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Date

Page

07/14/98

1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

- - -

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY

RECORD NUMBER

RECORDS SERIES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

NSC

145-10001-10267

125

Released under the John

Assassination Records

collection Act of 1992

144 USC 2107 Notel.

Case#:NU 54214 Date:

10-10-2017

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR

: DOD

FROM

: BRIG. GEN. LANSDALE

TO

:

SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

TITLE : MEMORANDUM

DATE : 07/25/62

PAGES

: 8

SUBJECTS : REVIEW OF OPERATION MONGOOSE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION :

RESTRICTIONS : 1B

CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW

: 02/17/98

OPENING CRITERIA

COMMENTS :

NO JOINT STAFF OBJECTION

TO DECLASSIFICATION

REQUIRES CONCURRENCE OF

DATE:

WAR

2015

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

42

H

SENSITIVE

25 July 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

From:

Brig. Gen. Lansdale

Subject:

Review of Operation Mongoose

This is the Operations report at the end of Phase I. It has

been compiled to assist you in reviewing Operation Mongoose thus

far and in determining the best course of U.S. action for the future.

This Operations report contains the contribution of each major

participant, on objectives, on the planning and operational activity

to win these objectives, and on future possibilities to be soverned by

the policy framework. A National Intelligence Estimate (NIE 85-2-62)

is being submitted separately for consideration in connection with

this report.

As Chief of Operations, I am indicating in this covering

memorandum what I consider to be the most significant aspects of

our policy and program picture. The full report of each major partici-

pant is appended, to ensure that you have access to the exact reporting

as submitted.

OBJECTIVES

As desired by bigher authority on 30 November 1961, the U.S.

undertook a special effort "in order to help Cuba overthrow the Communist

regime. " After a review of operational planning and programming con-

cepts, the Special Group (Augmented) provided guidelines on 14 March

1962 for Phase I, Operation Mongoose (roughly until the end of July 1962).

The main obiectives were seen as:

a. The acquisition of hard intelligence on the target area.

Excluded from automatic

regrading: DoD Dir 5200.10

does not apply.

EXCLUDED FROM GDS

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b. Undertaking all other political, economic, and covert

actions, short of inspiring a revolt in Cuba or developing the need

for U.S. armed intervention.

c. Be consistent with U.S. overt policy, and remain in

position to disengage with minimum loss in assets and U.S, prestige.

d. Continue JCS planning and essential preliminary actions

for a decisive U.S. capability for intervention.

ACCOMPLISHMENT

Elements of the U.S. government were organized to reach the

goals set for Phase I. My assessment of where we are on each

objective is noted under appropriate sub-headings below. In general,

this has been a remarkably quiet operation, well within the "noise"

and "visibility" limits imposed.

Higher authority has been kept informed of progress through

the Special Group (Augmented), by freguent reports. The Special

Group has provided policy guidance, as reguired, in Phase I.

The Chief of Operations has coordinated the efforts of participa-

ting departments and agencies, through meetings of the Operational

Representatives and by constant review of progress. The Operational

Representative of each major U.S. participant in Operation Mongoose

are William Harvey (CLA), Robert Hurwitch (State), Brig. Gen. Benjamin

Harris (Defense), and Don Wilson (USIA).

My assessment of the organization, planning, and actions to

reach the goals in Phase I:

Intelligence.

CLA had the main assignment to acquire the

"hard-intelligence" desired. The headquarters and field staff of CIA

are now well organized for a major effort for this aspect of Operation

Mongoose, being strengthened by a number of CLA officers experienced

in "denied area" operations elsewhere in the world. Planning and

actions rate superior, in a professional sense of intelligence collection.

12

CLA established the Caribbean Admission Center at Opa-Locka,

Florida, and an interrogation activity in Spain

It undertook a priority 1.31a.1

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plan to collect information on the target from third country areas in

Latin America and Europe. Inside Cuba, the recruitment and place-

ment of third country nationals and initiation of Cuban collection nets,

particularly in urban centers, has made Operation Mongoose numeri-

cally the largest U.S. intelligence agent effort inside a Communist

state. However, the effort in more remote provincial areas of Cuba,

where guerrilla resistance was expected to be spotted, recruited,

and organized, was short of the hoped-for goal; this was due to the

regime's security precautions and, to some degree, to policy limita-

tions on the risks to be assumed.

