## Page 1

4-00000

104-10211-10001

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME:_

CASE CE YUCY WARLICK

LESENKO (835 (ARE STDY)

PALES SE

703-835

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNI'S/LOCATION:

SE

DELESIONS, IF AÏY:

DATE

RECEIVED

1:197 338

DATE

RETUAYED

LEVERED BY (PRIET NAME)

MARIE

SIGNATURE OF RESEELING OUZLEA21

•it.

Jiten-

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE. COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

APPROVED FOR HANSE 109A

PACHI REVIEW FASCHAM

---

## Page 2

its stres

TOP SEGRET

603.

MN FOR MIESE NIN

VII. SPECINISTS' ASSESSYEITS OF HOSETRO

DOESCAL REVEN ROARIN

A. pinions on Intelligence end Pereonalisy

1. Grephoionical Analysin

and jottings in Russian made

by NOSENKO during en early debriefing session were submitied on

25 March 1364 to CIA hardwriting analysts, together with a nunker

of questions posed by the CIA officers handling NOSENKO.

The

graphologists were told only that the wilter was a Pusian male

aged 36, that he had a university-level education.

and that he was

an intelligence officer by profession.

Their report, which was

qualified due to linitationE on the amount of liOSENKO's handwriting

specimens submitted to them, is quoted below.

---

## Page 3

14-00000

tur Strnct E

604.

---

## Page 4

14-00000

E5° FOR-SECRET

605.

readate

2.

Reports by Psychologist

Isycheloadcal Testing Resulta

A CIA psychologist intervieted NOSENKO and administered a

series of psychological tests on 9 July 1964.

The psychologist's

report.

including answers to questions raised by the cia handlers

of NOSENKO is quoted in the following paragraphs.

---

## Page 5

14-000000

TOP SEGRET

606.

"Social Relations and Inter-Persoral Effectiveness: NOSENKO

ina.

"Protional Balance and Gareral 5rab111tY:

NOSENKO appears to

---

## Page 6

14-011100

•: 607•

"Relations and Loyalty to His Parents:

It is apparent

---

## Page 7

14-00000

608.

"Ideological

Makeup and

Lovalty to

His Country: To a

---

## Page 8

14-00000

609.

"Psychopathic Personality Structures

Many volumes have beer

b. Alternative Psychological Explanations

---

## Page 9

14-00000

TOP-SECRET

610.

---

## Page 10

14-80000

6110

Psychological Interrogation:

Por fourteen days between 3 and 21 May 1965, the same CIA

psychologist intervie.ed NOSENKO on his entire

early history.

from birth until about 1953, when he said he entered the Koô.

The main purposes were to collect additional information on this

period," to gain further psychological insights into NOSalKO's

personality, and to find possible ways of obtaining a truthful

Altrough conducted under the physical conditions of

interrogation, the questioning was relaxed and followed no rigid

outline. There were relatively few changes of story from pre-

vious versions; at the same time, however, NOSENKO described in

detail some incidents which he has

subsequently admitted to be

An extract from the psychologist's report of these

interrogations is given below.

• A comparison of infornation obtained during this series of

interrogatiors with information given earlier and later by

NOSENKO-can-be-found_in_ Part IV.

---

## Page 11

612.

---

## Page 12

14-40000

UR SECRET

613.

3.

Report by Psychiatrist

During the year April 1964-April 1965 NOSENKO was under the

medical care of a clA psychiatrist

who visited NOSHiNO at regular

intervals, usually weekly, to examine him physically ard to listen

to any comments NOSENKO might have about himself and his situation.

The psychiatrist familiarized himself with availabie materials on

NOSENKO, particularly with reports of his behavior in the months

immediately following the defection. A report which he submitted

on 20 December 1964 is given below.

---

## Page 13

14-00000

FOR SEERET

614.

---

## Page 14

14-00000

free.

TOP SECRET

6i5.

B. Views of Intelligence Pelsonnel

1. Statement by DERYABIN

a. Introduction

Former KGB officer Peter Sergeyevich DERYABIN has followed

closely the entire course of CIA's investigation of NOSENKO and

his information.

He took part in the interrogations of NOSENKO

1n April 1964, January-February 1965, and October 1966 as an ob-

server and consultant, and he personally questioned NOSENKO during

July and hugust 1965 concerning certain aspects of his personal

past and early KOB career.

On the basis of his direct, personal

knodledge of conditions within the Soviet Union and of KGY organi-

zation ard procedures prior to his defection in February 1954,

-supplemented by cortinuing study of later informatión from a

variety of sources, DERYABIN is of the opinion that much of what

NOSENKO has said about himself and the KGB is purposefully false

or distorted.

Although DERY¿BIN has been able to offer authorita-

tive comment on many aspects of NOSENKO's story, the folloring

section of this paper is limited to his remarks

concerning liOSEN-

KO's entry into the KGB (ther. MVD)

and his Communist Party affili-

ation,

both of wlich fall into the period when DERYABIN was active

as a KGB (then MVD) staff officer.

DERYABIN personally interro-

gated NOSENKO on these topics in the summer of 1965.

Since DER-

YABIN was a personrel officer of the KGB (then GB and MVD) in

Moscow, dith long experience

in Communist Party activities, at

the time NOSENKO claims to have entered the American Department

of the KGB Second Chief Directorate,

he is particularly qualified

to comment on these aspects of NOSENKO's story.

DERYABIN, as a

Soviet Army officer, das graduated in 1945

from the higher counterintelligence school of Smersh (counter-

intelligence dith the Soviet Armed

Forces).

Folloving this he

worked in Naval. Smersh in Moscow and in March 1947 began to work

in the MGB as a

case officer in the Central Personnel Directorate.

Shortly afterwards,

when his superior was appointed Deputy Chief

of the Chief Guards Directorate for Personnel, DERYABIN trans-

ferred with him to the Guards Directorate.

tie served as a Guards

Directorate personnel officer until May 1952, rising through the

ranks from case officer to the position of Chief of Section.

of his responsibilities was the approval of personnel for service

in various units of the Guards Directorate, and he was also

charge of supervising personnel and security matters concerning

one of the Directorate's surveillance sub-sece10n5.

After requesting a change from personnel to operational

duties, DERYABIN was transferred in May 1952 to the Austro-German

Department' of the MGB Foreign Intelligence Directorate.

Until

December 1952 he served as the Deputy Chief of a sub-section in

che Counterintelligence Sektor (desk)

of the Austro-German Depart-

ment.

He was then appointed Deputy Chief of the intelligence

Sektor of the same department.

¿ position he held until March

1953.

From farch until September 1953, DERYABIN was the Deputy

Chief of the section in MGB Headquarters which

was responsible

for the security of Soviets stationed in Austria and Germany:

In September 1953 he das transferred to Vienna, where he became

Deputy Chief of the section in the MVD Legal Residency respong-

¡ble for the security of Soviets in Austria. He defected to

American authorities on 15 February 1954.

---

## Page 15

14-00000

1OP SECRCI

Trálid.ed.

:: end:01

DERYASIN joined

the Komsonol in 1?16 and remultied à member

until 1940, wher. he

becane a candidate member of the Communist

Party of the Soviet Union, he became a full Party meniser 1n

August 1941.

During his Party career he feld a number of responsi-

ble posts.

Before the war, when DERYABIN das a teacher ir. Altay

Kray, he

das, the secretary of a local Komsomol unit aná simultan-

eously served us a member of the Komsonol Plenun in the rayon

where he lived.

From October 1940 uncil November 1941 he was

Secretary of the Kansomol Committee of the 107th Engineer Battalion

of the Red Army and from June 1945 until April 1946 held the same

position in the Komsomol Conmittee of the ilaval Smersh. This was

the unit which had particular responsibility for counterintelli-

gence work within the Naval GRU, which NOSEiKO said he joined in

1951. In the MGa DERYABIN was a member of the Party Committee of

the Personnel Section of the Guards Directorate and, after his

transfer, was eiected Secretary of the Party Bireau of the Austro-

German Departnent of the Foreigr. Intelligence Directorate.

this post from January 1953 until his transfer to Austria 10 Sep-

tember 1953.

b. DERYABIN '8 Comments

The following statements by DERYABIN are based or. his question-

1ng of NOSENKO between 26 July and 13 August 1965.

The questiong

asked and the statements attributed to NOSENKO (referred to as

were during this period. Although the Soviet State Secu-

rity Service did not become known as the KGB until March 1954,

this term is used for convenience sake, except where the specific

organization of the MiB or MVD is under discussion. DERYABIN'&

comments follod:

"NOSENKO'S Acceptance into State Security*

"Taking NOSENKO's. own statements at face value, it is highly

improbable that a person such

as he has described himself to be

dould be acceptable for a position as a staff officer in State

Security.

The folloving factors are important in this regard:

It was the policy of State Security to avoid hiring

the children of high govertment officials.

b. Until STALIN's death in March 1953, KOBULOV, the

man who supposedly helped NOSENKO gain entrance into the

service, had no influence inside the NGS apparatus.

about 1948 until 9 or 10 March 1953, KOBULOV had no office

Irside the MGB or the :D buildings... I know personally that

in these years KOBULOV worked in Germany as Deputy Chief of

the GUSIMZ (Chief Directorate of Soviet Properties Abroad) **

which was once directly under the Council of Ministers and

later under the Ministry of Foreign Trade.

The office was

located. on Chkajova Street, near the Kurskiy Railroad

Station (three blocks from my former apartment) ..

• See also Part V.B.

#* WISMUT A.G. in Germany was

subordinate to GUSIMZ; for a

further discussion of KOBULoV's role in helping NOSENKO

Join the KG3, see Part V.B.

---

## Page 16

14-00000

02-007 7:

TUP SECRET B

617.

It das physically inpossible at the time for NOSENKO

to be recommended for and accepted into State Security, as he

karch 1953.

(If one accepts

his earlier version that he had his talk with KOBUrow in Jan-

vaty or february, his account is similarly impossible because

KOBULOV das not then in State §ecurity.

It would normally

have taken a much longer time, bit in addition to this it was

a perica of reorganization and the personnel staff was not

actively condusting treir work at that time, and pennanent

staff officers were rot sure that they would retain their

d. In March 1953 NOSENO was already twenty-five and a

half years old

and orly a member of the Konsorol.

reconmendation for Party retibership. and could not become a

menber for a full year because of his transfer fron one ser-

vice (GRU) to anotner.

It is impossible that State Security

would accept him kroring in advance that on his birthday ne

would be trenty-six years old and without either Komsomol or

Party membership.

iven for the son of a Mirister, the Secre-

tary of the komsomol Conmittee of the KGS would have to talk

with the Personnel iffice and would not give a recommendation

for his acceptance, especially for the Internal Counterintel-

ligence (Second chief)

Directorate.

case of a son of

a Minister and one sho is recommended by KOBULOV, the secre-

tary would request from NOSENKO a recommendatior. for Party

membership from the members of the Communist Party where

NOSENKO used to work, in this case the GRU.

In this way the

secretary of the Komsomol would be sure himself that NOSENKO

would become a candidate member of the Communist Party during

the next year.

"However, even acceptirg that despite these obstacles and

contradictions the KGB dould have accepted him, ore

must also

remember laccording to roSaNKO's oun statemenis) that NOSENKO's

file contained the folio.ing negative points.*

They are serious

factors and certain of them alone would be erough to cause the

rejection; the totality makes it difficult to believe that at a

time of crisis in the State Security organs anyone would take the

respor. sibility of accepting him:

Subject was already married and divorced before entry

Into State Security.

He had been married to General TELEGIN's daughter

and TELSGIN had beer. arrested by State Security and was in

jail the day that Subject entered State Security.

NOSENKO said that there was a file on losenko's

father in which compromising material was collected on

Subject's family.

NOSENKO agreed that one piece of infor-

nation that would have-been in this file was the fäct that

his maternal grandfather died ir. a Soviet prison while under

sentence as a counter-revolutionary..

The social status background in the life of Subject's

nother was nobility.

•See also Part IV. B.

---

## Page 17

14/0000

TOP SECRET

618.

The shooting incident in Lenirgrad during Horld

War Il and his desertion fron the Naval School in Baku

would have played a very negative role in any consideration

of his acceptance into State Security.

Subject never completed high school in the romal

f.

fashion.

Subject was a poor student at the Irstitute of Inter-

national Relations.

h. It should be added that the KGB would definitely

krod that NOSEUKO. was involved in an automobile accident

in 1947 and was interrogated by the Militia (traffic court),

found guilty.

fined.

This would definitely play a

negative role in NOSENKO's admission to the KGS.

NOSENKO would never be allowed to enter the KGB having

just recovered from tuberculosis.*

In fact, there was a rule

at that time that no person who ever had tuberculoss (even

twertyyears earlier) would ke permitted to work in the KGB.

"In addition, after acceptance, the fact that KOBULOV was a

personal friend of subject's father, as he has told us, would

have been noted in the file and would have played a negative role

in permitting Subject to continue to work in State Security after

KOBULOV's arrest in June 1953.

"I asked Subject how he answered some of the questions in the

anketa (entry questionnaire), particularly the questions on his

former wife, her relatives.

and on his mother's ancestry.** I

then asked

subject how it was, taking into account his mother's

aristocratic ancestry, the fact that her father died in jail, the

Trotskyite allegations against Subject's father, the fact that

Subject's former father-in-law (TELEGIN) was still in jail, and

the fact that Supject was present when TELEGIN's apartnent was

searched--that he had been accepted into the kes.

particularly

in 1953 during the confusion and changes after the death of STALIN.

Subject admitted that the question was logical.

and said that he

could only assume that the influence of KOBULOV and the important

and influential position of his own father outweighed these nega-

tive factors.

He also cited his GRU experience in this connectior..

"I then asked Subject how he had reported his second marriage

to the KGB.

He replied that before the marriage he had mentioned

* NOSENKO first meritioned having had tuberculosis during the June

1962 meetings, when he described it as a minor case but said he

mas under out-patient treatment until 1958.

He next nertioned

his illness in 1966, describing how he sometimes coughed up a

"glass of blood" at a time: Although DERYABIN's questioning

covered this part of NOSENKO's life in detail, there was no

mention of tuberculosis in July and August 1965.

DERYABIN '5

commert is based on the

1966 information but is included here

for purposes of context.

**The anketa and DERYABIll's questioning on this subject are dis-

cussed further below.

---

## Page 18

14-00000

TOP SECRET 6

619.

1t briefly to GORBATENKO, ard that he had unofficially rur. a name

check on his prospective

bride (which was 'clean'),

and that after

the marriage he had filled out another arketa ir. which he included

all the required data on his wife and her relatives. After con-

siderable prompting, Subject said that he tad indicated trat she

and her parerts had been in france, but that he had concealed the

fact that her graranother had been

ir. German-occupied territory

during the war.

He admitted that the KGB would have learned this

in a routine check, however.)

I then reviewed for Subject the

negative security factors mentioned above, adding the arrest of

KOBULOV, the fact that his ned wife and her parents had been

abroad, the fact that her grandmother was in Serman-occupied

territory, the fact that Subject was now over-age for the Komsomol

but not yet a Party member or candidate, and the fact that Subject

received a 15-day sentence for misuse of cover documents and 1r.-

curring venereal disease, and asked if he didn't think that his

personnel file had been reviewed in 1954, and if so, what grounds

there could have been for retaining him in the KGB.

Subject said

that he thought that his file probably was reviered but that

again the influence of his father had

saved him.

Subject added

that another important factor was probably his language qualifi-

cation and particularly his higher educatior.

I pointed out to

Subject that if his second wife and her parents had been abroad

it was impossible that her name check could have been negative.

He admitted it was illogical, but insisted that this was

"NOSENKO 'g. Knowledge of KGB, 1953-54

"Entry Date into KGB: NOSENKO was reminded that he had pre-

viously given varying dates for his entry on duty in the KCB.

replied that he did not remember the exact date, but he was sure

that it was in the middle of March 1953 - perhaps 13 or 15 March

(15 March 1953 was a Sunday).

He would give no explanation for

why he previously claimed to have entered the KGB in

In fact it would be very unusual for a KGB officer to

forget his exact entry-on-duty date to the very day because it

1s used to compute length of service and must be entered on vari-

ous forms from time to time.

"Numerical resignation of the Intelligence and Counterintelli-

gence Directorates in 195j: Agked to describe what directorates

existed in the MVD while BERIYA was Minister (March-June 1953).

NOSENKO named the First Chief Directorate (FCD) and the Second

Chief Directorate (SCD) which he said were the intelligence ard

counterintelligence directorates respectively.

Asked if he were

sure, NOSENKO said he was positive.

and that the only change that

took place was that later, under KAÜGLOV, for a few months only,

the FCD became the SiD, ard vice versa.

NOSENKO stuck to this

even when told he was wrong; he did not say he did not know or

did not rementer. perhaps realizing that he could not claim not

to remember chat directorate he served in.

(Actually, the change

in numerical designations was instituted by BERIYA right after

STALIN's death in March 1953 and persisted until the KGB was

organized in March 1954.

Thus, NOSENtO does not know what the

correct designation of his own directorate was at the time that

he allegedly

ertered on duty with Soviet State Security and for

the entire first year of his alleged service there.

• NOSENKO on other occasions has given various reasons why he

told CIA that he joined the KCB in 1952. See Part V.B.

---

## Page 19

14-00000

TOP SECREI

620.

