Originator: FBI
From: MCINTOSH, RICHARD A.
To: DELOACH, C. D.
Document date: 3/7/70
Document type: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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File #:

662-116395

Serial Scope:

386 0N9

HH

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62-116395

EMORIA

IL INFORMATION CONTAINE

'2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz (Enc. 76)

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIID

DATE 1-3-01 8X 5P 2A

(J. B. Hotis)

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

July 10, 1975

1 - MI. W. 0. Cregal

UNTTED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTER ¿SSCo

Moore

TO STUDY COVERNHENTAL OPERATIONS

WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

BE: •DOCUNENTS PERIAINING TO THE "HUSTON

PLAN," COINTELPRO, AND OTHER PRACTICES

AND PROGRAMS

HUSTON PLAN AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

Reference 1s made to SSC letter dated May 14, 1975,

with attached appendices, requesting certain documents

and

other intornation iron the isL.

Appendix C, Part I, Item number 6, requested all

memoranda and other materials pertaining to

Poety, 59700 Proctate for liaison vita the po 1c0 1960

General instructions concerning Iaison with

other agencies, Including CIA, are set forth in Section 102

of the Hamal of Instructions, a copy of which has been

furnished to the SSC.

Item number 9 requested all memoranda and other

materials reflecting conversations or communications, during

1970, between Agents of the FBI and the FBI Director on the

subject of liaison or contact between personnel of the FBI

and personnel of the CIA, Including, but not limited to, all

menoranda and other materials written by former Speeial Agent

Sam Fajich.

Pursant to these requests there are enclosed

copios of 19 FBI conmunications.

Comp. Syst. -

Papich memorandun to the Director, March 5, 1970, which because

Ext. Affairs -

of their sensitive nature are being made available for review

Filor& com. -by SSC staff personnel at FBI Hoadguarters,

These Memoranda

cn.l. are anplifications of the possible CIA grievances listed by

Inspaction -

_Mr.

Papich.

Intell. -

ORIGINAL AND COPY TO ATTORNEY GEN'I

Laboratory

SEE NOTE PAGES TWO AND THREE

Plan. & Eval. - RIM :mam

Spec. Inv.c

Training -

Legal Coun. —

Telophone Rm. -

PLM

Director Sady -

MAIL ROOM

TELETYPE

116340

SECRET, MATERIAL ATTACHEDD

OLGSURE,

TIM

OPO: 19750-589-930

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MITTED CINTOS CITATE STUCT CONDITION (DEC)

DO SIOUX COVERIE RITAL DERATIONS TITH

RESISCI

TO INIBILIGINOS ASZIVITIES

PE: DOCUMIUS FDRIAIUING TO TES "HOLTO!

PLAT," COITELENO, AD OTHER FRACTICES

In rastonse to Ites rumber 9; it has beon necessary

to eroice nurerous names,

lated, places, and other material

in order to protoct concitive opcrations, cources, and nothous

anù to protect the privier of indiviculo. In sore incuncoo,

which coula lcau to an indiviunol's identit.

át the cno o2

mecrous parocropho siminictrative docails, euch as filo nurbera,

vero dclotod.

Daclosuros (19)

1 - The Attorney General

NOTE:

All documents responsive to Item number 9 being furnished

to ssC were previously furnished to the Rockefeller Commission

(see w. k. wannall memorandum to Mir. J. B. Adams, 4/16/75).

Originally Che Rockefeller Commission was to review the material

in FBI space but the Commission obtained possession of the documents.

The documents being made available for review by SSC

staff personnel are the cover memorandum W. C. Sullivan to

Mr. DeLoach, 3/9/70, and enclosed 37 memoranda. These memoranda

have been classified Secret and have been appropriately excised.

Enclosed for the Office of the Legal Counsel are one

unexcised and one excised copy of the memoranda being made

available for review.

NGTE CONTINUED PAGE THREE

=2 m

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UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC)

TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH

RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE "HUSTON

PLAN," COINTELPRO, AND OTHER PRACTICES

AND PROGRAMS

HUSTON PLAN AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

NOTE CONTINUED:

The Papich letter and memoranda, and the review of

the 38 possible grievances, contain comments and other intormation

which could have an adverse effect on our current relationshir

with CIA.

While numerous dates have been excised to protect the

identity of individuals, any reader can extrapolate the

approximate time of an event since Papich wrote his 3/13/7

letter following a chronological scheme from 1951 to 1970. There

is some chronological variance in the 3/5/70 letter.

-3-

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5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee:

Senate Select Committee

→ Report dated _ 7/10/75

Senate Select Committee Re: Huston

Caption or Doement: Plan and Related Developments

Appendix C, Part I, Items 6 and 9.

Qriginating Office:

FBI

Delivered by:

Paulvilal

-Date: 2/15125-

Received by:

-

Title: -

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

FmDe16

ALL INFORNATION CONTAINED

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CONTENTS

Tab A - Response to SSC request, Appendix C, Part I, Item

number 6.

Tab B - Response to SSC request, Appendix C, Part I, Item

number 9.

Tab C - Unexcised version of documents furnished to SSC in

response to request in Appendix C, Part 1, Item

number 6.

Tab D - Unexcised version of documents furnished to SSC in

response to request in Appendix C, Part I, Item

number 9.

Tab E

Excised version of 38 memoranda being held at FBIHQ

for review by SSC.

Tab F - Unexcised version of 38 memoranda being held at

FBIHQ for review by SSC.

ALI. INFORMATION CONTAINED

62-111395-386

ENCLOSURE

HTH 55036

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...

• ..

Response to SSC request, Appendix C, Part I,

Item number

..=

#MDRIG

ALI INFORMATION CONTAINED

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MILLE DIATES GOVE

Memorandun

TO

Mr. Sullivan

DATE: June 22, 1961

#MORIG

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIA

FROM

R. 0. L'Allier

SUBJECT:

LIAISON HITE INMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, (INS.

Liaison with INS has been handled for the past severa

years by sa Sam Papich

who also handles liaison with the Central

intelligence Agéncy. (CÍA).

The purpose of this memorandun is

to reconnend that SA Papich be relieved of his assignment with

INS in order to devote full time to CIA.

INFORMATION

• RELATING TO

INS

CiA continues to be one of the most '

important liaison assignlients as well as one of the most tine

consulling. Proper handling

of this assignment no requires the

full time

• and «tention of a Liaison Supervisor and it is believed

that SA Papich should be relieved of his INS assignment in order

to devote his entire attention tó CIA.

INFORMATION RELATING TO AGENT TO RE

ASSIGNED TO HANDLE LIAISON WITH INS.

ACTION:

It you approve

transferred from SA Papien daison responsibility for INS will be

NAME

22414

oad NAME

TH 55036 DocId:32989616 Page 8

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(E) CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) - DOMESTIC CONTACT

SERVICE -- You previously have been informed regarding CIA's Contact

Division which has had offices in various U. S. cities and which is openly

identified as being connected with CIA. This division has been responsible

• for the overt collection of positive intelligence gained through interviews of

aliens. travelers, businessmen, etc. The division has not been engaged

in any operational activity such as the development of double agents.

For

your information, CIA has reorganized this division and it is now called

the Domestic Contact Service.

An examination of CIA's activities in the area of overt collection

of positive intelligence has indicated that the Bureau can strengthen its

position by having our field offices establish direct contact with the local

offices of the Domestic Contact Service. This particularly applies to those:

situations where the Bureau and CIA both have an interest in Soviet-bloc

and lugoslav nationals

excluding those who are connected with embassies

or the United Nations. SWe recognize that CIA has a responsibility for

coilection of positive intelligenceli. e. information regarding Soviet-bloc

capability in a particular research field) which might be acquired from

such risitorg hit we rannot condone any CIA activity which might

interfere with Bureau operations. You therefore are authorized to

establish liaison with local offices of the Domestic Contact Service.

(5)

9-28-65

- SAC LETTER NO. 65-54

∞ 5

-

:

This document is prepared in response io your request und is not for disseme

nation outside your Cresmitter.

smited to offimia! " preedings dy

your committee and the rosient may nut b: disclosed to unauthorized verson

nel without the express approval of the FBI.

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In each case when you initiate any inquiry or investigation of a visiting

Soviet-bloc national, you should obtain from the local Domestic Contact

Service the nature and extent of CIA interest and all pertinent information

which CIA has gained or may acquire in the future relating to our internal

security responsibilities. If you feel that CIA activity conflicts with

Bureau objectives, you should so advise the Seat of Government, clearly

setting forth your reasons. In this connection; there may be instances

where continuing CIA pursuit of positive intelligence would conflict with

the Bureau s discharge of its internal security functions.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar. Hoover

Director

.::

-..

9-28-65

SAC LETTER NO. 65-54

-

6-

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PITED STATES GOVERNVENT

FENORANDUM

TO

i SUSTECT:

: DIrector, FBI

DATE:

10/25/Eb•

SACs Philadelphia

CERTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY -

DOVESTIC CONTACT SERVICE

ALY INFORMATION CONTAINZI

INFORMAZION CONCERNINE

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFISE

Re Section (E), SAC Ietter 65-54, 9/28/65.

• a.s.-

NAME.

Ihiladelshia Cffies, Cer-

til Intelligence Agency (CIA) Itsestle Contact Service, was

contacted on 10/14/65 as directed

.. In TEFErENCE& SAC Lotter:

NAME

Jadvised he had just returaed from conferences at his

agency readquarters in leshington. where he had been advised

ne Bureau was directing 1ta field offices to esteblish liaisen

with the local offices

of the Denssule contact Service.

NAME

offered his complete cooperation with this office In mat-

if matual interest.

- Ba..

Arrangements were perfected whersin agents of this

céfice maling Inquiries on Investigation of a Soviet Bios Na..

*onsl car contact

NAME

lend

he will place then ir contact

in the Dementic Contact Service reprisentative handlirg the

sise: so that Information of interest to us can be secured.

iny information coming to the attention of the Derestic Contact

service relating to our internal recurity reaccesiblilties will

imediately renorted to this cifice.

NAME

Trequested, la view en his Agency's regu-:

hat CIA not, be identified as the source in the event

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for disseni

nation outside your Committee, Is use is limited to official pinceedings by

your Committee and the content may nut be disclosed to unauthorized person

nel without the express approvai of the fBl.

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## Page 12

Intomation received iron his cifice should le Includea i a

communication going to anyone outside the

Bureas.

NAME

ras assured thai CIA's Identity in this regard rould be fully

protected.

INFORMATION RELÄTING TO. THE

TEPRITORY COVERED BY THE PHLLADELPHIA

OFFICE CIA DOMESTIC CONTACT SÉRVICE

INCLUDING NAMES OF CIA PERSONNEL:

PRQUEST OF THE BUREAU:

In the course of future contact: with CIA 11 these

• caste; It 1s anticipeteù that ci represensatives may at times

request information relating io Subjects: background, habits,

and characteristics, as well as any availabie photographs.

;" The Bureau is requested to auyise 1í It will be per-

aIssible to orally furnish such backgrourd irformation to the

¿In representative and to furrish cogies of phoucgraphs, 11

they. are avallable.

•The Bureau Is also reguested to auvise if the establisi.-

ront of liaison on the field office lever wiih crA's domestio

Contact Servica envisages the rurrishing di IEborts ma levisi

read memes tò this Service aù the field oilice leve Wüzeüo

have a legitimate Interest in the subjeco.

-2...

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SAC, Palladelphia

10/29/65

II. INFORMATTON CONTAINE

GREIN IS UNCLASSIFIEL

CENTRAL INTELLIGIRICE ACERCY (CIAS

DOMESTIC COMACT SARVICE

INTORSIATION COUCERNIG

Reference is undo to your lotter dated 10/25/65.

to suresy has been follering a policy ci not disserinating

Bureau information to the jonestic Contact service aù a local level.

This policy vill contious unicss you are sovised to the contrary.

÷ u3

In the eveut that the jocal cia office desires InicrnatiOn

COLCETDING INY JUDICON, SUCA IRQUESTS SHOULe Do CLICCied by tLA tO

Lureza leadquarters.

-.

nel without the express approval of the FBI.

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• MAY 1902 EDITION

OSA GEN. AIG. NO. 19

UNITED STATES GU

NMENT

Memorandum

TO

: Mr. C. D. Deloach

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: LIAISON WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE

DATE: 6/25/70

#MORIS

AId INFORMATION CONTAINED

FERRIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATEL 12-01 BY SP-ZALM/TE

The Director has inquired regarding the nature of

any liaison existing between the Washington Field Office (WFO)

and CIA, Limited liaison does exist, being addressed to

specific operational cases and name checks.

WFO, of necessity, is in contact with CIA concerning

specific cases in the espionage field. for example,.

-=-

SPECIFIC EXAMPLE GIVEN.

-

In addition, CIA has a domestic operations office

in the District which makes name checks with WFO and secures

background information concerning foreign diplomatic personnel.

No liaison is conducted with respect to policy matters and the

objective of all contacts is the handling of immediate opera-

tional matters.

ACTION:

For the Director's information.

ponge in once, die

;:.

ice sode dociati saddene

..

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissoni

nation outside your Committee.

Its use is limited to official proceedings. br

your Committee and the content may nut be disclosed to unauthorized person

nel without the express approval of the FBI.

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• OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

1010-106

MAY 1P82 POITION

OSA GAN, REG. NO. 21

UNITED STATES GOV

NMENT

Memorandum

TO

: Mr. C. D. Deloach

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

DATE:

SUBJECT: LIAISON WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE

6/26/70

#MARIE

ALI INFORMATION CONTAINM

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFLED

My attached memorandum, 6/25/70, discussed the

operational contacts between the

Washington Field Office

(WFO) and CIA's local domestic operations office. Mr. Tolson

noted "I thought all such contacts vere to be handled by

letter"' and the Director said "I most, certainly intended

the same." We are instructing WFO accordingly.

It is possible that other field offices have working-

level contact with the CIA offices in their territories.

If

ithe Director desires, similar instructions will be issued to

‹them.

ACTION:

(1) Attached for approval is a letter to WO

instructing that all future contacts with CIA are to be

handled by letter.

(2) If the Director desires, an SAC Letter will be

prepared containing sinilar instructions, applicable to all

offices.

No

1220

2246101231

was in, "no.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissenti

nation outside vour Committee.

Its use is limited to officia? proceedings by

your Committee and the content may nut be disclosed to unauthorized person

te without the express approval of the FBl.

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Response to ssc request,

Appendix C, Part I

Item number

...

#MORIG

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HURTIN IS UNCLASSITLED

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larch ?, 1970

CDS. Calig

ix, do agar Hoover.

Director

Federal Bureau of Investigation

iashington, D. C.

Dear iir. Hoover: :

SEV

#MDRIS

DSCTASSIFTED BY SRZ-ALM 116

0 1-7-01

I ask thrt you approve my request to retire from Bureau servicr

end, if it is convenient, to

have this retirement become effective /at]

• For several weeks I have been giving this matter serious th ught

since I begin questioning my capability to bring ab-ut r better coordin-

ned effort direcied against foreign intelligence targets, particilrly

those of the Comnunist-Bloc.

I have always ained for perfection, but I

do not find that the desired results are being achieved.

for almost. 18

years I have handled an assignient during a reriod of curbulent, hertic,

and controversial developments in the area of Intornal Security -ü. S.

incelligeuce.

very rewarding, but also pinisn-

Bonuse of this deep involverent

It was nest challonging, no realize that I have boily

neglected my responsibilities as a father und husband. Lith the tire I

may have left I would like to give my farily thé attention it rightlully

deserves.

It wouid be musi dishonesi vint if ii1 diunii conneni vu it iu-

cent events which have led to the severance of dircet liaison zith the

Centrrl Intelligence Agency, Since I have been the principal. Burenu cle-

ment in the day to day relations betreen the organizations, te las been

ny responsibility io anticipate problons, move in on the situation, and

pritect Bureau intcrests in in efficiont and effective monner.

I have re-

vieved my position in this latest developient, and I certainly must share

responsibilly for the tragic üurn of events.

I believe that I nirit have

employed better perception by following devolopments in Denver more clouchy.

iI deeply regret this.

I do not like to fail. I do not like to l05c.

I have been involved in intelligence operations dating back io

our S.I.S, history, and I think. I can speck with sore authority in stat-

ing that never in our history has this nation been faced with preter se-

curiüy threats from conmunist intelligerce services who, thrown volice

since organizations, have developed unusually schhisticatod caproilities

finits

to strike ai our vulnerabilities of a democrrtic and free s'cicly.

continuing and triosity.target of the Bloc is to penetr-te and colit or

disrupt our internal. security and intelligence orgarizations.

Contrary to

The tempo of the ties many yers aão, there is haraly an intelli ree on

ertion or an internal security cose which does not have dircet or in irect

international manilications.

The course of events and the hirily cronüle

effectiveness of Connunist-Bloc intelligence cervices have ol.ecu increas-

ing burdens on us and have necessitated close working relations titl: Cly

Date ol Des

milit.ry intelligence services and other agencies.

the corplex moire di

"any cases, the rapid means of travel ma comnication, the c-ily secur-

cice of emergency type political developients in various narts ni the

world have sarranted direct linison with coproximidly trenty ci citie

"Inla on a daily onsis. In addition, thore -re ab.at thirly ofrieils

contacied win lesder freduency.

THE WAHONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure

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Subject to Criminal Sanctions

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Intelligence Board and

sub- comilech thich cover

tters

such as

handling of dcicct.re, dovelonient of commier procrs, lonks of classi-

fied inforantion and rochotion of intollisence studies.

baches have rcason, to concact bas one regular basis, jund althouch it des

been a small volung oi business, the line el conunication betweeh o: sc-

mostic offices and local CIA renresent-tives has been

The daily busincss with Chi relates to hundreds of cases pertinina to

activities.of all, Commist-Bloc services, the Re:: Loft, Black National

ists, the Commuist farty ond related orgnizations, and politiel crises

in areas such is Vietnan,

the riddle bast, ond Intin America.

Theoretic-

'ally, all business could be hondled by mail, but fron a protion) st-rà-

poinü such a crocedure will lead, to unbeliouble chaos. There will te

lalmost insurcuntable obst:cles if le are to discharge our duties in :

resconsible mmer nd ife -re to counter a relentless chey in the

interest of natiomal security. Because interests of other agencies -re

frequently intertwined ith cases involving the bureau and ClA, inc sea:

in IBI-CIl liaison vill adversely airect our liaison with such

agencies.

I think you will share my alarm over the consequences once the

word is received by the "troops" in all Us. agencies that HI nd L

no longer have any liaison. Unfortanately,

there will be individuals to

will maliciously distort and nisinternet the true

facts. Within a short

period, ühore ill be stories in the press, and worst of all the Cou-

nist-ilos sorvices ill vick up a choice entree for the provotion of sic-

skilliul and extrenely barnful disruntion.

I am absolutely convinced

that the intelligence services of Great Briüain, trance, vest Gerrany Fro

others are well penetrated by the soviets.

bys, the Blakes, the Alrer hisses ere the last of the penctrations:

mention this becruse if such peneti-tions exist, the break in relations

between the IBI and CIA will provide a basis for promoting further riîus.

This is the lirst thie in our nisuory that such an event has occurred, ar

¡it is difficult to believe that the enemy will not make every effort to

reap the greatest profit possible. Briony, hr. Hoover, I inve too much

respect for you and our fBI to expose us to a potentially disastrous siti

lation.

Although the Denver incident is a blight on the relations ce-

tween the ISI and CId, it would be most unlair of me not to comment on

the dedicated and selfless efforts of nunerous individuals in CIA ho

strived for honest and harmonious relations. As a result of their en-

deavors there have been many services performed in behalf of the Buree

including notable and cutstanding accomplishments.

We have been furnisied

• sources, inforunts, solid proäuctive cases, technical advice and equip

men't

and there have been instances of cooperation nich led to substen-

tial saving of Bureau funds.. There also have been examples of alertness

on the part of CLi employes which prevented Bureau commission of errors

and averted embarrassrent. Anong some of the more significant examnles

of cooperation. I cite the excellent ind badly needed assist-nice of CLA

in the Rudolph doel case. I also refer to the Agency's providing us iün

one of the better crininal informints we have had in recent years in the

person of NAME

I only refer to the foregoing to emphasize

that, if at all possible, we should preserve the good friends and the

supporters of the Bureau.

4/651159

It is recognized that one con also present a bill of mriic-

ulars relating to carples of nocr cooneration and delibernte skuldur-

1н 5507 rHod: 3274564 brage f8r those in CIA who disrunted relations boticen

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## Page 19

11e0n 1rJ0 11.0

parest bon the cout.

91l0p-101 lie croilets

alive ideo, mi liver

the criers of tie dedierood prople.

that an done: mod morode arcination till reveal tirt the preorned oi

such Lypes at the present bir is nerlicibie no their inflaccee ir cose

coalcioly neuronlined.

informiety, Chi also biliovos tort in the

pasi i did and aliens not in a

deboright sanct, and the leones undott

You any not ronlize tit" ci

years no ve chored a roor repaintion ang Oil choloyes.

te were cher-

acterined as being dovins and there is a rcided sorosphere oi rictrust.

napolly, that is no bie siuction toddy.

I on confident bro you or co

into any segrent of Chi, lore oed abroad, and dou will find that midelity,

Bravery, ma Intocrity me sincerely relatoo do the 1Bt.

The prostens in

past jerrs winnily arose ton believably poor comication crong in-

terested ties.

aits connication ins boch grostly impreted iccuuse ci

the efforus of suny dedicated peoplo.

Nevertheless, there is roon for

improverent.

In our on bureau toere are mucrons officials mo cunlores

who have little or no noncuge of the background and the principles of

the National Secarity Act of 1947 and of the National. Security Courcil

Directives.

m andrion, these sume noople have a vague conception 01

the objortiros and tinctics of en intelligence organisation.

S1:L1-215,

within Chi there are very my chose concerton of the lb1, its juris-

diction, lis objectires, its lar enforce cht character, is shocking at

Cine se

Tromondous progress has been made, but it is not casy to harion-

iously coordinate the opcintions oi an cupanimation designed to oper te

in a clondestine cannot with an agency which is basically a lar eniorce

ment bany.

is still comosed of a fragile fabric. Ole incident potentially con de-

stroy jears of constructive effort.

iir. Hoover, I rescectiully recuest that you rcconsider the

decision to sever liaison with the Central Intelligence Ageney,

I aybeal

to you to leave the doer open for furtner deliberation because I am con-

fident this conflict can be satisfeciorily resolved. I believe that ty

removal fro:: the scene provides the coporinity to appoint another ament

who vall sicasure up to your desired croabilities and who will be ablo to

rapidly resolve the proble ith a new and fresh approach.

It is a 1000

tire to recamine our relations lin cli and to make adjustments satis-

factory to: 0u.

I sincercly regret that this situntion arose,

since i reartly

appreciate

you are burdened alon so mony heavy responsibilities.

Y.'t 1

feel that I had a firm oblization and daüy to communicate with you bo-

cause of the very natire of ny assignent these muny years na because

of ny involverent in this controversial case.

ly years with the Bureru gave me more satisfaction then enyone

can imagine.

You rould have to lmon me better to appreciate this.

want to assure you thrt wherever I go or whaïever I do 1uill be promred

to be of service in any cause hich involves the preservation of a strong

and respected FBI.

sincerely yourse

San Papich

Tapick

SSE

AREF

Flig

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## Page 20

TO

FROM

SUBJECT:

UNITED STATES G FRNMENT

Memoran..um

MI. C.

D

DeLoach

#. C. Sullivan

AZS TORRED CONTAINS

DATE: March 5, 1970

RUNKKIN IS UNCLASSITIED

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

DECLASCAFIED BY

•eN

Attached is, a memorandum dictated by Special Agent

Sam J. Papich in response to the Director's request for the

identification of the instances Papich had in mind whea in

his retirement request he indicated that CIA "believes that

in the past we (FBI) did not always act in a forthright manner

and the agency undoubtedly could present a list of grievances."

• A list identifying

the cases and outlining the problers

involved has been prepared by Papich and is attached to the

A review of the 25-page document reveals that it

contains several instances in which CIA has registered its

dissatisfaction and could conceivably renew its complaints,

and others in which presumably. CIA had no knowledge of Bureau

action

and

has made no complaint.

For the Director's further information, I have

instituted in this Division an analysis of each situation cited

añd a memorandum will be prepared as to each, containing my

Views and recommendations as a result

of that analysis. This

is being handled on an expedite basis and the memoranda will

be sent through as soon as possible.

.:

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d.10

8018-180

KAT 10.

GEA DEN.

40.87

* UNITED STATES G

VMENT

Memorandum

TO

:The Director

DATE: March 5, 1970

FROM : Sam J. Papich

(566851D/661-7FK2/9/98)

SUBJECT: RELATIONS WITH CIA

04+88-1806

Per CHA REVIEW OF 6/2/94

Reference is made to my letter of 3/2/70. I made the

statement, "Unfortunately, ClA also believes

that in the past

we did not always act in a forthright manner, and the Agency

undoubtedly could present a list of grievances." It is my

understanding that you want such grievances identified. There

is enclosed herewith

over the years.

a list of cases or situations which arose

AND

Based upon a revier of files

and my personal recollection

DECLASSIFICATION

FELEASE OF CIA IAN

this list would be representative of matters which CIA could use

for making charges such

as:

SCOU

not being forthright, not playing

tairly and squarely, not cooperating, not being of assistance,

not recognizing the need for concrete FBI contributions to the

foreign intelligence effort. What CIA may have compiled over the i

years is unknown. What situations are known to CIA and have not

tro

come to our attention cannot be answered at this time. I am

thinking of leaks including distorted

information which may have

been passed

I to CIA from ex-Bureau employees and CIA informants

and sources;

It should be clearly emphasized that there is no

indication whatsoever within CIA that the Agency has

been seeking

any kind of a showdown or confrontation with the FBI. Contrary,

to what some people may believe, the relationship between the

two agencies up to the recent crisis was never better despite

the problems which have arisen from time to time. I am confideut

that a thorough and impartial examination will conclusively

support the foregoing.

In order that there may not be any misunderstanding, it

is important to emphasize that the Bureau can also produce an

extensive list of justified grievances. We can also produce an'

excellent record of support which we have given CIA; presumably

CIA could do the same.

up there are

There are ingredients for continuing

conflict and there is also adequate machinery for maintaining

sound working relations and producing badly needed intelligence

information.

Classified by X?

Exempt from

Category 2 € 3÷

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Discinsure®

Date of Decassification Indefinite>

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

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ficnorandum to th

RS: RELATIONS

director

H CIA

I believe that it would be most helpful to you and

interested Bureau officials when evaluating and passing judgment

on the attached material if we analyzed very briefly the role

of the Bureau liaison Agent. A liaison Agent can be a simple

mail courier or he can be the true Bureau Agent ready to confront

any problem of issue with anotheragency, very often working mith

very limited information. .It is expected that the Bureau Agent

carry out his instructions forcefully and efficiently. He must

be prepared to handle all types of personalities under various

conditions.

He must be alert for pitfalls and express himself

in a most judicious and prudent manner but always making certain

that the Bureau position is well fortified.

In evaluating the attached and my encounters with CIA,

it should be noted that protests from the Bureau always were

easy to handle because the Agent had J. Edgar Hoover behind him.

However, when an Agent struck at san official on one day and

solicited his cooperation the next day, it did require some

resourceful action. It is believed that other liaison Agents

regularly encounter similar situations. On numerous occasions

I have bittorly feuded with CIA officials and this has included

rough language.

I have walked out on CIA officials when I felt

they were unreasonable.

They took the initiative by asking the

Agent to return. I did try to play fairly and squarely with all

of them and never hesitated to accept a confrontation; this include

the Director of the Agency. When 'I lectured to CIA personnel

over the years

• I always made a point to challenge them to present

any grievances or raise any subject matter relating to the

• Bureau.

I never left a discussion with any CIA official without

"being positive that our position was absolutely understood.

The approaches utilized by me might be open to criticism.

I

can only refer, to the records of the Bureau and CIA and I believe

the Bureau's position is most favorable. I don't think CIA has

ever transmitted a letter of protest to the Bureau during the

eighteen years during which the Agent handled the assignment.

ACTION:

for information.

0.001

602000

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CASES AND/OR SITUATIONS

INVOLVING CONFLICTS WITH THE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

(1) MOCASE. (THE BORIS MORROS CASE)

CIA HAS NO OBJESTION TO

DESLASSIFICATION AND/OR,

RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION

This was a sensitive Soviet-espionage case

which originated in 1943 and terminated for the most

The case had many wide foreign ramifi-

cations and historically has been, and undoubtedly

will be, one of the most important. and involved cases

of Soviet operations in this country and abroad. We

did not disseminate any iniormation of significance

In this case until 1954. On various occasions when

the Liaison Agent has become involved in heated argu

ments with CIA officials, they have seen fit to raise

this case as an outstanding example of FBI failure to

cooperate with the Agency. The position taken by CIA •

was that it should have been advised regarding the

Soviet operational activity in foreign countries,

claiming that the Agency would have had the opportunity

to develop more information of significance, identify

Soviet agents, and possibly prepare conditions for

recruitment or doubling of Soviet operatives. He did

not disseminate our reports to CIA because of the

extreme sensitivity of the case.

We actually did not

permit CIA to handle any investigations relating to

the MOCASE until 1957.

..

In 1957, CIA complained that it certainly had

every right to have received the information earlier

because many aspects of the MOCASE pertained to CIA

employees and operations. CIA further argued that it

had been greatly handicapped in effectively carrying out

the leads in 1957 because the leads were given to the

Agency at the same time that the case was publicized.

The Agency argued that the failure of the Bureau to

coordinate with CIA those French aspects of the case

permitted the French, rather than the U.S., to play a

dominating role in Europe.

CLASSIFIED BY 568 SLDIGCL

C'SCLASSIFY ON: 25X J.

(35K) 719/92-4/2798

AL CEA AND MANGOLD PELLASE

ALL IIFCEMATION CONTATES

HEREIN IS UNETASS13I02T002

WHERE SHOWN ONENNIS

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

WH

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with regard to dealing with the French, we

took the position that we would cover the leads through

our Legal Attaches wherever possible and to furnish

leads to.CIA in those countries where we did not have

Legal Attaches.

Cis maintained that since we were on

record that our Legal Attaches do not handle operations

abroad, the gureau had an obligation to levy those French

leads

on CIA or at least. coordinate with the Agency

before going to the French.

It is to be noted that in any argument relating

to jurisdiction in this matter, CIA will fall back on the

responsibilities placed on the Agency under the provisions

of the National Security Act of 1947 and the implementation

of the foregoing through National security Council Direc-

tives. CIA will maintain that' it is incumbent upon the

Bureau to recognize the provisions of the National Security

Act of 1947 and the Directives. The Agency would argue

that in the MOCASE. these were ignored by the Bureau.

(2)

SENSITIVE ONGOiNG

OPERATION

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SENSITIVE ÖNGOING OPERATION (continued from page 2)

1 1д

SECRET

3

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SENSITIVE ONGOING OPERATION (continued fron page 2 and 3)

(3) THE ABEL CASE

Although CIA has not raised the point for

several years, the prevailing attitude was, and probably

still exists,

that the FBI did not play it square with

CIA in the abel case by not making certain that the

Agency was given the proper recognition for its contri-

butions.

CIA feels that in the first place, there would

not have been any U. S. access or availability to the

source in this case,

NAME •

because CIA took

the full responsibility for moving

NAME frOM PLACE

Ito the U. S. in 1957.

CIA claims it took the risk and

responsibility of doing this after the Bureau declined

to become involved in any operation designed to transport

NAME

to the U:S.. It should be noted that NAMe

was an alcoholic and that his first contacts with CIA

in pLAcE raised questions concerning NAME

mental

stability.

After NAME arrived in the U. S., we

arranged access to him for a period, the purpose of

which was to obtain a complete story of his intelli-

gence activities in the U. S. and we were particularly

interested in identifying all of his associates, es-

¡Abel.

pecially the nan who later was identided as Rudolph

After a short handling period in the U. S., we

dropped NAME

• because he became a problem.

an extremely critical situation because we had not yet

I#dentified Abel. CIA agreed to take the responsibility

for the carrying and safeguarding of NAME but we

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were given free access to this difficult source. ' This

was a most fortunate arrangement as far as CIA was con-

cerned, because this adjustment gave us the time to work

with

NAMÉ

and subsequently develop the leads which

led to the apprehension of Abel. The Agency has main-

tained that it was largely responsible for making

absolutely certain that NAME

was mentally and

physically prepared for testimony at the Abel trial.

NAME

was a key witness.

CIA has also referred to

the heavy.

expenses incurred by the Agency, all for the

benefit of the Bureau.

CIA has complained that the

Bureau never really thanked the Agency for its coopera-

tion and CIA has been particularly irked becaused the

Bureau did not see fit to inform the. Attorney General

lor the White House of the role played by CIA.

(4)

NAME OF SUBJECT

In July, 1953, Senator

NAME

sought

to subpoena NAME

OCCUPATION

testify before the Senator's Committee.

NAME

claimed

that MAME

alleged communist activities were clearly

documented. The most serious allegation was that

IDENTIFYING

DATA

All of this was publicized... The infornation set forth

in the newspapers emanated from a Bureau report.

planned to charge the Bureau with leaking the information

to• Senator NAME

• CIA officials held numerous con-

terences concerning the matter but charges were never

made against the Bureau.

What information CIA has on

this particular lten is not known but the agency did

know that we maintained liaison with aME

Committee.

(5)

BUREAU DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION CONCERNING

In Hay, 1954, Allen Dulles raised the question

concerning the propriety o FBI dissemination of information

concerning

NAME

This information had been fur-

nished to us by

NAME

& former official of the

SECRET

5

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SECRET

Department of Labor.

When interviewed by us, NAME

made several accusations against CIA.

We disseminated

the information to the White House, the Attorney General,

and some data also went to the State Department. Dulles

took the position that by disseminating derogatory in-

formation concerning his Agency, he had been placed on

the spot because the

•NAME

data was not the

complete story: In the past, CIA informally referred

to this as an instance of very unfair conduct on the part

of the Bureau.

(6) BUREAU HANDLING OF CIA REQUESTS FOR TOURS

FOR FOREIGN OFFICIALS

On occasions in the 1950's,

CIA complained that

officials visiting the U. S. under CIA sponsorship were

given excellent treatment on the tour but, nevertheless,

many of the visitors left most disappointed because they

had not had

any contact with any Bureau officials.

CIA

felt that contact with Bureau officials had very significant

benefits and left lasting favorable impressions because of

the FBI's world-wide reputation.

CIA also pointed out that

when foreign visitors had no contact with Bureau officials,

they were left with the suspicion that there was some kind

of friction between the FBI and CIA..

In 1956, we had a

clear-cut policy to the effect that

tours for

such visi

tors would be of a restrictive nature in that such

visitors would view our facilities normally seen by the

public and nothing more.

CIA was so informed but

periodically indicated

that our policy prevented the

Agency from truly enhancing U. S. interests abroad.

CIA never lodged an official complaint.

It should beemphasized that for the past several

years there would not be any basis for any formd complaint

with regard to Bureau treatment of foreign officials coming

to the U. S. under CIA sponsorship. The personal attention

• Igiven to such officials by

NAME

other officials and Supervisors in the Domestic Intelligence

Division has been outstanding and benefits have accrued to

the Bureau. These visitors have gone back to their native

•.'.

→..

-6.

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SECRET

countries with far better impressions than in the

past.

In addition, we have learned more about these

countries, their services, and their security chiefs

by spending a few minutes

with them. Needless to say,

this kind of treatment has also immeasurably helped

our •Legad Attaches.

In 1965, the Dutch Internal Security Service (5)

(8)

that to ta a sea do it ten in cha

had been practically nonexistent because

CâSE of

NAME AND IDEUTIFKING DATA

who had been

clandestinely collecting intelligence at the National

SECUrity AgeuCy.

Then [CIA approached us, we -told

the Agency that

the Dutch could submit their request

through-diplomatic channels. He subsequently told CIA (s)

StUck tO Our pOSItiOn.

we were impairing their efforts to gather information

concerning Soviet-espionage activities in Europe.

TWo NAMES

NAME

DATA

..--=-

IDENTIFYING

, during Horld War It, established a

private intelligence retrork, operating throughout the

world but prinarily in Europe. His sources included

any number of European exiles who came to the U.s.

While he was in business,

he was financed by the State

Department, then the Department of the Army, and in the

later 1940's and into the 1950's by CIA.

NAME

established contact with the Bureau through one of

his subordinates,

NAME

who periodically called

...

SEGRET

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on us and furnished information which NAMe

felt

was of interest to us. This dissemination through

NAME

continued

during the period of

relationship with CIA.

We never informed CIA that we

were receiving such information which also was of

Interest to the Agency. It is possible that

had given the same data to CIA but we do not know. CIA

and

NAME

clashed and the relationship was severed

in an atmosphere of severe bitterness.

In the last

years of its dealings' with MAHe .

(5)

successfully penetrated the latter's organization ano

allegedly had identified many of the sources. CIA

hinted to the Liaison Agent that it had become aware

of the relationship between NAME "

organization

and the Bureau..

How much CIA really learned about

this relationship is not known but if its penetrations

were significant, the Agency may have developed evidence

to justify a charge that the Bureau lad withheld infor-

mation from CIA, particularly when we, were receiving

the data from an organization which was financed by

the AgenciD(s)

(9) COMMISSION ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE

EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNHENI

(Herbert Hoover Commission. - 1954)

In October, 1954, a task force of the captioned

Commission initiated

a survey of CIA's operations under

the leadership ci

In MONTH, 1955,

we were advised by a representative of the task force

that Senator. NAME

had furnished the group a

Ilst of CIA employees who were considered subversive.

CIA became cognizant of this development and there was

talk within the Agency that the Bureau had lurnished

the names to the Senator.

When the Liaison Agent was

informally approached on

this, he flatly told the Agency

to officially submit its charges.

The Agency never did.

What information CIA may have had on this matter as it

•I that we maintained liaison with the Senator's Committee.

SECRET

∞ 8∞

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(10) INTERNAL SECURITY LEADS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES

During the 1950's, we gave our Legal Attaches

numerous leads stemming from internal security cases in

the U. Si

In many instances we did not see fit to

notify CIA although the Agency always maintained that

you could not separate "internal Security" from "counter-

intelligence,". namely a lead in France pertaining to a

communist in

the U. S. warranted advising CIA, if not,

at least asking the Agency to handlé the lead.

last several years, it is not believed that there is

any basis for complaint since we have regularly been

notifying CIA concerning subjects of cases who travel

abroad.

If the legal attache is investigating, ClA is

notified in order to avoid duplicate eftorts.

There

have been exceptions where we have taken the position

that CIA should not be notified betause of the sensitivity

of the matter. How many such exceptions are known to

CIA cannot be established Irom our Intes; however, we

should bear in mind that when out legal Attaches inves.

tigate, they contact many of the same foreign officials

normally contacted by CIA.

How many of these foreign

officials are CIA informants, or on the Agency payroll,

is unknown.

(11) BUREAU OPERATIONS IN CUBA

: We operated informants in Cuba when we had a

Legal Attache's Office in Havana. Informants reported

on activities of communists and other subversives in

that country. During the period we operated these

informants, we did not coordinate our operations with

CIA.

We did not advise the Agency that we had such

sources. However, in 1960, after Castro

came on the

scene, it became infeasible to handle certain informants

in a secure manner: Approval was granted to turn certain

informants over to CIA. What these informants may have

subsequently told CIA about past Bureau operations is

unknown.

This item is being cited in the event CIA bad

evidence to establish that we had been operational in

Cuba and had not coordinated with the Agency pursuant

to Directives.

1T14

= 9

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Jones,

(12) BUREAU OPERATIONS IN BRAZIL -

In YEAR the U. S. Ambassador in Brazil accused

our Legal Attache of engaging in uncoordinated covert

Intelligence activity "of a nature which I believe

exceeds his terms of reference."

The Ambassador further

indicated that. CIA was unhappy over-the Legal Attache's

told the Ambassador

that the Legal Attache had disseminated information from

a source who was a fabricator or a provocator. This

situation arose as a result of the Legal Attaches

operation of an informant in Brazilals)some of the

information that he received from the informant was

(5)

of a derogatory nature and related to a Brazilian who

was being touted as a Presidential candidate.

CIA

asked for the identity of the informant and we told

the Agency that the person. could not be identified

because he did not wish that his identity be disclosed.

This case is being cited because cis may have evidence

that we had been operational in Brazil, had not coordi-

(s)

nated pursuant to Directives, and that the matter was

further aggravated because of the alleged unreliability

of the information.

(13) BORDER COVERAGE

INVOLVES SENSITIVE METHODS AND TECHNIQUES

SERRET

• 10 ∞ .

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SENSITIVE METHODS AND TECHNIQUES

(Continued from page 10)

(14) CODE NAME

In May, YEAR

the Bureau's double Agent in the

captioned case was advised by his Soviet contact that he

(s)

was to have a meeting in PLAcE

during the period

DATE

A question arose as to whether CIA

should be iniormed concerning the double Agent's travel

to

PLACE

i was reconmended and approved that we

not advise CIA.

What is important here is that CIA established

contact with our double agent at one point. The Agency

may have had further contact without our knowledge.

The

Agency may have also picked up the contact with the soviet (s)

IN PLAGE

The case is being highlighted since we

cannot exclude the possibility that the Agency has evidence

to demonstrate that we were operational in PLACE and we

did not coordinate with the Agency.

(15) CIA REQUESTS FOR BUREAU LECTURE ON COMMUNISM IN THE U. S.

On September 25, 1958, CIA inquired i1 NAME

could give a lecture on the communist movement

in the U.s.

It was recommended that MAHE

give the

lecture.

Such lectures were being afforded in other parts

of the Government. The Director made the notation "We

cannOt maKe NAME

available to this outfit." The

Agency accepted this as an affront and a blatant refusal

SECK

3051

• -57 2 0

• 11 .

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to cooperate on a most important subject of interest

to both agencies.

(16) CASE OF

NAME

On July 9, "YEAR. an official of the State

Department confidentially advised the Bureau that

NAME

a ClA employee in pLACE, had been

Involved in an allair with a foreiaN girl.

According

NAME

allegedly had furnished information

to the ForEIGN girl.

We checked with the State Departnent

and CIA and we confirmed

NAME

involved in

an affair and that he had been recalled. According to

CIA and State Department, there was no indication that

NAME

involved in any espionage against the

U. S. CIA gave consideration to requesting the Bureau

to iieniify iis suurce and then changed iis mind.

Whether CIA has documented this as an instance where

the Bureau failed to cooperate by not voluntéering the

source is a matter of conjecture but, it is a case that

should be kept in mind.

(27): NAME OF CASE

In April,

1963, we became: involved with CIA in

that Agency's efforts to

collect sensitive information

relating to foreioN Government'intentions to conduct

espionage against the U. S.

*CIA had access to a sensitive

NAME

sartable tight important to

who sas in a position to make

EREIGN documents. On April 11,

1963, CIA informed us that our Legal Attache in PLACE had

CIA concerning this matter. CIA Head-

quarters was highly disturbed because its office in pLAcE

had not been cut in on this operation and the Agency wanted

to be informed regarding the rature and the extent of our

dissemination of CIA information to our Legal Attache. We

• =12 -

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SECHEL.

determined that the Legal Attache had made inquiries in

PLACE in response to leads which had been sent from Bureau

"Readquarters.

This matter is being highlighted because

It was a vitally important operation to CIA and the Agency

nad received inaications that intormation nad been leaked

-We have no evidence or reason to

believe that the Legäl Attache Office ever involved itself

In any such leak. However, we should not, under any cir-

cumstances, discount the fact that CIALhas

penetrated

Lana has had access to sensitive intormatior

The foREIGN have always had

an outstanding cap-

ability of tapping phones and installing microphones in

Such coverage on U.S. officials, including their

residences, should never be excluded. The information we

had conveyed to our legal Attache possibly may have been

acquired by the firelGiathrough clandestine coverage. CIA

possibly could charge us with

handling their sensitive

Information in an insecure manner by'transmitting it to

PLAcE without conferring with the Agency.

30--

In connection with alleged forEichespionage

activity in the U. S., CIA has never been satisfied with

the efforts made by the Bureau. " The Agency possibly could

take the position that we looked lightly at the allegations

and did not pursue a matter which, in their eyes, merited

& more aggressive approach.

For some time, CIA has held to a position that

Porcle intelligence service, NAME

As penetrated by

the Sovietsas The Agency has pointed out that if the fOreIGi

are collecting sensitive information in the U. So, the

product is ending up in Moscowd/s)In January 1964, we

reviewed the status of our investigation of ForE aw intel-

ligence activities in the U. S. The Director commented

"I think this whole thing has been imaginary on the part

of CIA which has been played as a sucker by NAME

I would waste no more time on it at least until all CIA

restrictions are removed." CIA did impose restrictions

by not permitting us to pursue certain leads because it

feared that its sénsitive source would be jeopardized.

SECRET

OCTO

∞ 13.

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-

(18) LEAKS TO THE '"NATIONAL REVIEW" - 1959

In April, 1959, CIA became concerned over the

appearance of certain items in issues of the "National

Review." The publication carried a column authored by.

an unidentified individual who was making derogatory

references to CIA. ClA subsequently identified the

a former CIA employee.

CIA

investigation indicated that NaME was obtaining his

information from former CIA Agents. In checking on

NAME, CIA identified some of his friends who were

Internal Security Subcommittee; and

former member of the Senate

NAME

former

Assistant to the Director. The Liaison Agent was unable

to develop any additional information as it might have

pertained to NAME

in this,particular matter.

CIA

may have additiona, data not revealed.

(19) TRAVEL OF BUREAU INTORMANTS TO CUBA

In September, 1965, we received information

Indicating that oneof our informants on the Mexican border

was in a position to travel- to Cuba. A question was raised

concerning CIA interest in this matter, if the informant

made the trip.

It was recommended and approved that we

not advise CIA concerning the identity of the informant

or his trip to Cuba.

It is not known if CIA acquired any knowledge

but, if the agency did, we potentially are vulnerable.

The Agency could charge that we were operating outside

of the U.S. and we failed to coordinate with the agency.

(20) DISSEMINATION OF CIA INFORMATION IN A BUREAU MONOGRAPH

By letter dated May 5, 1965, we disseminated to

interested agencies, including CIA, a copy of a monograph

entitled "Communism in the Dominican Republic." The mono-

graph contained considerable information which had emanated

- 14 -

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from. CIA.. He did not obtain clearance from CIA for

the inclusion ofthis information in our monograph.

Clearance approval was not obtained because of the

urgency of the document. CIA was irritated because

it considered our action a distinct violation of the

third agency rule. The Agency never made any protest.

(21) BUREAU INFORMANTS IN PLACE

ID _PLAGE

I. At and 1967, 1e were operating informants

the inception of our operational ac-

tivity, CIA vas not informed..

In one case, we finally

were able to effect the necessary arrangements with CIA

whereby the Bureau would be permitted to run the informant

in PLACE

In the second instance, we established an

agreement with CIA in October,

1967, that we could con-

tinue handling an informant in PLAcE: with the under-

standing that the Bureau Agent, on the occasion of each

visit,

would cenfer with the local CIA office on political

information collected trom the intormant.

These two cases

had all the makings of a conflict. CIA was under the

definite impression that we had been running these

iniormants before we had finally coordinated with them.

It is true that the CIA Chief in PLACE

was much

incensed but. no issue was made at CIA Headquarters and

thematter was put to rest.

CIA may have developed concrete evidence that

we were operating in PLACE bearing in mind that in

a place such as

PLACE

., it would not be difficult

for a CIA intelligence officer to spot an FBI Agent in

contact with FOREIGNERS

• Our potential vulnerability is

that we were operating in pLace

without coordinating

with CIA.

(22)

CODE NAME

CURRENT SENSITIVE

OPERATION

811Т 3

(5)

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CURRENT SENSITIVE OPERATION -

Continued from page 15

(23) HARRASSIENT OF CIA

By letter dated November 15, 1967, CIA inquired

If the Bureau would check the toll calls on the bome

telephone of one NAME

who was harrassing

CIA in the Miami area. NAMe allegedly was seeking

information concerzing the Agency's covert operations.

•He told CIA that we would not check the toll-calls.

We

explained that on the basis of the information received,

there was not sufficient information to justify investigation

falling within theBureau's

our response but there is no doubt that treagency

characterized our position as

a concrete example of

refusal to help a sister agency with a problem relating

to the security of U. S: intelligence operations.

(24)

SENSiTiVE DOCUMENT

CIA became very irked when ve restricted

dissemination of our SENSITIVE DOCUMENT

to

two copies for thé Agency. CIA took the position with

• the Liaison Agent: that CIA always has been most liberal

in providing the Bureau with as many copies as we needed

when it involved various types of CIA material. The

Agency never made an Official issue of this matter. The

Haison Agent is confident that CIA almays considered this

an uncooperative gesture on our part.

SECRET

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•(25) ESTABLISHLENT OF BURBAU LIAISON WITH

_ DUTCH INTERNAL SECURITY SERVICE - 1960

(5)

trayeled to long on the sur se setacerans arrange-

ments for liaison with appropriate Dutch authorities.

NAME

raised questions, pointing out that over

the years,

all relations with the

Dutch authorities had

been handled through CI DisHe indicated that before there

was any change in procedure, it sould be necessary for

CIA and FBI to come to some

form of an agreement. Allen

Dulles subsequently expressed disappointment in that bis

Agency had not been contacted by the Bureau prior to

exploring the liaison arrangement. We eventually conferred

with• CIA and came

to an agreement

satisfactory to all

parties concerned."

Again, CIA could cite this as an instance where

we failed to coordinate with the Agency in line with

National Security Council Directives.

In the latter part of 1959 we gave consideration to

establishing a Legal

Attache in Copenhagen, Dennark.

The

purpose of the assignment was to follow Bureau leads in

Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Holland. We did not inform

• CIA of our intentions.

(26) BUREAU DISSEMINATION OF COUNTERINTALLIGENCE

INFORMATION TO FOREIGN SERVICES - DATE

By letter dated

ДАТЕ

, CIA raised

questions concerning the propriety of Bureau dissemination

101 munterintelligence information to foreign intelligence

services. CIA, at that time, had particular reference to

Information which our Legal Attache had transmitted to the

(FoREciIntelligence service concerninE RoB operations. Cla

"took the position that pursuant to the coordinating

∞ 17 0.

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Directive, the Bureau was obligated to coordinate with

CIA prior

to such dissemination.

The particular data

had emanated from one of our sensitive FOREIGN sources

CODENAME He responded to CIA by stating that the

information was the product of an internal security

operation and did not relate to any operational activity

abroad, CIA again surrendered. The Agency could argue

that it was responsible for following Soviet matters

with the fiEld intelligence Service and that we had an

obligation of coordinating with the agency.

(27) TITLE OF BOOK

AUTHOR

BOOK AUTHORED BY

In August,

1963, we received information indi-

cating that

AUTHOR

in the process of gathering

material for a book pertaining

• to activities of U.S.

intelligence activities:.

AUTHOR

contacted

the Bureau. It was recommended that liaison orally advise

CIA that

AUTHOR

preparing a book con-

cerning U.S. intelligence agencies.

The Director. noted

"I see no reason doing so."

It is not known if CIA was aware of the contact

with the Bureau.

AUTHOR

subsequently published the

book which contained extremely derogatory information

concerning CIA.

(28) COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES - AFRICA

In April, 1960, CIA inquired if the Bureau would

give any consideration to assisting the Agency toward

developing coverage in Africa.

CIA was looking for the

services of any Negro informant who might be available.

The Agency also inquired about placing a Negro in the

Communist Party, USA, under a plan which would have as

an eventual objective, the sending of the informant to

∞ 18 -

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Africa under an appropriate cover and for an extended

period.

We told CIA we had no informants available

because they were necessary for our own operations. We

took the position that we saw no benefit to be gained by

loaning an informant on a short or long term basis.

This item is being mentioned because Africa

has become vitally important to US. interest, bearing

In mind that both the Soviets and Chinese Communists have

made significant inroads into the area.

CIA could argue

that as early as 1960, it had the foresight to recognize

the need for additional coverage, that it appealed to the

Bureau for assistance, and that we did not cooperate.

;

(29) ADVISING THE WHITE HOUSE REGARDING CRITICISM

OF INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS - EUROPE

By letter dated October 23, 1964, we furnished

the White House information received by our Legal Attache

from the

SOURGE

He was critical

of intelligence operations in Europe and made particular

reference to the overstaffing of personnel.

We do not know if. CIA became cognizant of the

existence of the Bureau letter bearing in mind that the

Agency undoubtedly would have considered the document as

relating to. its operations. We do knöw that for several years,

CIA personnel have been assigned to the White House and had

access to considerable information.

(30) THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY

BOARD AND JOHN MC CONE

In bay, 1963, we became embroiled with CIA in a

rather critical conflict as a result of communication the

' Bureau sent to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory

Board.

The matter dealt with consideration that might be

given to increasing wire taps on diplomatic establishnents.

SECRET

• 19.

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In a portion of our communication, we attributed cer-

tain information to icCone, then Director of CIA. He

charged that the information attributed to hin was not

so because he. had never made any such statement and he

could prove it.

The actual fact was that the information

relating to icCone had been given to us by one of his

subordinates who had indicated that the information.

originated with licCone. McCone maintained that we

should have checked with him before we went on record

that any information had. originated with him.

The

record at the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory

Board was subsequently corrected.

(31) ALLEGED PENETRATIONS OF CIA

In February, 1965, Bureau representatives met

with ciA officials and with

NAMÉ

to discuss

allegations nade by NAME

= Soviet defector, relative

to alleged Soviet penetrations of CIA. NAME

was

interviewed in detail concerning these allegations.

By

letter dated February 26, 1965, ne officially advised CIA

that there appeared to be no basis at this time for a

full investigation of the individuals involved.

There are off cials in CIA who continue to be

seriously concerned about possible penetrations of the

• Agency and have not discarded NAME'S allegations.

He do not have any reason to believe that CIA

has developed any substantive evidence to support NAME'S

allegations.

If it does, we could be vulnerable and could

be charged that we did not cooperate and conduct the

necessary investigation in 1965.

(32) VICE PRESIDENT NIXON'S TRIP TO SOUTH AMERICA - 1958

In 1958, Vice President Richard M. Nixon traveled

to Latin America during which time there were numerous riots

and attacks which were directed against the Vice President

jand his party: By letter dated May 16, 1958, we provided

the Vice President with a summary of information which we

had received concerning the events in Latin America relating

SECRET

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to the trio.

Most of this information came from CIA.

Our letter could be interpreted as raising the question

concerning the quallty of CIA's coverage in Latin America.

•It is not known if CIA ever became knowledgeable

of the referenced communication. As already indicated

we do know that CIA personnel have been assigned to the

White House. We also know that ' NAME

CIA, was attached to Vice

President Nixon's staff.

If CIA is cognizant of the communication, the

Agency technically could raise a question concerning a

violation of the third agency rule and, furthermore,

could question the Bureau's propriety of making reference

to CIA's coverage in Latin America..

(33) . NAME OF SUBJECT

The captioned individual is a criminal infor-

mani whom we have been utilizing to very significant advan-

tage in New York City. He has been the source of valuable

criminal intelligence

and has been a key witness in

prosecutions of cases being handled by the Bureau.

We

acquired access to NAME through CIA. A covert CIA

operator in New York City had become acquainted with

• NAME saw his potential as a source of criminal intelligence,

• and then conferred with

NAME

CIAO

NAME

contacted the Bureau Liaison Agent and asked if the Bureau

was interested. Negotiations were initiated and we

subsequently acquired the services of NAMe Although

the Agency has never officially made any statement to us,

it has been bitterly disappointed that the Bureau never

acknowledged CIA's assistance which the Agency considered

extremely valuable.

(34) EXCHANGE OF TECHNICAL INFORHATION

for many years, ve maintained tight restrictions

with regard to the exchange of technical information with

Cia, particularly as it related to the technical surveillance

as th related

field. CIA exhibited its equipment to us but, for many years,

me declined to show any of our devices, with some exceptions.

SECRET

• 21 -

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CIA

never made any official protest but informally

indicated from time to time that the lack of exchange

in this highly important field was prejudicial to over-

all intelligence and internal security interests. The

Agency implied that we actually were more open with the

British in this general area than we were with CIA.

It should be noted that the foregoing situation

does not exist today. There is good

exchange between the

Bureau and CIA.

(35)

CIA LECTURERS AT BUREAU TRAINING SCHOOLS

•

CIA has never been able to understand why the

Bureau will not permit CIA personnel to lecture at Bureau

schools or training courses.

CIA has felt that through

a careful selection of lecturers, the Agency could make

a very valuable contribution boch to the Bureau and to

CIA. The Agency has indicated that its participation in

some of our courses would give the Agency the opportunity

to describo CIA's organiantion, objootiveo, and opcrational.

problems. Furthermore, it has

been expressed that Bureau

personnel could be given the opportunity to pose questions

and there would be a far better over-all orientation on

the part of our people.

The Liaison Agent has always resisted CIA's

request.

It has been a delicate matter to handle because

Bureau personnel have lectured to hundreds of CIA employees.

(36) EXCHANGE IN THE TRAINING FIELD

Although CIA has never officially made an issue

of the matter, the Agency has not been happy about our

attitude concerning exchange of information in the training

field. When the matter has been broughtup for any discussion

by CIA, the Agency has been discouraged.

CIA informally has

expressed the feeling that an exchange along certain guide-

lines could be most useful to the U. S. intelligence and

internal security effort.

SERRET

= 28 c

'co

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(37) POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE

(S)

This is an area where discussion with CIA

officials can rapidly generate criticism of the Bureau

• •

for failure to cooperate and offer the necessary assis-

tance.

Positive intelligence, briefly, is that information

which might assist the U. S. Government in formulating

foreign policy.: Much' of it is of a political nature. and

a vital portion pertains to scientific developments, military

capabilities of foreign countries, and intentions of foreign

countries.

Positive intelligence is rot only important

as it concerns the connunist-bloc countries but also

the son-bloc nations.

There never has been,

any'la?, Directive, of

Executive Order which has fixed the responsibilities for

the clandestine collection of positive intelligence in

the U.S.

The Bureau does have a responsibility which

we refer

to as internal security and which falls into the

accepted area of counterintelligence. He do investigate

subversives spys, and we develop penetrations of foreign

intelligence services.

Our work in the positive intelli

gence field, for the most part, has been restricted to

the compliance of requests imposed upon us by the State .

Departnent, usually when a political crisis occurs in

some country.

• CIA has maintained that there is a tremendous

unexplored

technical surveillance coverage, development of informants,

and collection of cryptographic material. CIA does not

feel that we have aggressively moved ou this particular

subject and that over the years, the agency has been

thwarted in its attempts to do much about the problem.

In DATE :

, CIA requested the Bureau to

Install technical surveillances at the offices and temporary

residences of two FoREIGN Government officials visiting the

U.S. Pursuant to instructions, CIA was told to seek the

authority of the Attorney General. The Director stated

that he did not want CIA utilizing FBl as a channel.

SEGRET

∞ 23 a

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SECRET.

In the same month, CIA inquired if the Bureau

would reestablish technical surveillance coverage on

NAME

who cla lelt was a key figure in the

transmittal o1 scentlIlc intelligence data to the

FOREIGN Intelligence Service.". We declined to reinstitute

the coverage: CIA considered the matter important because

of It's relationship to the PLACE

On October 21, 1969, we told CIA that future

requests from. CIA fon technical surveillance coverage

TOm. CLA 8on te

should be transmitted by the Agency directly to the

attorney General.

CIA has never made any official comment or

protest but it has considered the afore-mentioned action

by the Bureau as unfriendly and uncooperative. The Agency

has looked to the Bureau

as the logical point of contact and

as the only organization having the besources and capabilities

of adequately determining if such coverage is even feasible.

(38) MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS

The Liaison Agent recalls fragments of other

situations or conflicts which occured over the years and

which resulted in the voicing of

CIA displeasure or criticism.

The Agent cannot recall the names of the cases which is

necessary to acquire the required data. There was one

Instance early in the 1950's which involved information

received from a source of unknown reliability charging

Allen Dulles with having been a communist and a spy while

1n Europe.: He disseminated the information to several

agencies. Dulles exploded but never lodged a protest.

The Agent also has recollection of instances when

CIA alleged that its source or informant was compromised by

Bureau revelation of CIA iniormation during the course of

interviews conducted by us.

rechnically, this would be a

violation of the third agency rule and, if CIA had hard

core facts, we would be vulnerable, particularly if an

Important informant was lost.

CIA never made any official

issue or protest.

SECRET

∞ 24 =

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SEGRET

There also have been instances, but cases

cannot be recalled, where we included ClA information

in Bureau

reports but CIA had requested that the information

not be passed outside of the Bureau. CIA never protested.

:

DEUNLI

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UNITED STATEST

*Memorar.

TO

: Mr.. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: March 11,

1970.

FroM : w. C. Sullivan

"his document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemt

nation outside your Committee.

Its use is. limited to official proceedings by

nel/without the express approval of the FBI .

your Committee and the content may nut be disclosed to unauthorized person.

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

Reference my memorandum 3/9/70 recommending that a

letter be, directed to CIA outlining the elements of intelligence

and counterintelligence work affecting the United States.

Purpose of this letter is to protect Bureau by giving CIAa

chance to make any comments it may have concerning current

use of sources and facilities affecting both Bureau and CIA.

Pirector instructed "Prepare same and let me see it."

ALZ, INFORMATION CONTAINE MORIE

UNCTASSINIED

BYSELRE

HEREIN IS

DATE /1

We have prepared letter to CIA Director Helms in

line with the foregoing. Letter cites agreement or so-called

"ground rules" drawn up hetween Bureau and CiA in January, 1966,

with regard to coordination of FBI-CIA efforts in collection

of positive intelligence in ine United States: At that time

Vice Admiral Raborn was head of CIA and we are enclosinga

copy of the 1966 agreement for Mr. Helms' attention.

In letter we have also pointed out the Bureau's

primary responsibility concerning internal security of the

United States and for conducting counterintelligence operations

here. We have noted that while the Bureau has no statutory

responsibilities concerning collection of foreign intelligence,

we have made a concerted effort to obtain positive intelligence

of value to other U.S. agencies and policy-making officials

and have regularly furnished the product to CIA and other

interested agencies.

Letter invites any observations Mr. Helms

may desire to make after reviewing this matter, including the

1966 agreement.

A copy of the 1966 "ground rules" between CIA and the

Bureau is. attached to this memorandum for the Diréctor's :

Information.

•Al

-1.

CION*

If the Director approves, the attached letter

Ia. Helms

should go forward.

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

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soft te

January 19, 1966

JEK Act 6

3-7.2000

CLASSIMED BY 60267 NLS 2P/T

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X_

433669

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JEK Act 6 (1) (B)

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March 11, 1970

Honorable Richard Helms .

Director

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Helms:

As I am sure you will agree, the need for close

coordination of the intelligence-gathering ansfcounter-

Intelligence

efforts of the FBI and the Central

Intelligence

Agency (CIA)

is self-evident. This matter is one which

requires a continuing analysis to assure that both agencies

have established working agreements whereby we can most

•effectively realize positive results with a mininum of

duplication, misplaced effort, and jurisdictional problems.

During January, 1966, representatives of this

Bureau met with officials of the CIA to consider coordina-

• tion of our mutual efforts in the collection of positive

Intelligence in the United States. Ag a result of these

conferences, a set of ground rules was drawn up and agreed

to by both agencies. A copy of this agreement was transmitted

•In my letter of February 7, 1966, to then CIA Director

Vice Admiral William F. Reborn, Jr. A copy of the agreement

is enclosed for your information. This agreement has proven

generally effective and no major problems have been

encountered since its adoption in the areas it covers.

The FBI has primary responsibility with regard to

matters involving the internal security of the United States

as well as for conducting counterintelligênce operations in

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

AH 55036 • DocId: 32989616 Page 51

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this country. While

this Bureau does not have any statutory

responsibilities with regard to the collection of foreign

Intelligence, I have always recognized that the potential

for the development of such intelligence in this country 1s

considerable.

The FBI has, in fact, made a concerted effort

to obtain positive intelligence of value to other U. S.

-: Intelligence agencies, including the CIA, and policy making

officials of the Government. While these efforts have,

of course, been incidental to our main internal security

and counterintelligence responsibilities, we have on a

selective basis developed sources, both live and technical,

providing coverage at key foreign establishments in the

United States. The product of this coverage has been furnished

on & regular basis to the CIA and other interested agencies

and officials of the Goverment.

I know that you will share my belief that this

matter requires a periodic reexamination to assure that the

national security interegts continue.to be served in the

most effective and complete manner possible. After reviewing

this matter, Including the attached 1966 agreement, I would

welcome any observations you may desire to make.

sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

что 2 »

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UNITED STATES GOLFLAMENT

Memoraniüm

FRET

10.

: The Director.

DATE: 3/13/70

FROM : SA Sam Papich

DECTASSTITED BY SSTSXNGLNGLL

CIA HAS NO OBJECT ON TO

On ALLISTEN

DECLASSIFIL ATION AND/OR,

RELEASE 0F

CA AIORMATION

LUBJECTS RELATIONS WITH CIA

IN THIS DOCURL

AS SALTZEA

10/19/93 JBH (9

Gmie

6-29-94.

ПК)

Reference is made to my letters dated March 2 and

narch o, 1970, In my letter of barch 5, 1970, I stated "it

Is important to emphasize that, the Bureau can

also produce

an extensive list of justified grievances.":

It is

my under-

standing. that the Director desired that' this list be identified.

Enclosed herewith. is

a list of approximately ?5 items.

This list should not be considered absolutely complete,

Preparation was predicated on my personal recollection and a

review of Bureau records.

To make this list more complete and

specifically accurate would necessitate the review of thousands

ut ities.

The enolosed list can he sunnorter hy Bureau records.

What CIA

records rufleet on the same items is unsuynn. This

also must be kept in mind in connection. with our evaluation

of the alleged CIA grievances which I previously listed.

•I realize that it 1s presumptuous on my part, but

1f the Director feels that our Bureay work can benefit by a

.

personal discussion between the Director and myself, I am

available until April 3, 1970. I plan to leave the area

immediately thereafter for an extended period.

ACTION:

For information.

11/0193

Classified by

Decievery on: DADE(JER

Enclosure

GIA MAS NG GEJECTION TO

DECLASSINCATION AND/OR,:

RELEASE OF GIA HNFORDIATION

IN THIS BAGUMENT KP 1/8/98

Thise is mo

meant, ascuian.:

Classified by 12

Excmot:

entegory

Jute of Declassitication Inde

283

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure.

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

d.,

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# 88849848081

ITS I TORMATION CONTAINED

LIST OF BUREAU GRIEVANCES

13

Jacos 0604u1544,°

CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLDIGCL

DESLASSIFY ON: 25X

(7FK) 4/2/98

• 1951)

1. ATTACKS AGAINST • BUREAU

PLACE

Although Agent Papich did not begin handling Liaison

with CIA until 1952, it is important to refer to highly signi-

ficant differences with CIA which culminated in a serious

conflict in the Fall of 1951. Our Legal Attaches in PLAGE

and pLACE reported that CIA representatives were attacking the

Bureau, were endeavoring to place us in an unfavorable light,

were questioning our jurisdiction, and were making disparaging

remarks

- concerning the Bureau. Some of this was summed up by

characterizing it as covert hostility within CIA, stenning

largely from disgruntled former employees of the

FBI.

