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TITLE:

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SELECT COMMITTEE ASSASSINATION REPORT

DATE: 09/01/1975

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N7 50955

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Date :

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08/07/95

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September 1, 1975

SELECT COMMITTEE - ASSASSINATION REPORT

Tab A: PROLOGUE

Jab B: Part I: Introduction and Summary

Tab C: Part II: Covert Action as Vehicle for Foreign Policy Implementation

Tab D: Part III/Cuba

Tab

E: Part III/Dominican Republic

Tab F: Part III/Chile

Tab G: Part III/Congo

Tab H: Part III/South Vietnam

Tab I: Part IV: Findings and Conclusions

Tab J:

Part V: Recommendations

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Agreed to by Subcommittee

October 8, 1975

PROLOGUE

The events discussed in this Interim Report must be viewed in

the context of United States policy and actions designed to counter

the threat of spreading Communism.

Following the end of World

War II, many nations in eastern Europe and elsewhere fell under

Communist influence or control. The defeat of the Axis powers was

accompanied by the rapid disintegration of the Western colonial

empires:

The Second World War no sooner ended than a new struggle

began.

The Communist threat, emanating from what was then called

the "Sino-Soviet bloc," produced a policy of containment intended

to prevent further encroachment by Communism into the "free world."

•United States strategy for conducting the Cold War called for

the establishment of interlocking treaty arrangements and military.

bases throughout the world. Our concern over the expansion of an

aggressive Communist monolith led the United States to

fight two

major wars in Asia. In addition, it was considered necessary to

wage a relentless cold war against Communist expansion wherever

it appeared in the "back alleys of the world." This called for a

full range of clandestine activities in response to the operations

of Communist clandestine services.

The fear of expanding Communism was particularly acute when

Fidel Castro emerged as the leader of Cuba in the late 1950's.

His takeover was, seen as the first significant penetration by the

• Communists into the Western Hemisphere. U.S. leaders, including

To

there!

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most Members of Congress, called for vigorous action to stem the

Communist infection in this hemisphere.

These

policies rested on

widespread popular support and encouragement.

Throughout this period, the U.S. felt impelled to respond to

threats which were, or seemed to be, skirmishes in

a global Cold

Wár against Communism. Castro's Cuba raised the spectre of a Soviet

outpost at America's doorstep. Events in the Dominican Republic

appeared to offer more such opportunities for the Russians and their

allies.: The Congo, freed from Belgian rule, occupied the strategic

center of the African continent, and the prospect of Communist pene

tration there was viewed as a threat to American interests in emerging

Africa. Americans are well aware of the powerful reactions set off

in the United States in the 1960's by the domino theory in Indochina.

And; even the election in 1970 of a Marxist president in Chile was

¡seen by some as a threat similar to that of Castro's takeover in Cuba.

The Committee regards the unfortunate events dealt with in this

Interim Report as an aberration, explainable at least in part, but

not justified, by the pressure of events at the time. The Committee

believes that it is still in the national interest of the United

States to do what it can to helf nations resist Communist domination

but it is clear that this cannot justify in the future the kind of

abuses covered in this report. Indeed, the Committee has resolved

that steps must be taken to prevent them from happening again.

What thien

In For.ser=

DETERMINATI

HIT

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29

1%2!

Agreed to by Drafting subcommittee

on August 27, 1975*

1. INTRODUCTION AND SUNDARY

This interim report covers allegations of United States involve-

ment in assassination plots against foreign political leaders. Of equal

significance in this report are certain other cases where foreign political

leaders in fact were killed, where the United States was in some manner

involved in activity leading up to the killing, but where it would be

incorrect to say that the purpose of United States involvement had been

to encourage assassination.

The evidence establishes that the United States was implicated in

several assassination plots. The Committee believes that the use of assassi-

nation as a tool of foreign policy is incompatible with American principles,

international order, and morality. It should be rejected.

Our inquiry also revealed serious problems with respect to United

States involvement in coups directed against foreign governments. Some of

these problens are addressed here on, the basis of our investigation to date;

others we raise as questions to be answered after our investigation into

covert action has been completed.

We stress the interim

nature of this report. In the course of

the Conmittee's continuing work, other alleged assassination plots ray

surface, and new evidence concerning the cases covered herein may come to

light. However, it is the Committee's view that the cases covered herein

have been developed in sufficient detail to clarify the issues which are

at the heart of the Committee's mandate to recommend legislative and other

reforms relating to the vital matters

discussed below.

* The Vice Chairman reserved as to the first sentence in the discussion

of the similarities and differences among the plots. (See p.

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Hen picali

In depth treatment of the assassination question has lengthened

the Committee's schedule but has greatly increased the Committee's awareness

of the hard

issues

it must face in the months ahead. The Cormittee intends,

nevertheless, to complete, by February 1976, its main job of undertaking the

first comprchensive review of the intelligence community.

1. The Committee's Mandate

Under Senate Resolution 21, the Committee was instructed to in-

vestigate the full range of governmental intelligence activities and

the

extent, if any,

to which such activities were "illegal, inproper or un-

ethical". In addition to that very broad general mandate, the Committee

was required by the Senate to investigate, study and make recommendations

concerning various specific matters, several of which relate to the

assassi-

nation issue.*

Although the Rockefeller Commission conducted an inquiry into

reported assassination plots, the Commission declared it was unable, for

a variety of reasons,

•to complete its inquiry. At the direction of the Presi-

dent,

the. Executive Branch turned over to the Select Committee the work

the Commission had done, along with other documents relating to assassina-

tions.

* For example,

S. Res. 21 requires the Conmittee to study and investi-

gate the following:

the extent and necessity of .

.: abroad";

• covert intelligence activities

"[the] nature and extent of executive branch oversight of all

United States intelligence

activities";

is it

"the need for improved, strengthened, or consolidated oversight

of United

States

intelligence activities by the Congress"; and

the need for new legislation.

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B.

Conmittee Decision To Make This Report Public

This report raises important questions of national policy. We

-believe that the public is entitled to know what certain instrumentalities

their Government have done.

Further, our recommendations can only be

judged in light of the factual record.

Therefore, this interin report

should be made

public.

Because of our faith in the democratic system, and the paranount

importance of strengthening the institutions of this country, the Committee

believes the truth about the assassination allegations should be told.

Denocracy depends upon a well-informed electorate. Truth underlies both

justice

and freedom.

We reject any contention that the facts disclosed herein should be

kept secret because they

are embarrassing to the United States. Despite

the possible injury to our national reputation, the Committee believes that

foreign peoples will, upon sober reflection, respect the United States more

for keeping

faith with its democratic. ideal than they will condemn us for

the misconduct itself.

The fact that portions of the story have already been publicly dis-

closed only accentuates

the need for full disclosure. Innuendo and mis-

leading partial disclosures are neither fair to the individuals involved,

nor a responsible way to lay the groundwork for informed public policy

judgments.

STRess the

FAET THAI

that

IT

cant alli

be dono

C.

The Scope of the Committee's Investigation

The investigation of the

assassination issue has been an unpleasant

duty, but one that the Select Committee had

to meet. The Committee has

compiled a massive record in the months that the inquiry has been underway.

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The hearing

record includes some

pages of sworn testimony from

witnesses during _

hearing days as well as numerous staff interviews.

The documents

which the Committee obtained included raw files from the

agencies and departments, from the White House, and from the Presidential

libraries of the Administrations of former Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy

Kennedy and Johnson.**

We obtained evidence of two general types: first, evidence

which related to the overall setting of events, the national policy of

the time, and descriptions of normal operating procedures including

channels of command and control; and

second, evidence relating to specific

events.

A Senate Comnittee is not al court. It looks to the past, not to

determine guilt or innocence, but in

order to make recommendations for the

Future.

Therefore, where we found

the

evidence to be ambiguous--as we did

on some issues--we have set out both sides,

in order that the evidence may

speak for itself.

Despite the number of witnesses

and documents examined by the

Connittee, there were the following shortcomings in the evidence available

to us:

* The names of the witnesses are set forth in Appendix A.

** The Committee served both general and specific document requests upon

the Executive Branch and the Administration represented to the Committce that

it did not know of any additional relevant documents, except, of course, for

the possibility that the "Nixon papers" (which the Committee is attempting

to obtain) may contain material

relevant to the allegations relating to Chile.

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i g-

a.

llany of the events under consideration occurred as

10n2

aS

fifteen years ago. With one exception, they

occurred during the adrinistrations of Presidents now dead.

Other high officials, whose testimony might have

additional light upon

the thorny issues of authorization

and control, are also dead. Moreover, with the passage

of time, the memories

of those still alive have dired.

The Committee often faced the difficult task of dis-

tinguishing refreshed recollection from speculation.

many instances, witnesses were unable to testify from in-

dependent recollection and had to rely on documents con-

temporaneous with the events to refresh their recollections.

While informed speculation is of some assistance, it can

only be assigned limited weight in judging specific events.

Assassination is not a subject on which one would

expect

many records or documents to be made or retained.

In fact,

there were more relevant contemporaneous documents

then we had expected, and the CIA in 1967 made

internal

study of the Castro, Trujillo and Dien assassination allega-

tions.

That study was quite useful, particularly in

suggesting leads for uncovering the story of the actual

assassination activity. Unfortunately, some material

* Those studies were made at the direction of CIA Director Richard Helms

to provide him with information to respond to questions put to him by

President Johnson.

CIA attempts on the life of Castro using the Mafia.

The President

asked Helms at the same time to provide information

about Trujillo and Diem.

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4....

-6-

relating to that investigation was destroyed upon

its

completion.*

A final deficiency in the evidence stems

from the

doctrine that CIA covert operations

should be concealed

from the world and performed in such a way that if they

were discovered, the role of the United States could be

plausibly denied. As an extension of this doctrine of

"plausible deniability" cormunications between the Agency

and high Administration officials were often convoluted

and imprecise. i*

The evidence contains sharp conflicts,

some of which relate to

basic facts. But the most important conflicts

relate not so much to basic

facts as to differing perceptions and opinions based upon relatively undis-

puted facts.

With respect to both kinds of conflicts, the Conmittee has

attempted to set forth the evidence extensively so that it may speak for

itself. In the findings and conclusions section, we suggest resolutions

of some of the conflicts. Remembering that the Conmittee's nain job is

to find lessons for the future, there are also occasions where we point

out that resolving conflicts in the evidence may be less important than

making certain that the system which produced the abiguitics is corrected.

SEE If

RoF

TO

10/2

very

weak

* This was done pursuant to the instructions of CIA Director Richard

Helms (Helms Ex._; 6/13/75 Ir.. In fairness to Director Helms it

should be added, however, that he was responsible for requesting the

preparation of the I.G. Reports and for preserving them.

** For a full discussion of this doctrine see pages

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MUT SECRET

Summary of Findings and Conclusions

1. The Questions Presented

The Committee sought to answer four broad questions:

ASSASSINATION PLOTS. Did U.S. officials instigate,

attempt,

aid and abet, or acquiesce in plots designed to

assassinate foreign leaders?

INVOLVEMENT IN OTHER KILLINGS. Did U.S. officials

assist foreign dissidents in a way which significantly con-

tributed to the killing of foreign leaders?

AUTHORIZATION. Where there was involvement by U.s.

officials in assassination plots or other killings, were such

activities ordered and if so, at what levels of our Government?

COMMUNICATION AND CONTROL. Even if not authorized,

were the assassination activities perceived to be within the

scope of agency authority, and was adequate control exercised

over its activities.

2. Summary of Findings and Conclusions on the Plots

The Seven Allegations. The Committee investigated alleged

U.S. involvement in assassination plots in five foreign countries.* They

were:

Country

Cuba

Congo (zaire)

Indivicual Involved**

Fidel Castro

Patrice Lumumba

* Insert Footnote on Sukarno

and Duvalier.

** Insert re Raul and Che and Ngo Dinh Nhu.

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Country

Individual Involved

Dominican Republic

Rafael Trujillo

Chile

General Rene Schneider

South Vietnam

Ngo Dinh Diem

In summary, the evidence with respect to each allegation disclosed

the following.*

Fidel Castro (Cuba). United States Goverment personnel plotted

to kill Castro beginning in 1960. American underworld figures were used in

these plots as well as Cubans hostile to the Castro regime. One of the later

plots, which lasted until 1965, involved a Cuban dissident who was provided

encouragement and material

support by the United States.

Patrice Lumumba_ (Congo/Zaire). In the Fall of 1960, two CIA

officials were asked by superiors to assassinate Lumumba. Poisons were

sent to the Congo and some exploratory steps were taken toward gaining

access to Lumumba. Subsequently, in carly 1961, Lumumba was killed by

Congolese rivals. It does not appear from the evidence that the United

States was involved in the actual killing.

Rafael Trujillo (Dominican Republic). Trujillo was shot by

Dominican dissidents on May 31, 1961. Commencing in 1960 and continuing

to the time of the assassination, the U.S. Government generally supported

these dissidents and some Governnent personnel were avare that they intended

to kill Trujillo. Three pistols and three carbines were furnished by

American officials, although a request for machine guns was later refused.

There was conflicting

evidence whether the weapons were knowingly supplied

for use in the assassination and whether any were present at the scene.

_CALLOR!

OFF

* See Section III for a detailed treatment of the evidence..

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•?!5

Ceneral Rene Schneider (Chile). Un October 25, 1379, rencral

Schneider died of gunshot wounds inflicted while resisting a kidnap attempt

three days earlier.

Schneider, as Conmander in Chief of the Arry and a

constitutionalist opposed to military coups; was considered an obstacle to

efforts to prevent Salvador Allende from assuming the office of President

of Chilc.

The United

States Government supported, and sought to instigate,

a military coup to block Allende. U.S. officials supplied financial aid,

machine guns and other equipment to various military figures who opposed

Allende. There was conflicting evidence on whether the United States had

previously severed relations with the groupe that kidnapped and killed

Schneider and on whether any of the equipment supplied was actually used

in the kidnapping.

Neo Dinh Diem (South Vietnam). Diem and his brother, thu, were

killed on November 2, 1963, in the course of

a South Vietnamese Cenerals'.

coup. Although the United States Government supported the coup, there was

no evidence that American officials favored the assassination. Indeed, it

appeared that the assassination of Dien was not part of the Generals' pre-

coup planning but was instead a spontaneous act which occurred during the

coup and with which there was no American connection.

In addition to these five cases the Comnittee received evidence

that ranking government officials discussed, and may have authorized, the

establishment within the CIA of a generalized capability to assassinate.

HAVE TO

clearer.

ce-Chairman

Similarities and Differences Ariong, the Plots. The plots all

ver reserved

ht to

involved Third Horld countries, most of which were relatively snall and

ange to

clude con-

none of which possessed great political or nilitary strength.. Apart from

•nt of Com-

nist sphere

that sinilarity, there were significant differences

anong the plots.

The

luence

thin

following distinctions are pertinent:

stern Hemi-

here.

NW

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(1)

Whether United

States officials initiated the plot or

were responding to

requests

of local dissidents for aid.

(2)

Whether the plot was specifically intended to kill à

foreign leader, or

whether the leader's death was a reasonably

foreseeable consequence of an attempt to overthrow the govern-

ment.

The Castro case is an example of a plot conceived by United States

officials to kill a foreign leader.

The Lunumba plot falls into the same

category.

In thé case of Trujillo, although-the U. S. Covernment certainly

opposed his regime, it did not initiate the plot. Rather, United States

officials

responded to requests for aid from local dissidents whose ain

clearly vas to assassinate Irujillo. By aiding them this country ias in-

plicated, whether the specific weaponry actually supplied was meant to kill

Trujillo or was only intended as a symbol of U.S. support for the dissidents.

The Schneider case is different from that of both Castro and Tru-

jillo. The United States Government

sought a coup and provided support to

local dissidents, knowing they believed that General Schneider was an obstacle

to their plans.

However, even though the support included deadly weapons,

it appears that the intention of both the dissidents and the United States

officials was to abduct, not to kill, General Schneider.

Similarly, in

the Diem case, United States officials did want a change in Governnent, but

there is no evidence that the United States sought the death of Diem himself.

IS THAT

FAIr

do you

NUT

199 et

~Those

planning

they

ALLARS

Sumnary of Findings

and Conclusions on the Issues of Authority

and Control.

Is out the inquiry into

assassination allegations in context, two

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points must be nade clear.

First, there is no doubt that the United States

Government opposed the various leaders in question. U.S. officials

at the highest levels objected to the Castro and Trujillo regines, believed

the accession of

Allende to power in Chile would be harmful to American in-

terests, and

thought of Lumunba as a dangerous force in the heart of Africa.

Second, the evidence on

assassinations has to be viewed in the contezt of other,

nore massive activities directed against the regines in question. For

example, the plots directed against Fidel Castro personally, cannot be under-

stood without considering the fully authorized, comprehensive, assaults upon

his regine, such as the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1901 and Operation Mongoose in

1962.

However, the issue of Covermental authorization of assassination

is of independent

importance. There is a significant difference between a

colablooded, targeted, intentional killing of an

individual foreign leader

and

other forms of intervention in the affairs of foreign nations. Therefore,

the Committee endeavored to explore as fully as possible the question of

hor and why the plots happened, whether they were authorized, and if so, from

what level the authorization came.

We discovered a murky picture. It is not clear whether this is

due to the systen of deniability and the consequent state of the evidence

which even after our long investigation remains conflicting and inconclusive,

or whether there were in fact serious shortconings

in the systen of authori-

zation so that activities such as assassinations could have been undertaken by

an agency of the United States Government without express authority.

what

IT

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Arras

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Based upon the record of our investigation, the Committee's

single most important finding is that the system was such that assassina-

tion activity could have been undertaken by an agency of the United States

Government without it having been uncontrovertibly clear that there

was

explicit authorization from the highest level.

Along with that paramount conclusion, the Conmittee makes four other

major findings.*

The first relates to the lack of direct evidence of authori-

zation of the assassination plots by Presidents of other persons above the

Covernmental agency or agencies involved. The second explains why certain

officials may have, nonetheless, perceived that, according to their judsment

AnTHORIZOO

and experience, assassination was an acceptable course of action. The third

criticizes agency officials for failing on several occusions to elesf theft?

plans and activities to superior authorities, or for failing to do so with

sufficient detail and clarity. The fourth criticizes Administration officials

for, on occasion, giving vague and indirect instructions to subordinates, and

for not making sufficiently clear that assassination should be excluded from

consideration. pASUMES THAT THAT WAS INtONTOn

There is admittedly a tension within the four findings. The first

and third points tend to suggest a lack of authority while the second and

fourth points explain why agency officials could nonetheless have perceived

that their actions vere proper. This tension reflects a basic conflict in the

evidence. While there are some conflicts over facts, it is more important

that there may often have been two differing perceptions of the same facts.

This distinction may be the result of the differing backgrounds and eis-

perience of those persons experienced in covert operations as distinquished

* The Committee's findings are elaborated in Section

, infra.

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145 324

from those who were not. Words of urgency which to the former nay have meant

killing, to the latter

may have meant nothing of the sort.

While we are critical of certain individual actions, the Committee

is mindful of the inherent problems in a system which relies upon secrecy,

compartmentation, circunlocution, and

the avoidance of clear responsibility.

This syten creates the risk of confusion and rashness in the very areas where

clarity and sober judgment are most necessary. Hence: before turning to an

extensive review of the evidence relating to the cases, we briefly deal with

the general subject of covert action during the relevant period.

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TOP SECRET

Agreed to by Drafting Subcommittee

August 28, 1975

Il.

COVERT ACTION AS VEHICLE FOR FOREIGN POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

Simply stated, covert action may be defined as activity which sup-

ports the sponsoring nation's foreign policy objectives but is concealed

under circumstances permitting that nation to plausibly deny its actions.

The National Security Act of 1947 did not specifically include

authority for covert operations. However, it granted to the National

Security Council, then created as an instrument of the President, the

authority to direct the CIA to "perform such other functions and duties

related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National

Security Council may from time to time direct." Thereafter, at its

first meeting in December 1947, the National Security Council issued

a top secret directive granting the CIA the authority to conduct covert

operations. From 1955 to 1970, the basic authority for these operations

was National Security Council 5412/2.*

This directive framed the purposes of covert operations entirely

in terms of opposition to "International Communism, "** directing the CIA

to counter, reduce and discredit "International Communism" throughout the

world in a manner consistent with U. S. foreign and military policies.

It also directed the CIA to undertake covert operations to achieve this

end, and defined covert operations as any covert activities related to

*

Today the basic authority for CIA covert action operations is National

Security Decision Memorandum 40, which superceded NSC 5412/2 on Feb-

ruary 17, 1970.

** By contrast, NSAM 40 of 1970 described covert actions as those secret

activities designed to further official U. S. programs and policies.

abroad. It made no reference to communism.

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-3 TOP SECRET

propaganda, economic warfare, political action (including sabotage,

demolition and assistance to resistance movements) and all activities

compatible with the directive (emphasis supplied). In 1962, the CIA's

General Counsel rendered the opinion that the Agency's activities are

"not inhibited by any limitations other than those broadly set forth

• in NSC 5412/2." (CIA General Counsel Memorandum 4/6/62)

POLICY. DEVELOPMENT

AND APPROVAL MECHANISM

The evidence dealt with

in Part III is concerned with what actually

happened as far as obtaining, or not obtaining, authorization for the ac-

tivities under review by the Committee. With

_respect to what was meant

to happen in regard to covert action generally, the CIA's General Counsel

stated in

1962:

CIA must necessarily be responsible for planning. Oc-

casionally suggestions for action will come from out-

side sources but, to depend entirely on such require-

ments would be an evasion of the Agency's responsibili-

ties.

Also, the average person, both in government and

outside, is

thinking along normal lines and to develop

clandestine cold war activities properly, persons know~

ing both the capabilities and limitations of clandestine

action must be studying and devising how such actions

can be undertaken effectively.

With respect to policy approval, the General Counsel went on to say:

Both in developing ideas or plans for action it is in-

cumbent upon the Agency to obtain necessary policy ap-

proval, and

for this purpose these matters should be

explored with proper officials in other departments

and agencies, particularly in the Departments of State

and Defense, so the determination can be made as to

whether any one proposal should go to the Special Group

or higher for policy determination.

The General Counsel's 1962 memorandum made it clear that the CIA

considered itself responsible for developing proposals and plans to

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implement the specific objectives of NSC 54

•I TOP SECRET

time, how-

ever,

the memorandum stated that even in the development of ideas or plans

for action,

it was incumbent upon the Agency not only to coordinate with

other executive departments

and agencies, but also to "obtain necessary

policy approval" (emphasis

added): The issue which faced the Committee,

of course, was whether such approval was, in fact, sought and obtained

for assassination plans, and whether CIA officials thought it was "neces-

sary" to obtaip express approval for these activities.

Beginning in 1955, the responsibility for authorizing CIA covert

action operations rested in the Special Group, a sub-Cabinet level sub-

committee of the National Security Council composed of the President's

Assistant for National Security Affairs, the Director of Central In-

telligence, the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of

State for Political Affairs. Today this group is known as the 40 Com-

mittee, and its membership now includes the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staffs. In addition, during 1962 another subcommittee of the NSC was

established to oversee covert operations relating to Cuba. It was known

as the Special Group (Augmented) and:

was composed of the members of the

Special Group, the Attorney General and certain other high officials.

The overriding purpose of the Special Group and its successors

has been to exercise control over covert operations abroad. The Special

Group

was charged with the responsibility of considering the objectives

of

any proposed activity, whether or not it would accomplish these

aims.

how likely it would be to succeed, and in general whether or not it

would

be "proper" and in the American interest. The Special Group Chairman

usually was responsible for determining which projects required Presi-

sit

dential consideration, as well as keeping him abreast of progress or changes.

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The foregoing should not be taken to imply that the procedures

always have been clear

and tidy, nor that they have always been fol-

lowed. Prior to 1955, formal procedures barely existed at all. In

1955 the Special Group procedures were made more formal. Neverthe

less, the procedures that were followed during the period of 1959-63

were characterized by an internal CIA memorandum as "somewhat cloudy

and thus can probably be described as having been based on value judg-

ments by the DCI." (Memorandum for the Record, C/CA/PEG, "Policy Co-

ordination of CIA's Covert Action Operations," 21 February 1967)

In addition to the "somewhat cloudy" nature of the formal pro-

cedures themselves, there are other options available to any Chief Ex-

ecutive. The Committee recognizes that

an agency charter to plan cov-

ert action could not preempt Presidential authority to develop and

mandate foreign policy. Similarly, it is equally clear that what may

he represented as the "desire" of a President is often communicated by

intermediary officials whose perceptions may or may not accurately

reflect the true Presidential purpose. Obviously, formal procedures

can be disregarded from above

or below. In at least one case, for

example, a President instructed CIA officials not to consult with the

Special Group or other departments. In at least one other case, Agency

officials decided not to bring matters to the attention of the Special

Group. It should also be noted that all of the above procedures apply

to activities labeled "covert action" whereas some of the activities

considered in this report were treated as

"counter-intelligence" actions.

Such actions are not normally subject to 40 Committee-type interdepart-

mental authorization and review.

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- Si

The Concept of "Plausible Deniability"

TOP SECRET

Non-attribution for U. S.

Government covert operations was the

original and principal purpose of the so-called doctrine of plausible

denial.

Evidence before the Committee clearly demonstrates that this con-

Bit more.

hISTORICA

Fon

cept, designed to protect the U.S. and its operatives from the conse-

quences of disclosures, has been significantly expanded to: (1) mask

not only Presidential decisions but those of his senior staffers; (2)

support less than complete

advice to such persons regarding these op-

erations.

The quest for "plausible denial" has shaped the processes of the

U. S. Government for approving and evaluating covert actions. The 40

Committee

and its predecessors can serve as "circuit breakers" for a

President, placing the locus of consideration of covert action at sev-

eral removes from

the Oval office. One consequence of the doctrine of

plausible denial is an incomplete documentary record.

The quest for "plausible denial" has also led to the use of cer-

tain

techniques, including euphemism and circumlocution.

These tech-

testimony

cite

niques have had as their purpose the objective of allowing the Presi-

dent and

other senior officials to deny knowledge of an operation should

it be disclosed. In addition, the use of indirect reference to

inform

a President could be reversed--a President could communicate his desire

to see a highly sensitive operation undertaken in a similar indirect,

circumlocutious manner. Whether, at times circumlocution

a why affect

the other

of failing to let Presidents or other officials accurately understand

what was being said, was a question faced by the Committee.

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"Plausible deniability" raises a

* TOP SECKEL

number of other issues which the

Committee has had

to confront.

Differing interpretations of the practice

of plausible denial has affected the extent to which sensitive matters

were raised

or considered.

The evidence discussed below revealed that

very

serious problems of assessing and insuring accountability and con-

trol can arise out of plausible deniability.

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on August 29, 1975

TOP

ECRE

3. Cuba

We have divided the facts with respect to Cuba into three

broad sections.

The

first discusses the plots against Fidel Castro's life

without attempting to confront the question of authorization.

The second deals with the

evidence concerning whether or not

the successive Directors of Central Intelligence, Allen Dulles and John

McCone, authorized or knew about the various plots. (Although we have

organizationally divided the evidence relating to the DCI's from the

proof relating to other high administration officials, it is important

to remember that the Director of Central Intelligence is the principal

advisor to the President on intelligence matters, a member of major

administrative policy-making councils as well as head of the Central

Intelligence Agency.)

The third section covers the evidence concerning whether or

not other high officials--including the various Presidents--authorized

or knew about the plots. This section also considers the evidence relating

to whether or not the CIA officials who were involved with the plots believed

them to be consistent with the general policy objectives.of the various

administrations even if they had no personal knowledge as to whether the

plots were or were not specifically authorized by higher authority.

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437

328A-

2

1. The Assassination Plots Themselves

We have found concrete evidence of at least eight

plots involving the CIA to assassinate Fidel Castro from 1960

to 1965.

Although some of the assassination plots did not

advance beyond the stage of planning and preparation, one plot

involving the use of underworld figures reportedly twice pro-

gressed to the point of sending poison pills to Cuba and

dispatching teams to commit the deed. Another plot involved

furnishing weapons and other assassination devices to a Cuban

dissident. The assassination proposals ran the gamut from

high-powered rifles to poison pills, poison pens, deadly

bacterial powders, and other devices which would strain the

imagination.

The most ironic of these plots took place on

November 22, 1963--the very day that President Kennedy was

shot in Dallas--when a CIA official in Paris offered a poison

pen to a Cuban for use against Castro while at the same time

an emissary from President Kennedy was meeting with Castro to

explore the possibility of improved relations.

The following narrative sets forth the facts of

assassination plots against Castro as established before the

Committee by witnesses

and documentary evidence. The question

of the level and degree of authorization of the plots is

considered in the sections that follow.

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(a) Plots: Early 1960

(1) Plots to Destroy Castro's Public Image

Efforts against Castro did not begin with

assassination attempts.

From March through August 1960, during the

last year of the Eisenhower Administration, the CIA considered

plans to undermine Castro's charismatic appeal by sabotaging his

speeches. According to the Inspector General's Report, an

official in the Technical Services Division (TSD) recalled dis-

cussing a scheme to spray Castro's broadcasting studio with a

chemical which produced effects similar to LSD, but rejected the

scheme because the chemical was not reliable. During this period,

TSD impregnated a box of cigars with a chemical which produced

temporary disorientation, hoping to induce. Castro to smoke one

of the cigars before delivering a speech. The Inspector General

also reported a plan to destroy Castro's image as "The Beard" by

dusting his shoes with thallium salts, a strong depilatory that

would cause his beard to fall out. The chemical was to be adminis-

tered during a trip outside of Cuba, in which it was anticipated.

Castro would leave his shoes outside the door

of his hotel room

to be shined. TSD procured the chemical and tested it on animals,

but apparently abandoned the scheme because Castro cancelled his

trip.

(I.G., pp. 10-13.)

(2) Proposal to Sabotage Flight

The first proposed action against the life of

a Cuban leader sponsored by the CIA of which the Committee is

aware took place in July 1960. On July 18, 1960, a Cuban airline

3

JOE

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pilot who had volunteered to assist the CIA in gathering intelli-

gence informed his case officer in Havana that he would probably

be chosen to fly to Prague on July 21 to return Raul Castro to

Cuba (Memo to I.G., 1/17/75). On July 20 the pilot confirmed that

he would definitely fly the plane. CIA Headquarters and field

stations along the route were requested to inform the Havana Station

of any intelligence needs that the pilot might fulfill. The case

officer testified that he and the pilot contemplated only acquiring

information about Czechoslovakia and Raul Castro, and that assas-

sination was not considered.*

The cable from the Havana Station was received at Head-

quarters on the night of July 20. The duty officer, who was summoned

to Headquarters from his home, contacted Tracy Barnes, Deputy to

DDP Richard Bissell, and J.C. King, Chief of the Western Hemisphere

Division. ** Following their instructions, he sent a cable to the

Havana Station early in the morning of July 21, stating: "Possible

removal top three leaders is receiving serious consideration at

HQS. "

The cable inquired whether the pilot was sufficiently

motivated to risk "arranging an accident during return trip" and

4

* A cable to Headquarters requesting any intelligence needs

supports this account.

** The duty officer testified that he must have spoken with King

because he would not otherwise have signed the cable "by direction,

J.S. King". (Duty Officer, p. 16) He also would "very definitely"

have read the cable to Barnes before sending it, because "Barnes

was the man to whom we went... for our authority and for work

connected with the Cuban Project." (Duty Officer, pp. 4, 25) Since

King at that time was giving only "nominal attention" to Cuban

affairs, the officer concluded that a proposal of the gravity of an

assassination could only have "come from Mr. Barnes"

Duty Officer,

p. 24)

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TOP SECRET

advised that the station could "at discretion.contact subject to

determine willingness.to. cooperate and his suggestions on details".

Ten thousand dollars was authorized as payment "after successful

completion", but no advance payment was permitted because of the

possibility that the pilot was a double agent. According to the

case officer, this cable represented "quite a departure from the

conventional activities we'd been asked to handle". (Case Officer

interview, 8/4/75, p. 2)*

The case officer contacted the pilot and told him of the

proposal while accompanying him. to the airport for the flight. The

case officer avoided the word "assassinate"

, but made it clear that

the CIA contemplated

an "accident to neutralize this leader's

(Raul's) influence".

(Case Officer interview, p. 2) After being

assured that his sons would be given a college education in the

event of his death, the pilot agreed to take a "calculated risk",

limited to possibilities that might pass as accidental.** (Cable,

Havana to Director, 7/22/70)

Immediately after returning to the station the case

officer was told that a cable had just arrived stating: "Do not

5

* The duty officer remembered the cable and some of the surround-

ing facts for precisely that reason: "[Ilt was an unusual type of

cable, and I say this because I can remember it 15 years later."

(Duty Officer, p. 14) The case officer recalled that when he saw

the cable, he

"swallowed hard". (Case Officer interview, p. 3)

** The cable from Havana to Headquarters stated that the pilot

was willing to risk: "A.

Engine burnout on takeoff to delay or

harrass trip: B. Vague possibility water ditching approximately

three hours out from Cuba."

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TOP SECRET

pursue ref. Would like to drop matter." (Cable, Director to

Havana, 7/22/60; Memo to I.G., 1/17/75)* It was, of course, too

late to "drop the matter" since the plane had already departed.

When the Cuban pilot returned, he told the case officer that he

had not

had an opportunity to arrange an accident.

(3) Poison Cigars

A notation in the records of the Chief,

Operations Div., Office of Medical Services indicates that on

August 16, 1960, he was given a box of Castro's favorite cigars

with instructions to treat them with a lethal poison (I.G., p.

21).

The cigars were contaminated with a botulinum toxin so

potent that a person would die after putting one in his mouth

(I.G., p. 22): The Chief reported that the cigars were ready on

October 7, 1960; TSD notes indicate that they were delivered to

an unidentified person on February 13, 1961 (I.G., p. 22). The

record does not disclose whether an attempt was made to pass the

cigars to Castro.

(b) Use of Underworld Figures--Phase I

(1) The Initial Plan

In August 1960, the CIA took steps to enlist

the aid of members of the criminal underworld with gambling

6

* This cable was signed by Tracy Barnes (Duty Officer, p. 28)

The duty officer recalled seeing this cable, and testified that he

had heard that Allen Dulles had countermanded the cable authorizing

the possible assassination attempt against Raul Castro. (Duty

Officer, pp. 29-30) The reasons for Dulles' action are discussed

infra at

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syndicate contacts to assassinate Castro. The earliest evidence

of the operation is a conversation between Deputy Director of

Plans (DDP) Richard Bissell and Colonel Sheffield Edwards, Chief

of the Office of Security. Edwards recalled that Bissell asked

him to locate someone who could assassinate Castro (Edwards,

pp. 2-3). Bissell confirmed that he requested Edwards to find

someone to assassinate Castro, and believed that Edwards raised

the idea of contacting members of a gambling syndicate operating

in Cuba* (Bissell, 6/9, pp. 71-73). Edwards assigned the mission

to James P. O'Connell, Chief of the Operational Support Division

of the CIA's Office of Security, explaining that he and Bissell

were looking for someone to "eliminate" or "assassinate" Castro

(0 'Connell, pp. 6-8, 95-96) .

Edwards and O'Connell decided to rely on Robert A.

Maheu to recruit someone "tough enough" to handle the job

('Connell, p. 8). Maheu was an ex-FBI agent who had entered into

a career as a private investigator in 1954. Robert Cunningham,

a former FBI associate of Maheu's who was employed in the CIA's

Office of Security, had arranged for the CIA to use Maheu in

7

* Although Castro closed the gambling casinos in Cuba when

he first came to power, they were reopened for use by foreign

tourists in late February 1959, and remained open until late

September 1961.

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CHET

several sensitive covert operations in which "he didn't want to

8

have an Agency person or a government person get caught"* (O'Connell,

p. 158). Maheu was initially paid a monthly retainer by the CIA

of $500, which was

terminated after his practice became more.

lucrative (0'Connell, pp. 13-14; I.G., p. 15). O'Connell had

served as Maheu's case officer since the Agency first began using

Maheu's services, and by 1960 they had become close personal

friends (Maheu, p. 6) .

Sometime in late August or early September 1960,

O'Connell approached Maheu about the proposed operation (O'Connell,

p. 9; Maheu, 7/29, p. 6). As Maheu recalls the conversation,

O'Connell asked him to contact John Roselli, an underworld figure

with possible gambling contacts in Las Vegas, to determine if he

* During 1954-1955, Maheu cooperated with the CIA in'attempting

to undermine Aristotle Onassis' contract with the Saudi Arabian

government that would have given Onassis virtually complete control

over shipping of oil from Saudi Arabia. Although he was employed

by Onassis' competitor, Niarchos, Maheu worked closely with the

CIA. He testified that he contracted for a listening device to be

placed on Onassis' room in New York after first consulting with the

Agency, and that he provided the impetus for the termination of the

contract by publicizing its terms in a newspaper in Rome that he

said he purchased with CIA funds, (Maheu, 7/30/75, pp. 14-25.1

O'Connell testified that Maheu, at the CIA's request had also

previously arranged for the production of a film in Hollywood

depicting a foreign leader with a woman in the Soviet Union.

The

CIA planned to circulate the film, representing it to have been pro-

duced, but not released (O'Connell, pp. 159, 162-163). Maheu testi-

fied that he had located an actor resembling the leader and had

arranged for the production of the film (Maheu, 7/30/75, pp. 39-42).

NeC

oTher

ex,d

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ON SECRET

9

would participate in

a plan to "dispose" of Castro* (Maheu, 7/29,

p. 8). Maheu had known Roselli since the late 1950's (Miaheu, 7/29,

pp. 58-60). Although Maheu claims not to have been aware of the

extent of Roselli's underworld connections and activities, he

recalled

that

"it was certainly evident to me that he was able to

accomplish things in Las Vegas when nobody else seemed

to get the

same kind of attention" (Maheu, 7/29, p. 60).

O'Connell had previously met Roselli at Maheu's home (Maheu, 7/29,

p. 8). O'Connell and Maheu each clained that the other had raised

the idea of using Roselli, and Maheu Said O'Connell was aware that

did

Roselli had contacts with the gambling syndicate (Maheu, 7/29,

o'connel restry

p. 8; 0'Connell, pp. 15-16).

Maheu was at first reluctant to become involved

in the operation because it might interfere with his relationship

with his new client, Howard Hughes. He finally agreed because he

felt that he owed the Agency a commitment (0'Connell, Pp. 12-13,

103). O'Connell recalled that Mahe was to approach Roselli

using

a cover story that he represented business firms suffering

heavy financial losses caused by Castro's actions** (O'Connell,

p. 16). O'Connell testified that Maheu was told to offer money,

* Maheu testified that he was told that the plan to assassinate

Castro was one phase of a larger projèct to invade Cuba (Maheu,

pp. 7, 13, 47).

** Roselli testified that the story was developed later and

used as a mutual "cover" by O'Connell, Maheu, and Roselli in

dealing

with Cubans recruited for the project (Roselli, pp. 16-17).

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HOW SECRET

probably $150,000, for Castro's assassination* (O'Connell, pp. 16,

111; Memorandum, Osborn to DCI, 6/24/66) :

(2) Contact With The Syndicate

In early September 1960, Maheu met Roselli

at the Brown Derby in Beverly Hills, told him that "high govern-

ment officials" needed his cooperation in getting rid of Castro,

and asked him to help recurit Cubans to do the job (Roselli, p. 8).

Maheu recalled that Roselli was at first reluctant to participate

in the project and insisted on meeting with a representative of

the government (Maheu, 7/29, pp. 10-11; Roselli, p. 9). A meeting

with O'Connell was arranged in New York City at the Plaza Hotel

during the week of September 14, 1960 (Roselli, pp. 10-11; I.G.,

p. 16).

O'Connell testified that he was introduced to Roselli.

as

a business associate of Maheu, and that Maheu told Roselli

that he represented international business interests which were

pooling money to pay for the assassination of Castro (O'Connell,

p. 26).

Roselli claimed that Maheu told him at that time that

O'Connell was with the CIA** (Roselli, pp. 11, 85).

10

* The I.G. Report places the amount at $150,000; O'Connell

thought it might have been $100,000 (O'Connell, p. 16), Roselli

recalled $250,000 (Roselli, p. 25) and Edwards confirmed the

$150,000 figure (Edwards, p. 9). Maheu could recall no "price

tag"

for Castro's assassination (Maheu, p. 34).

** The weight of the testimony indicates that Roselli realized

the CIA was behind the assassination attempt at an early stage.

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11

It was arranged that Roselli would go to

Florida and recruit Cubans for the operation (Roselli, pp. 11-12).

Edwards informed Bissell that contact had been made with the

gambling syndicate (Bissell, 6/9, pp. 20-21; I.G., p. 17).

During the week of September 24, 1960,

O'Connell, Maheu, and Roselli met in Miami to work out the

details of the operation (O'Connell, pp. 25-26; Roselli, p. 12;

I.G., p. 18). Roselli used the cover name of "John Rawiston"

and represented himself to the Cuban contacts as an agent of

"some business interests of Wall" Street. that had . .

nickel interests and properties around in Cuba, and I

was getting

financial assistance from them" (Roselli,

pp. 9, 17).

burnor

Wet?

Maheu handled the details of setting up

the operation and keeping O'Connell informed of developments.

After they had been in Miami for a short time, and certainly

prior to October 18,* Roselli introduced Maheu to two indivi-

Maheu substantially confirmed his account (Maheu, p. 111).

O'Connell recalled that about three weeks after the New York

meeting,

Roselli told him,

"I am not kidding, I know who you

work for."

(0'Connell, p. 26.)

* Maheu recalls that he first met

"Sam Gold" (Giancana)

after November

; 1960, when he was staying at the fountainbleu

Hotel (Maheu, p. 17). Other evidence indicates that the meet-

ing took place earlier. When they first went to Miami, Maheu

and Roselli stayed at the Kennilworth Hotel (Maheu, pp. 15-16);

FBI records reveal that Maheu and Roselli (alias J. A. Rollins)

were registered at the Kennilworth from October 11-30 (File

R-505, FBI summary, p. 10). Giancana must have been involved

in the operation during the October period at the Kennilworth

because (1) the wiretap of Rowan's apartment, discussed infra,

was made on October 30; (2) on: October 18, the FBI sent a memorandum to

Bissell stating that Giancana had been telling several people that he was

involved in an assassination attempt against Castro (see infra, p.

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duals

on whom he intended to rely: "Sam Gold", who would

serve

as a "back-up man" (Roselli, p. 15), or

"Key" dan

(Maheu, p. 17), and "Joe", whom "Gold" said would serve as

a courier to Cuba and make arrangements there (I.G., p. 19).

O'Connell, who was using the name "Jim Olds", met "San" and

"Joe" only briefly (0'Connell, pp. 26-29) .

O'Connell testified that he learned the true

identities of his associates one morning when Maheu called and

asked him to examine the "Parade" supplement to the Miami

Times.* An article on the Attorney General's ten-most-wanted

criminals list revealed that "Sam Gold" was Mom Salvatore Giancana,

a Chicago-based gangster, ** and "Joe" was Santos Trafficante,.

the Cosa Nostra chieftain in Cubat (O'Connell, pP. 28-30);

I.G., p. 19). O'Connell reported his discovery to Edwards

(0'Connell, pp. 31, 33) but did not know whether Edwards

reported this fact to his superiors (O'Connell, pp. 32, 41).

O'Connell testified that this incident occurred after "we

were in this thing up to our ears"

, a month or so after

12

p13

* A search of supplements to all Miami papers during this

period did not reveal the article described by O'Connell.

** Sam Giancana was murdered in his home on June 20, 1975.

+ Trafficante made regular trips between Miami and Cuba on

gambling syndicate business (I.G., pp. 19-20).

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13

Giancana had been brought into the operation, but prior to

giving the poison pills to Roselli (O'Connell, pp. 30, 44).

Glyptic?

Maheu recalled that it was Giancana's job

not really

Immodeca

to locate someone in Castro's entourage who could accomplish

the assassination (Maheu, p. 19), and that he met almost

daily with Giancana over a substantial period of time (Maheu,

p. 18). Although Maheu described Giancana as playing a "key

role" (Maheu, p. 34), Roselli claimed that none of the Cubans

eventually used in the operation were acquired through

Giancana's contacts (Roselli, p. 15).

• (3) Rowan Wiretap Incident

In late October 1960, Maheu arranged for

a Florida investigator, Edward Dubois, to place an electronic

"bug" in comedian Dan Rowan's room in Las Vegas (Maheu, p. 36).

DuBois' employee, Arthur J. Balletti, flew to Las Vegas and

installed a tap on Rowan's phone (Maheu, p. 38). O'Connell

characterized the ensuing events as a "Keystone comedy act"

(0'Connell, p. 68). On October 31, 1960, Balletti, believing

that Rowan would be out for the afternoon, left the wiretap

equipment unattended. A maid discovered the equipment and

notified the local sheriff, who arrested Balletti and brought

* According to O'Connell and Roselli, DuBois had been

requested to place a legal electronic bug against the wall

from an adjacent apartment.

Balletti instead installed an

electronic tap on the phone (O'Connell, pp. 67-68; Maheu,

pp. 36-37).

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14

him to the jail. Balletti called Maheu in Miami, tying "Maheu into this

thing up to his ear" (O'Connell, pp. 71-72; File R-505, FBI memorandum).

Balletti's bail was paid by Roselli (Roselli, p. 52).

(1) Evidence Concerning CIA involvement in the Tap. The

Committee received conflicting evidence on whether the agency was consulted

prior to the installation of the tap.* O'Connell testified that he

had called Edwards and cleared the placement of an electronic "bug" in

Rowan's apartment prior to the installation of the tap (O'Connell,

pp. 67-71). Maheu recalled that he hadainitially asked O'Connell if

the CIA would handle the job, and that O'Connell had told him that

"he would call Mr. Edwards and see if they would have the

capability of accomplishing this,.. and that subsequently

he informed me that Mr. Edwards had said that they would not

do it, but approved paying for it if we hired an independent

private detective to put it on." (Maheu, 7/29, p. 37).

On the other hand, Edwards, in a May 14, 1962 memorandum for the

Attorney General (discussed at length, infra, p.

), stated that

"At the time oflthe incident neither the Agency nor

the undersigned knew of the proposed technical installation."**

Regardless of whether the CIA initially authorized the tap, it is apparent

_that the CIA paid for the tap. DuBois told FBI agents that Maheu had

pala him a retainer of $1,000 (File R-505, p. 14): O'Connell confirmed

that CIA "indirectly" paid for the tap because "we paid Maheu a certain

amount of money, and he just paid it out of what we were giving him."

"Q: But it was understood, or you understood, that out of the money

the CIA made available to Maheu, Dubois would be paid for the tap?

A: Yes.

***

Q: And Colonel Edwards.:. knew somebody was being employed

in order to accomplish a tap?

A:. That is right." (O'Connell, p. 69.)

**. A memorandum by J. Edgar Hoover states that the Attorney General said he had

been told by Edwards that the "CIA admitted that they had assisted Maheu

in making the installation" (Memo, Hoover, 4/10/62).

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15

The Inspector General's Report accepted Edwards' assertion that "the

Agency was first unwitting and then a reluctant accessory after the fact",

but offered no further evidence to support that contention (I.G., p. 67).

The Committee also received conflicting evidence concerning

whether the tap had been placed to keep Giancana in Miami or to check

on security leaks. O'Connell testified that during the early stages of

negotiations with the gambling syndicate, Maheu informed O'Connell that a

girl friend of Giancana was having an affair with Rowan. Giancana wanted

Maheu to bug Rowan's room; otherwise, Giancana threatened to fly to Las

Vegas himself. Maheu was concerned that Giancana's departure would

disrupt the negotiations, and secured O'Connell's permission to arrange

for a bug to ensure Giancana's continued presence and cooperation.

(0' Connell, pp. 68-67.) Maheu substantially confirmed this account

(Maheu, pp. 25-30) .

There is some evidence suggesting that the CIA itself may have

instituted the tap to determine whether Giancana was leaking information

about his involvement in an assassination attempt against Castro.

Bissell was informed that Giancana had been talking about Giancana's

involvement in an assassination plot*

without indicating the CIA was

pretty

this

When Roselli talked with Giancana after the wiretap had been discovered,

Giancana "laughed. . . I remember his expression, smoking a cigar, he

almost swallowed it laughing about it" (Roselli, p. 52). Roselli

claims that he was "perturbed" because "It was blowing everything,

blowing every kind of cover that I had tried to arrange to keep quiet"

(Roselli, p. 52).

Roselli said that he told Giancana that the CIA was involved in the

operation "in order to have him keep his mouth shut" (Roselli, p. 27).

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involved) by an October 18, 1960 menorandun Irom J. Edgar Hoover, which

stated that "a source whose reliability has not been tested" reported:

"(D)uring recent conversations with several friends,

Giancana stated that Fidel Castro was to be done

away with very shortly. When doubt was expressed

regarding this statement, Giancana reportedly assured

those present that Castro's assassination would

occur in November.

Moreover, he allegedly indicated

that he had already met with the assassin-to-be on

shree occasions.

• Giancana claimed that everything has

seen perfected for the killing of Castro, anc

that the 'assassin' had arranged with a girl, not further

described, to drop a 'pill' in some drink or

food of Castro's."

(File R-505, memo from Hoover

to DCI (Att: DDP), 10/19/60.)

Roselli testified that Maheu had given him two explanations for the tap

on different occasions: first, that Giancana was .concerned about a

possible affair between Rowan and his girl friend; and, second, that he

had arranged the tap to determine whether Giancana had told his girl

friend about the assassination plot, and whether she was spreading the

story (Roselli, pp. 47-48). Maheu gave the second explanation to the

FBI when he was questioned about his involvement in the tap (File

R-505, FBI Surmary), and Edwards wrote in the memorandum to the

Attorney General:

"Maheu stated that Sam Giancana thought that (Giancana's:

girl friend) might know of the proposed operation and

might pass on the information to one Dan Rowan, a friend

of (Giancana's girl friend)". (Memorandum, Edwards to

Kennedy, 5/14/62.)

(ii) Consequences of the tap. Edwards told Maheu that if he

was "approached by the FBI, he could refer them to me to be briefed

that he was engaged in an intelligence operation directed at Cuba"

(Memo, Edwards to Kennedy, 5/14/62). FBI records indicate that on April 18,

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17

1961, Maheu informed the FBI that the tap involved the CIA,

and suggested that Sheffield Edwards be contacted (File R-505,

Memo, 4/20/61). Edwards subsequently informed the Bureau

that the CIA would object to Maheu's prosecution because it

might reveal

sensitive information relating to the abortive

Bay of Pigs invasion* (R-505, Summary of FBI file). In a

memo dated April 24, 1962, Herbett J. Miller, Assistant

Attorney General, Criminal Division, advised the Attorney

General that the "national interest" would preclude any

prosecutions based upon the tap.. Following a briefing of

the Attorney General by the CIA, a decision was made not to

prosecute. **

• * Details of the discussions between the CIA and FBI are

described fully infra at pp.

** Maheu subsequently drew on his involvement with the CIA

to avoid testifying before Senator Edward Long's Committee

investigating invasions of privacy in 1966. According to the

Inspector General's Report, when Maheu learned that the

Cormittee intended to call him, "he applied pressure on the

Agency in a variety of ways--suggesting that publicity might

expose his past sensitive work for the CIA" (I.G., p. 74).

Lawrence Houston, General Counsel for the CIA, met with Maheu

and his attorney, Edward P. Morgan, and informed Senator Long

that Maheu had been involved in CIA operations (Houston, pp.

58-60).

As a result, the Long Committee did not call Maheu

to testify.

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(4) Poison Pills Are Prepared and Delivered

18

to Cuba

The Inspector General's Report described

conversations among Bissell, Edwards, and Cornelius Roosevelt, MAZErSIn

Chief of the Technical Services Division (TSD), concerning

the

most

effective method of poisoning Castro (I.G., PP. 23-

24).

There is some evidence that Giancana or Roselli originated

the idea of depositing a poison pill in Castro's drink to give

the "asset"

a chance to escape (I.G., p. 25). O'Connell

recalled Roselli's request for something "nice and clean, with-

out getting into any kind of out and out ambushing", preferably

a poison that would disappear without a trace (O'Connell, p. 116).

The Inspector General's Report cited O'Connell as stating that

the Agency had first considered a "gangland-style killing" in

which Castro would be gunned down. Giancana reportedly opposed

the idea because it would be difficult to recruit someone for

such a dangerous operation, and suggested instead the use of

poison.

(I. G., p. 25)

Edwards rejected the first batch of pills

prepared by ISD because they would not dissolve in water. A

second batch, containing botulinum toxin, "did the job expected

of them" when tested on monkeys. (I.G., pp. 25-26; O'Connell,

p. 43) 0'Connell received the pills from TSD, probably in

February 1961, with reassurances that they were lethal,* and

* Records of the TSD still extant in 1967 indicate that the

pills were tested on February 10 and delivered to O'Connell

sometime thereafter.

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then gave them to Roselli (O'Connell, p. 43).

In late February or March 1961, Roselli

reported to O'Connell that the pills had been delivered in

Cuba to an official close to Castro who may have received

kickbacks from the gambling interests (I.G.,. p. 23). The

official kept the pills for a few weeks, then returned them.

•Roselli and O'Connell ascribed his failure to a case of

"cold feet" (Roselli, p. 24; O'Connell, p. 44). The Inspector

General noted that he had lost his position in the Prime

Minister's office, and thus access to Castro, before he

received the pills (I.G., p. 28).

(5) A Second Delivery Is Attempted

Following this first failure, Roselli told.

O'Connell that Trafficante believed Tony Varona, a leading

figure in the Cuban

exile movement, might be able to accom-

plish the assassination (I.G., p. 29).* Dr. Manuel Antonio

de Varona y Lorado headed the Democratic Revolutionary Front,

a Cuban exile group supported by the CIA. The Inspector

General's Report suggests that Varona may have been receiving

funds from Trafficante and other racketeers interested in

securing "gambling, prostitution, and dope monopolies" in

19

O'Connell testified that he met Varona only once, and

that after the meeting Varona told Roselli:

"Look, I don't know Isic] like the CIA and you can't

tell me that this guy isn't a CIA man". O'Connell

recalled, "I don't know whether I showed it or what,

but he suspected that I wasn't what I was represented

to be. "

(0'Connell, p. 22.)

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1+29081H

Cuba after the overthrow of Castro (I.G., p. 29). The Report

speculated that Varona was interested in the assassination

scheme as a means of financing the purchase of arms and

communications equipment (I.G., p. 31).

Varona claimed to have a contact inside

a restaurant frequented by Castro (Roselli, p. 21). As a

prerequisite to the deal, he demanded cash and $1,000 worth

of communications equipment (I.G., pp. 31-32; O'Connell, p. 23).

O'Connell recalls that Colonel J. C. King, head of the Western

Hemisphere Division, gave him $50,000 in Bissell's office to

pay Varona if he

successfully assassinated.Castro (0'Connell,

pp. 17-21). O'Connell stated that Bissell also authorized him

to give Varona the electronics equipment that he requested

(0'Connell, pp. 20-24).

Bissell testified that he did not

doubt that

some cash was given to O'Connell, and that he was aware that

the poison pills had been prepared. He did not recall the

meeting, and considered it unlikely that O'Connell would have

been given the money in his office (Bissell, 6/11, p. 40). The

Inspector General's Report, relying on an Office of Security

memorandum to the DDCI dated June 24, 1966, as well as on an

interview with the person who signed the voucher for the funds,

placed the amount at $10,000 (I.G., pp. 31-32). If the

Inspector General's conclusionswere correct, the funds which

Bissell allegedly authorized were probably the advance payment

20

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002426659

to Varona, and not the $150,000 that was to be paid to Varona

after Castro's death.

21

The record does clearly reflect, however,

that communications equipment was delivered to Varona* and

that he was paid advance money to cover his expenses, probably

in the amount of $10,000 (I.G., p. 32). The money and pills

were delivered at a meeting between Maheu, Roselli, Trafficante,

and Varona at the Fontainebleau Hotel in Miami. As Roselli

recalled, Maheu

"opened his briefcase and dumped

a whole lot of money

on his lap .

• and also came up with the capsules

and he explained how they were going to be used.

As

far as

I remember, they couldn't be used in boiling

soups and things like that, but they could be used in

water or otherwise, but they couldn't last

forever

It had to be done as quickly as possible. (Roselli,

p. 21).

**

NAm E

Varona had no better success than

Orta.

According to the Inspector General's Report, Edwards believed

the scheme failed because Castro stopped visiting the restau-

rant where the "asset" was, employed. Maheu suggested an

* O'Connell testified that a man from the communications

office delivered the communications equipment that Varona had

requested to Miami (O'Connell, p: 20). Maheu recalled deliver-

ing an automobile which he had been told contained conmunica-

tions equipment. to an empty lot (Maheu, p. 52).

** Maheu denied that this dramatic event ever occurred, and

did not recall being present at a meeting at which the pills

were passed (Maheu, pp. 40-41). Maheu did recall that O'Connell

showed him the pills in an envelope and told him that the pills

would be given to a Cuban (Maheu, p. 40).

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alternative reason.

He recalled being informed that after

the pills had been delivered to Cuba, "the go signal still had

to be received before in fact they were administered" (Maheu,

p. 42). He testified that he was informed by O'Connell some-

time after the operation that the Cubans had an opportunity

to administer the pills to Fidel Castro and either Che Guevarra

or Raul Castro, but that the "go signal" never came (Maheu,

• pp. 43-44, 60-61). He did not know who was responsible for

giving

the signal (Maheu, p. 44-45). Varona subsequently

returned the cash and the pills (O'Connell, pp. 19-20; CIA

Justice file R-153, Memorandum, Osborn to DCI, 6/24/66) .

The date of the Varona operation is

unclear. The Inspector General's Report places it in Märch-

April 1961, prior to the Bay of Pigs (I.G., p. 29). Bissell

testified that the effort against Castro was called off after

the Bay of Pigs (Bissell, 6/11, p. 52) and Maheu testified

that he had no involvement in the operation after the Bay of

Pigs (Maheu, p. 50). O'Connell, however, was certain that it

occurred during early 1962 (O'Connell, pp. 47-48).

21л.

(c)

Use of Underworld Figures: Phase II

(1) Change in Leadership

The Inspector General's Report

divides the gambling syndicate operation into Phase

I, termina-

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ting with

NOP SECRET

the Bay of Pigs, and Phase II, beginning with

William Harvey's involvement in late 1961. The distinction

between

clearly demarcated Phase I and Phase II may be an

artificial one, as there is considerable evidence that the

operation

was

continuous, perhaps lying dormant for the period

immediately following the Bay of Pigs.*

In early 1961, Harvey** was assigned the

responsibility for establishing a general capability within

the CIA for disabling foreign leaders, including assassination

"last resort" (Bissell, 6/9, p. 73; Harvey, 6/25, pp. 34-35).

* Harvey said that he took over a "going operation" from

Edwards (I.G., p. 42; Harvey, 6/25, p. 67) and emphasized

that:

"I would like to make as clear as I can that there was

no phase 1, phase 2 in this. This is an ongoing matter

which I injected into ...: (Harvey, 6/25, p. 90).

Continuity was provided by retaining O'Connell as the case

officer for the project well into May 1962. During interviews

for the Inspector General's Report, O'Connell recalled that

there was "something going on" between the Bay of Pigs and

Harvey's assumption of control, (I.G., p. 43). When testifying

before the Committee, O'Connell firmly recalled several trips

to Miami in the Fall of 1961, and "right up to the time I

turned it over to Harvey I was in and out of Miami" (O'Connell,

pp. 89-90).

** Harvey had a long background in clandestine activities.

He had conceived and carried out the Berlin tunnel operation

(Harvey, 6/25, pp. 8-9), and served as Chief of the division,

which was responsible for, the surreptitious acquisition of code

information (Harvey, 6/25, pp. 8-9).

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The capability

was called Executive Action and was later

included under the cryptonym ZR/RIFLE. It and the evidence

relating to (i) its connection to the "White House" and (ji)

whether or not it involved action as well as "capability" is

discussed extensively infra at

Harvey's notes reflect that Bissell asked

him to take over the gambling syndicate operation from Edwards

and discussed the "application of ZR/RIFLE to Cuba" on

November 16, 1961 (I.G., p. 39). Bissell confirmed that the

conversation took place and accepted the November date as

accurate (Bissell, 7/17, pp. 12-13). He also testified that the

operation

"was not reactivated, in other words, no instructions

went out to Roselli or to others

• to renew the

attempt, until after I had left the Agency" (Bissell,

6/11, p. 53).

Harvey agreed that his conversation with Bissell was limited

to exploring the feasibility of using the gambling syndicate

against Castro (Harvey, 7/11, p. 60).

Richard Helms replaced Bissell as

DDP in February 1962. As such, he was Harvey's superior.

Harvey testified that he kept Helms informed of

the gambling

23

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NOP StOn

syndicate operation at all stages* (Harvey, 6/25, pp. 65-66;

7/11, P. 42; I.G., p. 41).

(2) The Operation is Reactivated

In early April 1962, Harvey, who testi-

fied that he was acting on "explicit orders" from Helms (Harvey,

7/11, p. 18), requested Edwards to put him in touch with Roselli

(CIA Justice File R-153; Edwards memorandum, 5/14/62). 0'Connell

first introduced Harvey to Roselli in Miami, where Harvey told

Roselli to maintain his Cuban contacts, but not to deal with Maheu

or Giancana (0'Connell, p. 50; Roselli, pp. 27-30), whom he had

decided were "untrustworthy" and "surplus" (Harvey, 6/25, p. 65).

O'Connell recalled that Roselli did not initially trust Harvey,

*When interviewed for the Inspector General's Report, Harvey

stated that he briefed Helms on his first meeting with Roselli,

and "thereafter he regularly briefed Helms on the status of the

Castro operation" (I.G., p. 41):

Helms' recollection was less certain. Helms did recall that

he was briefed by Harvey when Harvey first contacted Roselli in

April 1962. He remembered that he

"reluctantly"

had approved the operation,

but that he had no confidence that it would succeed (Helms, 7/17,

p. 23).

When asked if he authorized sending the poison pills to Florida,

Helms testified:

"I believe they were poison pills, and I don't recall

necessarily approving them, but since Harvey alleges to

have them and says that he took them to Miami, I must

have, I must have authorized them in some fashion."

(Helms, 6/13, p. 44).

Helms confirmed that Harvey was "reporting quite regularly what

was going on.

Whether he reported everything or not, I do not know."

It was Helms' expectation that Harvey would have reported to him a

matter such as the pills. (Helms, 6/13, p. 105). However, Helms also

testified:

"You saw the I.G. Report says that I was kept currently

informed.

Maybe I was and maybe I wasn't, and today

I don't remember it, as I have said. But I do not

recall ever having been convinced that any attempt was

really made on Castro's life" (Helms, 7/18, p. 32).

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FOR

although they subsequently developed a close friendship.

(0' Connell, p: 52) .

Harvey, O'Connell and Roselli met for

a second time in New York on April 8-9, 1962 (I.G., p. 43). A

notation made during this time in the files of the Technical Ser-

vices Division indicates that four poison pills were given to O'Connell

on April 18, 1962 (I.G., pp. 46-47). The pills were passed to Harvey,

who arrived in Miami on April 21, and found Roselli already in touch

with Varona (I.G., p. 47). He gave the pills to Roselli, explaining

that "these would work anywhere and at any time with anything" (Roselli,

p. 31). Roselli testified that he told Harvey that the Cubans intended

to use the pills to assassinate Che Guevara as well as Fidel and Raul

Castro.

According to Roselli's testimony, Harvey approved of the

targets, stating "everything is all right, what they want to do"

(Roselli, p. 34).

Varona requested arms and equipment as

a quid pro quo for carrying out the assassination operation (O'Connell,

pp. 53-54). Harvey, with the help of the CIA's Miami station

(JWAVE), procured explosives, detonators, rifles, handguns,

radios,

and boat radar costing about $5,000 (I.G., p. 49). Harvey

and the chief of the JMWAVE station rented a U-Haul truck under

an assumed name and delivered the equipment to a parking lot

(Harvey, 6/25, p. 63). The keys were given to Roselli, who watched

the delivery from across the street with O'Connell (0'Connell, pp. 92-93).

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a 2600

The truckload of equipment was finally picked up by either Varona

or Roselli's agent, Maceo,

(I.G., pp. 49-50; Roselli, p. 40).

Harvey testified that the arms "could" have been for use in the

assassination attempt, but that they were not given to Varona

solely for that purpose (Harvey, 7/11, p. 9).

Roselli kept Harvey informed of the

• operation's progress.

Sometime in May 1962, he reported that the

pills and guns had arrived in Cuba (Harvey, 6/25, p. 64; Roselli,

pp. 34, 42-43). On June 21, he told Harvey that Varona had dis-

patched a three-man team to Cuba. The Inspector General's Report

described the team's mission as "vague" and conjectured that the

team would kill Castro or recruit others to do the job, using the

poison pills if the opportunity arose (I.G., p. 51).

Harvey met Roselli in Miami on September 7

and 11, 1962. Varona was reported to be preparing to send in

another three-man team to penetrate Castro's bodyguard. Harvey

was told that the pills, referred to as "the medicine," were

still "safe" in Cuba

(Harvey, 6/25, p. 103; I.G., p. 51).

Harvey testified that by this time he

had grave doubts about whether the operation would ever take

place, and told Roselli that "there's not much likelihood that

this

is going anyplace, or that it should be continued" (Harvey,

6/25, p. 104). Varona's second team never left for Cuba, claiming

that "conditions" in Cuba were not right (I.G., p. 51-52). During

early January 1963, Harvey paid Roselli $2,700 to defray Varona's

expenses (I.G., p. 52).

26

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Harvey terminated the operation in mid-February 1963. At a

meeting with Roselli in Los Angeles, it was agreed that Roselli

would taper off his communications with Varona (I.G., pp. 52-53).

Roselli testified that he simply broke off contact with the Cubans.

However, he never informed them that the offer of $150,000 for

Castro's

assassination had been withdrawn* (Roselli, p. 45).

The agency personnel who dealt with

Roselli attributed his motivation to patriotism#* and testified

that he was not paid for his services. According to O'Connell,

Roselli

"paid his way, he paid his own hotel fees, he paid

his own travel....

And he

never took a nickel, he

said, no, as long as it is for the government of the

United States, this is the least I can do, because

I owe it a lot."

(0' Connell, p. 27).

Edwards agreed that Roselli was "never paid a cent" (Edwards,

p. 16), and Maheu testified that "Giancana was paid nothing at

all, not even for expenses, and that Mr. Roselli was given a

pittance that did not even begin to cover his expenses (Maheu,

7/29, p. 68).

It is clear, however, that the CIA did pay Roselli's

27

*"Q: As far as those Cubans knew, then the offer which they

understood from you to come from Wall Street was still

outstanding?

"A: I don't know if they still think so... I didn't see

them after

that to tell them that" (Roselli, p. 45)."

** Roselli claims that he was motivated by "honor and dedi-

cation" (Roselli, p. 59) .

In 1943, Roselli had been convicted of extorting money from

motion picture producers to insure studios against labor strikes,

and during the period of his contacts with the CIA, Roselli was

deeply involved in hotel and gambling operations in Las Vegas

(File R-505, Summary of FBI Documents). It is possible that he

believed cooperating with the government in the assassination

operation might serve him well in the future.

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1 chee ki

hotel bill during his stay in Miami in October 1960.*

The CIA's involvement

with Roselli caused the Agency some difficulty during Roselli's subsequent

prosecutions for fraudulent gambling activities and living in the country

under an assumed name.**

• (d)

Plans in Early 1963

Two plans to assassinate Castro were ex-

plored by Task Force W, the section concerned with covert Cuban

operations, in early 1963.

Desmond Fitzgerald (now deceased), Chief

of the Task. Force, asked Samuel Halpern to determine whether an exotic

seashell, rigged to explode, could be deposited in an area where Castro

commonly went skin diving (Halpern, p. 28). The idea was explored by the

Technical Division and discarded as impractical (Helms, 6/13, p. 135; I.G., P.T7)

A second plan involved having James Donovan

(who was negotiating with Castro for the release of prisoners

* FBI reports reveal that Roselli's expenses at the Kennilworth llotel,

where he was registered from October 11 - 30, 1960 under the name. of J.A.

Rollins, were paid by Mabeu (File R-505, FBI file summary, p.10). Maheu's

expenses were reimbursed by the CIA.

** In May 1966, the FBI threatened to deport Roselli for living in the United

States under an assumed name unless he cooperated in an investigation of the

Mafia. (Roselli, whose true name is Filippo Saco, was born in Italy and

allegedly brought illegally into the United States while still a child.)

Roselli contacted Edwards, who informed the FBI that Roselli wanted to

"Keep square with the Bureau," but was afraid that gangsters might kill him

for "talking" (CIA Justice File. R-153, Memorandum, Osborn to EBI, 5/27/66).

After Roselli was arrested for fraudulent gambling activities at the Friars

Club in Beverly Hills in 1967, he requested Harvey, who had left the Agency,

to represent him (CIA Justice File R-153, Memorandum for Record by Osborn,

12/11/67)• Harvey contacted the Agency and suggested that it prevent the

prosecution (Osborn Memorandum, supra). Roselli was subsequently convicted

of violating United States interstate gambling laws. In 1971, the CIA

approached the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of Justice,

to "forestall public disclosure of Roselli's past operational activity

with CIA "that might occur if deportation proceedings were brought. (CIA to

Select Committee, 7/21/75). It was agreed that CIA would be kept informed

of developments in that case. The deportation order is presently beingle, d

litigated in the courts.

do Anything

to stop,t-

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29

taken during the Bay of Pigs operation) present Castro with a

contaminated diving suit* (Colby, 5/21, pp. 38-39).

The Inspector General's Report dates this

operation in January 1963, when Fitzgerald replaced Harvey as

Chief of Task Force W, although it is unclear whether Harvey or

Fitzgerald conceived of the plan (I.G., p. 75). It is likely

that the activity took place earlier, since Donovan had completed

his negotiations by the middle of January 1963. Helms characterized

the plan as "cockeyed" (Helms, 6/13, p. 135).

TSD bought a diving suit, dusted the inside

with

fungus that would produce a chronic skin disease (Madura

foot), and contaminated the breathing apparatus with a tubercule

bacillus (I.G., p. 75).: The Inspector General's Report states

that the plan was abandoned because Donovan gave Castro a different

diving suit on his own initiative (I.G., p. 75). Helms testified

that the diving suit never left the laboratory (Helms, 6/13, p. 135) .

(e) AMLASH

(1) Origin of the Project

In March 1961, an officer of the Mexico

City CIA station met withla highly-placed Cuban official to determine

1t ho would coperate la desorts afarat the dato sesame. (r.0..

p. 78). The Cuban, referred to by the cryptonym AMIASH-1, had been

*Donovan was not aware

of the plan.

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1, i!

involved with an anti-Batista faction that only grudgingly accepted

Castro's rule. (Case Officer 2, p. 9, 39).* The meeting was incon-

clusive, but lead to subsequent meetings at which AM/LASH-1 agreed

to cooperate with the CIA.

AM/LASH-I was viewed as an important "asset"

inside Cuba.

As a high-ranking military

leader who enjoyed the

confidence of Fidel Castro, he could keep the CIA informed of the

internal workings of the regime (Case Officer 2, pp. 23, 40). It

was also believed that he might play.a part in fomenting a coup

within Cuba (Case Officer 2, p. 43).**

From the first. contact with AM/LASH-1, until

the latter part of 1963, it was uncertain whether he would defect

or remain in Cuba. His initial requests to the CIA and FBI for

aid in defecting were rebuffed (I.G., Pp. 80, 82-83). When Case

Officer I joined the AM/LASH-1 operation in June

(1967,).

his assign-

* The Committee has taken the testimoy of the two case officers

involved in the AM/LASH project. Case officer 1 dealt with AM/LASH-1

through September 1963; Case Officer 2 continued until mid-1965

(Case Officer 2, p.

). The Committee has agreed not to divulge

their names as they are still in active service with the Agency.

** AM/LASH-I was the major "asset" in the AM/LASH operation.

During this period the CIA also sponsored a separate operation to

"penetrate the Cuban military to encourage either defections

or an attempt to produce information from dissidents, or

perhaps even to forming a group which would be capable of

replacing the then present government in Cuba" (Case Officer 1,

pp. 18, 22) .

The case officers for AM/LASH were also involved in this second

related program.

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31

ment was to "stay in place and report to us" (Case Officer 1, p. 38).

At a meeting

in August 1962 in

a foreign capital, AM/LASH-1 stated

that he would remain in Cuba if he "could do something really signifi-

cant for the creation of a new Cuba"

, and expressed a desire to plan

the execution of Fidel Castro (Case Officer 1 Contact Report, August 1

meeting).

The subject of assassinating Castro was again discussed

at ia meeting on August 10, 1962, between AM/LASH-1 and his case

officer.

The case officer's contact report states that assassination

was raised in discussing AM/LASH-1's role in Cuba, and that AM/LASH-1

was visibly upset.

"It was not

the aet that he objected to, but

merely the choice of the word used to describe it. 'Eliminate' was

acceptable." (Case Officer 1, Contact Report, August 7-10, meetings):

The case officers who testified before the Com

mittee said that AM/IASH-1 was not directly requested to assassinate

Castro.

The record clearly reveals, however, that the agency per-

sonnel dealin gwith AM/LASH-1 were aware of his desire to take such

action. A cable to headquarters reporting an August 15, 1963 meet-

ing with AM/LASH-1 stated:

"Have no intention give AMLASH-1 physical elim-

ination mission as requirement but recognize

this something he could or might try to carry

out on his own initiative."*

* Case Officer 1 testified that AM/LASH-] discussed "eliminating Castro,

although he attributed such remarks to AMLASH-1's "mercurial" nature,

and stated that no specific plans for assassinations were ever discussed

(Case Officer 1, Pp. 39-41, 62). The case officer who took over the

AMLASH project in September 1963 recalled being briefed by Case Officer

I on AMLASH's belief that Castro's assassination was a necessary first

step in a coup. (Case Officer 2, p. 28) .

The second AMLASH case officer described the context in which AMLASH-1

generally raised the topic of assassination:

"You also must recognize that AMLASH was a rather tempera-

mental man whose temperament was of a mercurial nature and

whereas he may have said something like this in one fit of

pique, he would settle down and talk about organizing a regular

military coup in the next breath." (Case Officer 2, P.29)

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At a meeting on October 3, 1963, AMLASH-1

again raised the possibility of defecting, but indicated that he

would be willing to continue working against the Castro regime if

he received firm assurances of American support (Case Officer 2,

pp. 48-49). According to Case Officer 2, AMLASH-1 asked for

military supplies, a device with which to protect himself if his

plots against Castro were discovered, and a meeting with Attorney

General Robert Kennedy (Case Officer 2, pp. 48-49).

Desmond Fitzgerald (now deceased), who was

then

Chief,

SAS * agreed to meet AMLASH-1 and give him the assur-

ances

he sought. The Inspector General's Report states that Fitz-

gerald consulted with the DDP, Helms, who agreed that Fitzgerald

should hold himself out as a personal representative of Attorney

General Kennedy (I.G.,

p.89).**

Helms testified that he did not recall the con-

versation,

and speculated that the Attorney General might not have

been consulted because

"this was so central to the whole theme of what we had

been

trying to do . . .(find someone inside Cuba who might

head a government and have a group to replace Castro.

This is obviously what we had been pushing, what every-

body had been pushing for us to try to do, and it is that

context that I would have made some remark like this."

(Helms, 6/13, p. 117)

*

SAS (Special' Affairs Staff) was the name given to Task Force W in

early 1963 when Fitzgerald replaced Harvey as head of the covert Cuban

operations. The AMLASH Case Officers reported directly to Fitzgerald.

** The contact plan for the proposed meeting stated:

Fitzgerald will represent self as personal representative of

Robert F. Kennedy who travelled to (foreign capital) for spe-

cific purpose meeting AMLASH-1 and giving him assurances of

full support with a change of the present government in Cuba."

this is

problen

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TOP SI

1507 a:

8 61 14

Helms recalled that he told Fitzgerald to

"go ahead

and

say that from the standpoint of political

support, the United States government will be behind you if

you are successful. This had nothing to do with killings..

This had only to do with the political action part of it"

(Helms, 6/13, p. 131.)

Fitzgerald met AM/LASH-1 on October 29, 1963,

in a foreign capital, and promised that the United States would

support a coup against Castro* (Case Officer 2, p. 60). When

later interviewed for the Inspector General's Report, Fitzgerald

recalled that AM/LASH-1 repeatedly requested an assassination

weapon, particularly a "high powered rifle with telescopic sights

that could be used to kill Castro from a

distance" (I.G., p. 90).

Fitzgerald stated that he told AM/LASH-1 that the United States

would have "no part of

an attempt on Castro's life" (I.G., p. 90).

Case Officer 2 recalled that AM/LASH-1 raised the prospect of

assassinating Castro, but did not propose an explicit plan (Case

Officer 2, Pp. 62, 85). AM/LASH-1, was, however, "convinced that

Castro had to be removed from power before a coup could be under-

preth

* Case

Officer 2 did

not recall whether Robert Kennedy's name

used

(Case Officer 2, P.

60).

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pi?

taken in Cuba" (Case Officer 2, p. 61).

AMLASH-1 also requested high-powered rifles

and

grenades (Case Officer 2, P. 77). A memorandum by Case

Officer 2, dated November 18, 1963, states:

"C/SAS (Fitzgerald) approved telling AMLASH-1 he would

be given

a cache inside Cuba. Cache could, if he

requested it, include... high powered rifles with

goes

shor

AMLASH-I was told on November 22, 1963, that the cache would be

dropped in Cuba (Case Officer 2, P. 92).

(2) The Poison Pen Device

On November 22, 1963, Case Officer 2 met with

AMLASH-1 in a foreign capital, offered him a ball-point pen rigged

with a hypodermic needle, and suggested that Blackleaf 40 would be

an effective poison to use in the device. (Case Officer 2, p. 110)

The needle was designed to be so fine that the victim would not

notice its insertion (Case Officer 2, p. 103).

The Inspector General's Report states that

Case

Officer 2, when he was interviewed in 1967, stated that AMLASH-1

had requested the Agency to

"devise some technical means of doing the job that would

not automatically cause him to lose his own life in the

try."

(I.G.; D. 92)

The Report concluded that:

"although none of the participants so stated, it may be

inferred that they were seeking a means of assassination

of a sort that AMLASH-1 might reasonably have been ex-

pected to have devised himself."

(I. G., p. 92)

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35

C02d

Halpern, Fitzgerald's assistant, told the

Committee that the pen was intended to show "bona fides" and

"The orders were to do something to get rid of Castro..

and we thought this other nethod might work whereas a rifle

wouldn't."

(Halpern, p. 26)

Helms

confirmed that the pen was manufactured

"to take care of a request from him that he have some device

for getting rid of Casti " (Helms. 6/13, p. 113)

for killing him, murdering him,

whatever the case may be.

"... (t)his was a temporizing gesture." (Helms, 6/11, D. 133)*

On November 22, 4963, Fitzgerald and the case

officer met with AMLASH-1 in a European capital and offered him

the poison pen, recommending that he use Blackleaf-10, a deadly poison

which is commercially available. (Case Officer 2, p. 112) The Inspect-

or General's Report noted that

"it is likely that at the very moment President Kennedy was

shot a CIA officer was meeting with a Cuban agent in Paris

and giving him an assassination device for use against

Castro."

(I.G., p. 94)

* In his testimony before the Committee, Case Officer 2 offered a con-

flicting story.

He said that the purpose of the pen was

"to provide AMLASH with a device which would serve him to

protect himself in case he was confronted with and charged

with being involved in a military coup against Castro."

(Case Officer 2, p. 107)

According to the case officer, AMLASH-1 had requested an "esoteric device

which could easily be concealed and which he could use in self-defense

(Case Officer 2, po. 98-99). The device was not intended for offensive

use against any person, but was rather

"a kind of psychological crutch. .to help him think that

we enter i104 10).

1 protection, his own security"

This version is wholly inconsistent with documents in the CIA files, some

of which were written by the AMLASH case officer, which establish that

AMLASH-1 intended to kill Castro, and that the CIA knew his desire and

endeavored to supply the means that he needed.

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36

The case officer

later recalled that AMLASH-1 did not "think much

of the device,"

and complained that CIA could surely "come up with

sometning more sophisticated than that" (I.G., p. 93a).

The case officer recalled offering the pen

to AMLASH-1, but could not remember whether AMLASH-I threw it away

then or took it with him (Case Officer 2, pp. 105, 110). He did

recall that AMLASH-1 said he would not take the pen back to Cuba,

but did not know what AMLASH-1 in fact did with the pen (Case Offi-

cer 2, pp. 110-111).

An entry in the CIA files on AMLASH dated

March 29, 1965, states:

"Although Fitzgerald and the case officer assured AMLASH-1

on November 22, 1963, that CIA would give him everything

he needed (telescopic sight, silencer, all the money he

wanted) the situation changed when the case officer and

Fitzgerald left the meeting to discover that President

Kennedy had been assassinated. Because of this fact,

plans with AMLASH-1 changed and it was decided that we

could have no part in the assassination of a government

leader (including Castro) and would not aid AMLASH-1 in

this attempt. . . AMLASH-1 was not informed of (this de-

cision) until he was seen by the case officer in Novem

ber, 1964. "

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(3) Providing AMLASH-1 with Arms

CIA cables indicate that one cache of arms

for AMLASH-1 was delivered in Cuba in March 1964 and another in

June. An entry in

the AMLASH file for May 5, 1964, states that

the case officer requested the Technical Services Division to pro-

duce, on a "crash basis," a silencer which would fit an FAL rifle.

The contact report of a meeting between the case officer and a

confidant of AILASH states that AMLASH was subsequently informed

that it was not feasible to make a silencer for an FAL.

Toward the latter part of 1964, AMLASH-1

became more insistent on the fact that the assassination of the

Cuban leadership was a necessary initial step in

a successful coup.

(Case Officer 2, pp. 129-133). In a memorandum dated December 10,

1964, the case officer wrote:

"AMLASH-1 was told and fully understands that the United

States Government cannot become involved to any degree

in the 'first step' of his plan. If he needs support, he

realizes he will have to get it elsewhere. FYI: This is

where B-1 could fit in nicely in giving any support he

would request."

Documents in the AMLASH file establish that in

early 1965, the CIA put AMLASH in contact with B-1, the leader of an

anti-Castro group. As the case officer explained

to the Inspector

General:

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38

... what had happened was that SAS had contrived

to put B-l and AMLASH together in such a way that

neither of them knew that the contact had been engin-

eered by CIA. The thought was that B-l needed a man

inside and AMLASH wanted a silenced weapon, which CIA

was unwilling to furnish to him directly.

By putting

the two together, B-l might get its man inside Cuba

and AMLASH might get his silenced weapon -- from B-1."

(I.G., p. 101)

A report of a meeting between a case officer and

B-1 states that B-1, in his initial contacts with AMLASH-1, discussed

plans for assassinating Castro. AMLASH-1 suggested that guerrilla

raids against Cuba should be

stepped up one month before the

"attempt on Fidel Castro" to "prepare the public and raise the morale

and resistance spirit of the people." B-l reported that AMLASH-1

believed that the only solution to the problems in Cuba would be

"to get rid of Fidel Castro. He is able either to shoot

him with

a silencer or place a bomb in some place where

Fidel will be.

He might use, for example, a small bomb

that he can carry and place, or with his group attack,

the residence where Fidel lives . . . . B-l is going to

provide AMLASH-1 with escape routes and places where B-1

is able to pick him up. He will memorize these points

and escape routes. . . Next, B-l is to provide AMIASH-1 either

a silencer for a FAL or a rifle with a silencer.*

A CIA document dated January 3, 1965, states that B-1 told a

case officer that he and AM/LASH-1 had reached an agreement on the

following points:

"1. B-l is to provide AM/LASH-1 with a silencer for the FAL;

if this is impossible, B-l is to cache in a designated

location a rifle with a scope and silencer plus several

bombs concealed either in a suitcase, a lamp or some

other concealment device which he would be able to carry

and place next to Fidel Castro.

"2.

"3.

B-l is to provide AM/LASH-1 with escape routes controlled

by B-l and not by the Americans.

The lack of confidence

built up by the Bay of Pigs looms large:

B-l is to prepare one of the western provinces, either

Pinar del Rio or Havana, with arms caches and a clandes-

tine underground mechanism. This would be a fall back

position and a safe area where men and weapons are avail-

able to the group.

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39

that B-1 had given AMLASH-1 a silencer and that AMLASH-1 had

"small, highly concentrated explosives." On February 11, 1965

the Madrid Station cabled that AMLASH-1 would soon receive "one

pistol with silencer and one FAL rifle with a silencer from B-l's

secretary" (I.G., p. 103). A subsequent cable reported that

"B-I had three packages of special items made up by his technical

people and delivered to AMLASH-1 in Madrid" (I.G., P., 103

In June 1965, CIA terminated all contact with

AMLASH-1 and his associates because of reports that his activities

were widely known (I.G., pp. 104-105) •

"4.

B-1 is. to be in Cuba one week before the elimination

of Fidel, but no one, including AM/LASH-1 will know

B-l's location.

"5.

B-1 is to

arrange for recongition by at least five Latin

American countries as soon as Fidel is neutralized and

a junta is formed. This junta will be established even

though Raul Castro and Che Guevara may still be alive

and may still be in control of the part of the country.

This is the reason AM/LASH-1 requested that B-1 be able

to establish some control over one of the provinces so

that the junta can be formed in that location.

"6.

One month to the day before the neutralization of Fidel,

B-1 will increase the number of commando attacks.to a

maximum in order to raise the spirit and morale of the

people inside Cuba. In all communiques, in all radio

messages, in all propaganda put out by B-1 he must relate

that the raid was possible thanks to the information

received from clandestine sources inside Cuba and from

the clandestine underground apparatus directed by "p".

This will be AM/LASH-I's war name."

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Approved by Drafting

Subcommiteee 9/5/75

2. At What Level Were the Castro Plots Authorized or

Known About Within the Central Intelligence Agency?

(a) The Question Presented. As we have seen, first

Richard Bissell and then Richard Helms, each as Deputy Director of

Plans (DDP), were aware of plots to assassinate Fidel Castro. The

evidence set forth herein relates to whether their superiors in

the Agency, in particular Allen Dulles and John McCone, authorized

or were aware of the assassination plots.

Dulles served

l as Director of Central Intelligence (DCI)

from 1953 to November 1961. McCone served as DCI from November 1961

to 1965.* The Committee took considerable testimony on whether Dul-

les and McCone (or their Deputy DCI's, General Cabell and General

Carter, respectively) knew about or authorized the plots against

Fidel

Castro's life.

In summary, the evidence is as follows:

(1) Dulles: Bissell and Edwards both

expressed the belief that Dulles (and his Deputy, General Cabell)

authorized the initial phase of the assassination plot involving

underworld figures.

They acknowledged, however, that Dulles (and

his Deputy) were not told about the plot until after the under- :

world figures had been contacted. The words said to have been

used to brief them--"an intelligence operation"--do not convey on

* Bissell served as DDP from January 1, 1959,, to february 17,

1962.

(President Kennedy decided to replace Dulles and Bissell

because of the failure of the Bay of Pigs (Bissell, 619, pp. 6-8).)

Helms, who had been Bissell's

Deputy, succeeded Bissell in

February 1962 as DDP. He was appointed DDCI in April 1965, and

DCI in June 1966.

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their face that the plot involved

assassination, although- Bissell

and Edwards insist the real meaning must have been understood.

There is some other evidence which can be said both to suggest .

that Dulles and Cabell did know and to suggest that they did not

know..

(See Section (b) below.)

(ii) McCone: McCone testified that he did not

know about or authorize the plots. Helms and Bissell both stated

that McCone was not told by them of the earlier assassination ef-

forts when McCone assumed the position of DCI in November 1961.

The I.G. Report states that Harvey received Helms' approval not

to brief McCone when the actual efforts were resumed in 1962.

Harvey testified this accorded with his recollection. Thereafter,

Helms and Harvey did not tell McCone about assassination activity

on several occasions.: Helms did not recall any agreement not to

brief McCone, but did not call into question the position taken by

Harvey or the I.G. Report on this matter. Helms did say that Mc-

Cone never told him not to assassinate Castro, but added that he

was not claiming that he told McCone about the plots. (These mat-

ters, as well as the various reasons put forward by Harvey and

Helms for not briefing McCone, are set forth in Section (c) below.)

(b) Did Allen Dulles Know of or Authorize the Initial

Plots Against Castro?* Both Allen Dulles and his Deputy (DDCI),

* This testimony rélates to the "airplane" incident in July 1960

and what the I.G. Report referred to as the initial phase of the

assassination effort involving the underworld.: With respect to

the "schemes" prior to that operation, the I.G. Report concluded

they could "find no evidence that any

of the schemes were approved

at any level higher than division, if that". (I.G., p. 10.)

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3

General Cabell, are deceased. Since we were unable to take any

testimony from either, the Committee's investigation centered

around the documents available and the testimony of those still

alive who served under Dulles and Cabell.*

=..

*The Inspector General questioned neither Dulles nor Cabell in

preparing his Report in 1967.

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(i) Dulles' January 1960 Statement to the Special

Group Suggesting Contingency Plans for the Overthrow of the

Casto Government, but Ruling Out "Elimination" of Castro.

January 13, 1960, Allen Dulles, in what was apparently

the first Special Group discussion of a covert program to over-

throw Castro, emphasized that "a quick elimination of Castro"

was not contemplated by the CIA (minutes of Special Group meet-

ing, 1/13/60). According to the minutes of the meeting, Dulles

first "noted the possibility that over the long run the U.s.

will not be able to tolerate the Castro regime in Cuba, and sug-

gested that covert contingency planning to accomplish the fall

of the Castro government might be in order." Then, in response

to the State Department representative's comment that "timing

was very important so as to permit a solidly based opposition

to take over, " Dulles

"emphasized that we do not have in mind a quick

elimination of Castro, but rather actions designed

to enable responsible opposition leaders to get a

foothold."

(ii) Dulles' Alleged Recission of the July 1960

Airplane Assassination Plan Upon Learning of It.

As discussed in greater detail above (see p. →,

in July, 1960, Iracy Barnes, Bissell's assistant, approved the

sending of, in July, 1960, a cable to the Havana station stating

that "possible removal of top three leaders (was) receiving

serious consideration," and instructions were given to carry out

a plan to kill Raul Castro. That plan was, however, abandoned

shortly after it had been approved.

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The Executive Officer to the Chief of the Cuba

cours

action project, who had sent the cables testified that

he had "heard" that Dulles had countermanded Barnes' plan and

had indicated that "assassination was not to be considered."

(Duty Officer, p. 29).*

The officer added, however, that he

had

no personal knowledge of the reason for calling off the plan,

or even if Dulles had been the one who called it off, he further

testified that

"assassination had not been part of the Cuba

covert action project in 1960 and that Dulles'

action in this incident conformed with CIA

policy against the use of assassination." (Duty

Officer, p.

→.**

The countermanding cable to the Havana station, which was

"Operational Immediate," was sent the morning after the cable

of the previous night.

The officer who sent that cable testified:

18

...I saw the cable and was told that,

to the

best of my knowledge, my memory is that the

Director (Dulles], not the Deputy Director

[Bissell]

... had

countermanded the cable and

nad directed that -- had indicated that

assassination was

not to be considered ,'

(Duty Officer, p. 29) .

The officer stated that he did not talk to either Dulles or

Bissell about the countermanding cable, but that he did see the

cable and in all likelihood heard of the reason for Dulles' re-

action in discussions the same morning with his superior, the

Chief of the Cuba project. (Duty Officer, pp. 30-32).

i The officer testified:

...we were schooled that although other countries

[used assassination] we

do not, and I had always

understood this as a basic rule." (Duty Officer, p 14).

"Question:

So was it your understanding after this

cable, and in view of your knowledge of the Agency

general practice with respect to assassination in which

you had been schooled that it was not done, that assass-

ination was not part of the Cuba Project, as far as you

knew?"

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"Officer: That's correct."

* **

"Question:

And would it be accuaate to say that

your recollections

concerning what you now view

as what Mr. Dulles' attitudes were

...are based

on your general training about what had always been

said

.

(and] that after this incident, what you

were

told

... fortified that previous belief (in]

that Dulles had nullified at least this particular

cable?"

"Officer:

Correct."

"Question:

Do you have anything in your recollection

or as a result of your informed opinion or experience

that would indicate to the contrary; that is, that

Mr. Dulles did have assassination in his arsenal, so

to speak?"

"Officer:

I have no basis for any such speculation."

(Duty Officer, pp. 31,_.

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(iii) Dulles Briefing on Use of Underworld Figures

in September 1960.

1. Bissell and Edwards Said Dulles Was Told

About An "Intelligence Operation" With No "Bad Words" Used,

But That Dulles (and his Deputy) Understood That to Mean

Assassination.

Bissell recalled that "in the latter part of

September" there was "a meeting in which Col. Edwards and I

briefed Mr. Dulles and General Cabell" (Bissell, 6/9, p. 20).

Bissell testified that "Colonel Edwards outlined in somewhat

circumlocutious terms the plan that he had discussed with

syndicate representatives" (Bissell, 6/9, p. 22). He stated

that Edwards had said:

"that contact had been made with [the underworld!, that

a plan had been prepared for their use, and I think he

either said in as many words or strongly inferred that

the plan would be put into effect unless at that time

or subsequently he was told by Mr. Dulles that it should

not be"

(Bissell, 6/9, p. 22.),*

The CIA's 1967 I.G. Report, based upon interviews

with Edwards and Bissell, said Dulles and Cabell were briefed

as follows:

"The discussion was circumspect.

Edwards deliberately

avoided the use of any 'bad words'.

term used was

'an intélligence operation, descriptive

Edwards is

quite sure that the DCI and the DDCI clearly understood

the nature of the operation he was discussing. He

* Bissell testified that he was relying on the dating

ments concerning what was said at the poeting were of he state-

provided in the Inspector General'

personal knowledge (Bissell, 6/9, pp. 20-22) .

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recalls describing the channel as being 'from A to B. to

C'.

As he then envisioned it,

A was Maheu, B' was

Roselli, and C was the principal in Cuba.

Edwards

recalls

that Mr. Dulles merely nodded, presumably in

understanding and approval.

Certainly there was no

opposition.

Edwards states that, while there was no

formal approval as such, he felt that he clearly had

tacit approval to use his own juagement."

(I.G.,

pp. 17-18.)

Bissell testified that the description sounded "highly plausible"

(Bissell Tr. 6/9/75 at 24.) Edwards said it was "accurate"

(Edwards Tr. at 11).

In light of the manner in which Bissell and Edwards

described briefing Dulles, the question arises as to whether

Dulles in fact would have understood that the operation involved

assassination. The Inspector General, in attempting to "con-

jecture as to just what the Director did approve"

, decided

"It is safe to conclude, given the men participating and

the general subject of

the meeting, that there was little

likelihood of misunderstanding--even though the details

were deliberately blurred and the specific intended

result was never stated to unmistakable language.

It is

also reasonable to conclude that the pointed avoidance of

'bad

words' emphasized to the

sensitivity of the operation Participants the extreme

(I. G., p. 18) .

Bissell testified that

"I can only say that I am quite sure I came away from

that meeting--and there was, I think, subsequent

occasions when this came up between Mr. Dulles and

myself, and I am quite convinced that he knew the nature

of the operation.

"Q.:

What were the subsequent conversations you had

with Mr. Dulles in which you concluded that he knew.

that this was

an assassination effort?

"Bissell.:

it's really a guess on my part that

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such conversations occurred

... I do believe they did

occur is that during the entire autumn I suppose I must

have spoken to Mr. Dulles practically daily about some

aspect of the whole Cuban operation and I am virtually

certain that he would in one or another of those con-

versations and probably more than once have asked if

there was anything to report about the Sheffield Edwards'

operation. He also may have been in direct contact with

Edwards at that time."

(Bissell Tr. 6/9/75, PP. 24-26)

When asked by the Chairman why, in this context,

persons within the Agency talked "in riddles to one another"

Bissell replied that:

I think there was a reluctance to spread even

on an oral record some aspects of this operation.

"Chairman: Did the reluctance spring from the fact

that it simply grated against your conscience to have

to speak more explicitly?

"Bissell: I don't think it grated against my conscience.

I think it may have been a feeling that the Director

Dullest preferred the use of the sort of language that

is described in the I.G. Report."

Bissell, in a subsequent appearance before the

Committee, again addressed the issue of whether he and Edwards

had made it clear to Dulles that what was involved was an

assassination operation:

"I thought I made clear that it was my impression--and

I believe the impression incidentally. that I thought

was confirmed in the [I.G.

Report]--that in discussing

this with Dulles and Cabell

the objective of the

operation was made unmistakably clear to them.

terms

'an intelligence operation'

The

, I think someone

said, was that not a cover designation? But we would not

under any circumstances have told Allen Dulles that this

was an intelligence collection operation.

If I said that

on Monday, I must have given a wrong impression."

(BIsselL Ir: 6/11, p. 24.)

On the other hand, Scott Breckenriage; the only

author of the Inspector General's. Report still with the CIA,

testified that in his opinion a "pointed avoidance of 'bad

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words'" would have made it less likely that an "intelligence

operation" would have been understood as an assassination .

attempt, and that "it was open to question how clearly this

was stated to Mr. Dulles and whether or not. Mr. Dulles under-

stood" (Colby/Breckenridge, 5/ , p. . .)

Sheffield. Edwards was quite infirm when examined by

the Committee and has since died.* Edwards testified before

the Committee as follows:

• [T]his possible project was approved by Allen B.

Dulles, Director of CIA, and by General. Cabell, the

Deputy Director.

They are both dead.

"The Chairman: How do you know, Colonel, that the

project had been approved by these two gentlemen?

"Edwards: I personally briefed Allen Dulles ... and

Cabell." (Edwards, 5/30/75, рр. 5-6)

In his interview with the Rockefeller Commission,

Edwards testified (Edwards interview, p. 5):

"Q.: Now, who inside the Agency besides Bissell did

you have any contact with on the top echelon?

"A.: Very important.

Dulles and General Cabell. „Plan was approved by Allen w.

* As the investigation proceeded, members of the Committee

requested that Edwards be recalled.

Edwards passed away

before this could be accomplished.

As a result of Edwards'

infirmity and subsequent death,

the Committee was unable to

examine him effectively concerning his conflicting prior

statements concerning Dulles' knowledge of the plots.