MVD Leadership, 1953-54: Asked to nare the chiefs of the

and separate departments of the MVD under BERIYA

and KRUGLOV, NOSENKO named nine out of 28.

He was unable to name

the Chief of the Irtolligence Directorate, sajing that he remem-

bered only SAKHAROVSKIY (PANUSHKIN was Chier untii 1955). iiked

to name KRUGLOV's deputies, NOSENKO named Only ROMASHKOV ani

SEROV, and was ignorant of

such prominent deputies as LUNFY ad

SHATALIN.

Told that a Secretary of the Central Committee of ire

OPSU was one of KRUGLOV's deputies at this time (SHATALIN), !OS-

ENKO flatly denied that this was possible.

"Organization of KGS: NOSEIKO did not know when the KGB was

organized (March 1954).

He said that it was in early 1955 or

late 1954.

Iold that he was a year off and asked to think it

over, NOSENKO insisted that he was right.

"Processing Procedures for Employment with KGB: NOSENKO'S

story about how he

was processed for emploiment with the kGB in

1953 is inconsistent with the procedures used at that time.

He

does not know many

of the things that he should know about er-

trance procedures; he is wrong about many of the things that he

claims to remember.

The disparities are so great that they can-

not be explaired

(as NOSEIKO attempts to do)

by the claim that

KOBULOV's recommendation resulted in a simplified entrance pro-

cedure for NOSENkO.

"The most important document fiiled out by prospective em-

ployees of Soviet State Security is a detailed personal history

questionnaire, called in Russian Anketa spets-alnoco naznachentya

sot rudnika KGB.

This exhaustive questionnaire is 16 pages long,

and filling it

out is an experience that one is not likely to

forget.

A background investigation is run on the basis of this

questionnaire, which itself becomes a permanent and prominent

feature of the employee's personnel file.

NOSENKO remembers

filling out a questionnaire, but does not know its designation.

He asserts that it was only 4-6 pages long.

He asserts that he

filled it out at home, and submitted it in two copies shortly

before entering on duty.

Actually, this questionaire was re-

quired in ore copy only, and was never permitted to be taken

home since it was a classified document (even when not filled

in).*

"NOSENKO insists that he did not have to take a medical exam-

ination prior to entering the KGB.

This is not possible.

an examination was a routine and mandatory part of the processing.

I cannot think of any instance in which it wouid be waived.**

DERYABIN's views are based on NOSENKO's statements ir. August

1965.

In his original biographical statement (1962), NOSENKO

said that no anketa was required.

He implied as nuch in his

most recent statement in April 1966, after being questioned

by DERYABIN.. This statement is given in Part V.B.

**See remarks above concerning NOSENKO's alleged treatment for

tuberculcsis from 1952 to 1958.

---

## Page 20

14-00000

TOP SECREI

621.

"NOSENKO's descriptior of the secrecy agreener. that he

signed then entering on duty with, the KGB is corpletely unlike

the agreement that was in use at that time for staft employees.

It may be significant that NOSDily's description os tho secrecy

agreement he recalls signing resenbles che

secrecy afreuments

that were taken from

agents.

"NOSETKO Insists that he did not fill cut iny other forms,

questiornaires, or papers when entering

the KGo.

Actually, there

were

a number of other routine fors that had to be filled out by

applicants and neu employees.

"Location of ROZiaNKO's office: NOSENKO says that all his

entry processing was handled by a personnel officer ramed POZHEN-

KO and his staff.

He asserts that ROZlEYKO's office, which nos-

INKO visited several times in early 1953, as located on the oth

floor, Bth entry, Buildirg No. 12, Dzerzhinskiy Street.

In fact,

neither ROZHENKO nor any officers or units of the Personnel De-

partment were located in the 8th entry.

They were all (ircluding

ROZHENKO) located on the oth and ith floors of the 7th entry of

Buildirg No. 12.*

"Rank Pay: Asked about his salary when he first started to

work in the KGB, NOSENKO said he got a basic salary of 1700 rubles

as a case officer, 500 rubles for hig rank of lieutenant, plus

secrecy, language, and longevity pay. lie insistes that this vas

correct, even

aren told that KGB officers were no longer being

paid for rant

in March 1953, and said that although he remembered

that there was one year--1954--when they were not paid for rank.

he was sure that when he first entered on duty he received this

pay.

Salary for rank was taken aday from State Security officers

in September 1952 ard was not restored until April 1954.

"Promotion to Senior Lieutenant: In giving the chronology

of his promotion to various military ranks, NOSENKO claimed to

have been promoted to senior lieutenant in

April 1953, shortly

after joinirg the KGB.

Told that this was impossible, and that

no one in the KGB was promoted as this time; NOSENKO replied that

he couldn't say about anyone else but he was sure that he had re-

ceived his promotion at that time.

In fact, this is impossible:

all promotions in the KGB were frozen from the time BERIYA took

over as minister (March 1953) until late 1953.

"Visitor's Pass Procedures: In talking about his first visit

to the KGB to process for employment, NOSENKO was unable to re-

call the procedures employed by the KGS Pass Office in issuing

visitor's passes.

Specifically, he maintained that the name of

the interviewer was not indicated on the pass.

In fact.. the

name of the interviewer did appear on the pass and the inter-

viewer had full responsibility for the visitor while he was on

KGB premises.

While it is understardable that NOSeNKo might

have forgotter the details in olved if he had only visited there

a few times more than ten years ago, if he worked at KGB-head-.

quarters for over ten-years-as a staff. officer-and particularly

as a super:isor he would have frequent occasion to admit visitors.

and thus should krow visitor's pass procedures quite vell.

- - -

*NOSENKO has since said that he spoke to no personnel officers

prior to acceptance by the KGB of afterwards, thereby indicating

that his statements to DERYABIN were untrue.

See Part V.B.

---

## Page 21

14.00000

TOr SECKtT

622.

"Unescorted Entry into KGB Building with Yisitor's Pass:

describing

his firgt day at work, NOSEiKO said that he went from

the Pass Office, where he obtained a visitor's pass, to the 4th

entry of the Biilding lio. ¿, where his pass was checked by the

guards, and then went unescorted to KOBULOV's office or. the third

floor.

Challerged on this point, he said he was sure that it was

possible to enter ditrout an escort.

In fact, it was absolutely

impossible to go through any entry of Building

No. 2 without

escort if you did not have a properly stampes KG3

document (see below).

"KGB Identity Document:

NOSEKO was asked to describe the

KGB Identity document that he received when he first entered the

He was then asked if there das anything unusual in connec-

tion with this document at that time.

He replied that he knew of

notring unusual.

He was then reminded that after STALiN's death

and again after EERIYA's arrest it was nesessity to have special

stamps placed in the identity documents to validate then.

out the right stamp it was impossibie to ente: the KGB building.

NOSENKO was igorant of this and was urable to recall anything

about it despite a nunker of hints and leading questions.

ally, during the period of upheaval followirg STALIN's death

agrin after

BERIXA's arrest, all KES identity documents were tem-

porarily withdrawn in order

to have special validation stamps

placed in trem,

and it was literally impossible to get in the

KGB buildings if one did not have the right stamp.

This was the

subject of numerous

anecdotes at the time ard

is hard to believe

that an officer who served in the KGB at the time could have for-

gotten it completely.

Asked to describe the sign in front of the KGB

Club, NOSEND said that he did not remember any sign (there was

one in 1953) but mentioned that there was a Castronom (food store)

next to the KGB Club.

Asked when the Gastronem was opened, he

said. firmly that it was already there when he started to work

fact, this Gastronom was definitely not there as

It was opened sometime between 1955 anú 1957, as Moscow

directories show.

The KGb Club is in entry No. 1 of Building

No. 12, Dzerzhinskiy Square,.

it every day he dent to work.

"Chief Directorate of Militia: Asked where the Chief Direc-

of the USSR was located in 1953-54, NOSENKO

replied that he did not krow, and kne'd only that later it was

located on Ulitsa Ogareva.

Actually, in 1953-54 it was located

next to the main KGS building at Dzerzhinskiy No. 2.

officer in the counterintelligence directorate would have fre-

quent occasion to deal with the Chief Directorate of Militia.

"K.I. (Conmittee of Information): Asked where the Intelli-

gence Directorate of the MVD was located in 1953, NCSINKO replied

that it was scattered between Dzerzhinskiy No. ?.

the Agricultural

Exhibition,

the K.I. buildirg, and Kiselniy Pereulok.

& confused and incorrect angwer.

Asked for clarification, NCS=

ENKO said that he had never visited either the k.I. or the First

Chief Directorate building at the Agricultural Exhibition. Thus,

NOSENKO seems to be unaware that the K.I. has not existed since

1951, and that the K.I. bilding

and the building at the igri-

cultural Exhibition were one and the same place.

---

## Page 22

14.00000

TOP SECRET

"NOSENKO' 3 Claim to Have Been a Komsomol: Sparetery in the

Second Chief Directorate, KGB

"NOSEriKO claimed to have become a member of the Komsomol

Organization (K/O) of the KGB when he entered on duty in March

1953, to love been elected as Secretary of Komsomol Organization

of the Second Chief Directorate in the fall of 1953, and to have

Berved in that capacity until the fall of 1954, when he was re-

moved because he used operational-alias documerts in obtaining

treatment for a venereal disease he had incurred.

He claims to

have been excluded from the komsonol, without prejudice, when he

attained his 27th birthday in October 1954.

"Asked to describe how he transferred from the koinsomol organ-

ization of the Naval Intelligence Post in the Baltic to the Kom-

soirol Organization of the KGB, NOSENKO gave an entirely incorrect

description of this procedure, both as regards deregistration from

the K/O in the Baltic, and registration with the k/0 in the KGB.

He stated that he was issued

a new Komsomol registration card by

the KUB K/O, without reference to the previous K/O in the Baltic;

this 1s impossible.

"NOSENKO gave an incorrect account of how a K/0 secretary ig

elected, stating that he was elected at a meeting of the k/o.

convene separately to elect the Secretary.

no see tho

yote the ko come which will

"NOSENKO could not describe the duties of a K/O secretary in a

specific manner.

"NOSENKO did not know who was the secretary of the overall KGB

The secretary of the SCD K/O would

be directly subordinate

to him and would deal with him frequently.

"NOSENKO was unable to describe his dealings with the KGB K/O

or the identities or responsibilities of the people with whom he

dealt there.

"NOSENKO insisted that in 1953-54, the maximum age for a Kom-

somol member was 27.

In actual fact, the maximum age was 26 (it

was raised later).

This point is important, both because NOSENKO

should know exactly if he had served as a K/O secretary, and also

because it refutes

his story that he was excluded from the Kom-

somol for over-age in 1954.

"NOSENKO maintained that all the members of his K/O paid dues

In the amount of 2 percent of their monthly salaries.

Incorrect, as monthly Komsomol dues were calculated on a sliding

scale determined by wage group:

at that time, Komsomol members

earning up to 500 rubles monthly paid 0.5 percert: those earning

500 to 1500 rubles paid 1 percent, and those

earning over 1500

rubles paid 1.5 percent.

The K/O secretary collects the dues,

and must krow the right anount:

"NOSENKO did

not know whether or not a Komsomol Congress

took place while ne was k/O secretary, saying that they took

place every year.

the 12th Komsomol Congress

which convened in March 1954 was the first since 1948; at this

12th Congress a number of changes were made in the Komsomol Rules

(Ustav).

As secretary of a K/O NOSENKO would have been involved

---

## Page 23

14.00000

IUP SECRET

624.

In a good deal of preparatory work for this congress, which was

a big event in the life of every Komsomol worker at the tire, and

could not be forgotten. "

Although DERYABIN's direct knowledge of the KGB ended in 1954,

his more recent examination of reports fion ether sources.

regara to what NOSENKO has said about KGS procedures, DERYABIN

stated:

"Asked to describe how he conducted name checks on a

Soviet citizen and on a new arrival to the American Embassy in

1953-54, NOSENKO gave a superficial description of how such

checks were done.

However,

he resisted every attempt to get sim

to describe this process in detail, and he made several blunders

which show thât he never actually ran such a check himself.

For

example, he did not know where the records of all Soviet citizens

who have been tried are kept, and he attempted to improvise an

answer (completely wrong) that they would check with the Militia

about this.

NOSENKO correctly said that Archives were located

on Kirov Street, but he was completely unabie to stretch his

limited knowledge to provide a description of now these various

repositories were actually checked.

NOSRUKO was also asked to

describe 1n detaid how he ran such a check on a soviet citizen

in the 1950-59 period.

Here again he was in difficulty and re-

fused even to try.

He did not even know the everyday term Spets-

proverka, which

means a check for clearance.

"It was particularly interesting that he did not feel able to

dispute my challenges of his information, even though he undoubt -

edly knows that I do not have first-hand krowledge of procedures

in this period.

I even tested this on one occasion by asking

NOSENKO the difference between the lst Spets Otdel (Special

Department - KGB cards and files) and the Operati:to-Uchetniy

Ordel (Operational Reports Department - the functional name for

the Ist Special Department).

He answered that the ist Special

Departmert holas the files on Soviet criminal cases rile the

Operational Reports Department is for political and espionage

cases.

It seems he invented this answer on the spot.

In addi-

tion, it is wrong that political and security cards are separate

from criminal cres in the lst Special Department.

They were

In my time and must still be compined in one card file.

"NOSENKO states that he knows nothing about the files of

the First Chief Directorate.

It is unbelievable that in ten

years of service in the Second Chief Directorate NOSENKO never

Raw a First Chief Directorate file; how else would he be able

to check information on toreigners, especially on American Em-

bassy personnel?

The first stage in such a check is an inquiry

to the First Chief Directorate and a check of any files they

may have on the subject.

According to his own account, NOSENKO

Bhould have been doing this type of thing the whole of his ten

years of service, without regard to whether he was assigned-to

the Anerican Department or the Ipurist Department."

---

## Page 24

14-00000

TOP SECRET

625.

2. Remarks by CIA Handlers

a. Introduction

irate

SUE!

Five CIA case officers who worked directly with NOSENKO have

recorded their personal observations on his behavior and actions.:

The principal case officer, the first CIA representative to meet

NOSENKO in 1962, participated in all of the meetings and inter-

rogations (either personally or monitoring from off-stage)

then; he is a senior officer with 17 years of operational experi

ence, including extensive agent handling and dealings with more

than 10 officers of Soviet and Satellite Intelligence and Security

Services who were defectors

or agents in place; he has also had

desk or supervisory responsibilities connected with at least 20

other such sources.

A second case officer, ho participated in

the meetings in Geneva in 1964 and in all subsequent phases of

the

operation, has spent the 16 years of his career solely In

Soviet operations and has handled

several Soviet sources in place,

as well as defectors.

Three other officers, who began to work

with NOSENKO after his arrival in the United States and conducted

the bulk of both the debriefing and the hostile interrogations,

have spent most of their careers in Soviet counterintelligence

operations, mong them, they command an extensive knowledge of

the Soviet Intelligence Services,

and

they have had a variety

of agent- and defector-handling experience.

NOSENKO was talked to and questioned in several

types of

circumstances:

- In five tightly organized meetings in 1962 in

Geneva with limited time available for each of a wide

range of topics, none of which could be ignored but none

of which could be covered in detail.

- In concentrated but somewhat longer meetings in

place in Geneva

in January-February

1964, with the know-

ledge by all participants that items not adequately covered

then could 'be dealt with after the defection.

- In routine debriefing sessions after his defection,

first in a Frankfurt safehouse, then in a safehouse in

area, where a spectal effort was made not

to put pressure on NOSENKO or express doubts about his

staterents.

- Under

detailed hostile interrogation (especially

April 1964 and January-March 1965).

- In extended, detailed debriefing sessions which

NOSENKO could not evade

(May-November 1961, May 1965,

July-August 1965, and Oçtober 1966).

Thus there were

opportunities to note his performance and reac-

tions under varied degrees of stress and control.

The features of NOSENKQ's conduct, manner, and techniques

discussed below are

confined

to those which were clearly and con-

sistently observed by all of the officers involved.

---

## Page 25

14-00000

TOP SECRET

626.

b. NOSENKO's Conduct in Meetingg

NOSENKO in brief, super-icial,

uncritical debriefings (of

the sort which characterized the 1962 and 1964 Geneva meetings

and the debriefings. prior to 4 April 1964) was reasonabig con-

vincing in his manner.

For example, on the basis of the hur-

ried sessions of June

1962 in Geneva, which did not allow tire

for systenatic or detailed questioning, the CIA case officer

in commenting on NOSENKO's conduct mentioned "the ease of his

manner, the sureness of his knowledge of matters which

have known, and the amount of checkable information he provided."

NOSENKO seemed to that case officer to be "under little or no

restraint as to the amount and nature of what he told us

"made a convincing and good

personal impression: a vigorors.

temperamental and vital man."

Similarly, nothing in NOSENKO's

manner caused doubts on

the

part of the FBI represertatives who

took NOSENKO's reports in February, March, and early April 1964.

It became apparent, howver, when the cases ROSENKO had

mentioned briefly in early meetirgs were taken up in detail in

leisurcly debriefings after the defection, that he could not add

facts corsistent with what he had

said before.

He was unable to

recall related incidents or additional circunstances which did

not come to mind in the first telling, despite being ardes by

questioning from different angles or

in different coatexts.

sae results were obtained in exhausting his store of operational

leads (with a half dozen exceptions) and his information on KGB

procedures,

installations, and operational methods:

Having once

reported on these general topics, NOSENKO could offer nothing

more when debriefed again, regardless of the

method of question-

ing tried.