In October, 1951, General Walter Beddil Smith, then

Director of CIA, asked to meet with. the Director and other

Bureau representatives for the purpose of discussing the

General Smith denied that there was any

covart hostility agrinet. the Bureau and maintained that there

was a general feeling of respect for us.

He admitted that

there had been isolated instances of frictivn fui thion CIA

must accept its share of responsibility:

It is my recollection that the Director and other

- Bureau officials did meet with General Smith, at which time

guidelines were set forth for maintaining future relations

between the two agencies. I was not able to find a memorandum

of record covering this meeting.

?. PROSELYTING OF BUREAU PERSONNEL BY CIA

The Agent clearly recalls that early in the 1950's

te encountered difficulties with CIA because the Agency allegedly

was recruiting Bureau-employed personnel. He vigorously pro-

tested, and subsequently, the Agency advised that it would follow

& policy of not having any contact with a Bureau employee until

the Individual had been separated from the Bureau for a period

of at least thirty days.

The Agent could not locate the back-

ground of this matter in the files reviewed by him. It is pos-

sible that the pertinent information lies in the personnel file

of some former Bureau Agent.

CIA HAS NO OSJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR,

RELCASE CF CIA INFORMATION

AU THE DOCULIENTAS SANiTiZEDE

KP 1-8-98

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

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Jacis

3.

NAME

By letter dated May 19, 1954, we protested to CIA

for the manner in which the Agency bandled the case of the

captioned individual, a FoREIsH. defector who had been placed

under CIA. control in

PLACE

The Bureau had been Interested

in Interviewing NAME

as soon as he came to the United states,

anid this had

been agreed. to by CIA. Withou: notifying.or

"consulting with us, CIA permitted

NAHE

to arrive in the

United States and be placed in the hands of a Congressional

committee.

We were, therefore, unable to interview the subject

in any detail.

SO. CIÀ EVALUATION OF MOCÄSE

In February, 1954, we complained to CIA because the

Agency had evaluated information coming fros the key source

In the captioned case as emanating fron a. fabricator. He had

disseminated certain foreign intelligence information originat-

ing in this case to CIA. The source was a sey double agent

In one o1 the musi impoitant cases handled by the Bureau: and

the CiA evaluation was noi pruper or correct as at as te fare

concerned.

5. CASE OF NAME

NAME

a CIA employee thom that Agency con-

sidered to be a communist penetration. The Agency requested.

an investigation which was then initiated by us.

He subsequently

learned that CIA had been conducting its om investigation which

even included technical surveillance coverage on the subject.

•He considered this most uncooperative and re protested.

Go

NAME

NAME ANP OCCUPATION

defected to the communists

PLACE: AND DATE

• A

Lew weeks before his defection, he came to the United States

under CIA sponsorship.

He was afforded a tour of the Bureau

and he briefly net the

Director.

It is believed that if all availble facts were col-

lected, the evidence would strongly indicate that CIA did a very

ineffective job of assessing NAME

permitting the

United States Government to be embarrassed by even promoting

& visit for hin to this country. We could consider this instance

an affront to the Director and the bureau.

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•. s'aou

7.

CASE OF POLISH SEALEN - DEFECTORS - 1954

By letter dated October 13, 1951, a very strong letter

of protest was sent to

NAME

Interagency

Defector Committee at CIA. This letter made reference to

political asylum which was being considered for certain Polish

sailor's tho had been seized by the Chinese Nationalist Government.

disseminated a memorandum indicating that members

the Committee had agreed that in vier of commitments nade

by the United States and Chinese officials, that fallure to

arrange re-entry for the Polish seamen would have an adverse

effect on the over-all United States Defector Piogram.

emphasized to

NAME

that this matter had never been

officially presented before the Defector Committee. He mas

Informed that his action was not conducive to mutual cooperation.

8.

CIA INTERVIEN OF ALIENS IN THE UNITED STATES - DISCUSSION

WITH ALLEN DULLES SEPTEMBER 27, 1955

On September 27, 1955, the Liaison

Agent met with

Allen Dulles, at which time the CIA Director's attention was

toa matter shich bad not got

develeped Into a serins

situation but if not properly follored could lead to couiiivis

between the tho agencies.

Dulles was referred to the contacts

ot aliens in

•the United States made by ClA personnel mithout

first obtaining the necessary clearance from the Bureau. The

requirement

for such clearance was

clear-cut and pursuant to.an

established agreement.

-"=

9.

CIA APPROACH OF A NATIONAL ACADEMY GRADUATE (1955)

In November, 1955, an incident arose when Cla approached

a National Academy graduate to utilize his services in Guatemala.

This approach was made while the graduate nas attending vationa1

Academy

classes.

A protest was made to key CIA officials for

not having advised us prior to establishing contact with the

Academy graduate.

-- Tr

10.

HAME

In December,

1955, we received information indicating

that CIA ras in contact with an individual whom the Bureau was

developing for utilization in a double agent operation.

learned that CIA representatives had established contact with

MAHE

and had given him sone advice and guidance without

first checking with the Bureau. We protested to CIA.

..—.

STORET

HH 55036 DocTA: 32989616 Page 56

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'ALLEGED FABIAN SÓCIALISTS IN CIA

In 1956

NAME AND POSITION

made

available to the Bureau on a strictly confidential basis

detailed information concerning alleged infiltration of the

United States Government by "Fabian Socialists." NAME

furnished the names of many individuals whom he considered to

fall into this category. Many of those listed were CIA executives.

This item is being listed in the event we felt that

It could be used to justify that as of that period there was

reason to deal with CIA in a very circumspect manner.

12.

DELAYS IN HANDLING NAME CHECK REQUESTS

By letter dated January 11, 1956; our Washington Field

Office called attention to extreme delays encountered In obtaining

results of name check requests submitted to CIA. These delays

particulariy reidied to investigations of applicani maiteis

being handled by the Bureau.

13. NAME

AND.

In March, 1956, Allen Dulles announced that NAME

_POSITION

Intelligence Advisory

Committee (IAC), of which the Bureau was a member. NAME AND

DESCPRIPTIUE

DATA

admitted contributing to the Alger Hiss

Defense FUnd. ADPIIONAL DESCRIPYIVE DATA.

• Although we did not object to the appointment of NAME

this is another item to be kept in mind in the event we desired

to uphold an argument that there was reason to be circumspect

In dealings with CIA,

•14.

NAME

NAME

was a leading scientist assigned to the

•LOCATION

He had been used as a consultant

by such agencies as the

• Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and CIA.

In october, 1955, he net a Soviet scientist and, with the know-

Ledge of AEC and CIA, began cultivating him. NAME

Informed

IH 55036 DocId: 32989616 Page 57

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us that be had been advised by a CIA official that the FBI

would be furnishing operational guidance to him.

We had never

become involved in any such arrangement, and we later determined

that a CIA official had been in error in making the above-

described misrepresentation. He protested the CIA official's

handling of this matter.

15

NAME

On July 20, 1956, we determined that one

NAHE

had been in contact witn

IFOREJEN DIPLOMAT

..(5)

Washington; D. C.

He further ascertained NAME

was a

CIA employee.

We were informed by CIA on July 21, 1956, that

the Agency had no information concerning' NAME

contacts with FOREIGNER

He later intervieved NAME

it was indicated

NAME

In fact, had been in contact with

ciA official concerning his meetings with the LIPLOMAT

We protested and CIA submitted a letter of apology.

(S)

In July, 1956, a statément was made by a State

Department official to the effect that a CIA employee allegedly

a Soviet agent,

headyis eter the unated states so ihat his activities

was being per-

sould be covered and so that the bureau would be in a position

to promote a defection.

The Bureau was not in possession of

any information indicating that we had sanctioned the entry

of the subject for the purpose described above.

The State

Department official was unable to recall the name of the CIA

employee involved; inquiry at CIA was negative. He were not-

In & position to identify the CIA employee without conducting

investigation within the Agency or without the Agency coming

up with the identity.

17.

NAME

By letter dated November 8, 1956, we strongly pro-

tested to CIA because representatives of that Agency had inter-

Viewed an alien in the United States without first obtaining

glearance from the Bureau.

It should be noted that there was

& well-established agreement whereby it was incumbent upon

CIA to first check with the Bureau before interviewing any

allen. in the United States.

12 mys o

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•.

18.

NAME

was a former student at Columbia University

with whom we had been

in contact because of his association

with a Soviet assigned

to the United Nations SIn December,

1956, NAME

made a trip to Russiaßwhere he was contacted by

an unidentified individual and was given

3 letter indicatin

that the writer was a Colonel in the KGB and that he was

interested in cooperating with

the Unifed States.

When MAME

returned to the United States, we permitted CIA to interview

the subject because of the Agency's foreign intelligence inter-

ests. He subsequently interviewed NAME

tit which time he

informed.us that he had been cautioned by Cas not to furnish

pertivent information to the Bureau. CIA denied that any such

statement was made.

19.

1957

CIA REQUEST FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING A HIGH-SPEED CAMERA-

The San Francisco Office furnished information

Indicating inat cin had Icquoica a firm in California to fui-

pertaining to a high-speed camera manufacticed by the company.

The matter was reviewed because Re wanted to: be certain that

CIA was not invading our jurisdiction.

He did not develop

evidence that CIA had overstepped its jurisdiction. The Director

did make a notation,

"O.K., but it, does seen to me we give CiA

& pretty wide authority

to explore such a field. H"

20.

NAME

On kay 28, 1957, CIA advised that one of its repre-

sentatives in the field had interviewed the captioned foREIGN

alien who had agreed to. cooperate with the agency after he

returned to PLAcE

• CIA conducted this interview without

first obtaining clezrance from the Bureau. Such clearance mas

necessary pursuant to an established agreement. A vigorous

protest was made to the Agency.

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21.

VCIA REQUEST FOR TOUR FOR COLOMBIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

AREPRESENTATIVES - 1957

In July, 1957, CIA requested a tour for several

Colombian officials

who were coming to this country under CIA

grossly insulted the Bureau after we had arrested the

ambassador's chauffeur on lihite slave Iraffic Act chargeSSS(u)

considered undesirable in light of the foregoings?(u

22.

REQUEST FOR SECURITY SURVEY OF COUNCIL ON FOREIGN

RELATIONS - NEW YORK CITY - 1957

On Morember 15, 1957, our New Yor' Office was con-

tacted by the losal CIA

representative who dosired to be inc

formed if the Bureau could conduct a security survey of the

premises of the Council on Foreign Relations which were located

across the street from a building occupied by the Soviet

United Nations Delegation.

The CIA representative indicated

that his visit to our office was pursuant to instructions

received from Allen Dulles who allegedly was concerned about

the possibility of the Soviets establishing coverage of

conversations and discussions which might be held at the Council.

•It should be noted that the Council included as members many

well-known personalities, including officiais of the United

States Government, (v

Pursuant to instructions, Allen Dulles was informed

on November 18, 1957, that we did not like the approach used

by CIA in that such a sensitive matter had been taken up

the flold level rather than through bureau readquarters. 5)

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ONGAL!

23.

NAME

In October, 1957, we received information from NAME

Indicating that a Polish

and we kept CIA advised. The Agency was fully aware of the

situation and particularly knew that we were in contact with

NAME

We subsequently received information indicating that

NAME

, a CIs employee, established contact with

NaME for the purpose of developing information concerning the

work of Polish scientists. A protest was made to CiA for not

properly coordinating their interests with us, bearing in mind

that the action taken by NAME

possibly could have jeopardized

& Bureau operation.

24. NAME

By letter dated February 10, 1958, we directed a

protest to CIA charging that Agency with interviewing the

subject,

• FORFlIEN

alien, without first obtaining the nec-

cesary

clearance from the

Bureau.

25.

ALLEGED IMPERSONATION OF FBI, EMPLOYEE

On April 23, 1958, we received information indicating

that a CIA employee allegedly had represented herself as being

with the FBI when she tried to arrange an intervier with

WAME

, an official of the. International Association of

Machinists in Washington, D. C.

NAME gave a signed statement

In which he claimed that

NAME

he

had received a phone call from

who said she was with the fBI.

Upon checking with

CIA, ve were informed that NAMÉ

denied that she had made

such representation.

26.

NAME

By letter dated lay 12, 1958, the Bureau protested

to CIA for Interviewing an alien in the Detroit area nithout

first obtaining the necessary clearance from the Bureau.

Such clearance pas necessary pursuant to established agreement.

-38-8-89.0

•8.

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!

27.

NAME

He received information in may, 1958,

that

& CIA employee; was listed as being employed with the Bureau

In the records of the District of Columbia lational Guard.

The information was developed as the result of an investiga-

tion being conducted by the Bureau for the White House.•

NAME

furnished a signed statement indicating that he per

sonally had no knowledge of the existence oi the above infor

mation in the National Guard records..

28. NAME

By letter dated June I0, 1958, we protested to CIA

for not advising us concerning that Agency's interview of an

individual tho was the subject of a Bureau investigation.

We

had been corresponding with CIA concerning the subject, and

the Agenor should have been aware di vui lutcrosts.

29.

ALLEGED CIA INCOUPETENCE AND ALLEGED. PENETRATION OF

UNITED STATES AGENCIES

By letter dated June 3, 1958, Legat, PLACE Luinished

information volunteered to him by

- NAMÉ

of G-2.

NAME was very strong in his denunciation ot CIA. He indicated

that the Agency was incompetent and that it was penetrating

other United States agencies.

He also mentioned that when

Allen Dulles was in Switzerland, Dulles was intimate with a

woman, not identified.

The above is being cited in the event we desire to

use this information as evidence for supporting a position of

being circumspect in dealings with the CIA.

117 55036 DoeId: 32989616 Page 62

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30

NAME

The Legal Attache, PLACE advised by letter dated

June 10, 1958, that he had been invited to visit

the head of the FOREIGN

NAME

Intelligence Services cia

became aware of this invitation, and an Agency representative

Informed our Legal Attache that

it was not desired that the

Legat visit with Name

Our Legat was instructed by the Bureau

to accept the invitation regardless of the CIA position.

being uncooperative.

We could evaluate the CIA position in this matter as

31. CIA INTEREST IN (CHINESE ALIENS

(5)

In June, 1958, we raised the

question concerning

CIA's fallure to adheresto an agreement relating to CIA's

recruitment of Chinese

aliens in the United States for over-

Seas Latelligen

Under the agrooment, CiA was

not to approach any chinese lien without first cheching with

A situation developed in Illinois indicating that CIA

allegedly had become interested in recruiting an alien and

even took some action without first checking with us.

expressed our disapproval in a letter to CiA June 12, 1958.

32.

CIA OFFICIAL'S CRITICISH OF "MASTERS OF DECEIT"

our Legal Attache, PLACE, obtained a copy of a memo-

ranaun sent to an oificial in our Embassy in PLAcE by NAME

Chief of the CIA OfficerPLACE

• In his communication NAME

belittled the value of Masters of Deceit" as an anticommunist

weapon in foreign countries. He claimed that the book pertained

only

to the communist Party, USA, which he characterized as a

snall, ineffective, fraction-ridden organization. He stated

that the author of the book was not an intellectual but rather

& policeman.

HY 57036

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Fate.

63

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SIGNET

33.

THE UNITED STATES

DEVELOPHENT OF INDONESIAN GOVERNIENT SOURCES IN SLU)

(0)

In May, 1958, CIA furnished identifying and back-

ground data concerning

three individuals -

AMER

NAhe

NAME

all employees of the

Government and assigned to the United States.

had been developed as a source of information by CIA

in

PLACE

NAME

came to CIA in Washington, D. C.

and volunteered his services.

NAME had been developed as

& source by CIA and had been furnishing some information to

the Agency. In a letter dated June 24, 1958, we told CIA

a coure be

that in the case of MAMe, we felt that the Agency should

have notified us at an earlier date in order that we could

have considered expioitation for internal security purposes

at the outset.

340

NAME

grand

The subject, a former member ot defle

Service,

defected to the united States and

Interligeuve

furnished extremely

valuable information.

The beginnings of this case include

information raising questions concerning CIA cooperation.

In June, 1958, we developed information indicating

that CIA May have opened a letter in

PLACE

which had

been addressed to the director by

an individual who had

identified himself as

indicated that he misht be conneciad with runel"eintelligence

-Service. The letter addressed to the Director had been placed

In an envelope which, in turn,

had ended up in the office of

the [United States Ambassador (s) PLACE

We subsequently

received a copy of the particular communication from CIA,

and the contents were such at that time that no action was

required by the Bureau.

He asked CIA for particulars leading

to.

the alleged opening of the letter which had been addressed

to the Director. CIA claimed that it had not opened the

Letter. He were conIldentially intorned by an Agency repre-

sentative that the Ambassador had opened the letter and then

referred the matter to CiA.

The contents were such that inves

tigative action of an extensive nature was required by CIA

What actually happened at

the United States Embassy

Is something He may never know. U

39ET

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84. 91.

35.

NAME

By letter dated June 26, 1958, we voiced our concern

regarding CIA's alleged interview of a forElsa alien whom CIA

was considering for overseas recruitment.

CIA denied that an

approach of the alien had been made. Our investigation contra-

dicted the statements emanating from CIA.

36.

COMPROSISE OF FBI SENSITIVE SOURCE

DETALLS CONCERNING

SENSITIVE

SOURCE

COPERATED AGAIUST A

FOREIGN DIPLOMATIC

ESTABLISHMENTI(S)

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SENSITIVE SOURCE

(continued fom frage /2)

37.

CIA ALLEGED PARTICIPATION IN FOREIGN GOVERNMENT

DEPORTATION OF AMERICAN COMUNISTS

• In DATE, CIA officially informed us that it was

engaged in a program designed to disrupt overall communist

activity in plAce.

He became concerned because this program

was to involve deportation of undesirables, including American

communists residing in PlAce. The implementation of such a

moram would nave resulted in the return of american communists

to tne unattü states. Ci benzed that it was engagen in any..

operation specifically designed to oust American communists.

In September, 1958, we were informed that the FoREiGN Government

had embarked

on a strong anticommunist program and certain

Americans were ordered deported.

We checked with CIA and

the

Agency's

chief in

PiAGE. claimed that his Agency was not

involved. LaU

The Liaison Agent subsequently was informed on a

strictly confidential basis that the American Ambassador had

been in contact with certain ForEism officials concerning

possible anticommunist activities. The Ambassador had consulted

with the local CIA chief and had asked for a list of Anericans

who could be considered as being deportable. The CIA officer

reportedly furnished a list of approximately 40 names.(S)

38.

NAME

@(U) He expressed our displeasure to CIA in September,

1958,

because of that Agency's unauthorized investigation in

the United States of a FOREISN citizen who was here in connec-

tion with an exchange program.

The FoREIGNER indicated to an

American friend that he was interested in staying in the United

States, but was not ready for actual defection because of a

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SIGNET

possible

hostage situation in his native country.

The Bureau

was following this potential defection and pursuant to estab-

lished procedures was keeping interested agencies apprised of

developments.

On September 15, 1958, we received information

indicating. that another Government agency was conducting an

Investigation of the subject. It was later established that

CIA was the other agency.

39. CIA ACTIVITIES IN PLACE

September 22, 1958, that

The Legal Attache, PLACE

reported by letter dated

NAME AND POSITION

was a

paid, highly. regarded, and very sensitive source

u) of CIA@This information

-NAME AND POSITION

was given to the Legal Attache by

According to NAME

CIA did not want this information to be krown to other agencies,

particularly the FBI. The Director's notation was, "Some more

of CIA double dealing. H."

40.

ALLEGED CIA INCUMPETENCE

...

During the period October

PATE

, Bureau

representatives attended a seminar at Orlando, Florida, which

was given by the U.S. Air force.

Among the activities was a

lecture given by NAME

of CIA. Subsequent to the

briefing, General

of. the Air Force confided to

Bureau representatives and expressed his displeasure with the

briefing given by NAME

• He was particularly critical of

NAME

reluctance to furnish certain information, using the

• excuse that the matter was of a "Top Secret" nature.

General

NAME stated that the position taken by NAME

was only an

excuse for incompetence on the part of CIA.

This item is being cited in the event we desire to

use the foregoing as evidence to support a position that we were

obliged to be circumspect in dealing with ClA.

...

11;

CIA COVERAGE IN CUBÁ PRIOR TÒ OVERTHROW OF BATISTA GOVERNIENT

The overthrow of the Batista Government on January 1,

1959, and the subsequent assumption of pover by Castro raised

questions concerning the efficiency and

competence of U.S: intel-

ligence. Allen Dulles indicated that future developments

would

i

• 14

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RESOCT

show that many more people were involved in the Castro organi-

zation than the U.S. Government had realized.

Information

coming to.our attention suggested the possibility that both

State and CIA had failed to assess developments in Cuba properly.

The foregoing is cited in the event that we found

reason to question the competency of CIA in Cubal This could

be useful if we wanted to justify the existence of a Legal

Attache office in Havana.

One could also comment that poor

coverage in Cuba had an indirect and adverse effect on our

operations in the United States.

12. NAME !

By letter datéd April 25, 1959, re voiced our

objections to CIA for giving guidance to an individual with

whom we had been maintaining contact for. the purpose of developing

him as a double agent.

The individual involved was NAME

a well-known expert in the field of TypE of •

research as it applied to SPECIFIC SUBJECT MAYTEL raS

also a contract agent o1 cis and had occasion to handle sensitive

matters for that Agencyla In AprillPATE. NAME was preparing

to make

a trio to Moscow.

CIA briefed him on matters as they

(V)

applied to his trip.

The Agency also interviewed him concerning

his relationship with the subject in Washington, D. C., and,

furthermore, gave him guidance concerning the relationship.

He objected

to CIA giving any guidance to NAME

concerning

his contacts with the subject without first consulting with us.

73.

ALLEGED BELITTLING OF COMMUNISM BY ALLEN DULLES

In July, 1959, Allen Dulles of CIA spoke at the

• National Strategy

Seminar of the National Yar College. One

of the professors handling the Seminar was critical of Dulles.

He claimed that Dulles had belittled the importance of the

communist problem.

The above is being cited in the event we desire to

•utilize the information in justifying a position that it vas

necessary to be circumspect with CIA.

44. NAME MAGAZINE ARTICLE - SEPTENBER, DATE,

In September, DATE: NAME magazine carried an

article captioned

TITLE OF ARTICLE

which included information of a derogatory nature concerning

the Director and the Bureau.

The article precipitated a crisis

I SECRET

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• ;;

SECKET

which led to an almost open break between the Bureau and CIA.

The article was written by

NAME

who was connectes

with the NAME AND LOCATION OF ORGANIZATION

AND NAME'S CONNECTION WITH GIA

• The article

was very complimentary toward ClA. The author made reference

to relations between the Bureau and CIA and quite clearly

indicated that they were strained. He claimed that the CIA

took Agents from FBI; that Agents did not remain in the Bureau

for an extended period; and he related a story very critical

of the Dirèctor..

We learned that the author had been in contact with

CIA when he was preparing the article. We were told that

NAME

a CIA official, had read

and approved the article

prior to its publication.: As a result of this information,

i : NAME..

became persona non grata with the Bureau.

The Liaison Agent had conferred with both Dulles

and

NAME

concerning the matter.

He took the position

that based upon the information made zailable CIA had promoted:

• condoned, or possibly even authored the article.

Dulles denied

• that this was so and then NAME

procuced information indi-

cating that he had been knowledgeable of the author's article

before ii was published. The author had coniacied

one of NAME

subordinates, and had

discussed the matter with him.

The authos allegedly had raised

the question of strained relations between the two agencies

and at that time NAME

reportedly told the author that rela-

tions were not strained, but were satisfactory. Nevertheless,

the final draft of the article included the derogatory infor-

mation and the facts available to us indicate that NAMÉ

had

the opportunity to alert the Bureau to the existence of the

article before it was published. He did not do so. He told

us that this was an oversight.

Consideration was given to severance of liaison

relations.

It was recommended and approved that liaison contiou=

and that we keep Dulles and CIA on the string as to what course

of action we were going to take. It was suggested that we not

inmediately ansner letters which had been sent to the Bureau

by Dulles and NAME

in connection with this particular

matter.

It was also recommended and approved that we cut off

all contact with NAME.

By letter dated September PATE

to Dulles, the

Director expressed his keen disappointent because officials of

CIA, when they had the opportunity, had failed to voice any cos-

cert or objection to NAME OF MAGAZINE and Lurthernore, had failed

40 00

I SEGRET

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to notify the Bureau. A letter dated September

DATE

WAS

also sent to NAME

and he was told that the Bureau was

disappointed in him because he had failed to make any objection

to the article and had not alerted us concerning the impending

attack against the Bureau.

I.

15.

ACTIVITIES OF CONTACTS DIVISION OF CIA - 1959

*KU)

We, received information in September,

1959, that

the Contacts Division of CIA had held interviers with American

businessmen in the Boston area

; which

deaLt WIth meetIngs

between

the businessmen and visiting Soviets](SCIA reportedly was inter-

The bureau alread

had notified CIA of our interest in thelsoviet.By letters

dated september 29, 1959, we voiced our objection to the manner

in which CIA had handled

this.

(51(0)

EFECTUALS

46 =

APPRARANCE OF

NAMF

DEFORE THE

HOUSE COMITTEE ON UNAMERICAN ACTIVITIES (HUA) - 1959

.On

PATE

indicating

, 1959, information was received

that HUA was interested in obtaining

NAME

AND CHARACTERIZATIÖN

to testify before the Committee. HUA

advised us that it had contacted

the State Department who, in

turn; had conferred with CIA. Allen Dulles allegedly informed

CUA that NAME

was agreeable to appearing before the Committee

and that he would be made available pursuant to certain security

instructions.

The Director asked whether or not CIA had authority

to make a defector available to a congressional committee without

first checking with other interested agencies. The Director was

Informed that CIA did not have such authority

because a National

Security Council directive made it very clear that this could not.

be done without processing the matter through the Inter-Agency

Defector Committee. In this particular case the aforementioned

Committee had not called a meeting, but the chairman, a CIA

official, had

made certain phone calls..

A Bureau representative

was contacted by phone on.

DATE

1959, but at that time we

had not formulated a position.

Allen Dulles allegedly contacted

the chairman of the Committee and was told that the Committee

had no objection to making MAMa available.

SENNET

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On

ATE

1959, CIA repr

entatives were

Informed that we

were opposed to making the defector available

On that same date we were told that CIA was informing

could be made available.

• By memorandum dated DATE

1959, the develop-

ments in this matter were reviewed and it was recommended that

at the next Inter-Agency Defector Committee meeting we strongly

protest CIA's dereliction in the handling of the CUA

request.

4%.

CRITICISM; OF DIRECTOR

icemani

On April 11, 1960

Ü NAME

Of NAME

•, Caracas,

Venezuela Sinformed the Bureau that he recentl

held a conversation with NAME

an official of the U.S.(g(v)

Embassy infPLACE

• NAME WAS a CIA employee. SA

took exceptions

complimentary statements made

by souRce

concerning the Directorcu

and the FBI. SIA

stated that' the Director should have retired

five years ago for the good of all concerned. A protest was made

to Allen Dulles on April 20, 1960.

48.

NAME

RECOGNITION ÓF RED CHINA =

CIA OFFICIAL, ALLEGEDLY ADVOCATING

1960

'In February, 1960, NAME AND POSITiON

for the NAME

Foundation, volunteered information

concerning statements allegedly made by NAME

a top

CIA official. NAME allegedly advocated recognition of Red

China.

This matter was called to the attention of Allen

Dulles and on April 20, 1960, Dulles informed the Liaison Agent

that he had conducted an inquiry, had reviewed a tape recording

of NAME

talk, and was satisfied that NAME had not made the

statement attributed to him.

The above is being cited in the event we desire to

dispute the position taken by Dulles.

If the evidence clearly

established that NAME had made such a statement, we could use

the information to support a position that we would have been

warranted in being nost circumspect with CIA.

19°

ALLEGED INSTALLATION OF. MICROPHONES ON U.S.

PREMISES ABROAD BY CIA

A State Department representative informed the Burcau

that

a microphone had been found in

the U.S. Embassy, Mexico City;

that it had been planted by CIA; and that Allen Dulles allegedly,

18-

* / SECRET

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had maintained that if CIA was to operate effectively, it had

to know what was going on in U.S. establishments.. The implication

was left. that CIA was covering activities of other U.S. agencies

• through tochnical installations.

Inquiries! developed informa-

tion indicating that CIA had installed a microphone in the Embassy

in 1952 at the request of a State Department official.

The Office

of Security in State Department was contacted in an effort to

pin this down

in a more specific manner. We were told by State

that their records did not contain any information concerning

the microphone.

i

subsequently, a letter was transmitted to all Legal

Attaches Instructing them to be on the alert for technica

installations which may, affect Bureau operations.

50. NAME

(0)

Werreceived information indicating that the subject

& former Cuban intelligence agent and the subject of a Bureau

Investigation, had planned to defect In New York City Ye

permitted

a CIA representative to contact the subject in ordei

to orient nim so inui maximun propaganda effoct would ba derived

through newspaper publicity. We were told that the CIA repre-

sentative lin New York Cityshad been instructed by his headquarters

to tell the subject that he would not be prosecuted by the u.s.

Government. We complained to CIA

stressing that the Agency

-

had no power or authority to promise the subject immunity.

51. NAME:

Miss NAME

a CIA employee, obtained a

position as

a secretary in the Office offthe NAME Delegation

to the United Nationg(S) Prior to receiving this job, CIA checked

with the Bureau.

The

NAME

had informed the

her eat see was dearne her job.

The DELEGATION. inquired

if she could recommend somebody else.

She

gave them the name of another CIA employee, Miss NAME

The Liaison Agent informed CIA that the Agency was

out of line by not

with the bureau belore recom

mending NAME

fiRK LECer "that the Bureau was interested

zn. developing intelligence information which might be useful

to the U.S. Government; and

that, in this instance, CIA was

obstructing operations by not appropriately coordinating with

the: Bureau.

MH 55036

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52.

CIA USE OF BUREAU INFORMATION IN

A U:S. INTELLIGENCE BOARD DOCUMENT

On Narch 30, 1961, the Liaison Agent contacted

Allen Dulles concerning .CIA's failure to obtain Bureau clearance

for use of our information in a U.S. Intelligence Board document.

No known damage had been done, but the Agent stressed the sensi

tivity of the Bureau information. Dulles requested one of his

subordinates to establish a procedure to prevent a recurrence

of such errors.

53,

TITLE AND AUTHOR OF BOOK

In July, 1961

our pLACE Office received galley

proofs of the book

TITLE

written by AUTHOR

A review of these proofs disclosed several references which

portrayed our counterespionage capabilities in an

unfavorable

light. Since CIA was responsible for NAME and for any writing

which he might perform, the matter was discussed with CIA. It

turned out that CIA had not been following the preparation of

the book.

We were told that steps would be taken to protect

Bureau interest. The publishers had indicated to CIA that they

reuld cooperate on changes.

Although some changes were made,

the book still came out with some information which was not

entirely favorable to the Bureau.

54, CONFLICT WITH LEGAL, ATTACHE, PLACE

1961

•On October 6, 1961, our Legal Attache, PLACE

received information indicating that forEIGN Embassy in that

City was planning to protest harassment of its personnel by U.s.

Intelligence.

same ClA offIcer changedhis position and admitted that CIA had

been involved to a certain extent.

The Liaison Agent objected

to these tactics. It was important to hin to know the facts

so he could be guided accordingly

55. CIA TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES - 195=

When he defected in DATE 1961, NAME

furnished information concerning alleged penetration of American

intelligence. Inquiries and review conducted by CIA within the

Agency suggested that a CIA intelligence officer, MAME

was a logical suspect. He conferred with CIA and on DATE

1962, we advised the Agency that we would take over the investi-

gation.

SENRET

- 20 -

55036 _DocId: 32989616 Page 73

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on

- "1962, NAME

POSITION

CIA, informed the Liaison Agent that

CIA vas preparing a report contrining extremely sensitive

Information. He stated that this information came from a

sensitive source and he was not certain as to how it should

be handled:

As a result of a discussion with NAME

on

DATE

1962, It was ascertained that CIA bad maintained

& technical

surveillance on NAME

NAME

over an estended period..

; explained

that he had been reluctant to identify this

could have been jeopardized and, furthermore, he did not want

his Agency embarrassed in the event the Bureau objected to

CIa maintaining a capability such as technical surveillances.

It was made emphatically clear to NAME

that it was absolutely

necessary that we be

provided with all the details and, further-

more, that CIA, at the outset, should have apprised us of the

existence of the coverage.

The Director made the notation,

"I only wish we would eventually realize CIA can never be

depended upon to deal forthrightly with us.

Certainly my

skepticism isn't based on prejudice nor suspicion, but on

specific instances of all too many in number.

fet, there

exists

wistful belief that the 'leopard has changed his

spots.' H."

56. NAME.

In February, 1962, the Liaison Agent was requested

..to discuss with CIA a

case which, in our opinion, clearly

indicated CIA had failed to keep us appropriately informed

of developments.

The Bureau's original interest was initiated

in Miami as a

result of a discussion with CIA personnel in that

city. Attempts to get CIA replies via correspondence were

negative.

On February 13, 1962, the Lizison Agent discussed

the matter with CIA and received a reply which did not adequately

satisfy the Bureau's request.

"÷•

57. CIA WIRE TAPPING IN THE UNITED STATES

Sometime prior to the Bay of Pigs fiasco, CIA had

become involved in a weird plan designed to bring about the

assassination of Fidel Castro.

One of the principal ingredients

of this plan was to be the utilization of U.S. hoodlums. CIA

established contact with

NAME AND CHAPACTERIZATION

who

served as the intermediary in dealings with the notorious

hoodlum, NAME

SECRET

21

НН 55036 DocId:32989616 Page 74

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The entire operation tell apart when we developed

Information indicating that NAME was behind a wire tapping

operation in Nevada.

Potentially, there were elements for

possible violation.of unauthorized publication or use of

communications. However, prosecution was out of the question

because of the

tainted involvement of CIA.

58. NAME

In October, 1962, we lodged a protest with CIA

because the Agency initiated operation of Cuban agents in the

Miami area and in so doing violated Bureau jurisdiction.

Arrangements

Arrangements were subsequently effected where the source in

the matter was turned over to the Bureau' for handling.

59. NAME

•On PATE

1963; ClA requested that the Bureau

establish coverage on

a visiting. FOREIGN

national.

Immediately instituted investigation and then determined that

CIA actually had been instrumental in supporting the subject's

trip to the United States.

CIa had been endeavoring to recruit

the subject. On DATE

1963, a strong protest was lodged

"with

NAME AND POSITION

CIAO.

60.

ALLEGED ATTACK ON BUREAU BY JOHN MCCONE

He received information in December, 1963, indicating

that John McCone, Director of CIA, allegedly was attacking the

Bureau in what would appear to be a vicious and underhanded

RAME MCCODe allegediy informed NAME

and

that CIA had uncovered a plot in Mexico City

• Indicating that Lee Harvey Oswald had received $6,500 to

assasSinate President Kennedy. The story attributed to McCone

appeared to be related to information which had come from one

FOREIGN

national. Interrogation of

NAME including a polygraph, disclosed that he had fabricated

his story.

This had been made known to CIA and to McCone. There-

fore, 1f McCone had made the above statements to. NAME

it would appear that it would have been an obvious attempt to

ridicule the Bureau. The Liaison Agent contacted McCone on

December 23, 1963.

McCone vehemently denied the allegations.

HH 55036 DocId: 32989616 Page 75

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61. NAME

The subject is a ForfiGN national who first made

contact with CIA in DATE expressing a desire to cooperate.

He

openly defected. in DATE and he is currently in the United States.

He has been the source of considerable cortroversy because of

questions raised pertaining to his bona fides. Early in

CIA took a very strong position indicating that NAME

a plant. -The Bureau did not make a commitment on bona fides.

In the meantime, NAME

although controversial, continues to

furnish voluminous information.

Itiis possible that at some future date the issue of

bona fides will be conclusively resolved and the action taken

by the Bureau so far will have been justified.

This is important

to be kept in mind as far as the future, is concerned.

-----

"If it is finally concluded that NAME is a bona

fide defector, CIA could be charged with gross mishandling of

the subject over a period of jears.

62. NAME

On Aprii 13, 1964,

the Liaison Agent protested to

CIA because the Agency

had failed to notify the "Bureau concerning

the past utilization of an individual as a double agent in an

operation directed against the whom in wherE

- The Inezvidual

in this case was serving as

POSITION EU in Teras in 1964

(0)

and because CIA did not notify us concerning the

past

„our interests

could have been jeopardized, bearing in sind that the forEIGueR -

could have been

in contact with WHoM

CIA had severed its relationship with the oreiGhout our knowledge.

*prior to his

PoSITIoN assignment in the United States, but CIA,

nevertheless,,

had an obligation to give us proper notification.

CIA COVERT ACTIVITY IN ATANT 7 1965 KES)

We received information in Juse, 1965, that certain

"Cuban exiles in the Miami area were representing

themselves asl

Doeing with the "Department of National" Security."

These exiles

had been interviewing Cuban refugees concerning political con-

ditions in Cuba. We ascertained

that this activity was beings

exiles under the cover of

We protested, bearing in mind that the cover being used could

cause embarrassment to the United States and could impose a

problem for the Bureau because ve would become the recipients

(U)

-*23 -

KiN 55036. DocId: 32989616 Page 76

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of impersonation complaints. CIA was requested to take immediate

steps to

correct the undesirable situation. We were subsequently

informed by CIA that the credentials had been withdrawn and that

the cover would no longer be used.

64. NAME

In August,

1965, both the Bureau and CIA had an

interest in assessing the potential utilization of the services

NAME

a FOREIGN exile residing in the United States.

We were interested in sAMe because he potentially could furnish

information concerning FoREIsN exiles in this country and the

Agency wanted to utilize him in overseas intelligence operations.

We informed CIA that NAME would not be made available to the

Agency. CIA appealed and asked that we reconsider our position.

because of the potentially high value of NAMe in the proposed

CIA operation. While we were negotiating with ClA, we determined

that the Agency was already in contact with the subject and was

conferring with him. We subsequently protested to the Agency

who claimed that it had not been out of line in contacting

because 'the Agency had maintained a relationship with him in the

past. We did not accept this expianation.

65.

INSECURE HANDLING OF CODENAME INFORMATION

DETAILS CONCEPNING CIA'S

INSECURE HANDLING OF

INFORMATION RELATING TO

SENSITIVE FBI OPERATION

66. NAME

ECO)

In March, 1966, CIA requested coverage on a visiting

→ Governmentabecause of information develose

by the Agency indicating that fordeNed was working for the sue.

(0)

НН 55036 Do0Id:32989616 Page 77

(SECRET

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## Page 78

Instructions vere sent to the field and we then learned

New York Cityathat CIA allegedly planned to make a recruitment l

approach.

The matter was taken up with CIA headquarters and

& protest was made because of the wide discrepancy in the

reports we received on CIA intentions.

67 .

PASSING OF BUREAU DOCUMENTS TO

SENATOR

NAME

BY CIA EMPLOYEE - 1966

In September, 1966, we developed information indicating

that copies of FBI documents had been passed to Senator MAtE by

CIA. The matter was discussed with the Director of CIA and the

Agency subsequently conducted an investigation and established

that one of its employees,

NAME

had submitted

& name check request to the Bureau concerning one

NAME

who was the

subject of the material in question.

At that time

had a responsibility of handling name check requests for

CIA and, in this connection, was in contact with our Name Check

Section.

He admitted that he instituted a name check on an "off

the cuff basis" for another CIA employee named, NAME

It is my recuiieccion that-one or boil Cre employees

were subseguently fired

or asked

to resign.

68.

ALLEGED COMPROMISE OF BUREAU DOUBLE AGENT

(U)

In March, 1967, we protested to CIA in connection

with

a matter relating to our mutual interest in a Chemist)

connected with

COMPANY

New Jersey eyu)

we were utilizins the (chemistlas a louble agent in an operation

relation-

intelligence relating to the field of

SCIENCÉ

Office received intormation indicating that a clA ollIcer.

without authorizatIon, compromised our relationship withsthe

Chem 5) discussing

the matter with the president of the

firm.

69

NAME

the

Agency

In July, 1967, we protested to CiA in a case where

allegedly had failed to report to us concerning a

communication which a fortin exile, residing in the United States,

had received from the fongu Intelligence Service.

The particular

communication had instructed the exile to initiate preparations

TH 35036 DocFA. 32989

Paye 79

25

-

SARRET

---

## Page 79

SERRET

for the handling of

an intelligence assignment in the United

States. CIA claimed that the exile had been reluctant to

operate in this country and CIA then instructed him not to

respond to the communication received

PLACE. We took the

position that despite this reluctance on the part of the exile,

the Bureau had been entitled to have had the opportunity to

make its own assessment.

70.

CIA AND ITS INVOLVESIENT IN LEGISLATION

DEALING WITH THE NÄME OF LEGISRATION

On June 5, DATE information was received indicating

that Richard Helms had sent Senator NAME

three proposed

amendments to the legislation being proposed by the Senator,

all dealing with the protection of the constitutional rights

of Government employees. We had been following developments

relating to this proposed legislation beçause the provisions

had a very definite bearing on Bureau operations. The proposed

amendments made by Helms included exemptions from certain

provisions of the Bill for FBI, CIA, and the National Security

Agency.

These amendments were

suggested by CIA without prior

consultation with the Bureau.

The Director made the notation,

"this precumatunus artion of

Helmal le actrunding.

-:"

• 71. CIA COVERAGE OF BUREAU LEADS

Historically, CIA's coverage of Bureau leads had

been decidedly spotty from the standpoint of delivering

satisfactory content and servicing the leads within a reasonable

period of time. It would be necessary to revier hundreds, if

not thousands, of files to document what we consider delays in

following our leads. It should

be noted that CIA, organizationally,

has never maintained an atmosphere of discipline in any may

comparable to that of the Bureau. Matters are not followed

as promptly and responsibility is not firmly fixed. This

evaluation is made

in light of standards followed by the Bureau.

He continually prod and push CIA for responses. To develop all

of the evidence to explain these delays would require an inspection

of CIA operations. CIA has given the following types of responses:

hazards of adverse operating conditions in backward countries;

limited personnel; undue exposure to hostile intelligence, police,

and security services; pressures placed on the agency on priority

-26 -

HH 55036

Docid: 39989616- Page 79

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SERET

targets quite often dealing with political crises in foreign

countries.

Although CIA has not ventured to emphasize the

point, it

is believed that in many instances it has not pro-

duced

satisfactorily and efficiently because of the absence

of reliable sources.

72. LACK OF PROPER ORIENTATION OF BUREAU

RESPONSIBILITIES AND JURISDICTION

Although there has been decided improvement in

recent years, the Liaison Agent continues to note a definite

Jack of knowledge of FBI responsibilities and jurisdiction on

the part oI cia employees.

They do receive some

training in

this regard, but the impression is left that such training

could be

much more extensive. 'The Bureau's Liaison Agent has

lectured to hundreds of CIA

employees in the last few years

and this has produced significant signs

of concrete benefits.

CIA employees encountered the Liaison Agent on a very regular

basis and asked questions pertaining to our responsibilities.

Nevertheless, there is room for much improvement.

73. CIA POLICY REGARDING DISSEMINATION TO OUR LEGAL ATTACHES

There has been a sore spot in connection with CIA

policy relating to its dissemination oi information at a locai

level in our embassies(s) This policy allegedly has applied to

all other agencies and includes our Legal Attaches. CIA has

maintained that

unless the information it develops or receives

is in the immediate jurisdiction of a particular agency, it

will only disseminate at the Seat of Government.. As an

example,

If CIA received information concerning the existence of a U.S.

criminal fugitive in a foreign country, it would disseminate

to the Legal:Attache.

However, if the

information falls within

the area of intelligence, which includes subversive activities.

• the Agency has stated that under its system the information is

considered to be "raw material" and that it must be evaluated

at headquarters and

I reviewed in the context of what has been

received from other countries, and then disseminated to inter-

ested customers.

We have not

raised an issue, but dissemination

regarding political conditions in a country where the Legal

Attache is assigned could be useful because it would further

orient him in his dealings with foreign officials.

There have

After CIA disseminates at headquarters, we are in a position

to'communicate the information to our Legal Attaches. This

helps, but it would be much more convenient for the Legal

Attache to receive it lat the local level"

(v)

- 27 -

HH 55036 DocId:32989616 Page 80

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Could :

There

e situations where CIA

ices abroad

!

receive informa

on regarding a subject,

ich as an alleged

spy traveling to

the United States, or

the case abroad

simply:has ramifications in this country. In these instances,

CIA has followed a definite pattern over

the years of

not

furnishing such information to the Legal Attache, but

disseminating to us at Seat of Government. Here

again, CIA

has maintained that its headquarters must

review the data and

make the decision regarding dissemination. We have not raised

an issue: We could by claiming that the Legal Attache could

be useful in evaluating the case and being in a position to

IO1l0W Bureau interests as soon as possible.

However, if we

pushed for a change in current conditions, we should consider

that the Legal Atuaches possibly could inherit responsibilities

abroad which might present risks or operational headaches.

For several years there existed a coordinating

mechanism in Germany headed by CIA.

This was a committee

headed by the Agency and composed of répresentatives of other

U.S. agencies.

The committee reviewed espionage and counter-

espionage developments in Germany which had a bearing on U.s.

Interests.

a problem of operational jurisdiction arose

among

: the U.S. agencies, the committee mechanism was used to

responsibilities were divided among the ditterent agencies,

It is my recollectin that the Bureal has not heen interested

In becoming a part of such a committee. If we-did, we could

end up

with responsibilities not entirely agreeable to us.

74 SOME PAST HISTORY WHICH IS VERY RELEVANT

•

When evaluating our relationship with CIA, including

our grievances, it is believed that we cannot overlook the

relevancy of the serious differences we experienced with the

Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during World War II. The

seeds leading to the establishment of CIA came from OSS.

WAME AND

• CHAPACTERIZATION

has been referred to as the

"CHARAGTERIZAT"

There were instances when OSS blatantly ignored FBI

jurisdiction and failed to coordinate on numerous matters.

There

was a number of CIA officials who obviously had a definite dislise

for the Bureau. The loose administration of OSS, its employuen:

of known subversives, its alleged penetration by

the Soviets,

and its attitude toward the Russian Government at the time posec

serious problems to the Bureau.. At one point OSS was actually

giving serious consideration to establishing liaison with the

28-

T477.

1H 55036 DocId: 32989616 Page 81-

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NKVD. Because

a substantial number of OSS officials subsequently

became important figures within CIA, it would be logical to

assume that the FBI was justified in being most prudent, if not

circumspect, in dealings with the Agency.

When evaluating its position in 1970, the Bureau

rightfully cannot forget the troubles with oss.

At the same

time, it would be most unwise if we neglected to examine the

role

played-by the Bureau when we disbanded our SIs operations

In 1947.

In a matter of hours, we destroyed hundreds of files

in our sIs offices abroad, and

we did not turn over to CIA a

large number of

sources and informants.

There have been many

ex-Agents. who had been

with the tile destruction operation, and who later became

with SIS, who were familiar

•connected

with CIA. It is possible

that the Agency could

argue that the actions by the Bureau were detrimental to U.S.

interests and impaired CIA's early efforts. to establish desired

coverage in Latin America.

-SEART

- 29 -

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ROM

UBJECT:

OPTIONAL PORN NO. 10

45010-108

MAY 1902 EDITION

OSA GEN,

REG. NO. 21

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

AJI INFORMATION CONTAINED

HERAIN IS UNCLASSTrIED

DATE 2/9/28 3x5668 520/602

:

HI. DeLoach

DATE: March 23, 1970

HI o

C. Sullivan

22. 11 TO

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

091.6S.04:18

B MS KP 18/98

By letter dated 3/11/70, the Director communicated

with CIA Director Richard Helms referring to the existing

agreement entered into between the Bureau and CIA in 1966 with

regard to mutual efforts in the collection of positive intelli-

gence in the United States. The Director loted that he would

velcome any observations that CIA might desire to make to assure

that CIA"

that national security interests continue to be served in the

most effective and complete manner possible.

By letter dated

MI. Helms replied stating that be valued highly the

Dircotis persouai judgment in affairs bearing on the national

security and suggested certain areas which warrant periodic

reexamination since they have a direct bearing on domestic

clandestine collection of positive intelligence.

In view of the fact this is being held very tightly and

It will take several days for me to revier necessary files and

make proper analysis of Mr. Helms' letter, it is believed

desirable to advise Mr. Helms that this matter is under study

at the Bureau and that the Director will communicate with him

further upon completion of our analysis.

Is the meantime, I

an going over this matter very thoroughly and will submit the

results of my analysis to the Director for his consideration

and will attach a suggested additional communication to Mr. Helms.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the attached letter go forward to Mr. Helms

advising him of the receipt of his letter and that this matter

1s receiving analysis by the Sureau.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi

nation outside your Committee.

Its use is himited to official proceedings by

your Committee and the content may nut be disclosed to unauthorized person-

nel without the express approval of the FBI .

a deadline.

1N 55036 •DocId:32989616 Page 83

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## Page 84

DITIONAL FORM NO. 10

sorámias

MY IPAS EDITION

28A GEN. A1G. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVE

MENT

Memorandum

TO

:Mr. C. D. Deloach,

DATE: March 24, 1970

FROM:

W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT:

RELATIONS WITH CIA

The attached memorandum dated 3-23-70 reported the

receipt of a letter dated 3-11-70 from Richard Helms, Director

of CIA referring to agreements between the Bureau and the CIA

Concerning our mutual efforts in the collection of positive

intelligence in the United States. This memorandum recommended

that the letter which was attached go to Mr. Helms acknowledging

the receipt of his letter and advising that the matter was under

consideration at the Bureau. The Director asked that a deadline

be set.

A preliminary evaluation of the nine matters which have

been presented by CIA indicate that they will require extensive

file reviaw and studr is order that the pertinent aspects ôf

eạch matter as it affects FBI interests and responsibility may be:

properly considered. It is my judgment that these matters

lend themselves to the preparation of a series of about six

memoranda with accompanying letters to CIA.

To attempt to haudle

them in an all-inclusive memoranda might result in a lengthy

and unwieldy document.

Therefore, if approved, the matters raises

by CIA will be handled in a series of six memoranda, the first of

which is now being completed and will be sent through for

approval not later than tomerrow. The remainder will be sub-

mitted in three-day intervals thereafter.

ACTION:

For information

AIL INFORMATION CONTAINET

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFINL

DATE 1/2/Ol BY SP-LALMITE

one litter

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi

nation outside your Committee.

Its use is limited to offirin! "oceedings by

• voir Committee and the content may nut be disclosed to unauthorized person

nel without the

express approval of the FBI

MY 55036 DocId: 32989616

Page 84

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## Page 85

OPTIONAL FORM MO, 10

2010-108°

MAT 19A7 POITION

OSA GIN. 92G.NO. 37

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Mr.

C. D. DeLoach

DATE:

3/25/70

FROM : W. C. Sullivad

SUBJECT:

RELATIONS WITH CIA

Reference is made to my attached hemoranda of 3/23 and

3/24/70 with reference to our response to CIA's letter to us

of 3/11/70.

In accordance with the Director's instructions, the

matter is

being given attention ana the various subject matters

raised by

CIA are being studied. It is contemplated that our

memorandum and letter for the Director's approval will be ready

by Monday, 3/30/70.

ACTION:

For information.

ак.

CIA HAS NO DE/SOTION TO

CROL839EG

33°

REL ASE OF CIA ENORMATION

IN TING DOCUMENT, KY 1/8/98

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS LNCLASSIE LAD

DITE 29198 3x5668 540160L

(JFK)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissenc

nation outside your Committee,

Its use is limited to official proceedings by

your Committee and the content may nut be disclosed to unauthorized perso

nel without the express approval of the f'BI..

NH 55036

DocId: 32989616 Page 85

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## Page 86

Talen

• OSA CAM, 110. NO. 28

UNITED STATES GO - LENMENT

Memorandum

:Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE:

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONS WITH CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

March 30, 1970

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

DEGLASSIFICATION AND/OR,

RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION

IN THO DOCUMENT. KP 1/8/98

DECIASSIFIED BY

0n 4/2

Reference my memorandum 3/25/70 concerning letter 3/20/70

from CIA Director Helms. In letter, Helms expresses full agreement

with Director's view that intelligence collection efforts of FBI and CIA

must be closely coordinated and that periodic reappraisal of such efforts

is required. He has invited Director's desires as to how such reassessments

can be best conducted. He refers to 1966 conference between Bureau and

CIA representatives, which resulted in agreement covering certain phases of

• intelligence collection, and suggests additional discussions at this time.

Helms hac listed nine specific areas for possible discussion at

conference between Bureau and CIA. He states he would sincerely welcome

Director's observations on his proposed agenda. Specific items listed by

Helms are set forth hereinafter together with my observations.

1. Electronic Surveillance Coverage (Elsurs)

Helms notes Bureau has been receptive in past to requests for

this type coverage and has capability and experience in this field which cannot

be duplicated by any other U.S. agency. Helms refers to October, 1969,

CIA request for elsur coverage of two FoREIGNERs ; visiting U.S., one of

whom had KGB connections. Bureau advised CIA at that time that it should

refer such requests directly to Attorney General (AG) for approval. Helms

suggests question of such coverage be reopened between FBI and CIA

representatives, adding that this coverage should be rigidly controlled.

Comment: We have always been highly selective in our use of

elsurs, particularly during recent years in view of sensitive nature of this

type coverage, legal considerations, and manpower commitments. CIA:

which has no prosecutive responsibilities may not understand the Bureau's

position in this matter or need for great selectivity but I do not feel Director .

should modify stand taken in October, 1969, that CIA should seek approvai

directly from AG. Helms' point that no other U.S. agency has capability of

FBI in this field may have merit and when CIA can first clearly justify reques==

Classifiedar

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATIO

Exempt from CDS, Category 2 6 3

Date of Declassification Indefinite

Unauthorized Disclosure

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

55036 Do0Id:32989616 Page 86

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## Page 87

Memorandum for Mr. 'DeLoach

RE: RELATIONS WITH CIA

for this-lype coverage to the AG, if the Director wishes we could consider

To.

tis

handling actual installationson a highly selective basis as we currently do

with respect to meritorious requests by State Department. Each one, of

course, would be judged on its own merits. But there should be no change in

our October, 1969, vosition that CIA must first get approval for such coverage

from AG

Trans Inton's view. #

2. Mail Coverage

Helms cites importance of this as intelligence tool, which has

been proven in past. He has impression it has been discontinued and suggests

• FBI-CIA representatives confer to determine whether such coverage could be

used with regard to investigations of Soviet blos, New Left, and foreign agents.

Comment: In line with Director's instructions, we have discontinue

• this coverage in recent years. We know that other Federal agencies, including

Army and CIA, utilize this type coverage frequently and often with success

such as we experienced ourselves in the past. Eoth Army and CIA regularly

make available to us results of their coverage abroad concerning individuals

of interest to Bureau. This type coverage is sensitive and Helms has not

spelled out specifically what CIA may have in mind here. This type coverage

is too sensitive to be discussed in written correspondence. I recommend

Let unti

that we seek further information in direct discussions with CIA before

tho

deciding on our course of action. Of course no commitments of any kind

will be made and all issues raised will be referred to the Director for a

it"

decision.

3.

CIA Technical Services

Helms calls attention to recent tecinical and scientific equipment

recently developed by CIA in the counterintelligence field ( SENSITEVE

METHODS

). He inäcates willingness to share

such equipment and developments with Bureau and indicates he would welcom

suggestions as to how súch equipment can be better employed.

Comment: While it is not likely CIA has developed equipment of

this type which is not already known to FBI Lacoratory and while some of

do pent to which females lay a exploring a on as clue me bo, 1.

Qualified personnel from FBI Laboratory could confer with appropriate CLA

representatives to insure we have benefit of any recent scientific advances

* tealized by CIA.

ET

CONTINUED - OVER

HH 55036 DocId:32989616 Page 87

---

## Page 88

- Memorandum for Mr.' DaToach

RE: RELATIONS WITH

4 Courses in Positive Intelligence Requirements and Reporting

Helms offers to make available to us training courses in positive

intelligence for purpose of discussing in depth theneeds of the intelligence

community, including CIA.

Comment: I see no need for this at this time. We have a highly

effective and comprehensive training program for our Agents in security work

and I see no necessity for training lectures by CIA personnel. We regularly

receive from CIA copies of the Current Intelligence Reporting List which out-

lines priorities and requirements of other U.S. intelligence agencies in particu-

lar areas of positive intelligence. These Lists are reviewed by appropriate

supervisors at SOG and are then furnished on regular basis to interested field

offices. If any new developments occur in this field, we can always reconsider

if we wish. But as stated there is no need at this time. i.

5. Seminars on Opposition Services

Helms suggests that FBI and CIA specialists concerning hostile

- intolligence services meet as needed to keep abreast of new develmpments

and patterns on part of hostile intelligence agencies. He feels such

discussions should provide an opportunity to possibly devise new means to

penetrate or neutralize enemy forces.

Comment: I do not believe there is any need for conferences of

type referred to by Helms except on an infrequent basis. Of course, where

special circumstances warrant and provided such conferences are tightly

controlled by Bureau and specifically approved by Director there would be

no reason to object to them per se.

6. Live Bloc Sources

Helms refers to prior cooperation between FBI and CIA in handling

of communist bloc defectors and penetration agents but expresses belief there

is room for improvement in establishing more uniform exploitation of these

sources. He invites Director's suggestions for better coordination and evalua-

tion of live source information.

Comment: Our 1966 conferences and agreement with CIA were

(largely concerned with coordination and handling of live sources. This agree-

ment has proven effective.as.Helms. agrees. Iam not aware of any need for

modifying the 1966 understanding but this is an area which is quite sensitive a-=

Helms has not spelled out what he may have in mind. I feel we should listen

to any proposals CIA may have to offer on this point in direct discussions wiL.

their representatives.

Again. no commitments would be made and any proposa:

would be referred to the

Director for a decision. CONTINUED - OVER

1-3-1916 18

H# 55036 DocId: 32989616 Page 88

---

## Page 89

Memorandum for Mr: De

RE. RELATIONS WITH CIA

Lch

8 Live Sources in Non-Bloc Area

Helms points out diplomatic sources in this area, especially

critical Middle East and Latin-American fields, could provide much needed

intelligence. He urges the full potential of this area be explored by repre-

sentatives of both agencies.

Comment: This is very similar to previous point (6) and again

involves 1966 agreement. I think our approach should be the same; namely:

while we are not aware of any problems in this area we could listen to any

proposals CIA has to make and, of course, we would refer them to the Direcic=

prior to taking any action.

8.

New Left and Racial Matters

Helms notes that there is already a substantial exchange of infor-

mation in this area and cites close connections between subversive elements

in U.S, and abroad. He suggests we consider how we can best empiny our

respective menoves lu meet this threat which is intorational in scone.

Comment: We have carefully reviewed this situation and.feel CLA

could definitely provide more information concerning activities of New Left

and black estremisis while traveling abroad and additional data concerning

foreign funding or support of subversive activities in U.S. We furnish a

great deal of information to CIA regarding foreign aspects of the extremist

movement developed through our investigations. As to manpower commitmen-s.

our own use of manpower is, of course, under constant review. There are

heavy manpower demands on FBI in a host of areas (organized crime, civil

rights, applicant investigations, etc.) outside the security field.

I woulate

definitely opposed to any discussions with CIA involving the allocation of manpower

by either agency. This is a matter for each agency to decide in its own besi

interests andiudgment.

Relations With Domestic-Field Offices and Legal Attaches

Helms expresses belief there are no serious conflicts in this area

but there may be room to improve quality of liaison so as to expand intelli-

gence collection eitorts, particularly in view of changing conations both here

and abroad.

Comment: As indicated, Helms does not perceive any serious prs-

blems in this area either in U.S. or abroad. Our policy has always been ira:

any matters of substance involving liaison with CIA or other agencies must i=

CONTINUED - OVER

IT 55036 Dacid-32989616 Pare 89

---

## Page 90

Memorand

am for Mr.

De Loach

RE: RELATIONS WITH CIA

handled at headquarters level. To do otherwise could result in loose adminis-

trative control. I feel that we should adhere strictly to our long-standing policy

in this connection and I see

no need for discussions with CiA on this issue.

RECOMVENDED REPLY TO HELMS:

I do not believe the Director should seek to furnish detailed

observations regarding the Bureau's position o the various matters suggested

by Helms. Many of them are quite sensitive audi complex and there is nothing

to be gained by spelling out the Director's views in writing on such matters.

Accordingly, I recommend that a general reply be sent to Helms indicating

our willingness to meet with CIA representatives for direct discussions on

those points which merit further elaboration or where we might at least be

willing to listen to any CIA proposals.

Bearing in mind specific observatics set forth above, I think

our reply to Helms should show we are amenable to direct conferences with

ICIA on certain of these issues but we should inficate we see nothing to be

(4) Courses in Positive Intelligence Requiremats and Reporting;

(5) Seminars on Opposition Services; (8) New Left and Racial Matters;

and (9) Relations With Domestic Field Offices and Legal Attaches. With

regard to the other points, any discussions with CIA would be strictly within

current policies laid down by the Director anino commitments would be

made by Bureau representatives. All matters requiring a decision which

might arise would be reterred to the Director fr a decision.

If the Director desires,

and myself would

represent the Bureau in such meetings with Cli representatives. On a

selective basis, other officials of Domestic Inelligence Division could be

asked to join me as required.

-------

ACTION:

Attached for the Director's appromi is a letter to Helms in line

with the foregoing observations.

1 55036 00c14 32989616 Page 90

---

## Page 91

(SECK

March 31, 1970

Honorable Richard Helms

Director

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington,, D. C.

Dear Mr. Helms:

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR,

RELEASE OF CIA INFORIMATION

IN THIS DOCUMENT. K P4/8/98

DECLASSIFIED BY 5668 StOlECL

011_2-9-98 (27K)

I have carefully reviewed your letter of March 20 setting

out your observations with respect to various matters of mutual interest.

I certainly appreciate your kind comments concerning me and i share

your convictions as to the need for close coorcination of our intelligence

collection activities in behalf of the national security.

.

•Your letter suggested nine particular areas which might be

the subject of further discussions aimed at improving the coordination of

our operations. A number of these topics are highly sensitive and complex

and I will therefore make no effort here to set forth my views in detail.

However, in response to your letter and as a prelude to any direct discus-

sions on these matters, certain observations on my part may be appropriate.

With regard to electronic surveillance and mail coverage,

there is no question as to the frequent value of such operations in develop-

ing needed intelligence. On the other hand, the use of these measures in

domestic investigations poses a number of problems which may not be

• encountered in similar operations abroad. There is widespread concern

by the American public regarding the possible misuse of this type coverage.

Moreover, various legal considerations must be borne in mind, including

the impact such coverage may have on our numerous prosecutive responsi-

bilities. The FBI's effectiveness has always depended in large measure on

but capacity to retain the full,confidence of the American people. The use

of any investigative measures which infringe on traditional rignts of privacy

must therefore be scrutinized most carefully. Within this framework, however,

I would be willing to consider any proposals your Agency may mate:

HH 55036 DocId: 32989616 Page 91

---

## Page 92

Your offer to make available certain technical equipment

developed by the Agency is most welcome and I fully reciprocate your

willingness to cooperate in the exchange of relevant scientific data.

i am prepared to designate appropriate representatives of the FBI

Laboratory to meet with CIA technical personnel at any mutually

convenient time.

With respect to the inclusion of positive intelligence courses

in our training curricula, I am sure you will recognize that our training

programs must be designed primarily to fulfill our own widespread and

demanding responsibilities. While I appreciate your offer, I do not

feel it would be feasible at this time to include the proposed courses

in our training schedules. I would certainly have no objection to the

holding of seminars between specialists of our two agencies in selective

areas of interest when justified by specific circumstances.

Concerning the coordination of FBI-CIA activities in the

exploitation of live sources, both in the communist bloc field and with regard

to key nonblos establishments, I am not aware of any significant problems.

The 1966 agreement between our agencies was concerned directly with this

question and i have no changes to suggest in the ground rules at this time.

However, In the event your Agency has some specific proposals to male,

I would welcome bearing further from you in this connection.

There is already a considerable exchange of information

between our agencies concerning New Left and racial extremist matters.

Frequently, as you have pointed out, there have been substantial connections

between subversive and extremist elements in the United States and their

counterparts abroad. We will continue to furnish your Agency information

being developed by the Bureau which might have a bearing on your

intelligence requirements. At the same time, we are definitely in need of

additional information from your Agency as to the foreign aspects of the

extremist movement in the United States, including foreign funding and

support of local extremist organizations. While I do not believe there is

any need for detailed aiscussions on this point, if you have any specific

suggestions to make we would be pleased to consider them..

WN 55036. Docid: 32989616 Page 92

---

## Page 93

Similarly, I am not aware of any major problems which exist

at this time in connection with the coordination of our field liaison

operations.. It has been my long-standing policy that serious questions

affecting the coordination of our activities with other Government

agencies should be hanaled and controlled at a headquarters level in

order to avoid administrative confusion and misunderstanding.

in line with my letter of March Il and the observations

contained in your letter of March 20, I will in the immediate future

designate appropriate officials of the Bureau to meet with your representatives

for detailed discussions of these matters. It is my earnest hope that such

conferences will lead to a sharpened understanding of the responsibilities

and objectives of our respective agencies and will serve to promote more

effective cooperation in our joint commitment to the national intelligence .

needs.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

TH 55036 DocId: 32989616 _Paye 93

---

## Page 94

ANY 1002 POITION

O:A CPA, 11G. MO. 18

UNITED STATES GOV

"MENT

Memorandum

ET

: Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE:

April 14,

1970

ROM : W. C. Sullivan

DECLASSTFIED BY 566J SLAKUL

0N 412/98

UBJECT

RELATIONS WITH CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

SHAMES NO DEA

•STON TO L

NEAL ARSE45

:TORE AND/OR,

RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION

IN THIS DOL JEME

1-8-98-

Reference my memorandum 3/30/70 summarizing proposals of

CIA Director Helms regarding FBI-CIA coordination in intelligence colleczic-

activities. Director approved meetings between CIA and Bureau representa-

• tives to further explore these matters.

" On afternoon of 4/13/70,

"NAME

and MysElf met

briefly with

HAME AHO

POSITION"

and

MAME

CIA,

of his staff. This session was strictly exploratory

in nature and was aimed at defining the scope and limitations of our

discussions with CIA on the points in question NAME

noted that CIA

Director Helms will be closely following the outcome oi these ascussions

and is personally interested in resolving any current problems in this area.

..n.-

NAME

indicated that a A would like to direct initial attentic=

to two of the items cited by Helms, namely, the question of audio (electro.ic

surveillance) coverage and the suggestion that FBI and CIA specialists in the

communist bloc field hold periodic seminars to coordinate our information.

