DIEM ASSASSINATION
Originator: SSCIA
From: DAWSON, RHETT
To: SCHWARZ, FREDERICK A.O. JR
Document date: 7/7/75
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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157-10014-10152

JFK Assassination System

Identification Form

Agency Information

Date:

7/7/2015

AGENCY :

SSCIA

RECORD NUMBER :

157-10014-10152

RECORD SERIES :

MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE

AGENCY FILE NUMBER:

07-M-57

Document Information

ORIGINATOR: SSCIA

FROM:

DAWSON, RHETT

TO :

SCHWARZ, FREDERICK A.O.JR

TITLE:

DIEM ASSASSINATION

DATE: 07/07/1975

PAGES:

14

SUBJECTS:

VIETNAM

DIEM, ASSASSINATION

DOCUMENT TYPE: MEMORANDUM

CLASSIFICATION: Declassified

RESTRICTIONS: 1B; 1C

CURRENT STATUS : Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 03/22/2000

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS: CCBOX 437

v9.1

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Date

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08/07/95

1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY

RECORD

• NUMBER

RECORDS SERIES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

:

SSCIA

157-10014-10152

MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE

07-M-57

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA

FROM

DAWSON, RHETT

TO

SCHWARZ, FREDERICK A.O. JR

TITLE : DIEM ASSASSINATION

DATE : 07/07/75

PAGES : 14

SUBJECTS : VIETNAM

DIEM, ASSASSINATION

DOCUMENT TYPE : MEMORANDUM

CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET

RESTRICTIONS: REFERRED

CURRENT STATUS

: POSTPONED IN FULL

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 01/08/99

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : CCBOX 437

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

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MIS TILE

CONTAINS SPECIALLY DESICATED INTELLIGENCE MATERIAL

(COMPARTMENTED)

rmation in this file is to be read

only.

it is not to be extracted,

ud, paraphrased, or discussed with another person without specific

y .

If you have

a question,

or a requirement, speak to the Control

who gave vou access to this file.

MTE OF TERSON HAVING ACCESST FROM

tausan

2:00

TO

2.45.

ISSUED BY SUCURED BY T TIM

R 428

437-25

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R428

MEMORANDUM

TO : Fritz Schwarz

Curt Smothers

FROM: Rhett Dawson

DATE: July 7, 1975

RE : Diem Assassination

I. Overview

A. Summary

The assassinations of South Vietnamese President Dien and his

brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, on November 2, 1963, concurrent with a Vietnamese

generals' coup, represents the most remote,

if even that, instance of CIA

involvement in the murder of a foreign leader presently being considered

by the Committee.

Based on all available evidence, Diem's assassination

appears to have been a spontaneous and solely Vietnamese-inspired act,

guided by anger at Diem for not making available his resignation or

presence to coup leaders.

The only remaining incident casting doubt on

this evidence is the failure of the American Embassy to provide safe

conduct for Diem and Nhu out of the country, as originally planned by

the generals. (See paragraph II.E.) Nhu's assassination was a part of

the plan almost from its inception.

B. Conclusions

1. Diem's assassination represents not an incident of an abuse

by CIA as much as it does an account of mistaken national policy.

2. The Kennedy Administration, under intense public pressure

from both the New York Times and other dispatches from Saigon, sought

to disassociate itself from the repressive Dien regime.

3. A rift between the staff members of State and the National

Security Council, on the one hand, and DoD and CIA, on the other, as to .

whether Diem and Nhu must be driven from office exacerbated the situation

and 11l-served President Kennedy.

4. Although the generals relished the idea of killing Diem's

brother, Nhu, it was considered that Diem himself would be allowed to

live and either leave the country or, possibly, even retain the presi-

dency. No evidence has been adduced that U.s. representatives were

aware of the murder of Diem until after it was done.

