FDB: OPERATION MONGOOSE
Originator: SSCIA
Document date: 00/00/1975
Document type: REPORT

# DOCID-32423491

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JFK Assassination System

Identification Form

Agency Information

Date:

7/7/2015

AGENCY:

SSCIA

RECORD NUMBER :

157-10014-10103

RECORD SERIES :

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE

07-M-09

Document Information

ORIGINATOR: SSCIA

FROM:

TO :

TITLE:

FDB: OPERATION MONGOOSE

56000 Dater 11-04-2021

DATE: 00/00/1975

PAGES: 46

SUBJECTS :

SPECIAL GROUP

OPERATION MONGOOSE

DOCUMENT TYPE: REPORT

CLASSIFICATION: Declassified

RESTRICTIONS: 1B; 1C

CURRENT STATUS: Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 03/21/2000

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS: CCBOX 450

v9.1

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Date :

Page :

08/06/95

1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY:

SSCIA

RECORD

NUMBER

157-10014-10103

RECORDS

SERIES

MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTTEE

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

: 07-M-09

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR :

SSCIA

FROM

TO

TITLE : FDB: OPERATION MONGOOSE

DATE

: 00/00/75

PAGES : 46

SUBJECTS : OPERATION MONGOOSE

SPECIAL GROUP

DOCUMENT TYPE: REPORT

CLASSIFICATION

:TOP SECRET

RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED

CURRENT STATUS : POSTPONED IN FULL

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 01/05/99

OPENING CRITERIA

COMMENTS : CCBOX 450

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

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BOx 450

FDB: OPERATION MONGOOSE

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The Special Group, The Special Group (Augmented) and "Operation

Mongoose

Control over covert operations conducted by the CIA during

the period 1959 to 1965 was exercised by the Special Group, a:

subcommittee of the National Security Council

composed of the Presi-

dent's Assistant for National Security Affairs, the Director of

Central Intelligence, the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Under

Secretary of State for Political Affairs. Today this group is

known as the 40 Committee. In addition, during the period 1961

to 1965 another subcommittee of the NSC was established to oversee

oovert operations relating to Cuba. It was known as the Special

Group (Augmented) and was composed of the members of the

Special Group and Attorney General Robert Kennedy. Other high govern-

ment officials frequently attended Special Group (Augmented) meet-

ings on an ad hoc basis.

The overriding purpose of the Special Group was to exercise

political control over covert operations abroad. The Special Group

was charged with the responsibility of considering the objectives

of any proposed activity, whether or not it would accomplish these

aims, its likelihood of success and in general whether or not it

would be "proper" and in the American interest. In addition, the

Special Group had the responsibility for framing covert operations

in such a way that they later could be "disavowed" or "plausibly

denied" by the United States Government - or at least by the Presi-

dent.

Political sensitivity was the chief criterion for submission

of programs and activities to the Special Group. Also, the Director

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of Central Intelligence would submit programs or activities to the

Special Group if unusually large sums of money were involved, de-

fined as $25,000 or more. Despite these two general submission

criteria, however, the procedures that were followed during the

period 1959 to 1963 in determining which covert operations required

Special Group approval were characterized by an internal CIA memo-

randum as "somewhat cloudly and thus can probably best be described

as having been based on value judgments by the DCI. "I!

The memorandum went on to say:

b. It is obvious that a compilation of Special Group

approvals in no way reflects the totality of signifi-

cant CIA activities carried on over the past 15 years.

With respect to overall DDP

activity, it does not

include any mention of FI/CI actions

or, of course,

any decisions in the overt field.

Even within

the

restricted framework of covert action alone, a 1963

study prepared by this office showed that of the 550

existing CA projects of the DDP which were reviewed

against the background of our own internal instruction

on Special Group submission (CSI 50-20, 4 March 1963),

only 86

were separately approved (or reapproved) by

the Special Group between 1 January and 1 December 1962.

C .

From the above it seems that the procedures for deter-

mining which CA operations

require approval were not

only somewhat imprecise prior to 1963, but also, and

equally important, we did not keep adequate records of

just what projects (and in what detail) were discussed

with the Special Group._

1/Memorandum for the Record, C/CA/PEG, Subject: "Policy Coordination

of CIA's Covert Action Operations," 21 February 1967

2/Ibid.

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Not until the CIA's own internal instruction, dated March 4,

1963, on Special Group submissions did the criteria for submissions

become more formal and precise. The instruction (CSI 50-20) detailed

the following types of programs or activities which, as a general

rule, would require Special Group action:

Political and propaganda action programs involving direct

or indirect action to influence or support political parties,

groups, or specific political leaders,

including operations

which at and mont at pense soulsential military

Economic action programs designed to influence governments

to support U.S. national policy objectives, or to prevent

Bloc countries

trom obtaining some strategic politico-

economic advantage in countries or areas of importance to

u.s.

global strategy:

Paramilitary action programs.

CIA clandestine and covgft action annexes to U.S. Country

Internal Defense Plans.

The 1963 instruction also dealt with cases requiring resub-

mission to the Special Group. This was required where there was a

need for a

new policy determination or to reaffirm the previous

policy decisions; when developments or changes were such as to make

the subject a matter for re-examination by the Special Group; and if

specifically required by the Special Group in its approval of the

program or activity.

Meetings of the Special Group were infrequent until, at the begin-

ning of 1959, regular weekly meetings were instituted. Presentations

by the DCI to the Special Group took two basic forms: memoranda

3/Ibid

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requesting approval of specific, usually one country, undertakings

and general memoranda or oral presentations describing broader

international capabilities and actions. Such memoranda were to

include a summary of the proposal, the problem to which the

proposal was addressed, and the factors bearing on the problem.

In addition

to its primary function of approving major

covert action operations, the Special Group, during the 1959-

1965 period, pursued its second responsibility of framing these

operations in such a way that they could be "plausibly denied" by

the U.S. Government, or at least by the President. As Richard

Helms stated before the Select Committee:

...(the) Special Group was the mechanism...set up

...to use as a circuit-breaker so that these things

did not explode in the President's face and that he.

was not held responsible for them. (Helms testi-

mony, pp. 28-29)

According to one NSC staff official who served during the

Fisenhower Administration, the concept of "plausible deniability"

was taken in almost a literal sense: "The Government was authorized

to do certain things that the President was not advised of."4/.

In November of 1901, after a major reassessment of United

States strategy towards

Cuba had been completed following the Bay of

Pigs debacle President Kennedy decided to mount a substantial

effort designed ultimately to lead to the overthrow of the Castro

regime. The effort, ultimately code-named "Operation Mongoose,"

4/Interview with Bromley Smith, May 8, 1975.

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under the overall policy direction, of the Special Group (Aug-

• mented) ("SGA"'): The SGA was

chaired by General Maxwell Taylor,

who had conducted the

study of U.s. strategy concerning Cuba and

the reasons for the failure of the Bay of Pigs and operation.

Attorney General Robert Kennedy was also a vigorous participant

in its activities and to many seemed the principal driving force.5/

General Edward Lansdale was personally selected by the President

as the Chief of Operations for Mongoose activity. Lansdale's role

was to prepare and develop plans as tasked by the SGA and then to submit

specific plans and actions to the SGA for approval. This prior .

approval was the core of the SGA's role.

Mongoose aimed for the overthrow of the Castro regime.

The plan was to use propaganda and economic pressure--both covert

and over. through sabotage -- to build ultimately toward a hoped for

internal revolt of the Cubans themselves. Liberal use was made of

Cuban exiles, initially primarily infiltrated for intelligence

gathering purposes and later for sabotage purposes.

The CIA was the principal action arm of Mongoose. William

Harvey headed its Task Force W supported by the JM/WAVE station in

Miami, Florida. Some 400 persons were directly employed by the CIA

in the operation.. The CIA was, in turn, given material support by the DoD.

5/Other members were Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, or his

deputy Roswell Gilpatric; Secretary of State Dean Rusk, or his deputy U.