Repeatedly he used the same stories to illustrate

his points; new stories did not emerge.

In a period of nine

months, NOSENKO was drained of information on nis persona and

professional experiences

and knowleage.,

Never befere had the

SIA case officers encounteres a defector who

was totally de-

A technique NOSENKO has frequently used to explain his in-

ability to supply details and to forestall further questicring

has been to claim poor memory.

"Different people have different

types of memories," he has said on many occasions, or on others:

I have told what I remember."

The case officers who have

handled NOSENKO agree, on the other hand, that he has an excel-

lent memory,

although perhaps a peculiar one:

NOSENKO dia not

always recall most easily those events which had occurred most

recently, or those incidents which were most closely related to

him.

He was able, for

to remember detailed information

on the penetration of the Courier Transier Station in Paris and

to give a long, detailed, and ordered account of the compromise

of PENKOVSKIY,

in neither of which he claimed ary personal role:

he has been

able to name hundreds of KGB officers, to gi:e the

dates on

of them transferred from one corponent of

the Second Chief

Directorate to another, and to describe their

Yet NOSENKO forgot there

he himself served in the GRU; he could not consistently dis-

cribe the circumstances of his divorce; he failed to provide a

consistent date for his entry into the KGB and for his transfer

from the American Department to the Tourist Department in 1962.

Likewise, NOSENKO remembered details of KGB operations which,

like the

"ANDREY" case in 1953, took place in the relatively

dis-

tant past, but he could not recall the travels, friends, and

activities of his own target. john V. ABIÜN or details of opera-

tions against many American code clerks in 1960 and 1961.

---

## Page 26

1409000

TOP SECRET

627.

These limitations of knowiedge ard quirks of memory were

evident rot

only during meetings when HOSENKO was being desriesed.

Irey were also apparent in the interrogacions which supplanted

the debriefings.

c.

NOSENKO's Behavior Under Interrogation

(1) Introduction

In the many and long interrogation sessions there emerged

habits of behavior noticeable to each of the CiA officers present.

Trese characteristics of NOSENKO were his manner of recourting

events and his evasiveness, inprovisaiions, ard other defersive

tenniques. They are reviered belok.

(il) Manner of Recounting Brents

Typical of NOSENKO's performance in the interrogations vere

the following points:

- Talking about operatiors he supeivised ard about his per-

the KSB Headquarters aspects

of other operations,

NOSENKO habitually used the passive voice ("'it was decided") or

irdicated that he was not alore in these activities ("there was

по

ascourting on who was working on any cose cierx case--it was

GRYAZNOV, KOSCLAPOY, NOSENKO, and also working kas KLYPIN, GRIBAN-

nie made the decision--I and KOVSHUK and GRYAZNOV.

"or "I

and GRYAZNOV discussed this with him. "

when asked where a par-

ticular conversation

rarely located it in his own

office ('I was

in KOVSHUK's offlie wher KOSLOV sailed him about

the trip" or "I was Ir KLYPIN's office ard he was

calkirg to

KOVSHUK:").

"he said to me," etc.!, but it was in just such matters that

NOSENKO most often contradicted himself le,g.. his relatiorship

with GRIBANOV and his part in the recruitrent approach to the

American code clerk James STORSBERGI.

- In repeating certain stories (the CHEREPANOV case and the

provocation against Professor Frederick BARGHOCFN are examples!

NOSENKO gave them in precisely the same order, without addition

In relating the PENKOVSKIY story, which he stressed

be dearned little by intele from several different sources. he

presented the

facts each time in nearly idertical order.

for more details on these cases, he irvarlably insisted--often

with triitation--that he knew rothing more ard if he did, he

would have reported it.

Other factors contributed to the su-

pression that in such instances NOSENKO had delivered his infor-

nation

by rote:

Statements like "I don't remember what I told

you before" when queried agair. on a particular case; detachment

and a lack of emotion when describing the compromise of soviets.

who, like himself, had cooperated wich American Iatelligence:

POPOV, PENKOVSKIY, and CHEREPAVOV: an irability to correlate

dates and events in different operations which he said he was

handling

such as conflicts in the timirg of his approach to

X.E. JOHNSON and in the date he gave for johr. V. AIDIAN's visit

to the Pushkin Street dead drop, and conflict betteen the dates

of his participation in the MCRONE case and his travel co Cuba).

---

## Page 27

14-00000

TOP SECRET

628.

- NOSENKO, with a few excuptions (notably the compromise of

PENKOVSKIY and

the ASIDIAN visir: to the dead drop site), could

not supply specific or approxiate dates for operational activi-

ties during the period of his

service in the U.S. Imbassy Section.

Beyond recourse to the phrase "1960, 1961," he refused to estimate

the dates or to associate these

activities with the time of the

year or events in his personal life.

(111) Evasion, Improvisation, and Other Defenses

In the debriefings before the interrogations, ROSENKO avoided

questions and topics not of his own choosing, saying that he would

give full details "later," when systematic debriefing began.

when the question or topic came up anew in a later debriefing.

re would plead fatigue or boredom and propose:

we drink; tomorrow we work."

Prior to d April 1964 he provided

only accounts of operations selected by himself; it was only

after 4 April 1964 that he could be, constrained to reply to de-

tailed questioning on other matters.

From that point on, other evasive tactics became familiar

to his

interrogators.

He would try to change the

subject or

to shift from the specific event to a generalized account of how

such things were done in principle.

He would claim bad memory

on grounds that, for example, operations against U.S. Embassy

personnel were hopeless and

useless anyway.

lie would dismiss the

details

or the entire operation

as unimportant (for example, the

microphones in the U.S. Embassy).

He would set out reasons

for

his ignorance of things he admittedly should have known (his own

"poor performance,"

preoccupation with other matters, inattention

to duty, absence fron the KGB while on vacation, lack of time to

master details because he was a supervisor).

Unable to name or

talk about KGB indigenous agents working against Americans, in-

clusing those in operations under his supervision, NOSENKO

disparaged the quality of, such

agents ("they never reported any-

thing of interest on anyone"); he cited their low educational

level and their inferior status as servants and employees as

one reason none of them could give the KGB operationally useful

information.

In fact; the record of many indicated previous em-

ployment which would demand at least the equivalent of a college

degree or certificate from a technical institute.

Numerous maids

were former school teachers, one was formerly a chemist.

When evasion failed, it seemed to the interrogators that

NOSENKO improvised his answers.

Some of these evident improvisa-

tions led him into unacceptabie statements or positions.

To use

his response. to the questioning

on John V. ABIDIAN as an example:

Not knowing about ABIDIAN's car,

he said the KGB could not get

at it.

In fact, the car was held by. Soviet customs

for two

weeks, and later NOSENKO himself spoke about the way the KGB used

Embassy chauffeurs

for access to cars.)

Not knowing

of ABIDIAN'S

trips out of the USSR, he claimed that the

kGB had no way to

find out where Embassy officers went when they made trips out of

the country.

(In fact, ABIDIAN had told his language teacher

each time

and she, as NOSENKO said, was a KGB agent; al3o,

ABIDIAN

arranged his trips by long-distance phone from Moscow to his des-

tination abroad, and the KGB can cover such calls.)

Not knowing

of ABIDIAN's trip within the USSR, he

spoke of a vacation which

he latter admitted to be false.

Asked why he did not know personal

---

## Page 28

18.00000

TOP SECRET

629.

data on ABIDIAN from the State Departent Binaraphic Regigter.

he said "orly the first Chief Directorate" Usus

interrogator parsued the point, NoSElio said he rementered that

KOVSHUk did havo a copy in his

office.

"bus an old one, 1956,

which didn't list AbIDIA'i."

Under pressure about ABIDIAN's visit

to Pushkin Strcet, NOSENIO said the XGB thought that ABIDIAN maY

where the drop, if any, might be.

As another example, when he

initially

agked about Geo-ge BLake, tie KGb agent

the context of the question was a discussion of Second Chief

Directorate operations.

NOSE:IKO labeled it as such

"was not as important

Is VASSALL."

Later, when the name was men-

tioned again, he asxed:

"Who's BLAKE?"

On other occasions, when his self-contradictiong were pointed

out or when he admitted ignorance of matters ha acinowledge he

should have known, NOSENKO would fall back upon che of the follow-

ing lines of defense:

- "What I know I tell you;

what I remember I tell

you, " or "I don't know," "I car't explain," ... or a shiug.

- The details, even if corfused or contradictory, are

not important.

What is important is the

of the facts,

their importance and their "reality.

"wirole" of entirety

this that Anerican Intelligence should evaluate, not de-

tails.

- He must be genuine because otherwise how could I

have been working with "SARDAP" and 'PROKHOR'?"

PREISFREUND whose KGB cryptony. was "PROKHOR," did con-

firm NOSENKO'S

"How else could I'tell you about

STORSBERG?".

"The KGB would not use a staffer as a provo-

cateur," nor would the KGB supply information on

such as the Paris case (JOHNSON)

and VASSALL,. and

reveal the names of its officurs abroad.

- If American Intelligence checked his story "fully,"

it would learn that despite all this confusion, he was genu-

He repeatedly urged that his interrogators check

an independent penriration of the KGB--there it would

verify that his name is registered as the case officer who

opened, held ard turned over the ABIDIAN file and thus that

he was a KGB officer.*

NOSENKO referred to this method of corroborating him at least

20 times during the interrogations of January-larch 1965.

on 1 February 1965 that "maybe the day will come when you have

& source to check and you will find out" (that he was ABIDIAN's

case officer). Later in the same interrogation session, he added:

"I see how poor and miserable I'm looking with ragard to ABIDIAN's

filc, but anyore who can check in (KGB) Archives will see."

On

§ february he said.

"I greatly wish that you will have as soon

as possible an agent in the KGB. It is simple to look at the

was the only such source at the time.

Tan OrinT

---

## Page 29

14-00000

TOP SECRET

630.

file on ABIDIAN. On the first page is written that 'I, NOSENKO,

Yurly Ivarovich, opened this file'."

Or. l6 February he

said:

"Tine

will show I an what I say." On 3 March he referred nine times with-

In one hour to a check via such a source.

He repeatedly stated

that "time will show" that he is not a provocateur.

At one point

he engaged in the following dialogue with his interrogators:

NOSENKO:

That e'll nagyou that, is you check, you'll find

INTERROGATOR:

He're not disputing that you worked for the kGB.

We're disputing that you held the positions you

say you held in the kGB.

NOSENKO:

That's what I'm saying. If you could check you

would find that I was only in these two departrents

and only in these positions...

(later in the session)

NOSENKO:

A genit you any hutureoria shown

I can't prove

INTERROSATOR: What can the future show?

NOSENKO:

I don't know. But from what I understand the check-

Maybe you can check

if you have any possibility now,

in the KGB or out of

INTERROGATOR: You mean our acquaintances, don't you?

HOSENKO:

Yes, but maybe your acquaintances can check with

someone, because anyone in the kGB should know

that, yes, there was a liOSENKO.

INTERROGATOR: Should we ask someone like VAKHRUSHEV OF SUSLOV?

because I gave you their rames.

NOSENKO:

sure.

d. Additional Observations

(1) Inquisitiveress About CIA

NOSENKO's questions about CIA and its activities seemed to his

interrogators

to be beyond the interest or curiosity expected of

Soviet Intelligence defectors.

Frequently

he asked, even while

discussing his own KGB responsibilities:

"You tell me about a case.

and I will remember details.

Other examples of NOSENKO's inquisi-

tiveness--include-the-following:-

- When shown the CIA publication "Checklist of Soviet

Officials Abroad during the 1964 meetings in Geneva, NOSENKO

made inquiries about what organization prepared "t and to what

part of the U.S. Government that organization is subordinate.

---

## Page 30

14-00000

TOP SEChEl

631.

- In January 1964, entirely out of context, he asked

whether GOLITSY! had reported to CIA that Finnish President

KEKKONEN was a KGB agent.

(He was not able to explain in

not informed ClA about the case

before he made the foregoing inquiry.

- NOSENKO asked precisely how American Intelligence col-

lection in the USSR is directed and coordinated.

The CIA case

officer responded:

"What was thut question?"

NOSENKO there-

upon said:

"It was not a question--just general interest."

When the case officer urged him to repeat the question, he re-

fused to talk about it and diverted the conversation to other

matters.

- He asked where CIA secretaries resided in the washing-

ton area.

- NOSENKO tried to find out the grades of the CIA offi-

cers in contact with him.

- NOSENKO inquired in early 1964 whether the CIA offi-

cer who met him in Gereva two years earlier had received a

medal for that phase of the operation.

(li) Acceptance of Contrary Information from Other sources

Inder Interrogation.

even when

accused of lying, NOSENKO

rarely

challenged the validity of CIN's information

nor claimed

superior knowledge. The only facts he challenged strongly were

Incontestably true, such as the date of GOLITSYN's defection, the

date

of ABIDIAN's visit to the Pushkin Street dead drop, KOSO-

LAPOV's travel separate from JENNER, and KOSOLAPOV's November 1960

trip to Helsinki.

It seemed at all

times that he accepted that

CIA knew more than he did on tovics including conditions in the

OSSR and cases and people for whon he clained direct respongibility.

He never challenged DERIABIN's statements about KGB procedures,

although aware that his own information was more recert.

(e) Discussions with NOSENKO On His Own Performance

After admitting his inability to respond to questions about

operations

in which he said he participated, NOSENKO sometimes

gave a general appraisal of his own performance.

He would admit

that it was

"impossible to have such memory breaks" and agree

that his response was neither reasonable nor acceptable ("In your

place I wouldn't believe it either," or on another occasion,

"It

will look bad to your boss"). Admitting that the guestions

were

fair, logical, and clearly put, he acknowledged at least a dozen

• times during

the January-March 1965 interrogation that his per-

formance under questioning was bad and unacceptable.

He also admitted that most of the leads he had passed were

largely useless.

Out of the 150-or-so-he-said he had provided.

he stated that the great majority were

"no good,"

unimportant, or

people with wron the KGB had not worked ("Maybe

'ANDREY' became

not interesting to KGB, changed jobs, and was not so important any

"some of the agents recruited by the Seventh Department

weren't meeting the KGB": ets.)

He consistently estimated, how-

ever, that there were about 20 to 25 "good" leads.

1ur SECRET

---

## Page 31

4-00000

TOP SECRET

€32.

C. Polygraph Testing

1. Test In April 19€4

Shortly after his defection, NOSENKO agreed to undergo a

polygraph examiration which tre ClA handlers had cold him was a

routine part of liis defector processing.

He was informed on

3 april 1964 that the test would te administered the following

morning, and that it was therefore advisable for hua to get a

good night's rest and to refrain from alcorolic leverages.

NOS-

ENKo drank heavily on the night of 3 hor:l, did not enter.

bedroom until 0:00 hours on 4 horal.

and following breakfast at

0730 nours on 4 April consumed several gin-and-tories.

quently, wren NosaiKo thought he was not being observed, he was

seen to remove nis hand from his lips hurriedly.*

Followirg a medical examiration by a physicia: "ho noted

that NOSENKO had been drinking, he has irtroduceà to the cIA

polygraph operator.

An experierced interroga-or, Ellent in the

this polygapn operator conducies the test in

Russian from 1045 to 1515 hours on 4 doril. His report is quoted

"The question of Subject's (NOSEiKO'sl willingness to par-

ticipate in the polygraph test das one of minor corsideration,

since he had, on previous occasions; agreed that he would take

the test.

rowever, whether Subject wouid contirie with the

polygrapin testing if confronted with atsempted deception after

an Initial test run, was one of the considered problems.

sequently, in order to preclude the possibility of Subject's

terminating the test prior to its completion. it was decided

that a minor deviation from the accepted polygraph technique

would be used during the polygragh testig: specifically, to

Insure that a polygraphic recoid of Subject's reactions to all

the pertirent questions be obtained prior to challenging him on

any significart poiygraphic decepilor. irdicatiors his charts

might reflect...

This plan was folloried throsghout the poly-

graph intervien...

• On 18 May 1964 a report was received on the chemical analysis

of six types of tablets which had been taken frch NOSENKO'S

personal

In this report, a CIA chemical expert made

the following remarks based on chemical, microscopic,

and in-

strumental analysis including the use of X-ray:

"Sample No.

4238 consisted of three (3) gray tablets wrapped in a piece

of paper with the name

'Phenomin' written in Russian.

МістО-

scopic analysis of these tablets established the presence of

-a small amount of dl-amphetamine sulfate,

a large amount of

lactose, and a small amount of corn starch; al-aphetamine is

a sympathomimete agent employed mainly as a central nervous

system stimulart.

The effect of taking amphetamine as a drug

in conjunction with a polygraph test could exaggerate decep-

tion responses especially

for a weak reactor.

No phenothi-

azine la tranquilizer!

the active ingredient in

'Pheromin' was present in these tablets.

The tablets do not

appear to be of U.S. manufacture. ...As a result of the above

examinations it was established that none

of the items sub-

mitted are of the barbiturate family.

Although either

sul-

faguanidine (Sample No. 4242) or aspirin (Sample No. 4240)

could be used (and indeed have been used) as secret ink, they

are also rormal medicinals which a traveler might carry, and

thore da nothire ir the formlation of the tablets to suadest

---

## Page 32

14-00000

Ranchel

633.

