Originator: FBI
From: DIRECTOR, FBI
Document date: 02/13/1962
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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124-10183-10291

(B) CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY - OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED

STATES - The Bureau recently completed discussions with the Central

Intelligence Agency (CIA, regarding that agency's operational activities in

the United States.

These discussions essentially dealt with CIA's assessment

and recruitment of foreign intelligence sources in the United States, Enclosed

for your use is a list of the ground rules which both agencies have accepted

as guidelines for effecting the necessary coordination.

In order that you may

be adequately priented in this matter, the following background is set forth.

The need for the ground rules is related to CIA's interest in developing

positive intelligence sources in the United States and the necessity for

protecting the Bureau's jurisdiction in the counterintelligence field, The

latter is essential to the adequate discharge of our responsibilities to

national security,

Positive intelligence may be described as a comprehensive product

resulting from collection, evaluation collation. analysis, and interpretation

of all available information rélating to national security and concerning other

countries where such information is significant to our Government's develop-

ment and execution of plans, policies, and courses of action. Such intelligence

can be divided into various categories, such as economic, military, scientific,

political, geographic, et cetera. The collection of positive intelligence is

distinguished from counterintelligence which is primarily designed to penetrate,

monitor, neutralize and/or disrupt the foreign intelligence and security services.

Counterintelligence further includes other functions of an internal security

nature directed against subversive groups, organizations, and individuals. By

law CIA does not have any law enforcement or internal security functions. CIA's

authorization for collecting positive intelligence is predicated on the National

Security Act of 1947 and subsequent issuance of National Security Council

Directives. There is no law, directive, or charter which authorizes CIA to

engage in the clandestine development of positive intelligence sources in the

United States. Therefore, in the absence of any statutory prerogative to conduct

such activity in the United States, it has been mutually agreed by FBI and CIA

that the Agency can only engage in the clandestine development and handling of

positive intelligence sources in this country by coordinating with the Bureau.

The Bureau in turn legally has the primary counterintelligence responsibility

in the U. S. and is continually developing positive intelligence. It, howerer.

must be regarded an incidental product to our main objcctive. The Bureau

does not have a primary responsibility to collect positive intelligence, but we

do have numerous and very significant obligations in this field. In actual practice

the Bureau is required by the President and other agencies to derelop information

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of a positive intelligence nature. This requires Bureau action designed to

bring about the necessary coverage. A good example is our involvement

in the development of information relating to the crisis in the Dominican

Republic. From the above you will recognize that there can be "gray areas"

of interest to the Bureau and CIA. It, therefore, has been necessary to

effect adequate coordinating machinery.

The potential for the development of positive intelligence in this

country is vast and varied. Voluminous positive intelligence is collected

overtly through the review of foreign and domestic publications, interviews

of travelers, arriving aliens, contacts with scientists, et cetera. In this

area there have been no serious issues between the Bureau and CIA.

However, in the field of clandestine development of positive

intelligence both agencies have an interest, and there is a necessity for a

clear-cut understanding of jurisdiction and coordination. Particularly is

this true in the development of positive intelligence sources who are

employees or officials of foreign governments stationed in the United States

or who are visiting this country on a temporary basis.

For many years the Bureau has had a continuing program of

developing sources in diplomatic installations for the purpose of discharging

our counterintelligence responsibilities and incidentally for developing

positive intelligence information which might assist the Government in

formulating policy. The Bureau, recognizing CIA's need for sources in the

positive intelligence field, has permitted CIA to assess and recruit sources in

the United States in a limited manner with the understanding that such activities

are fully coordinated with the Bureau. In January, 1964, CIA established

their Domestic Operations Division (DOD) to conduct such operations in the

United States, and certain Bureau field offices were alerted and furnished

the necessary guidance and instructions. The recent discussions with CIA

resulted in a refinement of the understanding of the ground rules established

in January, 1964.

The enclosed ground rules will be applied by the Bureau and CIA

as cases arise. The Bureau position in each matter will be decided at the

Seat of Government. As a general rule, Bureau Headquarters will be informed

by CIA regarding its interest in an individual or a target. Prior to notification

of CIA regarding our position, the situation will be carefully reviewed at the

Seat of Government. This may often include a request to the field for

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observations and recommendations before notice is transmitted to CIA. At

the same time, it is possible that you may be contacted in the field by a

representative of DOD, CIA. If so, you should be guided by the enclosed

ground rules in any discussions, bearing in mind that the approval for any

particular operational activity is to be made at Bureau Headquarters.

You should hold to the concept that the protection of the internal

security of the United States involves very basic clear-cut responsibilities

of the FBI. This should be kept in mind in each case and in any contacts

which you may have with CIA representatives. There is to be no interference

with or infringement upon

lour jurisdiction. It is recognized that unforeseen

developments may create situations not adequately covered by the ground rules.

You, therefore, should report such matters to the Bureau setting forth

complete details with your recommendations. Although we have been informed

by CIA that the Bureau's jurisdiction and operational interests will not be …

interfered with, we cannot discount the results of past experiences stemming

from CIA's operational and organizational deficiencies. We have no reason to

believe that there will be a revolutionary change of these conditions. It is,

therefore, incumbent upon you to be extremely alert for any breakdown of the

adherence to the ground rules. I emphasize that this is an area of activity

which must be closely monitored by each Special Agent in Charge.

should be certain that your personnel is adequately oriented so that the Bureau

can have the full benefit of any constructive suggestions pertaining to this

entire matter.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosure for (B)

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