva

at the time of NOSENKO's defection,

reported to CIA that just afterwards V.S. EDVEDEV

from

5020439

the

Exits Commission of the USU Central Committee* travelled to

Genova to speak to the Soviets stationed there

and to Soviet

di legates to the Disarmament Conference.

MEDVEDEV under-

scored the seriousness of the descetion

and uiged greater

vigilance against such acts.

also reported that

the defection caused the recall of Nina Ivanovna YEFREMEYEVA,

a KGB secretary in Geneva, and

among the Sovicts there it was

runored that some 60 Soviet officials then stationed abroad

would be transferred from their

assignments in consequence of

the NOSENKO affair. V.A. POCHANKIN, a KGB officer with the

permanent Soviet representation

Geneva, speculated to

are that he had been completely exposed by NOSENiO and

cheret

•SIC

would have to return

to Moscow.

Y.I. GUK , said

sasha, who had known and reported on GUK for years,

was

discharged

fron

the KGB because he had recommended NOSENKO'S

travel to Geneva, and according to one runor,

the chief of

the department where NOSENKO had been employed would lose his

job. (This would be A.G. KOVALENNO who, according to NOSENKO,

was

Chief of the Tourist Department at the time of the de-

fection.)

T TIEDVEDEV,

AGB

officer formerly stationed in New York City,

W&S

said arrestine to be one of those from the CPSU Central

Conmittee who conduct interviews with KGB personnel gorag

abroad.

and halidentified NEDVEDEV, then a Coun

selor at the

Soviet Mission to the United Nations, as the

Communist Party organizer and possiuly a member of the rob,

"but his role is not

important and he works mainly with

the Ministry of Forcign Affairs."

TOP SECRET

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## Page 73

47.

4. KGB liandlers of Agents

A reflection of NOSENko's defection was seen in MGB's

handling ofte

the subject it

mad reccived

from

NOSENKO and Liarates abusic agent.*

asson 31 Mürch 1964,

was questioned by tro of the KGB oftic

our possible

SUI-

veillance and

was asked to provide passport pintographs so

that "escape" documents could be supplied to him and his

At this

same meeting, the KGB officers announced that

was being

put on

reserve

status for an unspecitied periou

and

tolà him that this decision had iren made about tis months

earlier (i.cr

about the time of NoSEsko's defection).

At the

next meeting

in November 190%, the Soviet fürulers

admitted to

ethat they had

"sond comection" with Nostard.

Al-

thot

NOSENKO

probably could not identify

es a KGB

agent,

they

said,

there

was a possibility th

"new

"what

we (the KGB) are doing in Canada.

in Paris, Sergcant Robert JCHNSO!! was told of

by his *GB

case officer and was instructed

to destroy anything which could identify him with Soviet Intel-

Although the soviet told JOHNSON that there was

about, he was evidently disturbed by the de-

fection, JOHNSON

* *

See Part VI.D.5.c. for full details of the

See Part VI.D.3.c.

for a discussion of the JOHNSON case.

TOP SECRET

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## Page 74

NON-KGB АБРЕСТА- OF NOSENKODBIPE

A.

Introduction

The biography of NOSENKO is built largely upon his oratate-

ments to CIA, but certain portions of it have been substantiated

(as well as contradicted) by other Soviet sources. Given first

below is the NOSENKO autobiography for the period

preceeding his

entry into the has, then follows a summary of his statements

about his non-professional life since becoming a KGB officer, and

finally there is presented a review of what other sources have

said on these subjects.. A separate section of this paper, Part Vo

discusses NOSENKO'g career in the KGB.

B.

NOSENKO'S Pre-KGB Autobiography

Although several other sources have since NOSENKO's defec-

tion furnished fragmentary information concerning NOSENKO's early.

personal history, NOSENKO himself has, of course, been the prin-

cipal source on this topic.

He volunteered information during

the 1962 meetings, during

debriefings in early 1964, and under

interrogation in April 1964, in 1965, and in 1956.

These vari-

ous accounts are arranged in separate coianng in the following

table, and they are organized chronologically from NOSENKO's

birth to his alleged entry into the KCB.

The first column in

the table contains statements which NOSENKO made during the June

1962 meetings in Geneva; these were taken from the transcripts

of the meetings and, for the

most part, are in NOSENKO's own

words.

The column headed "1964," derived from the April 1964

interrogation, reflects a number of changes in his story before

and during that interrogation.

Most of the information given

in the "1965" column was taken from discussions with NOSENKO,

mainly on his early years, by

a CIA psychologist in May of that

year; however, material from the February 1965 interrogation

and from DERYABIN's interrogation in July and August has also

been included when it was not covered in the psychologist's ques-

tioning and when NOSENKO signed protocols certifying his state-

ments to be correct.

The

"April 1966" column is comprised of

remarks by NOSENKO in a signed autobiography submitted to CIA

at that time.

The final column presents

the results of the

October 1966

interrogation as they pertain to NOSENKO's early

life.

from column to column appear inconsistercles and contra-

dictions with regard to dates and locations furnished by NOSENKO,

although in 1964, again in 1965, and most recently in October

1966 NOSENKO has said that he was "now" telling the truth.

The

table shows where he has admitted having previously lied about

certain events and where he seems to have forgotten his earlier

statements to CIA about the occurrence of other events affecting

his life.

This tabulation of NOSENKO's autobiography concludes in

Part V.A., in which are quoted the various dates and circum-

stances

concerning his entry into the KGB which NOSENKO has

given in 1962, 1964, 1965, and 1966.

IOP SECRET

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## Page 75

June 1962

1964

49.

1965

"I was born in

Born 30 October

Born 1927 in Niko-

Nikolayev, my father 1927 in Nikolayev,

layev where father

worked

a senior

Ukraine, USSR, where

was a student at the

mechanic at a plant

he lived with family

Shipbuilding Insti-

and took evening

until 1934.

tute.

Father from

CourseS.

Then he

simple peasant back-

graduated from the

ground, while

Nikolayev Ship-

nother's parents

building Institute."

were nobility.

(May)

In 1934, at

age

six, entered the

"zero" (nulavoy)

class, equivalent

to kindürgarten,

in Nikolayev.

Entered the

"zero" class in

Nikolaycv in Septem-

ber 1934, two months

before his seventh

birthday. (May)

"Ily father was

gent to Leningrad,

to the Sudomekh

plant, a small

plant in Lenin-

grad.

He was at

the plant for half

a year and then be-

came director.

This was 1936-1937.

1 Then he was

sent

to the Baltic

Shipyard in Lenin-

grad as Chief En-

gander.

ile was

there. less than a

¿ year.

Moved to Lenin-

grad in 1935,

where father

WaS

first appointed

Chief engineer and

later director of

Sudomekh.

Lived

at several ad-

dresses and at-

tended several

schools.

[Note:

Soviet press

stated elder Nay

SENKO was chief

engincer of "se-

veral enterprises"

in Leningrad during

Moved to Lenin-

grad, probably in

spring of 1935.

At-

tended three years

of school there,

completing First

Class in 1935-36,

Second Class in

1936-37, and Third

Class in 1937-38.

(May)

April 1966

"I, NOSENKO,

Yuriy. Ivanovich,

was born 30 Octo-

ber 1927 in Niko-

layev, an oblast

center in the

Ukrainian Repub-

lic of Soviet

Russia."

"In September

1934, in Niko-

layev,

I entered

the

'zero'

class.

My father was

already in denin-

grad, where he

was working at

the Sudomekh

Shipyard."

"Shortly there-

after he

(father)

found an apartment

and, interrupting

my studies, I

travelled to Lenin-

grad with my mother.

I did not begin

studies in the First

Class until Septem-

ber 1935 as there

were no 'zero'

classes in the Lenin-

grad

schools.

finished the Third

Class in

in 1938, «teningrad

October 1966

Born 1927 in Niko-

layev,

the son of

Ivan Isidorovien

NOSENKO and Tamara

Georgievna NOSENKO.

Lived in Leningrad

from 1935 to

1938.

• 340

---

## Page 76

June 1962

•"In 1938 my

father was assigned

to Moscow as Deputy

Peoples' Commissar.

I, was only a little

boy.

In 1939 he

was

appointed

peoples' Commissar,

later Minister, of

the Shipbuilding

Industry and re-

mained

such until

his death in 1956."

50.

1965

1964

1935-1937; became di-

rector of

Baltic

Shipyard in 1938.1

NOSENKO's father

was appointed

First

Deputy to the

Peoples' Commissar

of the Shipbuilding

Industry and then

became Commissar.

Family returned

to

Moscow and NOSENKO

entered 10-year

school located on

Ulitsa Bol' shaya

Polyanka.

