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Date : 07/08/98

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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY

RECORD NUMBER

RECORDS SERIES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

NSC

: 168

145-10001-10161

Released under the rohn

'• kenned

Assassination Record

Collection Act of 1992

i44 USC 2107 Notel .

Case# :NU 54214 Date:

10-10-2017

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : NSC

FROM

THOMAS A. PARROTT

TO

TITLE : MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

DATE : 06/11/62

PAGES

: 3

SUBJECTS : MEETING OF SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED) ON OPERATION

MONGOOSE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION

RESTRICTIONS : 1A

CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 02/10/98

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

1H 54214

DooId: 32977058

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11 April 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting of Special Group (Augmented) on Operation

Mongoose, 11 April 1962

PRESENT:

General Taylor and Mr. Bundy; Mr. Rusk, Mr. Johnson and

Mr. Martin; Mr. Kennedy; Mr. McNamara, Mr. Gilpatric,

General Lemnitzer and General Lansdale; Mr. McCone,

Mr. Helms and Mr. Harvey

(1) (R)

General Lansdale gave a progress report.

20

Mr. McGone stated that there is little evidence

Reconscancel of any significant increase in military support

therefore questioned whether current estimates of the size of the

Cuban military forces may not be somewhat exaggerated. In this

connection, attention was called to the sizeable list of bloc

materiel which has been provided to Cuba.

Mr. McNamara asked about evidences of underground in-

stallations, pointing out that should these exist in any significant

numbers it would have a bearing on probable Cuban intentions and also

on the difficulties of armed invasion of the island. He added that

in any case, the difficulties can be expected to increase in the next

one to five years.

Mr. Harvey reported on the interrogation of recent

exfiltrees, with emphasis on their statements that some resistance

elements exist in seven areas.

Answering Mr. Rusk's question, General Lemnitzer said that

the U.S. has the capability of blockading Cuba completely. He added

that the chiefs consider Cuba a threat to the U.S. and the Hemisphere

now and in the future.

The following requests emerged from this discussion:

a. Defense and CIA analysts should jointly consider

all available evidence, particularly photographic, bearing on

supporting military facilities, including any underground ones.

1168

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b.. A study should be made of the time and resources

required to put

a complete blockade into effect.

Pendsphere

Defense/JCS should examine the possibility of

establishing "patrol posts" in the Caribbean, manned by personnel

from one or several countries; particular attention should be

given to the possibility of such an establishment, to be purely

U.S., in Haiti, so as to guard against any invasion attempt of

that country from Cuba.

3. Mr. McCone said that the current schedule of covert actions

be met, but he suggested that perhaps it should be speeded up even

though this would entail increased dangers of attribution to the U.S.

He added that the present restrictions on attribution present difficulties

with respect to training agents and to supply missions.

Mt.: McCone

also questioned whether complete success within the current covert

framework would lead to the desired resulte

Mr. Rusk urged that efforts be continued to explore the

possibilities of defection or subversion of key individuals in the

Castro regime, and that efforts be made to induct Cuban exiles into

the U.S. armed forces. (Mr. McNamara agreed that the latter could and

should be done.)

In answer to the Secretary of State's question as to the

adequacy of existing policy approvals, General Lansdale said it would

be useful to have approval to go further with infiltrated agents than

restricting them to intelligence missions. It was agreed that, within

the framework of present understandings, the numbers of personnel to

be infiltrated could be stepped up.

In this connection, it was noted

however that it will be difficult if not impossible to maintain motiva

tion and morale indefinitely, without at least the implied promise of

eventual action by the U.S.

The Secretary of State said that, at this time, he can see

no way in which an organized invasion of Cuba could be justified; on

the other hand, this should not be taken as an excuse to cease activity

against the Castro regime.

He, supported by the Secretary of Defense,

took the position that the U.S. should "play for the breaks," and

should take necessary steps so as to get into a position which would

afford the U.S, a maximum number of choices of action.

In this

connection, he and Mr. McNamara suggested that the current target

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date for bringing covert operations to a climax should be removed.

Mr. Bundy cautioned that this could lead to an uncontrollable action

internally, which might come to a head at a time which would be

embarrassing or inconvenient for the U.S.

the security committee of the OAS be used as a vehicle to try to get

more cooperation from Latin American countries, in the anti-Castro

campaign.

In conclusion, Mr. Rusk asked that the program be revised

to permit the building up of a wider range of eventual choices, and

to effect the removal of any target date.

Thomas A. Parrott

No

distribution,

except

General Lansdale - cy destroyer 419163-54m

HH. 54214

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