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C. Alternatives

It appears that the Conmittee should either:

1. Consider the Diem assassination not as an element of CIA

involvement in the killing of foreign leaders, but as an instance of

U.S. Intervention in the internal affairs of a foreign country, not

unlike Chile, which led to a coup and the leader's not totally unex-

pected murder by indigenous military; or

2. Examine McGeorge Bundy and others on the delay in obtaining

air evacuation for Diem and Nhu to a country of asylum; or

3. Continue staff investigation further to develop existing

evidence as to the killing; or

4. Draft a report based on evidence available at this time.

D. Recommendation

It is recommended that the Committee examine MeGeorge Bundy

and others, if necessary, on the delay in air evacuation to asylum.

II. History

A. The Bombing in Hue

1. Chronology

May 6, 1963

May 7, 1963

Diem revives regulation banning

ublic display of any religiou

lag - either Buddhist or Catholi

- probably due to excessive dis-

play of the Vatican flag in DaNang

a few days earlier.

Vui Van Long arrives in Hue and,

seeing the city already bedecked

with flags for the Buddha's birth-

day the next day, tells Buddhist

monks that the regulation will not

be enforced. Despite Long's rever-

sal of the order, Thich Iri Quang,

a Buddhist monk, decides to send

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May 8, 1963

monks around to tell people to

take down flags as a result or

Diem's order. 2

Quang publicly criticizes Diem at

Buddhist gathering for flag regula-

tion and crowd gathers at a radio

station, resulting in grenades be-

ing exploded. There is a conflict

in the evidence as to who threw

the grenades as (a) it was general-

ly assumed that Diem's troops caused

the 8 deaths, but (b) medical evi-

dence found that none of the bodies

had metal fragments, implying the

grenades were plastic, usually as-

sociated with Viet Cong. 3

2. Significance

down the dient tense enteen with he sellat on bett

This event, along with the self-immolation by monks

and Madame Nhu's (Diem's sister-in-law) incredibly bloodthirsty statements

that she would like to furnish some mustard at a bonzes (monks) barbeque, 5

received unfavorable press and brought pressure on the Kennedy Administra-

tion to disassociate itself from that of Diem and apply "direct, relentless

and tableharmering pressure on Diem such as the United States had seldom

before attempted with a friendly sovereign government. "€

B. The Abortive August 1963 Coup

1. Chronology

July 4, 1963

July 1963

The initial conscious decision and

agreement among the coup principals

(Generals Minh, Don, Kim, and Khiem)

takes place, probably before this

date; even though the August coup

lails,,

the intention is never aban-

doned. /

A majority of the coup plotters, in-

cluding Minh, desire that Diem retire.

As to Ngo Dinh Nhu, his wife Madame Nhu,

and the warlord brother Ngo Dinh Can,

deate was never messention - their

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August 21, 1963

August 24, 1963

August 25, 1963

Special Forces, under personal loyalty

to Nhu, attack several pagodas in the

Saigon area.

Reasons for the raid are

unclear, but they may be (a) timed

when there is no U.S. Ambassador in

South Vietnam (Nolting left a few days

before and Lodge was on his way) 9 and

to (b) an effort by the Nhu's to strike

back'at a pagoda which "was more a

political command post than a holy

place

ters. 10

" serving as Quang's headquar-

Deptel 243, prepared by Roger Hilsman,

Assistant Secretary of State for Far

Eastern Affairs, and Undersecretary of

State Averell Harriman, I1 and cleared

In Hyannisport by President Kennedy, 12

is dispatched to the newly arrived Am

bassador Lodge. It demands that Diem

rid himself of his brothers, Nhu and Can,

and, if he does not do so, Lodge is told

that the U.S. will no longer support

Diem.