[Note:

Soviet press re-

ported that I.I.

NOSENKO became

Deputy Commissar in

1939 and Commissar

•in 1940.).

Completed the

Sixth Class at

School No. 585.

Went to Sochi with

parents for vaca

tion and was there

when war broke out.

Returned to Moscow

the next day.

April 1966

Octobar 1966

In 1938 the elder

"In 1938 my

NOSENtO was named

father was summoned

First Deputy to the

to Moscow and he be

Peoples'

Commissar

gan to work in the

of Shipbuilding and

Peoples' Commissariat

the fanily returned

to Moscow.

NOSENKO

of the Shipbuilding

Industry.

Having

entered a

school on

finished the Third

Bol'shaya Polyanka.

Class, I moved to

Ile completed the

Moscow with my

Pourth Class in 1938- mother at the end

1939 and the fifth

of the summer."

class in 1939-1940.

(May)

TOP SECRET

NOSENKO finished

the Sixth Class at

the 10-year school

on Bol'shaya Pol-

yanka during the

1940-1941 academic

year.

Then he

travelled on vaca-

tion to Sochi,

where the family

stayed at a "rest

home" of the Coun

cil Ministers.

Learned of war's

outbreak on the

radio while there

"In 1941 I completed

the Sixth Class at

the 585th middle

school and went to

Sochi for a vacation

with my father and

mother.

on 21 June,

during our vacation

in the south, the war

began and for this

reason my parents and

I returned to Moscow

the next day."

---

## Page 77

June 1962

"I studied

first in a school

of the Navy.

There I sailed

aboard boats and

dutters."

(No

date given.)

1964

51:

1965

Enrolled in

Moscow Special

Naval School, but

studies did not be-

gin in Moscow be-

cause of the war

and immediate plans

to evacuate the

school.

In

Sep-

tember 1941 NOSEN-

Ku spent one week

digging trenches

with a group from

the school, and on

10 October

he

travelled with the

rest of the school

to kuybyshev:.

There he began his

studies in the

Seventh Class.

and returned to

Moscow the next day

by train. (May)

Enrolled in the

Moscow Special Naval

School which was

evacuated to Kuyby-

shev, ättended the

1941-42 school year

in Kuybyshev.

(May)

In June 1942

In summer 1942

completed the

returned from Kuy-

Seventh Class at

byshev to Moscow on

the Moscow Special

leave.

While there

Naval School in

somehow learned

Kuybyshev.

Re-

that Special Naval

turned

to Moscow in

School to be moved

July with about

from Kuybyshev to

three other boys

Achinsk, Siberia.

from the school.

Did not want to go

Prevailed on father

so far away from

to allow transfer

to "real military

home, so enrolled in

school" and enrolled

Leningrad Naval Prep

in the Leningrad

School, Baku.

Spent

April 1966

October 1966

"In October 1941

my mother and I

were evacuated to

Chelyabinsk, where

I completed the

Seventh Class in

June 1942."

(Note:

NOSENKO here added

a year to his life

which he had not

mentioned earlier.

To accommodate this

change he

subtracted

a year from the

time he spent at the

Naval Preparatory

School in Baku.

See

below.]

went to Chelya-

binsk from Moscow in

1941, after the start

of the war.

"I completed the

Seventh Class in

Chelyabinsk. In

the beginning of

the summer of 1942

I moved from Chel-

yabinak to Gor'kiy

and soon after this

returned to Moscow.

In Moscow I was ac-

cepted in the Spe-

cial Naval School

which in August

1942 was evacuated

to Kuybyshev.

There

Was

in Gor'kiy for

a time

in

the

sunner

of 1942.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 78

üne 1962

1964

Naval Preparatory

School which had

been evacuated

from Leningrad to

Baku.

Spent summer

vacation at home in

Moscow with parents.

Afte: 3 1/2

months in Moscow,

left by train for

Baku with a group

of about 30 other

students in Octo-

ber.:

The trip

lasted 14 days.

Route

not recalled.

Arriving in Baku

joined Prep School

and spent about

a month in "quaran-

tine."

Then as-

signed to the Ninth

Training Company,

in the Third Course,

equivalent to the

Eighth Class.

(Note:

The lioscow-

Rostov railroad

line

was cut by the

Germans by this

time.

The only pos-

sible route at this

time would have been

a long and circuitous

one via Tashkent]

52.

1965

summer with parents

in Moscow.

(May)

went to Baku by

train in October.

Trip took two weeks.

Spent first four to

six months in Baku

in

"guarantine,"

which was

similar to

American boutcamp.

•Enrolled in the First

Course, equivalent

to the

Eighth Class.

(мау)

April 1966

I entered the Eighth

Class."

October 1966

(In Kuybyshev; see

above entry. 1

TOP SECRET

* It.

---

## Page 79

E

June 1962

1964

Took military

oath.

¡Note:

NO -

SENKO was 15 years

old at this time,

by law too yourg

to

take oath.

This

point stressed in

April 1964

inter-

rogations.l

Completed Third

Course

(Eighth

Class) in June

1943.

Took no

racation but spent

summer working at

the school in Baku.

In September 1943

began

new

school

year in the Second

Course, equivalent

to Ninth Class.

53.

1965

Took military

oath at end of

"quarantine" period.

Oath administered to

make boys feel a

part of service al-

though too young.

Oath taken

between

15th and 16th birth-

days, i.e., after

October

1942 and be-

fore November 1943.

NOSENKO certain he

celebrated 15th

birthday in Baku in

1942.

(May)

Completed First

Course in June and

spent summer of 1943

at school.

Entered

Second Course at the

Naval Prep School in

Baku in September

1943. (May)

Along with 15 or

Since 1942 NO-

20 classmates,

• SENKO had had an

NOSENKO submitted a "obsession" about

collective

letter: getting into the

asking to be sent

war.

Students from

April 1966

(studying in

Kuybyshev.

See

above entries.]

October 1966

(Completed

Eighth Class in

Kuybyshev.]

"During the summer

of 1943 I returned

to Moscow on vaca-

tion.

The Special

Naval School was to

be evacuated from

Kuybyshev to

Achinsk and there-

fore, not wanting

to go to Achinsk, I

enrolled in the

Naval Preparatory

School in Baku.

"While at the

Naval Prep School

in Baku, in Octo-

ber 1943, I joined

the KOMSOMOL."

"I took the mili-

tary oath

in Baku.

was 15 years old at the

time.

This was in

1943."

(No month' given.)

ICP

---

## Page 80

June 1962

1969

to the front be-.

cause they had

heard that stu-

dents at the Frunze

Higher Naval

school

had gone.

Request

caused an uproar

and investigations.

Permission denied.

54.

1965

the Frunze Higher

Schuol had gone

to

the front in 1412

and some of the

older boys at the

Prep School went in

early 1943. Fired

up, NOSENKO and

about eight others

filed a petition to

be allowed to fight.

(May)

April 1966

October 1966

Joined KOMSOMOL:

(See above entry.)

Inding of 1944)

In January,

to-

gether with class-

mate Yura RAD-

CHENKO, NOSENKO

went to the city

military commis-

sariat in Baku to

inquire about

joining a Marine

detachment.

They

were turned down

and thereupon ran

away from

the Naval

Prep School.

Tra-

velling by boxcar,

the two went to

Stantsiya Lazarev-

skaya via Tbilisi

and from there

walked to Tuause in

search of the mili-

• After receiving a

"I studied in Baku

scolding from

school

only for half the

authorities for

school year because

having

submitted the

I ran away from:

petition, NOSENKO and school, home to Mos-

several other boys

cow, in the begin-

began to plot to run ning of 19441"

away to the front.

When the time came in

early 1944 only one

other boy, RADCHENKO,

would accompany him.

The two slipped out

of school, made their

way to the railway

station, and found a

freight train heading

toward Tuapse.

On

arriving in Tuapse

they were arrested

almost immediately

The story about

going to or toward

the front was a lie,

NOSENKO

said.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 81

.7.7:2

DATE

June 1962

55.

1964

1965

tary front.

Ar-

at the station, sever-

riving in

Tuapse,

al days later

they

they were arrested

were returned to Baku

and were then re-

where they managed to

turned to Baku under escape.

They then

guard.

In Baku,

travelled to Moscow

they

managed to

es- using false documents

cape again

before

and were arrested at

being returned to the:the train station on

Prep School.

After

arrival. (May)

hiding a few days at

the home of a girl-

friend, NOSENKO and

RADCHENKO travelled

to Moscow by train,

using

forged docu-

mentation obtained

by a

friend in the

Naval Prep School.

They were arrested at

the Moscow Railroad

Station by military

police who had been

alerted by authori-

ties in Baku. "NO-

SENKO's father bailed

him out.