Alexis Johnson; CIA Director John McCone; USIA Director Edward Murrow;

and McGeorge Bundy. Each of the constituent départments or agencies

also had operational or working members assigned to perform tasks

assigned by the SGA. These included William Harvey from CIA, Generals

Benjamin Harris,

• From USIA, Robert Hurwitch from State.

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Beginning in August 1962, but particularly in October 1962, the

Mongoose plan for a build up toward a Cuban revolution was upset by

the Cuban missile crisis. For the first time Cuba appeared to be an

immediate threat to the security of the United States. The Mongoose

operations were stood down, and with the successful conclusion of the

missile crisis, the Special Group (Augmented) was disbanded:

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2

¡ HARVEY.

Tile

10 April 1962

MERIORANDUM FOR:

Director of Central' Intelligence

THROUGH:

SUBJECT:

Deputy Director (Plans)

Operation MONGOOSE - Appraisal of

Eifectiveness and Results which can

be Expected from Implementing the

Operational Plan Approved at the

Keeting of the Special Group (Augmented)

on 16 March 1962

1. Action: This memorandum contains the conclusions

reached as a result of the reassessment of the MONGOOSE

operational plan,

conducted pursuant to your oral instructions

to Hir. Helms on 5 April 1962. The recommendations for actior

are contained in Paragraph 11 below.

Z. Under the MONGOOSE operational plan as approved, CiA

• 1s authorized and directed between now and 31 July 1962 to

mount a concentrated operational program to collect intelli-

gence concerning Cuba and to develop, insofar as possible,

clandestine resistance cadres inside

Cuba.

This plan permits

intelligence, political, economic, and covert actions, short

of those reasonably calculated to

inspire revolt within the

target area, or other developments which would require U.s.

armed intervention.

These actions, insofar as

possible,

will be consistent with overt policies of isolating Castro

and of neutralizing his influence in the Western Hemisphere

and will be taken in such a way as to permit disengagement.

with minimum losses in assets and United States prestige..

The plan provides that major operations going beyond the

collection of intelligence be approved in advance by the

Special Group. The plan does not provide for maximum, or

even extensive, use of U.S. military personnel, bases, and

facilities. No decision has been made that U.S. Military

Forces will be committed at any time to support a revolt

within Cuba or to intervene for any other cause.

3.

Barring unforeseen difficulties, CIA can substantial-

ly fulfill the requirements of the present cperational plan.

However, this plan does not provide for a maxtrun intelligence

and thatti

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OFFICE

and covert action program against Cuba. It probably does

represent the maximum such program that can effectively be

created within the current policy and other limitations.

Fully effective implementation of the present program may

require some limited use

of U.S. military facilities,

particularly training areas and submarines

for agent

infil-

tration and exfiltration. If a more intensive efiort is to

be undertaken, maximum use must be made of U.S. military

facilities, personnel, and bases.

4.

Under the present program, by August 1962 we will

have far better hard intelligence coverage of Cuba, but it

15 doubtful 1f we will have achieved fully effective pene-

tration of the top heirarchy of Cuban leadership. During

the same period, we will have materially increased the

clandestine resistance potential controlled by us in Cuba,

but 1t will not ba possible for us to field, activate, and

keep alive large resistance groups. Our assets will consist

of a number of small clandestine teams with limited supplies

and possessing varying degrees of resistance and revolt

potential.

The teams will not be knit together into any

central organization within Cuba. It is unll&ely that by

this time we will have developed

any viable long term

political leadership for a new Cuba. Such leadership does

not exist in the emigration and it is doubtful if it can be

developed within Cuba at any time prior to the forceful

overthrow of the Castro regime, although sone potential

leaders of promise possibly can be developed.

5. Given the anticipated success in carrying out the

currently approved plan, we should be able by August 1962 or

within a reasonable time thereafter, provided policy approval

is given, to begin to prepare these

assets for an organized

revolt of substantial proportions.

This additional time

will be required since under existing limitations we are not

permitted to prepare the teams or cadres from their inception

for any concerted revolt nor, in fact, give them any assurance

of ultimate U.S. assistance which would support and preserve

such revolt.

able time after the expiration of Phase I of the current plan,

although possibly substantial in size, could not ba considered

a really full scale revolt in the sense that it alone could

overthrow the regime. In the face of Cuban counteraction,

the revolt could only be kept allve for a lew days unless

supported by active U.S. military intervention.

0175-1-7

.. .

Tni9 -3-1:

• :2

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7.

The increased operational activity of the present

program will attract some attention, may raisa the

Cuban

and U.S. "noise level", and could lead to some public

criticism and an increase in Cuban propaganda play.

Any

intelligence or covert action which is surfaced will, of

course, be charged to the United States and specifically to

CIA.

Il a maximum program is undertaken it will incvitably

attract nore attention and possibly lead to more intense

criticism.

The level of activity envisaged by the present

plan is not likely to convince the Castro regime or the

Cubans themselves that the United States is seriously con-

templating either invading Cuba or intervening to assist

any planned revolt.

8.

There is substantial dissatisfaction in Cuba and a

considerable latent resistance potential which 1s disorganized

and dispirited at the present time.

Internal Cuban conditions,

including the availability of lood and the general state of

the economy, will probably deteriorate during the next several

months.

Basically, however, time is running against us and

Cuba is likely to be a tougher nut to crack a year from today

than It is now.

The effective communization of the Cuban

State, the increasing effectiveness of its security and control

apparatus, the increased discouragement of the populace, in-

cluding a

measurable loss of hope and lessening of sporadic

spontaneous resistance can only lead to this conclusion.

He

cannot completely rule out the possibility of a spontaneous

uprising of greater or lesser proportions, but the possibili-

ties of this are not believed great and, in any event, unless

the United States is at the time of any such spontaneous

uprising prepared to and does intervene, this uprising will

be ruthlessly and rapidly crushed. Even if the Cuban economy

date at to no

continues to deteriorate, it will in our opinion be bolstered

to the extent necessary to preserve the status quo by the

Soviet Bloc which cannot afford to lose the Cuban bridgehead

in the

Western Hemisphere.. Tha Castro regime will not fall

as a result of such deterioration or such economic counter-

action as we can take.

In fact, after a period of deteriora-

tion, it 1s entirely possible that the economic situation

may gradually improve.

There are some possibilities that

the Castro regime may be seriously threatened by a power

split at the top level or by a palace guard revolt.

These

possibilities do not appear at the present time great and

certainly any such development is Insufficiently probable

to count on, although efforts are being made to develop and

exploit any opportunities to this end. In any event, even

1.".

Т3C9Y

107291..

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1l such opportunities develop and can be exploited, this is

1lkely to be a long and involved operation with marginal

chances of complete

success

9. Even if the current operational plan attains maximum

success, it is our firm conclusion that it will not lead

to the overthrow of the Castro regime and that if that over-

throw is a serious objective of the U.S. Government, it will

be necessary at the conclusion of the present plan

to face

the decision of military intervention, then prepare for 1t

and intensily the preparation for any necessary revolt or

This will require addi-

tional time and will be more difficult to do some months

from now than it will be if it is commenced now.

10. CONCLUSIONS: Based on the reassessment that has

been made and following the above comments, set out below

are our conclusions:

a. The current plan does not constitute and

does not permit a maximum intelligence and covert

action program against Cuba.

The plan is not likely

to result in the overthrow of the Castro regime un-

less followed by extensive additional preparation

and action based on a firm decision to use U.S.

Military Forces at the appropriate point to destroy

the regime.

b. II a maximum effort is to be mounted, the

decision to use military force must be made now

and the planning must go forward in phase to permit

a concentrated and planned uprising with the

Immediate support of military forces to prevent its

destruction.

In addition, in preparing for the

necessary revolt and/or provocation endangering U.S.

lives and property, maximun use must be made not

only of CIA assets and capabilities, but of the

assets and capabilities of the respective military

services.

To permit requisite flexibillty and pro-

fessionalism for a maxinum operational effort against

Cuba, the tight controls exercised by the Special

Group and the present time-consuming coordination

and briefing procedures should, 1f at all possible,

be made less

restrictive and less stultifying.

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TOP. SHO

HE WHITE

d.

The planning for the use of U.S. Military

Forces must contemplate minimum reaction time and

sufficient pre-positioning to permit the most rapid

possible elimination of organized opposition within

Cuba.