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James O'Connell, who was the case officer for the

operation involving underworld figures, testified that when

he and Edwards discussed the matter in 1975, prior to giving

evidence to the Rockefeller Commission, he was sure that

Edwards had told him Dulles had approved the plot (O'Connell

Tr. 5/30, pp. 58-59). He added that he was "reasonably sure"

or "knew" in the "back of my mind" that either. Edwards of

Bissell had also told him of Dulles' knowledge when the plot

was underway in 1960-62 (0'Connell Ir. 5/30, pp. 33-34; 36;

60) .*

A review of Dulles' calendar for August through

December 1960 showed no meeting involving Dulles, Cabell,

Bissell and Edwards.** Of course, such a meeting could have

occurred without having been recorded.

2.. Whatever Was Said to Dulles, He Was Not Briefed

Until After Contact With the Underworld Figures Had Been Made.

Bissell and the Inspector General's Report (which

* In June 1966, Howard J. Osborn, Edwards' successor as

Director of Security,

wrote a memorandum for Helms on Maheu

stating that "the DCI was briefed and gave his approval".

When questioned about this memorandum, Osborn stated that he

had no

firsthand knowledge of the briefing, and that he had

most likely obtained this statement from Edwards or O'Connell.

** The calendar also reflects no meetings during that period

between Dulles, Edwards and Bissell, or between Dulles and

Edwards.

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relied on Edwards) placed the briefing of Dulles in "the latter

part of September 1960"*

Bissell did not have a clear independent recollection

of the dates involved, but recalled that discussions concerning

the possible use of syndicate members against Castro began "in

the Autumn of 1960"

He recalled initial discussions among

himself, Edwards, and Colonel J. C. King, Chief of the Western

Hemisphere Division, which he said occurred before Dulles and

Cabell were approached about assassinating Castro. According

to Bissell,

"those conversations, the subject matter was a capability

to eliminate Castro if such action should be decided

upon.

"It is, therefore, accurate to say that my best

recollection of those conversations (with. Edwards and

King) is that they addressed themselves to the existence

or non-existence of the capability and to the possibility

of developing a capability. They were not conclusive or

decisive conversations

nor would they have revealed

a prior decision to implement such a plan by anybody."

(Bissell, 619, p. 19.)

* "Q.: When did you first become aware of any plan or

effort to assassinate Mr. Castro?

"Bissell: Well, I became aware of planning a contingency

basis for such an operation. My recollection is

August . . .

"Q.: August of 1960?

"Bissell:

'60; correct

• but without reading Ithe

I.G. Reportl, I would have remembered initial conversations

early in the autumn of 1960."

(Bissell Tr. 6/9, pp. 17-18.)

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O'Connell contacted Roselli in early September 1960.

During the week of September 25,| 0'Connell, Maheu, and Roselli

met with Giancana and Trafficante in Miami. Bissell testified

as follows concerning the sequence of those events:

"Q.: Well, before we come to the meeting (with Dulles1,

you had been informed, prior to that, had

you not, that

contact had been made with the Mafia?

"Mr. Bissell. : I had.

"Q.: Now were you informed that the Mafia had been given

the go ahead to proceed with actual efforts to assassinate

Castro?

"Bissell: Not that early, to my best recollection.

I canriot date that

at all well.

I would suppose that it

was within the next two or three weeks." (Bissell, 6/9,

pp. 20-21.)

On the other hand, Roselli's testimony suggests that Maheu had

indicated prior to the "latter part of September" 1960 that a

large sum of money would be paid for Castro's death (Roselli,

p. 17), and Edwards' May 14, 1962 memorandum indicated the

briefing of "senior officials" took place after the money had

been offered.

It is clear, then, that even if Dulles was informed

about the use of underworld figures to assassinate Castro, sub-

ordinate agency officials had previously decided to take steps

toward arranging for the killing of Castro, including discussing

it with organized crime leaders.

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(iV) Questions Raised by Edwards' Communications

to the Justice Department in 1961 and 1962.

As fully described supra, PP._, the FBI discovered

in the late 1960's that Maheu had been involved in an illegal

wiretap in Las Vegas. In April 1961, Maheu told the FBI that

the tap had been placed in connection with a CIA operation, and

suggested that the FBI contact Edwards to verify this fact.

An FBI report of a May: 3, 1961 interview with Edwards

(in which Edwards vaguely described the use of Giancana as

relating to "clandestine efforts! against the Castro Government"

with no mention of assassination, and a copy of which was given

to the Attorney General) stated:

"Col. Edwards advised that only Mr. Bissell (Director of

Plans, CIA) and two others in CIA were aware of the

Giancana-Maheu activity in behalf of CIA's program and

Allen Dulles was completely unaware of Edwards

with Maheu in this connection. He added that Mr. Bissell,

in his recent briefings of Gen. Taylor and the Attorney

General in connection with their inquiries into CIA

relating to the Cuban situation, told the Attorney General

that some of the associated planning included the use of

Gandu anand the under ta sine Case a "

(FBI memo-

, May 22,

1961, p. 2.) (Emphasis added)

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Bissell said he was certain, however, that the

statement regarding Dulles' knowledge about the operation was

wrong, and testified that "it is just flatly contrary to my

recollection that Allen Dulles was unaware of these contacts,

as I have testified several times" (Bissell, 6/11, p. 27).

When asked to speculate on why Edwards would have

told the FBI that Dulles was unaware of Edwards' contact with

Maheu, Bissell replied:

"I can only surmise that he believed he could secure

the cooperation of the Justice Department that he

required without in any way involving his superior,

Mr. Dulles, and simply did this in a protective

fashion."

(Bissell, 7/17/, p. 20).

A year later, on May 7, 1962, Edwards and CIA's

General Counsel met with Attorney General Robert Kennedy.. (That

meeting, is discussed extensively below at.p.

→. Edwards'

memorandum of the meeting indicated that he had said that

after Roselli and Giancana had been offered $150,000, Edwards

had "then briefed the proper senior officials of (the]

Now, it (the FBI memorandum) is just flatly

contrary to my recollection that Allen Dulles

was unaware of these contacts, as I have testified

several times.

Also, 1 submit it is quite im-

plausible that I would have briefed Gen.

Taylor

and the Attorney General--and incidentally, I

have no recollection of briefing those two

gentle

men except as members of the Board of Inquiry

that I have described, of which Allen Dulles him-

self was a member--it is quite implausible that

I would have briefed them on a matter which had

been going on for some months, and some which

the Director, Mr. Dulles himself, had never been

informed.

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Agency" (without specifying whom) and they had "duly orally

approved."* It further states that "knowledge" of the project

had been "kept to a total of six persons." **

Dulles had left the Agency between the time of

Edwards' two statements.

(v) Remarks Made to

the Special Group by General

Cabell in November 1960.

Bissell and Edwards testified that Cabell was aware

of the Castro plots (Bissell Tr.!

16/9, -p. 22; Edwards Tr. 5/30/75,

pp. 5-6) . ***

* On the same day as writing that memorandum for the

Attorney General, Edwards wrote another memorandum for his

own files indicating that after putting Harvey in contact

with Roselli in early April, he had:

"cautioned him [Harvey] that I felt that any future

projects of this nature should have the tacit approval

of the Director of Central Intelligence." (5/14/62,

Memorandum for the Record:)

This memorandum, which contained other information which

Harvey and Edwards had

agreed to'include to "falsify" the record,

is discussed infra, p.

** The 1967 Inspector General's Report surmised that thirteen

people knew of the plot, including Dulles, based upon Bissell's

and Edwards' account of the Dulles briefing. (See discussion,

supra. at

*** The Inspector General's Report stated:

"With Bissell present, Edwards briefed the Director

(Dulles) and the DDCI

(Cabell) on the existence of a plan

involving members of the syndicate.

• Edwards is quite

sure that the DCI and the

DDCI clearly understood the

nature of the operation he was discussing."

(IG Repoft,

p. 17.)

O'Connell testified that prior to O'Connell's testifying

before the Rockefeller Commission, Edwards told O'Connell that

Cabell had been aware of and authorized the project.

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The testimony indicates that the meeting between Dulles,

Bissell, Edwards, and Cabell occurred sometime

• "in the autumn"

of 1960, probably around September. The minutes of a meeting of

the Special Group, the high-level governmental body for consider-

ing covert action, on November 3, 1960, reflect the following

remarks:

"Finally, Mr. Merchant asked whether any real planning

had been done for taking direct positive action against

Fidel, Raul and Che Guevara. He

said that without these

three the Cuban Government would be leaderless and

probably brainless.

He conceded that it would be necessary

o act against all three simultaneously. General Cabell

pointed out that action of this kind is uncertain of

results and highly dangerous in conception and execu-

tion, because the instruments must be Cubans.

He

felt that, particularly because of the necessity of

simultaneous action, it would have to be concluded

that Mr. Merchant's

suggestion is beyond our capabilities.

(11/3/60 Special Group Minutes, P. 3) .

Exactly what the term "direct positive action" meant to the

speaker or those listening is uncertain. Neither was able to

offer any interpretive help to the Committee.

However, other

participants at this meeting have testified that the reference

could mean or include assassination.*

18 Thi

BuT

moT

beliève pois.

Do you read.

direct, positive action.

as meaning killing (Fidel Castro, Raul Castro and Che

Guevara)?"

I would read it

that way, yes." (Lansdale

Tr. 7/8/75, p. 103.)

"Q:

-would you agree that the words 'direct

positive action'

appear to question whether there's been any

planning

in connection with assassinating (the Castros and

Guevara)?"

"A: I think the phrase 'positive action' could include

assassinations, but.

mind."

I'm not sure what was in Mr. Merchant's

(Gray Ir.

7/9/75, p. 9.)

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Bissell was also asked about the minutes of the

November 3 meeting.

After reading the reference to "direct

positive

action,". Bissell said "I find it difficult to

understand" (Bissell Ir. 7/17, P. 18). He was then asked

"Q:

Do you, in light of the November 3

minutes) remain firm that Cabell was knowledgeable

(of the assassination plots)?"

"A: It casts some doubt on that in my mind."

When

asked if it cast "some significant doubt in light of

(Cabell's) character"' ,Bissell answered "yes" (Bissell, 7/17,

pp. 22-23) .

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(c) Did John McCone Know of or Authorize Assassina-

tion Plots During His Tenure as DCI

The CIA considered several assassination plots

against Castro during McCone's tenure as Director. Harvey

initiated his contact with Roselli in April 1962, and the

operation involving underworld figures continued into early.

1963. In early 1963 the CIA looked into the possibility of

assassinating Castro with an exploding seashell and contaminated

diving suit. AM/LASH was offered a poison pen device in

November 1963, and caches of arms were delivered to Cuba for

nis use in the following year.

(i) McCone Testified That He Did Not Authorize

or Know About the Castro Plots and That He Would Have Dis-

approved the Plots Had He Been Asked

McCone testified that he was not aware of

the plots to assassinate Castro which took place during the

years in which he was DCI, and that he did not authorize those

plots.* (McCone, 6/6/75, PP. 33, 44-45) He testified that he

was not briefed about the assassination plots by Dulles,

Bissell, Helms, or anyone else when he succeeded Dulles as

Director in November 1961 (McCone, 6/6/75, pp. 6-7, 17), and

that if he had ever been asked about the plots, he would have

disapproved. (McCone, 6/6/75, P. 47) McCone testified:

* McCone testified that he first learned of the Roselli operation

in August, 1963, long after it had been terminated.

See discussion,

p .

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I had no knowledge of any authorized plan or

planning that might lead to a request for

authorization.

Of course, during those days

it was almost common for one person or another

to say, we ought to dispose of Castro..

(but at no time did anyone come to me, or

come to other authorities to my knowledge,

with a plan for the actual undertaking of an

assassination.

Senator Hart of Colorado:

• . . Did you

ever discuss the subject of assassinations

with your predecessor, Mr. Dulles?

McCone :

No, I did not.

AISAI

CAPAR

(ii) Helms, Bissell, and Other Subordinate Agency

Employees Testified That They Did Not Ask McCone to Approve

the Plots or Know If He Had Knowledge Of Them.

Richard Bissell was DDP under McCone for three months,

from November 1961 until February 1962. Richard Helms assumed

the duties of DDP from Bissell.

Bissell testified about McCone's knowledge as follows:

?.: Your testimony is that you never discussed

assassinations with Mr. McCone?

A.: That is correct.

Q.::.

[D]id you tell McCone anything about

that conversation with Mr. Harvey in which

you at least told him (Harvey) to take

over the relationship with the criminal

syndicate?

A.: I don't remember so doing.

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Helms testified that he did not recall ever having dis-

cussed the assassination plots with McCone while the plots

were continuing.*

When asked whether McCone was aware of the

assassination plots against Castro, Helms testified:

No, it isn't my impression that I told him,

at least I don't have any impression, unfor-

tunately.

•. Mr. McCone is an honorable

man.

He has done his own testifying, and all

L can say is that I do not know specifically

whether he was aware or not.

(Helms, 6/13/75,

pp. 90, 101-102)

Helms further testified:

Q.:

I believe Mr. McCone testified that he

never heard of any of these attempts when he

was Director.

Would you have any reason

to

disagree with his testimony?

Helms:

Sir, I have always liked McCone and

I don't want to get into an altercation with

him.

He had access to Harvey and everybody

else just the way I had and he had regular

• access

to the Attorney General.

*****

Q.:

If you were a member of this Committee

wouldn't you assume that Mr. McCone was un-

aware of the assassination

attempts while

they were underway?

Helms: I don't know how to answer that?

Senator. Mondale. He was involved in this up

to his scuppers just the way everybody else

*Helms testified that he first told McCone about the plot

using underworld figures in August 1963.

See discussion supra

at p.

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was that was in it, and I just don't know.

I have no reason to impugn his integrity.

On the other hand, I don

t understand how

it was he didn't hear about some of these

things that he claims that he didn't.

(Helms, 7/13/75, PP. 32-33)

*****

I honestly didn't recall that Mr. McCone

was not informed and when I was

told that

there was evidence that he wasn't informed,

I was trying to scratch my head as to why I

didn't tell him at the time and my surmises

are the best I can come up with.

I am really

surprised I did not discuss it with him at

the time.

My relations with hin were good,

and so my surmises are just the best I am

able to do in 1975 over an episode that took

place that many years ago.

(Helms, 6/13/75,

p. 90)

Several other Agency officials who were aware of the

assassination plots testified that they had not told McCone

of the plots. William Harvey testified that he never spoke

with McCone about the operation involving underworld figures

or assassination and that, to the best of his knowledge,

McCone had not been told about the project... (Harvey, 6/25/75,

- p. 66)

Sheffield Edwards, when asked whether he had informed

McCone about the plot, replied:

Edwards:

No, I did not inform Mr. McCone.

Q.:

Was there a reason for why you did not

inform Mr. McCone?

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Edwards: Well, I did not want to drag

MT :

McCone into this thing that in my

opinion had petered out, and I did not

want to involve him. (Edwards, p. 18)

James O'Connell, who was the case officer for the opera-

tion under Edwards, testified that he recalled that Edwards had

told him during a discussion about the plots in 1965 that

Edwards had not briefed McCone on the operation.

As a matter of fact, I don't think he ever

knew about it.

From later conversations with

Colonel Edwards, not recently, we talked about

it, and he said that he was convinced that

Mr. McCone never knew about it, it wasn't on

his watch,

so to speak, and he didn't want to

get him involved.

(0' Connell, PP. 37, 39)

George McManus, Helms' Special Assistant for Cuba during

the relevant period, testified that he was not told about the

assassination activities, and gave his opinion that

if McCone

had been asked to approve an assassination, he "would have

reacted violently immediately".*

*McManus advanced two reasons for this opinion:

(1) McCone had a great love for the President of

the United States and he sort of looked at him

as an older son or a brother, a very protective

sense he had about the President, President

Kennedy, and McCone would have immediately said

Jesus, this is a no

win ball game.

(2)

Secondly, as an individual, he would have found

it morally reprehensible.

(McManus, p. 33)

(Continued)

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Walter Elder, McCone's Executive Assistant, testified

thät he had not known of the underworld operation until August

1963, and that in his opinion McCone did not learn of the

operation prior to that time.* (Elder, p. 15)

(111) Helms and Harvey Did Not Brief McCone About

the Assassination Plots

McCone assumed the position of DCI in Novem-

ber 1961. It was also in November 1961 that Bissell asked

Harvey to assume operational control over the Castro plot in-

volving underworld figures.** Richard Helms replaced Bissell

in February, of 1962 and was subsequently briefed by Harvey on

(Continued)

McManus also testified:

I always assumed that Mr. Helms would keep the

Director fully informed of any activity that he

thought was

sensitive.

. •'

Under most cir-

cumstances, and indeed under all circumstances

you can imagine, Helms would have told McCone,

with the exception of a situation in which

Helms had been told by higher authority not to

tell him. (McManus, PP. 32-34)

*In August 1963 Helms gave McCone a copy of Edwards' May 14,

1962, memorandum to the Attorney General.

See discussion infra

at p.

With respect to the Cuban assassination matters,

where

Colby's knowledge was only second-hand, Colby said:

"Mr. McCone

did not know of it."

(Colby, 5/21/75, p. 101)

**See earlier discussion supra.

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the existence of the assassination plots. Helms was Harvey's

immediate superior and the person to whom he reported about

the Castro plot activities.

Harvey testified that in the spring of

1962, when he was preparing to contact Roselli, he briefed

Helms on the assassination plot. (Harvey, 6/25/75, P: 65)

Harvey said:

.. . I briefed Helms generally on the take-

over of Roselli, on the doubts about the

operation, on the possible

... future of

it, and to the extent it had then been possible,

the assessment of Roselli and the cutting out

of various individuals.*

Harvey testified that when he briefed Helms on the assassina-

tion plot operation, they decided that it would not be appro-

priate at that point to brief John McCone.

There was a fairly detailed discussion be- '

tween myself and Helms as to whether or not

the Director should at that time be briefed

concerning this. For a variety of reasons

*Harvey testified that when he took over the Roselli opera-

tion, he had "cut out" both Maheu and Giancana because

less

"regard-

of what I may have thought of their trustworthiness,

they were surplus" to the operation.

(Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 65)

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226

which were tossed back and forth, we agreed

that it was not necessary or advisable to brief

him at that time.

I then

said, as I recall, to Mr. Helms, if you

decide in the future that he should be briefed,

I would like to know about it in advance to

which,

to my best recollection, he agreed

(Harvey, 6/25/75, P. 66)

Harvey then offered the following explanation for why he and

Helms had decided not to discuss the matter with McCone at

that time:

There were several reasons for this.

one,

this operation at that stage had not been

assessed.. It was obviously questionable on

several grounds. • It obviously involved know-

ledge by too many people.

We were not even

sure at that point it had any remote possibility

or rather any real possibility for success.

It

had arisen with full authority insofar as either

of us knew long before I knew anything about it,

and before the then-Director became Director of

the Agency:

I saw no reason at that time to charge him

with knowledge of this, at least until we reạch-

ed

the point where it appeared it might come to

trultation or had had a chance to assess the

individuals involved and determine exactly the

problem we faced, including the possible problem

-- and it was a very, or it appeared to be, and

in my opinion was,

either by Cubans for political purposes or by

figures in organized crime for their own self-

protection or aggrandizement, which, as it turned

out, did not happen, but at that time was a very

pregnant possibility.

(Harvey, 6/25/75, PP.. 67-68)

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I am definitely not saying that there was any

effort to hide or conceal any information from

the Director.

There was not.

This was a dis-

cussion as to whether or not it was even neces-

sary or appropriate at this point to take details

of this particular operation in an unassessed

form to the then-Director at that time. (Harvey,

6/25/75, p. 69)

Harvey stated that he did not have any reason to believe

that the assassination activities would have been "disapproved

by the Director"' had he been advised of the project (Harvey,

6/25/75, p. 69) and stated that he had thought the plots "were

completely authorized at every appropriate level within and

beyond the Agency". (Harvey, 7/11/75, p. 66) When asked why

McCone had not been given an opportunity to consider the plot,

Harvey replied:

One of the things that I don't know from

my own

i knowledge.. is who was briefed

in exactly what terms at the time of the so-

called Las Vegas flop that involved attempts to

place

a technical surveillance

in Dan

Rowan's hotel room. (Harvey, 7/Ii/i5, p. 46)

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Harvey was queried on whether

the reasons he had given for not

briefing McCone were actually "reasons why he should (have been]

briefed forthwith"

• Harvey replied:

Well, Senator Huddleston, it will be quite

easy in looking at it now to say, well, I can

see your argument.

All I can say to you in answer is at that

time I didn't feel that it was necessary or

advisable.

at all.

13225

I did not make this decision except

in consultation, and had I been disagreed with,

that would have been it. And I am not off-

loading this on Richard Helms or attempting to

It isn't.all. that easy for me to go

back this many years and sort of recast ali of

the reasoning and be sure I am accurate. And

I don't also want to evade it by saying, well,

it seemed like a good idea at the time.

But

actually it did.

In other words, this was not something

that either Helms or myself felt that at that

stage there was any point in attempting to

brief the Director on it until, at least, we

had a somewhat better handle on it. . .

*****

And I might also add, if I may, . . . but as

far as either one of us knew at that point he

might have been or should have been briefed,

If you want it that way, by either Allen Dulles

or Richard Bissell. (Harvey, 7/11/75, pp. 67-71)

The 1967 Report prepared by the Inspector General for

Helms states that Harvey said:

"When he briefed Helms on

Roselli, he obtained Helms' approval not to brief the

Director." (I.G., p. 41)

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Helms testified that he did not recall this conversation,

but that he had no reason to doubt the accuracy of Härvey's

testimony and the Inspector General's Report. (Helms, 6/13/75,

pp. 32, 106)

Helms, when asked about Harvey's testimony that he and

Harvey had agreed not to brief McCone, stated "I frankly don't.

recall having agreed to this."

My recollection is that I had very grave

doubts

about the wisdom of this.

And as

I recall it, we had so few assets inside Cuba

at that time that I was willing to try almost

anything.

But the thing did not loom large in

my mind at that time.

I was enormously busy

with a lot of other things, taking over a new

job las DDP]. Mr. McCone was realtively new in

the Agency and I guess I must have thought to

myself, well this is going to look peculiar to

him and I doubt very much this is going to go

anyplace, but if it does, then that is time

enough to bring him into

the picture. (Helms,

6/13/75, p. 33)

Helms also stated:

It was a Mafia connection and Mr. McCone was

relatively new to the organization and this was,

you know, not

a very savory effort. (Helms,

6/13/75,

P: 92)

Helms later testified that he did not "recall ever having been

convinced. that any attempt was really made on Castro's life."

I am having a very difficult time justifying

before this

Committee, because there is some-

thing in here that doesn't come together,

even

tor me, I am sorry to say. Because if this was

all that clear, as everybody seems to think it

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was, that there were those pills in that restau-

rant in Cuba and Castro was about to die, I cer-

tainly would have talked to McCone about it.

And this never was that clear, I am sorry to

say,

but it never was, not at that time.

7/17/75, P. 34)

On May 7, 1962, Edwards and the CIA's General Counsel,

Lawrence Houston, briefed Attorney General Robert Kennedy on •

the operation involving underworld figures, describing it as

terminated.*

Harvey told the Inspector General that:

on 14 May he briefed Helms on the meet -

by Edwards.

states that Helms concurred in this. (I.G.,

p. 65)

Harvey testified that what he had probably told Helms was that:

Any briefing of the Director on the discussion

with the Attorney General concerning this

should come from.Colonel Edwards and Larry

Houston, the General Counsel, and not from

DDP unless we are asked. (Harvey, 6/25/75,

p. 99)

Helms testified that he did not recall this conversation and

remarked:

It seems odd to me only because, if the Attorney

General had been briefed on something it would

seem very logical that it would be very important

to brief the Director at that time on the same

thing. (Helms, 6/13/75, P. 107)

*The briefing is exhaustively described supra

at

p.

According to the Inspector General's Report, Harvey and

Roselli had a farewell dinner before Harvey went on an assign-

ment to Rome in June 1963.

The meeting was observed by the FBI,

and Sam Papich; the FBI liaison with the CIA, notified Harvey

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Harvey supplied poison pills and weapons to Roselli

and his Cuban associates during a trip to Miami in April, 1962.*

At a Special Group meeting on April 26, General Taylor requested

that Harvey "attend the next meeting and report on agent

activities". (Memo, McCone, 4/26/62). On April 26, Harvey

was sent a memorandum informing him of General Taylor's request

and McCone's wish to meet with Harvey and Lansdale "immediately

on your return to discuss. the Task Force Activities." (Memoran-

dum, Elder to Harvey, 4/27/62) .

Harvey testified that upon his return, he reported

to the Special Group on the "status of the active and potential

sources inside Cuba..."

Q.:

"Did you report on the passage of the pills to Roselli?

Harvey: No, I did not.

Q.: Which you had just accomplished in Miami. ..for

the purpose of assassinating Fidel Castro.

Harvey: No.

Q.: And did you report that to Mr. McCone when he asked

you to tell him what you had done in Miami?

Harvey: No, I did not." (Harvey, 7/11, pp. 16-17.)

that Hoover would be informed. Harvey asked Papich to cäll him

if he felt that Hoover would inform the Director about the incident.

"Harvey said that he then told Mr. Helms of the incident

and that Helms agreed that there was no need to brief

McCone unless a call from Hoover was expected. (I.G.,

p. 54.)

* Harvey described the trip to Miami as

257-

"one of a number of periodic trips for the purpose of

reviewing in toto:

Miami

base.

the actual and potential operations at the

and this covered the whole gamut from personnel

administration, operational support in the way of small craft (and)

so on. . .

" (Harvey, 7/11, PP. 15-16).

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Harvey stated that he did not tell McCone or the Special GrouD

about the operation at that time because:

"I did not consider either, A, that this should be in any

sense in this amorphous stage, surfaced to the Special Group,

nor; as I have attempted to explain before that it should be

briefed to John McCone at that point in the state that it was

Accome at cha

in with as little as we knew about it, and with all of the at-

tendant. background which at that point, and I was not personal-

ly cognizant of all of this, had been going on for approximate-

ly, as I recall, two to two-and-a-half years." (Harvey, 7/11,

p. 18.)

Harvey attended an August 10, 1962 meeting of the

Special Group Augmented.* He testified that a person [Robert

McNamaral at that meeting suggested that the Special Group "consider

the elimination or assassination

of Fidel" (Harvey, 7/11; p. 30) .

Harvey then testified that on the day following this Special Group

meeting (Harvey, 6/25, P. 71):

"in connection with a morning briefing of John McCone, the

question again came up and I expressed some opinion as to

the inappropriateness of this having been raised in this

form and at that forum (Special Group meeting], at which

point Mr. McCone stated in substance that he agreed and

also that he had felt so strongly that he had, I believe,

the preceding afternoon or evening, personally called the

The Cas

gentleman who made the proposal or suggestion and had stated

similar views as to the inappropriateness and that he [Mc-

should he Conel said in addition : ..

• if I got myself involved in some-

askering like this, I might end up getting myself ex-communicated."

hore

Harvey stated that he did not tell McCone on that occasion about

the actual assassination operation involving Roselli. He said

(Harvey, 6/25, p. 73) :

*This meeting and the raising of the suggestion of assassina-

• tion is discussed in depth in part

_ infra.

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"I would like to recast the time that this took place. This

was August of '62:

This was at the start of the so-called

Missile Crisis. •

...

"A tentative decision had been made at that point that

the only sensible thing to do with [the Roselli operation]

was to terminate it as rapidly and cleanly as it could be

done

... I am sure that I had discussed with Roselli, at

least on a tentative basis, by August, the probable neces-

sity of terminating this

According to the Inspector General's Report, the "medicine" was

reported to be still in Cuba at this time. (I:G., pp. 51-52)

Harvey testified that the Report was referring to the pills

(Harvey, 6/25, P. 105).*

In relation to the August 10 meeting, Helms was asked whether

he believed McCone would have stopped an assassination attempt if

he had known that one was underway. Helms stated:

Mr. Helms: "The reason I say I don't know . . . is that

elsewhere Mr. McCone states that he went to see Mr. Mc-

Namara in connection with this August 1962 affair and told

Mr. McNamara that he wouldn't have anything to do with

this, that I have no recollection that I don't believe he

ever

said anything to me about his not wanting to have any-

thing to do with it.

Q.: "And you were close to Mr. McCone in that period? You

are his Deputy for Plans?

Mr. Helms: "I saw him almost daily.

Q.: "And is it your belief that if he had made any such

statement to Mr. McNamara that he would have come to you

and told you about it at some point?

Mr. Helms: "I just don't know why he didn't but I don't re-

call any

such statement.

As I said, and I would like to

repeat it, Mr. McCone had given me my job, he had promoted

me,

I felt close to him, I felt loyal to him, and I would

not have violated an instruction he gave me if I could have

possibly helped it.

*Harvey said:

"I may have deferred for a period of a few weeks giving

an actual order to terminate this as soon as possible,

(Harvey, 6/25, p. 74).

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O.: "But in any event, it is your judgment that he did not

indicate that he was opposed to assassinations?

Mr. Helms: "Not to me."

Walter Elder, who served as McCone's Executive Assistant, testified,

however, that he had personally told Helms of McCone's opposition

to assassination after the August 10 meeting.*

(iv) The August 1963 Briefing of McCone

An August 16, 1963, Chicago Sun Times article claimed

that the CIA had had a connection with Giancana.** McCone asked

Helms for a report about the article. McCone testified that when

Helms came to see him, he brought the following memorandum:

"1. Attached is the only copy in the Agency of a memorandum

on subject, the ribbon copy of which was sent to the Attorney

General in

May of 1962.

I was vaguely aware of the existence

of such a memorandum since I was informed that it had been

written

as a result of a briefing given by Colonel Edwards and

Lawrence Houston to the Attorney General

- in May of last year.

"2.

I spoke with Colonel Edwards on the telephone last evening,

and, in

the

absence of Mr. Bannerman on leave, I was with Colo-

nel Edwards'

assistance able to locate this copy. As far as I

*Elder told the Committee:

"I told Mr. Helms that Mr. McCone had expressed his feeling

• that

assassination could not be condoned and would not

be approved.

that it would be unthinkable to record in writing any consid-

eration of assassination because it left the impression that

the subject had received serious consideration by governmental

policy makers, which it had not. Mr. Helms responded,

derstand'

The point is that I made Mr. Helms aware of the

strength of Mr. McCone's opposition to assassination. I know

that Mr. Helms could not have been under any misapprehension

about Mr. McCone's feelings after this conversation.'

(Elder

Affidavit.)

**The 8/16/63 Chicago Sun Times article states that "Justice

Department sources" believed that Giancana never did any s the

for the CIA, but pretended to go along with the Agency

hopes that the Justice Department's drive to put him behind bars

might be slowed - or at least affected - by his ruse of coopera-

tion with another government agency."

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am aware,

this is the only written information available on

Agency relationships with subject. I hope that this will

serve your purpose.

"3.

I assume you are aware of the nature of the operation

discussed in the attachment."

(Memorandum to Director of

Central Intelligence, re: Sam Giancana, from Helms, 8/16/63.)*

That memorandum attached the May 14, 1962, memorandum to Attorney

General Kennedy from Sheffield Edwards which described the opera-

tion as

having been terminated before McCone became DCI: (See

discussion, infra, p.

Neither McCone nor Helms were able to remember what was said

at the meeting. Walter Elder, who was then McCone's Executive As-

sistant, recalled:

"Mr. Helms came in with (the memorandum]. He handed it to

[McCone] who read it and .

handed it back without any

particular comment other

than

to say, 'Well, this did not

happen during my tenure.'"

Q.: "Was anything else said?

A.: "No, he had very little to say about it.

Q.: "Did Mr. Helms then leave?

A.: "Mr. Helms left." (Elder, PP. 16-17, 57-59.)

Elder testified that he had concluded that the operation in-

volved assassination from reading the two memoranda that were given

to McCone (Elder, 8/13, p. 60). Elder "further concluded that IMc-

Conel was perfectly aware of what Mr. Helms was trying to say to

*When asked whether this entry in the memorandum suggested that

he had previously been aware of the operation, McCone testified that

Helms had orally informed him

I "on that day in August" that it in-

volved assassination (McCone, p. 9) .

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him' (Elder, p. 60): Elder further testified:

Q.: "Other than that conversation that you just described

between yourself and Mr. McCone, did he have anything else

to say about that memorandum?

Mr. Elder:

"No."

Q.:

"I take it then he did not tell either you or Mr. Helms

that we absolutely could not have this activity going on in

• the future?

Mr. Elder: "No."

The Inspector General's Report concladed that :

"This is the earliest date on which we have evidence

of Mr. McCone's being aware of any aspect of the

scheme to assassinate Castro using members of the

gambling syndicate." (I.G., p. 70).

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11/0

rai

Based on

Subcommittee

Meeting, 8/29/75

(b) The Question of Authorization Outside The Central Intelli-

gence Agency In The Eisenhower Administration.

1. Summary

As discussed in the preceding section, the evidence as to whether

Allen Dulles, CIA Director during the Eisenhower Administration, was

informed of the Castro assassination operation is not clear.

Even assuming that Dulles was so informed, authorization outside

•the CIA for a Castro assassination could, according to the testimony,

only have come from President Eisenhower, from someone speaking for him,.

or from the Special Group.* At issue, therefore, is whether President

Eisenhower, his close aides, or the Special Group authorized or had knowledge

of the Castro assassination plots:

In addition to Bissell, we took considerable testimony from

President Eisenhower's principal staff assistants, Gordon Gray (Special

Assistant for National Security Affairs and President Eisenhower's

representative on the Special Group); General Andrew Goodpaster (Staff

Secretary to President Eisenhower with particular responsibility for

* With respect to then Vice President

Nixon, Bissell testified--and he

was supported by the principal White House assistants and the documents--

that Nixon was not significantly involved in Cuban matters generally at

the critical

times.

There is no evidence suggesting his knowledge of the

'astro assassination effort during the period under review, significant.

parts of which occurred during the Presidential campaign.

(Bissell

; Gray, 7/9, p. 39). Therefore, we concluded that, despite the

indications in Nixon's book My Six Crises (p.

) that he was involved

in Cuban matters generally--and Howard Hunt's characterization of him as

the laction officer for the Bay of Pigs, there was insufficient reason

to examine Mr. Nixon on Cuba looked at alone.

We came to a contrary

conclusion on Chile and . . . .

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2

national security operational matters); John Eisenhower (Assistant Staff

Secretary and the President's son) and from Thomas Parrott (Secretary

to the Special Group and special assistant to. Allen Dulles). In summary,

the evidence was:

(i) Bissell testified that he did not inform the Special Group

or President Eisenhower of the Castro assassination operation, and he

had no personal knowledge that Allen Dulles informed either President

Eisenhower or the Special Group. However, Bissell expressed the belief

that Allen Dulles would have advised President Eisenhower (but not the

Special Group) in a "circumlocutious" or "oblique" way. Bissell based

this "pure personal opinion" on his understanding of Dulles' practice

with respect to other particularly sensitive covert operations. But

Bissell testified that Dulles never told him that he had so advised

President Eisenhower regarding the Castro assassination operation, even

though Dulles had told Bissell when he had employed this "circumlocutious"

approach to the President on certain other occasions.

(ii) Gordon Gray testified that the Special Group never approved

a Castro assassination, and that President Eisenhower had charged the

Special Group with the responsibility of authorizing all important covert

operations. A review of the records of Special Group meetings shows that

a query concerning a plan to take "direct positive action" against Castro

at a Special Group meeting caused Allen Dulles' Deputy, General Cabell,

to advise that such action was beyond the CIA's capability. Gray,

Goodpaster and John Eisenhower all affirmed (i) that they did not believe

President Eisenhower would have considered such a matter in a private

TOP

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3

meeting with Dulles, or indeed that President Eisenhower would have approved

a Castro assassination in any event, and (ii) that he would not have dis-

cussed

such a matter without telling them. They conclude, therefore, as a

matter of opinion, that President Eisenhower was never told, and testify,

as a matter of fact, that they never heard anything about any assassination

at any time.

(iii) In addition to the I.G. Report (which found that the CIA could

not say that any assassination activity carried on during this period was Lu mumBa

responsive to Administration pressure), the documentary evidence showed that

the subject of Castro's removal was discussed at two meetings of the National What

Security Council and the Special Group in March 1960. The minutes of these

meetings indicated that the discussions were in the context of a general con-

SAr

sideration of the proposal to train a Cuban exile force for an invasion of

Cuba and an assessment that Castro's overthrow might result in a Communist

T

apporte

takeover. Gray and Admiral Burke testified that the discussion of Castro's

removal at these meetings did not refer to assassination, but rather to the

problem of creating

an anti-Castro exile force strong enough to insure a non-

Communist successor to the Castro regime. In any event, no action was shown

to have stemmed from those meetings. An additional Special Group document

showed that when a question regarding planning for "direct positive action"

• against Cuban leaders was raised at a meeting in the Fall of 1960 (shortly

after Phase I of the CIA/underworld assassination operation was initiated),

the Deputy Director of the CIA told the Special Group that such action was

beyond the CIA's capability.

OP SECRET

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2. Richard Bissell's Testimony

IUY ShORE!

(a) Lack of Persoral Knowledge. Bissell testified that he knew

nothing of clearances outside the CIA for the Castro assassination effort.

(Bissell, 6/9, p. 30). Indeed, Bissell met frequently with the Special

Group in the Fall of 1960 for the purpose of discussing Cuban operations,

but never informed the Special Group that there was a plot underway involving

use of underworld figures to assassinate Castro, (Bissell, 6/9, pp. 25-26) ;

nor did Bissell inform President Eisenhower or Vice President Nixon or any

other person outside the CIA (Bissell, 6/9, pp. 26-29). Bissell testified

that his

reason for not doing so was that as Deputy Director of Plans, he

reported to the Director and under Agency procedures relied upon the Director

to inform

the appropriate persons outside the Agency. Thus, the question of

President Eisenhower's knowledge rests on whether Allen Dulles personally

informed him of the Castro plot.

(b) Assumptions Concerning Dulles. Based upon his belief that

Dulles had been briefed about the operation involving underworld figures

and understood that it involved assassination, Bissell assumed that Allen

Dulles would have sought authorization above the CIA level. As Bissell

testified:

"I went on the assumption that, in a matter of this sensitivity,

the Director would handle higher level clearances.

By clearance

I mean authorization."*

(Bissell, 6/9, p. 26.) */

*Bissell reiterated this view on his second day of testimony: "

... I

felt that the responsibility for obtaining necessary authorization should

remain with the Director."

(Bissell, 6/11, p. 4)

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5

Bissell further stated that although he believed that Dulles

"probably" talked with President Eisenhower:

"the Mafia operation was not regarded as of enormous importance

and there were much more important matters to talk about with

the President."

(Bissell, 7/17, p. 25.)

Bissell said he was

"guessing" that Dulles informed Eisenhower.

(Bissell 7/17, pp. 38-39.) He said, however, that he based his assumption

on his knowledge of "command relationship, of Allen Dulles as an individual,

and of his (Dulles'] mode of operations". (Bissell, 6/11, p. 6.) As

Bissell explained, his guess that Dulles informed President Eisenhower "is

not based on hard evidence" but is "pure personal opinion". (Bissell,

6/9, p. 61.) Nevertheless, he believed it to be so, and that the Presi-

dent thereupon gave his authorization "perhaps only tacitly". (Bissell,

6/11, p. 6.) As Bissell explained,

"My guess is that indeed whoever informed him, that is Dulles

directly or Dulles through a staff member, would have had the

same desire... to shield the President and to shield him in

the sense of intimating or making clear that something of the

sort was going forward, but giving the President as little in-

formation about it as possible, and the purpose of it would have

been to give the President an opportunity, if he so elected, to

cancel it, to order it cancelled, or to allow it to continue but

without, in effect, extracting from him an explicit endorsement

of the detailed specific plan." (Bissell, 6/9, p. 61)

TOP SE

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6

Bissell said circumlocution would have been used "to protect

the President" in accord with the concept of "plausible deniability".*

As noted

above, Bissell testified he had no personal knowledge

that Dulles informed President Eisenhower of the Castro plot. On other

specific occasions involving sensitive covert operations, Dulles had told

Bissell he had used the "circumlocutious" approach with President

Eisenhower. (Bissell, 6/11, p. 10.) But with respect to the Castro

assassination attempt, Dulles did not so inform Bissell. (Bissell, 6/11,

p. 11.) As Bissell testified:

"I still want to be quite clear, I do not have a recollection of the

Director telling me that on this specific operation he had made

such an approach and received assent, approval, tacit or otherwise."

(Bissell, 6/11, p. 11.)

As to whether Dulles knew of the plots and informed Eisenhower, we

have discussed above the fact that in January 1960 Dulles had told the Special

disasha

rose

or.p55

That

N.T59

Group that the CIA "did not have in mind a quick elimination of Castro."

(Memorandum of Special Group meeting, January 13, 1960, P._). And in July

1960 an Instruction by Bissell's deputy to attempt to kill Raul Castro, which

also stated that "possible removal of top three leaders is

receiving serious

consideration at headquarters" had been countermanded. The CIA officer

who drafted this instruction testified that he had heard at the time that

It was Dulles who countermanded this instruction and in doing so had "indicated

that assassination was not to be considered

(Hinkle, p. 29).

* Bissell explained the "plausible deniability" practice as follows:

"Any covert operations, but especially covert operations . . . that

if successful, would have very visible consequences, it was of course

an objective to carry out in such a way that they could be plausibly

disclaimed by the U.S. Government."

(Bissell, 6/11; p. 5:)

Bissell

apparently assumed that a corollary to that doctrine required the

use of "oblique".

"circumlocutious" language.

1 Wh

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(iii) White House Officials Denied Knowledge of Assassination

Efforts and Gave the Opinion that President Eisenhower Was Not Informed.

1. Gordon Gray. Gordon Gray served as President Eisenhower's

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs from July 1958 to

end of the Eisenhower Administration on January 20, 1961. (Gray, p. 4.)

In this capacity, Gray served as the President's representative on the

Special Group. (Gray, p. 4.) President Eisenhower specifically instructed

Gray that all covert actions impinging on the sovereignty of another

country must be deliberated by the Special Group. (Gray, p. 6.) Gray

testified that during the period July 1958 to January 20, 1961, the

Special Group never approved an action to assassinate Castro (Gray, p. 6)

and no such suggestion was made by Bissell. (Gray, p. 37.)

Gray testified he did not believe Allen Dulles would have

approached President Eisenhower without informing Gray. Gray stated:

"I find it very difficult to believe, and I do not believe, that

Mr. Dulles would have gone independently to him with such a

proposal without, for that matter, my knowing about it from Mr.

Dulles."

(Gray, p. 35.) *

7

*Gray pointed out

"that I was not with President Eisenhower twenty-

four hours a day. It was a few minutes every day, practically every day."

(Gray, p. 35.)

According to the records of the Eisenhower Library, Dulles was alone

with President Eisenhower on one occasion in the Fall of 1960. That

meeting lasted ten minutes on November 25, 1960. The record of the

previous portion of the meeting attended by Gray indicates only that, in

addition to discussion of operations in another country, "there was also

some discussion of Cuba"

• (Memorandum, November 28, 1960, by Gordon Gray,

of Meeting with the President, November 25, 1960 at 10:40 A.M.). We feel

compelled to state that the fact of this brief meeting, on the evidence

available, is of little, if any, significance or relevance.

1OP SECRET

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Gray further testified that his relationship with President

Eisenhower was

such that President Eisenhower "would discuss with me any-

thing that came to his attention independently of me.": (Gray, p. 7.)

And Gray testified that President Eisenhower never discussed with him the

subject of a Castro assassination or of the use of the underworld figures

and Cubans in such

an effort. (Gray, p..7.)

2. Andrew Goodpaster. Goodpaster served as President Eisenhower's

Staff Secretary and Defense Liaison Officer during the last two years of

the Eisenhower Administration. (Goodpaster, F. 3.) In addition to responsi-

bility for the President's schedule and the supervision of the White House

staff, Goodpaster was responsible for handling with the President "all

matters of day to day operations" in the foreign affairs and national

security field, including the activities of the CIA and the Departments

of State and Defense. (Goodpaster, p. 3.) Goodpaster

testified that he

had a "very close personal relationship" with President Eisenhower and

saw the President "essentially every day when [President Eisenhower) was

in Washington (Goodpaster, p. 4). Along with Gordon Gray, Goodpaster

served

as the channel between the CIA and the President. Goodpaster was

the particular channel for "operations in which [President Eisenhower]

might take a personal part". (Goodpaster, p. 4.)

Goodpaster testified that he never heard any mention of assas-

ination efforts. (Goodpaster, p. 5.) He said that President Eisenhower

never told him about any

assassination effort and that

it was his belief,

under White House procedures and by virtue of his close relationship with

President Eisenhower, that if an assassination plan or operation had ever.

been raised with the President, he would have learned of it. (Goodpaster,

p. 5.)

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Beyond this General Goodpaster testified that he found Bissell's

assumption of a "circumlocutious" personal conversation between Dulles and

the President "completely unlikely".

"That was simply not the President's way of doing business. He

had made it very clear to us how he wanted to handle matters of

this kind, and we had set up procedures to see that they were then

handled that way."

(Goodpaster, pp. 6-7)

According to Goodpaster, after the collapse of the Paris Summit

Conference between President Eisenhower and Premier Khruscher as a result

of the U-2 incident in the Spring of 1960, the Eisenhower Administration

reviewed its

procedures for approval of CIA operations and tightened them.

General Goodpaster testified that this review was carried out

"with the aim in mind of being sure we had full and explicit under-

standing of any proposals that came to us and we knew from

[President Eisenhower] that in doing that we were responsive.to

a desire on his part." (Goodpaster, p. T.)

Secondly, according to Goodpaster, the relationship between

President Eisenhower and Allen Dulles was quite different from that

• between the President and John Foster Dulles. He said John Foster Dulles

was a confidant of the President while Allen Dulles was not. (Goodpaster,

p. 8.)

3. Thomas Parrott. Thomas Parrott, a CIA officer, served as

Secretary of the Special Group from 1957 through the end of the Eisenhower

Administration (and thereafter until October 1963). (Parrott, p. 4.)

Parrott stated that, by virtue of this assignment, he functioned. as Allen

Dulles' assistant in connection with the Special Group, knew Dulles well,

and gained an understanding of Dulles' method of expression and his

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10

practice for dealing with the President. (Parrott, pp. 13-14.)*

Parcott testified that early in 1959, President Eisenhower

directed the Special Group to meet at least once a week to consider, approve,

or reject all significant covert action operations (Parrott, p. 4.)

Parrott testified it would have been "highly unlikely" for President

Eisenhower to have instructed the CIA to carry out a covert operation

without informing the Special Group. Parrott testified:

"as evidenced in his

revitalization

• of this Committee

[the Special Group], (President Eisenhower was highly conscious of

the necessity to be protective... in this field, and I just

cannot conceive that [President Eisenhower] would have gone off and

mounted some kind of covert operation on his own. This certainly

would not have been consistent with President Eisenhower's staff

method of doing business . . .

"** (Parrott, p. 7.)

4. John Eisenhower. John Eisenhower, President Eisenhower's

son, served in Goodpaster's office as Assistant Staff Secretary from mid-

1958 to the end of the Eisenhower Administration. (Eisenhower, pp. 5, 9)

He testified that his father had confided secret matters in him "to a very

large extent". (Eisenhower, p. 3.) For example, he said that after the

Potsdam Conference in July 1945, then Gen. Eisenhower told him that the

United States had developed the atomic bomb at a time when this was highly

* Parrott testified:

"I saw him (Allen Dulles] several times a week for hours at a time.

I had known him somewhat before .

• but I got to know him very

well indeed during these four years." (Parrott, p. 13.)

* * Parrott further testified that Allen Dulles followed a practice of

insisting upon specific orders rather than "tacit approval" and he also.

found Bissell's assumptions regarding a circumlocutious conversation

between President Eisenhower and Allen Dulles "hard to believe".

re

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Adas Li

secret information.

(Eisenhower, p. 3.) And he said that as early as

1956, President Eisenhower told him of the secret U-2 flights. (Eisenhower,

p. 4.)

; )

John Eisenhower testified, as a matter of fact, that President

Eisenhower never told him of any CIA activity involving an assassination

plan or attempt with respect to Castro. (Eisenhower, p. 5.) Based on

his father's practice

in other matters, it was his opinion that President

Eisenhower would have told him if the President had known of any such

activity. (Eisenhower, p. 5.) He further testified that President Eisenhower

did not deal with important subjects in a circumlocutious manner. (Eisenhower, p. 8.)

John Eisenhower further testified that it was his father's belief that

no leader was indispensable, and thus

assassination was not an alternative

in the conduct of foreign policy. (Eisenhower, p. 14.)

(iv) The Documents

I. The Inspector General's Report

The document latest in date which bears upon the issue of

authorization for Phase I of the Castro assassination efforts is the 1967

Inspector General's Report. In the concluding section of the Report to

Director Helms, the authors

advanced several possible Agency responses to

Drew Pearson's public charges regarding CIA/underworld links.*

One of the

* On March 3, 1967, Drew Pearson stated in his newspaper column that

there was a U.S. "plot" to assassinate Castro, and that

"one version

claims that underworld figures actually were recruited to carry out the

plot." (Pearson, Washington Merry Go-Round, March 3, 1967)

..,

TOU CA

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questions they asked was whether the Agency could say it was acting pur-

suant to Government policy -- or as they put the question: "Can CIA state

or imply that

it was merely an instrument of policy?" The answer given

was:

12

"Not in this case. While it is true that Phase Two (the

attempt commencing in April 1962) was carried out in an

atmosphere of intense Kennedy Administration pressure to

do something about Castro, such is not true of the earlier

phase." (I.G., p. 132).

In addition to the I.G. Report, we examined the records of the National

Security Council and the Special Group, as well as other relevant White House

files bearing on the question of authorization for the period from

Castro's rise to power to the end of the Eisenhower Administration. As we

discuss below, three documents were found which contained references arguably

related to the subject of assassination.

2.

The Contemporaneous Documents

In March 1960, the National Security Council and the Special

Group focused on Cuban policy. President Eisenhower had just returned from

& foreign trip in which

"Latin American Presidents had counseled further forbearance

by the U.S. in the hope that the members of the Organization

Of American States would finally see the potential danger in

Cuba and take concerted action."

(Gray, Ex. 2, Memorandum of

March 10, 1960 NSC Meeting, p. 8).

Castro was characterized as hostile, but his Communist ties were apparently

then unclear.

Indeed, it may have been the prevailing opinion, at that time,

that Castro was not actually a Communist.*

For it was stated in the minutes

of the March 10, 1960 NSC meeting:

"there is no apparent alternative to the present government in

the event Castro disappears.

Indeed the result of Castro's dis-

appearance might be a Communist takeover." (Gray, Ex. 2, p. 7).

* Castro apparently first announced publicly that he was a "Marxist-Lenist"

on December 2, 1961.

(David Larson, Cuba Crisis of 1962, p. 304):

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79k1

Out of these March 1960 meetings of the NSC and Special Group came

the general covert action plan against Cuba.*

Against this background of general discussions of Cuba, we con-.

sidered

certain remarks appearing in the records of a March 10, 1960 National

Security Council meeting and a March 14, 1960 Special Group meeting.

The record of the NSC meeting of March 10, 1960 (at which President

Eisenhower was present) states that Admiral Arleigh Burke, in commenting on

Allen Dulles' statement that the Cuba covert action plan was in preparation,

"suggested that any plan for the removal of Cuban leaders should be a package

deal, since many of the Cuban leaders around fastro were even worse than Castro."

(Gray Ex. 2, p. 9). And, according to the minutes of a Special Group meeting

on March I4, 1960 (which President Eisenhower did not attend) "there was a

general discussion as to what would be the effect on the Cuban scene if Fidel

and Raul Castro and Che Guevara should disappear simultaneously." (Gray Ex. 3,

p. 2).

Admiral Burke, who served as Chief of Naval Operations from 1955 to

1961, stated in an affidavit** that although he did not have a specific recollec-

tion of the March 10, 1960 meeting of the National Security Council, he had a

clear recollection of the discussions of Cuba policy that took place in the

spring of 1960. (Burke affidavit, p. 1). Burke stated that the reference to

the suggestion by him at the March 10, 1960 meeting "clearly refers to the

*

As Gray testified, this plan covered four areas: sabotage, economic sanc-

tions, propaganda, and training of a Cuban exile force for a possible invasion.

Gray stated that this plan had nothing to do with assassination. (Gray, 7/9/75,

p. 17).

**

Admiral Burke was unable to testify in person before the Committee

because he was in the hospital:

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general covert

action plan reported by Allen Dulles at that meeting and to

the general consideration given at that time in the U. S. Government to

identify Cuban groups with which the U.S. might work to overthrow the Castro

regime." (Burke affidavit, p. 1). Burke stated:

"In this connection, it was my view that the U.s. must support

those Cuban groups who would have a sufficient power base among

the Cuban people, not merely to overthrow Castro, but to be

able to cope with and dismantle his organization

as well. It

was my firm belief at the time that many people in Castro's

organization were Communist and that Castro was probably a

Communist. I therefore advocated that any effort to support

groups so as to achieve Castro's overthrow must focus, not

merely on the leaders at the top of the Castro regime, but on

the very strong organization that had been the key to Castro's

rise to power, and was the basis for his power." (Burke affidavit,

p. 1-2).*

14

Burke stated further:

"The question of a Castro assassination never arose at the March 10,

1960 NSC meeting or at any other meeting or discussion that I

attended or in which I participated.

It is my firm conviction

based on five years of close association with President Eisenhower

during my service as Chief of Naval Operations, that President

Eisenhower would never have tolerated such a discussion,

or

have permitted anyone to propose assassination, nor would he

have ever authorized, condoned, or permitted an assassination

attempt." (Burke affidavit, p. 2) .

Gray testified that the discussion at the March 10 and March 14,

1960 meetings dealt with plans to overthrow the Castro government, rather than

to assassinate Castro himself. He said that Admiral Burke's recorded comment

at the March 10, 1960 NSC meeting was part of a lengthy and general discussion

of the problem of Cuba. At the outset of that discussion, it was Under Secretary

of State Douglas Dillon who pointed out that "the result of Castro's disappearance

might be a Communist takeover." (Gray Ex. 2, P. T; Gray, p. 11). And

,=..

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Admiral Burke's reference to a "package deal" for the removal of Cuban

leaders was in direct response to &. comment by Allen Dulles recorded in

the minutes that "a plan to affect the situation in Cuba was being worked

on." (Gray Ex. 2, P. 9; Gray pp. 13-14). Gray said he believed that

Mr. Dulles "was certainly referring to" the Eisenhower Administration's

plan to train Cuban exiles for an invasion, rather than a targeted attempt

on Castro's life.*/ (Gray pp. 14, 45). Gray testified that viewing Admiral

Burke's remarks in context, he believed it was clear that "Admiral

15

ow.n

why

win.

A CIA memorandum of an internal CIA meeting (Memorandum of First

Meeting of Branch 4 Task Force, March 9, 1960), shows that the first

meeting of the CIA task force established to plan the training of a

Cuban exile force

was held on March 9, 1960, the day before the March

10, 1960 NSC meeting: (Memorandum of First Meeting of Branch 4 Task

Force, March 9, 1960). At that March 9, 1960, CIA meeting, the CIA

task force discussed "an operation directed at the overthrow of the

Castro regime" and described that operation as one: in which a Cuban

exile force would be trained for "6~7 months." In the discussion of

this operation, it was noted that a principal problem was the weakness

of the Cuban exile groups which "had no real leader and are divided

into many parts," but it was hoped that during the long training

period the

"opposition groups will have been merged and will have formed

a government-in-exile to which all trained elements could be attached."

(Id., p. 2).

According to the memorandum of the meeting,

chief of the CIA's Western Hemisphere division

J. C. King, had stated, "unless Fidel and Raul Castro and Che Guevara could

be eliminated in onepackage - which is highly unlikely - this operation

can be a long, drawn-out affair and the present government will only be

overthrown by the use of force."

(Id., p. 1).

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Burke….. was expressing his opinion that if you have any plan /for the

overthrow of Castro/ it ought to take these factors into consideration, that

you might end up with a Communist government." (Gray, p. 45).

With respect to the March 14, 1960 Special Group meeting, Admiral

Burke stated that the "general discussion" referred to in the record of that

meeting 'clearly did not involve a discussion of assassination of Cuban leaders,

but to the possible effects should only those leaders be overthrown by a group

not powerful enough to also master the organization those leaders had established

in Cuba." (Burke affidavit, p. 2) Burke stated further:

"Thus, it was consistent with my views then that I should have

been recorded in the record of the March 14 meeting as warning

in this discussion that the Communists might move into control

even if these three top leaders should be overthrown. As stated

above, I strongly believed that a strong, organized group must

be in the forefront of any effort to overthrow the Castro

government."

(Burke affidavit, p. 2).

In any event, when a question "whether any real planning had been

done for taking direct positive action against Fidel, Raul and Che Guevara"

was subsequently asked at a Special Group meeting on November 3, 1960, the

Deputy Director of the CIA, General Cabell, according to the record of that

meeting, pointed

out

"that action of this kind is uncertain of results and highly

dangerous in conception and execution, because the instruments

must be Cubans.

He felt that, particularly because of the

necessity for simultaneous action, it would have to be concluded

that (such action) is beyond our capabilities."

(Gray Ex. 1, P. 3).

• * The record of the March 14 meeting states: "Admiral Burke said that the

only organized group within Cuba today were the Communists and there was therefore

the danger they might move into control." (Gray Ex. 3, p. 2)

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The reference to "direct positive action" is ambiguous and can

be subject to a number of different interpretations, including a

question suggesting exploration of assassination.*

However, it is clear

that at most a question was being asked. Moreover, assuming that "direct

positive action" meant killing, it is significant that shortly after assassi-

nation plots

were begun, the CIA Deputy Director told the Special Group that

such action was "beyond our capabilities."

*

Testimony varied as to the meaning of the phrase "direct positive action"

and General Cabell's response in the November 3, 1960 memorandum.

Gray testified that the phrase "direct pasitive action" could be taken

to include assassination, but he did not know whether Mr. Merchant intended

to refer to assassination or not. (Gray, 7/9, p. 9).

Parrott, the author of the memorandum, testified that, although he had

no recollection of the November 3, 1960 meeting, it was his opinion, based

on the context of weekly Special Group meetings and discussion in the Fall of

1960, that this discussion centered on the possibility of a palace coup, as

opposed to a paramilitary operation mounted from outside Cuba; General Cabell

was indicating that "we simply do not have agents inside of Cuba to carry out

this kind" of a coup. (Parrott, pp. 19-21) Parrott also testified that the

phrase "direct positive action" was not a euphemism, and that he did not

employ euphemisms in Special Group records, except for references to the

President. (Parrott, pp. 19-21). We discuss in greater detail at pp.

_ other ambiguous phrases in minutes and memoranda drafted by

Bissell testified that he found it "difficult to understand" that General

vrieting

Cabell would have told the Special Group

that it was beyond the CIA's capa-

bilities to take "direct positive action" (if that referred to assassination)

in light of Bissell's assumption that General Cabell was informed of the CIA/

underworld assassination effort. (Bissell, 7/17, pp. 15-18).

Mr. Merchant was unable to testify because of ill health and orders of

his physician.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

c. THE QUESTION OF AUTHORIZATION DURING THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION

(i) PRE-BAY OF PIGS ASSASSINATION PLOTS

a. BISSELL WAS OF THE, OPINION THAT DULLES HAD INFORMED

PRESIDENT KENNEDY THAT THE ASSASSINATION OPERATION HAD

BEEN PLANNED AND WAS BEING ATTEMPTED --

b. BISSELL TESTIFIED HE DID NOT INFORM THE PRESIDENT

WHTTE HOUSE OFFICIALS OF THE ONGOING ASSASSINATION

OR

PLOTS --

c.

KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS DENIED KNOWLEDGE OF

ASSASSINATION EFFORTS AND GAVE OPINION THAT PRESIDENT

KENNEDY WAS NOT INFORMED

d.

THE QUESTION OF WHETHER ASSASSINATION EFFORTS WERE

DISCLOSED IN VARIOUS BRIEFINGS OF ADMINISTRATION

OFFICIALS --

(i) BRIEFING OF THE PRESIDENT-ELECT

(ií) DISCUSSION WITH BUNDY ON "EXECUTIVE ACTION

CAPABILTTY"T

e.

(iii) TAYLOR/KENNEDY BAY OF PIGS INQUIRY

(IV) MEMORANDUM TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

CONVERSATION BETWEEN PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND

GEORGE SMATHERS

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LUKATING SUBLUM IDE)

8/29/75

c. THE QUESTION OF AUTHORIZATION DURING THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION

The evidence on the issue of whether or not assassination plots were

authorized during the Kennedy Administration is divided herein into two

broad sections.

The first primarily relates to the assassination operation

involving underworld figures and occurring prior to the Bay of Pigs invasion

of April, 1961.. The second section deals with the Post-Bay of Pigs period,

including the Roselli operation in the spring of 1962, Operation Mongoose, the

laboratory schemes in early 1963, and the AM/LASH plot in the fall of 1963.

(i) PRE-BAY OF PIGS ASSASSINATION PLOTS

The pattern of testimony for this period was essentially the same

as for the Eisenhower Administration. Bissell, once again, said he assumed

and believed that Dulles had met with President Kennedy and informed him, in

a circumlocutious fashion, that the operation had been planned and was being

attempted. Bissell also testified that he (Bissell) did not inform the

President about the assassination efforts or any of the other non-CIA persons with

whom he was working on covert Cuban operations. The Kennedy Administration

officials all testified that they did not know about or authorize the plots.

Furthermore, they said they did not believe the President did or would authorize.

an assassination plot.

There were for this period no significant contemporaneous documents.

a. BISSELL WAS OF THE OPINION THAT DULLES HAD INFORMED PRESIDENT KENNEDY

IHAT THE ASSASSINATION OPERATION HAD BEEN PLANNED AND WAS BEING ATTEMPTEL

When John F. Kennedy became President in January, 1961, Richard Bissell

was still Deputy Director for Plans and the principal agency official respon-

sible for the ongoing efforts against the Castro regime, including both the

Bay of Pigs operation and the assassination plots. Bissell is the only sur-

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viving CIA policy maker with first hand knowledge of high-level decision-

making in the early phases of the Castro assassination efforts. Bissell

testified that he believed Allen Dulles had informed the President (although

Dulles did not so inform him) and that accordingly the plots had been approved

by the highest authority. Bissell was questioned about how he felt the Pres-

ident would have been made aware of the plots:

"Senator Baker:

...You have no reason to think

that he (Dulles] didn't or he did [brief President

Kennedy]. But the question I put was whether or

not in the ordinary course of the operations of

the CIA as you know it under their traditions,

their rules and regulations, their policies as

you knew them what in your opinion -- [was the

President, President-elect briefed or was he in

the light of all these circumstances?

Bissell: I believe at some stage the President

and the President-elect both were advised that such

an operation had been planned and was being attempted.

Senator Baker: By whom?

Bissell: I would guess through some channel by

Allen Dulles.

The Chairman:

But you're guessing, aren't you?

Mr. Bissell: I am, Mr. Chairman, and I have said that

I cannot recollect the giving of such briefing at

the meeting with the President-elect in November or

in any meeting with President Eisenhower.".. (6/9/75,

pp. 38-39).

Bissell's testimony varied with respect to the force with which he stated

his belief that the President had been informed. Once he referred to it as

"a pure personal opinion" (Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 60-1); on another occasion he

testified as follows:

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"Senator Morgan: Mr. Bissell, it's a serious

matter to attribute knowledge of this sort to

the President of the U.S., especially one who

cannot speak for himself.

Is it fair to assume

that out of an abundance of caution you are simply

telling us that you have no knowledge unless you

are absolutely certain?...l gather that you think

..It (assassination plot intormation] came out

but because of the seriousness of the accusation

you are just being extremely cautious... is that

a fair assumption to make?

Bissell:

That is very close to a fair assumption,

sir.

It's just that I have no direct knowledge,

first-hand knowledge of his [President Kennedy's]

being advised, but my beliet is that he knew of It

(assassination plans]." (Bissell, 6/9, p. 56).

When asked why he had not himself informed White House officials or the

President of the assassination plots, Bissell said since Dulles was the DCI,

he "left the question of advising senior officials of the government and

obtaining clearances in Allen Dulles' hands" (Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 29, 33).

As with President Eisenhower, Bissell said that, based upon his testimony

that Dulles knew about the assassination plot, he "assumed" that Dulles

"had at least intimated [to President Kennedy]

that some such thing was underway."

(Bissell,

6/9/75, p. 33).*

* The Presidential logs from the Kennedy Administration indicate only one

meeting before the Bay of Pigs invasion at which the President and Allen Dulles

may have met privately. This meeting took place on March 25, 1961. (There is

no record of the meeting. We feel compelled to state that the fact of this

meeting, on the evidence available, is of little, if any significance or

relevance.

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Again as part of his "pure personal opinion'' (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 60)

that this was done, Bissell speculated that Dulles would have engaged in a

"circumlocutious" sort of conversation. (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 6), using

"rather general terms."

Bissell repeatedly coupled Eisenhower and Kennedy together when he

speculated about the manner in which he felt the Presidents would have been

advised to maintain "plausible deniability." (Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 38, 57; ,

6/11/75, pp. 5-6) :

"In the case of an operation of high sensitivity

of the sort that we are discussing, there was a

further objective that would have been pursued at.

various levels, and that was specifically with

respect to the President, to protect the President.

And, therefore, the way in which I believe that

Allen Dulles would have attempted to do that was to

have indicated to the two successive Presidents the

general objective of the operation that was contem-

plated, to make that sufficiently clear so that the

President -- either President Eisenhower or President

Kennedy - could have ordered the termination of the

peration, but to give the President just as little

information about it as possible beyond an under-

standing of its general purpose. Such an approach

to the President would have had as its purpose to

leave him in the position to deny knowledge of the

operation it it should surface.

"My belief -- a belief based, as I have said, only to

me knowledge of command relationship of Allen Dulles

as an individual, and of his mode of operations -- is

that authorization was obtained by him in the manner

that I have indicated.

I used the word on Monday

"circumlocutious," and it was to this approach that I

referred.

"Assuming for the moment that I am correct, since the

effort would have been to minimize the possibility of

embarrassment to the President, it is, I think, under-

standable that neither I nor anyone else in the Agency

would have discussed this operation on our own initiative

with, for instance, members of the White House staff.

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rage s

The effort would have been to hold to the

absolute minimum the number of people who knew

that the President had been consulted, had been

notitled and had given, perhaps only tacitly,

his authorization." (Bissell, 6/11/75, pP. 5-6).

However, Bissell testified that Dulles never told him he had briefed

President Kennedy and he did not recall asking Dulles. (Bissell, 6/9/75,

p. 34; 6/11/75, p. XX; 7/17/75, p. 27). In contrast, Bissell testified that

on certain other occasions, Dulles had mentioned that a "circumlocutious" what

approach had been used to brief President Eisenhower on sensitive subjects

JFK

(Bissell, 6/11/75, pp. 10-14). Bissell also said that he never asked to

what degree Dulles had advised MiCeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the

President for National Security Affairs, of the assassination plot. (Bissell,

6/9/75, p. 34).

b. BISSELL TESTIFIED HE DID NOT INFORM THE PRESIDENT OR WHITE HOUSE

OFFICIALS OF THE ONGOING ASSASSINATION PLOTS.

When asked if he had informed anyone outside the CIA that an effort to

assassinate Fidel Castro was underway, Bissell stated, "not to my recollection."

He added that he was not told that any Administration official had been made

aware of such efforts. (Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 28-30).

After the change of Administration, McGeorge Bundy was the White House

official who was the liaison with Bissell concerning Cuba and in general was

the principal White House official responsible for CIA matters (Bissell, 6/9/75,

p. 16): Bundy was a former student of Bissell's at Yale and they were personal

friends (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 28). Bissell testified that he did not tell Bundy

about the ongoing Castro assassination plots (Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 28-29; 7/22,

p. 31), and Bundy confirmed this (Bundy, p. 41).

.we-

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Cuban affairs during this period leading up to the Bay of Pigs received

active high-level attention. Bissell said that, in a continuation of the kind

of intense weekly scrutiny the Eisenhower Administration had given the invasion

plans (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 13).

...almost from the beginning of the Kennedy

Administration, the President himslef and a

number of Cabinet members and other senior

officials took a very active interest in the

operation(s) concerning Cuba." (Bissell, 6/9/75,

p. 16) •

Bissell "almost invariably" was present at meetings in which the President

and other senior officials took an "active interest"' in Cuba (Bissell, 6/9/75,

p. 17). Bissell testified that he did not inform any of them of the assassin-

ation plot. (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 39).

C. KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS DENIED KNOWLEDGE OF ASSASSINATION EFFORTS

AND GAVE OPINION THAT PRESIDENT KENNEDY WAS NOT INFORMED

Testimony was taken by the Cormittee from all living officials high in

the Kennedy Administration who dealt with Cuban affairs. The theme of their

testimony -- which is set forth in detail below -- was that they had no know-

ledge of any assassination plan or attempt by the U.S. government before or

after the Bay of Pigs invasion.

As with the Eisenhower Administration officials, members of the Kennedy

Administration also said they did not believe the President's character or

style of operating would be consistent with approval of such a matter.

(McNamara, p. 4; Bundy, p. 98; Taylor, pp. 45,51).

* Most of the testimony from officials high in the Kennedy Administration

dealt with the period after the Bay of Pigs invasion, involving Operation Mon-

goose and related activities. (See Section

,infra.) It was during this period

that most of the high officials in the White House, State Department, Defense

Department, and the CIA were drawn into the detailed planning of Cuban operations.

During this period, an extraordinary amount of decision making memoranda and

other documents were generated in response to the Cuban situation.

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Secretary of State Dean Rusk testified:

"I never had any reason to believe that anyone

that I ever talked to knew about had any active

planning of assassination underway." (Rusk,

pp. 65,49).

Likewise, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara stated that he had "no

knowledge or information about...plans or preparations for a possible assass-

ination attempt against Premier Castro." (McNamara, pp. 7,4). [The question

of whether McNamara once raised the issue of assassinating Castro is discussed

at Section

, infra. 1

Roswell Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary of Defense under McNamara, said that

killing Castro was not within the mandate of the Special Group which he con-

strued to be the weakening and undermining of "the Cuban system." (Gilpatric,

p. 28).

This was supported by General Maxwell Taylor, who chaired Special Group

meetings on Operation Mongoose. Taylor stated that he had "never heard". of

the assassination effort against Castro (Taylor, pp. 72, 7-8). Taylor stated

that he never raised the question of assassination with anyone. (Taylor, p.

19). Moreover, Taylor testified that he was not aware of a directive for an.

assassination effort from the President or the Attorney General, nor was he

aware of a proposal for the assassination of a foreign leader in any form by

anyone to the Special Group (Taylor, pp. 41,45,62).

McGeorge Bundy stated that it was his "conviction" that

"no one in the Kennedy Administration, in the

White House, or in the Capitol, ever gave any

authorization, approval, or instruction of any

kind for any effort to assassinate anyone by the

CIA." (Bundy, p. 54)

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INY

Furthermore, Bundy testified that he was never told by anyone at any time that

assassination efforts were being conducted against Castro (Bundy, p. 63) .

Bundy said that Richard Bissell never informed him about CIA involvement in

assassination attempts against any foreign leader (Bundy, p. 41). Bundy

acknowledged, however, that he had once been briefed by Richard Bissell on

the development of an "executive action capability' at the CIA (see Section

, infra) .*

Walt Rostow, who shared national security duties with Bundy before moving

to the Department of State, testified that during his entire tenure in govern-

ment he "never heard a reference" to an intention to undertake an assassination

effort (Rostow, pP. 10, 12-13, 38) .

Asked if he had ever been told anything about CIA efforts to assassinate

Castro, Richard Goodwin, Assistant Special Counsel to the President, replied,

'No, I never heard of such a thing." (Goodwin, P. 13) *t

Pion

* As indicated further below, Bundy also said (i) that the matter of a

Castro assassination was "mentioned from time to time... as something to

talk about rather than to consider.

(Bundy, p. 73); and (ii) he had a "very

going to kill a large number of people in a headquarters mess or something

various plots. (Bundy, pp. 54, 63-64).

* As indicated below, Goodwin did on two occasions hear questions raised

about assassination. One involved the President, who said he was opposed

(see P.

); the other involved the meeting of August 10, 1962 (see pp.

to

• anti

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Presidential Assistant Theodore Sorensen said that his "first-hand

knowledge" of Cuban affairs was limited to the post-Bay of Pigs period

(Sorensen, P. 4), Sorensen stated, however, that his general opinion based

upon his close contact with President Kennedy, was that

"such an act [as assassination] was totally

foreign to his character and conscience,

foreign to his fundamental reverence for

human life and his respect for his adversaries,

verbiage

foreign to his insistence upon a moral dimen-

sion in U.S. foreign policy to his pragmatic

recognition that so horrendous but inevitably

counterproductive a precedent committed by a

country whose own chief of state was inevitably

vulnerable could only provoke reprisals and in-

flame hostility." (Sorensen, p. 5).

Sorensen also said that President Kennedy 'would not make major foreign

policy decisions alone without the knowledge or participation of one or more

of those senior foreign policy officials in whose judgment and discretion he

had confidence." (Sorensen, pp. 5-6).

Sorensen concluded his testimony by providing the Committee his judgment

on the following question:

"Q:

Would you think it would be possible that ... the

Agency, the ClA could somehow have been under

the impression that they had a tacit authorization

for assassination due to a circumspect discussion

that might have taken place in any of these

meetings?

Sorensen: It is possible, indeed, I think the

President on more than one occasion felt that Mr.

Dulles, by making rather vague and sweeping re-

terences to particular countries was seeking tacit

approval without ever asking for it, and the Presi-

dent was rather concerned that he was not being

asked for explicit direction and was not being given

explicit information, so it is possible. But on

something of this kind, assassination, I would

doubt it very much.

Either you are for it or you

are not for it, and he was not for it. " (Sorensen,

7/21/75, pp. 32-33.)

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d. THE QUESTION OF WHETHER ASSASSINATION EFFORTS WERE DISCLOSED

IN VARIOUS BRIEFINGS OF ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS.

(i) BRIEFING OF THE PRESIDENT-ELECT.

After the election, in the latter part of November, 1960, Dulles

and Bissell jointly briefed President-elect Kennedy on "the most important

details with respect to the operation which became the Bay of Pigs." (Bissell,

6/9/75, p. 34). Bissell testified that he did not believe the ongoing assass-

ination efforts were mentioned to the President-elect, and that to the best of

his recollection they were not. (Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 27, 35-36). Bissell

surmised that the reasons he and Dulles did not tell Kennedy at that initial

meeting were: (a) "apparently" they had not thought it was an important

matter*; and (b) they "would have thought that that was a matter of which he

should be advised upon assuming office rather than in advance." (Bissell,

6/9/75, p. 35). The latter comment led to the following exchange:

"The Chairman:

Isn't it a strange distinction

that you draw that on the one hand (as) a Presi-

dential designate, as President-elect, he should

have all of the details concerning a planned in-

vasion of Cuba, but that he should not be told

about an ongoing attempt to assassinate Fidel

Castro?

Mr. Bissell: I think that in hindsight it could

be regarded as peculiar, yes.

'The Chairman:

... (I)t just seems too strange

that if you were charged with briefing the man who

* This was subsequently repeated by Bissell in response to examination of

his assumption that Dulles probably told President Eisenhower about the assass-

ination operation:

"... the Mafia operation was not regarded as of

enormous importance and there were much more

important matters to talk about with the

President."

(Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 25).

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was to become President of the U.S. on matters

so important as a planned invasion of a neigh-

boring country, and that if you knew at the

time in addition to the planned invasion there

was an ongoing attempt to assassinate the leader

of that country, that you would tell Mr. Kennedy

about one matter and not the other.'"

Mr. Bissell: Well, Mr. Chairman, it is quite

possible that Mr. Dulles did say something about

an attempt to or the possibility of making use

of syndicate characters for this purpose.

I do

not remember his doing so at that briefing. My

elief is that had he done so, he probably would

nave done so in rather general terms and that

neither of us was in a position to go into detail

on the matter.

" (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 35).

However, Bissell also testified generally that pursuant to the doctrine of

plausible denial, efforts were made to keep matters that might be "embarrassing"

away from Presidents (Bissell, 6/11/75, pp. 5-6).

(ii) DISCUSSION WITH BUNDY ON "EXECUTIVE ACTION CAPABILITY"

As explained in the next section, sometime during the early period

of the Kennedy Administration, Bissell discussed with Bundy the subject of a

"capability" for "executive action" -- a term said by Bissell to include various

means of "eliminating the effectiveness" of foreign leaders up to and including

assassinations (Bissell, 7/22/75, P. 32).

There is some dispute concerning when this occurred and who initiated it,

and this subject is discussed at length at Section

, infra.

Bissell and Bundy both testified, however, that Bissell did not tell Bundy --

in the course of discussing the executive action capability or at any other

time -- of the actual assassination plots against Castro (Bissell, 7/22,

p. 31; Bundy, p. 41) .

(However, there was some testimony that the

• names of Castro, Trujillo, and Lumumba might have been mentioned in connection

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with the discussion of "research" into the capability. (Bissell, 6/11/75,

pp. 50-51)).

(iii) TAYLOR/KENNEDY BAY OF PIGS INQUIRY

Following the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion, President Kennedy

convened a "board of inquiry" which reviewed "the causes of... [the] failure"

of the operation (Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 42,45). The members of the board were

Robert Kennedy, General Maxwell Taylor, Allen Dulles and Admiral Arleigh Burke.

The panel examined the Bay of Pigs failure for several weeks and issued its

report on June 13, 1961. The "Taylor Report" does not mention the assassination

plots.

Bissell was questioned extensively and appeared to General Taylor to have

been the principal person involved in the operation and much more knowledgeable

than Dulles who had deliberately kept himself out of the planning and delegated

responsibility to Bissell. (Taylor, p. 73).

Bissell testified that he did not disclose to the Taylor/Kennedy Committee

that there had been an assassination effort against Castro (Bissell, 6/9/75,

p. 42). He put forward several reasons for not having done so. First, "the

question was never asked." Second, he claimed Dulles already knew about the

operation. Third, Bissell said 'by that time the assassination attempt had been

called off." Fourth, he contended that the assassination effort was "not germane"

because it did not contribute to the failure of the Bay of Pigs. (Bissell,

6/9/75, pp. 44-46; 6/11/75, p. 39).

Bissell hastened to add that he had no reason to believe" that Allen Dulles,

himself a board member, did not discuss the plots with one or more members

(Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 46).

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13

However, both General Taylor and Admiral Burke stated that neither

Bissell nor Dulles informed them of the assassination plots (Taylor, pp. 72-73;

Burke affidavit, 8/25/75, p. 3).

When asked if Richard Bissell ever informed him that underworld figures

had been offered a large sum to assassinate Castro, General Taylor responded,

"No, I never heard that, and it amazes me" (Taylor, p. 72). Taylor said that

during his review of the Bay of Pigs operation no mention was made of an

assassination effort against Castro (Taylor, p. 72). Despite the fact that

Dulles met with Taylor on the Board of Inquiry thirty or forty times, Taylor

testified that Dulles never told him about the plot (Taylor, p. 73).

(iv) MEMORANDUM TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Bissell's testimony that he had not disclosed assassination plots to

the Kennedy/Taylor "court of inquiry" was consistent with his statement that

"I have no knowledge that Robert Kennedy was

advised of this (the plot to kill Mr. Castro)."'

(Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 41).

The Committee tested this statement against other parts of Bissell's

testimony. An attachment to the May 22, 1961 FBI memorandun (regarding the

Las Vegas tap) which Director Hoover had sent to the Attorney. General* had

quoted Edwards as saying that Bissell in "recent briefings" of Taylor and

Kennedy,

"told the Attorney General that some of the

associated planning included the use of

Giancana and the underworld against Castro."

(Bissell, 7/17/75, Ex. 3).

When first shown this document, Bissell said,

* A handwritten note from the Attorney General to his assistant on the

face of the memorandum indicates that he had actually seen the document: This

memorandum is discussed in detail at Section

, infra.

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"I have no recollection of briefing those

two gentlemen except as members of the Board

Allen duty es him elave des ribed, of whichell,

6/11/75, p. 27).

As mentioned above. (Section (e), supra), Bissell testified that his briefings

to the Board of Inquiry did not deal with assassination efforts. (Bissell,

6/11/75, PP. 45-46).

Discussing the document in a subsequent appearance before the Connittee,

Bissell again said that he had no recollection of any such conversation (Bissell,

7/22/75, p. 56) but he was sure that it did not take place in front of the

Kennedy/Taylor board of inquiry (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 64).

However, Bissell speculated, the report quoted language which "I might

very well have used, that is, the use of the underworld against Castro."

(Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 21).

The examination of Bissell on whether he had had any such discussion and,

so, why he used such obscure and indirect language, elicited the following

testimony:

"Q: Did you, sometime in May of 1961 commmicate

the state of your awareness to the Attorney General

in your briefing to him?

Bissell: Well, there is a report which I was shown,

I think it was last week, I believe it also came

from the FBl, but I could be wrong about that, or

indicating that I did, at that time in May, brief

the Attorney General, and I think General Taylor to

the effect that the Agency had been using -- I

dut in cut ete her Caector das menst the by tro;

out in effect

regime.

Q: Did you tell them -- them being the Attorney

General and General Taylor -- that this use included

actual attempts to assassinate Mr. Castro?"

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"Bissell: I have no idea whether I did l.)

I have no idea of the wording. I think it

might quite possibly have been left in the

more general terms of using the underworld

against the Castro regime, or the leadership

of the Castro regime.

Q. Mr. Bissell, given the state of your

nowledge at that time, wouldn't that have beer

leliberately misleading information'

Bissell: I don't think it would have been.

We were indeed doing precisely that. We were

trying to use elements of the underworld

against Castro and the Cuban leadership.

You sue, in fat, yarion, didn't you, that

Bissell: I think that is a way of using these

people against him.

Q. That's incredible. You're saying that in

brieting the Attorney General you are telling

him you are using the underworld against Castro,

and you intended that to mean, Mr. Attorney

General, we are trying to kill him?

Bissell: I thought it signalled just exactly

that to the Attorney General, I'm sure.

Q. Then it's your belief that you coumnicated

to the Attorney General that you were, in fact,

trying to kill Castro?

Bissell: I think it is best to rest on that

report we do have, which is from a source over

which I had no influence and it does use the

phrase I have quoted here.. Now you can surmise

and I can surmise as to just whattthe Attorney

General would have read into that phrase."

(Bissell, 7/22/75, pp. 53-54).

Bissell then testified:

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"Q. Was it your intent to circumlocutiously

or otherwise, to advise the Attorney General

that you were in the process of trying to kill

Castro?

Mr. Bissell: [U]nless I remembered the con-

versation at the time, which I don't, I don't

have any recollection as to whether that was

my intent or not." (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 56).

Bissell proceeded to speculate that a "proper" briefing might not

have included any reference to the assassination plot. (Bissell, 7/22/75,

p. 59). He gave two reasons for this speculation: (i) even if he had

"thoroughly briefed"' the Attorney General he would have chosen "circumlocutious"

Language to tell him about the activity involving Giancana. (Bissell, 7/22/75,

pp. 53-56); and (ii) the assassination effort had been "stood down by then."

(Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 59). Bissell concluded by reiterating that he had "ho

knowledge" that the Attorney General was "specifically advised"' of the.

assassination plot against Castro (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 62).*

e. CONVERSATION BETWEEN PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND GEORGE SMATHERS

George Smathers, former U.S. Senator from Florida, testified that the

subject of the possible assassination of Castro arose in a conversation between

Smathers and President Kennedy on the White House lawn in 1961.* Smathers

* If the FBI quotation of Edwards is to be accorded significant weight, then

it is important to note that another section of it contradicts Bissell's assump-

tion that Presidents Eisenhower and Kernedy had been circumlocutiously advised

by Dulles of the assassination plot. Edwards told the FBI that "Allen Dulles was

completely unaware of Edwards' contact with Maheu"' in connection with Cuban opera-

tions.

Bissell's explanation for Edwards' statement was that Edwards was being "pro-

tective"' of the DCI. (Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 20). But this testimony must be

reconciled with Bissell's previous testimony that Dulles knew of the operation and

probably would have told the President about it.

** Smathers' testimony about this conversation referred to the transcript of

an Oral HIstory interview, conducted on March 31, 1964, in which his testimony was

based gives an indication that the conversation transpired in 1961, before the

Bay of Pigs invasion in mid-April.

It appears from the White House logs of Presidential meetings that there were

only two occasions in 1961 when Senator Smathers met with the President alone for

as much as twenty minutes. Both of those meetings took place in March. (Supra,

P.

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said he discussed the general Cuban situation with the President many times

(Smathers, P. 6). Smathers had many Cuban constituents, was familiar with

Latin American affairs, and was a long-time friend of the President (Smathers,

р. б) .

Smathers had the "impression" that the President raised the subject of

assassination with him because someone "had apparently discussed this and

other possibilities with respect to Cuba"' with the President (Smathers, pP:

16, 25). Smathers had no direct knowledge of any such discussion, nor did he

know who might have been involved (Smathers, pp. 18-19, 25). The President

did not indicate directly that assassination had been proposed to him (Smathers,

p. 18).

dres

According to Smathers:

"... [President Kennedy] asked me what reaction

I thought there would be throughout South

America were Fidel. Castro to be assassinated...

I told the President that even as much as I dis-

liked Fidel Castro that I did not think it would

be a good idea for there to be even considered

an assassination of Fidel Castro, and the Pres-

DAND

ident of the United States completely agreed with

me, that it would be a very unwise thing to do,

the reason obviously being that no matter who did

(Tor

it and no matter how it was done and no matter

what, that the United States would receive full

credit for it, and the President receive full

credit for it, and it would work to his great

disadvantage with all of the other countries in

Central and South America...I disapproved of it,

and he completely disapproved of the idea."

(Smathers, p. 22) .

Smathers further testified that he had said the reason it would work to "great

disadvantage" with the nations of Central and South America was because they would

blame the United States for any assassination of Castro (Smathers, p. 6) .

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Smathers said that on a later occasion he tried to raise the subject

of "Cuba and what could be done" with President Kennedy (Smathers, p. 22) .

The President made it clear to Smathers that he should not raise the subject

with him again.*

Senator Smathers concluded his testimony by indicating that on Cuban

affairs in general, he felt he was "taking a tougher stance than was the

President'' (Smathers, P. 24). But Snathers said that he disapproved of even

thinking about assassinating Castro and said he was "positive" that Kernedy

doeS

Imply also opposed it (Smathers, p. 16).

* One night at dinner with Senator Smathers, the President emphasized

his point by cracking his plate at the mention of Cuba.

(Smathers, p. 22) .

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-1-

Meeting: 8/30/75

(pp. 75-80 reserved

by

Senator Tower)

(iii)

Kennedy Administration

- The Question of Authorization Outside the

Agency During the Post Bay of Pigs, Mongoose, and 1963 Periods

This section discusses

the question of authorization outside the Agency

for the assassination plots during 1962 and 1963 - the period of Operation

Mongoose (the 1962 Kennedy Administration program aimed at overthrowing Castro

by an internal revolt), the Missile Crisis in the fall of 1962, and the subse-

quent program in 1963 which saw a more limited covert action program directed

against Cuba.

A. Recap of the Assassination Activity After the Bay of Pigs

During 1962 and 1963 there were three principal assassination plots.

I. In the spring of 1962, William Harvey reactivated the contact

with John Roselli and in April provided lethal pills and guns to Roselli and

Cuban associates in Miami. In May it was reported that the pills reached Cuba.

2. In early 19636 the science fiction schemes

- exploding sea shell

and poisoned diving suit - were contrived and then abandoned.

3. In November 1963 the dissident Cuban who was code-named AMLASH

was given a poison pen device.

B. The Issue of Authority

The fundamental issue dealt with in this section is whether the above

assassination plots were authorized outside the Agency. The issue arises from

the differing perceptions/of Helms and his subordinates, on the one hand,

and members of the Kennedy Administration. including the Director of the

CIA, on the other hand.

While Holms stated that he never received a direct order to assassinate

Castro, Helms testified that he fully believed that the CIA was at all times acting

within the scope of its authority and that he believed a Castro assassination came

within the bounds of the Kennedy Administration's effort to overthrow Castro and his

regime. Helms stated that he never informed

any puritan an Electennedy

SELl

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Administration of the

assassination plots. On the other hand, McCone and the sur-

viving

members of the Kennedy Administration testified that they did not believe

a Castro assassination

was permissible without a direct order, that assassination

was not within

the parameters

of the Administration's anti-Castro program, and

testified that to their knowledge no such direct order was given

to Helms.

Before setting out the testimony in detail, we discuss below the Kennedy

i To

Administration's 1962 covert action program, Operation Mongoose (as well as the

events in 1961 leading to that program) which was designed to overthrow the Castro

regime. An understanding of that program is essential to an evaluation of the testi-

mony on the issue of authorization.

C. Events From the Bay of Pigs to the Establishment of Mongoose

1. The Taylor Review

On April 22, 1961, following the Bay of Pigs failure, the President requested

Ceneral Maxwell Taylor to conduct a re-evaluation of "our practices and pro-

grams in the areas of military and paramilitary, guerilla and anti-guerilla

activity which fall short of outright war." The President hoped that Taylor

would give special attention to Cuba. (Letter to Maxwell Taylor, April 22,

1961) Robert Kennedy was to be Taylor's principal colleague in this effort.

The resulting review of the U.S. policy in this area concluded:

"We have been struck with the general feeling that there can be no

long-term living with Castro as a neighbor. His continued presence

within the hemispheric community as a dangerously effective exponent

of Communism and Anti-Americanism constitutes a real menace capable

of eventually overthrowing the elected governments in any one or more

of weak Latin American republics.

***

"It is recommended that the Cuban situation be reappraised in the light

of all presently known factors and new guidance be provided for political,

military, economic and propaganda action against Castro." (Report to

the President, June 13, 1961, memorandum No. 4, p. 8)

TOP ASCOET

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It is clear from the record, moreover, that the defeat at the Bay of Pigs

had been regarded as a humiliation for the President personally and for the CIA

institutionally.

By July the Special Group had agreed that the basic oujective "is to provide

support to a U.S. program to develop opposition to Castro and to help bring

about

a regime acceptable to the U. S.". (Memo for the Record, July 21, 1961.) Occasional

harrassment operations were mounted during the summer but there was neither over-

all strategy nor much

activity.

2. National Security Action Memorandum 100 of October 5, 1961, and the

CIA Intelligence Estimate

The documentary evidence and testimony indicate that in the fall of 1961

the question of the effect of Castro's removal from power and the prospects in

that event, for U. S. military

intervention were considered by the Kennedy Admini-

stration.

Two studies were prepared in this connection. Pursuant to National Security

Action Nemorandum

100 ("NSAM 100"), the State Department was

asked to assess the

potential courses of action open to the U. S. should Castro be removed from the

Cuban scene, and to prepare a contingency plan with the Department of Defense

for military intervention in that event. The CIA, prepared an "Intelligence

Estimate" on the "situation and prospects" in Cuba.. As discussed below, the

evluence indicates that the focus of these studies was on the possible courses

of action open to the U. S. in a post-Castro Cuba, rather than

013

de Bean

might bring about Castro's removal. However, it

aF:

that assassination

was not excluded from the potential means by which Ca

migit be removed.

NSAM 100

. On October 5, 1961, Bundy issued National Security Action Memorandum No.

100 ("NSAM 100) (Bundy, Ex 3) entitled "Contingency Planning for Cuba", NSAI

100 was addressed to the Secretary of State stated in full: "In confirmation of

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oral instructions conveyed to Assistant Secretary of State Woodwards

, a plan is

desired for tie indicated contingency."

Related documents indicate that the subject matter of the contingency

referred to in MSAM 100 was the

'"possible removal of Castro from the Cuban scene".

(Dundy Ix 3A, Minutes of Special Group leeting, October 6, 1961, p. 1.)

The Minutes of the Special Group

meeting on October 6, 1961, (the day after

the issuance of NSAM 100) state that the Group was told that in addition to an overall

plan for Cuban covert operations," a contingency plan in connection with the pos-

sible removal of Castro from the Cuban scene" was in preparation. (Bundy, Ex-3Л,

Memorandum for tlie Record of Special Groun meeting, October 6, 1051, p. 1.)

In addition, a lenorandum for the Record by Parrott on October 5, 1961,

states that Parrott informed Assistant Secretary Woodward's Deputy that "what was

wanted was a plan against the contingency that Castro would in some way or other

be removed from the Cuban scene". (Bundy, Ex 3B, P. 1.) Parrott's memorandum

further stated that in preparing the plan, 'the presence and positions of Raul

(Castro) and Che Guevara must be taken into account", and that General. Taylor had

told Parrott he preferred "the President's interest in the matter not be mentioned"

toto Woodward. (Bundy, Ex 33.) Parrott's menorandum also stated that "on the

covert side, I talked to Tracy Darnes in CIA and asked that

an up-to-date report

be furnished as soon as possible on what is going on and

(Bundy, Ex. 3B, p. 1.)

ati

Is being planned"

*Woodward at that time was Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs.

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TOP C"

1719709

Testimony of

Bundy

Bundy testified that the contingency referred to in NSAil 100 and the related

documents was "what would we do if Castro were no longer there"

, but that

"clearly one of the possibilities would be assassination". (Bundy, p. 77.)

However, Bundy emphasized that NSAM 100 represented an effort to assess

the

effect should Castro be removed from power by any means (including assassina-

tion) but "without going further with the notion (of assassination) itself".

(Bundy, p. 77..)

*"If people were suggesting this to you and you were curious about whether it

was worth exploring, one way of getting more light on it without going any fur-.

ther witi that notion itself would be to ask political people, not intelligence

people, what they thought would happen if Castro were not there any longer.

(Bundy, p.

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-b-

Bundy further contended that the President was not considering an

assassina-

tion, but rather "what are things going to be like after Castro." (Bundy, p. 81.)*

Taylor's Testimony

Taylor testified that he had no recollection of NSAM 100 of the events de-

scribed in the related documents set out above. (Taylor, p. 18.) On the basis of

his review of the documents, Taylor testified that "it sounds like purely a political

consideration of the sequence of power in Cuba."**

Taylor emphasized, moreover,

that"never at any time" did he raise the question of of assassination with Parrott,

or with anybody else. (Taylor,ip. 19)

Parrott's Testimony

Parrott, the Special Group Secretary who transmitted the request for the

NSAM 100 study to the State Department, testified that the request for a plan re-

flected in his memorandum of October 5, 1961, and the reference in that memorandum

to the "contingency that Castro would in some way or another be removed from the

Cuban scene" (described above, p. 18), reflected interest in a contingency study

for Castro's removal, but by

means "short of being killed."

(Parrott, p. 83)

what bason

*Thus, with respect to the desire not to indicate the President's interest in

the plan requested from the State Department, Bundy testified:

"...it was precisely to insulate the President from any false in-

ference that what he was asking about was assassination. It is easy

to confuse the question; what are things going to be like after.

Castro, with the other question, and we were trying to focus atten-

tion on the information!he obviously wanted, which is, what would

happen if we did do this sort of thing, and not get one into the

frame of mind of thinking that he was considering doing it."

(Bundy, p. 81)

**Taylor said he was puzzled by the wording of NSAM 100 and the related documents

and stated, "I just cannot tie in the language here with a plausible explanation."

(Taylor, p. 18)

NH 50955 DocId: 32423539 Page 142

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7

The CIA's Intelligence Estimate

The CIA study in connection with the consideration of Castro's removal

was an

intelligence estimate prepared by the CIA's oard of National listimates

(which was not part of the CIA's covert action directorate), entitled "The Situation

and Prospects in Cuba"%. The CIA Estimate vas pessimistic regarding tle chances

success of a Cuban internal revolt, and further found that a castro assassina-

was being

tion would likely strengthen the Comnunist position in Cuba.

discusson-

After a general review of the economic, military, and political situation

stow. does

Than?

in Cuba, the CIA estimate concluded that the Castro regime had sufficient popular

and repressive capabilities to cope with any internal threat. The concluding

squant

meN

eTAL

paragraph of the estimate was entitled "If Castro were to Die". It noted that:

"Ilis (Castro's) loss now, by assassination or by natural

causes, would have an unsettling effect, but would almost

certainly not prove fatal to the regime...(I)ts princípal

surviving leaders would probably rally together in the

face of a common danger."

(Estimate, p. 9.)

The CIA study further predicted that should Castro die, "some sort of pover struggle

would almost certainly develop eventually," but that whatever the outcome of suchan

a struggle, the Communist Party's influence would be "si

cantly" Litcreased.

(Estimate, p. 9.)

*The IG Report apparently refers to an earlier draft of this intelligence estimate.

(IG, p. 4.) The If Report, in reporting that many CIA officers interviewed in the

IG investigation stressed the point that "elimination of the dominant figures in a

sovernment.. will not necessarily cause the downfall of the governnent," stated:

"This point was stressed with respect to Castro and Cuba in an internal CIA

draft paper of October 1961, which was initiated in response to General Max-

well Taylor's desire for a contingency plan.

The paper took the position

that the demise of Fidel Castro, from whatever cause, would offer little op-

portunity for the liberation of Cuba from Conmunist and Soviet Bloc control."

(IC, p. 4.) The CIA was unable to locate the draft paper referred to in the

IG Report.

**A cover memorandum by Lansdale transmitting the CIA estimate to Robert Kennedy

stated that the estimate "seems to be the major evidence to be used to oppose.

your program" (referring to the proposed overall Mongoose operation). Lansdale's

memorandum criticized the estimate's assessment that "it is highly improbable that

an extensive popular uprising could be fomented" against Castro as a "conclusion

of fact quite outside the area of intelligence." (Lansdale Memorandum to Robert

Kennedy, 11/62, p.1) As discussed in detail at PP:

below. Lansdale's basic

concept for the Mongoose program was to overthrow Castro through an internal revolt

of the Cuban people.

HW 50955 DocId:32423539 Page 143

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## Page 144

At the close of the meeting, Robert Kennedy asked Szulc to meet

with President Kennedy the following day (Szulc, p. 25). On November 9,

1961, Szule, accompanied only by Goodwin, met with President Kennedy

for over an hour in the Oval Office.* (Szulc, 6/10, p. 25.) Szulc

recalled that the President discussed "a number of his views on Cuba

In the wake of the Bay of Pigs, asked me a number of questions concerning

my conversations with Premier Castro,

and...what the United States could

forT might do in... either 'hostile way or in establishing some kind of.

a dialogue.:." (Szulc, 6/10, pp. 25-26).

Szulc testified that after this general discussion, the President

then asked "what would you think if I ordered Castro to be assassinated.*/*/

(Szulc, 6/10, p. 26; Szulc Notes of conversation with President Kennedy,

November 9, 1961). Szulc testified that he replled that an assassination

would not necessarily cause a change in the Cuban system, and that it was

Szulc's personal view that the United States should not be party to murders

and political assassinations. (Szulc, 6/10, p. 26). Szulc testified that

WAnT

junt

CA/

the

raises

neg

STOS

*/Goodwin testified that President Kennedy met frequently with members of

the press and others who were experts in their fields, but that it was "possible"

that the meeting with Szulc may have been an occasion for the President to con-

sider Szulc for a position in the Administration (Goodwin, p. 49-30).