(Note:

previsus accounts

varied widely.

NO -

SENKO originally said

he had participated

in the battle for

Novorossiysk with his

entire class from the

"Frunze Higher Naval

School."

This battle

actually took place in

September 1942.

On

later occasion, NOSENKO

April 1966

October 1966

TOP SEGEST

1255. 152

---

## Page 82

June 1962

56.

1965

1965

April 1966

said that ho and

RADCHENKO SaW COM-

bat near Tuapse.!

Took Ninth Class

Did not want to

"In MOSCOW I

exams after studying return to Baku as

finished the Ninth

as an "external stu- ashanca to face class- Class as an exter

dent" at the Gorniy

mates after failure

nal student at

Institute in Moscow. to get to front.

Re- Gorniy Institate

Passed these and

mained at home and

and at the end of

through father's in- attended adult educa-

the summer of 1944...

fluence was trans-

tion courses at Gorniy was enrolled in the

ferred back to the

Institute and had

Naval School in Len-

Naval Prep School,

which had just moved

and Russian grammar.

there in the month

back to Leningrad

Finished Ninth Class of August."

from

Baku.

in spring or summer

velled to

Leningrad

and travelled in fall

to join his class in to leningrad to rejoin

September.

class in Prep School.

(May)

Studies did not

Arriving in Lenin-

start at once.

NO-

grad NOSENKO was as-

SENKO and others

signed to a group

lived in Narva and

made up of stragglers

worked in the woods.

and was sent to

the

forest near Lenin-

grad to cut wood for

the winter supply at

the school.

Condi-

tions were terrible--

the work was hard and

the weather was cold,

(any, and mistrable.

October 1966

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 83

Juno 1962

1966

57.

1965

Studies in Tenth

About three of

Class of Naval PIe-

four daya bafore the

paratory school can-

boys vers to return

PanCed in November

1944.

to Leningrad a car

was cant for NosEn

KO. Is returned to

Laningiad to stay

in tha Hotel Astoris

with his fathor sho

Has visiting with a

delenstion.

After

this ne vent back to

school, sonatina in

november.

(Hay)

Somatino in Pebru-

April 1966

At the end of

"In the bo-

19521 19652 NOSEKO

ginning of 1945 I

as chot in the hand

accidentally shot

at a party by a

an unknown Navy offi- myself through the

Jealous yourg offi-

cer. bogan to flirt

hand and spent

car and vas hospita- with NOSENKO. The of-about a month re-

lizad. In the ent, ficer bocans angry,

suing invastigation

ho protected

the

NOSENKO through the

roal culpilt by pre- hand.

The officer

tending that he had

was apologetic, and

ahot himself acci-

NOSENKO promised not

dantally shila

to report the inci

clearias a gus.

dent.

The wound

DaVEr Bau the 0ff1-

gIes MOIse, however.

car again.

and NOSENTO was foIced

to enter tha hospital.

Ba told the doctor

that ba had accidents

ally shot himsels with.

a soursals: gus.

was hospitalized for

about three weaks.

(May)

October 1966

NOSSNO shot hin

self through the hand.

Chis. was absolutely ac

cidental and was not

an attempt to avoid

military duty.

Note.

NOSENKO made this state

nent in rospongo to

a direct question..

Tha

question was based on

& report from skistan

sOurce talina that

NOSENKO Shot biasal!

to avoid being sent to

the front while ato

=Bnalag @ Daval СІЛаДІ

In Laningrad in 1942."1

TEr StORET

---

## Page 84

DATE

May-

June

1944

June 1962

"I finished the

Naval School, then

was in the Navy.

I

fought," (boyeval--

presumably

In world

War II).

•In

1945

I was demobilized."

diana ass

1964

58.

1965

while in the hos-

In the hospital

pital, NOSENKO ap-

NOSENKO decided he

plied

for release

could not return to

from military ser-

school as he was

vice.

This

was ag-

ashaned of the type

sisted by father'g

of girls he had been

friends.

After

with the night of

release from the

the accident and

hospital he did not

could not stand the

want to return to

thought of being

school.

He called

made an example of

his father and then

by the school KOMSO-

spent

a week with

MOL organization.

friends of the

He left the hospital

family in Leningrad

in civilian clothes

before getting a

and stayed with a

room in a dormitory

friend of his father.

at the Leningrad

He obtained a state-

Shipbuilding

Tekh-

ment that he had

nikum.

Despite

attended the Naval

fallure to return to

Prep School, which

the Naval Prep

was just a report of

School, NOSENKO waS

his courses and an

credited with satis

average of his marks

factory completion

up to that time.

Ag

of the school year

the son of a minister

(Tenth Class).

In

it was then easy for

June he passed the

him to enter the

exams for the

Second

Shipbuilding Tekh-

Course at the

Ship-

nikum whete, with

building Tekhnikum.

special tutoring, he

He then went to the was able to complete

District Military

the Tenth Class in

Commissariat and was the summer. (May)

demobilized.

He

received his mili-

tary reserve regis-

tration and a certi-

ficate of satisfac-

tory complation of

...:

for.

April 1966

"After this (iland

shooting) incident I.

did not-want to go

back to the school

and began to study

at the Shipbuilding

Tekhnikun in Lenin-

grad, in the Second

Course, in order to

complete the Tenth

Class.

In May or

June 1945, with the

help of the Director

of the Tekhnikum, I

received documenta-

tion certifying that

I had completed the

Second Course which

made it possible fpr

me to enter the In-

stitute lof Inter-

national Relations)

and I returned

October $966

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 85

June 1962

59.

1965

"After the war I

want to study at

the Institute of

International Rela-

tions...In 1945 I

was demobilized.

1964

ten year's schooling.

(Note:

A biographi-

cal statoment was

drawn up on the basis

of NOSENKO's state-

ments in January-

February 1964 and ap-

proved by NOSENKO as

correct in February

1964.

This states

ment said that he com-

pleted his 10-year ed-

usation at the Baku

school in the spring

of 1943 and thereby

became eligible to

enter a higher edu-

cational institution.

From 1943 to 1:45, the

statement continuca,

NOSENDO. attended the

Frunze Higher Naval

School (a counterpart

of Annapolis).

After

three years there,

ne decided to leave

the Navy, was demobi-

lized and entered

the

Institute of

Interna-

tional Relations.

October 1966, NOSENKO

said he had lied about

attending Frunze Academy.)

NOSENKO decided

he did not want to

study further at the

Shipbuilding Tekhri-

kum and returned to

Moscow where he

April 1966

October 1966

NOSENKO decided he

would like a career

in the foreign ser-

vice ard returned to

Moscow, where he

passed the entrance

"In July 1945. I

entered the Insti-

tute of International

Relations.'

TOP

'SECRET

---

## Page 86

June 1962

19r474 438776-957141 99

•+499 +9990.9971701494

minansinn.

1964

60.

1965

passed the entrance

examinations for

the Institute of

International Re-

lations (IIR).

The

exam consisted only

of a composition,

dictation, and

an

interview.

exams for the IIR.

(May)

Travelled to

Travelled to Esst

Germany with his

Gurmany in August 1945

father who was

with father's delega-

leading a delega-

tion.

Given tempo-

tion.

For the pur-

rarY

commission as

pose of the trip

senior lieutenant for

• only, NOSENKO was

the trip.

Continued to

issued a uniform

wear uniform on return,

and documents

even to classes at the

showing him to be a

institute. Entered in-

senior lieutenant.

stitute on return from

When he returned

to

Germany and chose to

Moscow he continued

specialize in English

to pass himself off

languago and U.S. area

as an officer who

studies for reasons he

had seen combat in

could not recall.

(May)

the war and eventu-

ally got into

trouble

at the in-

stitute because of

this.

Began studies

in Faculty of In-

ternational Law and

English language in

September.

April 1966

October 1966

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 87

-914999•9T

61.

DATE

June

1986

June 1962

sptember

1946

June

1947

1964.

Completed first

year at Institute

of International

Relations.

Began second

year at IIR.

Completed second

year at IIR.

com-

missioned junior

lieutenant in Re-

serves.

1965

April 1966

October 1966

eptember

1947

Began third year

at IIR.

Late

1947

{NOSENKO was talk-

about his present

wife.)

"This is my.

second wife.

I was

married before... I

cannot say that I

While studying

at the IIR NOSENKO

was dating Augus-

tina Konstantinovna

TELEGINA, the

daughter

of a lieu-

tenant general.

with help of tem-

porary documents used

for the trip to Ger-

mary, NOSENKO managed

to exempt himself from

compulsory military

training during his

first two years at IIR.