Defense contributed the majority of personnel to staff the

Caribbean Admission Center, stepped-up SIGINT collection under NSA

despite changes and improved sophistication of Cuban communication

procedures, and brought into play the available assets of Service intelli.

gence organizations, in coordination with CIA. State stepped up its

information collection from diplomatic and refugee organization sources.

Justice (FBI and INS) and USIA provided significant support to the

Caribbean Admission Center.

Political. State appointed a representative to devote full-time

to Operation Mongoose and to develop the required political actions.

During Phase I, the Punta del Este conference was a major U.S. political

action to isolate Castro and neutralize his influence in the Hemisphere,

but was not developed within the context of Operation Mongoose.

The

successful visit of President Kennedy to Mexico was another major U.S.

political action, with a potential impact upon our special goals, but was

not developed within the context of Operation Mongoose. Two Operation

Mongoose efforts in political action were attempted in Phase I: to

counter Castro-Communist propaganda exploitation of May Day and to

arouse strong Hemisphere reaction to Cuban military, suppression of the

hunger demonstration at Cardenas, in June. Ambassadors in Latin America

were asked to undertake a special effort, as possible, with the help of their

Country Teams; political action results in both instances were mostly

negative, due to lack of capability and the local attitude in Latin American

countries.

State is responsible for refugee political policy matters, assisted

by CIA in daily liaison. This is an area of major interest to Operation

Mongoose, since the Cuban refugees have an open objective of over-

throwing the Communist regime in Havana and recapturing their homeland.

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They are given open U.S. assistance to remain in this country, yet

are participating in covert actions in a limited way. Only a fractional

opening has been made to release the frustrated energy of these refugees

in freeing their homeland and in creating a favorable political climate in

Latin America for the liberation of Cuba. Policy limitations of "audibility"

and "visibility" apply directly in considering the handling and use of this

dynamic refugee potential.

As a working document for U.S. operational guidance, State

developed a definition of a political program for a free Cuba, with the

understanding that any real political program must be developed by the

Cubans themselves.

Psychological. Psychological activities for Operation Mongoose

make use of existing assignments of responsibilities within the U. S.

government: State, having the policy role, chairs an inter-agency Cuba

Psychological Operations Group which meets weekly; USIA disseminates

any U.S. government information (VOA and Press Service) and generates

"gray" or non-official information (5 million cartoon books and thousands

of Spanish books on Cuba disseminated in Latin America); CIA passes

information appropriate for "gray" and covert psychological channels

(radio, mailings to Cuba, and dissemination inside Cuba).

Conditions and events in Cuba have provided many effective themes,

which have been promptly and sharply exploited by available means in the

Western Hemisphere.

However, the U.S. still lacks the capability of

effectively getting information to the majority of the Cuban people. Our

short-wave broadcasts are highly regarded by the Cuban people, but short-

wave receiver sets are limited inside Cuba. Our medium-wave broadcasts

compete against stronger Cuban signals; it was felt that greater U.S.

competition in medium-wave broadcasts could lead to Cuban interference

of U.S. commercial broadcasts over a fairly wide area of the U.S.

Clandestine broadcasts from a submarine (appearing as broadcasts by

Cuban guerrillas inside Cuba) have been initiated; they are in their infancy,

and have a long way to develop before their messages are believed and

get passed among Cubans by word-of-mouth. Dissemination of leaflets

and propaganda inside Cuba by balloon or aircraft has not received policy

approval.

Economic. State has the main responsibility for developing economic

actions. State has chaired an inter-agency working group, which generated

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the U.S. trade embargo, denial of bunkering facilities, increased port

security, and control procedures on transhipment, technical data, and

customs inspection. Diplomatic means were used to frustrate Cuban

trade negotiations in Israel, Jordan, Iran, Greece, and possibly Japan.