Further, he is told to convey

to military commanders the assurance

that they will receive "direct support

in any interim period of breakdown

central goverrment...."13 The Country

Team is directed to look at alternative

Vietnamese leaders and make plans as

"to how we might bring about Diem's

replacement If this should become neces-

sary. "14

In a CIA cable, Chief of Station Richard-

son reports back the results of a con-

ference among Lodge, Deputy Chief of

Mission Trueheart, General Harkins (Com

mander, MACV), and himself. The group

concludes that giving Diem option in

Hilsman's cable has no chance of suc-

ceeding, and accepts Deptel 243 as de

cision from Washington. 15

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August 26, 1963

August 28, 1963

August 29, 1963

August 31, 1963

Lodge presents credentials to Diem. 16

CIA agents Conein and Spera are told

to tell the generals the substance of

Deptel 243, but that "we cannot be of

any help auring initial action of as-

suming power of state. "17

Maxwell Taylor; in a cable, elicits

Harkins' views on feasibility of opera-

tion as Washington is having second

thoughts. Taylor claims that Deptel

243 was prepared "without DoD or JCS

participation. "18

Conein and Spera meet with generals,

who want firm evidence of U.S. support,

and Minh flatly states that in order to

do this, U.S. should stop economic aid

to Diem (which was done in September). 19

In a CIA cable from Saigon, Washington

is told, "(t)his particular coup is

finished.. generals did not feel ready

and did not have sufficient balance of

forces.... There is little doubt that

GVN aware U.S. role and may have con

siderable detail...."20

2.

Significance

This period bears examination because it, and principally

Deptel 243, sets the tone for later relations between the Country Team

and the generals. Minh, disbelieving at first that the U.S. is really

supporting him, grows in confidence, despite the U.s. military's continu-

promises to get out of saigon, but by this time no one trusts another's

word and Nhu stays.

C.

The November Coup

1. Chronology

September 13, 1963

Lodge complains bitterly that having

to meet with Diem "1s an extremely

time consuming procedure" and asks

that he not have to do so unless he

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October 24, 1963

October 28, 1963

November 1, 1963

1315 hours

1340 hours

1345 hours

1650 hours

1715 hours

1845 hours

1856 hours

1915 hours

Conein meets with Don, a coup leader,

and informs him that the U.s.

"go for this knocking off. " 3à does not

Conein meets with Don for last time

before coup is launched and Is told

that he will receive four hours' no

tice.

Don wants firm departure time

from Vietnam for Lodge's temporary

return to Washington. 33

Saigon Embassy still does not have

coup force plans. 34

Instead of getting four hours' notice,

Embassy receives four minutes' warning

of start of coup. 35 An aide to Don

tells Conein to go to Joint General

Staff (JGS) headquarters and bring

with him all the money he can lay his

hands on. Conein takes 3 million piastre

Station had stored 5 million piastres

($68,000).36

The generals are unable to contact

palace by phone, but propose Diem resign

immediately, guaranteeing safe departure

to him and Nhu.

Otherwise

be attacked at

1530 hours. 37 alace will

Palace surrounded. 38

Minh tells Nhu that if he and Diem

do not resign within 5 minutes, the

palace will be bombed. 39

Minh telephones Diem, but Diem hangs

be bombed, 40"

Minh orders the palace to

Troops are moving in on. the palace. 41

Diem refuses again to capitulate. 42

Minh gives Diem another chance to sur-

render; if he refuses, he will be

blasted "off face of the earth. "43

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2140 hours

One air assault on Presidential Guard

barracks launched before nightfall

No others launched before nightfall

on me to ares ter. give Diem one more

November 2, 1963

0650 hours

Diem calls Don with offer to surrender

unconditionally. 45

The generals proceed to palace to pick

up Diem and Nhu and escort them to JGS.