If at all possible, the military intervention

should be so planned and prepared that from the time

of decision to intervene

until the elimination of

organized military opposition is only a few days,

preferably not more than lour or s1s. it is

believed that this is extremely important in order

to cut down the time avallable to the USSR and the Bloc

to react and take counteraction elsewhere using Cuba

as a pretext, and also to cut down the available time

for a coalescing of intense domestic and foreign

political press and propaganda opposition to this

action.

If the U.S. Forces to be committed can be pre-positioned

In such a way that a landing in force takes place

rapidly, it 1s believed that a substantial number of

Cubans, including those in the militia and the armed

forces, will give up quickly.

The United States

must, however, be prepared to cope with at least

some

substantial prolonged hard core resistance.

In addition, the U.S. Goverment must be prepared

with plans and resources to establish a military

goverment within Cuba and maintain it for an

appreciable period, probably at least a year, until

the situation can be stabilized, political parties,

movements, and leadership developed, and free elections

insured.

11. ACTION:

A. If you concur with the above conclusions, it is

recommended that you propose to the Special Group (Augmented)

at 1ts meeting on l1 April 1962 that it approve and propose

for the approval of higher authority

a plan of operations

against Cuba requiring decision now to:

(1) Make maximum use of CIA and military re-

sources to create a revolt in Cuba and/or provoca-

tion endangering U.S. lives and property, and

(2) Upon the activation of this revolt and/or

provocation intervene immediately with sufficient

military strength to eliminate organized military

opposition within Cuba at the earliest practicable

time.

fri:

Fig.

i ...

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-5-

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TONS

OREI

1799

....?

J

в.

If such a plan is not approved, or 11 the

decisions to take the actions necessary to ensure the over-

throw of the Castro regime are indefinitely delayed, it 1s

believed that you should give careful consideration as to

whether, in the face of other heavy demands and commitments,

the Clandestine Service can long continue to afford the

present level of efiort against Cuba and the heavy expenditure

of lunds and manpower involved in the operation of Task

Force V, which comprises a substantial percentage of the

overall

assets of the DD/P.

viriun

WILLIAN K. HARVEY

C/TFY

CONCUR:

Deputy Director (Plans)

The recommendations contained in

Paragraph ll are approved:

Director of Central Intelligence

Date

TM

-6-

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TO : Fritz Schwarz and Curt Smothers

FROM: Joseph E. diGenova

DATE: July 7, 1975

EDWARD G. LANSDALE: SHORT SUMMARY

Edward G. Lansdale was the Chief of Operations for Operation Mongoose

from November 30, 1961 until early 1963. He was present at the Special

Group meetings at which sabotage was discussed and provided the overall

planning framework for the approval of that Group. He was present at the

August 10, 1962 meeting of the Special Group when Secretary of Defense

Robert McNamara broached the subject of the assassination of Castro.

He wrote a memo on August 13, 1962 which

tasked the CIA with developing

plans "Including liquidation of leaders." Lansdale's testimony should

involve the following questions:

- Did any of the Special Group meetings implicitly or explicitly

contemplate or plan

assassination attempts against Castro?

- To what extent were CIA plans against Castro authorized or

made known to President Kennedy, Robert Kennedy, DCI John

McCone, or the Special Group as a whole? (It was established

practice and policy that all proposed specific actions were re-

viewed before implementation.)

- What was

the process involved in making decisions; what was

Lansdale's authority?

- If the Special "turned down" the idea of assassinating Castro

- What was the "sensitive work" referred to in Lansdale's Janu-.

ary 18, 1962 memo to RFK which he did not tell the Special

Group about? What was the "touchdown play?"

Questioning of Lansdale should focus upon the following documents:

- Inspector General's 1967 Report, page 113.

- Memorandum of August 13, 1962 from Lansdale to Wn. Harvey.

- Memorandum of August 14, 1962 from Harvey to DDP (CIA).

- Memorandum of January 27, 1962 from Lansdale to R. Kennedy:

- Memorandum of January 18, 1962 from Lansdale to R. Kennedy.

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PERTINENT REZATIONSHIP

President Kennedy

Robert Kennedy

William Harvey

John McCone, DCI

Robert McNamara

Lansdale was personally selected by the President

to coordinate Mongoose after the Bay of Pigs.

Lansdale's direct link to the President during

Operation Mongoose. In essence, he headed the

The CIA operational representative under McCone

to the Special Group. He coordinated the agent

Infiltration into Cuba. He frequently attended

SG meetings.

Met with Lansdale at the Special Group.

Lansdale was his Assistant for Special Operations

before

he became the Mongoose Chief of Operations.

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July 7, 1975

TO: Fritz Schwarz and Curt Smothers

FROM: Joe diGenova

SUBJECT: Preliminary Interview With Brig. Gen. Edward G. Lansdale

Gen. Lansdale was interviewed on July 7, 1975 from 11:00 a.m.

until 4:30 p.m. by Fritz Schwarz, Curt Smothers, Mike Madigan, Charles

Kirbow and Joe diGenova.

I. GENERAL BACKGROUND

In late October of 1961, President KENNEDY asked Gen. LANSDALE

personally to investigate what was being done in regard to Cuba by

the U.S. Government. LANSDALE discovered that U.S. activities in-

cluded minor harassment and sabotage. He felt that these acts were

counter-productive since they seemed to sharpen police controls over

the people of Cuba. Because Castro was so charismatic, these actions

worked in his favor with the people creating a "David and Goliath"

syndrome.

After his study, LANSDALE considered the possibility of forming

a group to do a "modified revolution in Cuba." He concluded that it

would take a long time and would require a firm unifying political

platform for Cubans to adopt and to find attractive. It would have

to be something of their own. He hoped that this group could be formed

from diverse

groups in Florida and Venezuela. "President KENNEDY per-

sonally told me sometime in 1962 'you go ahead with that.'"

TOY

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LANSTALE

- 2.

LANSDALE suggested that he report to the PRESIDENT through

a trusted subordinate.

"He told me to see RFK."

The organization developed very quickly with representatives

of each department (DOD, State, CIA, White House). LANSDALE outlined

his general idea which was to talk to Cuban exiles and develop them

as the actors so that the U.S. wouldn't be the "doer" but would merely

guide the Cubans who had the will, desire, and capability to do some-

thing; i.e., develop a political program that would gain support of

the Cuban people in order to have a country more compatible with the

U.S. as a neighbor.

PRESIDENT KENNEDY personally told LANSDALE that he wanted him

to work on getting approval at each stage from the Special Group.

"My duty became to draw up plans for approval for the Special Group

for each stage."

Strategy

The idea was to organize both in and out of Cuba and establish

safe entry and exit for people declared enemies of the Castro regime.

This included establishing "cellular organizations in Cuba to achieve

political results when the right time came."

Bay Of PIGS

LANSDALE said that this project was a failure due to the fact

that no political ground work had been done inside of Cuba before

the exercise. The success of such an operation, he said, shouldn't

rely on military support but rather on the people accepting those

who are coming into the country. In this regard LANSDALE noted that

TOP

SECRE!

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LANSDALE

people in the Special Group confused hit and run tactics with a con-

cept of revolution. Their backgrounds, he said, were obviously not

in this area.

II. THE PROCESS

Plans were drawn up by LANSDALE and taken to the Special Group:

Initially the Special Group did not accept his overall plan; both in

terms of general strategy and tactics. It was during this time that

he spoke with the Attorney General and explained to him that patience

was needed in a project of this magnitude. LANSDALE claims that

during this time he criticized the ongoing harassment raids along

with JOHN MCCONE. "Some place in there there was a very definite

feeling, which I thought came from the President, that the harassing

should stop." LANSDALE associated this feeling with the missile

crisis or the prisoner release crisis. At this juncture he was shown

his August 8, 1962 memo to the Special Group Augmented and he could

not reconcile that memo with his recollection of a cutback on harass-

ment. When shown a January 24, 1962 JCS memo which

said that he

had wanted paramilitary operations all along, he denied that that

•was his position. LANSDALE noted that there were limitations on

what he could do. Guidelines had to be approved by the Special Group.