Under Resolution VIll adopted at Punta del Este, the OAS has established

a special committee to study "the feasibility and desirability of extending

the suspension of trade with Cuba to other items (than arms, " State has

prepared a program to be submitted to this OAS committee in the future.

The evidence in that Cuba's economy is suffering. Trade with the

Communist Bloc and others has kept it limping along, despite scarcity

of U.S. goods, the bad drought limiting agrarian crops, increased worker

non-cooperation and the regime's bungling of economic control measures.

Critical spare parts still arrive in Cuba, including shipments from British

and Canadian firms. Chartered shipping from Free World sources still

plays a major role in Cuba's trade, and the U.S. has little hope of cutting

this life-line to Castro.

Guerrilla. CIA had the main responsibility for assessing resistance

potential inside Cuba and to start quietly organizing such resistance as

feasible. The CIA plan has been to set about doing this through introducing

small teams into the Cuban countryside, "over the beach" from boats.

Each team is tasked first to stay alive, while getting established in an area.

Once able to live in an area, it then stafts a cautious survey of potential

recruits for a resistance group. Names of such recruits are sent to CLA

for checking. As recruits join, they are trained on the ground by the team,

and then continue the survey. This is slow and dangerous work.

CIA reports that ll teams will have been infiltrated by

the end of July and that 19 maritime operations have aborted. Of the

teams in, the most successful is the one in Pinar del Rio in western Cuba;

its success was helped greatly by a maritime re-supply of arms and

equipment; the fact that it is a "going concern" and receives help from

outside has attracted recruits. Its potential has been estimated at about

250, which is a sizeable guerrilla force. With equally large guerrilla

forces in other Cuban provinces, guerrilla warfare could be activated

with a good chance of success, if assisted properly. However, the teams

in other provinces have not been so successful; our best hope is that we

will have viable teams in all the potential resistance areas by early October.

Bad weather, high seas, and increased security patrols will make the

infiltration of teams and their re-supply from small boats a hard task.

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Sabotage has not taken place, on a U.S. -sponsored basis.

Planning for such action by ClA has been thorough, including detailed

study of the structures and vulnerabilities of key targets. Sophisticated

actions, such as the contamination of POL has been frustrated by lack of

cooperation of nations where POL would be vulnerable to action. Commando

type raids would take maritime means which now have priority use in

support of CIA teams being infiltrated inside to survey and create a guerrilla

potential. CIA has reported that there is now some capability inside Cuba

for sabotage action, that target selection has been under further careful

review, and that a proposal is forthcoming to be submitted for policy approval.

Intervention Planning. The JCS were given the responsibility for

planning and undertaking essential preliminary actions for a decisive U.S.

capability for intervention in Cuba. This "Guidelines" objective has been

met, fully. Also, U.S. military readiness for intervention in Cuba has

been under continuing review within Defense, being improved wherever

feasible. In addition, rumors during June of a possible uprising inside Cuba

led to further planning for a contingency where a non-U.S. inspired revolt

might start inside Cuba; inter-agency staffing of U.S. planning for such a

Cuban contingency is being completed, under Defense leadership.

Assets. Whatever we decide to do in the future depends, to a

large degree, onthe assets available to us. Our own U.S. assets in organi-

zation, personnel, and equipment are sufficient to liberate Cuba, given the

decision to do 80.

Assets among the Cubans, to liberate themselves, are

capable of a greater effectiveness once a firm decision is made by the U.S.

to provide maximum support of Cubans to liberate Cuba, and the Cubans

start being helped towards that goal by the U.S.

There are enough able-

bodied and properly motivated Cubans inside Cuba and in exile to do the job.

There is wide-spread disaffection in Cuba, with strong indications that

economic distress and demoralization of population is causing real concern

and strain for the regime's control officials. Firm U.S. intention to help

free Cuba is the key factor in assessing the Cubans themselves as an

operational asset for Operation Mongoose.