When it was found that

his claims of active

duty were false, he

was commissioned a jun-

ior lieutenant in the

Reserves along with

his classmates. (May)

In third year at

IIR NOSENKO began to

specialize in Inter-

national law. (May)

"I was a friend

and companion of

TELEGINA for some

months before her

father was arrested

in connection with

STALIN's campaign

In 1947. commig-

Bioned

a juntor lieu-

tenant in the re-

serves.

Diu not under.

go any military train-

ing.

After complet-

ing second year at

the Institute, began

to do military trang-

lations to avoid

military service.

"While I was

studying at the In-

stitute, at the end

of 1947, I married

Augustina Konstanti-

novna TELEGINA, who

was born in 1929"

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 88

88

June 1962

1964

62...

1965 :*

SET

April 1966

loved her a great

deal... The war had

just ended.

wanted peace.

mantad a quiet

corner.

I wanted

someone to 100k

after, na... and

so wa bacane ac-

mainted. Ne

saw each othas for

about two seeks.

Let's get married.

I married her.

That's all."

Note:

NOSENKO did not

date this marriage

other

"than to in-

ply 1t was right

aftar the wars

de is included

here to place it

In the context of

later atatements.)

TELEGIN was ar-

against assoclates

rested by STALIN,

of Marshall zilUKoV.

and NOSENKO married However, we never

Augustina soon

planned

to marry.

afterwards, In about After the arrest,

November 1947.

however, I dacided

to marry her in

order to show my

strength of char-

acter.

I carnot re-

member the date of

the narriage, which

was my first.

think that it hap-

pened in 1947, but

do not know what

seagon of how long

after the arrest

of TELEGIN."

(In-

terrogation Pro-

tocol signed in

February 1965.1

"One Monday...at

Broke off mar-

"One morning..

10 o'clock (I came

"I lived with my

• Iíage after several I cannot remember the firat wife until 1949.

home early from

months when he found date or season, but

unith 1549.-

work).

Suddenly I

his wife in flas

it was in the first

heard--I approached

grante delicto with half of 1948--I cáme

on

tretos--What is

her brother.

this?

The

early and unexpected

In my bed,

wo were Beparated,

from my studies at

who is lying with

but not divorced,

at the Institute of In-

my wife?

Her older

this time.

(Note:

ternation Relationg E

brother. Well, I

As with other dates to the apartment of my

slammed

the door,

connected with the

wife's mother. where

left, and did not go TELEGINA marIlage,

I sometimes mot my

back.

Nevex went. NOSENKO has been im- wife, and surprised

back. That was all, precise here: in

her in sexual inter

October 1966

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 89

#7+79-79-380

June 1962

Bye bye...Well,

you can

imagine my

horror. " (Note:

Portions of the

tape.of this con-

versation are un-

readablo.

It is

clearly implied that

this scene

took

place at NOSENKO's

own home...

1964

April 1964 he said

on another occa-

sion that he found

his wife with her

brother sometime

prior to June 1947.1

Completed third

year at IIR.

"A child was

born

who might

have been mine and

who might not have

been mine.

God

knowS•

There was

still no child when

I left.

Well, I

helped out.

sent money.

That's

all.

But I didn't

see either her or

the child." (Note:

NOSENKO provided no

date for the above.l

63.

1965

course with her

brother.

I walked

out without comment.

The naxt day I Ie-

turned to our apart-

ment where my wife

and I continued to

live together, al-

though our relation-

ship was strained.

I stayed with her

because she was

pregnant at the time."

(Protocol signed

February 1965.

Girl with hare

lip and cleft

palate born to TELE-

GINA.

NOSENKO de-

cided deformity was

due to her incest-

uous relationship

with her brother.

Subsequently gave

his wife a little

money to help sup-

port the child, but

never considered it

his.

Marriage

cooled still further,

but NOSNEKO continued

to live in the apart-

ment.

(May)

April 1966

October 1966

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 90

June 1962

64.

1965

1964

Began fourth year

at IIR.

Completed fourth

year at IIR.

April 1966

October 1966

Successfully de-

fended his thesis on

the subject of "Dip-

Lomatic Immunity."

Completed English

language studies.

In March or

April 1950 NOSENKO

was interviewed by

the assignments

commission of the

IIR and was tenta

tively assigned to

the GRU.

ID. May

1950 he went to the

NOSENKO was through

with courses at the

Institute in January

1950 and had already

defended his thesis

on "Diplomatic Immu-

nity."

The last

half-year at the In-

stitute was relatively

free because the

students were given

time to prepare for

the state exams which

were requited for

graduation.

(May)

Before taking his

"In the spring

The Placement Com-

final state exams,

of 1950 before

mission sent NOSENKO

NOSENKO went before

the beginning of

to the MGB whare he was

the placement board.

the state examina told he was not a

Here they talked

tions a personnel

suitable cAndidate.

The

about his possible

placement commis-

reason was

for

"little

assignments and al-

sion was created at things.

I was drunk

though no definite

the Institute and

several times,

only an

decision was reached

I declared to it my average student, etc."

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 91

Jine 1962

1964

CRU Personnel

De-

partment for an

interview with

Colonel KALOSHIN

on the instructions

of the chief of

the "secret unit"

at the IIR.

65.

1965

it was suggested he

go into the Navy.

After this, but

before the

state

exams,

NOSENKO

visited a special

section of the Navy

Ministry

to give

them special docu-

ments for a secu-

rity check.

A1 -

though it was not

stated, NOSENKO be-

lieved

he was slated

for Navy Intelli-

(May)

April 1966

October 1966

wish tö work in

NOSENKO said he did

some sort of mili-

not mention this

tary organization.

carlier because his

Soon thereafter

interrogators would

the chief.of the

not have believed that

Institute's special

the MGB first turned

section gave me a

him down and they later

telephone number

accented him in 1953.

and told me to call

it.

The number was

K-6... and I rea-

lized that the MGB

was interested

in me since these

numbers belonged

to the MGB.

I

called the

number

and was told

to

come to the MGB...

the cönversation

(at the MGB]

con-

cerned my bio-

graphy and my

knowledye of the

English language..

Nothing was said

about where. it was.

intended.for.me to

work.... Latet the

chief of the In-

stitute's special

section told me my.

qualifications.were

not suitable.for

the MGB."

T8F SEORET

---

## Page 92

била 1962

1964

Took state

oxams for comple-

tion of the Ingti-

tute.

Passed

three of them but

Klunked Marxisn-

Isninian.

Advisad

GRU and was told to

call back when he

had his IIR diplo-

na. He was allowed

to take the Navy

physical exam,

which lasted three

days.

65.

1965

niter failing

the stato exam

NOSENKO had someone

in his father's

offica call the

GRU to see that he

should do.

It

turrsd out that the

security check

would take a long

time and NOSENKO

was told to check

back after he had

passed the exam.

(May)

"I finishod

the Inatitute of

International Ra-

lations Is 1950,

aftar this !

Markod da the GRU

of the Mary. "

Passed exams. on

second try and re

colved diploma of

completion of lIl.

Cantacted Colonal

HALOSHIN Of GRiJ PET-

Banned. subritted

NOSENKO checked

back with Gru Per-

sonnel after fiassing

hio exans.

(13y)

ApIll 1966

"During the

while the stato

exams were under-

say, I began to

process for entry

into the Navy GRU.

My processing

took place through

Colonel KALOSHIN,

the Chief of the

GRU Personnel De-

partment.

patEr March 1951

I repeatedly

visited the Minis

try of the davy...

I filled out

questionairas in

duplicate, urote

tuo autobiographies

and submitted

copies of my diplo-

Ha. " (Note:

SENKO in hia 1966

autabiograpay did

not santion

having falled tha

OMaN IN MAIXIEN

Laniniaa.!

"I submitted

caples of my diplo

ma tO GRU Personnel. "

see above antry.!

MOSENKO PIOCOSSING

§Or GRU entry.

Octajar 1968

., ::

TOP SECRET

До Талас""'9111

---

## Page 93

¿Jüne 1962

67.

1965

"When they of-

fered me

(assign-

ments in] Moscow,

Loningrad and the'

Far East I took

the Far Fast so

that nobody could

BaY that Yurly NO-

SENKO took advan-

1964

diploma,

trang-

cript of grades,

and other neces-

sary papers.

(Note:

Previously

in 1964 NOSENKO

stated that lie

graduated from the

IIR, which at that

time was a four-

year course,

in

mid-1949

and "just

loafed around"

for

a year.

He later

changed the com-

pletion

date to

late 1949 or early

1950.

Then he

changed this to

say that he failed

exams in 1949 and

had been forced to

wait an entire

year before he

could retake them

in 1950.