On November 2, 1961 Goodwin had: addressed an "eyes only" memorandum to the

President and the Attorney General outlining a suggested organization for what

became the Mongoose operation. Goodwin proposed five "staff components,"

Including "intelligence collection," "guerrilla and underground," and "propa-

ganda."

The memorandum

stated: "As for propaganda, I thought we might ask

Tad Szulc to take a leave of absence from the Times and work on this one-

although we should check with /USIA Director? Ed Murrow and Dick Bissell."

(Goodwin Ex. 2, p. 1, 2).

*/* Szulc made notes of the conversation with President Kennedy as soon

as he returned to his office, based on his memory of the meeting.

Kennedy's question regarding a Castro assassination appears in quotation marks

in Szulc's notes, which were made the same day from "reasonably fresh" memory.

(Szulc, 6/10, p.30) .

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3.

Testimony of Szulc on President Kennedy's November 9, 1961 Question

Regarding a Fossible Castro Assassination

Tad Szulct testified that in a private meeting he had with President Kennedy

on Novebmer 9, 1961, the President asked"Szulc what would you think if I ordered

Castro to be assassinated," and said "I agree with you completely" when

Szulc answered that a Castro assassination should be ruled out on both practical

and moral grounds. Szulc further testified that President Kennedy went on "to

make the point how strongly he and his brother felt that the United States for moral

reasons"

must not be involved in assassinations. (Szulc, p.27).

In early November 1961 Szulc was asked by Richard Soodwin, the Special Assistant

to President Kennedy, to meet with Attorney General Robert Kennedy on November 8,

1961,

to discuss the situation in Cuba. The meeting was an "off-the-record" one

which Szulc attended as

a friend of Goodwin's and not as a reporter. (Szulc,

p. 24.) During the mecting with Robert Kennedy, the discussion centered on the

situation in Cuba following the (Bay of Pigs) invasion (and) the pros and cons

of some different possible actions by the U.S. in that context" (Szulc, p. 25).

The subject of assassination was not mentioned during this meeting. (Szulc, p.

31.)

*In November 1961 Tad Szulc was employed as a reporter in the Washington Bureau

of the New York Times (Szulc, p. 24). Szulc had

visited Cuba in May-June 1961,

following the Bay of Pigs invasion.

(Szulc, p. 24) During the course of that

trip, Szulc had a

"series of very long conversations with Castro"'. "(Szulc, ?:

24.)

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10

thereupon the President said, "I agree with you completely." Szulc stated

further:

"He /President Kennedy/ then went on for a few minutes

to make the point how strongly he and his brother felt

that the United States for moral reasons should never be

in a

situation of having recourse to assassination." (Szulc, p.27).

Sulc's notes of the meeting with the President state:

"JFK then said he was testing me, that he felt the same

way -- he added 'I'm glad you feel the same way'

because indeed U.S. morally must not be part /sic/ to

assassinations."

Szulc's notes of the conversation further state:

"JFK said he raised question because he was under

terrific pressure from advisers (think he said intel-

ligence people, but not positive) to okay a Castro

murder.

sed: /sic/ he was resisting pressures."

(Szulc

note of conversation with President Kennedy, November

9, 1961).

Szulc stated, relying on his memory, that it is "possible"

and he "believed" that President Kennedy used such words as "someone in

the

191860

Intelligence business," as the source of the pressure for a Castro assassina-

tion. (Szule, 6/10, p. 29). The President did not identify the person or

persons. (Szulc, 6/19, p. 27). |

If anyone was in fact putting pressure on the President, there was no

INFORm

caram...

other evidence on this point adduced before the Committee. This was particularly

troublesome since everyone questioned by the Committee, both within and without

the CIA,denied ever having discussed

assassination with the President, let

alone having pressured him.

Testimony of Goodwin •

Goodwin attended the November 9, 1961 meeting between President

Kennedy and Szulc.

(Goodwin, p. 3). Goodwin testified that, 'after asking

Szulc for his reaction to a suggestion that Castro be assassinated,

President Kennedy said "well, that's the kind of thing I'm never going to do."

(Goodwin, p. 3) .

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11

Goodwin

testified further that several days after the meeting

with

Szulc, Goorwin referred to the mention of assassination to saule, and President

Kennedy said only "ve can't get into that kind of thing, or we would all be

tntgets"

(Goodwin,

p. 4, 11.)

4.

The Rejection of Assassination in President Kennedy's November 16,

1961 Speech

A few days after the meeting with Szulc and Goodwin, and

some six

weeks after the issuance of NSAM 100, President Kennedy delivered a speech at

the University of Washington. In that public address, President Kennedy stated:

Hon boes

that

1Mong0056

"We cannot, as a free nation, compete with our adver-

saries in tactics of terror, assassination, false

promises, counterfeit mobs and crises." (Public Papers

of the Presidents, John F. Kennedy, 1961, p. 724)

We discuss in the next section the nature of the program which was initiated

against the Castro regime

at the end of November 1961 pursuant to President

Kennedy's instruction, and which continued to the Missile Crisis in the fall of

1962.

TOP SECRET

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D. Operation Mongoose

1.

The Creation of Operation Mongoose. In November 1962 the

proposal for a major covert program to overthrow Castro was developed.

Richard Goodwin, a special assistant to President Kennedy, and Edward

Lansdale, a military officer with experience in counter-insurgency

operations, played major staff roles in the creation of Mongoose. Both

Goodwin and Lansdale worked closely with Robert Kennedy, who took

an

active interest in this preparatory stage and in the later. conduct of

Mongoose.

On November 1, 1961, Goodwin advised the President that

Robert Kennedy "would be the most effective commander" of the proposed

operation. (Memorandum

to the President, November 1, 1961, p. ).

Lansdale, in

a memorandum to Robert Kennedy on November 15, 1961, out-

lining the Mongoose proposal, stated that a "picture of the situation

has emerged clearly enough to indicate what needs to be done and to

support your sense of urgency concerning Cuba". (Memorandum, November 15,

1961, p.

At the end of the month, on November 30, 1962, President Kennedy

issued a memorandum recording his decision to begin the Mongoose project--

to "use

our available assets... to help Cuba overthrow the Communist

regime".

(Lansdale Ex. 17, Memorandum to the Secretary of State,

Defense, et al., November 30, 1961) .

SECRE

Important organizational changes were made in establishing Operation

MONGOOSE.

a.

The Special Group Augmented. A new control group, the Special

Group Augmented, was put in charge of Operation MONGOOSE. The SGA con-

sisted of the regular Special Group (i.e., Bundy, Johnson of State,

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## Page 149

Gilpatric of Defense, McCone of CIA, and Gen. Lemnitzer of the Joint

Chiefs) plus Robert Kennedy

and General Taylor. Also, Secretaries

Rusk and McNamara more frequently attended its meetings than they did

those of the Special Group

itself.

General Lansdale as the Chief of Operations of MONGOOSE.

General Edward Lansdale was

named the Chief of Operations of the MONGOOSE

activities by President Kennedy. Lansdale had developed a reputation in

the Philippines and Vietnam for having an ability to deal with revolu-

tionary

insurgencies in less developed countries. In addition, as a

result of the Bay of Pigs failure, President Kennedy distrusted the CIA

and believed he required someone from outside the Agency to oversee

major covert action programs. Rather than appoint Robert Kennedy to

head Mongoose as proposed by Goodwin, President Kennedy gave Lansdale

the task of coordinating the CIA's Mongoose operations with those of the

Departments of State and Defense, and made General Taylor the Chairman

of the Special Group Augmented. However, Robert Kennedy did play an active

role in the Mongoose structure, unrelated to his position as Attorney General.

c. CIA Organization

for Mongoose. In late 1961 or early 1962, William

Harvey was put in charge of the CIA's Task Force l, the CIA are for Mongoose

Operations. Task Force W operated under the Special Group Augmented

and em-

ployed some 400 people at CIA headquarters and at the Miami Station. McCone

and Harvey were

thereafter the principal CIA participants in Operation Mongoose.

Helns

attended only sone 1 of 40 ongoose meting and resulted ther fee t

was fair to state that McCone and Harvey, rathell than leins, were principally

concerned

with Mongoose..

Ilelms was, however, substantially involved in l'ongoose

and testified that he "was as interested" in Mongoose as larvey and Ilchone were.:

(Helms, 7/13, p. 10)

NN 50955 DOOIA:32423539 Page 149

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## Page 150

2.

Lansdale's Theory and Objective fur Mongoose

In the fall of 1961, Lansdale had been asked by President

Kennedy to examine the Administration's Cuba policy and to make recommen-

dations. Lansdale testified that, in reporting his recommendations to

President Kennedy,

he emphasized that "Castro ... had aroused con-

siderable affection for himself personally with the Cuban population...."

(Lansdale, p. 4), and that the U.S. "should take a very different course"

from the "harassment" operations that had been directed against Castro

up to that time. (Lansdale, p. 3). These prior U.S. operations were

conceived and led by Americans, Lansdale informed the President. (Lans-

dale, p. 5). In contrast, Lansdale proposed that the U.S. work with

all exiles, particularly professionals who had opposed Batista and then

became disillusioned by Castro. (Lansdale, pp. 4, 10-11): Lansdale's

ultimate objective was to have "the people themselves overthrow the

Castro regime rather than U.S. engineered efforts from outside Cuba."

(Lansdale, p. 41).

Hence, after his appointment as Chief of Operations, Lansdale's

concept for the MONGOOSE project emphasized as a first step the develop-

ment of leadership elements, and "a very necessary political basis"

among the Cubans opposed to Castro, before any large actions began.

(Lansdale, p. 11). At the same time, Lansdale sought to develop

"means

to infiltrate Cuba successfully" and to organize "cells and»

act it Testa

inside Cuba... who could work secretly and safely.

(Lansdale,p.

Lansdale's plan was designed so as not to "arouse premature actions, not

to bring great reprisals on the people, and abort any eventual success."

(Lansdale, p. 11) .

*/

As Lansdale described his "concept of operation": for Möngoose in a

memorandum to the President on January 18, 1962, it was to "help the

Cubans from within Cuba" to overthrow the Castro regime through a

"revolt of the Cuban people." (Lansdale Ex. 3, p. 2).

NW 50955 DooId:32423539 Page 150

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## Page 151

=1u=

3. Bissell's Testimony Concerning Presidential Instruc-

tions to Act More Vigorously, But That Assassination Was Not Included.

Sometime in the early fall of 1961, Bissell was apparently called to

the White House and was said to have been

"chewed out in the Cabinet Room in the White House

by both the President and the Attorney General for,

as he put it, sitting on his ass and not doing any-

thing about getting rid of Castro and the Castro

regime."

NAME

This description comes from the testimony of Samuel Halpern, a middle-

level CIA covert action officer, who said Bissell told him about the

meeting, and directed him to come up with some plans. (Halpern, pp. 8,

36-37). Bissell said he

did not remember that precise meeting but that

he had been, in essence, told to "get off your ass about Cuba."

(Bissell, 7/25/75, pp. 37-38).

Bissell was asked whether he considered such an instruction

to constitute authority for proceeding to assassinate Castro. He said it

would not, and that "formal and explicit approval" would be required for

assassination action (Id., 38-39).

Bissell also testified that there was in fact no assassination

activity between the pre-Bay of Pigs/Roselli operation and his departure

from the Agency in February 1962.

In late 1961 Halpern became Harvey's Executive Assistant

on Task Force W, the CIA action arm of Operation Mongoose. le testified

that he never heard of the Roselli assassination

operation

Halper

pp. 15-16).

NoT

GRAM

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4.

The January 12, 1962 Meeting at Which the Attorney General Was

Quoted As Saying Cuba Should Have the "Top Priority" in the United States Government.

On January 19, 1962, a meeting attended by Lansdale, probably Helms, Helms' Executive

Assistant George McManus, and other representatives of the agencies involved in

Mongoose, took place in Attorney General Kennedy's office.* (McManus, p. 6).

Notes taken

at the meeting by McManus contain the following passages:

"Conclusion Overthrow of Castro is Possible"

"....

11

....'a solution to the Cuban problen today

carried top priority in U.S. Cov/ernmen/t.

No time, money, effort -- or manpower is to

be spared.'"

"'Yesterday ... the President had indicated to

him' that final chapter lad not been written --

its got to be done and will be done. "

(McManus Ex. 1, Memorandum, January 19, 1962, p. 2). McManus

stated that the words "the top priority in the U.S. Gov/ernmen/t -- no

time, money, effort or manpower is to be spared" had been spoken

Attorney General (McManus, pp. 8-9) .

TOT

*/ Others who attended the meeting were Brig. Gen. Craig, representing

the Joint Chiefs, Don Wilson of USIA, Major Patchell of the Secretary

CRET

AW 50955 DocId: 32423539 Page 152

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## Page 153

-17-

Helms stated that those words reflected the "kind of atmosphere"' on which he

relied for his perception that assassination was implicitly authorized. (Helms,

7/17, p. 60-61.) McManus, who wrote the memorandum, agreed that Robert Kennedy

"was very vehement in his speech" and "really wanted action" but McManus disagreed

with Helms perception, stating that "it never occurred to me" that the words

quoted above from Robert Kennedy included permission to assassinate Castro. (McManus,

p. 9.) Nor did the spirit of the meeting as a whole give McManus any idea that

assassination was

either contemplated or authorized. (Tr., p. 9-10.)*

5. General Lansdale's Mongoose Planning Tasks

On January 18, 1962, Lansdale assigned 32 planning tasks to the agencies parti-.

cipating in Mongoose. (Lansdale Ex. 3, Program Review of the Cuba Project.) In a

memorandum to the working group members, Lansdale emphasized that "it is our job to put

the American genius to work on this project, quickly and effectively. This demands a

change from the business as usual and a hard facing of the fact that we are in a com-

bat situation--where we have been given full conmand." (Lansdale memorandum, 1/20/62,

p. 1.)

The 32 tasks comprised a variety of activities, ranging from intelligence collec-

tion to planning for "use of U. S. military force to support the Cuban popular

* With respect to the question of priorities and emphasis in the Kennedy

Administration, there was a great deal of proof showing that Cuba

indeed had a high priority and the very existence of a high level

group like the Special Group Augmented further demonstrates its

importance. MacNamara, for example, stated that. "we were hysterical

about Castro at the time of the Bay

of Pigs and thereafter." (In

the same context, MacNamara stated "I don't believe we contemplated

assassination.)

(MacNamara, P. 93). Similarly, General Lansdale In-

formed the members of his inter-agency committee that Mongoose "demands

cler

a change from business-as-usual and a hard facing, of the fact that

you're in a combat situation where we have been given full command."

WAS

contemp

Inted

, Ex.

Memorandum, January 20, 1962, from Lansdale).

On the other hand, Sorensen

testified that "there were lots of top

priorities, and it was the job of some of /us/ to continually.tell

various agencies their particular subject was the top priority" and

although Cuba was "important" it was "fairly well down"on the list of

the President's agenda.

(Sorensen, p. 12). For example, when told

that his first letter to Khruschev

in the secret correspondence that

lasted two of three years would be "the single most important docu

ment you will write during your Presidency (sorensen, p. 12).

President Kenndy said,

"Yes, we get these every day over here."

NN 50955 DocId:32423539 Páge 153

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## Page 154

movement"' and developing an "operational schedule for sabotage actions inside

Cuba." (Lansdale Ex. 3, p. 5, 7.)*

In focusing on intelligence collection, propaganda and various sabotage actions,

Lansdale's tasks were consistent with the underlying strategy of Mongoose to build

gradually towards an internal revolt of the Cuban people. (See p. above.)

Lansdale transmitted a copy of the tasks to Robert Kennedy on January 18, 1962,

with a handwritten note stating "my review does not include the sensitive work I

have reported to you; I felt you preferred informing the President privately."

Lansdale testified that this did not refer to assassinations and that he "never took

up assassination with either the Attorney General or the President.'** Lansdale

testified that he could not precisely recall the nature of this "sensitive work'

but that it might have involved a special trip he made under cover to meet Cuban

leaders in Florida and to assess their political strengths. (Lansdale, p. 30.)

*There was testimony regarding one Lansdale plan that a witness thought was an example

of Lansdale's "perspicacity" in planning operations. Parrott, the Secretary to the

Special Group Augmented, testified:

"I'll give you one example of Lansdale's perspicacity. He

had a wonderful plan for getting rid of Castro.

This plan

consisted of spreading the word that the Second Coming of

Christ was imminent and that Christ was against Castro (who)

was anti-Christ.

And you would spread this word around cuba

ind then on whatever date. it was, that there would be a mani-

festation of this thing..

And at

that time--this is absolutely

true--and at that time there would be an American submarine

which would surface just over the horizon off of Cuba and send

up some starshells.

And this would be the manifestation of the

Second Coming and Castro would be overthrown..."

Well, some wag called this operation--by this time Lansdale was

something of a joke in many quarters--and somebody dubbed this

Elimination by Illumination. (Parrott, P.

**Harvey testified that he never received any instructions from Lansdale to under-

take assassinations, although as noted below (p.

), in August 1902, Lanscale aske

Harvey to consider the feasibility of a plan for the "liquidation" of Cuban leaders.

(Harvey, 7/ 175, p.

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## Page 155

- 19 m

Lansdale also referred, in a memorandum to the Attorney General on

January 27, 1962, to his feeling that "we might uncork the touchdown

play" "independently of the institutional

program we are spurring."

(Lansdale Ex. 4, p.1). Lansdale testified that in this memorandum the

phrase "touchdown play" was a "breezy way

of referring to "a Cuban

-revolt to overthrow the regime" rather than to a Castro

assassination.

(Lansdale, •p.45).

*/

The examples of such "plays cited in the memorandum

*/ The testinony was as follows:

"The Chairman: What precisely dimyou mean by "uncork the

touchdown play independently of the institutional programs

we are spurring?"

"General Lansdale: Well, I was holding almost daily meet-

ings with my working group, and - in tasking,, and finding

how they were developing plans I was becoming nore and more

concerned that they kept going back to doing what I felt were

pro forma American types of actions rather than actively ex-

ploring how to get the Cubans into this, and to have them

undertake actions.

"In me, the touchdown play was a Cuban revolt to over-

throw the repime. I did not feel that we had rotten into

the real internal part of getting Cubans into the action,

"Senator Baker: In the same context, is it fair to say that

the name of the game was to get rid of Castro or his regime...

and that touchdown play was one of several methods, that fa

might have been used for that purpose?"

SON MANG

"General Lansdale: Yes."

"Senator Baker: All right, now what was the touchdown play

that you had in mind here?"

"General Lansdale: Well, it was a revolt by the Cubans

themselves... a revolution that would break down the police

controls of the state and to drive the top people out of

power and to do that, there needed to be political actions

cells, psychological propaganda action cells, and eventually

when possible, guerilla forces developed in the country in

a safe place for a new government to set up and direct the

revolution that would eventually move into lavana and take over."

(Lansdale, pp. 45-56).

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## Page 156

• 2U .

(e.g.,

"stir up workers in Latin America and Cuba," work through "ethnic

language groups," "youth elements," or families through the Church") do

not contain any indication of assassination. (ansdale, Ex. 4, p. 1.)

On January 19, 1962, Lansdale added an additional

to those assigned on January 18. This "Task 33" involved a plan to.

"incapacitate" Cuban sugar workers during the harvest by the use of chemical

warfare means. (Lansdale, p. 29). Lansdale testified that the plan in

volved the use of non-lethal chemicals to sicken Cubans temporarily and

keep them away from the fields for a 24-48 hour period "without ill effects."

After initial approval for planning purposes (with the notation that it

would require "policy determination" before final approval), the plan was

ultimately cancelled after a study showed it was not feasible and before de-

bate by the SGA. (Lansdale, P. 29, Special Group Minutes, 1/30/62, p. 1.)

Lansdale's 33 tasks were approved for planning purposes

by the Special Group on January 30, 1962 (Minutes of Special Group meeting,

1/30/62, p. 1). Thereafter, on February 20, 1962, Lansdale detailed a

six phase

schedule for Mongoose, designed to culminate in October, 1962,

with an "open revolt and overthrow of the Communist regime." (Lansdale

Ex. 11, Program Review of the Cuba Project, 2/20/62, p. 2). As one of the

operations for the "Resistance" phase proposed for September, 1962, Lansdale

listed "attack on the cadre of the regime, including key leaders." (Id., p. 151).

Lansdale's plan stated:

*/ Lansdale's memorandum described the "touchdown plays!" as follows;"

TOP SECRET

"It may be & special effort which professional labor

operators can launch to stir up workers in Latin America

and Cuba. It may be through ethnic-language groups; Spain

has an untapped action potential. It could be a warming-up

of the always lively youth element in Latin America and

Cuba, through some contacts specially used.

the families through the Church, with families resisting the

disciplined destruction of social justice by the Communists.

It

could be an imaginative defection project which

echelon of the Communist gang now

running Cuba, "cracks the top

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- Li -

"This should be

a 'Special Target' operation

Gangster elements might provide the best recruit-

ment potential for actions against police -- 62

/intelligence/ officials." (Ia., p. 151). *1

Lansdale testified that early in the Mongoose opera-

tion he had suggested to the working level representatives of the Mongoose

agencies that they get in touch with "criminal elements" to obtain intelli-

gence and "possible actions against the police structure" in Cuba. (Lans-

dale, p. 104). But Lansdale conceded that his proposal to recruit

gangster elements for attacks on "key leaders! contemplated the targeted

killing of individuals, in addition to the casualties that might occur in

the course of the revolt itself. (Lansdale, p. 107).

These 33 plans of Lansdale were, however, never

approved for implementation by the Special Group Augmented. As

discussed below in greater detail (see p. . ), the Special Group Augmented

tabled Lansdale's six phase plan altogether in February 1962, and directed

Lansdale to plan for and conduct an intelligence collection plan only.

(Memo, 3/2/62; Minutes of Special Group Augmented Meeting, 3/5/62).

Lansdale's Rejection of a Suggestion That a Propaganda

Campaign, Including Rewards for Assassination, Be Explored

On January 30, 1962, the representative of the Defense Department and the

Joint Chiefs on the Mongoose Working Group forwarded for Lansdale's con-

sideration "a concept for creating distrust and apprehension in the Cuban

Communist Hierarchy" (Lansdale Ex. 1, Memorandum, 1/30/62, from Craig

to Lansdale, p. 1). This concept, titled Operation Bounty, was described as

a "system of financial rewards, commensurate with position and stature,

for killing or delivering alive known Communists." (Id., p. 2) Under the

concept, leaflets would be dropped in Cuba listing rewards, which

*/An earlier reference to use of gangster-type elements had appeared

in a CIA memorandum for the Special Group on January 24, 1962. Commenting

on Task 5 of Lansdale's original 32 tasks (which called for planning for

"defection of top Cuban government officials"), the CIA memorandum

that planning for the task will "necessarily be based upon an appeal made

inside the island by intermediaries"' and listed "crime syndicates" along

with other grouns as possible intermediarios.

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were proposed as.ranging.from $5,000 for an "inforner" to $100,000 for

"government officials."

A reward of "Le" was listed tor castro nim-

self.: (Id., p. 3). Lansdale

testified that price was designed "to deni-

grate

Castro in the eyes of the Cuban population." (Lansdale, Ir. 26).

Lansdale testified that he "tabled" this concept when

he received it, on the ground that "I did not think that it was something

that

should be seriously undertaken or supported further." (Lansdale, p. 26).

Lansdale did not bring the proposal before the Special Group Augmented.

6. The Control Sustem for Mongoose Operations.

In establishing the Mongoose Operation

on November 30, 1961, President Kennedy had emphasized that the Special

Group should be "kept closely informed" of Mongoose activities. (memo-

randun. by the President, 11/30/62; Goodwin, p. 1.

In practice, as Samuel Ilalpern, Harvey's Executive Assistant on

the CIA Mongoose Task Force W testified, this resulted in the submission

of "specific detailed plans for every activity carried out by the task

force." (Halpern, p. 16). Halpern testified that those plans were sub-

mitted "in nauseating detail:"

"It went down to such things as the gradients on the

beach, and the composition of the sand on the beach

in many cases. Every single solitary thing was in

those plans, full details, times,

events, weaponry,

how it was going to happen, who was going to do wha

... the full details of every single thing wea

(Halpern, p. 17) •

SECRET

Harvey similarly characterized the control process (ilarvey, 6/25,

p. 123), as one which required the submission of "excruciating detail" and

where it was understood that the Special Group Augmented was to be given

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an opportunity to debate and decide after weighing the strengths and

weaknesses of any given proposed action. (Harvey, 6/25, pp. 114, 124).

3.

The Documentary. Evidence

The documentary

evidence illustrates the tight control pro

cedures set out for Mongoose by the special Group Augmented. For example,

as discussed

above (p.

), Lansdale initially submitled 32 specific tasks

with his 'basic concept" on January 19, 1962

for consideration by

the Special Group Augmented. (Lansdale Ex. 3) After consideration

of Lansdale's concept and the 32 tasks

in February, the Special Group Mo

Augmented ordered Lansdale to cut back lis plan to limit it to au

intelligence collection program for the Harch-May 1262 period, rather

commenT

ON

AlSArS...

than the five-stage plan to culminate in an Detober 'popular revolution"

as originally conceived by Lansdale. (Memo 3/2/62, by bansdale) In

approving the intelligence collection program, the Special Group Aus-

mented pointed out that:

• . : any actions which are me specifically spelled

out in the plan but seem to be desirable as the pro-

ject progresses, will be brought to the special Group

for resolution.

(Helms: Ex. 1, 7/18, p.1)

In audition, the Guidelines for the Mongoose program

emphasized the Special Group Augmented's responsibility for control

prior approval of important operations:

"The Specinl Group (5412 Augmented) is respons

tor providing policy quidance to the (Monenolo)

project,

for approving important operations and for monitorin?.

progress.

(Guidelines for Operation iongoose, March 14,

1962, p.2)

Further indication of the Mongoose control process is the request

riven

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to Helms i month prior lo Harvey's tip on meet Roselli in Miami. Pur

sunnt to the discussion at the Special Group's meetins on March 5, Helms

was asked to estimate "for each week as far into the next twelve months

as possible... the members and type of agents you will establish

inside Cuba

... (and) brief descriptions ... of actions contemplated.'

(Memo to llelms from Lansdale, March 5, 1962)

Moreover, the approved plan for Operation Mongoose, as of

the time of llarvey's meeting with Roselli in Miami required that any

proposal to supply arms and equipment to particular resistanee

groups inside Cuba "be submitted to the Special Group for decision,

ad hoc." (Lansdale Memo to

• April 11, 1962, p.

And the Guidelines for the Mongoose program emphasized that, after specific

tasks were approved by the Special Group Augmented and given to participating

agencies by Lansdale, normal command channels were to be observed.

As the

Guidelines stated:

During this period, General Lansdale will continue

as Chief of Operations, calling directly on the

participating departments and agencies for support

and implementation of agreed tasks.

The heads of

these departments and agencies are responsible for

performance through normal command channels to

higher authority.

(Guideline for Operation Mon-

goose, March 14, 1962, p.2)

* The initial draft of these. Guidelines had referred to the President but

was later amended to read' "higher authority." (Draft Guidelines, March

5, 1962, p.2) The minutes of the consideration of these Guidelines were

also amended with respect to the manner in which the Guidelines were approved.

On March 16, 1962, a Memorandum for Record of "Discussion of Operation

Mongoose with the President" of the Special Group (Augmented) stated:

"In the presence of the Special Group (Augmented)

the President was given a progress report on Operation MO!-

GOOSE.

and were used as the basis of the discussion.

prolonged consideration of the visibility, noise level and

risks entailed, General Lansdale and the Special Group (Aug-

mented) were given tacit authorization to proceed in accordance

with the guidelines.

(footnote cont'a.)

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a Menorandum to McCone on April 10, 1962, Harvey recognized that the

Special Group Augmented control process required advance approval of "major

operations going beyond the collection of intelligence." But llarvey stated

that these "tight controls" were unduly "stultifying:"

"To permit requisite flexibility and professionalism

for a maximum operational effort against Cuba, the

right controls exercised by the Special Group and the

present time-consuming coordination and briefing pro-

cedures should, if at all possible, be made less

restrictive and less stultifying."

(Memo, April 10, 1962,.

Harvey to McCone, p.4) *

Even as the Cuban Missile Crisis approached, and the pressure to

act against the Castro regime increased through a 'stepped up" Mongoose

plan, the Special Group

continued to insist on prior approval of sensitive

operations.

Thus, when the Special

Group Augmented on September. 14,

1962, approved in principle a proposed

set of operations,

Year

(Footnote cont'a)

However, a note at the bottom of this memorandum, dated March 22, 1962,

stated:

This minute was read to the Special Group

(Augmented) today.

The Group

was unanimous in feeling

that no authorization,

either tacit or otherwise, was

given by higher authority.

The members of the Group

asked that the minute be amended to indicate that the

Group itself had decided to proceed in accordance with

the Guidelines.

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Bundy, speaking to the Group,

... made it clear that this did not constitute

a blanket approval of every item in the paper and

that sensitive ones such as sabotage, for example,

(Memo of Special Group Augmented

meeting, September 14, 1962, p.

Helms and the members of the Special Group Augmented differed on

whether or not these control requirements were consistent with Helms' per-

ception that

assassination was permissible without a

direct order. We

discuss that testimony below at

7. The Pattern of Mongoose Action. The documentary evidence and the

testimony reveal that the Kennedy Administration pressed the Mongoose opera-

tion with vigorous language and

although the collection of intelligence

information was

the central objective of Mongoose up until August 1962

sabotage and para military actions were conducted.f.Ih

najor sabotage operation aimed at a large cuban copper here?

iner rand other

sabotage operations.

As Lansdale described them in his testimony, the

acts involved 'blowing up bridges to stop communications and

blowing up certain production plants'

(Lansdale, p. 36). And during

the Missile Crisis in the fall of 1962, sabotage was increasingly urged.

*/ In early March, 1962, the SGA recognized the need to begin "preliminary

actions ... involving such things as spotting, assessing and training

action-type agents" but the Group agreed that it must "keep its hand

tightly" on these actions.

The Group saw, however, that such control

might not be completely effective and recognized "that many of the

agents infiltrated would be of an all-purpose type; that is, they would

be trained in paramilitary skills, as well as those of exclusively

intelligence concern. It was noted that once the agents are within the

country, they cannot be effectively controlled from the U.S., although

every effort will be made to attempt such control." (Minutes of

Special Group meeting, March 5, 1962).

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At the same time, however, the record shows that the Special Group Aug-

mented turned away

from proposed sabotage and similar violent action throughout

1962, including the period of the Missile Crisis. (See p.

above.) Thus, Helms

noted in

memorandum of

a meeting on October 16, 1052, that kohert Kennedy in ex-

pressing the "general dissatisfaction of the President" with Mongoose, "pointed

out

that (Mongoose) had been

underway for a year...that there had been no acts of sabo-

tage

and that even the one which had been attempted had failed twice". (Memorandum

by Helms, October 16, 1962, p. 1.) Similiarly a memorandum to Helms by his Execu-

tive Assistant (who spent full time on Cuba matters), which reviewed the Mongoose

prostam

in the aftermath of the Missile Crisis, stated:

"During the past year, while one of the options of the

project was to create internal dissension and resistance

leading to eventual U.S. intervention, a review shows

that policymakers not only shied away from the military

intervention aspect but were generally apprehensive of

sabotage proposals: (McManus, Ex. 2, p. 1, McManus, p. 11).

Harvey testified that this assessment of the Special Group Aug-

mented's position was an

accurate one. (Harvey, 6/25, p. ). This is

also borne out by the record of Mongoose

activity. For example, after

Lansdale's initial six phase plan to overthrow Castro by the fall of 1962,

the single phase approved for January August 1962 was described by Lans-

dale as "essentially an intelligence collection" effort. (Memorandum,

April 11, 1962, by Lansdale). Indeed, the guidelines for Operation Mor

approved on March 5, 1962, stated that the acquisition of

the "immediate priority objective of U.S. efforts

coning months."

(Taylor Ex. 3, p. 2, Guidelines for Operation Mongoose, March 14, 1962).

The Guidelines further stated that although other covert actions would be

undertaken concurrently with intelligence collection, these were to beon

a scale "short of those

reasonably calculated to inspire a revolt" in Cuba.

(Id., p. 2). And the Special Group stipulated that Mongoose action beyond

the acquisition of intelligence "must be inconspicuous." (Menorandum,

3/2/62, Lansdale, p. 3):

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With the scheduled conclusion of that intelligence collection

phase

in August 1962, the Special Group Augmented considered whether to

adopt a "stepped-up Course B plus," which, in contrast to Phase I, was

designed to inspire a revolt against the Castro regime. (Memorandum for

the Special Group Augmented, 8/8/62, from Lansdale, p. 1). Initially, the

Special Group Augmented decided against this course and in favor of a "CIA

variant," at a meeting of Special Group Augmented principals on August 10,

1962. (Minutes of Special Group Augmented meeting, August 10, 1962). The

"CIA variant," which was proposed by Melone on August 10, posited more

limited actions to avoid inciting a revolt and sought not Castro's over-

throw, but a split between Castro and "old-line Connunists!" (Id., p. 2).

The onset of the Missile Crisis caused an initial reversion to the

stepped-up Course B plan, but ultimately, however, an order was issued on

October 30, 1962 to halt all sabotage operations. (Lansdale, Ex.8, Memo

by Lansdale, 10/30/62)

Thus, on August 20, Taylor told the President that the Special

Group Augmented perceived no likelihood of an overthrow of the Castro govern-

ment by internal means

without direct U.S. military intervention, and

that the Special Group Augmented favored a more agressive Mongoose program.

(Memo from Taylor to President.) Shortly thereafter, on

August 23, McGeorge Bundy issued NSC Memo Number 181 to Lansdale and Taylor

stating that, at the President's directive, "the line of activity projected

for Operation MONGOOSE Plan B plus should be developed with all possible

speed." One week later, on August 30, the CIA was instructed by the Special

Group Augmented to submit a list of possible sabotage targets they might

propose

and it was noted that this list could serve as the limit for action

on the Agency's own initiative: "The Group, by reacting to this list, could

define the limits within which the Agency could operate on its own initiative."

Special Group Augmented Minutes of August 30, 1962.)

HW

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Thus, at a Special Group Augmented meeting on October 4, 1962, Robert

Kennedy stated that the President "is concerned about progress on the Mongoose

program and feels that more priority should be given to trying to mount sabotage

operations"'. And Robert Kennedy urged that "massive activity" be undertaken

within the Mongoose framework. In line with this proposal, the Special Group

Augmented decided that "considerably more sabotage" should be undertaken, and that

"all efforts should be made to develop new and imaginative approaches with the pos-

sibility of getting rid of the Castro regime"'. (Minutes of Special Group Aug-

mented meeting, October 4, 1962, p.

)*. On October 30, 1962, however, the

order to stop all sabotage operations was issued (Lansdale, Ex. 8) **

The SGA also decided

on October 4, 1962, that Robert Kennedy would chair

the Group's meetings

"for the time being." (Id., p.

). Subsequently,

at a meeting on October 16, 1962, Robert Kennedy stated that he was

going to give Mongoose "more personal attention" in view of the lack of

progress and would hold daily meetings with the working group represen-

tatives, i.e., Lansdale, llarvey, and the other Agency members.

(Harvey,

Ex. 12, Memorandum of Meeting, October 16, 1962, by Helms, p. 1). Helms

testified that he did not recall

any such daily meetings with the

Attorney General, but he had the

impression there may have been several

at first, but then they ceased. (Helms, 7/17/

, Pp. 54-55).

**Harvcy

testified

that he

had a "confrontation" with Robert. Kennedy

at the height of the Missile Crisis concerning Harvey's order that

agent teams be sent into Cuba to support any conventional U.S. mili-

tary operation that might occur.

Harvey stated that Robert Kennedy

"took a great deal of exception" to this order andras a result MeCone.

ordered Harvey to stop the agent operations. (Harvey, 7711, p./ 30-S1

Elder, McCone's assistant at the time, similarly described this inci

dent and stated that, although larvey had attempted to get guidance

from top officials during the Missile Crisis, Harvey "earned another

black mark as not being fully under control". (Elder, p. 34-35.)

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As Sorensen (a member of the Executive Committee established to deal with

the Missile Crisis) testified, even though Cuba was the "No. I priority" dur-

ing the Missile Crisis, and "all alternatives, plans, possibilities were ex-

haustively surveyed" during that time, the subject of assassination was never

raised in the high-level National Security Council Executive Committee (of which

Helms was not a member) that was formed to deal with the Missile Crisis.

(Sorensen, 7/21, p. 11.)***

***

there

are references in the Special Group Augmented records to

attacks

on Soviet personnel in Cuba.

The record of the SGA meeting on September y,

1962,

states:

"It was suggested that the matter of attacking and

harassing of Soviet personnel within Cuba should be

considered." (SGA Minutes, 9/9/62, p. ).

Earlier, on August 31, 1962, Lansdale had included a task "to provoke

incidents between Cubans and Bloc personnel to exacerbate tensions,

in a proposed projection of actions for Phase II of Mongoose.

(Memo-

•randum to SGA, 8/31/62, from Lansdale, Action No. 47).

The Special Group

thereafter decided, as

a means of "emphasizing such activity" to replace

that task with one to "cause actions by Cubans against Bloc personnel,"

and to note that "consideration will be given to provoking and conducting

physical attacks on Bloc personnel."

(Memorandum to Taylor, Rusk, and

MacNamara, 9/12/62, from Lansdale, pp. 1-2).

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E.

The Issue of Authority Outside the Agency

This section discusses the evidence as to whether there was authorization

from outside the Agency for the assassination activity that took place during

the Mongoose operation.

TR. 7/17, p.4)

As discussed below in detail, both Helms and the Kennedy Administration

officials agreed that no direct order was ever given for Castro's

assassina

tion and that

no one outside the Agency (including McCone) was informed

about the

assassination activity. Helms testified, however, that he believed

the assassination activity was permissible and that it was within the scope

of the authority given to the Agency. McGone and the other Kennedy Admini-

stration officials disagreed, testifying that assassination was not permissible

without a direct order and that a Castro assassination was not within the

authorized bounds of the Mongoose operation.

In April 1962, when the poison pills were given to Roselli in Miami,

Helms was the CIA. Deputy Director in charge of covert operations and reported

to McCone, the CIA Director. Helms had succeeded Bissell in this job,

following Bissell's retirement in February, 1962, as a consequence of the

failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion. Helms testified that, after the Bay

of Pigs, "Those of us who were still (in the Agency) were enormously anxious

to try and be successful at what we were being asked to do by what was then

a relatively new Administration.

We wanted to earn our spurs with the

President and with other officers of the Kennedy Administration." (Helms

1. Helms' Testimony Concerning Authority

As set forth below, Helms testified that while he doubted whether

he was initially informed that Harvey gave poison pills to Roselli and did

not recall having authorized a Castro assassination in that form, nevertheless,.

Helms had

authorized the 1962 assassination plot because "we felt that we

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were operating as we were supposed to operate, that these things if

not specifically authorized, at least were authorized in general terms."

(Helms, 6/13, p.61)

need cleaven

a.

Lis Perception of Authority

Helas testified that based upon the "'intense' pressure exerted by the

Kennedy Administration to overthro Castro it was his perception that the CIA

was at all tines acting within the scope of its authority with respect to

assassination activity. but, delms testified the dere ma nd dired ordet.

assassinate Castro from anyone, including the President of the Attorney General.

(lielms, 6/14, p. 83.) (Tiris point is discussed in detail infra p.__'_.)

(Helms, 6/13, p. 137: ilelms, 7/17, P. 62, 7/17=P. 1-5.) Helms testified that

this authority, as he perceived it, vas implicit in the U. S. policy and attitude

towards Castro. (Helms, 6/13, p. 165.) As llelms testified:

"I believe it was the policy at the time to get rid of castro

and it killing him was one of the things that was to be done

in this connection, that was within what was expected."

(ilelms, 6/13, p. 137.)

prossure

*The extent to which pressure in fact existed "to do something about Castro" is

discussed in detail in the section immediately above dealing with Operation Mon-

goose, its strategy of causing an internal revolt of the Cuban people against

Castro, the strict control system established by the Special Group Augmented, and

the pattern of intelligence collection and sabotage activity actually authorized

and undertaken.

NH 50955 DocId: 32423539 Page 168*

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Helms testified that "I remember vividly (the pressure to overthrow

Castro) was very intense." (Helms, 6/13, p. 26.) Helms stated that this pres-

sure intensified during the period of Operation Mongoose during late 1951 and

throughout

1962, and then continued on through much of 1963. (Helms, 6/13, p. 27.)

As these pressures rose, "obviously the extent of the means that one thought

were available, obvious increased too." (ilelms, 6/13, p. 20.)

Helms

stated that during the Mongoose Operations period "it was made abundantly

clear... to everybody involved in

the operation that the desire was to get rid of

the Castro regime and to get rid of Castro...the point was that no limitations

were put on this injunction." (lielms, 7/17, p. 16-17): In Helms' testimony,

the following exchange occurred:

"Senator Mathias:

'Let me draw an example from history.

When Thomas A. Beckett was proving to be an annoyance,

as Castro, the King said who will rid me of this man.

He didn't say to somebody go out and murder him.

He said

who will rid me of this man, and let it go at that.

"Mr. Helms: 'That is a warming reference to the problem.'

"Senator Mathias: 'You feel that spans the generations

and the centuries?!

"Mr. Helms: "I think it does, sir.'

"Senator Mathias:

'And that is typical of the kind of thing

which might be said, which might be taken by the director or

by anybody else

presidential authorization to go forward?'

"Mr. Helms: "That is right. But in answer to that, I re-

alize that one sort of grows up in [thel tradition of the

time and I think that any of us would have found it very

an enema the aron

difficult to discuss assassinations with a President of the

u.s.

I just think we all had the feeling that we're hired

out to keep those things out of the oval office.'

"Senator Mathias:

'Yet at the same time you felt that some

spark had been transmitted, that that was within the per-

missible limits?'

"Mr. Helms: 'Yes, and if he had disappeared from the scene

they would not have been unhappy.!!

(Helms Tr.: 6/13, pp. 72-73)

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Helms said that although he never was told by his superiors to kill Castro

(Helms, 7/17, p. 15), there was at the same time never any injunction laid down

by the Kennedy Administration that proscribed a Castro assassination: "No member

of the kennedy Administration...ever told me that (assassination) was proscribed,

(or) ever referred to it in that fashion..." (Helns, 7/71, p. 18.) "Nobody ever

said that (assassination) was ruled out...

"*/(Helms 7/17;

D. 43

Helms stated that during the Mongoose period, r

delivery of

0ISQ0

assassination of Castro, "with all the other things

that were

going

on at that

time...seemed to be within the permissible part of this effort." (welms, ú/13,

p. 99.)

"In the perceptions of the time and the things ve were trying to do this

vas one human life against many other human lives that were being lost."

(Helms, 6/13, p. 64.) K2/

*As Helms declared: "In my 25 years in the Central Intelligence Agency, I always

thought I was working within authorization, that I was doing what I had been

asked to do by proper

authority and when I was operating on my own I was doing

what I believed to be the legitimate business of the Agency as it would have been

era geno a at to ta de been

expected of me."

(Helms, 6/13, p. 30-31.)

**As set out above (p._,

Helms stated: "

...people were losing their-lives

in raids, a lot of people had lost their life at the Bay of Pigs, agents were

being arrested left and right and put before the wall and shot."

(Helms, 6/13,

p. 64.)

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b.

Helms' Testimony That He Had No Direct Order to Assassinate

Castro and Did Not Inform the President or the Special Group

of the Assassination Activity

Helms testified that there was no direct order to assassinate Castro.

ile said that his perceptions of authority did not reach the point where he could

testify

that he had specific instructions to kill Castro. Is he put it:

thee test fied a meet to la about

want to take refuge in saying that I was instructed to

specifically murder Castro. . ." (Helms, 6/13, p.88).

On the question of

whether

the President was informed of any

assassination plots, Helms pointed out that "nobody wants to embarrass a

President of the United States (by) discussing the assassination of foreign

leaders

in his presence" (6/13, p. 29), and that the Special Group was "the

mechanism that was set up. . .to use as a circuit breaker so that these

things did not explode in the President's face and that he was,

responsible for them." (6/13, p. 29). However

Helms

that he had "no knowledge that a Castro assass

ination was ever authorized

by the Special Group (Augmented)" (6/13, pp. 28-29).

In addition, Helms said he never informed the Special Group Augmented

or any member of that Group that Harvey had given the pills to Roselli

in Miami "because I am not even sure I knew about it at the time." (Helms,

7/18, p.18).$/ Helms also stated he never told Robert Kennedy about any

assassination activity and my "presumption is he wasn't informed" (Helms,

6/13, p.58), and that "Harve, kept (the Roselli pill plot) pretty much

in his back pocket." (Helms, 6/13, pp. 57-58) .

Helms further testified that although Robert Kennedy was "constantly

in touch" with him in 1962 and 1963, Robert Kennedy never instructed Helms

ast.

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to assassinate Castro:

"The Chairman.

'Since he was on the phone to you

repeatedly did he ever tell you

to kill Castro?'

"Mr. Helms. 'No.'

"The Chairman: 'He did not?'

"Mr. Helms: "Not in those words, no.'"

(Helms,

7/17, 8.13)*1

Any Not godd

,T.

poet: 142914

when learnon pont

Helms immediately reiterated after this exchange that his perception of

authority for a Castro assassination rested on the pressure exerted by the

Administration against Castro. The exchange between the Chairman and Helms

continued as follows:

"The Chairman: Well, did he ever tell you in other words

that clearly conveyed to you the message that he wanted

to kill Castro?'

'Sir, the last time I was (before the Committee), I

did the best I could about what I believed to be the parameters

under which we were working, and that was to get rid of Castro.

And I don't, I am sorry to say... see how one would have

expected that a thing like killing or murdering or assassinating

would become part of a large group of people sitting around a

table in the United States Government. I can't imagine any

I

can't imagine anybody wanting something in writing saying I

have just charged Mr. Jones to go out and shoot Mr. Smith."

(Helms, 7/17, PP. 13-14)

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Helms Testimony that he. Doubted Whether he had

Authorized a Specific Assassination Attempt or was Informed

of the Passage of the Pills

There is some doubt whether Helms ever authorized a specific attempt

at. Castro's assassination, or was informed of the passage of the pioson

pills to Roselli in April, 1962. Although Helms testified that Harvey

regularly

reported to Helms on Harvey's Mongoose work (Helms, 6/13, p.95),

and Helms

"would have thought" that Harvey would have reported to Helms

the transfer of the pills into Cuba (Helms, 6/13; p. 105), Helms does not

recall Harvey.

ever telling him that the pills were delivered to Roselli.

(Helms, 7/17, p.22).

Thus, as indicated

above, Helms, testified he never informed the Special

Group Augmented or any member of that Group that ilarvey had given the pills

to Roselli in Miami "because I am not even sure I knew about it at the time."

(tielms, 7/18, p. 18.)" And with respect to the pills, Helms testified that,

although he agreed to the llarvey-Rosellipperat lon

fand believed

thet es

implicit authorization for assassinatioglactivity) he testified ""I never re-

call having okayed the killing of Castro myself in that form." (Helms, 7/17,

p: 9.)

d.

Helms' Perception of Robert Kennedy's Position on a Castro

Assassination

In testifying as to his perception of authority, Helms emphasized the

particular role played by Robert Kennedy in pressing for progress

and results

*/ Helms' testimony that he may not have been informed that the pills were

delivered is corroborated by Harvey's testimony.

Harvey testified that

when he returned from Miami he reported to Helms on his contacts with

Roselli. But ilarvey said that he only "briefed Helms generally", on the

subjects of Harvey's lakeover of the Roselli operation, the prospects

of the operation, and the fact that Harvey lad dropped Maheu and Giancana

from the operation. (Harvey, 6/25, p.65) .

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Robert Kennedy often talked directly with Helms and other CIA officials

working on the Mongoose program, outside of the Special Group Augmented

channels. (Helms, 7/17, p. 13; 7/18, pp. 60-61). As lielms stated:

"I can say

absolutely fairly we are constantly in

touch with

each other in these matters.

The Attorney

General was on the phone to me, he was on the phone

to Mr. Harvey, to Mr. Fitzgerald, his successor.

He

was on the phone even to people on Harvey's staff, as

I recall it." (Helms, 7/17, p.13) .

Helms said that although he did not know whether a Castro

assassination would have been morally acceptable to Robert Kennedy,

Helms believed

that Robert Kennedy "would not (have been) unhappy if

(Castro) had disappeared off the scene by whatever means." (Helms,

7/17. p.17-18). And Helms stated that Robert Kennedy never told him

that a Castro assassination was ruled out. (Helms, 7/17, p.21).

However, Heims further testified that although Pobert. Kennedy was

"constantly in touch" with Helms and their exchanges were marked by de-

tailed, factual, and highly specific discussions on anti-Castro operations.

Robert Kennedy never raised the subject of a Castro assassination and never

instructed Helms to assassinate Castro.** Helms further testified that he had

no knowledge that Robert Kennedy "was ever asked to specifically approve

an assassination plot." (Helms, 6/13, p. 57.).

"So it was your impression that he was sort of setting the co

for

the group's action or activity."

A: "Oh, yes... there wasn't any doubt about that.

He was

very much

interested in this and spent a great deal of time

n. Vilelms,

6/13, p. 22.)

**The telephone records of the Attorney General?

Is office, Indicate frequent:

contact between the Attorney General and elms and'llelms stated that his

conversations with Robert Kennedy wereylcandid! and that "he and I used to

deal in facts most of the time."

(Helms 6/13, p. 63.) Helns lestified as

to the level of detail in his talks with Robert Kennedy:

"For example, we had projects to land sabotage teams.*/

Well, (the Attorney General would ask) have you got the

team organized, did the team go? Well, no, we've been

delayed a week because the weather is bad or the boats

don't run, or something of this kind.

It even got down

to that degree of specificity." (Helms, 7/17, p.40)

ast.

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And, as stated above, llelms also testified that "ilarvey kept Phase 2

(the Roselli pill operation) pretty much in his back pocket" and that al-

though llelms stated "I do not know this for sure," he testified it was

his "presumption" that Robert Kennedy was not informed of the Pllase 2

operation." (Helms, 6/13, P: 57-58.)

Helms' Testimony as to Why He Did Not Obtain a Direct

Ilelms testified that assassination "was not part of the CIA's policy"

or a part of CIA's "armory". (Helms, 6/13, p. 37-881) And, in his own

view, Helms

said that he "never liked

assassination". (And, in fact, banned

its

years after he became CIA Director.) (Helms, -

Moreover,

Helms testified that he had serious reservations regarding the

CIA working with underworld figures. (Helms, 7/18

p.31). When Harvey

developed, Helms "had very grave doubts about

Cuba

icould

be

the

wisdoms

underworld figures. (Helms, 6/13, Р.33; 7/18, р.31).

Despite these reservations, Helms did not seek approval for

the assassination activity because he said assassination was not

subject that he felt should be aired with higher authority.

pp. 31-32). With respect to the question of obtaining express authority

KA D

by

him

other

har

(Helms, 7/18, DC/:

*llelms based this presumption on a review of relevant documents at the

time of his testimony.

(Helms, 6/13, p.58) •

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from the Special Group or Special Group Augmented, Helms stated: "...

I didn't. see how one would have expected that a thing like killing or

murdering

or

assassination

would become a part of a large group of people

sitting around a table in the United States Government." (Helms, 7/17,

p. 14). And with regard to informing the President or obtaining explicit

authority from him, Helms

stated that "nobody wants to embarrass a Presi-

dent of the United States

(by) discussing the assassination of foreign

leaders in his

presence."

(Helms, 6/13, p. 29).

Thus, in the following exchange Helms stated that it "wouldn't have

occurred to me to ask" for clarification or express authority for assass-

ination activity from Robert Kennedy or the Special Group:

"Senator Huddleston: "

...it did not occur

to you to

inquire of the Attorney General or of the Special

Group or of anyone that when they kept pushing and

asking for action...to clarify that question of

whether you should actually be trying to assassinate?"

"Mr. Helms: "I don't know whether it was in training

experience, tradition or exactly what one points to,

.but I think to go up to a Cabinet officer

and say,

am I right in assuming that you want me to assassinate.

Castro or to try to assassinate Castro, is a question

it wouldn't have occurred

to me to ask."

***

"Senator Huddleston: "... (because assassination has such

serious consequences) seems to fortify the thought that

I would want to be dead certain, I would want to hear

it from the horse's mouth in plain, simple English language

I would want to undertake that kind of activity."

(Helms, 7/17, pp. 51-52).

Helms also pointed out his reason for

in the following exchange:

SECRET

"Senator Morgan: "In light of your previous statement

that this is a Christian country and that this Committee

has to face up to the prime moral issue of whether or not

killing is...acceptable...don't you think it would have

taken affirmative permission or authority to kill, rather

than just saying it was not eliminated from the authority

or you were not restricted...?"

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"Mr. Helms: "

...killing was not part of the CIA's policy.

It was not part of the CIA's armory...but in this Castro

operation...I have testified

as best I could about the

atmosphere of the time, what I understood was desired (and)

that this was getting rid of Castro, if he had been gotten

rid of by this means that this would have been acceptable

to certain individuals...I was just doing my best to do

what I thought I was supposed to do." (ielms, 6/13. pp.87-88).

When asked why he did not seek clarification from. the Special

Group, its members, or Robert Kennedy whether it was "in fact, the

policy of the U.S. Government to actually kill Fidel Castro," Helms

answered "I don't know..."

...There is something about the whole chain of episodes

in connection with this Roselli business that I am

simply not able to bring back in a coherent fashion.

And there was something about the ineffectuality of all

this, or the lack of conviction that anything ever

happened, that I believe in the end made this thing

simply collapse, disappear.

And I don't recall what I

was briefed on at the time.

Maybe I was kept currently

informed and maybe I wasn't, and today I don't remember

it... But I do not recall ever having been convinced

that any attempt was really made on Castro's life. And

since I didn't believe any attempt had been made on

Castro's life, I saw

no reason to pursue the matter

further."

(Helms, 7/18, pp. 31-32).

f. Helms' Perception of the Relevance of Special Group

Controls to Assassination Activity

The evidence concerning the control system established by the

Special Group

for the Mongoose Operation is discussed

above (see p.

Helms stated, however, that the control system established by the

Special Group for Mongoose was not intended to apply to assassination

activity. (Helms, 7/18, p.21). Thus, with respect to the Special Group

Augmented's decision on March 5, 1962 that major operations going beyond

stated that this referred to "rather specific

Group had on its agenda" from the outset of Mongoose:

(Helms, 7/18,x

p.21). Since assassination was not among such items, Helms statei?

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that the Special Group would not have expected assassination

activity to come under this particular policy. (Helms, 7/18,

p. 21). And with respect to the Special Group Augmented's desire

to "keep

its hands tightly on preliminary actions"

leading

towards

sabotage and other actions beyond intelligence collection,

Helms stated that was the kind of injunction "that appears in all

kinds of governmental minutes of meetings."

(Helms, 7/18, p.17).

HeIms said he regarded these as "general injunctions: rather than

an "all inclusive injunction" to keep the Group informed of all matters.

(Helms, 7/18, -. 17) •

Helms said he recognized, however, that there were limits on

permissible activity during Mongoose.*/ (Helms, 7/18, p.9). Thus,

Helms stated that

although there were "no limitations" on actions

to remove Castro during Mongoose, there were restraints on sabotage

operations and he did not understand the absence of specific limitations

to authorize

more

drastic actions, such as committing the U.S. military

to an invasion of Cuba. (Helms, 7/18, p.9).

In addition, Helms testified that he saw no need to inform the

Special Group of the Harvey-Roselli operation because that operation was

characterized by "ineffectuality" and a "lack of conviction that anyshing

ever happened." (Helms, 7/18, p.32). Helms stated he did

not-be

any attempt had been made on Castro's life by virtue

eetings

in Miami with Roselli. (Helms, 7/18, p.32).

*/ Helms testified, that although loss of life

was

implicit in the

Mongoose operations,

"I think there was an effort made not to take tacks

that would recklessly kill a lot of people and not

achieve very much. I think there was an effort, if you

had a sabotage operation, not to throw a lot of hand

grenades into a city, but rather take out the power.

plant which would actually damage the economy of the

country. There was an effort made to find devices that

would seem to have a useful end. (Helms, 7/17, p.63-64).

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2. Harvey's Testimony Concerning Authority

a. Harvey's Perception of Authority

Harvey stressed that at all times he was acting as a line officer re-

porting to his immediate superior within the Agency, the Deputy Director for

covert actions (first Bissell, then Helms.)* (Harvey, 6/25, p. 83).

Similarly, Harvey also pointed out that his information with respect

to authorization from outside the agency came from the Deputy Director:

"(a)t no time during this entire period...did I ever personally

believe or have any feeling that I was either free-wheeling or

end-running or engaging in any activity that was not in response

to a considered, decided U. S. policy, properly approved, admittedly,

perhaps, or through channels and at levels I personally had no in-

volvement in, or first-hand acquaintance with, and did not consider

it at that point my province to, if you will, cross-examine either

the Deputy Director or the Director concering it." (Harvey 6/25,

p. 83.)

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179

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## Page 180

39

Thus, Harvey relied upon his superiors within the Agency for authority.

Indeed, Harvey indicated that his perception of the authorization for the

1962 assassination activity may have come from the period when Allen Dulles

was DCI. As Harvey stated:

"But I d every wal to banteve put at that nothing

numanly,

that was being told to me by Bissell had not in fact

come to him from /Allen DullesT.

But Harvey made clear that this did not imply that McCone knew of or au-

thorized the assassination activity:

"The Chairman: "That doesn't necessarily mean that be-

cause the previous director had knowledge that Mr. McCone

had knowledge.

It is not like a Covenant that runs in

the land.''

ore they sues of course are and they don't always

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180

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b. Harvey and the Special Group Augmented

Harvey testified that he never informed the Special Group Augmented,

or any of its members individually, of the ongoing assassination plots. As

we described

earlier, the Special Group Augmented and its Mongoose program

began its Cuba activities in late 1961 through 1962. Harvey attended. many

of the Special Group Augmented meetings as the CIA's representative.

testified that at no time was assassination discussed at any of the meetings,

except for the August 10, 1962 meeting.*

here

CRuCIAL

We took substantial testimony covering the April/May 1962 period when

the underworld contact was reactivated, the pills were passed to Roselli and

goes to

delivered to Cuba.

Harvey had been appointed several months earlier as head

of the CIA's Task Force W, which operated under the Special Group Augmented as .

Loormean

the CIA's action arm for Mongoose activities.

test

In the latter part of April, Harvey went to Miami where the CIA had its

large (at least 200 persons) JM/WAVE Station. As Harvey testified, in addition

to his meeting with Roselli and the delivery of the poison pills, Harvey's trip.

had other totally unrelated (in Harvey's view) purposes as. well:

"...this was one of a number of periodic trips for the

purpose of reviewing in toto...the actual and potential

operations at the Miami base... and this covered the whole

gamut from personnel administration, operational support

in the way of small craft land] so on.. "(Harvey, 7/11

pp. 15-16) .

The Special Group Augmented expected to receive a

re

his April trip to Miami. On April 19, 1962, while

on Harvey on

was in Miami, Lansdale

told the Special Group Augmented that:

"Upon the return of Mr. Harvey from his current field visit,

more specific information on the status of agent training

and operations should be made available." (Memorandum for

* This meeting and the testimony concerning it is treated in depth in the

section, infra, pp._

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## Page 182

the Special Group, April 19, 1962, from Lansdale, P.-

). On April 26,

1962, the Special Group Augmented was informed by Lansdale that Harvey

was

in Florida "initiating a new series of agent infiltrations" and would

return to Washington on April 30. (Memorandum for the Special Group

/Augmented/, April 26, 1962, from Lansdale.) At the Special Group meeting

on the same day General

Taylor requested that Harvey "attend the next meet-

ing and report on agent activities." (Memorandum for the Record, April 26,

1962, by McCone.) The next day, April.

26, 1962, Harvey was sent a memorandum

informing him of General Taylor's request as well as the fact that McCone

wanted

to meet with Harvey and Lansdale "immediately on your return to dis-

cuss the Task Force activities," (Memorandum for Action, Elder to Harvey,

April 27, 1962.)

Harvey did report to the Special Group upon his return but did not

mention his meeting with Roselld or the delivery of the pills and the weapond.

Harvey testified that when he reported to the Special Group.

Augme

teda

individiat

on his trip to Miami, he did not inform them or, inde it?

an

outside the Agency, that he had given the pills to!

Roset11.

(Harvey, 7/11,

p. 16.)* And when McCone asked Harvey to brief him on what Harvey had done.

in Miami, Harvey did not tell McCone of the pills.As indicated above,

Harvey did not believe it was

necessary to do so. (Harvey, 7/11, p. 17.)*

 Harvey testified with respect to why he did not brief the Special Group Augmented,

in the following exchange:

"Q.: "...Did you believe that the White louse did not

want the Special Group to know?'''

"A.: "Well, I would have had no basis for that belief,

but I would have felt that if the White House (tasked)

this (operation to the CIA) and wanted the Special

Group to know about it, it was up to the White llouse

to brief the Special Group and not up to me to brief.

siti.

them, and I would have considered that I would have

been very far out of line and would have been subject

to severe censure."*

(Harvey Tr. 7/11, p. 77).

AW 50955 DocId: 32423539 Page 182

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## Page 183

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The minutes of the May 3, 1962, Special Group Augmented meeting make no

mention of Harvey's above-related plot activities. The minutes of that meet-

ing show that on his return from Miami, Harvey gave a progress report to the

Special Group Augmented on "agent teams" and the "general field of intelli-

gence". (Harvey, Ex. 3, Memorandum of Special Group Augmented Meeting, May

1962, p. 1.) Harvey reported that three agent teams had been infiltrated and

that 72 actual or potential reporting sources were also in place. (Harvey Ex. 3,

p. 1.)

Shortly after the May 3 meeting, General Taylor went to see the President to

give him what he called a "routine briefing" (Taylor Tr. — p. _

General Taylor's memorandum of his briefing of the President similarly makes

no reference to Harvey's contacts with Roselli or the delivery of pills and

guns. (Memorandum for Record May 7, 1962, by General Taylor.) Taylor testified

that he had never heard of Harvey delivering pills to poison Castro, or of any

assassination attempts. (Taylor Tr.

, p. 42.)

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3. Testimony of Kennedy Administration Officials

In addition to examining the actual nature of the Mongoose operation (discussed

above at p. _), we took considerable testimony from Kennedy Administration offi-

cials on the question of authority for a Castro assassination in the Mongoose

period. Set out in the section below is the testimony of the Kennedy Administra-

tion officials principally involved in the MOngoose operation and the Special Group

Augmented, all of whom testified the assassination plots were not authorized. These

were McCone, the Director of CIA and

a member of the Special Group Augmented;

General Taylor, Chairman of the Special Group Augmented; General Lansdale, Chief of

Operations for Mongoose; Special Group Augmented members Bundy and Gilpatric; Secre-

tary of State Rusk; and Secretary of Defense McNamara. Their testimony focused on

the principal issues raised by Helms, including? (1) whether any authority for a

Castro assassination existed; and (2) whether they had knowledge of any Castro assassi-

nation activity.*

In the succeeding section we discuss the August 10, 1962, meeting where the subject

of a Castro assassination was raised.

a.

Testimony of McCone

McCone testified that at no time during his service in the Kennedy Administration

as DCI (1961-1963), did President Kennedy, Robert Kennedy or any member of the Cabi-

net or White House staff discuss with him any Castro assassination plans or operations.

(McCone, p. 44.)

As discussed above in greater detail, McCone, the Director of Central Intelligence

and Helms immediate superior, testified he

did not authorize and was not informed

about, the assassination activity. (McCone, p. 3.)

*In addition, the Conmittee questioned the Kennedy Administration members as to the

likelihood that an assassination order might have been given to Helms by Robert

Kennedy through a "back channel"

, outside the normal chain of command; however,

Helms subsequently appeared and testified that no such order was ever given by

Robert Kennedy. (See p. _

above.)

AW 50955 DocId: 32423539° Page 184

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Mclone, pointed out that älthough the cuban problem was aiscussed in terms

of "&ispose of Castro," or "knock off Castro", these terms were meant to refer

to "the overthrow of the Communist Government in Cuba". and not a Castro assassi-

nation. (McCone, P. 44; McCone Ex. 4, memorandum April 14, 1967, to Helms.)

NcCone further stated that "it is very hard for me to believe"

that Robert Kennedy would have initiated a Castro assassination activity

without consulting with the Special Group Augmented. (McCone, p. 52).

b. Testimony of Taylor

Taylor served as Chairman of the Special Group Augmented

during the Mongoose Operation (Taylor, 7/9, p. ). In addition, Taylor

also served as President Kennedy's Military Representative and Intelligence

Advisor after the Bay of Pigs until his appointment as Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff in November 1962. (Taylor, 7/9, p. ; Bundy, 7/11,

p. 25).

Taylor testified that a Castro assassination plan was

- 32 marry

"never" submitted to the Special Group Augmented, either orally or in

proposen

writing. (Taylor, p. 41). Taylor further testified that he and the

Special Group Augmented were never told of the passage of the poison

pills to Roselli in April 1962, and that the passage of these pills

without the knowledge of the Special Group Augmented was "entirely,

completely out of the? context and character of the way the /Special

Group Augmented/ operated or the way it would accept" that an operation

was properly authorized. (Taylor, p. 43). And Taylor testified that

although the Special Group Augmented was "certainly anxious for the

downfall of Castro" an "assassination never came up" in the meetings

and discussions of the Special Group Augmented. (Taylor, p. 62).

With respect to whether President Kennedy or Robert

Kennedy or Robert Kennedy might have bypassed the Special Group Aug-

mented to deal directly with llelms or CIA officers to assassinate

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Castro, Taylor testified that this would have been "entirely con-

tradictory to every

method of operation I ever saw on the part

of

the President and his brother." (Taylor, p. 45). Taylor stated "the

President and the Attorney General would never have gone around" the

Special Group Augmented.

(Taylor, p. 49).

Although Taylor acknowledged that Robert Kennedy

frequently pushed for more direct action during Mongoose, Taylor

stated that "there was no suggestion /of/ assassination" in these urgings.

(Taylor, p. 67). Taylor testified that Robert Kennedy dealt directly

with Lansdale outside Special Group Augmented channels "only for the

purpose of imparting his own sense of urgency" but "never" would

Robert Kennedy have done so on substantive issues:

"Senator Hart of Colorado: But on substantive issues,

he wouldn't, in effect, been dealing behind your back?"

"General Taylor: Never. Never. That was not his way."

(Taylor, p: 53) .

_*/

C .

Testimony of Lansdale

Lansdale testified that he "was very certain" that

he never discussed a Castro assassination with either President Kennedy

* The evidence showed, however, that there were occasions when the

Attorney General dealt with those concered with Mongoose without

consulting General Taylor.

For example, as discussed in greater de-

tail (in the section on Mongoose operations) on January 18, 1962,

General Lanscale sent a copy of his program revion to dohert Kennoy

attached to which was a cover nomorandum indicating that other "sensi-

tive work" not in the review was to be dealt with only between the

res (rate astro te tired not a politic to mire if the cuba

exilc community) is discussed at p.

ight hav

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## Page 187

or Robert Kennedy:

de vou do pot recal eye having discussed with

Fidel Castro?"

"General Lansdale: No. And I am very certain Senator, that

such a discussion never came up...neither with the Attorney

General or the President." (Lansdale, P. 18.)*.

Lansdale further testified that the plausible deniability concept had no part

in the fact that he never discussed a Castro assassination with President Kennedy

or the Attorney General. ** Lansdale testified that he "had doubts" that assassina-

tion was a "useful action, and one which I had never employed in the past, and dur-

ing work in copying with revolutions and I had considerable doubts as to its utility

and I was trying to be very pragmatic." (Lansdale, p. 31.). When asked if he thought

the President was not aware of efforts to depose Castro and his government by any

means including assassination, Lansdale answered "I am certain he was aware of ef-

forts to dispose of the Castro regime. I am really not one to guess what he knew

of assassinations, because I don't know." (Id., p. 32.)

With regard to the Castro assassination attempts, Lansdale testified that

Harvey "never" told him that Harvey was attempting to assassinate Castro. (Lansdale,

p. 24.) Lansdale stated:

"I had no knowledge of such a thing. I know of no order

or permission for such a thing and I was given no infor-

nation at all that such a thing was going on hy people

who I have now learned were involved with it.

(Lansdale, p. 58). */

*/ Thus, when Lansdale was questioned about the

"touchdown plays"

(discussed in detail above at p.

), there was this testimony:

"Senator Baker: Now do you completely rule out the possibility

that the touchdown play had to do with the possible assassination

efforts against Fidel Castro?"

"General Lansdale: Yes... I never discussed, nor conceived, nor

received orders about an assassination of Castro with my dealings

with either the Attorney General or the President."

**/

"Senator Baker: Is that the reason you didn't, because of the

principle of deniability?"

"General Lansdale: No, it wasn't.

The subject never came up,

and I had no reason to bring it up with him.

11

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47

As discussed below in detail at pp

, after the subject

of a Castro

assassination was raised at the August 10, 1962 meeting of the

Special Group Augmented, Lansdale directed Harvey to prepare a plan for the

"liquidation" of Cuban leaders.

However,

no such plan was ever prepared and,

as the IG Report concluded, the August 10 meeting was "unrelated to any actual

attempts

at assassination." (IG, p. 118):

With respect to the possibility that Robert Kennedy

might have by-passed the SGA

and Lansdale to deal directly with Agency

officials on a Castro assassination, Lansdale testified:

"I never knew of a direct line of communication

between the President or the Attorney General and Harvey

apart from me on this....

During the course of the Committee's investigation

into these allegations of assassination efforts by the U.S. government,

however, General Lansdale spoke with several reporters concerning the

subject of a Castro assassination plan in 1902. Lansdale's comments lu

the reporters are dealt with below in connection with the August iu,

1962, mecting of the Special Group.

"Senator Huddleston:

You never had any reason to believe that

the Attorney General had dealt directly with Mr. Harvey?"

"General Lansdale: I hadn't known about that at all, no...

"Senator Huddleston:

...You have no reason to believe that he

might have broached (a Castro assassination) with the Attorney

General?"

"General Lansdale: I wouldn't know that -- I certainly didn't

knöw it. "

"Senator Huddleston: You had no reason to believe that there

was any kind of activity going on in relatión to Cubar-outside

of what you were proposing or what was coming before! the Special

Group?"

"General Lansdale: No, I was supposed to know it all, and I

had no indication that I did not know it all (except for one

operation by Harvey unrelated to assassinations)."

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d.

Testimony of Bundy

Bundy served as President Kennedy's Special Assistant

for National Security Affairs throughout the Kennedy Adninistration.

(Bundy, p. 2). In addition, Bundy participated in the planning that

led to the creation of Operation Mongoose and was

member of the

Special Group Augmented. (Bundy, pp. 34, 87).

Bundy testified that the matter of a Castro assassination

was

"mentioned from time to time" over the period 1961-1963 but "never to

me that I can recall by the President." (Bundy, p. 73). Bundy emphasized

that the question came up "as something to tall: about rather thin to

consider." (Bundy, p. 73.)

Bundy testified that it was his conviction that "no

one in the Kennedy Administration, in the White House

... ever gave

any authorization, approval, or instruction of any kind for any effort

to assassinate anyone by the CIA." (Bundy, p. 54). Bundy testified

that he knew

and worked on an intimate basis with both President Kennedy

and Robert Kennedy during the entire Kennedy Administration, and testi-

fied that it was "incredible" that they would have authorized a Castro

TOP SECRET

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assassination, either explicitly or implicitly as a result of pressure

they exerted in the anti-Castro effort:

"The Chairman: Based upon that acquaintanceship, do you

believe, under any of the circumstances that occurred

during that whole period, either one of them would have

authorized the assassination of Fidel Castro?"

"Mr. Bundy: I most emphatically do not ...

If you have

heard testimony that there was pressure to do something

about Cuba, there was.

There was an effort, both from the

President in his style and from the Attorney General in

his style to keep the government active in looking for

ways to weaken the Cuban regime. There was. But if you,

as I understand it, and not even those who pressed the

matter most closely as having essentially been inspired

by the White House can tell you that anyone ever said to

them, go and kill anyone.

Let me say one other thing about these two men, and

that is that there was something that they really wanted done,

they did not leave people in doubt, so that on the one

hand, I would say about their character, their purposes,

and their nature and the way they confronted international

affairs that I find it incredible that they would have

ordered or authorized explicitly or implicitly an assassi-

nation of Castro. I also feel that if, contrary to every-

thing that I know about their character, they had had such a

decision and such

a purpose, people would not have been in

any doubt about it." (Tr. 98-99).

Bundy was asked "have you any way to explain to the Com-

mittee, as to why Mr. Helms would testify that he...had no doubts,

that the Agency was fully authorized to proceed to not only develop

schemes, but to engage in active attempts to assassinate Castro?"

Bundy replied:

"I have no explanation of that" (Bundy, pP. 99-100) •

Bundy further testified that despite the extreme sense of

urgency that arose during the Cuban Missile Crisis, Castro's assassi-

nation was never discussed, and it was "totally inconsistent" with the

policies and actions taken by the President and Robert Kennedy in that

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crisis for them to have authorized a Castro assassination. (Bundy, P. 95,

97-93).*

Bundy further stated that he was never told by anyone that assassination

efforts were underway against Castro, that undervorld figures were hired by

the CIA in this regard, or that larvey was engaged in Castro assassination ac-

tivity. (Bundly, p. 63.)

Bundy testified that he heard about the concept of "exccutive action"

why!

"Some time in the carly months of 1961". (Bundy, 7/11/75, P. 4.) But since

this was presented to him as an untargeted capability only he did not "is-

courage or dissuade" the person who briefed him on this. (Bundy, p. 1, 7, 10.)

When asked if he had any recollection of any specific covert plans that involved

poisons in conjunction with activities against Cuba, Bundy stated

"I have no recollection of any specific plan.

I do

have a very vague, essentially refreshed recollection

that I heard the word poison at some point in connec-

tion with a possibility of action in Cuba.

But that

is as far as I have been able to take it in my own

memory. (Bundy, p. 42) .

Bundy stated further that this recollection relating to poison involved a

proposal that seemed "impractical" because it was going to kill a large group

of people in a headquarters mess, of something of that sort." (Bundy, p.42-43).

*/ Bundy stated:

... the most important point I want to make is

is that

I find the notion that they separately, privately encouraged,

ordered, arranged efforts at assassination totally incon-

sistent with what I knew of both of them. And, as an

example, I would cite - and one among very many -- the role

played by the Attorney General in the Missile Crisis, because

it was he who, most emphatically, argued against a so-called

surgical air strike or any other action that would bring

death upon many, in favor of the more careful approach which

was eventually adopted by the President in the form of a

quarantine or a blockade." (Bundy, p. 98).

NN 50955 DooId: 32423539 Page 191

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With respect to the possibility that Robert Kennedy

may have authorized assassination outside of Special Group Augmented

channels, Bundy stated that although Robert Kennedy did spur people

to greater

effort during Mongoose, "he never took away from the

existing channel of authority its authority or responsibility."

(Bundy, pp. 47-48). Bundy further testified that there existed be-

tween Robert Kennedy and Maxwell Taylor (the Special Group Augmented

Chairman) "a relation of real trust and confidence." In view of this

relation, Bundy stated it was his opinion that Robert Kennedy would

not have by-passed Taylor to develop a "back-channel" relationship

with someone else to assassinate Castro. *(Bundy, p. 87).

e.

Testimony of MacNamara

MacNamara, served as Secretary of Defense throughout

the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations. In that capacity, he rep

sented the Department

of Defense as

a member of the Special

the Special Group Augmented during the Mongoose Operation

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McNamara stated that he had no knowledge or information of any proposal

for the assassination of Premier Castro coning from President Kennedy or

Robert Kennedy. (Ic Namara, 7/11/75, p. 4.) He did note that "we were hysteri-

cal about Castro at the time of the Bay of Pigs and thereafter, and that there

was pressure fron! (President Kennedy and Robert Kennedy) to do something about

Castro. But I don't beliove we contemplated assassination.

l'e did, however,

contemplate overthrow." ('cNamara, p. 93.)

There occurred during NcNamara's testimony an exchange which is appropriate

to set out in full because of the manner in which it captures the dilemma posed

by the evidence on the question of authority:

" The Chairman.

We also have received evidence

• from

your senior associates that they never participated in

the authorization of

an assassination attempt against

Castro nor ever directed the CIA to undertake such

attempts.

We have much testimony establishing the chain of

command where covert action was concerned, and all of

it has been to the effect that the Special Group or

the Special Group Augmented had full charge of covert

operations, and that in that chain of command any proposal

of this character or any other proposal having to do

with covert operations being directed against the

Castro regime, or against Castro

personally, were to

be laid before the Special Group Augmented and were not

to be undertaken except with the authority of that

group and at the direction of that group.

Now, at the same time we know from the evidence

that the CIA was in fact engaged during the period

in a series of attempts to assassinate Castro.

Now, you see what we are faced with is this dilemma.

Either the CIA was a rogue elephant rampaging out off

control, over which no effective direction was being

given in this matter of assassination, or there

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some secret channel circumventing the whole structure

of command by which

the CIA and

certain officials in

the CIA were

authorized to proceed with assassination

plots and

assassination attempts against Castro. Or the

third and final point that I can think of is that

somehow these officials of the CIA who were so engaged

misunderstood or misinterpreted their scope of authority.

Now it is terribly important, if there is any way that we

can find out which of these three points represented what

actually happened. That is the nature, that is the

quandary.

Now, is there anything that you can tell us that would

assist us in finding an answer to this central question?

Mr. McNamara.

I can only tell you what will further your

uneasiness.

Because I have stated before and I believe

today that the CIA was a highly disciplined organization,

fully under the control of senior officials of the govern-

ment, so much so that I feel as a senior official of the

government I must assume responsibility for the actions

of the two, putting assassination aside just for the

But I know of no major action taken by CIA during

the time I was in the government that was not properly

authorized by senior officials. And when I say that I

want to emphasize also that I believe with hindsight we

authorized actions that were contrary to the interest of the

Republic but I don't want it on the record that the CIA

uncontrolled, was operating with its own authority

and we can be absolved of responsibility for what CIA

did, again with exception of assassination, again which

The second point you say that you have, you know that

CIA was engaged in a series of attempts of assassination..

I think to use your words. I don't know that.

the fact that you do and that you have information I was

not aware of. I find that impossible to reconcile. I just

can't understand how it could have happened and I don't

accept the third point, that they operated on the basis

of minunderstanding, because it seems to me that the

McCone position that he was opposed to it, hts, clear

recollection and his written memo of 1967

tlawas strongly

opposed to it, his statement that Murrow oppo

Yall should

eliminate any point of misunderstanding.

So

apkly can't

reconcile. (TR. 38-41)

McNamara further stated that "I find it almost inconceivable?

assassination

attempts were carried on during the Konnedy Aninist

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days without the senior members know it, and I understand the contradiction that

this carries with respect to the face." (McNamara, P. 4.) He further emphasized

that for the President or Robert Kennedy to have approved a Castro assassination

was "totally inconsistent with everything I know about the two men." (McNamara

p. 90.)

f. Testimony of Gilpatric

Gilpatric served as Deputy Secretary of Defense throughout the Kennedy Admini-

stration. (Gilpatric, P. 5; Gilpatric Ex. 1, P. 5.) In that capacity, Gilpatric

represented the Department of Defense as a member of the Special Group and the

Special Group Augmented during the Mongoose operation. (Gilpatric, p. 5.)

Gilpatric testified that he understood the mandate of

the Special Group during Mongoose was not to kill Castro, but to "so under-

mine,

so disrupt

the Cuban system under Castro that it could not be

effective."* (Gilpatric, p. 28). Gilpatric emphasized that "it was the

system we had

to deal with" and words such as "get rid of Castro" were

said "in the context of the system, of the .... gove

ahmen

whe had installed

and was presiding over, but of which (CastroT was only

(Gil-

patric, p. 29).

* Initially in his first appearances before the Committee Mr. Gilpatric

was unable to recall

any of the events or characters involved in Operation

Mongoose.

He failed to recall that General Lansdale was the Chief of

Operations for the project, or Lansdale's involvement in the Special

Group Augmented even though Gilpatric recommended Lansdale for pro-

motion to Brigadier General.

Gilpatric testified that the lapse of time,

approximately fifteen years, had impaired his memory on these events.

(Gilpatric, pp. 6-9.) (Insert possible proposed additional language by

Smothers.)

st.

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-. "

Gilpatric said that he knew of no express restriction

that would have barred the killing of Castro.

But Gilpatic testified that

he understood "There were limits on the use of power" and that these pre-

cluded the use of

assassination. (Gilpatric, p. 31). Thus, while Gil-

patric said that it was "perfectly possible" that one might reasonably

have inferred assassination was authorized, nevertheless, the limits on

action

set down by the Special Group Augmented would have

required that specific efforts be made by one receiving general instructions

to clarify whether those instructions authorized assassination.*/ He added

that "within our charter, so to speak, the one thing that was off limits

was military invasion." (Id. p. 45). In this context of the ingonse

charter, Gilpatric, when asked whether the "killing of Castro by a para-

military group (would) have been within bounds." he responded, "I know of

no restriction that would have barred it." (Id.) In response to a ques-

tion as to whether

there was any concern for the limits on the activities

of personnel involved in these raids and infiltration efforts, Gilpatric

said: "No, to the contrary. The complaint that the Attorney General had,

if we assume he was reflecting the President's views on it, [was that/ the

steps taken by the CIA up to that point, Land/ their plans were too petty,

were too minor, they weren't massive enough, they weren't going

to be ef-

fective enough." (Id., p. 47.) However, as discussed above at p.

on March 5, 1962, the Special Group Augmented had agreed, with respect to

"action-type" agents, that it "must keep its hand tigh

on these agents*

activities, and although once such agents were inside Cuba, they could not

be "effectively controlled," the Group would make "every effoft...to attempt

such control."

*/ In Gilpatrir's testimony, there was the following exchange:

"Senator Huddleston:...It's on the basis of these words that

everybody admits were used, like replace or get rid of

• on

the basis of these kinds of conversation alone that /Helms?

was firmly convinced

and that apparently went right down

through the whole rank of command, firmly convinced that he

had the authority to move against the life of a head of state.

(Footnote continued on next page.)

pusht

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Gilpatric testified that "it was not unusual" for Presi-

dent Kennedy and Robert Kennedy to deal directly

with people at various

levels in the Executive Branch. (Gilpatric, p. 58). With respect to Mon-

goose, Gilpatric said that Robert Kennedy was the "moving spirit" (Gil-

patric, p. 11). But Gilpatric stated that Robert Kennedy's role was "prin-

cipally to spur us on, to get going, get cracking." (Gilpatric, p. 47). Thus,

although Robert Kennedy frequently complained that the plans of the CIA and

Mongoose weren't "massive enough" and that "we should get in there and

do more," Gilpatric pointed out that Robert Kennedy was not making specific

proposals in these urgings,

and the result he desired was a general one

"to limit the Castro regime's effectiveness," rather than any specific measure.

(Gilpatric, p.°47).

% -

Testimony of Rusk

Dean Rusk served

as Secretary of State throughout the

Kennedy Administration.

Rusk participated in a number of Special Group

Augmented meetings during the Mongoose operation. (Kusk, p. _).

(Footnote

continued from previous page.)

Now this disturbs me, and I don't know whether our councils of govern-

ment operate that way

in all areas or not, but if they do then it seems

to me it would raise a very serious

question as to whether of not the

troops are getting the right orders.

"Mr. Gilpatric...I thought there were limits on the use of powers and

that was one of them."

"Senator Huddleston. And going beyond that would require that some?

body make a specific effort to make sure he understood preciselyivrat,

they were talking about, would that be your interpretation?"

"Mr. Gilpatric. It would." • (Gilpatric, p. 31).

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Rusk testified that he had never been informed of any

Castro assassination plans or undertakings and had no knowledge of

any

such

activity. (Rusk, p. 52) .

Rusk further testified that he found it "very hard to

believe" that President Kennedy or Robert Kennedy would have, in the course

of urging

action

against Castro, sanctioned the use of any measure against

Castro.*/

Rusk

said that, while it was "possible" that a person, in good

faith, might have thought specific courses of action were authorized from

the emphasis given to taking action against Castro, nevertheless Rusk testi-

fied that with respect to a Castro assassintion,

"It would have

been an abuse of, the President and the

Attorney General if

somebody had thought they were

getting that without confirming that this was,

in fact,

an official, firm

policy decision. (Rusk, Pp. 98-99).

with respect to whether President Kennedy or Robert

Kennedy might have communicated directly with Helms or Harvey on a Castro

assassination effort, Rusk testified that, based on his experience and the

manner in which

foreign affairs matters were handled, I don't see how it could

have happened."

(Rusk, p. 99).*x/

*/ "Senator Huddleston... (Do) your contacts with Robert Kennedy or Presi-

dent Kennedy, indicate to you that they were agitated to such an extent

about Cuba and Mongoose progress that in a conversation with someone

urging them to get off their rear-end and get something done that they

might convey the message that they meant anything, go to any length to

do something about the Castro regime?

"Mr. Rusk.

I find it very hard to believe that Robert Kennedy standing

alone, or particularly Robert Kennedy alleging to speak for president

Kennedy, would have gone down that trail...

**/"Senator Mondale...We asked General Taylor yesterday whether he thought

something of informal, subterranean, whatever kinds of communications

from the highest level

to Helms would have been possible without his

(Footnote continued on following page.)

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h. Testimony of Sorensen

Sorensen served as a Special Assistant to President Kennedy during

the entire Kennedy Administration. Sorensen was a member of the National Security

Council Executive Committee that dealt with the Missile Crisis, although he

was not involved with Mongoose.

Sorensen testified that in his daily personal meetings with the

President and at all the National Security Council meetings he attended, there

"not

at any time any mention -- much less approval by him -- of any U.S.-

sponsored plan to assassinate any foreign leaders" (Sorensen, p. 4). Based

upon his close contact with President Kernedy, Sorensen stated that it was his

opinion that:

"such

an act (as assassination) was totally foreign to his

character and conscience, foreign to his fundamental reverence

for human life and his respect for his adversaries, foreign to

his insistence upon a moral dimension in U.S. foreign policy

and his concern for his country's reputation abroad, and

foreign to his pragmatic recognition that so horrendous but

inevitably counter-productive a precedent committed by a

country whose own chief of state was inevitably vulnerable."

(Sorensen, p. 5).

(Footnote continued from previous page.)

knowledge, and he said he felt that was incredible, he didn't think it

was possible.

Do you think that it would be likely that an informal

order around

channels, say to Helms or to Harvey--

The Chairman.

Over a three-year period.

Senator Mondale. Over a three-year period would have been possible

without your being informed?

Mr. Rusk. Theoretically, Senator, one would have to say itfis possible.

Senator Mondale. But based on your experience?

Mr. Rusk. In terms of practicality, probability and so forth, I don't

see how it could have happened.

You know those things, in these circles we were moving in could not

be limited in that way.

You know the echoes would come back."

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F. The August 10, 1962 Meeting

As indicated above (see p.

), the question of a Castro assassination

was raised

at a meeting of the Special Group Augmented on August 10, 1962.

Thereafter, on August 13, 1962, Lansdale directed Harvey to include in a

proposed

plan

for Phase II of Mongoose a plan for the "liquidation of leaders"

as an option. We took considerable testimony and examined the documents

relating to the August 10 meeting, the nature of the discussion of a Castro

assassination, and Lansdale's subsequent request for a contingency plan.

Du

At the

outset, it should be noted that the documents and testimony

showed that discussion of a Castro assassination at the Agust 10, 1962 meeting

had no connection to the assassination activity undertaken by Harvey and

Roselli, or

any other Castro assassination plans or efforts. As the CIA

Inspector General found:

"The subject (of a Castro assassination) was raised

at a meeting at State on 10 August 1962, but it is

unrelated to any actual attempts at assassination.

It did result in a MONGOOSE action memorandum by

Lansdale assigning to CIA action for planning

liquidation of leaders. (IG, p. 118).

The finding of the Inspector General is supported both by the chrono-

logy of the Castro assassination efforts and the testimony of Harvey. The

chronology shows that it was three months prior to the August 10, 1962 meet-

ing that Harvey gave Roselli the poison pills for use against Castro, and

that shortly thereafter (and well before August 10, 1962) Harvey was informed

-

that the pills were inside Cuba. (see p. _: above). Moreover, after the

August 10, 1962 meeting there was no Castro assassination activity during

the remainder of

1962. see p.

above).

In addition, Harvey (who attended the August 10, 1962 meeting and

Bunny

never

we

LAnT

they

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recalled that the question of a Castro assassination was raised) declared

that the discussion was not related to his assassination activity with Ro-

selli. (Harvey, 7/11, pp. 48-50). Harvey further testified that he did not

view the August 10, 1962, discussion of a Castro assassination as authoriza-.

tion for the Roselli operation because "the authority, as I understood it,

for this particular operation went back long before the formation" of the

Special Group Augmented. (Harvey, 7/11, P. 49):

1. The Contemporaneous Documents

a. Lansdale's August 13, 1962. Memorandum

Following the August 10, 1962 meeting, Lansdale sent a memorandum

on

August 13, 1962, to Harvey and the other

members of Lansdale's interagency

working group.*/ (Lansdale Ex. 15, Memorandum from Lansdale, August 13, 1962).

The Memorandum began by stating: "In compliance with the desires and guidance

expressed in the August 10 policy meeting on Operation Mongoose, we will

produce an outline of an alternate Course B for submission." (Lansdale

Ex. 15, p. 1).

Lansdale further set out his concept of what was required: "I be-

lieve the paper need contain only a statement of objectives and a list of

implementing activities. The list of activities will be under the heading

of: Intelligence, Political, Economic, Psychological, Paramilitary, and

Military." (Lansdale Ex. 15, p. 1).

* In addition to Harvey, copies of Lansdale's August 13, 1962, memorandum were

sent to Robert Hurwitch (State Dept), Gen. Benjamin Harris (Defense Dept) and

Don Wilson (U.S. Information Agency). (Lansdale Ex. 15.)

In his testimony, Gen Harris identified a document drafted by the Mongoose Work-

ing Group in the

Defense Dept shortly before the August 10 meeting. The document

listed a number of steps that could be taken in the event of an intensified. Mon-

goose program that might involve U. S. military

intervention. One such step was

"assassinate Castro and his handful of top men." (Harris Ex. 4.) Gen. Harris

stated that this was "not out of the ordinary in terms of contingency planning...

it's one of the things you look at.

(Harris, p. 37) There was no evidence that

this document was distributed outside the Defense Dept's Mongoose working group.

NN 50955 DocId: 32423539 Page 201

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Lansdale's memorandum then assigned to Harvey papers on the following

subjects by the means of the following passage, which contained a deleted

phrase:

"Mr. Harvey: Intelligence, Political, Iwords deleted,

Economic, (sabotage, limited deception), and Paramilitary."

(Lansdale,

Ex. 15, p. 1).

According to a memorandum by Harvey to Helms the following day, August

14, 1962, the words deleted from the above-quoted passage were "including

liquidation of leaders." (Lansdale Ex. 16, Memorandum by Harvey, August 4,

1962, to Helms).

b. Harvey's August 14, 1962 Memorandum

When Harvey received Lansdale's August 13 memorandum, Harvey wrote

a memorandum to Helms attaching a copy of Lansdale's August 13 Memorandum, and!

noting that Harvey had excised the words "including liquidation of leaders."

(Lansdale Ex. 16, Memorandum, August 14, 1962, from Harvey to Helms). Har-

vey's Memorandum stated:

"The question of

assassination, particularly of

Fidel Castro, was brought up by Secretary McNamara

at the meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) in

Secretary Rusk's office on 10 August. It was the

obvious consensus at that meeting, in answer to a

comment by Mr. Ed Murrow, that this is not a sub-

ject which has been made a matter of official

record. I took careful notes on the comments ati

this meeting on this point, and the Special Group

(Augmented)

is not expecting any written comments

or study on this point.

(Lansdale Ex. 16).

Harvey's memorandum further stated that, on receipt of Lansdale's

memorandum, Harvey had

called Lansdale's office and pointed out "the inad-

missibility and stupidity of putting

this type of comment in writing

in such

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a document," and that the CIA "would write no document pertaining to this

and would participate in

no open meeting discussing it." (Lans'dale Ex. 16,

p. 1).

c.

The Minutes of the August 10, 1962 Meeting

The minutes of the August 10 meeting contain no reference to the sub-

ject

of

a Castro

assassination. (Memorandum for Record, Special Group Aug-

mented Meeting, August 10, 1962, by Parrott, hereafter referred to as the

"August 10 Minutes"). Parrott, the author of the August 10 Minutes, testi-

fied that he did not recall a discussion of

assassination at that meeting,

but the fact that the minutes do not reflect such a discussion is not an

indication that the matter did not come up. (Parrott, p. 34). Parrott

pointed out that his minutes "were not intended to be a verbatim transcript

of everything that was said," since the purpose of his minutes was "to

interpret what the decisions were and to record those and to use them as

a useful action document." (Parrott, 34-35). Parrott testified:

"we had 15 or 16 people (at the August 10, 1962

meeting)...all of them well informed, all of

them highly articulate.

This meeting, as I recall, went on for several

hours... Now

I'm sure that

particularly in a

group like this that there were a great many

proposals made that were just shot down

immediately." (Parrott, P. 34-35).

Parrott further testified that he did not record proposals that were

- quickly rejected at the August 10 meeting. (Parrott, p. 35). Parrott

stated that, although he had no recollection of a discussion of Castro's

assassination at the August 10 meeting, he would infer from the related

ціль.

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documents (the Lansdale and Harvey Memoranda of August 13 and 14) that the

subject was raised but "it never got off the ground....Therefore, I did not

record it." (Parrott, p. 35).

The documents and testimony of Parrott suggest several possible in-

ferences with respect to the nature of the discussion of a Castro

assassination

at the August 10 meeting. First, as indicated by the Lansdale and Harvey

memorandum, it is possible that

a contingency plan was requested but that it

was decided

not to make this "a matter of official record." (Lansdale

Ex. 16, p. 1). However, if it had been decided to commission a written

contingency plan, as Lansdale requested Harvey prepare, it is difficult to

see how this request could have been reconcilèd with a decision to make to

written record.

Second, it is possible that, as Parrott's testimony indicated, the

subject was raised but quickly rejected. This inference is apparently con-

sistent with the fact that the subject did not appear in Parrott's minutes,

and perhaps, although less so, with Harvey's August 14 Memorandum. Harvey's

Memorandum states that the Special Group Augmented "is not expecting any

written comments or study on this point." (Lansdale Ex. 16, p. 1) .

Before turning to the testimony on these questions, we discuss the

context of the August 10 discussion of a Castro assassination as reflected

in the minutes of the August 10 Meeting•

plansible

consis ont

do the

plan

dums

(amo

a. The August 10 Meeting

The August 10 Meeting was held to decide upon a further course of action

to succeed the intelligence collection phase of Mongoose which was scheduled

to conclude in August.

(McCone, p. 34). As a policy meeting, there were in

Fats.

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-64-

attendance

a larger number of officials than usually participated in Special

Group Augmented meetings.

The Meeting was chaired by Secretary of State

Rusk (and held

in his office), and attended by a total of 15 officials,

including the

principals of the agencies taking part in Mongoose, 1.e.,

Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, CIA Director McCone, and USIA Director

Murrow.

At the August 10 meeting, General Lansdale proposed that a "stepped-up

Course B"' be adopted for Mongoose, (August 10 Minutes, p. _). This plan

involved operations

to "exert all possible diplomatic, economic, psychologi-

cal, and other overt pressures to overthrow the Castro-Communist regime, without

overt employment of U.S. military." (Memorandum for Special Group Augmented,

August 8, 1962, p. 1) .

However, the Special Group Augmented decided against consideration of

the "stepped-up Course B"'. In the discussion of Lansdale's Course B proposal,

Rusk "emphasized the desirability of attempting to create a split between

Castro and old-line Communists". (August 10 Minutes, P. 2). In addition,

McNamara questioned whether the practice of building up agents. in Cuba would

not lead to actions that "would hurt the U.S. in the eyes of world opinion".

(August 10 Minutes, p. 2) (A remark which seems inconsistent with McNamara

at the same Meeting raising the question of assassination in any sense of

advocacy). The Minutes state that McNamara's concern "led to the suggestion

by General Taylor that we should consider changing the overall objective

Jof Mongoose/ from one of overthrowing the Castro regime" to one of causing

its failure. (August 10 Minutes, p. 2).

DOES IT

NoT

MARIAR

Inconsistrai

- Its

Approups

SABOTAGE

+te

Hence, in lieu of Lansdale's "stepped-up Course B!'

, the Special Group this wonl din

hint w

tit..

"neyer.

world

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Augmented chose

a plan advanced by McCone that assumed Castro's continuance

in power and had the more limited objective of splitting off Castro from

"old-line Communists"

•* (August 10 Minutes, p. 2). The decision and "action"

of the Special Group Augmented at the August 10 meeting was stated as follows:

"The principal members of the Special Group felt,

after some discussion, that the CIA variant should

be developed further for consideration at next Thurs-

day's meeting of the Special Group. McCone was asked

to stress economic sabotage, and to emphasize

measures to foment a Castro-oldline Communist split."

(August Memorandum, p. 2) .

* **

"Action to be taken:

CIA to prepare a new version of its variant plan,

in accordance with the above-summarized discussion.

This should be ready by Wednesday, August 15:"

(August 10 Memorandum, p. 3) .

It was therefore in this context that Lansdale's August 13 Memorandum

to Harvey stated

that "in compliance with the desires and guidance expressed

in the August 10 policies meeting on Operation Mongoose, we will produce an

outline of an alternate Course B. "Indeed, pursuant-to the August 10 decision

to adopt McCone's proposal for. a

more limited plan that assumed Castro's

continuation in power, Lansdale's memorandum stated that a CIA paper titled

"Operational Plan (Reduced Effort) will be used as the starting basis."

(Lansdale Ex. 15, P. 1) .

The August 10 Minutes show that McCone pointed out that the stepped-up

Course B "will risk inviting an uprising, which might result in a Hungary

type blood bath if unsupported". (August 10 Minutes, p. 2). McCone

"emphasized that

the stepped-up plan should not be undertaken unless

U.S. is prepared

to accept attributability for the necessary actions,

including the eventual use of military force". (August 10 Minutes).