"Although the subject had used both alcohol and some unknown

drug prior to testirg.

question, based both on analysis

of Subject's polygraph charts as well as personal observation dur-

ing the interview, that Subject has atterpted deliberate deception

In the specific pertinert areas which are mentioned below in this

repoit.

"It is (my) conclusion trat Subject is not a bona fide defector,

but is a dispatched agent sent by Soviet Inteliigence

for a spe-

cific mission or missions.

"According to the pian, the differert phases involving various

pertinent areas were covered wish subject polygraprically.

lenge uf subject's reacticas nas indirect and

sion dia Subject even attenpi so volunteer ary explanation of the

possible

for his polygraph reactions.

He continually denied

and

refused to admit that there was anyching to any of the questions

which were asked of him.

when the final test questions were con-

pleted and a record has obtained of all of subject's polygraphic

responses, the nature of the challenge und probing was changed.

"Subject was told that he was lying to numerous pertinent ques-

and was accused of beirg

a dispatched agent.

Subject's only

explaration to (sy) direct accusazion was that he

could not be a

dispatched agent because

of the arount of information he nad volun

teered to American Intelligence.

"Subject, who before and throughout testing reflected com-

plete self-control and composure, •ow exhibited a completely dif-

ferent picture.

His composure was non-existent, his eyes watered,

and his hands trentles.

Prior to being confronted with

thar subiect was a dispatched agent, when Subject was askec on

one of the

last test runs (à) If he

were sent to penetrate Ameri-

can Intelligence and

(b) if Subject received instructions from KGB

on how to attempt to beat the polygraph, his answers were given

in a voice that actually trenbied...

"Listed below are all of the questions asked of Subject.

"Series il:

here you borr ir the Soviet Urion? Yes.

(No reaction)

Wese you born in the city of Nikolayer? Yes. (No reaction)

Were you born on 30 October 1927? Yes. (No reaction)

id you deliberately give any kind of misinfornation wher

you told us your

autobiography? No.

(Reaction)

Is NOSENKO the surname which you had at tire of birth?

Yes. (Reaction)

my is the one dant the rue done test

may discover

(No reaction)

Was your father the Minister of Shipbuidling? Yes.

(No reaction)

---

## Page 33

14-00000

NOP SCORET

634.

were you a member of the Commurist Party before 1956? No.

(No reactior.)

(Subject stated that he applied for candidacy to the Commu-

nist Party in 1956, and in mid-1957 was accepted as a menber.)

Die you deliberately give any misinformation about your work

ard service ir. the

KGB?

No. (No reaction)

Besides your children, is there anything in your life on

the basis of which

someone may blackrail you? No. INO IA-

action)

(Subject stated that his love for his children was the only

thing that is of any corsequence which the Soviets might use

for blackmail purposes.

However, Subject said he was not

worried, because reyardless of tireats against the welfare

of his childrer:, he would not allow hinself to be black-

mailed or controlled.)

Have you ever engaged in any honosexial activity? No.

(Reaction)

Did you give deliberate misinformation about your education?

(No reaction)

Did you ever commit a major crime? No. (No reaction)

Did you give deliberate misinformation about your military

service?

No.

(No reaction)

"Series 12:

Did you establish contact with American Intelligence in Geneva

in 1962? Yes.

(No reaction)

id you establish contact with American Intelligence il

Geneva in January 1964?

Yes. (No reaction

Did you voluntarily defect to the Americans? Yes. (No

reaction)

ne ya ask cos the o ret of political asylum from the

(No reaction)

Here you sent to the Americans by the organs of Soviet

Intelligence (with a special mission)? No.

(Reaction)

Do you have a sincere desire to fight against the KGB and

all other punitive organs

of the Soviet Union?

reaction)

Did you establish

contact with American Intelligence on

orders of the KGB?

(Reaction)

Did anyone know of your intention to defect to the Americans?

No.

(No reaction)

Does the KGB have a pre-arranged signal for establishing

contact with you In America?

(Reaction)

---

## Page 34

14-00000

• jur SECRET

635.

Do you have a pre-arranged signal for establishing contact

with Soilet Intelligence?

No.

(No recition)

Do you tiave

a corcrete plan

to return to the Soviet Union

sometine in the future?

(Reaction)

Are you performing a special mission for Soviet Intelligence

In connection with your defection?

No.

(Reaction)

Are you deliberately hiding penetrations made by Soviet

agents into American Intelligence about which you are

aware?

No. (Reaction)

Are you witting of other recruitments made by Soviet Intel-

ligence of American Embassy personnel which occurred after

RHODES and 'ANDREY'? No.

(No reaction)

Are you an agent of the KGB or other Soviet Intelligence

organs?

(No reaction)

Was thee any pre-arranged signal included in the letters

you wrote to your wife (since your defection)? No.

(No reaction)

"Series t3:

Did you defect to the Americans in 1964? Yes. (No reaction)

Did you defect to the Americans in Geneva? Yes. (No re-

action)

Did you defect to the Americans with the assignment of un-

covering plans of American Intelligence against USSR?. No.

(Reaction)

• Did you defect to the Americans with the assignment to find

out more about the structure and methods of operation of

American Intelligence?

(Reaction)

Did you defect to the Americans with the aim of penetrating

American Intelligence?

No.

(Reaction)

Did you defect to the Americans because you were dissatis-

fied with the Soviet system?

(Reaction)

Did you defect to the Americans with the aim of discredit-

ing Soviet officers of the KGB who defected earlier?

(No reaction)

Did you defect to the Americans with the aim of giving mis-

information about Soviet'iagents'-penetration-of_American

Intelligence?

No.

(No reaction)

"Series 14:

Did you hide anything from American Intelligence about your

trip to Geneva in 1962?

No.

(No reaction)

Did you hide anything from

American Intelligence about your

trip to Geneva in 1964%

(No reaction)

---

## Page 35

14-00000

jUr SECRET

636.

Did you hide anything from Anerican Intelligence about your

trip to cuba

in 1960?

(Reaction)

Did you hide anything

trip to London in 1957% a American Intelligence about your

(No reaction)

Preo done mining eric Intelligence about your

trip to London

Did you personally participate in the search for CHEREPANOV

in December 1953?

(Reaction)

* it true that KOVsHUx visited the United States in 19572

(Reaction)

Did GRIBANOV visit Switzerland in 1962? No. (No reaction)

To your knowledge, did GRIBANOV visit Switzerlard in 1964?

No.

(No reaction)

Was GUK in Switzerland in 1964? Yes. (No reaction)

"Series 15:

Did you work for Soviet Intelligence in 1962? Yes. (No

reaction)

Did you work for Soviet Intelligence in 1964? Yes. (No

reaction)

Did you tell us the truth about Lee Harvey OSWALD? Yes.

(No reaction)

Did you tell us the truth about Yuri KROTKOV? Yes.

(Reaction)

Kere the CHEREPANOV papers especially prepared and passed

to the Americans by the KGB? No.

note out see a deerican capesentatives

in Paris?

Yes. (Reaction)

Did you bring with you personal identity documents which

yere fabricated by KGB?

(Reaction)

Did you give truthful information about the structure of

the first

ard

Second Chief Directorates of the KGB?

Yes.

(No reaction)

Are you misinforming American Intelligence according to a

specially developed-KGB-plan?_No.-

-(No-reaction).

Is it true that AGAYANTS is the Chief of Department D (Dis-

information)?

Yes. (Reaction)

To your knowledge,

was PEDOSEYEV the Chief of the American

Department of the

Second Chief Directorate in 1963 and 1964?

(Reaction)

---

## Page 36

14-00000

-

TOP SECRET

637.

*Series 16:

Did you drink more than you told me? No. (Reaction)

(Subject admitted to having only one gin and tonic prior

to testing.)

Did yoü know that American

Intelligence uses the polygraph?

Yes.

(No reaction)

Did anyone in the Soviet Union explain to you anything about

American Intelligence's use of the polygraph.

reaction)

Do yony ne a the reaceplan anything about the polygraph

No. (No reaction)

During the last twenty-four hours, did you take any medi-

cine or pills?

(Reactior.)

Did you receive instructions from the KGB on how to attempt

to beat the polygraph? No.

(Reaction)

Were you ever hypnotized by anyone? No. ¡No reaction)

Did you bring any types of medicine of pills with you (from

abroad or from the Soviet Union)? No.

(Reaction)

Do you have any pills of medicine about which you have not

told me?

(Reaction)

"Although Subject later admitted that he had two types of

pills with him which he brought from Moscow and which (werel

in his portfolio, he declined to adrit that he had had more liquor

than he told (mel, that he had received specific instruc=

tions about the polygraph from the KGB, or that he had taken any

type of pills during the last twenty-four hours."

...

---

## Page 37

14-00000

üniailini

638.

2. Test In October 1965 on Lee Harvey OSWALD

a. Introduction

CIA conducted i

polygraph examination of NOSENXO on

18 October 1956 on

ise subject of Lee Harvey OSWALD.*

Since the previous polygraph test in April 1964, NOSENKO

had been under close security guard, his novenents restricted,

and in the interin had been interrogated in detail and accused

of bad faith in dealing with U.S. Government authorities.

NOSENKO had not been

interviewed by ClA during the six nonths

prior to October 1966.

He had had no access to alcohol or

drugs, his food consumption had been normal, ard his sleep

had been adequate.

NOSENKO was given no advance notice of the polygraph

examination.

Upon entering the room where it was to take

place, he immediately recognized the officer present as the

person who administered the first CIA polygraph test two and

one-half years earlier.

NOSENKO correctly

said that they had

first met on 4 April 1964.

In the pre-test interview, questions on the OSWALD case

were put to NOSENKO in Russian, his answers (also in Rusylan)

were recorded, the operation of the machine was explained,

and clarifications of the questions ard his answers were

nade.

series of questions pertaining to the OSWALD

case are given below in their entirety,

and they are followed

by the conclusions of the polygraph expert.

bo: Resulte

"Series No. 1

I. Was Lee Harvey OSWALD ever in the Sovlet Union?

Alswer: Yes. (No reaction)

2. Was OSWALD in the Soviet Union from 1959 to 1961?

Answer: Yes. (No reaction)

3.

Did you receive special instructions about what to

tell the Anericans about the OSHALD case:

Answer: No. (Reaction)

4. Did you personally neet OSWALD?

Angwer: No. (No reaction)

5. Mas ÖSWALD recruited by KGB as an agent?

Answer: No. (No reaction)

6. Were you glad that President Kennedy was killed?

Answer: No. (Reaction)

т.

Other than what you told me, did you'actively parti-

cipate in the OSWALD case prior to 1963?

Answer: No. (No reaction)

r.CRIATA

---

## Page 38

14-00000

TOP SECRET

639.

3. Did you see a photograph of OSWALD in 1963?

Answer: Yes. (Reaction)

9. Was Marina PRUSAKOVA an agent of KGB?

Answer: No. (No reaction)

98. Before her marriage to OSWALD?

Answer: No. (Reaction)

9b. After her marriage to USAiD?

Answer: No. (No reaction)

10. Did you personally meet Marina PRUSAKOVA?

Answer: No. (No reaction)

11.

Did OSWALD have ary kind of contact with the 13tt

Otdel of the First Chief Directoratei

Answer: No. (No reaction)

12. Did KGB prepare OSWALD for committing assassinations?

Answer: No. (No reaction)

13.

Was OSWALD prepared (trained) by KGB to kill President

Kennedy?

Answer: No. (No reaction)

24.* Did you hear of OSWALD (case) prior to Presidenl

Kennedy's assassination?

Answer: Yes. (Reaction)

"Subject's (NOSENKO'S) most significant reactions on

this test series were to quescions 3 and 24--other reactions

and desser significance were evident to questions 6, B, 9a,

"Series No. 2

20. Is the name OSWALD familiar to you?

Answer: Yes. (No reaction)

21. Did you ever read the OSWALD case?

Answer: Yes. (No reaction)

22. Was this the full and official KGB case on OSWALD?

Answer: Yes. (Reaction)

23.

Did you give us any kind of information about

OSHALD?

Anster: Yes. (No reaction)

*Before the beginning of the exanination, the polygraph operator

.. %.

---

## Page 39

14-00000

.. ...-.

TOP SEGRET

640.

24. Did you hear of the OStiALD (casel prior to President

Kennedy's assassination?

Answer: Yes. (Reaction)

24a. Did you hear of the OSWALD (case) only after President

Kennedy's death?

nawer: Irstead of the usual yes or no answer

Subjest

answered:

Before and after

When the question was repeated, he again

ansvered:

'Eefore and after.' Only when

sure reached these one o

(Reaction)

'Before ard

25. Did the KGB consider OSWAiD abnormal?

Answer: Yes. (No reaction)

did Marina OSWALD know about her

Answer: No. (No reaction)

27. To your knowledge did OsrAld talk with a kgb officer

in Mexico?

Answer: No. (No reaction)

28. Did OSWALD return to the United States in 1961?

Anster: Yes.

(No reaction)

Subject's reaction

to this question

was inconsistent when he

answered

'Yes: ' hence the (No reaction)

notation.

However, It is noeworthy that

Subject did not attempt to correct the

date of OSWALD's departure to the U.S.:

OSWALD returned to the U.S, in june 1962

and not in 1961.

29. Legend conta storth the oslAla case part of your

Answer: No. (Reaction)

30. Did you really take part in the OSWALD case in 1959?

Answer: Yes. (Reaction)

"Subject's most significant reactions were to questions

22, 24, 242. 29 and 30.

"Series No. 3

•.•..

---

## Page 40

19000

...

TOP SECRET

641.

16. Did you personally order RASTRUSIN, 1n 1959, to

collect material or 'ISNALD?

Answer: YeB. (RiFetIOD)

18. Did you personally talk on the V. Ch.. with sirsk

about the OSWALD case 1o 1963?

AnEwer: Yes. (Reaction)

17.

Here you instructed on the OSWALD case by one ol

the KGB operational officers?

Answer: No. (Reaction)

17a. Did the KGB instruct you to tell us OSWALD was

a bad shot?

Answer: No. (No reaction)

18.

Do you know definitely that OSWALD was not of opera-

innal interest to KGBi

Answer: Yes. (Reaction).

8c. Did KGB give the OSwAlds ajy bind of help in thei

departure from the Soviet Unioni

Answer! No. (No reaction)

38.

Did you receive special instructions from the KGB

about what to tell the Americans about OSFAWD?

Anster: No. (Reaction)

'Subject's reactions to the questlons so indicated.

ere about equal in consistency and significance.

opinion that:

subject was not personally or actually

Involved in the OSHALD case from 1959 to 1961 shile

OSWALD was in the Soviet Unlos.

b. Subject heard of OSWALD only after Kennedy's

assassination; however, he was not an actire partici-

pant in 1963 as he indicates, but was probably

briefed on the case by a kGB officer.

Subject-received special instructions

(fron tbe KGB) about the OSWALD case and what to

tell Anerican authorities about it."

TAD SEPRET

---

## Page 41

4-00000

642.

VII!. NOSENKO'S BONA PIDES: ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

do Introduction

It is standard procedure to assess the bona fides of each

intelligence and counterirtelligence source, and special care is

required in assessing sources of inforation relevant to the secu-

Ore difficulty in doing so with a Soviet source 1s that

Soviet realities, particularly in the KGB, are imperfectly known:

Except where independent informatic. is available,

it is risky to

say ard impossible to prove what the Soviets--most notably the

KB--would or would not do in any given situation, or what any

given KGB officer should or should not know. Independent informa-

voluminous ir. quantity although never comprehensive and

entirely current., nevertheless has been assimilated fron the re-

ports of the several KGB staff ufficers who have defected, from

the KGB agents who have coniessed, and from the Western services

which nave investigated KGB activities.

There 1s.

therefore,

base of reliable knowledge upon which to predicate an assessment

of a source reporting on the KG3, even one who principally covers

a KGB component lin this instance the Second Chief Directorate)

upon which there previously had been relatively little inside

inforration.

Moreover.

in the absence of direct evidence from

other sources, it would be arbitarily confining if an assumption

dere not made

that certain KGB stardards are at least comparable

to those of Western services.

such prior knowledge and, to a

such an assumption are factors in the assessment

of Yurly Ivanovich NOSENKO that 1s submitted here.

A much more prominent factor in this assessment, however,

is NOSENKO's own testimonY:

CIA has exhaustively debriefed and

interrogated NOSENKO, his leads were checked, his information was

studied, and a large body of facts pertinent to his bona fides

These details, as well as direct evidence

from other sources and the views of specialists affiliated with

have been presented in Part IIi. through. Part VII. of this

paper.

The basic questions with reçard to the bona fides of

NOSENKO are the following:

- Is there reason to question the general accuracy

sill completeness of NOSENKO's accounts of his situation

and motivations in contactirg CIA and later defecting,

his personal life, military service, positions in the

KGB, personal participation in KGB operations, know-

ledgeabidity

about KGB

activities and the way he learned

of then, and his associations with KGB personnel?

- If there are grounds for doubting the general

accuracy and completeness of these accounts, then what

are the explanations for NOSENKO's actions,

nature of the information he has provided, and for

other Soviet sources having authenticated his personal

life and KGB career?

In assessing the bona fides of NOSEVKO, the classic method

has been used: evaluating his production and sourcirg, examining

his autobiography, and appraisirg him and the circumstances of

this operation.