The Bureau's position regarding electronic surveillance coverage, as

outlined in the Director's letter to Helms of 3/31/70, was reitereated with

emphasis upon the problems such coverage often pose with regard to

prosecution as well as adverse public reaction to this type coverage.

I made the point that the Bureau has not received the necessary.

support in this area from responsible quarters; that in the past the Bureau

had a substantial amount of coverage of this type in the interest of both our

own counterintelligence responsibilities as well as the national security

interest but that we have had to retrench in recent years largely as a résuit

of the lack of support for such operations.

MAME

noted that in response to CIA's request for electronic

coverage of to FOREIGNERS

who were suspected KGB agers in the Fall

of 1969, the Bureau had requested that they take this matter up with the

Classes 12

HN 55036 DocId:32989616 Page 94

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATIO

Unauthorized Disclosure

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

---

## Page 95

Memorandum for Mr. DeLoach

RE: RELATIONS WITH CIA •

Attorney General. He said that CIA has been giving the question of

approaching the Attorney General considerable thought but this would

involve a whole new set of procedures and policy considerations which

would have to be carefully considered. MAME

said that his staff was in

the process of drawing up a proposal on this point for Mr. Helms to

consider and that they would probably have something specific for the

Bureau to consider at a subsequent meeting.

Concerning the proposed seminar, in line with the Director's

letter to Helms 3/31/70, I pointed out that we would certainly have no

obiection to such conferences where the occasion justified them. From

remarks, it appears that CIA is primarily interested here in the

Soviet field and would like to furnish the Bureau with details of an extensive

¡'estain piûject CIA has undertaken in recent vears to coorelate all available

source inform tion regarding known Soviet intelligence agents. This

apparently would not involve any commitment by the Bureau ana would represe=:

essentially an opportunity for us to see what CIA has done in this field and

how it might tie in with any current Bureau interest. When CIA submits any

firm proposals in this regard, we will submit specific recommendations.

NAME said that CIA would be in touch with us when they have

firmed up various proposals and at that time

MAME

and MYSELE

will meet with them again as required. The Director, of course, will be

kept fully informed and no commitments will be made without his prior

approval.

ACTION:

For information.

:

i .

ET:

₩ 55u36 "DuCIt.32909616 Page 95

---

## Page 96

UNEXCISED VERSIONS OF DOCUMENTS

FURNISHED TO SSC IN RESPONSE TO

REQUEST IN APPENDIX C, PART I,

ITEM NUMBER 6.

#moR16

ATL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HW 55036

DocId: 32989616

Page

96

---

## Page 97

DATIONAL PORK NO. 10

U'NITED STATES GOVERNE

•Memorandum

Mr. Sullivan

R. 0. L'Allier

DATE: June 22,

1961

DisUIT

Api Callat

CoRrGu

DeLoachke

Evans -

•Ricione

Rosema

Sullivas

Tavet

Wotter.

Tele. Room

L'

ars by ca Sam Papich

richligence Agency (CÍA).

who also handies liaison with the central/ticine

The purpose of this memorandum is

, rescimend that sa Papich be relieved of his assignment with rom

¿is to order to devote full time to cla.

i on several occasions it was necessary for SA Papich to stand up

i: Lineral Swing and straighten hin out insofar as that individual

•;= straightened.

The situation now appears to be changed.

*ad swing may not be at INS nuch longer and,

in any event,

hẹ .

$

its not created any special problems for us curing the current

On the other hand, CIA continues to be one of the most

* sciont liaison assignments as well as one of the most time

"wing. Proper handling of this assignment now requires the

..¿e "ine and atention of a Liaison Supervisor and it is believed

"'s?

i lapich should be relieved of his INS assignment in order

is wrote his entire attention to ciA.

SA Robert H. Haynes has demonstrated that he is an able,

ware, ard productive Supervisor in his liaison handling of such

the Department of Health,

176 751-256

I1 you approve,

ArIssierTed from SA Papich to

SA Haynes. 6.2 - y

callivan

fs,lch

4< 4

4144S

¡ection

XERO

JUL 5

1961

8 JUL. 5 1961

Stin's ox, porticulaily

with e if mider fire

PERS, PRES

55036

DocId: 32989616

Pade 97.

---

## Page 98

6 (1) (B)

CHITED STATES GOVERNMENT

MEMORANDUM

• 1O

.: Directors FBI

SAC, Philadelphia

, SISJECT:

CERTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENOY -

INEORMANZON CONCERNINE

DATE:

Re Section (E), SAC Letter 65-54, 9/28/65.

10/25/Eb

ATE INFORMATION CONTAINED.

REREIN IS UNCEASSIFIMD

DATE LILO BYSTE ALWIL

W35

on 10/14/65 as directed in referenced SAC Letter:.

advised he had just returned from conferences at his

Agency Headquarters In Washington, Were be lau been advisea

tro Fureau was directing its field affices to esteblish liaison

hath the local offices of the

orfered his complete coopsration with this office in mat

ters

of mutual Interest.

Arrangements were perfected whersin Agents of this

cafice making inquiries or investigations of a soviet-Blos Na.

1100s1

car contact

he will place them ir contact

Pith the

Trepissentative randling the

cases se that Information of interest to us can be secured.

in information coming to the attention of thel

relating to our Internal recurity respcasibillties will

te immediately reported to this cffice.

- WH 55036 DocId: 32989616 Page 98

---

## Page 99

UNCODED

REQUEST OF THE BUREAU:

In the course of future contacts with CIA in these

cases, it 1s anticipated that cia represensatives may at times

request information relating to Subjects! background, habits,

and characteristics, as well as any available photographs.

The Bureau Is requested to auvise if lt will be per-

nissible to orally furnish such background irformation to the

CIA representative and to furrish copies of photcgraphs, 1f

they are available.

The Bureau is also rejuested to advise If the establish

rent of llalson on the field office level with CIA's

UNCODED

envisages the furnishing of reports and letter-

head

memes to this Service at the field office level where they

have a legitimate Interest in the subject.

-2.

IW 55036 DocId:32989616 Page 99

---

## Page 100

Leads

SALTINORE AND NEWARK:

Baltimore and Newark are requested to advise Philadelphia

whether or not the above arrangements are satisfactory for

cases in their territory.

FILESBURGH:

Eittsburgh is requested to advise Philadelchia of llaison

Errangements made with the Pittsburgh office of the Dorestic

contact service of CIA, so this office mill be able to

I-sperly henale cases within this categery which may be 10

cared in the State College, Pa., area.

!

3

wE 55036 docTd: 32989616 Page 100

---

## Page 101

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

5010-106 °

MALAY 1962 EDITION

OSA GEN. REG, NO. 27

UNITED STATES GUVERNMENT

Memorandum

poison

DeLoac

Walters

TO

: HI.

C.

D. DeLoach

DATE: 6/25/70

Casper

Call chen*

01270

Liken

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

Soyars

Tele. Room

Holmes -

Gandy

SUBJECT: LIAISON WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE

LI, INORMATION CONTATANO

HEREIN IS UNGLISSIVIID BXCENS

WHERE SHOTH OTHERWISE.

The Director has inquired regarding the nature of

hany liaison existing between the Washington Field Office (WFO)

and CIA. Limited liaison does exist, being addressed to

specific operational cases and name checks.

WFO, of necessity, is in contact with CIA concerning

specific cases in the espionage field. For example, NFO handles

leads to interview the Soviet defector, Yuri Nosenko, who is

under CIA control and support.

JFK Act 6 (1) (B)

1-12-01

FEMORIG

CLASSIFIED BY SPAALM

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X.L

In addition.

JFK Act 6 (1) (B)

No liaison is conducted with respect to policy matters and the

objective of all contacts is the handling of immediate opera-

tional matters.

ACTION:

For the Director's information.

Mr.

DeLoach

Hir.

Sullivan

Hir. Branigan

- HI. Gray

- Liaison

1 = MI. Cassidy

Her,

REC:20 KI

wes

1x0

11/22

15 JUL 1d 19F0 pisa.

GAD: mIM

6/25/70 ADDENDUM BY MR. TOISON UN

15 03 bH,10

F34 thought all such contacts were to be handled by letter.

CT DSS, ENCLOSURE

НН 55036 DocId: 32989616

Page

101

2-80757

---

## Page 102

=

OPTIONAL FORM NO, 10

MAY 1982 EDITION

saio-106

OSA GEN. REG. NO. 27,

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

Mr. C. D. Deloachs fu,l"

DATE:

6/26/70

FROM

IT& IPORMATION CONTAINED

: W. C. Sullivan

HEREIN IS URCLASSITIED

0171-3-01 BY-SPLAIN/EG

SUBJECT:

LIAISON WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE

west

Tolson

DeLoach

Walters.

Mohr -

Bishop

Casper

Callahan

Conrad

Feit

Gale

Rosen

Sullivan

Tavel

Soyars

Tele. Room -

Holmes -

Gandy .

My attached memorandum, 6/25/70, discussed the

operational contacts between the Washington Field Office

(HFO) and CIA's local domestic operations office.

Mr. Tolson

noted "I thought all such contacts were to be handled

by

letter" and the Director said "I most certainly intended

the same." We are instructing WFO accordingly.

It is possible that other field offices have working-

level contact with the CIA offices in their territories. If

the Director desires, similar instructions will be issued to

them.

ACTION:

(1) Attached for approval is a letter to WFO

instructing that all future contacts with CIA are to be

handled by letter.

prepared

offices.

(2) If the Director desires, an SAC Letter will be

containing similar instructions, applicable

to a11

HH 55036

Enclosures

1

HI.

DeLoach

.

HTS

Sullivan

1

HIT.

Branigan

1

nT.

Gray

Нт .

Wannall

-

Ljaison

1

- Mr. Cassidy

GAD: mIM

(8)

0752505010

N-114

PEt20 62-627 1 4/88

13 JUL IN 1970

62-80750

---

## Page 103

SAC, Hashtagton field

Daroctor, TBKcG-205: +-88752-4801

#LIAISON WITH CONTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

JASHINGTON FIELD OFFICS

6/26/70

1 - MI. DeLoach

Sullivan

pond pand

Mr. Branigan

Mr. Gray

MiT .

Wannall

Liaison

1

• Mr. Cassidy

Henceforth, all contacts with the Central Intel-

Ilgence Agency are to be handled by lettar.

ATE INFORMATTON CONTAITOR T

HERBIN IS UNCLASSITID

EX 14

DAPE1-/2-01 BX SP-2ALMFHEG

GAD :mIm

(10)

meer

NOTE:

see memo H. C. Sullivan to C. D. Deloach, 6/26/70,

captioned as above, GAD:mIm.

HIH

Tolson

DeLoachs.

Halters.

Mont.

Bishop

Casper

Callahan

Contad

Felt

Gale

Rosen

=335

58 JUL 171970

Sullivan

Tavel

Soyars

Tele. Room

Holmes _

Gandy -

MAIL ROOML

TELETYPE UNIT

55036

DocId: 32989616 Faye 183

: B

-2011

---

## Page 104

UNEXCISED VERSIONS OF DOCUMENTS

FURNISHED TO SSC IN RESPONSE TO

REQUEST IN APPENDIX C, PART I,

ITEM NUMBER 9.

ATI INFORMATION CONTAINED

AMDELS

HH 55036

DocId: 32989616

Page 104

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## Page 105

Larch ?, 1970

Pategory

Clarifiod by

Date of Decle:

11074

55036

es, Jo nagar Hoover

jirector

Federal. Buren of Investigation

rashington, D. C.

Dear iir. Hoover:

DECLASSTFIED BY SP-2 ALM, 11G

or 1=2-0f

I ask thrt you approve my request to retire from Bureau service

and, II It is convenient, to have this retirement become effective Arril

APRiL 3

For several weeks I have been giving this matter serious thonghu

since I began questioning my capability to bring about a better coordin-

sted effort directed against foreign intelligence targets, particularly

those of the Comnist- Bloc.

I have always aimed for perfection, but I

do not find that the desired results are being achieved.

For lmost 18

years I have handled an assignient during a veriod of turoulent, hectic,

and controversial developments in the area of Internal Security -Ü, S.

Intelligence. It was most challenging,

very rewarding, but also punisn-

ing. Bccause of this deep involvement

I now realize that I have badly

neglected my responsibilities as a father and husband.

with the time I

may have left I vould like to give my family the attention it rightfully

deserves.

It woulu ve nusi disionesi uf me if I didn'ü vuineno vu te iu-

cent events which have led to the severance of direct liaison with the

Central Intelligence Agency.

ment in the day to day relations betteen the organizations, it has been

my responsibility io anticipate problens, move in on the situation, ad

erctect Bureau interests in an efficient ind effective nonner,

I have re-

viered my position in this latest development, and I certainly must share

I believe that I might have

(I deeply regret this. I do not like to fail. I do not like to lose.

I have been involved in intelligence operations dating back to

our S.I.S. history, and I think I can speak with sone authority in stai

ing that never in our history has this nation beon faced with erecter se-

curity threats from communist intelligence services who, through police

state organizations, nave developed unusually sophisticated capebilities

to strike ai our vulnerabilities of a democratic and tree socieby.

continuing and priority target of the Bloc is to penetrate and solit or

disrupt our internal security and intelligence organizations.

Contrary to

the tempo of the tines many years ago, there is hardly an intelligence op-

eration or an internal security case shich does not have direct or intirect

international emifications.

The course of events and the highly capable

effectiveness of Cormunist-Bloc intelligence services have placed increas-

ing burdens on us and have necessitated close working relations with CIA,

military intelligence services and other agencies.

The complex nature of

rang cases, the rapid means of travel and communication, the drily occur-

ence of energency type political developnents in various parts of the

world have varranted direct liaison with approximately twenty CIA offic

1ials on a daily basis.

In addition, there -re about thirty officials

dontacted with lesser frequency. The Bureau is a member of the U. S.

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.. .==

Intelligence Roard

its sub connil toes which cover

Matters such as

handling o1 defoctora:

develoment of comuter prograns, leaks of classi-

fied inforsation and "roduction of intelligence ctudies.

Our Leg'I At-

taches have reason to contact CId on a regular basis, and althouth it res

been a small volume of business, the line a com unication between our co-

mestic offices and local CIA represent-tives has been definitely usoful.

The daily business with CIA relates to hundreds of cases pertrining to

activities-of all. Conmunist-Bloc services, the new Left, Black Nationel-

•ists, the Comunist Party and related orgenizations, and poliüical crises

Theoretic-

be handled by mail, but from a ninction stro-

lalnost insurmountable absticles if we are to discharge our auties in

responsible manner nd if ve are to counter a relentless enemy in the

interest of national security. Because interests of other agencies tre

frequently intertined with cases involving the bureau and CIA, the break

in BI CLl liaison will adversely effect our liaison with such agencies.

I think you will share my alarm over the consequences once the

word is received by the "troops" in all U. S. agencies that FBI and (I

no longer have any liaison.

Unfortunately, there will be individuals no

will maliciously distort and misinterpret the true facts.

sithin a short

period, there will be stories in the press, and worst of ,11 the Comu-

nist-Bloc services will pick up a choice entree for the promotion of sub-

skillful and extremely harmful disruption.

I am absolutely convinced

that the intelligence services of Great Britain, france, lest Germy and

othors cio noll puneuraied by tne sorets.

I can't believe that the

Pail-

the Blakes, the Alrer Hisses were the last of the penetrations.

mention this bec.use if

such penetr-tions exist, the break in relations

between the FBI and CIA trill provide a basis fur promoting further rifts.

this is the lurst thrie in our history thet such an event hes occurred, ano

it is difficult to believe that the enemy will not make every eifort to

reap the greatest profit possible. Briefly, Mr. Hoover, I have too much

respect for you and our FBI to expose us to a potentially disastrous situ-

ation.

Although the Denver incident is a blight on the relations be-

tween the FBI and CIA, it would be most unfair of me not to comment on

the dedicated and selfless efforts of numerous individuals in ClA who

Get es would be

strived for honest and narmonious relations.

As a result of their en-

deavors there have been many services performed in behalf of the Bureau

including notable and outstanding accomplishments.

We have been furnished

tral

on the part of CIl employes which prevented Bureau commission of errors

and averted embarrassment. Among some of the more significant examoles

of cooperation I cite the excellent and badly needed assistance of CL

in the Rudolph Abel case. I also refer to the Agency's providing us with

one of the better criminal informants we have had in recent years in the

person of Herbert Itkin. I only refer to the foregoing to emphasize

that, if at all possible, we should preserve the good friends and the

supporters of the Bureau.

It is recognized that one con also present a bill of partic-

ulars relating to cramples of poor cooperation and deliberate skuldug-

gery. I hold no briei for those in CIA who disrupted relations between

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- 3 =

the to agencies hoo-

of uncilled-for actions.

50:

of those core the

parasites who condeadole bleer tie expires, nover proruced a cro-

aulve ide, and liven mit ine errers of the dedicated people. I boleve

that an honest and thoroth omninction will reveal thpi the presence oi

such types at the present tine is negligible or their influence is almost

completely neutralinod.

uniorunately, Chi also believes that in the

past ve did ant almys act in a forthrignt manner, and the Agency unacubt

edly could present ? list of grievances.

You may not realize that a few

years ago we enjoyed a roor repuation among CIA employes.

We were char

acterined as being devious and there was a decided abnosphere oi ristrust.

Happily, that is noi the situation today. I an confident that you con go

into any segment of CIl, here and abroad, and you will find that Fidelity,

Bravery, and Integrity are sincerely related to the FBI.

The problons in

past yers primrily arose from unbelievably poor cormunication anong in-

terested parties.

his cormunication has been greatly improved because of

the efforts of many dedicatca people.

Nevertheless, there is room for

inprovement.

In our on Bureau there are numerous officials and employes

who have little or no norlodge of the background and ine principlos of

the National Security Act of 1947 and of the National Security Council

Directives.

In addition, these sare people have a vague conception ol

the objectives and functions of an intelligence organization.

Similorlys

within CIl there are very many chose conception of the IBI, its juris-

diction, Ius objecülves, its law enjorcench characier, Is

shocking at

Tremendous progress has been made, but it is not easy to parion

iously coordinate the operations of an cramnization designed to operte

in a clandestine manner with an agency which is basically a law enforce

ment boar. This diffinnty is further agmarado Muude ou relalionsnip

is still comoosed of a fragile labric. One incident poventially can de

stroy years of constructive effort.

Pir. Hoover, I respectfully request in:t you reconsider the

decision to sever liaison with the Central Intelligence Agency.

to you to leave the door open for further deliberation because I am con-

fident this contlict can be satisfactorily resolved. I believe that my

removal from the

scene provides the opportunity to appoint anothex agent

uno will measure up to your desired capabilities and who will be able to

rapidly resolve the problen with a new and iresh appro.ch. It is a £000

time to reexamine our relations with CIA and to make adjustments satis

factory to you.

I sincerely regret that this situation arose, since I readily

appreciate you are burdened with so mony heavy responsibilities.

feel that I had a firm obligation and daty to communicate with you be

cause of the very nature of my assignment these many years and because

of my involvement in this controversial case.

My years with the Burenu gave me more satisfaction then anyone

can imagine.

You would have to know me better to appreciate this.

want to assure you that wherever I go or whatever I do I will be prepared

to be of service in any cause which involves the preservation of a strong

and respected FBI.

Sincerely yourss.

Xena

sam LapICI

Tapich

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FROM

SUBJECT:

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

30s0-106

MAY 1942 EDITION

рёл ден. аг0. N0. 27

-NITED STATES G

ERNMENT

Memorandum

MI.

C.

D

DeLoach•

SPERET

DATE: March 5, 1970

W. C. Sullivan

DSCIASSIPIED BY SP-2ALm. 1K

0x 1 - 4-01

XRELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

Attached is a memorandum dictated by Special Agent

Sam J. Papich in response to the Director's request for the

identification of the instances Papich had in mind when in

his retirement request he indicated that CIA "believes that

• A list identifying the cases and outlining the problems

involved has been prepared by Papich and is attached to the

memorandum. A review of the 25-page document reveals that it i

contains several instances in which CIA has registered its

dissatisfaction and could conceivably renew its complaints,

end others in which presumably CIA had no knowlerge of Rureau

action and has made no complaint.

For the Director's further information, I have

instituted in this Division an analysis of each

situation cited

and a memorandum will be prepared"as to each,

containing my

Views and recommendations as a result

of that analysis.

This

is being handled on an expedite basis and the memoranda will

be sent through as soon as possible.

Classified by

Exempt from GDS Category_

Date of Declassitic

on Indefinite

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10

010-108

OStAGEN.

110. 27

UNITED STATES G ERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

: The Director

FROM : Sam J. Papich

SUBJECT: RELATIONS WITH CIA •

DATE: March 5, 1970

(5668 SLD/GOL-JFK 2/9/98)

CIA HAS NO OOJECTION TO

ALL INFORVATION CONTAINED

DECLASSIF CATION AND/OR,

BEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12 7/94 BY SPTOLC/HY

FELEASE GY CIA INFORMATION

C7 N 88-1826

RA EFA ANiEW: 612194

IN THIS DOCUMENT. KP 118/98

Reference is made to my letter of 3/2/70. I made the

undoubtedly could present a list of grievances." It is my

understanding that you want such grievances identified. There

is enclosed herewith a list of cases or situations which arose

over the years.

Based upon a review of files and my personal recollection:

this list would be representative of matters which CIA could use

for making charges such as: not being forthright, not playing

fairly and squarely, not cooperating, not being of assistance,

not recognizing the

need for concrete FBI contributions to the

foreign intelligence effort. What CIA may have compiled over the s

years is unknown.

What situations are known to CIA and have not

come to our attention cannot be answered at this time. I am

thinking of leaks including distorted information which may have

been passed to CIA from ex-Bureau employees and CIA informants

and sources.

It should be clearly emphasized that there is no

indication whatsoever within CIA that the Agency has been seeking

any kind of a showdown or confrontation with the FBI. Contrary

to what some people may believe, the relationship between the

two agencies up to the recent crisis was never better despite

the problems which have arisen from time to time. I am confident

that a thorough and impartial examination will conclusively

support the foregoing.

In order that there may not'be any misunderstanding, it

1s

important to emphasize that the Bureau can also produce an

extensive list of justified grievances.

We can also produce an

excellent record of support which we have given CIA; presumably

CIA could do the same.

There are ingredients for continuing

conflict and there is also adequate machinery for maintaining

sound working relations. and producing badly needed intelligence

Information.

1 55036

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Memorandum to the Director

RE: RELATIONS WITH CIA

I believe that it would be most helpful to you and

interested Bureau officials when evaluating and passing judgment

on the attached material if we analyzed very briefly the role

of the Bureau liaison Agent. A liaison Agent can be a simple

mail courier or he can be the true Bureau Agent ready to confront.

any problem or issue with another-gency, very often working with

very limited information.

• It is expected that the Bureau Agent

carry out his instructions forcefully and efficiently. He must

be prepared to handle all types of personalities under various

conditions.

He must be alert for pitfalls and express himself

In a most judicious and prudent manner but always making certain

that the Bureau position is well fortified.

In evaluating the attached and my encounters with CIA,

it should be noted that protests from the Bureau always were

easy to handle because the Agent had J. Edgar Hoover behind him.

However, when an Agent struck at an official on one day and

-solicited his cooperation the next day, it did require some

resourceful action.

It is believed that other liaison Agents

regularly encounter similar situations.

On numerous occasiOns

i have bitterly fouded with CIA officials and this has included

rough language. I have walked out on Cia officials when I felt

they were unreasonable.

They took the initiative by asking the

Agent to return. I did try to play fairly and squarely with all

of them and never hesitated to accept a confrontation; this included

the Director of the Agency. When I lectured to CIA personnel

over the years I always made a point to challenge them to present

any grievances or raise any subject matter relating to the

• Bureau.

I never left a discussion with any CIA official without

"being positive that our position was absolutely understood.

The approaches utilized by me might be open to criticism.

I

can only refer to the records of the Bureau and CIA and I believe

the Bureau's position is most favorable. I don't think CIA has

ever transmitted a letter of protest to the Bureau during the

eighteen years during which the Agent handled the assignment.

ACTION:

for information.

S

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CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SL

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X16

GC

SECRET

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

CECLASSIFIGATION AND/OR,

• PELLADE UP GIA INFORMATION

CASES AND/OR SITUATIONS

IN THIS BOCUMENT. KP1/898

INVOLVING CONFLICTS WITH THE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

(1) MOCASE (THE BORIS MORROS CASE)

This was a sensitive Soviet-espionage case

which originated in 1943 and terminated for the most

part in 1957.

The case had many wide foreign ramifi-

cations and historically has been, and undoubtedly

will be, one of the most important and involved cases

of Soviet operations in this country and abroad. We

did not disseminate any information of significance

in this case until 1954. On various occasions when

the Liaison Agent has become involved in heated argu~

ments with ClA officials, they have seen fit to raise

this case as an outstanding example of FBI failure to

cooperate with the Agency. The position taken by CIA

was that it should have been advised regarding the

Soviet operational activity in foreign countries,

claiming that the Agency would have had the opportunity

to develop more information of significance, identify

Soviet agents, and possibly prepare conditions for

recruitment or doubling of Soviet operatives.

We did

not disseminate our reports to CIA because of the

extreme sensitivity of the case.

We actually did not

permit CIA to handle any investigations relating to

the MOCASE until 1957.

In 1957, CIA complained that it certainly had

every right to have received the information earlier

because many aspects of the MOCASE pertained to CIA

employees and operations. CIA further argued that it

had been greatly handicapped in effectively carrying out

the leads in 1957 because the leads were given to the

Agency at the same time that the case

The Agency argued that the failure or tas publicized.

the. Bureau to

coordinate with CIA those Freich aspects of the case

permitted the French, rather than the U.S., to play. a.

dominating role in Europe.

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With regard to dealing with the French, we

took the position that we would cover the leads through

our Legal Attaches wherever possible and to furnish

leads to CIA in those countries where we did not have

Legal Attaches. CIA maintained that since we were on

record that our Legal Attaches do not handle operations

abroad, the Bureau had an obligation to levy those french

Jeads on CIA or at least coordinate with the Agency

before going to the French.

It is to be noted that in any argument relating

I to jurisdiction in this matter, CIA will fall back on the

responsibilities placed on the

Agency under the provisions

of the National Security Act of 1947 and the implementation

of the foregoing through National Security Council Direc-

tives.

CIA will maintain that it is incumbent upon the

Bureau to recognize the provisions of the National Security

Act of 1947 and the Directives.

The Agency would argue

that in the MOCASE, these were ignored by the Bureau.

I (Bufile - 100-352385)

(2) BUREAU OPERATIONS IN MEXICO

During the 1950's, CIA periodically raised

questions concerning the functions of our Legal Attache

Office in Mexico City. As early as 1951, CIA claimed

that the Legal Attache was acting outside of the scope

of the Bureau's jurisdiction since we were on record

that our Legal Attaches were acting strictly in a liaison

capacity, yet we allegedly were conducting operations

such as developing penetrations of the Communist Party

of Mexico. A heated discussion took place in 1951

between the two Agencies but we did not change or modify

Ithe operations of our office in Mexico. CIA, from time

to time, has informally raised questions on our running

informants in Mexico and still being able to comply with

Directives.

The interpretation given by CIA is that

overseas counterintelligence operations, including the

operation of informants by the Bureau, must be coordinated

with CIA. Further

interpretation by the Agency has been

that "coordination" means a discussion of the operation,

including the identity of the informant, if the Agency

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feels such information is necessary. CIA officials

have casually and informally referred to the situation

in Mexico as a potential issue and conflict but, for

-

several years, nobody in CIA has seen fit to create

any kind of a problem. We, of course, might be vulner-:

able since we have been operating informants in Mexico •

for many years. The problem undoubtedly was greatly

mitigated because of the outstanding work of former

Legal Attache John Speakes and the current Legal

Attache Nathan L Ferris.

As an example of a situation encountered through-

out the years, in 1957 our Legal Attache, Mexico City,

asked the local CIA office for an up-to-date list of

Soviet Embassy personnel in order to keep apprised of

the identity of the Soviets officially assigned in

Mexico City. The CIA office responded but included

the following statement "It is understood that your

office has no operations aimed at or involving the Soviet

Embassy or any of the persons on the attached list.

If

I am wrong, I should appreciate being advised." The

Legal Attache advised that in his opinion, the wording

of the CIA communication did not warrant a reply. He,

however, reported to the Seat of Government, that at

that particular time, we did have three cases which

might be considered as operations directed against the

Soviet Embassy. (Memorandum Belmont to Boardman,

March 22, 1957, re: "Relations with CIA," 62-80750)

In 1963, Legal Attache, Mexico City, received

information indicating that clA intended to penetrate the

Communist Party of Mexico at the top leadership levels.

The Legal Attache pointed out that this proposed action

night affect top-level informants of the Legal Attache

Since ClA would undoubtedly be making requests of the

Bureau concerning certain individuals, including those

who were our informants.

The Legal Attache proposed

|that if CIA levied any request on him, he would furnish

ample intormation on each Party leader, but only infor

mation which was well balanced in quality and quantity,

so that no one individual would stand out at the risk of

being pinpointed.

(Memorandum Brennan to Sullivan,

August 5, 1963, re: "Legal Attache Office, Mexico City,"

62-80750-4132)

/ SECRET

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How much information CIA has developed over

the years concerning our operational activity in

Mexico City is unknown.

However, we should bear in

mind that former Special Agent George Munro handled

many of our operations in Mexico, including key infor-

mants, and subsequently began performing services for

CIA after he left the Bureau.

We also should not

forget that Americans operating in Latin American

countries for one agency are heavily exposed to the

resources of another U. S. intelligence or investigative

agency.

This Agent knows from personal experience that

operating in these areas constitutes a "very small world"

and the exposure to leaks and errors is considerable.

(3) THE ABEL CASE

Although CIA has not raised the point for

several years, the prevailing attitude was, and probably

still exists,

that the FBI did not play it

square with

CiA in the abel case by not making certain that the

Agency was given the proper recognition for its contri-

butions.

CIA feels that in the first place, there would

not have been any U.S. access or availability to the

source in this case, Reino Hayhanen, because CIA took

the full responsibility for moving Hayhanen from France

Ito the U. S. in 1957. CIA claims it took the risk and

responsibility of doing this after the Bureau declined

to become involved in any operation designed to transport

Hayhanen to the U. So

was an alcoholic and

It should be noted that Hayhanen

that his first contacts with CIA

in Paris raised questions concerning Hayhanen's mental

stability.

After Hayhanen arrived in the U. S., we

arranged access to him for a period, the purpose of

which was to obtain a complete story of his intelli-

gence activities in the U. S. and we were particularly

interested in identifying

all of his associates, es-

pecially the man who later was identified as rudolph

Abel.

After a short handling period in the U. S., we

dropped Hayhanen because he became a problen.

was

an extremely critical situation because we had not yet

identified Abel. CIA agreed to take the responsibility

jfor the carrying and safeguarding of Hayhanen but we

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were given free access to this difficult source. This

was a most fortunate arrangement as far as CIA was con-

cerned, because this adjustment gave us the time to work

with Hayhanen and subsequently develop the leads which

led to the apprehension of Abel. The Agency has main-

tained that it was largely responsible for making

absolutely certain that Hayhanen was mentally and

physically prepared for testimony at the Abel trial.

Hayhanen was a key witness.

CIA has also referred to

the heavy expenses incurred by the Agency, all for the

benefit of the Bureau.

CIA has complained that the

Bureau never really thanked the Agency for its coopera-

tion and CIA has been particularly irked becaused the

Bureau did not see fit to inform the Attorney General

or the White House of the role played by CIA.

(Bufile - 65-64538)

(4) WILLIAM P. BUNDY CASE

In July, 1953, Senater Josenh MeCarthy sought -

to subpoena William P. Bundy, then a CIA official, to

testify before the Senator's Committee. McCarthy claimed

that Bundy's alleged communist activities were clearly

documented: The most serious allegation was that Bundy

had contributed $400 to the detense tund of alger Hiss.

All of this was publicized. The information set torth

in the newspapers emanated

from & Bureau report.

CIA

planned to charge the Bureau with leaking the intormation

to Senator McCarthy. ClA officials held numerous con

terences concerning the matter but charges were never

What information CIA has on

this particular item is not known but the Agency did

know that we maintained liaison with McCarthy's Committee.

(Bufiles - 62-80750 and 140-1477)

(5) BUREAU DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION CONCERNING JAY LOVESTONE

In May, 1954, Allen Dulles raised the questior

concerning the propriety a FBi dissemination of intormatior

concerning Jay Lovestone.

This information had been fur-

nished to us by Spencer Miller, a former official of the

SECRET

5 ÷

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= :

Department of Labor.

When interviewed by us, Miller

made-several accusations against CIA.

We disseminated

the information to the White House,

the Attorney General,

and some data also went to the

State Department. Dulles

took the position that by disseminating derogatory in-

formation concerning his Agency, he had been placed on

the spot because the Spencer Miller data was not the

complete story.

In the past, CIA informally referred

to this as an instance of very unfair conduct on the part

of the Bureau. (Memorandum Keay to Belmont, May 24, 1954,

re: "Relations with CIA," 62-80750)

•(6) BUREAU HANDLING OF CIA REQUESTS FOR TOURS

FOR FOREIGN OFFICIALS

On occasions in the 1950's, CIA complained that

officials visiting the U. S. under CIA sponsorship were

given excellent treatment on the tour but, nevertheless,

many of the visitors left most diseppointed because they

had

not had any contact with any Bureau officials.

CIA

felt that contact with Bureau officials had very significant

benefits and left lasting favorable impressions because of

the FBI's world-wide reputation.

CIA also pointed out that

when foreign visitors had no contact with Bureau officials,

they were left with the suspicion that there was some kind

of friction between the FBI and CIA. In 1956, we had a

clear-cut policy to the effect that

tours for

such visi-

would be of a restrictive nature in that such

visitors would view our facilities normally seen by the

CIA was so informed but

periodically indicated that our policy prevented the

Agency from truly enhancing U.s. Interests abroad.

CIA never lodged an official complaint.

(Memorandum

By cared pointe wad intelligence oxicals, oxticlals,"562-80750)

enhance complainvisit at Bueal

It should beemphasized that for the past several

years there would not be any basis for any formo complaint

with regard to Bureau treatment of foreign officials coming

to the U. S. under CIA sponsorship.

The personal attention

given to such officials by Assistant Director Sullivan and

other officials and Supervisors in the Domestic Intelligence

Division has been outstanding and benefits have accrued to

the Bureau. These visitors have gone back to their native

"SECRET

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countries with far better impressions than in the

past.

In addition, we have learned more about these

countries, their services, and their security chiefs

by spending a few minutes with them. Needless to say,

this kind of treatment has also immeasurably helped

our Legal Attaches.

(7) CIA - OUTCH INTEREST IN SOVIET ESPIONAGE ACTIVITY

In 1965, the Dutch Internal Security Service] /5

was in the process of investigating individuals in

with the dated en

At that time, our relations

5) the uter had filed to honestly dead wath us ta thee

clandestinely collecting intelligence at the National

Security Agency•

When CIA approached us, we tol

(S the Agency that

thebutchscould submit their request

through aiplomatic channels. He subsequently told CIA (S)

stuck to our position. CiA surrendered but tect that

stuck to our position.

we were Impalring their eriorts to gather information

concerning soviet-espionage activities in

Europe.

(Walter G. Krivitsky, Bufile - 100-11146)

(8) COLONEL JOHN GROMBACH (PAT O' BRIEN)

Colonel John Grombach was a retired U. S.

Army officer who, during world War Ii, established a

private intelligence network, operating throughout the

world but primarily in Europe. His sources included

any number of suropean exiles

who came to the U.s.

While he was in business, he was financed by the State

Department, then the Department of the army, and in the

later 1940's and into the 1950's by CIA: Grombach

act v th the Bure

established contact with the Bureau through one of

his subordinates, Pat O'Brien, who periodically called

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on us and furnished information which Grombach felt

was of interest to us. This dissemination through

Pat O'Brien continued

during the period of Grombach's

relationship with CIA. We never informed CIA that we

were receiving such information which also was of

interest to the Agency.

It is possible that Grombach

had given the same data to CIA but we do not know. CIA

and Grombach clashed and the relationship was severed

in an atmosphere of severe bitterness.

Years of its dealings with Grombach, Ehe Agency had (S)

successfully penetrated the latter's organization and

allegedly had identified many of the sources. CIA

hinted to the Liaison Agent that it had become aware

of the relationship between Grombach's organization

and the Bureau.

How much CIA really learned about

this relationship is not known but if its penetrations

were significant, the Agency may have developed evidence

to justify a charge that the Bureau had withheld infor-

mation from CIA, particularly when we were receiving

the data from an organization which was Ilnanced by

the Agency 4s) Buttle - 52-77306)

(9) COMMISSION ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE

EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT

(Herbert Hoover Commission - 1954)

In October, 1954, a task force of the captioned

survey of CIA's operations under

the leadership of General Mark W. Clark. In January, 1955,

we were advised by a representative of the task force

that. Senator Joseph McCarthy had furnished the group a

list of CIA employees who were considered subversive.

CIA became cognizant of this development and there was

talk within the Agency that the Bureau had furnished

When the Liaison Agent was

informally approached on this, he flatly told the Agency

to officially submit its charges. The Agency never did.

What information CIA may have had on this matter as it

pertained to the Bureau is not known.

It is possible that

the Agency's attitude was strictly predicated on a knowledge

that we maintained liaison with the Senator's Committee.

(Relations with CIA, Bufile - 62-80750)

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(10) INTERNAL SECURITY LEADS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES

During the 1950's, we gave our Legal Attaches

numerous leads stemming from internal security cases in

the U.S. In many instances we did not see fit to

notify CIA although the Agency always maintained that

you could not separate "internal Security" from "counter-

intelligence," namely a lead in France pertaining to a

communist in

the U. S. warranted advising CIA, if not,

at least asking the Agency to handle the lead.

In the

last several years, it is not believed that there is

any basis for complaint since we have regularly been

notifying CIA concerning subjects of cases who travel

abroad.

If the Legal Attache is investigating, CIA is

notified in order to avoid duplicate efforts.

There

have been exceptions where we have taken the position

that CIA should not be notified because of the sensitivity

of the matter. How many such exceptions are known to

CIA cannot be established irom our Illes; nowever, we

should hear in mind that, when our Legal Attaches inves-

tigate, they

contact many of the same foreign officials

normally contacted by CIA.

How many of these foreign

officials are CIA informants, or on the Agency payroll,

is unknown.

(11) BUREAU OPERATIONS IN CUBA

We operated informants in Cuba when we had a

Legal Attache's Office in Havana. Informants reported

on activities of communists and other subversives in

that country. During the period we operated these

we did not coordinate our operations with

CIA. We did not advise the Agency that we had such

however, in 1960, after Castro, came on the

scene, it became infeasible to handle certain intormants

in a secure manner. Approval was granted to turn certain

informants over to CIA.

What these informants may have

subsequently told CIA about past Bureau operations is

unknown.

This item is being cited in the event CIA had

evidence to establish that we had been operational in

Cuba and had not coordinated with the Agency pursuant

to Directives. (Memorandum Donahoe to Belmont, February 5,

1960, re: "Partido Socialista Popular," 64-200-210, 2377

and Memorandum Frohbose to Belmont, February 3, 1960, re:

"Narcisco Tauler Beneficto,' 134(8539-4)

• ..

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(12) BURRAU OPERATIONS IN FRAZIE 1959

In 1959 the U. S. Ambassador in Brazil accused

our Legal Attache of engaging in uncoordinated covert

intelligence activity "of a nature which I believe

exceeds his terms of reference." The Ambassador further

indicated that CIA was unhappy over the Legal Attache's

activities and the Agency allegedly had told the Ambassador

that the Legal Attache had disseminated information from

a source who was a fabricator or a provocator. This

situation arose as a result of the Legal Attaches

operation of an informant in Brazilys Some of the

information that he received from the informant was

of a derogatory nature and related to a Brazilian who

(5)

was being touted as a Presidential candidate. CIA

asked for the identity of the informant and we told

the Agency that the person could not be identified

because he did not wish that his identity be disclosed.

unis case is being cited. because .cA may have evidence.

that we had been operational in Brazil) had not coordi- (s

nated pursuant to Directives, and that the matter was

further aggravated because of the alleged unreliability

of the information.

Memorandum Roach to Belmont,

May 1, 1959, re: "William I. Friedman, Legal Attache,

R20 de Janeiro,"

67-429840) and (Memozandum Roach to

Belmont, May 25, 1959, re: "Soviet-Satellite Activities -

Brazil 9134-7667-48)(5)

(13) BORDER COVERAGE

In June, 1957, our Phoenix Office presented a

problem concerning the Bureau's handling of informants

on the Mexican border.

These informants were operating

inside Mexico.

The problem was predicated on situations

which might arise as the result of CIA's endeavors to

develop informants who already were being handled by the

Bureau. It was pointed out that CIA logically could

come in contact with such sources and could make approaches

for recruitment. It was recommended and approved that

in order to protect our coverage in the border area, a

valuable, trusted, and reliable confidential source would

continue

to be utilized even if he were contaced by CIA.

Our policy was that we would not identify our sources to

the Agency.

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(6)

How much CIA learned about our border coverage

again, It is pointed out that Iormer

Bureau Agent George Munro/ may have been knowledgeable.

As indicated, he later began performing services for

learned that we were operating informants

in Mexico, it could use such information as additional

evidence of Bureau failure to cooperate and coordinate

with the Agency pursuant to Directives. (Memorandum

Roach to Belmont, June 14, 1957, re"Communist Coverage

Along the Mexican Border, Relations with CIA,"

• 100-356015-1238)

(14) /CARPORT CASE (5)

the Bureau's double Agent in the

captioned case Yas advised by lois soviet contach that he

was to have a meeting in Switzerland tring the period

(s)

(5)

S June 16-19, 1957. A question arose as to whether CIA

should be intormed concerning the double Agent's travei

to Switzerland. (s)It was recommended and approved that we

not advise CIA.

What is important here is that CIA established

contact with our double agent at one point. The Agency

may have had further contact without our knowledge.

Agency may have also picked up the contact with the [soviet (5)

in Switzerlands The case is being highlighted since we

cannot exclude the possibility that the Agency has evidence

to demonstrate that we were operational in Europe and we

(5)

did not coordinate with the Agency. (Memorandum Branigan

to Belmont, June 10, 1957, re; "CARPORT," 105-25453-18252) (s)

(15) CIA REQUESTS FOR BUREAU LECTURE ON COMMUNISM IN THE U. S.

On September 25, 1958, CIA inquired if W. C.

Sullivan could give a lecture on the communist movement

in the U.S. It was recommended that Sullivan give the

lecture.

Such lectures were being afforded in other parts

of the Government. The Director made the notation "He

cannot make Sullivan available to this outfit." The

Agency accepted this as an affront and a blatant refusal

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to cooperate on a most important subject of interest

to both agencies.

(Memorandum Sullivan to Belmont,

October 1, 1958,

re: "Request for Lecture on Communism

by CIA,")

(16) CASE OF EDWARD ELLIS SMITH

On July 9, 1956, an official of the State

Department confidentially

advised the Bureau that

Edward Ellis Smith, a CIA employee in Moscow, had been

involved in an affair with a Soviet girl. According

to our source, Smith allegedly had furnished information

to the Soviet girl.

We checked with the State Department

and CIA and we confirmed that Smith had been involved in

an affair and that he had been recalled. According to

CIA and State Department, there was no indication that

Smith had been involved in any espionage against the

U.S.

CIA gave consideration to requesting the Bureau

to identify is source and then changed its mine.

Whether CIA has documented this as an instance where

the Bureau failed to cooperate by not volunteering the

source is a matter of conjecture but, it is a case that

should be kept in mind. (Bufile - 65-64084)

C27)THE LIVIORATION

In April, 1963, we became: involved with CIA in

(5)

chat Agency's eItorus to

collect sensitive information

relating to French Government intentions to conduct

CIA had access to a sensitive

(s)

available highly important French documents. On April 11,

1963, CIA informed us that our Legal Attache in Paris had

locally contacted

"CIA concerning this matter.

CIA Head-

quarters was highly disturbed because its office in Paris

had not been cut in on this operation and the Agency wanted

to be informed regarding the nature and the extent of our

dissemination of CIA information to our Legal Attache.

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determined that the Legal Attache had made inquiries in

Paris in response to leads which had been sent from Bureau

Headquarters.

This matter is being highlighted because

it was a vitally important operation to CIA and the Agency

had received indications that information had been leaked

to French authorities.

We have no evidence or reason to

believe that the Legal Attache Office ever involved itself

in any such leak. However, we should not, under any cir-

cumstances, discount the fact that CIA has penetrated

french

services and has had access to sensitive information

in Paris.

The French have always had an outstanding cap-

ability of tapping phones and installing microphones in

Paris.

Such coverage on U. S. officials, including their

residences, should never be excluded.

The information we

had conveyed to our Legal Attache possibly may have been

acquired by the French through clandestine coverage.

CIA

possibly could charge us with handling their sensitive

information in an insecure manner by transmitting it to

Paris without conferring with the Agency.

In connection with alleged Frouch espionage

activity in the U. S., CIA has never been satisfied with

the efforts made by the Bureau.

The Agency possibly could

take the position that we looked lightly at the allegations

and did not pursue a matter which, in their eyes,

merited

& more aggressive approach. (Bufile - 105-109053)

For some time, CIA has held to a position that

the French Intelligence Service (SDECE) is penetrated by

the Soviets.

The Agency has pointed out that if the French

are collecting sensitive information in the U. S., the

product is ending up in Moscow. In January, 1964, we

reviewed the status of our investigation of French intel

ligence activities in the U.S. The Director commented

"I think this whole thing has been imaginary on the part

of cla which has been played as a sucker by Devosjoli.

I would waste no more time on it at least until all CIA

restrictions are removed." CIA did impose restrictions

by not permitting us to pursue certain leads because it

feared that its sensitive source would be jeopardized.

(Bufile - 105-109053)

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(18) LEAKS TO THE "NATIONAL REVIEW" - 1959

In April, 1959, CIA became concerned over the

appearance of certain items in issues of the "National

Review."

The publication carried a column authored by

an unidentified individual who was making derogatory

references to CIA. CIA subsequently identified the

author as Lyle Hugh Munson, a former CIA employee.

CIA

investigation indicated that Munson was obtaining his

information from former CIA Agents.

In checking on

Munson, CIA identified some of his

friends who were

listed as Robert Morris, former member of the Senate

Internal Security Subcommittee; and Lou Nichols, former

Assistant to the Director.

The Liaison Agent was unable

to develop any additional

information as it might have

pertained to Nichols in this particular matter. CIA

may have additional data not revealed.

(Memorandum

Roach As Bey on 2-80750-33411959, xe: "Central Intelli-

(19) TRAVEL OF BUREAU INFORMANTS TO CUBA

In September, 1965, we received information

indicating that oneof our informants on the Mexican border

was in a position to travel to Cuba.

concerning CIA interest in this matter, if the informant

made the trip. It was recommended and approved that we

not advise CIA concerning the identity of the informant

or his trip to Cuba.

but, it the

It is not known if CIA acquired any knowledge

but, if the Agency did, we potentially are vulnerable.

The Agency could charge that we were operating outside

of the U. S. and we failed to coordinate with the Agency.

(Memorandum

• Hannall to Sullivan, October 4, 1965, re:

"ED 572-5,": 134-11461-39)

(20)

DISSEMINATION OF CIA INFORMATION IN A BUREAU MONOGRAPH

By letter dated May 5, 1965, we disseminated to

interested agencies, including CIA, a copy of a monograph.

entitled "Communism

in the Dominican Republic." The mono-

graph contained considerable information which had emanated

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from CIA. We did not obtain clearance from CIA for

the inclusion ofthis information in our monograph.

Clearance approval was not obtained because of the

urgency of the document.

CIA was irritated because

it considered our action a distinct violation of the

third agency rule. The Agency never made any protest.

(21) BUREAU INFORMANTS IN GUATEMALA

(s)

In 1966, and 1967, we were operating informants

in Guatemala sAt the inception of our operational ac-

tivity, CIA was not informed. In one case, we finally

were able to effect the necessary arrangements with CIA

whereby the Bureau would be permitted to run the informant

in Guatemala MIn the second instance, we established an

agreement with ClA in october, 1967, that we could con-.

tinue handling an informant in Guatemala with the under- (s

standing that the Bureau Agent, on the occasion of each

visit, would confer with the local CIA office on political

(5)

information collected Irom the intormant.

These two cases

had all the makings of a conflict. CIA was under the

definite impression that we had been running these

informants before we had finally coordinated with them.

It is true that the CIA Chief in Guatemala was much

(5)

incensed but no issue was made at CIA Headquarters and

thematter was put to rest.

CIA may have developed concrete evidence that

(3)

we were operating in Guatemala, bearing in mind that in

(5)

a place such as Guatemala City, it would not be difficult

for a CIA intelligence officer to spot an ibl Agent in

contact with Guatemalans.SOur potential vulnerability is

that we were operating in Guatemala) without coordinating

with CIA.

(Roberto Francisco Castanedo Felice, MEX-65,

134-3176)

(22), SOLO

The information emanating from the captioned

sensitive Bureau operation has been disseminated to CIA

and other agencies for several years. The sensitive

source has traveled abroad numerous times and his trips

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have included Russia. We have never identified the

source to CIA and we have never coordinated with the

Agency regarding any trips made by the source. Up

to date, no issue has been raised.

We are potentially vulnerable in that former

Bureau Agents now with CIA may have been familiar with

aspects of the SOLO operation. We have no evidence

that such ex-Agents passed any of their knowledge to

CIA officials. If they have or, if CIA has become

cognizant of

the existence of the operation, we could

be charged with failure to coordinate.

The

Agency

could place special emphasis in this case because it

has so many high-level foreign ramifications.

(23) HARRASSMENT OF CIA

(24)

By letter dated November 15, 1967, CIA inquired

if the Bureau would check the toll calls on

the home

• telephone of one Robert Kenneth Brown who was harrassing

CIA in the Miami area.

Brown allegedly was seeking

information concerning the Agency's covert operations.

-We told CIA that we would not check the toll calls.

We

explained that on the basis of the information received,

there was not sufficient information to justify investigation

falling within theBureau's jurisdiction.

CIA accepted

our response but there is no doubt that the Agency

characterized our position as a concrete example of

refusal to help a sister agency with a problem relating

to the security of U. S. intelligence operations.

(Memorandum Brennan to Sullivan; November 16, 1967,

re: "Robert Kenneth Brown, Panther Publications -

Harrassment of CIA," 105-94508-12)

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

CIA became very irked when we restricted

dissemination of our Current Intelligence Analysis to

two copies for the Agency. CiA took the position with

I the Liaison Agent that CIA always has been most liberal

in providing the Bureau with as many copies as we needed

when it involved various types of CIA material. The

Agency never made an official issue of this matter.

The

Liaison Agent is confident that CIA always considered this

an uncooperative gesture on our part.

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(35) ESTABLISEMENT OF BUREAU LIAISON WITH

(5)

DUTCH INTERNAL SECURITY SERVICE - 1960

(5)

In January, 1960, our Legal Attache, Bonn,

traveled to Holland for the purpose of exploring arrange

ments for liaison with appropriate Dutch authorities. The

U. S. Ambassador raised questions, Pointing out that over

the years, all relations with the Dutch authorities had

been handled through CIA./sHe indicated that before there

was any change in procedure, it would be necessary for

CIA and FBI to come to some

Dulles subsequently expressed disappointment in that his

Agency had not been contacted by the Bureau prior to

exploring the liaison arrangement. We eventually conferred

with CIA and came to an agreement satisfactory to all

parties concerned.

Again, CIA could cite this as an instance where

we failed to coordinate with the Agency in line with

National Security Council Directives.

(Memorandum Frohbose

to Belmont, March 3, 1960, re: "Legal Attache Operations -

Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and the Netherlands," 66-18973-123)

In the latter part of 1959 we gave consideration to

establishing a Legal Attache in Copenbagen, Denmark.

The

purpose of the assignment was to follow Bureau leads in

Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Holland. We did not inform

CIA of our intentions.

(Memorandum Frohbose to Belmont,

January 14, 1960, re:

"Legal Attache Operations, The

Netherlands," 66=18973-113)

DI BUREAU DISSEMINATION OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

INFORMATION TO FOREIGN SERVICES - 1962

By letter dated November 7, I962, CIA raised

questions concerning the propriety of Bureau dissemination

of counterintelligence information to foreign intelligence

services.

CIA, at that time, had particular reference to

information which our Legal Attache had transmitted to the

S)Greel Intelligence Service concerning XGB operations. CIA

took the position that pursuant to the coordinating

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Directive, the Bureau was obligated to coordinate with

CIA prior

• to such dissemination.

The particular data

had emanated from one of our sensitive Soviet sources

(FEDORA). We responded to CIA by stating that the

information was the product of an internal security

operation and did not relate to any operational activity

abroad. CIA again surrendered.

The Agency could argue

that it was responsible for following soviet matters

(5)

with the Greek intelligence service and that we had an

obligation of coordinating with the Agency.

(Memorandum

Branigan to Sullivan, November 9, 1962, re; "FEDORA, "

105-104811-344)

(27) "THE INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT, "A BOOK AUTHORED BY

DAVID WISE AND THOMAS ROSS

In August, 1963, we received information indi-

cating that Wise and Ross

were in the process of gathering

material for a book pertaining to activities of U.S.

intelligence activities: Both Ross and Wise contacted

the Bureau.

It was recommended that Liaison orally advise

CIA that these two individuals were preparing a book con-

cerning U.S. intelligence

agencies. The Director: noted

"I see no

reason doing so."

It is not known if CIA was ware of the contact

with the Bureau.

Wise and Ross subsequently published the

book which contained extremely derogatory information

concerning CIA.

Memorandum Jones to Deloach, re: "David

Wise of the "New York Herald Tribune" and Thomas Ross of

the "Chicago Sun Times")

(28) COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES - AFRICA

In April, 1960, CIA inquired if the Bureau would

give any consideration to assisting the Agency toward

developing coverage in Africa.

sto informant

CIA was looking for the

services of any Negro informant who might be available.

The Agency also inquired about placing a Negro in the

Communist Party, USA, under a plan which would have as

an eventual objective, the sending of the informant to

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Africa under an appropriate cover and for an extended

period. We told CIA we had no informants available

because they were necessary for our own operations.

We

took the position that we saw no benefit to be gained by

loaning an informant on a short or long term

basis.

This item is being mentioned because Africa

has become vitally important to U.S. interest, bearing

in mind that both the Soviets and Chinese Communists have

made significant inroads into the area.

that as early as 1960, it had the foresight to recognize

the need for additional coverage, that it appealed to the

Bureau for assistance, and that we did not cooperate.

memorandum Papich to Frohbose, April T, 1960,

re:

"Communist Activities in Africa," 64-200-302-110)

(29) ADVISING THE WHITE HOUSE REGARDING CRITICISM

OF INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS - EUROPE

By letter dated October 23, 1964, we furnished

the White House information received by our Legal Attache

from the U. S. Ambassador to Luxembourg. He was critical

of intelligence operations in Europe and made particular

reference to the overstaffing of personnel.

We do not know if CIA became cognizant of the

existence of the Bureau letter bearing in mind that the

Agency undoubtedly would have considered the document as

relating to its operations.

We do knöw that for several years,

CIA personnel have been assigned to the White House and had

in Europe")

(30) THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY

BOARD AND JOHN MC CONE

In May, 1963, we became embroiled with CIA in a

rather critical conflict as a result of communication the

Bureau sent to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory

Board. The matter dealt with consideration that might be

given to increasing wire taps on diplomatic establishments.

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In a portion of our communication, we attributed cer-

tain information to McCone, then Director of CIA. He

charged that the information attributed to him was not

so because he had never made any such statement and he

could prove it. The actual fact was that the information

relating to McCone had been given to us by one of his

subordinates who had indicated that the information

should have checked with him before we went on record

subord rates the led indi

McCone maintained that we

that any information had originated with him.

The

record at the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory

Board was subsequently corrected. (Memorandum Belmont

to Tolson, May 16, 1963, re: "Central Intelligence Agency,"

(31) ALLEGED PENETRATIONS OF CIA

In February, 1965, Bureau representatives met

Anatoli Golitzyn to discuss

=llegations made by Colitzyn, a Soviet defecter, relative

to alleged Soviet penetrations of CIA. Golitzyn

was

interviewed in detail concerning these allegations.

By

letter dated February 26, 1965, we officially advised CIA

that there appeared to be no basis at this time for a

full investigation of the individuals involved.

There are off cials in CIA who continue to be

seriously concerned about possible penetrations of the

Agency and have not discarded Golitzyn allegations.

We do not have any reason to believe that CIA

has developed any substantive evidence to support Golitzyn's

allegations.

If it does, we could be vulnerable and could

covide nee

be charged that we did not cooperate and conduct the

necessary investigation in 1965.

(32) VICE PRESIDENT NIXON'S TRIP TO SOUTH AMERICA - 1958

In 1958, Vice President Richard M. Nixon traveled

to Latin America during which time there were numerous riots

and attacks which were directed against the Vice President

and his party. By letter dated May 16, 1958, we provided

the Vice President with a summary of information which we

had received concerning the events in Latin America relating

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to the trip. Most of this information came from CIA.

Our letter could be interpreted as raising the question

concerning the quality of CIA's coverage in Latin America.

It is not known if CIA ever became knowledgeable

of the referenced communication. As already indicated,

we do know that CIA personnel have been assigned to the

White House. We also know that General Robert Cushman,

currently Deputy Director of CIA, was attached to Vice

President Nixon's staff.

If CIA is cognizant of the communication, the

Agency technically could raise a question concerning a

violation of the third agency rule and, furthermore,

could question the Bureau's propriety of making reference

to CIA's coverage in Latin America. (Bufile - 62-88461-117)

(33) HERBERT TAKINI (5)

-The captioned individual is a criminal infor-

mant

whom we have been utilizing to very significant advan-

tage in New York City. He has been the source of valuable

criminal intelligence

and has been a key witness in

prosecutions of cases being handled by the Bureau.

We

(s)

acquired access to Itkin through CIA. A covert CIA

operator in New York City had become acquainted with

Itkin, saw his potential as a source of criminal intelligence,

and then conferred with James Angleton, CIA.

Angleton

contacted the Bureau Liaison Agent and

asked if the Bureau

was interested. Negotiations were initiated and we

subsequently acquired the services of tkinJAlthough

the Agency has never officially made any statement to us,

it has been bitterly disappointed that the Bureau never

acknowledged CIA's assistance which the Agency considered

, extremely valuable.

(34) EXCHANGE OF TECHNICAL INFORMATION

For many years, we maintained tight restrictions

with regard to the exchange of technical information with

CIA, particularly as it related to the technical surveillance

field.

CIA exhibited its equipment to us but, for many years,

we declined to show any of our devices, with some exceptions.

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CIA never made any official protest but informally

indicated from time to time that the lack of exchange

In this highly important field was prejudicial to over-

all intelligence and internal security interests.

The

Agency implied that we actually were more open with the

British in this general area than we were with CIA.

It should be noted that the foregoing situation

does not exist today. There is good exchange between the

Bureau and CIA.

(35) CIA LECTURERS AT BUREAU TRAINING SCHOOLS

CIA has never been able to anderstand why the

Bureau will not permit CIA personnel to lecture at Bureau

schools or training courses.

CIA has felt that through

a careful selection of lecturers,

the Agency could make

a very valuable contribution both to the Bureau and to

CIA. The Agency has indicated that its participation in

some of our courses would give the Agency the opportunity

to describe CIA's organization, objectaros, and operational.

problems. Furthermore, it has

been expressed that Bureau

personnel could be given the opportunity to pose questions

and there would be a far better over-all orientation on

the part of our people.

The Liaison Agent has always resisted CIA's

request. It has been a delicate matter to handle because

Bureau

personnel have lectured to hundreds of CIA employees.

(36) EXCHANGE IN THE TRAINING FIELD

Although CIA has never officially made an issue

of the matter, the Agency has not been happy about our

attitude concerning exchange of information in the training

field.

When the matter has been broughtup for any discussion

by CIA, the Agency has been discouraged.

CIA informally has

expressed the feeling that an exchange along certain guide-

lines could be most useful to the U. S. intelligence and

internal security effort.

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(37) POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE

(5)

This is an area where discussion with CIA

officials can rapidly generate criticism of the Bureau

for failure to cooperate and offer the necessary assis-

tance.

Positive intelligence, briefly, is that information

which might assist the U. S. Government in formulating

foreign policy. Much of it is of a political nature and

a vital portion pertains to scientific developments, military

capabilities of foreign countries, and intentions of foreign

countries. Positive intelligence is not only important

as it concerns the communist-bloc countries but also

the non-bloc nations.

There never has been any law, Directive, or

Executive Order which has fixed the responsibilities for

the clandestine collection of positive intelligence in

the U.s.

The Bureau does have a responsibility which

we refer

to as internal security and which falls into the

accepted area of counterintelligence. We do investigate

subversives, spys, and we develop penetrations of foreign

intelligence services.

Our work in the positive intelli-

gence field, for the most part, has been restricted to

the compliance of requests imposed upon us by the State .

Department, usually when a political crisis occurs in

some country.

CIA has maintained that there is a tremendous

unexplored field for expanded acquirement of positive

intelligence in the U.S. This would mean vastly increased

technical surveillance coverage, development of informants,

and collection of cryptographic material. CIA does not

feel that we have aggressively moved on this particular

subject and that over the years, the Agency has been

•thwarted in its attempts to do much about the problem.

In October, 1969, CIA requested the Bureau to

install technical surveillances at the offices and temporary

residences of two Indian Government officials visiting the

U.S. Pursuant to instructions, CIA was told to seek the

authority of the Attorney General. The Director stated.

that he did not want CIA utilizing FBI as a channel.

tAlt he S. Gonsalves, Butile - 205-1659501 (5)

• (5)

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In the same month, CIA inquired if the Bureau

would reestablish technical

surveillance coverage on

valman shapiro who cla felt was a key ligure in the

transmittal of scientific intelligence data to the

(s) Israeli Intelligence service. He declined to reinstatute

the coverage. CIA considered the matter important because

of its relationship to the Mideast Crisis.

On October 21, 1969, we told CIA that future

requests from CIA for technical surveillance coverage

should be transmitted by the Agency directly to the

Attorney General.

CIA has never made any official comment or

protest but it has considered the afore-mentioned action

by the Bureau as unfriendly and uncooperative. The Agency

has looked to the Bureau as the logical point of contact and

as the only organization having the resources and capabilities

of adequately determining if such coverage is even feasible.

(38) MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS

The Liaison Agent recalls fragments of other

situations or conflicts which occured over the years and

which resulted in the voicingol CIA displeasure or criticism.

The Agent cannot recall the names of the cases which is

necessary to acquire the required data. There was one

• instance early in the 1950's which involved information

received from a source of unknown reliability charging

Allen Dulles with having been a communist and a spy while

in Europe. We disseminated the information to several

agencies. Dulles exploded but never lodged a protest.

The Agent also has recollection of instances when

CIA alleged that its source or informant was compromised by

Bureau revelation of CIA information during the course of

interviews conducted by us.

Technically, this would be a

violation of the third agency rule and, if CIA had hard

core facts, we would be vulnerable, particularly it an

important informant was lost.

CIA never made any official

issue or protest.

SECRET

- 24 -

17, 55056- D0CIA!02989616 Page 134

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## Page 135

sitt

""".

SECRET

There also have been instances, but cases

cannot be recalled, where we included CIA information

in Bureau reports but CIA had requested that the information

not be passed outside of the Bureau.

CIA never protested.

SECRET

- 25 -

NH 55036' 'DocId:32989616 Page 135.

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## Page 136

3010-100

MAY 1902 POSTIC I

"OSA FIN: RIG. 73. 27

UNITED STATES G

VEiNMENT

Memorandum

AREI

TO

: The Director

DECLASSIFIED BY

1690

DATE: 3/13/70

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

FROM : SA Sam Papich

SECRET

DECLASSIE

4D/OR,

RELEASE US JIM INTUIRMATION

IN THIS DOCUMENT.

SUBJECT RELATIONS WITH CIA.

ASSANITIZED

6mB 6-22-94

Reference is made to my letters dated March 2 and

March 5, 1970. In my letter of March 5, 1970, I stated "it

is important to emphasize that the Bureau can also produce

an extensive list of justified grievances."

It is my under-

standing that the Director desired that this list be identified.

Enclosed herewith is a list of approximately 75 items.

This list should not be considered absolutely complete,

Preparation was predicated on my personal recollection and a

review of Bureau records.

To make this list more complete and

specifically accurate would necessitate the review of thousands

üi files.

The enclosed list can be supported hy Bureau records.

What CIA records reflect on the same items is unknown.

This

also must be kept in mind in connection with our evaluation

of the alleged CIA grievances which I previously listed.

•I realize that it is presumptuous on my part, but

if the Director feels that our Bureau work can benefit

by a

personal discussion between the Director and myself, I am

available until April 3, 1970. I plan to leave the

area

immediately thereafter for an extended period.

ACTION:

For information.

6-24,94

Classified by S

MACKSR

Beciassify on:

DAIR JFK)

Enclosure

ALL INFOREN

ATICA CONTATES

HE*•

SSIFIED

*I WHEKE SHOWA,

Classified by /11

Exempt from

GDS, Category 263

Dan of Declassificition Indefinite

GA KOS NE CUESTION TO

TON ADVOR,

RELENO OF CA INPORUENTION

IS TES EUGULENG, KP1-8-98

1N 35036 D001d:32989616 Page 136

---

## Page 137

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

FOREI IS UNGLASSITIRD ERCARE

1298 By 5668S0/8C4

DSCLASSIFY ON: 25X1,6

LIST OF BUREAU GRIEVANCES

(SEK)

1.

ATTACKS AGAINST BUREAU (MEXICO CITY AND FRANCE - 1951)

Although Agent Papich did not begin handling Liaison

with CIA until 1952, it is important to refer to highly signi-

ficant differences with CIA which culminated in a serious

conflict in the Fall of 1951. Our Legal Attaches in Mexico City

and Paris reported that CIA representatives were attacking the

Bureau, were endeavoring to place us in an unfavorable light,

were questioning our jurisdiction, and were making disparaging

remarks concerning the Bureau.

Bureau Bone 02 this

Some of this was summed up by

characterizing it as covert hostility within CIA, stemming

largely from disgruntled former employees of the FBI.

In October, 1951, General Walter Beddil Smith, then

Director of CIA, asked to meet with the Director and other

Bureau representatives for the purpose of discussing the

existing differences.

General Smith denied that there was any

covest hostility against the Bureau and maintained that there

was a general feeling of respect for us.

He admitted that

there had been isolated instances of friction for which CIA

must accept its share of responsibility.

It is my recollection that the Director and other

Bureau officials did meet with General Smith, at which time

guidelines were set forth for maintaining future relations

between the two agencies.

I was not able to find a memorandum

of record covering this meeting. (62-80750-1712, 1715, 1716,

1726, 1728, 1748, 1750)

2. PROSELYTING OF BUREAU PERSONNEL BY CIA

The Agent clearly recalls that early in the 1950's

we encountered difficulties with CIA because the Agency allegedly

was recruiting Bureau-employed personnel.