He felt, after he "tried to

get plans brought forward, that there

wasn't an understanding that Americans wouldn't go in. The CIA didn't

see it that way. They kept trying to do things themselves. The con-

cept of getting Cubans to do things in a Cuban manner was foreign

to the CIA." Merely because the sabotage effort was minuscule during

this time BWCW was tasked out to the Department of Defense for a

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LANSDALE

4

feasibility study. They determined it was infeasible and it was

cancelled. He noted, however, that if it had been a possibility,

it would have been a go project if DOD had determined it was feasible.

III. ASSASSINATIONS

LANSDALE personally opposed assassination of Castro because

he was concerned that that in itself might lead to a disastrous

end because the only heirs apparent were RAUL and CHE GUEVARA.

"Castro had more breaks on him." He indicated that the subject of

assassination came to him initially through rumor because there was

talk of this from Cuban refugees

in Florida. He got these rumors

from

people in the intelligence community. He thought that he might

have talked to RFK about these reports.

According to him, the only time assassination was ever brought

up in the Special Group "it was turned down very hard." Initially

during the interview, he said it was turned down, he felt, because

of the ethics or morality and it was done openly at the meeting.

He noted, however, that he didn't remember MCCONE's "oration of the

immorality of assassinations. He might have (raised the subject of

assassination). The idea was to explore drastic actions, ideas or

plans. But I don't recall ever talking to RFK about assassination

except at that one meeting (Aug. 10, 1962.)" Yet LANSDALE sent a

memo to Harvey on August 13 which included tasking HARVEY to prepare

plans for the "liquidation of leaders." LANSDALE said "If I used

the word liquidation, that mean't killing." He did not recall, how-

ever, having the phrase including liquidation of leaders blocked out

from his August 13 memo after a call from HARVEY. He indicated that

!.

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## Page 22

LANSDALE

- 5 -

MCNAMARA could well have raised the assassination issue at the

August 10 meeting. "It was well within his nature. He talked off

the cuff in a brusque way. He was an impatient man." The idea of

assassination might have come up at that meeting because of the missile

crisis developing in Cuba. "MCNAMARA essentially didn't understand

human beings. He wasn't ethical." (He noted that shortly after the

stories in the New York Times and the Associated Press came out naming

LANSDALE as MCNAMARA's deputy who had been involved in the plots to

assassinate Castro, MCNAMARA called the Times and the Associated Press

telling them LANSDALE did not work for him at that time. Our records

indicate that LANSDALE did work for him at that time. LANSDALE noted

"MCNAMARA is a strange person."

Actual Attempts

LANSDALE had heard gossip of mafia attempts against Castro

: but had never heard names mentioned until recent newspaper stories.

СІЛ

personnel had told him

that some Cuban exiles were planning to

assassinate Castro but these people were not under CIA control and

the CIA people who briefed him on the matter were nonoperational.

He had heard the gossip about the mafia in the late EISENHOWER admini-

stration. It centered on the thesis that the mafia was angry at

losing their casinos. He assumed that the CIA or its people were

trying to do something about assassination Castro. The gossip never

became more concrete and to his knowledge the mafia was never part

of Mongoose.

WILLIAM HARVEY never told LANSDALE that he either was or was

not engaged in assassination. He had no recollection of HARVEY ever

telling him he was engaged in assassination or used the mafia. "I'm

damned sure he wouldn't have told me if he were. HARVEY was naturally

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## Page 23

LANSDALE

- 6-

secretive. He did not give information." He gave LANSDALE generally

monosyllabic responses to questions. (NOTE: The luncheon recess

occurred at this juncture and GEN. LANSDALE reviewed documents which

included all of his program reviews, pertinent Special Group minutes

and other memoranda for approximately 1-1/2 hours with Mr. diGenova).

He noted that Mr. PARROTT was an excellent minutes writer and that

he excluded little if anything from them. Consequently, LANSDALE

was at a loss to explain why PARROTT did not include the discussion

of assassination in his minutes of the August 10, 1962 meeting.

Documents Arguably Related to Assassination

February 20, 1962 Program Review: This document noted the use

of ganster elements from Cuba to attack the cadre of leaders. LANSDALE

said this meant "up to and including killing these leaders." HARVEY.

received a copy of this review. When asked if HARVEY wanted to decide

whether or not do kill Castro and could this section of this document

give him that impression, LANSDALE remarked, "I don't see how it could

have. Individual actions against individual targets had to be brought

up to the Group and none ever were." LANSDALE never told HARVEY or

anyone else, however, not to kill Castro.

January 27, 1972 "Touchdown Memo" to RFK: When shown this memo

which referred to a "touchdown plan" he said this referred to the

removal of the Castro Government.. The "institutional program" referred

to in the document was his January 18, 1962 program review. In the

January 27 document, he was pleading with RFK to be freed to go to

work directly with Cuban leaders in Florida to see.what they were

planning. He received approval to go to Florida and Guantanamo

personally under assumed names.

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LANSDALE

- 7 -

January 18, 1962

LANSDALE'S Note to the Attorney General:

When asked what the "sensitive work" was referred to in this hand-

written note, work not included in the program review to which it

was attached, LANSDALE replied, that this referred to his personally

going to Florida and speaking with Cuban leaders. The sensitive

work was "not an assassination thing." He would have regarded BW/CW

as sensitive but he would rule out assassination as an interpretation

of "sensitive work" because he never had that in mind. He noted

that he had previously travelled to Florida under false names be-

cause the exiles would never had spoken to him if they had known

who he was. According to LANSDALE "Operation Bounty" was never

approved. "It was an ill conceived thing."

General Comments re Assassination

"I have a very strong feeling from my own relationship with

them that neither of them ever ordered such think (assassination).

ROBERT KENNEDY was scrappy, but he wasn't uderous scrappy. BOBBY

made a grimace when I suggested chemical warfare. It was unorthodox

enough that he didn't go along with it. He found it distasteful.

These were free going discussions. This type of thing, a personal

attack on a leader was beyond his character."

LANSDALE noted that someone could have interpreted

some of

their meetings to aim at assassination, "but the process would weed

this out. Individual actions had to be approved - that was made

very clear." He also noted that he never discussed assassination

with MAXWELL TAYLOR whom he said would have been against it morally.

LANSDALE added that there is a practical distinction (i.e. RAUL and

CHE replacing Castro) but not a moral distinction between assassination

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LANSDALE

- 8

-

per se and an overthrow that leads to the killing of a leader.

"I

have

never ordered executions, but I have been a target several times.

I was opposed to violence for violence sake."

TOP SODET

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## Page 26

MEMORANDUM

'TO:

Fritz Schwarz

FROM: Joesph E. diGenova

DAlE: July 6, 1975

Subj:

Sumary of the Testimony of Brig. General Edward G.

Lansdale before the Rockefeller Commission on May 16,

1975.

Attached you will find a sumary prepared by me of

the testimony of Brig. Gen. Edward G. Lansdale before the

Rockefeller Commission on May 16, 1975. That testimony was

taken by David W. Belin and was under oath.

TOP SECRE

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## Page 27

SUMMARY OF:

Testimony of General Edward G. Lansdale before the

Rockefeller Conmission. Sworn on Friday, May 16,

1975 and examined by David W. Belin.

Lansdale is a retired Major General from the Air Force. He went

Into the military during World War II (Tr. 2). After the war, he be-

came a regular officer in the Air Force and stayed in until November,

1963. He was aware of the very early planning phases of the Bay of

Pigs

as an advisor on the staff of the Secretary of Defense, and atten-

ded some policy meetings concerned with the Bay of Pigs. Thomas Gates

was the Secretary of Defense at that time under Eisenhower. Lansdale

was Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Special Operations.

But he had no direct Involvement In the planning of the Bay of Pigs.

(Ir. 3). He was asked:

Q. At any time during 1960, did you have any knowledge of any discussion

of possible plans for the assassination of any foreign leaders?