These points, "it? the conclusions drawn from

each, are reviered belor.

The ciscussion continues with a survey

of the sources who have corroborated NOSENKO'S background and

status, and this is followed by argurertations on the various

hypotheses which could explain NOSEVKO as a source.

The final

portion is a summary of conclusions about NOSENKO's bona fides.

---

## Page 42

14-00000

.....

TOP SECRET

643.

B. Evaluation of Production

1. Introduction

What a Soviet source reports 18 one factor in assessing his

good falth.

Rarely, rodever, can it be conclusive:

and conscientious source may

be poorly irforme' or misinformed; he

may be hampered by forgetfulness, mental shortcumings, or lack of

education; his reporting may be incomplete because he

1s not avail-

able long

enough to permit amplification and clarification of his

On the other hand, a Soviet-controlled agent who 18

planted on the opposition may be supplied with useful, voluminous,

and accurate infomation.

There are several standards which may be applied to the assess-

ment of a source's production.

Each of them is qualified; none 19

likely to be conclusive by itsell; and ali of them tugether may rot

permit a definite conclusion, although they do contribute to a

broader assessmert of bona fides.

Mie standards are:

First, how does the information equate, in terms of complete-

ness, accuracy, and detail, with the source's claimed or proven

position and access to information?

(In this, one judges the in-

ternal consistency of the source's reporting

and also compares it

with information from other sourses and iron investigations.)

Second, does the information harm the opposition? (This point

is risky to judge.

a geruine source may simply not know any-

thing harmful to

Aiso, information which seems harm-

ful to the USSR may not actually be such in Soviet eyes; for ex-

the loss of

an apparently valuable agent could be mitigated

by the KGB's possession of better or comparable assets still un-

exposed.)

Third, 1s the information important or useful to us?

point may in some cases te irrelevant, for information useful to

us may not harm the opposition, ard the apparent usefulness of in-

formation may not balance against the tine and effort required to

process and investigate it.)

These standa.ds have been applied in evaluating the production -

of NOSENKO on the topics discussed below..

NOSENKO's production is exclusively in the field of courter-

intelligence information.

As described in Part VI.A., he did not

have any useful positive irtelligence.

This does not

necessarily

affect the question of his bona fides.

horever, for NCSENKO claims

to have been a KGB internal counterintelligence officer.

comparative standpoint, not one of the previous KGB officers who

defected to Western services has produced significant military.

economic, or scientific information on the USSR, and

saly a few

have supplied political intormation (usually concerned with the

personalities and relationships in the ruling group of the commu-

nist Party).

Therefore,

nothing of_positive_intelligerce_conse-

quence is expected of NOSENKO,

altrough some question might be

raised about his irability to report on the leadership of the

Soviet regime in view of his father's position and NOSENKO'g

continuing contacts with the leadership after his father's death.

The failure of NOSENKO to respond to questionnaires along posi-

tive intelligence lines is not considered unusual.

---

## Page 43

14-00000

inó üluncl

644.

NOSENKO's counterintelligence production includes all of his

Information on the Soviet intelligence and security organs:

- their structure, functions, methoss, ard procedures;

- their officers and their agents of soviet citizenships

- their operational activities inside and outside the

USSR.

For the sost part this portion of the paper las in Part VIII.C.

through Part VIII.P.) foilors a format in which

the evidence

summarized, the facts interpreted, and conclusiors presented.

2. XSB Orgenization, Persoralities, Methods

Ability to discuss the structure of his service in general

and at least same of its couponents in particular 1s an absolutely

minimal requirement for anyone who clains to have

beer. exployed

within that seriice.

At the same time, current inforration

organization of an

service is of classic interest to

opposirg intelliger.ce ard security services.. Organizational

changes are irdicators of policy and planning trends in the ser-

vice; short of a penetration of the service's leadership, such

changes are perhaps tre

most reliable reflection of changes in

operational exphasis and tactics.

Had NOSENKO's information on the organization of the KGB

been novel in this sense, it would have been of corsiderable

value, while the exposure of this intomation--although perhaps

riot a

major loss to the Soviets--would nonetheless nave been

against the KGb's best interests.

RiOSENKO's reports on

the

organization of the. KGB in 1964

(Pages 352-358)

agree with and

are a logical extersion of that framerork of KGB organization

newly revealed by the 1961 sources.

but this weighs reither for

nor against him as the source:

In the absence of contradictory

information, he cannot be subject to criticism or to suspicion

becaise his reports

show no redirection of the thrust of the

KGB.

Furtnermore, NOSEKO's staterents indicating that there

have been no major changes in the

years between the 1959 re-

organization and 1964 are asseptabie in the light of available

information from other sources.

rhe information which nostro

provided on

the KGB's organization therefore neither supports

nor discredits his bona fides.

NOSENKO's information oi some 1,000 Soviets connected with

Intelligence and security activities

is an impressive achieve-

ment of memory.

These identifications, however.

must be evalu-

ated according to the damage inflicted upon the Soviets by his

exposure of these personalities.

In this respect, the discus-

sion must concern ned identifications, for intelligence person-

alities previously exposed could not be danaged any further by

a repetition of their compromise.

This discussion must be fur-

ther restricted to new identificationg of staff persowel, be-

cause

the entire soviet population is available to the KGB for

occasional use

as it

sees fit, with the loyalty and discretion

of the individual as the only limiting factors; to learn that a

Soviet employed at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow is an agent re-

porting to the KCB is to learn nothing that has not already

been taken

for granted, and besides,

no action or such infor-

mation can be taken.

Finally, the new identifications also

---

## Page 44

14-00000

for anurel

645.

must be arong persons dho are Identifiable and arcessible, or tre

Information la uselesg to Westerr. services ari 15 to losE

this tests, only KGB First Chief i:rectcrate as well

as GRU identificationg merit inclusion ir this reluation. since

thege are the officers who normally appear abroad and participate

1r. agent operations.

Although Koy second Chiel Directorate per-

cor.el have in the past transferred to the First Chief Directorate,

this 19 5o% a predictable evert and canrot be considered in dis-

cussion of current damage.

NOSEXO idertified 165 First Chief Directorate personnel, but

li.Io, were identifiable by

namel, the remaining 16 names fron NOSEYKO were valueless as they

of the 149, thore were 37 Who were not known

or

suspected as intelligence ufficers prior tu tre reccipt of NoStiko's

there were i4 who esther resided abroad at

the

_time of Nosinio's defection or vere sone abroad since that tiine.*

I assuming that NUSDiKO was correct in his ivertifications of all

accessible," it cannot be said

that the nurver is so large that the janage to kub agert opera-

done of instiko's uniau: lizU ideriifica-

it the tire of his defeation r have been since.

These personality identifications hence du rot serve as evidence

Àt tre sate tine, ris irability to do

further measurable tarm to the ked ir. this rsgard cannot be held

for he has claired service only in the Second

throughout his career and so cannot be expected

to krow a high percentage

of the First Chief MIcctorate comple-

ment.

Trerefore.

HOSENKo's intelligence personality Identifications

do not constitute a factor in finding for or açainst his bona fides.

NOSEiKO has been the source of any interesting details and

examples of KGB noius operardi (Pages 359-340), but while useful

for illistrative purposes and valuable because of the fact that

the material nas easily coliatable for study purposes, none of

the methods described could be corsidered

ned and revealing, and

their exposure in any

event would rot prevent their cortinued use

in the future.

POSENKO's discussior. of tre orly double agent case

in which he claimed to have played a role, however, demonstrates

his lack of knowledge of

the

principles and pürposes of such an

operation.

This case, PELIISHlY, is a

subjest of

senarate

sensilive sources

trese 24, ter were identified by

as KGB

Chand thersaiter, and two becane pro-trently

active in

insecure KGB operations shortly after NOSENKO identifled them.

**Other evidence tas contradicted staterents by NOSENKO to

effect that certain Soviets

were not affiliated with the KGB;

in Geneva, for example, ¿here

he had daily access to the KGB

Legal Residency for ronths and claired nearly complete know-

ledge of KGB personnel, he ramed 15 of a KS3 staff which he

said totalled at the most 18; CIA identifications of KGB offi-

cers in Geneva on the basis

of other sources, investigations

and analysis totalled at

least double this number ard probably

triple, as many as 55 of the approximately 120 Soviets station-

ed there la proportion which is consistent with other areas

and defectors' estimates). NOSENKO was not entirely accurate

KGB officers on his own delegation in Geneva.

as noted on Pages 12 and

Therefore, the accuracy of

NOSEIKO's original idertifications, positive or negative.

cannot be accepted without question.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 45

14-00000

TOP SECRET

646.

discussion below. This subject, tuo, must be corsidered neutral

evidence in the bona fides assessment.

NOSENKD has shown himself to be both uninformed and inaccurate

in his answers to questions on KGB Headquarters staff procedures

(Page 360 and Pages 619-624).

He has been unabie to

contribute

any new information, although there has been no detailed repsiting

on the subject since

material on procedures but was never comprehensively debriefed on

(GOLITSYN in 1962 provided some rew

the topic.)

Thus, information on thr more up-to-date forms, co-

ordination requirements, mechanization of records and tracing

mechanisms, etc., could have been a singular contribution

to our

knowledge; NOSENKO could not describe anything of this

sort.

when

he replied to questions about such matters for the period

covering

his entry into the KGB, on which orevious

reporting is available

in detail, he answered incorrectly on numerous points.

NOSENKO 's

tendency

to improvise

when he did not know the correct answer or

when he had forgotten has been characterized by a CIA psychologist

as the behavior of a pathological liar saviny face in a tight

psychological situation.

when re could not produce a correct

answer in this area of reporting, NOSENKO may have improvised

I because he is a liar or because he is concealing an

ignorance

(based on not having been a KGB Headquarters officer.

3. Operational Leads

a. Introduction

Consideration of NOSENKO's operational leads must take into

account the KGB positions and personal associations (with attendant

access to informarion) which NoStrO has claimed for himself.

Indicated lial the breadth of hig knonledge about KGB agent opera-

tions and development cases increased as he rose from case officer

in the U.S. Embassy Section

in 1953-1955 and in the Arerican lourist

Section in 1955-1958 to become Deputy Chies of the latter section

in 1958-1959, Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section in 1960-1961,

and finally Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department from 1962 until

his defection.

Simultaneously he established lasting contacts with

his KGB colleagues so that, for example, even after leaving the

U.S. Embassy Section for the second time, in December 1961, NOSENKO

kept abreast of its most important activities.

On these grounds

NOSENKO presented himself as

an authoritative source, one who

could detail the

successes and failures of the KGB in recruiting

Westerners--especially Americans--in the USSR over the years from

1953 through 1963.

Repeatedly NOSENKO asserted that his leads to

KGB agents constituted proof of his bona fides.

b. Operations Involving Americars

NOSENY drew a picture of the recruitment scene in Moscow

showing that:

- Since the "ANDREY" case of the early 1950's* the KGB

recruited no Americans on the U.S. Embassy staff, succeed-

ing only in recruiting one contract employee who was in

NOSINKO reported on recruitment approaches

to six American officials stationed

in Moscoh, all of whom

1n aarly 190l.

Hool. 10o9860 W.

T:e90T08 88.0000cr8s8000ym

"ANÜKEY") dald lie boxullo a Kill ayoll 11 NOVellér or December

19530

TAD prnn...

---

## Page 46

14-00000

TOP SECRET

69т.

refused to collaborate with the kig. lie discussed 14 de:elop-

ment cases which never culmiratud in recruitment approaches

to these U.S. Goverrmert enployees in rossor, and he named

11 officials

at the Moscow Enbassy wis were Investigated bi

the KGB.

Inese operations, MUSEWO asserted, comprised ete

total KGB dctivity against Embassy personnel

with the ex-

ception of tire techrical penetratioes (sce Part VIII. B.4.%.

- Seven incrican correspondents in Moscow nad been re-

cruited ly the KGB, four of them knüm to NOSEiko fron the

years 1953-1954 when he was working against U.s. newspaper-

Arother two were under development by the KGB during

triat period.

- The Frerican Express Company representative in Moscow.

FIsene FRIFPEL, had become a KGB agent in 1959; NOSENKO was

the case officer.

- The rumber of American visitors recruited by the KG3

in 1962-1963 was 14, and if there had been others, NOSENKO

would have known about them in light of his senior position

in the Tourist Department during that period.

Moreover.

for

the jears before 1962, NOSF'KO provided leads to 19 other

Imerican tourists whom the KGB recruitea, plus ore who was

serving the GRU when he came to Moscow.

MOSENKO also de-

scribed 18 development cases ard nine

irvestigations in

which the targets were American tourists.

As for KGB operations outside tre Soviet Union, NOSENKO gave leaás

to four recruited Americars about whom he learned through corver-

sations with KGB associates:

a U.S.

intelligerce officer having

the XGB cryptonym "SASHA" (stall unidentified), a penstration of

Orly Courier Transfer Station (idertified as Sergeant Robert Lee

JOHNSCi).

and two

agents in Ger.eva (naines rot given and as yet ret

positively identified):

NOSENKO leagred of the kos agent status

of Horace G. LUNT] an

imerican professur, because he tock part in

(LUNT's recruitment while on Tax ir

Sofia, and of the fatal

Let Ready are bear not a Angrue tourist with ano

an American tourist with whose

case NOSEiKO was personally involved.

In addition, NOSEYKO de-

scribed two development cases with U,S, citizens.

Fron his know-

ledge of the "SASHA" operation, NOSENKO also knew that the KGB

had no ager.t sources able to supply irformation concerning the

Cuban missile crisis of October 1962.

(i) Completeness, Accuracy Detail and Consistency of Reporting

If he occupied the various KGB positions as claimed, if his

access were as broad as he said it was, NOSENKO has provided a

co..prehensite. review of KGB operations involving Americans in

the USSR.

Other information, towever, contradicts NOSENKO's assurances

on all major

cases involving Americans working

at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow:

- GOLITSYN's reports indicate that a U.S. military code

clerk was recruited in 1960.

and other factors point toward

this person being Janes STORSBERG or possibly willian HURLEY

(Pages 166-182).

NOSaiKO, the supervisor of operations

against Embassy code clerks in 1960-1961, stated that

---

## Page 47

#4.00000

¡Ur SECRET,

648.

STORSBERG rejected the recruitment approach, and when inter-

vieved on the basis of the NOSENKO lead, STORSBERG confirmed

this.

Both agree the approsch was made in the latter part

of 1961.

- GOLITSYN's reports cover six other operations (Pages

595-5981 wrich NOSEiKO has rot mentioned:

The KGS's recruit-

ment of a female employee at the Enbassy in 1957, the pre-

sence of a code clerk in the ambassy in 1960 who was a Kes

agent, an unsuccessful recruitment approach to a female sec-

retary at the Enbassy prior to July 1960, the KGB plan to

complete the recruitment of an anericar diplomat following

his reassignment from Moscow in 1959, the KGB's recruitmert

of or planned recruitmert approach to a U.S. Embassy employee

(possibly a coie clerk) prior to April/May 1960, and a KGB

officer's trip to Helsinki to accompany ar. Embassy code clerk

travelling by train to Moscow.

(There

15

documentary evi-

dence to support the accuracy of GOLITSYN's statements about

the last of these cases; see beiow.)

On the basis of available information, NOSENKO cannot be

faulted on the completeness of his reporting about American tour-

ists recruited, approached, and under development by the KGB, but

he could cite only one instance of KüB investigations uncovering

dispatched to the USSR by American Intelligence (Pages

He knew nothing concerring two documents of CIA origin

which described "legal travel" operations, one discussing forth-

coming tasks of American agents in the tourist season of 1959, a

Jeer10n. Which NOSENKO Has Deputy Chief of the American Tourte,

These docunents were placed in the hands of the KGB by

George BLAKE of MI-6 in July 1959 (before the end of the tourist

season) and in 1960: NOSENKO was not familiar with any aspects of

That the Tourist Department was

aware of U.s.

Intelligerce sendirg agents under tourist cover to

the Soviet Union in the years when lOSINKO was Deputy Chief of

the American Tourist Section is denorstrable by four cases of

1958 and 1959 cited in'a KGB document supplied by GOLITSYN. NOS-

EriKo, although having no information on KGB countermeasures

against Anerican tourists in 1958 and 1959, knew that the docu-

ment had been passed to CIA by GOLITSYN and that it had been

written in the Tourist Department.

where NOSENKO's reporting

on American tourist cases is checkable, therefore, it has beer.

found to be incomplete.

* NOSENKO reported that of nine other tourists investigated by

the KGB, eight were suspected of having current connectiors

with American Intelligence.

The KGB was correct with regard

to Thomas BARTHELEMY and Robert GiRISINER, who were on CIA

missions, and Alfred SLESINGER, an FBI informant who neverthe-

less had

no American Irtelligence mission when he visited the

USSR

in 1961 and 1962.

Frederick BARCHOOR!, arrested in the

USSR in 1963; had been affiliated with U,S. military intelli-

gence many years before, and Ray GARTHOFF had severed his

association with CIA as an overt employee before he went to

Moscow in 1963.

Concerning the rest reportedly suspected by

the KGB--Donald ALBINGER, Bernard KOTEN, and Gabriel REINER--

none was associated with American Intelligence in any way.

---

## Page 48

14-00000

100 SLUB:

649.

NOSENKO '8 reporting on individual cases wherein he was a per-

sonal participant or supervisor is not, with few exceptions, con-

tradicted by information available from other sources.