August 10 Minutes further stated that, in McCone's view, the CIA variant

"would avoid all of these dangers because it would not invite an uprising".

(August 10 Minutes, p. 2).

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In view of the issues raised by these documents we took testimony

from the principal participants in that meeting. In particular, we discuss

below the

testimony

as to whether Lansdale's request for an assassination

plan reflected the desire of the SGA or was contemplated by the SGA's decision

to proceed

with

plan of "reduced effort" that posited Castro's continuance

in power.

2.

The Testimony

As set out below, Harvey, McCone, and Goodwin recall the question of

a Castro

assassination was raised at the August 10 meeting.*

We discuss

that testimony, first with respect to the August 10 meeting itself, and,

second, with regard to the action that followed that meeting.

a. Testimony as to the August 10 MeetinE

(1). Testimony of McCone

McCone testified that the question of a "liquidation" or removal of

Castro and other Cuban leaders arose at the August 10 meeting in the context

of "exploring the alternatives that

were available" for the next phase of

Mongoose. (McCone, P. 33). McCone testified that he did not recall who

made this suggestion, but that he and Mr. Murrow took "strong exception"

to the suggestion.

A memorandum of McCone's recollection of the August 10

Meeting, written in 1967, hi/states:

Other participants (Rusk, McNamara, Bundy, and Gilpatric) did not recall

the August 10 discussion.

**/ On April 14, 1967, after McCone left the CIA, he dictated a memorandum

of his recollection regarding the August 10, 1962 meeting.

The memoran-

dum was prompted by a telephone call from the newspaper columnist, Jack

Anderson, who at that time was preparing a column on Castro assassination.

(Continued on the following page.)

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"I took immediate exception to this suggestion,

stating

that the subject was completely out of

bounds as

far as the USG (U.S. Government) and

CIA were concerned and the idea should not be

discussed nor should it appear in any papers,

as the USG could not consider such actions on

moral or ethical grounds."

(McCone Ex. 4).

McCone testified that there was no decision at the August 10 meeting

that assassination should not be part of any program, but that "the subject

McCone's 1967

was just dropped" after his objection. (McCone, p: _.

memorandum stated that

did

wh.

"At no time did the suggestion receive serious

consideration by the Special Group (Augmented)

nor by any individual responsible for policy."

(McCone, Ex. 4).

(2) Testimony of Harvey

Harvey's testimony that the August 10 discussion was unrelated to any

actual Castro

assassination

activity is discussed above (see p.

→. With

respect to that discussion itself, Harvey testified that it was his recollection

that the question of a Castro assassination was raised by Secretary McNamara.

(Harvey, P. 30). Harvey said it was his impression that McNamara raised the

question as one of "shouldn't we consider the elimination or assassination"

of Castro.

(Harvey, p. 30) .

With respect to the reaction of the Special Group Augmented to this.

(Footnote continued from the previous page.).

Anyone

attempts, implicating President Kennedy and Robert Kennedy. After talking

with Anderson on the

telephone,

at Robert Kennedy's request, McCone dic-

tated the April 14, 1967 memorandum, which stated that at

Mongoose meetings on August 8, 9 or

10, 1962, "I recall a suggestion being

made. to liquidate top people in the Castro regime, including Castro."

(McCone, Ex. 4, p. 1) .

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suggestion, Harvey testified:

"I think the consensus of the Group was to sweep

that particular proposal or suggestion or question

or consideration off the record and under the rug

as rapidly as possible.

There was no extensive

discussion of it, no discussion, no back and forth

as the whys and

wherefores and possibilities and

so on."

(Harvey, p.

30).

(3) Testimony of Coodwin

Goodwin

testified that he had a recollection of "limited certainty"

that the subject of a Castro assassination was raised at the August 10

meeting.*/

Goodwin testified that "I am unable to say with any certainty who it

was" who raised the subject of a Castro assassination at the August 10

meeting. (Goodwin, 7/18, p. 8)**/

*/ In à staff interview prior to his testimony, Goodwin recalled the date

of the meeting at which a Castro assassination was raised as ,falling in

early 1961, after the Bay of Pigs. (Memorandum of Staff Interview with

Goodwin, May 27, 1975, P. 2). After reviewing the Minutes of the August

10, 1962 meeting and the Lansdale and Harvey memoranda of August 13 and

14, respectively, Goodwin testified that he had "misplaced the date of

the meeting in my own memory."

(Goodwin, 7/18, p. 7). In placing the.

incident on August 10, 1962, Goodwin stated

"Now, of course, you know, it may not be. That's the best

recollection I now have.

It's a little better than the earlier

one, but it's not certain." (Goodwin, 7/18, p. 8).

**/In a magazine article in June 1975, Goodwin was quoted

as stating that

at one of the meetings of a White House task force on Cuba it was McNamara

who "said that Castro's assassination was the only productive way of deal-

ing with Cuba." (Branch and Crile, "The Kennedy Vendetta," Harpers,

July,

1975, P. 61). In his testimony on July 18, 1975, Goodwin stated:

"that's not an exact quote" in the article, and explained further:

(Footnote continued on following page.)

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(4) Testimony of McNamara

McNamara testified that, although he had no recollection of the question

of a Castro assassination being raised

at the August 10 meeting, he did

express opposition to any assassination attempt or plan when he spoke with

McCone several days after the August 10 meeting. (McNamara, p. 7,8) .

McNamara's testimony with respect to his

conversation with McCone is

dis-

cussed below with the testimony as to actions after the August 10

meeting:

b.

Testimony as to Actions After the August 10, 1962 Meeting

(1) Testimony of McCone

McCone testified that he called McNamara after he received Lansdale's

August 13 Memorandum and,

"insisted that that Memorandum be withdrawn

because no decision was made on this subject, and

since no decision was made, then Lansdale was

quite out of order in tasking the Central In-

telligence Agency to consider the matter."*/

(Footnote continued from the previous page.)

"I didn't tell (the author of the magazine article)

that it was definitely McNamara, that very possibly it

was McNamara.

He asked me about McNamara's role, and

I said it very well could have been McNamara."

(Goodwin, 7/18, p. 33).

If Goodwin's recollection was as uncertain as he swore it was in his

testimony, it is difficult to understand how he could have spoken in the terms

he testified he did to the author of the magazine article, particularly in

view of Goodwin's statement that "it's not a light matter to perhaps destroy

- a man's career on the basis of a fifteen year old memory of a single sentence

that he might have said at a meeting without substantial certainty in your

own mind /and/ I do not have that."

(Goodwin, pP. 34-35).

*/ McCone's 1967 Memorandum stated:

"Immediately after the meeting, I called on Secretary McNamara

personally and re-emphasized my position, in which he heartily

agreed: I did this because Operation Mongoose--an interdepartmental

affair-was under the operational control of (the Defense Depart-

ment)... (McCone Ex. 4).

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McCone also testified that McNamara agreed that the Lansdale Memorandum

should be withdrawn for the same reason expressed by McCone, i.e. because the

topic of a Castro assassination had not been

given consideration by the Special

Group Augmented.

(McCone, p. 39).

(2) Testimony of Harvey

As discussed above (see p.

) Harvey's Memorandum of August 14, 1962

states that upon receiving Lansdale's August 13 Memorandum, Harvey demanded

that Lansdale excise the words referring to "liquidation of leaders."

Har-

vey's Memorandum further stated that "the Special Group (Augmented) is not

expecting any written comments or study on this point." This latter passage

raises the issue

whether. Harvey meant to state that the Special Group Aug-

mented authorized

a Castro assassination plan or activity but that no written

record should be made.

In his testimony, Harvey clarified this point by

stating that the Special Group did not express a desire to proceed with the

suggestion of a Castro assassination:

"Senator Schweiker:...was it understood in an

written way that (assassination) was to pro

eed?"

"Mr. Harvey:

Not to my knowledge, nо.....

If there was any anwritten understanding on

the part of the members of the Special Group

concerning this, other than what was said at the

meeting, I do not know of it..."

(Harvey, pp. 30-31).

Notress

10 thp

pt -

Harvey further testified that shortly after the August 10 meeting,

McCone

told Harvey that he had called McNamara to state that assassiantion

should not be discussed and that he had told McNamara that if he was involved

in such matters, he might be excommunicated from his church. (Harvey, p. 25).

did Honey fert

relat w

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_/1-

(3) Testimony of McNamara

McNamara testified that he did not recall any discussion of a Castro

assassination

at the August 10 meeting, but that he did express opposition

to any assasssination attempt when McCone telephone him after Lansdale's

August 13 memorandum was brought to McCone's attention.

(McNamara, P. 7,8).

McNamara stated that

"I agreed with Mr. McCone that no such planning

should be undertaken."

(McNamara, p. 8).

McNamara stated further that

"I have no knowledge or information about any other

plans or preparations for a Castro assassination."

(McNamara, p. 7).

(4) Testimony of Elder

Elder, a career CIA officer, served as McCone's Executive Assistant

from May 1962 until McCone's departure from the Agency in April 1965.

Elder

testified that he was present when McCone telephone McNamara after the August

10 meeting. Elder stated that McCone told McNamara

"the subject you just brought up, I think it is highly

improper.

I do not think it should be discussed.

is not an action that should ever be condoned.

It is

not proper for us to discuss, and I intend to have it

expunged from the record."

(Elder, p. 23).

Elder testified that this was the essence of the conversation but that he

remembered "several exact phrases, like 'would not be condoned' and 'im-

-

proper'". (Elder, pp. 23, 24).*/

* Elder, who stated he heard both McCone and McNamara's pact of the tele-

phone conversation via a speaker phone, said that McNamara

"just more

or less accepted what Mr. McCone said without comment or rejoinder."

(Elder, p. 24).

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When Harvey later received Lansdale's August 13 memorandum, McCone

spoke to Harvey in Elder's presence, and "McCone made his views quite clear

in the same language and tone...that he used with Mr. McNamara." (Elder,

p. 25).

Elder testified that Harvey did not tell McCone that Harvey was

engage in the Castro assassination effort at that time. (Elder, p. 25).

Elder also described a meeting he had with Helms in Elder's office

shortly after the August 10 meeting to convey to Helms McCone's views re-

garding the subject of assassinations. Elder

stated:

"I told Mr. Helms that Mr. McCone had expressed

his feeling to Mr. McNamara and Mr. Harvey that

assassination could not be condoned and would not be

approved. Furthermore, I conveyed Mr. McCone's

statement that it would be unthinkable to record

in writing any consideration of assassination

because it left the impression that the subject

had received serious consideration by governmen-

tal policymakers, which it had not.

Mr. Helms

responded,

'I understand.'

The point is that

I made Mr. Helms aware of the strength of Mr.

McCone's opposition to

assasination.

I know that Mr.

Helms could not have been under any misapprehension

about Mr. McCone's feelings after this conversation."

(Elder Affidavit, 8/_ 75, p. → .

(5) Testimony of Lansdale

Lansdale testified that he recalled that the subject of Castro's

assassination

surfaced at the August 10 meeting, but that the "consensus was

-1+C07515702

...hell no on this and there was a very violent reaction." (Lansdale, p. 20).

Yormagen.

With respect to why he asked Harvey on August 13 for a Castro assasination

is minates

wouldhaire

- plan, Lansdale testified:

"Senator Baker: Why did you, three days later

if they all said, hell no, 18o/ ahead with it?"

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-!?-

"General Lansdale:.

..the meeting at which they

said that was still

on a development uf my original

task, which was a revolt and an overthrow of a

regime.

At the same time, we were getting intelligence

accumulating very quickly

of something very different

taking place in Cuba than we had expected, which was

the Soviet technicians starting to come in and the

possibilities of Soviet missiles being placed there...

At that time, I thought it would be a possibility

someplace down the road in which there would be some

possible need to take action such as Lassassination/."*/

(Lansdale, p. 21) .

Lansdale stated that he had only one brief conversation with Harvey

after the August 13 memorandum in which Harvey stated "he would look into it...

see about developing some plans" but that was the last Lansdale ever heard

of the matter.

(Lansdale, p. 124). Lansdale stated that with the develop-

ment of the Missile Crisis, Mongoose "was being rapidly shifted out of con-

sideration" and

thus "I wasn't pressing

for

answers..

it was

very obvious that another situation was

developing that would be handled

quite differently in Cuba." (Lansdale, P. 124).

Lansdale testified that he was "very certain" that a discussion of a

Castro assassination plan or proposal never came up in his discussions with

Robert Kennedy

or

with President Kennedy, and that he had originated the

request to Harvey for plan without discussing the matter with anyone:

"Q:...Why, if it is true that assassination

idea

was

turned down on August 10, you sent out your

memo of August 13?"

"General Lansdale:...I don't recall that thoroughly,

I don't remember the reasons why I would."

"Q: Is it your testimony that the August 10 meeting

turned down assassinations as a subject to look into,

and that you nevertheless asked Mr. Harvey to lo0k

into it?"

"General Lansdale: I guess it is, yes.

The way you

put it to me

now has me baffled about why. I did it.

I don't know."

(Lansdale, pp. 123-124.

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"Senator Baker:...did you originate this idea of

laying on the CIA a requirement to report on the

feasibility of the assassination of Castro or did

someone else suggest that?"

"General Lansdale: I did, as far as I recall."

"Senator Baker: Who did you discuss it with before

you laid

on that requirement?"

"General Lansdale: I don't believe I discussed it with

anyone."

"Senator Baker: Only with Harvey?"

"General Lansdale: Only with Harvey."

"Senator Baker: Did you ever discuss it with Helms?"

"General Lansdale: I might have, and I don't believe

that I did.

I think it was just with Harvey."

"Senator Baker:

Did you ever discuss it with Robert

Kennedy?"

"General Lansdale: No, not that I recall."

"Senator Baker: With the President?"

"General Lansdale: No."

(Lansdale, pp. 19-20) .

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a 13--

c .

Testimony of News Reporters as to Lansdale's Comments on

the August 10 Meeting

During the Committee's investigation, news reports concerning the

August 10 meeting and Lansdale's request for a Castro assassination plan

appeared in the press. Two of these reports were based on statements made

by Lansdale to David Martin of the Associated Press and Jeremiah O'Leary

of the Washington Star-News. In view of the apparent conflict between

Lansdale's testimony to the Committee and what Lansdale was reported to have

said to Martin and O'Leary, the Committee invited these reporters to testify

as to Lansdale's statements to them. Martin testified under a subpoena

Issued by the Committee pursuant to Senate Resolution 21. O'Leary appeared

voluntarily but stated the policy of his newspaper with regard to disclosing

news sources precluded him from any comment going beyond that contained in

a prepared statement he read under oath. O'Leary's statement declared that

his news report "represents

accurately my understanding of the relevant in-

formation I obtained from news sources." (O'Leary, page 5).

We discuss below Martin's testimony and the news reports as they compare

to Lansdale's testimony.

(1) The Martin News Report

Martin's news report stated, in its lead paragraph:

"Retired Maj. Gen. Edward G. Lansdale

said Friday

that acting on orders from

President John F. Kennedy delivered

through an intermediary, he developed

plans for removing Cuban Premier Fidel

Castro by any means including assassination."

(Ex. 2 to Martin Affidavit)

Martin testified that this lead paragraph was accurate and that it was

a conclusion which he drew based upon the totality of his interview on

May 30, 1975 with Lansdale. (Martin, PP. 19-20) In contrast, Lansdale

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-76-

testified that, after reading Martin's report in the press, he told Martin

"your first sentence is not only completely untrue, but there is not a

single thing in your

story that says it is true." (Lansdale, p. 65)

As discussed

above (see p. _), Lansdale testified that on his own initiative

he had originated the request to Harvey without discussing the matter with

anyone and that a Castro assassination plan never came up in his

discussions

with Robert Kennedy (or with President Kennedy) .

In view of Martin's testimony. that the lead paragraph of his report

was

a conclusion based on

the totality of his interview with Lansdale, it

should be noted that the remainder of Martin's story does not state that

Lansdale was ordered by President Kennedy Or Robert Kennedy to develop

plans for a Castro assassination. The report quotes Lansdale as stating

"I was working for the highest authority in the land...the President"

and goes on to state that Lansdale said he did not deal directly with

the President but worked through" an intermediary nore intimate to the

President than Bundy.*/ It can be noted that the phrases "working for"

and "working through" are not the same as the lead paragraph's conclusion

пот

1a6

that Lansdale was

"acting on orders" to develop a Castro assassination plan.

In addition, subsequent paragraphs in the Martin report indicate that Lansdale

said the decision to include assassination in his planning was Lansdale's

own, as he testified it was to the Committee. Thus, the Martin report states

Lansdale said that assassination was "one of the means he Lansdale/

considered," that it was Lansdale's belief that assassination would not have

been "incompatible" with his assignment, and that Lansdale said "I just wanted

to see if the U.S. had any such capabilities."

1*

The Martin report states that Lansdale refused to provide this

intermediary's name for the record. In respecting the confidentiality

of news sources, the Committee didnot seek to ask Martin what was said

off the record to him in the course of his newsgathering efforts. (Martin,

p.

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-77-

Moreover, in his testimony as to the conversation with Lansdale on

May 30, 1975 that was the basis for his report, Martin said he did not

specifically ask Lansdale if he had acted on orders with regard to an

assassination plan, nor did Lansdale say he acted on orders. Rather,

Martin asked Lansdale "who were you working for?"*/. When Martin did

specifically ask Lansdale in a subsequent conversation on June 4, 1975

if he had acted on orders, Martin testified that Lansdale stated that

he had not. In this subsequent conversation on June 4, 1975, Martin

said he asked Lansdale specifically, "were you ever ordered by President

Kennedy or any other Kennedy to draw up plans to assassinate Castro?"

(Martin, p. 21). Martin testified that Lansdale replied "no" and that

his orders were "very broad." (Martin, p. 21). Martin further testified

that in this June 4 conversation he asked Lansdale whether "any assassination

Planning you did was done on your own initiative," and that Lansdale replied

"yes." (Martin, p. 21). Martin stated that it was his belief that his

June 4 conversation was at variance with Lansdale's statements to him

on May 30, 1975. (Martin, p. 21). It may also be the case, based on

• Martin's testimony as to the differences between the questions he posed to

Lansdale on May 30 and on June 4, 1975, that he and Lansdale may have

misunderstood each other.

noTe

reation

* Martin testified that his conversation with Lansdale on May 30, 1975.

involved two subjects: 1) "what were you (Lansdale) doing in August 1962"

(Martin, p. 16), and 2) "who were you working for."

(Martin, p. 17).

Martin stated that in the first portion of the conversation dealing with

Lansdale's activities in August 1962, Lansdale stated, according to

Martin, "I just wanted to see if the U.S. had any such capabilities" and

that this included "assassination" as well as other means of disposing

of Castro.

As to the second portion of the conversation, Martin stated

he asked Lansdale "who were you working for" and Lansdale replied "on that

project I was working for the highest authority in the land.

" (Martin, p. 18).

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(2) The O'Leary Report

O'Leary's news report read as follows

in its lead paragraphs:

"Retired Maj. Gen. Edward G. Lansdale has named

Robert F. Kennedy as the administration official

who ordered him in 1962 to launch a CIA project

to work out all feasible plans for "getting rid

of" Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro.

"Lansdale, in an interview with the Washington

Star, never used the word "assassination"

and

said

it was not used by Kennedy, then the attor-

ney general.

But he said there could be no doubt that "the

project for disposing of Castro envisioned the

whole spectrum of plans from overthrowing the

Cuban

leader to assassinating him."

O'Leary's report also stated that "Lansdale said he was contacted

by Robert Kennedy in mid-summer of 1962...." In his appearance before the

Committee, O'Leary pointed out that this reference to the mid-summer of

1962 modified the reference in the lead paragraph of his report. (O'Leary,

p. 13).

In his testimony, Lansdale said he submitted a statement to

the

Washington Star stating that this report was "a distortion of my

remarks." (Lansdale, p.61). Lansdale testified that he stated to

the Washington Star

that "perhaps someplace in the planning there

is

something about what to do with

a leader who would threaten

the

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lives of millions of Americans with Soviet Missiles/...Dut I can

say I never did receive any order from President Kennedy or from

Robert Kennedy about taking action against Castro personally."

(Lansdale, pp. 61-62). Lansdale further testified that he told

O'Leary that he did take orders from Robert Kennedy, büt made clear

that "it was on a very wide-ranging type of thing." (Lansdale, p.62).

Lansdale testified as follows concerning his statement to the Star

following the O'Leary report:

"After the story appeared, the... Washington Star

asked me what wide-ranging things were you talking

about?

"I said there were economic matters and military

matters

and military things and they were very

wide-ranging things. I said perhaps all O'Leary

was thinking of was assassination. I was

thinking of far wider than that." (Lansdale, pp.62-63)

O'Leary's report makes clear that Lansdale did not state that

Robert Kennedy instructed Lansdale to develop an assassination

plan.

The O'Leary report states:

"Lansdale said he is certain Robert Kennedy's

instructions to him did not include the word

"assassination."

He said the attorney general,

as best he could recall, spoke in more general

terms of exploring all feasible means and

practicalities of doing something "to get rid

of" Castro.

In view of the above, it appears that although he may have been

imprecise in his conversations with O'Leary and Martin, Lansdale never-

theless did not tell them that he was ordered to develop an assassination

plan by Robert Kennedy or the President.

As discussed above (see p.

Lansdale testified that he never discussed a Castro assassination with

President Kennedy or with Robert Kennedy. Lansdale's reported statements

that he was ordered to plan to "get rid of Castro by all feasible means"

is also consistent with Lansdale's testimony, as well as that of the other

witnesses, with respect to the objective of the Mongoose operation.

As

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-?0-

discussed above in section

- however, it was the testimony of all

witnesses

except Helms that such

statements did not include assassination.

Lansdale's statements to O'Leary and Martin appear consistent with his

sworn testimony that

it was his own idea to request

assassination plan

from Harvey and that he did not discuss this idea with anyone except Harvey.

(see p.

above).

With respect to this latter point, however, it is

a fact that Lansdale's request for

an assassination plan followed almost

immediately after

the August 10 meeting, where the question of a Castro

assassination was raised. Hence, it is not unreasonable to conclude that

the

raising of the question of a Castro assassination at the August 10

meeting prompted Lansdale to request an assassination plan (although it

was the finding of the IG Report as well as the testimony of Harvey that

the August 10 meeting had no relation to the question of authorization for

the 1962 assassination plot).

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H.

porate

Helms testimony on 9/12/75)

R1080

The Question of Authorization for the 1963 Assassination Plot

1. The 1963 Assassination Plot

1UP

This section discusses the specific question of authorization above the Agency

SECRET

for the delivery of the poison pen to AM/LASH on November 22, 1963, and reviews

certain policies of the Kennedy Administration during 1963 which are relevant to

that question.#/ (The facts relating to the poison pen plot are set out at pp.

above).

2. The Issue of Authority

Much of the testimony of Helms and the Kennedy Administration members dis-

cussed in the preceding section (see pp. _ to _ is relevant to the question

of authorization for the 1963 assassination activity. Once again there was no

evidence that anyone above the Agency was informed about or specifically authorized

the plot.

As in the case of the 1962 assassination plot, however, Helms testified that

he believed the 1903 assassination activity was permissible in view of his

perception of continuing pressure exerted by the Administration to overthrow Castro

Jand his perception that there were no limits placed on the means that could be

used to achieve Castro's

downfall. (Helms, 9/11/75, pp. 11-13)./

The testimony of Helms and the Kennedy Administration members on the issue

of whether the pressure to overthrow. Castro made assassination permissible with

out a direct order is discussed in detail in the preceding section and is not re-

peated here.

Before turning to Helms! specific testimony relating to AM/LASH

(Including his view that AM/LAsh was not seen as a potential assassin) we

discuss below the Kennedy Administration Cuba policy in 1963.

In

*/The evidence showed that the "science-fiction" devices of an exploding sea

shell and a poison diving suit were abandoned

at the laboratory stage within the

ali.

•LA and that no authorization was sought for their development or eventual use.

-dence, the focus in this section is on the activity involving the delivery of the

poison pen to AM/LASH.

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general, the 1963 covert action program and pressure was less

intense than it had been in 1962.

3. The Kennedy Administration's Policy Towards Cuba in 1963

• (a) Organization

The Mongoose Operation was disbanded following the Cuban

Missile Crisis. An interagency "Cuban Coordinating Committee"

was

established within the State Department with responsibility

for developing, covert action proposals: (Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 148.)

The review and approval function was taken from the Special Group

Augmented (which passed out of existence) and was placed under

the Special Group, chaired by Bundy: (Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 148.)

U.S. policy towards Cuba in 1963 was also treated in the

National Security. Council's Standing Group, the successor to

the Executive Committee which had dealt with the Missile Crisis.

Members of the Standing Group included Robert Kennedy, McNamara,

McCone, Bundy and Sorensen.

We discuss below four aspects of the Kennedy Administration's

1963 Cuba policy. These are: (1) the Standing Group's discus-

sion of possible developments in the event of Castro's death;

(2) the Standing Group's discussion of policy options; (3) the

covert action program approved by the Special Group; and (4) the

diplomatic

effort to explore the possibility of reestablishing re-

lations with Castro. The first three of these took place in the

Spring or early Summer of 1963; the fourth aspect -- the effort

to communicate with Castro -- took place at the same time as the

1963 assassination activity.

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(b) The Discussion of the Contingency of Castro's Death

In the Spring of 1963, the Standing Group discussed con-

tingency planning in the event of Castro's death. The documen-

tary evidence and testimony indicated that Castro's death was

discussed as a contingency which might occur independent of

U.S. action.

The Group found that the possibilities for

favorable developments to the United States should Castro die

were "singularly unpromising". (Summary Record of Standing Group

Meeting, May 28, 1963, P. 1).

The discussion stemmed from a memorandum by Bundy which

discussed "possible new directions" for U.S. Cuban policy. (Bundy

Memorandum to the Standing Group, April 21, 1903). The memoran-

dum distinguished between (i) events which might occur indepen-

dently of U.S. action and (ii) steps the U.S. might "initiate"

(Bundy memorandum, p. 2.) .

When the Standing, Group discussed the Bundy memorandum,

Robert Kennedy proposed a study of the "measures we would take

following contingencies such as the death of Castro or the shoot-

ing down of a U-2." (Bundy Ex. 6E, Summary Record of NSC Stand-

ing, Group Meeting, April 23, 1963, p. 2). The downing of a U-L

had been listed in the Bundy memorandum as a subject for contin-

gency planning under the category of steps for which the u.s.

must "await events" as distinguished from "initiate actions"

Bundy's follow-up memorandum, an agenda for a further Stand-

ing Group discussion of Cuban policy, listed the subject of a

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Castro death contingency under a category comprising subjects

not involving U.S. initiatives, e.&., "occurrence of revolt

or repression in the manner of Hungary", attributable inter-

ference by Castro in other countries", and "the reintroduction

of offensive weapons". (Bundy Fix. 6-G, 4/29/63).

After the meeting of April 23, 1963, the Standing Group

assigned to CIA's Office of National Estimates*/ the task of

estimating possible developments if Castro should die. (Bundy

Ex. G-H, Memorandum for Members of the Standing Group, May 2,

1963).

The resulting paper analyzed the various forces which would

come into play in Cuba after Castro's death, including the

likely behavior of Castro's top aides, Raul Castro and Che

Guevara, as

well as

possible Soviet reaction. (Bundy Ex. 6-I,

Draft Memorandum by Office of National Estimates titled "Develop-

ments in Cuba and Possible U.S. Actions in the Event of Castro's

Death"

, Pp. 2-5, hereafter called the "ONE paper"). The ONE

Paper concluded that "the odds are that upon Castro's death, his

brother Raul or some other figure in the regime would, with Soviet

backing and help, take over control". **/

*/Ihe Office of National Estimates is the research division of the

CIA responsible for

analyzing foreign intelligence.

The Office is

not part of the CIA's covert operations organization.

**/The ONE Paper also saw little chance that a government disposed

towards the United States would be able to come to power without ex-

tensive U.S. military support: "Anti-Moscow Cuban nationalists would

require extensive U.S. help in order to win, and probably U.S. military.

intervention.

(Bundy Ex. 6-I, p. ii) :

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In addition, the ONE Paper warned that the United States

would most likely be blamed if Castro should die by another's

hand. "If Castro were to die by other than natural causes the

U.S. would be widely charged with complicity, even though it

is widely known that Castro has many enemies". (Bundy Ex. 6-I,

p. 4.)

The ONE Paper also identified a number of possible U.S.

actions in the event of Castro's death, ranging along a spec-

trum that included no U.S., initiatives, action to support a

government in exile, quarantine and blockade, and outright

invasion.. (Bundy Ex. 6-I, PP. 7-12.)

On May 23, 1963, the Standing Group discussed the ONE. Paper.

The Standing Group found that "all of the courses of action

[open to the U.S. should Castro diel were singularly unpromising"

(Summary Record of NSC Standing Group Meeting No. 7/63, May 28,

1963, p. 1) .

Bundy agreed that the Standing Group "certainly posed the

question" in the Spring of 1963 as to what would happen if Castro

died or were killed. (Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 130.)

But he testified

that he had no recollection of

a Castro assassination being on

the minds of Standing Group members when they discussed this

contingency. (Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 14.)*/

*As indicated above

p. .

, Bundy did recall that over the

period 1961 and 1963 "the subject of a Castro assassination was.

mentioned from time to time by different individuals"

he was not aware of "much discussion

subject"'. (Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 140.)

in the Spring, of 1963 on, that

but said that

wich Peats

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Bundy testified, however, that one reason for getting an

estimate of this kind was to get it on record that we should

not be "fussing" with questions of assassination and that it

was not a sound policy. (Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 142.)

Bundy further testified that it was not unusual to assess

the implications of a foreign leader's possible death, giving

the cases of Stalin and DeGaulle as examples. In the case of

Castro, Bundy said he felt it was only prudent to attempt to

assess the question of a post-Castro Cuba since Castro was

such

a "dominant figure"

• (Bundy; 7/11/75, P. 145.)

(c) The Standing Group's Discussion of U.S. Policy

Towards Cuba

The Standing Group's documents indicate it continued to

assume the desirability of harassment, but recognized there

were few practical measures the U.S. could take that were

likely to achieve Castro's overthrow.

In his April 21, 1963 memorandum on "Cuban Alternatives"

Bundy identified three possible new alternatives: (1) forcing

"a non-Communist solution in Cuba by all necessary means"

(2) insisting on "major but limited ends", or (3) moving "in

the direction of a gradual development. of some form of accommo-

dation with Castro". (Bundy Memorandum to the Standing Group,

April 21, 1963, p. 3.) These alternatives were discussed at

Standing Group meetings on April 23 and May 28, 1963.

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Sorensen, who participated in these meetings, testified

that the "widest possible range of alternatives" were dis-

cussed, but that "assassination was not even on the list"

(Sorensen, 7/21/75, p. 4.) He said that consideration of

possible options such as forcing "a non-Communist solution

in Cuba by all necessary means" did not encompass assassina-

tion:

"[this] could not have included or implied assassina-

tion.

Instead, it expressly referred to 'the develop-

ment of pressures'

and 'gradual escalation of the con-

frontation in Cuba' to produce an overthrow of the

regime, including

'a willingness to use military force

to invade Cuba'.

Such a course was obviously not

adopted by the President, and in any event expressed

an approach far different from assassination"

• (Soren-

sen affidavit, 7/25/75, p. 4):21

The record of the first Standing Group discussion of Bundy's

memorandum shows that a number of alternatives were discussed (none

of which involved assassination) but no conclusions were reached.

On May 28, 1963, the Standing Group met again. McCone argued

for steps to "increase economic hardship" in Cuba, supplemented

by sabotage to "create a situation in Cuba in which it would be

possible to subvert military leaders to the point of their acting

*/ The Bundy memorandum also used the phrase "all necessary measures"

to describe the steps the U.S.

was willing to take to "prevent" a di-

rect military threat to the U.S. or to the Western Hemisphere from Cuba.

Sorensen explained the meaning of this phrase in the context of the

April 23 discussion of Kennedy Administration policy.

"[this phrasel could not by any stretch of semantics

or logic have included assassination.or any other

initiative.

It reflected the purely defensive posture

implemented six months earlier when long-range missiles".

and other offensive weapons were placed in Cuba mom

(Sorensen affidavit, 7/25/75, ap:

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to overthrow Castro". (Summary Record of NSC Standing Group

Meeting No. 7/63, May 28, 1963, p. 1.) McNamara said that

sabotage would not be "conclusive" and suggested study of

"economic pressures which could upset Castro." Robert Kennedy.

said "the U.S. must do something against Castro, even though

we do not believe our actions would bring him down". (Id.,

p. 2) In conclusion, Bundy summarized by stating that the

task

was "to decide now what actions we would take against Castro,

acknowledging that the measures practical for us to take will

not result in his overthrow". (Id., p. 2.)

(d) The Special Group's Authorization of a Sabotage Pro-

gram Against Cuba

During the first six months of 1963, little, if any,

sabotage activity against Cuba was undertaken.&/ However, on

June 19, 1963, following the Standing Group's discussion of Cuba

policy in the Spring, President Kennedy approved a Cuba sabotage

program.xx/ (Memorandum for the Special Group, 6/19/63, p. 1.)

is/ At an April 3, 1903. meeting on Cuba, Bundy stated that no

sabotage operations

were then underway because the Special Group "had

decided

... that such activity is not worth the effort expended on

it." (Memorandum of Meeting on Cuba, 4/3/63, p. 1) .

sabotage program approved on June 19, 1903 was directed at

"Four major segments of the Cuban economy"

, (1) electric power; (2)

petroleum refineries and storage facilities; (3) railroad and high-

way transportation and (4) production and manufacturing.

(Memoran-

dum for the Special Group, June 19, 1963, P. 1) Operations under this

program were to be conducted by CIA-controlled Cuban agents from a

U.S. island off Florida and it was to complement a similar effort de-

signed to

"develop internal resistance elements which could carty out

sabotage." (Id., p. 2.)

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In contrast to the Mongoose program, which sought to build

toward an eventual internal revolt, the 1963 covert action

program had a more limited objective, i.e., "to nourish a

spirit of resistance and disaffection which could lead to

significant defections and other byproducts of unrest"

• cId.,

p. 2.)

After the initial approval, particular intelligence and

sabotage operations were submitted to the Special Group for

specific prior authorization. On October 3; 1963, the Special

Group approved nine operations in Cuba, including several

sabotage operations. And on October 24, 1963, thirteen major

sabotage operations were approved to be undertaken in the

period November 1963 through January 1964, including the sabo-

tage of an electric power plant, an oil refinery, and a sugar

mill. (Memorandum, July 11, 1975, CIA Review Staff to Select

Committee, on "Approved CIA Covert Operations into Cuba."):

(e) The Diplomatic Effort to Explore an Accommodation With

Castro

As early as January 4, 1963, Bundy proposed to President

Kennedy that the possibility of communicating with Castro be

explored. (Bundy Ex. 6, Memorandum to the President, January 4,

1963, p. 3.) Bundy's memorandum on "Cuba Alternatives" to the

Standing Group on April 23, 1963, also listed the "gradual de-

velopment of some form of accommodation with Castro" among

policy alternatives. (Bundy memorandum, p. 3) .

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And, at a meeting on June 3, 1963, the Special Group agreed

it would be a "useful endeavor" to explore "various possibili-

ties of establishing channels of communication to Castro"

(Memorandum of Special Group meeting, June 6, 1963, p. 2).

In the Fall of 1963, William Atwood was a Special Advisor

to the U.S. Delegation to the United Nations with

the rank

of Ambassador. (Atwood, 7/10/75; P. 3.). Atwood testified

that during the period of September-November, 1963, he held a

series of talks with the Cuban Ambassador to the United Nations

to discuss opening negotiations on an accommodation between

Castro and the United States. (Atwood, pp. 5-9.)

Atwood testified that at the outset he informed

Robert

Kennedy, who told him that the effort "was worth pursuing"'. (Atwood, p.6).

Atwood said he regularly reported on the talks to the White

House and to his superior at the United Nations, Adlai Steven-

son: (Atwood pp. 6-7.) Atwood further stated that he was told

by Bundy that President Kennedy was in favor of "pushing towards

an opening toward Cuba" to take Castro "out of the Soviet

fold and perhaps wiping out the Bay of Pigs and maybe getting

back into normal". (Atwood, p.7-3 .)

Atwood stated that he believed the only people who knew of

his contacts with the

Cubans were the President, Harriman, Steven-

son, Robert Kennedy, Bundy, Bundy's assistant, and journalist Lisa

Howard. (Howard had initially placed Atwood in contact with the

Cuban Ambassador after reporting to Atwood that during a

trip to Cuba she had learned Castro was anxious to establish

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communications with the United States. Thereafter Howard

served as an intermediary in arranging Atwood's meetings with

the Cubans.

(Atwood, pp. 4, 18)).

Atwood also testified that he arranged for a French

journalist, Jean Daniel, to visit the White House prior to.

Daniel's scheduled trip to see Castro. (Atwood, p. 19.)

(According to an article by Daniel in December, 1963, Daniel

met with President Kennedy on

October 24, 1963. They discussed

the prospects for reestablishing U.S.-Cuba relations and

President Kennedy asked Daniel to report back to him

after

seeing Castro.) */

Atwood's efforts reached their high point on November 18,

1963, when Atwood spoke by telephone with a member of Castro's

staff in Cuba. (Atwood, p. 8). Pursuant to White House in-

structions, Atwood informed Castro's staff member that the

U.s. favored preliminary negotiations at the U.N. (rather than

in Cuba as proposed by the Cubans), and that the U.S. desired

to work out an agenda for these

talks. (Atwood, DD. 8-9).

After receiving Atwood's report on this conversation, Bundy told

Atwood that after the Cuban agenda was received, President

Kennedy wanted to see Atwood to "decide what to say and

x/ Daniel, Unofficial Envoy:

A Historic Report from Two Capitals,

(New Republic, December 14,

1963).

Daniel was with Castro when Castro

received the report of President Kennedy's assassination.

Daniel,

When Castro Heard the News, (New Republic, December 7, 1963) .

nUS.

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whether to go of what we should do next".

(Id., p. 9.).

Four

days later, on November 22, 1963, (the same day. AM/LASH was given

the poison pen), Jean Daniel was meeting with Castro. On that

same day, President Kennedy was assassinated. With the change of

Administrations, Atwood's talks

with the Cubans became less

fre-

quent and eventually ended in early 1964. (Atwood, P. 10.)

4. Testimony on the Question of Authorization for the

AM/LASH Poison Pen Device

(a) . Testimony of Helms

(i). The October 29 Meeting and the Use of Robert

Kennedy's Name Without Obtaining His Approval

As discussed above in detail (see pp. ), Fitzgerald met

with Ail/LASH on October 29, 1963, in a foreign capital. Fitz-

gerald represented to AM/LASH that he was the personal represen-

tative of Robert Kennedy, and gave AM/LASH assurances of full sup-

port should AM/LASH succeed in overthrowing Castro.

The IG Report states that, according to Fitzgerald, Helms and

Fitzgerald discussed the planned meeting with AM/LASH and Helms de-

cided "it was not necessary to seek approval from Robert Kennedy for

Fitzgerald to speak in his name". (IG, PP. 83-89).. In his testimony,

Helms stated he did not recall such a discussion with Fitzgerald, but

that he believed he had pre-existing authority to deal with AM/LASH

with respect to "a change in government" (as opposed to assassination)

and that this made it unnecessary to obtain Robert Kennedy's approval.*,

"I felt so sure that

if I went to see Mr. Kennedy that he would have

/The following, exchange occurred in Helms' testimony:

"Sen. Hart of Michigan: Dealing with respect to "what? '".

A change in government, or assassination?"

Mr. Helms: A change in government,

Senator Hart.

This is

what we were trying to do. (Helms, 6/13/75, P. 132)

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3023.

said yes, that I didn't think there was any need to." (Helms,

6/13/75, P: 132.)

Helms said his view was that AM/LASH was a political

action agent, not a potential assassin, and that the meet-

ing with AM/LASH and his decision not to contact Robert

Kennedy should be viewed in that light:

...given this Cuban of his standing and all

the history...of trying to find someone inside Cuba

who might head a government and have a group to re-

place Castro...this was so central to the whole theme

of everything we had been trying to do, that I find

it totally unnecessary to ask Robert Kennedy at that

point (whether) we should go ahead with this.

This

is obviously what he had been pushing, what every-

body had been pushing for us to try to do...let's

get on with doing it. (Helms, 6/13/75, pp. 117-113), *1

• (11) The Delivery of the Poison Pen on November 22

While Helms stated that the delivery of a poison pen to

AM/LASH was not part of an assassination plot, Helms testified

*/As discussed above (see PP.

→, there was conflicting testi-.

mony from CIA officers as to whether they viewed AM/LASH as an

assassin and as to the purpose of giving him the poison pen.

The docu-

mentary evidence, however, indicates that AM/LASH in 1963 was intent

upon assassinating Castro, that the CIA officers knew of this, and,

in addition to

offering

a poison pen, told AM/LASH they would

supply him with high powered rifles with

telescopic sights. (see

•p. __, above).

Helms testified that because Amlash 'was the asset we were looking

for, (we didn't want him to blow himself or blow anything else by

getting involved in something like this (assassination] and have it

him to stay in place.

Helms stata that at o stame was it the idea se ithe A/LÄsH-11 case

officers, or those people in the chain behind, to use [AM/LASH-1] to

assassinate castro.

(Helms, 6/13/75, p. 135).

Helms further

stated

... there was an enormous amount of

temporizing with this fellow to keep him on the team, to keep him

one way to so about st", but to try and persuade him that this was not

(Helms, 6/13/15, p. 135). Helms testified

that AM/LASh-1 was given the poison pen

"because he was insisting on

something and this was a temporizing

gesture rather than giving him

some kind of a gun he had

asked for.

Helms, 0113

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that he belleved Castro's assassination was within the scope of the CIA's

authority. /(Helms, 9/12/75; pp. 11-12).T As in the case of the 1962 plots,

Helms based this on the vigor of the Administration's policy towards Cuba

/and his perception that there were no limits put on the means that could

be used in the effort

against Castro. (Helms, 9/12/75, pp. 11-12). Thus,!

Helms testified that after the missile crisis the U.S. continued to conduct

covert

actions whose purpose was "to overthrow Castro." (Helms, 6/13/75,

p. 24.).. /Helms was asked

whether it was his opinion that the offer of the poison

pen to AM/LASH was authorized because it came within the scope of

the 1963 pro-

gram against Castro. Helms. responded:

/"I think the only way I know how to answer that is that I

do not recall when things got cranked up in 1963 any dramatic

changes or limitations being put on this operation. There

was still an effort by whatever device, and perhaps only

slightly differently oriented at this time, to try to get rid

of Castro...But I do not recall specific things being said,

now, (we are not) going to do this, we're not going to do that,

and we're not going to do the other thing, and we will do just

these things."'

(b) Testimony of Administration Officials

As with the Mongoose period, the Administration officials agreed that

they were not informed about any assassination plot and that there was no order that.

Castro be assassinated. Again, they disagreed with Helms' position that an assassi-

nation plot could be undertaken without express authority. The only added part

relating to the AM/LASH plot was certain testimony which asserted that it was in-

conceivable that the President would have approved an assassination plot at the very

same time he had authorized talks to explore the possibility of Improved relations

with Castro.*/

*/Rusk testified that "I find it extraordinarily difficult to believe" and*that "I

just can't conceive" President Kennedy would have authorized the passage of an

assas

sination device for use against Castro while Atwood was exploring the possibility

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Since Helms did not claim any higher specific authorization for or

knowledge of the AM/LASH

assassination plot, however, the additional issue

posed by that testimony does

not really arise.

(continued)

of normalizing relations

with Castro.

(Rusk, 7/10/75, P. 85). Similarly, Bundy

testified he "absolutely" did not believe President Kennedy would have authorized:

or permitted an assassination device to have been passed at the same time a

possible rapprochment with Castro was being pursued. (Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 151).

On the other hand, when the possibility of exploring better relations with

Castro was initially raised (but before any talks were begun) Bundy indicated

that it could be explored on a "separate track" while other proposed actions,

such as sabotage, were going on. (Agenda for Special Group meeting of 4/29/63,

p. 2.)

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Subcommittee Meeting

9/9/75. Approved Draft.

d. The Question of Authorization in the Johnson Administration

1. Sunmary of the Assassination Activity. As discussed above (see pp. _

the Agency delivered arms to AM/LASH in Cuba in March and June 1964.

In early

1965 after AM/LASH became more insistent that a Castro assassination was neces-

sary and had asked for a silenced weapon, the Agency put AM/LASH in contact with

the leader of an anti-Castro group, B-1, with the intention that AM/LASH obtain

such a weapon. Thereafter, the Agency learned that AM/LASH had received a

silencer and other special equipment from B-1 and was preparing to assassinate

Castro.

2. The Issue of Authorization. The issue of authority in the Johnson Admini-

stration is similar to that in the Kennedy Administration. During this phase of

the AM/LASH plot, Helms continued as Deputy Director for covert operations, and

the principal members of the Kennedy Administration continued in their positions

in the relevant period of the Johnson Administration (Robert Kennedy left the

Administration in the midst of this period, on _

) * Helms' testimony

that he believed a Castro assassination was within the scope of the CIA's authority

in view of Administration policy towards Cuba applied to the AM/LASH operation in

both 1963 and 1964-65. (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 137-138.) Again, there was no evidence

that McCone or anyone above the Agency specifically authorized or knew about the

1964-65 plot.

We discuss below four other matters occurring during the Johnson

Administration: (1) the covert action program against Cuba in 1964-1965; (2)

the Special Groups' action in investigating reports of Cuban exile underworld

#Rusk (Secretary of State), McNamara (Secretary of Defense), McCone (Director

of Central Intelligence); and Bundy (Special Assistant for National Security

and Chairman of the Special Group).

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2

SENSITIVE

plots to assassinate Castro; (3) Helms' report to Rusk that CIA was not in-

volved with AM/LASH in a Castro assassination plot; and (4) Helms' briefing

of President Johnson ön the 1967 IG Report on alleged CIA assassination plots.

3. The Covert Action Program Against Cuba in 1964-1965. According to the

minutes of a Special Group meeting on April 7, 1964, which he chaired, President

Johnson decided to discontinue the use of CIA-controlled sabotage raids against

Cuba. * (Memorandum of Special Group Meeting, April 7, 1964, p. _•) A memoran-

dum by McCone indicated that in deciding this question, President Johnson abandoned

the objective of Castro's overthrow.**

At. the April 7, Special Group meeting, Rusk had emphasized his opposition to

the use of sabotage raids, stating his belief that they were unproductive, and

had a "high noise level" that called attention to them. In addition, Rusk stated

that "he suspects the Cuban exiles who actually conduct the raids of possible

wishing to leave fingerprints pointing to U. S. involvement in order to increase

that involvement." (Memorandum of Special Group Meeting, April 7, 1964, page.2.)

*A memorandum by Bundy on April 7, 1964, listed seven aspects of the covert action

program which had been in effect..

These were: (1) collection of intelligence;

(2) covert propaganda to encourage low risk forms of active and passive resistance;

(3) cooperation with other agencies in economic denial; (4) attempts to identify

and establish contact with potential dissident elements inside Cuba; (5) indirect

economic sabotage; (6) CIA-controlled sabotage raiding; and (7) autonomous opera-

tions.

(Memorandum for the Record of the Special Group, April 7, 1964, p. 1-2.)

**At the April 7, 1964, meeting Rusk and Bundy opposed continuation of sabotage

actions by CIA-controlled assets as "unproductive" and impractical. McCone dis-

agreed, noting that the covert action program relied on a 'well-planned series

of sabotage efforts"'. (Memorandum of Special Group Meeting, April 7, 1964, р. 3.)

In this connection, Bundy noted that since the approval of the current sabotage

in June 1963 "policymakers.. had turned sabotage operations on and off to such

an extent that (the sabotage program) simply does not, in the nature of things,

appear feasible"'. (Id., p. 2.)

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3

OENONIVE

4. The Special Group Investigation of Reported Castro Assassination Plots

by Cuban Exiles. On June 10, 1964, Helms informed McCone by memorandum that

Agency officials had learned of several plots of Cuban exiles to assassinate

Castro and other Cuban leaders. (Memorandum, Helms to McCone, June 10, 1964.)

Several of the plots, according to the memorandum, involved "people apparently

associated with the Mafia". Reportedly the exiles had offered people associated

with the Mafia $150,000 to perform the deed. In his memorandum, Helms stated that

the sources of the reports were parties to the plots and in submitting the in-

formation to Agency officers were presumably seeking legal immunity should the

plots succeed. (Id., p. 1.)

Helms' memorandum, however, made no mention of any of the CIA assassination

plots against Castro.*

(Footnote continued from previous page.)

In a memorandum the day after President Johnson's decision to stop CIA-controlled

sabotage operations, McCone stated: "the real issue to be considered at the

meeting and by the President was a question of whether we wished to implement

the policy (outlined in certain memoranda) or abandon the basic objective of bring-

ing about the liquidation of the Castro Conmunist entourage and

the elimination

of Communist presence in Cuba and thus rely on future events of an undisclosed

nature which might accomplish this objective". (Memorandum by McCone, April 8,

1964, p. -.)

In the context of the Special Group's discussion, McCone's use of the words "liqui-

dation"' and "elimination" appears to be another example of inartful language.

literal interpretation of these words leaves one with the impression that assassina-

tion was contemplated.

But the context of the discussion does not bear out such an

interpretation.

Thus in specifying what he meant by "future events of an undisclosed

nature". McCone pointed to "extreme economic distress caused by a sharp drop in

sugar prices"

, and "other external factors"

• (Ia, p. 8.) McCone testified that

such references as the "elimination" or "liquidation" of the Castro regime did not

refer to assassination. (McCone, P. _)

**Moreover, according to Bundy, no one from the CIA or anyone else informed him at

the meetings that "in earlier years there had been a relationship with...persons

allegedly involved with the criminal syndicate--in order to accomplish the assassi-

nation of Fidel Castro". (Bundy, p. 71.)

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SEING INVE

" Indeed, it stated that "Agency officers made clear to each of the sources that

the United States Government would not under any circumstances, condone the

planned actions". (Id., p. 1.)

When the Special Group considered the information in Helms memorandum on

June 18, 1964, McCone stated he was "somewhat skeptical" and proposed additional

investigation, but "others, including Mr. Bundy, felt that the U. S. was being

put on notice and should do everything in its power to ascertain promptly the

veracity of the reports and then undertake prevention". (Memorandum of Special

Group Meeting, June 18, 1964.). In a memorandum on the June 18 meeting, McCone

indicated he had dissented from the Special Group's decision, stating his be-

lief that the Special Group was "overly exercised"' and that he was inclined to

dismiss the matter as 'Miami cocktail party talk"'. McCone noted, however, that

the Special Group "was more concerned than I and therefore planning to discuss

the subject with the Attorney General and possibly Mr. Hoover". Memorandum

June 18, 1964, p. 1.)

The Special Group decided that the reports be transmitted to the Attorney

General "as a matter of law enforcement". (Id.) Robert Kennedy was informed of

this matter a few days later and stated that the Justice Department would investi-

gate.

(Memorandum of Meeting, 22 June 1964.) Thereafter the FBI conducted an

investigation, the results of which were submitted to the Special Group on

August. 19, 1964, by McCone.* (Memorandum, August 19, 1964, McCone to Bundy.)

*McCone's memorandum summarized seven FBI reports on its investigation. The FBI

found that several of the persons it interviewed stated they had knowledge of

the exile's plots and had reported the information to the CIA.. Others inter-

viewed denied knowledge of the plans.

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5

SENSITIVE

5.

Helms' Report to Rusk that CIA was not Involved with Amlash in a

Castro Assassination. Plot

In March 1966, Helms reported to Rusk by memorandum on the CIA's re-

lations with Amlash. (Rusk' Ex. 7, Memorandum, March 7; 1966, Helms to Rusk).

In this report, Helms stated that the CIA's contact with Amlash was for "the

express

purpose" of intelligence collection. (Id.). Noting Cuban press

claims that Amlash and a second Cuban had been involved with the CIA in a

Castro assassination plot, Helms stated:

The Agency was not involved with either of

these two men in a plot to assassinate

Fidel Castro, as claimed in /a Cuban news

release/ nor did it ever encourage either

of these two persons to attempt such an act.

(Rusk Ex. 7, p. 1) :

The Helms memorandum to Rusk made no mention of the fact that CIA officers,

with Helms' knowledge, had offered a poison pen to Amlash on November 22, 1963,

that CIA had supplied arms to Amlash in 1964, or that CIA had put Amlash in touch

with B-1 to enable him to obtain a silenced weapon to assassinate Castro.

In his testimony, Helms stated that this memorandum to Rusk was "inaccurate"

and "not truthful". (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 115.)

The CIA's copy of the Helms' memorandum to Rusk contains a typed notation

in which Helms' signature was recommended by the CIA's then Deputy Director for

Plans, Thomas Karamessines:

(Rusk Ex. 7, p. 2.) Helms testified that the day

before his June 13, 1975, testimony to the Committee he had asked Karamessines

why the memorandum to Rusk had been written as it was. Helms stated he and Kara-

messines concluded they did not know the reason but Helms speculated that "it

may be until we conducted (the 1967 IG investigation) somewhat later we didn't

have the facts straight, or maybe we had the facts straight then but we did not

"have them straight later". "(Helms, 6/13/75, p. 115.)

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6.

Helms' Briefing of President Johnson on the 1967 Inspector General's

Report. Drew Pearson's article in the spring of 1967 alleging U. S. involve-

ment

in plots to assassinate Fidel Castro prompted President Johnson to re-

quest Helms, who by then had become the DCI, to conduct an investigation. The

result was the Inspector General's Report of May 23, 1967. (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 35.)

After receiving the report, Helms briefed the President "orally about the contents".

(Id. at 36.) During his testimony, Helms was shown his handwritten notes apparently

prepared for his briefing of the President.

Those notes carried the story through

mid-1963. When asked if he told President Johnson that, according to the 1967

study, the efforts to assassinate Fidel Castro had continued into Johnson's

presidency, Helms replied, "I just can't answer that, I just don't know. I can't

recall having done so"'. (Id. at 38.) He did note that it would not have

occurred to him to brief President Johnson on the 1964 AM/LASH gun deliveries

because "I don't think one would have approached the AM/LASH thing as an assassina-

tion plot against Castro". (Id. at 39.) Helms had testified that AM/LASH was an

intelligence and political action agent. (Helms, _ P. _ .) The IG Report

however, treated the AM/LASH operation as an assassination plot. (IG, p. _

%. Helms Testimony on Authorization in the Johnson Administration.

In his

testimony, Helms was asked if the Agnecy regarded 'whatever marching orders.

they had obtained prior to the dealth of President Kennedy as still being valid

and operative" when President Johnson succeeded to the office.

Helms replied:

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7

This is not very clear to me at this stage. A lot

of the same officers were serving President Johnson

as they served President Kennedy, and...I can't re-

call anymore whether there was any specific issue

about whether this was taken up with President

Johnson at any meeting or any session. If it had

been, I would have thought there would have been

records someplace."

(Helms, 6/13, p. 139.)

When asked whether President Johnson had been informed of or had authorized

continuing efforts to assassinate Castro, Helms replied indirectly that "the

Special Group would have continued to consider these matters, and I would have

assumed that whoever was chairing the Special Group would have in turn reported

to the President, which was the usual practice". (Id.)

But the records of the Special Group do not show any consideration of a

Castro assassination or of the AM/LASH plot during the Johnson Administration

(or earlier). And, as discussed above, there was no evidence that McCone or

anyone above the Agency was informed of or specifically authorized the AM/LASH

plots.

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agreed to oy. duocommittee 10/10/75

Pending (1) Rewrite per Subcommittee

Editing and (2) Insertion of

Gottlieb and Iweedy Testimony

TABLE OF CONTENTS

D. CONGO ...

1. Introduction

2. Dulles Cabled Leopoldville That "Removal"

of Lumumba is an Urgent Objective in "High

Quarters"

....

3. CIA Encouraged Congolese Efforts to "Eliminate"

Lumumba,

Who Was Viewed as a "Grave Danger" Even

After Being Deposed and Placed in U.N. Protective

Custody .

• 4. The Plot to Assassinate Lumumba . .

(a) Dulles Cabled Again for "Elimination"

of Lumumba, and a Messenger Was Sent to

Congo With

a Highly Sensitive

Assignment..

(b) Gottlieb Delivered Lethal Substance to

Hedgman in the Congo for the Assassi-

nation of Lumumba:

September 1960 .

(c)

Hedgman Testified That Gottlieb Told

Him That President Eisenhower Had

Ordered the Assassination of Lumumba

(d)

(e)

Headquarters Makes the Assassination

Plot "Highest Priority" and Authorizes

Steps in Furtherance of It

....

The Chief of Station Moves Forward

With Assassination Plot : ...

(i) The Chief of Station

Testified

That He Requested and Received

Confirmation of the Assassination

Plan from Headquarters

(ii)

Ihe Chier of Station Took "Explora-

tory Steps" in Furtherance of the

Assassination Plot and Testified

That He Destroyed Cable Traffic

Related to the Plot

Page

1

1

3

8

14

15

18

22

24

31

31

34

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5.

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(f) Testimony of Bissell and Iweedy About the

Degree of Support for and Perpetration of the

Assassination Plot . . ..

...

(i)

Iweedy Had No Recollection of the Operation

To Poison Lumumba . . ... •

(ii)

Iweedy Testified That He Discussed With

Bissell the Feasibility of Assassinating

Lumumba and He Cabled Hedgman About Gaining

Access

to Lumumba. for the Purpose of

Assassination ..

(i11)

Bissell Testified That Ile Did Not Recall

Whether the Assassination Operation Had

Moved from Planning to Implementation

But it Was

Not Against Agency Policy to

Send Poisons to the Congo . . .

The Question of a Connection Between the Assassination.

'Plot and Other Actions of CIA Officers and Operatives

in the Congo... ..........

(a) O'Donnell's Operations in the Congo

(i)

Tweedy and the Chief of Station Agreed That

a Senior Case Officer Should be Sent to

the Congo to Concentrate on the Assassi-

nation Operation

(ii)

Bissell Discussed Assassination of

Lumumba With O'Donnell and Sent Him

to Congo: October-November 1960 . . . ...

(iii) Bissell Testified That He Asked O'Donnell

to Plan and Prepare for an Assassination

Operation

......

(iv)

O'Donnell Arrived in the Congo and

Learned That a Virus Was in the

Station Safe

(b)

(v) D'Donnell Planned to "Neutralize"

Lumumba by Turning Him Over to

Congolese Authorities and Requested

the Assignment of Agent QJWIN to

Leopoldville as His Alter Ego

Agent QJWIN's Mission in the Congo: November-

December 1960

...

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41

41

44

48

52

53

53

54

59

60

65

67

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-11i-

(c) QJWIN's Connection to Project ZRRIFLE

•(d) Agent QJWIN Was Asked By Hedgman's Operative

WIROGUE to Join an "Execution Squad":

December 1960

6.

The Question of Whether the CIA Was Involved in

Bringing About Lumumba's Death in Katanga

(a)

Lumumba's Escape from UN Custody, Capture

by Congolese Army, and Imprisonment at

Thysville: November 27-December 3, 1960

(b)

Transfer of Lumumba to Katanga Where He

Was Killed: January 17, 1960 .

7. The Question of the Level at Which the Assassination

Plot Was Authorized

(a) High-Level Meetings at Which "Getting Rid

of Lumumba" is Discussed

•.

(i)

Dillon

Testified That the Question of

Assassination Was Raised at Pentagon

Meeting: Summer 1960

• ..

(ii)

Robert Johnson Testified That He Heard

the President Order Lumumba's Assassi-:

nation at an NSC Meeting .

...

(iii)

The President's "Extremely Strong

Feelings' Lead the Special Group to

Consider Anything That Might Get Rid

of Lumumba and Dulles Cables for Lumumba's

Removal: August 25-26, 1960

(iv)

NSC Meeting of September 21, 1960: Dulles

Said Lumumba Would Remain a Grave Danger.

Until "Disposed Of"

(b)

Testimony of Eisenhower White House Officials

That They Knew of No Presidential Consideration

of Assassination

'•

(c)

Richard Bissell Testified That He "Strongly

Inferred" That the Assassination Effort Against

Lumumba Was Authorized By President Eisenhower

and Allen Dulles

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72

74

79

79

81

82

84

84

88

101

106

110

114

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DRAFT: OCTOBER 6, 1975

Frederick D. Baron

TOP SECRET

For Internal Committee

Use Only

D.

CONGO

1:

Introduction

The Committee has receivedsolid evidence of a CIA

plot to assassinate Patrice Lumumba. The plot proceeded to

the point where lethal substances and instruments specifically

intended for use in an assassination were placed in the hands

of the CIA Chief of Station in Leopoldville by an Agency

scientist.

Altnough these instruments of assassination were never

used, a number of questions are presented by the Lumumba case

which reflect general issues that run throughout the Committee's

assassination inquiry. First, did CIA officers and operatives

in the. Congo take steps to attempt the assassination of Lumumba?

Second, how high in the United States government was the

source of authorization for, the CIA assassination plot? Finally,

was the CIA connected in any way to the events that actually led

to the death of Lumumba while in Congolese custody?

A thread of historical background is necessary to weave these

broad questions together with the documents and testimony re-

ceived by the Committee.

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In the summer of 1960, there was a great deal of concern

at the highest levels in the United States government about the

role of Patrice Lumumba in the Congo.* Lumumba, who served briefly

as Premier of the newly independent nation, was viewed with alarm

by United States foreign policymakers because of what they perceived

as his magnetic public appeal and his leanings toward the Soviet

Union.

Under the leadership of Lumumba and the new President,.

Joseph Kasavubu, the Congo. declared its independence from Belgium

on. June 30, 1960. In the turbulent month that followed, Lumumba

threatened to invite Soviet troops to hasten the withdrawal of

Belgian armed forces. The United Nations Security Council re-

quested a Belgian withdrawal and dispatched a neutral force

to the Congo to preserve order. In late July, Lumumba visited

Washington and received pledges of economic aid from Secretary

of State Christian Herter.. At the beginning of September,

Soviet airplanes, trucks, and technicians were arriving in the

province where Lumumba's support was strongest.

By mid-September, Lumumba sought protection from the UN

guard in Leopoldville after losing a struggle over the leadership

of the government with Kasavubu and Joseph Mobutu, Chief of Staff

of the Congolese

armed forces. In early December,

Mobutu's troops

captured Lumumba while he was traveling toward his stronghold

at

* Since the period in which the events under examination occurred,

the names of many geographical units

and governmental institutions

have changed.

For instance,

the nation formerly known as the Republic

of the Congo is now the Republic of Zaire and the present capital city,

Kinshasa, was known then as Leopoldville.. For the sake of clarity in

dealing

with many of the documents involved in this section, the names

used in this report are those which applied in the early 1960's, con-

temporaneously with the events under consideration:

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Stanleyville, and he was imprisoned. The central government of

the Congo transferred Lumumba on January 17, 1961 to the custody

of authorities in the province of Katanga, which was asserting its

own independence at that time. Several weeks later, the Katangese

authorities announced Lumumba's death.

There are various accounts of the circumstances and timing

of Lumumba's death.

The United Nations investigation of the inci-

dent concluded that Lumumba was killed on January 17.*

2. Dulles Cables Leopoldville That "Removal'' of Lumumba

is an Urgent Objective in "High Quarters"

Shortly after the Congolese declaration of independence

from Belgium on June 30, 1960, the CIA assigned a new Chief of

Station to the Congo. The Chief of Station said that the briefings

he received at CIA headquarters in preparation for his departure

contained no discussion of the possibility of assassinating Patrice

Lumumba (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 8). On his brief return to head-

quarters in connection with Lumumba's visit to Washington in late

July, the Chief of Station again heard no discussion of assassi-

nating Lumumba (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 9).

During August, great concern about Lumumba's political

strength in the Congo was growing among the foreign policy-makers

of the Eisenhower Administration.** This concern was nurtured

* Report of the Commission of Investigation, 11/61, UN

Security Council, Official Records, Supplement for October,

November, and December.

* See Section 5, infra, for full discussion of the prevailing

anti-Lumumba attitude In the United States government as shown by

minutes of the National Security Council and Special Group and the

testimony of high Administration officials.

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by intelligence reports such as that cabled to CIA headquarters

by the new Chief of Station:

EMBASSY AND STATION BELIEVE CONGO EXPERIENCING

CLASSIC COMMUNIST EFFORT TAKEOVER GOVERNMENT

MANY FORCES AT WORK HERE: SOVIETS ... COMMUNIST

PARTY, ETC.

ALTHOUGH DIFFICULT DETERMINE MAJOR

INFLUENCING FACTORS TO PREDICT OUTCOME STRUGGLE

FOR POWER, DECISIVE PERIOD NOT FAR OFF. WHETHER

OR NOT LUMUMBA ACTUALLY COMMIE OR JUST PLAYING

COMMIE GAME TO ASSIST HIS SOLIDIFYING POWER, ANTI-

WEST FORCES RAPIDLY INCREASING POWER CONGO AND

THERE MAY BE LITTLE TIME LEFT IN WHICH TAKE ACTION

TO AVOID ANOTHER CUBA....

(CIA Cable IN 39706,

Leopoldville to Director, 8/18/60.)

This cable also stated the Chief of Station's operational "OBJECTIVE

(OF] REPLACING LUMUMBA WITH PRO WESTERN GROUP" (CIA Cable, 8/18/60).

Bronson Iweedy, then Chief of the Africa Division of CIA's clan-

destine services, replied the same day that he was seeking State

Department approval for the proposed operation based upon "OUR

BELIEF LUMUMBA MUST BE REMOVED IF POSSIBLE"' (CIA Cable Out 59741,

Iweedy to. Leopoldville, 8/18/60). On August 19, Richard Bissell,

Director of CIA's covert operations branch, signed a follow-up

cable to Leopoldville: "YOU ARE AUTHORIZED PROCEED WITH OPERATION"

(CIA Cable OUT 59959, Director to Leopoldville, 8/19/60).

Several days later, the Chief of Station reported that a plan

to assassinate Lumumba had been proposed to President Kasavubu by

Congolese leaders:

ANTI-LUMUMBA LEADERS APPROACHED KASAVUBU

WITH PLAIN ASSASSINATE LUMUMBA ... KASAVUBU

REFUSED AGREE SAYING HE RELUCTANT RESORT

VIOLENCE AND NO OTHER LEADER SUFFICIENT

STATURE REPLACE LUMUMBA. (CIA Cable IN 42761,

Leopolaville to Director, 8/24/60.)

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This incident indicates that the CIA was aware that there was

some Congolese support for the assassination of Lumumba, but that

the moderate President of the Congo still respected Lumumba and

refused to consider

assassination.

On August 25, 1960, Allen Dulles attended a meeting of the

Special Group -- the National Security Council subcommittee re-

sponsible

for the planning of covert operations.* In response to

the outline of some CIA plans for political actions against

Lumumba,

such as arranging a vote of no confidence by the Congolese

Parliament, the Special Assistant to the President for National

Security Affairs reported that the President

had expressed

extremely strong feelings

on the necessity for very straightforward

action in this situation,

and he wondered

whether the plans as outlined were sufficient

to accomplish this. . (Special: Group Minutes, 8/25/60.)

After this discussion, the Special Group.

finally agreed that planning .for the Congo

would not necessarily rule out "consideration"

of any particular kind of activity which might

contribute to getting rid of Lumumba.

(Special Group Minutes, 8/25/60.)

* This Special Group meeting and the testimony about its

significance on the issue of authorization is discussed in detail

in Section 5 (iii), infra.

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The next day, Allen Dulles personally signed a cable* to

the Leopoldville Chief of Station which stressed the urgency of

"removing" Lumumba:

IN HIGH QUARTERS** HERE IT IS THE CLEAR-

CUT CONCLUSION THAT IF LLL [LUMUMBA] CON-

TINUES TO HOLD HIGH OFFICE,

THE INEVITABLE

RESULT WILL AT BEST BE CHAOS AND AT WORST

PAVE THE WAY TO COMMUNIST TAKEOVER OF THE

CONGO WITH DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE

PRESTIGE OF THE UN AND FOR THE INTERESTS OF

THE FREE WORLD GENERALLY.

CONSEQUENTLY

WE CONCLUDE THAT HIS REMOVAL MUST BE AN

URGENT AND PRIME OBJECTIVE THAT UNDER EXISTING

CONDITIONS THIS SHOULD BE A HIGH PRIORITY OF

OUR COVERT ACTION. (CIA Cable, OUT 62966,

Director to Leopoldville, 8/26/60.)

Dulles cabled that the Chief of Station was to be given "WIDER

AUTHORITY" -- along the lines of the previously authorized opera-

tion to replace Lumumba with a pro-Western group -- "INCLUDING

EVEN MORE AGGRESSIVE ACTION IF IT CAN REMAIN COVERT" (CIA Cable,

8/26/60). "WE REALIZE THAT TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY MAY PRESENT

THEMSELVES TO YOU," the cable continued (CIA Cable, 8/26/60).

* Cables issued under the personal signature of the DCI are

a relative rarity in CIA communitations and call attention to the

importance and

sensitivity of the matter discussed.

xx As discussed in Section S(c), infra, Richard. Bisell testified

that Allen Dulles would have used the phrase "higher quarters" to

refer to the President (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 48).

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Dulles also authorized the expenditure of up to $100,000 "TO

CARRY OUT ANY CRASII PROGRAMS ON WHICH YOU DO NOT HAVE THE OPPOR-

TUNITY TO CONSULI HQS" (CIA Cable, 8/26/60). He assured the

Chief of Station that the message had been "SEEN AND APPROVED AT

COMPETENT LEVEL"' in the State Department (CIA Cable, 8/26/60).

But the Director of Central Intelligence made a special point

of assuring the Chief of Station that he was authorized to act

unilaterally in a case where the United States Ambassador to the

Congo would prefer to remain uninformed:

TO THE EXTENT THAT AMBASSADOR MAY DESIRE

TO BE CONSULTED, YOU SHOULD SEEK HIS. CON-

CURRENCE. IF IN ANY PARTICULAR CASE, HE

DOES NOT WISH. TO BE CONSULTED YOU CAN ACT

ON YOUR OWN AUTHORITY WHERE TIME DOES NOT

PERMIT REFERRAL HERE (CIA Cable, 8/26/60) .

This mandate raises a question as to whether the DCI was. contem-

plating a particular form of action against Lumumba which the

Ambassador would want to be in a position to "plausibly deny"

United States involvement. DDP Richard Bissell testified that he

was "almost certain" that he was informed about the Dulles cable

shortly after its transmission and that it was his "belief" that

the cable was a circumlocutious means of indicating that the

President wanted Lumumba to be killed (Bissell, 9/10/75, pP. 33,

64-65) -36

* See Section 5(c), infra, for additional testimony by Bissell

on the question of authorization for the assassination effort

against Lumumba.

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3.

CIA Encourages Congolese Efforts to "Eliminate"

Lumumba, Who is Viewed as a

"Grave Danger" Even After

Being Deposed and Placed in UN Protective Custody

On September 5, 1960, President Kasavubu dismissed

Premier Lumumba from the government despite the strong support

for Lumumba that existed in the Congolese Parliament. After losing

the ensuing power struggle with Kasavubu and Mobutu, who seized

the government by a military coup on September 14; Lumumba sought

protection from the United Nations peace-keeping force. The

evidence indicates that the ouster of Lumumba from the government

did not alleviate the concern about him in the United States govern-

ment.

Rather, the CIA and high Eisenhower Administration

officials continued to view him as a threat, at least until

early December when he was captured by Mobutu's troops and im-

prisoned. During this period, CIA officers in the Congo advised

and aided Congolese contacts known to have any intent to kill

Lumumba. They also opposed the resumption of the democratic process

after the coup. -- by reopening the Parliament -- because of the

likelihood that this would return Lumumba to power.

The day after Lumumba was deposed by Kasavibu, two CIA

officers met with a high level Congolese politician who had a

close relationship to the Leopoldville Station. The Station re-

ported to CIA headquarters that the politician had made a response

* A detailed treatment of the expressions of continued concern

over Lumumba at the National Security Council level is set forth

in Section

intra.

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to a remark by the Chief of Station

that implied that he might

assassinate. Lumumba:

TO COS COMMENT THAT LUMUMBA IN OPPOSITION IS

ALMOST AS DANGEROUS AS IN OFFICE, [THE

CONGOLESE POLITICIAN] INDICATED UNDERSTOOD

AND IMPLIED MIGHT PHYSICALLY ELIMINATE

LUMUMBA

(CIA Cable, IN 49679, Leopoldville

to Director, 9/7/60.)

The cable continued to report that the Chief of Station had offered

to assist this politician "IN PREPARATION NEW GOVERNMENT PROGRAM"

and

assured him that the United States would supply technicians

(CIA Cable, 9/7/60).

As the chaotic struggle for power raged, the Chief of

the Africa Division succinctly summarized the prevalent U. S.

apprehension about Lumumba's ability to influence events in the

Congo by virtue of personality, irrespective of his official

position:

LUMUMBA TALENTS AND DYNAMISM APPEAR OVER-

RIDING FACTOR IN REESTABLISHING HIS POSITION

EACH TIME IT SEEMS HALF LOST. IN OTHER WORDS

EACH TIME LUMUMBA HAS OPPORTUNITY HAVE LAST

WORD HE CAN SWAY EVENTS TO HIS ADVANTAGE.

(CIA Cable, OUT 69233, Director to Leopoldville,

9/13/60) .

The day after Mobutu's coup, the Chief of Station reported

that he was serving as an advisor to a Congolese effort to "elimi-

nate" Lumumba due to his "fear" that Lumumba might, in fact, have

been strengthened by placing himself in UN custody, which afforded

a safe base of operations:

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STILL DIFFICULT DETERMINE WHETHER MOBUTU HAS

SUFFICIENT CONTROL ARMY TO ENFORCE DECISIONS

ANNOUNCED NIGHT 14 SEPTEMBER. STATION ADVISED

[TWO MODERATE CONGOLESE POLITICIANS] TRY WORK

WITH [KEY CONGOLESE CONTACT] IN EFFORT ELIMI-

NATE LUMUMBA.

FEAR UN PROTECTION WILL GIVE

LUMUMBA OPPORTUNITY ORGANIZE COUNTER ATTACK.

ONLY SOLUTION IS REMOVE HIM FROM SCENE SOONEST.

(CIA Cable, IN 13374, Leopoldville to Director,

9/15/60 .)

On September 17, another CIA operative in the Congo met

with a leading Congolese senator. At this meeting, the senator.

requested a clandestine supply of small arms to equip some

Congolese

Army troops. The cable to CIA headquarters concerning

the meeting reported:

[CONGOLESE SENATOR] REQUESTED CLANDESTINE

SUPPLY SMALL ARMS TO EQUIP

... TROOPS

RECENTLY ARRIVED LEOP[OLDVILLE] AREA

[THE SENATOR] SAYS THIS WOULD PROVIDE CORE

ARMED MEN WILLING AND ABLE TAKE DIRECT

ACTION

..: [SENATOR] RELUCTANTLY AGREES

LUMUMBA MUST GO PERMANENTLY.

DISTRUSTS

[ANOTHER CONGOLESE LEADER] BUT WILLING MAKE

PEACE WITH HIM FOR PURPOSES ELIMINATION

LUMUMBA. (CIA Cable, IN 14228, Leopoldville

to Director, 9/17/60.)

The CIA operative told the Congolese senator that "HE WOULD EXPLORE

POSSIBILITY OBTAINING ARMS" and recommended to CIA headquarters

that they should

HAVE [ARMS] SUPPLIES READY TO GO AT

NEAREST BASE PENDING [UNITED STATES]

DECISION THAT SUPPLY WARRANTED AND NECES-

SARY, (CIA Cable, 9/17/60).*

* This recommendation proved to be in line with large scale

planning at CIA headquarters for clandestine paramilitary support

to anti-Lumumba elements.

On October 6, 1960, Richard Bissell and

Bronson Tweedy signed a cable concerning plans which the Chief of

Station was instructed not to discuss with State Department repre-

sentatives or operational contacts:

(footnote continued on next page)

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Several days later, while warning

a key Congolese

leader about coup plots led by Lumumba and two of his supporters,

the Chief of Station

URGED ARREST OR OTHER MORE PERMANENT DISPOSAL

OF LUMUMBA, GIZENGA, AND MULELE (CIA Cable,

IN 19043, Leopoldville to Director, 9/20/61).

Gizenga and Mulele were Lumumba's lieutenants who were

leading his supporters while Lumumba was in UN custody.

(Footnote continued from previous page)

[IN]VIEW UNCERTAIN OUTCOME CURRENT DEVELOP-

MENTS [CIA) CONDUCTING CONTINGENCY PLANNING

FOR CONGO AT REQUEST POLICY ECHELONS. THIS

PLANNING DESIGNED TO PREPARE FOR SITUATION

IN WAY [UNITED STATES] WOULD PROVIDE CLAN-

DESTINE SUPPORT TO ELEMENTS IN ARMED

OPPOSITION TO LUMUMBA.

CONTEMPLATED ACTION INCLUDES PROVISION ARMS,

SUPPLIES AND PERHAPS SOME TRAINING TO ANTI-

LUMUMBA RESISTANCE GROUPS.

(CIA Cable OUT 04697, Director to Leopoldville,

10/6/60.

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Throughout the fall of 1960, the CIA continued to view

Lumumba as a serious political threat while he remained in UN

protective custody.* One concern was that if the Parliament --

which had been closed by the coup -- were re-opened and the moderates

* Both Richard Bissell and Bronson Iweedy, then Chief of the

CIA Africa Division, confirmed that the CIA continued to view

Lumumba as a threat even after he placed himself in UN custody

(Bissell; 9/10/75, pp.

; Tweedy,

9/9/75, PP.

) .

Both

Bissell and Tweedy referred to two factors to substantiate this

view:

first, Lumumba was a spellbinding orator with the ability

co stir masses of people to action; and second, the UN forces did

not restrain Lumumba's freedom of movement and

the Congolese army

surrounding them were often lax in maintaining their vigil.

[Quote/Cite from transcripts:]

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failed to obtain a majority vote, the "PRESSURES FOR [LUMUMBA'S]

RETURN WILL BE ALMOST IRRESISTABLE"' (CIA Cable, IN 33499.

Leopoldville to Director, 10/26/60).* Another general concern

at CIA headquarters was that foreign powers would intervene in

the Congo and bring Lumumba to power (CIA Cable, OUT 81720, Director

to Leopolaville, 10/17/60). Similarly, throughout this period

Lumumba was viewed by CIA officials and the Eisenhower Adminis-

tration»t as a stalking horse for "what appeared to be a Soviet...

effort to take over the Congo" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 10, 45) .

During this period, the Leopoldville station continued to

maintain close operational relationships with, and offer aid to,

Congolese contacts who expressed a desire to assassinate Lumumba****

although there is no direct evidence that aid was provided for the

specific purpose of assassination.

* A CIA Cable (IN 37289) from Leopoldville to the Director

on November 3, 1960 returns to this theme:

the opening of the

Congolese Parliament by the United Nations is opposed because it

"WOULD PROBABLY RETURN LUMUMBA TO POWER."

* See Section -

_, intra, on such analysis at high-level policy

meetings:

***. A Congolese security officer in liaison with the CIA on an

attempt to tap Lumumba's phones

KILLED BUT ADDED THIS MOST DIFFICULT AS JOB WOULD HAVE BE DONE

BY AFRICAN WITH NO APPARENT INVOLVEMENT WHITE MAN. (CIA Cable,

IN 34867, Leopoldville to Director, 10/28/60.)

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4.

The Plot to Assassinate Lumumba

In the fall of 1960, a scientist from CIA headquarters

delivered to the Chief of Station in Leopoldville lethal bio-

logical substances to be used to assassinate Patrice Lumumba.

The Chief of Station testified that after requesting and receiving

confirmation from CIA headquarters that he was to carry out the

scientist's instructions, he proceeded to take "exploratory steps"

in furtherance of the assassination plot. The Chief of Station

testified that in the course of his discussion with the CIA

scientist, Sidney Gottlieb, he was informed that President Eisenhower

had ordered the assassination mission against Patrice Lumumba.

Gottlieb's mission to the Congo was both preceded and followed by

general cables urging the "elimination" of Lumumba sent from CIA

headquarters in an extraordinarily restricted "Eves Onlv" channel --

including two messages under the personal signature of Allen Dulles.

The lethal substances were

never used by the Chief of

Station. But despite the fact that Lumumba had placed himself in

the protective custody of the UN peace-keeping force shortly

before the poisons were delivered to the Chief of Station, there

is no clear evidence that the assassination operation was termi-

nated before Lumumba's death. There is, however, no direct evidence

of a connection between the CIA assassination plot and the events

which actually. led to Lumumba's death.*

* See Section 6, infra,

for a discussion of the evidence about

.the circumstances that led to Lumumba's death in Katanga.

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(a) Dulles Cables Again for "Elimination" of Lumumba,

and a Messenger is Sent to Congo With a Highly

Sensitive Assignment

On September 19, 1960, several days after Lumumba placed him-

self in the protective custody of the United Nations peacekeeping

force in Leopoldville, Richard Bissell and Bronson Tweedy signed

a cryptic cable to Leopoldville to arrange a clandestine meeting

between the Chief of Station and "Sidney Braun," who was traveling

to the Congo on an unspecified

assignment:

["SID"'] SHOULD ARRIVE APPROX 27 SEPT. . WILL

ANNOUNCE HIMSELF AS "SID FROM PARIS".

IT

URGENT YOU SHOULD SEE ["SID"'] SOONEST POSSIBLE

AFTER HE PHONES YOU. HE WILL FULLY IDENTIFY

HIMSELF AND EXPLAIN HIS ASSIGNMENT TO YOU.

(CIA Cable, OUT 11464, Bissell/ Tweedy to Chief

of Station, 9/19/60.

The cable bore a highly unusual sensitivity indicator --

"PROP" -- that restricted circulation at CIA headquarters to the

Chief of the Africa Division.*

In a letter of September 23, 1975, the Chief of the CIA Review

Staff informed the Committee that

"PROP" was normally used "to

denote sensitive personnel matters" (Seymour R. Bolton to Frederick

A. 0. Schwarz and Frederick D. Baron, 9/23/75.

It appears that this

sensitivity indicator,

while created

for other purposes,

was utilized

by Bissell, Tweedy, and the Chief of

Station to restrict distributior

of their communications about an assassination operation.

The cable

traffic cited in this report that was sent through the PROP channel

did not touch upon personnel matters except in terms of recruiting

additional CIA officers and agents for the assassination operation.

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The Bissell/Iweedy cable' informed the Chief of Station that

he was to continue to use this indicator for

ALL (CABLE] TRAFFIC THIS OP, WHICH YOU

INSTRUCTED HOLD ENTIRELY TO YOURSELF.

(CIA Cable, 9/19/60.)

The Chief of Station -- referred to herein as "Hedgman"$ --

testified to a clear, independent recollection of

receiving such

a cable. Hedgman stated that in September of 1960. he received a

"most unusual" cable from CIA headquarters (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pP. 11,

43). The cable advised, in his words, that:

someone who I would have recognized would

arrive with instructions for me....

I

believe the message was also marked for my

eyes only ... and contained instructions

that I was not to discuss the message with

anyone: (Hedgman, 8/21/75, PP. 12-13.)

Hedgman said that the cable did not specify the kind of instruc-

tions he was to receive, and it "did not refer to Lumumba in any

way"' (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 12) .

Three days after the Bissell/Tweedy message that Hedgman was

to meet "Sid" in Leopoldville, Bronson Iweedy uses the same sensi-

tivity indicator on a cable sent to Hedgman on an "Eyes Only"

basis (CIA Cable, OUT 74837, Iweedy to Leopoldville, 9/22/60).

* Due to fear of reprisal from Lumumba's followers, the Chief

of Station for the Congo from mid-sunmer 1960 through 1961 testi-

fied under the alias "Hedgman" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 2; 3/25/75,

p. 4).

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On September 24, Allen Dulles personally issued a cable to

Leopoldville expiessing in absolute terms his desire to "eliminate"

Lumumba:

WE WISH GIVE EVERY POSSIBLE SUPPORT IN

ELIMINATING LUMUMBA FROM ANY POSSIBILITY

RESUMING GOVERNMENTAL POSITION OR IF HE

FAILS IN LEOP [OLDVILLE], SETTING HIMSELF

IN STANLEYVILLE OR ELSEWHERE.

(CIA Cable

OUT 73573, Dulles to Leopoldville, 9/24/60.)

Dulles had expressed a similar view three days before in the

presence of the President at an NSC meeting, stating: -

Mobutu appeared to be the effective power in

the Congo for the moment but Lumumba was not

yet disposed of and remained a grave danger

as long as he was not disposed of. (NSC

Minutes, 9/21/60)

(b)

Gottlieb Delivers Lethal Substances to the Chief of

Station in the Congo for the Assassination of Lumumba

The Chief of Station reported through the PROP channel to Bronson

Tweedy that he had made contact with the man dispatched to Leopoldville

with a highly sensitive assignment on September 26. (CIA Cable

IN 18989; Leopoldville to Iweedy; 9/27/60) . This was the same

week in which Dulles cabled about the "elimination" of Lumumba

and made his statement to the NSC about the "grave danger" that

existed as long as Lumumba was not "disposed of"

Hedgman testified about the identity of "SID" -- the messenger

referred to in the first cable through the PROP channel:

I: Who was the messenger who arrived?

Hedgman: Mr. Sidney Gottlieb

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Iweedy's cable indicated that a third country national would be

required as an agent in the PROP operation:

IF DECIDED SUPPORT FOR PROP OBJECTIVES,

BELIEVE ESSENTIAL SUCH BE PROVIDED THROUGH

THIRD NATIONAL CHANNEL WITH [AMERICAN]

ROLE COMPLETELY CONCEALED. (CIA Cable,

9/22/60.)

Iweedy expressed reservations about two agents that the station

was using for other operations and said "WE ARE CONSIDERING A

THIRD NATIONAL CUTOUT CONTACT CANDIDATE AVAILABLE HERE WHO MIGHT

FILL BILL'* (CIA Cable, 9/22/60). Despite Iweedy's concern about

the two existing station contacts, he indicated that the Chief of

station and his "colleague" -- presumably the man identified as

"Sid" who was to arrive in the Congo shortly to explain the PROP

operation to Hedgman -- were to be afforded considerable latitude

in

exercising their judgment on the conduct of the operation:

YOU AND COLLEAGUE UNDERSTAND WE CANNOT READ

OVER YOUR SHOULDER AS YOU PLAN AND ASSESS

OPPORTUNITIES. OUR PRIMARY CONCERN MUST BE

CONCEALMENT [AMERICAN] ROLE, UNLESS OUT-

STANDING OPPORTUNITY EMERGES WHICH MAKES

READY

ENTERTAIN ART SERIOUS PROPOSES YOU ARE

BASED OUR HIGH REGARD BOTH YOUR PROFESSIONAL

JUDGMENTS. (CIA Cable, 9/22/60.)

* This is probably a reference to agent QJWIN, who was later

dispatched to the Congo. His mission is discussed

_ and

'in Sections —

_ infra.

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L: And at that time, you knew who he was?

Hedgman: I recognized him as an officer of the

Agency

I believe he referred to the

fact that I had received a message and that he

was the person concerned. (Hedgman, 8/21/75,

pp. 15-16)

The message carried by Gottlieb, then Science Advisor to

DDP Richard Bissell, was unmistakeably clear according to Hedgman:

Hedgman: It is my recollection that he advised me, or

my instructions were, to eliminate Lumumba:

l: By eliminate, do you mean assassinate?

Hedgman: Yes. I would say that was

• my under-

standing of the primary means.

I don't think it was

probably limited to that, if there was some other way

of doing it.

Q: Of doing what?

Hedgman :

threat.

Of removing him from a position of political

(Hedgman, 8/21/75, pP. 17-18:)

Hedgman said that he and Gottlieb also may have discussed non-

lethal means of removing Lumumba as a "political threat", but

he said, "I cannot recall with certainty on that" (Hedgman,

8/21/75, p. 28) .

He clearly recalled the discussion of assassination,

however:

Q: And

what did Mr. Gottlieb indicate with regard to

the possibility of physically eliminating him?

Hedgman: It was my understanding that that was

probably expected of me:

(Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 18.)

And again:

Q:

I take it that once you started discussing these

lethal agents, there was no doubt in your mind that

the kind of elimination he was there particularly to

discuss was killing Lumumba?

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Hedgman: There was no doubt in my mind that

this was one of the way[sl, and probably what

they thought was the only way that would work

(Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 25) :

Hedgman explained Gottlieb provided him with poisons as a means

of assassination:

And what did he tell you with regard to

how that might be accomplished?

Hedgman :

... He brought some biological agents:

I assume that that's the correct word.

But in

any case, poisonous agent with him, which he

passed to me....

I: These were lethal biological substances?

Hedgman: Yes. That was my understanding

as a non-expert. (liedgman, 8/21/75, pp: 18-19.)

Hedgman testified that he received "rubber gloves, a mask, and a

syringe" along with the poisons and that Gottlieb instructed him

in their use (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 20-21). Hedgman indicated that

this paraphernalia was for administering the poisons to Lumumba:

l:

(Wlhen he [Gottlieb] came to the Congo

to give you lethal biological agents for

the assassination of Lumumba, was it clear

at that time that the means for administering

those biological agents was to inject them

into a substance that was to be ingested by

Lumumba, whether it be food, or drink, or

toothpaste or any other substance that was

to be ingested?

Hedgman: That's my recollection, yes.

(Hedgman, 8/21/75, P. 82; accord. p. 24.)

Hedgman said that the means of assassination was not restricted

to use of the poisons provided by Gottlieb:

This was not a sine qua non that I employ this.

If there were another method, another way, it

would have been acceptable: (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 19.)

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For example, ledgman testified that he may have "suggested"

shooting Lumumba to Gottlieb as an alternative to poisoning

(Heagman, 8/21/75, PP. 27-29).

There was a firm requirement, however, that the means of assassi

nation should not be traceable to the United States:

The biological substance, or specimens, what

have you, I think it was up to my judgment,

and if there was a better way -- certainly.

(The point I now recall was in no way, if I

implemented these instructions, no way could

it be traced back to the United States. It

had to be a way which could not be traced

back

... either to an American or the United

States government. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 19.)

Hedgman said Gottlieb assured him that the poisons were pro-

duced to meet this requirement:

I believe I raised the point that poisons left

traces in the human body, which could be found

on autopsy ... I believe that I was assured

that these ... lethal agents would ['leavel

normal traces found in people that die of

certain diseases. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 23.)

Hedgman said that he had an "emotional reaction of great sur-

prise" when it first became clear that Gottlieb was there to discuss

an assassination plan (Hedgman, 8/21/75, P. 30). But the Chief of

Station said that he did not give any indication that he would not

carry out the instructions (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 46). Instead, he

told Gottlieb he "would explore this" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p: 46)

and left him with the following impression:

I think it would be a fair impression that he would

take away the thought that I was going to look into it

and try

and figure if there was a way ... I believe I

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stressed the difficulty of trying to carry

out such an operation. (Hedgman, 8/21/75,

p. 47.)

The cable that Hedgman sent to headquarters reporting his.

initial contact with Gottlieb was clearly an affirmative response

to the assignment. The Chief of Station said that he and Gottlieb

were "ON SAME WAVELENGTH." (CIA Cable IN 18989, Leopoldville to

Iweedy, 9/27/60.) Hedgman was 'afraid" that Mobutu's government

was "weakening under" foreign pressure to effect a reconciliation

with Lumumba, and said:

HENCE BELIEVE MOST RAPID ACTION CONSISTENT

WITH SECURITY INDICATED. (CIA Cable, 9/27/60:)

(c) Hedgman Testified That Gottlieb Told Him That

President Eisenhower Had Ordered the Assassination

of Lumumba

Hedgman testified that in the course of their meeting in

Leopoldville, Dr. Gottlieb informed him that President Eisenhower

had authorized the assassination of Lumumba:

S: Did you raise with him the question of authori-

zation of such instructions to you?

Hedgman: Yes, I did.

That's my quite strong

recollection, that I did.

Q: What do you recall in essence was what you

said to him?

Hedgman: In essence, I think I must have ... pointed

out that this was not a common or usual Agency tactic,

and I may have probably said that I never heard of

it being done, which I had not, never in my training

or previous work in the Agency had I ever heard any

references to such, in my recollection at least, such

methods.

And it is my recollection I asked on whose

authority these instructions were issued.

Q: And what did Mr. Gottlieb reply?

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Hedgman:

It is my recollection that he identi-

fied the President, and I cannot -- the President

of the United States -- and I cannot recall

whether he said "the President,"

or whether he

identified him by name. (Hedgman, 8/21/75,

pp. 30-31.)

Hedgman continued to explain that he was told "something to the

effect that the President had instructed the Director" (Hedgman,

8/21/75, pp. 32, 34). Hedgman was clear that the ultimate source

of authority for the assassination mission was the President:

Q: Your understanding then was that these

instructions were instructions coming to you

from the office of the President?

Hedgman: That's correct.

They were passed on to you?

Or that he had instructed the Agency, and

Hedgman: That's right.

S: You are not the least unclear whether or

not you became aware with a very clear im-

pression that the President's name had been

invoked in some fashion?

Hedgman: Yes. I came - certainly that is my

recollection.

& You have no doubt about that?

I: At the time.

Hedgman: At the time, I certainly felt that I

was under

instructions

from the President, yes.

(Hedgman, 8/21/75, pP. 32-33.)

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Hedgman cautioned that he was recalling events long past:

Hedgman: Gentlemen, after fifteen years, I cannot

be 100 per cent certain, but I have always, since

that date, had the impression in my mind that these

orders had come from the President. (Hedgman,

:8/21/75, p. 34.)

But he left no doubt about the strength of his "impression" :

I: You have a very firm recollection that he

[Gottliebl represented to you that the President

of the United States directed the assassination of

Patrice Lumumba, is that

correct?

Hedgman: That's my recollection. Yes. (Hedgman,

8/21/75, P. 102; accord, p. 34.)

(d)

Headquarters Makes the Assassination Plot "Highest

Priority" and Authorizes Steps in Furtherance of It

On the basis of his talks with "Sid," Hedgman listed a

number of "possibilities"' for covert action against Lumumba. At

the top of the list was the suggestion that a particular agent

be used in the following manner:

HAVE HIM TAKE REFUGE WITH BIG BROTHER.

WOULD THUS ACT AS INSIDE MAN TO BRUSH UP

DETAILS TO RAZOR EDGE. (CIA Cable, 9/27/60.)

Hedgman indicated that he would begin to follow this course by re-

calling the agent to Leopoldville. (CIA Cable, 9/27/60.) He in-

formed headquarters: "PLAN PROCEED ON BASIS PRIORITIES AS LISTED

ABOVE, UNLESS INSTRUCTED TO CONTRARY" (CIA Cable, 9/27/60).

On September 30, the Chief of Station urged that head-

quarters authorize "exploratory conversations" with this agent so

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that he could proceed with the plan that was his top priority:

NO REALLY AIRTIGHT OP POSSIBLE WITH ASSETS

NOW AVAILABLE.

MUST CHOOSE BETWEEN CANCELLING

OP OR ACCEPTING CALCULATED RISKS OF VARYING

DEGREES.

• [IN] VIEW NECESSITY ACT IMMEDIATELY, IF AT

ALL, URGE HQS AUTHORIZE EXPLORATORY CONVER-

SATIONS TO DETERMINE IF [AGENT] WILLING TAKE

ROLE AS ACTIVE AGENT OR CUT-OUT THIS OP.

(WOULD APPROACH ON HYPOTHETICAL BASIS AND NOT

REVEAL PLANS.) IF HE APPEARS WILLING ACCEPT

TIVE OP TO HIME II NECESSARY REVEAL OBJEC-

OP TO HIM.

REQUEST HQS REPLY [IMMEDIATELY]. (CIA

Cable,

IN 20857, Leopoldville to. Iweedy,

• 9/30/60 .)

Hedgman's cables -- sent for Iweedy's "Eyes Only" in the PROP

channel -- indicated that the assassination operation had been

mounted. They show that a specific operational plan had been set

in motion to the extent that Hedgman thought that it would have

to be clearly "cancelled" by headquarters before he would stop

proceeding with the plan. Hedgman's description of the means

of maintaining the security of the operation could be taken as

a reference to a lethal biological agent which would be slow to

take effect or which would leave no traces:

ALTHOUGH TOO EARLY SEE SPECIFIC DETAILS

(AGENT'S] PART IN O1,

BELIEVE RISK MINI-

MIZED IF HE LEAVES AREA BEFORE EFFECTS OP

ARE APPARENT. (CIA Cable, IN 20857,

Leopoldville to Tweedy.)

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The same day, through the PROP channel, Hedgman received

authorization from headquarters to proceed with his top priority

plạn:

YOU ARE AUTHORIZED HAVE EXPLORATORY TALKS

WITH SCHOTROFFE TO ASSESS HIS ATTITUDE

TOWARD POSSIBLE ACTIVE AGENT OR CUTOUT ROLE.

• APPRECIATE MANNER YOUR APPROACH TO

PROBLEM.

(CIA Cable,

OUT 75900, Fields to

Leopoldville, 9/30/60.)

In this cable, Glenn Fields, Assistant Chief of the Africa Division,

expressed a "HOPE.... FOR MODERATE HASTE" (CIA Cable OUT 75900,

Fields to Leopoldville, 9/30/60.)

According to the report of the Chief of Station, Gottlieb

left the Congo to return to headquarters on October 5 in view of

the "EXPIRATION DATE HIS MATERIALS" (CIA Cable IN 24171, Leopold-

ville to Iweedy, 10/7/60). The "expiration" of Gottlieb's

"materials" probably refers to the date beyond which the substances

would no longer have lethal strength. Although the relation of

the "expiration date" to Gottlieb's departure is unclear from the

cables, it probably signifies that some of the biological substances

had lost their toxicity. Nonetheless, the Chief of Station indi-

cated that Gottlieb left some biological substances that were still

lethal and that he intended to proceed with the assassination

operation:

[SID] LEFT CERTAIN ITEMS OF CONTINUING USE-

FULNESS.

[CHIEF OF STATION] PLANS CONTINUE

TRY IMPLEMENT OP. • (CIA Cable IN 24171,

Leopoldville to Iweedy, 10/7/60.)

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- 27--

By this

point, Hedgman had conducted his "exploratory .con-

versation". with the agent who was his best candidate for gaining

access to Lumumba (liedgman, 8/21/75, P. 60). Hedgman testified

that the subject he "explored" was the agent's ability to find a

means to inject poison into Lumumba's food or toothpaste. (Hedgman,

8/21/75, p. 60):

I believe that I queried the agent who had

access to Lumumba, and his entourage, in

detail about just what that access, what

access he actually had, as opposed to speak-

ing to people.