We vigorously pro-

tested, and subsequently, the Agency advised that it would follow

a policy of not having any contact with a Bureau employee until

the Individual had been separated from the Bureau for a period

of at least thirty days. The Agent could not locate the back-

ground of this matter in the files reviewed by him. It is pos-

sible that the pertinent information lies in the personnel file

of some former Bureau Agent.

CIA HAS NO DEUECTION TO

DECLASSIAGATION AND/OR,

RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION

EN TS-LOGUMENTAS SANiTiZED

KP1-8-98

HW 55036

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Page

137

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## Page 138

SECRET

JEK Act 6 91)(B)

3

By letter dated May 19, 1954, we protested to CIA

for the manner in which the Agency handled the case of the

captioned individual, a Soviet defector who had been placed

under CiA contrA

in interviewing

in turns soon asure a med be the intered st

Act 6 (1) (B)

as soon as he came to the united states,

and this had been agreed to by CIA, Without, notifying or

consulting with us, CIA permitted

Ho arrive in the

* JEK Act 6 (1) (B)

United States and be placed in the hands of a Congressional

committee.

We were,.

therefore, unable to interview the subject

in any detail. (Re:

JFK Act 6 (1)

S. CIA EVALUATION OF MOCASE

In February, 1954, we complained to CIA because the

Agency had evaluated

information coming frou the key source

in the captioned case as emanating fron a fabricator. We had

disseminated certain foreign intelligence information originat-

ing in this case to CiA. The source was a sey double agent

in one oi the mosi impuitani cases handled by the Rureau, und

the CIA evaluation was not proper or correct as far as we were

concerned. (Re: MOCASE)

JEK Act 6 (1) (B)

5. CASE OF

(5)

was a CIA employee whom that Agency conK Act 6 (1) (B

sidered to be a communist penetration.

The Agency requested

an investigation which was then initiated by us.

We subsequently

learned that CIA had been conducting its ow investigation which

even included technical surveillance coverage on the subject.

He considered this most uncooperative and se protested.

(Re:

1(5)

JEK Act 6 (1)(B

6. DR. OTTO JOHN, VISIT TO BUREAU - 1954

DI. Otto John, a Hest German security official,

defected to the communists in East Germany in July, 1954.

few weeks before his defection, he came to the United States

under CIA sponsorship. He was

afforded a tour of the Bureau

and he briefly met the Director.

It is believed that if all available facts were col-

lected, the evidence would strongly indicate that CIA did a very

ineffective job of assessing Dr. Otto John and permitting the

United States Government to be embarrassed by even promoting

a visit for him to this country. We could consider this instance

this countay the a could

an affront to the Director and the Bureau. (Memorandum Roach to

Belmont October 13, 1954, "CIA Tours Afforded by Bureau")

02 .

147 55036 DorId:32989616

Pare 138

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(S)

• OBODAT

T. CASE OF POLISH SEAMEN

DEFECTORS - 1951.

By letter dated October 13, 1954, a very strong letter

of protest was sent to General T. J. Betts

of the Interagency

Defector Committee &t CIA. This

letter made reference to

political asylum which was being considered for certain Polish

sailors who had been seized by the Chinese Nationalist Government.

General Betts disseminated a memorandum indicating that members

of the Committee had agreed that in view of commitments made

by the United States and Chinese officials, that failure to

arrange re-entry for the Polish seamen would have an adverse

effect on the over-all United States Defector Program.

We

emphasized to General Betts that this matter had never been

officially presented before the Defector Committee. He was

informed

that his action was not conducive to mutual cooperation.

8.

CIA INTERVIEW OF ALIENS IN THE UNITED STATES - DISCUSSION

WITH ALLEN DULLES SEPTEMBER 27, 1955

On September 27, 1955, the Liaison Agent met with

Allen Dulles, at which time the CIA Director's attention was

referred lo & naviei which huu nut yet developed into s serints

situation but if not properly followed could lead to conflicts

between the two agencies.

Dulles was referred to the contacts

of aliens in the United States made by CIA gersonnel without

first obtaining the necessary clearance fron the Bureau.

The

requirement for such clearance was clear-cut and pursuant to an

established agreement, (62-80750; memorandm Roach to Belmont

September 28, 1955, "Relations with CIA")

9. CIA APPROACH OF A NATIONAL ACADEMY GRADUATE (1955)

In November, 1955, an incident arose when

CIA approached

& National Academy graduate to utilize his services

This approach was made while the graduate was attending National

Academy classes.

A protest was made to key CIA officials for

not having advised us prior to establishing contact with the

Academy

graduate. [Re:

(B

JEK Act 6 (1) (B

10.

R

JEK Act 6. (1) (B

In December, 1955, we received information indicating

that CIA was in contact with an individual whom the Bureau was

developing for utilization in a double agent operation.

He

learned that CIA representatives had established contact with

and had given him some advice and guidance witho

first Checking with the Bureau. We protested to CIA.

6 (1) 1B!

(1) 1B

ran%

SECRET:

HL 55036 DocIdl32989616 Page 139

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11. ALLEGED FABIAN SOCIALISTS IN CIA

In 1956

former head of G-2; made

available to the Bureau on a strictly confidential basis

detailed information concerning alleged infiltration of the

United States Government by "Fabián Socialists."

(5)

furnished the names of many individuals whom he considered to

fall into this category..

Many of those listed were CIA executives.

This item is being listed in the event we felt that

it could be used to justify that as of that period there was

reason to deal with CIA in a very circumspect manner.

(Memorandum Roach to Belmont January 11, 1956, "Infiltration

of Fabian Socialists into the High Policy Areas of the

United States Government"')

JEK ACt 6 (111B

JEK Act 6 (1) 1B

12. DELAYS IN HANDLING NAME CHECK REQUESTS

By letter dated January 11, 1956, our Washington Field

Office called attention to extreme delays encountered in obtaining

, results of name check requests submitted to CIA.

These

delays

particularly related to investigations oi appiicani natters

being handled by the Bureau. (Memorandum Roach to Belmont January 19,

1956 "Applicant Matters - Record Checks at CIA")

13. WILLIAM P. BUNDY

In March, 1956, Allen Dulles announced that William

P. Bundy would serve as a

secretary for the Intelligence Advisory

Committee (IAC), of which the Bureau was a member.

Bundy, son-

Defense Fund.

in-law of eat Aches telet at many me 1

the Alger Hiss

the same law firm with Donald Hiss, brother of Alger Hiss.

Although we did not object to the appointment of Bundy,

this is another item to be kept in mind in the event we desired

to uphold an argument that there was reason to be circumspect

in dealings with CIA.

14.

tor.

las a leadi

was a leading scientist assigned to thel

He had been used as a consultan

such

agencies as the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and CIA.

October, 1955, he met a Soviet scientist and,

edge of AEC and CIA, began cultivating him.

l informed!

pit. section.

(5)

JEK Act 6 (1) (B)

(1) (B)

(1) (B

(1) (B

..

4593

-Page 140-

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## Page 141

us that he had been advised by a CIA official that

• the FBI

would be furnishing operational guidance to him.

We had never

become involved in any such arrangement, and we

later determined

that a CIA official had been in error in making the above-

described misrepresentation.

handling of this natter. (Be for l

protested the CIA official's

EK Act 6 (1) (B)

15.

(5)

JEK Act 6 (1) (B)

(5)

on July 20, 1956, we determined

had been in contact

with

JEK Act 6

(1) (B)

Act 6 (1) (B)

Act 6 (1) (B)

Washington, D. C. We further ascertained thatl

CIA employee, We were informed by CIA on July 21,1956, that

the Agency had no information concerning

contacts with

sWe

reported first sial

Later interviewed

MAGE 6

(1) (8)

it was indicated that

in fact, had been in contact with

(1) (B)

a CIA official concerning his meetings with

Military

(1) (B)

Attache.

We protested and CIA submitted a lettér of apology.

(Memorandum Belmont to Boardman July 21, 1956

JFK Act 6 (1) (B;

JER

Act

6 (1) (B).

16.

[MARK GOLANSKY_ (5)

In July, 1956, a statement was made by a State

Department official to the effect that a CIA employee allegedly

had advised that the subject, a Soviet agent, was being per-

mitted to enter the United States so that his activities

could be covered and so that the Bureau would be in a position

to promote a defection.

The Bureau was not in possession of

any information indicating that we had sanctioned the entry

of the subject for the purpose described above. The State

Department official was unable to recall the name of the CIA

employee involved; inquiry at CiA was negative. He were not

in a position to identify the CIA employee without conducting

up with the identity. (Re:

JEK Act 6 (1). "B

JFK Act 6 (1) 1B

By letter dated November 8, 1956, we strongly pro-

tested to CIA because representatives of that Agency had inter-

viewed an alien in the United States without first obtaining

clearance from the Bureau.

It should be noted that there was

a well-established agreement whereby it was incumbent upon

CIA to first check with the Bureau before interviewing any

alien in the United States. (Letter to CIA November 8,

1956,

JEK Act 6 (1) (Bi

....=

5

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18.

(S) SECRET

JEK Act " 6 (1) (B)

was a former student at Columbia University

JEK Act 6 (1) (B)

At sponse a Meen in at a cause a hot Bette

_ IS in December,

made a trip tol

"where he was contacted by

JEK Act 6

(1) (B)

JER AgE

611(B)

an unidentified individual and was given

& letter indicating

that the writer was

and that he was

JEK Act

6 (1) (B)

interested in cooperating with the United States. Whenl

returned to the United States, we permitted CIA to interview

the subject because of the Agency's foreign tell ence he e

We subsequently interviewed

informed us that he had been cautioned by CIA not to furnish

pertinent information to the Bureau. CIA dnied that any such

statement was made. (Re:

1(5)

JEK Act 6 (1) (B)

CIA REQUEST FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING A HIGH-SPEED CAMERA-

19.

1957

The San Francisco Office furnished information

indicating thai Ci had cguested a firm in California to fui-

nish that Agency information regarding all foreign inquiries

pertaining to a high-speed camera manufactured by the company.

The matter was reviewed because we wanted to be certain that

CIA

was not invading our jurisdiction. We did not develop

evidence that CIA had overstepped its jurisdiction. The Director

did make a notation,

"O.K., but it does seen to me

we give CIA

a pretty wide authority to explore such a field. H"

(Memorandum Belmont to Boardman April 10, I957, C'Flow of

Intelligence Information to Soviets and Satellites through

So-Called Channels")

20.

(s)

On May 28, 1957, CIA advised that one of its repre

sentatives in the field had interviewed the captioned

765

alien who nad agreed to

cooperate with the Agency after he

returned to

BCIA conducted this interview without

first obtaining clearance from the Bureau. fuch clearance was

necessary pursuant to an established apreement. A vigorous

protest was made to the Agency.

(Re:

JEK Act 6 (1) (

6 (1) (B

• Act 6 (1) (B

Act 6 (1) (B

n790-551

WN 55036 DocId: 32989616 Page 142

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## Page 143

SEGRET

21.

CIA REQUEST FOR TOUR FOR COLOMBIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

REPRESENTATIVES - 1957

S)

(9) In July, 1957, CIA requested a tour for several

Colombian officials who

were coming to this country under

CIA

S Colombians, because in the past a Jolombian Ambassador

Cia was told that no tours would be given to the

had

grossly insulted the Bureau after we had arrested the

ambassador's chauffeur on White Slave Traffic Act charge.

(u)

If we so desired, we could give consideration to

accusing cla of trying to impose upon us individuals whom we

considered undesirable in light of the foregoing.

(hemorandum July 15, 1957, Roach to Belmont Representatives

of Colombian Intelligence service- request for Bureau lour

by CIA")

*(U)

22.

REQUEST FOR SECURITY SURVEY OF COUNCIL ON FOREIGN

RELATIONS - NEH YORK CITY - 1957

1S(0)

Ой Horember 15, 1957, our New. York Office was con-

tacted by

the local CIA representative who desired to be in

formed if the Bureau could conduct a security survey of the

premises of the Council on Foreign Relations which were located

across the street from a building occupied by the Soviet -

United Nations Delegation..

The CIA representative indicated

that his visit to our office was pursuant to instructions

received from Allen Dulles who allegedly was concerned about

the possibility of the Soviets establishing coverage of

conversations and discussions which might be held at the Council.

•It should be noted that the Council included as members many

eates coverant a do

including officials of the United

Pursuant to instructions, Allen Dalles was informed.

on November 18, 1957, that we did not like the approach used

by CIA in that

such a sensitive matter had been taken up at

the field level rather than through Bureau Headquarters.

on Foreign Relations")

a for tattoo 15 Big endor 10, 2907, 80 coac 2

-

1433

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## Page 144

SECRET

JEK Act 6 (1) (B)

23.

indicating that

In October, 1957

we received information froml

= 1

6

(1) (B)

Scientist then visiting in the United

6

(1) (B)

States might defect.

We followed developments through

Act 6

(1) (B)

and we kept CIA advised.

The Agency was fully aware of

the

We subsequently received information indicating thate

la CIA employee, established contact with

for the purpose of developing information concerning

Works of

scientists. A protest vas made to CIA for not

K Act 6 (1) (B)

(1) (B)

6

(1) (B)

(1) (B)

properly coordinating their inteyests with us, bearing in mina

that the action taken by

_possibly could have jeopardized

a Bureau operation. (Re:

5) JEK

(1) (B)

6 (1) (B)

24.

JEK Act 6 (1) (B)

(S)

protest

subject,

to or cher date any at tore dire on a

Jalien, without first obtaining the nec-

Act 6 (1) (B)

(1) (B)

cesary clearance from the Bureau. (Re:

25. ALLEGED IMPERSONATION OF FBI EMPLOYEE

On April 23, 1958, we received information indicating

that a CIA employee allegedly had represented herself as being

with the FBI when she tried to arrange an interview with

Wachinists in washinston, Do Chanternational Association of it?

_gave a signed statement

in which he/claimed that

he

had received a phone call from a

MiSS

who said she was with the fol.

Upon checking witho

CIA,

we

were informed that Missil

denied that she had made.

(1) (B)

'6 (1) (B)

such representation. (memorandum Roach

_to Belmont April 25,

1958, "Unknown Subject;

JEK Act 6 -(1) (B)

26.

JEK Act 6 (1) (B)

By letter dated May 12, 1958, the Bureau protested

to CIA for interviewing-an alien

in the Detroit area without

first obtaining the necessary clearance from the Bureau.

Such clearance was necessary pursuant to established agreement.

Re:

JEK Act 6 (1) (B)

00

-

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SECRES

27.

He received information in May, 1958,

a CLA employee Ested as one oployet vath the bueau

In the records of the District of Columbia Fational Guard.

The information was developed as the result of an investiga-

tion being conducted by the Bureau for the White House.

furnished a signed statement indicating that he per-

sonally had no knowledge of the existence of the above infor-

mation in the National Guard records.

(Memorandum Roach to Belmont May 17,

1958, Alleged

Representation by CIA Employee of Employment with FBI"')

28. CORNEL MUNTIU

By letter dated June 10, 1958, we protested to CIA

for not advising us concerning that Agency's interview of an

individual tho was the subject of a Bureau investigation.

We

had been corresponding with CIA concerning the subject, and

the Agency should have been aware of our interests.

(Re: Cornel Muntiu - 10558749)

29. ALLEGED CIA INCOMPETENCE AND ALLEGED PENETRATION OF

UNITED STATES AGENCIES

By letter dated June 3, 1958, Legat, Tokyo, furnished

information volunteered to him by (Colonel Emes Riley Of G-2.

tRiley was very strong in his denunciation ci CIA. He indicated-

that the Agency was incompetent and that it was penetrating

other United States agencies.

He also mentioned that when

Allen Dulles was in Switzerland, Dulles was intimate with a

woman, not identified.

The above is being cited in the event we desire to

use this information as evidence for supporting a position of

being circumspect in dealings with the CIA.

(Letter dated June 3, 1958, from Legat, (Tosto,] "Relations withe

CIA")

JEK Act 6 (1) (B)

ct 6 (1) (B)!

(1) (B)

---

## Page 146

SHERET

30.

GENERAL REINHARD GEHLEN (5)

The Legal Attache, Bons, advised by letter dated

June 10, 1958, that he had been invited to visit General Reinhard

Gehlen, Sthe head of the West German Intelligence Service, CIA

became aware of this invitation, and an Agency representative

intormed our Legal attache that

it was not desired that the

Legat visit with Gehlen YOur Legat was instructed by the Bureal

to accept the invitation regardless of the CIA position.

We could evaluate the CIA position in this matter as

being uncooperative. (Memorandum Roach to Belmont June 17,

1958, "Relations with CIA")

31. CIA INTEREST IN CHINESE TENS 6E

In June, 1958, we raised the question concerning

CIA's failure to acheresto an agreement relating to CIA's

recruitment of Chinese aliens in the United States for over

US. A situation developed in Illinois indicating that CIA

allegedly had become interested in recruiting an alien and

even took some action without first checking with us.

expressed our disapproval in a letter to CIA June 12, 1958.

(Memorandum Belmont to Boardman June 9, 1958, "Recruitment

of ChineseTtliens in the United States

for Overseas

Intelligence Operations')

32. CIA OFFICIAL'S CRITICISM OF "MASTERS OF DECEIT"

Our Legal Attache, Tokyo, obtained a copy of a memo-

randum sent to an official in our.

Embassy in Tokyo by John Baker 75)

Chief of the CIA Office in Japan. In his communication (Baker (

belittled the value of "Masters of Deceit" as an anticommunist

weapon in foreign countries. He claimed that the book pertained

only to the Communist Party, USA, which he characterized as a

He stated

that the author of

a policeman. (Memorandum Roach to Belmont June 12 and 24, 1958,

"Masters of

Deceit.")

"'10 -

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I SECRET

(5)

33.

CIA DEVELOPMENT OF

THE UNITED STATES

GOVERNMENT SOURCES IN

In May, 1958, CIA furnished identifving and back-

ground data concerning three individuali

(S)

Government and assigned to the united state the

(S)

in

Thad been developed as a source of intormation by CIA

and volunteered his services.(sl

Thad been developed

a source by CIA and had been furnishing

some information to

that in the case ofL

that in the e set the the wee shout

we felt that the

Agency should

notified us at an eaflier date in order that we could

at the outset. (Re:

Activities -

34.

Act 6 (1) (B)

JEK Act 6 (1) (B)

JFK Act 6

(1) (B)

JEK Act

6

(1) (B)

JEK Act 6

(1) (B)

JER AGE

(E)(B)

JEK Act

6 (1) (B)

JEK Act 6 (1) (B)

JEK Act 6 (1) (B)

JEK Act 6 (1) (B)

The subject, a former member of the

intelligelcêt 6 (1) B

Service, defected

to

the United states and furnished extremely

valuable information. The beginnings of this case include

information raising questions concerning CIA cooperation.

In June, 1958, we developed information indicating

that

which had

JEK Act 6 (1) (B)

been addressed to the Director by an individual who had

identified himself as

she writer further Act 6 (1) (B)

indicated that he might be connected with thel

Intelligencêt 6 (1) (B

Service.

The letter addressed to the Director had been placed

received a copy of the particular communication from CIA,

and the contents were such at that time that no action was

required by the Bureau.

We asked CIA for particulars leading

to the alleged opening of the letter which had been addressed

to the Director. CIA claimed that it had not opened the

letter.

He were confidentially informed by an Agency repre-

sentative that the Ambassador had opened the letter and then

referred the matter to CIA.

The contents were such that inves

tigative action o1 an extensive nature was required by ClA

in Europe.

What actually happened at the United States Embassy

is something we may never know.

(1) 1B

12

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SECRET

JEK Act 6 (1) (B)

35.

By letter dated June 26, 1958, we voiced our concern

regarding CIA's alleged interview of a [Chinese alien whom CIA (S

was considering for overseas recruitment. CIA denied that an

approad a the alien had been aton it are ration contra

dicted the statements emanating from CIA. (Re

(Bureau file 231-52437](

36.

(COMPROMISE OF FBI TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COVERAGE ((S)

On July 18, 1958, CIA requested the Bureau for

(1) (B)

On June 5, 1958,

we had obtained the contents of a (conversation between Mahmouc

ousan of the Jordanian ambassy and the Egyptian Air Attache.cs

he conversation strongly indicated that Rousan was workin

revolutionary plot

King Hussei

lu the objective of which was to overthrow

CRousan returned to Jordan and was imprisoned by

King HusseiDbased upon information made available through CIA.

(sy Rousan denied any implication in any revolutionary activity and

he was strongly supported by certain top officials in the

(s Jordanian Government.The King told CIA that he was on the

spot and that he needed proof of Rousan S conspiratorial

activity. CIA asked if we would permit the /recording to

played to the King/"stressing that this was

the only way King

Hussien could be convinced. (S,(V)

On July 18, 1958, a CIA official was advised that

the Bureau positively would not grant permission to playing

of the recording. SWe maintained that if we granted such

permission, our other leverage of a sensitive nature, could

be seriously imperiled.

.

On July 21, 1958,

Allen Dulles asked if the Bureau

would reconsider its

position in view of the critical situation

in the Middle East. Pursuant to instructions, CIA was then

told that in view of the position in which the Bureau had been

placed, we

placed in such a position in the future.

• On July 22,

1958, Dulles

told the Liaison Agent

that he was very much disturbed over. the Director's reaction

He stated that

he was not interested in holding a pistol to

- 12 -

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## Page 149

atybe ye head ate he her and ted that he was delibe

he was deliber-

recommended that the Liaison Agent follow the matter for the

purpose of determining if the recording was to be used by CIA.

The Director's notation was,

"No. The fat is in the fire now

and it is useless to waste any more time on it.

We will

probably hear of any details in Pearson's column. H." 05

(v)

The strong position we took in resisting

the

dissemination of such sensitive information to a foreign

government was fully justified.

(Memorandum Roach to Belmont,

dated July 22, 1958, re "CIA Request for Permission toLPlay

Technical Surveillance Recording to King Hussien, Jordan")

37.

(E(U)

(1) (B

JEK Act 6(1) (B)

We became concerned because this program

was to involve deportation of undesirables, including American

communists residing in

The implementation of such a

program would have resulted in the return of American communists

to

the United States.

In September, 1958, we were informed that the

Government 6 (1) (B)

had embarked on a strong anticommunist program

and certain

Americans were ordered deported.

We checked with CIA and the

Agency's chief

'in

claimed that his Agency was not

involved.

(S) (0)

The Liaison Agent subsequently was informed on a

strictly confidential basis that the American Ambassador had

been in contact with certain Mexican officials concerning

possible anticommunist activities. The Ambassador had consulted

with the local CIA chief and had asked for a list of Americans

who could be considered as being deportable. The CIA officer

reportedly furnished a list of approximately 40 names.

(memo-

randun Roach to Belmont, September 17, 1958, "Legal Attache's

Office,

Belationship with Embassy and CIA"

JEK Act 6 (1) (B)

38 :

JEK Act 6 (1) (B)

(0)

He expressed our displeasure to CIA in September

1958, because of that Agency's unauthorized investigation in

the United states or al

citizen who was here in connec

tion with an exchange program.

The-

lindicated to ank

American friend that he was interested in staying in the United

States, but was not ready for actual defection because of a

) (B))

V".

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possible hostage situation in his native country.

The Bureau

was following this potential defection and pursuant to estab-

lished procedures was keeping interested agencies apprised of

developments.

On September 15, 1958, we received information

indicating that another Government agency was conducting an

investigation of the subject.

It was later established that

CIA was the other agency. (Re

Bureau fileS

Act 6 (1)

[105-64024)]

(5)

=(5)

39.

CIA ACTIVITIES INE

JFK Act

6 (1) (B

The Legal Attache, lokyo, reported by letter dated

September 22; 1958, Nthat L

D'(sat Act 6 (1) (B

was a paid, nighly regarded,

and very sensitive sourcek Act 6 (1) (B

of CIA.* This information was given to the Legal Attache by

(sColonel John B. Stanley G2 Head in Japan. According to Stanley](S

CIA did not want this information to be known to other agencies,

particularly the FBI. The Director's notation was,

"Some more

of CIA double dealing. H."

(Letter from legat, Tokyo, dated

September 22,

1958, "Investigations in

JEK Act 6 (1) (B)

JFK Act 6 (1) (B)

40.

ALLEGED CIA INCOMPETENCE

(5)

During the period October 20-25, 1958, Bureau

representatives attended a seminar at Orlando, Florida, which

was given by the U.S. Air Force. )Among the activities was a

lecture given by

Jot CIA * Subsequent to the

4ct

(1) (B

briefing, General

Millard Youngs)of the Air Force confided to

briefing given by

(5)

reluctance to furnish certain information, using the

General

was only anak

• Act 6 (1) (B;

...

This item is being cited in the event we desire to

use the

foregoing as evidence to support a position that we were

obliged to be circumspect in dealing with CIA. (Memorandum

October 28; 1958, Roach to Belmont, "Joint Strategic Planning) (S

Seminar, Orlando

1958")

Air Force Base, Orlando, Florida, October [20-25, (5)

41. CIA COVERAGE IN CUBA PRIOR TO OVERTEROW OF BATISTA GOVERNMENT

The overthrow of the Batista Government on January 1,

1959, and the subsequent assumption of pover by Castro raised

questions concerning the efficiency and competence of U.S. intel-

ligence.

Allen Dulles indicated that future developments would

14 -

4# 55036

10

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## Page 151

show that many more people were involved in the Castro organi-

zation than the U.S. Government had realized. Information

coming to our attention suggested the possibility that both

State and CIA had failed to assess developments in Cuba properly.

The foregoing is cited in the event that we found

reason to question the competency of TA in Cuba.

This coulde

be useful if we wanted to justify the

Attache office in Havana.

One could also comment that poor

coverage in Cuba had an indirect and adverse effect on our

operations in the United States.

42.

MIKHAIL N. KOSTYUK (S)

By letter dated April 25, 1959, we voiced our

objections to CIA for giving guidance to

an individual with

whom we had been maintaining contact for the purpose of developing

him as a double agent (she individual involved was Dr. William

Randolph Lovelace II, a well-known

expert in the field ofes

(5)

medical research as It applied toYspace fljing. Lovelace

also a contract agent of CIA and had occasion to handle sensitive

matters for that Agency.] InApril, 1959, Lovelace was preparing

(5)

to make

a trip

to Moscow.

CIA briefed him on matters as they

applied to his trip.

The Agency also interviewed him concerning

his relationship with the subject in Washington, D. C., and,

furthermore, gave him guidance concerning the relationship.

He objected

to CIA giving any guidance to (Lovelace concerning(S)

his contacts with the subject without first consulting with us.

(M1kha11 N. Kostyuk, Bureau file 105-69694) 5)

43.

ALLEGED BELITTLING OF COMMUNISM BY ALLEN DULLES

In July, 1959, Allen Dulles of CIA spoke at the

• National Strategy

Seminar of the National Har College.

of the professors handling the Seminar was critical of Dulles.

He claimed that Dulles had belittled the importance of the

communist problem.

The above is being cited in the event we desire to

utilize the information in justifying a position that it was

necessary to be circumspect with CIA. (Memorandum W. C. Sullivan

to Belmont, August 14, 1969, "National Strategy Seminar, National

War College, July, 1959")

44

"TRUE" MAGAZINE ARTICLE - SEPTEMBER, 1959

In September, 1959, "True" magazine carried an

article captioned "Allen Dulles:

America's Global Sherlock,"

which included information of a derogatory nature concerning

the Director and the Bureau. The article precipitated a crisis

15

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## Page 152

SECRET

ÄJEK Act 6 (1) (B)

which led to an almost open break between the Bureau and CIA.

The article was written byl

who was connected

with the International Labor Organization in Geneva, Switzerlana

The article

was very complimentary toward CIA. The author made reference

to relations between the Bureau and CIA and quite clearly

indicated that they were strained. He claimed that the CIA

took Agents from FBI; that Agents did not remain in the Bureau

for an extended period; and he related a story very critical

of the Director.

We learned that the author had been in contact with

CIA when he was preparing the article. We were told that lyman

(5) Kirkpatricks a CIA official, had read

and approved the article

prior to its publication.

as a result of this information,

(Kirkpatrich became persona non grata with the Bureau.

The Liaison Agent had conferred with both Dulles

(s) and Kirkpatrick)concerning the matter.

We took the position

that based upon the information made mailable CIA had promoted,

condoned, or possibly even authored the article. Dulles deniec

that this was so and then Kirkpatrick produced information indi-

cating that he had been knowledgeable of the authoris article

before it was published.

Thesauthor had contacted Stanley

(5) Grogan, one of Kirkpatrick's Subordinates, and had

discussed the matter with him.

The author allegedly had raised

the question of strained relations between the two agencies

and at that time Grogan

reportedly told the author that rela-

tions were not strained, but were satisfactory.

Nevertheless,

the final draft of the article included the derogatory infor-

mation and the facts available to us indicate that Kirkpatrick

1(5>

had the opportunity to alert the Bureau to the existence of the

article before it was published. He did not do so. He told

us that this was an oversight.

Consideration was given to severance of liaison

relations. It was recommended and approved that liaison continue

and that we keep Dulles and CIA on the string as to what course

of action we were going to take.

It was suggested that we not

It was also recommended

and approved that we cut off

all contact with Kirkpatrick (5)

By letter dated September 11, 1959, to Dulles, the

Director expressed his keen disappointment because officials of

CIA, when they had the opportunity, had failed to voice any con-

cern or objection to "True" magazine, and furthermore, had failed

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I SECRE

dated September 16, 1959, was

was

disappointed in him because ne had failed to make any objection

to the article and had not alerted us concerning the impending

attack against the Bureau.

(Memorandum Frohbose to Belmont,

August 27, 1959, "Allen Dulles:

America's Global Sherlock,

'True' Magazine, September,

1959"; and Memorandum Frohbose

to

Belmont, September 4, 1959,

"Allen Dulles")

45. ACTIVITIES OF CONTACTS DIVISION OF CIA - 1959

We received information in September, 1959, that

the contacts Division of CiA had held intervievs with American

businessmen in the Boston area, which dealt with meetings between

the businessmen and visiting Soviets.@CIA reportedly was inter-

ested in developing positive intelli

so happened that,one of the Soviet isence information, Mout it

agent operation being handled by the Bureau.

Thes Bureau already

had notified CIA of our interest in the Soviet ]By letter E

dated September 29, 1959, we voiced our objection to the manner

in which CIA had handled

file [134-84931

this. (Re(Bernard M. Gordon,] Bureau(S)

46.

APPEARANCE

OF COLONEL FRANTISEK TISLER BEFORE THE

HOUSE COMMITTEE. ON UNAMERICAN ACTIVITIES (HUA) - 1959

On November 6, 1959, information was received

indicating that HCUA was interested in obtaining Colonel Frantisek

Tisler, a Czech defector, to testify before the Committee. HCUA

advised us that it had contacted the State Department who, in

turn, had conferred with CIA. Allen Dulles allegedly informed

FCUA

that Tisler was agreeable to appearing before the Committee

and that he would be made available pursuant to certain security

instructions.

The Director asked whether or not CIA had authority

to make a defector available to a congressional committee without

first checking with other interested agencies. The Director was

informed that CIA did not have such authority

because a National

Security Council directive made it very clear that this could not

be done without processing the matter through the Inter-Agency

Defector Committee. In this particular case the aforementioned

Committee had not called a meeting,

but the chairman, a CIA

official, had made certain phone calls. A Bureau representative

was contacted by phone on November 6,

1959, but at that time we

had not formulated a position. Allen Dulles allegedly contacted

the chairman of the Committee

and was told that the Committee

had no objection to making Tisler available.

...=".=.

it - do

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## Page 154

SEC

On November 13, 1959, CIA representatives were

informed that we were opposed to making the defector available

On that same date we were told that CIA was informing

HUA it was reversing its position and that upon reconsideration,

it did not feel that Tisler could be made available.

By memorandum dated November 14, 1959, the develop-

ments in this matter were reviewed and it was recommended that

at the next

Inter-Agency Defector Committee meeting we strongly

protest CIA's dereliction in the handling of the HUA request.

(Bureau file 105-38958)

47. CRITICISM OF DIRECTOR

On April 11, 1960, Ray Tanner, President of Reicco

Company, Caracas, Venezuela, informed the Bureau that he recently

held a conversation, wa ta

B)

XEmbassy inl

was a CIA employee

to complimentary statements made by Ianner concerning the Director

and the FBI.

stated that the Director should have retirede

five years ago for the good of all concerned. A protest was made

to Allen Dulles on

April 20, 1960:

(Memorandum Frohbose to Belmont;

April. 21, 1960;

'JEK* Act 6 (1) (B)

48.

(ROBERT AMORY CIA OFFICIAI ALICEDLY ADVOCATING

RECOGNITION OF RED CHINA - 1960

(5) In February, 1960, Dr. Frank Barnett, Director of

Research for the Richardson Foundation, volunteered information

concerning statements allegedly made by Robert Amory, a top

allegedly advocated recognition of Red

China.

This matter was called to the attention of Allen

Dulles and on April 20, 1960, Dulles informed the Liaison Agent

that he haasfonducted an inquiry,

had reviewed a tape recording

of Amory's talk, and was satisfied that LAmory had not made the

statement attributed to him.

(5)

The above is being cited in the event we desire to

dispute the position taken by Dulles. If the evidence clearly

established that mory lad made such a statement, we could use

the information to support a position that we would have been

warranted in being most circumspect with CIA. (Memorandum

Frohbose to Belmont, April 21, 1960, Robert Amory'D (5)

49. ALLEGED INSTALLATION OF MICROPHONES ON U.S.

PREMISES ABROAD BY CIA

A State Department representative informed the Bureau

that a

microphone had been found in the uS. Embassy, Mexico City:

that it had been planted by CIA; and

that Allen Dulles allegedly

in it.

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had maintained that if CIA was to operate effectively, it had

to know what was going on in U.S. establishments. The implication

was left. that CIA was covering activities of other U.S. agencies

through

technical installation.

Inquiries deveioped informa-

tion indicating that CIA had installed a microphone in the Embassy

in 1952 at the request of a State Department official.

The Office

of Security in

State Department was contacted in an effort to

pin this down in a more specific manner.

We were told by State

that their records did not contain any information concerning

the microphone.

Subsequently, a letter was transmitted to all Legal

Attaches instructing them to be on the alert for technical

installations which may affect Bureau operations.

(Memorandum

L'Allier to Belmont, May 2, 1960, "Installation of Microphones

on U.S. Premises Abroad by CIA")

50.

JEK Act 6 (1) (B)

We received

information indicating that the subject

investigation,

had planned to defectl

intelligence erent and the sublect of a ret

permitted

a CIA representative to contact the subject in order

to orient him so that maximun propaganda effect would be derived

through newspaper publicity.

We were told that the clA repre-

sentative

Thad been instructed by his headquarter

to tell the

subject that he would not be prosecuted by the u.s.

Government. We complained to CIA

stressing that the Agency

bad no power or authority to promise tie subject immune t

(Memorandum

L'Allier to Belmont, September 30, 1960,

B)

6

(1) (B)

6 (1) (B)

51.

JEK Act 6 (1) (B).

Miss l

Ja CIA employee, obtained alz

position as a secretary in the Office of the Tunisian Delegation

to the United Nations SPrior to receiving this job, CiA checke

(S)

The Liaison Agent subsequently learned that

wath thad entormed the 150stans that sau vas leaving her tob

The Tunisians inquired if she could recommend somebody

(5) She

dave them the namé of another CIA employee, Miss.

(1) (B)

(B

Act

(1) (B

(1) 1B

The Liaison Agent informed CIA that the Agency was

out of

line by not first checking with the Bureau before recom-

mending l

I to [the Tunisians] that the Bureau was interested

- 11B

in. developing

intelligence information which might be useful

to the U.S. Government; and

that, in this instance, CIA was

obstructing. operations by not appropriately coordinating with

the Bureau.

(Memorandum L'Allier to Belmont, October 31, 1960,

JFK Act 6

(1)(B

19 -

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•Page 155*

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52.

CIA USE OF BUREAU INFORMATION IN

A U.S. INTELLIGENCE BOARD DOCUMENT

On March 30, 1961, the Liaison Agent contacted

Allen Dulles concerning CIA's failure to obtain Bureau clearance

for use of our information in a U.S. Intelligence Board document.

No known damage had been done, but the Agent stressed the sensi-

tivity of the Bureau information. Dulles requested one of his

subordinates to establish a procedure to prevent a recurrence

of such errors.

(Memorandum L'Allier to Belmont, March 30, 1961g

53 .

"SPY IN THE U.S." BOOK AUTHORED BY PAWEL MONAT

proofs of the book

"written by Pawel Monat.

A review of these proofs disclosed

several references which

portrayed our counterespionage capabilities in an unfavorable

light.

Since CIA was responsible for Monat and for any writing

which he might perform, the matter was discussed with CIA. It

turned out that CIA had

not been following the preparation of

the book.

We were told

that steps would be taken to protect

Burcau interest. The publishers had indicated to CIA that they

would cooperate on changes.

Although some changes were made,

the book still came out with some information which was not

entirely favorable to the Bureau. (Pawel Monat, Bureau file

105-40510)

54. CONFLICT WITH LEGAL ATTACHE, MEXICO CITY - 1961

On October 6, 1961, our Legal Attache, Mexico City,

received information indicating that the Czech Embassy in that

city was planning to protest harassment a its personnel br U.S.

• Intelligence.

The Legal Attache

was told by the

that the Agency was not involved. On October 12,

1961,

the

.. same CIA officer changed his position and admitted

that CIA had

been involved to a certain extent.

The Liaison Agent objected

to these tactics. It was important to him to know the facts

so he could be guided

accorcingly. (Memorandum L'Allier to

Sullivan, October 18,

1961, Czechoslovakian Diplomatic

Activities i

- Mexico ")?

1(0)

(u)

55. CIA TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES - 1961

When he defected in December, 1961,

JER

furnished information concerning alleged penetration of American

intelligence.

Inquiries and review conducted by CIA within the

Agency suggested that a CIA intelligence officer,!

JER AC

was a logical suspect.

We conferred with CIA and on February 9,

1962, we advised the Agency that we would take over the investi-

gation.

(5)

S

1) 1B

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On February 1, 1962, Colonel Sheffield Edwards,

Director of security, ClA, informed the Liaison Agent that

CIA was preparing a report containing extremely sensitive

information.

He stated that this information came from a

sensitive source and he was not certain as to how it should

be handled.

As a result of a discussion with Edwards on

February 26, 1962,

& technical

and than a ho in a can to do i to cha

over an extended period. S

EK Act 6 (1) (B)

source at an earlier date because he feared that prosecution

could have been jeopardized and, furthermore, he did not want

his Agency embarrassed in the event the Bureau objected to

CIA maintaining a capability such as technical surveillances.

It was made emphatically clear to Edwards that it was absolutely

necessary

that we be provided with all the details and, further-

more, that cla, at the outset, should have apprised us of the

existence of the coverage.

The Director made the notation,

"I only wish we would eventually realize CIA can never be

depended upon to deal forthrightly with us.

Certainly my

skepticism isn't based on prejudice nor suspicion, but on

specific instances of all too many in number.

Yet, there

exists wistful belief that the 'leopard has changed his

spots.'

H." (Memorandum Branigan to Sullivan February 27,

1962, Unknown Subject; iGs Agent inons as

'sasha"")

56.

JEK Act 6 (1) (BY

In February, 1962, the Liaison Agent was requested

to discuss with CIA a

case which, in our opinion, clearly

indicated CIA had failed to keep us appropriately informed

of developments.

The Bureau's original interest was initiated

in Miami as a result of a discussion with CIA

_Attempts to get CIA replies via correspondence were

negative. On February 13, 1962,

the Liaison Agent discussed

the matter with CIA and received a reply which did not adequately

satisfy the Bureau's request. (Memorandum Donahoe to Sullivan,

February 27, 1962

and Brennan to Sullivan, March 2, 1962; Bureau

11le (205-999471 (5)

57.

CIA WIRE TAPPING IN THE UNITED STATES

Act 6 (1) (B)

JEK Act 6 (1) (B)

Sometime prior to the Bay of Pigs fiasco, CIA had

become involved in a weird plan designed to bring about the

assassination of Fidel Castro.

One of the principal ingredients

of this plan was to be the utilization of U.S. hoodlums:

CIA

established contact with Robert Maheu, former Bureau Agent, who

served as the intermediary in dealings with the notorious

hoodlum, Sam Giancana.

RET

21

ra

уда

14 55036 DocId:32989616 Page 157

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The entire operation fell apart when we developed

information indicating that Maheu was behind a wire tapping

operation.

in Nevada.

Potentially, there were elements for

possible violation of unauthorized publication or use of

communications. However, prosecution was out of the question

because of the

tainted involvement of CIA.

(Arthur James Balletti,

"Unauthorized Publication or Use of Communications" and memo-

randum from the Director to Mr. Tolson, dated May 10, 1962)

58.

ALWIN ODIO TAMAYO IS

In October, 1962, we lodged a protest with CIA

because the Agency initiated operation of Cuban agents in the

Miami area and in so doing violated Bureau jurisdiction.

Arrangements were subsequently effected where the source in

the matter was turned over to the Bureau for handling..

(Memo-

randun Brennan to Sullivan, October 29, 1962,

"Alwin Odio

ramayo"') |(5)

59. [THELMA RING 5)

On April 23, 1963. ClA requested that the Bureau

establish coverage on

a visiting(Panamanian natlonal, Wex (V)

immediately instituted investigation and then determined that

CIA actually had been instrumental in supporting the subject's

trip to the United States.

CIA had been endeavoring to recruit

the subject.. On April 29, 1963, a strong protest was lodgec

with General Carter, Deputy Director of CIA.. (Memorandun

Brennan to Sullivan, April 26, 1963, ("Thelma Ring"'](S

60. ALLEGED ATTACK ON BUREAU BY JOHN MCCONE

ve received information in December, 1963, indicating

that John McCone, Director of CIA, allegedly was attacking the

Bureau in what would appear to be

a vicious and underhanded

manner. McCone allegedly informed Congressman Jerry Ford and

Drew Pearson that CIA had uncovered a plot in Mexico City

indicating that Lee Harvey Oswald had received $6,500 to

assassinate president Kennedy. The story attributed to McCone

appeared to be related to information which had come from one

Interrogation of

Alvarado, including a polygraph, disclosed that he had fabricated

his story.

This had been made known to CIA and to licCone.

There-

fore, if McCone had made the above statenents to Ford and

Pearson,

it would appear that it would have been an obvious attempt to

ridicule the Bureau.

The Liaison Agent contacted McCone on

December 23, 1963.

McCone vehemently denied the allegations.

(Memorandum

Brennan to Sullivan, December 23, 1963, "Relations

Hith CIA")

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61.

JURI NOSENKOJ (S)

The subject

contact

with cAn 4962 essent desire to cooperate. He

openly defected in L964Jagd he is currently in the United

States.

He has been the source

considerable controversy because of

questions raised pertaining to his bona fides.

Early in 1964J (5)

CIA took a very strong position indicating that Nosenko was

(5)

a plant.

furnish voluminous information.

It is possible that at some future date the issue of

bona fides will be conclusively resolved and the action taken

by the Bureau so far will have been justified. This is important

to be kept in mind as far as the future is concerne

If it is finally concluded that Wosenko is a bona

fide defector, CIA could be charged with gross mishandling of

the subject over a period of years. (Yuri Nosenko, Bureau file

[65-685301(5)

62. [JOSE RAFAEL SUAREZ-ARCOS (S

On April 13, 1964,

the Liaison Agent protested to

CIA because the Agency

had failed to notify the Bureau concerning

the past utilization of an individual as a double agent in an

operation directed against the soviets in Mexico The individual

In this case was serving as

fan Ecuadorian Consul

in Texastin 1964

and because CIA did not notify us concerning the past, our interest

could have been jeopardized, bearing in nind that the Ecuadorians

could have been in contact with the Soviets without our knowledge.

CIA had severed its relationship with the Ecuadorian prior to his

but ClA, nevertheless

(Memorandum

Brennan to Sullivan, April 7, 1964, "Jose Rafael Suarez-Arcos")(S

63. CIA COVERT ACTIVITY

- 1965 C

STCU

JEK Act 6 (1) (B)

' We received information in June, 1965, that certain

(Cuban exiles

I were representing

themselves Fas

(being with the "Department of National Security."

These exiles

had been interviewing Cuban refugees concerning political con-

ditions in Cuba.] We ascertained that this activity was being (U

performed in behalf of CIA,

@/W"

We protested, bearing in mind that the cover being used could

cause embarrassment to the United States and could impose a

problem for the Bureau because we would become the recipients

"23

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(s)

of impersonation complaints. CIA was requested to take immediate

steps to correct the undesirable situation. We were subsequently

informed by CIA that the credentials had been withdrawn and that

the cover would no longer be used. (Memorandum Brennan to Sullivan

nger credentials,

June 21,

64.

JFK Act 6

In August,

1965, both the Burean and CIA had an

interest in assessing

the potential utilization of the services

of

a Haitianfexile residing in the United States

We

were interested

in

because he potentially could furnishe

information concerning

Texiles in this country and the

(B)

Agency wanted to utilize him in overseas intelligence operations.

We informed CIA thate

would notbe made available to thers

Agency. CIA appealed and asked that we reconsider our position

because of the potentially high value of!

Jin the proposed

6 (1) (B)

CIA operation. While we were negotiating with CIA, we determined

that the Agency was already in contact with the subject and was

conferring with him.

We subsequently protested to the Agency

who claimed that it had not been out of line in contacting kAil

1 (B)

because the Agency had maintained a relationship with him in the

past.

to Sullivan, September 2, 1965,

ve ala nor recepi this elantion Men Dear

JEK Act 6 (1) (B)

65. INSECURE HANDLING OF

INFORMATION E

JEK Act 6 (1) (B)

In Burmal that the newly designated Soviet Military Attache inf

15 RangoonThad cooperated with the FBI prior to leaving the United

States in 1962 and that he had remained in contact following&

his return to Moscow. This all pertained to a sensitive Bureau

source who had been transferred by the Soviet Government from

Moscow to the Soviet Embassy in Burma. By letter dated December

11965,] we made a strong protest to CIA™

charging that Agency withs

violating an understanding relative to

Admiral Raborn, then Director of CIA,

telephonically contacted

the Director, made reference to our communication, acknowledged

that his man had been out of line,

but did express concern

that the Bureau's displeasure had

been placed in writing.

The

Director made it crystal clear that he was not happy with the

unauthorized action taken by CIA and instructed that

no further

operational activity be taken with regard tol

until wel

determined what CIA planned to do concerning

the matter.

(Memorandum Brennan

to Sullivan, december 2, L1965,

JEK ACt

66

In arch,

196S. CIA requested coverage on a visiting

official of

I'Covernment because of information developea

the Agency indicating that

was working for the KGB

-24

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600014.32989616 Page -149----

(B

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## Page 161

(S)

¡ SEGREI

Instructions were sent to the field and we then learned in

New York City that CIA allegedly planned to make a recruitment

approach. The matter was taken up with CIA headquarters and

a protest was made because of the wide discrepancy in the

reports we received on CIA

Sullivan, April 18, 1966,

intentions.

(Memorandum Brennan

to

5

JFK Act 6 (1) (B)

67. PASSING OF BUREAU DOCUMENTS TO

SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD BY CIA EMPLOYEE - 1966

In September, 1966, we developed information indicating

that copies of FBI documents had been passed to Senator Byrd by

CIA. The matter was discussed with the Director of CIA and the

Agency subsequently conducted an investigation and established

that one of its employees, L

Thad submitted 5111(B)

a name check request to the Bureau concerning one

Ralph D. Fertig](5)

who was the subject of the material in question.

At that

time

had a responsibility of handling name check requests fört

6 (1) (B)

He admitted that

the cuff basis" for another CIA employee named[

It is my recollection that one us juiù CiA employees

were subsequently

fired

'or asked to resign. (Memorandum

Brennan to Sullivan, September 21, 1966,

"Leak of FBI Documents

Concerning Ralph D. Fertig to

Senator Robert C. Byrd")

68.

ALLEGED COMPROMISE OF BUREAU DOUBLE AGENT

(o)

LIn March, 1967, we protested to CIA

with a matter relating to our mutual

interest in a chemists

connected with schering corporation

in Newark, New Jersey!

Ne were utilizing the chemist as a double agent in an operation

directed against the Soviets.is,

ship with the same person for the purpose of acquiring positive

intelligence relating to the field of antibiotics. (sOur Newark/*(v)

withou rectorization compromised us celationship wite he

without authorization, compromised

S chemist by discussing

the matter with the president of thels. (v)

firIl.

(Memorandum Sullivan to DeLoach, March 15, 1967,

"NK 2264-S, IS - R''](S)

69.

J(5)

In July, 1967, we protested to CIA in a case where

the Agency allegedly had

failed to report to us concerning a

communication which a Cuban exile,

residing in the United States,

had received from the Cuban Intelligence Service.

The particular

communication had instructed the exile to initiate preparations

JFK Act 6 (1) (B)

# 55036 DocIds32989616 Page 161

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for the handling of an intelligence assignment in the United

States. CIA claimed that the exile had been reluctant to

operate in this country and CIA then instructed him not to

respond to the communication received from Cuba.

We took the

position that despite this reluctance on the part of the exile,

the Bureau had been entitled to have had the opportunity to

make its own assessment. (memorandum Brennan to sullivan,

July 20, 1967,

IS - Cuba")

"(5)

70. CIA AND ITS INVOLVEMENT IN LEGISLATION

DEALING WITH THE "ERVIN BILL"

Act 6 (11 (B)

On June 5, 1969, information was received indicating

that Richard Helms had sent Senator Sam Ervin three proposed

amendments to the legislation being proposed by the Senator, .

all dealing with the protection of the constitutional rights

of Government employees. We had been following developments

relating to this proposed legislation because the provisions

had a very definite bearing on Bureau operations. The proposed

amendments made by Helms included exemptions from certain

provisions of the Bill for FBI, CIA, and the National Security

Agency:

These amendments. were

suggested by CIA without prior

consultation with the Bureau.

The

Director made the notation,

"This presumptuous action of Helms' is astounding." (M. A. Jones

to Bishop memorandum, June 6, 1969, "S. 782; Protection of

Constitutional Rights of Government Employees to Prevent

Unwarranted Invasion of Their Privacy')

71.. CIA COVERAGE OF BUREAU LEADS

Historically, CIA's coverage of Bureau leads had

been decidedly spotty from the standpoint of delivering

satisfactory content and servicing the leads within a reasonable

period of time.

It would be necessary to review hundreds, if

not thousands, of files to document what we consider delays in

following our

leads.

It should be noted that CIA, organizationally,

has never maintained an atmosphere of discipline in any way

comparable to that of the Bureau. Matters are not followed

as promptly and responsibility is not firmly fixed. This

evaluation is made in light of standards followed by the Bureau.

He continually prod and push CIA for responses. To develop all

of the evidence to explain these delays would require an inspection

of CIA operations. CIA has given the following types of responses:

hazards of adverse operating conditions in backward countries;

limited personnel; undue exposure to hostile intelligence, police,

and

security services; pressures placed on the Agency on priority

striat

- 26 -

HH 55036 • DocId:32989616 Page 162

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targets quite öften dealing with political crises

in foreign

countries.

Although CIA has not ventured to emphasize the

point, it

is believed that in many instances it has not pro-

duced

satisfactorily and

efficiently because of the absence

of reliable sources.

72. LACK OF PROPER ORIENTATION OF BUREAU

RESPONSIBILITIES AND JURISDICTION

Although there has been decided improvement in

recent years, the Liaison Agent continues to note a definite

lack of knowledge of FBI responsibilities and jurisdiction on

the part of CIA employees.

They do receive some training in

this regard, but the impression is left that such training

could be much more extensive.

lectured to hundreds of CIA employees in the last few years

and this has produced significant signs of concrete benefits.

CIA employees encountered the Liaison Agent on a very regular

basis and asked questions pertaining to our responsibilities.

Nevertheless, there is room for much improvement.

73. CIA POLICY REGARDING DISSEMINATION TO OUR LEGAL ATTACHES

There has been a sore spot in connection with CIA

policy relating to its dissemination of informationat a local

level in our embassies.

/ This policy allegedly has applied tolstU

all other agencies and includes our Legal Attaches. CiA has

maintained

that unless

the information it develops

or receives

is in the immediate jurisdiction of a particular agency, it

will only disseminate at the Seat of Government. As an

example,

if CIA received information concerning the existence of a U.s.

criminal fugitive in a foreign country, it would disseminate

to the Legal Attache.

However, if the information falls within

the area of intelligence, which includes subversive activities,

the Agency has stated that under its system the information is

considered

to be "raw material" and that it must be evaluated

at headquarters and reviewed in the context of what has been

received from other countries, and then disseminated to inter-

ested customers.

We have not raised an issue, but dissemination

regarding political conditions in a country where the Legal

Attache is assigned could be useful because it would further

orient him in his dealings with foreign officials.

There have

been exceptions where the CIA chief in an area, on his own

initiative,] has given such information to our Legal Attache

After CIA disseminates at headquarters, we are in a position

'communicate the information to our Legal Attaches.

This

helps, but it would be much more convenient

for the Legal

Attache to receive itfat the local level.]

(V)

"?:

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## Page 164

receive information regarding a subject, such as an alleged

spy traveling to the United States, or the case abroad

simply-has ramifications in this country. In these instances,

CIA has followed a definite pattern over the years of not

furnishing such information to the Legal Attache, but

disseminating to us at Seat

of Government. Here

again, CIA

has maintained that its headquarters must review the data and

make the decision regarding dissemination. We have not raised

an issue.

We could by claiming that the Legal Attache could

be useful in evaluating the case and being in a position to

follow Bureau interests as soon as possible. However, if

we

pushed for a change in current conditions, we should consider

that the Legal Attaches possibly could inherit responsibilities

abroad which might present risks or operational headaches.

mechanism

For several years there existed a coordinating

In Germany headed by CIA.

This was a committee

headed by the Agency and composed

of representatives of other

U.S. agencies.

The committee reviewed espionage and counter-

espionage developments in Germany which had a bearing on U.s.

interests.

If a problem of operational jurisdiction arose

among the U.S. agencies, the committee mechanism was used to

establish an agreed-to operating agreement.

responsibilities were divided among the different agencies.

It is my

recollection that the Bureau has not been interested

In becoming a part of such a committee. If we did, we could

end up.

with responsibilities not entirely agreeable to us.

74. SOME PAST HISTORY WHICH IS VERY RELEVANT

When evaluating our relationship with CIA, including

our grievances, it is believed that we cannot overlook the

relevancy of the serious differences we experienced with the

Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during World War II. The

seeds leading to the establishment of CIA came from OSS. William

Donovan, who was the head of OSS, has been referred to as the

"Father of CIA."

There were instances when OSS blatantly ignored FBI

jurisdiction and failed to coordinate on numerous matters:

There

wassa number of CIA officials who obviously had a definite dislike

for the Bureau.

The loose administration of OSS, its employment

of known subversives, its alleged penetration by the Soviets,

and its attitude toward the Russian Government at the time posed

serious problems to the Bureau, At one point OSS was actually

giving serious consideration to establishing liaison with the

- 28 -

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SEGRET

NKVD.

Because a substantial number of OSS officials subsequently

became important figures

within ClA, it would be logical to

assume that the tBt was justilled in being most prudent, it not

circumspect, in dealings with the Agency.

When evaluating its position in 1970, the Bureau

rightfully cannot forget the troubles

with OSS.

At the same

time, it would be most unwise if we neglected to examine the

played by the Bureau when we disbanded our SIS operations

in 1947.

In a matter of hours, we destroyed hundreds of files

in our SIS offices abroad, and

we did not turn over to CIA a

large number of sources and informants.

There have been many

ex-Agents who had been connected with SIS, who were familiar.

with the file destruction operation, and who later became

•connected with CIA. It is possible

that the Agency could

argue that the actions by the Bureau were detrimental to U.S.

interests and impaired CIA's

early efforts

to establish desired

coverage in Latin America.

29 -

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70

TRỌM

SUBJECT:

Classified by

Exempt from

ADS

Shtegory_ 2

Date of Depassis ation Ind ofinite

55036

ROUTE

IN ENVELUEL

ORIGINI DORM 10, 10

MAY HI EDITICH

«ó! SEM. AEG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum:

: Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE:

March 30, 1970

W: E. Sullivan

RELATIONS WITH CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

DECLASSTFIED BE: 5660-SLD GCL

4/2/18(2FK)

Reference my memorandum 3/25/70 concerning letter 3/20/70

from CIA Director Helms. In letter, Helms expresses full agreement

with Director's view that intelligence collection efforts of FBI and CIA

must be closely coordinated and that periodic reappraisal of such efforts

is required. He has invited Director's desires as to how such reassessments

can be best conducted. He refers to 1966 conference between Bureau and

CIA representatives, which resulted in agreement covering certain phases of

intelligence coliection, and suggests additional discussions at this time.

Heims has listed nine specific areas for possible discussion at

conference between Bureau and CIA. He states he would sincerely weicome

Director's observations on his proposed agenda. Specific items listed by

Helms are set forth hereinafter together with my observations.

1. Electronic Surveillance Coverage (Elsurs)

Helms notes Bureau has been receptive in past to requests for

this type coverage and has capability and experience in this field which cannot

be duplicated by any other U.S. agency. Helms refers to October, 1969,

whom had KGB connections. Bureau advised CIA at that time that it should

CIA request for elsur coverage of two Indian nationals visiting U.S., one off

refer such requests directly to Attorney General (AG) for approval. Helms

suggests question of such coverage be reopened between FBI and CIA

representatives, adding that this coverag helluld be rigidly controllec.

Comment: We have always been highly selective in our use of

elsurs, particularly during recent years in view of sensitive nature of this

type coverage, legal considerations, and manpower commitments. CLA

which has no prosecutive responsibilities may not understand the Bureau's

position in this matter or need for great selectivity but I do not feel Director

FBI in this field may have merit and when CIA can first clearly justify requests

• MAY 6 1970

Enclosure

1 - Mr. DeLoach

Sullivan

DocIr

N29a99102 Page 166

VR-I

CONTINUED - OVER

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SI

Memorandum for Mr. DeLoach

RE. RELATIONS WITH CIA

*:.

:.di

:.""

It ins

;...

for this type coverage to the AG; if the Director wishes we could consider

handling actual installationson a highly selective basis as we carrently do

with respect to meritorious requests by State Department.

Each one; of

course, would be judged on its own merits. But, there should be no change in

our October, 1969, position that CIA must first get approval for such coverage

from AG.

Mail Coverage. ori

Helms cites importance of this as intelligence tool, which has

been proven in past. He has impression it has been discontinued and suggests

FBI-CIA representatives confer to determine whether such coverage could be

used with regard to investigations of Soviet bloc, New Left, and foreign agents.

Comment: In line with Director's instructions, we have discontinued

this coverage in recent years. We know that other Federal agencies, including

Army and CIA, utilize this tyne coverage frequently and often with success

such as we experienced ourselves in the past. Both Army and ClA regularly

make available to us results of their coverage abroad concerning individuals

of interest to Bureau. This type coverage is sensitive and Helms has not

spelled out specifically what CIA may have in mind here. This type coverage

is too sensitive.to.be discussed in.written correspondence. I recommend

Let serie

that we seek further information in direct discussions with CIA before

deciding on our course of action. Of course no commitments of any kind

will be made and all issues raised will be referred to the Director for a

decision.

listenin d

3. CIA Technical Services

Helms calls attention to recent technical and scientific equipment

recently developed by CIA in the counterintelligence field (specialized TV

equipment, laser beam devices, etc.). He indicates willingness to share

such equipment and devélopments with Bureau and indicates he would welcome

suggestions as to how such equipment can be better employed.

Comment: While it is not likely CIA has developed equipment of

this type which is not already known to FBI Laboratory and while some of

equipment to which Helms alludes may have no applicability to our needs, I

do not believe we have anything to lose by exploring this on a selective basis.

Qualified personnel from FBI Laboratory could confer with appropriate CIA

representatives to insure we have benefit of any recent scientific advances

realized by CIA.

SEC

- 2 -

• CONTINUED - OVER

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Page

167

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SE

Memorandum for Mr. DeLoach

RE: RELATIONS WITH-CIA:

*. Courses in Positive Intelligence Requirements and Reporting

Heirs offers to make available to us training courses in positive

intelligence for purpose of discussing in depth theneeds of the intelligence

community, including CIA.

Comment: I see no need for this at this time. We have a nighly

effective and comprehensive. training program fonour Agents in security worker

and I see no necessity for training lectures by CIA personnel. We regularly

receive from CIA copies of the Current Intelligence Reporting List which out-

lines priorities and requirements of other U.S. intelligence agencies in particu-

lar areas of positive intelligence. These Lists are reviewed by appropriate

supervisors at SOG and are then furnished on regular basis to interested field

oinces. I any new developments occur in this field, we can always reconsider

if wewish. But as stated there is no need at this time.

5. Seminars on Opposition Services

Helms suggests thai FBI and CIA specialists concerning hostile

intelligence services meet as needed to keep abreast of new developments

and patterns on part of hostile intelligence agencies. He feels such

discussions should provide an opportunity to possibly devise new means to

penetrate or neutralize enemy forces.

Comment: I do not believe there is any need for conferences of

I type referred to by Helms except on an infrequent basis. Of course, where

special circumstances warrant and provided such conferences are tightly

controlled by Bureau and specifically approved by Director there would be

no reason to object to them per se.

6. Live Bloc Sources

Helms refers-to prior cooperation between FBI and CIA in handling

of communist bloc defectors and penetration agents but expresses belief there

is room for improvement in establishing more uniform exploitation of these

sources. He invites Director's suggestions for better coordination and evalua-

tion of live source information.

Comment: Our 1966 conferences and agreement with CIA were

largely concerned with coordination and handling of live sources. This agree-

ment has proven effective as Helms agrees. I am not aware of any need for

modifying the 1966 understanding but this is an area which is quite sensitive and

Helms has not spelled out what he may have in mind. I feel we should listen

to any proposals CIA may have to offer on this point in direct discussions with

their representatives. Again, no commitments would be made and any proposa:s

WH 55036901tS5a68tae 4e the Director for a decision. CONTINUED - OVERUEGREI

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## Page 169

SEORET

^??:.

•iir: : R$:

Memorandum for Vr. DeLoach

RELATIONS WITH CIA

i ? ° o.

7. Live Sources in Non-Bloc Area

Helms points out diplomatic'sources in this area, especially

critical Middle East and Latin-American fields, could provide much needed

intelligence. He urges the full potential of this area be explored by repre-

sentatives of both agencies.

4.200272310

*comment. This is very similar to previous point (6) and again

Comment:

involves 1966 agreement. I think our approach should be the same; namely,

while we are not aware of any problems in this area we could listen to any

proposals CIA has to make and, of course, we would refer them to the Director

prior to taking any action.

8. New Left and Racial Matters

Helms notes that there is already a substantial exchange of infor-

maiiun in tis area and ciico ciooe connoctons botweer supversive elemenis

in U.S. and abroad. He suggests we consider how we can best employ our

respective manpower to meet this threat which is international in scope.

Comment: We have carefully reviewed this situation and feelCLA

could definitely provide more information concerning activities of New Left

and black extremists while traveling abroad and additional data concerning

foreign funding or support of subversive activities in U.S. We furnish a

greal deal of information to CIA regarding foreign aspects of the extremist

movement developed through our investigations. As to manpower commitments:

our own use of manpower is, of course, under constant review. There are

heavy manpower demands on EBI in a hosi of areas (organized crime, civil

rights, applicant investigations, eic.) outside the security field. I would be

definitely opposed to any discussions with CIA involving the allocation of manpone.

by either agency. This is a matter for each agency to decide in its own best

interests and juagment..

out. R

9. Relations With Domestic Field Offices and Legal Attaches

Helms expresses belief there are no serious conflicts in this area

but there may be room to improve quality of liaison so as to expand intelli-

gence collection efforts, particularly in view of changing concitions both here

and abroad.

Comment: As indicated, Helms does not perceive any serious pro-

Dlems in this area either in U.S. or abroad. Our policy has aiways been that

any matters of substance involving liaison with CIA or other agencies must be

SECRET

CONTINUED - OVER

HH 55036

• DocId: 32989616

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--- 4.

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SEC

Memorandum for Mr. DeLoach

RE: RELATIONS WITH CLA

handled at headquarters levei. " To do otherwise could result in loose adminis-

trative control. I feel that we should adhere strictly to our long-standing policy

in this connection and I see no need for discussions with CIA on this issue.

RECOMMENDED REPLY TO HELMS:

I do not believe the Director should seek to furnish detailed

observations regarding the Bureau's position on the various matters suggested

i-by Helms. Many of them are quite sensitivé and complex and there is nothing:

to be gained by spelling out the Director's views in.writing on such matters.

Accordingly, I recommend that a general reply be sent to Helms indicating

our willingness to meet with CIA representatives for direct discussions on

those points which merit further elaboration or where we might at least be

willing to listen to any CIA proposals.

Bearing in mind specific observations set forth above, I think

our reply to Helms should show we are amenable to direct conferences with

ICIA on certain of these issues but we should indicate_we see nothing to be

gained by discissions at this time with regard to the following:

(4) Courses in Positive Intelligence Requirements and Reporting;

(5) Seminars on Opposition Services; (8) New Left and Racial Matters;

and (9) Relations With Domestic Field Offices and Legal Attaches. With

regard to the other points, any discussions with CIA would be strictly within

current policies laid down by the Director and no commitments would be

made by Bureau representatives. All matters requiring a decision which

might arise woula be referred to the Director for a decision.

If the Director desires, Inspector D. E. Moore and myself wouid

represent the Bureau in such meetings with CIA representatives. On a

selective basis, other officials of Domestic Intelligence Division could be

asked to join me as required.

ACTION:

Attached for the Director's approval is a letter to Helms in line

with the foregoing observations.

SECRET.

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MAILED

corriers

MAR 3 1 1970

Tolsan

DeLoach

Walters

Mohr -

Bishop

Casper

Callah ca

Conrad.

Felt

Gale

Rosen

Sullivan

Tavel -

Soyars

Tele. Room

Holmes

I - Mr. DeLoach

1 - Mr. Sullivan

I - Mr. Confad

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

KEE 822-80750-44794

March 31, 1970

BY COURIER SERVICE

Honorable Richard Helms

Director

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D. C..

DECTASSIFTED BY 5662-SLDIGEL

ON 2 9/98

Dear Mr. Helms:

I have carefully reviewed your letter of March 20 setting

out your observations with respect to various matters of mutual interest.

I certainly appreciate your kind comments concerning me and i share

your convictions as to the need for close coorcination of our intelligence

collection activities in behalf of the national security.

•Your letter suggested nine particular areas which might be

the subject of further discussions aimed at improving the coordination of

our operations. A number of these topics are highly sensitive and complex

and I will therefore make no effort here to set forth my views in detail.

However, in response to your letter and as a prelude to any direct discus-

sions on these matters, certain observations on my part may be appropriate.