Nearly all

of his statements have proven accurate when they could be compared

with collateral information:

In fact, the imericans whom he cited

did visit or live in the Soviet Union, and many of them are known

to have been of operational interest to the KGB, as NOSENKO said.

The exceptions to his general accuracy of reporting, however, are

of major importance in themselves and in reference

to his claimed

positiong in the U.S. Embassy. Section during 1960-1961:*

NOSENKO

Collateral

U.S. Embasay Security Officer

John V. ABIDIAN, for whoM NOSENKO

was the responsible KGB officer.

visited the Pushkin Street dead

drop site in 1960 or at the begin-

ning of 1961.

Later that same

day KOZLOV, Chief of the KGB SUr-

veillance Directoratel went to the

SCene.

Tered ol

Cia records on the PEKoVSKIy

case, in which the Pushkin

Street dead drop was used,

show

that ABIDIAN visited the site

only once, on 30 December 1961

at 1130 hours.

KOZOV left New

York City on the game day,

travelling via France, at

the

completion of a TDY in the

United States.

(Pages 231-

2358 this subject is discussed

at greater length in Part

VIII. B. 6.)

Travel records show that KOSO-

LAPOV was twice in Helsinki

during 1960.

in March-April

and again in November. (Pages

186-200) •

KOSOLAPOV, NOSENKO's direct sub-

ordinate, made but one TDY to

Helsinki in the 1960-1961 period;

NOSENKO would Have known about if

not approved other TDY's in these

years wher. he was Deputy Chief of

the U.S. Embassy Section.

Returning from his single TDY to

Helsinki, KOSOLAPOV was abroad

train as his target, the

American military code clerk

JENNER: as supervisor of all oper-

stions against code clerks at the

U.S. Eribassy,

NOSENKO was familiar

with the details of all such major

activities.

The KGB knew that the U.S. mili-

tary code

clerk Janes KaYSERS,

whom NOSENKO personally contacted

In an effort to persuade him to

defect, did not report the earlier

recruitment approach by the KGB.

Travel records show that JENNER

and KOSOLIPOV travelled on

separate days. (Pages 186-200)

KEYSERS reported the recruitment

approach immediately after it

occurred.

and the report was

submitted in an Embassy room

later fourd to have a concealed

microphone. (NOSENKO stated that

he was a customer for microphone

intercepts at the time and that

this microphone was monitored on

& continuous basis by KGB per-

sonnel.) (Pages 213-219)

• An example of NOSENKO's inaccuracy on events during his later

related to his

arrest of American Professor Frederick BARGOORN:

approval for this KGB action in which he had a per-

was obtained from BREZINEV in KHRUSHCHEV's absence

from Moscow, and the arrest was made a few hours later; BARG-

HOORN was arrested on 31 October 1963, and on that day and the

day before KHRUSHCHEV made public appearances in Moscow. (BREZ-

NEV was not geen in Moscow between 29 October and 2 November

---

## Page 49

11.00000

iUr SECRET

650.:

In addition, a number of Americans--e.g., Walter RASK, Adam

BROCHES, Herry APISSON, Herbert HOlARD,

Vasiliy VOLKOV, william

WILLACE, Thomas Whitney, and Stanley ZIRING--denied having been

recruited by the KGB, as NOSENKO said they had been.

The only noteworthy internal inconsistencies in NOSEYKO's

reporting on KGB operations involving Americans appear in the

HARISTONE case, where he has given conflicting information on the

KGB's ability to obtain photographic evidence of his homosexuality,

and in his advice on how to identify "AIDREY"--that he was the only

witness to testify in Roy RieDaS'

trial and that he did not testify

at Roy RHODES! trial but was only interviewid in the pre-trial in-

vestigation once.

Part VIII.U. covers the extent of his knowledge

about American cases in which

he took part persorally or as a

supervisor.

Regarding others to which his official positions did

not give him access, NOSENKO has indicated that it was his per-

sonal

contact with KGB colleagues which

enabled him to report on

nine recruitments (Hersert HOWARD, Sam AFFE, the KGS agent in

France.

the YOUNGER couple, "SASHA"; and two unnamed agents in

Geneval, three development

cases (George VAN LAETHEM, Attorney

General Robert KENNEDY,

and Stephen HOFFMAN) : three unsuccessful

recruitment approaches (Richard HARNSTONE, Peter BINDER, and

Collette SCHWARZENBACi); and three investigations (Thomas BARTHE-

LEMY, LEWiS BO.IN, and George WINTERS) .

NOSEiNO's alleged asso-

ciates in the ngs thus gave him the names of four recruited agents

and sufficient details for one more to be identified by subsequent

investigation, JOiSON.

All of the NOSENKO leads to developmental

operations, unsuccessful recruitment approaches, and investigations

have been identified.

(11) Damage to the Soviets

Three criteria can be used in assessing the harm to Soviet

Interests caused by NOSENKO's operational leads to Americans:

First, the originality of nis information on recruited

agents and unsuccessful recruitment approaches;

Second, the agents' access to classified information

at the time

he reported on them; and

Ieceivad from other sources.

the pages balto or entifying chen net atala

There is no reason to believe that NOSENKO's information on 22

Americang under investigation while in the USSR could have damaged

the KGB, especially since all of them had left the Soviet Union

before the NOSENKO leads were received (Pages 402-410).

In an-

-other-category,-NOSANKO's leads. to.35.Americans under_development

(Pages 379-397), there is no means for evaluating their impor-

tance to the KGB because it is impossible to estimate with con-

fidence the likelihood of the KGB recruiting some or any of these

targets; vulnerability and assessment data, when coupled with

spasmodic of

even continuing KGB access to the target, would be

no guarantee

that he is recruitable.

Nevertheless,

following

the criteria listed above, NOSE.XO's statements on KGB operation-

al interest stemming from their homosexuality did bring about the

recall of Robert ARMSTRONG and Stephen HOFFMAN from the U.S.

Embassy in Moscow.

---

## Page 50

14-00000

it to te

TOP SEGRET

651.

NOSINKO was the first source to report on the KGS recruit-

ments of 22 tourists inone with access to classified materials

and on 11 of whom there was previous derogatory information):

four correspondents lone said by NOSiixO to have become inacti:e

and

on two

of whom there was previous derogatory informationi:

the American Express Company representative in Mossor; a contrari.

employee of USIA who had earlier declared his intent to marry a

Soviet national; and two agents whose names were not known to

NOSENKO but who were identifiable.

The latter two agents were:

- Doyle W. SMITH (KGB cryptonym "ANDREY"), a cipher

machine rechanic at the U.S. Embassy in doscow recruited in

ly supplying valuable information in June 1962. SMITH lost

his access to classifled information through retirement from

the U.S. Army on 30 November 1961, or about six months before

NOSENKO first reported on him (Pages 413-426).

- U.S. Army Sergeant Robert Lee JOHNSCH, who with his

wife Hedwig began collaborating with the KGB in 1952 and

who made James MINTKENBAUGH an agent of the KGB in 1953

(Pages 427-462).

Hedwig JOiNSUN discontinued her role in

the operation in 1953, although thereatter remaining know-

ledgeable of the KGB activities of her husband and MINTKEN-

BAUGH; according to MINTKENBAUGH, who lost access to classi-

fled information in 1954, he had no direct contact with the

KGB after the late summer or early autumn of 1953 (about

three to five months before NOSENKO first gave the lead on

JOHNSON) & JOHNSON was still on active duty with the U.s.

Army and in contact with the KGB when NOSEIKO reported in

January 1964 about the existence of this agent.

Thus from a total of 30 original and identifiable leads, only one

agent had access to classified information as of the date when

NOSENKO's reporting on him began.

By the criteria given in the

preceeding paragraph, the single

operational lead from NOSENKO

which_could have damaged Soviet interests was that which un-

covered JOHNSON.

It is debatable, however, whether the JOHNSO!! lead consti-

tuted a serious loss to the KGB.

In the first place.

if JOhNSON

can be believed, he gave the Soviets but one classified document

while in charge

of the "Classified Control Center" at Camp Des

Loges between August 1963 and May 1964.

His KGB case officer

later told him, JOHNSO: said, that the information he could pro-

vide was not worth the risk involved and that no future attempts

of this sort should be made.

JOHNSON also stated that he felt

his espionage work at Camp Des Loges had not been very profitable

for the Soviets,

adding that his case officer had shown dis-

interest in his proposal to obtain for the KGe a top secret

document he (JOHNSON) thought of greater importance than any

other to which he had access.

(NOSENKO indicated that JOHNSON

10st his

access in the spring of 1963, while at the orly courier

Transfer

Station.)

In the second place, as the KGB knew, the

behavior

of liedwig JOHNSON, a mental case, was unpredictable.

Finally,

the JOHNSON couple and MINTKENBAUGH repeatedly dis-

regarded the KGB's instructions to compartment their activitles

and to observe other routine security precautions.

seems to have avoided full exploitation of Joiso: in the latter

stages of the operation, to have been concerned over Hedwig's

mental condition as early as 1962, and to have regarded the

---

## Page 51

14-00000

TOP SECRET

652.

threesome is difficult handling problems. Given these apparent

factors, the NOSEliO lead may have been

considered expencable by

the KGB, without jung-lasting adverse effect on che fulfillrent

of its overall intelligence requirements.

ROSELiKO was the first source to identify Janes STORSBEFG, a

U.S. military code clerk stationed at the Moscow Embassy, as a

target who had rejected the KGB's recruitment offer (Pages 165-

The inforration was received from NOSENKO after STORSBERG

discharged from the U.s. Army,

and when interricted on the

basis of this information,

STORSBERG generally confired NCSENKO's

reporting on the case.

GORITSYN had carlier reportes on what nay

have been the same iGB oparation, but SOLITSY. i believed the mili-

tary cose clerk had been recruited; from what GOLITS!N had pre-

viously told ClA and from later investigations, it seens possible

that

the KGB recruited either STOMSBERG or Wililam HURiEY (who

NOSENKO said was rut recruited or approached by tre 1G3). If it

is assumed that STORSBERG was not recruited in the approach de-

scribed by NOSENKO and in the operation discussed by GOLITSYN,

the KGB

suffered no loss in the American services learring

of

this case.

If it

is assumed on the other hand that STORSBERG Or

HURLEY was recruited,

the reporting by noseuro assisies the KGB--

not the Aterican

services--by deflecting security investigations

from a recruited agent of the KGB.

•(iii) Importance or Usefulness

The American leads from NOSENKD enabled U.S. security author -

ities to:

- Confirm previous information on the recruitsents of

13 tourists and three correspondeats;

- Verify previous derogatory infommation on lil tourists,

two correspondents, and perhaps ore military code clerk,

STORSBERG;

- Remove two homosexuals from the U.S. Embassy in

Moscow; and

- Identify 32 KGB agents including Hedwig JOHNSON and

MINTKENBAUGi. *

One or possibly tao of these 32 agents (SMITH and possibly HOliARD)

past had been in a position to pass classified information

to the KGB, and a third (JOHNSON) had current access to classified

information and current contact with the KGB; the two honosexuals

at the Moscow Embassy (APMSTRONG and HOFFMAN) presurably also had

access to classified infornation.

From the stanapoint of pro-.

tecting_the_security of the U.S:

Government, NOSENKO brought to

an end the JOliNSON operation and the KGB's potential™

for recruit

ing ARMSTRONG and HOFFMAN.

Against this product of NOSENKO's reporting must be balanced

the amourts

of money and manpower that were needed for u.s. secu-

city authorities to exhaust and investigate NOSENKO's infornation

on

19 recruitments, 35 developmental targets, seven ursuccesstul

recruitment approaches, ard 33 investigations by the iGB--a total

of 113 operational leads.

CIA carried the burden of the debriefing :

and interrogation of NOSEiKO on these cases, but the investigative

" Anong these 32 agents were many whom the iGB had not recontacted

after their return to the United States from the Soviet Union,

others who had bicken contact with the KGS, some who were known

---

## Page 52

14-00000

iu: SECREL

653.

work in the United States was acconpliched mostly by other

agencies.

It would seen, however, that the JOHNSOy operation

was the only MOSLiKO lead to be important or useful.

(2v) Remarks

Judged by his major inaccuracies and by the demonstrable in-

completeress in some

of his reporting, loSiNKO is not an authori-

tative or reliable

source of information on operations against

Americans by the U.S. ¿massy Section and the inerican

untrustworthy in other categories of operational

ileacs, there is no reason to accept at face value NOSENKO's state-

ment that smith was the only Moscow smoussy enficyce working with

"the KGB from 1953 through 1063; indeed, evicence to the contrary

exists.

The

same maj te true

regarding Anericar courists and

correspondents

in Moscow, i.e., other recruitments not mentioned

by NOSENKO could have occurred. Purchermore, wich the question-

able exception of the JOHNSGY case, the KGB lost nothing of great

value in consequence of NOSENKo's leads but garred an advantage

by occupyirg the

attention and facilities of Auerican security

authorities.

It is therefore concluded that NOSENKO has withhold infor-

mation on recruitrents of Anericans in lioscow,

or he is unable to

provide a comprehensive review of such activities because he did

not hold the claireá positions in the U.S. Encassy and American

Tourist Sections.

Either explanation forces strong reservations

fides of NOSENKO as a genuine scurce, and these

reinforced by the relative costs to the KGB and

U.S. security authorities

of the NOSESKo leads.. By itself, this

evaluation of his production on American cases

suggests the possi

bility that the KGB dispatched NOSENKO to report to CIA, and that

the KGB did so for tre purpose of misleading the U.S. security

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 53

$4.00000

TOP SEGRET

654.

c. Operatiors Involving Other hesterners

(1) Introduction

As already indicated, POSINKO's principal knowledgeability

of KGB operations is rolated to americans

in the soviet undon.

With the exception of one German and one Norwegian tourist case,

his only other personal participation in third-national li.e..

American) operations stens fron his agruciation

with the section

of the tourist Department concerred with United kingdon and Canad-

ian, as well as lnerican,

tourists.

where he has contented or

sources for the rest of his third-national leads, he indicated

his knowledge was acguired either

through conversationg with

other officers or through his position as Deputy Chief of the

Tourist Departient in 1962-1963.

Thus he made ro, clain for com-

picteress of his coverage, nor recessurily for absolute accuracy

and full details on cry one case.

No attempt will be made here,

therefore, to compare his inforution with other sources,

of whether Nestrito's reportiny harned the Soviets and

security.

(i1)

Discussion

Of the 90 third-natienal cecruitment leads (Pazeg 474-502!.

22 have not yet been

positively icentities.

clerk in the ese dera blast in rot en source withou code

krowing the status of chese tho operations at the tire NOSENKO

told CiA about them, it is not possible to measure the value to

•us or the cange to

the soviet inion through the compromise of

,these cases.

the remaining 68 known or possible agents who have been

identified, 35 were unique leads when HOSENKO provided

them.

NO

conclusive

investigation results have yet been cbtained on 30 of

these, but the majority were said by NOSEiKO to be travel agency

employees

(guides, bus drivers, etc.).

Five of the 30 helá

positions

of trust in their respective governments;

these five

leads

are discussed below in terms of potential value to U.s.

security and potential damage to the KGB.

Of the five who have been

interviewed on the basis of

the NOSENKO information

four denied

hiar recruited by the KGB, including kaal (the only one

of those interviewed holding a government positioni.

discussed

below.

Reporting on

the one remaining

lead, a Dutch woran, is

unclear and incorclusive--she admitted only to having been ques-

tioned while in the USSR.

Among the 35 new leads from

NOSENKO, a total of five had

positions

of trust, with known

or presumed access

to

sensitive

information, in their respective governments:

NOSENKO Said in 1962

that

the

XGB

waS

worklrig

when he wast!

Alastin Mo5coi.

but he did rot

was

not.

i1s contacts

in

MOSCOW

with

Soviets

whom he

suspected of being

intelligence officers,

and in

1964 he

reported a social visit in Vienna by

General GORBUNOV (an operational alias of GRIBANOV), whom

---

## Page 54

14-00000

65=.

he had krowt in irredi

teres r910.6 lanes leard directly

on the insis of no Nosesto load, For hus he reported a re-

cruitrent approsch.

ch.

cosato has sderiified hir

information.

Etatiored

Indonesiar.8x6

1950

Minaugh NeSE:o

he could recall no

such case bit thoight this midst

see? i nistake for the

case o distian who had been the fa

Aside fron the faut that corditiors in Indoresia

precluied CIA's passing this lead to che Indonesian service

for investigation,

Indonesia's position intll 1966 was that

uf a seni-satellite of the communist Else,

and revelation

of such a recruitment in the prevalling situation would

have been of no value to the United stares nor harm to the

Soviet Unioil.

Thus of the thira-national leads originüting with nosenKo.

five might be considered to ba important sea:se of their posi-

tion in government.

In two cases insides

18 he was

not able to say whether there sas a recrime!",

rowever, while

a third lassumirg that there was no further cortusion or NOSE!-

KO's part)

canrot be considered in import:it lead because of che

communist bias of the Indonesian lovernment.

Chas position as

an agent or contact loses significance ir. vien of his freviously

reporred sipport of a partriut leftisi pulitical figure.

possitle irportance o: ther

, lead carrot, be assessed

without irvestigation resilts.

The Willian VASSALL EaSe (Pages 501-507) was the one third-

national lead wiich NoSEiXO timself corsidered most important.