Finally

he gave the version

above. l

Entered on ac-

tive duty with the

Navy on 17-19 Sep-

tember 1950, when

he recüived

orders

transferring him

from a junior lieu-

tenant in the Re-

serves to a junior

April 1966

October 1986

TOF SECRET

In the autumn of

(See abové entries.)

1950 received orders Still processing for

transferring him

Gru entry.

from the Reserve to

ictive duty.

Offered

• choice of duty

"..".

posts, NOSELKO chose

to go to the Far East.

"in order to prove he

---

## Page 94

onpetencs

HeeNi

June 1962

1964

tage of his father's lieutenant on

ac-

position."

tive duty."

Re-

ceived orders to

the Intelligence

Staff of the Seventh

Far East Fleet.

(Note:

In an

ear-

lier version, ND-

SENKO said he en-

•tered

the GRU in

1949,

having fin-

ished the Insti-

tute of Interna-

tional Relations

the same year.]

"I worked in

the field of in-

formation in the

Far Fast, in the

felty of Sovetskaya

¿Gavan...in the

Fiend

of informa-

tion--radio inter-

icept., etc.

Al1

IVOUr

movements,

iwhen you movedl

vessels to Che-

mul'po, Korea,

ithe Korean opera-

tion...we know all

the ships there be-

{causo you talked on

the air.

YOu

transmitted.

We

knew each division,

Its name, its num-

ber, everything...

On approxi-

•mately l October

1950 NOSENKO left

Moscow by train for

the Far East. The

Itrip to Bukhta•

Postovaya (near

Sovetskaya Gavan),

where his unit: was

stationod, took nino

or ten days.

Ag-

signed to work in

the Information

Section under Cap-

tain Second Rank

KHAYTOV.

Duties

included transla-

tions from Ameri-

can Naval litera-

ture and making

summaries of

American Navy OB in

68.

1965

was now ready to

make a

man of him-

self...in the country

God forgot." (May)

Arriving at his

duty station NO-

SENKO was assigned

to the Information

section.

Hle liked

the work and did a

good iob despite

the rigorous con-

ditions.

During his

acivice hore he ro-

ceived spocial

mention as an out-

standing officer.

There were 300 to

350 intercept opera-

tors there.

NO-

SENKO and other

officers analyzed

the take as well as

information received

from Sakhalin and

Vladivostok.

(May)

April 1966

Still processing

for GRu entry.

October 1966

roispu.et rozo .- 31

tleoClldl, erénld'ttalod digedannleMirrd' late, ddlé, Uere ne, d lrjuge,

• urinas:

---

## Page 95

69.

1965

June 1962

1964

ahd wa reported

Far East. There was

this to Moscow. I a unit involved in

don't know what

radio intercept of

was done with this

American Naval car-

Information after

gets in Korean area,

this.

So, we were

but NOSENKO was not

concerned

with

personally concerned

information."

with this work.

April 1966

October 1966

Promoted to the

rank of lieutenant.

After about seven

months in the Far

"On 12 March 1951

two orders were is-

"I lied when I

said I started in the

GRU in 1950.

It was

to lieutenant.

Ministry; one con-

really March 1951.°

This was April 195l.

cerning my enlistment

(Note:: No effort

Normally one is pro-

in the Navy and the

was made to obtain

moted from junior

other assigning me

reason for this

licutenant to lieu-

as a translator to

lie or to question.

taint only after a

the Intelligence

NOSENKO on its im-

year's service in

Unit of the Seventh

plications for hig

grade.

This can

be

Fleet (Military Unit

earlier statements

reduced to six months 70176) 'ZALOSHIN's

The following about promotions, etood

in the Far East.

day at

"I was or active

(May)

instructions I te-

duty in Sovetskaya

ported to the Moscow

Gavan--Bukhta Posto-

City Military Com-

vaya

from 1951 to

mission where I was.

1953."

issued my passport

and my voyenyy bilet.

The Conmission also

issued me temporary

duty orders and tra-

vel documents.

On

16 or 17 March I left

Moscow for my duty

post.

I arrived at

Bukhta Postovaya at

the end of March and

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 96

DATE

June 1962

1964

matt. 26.

70.

1965

April 1966

began work in the

Information De-

partment of the

Intelligence Unit

of the

Seventh

Fleet.

October 1966

ind of

1951

January-

Rebruary

1952

NOSENKO involved

in apprentice work

in the Agent-Intel-

ligence Section

at

Bukhta Postovaya.

This involved going

out to sea on

sub-

chasers to pick up

and drop off, and

conducting meetings

with agents from

Hokkaido and Sak-

halin.

NOSENKO did

not actually meet

agents, but was

merely along to learn

how they were picked

up at sea.

Filed action by

NOSENKO was

mail to divorce TELE- planning

to divorce

GINA in Moscow court

his wife before he

and published inten-

left Moscow but did

tion notice in a local not start proceedings

Sovetskaya Gavan news- because he was afraid

paper in January or

she would bring

February.

charges against him

in the KOMSOMOL.

Sometime in late 1951

or early 1952 he

published his notice

indice indoors dee

eased promoti

---

## Page 97

DATE

June 1962

1964

April

1952

Left Bukhta

Postovaya and re-

turned

to MOSCOW

on leave.

Arrived

at the end of

April and reported

to KALOSHIN.

Re-

quested transfer

from

the Far East.

71.

1965

of intent in a local

newspaper

and for-

warded the neces-

sary papers to Mos-

cow.

(May)

On 1 May 1952

NOSENKO's father was

to observe his

50th

birthday.

NOSENKO'S

two-ycar.

tour in the

Far tast would not

be up until October

or November 1952,

and

he was not entitled

to any leave until

it was ended.

HOW.

ever, his section

chief was very under-

standing and ar-

ranged for him to

leave in April so

that he could be in

Moscow for the birth-

day celebration.

NOSENKO flew to

Khabarovsk where he

had a

"two-day

drunken orgy" with

another Naval offi-

cer.

He then con-

tinued on to Moscow

in time for the May

Day and birthday

celebrations.

Ine

next day he reported

to the Navy Ministry

and was told to re-

April 1966

October 1966

"At the end of

April 1952 I left

Sovetskaya Gavan on

leave, arriving in

MOSCOW on 28 April,"

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 98

14-00000 ket: 12.

June 1962

1964

mI worked in

the

ar Fast until 1952,

hen suddenly

Fell 111.

In

the

Fat Fast.

It was

this way.

Then I

arrived in Moscow,

I went to the

doctor.

They began

tOX-IiY iC.

Clear lungs, ahso-

lutely.

They

examined me one

day,

two days:

three

dayg.

Clear, abso-

lutoly clear.

Then

by accident,

right

under my collar-

bone, a small, small,

little spot was

found and it turned

out to be on a

blood vessel.

It

turned out to be at

al very early stage.

At that time they

had just discovered

streptomycin and I

was confined at

the Hertzen Sani-

torium near Mos-

dow.

I was thera

for two months.

I

felt fine but they

NOSENKO was on

leave during May

and June 1952 and

lived during this

time at the home

of his parents at

No. 4 Ulitsa

Gor'kogo in Mos-

cow.

He received

one

month leave

for his 1951 ser-

vice in the far

East and the

other for his

1952

service

there.

(Note:

NOSENKO did not

mention having

had

tuberculosis

during any inter-

rogations

or state-

ments in 1964.

AC-

cording to his 1966

statements, he

spent only

one

year, March 1951 to

April 1952, in the

Far East.!

72.

1965

turn at the end of

his leave for reas-

signment.

(May)

NOSENKO was on

leave during May

and June.

No de-

cision

had been

reached with re-

gard to whether

he would return to

Sovetskaya Gavan

or not and he was

"at the disposal"

of the: Naval Minis-

try

during this

period.

After the

Leave, NOSENKO

waited

another

ronth until his as-

signment was de-

cided upon.

(May)

INote:

NOSENKO did

not: mention having

been hospitalized

in this period.

April 1966

"While on leave

I became ill with

tuberculosis and

spent almost two

months in a sani-

torium near Mos-

cow."

Note:

In

another statement,

written a week

earlier, NOSENKO

said that in

Sovetskaya Gavan

"drunkeness and

the severe condi-

tions had their

effect on my

health and led to

an outbreak of

tuberculosis in

May 1952."]

October 1966

NOSENKO confirmed

that he was at the

Herzen Sanitorium

during

this period

and said that

as a

result of his illness

he was "coughing

up a half a glass of

blood at a time."

His treatment con-

sisted of shots of

streptomycin.

*..: 49:

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 99

DATE

Mid-

1952

July-

August

1952

73.

1965

June 1962

gave me shots of

streptomycin evesy

hour for two months

and stopped this

disease at once.

After this I had

check-ups for five

years, was car-

ried on their books

until 1957. It was

nothing."