A. I don't recall any at all. I would say none. (Tr. 4).

At the end of 1960 he was in Vietnam doing a survey for the Secre-

tary of Defense concerning the security conditions in the country and

its political and economic needs. (Tr. 4). He returned to the U.S. in

January of 1961. (Ir. 5). After the inauguration, McNamara asked him

to stay on and Lansdale became the Assistant to the Secretary of De-

fense for Special Operations. The job scope was unclear but it initially

"became a job of helping the Armed Forces get ready for counterinsurgency,

that is the Army, Navy, Air Force, and even the Marine Corps." (Tr. 5).

In the late fall of 1961, Lansdale became involved with Cuba..

"The Presi-

dent of the United States asked me to look over the situation vis a vis

the U.S. in Cuba and to see if I had any ideas or could give him some.

ideas." (Ir. 5). This resulted from. direct conversation with the President

(Tr. 5-6) .

"It was a rather vague assignment by him, but it was to be

done

• for him personally" (Ir. 6). (Emphasis added).

Lansdale suggested that he work with the President through an inter-

mediary and the President "appointed his brother, who was the Attorney

General." (Ir. 6). Subsequently, he worked with both the President and

the Attorney General, but it was primarily with the Attorney General, "but

with several conversations with the President." (Tr. 6). The Special Group

was "part of the approving group for any recommendations that I would come

up with...

" (Tr. 6). After the meeting with the President, Lansdale read

as many documents as he could find on the subject and made a report to the

President (Ir. 7). He made an initial recommendation to the President at

the end of September or December 1961 or early 1962, that the U.S. "see

if there was a possibility of using Cuban refugees to help them get their

political thinking together to see if there would be any feasibility of a

revolution in Cuba." (Ir. 7). That recommendation was in writing and

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## Page 28

-2-

Lansdale thought that it was delivered to the Attorney General. But

"the only copy of that paper was in the files of the President. I saw

it there later." (Tr. 7). He saw it later when he delivered all of his

files on the matter to the President,

"and he had his secretary put them

in his own personal file, and at that time I saw what else was in the file."

(Tr. 7). Lansdale kept no copies of his own files (Ir. 7) .

After he made the recommendation, he surveyed the refugee organizations

in Florida, talked with people in the department of state, ClA, and the

U.S. military and proposed some "careful organizational plans of the Cubans

to see if they could reconstitute one of their previous constitutions of

Cuba, and 1f an organization would be willing to work under such guidance."

(Tr. 8-9). No such group was ever organized. (Tr. 9) .

This took place in early 1962 and during that time there were discussions

of Cuban exiles possible going back Inside Cuba to harass the regime. At

this juncture Lansdale was asked:

Q. Were there any discussions that possibly some of these exile groups

might very well try and assassinate Castro?

A.. It might well have been mentioned, yes.

Q. Do you remeber whether or not there was any discussion of the fact

that such plans for assassination might actually be taking place?

A. I don't recall a single instances of any serious action being under-

taken on any such plan.

Q. What you're saying is you recall discussions, but you don't recall

specific discussions as to existing plans?

A. That is correct.

Q. And so would you say those discussions related to possibilities

rather than actualities, is that a fair statement?

A. Yes, definitely. (Ir. 9-10) (Emphasis added).

The President, the Attorney General, and Lansdale did their best "to

stop harassing raids against Cuba since they were not serving the purpose

of assisting the exile groups of doing something very carefully and con-

structively politically inside the country." (Tr. 10). This effort was

in the first part of 1962.

Lansdale remembered the Special Group and the Special Group Augmented.

"There was a Special Group that I was reporting to on'this, and so yes, I

do recall such a thing." (Ir. 10). Lansdale was here shown Helms Exhibit

No. 7 (Lansdale's August 13, 1962 memo re the August 10, 1962 SGA meeting)

(Ir. 11) .

NW 66000 Docld:32423491 Page 28 -

-П=-

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-3-

When asked about the whited out words and asked if there was testimony

that the whited out words were "including liquidation of leaders" if that

would refresh his recollection he replied, "I doubt it. I doubt it. I

just don't recall anything at all on liquidation of leaders.". (Tr. 12).

When asked if he recalled anyone bringing up the topic of possible liquidat-

ing Cuban leaders he replied, "Possibly,

I simply. don't recall that.

(Tr. 12) .

He did not remember Frank Hand telling him a few days after that

August 10, 1962 meeting that Mr. Harvey had talked to Hand to recommend that

some words be excised from that memorandum. (Tr. 12). (Ir. 13): He did

not recall calling Mr. Harvey a day or two later and telling him that the

words had been excised (Tr. 13). It might have happened, but he could not

recall (Ir. 13): Lansdale then notes concerning Exhibit No. Y that it "was

a request for some planning and some ideas which were later

submitted as part

of a plan for approval and it was not approved" (Tr. 14). It was not an author-

ization necessarily for carrying out the action.

"That we had been asked to

come up with plans and then what I was doing was asking each element to come

up with some plans, and we could put that into an overall plan." (Tr. 14).

There may well have been a request for the CIA to come up with a plan for

liquidation of leadership as a possibility. (Tr. 14).

Lansdale might have

made such a request to Harvey. He would have probably discussed that idea

with the Secretary of Defense, (Tr. 14-15), and "possibly with the Attorney

General, with whom I was in contact." (Tr. 15).

When shown MeCone Exhibit No. 3, a memo of SGA meeting of October "i In

1962, he did not remember the Attorney General asking for more sabotage.

fact, it was just the reverse of this, and McCone might well have said that no

Lansdale noted that he possibly had some very short meetings with the President

in 1962 concerning the development of plans for Mongoose.

"It was a very

tentative contact with the President. It was mostly with his brother."

(Tr. 16). He had no knowledge during 1960, 1961, 1962, 1963 of the existence

of any plans for the assassination of any Cuban leader, (Tr. 16), nor of

anyone else (Tr. 17). Nor did he ever have any discussions other than what

he referred to (i.e., the discussions of possibilities) with anyone concern-

ing the assassination of a Cuban or other leader (Tr. 17). He added:

No, except of in planning and planning various possibilities,

this subject was discussed as a possibility, and whether such

a thing would be feasible and if done, if it would have con-

structive results and a decision was always that the results

would not be worth doing, something like that. (Ir. 17).

That latter decision was reached by "I suspect it was largely in

the group Itself.

The reaction toward that was always quite sharp by

members of the group Including the Attorney General, McCone, and McGeorge

Bundy, among others." (Ir. 17) (Emphasis added).

-

TOP

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## Page 30

-4-

Lansdale might have brought the point up for discussion along with other

points.

He added:

I might point out, most of this was in planning to

do something with the plans, not ever really reach-

ing fruition other than getting ready to do things

and not carrying them out, and one of the things

definitely wasn't an assassination.

*******

I say one of the things we planned to carry out defini-

tely was not an assassination of Castro or another

leader there. (Tr. 18).

Lansdale admitted that there was "a lot of pressure" on this group

to "do something about Castro."

(Tr. 18). But he reiterated that he re-

membered about 1962 that "most clearly...that it was definitely against

the top executive policy to carry out harassing raids in Cuba, and I had

exacted a promise and had given instructions in writing to CIA to cease and

desist on that, not carry them out." (Ir. 18-19). These instructions were

generally followed, although he thought there was "one raid that had been

too late, that had been planned or a group had gone in to harass and it had

not been authorized."

(Tr. 19). He said "at least...it hadn't been author-

ized by me. It might have been by someone else." (Tr. 19). Generally, more-

over, the CIA would not undertake plans of this kind unless they were authorized

(Tr. 19).

And when the CIA was ordered to cease an operation, Lansdale "could

be fairly definite on that" that they would obey. "I use the term fairly

because if they were undertaking a series of actions, such a directive to

them might come in too late to stop an operation. I think they would try to

do so, though.". (Ir. 19). When asked then whether they (the CIA) obeyed

orders he remarked:

There might have been Individuals there who would be inclined

to know better than an outsider, and they might attempt some-

thing, but It's just a feeling I had. I have not ever been

able to pin that down specifically.

******

It might have been Harvey. It might have been such a per-

(Tr. 20) •

Lansdale said that Harvey might have done something without direc-

tion from above.