In other words, did he have

access to the bathroom, did he have access

to the kitchen, things of that sort.

I have a recollection of having queried him

on that without specifying why I wanted to

know this. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, P. 48.)

On October 7, the Chief of Station reported to headquarters

on this meeting:

CONDUCTED EXPLORATORY CONVERSATION WITH

[AGENT] ... AFTER EXPLORING ALL POSSIBILITIES

[AGENT]

SUGGESTED SOLUTION RECOMMENDED BY

HOS.

HE PREPARED TAKE ANY RODE NECESSARY BELIEVE

HE PREPARED TAKE ANY ROLE NECESSARY BELIEVE

LIMITS SECURITY ACCOMPLISI OBJECTIVE.

Hedgman testified that his exploratory steps left him with

doubts about the wisdom or practicality of the assassination plot:

[Certainly I looked on it as a pretty wild

scheme professionally. I did not think that

it ... was practical professionally.

Certainly ... to keep the U.S. öut of it....

I explored it, but I doubt that I ever really

expected

to carry it out. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 111.)

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However, his cables

indicate that he was planning to con-

35:"

tinue to implement the operation and sought the resources to do

it successfully. He urged headquarters to send him an alternate

operative for the assassination mission in the event that they

found his first choice unacceptable:

IF HQS BELIEVE [AGENT'S CIRCUMSTANCES]

BAR HIS PARTICIPATION, WISH STRESS NECES-

SITY PROVIDE STATION WITH QUALIFIED THIRD

COUNTRY NATIONAL. (CIA Cable IN 24171,

Leopoldville to Tweedy, 10/7/60.)

Iweedy cabled the Chief of Station the same day that he "HAD

GOOD DISCUSSION YOUR COLLEAGUE 7 OCT -- presumably referring to

a de-briefing of Gottlieb upon his return to the United States.

(CIA Cable OUT 78336, Iweedy to Leopoldville, 10/7/60.) Iweedy

indicated that he was

CONSIDERING DISPATCHING THIRD COUNTRY

NATIONAL OPERATOR WHO, WHEN HE ARRIVES,

SHOULD THEN BE ASSESSED BY YOU OVER

PERIOD TO SEE WHETHER HE MIGHT PLAY

ACTIVE OR CUTOUT ROLE ON FULL TIME BASIS:

(CIA Cable: OU1 78336, Iweedy to Chief of

Station, 10/7/60.)

This expression of support for the operation was followed by

an extraordinary pair of cables from headquarters on October 15,

1960. One of these cables was issued by a desk officer in CIA's

Africa Division and released under Bronson Iweedy's signature, as

Division Chief, and sent to Leopoldville through standard CIA

channels, which would allow for distribution of the message to

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appropriate personnel in the CIA station and the United States .

embassy. This cable .... generally discussed the possibility of

covertly supplying certain Congolese leaders with funds and

military aid (CIA Cable OUT 81476, Director to Leopoldville,

10/15/60). This cable also delimited the kind of.

action against

Lumumba that would be authorized:

ONLY DIRECT ACTION WE CAN NOW STAND BEHIND

IS TO SUPPORT IMMOBILIZING OR ARRESTING

[LUMUMBA], DESIRABLE AS MORE DEFINITIVE

ACTION MIGHT BE.

ANY ACTION TAKEN WOULD

HAVE TO BE ENTIRELY CONGOLESE.

(CIA Cable

OU1 81476, Director to Leopoldville,

10/15/60.

On the same day that this message was dispatched, a second

cable was sent to Leopoldville. This cable was issued personally

by Bronson Iweedy and sent in the special PROP channel for

Hedgman's "EYES ONLY"' (CIA Cable OUT 81396, Iweedy to Chief of

Station, 10/15/60) •

YOU WILL NOTE FROM CABLE THROUGH NORMAL

CHANNEL CURRENTLY BEING TRANSMITTED A PARA [GRAPH]

ON PROP TYPE SUGGESTIONS. YOU WILL PROBABLY RE-

CEIVE MORE ALONG THESE LINES AS STUMBLING BLOC

[LUMUMBA] REPRESENTS INCREASINGLY APPARENT ALL

STUDYING CONGO SITUATION CLOSELY AND HIS DIS-

POSITION SPONTANEOUSLY BECOMES NUMBER ONE CON-

SIDERATION.

RAISE ABOVE SO YOU NOT CONFUSED BY ANY

APPARENT DUPLICATIÓN. THIS CHANNEL REMAINS FOR

SPECIFIC PURPOSE YOU DISCUSSED WITH COLLEAGUE AND

ALSO REMAINS HIGHEST PRIORITY.

(CIA Cable OUT

81396, Tweedy to Chief of Station, 10/15/60).

Thus, Tweedy resolved the apparent duplication of cables by indi-

cating that communications about the assassination mission were

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restricted to the PROP channel and that the assassination

mission was to move forward. He went on to request Hedgman's

reaction to the prospect of sending a senior CIA case officer to

the Congo on a "DIRECTED ASSIGNMENT ... TO CONCENTRATE ENTIRELY

THIS ASPECT" (CIA Cable OUT 81396, Iweedy to Chief of Station,

10/15/60). This referred to CIA officer Justin O'Donnell, who

testified that in late October he was asked by Richard Bissell to

undertake the mission of assassinating Lumumba.*

In the course of suggesting the assignment of an additional

officer to the Congo, the cable provided insight into the reason

that the assassination mission had not progressed more rapidly

under the Chief of Station:

SEEMS TO US YOUR OTHER COMMITMENTS TOO HEAVY

GIVE NECESSARY CONCENTRATION PROP .

(CIA

Cable OUT 81396, Iweedy to Chief of Station,

10/15/60.)

Again, in contradiction of the limitations on anti-Lumumba

activity outlined in the cable sent through normal channels,

Iweedy's cable also proposed a plan to kidnap Lumumba:

POSSIBILITY USE COMMANDO TYPE GROUP FOR

ABDUCTION [LUMUMBA], EITHER VIA ASSAULT

ON HOUSE UP CLIFF FROM RIVER OR, MORE

PROBABLY, IF [LUMUMBA] ATTEMPTS ANOTHER

BREAKOUT

INTO TOWN

... REQUEST YOUR VIEWS.

(CIA Cable OUT 81396, Tweedy to Chief of

Station, 10/15/60.)

* For a full account of the meeting between Bissell and

O'Donnell and O'Donnell's subsequent activities in the Congo, see

Section 5(a), infra.

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This series of cables sent

during, and after

Gottlieb's visit to the Congo demonstrated a clear intent at CIA

headquarters to authorize and support rapid progress on the assassi-

nation mission. The cables also show an intent to severely re-

strict knowledge of the assassination operation among officers in

CIA's Africa Division and among United States personnel in the

Congo, including those who were aware of and involved in other

covert activities.

(e)

The Chief of Station Moves Forward With Assassination

Plot

The testimony of the Chief of Station, taken fifteen

years after the events in question and without benefit of review

of the cables discussed above, was compatible with the picture

derived from the cables of a fully authorized and tightly restricted

assassination operation. Hedgman's testimony is at variance from

the cables only with respect to the lack of vigor with which he

claims to have pursued the assignment which he dealt with in an

affirmative, aggressive manner in the cables.

(i) The Chief of Station Testified That He Requested

and Received Confirmation of the Assassination

Plan from Headquarters

Hedgman testified that, after receiving Gottlieb's

instructions, he cabled CIA headquarters seeking confirmation that

he was to carry out Gottlieb's instructions (Hedgman, 8/21/75,

p. 36). Hedgman did not recall whether he identified Gottlieb by

name, and he doubted that he "would have" mentioned the President

in such a cable (Hedgman, 8/21/75, PP. 36, 43).

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Hedgnan described the extraordinary security precautions he

took cabling his request for confirmation of the assassination in-

structions:

There was some special channel ... because

it was handled differently than any other

normal message.

For example, it was not put

on a regular cable form, which, you know,

you have several copies

entried

for your various files:

And it was my recollection that I personally

carried the message to the communicator to

encrypt, and that was worded in a doublt-talk

way that even the communicator would not

necessarily. know what it was about.

(Hedgman, 8/21/75, PP. 42-43.)

This description approximates the PROP channel that was used for

all cables relating to the assassination mission.

Hedgman testified that soon after cabling his request for con-

firmation that he was to carry out the assassination assignment,

he received an affirmative reply from headquarters:

I believe I received a reply which I interpreted

to mean yes, that he was the messenger and his

instructions were ... duly authorized.

(heagman, 8/21/75, pp. 37-38.)

Despite the cryptic nature of the cables, Hedgman said "I was con-

vinced that yes, it was right." (Hedgman, 8/21/75, PP. 44, 50.)

Hedgman did not recall receiving any indication, either from

Gottlieb of by cable, that he was to await further authorization

before using the poisons (Hedgman, 8/21/75, P. 38). Hedgman ex-

pressed some uncertainty about whether he "had an absolute free

hand" to proceed with an assassination attempt without receiving.

"final confirmation" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pP. 38, 47, 53).

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Hedgman summarized his testimony on this question in his

second appearance:

I probably had authority to act on my own

but

... it was possible that I had to go

back and get clearance for my action.

(Hedgman, 8/25/75, P. 11; see also 8/21/75,

p. 39.)

Hedgman testified, however, that a "policy decision" had been

made -- that assassination had been "approved" as "one means" of

eliminating Lumumba as a political threat (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 52).

I thought the policy decision had been made

in the White House, not in the Agency, and

that the Agency had been selected as the

Executive Agent,

if you will, to carry out

a political decision. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 52.)

Although Hedgman assumed that the President had not personally

selected the means of assassination, he testified that he was under

the impression that the President had authorized the CIA to do so

and to proceed to take action:

Hedgman:

... I doubt that I thought the

President had said, you use this system.

But my understanding is the President had

made a decision that an act should také

place, but then put that into the hands of

the Agency to carry out his decision.

Q:

Whatever that act was to be, it was

clearly to be assassination or the death

of the foreign political leader?

Hedgman: Yes.

l: Instigated by the CIA, initiated by the CIA?

Hedgman:

Certainly if those -- if Dr. Gottlieb's

lethal agents were employed, that would have been

the result, yes.

'(Hedgman, 3/21/75, P. 104.)

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Nonetheless, Hedgman said he had no "desire to carry. out

these instructions". (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 106). Whether or not

he felt there was authority to attempt an assassination without

seeking final confirmation, he said that he would have checked

with headquarters before taking action:

I think probably that I would have gone. back

and advised that I intended to carry out and

sought final approval before carrying it out

had I been going to do it, had there been a

way to do it.

I did not see it as

... a

matter which could be accomplished practically,

certainly. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pP. 51-52.)

He proceeded to affirm that his reason for seeking a final approval

would have been to receive assurances about the practicality of the

specific mode of assassination that he planned to use (Hedgman,

8/21/75, p. 53) .

(ij) The Chief of Station Took "Exploratory Steps" in

Furtherance of the Assassination Plot and Testified

That He Destroyed Cable Traffic Related to the Plot

Hedgman testified that after Gottlieb's visit, he locked

the lethal substances in the bottom drawer of his safe, "probably".

sealed in an envelope marked "Eyes Only" with his name on it

(Hedgman, 8/21/75, PP. 48-49). He said that his secretary was

the only other person with access to the safe and that she would

not have examined a package marked in this fashion (Hedgman, 8/21/75,

p. 49) .

Hedgman testified that it was "possible" that he pre-

served the poisons in his safe until after. Lumumba's death; at any

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rate, they were not disposed of before Lumumba was "successfully

neutralized" by being captured and imprisoned by. the Congolese

government •(Hedgman, 8/21/75, PP. 85-86) at the beginning of

December, 1960. Hedgman said that he does not recall taking the

poisons out of his safe on any occasion other than when he disposed

of them on the banks of the Congo River:

I think that I took them out probably in a

briefcase,

or an air bag of some sort, and

I believe

that the things like the rubber

gloves and the mask were thrown away in a

bushy area

or something where, you know, if

they were found, it didn't matter that much.

I believe: I buried the other matters.

(Hedgman, 8/21/75, P. 84.)

Hedgman

testified, however, that in the intervening months,

while the poisons were in his safe, he took "exploratory steps"

in furtherance of the assassination plot (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 60) .

He said that he sent several cables to CIA headquarters, after his

request for confirmation of the assassination instructions, which

"probably reflected further steps I had taken'' (Hedgman, 8/21/75,

pP. 59-60) .

Hedgman stated that his cables to headquarters on this matter

were essentially "progress reports" on his attempts to find a neans

of access to Lumumba (Hedgman, 8/21/75, P. 50). He also said that

he "would bet on the fact that there was at least one or two more

[cables] back" to him from CIA headquarters in response (Hedgman,

8/21/75, p. 50) .

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The cable traffic conforms to Hedgman's recollection. For

two months after Gottlieb's arrival in the Congo, a regular stream

of messages flowed between the Leopoldville Chief of Station and

headquarters through the PROP channel. In late September and early

October the cables concerned the initiation of Hedgman's top priority

plan -- recruiting the aid of a particular agent thought to have

sufficient access to Lumumba's entourage to be able to poison

Lumumba.* In mid-October, Tweedy notified the Chief of Station

that the assassination mission remained "HIGHEST PRIORITY", and

he suggested sending additional personnel to Leopoldville to in-

tensify "CONCENTRATION" on this operation (CIA Cable OUT 81396, Tweedy

to Chief of Station, 10/15/60).**

These cables were followed by Hedgman's report to Tweedy on

October 17 that the agent he had picked for the assassination mission

• CIA Cable IN 18989, Chief of Station to Iweedy, 9/21/60;

CIA Cable IN 20857, Chief

of station to Tweedy, 9/30/60; CIA Cable

OUT 15900, Fields to Chief of Station, 9/30/60; CIA Cable IN 24171,

Chief of Station to Iweedy, 10/7/60.

full treatment of these cables.

See Section __, supra, for

** See Section

_ supra, for more complete text of this

cable.

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HAS NOT BEEN ABLE PENETRATE ENTOURAGE.

THUS HE HAS NOT BEEN ABLE PROVIDE OPS

INTEL NEEDED THIS JOB. (CIA Cable

IN 28936, Chief of Station to Tweedy,

'10/17/60.)

Hedgman testified that this operative left Leopoldville "sometime

in October" which terminated their discussions about gaining access

to Lumumba for the purpose of assassinating him (Hedgman, 8/21/75,

p. 61). The Chief of Station continued to communicate with head

quarters about finding a means to move forward with the assassina-

tion operation and securing the necessary manpower

to do so.

Hedgman confirmed

Iweedy's view that although the assassination

operation was still his highest priority, he was overburdened with

responsibility for other operations so that he could not concentrate

on the progress of the assassination mission:

ALTHOUGH MAINTAINING PRIORITY INTEREST THIS

OP, ABLE DEVOTE ONLY LIMITED AMOUNT TIME,

VIEW MULTIPLE OPS COMMITMENTS. (CIA Cable,

IN 28936, 10/17/60.)

Due to his workload, the Chief of Station responded enthusiastically

to Iweedy's suggestion of an additional

case officer:

BELIEVE EARLY ASSIGNMENT SENIOR CASE OFFICER

HANDLE PROP OPS EXCELLENT IDEA

• IF CASE

OFFICER AVAILABLE [CHIEF OF STATION] WOULD

DEVOTE AS MUCH TIME AS POSSIBLE TO ASSISTING

AND DIRECTING HIS EFFORTS. (CIA Cable

IN 28936, 10/17/60.)

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The Chief of Station concluded this cable with the following

cryptic recommendation, reminiscent of his testimony that he

may have "suggested" shooting Lumumba to Gottlieb as an alternative

to poisoning (liedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 27-29) :

IF CASE OFFICER SENT, RECOMMEND HQS

POUCH SOONEST HIGH POWERED FOREICH MAKE

RIFLE WITH TELESCOPIC SCOPE AND SILENCER.

HUNTING GOOD HERE WHEN LIGHTS RIGIT.

HOWEVER AS HUNTING RIFLES NOW FORBIDDEN,

WOULD KEEP RIFLE IN OFFICE PENDING OPENING

TO LO ERE SEASON

OF HUNTING SEASON. (CIA Cable Il 28936,

10/17/60 .)

The first sentence of Hedgman's recommendation clearly refers

to sending a sniper rifle to the Congo via diplomatic pouch. The

rest of the message is probably an oblique reference to the

possibility of shooting Lumumba at the "OPENING OF HUNTING SEASON" --

in other words, at the first opportunity to find Lumumba outside

the residence where he remained in UN protective custody. This

interpretation is bolstered by a report sent the next month by

the Chief of Station through the PROP channel for Tweedy's "EYES

ALONE. " Hedgman's cable described the stalemate which prevailed from

mid-September until Lumumba's departure for Stanleyville on

November 27; Lumumba was virtually a prisoner in UN custody, but

inaccessible to CIA agents and the Congolese:

TARGET HAS NOT LEFT BUILDING IN SEVERAL

WEEKS. HOUSE GUARDED DAY AND NIGHT BY

CONGOLESE AND UN TROOP ....

CONGOLESE

TROOPS ARE THERE TO PREVENT TARGET'S

ESCAPE AND TO ARREST HIM IF HE ATTEMPTS.

UN TROOPS THERE TO PREVENT STORMING OF

PALACE BY CONGOLESE.

CONCENTRIC RINGS

OF DEFENSE MAKE ESTABLISHMENT OF OBSER-

VATION POST IMPOSSIBLE. ATTEMPTING GET

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COVERAGE OF ANY MOVEMENT INTO OR OUT OF

HOUSE BY CONGOLESE....

TARGET HAS DESMISSED

MOST OF SERVANTS SO ENTRY THIS MEANS SEEMS

REMOTE: (CIA Cable IN 42478, Chief of

Station to Iweedy.)

Hedgman testified that all of his cable traffic about the

assassination question would have been sent with the same

extraordinarily stringent security precautions -- presumably.re-

ferring to the PROP channel -- which concerned Gottlieb's visit

and the confirmation of authorization for his instructions:

I would have sent in a special channel

anything dealing with Lumumba, at least

that would touch upon his removal in one

way or another.

(Hedgman, 8/21/75, P. 62.)

The Chief of Station also testified that sometime before

leaving the Station, he destroyed all cable traffic relating to

the assassination mission (Hedgman, 8/21/75, P. 89). Hedgman's

best recollection was that he had received instructions to destroy

those cables (Hedgman, 8/21/75, P. 96). Hedgman said he had never

before in his tenure as Chief of Station in the Congo destroyed

cable traffic

because of its sensitivity (Hedgman, 9/21/75, p. 91).

But he stated that the cables relating to assassination were

destroyed because of their extremely sensitive nature.* He said

* It is possible that copies of cables dealing with such a

sensitive operation were also destroyed at CIA headquarters.

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that eventually

I destroyed a great deal of traffic, because

the Congo was

a highly sensitive area in

which -- at one period I recall we had all

of our files in the burn barrels. I mean,

when you wanted a file, you went over and

dug it out of the burn barrell. (Hedgman,

8/21/75, p. 91.)

At the conclusion of his testimony about the assassination

plot, the Chief of Station was asked to give a general characteri-

zation of the advisability of the plot and the tenor of the times

in which it took place. His response indicated that although he

was

willing to carry out what he considered a duly authorized

order, he was

not convinced of the necessity of assassinating

Lumumba:

I looked upon the Agency as an executive

arm of the Presidency..

Therefore, I

suppose I thought that it was an order

issued in due form from an authorized

authority.

On the other hand, I looked at it as a

kind of operation that I could do without,.

that I thought that probably the Agency

nd the U.S. government could get along

I didn't regard Lumumba as the

kind of person who was going to bring on

World War III or something.

I might have had a somewhat different

attitude if I thought that one man could

bring on World War III and result in the

deaths of millions of people or something,

but I didn't see him in that light.

I saw

him as a danger to the political position

of the United States in Africa, but

nothing more than that. Hedgman, 8/21/75,

pp. 110-111.)

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(E)

Testimony of Bissell and Iweedy About the Degree

of Support for and Perpetration of the Assassination

PIOt

There is a great variance between the testimony of Richard

Bissell and Bronson Iweedy and the picture of the assassination

plot presented by the Chief of Station and the cable traffic from

the period. While the weight of the evidence demonstrates that

the assassination effort was

: the "highest priority" at CIA head-

quarters among operations in the Congo, Bissell has no direct

recollection of Gottlieb's mission to the Congo and Tweedy can

recall

nothing more than consideration of the feasibility of an

assassination attempt.

(i.)

Iweedy Had No Recollection of the Operation

To Poison Lumumba

As Chief of the Africa Division, Bronson Iweedy was the principal

liaison at CIA headquarters with the Chief of Station in Leopoldville

for all instructions, plans, and progress reports concerning the

effort to assassinate Lumumba, which were communicated through the.

special PROP channel. Most of the reports and recommendations

cabled to headquarters by the Chief of Station on the assassination

operation were marked for Tweedy's "Eyes Only.":

Tweedy personally signed both the cable which initially informed

the Chief of Station that "SID" would arrive in Leopoldville, with

assignment (CIA Cable OUT 71464, Bissell/Tweedy to Chief of

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Station, 9/19/60) and the cable of October 7 indicating that he

had debriefed Gottlieb

upon his return from the Congo (CIA Cable

OUT 78336, Tweedy to Chief of Station, 10/7/60). Tweedy was also

the "Eyes Only" recipient of Hedgman's reports on Gottlieb's

arrival in the Congo (CIA Cable IN 18989, Chief of Station to

Tweedy, 9/27/60) and the subsequent communications about the plan

which emerged from the discussions between Gottlieb and Hedgman

as the top priority -- infiltration of

an agent into Lumumba's en-

tourage to administer a lethal poison to the Congolese leader (CIA

Cable IN 20857, Chief of Station to Tweedy, 9/30/60; CIA Cable,

Chief of Station to Tweedy, 10/7/60; CIA Cable, Chief of

Station

to Tweedy, 10/17/60) .

Iweedy testified, however, without benefit of reviewing these

cables, that he had no knowledge of the plot to poison Lumumba:

?.. Do you have any knowledge of a messenger

from CIA headquarters having to go to the Congo

to provide the Chief of Station in the Congo

with instructions to carry out the assassination

of Lumumba, if possible, and also provide him

with the tools to carry out such an assassination,

namely, poisons and medical equipment for admin-

istering them?

Mr. Tweedy. No, I do not. (Iweedy, 9/9/75, pp. 30-31)

* See. Sections 4(a). - 4(e) for full treatment of the cables sent

in the PROP channel between Tweedy and the Chief of Station in

Leopoldville.:

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When asked his opinion about the truth of the testimony received

by the Committee that poisons were delivered to the Congo by

Gottlieb, who carried instructions that they were to be used in

the assassination of Lumumba, Iweedy replied:

There

is nothing in my experience with the

Agency which would really bear on that

point whatsoever: (Iweedy, 9/9, PP. 39-39)

Tweedy added that if Gottlieb went to the Congo as a courier,

"I will bet I knew it, but I don't recall it" (Iweedy, 919, p. 35).

Iweedy testified that it was "perfectly possible" for lethal bio-

logical substances to have been sent to the Congo, "but I don't

recall it" (Iweedy, 9/9, p. 30) .

In response to a question about whether he knew about a cable

from headquarters informing Hedgman that a messenger was to come to

the Congo with instructions for him,. Iweedy said that he would be

"very surprised if I didn't (knowl, but I certainly have no recoll-

ection of it whatsoever (Iweedy, 9/9, p. 31).

Iweedy said that he "was not going to gainsay" the testimony of

the

Chief of Station that a cable was sent to headquarters through

a special channel requesting confirmation that the instructions

were to be carried out but he did not recall it (Tweedy, 9/9, pp.

32-33) -

Tweedy commented that rather than questioning the truth of the

testimony of the Chief of Station,* the discrepancies in their

Iweedy expressed a high regard for the general credibility of the

Chief of Station. Iweedy said that he never had occasion to doubt

"I would trust his memory

(Tweedy, 9/9, p. 30) :

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testimony could be attributed to his own lack of recall:

I'really am having trouble with this.

I had to

be reminded of so many things. .. (The things

that I recall the most vividly about all my

African

experiences were.

the things I was

basically concerned with all the time,

which was

putting this division together and the rest of

it. When it comes to operational detail I start

fuzzy and you would have thought with something

like thinking about Mr. Lumumba in these terms,

that I would have gone to bed and got up thinking

about Lumumba, I can assure you this wasn't the

case. (Tweedy,: 9/9, p. 34)

Iweedy was firm, however, in his disbelief that "Gottlieb would

have left instructions with the Chief of Station which would have

empowered (him].

• to go out and assassinate Lumumba, without any

further recourse or reference to headquarters" (Tweedy, 9/9, PP. 32,.

36) . Iweedy said:

In such a matter of this kind, headquarters

would

have wanted to have a last word up to the last

minute. (Iweedy, 9/9, p. 36)

(ii) Tweedy Testified That He Discussed With Bissell

the Feasibility of Assassinating Lumumba and He

Cabled Hedgman About Gaining Access to Lumumba

For the Purpose of Assassination

Despite Tweedy's lack of recollection about the actual plot to

poison Lumumba, he did recall exploring the feasibility of an assass-

ination attempt.

Tweedy testified that he

had discussed the subject of assassinating

Lumumba "more than once" with Richard Bissell in the fall of 1960

(Iweedy, 9/9, PP. 14-15). Tweedy stated that he did not know

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whether Bissell had consulted with any "higher authority" about

exploring the possibilities for assassinating Lumumba (Iweedy,

9/9, p. 28): Generally, Tweedy said, when he received an instruc-

tion from Bissell he would proceed to implement it on the assump-

tion that it was fully authorized above the level of DDP:

I would proceed with it on the basis that he

was authorized to give me instructions and it

was up to him to bloody well know what he was

empowered

to tell me to do: (Iweedy, 9/9, p.13)

Iweedy characterized his discussions with Bissell about assass-

inating Lumumba as "contingency planning" (Tweedy, 9/9/75, D. 28):

Tweedy.

•I think it came up in the sense that

Dick would have said we probably better be

thinking about whether it might ever be necessary

or desirable to get rid of Lumumba, in which case

we presumably should be in position to assess

whether we could do it or not successfully.

Q.: Do it, meaning carry off an assassination?

Tweedy.

Yes, but it was never discussed with him

in any other sense but a planning exercise,

never were we instructed to do anything of this

kind. We were instructed to ask whether such a

thing would be feasible and to have the Chief of

Station be thinking

along those lines as well.

(Tweedy, 9/9, p. 15)

Tweedy said that the planning that he undertook pursuant to his con-

versation with Bissell included "a few" cables that he remembers

sending to the Chief of Station asking him

to keep in mind what sort of access one might ever

have had to Lumumba. .

[in] the eventuality that

we might wish to get rid of. Mr. Lumumba personally.

(Iweedy, 919, pp. 19-21)

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Tweedy did not recall inquiring about gaining access to Lumumba for

the purpose of abducting him from UN custody (Iweedy, 9/9, p. 24) ;

rather he "supposed" that various means of assassination were

being explored:

Would this be access to shoot him or would this

be access to his personal food or drink or toiletries?

Tweedy:

• I suppose all those types of things might

have been considered. (Tweedy, 9/9, P. 23)

Q.

In your discussions with Bissell, about the

feasibility of an assassination operation, did

poisons come.up as one means that was being con-

sidered

and which the Chief of Station should explore?

Tweedy.

•I am sure it must have. After all, there

are not many ways of doing it.

Shoot a man, poison

him, of course you could,

I suppose, stab him of

something like that.

But basically you are talking

about a contingency plan which I assume has the best

possibility of protecting the involvement of the U.S

Government and if you want to do it in a manner which

would be as distant, if that is the right word, as

possible, I think poison would then stand high

on

the list of possibilities.

Iweedy did not "recall specifically" the response from the Chief

of Station, but said he was "sure" that he received "a serious

answer... a disciplined reply to an instruction from headquarters"

: (Iweedy,. 9/9, pP: 23,27).

Although Tweedy did not recall sending or receiving cables in a

special channel concerning the 'messenger" to the Congo or confirm-

ation of his instructions, he acknowledged that the cables exploring

access to Lumumba for the purpose of assassination would have been

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sent in a channel that was even more closely restricted than the

normal CIA cable traffic (Tweedy, 9/9, PP: 22, 32-33). Tweedy

said destruction of such cable traffic would have been left to the

discretion of the Chief of Station and he

did not know whether

Hedgman destroyed the Station's copies (Iweedy, 9/9, P. 22):

Tweedy said "I would be surprised if I didn't" have a conver-

sation with Sidney Gottlieb about "anything in his inventory that

could possibly be used, including lethal biological substances

(Tweedy, 9/9, PP..

68-69). Tweedy "suspected" that "the first

conversation along. these lines would undoubtedly have been held

between Dick Bissell and Sidney Gottlieb," which Iweedy then would

have "followed-up" (Iweedy, 9/9, p. 69) .

Tweedy maintained that the period in which he explored the

means of access for assassinating Lumumba remained "a planning

interval and at no point can I recall that I ever felt it was im-

minent that somebody would say 'go'" (Iweedy, 9/9. pp. 18-19):

Tweedy.

It was always my assumption that at the

time anything like this should occur there would

have been some kind of real focus on the problem

at probably a very considerable policy level with-

in the Agency. :

and it never occurred to me that

I would get a

cali or Bissell would ask me to come

down to his office and sya go to it.

Nor were we

ever in a position where he said that I would

merely implement plan so-and-so.

We never got

that far.

Q. You didn't have any action plans for the

assassination of Lumumba that you had prepared or

were aware of? .

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Tweedy.

No.

Planning, yes, but nothing that

ever got anywhere. . (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 19)

It is difficult to reconcile the cable traffic with Iweedy's

testimony that no action plans were launched and that no authoriz-

ation for implementing the assassination operation, authorization

for Hedgman's approach to his agent to explore access to Lumumba's

entourage is in accord with Iweedy's description of his inquiries

about gaining access to Lumumba.

However, the fact that Tweedy was personnaly informed that the

Chief of Station "PLANS CONTINUE TRY IMPLEMENT OP". (CIA Cable IN

24171, Chief of Station to Tweedy, 10/7/60) is harder to reconcile

with his statements that a "go ahead" on the operation was never

imminent, especially in light of Iweedy's PROP cable the next week

which told the Chief of Station that Lumumba's

DISPOSITION SPONTANEOUSLY BECOMES NUMBER ONE

CONSIDERATION.

SONSTRIC PURPOSE YOU DISCUSE EEMA COLLEAGUE

AND ALSO REMAINS HIGHEST PRIORITY. (CIA Cable

OUT 81396, Tweedy to Chief of Station, 10/15/60)

(iii) Bissell Testified That He Did Not Recall

Whether The Assassination Operation Had

Moved From Planning To Implementation

But It Was Not Against Agency Policy to

Send Poisons to The Congo

Richard Bissell testified that he did not remember discussing

the feasibility of assassinating Lumumba with Bronson Tweedy, but it

seemed "entirely probable" to him that such discussions took place

(Bissell, 9/10, pp. 3-4) .

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Bissell said he "may have" given Tweedy specific instructions about

steps he was to take to further an assassination plan, but he did

not remember to do so (Bissell, 9/10,p.4). Bissell said that

exploring access to Lumumba --"almost certainly" seeking information

from the Chief of Station about access for poisoning -- would have

been a "key part" of his

"planning and preparatory activity" but

he had no specific recollection of cable communications on this

subject. (Bissell, 9/10, pp. 6-8). Bissell remembered that he was

aware. that the Chief of Station had an agent thought to have direct

access to Lumumba (Bissell; 9/10, p. 80).

Bissell testified that he "most certainly" approved any cables

that Tweedy sent to the Chief of Station seeking information about

gaining access to Lumumba but it was so sensitive a matter (Bissell,

9/10; p. 8) Bissell added:

I think Mr. Iweedy, on the basis of an oral author-

ization from me

• (Bissell, 9/10, p. 8)

Bissell believed that Iweedy would have known of Gottlieb's trip

to the Congo, although it was possible that Tweedy was "cut out of

knowledge of the specific operation!' (Bissell, 9/10, p. 21).

Bissell's lack of recollection of discussing his assignment to

Justin O'Donnell'with Tweedy was the reason for his speculation that

'Bissell's assignment to O'Donnell is discussed in Sections 5(a)

(i) and 5(a) (ii), infra.

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Tweedy might have been unaware of the true purpose of Gottlieb's

visit (Bissell, 9/10, PP. 20-22) .

Bissell did not recall cables concerning the dispatch. of a

messenger and subsequently confirming that his instructions were

to be followed, but he said "This sounds highly likely. . : I

would expect, given the background; that the confirmation would

have been forthcoming" (Bissell, 9/10, p. 43).

It was "very probable," according to Bissell, that he discussed

the assassination of Lumumba with Sidney Gottlieb, who was then

his Science Advisor (Bissell, 9/10, P. 14). Bissell said that on a

number of occasions he discussed with Gottlieb "the availability

of means of incapacitation, including assassination" (Bissell, 9/10,

p. 60) .

Although he had no "specific recollection," Bissell assumed

that, if Gottlieb went to the Congo, he had approved the mission,

(which "might very well" have dealt with the assassination of

Lumumba) (Bissell, 9/10, PP. 18, 20, 44). Despite his absence of

specific recollection of these events, Bissell said, "There is

nothing in mind that I remember that would be in conflict" with the

testimony of the Chief of Station that. Gottlieb carried poisons to

the Congo (Bissell, 9/10, p. 35).

Bissell testified that it would not have been against CIA policy

in the fall of 1960 to send poisons to the Congo (Bissell, 9/10, p. 35) .

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He classified "the act of taking the kit to the Congo. .... as still

in the planning stage"' (Bissell, 9/10, p. 49): Bissell acknowledged,

however, that the dispatch of poisons and paraphernalia with which

to administer them was an extraordinary. event:

It would indeed have been rather unusual

to send

such materials -- a specific ki.t.

of this

sort -- out to a relatively small station, unless

planning for their use were quite far along.

(Bissell, 9/10, p. 37) .

yes.

Nonetheless, Bissell said that he "probably believed" that he

had sufficient authority at that

point to direct CIA officers to

move from the stage of planning to implementation (Bissell, 9/10,

pp. 60-61). In light of his absence of a specific recollection of

these events, he stated that "if it be taken as established that Mr.

Gottlieb took specific instructions 'to implement,' " Gottlie!.

would not have been acting beyond the mandate given to him by

Bissell and it would show that the assassination plot "had then passed

into an implementation phase" and that "authorization was given"

(Bissell, 9/10/ PP. 39, 41, 49).

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5 .

The Question of a Connection Between the Assassination

Plot and Other Actions, of CIA Officers and Operatives

In the Congo

Justin O'Donnell, a senior CIA officer in the clandestine

operations division in 1960, testified that during this period he

had been asked by DDP Richard Bissell to go to the Congo to carry

out the assassination of Lumumba (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, PP. 11-12).

O'Donnell said that he refused to participate in an assassination

operation, but proceeded to the Congo to attempt. to draw Lumumba

away from the protective custody of the UN guard and place him in

the hands of Congolese

authorities (Ö'Donnell, 6/9/75, PP. 13-14).

Shortly after O'Donnell's arrival in the Congo he was

joined by a CIA agent with a criminal background who was used the

following year by the CIA as part of a program to develop a stand-by

assassination capability. Late in 1960, one of the operatives of

the Chief of Station in Leopoldville approached this agent of

O'Donnell's with a proposition to join an "execution squad" (CIA

Cable IN 18739, Leopoldville to Director, 12/7/60):

Despite the fact that O'Donnell was initially approached

to be part of the plot to assassinate Patrice Lumumba, it is un-

likely that O'Donnell was actually involved in the implementation

of that plot by the Chief of Station. Whether there is any connec-

tion between the assassination plot and either of the two operatives --

QJWIN and WIROGUE -- is less clear.

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(a)

O'Donnell's Operations in the Congo

(i) Iweedy and the Chief of Station Agreed That a

Senior Case Officer Should be Sent to the Congo

to Concentrate on the Assassination Operation

In early October, 1960, several cables sent in the

specially restricted PROP channel dealt with a plan to send a "senior

case officer". to the Congo to aid the Chief of Station with the

assassination operation.* On October 7, Bronson Iweedy informed

Hedgman that he "WOULD EXPECT DISPATCH TDY [TEMPORARY DUTY] SENIOR

CASE OFFICER RUN THIS OP" by supervising a third country national

operative (CIA Cable OUT 78336, Iweedy to Chief of Station, 10/7/60).

On October 15, Iweedy requested Hedgman's reaction to the sugges-

tion of dispatching the

senior case officer as soon as possible to

concentrate on the assassination operation (CIA Cable OUT 81396,

Iweedy to Chief of Station, 10/15/60). Iwo days later, the Chief

of Station replied affirmatively:

BELIEVE EARLY ASSIGNMENT SENIOR CASE OFFICER

HANDLE PROP OPS EXCELLENT IDEA.

(CIA Cable

IN 28936, Chief of Station to Iweedy).

The Chief of Station advised that his responsibilities for "MULTIPLE

OPS" had restricted the amount of time he was able to devote to the

assassination operation (CIA Cable, 10/17/60).

* See Section 4(e), supra, for full treatment of these cables.

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(ii)

Bissell Discussed Assassination of Lumumba With

O Donnell and Sent Him to Congo: October-November 1960

Probably shortly after the Chief of Station's cable of

October 17 requesting the assignment of a senior case officer to

concentrate on the assassination operation, Richard Bissell broached

the subject with CIA officer Justin O'Donnell.

At that time, O'Donnell was the Deputy Chief of a com-

ponent of the Directorate of Plans -- the CIA's covert action arm

O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 8) .

Justin O'Donnell testified that in October of 1960, he

was asked by Richard Bissell to undertake the mission of assassi-

nating Patrice Lunumba (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, PP. 11-12; 9/11/75,

PP: 19, 43):

O'Donnell: He called me in and he told me

he wanted to go down to the Belgian Congo,

the former Belgian Congo, and to

eliminate

Lumumba

What did you understand him to mean by

eliminate?

O'Donnell: To kill him and thereby eliminate

his influence.

Q: What was the basis for your interpreting his

remarks, whatever his precise language, as

meaning

that he was talking about assassination

rather than merely neutralizing him through

some other

means?

O'Donnell: It was not neutralization

Clearly the context öf our talk was to kill

him.

(D' Donnell, 6/9/75, pp. 11-12.)

O'Donnell reacted strongly to Dissell's instruction:

I told him that I would absolutely not

have any part of killing Lurumba.

He said,

I want you to

go over and talk to Sidney

Gottlieb. (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 12.)

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Gottlieb was a CIA scientist who was at that time the Science

Advisor to Bissell (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 14).

• O'Donnell said it was "inconceivable that Bissell would direct

such a mission without the personal permission of Allen Dulles".

(0' Donnell, 9/11/75, P. 44). But the question of authorization

was

never raised by Bissell:

I assumed that he had authority from Mr. Dulles

in such an important issue, but it was not dis-

cussed, nor did he purport

to have higher

authority to do it. (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 15.)

O'Donnell promptly met with Gottlieb and testified that he was

"sure that Mr. Bissell had called Gottlieb and told him I was coming

over" (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, P. 13; 9/11/75, P. 7). O'Donnell said

that Gottlieb told him "that there were four or five ... lethal

means of disposing of Lumumba" (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, P. 13). O'Donnell

recalled that "one of the methods was a virus and the others in-

cluded poison'' (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, P. 12; 9/11/75, p. 7). O'Donnell

said that Gottlieb "didn't even hint... that he had been in the

Congo and that he had transported any lethal agent to the Congo"

(0 ' Donnell, 9/11/75, P. 7-A) .

After speaking with Gottlieb, O'Donnell said:

I then left his office, and I went back to

Mr. Bissell's office and I told him in no

way would I have any part in the assassina-

tion of Lumumba

and reasserted in

absolute terms that I would not be involved

in a murder attempt. (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 43.)

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O'Donnell said that in one of his two conversations with

Bissell about Lumumba, he raised the prospect "that conspiracy

to commit murder being done in the District of Columbia might be

in violation of federal law" (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 14). He said

that Bissell "airily dismissed" this prospect (D'Donnell, 6/9/75,

p. 14).

Despite his refusal to participate in assassination, O'Donnell

agreed to go to the Congo on a

' general mission to "neutralize"

Lumumba "as a political factor" (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, pp. 43-44):

I said I would go down and I would have no

compunction about operating to draw Lumumba

out [of UN custody], to run an operation to

neutralize his operations which were against

Western interests, against, 1 thought,

American interests. (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 13.)

O'Donnell added that his objective was to

neutralize Lumumba's influence

and his

activities against [a Congolese leaderl,

whom at that time you might say was our close.

instrument, he was

the man we had put our

chips on.

(O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 20.)

Bissell also recalled that, after their discussions about assassi-

nation, O'Donnell went to the Congo "with the

assignment..: of

looking at other ways of neutralizing Lumumba" (Bissell, 9/10/75,

p. 53).:

Although O'Donnell did not formulate a precise plan until he

reached the Congo, he discussed

a general strategy with Bissell:

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Mr. O'Donnell: I told Mr. Bissell that I

would be willing to go down to neutralize

his activities and operations and try to bring

him out lof UN custody] and turn him over to

the Congolese authorities, that

is correct.

Senator Mondale: Was it discussed then that

his life might be taken by the Congolese

authorities?

Mr. O'Donnell: It was, I think, considered

In the -- not to have him killed, but then

it would have been a Congolese being judged

p. 38.)

There was a "very, very high probability" that Lunumba would re-

ceive capital punishment at the hands of the Congolese authorities,

according to O'Donnell (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 24). But O'Donnell

"had no compunction about bringing him out and then having him

tried by a jury of his peers'' (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 14).

Although O'Donnell had expressed his aversion to assassination

to Bissell and had undertaken a more general mission to "neutralize"

Lumumba's influence, it was clear to him that Bissell was still

interested in the assassination of Lumumba:

in leaving at the conclusion of our second

discussion ... he said, well, I wouldn't

rule out that possibility -- meaning the

possibility of the elimination or the killing

of Lumumba -- I wouldn't rule it.

In other

even though you have said this, don't

There is no question

meaning the elimination or the assassination

(0' Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 45).

O'Donnell had a distinctive recollection that after his second dis-

cussion of Lumumba with Bissell, he met with Richard Helms in order

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to make his opposition to assassinating Lumumba a matter of

record (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, PP. 44-45) :

[I]n the Agency, since you don't have

documents, you have to be awfully canny

and you have to get things on record; and

I went into Mr. Helms' office,

and I

said, Dick,.

here is what Mr. Bissell

proposed to me, and I told him that I

would under no conditions do it, and Helms.

said you're absolutely right.. (O'Donnell,

6/9/75, pp. 15-16) .

Richard Helms testified that it was "likely" that he had such a

conversation with O'Donnell and he assumed that O'Donnell's version

of

their conversation was correct (Helms, 9/16/75, pp. 22-23).*

William Harvey testified that O'Donnell had informed him

about the conversations with Bissell:

Mr. O'Donnell came to me and said that he

had been approached by Richard Bissell ...

to undertake an operation in the Congo,

• one

of the objectives of which was the elimina-

tion of Patrice Lumumba.

He also told me

that he had declined to undertake this

assignment. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 9.)

Harvey said that in a later conversation with Bissell, Bissell told

him that he had asked O'Donnell to undertake such

an operation

(Harvey, 6/25/75, P. 9):

O'Donnell said that within forty-eight hours of his second dis-

cussion with Bissell, he departed for the Congo (O'Donnell, 9/11/75,

pP. 45-46) •

* Helms: testified that he did not follow-up on this conversa-

tion in any way. He did not recall why

O'Donnell had gone to the

Congo or what his mission was

(lelms, 9/16/75, PP. 32-33).

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(iii)

Bissell Testified That he Asked D.'Donnell to Plan

and Prepare for an Assassination Operation

Bissell remembered "very clearly" that he and O'Donnell

discussed the assassination of Lumumba in the fall of 1960 (Bissell,

6/9/75, p. 75) and that O'Donnell reacted negatively (Bissell,

9/11/75, p. 18). According to Bissell, O'Donnell said that he

thought that assassination "was an inappropriate action and that,

the desired object could be accomplished better in other ways"

(Bissell, 6/11/75, P. 54).

Bissell also confirmed the fact that he had asked

O'Donnell to see Sidney Gottlieb (Bissell, 9/10/75, p.. 44).

Bissell differs with O'Donnell's account on only one

important point -- the degree to which Bissell's initial assign-

ment to O'Donnell contemplated the mounting of an operation as

opposed to contingency planning. O'Donnell flatly testified that

Bissell requested him to attempt to kill Lumumba. In his first

testimony on the subject, Bissell said that he asked O'Donnell

"to investigate the possibility of killing Lumumba" (Bissell,

6/11/75, P. 54; see also pp. 55, 75). In a later appearance,

however, Bissell stated that O'Donnell "had been asked to plan

and prepare for" the assassination of Lumumba (Bissell, 9/10/75,

p. 24) .

Bissell said that after his conversations with O'Donnell, he

felt that it would be necessary to "postpone" the assassination

operation because, "given O'Donnell's reaction, there was a risk

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that the planning of such an operation would be blown" (Bissell,

9/10/75, p. 25). Despité his impression that he might have de-

activated assassination operations against Lumumba at that time,

Bissell could not preclude the possibility that the Hedgman/

Gobblieb poison plot continued to move foward:

[This had been in my mind a very sensitive

assignment to him, limited -- with the

knowledge of it limited very. narrowly even

within the Agency.

And it is difficult to

separate recollection from inference on

occasion..

But I seem to recollect that

after this conversation with him,

I wanted

this put very much

on the back burner and

inactivated for quite some time.

Now that

doesn't rule out the possibility that some

action through completely different channels

might have gone forward.

But the best of

my recollection is, I viewed this not only

as terminating the assignment for him, but

also as reason for at least postponing

any-

thing further along that line. (Bissell,

9/10/75, PP. 25-26).

In Iweedy's mind, O'Donnell'

s eventual mission to the Congo was

linked to assessing the possibility for assassinating Lumumba

rather than to a general plan to draw Lumumba out of UN custody

(Iweedy, 9/9/75,.p. 26).

(iv)

O'Donnell Arrived in the Congo and Learned That

a Virus Was In the Station Safe

On October 29, the Chief of Station was informed through

the PROP channel that Justin O'Donnell was soon to arrive in Leo-

poldville "IN FURTHERANCE THIS PROJECT" (CIA Cable OUT 86798, Fields

to Chief of Station,

10/29/60). On November 3, O'Donnell arrived

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in Leopoldville (CIA Cable IN 38052, Leopoldville to Director,

11/4/60). Chief of Station Hedgman testified that he had been

made aware by cable that O'Donnell was coming to the Congo

(Hedgman, 8/21/75, P. 40). Hedgman said it was "very possible"

that as a new Chief of.

Station he took the dispatch to the Congo

of a senior officer like O'Donnell as

a signal that CIA headquarters

was "dissatisfied with my handling" of Gottlieb's instructions

(Hedgman, 8/21/75, P. 42).

Hedgman had a general picture of O'Donnell's mission:

I understood it to be that -- similar to

mine, that is, the removal or neutrali-

zation of Lumumba ... I have no clear

recollection of his discussing the assassi-

nation. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, P. 54.)

Hedgman said that he had no recollection of O'Donnell indicating

one way of the other whether he was considering assassination as

a means of "neutralizing" Lumumba (Hedgman, 8/21/75, P. 55).

Hedgman said, "in view of my instructions, I may have assumed that

he was'' considering assassination (Hedgman, 8/21/75, P. 55). Gen-

erally, however, Hedgman perceived O'Donnell as being unenthusiastic

about his mission (Hedgman, 8/21/75, PP. 56, 88-89).

When O'Donnell arrived in the Congo, he met with the Chief of

Station, who informed him that there was "a virus in the safe"

(0' Donnell, 9/11/75, P. 7-A; 6/9/75, p. 16). O'Donnell said he

assumed it was a "lethal agent" (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 37), although

Hedgman was not explicit:

I knew it wasn't for somebody to get his polio

shot up to date.. (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, р. 16.)

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He added that if the virus was to be used for medical purposes,

"it"would have been in the custody of the State Department"

personnel, not the CIA station (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 36).

•O'Donnell said that he did not recall that Hedgman mentioned

the source of the virus (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 8).* But O'Donnell

assumed that it had come from Sidney Gottlieb's office:

It would have had to have come from Washington,

in my estimation, and I would think, since it

had been discussed with Gottlieb that it

probably would have emanated from his office.

(0' Donnell, 6/9/75, p: 28.)

Hedgman did not recall discussing Gottlieb's trip to the Congo

with O'Donnell, but "assumed" that he did so (Hedgman, 8/21/75;

pp. 60-6,1).

0 'Donnell was

"certain" that the virus had arrived before he

did (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, P. 24). He was surprised to learn that

such a virus was being held at the Leopoldville station because

he had refused an assassination mission before departing for the

Congo (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 17) .

O'Donnell stated that he knew of no other instance where a

lethal biological substance was in the possession of a CIA station

(O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 50). He assumed that its purpose was

assassination:

When O'Donnell was informed about lledgman's testimony on

the visit of Gottlieb to the Congo and the plot to poison Lumumba,

he said,.

"I believe

absolutely in its credibility" (O'Donnell;

9/11/75, p. 53). O'Donnell found nothing in the facts as he knew

them, nor in Hedgman's character to raise a question about that

testimony. O'Donnell regarded Hedgman as

"an honest and a decent

man"' (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 19) -- "a totally truthful man"

(0' Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 56).

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My feeling definitely is that it was for a

specific purpose, and was just not an all-

purpose capability there begin held for tar-

gets of opportunity, unspecified targets.

(0 ' Donnell, 9/11/75, P.

49.).

At several points, O'Donnell stated that he did not think that

Lumumba was the target specified for the use of the virus (O'Donnell,

6/9/75, p. 17; 9/11/75, p. 48). But he allowed for that possibility:

I supposed it was for a lethal operation, very

possibly Lumumba, but very possibly in connec-

tion with other people.

(O'Donnell, 6/9/75,

p. 24; accord. 6/9/75, p. 17.)

His final word on the subject was that he assumed that the "specific

purpose" of the virus was the assassination of Lumumba (O'Donnell,

9/11/75, P. 50).

O'Donnell said that the Chief of Station never indicated that

O'Donnell was to employ the virus (0'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 52). In

fact, O'Donnell testified that Hedgman "never discussed his assassi-

nation effort, he never even indicated that this was one." (O'Donnell,

9/11/75, p. 54.)

While ledgman has no direct recollection of discussing his

assassination operation with O'Donnell, he "assuned" that he had

at least discussed with O'Donnell the problem of gaining access

to

Lumumba for the purpose of assassinating him (Hedgman, 8/21/75,

pp. 55, 60). O'Donnell testified, however, that because he was.

"morally opposed to assassination" he would "absolutely not" have

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explored the means by which such access could be gained, nor would

he have undertaken a mission to the Congo if it involved assess-

ment of the situation for an assassination operation by someone

else (0'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 26).

O'Donnell was "sure" that he "related everything" to Hedgman

about his conversations with Bissell concerning the assassination

of Lumumba (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 46). Hedgman, however, had no

recollection of learning this from O'Donnell (liedgman, 8/21/75,

p. 56) .

Beyond this, O'Donnell said that his discussions of assassi-

nation with Hedgman were general and philosophical, dealing with

"the morality of assassinations" (O'Donnell, 3/11/75, pp. 46, 54):

From my point of view I told him I had

moral objections

to it,

not just qualms,

but objections.

I didn't think it was

the right thing to do. (O'Donnell,

9/11/75, P. 9) :

When

asked to characterize Hedgman's attitude toward assassination

based on those discussions, 'Donnell said:

I will answer your question just

as fairly

and as scrupulously. as I can.

I have a

great deal of respect for Hedgman.

And if

he said something, I would believe him to

be spealing the truth as he knew it without

shading it...

The best I could say, I

think, would be this,

that he would not have

been opposed in principle to assassination in

the interests of national security....

know that he is a man of great moral per-

and honor,

and so forth.

And that it would disturb him to be engaged in

something like that. But I think I would

have to say that in our conversations, my

memory of those, at no

time would he rule it

out as being

9/11/75, P. 13 Possibility. ('Donnell,

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(v)

O'Donnell Planned to "Neutralize" Lumumba by Turning

Him Over to Congolese Authorities and Requested the

Assignment of Agent OJWIN to Leopoldville as His

Alter Ego

After Justin O'Donnell arrived in the Congo, he formu-

lated a plan for "neutralizing" Lumumba by drawing him away from

the custody of the UN force which was guarding his residence:

O'Donnell: (What I wanted to do was to

get him out, to trick him out, if I could,

and then turn him over

... to the legal

authorities and let him stand trial:

Be-

cause he had atrocity attributed to him for

which he could very well stand trial.

?: And for which he could very well have

received capital punishment?

O'Donnell: Yes. And I am not opposed to

capital punishment. (O'Donnell, 9/11/75,

pp. 20-21.)*

To implement his plan, O'Donnell made arrangements to rent "an ob-

servation post over the palace in which Lumumba was safely ensconced"'

* According to an earlier report from the Chief of Station, it

was the view of the Special Representative of the Secretary General

of the United Nations that arrest by Congolese authorities was "JUST

•A TRICK TO ASSASSINATE LUMUMBA" (CIA Cable Leop

Chief

of Station to Director, 10/11/60).

The Chief of Station proceeded

to recommend Lumumba's arrest in the same cable:

STATION HAS CONSISTENTLY URGED [CONGOLESE] LEADERS

ARREST LUMUMBA IN BELIEF LUMUMBA WILL CONTINUE BE

THREAT TO STABILITY CONGO UNTIL REMOVED FROM

SCENE (CIA Cable, 10/11/60).

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(0' Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 20).* O'Donnell also "spotted" a member

of the UN guard and made his acquaintance to recruit him for an

attempt to lure Lumumba outside UN protective custody (O'Donnell,

6/9/75, p. 20: 9/11/75, P. 21).

O.'Donnell said that he cabled progress reports on his plan to

CIA headquarters (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 26): He also said that

he informed the Chief of Station about his plan (D'Donnell, 9/11/75,

p. 56).

In connection with his effort to draw Lumumba out of UN. cus-

tody, O'Donnell arranged for a CIA agent, whose

code name was

QJWIN, to

come to the Congo to work with him (O'Donnell, 9/11/75,

p. 19):

What I wanted to use him for was

...

counter-espionagel.1....

I had to screen

the U.S. participation in this

... by

using a foreign national whom we knew,

trusted, and had worked with ... the

idea was for me to use him as an alter

ego. (0'Donnell Tr.; pp. 19-20.)

In mid-November, two cables fron Leopoldville urged CIA head-

quarters to send QJWIN as soon as possible (CIA Cable IN 41261,

Leopoldville to Director, 11/11/60) with this message:

LOCAL OPERATIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRE

IMMEDIATE EXPEDITION OF QJWIN TRAVEL TO

LEOPOLDVILLE. (CIA Cable IN 41556,

Leopoldville to Director, 11/13/60.)

* A cable from the Chief of Station to Iweedy in mid-November

reported that the double guard of United Nations and Congolese

troops around Lumumba's residence thwarted this plan: "CONCENTRIC

RINGS OF DEFENSE MAKE ESTABLISHMENT OF OBSERVATION POST IMPOSSIBLE"

(CIA Cable IN 42478, Chief of Station to Iweedy, 11/14/60).

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The cables contained no exploration of this sense of urgency about

the" "operational circumstances."

(b)

196D€ QWEN's Mission in the Congo: November-December

QJWIN was a foreign citizen with a criminal background,

recruited in Europe (Memorandum to CIA Finance Division, Re:

Payments

to QJWIN, 1/31/61), and supervised by CIA officer Arnold

Silver. In November 1960, at O'Donnell's request. (O'Donnell, 6/9/75,

p. 19), agent QJWIN was dispatched to the Congo by Silver, to under-

take a mission that "might involve a large element of personal risk."

(CIA Cable IN 36814, 11/2/60.)*

A dispatch from the CIA headquarters on his pending trip

to Africa made clear the high degree of sensitivity accorded to

his mission:

In view of the extreme sensitivity of the ob-

jective for which we want him to perform his

task, he was not told precisely what we want

aim to do.... Instead, he was told ... that

we would like to have him spot, assess,

and

recommend some dependable, quick-witted

persons for our use....

It was thought best

to withhold our true, specific requirements

pending the final decision to use [him].

•(CIA Dispatch, AUDW-147, 11/2/60.)

* Part of the purpose in dispatching QJWIN to Africa was to

send him from the Congo to another African country for an unspeci-

fied mission. QJWIN's mission to this country is not explained

in the cable traffic between CIA headquarters and the various sta-

tions that dealt with him.

There is no indication in CIA files as to whether QJWIN com-

pleted this mission. O'Donnell said he had no knowledge of any

mission that would have taken QJWIN to this country (0'Donnell,

9/11/75, PP. 32-33).

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This message itself was deemed too sensitive to be retained

at the station: "this dispatch should be reduced to cryptic

necessary notes and destroyed after the first reading." (CIA

Dispatch, AUDW-147, 11/2/60.)

QJWIN arrived in Leopoldville on November 21, 1960 (CIA Cable

IN 49486, 11/29/60) and returned to Europe in late December 1960

(CIA Cable OUT 54710, Director to Leopoldville, 12/9/60).

The CIA Inspector General's Report said that QJWIN

had been

recruited earlier by Arnold Silver

for use in

a special operation in the Congo

[the assassination of Patrice Lumumba] to be

run by Justin O'Donnell. (I.G. Report, P. 38.)

However, both O'Donnell and Bissell testified that O'Donnell re-

fused to be associated with an assassination operation.* Instead,

O'Donnell said he went to the Congo to attempt to snatch Lumumba

from the protective custody of the U.N. guard and place him in

the hands of the Congolese army: (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, pP. 13-14,

37.)

According to O'Donnell, QJWIN was a man who was capable of

undertaking an

assassination mission:

O'Donnell:

... I would say that he would not

be a man of many scruples.

I: So he was a man capable of doing anything?

O'Donnell: I would think so, yes.

l: And that would include assassination?

O'Donnell: I would think so.

(0' Donnell, 9/11/75, pp. 35-36.)

* See Sections 5(a) (ii) and 5(a) (iii) above.

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But O'Donnell had no knowledge that QWIN was ever used for an

assassination mission (0'Donnell, 9/11/75, po. 36, 42).

O'Donnell said that, as far as he knew, he was the only CIA

officer with supervisory responsibility for QJWIN and QUWIN did

not report independently to anyone else (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 28).

When asked if it was possible that QJWIN had a mission independent

of that he was performing for O'Donnell, he said:

O'Donnell: Yes, that is possible -- or

it could have been that somebody contacted

him after he got down there, that they

wanted him to do something along the lines

of assassination. I don't know. (O'Donnell,

9/11/75, P. 29:)

But he discounted this possibility as "highly unlikely" because it

would be a departure from standard CIA practice -- placing an agent

in a position of knowledge superior to that of his supervising

officer (0'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 29) .

Despite O'Donnell's doubt that QJVIN had an independent line

of responsibility to the Chief of Station, a cable of November 29

shows that Hedgman was aware of WIN's activities.

In that cable, the Chief of Station reported through the PROP

channel to Iweedy that QJWIN had begun implementation of a plan to

"PIERCE BOTH CONGOLESE AND UN GUARDS" to enter Lumumba's residence

and "PROVIDE ESCORT OUT OF RESIDENCE" (CIA Cable IN 49486, Chiet

of Station to Iweedy, 11/29/60). O'Donnell said that he had directed

QJWIN to make the acquaintanceship of the member of the UN force

whose

help he sought for the plan to snatch Lumumba from UN custody

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(0' Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 21). But Lumumba had left UN custody at

this point to travel toward his stronghold at Stanleyville. This

did not deter QJWIN:

VIEW CHANGE IN LOCATION TARGET, QWIN

ANXIOUS GO STANLEYVILLE AND EXPRESSED

DESIRE EXECUTE PLAN BY HIMSELF WITHOUT

USING ANY APPARAT (CIA Cable, 11/29/60).

It is unclear whether this latter "plan" contemplated assassina-

tion as well as

abduction.. An affirmative reply from headquarters

came through the PROP channel the next day which was also suscep-

tible of interpretation as an assassination order:

CONCUR QWIN GO STANLEYVILLE.

WE ARE

PREPARED CONSIDER DIRECT ACTION BY OWIN

BUT WOULD LIKE YOUR READING ON SECURITY

FACTORS. HOW CLOSE WOULD THIS PLACE [UNITED

STATES] TO THE ACTION? (CIA Cable OUT 98314,

Chief of Africa Division to Chief of Station,

11/30/60.)

O'Donnell said that agent QJWIN's stay in the Congo was "co-

extensive with my own, allowing for the fact that he came after I

did." (0'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 19.) O'Donnell said he left the

Congo around the time of Lumumba's death in Katanga at the hands

of Congolese authorities. (O'Donnell, p. 20.) QJWIN left in

• December shortly after Lumumba was captured by the Congolese army.

In

a memorandum to arrange the accounting for QJWIN's activities

in the Congo, William K. Harvey •- under whom O'Donnell had worked

before being detached for assignment to the Congo -- noted the

success of QJWIN's mission: "QJWIN was sent on this trip for a

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specific, highly sensitive operational purpose which has been

completed" (Memorandum for Finance Division from William K. Harvey,

1/11/61). O'Donnell explained Harvey's reference to the fact that

QJWIN's mission had been "completed" by saying that once Lumumba

was in the hands of the Congolese authorities "the reason for

the mounting of the project ... had become noot" (O'Donnell,

9/11/75, p. 35). When asked if he and QJWIN were responsible for

Lumumba's departure from UN custody and subsequent capture, O'Donnell

said: "Absolutely not"' (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, P. 35). Harvey did not

recall the meaning of the memorandum, but he assuned that O'Donnell's

return from the Congo constituted the "completion"' of QJWIN's .

mission (Harvey, affidavit, p. ).

Despite the indication in the Inspector General's Report that

QJWIN may have been recruited initially for an assassination mission

and the suggestive language of the cables at the end of November,

there

is

no clear evidence that QJWIN was actually involved in any

assassination plan or attempt.

The CIA officers who were involved

in or knowledgeable of an assassination plot against Lumumba gave

no testimony that tended to show that QJWIN was related to that plot.

The Chief of Station had a "vague recollection" that QJWIN:

was in the Congo working for Justin O'Donnell: (Hedgman, 8/21/75,

p. 95.) But Hedgman did not recall why QJWIN was in the Congo.

(Hedgman, 8/21/75, P. 95.) QJWIN was not a major operative of

Hedgman's. (ledgman, 8/21/75, p. 95.) Richard Bissell and Bronson

Iweedy did not recall anything about QJWIN's mission in the Congo

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(Bissell, 9/10/75, PP. 54-57; Iweedy, 919/75, pP. 54, 61) .

* William Harvey, from whose division QJWIN was on loan for

his Congo assignment, had no specific knowledge of WIN's activities

in the Congo:

I was kept informed of the arrangements for

QJWIN's trip to the Congo and, subsequently,

of his presence in the Congo.

I do not know

specifically what QJWIN did in the Congo. I

do not think that I ever had such knowledge....

If QWIN were to be used on an assassination

mission, it would have been cleared with me.

I was never informed that he was to be used

for such a mission. (Harvey affidavit, P. :)

He stated that Arnold Silver probably wrote the memoranda con-

cerning QJWIN and submitted them for HARVEY's signature (larvey

affidavit, p. .

(c) QJWIN's Connection to Project RIFLE

After leaving the Congo in early 1961, QJWIN was used by

CIA officer William Harvey as the principal asset in Project ZRRIFLE,

a project which included research into a capability to assassinate

foreign leaders.* QJWIN's role in Project ZRRIFLE was to "SPOT"

figures of the European underworld who could be utilized

as agents

by the CIA if required. Harvey stated that before the formation

of Project ZRRIFLE:

* For a full treatment of Project ZRRIFLE,

see Section

infra, on the "Executive Action Capability.

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--73-

Arnold Silver had not previously used

QJWIN as an assassination capability or

even viewed him as such. (Harvey affi-

davit, p.

Although Harvey also had discussions with Sidney Gottlieb in connec-

tion with Project ZRRIFLE, he believed

that Gottlieb never mentioned

to him either QJWIN's activities in the Congo or Cottlieb's own

trip to Leopoldville (Harvey affidavit, p.

). Harvey had con-

sulted with Arnold Silver about the initiation of Project ZRRIFLE

(Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 52) :

The Chief of Station in Leopoldville testified that he had

never heard of Project ZRRIFLE, nor was he aware of any CIA project

to develop the capability of assassinating foreign leaders.

(Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 93.) Furthermore, Hedgman said that he was

"quite certain" that he never discussed assassination capabilities

or assets with Harvey at any time. (Hedgman, 3/21/75, p. 95.)

Hedgman testified that Arnold Silver came to the Congo on a counter-

intelligence mission during his tenure, but they did not discuss

the plan to assassinate Lumumba. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, P: 92.)

An interesting note on the value accorded QWIM by the CIA

and the inherent predicament for an intelligence agency. that employs

hoodlums is found in a cable from CIA headquarters to Arnold Silver

in 1962. The CIA had learned that QJWIN was about to go on trial

in Europe on smuggling charges.

The cable suggested:

IF

... INFOR TRUE WE MAY WISH ATTEMPT QUASIL

CHARGES OR ARRANGE SOMEHOW SALVAGE QUWIN FOR

OUR PURPOSES. (CIA Cable OUT 73943, 4/18/62.)

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Agent, QuWIt Was Asked By Hedgman's Operative WIROGUE

to Join an "Execution Squad"

December 1960

The one incident where there is an explicit reference

to

assassination in connection with QJWIN involved his contact with

WIROGUE, another asset of the Congo station:

WIROGUE

was an

"essentially stateless" European who was

" a forger and former bank robber"' and had fought with the French

Foreign Legion. : (Inspector General Memorandum, 3/14/75.) He was

sent to the Congo after being given plastic surgery and a toupee

by the CIA so that he would not be recognized by Europeans traveling

through the Congo. (I.G. Memorandum, 3/14/.75.) WIROGUE was

assessed by the CIA as a man who "LEARNS QUICKLY AND CARRIES OUT

ANY ASSIGIMENT WITHOUT REGARD FOR DANGER" (CIA Cable OU'I 36554,

Africa Division to Leopoldville, 10/27/60).

The Chief of Station described WIROGE as "a man with a

rather unsavory reputation, who would try anything once, at least."

(Hedgman, 3/21/75, p. 96.) Iledgman used him as "a general utility

agent'' because "I felt we needed surveillance capability, develop-

ing new contacts, various things." (Hedgman, 3/21/75, p. 96.)

Hedgman supervised WIROGUE directly and did not put WIROGUE in

touch with Justin O'Donnell. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 97.)

A report on agent WIROGUE, prepared for the CIA Inspector

General's office in 1975, described the training and tasking he

received:

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On 19 September 1960 two members of Africa

Division met with him to discuss

"an opera-

tional

assignment in Africa Division.

In

connection with this assignment, WIROGUE/1

was to be trained in demolitions, small arms,

and medical immunization....

In October 1960

a cable to Leopoldville stated that

Headquarters [had]

... intent to use him as

utility

agent in order to "(a) organize and

conduct a surveillance team; (b) intercept

packages; (c) blow up bridges; and (1) execute

other assignments requiring positive action.

His utilization is not to be restricted to

Leopoldville." (I.G. Memorandu, 3/14/75.)

VIROGUE made his initial contact with Hedgman in Leopoldville on

December 2, 1960 (CIA Cable IN 13739, 12/17/60). He was given two

instructions by Hedgman: (1) to "build cover during initial period;"

and (2) to "spot persons for (al surveillance team" of intelligence

assets in the province where Lumumba's support was strongest. (CIA

Cable IN 18739, 12/17/60.)

Soon after receiving these instructions, agent WIROGUE approached

QJWIN and asked him to join an "execution squad." This incident is

described by Leopoldville Chief of Station Hedgman in a cable to

CIA headquarters (Hedgman, 8/21/75, P. 99):.

QJWIN WHO RESIDES SAME HOTEL AS WIROGUE REPORTED

LATTER TOLD HIM HE HAD LIVED ALASKA, JAPAN, SOUTH

AMERICA, GERMANY AND OTHER PARTS EUROPE. QUWIN

SAID WIROGUE SMELLED AS THOUGH HE IN INTEL BUSINESS:

STATION DENIED ANY INFO ON WIROGUE.

14 DEC QJWIN

REPORTED WIROGUE HAD OFFERED HIM THREE HUNDRED DOLLARS

PER MONTH TO PARTICIPATE IN INTEL NET AND BE MEMBER

"EXECUTION SQUAD."

WHEN QJWIN SAID HE NOT. INTERESTED,

WIROGUE ADDED THERE WOULD BE BONUSES FOR SPECIAL JOBS.

UNDER QJWIN QUESTIONING, WIROGUE LATER SAID HE WORK-

INF FOR [AMERICAN) SERVICE.

IN DISCUSSING LOCAL CONTACTS, WIROGUE MENTIONED

QJWIN BUT DID NOT ADMIT TO HAVING TRIED RECRUIT HIM.

THEN [CHIEF OF STATION] TRIED LEARN WHETHER WIROGUE

HAD MADE APPROACH LATTER CLAIMED HAD TAKEN NO. STEPS

[CHIEF OF STATION] WAS UNABLE CONTRADICT, AS DID NOT

WISH REVEAL RIVIN CONNECTION [CIA].

(CIA Cable,

NN 30953

DocId: 32423539

Leopoldville to Director, 12/17, 60.)

Page

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The cable also expressed Hedgman's concern about WIROGUE'S

actions:

LEOP CONCERNED. BY WIROGUE FREE WHEELING

AND: LACK SECURITY.

STATION HAS ENOUGH HEAD-

ACHES WITHOUT WORRYING ABOUT AGENT WHO NOT

ABLE HANDLE FINANCES AND WHO NOT WILLING

FOLLOW INSTRUCTIONS. IF HQS DESIRES, WILLING

KEEP HIM ON PROBATION, BUT IF CONTINUE HAVE

DIFFICULTIES, BELIEVE WIROGUE RECALL BESI

SOLUTION.

(CIA Cable, Leopoldville to Director,

12/17/:60.)

WIROGUE's attempt. to recruit QJWIN for an execution squad is

explained by lledgman as a mistake and by the actions of QJWIN as

an unauthorized, unexpected contact which he did not initiate.

The Chief of Station testified that he had not instructed

WIROGUE to make this kind of proposition to QJWIN or anyone else.

(Hedgman, 3/21/75, p. 100.) He added:

I would like to stress that I don't know what

WIROGUE was talking about as aln] "execution

squad," and I am sure he was never tasked to

go. out and execute anyone. (Hedgman, 8/21/75,

p. 100.)

Hedgman suggested that WIROGUE may have concocted the idea of an

execution squad:

His idea of what an intelligence operative

should do,

I think, had been gathered by

reading a

few novels or something. of the

sort.

(ledgman, 8/21/75, p. 100.)

Justin O'Donnell had no knowledge of an attempt by anyone

connected to the CIA to recruit an execution squad and no recollec-

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tion of WIROGUE (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, pP. 39-12). O'Donnell men-

tioned that agent QJWIN was considered for use on a "strong arm

squad," but'

said that this was for purposes more general than

assassinations:

surveillance teams where you have to go

into crime areas ... where you need

fellow that if he gets in a box can

I fight

his way out

of it. (0'Donnell, 9/11/75,

P: 36).

Richard Bissell recalled nothing of the WIROUGE approach to

QJWIN (Bissell, 9/11/75, P. 71). Bronson Tweedy did recall that

WIROGUE was "dispatched on a general purpose mission" to the Congo

(Iweedy, 9/9/75, p. 63). But Iweedy testified. that WIROGUE would

"absolutely not" have been used on an assassination mission against

Lumumba because

"he was basically dispatched, assessed and dealt

with by the balance of the Division" rather than by the two people

in the Africa Division -- Tweedy himself and his deputy, Glenn

Fields -- who would have known that the assassination of Lumumba

was being considered (Iweedy, 9/9/75, pp. 64-65).

The Chief of Station said that if the WIROGUE incident was

connected to an actual

assassination plan, he would have transmitted

a message in a more narrowly restricted channel than that in which

this cable was sent. His cable on WIROGUE's approach to QJWIN was

sent to headquarters with a security designation that allowed much

wider distribution than the PROP cables that he sent and received

concerning the Gottlieb assassination assignment. (Hedgman, 8/21/75,

p. 102.)

. In contrast, he limited distribution of the cable about

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WIROGUE only as a CIA officer would "normally do ... when you

speak in a derogatory manner of an asset." (Hedgman, 8/21/75,

p. 101)

The Chief of Station maintained that WIROGJE's proposition

to QJWIN to join an "execution squad" could be attributed to

WIROGUE's "freewheeling" nature. Hedgman said:

I had difficulty controlling him in that he

was not a professional intelligence officer

as such. He seemed to act on his own without

seeking guidance of authority

... I found

he was rather an unguided missile ...

the

kind of man that could get you in trouble be-

fore you knew you were

in trouble....

(Hedgman, 8/21/75, PP. 96-97) .

But Hedgman did not disavow all responsibility for WIROGUE's

actions:

[Ilf you give a man an order and he carries it

out and causes a problem for the Station, why

then as Chiet of Station, well,

you accept

responsibility. (Hedgman,. 8/21/75, p. 97.

In sum, the Chief of Station testified that despite the fact

that the CIA was interested in the assassination of Lumumba during

this period, agent WIROGUE's attempt to form an "execution squad"

was an unauthorized, maverick action, unconnected to the CIA assassi-

nation plan.

Nonetheless, the fact that WIROCUE was to be trained in "medical

immunization" (I.G. Memorandum, 3/14/75) raises the possibility

that he was connected to the plot to assassinate Lumumba by means

oI lethal biological substances. The 1975 report on WIROGUE's case

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by the Inspector General's office leaves this question open. The

report concludes with the statement that "WIROGUE/1

spent most.of

his time trying to develop contacts and was not directly involved

in any particular operation." (I.G. Memorandum, 3/14/75.): But,

when the report was

circulated in the Inspector General's office,

the following comment was handwritten by Scott Breckinridge, one

of the principal authors of the 1967 report on CIA involvement in

assassination attempts: "'ROGUE's pitch is too clear to be dis-

carded out of hand as

exceeding instructions.'". (I.G. Memorandum,

•3/14/75)

6. The Question of Whether the CIA Was Involved in Bringing

About Lumumba's Death in Katanga

There is no direct evidence of CIA involvement in bring-

ing about Lunumba's death

in Katanga. The CIA officers most closely

connected to the plot to poison Lumumba testified uniformly that

they knew of no CIA involvement in Lumumba's death:

(a). Lumumba's Escape from UN Custody, Capture by

Congolese Army, and Imprisonment at Thysville:

November 27-December 3,

1960

The strongest hint that the CIA inay have been involved

in the capture of Lumunba by Mobutu's troops after his departure

from UN custody on November 27, was contained in a PROP cable from

the Chief of Station to Iweedy on November 14 (CIA Cable IN 42478,

Chief of Station to Iweedy, 11/14/60): In the cable, Hedgman re-

ported that an agent of his had learned that Lunumba's

POLITICAL FOLLOWERS IN STANLEYVILLE DESIRE THAT

HE BREAK OUT OF HIS CONFINEMENT AND PROCEED TO

THAT. CITY BY CAR TO ENGAGE IN POLITICAL ACTIVITY.

(CIA Cable, 11/14/60.)

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The Chief of Station was confident that he would have foreknowledge

of Lumumba's departure and that action plans were prepared for that

eventuality:

DECISION ON BREAKOUT WILL PROBABLY BE MADE

SHORTLY. STATION EXPECTS TO BE ADVISED BY

[AGENT] OF DECISION WHEN MADE…...

STATION

HAS SEVERAL POSSIBLE ASSETS TO USE IN EVENI

OF BREAKOUT AND STUDYING SEVERAL PLANS OF

ACTION. (CIA Cable, 11/14/60:)

There is no other evidence, however, that the CIA actually

gained prior knowledge of Lumumba's plan to depart for Stanleyville.

In fact, a cable from Leopoldville on the day after Lumumba's

escape betrays the station's complete ignorance about the circum-

stances of Lumumba's departure (CIA Cable IN 48484, Leopoldville

to Director, 11/28/60) .

But the same cable raises at least a question as to whether

the CIA was involved in the capture of Lumumba enroute by Congolese

troops:

-

[STATION] WORKING WITH [CONGOLESE GOVERNMENT]

TO GET ROADS BLOCKED AND TROOPS ALERTED

[BLOCK] POSSIBLE ESCAPE ROUTE. (CIA Cable,

11/28/60. •

A cable of December 2 reporting Lumumba's capture militates

against CIA involvement, however, because it portrays the Congolese

forces as the source of the station's information (CIA Cable IN 10643

Leopoldville to Director, 12/3/60) .

The Chief of Station testified that he was "quite certain that

there was no Agency involvement in any way" in Lumumba's departure

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from Ull custody and that he had no foreknowledge of Lumumba'

S

plan (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pP. 63-64). He stated that he consulted

with Congolese officers about the possible: routes Lumumba might

take to Stanleyville, but he was "not a major assistance" in track-

ing down Lumumba prior to his capture (Hedgman, 3/21/75, p. 65).

Despite the fact that O'Donnell had planned to draw Lumumba

out of UN custody and turn him over to Congolese authorities, he

insisted that Lumumba escaped by his own devices and was not tricked

by the CIA (O'Dönnell, 9/11/75; p. 22) .

(b)

Transfer of Lumumba to Katanga Where He Was Killed:

January 17, 1960

The contemporaneous cable traffic shows that the CIA was

kept informed of Lumumba's condition and movements in January of

1961 by the Congolese and that the CIA still considered Lumumba

a serious political threat. But there is no direct evidence of

CIA involvement in bringing about Lumumba's death in Katanga.

* Excerpts from cable traffic of January 1961 and from the

testimony of CIA officers Hedgman, Tweedy, O'Donnell, and lielms

(investigative report) should be inserted.

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SECTION 7: Rewritten per

Subcommittee Instructions,

10/20/75. (FDB)

The Question of the Level at which the Assassination Plot

Was Authorized

The

chain of events revealed by the documents and testimony

is strong enough to permit a reasonable inference that the assas-

sination plot was authorized by the President. It is clear that

Allen Dulles authorized the plot.

At the least, the chronological relationship between strong

Presidential or other White House expressions of hostility to

Lumumba and CIA steps toward the assassination of Lumumba is close

enough to make it appear that Dulles thought he was acting in re-

sponse to pressure from above in approving assassination as one

means of

removing Lumumba from the political

scene.

Nevertheless, there

is enough countervailing testimony by

Eisenhower Administration officials and enough ambiguity in the

records of high-level policy meetings to raise a doubt as to whether

President Eisenhower intended an assassination effort against Lumumba.

The chain of significant events in the Lumumba case begins with

the testimony that President Eisenhower made a

statement at a meet-

ing of the National Security Council in the Summer or early Fall of

1960 that came across to one staff member in attendance as an order

for the assassination of Patrice Lumumba. The next link is a memo-

randum of the Special Group meeting of August 25, 1960, which indi-

cated that when the President's "extremely strong feelings on the

necessity for very straightforward action" were conveyed, the Special

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GrouP

agreed that planning for the Congo would not necessarily

rule out "consideration" of any particular kind of ac-

tivity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba.

(Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 25 August 1960)

The next day CIA Director Allen Dulles, who had attended the Special

Group meeting, personally cabled to the Chief of Station in Leopold-

ville that Lumumba's "REMOVAL MUST BE AN URGENT AND PRIME OBJECTIVE

... A HIGH PRIORITY OF OUR COVERT ACTION" (CIA Cable OUT 62966,

Dulles to Leopoldville, 8/26/60): Dulles added: "YOU CAN ACT ON

YOUR OWN AUTHORITY WHERE TIME DOES NOT PERMIT REFERRAL HERE."

Although the Dulles cable does not explicitly mention assassina-

tion, Richard Bissell -- the CIA official under whose aegis the as-

sassination effort against Lumumba took place -- testified that, in

his opinion, this cable was a direct outgrowth of the Special Group

meeting and signaled to him that the President had authorized assas-

sination as one means of removing Lumumba (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 33-

34, 61-62; see Section 7(c), infra). Bronson Tweedy, who bore the

primary administrative responsibility for activities against Lumumba,

testified that the Dulles cable confirmed the policy that no measure,

including assassination, was to be overlooked in the attempt to re-

move Lumumba from a position of influence (Iweedy, 10/9/75, PP. 4-5).

On September 19, 1960, Bissell and Iweedy cabled the Chief of

Station to expect a messenger from CIA headquarters. Two days later,

in the presence of the President at a meeting of the National Security

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Council, Allen Dulles stated that Lumumba "would remain a grave

danger as long as he was not yet disposed of!' (Memorandum, 460th

NSC Meeting, 9/21/60). Five days after this meeting, a CIA scien-

tist arrived in Leopoldville and provided the Chief of Station

with lethal biological substances, instructed him to assassinate.

Lumumba, and informed him that the President had authorized this

operation.

Two mitigating factors weaken this chain just enough so that

it will not support an absolute finding of Presidential authoriza-

tion for the assassination effort against Lumumba.

First, the two officials of the Eisenhower Administration re-

sponsible to the President for national security affairs testified

that they knew of no Presidential approval for, or knowledge of, an

assassination plot.

Second, the minutes of discussions at meetings of the National

Security Council

and its Special Group do not record an explicit

Presidential order for the assassination of Lumumba. The Secretary

of the Special Group maintained that his memoranda reflect the

ac-

tual language used at the meetings without omission or euphemism

for extremely sensitive statements (Parrott, 7/10/75, pP. 18-19).

NSC staff executives

stated, however, that there was a strong pos-

sibility that a statement as sensitive as an assassination order

would have been omitted from the record or handled by means of euphe-

mism. Several high Government officials involved in policy-making

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and planning for covert operations testified that the language in

these minutes clearly indicated that assassination was contemplated

at the NSC as one means of eliminating Lumumba as a political

threat; other officials testified to the contrary.

(ai)

High-Level Meetings at which "Getting Rid of Lumumba"

Was Discussed

(i) Dillon Testified that the Question of Assassina-

tion Was Raised at Pentagon Meeting: Summer 1960

In late July 1960, Patrice Lumumba visited the United

States and met with Secretary of State Christian Herter and Under-

secretary of State C. Douglas Dillon. While Lumumba was in Washing-

ton, D.C., Secretary Herter pledged aid to the newly formed Govern-

ment of the Congo (New York Times, 7/28/60, p: ).

According to Dillon, the impression that Lumumba left

with the Government officials was that of an irrational, almost

psychotic personality:

When he was in the State Department meeting, either with

me or with the secretary in my presence .

• he would.

never look you in the eye.. He looked up at the sky. And

a tremendous flow of words came out.

He spoke in French,

and he spoke it very fluently.

And his words didn't ever

have any

relation to the particular things that we wanted

to discuss . .

You had a feeling that he was a per-

son that was gripped by this fervor that I can only char-

acterize as messianic

• [Hle was just not a rational

being.

(Dillon, 9/2/75, p: 24.)

Dillon said that the willingness of the United States Government to

work with Lumumba vanished after these meetings:

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[Ithe impression that was left was

• very bad, that

this was an

• individual whom it was impossible to deal

with.

And the feelings of the Government as a result

of this sharpened very considerably at that time

We (hadl hoped to see him and see what we could do to

come to better understanding with him. (Dillon, 9/2/75,

pP. 23-24.)

Dillon testified that shortly after Lumumba's visit to Washing-

ton, in late July or August, he attended a meeting at the Pentagon

where representatives of the State Department, Defense Department,

Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the CIA were present (Dillon, 9/2/75, pp.

17-20, 25-26).*

According to Dillon, "a question regarding the possibility of

an assassination attempt against Lumumba was briefly raised" at the

meeting (Dillon, 9/2/75, P. 15; see also 17, 25): Dillon did not

recall anything about the language used in raising the question

(Dillon, 9/2/75; P. 30). Dillon assumed that when the subject of

Lumumba's assassination was raised, "it was turned off by the CIA"

(Dillon, 9/2/75, P. 30). Dillon said that "the CIA people, whoever

they were, were negative to any such action" (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 18).

This opposition "wasn't moral," according to Dillon, but rather an

objection on the grounds that it

was

"not a possible thing" (Dillon,

9/2/75; p. 18). Dillon said the CIA reaction "might have been" made

out of the feeling that the group was too large for such a sensitive

* Dillon was unable to recall the precise date of this

meeting (Dil-

Ion, 9/2/75, pp. 25-26) .

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discussion (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 60) .

Dillon was clear about the fact that "top level" CIA people.

were in attendance, although he did not remember who lodged the

negative reaction to the assassination question (Dillon, 9/2/75,

PP. 22, 25): He said it "would have to have been either Allen.

Dulles, or possibly (Generall Cabell. : : most likely Cabell"

(Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 25). He added that it was "very likely" that

Richard Bissell was in attendance (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 21).

Dillon stated that this discussion could not have served as

authorization for an actual assassination effort against Lumumba

(Dillon, 9/2/75; P. 31). But he believed that the expression of

concern typified a prevalent attitude toward Lumumba that might :

have justified the CIA's development of a capability to assassinate

him:

I think they could have decided they wanted to develop

the capability.

just by knowing the concern that

everyone had about Lumumba.

:.They wouldn't have

had

to tell anyone about that. That is just developing

their own internal capability, and then they would have

to come and get permission. (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 30)

Dillon testified that he had never heard any mention of the plot to

poison Lumumba; nor, by implication, had he heard even a hint that

the CIA asked

permission to mount such an operation (Dillon, 9/2/75,

p. 50).

But after being informed of the poison plot, Dillon made

the following comment about the Pentagon meeting he attended:

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"I think it is

.. likely that it might have been

the beginning of this whole idea on the CIA's part that

they

should develop such a capacity. And maybe they

didn't have it then and went to work to develop it be-

ginning in august.

(Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 61)

Dillon said that it was unlikely that formal notes were taken at the

meeting or preserved

because it was

a small "ad hoc" group rather

than an official body (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 18). Such interdepartmen-

tal meetings were "not unusual," according to Dillon (Dillon, 9/21

75, p: 20) .

The only officials Dillon named as probable participants other

than the CIA representatives were Deputy Secretary of Defense James

Douglas and Assistant Secretary of Defense John N. Irwin II (Dillon,

9/2/75, Pp. 19, 21). Douglas stated that it was possible that he

attended such a meeting at the Pentagon, but he does not recall it

(Douglas affidavit, 9/5/75): Nor does he recall the question of

Lumumba's assassination ever being raised in his presence (Douglas

affidavit, 9/5/75). Likewise, Irwin stated that it was "likely"

that he attended the meeting to which Dillon referred; but he did

not remember whether he was present "at any meeting at the Pentagon

where the question of assassinating Patrice Lumumba was raised"

(Irwin affidavit, 9/22/75, p. 3).

(ii)

Robert Johnson Testified That He Heard the Presi

dent Order Lumumba's Assassination at an NSC

Meeting

Robert H. Johnson, a member of the National Security

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Council staff from 1951 to January 1962, offered what he termed a

"clue" to the extent of Presidential involvement in the decision to

assassinate. Lumumba (Johnson, 6/18/75, PP. 4-5). * Johnson re-

counted the following occurrence at an NSC meeting in the Summer

of 1960 which began with a briefing on world developments by the

Director of Central Intelligence:

* Robert Johnson introduced his testimony with the following state-

ment:

.. I would like to preface my remarks by pointing out

that my decision to offer testimony to this committee has

involved for me a profound personal,

moral dilemma.

In

my role as a member of the NSC Staff for ten and one-half

years, I was privy to a great deal of information that in-

volved relationships of confidentiality with high officials

of the United States government.

I have always taken very

seriously the responsibilities implied in such relation-

ships.

These responsibilities extend, in my view,

far beyond

questions of security classification or other legal or

foreign policy concerns.

They relate to the

very basis of

human society and government -- to the relationships of

trust without which no free society can long survive and

no government can operate.

I have been forced by recent developments; however, to

weigh against these considerable responsibilities my broad-

er responsibilities as

a citizen on an issue that involves

as well as questions

major questions of public morality; have concluded, not

of sound policy.

Having done so,

without a great deal of reluctance, to come to your commit-

tee with information

bearing upon your inquiry into govern-

ment decisions relating to the assassination of foreign

leaders: (Johnson, 6/18/75, pP. 4-5)

After his tenure on the staff of the National Security Council,

Robert Johnson served from 1962 to 1967 on the Policy Planning Coun-

cil at the Department of State.

NH 50955 DocId: 32423539 Page 335

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• At some time during that discussion, President Eisen-

hower said something -- I can no longer

remember his words

_- that came across to me as an order for the assassina-

tion of Lumumba who was then at the center of political

conflict and controversy in the Congo.

There was no dis-

cussion; the meeting simply moved on.

I remember my sense

of that moment quite clearly because the President's state-

ment came as a great shock to me.

I cannot, however, re-

construct the

moment more specifically.

Although I was convinced at the time -- and remained

convinced when 1 thought about it later -- that the Presi-

dent's statement

was intended as an order for the assas-

sination of Lumumba, I must confess that in thinking about

the incident more recently I have had some doubts.

As is

well known, it was quite uncharacteristic of President

Eisenhower to make or announce policy decisions in NSC

meetings.

Certainly, it was

strange. if he departed from

that normal pattern on a subject so sensitive as this.

Moreover, it was not long after this, I believe, that Lu-

mumba was dismissed as premier by Kasavubu in an action

that was a quasi-coup.

I have come to wonder whether what

I really heard was only an order for some such political

action.

All I

can tell you with any certainty at the

present moment is my sense of that moment in the Cabinet

Room of the White House. (Johnson, 6/18/75, PP. 6-7)

Johnson "presumed" that the President made his statement while "look-

ing toward the Director of Central Intelligence" (Johnson, 6/18/75,

p. 11). He was unable to recall with any greater specificity the

words used by the President (Johnson 9/13/75, p. 10):

When asked about the strength of the possibility that he had

heard only a general directive for the political overthrow of Lumumba,

Johnson testified that it was his clear impression at the time of the

meeting, and has remained so for the fifteen years

since, that he had

heard an

assassination order:

• Would it be fair to say that although you al-

low for the possibility that a coup or some more general

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political action was being discussed, it is your clear

impression that you had heard an order for the assassi-

nation of Lumumba?

Johnson: It was my clear impression at the time.

8: And it remains your impression now?

Johnson: It remains my impression now. I have reflect-

ed on this other kind of possibility, but that is the

sense . . . that persists.

(Johnson, 9/13/75, PP. 24-25)

Johnson explained that his allowance for the possibility that he had

heard an order for

a coup did not disturb his recollection of hear-

ing an assassination order:

It was a retrospective reflection on what I had heard;

and since this coup did occur, it occurred to me that

it was possible that that is what I heard, but that

would not change my sense of the moment when I heard

the President speak, which I felt then, and I continue

to feel, was a

statement designed to direct the dispos-

al, assassination; of Lumumba. (Johnson, 9/13/75, P. 12)

Johnson stated that the incident provoked a strong reaction

from him:

I was surprised

ays surprise this ham would een the presentent

a group of people..

I was startled. (Johnson, 6/18/75,

p. 13)

A succinct summary of Johnson's testimony was elicited by Senator

Mathias in the following exchange:

• What comes across is that you do have a

memory, if not of exact words, but of your own reaction

really to a Presidential order which you considered to

be an order for an assassination.

Johnson: That is correct.

Mathias: And that although precise words have escaped

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you in the passage of fifteen years, that

sense of shock

remains?

Johnson:

Right. Yes, sir. (Johnson, 6/18/75, p. 8)

After the meeting, Johnson, who was responsible for writing the

memorandum of the discussion, consulted with a senior official on

the NSC staff to determine how to handle the President's statement

in the memorandum and in the debriefing of the NSC Planning Board

that followed each meeting:

I suspect -- but no longer have an exact recollection --

that I omitted it from the debriefing. I also do not re-

call how I handled the subject in the memo of the meet-

ing; though I suspect that some kind of reference to the

President's statement was made. (Johnson, 6/18/75, p. 7)

In his second appearance, Johnson reiterated that it was "quite like-

ly that it was handled through some kind of euphemism or may have

been omitted altogether" (Johnson, 9/13/75, P. 21).*

In 1960, Johnson was Director of the Planning Board Secretariat --

third in command on the NSC staff.. He

attended NSC meetings to take

notes on the discussions whenever one of the two senior NSC officials

waS

absent.

Johnson testified that the person with whom he consulted about the

manner of recording the President's statement in the minutes was one

of the two top NSC staff officials at that time:

NSC Executive Secre-

-ary. James Lay or Deputy Executive Secretary

• Marion Boggs (Johnson,

9/13/75, pp. 12-13).

Johnson could not recall which of the two offi-

cials he

had consulted, but he

"inferred" that it must have been the

"top career NSC staff person present"

at the meeting where he heard

the President's statement (Johnson, 9/13/75, p. 12).

At both of the

NSC meetings where the President and Johnson were present for a dis-

cussion of Lumumba -- August 18 and September 7 -- James Lay was ab-

sent and Marion Boggs served

as Acting Executive Secretary.

Marion Bogg's statement about his method of handling the situation

described by Johnson is in accord with Johnson's testimony:

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*As Johnson stated, his testimony standing alone is "a clue,

rather than precise evidence of Presidential involvement in decision-

making with respect to assassinations" (Johnson, 6/18/75, p. 5). To

determine the significance of this "clue," it must be placed in the

context of the records of the NSC meetings attended by Johnson,

testimony about those meetings, and the series of events that pre-.

ceded the dispatch of poisons to the Congo for Lumumba's assassina-

tion.

In the Summer of 1960, there were four NSC meetings where de-

velopments in the Congo were discussed at which Robert Johnson was

present. The President

was not in attendance at two of those occa-

sions -- July 15 and July 21 (NSC Minutes, 7/15/60; NSC Minutes,

I have no independent recollection of being consulted by

Mr. Johnson about how to handle in the memorandum of dis-

cussion any sensitive statement regarding Lumumba.

I am

not saying I was not consulted; merely that I do not re-

member such an incident. If I

had been consulted, I

would almost certainly have directed Mr. Johnson to omit

the matter from the memorandum of discussion.. (Boggs

affidavit, 10/10/75, P. 2)

James Lay,

who attended other NSC meetings where Lumumba was discuss-

September 21, 1960), also confirmed the fact that NSC min-

utes would not be likely to record a statement as sensitive as a

Presidential order

for an assassination, if such

an order were given:

If extremely sensitive matters were discussed at an

NSC meeting, it was sometimes the practice that the

official NSC minutes would record only the general

subject discussed without identifying the specially

sensitive subject as the discussion.

In highly

sensitive cases, no reference to the subject would

be made in the NSC minutes. (Lay affidavit, 9/8/75,

p. 2)

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=94-

7/21760). Nonetheless, the attitude toward Lumumba even at these

early meetings was vehement:

Mr. Dulles said that in Lumumba we were faced with a

person who was a Castro or worse .

. Mr.

Dulles went

•on to describe Mr. Lumumba's background which he de-

scribed as "harrowing"

It is safe to go on the

assumption that Lumumba has

been bought by the Commun-

ists; this

also, however,

fits with his own orienta-

tion.

(NSC Minutes, 7/21/60)

The President presided over the other two NSC meetings. After look-

ing at the records of those meetings, Johnson was unable to deter-

mine with certainty which one was the meeting at which he heard the

President's statement. (Johnson, 9/13/75, p. 16).

However, the chronology of meetings; cables, and events in the

Congo during this period makes it most likely that Johnson's testi-

mony refers to the NSC meeting of August 18, 1960.

The meeting of August 18 took place at the beginning of a series

of events that preceded the dispatch of a CIA scientist to Leopold-

ville with poisons for the assassination of Lumumba.* The Septem-

ber 7 meeting took place in the midst of this series of events.

The major events in the series, each of which is discussed in de-

tail in other sections of the report, may be summarized as follows:

The week following the NSC meeting of August 18, the Special Group

was informed of the President's

"extremely strong feelings about the

and the Group agreed to

meeting, DCI Allen Dulles commented that "he had taken the comments

referred to seriously

and had

orously as the situation permits" (Special Group Minutes,

every intention of proceeding/25/60;

as vig-

see Section 7(a) (iii), infra).

The next day, Dulles

sent an "Eyes

Only" cable under his personal signature to the Chief of Station in

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*The NSC meeting of August 18, 1960, was held three weeks before

the "quasi-coup" in the Congo -- the dismissal of Lumumba by Kasavubu

-- which Johnson remembers as taking place "not long after" he heard

the President's statement.. The only other meeting. at which Johnson

could have heard the statement by the President was held on Septem-

ber 7, two days

after this event.

Robert Johnson's memorandum of the meeting of August 18, 1960,

indicates that Acting Secretary of State C. Douglas Dillon* introduced

* Leopoldville, indicating that it had been concluded in "HIGH QUAR-

TERS" that Lumumba's "REMOVAL MUST BE AN URGENT AND PRIME OBJECTIVE

AND THAT

THIS SHOULD BE A HIGH PRIORITY OF OUR COVERT ACTION"

(CIA Cable OUT 62966, Dulles to Chief of Station, 8/26/60). The Dul-

les cable added:

WE WISH GIVE YOU WIDER AUTHORITY

.. INCLUDING EVEN MORE

AGGRESSIVE ACTION IF IT CAN REMAIN COVERT

• YOU CAN

ACT ON YOUR OWN AUTHORITY WHERE TIME DOES NOT PERMIT RE-

FERRAL HERE.

_(CIA Cable, 8/26/60) (See Section 2, supra,

for more complete treatment of this cable.)

On September 19, a CIA scientist was dispatched from headquarters

to the Congo on

extraordinarily sensitive assignment (CIA Cable

OUT 71464, Bissell/Tweedy to Chief of Station, 9/19/60; see Section

4(a), supra). On September 21, in

the presence of the President at

Section ? (a) (iv), infra): Finally, on September 26, the CIA scien-

tist arrived in the Congo, provided the Chief of Station with lethal

biological substances, instructed him to assassinate Lumumba, and in-

formed him that the President had ordered the DCI to undertake an

sassination effort. (see Sections 4(a) -4(c), supra).

The Chief of

Station stated that he received confirmation from CIA headquarters

that he was to follow the instructions he had been given (see Section

4(e) (i), supra) .