"They offered

me the opportunity

to study in the

Military-Diploma-

tic Academy•

I

went and took a look

at the courses they

had to offer--Marx-

ism, Philosophy,

History, and so on.

well, what did I

need this for?

already knew this.

I said:

'No, I

won't go.'"

1964

April 1966

Octaber 1966

"After my ill-

ness and after the

Far East I received

orders to the Bal-

tic.

On the Bal-

tic

there is a city

which was formerly

403-810197990

5.47г0, 2:

Following hig

regular leave

NOSENKO waB Or-

dered by the Navy

to proceed to

Berlin and Rostok,

but refused to go

During the summer

of 1952 NOSENKO was

offered assignments

to the Military-

Diplomatic Academy,

to a special Navy

espionage school,

and to Germany, but

turned all of them

down for various

reasons.

He re-

jected the opportun-

ity to attend the

Military-Diplomatic

Academy because he

had already had

96 per cent of the

courses in the In-

stitute.

(Hay)

NOSENKO received

"During the

orders to Sovetsk and month of July the

arrived there in late l'ersonnel Departs:

Auguat or early Sep-

ment of the GRU

tember 1952.

In

reached a deci-

Sovets': NOSENKO was

sion concerning

assigned a political

the place of my

NOSENKO was offered

an

opportunity to

attend the Military-

Diplomatic Academy,

but did not want to go.

Besides, he tailed the

physical examinations

for entrance when sugar

was discovered in his

faeces.

NOSENKO drank

too much.

NOSENKO was shown

a map of Kalinin

/gradskaya Oblast

..--

showing Primorak to be

where he said Sovetsk:

should be located.

NOSENKO continued

to

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 100

++792-17-73-046

June 1962

tho Germin city of

PfIlau and is now

called Primorsk."

There NOSENKO was

Involved in the

formation of

"agent-observation

posts."

Suitable

dandidates were

selected from

among the crews of

ships.

They were

then formed into

groups of three

men

each and were

trained in radio-

operation.

demo-

Istion,

etc.

After this

the

groups split up

2.

and. their mom-

bers went their

deparate ways.

In

case of war the

groups were to be

retormed and sent

ehind enemy lines

in sabotage and

Intelligence mis-

dions.

[Note:

The former German

city of Pillau is

now called Baltiysk.

not Primorsk; the

Tatter is a small

Mitage nearby y

1964

74.

1965

when he learned

that officer's job and

the Naval Intelli-

helped train

gence Points (MRP's) sailors for wartime

in Germany were

agent missions.

closing down

His main task was

and that his final

to prepare the

assignment was not

training plan for

definite.

He then

the sailors, to

tock more leave

instruct them in

(unauthorized)

subjects such as

until about 29 July

"The Foreign Policy

/. when he lefu for

of the USSR," and

Bareysk and st

generally to see to

ported

for duty to

their needs.

(May)

the Intelligence

Staff of the Fourth

Baltic Fleet.

He was assigned to

a Naval Intelli-

gence Point be al

set up in

Sovetsi,

a small town

near

Baltrysk.

There he

prepared arca

training materials

for and carried

supplies to agents,

but did not actually

deal with or train

them directly.

(Note: Previously

during the April

1964

interrogations

NOSENKO said

that he

had received training

near Moscow and was

then sent to Rostok

and Sassnitz before

April 1966

further assignment

and I was ordered

to the Naval Intel-

ligence Point of

the Fourth Baltic

Flect Intelligenc

Unit in Sovetsk,

Kaliningradskaya

is located before

you go out on the

spit of land where

Baltiysk (Pillau)

I arrived

In Sovetsk in

August 1952 and

began to work

the Naval Intelli-

gence Unit as a

senior translator.

Shortly before

my arrival the In-

telligence Point

had been moved

from Rostok,

in

Germany, to Sovetsk.

[Note:

It was

clear from NOSENKO'S

earlier descrip-

tions

that the

"Sovetsk" which.NO-

SENKO described is,

in fact, Primorsk,

a small village on

the coast.

The

only place called

Sovetsk in Kalinin-

gradskaya Oblast

October 1966

Bay that he was ag-

signed to Sovetak

in

the summer of

1952.

He was asked

why, as a son of a

minister and as

patient under

treat-

ment

for tuberculo-

sis,

he was not as-

signed to the Black

Sea oi somewhere

else with a healthy

climate.

NOSENKO

explained that there

were no positions

available

"elsewhere."

TOP SELMEN

---

## Page 101

2

June 1962

No date given

for divorce.

75.

1965

1964

going

to 'Bal-

tiysk/Sovetsk.

then said this

He

was

a lie. and gave

the version above.

The reason for the

lic, NOSENKO said,

was

that he knew

we "wouldn't be-

lieve the

truth"--

that he had suc-

cessfully refused

he assignment to

jermany.

In mid-August

September

or

"Sometime ifter my

1952 NO-

return to Moscow from

SENKO returned to

Sovetskaya Gavan, I

Moscow from the Bal-

carried

through with

tic for 7 to 10

my intention to

days to complete

divorce.

My di-

divorce proceedings

vorce was noted in

he had initiated

my Officer's Book-

in tie Far East.

let and nowhere

This was not

else.

I turned this

counted

as leave,

but

document in to the

as official

KGB Personnel office

business.

He then

when I began my KGB

returned to sov-

etsk.

Service and since

then have had.no.re-

cord of the divorce.

I continued to pay

alimony to Augustina..

TELEGINA (one quarter

of my salary) until

I left the USSR in

April 1966

is about 40 kilo-

meters inland,

and

NOSENKO himself

had said in 1962...

that he.served.in

Primorsk.

October 1966

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 102

490449 5009916599-4999

June

1962

1964

October 1966

[See

next entry.)

953

"In the be-

ginning of 1953

came to Moscow

from Primorskla

WiTS was

'55, 1n

the beginning.

NOSENKO did

not like his work

in Sovetsk bich

and wanted to

re-

turn to Moscow to

arrange for a

transfer.

asked for annual

leave which the

unit commander re-

fused to give him

as he had none due.

NOSENKO thereupon

went to Admiral

GOLOVKO in Bal-

tiysk and with his

help obtained

leave because of

the elder NOSENKO's

influential

sition.

VOSENKO

then returned to

Moscow shortly

before New Year's.

"I arrived back

in Moscow in Decem-

ber 1952, just be-

fore New Year's.

had vacation

for

the month of Janu-

76.

1965

1964.

She kept the

name NOSENKO

even after

she remarried."

(Note:

This is placed here for

comparison with his

1904 statement. 1*

April 1966

NOSENKO disliked

"I remained in

his job as a politi-

Sovetsk a short time

cal officer and was

and returned to Mos-

disdainful of the

cow at the end of

low educational level the ycar (1952l witb

of those he

was

the aim of changing

called upon to train, my place of work.

as well as of the

While in Sovetsk' i

"whole stupid" pro-

received the

rank of

gram.

He remained

lieutenant of the

in Sovetsk only

Administrative Ser-

until December 1952,

vice."

[Note: Sec

when he obtained

1965

entry for the

leave to spend the

spring of 1951.]

holidays with his

parents in Moscow.

(May)

In January NOSEN-

KO and his parents

went to visit the

family of General

KOBULOV at KOBULOV'S

dacha in Usov. NO.

"On 1 January 1953

my parents and I were

guests

at'the dacha

of KOBULOV who at

that time was working

in GUSIMZ in East Ber-

NOSENKO was divorced from TElEGINA durine his leave bofore anine to Sovaask (Mar and June 1952).

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 103

June 1962

in January.

Well

I came on

leave to

Moscow.

I was

there at my

father's

dacha, near Moscow.

KOBULOV came to

visit us at the

dacha...a conver-

sation

started.

He asked:

• What

are you doing?'

I answered:

am working in the

GRU...I came home

on leave. ' KOBU-

LOV asked:

'How

I said:

• Speaking

I don't.

frankly,

well,

ho said,

"you

better come work

s1th us....h0ok,

drop in

to sue me

for &

fome minute

some-

KOBULOV

was First Deputy

tO BERIA and a

freher riend of my

- 964

ary.

At the end

of January, at the

end of my

vacation

I went back to GRU

Personnel

and saw

KALOSHIN.:.I told

him I did not like

my job, all that

typing, well,

and he

said:

wait a while.

Look around.'

I

was at the dispo-

sal of the Person-

nel Department all

of February.

I

has no work

at all.

And since

I was

not working, I

did not get any

pay

for this month.

During this vacation

I was living with

my father and mother

on Gor'kiy Street."

"77.

1965

April 1966

SENKO and KOBULOV

discussed. NOS ENKQ: So;

dissatisfaction

with his Sovetsk

assignment and KOBU-

LOV suggested the

possibillty of

NOSENKO getting

into State Security

work.