This prompted Lansdale to give Harvey "directions In

writing." (Ir. 20). "It was just a gut feeling I had dealing with him,"

but not with anyone else at the CIA. (Tr. 20). Apart from Harvey, Lansuale

NW 66000 Docld:32423491 Page 30

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## Page 31

-5-

did not have any feelings that the CIA would undertake an activity without

directions from above. (Ir. 21). The CIA was "quite disciplined in fol-

lowing executive direction."

(Tr. 21).

Lansdale had never heard any discussion of Executive Action Capability

"which was defined as a capability of being able to assassinate foreign

leaders (.)"

(Ir: 21). He opined that if planning existed, prior to the

August 10, 1962 meeting, for assassination "the planning part of it might

well have

developed inside the Agency as a possibility or something to be

considered. Any step from a possibility over to an actual starting, initiat-

ing, a plan to carry it out, I feel very definitely would require the top

authority approval first."

(Tr. 21). By "top authority" Lansdale meant

probably the President of the United States. (Tr. 22). "I say probably

because it might have been either a Secretary of State or a Secretary of Defense,

but again, speaking for the President. And it would be done perhaps orally."

(Tr. 22).

(Emphasis added).

SECRET

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## Page 32

January 27

January 30

February 20

March 2

March 5

- 3-

TOP SECRET

Lansdale Memo to AG stating need for strong decisions and evidence

Efforts of Agency so far have accomplished goal

of his super still feel that we might uncork the touchdown

play independently of the institutional program we are spurring."

(emphasis added)

QUESTIONS AND ISSUES

for killing or delivering alive known Communists in Cuba.

Lansdale program review.

Proposed plans for September will include

'an attack

on the cadre of the regime

including key leaders.

Gangster

elements might provide the best recruitment potential for actions

against police -- G2 officials...CW agents should be fully considered."

Lansdale memo to SGA wiht basic plan of action notes "any inference

that this plan exists couldplace the President of the United States

in a most damaging position."

authspitY i" approvah."

Rusk notes that "once the agents are within

the country they cannot be effectively controlled from the U.s."

Taylor guidelines for Mongoose sent to Lansdale in 'draft form.

"Are responsible for performance : through normal command channels

to the President."

(The word President" is crossed out and "higher

authority" is put in its place.)

Was this genuine concem

for lack of control? Was

what Harvey had done a

known example?

(poison

pills) Was

what Harvey

did inconsistent with

control

Is this another example

of attempts to isolate

the President on the

record from the project?

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## Page 33

March 5

March 12

March 13

March 16

April 5

- 4 -

TOP SECRET

Lansdale memo to Goodwin asking for alternate tracks: Rusk sees

open to achieve Cuban objectives; plus list of pretexts Rusk.

sees as desirable in connection with any direct military inter-

vention.

Lansdale tells SGA CIA urgently needs policy determination

"on the supplying of arms and equipment to deserving Cuban

guerrillas, as they are located, assessed, and request help.

Such requests are starting to surface...there is a need

for defining the limits of arming guerrillas (for self

defense, for training, for purposes shor of open actions in

revost ted peration rations judgment to be used by.

QUESTIONS AND ISSUES

Is this part of

"plausible deniability"

What were the guns

to be used for?

Were the limits" con-

cerned with control

of what was done with

or with the

timing se their deliver

(CIA was

setting up

new contacts with

Mafia in late March)

Lansdale memo to SGA says many agents infiltrated into Cuba

"will be trained for paramilitary skills as well as intelligence

once the agents

are inside cuba veey cannot be controlled effectively outside

are inside

Craig reports to SGA that use of BN/CW to incapacitate Cuban

sugar workers "infeasible and it was cancelled."

Taylor memo re meeting of SGA with President discussing Taylor's

guidelines notes "General Lansdale and the Special Group (Augmented)

were given tacit authorization to proceed in accordance with the

guidelines."

Footnote says:

•..group was unanimous in feeling

that no authorization,

either tacit or otherwise was given by

higher authority.". Footnote added one week later.

SGA meeting. McCone impatient.

Group consensus is that time

has come

to reexamine basic philosophy of project with particular

reference to the possibility of finding a pretext for early

overt intervention.

Isolating the President once

Plausible deniability?

If so why such a clumsy

attempt?

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April 10

April 11

April 12

May 3

May 7

=5 -

TOP SECRET

Harvey memo to McCone.cites need for less restrictive

and less stultifying controls by SGA.

Harvey considers

Lansdale insistence to be given details improper.

At SGA meeting McCone urges speed-up of covert action

schedule.

"General Lansdale

said it would be

useful

to have approval to go further with infiltrated agents!

than restricting them to intelligence missions."

Three pages marked alternatives I, II, III, with no

attribution note:

be directed at the attrition of the leadership of the

our covert

activities

go other disavowable

through bribery and related means,

and at

courses of action detrimental to

local regimes."

(00270-00272)

Lansdale tells Taylor "Under revised plan for Operation

Mongoose, proposal for supplying arms and equipment to

team in place plus 7 local groups identified)

will be submitted to the SG for decision, ad hoc. No

proposals have been received."

SGA meeting. Harvey reports onhis infiltration teams.

Three are in place.

the

QUESTIONS AND ISSUES

Does MeCone's statement show

pressure or lack of it? Lans-

dale's

comments are inconsistent

with his Rockefeller testimony.

Lansdale memo to SGA complains of breakdown of communi-

cation with Chief of Operations.

He requests that "all

plans and actions with operational aspects hereafter

be made known to the Chief of Operations...."

is

not done,

between the

done chairs.

If this

"we invite the danger of matters falling

Did Harvey mention the poison

and other attempts on

the Site o castro! et he did

not why would Taylor make a

special report to the President

on May 7 of Harvey's report?

Was this an allusion to recent

discovery of unknown Harvey

activities?

Or was it complaint

that Harvey had simply not kept

him informed in greater detail?

Did it have to do with Harvey at

all?

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## Page 35

May 7

June 20

July 11

July 23

July 24

August 8

August 8

-6 -

TOP SECRET

Taylor reports to President on Harvey's report to the Special

Group pointing out "the very limited progress that has been

QUESTIONS AND ISSUES

What limited projects?

Was this an allusion to

assassination?

Were arms involved in the request?

Harvey memo

to Lansdale requesting permission from StA

for aerial resupply of infiltrated

agents.

Parrott memo to a superior re air resupply operations.

"Exactly what supplies is it intended to provide?.

sort of thing gets us pretty close to the moment of This

truth."

DOD working group tells Lansdale electronic intelligence

should improve and provide

increases

information in areas

such as:

"plots against prominent figures."

Harvey memo to Lansdale outlining CIA

participation

in phase one states reason they haven't done more in

area of infiltration has been lack of decisiveness by

"higher authority" on use of military force.

Lansdale memo to SGA states "the major difference from

phase one of Operation Mongoose would be in removing

the restriction, in the 14 March policy guidelines,

which kept our actions 'short of those reasonably

calculated to inspire a revolt within the target

What is the moment of truth?

Why such concern for the nature

of the supplies?

Where does DOD get this idea?

What plots are they referring to?

Was Harvey frustration put into

action by disobeying orders?

Lansdale memo to SGA concerning Harvey request for

authority for major sabotage

against industry and public

utilities.

Lansdale requested this stepped-up plan from

Harvey•

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August 10

August 13

August 14

August

20

-7 -

QUESTIONS AND ISSUES

Special group meeting at which McNamara

assassination of Castro.

Lansdale is present.

TOP SECRET me the oron, of one de

cussion?

Were people told to

present plans?

Lansdale understood from August

10 meeting that plans were to be

prepared.

Did everyone else get

this impression?

Harvey memo relating to August 10 meeting states "we will

produce an outline

for an alternate course B for sub-

mission.

Papers required from

individuals for Tuesday

include

'Mr. Harvey:

Intelligence, Political

(splitting the regime, liquidation of leaders)'"'

McCone calls McNamara after receiving Lansdale memo insis-

ting that it be withdrawn because no decision had been

made on the subject of liquidation and Lansdale was out

of order in asking CIA to consider the matter.

testified that McNamara agreed memo should be withdrawn.