With regard to electronic surveillance and mail coverage,

there is no question as to the frequent value of such operations in develop-

ing needed intelligence. On the other hand, the use of these measures in

domestic investigations poses a number of problems which may not be

encountered in similar operations abroad.

There is widespread concern

by the American public regarding the possible misuse of this type coverage.

Moreover, various legal considerations must be borne in mind,

inclucing

the impact such coverage may have on our numerous prosecutive responsi-

bilities. The FBI's effectiveness has always depended in large measure on

• out capacity to retain the fuil, confidence of the American people. The use

of any investigative measures which infringe on traditional rights of privacy

must theretore be scrutinized most carelully. Within this tramework. however,

I would be willing to consider any proposals your Agency mayake

"SECRET 62-8075D, MAY

1970

WCS: mea (5)

Grgup 1

see note, page 3

Excluded from automatic

downgrading and

TELETYPE UNITL

declassification

Page

171

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## Page 172

SEORET

Honorable Richard Helms

Your offer to make available certain technical equipment

developed by the Agency is most welcome and I fully reciprocate your

willingness to cooperate in the exchange of relevant scientific data.

I am prepared to designate appropriate representatives of the FBI

Laboratory to meet with CIA technical personnel at any mutually

convenient time.

With respect to the inclusion of positive intelligence courses

in our training curricula, I am sure you will recognize that our training

programs must be designed primarily to fulfill our own widespread and

demanding responsibilities. While I appreciate your offer, I do not

feel it would be feasible at this time to include the proposed courses

in our training schedules. I would certainly have no objection to the

holding of seminars between specialists of our two agencies in selective

areas of interest when justified by specific circumstances.

Concerning the coordination of FBI-CIA activities in the

exploitation of live sources, both in the communist bloc field and with regard

to key nonbloc establishments, I am not aware of any significant problems.

The 1966 agreement between our agencies was concerned directly with this

question and I have no changes to suggest in the ground rules at this time.

However, in the event your Agency has some specific proposals to make,

I would welcome hearing further from you in this connection.

There is already a considerable exchange of information

between our agencies concerning New Left and racial extremist matters.

Frequently, as you nave pointed out, there have been substantial connections

petween subversive and extremist elements in the United States and their

counterparts abroad. We will continue to furnish your Agency information

being developed by the Bureau which might have a bearing on your

intelligence requirements. At the same time, we are definitely in need of

additional information from your Agency as to the foreign aspects of the

extremist movement in the United States, including foreign funding and

support of local extremist organizations. While I do not believe there is

any neea for detailed discussions on this point, if you have any specific

suggestions to make we would be pleased to consider them.

* -2-

SEX

ET

HH 55036 DocId:32989616 Page 172

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SECRET

Honorable Richard Helms

Similarly, I am not aware of any major problems which exist

at this time in connection with the coordination of our field liaison

operations. it has been my long-standing policy that serious questions

affecting the coordination of our activities with other Government

agencies should be handled and controlled at a headquarters level in

order to avoid administrative confusion and misunderstanding.

In line with my letter of March ll and the observations

contained in your letter of March 20, I will in the immediate future

• designate appropriate officials of the Bureau to meet with your representatives

for detailed discussions of these matters. It is my earnest hope that such

conferences will lead to a sharpened understanding of the responsibilities

and objectives of our respective agencies and will serve to promote more

effective cooperation in our joint commitment to the national intelligence

needs.

.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

NOTE:

See memo Sullivan to DeLoach 3/30/70 captioned "Relations

With CIA" prepared by WCS:mea.

'*.

SECRET

"HW 55036 DocId:32989616

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## Page 174

TO

FROM

SUBJECT

OFFLENAL PORN NO. 15

NO. 39

UNITED STATES GOVE

Memorandum

Mr. C. D. DeLoach

10149169

WENT SECA

W. C. Sullivan

1 - Mi. DeLoac

1 - Mr. Sullivan

1 - Mr. Conrad

DATE:

April 14, 1970

48-510654

DECLASSTFILD BY

01 4-2-28

LEEK

RELATIONS WITH CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

Reference my memorandum 3/30/70 summarizing proposals of

CIA Director Helms regarding FBI-CIA coordination in intelligence collection

actvities. Director approved meetings between CIA and Bureau representa-

tives to further explore these matters.

On afternoon of 4/13/70, Inspector D, E. Moore and myself met

briefly with Mr. James Angleton,

Chief, Counterintelligence Staff, CIA,

and Mir. W. Scott Miler of his staff. This session was strictly exploratory

in nature and was aimed at defining the scope and limitations of our

.. discussions with CIA on the points in question. Angleton noted that CIA

Director Heims will be closey fullowing ine vittome of thest dscuscions

and is personally interested in resolving any current problems in this ared.

Mr. Angleton indicated that C A would like to direct initial attention

to two of the items cited by Helms, namely, the question of audio (electronic

surveillance) coverage and the suggestion that FBI and CIA specialists in the

¿ communist bloc field hold periodic seminars to coordinate our information.

The Bureau's position regarding electronic surveillance coverage, as

outlined in the Director's letter to Helms of 3/31/70, was reitereated with

emphasis upon the problems such coverage often pose with regard to

prosecution as well as adverse public reaction to this type coverage.

I made the point that the Bureau has not received the necessary

support in this area from responsible quarters; that in the past the Bureau

had a substantial amount of coverage of this type in the interest of both our

own counterintelligence responsibilities as well as the national security

interest but that we have had to retrench in recent years largely as a result

of the lack of support for such operations.

Angleton noted that in response to CIA's request for electronic

coverage of two Indian nationals who were suspected KGB agents in the Fall

ot 1969, the Bureau had requested that the tate in saitex up with the

WCS: mea

(4)

5'7 APR 24 1970

поста

SEGRET

---

## Page 175

SECRET

'Memorandum for Mr. DeLoach

RE:

RELATIONS WITH CLA

."..'

Attorney General. He said that CIA has been giving the question of

approaching the Attorney General considerable thought but this would

involve a whole new set of procedures and policy considerations which

would have to be carefully

considered. Angleton said that his staif was in

the process of drawing up a proposal on this point for Mr. Helms to

consider and that they would probably have something specific for the

Bureau to consider at a subsequent meeting.

Concerning the proposed seminar, in line with the Director's

Jetter to Helms 3/31/70, I pointed out that we would certainly have no

objection to such conferences where the occasion justified them. From

Angleton's remarks, it appears that CIA is primarily interested here in the

Soviet field and would like to furnish the Bureau with details of an extensive

research project CIA has undertaken in recent years to corelate all available

source information regarding known Soviet intelligence agents. This

(apparently would not involve any commitment by the Bureau and would represent

essentially an opportunity for us to see what CIA has done in this field and

now ii migi it in will any curient bureau intonest.

When Cle gunmite any

| firm proposals in this regard, we will submit specific recommendations.

Angleton said that CIA would be in touch with us when they have

1 firmed up various proposals and at that time Inspector Moore and myself

will meet with them again as required. The Director, of course, will be

kept fully informed and no commitments will be made without his prior

approval.

ACTION:

For information.

Wher

SECRET

- 2-

HH 55036 DocId:32989616 Page i75

---

## Page 176

EXCISED VERSION OF 38 MEMORANDA

• BEING

HELD AT FBIHQ FOR REVIEW BY SSC.

AZI FOR TO COME 6

HEREIN IS UNCLASSITIED

DATE - 4-01 Bx 58-2 ALm /HAG

WH 55036

DocId: 32989616

Page 176

---

## Page 177

GRA GEN. DIG. NO. 2T

•UNITED STATES & 'T

NMENT

Memorantim

TO

: Mr. DeLoach

DATE: farch 9, 1970

FROM : W. C. Sullival

SECREA

SUBJECT:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

DECTASSTTIED BY 566-8 SLD/ECL

ĐAL 2/61.98

Reference is made to the memorandum W. C. Sullivan

to C. D. DeLoach dated 3/5/70; captioned as above.

At that

time the Director was advised this Division vould make an

analysis of each situation cited in the memorandum of

Special Agent sam J. Papich relative to grievances which CIA

might hold in connection with relations with the fBI.

Enclosed will be found an analysis of 38 items

(« are contained in one memorandum, making a total of 37

memoranda), In substance our analysis does not show any

real reason why CIA would raise any issue in connection with

37 out of the 38 items.

The recommended action in each of

these cases would logicaliy ciuse the nuttor. In che memorandum

the 37th item saad, it is recommended that a carefully worded

letter to CIA outlining policy and the basic elements of

intelligence and counterintelligence work affecting the

United States be sent. to that Agency. The purpose of this is

to protect the Bureau by giving ClA a tiance to make any

comments, if it has any, in regard to tie current utilization

pf sources and facilities affecting both CIA and the Bureau.

If CIA replies that it is satisfied witt the current intelli-

gence conditions in this area, ve will aut this particular

matter to rest and we will have their letter in the file.

This Division will take any and all steps to comply.

with the Director's wishes in this matter and in any other

concerning which this Division is involved.

RECOMMENDATION:

For the information of the Director.

Pretailsame?

Classified by 628

Date of Declagatica

Seeepery 283

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

NH 55036 DосId:32989616 Page 177

---

## Page 178

GãÀ CAN. 11G NO 81

UNITED STATES (o

•VERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

: Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: March 6, 1970

FROM : Mr. V. C. Sullivan

DRAST IS PLAINTE

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

03412-0

MOCASE (THE BORIS MORROS CASE)

Item number one in the material

submitted to the

Director by Special Agent (SA) Sam Papich in his memorandum

3/5/70 discusses the case of Boris Morros (Mocase) •

BACKGROUND OF CASE

Boris Morros, a Hollywood motion picture

producer,

was recruited by Soviet intelligence in 135. fron

1947 to 1957 he was operated as

a double agent by the FBI.

This

was an extrenely sensitive counterintelligence operation involving

Soviet intelligence activities in the United States in which

MorTos traveled

behind the

Iron Curtain for meetings with his

Soviet principals.

Information obtained by Morros from his Soviet contacts

was disseminated to interested agencies,

including the Central

Intelligence Agency.

On January 25, 1957, Jack Soble, Myra Soble,

and Jacob Albam were arrested in New York

on charges of conspiracy

to commit

espionage against the United states.

PROBLEN WITH CIA

On March 16, 1954, the Bureau disseminated

infornation received from Boris Morros to heads of the various

intelligence agencies, including, CIA.

By letter of Narch 27, 1954,

Lieutenant General C.. P. Cabell, Acting Director of CIA,

criticized the information and, in effect,

characterized it as

NION

"fabrication or, the product of

a paper mill," which conclusion

Cabell stated had been applied to many similar disseminations in

FERDIN IS UN

WERE SHOW

purpose would be served in making any future dissemination to

CIA of information received from this source.

On April 9, 1954, Mr. Allen Dulles, then Director of

CIA, advised Liaison

Agent Papich that he had been looking into the

matter and there was no question in his mind but that his agency

had acted stupidly in transmitting such a letter to the Bureau.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

BET

CONTINUED • OVER

AH 55036

DocId: 32989616 Page 178

---

## Page 179

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach

RE:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

By letter of April

21

L1954, Mr. Dulles stated that

CIA would appreciate it if the Bureau would kindly continue

to send reports from the source (Morros) which relate

to matters of foreign intelligence.

By letter of April 29, 1954,

the Director expressed the opinion that no useful purpose

would be served by disseminating to CIA information received

from the source in the future.

Nevertheless, memorandum

to MaMA dated

by National Security Council Directivto be furnished to CIA,

it should be carefully evaluated, and a decision made at that

time

as to the officials and agencies

of the Government to whom it

should be disseminated. The Director noted "OK but before anything

goes to CIA from this source I want to pass on it.

This

restriction does not apply to dissemination to other agencies. H"

Subsequent to the foregoing three disseminations were

made to interested agencies, including CIA, based on information

from borros during October and December, 1954, and appropriate

dissemination was made thereafter with the Director's approval.

As the time grew near for prosecutive action, the

Department requested the Bureau to check with CIA to see if

Department attorneys could interview a Soviet intelligenée

defector then in custody of CIA named

IAME

AccordIngly, the Director authorized an oral briefing of Mr. Dulles

and on 1/8/57 he and

FAME

I of his staff were generally

briefed on the Mocase and the

contemplated prosecution.

They were

furnished with background data concerning subjects residing in

CIA was requested to search

the names of individuals involved in the case and was

asked regarding identities of CIA employees who might have

information of pertinence concerning the NAME

On March 4, 1957;

NAME

informed the liaison

agent of resentment on the

based upon the following:

part of CIA employees and officials

- 2 -

CONTINUED - OVER

NW 55036 DöcId:32989616 _ Paye 179

---

## Page 180

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach

RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

(1) CIA feels it should have been advised much

earlier concerning those aspects of the case relating to

CIA employees.

(2) Leads were, given to CIA. at the same time the

case was

publicized and, therefore, CIA was handicapped.

(3) The failure to coordinate the French aspects

of the case with CIA permitted the French intelligence

agencies to play a dominant role in the European

investigation.

(1) CIA fears the Bureau had not told it all there

was to know about the case that CIA should have known.

DISPOSAL OF PROBLEM WITH CIA

The Bureau took the position

that any necessary investigation looking 'toward prosecution

in countries where Bureau had a Legal Attache would be

referred by the Legal Attache to the appropriate investigative

agency of that country. In those countries where the Bureau

did not have a Legal Attache, request for investigation would

be channelled through CIA.

Because the NAME

were in

France, the interrogation of the NAME

was handled by

request from the Legal Attache

to the French.

NAME

during World War II had been with the

Office of Strategic Services and had contacts later with CIA

personnel. Prior to decision on prosecution we did not

disseminate information regarding the NAME

because we

feared the effects of compromise from possible leaks would

endanger the life of our source.

This was particularly true

in view of CIA's expressed attitude in 1954. Some leads had

been given to CIA over two weeks before the arrests of the

subjects in the United States. •Leads were not given earlier

because of the fear of possible compromise. As far as

coordinating the french aspects of the case were concerned,

it is doubted that CIA could have exerted any control over

the

French investigation after the French had the information.

There was a distinct difference in this case between

intelligence information and evidence in support of prosecutive

action.

- 3 - CONTINUED - OVER

HH 55036 DocId:32989616 Page 180

---

## Page 181

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. Deloach

RE:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

Recently the FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

has made some inquiries relating to Boris Morros

indicating the FoREIGN may now believe Morros vas either

known to the Soviets as our agent or was under their control.

It is not known if the FoREIGN have discussed this matter

with CIA:

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

set forth, that if do not believe, in light os the facts

will make

an isste of this matter.

...

NH 55036 DooId:32989616 Page 181

---

## Page 182

TO

MAT IPO? PORTION

9010-106.

GSA GEN. XIG. NO. 21

UNITED STATES GO

ERNMENT

Memorandum

: Mr. C. D. DeLoach

FROM : W. C.. Sullivan:

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

DATE: 3/9/70

DECLASSIFIED BY SR-ZILM FLI

1-10-01 :

Item number two in the material submitted to the

Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum dated 3/5/70

SENSITIVE

• ONGOING OPERATION

..s.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure

Subiect to Criminal Sanctiong

St

WH 55036 DocId: 32989616 Page 182

---

## Page 183

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach

RE:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None: We do not beijeve, in, light of the facts set

forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

SECRET

∞ 2 =

HH 55036

DocId: 32989616 Page 183

---

## Page 184

TO

FROM

SUBJECT:

OPTIONAL PORM NO 10

8010-108

MAr 1962 ADIlION

i GSe GIN. REG. NO »1

UNITED STATES GO

RNMENT

Memorandum

SPRET

: Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: Marchi6, 1970

Mr.

W. C. Sullivan

DECLASSIFIED BY SP 2ALM /216

- o.

Here

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

THE ABEL CASE

Item #3 in the material submitted to the Director by

SA Sam Papich in his memorandum of March 5, 1970, discusses the

Abel case.

According to Papich, CIA felt it was not given proper

recognition for its contribution in the case, in that it took the

risk and responsibility of transporting. NAME from PLACE to the

U. S. in 1957 after the Bureau declined

to become involved in this

transportation; that after a short handling period in the U. S. the

Bureau dropped

NAME

, an alcoholic, because he became a problem

and CIA took the responsibility of safeguarding him, giving the

Bureau free access to him and time to develop leads

leading to the

apprehension of Abel; that CIA was responsible for making

NAME

mentally and physically capable to testify at the Abel trial; also,

CIA incurred heavy expenses, all for the benefit of the Bureau;

further, the Bureau never thanked 'CIA for its cooperation nor did it

see fit to inform the Attorney General or the White House of the

role played by CIA.

BACKGROUND OF THE SITUATION:

Abel is the Soviet intelligence officer who was uncovered

in the U.S. in 1957 through the defection of

NAME

IDENTIFYING DATA

On the night of May

NAME

NAME

that NAME

*a ked into the American Embassy In

of CIA advised

PLACE about three days ago and was referred to CIA. He claimed he

was a Soviet agent in New York since 1952 and gave certain details

to back up his

story. He claimed he was ordered back to Moscow and

got "cold feet" in plAcE and wanted to cooperate with American

officials.

He was in

a highly emotional state which led CIA

to

question his mental stability. It was the opinion of

that no steps should be taken to return

NAME to the U.S. until

the story was substantiated or demolished to reflect his actual

status.

Our New York Office immediately instituted investigation,

SE

CONTINUED - OVER

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

HH 55036 DocId:32989616 Page 184

---

## Page 185

licmorandum Mr.

C. Sullivan to Mr. C. D. DeLoach

P.E:

"CLATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

SECRET

based on

disclosures

was not able to prove or

disprove his story. On May &, 1957, CIA was inforned of the

facts

developed by our investigation and assed what action it

intended to take regarding NAME

return to the U.s.

May 9,

1957,

advised of a report received from CIA, PLACE

revealing that NAME

lad sufferea almost a complete mental

breakdown and that in view of his condition,

arrangenents vere

made by CIA for him to be returned to the U.S. by plane.

Hay 10, 1957, NAME

was reiurned to the U.s. in the company of

a CIA

agent.

On arrival our New York Agents

were at the airport

to take him over, but because of his emotional state, he was

confined at the U.S. Marine Hospital in Staten Island until

Immigra 105, when le was released to tie distody i our Agents.

and Naturalization Service (INS) authorities

arranged for his confinement in the U.S. marine hospital,

Staien Islam, for psychiatric exanination through the u.S.

Public Healin Service. (Liaison Agent Papich had previously

conferred with an INS official who had stated that if

NAME

condition varranted confinement upon his arrival in the u.S.,

an order would have to be issued by the U.S. Public Health

Service).

NAME

and his wife were placed in a midtown hotel

by new fork agents and were under. Bureau control from lay 15, 1957,

until June 20, 1957, when they were

taken to their residence

PLACE

at their reguest.

All expenses for their

maintenance were paid by the Bureau.

Luring this period! NAME

and his wife were becoming

a problem because of heavy drinking

and irrational behavior.

on dune 1o, 1ybt, abel was located by Bureau Agents wher

visiting his studio in Brooklyn, New York, Efforts by Bureau

Agents and the department to have NAME

testify against Abel in a

ciiminal prosecution vere unavailing.

With the Depastnent's

concurrence, we arranged for INs authorities to arrest Abel on

June 21, 1957,

on an alien varrant.

Aîter Avel's arrest, the

Department continued to raise questions concerning NAME

willingness to testify in an espionage prosccution against Abel

and requested the Burea to press

NAME in thai regard.

took the position that any efforts to induce

NAME

to testity

should be made by the Department, as we realized that

NAME

would undoubtedly want assurances, such as semaining in this

country and financial assistance,

and the Department was so

advised. The Department was also advised that the Bureau

would no longer

pay

that other

ariangements would have io be made.

In an efiort to solicit

NAME

cooperation, the Department conferred with Allen

Dulles of CIA to determine it CIA would be willing to sponsor

the entry of NAME

into the U.s. under the authority granted

the Director of CIA by law. Dulles indicated a willingness

not only to sponsor

NAME but also to assist in his ichabilitation

mY 55036 Dbetal5296961

1185

-2 -

---

## Page 186

Memorandum Mi.

C. Sullivan to Mx.

RE: HELATIONSHIDS WITH CIA

D. De Loạch

in the U.S., such as assisting

hin in obtaining a job

and furnishing financial assistance for an extended period

0f

tine.

On July 21, 1957 a CIA representative was placed

in touch with NAME

by New York Agents for this purpose:

Our Agents also arranged for rBI's access to NAME

whenever neces

sary.

subsequently, NAME

agreed to testify and appeared

before a lederal grand jury on DATE: and DATE

1957

As indicated above, we located Avei on June 13 and

he was taken into custody by

INS on June 21, 195%.

On July 21,

1957, over a month later, CIA instituted arrangements for

NAME rehabilitation.

While CIA undoubtedly incurzed heavy expenses on

ichali of NAME

•, it was not at the request of the Bureau

but at the request of the Department.

ñegarding CIA's complaint that the Bureau never thanked

it for its cooperation, it is pointed out nat a loiter tim

the sirecior was sent to hi. Dulles on November 19, 1957,

shortly after abels conviction.

It pointed out the excellent

cooperation of

NAME

and his staîf with the Bureau

since the inception of this case and that the Director wished

to express his personal appreciation to NAME

and his staff

¿oi thcir valuable assistance.

IECOMMENDED ACTION:

Hone, we do not believe, in light of the facts set

forth, that CIA willdake an issue of this matter.

HH 55036

DocId: 32989616

Page 186.

---

## Page 187

TUITION

psd сем. 110. мо. 11

UNITED STATES GC

RNMENT

Memoranaum

TO

:Mx. C. D. 'DeLoach

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIP WITH THE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

NAME

DATE:

3/6/70

FMDRIG

DICIASSIFTED BYS 2-2 AiM /ETE

•ON 1 - 10-01

Item No. 4 in the materíal submitted to the Director

by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum dated 3/5/70 discusses

belief by CIA officials that damaging publicity regarding

NAME

emanated from a, Bureau report. NAME

was a CIA official at the time and the publicity was felt to

be damaging to CIA. CIA apparently was'of the belief that

the Bureau leaked the information to Senator NAME

who then released the information to the press.

Bureau files reveal that in a discussion between

SA Papich and Allen W. Dulles, then head of CIA, on 7/10/53

Dulles inquired of Papich as to where NAME

... could get infor-

mation such as that released concerning NAME... Papich

immediately informed Dulles that if Dulles was under any

suspicion that the Bureau

might be disseminating such infor-

• mation to Senator NAME

he was definitely wrong and off base.

Papich also told Dulles that the results of the Bureau

investigation concerning NAME had also been made available

to the Atomic Energy Commission

. (AEC) as well as other

linterested agencies. Dulles told Papich that he definitely

did not feel that the Bureau was involved in the NAME

releases to the press and that he was sorry if there had been

an impression he suspected the Bureau.

There is nothing in Bureau files concerning NAME

which would indicate that the Bureau did, in fact, supply any

information concerning NAME to Senator NAME

or the news

media. There was considerable publicity concerning NAME

at the time and it is noted that due to the fact that NAME,

IDENTIFYING DATA

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

CONTINUED - OVER

HN 55036 DocId: 32989616

Page 187

---

## Page 188

Memorandum for Mr. Deloach

RE:

RELATIONSHIP WITH THE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

there was possibly an element of potential embarrassment to

the Democratic Party attendant to publicity afforded the

matter by-

NAME AND POSITIAN

It is also noted

that copies of reports of Bureau investigation concerning

NAME had been disseminated, in addition to CIA, to Civil

Service Commission, National Security Agency, Atomic Energy

Commission, Army and the Attorney General.

A conflict broke

out between CIA and Senator NAME

after MAME

publicly quoted from a document, not identified, which spelled

out

NAME AND IPENTIFYINE DATA

spelled

indicate that CIA alleged that the AEC had leaked the

information in question to Senator McCarthy.

RECOMNENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts

set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

2.

2

HH 55036

DocId: 32989616

Page 188

---

## Page 189

HAT IRDS COIRION

GRA GEN, RIG NO. 88

UNITED STATES GOVORNMENT

Memoranaum

TO

: Mr. DeLoach

DATE:

March 6, 1970

FROM :

W. C. Sullivan

DECLASSIFIED BY SP 2 ALM /116

0N 1-10-0

SUBJECT:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

BUREAU DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION

CONCERNING NAME

Item number five in the material submitted to the Director by

SA Sam Papich with his memorandum 3/5/70 discusses a question raised by

former CIA Director Allen Dulles concerning the propriety of FBI

dissemination of information concerning

•NAME

who

IDENTIFTING

DATA

The particular information referred to by Mr. Dulles had been

furnished FBI by

NAME

•IN DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

made several accusations against CIA. Mr. Dulles took the position

that dissemination of the allegations to the White House, Attorney General

and Department of State had placed Dulles on the spot because the NAME

data was not a complete story.

BACKGROUND:

CIA advised that on DATE/53 NAME had informed CIA representa-

tives abroad that he had evidence pointing toward. NAME

being a

communist and active agent, and that NAME

might shortly be exposed

by the McCarthy Subcommittee of the Senate as the chief of the third great

Soviet ring after NAME and

NAME

When interviewed by

Bureau 1/7/54 he furnished no information indicating that

NAME

was

engaged in espionage activity and appeared to have an axe to grind insofar as

NAME

was concerned. He acknowledged everything he had came to him

secondhand. Results of interview were furnished CIA by letter.

On 1/22/54 Attorney General advised the Director that

had told him of a conversation he had with

NAME

NAME

The

Attorney General said he told NAME

he would have NAME inter-

viewed to get the whole story and asked that we conduct the interview.

On 1/25/54 we wrote the Attorney General about the previous

interview with vane and advised we would have him interviewed again to

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

• CONTINUED - OVER

НН 55036 Do0Id:32989616 Pode 189

---

## Page 190

Memorandum for Mx.

DeLoach

RE:

RELATIONSHIPS' WITH CIA

secure any additional data he might have.

NAME was reinterviewed

the same day and results were sent to Attorney General 1/27/54.

Subsequently, on 2/ /51,

NAME

called

(the Director from White House about the NAME situation.

Director advised

NAME

The

that he had personally talked to

NAME for two hours the previous day and-had concluded that NAME

was obsessed with the charges he was making and while he appeared

to be a brilliant and well educated man he did not appear to have

specific details.

On the day the Director spoke with NAME , 2/.../54, he

referred NAME to Domestic Intelligence Division where a detailed

interview was conducted and results incorporated in a

-page memo-

randum, copies of which

were furnished Attorney General, Governor

Adams,

CIA and State Department.

We interviewed NAME at the specific instructions of the

Attorney General based upon a White House request and dissemination

of interview results to Attorney General and White House was not

only proper but required under the circumstances.

CIA and State

Department received results since allegations concerned officials

and operations of those agencies.

NAYE furnished names of

persons who he said could support his allegations and we interviewed

them and disseminated results.

NAME

of CIA commented

on 3/13/54 that when the

NAME information was first received at

that Agency some officials gained the impression FBI was deliberately

collecting and disseminating data solely for the purpose

of "hurting"

NAME

said rosults of interviews and investigation conducted

by Bureau had clearly demonstrated to CIA officials that FBI was

living by its vell-known tradition and reputation of developing

facts and reporting information in an impartial manner. He said

on the previous day all officials, including Dulles, commented the

Bureau was following the

NAME

case in conformity with its

well established reputation of getting. all the facts. In view of

this, there is no basis for believing that at this time CIA would

raise any charges of unfair conduct on the part of Bureau in its

handling of the NAME matter.

RECONNENDED ACTION:

None. Ve do not believe, in light of the facts set

forth, that CIA will make an issue

of this matter.

NW 55036 DocId: 32989616 Page 190

---

## Page 191

OPTIONAL PORM NO. 10

3010-106

MAY IRd? POllION.

OSA GRN. PIG. NO. 21

UNITED STATES GO

INMENT

Memorandum

253.

SLON

TO

: Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: 3/6/70.

FROM : Mr. W..C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIP WITH. CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA).

BUREAU HANDLING OF CIA REQUESTS

FOR TOURS FOR FOREIGN OFFICIALS

" #MDR/6

DECLASSITIED BY SPILLA

1113-01

Item six in material submitted to the Director by Sam

Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 mentions occasions in the 1950's

when CIA complained that officials visiting the United States

under CIA sponsorship were disappointed because they had no

contact with Bureau officials.

CIA felt' contact with Bureau

officials had significant benefits, left lasting favorable

impressions because of the FBI's world-wide reputation, and

when foreign visitors had no contact with Bureau officials

they were left with

suspicions there was friction between the

I'BI and CIA. In 1956, we had a clear-out policy to the effect

that tours for such visitors would be oi a restrictive nature

and they would be afforded the same treatment as the public

and nothing more.

Memorandum 5/31/56 Eröm NAME tO.

captioned

"Visit at

"NAME".

Bureau by loreign PoLice and Intelligence

Officials,"

SILE NUMBER

recommended for Director's

approval that Liaison would (1) inform CIA tours afforded to

foreign police officials and security officials would continue

to be of a restricted nature and the visitors will only view.

facilities normally seen by the public, and (2) that such

foreign officials would not be interviewed unless it appeared

Ito the Bureau's advantage. In regard to 1, the Director noted,

thoroughly agree. I am not too keen anyway about such tours.

We were 'burned' in

the NAME

matter." The Director noted in

regard to 2, "I see no

need of interviews."

was an official of FOREIGN

Jwas alleged to have dejected to the FOREIGNERS

security service who was closely associated with CIA and who

1 .

In his memorandum, Papich emphasized that for the past

several years there was no basis for complaints with regard to

Bureau treatment of foreign officials coming

sponsorship.

: to. U.s. under CIA

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized. Disclosure

RECONMENDED ACTION:

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

None.

We do not believe, in light of the facts set

forth, that CIA will make an issue

of this matter

HH 55036 DocId:32989616 Page 191

---

## Page 192

OPTIONAL

aM NO, 10

MA.

5010-100

GSA GRA

110 NO. 18

UNT: ED STATES CL

‹NMENT

Memorandum

SEC.

TO

: Mr.. C. D. DeLoach

DNTE: March 6, 1970

FROM : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

SECRET

SUBJECT:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

[CIA - DUTCH INTERESTS IN SOVIET ESPIONAGE ACTIVITY

Item #7 in the material submitted to the Director by.

JA sam PapIca in nis memorandum of March 5, 1970, discusses

SCIA - Dutch Interests in Soviet Espionage Activity.

SA Papich

(5)

notes that in 1956 the Dutch Internal Security Service (BVD) wanted

to have certain individuals in the U. S. interviewed and approached

ALL INFORMATIÓN CONTAININ

FERDIX IS UNCLASSTTIED NONTE

NEZRE SHOWN OSUTARWICE.

position was based on failure of the Dutch to deal honestly with us

in the case of

NAME

who was involved in collecting

Intelligence intormation at the National Security Agency for a

Dutch official.

BACKGROUND OF THE SITUATION:

This question first arose when a bute olficial approached

our representatives at the NATO Special Committee conference in

ParIs In May, 1yJb, and requested Bureau assistance ii

NAME

the U.S. and to have a Dutch representative

present during the interview.

is the widow of NAME

1-10-01

FEMBR 16

CLASSIFIED BY SP 21m

, who operated an espionage network in Europe prior

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X16

to his defection in YEAP Whe Dutch representative said CIA had

interviewed her, but the results were unsatisfactory sHe was told

In June, a CIA

on the case to the U. So for the Bureau's use in interviewing

NAME

and two others in the U. s., but not to participate in

the interview. sin accordance with instructions, SA Papich told

CIA to have the Dutch submit their request through diplomatic

channels and to include all intormation In writing, and that the

Bureau would not deal personally with a Dutch representative. By

memorandum of June 15, 1956, it was reported that NAME

Sof CIA told SA Papich

he was of the very strong opinion that the

Bureau's position made good sense, but other CIA officials felt the

(sLutch should be helped in every possible way.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

CONTINUED - OVER

Unauthorized Disclosure

Subject to Criminal Sanctiona

HH

55036 DocId:32989616 Page 192

---

## Page 193

Memorandum Mr. W.C. Sullivan to Mr. C.D. DeLoach

RE:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

DISPOSAL OF PROBLEM:

On June 19, 1956, then

NAME AND POSITION

and SA Papich met with ENAME ANS NOSITION

---==

i, and

NAME

Of CIA. NAME asked if the Bureau

would talk to a representative of the Dutch if he came over

and, in lieu of that, would the Bureau accept from CIA information

and

leads furnished by the Dutch, (S)

NAME pointed.

simple in that the inter the cane man m

case when their representatives had been obtaining highly

the FBl even requested to

notified State Department

that i buten ?epresentatives were to be intervieved, it should

be done by State Department and not by the FBI. NAME was

told that

by the Bureau must be channeled through the State Department.

NAME

said that this was a situation created by the

5) Dutch and the Bureau had no inteption of altering its position

and wewould not talk to a Dutch representative and did not

NAME

case through CIA.(s)

NAME

respected the Bureau's position

and had attempted to guide itself accordingly in dealing with

the Dutcho(sHe said he understood the Bureau's position, which

in essence was that the Dutch had made their bed and could

now lie in it.

LIKELIHOOD OF PROBLEM ARISING NOY:

It would appear remote that this problem would

arise at this time..

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None.

We

do not believe, in light of the facts

set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

2 -

НН 55036 Do0Id:32989616 Page 193

---

## Page 194

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 70

3010-100°

MAY IDAS EDITION

о дд сем. его. по. 21

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

:Mx. C. D. DeLoach

DATE:

March 6, 1970

FROM :#. C. Sullivan

#MDRIS

DECLASSIFIED BES CALM THE

071-12-0

SUBJECT: RELATIONS WITH CIA

NAME

Background: Item number eight in the material submitted to the

Director by SA Sam Papich in his. memorandum 3/5/70 discusses

relations between Bureau and CIA with NAMe, head of private

intelligence network ( NAME

was

NAME

's aide who had liaison

with Bureau) •

Problem:

Papich states we never informed CIA we were receiving

Information from NAME

which was also of interest to CIA;

and that while it is possible NAME

.. nad given same data to

CIA, we do not know.

Analysis:

NAME

was financed by CIA durine eariv 1950s (e.g.,

CIA budgeted $650,000 fOr

in 1952) . (1. FlE * ) There

is ample evidence CIA knew we were receiving information

_NAME

• We do know some information was given by NAMe to

CIA and Bureau jointly.

NAME, for example, told us of

conference in early 1951 between CIA officials and NAME when

it was agreed information might be furnished directly to FBI by

_NAME

FILE a provided CIA was advised by NAME of what was given.

Moreover, on 5/7/52 a CIA official requested

Bureau's views regarding validity of information we were receiving

from NAME and asked for our views regarding method to be

employed in channeling information from NAME

to Bureau.

Significantly, under procedure then, NAME

directed communica-

tions to CIA with copies to Bureau.

CIA was told that as it

appeared NAME was an appendage of CIA, Bureau was not recom

mending any method of dissemination and it was up to CIA to handle

problem.

NAME In the ensuing period, dispute arose between CIA and

over channeling of information and Bureau made every

effort to stay out of dispute.

In late 1952, for example, C/A

inquired if Bureau's views regarding dissemination had changed.

He was told they certainly had not and again informed that Bureau's

desire was to receive all information of interest no matter how

received. ( FILE

Our position of not becoming involved in

NAME. -CIA dispute reiterated on other occasions.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

RaT

CONTINUED - OVER

HH 55036 . DooId:32989616 Page 194

---

## Page 195

Memorandum W.C.

allivan to Mr. C.D. DeLoa

RE:

RELATIONS WITH CIA

On the other hand, there were instances where we

received information from NAME

which was of either an

administrative or intelligence interest to CIA and we did

not inform CIA. These instances covered period both prior

and subsequent to the contractural relationship between CIA

and NAME

which was from 4/51 to 7/54 FILE NUMBER

AND PÉFEGENCE:

For example,

NAME

wrote a confidential letter dated 7/30/48 to former

NAME AND POSITION

which contained infor-

mation of interest to CIA. This letter contains a penciled

notation:

"This info. not to be given to CIA, per IMITIAL

FILE NUMBER.

Memorandum 10/11/50 from

NAME

contains information frOm NAME NAME

concerning

NAME

intentions to plant microphones in Finland to

cover meetings attended by Russian high staff. It was

observed in the. memorandum that at that time NAME

and

NAME

had no relations-with CIA and that NAME

intended operation was under primary responsibility of CIA.

No indication this information given to CIA by Bureau

NAME

furnished Bureau a memorandum dated

6/29/54 entitled "Termination Nemorandum to FBI" which

informed of the termination of

contract between NAME

and CIA. In the memorandum it is pointed out that NAME

will continue to receive raw material from the field and

that while he will no longer be in a position to translate,

evaluate, publish, etc.,

NAME

desires to forward such

material

to Bureau as

Name would not trust any other

agency. The memorandum also states that NAME has continued

the flow to the Bureau of all reports he felt Bureau would

be interested in even though NAME

received a written

order specifically directing him to not give Bureau any

thing.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts

set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

- 2-

•N# 55036 DocId:32989616 Page 195

---

## Page 196

OPTIONAL PORA NU 10

MAY, 0AZ COIION

5010-108

GOA GAN. RIG, NO 8Y

UNITED STATES G

RNMENT®

Memorandum

TO

: Hx.. C. D. DeLoach

• DATE:

3/7/70

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

AGENCY (CIA)

#MDRIG

COMMISSION ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE

EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNHENT

DSCLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALm)ITG

(HERBERT HOOVER CONMISSION - 1954)

051-10-01

Item number nine in the material submitted to the

Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 discusses

the Hoover Commission survey of CIA operations in 1954. According

to Papich, there was talk within CIA that the Bureau had furnished

the names of subversives within CIA to Senator NAME

AND. IDENTIFYING DATA

NAME

headed the Task Force which

surveyed CIA operations between 9/54 and 6/55. In 10/54, CIA

alleged that the

NAME

was attempting to develop

information regarding CIA operations. According to the Washington

Star, DATE /54,

NAME

said CIA was

"one of the worst situations

we have as far as communist infiltration is concerned." He said

he would give his data relative to this matter to NAME Task

Force.

According to the Washington Star, DAYE /55,

NAME

said he had given NAME information relative to alleged communist

infiltration of CIA.' AS Of DAYE/55, CIA had not received from

NAME

the names of those considered

security risks but CIA

believed it had done a good job of removing security risks anc

believed that it was in good shape.

On pATE /55, the Task Force requested name checks on

security risks named by NAME

Memoranda containing the

results of those checks were given to the Task Force on pArE/55.

On ArE 155, the Bureau received a letter from NAME asking for

investigations relative to character, reputation, and loyalty

of individuals mentioned as security risks. CIA

was aware of

the names as we asked it for identifying data concerning them.

NAME was later advised that the investigations would entail

Interviews at CIA, review of its programs, inquiries in foreign

countries, and the like and he withdrew his request.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

CONTINUED - OVER

НН 55036 Do0Id:32989616 Page 196

---

## Page 197

230-at

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach

RE:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

• AGENCY (CIA)

The talk at CIA that the Bureau had furnished

NAME the names of subversives at CIA has not been

recorded in FBI files nor is there any complaint in the

matter recorded. Neither is there recorded any complaint

by CIA to this effect.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts

set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

• ..

e kn

HH 55036 • DocId: 32989616

Page 197

---

## Page 198

OPTIONAL PORN NO, 10

2018-108

MAT IRAZ EDITION

GSA GIN. RIG. NO. 21

UNITED STATES GO

¿NMENT

Memorandum

TO

: Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE:

3/6/70

FROM :W. C. Sullivan

02 1-10-01

DECIASSIFIED BY SPALM| 1TG

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE - AGENCY

INTERNAL SECURITY LEADS IN

FOREIGN COUNTRIES

Item number 10 in the material submitted to the

Director by Special Agent Sam Papich in his memorandum of

3/5/70 discussed our furnishing leads to our Legal Attaches

(Legats) without advising Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

or requesting the Agency to handle the, lead.

The observations of Special Agent Papich in this

matter are broad and general in nature. His presentation is

hinged upon the premise advanced by the Agency that "internal

security" cannot be separated from "counterintelligence,"

thereby necessitating our advising CIA of requests to our

Legats to have

• leads covered in foreign countries.

The Manual

of Instructions, Section 102, page 23, states CIA's responsibilities

include collection, collation, evaluation, coordination and

dissemination of intelligence

information. CIA does not have,

among other things, responsibility for "internal security

functions."

In the absence of unusual situations,: We forward

investigative.leads pertaining to our cases in countries where

we have liaison coverage to the particular Legal Attache

concerned.

Through his contacts

the Legat arranges for the

necessary investigation and submits the desired information

according to our reporting needs.

The Legat coordinates

this activity on a local level..

It is more desirable to have our representatives

request investigation abroad in order to achieve maximum coverage,

and to maintain tight control so we can insure that we fulfill

our responsibilities.

RECOMMENDED ACTION: '

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set

forth,. that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

55036 DooId: 32989616 Page 198

---

## Page 199

OPTOMAL DORM NO, 10

3018-180

MAT IPO% ADITON

08А. СЕн. 10, м0. 81

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

:Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DECIASSITIED

1-02-00 MANGOLD

CA +88-1826 754-412198

DATE:

3/7/70

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

FROM :H. C. Sullivan

DECLASROSCATION AND/OR,

RELEASE C" CIA NNEORMATION . .

IN THIS DOCUMENT, AS SANITIZED

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

AGENCY (CIA)

(BUREAU OPERATIONS IN CUBA DE (U)

Item number eleven in the material submitted to the

Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 states that

we operated informants' in Cuba during the period we had a

Legat Office in Havana and did not coorditate our operations

with CIA or advise it we had sources there. It was noted that

after Castro came on the scene, approval was granted to turn

certain informants over to CIA. Papich also refers to a

memorandum NAME

to.

NAMe

2/5/60, regarding the

Communist Party of Cuba (CPC) which dealt

with the problem

of whether a Havana source used in an intercept operation

between the Communist Party of Venezuela and the CPC should bel

S <U)

turned over to CIA to obtain complete coverage. We, of course,

had no coverage of Venezuela?Bureau had not advised other

agencies of this source since we did not want Castro to uncover

any operational activities which might embarrass the Bureau. (ry (V)

The entire operation was later turned over to CIA.

CIA began its operations in Havana in 4/47 and in a

letter to the Bureau, 4/28/53, Eegarding Havana informants. M

NAME noted that CIA was not overly cooperative and that,

(U)

in fact, it was not developing pertinent information. At that

time NAMe met with the CIA representative in Havana who

admitted he was not getting any information Concerning the CPD

(v)

and had no plans for any aggressive action in that field. For

this reason it was necessary for us to develop our own coverage (e)(v)

We. instructed NAME to ascertain from the Hatana CIA

representative information available to him concerning matters

of interest to the Bureau; however, he was to continue through

Informant sources to obtain needed information regarding security

matters which could not be supplied by cIA.

Subsequently, our

(0)

relations vith CIA improved to the point of being described as

excellent in 1958. We think our overall position to be sound 6-294

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

Doclassit ON DAURJFK

!

None. Ne do not believe, in light of the facts set forth,

that CIA will male an issue of this "I AFONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

HH 55036

DocId:32989616 Page 199

ET

Unauthorized Disclosure

Stinient to Niminal Endinar,

---

## Page 200

OFTIONAL FOR 1O. 10

3010-100.

HAS 1908 8018IC'8

soG$e GEM.

нес. но. 58

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

(SECRET

TO

Mr. C.D. Deloach

DATE: March

6,

• 1970

FROM : HaC. Sullivan

1-10-01F5mDe16

CLASSIFIED BY SPE ALMETE

DECLASSIFY ON: 25XJ,6

• SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH ÇIA

BUEBAT ORATIONS INDRAZINESS

- DATE

Item #12 in the material submitted to the director by

SA Sam Papich in his memorandum dated March 5, 1970, discusses

situation in Rio de Janeiro (Rio)sin pAry. concerning strained

..

relations which had developed between former Legal Attache (Legat)

----

NAME

and former U.S. Ambassador

NAME

According to Papich the Ambassador alleged that

legat had engaged in uncoordinated intelligence activity and that

CIA was unhappy with legat's activities and hád told the Ambassador

that legat had disseminated information from a source who was either

a fabricator or a provocator.

•NAME

and was transferred

was assigned as legat in Rid on

ДАТБ

PLACE AND

DATE

after Bureau concluded that he lacked.

sufficient administrative

experience to function as legat, Rióas In early parè he began to

receive information from

NAME

UNIT

....i an employee of

, Federal District Police.

NAME furnished

derogatory information concerning one , NAME

of the Brazilian

Army who was a possible Brazilian presidential candidate in DATe,

indicating that Hask had questionable contacts with

FOREIGN Embassy

in Brazil.S This information was disseminated to CIA attributed to

who had not been contacted sufficiently to determine his

reliability. CIA advised Bureau that the information concerning NAME

caused considerable consternation within CIA which had been unable

to evaluate

reliability of the information. CIA suggested possibility

that the information had been fabricated or was part of a communist

deception operation. CIA requested

that we identify our source but

we declined to do so because source did not want his identity disclosed.

By letter dated. PATE,

recommended that

NAME

be discontinued, the new Legat, rio,

as a potential

source

based

on his admissions to legat that he had no sources in FoREI

Embassy and could not provide identities of his sources or additional

details concerning information he had reported. Legat.concluded that

• (5)

AiT, INFORCIATION CONTATIS

HERBEN IS UNCLASSIFICA EXCH'T

WHERE SUOTA OTHERWISE

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure

Subject to Criminal Sanctiong

SECRET

CONTINUED - OVER

55036 DocId: 32989616

Page 200

---

## Page 201

NEGRET

Memorandum to Mr. D. J. Brennan, Jr.

RE:

RELATIONSIIDS WITH CIA

BUREAU OPERATIONS IN BRAZIL - 1959

information NAME had furnished was of such a nature that it

could have come fron public sources, the political police or

could have bech invented and attributed to his alleged contacts.

Legat also concluded that

NAME

could not have been a

provocator used-by ForEiGe to pass deceptive information

Contacts with NAME

were discontinued in

DATE. (S)

In our dissemination of information from NAME

to

CIA we were careful, to state that our contacts with the source

were insullicient to establish his reliability Althougn

subsequent evonts established thai 1t was likely that CiA was

corroct in sprculating that the information was fabricated,

there was no

indication that the source was a FOREIGN couTfells

provocator. (s)

RECOMINDED ACCION:

• None.

Ve do not believe, in light of the facts

set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this natter.

- 2-.

NH 55036 DocId: 32989616

Page 201

---

## Page 202

• TO

FROM

SUBJECT:

OPTIONAL POL A NO, 10

8016-103

MAT 19EE IDITION

ERA GEN. SEG.NO-JU

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SEX

Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: 3/6/70

W. C. Sullivan

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

BORDER COVERAGE

on 16-01

Item number (13) in the material submitted to the

Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 discusses/

a problem presented by the Phoenix Office in June, 1957,

concerning the Bureau's handling of infermants on

the

These Informants were operated inside

JEK AGE

The problem was predicated on situations, which might arise as

the result of CIA endeavoring to develop informants who were

already being handled by the Bureau.

(1) (BI

SENSITIVE METHODS AND TECHNIQUES

PROBLEM:

By airtel 6/8/57, Phoenix advised that the CIA

representative had endeavored to develop

3 Burean sources in

Jand stated that it was discontinuing these sources unless aB

advised to the contrary by the Bureau.

SOLUTION:

This situation was

analyzed in Bureau memorandum dated

6/14/57 wherein it was recommended that safeguards be established

to continue operating already established valuable sources even

though CIA also began using them; however, the information we

S

E

CONTINUED - OVER

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized DiscInsure

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

1W 55036 DocId:32989616 Page 202

---

## Page 203

alchorancum to Mr. C. D. Doloach

:. IPLATIONCHIES WITH CIA

BORDEL COVERAGE

received iron these sources was to be, broken down and

paraphrased in reports in such manner

23 to conceal as far.

as possivlc the inct that those individuals veic assisting

uS.

The Director approved

these safeguards which were

successiully placed into effect by phoenis.

A reviou of oui files since June 14, 1957, fails

to reveal that this problon has been raised subscquently by

CiA activity in the phochixcomin area.. In addition, the

CIa representaiive was transioried PLACE

Ic vas not replaced by CIA and the border territory no had

covered wes munsgauently handled y cia on & road trip basis

out a PLACE.

the particination of the

Phoenix Office in CODENANE

ruthemorscontinued with the Ilrecior's

approval by letter dated 12/10/69..

RECOMIEIDED ACTICA:

None.

He do not believe, in light of the facts

set forth, thai CIA will make an issue of this matter.

star

HH

55036

DocId: 32989616 Page 203

---

## Page 204

OPTIONAL PORN NO 10

MA IRES ROITION

5010-188

OSA GRA, SEG. NO 11

•UNITED STATES GO

NMENT

Memorandum

TO

: N2• C. D. DCLoach

AIS INFORMATION CONTAINSO

SEREIN IS UNCLASSITITA RACKET

DATE: 3/6/70 SRE SEOME OTMERWISE.

FROM : " C. Sullivan

#mDE16 1-10-01

CLASSIFIED BY 5P Z ALmIZIE

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1, 6

SUBJECT: RELATIONGHEPS WITH CIA

CODEÑAME

Iten number li in material

submitted to Director

by si Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 discusses CODENAME

case. CoDENAME iS coLe name for case oil oui couble agcat,

(5)

NAME

who was recruited by joviets while on TYPE oF

¿rip to phace in yeAr, Until discontinued infear he delivered

extensive interial, clearca ly._APPROpRIATE

to the Soviets

PLACE.

BODY

and PLACE

Ni'. Papich's memprandum states case was being

highlighted since we cannot exclude possibility Central

Intelli-

gence Agency (CIA) has ovidence to demonstrate we were

onerational in place and did not coordinaie witu CiA.

The

fact is CIA did linow NAME was meeting the Doviets in PLACE

(S)

and Mr. Papich's menorandum does not disclose CId raised

any

objection to date.

Ve recognized at the time there could be

a jurisdictional problcm.

Te permitted CIA to inteiview

HAME

DATE

, shortly aiter his recruitnent at

(s)

which time CIA Icarned from hit he hau a scheuled espionage

Iceting in

PLACE AND

DATE

, CIA agiced

handling of NAME was Solely within jurisdiciion oi Bureau..

On pArE , CIA was orally infoined pAME

in

would leet Govicts lS,

PLACE

AND DATE

that we desired CId to take no

action which would interfere with our operation and that results

•..would be furnishca CIA (approved by menoranduln MAME

-

WAME

Hemorandum NAME

tO NAME

recommended we not

(s)

auvise ClA gi a latei meting between NAME

and soviets scheduled for PLACE Aud DATE

'in interest

of seculity...

This was approved and this policy fas iollowea

thcrcaiici

All information iron vAME was disseminated to CIn

and it disclosed out, source was meeting Bovicts at various

points in pLAcE

In

PATE

CIa was auvised it could

in suture contact NAME for cata he acquired in his vorld-wide

travels providing it dic not use hin in opciational capacity;

NAME was instructed not to disclose to CIs information on his

(5)

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized DiscInsure

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

CONTINUED - OVER

HW 55036 DocId: 32989616 Page 204

---

## Page 205

SECRET

Menorandum to In. C. D. DeLoach.

KE:

CRLATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

relationship with Bureau.

we did

permit NAME

under ou supervision,

(S) principals outside the United States

without clearing

with CIA.

We discontinuca him as an informant in

DATE!

RECORLDENDED ACTION:

None. - Me do not believe, in light of the facts

set forth, that CIA will make

an issue of this

matter.

= 22 co

SEPRET

NW 55036 DocId: 32989616

Page 205

---

## Page 206

OFTIONAL FORM NO. 10

MAY IONS IDITION

3010-108

ESA GILL.

RIG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOV

NMENT

Memorandum

TO

: Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: 3/6/70

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

CIA REQUEST FOR BUREAU LECTURE

#MARIG

DECEASSITIED BY SPIZALMITE

1-01-01

ON COMMUNISM IN THE U. S.

Item Number 15 in the material submitted to the Director

by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 discusses the Director's

refusal of a 1958 CIA request for NAME

to lecture

on communism before & CIA group. Papich stated that CIA accepted

this as an affront and a blatant refusal to cooperate on a most

important subject of interest to both agencies.

The files disclose that by letter 9/25/58 signed by

NAME

, CIA requested MAME

to address a selected

group of CIA personnel on the communist movement in the U. S.

CIA suggested dates of 12/9,10,or 11/58.

The Director by routing

slip attached to NAME

letter commented, "it seems strange

that CIA should seek this when its top representative in Japan

considers FBI as a bunch of mere 'flat-feet' and the dangers

of communism as something conjured up in the minds of the FBI.

But then again I note request doesn't comé

from the Director

nox even the Deputy Director of CIA."

Memorandum

NAME

tO MAHE

dated 10/1/58

made reference to CIA's request ard the Director's comments. It

recommended that the best interests of the Bureau would be served

by giving this lecture, not because of the information which

could be conveyed to CIA on communism in the U.S., but because

it would give MAME

an opportunity to raise a number of

questions himself of the group concerning CIA's own activities

In the field of communism.

It was pointed out that it could be

considered a bit of a challenge to see how much the FBI could

learn about the operation of CIA during the course of the lecture

and discussion rather than

the converse. If te

recommended

that the request be declined and the Director concurred commenting,

"We cannot make NAME

available to this outfit."

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure

Subjeet to Criminal Sanctions.

I SE

CONTINUED

НН 55036 Do0Id:32989616 Page 206

OVER

---

## Page 207

Memorandum to Nr. C. D. DeLoach

RE:

RELATIONSILIPS WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

CIA REQUISI FOR BUREAU LECTURE ON CONNUNISM IN THE U.S.

Pursuant to the Director's decision, a letter was

directed to CIA under date of 10/7/58 advising that it was not

possible to grant CIA's request for this lecture because of

NAME

other commitments.

Nothing could be located in Bureau files to indicate

CIA's reaction to this letter.

ACTION RECOMMENDED:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts setforth,

that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

NH 55036 DocId: 32989616

Page 207

---

## Page 208

OPTIONAL PORM NO. 16

3010-100

MAY 1963 IDITION

GSA GIN. RIG. MO. 17

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

• TO

Mr. C. D. DeLoach

FROM : MI. W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

NAME

143x1

DATE: 3/6/70

Item Number 16 in the material submitted to the Director

by Special Agent (SA) Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 discusses

the case of

NAME

that CIA might criticize our not

identifying our source.

BACKGROUND OF CASE

MAMA waS the CIA employee assigned to

He became involved with a FoREIGN girl, and the FoREIGN

approached him for recruitment, using the

affair with the girl and compromising photographs as leverage to

carry out the approach. NAME reported the approach to his

superiors and was returned to U.S. and ultimately removed from

PROBLEM WITH CIA

We first learned of this case on 7/9/56

FrOm NAME AND POSITION

, who furnished the information in confidence and who

indicated HAME

• might have

been involved in espionage.

7/16/56

NAME ANA

POSITION

, CIA, advised

SA Papich that CIA was considering requesting in writing that

the Bureau identify our source.

On 7/17/56 SA Papich was advised

by NAME

• CIA, that Allen Dulles had instructed

..Ithat the request not be made.

DISPOSAL OF PROBLEM WITH CIA

• This problem never officially

arose in view of the instructions of Mr. Dulles.

Bureau files

contain no indication as to whether or not CIA documented this.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set

forth, that CIA will

make an issue

of this matter.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Dischsure

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SECRET

55036 DocId: 32989616 Page 208

---

## Page 209

DORIONA PORA NO. 10

5014-108

MAY 1863 1018:0K

ESA GIN, SEG. NO, 21

UNITED STATES GO

MENT

Memorandum

TO

:Mr .

C. D. DeLoach

DATE: 3/6/70

FROM

:Mr. W. C. Sullivan

#MDRIG

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH

1-1-01

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NAME

• Item Number 17 in the material submitted

l to the

Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum of 3/5/70 discusses

the possible belief of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that

the Legal Attache, Place, had leaked sensitive information

SA Papich noted that perhaps CIA

might question whether FBI had pursued investigation in the case

vigorously enough. Memorandum is to review circumstances under

which information was furnished by CIA to FBI, Legal Attache

inquiries of CIA, PLACE,

and the effect of CIA restrictions on

FBI investigations in this case.

In February,

NAME AND IDENTIFYING

1193, HTA

CIA made available information from

to the effect that the FORElaN

Government was planning to engage in clandestine collection of

scientific and technical information in the United States.

agencies and no investigation be conducted which might jeopardize

its source. CIA then made available extensive information

SENSITIUS SOURCE

Analysis of the

SOURCE MERALreVealed several discrepancies which would have

made interview by FBI of MAME

desirable. CIA refused this

request.

We made numerous requests to obtain clarifying data to

explain items mentioned

in SOURGE MATERIAL

and CIA failed

to respond.

In March, 1963, CIA furnished information concerning

WAlÉ interest in American personnel and installations in pLAcE

This information was made available to legal Attache, PLAcE

On

4/11/63 CIA advised that its CIA station PLACE

which had not

heretofore been apprised offand case had made inquiry concerning

the case. Our inquiry of Legal Attache, pLAcE, disclosed that

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

• Unauthorized Discinsure.

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

OBSERVATIONS - OVER

NH 55036 DocId: 32989616 Page 209

---

## Page 210

Memorandum to Mi. 'C. D. DeLoach

RE:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

inquiry of CIA personnel in pLAcE had been made concerning

one of the individuals previously identified as FORSIGN

agent

and also requests had been made for certain biographical data

concerning other individuals. Legal Attache noted that CIA

personnel in PLACE had indicated they were previously aware

of the NAME Case and were impressed with the extreme sensitivity

of the case. We furnished this information to CIA headquarters

and on 5/7/63 CIA referred to the incident and stated that it

was a matter of serious concern to it, requesting that any

future dissemination outside Bureau or to the Legal Attache

'be coordinated in advance with that Agency. This practice

was closely followed. The Director observed in January, 1964,

that he thought the whole thing had been imaginary on

the part

of CIA which had been played as a sucker by MAME

-=

The

Director added that no more time should be wasted on it, at

least until CIA restrictions were removed. We continued

to attempt to get the restrictions removed without success and

covered outstanding leads.

In September, 1964, an analysis of the case disclosed

that although thirty-eight separate investigations were opened

only

three FoREiGN agents were uncovered. Original allegations

Of FOREIGN intent to mount an espionage mission in the United States

could not

be substantiated. This information, coupled with the

fact that CIA refused to make NAME

available to us for

the purpose of resolving discrepancies, prompted a decision

transmitted by us to CIA on 9/30/64 that we were closing our

investigation in this case.

Mr. Papich commented in his memorandum of 3/5/70

CIA never has been satisfied with the efforts made by the

Bureau in this case. Our review indicates our efforts in the

matter were as full and complete as possible under circumstances

where CIA refused to grant us access to the source, did not

respond to request for clarifying data and declined to remove

restrictions making it impossible to take necessary investigative

steps. Should any question be raised in the future, we are in

a position to document our difficulties experienced

with CIA.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set

forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

HН 55036 D001d:32989616 Page 210

---

## Page 211

OPIIONAL PORM NO. In

5010-106

MAY 8EZ EDITION

GSA GEM.

IIG.NO. 17

UNITED STATES GO

NMENT

Memorandum

SANT

• TO

: Mr. C. D. Dekoach

DATE:

3/6/70

FROM : W. Co Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

LEAKS TO THE "NATIONAL REVIEW" - 1959

BACKGROUND: •

PROLAS NOS AIm 12

ON 1-10-01

Item number 18 in the material submitted to the

Director by Special Agent Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70

cites a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) investigation of

leaks to the "National Reviey" which identified NAME

, Iormer CIA employee, as the leak and referred to

former Assistant to the Director NAME... as among his

contacts.

PROBLEM:

Papich implies that CIA may have further information

regarding dAMe

involvement.

ANALYSIS:

This situation was set forth in memorandum MaMa

NAME

, 4/21/59. We do not know if CIA has

additional information as to the suggested relationship

between MAkk and NAME

We do know that they have not

made an issue of this matter to date.

RECONMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set

forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

NAYTON A BROTE DISTORMATION

Unauthorized Dis-insure

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

AT 55036 DocId: 32989616 Page 211

---

## Page 212

• 5030--108

MAT IDOL ICITIO'

632

"eH. XEC. HO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandüm

TO

Mr. C.D. DeLoach

DATE: March

6, 1970

FROM :

W.C. Sullivan

SUBJECT:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA - TRAVEL OF

BUREAU INFORMANTS TO CUBA

Item Number 19 in the material submitted to the

• Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 discusses

the possible travel of one of our Mexican border informants

to Cuba and whether our not advising CIA of this made us

potentially vulnerable to charges we were operating outside

the U.S. without coordinating with CIA.

BACKGROUND:

This involved our plans to send

CODE-

NATE

informant to a guerrilla training camp in

Cuba. The trip never materialized.

In October, 1965, we were vitally interested in

determining the location and extent of Cuban guerrilla training

sites being used to prepare Latin American subversives to carry

out revolutions in their home countries.

• NAME

, a Mexican

national residing in PLACE

,Mexico, which is within the area

covered by

GODENAME

, had infiltrated Forsand ForeI.

intelligence operations in Mexico City and had made himself

attractive to Mexican communist leaders who were planning to

pay expenses of sending guerrilla trainees to Cuba..

CIA CONSIDERATIONS:

NAME

NAME

was an integral part of CoDE-".

which is handled on a need-to-know basis.

- We

had previously obtained material from CIA showing its primary

• targets insiäe Cuba which allowed us to fully brief the informant

as to overall U.S. Government objectives and a procedure was

established for use in disseminating data to CIA if the trip

materialized which would fully protect our informant and not

jeopardize

CODE NAME

OUTCOME :

During period informant was striving to arrange the

trip to cuba his wife

IDENTIFTING

DATA

This strained family

relationship

caused us to order NAME to have informant cancel

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION° Cuba and thus no trip was ever

made.

Unauthorized Discinsure

CONTINUED - OVER

ww 55036 Sybiest: teGriminalaganctions

---

## Page 213

-

Memorandum to Mir. C. D. DeLoach

RE:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA - TRAVEL OF

BUREAU INFORMANTS TO CUBA

ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS:

After NAME

had moved to

PLACE

which is outside COPERAME

-----=

in MOrTH

, 1966, we

advised ClA of his past cooperation with us and interposed

no objection to his use by CIA in areas outside our

jurisdiction. On 122/66 CIA stated it would consult us

should it initiate contacts with the informant. There is

po indication that CIA did use the informant and on 124/68

CRA did

as he was of no further value to us.

The trip never materialized.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts

set

forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

SECRETI

• 2

HH 55036 DocId: 32989616 Page 213

---

## Page 214

OPTIONAL FORM NO 10

5010-1.

MAT IPOZ EDITION

654 GAX. RIG. NO. 88

UNITED STA'IES GO

NMEN

Memorandum

TO :Mr. C. D. Deloach

DATE: 3/6/70

FROM

: Mr. W.. C. Sullivan

#MORIG

• DECTASSTFIED BY SF2 ALMENG

1-10-01

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHEP WITH CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

DISSEMINATION OF CIA INTORMATION

IN A BUREAU MONOGRAPH

Item 20 submitted to the Director by Sam Papich in his

memorandum 3/5/70 mentions the dissemination of a Bureau monograph

dated 5/5/65 and entitled "Communism in the Dominican Republic."

Special Agent (SA) Papich stated that due to the urgency of the

document Bureau did not obtain CIA clearance to include CIA

information in the monograph which was disseminated to interested

agencies, including CIA.

According to SA Papich, CIA never

made any

protest although it considered our action a violation

of the "third agency rule."

Although the monograph referred to by SA Papich did

contain CiA data, it also set forth highly significant data

obtained by Bureau through our own informants. The CIA data

was biographical in nature and was used in the monograph to

characterize the past, including, communist contacts, of key

figures in the Dominican Republic. It was taken from the 1963

CIA Biographical Handbook and CIA

telegrams dating back to 1961,

all of which were previously disseminated to the U.S. intelligence.

community by CIA.

No attempt was made in the monograph to

characterize CIA data

as Bureau information and, in fact,

this

information was attributed to "another Government agency," in

accordance with established procedures.

The so-called "third'

agency rule" provides that

classified information originating in a department or agency

will not be disseminated outside the receiving agency without

the permission of the originating agency. However, an exception

to this rule provides that the receiving agency may disseminate

such data to other members of the U. S. Intelligence

Boara (USIB,,

of which Bureau is a' member, unless

the originating agency

uses appropriate control markings limiting its data

to the

use of the receiving agency only. The CIA data used in the

Bureau monograph had no such control markings and our monograph

was disseminated to the President, the Attorney General and

USIB members only.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Discinsure

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

de.

НН 55036 Do0Id:32989616 Page 214

---

## Page 215

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach

RE:

RELATIONSHIP WITH CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

The Bureau's monograph was a compendium of our own

data, CIA data, and that received from other members of the

intelligence community.

It was prepared under emergency

conditions for tie President and had a significant bearing

on the understanding and handling by the intelligence community

of a serious crisis which confronted this country.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts

set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter?

HH 55036 DocId: 32989616 Page 215

---

## Page 216

10.

TO

OPTIONAL PORM NO. 10

5010-108

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

:

Mx. C.D. DeLoach

DATE: March

6, 1970

FROM :

SUBJECT:

W.C. Sullivan

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA - BUREAU INFORMANTS

IN

PLACE

0x 1-10-07

Item Number 21 in the material submitted to the

Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 discusses

Bureau operation of informants in

-PLAGE

and comments on

our potential vulnerability for not having informed CIA at

the inception of the operation of these informants.

SA Papich has cited two situations. The first

concerns .

NAME

_ an attorney

residing in

PLACE

..Our Legat, Plice, in the Fall

0 1906, Identitled wAne

as a potential source of inciligous

information of importance to U.S. security; conducted

appropriate background inquiry regarding him and determined

his excellent potential and willingness to furnish intelligence

information to U.S. Government.

By memorandum 11/23/66 it was

approved that we contact CIA headquarters through liaison

_channels to inform CIA that we planned to maintain contact with

_NAME

; that CIA would be furnished the information obtained

and that we would service CIA requests provided they could be

handled with complete security. SA Papich so informed

- NAME

of CIA on

11/25/66. NAME - C/A

stated he say no reason

why FBI could not proceed as we desired and that CIA headauarters

would so inform its representatives in PLAcE and PLAcE

instructing them to give FBI all necessary support in this

operation.

Since that date we have operated NAME : as a

valuable and productive unpaid confidential source.

Since this

matter was coordinated with CIA at the outset,:

there appears to

..be no problem.

The second situation cited by SA Papich

concerned

Legat, PLACE, informant NAME

• This individual has cooperated

with the Bureau for some 25 years. As a aLAce police

official in 1945-47, he was most helpful to our representative

assigned in fLACE. We had no contact with him thereafter

until 1954 when he

-*.