In 1960, Dillon served as Undersecretary of State, the "number two

position in the State Department," the name of which subsequently

changed to Deputy Secretary of State. In this position, he frequently

(Continued)

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the discussion of U.S. policy toward the Congo.. In the course of

his remarks, Dillon maintained that the presence of United Nations

troops in the Congo was necessary to prevent Soviet intervention at

Lumumba's request:

If

• .

Lumumba carried out his threat to force the UN

out, he might then offer to accept help from anyone. . :

The elimination.of the UN would be a disaster which,

Secretary Dillon stated, we should do everything we

could to prevent.

If the UN were forced out, we might.

be faced by a situation where the Soviets intervened by

invitation of the Congo. (NSC Minutes, 8/18/60)

The discussion then continued to raise the spectre of an alliance be-

tween Lumumba and the Soviet Union:

Secretary Dillon said that he [Lumumba] was working. to

serve the purposes of the Soviets and Mr.

Dulles pointed

out that Lumumba was in Soviet pay. (NSC Minutes, 8/18/

60)

In this context, the following exchange between President Eisenhower

and Secretary Dillon was recorded:

The President said that the possibility that the UN would

be forced out was simply inconceivable. We should keep

the UN in the Congo even if we had to ask for European

troops to do it.

We should do so even if such action was

used by the Soviets

as the basis for starting a fight.

Mr. Dillon indicated that this was State's feeling but

that the Secretary General

and Mr. Lodge doubted whether,

if the Congo put up really determined opposition to the

UN, the UN could stay in.

In response, the President

stated that Mr. Lodge was wrong to this extent -- we were

talking of one man forcing us out of the Congo; of Lumum-

ba supported by the Soviets..

There was no indication, the

served as Acting Secretary of State and either attended or was

kept informed about NSC and Special Group meetings.

Dillon

later served as Secretary of the Treasury under. President Kennedy.

(Dillon, 912/75, PP. 2-4.)

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President stated, that the Congolese did not want

UN support and the maintenance of order.

Secretary

Dillon reiterated that this was State's feeling

about: the matter.

The situation that would be

created by a UN withdrawal was altogether

too

ghastly to contemplate. (NSC Minutes, 8/18/60)

This is the only statement about Lumumba which the memorandum of

the meeting attributed to the President.

As reported, it clearly does not contain an order for the .

assassination of Lumumba.

But the statement does indicate extreme

Presidential concern focused on Lumumba: The President was so

disturbed by the situation in the Congo that he was willing to

risk a fight with the Soviet Union and he felt that Lumumba was

the "one man" who was responsible for this situation, a man who

did not represent the sentiments of the Congolese people in the

President's estimation.

After reviewing NSC documents and being informed of Robert

Johnson's testimony, Douglas Dillon stated his "opinion that it

is most likely that the NSC meeting of August 18, 1960 is the

meeting referred to by Mr. Johnson." (Dillon affidavit, 9/15/75.)

However, Dillon testified that he did not "remember such a thing"

as an explicit Presidential order for the assassination of

Lumumba

(Dillon, 9/2/75, P. 32). Dillon explained how he thought

the President may have expressed himself about Lumumba:

Dillon:

• It could have been in view of this

feeling of everybody that Lumumba was [al very

difficult if not impossible person to deal with, and

was dangerous to the peace and safety of the world,

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that the President expressed himself, we will have.

to do whatever is necessary to get rid of him. I

don't know that I would have taken that as a

clearcut. order as Mr. Johnson apparently did.

And

I think perhaps others present may have interpreted

it other ways.

(Dillon, 912/75, pP. 32-33.)

l: Did you ever hear the

remark about Lumumba, leti resident make such a

s get rid of him, or let's

take action right away on this?

Dillon: I don't remember that. But certainly this

was the general feeling of Government at that time,

and it wouldn't have been if the President hadn't

agreed with it. (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 33.)

Dilion said that he would have thought that such a state-

ment "was not a direct order to have an assassination" (Dillon,

9/2/75, P. 33): But he testified that it was "perfectly

possible" that Allen Dulles would have translated such strong

Presidential language about "getting rid of" Lumumba into

authorization for an assassination effort (Dillon, 9/2/75,

PP. 34-35):

I think that Allen Dulles would have been quite

responsive to what he considered implicit autho-

rization, because he felt very strongly that we

should not involve the President directly in

things of this nature.

And he was perfectly

willing to take the responsibility personally

that maybe, some of his successors wouldn't have

been.

And

so I think that this is a perfectly

plausible thing, knowing Allen Dulles. (Dillon,

9/2/75, p. 34.)

Marion Boggs, who attended the meeting of August 18; as

Acting Executive Secretary of the NSC, stated after reviewing

the Memorandum of Discussion at that meeting:

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I recall the discussion at that meeting, but have no

independent recollection of any statements or dis-

cussion not summarized in the memorandum. Specifically,

I have no recollection of any statement, order of

reference by the President (or anyone else present

at the meeting) which could be interpreted as favor-

ing action by the United States to bring about the

assassination of Lumumba.*

(Boggs affidavit, 10/10/75,

pp. 1-2.)

The Memorandum of Discussion at the NSC meeting of Septem-

ber 7, 1960--the only other meeting at which Johnson could have

heard the President's statement--records only a brief, general

discussion of developments in the Congo (NSC Minutes, 9/7/60).

As part of Allen Dulles' introductory intelligence briefing on

world events, the Memorandum related his remarks on the situation

in the Congo following Kasavubu's dismissal of Lumumba from his

position in the government (NSC Minutes; 9/7/60, p. 4). Neither

the length nor the substance of the record of this discussion

indicates that Lumumba's role in the Congo received the same

intense kind of consideration as the NSC had given it on August

18. ** There is no

record of

any stateucht by the President

* Boggs added:

"Based on my whole experience with the NSC, I would have

considered it highly unusual if a matter of this nature

had been referred to in a Council meeting where

a number

of persons with no

"need to know"

were present."

(Boggs

affidavit, 10/10/75, p. 2.)

** The NSC minutes of the meeting of September 7, deal

with

the discussion of the Congo in two pages (NSC Minutes, 9/7/60,

PP. 4-5). By comparison, the August 18 meeting required an

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during this discussion, (NSC Minutes, 9/7/60, pp. 4-5).

Nevertheless,

in the course of his briefing Dulles

expressed his continuing concern over the amount of personnel

and equipment that was being sent to the Congo by the Soviet

Union, primarily to aid Lumumba (NSC Minutes, 9/7/60, p. 5).

Dulles concluded this part of his briefing with an observation

that demonstrated that Lumumba's dismissal from the government

had not lessened the extent to which he was regarded at the

NSC as a potent political threat in any power struggle in the

Congo:

Mr. Dulles stated that Lumumba always seemed to

come out on top in each of these

struggles.

(NSC Minutes, 9/7/60, p..5.)

The day after this NSC meeting, Gordon Gray made a pointed

reminder of the President's. concern about the Congo to Allen

Dulles at a meeting of the Special Group:

Mr. Gray said that he hoped that Agency people in

the field are fully aware of the top-level feeling

in Washington that vigorous action would not be

amiss. (Special Group Minutes, 9/8/60.)

There are three possible interpretations of the failure.

of NSC records to reveal whether the President ordered the

assassination of Lumumba

at one of these meetings.

First, an

extraordinarily lengthy. (fifteen pages) summary of discussion

on the Congo and related policy problems in Africa, indicating

that this topic was the focal point of the meeting (NSC

Minutes, 8/18/60, pP. 1-15) .

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assassination order could have been issued but omitted from

the records. Robert Johnson testified that it was "very

likely" that the Presidential statement he heard would have

been handled by means of a euphemistic reference of by

complete omission "rather than given as lal . . . direct quo-

tation" in the Memorandum of Discussion (Johnson, 9/13/75,

P. 14). Second, as illustrated by Douglas Dillon's testimony,

the President could have made a general statement about "getting

rid of" Lumumba with the intent to convey to Allen Dulles that

there was implicit authorization for an assassination effort.

Third, despite general discussions about removing Lumumba; the

President may not have intended to order the assassination.of

Lumumba even though Allen Dulles may have thought an assassina-

tion effort had been authorized.. The three White House staff

members

responsible to the President for national security.

affairs testified that there was no such order. Gordon Gray,

Andrew Goodpaster, and John Eisenhower were all in attendance

at the NSC meetings of August 18 and September 7.*

(iii)

The President's "Extremely Strong Feelings" Led

The Special Group to Consider Anything That Might

Get Rid of Lumumba: August 25, 1960

On August 25, 1960 five men** attended a meeting of the

* See Section 7(b), infra, for a general treatment of the

testimony of Gray,. Goodpaster and Eisenhower.

** There were four standing members of the Special. Group at

this time: Allen Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence; Gordon

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Special Group, the subcommittee of the National Security

Council responsible for planning covert operations:

Thomas

Parrott, a CIA officer who served as Secretary to the Group,

began the meeting by outlining the CIA operations that had

been undertaken in "mounting an anti-Lumumba campaign in the

Congo" (Special Group Minutes, 8/25/60). This campaign involved

covert operations through certain labor groups and "the planned

attempt... to arrange a vote of no confidence in Lumumba"

in the Congolese Senate (Special Group Minutes, 8/25/60).

The outline of this campaign evoked the following dialogue:

The Group agreed that the action contemplated is

very much in order.

Mr. Gray commented, however,

that his associates had expressed extremely strong

feelings on the necessity for very straightforward

action in this situation, and he wondered whether the

plans as outlined were sufficient to accomplish this.

Mr.

Dulles

replied that he had taken the comments

referred to seriously and had every intention of pro-

ceeding as vigorously as the situation permits or

requires, but added that he must necessarily put himseli

in a position of interpreting instructions of this kind

within the bounds of necessity and capability.

finally agreed that planning for the Congo would not

necessarily rule out

'consideration' of any particular

Both Gordon Gray and Thomas Parrott testified that refer-

ence to Mr. Gray's

"associates" was a euphemism for President

Gray, Special Assistant to the President for National Security

Affairs; Livingston Merchant, Undersecretary of State for Political

Affairs; and John N. Irwin II, Assistant Secretary of Defense.

Also in

regular attendance was Thomas A. Parrott, Secretary to

the Special Group:

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Eisenhower which was employed to preserve "'plausible deniabil-

ity" by the President of discussion of covert operations

memorialized in Special Group Minutes (Gray, 7/9/75, p. 27;

Parrott, 7/10/75, pp. 8-9).

The four living participants at the meeting have all stated

that they do not recall any discussion of or planning for the

assassination of Lumumba (Merchant affidavit, 9/8/75, P. 1;

Irwin affidavit, 9/22/75, PP. 1-2; Gray, 719175, pP. 27, 32;

Parrott, 7/10/75, PP. 25-26). Gray said that he did not con-

sider the President's desire for "very straightforward action"

to include "any thought in his mind of assassination" (Gray,

7/9/75, p. 32). Parrott testified to the same effect, maintain-

ing that he would have recorded a discussion of assassination

in explicit terms in the Special Group Minutes if such a dis-

cussion had taken place (Parrott, 7/10/75; PP. 26-27).

John N. Irwin II acknowledged, however, that while he did

not have "any direct recollection of the substance of that meet-

ing", the reference in the minutes to the planning for "getting

rid of Lumumba" was "broad enough to cover a discussion of

assassination" (Irwin affidavit, 9/22/75, p. 2) .

Irwin's interpretation is shared by Douglas Dillon and

Richard Bissell--two high government officials who were not

participants at this Special Group meeting but who were involved

in the planning and policymaking for covert operations in the

Congo during this period.

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As a participant in National Security Council meetings

of this period, Dillon said that he would read the Special

Group minutes of August 25, 1960, to indicate that assassina-

tion was within the bounds of the kind of activity that might

be used to "get rid of" Lumumba. (Dillon, 9/2/75,: p. 42).

Dillon noted that the reference in the minutes

to the fact

that Allen Dulles stated that he "had taken the comments

referred to seriously"' probably pointed to the President's

statement at the previous NSC meeting at which Robert Johnson

took notes (Dillon, 9/2/75, PP. 39-40).

When asked whether the CIA would have the authority to

mount an assassination effort against Lumumba on the basis of

the discussion at the Special Group, Dillon said:

They would certainly have the authority to plan.

It is a close question whether this would be

enough to actually go ahead with it. But cer-

tainly the way this thing worked,

as far as I

they didn't do anything just on their own.

I think they would have checked back at least.

with the senior people in the State Department

or. the Defense Department. (Dillon, 9/2/75;

p. 43 .)

Dillon said that if the CIA checked with the State Depart-

ment, it might have been done in such a way that it would not

appear on any record

(Dillon, 9/2/75, P. 43). Dillon added that

"to protect the President as the public representative of the

U.S. from any bad publicity in connection with this", Allen

Dulles "wouldn't return to the President" to seek further

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approval if an assassination operation were mounted (Dillon,

9/2/60, PP.42-43).

Richard Bissell stated that in his opinion the language

of the Special Group Minutes of August 25, 1960 indicated

that the assassination of Lumumba was part of a general

strategy at the NSC and within the CIA for removing Lumumba

from the political scene (Bissell, 9/10/75, PP. 29, 32).

Bissell added:

The Agency had put a top priority, probably, on

1 range of different methods of getting rid

of

Lumumba in the sense of either destroying him

physically, incapacitating him, or eliminating

his political influence. (Bissell, 9/10/75;

p. 29:)

Bissell pointed to the Special Group Minutes of August 25,

1960 as a "prime example" of the circumlocutious manner in

which a topic like assassination would be discussed by high

government officials:

Bissell: When you use the language that no particu-

lar means were ruled out, that is obviously what it

meant, and it meant that

to everybody in the room.

Meant that if it had to be assassination, that that

was a permissible means.

You don't use language of that kind except to mean

in effect, the Director is being told, get rid of

the guy, and if you have to use extreme means up

to and including assassination, go ahead.. (Bissell,

9/10/75, pP. 32-33.)

Bissell added that this message was, "in effect"

, being given

to Dulles by the President through his representative Gordon

Gray (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 33) .

(iv) NSC Meeting of September 21, 1960: Dulles Said

Lumumba Would Remain a Grave Danger Until

"Disposed Of"

In the course of his intelligence briefing to the NSC

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on September 21, 1960, Allen Dulles stressed the danger of

Soviet influence in the Congo. Despite the fact that Lumumba

had been deposed from his position as Premier and was in UN

custody, Dulles continued to regard him as a threat, especially

in light of reports of an impending reconciliation between

Lumumba and the post-coup Congolese government:

Mobutu appeared to be the effective power in the

Congo for the monent but Lumumba was not yet

disposed of and remained a grave danger as long

as he was not disposed of. (NSC Minutes,

9/21/60.

Three days after this NSC meeting, Allen Dulles sent a

personal cable to the Chief of Station in Leopoldville which

included the following message:

WE WISH GIVE EVERY POSSIBLE SUPPORT IN ELIMINATING

LUMUMBA FROM ANY POSSIBILITY RESUMING GOVERNMENTAL

POSITION OR IF HE FAILS IN LEOP (OLDVILLE], SETTING

HIMSELF IN STANLEYVILLE OR ELSEWHERE.

(CIA Cable,

OUT 73573, Dulles to Leopoldville, 9/24/60.)

On September 26, Sidney Gottlieb, under assignment from

CIA headquarters, arrived in Leopoldville (CIA Cable IN 18989,

Leopoldville to Director, 9/27/60), provided the Chief of

Station with poisons, instructed him to assassinate Lumumba;

and assured him that there was Presidential authorization for

• this mission (see Sections 4(b)-4(c), supra).

Marion Boggs, NSC Deputy Executive Secretary, who wrote

the memorandum of the discussion of September 21, did not

interpret Dulles' remark as referring to assassination:

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I have examined the memorandum (which I prepared)

summarizing the discussion of the Congo at the

September

21, 1960 meeting of the NSC:

I recall

the

discussion and believe it is accurately and adequately

summarized in the memorandum.

I have no recollection

of any discussion of a possible assassination of Lumumba

at this meeting.

With specific reference to the state-

ment of the Director of Central Intelligence

believe this is almost a literal rendering of what. Mr.

Dulles said.

My own interpretation of this statement

was that Mr. Dulles

was

speaking in the context of

efforts being made within the Congolese government to

force Lumumba from power. : I did not interpret it as

referring to assassination* (Boggs affidavit 10/10/75;

PP: 2-3.)

Boggs was not, however, in a position to analyze Dulles'

remark in light of the actual planning for covert operations

that took place during this period because Boggs was not privy

to most such discussions (Boggs affidavit, 10/10/75, p. 2).

C. Douglas Dillon, who attended this NSC meeting as.

Acting Secretary of State, said that he did not recall the dis-

cussion (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 47). Dillon said that the minutes

"could mean that" assassination would. have been one acceptable

means.of "disposing of" Lumumba, although he felt that "getting

him out lof the Congol or locking him up" would have been a.

preferable disposition of Lumumba at that point since he was

* NSC Executive Secretary James Lay, who was also present

at the meeting of September 21, 1960.

stated:

"I cannot recall

whether there was

any discussion of assassinating Lumumba at

any NSC meetings." (Lay affidavit, 9/8/75, p.. 1.)

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already out of office (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 48). * When reminded

of the fact that Lumumba's movement and communications were

not restricted by the UN force and that the Congolese army

continued to seek his arrest long after the NSC meeting, Dillon

acknowledged that during this period Lumumba continued to be

viewed by the United States as a potential threat and a volatile

force in the Congo:

• He had this tremendous ability to stir up

a crowd or a group. And if he could have gotten

öut and started to talk to a battalion of the

congolese Army, he probably would have had them

In the palm of his hand in five minutes. (Dillon,

9/20/75, p. 49.).

John N. Irwin II, who attended the NSC meeting as Assistant

Secretary of Defense, stated that although he had no recollection

of the discussion, the language of the minutes was "broad enough

to cover a discussion of assassination": (Irwin affidavit,

9/22/75, p. 2) .

Richard Bissell testified that, based upon his understanding

of the policy of the

NSC toward Lumumba even after Lumumba was

in UN custody, he would read the minutes of September 21 to indi-

cate that assassination was contemplated "as one possible means"

* See Section 3, supra, for discussion of CIA cable traffic

indicating that Lumumba continued to be regarded as capable

of taking over the government after he was deposed and that

pressure to "eliminate" him did not cease until his death.

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of "disposing of" Lumumba. (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 70.) Bissell

was not present at the NSC meeting (NSC Minutes, 9/21/60) :

Bissell's opinion stands in opposition to that of Gordon

Gray, the President's National Security Advisor, who likewise

testified that he could not remember the NSC discussion in which

he participated (Gray, 7/9/75, P. 57). When asked to interpret

the reference to "disposing of" Lumumba, Gray said he "put it in

the same category as 'get rid of', 'eliminate'" (Gray, 7/9/75,

p. 57). Early in his testimony, Gray stated that "assassination

could have been on the minds of some people when they used

these words "'eliminate' or 'get rid of'" (Gray, 719/75, p. 17).

Nonetheless, when asked to comment on the minutes of the NSC

meeting of September 21, he said: "It was not my impression

that we had in mind the assassination of Lumumba" (Gray, 719/75,

p: 57).*

White House

John Eisenhower, who attended the NSC meeting as Assistant

Staff Secretary, said that he had no

recollection" of the discussion but he found the minutes of

the meeting consonant with his "recollection of the atmosphere"

at the time: "the U.S. position was very much anti-Lumumba"

(Eisenhower, 7/18/75, p. 9). He said:.

I would not conjecture that the words "disposed of"

meant an assassination, if for no other reason than

if I had something as

nasty. as this to plot, I wouldn't

do it in front of 21 people

• the number present

[at] the meeting. (Eisenhower, 7/18/75, p. 10.)

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(b)

Testimony of Eisenhower White House Officials That

They Knew of No Presidential Consideration of

Assassination

The two members of President Eisenhower's staff who were

responsible for national

security affairs--Gordon Gray and

Andrew Goodpaster--both made general disclaimers of any knowledge

of Presidential consideration of assassination during their

tenure.

Gordon Gray served as Special Assistant to the President

for National Security Affairs, in which capacity he coordinated

the National Security Council and represented the President at

Special Group meetings. Gray testified that he did not recall

President Eisenhower "ever saying anything that contemplated

killing Lumumba" (Gray, 7/9/75, P. 28).* When asked to inter-

pret phrases from the minutes of particular NSC and Special

Group meetings such as "getting rid of" or "disposing of"

Lumumba, Gray stated:

It is the intent of the user of the expression or

the phrase that is controlling and there may well

have been in the Central Intelligence Agency plans

and/or discussions of

assassinations, but

. at

the level of the Forty Committee [Special Group]

or a higher level than that, the National

Security

Council, there was no active discussion in any way

planning assassination.

• I agree that assassination could have

* At the outset of his testimony on the subject, Gordon Gray

acknowledged that he did not have a clear, independent recollec-

tion of Lumumba's role in the Congo (Gray, 7/9/75, pP. 25-26) .

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been on the minds of some people when they used

these words

'eliminate' or

'get rid of'

• I

am just trying to say that it was not seriously

considered as a program of action by the Presi-

dent or even the Forty. [Speciall Group. (Gray,

7/9/75,

p. 17.)

Andrew Goodpaster, the White House Staff Secretary to

President Eisenhower, said that he and Gray were the "principal

channels" between the President and the CIA, outside of NSC.

meetings (Goodpaster; 7/17/75, P: 4). Goodpaster was responsi-

ble for "handling with the President all matters of day-to-day.

operations in the general fields of international affairs and

security affairs' (Goodpaster, 7/17/75, P. 3). He regularly

attended NSC meetings and was listed among the participants at

the NSC meetings of August 18, 1960 and September 21, 1960.

When asked if he ever heard about any assassination effort

during the Eisenhower Administration, Goodpaster replied

unequivocally:

• at no time and in no way did I ever know

of of hear about any proposal, any mention of

such an acitvity.

TIlt is my beliet that

had such a

thing been raised with the President

other than in my presence,

I would have known

about it,

and

it would have been a matter

of such significance and sensitivity that I am

confident that

I would have recalled it had

such a thing happened.: (Goodpaster, 7/17/75,

p. 5.)

John Eisenhower, the President's son who served under Good-

paster as Assistant White House Staff Secretary, stated that

the use of assassination was contrary to the President's philos-

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ophy: that

"no mani is indispensable" (Eisenhower, 7/18/75, p. 14.)*

As a participant at NSC meetings who frequently attended dis-

cussions in the Oval Office relating to national security affairs,

John Eisenhower testified that nothing that came to his atten-

tion in his experience at the White House "can be construed in

my mind in the remotest way to mean any Presidential knowledge

of or concurrence in any assassination plots

or plans" (Eisenhower,

7/18/75, P. 4).

* Douglas Dillon

testified that the subject of assassination

never arose in his

"direct dealings with either President

Eisenhower or President Kennedy (Dillon, 9/2/75, P. 22). He was

asked by a member of the Committee, however,

to

speculate upon

the general philosophical approach

that Presidents Eisenhower

and Kennedy would have taken to decisionmaking on the question

of using assassination as a tool of foreign policy:

Senator Hart (Colorado): I would invite your speculation at

this point as a sub-Cabinet officer under President Eisen-

hower, and as a Cabinet Officer under President Kennedy, I

think

the Committee would be interested in your view

as

to

the attitude of each of them toward this subject, that is

to say, the elimination; violent elimination of foreign

leaders?

Dillon: Well, that is a difficult thing to speculate on

in a totally different atmosphere.

But I think probably

both of them would have approached it in a very pragmatic

way; most likely, simply weighed the process and con-

sequence rather than in

a way that was primarily of a

moral principle. That is what would probably have been

their attitude in a few cases.

Certainly the idea that

this was going to be a policy of the U.S., generally

both. of them

were very much opposed to it. (Dillon,

9/2/75; pP. 22-23.).

Dillon served as Undersecretary of State in the Eisenhower

Administration

and as Secretary of the Treasury under Kennedy.

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Other Eisenhower Administration officials who were active

in the Special Group in late 1960--Assistant Secretary of

Defense John N. Irwin II, Undersecretary of State for Political

Affairs Livingston Merchart, and Deputy Secretary of Defense.

James Douglas--stated that they did not recall any discussion

about assassinating Lumumba (Irwin affidavit, 9/22/75, PP. 1-2;

Merchant affidavit, 9/8/75, P. 1; Douglas affidavit, 9/5/75).

(c)

Richard Bissell Testified That, Despite His Lack of

a Specific Recollection,

He "Strongly Inferred"

That the Assassination Effort Against Lumumba Was

Authorized by President Eisenhower and Allen Dulles

Richard Bissell's testimony on the question of high-level

authorization for the effort to assassinate Lumumba is prob-

lematic.

Bissell insisted that he had no direct recollection

of receiving such authorization and that all of his testimony

on this subject "has to be described as inference" (Bissell,

9/10/75, p. 48). Bissell began his testimony on the subject

by asserting that it was on his own initiative that he instructed

Justin O'Donnell to plan the assassination of Lumumba (Bissell,

6/11/75, PP. 54-55). Nevertheless, Bissell's conclusion--based

on his

inferences from the totality of circumstances relating

to the entire assassination effort against Lumumba--was that an

assassination

attempt had been authorized at the highest levels

of the government (Bissell, 9/10/75, PP. 32-33, 47-49, 60-62,

65).

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*As discussed..above, Bissell testified that the minutes

of meetings of the Special Group on August 25, 1960 and the

NSC on September 21, 1960 indicate that assassination was con-

templated at the Presidential level as one acceptable means

of "getting rid. of Lumumba" (see

Sections 5(a) (i1) and 5(a) (iji),

supra) .

There was "ho question"

, according to Bissell, that the

cable from Allen Dulles to the Chief of Station in Leopoldville

on August 26, which called for Lumumba's removal and authorized

Hedgman to take action without consulting headquarters, was a

direct outgrowth of the Special Group meeting Dulles had

attended the previous day (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 31-32). Bissell

was "almost certain" that he had been informed about the Dulles

cable shortly after its transmission (Bissell, 9/10/75, P. 12).

Bissell testified that he assumed that assassination was one of

the means of removing Lumumba from the scene that is contemplated

within the language of Dulles' cable (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 32) :

It is my belief on the basis of the cable drafted

by Allen

Dulles that he regarded the action of

the Special Group as

authorizing implementation

[of an assassination] if favorable circumstances

presented themselves, if it could be done covertly.

(Bissell, 9/10/75, PP. 64-65.)

Dulles' cable signalled to Bissell that there was Presi-

dential authorization for him to order action to assassinate

Lumumba (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 61-62) :

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S: Did Mr. Dulles tell you that President Eisenhower

wanted Lumumba killed?

Mr. Bissell: I am sure he didn't:

I Did he ever tell you even circumlocutiously

through this kind of cable?

Mr. Bissell: Yes,

I think his cable says it in effect.

(Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 33 :)

As for discussions with Dulles about the source of autho-

rization for an assassination effort against Lumumba, Bissell

stated:

I think it is probably unlikely that Allen Dulles

would have said either the President or President

Eisenhower even to me. I think he would have said,

this is authorized in the highest quarters, and I

would have known what he meant. (Bissell, 9/10/75,

p. 48.)

When asked if he had sufficient authority to move beyond the

consideration or planning of assassination to order implementa-

tion of a plan, Bissell said, "I probably did think I had [such]

authority" (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 61-62).

When informed about the Chief of Station's testimony

about the instructions he received from Gottlieb, Bissell said

that despite his absence of a specific recollection:

I would

strongly infer in this case that such an

authorization did pass through me, as it were,

it Sid Gottlieb gave that firm instruction to

the

Station Chief. (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 40.)

Bissell said that the DCI would have been the source of this

authorization (Bissell, 9/10/75, p: 40).

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-Bissell did not recall being informed by Gottlieb that

Gottlieb had represented to the Chief of Station that there

was Presidential authorization for the assassination of Lumumba

(Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 46). But Bissell said that assuming he

had instructed Gottlieb to carry poison to the Congo, "there

was no possibility" that he would have issued such an instruc-

tion without authorization from Dulles (Bissell, 9/10/75,

p. 47). Likewise Bissell said he "probably did" tell Gottlieb

that the mission had the approval of President Eisenhower

(Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 47). This led to Bissell's conclusion

that if; in fact, the testimony of the Chief of Station about

Gottlieb's actions is accurate, then Gottlieb's actions were

fully authorized:

I: In light of the entire atmosphere at the Agency

ottlie policy at the Agency at the time, Mr.

s representation to the Chief of Station

that the President had instructed the DCI to

carry out this mission would not have been beyond

the pale of Mr. Gottlieb's authority at that

point?

Bissell:

No, it

would not. (Bissell, 9/10/75,

P. 65)

Bissell further stated:

Knowing Mr. Gottlieb, it 1s literally inconceivable

to me that

he would have acted beyond his instruc-

tions.

(Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 41.)

With respect to his assignment to Justin O'Donnell to "plan

and prepare for" the assassination of Lumumba (Bissell, 9/10/75,

p. 24) Bissell testified that "it was my own idea to give

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O'Donnell this assignment" (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 50). But he

said that this specific assignment was made in the context

that an assassination mission against Lumumba already had autho-

rization above the level of DDP (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 50; see

also pp. 32-33, 47-48, 60-62).

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The "Executive Action" Capability

Along with the question of authorization for actual assas-

sination attempts, the Committee considered the extent and nature

of authorization for a CIA project which included, as one element,

the development of an

assassination capability.

(a)

Introduction

Sometime in early 1961, Richard Bissell (Deputy Director

of Plans) instructed William Harvey, who was at that time the

Chief of one of CIA's Foreign Intelligence staffs, to establish

an "executive action capability" which included research into a

capability to assassinate foreign leaders. (Bissell 6/9/75, p. 51;

Harvey 6/25/75, pp. 36-37.). At some time within the same period,

Bissell

and McGeorge Bundy (Special Assistant to the President for

National Security Affairs) had a conversation about the matter.

Bissell, Harvey and Helms all agreed that the "generalized"

capability was never used'' (Bissell 6/9/75, p. 87; Harvey 6/25/75;

P.. 45; Helms 6/13/75, p. 52) .

"Executive action" is a CIA euphemism, defined by the

testimony before the Committee as a project for research into

developing means for overthrowing foreign political leaders, includ-

ing a "capability to perform assassinations". (Harvey 6/25/75,

p. 34.) Bissell indicated that executive action covered a "wide

spectrum of actions" to "eliminate the effectiveness" of foreign

leaders, with assassination as

the "most extreme"

action on the

spectrum (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 32). The Inspector General's Report

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described executive action as a "general stand-by capability" to

carry out assassination when required (I.G., p. 37). The project

was given the code name ZR/RIFLE by the CIA.*

A single agent ("'asset"), given the cryptonym QJ/WIN,

was placed under Harvey's supervision for the ZR/RIFLE project,

but never used in connection with any actual assassination efforts.

Richard Helms described QJ/WIN's "capability":

"If you needed somebody to carry out murder, I guess you

had a man who might be prepared to carry it out.

(Helms,

6/13/75, p. 53).

Harvey did use agent QJ/WIN, however, to spot "individuals

with criminal and underworld connections in Europe for possible

multi-purpose use" (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 50). For example, QJ/WIN.

reported that a potential asset in the Middle East was "the leader

of a gambling syndicate" with "an available pool of assassins"

(CIA file, ZR/RIFLE/Personality Sketches) .

However, Harvey testified that:

"during the entire existence of the entire ZRRIFLE project

no agent was recruited for the purpose of assassina-

tion, and no even tentative targeting

or target list was

ever drawn:". (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 45.)

Project ZR/RIFLE involved, generally, assessing the

problems and requirements of assassination and developing a stand-

* ZR/RIFLE was a cryptonym relating to two programs.

One was

the executive action assassination capability.

The other was

another program which is not part of the subject matter of this

(William Harvey had been in charge of the CIA section

with general responsibility for such programs.)

This second

program was genuine, but it was also to provide a cover for any.

executive action operation: (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. :49.)

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by assassination capability; more specifically, it involved

"spotting" potential agents and "researching" assassination

techniques that might be used (Bissell, 7/17/75, p. Il and 6/9/75,

p. 73; Harvey, 6/25/75, PP. 37-A, 45). Bissell characterized

Project ZR/RIFLE as "internal and purely preparatory" (Bissell,

7/22/75, P. 32). The I.G. Report of 1967 found "no indication

in the file that the Executive Action Capability of ZR/RIFLE-

QJ/WIN was ever used"

, but said that "after Harvey took over the

Castro operation, he ran it as one aspect of ZR/RIFLE". (I.G.

pp. 40-41.)*

(b) The Question of White House Initiation, Authorization,

or Knowledge of the Executive Action Project

There is general agreement

on one fact: at some point in

early. 1961 Bissell discussed the executive action capability with

Bundy. The timing of that conversation and whether "the White

House" urged that a capability be created were matters on which

the evidence varied widely.

Harvey testified that Bissell

had told him that "the

White House" had twice urged the creation of such a capability

and the Inspector General's Report quoted notes of Harvey's (no

longer in existence) to that effect. Bissell did not recall any

specific conversation with the "White House"

• However, his initial

testimony assumed the

correctness of Harvey's notes, and stated

* A discussion of whether ZR/RIFLE was related to the actual

assassination efforts against Castro is found at Section (d),

infra.

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that, while he could have created the capability on his own,. any

urgings would have come from Bundy or Walt Rostow. In a later

appearance, however, Bissell said he merely informed Bundy of

the capability and that the context was a briefing by him and

not urging by Bundy. Bundy said he received a briefing ánd!

gave no urging, though he raised no objections. Rostow said he

never heard of the project.

William Harvey testified that he was "almost certain"

rame

that on January 25 and 26, 1961, he met with CIA officials Sidney Alurma

Gottlieb, the new Chief of CIA's Technical Services Division, and

Arnold Silver, a CIA recruiting officer, to discuss the feasibility

of creating a capability within the Agency for "executive action":

(Harvey, 6/25/75, P. 52). After reviewing his notes of those

meetings,* Harvey testified that they took place after his initial

* As to the date of these notes, Harvey was asked whether his no-

tations

"25/1-Sid G" and "26/1-1S"

indicate that he spoke to Sidney

Gottlieb and Arnold Silver in 1961, as opposed to 1962. Harvey testi-

fied as follows:

?: And is it your judgment that that is January 26, 1961 and

is about the subject of Executive Action?

Harvey: Yes, it is.

Q: And it followed your conversation with Mr. Bissell

that

you have recounted?

Harvey:

Well, when I first looked at this, I thought

this, well, this has got to be

now that it is not.

'62, but 1 am

almost certain

If this is true, this might place the

first discussion that I had with Dick Bissell in carly

January and this is difficult to pinpoint because there were

several such discussions in varying degrees of detail during

the period in the spring; and very early in

'61 to the fall

of '61 period, but I did find out fairly early on that Silver

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discussion of executive action with Bissell, which, he said,

might have transpired in "early January". (Harvey, 6/25/75, P.

52). When Bissell was shown these notes, he agreed with Harvey

about the timing of their initial discussion (Bissell, 7/17/75,

p.. 10) .

had -- or that Bissell had discussed the question of assassi-

nation with Arnold Silver,

and this discussion,

at the very

least, had to take place after I know Bissell already had

discussed the matter with Silver. (Harvey, 6/25/75, P. 52) .

Harvey had also testified that, after receiving Bissell's initial in-

structions to establish an executive action capability:

the first thing I did

• was discuss in theoretical

terms

with a few officers whom I trusted quite implicitly

the whole subject of assassination,

our possible assets;

our posture, going back, if you will, even to the funda-

nental questions of A, is assassination a proper weapon

oi an American intelligence service, and B, even it you

assune that it is, is it within our capability within

the framework of this government to do it effectively

and properly, securely and discreetly. (Harvey, 6/25/75,

PP. 37-A, 38) .

The Inspector General's Report connected Silver and Gottlieb to the

early stages of the executive action project as follows:

Harvey says that Bissell had already discussed certain

aspects of the problem with Arnold Silver and with Sidney

Gottlieb. Since Silver was already cut in, larvey used

him in developing the Executive Action Capability.

Harvey's mention of him [Gottliebl in this connection

may explain a notation by DI. Gunn that Harvey instructed

Gunn to discuss techniques with Gottlieb without associa-

ting the discussion with the Castro operation. .(I.G.

Report, PP. 37-38) .

It is evident from the testimony of Harvey and Bissell. that the turn-

over to Harvey of the Roselli contact in November 1961 was discussed

Thus, their initial

aS Part Of ZRRIFLE (see Section (d), L" the least, be dated before

discussion of executive action can,

November 1961 and the "25/1". and "26/1" notations would have to

refer to January 1961.

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Harvey testified that the "executive action"' capability.

was intended to include assassinations (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 35):

His cryptic handwritten notes of the January 25/26 meetings, pre-.

served at

the CIA,

contain phrases which suggest a discussion of

assassination--and Harvey confirmed this interpretation: "last

resort beyond last resort and a confession of weakness"

, "the

magic button"

and "never mention word assassination".: (Harvey,

•4..

Ex. I, 6/25/75).*

The Inspector General's Report did not mention these

notes, or their dates. However, in describing Richard Bissell's

initial assignment of the "executive action" project to Harvey,

it referred to another set of Harvey's notes, which were destroyed

after

the preparation of the Report.. The excerpt from these notes

quoted Bissell as saying to Harvey, "The White House had twice

urged me to create such a capability"' (I.G., P. 37). Harvey also

testified that this "urging" was mentioned in his initial dis-

cussion of "executive action" with Bissell (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 37).

However, the testimony from Bissell and White House aides in the

Kennedy and Eisenhower Administrations is in conflict with Harvey's

testimony as to whether such 'urging" had in fact been given to

Bissell.

* Harvey's notes also contained a phrase which suggests his con-

cern

that any U.S. assassination attempts might breed retaliation

from other governments:

Service) countèr-action and monitor if they are blamed."

(Harvey,

Ex.. 1, 6125/75; Bissell, Ex. 1, 7/17/75).

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The following testimony regarding the relationship

between "the White House"' and the executive

action capability

was obtained by the Committee:

Harvey: Harvey testified that his missing notes indica-

ted that Bissell mentioned White House urgings to develop an execu-

tive action capability (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 37). Harvey said that

"particularly rememberled]" that Bissell said that he received

more than one" urging from the White House (Harvey, 0/25/75,

pp. 36-37; 7/11/75, P. 59). However, he had no direct evidence

that Bissell actually had any such discussion with "the White House."

No specific individual in the White House was named to Harvey

(Harvey, 6/25/75, P. 31). Moreover, he said that it would have been

"improper" for him to haye asked Bissell who he had talked to and!

"grossly improper" for Bissell to have volunteered that name

(Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 37) .

Bissell: Bissell specifically recalled assigning Harrey

to investigate the capability (Bissell, 6/9/75, P. 51). However,

Bissell did not recall "a specific conversation with anybody in

the White House as the origin"' of his instruction to Harvey (Bissell,

6/9/75, p. 51).

During the course of several appearances before the

Committee, Bissell's testimony varied as to whether or not he had

been urged by the White House to develop an executive action

capability.

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In his initial appearances before the Committee on June 9 and

11, 1975, Bissell made statements that tended to indicate that White

House authorization had been given. In response to the "twice urged'

" quotation of llarvey's notes in the Inspector General's Report,

Bissell said, "I have no reason to believe that Harvey's quote is :

wrong." (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 51). Bissell accordingly said in his

initial testimony that as far as he knew, it was true that he was

asked by the White llouse to

create a general stand-by assassination

capability. (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 49) .

Based again upon llarvey's missing notes ("White House urging"').

and his initial statement that he had no reason to challenge their

accuracy, Bissell initially gave the opinion that McGeorge Bundy

(Id., 6/9/75, P. 49), Special Assistant to President Kennedy for

National Security Affairs, and Walt Rostow (Id., P. 51), Deputy !

Assistant to President Kennedy during 1961, were the two people from

whom such a request was most likely to have come (Id., p. 53) because

they were "the two members of the White House staff who were closest

to CIA operations." (Id., p. 54).

At another point in his initial testimony, Bissell said that

the creation of the capability "may have been initiated within the

Agency' (I. p. 81). And still Later he aaid: "there is little )

doubt in my mind that Project RIFLE was discussed with Rostow and

possibly Bundy" (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 46) .

When Bissell returned to the Committee on July 17 and 22, his

testimony, given in light of information gained since his earlier

(6481)70427

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appearances, was that there was no White llouse urging. for the creation

of the executive action project, although tacit approval for the .

"research" project was probably given by Bundy after it was established.

First, he was shown the llarvey notes which had been preserved

and which, without any mention of the White House, indicated Harvey

had received his assignment prior to January 25/26, 1961. Those

dates -- just 5 days after the change of administration -- made

Bissell conclude that it

was "very unlikely that that assignment

to (Harvey) was taken as a result of White House urging of consul-

tation" (Bissell, 7/17/75, P. 10). Bissell said that Bundy did

not have any influence on the performance of his Agency duties before

the Presidential inauguration (Bissell, 7/22/75, P. 23). Bissell

added that he did not remember meeting with anyone in the new ad-

ministration on matters prior to the inauguration (Bissell,: 7/22/75,

p. 23) .

Second, when he returned in July, Bissell also said he was con-

vinced by telephone conversations with Kostow and Bundy that based

upon Rostow's duties -- which, in 1961, had nothing to do with

covert action -- he "never discussed" executive action with Rostow

(Bissell,. 7/ 17/75, p. 10; 7/27/75, p: 22) .

As for Bundy, Bissell's final testimony (after telephone con-

tact with Bundy) was that he believed that he had informed Bundy

about the capability after it had been created (Bissell, 7/17/75,

pp. 10-11; 7/22/75, PP. 21-22). But Bissell confirmed his original

testimony (6/9/75, pP.

- that he did not brief Bundy on the

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actual assassination plots against Castro already undertaken by the

CIA (Bissell, 6/11/75, P. 47; 7/22/75, P. 31). Bissell was "quite

certain" that he would not have expected Bundy to mention the

executive action capability to the President. (Bissell, 7/22/75,

p. 35). Bissell testified:

Q. Would you think the development of a capability to

kill foreign leaders was a matter of sufficient impor-

tance to bring to the attention of the President?

Bissell: In that context and at that time and given the

limited

scope of activities within that project, I would

not."

(Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 35).

Bissell said that he and Bundy spoke about an untargeted

"capability" rather than the plan of approval for an assassination

operation (Bissell, 7/17/75, P. 11). Bissell said that although

he does not have a specific recollection, he "might have" mentioned

Castro, Lumumba, and Trujillo in the course of a discussion of

executive action "because these were the sorts of individuals at i

that moment in history against whom such a capability might possibly

have been employed." (Bissell, 6/11/75; pP. 50-51) .

Bissell said his impression was that Bundy, in audition to. ex-

pressing no unfavorable reaction to the project, might have actually

given a more affirmative reaction (Bissell, 7/22/75, PP. 25, 28) .;

Bissell testified that he might have interpreted Bundy's reaction

as approval for the executive action concept (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 30) .

Q:

. I think the testimony of this witness is going

further in saying what you received from (Bundy) was,

in your view, tantamount to approval?

Bissell: I, at least, interpreted it as you can call

it approval, or you could say no objection. : He (Bundy) "

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was briefed on something that was being done, as I now

believe, on the initiative of the Agency. His (Bundy's)

comment is that he made no objection to it.

I suspect:

that his reaction was somewhat more favorable than that,

but this is a matter that probably someone listening to

the conversation on which such a person could have had

differing interpretations. (Bissell, 7122/75, p. 33).

Bissell's testimony on any conversation with Bundy regarding.

executive action was speculative reconstruction from first appearance

to last because he had no "clear recollection" of the events (Bissell,

7/22/75, PP. 29, 36). But Bissell maintained that more "Formal and

specific and explicit approval would have been required" before any

"actual overt steps in use of the capability." (Bissell, 7122/75,

p. 31) .

Bissell said that Harvey's notation about White House urgings

to develop an executive action capability may have been a slightly

confused account of a conversation subsequent to the initiation of

the project in which Bissell relayed Bundy's reaction to Harvey i

(Bissell, 7/22/75, P: 25) .

Bissell testified that the development of an executive action

capability was "undoubtedly" initiated within the Agency (Bissell,

7/22/75, p. 22). He had acknowledged on his first day of testimony

that this would not have been unusual:

it was the normal practice in the Agency and an impor-

tant part of its mission to create various kinds. of

capability long before there was any reason to be certain

whether those would be used or where or how or for what

purpose... The whole ongoing job of

sence service of recruiting agents is of shate character.

So it would not be particularly surprising to me. if the

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decision to create ... this capability had been taken

without an outside request. (Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 67-68).":

Bundy: ' McGeorge Bundy also testified that he had a conversation

with Bissell; during which the executive action capability was dis-

cussed (Bundy, PP. 4-5).

Bundy's testimony comports with :

Bissell's on the fact that they spoke about an untargeted capability,

rather than an assassination operation (Bundy, pp. 4-5). But Bundy

said that the capability included "killing the individual" (Bundy,

p. 5). Bundy's impression was that the CIA was "testing my reaction

not "seeking authority" (Bundy, p. 15). Bundy sunmarized his testi-

mony by saying:

I an sure I gave no instruction. But it is only fair to

add that I do not recall that I offered any impediment

either. (Bundy, p. 10)

Bundy said that he did not take steps to halt the development of

the executive action capability or "pursue the matter at all" (Bundy,

p. 19) because he was

satisfied

that this was not an operational activity, and would not

become such without two conditions: first, that there

be a desire or a request or a guidance that there should

be planning against some specific individual; and second

that there should be a decision to move against the indi-

and or to co now.

vidual. (Bundy, p.:7):

* For example, Bissell testified that on his own initiative, he

had requested a CIA officer to go to the Congo to "make plans and

develop the capability!' for

an

assassination attempt against Lunumba,

if ordered (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 55) .

* Bundy also testified that he had a vague recollection of hearing

about poison in relation to cuba, but he did not connect this to the

conversation about executive action. (See footnote, p. 6, Kennedy

Pre-Bay of Pigs section, supra.)

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Bundy testified that he believed that neither of these conditions had

been fulfilled. (Bundy, p. 7).

Bundy recalled the conversation as taking place "sonetime in

the

early months of 1961:" (Bundy, p. 4). When questioned about the

dates in Harvey's notes, Bundy rated the chance that the conversation

about executive action took place before January 25 -- when Harvey

was already discussing the project at the CIA pursuant to Bissell's

directive -- as "near zero" because the new Administration had been

in office less than a week and he had been preoccupied with other

problems, including the Berlin crisis and reorganizing the National

Security staff (Bundy, P. 9).

Bundy testified that he did not brief the President on the

executive action project:

Chairman: And you have testified that you did not take

the matter to the President?

Bundy: As far as I can recall, Mr. Chairman.

(Bundy, P. 16)

Bundy explained that the

division of responsibility for national

security affairs excluded Rostow from jurisdiction over covert opera-

tions, making it unlikely that Rostow would be briefed on a project.

like ZRRIFLE (Bundy, P. 11; Rostow, p. 11) .

Rostow: Rostow testified that he was "morally certain" that:

during his entire tenure in government, he never heard a reference

to executive action or "such a capability or such an intention to

act by the U.S." (Rostow, PP. 10, 13).

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Goodpaster and Gray: The responsibility for national security

affairs during the latter part of the Eisenhower Administration was

borne by Andrew Goodpaster and Gordon Gray. However, there

was no

evidence which raised the name of either man in connection with the

development of an executive action capability. Both Goodpaster and

Gray testified to having no knowledge of it. (Goodpaster, p. 11;

Gray, P.. 56.)

(c) Authorization or Knowledge of Executive Action Project

Бу DCI

Richard Bissell said he was "quite certain" that Allen

Dulles had full knowledge of the executive action project for two

reasons:

first, it "would have come to the DCI's attention" at the

time of the transfer of William Harvey between components of the

Agency to work on Cuban operations;* and second, Bissell "would

imagine" it was mentioned to Dulles at the initiation of the project

(Bissell, 7/22/75, P. 35). Bissell and Harvey briefed Richard Helms

on Project ZRRIFLE when he became DDP (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 53; Harvey,

7/11/75, p. 63). But Bissell did not recall briefing John McCone

about the project when McCone took over as DCI (Bissell, 7/17/75,

p. 11). McCone testified that he had no knowledge of such a project

(McCone, p. 43) .

Willian Harvey said it was assumed that the project was;

within the paraneters permitted by the DCI. But larvey testified

that officially advising the DCI of the existence of the project

* Harvey's transfer to Cuban operations was not. completed until

late in 1961.

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was "a bridge we did not cross" and would not have crossed until

"there was either specific targeting or a specific operation or a

specific recruitment." (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 59).

(d)

The Question of Whether Project ZRRIFLE was Connected

to Any Actual Assassination Plots

The Committee has sought to determine whether the CIA de-

velopment of an executive action capability was related in any way to

the actual assassination efforts. One question raised by this

inquiry is whether the participants in the assassination operations

might have perceived the executive action capability as in some way

lending legitimacy to the actual assassination efforts.

(i) Conversation Between Bissell and Bundy

In his early testimony, Bissell said he did not have

a recollection of whether he discussed the names of Castro, Lumumba,

and Trujillo with anyone in the White House in the course of discussing

the project to develop an executive action capability (Bissell, 6/11/75,

p. 51). However, Bissell testified that it was "perfectly plausible

that I would have used examples" (Bissell, 6/11/75, P. 51).: He con-

tinued:

in such a discussion of a capability, I might well have

used the three names that I just gave, because these were

the sorts of individuals at that moment in history against

whom such a capability might possibly have been employed."

(Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 51) .

Bissell and Bundy both

testified, however, that

their discussion of the development of the capability for assassina-

- tion did not involve any mention of actual assassination plans or

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attempts (see detailed treatment at Section (b), supra). There

is no testimony to the contrary. The account of this conversa-

tion raises a question as to whether Bissell acted properly in

withholding from Bundy the fact that assassination efforts

against Castro had already been mounted and were moving forward.

propone,

Bundy was responsible to a new President for national security

affairs and Bissell was his principal source of information about: Kenitor

covert operations at the CIA.

(11)

Bissell's Instruction to Take Over Responsibility

For Underworld Contact: November 1961

Both Bissell and Harvey recall a meeting in November

1961 in which Harvey was instructed to take over the contact with

John Roselli (Bissell, 6/11/75, PP. 19, 47; Harvey, 6/25/75, P. 86;

and 6/11/75, P. 19)--which had been used for the initial poison pill

plot as part of Project ZR/RIFLE. Harvey's notes placed the meeting

on November 15, 1961 (I.G., p. 39), during the period in which Harvey

was freed from his duties on another Agency staff to take over

direction of Task Force W, the locus of CIA activity against the

Castro regime.

According to Bissell and Harvey, the November meeting

involved only. the planning and research of a capability rather than:

a

targeted operation against Castro (Bissell, 7/17/75, P: 13;

Harvey, 7/11/75, p. 60). But Bissell acknowledged that the purpose

of the Roselli contact had been to assassinate Castro, and that "it

is a fair inference that there would have been no reason to maintain

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it (the contact] unless there was some possibility of reactivating

that operation". (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 19). Bissell stated that

because the 'assassination plot against Castro involving the syndicate

had been stood down after the Bay of Pigs':.. and there

was no authorization to pursue it actively..

• the re-

sponsibility that

was given to him (larveyl was that of

taking over an inactive contact.

" (Bissell, 7/17/75, P. 14)

Bissell said that he had, in effect, asked Harvey to stand watch over

the contact in case any action should be required and further testi-

fied that it was never required.

The Inspector General's

Report stated: "After

Harvey took over the Castro operation, he ran it as one aspect

Of ZRRIFLE."' (I.G., P. 40).. Harvey recalled that during a dis-

cussion with Bissell of the creation of an executive action capability,

Bissell advised him of "a then going operation" involving the names

of Maheu and possibly Roselli and Giancana, "which was a part of the

Agency's effort to develop... a capability for executive action."!

(Harvey, 7/11/75, pP. 55, 61). Harvey said that at the time of 1

this discussion, the operation had been "in train" for "approxi-

mately two years or perhaps 18 months.". (Harvey, 7/11/75, p. 54)!

Although his "net impression" was that both the

"exploratory project" and the"specific operation" were

"fully

authorized and

approved", Harvey said he could not testify that

"specific White llouse authority. for this given operation was implied

or stated". (Harvey, 7/11/75, p. 54.): Bissell does not recall

telling anyone in the White House that something had been done to

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bring a CIA officer together with the criminal syndicate (Bissell,

6/11/75, pp. 19-20). Harvey did not recall any mention of the :

White House or any higher authority than the DDP in his November

meeting with Bissell (Harvey, 7/11/75, pP. 60-61) .

Although Richard Helms was briefed and given

administrative responsibility (as DDP) for Project ZR/RIFLE three

months

later, he did not recall that ZR/RIFLE was ever contemplated

as a capability to assassinate Castro (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 55).

Asked whether the actual assassination efforts against Castro were

related to ZR/RIFLE (executive action), llelms testified: "In my

mind those lines never crossed" (Helms, 6/13/75, P. 52). However,

Bissell'

s testimony leaves more ambiguity: "the contact with the

syndicate which had Castro as its target . . . folded into the

ZR/RIFLE project.:. and they became one" (Bissell, 6/11/75,

p. 47). When asked by Senator Baker whether the executive action:

"capability... for assassination" was "used against Castro",

Bissell replied that it was "in the later phase": (Bissell, 6/11/75,

p: 47). The instruction from Bissell to Harvey on November 15,

1961, however, preceded the reactivation of the CIA-syndicate assas-

ination operation against Castro by approximately five months.

(iii) Use of Agent QJ/WIN in Africa

QJ/WIN was a foreign citizen with a criminal back-

ground who had been recruited by the CIA for certain sensitive

programs involving surreptitious entries which pre-dated Project

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ZR/RIFLE. Harvey testified that QJ/WIN's function after the advent

of Project ZR/RIFLE in 1961 was restricted to the "spotting" of.

potential

assets for "multi-purpose" covert use.

However, in the Fall of 1960--before Harvey was

assigned to create Project ZR/RIFLE by Richard Bissell--agent

QJ/WIN had been dispatched to the Congo by Arnold Silver, his

supervising CIA case

officer in Europe. William Harvey, as the

Chief of the CIA Foreign Intelligence staff on which Silver worked,

had ordered QJ/WIN's mission to the Congo (CIA Dispatch AUDW-147,

11/2/60)

and arranged the financial accounting for the mission

afterward (Memorandum to Finance Division from William K. Harvey,,

1/11/61). [QJ/WIN's activities in the Congo

are treated in detail

in the discussion of the Lumumba case; see Section _, supra. :

There are two factors which may raise a question as

to whether QJ/WIN was being used in an ad hoc capacity to develop

an assassination capability before ZR/RIFLE was formally initiated

First, there is a similarity in the cast of characters: Harvey,

QJ/WIN; Silver, and Gottlieb were connected with the. Lumumba matter

and reappear in connection with the subsequent development of

ZR/RIFLE. Second, Bissell informed Harvey that the development of

an assassination capability had already been discussed with Silver

and Gottlieb before Harvey's assignment to ZR/RIFLE (Harvey, 6/25/75,

p. 52; I:G. Report, PP. 37-38).

Nevertheless, there does

not appear to be any firm

evidence of a connection between QJ/WIN and the plot to

assassinate

Lumumba.

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FINAL

DRAFT

Summary

60005:

UhAm

R948

TRUJILIO

Agreed to by drafting

subcommittee on

August 28, 1975*

Rafael Trujillo was assassinated by a group of Dominican dissidents on

May 30, 1961.

Irujillo was a brutal dictator, and both the Eisenhower and

Kennedy Administrations encouraged the overthrow of his regime by Dominican

dissidents. Toward that end the highest policy levels of both Administrations

approved or condoned supplying arms to the dissidents. Although there is no

evidence that the United States instigated any assassination activity, certain

evidence tends to link United States officials to the assassination

plans.

Material support, consisting of three pistols and three carbines, was

supplied to various dissidents. While United States' officials knew that the

dissidents intended to overthrow Trujillo, probably by assassination, there

is no direct evidence that the weapons which were passed were used in the

assassination. The evidence is inconclusive as to how high in the two

Administrations information about the dissidents' assassination plots

had been passed prior to the spring of 1961.

Beginning in March of 1961, the dissidents began asking United States

officials for machine guns. By the time four M-3 machine guns were shipped to

the CIA Station Chief in the Dominican capitol in April, it was well hnown

that the dissidents wanted them for use in connection with the assassination.

Thereafter, however, permission to deliver the machine guns to the dissidents

was denied, and the guns were never passed. Two days before the assassination,

President Kennedy personally authorized a cable to the U.S. Consul General

* The second paragraph under V.A. 3.c. and the paragraph under VII.C. were

drafted pursuant to the directions of the Subcommittee but have not been

reviewed by the Subcommittee.

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in the Dominican Republic stating that the United States government, as a

matter of general principle, could not condone political assassinations, but

at the same time indicating the United States continued to support the dissi-

dents and stood ready to recognize them in the event they were successful

in their endeavor to overthrow Trujillo.

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hand than

I. Background

Rafael Trujillo came to power in the Dominican Republic

in 1930.

For most of his

tenure, the United States government

supported him and he was regarded. throughout much of the

Caribbean and Latin America as a protege of the United States.

Trujillo's rule, always harsh and dictatorial, became more

arbitrary during the 1950's. As a result, the United States

States' image was increasingly tarnished in the eyes of many

Latin Americans.

Increasing American

awareness of Trujillo's brutality

and fear that it would lead to a Castro-type revolution caused

U.S. officials to consider various plans to hasten his abdi-

cation or downfall.

As early as February 1960 the Eisenhower administration

gave high level consideration to a program of covert aid to

Dominican dissidents. (Special Group minutes, 2/10/60) .

In

April 1960 President Eisenhower approved a contingency plan

for the Dominican Republic which provided, in part, that if the

situation deteriorated still further:

...the United States would immediately take political action to

remove Trujillo from the Dominican Republic as soon

as a suitable successor regime can be induced to take over

with the assurance of U.s. political, economic, and

- 1i necessary -- military support.

(Memo from

Secretary of State Herter to the President, 4/14/60;

Presidential approval indicated in Herter letter to

Secretary of Defense Gates, 4/21/60.)

Simultaneously, the United States was trying to

organize

hemispheric opposition to the Castro regime in Cuba. Latin

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Maid id

American leaders,

such

as President Betancourt of Venezuela,

pressed the United States to take affirmative action against

Trujillo to dispel criticism. that the U.S. opposed dictator-

ships of the left only. A belief that Castro's road to power

was paved by the excesses of Batista led to concern that the

Dominican

Republic might also eventually fall victim to a

Castro-style Communist regime. (Rusk, pp. 8,9)

II. Initial Contact with Dissidents and Request for Arms

During the spring of 1960, the U.S. ambassador to the

Dominican

Republic, Joseph Farland, made

initial contact with

dissidents who sought to free their country from Trujillo's

grasp. They asked for

sniper rifles. Although documentary

evidence indicates

that a recommendation to provide these

rifles was approved both within the State Department and the

CIA, the rifles were never provided.

A. Dissident Contacts

Ambassador Farland established contact with a group of

dissidents regarded as moderate, pro-U.S. and desirous of

establishing a democratic form of government.* (Farland

affidavit) Prior to his final departure fron the Dominican

Republic in May 1960, the Ambassador introduced his Deputy-Chief-

of-Mission, lenry Dearborn, to the dissident leaders, indicating that

* This loosely-organized group, with which contact was es-~

tablished, was referred to in cables, correspondence, and

memoranda

as "the dissidents" and is so referenced herein.

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Dearborn could be trusted. Then on June 16, 1960, CIA

Headquarters* cabled a request that Dearborn become the "communi-

cations link" between the dissidents and CIA. The cable [stated/

that Dearborn's role had the "unofficial approval of /Assistant

Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Roy R_T Rubottom"

(Emphasis in original.) (HQS to Station cable 6/16/60):

Dearborn agreed. He requested, however, that the CIA

confirm the arrangement with the dissidents as being that the

U.S. would "clandestinely" assist the opposition to "develop

effective force to accomplish Irujillo overthrow," but would

not "undertake any overt action itself against Trujillo

government while it is in full control of Dominican Republic"

(Station to HQS cable 6/17/60). CIA Headqaurters confirmed

Dearborn's understanding of the arrangement (HQS to Station

cable 6/19/60):

B. The Sniper Rifles

During the course of a cocktail party in the Dominican

Republic, a leading dissident made a specific request to Ambas-

sador Farland for a limited number of rifles with telescopic

sights. The Ambassador promised to pass on the request (Farland

affidavit) He apparently did so after returning to Washington

in May 1960 (CIA memorandum for the record, 6/7/61).

* As used herein "Headquarters" refers to ileadquarters of the

Central Intelligency Agency; "Department" indicates the

Department of State.

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Documents indicate that consideration was given within

the CIA to airdropping rifles into the Dominican

Republic.

At a June 21, 1960, meeting with Ned Holman of the CIA

Western Hemisphere Division, Ambassador Farland reportedly

suggested possible sites for the drops.

(CIA memo, 6/21/60)

Documents also indicate that a meeting was held

around the end of June 1960 between Assistant Secretary

of State for Inter-American Affairs Roy R. Rubottom and

Col. J. C. King, Chief of CIA's Western Hemisphere Division.

Apparently King sought to learn the Assistant Secretary's view

reyarding "To what extent will the U.S. government participate

in the overthrow of Trujillo." A number of questions were

raised by King, among them:

"c. Would it provide a small number of sniper rifles

or other devices for the removal of key Trujillo people

from the scene?"

King's handwritten notes indicate that Rubottom's response to

*/

that question was "yes" (CIA memo of 6/28/60; King affidavit)

On July 1, 1960, a memorandum directed to General Cabell, the Acting

Director of Central Intelligence, was prepared for Colonel King's

signature and, in his

absence, signed by his principal deputy,

Rudy Gomez (I.G. Report, p. 26). The memorandum stated that

a principal leader of the anti-Trujillo opposition had asked

Ambassador Farland for a limited number of arms to precipitate

Irujillo's overthrow, and recognized that such arins

* Neither King nor Rubottom recalls such a meetiny, nor does

either recall any proposal for supplying sniper rifles.

(Rubottom affidavit, King affidavit.):

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1191

as i

No dia borde

"presumably would be used against key members of the Trujillo

regime." The memorandum recommended that the arms be provided,

since the fall of the Trujillo regime appeared inevitable,

and therefore U.S. relations with the opposition should be as

close as possible.

"Providing the arms as requested would

contribute significantly toward this end."

(CIA memo, 7/1/60)

Specifically, the recommendation was to deliver to dissidents

in the Dominican Republic 12 steril*

rifles with teles-

copic sights, together with 500 rounds of ammunition.

Paragraph 4 of the memorandum stated:

14.

Approval for delivery of these arms has

been given by Assistant Secretary of State

Roy Rubottom, who requests that the arms be

placed in hands of the opposition at the earliest

possible moment." (Id.)

Gomez's reconmendation was concurred in by Richard

Helms, as Acting DDP, and approved by General Cabell,

(I. G. Report, p. 26).

The kind of arms approved, sterile rifles with

telescopic sights, together with the statement that they would

be presumably used against key members of the Trujillo regime

clearly indicated the "targeted use" for which the weapons were

intended. (Bissell, 7/22/75, ?. 77).

On July 1, 1960, a cable was sent to Dearborn by CIA

Headquarters informing him of the plan to airdrop 12

telescopically-sighted rifles into the Dominican Republic. The

* "Sterile" I

rifles are "untraceable" rifles. (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 69)

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cable inquired whether the dissidents had the capability to

realign

the sights if thrown off by the drop. On July 14,

1960, Dearborn replied that the dissident leaders were against

any further action in the Dominican Republic until after re-

solution by the OAS of a Venezuelan complaint then pending

against Trujillo. The dissidents reportedly believed that

sufficiently strong action by the OAS could bring Trujillo's

downfall without further effort on their part. (Station to

HQS cable, 7/14/60) The 12 sniper rifles were never furnished

to the dissidents.

On August 26, 1960, Dearborn cabled Deputy Assistant

Secretary of State Lester Mallory reporting on a meeting between

a dissident leader and John Barfield, the Consulate's political

officer. The dissident leader was reported to have lost

enthusiasm for an assassination attempt and was then speaking

of an invasion from Venezuela. However, by September 1, 1960,

dissidents were again speaking about the possible provision to

them of arms. This time the request was for 200 rifles. For

the next several months, consideration centered on providing

200 to 300 guns.

II. Summer and Fall of 1960

In August 1960, the United States severed diplomatic

relations with the Dominican Republic and recalled most of its

personnel. Dearborn was left as Consul General and de facto

CIA Chief of Station.

Consideration was given both to providing

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arms and explosive devices and to the use of high level

emissaries

to persuade Trujillo to abdicate. By the end of

the year, a broad plan of general support to anti-trujillo

forces, both within and without the country, was approved.

A. Diplomatic Development --

Withdrawal of U.S. Personnel

Events occurring during the summer of 1960 further in-

tensified hemispheric opposition to the Trujillo regime. In

June agents of Trujillo tried to assassinate Venezuelan Presi-

dent Betancourt.. As a result, the OAS censured the Trujillo

government. At the same time, in August 1960, the United

States broke interupted diplomatic relations with the Dominican

Republic and imposed economic sanctions.

With the severance of diplomatic relations, the United

States closed its Embassy. Most American personnel, including

the CIA Chief of Station, left the Dominican Republic. With

the departure of the CIA Chief of Station, Dearborn became

de facto CIA Chief of Station and was recognized as such by

both CIA and the State Department. Although on January 20,

1961, a new

CIA Chief of Station came to the Dominican Republic,

Dearborn continued to serve as a link to the dissidents.

B.

Dearborn Reports Assassination May be Only

Way to Overthrow Trujillo Regime

Dearborn came to believe that no effort to overthrow the

Bis

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9608o B

Trujillo government could be successful unless it involved

Trujillo's assassination.

He communicated this opinion to both the State Department and

the CIA. In July 1960, he advised Assistant Secretary Rubottom

that the dissidents were

.. in ne way ready to carry on any type of revolutionary

activity

in the foreseeable future except the

assassination of their principal enemy."

(Dearborn to Rubottam letter, 7/14/60)

It is uncertain what portion of the information provided

by Dearborn to State was passed above the Assistant Secretary

level. Through August of 1960, only Assistant Secretary Rubottom,

his Deputy, Lester Mallory, and Staff Assistant Frank Devine,

were, within the Latin American Division of the Department,

aware of Dearborn's "current projects." (Devine to Dearborn

letter, 8/15/601*

By September 1960, Thomas Mann had replaced Roy Rubottom

as Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, and Frank

Devine had become a Special Assistant to Mr. Mann. While

serving as Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary, Devine

reportedly spent ninety percent of his time coordinating State

activities in Latin America.

It was in this capacity that

Devine maintained almost daily communication with Ned Holman

and other officials of the CIA's Western Hemisphere Division

(Devine, p.7)

*Dearborn's candid reporting to State during the sunmer of 1960

raised concern with the Department and ne was advised that certain

specific information shoula more appropriately come through "the .

other channel" (presumably, CIA communications) . Dearborn was

advised that his cables to

State were distributed to at least 19

different recipient offices. (Id.)

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Mann solicited Dearborn's comments concerning plans.

under discussion for forcing Trujillo from power.

Dearborn

replied in a detailed letter which concluded:

"One further point which I should probably not even

make.

From a purely practical standpoint, it will

be best for us,

for the OAS, and for

the Dominican

Republic if the

Dominicans put an end to Trujillo

before he leaves this island.

If he has his millions

and is a free agent, he will devote his life from

exile to preventing stable government in the D.R., to

overturning democratic governments and establishing

dictatorships in the Caribbean,

and to assassinating

his enemies. If I were a Dominican, which thank

heaven I am not, I would favor destroying Trujillo as

being the first necessary step in the salvation of

my country

and

I would regard this, in fact, as my

Christian duty. If you recall Dracula, you will

remember it was necessary to drive a stake through

his heart to prevent a continuation of his crimes.

I believe

sudden death would be more humane than

the solution of the Nuncio who once told me he thought

he should pray that Trujillo would have a long and

lingering illness." (Dearborn to. Mann letter, 10/27/60)

c. Efforts to convince Trujillo to Abdicate

Throughout the fall of 1960, efforts were made on both the

diplomatic and economic fronts aimed at pressuring Trujillo

into relinguishing control, and ideally, leaving the Dominican

Republic. The use of high level emissaries, both from within

and without the ranks of government, was considered.

(Special

Group Minutes, 9/8/60; Mann to Dearborn corres., 10/10/60)

None of the efforts proved successful, and at the end of 1960

Trujillo was still in absolute control.

D. CIA Plans of October 1960

A CIA internal memorandum dated October 3, 1960 entitled

odda

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"Plans of the Dominican Internal Opposition and Dominican

Desk for Overthrow of the Trujillo Government" set forth plans

which "have been developed on a tentative basis which appear

feasible and which might be carried out..covertly by CIA with

a minimal risk of exposure." These plans provided, in part,

for the following:

"a. Delivery of approximately 300 rifles and pistols,

together with ammunition and a supply of grenades, to

secure cache on the South shore of the island, about

14 miles East of Ciudad Trujillo.

"b. Delivery to the same cache described above, of an

electronic detonating device with remote control.

features, which could be planted by the dissidents in

such manner as to eliminate certain key Trujillo

henchmen.

This might necessitate training and intro-

ducing into the country by illegal entry, a trained

technician to set the bomb and detonator."

(Emphasis

added) (CIA Memorandum, 10/3/60)

E. December 1960 Special Group Plan of Covert Action

On December 29, 1960, the Special Group considered and

approved a broad plan of covert support to anti-Trujillo forces.

plan, presented by Bissell, envisioned support to both

Dominican exile groups and internal dissidents.

The

exile groups were to be furnished money to organize and under-

take anti-Trujillo propaganda efforts and to refurbish a yacht

for use in paramilitary activities. Bissell emphasized

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037025

to the Special Group that "the proposed actions would not,

of themselves, bring about the desired result in the near

future, lacking some decisive stroke against Trujillo himself."

(Special Group Minutes, 12/29/60)

IV.

January 12, 1961 Special Group Approval of "Limited

Supplies of Small Arms and Other Material"

on January 12, 1961, with all members present, *

the

Special Group met and, according to its Minutes, took the

following action with respect to the Dominican Republic:

"Mr. Merchant explained the feeling of the Department

of State that limited supplies of small arms and other

material should be made available for dissidents in-

side the Dominican Republic.

Mr. Parrott said that we

believe this can be managed

securely by CIA, and that

the plan would call for final transportation into the

country being provided by the dissidents themselves.

The Group approved the project." (Special Group Minutes, 1/12/61)

A. Memoranda

Underlying the Special Group Action

On January 12, 1961, Thomas Mann sent a memorandum to

Under Secretary Livingston Merchant. The memorandun, sent

through Joseph Scott, Merchant's Special Assistant, reported

on the disillusionment of Dominican dissidents with the United

States for its failure to furnish them with any tangible or

concrete assistance. Further, it reported:

Opposition elements have consistently asked us to supply

them with '"hardware"' of various types.

This has included

quantities of conventional arms and also, rather persis

tently, they have asked for some of the more exotic items

and devices which they associate with revolutationary

effort. (Mann to Merchant memo of 1/12/61)

* The members. of the Special Group were at the time: Livingston

Merchant, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs; Gordon

Gray, Advisor to the President for National Security Affairs;

John

N. Irwin, Deputy Secretary of Defense; and Allen Dulles,

Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

NH 50955

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- 12.

is mindi

Mann suggested

for Merchant's consideration and, if he

approved, for discussion by the Special Group, the provision

of token quantities of selected items desired by the dissidents.

Mann specifically mentioned small explosive devices which would

Place some "sabotage potential" in the hands of dissident

elements, but stated that there "would be no thought of

toppling the GODR (Government of Dominican Republic)

by any such minor measure." (Mann to Merchant memo, 1/12/61)

This memorandum was drafted on January 11 by Mann's Special

Assistant for CIA liaison, Frank Devine.

A covering

memorandum from Scott to Merchant, forwarding

Mann's memo, was apparently taken by Merchant to the Special

Group meeting.

Merchant's handwritten notations indicate that

the Special Group "agreed in terms of 'fom Mann's meno"

and that the Secretary of State was informed of that

decision by

late afternoon on January 12, 1961. (Scott

to Merchant memo, 1/12/61)

There is no evidence that any member of the Special Group,

other than Allen Dulles, knew that the dissidents had clearly

and repeatedly expressed a desire for arms and explosives to

be used by them in assassination efforts.*

While it is, of

course, possible that such information was passed orally to

some or all of the members of the Special Group, and perhaps

even discussed by them on January 12, 1961, there is no

*Various CIA cables, including those dealing with the sniper

rifles, indicate that copies were sent to the DCI, Allen Dulles.

D

y li

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documentary evidence of which the Committee is aware which

would establish this to be the case.

On January 19, 1961, the last day of the Eisenhower

administration, Consul General Dearborn was advised that

approval had been given for supplying arms and other material

to the Dominican dissidents (HQS to Station cable, 1/19/61).

Shortly thereafter, Dearborn informed Devine that the

dissidents were "delighted" about the decision to deliver

"exotic equipment." (Dearborn to Devine cable, 1/31/61)

V. January 20, 1961 - April 17, 1961

(the Kennedy Administration Through the Bay of Pigs)

on January 20; 1961, the Kennedy administration took

office. Three of the four members of the Special Group

(all

except Allen Dulles, retired.

Prior to the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion on April

17, 1961, a number of significant events occurred. These

events included meetings with Dominican dissidents in

which specific assassination plans were discussed, re-

quests by dissidents for explosive devices,

the passage by

U.S. officials of pistols and carbines to dissidents inside

the Dominican Republic, and the pouching to the Dominican

Republic of machine guns which had been requested by the

dissidents for use in connection with an assassination attempt.*

*As indicated in the post-Bay of Piys section, infra, permission

to pass those machine guns was denied and the guns were never

passed.

MN 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 397

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-14-

These

events are discussed below under subheading A.

Evidence reflecting the degree of knowledge of those events

possessed by

senior American officials is treated thereatter.

As used herein, "senior American officials"

means individuals

in the White House or

serving

as

members of the Special Group.

A.

Specific Events Indirectly Linking U.s.

to Dissidents' Assassination Plans

1. Assassination Discussione and Requests for Explosives

At meetings held with dissident leaders in New York City

on February 10 and 15, 1961, CIA officials were told repeatedly

by dissident leaders that "the key to the success of the plot

Ito overthrow the Trujillo regimel would be the assassination of

Trujillo."

(CIA memo for the record, 2/13/61) Among the requests

made of the CIA by dissident leaders were the following:

(a)

EX-FBI agents who would plan and execute

the death of Trujillo.

(b) Cameras and other items that could be used

to fire projectiles.

(c) A slow working chemical that could be rubbed on the palm

of one's hand and transferred to Trujillo in

a handshake, causing delayed lethal results.

(d) Silencers for rifles that could kill from a

distance of several miles. (Id.)

Other methods of assassinating Trujillo proposed by dissidents

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Pl AWa

- 15 -

at the February 10 or February 15 meetings included poisoning

Trujillo's food or medicines, ambushing his automobile, and

attacking him with firearms and grenades. (CIA memo for the

record, 2/13/61: 2/16/61)*

The dissidents' "latest plot", as described in the February

CIA memoranda, was said to involve the planting of a powerful

bomb, which could be detonated from a nearby electric device,

along the route of Trujillo's evening walk. (Id.)

On March 13, 1961, a dissident in the Dominican Republic

asked for fragmentation grenades "for use during the next week

or so." This request was communicated to CIA Headquarters

on March 14, 1961, and was followed the next day by an additional

request for 50 fragmentation grenades, 5 rapid-fire

weapons,

and 10 64

mm anti-tank rockets. This further request was also

passed on to CIA Headquarters. (Station to HQS cable, 3/15/61)

There is no evidence that any of these arms were supplied to

the dissidents.

The documentary record makes clear that Frank Devine at

the State Department was also advised of related developments

in a March 16, 1961, "picnic" letter from Dearborn who complained

that his spirits were in the doldrums because:

.. • the members of our club are now prepared

in their minds to have a picnic but do not have

the ingredients fox the salad.

Lately they have

developed a plan for the picnic, which just might

work if they could find the proper food. They

* There is no record that the CIA responded affirmatively to

any of these requests and the CIA officer who drafted the

February 13 memorandum stated the view that some of the ques-

tions raised by the dissidents did not require an ansver.

NH 30955

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NE

Des cram it

have asked us for a few sandwiches, hardly

more; and we are not prepared to make them

available.

Last week we were asked to furnish

three or four pineapples for. a party in the

near future, but I could remember nothing in my in-

structions that would have allowed me to contri-

bute this ingredient. Don't think I wasn't

tempted.

I have rather specific guidelines

to the effect that salad ingredients will be

delivered outside the picnic grounds and will

be brought to the

area by another club.

(Dearborn letter to Devine, 3/16/61)

After reviewing his "picnic" letter, together with the requests

in the March 14 and 15 cables discussed above, Dearborn con-

cluded during his testimony before the Committee that the

"pineapples" were probably the requested fragmentation

grenades and the restriction on delivering salad ingredients

outside of the picnic grounds was, almost certainly, neant to

refer to the requirements of the January 12 Special Group

order that arms be delivered outside the Dominican Republic.

(Dearborn 7/29, pp. 25-27)

2. The Passage of Pistols

a. Pouching to the Dominican Republic

In a March 15, 1961 cable, Chief of Station Owen reported

that Dearborn had asked for three .38 caliber pistols for issue

to several dissidents. In reply, Headquarters cabled: "Regret

no authorization exists to suspend pouch regulations against

shipment of arms" and indicated that their reply had been coor-

dinated with State. (HQS to Station cable, 3/17/61) The

Station Chief then asked Headquarters to seek the necessary

What

authorization and noted that at his last two posts, he had

wome

received pistols via the pouch for "worthy purposes" and,

they

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therefore, he knew

it could be done. (Station to Has cable,

3/21/61)

Two days later, Headquarters cabled that the pistols

and ammunition were being pouched. However, the Station

Chief was instructed not to advise Dearborn. (Hqs. to Station

cable, 3/24/61)*

b.

Reason for the CIA Instruction

Not to Tell Dearborn

Owen testified that he believed the "don't tell Dear-

born the pistol is being pouched" language simply meant that

the sending of firearms through the diplomatic pouch was not

something to be unnecessarily discussed. (Owen, pp. 78,79)

Dearborn said he never doubted the pouch was used, since he knew

Owen had no other means of receiving weapons. (Dearborn,

7/29, p. 33)

NH 30955

c. Were the Pistols Related to Assassination?

Dearborn testified that he had asked for a single pistol

for purposes completely unrelated to any assassination con-

sideration.. (Dearborn, 7/29, pp. 29-31) He said he had been

approached by a Dominican contact who lived in a remote area

and

was concerned for the safety of his family in the event

of political reprisals. Dearborn testified that he had believed

* The Inspector General's Report, issued in connection with

a review of these events, concludes that:

"There is no indication in the EMDEED operational files

that the pistols were actually pouched.

The request

for pistols appears to have been overtaken by a sub-

sequent request for submachine guns."

(I.G. Report, p. 60)

This conclusion is difficult to understand in light of the March

24, 1961, Headquarters to Station cable,

which provides:

"C. Pouching: revolvers and ammo requested TRUJ 0462

(in 20040) on 28 March. Do not advise (name Dearborn deleted)

DocId: 3212gbi Paterial being pouched., Explanation follows."

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## Page 402

ET

18

0v-06

16 11

the man's fears were well-founded and had promised to seek a

pistol.*

Although there is no direct evidence linking any of these

pistols to the assassination of Trujillo, a June 7, 1961, CIA

memorandum, unsigned and

with no attribution as to source,

states

that two of the three pistols were passed by Owen to

Lorenzo "Wimpy" Berry, a United States citizen who was in direct

contact with the action element of the dissident group. It

should also be noted that the assassination was apparently con-

ducted with almost complete reliance upon hand weapons. Whether

one or more of these .38 caliber Smith & Wesson pistols

eventually came into the hands of the assassins

and, if so, whether they were used in connection with the

assassination, remain open questions.

Both Dearborn and Owen testified that they regarded the Distols

as weapons for self-defense purposes and they never

considered them in any way connected with the then-current

assassination plans. (Dearborn 7/29, p.70; Owen, pp. 38,73)

However, none of the Headquarters cables inquired as to the

purpose for which the handguns were sought and Owen's cable

stated only that Dearborn wanted them for passage to dissidents.

(Station to HQS cable, 3/15/61) Indeed, the March 24, 1961,

*Dearborn is clear in his recollection that ne asked owen to

request only

one pistol. (Dearborn, 7/29, pp.30,31) Owen,

on the other hand, testified that if his cables

requested three

pistols for Dearborn then Dearborn must have asked for three

pistols. (Owen, p.72)

The pistols were, however, apparently sent in one package

(HUS to Station cables, 3/27/61 and 3/24/61) and Dearborn testi-

fied that, what he believed to be the one gun, came "wrapped

up" and that he passed it. .

(Dearborn, - 7/29, p.30)

NW 50955 DocId: Page Page 402

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## Page 403

cable advising that the pistols were being pouched is the

very cable which was sent in response to a request by the

dissidents for machine guns to be used in an assassination

effort which had been previously described to Headquarters.

As with the carbines discussed below, it appears that little,

if any, concern was expressed within the Agency over passing these

weapons to would-be assassins.

0 r

CIA?

3. Passing of the Carbines

a. Request by Owen and Dearborn and Approval by CIA

In a March 26, 1961 cable to CIA Headquarters, Owen asked

for permission to pass to the dissidents three 30 caliber Mi

carbines.

The guns had been left behind in the Consulate by

Navy personnel after the U.S. broke formal diplomatic relations

in Aujust 1960. Dearborn testified that he knew of and concurred

in the proposal to supply the carbines to the dissidents.

(Dearborn 7/29, PP. 42,43) On March 31, 1961 CIA Headquarters

cabled approval of the request to pass the carbines. (Hqs to

Station cable, 3/31/61)

b. Were

the Carbines Related to Assassination?

The carbines were passed to the action group contact, impy Berry, on April 7,

1961. (Station to HQS cable, 4/8/61) Eventually, they found

their way into the hands of one of the assassins, Antonio

de la Maza.

(Station to HQS cable, 4/26/61; I.G. Report

pp. 46, 49) Both Dearborn and Owen testified that the

carbines were at ail times viewea as st

strictly a token show

NH 50955 DocId: 32423539

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of support, indicating U.S, support of the dissidents' efforts

to overthrow Trujillo.

(Dearborn 7/29, Pp. 46-48; Owen p. 39)

C.

Failure to Disclose to State Department

Officials in Washington

There is no indication that the request or the passage

of the carbines was disclosed to State Department officials in

Washington until

several weeks after the passage. In fact, on

April 5, Headquarters requested its Station to ask Dearborn

not to conment in correspondence with State that the carbines

and ammunition were being passed to the dissidents. This cable

was sent while Owen was in Washington, and it indicated that

upon his return to the Dominican Republic, he would explain

the request.

The Station replied that Dearborn had not com-

mented on the carbines and ammunition in his correspondence

with State and he realized the

necessity not to do so. (Station

to HQS cable, 4/6/61)

Dearborn testified, however, that he believed, at the

time of his April 6 cable, that someone in the State De-

partment had been consulted in advance and had approved the

passage of the carbines (Dearborn 7/29, p. 44)

NH 50955 DocId: 32423539 Page 404

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## Page 405

"LL"

3. Requests For and Pouching of the Machine Guns

a. Owen Requests Machine Guns for Use

in Assassination

The Station Chief suggested that Headquarters consider

pouching an M3 machine gun on February 10, 1961 (Owen, pp. 63,64;

Station to HQS cable, 3/15/61). The request was raised again

in March but no action was taken. On March 20, 1961, Owen cabled

a dissident request for five M3 or comparable machine guns

specifying their wish that the arms be sent via the diplomatic

pouch or similar means. The dissidents were said to feel that

delivery by air drop or transfer at sea would overly-tax their

resources. (Station to HQS cable, 3/20/61)

The machine guns sought by the dissidents were clearly

identified, in Owen's cable, as being sought for use in connec-

tion with an attempt to assassinate Trujillo. This plan was to

kill Trujillo in the

apartment of his mistress and, according

to Owen's cable:

"4. To do they need five M3 or comparable machine-

guns. and 1500 rounds ammo for personal defense in

event fire

fight. Will use quiet weapons for basic

job."

(Id.)

In essence, CIA's response was that the timing for an

assassination was wrong. Owen was told that precipitious or

uncoordinated action could lead to the emergence of a leftist,

Castro-type regime and the "mere disposal of Trujillo may create

more problems than

solutions." It was Headquarters' position

that:

...we should attempt to avoid precipitous action

by the internal dissidents until opposition group

and HQS are better prepared to support /assassination/*

effect a change in the regime, and cope with the after-

math." (HQS to Station cable,

3/24/61)

* Word supplied by CIA in previously sanitized cable.

H# 50955 DocId: 32423539

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## Page 406

- 22-

The cable also stated that Headquarters was prepared

to deliver machine guns and

ammunition

to the dissidents

when

they developed a capability to received them, but that security

considerations precluded use of U.S. facilities as a carrier.*

Soon, thereafter, on April

6, 1961, while Owen was in Washington

for consultation with Headquarters, he reported on events

in

the Dominican Republic and

"especially on the insistence of the BHOlll (dissident]

leaders that they be provided with a limited number

of small arms for their own protection (specifi-

cally,

five

M3 caliber 45 SMG's)."

for

(CIA memo

the record, 4/11/61)

b.

Pouching the Machine Guns is Approved

by Bissell

Accordingly, on April 7, 1961, a Pouch Restriction Waiver

Request and Certification was submitted seeking permission to

pouch "four M3 machine guns and 240 rounds of ammunition on a

priority basis

for issuance to a small action group to be used

for self protection."

(Pouch Restriction Waiver Request 4/7/61)

N# 50955

DooId: 32423539

The request,

submitted on behalf of the Chief, Western

Hemisphere Division,

further provided:

"B.

A determination has been made that the issuance

of this eguipment to the action group is

desirable

if for no other reason than to assure this important

group's continued cooperation with and confidence in

this Agency's determination to live up to its earlier

to the group. These conmitments took

* This

same cable of March 24, 1961, Is the one which advised

that

the revolvers

and

ammunition were being pouched.

Page sodi!

US X

cassiolat

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## Page 407

TOP SECREA

the form of advising the group in January

1961 that we would provide limited arms

and assistance to them provided they develop.

the capability to receive it.

Operational

circumstances have prevented this group from

developing the assets capable of receiving

the above equipment through normal clandestine

channels such as air drops or sea infiltra-

tion."

The Waiver Request was approved by Richard Bissell, as Deputy

Director (Plans), on April 10, 1961. (Id.)

The machine guns were pouched to the Dominican Republic and

were received by the station on April 19, 1961.* (I.G. Report,

p. 42; Station to Headquarters cable 4/19/61).

On April 10, Walter Elder, Assistant to the Director, had issued

a memorandum which stated:

"Mr. Dulles wants no action on drops of leaflets

or arms in the Dominican Republic taken without

his approval."

(Elder memorandum of 4/10/61).

The

Elder memorandum suggests that Dulles did not know that an

air drop of arms

was regarded. as unfeasible and that pouching

had been approved.

B. Knowleage of Senior American Officials (pre-Bay of Pigs)

On February 14, 1961, prior to the passage of weapons,

but a month

after the generalized approval of the passage

of arms by the prior administration, a meeting of

the Special Group was held with Messis. McNamara, Gilpatric,

Bowles, Bundy, Dulles, Bissell, and General Cabell in attendance.

* Permission to pass the machine guns was never obtained and the guns

never passed into the hands of the dissidents. The matter is discussed

in detail beginning at page ;

*i Elder testitied that this note, sent the weekend before the Bay of Pigs

invasion of Cuba, was intended to make sure that there were no unusual

planes shot down or any unnecessary noise in the Dominican Republic"

prior to the Cuba invasion. (Elder, p. 51)

HH 50955

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TON.

-212

visit

Lici

The minutes state that:

"Mr. Dulles, assisted by Mr. Bissell, then summarized

for the benefit of the new members of the Special

Group the specific actions taken by the predecessor

group during the past year, and also a list of signi

Ilcant projects which antedate the beginning of 1960

and which

of 2/14/61)

it is planned to continue." (Special Group Minutes

In the course of the discussion, the following point,

among

others, was made:

"(a) Dominican Bepublic -- Mr. Bundy asked that a shagett?

memorandum be prepared for higher authority on the

subject of what plans can be made for a successor

That keen

The request attributed to Bundy suggests that the Domini-

can Republic had been one of the matters on which Dulles and

Bissell briefed the new members.

What is unclear from the February 14 minutes (just as

it is unclear from the January 12 minutes) is the degree to

which the Special Group was informed concerning the means by

which the dissidents planned to accomplish the overthrow of

the Trujillo regime. Specifically, it is not known if

the new members of the Special Group were told that the

dissident group had expressed the desire to assassinate

Trujillo.

Nor is it known

if the Special Group was

inhu

dows

The

H# 50955 DocId: 32423539

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## Page 409

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-25--

advised that the State

Department representative in the

Dominican Republic had made the assessment that the Dominican

government could not be overthrown without the assassination

of Trujillo.

Bissell

testified that he had no clear recollection

of the details of the February 14 briefing and he was

unable

to say whether or not

the method of overthrow to be attempted

by the dissidents was discussed. (Bissell, 1/22, PP. 101, 102)

Robert McNamara, one of the new members of the Special Group

in attendance for the briefing, has no recollection as to the

specificity in which the Dominican Republic was discussed at the

February 14 meeting. He does not recall any mention by either

Dulles or Bissell of dissident plans to assassinate trujilio.

(McNamara atfidavit).

February Memoranda

The Secretary of State sent the President a memorandum

on February 15, 1961, in response to a request concerning pro-

gress to assure an orderly takeover "should Frujillo fall."

The memorandum advised that:

"Our representatives in the Dominican Republic

have, at considerable risk to those involved,

established contacts with numerous

leaders of the

underground opposition

• /and/. . . the CIA

has recently been authorized to arrange for delivery

to them outside the Dominican Republic of small arms

and sabotage equipment.

This reference to recent authorization for delivery of

arms indicates that Secretary Rusk had received some briefing

concerning events in the Dominican Republic and the January 1961

50101:

NY 50955 DocId: 32423539 Page

409

iF

ther

Kne's

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## Page 410

550.0

Special Group decision to provide arms to anti-Trujillo

elements.

Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs,

Thomas Mann; Deputy Assistant Secretary William Coerr; and

Special Assistant Frank Devine continued in their respective

positions throughout the transition period. The Comnittee has

been furnished no documents indicating that Secretary Rusk or

Under Secretary Bowles were specifically advised as to the How

intentions of the Dominican dissidents to kill Trujillo; intentions

of which the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs certainly

had knowledge. Indeed, Secretary Rusk testified that he was not

personally so advised. (Rusk, 7/10, pp. 41,42)

On February 17, 1961, Richard Bissell sent a briefing paper

on the Dominican Republic to McGeorge Bundy, President Kennedy's

National Security Advisor. The paper made note of the out-

standing Special Group approval for the provision of arms and

equipment to Dominican dissidents and stated that the dissidents

had been informed that the U.S. was prepared to provide such

arms and equipment as soon as they developed the capability to

receive them.

portin someone

AIK

The briefing paper also indicated that

dissident leaders

hat

had informed CIA of "their plan of action which they felt could ther

plan

be implemented if they were provided with arms for 300 men,

explosives, and remote control detonation devices." Various

witnesses

have testified, however, that supplying arms for 300

men would, standing alone, indicate a "non-targeted" use for the

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50 L

arms

a paramilitary or revolutionary implementation as

opposed to a specifically targeted assassination usel. (Bissell,

7/29, p. 80) ,

Concerning the briefing paper, Bissell testified that:

it is perfectly clear that I was aware at the

time

of the memorandum to Mr. Bundy that these

dissident groups were, and had for a long time,

been hoping

they

could accomplish the assassination

of Trujillo.

As a matter of fact, the requests since

some seven or eight months earlier was a perfectly

clear indication of that, so that fact was not new

knowledge."

(Bissell 7/22, p.102)

When asked why the memorandun did not include the fact that

the dissidents intended the assassination of Trujillo, Bissell

replied:

"I cannot tell you, Mr. Chairman. I do not

remember what considerations moved me.

I don't

know whether it was because this was common

Knowledge and it seemed to me unnecessary to

Buade

ask

include it, or as you are implying, there was

an clement of concealment here. I would be very

surprised if it were the latter, in this case."

(Bissell, 7/22, P.101)

In response to questions concerning the lack of information

in the February 17, 1961 briefing paper concerning the uses to

which the requested arms might likely be put by the dissidents,

Bissell stated:

•. • I would say that the Agency's failure,

if there be a failure here was (not) (sic) to

state

in writing that the plans of the dissidents

would include assassination attempts."

(Bissell, 7/22, P.99)

Bissell's briefing paper for Bundy concluded with the

assessment that a

violent clash might soon occur between Trujillo

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+28-112

160 d

and the internal opposition, "which will end either with the

liquidation of Trujillo and his cohorts or with a complete

roll up of the internal opposition." In this regard, the fear

was expressed that existing

schedules for the delivery of

weapons to the internal opposition might not be sufficientlu

timely, and it was therefore recommended that consideration be

given to caching the requested arms and other materials.

(Bissell to Bundy memo, 2/17/61)

Thus, by the middle of february 1961, the senior

members of the new administration, and in view of the "for

higher authority" nature of Bundy's request, presumably frequene

President Kennedy himself, were aware of the outstanding Special

Group approval for the passage of arms and other materials to

opposition elements within the Dominican Republic. There was

no modification or recision of the "inherited" Special Group

approval and it would seem fair, therefore, to regard the

approval as having been at least acquiesced in by the new

administration.

During March and early April 1961, operational levels

within both the CIA and the State Department learned of in-

creasingly detailed plans by the dissidents to

assassinate

Trujillo. There is no evidence that this information was

true

passed to the White House or to any member of the Special Group,

tial

/ 2l

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HW 50955

7778

except Allen Dulles.*

Similarly, there is no evidence that

the passage of the pistols or the carbines or the pouching

of the machine guns to the Dominican Republic was disclosed

to anyone outside of the CIA during this period.**

VI.

Aay 2?195 Thr-May Tu 110 Assassination)

Following the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion, attempts

were made by State and CIA representatives in the Dominican

Republic to dissuade the dissidents from a precipitous assassina-

tion attempt. These efforts to halt the assassination of Trujillo

were the result of instructions from CIA Headquarters and were

prompted by concern over filling the power vacuun which would

result from Trujillo's death.

The machine guns arrived in the Dominican Republic but

permission to pass them to the dissidents was never given and

the guns never left the Consulate.

Dearborn returned to Washington for consultation and a

contingency plan for the Dominican Republic was drafted.

Two days before Trujillo's assassination, Dearborn received

a cable of instructions and guidance from President Kennedy.

The cable advised that the U.S. must not run the risk of associ-

ation with political assassination, since the U.S., as a matter

of general policy, could not condone assassination. The cable

* Copies of CiA cables, including the March 20, 1961 cable

describing the plan to assassinate Trujillo in the apartment

of his mistress

were apparently sent to the office

of the Director of Central Intelligence.

** Although a copy of the CIA cable advising that the pistols

were being pouched was sent to the Director's office, Dulles

apparently did not receive copies of the cables approving

passage of the carbines or pouching of the machine guns.

DocId: 32423539 Page 413

How

does

this

Square

MORALIT.

Disclornes

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- 30

further advised Dearborn to continue to hold open offers of

material

assistance to the dissidents and to advise them of

U.s. support for them if they were successful in overthrowing

the Trujillo government.. The cable also reconfirmed the

decision not to pass the machine guns.

A. Decision Not to Pass the Machine Guns and Unsuccess-

ful U.5. Attempt to Stop Assassination Effort

By April 17, 1961, the Bay of Pigs invasion had

/operation was a failedT.. As a result, there developed a general

realization that precipitous action should be avoided in the

• Dominican Republic until Washington was able to give further

consideration to the consequences of a Trujillo overthrow and

the power vacuum which would be created. (Bissell, 6/11,

p.113) A cable from leadquarters to the Station, on April 17,

1961, advised that it was

most important that the machine

guns

not be passed without additional Headquarters approval.

The machine guns arrived in the Dominican Pepublic on April

• 19, 1961, and Headquarters was so advised. The earlier ad-

monition that the machine guns should be held in Station custody

until further notice was repeated in a second cable from llead-

quarters, sent April 20, 1961. This decision was said to have

been "based on judgment that filling a vacuum created by assas-

sination now bigger question than ever view unsettled conditions

in Caribbean area." (IIQs. to Station cable, 4/20/61)

The dissidents continued to press for the release of the

nachine guns and their requests were passed on to Headyuarters

Colordin

ist list sick?

HW 50955

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## Page 415

in

cables from Dearborn and Uwen.

(Station to HUS cables

4/25/61) On April 25, 1961, Owen advised Headquarters that

Wimpy Berry had informed him that Antonio de la Maza was

going

to attempt the assassination between April 29 and May 2.

Owen also reported that this attempt would use the three

carbines passed from the American Consulate, together with

whatever else was available. (Id.)

In response to the April 26 cable, Headquarters restated

that there

was no approval to pass any additional arms to the

dissidents and requested Owen to advise the dissidents that the

United States was simply not prepared at that time to cope with

the aftermath of the assassination. (See C/S comments,

Station to HUS cable, 4/27/61). The following day, April 27,

1961, Owen replied that, based upon further discussions with

the dissidents, "We doubt statement U.s. government not now

prepared to cope with aftermath will dissuade them from

attempt." (Station to HUS cable, 4/27/61)

Dearborn recalls receiving instructions that

an effort be made to turn off the assassination attempt and

testified that

efforts to carry out the instructions were

unsuccessful.

In effect, the dissidents informed him that

this was their affair and it could not be turned off to suit

the convenience of the U.s. government.

(Dearborn, 7/29, p.52)

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32

Hurr

On April 30, 1961, Dearborn advised Headquarters that

the dissidents had reported to him the assassination attempt

was going to take place during the first week of May. The

action group

was

reported to have in its possession three carbines,

four to six 12-gauge shotguns and other small arms. Although

they reportedly still wanted the machine guns, Dearborn advised

Headquarters that the group was going to go ahead with what they

had, whether the U.S. wanted them to or not. (Station to HQS

cable, 4/30/61)

Dearborn's cable set forth the argument of the action

group that, since the u

.S. had already assisted the group to

some extent and was therefore implicated, the additional assistance

of releasing the machine guns would not change the basic re-

lationship.