He invarlably included this lead wher talking about the impor

tance of his seportirg. The Erstist security services neverthe-

---

## Page 55

14-00000

TOP SECRET

4-1•39-8

656.

Less were well en their way to identifying the source of the

Admiralty documents identifled by GOLITSYN, having narrowed

their list of suspects to 20 (including VASSALI) by 11 June 1962.

When they received the fragment of NOSENKO information which

focused

on the british Elbassy in Moscow, the nunter was reduced

to VASSALL and one other.

Although

the NOSENKO information

apparently confirned the already solid suspicions of vASSALL,

there is rescate believe that the identification would have

been accomplished without this information.

The

lead was there-

fore not ner or exclusive information, and NOSENKO himself ad-

mitted in 1964 that he krew that GOLITSYN had knom of the case

from the latter's work in the information (Reports) Department.

Of the identified third nationals whom NOSENKO said were

beirg targetted or investigated by the KGB, nor? held positiong

of significance, with the sole excestion of the then member of

the Sritish Parliament, Balkana

Daisy whose personal life

and career the

subsequently

attempted--with considerable

success--to destroy through a campaign of scardal.

(ili) Remarks

On the basis of the alove examination, NOSLitO's information

on KGB operations against third-nationals cannot be considered a

Lose tive factor in the assessment of his pora fadea

18 3.p089-

negative factor in corsideration of his bona fides.

the 1n-

significance of NOSINKO's reporting

on third-national leads must

be measured against the criteria of his clained access and con-

trary evidence..

In the case of foreign tourists his leads show--

ard he hinself has cormented--that such recruitments were of no

particular value; assuming that NUSaNKO was Deputy

chiet of the

Tourist Department, he should be able to make

such a statement

without challenge.

To date no independent

eviderce of foreign

tourist recruitmerts has emerged which contradicts him.

Орега-

tions against other western

embassies in Moscow are a slightly

different matter.

NOSENKO's information, or lack thercof.

can-

not be evaluated on the basis of completeness because he

has made

no claim to full

access to such information or to positiong

which

would have given

him better access. Except for tiose he said he

was informed of in connection with possibie use against U.S.

embassy targets, he has usually sourced such third-national

leads as he did have to particularly close relations with the

responsible case officer.

It would not be valid to argue that

a source of

one lead should have told him of others, or that he

should have had more close friends in the KGB.

Thus on all

applicable criteria,

the NOSEiKO leads to operations against

third-raticnals must be excluded as a factor weighing for or

against his bona fides.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 56

14-00000

•...

"äi:

xá.:

t:..

r.or:.

AI.E

!

iNe SECRET,

.. ...

657.

4. Technical Operations Against the U.S, EmladaY

Discussion

In reporting on KGB microphones in the U.S. Alibassy (Pages

248-269), NOSENKO said in 1962 that there were at liar

points," later adding a sixth, from which cirversations

They included the offices of the Miniatur counselor,

the Military Attache, the Naval Attache, the Alr Allaho, one

(unidentified)

"State Department employee," ard thr Alcicultural

He also referred to a non-productive indianplong

code roum but did not count this as one of the pullro.

did rot supply details of the information worth' ills krill oktained

from any of these microphones except to make perilal allusions

to the importance of the materials from those in lie upfices of

the Minister Counselor and the Military Attache.

that the existence of these microphoney

was the kill's "biggust

secret" and that only a very few people know uf lllil.

in 1964

NOSENKO gave more details and provided a written dial of tha

offices where microphones were actively monitored in 1960 and

NOSENKO's information on the microphones woul appods, on

the basis of the findings of the sweep team in loud, to be gener-

Where NOSENKO reported there wan ll production

but microphones were found audible, the discropancy could be ex-

plained by KGB technical failure to receivo tha intercepta after

they left the point at which the sweepers tortrell were HOSENKO

reported materials were obtained (such as frum lie dir Attache's

and the sweepers found the microphone dallido,

it could

be conjectured that the microphore died betworn "ally 1962 aud

the date of the sweep in 1964.

However, NOStAlK i'a legorling did

not harm the Soviets, because GOLITSYN know and Mail reported on

one specific microphone, and another earlier (and pirably cam-

promised) source had also reported that the minnes were

The microphone known to GOLITSYN, when

talou and traced

back to the point where its wires left the bullind, would load

to the urcovering of all the other microphones, da in fact happen-

ed with the find in foom 1008 (Page 256).

NOSENKO was unable to expand on his microphola Information

after his defection.

Questioned repeatedly dur deralla of the

operation or examples of the product of thour microphunes, ho gave

almost no operational details" and could supply my the same

three generalized examples of their product which lis liai already

given in 1962: the unproductivity of the cude i un ndrirophonos

• One of the few concrete incidents which Nostlli perpunter

conrected to the microphone operation (wirh the arraption

of the North Wing planning, see below was the las ut a

document reporting the product from one ut lla miniophones!

GOLITSYN had already told the same story (rage 115).

COLIT-

SYN said he was present during the search fur lid document

and it was under these circumstances that he loathe apoet-

fically that there was a microphone in the urflie ur tho

NOSENKO in :962 aerope 1la8 11110

microphone was the most important in the Embardy,

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 57

14-00000

658.

the Minister Counselor's dictation, Ircluding fitness reports

which NOSENKO said wese of operational interest to the KGB but

coula not say how mary of them there were of whom they conserned;

and the Military Attache's plannirg of trips which permitted the

KGB to seize equiprent

in Stalingrad 1n 1955.

Of these three

examples given by an officer who

said he culled all the micro-

phone materials for two years, one concerned a non-operating

therefore useless mic=ophone.

the secord concerred a microphone

(1n the Minister Courselor's office; already reported by a pre-

vious defector, and the third concerned a well known incident

which took place years earlier (and which NOSEiKO should have

plarned and helped corduct, according to his claimed position in

1955: HOSENKO said re played no such rolel."

In 1964 NOSENKO trought to CIA a sheet of paper which he

said

was in KOVSHUk's handwriting aro which had

been obtained in

19€0

or 1961 during a conference

(Pages 250-251):

This, he said

then, was how he knew of the exace locations of all the actively

* A comparison betweer. NOSENKO's hird exanple and a 1956 message

from à sensitive suurce who is believed to have been compromis

ed to the KGB after that message lout before 1962) reveals sim-

ilarities which may pot be coircidental.

- NOSENKO (11 Jure 1962: see Page 260): "We are listening

to your Military hitaches there.

We kron where they intend

to travel, what they want to fird out.

We know what machin-

ery and what targets interest :'en...

Some of the things

they say are surpissing.

They discuss, among other things.

where to go, whät so see.

what to take with then - electric

equipment or not.

hid we are hunting for this electronic

equipment and now have permission,

if we are absolutely cer-

tain that one of your people is taxing electronic apparatus

with him on an intelligence trip outside Moscor, to take, to

steal it.

We now hare authorization to take any necessary

steps to steal 1t.

Because you row have improved your equip-

ment.. He stole sons equipmert in Stalingrad in 1955..."

- Sensitive source, 1956 (see Page 254): "... All rooms

are being monitored by the KSB... The 'flap' involving the

American directior, - findirg specialists in

Stalingrad in

the sumer of 1955 das organized by the KGB because conver-

As you know, as a result of this flap, the KGs seized valu-

able direction-firding equiprent from the American Intelli-

gence officers...*

It is possible that both NOSENKO and the sensitive source were

reporting a well-knrm event, because GOLITSYN reported in

1962 that the 1955 Stalingrad incident was written up in KGB

training materials as an example of Second chief Directorate

The training version may have included the role of the

microphone information (although COLITSIN did not report that

it did), which may thus have come naturally to the attention

Of NOSENKO and the sensitive source.

However, this would call

into question NUSRiKD's allegation of direct access to all of

the microphone product.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 58

14-00000

659.

monitored ard productive "points" in 1960-1961. NCSIXO was not

able to explain why he would need this list to know the locations

of the microphores when he had been daily receiving, selecting,

and distributing the product of all of them for two years.

1larly, it was never clear why NOSENKO did not remember in 1962

that there were eleven points--as the list showed--rather than

the four-to-aix NOSENXO reported on in 1962.

NOSEXO's account of how the product from the microphones was

distributed and exploited would inevitably mean that all KGB case

officers who had served in the U.S. Embassy Section sirce the

microphones were installed would know of their existene: -despite

any effort to paraphrase and disguise the product as "agent re-

ports."

NOSENKO noretheless maintalned in 1962 that "it is a

tremendous secret that le are listening to you," ard that che

microphones were known to so few that any countermeasures the

Americans might take on the basis of NOSaNKO's statements could

reflect dangernusly on him as the source."

Accepting at face value NOSENKO's claimed lack of aptitude

and interest in technical matters, and therefore nis inability

To provide

specific technical details concerning electronic oper-

ations against the American Embassy, it is still noteworthy that:

- NOSENKO did not know the purpose of the so-called

"Moscow beara, "

sometimes saying it was to jam Embassy

communications and at other times that it was used to

- Although he claimed to have personally pa-ticipated

in the planning for the installation of audio devices in

the North Wing of the Embassy, he did not know of the ex-

istence or the purpose of the coaxial cables and grill

found there by American technicians in 1964.

insisted that there vere no audio devices installed in the

North Hing at the time of its, renovation for occupancy

by Anericans.)

- NOSENKO knew nothing of the general lines of research

and developmeat to substitute for or improve the fading

microphone coverage of the U.S. Embassy.

These three points relate to aspects of the KGE's audio-technical

attack on the U.S. Embassy in which the reporting of a source in

NOSENKO's claimed position, no matter what his technical aptitude.

could have been detrirental to Soviet interests.

* Both COLITSYN and the 1956 source cited on Page 254 were First

Chief Directorate officers.

That they both knew of the micro-

phones suggests that NOSENKO exaggerated the sensitivity ol

che microphone operation, which had moreover always beer

TOP SECRET

schindle

---

## Page 59

14-00000

659a.

bo

NOSENKO's sourcing of his information on electronie opera-

tions against the U.S. Embassy in Moscow nas unclear and unlikely.

His knowledge of the location and production of these microphones,

as well as the existence,

nature, and purpose of other electronic

operationg directed against the Enbassy, was not commensurate with

his alleged position in the U.S. Embassy Section ard his particu-

lar responsibility for audio sperations.

Significar.tly, the

essertial element of the information which NOSENKo did report.

the exister.ce of the microphone in the Minister Courselor's

office, would presumably have bech corsidered k the KGB to have

been compromised sux months earlier, wish the delection of cubit-

SYN. Discovery of this microphone, as an outgrowth of action on

GOLITSYN's informition, would have led to all the others.

the Embassy microphones must have beer. corsidered by the

have been compromised before NOSiNKO first spoke of them in 1962.

sated to this is the fact (supported by NOSENKO himself) that

1':e. efficiency of the Embassy microphone installation as a whole

1ag seriously diminished by late 1961 or early 1962 due to, first.

rioral deterioration of equiprent and wiring and, secona.

installation of secure rooms and the impletentation of more

stringent security precaucions at the Embassy.

For these reasons

and in the absence of any information concerring other forms of

attack against the U.S. Embassy in Moscod, it cannot

be considered that the information provided by liosaiko

and 1964 was harmful to the interests of the KGB nor helpful to

American authorities.

NOSENKO's denial of any installations in

the north wirg, in the light of the later discovery there ot

coaxial cables, the purpose of which appears serious and 18 as

yet unclarified, and in the light of NOSENkO's specific claim to

have been responsible for the operational plarning for the north

wing at the time it was being prepared for Aterican occupancy,

would appear to be purposeful deception.

HOP SECRET

---

## Page 60

14-00000

660.

5. The BELITSKIY Case

8. Introduer son

NOSENKO reported to CiA in June 1962 las one of the two items

he wanted to sell) that he of its agents, the Soviet interpreter

BELITSKIY,

was in fact a KGB double agent who had been planted on

CIA (Pages 517-529) •

NOSENKO said that this was a case run by the

Second

("Active Line") Section, but that he personally had a role

in the management of the case in May 1962 in Ceneva.

NOSENKO was

able to give certain inside information on this case; for example.

he knew the nicknames ustd by the ClA case officers with the agent.

b. Discussion

NOSENKO's information, at least in its general outlines, was

correct.

CIA had been running BELITSKIY as an agent, and the CIA

case officers (alias "Bob" ard "Henry," the latter from Washington

aS NOSEiKO said nad just completed a series of meetings with

BELITSKIY in rieneva.

Important aspects of his information were

inaccurate:

BELITSKIY had been recruited a year before NOSENKO'S

date

of

1959, and in Brussels,

not lordon.

Also, NOSEViO's claim

that this was a Second Chief Directorate operation aimed at en-

ticing CIA into meetings in the USSR was not borne out by the

history of the case or by RELITSKlY's conduct, although it cannot

be excluded that this was a long-term

still

sought without appearing to.

thus is not as accurate as could be expected if his own role in

it had been as claimed.

NOSENKO's description of his own involvement is not consis-

tent

with observed Soviet practice or with operational logic.

NOSENKO said

in both 1962 and 1964 that he had had orders to

supervise the handling of this case in Geneva in the spring of

1962.

The reason was that the case officer for BELITSKIY in

Gereva (ARTEMEV) was young and inexperienced and had not even

worked on the BELITSKIY case before.

NOSEiKO was saying in

effect--with the authority of direct knowledge and official re-

sponsibility--that BELITSKIY, a prominent Soviet citizen having

personal contacts with well placed members of the Soviet Goverr.-

ment, a man who had beer. under the ostensible control of a hos-

tile irtelligence service (CIA) for four years, was sent by the

KGB to Geneva for the purpose of recontacting

CIA, with pre-

pared information,

that the KGB did not send with him the

case officer or any member of the section responsible

for the operation.

Instead, the KGB turned over the respongi-

bility to a young and inexperienced KGB officer who happened to

se in Geneva to protect the security of a delegation and who

had had no prior connection with

the BELITSKIY case nor even

local knowledge of Geneva conditions; then, after BELITSKIY was

already in Geneva,

the KGB had cabled instructions that NoSenKo,

who had no reed to know of the case and had learned of it only

unofficially from conversations in 1960-1961 with the section

Chief responsible, who had no experierce or training in handl-

ing double agent operations, ard who was similarly in Geneva

IUP SECRET

---

## Page 61

14-00000

661.

by chance with delegation security functions, should quide the

"less experienced" case officer."

NOSENKO shored

under questioning, he did not know the contents of any of the

positive intolligence BELITSKIY was to pass to CIA as disinfor-

mation; he did not know BELITSKIY's Moscow or Geneva pattern

of movement or contacts; he did not know in detail hos or when

the operation

started; he did not krow the nature of degree of

British involvement, nor the operational details and contact

arrangements.

NOSE:iKO said that BELITSKIY had been placed on a

Geneva delegation in the hope that ClA might be able to find"

recontact him.*

C. Remarks

The circumstances above not only cast doubt on MOSENKO's

version of the case and his own accegg but also sliggest that

NOSENKO did not have a theoretical appreciation of hor double

agents are handled.

The examples he gave of his "guidance" to

ARTEMEV are few in number.

NOSENKO algo stated in 196÷ that he

had arranged the actual introduction to ifI.ITSKIY of SISLoV, the

TASS man, to provide for BELITSKIY's need of a notioral subsource

for some of his disinformation; NOSENKO by October 1966 had appar-

ently forgotten this event, for he stated unequivocally that kis-

LOV had had no

connection whatever with

the BELITSKIY case. NOS-

ENKO claimed to have met BELITSKIY, but did not recognize his

photo when shown it in 1966.

Did NOSENKO's report to CIA on the BELITSKIY case harm the

It was useful to CIA, since despite

freguently expressed

doubts of BELITSKIY's bona fides, CIA vas handling

the operation

as if it were genuine (but not intending to go to the extent of

exposing to BELITSKIY CIA assets inside the USSR). (Tie KGB is

* NOSENKO has reported that he handled only one American agent

(FRIPPEL): he had practically no knowledge of CIA ror even

vicarious exposure to the substance of any other double agent

ARTEMEV had had extended contact with a CIA

tourist agent as early as August 1958, a role in other opera-

tions against American tourists in 1959--including clandestine

search (see Page 146), and continuous American Department

service since then.

NOSENKO did not know of the 1953-1959

operational activities of ARTEMEV, although they feil in the

operational area NOSENKO claimed to have supervisea at the

time as Deputy Chief of the American Tourist Section.

•* NOSENKO was seemingly unaware that BELITSKIY had contact

arrangements which would presumably guarantee recontact.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 62

14-00000

662.

aware, as soviet Bloc counterintelligence guidance demonstrates,

of the dangers inherent in having disinformation recognized as

such.)

The meetings in Geneva in May 1962 would have made it

clear to the KGB that CIA had no intention of meeting BeLITSKIY

Inside tre USSR, and, in KGB eyes, the case may have reached the

point of dininishing returng.

It is pertaps significant that

NOSENKO did not contact CIA and report on the BELITSKIY case until

10 days after BELITSKIY's serles of meetings with CIA in Geneva

nad been completed, which would have given the KGB time for fina.

ippraisal of the operation's potential.

NOSENKO's account of his own role in this operation appears

to have been false.

and nothing in the available evidence would

preclude Sorict sacrifice of this already tired operation.