IDENTIFHING

DATA

For I1 years thereafter, NAME

was

operated

by our Legat, PLACE

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure

CONTINUED - OVER

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

HH 55036 DocId:32989616 Page 216

---

## Page 217

Memorandum to Mr: C. D. DeLoach

RE:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA - BUREAU INFORMANTS

IN FLACE

In April, 1965, MAHE returned to PLACE

and

by memorandum 6/7/65 it was approved that contacts with him

be continued in

PLACE

by out

NAME

Agent. -He proved to be an extremely valuable informant on

criminal matters as well as those of interest to U.S. security

1n

PLACE

...

Upon lAME's designation as a highly placed police

official in prose

in 1967, we promptly advised CIA

headquarters through liaison channels of informant's identity.

We advised CIA that we had utilized k

for handling

criminal leads and that he periodically volunteered information

concerning political developments in pAcE

At that time,

10/6/67, it was agreed that Bureau would continue control of

informant and that after each contact with informant by our

road trip Agent, the latter would confer with

NANE

Head of CIA operations in PLACE

(who was present at CIA

headquarters at the meeting) concerning political information

furnished by the intormant.

ie were assured di complete CIA

cooperation in this matter.

On the occasion of our road trip

Agent's next contact with MAME in PLACE, however, NAMÉ-CA

bitterly accused our Agent of having lied to him and of

having

operated a source in PLACE

• Without CIA's knowledge.

He

stated that responsibility for the development of security

information outside the U,S. is solely CIA's. It is noted that

-NAME has been a difficult person with whom

to deal and has been

inclined to "pop off." Matter has been closely followed by Legat,

_PLACE, and there have been no

further indications of difficulty

afforded us complete cooperation

10/6/1

as we were assured it would in the

10/6/67 meeting. Accordingly, no issue was made of this matter

with CIA.

NAME

- continues as à very valuable paid informant

¿Of our Legat, pLAcE CIA has made favorable comments regarding

the escellent duality of the intormation obtained by NAME.

This arrangement has worked smoothly for two and one-half years

and there appears to be little likelihood of CIA raising an

issue

regarding this matter.

RECO:MENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, In light of the fact set

forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

-2-

H# 55036 DocId: 32989616 Page 217

---

## Page 218

„DANONAL TORI NO, 10

1918-104

MAT 1482 PONION

OSA GEN, REG, NO. 21

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

: Mr. C. D. Deloạch

FROM :W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

• ITEM (22) CODENAME

DATE: 3/6/70

DECTASSY LED BY SEZ ALMATE

ox 1p0/ 0l

Item (22),

..by Special

Agent Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70

mentions

CURRENT SENSITIVE OPERATION

HH 55036

DocId: 32989616 Page 218

CONTINUED - OVER

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

---

## Page 219

Memorandum to Mir. C. D. DeLoach

RE :

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

i Detoach

ITEM (22)

CODENAME

CURRENT SENSITIVE OPERATION

(Continued from page 1)

ACTION RECOMENDED:

None.

!

.....

...

T

H₩ 55036 •DocId:32989616 Page 219

2

---

## Page 220

OPTIONAL PORA NO, 10

3010-100

MAY 196Z EDITION

OSA GEN, RIG. NO. 21

UNITED STATES GON

INMENT

Memorandum

TO

Mr. C. D. Deloach

DATE: March 6, 1970

FROM :W. C. Sullivan

#MORIG

DECLASSIFIED BYSP ZALM/ITE

oN 1-10-0/

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

HARASSMENT OF CIA

Item #23 in the material submitted to the Director by

SA Sam Papich in his memorandum of March 5, 1970, discusses a letter

dated November 15, 1967, from CIA which requested that the Bureau

check telephone toll calls from the home of one fAME

who was allegedly harassing CIA in the Miami area. JAME. was

supposedly seeking information concerning CIA's covert operations.

SA Papich states that we told CIA that we would not check the toll

calls on the basis that the information received was not sufficient

to justify investigation within the Bureau's jurisdiction. SA Papich

also states that "CIA accepted our response but there is no doubt

that the Agency characterized our position as a concrete example of

refusal to help a sister agency with a problem relating to the

security of U.S. intelligence operations."

A rEVIeW O1 Bureau tiles disclosed that a memorandum,

NAME

, to NAME

dated November 17, 1967,

was prepared.

This memorandum encompassed the above facts and

recommended that CIA Liaison Agent advise CIA that we would not

check the toll calls as requested.

This memorandum and recommendatior

was prepared by SA Papich. The

pirector noted "OK H."

In addition

to the above, on December 9, 1967, NAME

contacted our Miami Office and stated that he was writing a book

about CIA and offered to make the material available to the Miami

Office.

Our Miami Office was advised that this information was of

Interest to CIA headquarters and instructions were furnished that

lINAME did furnish Miami with the information, it would be given

to CiA. Brown. did not follow through with his offer.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set

Lorth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

H# 55036 DocId:32989616 Page 220

---

## Page 221

OPTIONAL PORM NO. 10

SOLDIER

SAY 1RDI P011ION

GIA GAH, 110.110.28

UNITED STATES GO+

NMENT

Memorandum

•TO

: Mc. C. D. Deloach

DATE:

3/6170

FROM. : W. C. Sullivan

#MDRIG

DECTASSIFIED BY SP-ZALM 7TG

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIP WITH THE CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

SENSITIVE DOCUMENT

--

Item number 24 in the material submitted to the

Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorindum dated 3/5/70

number 26h 1n

- discusses the restriction of dissemination of the seNsive

DOGUMENT

.... to Central Intelligence Agency

(CIA) • Prior to 10/67, some of the Government agencies on

the distribution list for towed received multiple copies.

The Director of CIA was then receiving 19 copies of CoDEwORd

as a result of requests from CIA on 3/30/62 and 10/23/62 for

additional copies to expedite reading by key CIA officials

and to facilitate rapid utilization of the information

The Director made a notation on the 10/4/67 CODEWORD

"Please look over list of distribution.

I have marked with

a dot those I question as to why they should recieve copies

and I do not think more than I copy should be sent anyone.

Let me have your views. H." By memorandum NAME

to

•NAME

10/6/67, it was stated that although security

of the classified document comatihad been maintained, if the

Director so desired, we would tell recipients that they would

recieve only one copy each in the future. NAME

noted

on this memorandum,

"Yes.

NAME

also noted,

"We could never run down a leak." The Director noted,

, "Send

only I copy & if any inguiry, then indicate we have had to

cut costs. H."

Since 10/67. the Director's instructions have been

followed and only one copy of comes has been furnished to

those, including CIA, on

the codeword distribution list.

RECOSMENDED ACTION: '

None.

We do not believe, in light of: the facts set forth,

that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

HW 55036 DocId: 32989616 Page 221

---

## Page 222

OP. ONAL PORN NO. 10

9010-106

+4Y 8962 K0111CH

SSA GIN, RIG. NO. 21

* UNITED STATES GOV

NMENT

Memorandum

-

1 te

•TO

: Mr: C. D. DeLoach

DATE: Harch

8, 1970

FROM :W. C. Sullivan'

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

ESTABLISHAENT OF BUREAU LIAISON

WITHI

H-0!

CLASSIFIED BY SP-2 AIMLITE

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1,5

JEK Act 6 (1) (B)

JEK Act 6 (1) (B)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNGLASSIFIOD EXCAP

OTHORWISEN

HERE SHOWE

(5)

Item number 25 in the material submitted to the Director

(s) by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum of 3/5/70, discusses a trip to

Holland by Legal Attache (Legat),PLACE

ments for linison with appropriate Dutch authorities.

in 1960 to explore arrange

It is given

as an instance CIA could cite as an FBI failure to coordinate with

them in line with National Security Council Directives.

MAME

should first reach agreement

reportedly raised questions, Indicating FBI

which he said had previously)

NS) Papich says CIAt 6 (1) (B)

Director, Allen Dulles, later expressed disappointment that we

did not contact CIA beforehand but that an agreenent satisiactory

to all concerned was eventually worked out.

Papich also says that

in late 1959 we gave consideration to establishing a Legat in

Denmark but did not inform CIA.of our iptentions.

In contemplation of the stationing of a Legat in Denmark,

• to broaden liaison

Since we had told State by letter of 3/10/55

that we would handle requests for investigations and name checks

for the Dutch only when receiyed through formal State channels

and stat

State sent a letter to the U. S. Embassy in folland (S

on 12/17/59, advising of the Bureau's intention,: but it apparently

did not get

tO NAME

• prior to Legat's trip to Holland. (s

on 1/4/60 Legat, PLACE, called the BVD from PLACE

Franred to call

on them on 1/7/60.

The

and

ACt-6

Who told STATE DEPARTHEVT

On 1/7/60 the Director received a letter of 1/5/60

from. NamE in which he said he was disturbed about the manner

in which he had learned of the Legat's proposed visit.

While

offering to assist the Bureau, MAll spoke of the long standing

suggested the Director and Allen Dulles discuss the matter if

PATIONAL SCURITY INFORMATION

was planned.

JEK Act 6 (1) (B)

Unauthorized Disclosure

MY 55036 DocId: StARed do TermiRal Sanctione

(B)

(5)

---

## Page 223

Memorandum to he.

C. D. DeLoach

RI:

RELATIONSIIDS WITH CIA

ESTABLISMENT OF BUREAU LIAISON

WITH

1960

JEK Act 6 (1) (B)

JEK ACt 6 (11 (B)

On 1/7/60, Legat met with

CIA ' jAIS

PrIOr tO ViGÍLiNg AVD.

Z0 expiris

that he was to explore the possisility of diacct ccadoos vaca

SEVy concerning exchange of

information bearing on i.s.

22d00r6

security matters.

He said he would not be operational dad dox

the contemplated liaison could noc reasonably cause 2-0220504--

JEK Act 6 (1, (B)

be confused, no request

said he had sequested his headquarters for comment on Icarning

of the proposed visit of Legat but had not received a reply.

NAME

on the results of

is visit to min"

who vere friendly but deferred a linal

commitment, reierring to the existing "American arrangement."

By letter of 1/23/60 the Director thanked NAME

for his offer to assist, and

SaiC Bureau interests 1

candinavian countries and lolland vere under discussion wit

AlLeR Duiles. MANK

was also assured our proposed contacts with

(5)

the Dutch vore purely Liaison in nature; that while we wouid

keep CIA advised of items of interesi to it in connection with

its responsibilities abroad, it yas not believed necessary to

go beyond the U.s. Intelligence

coordinating with

CIA matters taken up with the Dutch & That

Directive says CIA Shall be responsible for coordination o1

all

U.S. Iiaison which concerns clandestine intelligence activities

or which involve foreign clandestine services.

Paragraph 10,

however, says the directive does not apply to any liaison

relationship concerned with U.s. internal security functions,

or vich criminal or disciplinary matters which are not dicectly

related to foreign espionage or clandestine counterintelligence.

On 1/13/60 Papich explained to Allen Dulles and liE

the reasons for our contacis in Scandinavian countries and

6 Dollandexploring possible establishment of a Legat in Denmark.

When Papich challenged them to cite any Bureau failure to comply

with the Directive for coordination of U.S. lisison act..ities

abroad, idle immediately stated there were no suca ¿-stances.

In answer to specillo invitation by rapich do tir any 0o.210s

or problens, Dulles stated that zesther

402 440 23225-26204503

had any complaints; that no mos corsoze 2y daazzy tis

being contacted in the beginning; but choi de and 02i could Give

all possible assistancs.. (Dulles did assist by writing

letter to MAMa

which resulted in a joint fbi dipacIA

÷ 02230222

meeting on 4/8/50, at which direct FBI BVD Ilaison was agreed upon).

(5)

177 55036 DocId: 32989616 Page 223 - 2 =

( SECRET

---

## Page 224

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. Deloach

RE:

RELATIONSHIPS WITE CIA

ESTABLISINIENT OF BUREAU LIAISON

WITH

1960

1 DEGHLA

On memorandum WifE

to HAME. 01 1/14/60,

concerning the 1/13/60 meeting of Papich, Dulles and NAME

Director noted : "1.

Well handled by Papich. 2.

A1] 01

the turmoil developing in this situation could have been

avoided If we had properly contacted Dulles and also

followed through with State. H."

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set

forth, that CIA will make an issue

of this matter.

JEK ACt 6 (1) (E

JEK Act 6 (1) (E

B

SECRET.

• 30

HH 55036 DocId: 32989616 Page 224

---

## Page 225

F."TIONAL POEM NO. 10

3010-108

MAY ISSZ COITION

aS-ÜIN.

12G. 0:0.27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

: Mr. C. D. DeLoach

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 3-6-70

DECLAWSILED BY SP-ZALM/ZE

DML1-10-01

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIÁ)

BUREAU DISSEMINATION OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

TO FOREIGN SERVICE - PATE_

Item No. 26 in the material submitted to the Director

by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3-5-70 states that CIA by

letter DATE

raised questions concerning the propriety of our

dissemination of information through our Legal Attache to the

FoREi Intelligence Service. This concerned certain

SENSITIVE

_ METHOOS

which was obtained

iron our daletter pea deractor in place, Bureau code same

stated that a representative of

FOREIGN Intelligence Service informed CIA it received afore-

mentioned information from our Legal Attache. CIA claimed

such dissenination abroad should have been coordinated with

CIA because of Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID)

5/2 which indicates that CIA shall be responsible for all U.s.

liaison concerning clandestine intelligence

activities abroad

Or

involving foreign clandestine services.

CIA claimed that pursuant

above ve were obligated to coordinate with CIA prior to dissemination.

Memorandum

NAME tO HAME ..

__ under NAME

caption reviewed this situation

and indicates that on 7-13 and

8-1

AsTE,NAr-provided.information.concerning several types of

" SENSITIVE

METHODS

Dissemination of above was

made to state Department. CIA and military intelligence agencies

by letter on .

Information was also furnished to

Legal Attaches, London, Bern, Bonn, Paris, Rome and Madrid, with

instructions to disseminate only to contacts in foreign intelli

gence

agencies known to be reliable and cooperative and with

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

CONTINUED - OVER

HN 55036 DocId:32989616 Page 225

---

## Page 226

Memorandum to Mir. C. D. DeLoach

the instructions that it be given limited distribution and

handled in a manner so it would not be apparent it emanated

from the Bureau or a source within the U.S. Above memorandum

assout no wid no

points out that DCID 5/2 has been controversial since its

inception (12-8-59) and the subject of differences of inter-

pretation.

We recognized CIA's coordination responsibilities

but, in this instance, were of the opinion there was no operational

angle and no necessity for coordinating dissemination of above

since we had previously given the information to CIA. This

memorandum recommended approval of a letter to CIA answering

•CIA's inquiry according to above. Director indicated "O.X.

-and "It looks like CIA is throwing its weight around." On

PATE

we directed a letter to CIA accordingly.

As indicated

lin memorandum of SA Papich, CIA "surrendered" and did

not

further contest this issue.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None.

We dn not helieve, in light of the tacts set...

forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

septer

HW 55036 DooId:32989616 Page 226

---

## Page 227

OPTIONAL PORM NO. 10

MAY 1902 EDITION

5010-100

GIA GIN: REG. NO, 17

UNITED STATES GOV

NMENT

Memorandum

• TO

: Mr. C. D. DeLoach

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

DATE:

3/6/701

IMORIG

DBGLASSIPIED EX SP-ZHLM/2SE

2-11eT

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

TITLE

BOOK AUTHORED BY

NAME

Item 27 of the material submitted to the Director by

SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 indicates that MAE

had visited the Bureau in 1963 to gather material for a

book regarding U. S. intelligence agencies. It was suggested

that CIA be advised

of this, and the Director noted, "I see no

reason for doing so."

NAME

memorandum toNAME

8/28/63, reports

this visit and notes thathAme

had asked for data concerning

the Bureau's internal security

procedures and had asked concerning

other FBI operations, making no reference to CIA, with one

exception.

He did inquire as to whether there was friction between

the two agencies and was told that we cooperated closely and

maintained daily liaison with CIA. It was on this memorandum

that the Director said he saw no reason,for informing CIA con-

cerning the visit of NAME

We later learned that their book, TIThE

2.

was furnished in the form of advance proofs to

CIA prior to its publication. We also received such proofs

from CIA through Liaison.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None.

We do not believe, in light of the facts set

forth, that CIA will make an issue

of this matter.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFÖRMATION

Unauthorized Discinsure

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

HN 55036

DocId: 32989616

Page 227

---

## Page 228

ОЯТИЛАЕ гОДМ, НО. 10

3010-108

69. ORM. $1G.tU.88

* UNITED STATES GO

NMENT

Memorandum

TO

• Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: March 6, 1970

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

50R16

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES - AFRICA

Item number 28 in memorandum of 3/5/70 from SA Sam

Papich to the Director, captioned "Cases and/or Situations

Involving Conflict With CIA," states that in April, 1960,

CIA inquired if the Bureau would give any consideration to

assisting that agency toward developing coverage in Africa by

providing a Negro informant or placing a Negro in the Communist

Party, USA for the purpose of eventually using him in Africa.

His memorandum added that we told that agency the FBI had no

informants available because they were

necessary for our own

operations.

He claims we took the position since we saw no

benefit to

be gained by loaning an informant on a short or

Long torm basis.

Ho states that Cid could argue that as early

as 1960 it had foresight to recognize the need for additional

coverage and when it appealed to the Bureau for assistance,

we did not cooperate. He refers to his memorandum dated 4/7/60

concerning

this matter captioned "Communist Activities in Africa."

The memorandum referred to discloses that on 4/5/60

NAME AND POSITION

CIA, Stated

•that communist organizations were rapidly increasing in strength

on the continent of Africa and that his agency. found

it most

difficult to establish effective penetration.

МАМЕ

noted that

in this connection it was almost impossible for a white man to

move about Africa and establish a relationship which would enable

him to develop worthwhile sources.

He asked'if the Bureau would

consider furnishing one of its

Negro informants or developing

• a,n

informant in the Communist Party, USA for eventyal use by CIA in

Africa.

Papich told AHe

that

if the Bureau had a good Negro

informant, we certainly were not interested in having his future

jeopardized nor did we want to lose his production. Papich

added that it undoubtedly would be most difficult to take a Bureau

informant, have him'travel to Africa under some cover and still

be able to satisfactorily explain such activities to his communist

colleagues without becoming a target of suspicion. NAME

said

he recognized all this but asked if the Bureau would give

consideration.:

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

CONTINUED - OVER•

1Н 55036 DocId:32989616 Page 228

---

## Page 229

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. Deloach

RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

Addendum to Papich's memorandum dated 4/8/60 by

the Internal Security Section pointed out that all of our

informants were necessary for our own operations, particularly

in the communist field, and it recommended and was approved

that CIA be-orally informed that it is not possible to provide

an informant on a loan basis to be used in Africa.

Regrettably, the Bureau was not in a position to

assist CIA. CIA's problem was an

administrative one within

that Agency.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts

set

forth, that CIA will make an

issue

of this matter.

... •

2

HH 55036 DocId: 32989616 Page 229

---

## Page 230

OPTIONAL PORN NO, 10

3010-108

MAY IONS EDITION

GSA GEN. XIG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

: Nx. Ce D. DeLoach

DATE: March

• 6,

1970

FROM : %. C. Sullivan

enL

SUBJECT:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

U.S. INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS - PLAGE

Item #29 in the material submitted to the Director by

SA Sam Papich in memorandum of 3/5/70, states that by Bureau

letter dated 10/23/64 we provided the

White House information

received by our Legat from U.S. Ambassador

PLACE

wherein

the latter was critical of intelligence operations,

the overstaffing of personnel.

SA Papich comments

particularly

that we do

not know if CIA became knowledgeable regarding this letter but

could construe same as relating to its operations.

-

Our Legat,

PLACE

in a letter to the Director dated

10/19/64, set forth the results of a conversation with Ambassador

- KAME

PHD PLACE

DATA

=-=====

- IDENTLEYING

THE AMBASSADOR

remarked that the results

were appalling, there

being 23, 000 military personnel in

i. SIX COUNTPIÉS

intelligence operations and

numerous CIA personnel.

the lack of coordination between the military and CIA as

"scandalous." He stated the Offices of the Military Attaches

were grossly overstaffed and he was recommending drastic cuts

and that duplicate administrative services be combined with those

of the embassies.

He made no mention of specific intelligence

operations nor did he elaborate on the lack of coordination.

SourcE commented that on his return to the U.S., he intended to

see the President personally to bring this matter forcefully to

his attention.

JOURCE

s comments were incorporated in a letter to

DATE

-164,

, Special Assistant to the President, dated

in accordance with the Director's noted instructions.

Our files disclose no indication that CIA cognizant of Bureau

letter.

RECOMMENDED ACTION: None.

We do not believe, in light of the

facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure

Subiect to Criminal Sanctions

HH 55036 DocId: 32989616

Page

230

---

## Page 231

OPIIONAL FORM MO, 10

1010-108

MAT SAGE POITION

GIA GEN.

AG. NO, 17

UNITED STATES GOV

RNMENT

Memorandum

• TO

Mr. C. D. Deloach

DATE: March 7, 1970

FROM : W. Co. Sullivan

SUBJECT:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

DECIASSIFIED BY SP-ZALIA

1416

THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE

ON 1-11-0

ADVISORY BOARD AND JOHN MC CONE

Item number 30 in the material submitted to the

Director by $A Sam Papich tr his memorandum of Narch 5 result

discusses a dispute we had with CIA in May, 1963, as a

of a communication the Bureau sent to the President's Foreign

Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB). It was pointed out that

in our communication to PFIAB we attributed certain information

to McCone, then Director of CIA, concerning the matter of

increasing wire taps on diplomatic establishments. McCone

charged that the information attributed to him was not so

because he had never made any such statement and he could

prove it.

The lact was that the information relating to

McCone had been given us by one of his subordinates who had

indicated the information originated with McCone.

McCone

maintained that we should have checked with him before going

on record that any infornation had originated with him.

A review of the file in this matter discloses? that

1n Ax 11, 1963, NAME

along with Papich had discussed

with

NAME

and.NAME

of CIA McCone's alleged

position with the PFIAB; that he was in favor of across the

board telephone taps on diplomatic establishments. The

Bureau, of course, wasopposed to this and advised lAME that

we would request to make our position known before the board.

At the conclusion of the meeting in April, 1963, nAME

specifically asked what he should tell McCone and MAMe

told him he should tell McCone exactly what had occurred at

the meeting; that the Bureau was opposed to across the board

wire taps and the Bureau intended to so advise PFIAB.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set

forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Discinsure

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

HIH

55036 DocId: 32989616

Page 231

SE

---

## Page 232

TO

OPTIONAL PORN NO. 10

8010 -106

MAY 190381.

_UNITED STATES GO

MENT

Memorandum

Mr. C. D. DeLoach

FROM

Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: March

6.,

1970

=

#mon 16

DECLASSIFLED BY SP-Z ALMIZTE

1-11-01

SUBJECT:RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

ALLEGED PENETRATIONS OF CIA

Item number 31, "alleged penetration of CIA," in the

•material

submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his

memorandum of 3/5/70 discusses allegations made by

NAME

regarding recruitment of four

CIA employees by the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB),

that CIA requested full investigation which we declined.

BACKGROUND OF CASE MAME.

AND

IDENTFYING DATA

alleged that the KGB had

penetrated CIA through an individual having the code name

NAME

In an effort to identify this penetration CIA provided NAME

with information regarding many individuals who had worked for

CIA in Germany.

NAME identified two individuals at various times

as NAME

and in each instance investigation "washed out" the

identification. NAME

finally identified NAME

. as one

• NAME

a former employee of CIA. During the course of

extensive document reviews NAME • became acquainted with

background of various individuals who had worked in Germany at

the time

NAME did. NAME

identified four present employees

of CIA with unknown subjects who had come to his attention while

he was active in the KGB.

PROBLEA WITH CIA

CIA wanted the Bureau to undertake full-

scale investigation of its four employees based solely on

NAME's allegations.

DISPOSAL OF PROBLEM WITH CIA

By letter of February 26, 1965, CIA

was informed there appeared to be no basis at that time for a

full-scale investigation of these men by the FBI on the basis of

allegations by NAME

• With regard to any investigation in the

United States concerning two of the men,

a conclusion would be

made following completion of the investigation of NAME

and interviews of NAME

Based upon the investigation

OINAME

and the interviews of NAME

•, CIA was

informed by letter of July 20, 1965, that nothing had been developed

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized DiscInsure

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

*HH 55036 DooId: 32989616 Page 232

CONTINUED - OVER

---

## Page 233

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach

RE:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

ALLEGED PENETRATIONS OF CIA

which supported MAME

speculation that MANk was

instrumental in the recruitment by the Soviets of either

NAME

Or NAME

and nothing was developed

which would support are

two suspects,

allegations against the other

NAME

and AMs

Furthermore,

CIA had furnished no documentary material regarding NAME

Or NAME

which would in any way support AME

Bureau added "Accordingly, this Bureau is conducting no

investigation of NAME, NAME,

NAME

OrNAME

will interpose no objection, since they are all employees

of your agency, if you wish to pursue MAME

allegations concerning them, including interviews of the

individuals concerned.

'This Bureau would, of course, be interested ir

receiving the results of any investigation which would tenc

to confirm NAME

's conclusions that one or more of these

employees of your agency had actually been recruited by the

Soviets."

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set

forth, that CIA will make an issue

of this matter,

"..

i SECRET

-2 -

HH 55036

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Page 233

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## Page 234

OPTIONAL FORM NO, 10

3010-108

ALLY I9ST EDITION

ASA CIA.

AEG. NO. 87

UNITED STATES GOV

NMENT

Memorandum

. To

• Mr. C. D. DeLoach

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

VICE PRESIDENT NIXON'S TRIP TO

SOUTH AMERICA * 1958

DATE: 3/7/70

EMORIG

NGURASSTPTEDER SPALMING

05-1-11-01

Item number 32 in material submitted to the

Director by SA Sam J. Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70

mentions Bureau letter 5/16/58 sent to the then Vice

President Nixon and containing a summary of CIA informa

tion concerning events in Latin America relating to

Mr. Nixon's trip there during 5/58.

According to SA Papich, most of the information

in above letter came from CIA. He commented that this

letter could be interpreted as raising question concerning

quality of CIA's coverage in Latin America. Papich noted

it is not known if CIA ever became aware of the letter.

Papich stated that MAME AND POSITION

CIA, was attached to the then Vice President

Nixon's staff. SA Papich pointed out that CIA, if aware of

above letter, could raise question as to violation of Third

Agency Rule.

Results of Review of Bureau Files

The letter to the then Vice President Nixon

is located in, FILE NUMBER

It contains

summary of information relating to riots and attacks.

against Mr. Nixon and his party during their 5/58

Latin American

trip. Letter identifies CIA as the

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

CONTINUED - OVER

IN 55036

DocId: 32989616 Page 234

---

## Page 235

Memorandum W.C. Sullivan to

Mx. C. D. DeLoach

Re:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

source of the information set forth in our letter. The last

paragraph of this letter includes a statement that the

impression gained from a review of CIA reports indicates that

CIA had some coverage reflecting there were to be troubles

concerning Mr. Nixon's Latin American travels. This letter

also stated

as follows:

"It is significant that information in the indi-

vidual countries came to CIA's attention shortly before your

arrival in a particular country.

Therefore, there is a

question

as to whether or not CIA had coverage in communist

organizations which would have led to the development of

information concerning communist plans days or weeks ahead of

your visit."

There is no indication in this file regarding

instructions given to prepare our letter of May 16, 1958.

The

first paragraph of this letter indicates that the Director

had

a discussion with Mr. Nixon on May 16, 1958, inasmuch as

the first sentence of the above letter reads as follows:

"Apropos of our discussion today, there is set

forth information contained in Central Intelligence Agency

reports received from them on May 14, 1958."

The data

set forth in our May 16, 1958, letter to

Mr. Nixon is contained in a memorandum NAME

NAME

dated May 15, 1958, which was prepared for

the Director's information. The Director noted on this

memo-

randum, "Send summary to A. G. H." In accordance with

instructions, a letter was

sent to the then Attorney General

under date of May 16, 1958, and this letter contained a sumnary

Of CIA information in the same manner.as had been sent to

Mr. Nixon on May 16, 1958.

Our letter to the Attorney General,

however, did not contain any observations regarding.CIA

coverage in Latin American countries visited by Mr. Nixon and

his party.

Our file in this matter FILE NUMiER indicates that

on June 9, 1958,

MANE

in the office of the

then Vice

President Nixon contacted the Bureau at the request

-2.

HH 55036 DocId: 32989616 Page

---

## Page 236

Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to

MT. C. D. Deloach

Re:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

of Mr. Nixon to determine if the contents of a letter from

the Directoi to Mr. Nixon dated May 16, 1958, regarding

Mr. Nixon's trip to South America could be leaked to the

press.

MAME

request was set lorth in memorandum

tO NAME

June 9, 1958, with the recommenda-

tion that sAms

'be advised that if the information

were to be given to the press, it would undoubtedly create a

serious problem as the FBI would then have violated CIA's

confidence since CIA was aware that SA Papich had reviewed

CIA's classified reports and, therefore, this information

should not be given to the press.

Both NAME

* and the

Director agreed with the recommendation, and NAME

was advised of our decision.

is

It is noted that : 44M0

identical with the individual who is now posItion...

Comments on Re:

ss in SA Papich Memo 3/5/70

That most of the information in our letter to

Mr. Nixon dated May 16, 1958, came frOM CIA and that this

letter could be interpreted as raising the question concerning

the quality of CIA's coverage in Latin America.

There is no dispute as to the source of the informa-

ion which was summarized in our letter to Mr. Nixon, and we

clearly indicated in our letter

that the source was CiA.

With

regard to any question being raised as to the quality of

..CIA's coverage in Latin America, we merely pointed out to

Mr. Nixon something that was readily discernible to any reader

oi the cla reports - - that 1s,.

that the information from CIA

popped up

rather suddenly as related to the country anc

Mr. Nixon's arrival. Certainly Mr. Nixon himself, since he

was personally involved in demonstrations directed against

him during his Latin American trip, must have been aware that

advance information from our responsible intelligence agency

(CIA) may have been lacking.

2.

We are not aware if CIA became knowledgeable of

our letter to Mr. Nixon dated May 16, 1958. Under ordinary

conditions, we are not aware nor do we seek to identify any CIA

• 3 .

HH 55036 DocId: 32989616 Page 236

---

## Page 237

Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to

• Mr. C. D. DeLoach

RE:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH

CENTRAL, INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

personnel who might be assigned to the White House staff.

As indicated above,

NAME

who was a member of

Mr. Nixon's staff infail and who is now position

was. aware of our 5/16/58 letter and its contents.

We have no information that CIA ever registered any type of

protest in this matter.

3. That CIA technically could raise a question

as to violation of the Third Agency Rule as regards our

5/16/58 letter to Mr. Nixon.

The Third Agency Rule is intended to prohibit a

Government agency from disseminating information originating

with another Government agency in the absence of specific

authority to do so, and we follow this rule unless there

are overriding reasons. With regard to our letter to

Mr. Nixon dated 5/16/58, we set forth information clearly

identified as having originated, with CIA. This letter

was apparently prepared at the specific request of then?

Vice President Nixon after conferring with the Director.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts

set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter

4

HH• 55036

DocId: 32989616

Page 237

---

## Page 238

TO

OPTICIAL SURM NO. 10

3010-108

MAY 1902 10,1ION

GSA GEN, IEG. NO 21

*UNITED STATES GO

INMENT

'Memorandum

:Mr. C. D. DeLoach

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

DATE: 3/6/70:

#mORlE

DECLASSIFIED BY

SP2 ALmIZTG

ON 1-1107

Item number 33 in the material submitted to the

Director by Special Agent (SA) Sam J. Papich in his memorandum

3/5/70 discusses NAME

an individual who was operated

as a criminal informant by the Bureau who furnished valuable

information and who has been a key witness in the prosecution

of cases being handled by the Bureau. Mr. Papich states that

the Bureau acquired access to dAME through the CIA and that

although the CIA has never officially made any statements to the

Bureau, it has been bitterly disappointed that the Bureau never

acknowledged CIA's assistance which the agency considered

extremely valuable.

Memorandum dated 2/20/63 from NAME

to

NAME

captioned At

set out that fAts

of CIA advised SA Papich that CIA had briefed the Attorney General

concerning a source whom MAME

had used since World War II

and who subsequently has developed a close association with a

lawyer who does considerable work for NAME

HAME

source was confident that the lawyer could be developed

as a penetration which could "sink'' faME and all of his cohorts.

The Attorney General agreed with the CIA representatives that the

matter should be referred to the Bureau for handling.

NAME set up the first contact with the individual

who had the contact with the attorney and at that time dame

stated that he did not want to get involved in any. investigative

aspects and wanted

to step out of the matter as soon as possible.

As a result, eventual contact was made with At

who

developed into a very productive source. NAME chas been publicly

identified as both a source of the FBI and CIA as a result of his

testimony.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure

CONTINUED - OVER

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

HH 55036 Do0Id:32989616 Page 238

---

## Page 239

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach

RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

The Bureau's success in handling disme can be

attributed to the know-how of the sas of the New York

Office becausedan is a highly emotional individual

a high degree of skill in dealing with this source in

order to achieve the success that we did.

While it is acknowledged that CIA put us

originally in touch with this source, it was not

believed that it is essential that we go back to CIA

and explain to them our success or to thank them for .

giving us this original léad. It is also noted that

there is an obligation upon Government agencies to

cooperate in the fullest and CIA's cooperation in this

matter was in accordance with the long standing policy

among all Government agencies.

Review of NAME. file does not reflect any

instance where CIA indicated a displeasure in the Bureau

not acknowledging CIA's assistance in placing us in touch

with NAME

This is in line with : NAME

statement

in 1963 that he did not want to get involved in any

investigative aspects of this matter and wanted to step

out as soon as possible. In view of the above, it is not

believed that CIA would have any basis to complain that the

Bureau never acknowledged CIA's assistance.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts

forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matterine

Iseter

IN 55036 DocId:32989616 Page 239

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## Page 240

OFFIONAL EARN NIT 19

5010-106

MAT THE GOIN

LiSA GON, BIG. NO.21

*.. * UNITED STATES GO,

NMENT

Memorandum

TO

Mr. C. D. Deloach

FROM :M. C. Sullivan

DATE: March

7, 1970

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPSWITH CIA

EXCHANGE OF TECHNICAL INFORMATION

0x 1-11-01

Item number 34 in the material submitted to the

Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 concerns

exchange of technical information' with CIA, particularly as

it related to the technical surveillance field. Papich states

CiA exhibited its equipment to us, but for many years we declined

to show any of our devices, with some exceptions. He states

that CIA never made an official protest but informally indicated

from time to time that the lack of exchange was prejudicial to

overall intelligence and internal security interests and implied

we were more open with the British in this area than with CIA.

Papich states this situation does not exist today as there is

a good exchange by the Bureau and CIA.

Our files reveal that through the years CIA has

furnished the Bureau a number of technical devices for our use

or inspection.

They have also furnished technical manuals obtained

abroad

and briefed us on operational and technical aspects of

some of

their operations abroad. • Laboratory personnel have been

afforded tours and briefings concerning CIA facilities ahd

equipment and in two instances Bureau personnel have been afforded

training at CIA schools.

As recently as October, 1969, CIA

afforded a briefing to Bureau personnel concerning SENSITiVE

METHOD •

, developed by their technical people and

•offered to loan us one of these units as weld as afford our

of these,

personnel training in the operation of the equipment.

COMMENTS OF THE LABORATORY

Similarly, Bureau records show substantial reciprocity

on the part of the FBI in developing and furnishing important

technical information to clA over a period of many years.

Representative examples are cited below:

PIiOr tO yEAR an important unsolved technical

intelligence problem involved desired access to

enemy intelligence and other security information

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

CONTINUED - OVER

HIH

55036 DocId:32989616 Page, 240

---

## Page 241

id

Memorandum for Mr: DeLoach

RE:

RELATIONSHIPSWITH CIA

EXCHANGE OF TECHNICAL INFORMATION

protected by SENSITIVE - IDENTIFYNG DATA

Scientists in the FBI Laboratory were

able to solve this problem by

SENSITIVE METHOD

This was a scientific

breakthrough of tremendous intelligence potential and,

with Bureau approval, our results and techniques were

made known to the appropriate CIA representatives.

CIA advised that they had theretofore spent thousands

they had the

of dollars in an intensive, but unsuccessful effort to

solve the same problem. The impact of this scientific

discovery in permitting access to previously unavailable

intelligence had tremendous value for both the FBI and

CIA.

.

In approximately the late YEAR and early WEAN both CIA

and FBI encountered a new, highly sophisticated type

SENSITIVE METHI

-------

In spite of a

massive technical effort mounted by CIA, scientists

of the FBI Laboratory were successful in first unraveling

the basic principles and techniques underlying this new

SENSITIVE system.

This important breakthrough thus permittec

for the first time a successful attack against the new

SENSITIVE METHOD

Because of its

extreme intelligence potential, with prior Bureau approval;

this development was made known to CIA, and its importance

•to CIA is reflected in part by a letter addressed to the

Director of FBI by Allen W. Dulles, then Director of CIA,

under date of August 19, 1961, in which Dulles said, in

part, "For the past several years there has been

increasingly effective technical liaison between the

Technical Services Division of this Agency and correspond

ing components of your Bureau. . ." Dulles further

commented that Bureau technical personnel had "

•• • made

an outstanding technical contribution for which they are to

be highly .commended.

Their work not only has an important

Impact in one sensitive area, but also has revealed a

SENSITIVE METHOD

The discovery will have an

∞ 2 =

CONTINUED - OVER

SECR

ET

HH 55036

DocId: 32989616

Page 241

---

## Page 242

Memorandum for dir. Deloach

RE:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

EXCHANGE OF TECHNICAL INFORMATION

isifias

important influence on the discharge of responsibilities

assigned both to this Agency and the FBI. I consider

access to these lindingsto be further evidence of the

value of close technical liaison between our two

organizations. . ."

Subsequently, again with prior Bureau approval, whenever

it could be done without jeopardizing FBI operational

interests, the FBI on a continuing basis made available

SENSITIVE METHOD

A recent example involved the

espionage case of NAME

Wherein

on 2/12/69 a. SENSITVE METHOD

used by

vas

furnished to CIA by a representative of the FBI Laboratory.

The above items are representative outstanding examples

,OI fBI cooperation in developing and sharing highly important

technical information, and certainly the letter from CIA reflects

the satisfaction and importance which CIA attached to such

information received from the Bureau. Within general Bureau

policy guidellnes, there were, of course, on a continuing basis

numerous other items of technical information shared with CIA

over the years, including briefings and exchange of visits.

RECOMBENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set

forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

WH 55036 DocId: 32989616

Page 242

---

## Page 243

GEN.

11G, NG. 38

•" UNITED STATES GO'

NMENT

Memorandum

TO

Mr. C. D. DeLoạch

DATE: March

.6;

1970

DECLASSIFTED BY SP -2 ALm/ZAC

FRO. : Mir. W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

CIA LECTURERS AT BUREAU TRAINING SCHOOLS

EXCHANGE IN THE TRAINING FIELD

Items number 35 and 36 in the material submitted to the

lecture at our schools and CIA was unhappy regarding our attitude

concerning exchange of information in the training field.

CIA by letter May 19, 1950, requested it be permitted to

discuss training problems with

FBI training staff in view of

necessity of its maintaining relations with foreign police and

security agencies.

Following recommendations by the Executives

conterence, Bureau advIsed ClA by letter May 2o, Lysu, that we dio

not believe IBl training staff could intelligently discuss training

methods with CIA since our staff was not knowledgeable concerning

conditions encountered by CIA in various foreign countries.

SENSITIVE METHOD

IDENTIFYING DATA.

of its mon attend, the Director approved a request of CIA to have

Onr

the National Academy for purpose "to improve

capabilities of CIA personnel engaged in overseas police training

programs."

As a result, a CIA Security Officer graduated from the

#

SESSION Of the FBI National Academy

At the specific request of CIA, Bureau representatives have

addressed CIA intelligence personnel attending refresher-type

training courses on 31 occasions between June,

1962, and December,

1969.

CONTINUED - OVER

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Discinsure

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

НН 55036 •Do0Id:32989616 Page 243

---

## Page 244

Memorandum to Mr.

C. D. DeLoach

We loaned CIA four Bureau training films in

February, 1965, one was eventually returned, but CIA

continues to utilize the otber three films entitled "on

The Record, " "Interviews," and "Burglary Investigations."

We continue to use foreign language films from CIA which.

were loaned to us as a supplement to the Bureau's Language

Training Program.

Representatives of CIA have not lectured at

Bureau training schools and there is no indication in

Bureau files that this has been advocated by CIA.

This memorandum has been coordinated with the

Training Division.

RECOMMANDED ACTION:

None.

We do not. believe, in light of. the facts

set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

2.

Ни 55036,

DocId: 32989616

Page 244

---

## Page 245

.

OPTIONAL PORM NO, 10

5010-108

ESA GIN.-CG.NO 27

UNITED STATES Ci

KNMENT

Memorandum

C4220

142035-

TO

:Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: 3/6/70

FROM : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

(POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE)

Item Number 37 in the material submitted to the

Director by Special Agent Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70

discusses CIA criticism which could generate from Agency belief

that Bureau has failed to cooperate and offer necessary assistance

in collection of positive intelligence in the United States.

Memorandum is to deal with specific cases believed by Papich

to evidence lack of cooperation and to briefly comment on policy

of cooperation we have adopted with CIA.

SYNOPSIS:

Mentioned

Item by Papich points out CIA belief that

more aggressive action should have been taken in field of

collecting positive intelligence in the United States.

Papich

notes Bureau's action in this field, for the most part, has been

restricted to compliance with requests by State Department when

political crises occur in some country.

He points out CLA belief

that acquiring needed data would mean increased technical surveil-

Lance coverage, developmenapich aformants and collection of

cryptographic material.

cites two specific cases occurring

in 1969 where Bureau declined CIA's request for technical coverage,

suggesting to Agency that it make its request directly to the

Attorney General. Review of specific cases mentioned set forth

with Director's comments relative thereto being noted.

Our

policy of cooperation with CIA most recently delinated to field

by SAC Letter 65-10 (B) - copy attached. SAC lefter calls for

guarding our jurisdiction but shows our willingness to cooperate

with CIA.

OBSERVATIONS AND ACTION - OVER

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SECRET

55036 DooId: 32989616

Page 245

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## Page 246

Memorandum to M. C. D. DeLoach

RE:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

CIA has repeatedly raised the issue in the past of

our coverage in the positive intelligence collection area and

we can reasonably expect similar issues to be raised in the

future.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

That we prepare a carefully worded letter to CIA

outlining

policy and the basic elements of intelligence and

counterintelligence work affecting the United States and

forthrightly ask CIA if it is satisfied with the status quo

and if not what do they have to suggest as changes.

- 2 -

SECRET

HH 55036 DocId:32989616

Page 246

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## Page 247

Memorandum to Mr.

• D. ' DeLoach

RE:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

RU6S1

DETAILS:

Papich points out CIA feels there is unexplored

field for acquiring positive intelligence in the United States

but he notes that there has been no law, directive, or executive

order which fixes responsibility for clandestine collection of

such information. He notes we investigate subversives, spies,

and develop penetrations of foreign intelligence services and

that facets of these investigations of violations of United States

laws serve

to fulfill a counterintelligence objective referred

to by us as investigations of internal security matters.

Papich

notes, however, that most of our work in the positive intelligence

has been

restricted to the compliance with requests by

State Department prompted usually by a political crisis occurring

in some foreign country.

Papich points out CIA feels there is unexplored

field for acquiring positive intelligence requiring use of

vastly increased

technical surveillances, informant development

and collection of cryptographic material. According to Papich,

CIA does not feel Bureau has moved aggressively in this area

and CIA has been thwarted in attempts to do much about the

problem. Papich cites two cases MAME

and

NAME

where CIA requests

for technical surveil

lance were declined by us with the suggestion to CIA that these

matters should be taken up by that Agency directly with

• the

Attorney General.

Specific Cases

CIA advised that MAME AND POSITION

had been

under development by FoREiGi intelligence service partly as

a result of his weakness for women when assigned PLACE

EXOM YEAR tO YEAR.

NAME

was to participate, in bilateral

talks with United States officials in DATE

3y letter

DAYE CIA requested telephone and microphone surveillances on

NAME

The Director commented "Let CIA seek the authority

of the AG.. I don't

want them utilizing FBI as their channel."

NAME

was originally investigated by us

in fEAR as a possible unregistered agent of FOREIGN

Govern-

ment due to negotiations by him with FOREIGN

designed

to set up a semiprivate nuclear processing company iu FOREIGN

COUNTEY.

-3 -

CONTINUED - OVER

HN 55036 DocId: 32989616 Page 247

---

## Page 248

SEANS

Memorandum to Mr

D. DeLoach

RE:

RELATIONSHIPS

WITH

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Our investigation showed close contact by fAME

with FORE/GW

officials,

NAME

and details

of activity by that subject to create the firm mentioned.

NAME

headed a Plata-

Commission

firm involved in Atomic Energy

Our initial AIC) work requiring "Top Secret" clearance by ABC.

investigation was closed when Assistant Attorney

General - Internal

Security Division found that facts did not

justify soliciting

NAME

...'s registration as a foreign agent.

In Spring of YEAR sixty-one kilograms of nuclear

material were found to be unaccounted for by the firm headed

but subsequent inventories and checking by AEC

revealed this shortage was probably the result of cumulative

process of wasteful production methods over a period of eight

years and did not justify an unqualified determination of a

diversion of nuclear material on the part of WAME

to

unauthorized persons or government.

CIA, in YEAr became alarmed on receipt of information

of loss of mentioned nuclear material and despite AEC findings

{cit it may indicate illogal diversion or at least justification

for reopening investigation.

NAME

¿ CIA contacted

the Attorney General directly with his thoughts regarding the

need for additional investigation. Attorney General contacted

Bureau requesting it discuss matter with CIA and determine

advisibility of additional investigation. The Director,

in

approving conference with CIA, noted "OK but I doubt advisibility

of getting into this. It looks, like MAMe is going around

us to AG as he suspects we would say no."

An intensive investigation of NaMe conducted

during late YEAN and into Fall offran revealed no positive

intelligence activity on his part or verifiable diversion of

surveillances installed DATE

and discontinued, DAYM.HAME

was interviewed by AEC DATE

and disclaimed passing any

classified data to FOREIGN

Facts of case were

reviewed by Department of Justice which

found no evidence of pro-

secutable violation by NAME

AEC felt the additional investi-

gation produced no data upon which could be based a legitimate

withdrawal of clearance for AEC contracts or information. In

view of this, we closed our investigation and CIA was so advised.

A DATE

letter from NAM' acknowledged additional investigation

- 4-

CONTINUED - OVER

(877950393498417.92

---

## Page 249

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach

RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

would produce no legal evidence pertinent to the issue which

prompted CIA's original request but noted he felt reinstituted

audio surveillances of jAM

would produce positive intelligence

information.

He therefore requested reinstitution of this

coverage.

The Director's letter to MAME

noted that

after careful review it was felt that CIA should take this

matter to the Attorney General.

On October 21, 1969, a CIA official was told by

Special Agent Papich that inthe future CIA should transmit its

requests for technical surveillance coverage in the United States

to the Attorney General. This specifically covered the cases

of NAME

and NAME

The Director commented "Right."

Bureau Policy of Cooperation

In 1965 and 1966, recognizing overlapping interests,

changes inherent in faster

communication, hysteria to facilitate

international travel and in response to requests from CIA, the

Director approved Bureau attendance at conferences with CIA

regarding that Agency's operational activities in the United

States.

On a memorandum reporting the results of the conferences with

CIA,

the Director commented "I hope we still don't let our

guard down as CIA has always outsmarted'us because of

our

gullibility."

SAC Letter 66-10 (B) dated 2/15/66 furnished to the

field and Bureau offiçials results of the conferences with CIA

and emphasized necessity for protecting Bureau jurisdiction.in

the counterintelligence field.

This SAC letter (copy attached)

emphasized there is to be no interference with or infringement

upon our jurisdiction but clearly shows our willingness

cooperate with CIA in developing positive intelligence in the

United States. In approving this SAC letter, the Director

noted "I hope

there is no 'sneaker' in this.

Time will tell."

There has been

no renewed request from CIA for

technical coverage in the cases mentioned above, nor has there

been any indication that such requests have been sent by CIA

to the Attorney General as we suggested. Due to CIA interest

in the past in these matters, we cannot rule out the possibility

the Agency may approach

Attorney General for the desired

coverage at some time in the future.

-5 -

( SECRET

1N 55036 DooId:32989616 Page 249

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## Page 250

(B) CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCI - OPCRATIONS IN THE UNITED

STATES - The Bureau recently completed discussions with the Central

Intelligence Agency (CIA) regarding that agency's operational activitics in

the United States. These discussions essentially denit with CiA's assestcht

and recruitment of foreign intelligence sources in the United States. Endlesad

toi your use is a list oi the ground rules which both agencies have accepted

as guidelines for effecting the necessary coordination. In order that you may

be adequately oriented in this matter, the following background is set crth.

The need for the ground rules is related to Cli's interesi in developing

positive intelligence sources in the Unitec States and the necessity for

protecting the Bureau's jurisdiction in the counterinteiligence field. The

latter is essential to the adequate dischaige of our responsibilities to

national security.

Positive intelligence may be described is a comprchensive product

resulting from collection, evaluation, colation, chalysis, and interpretation

of all available intormation relatirg to national security and concerning die:

countries where such information is signiticant to our Go: ernient's deralna-

ment and execution of plans: policies, and courses of action. Such intelligence

can be divided into various categories, suen as econoinic, military, scienufic.

political; geographic, st cerera. The collection of positive intelligence is

distinguished from counterintelligence waich is primarily cosigned to pendate.

monitor, neutralize and/or disrupi the foreign inteiligence and security services.

Counterintelligence further includes other functions of an internal security

nature directed againsi subrersive groups, cagumzations, and induriduals. By

law CIA does not have any law enforcement o. internal security funcuone. Ci's

authorization for collecting positive intelligence is predicated on the Nationai

Security Act of 1947 and subsequent issuance oi National Security Council

Directives. There is no law: directive, or charter which authorizes Cia io

engage in the clandestine development of positiva intelligence sources in the

United States. Thereîcre, in the absence of any statuory prerogative to conduc-

such activity in the United States, it nes been mutually arced by FBI and Ci

that the Agency can only engage in the clandestine developrient and handing ef

positive intelligence sources in this country by coordinating with the Dorea:

The Bureau in turn legally has the primary counterinielligence responsioni::

in the U. S. and is continually developing pestttre intelligence, It, hostar.

must be regarded an incidental product to our main objective. The Buretu

does not have a primary responsibilty to collect positive intellígence. but we

do have numerous and very sigmacant obligatone in this field. In acid: practica

the Bureau is required by the President and ciher agencies to develop infouriar:

DECLASSIFIED MARG

OIN

2-15-66

SAC LETTER 66-10

111-01

LAALAN 176

- 2 -

\ SEC

HH 55036 DocId: 32989616 Page 250

---

## Page 251

of a positive intelligence nature. This requires Bureau action designed to

bring about the necessary coverage. A good example is our involvement

in the development of information relating to the crisis in the Dominican

Republic. From the above you will recognize that there can be "gray areas"

of interest to the Bureau and CIA. It, therefore, has been necessary to

effect adequate coordinating machinery.

The potential for the development of positive inteiligence in this

country is vast and varied. Voluminous positive intelligence is collected

overtly through the review of foreign and comestic publications, interviews

of travelers, arriving aliens, contacts with scientists, et cetera. In this

area there have been no serious issues between the Bureau and CIA.

However, in the field of clandestine development of positive

intelligence both agencies have an interest, and there is a necessity for a

clear-cut understanding of jurisdiction and coordination. Particularly is

this true in the development of positive intelligence sources who are

employees or officials of foreign governments stationed in the United States

or who are visiting this country on a temporary basis.

For many year's he Bureau has had a continuing prograin of

developing sources in diplomatic installations for the purpose of discharging

our counterintelligence responsibilities and incidentally for developing

positive intelligence information which might assist the Government in

formulating policy. The Bureau, recognizing CIA s need for sources in the

positive intelligence field, has permitted CIA to assess and recruit sources in

the United States in a limited manner with the understanding that such activities

are fully coordinated with the Bureau. In January, 1964, CIA established

their Domestic Operations Division (DOD) to conduct such operations in the

United States. and certain Bureau field offices were alerted and furnished

the necessary guidance and instructions. The recent discussions with CIA

resulted in a refinement of the understanding of the ground rules established

in January, 1961.

The enclosed ground rules will be applied by the Bureau and CIA

as cases arise. The Bureau position in each matter will be decided at the

Seat of Government. As a general rule. Bureau Headquarters will be intormed

by ClA regarding its interest in an individual or a target.

Prior to notiricatior

of CIA regarding our position, the situation will be carefully reviewed at the

Seat of Government. This may often include a request to the field for

2-15-66

SAC LETTER 66-10

-3 -

НН 55036 DooId:32989616 Page 251

---

## Page 252

observations and recommendations before notice is transmitted to CIA. Ai

the same time, it is possible that you may be contacted in the field by a

representative of DOD, CIA. I so, you should be guided by the enclosed •

ground rules in any discussions, bezring in mind that the approval for any

particular cperational activity is lo be made at Bureau Headquarters.

You should hold to the concept that the protection of the interna!

security of the United States involves very basic clear-cut responsibilities

of the FBI. This should be kept in mind in each case and in any contacts

which you may have with CIA representatives. There is to be no interfere-se

with or infringement upon our jurisdiction. It is recognized that unforesee.

developments may create siuations not adequately covered by the ground riles.

You, therefore, should report such matters to the Bureau setting forth

complete details with your recommendations. Although we have been inforzed

by CIA that the Bureau's jurisdiction and operational interests will not be

interfered with, we cannot discount the results of past experiences stemming

from CIA's operational and organizational deficiencies. We have no reasc. io

believe that there will be a revolutionary change of these conditions. It is.

therefore, incumbent upon you to be extremely alert for any breakdown of the

adherence to the ground rules. I emphasize that this is an area of activity

which must be closely monitored by each Special Agent in Charge.

You

should be certain that your personnel is adequately oriented so that the Bureau

can have the full benefit of any constructive suggestions pertaining to this

entire matter.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosure for (B)

2-15-66

:

SAC LETTER 66-10

- 4-

NH 55036 DocId: 32989616 Paye 252

---

## Page 253

UNIT

1na Repls, Plause Riefer 80

file No.

SECRET

STATES DEPARTMENT OF JE

CE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

NASHINGTON, D.C.

20535

February 7, 1956

JEK Act 6 11)

(B)

SECRET

GHOUP 1

Excluded from automatio

downrading and

declassification

SECRET

IN 55036 DocId:32989616 Page 253

---

## Page 254

SECRET

JEK Act

6 (1) (B)

¡ SEERET

- 2

SECRET

HH 55036

DocId: 32989616

Page 254

---

## Page 255

OPTIONAL "ORA "A lU

2010 - 106

MAY :908 EDITIUN

GSA GEN, EEG.NO. 97

UNITED STATES GOL

FERNMENI

Memorandum

TO

:Mr. C. D. DeLoach

FROM :W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS

DATE:

3/7/70

#MORIG

DECLASSIFIED BY SP. 2 ALM/116

0x1-1/=01

Director by SA Sam Papich in hisremorandum of 3/5/70 serves as

a sort of summary in which SA Papich indicates that he cannot

recall the names of other cases which resulted in CIA displeasure

or criticism, but does cite one instance "early in the 1950's"

in which we disseminated data from a source of unknown reliability

charging Allen Dulles as having been a communist and a spy

while in Europe.

By letter 3/22/52, we informed State and CIA that a

source of unknown reliability hud alleged that IPENTFFING

PAYA

had been arrested in Hungary in 1947 or

1948 and forced to write a letter to his wife which brought her

to Hungary where she was also arrested.

We asked for an

evaluation of the information.

NAME

memorandum,

4/5/52, states he received a call from

ALLen Dulles auring which

Dulles

referred to the letter and said'he was not concernec

about it but wanted varito look it over. We vere subsequently

informed by CIA that Allen Dulles . IDENTIFYING ANYA?

OTHER INDIUUDUAL

had said that

the information concerning dulles and his wife was without

foundation and we promptly told State of this by letter 4/15/52,

a copy of which was directed to Allen Dulles.

memorandum 5/10/52 written by SA Papich reports his discussion

with Dulles concerning this matter:

original letter could be withdrawn and was told that it appeared

that the FBI had already set the records straight but that if he

wished to make an official request, Papich would refer the natter

to the Bureau for consideration.

Dulles. immediately replied that

he definitely did not want to make "a big thing" of the letter,

that it was not that important,

and that maybe it would be better

to drop the matter.. General Smith (then Director of Central

Intelligence) later told Papich that he considered the matter

closed.

SA Papich also alludes to other instances in which

CIA alleged that we bad mishandled its information. He has no

i specifics, however, and states he cannot recall the

cases.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Diselasure

ACTION - Page 2

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

IN 55036 DocId:32989616 Page 255

---

## Page 256

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach

RE:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts

set forth, that CIA will make

an issue of this matter.

WH 55036 DocId: 32989616 Page 256

---

## Page 257

UNEXCISED VERSION OF 38 MEMORANDA BEING

HELD AT FBIHQ FOR

i REVIEW BY SSC.

IF TEFORMATION COUTAIN:

HH 55036 DocId: 32989616

Page 257

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## Page 258

OPTIONAL FORM NO, 10

50102100

MAY 1957 EDITION

GSA GEN. REG. NO, 27

UNITED STATES ^

NMENT

Memoranaim

TO

: Mx. DeLoach

'SE

DATE: Harch 9, 1970

FROM : W. C. Sullivas

SUBJECT:

DECLASSTATED BY 5668 SEDIGEL

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

Reference is made to the memorandum W. C. Sullivan

to C. D. DeLoach dated 3/5/70; captionedi as above.

At that

time the Director was advised

this Division would make an

analysis of each situation cited in the memorandum of

Special Agent Sam J. Papich relative to grievances which CIA

might hold in connection with relations with the FBI.

Enclosed will be found an analysis of 38 items

(2 are contained in one memorandum, making a total of 37

memoranda),

In substance our analysis does not show any

real reason why CIA would raise any issue in connection with

37 out of the 38 items.

The recommended action in each of

these cases would logically close the mutter.

In one memorandum

the 37th item ense, It is recommended that a carelully wordec

letter to CiA outlining policy and the basic elements oi

intelligence and counterintelligence work affecting the

United States be sent to that Agency. The purpose of this is

to protect the Bureau by giving CIA a dance to make any

comments, if it has any, in regard to the current utilization

pf sources and facilities affecting both CIA and the Bureau.

If CIA replies that it is satisfied with the current intelli-

gence conditions in this area, we will qut this particular

matter to rest and we will have their letter in the file.

This Division will take any and all steps to comply

With the Director's wishes in this matüer and

in any other

concerning which this Division is involved.

RECOMMENDATION:

For the information of the livector.

Classified by.

83

Exempt from GDS Category 2€3

Date of Declassifiction Indefinite

Pressame

SECI

14.55036 DocId:32989616 Page 258

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## Page 259

OL'SINAL FORM NO. 10

101-110

MA:

962 EUITIG, 1

GSA GEN, REG. NO, 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

lohr -

3ishop

Colon -

TO

Mr. C. D. Deloach

SECRET

DATE: March 6, 1970

FROM

: Mr. W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

JEK Act 6 (1) (A)

Item number one in the material submitted to the

Director by

special Agent (SA) Sam Papich in his memorandum

3/5/70 discusses the case of

110-01

ANDRIG

CLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM /IT&

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X6

JEK ACt 6 (1)(A)

BACKGROUND OF CASE

Ja Hollywood motion pictureAct 6 (1)A)

producer,

was recruited by Soviet intelligence in 1935.

From

1947 to 1957 he was operated as a double agent by the FBI.

This

was

an extremely sensitive counterintelligence operation involving

Soviet intelligence activities in the United States in which

Norros traveled behind

the

"Iron Curtain for meetings with his

Soviet principals.

Information obtained by

from his Soviet contactst 6 (1)1)

was disseminated to interested

agencies,

including the Central

Intelligence Agency. On January 25, 1957, Jack Soble, Myra Soble,

and Jacob Albam were arrested in New York on charges of conspiracy

to commit espionage against the United States.

ATL INFORMATION CONTAXMAD

HOREIN IS UNCLASSITIID EXCEET

WERE SHOWN QEERWISE

PROBLEM WITH CIA

On March 16, 1954, the Bureau disseminated

Information received from [

_to heads of the various k Act 6 (1) (4)

intelligence agencies, including, CIA.

By letter of March 27, 1954,

Lieutenant General C.

P. Cabell, Acting Director of CIA,

criticized the information and, in effect, characterized it as

"fabrication or the product of

a paper mill," which conclusion

Cabell stated had been applied to many similar disseminations in

the past from apparently the same source.

By letter of April 5,

1954, the Bureau informed CIA that it was believed that no useful

purpose would be served in making any future dissemination to

CIA of information received from this source.

On April 9, 1954, Mr. Allen Dulles,

then Director of

CIA, advised Liaison

Agent Papich that he had been looking into the

matter and there was

no question in his mind but that his agency

had acted stupidly in transmitting such a letter to the Bureau.

62-80750

1 - 100-352385

JEK Act 6 (1) (A)

1 - Mx. C. D. DeLoach

1=1:

W. C. Sullivan

W. A. Branigan

SECRET

Do J. Brennan

Classified by G 2 83

Exempt from CDS, Category 2&J

Date of Declassification Indefinite

1 - Mr.

Whitson

IW: as P'(7)

CONTINUED - OVER

HH 55036 DooId: 32989616 Page 259

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## Page 260

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach

RE:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

62-80750

SECRET

By letter of April 21, 1954, Mr. Dulles stated that

CIA would appreciate it if the

to send reports from the source l

Bureau would eh del continue

I which relate

JEK Act

6 (1). A)

to matters of foreign intelligence. By letter of April 29, 1954,

the Director expressed the opinion that no useful purpose

would be served by disseminating to CIA information received

from the source in the future.

Nevertheless, memorandum Branigan to Belmont dated

• Information in the L

JEK Act 6 (1) (A)

by National Security Council Directivto be furnished to CIA,

it should be carefully evaluated and a decision made at that

time

as to the officials and agencies of the Government to whom it

should be disseminated. The Director noted "OK but before anything

goes to CIA from this source I want to pass on it.

This

restriction does not apply to dissemination to other agencies. H"

Subsequent to the foregoing three disseminations were

made to interested agencies, including CIA, based on information

during October and December, 1954, and appropriater Act 6(1)14

dissemination was made thereafter with the Director's approval.

As the time grew near for prosecutive action, the

Department requested the Bureau to check with CIA to see if

Department attorneys could interview a soviet intelligence

defector then in custody of CIA named L

JEK ACt 6 (1) (A

Accordingly,

the Director authorized an oral briefing of Mr. Dulles

and on 1/8/57 he and James Angleton of his staff were generally

briefed on the l

and the contemplated prosecution.

They were (lA

furnished with background data concerning subjects residing in

France, C

_ CIA was requested

I to searchAct 6 (1) (A)

the names of individuals involved in the case and was

asked regarding identities of CIA employees who might have

information of pertinence concerning the l

JEK Act 6 (1) (A).

On March 4, 1957, Mr. James Angleton informed the liaison

agent of resentment on the

part of CIA employees and

officials

based upon the following:

SECRET

-2 -

CONTINUED - OVER

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## Page 261

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach

RE:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

62-80750

SECRET

(1) CIA feels it should have been advised much

earlier concerning those aspects of the case relating to

CIA employees.

(2) Leads were given to CIA at the same time the

case was

publicized

and, therefore, CIA was handicapped.

(3) The failure to coordinate the French aspects

of the case with CIA permitted the French intelligence

agencies to play a dominant role in the European

investigation.

(4)

CIA fears the Bureau had not told it all there

was to know about the case that CIA should have known.

DISPOSAL OF PROBLEM WITH CIA

The Bureau took the position

that any necessary investigation looking toward prosecution

in countries where Bureau had a Legal Attache would be

referred by the legal Attache to the appropriate investigative

agency of that country.

did not have a Legal Attache, request for investigation would

be channelled through CIA.

прошей стало,

In those countries where the Bureau

Because thel

were in

JEK Act 6 (1) (A

France, the interrogation

of the

was handled by

JEK Act 6 (1)(A

request from the Legal

Attache to the French.

JEK Act 6 (1)(A)

during World War II had been with the

Office of Strategic Services and had contacts later with CIA

personnel.

Prior to decision on prosecution we did not

disseminate information regarding the

_ because we

JEK Act 6 (1) (A)

feared the effects of compromise from possible leaks would

endanger the life of our source. This was particularly true

in view of CIA's expressed attitude in 1954. Some leads had

been given to CIA over two weeks before the

arrests

of the

subjects in the United States. • Leads were not given earlier

because of the fear of possible compromise. As far as

coordinating the French aspects of the case were concerned,

it is doubted that CIA could have exerted any control over

French investigation after the French had the information.

There was a distinct difference in this case between

intelligence information and evidence in support of prosecutive

action.

SECRET

- 3 - CONTINUED - OVER

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## Page 262

i""'

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach

RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

62-80750

(5)

Recently the British MI-5 representative in

Hashington has made some inquiries relating to

indicating the British may now believe l

Iwas either

known to the soviets as our agent or was under their control.

It is not known if the British have discussed this matter

with CIA.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None.

We do not believe, in light of the facts

set

forth,

that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

Act 6 (1) (A)

SECRET

- 4-

HH 55036

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262

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## Page 263

OPTIONAL FORM NO, 10

5010-108

MAY 1962 EDITION

GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

: Mx. C. D. Deloach

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

BUREAU OPERATIONS IN MEXICO

jolion

11oach

Mohr

1 - Mr. DeLoach

1 - Mr. Sullivan

Rishop

Casper

Callahan

Conrad

Felt.

DATE: 3/9/70

Gale

Rosen

Sullivan

1 - Liaison

Tavel

Soyars

1 - Mr. Bermingham

Tele. Room

Holmes

Gan dy

#mOR16

DECLASSTITED BY SPEZ ALIN LIG

eL 1-10-01

disaster is

Item number two in the material submitted to the

Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum dated 3/5/70 states

that during the 1950's, CIA periodically complained that the

operations of our office in Mexico and specifically those

involving the operating of informants and the penetration of

the Communist Party of Mexico violated the understanding that

this office was to act only as a liaison post. He also states

CIA has informally raised questions on our running informants

in Mexico and still being able to comply with Directives requiring

coordination of overseas clandestine counterintelligence

operations under CIA. He states comments by CIA officials

along above lines have been casual and informal and indicate

the situation has been

a potential issue rather than an actual

conflict or disagreement. The essence of his remarks in this

item is that the Bureau is vulnerable to criticism by CIA

because of our operations in Mexico.

formal

Review of our files fail to reveal receipt of any

protest by CiA concerning these matters.

We have been

operating

in Mexico City since 1947. In 1951,

Inspector V. P. Keay,

after visiting Mexico City,

reported

that CIA was not adequately investigating matters

affecting the internal security of the U.S. and recommended

that after properly advising CIA, Legat, Mexico, be instructed

to undertake such investigations.

considered this problem on 4/19/51 and decided we should extend

око but so.