The cable concluded:

'wing to far-reaching political implications

involved in release or non release of re-

quested items, Headquarters may wish discuss fore-

going with State Department.

" (Id.)

B. Further Consideration of Passing Machine Guns

In reponse, a cable was drafted at CIA Headquarters authori-

zing passage of the machine guns. The cable which was sent

to Allen

Dulles, with Bissell's recommendation for its dispatch,

provided:

"Since it appears that opposition group has

committed itself to action with or without

NH 50955

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- 33-

additional support, coupled with fact ref.

C items

[the carbines] already made available

to them for personal defense; station authori-

zed pass ref. A items [the machine guns) to

opposition member for their additional pro-

tection on their proposed

endeavor." (Draft of HOS

to Station cable, 5/2/61) .

The cable was never sent.

In his testimony before the Committee, Bissell characteri-

zed his reasoning for recommending release of the machine guns

as :

• having made already a considerable

investment in this dissident group and its

plans that we might as well make the addi-

tional investment."

(Bissell, 7/22, p.127)

NAME

The following day, May 3, 1961, Ray Herbert,

Deputy Chief

of the western Hemisphere Division of CIA, who frequently acted

as liaison with the State Department in matters concerning

covert operations in the Dominican Republic, met with Adolph

Berle, Chairman of the State Department's Interagency Task Force

on Latin America.

A Berle memorandum of the meeting states that Herbert

informed Berle that a local yroup in the Dominican Republic

wished to overthrow Trujillo and sought arms for that purpose.

The memorandum continued:

"On cross examination it developed that the

real plan was to assassinate Trujillo and they

wanted guns for that purpose.

flerbert wanted

to know what the policy should be.

"I told him I could not care less for Trujillo

and that this was the general sentiment.

But

we did not wish to have any thing

to do with any

assassination plots anywhere, any time. Herbert

said he felt the same way."

(Berle, Meno of

Conversation, 5/3/61)

HW 50955 DocId:32423539 Page 417

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## Page 418

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Copies of Berle's memorandum were sent to Wymberly Coerr;

the Acting Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs,

and to Special Assistant Frank Devine.

Both Herbert and Devine, who had been in almost daily.

contact with each other since August of 1960, had been advised

of the assassination plans of the dissident group.

In fact,

Herbert, along with Bissell, had signed off on the proposed

cable of May 2, releasing the machine guns for passage.

C. Special Group Meetings of May 4 and May 18, 1961

On the day following the Berle-llerbert meeting, the

Special Group net and, according to the minutes:

"The DCI referred to recent reports of a new

anti-trujillo plot.

He said we never know if

one of these is going to work or not, and aslied

what is the status of contingency planning should Wrat

• the plot come off. Mr. Bundy said that this point

thes

is covered in the Cuba paper which will be discussed

at a high level in the very near future." (Special

Group Minutes, 5/4/61)

Once ajain, the cryptic reporting of Special Group Minutes

makes subsequent analysis as to the scope of matters discussed

speculative. It is not known to what extent and in what detail

Allen Dulles referred to "recent reports" of ainew anti-Trujillo

plot. Certainly, the most recent report of such a plot was

Dearborn's April 30 cable -- disclosing an imminent assassination

attempt potentially utilizing U.s.-supplied weapons.

On May 18, 1961, the Special Group again considered the

situation in the Dominican Republic and, according to the

why.

didn't

they

tell

Berle

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## Page 419

~35

minutes:

" Cabell (Deputy DCI] noted that the

internal dissidents were pressing for the

release to them of certain small arms now in

U.S. hands in the Dominican Republic.

He

inquired whether the feeling of the

Group remained that these arms

passed contre no

should not be

The members showed no inclination to

take a contrary position at this time.

(Emphasis supplied) (Special Group Minutes,

5/18/61)

D. Final Requests by Dissidents for Machine Guns

On May 16, 1961, Dearborn cabled the State Department,

attention Acting Assistant Secretary Coert, with an urgent

request from the dissidents for the machine guns. The cable

advised that the assassination attenpt was scheduled for the

night of May 16 and that, while the chances of success were

80 percent, provision of the machine guns would reduce the

possibility of failure. The dissidents reportedly stressed

to Dearborn that if the effort failed, due to U.S. refusal to

supply the machine guns, the U.s. would be held responsible

and would never be forgiven. Dearborn reported that he had

informed the dissidents that, based on his recent conversations

in Washington, he was reasonably certain that authorization

could not be obtained for handing over machine guns. (Dearborn

to State cable, 5/16/61)

A return

cable from the State Department to Dearborn, sent

the same day, confirmed Dearborn's judgment. It instructed him

* there was no meeting of the Special Group at which the Domini-

can Republic was discussed between May 4 and May 18. the language

attributed to General Cabell as to whether the feeliny of the

Group remained not to pass the arms, tends

to suggest that the

question of passing these arms must have been raised prior to

the May 18 Group meeting. perhaps at the May 1, 1961 meeting.

NH 50955 DocId: 32423539 Page 419

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## Page 420

- 36

to continue to take the same line until he received contrary

instructions which

clearly indicated they had been cleared in

advance by the State Department itself. This cable from State was

approved by Under Secretary Bowles. (Department to Dearborn, 5/16/61)

. Ray Herbert referred to Dearborn's May 16 request in a

memorandum he sent to Devine on the same date and asked to be

advised

as to the Department's policy concerning passage of

the machine guns. Herbert noted that when this request was

last taken to the Department, Berle made the decision that the

weapons not be passed. (Memo to ARA FrOM CIA, 5/16/61)

Devine responded to Herbert's memorandum on the same day,

advising Herbert that the Department's policy continued to be

negative on the matter of passing the machine guns."

Herbert's

attention was directed to the January 12, 1961 Special Group

limitation concerning the passage of arms outside of the

Dominican Republic. A copy of Devine's memorandum to Herbert

was forwarded to the Office of the Under Secretary of State,

to the attention of his personal assistant, Joseph Scott.

(Dèvine to herbert memo, 5/16/61)

E. Dearborn in Washington for Consultation --

Drafting of Contingency Plans

At a meeting of the National Security Council on May 5, 1961,

the question of U.S. policy toward the Dominican Republic was

considered and it was:

"Agreed that the Task Force on Cuba would

prepare promptly both emergency and long-

range plans for anti-communist intervention

in the event of crises in liaiti or the

By May 27, 1961 Dearborn was advising the State Department that

the roup was no longer requesting the arms and had accepted the

fact that it must make do with what it had. (Dearborn to State

NN 50955 Doctabla735392 78/age) 420

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## Page 421

37 -

Dominican Republic.

Noted the President's

view that the United States should not

initiate the overthrow of Trujillo before

we knew what government would succeed him,

and that any action against Trujillo should

be multilateral."

(Record

of Actions bv

National

Security Council, 5/5/61)

(Approved by the President, 5/16/61)

Although the precise dates are uncertain, Dearborn was

recalled to Washington to participate in drafting of these

contingency plans and recommendations. Dearborn was in Washing-

ton at least from May 10 through May 13, 1961.

While in Washington, Dearborn met with State

Department personnel and with Richard Goodwin and Arthur

Schlesinger of the White House staff. When testifying before

the Committee, he was unable to recall the substance of

his discussions with Goodwin and Schlesinger, aside from his

general assumption that the current situation in the Dominican

Republic was discussed. lie aid not recall any discussion with

Goodwin or Schlesinger concerning arms, either those which had

been passed to the dissidents or those which were being sought.

(Dearborn, 7/29, PD. 58-61) Dearborn left the meeting at the

White House, however, with the firm impression that Goodwin nad been

reviewing cable traffic between Washington and the Dominican

Republic and was very familiar with events as they then stood.

(Dearborn, 7/29, p.62)

FAR

HW 50955

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- 38

•On May 11, 1961, Dearborn prepared a two-page draft

document which set forth ways in which the U.s. could overtly

aid and encourage the opposition to Trujillo. The draft noted

that means of stepping up the covert program were considered

in separate

papers. (Dearborn draft docunent of May 11, 1961)

This Dearborn draft of May 11, 1961, was apparently used as a

basis for portions of the "Dominican Republic - Contingency

Paper" discussed below.

Two documents entitled, 'Program of Covert Action for the

Dominican Republic" were provided to the Comnittee staff from

State

Department files. Each appears to be a draft of the

covert activities paper described in Dearborn's May 11, 1961

memorandum. One draft recommended an expanded U.S. offer to

deliver small explosive devices and arms. (Document indicating

it was attached to "Dominican Republic -- Contingency," dated

5/12/61 and bearing Nos. 306-308). The other draft is very

similar except that it concludes that delivery of arms within

the Dominican Republic to members of the underground is not

recommended. (Document from State Dept. files bearing No. 310) •

Attached to the second draft was a one-page document which

Frank Devine believes he wrote. It listed eight numbered

points including the following:

"1. The USG

"2.

should not lend itself to direct h

political assassination.

US

moral posture can ill afford further

tarnishing in the eyes of the world.

TOM:

00069

NH 50955 DocId: 32423539

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this

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F

= 39

Who san

th

"3.

We would be encouraging the action, supplying

the weapons, effecting the delivery, and then

turning over only the final execution to

"4.

(unskilled) local triggermen.

So far we have seen no real evidence of action

capability. Should we entrust ourselves and

our reputation to this extent in the absence

thereof?

"7. Can we afford a precedent which may convince

the world that our diplomatic pouches are used

to deliver assassination weapons?" (Document

from

State Department files bearing No. 313)

The other points raised in document No. 313 related to the

likelihood that any such involvement by the U.s. would ultimately

be revealed.

On May 15, 1961, Acting Assistant Secretary Coerr sent to

Under Secretary Bowles a document entitled "Covert Action Pro-

grams Authorized With Respect to the Dominican Republic". That

document outlined the existing Special Group approvals for covert

assistance to Dominican dissidents and, while making no recommen-

dation as to further policy, suygested that the Special Group

review the outstanding approvals and communicate to interested

agencies the status of such authorizations. (State Dept. document

from Coert to Bowles, 5/15/61)

During this period a document dated May 13, 1961, was

F:

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-. 40 - 1

prepared at the reguest of Richard Goodwin

and was thereafter

circulated within the State Department.

This document,

entitled

"Program of Covert Action for the Dominican Republic"

reported:

"CIA has had in the

direct custody of its Station

in Ciudad Trujillo, a very limited supply of

weapons and grenades.

In response to the urgent

requestsfrom the internal opposition leaders for

personal defense weapons attendant to their.

projected efforts to neutralize TRUJILLO, three.

(3) 38 Cal revolvers and three (3) carbines with

accompanying ammunition have been passed by secure

means to the opposition.

The recipients have

repeatedly requested

additional armed support."

This memorandum is the first direct evidence of disclosure to

anyone on the white House staff of the fact that arms had been

passed to dissidents in the Dominican Republic.

The original ribbon copy of the memorandum has the above

quoted material circled in pencil and the word

"neutralize"

is underscored. Goodwin testified before the Conmittee that

he circled the above paragraph when first reading the memorandum

because the information concerning passage of the arms was new

to him and struck him

as significant. (Goodwin 7/18, pp. 48,49)

Under the heading of "Possible Covert Actions Which Require

Additional Authorization," the memorandum to Goodwin indicated

that the CIA had a supply of four 45 caliber machine guns and

a small number of grenades currently in the direct custody of

the Station in Ciudad Trujillo and that a secure means of passing

these weapons to the internal opposition "for their use in

* See Scott to Bowles memorandum of May 19, 1961, enclosing copy

of Goodwin memorandum.

NN 50955 DocId: 32423539 Page 1424

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## Page 425

41

personal defense

attendant to their projected efforts to re

move

Trujillo" could be developed by the Station.

• 2=

The memo-

randum made no recommendation to approve or disapprove passage

of these weapons.. (Id.)

On May 15, 1961, Bundy forwarded to Goodwin another

memorandum. This one, entitled "The Current Situation in and

Contingency Plans for the Dominican Republic," had been received

by Bundy from

the State Department. Attached was an under-

lying document which began:

"Recent reports indicate that the internal

Dominican dissidents are becoming increasingly

let near lesse

determined to oust Trunillo by any means, and

their plans in this regard are well advanced."

The May 15 memorandum stressed that it was highly desirable

for the U.S. to be identified with and to support the elements

seeking

to overthrow Trujillo. The attachment

recommended that Consul General Dearborn inform the dissidents

that if they succeed "at their own initiative and on their own

responsibility in forming an acceptable provisional government

they can be assured that any reasonable request for assistance

from the U.S. will be promptly and favorably answered." (Documents

from State Dept. files

bearing NOS. 279-286).

F. Draits Leading to and Final Cable of May 29, 1961

A copy of Dearborn's cable of May 16, 1961, requesting

urgent State Department guidance, was forwarded to Richard

Goodwin. At the specific request of Goodwin,

the State Department replied to Dearborn on May 17,

MODICT

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and advised him to keep in mind the President's view, as

expressed at the May 5 National Security Council Meeting, that

before knowing what government would succeed him.

ment to Dearborn, 5/17/61)

Dearborn responded on May 21, 1961, pointing out that

for over a year State Department representatives in the

Dominican Republic had been nurturing the effort

NoT

moral

OpposiTi

to overthrow Trujillo and had assisted the dissidents in

numerous ways, all of which were known to the Department. It

was, Dearborn stated, "too late to consider whether United

States will initiate overthrow of Trujillo." Dearborn invited

further guidance from State.

In response to Dearborn's request for guidance, the State

Department drafted a reply on May 24. The draft discussed a

conflict between two objectives:

" (1)

To be so associated with removal Trujillo

regime as to derive credit among DR dissidents

and liberal elements throughout Latin America;

" (2)

To disassociate US from any obvious inter-

vention in Dominican Republic and even more so

from any political assassination which might

occur."

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TOP SECRET

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## Page 427

п...

165-43- 6181

It was

said to be the Department's considered opinion that

"former objective cannot, repeat not, easily override latter."

(State Dept. to Dearborn cable, 5/24/61 - not sent)

This State Department draft was forwarded to under Secretary

Bowles with the connent that Goodwin considered it "too negative"

and that he would try his hand on a draft "for Bundy to present

tonorrow norning." (Memo from Achilles to Bowles, 5/24/01)

A May 26, 1961, memorandum from Bowles to Bundy begins:

"Following up on our discussion of the Dominican

Republic at yesterday's meeting of the Special

GrOUP, I

am forwarding you a draft telegram which

we would like to send to Henry Dearborn, our Consul

General in Cludad Trujillo, supplementing the

quidance he will be receiving on the recently

approved contingency plans."

Minutes of the Special Group meeting on May 25, 1961 do not,

however, reflect

any discussion of the Dominican Republic.

If; as Bowles' menorandum suggests, a discussion concerning

the Dominican Republic did occur at the May 25 meeting, it is

not known what the discussion involved or what decisions,

if any, were made.

Richard Goodwin personally prepared alternate drafts to

the proposed State Department cable to Dearborn. Goodwin testi-

fied that it was his intent in revising the cable to communicate

to Dearborn, President Kennedy's personal belief that the United

States:

derived

... didn't want to do anything that would

involve us further, the United States further,

in any effort to assassinate Trujillo."

(Goodwin, 7/10, p.32)

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## Page 428

004

At the same time, Goodwin's draft raised the issue of

further covert action and transfer of arms to the dissidents

and advised Dearborn to hold out the arms as being available

to the dissidents pending their ability to receive them.

accondem

tota intent of the cable as revised by

Goodwin, (1) to express the desire to remain in the good graces

of the dissidents who, it was believed, would constitute the

new government following Trujillo's assassination, and (2)

to avoid any

action which might further involve the United

States in the anticipated

assassination. This dual purpose

is clearly evident in the cable which advised:

... we must not run risk of U.S. association

with political assassination, since U.S. as matter

of general policy cannot condone assassination.

This last principal is overriding and must prevall

in doubtful situation." (Emphasis added)

* **

"Continue to inform dissident elements of u.s.

support for their position."

onbital

In

what

wags

According to Goodwin, the underscored material was inserted in

the cable at the specific direction of President Kennedy.

more on the gon ont

(Goodwin, 7/10, pP. 22, 23).

With respect to the four machine guns which were in the

v.

special

Consulate and which had been repeatedly requested by the

dissidents, the cable advised Dearborn that the U.S. was unable

to transfer these arms to the dissidents. Dearborn was

instructed to:

"Tell them that this is because of our suspicion

that method of transfer may be unsafe. In actual

HW 50955

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-: 45.-

1 11

fact, we feel that the transfer of arms would

serve very little purpose and expose the United

States to great danger of association with

assassination attempt."

The cable, as revised by Goodwin and approved by President

Kennedy, was sent to Dearborn on MaY 29, 1961.

(State Dept.

to Dearborn cable, 5/29/61)

VII: May 30, 1961 and Immediately Thereafter :

A. Trujillo Assassinated

Late in the evening of May 30, 1961, Trujillo was ambusned

and assassinated near San Cristobal, Dominican Republic. The

assassination closely paralleled the plan disclosed by the

action group to American representatives in the Dominican Republic

and passed on to officials in Washington at both the CIA and

the State Department. (Dearborn cable to State, 5/30/61) The

assassination was conducted by members of the action group, to

whom the American carbines had been passed, and such sketchy

information as is available indicates that one or more of the

carbines were in the possession of the assassination group when

Trujillo was killed. (I. G. Report, pp. 60-61). This evidence indicate:

however, that the actual assassination was accomplished by

handguns and

shotguns.

(I.G. Report, p.61)

B. Cables to Washington

After receiving the May 29 cable from Washington, both Consul

General Dearborn and Station Chief Owen sent replies. According

to Dearborn's testimony, he did not regard the May 29 cable

a change in U.S. policy concerning support for assassinations.

(Dearborn 7/29/75, p. 74) .

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- 46

He interpreted the May 29 cable as saying:

19

...we don't care if the Dominicans assassinate

Trujillo, that is all right. But we don't want

anything

to pin this on us, because we aren't

doing it, it is the Dominicans who are doing

it:"

(Dearborn, 7/29, p. 104)

Dearborn testified that this accorded with what he said had

always been his personal belief; thae the U.S. should not be

involved in an assassination and that if an assassination

occurred it would be strictly a Dominican affair. (Dearborn

7/29, pp. 100, 101)

In contrast the CIA Station Chief, Owen, did regard the

cable as manifesting a change in U.S. policy, particularly on

the questionof supplying arms. (Owen' p. 120) He believed the

May 29 cable was the final word in U.S. policy on this matter

and consequently felt that the government had

retreated from

its

prior position, of offering material support to the dissi-

dents, and had adopted a new position of withholding such sunport.

Owen 's

responsive cable to Headquarters stated:

"HQS aware extent to which U.S. government already

associated

assassination.

If we are to at least

cover up tracks, CIA personnel directly involved in

assassination preparation must be withdrawn."

(Station to HQS cable, 5/30/61)

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## Page 431

Immediately following the assassination, all CIA

personnel in the Dominican Republic were removed from the

country and within a few days Consul General Dearborn was

back in Washington: The State Department cabled the CIA station

in the Dominican Republic to destroy all records concerning

contacts

with dissidents and any related matters, except not to

destroy the contingency plans or the May 29, 1961 cable to Dear-

born. (HQS to Station cable, 5/31/61.

C. Immediate Post-Assassination Period

The U.S. Consulate in the Dominican Republic was quick

to dispatch its early reports that Trujillo had been assassinated,

and the U.S. communications network transmitted the report to

President Kennedy in Paris. The President's Press Secretary,

• Pierre Salinger, made the first public announcement of the

assassination, preceeding by several hours release of the news

in the Dominican Republic. Secretary of State Rusk testified

that when he learned of Salinger's announcement he was most con-

cerned. Rusk said that Trujillo's son Ramfis was also in Paris

and he was afraid that Ramfis, upon first learning of his

father's death from the press

secretary to the President of the

U.S., might try to retaliate against President Kennedy.

(Rusk,

32, 33.)

what

WAt

Tisreaction

BAN

NH 50955 DocId: 32123539 Page 431

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## Page 432

PANTA

SCHNEIDER REPORT

Summary

II.

The President's Initial General Instruction

and Background

A. September 15 White House Meeting

B.

Background:

Tracks I and II

C. CIA Views of Difficulty of Project

III. CIA's Implementation of Track II

A.

Evolution of CIA Strategy

1. The "Constitutional Coup" Approach

2. Military

• Solution

B. The Chile Task Force

C. The Use of the Army Attache and Interagency

Relations

D. The False Flag Base

E. Chief of Station

IV. CIA Efforts to Promote a Coup

A. The Chilean Conspirators

B. Contacts Prior to October 15

C. October 15 Decision

D. Coup Planning and Attempts After October 15

E. The Killing of General Schneider

F. Post October 22 Events

V. CIA/White House Communication During Track II

A. September

B. October

C. December

D. Did Track II End?

Page

1

6

6

8

15

17

17

17

18

19

20

26

27

29

29

30

34

36

39

41

43

45

46

54

54

HW

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## Page 433

A TAM

„SCHNEIDER REPORT

÷ 17

I. Summary

On September 4, 1970, DI. Salvador Allende Gossens won a plurality

in Chile's Presidential election.*

Since no candidate had received

a

majority of the popular vote, the Chilean constitution required that

a joint session of its Congress

decide between the first

and second place

finishers. This constitutional requirement had, in the past, been pro-

forma.

The Congress had

always selected the candidate who received

highest popular

vote.

The date set for the Congressional joint session

was October 24, 1970.

On September 15, 1970, President Richard Nixon informed CIA Director

Richard Helms that an Allende regime in Chile would not be acceptable to

the United States.

The CIA was instructed by President Nixon to play a

direct role in organizing a military coup d'etat in Chile to prevent

Allende's accession to the presidency.

+10.20.n

The Agency 'was

take this action

without coordination with the Departments of State or Defense and without

informing the U.S. Ambassador in Chile. While coup possibilities in

general

and other

means of seeking to prevent Allende's accession to

power

were explored by the 40 Committee throughout this period, the 40

Committee was never informed of this direct CIA role. Nor did it ever

approve that role.

The only institution to which the Agency was to re-

port, both

for informational and approval purposes, was the White House.

1/6x1

hecke

---

*Dr. Allende, a long-time Senator and founder of the Socialist Party in

Chile, was a candidate of Popular Unity Coalition.

The Coalition was made

up of Communists, Socialists, Social Democrats, Radicals, and dissident

Christian Democrats.

Allende was a selt-proclaimed Marxist and was making

his fourth try for the presidency. His opponents were Radomire Tomic Romero,

candidate of the ruling Christian Democratic Party, and Jorge. Alessandri

Rodriquez, candidate of the right-wing National Party.

Dr. Allende won

36.3% of the popular vote; Alessandri was second

with 35.3% of the vote.

Dr. Allende's margin of victory was 39,000 votes. out of a total of 3 mil-

lion votes cast in the election. The incumbent President, Eduardo Frei

Montalvo, a Christian Democrat, was ineligible for re-election.

Chilean

law prohibits Presidents from succeeding themselves.

too

much

Til:

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In practice, this meant that the CIA was to keep the President's Assis-

tant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, informed of its

activities.

Between October 5 and October 20, 1970, the CIA made 21 contacts

with key military

and Carabinero (police) officials in Chile. Those

Chileans who were inclined to stage a coup were given assurances of

strong support at the highest levels of the U.S. Government, both be-

fore and after a coup.

One of the major obstacles faced by all the military conspirators

in Chile was the strong opposition to a coup by the Commander-in-Chief

of the Army, General Rene Schneider; who insisted the constitutional

process be followed.

As a result of his strong constitutional stand,

the removal of General Schneider became a necessary ingredient in the

coup plans of all the Chilean conspirators. Unable to have General

Schneider retired or reassigned, the conspirators decided to kidnap

An unsuccessful abduction attempt was made on October 19, 1970, DID

by a group of Chilean military officers whom the CIA was actively sup-

they

porting.

A second kidnap attempt was made the following day, again un-

successfully. In the early morning hours of October 22, 1970, machine

guns and ammunition were passed by the CIA to the group

that had failed

on October 19. That same day General Schneider was

mortally

wounded in

an attempted kidnap on his way to work. The attempted

kidnap and the shooting was apparently conducted by conspira-

tors other than those to whom the CIA had provided weapons earlier

in the day.

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## Page 435

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1 79 23

A Chilean military court found that high-ranking military officers,

both active and retired, conspired to bring about a military coup and

to kidnap General Schneider. Several of the officers whom

the CIA had

contacted and encouraged

in their coup conspiracy were convicted of con-

spiring to kidnap General Schneider. Those convicted of carrying out

the actual kidnap attempt and the killing of General Schneider were assoc-

iates of retired General Roberto Viaux, who had initially been thought by

the CIA to be the best hope. However, later the CIA discouraged General

Viaux because the Agency felt other officers, such as General Camilo

Valenzuela, were not sufficiently involved. General Viaux was convicted by the

military court and received a twenty-year prison sentence for being

the "intellectal author" of the

Schneider kidnap attempt. General

Valenzuela was sentenced by the military court to three years in exile

for taking part in the conspiracy to prevent Allende's assumption of

office.

The military court found

that the two Generals had been in

contact throughout the coup plotting.

pass:,

..

The principal facts leading up to the death of General Schneider (all

of which are

discussed in more detail below) are as follows:

I. By the end of September 1970, it appeared that the only feasible

way for the CIA to implement the Presidential order to prevent Allende from

coming to power was to foment a coup d'etat.

2. All of the known coup plots developed within the Chilean mili

tary entailed the removal of General Schneider by one means or another.

3. United States officials continued to encourage and support Chilean

plans for a coup after it became known that the first step would be to

kidnap General Schneider.

HW

39, Page

135

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-4=

4. Two

unsuccessful kidnap attempts were made,

one on October 19,

the other

on

October 20. Following these

attempts, and with knowledge

of their failure, the CIA passed three submachine guns and ammunition

to Chilean officers who still planned to kidnap General Schneider.

5. In a third kidnap

attempt on October 22, apparently conducted

by Chileans other than those to whom

weapons had been supplied, General

Schneider was shot and subsequently died. The guns used in the abor-

tive kidnapping of General Schneider were, in all probability, not those

supplied by the CIA to the conspirators. The Chilean military court

which investigated the Schneider killing determined that Schneider had

been murdered by handguns, although one machine gun was at the scene of

the killing.*

6. While there is no question that the CIA received a direct

instruction from the President on September 15th to attempt to foment

a coup, the Committee received sharply conflicting testimony about

whether the White House was kept informed of, and authorized, the

coup efforts in Chile after October 15.. On one side of the conflict

is the testimony of Henry Kissinger and General Alexander Haig; on the

other, that of CIA officials. Kissinger testified that the White House

stood down CIA efforts to promote a military coup d'etat in Chile on

October 15, 1970.

After that date, Kissinger testified--and Haig agreed--

that the White House

neither knew of, nor specifically approved, CIA

coup

activities in Chile. CIA officials, on the other hand, have testi-

fied that their activities in Chile after October 15 were known to and

* The Committee has not been able to determine whether or nct

the machine gun at the scene of the Schneider killing was one

of the

three supplied by the CIA.

NW 50055

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## Page 437

*

thus authorized by the White House.

This conflict in testimony, which the Committee has been unable

to resolve through its hearings or the documentary record, leaves, un-

answered the most

serious question

of whether the CIA was acting

pursuant to higher authority (the CIA's view)

or was pursuing coup

activities in Chile without sufficient communication (the Kissinger/

Haig view).

The basic issue is whether or not the CIA informed the White House of

its activities.

In context, informing was

tantamount to being authorized.

No one who testified believed that the CIA was required to seek step-by-

step authorization for its activities; rather the burden was on the White

House to object if a line of activity being pursued by the CIA seemed

unwise. Both Kissinger and Haig agreed that if the CIA had proposed a persua-

sive plan to them, it almost certainly would have been approved. The CIA

did not believe it needed specific White House authorization to transfer wea-

pons to the Chileans; in fact, CIA. Deputy Director (Plans) Thomas

Karamessines testified that he did not formally approve the transfer,

but rather that in the context of the project it was clear that the

Agency had the authority to transfer weapons and that it was clear to

Karamessines'

subordinates that he would approve their decision to do

He believed he probably was informed before the weapons actually

HW

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## Page 438

=6-

110

The President's Initial General Instruction and Background

A.

September 15 White House Meeting

* On September 15, 1970, President Nixon met with his Assistant for

National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, CIA Director Richard Helms,

and Attorney General John Mitchell at the White House.

The topic was

Chile. Handwritten notes taken by Director Helms at that meeting re-

flect both its tenor and the President's instructions:

1 in 10 chance perhaps, but save Chile!

worth spending

not concerned risks involved

no involvement of Embassy

$10,000,000 available, more if necessary

full-time job--best men we have

game plan

make the economy scream

48 hours for plan of action

In his testimony before the Select Committee, Director Helms recalled

coming away from the meeting on September 15 with:

... (the) impression...that the President came down

very hard that he wanted something done, and he

didn't much care how

that he was prepared to

make money available....This was a pretty all-

inclusive order....If I ever carried a marshall's

baton in my knapsack out of the Oval Office, it

was that day. *

(Helms testimony, July 15, pp. 6,10, 11)

Director Helms also testified that the September 15th meeting with

Pepsi Cola, Henry Kissinger and John Mitchell had met for breakfast

with Kendall and Edwards. (Mitchell calendar) The topic of conversa-

tion was the political situation in Chile and the plight of El Mercurio

and other anti-Allende forces. • According to Mr. Helms:

I recall that prior to this meeting (with the President)

the editor of El Mercurio had

come to Washington and

I had been asked to go and talk to him at one of the

hotels here, this having been arranged through Don

Kendall, the head of the Pepsi Cola Company....I have

this impression

that the President called this meeting

where I have my handwritten notes because of Edwards'

presence in

Washington

and what he heard from Kendall

about what Edwards was

saying about conditions in

Chile

and

what was happening there.

(Helms testimony, July 15, pp. 4-5)

Ria.

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## Page 439

-1-

However's none of the CIA officers believed that assassination was within

the guidelines Helms had been given.

Senator Hart of Colorado.

...did the kind of carte

blanche mandate you carried, the marshall's baton

that you carried

out in a knapsack, to stop Allende

from assuming office, include physical elimination?

Mr. Helms.

Well, not in my mind, because when I be-

came Director, I had already made up my mind that we

weren't going

to have any of that business when I was

Director, and I had made that clear to my fellows, and

I think they will tell you this.

The following day, September 16, Director Helms called a meeting

at the CIA to discuss the Chilean situation. At this meeting, he re-

lated to his colleagues his understanding of the President's instruc-

tions:

2. The Director told the group that President

Nixon had decided that an Allende regime in Chile

was unacceptable to the United States. The Presi-

dent asked the Agency to prevent Allende from com-

ing to power or to unseat him.

The President

authorized $10,000,000 for this purpose, if needed.

Further, the Agency is to carry out this mission

without coordination with the Departments of State

cr Defense.

(Memorandum/Genesis of the Project, 16 Sept. 1970)

Henry Kissinger's recollection of the September 15 meeting with

President Nixon is in accord with that of Richard Helms.* Although

Dr. Kissinger did not recall the President's instructions to be as

precise

as those related by Director Helms, he did testify that:

...the primary thrust of the September 15th meeting

was to urge Helms to do whatever he could to prevent

Allende from being seated. (Kissinger testimony, p. 13)

***

The documents, and the officials from whom the Committee has heard

testimony, are in substantial agreement about what President Nixon

authorized on September 15, namely CIA involvement in promoting a

military coup d'etat in Chile.

There is not, however, agreement

about what was communicated between the CIA and the White House--

and hence what was authorized by the latter--in the week between

October 15 and the death of General Schneider, October 22. This

matter will be discussed in Part V of this report on the Schneider

killing.

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## Page 440

-8-

It is clear that President Nixon wanted him (Helms)

to encourage the Chilean military to cooperate or

to take the initiative in preventing Allende from

taking

office.

(Kissinger testimony, p. 12)

Operationally, the CIA set the President's instructions into motion

on September 21. On that day two cables were sent from CIA Headquarters

to Santiago informing the CIA Chief of Station (COS) of his new directive:

Purpose of exercise is to prevent Allende as-

sumption of power.

Parliamentary legerdemain has

been discarded.

Military solution is objective.

(Hqs. to Stn. 236, 21 September 1970)

***

B. (Track Two--This is authority granted to CIA

only, to work toward a military solution to problem.

As part of authority we were explicitly told that

40 Committee, State, Ambassador and Embassy were

not to be told of this Track Two nor involved in any

matter. (Hqs. to Stn. 240, 21 September 1970)

B. Background: Tracks I and Il

United States Government concern over an Allende regime in Chile

did not begin with President Nixon's September 15 instruction to the

CIA. *

For more than a year, Chile had been on the 40 Committee's agenda.

At an April 15, 1969, meeting of the 303 Committee (the predecessor of

the 40 Committee) the question arose as to whether anything should be

done with regard to the September 1970 Presidential election in Chile.

At that time,Director Helms pointed out that "an election operation will

Covert U.S. Government involvement in large-scale political action

programs in Chile began with the 1964 Presidential election.

As in

1970, this was in response to the perceived threat of Salvadore

Allende.

Over $3 million

was spent by the CIA in the 1964 effort.

(Colby testimony.. July 14, 1975, n. 5!

:.."

HH • 5

52002 395-065

3124/28302970

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## Page 441

-9-

not be effective unless

an

early enough start is made.

On March 25,

11970, the 40 Committee approved a joint Embassy/CIA proposal recom-

mending that "spoiling" operations--propaganda and other

activities--

be undertaken by the CIA in an effort to prevent an election victory

by Allende's Popular Unity (UP) Coalition. A total of $135,000 was

authorized by the 40 Committee for this anti-Allende activity.

On

June 18, 1970, the U.S. Ambassador to Chile, Edward Korry, submitted

a

two-phase proposal to the Department of State and the CIA for review.

The first phase involved an increase in support to the anti-Allende

campaign..

The second was a contingency plan to make "a $500,000 effort

in Congress to persuade certain shifts in voting on 24 October 1970."

Phase II was, stated

simply, a proposal to bribe Chilean Congressmen to

vote against Allende should he win a plurality in the September 4 elec-

tion.

On June 27, 1970, the 40 Committee increased funding for the

anti-Allende "spoiling" operation to $390,000. A decision on Ambassador

Korry's bribe proposal

was deferred pending the results of

the September 4

election.

The 40 Committee met twice between the time Allende received a plural-

ity of the popular vote on September 4 and President Nixon issued his

instruction to Director Helms on September 15** At both these

meetings the

question

of U.S. involvement in a military coup against Allende was raised.

Kissinger stressed the importance of these meetings when he testified be-

fore the Select Committee:

*This and other references to 40 Committee discussions and actions regard-

ing Chile are contained in a memorandum provided to the Committee by the

I CIA entitled "policy Decisions Related to Our Covert Action Involvement

in the September 1970 Chilean Presidential Election," dated October 9, 1970.

d'Me On August 25, 1975, we subpoenaed all White House/National Security Council

documents and records relating to the effort by the United States Govern-

ment to prevent Salvadore Allende from assuming office.

On September 4, the

Committee received

46 documents from the White House relating to Chile cover-

ing the period September.

**See Page 9a.

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## Page 442

TOP

- 9a -

**Following the September

4 election, the CIA's Directorate.of Intelli-

gence circulated an intelligence community assessment of the impact of

an Allende government on U.S. national interests. That assessment,.

dated September 7, 1970, stated:

Regarding threats to U.S. interests, we conclude that:

1.

The U.S. has no vital national interests within Chile.

There would, however, be tangible economic losses.

2. The world military balance of power would not be sig-

nificantly altered by an Allende government.

3. An Allende victory would, however, create consider-

able political and psychological costs:

•a.

Hemispheric cohesion would be threatened by

the challenge that an Allende government

would pose to the OAS, and by the reactions

that it would create in other countries.

We do not see, however, any likely threat

to the peace of the region.

b. An Allende victory would represent a defin-

ite psychological set-back to the U.S. and

a definite psychological advance for the

Marxist idea. (Intelligence Memorandum/

"Situation Following the Chilean Presidential

Election," CIA's Directorate of Intelligence,

7. September 1970)

TOP SECRET

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## Page 443

-10-

I think

the meeting of September 15th has to be

seen in the context of two previous meetings of

the 40 Committee on September 8th and September

14th in which the 40 Committee was asked to look

at the pros and cons and the problems and pros-

pects of a Chilean military coup to be organized

with United States assistance.

(Kissinger testimony, p. 5).

According to the summary of the 40. Committee meeting on September

8, the following was discussed:

... all concerned

realized that previous plans for

a Phase II would have to be drastically redrawn....

The DCI made the point, however, that congressional

action against Allende was not likely to succeed

and that once Allende was in office the Chilean

opposition to

him would disintegrate and collapse

rapidly.

While not advocating a specific course

of action, the Director further observed that a

military golpe against Allende would have very

little chance of success unless undertaken soon.

Both the Chairman and the Attorney General supported

this view....At the close of the...meeting the

Chairman directed the Embassy to prepare a "cold-

blooded assessment" of:

1) the pros and cons and problems and pros-

pects involved should a Chilean military

coup. be organized now with U.S. assistance,

and

2) the pros and cons and problems and pros-

pects involved in organizing an effective

future Chilean opposition to Allende.

(CIA Memorandum/Policy Decision Related to Our

Covert Action Involvement in the September 1970

Chilean Presidential Election, 9 October 1970)

Ambassador Korry responded to the 40 Committee's request for a

"cold-blooded assessment" on September 12. He stated that "We /the

Embassy/ believe it now clear that Chilean military will not, repeat

not, move to prevent Allende's accession, barring unlikely situation

of national chaos and widespread violence." The Ambassador went on to

say that "Our own military people lare/ unanimous in rejecting possi-

SECRET

A NS NAN

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## Page 444

- 10a -

A 6 MM

bility of meaningful military intervention in political situation."

He concluded by stating:

"What we are saying in this 'cold-blooded

assessment' is that opportunities for further significant USG action

with the Chilean military are nonexistent." (Memorandum/Ambassador's

Response to Request for Analysis of Military Option in Present Chilean

Situation, 12 September 1970)

The CIA's response was in the same vein. Viron Vaky, Kissinger's

assistant for Latin American affairs on the NSC staff, summarized the

CIA's "cold-blooded assessment" in a memo to his boss: "Military ac-

tion is impossible; the military is incapable and unwilling to seize

power. We have no capability to motivate or instigate a coup." (Memo-

randum for Dr. Kissinger/Chile--40 Committee Meeting, Monday--September 14,

September 14, Viron P. Vaky)

On September 14, the 40 Committee met to discuss these reports and

what action was to be taken:

Particular attention was devoted to a CIA prepared

review of political and military options in the

Chilean electoral situation based on the Embassy

and Station's "cold-blooded assessment."

The Com-

mittee focused on the so-called "Rube Goldberg"

gambit which would see Alessandri elected by the

Congress on October 24th, resigning thereafter to

leave Frei constitutionally free to run in a second

election for the presidency.

TOP SECREI

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## Page 445

-11-

Ambassador. Korry was asked to go directly to President

Frei

to see if he would be willing to commit himself to

this line of

action.

A contingency of $250,000 was

approved for

his trusted teamere import mE Projects which frei or

It was further agreed

that a propaganda campaign be undertaken by, the Agency

to focus on the damage of an Allende takeover....

(CIA Memorandum/Policy Decision Related to Our

Covert Action Involvement in the September 1970

Chilean Presidential Election, 9 October 1970)

Following the September 14 Forty Committee meeting and President

Nixon's September 15 instruction to the CIA, U.S. Government efforts

to prevent Allende from

assuming office proceeded on two tracks. Track

I comprised all covert activities approved by the 40 Committee,

in-

cluding the $250,000 contingency fund to bribe Chilean congressmen as

well as propaganda and

economic activities. These activities were

designed to induce the opponents to Allende in Chile to prevent his.

assumption of power, either through political or military means. Track

*The terms Track I and Track II were known only to CIA and White House

officials who were knowledgeable about the President's September 15 order

to the CIA. The Committee sent letters to various

senior officials in-

quiring if they were,

in fact, not knowledgeable of the Track II activities.

Those letters were sent to Secretary of State William Rogers, Secretary of

Defense Melvin Laird, Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard, Under-

secretary. of State for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson, Chairman of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Thomas Moorer, NSC Staff Member for

Latin America Viron P. Vaky, Director of the State Department's Bureau

of Intelligence and Research Ray S. Cline, and the Deputy Chief of Mission

in Santiago Harry W. Shlaudeman. Thus far the Committee.has received

written responses from Messrs. Moorer, Johnson, Vaky, Shlaudeman and Cline.

All except Cline have indicated that they had no knowledge of the Track II

activity at the time; Cline indicated he heard of the activities in a

general way, from his subordinate who handled 40 Committee work and from

former associates at the CIA. In oral communications with

Committee

staff members, Secretaries Rogers and Laird have indicated they were unaware

of Track II.

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## Page 446

-12-

II activities in Chile were undertaken in response to President Nixon's

September 15 order and were directed towards actively promoting and

encouraging the Chilean military to move against Allende. In his testimony

before the Committee, Kissinger stressed the links between Tracks

I and II:

...There was work by all of the agencies to try to

prevent Allende from being seated, and there was

work by all of the agencies on the so-called Track

I to encourage the military to

move against Allende

...the difference between the September 15th meet-

ing and what was being done in general within the

government was that President Nixon was encouraging

a more direct

role for the CIA in actually organiz-

ing such

a coup.

(Kissinger testimony, p. 13)

Tracks I and II did, in fact, move together in the month afie=

September 15. The authorization to Ambassador Korry, who was formally

excluded from Track II, to encourage a military coup became broader and

broader. In the 40 Committee meeting on September 14, he and other.

"appropriate members of the Embassy Mission" were authorized to inten-

sify their contacts with Chilean military officers to assess their

willingness to

support the "Frei gambit"--a voluntary turn-over of

power to the military by Frei, who would then have been eligible to

run

for President in new

elections. (Memorandum/Policy Decisions Related

to Our Covert Action Involvement in the September 1970 Chilean Presiden-

tial Election, 9 October 1970)

In a situation report to DI. Kissinger and Assistant Secretary

Charles Meyer on September 21, Ambassador Korry indicated that in order

to make the Frei gambit work, "if necessary, General Schneider would

Fer:

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## Page 447

-13-

have to be neutralized, by displacement if necessary."* (Korry to

Meyer and Kissinger/Situation Report, 21 September 1970) In testifying,

Kissinger felt the Korry report indicated "the degree to which Track

I and Track II were merging, that is to say, that individuals on Track

I were working on exactly the same problem

as the CIA was working on

Track II." (Kissinger

testimony, p. 21)

Ambassador Korry's activites in Chile between September 4 and

October 24 support Kissinger's view

that the line separating Track I

and Track II often became blurred.

For example, the Ambassador was

authorized to make his contacts in the Chilean military aware that if

Allende were

seated, the military could expêct no further military

assistance (MAP) from

the United States. Later, in response to his own

recommendation, Korry

was

authorized to inform the. Chilean military that

all MAP and military sales were being held in abeyance pending the outcome

of the Congressional election on October 24. On October 7, Ambassador

Korry received the following cable from Kissinger and Under Secretary

In this same situation report, Ambassador Korry related a message that

he had sent to President Frei through his Defense Minister indicating

the economic pressures that would be brought to bear on Chile should

Allende assume office.

Frei

should know that not a nut or bolt will be

allowed to reach Chile under Allende. Once

Allende comes

to power we shall do all within

our power to condemn Chile and the Chileans to

utmost deprivation and poverty, a policy designed

for a long time to come to accelerate the hard

features of a Communist society in Chile.

Hence,

for Frei to believe that there will be much of

an alternative to utter misery, such as seeing

Chile muddle through, would be strictly illusory.

The use of economic instruments as levers on Frei and the Chilean

military was a persistent subject of White House/CIA discussions

and of instructions to the field. Helms'

notes from the September

15 meeting with the President and Kissinger included the notation

"make the economy scream."

Economic leverage was the primary

topic of a September 18 White House meeting involving Kissinger,

Helms and Karamessines.

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hith

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## Page 448

-14-

of State U. Alexis Johnson:

...you are now authorized to inform discreetly

the Chilean military through the channels available

to you that if a successful effort is made to block

Allende from taking office, we would reconsider the

cuts we have thus far been

forced to make in Chilean

MAP and otherwise increase our presently programmed

MAP for the Chilean Armed Forces.... If any, steps

the military should take should result in civil dis-

order, we would also be prepared promptly to deliver

support and material that might be immediately re-

quired.

(Hqs. to Stn. 075517, 7 October 1970)

The essential difference between Tracks I and II, as evidenced by

instructions to Ambassador Korry during this period, was not that Track

II was coup-oriented and Track I was not. Both had this objective in

mind. The difference between the two tracks was, simply, that the CIA's

direct contacts with the Chilean military, and its active promotion and

support for a coup, were to be known only to a small group of individuals

in the White House and the CIA. Kissinger testified that Track II

matters were to be reported directly to the White House "for reasons

of security." (Kissinger testimony, p. 14) Thomas Karamessines, the

CIA's Deputy Director for Plans at the time and the principal CIA

contact with the White House on Track II matters, testified on his

understanding of why State, Defense, the 40 Committee and Ambassador

Korry were excluded from Track II:

That

was not a decision that we made.

But the

best I can do is suggest that there was concern

about two things.

Number one, that there might

be serious objections lodged, for example, by

the State Department particularly if Track 2

were to be laid out at a Forty Committee meeting.

And the only other thing I can contribute to that

is that it was felt that the security of the

activity would be better protected if knowledge

of it were limited. (Karamessines

testimony, p. 122)

ri..

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148

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## Page 449

-15-

C.

CIA Views of Difficulty of Project

••?.

On one point the testimony of CIA officials who were involved in

Track II is unanimous: they all said they thought Track II was unlikely

to succeed. That view ran from the working levels of the Agency to the

top. They all said they felt they were being asked to do the impossible,

that the risks and potential costs of the project were too great. At

the same time, they felt they had been given an explicit Presidential

order, and they tried to execute that order.

A few excerpts from the testimony follow:

Richard Helms, CIA Director -

...my heart sank over this meeting, because...the

possibility of bringing off something like this

•seemed to me at that time to be just as remote as

anything could be.

In practical terms, the Army

was

constitutionalist.... And when you look here at

the time frame in which the man was suddenly asking

you to accomplish something, it seemed really almost

inconceivable....

What I came away from the meeting with

the distinct impression that we were being

asked to do almost the impossible and trying

to indicate this was going to be pretty tough....

(Helms testimony, July 15, 1975, pp. 6-7)

David Phillips, Chief, Chile Task Force -

...it is my feeling that the odds are unaccept-

able, it is something that is not going to work,

and we are going to be burned if we get into it

...what

are the chances of pulling off a. coup

successfully, or in any way stopping Allende from

assuming the

presidency?...we never even got to

two chances out of 20. (Phillips testimony, p. 16)

...I

assure you that those people that I

was in touch with at the Agency just about univers-

ally said, my God, why are we given this assignment?.

(Phillips testimony, p. 53)

(James Flannery,

Deputy Chief, Western Hemisphere Division -

There was just no question that we had to make

this effort, no matter what the odds were.

And

I think that most people felt that the odds were

just pretty long.

(Flannery testimony, p. 20)

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## Page 450

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Further, CIA officials believed their judgment of the endeavor's

difficulty was known to the White House. Helms commented on the

Septem-

ber 15th meeting:

"So realizing all of these things, I'm relatively

certain that day

that I pointed out this is going to be awfully tough."

(Helms testimony, July 15, 1975, p. 16) Karamessines recalled

pointing

out to the President that "the Chilean military seemed to be disorganized

and unwilling to do anything. And without their wanting to do something,

there did not seem to be much hope." (Karamessines testimony, p. 10)

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III. CIA's Implementation of Track II

A. Evolution of CIA Strategy

The President's instruction to the CIA on September 15 to prevent

Allende's assumption of power was given in the context of

a broad U.S.

Government effort to achieve that

end. The September 15 instruction

to the CIA involved from the beginning the promotion of a military coup

d'etat in Chile. Although there was talk of a coup in Chilean military

circles, there was little indication that it would actually take place

without active U.S. encouragement and support.

1.

There was much talk among Chilean officers

about

the possibility of some kind of coup...but this

was not the kind of talk that was being backed by,

you know, serious organizational planning.

(Karamessines testimony, Aug. 6, 1963, p. 32)

The "Constitutional Coup" Approach

Although efforts to achieve a political solution to the Allende

victory continued

simultaneous with Track II, the Agency premised its

activities on the assumption that the political avenue was a dead

end.

On September 21, CIA Headquarters cabled its Station in Santiago:

Purpose

of exercise is to prevent Allende assump-

tion of power.

Paramilitary legerdemain has been

discarded. Military solution is objective.

(Hqs. 236, Sept. 21, 1970, para. 3)

The initial strategy attempted to enlist President Frei in promoting

a coup to perpetuate his presidency for six more years. The Agency

decided to promise "help in any election which was an outgrowth of a

successful military

takeover." (Nov. 18, 1970 Helms memo to Kissinger)

Under this plan Frei would invite the military to take over, dissolve the

Congress,

and proclaim a new election. A private U.S. citizen who had

been

a conduit for CIA funds to Frei's 1964 campaign was sent to see him

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with this message on: September 24. (Task Force Log, September 23)

Thomas Karamessines, the Deputy Director for Plans, testified:

So this was in a sense not Track II, but in a

sense another aspect of a quiet and hopefully

non-violent military. coup.... This was abandoned

when the military were reluctant to push Frei

publicly..:and, number two, Frei was reluctant

to leave on his own in the absence of pressure

from the military.... There was left as the only

chance of success

a straight military coup.

(Karamessines testimony, Aug. 6, 1975, p. 6)

At the same time, the Station in Santiago reported:

Strong. reasons for thinking neither Frei nor

Schneider will act. For that reason any scenario

in which either has to play an active role now

appears utterly unrealistic. Overtures to lower

echelon officers (e.g., Valenzuela) can of course

be made.

This Involves promoting Army split.

(Stn. to Hqs. 424, September 23, 1970)

2. Military Solution

President Frei's failure even to attempt to persuade his own party

convention on October 3-4 from reaching a compromise with Allende ended

all hope of using him to prevent an Allende presidency. (November 18

memo, Helms to Kissinger, page 16) Thus, by the beginning of October,

it was clear that a vehicle for a military solution would have to be

found in the second echelon of Chilean officers, and that the top leader-

ship of the Armed Services, particularly General Rene Schneider, consti-

tuted

a stumbling block. (Santiago 424, September 23, 1970; Santiago 439,

September 30, 1970) The Agency's task was to cause a coup in a highly

unpromising situation and to overcome the formidable obstacles represented

by Frei'

s inaction, Schneider's strong constitutionalism, and the absence

of organization and enthusiasm among those officers who were interested

in a coup•

A three-fold program was set into motion:

A3

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Collect intelligence on coup-minded officers;

Create a coup climate by propaganda, disinformation,

and terrorist activities intended to provoke the left to

give

a pretext for

a coup; *(Hqs. 611, October 7, 1970)

c. Inform those coup-minded offirers: that the U.S. Govern-

FN

DOEIN'S

SAy

support

ment would give them full support in a coup short of direct

terrorisT

U.S. military intervention. (Hqs. 762, October 14, 1970)

B. The Chile Task Force

Because of the highly sensitive nature of the operation, a special

task force was created in the CIA's Western Hemisphere Division to manage it.

The task force was placed under the daily direction of the Deputy Direc-

tor for Plans,

Thomas Karamessines, and a group of the Agency's most

experienced and skilled operators were detailed to the task force.

fie

*A cable sent from CIA Headquarters to Santiago on October 19 focused

on creating an appropriate justification for a coup. The cable stated:

1. It still appears that Ref A coup has no pretext or justification

that it can offer to make it acceptable in Chile or Latin America. It

therefore would seem necessary to create one to bolster what will prob-

ably be their claim to a coup to save Chile from communism... You may

wish include variety of themes in justification of coup to military for

their use.

These could include but are not limited to: A) Firm intel.

that Cubans planned to reorganize all intelligence services along

Soviet/Cuban mold thus creating structure for police state.... B) Economic

situation collapsing....C) By quick recognition of Cuba and Communist

countries Allende assumed U.S. would cut off material assistance to

Armed Forces thus weakening them as constitutional barriers. Would then

empty armories to Communist Peoples Militia with task to run campaign of

terror based

on alleged labor and economic sabotage (Use some quotes

from Allende on this.)

2. Station has written some excellent prop guidances.

Using themes

at hand

and which best known

to you we are

now asking you to prepare

intel report based

on some well known facts and some fiction to justify

coup, split opposition, and gain adherents for military group. With

appropriate military contact can determine how to

"discover" intel report

which could even be planted during raids planned by Carabineros.

3.

We urge you to get this idea and some concrete suggestions to plot-...lär

ters

as

soon

as

you can.

Coup should have a justification to prosper.

(Headquarters 882, 19 October 1970)

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David 'A. Phillips, Chief of Station in Rio de Janeiro, was summoned

back to Washington to head the operation.

With the exception of the

Division Chief, William Broe, his deputy James Flannery and the head

of the Chile

Branch, no other officers in the Division were aware of the

task force's activities,

not even

those officers who normally had respon-

sibility for Chile. The task force had a special communications channel to

Santiago and Buenos Aires to compartment cable traffic about Track II.

(November 18, 1970, Helms to Kissinger memo, page 3) Most of the

significant operational decisions were made by Phillips, Broe and

Karamessines, who met on a daily basis.

It should be noted that all those involved with the task force des-

cribed the

pressure from the White House as intense. Indeed, Karamessines

has said that Kissinger "left no doubt in my mind that he was under the

heaviest of pressure to get this accomplished, and he in turn was plac-

ing us under the heaviest of pressures to get it accomplished." (Kara-

messines testimony, August 6, 1975, page 7) The Deputy Chief of the

Western Hemisphere

Division, James Flannery, testified that pressure was

"as tough as I ever saw it in my time there, extreme." (Flannery testi-

mony, July 15, 1975, page 20) Broe testified that "I have never gone

through a period as we did on the Chilean thing. I mean it was just

constant, constant....Just continual pressure....It was coming from

the

White House."

(Broe testimony, August 4, 1975, page 55)

C.

The Use of the Army Attache and Interagency Relations

The CIA Station in Santiago had inadequate contacts within the

Chilean military to carry out its task. However, the U.S. Army At- f

tache in Santiago, Colonel Paul Wimert, knew the Chilean military

1214

139

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454

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## Page 455

very

well quento his five years of service there and his broad personal

contacts among the Chilean officers. Following a proposal by the Chief

of Station, the CIA decided to enlist Colonel Wimert in collecting in-

telligence concerning the possibility of a coup and to use him as a

channel to let the interested Chilean military know of U. S. support

for a coup. Karamessines described this procedure for the Committee:

We also needed contact with a wider segment of the military,

the senior military which we had not maintained and did not

have, but which we felt confident that our military represen-

tative in Chile had.... And we got the approval of the DIA to

enlist the cooperation of Colonel Wimert in our effort to pro-

cure

intelligence.

(Karamessines testimony, August 6, 1975, p. 6)

To obtain Wimert's services, CIA officials prepared a suggested mes-

sage for the Director of DIA to send to the Army Attache in Santiago

through CIA communications

channels. Because the DIA Director, General

Donald V. Bennett, was in Europe on official business, the Deputy

Director of Central Intelligence, General Cushman, invited DIA Deputy

Director Lt. General Jammie M. Philpott to his office on September 28,

1970.* During that meeting, General Cushman requested the assistance of

the Army Attache, and General Philpott signed a letter which authorized

transmission of a message directing the Army Attache:

...to work closely with the CAS chief, or in his absence,

his deputy, in contacting and advising the principal mili-

tary figures who might play a decisive role in any move which

might, eventually, deny the presidency to Allende.

Do not, repeat not, advise the Ambassador or the Defense At-

tache of this message, or give them any indication of its

portent. In the course of your routine activities, act in

accordance with the Ambassador's instructions.

Simultaneously,

I wish--and now authorize you--to act in a concerted

fashion

with the CAS chief.

* General Bennett returned to the

United States on the evening of October

10, 1970. General Philpott

Was Acting DIrector in Bennett's absence.

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very well due to his five years of service there and his broad

personal

contacts among the Chilean officers.

Following a proposal by the Chief

of Station, the CIA decided to enlist Colonel Wimert in collecting in-

telligence concerning the

possibility of a coup and to use him as a

channel to let the interested Chilean military know of U. S. support

for a coup.

Karamessines described this procedure for the Committee:

We also needed contact with a wider segment of the military,

the senior military which we had not maintained and did not

have, but which we felt confident that our military represen-

tative in Chile had.... And we got the approval of the DIA to

enlist the cooperation of Colonel Wimert in our effort to pro-

cure intelligence.

(Karamessines testimony, August 6, 1975, p. 6)

To obtain Wimert's services, CIA officials prepared a suggested mes-

sage for the Director of DIA to send to the Army Attache in Santiago

through CIA communications channels. Because the DIA Director, General

Donald V. Bennett, was in Europe on official business, the Deputy

Director of Central Intelligence, General Cushman, invited DIA Deputy

Director Lt. General Jammie M. Philpott to his office on September 28,

1970.* During that meeting, General Cushman requested the assistance of

the Army Attache, and General Philpott signed a letter which authorized

transmission of a message directing the Army Attache:

-

tary figures who might play a decisive role in any move which

might, eventually, deny the presidency to Allende.

Do not;

repeat not, advise the Ambassador or the Defense At-

tache of this message, or give them any indication of its

portent. In the course of your routine activities, act in

accordance with the Ambassador's instructions.

Simultaneously,

I wish--and now authorize you--to act in a concerted fashion

with the CAS chief.

General Bennett returned to the United States on the evening

of October

10, 1970. General Philpott was Acting Director in Bennett's absence.

NH 50955 DocId:32423539 Page 456

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-22-

This

message is for your eyes only, and should not be dis-

cussed with any person other than those CAS officers who will

be knowledgeable.

CAS will identify them.

(Headquarters 380

to Santiago)

For this and all subsequent messages intended for the Army Attache,

the secret CIA communications channel was used.

Both General Philpott and Thomas Karamessines testified that ini-

tially the Army Attache would be used only to "obtain or procure" in-

telligence on Chilean military officers.* (Philpott, P. 11; Karamessines,

p. 6) The September 28, 1970 message to the Army Attache, however, did

in fact trigger his deep involvement in the coup attempt.

According to

the Attache's testimony, he received day-to-day instructions from the

Ghief of Station, and on occasion, the COS would show him messages which

ostensibly from Generals Bennett and/or Philpott, directing him

to

nete

17h070

take certain actions. The COS also transmitted messages from the Army

Attache to these Generals.

General Bennett testified that he never had knowledge of Track II

and that he never received any communication relating thereto, nor did

he ever authorize the transmission of any messages to the Army Attache.

General Philpott also testified that he had no recollection of anything

connected with Track II after his initial

meeting with General Cushman

on September 28. (Philpott, p. 16)

U. S. Army Colonel Robert C. Roth, who in September and October 1970

was the Chief of the Human Resources Division, Director of Collection, DIA,

*

In this connection it should be noted that when questioned about

this letter, General Philpott testified that he recalled signing

an authorization such as that contained in the first paragraph of

Headquarters 380 but that he did not recall the authorizations and

instructions in paragraphs tworand

three.

int

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1 10141.

23. -"

testified that he recalled working for Generals Bennett and Philpott on

"a priority requirement to identify Chilean personalities who might be

helpful in preventing the election of Allende as President of Chile."

(Roth, Vol. I, p. 6)

Though Roth recalls no mention of Track II as such,

the goal of this mission is identical to that described in the message

of September 28 bearing Philpott's signature.

Beginning on October 15, Roth kept a chronology of his activities

connected with Chile. This chronology reflects that there was a meeting

on October 21 regarding the preparation of biographic material on Chilean

generals which focused on their willingness to participate in a military

coup. Generals Bennett, Philpott, and a CIA representative attended.

The chronology also shows that on October 21, Roth delivered a message to

Mr. Broe to be sent by CIA channels.*

A message was sent to Col. Wimert

that same day, ostensibly from General Bennett, which authorized:

FYI: Suspension temporarily imposed on MAP and FMS has

been rescinded.

This action does not répeat not imply

change in our estimate of situation.

On the contrary,

it is intended to place us in a posture in which we can

formally cut off assistance if Allende elected and situa-

tion develops as we anticipate. Request up date on situa-

'tion.

(Santiago 446; Ref: Headquarters 762) (Headquarters

934, 21 October 1970)

Roth testified that this DIA project ended on October 23 when he

followed Philpott's instructions to deliver biographic information on

Chilean figures to Mr. Broe at CIA.. Philpott also instructed him that

Roth believes that General Philpott directed him to deliver this

message and also pressed him on several occasions to seek a re-

sponse from Broe to an earlier message to Colonel Wimert.

(Roth,

Vol. II, p.

TOP SECRET

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23a

"any further action on

the subject would henceforth be. the responsibility

of the CIA and that DIA would perform normal support functions." (Roth,

p. 8) *

Both Bennett and Philpott testified that the activities described

by Roth were routine DIA activities. However, Colonel Roth testified:

I believe my impression at the time, or my recollection, is

that I was informed that there was concern at the highest

U.S. Governmental level over the possible election of Allende,

that DIA then had a priority responsibility of coming up with

the identities of key Chilean personalities that would be help-

ful, and so forth. I have nothing specific as to the nature of

the instructions or the channels through which they came.

Q. It was your sense at the time that you were working on a

project that if it had not been initiated by, at least had

the attention of or concern of, the highest level?

Roth's chronology also indicates that Philpott had asked that Broe

be queried

on

two or three occasions regarding a report from Wimert

and that Philpott instructed that only he (Philpott) would communi-

cate with Cushman if the need arose. (Roth, p. 11) Roth also testi-

fied that Philpott advised him that communications with Wimert would

be by CIA channels.

(Roth, p. 41)

COND SODE

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lill -24-

Colonel Roth. That

was my impression at the time.

Q. You understand from your work in the Defense Department

that the highest level of government usually indicated the

President of the United States?

Colonel Roth. I would assume that.

The CIA produced copies of several messages which identify

Generals Bennett

and Philpott as either the sender or recipient. Among

these documents is a message relating to Track II which bears Philpott's

purported signature.

(Undated message. ca. 14 October 1970) General

Philpott admitted that the signature appears to be his but doubted that

it was and he could not recall signing it, or having seen it. (Philpott,

p.

) CIA also produced messages of October 14 (Headquarters

762)

and October 21 (Headquarters 934) conveying instructions from General

Bennett to the Army Attache.

General Bennett testified he did not

authorize these

messages:

It is beyond the responsibilities which I had in the military

It goes beyond the responsibility which I

had in terms that I would have to get the authority or the

approval of the Secretary through the Chairman for covert

action of this magnitude.

This message would

not have been

signed by me. (Bennett testimony, p. 21)

According to Karamessines, only the White House had the authority to

issue the directives contained in those messages (Karamessines testi-

mony, p. 84)

The Department of Defense was unable to provide any documents bear-

ing on the issue of Wimert's Track II instructions or responses.

DOD file search under the direction of General Daniel 0. Graham, the

present Director of DIA, produced no copies of communication documents

for the September-October 1970 period. (Graham, p. 6) However, Roth

testified that detailed memoranda for the record which he prepared on

All: 1

his activities are missing from the files: (Roth, Vol: II, p. )

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CIA officials maintain that they acted faithfully in transmitting

messages to Generals Bennett and/or Philpott and in never sending a

message without proper authorization. Mr. Karamessines was particularly

forceful in this regard:

...I can recall no instance in my experience at the Central

Intelligence Agency in which a message was received for an

individual, an officer of the government anywhere, in what-

ever department, which was not faithfully, directly, promptly

and fully and accurately delivered to that officer, or to his

duly authorized representative.

testimony; p. 79)

We may have played tricks overseas, but it stopped at the

water's edge, and we didn't play tricks among ourselves or

among our colleagues within the Agency or in other agencies.

(Karamessines testimony, p. 79)

We could not remain in business for a day...if this had been

the practice of the Agency. It would have been no time at

all before we would have been found out, a single instance

of the kind of thing you are suggesting might have taken

place would have put us out of business.

(Karamessines testimony, P. 80)

Dr. Kissinger denied he was ever informed of the Army Attache's

role or that he authorized any messages to be sent to the Army Attache.

(Kissinger testimony, p. 22)

The investigation to date has not resolved the conflict between the

statements of the senior CIA, DIA and White House officials. There are

four

possibilities that could explain the conflict. First, Generals

Bennett and Philpott were cognizant of Track II and communicated their

general instructions. to the Army Attache. This possibility would be

contrary to their sworn testimony. Second, General Bennett was not aware

of Track II but General Philpott was and

communicated general instructions to

the Army Attache. This possibility is supporied by Roth's testimony

but would be contrary to Philpott's sworn testimony and his duty to

keep General Bennett informed. Third, the CIA acted on its own, and,

after receiving initial

authority from General Philpott, co-opted and ordered

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the Army Attache without further informing any member of the Department

of Defense

of the White House. This possibility would be contrary to

the sworn testimony of David Phillips, Willlam Broe, _Thomas Karamessines,

and William Colby.

Stole men by Do th

f the White House staff authoriz

the CIA to convey orders to the Army Attache on the basis of high or

highest government authority. Further, that the White House staff

directed that the Army Attache's superiors

in the Pentagon not be in-

formed. This possibility would contradict the sworn testimony of Dr.

Kissinger and General Alexander Haig.

D. The False Flag Base

In order to minimize the risks of making contact with the dissident

Chilean officers, the task force decided in late September to set up a

"False Flag Base," i.e., to send four staff officers to Chile posing as

nationals of other countries to supplement Colonel Wimert's contacts

with Chilean military officers.*

Given the limitations of the Station's

resources and Colonel Wimert's visibility, Headquarters felt. the use of

"False Flag Officers" was necessary because "We don't want to miss a

chance." One of these officers posed as a Brazilian intelligence officer

so that "any flap would be a Brazilian one." (Headquarters 363,

September 27, 1970)

i...

Com

disas a

*The use of "False Flag Officers" is not, according to David Phillips..

"an unusual practice,"

either by the CIA of foreign intelligence

services.

(Phillips testinony, pp. 47-48)

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The False Flaggers

were compartmented from each other and reported

separately on their contacts to a "deep cover" CIA officer in Santiago

who in turn reported to the Station. According to the testimony of the

Chief of Station, they received their instructions from Washington and

not from him. (Chief of Station testimony (Felix), August 1, 1975, p. 27)

E. Chief of Station

Although most of the Station officers in Santiago did not know of

Track II, the Chief and Deputy Chief of Station were knowledgeable and

the Chief of Station initiated contacts on his own with Chilean

officers.

The COS has testified that he regarded Track II as unrealistic:

I had left no doubt in the minds of my colleagues

and superiors that I did not consider any kind of

intervention in those constitutional processes

desirable.... And one of the reasons certainly for my

last recall (to Washington) was to be read the riot

act--which

was done in a very pleasant, but very

intelligible manner. Specifically, I was told at

that time that the Agency was not too interested

in

continuously being told by me that certain proposals

which had been made could not be executed, or would

be counterproductive.

(Chief of Station (Felix)

testimony, August 1, 1975, p. 10)

The Chief of Station's objection to Track II did not go unnoticed.

The following

instruction to the COS was sent on October 7: "Report

should

not contain analysis and argumentation but simply report on

action taken." (Headquarters 612, 7 October). Very simply, Headquarters

wanted the Station to take orders quietly as was the Agency itself.

TOP CoOn

....

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1, NAM

..i...

Three examples of the Chief of Station's reporting bear out his

claim to have dissented:

Bear in mind that parameter of action is exceed-

ingly narrow and available options are quite

limited and relatively simple.

(Santiago 424, September 23, 1970)

Feel necessary to caution against any false optimism.

It is essential that we not become victims of our

own propaganda.

(Santiago 441, October 1, 1970)

Urge you do not convey impression that Station has

sure-fire method of halting, let alone triggering

coup attempts.

(Santiago 477, October 7, 1970, p.2)

/ A

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IV.

1ol41

11-29=

CIA Efforts to Promote a Coup

A. The Chilean Conspirators

Anti-Allende coup plotting in Chile centered around several key

individuals. One of these was retired General Roberto Viaux, the General

who had led the "Tacnazo" insurrection a year before.

Following the

"Tacnazo" revolt, and his dismissal from the Army, Viaux retained the

support of many non-commissioned and junior officers as well as being

the recognized leader of several right-wing civilian groups.

(CIA

Briefing Paper, "Special Mandate from the President on Chile," July

15, 1975)

Another individual around which plotting centered was General Camilo

Valenzuela, Commander of the Santiago Garrison.

General Valenzuela was

in league with several other active duty officers, including Admiral

Hugo Tirado, Navy Commander in Chief; General Vicente Huerta, Director

General of the Carabinero (police) Corps; General Canales, Director of

the Military Academy; and General Joaquin Garcia, second in command,

Air Force. (CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, November 18,

1970) All of these officers, with the possible exception of Canales,

**

were in contact with Viaux as well.

*This revolt was engineered by Viaux ostensibly for the purposes of drama-

tizing the military's demand for higher pay, but was widely interpreted as

an abortive coup.

**The record of meetings between Viaux and the active duty military officers

is incomplete.

The record does show, however, that Viaux met with General

Huerta around October 7. (Chile Task Force Log, October 7). On October 12

Viaux met with General Valenzuela (Chile Task Force Log, 14 October) .

One

cable from Santiago indicates that Admiral Tirado may have been a member

of Viaux's inner circle of conspirators. (Station 545, 16 October 1970)

At the very

least, Tirado was in contact with Viaux.

Although a distinction can be made between the Viaux and Valenzuela groups,

as CIA witnesses did throughout their testimony before the Committee, the

principal distinction between the two was that the latter was led by

active duty

military officers.

The two groups were in contact with each other.

The

record also indicates that

they worked together in at least two of the three

Schneider kidnap

attempts.

ATS

NH 50955 DooId: 32423539 Page 465

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Malala l

• :

There was considerable communication among the various plotting

elements. As Thomas Karamessines testified:

...I might add here that it seemed that a good

dozen or more, maybe 20 Chilean

senior officers

were privy to

what was going on in addition to

President Frei and they were all talking to one

another exchanging views

and trying to see how

best to mount the kind of coup that they wanted

to see take place. (Karamessines testimony, p. 10)

B. Contacts Prior to October 15

The CIA's initial task in Chile was to

assess the potential within

the Chilean military to stage a coup. It recognized quickly that anti-

Allende currents did exist in the military and the Carabineros (police),

but were immobilized by "the tradition of military respect for the

Constitution" and "the public and private stance of General Schneider,

Commander in Chief of the Army, who advocated strict adherence to the

Constitution." (CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, 18 Novem-

ber 1970, p. 17) The Agency's task, then, was to overcome "the apolitical,

constitutional-oriented inertia of the Chilean military." (Ibid, p. 2)

Since

the very top of the Chilean military, embodied by General

Schneider and his second-in-command, General Prat, were hostile to the

idea of a coup against Allende, discreet approaches were made to the

second level of general officers. They were to be informed that the U.s.

Government would support a coup both before and after it.took place,*

(Headquarters to Station 611, 7 October 1970) This effort began in

earnest on October 5 when Colonel Wimert informed both an Army General

("Station's priority contact") an an Air Force General of

the pro-coup

1. •

*The military officers were told, for example, that should Allende be

prevented from taking office, "The Chilean military will not be ostra-

cized, but rather can continue to count on us for MAP support and main-i*.

tenance of our close relationship." (Hqs. 075517, 7 October 1970)

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.....

U.S:

policy.

(Santiago 469, October 5; Santiago 473, October 6)*

Three days later the Chief of Station told General Huerta, Commander

of the Carabineros that "the U.S. Government favors a military solu-

tion and is willing to support it in 'any

manner short of outright

military intervention." (Task Force Log, 9 October) General Huerta

informed the COS that there was no chance of a coup by the Chilean

Army high command. (Task Force Log, 10 October)

On October 7, Colonel Wimert approached

members of the War Academy

in Santiago who in turn asked him to

provide light weapons. This was

Colonel Wimert's first contact with the Army Lt. Colonel to whom he

**

would ultimately pass three submachine guns on October 22.

At this

meeting, the Lt. Colonel told Colonel Wimert that he and his colleagues

were

trying to exert force on Frei to eliminate

Gen. Schneider

to either replace him, send

him out of the country. They had even stud-

ied plans to kidnap him. Schneider is the

main barrier to all plans for the military

to take over the government to prevent an

Allende presidency. (Santiago 483, 8 October)

*

According to the CIA's wrap-up report on Track II, between October 5

and October 20, the CIA Station and the Army Attache--for the most part

the latter--made 21 contacts with key military and Carabinero officials.

(CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, 8 November 1970)

**

In his testimony, Colonel Wimert indicated that the It. Colonel was

affiliated with General Canales.

(Wimert testimony, p. 52) In a cable

sent to Headquarters on

October 18, in which the Lt. Colonel's request

for three submachine guns was made, the Station indicated that Wimert

believed the Army officer, and his companion, a Navy Captain, were in

league with Admiral Tirado. (Station 562, October 18)

At another point

in his testimony, Wimert stated, "There was Valenzuela here and the Navy

Captain and the Army Lt. Colonel and the Air Fotce General over here."

(Wimert testimony, p. 107) The Committee has been unable to determine

the exact affiliation of the Army Lt. Colonel. However, as previously

stated, both General Canales and Admiral Tirado were affiliated with

General Valenzuela and Admiral Tirado was in contact with General Viaux.

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The next day, October 8, Headquarters cabled the Station in response

to the Wimert-Lt. Colonel meeting.

Headquarters took note of Schneider's

resistance to coup plans and stated:

...This would make it more important than

ever to remove him and to bring this new

state of events... anything we or Station

can do to effect removal of Schneider? We

know this rhetorical question, but wish

inspire thought on both

ends on this matter.

(Hqs. 628, 8 October)

During the first week of intensive efforts chances of success

looked

unusually bleak. The Chile Task Force Log commented:

President Frei and the highest levels of the

armed forces unable to pull themselves together

to block Allende.

The Chilean military's tradi-

tion of non-intervention, Frei's reluctance to

tarnish his historical image, General Schneider's

firm constitutional stand, and most importantly,

the lack of leadership within the government and

military are working against a military takeover.

(Task Force Log, 8 October)

The following day the Station made reference to the "rapid (ly) waning

chances for success."

(Santiago 487, 9 October). This pessimism was not

dispelled by

their simultaneous judgment:. "Station has

arrived at Viaux

solution by process of elimination." (Santiago 504, 10 October) Three

days later the Task Force agreed:

"We continue to focus our attention

on General Viaux who now appears to be the only military leader willing

to block Allende." (Task Force Log, 13 October)

If Viaux was

the CIA's only hope of staging a coup, things were bleak

indeed. His own colleagues, Generals Huerta and Valenzuela described him

as "a General without an army." (Santiago 495, 9 October) Yet in the

first two weeks of October he came to be regarded as the best hope for.

carrying out the CIA's Track II mandate.

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Although Colonel Wimert was instructed not to involve himself with

Viaux because of the high risk involved (Santiago 461, 5 October), he

served

initially as

a contact to Viaux through an Argentine military

Attache. The Argentine reported on October 5 that Viaux wanted several

hundred paralyzing gas grenades to launch a coup on October 9. (Santiago

476, 6 October) Headquarters turned down the request, concluding that

a "mini-coup at this juncture would be counterproductive" and Viaux

should postpone his plans, "while encouraging him in a suitable manner

to maintain his

posture so that he may join larger movement later if

it materializes." (Headquarters 585, 6 October)

The primary purpose of the "False Flag Base" was to contact Viaux,

and it very rapidly relieved Wimert and the Argentine Attache of that

task. Viaux reiterated his demand for an air drop of weapons to the

"False Flagger," and again the response was the same: reject the demand

for arms, but encourage him to keep planning. In essence the Agency

was buying time with Viaux:

"We wish to encourage Viaux to expand and

refine his coup planning. Gain

some influence over his actions."

(Headquarters 689, 10

October) To achieve this latter purpose, Head-

quarters

authorized

passing

$20,000 in cash and a promise of $250,000

in life insurance to Viaux and his associates, as a demonstration of

U.S. support. (Headquarters 729, 13 October)

On October 13, Headquarters again indicated its concern over Schneider

by asking: "What is to keep Schneider from making statement in early

hours which will freeze those military leaders who might otherwise join

Viaux?" (Headquarters 729, 13 October) The Station's response later that.

same day was "Viaux intends to kidnap Generals Schneider and Prats within

the next 48 hours in order to precipitate a coup."

(Santiago 527,

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13 October)" This Viaux kidnapping of Schneider was reported by the Sta-

tion "as part of a coup that included Valenzuela." (Station 529, 13 October)

At about this time the Station began to receive encouragement from its

other contacts.

On October 14, ten days before the Chilean Congress was

to vote, the Task Force Log concluded:

Now we

are beginning to see signs of increasing

coup activity from other military quarters,

specifically, an Army General (name deleted),

Admiral Tirado, the forces in Concepcion and

Valdivis and perhaps even Frei and Ossa.

(Task Force Log, 14 October)

C. October 15 Decision

To summarize, by October 15, General Viaux had advertised to his con-

tact a desire to proceed with a coup, had indicated he would deal with

the Schneider obstacle by kidnapping him, had met at least once with Gen-

erals Huerta and Valenzuela and had once postponed his coup plans.*

On October 15 Thomas Karamessines

met Henry Kissinger and Alexander

Haig at the White House to discuss the situation

in Chile. According

to the Agency's record of this meeting, Karamessines "provided a run-

down on Viaux, the Canales meeting with Tirado, and, in some detail,

the general situation in Chile from the coup-possibility viewpoint."

(Memorandum of Conversation/Kissinger, Karamessines, and Haig, 15 October

1970) A decision was made at the meeting "to de-fuse the Viaux coup plot,

at least temporarily:"

* The reason for Viaux postponing his coup plans was the subject of a cable

from Santiago to Headquarters:

We discount Viaux's statement that he had called off his coup at-

tempt because of False Flag Officer's impending visit. Other re-

porting indicated Viaux probably not able or intending move this

weekend. (Santiago 499, 10 October)

There is

also

reason to believe that General Valenzuela was instrumental

in persuading Viaux to postpone. According to the Chile Task Force Log:

Station reported that on 12 October General Valenzuela met

with General Viaux and attempted to persuade him not to at-

tempt a coup." (Chile Task Force Log, 14 October)

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It

was decided by those present that the Agency

must get a message to Viaux warning him against

any precipitate action. In essence the message

should state:

"We have reviewed your plans and

based on your information and ours, we come to

the conclusion that your plans for a coup at

time cannot succeed.

Failing, they may re-

your capabilities in

the future. Preserve

your

assets.

We will stay in touch.

The time

will come when you with all your other friends

can do something. You will continue to have

our support." (15 October Memorandum of Conver-

sation, Kissinger, Karamessines, Haig)

The meeting concluded, according to the Agency's record, "on Dr.

Kissinger's note that the Agency should continue keeping the pressure

on every Allende weak spot in sight--now, after the 24th of October,

after 5 November, and into the future until such time as new marching

orders are given.

Mr. Karamessines stated that the Agency would comply."*

The following day CIA Headquarters cabled the results of the White

House meeting

to the Station in Santiago:

2. It is firm and continuing policy that Allende

be overthrown by a coup....We are to continue to

generate maximum pressure

toward this end utiliz-

ing every appropriate resource.

3.

After the most careful consideration it was

determined that a Viaux coup attempt carried out

by him alone with the forces now at his disposal

would fail.

Thus it would be counterproductive

to our Track Two objectives.

It was decided that

CIA get a message to Viaux warning him against

precipitate action. (Headquarters 802, 16 Octo-

ber)

The message was supplemented by orders to "continue to encourage him

(Viaux) to amplify his planning; encourage him to join forces with other

coup planners." (Headquarters 802, 16 October) The message concluded:

"There is great and continuing interest in the activities of Tirado,.

Canales, Valenzuela

et al and we wish them optimum good fortune." (Ibid.)

*

Secretary Kissinger's recollection of the October 15 meeting is not

in accord with that of Mr. Karamessines or the cable (Headquarters 802)

that was sent the following day to the Station in Santiago.

This

mat-

ter will be discussed in Part V of this report.

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D.

Coup Planning and Attempts After October 15

The decision to "de-fuse" General Viaux was passed to Viaux's

father-in-law on October 17. The in-law

responded that it did not

matter because they had decided to proceed with the coup in any case.

(Santiago 533, 17 October) At the final meeting of the CIA "False

Flagger" and Viaux's father-in-law on October 18, the Agency was in-

formed that the coup would proceed on October 22, "and that the abduc-

tion of General Schneider is first link in chain of events to come."

(Santiago 568, 19 October) An "emergency channel" of communication

with Viaux was maintained. (Report on CIA Chilean Task Force Activities,

18 November 1970, page 21)

As previously stated, by mid-October things suddenly looked brighter

*

for a coup being mounted by the high-level Chilean

military contacts.

As a CIA overview

statement in Track II stated:

Coup possibilities afforded by the active

duty military group led by General Valenzuela

and Admiral Tirado had always seemed more

promising than the capabilities of the Viaux

group.

These military officers had the abil-

ity and resources to act providing they de-

cided to move and organized themselves ac-

cordingly.

(CIA Briefing Paper, "Special Mandate from

the President on Chile,"

July 15, 1975, p. 5)

By mid-October those military officers appeared to be moving in

this direction.

On the evening of October 17, Colonel Wimert met with the Army Lt.

Colonel and

the

Navy Captain. They requested 8 to 10 tear gas grenades,

*Two coup plotters, Generals Canales and Garin, made one last attempt to

persuade General Schneider to change his anti-coup 'position on October 15:.

The Station

reported that the meeting turned out to be a "complete fiasco.

Schneider refused to listen to General Canales' eloquent presentation of

Communist action in Chile...and adament in maintaining his non-involvement

stance."

(Santiago 548, 16 October)

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ithree *45-caliber machine guns and 500 rounds of ammunition.

The Navy

Captain said he had three

machine guns himself "but can be identified

by serial numbers as having been issued to him. Therefore unable to

use them." (Santiago 562, 18 October)

Colonel Wimert and the Chief

of Station have testified

that the officers wanted the machine guns

for self-protection. The question, of course, is whether the arms were

intended for use, or were used, in the kidnapping of General Schneider.

The fact that the weapons

were provided the Lt. Colonel and the Navy

Captain and

that Viaux associates were convicted of the Schneider killing

suggests that the guns were not involved.

The machine guns and ammunition were seat from Washington by diplo-

matic pouch

on

the

morning of October 19, although Headquarters was

puzzled about their purpose:

"Will continue make effort provide them

but find our credulity stretched by Navy Captain leading his troops

with

sterile guns.

What is special purpose for these guns?

We will

try send

them whether you can provide explanation or not." (Headquarters

854, 18 October)

The first installment was delivered to the Army Lt.

Colonel and the Navy Captain late in the evening of October 18 and con-

sisted of the six tear gas grenades intended originally.for Viaux.*

-

* As previously stated, after October 15 CIA efforts to promote a coup in

Chile focussed on the active duty military officers--Valenzuela, et. al.--

rather than Viaux.

An example of this shift in focus was the decision to

provide the Army Lt. Colonel and the Army Captain the tear gas grenades

originally intended for Viaux. A cable from Santiago explained the purpose.

of

this action:

Station plans give six tear gas grenades to

Colonel Wimert for delivery to Armed Forces

officers (deletion) instead of having False

Flag Officer deliver them to Viaux group.

Our reasoning is that Wimert dealing with

active duty officers.

Also False Flagger

leaving evening 18 October, and will not be

replaced but Wimert will stay here.

Hence

important that Wimert credibility with Armed

Forces officers be strengthened.

(Santiago 562, 18 October)

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•-**

That same day, General Valenzuela informed Colonel Wimert that he,

General Huerta, Admiral Tirado and an Air Force General were prepared

to sponsor a coup. (CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, 18

November

1970) Their plan was to begin with the kidnapping of General

Schneider on the following evening, October 19, at a military

dinner being given for Schneider,* after which Schneider would be flown

to Argentina, Frei would resign and leave Chile, Admiral Tirado would

head the military junta, and dissolve Congress. With respect to the

kidnapping of Schneider, the cable reports:

General Viaux knowledgeable of above operation

but not directly involved. He has been sent to

Vina to stay with prominent physfcian.

Will be

seen in public places during 19 and 20 October

to demonstrate fact that above operation not his

doing.

Will be allowed to return to Santiago at

end of week.

Military will not admit involve-

ment in Schneider's abduction which is to be

blamed on leftists. (Santiago 566, 19 October) $

The kidnapping of the evening of October 19 failed because General Schneider

left in a private vehicle, rather than in his official car, and his police guard

failed to be withdrawn, but the Army It. Colonel assured Colonel Wimert that an-

other attempt would be made

on October 20. (Santiago 582, 20 October)

Colonel Wimert was authorized to pay Valenzuela $50,000 "which was the price

agreed upon between the plotters and the unidentified team of abductors."

* The "False Flag Officer" who was in contact with Viaux at the time

the Valenzuela plan was given to Colonel Wimert apparently understood

that Viaux was involved in the October 19 attempt.

He stated:

Q. Were you told any of the details of how

the (Viaux) kidnapping would be carried out?

Mr. Sarne.

They indicated it was going to be

at some sort of a banquet which the General

(Schneider) would be attending.

(Sarno testimony, p. 37)

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=JY÷

but Wimert insisted that the kidnapping be completed before he paid the

money. (Task Force Log, 20 October) At the same time General Valenzuela

assured Colonel Wimert that the military was

now prepared to move.

(Task

Force Log, 20 October) The second abduction attempt on the 20th also

failed and the Task Force concluded

Since Valenzuela's group is apparently having

considerable difficulty executing even the first

step of its coup plan, the prospects for a coup

succeeding or even occurring before 24 October

now appears remote. (Task Force Log, 22 October)

E. The Killing of General Schneider

In the early morning hours of October 22 (2 am), Colonel Wimert

delivered the three submachine guns with ammunition to the Army It.

Colonel in an isolated section of Santiago.*

in :

"Although Colonel Wimert's testimony and the cable traffic do not

clearly establish the identity of the group to which the Lt. Colonel

was affiliated (see page 31) two CIA statements on Track II tie the

weapons, and therefore the Lt. Colonel, to the Valenzuela group:

...The only assistance requested by Valenzuela

to set the plan Lof October 19/ into motion

through Schneider's abduction was several sub-

machine guns, ammunition, a few tear gas grenades

and gas masks (all of which were provided) plus

$50,000 for expenses (which was to be passed upon

demand.

(CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities,

18 November 1970, p. 22)

... Three sub-machine guns, together with six gas

cannisters and

masks, were passed to the Valen-

zuela group at 2 am on 22 October. The reason

why they still wanted the weapons was because

there were two days remaining before

the Congress

decided the Presidential election and the Valen-

zuela group maintained some hope they could still

carry out their plans.

(CIA Briefing Paper, "Special Mandate from the

President on Chile,"

p. 7, July 15, 1975)

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At about I am that day the group that intended to kidnap General

Schneider met to discuss last-minute instructions. According to the

findings of the Chilean Military Court which investigated the Schneider

killing, neither the Army Lt. Colonel nor the Navy Captain were there.

Shortly after 8 am, General Schneider's car was intercepted, on his

way to work, by the abductorsand he was

mortally wounded when he drew

his handgun in self-defense. The Military Court determined that hand

gurs had been used to kill General Schneider, although it also found

*

that one unloaded machine gun was at the scene of the killing.

The first Station reports following the Schneider shooting said

"Military Mission sources claim General Schaeider machine gunned on

way to work" (Santiago 587, 22 October) and "Assailants used grease

guns." (Santiago 589, 22 October). The submachine guns had previously

been described as "grease guns." Thus the initial reaction of the Station

was that Schneider had been shot with the same kind of weapons delivered

several hours earlier to the Army Lt. Colonel. Santiago then informed

Headquarters "Station has instructed Col. Wimert to hand over $50,000

if Gen. Valenzuela requests " (Santiago 592, 22 October), thus indicating

that the Station thought the kidnapping had been accomplished by Valen-

zuela's paid abductors. Later that day, the Station cabled Headquarters:

* The Military Court determined that those who participated in the

shooting of General Schneider on October 22 were

part of the Viaux-led

conspiracy. The Court also found that this same group had participated

in the October 19 and 20 kidnap attempts.

In June 1972 General Viaux

was convicted for complicity in the plot

culminating in the death of General Schneider. He received a 20-year

prison sentence for being "author of the crime of kidnapping which re-.

sulted in serious injury to the victim," and a five-year exile for con-

spiring to cause a military coup.

Also convicted on the latter charge

were Generals Valenzuela and Tirado. They received sentences of three

years

in exile.

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Station unaware if assassination

was pre

meditated or whether it constituted bungled

abduction attempt.

In any case, it important

to bear in mind that move against Schneider

was conceived by and executed

at behest of

senior Armed Forces officers. We know that

General Valenzuela was involved.

near certain that Admiral Tirado, Army Lt.

Colonel and Navy Captain witting and involved.

We have reason for believeing that General

Viaux and numerous associates fully clued in,

but cannot prove or disprove that execution

or attempt against Schneider was entrusted to

elements linked with Viaux.

Important factor

to bear in mind is that Armed Forces, and not

retired officers or extreme rightests, set

Schneider up for execution or abduction....

All we can say is that attempt against Schneii

is affording Armed Forces one last opportunit

to prevent Allende's

election if they are wil

to follow Valenzuela's scenario.

(Santiago 598, 22 October)

F. Post October 22 Events

The shooting of General Schneider resulted immediatel

tion of martial law, the appointment of General Prats to

as Commander in Chief, and the appointment of General Val

of Santiago province. These measures,

and others taken,

Task Force to make the following initial judgment:

With only 24 hours remaining before the Congre

Although 11

prediction of ‹

an abduction al

constitutional:

Dr. Allende wa:

died the next

uel

closely

plotters'

post Vane else enhan consequent

(Chile Task Force Log, 22 Octot

On October 23, Director Helms reviewed and discussed

It was agreed...that a maximum effort has beer.

and that now only the Chileans themselves.can

successful coup. The Chileans have been guide

point where a military solution is at least of

them.

(Task Force Log; 24 Octot

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Wit trous de was one semestately clear to cia oberverts, the station 'a

prediction of October 9 that the shooting of Schneider (as a result of

an abduction attempt) would "rally the Army firmly behind the flag of

constitutionalism" was correct.

(Santiago 495, 9 October) On October 24

Dr. Allende was confirmed by the Chilean Congress. General Schneider

died the next day.

TOP SECRET

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V.

09501

CIA/White House Communication During Track II

The testimony given to the Committee by Henry Kissinger and General

Haig conflicts with that given by CIA officials.

Kissinger and Haig testified that on October 15, 1970, the White

House stood downCIA efforts to promote a military coup d'etat in Chile.

Both testified that after that date they

were neither informed of, nor

authorized, CIA Track II activities, including the kidnap plans of

General Schneider and the passage of weapons to the military plotters.

By contrast, CIA officials testified that they operated before and

after October 15 with the knowledge and approval of the White House.

The conflict pertains directly to the period after October 15, but

it bears on

the degree of communication between the White House and the

CIA in the earlier period as well. For instance, Henry Kissinger testi-

fied that he was informed of no coup plan which began with the abduction

of General Schneider. He was aware of General Viaux's plan--which he

and Karamessines decided on October 15 to try to forestall--but did

not

know that it was to begin with Schneider's abduction.

CIA officials, especially Thomas Karamessines, stated that there was

close consultation throughout Track II between the Agency and the White

House. Karamessines testified that he met with Kissinger some six to

ten times during the five weeks of Track II (Karamessines testimony,

page 66); and that he kept Kissinger generally informed of developments.

(Ibid., page 56) The Committee has records of two meetings between

Karamessines and Kissinger and of

one telephone conversation between

Karamessines and Kissinger's deputy, General Alexander Haig.

Karamessines'

daily calendar indicates that three other meetings with General Haig

took place--but does not establish with

inty that the topic was

0,6 26g 106 41 6)

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RAFT

A. September

September 18

Helms

and Karamessines

met with Kissinger at the White House. As

Helms' notes of the September 15 meeting indicate, Kissinger wanted a

plan within 48 hours. In the meeting on the 18th, according to CIA

records, there was little discussion of a military coup. Rather the

conversation

focused on "what economic leverage could be exercised in

the Chilean

situation...." (Memorandum/Meeting with DDP, 18 September)

The efficacy of economic pressure continued to be a subject of con-

cern during the last days of September. Apparently that pressure was

viewed as another inducement to Frei to opt for the "Frei gambit."

September 21

The 40 Committee met. The Select Committee has no confirmation

that Chile was on the agenda at this meeting. Karamessines' calendar

confirms that he attended; presumably Kissinger, the 40 Committee chair-

man, also

attended, although the Committee has not been able to review

his calendar. All that can be said about this meeting--and the meetings

of the Senior Review Group, which Kissinger also chaired--is that the

meetings afforded Karamessines and Kissinger an opportunity to meet

privately

and discuss Track II if they desired. In all these instances

save the 40 Committee meeting on September 22, the Committee has no

evidence to confirm that such a private Kissinger/Karamessines meeting

actually took place. That the CIA prepared a memorandum of conversa-

tion for the private meeting on the 22nd but has been able to find none

for other meetings may provide some support for the argument that no

other such private

meetings occurred.

September 22

Kissinger asked Karamessines to stay behind

meeting called to discuss Track I. The two

after

mmit tee

2049 1a

discussed Track II" actions,

especially the contacts with then-Chilean-President Frei.

According to

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coat we enon kissinger told karanessines chat "our

nandling of the problem during the earlier meeting had been perfect

and he added

we were doing fine and keep

it up."

(Memorandum for

the Record/Chile, 22 September 1970, by Thomas Karamessines)

B. October

October 5

A cable sent to Santiago, released by Karamessines, requested a

report on how the Station planned to contact the three Chilean Generals

--Prats, Valenzuela and Huerta--named in a cable of September 30.

(Headquarters 449) The October 5 cable indicated that the report was

needed for a discussion with Kissinger on October 6. (Santiago 556,

5 October 1970) Karamessines presumed such a meeting had taken place,

although he had no specific memory of it. (Karamessines testimony,

pp. 69-70) His calendar for October 6 indicates that he attended a 40

Committee meeting on Chile. (Karamessines calendar) Kissinger

chaired the 40 Committee.

October 6

The Station reported that General Viaux was "ready to launch golpe

evening 9 October, or morning 10 October." (Santiago 472, 6 October

1970)

In response, CIA Headquarters labeled the prospective coup one

"with scant chance of success which will vitiate any further more seri-

ous action." The Station was directed to try to "stop ill-considered

action at this time." (Headquarters 585, 6 October 1970)

Kissinger testified he had not been informed of the Viaux plan,

supporting his recollection with the fact that the CIA memorandum of

an October 10 conversation between Karamessines and Haig (see below)

makes

no mention of any previous plots.

(Kissinger testimony, p. 24):

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Similarly, Kissinger did not remember having been informed that the

CIA had called off a coup it regarded as premature. He stated:.

My perception at that period

was that if they

had a coup they would

come...back to us

before

triggering it...at no time

during the period

did they, in fact, tell us... that they had a

coup that might be ready to go. And, indeed,

they generally told us the opposite.

(Kissinger testimony, pp. 25-26)

As Karamessines' calendar indicated, there was a 40 Committee meet-

ing on October 6. He attended this meeting, along with Richard Helms:

and William Broe of the CIA. According to the minutes of that meeting,

CIA efforts to promote a military coup in Chile were not discussed.

However, in an exchange with Charles Meyer, who was then the State De-

partment's Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs, Dr. Kissinger

stressed the desire of "higher

authority" (President Nixon) to prevent

Allende's assumption of office. According to the minutes:

Mr. Meyer pointed to the need to determine a

post-Allende

position such

as proposed in NSSM 97.. It was agreed

that

an early NSC meeting was desirable on that subject. Mr.

Kissinger said this presumed total acceptance of a fait

accompli and higher authority had no intention of conced-

ing before the 24th; on the contrary, he wanted no stone

left unturned. (Memorandum for the Record/Minutes of the.

Meeting of the 40 Comnittee, 6 October 1970, 7 October

1970)

October 8

Karamessines met for lunch with General Haig. (Karamessines calendar)

In his testimony, Haig recalled being aware that the CIA was in touch

with two differenct groups of military plotters. He believed there must

have been another meeting in which the CIA informed him of its on-going

contacts.

TOP SECRET

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It seems to me, although the records don't re-

flect it,

that

there was a meeting in September,

a very brief one, in which I must have been

told that there was a specific program going

underway.

That probably would have been by

Henry (Kissinger) and perhaps with Karamessines

there.

am not sure.

(Haig testimony, p. 12)

October 10

Karamessines discussed the Chilean

situation by telephone with General

Haig.

He indicated that the Station had "made direct contact with a number

of the senior military officers, especially those who had been reportedly

very activist-minded and had received pessimistic reactions from all."

(Memorandum/FUBELT, by William Broe, 10 October 1970)

Haig recalled the telephone conversation with Karamessines on the 10th.

His recollection accords with the CIA memorandum of conversation.

I do know, and I know that from looking at the

record this morning, that Karamessines made a

telephone call to me in which he gave a progress

report.

I recall that.

It was in effect a nega-

tive progress report, that they were just not com-

ing up with it. (Haig testimony, p. 12)

All 1LA

TOP SECRET

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meeting on

the

.15th. (see below) to have discussed the results of the

culoctober inch mesage. But the CIA record makes no menezon of any

such discussion. (Kissinger testimony, p. 53)

October 14

The 40 Committee met to discuss, among other topics, Chile. In ad-

dition to the 40 Committee principals (Kissinger, John Mitchell, David

Packard, Alexis Johnson, Admiral Moorer), the meeting was attended by.

Karamessines, William Broe and General Robert Cushman of the CIA,. Charles

Meyer from State, Viron Vaky, and Ambassador Korry, who had returned to

Washington from Santiago for a short period of consultation.

According to the minutes of that meeting, Kissinger asked Karamessines

to give a rundown on the latest developments and present situation in Chile.'

Karamessines pointed out that "a coup climate does not presently exist."

He noted that "the unpredictable General Viaux is the only individual seem-

ingly ready to attempt a coup and...his chances of mounting a successful

one were slight." Ambassador Korry agreed with Karamessines' assessment

and stated that "as of now it seemed almost certain that Allende would

be voted into office on October 24th." Kissinger then observed that

"there presently appeared to be little the U.S. can do to influence the

Chilean situation.one way or another." Other participants at the meet-

ing concurred. (Memorandum for the Record/Minutes of the Meeting of the

40 Committee, 14 October 1970, 16 October 1970)

TOP

SEGRET

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MAGE RA

October 15

Karamessines met with Kissinger and Haig at the White House to

dis-

cuss Track II. According to the CIA memorandum of conversation, Karamessines

gave a run-down on Viaux, Canales and Tirado and "the general situation in

Chile from

the coup-possibility viewpoint." It was concluded that Viaux

did not have more than one chance in twenty--perhaps less--to launch

successful coup.

