EFFORTS TO SPLIT THE REGIME: MARCH - JUNE 1962 - STUDY OF THE LOCI OF POWER CONCLUDED.
Originator: CIA
Document date: 06/01/1962
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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2023 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

EFFORTS TO SPLIT THE REGIME

March - June 1962

Study of the Loci of Power Concluded

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EFFORTS TO SPLIT THE REGIME

March - June 1962: Study of the Loc of Power Concluded:

A. Power Groups in Cuba

26th of July Movement

2. The Popular Socialist Party, Comnunist

(Partido Popular Socialista - PSP)

3. The Revolutionary Director (Directorio

Revolucianario - DR)

B. Key Leaders

1. 26th of July:

a. Fidel Castro

bi Raul Castro

c. Ernesto "Che" Guevara

d. Osvaldo Dorticos, President

e. Raul Roa, Foreign Minister

f. Ramiro Valdes, Minister of Interior

2.

PSP - Communist Leaders

a. Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, President of

the National Institute of Agrnrian Reform

(Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria - INNA)

b. Bles Roca, Member of the Executive Board of

Integrated Revolutionary Organizations

(Organizaciones Revolucionarias Integrades -

ORI)

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Lazaro Pena, Secretary General of the Cuban

Revolutionary Labor Council (Central de

Trabajadores de Cuba Revolucionaria - CTC-R)

d. Manual Luzardo Garcia, Minister of Internal

• Commerce

•. Antonto Nunez Jiminez, Executive Director

of National Agrarian Reform Institute (INRA)

I. Severo Aguirre Cristo, a national leader of

the Integrated Revolutionary Organizations

(ORI)

B. Lionel soto -

_ Director General of Schools

of Revolutionary Instruction

3. Important Men not Clearly Aligned to the 26th of

July or Communist Power

a.

Regino Boti, Minister of National Economy

b. • Armando Hart

Davalos, Minister of Education

c. Alfredo Yabur Maluf, Minister of Justice

d. Carlos Lechuga Hevia, Ambassador to UN

e.'

Faure Chomon

1. Raul Pruntlles,

Cuban Delegate to the UN

B. (Ambassador)

•Garcia Inchaustegul, until

recently head of the Cuban delegation to the

UN

h.

Rolando Cubela Secades, Ex-President of

University Students

1. DI. Rene Vallejo, Castro's 'personal physician

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C. Governmental Structure:

• 1. Present Ruling Political Group: Integrated

Revolutionary Organizationg (Organizaciones

Revolucionarias Integradas - ORI)

2. Future Ruling Political Group: United Party

of the Socalist Revolution (Partido Unido de la

Revoluciona Socialista - PURS)

3. Numerical Representations of Power Groups on

Ministerial Levels:

a. 26th of July Movement - 8

b. PSP - Communist - 2

c. Revolutionary Directorate - 3

d. Fidel Castro Appointment.

(1) Raul Roa, Foreign Minister

(2) Rolando Diaz Astarain, Minister of Flnance

D. The Implications

to.

the Power Alignments of Escalante's

Purge:

1. The purge of Anibal Escalante Dellunde, Executive

Secretary of the PSP from the position of -

in the ORI did not create a "split"

between "new" and "old" communists.

2. Castro's reasons for purging Escalante were Almost

Certainly Aimed at:

Reassuring those 26th of July leaders who

had fought for the revolution but not for

communism.

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b. Putting the brakes on the PSP's grab

for power.

c. Castigating Escalante for personal

"sectarianism".

E.

A New View on Splitting the Regime:

1. Castro's purge of Escalante surfaced his

concern for the balance between the non-communist

elements of the 26th of July Movement and the

"unaligned" government leader and the PSP - "old"

and "new".

z..

To split Castro from the PSP would be difficult

and of questionable value:.

a. The PSP to gain its final objective would

take any Insult and turn the other cheek.

It had embraced Fidel and would not let go

under any circumstances. To rise against

Castro now

would not be opportune, and

would probably be fatal.

b.

Fidel was now totally dependent on the

Soviet Union

The only hope was not to split Fidel from

PSP but to identify, at every opportunity,

him and his government with communism, for

only the non-communist element of the 26th

of July Movement and the "unalighed leaders

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of the government could effectively be

split from the government.

d.