They will request preference as to

destination and seek approval of the

country designated. 46

0800 hours

Escort at palace, but neither Diem nor

Nhu appear. 47

How Diem and Nhu leave the palace and are subsequently located is

Eques toe to elute go tea speculate the the esca, ehra canaltar

faces, an informant identifies them and calls JGS. 49 Another less specula-

tive and more detailed account, by a CIA source, states that Diem and Nhu

left the palace the previous evening with a Chinese businessman and went to

ala e00 hour, one

Higgins reports this account to some extent, but states that

Diem called Khiem, a coup leader, and offered to resign, disclosing their

whereabouts in Cholon. Then, she states, Minh called a meeting, excluding

Khiem, and a convoy was organized. Diem and Nhu are forced into a vehicle,

left to themselves by Colonel Lam, who seeks their safe conduct. When Lam,

at the end of the convoy, arrives at JGS, he finds Diem has been shot in

the back of the head, and Nhu stabbed in the chest and shot numerous times

In the back. Both had their hands tied behind their backs.51

Minh tells

Conein that Diem and Nhu carmitted suicide, but Conein doubts that a Catholic

would take his life in a church. 52

Minh, according to Higgins, later states

that his aide, Captain Nhung, had gotten into the vehicle with Diem and Nhu

and, having been provoked into an argument, shoots them both. 53 There is

leath and their hands tied.-

In any event, Nhung is assumed to be the

executioner, 55 but only one account blames Minh for giving the order, al-

though it might be expected that an aide to a general would be so acting. 56

TOP

Gici

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1030 hours

The bodies of Diem and Nhu are at JGS,

but Conein declines to view them for

fear of the damage a leak of his having

done so could do to U.S. interests.57

D. The Five Million Piastres

The decision for the CIA to pass along funds to the coup leaders

may have been a point of discussion in early October 1963.58 Lodge men-

tions that a request for money may be forthcoming and that it should be

anticipated.59 This is interesting as all other available evidences sub

mits that this decision was of such relative insignificance that it could

be made by the Station without consultation with Lodge.

Conein received the money on October 24, 1963, and put it into a

sale in his house. The money was given to Don for two purposes: (1) to

procure rice and bread for troops diverted from supplies; and (2) to pay

death benefits to those killed during the coup (Conein claims there is no

Insurance in Vietnam and that this was a customary practice). 61

The only observation that this question poses is the laxity of

payment by the CIA of a sizeable amount of the money.

E. The Twenty-four Hour Airplane Delay

The only remaining question in the conduct of the U.S. Government

during the November 1 coup is whether Lodge's unwillingness or inability

to obtain safe conduct for Diem and Nhu indicates some involvement in or

knowledge of the assassination of the two that is not apparent on the face

of available records.

On October 30, 1963, Lodge notifies Washington that they should

anticipate a request by key personalities for evacuation. Lodge suggests

Saipan as a depository for the asylees as its absence of press and com

munications would allow policy makers time to make further disposition.

Lodge recognizes that a request for asylum in the Saigon Embassy is not

this, Ely also and hopes that the new goverment will help him resolve

Conein was the go-between for securing an airplane for Diem and

Nhu. He was first asked by Minh and Don, after Minh's phone conversation

with Diem shortly after 6 o'clock in the morning, November 2, 1963. Conein

sponsive fashion that Diem would be taken to the first country that of-

fered asylum and that they did not want to land in a country other than

the one which was granting asylum.

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At some point, Conein was also advised that the C-130, which

was the only airplane available in Vietnam, could not fly far enough

to land in New Delhi, Karachi, or Tehran, and that 24 hours would be

needed to get a KC-135 from Guam. Conein then passed all this informa-

tion on to Don. 63

pilots in Guam would have to be briefed on their route and that the

airport would have to be opened. 64

This whole incident casts a pall over American involvement in

the assassinations of Diem and Nhu. Evidence presently available is

unsatisfactory to explain away what is considered to be the last linger-

ing doubt of U.S. having any hand in the killings. For this reason,

t is recormended that the Committee examine McGeorge Bundy on the is

sue and consider whether further investigation is warranted

TOR

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FOOTNOTES

1. Marguerite Higgins, Our Vietnam Nightmare (Harper and Row, 1965), p. 91

(hereinafter cited as Higgins).

2. Higgins, pp. 91-92.

3. Higgins, pp. 95-96.

4. Hearing before the Senate Select Conmittee on Intelligence Activities,

June 20, 1975 (hereinafter cited as Hearings, with person and date), at

op. 42-44, Conein

5. Hearings, Conein, June 20, 1975, p. 43.

6. Higgins, p. 100.

7. Hearings, Conein, June 20, 1975, Exhibit 1, p. 10.

8. Ibid.

9. Hearings, Conein, June 20, 1975, p. 21.

10. Higgins, p. 181.

11. Deptel 243, received from White House (WH), July 3, 1975.

12. Higgins, p. 196.

13. Deptel 243, received from WH, July 3, 1975. Having used the quoted

phrase, Hiisman later (Deptel 249) queries Lodge as to its meaning.

14. Ibid.

15. CIA I.G. Report (hereinafter cited as I.G.), Part C, 1967, pp. 7-8.

16. Ibid., p. 8.

17. Ibia., p. 9.

18.