(May)

lin with_£be : WISMUTH

first Time his was. the

member how do 'on"

Te-

versation came around

to me,

but I told

KODULOV about my

work in the Naval

GRU and my desire

to

change my place. of.==

work.

He promised to

find me. a place in

the

but this promise

MGB ampty conversation."

October 1966

TOP SECRET

"After. the New

"I met my (second]

Year I went to this

wife (Lyudmila

sanitorium,

Kubinka,

KOZNEVNIKOVA]. for. the

75 or 78 kilometers.

first time at the

from Moscow, and I

Herzen

"House of

was there January

Rest," one of the

"From the end.of

Jamaron i the undere

under

treatment at the

sanitorium near Mos-

cow where I had been . :

---

## Page 104

June 1962

1964

and

part of Febru-

ary.

After that I

was home."

[Note:

This statement las

made on

8:April.

As no

attempt.nas

made to reconcile

it with the pre-

vious entry, made

on ó April,

and be-

cause NOSENKO of-

fered no explana-

tion, both

are

included here.]

78.

1965

April 1966

"Houses of Rest" of

during

the summer of

the Council of Minis - 1952.

Hare I became

ters.

I was

resting

acquainted with my

there for several

second wife,

Lyudmila

days.

She was there

Yulianovna KOZHEV-

too.

It's about

NIKOVA.

65-70 kilometers

from Moscow, not far

from Kubinka.

I

was waiting for my

status to be re-

.solved...I didn't

want to

stay alone

at the

dacha (his

father's].

She was

studying philology

in the third course

at Moscow

State Uni-

versity.

She had

been seriously ill

with tuberculosis

when she was 17 and

still

ments. required treat-

(Interro-

gation,. 12 February

1965)

[Note:

NOSEN -

KO's explanation

of his presence at

the "House of Rest"

vas given in

response

co. the specific

•....

question:

"What

were you doing there?"]"

October 1966

...

TOP SECSET

1965 NOSENKO said: "I met my wife in a llouse of Rest. I had been at Sosno in January but didn't like it.

tried Dyatkino and met her.

See June 1942 entry:

in 1940 in Leningrad, Moscow,

Red Star, on 14 January 1967,

reported that seven "special naval schools" were establishe"

Vladivostok, Gorkly!

Kiev, Odessa, and Baku.

There is no indication that any of

---

## Page 105

79.

C. Personal Affairs Since Entering the KGB

1. Family Life

The Soviet internal passport which NOSENKO carried to

Geneva in 1964 confirms his claim that he married Lyudmila

KOZHEVNIKOVA on 27 June 1953.

(They married approximately

six months

says he joined the KGB.)

Immediately after their narriage

the couple moved

into the home of NOSENKO's new in-laws at

Ulitsa Serafimovich 2, Moscow, where they lived until obtain-

ing their own apartment on Narodnaya Ulitsa in January 1955.*

KOZHEVNIKOVA's father is Yulian Mikolayevich KOZHEVNIKOV, a

metallurgical engineer by training, who held the position of

First Deputy Chairman of the State Scientific Research Com-

mittee

(GKKNIR) of the RSFSR at the time of NOSENKO's defec-

tion.**

NOSENKO said that he has two daughters by this second

marriage.

According to his passport, the eldest of these,

Oksana, was born on 21 August 1354' and the other, Tamara,

on

13 July 1958.***

NOSEUKO in 1952 displayed to his CIA handlers

a photograph of the two girls and their nother and made a par-

ticular point of noting the close physical resemblance between

On 23 April 1964 NOSENKO was questioned on the various

apartments he occupied in Moscow.

time of his marr:age to TELEGINA until his departure for

his first GRU post in the Far Fast, he lived in an apart-

ment on Meshchanskaya Ulitsa. He gave up this apartment,

he said, in 1950, when. his Navy orders came through.

Having

nade this

the 1951 Moscow telephone directory still listed him at

the Meshchanskaya Ulitsa address. He replied that he could

not explain but that he was considered to have vacated the

house in 1950.

(He later said he moved to the Far East in

1951 - see Section IV.B. ) NOSENKO ther said that the

previous tenant at Narodnaya Ulitsa 13 had been one Nikita

ISHCHENKO.

Although the phone then in the apartment was

switched to NOSENKO's name for billing purposes, NOSENKO

never bothered to have

phone book; he said that this would have required a visit

to a downtown office, the filling out of numerous forms,

etci; besides he added, he did not use

way.

Therefore, NOSENKO said, from 1955 until his defec-

tion in 1964, the telephone in his apartment was listed

under the name of ISHCHENKO.

He has repeated this story

during subseguent questionings.

The 1961 Moscow phone

directory carries no listing for NOSENKO; it does list

ISHCHENKO but gives his address as Krasnokholmskaya

Naberezhnaya, not Narodnaya Ulitsa.

# *

• The GKKNIR of the RSFSR

is now the GNTK. PENKOVSKIY worked

under cover in the GKKNIR of the USSR.

* * *

NOSENKO has also given his second daughter's year of birth

as 1957.

In 1962 he told CIA that the older daughter was

then studying in the first class at school; in 1965, how-

ever, he said she began school in the fall of 1962.

TOP. SECRET

---

## Page 106

Oksana and himself.

He said that he and his wife refer to her

"double"

(kop-ya).

His wife, in a letter after the

defection, referred to Oksana as NOSENKO's kopiya.

NOSENKO's father,

the Shipbuilding Minister, died of

stomach cancer in August 1956, three years after NOSENKO says

he entered the KGB. Second Chief Directorate.

The period of

time surrounding his father's death was, according to NOSENKO,

a turning point in his personal and professional life.

It was

"found himself" after an irresponsible past.

drinking and wenching, and indifference to his work.

2.

Venereal Disease

The incident which NOSENKO has most often cited as an

example of his irresponsibility in the period prior to 1956

involved his illegal use of KGB alias documents to cover treat-

ment for a case of gonorrhea he contracted in 1954, at the time

his wife was pregnant with their first child.

ThE CIA psycho-

Logist who questioned NOSENKO in May 1966 submitted the follow-

ing summary of HOSENKO's statements about this incident, which

about as given earlier (during the April 1964 interroga-

tion) :

"A girl friend he had known in Leningrad since 1945 came

to visit relatives in Moscow in 1954.

She called him, and he

spent some time with her.

She was not a prostitute, and he

had slept with ner before, so he thought nothing of it. Later

he developed what he feared was a venereal disease.

Since his

wife was pregnant, he was safe both from discovery and the

danger of infecting her.

He searched frantically around Moscow

Ior a private doctor wo treated such diseases, but could not

Some of his friends at the

office suggested a central

clinic that would require no documents.

He went here but when

confronted with a request for documents, had the choice of

showing his KGB certificate or ising a false passport he had

for business.

He tried to talk the doctor into letting him

go home to get his documents, but the doctor said re would have

to be accompanied by a member of the militia; otherwise he

might not come back.

He was required to take treatment of a

conrunicable disease.

He was forced to give the false document.

He. Came back for treatment about three times and was ordered

to report back in two weeks for a final

check.

They also

demanded the name of the

girl, but he claimed

he had only just

met her and did not know who she was.

He forgot to go back

and a nurse visited the safehouse about two times and left

a note for him to report.

However, he did not go to the safe-

house so knew nothing of the note.

In the false passport was

a listing of where the named person worked, a fictitious

factory.

As the result of the clinic inquiries, the request

for information got into the hands of the section which made

the docurents.

MOSELKO was called before the deputy chief of

the Directorate and severely criticized.

He explained what

had happened and was given five days of

house arrest.

However.

the chief of his section had also gotten word of the

infraction

and sentenced him to fifteen days of house arrest without even

talking to him.

He toid his wife he was going on a trip and

moved into the administrative room near the office to serve

his term.

In the meantime, the Secretary of the KGB Party

TO? SEORET

---

## Page 107

81..

Committee called NOSENKO's father on the phone and told him

the whole story.

NOSENKO's father never toli either NOSENKO'S

wife of mother of the incident, but did chide NOSENKO about

it..

The incident was brought before the Komsomol and discussed.

A written reprimand for immoral conduct-unauthorized use of

official documents was placed in his recora.

This was also

a final warning meaning

that any other infraction would result

in expulsion.

He made the statement

that he had been punished

for this incident many times.

He could not immediately apply

for party membership; the incident was broucht up repeatedly

in Konsomol meetings

and even in party meetings (after he was

accepted) as a horrible example; and it kept him from being

promoted from Senior Lieutenant to Captain.

(The Deputy-

Director who

gave him five days was a member of the promotion

commission.)"