This conclusion did not preclude the Task

Force from attempts to create suspicion,

hostility and friction between Castro and

the PSP.

• II.

The Direction of Task Force Efforts to Split the Regime:

A. To identify those members of the 26th of July Movement

and other "unaligned" government leaders who were for

the revolution but against communisn. To date, there

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reasonably good evidence indicating that the

following individuals do not approve of the communist

direction of the Cuban revolution and may in fact

be conspiring against the regime.

1. Major Pedro Miret Prieto, commanding artillery unit

2. Ambassador Gustavo Arcos y Bergnes

3. Commander Sebastian Arcos, brother

of Gustavo rnd

a commander in the Cuban havy. Has been in Prigue

for some time on a training mission

4. Orlando Ventura Reyes

5. Manuel Carbonell Duque

6. Major Faustino Perez, former minister charged with

the recovery of stolen properties

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7. Ouar Fernandez Canizares, Minister of Transportr

tion.

NOTE: Ambassador Gustavo Arcos is undoubtedly an

important member of this group of potential con-

spirators.

TEW has made an unsuccessful but sustained

effort to recruit him in russels.

Trespite our

failure

to date, Arcos remains In close and friendly

contact with TFW sources.

Conspiring in Cuba today is dangerous business.

These are fearful men and neither

easily identified

or easily contacted within Cuba.

Each of the above men remain as high priority targets

within. Our main efforts to contact them take tur

directions: (1)

The identification of suitable

intermediaries to them, and (2) the eventual use

of internal assets now

in place.

8. Major Rolando Cubela Secades, ex-president of

the Federation of University Students. An M.D).,

recruited, trained and returned to Cuba after

attending the World Youth Festival in Helsinli

9.

In June 1962.

Juantta Sastro, younger atster.of Fldel and

- recruited, trained and returned to

10.

Cuba.

Aise of Major Raul Jaime Diaz Arpuellos.

Reporting from Havana through CAMSTRUT/1, the

wife of the Braziltan Aubassador to Russty, who

travels to Cuba for TEW froin Pio, where She lives

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-. -

1

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Major Diaz is described as a "new" communist

by Juanita Castro

11. Raul Roa, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Effort

to contact and recruit in October 1962 failed.

Recruited and working for TEW is the brother.

Of Mrs. Raul Roa. He resides in Miami.

TE'W

is presently engaged in attempting to resettle

the parents of Mrs. Rod in the U.S. The deperture

of the parents from Cuba will leave Mrs. Roa is

the last member of her large family in Cuba:

This move of her parents could cause a final

break between the Roas, who are already in-

tensely concerned with their situation with

Cuba. Raul Roa remains a high priority target.

12. President Osvaldo Dorticos. An attempt to

recruit President Dorticos in October 1962 falled.

Dorticos was approached by a TEW asset in New

York during his last visit to the United Nations.

Our agent was "forcibly" removed from the

botel whereDorticos was staying.

13.

Jose Llanusa, Director of Sports in Cuba and onc

time "Mayor" of Havana. Efforts to recruit

Llanusa in May 1962 failed; however, a total rif

ten (10) Cuban athlets defected during the seme

, period of the 9th Central American and Carribenn

games in Kingston, Jamaica.

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1:

d14.

Major Jose Ricardo Rabel Nunez, Chief of Rurnl

Housing in Cuba refused to work in place but

will defect. Contact is maintained inside

Cuba. Rabel states he will fly out of Cuba

with a "fat one" (unidentified).

15. Alfred Davins Ferrer, a Spaniard hired to

recruit technicians for Cuban industry hos

been recruited. He has recently returned to

Cuba. He claims to be close to "Che" Guevarn

and Minister of National Economy, Regino Boti.

Davins may serve as an excellent mechanism for

the infiltration of TEW chosen technicians into

16.

Cuba.

Mrs. Carlos Lechuga, wife of Carlos Lechuga

Hevia, Cuban Ambassador to the United Nations,

is expected to seek asylum and break with her

husband and Cuba toward the end of November

1962. Her "defection" has been the object of

TEWefforts since

August 1962.3

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