Ibid., p. 11. Higgins, however, claims that Roswell Gilpatric, Act-

Ing Secretary of Defense, was telephoned and gave his assent. Higgins,

p. 196.

19. Ibid., p. 18.

20. Ibid., p. 15.

TOP

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imminent visit of Taylor and Maxwell to Diem. Also, paragraph 4, Lodge

cable from Saigon CIA, number 2023, October 29, 1963, reporting on Conein

meeting with Minh, who complains that "other Americans should quit talk-

ing to Colonels and Majors (Vietnamese) about coup action...."

An in-

teresting sidelight to this entire study is the division within the U.S.

Government, With state and certain National security Council staff main-

taining a "Diem must-go" attitude, while DoD and CIA believe that the issue

1s in the countryside, not in Saigon and Hue. Cf., for example, Hearings,

Colby, June 20, 1975, p. 65.

22. CIA Saigon (Lodge) cable, number 2114, to Secretary of State and

others, dated October 31, 1963.

23. CIA Saigon (Lodge) cable, number 2023, to Secretary of State and

others, dated October 29, 1963.

24. Saigon Embassy (Lodge) cable, number 403, to Secretary of State,

dated September 2, 1963.

25. saigon Embassy (Lodge) cable, number 505, to Secretary of State,

Cf., also I.G., pp. 21-22, where McCone com

plains that Lodge has had little contact with Diem and has not been out

of saigon.

26. Hearings, Conein, June 20, 1975, p. 25. But Minh stated that Diem

1s to be kept in office. Other two alternatives envision (a) encircle-

ment of Saigon by various military units and (b) direct confrontation

between military units involved in the coup and loyalist units. I.G.,

pp. 27-28.

27. I.G., p. 28.

28. Hearings, McCone, June 6, 1975, p. 60. (Colby drafted this for

McCone. Hearings, Conein, June 20, 1975, p. 35.)

29. Ibid., p. 62.

30. I.G., p. 28.

31. I.G., p. 29.

Hearings, Conein, June 20, 1975, p. 31. It should be pointed out

that Colby stated at the Hearings, June 20, 1975, at p. 50, that Coneir

was not aware of McCone's instructions at his next meeting with Minh

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(not Don - Conein was confused as to who he instructed) and therefore

did not pass on decision to him.

Conein could not explain why he had

not included his discussion with Don in an otherwise exhaustive after-

action report. Hearings, June 20, 1975, рр. 37-38.

33. I.G., p. 37.

34. CIA Saigon cable (Lodge) to State, number 2129, dated November 1,

1963.

35. MACV Cable (Harkins) to JCS, number 8512, dated November 1, 1963.

36. I.G., p. 40.

37: Hearings, Conein, June 20, 1975, Exhibit 1 (hereinafter simply

Exhibit), p. 15.

38. Exhibit, p. 14.

39. Ibid., p. 17.

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid., p. 18.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid., pp. 19-20.

45. Ibid., p. 23.

46. Ibid.

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid., p. 25.

49. Hearings, Conein, June 20, 1975, pp. 58-59. This story Is bolstered

by a summary of speculative stories contained in a Saigon Embassy cable

(Lodge), number 888, to State, dated November 2, 1963, at p. 3.

50. Saigon Embassy cable (Lodge), number 888, to State, at p. 1.

51. Higgins, pp. 216-219.

52. Hearings, Conein, June 20, 1975, p. 56.

53. Higgins, p. 219 g

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54. I.G., p. 43.

55. I.G., p. 43.

56. Higgins, p. 219.

57.

Hearings, Conein, June 20, 1975, р. 58.

58. Hearings, Colby, June 20, 1975, p. 22.

59.

2983, a Station 2013, (ode), rume 30, 2,650 State, dated October

60. I.G., p. 41, and Hearings, Colby, June 20, 1975, p. 23.

61. Hearings, Conein, June 20, 1975, p. 72.

62. Saigon Station Cable (Lodge), number 2063, dated October 30, 1963.

63.

Hearings, Conein, June 20, 1975, p. 54.

64. Ibid., pp. 76-78.

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