Harvey memo to McCone roting he called Lansdale's office and

told Frank Hand of the "stupidity" of including

Lansdale memo as a topic to be considered "liquidation

of leaders."

CIA would not participate in preparation

of such documents pertaining to liquidation and urged

that Hand recommend to Lansdale that phrase be excised.

Lansdale called back to say that it had been done.

Harvey memo to DDP (CIA) notes that matter of assassi-

nation brought up in Rusk's office by McNamara.

"I took

careful note from the comments...and the SGA is not

expecting any written comments or study on this point."

Taylor memo to SGA received by Lansdale which notes

"attached papers were read and approved by higher

authority today."

Papers were Taylor guidelines

phase two sabotage was to be employed on selective

President told SGA favors more aggressive

program.

basis under guidelines.

Was this the first time McNamara

was

aware of the Lansdale memo?

Had he himself made an effort to

have Lansdale withdraw the memo

independent of McCone's request?

Why was Harvey so concerned?

He had carried out full-scale.

operation against Castro in

April of 1962.

Was it simply

the

fear of having something in

writing?

Were they expecting unwritten

comments

or studies on this point?

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## Page 37

August 30

September

October 4

October 11

October 26

October 30

November 21

- 8.

SGA requests CIA to submit list of possible sabotage

targets.

"The group by reacting to this list

could de-

the limits within

which the Agency could operate

on its own initiative."

At SGA meeting where Lansdale was present Bundy notes

re agricultural sabotage that

release of chemicals

must be avoided unless it could be completely covered

up.

whether we were going

down the

or whether

''more direct action"

is not indicated.

President dissatisfied with lack of action in the

sabotage field.

Lansdale recommends

early approval of CIA plans for

sabotaging Cuban shipping vessels.

Lansdale disavows any responsibility or support for

the proposed infiltration of 9 teams into Cuba.

"Mr. Harvey's defense of the plan was not conclusive."

All teams were to be withheld.

This is the Matahambre

copper mine sabotage operation.

McCone tells Lansdale President has decided to hold

back Operation Mongoose during negotiations

Soviet missile crisis. No more sabotage of any

Harvey memo says that Lansdale's statement that

Operation Mongoose

"had had no

information

on this

opeation (Matahambre) since early October was patently

false."

QUESTIONS AND ISSUES

Vas this an abdication of

control?

Was Lansdale kept in the dark

about these operations?

Numerous

Harvey memos have marked as a

footnote on them re Matahambre

"not in Lansdale's memo.": What

does this mean?

This was part of an escalating

debate over how much Lansdale

either knew or did not know about

that operation.

• Was Harvey cover-

ing his tracks?

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## Page 38

1975

May 16

May

May 31

July 3

TOP SECRET

Lansdale tells Rockefeller Commission he tried to stop

sabotage.

however, that there were discussions

in the SGA concerning the possibility of plans

to assassi-

nate foreign leaders.

He denies,

however, that any such

plans were ever actually formuated.

Washington Post story says Lansdale "Hinted strongly,

but refused to confirm,

that the orders to draw up

plans (that may have included Fidel Castro's assassina-

tion) came

from the late Attorney General Robert F.

Kennedy." Lansdale insisted however,

that "neither

President Kennedy or any other Kennedy ever gave me

any orders to plan the assassination of Castro."

In a New York Times story Horrock reports that "yesterday

General Lansdale said that in November, 1961, AG Robert

F. Kennedy ordered him to prepare a secret contingency

plan to depose Mr. Castro.

General Lansdale confirmed

that Robert Kennedy was acting on behalf of President

Kennedy."

Assassination may have been considered as one

of the mans of removing Castro. He never redeived specific

orders

from JFK or RFK to prepare a plan to assassinate

Castro.

Washington Star story by O'Leary reports that Lansdale

its nate bedered him in 195e to launch a cia project

Kennedy as the Administration

to work out all feasible plans for 'getting rid of' Cuban

Prime Minister Fidel Castro."

never used by anyone Lansdale said, but there was no doubt

that the plans envisioned this as one of the means. Lansdale

relayed the orders directly to William Harvey.

Lansdale gives statement to Select Committee stating that

Washington Star

action against Castro personally."

QUESTIONS AND ISSUES

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## Page 39

TO :

FROM:

DATTE:

SUBJECT:

Fritz O Schwarz and Curt Smothers

Joseph E. Digenova

July 6,

1975

Brig. Gen. Edward G. Lansdale Summary Chronology

TOP SECRET

Biographical Background

1941-

1945

U.S. Air Force

1945-1963

Eisenhower

Administra-

tion

Became regular officer in the Air Force (ultimately retired as Major General)

Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

(Secretary Thomas Gates)

1960-1961

In Vietnam doing a survey for the Secretary of Defense.

1961

Assistant to the

Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

(Secretary Robert McNamara)

1965

Special Assistant to the United States Ambassador to South Vietnam

(Lodge)

Chronology of Events

QUESTIONS AND ISSUES

1960

November 3

Lansdale present at Special Group meeing when Merchant

(SG Minutes)

Cabell said that kind of program not practical and group

decides not to adopt sucha plan.

Yet CIA had already made contact

with the Mafia.

Was Cabell not

informed or was he being dis-

ingenuous?

1961

Oct 6

November 3

SGA told by Parrott of 2 "other contingency plans in

connection with possible removal of Castro from the

Cuban scene..."

(Minutes of SGA)..

Lansdale memo discusses major sabotage action.

Indica-

tes that present means NOT likely to cause overthrow

of Cuban regime.

Before the Rockefeller Commission

Lansdale denies that he was

in-

volved in sabotage and said that

he and JFK and RFK tried to stop

sabotage.

Clearly not the case.

R42

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## Page 40

November 31

December 1

December 8

1962

January 18

2. TOP SEURLI

President Kennedy in memo to Special Group summarizes

major decisions re Cuba Project and appoints General

Lansdale as acting Chief of Operations.

R. Kennedy tells SG that "Higher authority" *i.e., the

President) has given priority to Cuba project and

Lansdale

is to develop long range plan to

be reviewed by SG and

submitted

to higher authority for approval.

Lansdale presents outline of program designed to overthrow

Castro regime.

Uses Cubans as nucleus.

Lansdale sends R. Kennedy a copy of his program review of

same day and notes on an attached paper:

"My review does

not include the sensitive work I have reported to you.

felt that you preferred informing the President privately.

QUESTIONS AND ISSUES

January 20

Lansdale memo reflecting on 1/19/62 meeting with AG.

Reflects L's own view of the severity and the

importance

of the remarks of the AG re pushing

forward vigorously with

"We are in a

combat situation -- where

we have been given full command."

January 24

Lansdale memo for Special Group notes it is difficult to

control indigenous nationals if the movement develops

its own impetus.

What wa's the nature of this sensi-

tive work?

All plans were supposed

to go to the SG-2hy not these?

Was

there a separate secret plan that

only Lansdale, the President, 'and

AG and a few others knew of?

Was

this a manner of avoiding a

"reporting" requirement?

Did this reflect the pressure that

Helms

testified to that created

what he called a feeling that

"anything goes?": Yet McCone

continually complained not enough

being done, Why?

Was there concern that these

nationals if armed would assassi-

nate Cuban leaders?

Were they

concerned that they could unleash

something

they could not control?

Was this

dangerous becasue ,we

couldn't control what followed

assassination?

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## Page 41

- 2A -

TOP SECREN

Jan. 24

Lansdale briefs the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Memo for

record says "From the outset,

General Lansdale has

emphasized paramilitary oeprations in connection with

QUESTIONS AND ISSUES

These are inconsistent with his

claim to Rockefeller Commission'!

that he tried to stop sabotage

operations.