The Executive Conference

our coverage in Mexico but should not reach any, understanding

with ClA regarding these increased activities.

It was decided,

however, to advise ClA in writing of this problem in Mexico

in order to fix responsibility on that Agency and such a letter

was sent on 5/1/51..

A copy is attached.

Enclosure

JEK Act 6 (1) (B)

RAB: bsf/ wnk Whik

(5)

CONTINUED - OVER

NW 55036 DocId:32989616 Page 263

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## Page 264

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach

RE:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

BUREAU OPERATIONS IN MEXICO

EYRET

In 10/51, almost simultaneously, our Legats in

Mexico City, Madrid, and Paris, reported instances of CIA

officials openly challenging our operations, generallyk Act 6 (11B

on the grounds that we were violating CIA overseas

jurisdiction. Inspectors V. P. Keay and DeLoach personally

and forcefully brought these instances to the attention of

General Walter B. Smith, Director of CIA, in a heated exchange

on 10/24/51. Out of this meeting developed a luncheon on 11/7/51

attended by the Director, Bureau officials and General Smith,

who was accompanied by several officers of his Agency.

According to a memorandum, D. M. Laddto the Director, dated

pieceed, CIA recognized our presence abroad and both areacies

cooperation and coordination through greater liaison

so as to prevent conflict and competition in these closely

associated operations.

During the ensuing 19 years, the

Bureau continued to operate in Mexico and on occasions

moderately expanded its activities in order to meet its

needs. During this lengthy

period, there were no serious

problems with CIA, with reference to our Mexico City office.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set

forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

WKS

SENRET

— 2 00

KH 55036 DocId: 32989616 Page 264

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## Page 265

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

Date:

To:

May 1, 1951

Director

Central Intelligence Agency

2430 E Street, Northwest

Hashington, D. C.

Attention:

Major General W. G. Wyman

JEK Act 6 (1) (B)

From:

Subject:

John Edgar Hoover, Director

Federal Bureau of Investigation

COVERAGE OF ACTIVITXES OF

AMERICAN COUNUNISTS IN MEXICO

Reference is made to recent discussions between representa-

tives of the Office of

Jand Special AgentkOst D 1 (B

Deloach of the faderal Bureau of Investigation regarding the captioned

matter. It is understood that your representatives pointed out that

the

with its limited personnel, attempted- (B

to follow movements of American

Communists as vell as possibie,

however, it would be impossible to guarantee an advance report in

each individual cage when the Communist member in question is about

to return to the United States.

You will recall that the following suggestions were

offered by your representatives in connection with this matter:

(1) Utilization of the Immigration and Naturalization

Service Watch list.

(2) Advice from FBI as to whether the Mexican Police

could be used in handling cases.

(3)

Tolson

JeLoach

Wolters

1ohr

Bishop

Casper

Callahan

Conied

Felt

Gale

Essen

Salivan.

Tavel

Soyars

Tele. Room

Holmes -

HIH

NH 55036 DocId: 32989616

TELETYPE UNITL

Page

265

Advice fron the FBI to CIA indicating which cases

are nost important so that those cases could be

given preferred attention.

It was Indicated by the CIA representatives that possibly

the adoption of these suggestions would in some manner assist them

a Legal Attache,

COMMUNIST

Hes elico

SECRET

ec: Foreign Service Desk (detached)

AIR COURIER

---

## Page 266

SECRET

The FBI, of course, fully realizes the difficult problems

Involved in surveilling American communists in foreign countries

At the same time, however, it must be pointed out that in the present

emergency each individual

Communist investigation, routine or

otherwise, should receive proper attention when the subject concerned

travels to foreign countries.

As you no doubt realize, the Communist

Party, U.s.A,, represents a potential force as far as

espionage

ana sabotage opeiations are concerned. Theretore, even minor

members of the

Party could become involved in delicate operations:

As pointed out in the discussions between Mi. DeLoach and representa

Lives of your agency, the travels of Communists fron the United

States to Mexico are

very likely to become much greater, thereby

proposing a more serious problem than is now faced.

The FBI has for some time utilized the Immigration and

Naturalization Service Watch List as a source of information concerning

the travel of Comnunists. Although representing an excellent method

of ascertaining this type of information, at the same time the FBI

is not afforded any advance warning from

this source as to the return

of the Conmunist. Party member to the United States.

Therefore, the

investigation of that member becomes delinquent in

view of the

fact

active investigation 1s not initiated at the time of his re-entry.

It is, therefore, belleved that this particular source of information

would not be satisfactory in lieu of information from your agency

which would notify us in advance of the return to the United States

of the Communist Party member in question.

With respect to the FBI advising your agency when the

services of the Mexican Police may, be utilized in individual cases,

this Bureau will be most-happy to advise you of those "sensitive

cases" which are considered too delicate for reierral to the Mexican

Police, or foreign factions. With regard to the remainder

of

Investigations, however, we shall defer to your judgment as to

whether you wish to utilize the Mexican Police or not.

The

jurisdiction of the Office of Special Operations in foreign

intelligence matters allows for a more over all knowledge oi the

Mexican Police than this Bureau presently possesses. Thererore, we

suggest that you weigh the facts in each individual case and consider

whether the Mexican Police should be called in or not. -

Concerning the

ranking importance of cases, it is the

opinion of this

Bureau that the facts provided your agency in each

individual case

will determine the methods of investigation you

wish to apply.

It is not, therefore, considered necessary for the

IBI to point out

; the importance of each matter referred to your

agency.

= .

CHET

-22 m

WH 55036 DocId: 32989616 Page 266

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## Page 267

SECRET

As suggested by your representatives, ve will be most

happy to hold a contorence with your Mexican supervisory personnel

at any time concerning discussions. of investigations in Mexico.

It is additionally suggested, however, that you advise your field

representatives in Moxico City to contact the FBI's Legal Attache

regarding coordination of the same matters in that locality.

..

3

SECRET

I₩ 55036 DocId:32989616 Page 267

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## Page 268

TO

FROM

SUBJECT:

#mDR/6

DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM

01 1-10-0L

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

5010-106

MAY 1982 EDITION

GSA GEN, REG. NO 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

: Mr.. C. D. DeLoach

Mr.

W. C. Sullivan

SERRET

1 - Mr. C.D. DeLoach

1 - MI. W.C. Sullivan

DATE: March 6, 1970

I - Mr. WoA. Branigan

1 - Mr. A.P. Litrento

1 - Liaison

Tolsion -

Polouch

salters

Mohr .

Bishop

Casper

Callahan

Conrad

felt -

Gale.

Rosen

Sullivan

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

THE ABEL CASE

Item #3 in the material submitted to the Director by

SA Sam Papich in his memorandum of March 5, 1970, discusses the

Abel case.

According to Papich, CIA felt it was not given proper

recognition for its contribution in the case, in that it took the

risk and responsibility of transporting Hayhanen from Paris to the

U. S. in 1957 after the Bureau declined to become

involved in this

transportation; that after a short handling period in the U. S. the

Bureau dropped Hayhanen, an alcoholic, because he became a problem

and CIA took the responsibility of safeguarding him, giving the

Bureau free access to him and time to develop leads leading to the

apprehension of Abel; that CIA was responsible for making Hayhanen

mentally and physically capable to testify at the Abel trial; also,

CIA incurred heavy expenses, all for the benefit of the Bureau;

further, the Bureau never thanked CIA for its cooperation nor did it

see fit to inform the Attorney General or the White House of the

role played by CIA.

BACKGROUND OF THE SITUATION:

Abel is the Soviet intelligence officer who was uncovered

in the U. S. in 1957 through the defection of Reino Hayhanen,

Abel's assistant.

Mr. Belmont that Hayhanen had

that make en talked a the meet cass wised

Paris about three days ago and was referred to fIA. He claimed he

was a Soviet agent in New York since 1952 and gave certain details

to back up his

story.

He claimed he was ordered back to Moscow and

got "cold feet" in Paris and wanted to cooperate with American

officials.

He was in a highly emotional state which led CIA to

question his mental stability. It was the opinion of Mr. Belmont

that no steps should be taken

to return Haybanen to the U. S. until

the story was substantiated or demolished to reflect his actual

status.

Our New York Office immediately instituted investigation,

62-80750

APL: tap (7) KIm

1 - 65-64538

CONTINUED - OVER

HH 55036 DocId: 32989616 Page 268

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## Page 269

Memorandun Mr. W. C. Sullivan to Mr. C. D. DeLoach

PE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

62-30750

based on Hayhänen's disclosures and

was not able to prove or

disprove his story. On May S, 1957, CIA was informed of the

facts developed by our investigation and asked what action it

intended to take regarding Hayhanen's return to the U.S.

On

May 9, 1957, Angleton advised of a report received from CIA, Paris,

revealing that haynanen had sutiered almost a complete mental

breakdown and that in view of his condition, arrangements were

made by CIA for him to be returned to the U.S. by plane.

On

May 10, 1957, Hayhanen was returned to the U.s. in the company o

a CIA agent.

On arrival our New York Agents were at the airport

to take him over, but because of his emotional state, he was

to take hin overy. healen

confined at the U.S. Marine Hospital in Staten Island until

Hay 15, 1957, when he was released to the custody of our Agents.

Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) authorities

irranged for his confinement in the U.s. Marine Hospital,

Staten Islar, for psychiatric examination through the U.S.

Public Realin service. (Liaison Agent Papich had previously

conferred with an INS official who had stated that if Hayhanen's

condition warranted confinement upon his arrival in the U.S.,

an order would have to be issued by the U.S. Public Health

Service).

Hayhanen and his wife were placed in a midtown hotel

by New York Agents and were under Bureau control from May 15, 1957,

until June 20, 1957, when they were taken to their residence

Peekskill, New York,

at their request. All expenses for their

maintenance were paid by the Bureau.

During this period Hayhanen

and his wife were becoming a problem because of heavy drinking

and irrational behavior.

On June 13, 1957, Abel was located by Bureau Agents when

visiting his studio in Brooklyn, New York, Ifforts by Bureau

Agents and the Department to have Hayhanen testify against Abel in a

crininal prosecution were unavailing.

With the Department's

concurrence, we arranged for INs authorities to arrest Abel on

June 21, 1957, on an alien warrant. After Abel's arrest, the

Department continued to raise questions concerning Hayhanen's

willingness to testify in an espionage

prosecution against Abel

and requested the Burea to press Hayhanen in that regard.

We

took the position that any efforts to induce layhanen to testify

should be made by the Department, as we realized that Hayhanen

would undoubtedly want assurances, such as remaining in this

country and financial assistance, and the Departnent was so

advised. The Department was also advised that the Bureau

would no longer pay liayhanen's subsistence and that other

arrangements would

have to be made.

In an effort to solicit

Haynanen's cooperation,

the Department conferred with Allen

Dulles of CIA to determine if CIA would be willing to sponsor

the entry of Hayhanen into the U.S. under the

authority granted

the Director of CIA by law. Dulles indicated a willingness

not only to sponsor Hayhanen but also to assist in his rehabilitation

HH 55036 DocId:32989616 Page 269

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"***

Memorandum Mr. W. C. Sullivan to Mc. C. D. DeLoach

RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

62-30750

In the U.s., such as

assisting

nim

in obtaining a job

and furnishing financial assistance for an extendea period

time.

On July 21, 1957 a CIA representative was placed

in touch with Hayhanen by New York Agents for this purpose!

Our Agents also arranged for FBI's access to Hayhanen whenever neces

sary.

Subsequently, Hayhanen agreed to testify and appeared

before a Federal grand jury on August 5 and August 6, 1957.

As indicated above, we located Abei on June 13 and

he was taken into custody by INS on June 21, 1957. On July 21,

1957, over a month later, CIA instituted arrangements for

Hayhanen's rehabilitation.

While CIA undoubtedly incurred heavy expenses on

schalf of Hayhanen, it was not at the request of the Bureau

but at the request

of the Department.

Legarding CIA's complaint thai the Bureau never thanked

let for its cooperation, it

is pointed out thai a letter from

Director was sent to Mr. Dulles on November 19, 1957,

shortly after Abel's conviction.

It pointed out the excellent

cooperation of James Angleton and his stait with the Bureau

since the inception of this case and that the Director wished

to express his personal appreciation to Angleton and his staff

{ol their valuable assistance.

LECOMMENDED ACTION:

forth, that A Weld not believe in taht ma the facts set

of, this matter.

V.

Weh.

MET

# 55036 DocId: 32989616 Page 270

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## Page 271

*OPTIONAL FETH NO. 10

5010-106

MAY 1802 EDITION

GSA GEN. REG. NO, 37

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

: Mr. C. D. DeLoach

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIP WITH THE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

WILLIAM P. BUNDY CASE

1 - Mr. DeLoach

1- Mr. Sullivan

1 - Mr. Cotter

ISE

DATE:

1 - Liaison

3/6/70

Tol: on

:01.000%

fullers

Mohr -

Pr. hop

Casper

Callahan

Conrad.

Fell -

Gale

Rosen -

Sullivan

Tave)

Soyars

Tole. Room

Holmes -

Gandy

DECLASSIFIED BY SPLALM HI

oN 1-10-01

sadles

Item No. 4 in the material submitted to the Director

by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum dated 3/5/70 discusses

belief by CIA officials that damaging publicity regarding

William P. Bundy emanated from a Bureau report. Bundy

was a CIA official at the time and the publicity was felt to

be damaging to CIA. CIA apparently was of the belief that

the Bureau leaked the information to Senator Joseph McCarthy

who then released the information to the press.

Bureau files reveal that in a discussion between

SA Papich and Allen W. Dulles, then head of CIA, on 7/10/53

Dulles inquired of Papich as to where McCarthy could get infor-

mation such as that released concerning Bundy. Papich

immediately informed Dulles that if Dulles was under any

suspicion that the Bureau might be disseminating such infor-

mation to Senator McCarthy he was definitely wrong and off base.

Papich also told Dulles that the results of the Bureau

investigation concerning Bundy had also been made available

to the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) as well as other

interested agencies. Dulles told Papich that he definitely

did not feel that the Bureau was involved in the McCarthy

releases to the press and that he was sorry if there had been

an impression he suspected the Bureau.

There is nothing in Bureau files concerning Bundy

which would indicate that the Bureau did, in fact, supply any

information concerning Bundy to Senator McCarthy or the news

media. There was considerable publicity concerning Bundy

at the time and it is noted that due to the fact that Bundy

was the son-in-law of former Secretary of State Dean Acheson

HH 55036

TJS : mea

(5)

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CONTINUED - OVER

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## Page 272

-

Memorandum for Mr. DeLoach

RE:

RELATIONSHIP WITH THE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WILLIAM P. BUNDY CASE

there was possibly an element of potential embarrassment to

the Democratic Party attendant to publicity afforded the

matter by Republican Senator McCarthy.

It is also noted

that copies of reports of Bureau investigation concerning

Bundy had been disseminated, in addition to CIA, to Civil

Service Commission, National security Agency, Atomic Energ.

Commission, Army and the Attorney General.

A conflict broke

out between CIA and Senator Joseph McCarthy after McCarthy

publicly quoted from a document, not identified, which spellec

out Bundy's contribution to the Alger Hiss fund.

The files

indicate that CIA alleged that the AEC had leaked the

information

in question to Senator McCarthy.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

sat forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

We do not believe, in light of the facts

SENET

-

I 55036 DocId: 32989616 Page 272

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## Page 273

OPTIONAL FORM NO, 10

5010 - 106

MAY 1962 EDITION

GSA GEN, REG. 4O.27

Tolon

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

:15ah

Memorandum

Walters

1 - Mr. DeLoach

Hohs.

Bishop

1 - Mr. Sullivan

Collaho

Conrac

Felt

TO

: Mr. DeLoach ;

Gale

SRET

DATE:

March 6, 1970

Rosen

Sullivan

Tavel

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

Soyars

1 - Mr. D.J. Brennare Room

1 - Mr. Wannall

Gandy

SUBJECT:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

1 - Mr. Harrell

BUREAU DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION

I#MDP16

CONCERNING JAY LOVESTONE

DECIASSIFIDD BYSPaAmIHE

ON 1-10-07

is bernati

Item number five in the material submitted to the Director by

SA Sam Papich with his memorandum 3/5/70 discusses a question raised by

former CIA Director Allen Dulles concerning the propriety of FBI

dissemination of information concerning Jay Lovestone, who in the late

1920's headed the U. S. Communist Party, thereafter became completely

disillusioned with the Party, and subsequently occupied an executive position

with American Federation of Labor.

The particular information referred to by Mr. Dulles had been

furnished FBI by Spencer Miller, Jr., former Assistant Secretary of Labor.

Miller made several accusations against CIA. Mr. Dulles took the position

that dissemination of the allegations to the White House, Attorney General

and Department of State had placed Dulles on the spot because the Miller

data was not a complete story.

BACKGROUND:

CIA advised that on 12/4/53 Miller had informed CIA representa-

tives abroad that he had evidence pointing toward Jay Lovestone's being a

communist and active agent, and that Lovestone might shortly be exposed

by the McCarthy Subcommittee of the Senate as the chief of the third great

Soviet ring after Alger Hiss and Harry Dexter White. When interviewed by

Bureau 1/7/54 he furnished no information indicating that Lovestone was

engaged in espionage activity and appeared to have an axe to grind insofar as

Lovestone was concerned. He acknowledged everything hethad ceme to him

secondhand. Results of interview were furnished CIA by letter.

On 1/22/54 Attorney General advised the Director that Dr. Milton

Eisenhower had told him of a conversation he had with Spencer Miller. The

Attorney General said he told Dr. Eisenhower he would have Miller inter-

viewed to get the whole story and asked that we conduct the interview.

On 1/25/54 we wrote the Attorney General about the previous

interview with Miller and advised we would have him interviewed again to

WRW/HLD:am$

(6)

NH 55036 DocId: 32989616 Page 273

CONTINUED - OVER

---

## Page 274

Memorandum for Mr. DeLoach

RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

IS

secure any additional data he might have.

Miller was reinterviewed

the same day and results were sent to Attorney General 1/27/54.

Subsequently, on 2/19/54, Governor Sherman Adams called

(the Director from White House about the Miller situation. The

Director advised Governor Adams that he had personally talked to

Miller for two hours the previous day and had concluded that Miller

was obsessed with the charges he was making and while he appeared

to be a brilliant and well educated man he did not appear to have

specific details.

On the day the Director spoke with Miller, 2/18/54, he

reierred Miller to Domestic Intelligence Division where a detailed

interview was conducted and results incorporated in a 20-page memo-

randum, copies of which

were furnished Attorney General, Governor

Adams, CIA and State Department.

We interviewed Miller at the specific instructions of the

Attorney General based upon a White House request and dissemination

of interview results to Attorney General and White House was not

only proper but required under the circumstances. CIA and State

Department received results since allegations concerned officials

and operations of those agencies.

Miller furnished names of

persons who he said could support his allegations and we interviewed

them and disseminated results.

Mr. James Angleton of CIA commented

on 3/13/54 that when the Miller information was first received at

that Agency some officials gained the impression FBI was deliberately

collecting and disseminating data solely for the purpose

of "hurting"

CIA. Angleton said results of interviews and investigation conducted

by Bureau had clearly demonstrated to CIA officials that IBl was

Jiving by its well-known tradition and reputation of developing

¡facts and reporting information in an impartial manner.

on the previous day all officials, including Dulles, commented the

Bureau was following the Lovestone case in conformity with its

well established reputation of getting all the facts.

this, there is no basis for believing that at this time CIA would

raise any charges of unfair conduct on the part of Bureau in its

handling of the Miller matter.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set

forth, that CIA will make an issue

of this matter.

WH 55036 DocId: 32989616 Page 274

---

## Page 275

OPTIONAL FORM NO, 10

5010-106

MAY 1962 EDITION

GSA GEN, REG, NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

Mr. C. D. DeLoach

SECRET

FROM : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

1 - Mr. DeLoach

1 - Mr. Sullivan

1 - Mr. Cotter

DATE: 3/6/70

1 - Liaison

1 - Mr. Ryan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIP WITH CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

BUREAU HANDLING OF CIA REQUESTS

FOR TOURS FOR FOREIGN OFFICIALS

Tolson

i cLouch

Walters.

Mohs

Bishop

Casper

Callchan

Conrad.

Fell -

Gale -

Rosen

Sullivan.

Tavel .

Soyars

Tele. Room

Holmes -

Gandy

#MOR16

MIT INFORMATION CONTAINED

STEIN IS UNCIASSITIED

DARE 1-16-0/BXSBZALM

Item six in material submitted to the Director by Sam

Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 mentions occasions in the 1950's

when CIA complained that officials visiting the United States

under CIA sponsorship were disappointed because they had no

contact with Bureau officials.

CIA felt contact with Bureau

officials had significant benefits, left lasting favorable

impressions because of the FBI's world-wide reputation, and

when foreign visitors had no contact with Bureau officials

they were left with suspicions there was friction between the

FBI and CIA.

that tours for such visitors would be of a restrictive nature

and they would be afforded the same treatment as the public

and nothing more.

Memorandum 5/31/56 from Mr. Roach to Mr. Belmont,

captioned "Visit at Bureau by Foreign Police and Intelligence

Officials," (Bureau file 94-2-32781) recommended for Director's

approval that Liaison would (1) inform CIA tours afforded to

foreign police officials and security officials would continue

to be of a restricted'nature and the visitors will only view

facilities normally seen by the public, and (2) that such

foreign officials would not be interviewed unless it appeared

not

to the Bureau's advantage. In regard to 1, the Director noted,

"I thoroughly agree.

We

I am not too keen anyway about such tours.

were 'burned' in

the Johns matter."

The Director noted in

regard to 2, "I see no need of interviews."

Doctor Otto John was an official of the West German

security service who was closely associated with CIA and who

was alleged to have defected to the East Germans.

In his memorandum, Papich emphasized that for the past

several years there was no basis for complaints with regard to

Bureau treatment of foreign officials coming to U.S. under CIA

sponsorship.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

SECRET

None.

We do not believe, in light

forth, that CIA will make an issue

of this matter

the facts set

HH 55036

Decrafw/stballs. (fage 27x

---

## Page 276

OPTIONAL FORM NO, 10

3010-106

I MA 1962 EDITION

GSA GEN. REG.

NO. 27

UNITED STATES (:)VERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

:MI. C. D. DeLoach

LUNC

FROM : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

1 - Mr. C.D. DeLoach

1 - Mr. W.C. Sullivan

DATE: March 6, 1970

1 - Mr. WoA. Branigan'

1 - Liaison

1 - Mr. J.P. Lee

Tolion

Debouch -

Mohr -

Bishop

Casper

Callahan

Conrad

Fell -

Gale -

Rosen

Sullivan

Tavel

Soyars

Tele. Room.

Holmes -

Gan dy

SUBJECT:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

CIA

-EVERESTS IN SOVIET ESPIONAGE ACTIVITY

Item #7 in the material submitted to the Director by

ALL. INFORMATION CONTAIMIN

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIZO

WHERE SHOWN OPHERMISE.

SYCIA - Dutch

(5)

notes that in 1956 the Wutch Internal Security Service (BVD) wanted

(5)

to certaint the the entered an approached

channels and we sequent tont the recut not bene tomatic .

interviews for the Dutch AlthoughLIN accepted this, they felt it

hurt efforts to gather soviet espionage information in Europe.

position was based on failure of

(sintelligence information at the National Security Agency for a

Dutch official.

BACKGROUND OF THE SITUATION:

This question first arose when a butchofficial approached

our representatives at the NATO Special Committee conference in

Paris in May, 1956, and requested Bureau assistance insinterviewing

Mrs. Antonina

Thomas in the U.S. and to have a Dutch representative.

present during the interview. *Mrs. Thomas is the widow of General

Walter Krivitsky, who operated an espionage network in Europe prior

to his defection in 1937. The Dutch representative said CIA had

interviewed her, but the results were unsatisfactorysistle was told

In June, a CIA

1-10-01

HAMDRIG

CLASSIFIED BY SA 2 ALM

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X./,6

on the case to the U. S. for the Bureau's use in interviewing

Mrs. Thomas and two others in the U.S., but not to participate in

channels and to include all informationsin writing, and that the

Bureau would not deal personally with a butch, representative.

By

memorandum of June 15, 1956, it was reported that James Angleton

6 of CIA told SA Papich he was of the very strong opinion that the

Bureau's position made good sense, but Other CIA officials) felt the

Dutch should be helped in every possible way.

62-80750

CONTINUED - OVER

JPL:tdp (6). 14

SECRET

H# 55036 DocId:32989616 Page 276

---

## Page 277

Memorandum Mr. W.C. Sullivan to Mr. C.D. DeLoach

RE:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

62-80750

DISPOSAL OF PROBLEM:

On June 19, 1956, then Assistant Director A. H. Belmont

and sA Papich met with Richard Helms, then Deputy Director of

Plans, and James Angleton of CIA. Helms asked if the Bureau

would

talk to a representative of the Dutch if he came over

and, in lieu of that, would the Bureau accept from CIA information

and leads furnished by the Dutch, (s)

I'S posItIon was verY

simple in that the fateh encome some to ten is

case when their representatives had been obtaining highly

• classified

information from a friendly government and, before

the even ten an assane te ate depresentives

(S) that if/Dutch representatives were to be interviewed, it

should

be done by State Department and not by the FBI. Helms was

(5)

told that in view of this, the Bureau notified State Department

that any requests for information from the Dutch to be handled (5

by the Bureau must be

channeled through the State Department.

Mr. Belmont said that this was a situation created by the

(s)Outch and the Bureau had no intention of altering its position

and wewould not talk to a Dutch representative and did not

desire to receive any leads in the Krivitsky case through CIAJ(s)

(S)r. Helms advised that CIA respected the Bureau's position

and had attempted

to guide itself accordingly in dealing with

the Dutch, He said he understood the Bureau's position,

which

in elsence was that the butellhad made their bed and couzd

now lie in it.

LIKELIHOOD OF PROBLEM ARISING NOW:

It would appear remote that this problem would

arise at this time.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

set forth, that CAl will make

We do not believe, in light of the facts

issue

of this matter.

(5)

-2-

SECRET

NW 55036 DocId: 32989616 Page. 277

---

## Page 278

→ OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

5010-106

MAY 19D2 EDITION

G:I GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

: Mr. C. D. DeLoach

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach

1 - Mx. W. C. Sullivan

1 - Liaison

DATE:

March 6, 1970

FROM

:W. C. Sullivan

I - MI.

1 - Mr.

A.

W. Gray

S:

F. Phillips

Tolion

Tollars.

Mohr

Rishop

raspos

Collahan

Conrad.

Felt.

Gale

Rosen

Sullivan

Tavel

Soyars

Tele. Room

Holmes

Gan dy

SUBJECT: RELATIONS WITH CIA

COL. JOHN GROMBACH (PAT O'BRIEN)

Background: Item number eight in the material submitted to the

Director by SA Sam Papich in his: memorandum 3/5/70 discusses

relations between Bureau and CIA with Grombach, head of private

intelligence network (O'Brien was Grombach's aide who had liaison

with Bureau) •

Problem: Papich states we never informed CIA we were receiving

Information from Grombach which was also of interest to CIA;

and that while it is possible Grombach had given same data to

CIA, we do not know.

Analysis:

JEK Act

(1) (B)

(62-77306-60) There 6 (1) (B)

receiving information from

Grombach. We do know some information was given by Grombach to

CIA and Bureau jointly. O'Brien, for example, told us of

conference in early 1951 between CIA officials and Grombach when

it was agreed information might be furnished directly to FBI by

Grombach, provided CIA was advised by Grombach of what was given.

(62-77306-23) Moreover, on 5/7/52 a CIA official requested

Bureau's views regarding validity of information we were receiving

from Grombach and asked for our views regarding method to be

employed in channeling information from Grombach to Bureau.

Significantly, under procedure then,

JEK Act 6. (1) (B)

tions to CIA with copies to Bureau.

JEK A

(1) (B)

• Bureau was not recome 6 (1) (B)

mending any method of dissemination and it was up to CIA to handle

problem. (62-77306-25)

In the ensuing period, dispute arose between CIA and

Grombach over channeling of information and Bureau made every

effort to stay out of dispute. In late 1952, for example, Helms

inquired if Bureau's views regarding dissemination had changed.

He was told they certainly had not and again informed that Bureau's

desire was to receive all information of interest no matter how

received. (62-77306-27) Our position of not becoming involved in

Grombach-CIA dispute reiterated'on other occasions. (62-77306-36, 69,

81; 65-58725-56)

SECRET

SFP: 115'

(6) 110.

HW 55036 DocId/32989616 Page 278

CONTINUED - OVER

---

## Page 279

Memorandum W.C. Sullivan to Mr. C.D. DeLoach

RE:

RELATIONS WITH CIA

COL. JOHN GROMBACH (PAT O'BRIEN)

1 SECKE

On the other hand, there were instances where we

received information from Grombach which was of either an

administrative or intelligence interest to CIA and we did

not inform CIA.

These instances covered period both prior

and subsequent to the contractural relationship between CIA

and Grombach

which was from 4/51 to 7/54 (62-77306, unrecorded

memo 11/29/55, Belmont to Boardman re Grombach). For example,

Grombach wrote a confidential letter dated 7/30/48 to former

Assistant to the Director D. M. Ladd which contained infor-

mation of interest to CIA.

This letter contains a penciled

notation: "This info, not to be given to CIA. per DML--OHB"

(62-77306-7).

Memorandum 10/11/50 from A. H.

Belmont to

Mr. Ladd

contains information from O'Brien concerning

Grombach's intentions to plant microphones in Finland to

cover meetings attended by Russian high staff.

It was

observed in the. memorandum that at that time O'Brien

and

Grombach had no relations- with CIA and that Grombach's

intended operation was under primary responsibility of CIA.

No indication this information given to CIA by Bureau

(65-58725-10) •

O'Brien furnished Bureau a memorandum

dated

6/29/54 entitled "Termination Memorandum to FBI" which

informed of the termination of contract between Grombach

and CIA.

In the memorandum it is pointed out that Grombach

will continue to receive raw material from the field and

that while he will no longer be in a position to translate,

evaluate, publish, etc., Grombach desires to forward such

material

to Bureau as Grombach would not trust any other

agency.

The memorandum also states that Grombach has continued

the flow to the Bureau of all reports he felt Bureau would

be interested in even though Grombach received a written

order specifically directing him to not give Bureau any

thing: (62-77306-70).

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

set forth, that CIA will make an issue al this matter.

We do not believe, in light of the facts

-2-

SECRET

NH 55036 DocId:32989616 Page 279

---

## Page 280

OPTIONAL FORM NU. 10

3010-106

MAT IYOL COTION

GEA GEN, REG. NO, 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Mr.

DeLoach

1 - Mr. Sullivan

TO

: Mr. C. D. DeLoach

SEN

FROM

: W. C. Sullivan

DATE:

3/7/70

1 - Liaison

1 - Mr. Dix

Tolcon

[«Loach

Wallers

Mohr

Bishop

Casper

Callahan

Conrad.

Fell.

Gale

Rosen

Sallivan

Torel

Coyars

Tole. Room

Holmes .

Gandy

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

AGENCY (CIA)

COMMISSION ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE

EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT

(HERBERT HOOVER COMMISSION - 1954)

ON

#MDRIG

1-10-0

mas istest

Item number nine in the material submitted to the

Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 discusses

the Hoover Commission survey of CIA operations in 1954. According

to Papich, there was talk within CIA that the Bureau had furnished

the names of subversives within CIA to Senator McCarthy.

Senator Joseph R. McCarthy (R-Wisc) was Chairman of the Senate

Investigations

Subcommittee.

General

Mark Clark headed the Task Force which

surveyed CIA operations between 9/54 and 6/55.

In 10/54, CIA

alleged that the McCarthy Committee was attempting to develop

information regarding CIA operations.

According to the Washington

Star, 10/1/54, McCarthy said CIA was

"one of the worst situations

we have as far as communist infiltration is concerned."

He said

he would give his data relative to this matter to Clark's Task

Force.

According to the Washington Star, 1/15/55, McCarthy

said he had given Clark information relative to alleged communist

infiltration of CIA.' As of 1/17/55, CIA had not received from

Clark the names of those considered security risks but CIA

believed it had done a good job of removing security risks and

believed that it was in good shape.

On 1/21/55, the Task Force requested name checks on

security risks named by McCarthy.

Memoranda containing

results of those checks were given to the Task Force on 2/8/55.

On 5/13/55, the Bureau received a letter from Clark asking for

investigations relative to character, reputation, and loyalty

of individuals mentioned as security risks. CIA was aware of

the names as we asked it for identifying data concerning them.

Clark was later advised that the investigations would entail

interviews at CIA, review of its programs, inquiries in foreign

countries, and the like and he withdrew his request.

WPD: bsf

(5)

NH 55036 DocId: 32989616 Page 280

CONTINUED - OVER

RET

---

## Page 281

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach

RE:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

AGENCY (CIA)

SORT

The talk at CIA that the Bureau had furnished

McCarthy the names of subversives at CIA has not been

recorded in FBI files nor is there any complaint in the

matter recorded. Neither is there recorded any complaint

by CIA

to this

effect.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts

set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

0419205,

NH 55036 DocId:32989616 Page 281

- 2 -

SECRET

---

## Page 282

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

MAY 1902 EDITION

5010-106

GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

: Mr. C. D. DeLoach

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach

1 - Mr.

W. C.

Sullivan

I - Mr. D. J. Brennan

DATE:

3/6/70

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

- Mr. C. D. Brennan

¿ - Mr• Lo B. Griffith

Tolson

1ol.0ad

Walters

Mohr -

Bishop

Casper

Callahan

Conrad

Felt -

Gale -

Rosen

Sullivan

Tavel

Soyars

Tele. Room

Holmes

Gandy

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INTERNAL SECURITY LEADS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES

DECLASSIFTED BY SPERM

1165

ON 1/10/01

• Intel

Item number 10 in the material submitted to the

Direct a s

Director by Special Agent Sam Papich in his memorandum of

3/5/70 discussed our furnishing leads to our Legal Attaches

(Legats) without advising Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

or requesting the Agency

• to handle the lead.

The observations of Special Agent Papich in this

matter are broad and general in nature. His presentation is

hinged upon the premise advanced by the Agency that "internal

security" cannot be separated from "counterintelligence,"

thereby necessitating our advising CIA of requests to our

Legats

to have leads covered in foreign countries.

The Manual

of Instructions, Section 102, page 23, states CIA's responsibilities

include collection, collation, evaluation, coordination and

dissemination of intelligence

information. CIA does not have,

among other things, responsibility for "internal security

functions."

In the absence of unusual situations,; we forward

investigative leads pertaining to our cases in

countries where

we have liaison coverage to the particular Legal Attache

concerned.

Through his contacts

necessary investigation and submits the desired information

according to our reporting needs. The Legat coordinates

this activity on a local level..

It is more desirable to have our representatives

request investigation abroad in order to achieve maximum coverage,

and to maintain tight control so we can insure that we fulfill

our responsibilities.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set

forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

FBG: ser: ekn en

(7)

IH 55036 DocId: 32989616 Page 282

---

## Page 283

OPTIONAL FORM NO 10

5010-106

H411007 201195

GSA GEN, REG. NO, 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tes

i..'

Kalls..

Mohr

Bishop

TO

:Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE:

SECRET

1 - MI. DeLoach

1 - Mr. Sullivar

3/7/70

• • LIAISOI

• • MI. FLemiSte!

Conrad

Felt -

Gale

Rosen

Sullivan

Tavel

Soyars

FROM :w. C. Sullivan

Tele. Room

Holmes

"CIA HAS NO OBJECTION FOR

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

AGENCY (CIA)

BUREAU OPERATIONS IN CUBATE(U

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR,.

A INFORIMATION

PION CONTAINED

OLASSIFTED

FORME

IN THIS QUUDAENTAS SANITIZE

GMB 5/31194 SP8 MAK GCL-64/74-JFK

Item number eleven in the material submitted to the

Opirector by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 states that

we operated informants in Cuba during the period we had a

Legat Office in Havana and did not coordinate our operations

with CIA or advise it we had sources there. It was noted that

after Castro came on the scene, approval was granted to turn

AT.L:

certain informants over to CIA.

Papich also refers to a

i=

memorandum Donahoe to Mr. Belmont, 2/5/60, regarding the

(CPC) which dealt

with the problem

RELEASE

of whether a Havana source [used in an intercept operation

between the Communist Party o1 Venezuela and the Cheeat course,

turned over to CIA to obtain complete coverage.

ALm

#MOR

UECIASSIFIED BXSRZ

MANGOLD

037

PERCIA AND,

+88-1826/55K4)2198

had no coverage of Venezuela. Bureau had not advised other

agencies of this source since we did not want Castro to uncover

any operational activities which might embarrass the Bureau. (e

The entire operation was later turned over to CIA.

CIA began its operations in Havana in 4/47 and in a

letter to the Bureau, 4/28/53, gregarding Havana informants, (v)

the Legat noted that CIA was not overly cooperative and that,

in fact, it was not developing pertinent information. At that

time Legat met with the CIA representative in Havana

admitted he was not getting any information concerning the CPC W

and had no plans for any aggressive action in that field. For

this reason it was necessary for us to develop our own coverage.

We instructed the Legat to ascertain from the Havana CIA

representative information available to him concerning matters

011°

Classifted

Declassify

information regarding security

Subsequently,.our

relations with CIA improved to the point of being described as

excellent in 1958. We think our overall position to be sound.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light

that CIA will make an issue of this matter

of the facts set forth

HCF : bsf/mst

(5) not

MY 55036 DocId: 22989616 Pase 283.

SECRET

---

## Page 284

-+

OPTIONAL FORM 10. 10

3010-106

MAY 1P02. EDITIC"

GSA GEN. REG, NO, 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

Mr. C.D. Deloach

DATE: March 6, 1970

FROM

:W.C. Sullivan

SECRET

CLASSIFIED BYSPALm A16

DECLASSIFY ON: 20XJ6.

Tolson

DeLoach

Walters _

Moht -

Bishop .

Casper

Callahan

Conrad -

Fell -

Gale

Rosen -

Sullivan

Tavel -

Soyars

Tele. Room

Holmes -

candy -

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

BUREAU OPERATIONS IN BRAZIL

- 1959

Item #12 in the material submitted to the Director by

SA sam Papich In his memorandum dated March 5, 1970, discusses

situation in Rio de Janeiro (Rio IN 1959 concerning strainec

relations which had developed between former Legal Attache (Legat)

STREIN

William G. Friedemann (now retired) and former U.S. Ambassador

Ellis 0. Briggs.

According to Papich the Ambassador alleged that

i SHOWE

Legat had engaged in uncoordinated intelligence activity and that

CIA was unhappy with Legat's activities and had told the Ambassador

that legat had disseminated information from a source who was either

a fabricator or a provocator.

IS UNCLASSIFIND:

ORHARXISE.

AT IRPCRVATION CONTAINED

and was transferred as Assistant Legat in Havana on August 22,

Friedamann was assigned as Lesat in icon october 251950,8

after

Bureau concluded that nestacked suiticient administrative

experience to function as Legat, lio, En early 1959 he began to

receive information from Antonio Martinez De Santos, an employee of

the Political Section, Federal District Police.

Martinez furnished

derogatory information concerning one General Lott of the Brazilian

Army who was a possible Brazilian presidential candidate in 1960,

indicating that Lott had questionable contacts with the Czech Embassy

in Brazils)This information was disseminated to CIA attributed to

a source who had not been contacted

sufficiently to determine his

reliability: CIA advised Bureau that the information concerning lots)

caused considerable consternation within CIA which had been unable

to evaluate reliability of the information. CIA suggested possibility

that the information had been fabricated or was part of a communist

deception operation. CIA requested

that we identify our source but

we declined to do so because source did not want his identity disclosed.

By letter dated October 1, 1959, the new Legat, Rio,

recommended that Martinez be discontinued

as a potential

based on his admissions to legat that he had no sources in Czech

Embassy and could not provide identities of his sources or additional

details concerning information he had reported. Legat concluded that (s

1 - Mr. C.D. DeLoach

1 - Mr. W.C. Sullivan

1 - Liaison

I - Mr. LoF. Schwartz

LFS: bCw (5)

SECRE

CONTINUED - OVER

H# 55036 DocId:32989616 Page 284

---

## Page 285

Memorandum to Mr. D. J. Brennan, Jr.

RE:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

BUREAU OPERATIONS IN BRAZIL - 1959

information Martinez had furnished was of such a nature that it

could have come from public sources, the political police or

could have been invented and attributed to his alleged contacts.

Legat also concluded that Martinez could not have been a

provocator used by Czechs to pass deceptive information.

Contacts with Martinez were discontinued in November, 1959. (5)

In our dissemination of information from Martinez to

CIA we were careful to state that our contacts with the source

were insufficient to establish his reliability. Although

subsequent events established that it was likely that cIA was

correct in speculating that the information was fabricated,

there was no

indication that the source was a Czech-controlled

provocator. (S)

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None.

We do not believe, in light of the facts

set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

- 2.

SECRET

NY 55036 DocId: 32989616 Page 285

---

## Page 286

= OPTIONAL POP.A NO, 10

5010-106

MAY 196Z EDITION

CSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

: Mr. C. D. DeLoach

FROM

: W. C. Sullivan

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach

- Mr.

1 - Mr.

W.

C. Sullivan

W. R. Wannall

DATE: 3/6/70

1 - Liaison

1 - Mr. H. W. Little

1 - Mr. J. E, Gauzens

•- 1.oach

Walters

Pist: -

k:. "op

per

rei id.

Fell -

Gale -

Rosen

Sullivan

Tavel

Soyars

Tele. Room -

Holmes -

Gan dy

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

BORDER COVERAGE (BOCOV).

DUCLASSIFTED BY SPEALM 11

04 1-10-0

tourisite

Item number (13) in the material submitted to the

Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 discusses

a problem presented by the Phoenix Office in June, 1957;

concerning the Bureau's handling of informants on

the

These informants were operated inside

JER

LASE & 113YB}

The problem was predicated on situations which might arise as

the result of CIA endeavoring to develop informants who were

already being handled by the Bureau.

BACKGROUND:

The Director initiated BOCOV in 1948 to fill a void

in the lack of coverage in the 25-mile zone south of the U.S.-

Mexican border on the part of CIA and Immigration and Natural-

ization Service (INS).

The program, which at first involved

3

and subsequently 5 of our border offices including Phoenix,

was designed to detect and neutralize anti-U.S. activities by

subversives in that zone.

In June, 1956,

border zone then covered by Phoenix.

JFK

6 (1) (B)

which is in ther Act 6 (1) (B)

PROBLEM:

By airtel 6/8/57, Phoenix advised that the CIA

representative had endeavored to develop 3 Bureau sources

• JFK Act 6 (1) (B)

and stated that it was discontinuing these sources unless (2)(B)

advised to the contrary by the Bureau.

SOLUTION:

This situation was analyzed in Bureau memorandum dated

6/14/57 wherein it was recommended that safeguards be established

to continue operating already established valuable sources even

though CIA also began

using them; however, the information we

62-80750

CONTINUED - OVER

1 - 100-356015 (BOCOV)

1 - 100-356015 Sub 38 (BOCOV-PX)

HH 55036

JEG:HWL: dIm dis

(9)

DocId: 32989616 Page 286

SECAFT

---

## Page 287

Menorandum to Mr. C. D. Deloach

IFLATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

BORDER. COVERAGE (BOCOV).

SED

received fron these sources was to be broken down and

paraphrased in reports in such manner as to conceal as far

as

possible the fact that these individuals were assisting

uS.

The Director approved these safeguards which were

successiully placed into effect by Phoenix.

A review of our files since June 1a, 1957, fails

to reveal that this problen has been raised subsequently by

Cia activity in the phoenix BocoY area. In accation, the

JEK Act 6 (1) (B)

He was not replaced by CIA and the border torritory he had

covered was subsequently handled by CIA on a road trip basis

out of L

• Furthermore,

the participation of the

JEK Act 6 (1) (BI

Phoenix Office in BOCOV was

discontinued with the Director's

approval by letter dated 12/10/69.

RECOMIENDED ACTION:

We do not believe, in light of the facts

set forth, Uhat CIA will sake on Losue di this matter:

- 2

NW 55036 DocId: 32989616

Page 287

---

## Page 288

OPTIONAL FORM NO, 10

3010-106

MA

1982 EDITION

GSA GEN, REG. NO, 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

:Miro C. Do DeLoach

, SECRET

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

1 - Mr. C. Do DeLoach

1 - Min' No C. Sullivan

DATE: 3/6/70

1 - Mr.

Do J. Brennan

1

W. A. Branigan

1 = Mi. Lo

Ho Martin

SMDR16

1-10-01

CLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/216

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X4,6-

Tolson

Dolough

Walters

Mohi.

Bishop

Casper

Callahan .

Conrad.

Felt -

Gole -

Rosen

Sullivan

Tovel

Soyars

Tele. Room

Holmes -

Gandy-

SUBJECT: REKATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

BJEK Act 6 (1) (A

(S)

Item number 14 in material subnitted to Director

by

SA Sam

(5)

Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 discusses

Is code name or case on our couble agent,

who was recruited by sovieis rhile on business

trip to Moscow in 1954.

Until discontinued in 1964 he delivered

extensive material, clearca by United States Evaluation Board,

to the Soviets in

United States and Europe: (5)

Mr. Papich's memorandum states

case

was being

highlighted since ve cannot exclude possibility Central Intelli

gence Agency (CIA) hasgevidence to demonstrate wc were

onerational in curopeland did not co-ordinate ite

The L

fact is CIA

did know

was meeting

and Mr. Papich's memorandum does noi disclose CIA raised any

objection to date.

We recognized at the time there could be

a jurisdictional problem (s) We permitted

SIA to interviews

in december, 1954g shortly after

which time CIA learned from him he had

scheculed_espionage

ALL INFORMATION

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFEND

WHERE SHOWN GREERY.

meeting in Switzerignd in March, 1955.5/on (12/15/54YSCIA agreec

handling oiL

On B/2/55, CIA was orally informedi

(5) in Switzerland in March, 1055; that we desired CIA to take i10

CONTAIN

action which would interfere with our operation and that results

would be furnished CIA (approved by menorandun Belmont to

Boardman, 2/25/55) • Memorandum Belmont to Boardman, 6/10/57,

(5)

recommended, wendi

avise cla or a datei meeting between

(5)

scheduled for 6/10-10/57/5in Svitzerland In interes

of security..

This was approved and this policy was followec

thereafier'.

(5

All information from

Jwas

and it disclosed our, source was

meetIng

disseminated to CrA

lat various

points in burope (In December, 1900, CIa was auvised it could

in future contacti

acquired

in his world-wide

travels providing it dia not use him

in operational capacity;

was instructed not to disclose

•to CiA intornation on his,

1 - 105-25453

D(S)

(5)

(7)

CONTINUED - OVER

SECRET

H# 55036 DocId:32989616 Page 288

---

## Page 289

Ilemorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach

iE:

ILIATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

SECRET

relationship with Bureau.

It is a fact, however, we did

(5)

pernit

I under ou supervision, to

(sprincipals outside the United States without clearine

with Cla.

We discontinued him as an informant in 1904 d

DECOMMENDED ACTION:

set forth, Chet CIA vill nase an

We do not believe, in light of the facts

issue of this

matter.

JEK Act 6 (1)(A)

HW 55036 DocId:32989616 Page 289

-2 -

SECRET

---

## Page 290

DATIONAL TORM NO, 10

MAY 1962 EDITION

5010-106

GSA GEN, REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

:Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: 3/6/70

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

102.00.n1.

Walters -

Mohr.

Bishop

Casper

Callahan

Coniad

Felt

Gale.

Rosen

Sullivan.

Tavel -

Soyars -

Tele. Room

Holmes -

Gandy

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

CIA REQUEST FOR BUREAU LECTURE

DECLASSIP TED BY SPALMIKE

en 1-10-01

ON COMMUNISM IN THE U. S.

Item Number 15 in the material submitted to the Director

by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 discusses the Director's

refusal of a 1958 CIA request for Mr. W. C. Sullivan to lecture

on communism before a CIA group. Papich stated that CIA accepted

this as an affront and a blatant refusal to cooperate on a most

important subject of interest to both agencies.

The files disclose that by letter 9/25/58 signed by

James Angleton, CIA requested Mr. Sullivan to address a selected

group of CIA personnel on the communist movement in the U. S.

CIA suggested dates of 12/9,10,or 11/58.

The Director by routing

slip attached to Angleton's

letter commented, "It seems strange

that CIA should seek this when its top representative in Japan

considers FBI as a bunch of mere 'flat-feet" and the dangers

of communism as something conjured up in the minds of the FBI.

But then again I note request doesn't come from the Director

nor even the Deputy Director of CIA."

Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to A. Belmont dated 10/1/58

made reference to CIA's request ard the Director's comments.

It

recommended that the best interests of the Bureau would be served

by giving this lecture, not because of the information which

could be conveyed to CIA on communism in the U.S., but because

it would give Sullivan an opportunity to raise a number of

questions himself of the group concerning CIA's own activities

in the field of communism. It was pointed out that it could be

considered a bit of a challenge to see how much the FBI could

learn about the operation of CIA during the course of the lecture

and discussion rather than the converse. •Mr. Tolson recommended

that the request be declined and the Director concurred commenting,

"We cannot make Sullivan available to this outfit."

BCR : hc

(5)

1-Mx. DeLoach

1-Mr. Sullivan

1-Liaison

1-Mr. Rachner

CONTINUED _ OVER

55036 DocId:32989616 Page 290

---

## Page 291

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach

CIA REQUEST FOR BUREAU LECTURE ON COMMUNISM IN THE U. S.

Pursuant to the Director's decision, a letter was

directed to CIA under date of 10/7/58 advising that it was not

possible to grant CIA's request for this lecture because of

Mr. Sullivan's other commitments.

Nothing could be located in Bureau files to indicate

CIA's reaction to this letter.

ACTION RECOMMENDED:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts setforth,

that CIA will make

issue of this matter.

-_2

NW 55036 DocId: 32989616 Page 291

---

## Page 292

3010-100

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

: Mr. C. D. DeLoach

FROM : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

Tolson -

"Ingch

SECRET

DATE: 3/6/70

Conrad

l'elt -

ullivo

Tavel

Soyars

Tole. Room

Holmes -

Gandy

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

CASE OF

JFK Act 6 (1) (BI)

Item Number 16 in the material submitted to the Director

by Special Agent (SA) Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 discusses

the case of l

I that CIA might criticize our not

identifying our source.

BACKGROUND OF CASE

He became involved with a Russian girl, and the Committee for

State Security (KGB) approached him for recruitment,

using the

affair with the girl and compromising photographs as leverage to

carry out the approach.

_ reported the approach to his

superiors and

CIA.

was returned to U.S. and ultimately removed

PROBLEM WITH CIA

We first learned of this case on 7/9/56

from David Teeple, a consultant to Scott McLeod of State

epartment who unt had then formation in sold dent and who

I CIA, advised

SA Papich that CIA was considering requesting in writing that

the Bureau identify our source. On 7/17/56 SA Papich was advised

• by Director of Security, CIA, that Allen Dulles had instructed

that the request not be made.

DISPOSAL OF PROBLEM WITH CIA

This problem never officially

arose in view of the instructions of Mr. Dulles. Bureau files

contain no indication as to whether or not CIA documented this.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set

forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

62-80750

1 - 65-64084

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach

1

- Mr.

W.

C. Sullivan

1

- Mr.

D. J. Brennan

1 - Mr. W.

A. Branigan

1 - Mr. T. N. Goble

TNG: as: bipbjp (7)

SECRET

HN 55036 DooId:32989616 Page 292

i..

---

## Page 293

OrTIONAL FORM NO, 10

3010-106

MAY 1902 EDITION

GSA GEN. REG, NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

Mr. C. D. DeLoach

SECRET

FROM

:Mr. W. C. Sullivan

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach

1

- Mr. W. C. Sullivan

. - Liaison

DATE: 3/6/70

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

1 ~ Mr. J. R. Wagoner

TEK Act 6 (1) (A)

Tolson

ToLoach

walters.

Mohr -

Bishop

Casper

Callahan

Contad -

Fell -

Gale -

Rosen

Sullivan

Tavel

Soyars

Tele. Room -

Holmes -

Gandy .

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

(THE

OPERATION)

#moris 1-10-01

CLASSIFIZO BY SP-aALM| 1E

DECLASSIFY DIV: 25XL6...

Item Number 17 in the material submitted to the

Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum of 3/5/70 discusses

concerning the

SA Papich noted that perhaps CIA

might question whether FBI had pursued investigation in the case

vigorously enough. Memorandum is to review circumstances under

which information was furnished by CIA to FBI, Legal Attache

inquiries of

Sand the effect of CIA restrictions or

FBI investigations in this case.

In February, 1963, CIA made available information from

to the effect that the

Government was planning to engage in clandestine collection of

scientific and technical information in the United States. CIA

insisted information not be made available to other government

agencies and no investigation be conducted which might jeopardize

its source.

CIA then made available extensive information from

14)Analysis of the

revealed several discrepancies which would have

made interview by FBI of l

desirable.

CIA refused this

request.

We made numerous requests to obtain

clarifying data to

explain items mentioned in

to respond.

and CIA failed

(S)

In March, 1963, CIA furnished information concerning

interest in American personnel and installations inl

This

D(S)

information was made available to legal Attache, Parisg(sOn

4/11/63 CIA advised that its

which had not

heretofore been apprised of l

Fease had made inquiry concerning

the case. Our inquiry of Legal Attache, Baris,

disclosed that

1 - 105-109053

LEB: bjpbff (7)

(S)

OBSERVATIONS - OVER

(5)

SEGMEr

H# 55036 DocId:32989616 Page 293

---

## Page 294

(5)

• Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach

RE:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

TJEK Act 6 (1) (A)

JEK Act 6 (1) (B)

SECRET

inquiry of CIA personnel

aa been made concerning

none of the individuals previously identified as anT

and also requests had been made for certain biographical data

(15)

had indicated they were previously aware

of the case

a We furnished this information to CIA headquarters

and on 5/7/63 CIA referred to the incident and stated that it

was a matter of serious concern to it, requesting that any

future dissemination outside Bureau or to the Legal Attache

be coordinated in advance with that Agency.

This practice

was closely followed. The Director observed in January, 1964,

that he thought the whole thing had been imaginary on the part

of CIA which had been played as a sucker by l

_ The

Director added that no more time should be wasted on it, at

least until CIA restrictions were removed.

We continued

to attempt to get the restrictions removed without success and

covered outstanding leads.

(S)

In September, 1964, an analysis of the case disclosed

that although thirty-eight separate investigations were opened

only three

agents vere uncovered. Original allegations

of L

Jintent to mount an espionage mission in the United States

could not be substantiated.

This information, coupled with the

fact that CIA refused to make.

available to us for

(s)

the purpose of resolving discrepancies, prompted a decision

transmitted by us to CIA on

9130/64 that we were closing our

investigation in this case:

Mr. Papich commented in his memorandum of 3/5/70

CIA never has been satisfied with the efforts made by the

Bureau in this case.

Our review indicates our efforts in the

matter were as full and complete as possible under circumstances

where CIA refused to grant us access to the source, did not

respond to request for clarifying data and declined to remove

restrictions making it impossible to take necessary investigative

steps.

Should any question be raised in the future, we are in

a position to document our difficulties experienced

with CIA.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set

forth, that CIA will make an issue

of this matter.

# 55036 DocId: 32989616 Page 294

- 2 -

SECRET

---

## Page 295

OPTIONAL TORM NO. 10

MAY 1962 EDITION

3010-108

SSA GEN.

REG. NO, 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

: Mr. C. D. DeLoach

SELYET

DATE:

3/6/70

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

Tolson

D-Loach

Waltrrs

Mohr -

Bishop

Casper

Callahan

Contad -

Fell -

Gale _

Rosen

Sullivan

Tavel -

Soyars -

Tele. Room

Holmes -

Gandy

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

LEAKS TO THE "NATIONAL REVIEW" - 1959

EMOR16

021-10-01

BACKGROUND :

Item number 18 in the material submitted to the

Director by Special Agent Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70

cites a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) investigation of

leaks

to the "National Review"

which identified

former CIA employee, as the leak and referred to

former Assistant to the Director Lou Nichols as among his

contacts.

PROBLEM:

JEK Act 6 (1) (B)

JEK Act 6 (11 (B)

Papich implies that CIA may have further information

regarding Nichols' involvement.

ANALYSIS:

This situation was set forth in memorandum R. R.

Roach to A. H. Belmont, 4/21/59. We do not know if CIA has

additional information as to the suggested relationship

between

and Nichols.

We do know that they have not

made an issue of this matter to date.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set

forth, that ClA will make an issue of this matter.

HHW : km1/mst

(6)

JEK Act 6 (1) (B)

1 - Mr. DeLoach

1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan

1 - Mr. A. W. Gray

1 - Liaison

1 - Mr. H. H. Wallace

SE

IW 55036 DocId:32989616 Page 295

---

## Page 296

TO

OPTIONAL FOR NO. 10

3010-106

MAY 1802 EDITIO

GSA GEN, REG. NO, 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

:

Mr. C.D. DeLoach

SECRET

FROM :

1

-

Mr. C.D. DeLoach

1 - Mr. W.C. Sullivan

DATE: March 6, 1970

1 - Mr. D.J. Brennan

1 - Mr. W.R. Wannall

1 - Mr.

E.R. Harrell

1 - Mr. R.A. Mullins

Mohr -

Rishor

Casper

Callala in

Conrad

Felt -

Gale -

Rosen

Sullivan

Tavel

Soyars

Tele. Room -

Holmes -

Gandy -

SUBJECT:

w.C. Sullivan

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA - TRAVEL OF

BUREAU INFORMANTS TO CUBA

Item Number 19 in the material submitted to the

Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 discusses

the possible travel of one of our Mexican border informants

to Cuba and whether our not advising CIA of this made us

potentially vulnerable to charges we were operating outside

the U.s. without coordinating with CIA.

BACKGROUND:

This involved our plans to send a Border Coverage

Program (BOCOV) informant to a guerrilla training camp in

byed our

Cuba. The trip never materialized.

In October, 1965, we were vitally interested in

determining the location and extent of Cuban guerrilla training

sites being used to prepare Latin American subversives to carry

out revolutions in their home countries.

EP ST4-S, a Mexican

national residing in Juarez, Mexico, which is within the area

covered by the BOCOV Program, had infiltrated Cuban and Chinese

intelligence operations in Mexico City and had made himself

attractive to Mexican communist leaders who were planning to

pay expenses of sending guerrilla trainees to Cuba.

CIA CONSIDERATIONS:

EP 572-S was an integral part of our top secret

BOCOV Program which is handled on a need-to-know basis.

had previously obtained material from CIA showing its primary

targets inside Cuba which allowed us to fully brief the informant

as to overall U.S. Government objectives and a procedure was

established for use in disseminating data to CIA if the trip

materialized which would fully protect our informant and not

jeopardize the BOCOV operation.

OUTCOME:

During period informant was striving to arrange the

trip to Cuba his wife became mentally ill, extremely emotional

and temporarily deserted the informant. This strained family

relationship

caused us to order El Paso to have informant cancel

efforts to make the trip to Cuba and thus no trip was ever made.

RAM: drl (7)

CONTINUED - OVER

SECRET

HH 55036 DocId:32989616 Page 296

---

## Page 297

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach

RE:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA - TRAVEL OF

BUREAU INFORMANTS TO CUBA

SECRET

ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS:

Alter eP 572-5 had moved to Guadalajara, Mexico,

Which Is outside our BOCOV area, in November, 1966, WE

advised CIA of his past cooperation with us and interposed

no objection to his use by clA in areas outside our

jurisdiction.

On 11/22/66 CIA stated it would consult us

should it initiate contacts with the informant.

There 1S

no indication that CIA did use the informant and on 6/24/68

we discontinued EP 572-s as he was of no further value to us.

The trip never materialized.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the tacts set

forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

NH 55036 DocId: 32989616 Paye 297

- 2 -

SECRET

---

## Page 298

OPTIONAL FORM NO, 10

3010-106

MAY 1962 EDITION

USA GFN. REG. NO, 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

: Mr. C. D. DeLoach

FROM

: Mr. W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIP WITH CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

DISSEMINATION OF CIA INFORMATION

IN A BUREAU MONOGRAPH

1 - Mr.

1

C. D. DeLoach

. - Mr.

W. C.

Sullivan

1 - Mr.

D. J. Brennan

SUPRET

DATE: 3/6/70

Mr. R. D. Cotter

1

- Liaison

1 - Mr. E. J. O'Malley

Tolson

DoLoach

walters

Mohr -

Bishop

Casper

Callnhan

Conrad

Felt _

Gale -

Rosen

Sullivan

Tavel

Soyars

Tele. Room

Holmes

Gandy

FMDR16

DOCTASSIPTED BY 5 PSALM

1-10-01

Item 20 submitted to the Director by Sam Papich in his

memorandum 3/5/70 mentions the dissemination of a Bureau monograph

dated 5/5/65 and entitled "Communism in the Dominican Republic."

Special Agent (SA) Papich stated that due to the urgency of the

document Bureau did not obtain CIA clearance to include CIA

information in the monograph which was disseminated to interested

agencies, including CIA. According to SA Papich, CIA never

made any

protest although it considered our action a violation

of the "third agency rule."

Although the monograph referred to by SA Papich did

contain CIA data, it also set forth highly significant data

obtained by Bureau through our own informants.

The CIA data

was biographical in nature and was used in the monograph to

characterize the past, including communist contacts, of key

figures in the Dominican Republic. It was taken from the 1963

CIA Biographical Handbook and CIA telegrams dating back to 1961,

all of which were previously disseminated to the U. S. intelligence

community by CIA.

No attempt was made in the monograph to

characterize CIA data as Bureau information and, in fact,

information was attributed to "another Government agency," in.

accordance with established procedures.

2024

this

The so-called "third

agency rule" provides that

classified information originating in a department or agency

will not be disseminated

outside the receiving agency without

the permission of the originating agency. However, an exception

to this rule provides that the receiving

agency may disseminate

such data to other members of the U. S. Intelligence Board

(USIB),

of which Bureau is a

member, unless the originating agency

uses appropriate control markings limiting its data

to the

use of

the receiving agency only.

The CIA data used in the

Bureau monograph had no such control markings and our monograph

was disseminated to the President, the Attorney General and

USIB members only.

EJO: ekn ekn

(7)

NH 55036 DocId: 32989616 Page 298

---

## Page 299

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach

RE:

RELATIONSHIP WITH CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

The Bureau's monograph was a compendium of our own

data, CIA data, and that received from other members of the

intelligence community.

It was prepared under emergency

conditions for the President and had a significant bearing

on the understanding and handling by the intelligence community

of a serious crisis which confronted this country.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None.

We do not believe, in light of the facts

set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

ww 55036 DocId: 32989616 Page 299

---

## Page 300

TO

:

FROM

:

SUBJECT:

OPTIONAL FORM NO, 10

3010-106

MEY 1962 EDION

GSA GEI. REG. NO, 27

Tol. in

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

L•Loach

Wallers

Memorandum

Mohr -

1

- Mr. C.D. DeLoach

Bishop

-Mr. W.C. Sullivan

Caspor

Callahan

1 - Mr. D.J. Brennan

Contad

Mr. C.D. DeLoach

SECRET

Felt -

DATE: March 6, 1970

Gale _

Rosen

1 - Mr. W.R. Wannall

Sullivan

w.C. Sullivan

1

- Mr. J.E. Gauzens

Tavel

Soyars

Tele. Room

I - Mr. A.H. Solomon

Holines -

Gandy -

RELATIONSHYPS WITH CIA - BUREAU INFORMANTS MOle MEYSP-2ALM) 216

IN (GUATEMALA (S)

DEGLASSIFY ON; 25X.,

AIT INTORIATION CONTAINS

FEREIN IS UNGLASSIFISD BYCH?

SHOWN CREFRWISTR

WHERE

Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 discusses

Bureau operation of informants in Guatemala, and comments on

our potential vulnerability for not having informed CIA at

the inception of the operation of these informants.

(s)

SA Papich has cited two situations. The first

concerns

koberto francisco castaneda felice, an attorney

residing in Guatemala City Our Legat, Mexico, in the Fall

of 1966, identified Castaneda as a potential source of intelligence

information of importance to U.S. security; conducted

appropriate background inquiry regarding him and determined

his excellent potential and willingness to furnish intelligence

information to U.S. Government.

By memorandum 11/23/66 it was

approved that we contact CIA headquarters through liaison

channels to inform CIA that we planned to maintain contact with

Castaneda; that CIA would be furnished the information obtained

and that we would service CIA requests provided they could be

handled with complete security.

• SA Papich so informed|

(5)

CIA On, 11/ 25/66.*

stated he saw no reason

why FBI could not proceed as we

desired and that CIA headquarters

would so inform its representatives

I<S)

instructing them to give FBI all necessary support in this

operation.

Since that date we have operated Castaneda as a

valuable and productive unpaid confidential source.

Since this

matter was coordinated with CIA at the outset, there appears to

be no problem.

The second situation cited by SA Papich concerned

Legat, Mexico, informant MEX-65. This individual has cooperated

with the Bureau for

official in 1945-47, Some 25 years.

As a Guatemalan police

(S)

was most helpful to our répresentative

assigned in Guatemala. We had no contact with him thereafte

until 1954 when he appeared in Mexico City as a political refugee

from Guatemala.SFor 1l years thereafter, MEX-65 was operated

by our Legat, Mexico, in Mexico.

AHS: drl (7)

die.

CONTINUED - OVER

JEK ACt 6 (1) (B)

ANET

HW 55036 DooId:32989616 Page 300

---

## Page 301

(5)

(3)

(5)

HH 55036

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach

RE:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA - BUREAU INFORMANTS

IN (GUATEMALA

(5)

SECRET

In April, 1965, MEX-65 returned to Guatemala) and

by memorandum 6/7/65 it was approved that contacts with him

be continued in Guatemala by our Central American road trip

Agent.

He proved to be an extremely valuable informant on

criminal matters

in Guatemalad (as well as those of interest to U.s. security

OIIICIaL In Guatemalayin 1967, we promptly advised CIA

headquarters through liaison channels of informant's identity.

We advised CIA that we had utilized MEX-65 for handling

criminal leads and that he periodically volunteered information

concerning political developments in Guatemala. At that time,

10/6/67, it was agreed that Bureau would continue control of

informant and that after each contact with informant bu our

road trip Agent, the latter would confer with l

(who was present at CIA

headquarters at the meeting) concerning political information

furnished by the informant. We were assured of complete CIA

cooperation in this matter. On the occasion ofyour road trig

Agent's next contact with

bitterly accused our Agent of having lied to him and of

having

operated a source in (Guatemalal without CIA's knowledge.

stated that responsibility for

the development of security

information outed the pes so ely wm to des not as at

Shas been a difficult person with whom to deal and has been

inclined to "pop off." Matter has been closely followed by Legat,

Mexicu, and there have been no further indications of difficulty

with him.(SCIA,

Thas afforded us complete cooperation

in our handling of MEX-65 as we were assured it would in the

10/6/67 meeting.