At the close of Phase I, my concern is strong that time is running

out for the U.S. to make a free choice on Cuba, based largely on what is

happening to the will of the Cuban people. Rightly or wrongly, the Cubang

have looked and are looking to the U.S. for guidance on what to aspire to

and do next. They wonder if we are not merely watching Cuba closely, as

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a matter of our own security, undertaking some economic proscription,

and isolating the Castro/Communist gang from contaminating the Hemis -

phere. Along with recognition of our humanitarian sympathies, this seems

to be the fear among Cuban refugees, although they are still hopeful.

If Cubans become convinced that the U.S. is not going to do more

than watch and talk, I believe they will make other plans for the future.

The bulk of Cuban refugees in the U.S. are most likely to start getting

serious about settling down for life in the U.S., dulling their desire to

return home with personal risk involved. The bulk of disaffected people

inside Cuba will lose hope and incentive for futile protests against the regime

and start accepting their status as captives of the Communists. Some Cuban

activists will not accept the loss of their homeland so easily and may seek

release from frustration by liberation operations outside U.S. territory

and control. The recent wildcat Cuban scheme to bomb Habana from Central

America is an example.

Our probes of the guerrilla potential inside Cuba have been hampered

by similar morale factors. Cubans sent to risk their lives on missions

inside Cuba feel very much alone, except for their communications link

back to the U.S. They are unable to recruit freedom fighters aggressively

by the time-proven method of starting an active resistance and thus attracting

recruits; U.S. guidelines to keep this short of a revolt have made the inten-

tion behind the operation suspect to local Cubans. The evidence of some

intent is seen in the recent maritime re-supply of the team in Pinar del Rio.

We brought in extra weapons, for which there were immediate recruits; if

we were to exploit the evident guerrilla potential in this province, it appears

likely that we would have to furnish supplie: by air and probably open the U.S.

to strong charges of furnishing such support to Cuban resistance elements.

Therefore, we have been unable to surface the Cuban resistance

potential to à point where we can measure it realistically.

The only way

this can be done, accurately, is when resistance actually has a rallying

point of freedom fighters who appear to the Cuban people to have some

chance of winning, and that means at least an implication that the U.S. is

in support. Word-of-mouth information that such a freedom movement is

afoot could cause the majority of the Cuban people to choose sides.

It

would be the first real opportunity for them to do so since Castro and the :

Communists came to power. There was little opportunity for the Cuban

people to join an active resistance in April 1961; there is less opportunity

today. If the Cuban people are to feel they have a real opportunity, they

must have something which they can join with some belief in its success.

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DELHEI

PROJECTION (PHASE II).

As a help towards the making of a U.S. decision on a future course

of action, the Operational Representatives developed working statements

of four possibilities; at my request they have commented on the positive

and negative factors worth considering for each possible course, and it

is suggested that these thoughtful statements are worth reading in full.

The working statements of the choices open to the U.S. are as follows:

a. Cancel operational plans; treat Cuba as a Bloc nation; protect

Hemisphere from it, or

b. Exert all possible diplomatic, economic, psychological, and

other pressures to overthrow the Castro-Communist regime without

overt employment of U.S. military, or

c. Commit U.S. to help Cubans overthrow the Castro-Communist

regime, with a step-by-step phasing to ensure success, including the use

of U.S, military force if required at the end, or

d. Use a provocation and overthrow the Castro-Communist

regime by U.S. military force.

RECOMMENDATION.

It is recommended that this review of Phase I be considered by

the Special Group as providing the operational basis for guidelines and

objectives for Phase II. It is a matter of urgency that these be arrived

at by the Special Group, to permit developing specific plans and schedules

for Phase II.

4 Attachments

"Eyes Only" copies to:

Special Group (Augmented)

1. General Taylor

2.

Mr. Alexis Johnson

3. Mr. Roswell Gilpatric

Operational Representatives

7. Mr. William Harvey (CLA)

8. Mr. Robert Hurwitch (State)

4. Mr. Jobn McCone

Mr. Robert Kennedy

6. General Lemnitzer

9. General Harris (Defense)

10.

Mr. Don Wilson (USIA)

11. Chief of Operations

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