Although there have been slight changes and contradictions

in NOSENKO's numerous accounts of this story (the house arrest

was variously reported as 5, 10, and 15 days) it remained

basically consistent until the October 1966 interrogations

when he said for the first time that he contracted gonorrhea

from the girl in Leningrad in 1945 rather thar. 1954.

In 1954,

he said,

he again was infected, this time by a prostitute whom

he picked up

in the vicinity of the Leningrad Railroad Station

in Moscow.

When the KGB required that he reveal the source.

NOSENKO said, he ascribed the latter case to the origiral girl

from Leningrad.

During the October 1966 interrogations NOSENKO

also told CIA for the first time that he had had venereal

disease on

two other occasions while studying at the Institute

of International Affairs.

He later began to "feel more a part of the KGB," and as

a junior KGB case officer,

BURGI in the first successful recruitment operation carried

out by the newly-created Tourist Departmert of the Second Chief

Directorate.*

"And in 1956," NOSENKO said ir. 1964, "cefore

my father's death, I was made a candidate for membership in

the Communist Party and, exactly 15 days later, was assigned

the rank of Senior Case Officer.

I developed a pride in my-

selfe (a feeling) that I can do things.

You know how it Is.

When

a person feels that he can,

that he has some support,

then he works much better. "e has more initiative and

SO

forth."

3, Affiliation with Comnunist Party Organs

NOSENKO said that his formal participation in Connunist

Party activities began in late 1943 or early 1944 when he

joined the Komsomol at the Naval Preparatory School in Baku.

This step was a casual one, and he has said that he took it

without much thought, mainly because all his friends were

See Part V.D.4.b. for a description of the BURGI recruit-

ment operation.

Until 1966 NOSENKO claimed to CIA that

he had received an award for his participation in this

operation.

In the October 1966 interrogations he retracted

this and said that he never received any KGB award for the

BURGI or any other operation.

TOP SECHET

---

## Page 108

82.

jolning..

When NOSENKO entered the KGB in the spring of 1953.

he transferred routinely to the Konsomol organization there

and became

Secretary of the Komsomol Organization of the

Second Chief Directorate.

This was a small organization

consisting, NOSENKO thought, of about 17 KGB employees; he

remained its secretary until June or July 1954,

when he got

into the trouble over illegal use of operational documents.

According to NOSENKO,

"Inmediately after this incident the

Bureau of the Komsomol was gathered, and I was immediately

removed from the position of Secretary." A week later, a

"strict reprimard" was entered in NOSENKO's Konsomol records.

In October 1954, on the eve of his 27th birthday, NOSENKO

was

forced out of the Komsomol for over-age.*

At that time,

the "strict reprimand" he had received several months earlier

was remitted on NOSENKO's petition, and he was permitted to

leave the organization with a clean record.

He was not per-

mitted to join the Communist Party immediately, however.

NOSENKO described the situation on 15 April 1964 as follows:

"Now I had to prove myself.

Not being a candidate for Party

membership. I asked them for assignments to show my eagerness,

to prove myself. I also asked the Party Organization of the

Second Chief Directorate for some

'public service' (obshchest-

venniy) assignments.

I collected newspapers."

For a year,

"made good" by running errands and performing other

such tasks, until it was decided that he was suitable for

Party membership.

He applied in January 1956 and was accepted

as a candidate member of the Party in June the same year;

full membership was granted in 1957.

For over a year, from

October 1954 until January 1956, NOSENKO said, he had

the

distinction of being the only employee of the

KGB who was

neither a Komsomol nor a Party member or applicant.

4.

Statements to Others. by NOSENKO

Before giving CIA the foregoing details, NOSENKO had

talked about himself to several non-Soviets, including persons

involved in cases which are reviewed in other portions of this

NOSENKO informed the recruitment target Horst BRAUNS

that he had two daughters.** He advised Ivan Ivanovich PREIS-

FREUND, a Finnish citizen

used in the recruitment approach to

a U.S. Army sergeant in Moscow, that he was married, his

father was dead

but his mother

was living, he had served in

the Navy, and he had two children.

PREISFREUND met the

"little girls" ard later reported to CIA that, although

NOSENKO was a "woman-chaser," he loved his daughters very

much. *** With one KGB agent

in particular, Arsene FRIPPEL,

NOSENKO was especially forthcoming: he told FRIPPEL of his

According to the Statutes (Ustav) of the Komsomol in effect

in 1954, the maximum age for a Komsomol member at that time

was 25.

On this basis, NOSENKO should have been excluded

in October 1953, upon reaching his 26th birthday.

When

this was explained to NOSENKO by DERYABIN in July 1965,

NOSENKO replied that he was certain he left the Komsomol

in 1954 upon reaching the age of 27, that he was sure the

maximum age was 26 at that time, and that no special

** See Part V.F.9.

***PREISFREUND is discussed in detail in Part V.E.4.a:

TEP, SENIET

---

## Page 109

source

83.

service in the Soviet lavy; he dwelt at length on his father's

work in the soviet shipbullding industry; and while using the

allas "NIKOLAYEV" with FRIPPEL, he mentioned that his father

had been employed in the town of Nikolayev.

On one occasion

NOSENKO and his wife dined at FRIPPEL's home.*

NOSENKO told

his recruitment target George DREW in April 1953 that he had

two daughters.

D. Soviets' Statements About NOSENKO

Portions of the NOSENKO autobiography have been supported

and other portions contradicted by the statements of

several

Soviets following the defectior.

The Soviets' remarks dealing

with NOSENKO'S KGB career are reviewed in Part V.I.. but with

reference to other aspects of. the background of NOSENKO:

- Letters

to NOSENKO in Geneva from his wife (wno

later went to

the U.S. Embassy after his defection) in-

clude a reference to one of the daughters as his "double"

ind two other personal letters in his possession at the

GUK and G. I.

DUCHKOV,

referred to visits to NOSENKO's wife and children.

- À KGB officer in Vierna, Vladimir TULAYEV, told

a CIA double agent that NOSENKO, whom he knew well, came

from a wonderful family, loved his wife and children,

and earned a good salary. . TULAYEV later told the agent

that he had "friends who knew NOSENKO well."**

- A Soviet diplomat in Buenos Aires, Feliks KOVALEV,

gaid to a CIA agent that NOSENKO had twice married, had

the government,

was notorious. for his "adventurous"

nature, and was "fanous for his character."

- The Soviet Navy defector Nikolay ARTA:ONOV said

he attended a naval preparatory school with NOJENKO in

1944 to 1946.

end of the dates involved, however, differs from

NOSENKO 'S• bensitive source

ment reported NOSENKO is the son of a former

Soviet Government Minister,

naval college.

shot

himself to avoid going to

front with the rest of his

class, was graduated from the Institute in 1950, and

contracted

venereal disease in 1950 but through his

father's influence avoided damage to his career

"from conversations with fellow officers

has

indicated that he does not know NOSENKO.

**

FRIPPEL is discussed more fully in Part .V.D.5.

In October 1966 NOSENKO failed to identify TULAYEV either

by name or photograph and said he didn't know him.

Med Das:

sensitive

"ist

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 110

84.

sersitive source

Galatal said

that when NOSENKO was a young man, he

atterded the GRU Military-Diplomatic Academy and then spert.

a short time, perhaps a year. in the Information: Department

at GRU

Headquarters.

NOSENKO had been a "very undisciplined

person" while in the GRU and "not very good, "ailiP con-

tinued, and he was discharged from the GRU. However, his

father, an

"influential person in the Ministry of Ship-

building, " was able to get HOSENKO transferred to the KGB.

#said he did not know NOSENKO personally, but

learned this information from

"various persons" (unnamed)

in MoscoW.

- The thumbnail biography of NOSENKO which KOROLEV

and ROSENTAL submitted to the editors of Paris Match in

•Qctober 1966

(see Part III.H.) stated that NOSENKO was

"closely acquainted with the country's leaders,

families.

and homes" and that his "father who died several years

ago was

an important official in the Party and state

organs."

The document went on to say that "NOSENKO'S

family consists of a wife, 35,

two daughters, 10 and 12.

mother and a brother (younger)." KOROLEV and ROSENTAL

also provided photographs purporting to be of NOSENKO's

and daughters.

-

sassass said she heard from her KGB friend

V. G. SVIRIN that NOSENKO's father was a Minister or a

General of Ukrainian origin and that his mother was. denist

and "was always

involved in some blackmarketeering."

She

also said that

she heard NOSENKO was a "civilian,"

not a

KGB officer, but was connected somehow with the KGB. (She

could not explain this connection other than to say that

all Soviets permitted to meet foreigners are either

officers or

"lativag" of cha nub.)

TOP SECRET

---