Accordingly, no issue was made of this matter

with CIA.

MEX-65 continues as a very valuable paid informant

• of our Legat, Mexico. CIA has made favorable comments regarding

the excellent quality of the information obtained by MEX-65.

I This arrangemen't has worked smoothly for two and one-half years

and there appears to be little likelihood of CIA raising an issue

regarding this matter.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. He do not believe, in light of the fact set

forth, that CIA will make an issue

of this matter.

V.

-2-

JEK Act 6 (1) (B)

DocId: 32989616

Page 301

SECRET

---

## Page 302

"-I OF SIONAL FORA NO

10

3010-106

MAY 196Z EDIDION

GSA GEN, REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

: Mr. C. D. DeLoach

FROM :W. C. Sullivan

Tobi on

Hollers

Moht -

1 - Liaison

1 - Mx. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: 3/6/70

Bishop

Casper

Callohan

Conrad

Felt -

Gale -

Rosen

Sullivan

1 - Mr. W. C. SullivanTave

Soyars

1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan

Tele. Room

1 - Mr. R. Strain

Holmes -

Gandy

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

ITEM (22) SOLO

DECLASSTFIED BYSE ALM TAC

0N 1-11-0.

Item (22), SOLO, in the material submitted to the

Director by Special Agent Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70

mentions that the Bureau could be vulnerable and charged with

failure to identify the source and coordinate with them on

this matter if they were to become cognizant of the high-level

foreign ramifications of this operation.

SOLO is the code word used to refer to the liaison

operation performed by our informants between the Communist

Party, USA, (CPUSA), and other communist parties of the world.

This operation basically is performed to gain

high-level intelligence concerning the Soviet Union's

financial support, domination and control of the CPUSA.

Attendant to this objective, our informants have met with and

discussed mutual problems with leaders of the various inter-

national departments within the Soviet Government.

They have

also held discussions with CP leaders from other nations.

All information received as a result of this operation

which has foreign ramifications has been promptly disseminated

to CIA at the highest level.

It has not been considered desirable to identify our

sources in this case in view of. the sensitivity of the case

and the physical danger to the informants.

Considerable security precautions have

been carefully

built into the SOLO operation both in the field and at the

Seat of Government to insure the fullest protection to its

security and to the safety of the informants involved. Exposure

of the identity of these sources might jeopardize the entire

operation.

RS: 01m/Imj

(6)

CONTINUED - OVER

WW 55036 DocId: 32989616 Page 302

---

## Page 303

RE :

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

ITEM (22) SOLO

While former Bureau Agents have gone to work for CIA,

there is

no information available indicating they have com-

promised this operation.

Of course, they could have done this

unknown to us.

The prompt dissemination, to CIA, of information

developed through SOLO, which is of interest to that agency,

(completely fulfills this Bureau's responsibility without

needless jeopardy.

The mechanics

of the operation itself

are of no essential

significance to CIA.

ACTION RECOMMENDED:

None.

SENRET

- 2

HW 55036 DocId: 32989616 Page 303

---

## Page 304

5010-106

GSA GEN, REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

Mx. C. D. DeLoach

S

FROM :W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

HARASSMENT OF CIA

JEK Act 6 (1) (B)

Tolsion

Polouch ..

Writers -

~ Mx. C. D. DeLoach

_ MI.

1

W.

C.

Sullivan

- Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: March 6, 1970

1 - Mr. R. D. Cotter

• - Liaison

Mohr.

Bishop

Casper

Callahan -

Contad .

Fell -

Gale.

Rosen

Sullivan

Tavel

Soyars

Tele. Room

Holmes -

Gandy

DECTASSIPIED BY SP-DALMI

oN 1-11-01

Item #23 in the material submitted to the Director by

SA Sam Papich in his memorandum of March 5, 1970, discusses a letter

dated November 15, 1967, from CIA which requested that the Bureau

check telephone toll calls from the home of one Robert Kenneth Brown

who was allegedly harassing CIA

Brown was

supposedly seeking information concerning CIA's covert operations.

SA Papich states that we told CIA that we would not check the toll

calls on the basis that the information received was not sufficient

to justify investigation within the Bureau's jurisdiction. SA Papich

also states that

• "CIA accepted our response but there is no doubt

that the Agency characterized our position as a concrete example of

refusal to help a sister agency with a problem relating to the

security of U.S. intelligence operations."

D. J. Brennan, JI., to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, dated November 17,

A review of Bureau files disclosed that a memorandul 9a7,

was prepared.

recommended

This memorandum encompassed the above facts and

that CIA Liaison Agent advise CIA that we would not

check the toll calls as requested. This memorandum and recommendation

was prepared by SA Papich. The pirector noted "OK H."

In addition

to the above, on December 9, 1967, Brown

contacted our Miami Office and stated that he was writing a book

about CIA and offered to make the material available to the Miami

Office. Our Miami Office was advised that this information was of

' interest to CIA headquarters and instructions were furnished that

:If Brown did furnish Miami with the information, it would be given

to CIA. Brown. did not follow through with his offer.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the fäcts set

forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

JAM: bew/bad

L(6)

SEI

55036 DocId: 32989616 Page 304

---

## Page 305

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

5010-106

MAY 1962 EDITION

GSA GEN, REG, NO, 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolon

{o1.01.h

Walters -

TO

: MT. C. D. DeLoach

~ Mr. C. D. DeLoach

- Mr. W.

1

c. Sullivan

- AX. R. D. Cotter

DATE: 3/6/70

Mohr -

Bishop

Casper

Callahan -

Conrad

Felt -

Gale -

SEURE

Rosen

Sullivan

- Liaison

Tavel

Soyars

FROM

:w. C. Sullivan

- Mr. R. S. Garner

Tele. Room

•1 - Mr. J. E. Keating

Holmes

(CINAL-

Gandy

Administrative File)

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIP WITH THE CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

ANDRIG

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

DECLASSTTTED BYSPETEM 1LE

On TO

Item number 24 in the material submitted to the

Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum dated 3/5/70

discusses the restriction of dissemination of the Current

Intelligence Analysis (CINAL) to Central Intelligence Agency

(CIA) • Prior to 10/67, some of the Government agencies on

the distribution list for CINAL received multiple copies.

The Director of CIA was then receiving 19 copies of CINAL

as a result of requests from CIA on 3/30/62 and 10/23/62 for

additional copies to expedite reading by key CIA officials

and to facilitate rapid utilization of the information

within CIA.

The Director made a notation on the 10/4/67 CINAL:

"Please look over list of distribution. I have marked with

a dot those I question as to why they should recieve copies

and I do not think more than I copy should be sent anyone.

Let me have your views. H." By memorandum R. W. Smith to

W. C. Sullivan 10/6/67, it was stated that although security

of the classified document CINAL had been maintained, if the

Director so desired, we would tell recipients that they would

recieve onLy one copy each in the tuture. Mr. lolson noted

on this memorandum, "Yes.

T 10/9." Mr. Tolson also noted,

"We could never run down a leak."

The Director noted, "Send

only I copy & if any inquiry, then indicate we have had to

cut costs. H."

Since 10/67 the Director's instructions have been

followed and only one copy of CINAL has been furnished to

those, including CIA, on the CINAL distribution list.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth,

that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

RSG: ekin/bad (7)

55036 DocId: 32989616 Page 305

---

## Page 306

-= =

"OPTIONAL FORM NO, 10

5010-106

MAY 1902 LOITION

GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

Tolson

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

i rouch.

Walters.

Memorandum

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach

Mohr .

• - Mr. W. C. Sullivan

Bishop

Casper

1

- Liaison

callahun

1

- Mr. J. M. Fitzgerald

Contad

Felt -

TO

: Mr. C. D. DeLoach

SECRET

DATE: March 7, 1970

Gale .

Rosen

Sullivan

Tavel

FROM

Soyars

:W. C. Sullivan

Tele. Room

Holmes .

Gandy

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

:1-11-01

#m0r16

ESTABLISHMENT OF BUREAU LIAISON

CLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM 716

WITH DUTCH INTERNAL SECURITY

DECLASSIFY ON: 25XL, 6i

SERVICE (BVD)

(5)

1960

Item number 25 in the material submitted to the Director

by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum of 3/5/70, discusses a trip to

(s)[Holland) by Legal Attache (Legat), Bonn,in 1960 to explore arrange-

ments

for liaison with appropriatelutch authorities.

It is given.

as an instance CIA could cite as an FBI failure to coordinate with

FOREIN IS CELASSIFIEN EXCAVO

them in line With National Security Council Directives:

The U.S.

Ambassador to Holland reportedly raised questions,

should Girst reach agreement with CIA;

indicating FBI

which he said had previously

FEARE LOON ORMXRHZ254

handled all relations with Dutch authorities?(sPapich says CIA

Director, Allen Dulles, later expressed disappointment that we

did not contact CIA beforehand but that an agreement satisfactory

to all concerned was eventually worked out.

Papich also says that

in late 1959 we gave consideration to establishing a Legat in

Denmarks but did not inform CIA of our intentions.

In contemplation of the stationing of a Legat in Denmark,

Bulet of 12/7/59 instructed Legat, London, to broaden liaison

contacts in scandinavian countries and told Legat, Bonn, to make

exploratory contacts with appropriate authorities in Holland (S)

for the same purpose.

Since we had told State by letter of 3/10/55

that we would handle requests for investigations and name checks

for the Dutch only when received through formal State channels,

we advised State of our intention to make exploratory contacts with

(5) the Dutch regarding regular liaison arrangements, and State

approved.

State sent a letter to the U.S. Embassy in Holland (5)

on 12/17/59, advising of the Bureau's intention,! but it apparently

did not get

to the Ambassador prior to Legat's trip to Holland» (s)

On 1/4/60 Legat, Bonn, called the Bvd from Germany and

arranged to call on them on 1/7/60.

The BVD reported the call to

(S)

(5)

the CIA

] who told U. S. Ambassador

Philip Young.

On 1/7/60 the Director received a letter of 1/5/60

from. Young in which he said he was disturbed about the manner

ch he said

in which he had learned of the Legat's proposed visit. While

offering to assist the Bureau, young spoke of the long standing

HH 55036

suggested the Director and Allen Dulles discuss the matter if

permanent Bureau liaison with

Swas planned.

JMF: jan (5)

DocId: 1989616 Page 306

SECRET

JEK Act 6 (1) (B)

---

## Page 307

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach

RE:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

ESTABLISHMENT OF BUREAU LIAISON

WITH DUTCH INTERNAL SECURITY

SERVICE (BVD), - 1960

SECRET

'JEK Act 6 (1) (B)

(SCIA Chief of Mission

On 1/7/60, Legat met with Ambassador Young and the

He explained

that he was to explore the possibility of direct contact with

(s) BVD]concerning exchange of information bearing on U.S. internal

security matters.

He said he would not be operational and that

the contemplated liaison could not reasonably cause interference

vith the existing cla arrangements whide the embassy oIticlal.

expressed misgivings that the Dutch might be confused, no request

was made to refrain from contacting (BVDs The CIA representative

said he had requested his headquarters for comment on lerning

of the proposed visit of legat but had not received a reply.

Legat later briefed both Embassy officials on the results of

(5) his visit to BVD, who were friendly but deferred a final

commitment, referring to the existing "American arrangement."

By letter of 1/13/60 the Director thanked Ambassador

Young for nis oIter to assist, anc

scandinavian countries and holland were unret discussion with

Allen Dulles. Young was also assured our proposed contacts with

(s) the Outch) were purely liaison in nature; that while we would

keep CIA advised of items of interest to it in connection with

its responsibilities abroad, it was not believed necessary to

go beyond the U.S. Intelligence Board Directive of 12/8/59 in

coordinating with

CIA matters taken up with the Dutch. 5)That

Directive says CIA shall be responsible for coordination of all

U.S. liaison which concerns clandestine intelligence activities

or which involve foreign clandestine services.

Paragraph 10,

however, says the Directive does not apply to any liaison

relationship concerned with U.S. internal security functions,.

or with criminal or disciplinary matters which are not directly

related to foreign espionage or clandestine counterintelligence.

On 1/13/60 Papich explained to Allen Dulles and Richard

Helms the reasons for our contacts in Scandinavian countries and

(s) Holland exploring possible establishment of a Legat in Denmark.

When Papich challenged them to cite any Bureau failure to comply

with the Directive for coordination of U.S. lisison activities

abroad, Helms immediately stated there were no such instances.

In answer to specific invitation by Papich to air any complaints

or problems, Dulles stated that neither he nor his representatives

had any complaints; that he was personally unhappy about not

being contacted in the beginning; but that he and CIA would give

all possible assistance.. (Dulles did assist by writing a personal

meet on 1/860 at ouch treat -B on a are upon.

- 2 -

НН 55036 Do0Id:32989616 Page 307

SECRET

---

## Page 308

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach

RE:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

ESTABLISHMENT OF BUREAU LIAISON

WITH DUTCH INTERNAL SECURITY

SERVICE (BVD)

- 1960

SECRET

On memorandum Frohbose to Belmont of 1/14/60,

concerning the 1/13/60 meeting of Papich, Dulles and Helms,

Director noted :

"I. Well handled by Papich.

All of

the turmoil developing in this situation could have been

avoided if we had properly contacted Dulles and also

followed through with State. H."

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set

forth, that CIA will make an issue

of this matter.

:

-2-

SECRET

NW 55036 DocId:32989616 Page 308

---

## Page 309

NOTIONAL FORM NO, 10

3010-106

MAY 1962 EDITION

US- GEN.

REG. 1:0. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Irl.en -

TO

:Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: 3-6-70

caller-

tolt.

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

10%, m

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

BUREAU DISSEMINATION OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

TO FOREIGN SERVICE - 1962

Item No. 26 in the material submitted to the Director

by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3-5-70 states that CIA by

letter 11-7-62 raised questions concerning the propriety of our

dissemination of information through our Legal Attache to the

(5) Greek Intelligence Service.

This concerned certain Committee

for State Security (KGB) technical equipment which was obtained

from our sensitive Soviet defector in place,

Bureau code name

Fedora.

CIA letter 11-7-62 stated that a representative of

(S) Greek Intelligence Service informed CIA it received afore-

mentioned intormation from our Legal Attache. ' CIA claimed

such dissemination abroad should have been coordinated

CIA because of Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID)

5/2 which indicates that CIA shall be responsible for all U.s.

liaison concerning clandestine intelligence activities abroad or

involving foreign clandestine services.

CIA claimed that pursuant

above we were obligated to coordinate with CIA prior to dissemination.

ACI: XIS SINARION CONTAININ

MERATE TS UNCLASSITIOD EXCIT

WORST SAUND QUHERWISES

Memorandun Branigan to Sullivan 11-9-62 under Fedora

caption reviewed this situation and indicates that on 7-13 and

8-1-62 Fedora provided information concerning several types of

technical paraphernalia usea by KGB.

Dissemination of above was

made to State Department, CIA and military intelligence agencies

by letter on 7-24 and 8-16-62. Information was also furnished to

Legal Attaches, London, bern, sonn, Paris, kome and Madrid, with

instructions to disseminate only to contacts in foreign intelli

gence agencies known to be reliable and cooperative and with

62-80750

1

- 105-104811

1

- Mr. C. D. DeLoach

1

- Mx. W. C. Sullivan

CLASSIFIED BY SR 2 ALMATE

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X6

-

1

MX.

D. J. Brennan

Mr.

W

A. Branigan

1 - Nir.

J. F. Mabey

JEM: plm

(7) |1

CONTINUED - OVER

Lill

TH 55036 DocId: 32989616

Wolo

Page 309

SECREA

---

## Page 310

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach

(StERL.

the instructions that it be given limited distribution and

handled in a manner so it would not be apparent it emanated

from the Bureau or a source within the U.S. Above memorandum

points out that DCID 5/2 has been controversial since its

inception (12-8-59) and the subject of differences of inter-

pretation.

We recognized CIA's coordination responsibilities

but, in this instance, were of the opinion there was no operational

angle and no necessity for coordinating dissemination of above

since we had previously given the information to CIA.

This

memorandum recommended approval of a letter to CIA answering

CIA's inquiry according to above. Director indicated "O.K.

and "It looks like CIA is throwing its weight around."

On

111-13-62 we directed a letter to CIA accordingly. As indicate

lin memorandum of SA Papich, CIA "surrendered" and did not

further contest this issue.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set

forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

DVE

- 2 -

SECREd

IN 55036

DooId: 32989616 Page 310

---

## Page 311

APTIONAL FORM NO. 10

5010-106

MAY 1902 EDITION

GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STA'TES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

Mr. C. D. DeLoach

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

DATE:

3/6/70

oN 1-1-0l

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

"THE INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT

," A BOOK AUTHORED BY

DAVID WISE AND THOMAS ROSS

lolaon

Tol.onsh

Walters.

Mohr

Bishop -

Casper

Callahan

Contad.

Fell -

Gale -

Rosen -

Sullivan

T'avel -

Soyars.

Tele. Room

lolmes .

Gan dy

Item 27 of the material submitted to the Director by

SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 indicates that Wise and

Ross had visited the Bureau in 1963 to gather material for a

book regarding U. S. intelligence agencies.

It was suggested

that CIA be advised of this, and the Director noted, "I see no

reason for doing

so."

Mr. Jones' memorandum to Mr. DeLoach, 8/28/63, reports

this visit

and notes that Wise had asked for data concerning

the Bureau's internal security procedures and had asked concerning

other FBI operations, making no reference to CIA, with one

exception.

He did inquire as to whether there was friction between

the two agencies and was told that we cooperated closely and

maintained daily liaison with CIA. It was on this memorandum

that the Director said he saw no reason for informing CIA con-

cerning the visit of Wise and Ross.

We later learned that their book, "The Invisible

Government," was furnished in the form of advance proofs to

CIA prior to its publication. We also received such proofs

from CIA through Liaison.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None.

We do not believe, in light of the facts set

forth, that CIA will make an issue of this mattey.

1-

Mr. C.

D. DeLoach

1

Mr.

T.

E.

Bishop

Mr. W.

C. Sullivan

1

Liaison

1 - Mr. Rose

BFR:m1m/ mk1

(6)

NW 55036 DocId:32989616 Page 311

---

## Page 312

• OPTIONAL FORM, NO 10

3010-106

MAY 1802 EDITI AN

GI' SEN, REG, VU 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

- Memorandum

TO

: Mr. C. D. DeLoach

SE GET

FROM

: W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES - AFRICA

1 - Mr. DeLoach

1

~ Mr. Sullivan

1 - Liaison

DATE: March 6, 1970

1 - Mr. C.D. Brennan

1 - Mr. Rozamus

*MORIE

0 - 11-0/

Tolion -

:01.000h

"ulters

Mohr -

Rishop

Casper

Callahan

Contad

Felt -

Gale -

Rosen

Sullivan

Tavel

Soyars

Tele. Room

Holmes

Gandy

UNKENYANIANNON SEE

Item number 28 in memorandum of 3/5/70 from SA Samm

Papich to the Director, captioned "Cases and/or Situations

Involving Conflict With CIA," states that in April, 1960,

CIA inquired if the Bureau would give any consideration to

assisting that agency toward developing coverage in Africa by

providing a Negro informant or placing a Negro in the Communist

Party, USA for the purpose of eventually using him in Africa.

His memorandum added that we told that agency the FBI had no

informants available because they were necessary for our own

operations.

He claims we took the position since we saw no

benefit to be gained by loaning an informant on a short or

long term basis.

He states that CIA could argue that as early

as 1960 it had foresight to recognize the need for additional

coverage and when it appealed to the Bureau for assistance,

He refers to his memorandum dated 4/7/60

concerning this matter captioned "Communist Activities in Africa."

The memorandum referred to discloses

that on 4/5/60

Herman Horton, Deputy Chief, Counterintelligence, CIA, stated

that communist organizations were rapidly increasing in strength

on the continent of Africa and that his agency found it most

difficult to establish effective penetration.

Horton noted that

in this connection it was almost impossible for a white man to

move about Africa and establish a relationship which would enable

him to develop worthwhile sources. He asked if the Bureau would

consider furnishing one of its

Negro informants or developing an

informant in the Communist Party, USA for eventyal use by CIA in

Africa.

Papich told Horton that if the Bureau had a good Negro

informant, we certainly were not interested in having his future

jeopardized nor did we want to lose his production.

Papich

added that it undoubtedly would be most difficult to take a Bureau

informant, have him'travel to Africa under some cover and still

be able to satisfactorily explain such activities to his communist

colleagues without becoming a target of suspicion. Horton said

he recognized all this but asked if the Bureau would give

consideration.

MJR :SSI

(6).-

CONTINUED - OVER

NH 55036 DocId: 32989616 Page 312

---

## Page 313

' Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach

RE:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

ET

Addendum to Papich's memorandum dated 4/8/60 by

the Internal Security Section pointed out that all of our

informants were necessary for our own operations, particularly

in the communist field, and it recommended and was approved

that CIA be orally informed that it is not possible to provide

an informant on a loan basis to be used in Africa.

Regrettably, the Bureau was not in a position to

that end, CI

s problem was an administrative one within

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set

forth, that CIA will make an issue

of this matter.

V

2-

HH 55036

_ DocId: 32989616

Page 313

---

## Page 314

OPTIONAL FORM NO, 10

5010-106

MAY 1982 EDITION

GSA GEN. REG. NO, 37

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson -

irLoach

Walters.

Moht -

Bishop

Casper

Callahan

Conrad.

TO

:Mr. C. D. DeLoach

Felt -

DATE: March 6, 1970

Gale

SEC

Rosen -

1

- Mr. C. D. DeLoach

Sullivan

Tavel -

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

Soyars

- Mr. W. C. Sullivan

Tele. Room

- Liaison

Holmes -

Gandy -

I - Mr. W. J. McDonnell

SUBJECT:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

U.S. INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS - EUROPE

SECTASSIFIED BY SEE ALM FEE

0 1-11-0/

Misintentai

Item #29 in the material submitted to the Director by

SA Sam Papich in memorandum of 3/5/70, states that by Bureau

letter dated 10/23/64 we provided the

White House information

received by our Legat from U.S. Ambassador to Luxembourg wherein

the latter was critical of intelligence operations, particularly

the overstaffing of personnel. SA Papich comments

that we do

not know if CIA became knowledgeable regarding this letter but

could construe same as relating to its operations.

Our Legat, Paris, in a letter to the Director dated

10/19/64, set forth

the results of a conversation with Ambassador

William R. Pivkin at Luxembourg. The latter was assigned by the

State Department to conduct a survey of the U.S. intelligence

operations in six Luropean countries, assisted by representative:

of Defense, State Department, and Bureau of the Budget.

Rivkin

remarked that the results of

the survey were appalling, there

being 23, 000 military personnel in the six countries engaged in

intelligence operations and numerous CIA personnel.

He described

the lack of coordination between the military and CIA as

"scandalous." He stated the Offices of the Military Attaches

were grossly overstaffed and he was recommending drastic cuts

and that duplicate administrative services be combined with those

of the embassies.

He made no mention of specific intelligence

operations nor did he elaborate on the lack of coordination.

Rivkin commented that on his return to the U.s., he intended

to

see the President personally to bring this matter forcefully to

his attention.

Rivkin's comments were incorporated in a letter to

William D. Moyers, Special Assistant to the President, dated

10/23/64,

in accordance with the Director's noted instructions.

Our files disclose no indication that CIA cognizant of Bureau

letter.

RECOMMENDED ACTION: None.

We do not believe, in light of the

facts set forth, that CIA will make

an issue of this matter.

WJM: bcw/mk1 (5)

SERI

H# 55036 DocId: 32989616 Page 314

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## Page 315

OPTIONAL TORM NO. 10

9014=99

MAY 1962 EDITION

GSA GEN, REG. NO. 37

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

• 1.99.

Walters

Mohi -

TO

: Mr. C. D. DeLoach

FROM :

W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE

ADVISORY BOARD AND JOHN MC CONE

i SENAET

DATE: March 7, 1970

1 - Mr. DeLoach

1

- Mr. Sullivan

• - Liaison

canad -

Felt -

Gale -

Rosen -

Sullivan .

Tavel -

Soyars

Tele. Room -

Holmes -

Gandy

1 - Mr. Haynes

#MDR16

DECLASSIFIED BY SEE HINTG

1-1-01

cate 3-556468

Item number 30 in the material submitted to the

Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum of March 5, 1970,

discusses a dispute we had with CIA in May, 1963, as a

result

of a communication the Bureau sent to the President's Foreign

Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB). It was pointed out that

in our communication

• to PFIAB we attributed certain information

to McCone, then Director of ClA, concerning the matter of

increasing wire taps on diplomatic establishments. McCone

charged that the information attributed to him was not so

because he had never made any such statement and he could

prove it.

The fact was that the information relating to

McCone had been given us by one of his subordinates who had

indicated the information originated with McCone.

McCone

maintained that we should have checked with him

before going

on record that any information had originated with him.

A review of the file in this matter discloses that

in April, 1963, Mr. Belmont along with Papich had discussed

with Richard Helms and James Angleton of CIA McCone's alleged

position with the PFIAB; that he was in favor of across the

Bureau, of course, wasopposed to this and advised

Helms that

we would request to make our position known beiore the board.

At the conclusion of the meeting in April, 1953, Helms

specifically asked what he should tell McCone and Mr. Belmont

told him he should tell McCone exactly what had occurred at

the meeting; that the Bureau was opposed to across the board

wire taps and the Bureau intended to so advise PFIAB.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:'

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set

forth, that CIA will make an issue of

this matter.

RHH : wmk/sef

(5)

TW 55036 DocId: 32989616 Page 315

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## Page 316

a da pit OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

3010-106

GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

Mr. C. D. DeLoach

FROM Mr. W. C. Sullivan

SECRET

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach

1 - Mr.

W. C.

Sullivan

1 - Mr. D. J. Brennan

DATE: March 6, 1970

1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan

1 - Mr. L. Whitson

11.1)1.

Halters

Mohi -

Pishop

Casper

Collohan

Consad.

Foll -

Gale.

Rosen.

Sullivan

Tavel.

Soyars

Tole. Room

Holmes -

Gan dy

SUBJECT IONSHIPS WITH CIA

ALLEGED PENETRATIONS OF CIA

Item number 31, "alleged penetration of CIA," in the

'material

submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich

• in his

memorandum of 3/5/70 discusses allegations made by

Anatoliy Mikhailovich Golitzyn regarding recruitment of four

CIA employees by the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB),

that CIA requested full investigation which we declined.

BACKGROUND OF CASE

Golitzyn, an intelligence officer of the

KGB who detected to CIA in 1961, alleged that the KGB had

penetrated CIA through an individual having the code name "Sasha."

In an effort to identify this penetration CIA provided Golitzyn

with information regarding many individuals who had worked for

CIA in Germany.

Golitzyn identified two individuals at various times

as "Sasha" and in each instance investigation

"washed out" the

identification. Golitzyn finally identified "Sasha" as one

During the course of

extensive document reviews Golitzyn became acquainted with

background of various individuals who had worked in Germany at

the timel

did. Golitzyn identified four present employees

of CIA with unknown subjects who had come to his attention while

he was active in the KGB.

PROBLEM WITH CIA

CIA wanted the Bureau to undertake full-

scale investigation of its four employees based solely on

Golitzyn's allegations.

DISPOSAL OF PROBLEM WITH CIA

By letter of February 26, 1965, CIA

was informed there appeared to be no basis at that time for a

full-scale investigation of these men by the FBI on the basis of

allegations by Golitzyn. With regard to any investigation in the

United States concerning two of the men, a conclusion would be

nade following completion of the investigation o

nd interviews of and his wife.

Based upon the investigation

of

and the interviews of

Jand his wife, CIA was

informed by letter of July 20, 1965,

that nothing

had been developed

62 - 80750

JEK Act 6 (11(B)

1 - 105-105608 (Golitzyn)

LW:as: bipbjp (7)

CONTINUED - OVER

/ SECRET

H# 55036 DocId:32989616 Page 316

---

## Page 317

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach

RE:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

ALLEGED PENETRATIONS OF CIA

62-80750

QUEK Act 6 (1) (B)

which supported Golitzyn

SECRETS

speculation thatl

was

instrumental in the recruitment by

the Soviets of either

and nothing was developed

which would support Golitzyn's allegations against the other

two suspects,

Furthermore,

CIA had furnished no documentary material regarding E

which would in any way support Golitzyn.

Bureau added "Accordingly, this Bureau is conducting no

investigation of I

will interpose no objection, since they are all employees

of your agency, if you wish to pursue Anatoliy Golitzyn's

allegations concerning them, including interviews of the

individuals concerned.

"This Bureau would, of course, be interested in

receiving the results of any

investigation which would tend

Ito confirm Golitzyn's conclusions that one or more of these

employees of your agency had actually been

recruited by the

Soviets."

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None.

We do not believe, in light of the facts set

forth, that CIA will make an issue

of this matter.

2377

NH 55036 DocId: 32989616

Page 317

(SECRET

---

## Page 318

OPTIONAL FORM NO, 10

3010-106

ISA GEN. REG. NO, 2:

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

• Mr. C. D. DeLoach

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

VICE PRESIDENT NIXON'S TRIP TO

SOUTH AMERICA • 1958

• Mr. C. D. DaLoach

1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan

1 - Liaison

DATE: 3/7/70

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

1 • Mr. F. X. O'Brien

Tolson

! 4.0uch

Walters.

Mohr -

Bishop

Casper

Callahan

Conrad

Felt -

Gale _

Rosen

Sullivan

Tavel.

Soyars

Tele. Room

Holmes -

Gandy .

DECLASSIFIED BY SPARE

on 111-01

Item number 32 in material submitted to the

Director by SA Sam J. Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70

mentions Bureau letter 5/16/58 sent to the then Vice

President Nixon and containing a summary of CIA informa~

tion concerning events in Latin America relating to

Mr. Nixon's trip there during 5/58.

According to SA Papich, most of the information

in above letter came from CIA.

He commented that this

letter could be interpreted as raising question concerning

quality of CIA's coverage in Latin America. Papich noted

it is not known if CIA ever became aware of the letter.

Papich stated that General Robert Cushman, currently Deputy

Director of CIA, was attached to the then

Vice President

Nixon's staff. SA Papich pointed out that CIA, if aware of

above letter,

could raise question as to violation of Third

Agency Rule.

Results of Review of Bureau Files

• The letter to the then Vice President Nixon

is located in Bureau' file 62-88461-117. It contains.

summary of information relating to riots and attacks.

against Mr. Nixon and his party during their 5/58

Latin American trip. Letter identifies CIA as the

WW 55036

62-80750

FX0: dgo/sef (6)

DocId: 32989616A %age 318

CONTINUED - OVER

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## Page 319

Memorandum W.C. Sullivan to

ISt

Kat

Mr. C. D. DẹLoach

Re:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

62-80750

EMORIG

9x1-11-01

source of the information set forth in our letter.

The last

paragraph of this letter includes a statement that the

impression gained from a review of CIA reports indicates that

CIA had some coverage reflecting there were to be troubles

concerning Mr. Nixon's Latin American travels. This letter

also stated as follows:

"It is significant that information in the indi-

vidual countries came to CIA's attention shortly before your

arrival in a particular country.

Therefore, there is a

question as to whether or not CIA had coverage in communist

organizations which would have led to the development of

information concerning communist plans days or weeks ahead of

your visit."

There is no indication in this file regarding

instructions given to prepare our letter of May 16, 1950.

The first paragraph of this letter indicates that the Director

had

a discussion with Mr. Nixon on May 16, 1958, inasmuch as

the first sentence of the above

letter reads as

follows:

"Apropos of our discussion today, there is set

forth information contained in Central Intelligence Agency

reports received from them on May 14, 1958."

The data set forth in our May 16, 1958, letter to

Mr. Nixon is contained in a memorandum Mr. R. R. Roach. to

Mr. A. H. Belmont dated May 15, 1958, which was prepared for

the Director's information. The Director noted on this memo-

randum, "Send summary to A. G. H." In accordance with

instructions, a letter was sent to the then Attorney General

under date of May 16, 1958, and this letter contained a summary

of CIA information in the

190 game

same manner.as had been sent to

Mx. Nixon on May 16, 1958.

Our letter to the Attorney General,

however, did not contain any observations regarding.CIA

coverage in Latin American countries visited by Mr. Nixon and

his party.

Our file in this matter (62-88461-150) indicates that

on June 9, 1958, Colonel Robert Cushman in the office of the

then Vice

President Nixon contacted the Bureau at the request

- 2 -

HH 55036 DocId:32989616 Page 319

---

## Page 320

Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to

Mr. C. D. DeLoach

Re: RELATIONSHIPS WITH

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

62-80750

of Mr. Nixon to determine if the contents of a letter from

dateh Mao

the Director to Mr. Nixon dated May 16, 1958, regarding

Mr. Nixon's trip to South America could be leaked to the

press.

Colonel Cushman's request was set forth in memorandum

G. A. Nease to Mr. Tolson June 9, 1958, with the recommenda-

tion that Colonel

Cushman be advised that if the information

were to be given to the press, it would undoubtedly create a

serious problem as the FBI would then have violated CIA's

confidence since CIA was aware that SA Papich had reviewed

CIA's classified reports and, therefore, this information

should not be given to the press.

Both Mr. Tolson and the

Director agreed with the recommendation, and Colonel Cushman

was advised of our decision. It is noted that Colonel Cushman

is identical with the individual

• who is now Deputy Director

of CIA.

Comments on Remarks in SA Papich Memo 3/5/70

I. That most of the information in our letter to

Mr. Nixon dated May 16, 1958, came from CIA and that this

it the

letter could be interpreted as raising the question concerning

the quality of CIA's coverage in Latin America.

There is no dispute as to the source of the informa-

regard to any question being raised as to the quality of

CIA's coverage in Latin America, we merely pointed out to

Mr. Nixon something that was readily discernible to any reader

of the clA reports - - that 15,

that the information from CIA

popped up rather suddenly as related to the country anc

Mr. Nixon's arrival. Certainly Mr. Nixon himself, since he

was personally involved in demonstrations directed

against

him during his Latin American trip, must have been aware that

advance information from our responsible intelligence agency

(CIA) may have been

lacking.

2.

We are not aware if CIA became knowledgeable of

our letter

to Mr. Nixon dated May 16, 1958. Under ordinary

conditions, we are not aware nor do we seek to identify any CIA

-3 -

NW 55036 DocId:32989616 Page 320

---

## Page 321

Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to

Mr. C. D. DeLoach

RE:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH

SEXEI

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

62 - 80750

personnel who might be assigned to the White House staff.

As indicated above, Colonel Cushman, who was a member of

Mr. Nixon's staff in 1958 and who is now a Deputy Director

of CIA, was aware of our 5/16/58 letter and its contents.

We have no information that CIA ever registered any type of

protest in this matter.

3. That CIA technically could raise a question

as to violation of the Third Agency Rule as regards our

5/16/58 letter to Mr. Nixon.

The Third Agency Rule is intended to prohibit a

Government agency from disseminating information originating

with another Government agency in the absence of specific

authority to do so, and we follow this rule unless there

are overriding reasons. With regard to our letter to

Mr. Nixon dated 5/16/58, we set forth information clearly

identified as having originated with CIA. This letter

was apparently prepared at the specific request of then

Vice President Nixon after conferring with the Director.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

set forth, the he ditton kerie sue dishes the ea

V

NW 55036 DocId: 32989616 Page 321

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## Page 322

OPTIC MAL FORM NO. 10

• si

MaY 1902 EDITION

GSA GEN, REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

: Mr. C. D. DeLoach

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

HERBERT ITKIN

SECRET

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach

1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 3/6/70

1

1

- Mr. A. Rosen

- Mr. J. H. Gale

1 - Mr. D. J. Brennan

1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan

Tooline

1.1.0nh

Mohr

Bishop

Casper

Callahan

Conrad

felt -

Gale -

Rosen

Sullivan.

Tavel

Soyars

Tele. Room

Holmes

Gan dy

Item number 33 in the material submitted to the

Director by Special Agent (SA) Sam J. Papich in his memorandum

3/5/70 discusses Herbert Itkin as an individual who was operated

as a criminal informant by the Bureau who furnished valuable

information and who has been a key witness in the prosecution

of cases being handled by the Bureau. Mr. Papich states that

the Bureau acquired access to Itkin through the CIA and that

although the CIA has never officially made any statements to the

Bureau, it has been bitterly disappointed that the Bureau never

acknowledged CIA's assistance which the agency considered

extremely valuable.

Memorandum dated 2/20/63 from W. C. Sullivan to

Mr. Belmont captioned "James Hoffa" set out that James Angleton

of CIA advised SA Papich that CIA had briefed the Attorney General

concerning a source whom Mr. Angleton had used since World War II

and who subsequently has developed a close association with a

lawyer who does considerable work for the Teamsters Unions.

Angleton's source was confident that the lawyer could be developed

as a penetration which could "sink" Hoffa and all of his cohorts.

The Attorney General agreed with the CIA representatives that the

matter should be referred to the Bureau for handling.

Mr. Angleton set up the first contact! with the individual

who had the contact with the attorney and at that time Angleton

stated that he did not want to get involved in any. investigative

aspects and wanted to step out of the matter as soon as possible.

As a result, eventual contact was made with Herbert Itkin who

developed into a very productive source. Itkin has been publicly

identified as both a source of the FBI and CIA as a result of his

testimony.

JGD: rmm (7)

CONTINUED - OVER

SECRET

WW 55036 DocId: 32989616 Page 322

---

## Page 323

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach

RE:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

HERBERT ITKIN

I SECRET

The Bureau's success in handling Itkin can be

attributed to the know-how of the SAs of the New York

Office because Itkin is a highly emotional individual

and he had aggravated marital problems, severe pressures

from his many business associates; therefore, it took

a high degree of skill in dealing with this source in

order to achieve the success that we did.

While it is acknowledged that CIA put us

originally in touch with this source, it was not

believed that it is essential that we go back to CIA

and explain to them our success or to thank them for

giving us this original lead. It is also noted that

there is an obligation upon Government agencies to

cooperate in the fullest and CIA's cooperation in this

matter was in accordance with the long standing policy

among all Government agencies.

Review of Itkin's file does not reflect any

instance where CIA indicated a displeasure in the Bureau

not acknowledging CIA's assistance in placing us in touch

with Itkin. This is in line with Mr. Angleton's statement

in 1963 that he did not want to get involved in any

investigative aspects of this matter and wanted to step

out as soon as possible. In view of the above, it is not

believed that CIA would have any basis to complain that the

Bureau never acknowledged CIA's assistance.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set

forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

SECRET

NH 55036 DocId: 32989616 Page 323

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## Page 324

3010-106

MAY

LiSA GEN, REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Toleon

Hurt.

" iltrr.

Mohr -

TO

:Mr. C. D. DeLoach

SECRET

FROM. :W. C. Sullivan

1 - Mr. C.

D. DeLoach

1

- Mr. J.

P. Mohr

1 - Mr. I. W. Conrad

DATE: March 7, 1970

1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan

- Liaison

1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy

Conrad

Felt -

loser

Sulliva

Toye: Room

Holmes —

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPSWITH CIA

EXCHANGE OF TECHNICAL INFORMATION

Item number 34 in the material submitted to the

Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 concerns

exchange of technical information with CIA, particularly as

it related to the technical surveillance field. Papich states

CIA exhibited its equipment to us,

but for many years we declined

to show any of our devices, with some exceptons. •he states

that CIA never made an official protest but informally indicated

from time to time that the lack of exchange was prejudicial to

overall intelligence and internal security interests and implied

we were more open with the British in this area than with CIA.

Papich states this situation does not exist today as there is

a good exchange by the Bureau and CIA.

Our files reveal that through the years CIA has

furnished

the Bureau a number of technical devices for our use

or inspection.

They have also furnished technical manuals obtained

abroad and briefed us on operational and technical aspects of

some of their operations abroad.

Laboratory personnel have been

afforded tours and briefings concerning CIA facilities and

equipment and in two instances Bureau personnel have been afforded

training at CIA schools. As recently as October, 1969; CIA

afforded a briefing to Bureau personnel concerning a Clandestine

Transmitter Activator, developed by their technical people and

offered to loan us one of these units as well as afford our

personnel training in the operation of the equipment.

COMMENTS OF THE LABORATORY

Similarly, Bureau records show substantial reciprocity

on the part of the FBI in developing and furnishing important

technical information to CIA over a period of many years.

Representative examples are cited below:

Prior to 1955 an important unsolved technical

intelligence problem involved desired access to

enemy intelligence and other security information

SECRET

CONTINUED - OVER

FJC:sef

(7)

HH 55036

DocId:32989616 Page 324

---

## Page 325

Memorandum for Mr. DeLoach

RE:

RELATIONSHIPSWITH CIA

SECRET

EXCHANGE OF TECHNICAL INFORMATION

protected by combination-type locks (safe doors, and

the like).

Scientists in the FBI Laboratory were

able to solve this problem by using X-rays from

radioactive materials to "see" into the interior of

a combination lock and thus recover the combination,

without trace of tampering or other indication that

the lock had been compromised. This was a scientific

breakthrough of tremendous intelligence potential and,

with Bureau

approval, our results and techniques were

made known to the appropriate CIA representatives.

CIA advised

that they had theretofore spent thousands

of dollars in an intensive, but unsuccessful effort to

solve the same problem.

The impact of this scientific

discovery in permitting access to previously unavailable

intelligence had tremendous value for both the FBI and

CIA.

In approxmately the late 50's and early 60's, both CIA

and FBI encountered a new, highly sophisticated type

of secret writing placed into use by the Russians for

communicating with espionage agents. In spite of a

municating with espio

massive technical effort mounted by CIA, scientists

of the FBI Laboratory were successful in first unraveling

the basic principles and techniques underlying this new

Russian system.

This important breakthrough thus permitted

for the first time a successful attack against the new

Russian secret ink communication system.

Because of its

extreme intelligence potential, with prior Bureau approval,

this development was made known to CIA, and its importance

to CIA is reflected in part by a letter addressed to the

Director of FBI by Allen W. Dulles, then Director of CIA,

under date of August 19, 1961, in which Dulles said, in

part, "For the past several years there has been

increasingly effective technical liaison between the

Technical Services Division of this Agency and correspond-

ing components of your Bureau. • ." Dulles further

commented that Bureau technical personnel had "

.. • made

an outstanding technical contribution for which they are to

be highly .commended.

Their work not only has an important

impact in one sensitive area, but also has revealed a

chemical mechanism from which may well stem new high-level

secret writing systems. The discovery will have an

- 2 -

CONTINUED - OVER

I SECRET

HH 55036 DocId: 32989616

Page 325

---

## Page 326

Memorandum for Mr. DeLoach

RE:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

EXCHANGE OF TECHNICAL INFORMATION

SEGRET

important influence on the discharge of responsibilities

assigned both to this Agency and the FBI. I consider

access to these findingsto be further evidence of the

value of close technical liaison between our two

organizations. . ."

Subsequently, again with prior Bureau approval, whenever

it could be done without jeopardizing FBI operational

interests, the FBI on a continuing basis made available

to CIA actual Soviet secret writing chemicals and methods

of development which had come into the possession of the

Bureau through investigative activity and through high-

level informants. A recent example involved the Russian.

espionage case of Herbert William Boeckenhaupt wherein

on 2/12/69 a sample of secret writing material used by

Boeckenhaupt to communicate with the Russians was

furnished to CIA by a representative of the FBI Laboratory.

The above items are representative outstanding examples

of FBI cooperation in developing and sharing highly important

technical information, and certainly the letter from CIA reflects

(the satisfaction and

importance which CIA attached to such

information received from the Bureau. Within general Bureau

policy guidelines, there were, of course, on a continuing basis

numerous other items of technical information shared with CIA

over the years, including briefings and exchange of visits.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None.

We do not believe, in light of the facts set

forth, that CIA vill make an issue of this matter.

JK

V.

SECRET

WW 55036, DocId: 32989616 Page 326

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## Page 327

TO

OPr

ALrL

so. 10

3010-106

Go

GEN.

REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

:Mr. C. D. DeLoach

SECR

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach

1

Mr. J. P. Mohr

Mr.

J. J. Casper

- Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: March 6, 1970

1

- MT. D. J. Brennan

1

- Mr. W. H. Atkinson

1o1h

Holler:

Mohr _

Bishop

Casper

Callah in

Contad

Felt -

Gale -

Rosen

Sullivan

Tavel.

Soyars

Tele. Room

Holmes -

Gandy

FROM

:Mr. W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

CIA LECTURERS AT BUREAU TRAINING SCHOOLS

EXCHANGE IN THE TRAINING FIELD

Items number 35 and 36 in the material submitted to the

Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum March 5, 1970, indicated

CIA has never understood why Bureau will not permit CIA personnel to

lecture at our schools and CIA was unhappy regarding our attitude

concerning exchange of information in the training field.

CIA by letter May 19, 1950, requested it be permitted to

discuss training problems with

FBI training staff in view of

necessity of its maintaining relations with foreign police and

security agencies. Following recommendations by the Executives

1950, that we did

not believe FBI training

cot beenere fur trining statt could intelligently discuss traintne

methods with CIA since our staff was not knowledgeable concerning

conditions encountered by CIA in various foreign countries.

Since 1962, we have taken foreign police officers into the

(AID). These officers spent two weeks of orientation with AID and

after

graduation certain

selective officers have been in touch with

CIA through AID. We are aware that CIA has used many of these

graduates as sources of information.

capabilities of CIA personnel engaged in overseas police training

programs." As a result,

a CIA Security Officer graduated from the

77th Session of the FBI

National Academy (March 7 - May 25, 1966).

At the specific request of CIA, Bureau representatives have

addressed CIA intelligence personnel attending refresher-type

training courses on 31 occasions between June, 1962,

and December,

1969.

WHA: mbm

imon

CONTINUED - OVER

SECRET

NW 55036 DocId:32989616 Page 327

---

## Page 328

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach

We joaned CIA four Bureau training films in

February, 1966, one was eventually returned, but CIA

continues to utilize the other three films entitled "On

The Record, " "Interviews," and "Burglary Investigations."

We continue to use foreign language films from CIA which.

were loaned to us as a supplement to the Bureau's Language

Training Program.

Representatives of CIA have not lectured at

Bureau training schools and there is no indication in

Bureau files that this has been advocated by CIA.

This memorandum has been coordinated with the

Training Division.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not. believe, in light of the facts

set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

SENET

WW 55036. DocId: 32989616 Page 328

---

## Page 329

OPTIONAL FORM NO, 10

5010-100

MAY IRGAAITION

'OSA GIN, NiG. NO, 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

:Mr. C. D. DeLoach

SECRET

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach

1

- MX.

W.

C.

Sullivan

1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan

DATE: 3/6/70

FROM : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

idla will.

Multar.

Mohr —

Bishop

Casper

Callithan

Contad.

Fall -

Gale _

Rosen.

Sullivan

Tavel -

Soyars

Tele. Room

Holmes -

Gandy

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

(POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE)

1 - Liaison

1

- Mr. W. R. Wannall

- Mr. L.

M. Linton

1 - Mr.

E. R. Harrell

#MORI6 ILO

CLASSIFIED BY SP 2 ALmIJIG

DECLASSIFY ON: 25XI,6u

NIL INTORMIARION CONTAINS

HEREIN LG LNGLASSTEIED EXCHES

OFFERWISE

WACRE SHOWE

Item Number 37 in the material submitted to the

Director by Special Agent Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70

discusses CIA criticism which could generate from Agency belief

that Bureau has failed to cooperate and offer necessary assistance

in collection of positive intelligence in the United States.

Memorandum is to deal with specific cases believed by Papich

to evidence lack of cooperation and to briefly comment on policy

of cooperation we have adopted with CIA.

SYNOPSIS:

Mentioned Item by Papich points out CIA belief that

more aggressive action should have been taken in field of

collecting positive intelligence in the United States.

Papich

notes Bureau's action in this field, for the most part, has been

restricted to compliance with requests by State Department when

political crises occur in some country.

He points out CIA belief

that acquiring needed data would mean

increased technical surveil-

lance coverage, development of informants and collection of

cryptographic material.

cites two specific cases occurring

in 1969 where Bureau

declined CIA's request for technical coverage,

suggesting to Agency that it make its request directly to the .

Attorney General.

Review of specific cases mentioned set forth

with Director's comments relative thereto being noted.

Our

policy of cooperation with cla most recently delinated to field

by SAC Letter 66-10 (B) - copy attached.

SAC letter calls for

guarding our jurisdiction but shows our willingness to cooperate

with CIA.

Enclosure

*.

(7)

OBSERVATIONS AND ACTION - OVER

SECRET

55036

• DocId:32989616 Page

329

---

## Page 330

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach

RE:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET

CIA has repeatedly raised the issue in the past of

our coverage in the positive intelligence collection area and

reasonably expect similar issues to be raised in the

future.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

That we prepare a carefully worded letter to CIA

outlining policy and the basic elements of intelligence and

counterintelligence work affecting the United States and

forthrightly ask CIA if it is satisfied with the status quo

and if not what do they have to suggest

as changes

Wiel

- 2 .

SECRET

Wh 55036 DocId: 32989616 Page 330

---

## Page 331

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach

RE:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DETAILS:

SECREI

Papich points out CIA feels there is unexplored

field for acquiring positive intelligence in the United States

but he notes that there has been no law, directive, or executive

order which fixes responsibility for clandestine collection of

such information.

He notes we investigate subversives, spies,

and develop penetrations of foreign intelligence services and

that facets of these investigations of violations of United States

laws serve

to fulfill a counterintelligence objective referred

to by us as investigations of internal security matters. Papich

notes, however, that most of our work in the positive intelligence

field

has been restricted to the compliance with requests by

State Department prompted usually by a political crisis occurring

in some foreign country.

Papich points out CIA feels there is unexplored

field for acquiring positive intelligence requiring use of

vastly increased technical surveillances, informant development

and collection of cryptographic material. According to Papich,

CIA does not feel Bureau has moved aggressively in this area

and CIA has been thwarted in attempts to do much about the

problem.

Papich cites two cases Alfred S. Gonsalves, J10/69 and

(5) 1

Lalman Shapiro, 10/69) where CIA requests for technical surveil

lance were declined by us with the suggestion to CIA that thes

matters should be taken up by that Agency directly with the

Attorney General.

• Specific Cases

Representative of the

(5)

a result of his weakness for women when assigned in Moscow.

(5)

from (1957 to 1961.5)Gonsalveswas to participate, in bilateral

talks with United States officials in ctober, 19695)By letter

s) 9/26/69 CIA requested telephone and microphone surveillances or

(s) Gonsalves. The Director commented "Let CIA seek the authority

of the AG.

I don't want them utilizing FBI as their channel." (

(s) CZalman M. Shapirg was originally investigated by us

in 1965 as a possible unregistered agent of the (Israeli Govern-

ment due to negotiations by him with Israeli officials designed

to set up a semiprivate nuclear processing company in israely

(5)

(5)

(5)

-3 -

SECRET

CONTINUED - OVER

HH 55036 DocId: 32989616 Page 331

---

## Page 332

(5)

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach

RE:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRLI

(5)

and details

i activity by that subject

5 Shapiro headed a Pittsburg in involved in Atomic nee

Commission (AEC) work requiring "Top Secret" clearance by AEC.

Our initial investigation was closed when Assistant Attorney

General - Internal Security Division found that facts did not

justily soliciting (shapiro' esistration as a foreign agent i

In Spring of 1965, sixty-one kilograms of nuclear

material were found to be unaccounted for by the firm headed

by Shapiro, but subsequent inventories and checking by AEC

revealed this shortage was probably the result of cumulative

process of wasteful production methods over a period of eight

diversion of nuclear material on the part of Shapirolio

years and did not justify an unqualified determination of a

unauthorized persons or government'"

CIA, in 1968, became alarmed on receipt of information

of loss of mentioned nuclear material and despite AEC findings

felt it may indicate illegal diversion or at least justification

for reopening investigation. Richard Helms of CIA contacted

the Attorney General directly with his thoughts regarding the

need for additional investigation.

Attorney General contacted

Bureau requesting it discuss matter with CIA and determine

advisibility of additional investigation.

The Director,

approving conference with CIA, noted "OK but I doubt advisibility

of getting into this.

It looks like Helms is going around

us to AG as he suspects we would say no...

an intensive investigation of Shapiro conducted

during late {968 and into Fall of I969 revealed no positiv

(5)

intelligence activity on his part or verifiable diversion of

material to srael destination included technica

ind discontinued 9/4/69. Shapirols

was interviewed by AEC B/14/69and disclaimed passing any

classified data to Israeli Government. Facts of case were

reviewed by Department of Justice which found no evidence of pro-

secutable violation by Shapiro.($) AEC felt the additional investi-

gation produced no data upon which could be based a legitimate

withdrawal of clearance for AEC contracts or information. In

view of this, we closed our investigation and CIA was so advised.

A 10/13/69 letter from Helms acknowledged additional investigation/

CONTINUED - OVER

SECREN

WW 55036 DocId: 32989616 Page 332

---

## Page 333

Mémorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach

RE:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

would produce o legal evidentlertinent to the laste which

prompted CIA's original request but noted he felt reinstituted

1 piest out

audio surveillances of (Shapirg would produce positive intelligence

information. He therefore requested reinstitution of this

coverage.

The Director's letter to Helms 10/17/69 noted that

after careful review it was felt

that CIA should take this

matter to the Attorney General.

On October 21, 1969, a CIA official was told by

Special Agent Papich that in the future CIA should transmit its

requests for technical surveillance coverage in the United States

to the Attorney General.

This specifically covered the cases

of Consalves and shapirol The Director commented "Right."

Bureau Policy of Cooperation

In 1965 and 1966, recognizing overlapping interests,

changes inherent in faster

communication, hysteria to facilitate

international travel

and in response to requests from CIA,

the

Director approved Bureau attendance at conferences with CIA

regarding

that Agency's operational activities in the United States.

On a memorandum reporting the results of the conferences with

CIA,

the Director commented "I hope we still don't let our

guard down as CIA has always outsmarted us because of our

gullibility."

SAC Letter 66-10 (B) dated 2/15/66 furnished to the

field and Bureau offiçials results of the conferences with CIA

and emphasized necessity for protecting Bureau jurisdiction in

the counterintelligence field. This SAC letter (copy attached)

emphasized there is to be no interference with or infringement

upon our jurisdiction but clearly shows our willingness to

cooperate with CIA in developing positive intelligence in the

United States. In approving this SAC letter, the Director

noted "I hope

there is no 'sneaker' in this.

Time will tell."

There has been no renewed request from CIA for

technical coverage in the cases mentioned above, nor has there

been any indication that such requests have been

sent. by CIA

to the Attorney General as we suggested. Due to CIA interest

in the past in these matters, we cannot rule out the possibility

the Agency may approach Attorney General for the desired

coverage at some time in the future.

Eres

НН 55036 Do0Id:32989616

Page

333

- 5 -

SECREN

---

## Page 334

(B) CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY - OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED

STATES -- The Bureau recently completed discussions with the Central

Intelligence Agency (CIA) regarding that agency's operational activities in

the United States.

These discussions essentially decit with ClA's asses-aunt

and recruitment of foreign intelligenre sources in the United States. Enclosed

for your use is a list of the ground rules which both agencies have accopted

as guidelines for effecting the necessary coordination. In urder that you may

be adequately oriented in this matter, the following background is set lorth.

The need for the ground rules is related to Cli's interesi in dereloping

positive intelligence sources in the Unitsc States and the necessity for

protecting the Bureau's jurisdiction in the counterintelligence field, The

latter is essential to the adequate discharge of our responsibilities to

national security.

Positive intelligence may be described is a comprchensive product

resulting from collection, evaluation, colation, analysis, and interpretation

of all available information relating to national security and concerning other

countries where such information is significant to our Co: erninent's revelma-

ment

and execution of plans: policies, and courses of action.

Such intelligence

can be divided into various categories, such as economic, military, scientific.

political, geographic, et cerera.

The rotection of positive intelligeno: is

distinguished from counterintelligence waich is primarily dcsigned to penetrate.

monitor, neutralize and/or disrupt the foreign intoiligence ond security services.

Counterintelligence further incluces other functions of an internal security

nature directed againsi subrersive groups, cigunzarions, and individuals. Sy

law CIA does not have any law enforcement or internal security funcuons. CIA's

authorization for collecting positive intelligence is predicated on the Nationai

Security Act of 1947 and subsequent issuance oi National Socurity Council

Directives. There is no law, directive, or chartor which euthorizes Cia in

engage in the clandestine development of positive intelligence sources in the

United States. Therefore, in the absence of any statutory prerogative lo conduc

such activity in the United States, it nes been mutually agreed by FBI and Ci

that the Agency can only engage in the clandestine developrent and harling ei

positive intelligence sources in this country by coordinatin: with the Bereat.

The Bureau in turn legally has the primary counterintelligence responstanti::

in the U. S. and is continually developing postave intelligence, It, horarer.

must be regarded an incidental product io our reain dojective.

The Buren

does not have a primary responsibility to collect positive intelligence: but we

do have numerous and very signisicant obligations in this field. In actual practice

the Bureau is required by the President and other agencies to develop inferriano.

2-15-66

SAC LETTER 66-10

- 2-

H# 55036 DocId: 32989616 Page 334

---

## Page 335

of a positive intelligence nature. This requires Bureau action designed to

bring about the necessary coverage. A good example is our involvement

in the development of information relating to the crisis in the Dominican

Republic. From the above you will recognize that there can be "gray areas"

of interest to the Bureau and CIA. It, therefore, has been necessary to

effect adequate coordinating machinery.

The potential for the development of positive intelligence in this

country is vast and varied. Voluminous positive intelligence is collected

overtly through the review of foreign and domestic publications, interviews

of travelers, arriving aliens, contacts with scientists, et cetera. In this

area there have been no serious issues between the Bureau and CIA.

However, in the field of clandestine development of positive

intelligence both agencies have an interest, and there is a necessity for a

clear-cut understanding of jurisdiction and coordination. Particularly is

this true in the development of positive intelligence sources who are

employees or officials of foreign governments stationed in the United States

or who are visiting this country on a temporary basis.

For many years the Bureau has had a continuing progräm of

developing sources in diplomatic installations for the purpose of discharging

our counterintelligence responsibilities and incidentally for developing

positive intelligence information which might assist the Government in

formulating policy.

The Bureau, recognizing CIA s need for sources in the

positive intelligence field, has permitted CIA to assess and recruit sources in

the United States in a limited manner with the understanding that such activities

are fully coordinated with the Bureau. In January, 1964, CIA established

their Domestic Operations Division (DOD) to conduct such operations in the

United States. and certain Bureau field offices were alerted and furnished

the necessary guidance and instructions. The recent discussions with CIA

resulted in a refinement of the understanding of the ground rules established

in January, 1964.

The enclosed ground rules will be applied by the Bureau and CIA

as cases arise. The Bureau position in each matter will be decided at the

Seat of Government, As a general rule. Bureau Headquarters will be informed

by ClA regarding its interest in an individual or a target. Prior to notification

of CIA regarding our position, the situation will be carefully reviewed at the

Seat of Government. This may often include a request to the field for

2-15-66

SAC LETTER 66-10

NW 55036 DocId: 32989616 Page 335

---

## Page 336

in ..

observations and recommendaBens before notice is transmitted to CIA. A:

the same time, it is possible that you may be contacted in the field by a

representative of bob, CiA. li so, you should be guided by the enclosed

ground rules in any discussions, bearing in mind that the approval for any

particular operational activity is lo be made at Bureau Headquarters.

You should hoid to the concept that the protection of the internal

security of the United States involves very basic clear-cut responsibilities

of the FBI. This should be kept in mind in each case and in any contacts

which you may have with CIA representatives.

There is to be no interfere-se

with or infringement upon our jurisdiction. It is recognized that unforest.

developments may create situations not adequately covered by the ground riles.

You, therefore, should report such matters to the Bureau setting forth

complete details with your recommendations. Although we have been informed

by CIA that the Bureau's jurisdiction and operational interests will not be

interfered with, we cannot discount the results of past experiences stemming

from CIA's operational and organizational deficiencies. We have no reasc= io

believe that there will be a revolutionary change of these conditions. It is.

therefore, incumbent upon you to be extremely alert for any breakdown of :-a

adherence to the ground rules. I emphasize that this is an area of activity

which must be closely monitored by each Special Agent in Charge. You

should be certain that your personnel is adequately oriented so that the Bureau

can have the full benefit of any constructive suggestions pertaining to this

entire matter.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosure for (B)

2-15-66

SAC LETTER 66-10

-4-

SEGRET

WW 55036 DocId:32989616 Page 336

---

## Page 337

UNIT

In Reply, Pleuse Refer 80

File No.

SECREE

STATES DEPARTMENT OF JI

ICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

NASHINGTON, D.C.

20535

February 7, 1956

SECRET

JEK Act 6 (1) (14)

A LEERATI ON CONTATE

• WHERE SAUCH COSE AIST.

117-O1 #MDRI6

CLASSIFIED BYSP 2 ALm./1TG

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X_/

SECRET

GROUP I

Excluded

from autonatic

downgrading and

declassification

SECRET

NH 55036 DocId:32989616 Page 337

---

## Page 338

SECRET

JFK Act

(1) (B)

SECRET

NH 55036 DocId:32989616 Page 338

---

## Page 339

OPTiONAL "ORN "D, IU

5010-106

MAS : DOR EDITIUN

OSA GIN. REO, NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

Mr. C. D. Deloach

FROM :W. C. Sullivan

(SECRET

DATE:

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS

Tolson

DeLonch

Walters

- MT. Deloach

Mr. Sullivan

1 - Liaison

3/7/70

Mohr

Bishop

Cusper

Callahun

Conrad

Felt

Gale

Rosen

Sullivan.-

1 - Mr. Gray

Tavel -

1.

Mr. Hengemuhle

Soyars

Tele. Room

Holmes -

Gandy.

DECEASED BY SPARMINTE

07_1-11-01

Item Number 38 In the material subnitted to the

Director by SA Sam Papich in hismmorandum of 3/5/70 serves as

a sort of summary in which SA Papich indicates that he cannot

recall the names of other cases which resulted in CIA displeasure

or criticism, but does cite one instance "early in the 1950'g"

in which we disseninated data from a source of unknown rellability.

charging Allen Dulles as having been a communist and a spy

while in furope.

By letter 3/22/52, we Informed State and CIA that a

source of unknown reliability had alleged that the brother of

John Foster Dulles had been arrested in Hungary in 1947 or

1948 and forced to write a letter to his wife which brought her

to hungary where she was also arrested. We asked for an

evaluation of the information.

Mr. D. M. Ladd menorandun,

4/5/52, states he received a call from Allen Dulles during which

Dulles referred to the letter and said he was not concerned

about it but wanted ladd to look it over. We were subsequently

informed by CIA that Allen Dulles (the only brother of

John foster Dulles and then CIA Deputy Director) had said that

the information concerning Dulles and his wife was without

loundation and we promptly told State of this by letter 4/15/52,

a copy of which was directed to Allen Dulles. Mr. Keay's

memorandum 5/10/52 written by SA Papich reports his discussion

with dulles concerning this matter:

Mr. Dulles asked if the

original letter could be withdrawn and was told that it appeared

that the FBI had already set the records straight but that if he

wished to make an official request, Papich woulf refer the matter

Dulles. Inmediately replied that

he definitely did not want to nake "a big thing" of the letter,

that it was not that important, and that maybe it would be better

to drop the natter.. General Smith (then Director of Central

Intelligence) later told Papich that he considered the matter

closed.

SA Papich also alludes to other instances in which

cle alleged that we had mishandled its information. it has no

i specifics, however, and states he cannot recall the cases.

(6)

ACTION - Page 2

HH 55036 DocId:32989616 Page 339

RET

---

## Page 340

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach

RE:

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

STORET

None.

We do not belleve, in light of the facts

set forth, that CIA "1ll make an issue of this matter.

:

16 55036 DocId: 32989616 Page 340

---

## Page 341

SECKET

1

1

"ST-105

- Mr.

DeLoach

- Mr. Sullivan

- МГ.

J.A. Sizoo

- MI. D.E. Moore

March 11, 1970

BY COURIER SERVICE

REC47. 69-80750-4781

Tolson

DeLaach

Halter's

blahr .

Bishop

Casper

Callahon

Conrad

Felt.

Gala

ilosen

Sullivan.

Tavei

Sojars

Tele. Room.

tolnes

Hidy 55036/

Honorable Richard Helms

Director

Central Intelligence Agency

•Washington, D. C.

1 - Mr. D. J. Brennan

FMPR16

5668510l5c1

DECLASSIFIED BY SPOT

On T

4!

Dear Mr. Helms:

As I am sure you will agree, the need for close

coordination of the Intelligence-gathering ang

counter-

Intelligence estorts of the This matter is one which

FBi and the Central intelligence

Agency (CIA) is self-evident.*

requires a continuing analysis to assure that both agencies

have established working agreements whereby we can most

effectively realize positive results with a minimum of

duplication, misplaced effort, and jurisdictional problems.

During January, 1966, representatives of this

Bureau met with officials of the CIA to consider coordina-

tion of our mutual efforts in the collection of positive

intelligence in the United States. As a result of these

conferences, a set of ground rules was drawn up and agreed

to by both agencies. A copy of this agreement was transmitted

In wy letter of February 7, 1966, to then CIA Director

Vice Admiral William F. Raborn, JI. A copy of the agreement

is enclosed for your information.

This agreement has proven

generally effective and no major problems have been

encountered since its adoption in the areas it covers.

.. - The FBI has primary responsibility with regard to

matters involving the internal security of the United States

as well as for conducting counterintelligince operations in

SECkET

les weary

'Excluded fron auto

see note, page

downgrading and

-declassiiication

---

## Page 342

Honorable. Richard Helms

this country. While this Bureau does not have any statutory

considerable.

The FBI has, in fact, made a concerted effort

to obtain positive intelligence of value to other U. S.

Intelligence agencies, including the CIA, and policy-making

officials of the Government.

While these efforts have,

of course, been Incidental to our main internal security

and counterintelligence responsibilities, we have on a

selective basis developed sources, both live and technical,

providing coverage at key foreign establishments in the

United States. The product of this coverage has been furnished!

on a regular basis to the CIA and other interested agencies

and officials of the Goverment:

I know that you will share my bellef that this

matter requires a periodic reexamination to assure that the

national security interests continue to be served in the

most effective and complete manner possible. After reviewin?

this matter, including the attached 1966 agreement, I would

valcome any observations you may desire to make.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

Inclogure.

NOTE:

See memo W. C. Sullivan to DeLoach 3/11/70

"Relationships with CIA,"' prepared by WCS:mea.

Classified "Sepret" since disclosure would

serlously damage the internal security interests.

MH 55036 DOeId:32989616Paue 342

---

## Page 343

185-is05.

INSTRUCTIONS

• Type or print clearly in ink.

• Indicate classification

of the

and bottom.

Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

"FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the

information.

If additions fas when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to

HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a

copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. S. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing'

substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community

matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests

Commitments made to supply additional information should he

noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered her,

e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whther

interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript ,

is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional

pages may be attached if necessary.

---