Kissinger ticked off the list of negative repercussions

from an unsuccessful coup.

The CIA record of the meeting continues:

5. It was decided by those present

that the

Agency must get a message to Viaux warning him

against any precipitate action.. In essence our

message was to state:

"We have reviewed your

plans,

and based on your information and

ours,

we come to the conclusion that your plans for a

coup at this time cannot succeed.

Failing,

they may reduce your capabilities for the future:

Preserve your assets.

We will stay in touch.

The time will come when you with all your other

friends can do something. You will continue to

have our support."

6. After the decision to de-fuse the Viaux coup

plot, at least temporarily, Dr. Kissinger. instruc-

ted Mr. Karamessines to preserve Agency assets in

Chile, working clandestinely and securely to main-

tain the capability for Agency operations against

Allende in the future.

8. The meeting concluded on Dr. Kissinger's note

that the Agency should continue keeping the pres-

sure on every Allende weak spot in sight--now,

after the 24th of October,

after 5 November, and

into the future until such time as new marching

orders are given. Mr. Karamessines stated that

the Agency would comply.

(Memorandum of Conversation/Dr. Kissinger, Mr.

Karamessines, Gen. Haig at the White House, 15

October 1970)

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Kissinger, in his

testimony before the Committee, regarded the CIA

memorandum of conversation as substantially correct, although somewhat

more detailed than he would have remembered. (Kissinger testimony, p. 52)

He believed the Agency had been told to "stand down and preserve your

assets."

Kissinger believed that the gist of the October 15th meeting as

recorded in the CIA memorandum was incompatible with the order the CIA

issued to its Station the next day, an order ostensibly based on the •

October 15th meeting. And, he noted, in writing its memorandum of the

meeting of the 15th, the CIA had a "high incentive to preserve the maxi-

mum degree of authority." (Ibid., pp. 55-56) The October 16th order

indicated that Track II had been reviewed at "high USG level" the previous

day,

and stated:

2. It is firm and continuing policy that Allende

be overthrown by a coup.

It would be much prefer-

able to have this transpire prior to 24 October

but efforts in this regard will continue vigorously

beyond this date....

4. There is great and continuing interest in the

activities of Tirado, Canales, Valenzuela et al

and we wish them optimum good fortune.

(Headquarters

802, 16 October 1970)

Kissinger recalled the October 15th conversation as "turning off

the coup plans rather than giving a new order to do them." (Kissinger

testimony, p. 56) Haig agreed in his testimony.

The conclusions of that meeting were that we had

better not do anything rather than something that

was not going to succeed....My general feeling

was, I left that meeting

with the impression that

there was nothing authorized."

(Haig testimony, p. 13)

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October 10-October 22 (approximate)

Karamessines and one or two others went with Kissinger to speak with

the President, after a larger meeting. Karamessines believed this meeting

took place between October 10 and 24. (Karamessines

testimony, P. 89)

According to Karamessines, the "President went out of his way to impress

all of those there with his conviction that it was absolutely essential

that the election of Mr. Allende to the presidency be thwarted. ""

As

they

were leaving the Oval Office, the President took Karamessines aside

to reiterate

the message. (Karamessines

testimony, p. 8)

October 19

Station cabled Headquarters early in the morning, advising that

the tear gas had been passed and outlining the Valenzuela coup plan,

beginning with the kidnap of Schneider. In testimony before the Com-

mittee, Karamessines indicated he certainly would have reported the

Valenzuela plan to Kissinger "very promptly, if for no other reason

than that we didn't have all that much promising news to report to

the White House...." (Karamessines

testimony, p. 72)

And as I say, if for no other reason we would have

wanted to get this kind of hopeful report to the

White House as soon as possible, and it would be my

best estimate now that

that is precisely what we

did.

(p. 72).

In the afternoon of the 19th, Karamessines met with General Haig

for an hour at the White House. (Karamessines calendar) By then,

Karamessines would have had in hand the cable outlining the Valenzuela

*

If the meeting with the President

occurred after October 15, that

would lend credence to the testimony of CIA officials that they were

not directed to end their coup efforts in the October 15th meeting.

Unfortunately, the Committee has not had access to the daily calendars

of President Nixon or Secretary Kissinger, which might pinpoint the

date of the President's conversation with

Karamessines.

Those calen-

dars, along with other White House documents bearing on Track II, have

been

subpoenaed.

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plan,

since the cable had arrived that morning. However, General Haig

had no recollection of the meeting with Karamessines on the 19th. Nor

did he believe he had been informed of the Valenzuela plan.

"This

is all very

new

to me. I hadn't seen any of this, and I was

not familiar

with this

particular plan...or $50,000, or any of the characters that

are described in here." (Haig testimony, pP. 38-39)

Similarly, Kissinger testified that he had not been informed of

the Valenzuela plan. He said he "was informed of nothing after October

15th...." (Kissinger testimony, p. 65) He indicated that, according

to his daily calendar, he had no conversation with either Karamessines

or Helms between the 15th and the 19th. (Ibid., P. 53) He indicated

that he never knew that the CIA was in the process of passing guns and

tear gas to Chilean military conspirators.

He said

"...there was no

further meeting on that subject. In anybody's record, mine or theirs

(the CIA's), none of the information from the 16th on was familiar to me."

(Ibid., p. 62)

Kissinger further testified he did not know that the United States

was dealing with Chilean officers who plotted a coup which involved

the abduction of General Schneider:

Senator Hart of Colorado. I am not sure that

the record clearly shows

you answer to the direct

question of whether you knew of did not know that

we were negotiating with military officers with

regard to a plot that did involve the abduction

of General Schneider.

Secretary Kissinger.

I said I did not know.

(Kissinger testimony, p. 86)

Nor did General Haig believe he had been informed of any abduction

plans before the fact.

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-Were

aware during that period of time

the plans to kidnap General Schneider?

General Haig. I was aware after the fact....

Q. But you were never informed prior to his

attempted abduction?

General Haig.

I don't believe I was at all.

-

October 20

A cable to the Station indicated that "while awaiting word on whatever

events may have occurred 19 October, please let us know what you can on

interim basis....Headquarters must respond during morning 20 October to

queries from high levels." (Headquarters 883, 20 October 1970) Karamessines

testified that the references to "high levels" in the cable of the 20th

meant White House officials, probably Kissinger. He felt quite certain

that Kissinger would have been briefed in advance about Valenzuela's plan

for the l9th and so would have been expected to ask what happened on the

morning of the 20th. (Karamessines testimony, p. 73) In contrast, Kissinger

interpreted that cable in precisely the opposite light. He felt it indicated

that he had not been informed of the Valenzuela plan in advance. When

news

of the Schneider kidnap reached the White House, Kissinger believed

he would have had "somebody pick up a telephone and say, 'What is this

all about?'"

(Kissinger transcript, p. 68)

October 22

Karamessines met with Haig at the White House.

(Karamessines calendar)

General Haig remembered that word of the shooting of Schneider came as

"a great shock" to him, and he believed that Karamessines had told him

about it in their meeting on the 22nd. He thought that Kissinger either

was

present at the meeting

or that he, Haig, had gone immediately in to

Kissinger's office to relate what Karamessines had told him!

(Haig testi-

mony, p. 36)

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=34-

C. December

December 2

A memorandum,

dated December 2, 1970, from Helms to Kissinger stated

that Helms had given a recapitulation on Track II to Attorney General•

Mitchell, who would deliver it personally to Kissinger.

A handwritten

note

on

the memorandum reads: "sent to Kissinger via DCI (Helms)."

(Helms memorandum for Kissinger, 2 December 1970) The report, which

was dated November 18, 1970, contained a full account of CIA activities

during Track II, including

the several plans to kidnap Schneider and

the passage of weapons to the Chilean conspirators. (Report on CIA

Chilean Task Force Activities, 15 September to 3 November 1970, 18

November 1970)

In his testimony to the Committee, Kissinger did not recall receiv-

ing the report, although he doubted that he would have read such an

"after action" report in

any

case. He testified that he could not find

it in his files, in contrast to his finding a CIA report on Track I,

dated November 19, 1970. Kissinger was puzzled by. a number of aspects of

the memorandum and report: why there were two reports, why the report

of the l8th apparently was only called to his attention on the 2nd of

December, and why it was to be delivered through Mitchell. (Kissinger

testimony, pp. 71, 74)

D. Did Track II End?

The Committee also received conflicting testimony about whether or

not Track II ever ended, formally or in fact. As noted above, Kissinger indi-

cated that Track II was supposed to have ended, as far as he was concerned, on

October 15. It was formally terminated, according to Kissinger, by a new Presi-

dential marching order issued prior to the October 24 vote of the Chilean Congress.

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....

The Committee does not have this new "marching

order" in its possession.

However, CIA officials from whom the Committee took testimony believed

that there had been no such definitive end to Track II. It merely

tapered off, to be replaced by a longer-term effort to effect a change

of government in Chile... Karamessines' testimony was most explicit:

Mr. Karamessines. I am

sure that the seeds that

were laid in that effort in 1970 had their impact

in 1973.

I do not have any question about that

in my mind either.

(Karamessines testimony, p. 26)

***

Q. Was Track II ever formally ended?

Was there

a specific order ending it?

Mr. Karamessines.

As far as I was concerned,

Track II was really never ended. What we were

told to do in effect was, well, Allende is now

President.

So Track II, which sought to prevent

him from becoming President, was technically out,

it was done.

But what we were told to do was to

continue our efforts.

Stay alert, and to do what

we could to contribute to the eventual achieve-

ment of the objectives and purposes of Track II.

That being the case, I don't think it is proper

to say that Track II was ended.

(Ibid., pp. 128-129)

When informed of Karamessines' testimony that Track II was never

ended, Kissinger testified:

The Chairman. Would you take issue with that,

with the (Karamessines) testimony?

Secretary Kissinger. Totally....It is clear

that...after October 15th that there was no

separate channel by the CIA to the White House

and that all actions

with respect to Chile were

taken in the 40 Committee framework. There was

no 40 Committee that authorized an approach to

or contact with military people, no plots which

I am familiar with, and all the covert operations

in Chile after Allende's election by the Congress

were directed towards maintaining the democratic

opposition for the 1976 election. And that was

the exclusive thrust, and if there was any further.

contact with military plotting, it was, totally

unauthorized and this is the first that I have

heard of it. (Kissinger testimony, PP. 75-77)

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shouldput

(Draft--9/8/75)

that

TRUEHANTS OR STATE

A.,.

Summary

South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother,

Ngo Dinh Nhu, were assassinated during a coup by Vietnamese

generals on November 2, 1963. Evidence before the Committee

indicates that the United States Government offered encourage-.

ment for the coup, but neither desired nor was involved in the

assassinations: Rather, Diem's assassination appears to have

been a spontaneous act by Vietnamese generals, engendered by

anger at Diem for refusing to resign or put himself in the

custody of the leaders of the coup.

On one occasion, General Duong Van Minh ("Big Minh") out-

lined to a CIA officer the possible assassination of Nhu and

another brother, Ngo Dinh Can, as one of three methods being

considered for changing the government in the near future.

Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge and Deputy Chief of Mission William

Trueheart were informed of this possibility by the Saigon Chief

of Station, who recommended that "we do not set ourselves

irrevocably against the assassination plot, since the other two

alternatives mean either a bloodbath in Saigon or a protracted

struggle which would rip the Army- and the country asunder" (CIA

cable SAIG 1447, Saigon Station to DCI, 10/5/63). Upon being

informed, Director McCone sent two cables. The first stated

"Iwe cannot be in the position of stimulating, approving, or

supporting assassination"

, and the second directed that the

- recommendation be withdrawn because "we cannot be in position

actively condoning such course of action and thereby engaging

NN 50955 DocId: 32423539 Page 492

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our responsibility therefor"' (CIA cable, DCI to Saigon 10/5/63);

CIA cable DIR 73661, DCI to Saigon, 10/6/63).

B.

The Abortive Coup of August 1963

• On May 8, 1963, South Vietnamese troops in the City of Hue

fired on Buddhists protesting against the Diem Government, killing

nine and wounding fourteen. This incident triggered a nationwide

Buddhist protest and a sharp loss of popular confidence in the

Dien regime.*

• On May 18, United States Ambassador Frederick i. Holting

met with Diem and outlined steps which the United States desired

him to take to redress

the Buddhist grievances and recapture

public confidence. These steps included admitting responsibility

for the llue incident, compensating the victims, and reaffirming

religious equality in the country. (Pentagon Papers, p.208) On

June 3, Madame Whu, the wife of Diem's brother, Nhu, publicly

accused the Buddhists of being infiltrated with Communist agents;

Truehart protested her remarks to Diem and threatened to dis-

associate the United States from any repressive measures against

the Buddhists in the future (Pentagon Papers, P.308). Shortly

thereafter, Madame ihu commented on the self-inmolation of Quang

* Senator Gravel Laition, The Pentagon Papers, The Defense Depart-

ment fistory of United States Decisionnaking

on Vietnam, pp. 207-

208, Volume II, Beacon Press, Boston (hereinafter cited

as Pentagon

Papers).

Former Public Affairs Officer of the U.S. Embassy in

Saigon, John Mecklin), in his book, Mission in Torment, An Intimate

Account of the U.S. Role in Vietnam, Doubleday and Company, 1965,

(hereinafter cited as Mecklin, at pages 158-60 described the vul-

nerability of the Buddhists to Communist infiltration during this

period noting

that it'offered a classic opportunity for a Conmunist

sleeper ploy."

HW 50955 DocId:32423539 Page 493

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Duc and other Buddhist monks by stating that she would like to

furnish mustard for the monks' barbecue. On June 12, Trueheart

told Diem that Quang Duc's suicide had shocked the world and

again warned that the United States would break with his govern-

ment if he did not solve the Buddhist problem. (Pentagon Papers,

p. 208.)

Lucien Conein, a CIA officer in Saigon, * testified that the

Buddhist uprisings were the catalyst that ultimately brought

down the Diem

regime (Conein, PP. 42-44). These events led the

United States to apply "direct, relentless, and tablehammering

pressure

on Diem such as the United States has seldom before

attempted with a sovereign friendly government." (Mecklin, p. 169)

By July 4, 1963, Generals Minh, Don, Kim, and Khiem had

agreed on the necessity for

a coup. **.

In his final meeting on August 14 with Ambassador Nolting,

Diem agreed to make a public statement offering. concessions to

the Buddhists. This statement took the form of an interview

* Conein testified that he had known the Generals involved

in the coup

"for many years.

Some of them I had known back even in

World War II.

Some of them were in powerful positions,

and I was able to talk to them on a person to person basis,

not as a government official."

(Conein, P: 17.)

** Conein's After-Action Report stated that:

"The majority of the officers, including General Minh,

desired President Diem to have honorable retirement from

the political scene in South Vietnam and exile.

Ngo Dinh Nhu and Ngo Dinh Can, there was never dissention.

The attitude was

that their deaths, along with Madame Ngo

Dinh Nhu, would be welcomed." (Conein After-Action Report,

p. 10.)

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with the columnist, Margurite Higgins, in which Diem asserted

that his policy toward the Buddhists had always been conciliatory

and"asked for harmony and support of the government.

Shortly after midnight on August 21, 1963, Whu ordered forces

loyal to him to attack pagodas throughout Vietnam, arresting monks

and sacking the sacred buildings. Over thirty monks were injured

and 1,400 arrested.

The American Embassy was taken by surprise

and viewed the attacks as a shattering repudiation of Diem's

promises to iolting. (Pentagon tapers, p.¿iU)

On August 24, 1963, the State Department sent a cable

(Deptel 243) to the new ambassador in Vietnam, Henry Cabot Lodge.

The telegram was prepared by Roger Illsman,.

Assistant Secretary

of State for Far Eastern Affairs, and Under Secretary of State

Averell liarriman, and was approved by President kennedy. (Pentagon

Papers, P.235) Deptel 243 told Lodge to press Diem to take

"prompt dramatic actions" to redress the grievances of the

Buddhists.

"We must at same time also tell key military leaders

that Us would find it impossible to continue support

GVN (Vietnamese Government) militarily and economically

unless above steps are taken immediately which we

recognize requires renoval of the ihu's from the scene.

We wish give Diem reasonable opportunity to remove Nhu's

but if he remains obdurate, then we are prepared to accept

the obvious implication that we can no longer support

Diem.

You may also tell appropriate military commanders

we will give them direct support in any interim period

of breakdown central government mechanism . . .

Con-

currently with above, Ambassador and country teams should

urgently examine all possible alternative leadership and

make detailed plans as to how we might bring Dien's

replacement if this should become necessary . ..

sodo a sen.

Conein testified that the raids might have been timed to occur

when no American Anbassador was

in Vietnam (Nolting had left a few

days before and his replacement, Lodge, had not yet arrived) (Conein,

p.21).

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In a cable on August 25, CIA Chief of Station John Richardson

reported the result of a conference among himself, Lodge, True-

heart, General Harkins (Commander, Military Assistance Command,

Vietnam (MACV) and General Weede (Chief of Staff, MACV). They

accepted Deptel 243 "as a basic decision. from Washington and

would proceed to do their best to carry out instructions"

, (I. G.,

C, Pp. 7-8) but believed that Diem would refuse to remove his

brother from his position in the government.

Early in the morning of August 26, 1963, the Voice of America

in South Vietnam placed the blame on Nhu for the August 21 raids '

and absolved the army. The broadcast also reported speculation

that the United States contemplated suspending aid to the South

Vietnamese Government (Pentagon Papers, p. 212).* Later on that

same day, Lodge presented his credentials to Diem. CIA officers

Conein and Spera were told to see Generals Khiem and Khanh,

respectively, and to convey to them the substance of Deptel 243,

but to remind them that "we cannot be of any help during initial

action of assuming power of state. Entirely their own action,

win or lose" (SAIG 0304, 8/26/63).

A message from the White House on August 29 authorized

Harkins to confirm to the Vietnamese Generals that the United

States would support a coup if it had a good chance of succeeding,

but did not involve United States armed forces. Lodge was autho-

rized to suspend United 'States aid at his discretion. (Deptel 272,

8/29/63.) A cable from the President to Lodge

on the same day stated:

*In a cable to Harriman, Lodge complained that the von broadcast

• had "complicated our already difficult problem" by elininating

"the possivility of the generals' effort achieving surprise."

Lodje further warned that "the US must not appear publicly in

the matter, thus giving the 'kiss of death' to its friends"

(Cable, Lodge to Harriman, 8/26/63) .

HW 50955 DocId: 32423539 Page 496

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"I have approved all the messages you are receiving from

others today, and I emphasize that everything in these

messages has my full support.

We will do all that we can

to help you conclude this operations successfully . .

Until the very moment of the go signal for the operation

by the Generals, I must reserve a contingent right to

change course and reverse previous instructions.

While

fully aware of your assessment of the consequences of

such a reversal, I know from experience that failure is

more destructive than an appearance of indecision.

would, of course, accept full responsibility for any such

change as I must also bear the full responsibility for this.

operation and its consequences." (Cable, 8/29/63).

In a reply cable, Lodge stuted:

"1. I fully understand that you have the right and

responsibility to change course at any time.

Of course

I will always respect that right.

2. To be successful, this operation must be essentially

a Vietnamese affair with a momentum of its own.

Should

this nappen you may not be able to control it, i.e., the

"go signal" nay be given by the generals." (Cable, Lodge

to President, 8/30/63)

A cable from Saigon dated August 31, 1963, stated:.

"This particular coup is finished

Generals did

not feel ready and did not have sufficient balance of

forces

...

There is little doubt that GNV (South

Vietnamese Government) aware US role and may have con-

siderable detail...."

(SAIG 0499, 8/31/63)

Deptel 243 and the VOA broadcast set the tone for later

relations between the United States representatives and the

generals. Big Minh, who had initial doubts about the strength

of American support, grew in confidence.

C. The November 1963 Coup

American dissatisfaction with the Diem regime became

increasingly apparent. On September 8, AID Director David Bell,

• in a television interview, stated that Congress might cut aid

to South Vietnam if the Diem government did not change its course

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att

(Pentagon Papers, P. 214). Lodge suggested a study to deter-

mine the most effective methods of cutting aid to topple the

regime (Pentagon Papers, P. 214). On September 12, with White

House approval, Senator Church introduced a resolution in the

Senate condemning the South Vietnamese Government for its

repressive handling of the Buddhist problem and calling for an

end to United States aid unless the oppressive measures were

curtailed (Pentagon Papers, PP. 214-215).

In mid-September 1963, two proposals for dealing with Diem

were considered by the Administration. The first contemplated

increasingly severe pressure to bring Diem in line with American

policy; the second involved acquiescing in Diem's actions,

recognizing that Diem and Nhu were inseparable, and attempting

to salvage as much as possible. It was decided to adopt the

first proposal, and to send Secretary of Defense McNamara and

General Taylor on a fact-finding mission to Vietnam. (Pentagon

Papers, p. 215.

On October 2, McNamara and Taylor returned to Washington

and presented their findings to the National Security Council.

Their report confirmed that the military effort was progressing

favorably, but warned of the dangers inherent in the political

turmoil and recommended bringing pressure against Diem. This

pressure would include announcing the withdrawal of 1,000

American troops by the end of the year, ending support for the

forces responsible for the pagoda raids, and continuing Lodge's

policy of remaining aloof from the regime. The report recommended

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against a coup, but suggested that alternative leadership should be

identified and cultivated. The recommendations were promptly

approved by the President. (Pentagon Papers, PP.215-716)

On October 3 Conein contacted Minh. Minh explained that a

coup was being planned, and requested assurances of American

support if it were successful. Minh outlined three courses of

action, one of which was the assassination of Dien's brothers,

Nhu and Can (Conein, p.25; cable, Saigon to Director, 10/5/63) .

The Acting Chief of the CIA Station, David R. Smith, cabled on

October 5 that he had recommended to Lodge that "we do not set

ourselves irrevocably against the assassination plot, since the

other two alternatives mean either a blood bath in saigon or a

protracted struggle" (Cable, Saigon to Director, 10/5/63).

A cable fron the Director, CIA to Saigon responded that:

"(we certainly cannot be in the position of stimulating,

approving, or supporting assassination, but on the other

hand, we are in no way responsible for stopping every

such threat of which we might receive even partial know-

We certainly would not favor assassination of Diem.

We believe engaging ourselves by taking position on this

matter opens door too easily for probes of our position

re others, re support of regime, et celera. Consequently

believe best approach is hanus off.

interested in intelligence on any such plan. le naturally

ASSASS...

* The other courses of action were the encirclement of Saigor

oy various military units and direct confrontation between military

units involved in the coup and loyalist units.

** Colby, who was then Chief, Far Eastern Division, drafted

this

cable

for McCone. Colby testified:

"Q:

So you were on notice as of that date that the Director

personally opposed any involvement by the CIA in an assas-

sination?

"Colby: I certainly was." (Colby, p. 57)

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McCone testified that he met privately with the President and

the Attorney General, taking the position that "our role was

to assemble all information on intelligence. as to what was

going on and to report it to the appropriate authorities, but

to not attempt to direct it" (McCone, P. 62). He believed the

United States should maintain a "hands off attitude" (McCone,

p. 62). McCone testified:

"I felt that the President agreed with my position, des-

pite the fact that he had great reservations concerning

Diem and his conduct.

I urged him to try to bring all

the pressure we could on Diem to change his ways, to

encourage more support throughout the country.

My precise

words to the President, and I remember them very clearly,

was that Mr. President, if I was manager of

a baseball

team, I had

one pitcher, I'd keep him in the box whether

he was a good pitcher or not. By that I was saying that,

if Diem was removed we would have not one coup but we

would have a succession of coups and political disorder

in Vietnam and it might last several years and indeed

it did." (McCone, pP. 62-63.)

McCone stated

that he did not discuss assassination with

the President, but rather "whether we should let the coup go

or use our influences not to"

• He left the meeting believing

that the President agreed with his "hands off" recommendation

(McCone, pp. 62-63). McCone cabled Smith on October 6:

"McCone directs that you withdraw recommendation to

ambassador (concerning assassination plan) under IcCone

instructions, as we cannot be in position actively con-

doning such course of action and thereby engaging our

responsibility therefore" (CIA to Saigon, DIR 73661, 10/6/63).

In response, the CIA Station in Saigon cabled headquarters:

"Action taken as directed.

In addition, since DCH

Trueheart was also present when original recommendation

was made, specific withdrawal of recommendation at McCone's

Instruction was also conveyed to Trueheart.

Ambassador

Lodge conmented that he shares McCone's opinion." (Saigon

to CIA, SAIG 1463, 10/7/631

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Conein, the CIA official who dealt directly with the Generals,*

testified that he was first told of McCone's response to the

assassination alternative by Ambassador Lodge around October 20

(Conein, p. 35). Conein testified (but did not so indicate in

his detailed After-Actio, Report) that he then told General Don.

that the United States opposed assassination, and that the

General responded, "alright, you don't like it, we won't talk

about it anymore" (Conein, p. 36).

The United States increased pressure on Diem to mend his

ways. On October 17, General Richard Stillwell (MACV J-3)

informed

Secretary

Thuan that the United

States was suspending

aid to the special forces units responsible for the pagoda

raids until they were transferred to the field and placed under

Joint General Staff (JGS) command (Pentagon Papers, p. 217).

On October 27, Lodge traveled to Dalat with Diem, but did

not receive any commitment from Diem to comply with American

requests (Pentagon Papers, p. 219). '

On October 28, Conein met with General Don, who had

received

assurance from Lodge that Conein spoke for the United

States. Don said that he would make the plans for the coup

* Conein described his role as follows:

"My job was to convey the orders from my Ambassador and

the instructions from my Ambassador to the people who

were planning the coup, to monitor those individuals who

were planning the coup,

to get as much information so

that

our government would not

be caught with their pants

down"' (Conein, pp. 38-39).

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available to the Ambassador four hours before it took place,

and suggested that Lodge not change

his plans to go to the

• United States on October 31. (I.G., C, p. 37; Pentagon Papers,

p. 219.)

On October 30, Lodge reported to Washington that he was

powerless to stop the coup, and that the matter was entirely

in Vietnamese hands.

General-Harkins disagreed and cabled his

opposition to the coup to General Taylor (Pentagon Papers,

p. 220). A cable from Bundy to Lodge dated October 30 expressed

White House concern and stated that "[wle cannot accept conclu-

sion that we have no power to delay or discourage a coup"

(Cable, Bundy to Lodge, 10/30/63). A subsequent cable on that

same day from Washington instructed Lodge to intercede with

the Generals to call off the coup if he did not believe it

would succeed. The instructions prescribed "strict noninvolve-

ment and somewhat less

strict neutrality". (Pentagon Papers,

p. 220.

Late in the morning of November 1, the first units involved

in the coup began to deploy around Saigon. The Embassy was

given only four minutes' warning before the coup began (MACV

cable to Joint Chiefs of Staff 8512, 11/1/63).. An aide to

Don told Conein to bring all available money to the Joint

General Staff headquarters. Conein brought 3 million piasters

(Approximately $42,000) to the headquarters, which was given

to Don to procure food for his troops and to pay death benefits

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to those killed in the coup (Conein,. 6/20,, p. 72).*

Conein was at the Joint General Staff Headquarters during

most of the coup (I.G., C, PP. 41-42). At 1:40 p.m., the

Generals proposed that Diem resign immediately, and guaranteed

him and Nhu safe departure (Conein After-Action Report, p. 15).

The palace was surrounded shortly afterwards, and at 4:30. p.m.

the Generals announced the coup on the radio and demanded the

resignation of Diem and Nhu. Diem called Lodge and inquired

about the United States" position. Lodge responded that the

United States did not yet have a view, and expressed concern

for Diem's safety (Pentagon Papers, p. 221).

According to Conein's report, Minh told Nhu that if he and

Diem did not resign within five minutes, the palace would be

bombed. Minh then phoned Diem. Diem refused to talk with him

and Minh ordered the bombing of the palace. Iroops moved in

on the palace, but Diem still refused to capitulate. Minh

offered Diem a second chance to surrender half an hour later,

telling him that if he refused he would be "blasted off of the

earth". Shortly before nightfall an air assault was launched

on the Presidential Guard barracks. (Conein After-Action Report,

pp. 17-18.)

At 6:20 on the morning of November 2, Diem called General

* CIA had apparently considered passing money to the coup

leaders in early October (Colby, 6/20, p. 21). On October 29,

Lodge calbed that a request for

funds should be anticipated

(Does teeted the money on october au, and kept it in a

received

in his house.

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Don at the Joint General Staff headquarters and offered to

surrender if he and Nhu were given safe conduct to an airport.

Shortly afterwards, Diem offered to surrender unconditionally

and ordered the Presidential Guard to cease firing. According

to Conein, an escort for Diem appeared in front of the palace

at 8:00 a.m., but Diem and Nhu

were not present (Conein After-

Action Report, p. 24).

At 10:30 a.m. the bodies of Diem and Nhu were reported to

be at the Joint General Chiefs' headquarters. Conein declined

to view the bodies because he feared that doing so might damage

United States interests (Conein, p. 57) .

The details of Diem's and Nhu's deaths are not known.*

* Conein specualted that Diem and Nhu escaped through a tunnel

from the palace and.fled to a Catholic Church in Chalon.

He

opined that an informant must have identified them and called the

•General Staff Headquarters (Conein After-Action Report, P. 23).

Another CIA source states that Diem and Nhu had left the palace

the previous evening with a Chinese businessman and arrived at

the church at 8:00 on the morning of November 2.

Ten minutes

Minh originally told

doubted that Catholics would have taken their own lives in a

church (Conein, p. 56).

that on November 16, 1963, a field-grade officer of unknown

reliability gave the CIA two photographs of the bodies of Diem

and Nhu in which it appeared their hands were tied behind their

backs (I.G., C, PP. 43-44).

source reported that Diem and

Nhu had been shot and stabbed while being conveyed to the Joint

General Staff headquarters.

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None of the informed sources give any indication of direct or .

indirect involvement of the United States.*

* It must be noted that on October 30, 1963, Ambassador Lodge

notified Washington that there might be

a request by ked leaders

for evacuation, and

suggested Saipan as a point for evacuation

(Saigon Station Cable No. 2036, 10/30/63):

Conein was charged

with obraining the airplane.

Between 6:00 and 7:00 on the

morning of November 2, Minh and Don asked Conein to procure an

Chief of Station at the Embassy, who replied that it would not

se possible to get an aircraft for the next twenty-tour hours,

since it would have to be flown from Guam. Conein testitled

that Smith told him that Diem could be flown only to a country

that offered him asylum and that the plane could not land in

any other country.

There were no aircraft immediately avail-

able that had sufficient range to reach a potential country

of asylum (Conein, p. 54).

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R1440

TABLE OF CONTENTS

IV.

Findings and Conclusions

A. Findings Concerning the Plots Themselves

1.

Officials of the United States

Government Initiated Plots to

Assassinate Fidel Castro and

Patrice Lumumba

2.

No Foreign Leaders Were Killed As

A Result of Assassination Plots

Initiated by Officials of the

United States

3.

American Officials Encouraged or

Were Privy to Coup Plots Which

Resulted in the Death of Trujillo,

Diem, and Schneider

..•

4.

The Plots Occurred in a Cold War

Atmosphere Perceived to be of

Crisis Proportions : . . .

5.

American Officials Had Exaggerated

Notions About Their Ability to

Control the Actions of Coup Leaders . ..

6.

CIA Officials Made Use of Known Under-

world Figures in Assassination

Efforts

... ...

B. Conclusions Concerning the Plots Themselves. •

1.

The United States Should Not Engage

in Assassination . . . ...

a.

Distinction Between Targeted

Assassinations Instigated by

the United States and Support

for Dissidents Seeking to

Overthrow Local Governments.

b.

The Setting In Which the Assas-

sination Plots Occurred Explains,

But Does Not Justify Them

Page

1

2

2

3

3

4

5

5

5

6

8

ini

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C.

2.

The United States Should Not Make

Use of Underworld Figures for

Their Criminal Talents : . ... •

Findings and Conclusions Relating to

the Issues of Authorization and

Control

→.....

1.

The Command and Control System for

Assassinations Was Such That the

Plots Could Have Been Undertaken

Without Express Authorization

2.

Findings Relating to the Level at

Which the Plots Were Authorized

3.

4.

a. Diem . .

b. Schneider

c. Trujillo

d. Lumumba

e. Castro :

CIA Officials Involved in the Assassina-

tion Operations Perceived Assassination

To Have Been A Permissible Course of

Action

The Failure In Communication Between

Agency Officials In Charge Of The

Assassination Operations And Their

Superiors In The Agency And In The

Administration Was Due To: . .

(a)

The Failure of Subordinates To

Disclose The Operations to

Their Superiors; and . . . . .

(b)

The Failure of Superiors To

Give Precise Orders Regarding The

Nature of Permissible Operations

and to Make Clear That Assassina-

tion Was Precluded in the Climate

of Violence Engendered by the

Aggressive Covert Actions

Sanctioned by the Administrations

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11

Page

10

13.

14

15

15

16

16

17

18

26

26

26

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iii

Page

(a)

Agency Officials Failed On

Several Occasions to Reveal

The Plots To Their Superiors

Or To Do So With Sufficient

Detail and Clarity

Castro ..

(b)

Trujillo.

Schneider . . . .

On Occasion, Administration Officials

Gave Vague Instructions to Sub-

ordinates and Failed to Make Sufficiently

Clear That Assassination Should Be

Excluded From Consideration.

Schneider.

Lumumba .

Castxo

...

6.

Practices Current at the Time in Which

the Assassination Plots Occurred Were

Revealed by the Record to Create the

Risk of Confusion, Rashness, and

Irresponsibility in the Very Areas Where

Clarity and Sober Judgment Was Most

Necessary.

(a)

The Danger Inherent in Overextending

the Doctrine of Plausible Denial

(b)

The Dangers of Using "Circumlocution"

and "Euphemism"

•.....

(c)

The Danger of Generalized Instructions.

(d) The Danger of "Floating Authorization"

(e)

The Problems Connected With Creating

New Covert Capabilities

27

27

34

36

37

38

38

39

46

47

48

49

50

50

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43 19

Approved, Drafting Subcommittee,

10/8/75 (Lumumba sections open

to possible reconsideration

IV. Findings and Conclusions

In evaluating the evidence and

arriving at findings and

conclusions, the Committee has been guided by the following

standards. We believe these standards to be appropriate to

the constitutional duty of a Congressional committee.

1. The Committee is not a court.

Its primary role is

not to determine individual guilt or innocence, but rather

to draw upon the experiences of the past to better propose

guidance for the future.

2. It is necessary to be cautious in reaching conclusions

because of the amount of time that has passed since the events

reviewed in this report, the inability of three Presidents and

many other key figures to speak for themselves, the conflicting

and ambiguous nature of much of the evidence, and the problems

in assessing the weight to be given to particular documents

and testimony.

3. The Committee has tried to be fair to the persons

involved in the events under examination while at the same

time responding to a need to understand the facts in sufficient

detail to lay a basis for informed recommendations.

With these standards in mind, the Committee has arrived at

the following

; findings

and conclusions.

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A. Findings Concerning the Plots Themselves

1. Officials of the United States Government Initiated

Plots to Assassinate Fidel Castro and Patrice Lumumba

The Committee finds that officials of the United States

Government initiated and participated in plots to assassinate

Patrice Lumumba and Fidel Castro.

The plot to kill Lumumba was conceived in the latter half

of 1960 by officials of the United States Government, and quick-

ly advanced to the point of sending poisons to the Congo to be

used for the assassination.

The effort to assassinate Castro began in 1960 and continued

until 1965. The plans to assassinate Castro using poison cigars,.

exploding seashells, and a contaminated diving suit did not

advance beyond the laboratory phase. The plot involving under-

world figures reached the stage of producing poison pills,

establishing the contacts necessary to send them into Cuba,

procuring potential assassins within Cuba, and, according to one

witness, delivering the pills to the island itself. In the

1960 plot involving a Cuban pilot and in the AM/LASH episode -

from 1963-1965, the CIA gave active support and encouragement

to Cubans whose intent to assassinate Castro was known, and

provided

the means for carrying out the assassination.

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2.

No Foreign Leaders Were Killed As a Result of Assas-

sination Plots Initiated by Officials of the United

States

The poisons intended for

use against Patrice Lumumba

were never administered to him, and there is no evidence that

the United States was in any way involved in Lumumba's death

at the hands of his Congolese enemies. The effort to assas-

sinate Castro failed. Do we know hon far tha

3. American Officials Encouraged or Were Privy to

Coup Plots Which Resulted in the Death of Trujillo,

Diem, and Schneider

American officials clearly desired the overthrow of

Trujillo, offered both encouragement and

guns to local dissi-

dents attempting his overthrow, and supplied them with pistols

and rifles. Khen AplArs mAl desired

American officials offered encouragement to the Vietnamese

generals who plotted Diem's overthrow, and a CIA official in

Vietnam gave the generals money after the coup had begun.

However, Diem's

assassination was neither desired nor suggested

by officials of the United States.

The record reveals that the United States officials

offered encouragement to the Chilean dissidents who plotted

the kidnapping of General Rene Schneider, but did not desire

or encourage his death. Certain high officials did know that

the dissidents planned to kidnap General Schneider.

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TOI

As Director Colby testified before the Committee, the death of

a foreign leader is a risk forseeable in any coup attempt. In

the cases we have considered, the risk of death was known in

varying degrees. It was widely known that the dissidents in

the Dominican Republic intended to assassinate Trujillo; the

contemplation of coup leaders to assassinate Nhu, President

Diem's brother, was communicated to the upper levels of the

United States Government; while the CIA and perhaps the White

House knew that the coup leaders in Chile planned to kidnap

General Schneider, it was not anticipated that he would be killed,

although the possibility of his death should have been recognized

as a.forseeable risk of his kidnapping.

4.

The Plots Occurred in a Cold War Atmosphere Perceived

..to be of Crisis Proportions

The Committee fully appreciates the importance of

evaluating the assassination plots in the historical context

within which they occurred. In the preface to this report, we

described the perception, generally shared within the United

States during the depths of the Cold War, that the country

faced a monolithic enemy in Communism. That attitude helps

explain the assassination plots which we have reviewed,

although it does not justify them. Those involved neverthe-

less appeared to believe they were advancing the best inter-

ests of their country.

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American Officials Had Exaggerated Notions About

Their Ability to Control the Actions of Coup Leaders

Running throughout the cases considered in this report

was

the expectation of American officials'that they could

control the actions of dissident groups which they were support-

ing in foreign countries. Events demonstrated that the United

States had no such power. This point is graphically demonstrated

by cables exchanged shortly before the coup in Vietnam.

Ambassador Lodge cabled Washington on October 30, 1963, that he

was unable to halt a coup; a cable from Bundy in response

stated

that "We cannot accept conclusion that we have no power to delay

or discourage a coup." The coup took place three days later.

Shortly after the experience of the Bay of Pigs, CIA

headquarters requested operatives in the Dominican Republic

to tell the dissidents to "turn off" the assassination attempt,

because the United States was not prepared to "cope with the

aftermath." The dissidents replied that the assassination

was their affair and that it could not be turned off to suit

the convenience of the United States Government.

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•6.

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10 d

CIA Officials Made Use of Known Underworld Figures

in Assassination Efforts

Officials of the CIA made use of persons associated

with the criminal underworld in attempting to achieve the

assassination of Fidel Castro. These underworld figures were

relied upon because it was

believed that they had expertise and

contacts that were not available to law-abiding citizens.

Foreign citizens with criminal backgrounds were also used

by the CIA in two other cases that we have reviewed. In the

development of the Executive Action capability, one foreign

national with a criminal background was used to "spot" other

members of the European underworld who might be used by the CIA

for a variety of purposes, including assassination if the need

should arise. In the Lumumba case, two men with criminal back-

grounds were used as field operatives by CIA officers in a

volatile political situation in the Congo.

B. Conclusions Concerning the Plots Themselves

1. The United States Should Not Engage in Assassination

We cannot condone the use of assassination as a tool

of foreign policy. Aside from pragmatic arguments

against the

use of assassination supplied to the Committee by witnesses with

extensive experience in covert operations, we find that assas-

sination violates moral precepts fundamental to our way of life.

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In addition to considerations, there were several

practical reasons advanced for not assassinating foreign

leaders. These reasons are discussed in the section of

this report recommending a statute making assassination

a crime:

Distinction Between

Targeted Assassinations

Instigated by the United States and Support

for Dissidents Seeking to Overthrow Local

Governments

Two of the five principal cases investigated

by the Committee involved plots to kill foreign leaders

(Lumumba and Castro) that were instigated by American

officials. Three of the cases (Irujillo, Diem, Schneider)

involved killings in the course of coup attempts by local

dissidents. These latter cases differed in the degree to

which assassination was contemplated by the leaders of the

coups and the degree

to which United States officials

motivated the coups.

The Committee concludes that targeted assassinations

instigated by the United States

must be prohibited.

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Fbicanda

Coups involve varying degrees of risk of assassination.

The possibility of assassination in coup attempts raises

questions concerning the propriety of United States involve-

ment in coups, particularly in those where the assassination

of a foreign leader is a likely prospect.

This country was created by violent revolt against a

regime believed to be tyrannous, and our founding fathers

(the local dissidents of that era) received aid from foreign

countries. Given that history, we should not today rule

out support for dissident groups seeking to overthrow tyrants.

But passing beyond that principle, there remain serious

questions: for example, whether the national interest of

the United States is genuinely involved; whether any such

support should be overt rather than covert; what tactics

should be used; and how such actions should

be authorized

and controlled by the coordinate branches of government.

The Committee believes that its recommendation on the question

of covert actions in support of coups must await the Committee's

final report which will be issued after a full review of

covert action in general.

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b.

- 8 -

The Setting In Which the Assassination Plots

Occurred Explains, But Does Not Justify Them

The Cold War setting in which the assassination

plots took place does not change our view that assassination

is unacceptable in our society. In addition to the moral

and

practical problems discussed elsewhere, we find two principal

defects in any contention that the tenor of the period justifi-

ed the assassination plots:

First, the assassination plots were not necessitated by

imminent danger to the United States. Among the cases studied,

Castro alone posed a threat to the United States, but then

only during the period of the Cuban missile crisis.

astro

assassination had been planned by The CiA loñg before that.

crisis, and was not advanced by policymakers as a possible

course of action during the crisis.

Second, we reject absolutely any notion that the United

States should justify its actions by the standards of totali-

tarians. Our standards must be higher, and this difference is

what the struggle is all about. Of course, we must defend our

democracy. But in defending it, we must resist undermining

the very virtues we are defending.

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MUNN

Two documents which have been supplied to the Committee

graphically demonstrate attitudes which can lead to

tactics that erode and could ultimately destroy the very

ideals we must defend.

The first was written in 1954 by a special committee form-

ed to advise the President on covert activities. The United

States may, it said, have to adopt tactics "more ruthless than

Ithosel employed by the enemy" in order to meet the threat from

hostile nations. The report concluded that "long standing

American concepts of American fair play must be reconsidered. "*

Although those proposals did not involve assassinations,

the attitudes underlying them were, as Director Colby testified,

indicative of the setting within which the assassination plots

were conceived. (Colby, 6/4/75, P. 117)

* The full text of the passage is as follows:

• another important requirement is an aggressive

covert psychological, political, and paramilitary

organization far more effective,

more unique, and,

if necessary, more ruthless than that employed by the

enemy.

No one should be permitted to stand in the

way of the prompt, efficient, and secure accomplish-

ment of this mission.

this mission. tone,

The second consideration, it is now clear that we

are facing an implacable enemy whose avowed objective

is world domination by whatever means at whatever

There

no rules in such a game. Hitherto

acceptable norms of human conduct do not apply. If

the U.S. is to survive, long standing American con-

cepts

of American fair play must be reconsidered.

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We do not think that traditional American notions of

fair play need be abandoned when dealing with our adversaries.

It may well be ourselves that we injure most if we adopt

tactics "more ruthless than the enemy"

A second document which represents an attitude which we

find improper was sent to the Congo in the fall of 1960 when

the assassination of Patrice Lumumba was being considered. The

chief of CIA's Africa Division recommended a particular agent --

WIROGUE -- because

which may be morally wrong in the eyes of the

world, but necessary because his case officer

ordered him to carry it out, then it is right,

action for its execution without pangs of con-

science.

In a word, he can rationalize all

actions. (Memo dated

/ 160; Bissell

Tr.,

6/11/75, p.

The Committee finds this philosophy is not in keeping with the

ideals of our nation.

2. The United States Should Not Make Use of Underworld

Figures for Their Criminal Talents

We conclude that agencies of the United States must not

use underworld figures for their criminal talents' in carrying

out their operations. In addition to the corrosive effect

*Pending our investigation of the use of informants by the FBI and

other agencies, we reserve judgment on the use of known criminals

as informants.

We are concerned here only with the use of persons

known to be actively engaged in criminal pursuits for their

expertise in carrying out criminal acts.

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upon our government, * the use of underworld figures involves

the following dangers:

a .

The use of underworld figures for "dirty business"

gives them the power to blackmail the government and to avoid

prosecution, for past or future crimes. For example, the

Figures involved in the Castro assassination operation used _ sor

their involvement with the CIA to avoid prosecution?

The CIA

also contemplated attempting to quash criminal charges against

QJWIN in a foreign tribunal.

b. The use of persons experienced in criminal tech-

niques and prone to criminal behavior increases the likelihood

that criminal acts will occur. Agents in the field are neces-

sarily given broad discretion. But the risk of improper

activities is increased when persons of criminal background

are used, particularly when they are selected precisely to take

advantage of their criminal skills or contacts.

*The corrosive effect of dealing with underworld figures is

graphically demonstrated by the

fact that Attorney General Robert

Kennedy, who had devoted much of his professional life to fight-

ing organized crime, did not issue an order against cooperating

with such persons when he learned in May 1961 that the CIA had

made use of Sam Giancana in a sensitive operation in Cuba.

In May 1962, when the Attorney General learned that the

operation had involved assassination, he did, according to

a CIA witness, inform those briefing him that underworld

Figures should not be used before checking with him first,

but failed to direct that they must never be so used.

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c. There is the danger that the United States Govern-

ment will become an unwitting accomplice

to criminal.acts and

that criminal figures will take advantage of their associa-

tion with the government to advance their own projects and

interests.

¿. There is a fundamental impropriety in selecting

persons because they are skilled at performing deeds which the

laws of our society forbid.

The use of underworld figures by the United States Govern-

ment for their criminal skills raises moral problems comparable

to those recognized by Justice Brandeis in a different context

five decades ago:

Our government is the potent, the omnipresent

teacher.

For

good or for ill, it teaches the

whole people by its example.

Crime is con-

tagious.

If the Government becomes a law-

breaker, it breeds contempt for law; it in-

vites every man to become a law unto himself.

To declare that in the administration of the

criminal law the end justifies the means --

to declare that the Government may commit

crimes in order to secure the conviction of

the private criminal -- would bring terrible

retribution.

Against this pernicious doctrine

this Court should resolutely set its face.

Olmstead v. U. S., 277 U.S. 439, 485 (1927)

-u5o

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C. Findings and Conclusions Relating to the Issues of Authori-

zation and Control

In the introduction to this report, we set forth in

summary form our major conclusions concerning whether

the

assassination plots were authorized. The ensuing discussion

elaborates and explains those conclusions.

The Committee analyzed the question of authorization for

the assassination activities from two perspectives. First,

the Committee examined whether officials in policymaking

positions authorized or were aware of the assassination

activities. Second, the Committee inquired whether the

officials responsible for the operational details of the

plots

perceived that assassination had the approval of

their superiors, or at least was the type of activity that

their superiors would not disapprove.

No doubt, the CIA's general efforts against the

regimes

discussed in this report were authorized at the highest

levels of the government. But the record leaves

serious

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doubt concerning whether assassination was authorized by

the Administrations.

Even if the plots were not expressly

authorized, it does not follow that the Agency personnel

believed they were acting improperly.

1.

The Command and Control System for Assassina-

tions Was Such That the Plots Could Have

Been Undertaken Without Express Authorization

As emphasized throughout this report, we are

unable to draw firm conclusions concerning responsibility

for the assassination plots. Even after our long investiga-

tion, it

is unclear whether the conflicting and inconclusive

state of the evidence is due to the system of plausible

denial and its attendant doctrines, or whether there were

in fact serious shortcomings in the system of authorization

which made it possible for assassination efforts to have

been undertaken by agencies of

the United States Government

without express authority from officials outside of those

agencies.

Our preeminent finding is that assassination could have

been undertaken by an agency of the United States Government

without it having been uncontrovertibly clear that there was

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explicit authorization from the highest level. The command

and control system revealed by the record made it possible for

the CIA to have engaged in assassination activities without

express authorization by officials outside the Agency.

The ambiguity and imprecision in the record illustrates

the dangers of a "plausible denial" system in which the precise

level of authorization may be difficult to ascertain. While

there is no evidence that the "plausible denial" system has

succeeded in shielding decision makers in the cases considered

in this

report, the possibility that a system exists which

might permit those responsible for authorizing major operations

to escape responsibility is disturbing. Responsible government

requires that public officials be held accountable for their

decisions.

2. Findings Relating to the Level at Which the Plots Were

Authorized

a. Diem

We find that neither the President nor any other

official in the United States Government authorized the assas-

sination of Diem and his brother Nhu. Both the DCI and top

State Department officials did know, however, that the death

of Nhu at least at one point had been contemplated by the coup

leaders. To the contrary, when the possibility that the coup

leaders were considering assassination was brought to the

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attention of the DCI, he directed that the United States

would have no part in such activity, and this information

was relayed to the coup leaders.

b. Schneider

We find that neither the President nor any other

official in the United States Government authorized the assas-

sination of General Rene Schneider. The CIA, and perhaps the

White House, did know that coup leaders contemplated kidnap-

ping, which, as it turned out, resulted in Schneider's death.

but was. the

Trujillo

fifeblem or death naren

The Presidents and other senior officials in

the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations sought the overthrow

of Trujillo and approved general actions to obtain that end.

The DCI and the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-

American Affairs knew that the Dominican dissidents intended

to assassinate Trujillo, but the date at which the dissidents'

intent to assassinate was communicated to higher levels of

the government responsible for formulating policy is less

clear. The record does establish that in the Spring of 1961

senior American officials, including the President, learned

that the dissidents intended to assassinate Trujillo and that

they desired machine guns for that purpose.

The Special Group

disapproved passage of those weapons and the President himself,.

in a telegram,

reaffirmed that decision, indicating that the

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United States "as (al matter of general policy cannot condone 1‹

assassination"

, although he did state that if the coup succeeded,

the United States would support the plotters.

Need.

d. Lumumba

The chain of events revealed by the documents and

testimony is strong enough to permit a reasonable inference

that the assassination plot was authorized by the President.

It is absolutely clear that Allen Dulles authorized the plot.

The juxtaposition of discussions concerning "disposing of"

Lumumba and taking "straightforward action" against him at NSC

and Special Group meetings with Dulles' cable to the Congo,

Bissell's representation to Gottlieb about "highest authority"

and the delivery of poison to the Congo can be read to support

an inference that the President and the Special Group urged

the assassination of Lumumba.

Robert Johnson's testimony that he understood the President

to have ordered Lumumba's assassination at an NSC meeting does,

as he said, offer a "clue" about Presidential authorization

which, however, should be read in light of the uncertain record

of the meetings Johnson attended and the contrary testimony of

others in attendance at the

meetings, including the President's

national security advisors. The fact that both the Chief of

Station and Gottlieb were under the impression that there was

Fresidential authorization for the

assassination of Lumumba

is not in itself direct evidence of such authorization because

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this impression was derived solely from Gottlieb's meetings

with Bissell and Tweedy. Neither Gottlieb nor the Chief of

Station had first-hand knowledge of Allen Dulles' statements

about Presidential authorization. Richard Bissell assumed

that such authorization had been conveyed to him by Dulles,

but Bissell had no specific recollection of any event when

this occurred.

The evidence leads us to conclude that DDP Bissell and

DCI Dulles knew about and authorized the plot to assassinate

Lumumba.

However, we are unable to make a finding that

President Eisenhower intentionally authorized an assassination

effort against Lumumba because of the

• lack of absolute certainty

in the evidence.

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e.

Castro

There was no evidence from which the Committee

could conclude that Presidents

Eisenhower, Kennedy, or Johnson,

their close advisors, or the Special Group authorized the

assassination of Castro.

We find that the effort against Castro was clearly autho-

rized through the level of DDP. It is not certain whether

Allen Dulles knew about the plots, although Bissell and

Edwards were of the opinion that he did, and the credibility

of their beliefs is buttressed by the fact that Dulles knew

about the Lumumba assassination plot, which was planned and

attempted at the time of the early Castro plots. We can find

no evidence that McCone was aware of the

plots which occurred

during his tenure. His DDP, Richard Helms, testified that

he never discussed the subject with McCone and was never

expressly authorized by anyone to assassinate Castro.

The only suggestion of express Presidential authorization

for the plots against Castro was Richard Bissell's opinion

that Dulles would have circumlocutiously informed Presidents

Eisenhower and Kennedy after the assassination had been plan-

ned and was underway. The assumptions underlying this opinion

are too attenuated

for the Committee to adopt it as a finding.

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First, it assumes

that Dulles himself knew of the plots, a

matter which is not certain. Second, it assumes that Dulles

went privately to the two Presidents--a course of action

which Helms, who had far more covert action experience than

Bissell, testified was precisely what the doctrine of

plausible denial forbade CIA officials from doing:

Third,

it necessarily assumes that the Presidents would understand

from a "circumlocutious" description that assassination was

being discussed.

The chain of assumptions is far too speculative for the

Committee to make findings inplicating Presidents who are not

able to speak for themselves. Moreover, it is inconsistent

with Bissell's other testimony that "formal and explicit"

approval would be required for assassination,* and contrary

to the testimony of all the Presidential advisors, the men

closest to both Eisenhower and Kennedy.

thaT

* If the evidence concerning President Eisenhower's order

-o assassinate Lumumba is correct, it should be weighed against

Bissell's testimony concerning circumlouutious briefings of the

against.

Presidents in the Castro case.

First, the Lumumba case would

imply that President Eisenhower and Dulles did discuss such

matters bluntly and not circumlocutiously. Second, the Lumumba

example indicates that the President would discuss

such matters

openly in an appropriate torum, and would not need to be.

approached privately.

Third, it can be inferred from Bissell's

testimony in the Castro case that if President Eisenhower had

Dulles would not have

told Dulles that be that tect." tet pottieb's testimony in the

told anyone else of

Lumumba case

that he had been told of Presidential autho-

rization for assassination by Bissell, who in turn assumed he

was told by Dulles.

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Helms and McCone testified that the Presidents under

which they served never asked them to consider assassination.

There was no evidence whatsoever that President Johnson.

knew about or authorized any assassination activity during his

Presidency.

3. CIA Officials Involved in the Assassination Opera-

tions Perceived Assassination To Have Been A Permis-

sible Course of Action

The CIA officials involved in the targeted assassination

attempts testified that they had believed that their activities

had been fully authorized.*

In the case of the Lumumba assassination operation,

Richard Bissell testified that he had no direct recollection

of authorization, but after having reviewed the cables and

Special Group minutes, testified that authority must have

flowed from Dulles through him to the subordinate levels in

the Agency.

In the case of the assassination effort against Castro,

Bissell and Sheffield Edwards testified they believed the

operation involving underworld figures had been

authorized

by Dulles when they briefed

him shortly after the plot had been

initiated.

William Harvey testified he believed that the

* The lower level operatives, such as O'Connell and the

AM/LASH case officers, are not discussed in this section, since

they had clear orders

from

their immediate superiors.

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plots "were completely authorized at every appropriate level

within and beyond the Agency", although he had "no personal

knowledge whatever of the individuals' identities, times,

exact words, or channels through which such authority may

have passed". Harvey stated that he had been told by Richard

Bissell that the effort against Castro had been authorized

"from the highest level"

, and that Harvey had discussed the

plots with Richard Helms, his immediate superior. Helms

testified that although he had never discussed assassination

with his superiors, he believed:

.. that in these actions we were taking against

Cuba and against Fidel Castro's government in Cuba,

that they were what we had been asked to do.

• •

In

other words we had been asked to get rid of Castro

• there were no limitations put on the means,

and we felt we were acting well within the guidelines

that we understood to be in play at this particular

time.

The evidence points to a disturbing situation. Agency

officials perceived the effort to assassinate Castro to have

been within the parameters of permissible action, but Adminis-

ing policy were not

aware of the effort and

it.

The explanation may lie in the fact that orders concerning

overthrowing the Castro regime were stated in broad terms that

were subject to differing interpretations by those responsible

for carrying out those orders.

The various Presidents and their senior advisors

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strongly opposed the regimes of Castro and Trujillo, the

accession to power of Allende, and the potential influence

of Patrice Lumumba. Orders concerning action against those

foreign leaders were given in vigorous language. For example,

President Nixon's orders to prevent Allende from assuming

power left Helms feeling that "if I ever carried a marshall's

baton in my knapsack out of the oval office, it was

that day."

Similarly, General Lansdale described the Mongoose effort

against Cuba as "a

combat situation", and Attorney General

Kennedy emphasized that "a solution to the Cuban problem

today carries top priority". Helms testified that the

pressure to "get rid of (Castro and the Castro regime]" was

intense, and Bissell testified that he had been ordered to

"get off your ass about Cuba"

It is possible that there was a failure of communica-

tion between policymakers and the agency personnel who were

experienced in secret, and often violent, action. Although

policymakers testified that assassination was not intended

by such words as "get rid of Castro"

, some of their sub-

ordinates in the Agency testified that they perceived that

assassination was desired and that they should proceed with-

out troubling their superiors.

The 1967 Inspector General's Report on assassinations

appropriately observed:

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The point is that of frequent resort to. synechdoche -

the mention of a part when the whole is to be under-

stood, or vice versa.

Thus, we encounter repeated

references to phrases such as "disposing of Castro"

which may be read in the narrow, literal sense of assas-

sinating him, when it is intended that it be read in

the broader,

figurative sense of dislodging the Castro

regime.

Reversing the coin, we find people speaking

vaguely of "doing something about Castro" when it is

clear that what they have

specifically in mind is

killing him.

In a

situation wherein those speaking

may not have actually meant what they seemed

to say or

may not have said what they actually meant, they should

not be surprised if their oral shorthand is interpreted

differently than was intended.

Differing perceptions between superiors and their sub-

ordinates were graphically illustrated in the Castro context.*

McCone, in a memorandum dated April 14, 1967, reflected as

follows:

Through the years the Cuban problem was discussed

terms such as "dispose of Castro"

, "remove Castro, In

"knock off Castro"

, etc., and this meant the overthrow

of the Communist government in Cuba and the replacing

of it with a democratic regime.

Terms such as the

above appear in many working papers, memoranda for the

record,

etc., and,'as stated, all refer to a change in

the Cuban government.

* "Senator Mathias: Let me draw an example from history.

When Thomas A'Beckett was proving to be an annoyance, as

'go out and murder him'

He said,

; and let

it go at that.

"Mr. Helms: That is a warming reference to the problem.

"Senator Mathias: You feel that spans the generations

and the centuries?

"Mr. Helms: I think it does, sir.

"Senator Mathias: And that is typical of the kind of

thing which might be said, which might be taken by the

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Helms, who had considerable experience as a covert operator,

gave precisely the opposite meaning to the same words, interpret-

ing them as conveying authority for assassination.

Helms repeatedly testified that he felt

that explicit

authorization was unnecessary for the

assassination of

Castro in the early 1960's, but he said he did not construe

the intense pressure from President Nixon in 1970 as pro-

viding authority to assassinate

anyone. As Helms testified,

the difference was not that the pressure to prevent Allende

from assuming office was any less than the pressure to remove

the Castro regime, but rather that "I had already made up my

mind that we weren't going to have any of that business when

I was Director."

Certain CIA contemporaries of Helms who were subjected

to similar pressures in the Castro case rejected the thesis

that implicit authority to assassinate Castro derived from

the strong language of the policymakers. Bissell testified

that he had believed that "formal and explicit approval"

would be required for assassination, and McManus testified

director or by anybody else as presidential authorization to

go forward?

"Mr. Helms: That is right. But in answer to that, 1

realize that one sort of grows up in tradition of the time

and I think that any of us would have

found it very difficult

to discuss assassinations with a President of the U.S. I

just think we all had the feeling that we were hired out to

keep those things out of the oval office."

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that "it never occurred to me" that the vigorous words of

the Attorney. General could be taken

as authorizing

assassination. The differing perceptions may have resulted

from their different backgrounds and training. Neither

Bissell (an academician whose Agency career for the six years

before he became DDP had been in the field of technology) nor

McManus (who had concentrated on intelligence and staff work)

were experienced in covert operations.*

The perception of certain Agency officials that assas-

sination was within the range of permissible activity was

reinforced by the continuing approval of violent covert actions

against Cuba that were sanctioned at the Presidential level

and by the

failure of the successive administrations to make

clear that assassination

was not permissible.

This point is

one of the subjects considered in the next section.

* Of course, this analysis cannot be carried too far. In

the bumumba case,

Administration officials with

for example, Johnson and Dillon, who were

no covert operation experience

construed remarks as urging or permitting assassination, while

other persons who were not in the Agency did not so interpret

them.

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4. The Failure In Communication Between Agency Officials

In Charge Of The Assassination Operations And Their Superiors

In The Agency And In The Administration Was Due To:

(a) The Failure of Subordinates To Disclose The

Operations To Their Superiors; and

(b) The Failure of Superiors to Give Frecise Orders

Regarding the Nature of Permissable Operations and to Make

Clear That Assassination Was Precluded in the Climate of

Violence Engendered by the Aggressive Covert Actions

Sanctioned by the Administrations.

While we cannot find that officials responsible for

making policy decisions knew about or authorized the assassina-

tion attempts (with the possible exception of the Lumumba case),

Agency operatives at least through the level of DDP neverthe-

less perceived assassination to have been permissible. This

failure in communication was inexcusable in light of the gravity

of assassination. The Committee finds that the failure of

Agency officials to inform their superiors was reprehensible,

and that the reasons that they offered for having neglected

to inform their superiors are unacceptable. The Committee

further finds that Administration officials failed to be

sufficiently precise in their directions to the Agency

and

that their attitude toward the possibility of assassination

was ambiguous in the context of the violence of other activities

that they did authorize.

3/DIDN Forcin-up

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2.7

300

(a) Agency Officials Failed On Several Occasions To Reveal

The Plots To Their Superiors, Or To Do So With Sufficient

Detail and Clarity

Several of the cases considered in this report raise

questions concerning whether, officials of the CIA sufficiently

informed their superiors in the Agency or officials outside the

Agency about their activities.

Castro

The failure of Agency officials to inform their superiors

of the assassination efforts against Castro is particularly

troubling.

Richard Bissell testified that he and. Sheffield Edwards

told Allen Dulles only "circumlocutiously" and only after

the project had begun about the operation which used members

of the underworld. Both Bissell and his successor as DDP,

Richard Helms, testified that they never discussed the opera-

tion with John McCone or any officials outside the CIA. The

two officials directly responsible for the operation--Edwards

and William Harvey--testified that they never discussed the

operation with McCone or any Government official above the

level of DDP. McCone testified that he was never consulted about

the operation, and that Dulles never briefed him on its

existence. On the basis

of the testimony and documentary

evidence before the Committee, it is uncertain whether Dulles

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was ever made aware of the true nature of the underworld

operation, and virtually certain that it continued into

McCone's term without his or the Administration's knowledge

or approval.

On the occasions when Richard Bissell had the opportunity

to inform his superiors about the assassination effort against

Castro, he either failed to'

Inform them or misted them.

Bissell testified that he and Edwards told Dulles and

Cabell about the assassination operation using underworld

figures, but that they did so "circumlocutiously", and then

only after contact had been made with the underworld and a

price had been offered for Castro's death.

Bissell

further testified that he never raised the issue

of assassination with officials of either the Eisenhower or

Kennedy Administration. His reason was that since he was under

Dulles in

the chain of command, he would normally have had nọ

duty to discuss the matter with the Presidents or other Adminis-

tration officials, and that he assumed that Dulles would have

circumlocutiously spoken with Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy

about the operation. These reasons are insufficient. It was

inexcusable to withhold such information from those responsible

for formulating policy. on the unverified assumption that they

might have

been circumlocutiously informed by Dulles, who

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himself had not been straight-forwardly told about the operation.*

The failure to either inform those officials or to make

certain that they had been informed by Dulles was particularly

reprehensible in light of the fact that there were many occasions

on which Bissell should have informed them, and his failure to

do so was misleading. In the first weeks of the Kennedy Adminis-

tration, Bissell met with Bundy and discussed the development

of an assassination capability within CIA--executive action.

But Bissell did not mention that an actual assassination attempt

was underway. Bissell appeared before the Taylor-Kennedy Board

of Inquiry which was formed to report to the President on the

Bay of Pigs and the Cuban situation, but testified that he did

not inform the Commission of the assassination operation. As

chief of the CIA directorate concerned with clandestine operations

and the Bay of Pigs, Bissell frequently met with officials in

the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations to discuss Cuban

-estate

operations, and his advice was frequently sought. He did not

tell them that the CIA had undertaken an effort to assassinate

That

Castro, and did not ask if they favored proceeding with the

* Even

assuming that Bissell correctly perceived that Dulles

understood

the nature of the operation, it was inexcusable for

Bissell not to have briefed Dulles in plain language.

Further,

even if one accepts Bissell's assumption that Dulles told the

Presidents, they would have been told too late, because Bissell

"guessed" they would have been told that the operation

been planned and was being attempted"

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effort. He was present at the meeting with Dulles and Presi-

dent Kennedy at which the new President was briefed on covert

action in Cuba, but neither Dulles nor Bissell mentioned the

assassination operation that was underway.

The failures to make forthright disclosures to policy-

makers continued during the time that. Richard Helms was DDP.

Helms' failure to inform McCone about the underworld operation

when it was

reactivated under Harvey and poison pills were

sent to Cuba was a grave error in judgment, and Helms' excuses

are unpersuasive. In May of 1962, the Attorney General was

told that the CIA's involvement in an assassination plot had

terminated with the Bay of Pigs. Not only did Edwards, who

had briefed the Attorney General, know that the operation had

not been terminated, but Helms did not inform the Attorney

General that the operation was still active when he learned

that the Attorney General had been misled. Helms did not

inform McCone of the

plot until August 1962, and did so then

in a manner which indicated that the plot had been terminated

before McCone became Director. ' Helms' denial that AM/LASH

had been involved in an assassination attempt in response to

Secretary of State Rusk'

s inquiries was, as Helms testified,

"not truthful"

When Helms briefed President Johnson on the Castro plots,

he apparently described the activities

that had occurred during

prior administrations but did not describe the AM/LASH opera- i

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tion which had continued until 1965. Helms also failed to

inform the Warren Commission of the plots because the precise

question was not asked. FN

Helms told the Committee that he had never raised the

assassination operation with McCone or Kennedy Administration

officials because he had assumed that the project had been

previously authorized, and that the aggressive character of

the Kennedy Administration's program against the Castro regime

made assassination permissible even in the absence of an

express instruction. He added that he had never been convinced

that the operation would succeed, and that he would have told

McCone about it if he had ever believed that it would "go

anyplace"

Helms' reasons for not having told his superiors about

the assassination effort are unacceptable; indeed, many of them

were reasors why he should have sought express authority.

As Helms himself testified, assassination was of a high order

of sensitivity. Administration policymakers, supported by

intelligence estimates furnished by the Agency, had emphasized

on several occasions that successors to Castro might be worse

than Castro himself. In addition, the Special Group Augmented

required that plans for covert actions against Cuba be sub-

mitted in detail for its approval. Although the Administration

was exerting intense pressure on the CIA to do something about

Castro and the Castro regime, it was a serious error to have

mc cont

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undertaken so drastic an operation without obtaining full and

equivocal permission.

William Harvey, the officer in charge of the CIA's attempt

using underworld figures. to assassinate Castro, testified that ..

he never discussed the plot with McCone or officials of the

Kennedy Administration because he believed that it had been

fully authorized by the previous Director, because he was

uncertain whether it had a chance of succeeding, and because

he believed that it was Helms'

, not his, duty to inform higher

authorities.

Nonetheless, the Committee believes there were occasions

on which it was

incumbent on Harvey to have disclosed the

assassination operation. As head of Task Force W, the branch

of the CIA responsible for covert operations in Cuba, Harvey

reported directly to General Lansdale and the special Group a cluding

Augmented. The Special Group Augmented had made known that

covert operations in Cuba should be first approved by it, both

by explicit instruction and by its practice that particular

operationa be submitted in "nansentan detail", det Harvey /

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solvert

did not inform either General Lansdale or the Special Group

Augmented of the assassination operation, either when he was

explicitly requested to report to McCone, General Taylor,

and the Special Group on his activities in Miami in April

1962, of when the subject of assassination was raised in the

August 1962 meeting and McCone voiced his disapproval.

The Committee finds that the reasons advanced for not

having informed those

responsible for formulating policy

about the assassination operation were inadequate, misleading,

and

inconsistent. Some officials viewed assassination as

too important and sensitive to discuss with superiors, while

others considered it not sufficiently important. Harvey

testified that it was premature to tell McCone about the

underworld operation in April 1962, because it was not

sufficiently advanced, but too late to tell him about it in

August 1962, since by that time he had decided to terminate

it. On other occasions, officials thought disclosure was

someone else's responsibility; Bissell said he thought it was

up to Dulles, Harvey believed it was up to Helms, but Helms

remarked that Harvey "kept Phase II pretty much in his back

pocket"

relationship

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The Committee concludes that the failure clearly to

inform policymakers of the assassination effort against

Castro was grossly improper. The Committee believes that

it should be incumbent upon

the DDP to report such

sensitive operation to his superior, the DCI, no matter how

grave his doubts might be about the possible outcome of the

operation. It follows that the DCI has the same duty to

accurately inform his superiors.

Trujillo

In the Trujillo case there were several instances in

which it appears that policymakers were not given sufficient

information, or were not informed in a timely fashion.

At a meeting

on December 29, 1960, Bissell presented a

plan to the Special Group for supporting Dominican exile groups

and local dissidents, and stated that the plan would not bring

down the regime without "some decisive stroke against Trujillo

himself". At a meeting on January 12, 1961, the Special Group

authorized the passage of "limited supplies of small arms and

other material" to Dominican dissidents under certain conditions.

• At this time, the fact that the dissidents had been contemplating

the assassination of Trujillo had been known in the State Department

at the level of the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-

American Affairs, and by senior officials of the CIA, including the DCI.

Yet the memorandum supplied to Under Secretary Merchant, which .

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was

said to have been the basis upon which the Special Group

agreed

to the "limited supply" of small arms, did not mention

assassination. Io the contrary, it spoke of "sabotage potential"

and

stated that there "would be no thought of toppling the

[government] by any such minor measure las the supplying of

small arms]."

On February 17, 1961, Richard Bissell sent a memorandum

on the Dominican Republic to McGeorge Bundy. Bissell knew

that the dissidents planned to assassinate Trujillo, but his

memorandum did not mention assassination. It indicated that

the dissidents' "plan of action" included arms for 300 men.

Those involved agreed that support of this nature suggested a

non-targeted paramilitary plan, not an assassination.

The passage of the carbines was approved by CIA head-

quarters on March 31, 1961. The State Department was apparently

unaware of this passage for several weeks. The pouching of the .

machine guns was not disclosed outside the CIA.

The State Department

official from whom the CIA sought

permission to pass the machine guns stated that on "cross

examination" the CIA official conceded that the purpose was

assassination. The CIA official then agreed the United States

should have nothing to do with assassination plots "anywhere,

anytime"

, even though the previous day he and Bissell had signed

a draft cable permitting the passage of the machine guns for

use in connection with a planned assassination.

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Schneider

The issue here is not whether the objectives of the CIA were

contrary to those of the Administration. It is clear that Presi-

dent Nixon desired to prevent Allende from assuming office, even

if that required fomenting and supporting a coup in Chile. Nor

did White House officials suggest that tactics employed (includ-

ing as a first

step to kidnapping General Schneider) would have

been unacceptable as a matter principle. Rather, the issue posed

is whether White House officials were consulted, and thus given

an opportunity to weigh

such matters as risk and likelihood of suc-

cess, and to apply policy-making judgments to particular tactics.

The record indicates that up to October 15 they were; after Octo-

ber 15 there is some doubt.

The documentary record with respect to the disputed post-

October 15 period gives rise

to conflicting inferences. On the one.

hand, Karamessines' calendar shows existence of at least one White

House contact in the critical period prior to the kidnapping of

General Schneider on October 22. However, the absence of any sub-

stantive memoranda in CIA files--when contrasted with several such

memoranda

describing contacts with the White House between Septem-

ber 15 and October 15--may suggest a lack of significant communi-

cation on the part of the CIA as

well as a lack of careful super-

vision on the part of the White House.

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The standards applied within the CIA itself suggest a

view that action which the Committee believes called for

top-level policy discussion and decision was thought of as

permissible, without any further consultation, on the basis

of the initial instruction to prevent Allende from assuming

power. Machine guns were sent to Chile and delivered to

military figures there on the authority of junior CIA officers

without consultation even with the CIA officer in charge of

the program. We find no suggestion of bad faith in the action

of the junior officers. But it necessarily establishes that

there was no advance permission from outside the CIA for the

passage of machine guns. And it also suggests an attitude

within the CIA toward consultation which was. unduly lax.

Further, this case demonstrated the problems inherent in giving

an agency a "blank check" to engage in covert operations

without specifying which actions are and are not permissible,

and without adequately supervising and monitoring these

activities once

begun.

(b) On Occasion, Administration Officials Gave Vague

Instructions to Subordinates and Failed to Make Sufficiently

Clear That Assassination Should Be Excluded From Consideration.

While we cannot find that high Administration officials

expressly approved of the assassination attempts, we have

noted that certain agency officials nevertheless perceived

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assassination to have been authorized. Although those officials

were remiss in not seeking express

authorization for their

activities, their superiors were also at fault for giving

maybe dedai

his les

vague instructions and for not explicitly ruling out assassina-

tion. No written order prohibiting assassination was issued

until 1972, and that order was an internal CIA directive issued

by Director Helms.

Schneider

As explained above, there is no evidence that assassina-

tion was ever

proposed as a method of carrying out the Presi-

dential order to prevent Allende from assuming office. The

Committee believes, however, that the granting of carte

blanche authority to the CIA by the Executive in this case

may have contributed

to the tragic and unintended death of

General Schneider. This was also partially due to impositing

an impractical task to be accomplished within an unreasonably

short time. Apart from

the question of whether any inter-

vention was justified under the circumstances of this case,

the committee believes that the Executive in any event should

have defined the limits of permissible action.

Lumumba

We are unable to make a finding that President

Eisenhower intentionally authorized an assassination

effort against Lumumba because of the lack of absolute

certainty in the evidence. However, it appears that the

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strong language used in discussions at the Special Group and

NSC, as reflected in minutes of relevant meetings,

led Dulles to believe that assassination was desired. The

minutes contain language concerning the need to "dispose of"

Lumumba, an "extremely strong feeling about the necessity

for straight forward action"

, and a refusal to rule out any

activity that might contribute to "getting rid of" Lumumba.

Castro

The effort to assassinate Fidel Castro took place in an

atmosphere of extreme pressure by Eisenhower and Kennedy

Administration officials to discredit and overthrow the Castro

regime. Richard Helms recalled that:

"I remember vividly [that the pressure] was very

intense.

And therefore, when you go into the record,

you find a lot of nutty schemes there

and those nutty

schemes were borne of the intensity of the pressure.

And we were quite frustrated.

Bissell recalled that:

"During that entire period, the administration was

extremely

sensitive about the defeat that had been

afflicted, as they felt, on the U.S. at the Bay of

Pigs, and were pursuing every possible means of

getting rid of Castro.'

Another witness, Samuel Halpern, stated that sometime in

the Fall of 1961 Bissell was

"chewed out in the Cabinet Room in the White House by

both the fresident and the Attorney General for, as he

put it, sitting on his ass

and not doing anything about

getting rid of Castro and the Castro Regime.

General Lansdale informed the agencies cooperating in Operation

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Mongoose that "you're in a combat situation where we have

been given full command". Secretary of Defense McNamara

confirmed that "we were hysterical about Castro at the time

of the Bay of Pigs and thereafter".

Many of the plans that were discussed and often approved

contemplated violent action against Cuba. The operation

which resulted in the Bay of Pigs was a major paramilitary

onslaught that had the approval of the highest government

officials, including the two Presidents.

Thereafter, Attorney

General Kennedy vehemently exhorted the Special Group Aug-

mented that "a solution to the Cuban problem today carried

top priority ... no time, money, effort--or manpower is

to be spared."* Subsequently, Operation Mongoose involved

propaganda and sabotage operations aimed toward

spurring a

revolt of the Cuban people against Castro. Measures that

were considered by the top policymakers included incapacita-

ting sugar workers during harvest season by the use of

chemicals; blowing up bridges and production plants; sabotaging

merchandise in third countries--even those allied with

the United States--prior to its delivery to Cuba; and arming

insurgents on the island.. Programs undertaken at the urging

* The Attorney General himself took a personal interest

in the recruitment and development of assets within Cuba,

on occasion recommending Cubans to the CIA as possible recruits

and meeting in Washington and Florida with Cuban exiles

active in the covert war against the Castro government.

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of the Administration included intensive efforts to recruit

and arm dissidents within Cuba and raids on plants, mines,

and harbors.

Discussions at the Special Group and NSC meetings might

well have contributed to the perception of some CIA officials

that assassination was a permissible tool in the effort to

overthrow the Castro regime.

At a Special Group meeting in

November 1960, Under Secretary Merchant inquired whether

any planning had been undertaken for "direct, positive action"

against Che Guevarra, Raul and Fidel Castro. Cabell replied

that such

a capability did not exist, but might well have

left the meeting with the impression that assassination was

not out of bounds. One phase of Lansdale's plans, which

was submitted to the Special Group in January 1962, aimed

at inducing "open revolt and overthrow of the Communist

regime"

, and included in the final phase an "attack on the

cadre of the regime, including key leaders". The proposal

stated

that "this should be a 'Special Target" operation.

Gangster elements might provide the best recruitment potential

against police..." Several minutes from Special Group

meetings contain language such

as "possible removal of

Castro from the Cuban scene"

• Although Lansdale's proposal

was shelved, the type of aggressive action contemplated was

not ruled out.

On several occasions, the subject of assassination was

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discussed in the presence of senior Administration officials.

While those officials never consented to actual assassina-

tion efforts, they also

was impermissible as a matter of principle.

failed to indicate that assassinario lone

did then

In early 1961, McGeorge Bundy was informed of a CIA

project described as the development of a capability to

assassinate.* Bundy raised no objection and, according to

Bissell, may have been more affirmative. Although Bissell

stated that he did not infer authorization from Bundy's

remarks for the underworld plot against Castro that was then

underway; the fact that he believed that the development

of an assassination capability had been approved by the White

House (which he

subsequently told to Harvey) may well have

contributed to the general perception that assassination was

not prohibited.

Documents indicate that in May 1962, Attorney General

Kennedy was told that the CIA had sought to assassinate

Castro prior to the Bay of Pigs. According to the CIA

officials present at the briefing, the Attorney General

* Bundy, who was National Security Advisor to the President,

had

obligation to

tell the President of such a grave

matter, even though it was only a discussion of a capability

to assassinate.

His

failure to do so was a serious error.

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DAr line

indicated his displeasure about the lack of consultation

on the impropriety of the attempt itself.* There is no

evidence that the Attorney General told the CIA that it must

not engage in assassination plots.

At a meeting of the Special Group Augmented in August

1962, well after the assassination efforts were underway,

Robert McNamara is said to have raised the question of

whether the assassination of Cuban leaders should be explored,

and General Lansdale issued an action memorandum assigning

the CIA the task of preparing contingency plans for the

assassination of Cuban leaders. While McCone testified

that he had immediately made it clear that assassination

was not to be discussed or condoned, Harvey's testimony

and documents which he wrote after the event indicate that

Harvey may have been confused over whether McCone

had

objected to the use of assassination, or whether he was only

concerned that the subject not be put in writing. In any

* Documents show that the Attorney General, Robert Kennedy,

learned in May of 1961 that the CIA had used underworld

figures in an operation against Cuba.

The documentary record

further reflects that the Attorney General was not told that

the operation had involved assassination efforts until May

of 1962, and that the operation was then described to him

as having been terminated in May 1961.

There is no evidence

that the Attorney General suspected the true nature of the

operation until that brieting, or that he learned that it

had not in fact been

terminated. While it is curious that

the Attorney General would not have inquired further into

the nature of the operation when he discovered that Sam

Giancana had been involved in it, there is no evidence that

he did..

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event, McCone went no further. He issued no general order

banning consideration of assassination within the Agency.

One of the programs forwarded to General Lansdale by

the Defense Department in the Mongoose program was entitled

"Operation Bounty" and envisioned dropping leaflets in Cuba

offering rewards for the assassination of Government leaders.

Although the plan was vetoed by Lansdale, it indicates that

persons in agencies other than the CIA perceived that assas-

sination might be permissible.

While the ambivalence of Administration officials does

not excuse the misleading conduct by Agency officials or

justify their failure to seek explicit permission, it dis-

played an insufficient concern about assassination which

may have contributed to the perception that assassination

was an acceptable tactic in accomplishing the Government's

general objectives.

proconu,

With the exception of the tight guidelines issued by to >

the Special Group Augmented concerning Operation Mongoose,

limitat

precise. limitations were never imposed on the CIA requiring

prior permission for the details of other proposed covert

operations against Cuba. No general policy banning assas-

sination was promulgated until Helms' intra-agency order

in 1972. In light of the number of times in which the

subject of assassination arose, Administration officials

were remiss in not explicitly forbidding

such activity.

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20HPA0

*

The Committee notes that many of the occasions on

which CIA officials should have informed their superiors

of the assassination efforts but failed to do so, or did

so in a misleading manner, were also occasions on which

Administration officials paradoxically may have reinforced

the perception that assassination was permissible.

For example, when Bissell spoke with Bundy about an

executive action capability, Bissell failed to indicate that

an actual assassination operation was underway, but Bundy

failed to rule out assassination as a tactic.

In May of 1962 the Attorney General was misleadingly told

about the effort to assassinate Castro prior to the Bay of Pigs,

but not about the operation that was then going on. The Attorney

General, however, did not state that assassination was improper.

When a senior administration official raised the question

of whether assassination should be explored at

a Special Group

meeting, the assassination operation should have been revealed,

but a firm written order against engaging in assassination should

also have been

issued by McCone if, as he testified, he had ex-

hibited

strong aversion to assassination.

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6. Practices Current at the Time in Which the Assas-

sination Plots Occurred Were Revealed by the Record to

Create the Risk of Confusion, Rashness, and Irresponsibility

in the Very Areas Where Clarity and Sober Judgment Was

Most Necessary:

Various witnesses described elements of the system

within which the assassination plots were conceived. The

Committee is disturbed by the custom that permitted the

most sensitive matters to be presented. to the highest levels

of Government with the least clarity. We find this dis-

turbing, and view the following concepts as particularly

dangerous:

(1) The extension of the doctrine of "plausible denial"

beyond its intended purpose of hiding the involvement of

the United States from other countries to an effort to.

shield higher officials from knowledge, and hence, responsi-

bility for certain operations.

• (2) The use of circumlocution or euphemism to describe

serious matters--such as assassination--when precise meanings

ought to be made clear.

(3) The theory that general

approval of broad covert

action programs is sufficient to justify specific actions

such

as assassination or the passage of weapons.

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(4) The theory that authority granted, or assumed to

be granted, by one director or one administration could be

presumed to continue without the necessity for reaffirming

the authority with successor officials.

(5) The creation of capabilities without careful

review and authorization by policymakers, and the risk that

such capabilities might be used without further authoriza-

tion.

(a). The Danger Inherent in Overextending the Doctrine

of Plausible Denial

The original concept of plausible denial envisioned

implementing covert actions in a manner calculated to conceal

American involvement if the actions were exposed. The

doctrine was at times a delusion and at times a snare. It

was

naive for policymakers to assume that sponsorship of

actions as big as the Bay of Pigs invasion could be concealed.

The Committee's inquiry into assassination and the public

disclosures which preceded it demonstrate that when the

United States resorted to cloak and dagger tactics, its hand

was ultimately exposed In addition, the likelihood of

reckless action is substantially increased when policymakers

believe that their decisions will never be revealed.

Whatever can be said in defense of the original pur-

pose of plausible denial--a purpose which intends to conceal

U.S. involvement from the outside world--the extension of

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the doctrine to the internal decision-making process of

the Government is absurd. Any theory which, as a matter

of doctrine, places elected officials on the periphery of

the decision-making process is an invitation to error, an

abdication of responsibility, and a perversion of democratic

government.

(b) The Dangers of Using "Circumlocution" and

"Euphemism"

According to Richard Bissell, the extension of plausible

denial to internal decisionmaking required the use of cir-

cumlocution

and euphemism in speaking with Presidents and

other senior officials.

Explaining this concept only heightens its absurdity.

On the one hand, it assumes that senior officials should be

shielded from the truth to enable them to deny knowledge if

the truth comes out. On the other hand, the concept assumes

that senior officials must be told enough, by way of double

talk, to

grasp the subject. As a consequence, the theory

fails to accomplish its

objective and only increases the

risk of misunderstanding. Subordinate officials should des-

cribe their proposals in

clear, precise, and brutally frank

language; busy superiors are entitled to and should demand

no less.

doesat

NeCTARLY

Euphemism may actually have been preferred--not because

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of plausible denial--but because the persons involved

could not bring themselves to state in plain language what

they intended to do and may have, in some instances, assumed,

rightly or wrongly, that the listening superiors did not

want the issue squarely placed before them.

Assassinate,

murder and kill are words many people do not want to speak

or hear. They describe acts which should not even be pro-

posed, let alone plotted. Failing

to call dirty business

by its rightful name may have increased the risk of dirty

business being done.

(c)

The Danger of Generalized Instructions.

Permitting specific acts to be taken on the basis of

general approvals of broad strategies (e.g., keep Allende

from assuming office, get rid of the Castro regime) blurs

responsibility and accountability. Worse still, it increases

the danger that subordinates may take steps which would

have been disapproved if the policymakers had been informed.

A further danger is that policymakers might intentionally

use loose general instructions to evade responsibility for

embarrassing activities.

In either event, we find that the gap between the

general policy objectives and the specific actions under-

taken to achieve them was far too wide.

It is important that policymakers review the manner in

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which their directives are implemented, particularly when

the activities are sensitive, secret, and immune from

public scrutiny.

(d) The Danger of "Floating Authorization"

One justification advanced by Richard Helms and William

Harvey for not informing John McCone about the use of under-

world figures to assassinate Fidel Castro was their assertion

that the project had already been approved by McCone's

predecessor, Allen Dulles, and that further authorization was

unnecessary, at least until the operation had reached a more

advanced stage.

Similarly, most of the actions taken in the Trujillo

case during the early months of the Kennedy Administration

were authorized by the Special Group on January 12, 1961,

at the end of the Eisenhower Administration.

The idea that authority might continue from one adminis-

tration or director to the next and that there is no duty

to reaffirm authority with successors inhibits responsible

decisionmaking. Circumstances may change or judgments differ.

New officials should be given the opportunity to review

significant programs.

(e) The Problems Connected with Creating New Covert

Capabilities

The development of a new capability raises numerous

problems. Having a capability to engage in certain covert

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activity increases the probability that it will occur,

since the capability represents a tool that is available

for use. There is the further danger that authorizing a

capability may be misunderstood

as authorizing its use

without need for obtaining explicit authorization:

Of course, an assassination capability should never

have been created in the first place.

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Approved by

Drafting

Subcommittee

10/8/75

(with possible reservation

as to language of statute)

assassination, a number of vital issues

v.

RECOMMENDATIONS

During our long investigation of

• 39

came into sharp

focus.

Above all, stood the question of assassination.

Our recommendations on

other issues

should

await the completion of our continuing investigations

and

our final

report.

But we need no more information to convince us

that

a flat

ban against assassination should be written into law.

We condemn assassination and reject it as

an instrument of American

policy. Surprisingly, at present there is. no statute making it a crime to assas-

• sinate a foreign official outside the United States.

Hence, for the reasons

set forth below, the Committee recommends the prompt enactment of a statute mak-

ing

it a Federal crime to commit or attempt an assassination; or to conspire to

do so..:

A. General agreement that the United States must not engage in assassina-

tion. Our view that

assassination has no place in America's arsenal is shared by

the Administration.

....

President Ford, in the same statement in which he asked this Committee to

deal with the

assassination issue, stated:

I am opposed to political assassination. This administration

has not and will not use such means as instruments of national

policy. Presidential Press Conference, June 9, 1975, Weekly

Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. II, No. 24, P. 611.

The witnesses we examined uniformly condemned assassination. They denounced

it as immoral, described it as impractical, and reminded us that an open society,

most of all, runs the risk of the assassination of its own leaders. As President

Kennedy was reported to have said: "we can't get into that kind of thing, or we

would all be targets." (Goodwin

7/18/75, p. 4)

The current CIA Director and his two predecessors testified emphatically

that assassination should be banned. Thus, Colby said:

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With respect to assassination, my position is clear. I

just think it is wrong.

And I have said so and made it

very clear to my subordinates. (5/21/75, p. 89)

Colby's predecéssor, Helms, although himself involved in an earlier plot,

said he had concluded assassination should be ruled out for both moral and

practical reasons:

As a result of my experiences through the years, when I be-

came Director I had made up my mind that this option...of

killing foreign leaders, was something that I did not want

to happen. on my watch. My reasons for this were these:

There are not only moral reasons but there are also

some other rather practical reasons.

It is almost impossible in a democracy to keep any-

thing like that secret....

Somebody would go to a Con-

gressman, his Senator, he might go to a newspaper man, what-

ever the case may be, but it just is not a practical alterna-

tive, it seems to me, in our society.

Then there is another consideration...if you are going

to try by this kind of means to remove

a foreign leader,

then who is going to take his place running that country,

. and are you essentially better off as a matter of practice

when it is over than you were before? And I can give you I

think a very solid example of this which happened in Vietnam

when President Diem was eliminated from the scene.

We then

had a revolving door of prime ministers after that for quite

some period of tiem, during which the Vietnamese Government

at a time In its history when it should have been strong was

nothing but a caretaker government....In other

words, that whole exercise turned out to the disadvantage of

the United States.

...there is no sense in my sitting here with all the ex-

perience I have had and not sharing with the Committee my

feelings this day.. It isn't because I have lost my cool,

or because I have

lost my guts, it simply is because I don't

think it is a viable option in the United States of America these

days.

Chairman Church. Doesn't it also follow, Mr. Helms -- I:

agree with

what

you have said fully -- but doesn't it

also follow on the practical side, apart from the moral side,

that since these secrets are bound to come out, when they do,

they do very grave political damage to the United States in

the world at large? I don't know to what extent the Russians

;

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involved themselves in political assassinations, but under

their system they at least have a better prospect of keep-

ing it concealed. Since we do like a free society and

since these secrets are going to come out in due course, the:

revelation will then do serious injury to the good name and

reputation of the United States.

Would you agree with that?

Mr. Helms. Yes, I would.

The Chairman. And finally,

if we were to reserve to our-

selves the prerogative to assassinate foreign leaders, we may in-.

vite reciprocal action from foreign governments who assume

that if It's our prerogative to do so, it is their prero-

gative as well, and that is another danger that we at least

invite with this kind of action, wouldn't you agree?

Mr. Helms. Yes, sir. (6/13/75, pp. 76-78)

Similarly, John McCone said he was opposed to assassinations

because:

I didn't think it was proper from the standpoint of the U.s.

Government and the Central Intelligence Agency. (6/6/75, p.: 15)

B. CIA Directives Banning Assassination. In 1972 and 1973, Helms and

then Colby issued internal CIA orders banning assassination. In his order, Helms

said:

It has recently again been alleged in the press that CIA

engages in assassination.

As you are well aware, this is not

the case, and Agency policy has long been clear

on this issue.

To underline it, however, I direct that no such activity or

operation be undertaken,

assisted or suggested by. any of our

personnel.... (Memorandum, Helms to Deputy Directors, 3/6/72)

• Colby, in one of a series of orders in August 1973 arising out of the Agency's

own review of prior "questionable activity," issued an order which stated:

CIA will not engage in assassination nor induce, assist or

suggest to others that assassination be employed. (Memorandum, Colby

to Deputy Directors, 8/29/73)

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C.

The need for a statute. Commendable and welcome as they are, these

CIA directives are not sufficient. Administrations change, CIA directors change,

and someday in the future what was tried in the past may once again become a tempt-

ation. Assassination plots did happen. It would be irresponsible for us not to do

all that we can

do to prevent their happening again. Laws express our society's

values; they deter those who might be tempted and stiffen the will of those who

want to resist.

The statute we recommend, which is printed as an appendix to this report,:

makes it a criminal offense for persons

subject to the jurisdiction of the United

States 1) to conspire, within or outside the United States, to assassinate a

foreign official; 2) to attempt to assassinate a foreign official, or 3) to

assas

sinate a foreign official.

Present law makes it

a crime to kill, or to conspire to kill, a foreign

official or foreign official guest while such

a person. is in the United States.

18 U.S.C. 1116; 18 U.S.C. 1117. However, there is no law which makes it a crime

to assassinate, or to conspire or attempt to assassinate, a foreign official

while such official is outside the United States.

Our proposed

statute is thus

designed to close this gap in the law.

Subsection (a) of the proposed statute would punish conspiracies formed

within the United States; subsection

(b) punishes conspiracies outside of the

United States.

Subsection (b) is necessary

to eliminate the loophole which would

otherwise permit persons to simply leave the United States and conspire abroad. i

Subsections (c) and (d), respectively, make it an offense to attempt to kill of

to kill a foreign official outside the United States.

Subsections (a) through (d) specifically apply to any "officer or employee

of the United States" to make clear that the statute punishes conduct by U.S.

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government personnel,. as well as conduct by private citizens having no relation

to the U.S. government. In addition, subsection (a), dealing with conspiracies

the United States, applies to "any other person," whether or not

a United

States citizen.

Noncitizens

who conspire within the United States to assassi-

nate a foreign official clearly come within the jurisdiction of U.S. law. Sub-

sections (b) through (d), which deal with conduct outside the United States, apply

to U.S. citizens, and to officers or employees of the United States, whether or .

not they are citizens. Criminal liability for conduct outside the United States

of persons

who are not U.S. citizens or who do not hold a position as a officer

or employee of the United States are matters for the law of the place where such

conduct takes place.

The term "foreign official" is defined in subjection (d) (2). The defini-

tion makes it clear that the offense may be committed even though the official

belongs to an insurgent force, an unrecognized government, or a non-governmental

political party. Our investigation - as well as the reality of international

politics - has shown that officials in such organizations are potential targets

for assassination.*/

The offenses are limited to conduct aimed at such persons because of their

official duties or status, or their political views, actions, or statements. Thus?

for example,

a conspiracy to kill or the killing of a foreign official, which is

not politically motivated would not be punishable under this statute.

The definition of official in section (d) (2) also provides that such per-

son must be an official of a foreign government or movement "with which the

United States is not at war or against which the United States Armed Forces have

*/For example, Lumumba was not an official of the Congolese government at the

time of the plots against his life, and Trujillo, though the dictator, held no

official

governmental position in

the latter period of his regime.

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not been introduced into hostilities or situations pursuant to the provisions of

the War Powers Resolution." This definition makes it clear that, absent a decla-

ration of war or the introduction of United States Armed Forces pursuant to the

War Powers Resolution, the killing of foreign officials is a criminal offense.

/insert discussion of paramilitary aspect?

* * * * *

In the course of our hearings, some witnesses, while strongly condemning

assassination, asked whether, as a matter of

theory, assassination should absolutely

be ruled out in a time of truly unusual national emergency. Adolf Hitler was

cited as an example. Of course, the cases with which we were concerned were not

of that character.*/ In a grave emergency, the President has a limited power to

act, not in violation of the law, but in accord with his own responsibilities

under the Constitution to defend the Nation. As the Supreme Court has declared, the

Constitution "is not

a suicide pact." Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144,

160 (1963) .

Abraham Lincoln, in an unprecedented emergency, claimed unprecedented

power based on the need to preserve the nation:

...my oath to preserve the Constitution to the best of

my ability, imposed

upon me the duty of preserving, by

every indispensable means, that government -- that

nation - of which that Constitution was the organic law.

Was it possible to lose the nation, and yet preserve the

Constitution? By general law life and limb must be pro-

tected; yet often a limb must be amputated to save a life;

but a life is never wisely given to save a limb. I felt

that measures, otherwise unconstitutional, might become

lawful, by becoming indispensable to the preservation of

the Constitution, through the preservation of the nation

•... The Complete Works of Abraham Lincoln, Vol. X,

pp. 65-66 (Nicolay and Hay, Eds. 1894).

*/Indeed, in the only situation of true national crisis -- the Cuban missile

crisis - assassination

was not even considered.

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Of course, whatever the extent of the President's own constitutional

powers," it is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system that these

powers are checked and limited by the Congress, including the Congress' power

impeachment. As a necessary corollary, any action taken by a President pur-

suant to his limited inherent

powers and in apparent conflict with the law

must be disclosed to the Congress. Only then may the Congress judge whether the

ac-

tion truly represented, in Lincoln's phrase, an "indispensable necessity"

the life of the Nation.

As Lincoln explained in submitting his extraordinary actions to the Congress

for ratification: "In full view of his great responsibility he has,

so far,

done what he has deemed his duty. You will now, according to your own judgment,

perform yours."

(Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session, July 4,

1861)•

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Approved by Drafting

Subcommittee on 9/9/75

EPILOGUE

We do not believe that the acts which we have examined represent the

real American

character.

They do not reflect the ideals which have diven

the people of this country and of the world hope for a better, fuller,

fairer. life. We regard the assassination plots as aberrations.

We must not adopt the tactics of the enemy. Means are

as important

as ends. Crisis makes it tempting to ignore the wise restraints that make

men free. But each time we do so, each time the means we use are wrong,

our inner strength, the strength which makes us free, is lessened.

Despite our distaste for what we have seen, we have great faith in

this country. The story is sad, but this country has the strength to hear

it and to learn from it. We must remain a people who confront our mistakes

and resolve not to repeat them. If we do not, we will decline; but, if we

do, our fucure will be worthy of the best of our past.

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