-

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## Page 42

July 8, 1975

INDEX TO DOCUMENTS

TAB 1

TAB 2

TAB 3

TAB 4

TAB 5

TAB 6

TAB 7

TAB 8

TAB 9

TAB 10

TAB 11

TAB 12

November 3, 1960

October 6, 1961

November

3, 1961

November 30, 1961

December 1, 1961

December 4, 1961

January 11, 1961

January 18, 1962

January 19, 1962

January 19, 1962

January 19, 1962

January 20, 1962

TAB 13

TAB 14

TAB 15

TAB 16

January 24, 1962

January 25, 1962

January 26, 1962

January 27, 1962

TAB 17

TAB 18

TAB 19

TAB 20

January 30, 1962

January 30, 1962

February 20, 1962

March 2, 1962

TAB 21. March 5, 1962

TAB 22

March 5, 1962

Minutes of Special Group Meeting

Minutes of Special Group Meeting

Present and Projected Clandestine Operations

Against Cuba

Memorandum from JFK to General Taylor

Minutes of Special Group Meeting

Memorandum from Lansdale to Taylor

Minutes of Special Group Meeting

Program Review of Cuba Project by Lansdale

Memorandum from Lansdale to Taylor re:

Task 33, Cuba Project

Memorandum from McManus to the DCI

Program Review of Cuba Project by Lansdale

Memorandum from Lansdale to Members of

Caribbean Survey Group

Memorandum from Lansdale to the Special Group

Minutes of Special Group Meeting

Memorandum from Taylor to JFK

Memorandum from Lansdale to the Attorney General

Memorandum from Craig to Lansdale

Memorandum from Lansdale to Taylor

Program Review of Cuba Project by Lansdale

Program Review of Cuba Project by Lansdale

Minutes of Special Group (Augmented) on

Project MONGOOSE

Guidelines for Operation MONGOOSE

"sides, to

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## Page 43

July 8, 1975

TAB A

TAB B

TAB C

TAB D

TAB E

TAB F

TAB G

TAB 39

TAB 40

TAB 41

• TAB 42

TAB 43

TAB 44

TAB 45

TAB 46

TAB 47

TAB 48

TAB 49

TAB 50

TAB 51

TAB 52

August 8, 1962

Memorandum from Lansdale to the Special

Group (Augmented)

August 10, 1962

Minutes of Special Group (Augmented) Meeting

1967

IG Report, 1967, pages 113-115

August 13, 1962

Memoradum from Lansdale to Harris

June 6, 1975

McCone Testimony, SSCI

August 14, 1962

Memorandum from Harvey to Helms

August 16, 1962

Minutes of Special Group (Augmented) Meeting

August 17, 1962

Memorandum from Gilpatrick to Lansdale

August 20, 1962

Memorandum from Taylor to the Special Group

(Augmented) with attached Memo to President

from Taylor plus Taylor Guidelines for Phase II

of Operation MONGOOSE

August 23, 1962

Memorandum from Bundy to Taylor

August 30, 1962

Minutes of the Special Group (Augmented) Meeting

August 31, 1962

Memorandum from Lansdale to the Special Group

(Augmented)

September 12, 1962 Memorandum from Lansdale to Taylor

September 6, 1962

Minutes of Special Group (Augmented) Meeting

September 14, 1962

Minutes of Special Group (Augmented) Meeting

October 4, 1962

Minutes of Special Group (Augmented) Meeting

October 4, 1962

Memorandum from McCone of Special Group

(Augmented) Meeting

October 26, 1962

Memorandum of Special Group (Augmented) Meeting

December 3, 1962

Memorandum from Helms for the Record

April 14, 1967

Memorandum from McCone to DCI

July 3, 1975

Washington Star Article and Statement by

Lansdale in Response to the Article

-

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## Page 44

UP SECRET

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

HARVEY

26 April 1962

SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

From:

Brig. Gen. Lansdale Ed

Subject: Operation Mongoose, 20-26 April

The following are the significant highlights of Operation

Mongoose for the week:

May Day. World-wide attention focused upon May Day by

the Communists, as "their day, " is expected to be exploited by

Castro promoters throughout Latin America. CLA and USLA

hope to counter this propaganda play and possibly to encourage

public opinion favorably for Cuban freedom. The plight of

Cuban workers especially will be a theme injected into state-

ments, speeches, meetings, and parades on 1 May. It is hoped

to have prominent Cuban exiles make statements and, if possible,

appearances in key Latin American cities to attract news pick-up

and impress their case most favorably.

Agents.

The past 3 weeks have been marked with bad luck

in CIA's infiltration and exfiltration of agent teams. Most of the

operations aborted. Bill Harvey is now in Florida initiating a

new

series of agent infiltrations and is hopeful of closing up with

the schedule in May. He will be back in Washington 30 April.

Special Press Interest. The increased play given by the U.S.

press to possible liberation projects and the Cuban refugees makes

the security of operations more difficult and important.

An item

pertaining to intelligence in the Wall Street Journal, which appeared

20 April, was called to the attention of General Taylor by the Chief

of Operations as warranting special attention. At General Taylor's

request, copies of the item were sent to members of the Special

Group (Augmented) to note possible security implications. Such

news projects as Dave Brinkley's scheduled coverage of Guantanamo

for a TV documentary underline the need for being alert to publicity

affecting Operation Mongoose.

0128%

SENSITIVE

EXCHO? ГРОС МАТОЧАТІС

REGRADIEC: DCP D17 5200.10

DOES NOT AFFLY

TOP SECRET

This document contains i pores.

Copy No._

_of 1 copies. Series

PROPERTY OF

THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

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## Page 45

Information. USIA continued its strong play that Castro-

Communism, despite all its promises, has failed to achieve

progress. Special stories were prepared on Castro's sending

7,000 more army troops into the sugar cane fields.

There also

were stories of the Cuban people's refusal to turn in old silver

coins for the new low-value alloy issue. Commentary material

along the lines of "hungry Cuban people get excuses instead of

food" was produced, with some cross-play from Latin American

newspapers.

Political. State reports it has prepared a position paper,

to follow up the Rostow presentation at NATO, for Secretary

Rusk's use at the NATO Ministerial Meeting,

3 May.

Studies Scheduled. The preparation of a number of papers

desired by the Special Group is in progress, including:

1.

Blockade - how to impose physically (Defense)

2. Blockade - effects of total blockade (CIA)

3.

Cubans in the U.S. Armed Forces (Defense)

4. List of Cuban anti-Castro organizations (CLA)

5.

Security Committee, OAS, activity (State)

6. Joint analysis of evidence on supporting military facilities

(Defense -CIA)

7. Census of Hemisphere travellers to Cuba (CIA)

8. "Patrol posts" in Caribbean, with particular reference to

Haiti and Dominican Republic (Defense)

9.

Feasibility of electronic intrusion (Defense)

10. Feasibility of uses of Guantanamo (Defense).

"Eyes Only" of

Copy 1 - Gen. Taylor #

2 - Mr. Johnson

3 - Mr. Gilpatric

4 - Mr. McCone

5 - Mr. Kennedy

6 - Gen. Lemnitzer

7 - Chief of Operations

01.288

2

1OP SECRET SENSITIVE

PROPERTY OF

THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICI

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## Page 46

26 April 1962

its ian.

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT:

Minutes of Meeting of Special Group (Augmented)

Operation Mongoose, 26 April 1962

PRESENT:

General Taylor; Mr. Kennedy: Mr. Johnson; Mr. McCone;

General

Lansdale and General Craig

1. General Lansdale's report of 26 April was distributed.

General Taylor asked that Defense give the Augmented

a report next week on the status of efforts to step up

recruitment of Cubans for the U. S. Army.

3.

The Wall Street Journal story of the 20th of April was

mentioned. Mr. McCone said that the Chief of Naval Operations had

ordered a

security investigation, but that he himself felt this

would be inadvisable, since it would probably have little positive

result and might in fact damage the operation.

He said that he

would talk to the Navy and try to have this investigation called

Jap mitt

Thomas

A. Parrott

cc :

General Lansdale

-estranged 419163-mn

PROPERTY OF

THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

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1402.

¿milliod pid to 1i:)

10 Mish a doling ily

ut te. Mary's beinding

on 3 way 19ül, minding out

wHich has been made med llie mirrelalady of the alpire

Moriend as indicative of clin dreaded peellond.

greed that lie binde mood irred along llet

it. was

20000

y)i

Metroined

NW 66000

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