NOSENKO provided some inside details of a sensitive KCB operation

which could have been known to only a few, it is difficult to

find any other explanation of NOSENKO's access to.this information

except that the KGB briefed him about it.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 63

14-00000

et.p0.0

663.

6. K08 Investigations°

a. ComproMise of POPCY

(1) Introduction

Firing the date and cause o: tle compromise of POPOr, the

CIA penetration source

in the Cr: 'iFages 530-534) could affect

the evaluation of HOSeiKo's projustion. If what lUSENKO has said

1s basically true, his story of ripoV's compromise (which ties also

been reported by other sources) is nou particularly importart and

has not harried the KCB ror measurably assisted CiA: The KGB

assunes an ewareness bu ClA that it conducts survelliance of U.s.

Embassy personnel,

esprcially those revirg known cr suspected Am-

erican intelligence corntetions (as with LANGELLE and WINTEPS).

16 NOSENKO on the other hand has been incimplete or inaccurate

in his statements

about tre crapromise of lopoY, then his cizIns

to krowledgeability on this subject mist de questioned.

(i1) Discussion

The informacion from NOSENkO and other sources on the POFOV

compromise may be collated and summarized ir tacular form:

Cause

Date Implied

Source

KGa surveillarce of WINTERS

21 January 1959

NOSENKO**

KGB surveillarce of WINTERS

21 january 1959

CHEPEPHIOV

document

KGB intercept of WINTERS

letter

21 January 1959

POPOV message

of 18 September

1959***

KGB surveillance

of U.S.

none

Embassy

officer

KGB surveillance of LANGELLE 4 January 1959

seasitite

SOirCo

GOLITSYN, frOm

the KGB orienta-

tion paper on

the POPOV case

GOLITSYN

...

KGB agent

prior to 23 Nov-

ember 1957

Under this heading, only the compromises of POPOV, PENKOVSKIY,

and GriEREPLOV are considered: there

insufficient collateral

material available

for an evaluation of NoseiKO's inforation

on Vladimir KAZAN-KOMAREK (pages 569-570) and Alfred SLESINGER

(Pages 571-575).

** NOSENKO reported that the KGB observed WINTERS] mailing a

Letter witch has

to POPOV: he

apon head che sell about

was found to be

whether the

applied metka to this letter.

***POPOV Is believed to have been under KGB control in composing

this letter.

(Footnotes cartinued as next page.)

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 64

14-00000

664.

The only other evidence avaiiable is analytical. POPOV was

transferred to the Illegals handling unit in Berlin on 28 June

1957, an assigment of high sensitivity. Urtil mid-hugust he

handled five

Illegals, thereafter only one, TAIROVA, in October

1957. • Following home leave from 12 December 1957 to 19 January

1958, he was again transferred, this time to à position where

Illegals and productive GRU sources of intelligence were not ex-

posed to him.

between March and November 1958 there were signs

of a KGB investigation of the Illegals handling. unit where POPOV

formerly served, and he was recalled to Moscow in November of that

These facts can be interpreted as follows::

- POPOV's status as a CIA source was not compromised before

his transfer to the Illegals handling unit.

- POPOV's status was compromised before his recall to Moscod

in November 1958, probably before his reassignment from the

Illegals handling unit in January 1958, and possibly some time

earlier.

The latter possibility is apparent from the Soviets'

knowledge that the TAIROVA couple was under surveillance in

December 1957 (and until March 1958); it is also noteworthy

that, after having met five Illegals in less than one and one-

half months prior to 13 August 1957, POPOV subsequently was

involved personally with only one other, TAIROVA, in October

1957.

- The KGB, realizing that POPOV was a CIA source, chose to

keep him in Berlin

until November 1958 in order to investigate

the possibility of his operating in conjunction with other

This line of reasoning, if accepted, would confirm GOLITSYN's in-

formation that a KGB agent compromised POPOV prior to the arrival

of ZHUKOV in Berlin, an arrival date falling some time before

23 November 1957.

(rootnotes from preceding page.)

*****Since such orientation papers are written for general circula-

tion within the KGB, it is doubtful that KGB security prac-

tices would permit their conterts to reveal sensitive infor-

mation; other sources have indicated that orientation papers

• sometimes are

sanitized; this particular paper, however.

reportedly dia state

that the KGB learned from an agent

in

about 1957 (GOLITSYN's estimate) that American Intelligence

had a source which had provided GRU information.

**This date, which is consistent with that cited in the final

sentence

of the preceeding footnote, was derived from the

time when POPOV reported the presence of the KGB

officer

boston soo boy in

ZHUKOV in Berlin; according to GOLITSYN,

ZHUKOV was sent to

Berlin after POPOV had been identified by a KGB agent as

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 65

14-00000

665.

(111) REmarke

The completeness and accuracy of Noseiko's

irformation on

the compromise of POPOV, supported as it is aj dealino and the

CHEREPANOV document and

POPOV's message but cortrauicted by

GOLITSYN and aralytical

evidence, cannot he firally evaluated.

Only with resoistion of the bona fides of NOSENKO can a judgment

be made on this part of his production.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 66

14-00000

666.

D. COTFICTISC OF PE:KOVS:Y

(1) introduction

Hecause

his direct respursitility for covercon of ABIDIAN

15 an essential

eirport in dosaKCa slary of t1s 1950-1951 career,

because he insist: that the iGh had no lea o: l.s. invoiverent in

the FOIKCVSKIY

case until Richard JADDB vert de tre Fushkin Street

diad drop or 2 lioiericer 1962.

ard decause t? is

ajatart or the

soirt thet tre. iGo until ainose tre end of the Fe:lüiskir casr knew

conruction betreen PiioVSKIY ard the Fus.iir. street gite

wich haDiti visited, dosEiko's story of the conpronise of PENKOV-

SKIY uppears to bear directlj on the questio. re ostiko's bona

Each of the various versions of the compasmise ci palkoV-

SkIY must be exam:red

tre established facts. And compared with NOSENkO's story and with

(11) Discussion

dissy sources agree on the cause, and two on the timing.

roseido, Exist and the "official Ko! report" attribute the

compronise lo the fact that surveillarce detecter a meeting be-

tween its.

FISHOLM

aS PEKOVSKIY.

NOSEiKO dated this as aruurd lovenber or December

1961.

ar:d ta

the official report stated this eccurred on 30 Decender 1961,

¿ did not give a date.

gave the cause as surveillar.ce, but of Grcville WYNE

CHI SUCLY

promise dated from ay labeen gate tee dieterent

ara stated triat the com-

promise dated from day 1962.

accounts, ore

that FEiOSKlY has

irvestigated for reasors unre-

lated to any suspiciors of espionage and was trereby four.d out as

a spy, the other that his excessive sponding ard sale of foreign

merchandise led to an investigation which Itsulted in detection of

his espiorage activities.

She placed the timing of the first ver-

sion in 1951, without citirg the time of year:

in the secord, she

associated the tirirg "ith a darning against association with

PENKOVSKIY which

sre

ang

her

husbard

received in

27

liavember

1961.

Since

* See Pages 535-547 for discussion of this case.

**It does not seem crusual for several sources to have reported

on the compromise of PElOVSKIY:

Fresumably this was the sub

ject of widespread discussion within the two Soviet services,

for it was covered in the Soviet press and ir. at least one

"official report" disseminated by the KCB.

differing situations within the Soviet services could partially

explain the differing versions that these sources have given.

some of them revertreless have claimed either direst knowledge

of the compromise or specially informed sub-sources.

There-

fore the discreparcies

arrong

the reporting of doSeNKo on the

PENKOVSKIY compromise, the accounts by other sources, ans the

facts on the hardling of the case by fla ard Mi-o are percinent

to the question of NoStiko's bona fides.

CECRET.

---

## Page 67

14.00000

DATE

4/12/94

LOST/MISSING MATERIAL

THE DOCUMENT OR PAGE(S) LISTED BELOW WAS/WERE MISSING

DURING THE DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW BY THE HISTORICAL

REVIEW GROUP, CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF INTELLIGENCE.

DOCUMENT NO.

DATED: _

PAGE LST-

OR

667

FROM:

CIA JOB NO.

BOX NO. -

JFK Reel 46

FOLDER NO.

2

---

## Page 68

14-00000

668:

PEIKOUSKIY that te hail visited the alte aftor lie choss 1t in 1960.

although it is poss:ble, especially as he had not been informed

of ABIDINi having been sent to choct. on a possible sijnal fron

him about the doad drop.

gracielve enirec

hoverer, makes it clear

that the ABldliN visit

mias not

the first obsorved activity

at Plishkin Street to stir KGB investigative interest in the

site.

report slates, when massive surveilance of

U.S.

Embassy targets detected an inerican visiting this

address the first time, he ras not followed inside by sur-

veillants, but on the

second occasion he n'33 follored

closely and the surveillant ouservan

that he was kneeling

down apparently tying his stoe." or

i went on to 5ay

that, although this was not very unusual, it was gufficient

to arouse suspicion in view of the fact that this American

had been observed visiting the sane address on two occasions

for no apparent reason. There is no quiscion about the

fact that

¡BIbIAl visited the Pustkin Street drop site on

one occasion only, and that was on 30 Decender 1961.

The

refererce to this

as a second visit to this address by an

Anerican fron. the embassy is a clear irdication that the

KGB had surveilled the first such visit, which was made

ty tre CIA officer MAHOY5y**

ABIDIAN.

Thus there datarah Jammary 1961, Brd not by

as erred by indicating

one Arerican vent to

Pushkin

caice, the KGS must

have known that MalONzY dent there

first,

in January

1951

and AbIDIAN dent there next, on 30

DECEmber. 1961.

said that the 24-tour fixed

survesllance resulted ficm

the second visii..

and beccuse of it PRiKOVSKIY was sub-

sequetly observed to enter the vestibile of this address

but did not visit anyone

there.

it was determined that

no one living at that address kren rakovskiy and he be-

came a target of KGB suspicion

and investigation.

rest of the

story is completely in disagreement

with the facts of the

does not warrant discussion here.

It must be noted, nonetheless,

this is the only instance

among all the versions dhich places

the compromise oh the Arer-

side of the case, and the only

one chich. makes a direct

connection between the Pushkin Street dead drop and the KGB

detection of PENKOVSKIY.

(All others attribute the compromise

to surveillance of British Embassy personnel.

and NOSENKO claim-

ed that the KGB was unadare of American Intelligence participa-

tion until the operation was terminated.) It is also in direct

conflict with NOSEiKO, who had no knowledge of ary U.S. Embassy

official visiting the

Pushkin Street site prior to ABIDIAN.

this regard. NOSENKO insisted that the date of ABIDIAN's visit

* ABIDini reported that a woman entered the vestibule behind

him while he was ir there.

and he kneit down pretending to

tie his shoelaces until she proceeded past him and on up the

**NOSENKO was not aware that MAHONEY had beer identified to the

KGB as a CIA officer

well before MAHONEY's October 1960 arri-

val in l'oscow.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 69

14-00000

669

was the era of 1980 or the very bogirring of 1961, dicieas in

fast MAHOiEY'3

visir. das in Januery igul.

Dealer the errorg

relat...g to loadings and unloadings of deadirop. dt the Pishkin

tory tro stablishe des knowledge":

len tir serond (AliDlA) visit riere, this

of Pusinkir street.

Greville nif'a testimony co.ccrring his interrogations be

the GB also litroducer?

alonents coreradictir. the versiOns

un discussin of dust

versation

DULACKi (rages 536-508). tie KriS Was

that PaKOVShlY's question shout his girlfrie!

portart allusion and they demanded that mire expiair. 1º.

cither hiad forgotten the name or had rever knoin it, ard he was

10 tell the KGB who "Zip" las.

The fact that tre l'GB had

¿ recordirg of this 27 May 1941 concersation shows also that the

KGB was ai least suspicious of the relationship before that con-

versatior. took plice and must have then trconi anare of the con-

spiratorial aspect of the PENKOVSkly-rarit erlationship ky virtue

of tie cryptic nature of that curversation.

The additional fact

that the KGB surveilled iniNE to the apartment of an uridentified

officer of British Intelligence on the sane day the

"ZEp" conver-

sation between widE and PaiKOVSKIY "as monitored as evidence

that coth miNE and PelOUSKlY were under strong susgicion of

if not earlier.

Nor could trose sus-

picions have been explained aray by the fact that PEKOVSHIY ard

mYrilE hed legitimate cover reasons for contact, in view es the

ir. their oveit

relationship which rcquired secrecy or ever. caution in conversa-

tion.

The indication fron

so that the 102 was aware

of MAidity's visit to the inside vestiviie ci

the fistkin Street

site in Junuary 1961 18 not orly missirg from

31l other versions.

but conspicuously so from NOSENKO's story: he riained to know

everything the

Kes knew about this Anerican dead drop site.

cause of AIDIA's visit there.

NOSENKO on one occasion sald

that he thougit an

Anerican tourist (rut a J.S.

Embassy officer

might have visited the site a year or two earlier thar. ABIdIAy.

(lii) Remarks

NOSENKO did not know or did not report to cia that the

only other American who had visited the Pushkin Street dead drop

area was MAjOrEY.

This fact suggests that either NOSEIKO was

deliberately withholding from CiA inforration of vital import-

ance in the PENKOVSKIY compromise, or he was unaware of the

KGg's possession of this information, despite his claired posi-

tior. in the U.S. Embassy Section and responsibility for cover-

age of ABIDIAY.

The fact that his story on the pairOYsKIY

compromise, like the

"official report" of the KUB, does rot

show the seriousness of the evidence in the KGa's possession

as of 27 May 1961 additionally points to his wichholding of in-

fortation on the subject of the timing of PEiKOVSKIy's compro-

mise.

which was definitely no later than this date.

If NOSEIKO

was deliberately withhoiding information on this subject and

¡jing about the PENKOVSKIY compromise, thea he is rot a bona

fide defector.

If re is unaware of the information

KGB has in its possession.

then he was not in the ü.S. Erisassy

Section in 1950 or 1961

as claimed, ard hence his bor? fides

rould be disproven.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 70

14-00000

let viven

•3.

670.

i i .

c. Compror ise of CHEREPANOV

(1) Introduction

NOSENKO'& stories on the compromises of POPOV and PeNKOV

SKIY were examined for their accuracy as to tiring and cause. In

the case of CHEREPANOV (Pages 548-558), there is no question

about

when the so-called CHEREPANOV papers were passed, nor how the #GB

openly learred of the U.S. Embassy's possession

of the papers.

The chief question is the

authenticity of the documents themselves,

with the subsidiary implications, if they are not authentic, that

the passage of the papers was instigated by the KGB, and that

there could have been neither a compromise of nor a search for

CHEREPANOV, as described by NOSENKO

and attested to by his travel

authorization (sae

also Part VIII.D.8.).

(11) The Operational Plan in Draft

Examiration of one draft document--the operational plan

against the CiA officer WINTERS--reveals the following points

related to fora:

- Although only a draft, the title of the case officer,

the designation of his office, the title of his supervisor

as approving authority, and the designation of his office

component as well as the title of the confirming authority

(the head of the department) are spelled out in full, even

including the subordination of the KGB to the Council of

Hinisters of the USSR.

KGB practice, as reported by

other sources and as logic would dictate, does not require

that this be done, cumbersome as these desigrations are,

and the typist routinely fills them in as the official

copy is typed from the draft.

- Although only a draft, this document has been signed

by KOVSHUK as

being approved, which is against connon

sense and KGB practice.

NOSENKO himself noted this dis-

crepancy, asking nimself aloud why kovSHuk had done this.

- Although only a draft, the name of the target of

the plan appears several times, but earlier KGB defectors

have stated and NOSENKO himself has confined that the

nane is left out of drafts

so the typist ir

the typing

pool will not krow the identity of the subject of the

report; a blank line is used wherever the name is to

appear to be filled in by hand by the case officer after

the document comes back from the typist.

- On the basis of references to LANGELLE and POPOV,

this plan (which is not dated) would have to have been

drafted sometine after October 1959.

WINTERS by this

time had been in Moscow since August 1958, had been de-

tected in operational letter-mailing, and

had been

associating wich KGB officers, etc.

Neither this

TOP SECRET,

---

## Page 71

14-00000

671.

operational plan nor any other of the drafts included in

the CHEREPMiOV package cited a KG3 cryptonym for hin.

he 16 always referred to an true rare.

but this is contrary

to the usage in the other operational plans in the package.

It 1s also contrary to KGB practice, as described by NOSei-

KO and other sources.

- The draft cited several technical aids to be used in

the clandestine study of nInteRs.

It not only gives the KGB

cryptonym of metro and "ieptun-80" for two of these techni-

ques, but inmediately thereafter explains for what purpose

each one uf them is used. In the other operational plans

from CHEREPANOV, and in conformance with the established

KGB practice of

inserting cryptonums for such devices,

these preparations are not only not described, but the

olank. Line typed by the typist has been filled in by hand

after typing.

In addition to the above points ot form, this same document

contains statements which run courter to rigid KGB practice and

which

are internally contractory,

especially noteworthy in en

approved draft. One of the objectives arnourced in the plan 1s

to investigate two Soviet citizens who were detected in contact

with

WINTERS

in Moscow; one of the two is identified parenthetic-

ally as having gore abroad.

This document, if genuine, would be

an admission

on the part of the case offices,

and as approval

thereof by his supervisor, that a Soviet citizen who had been

observed in contact with an identified officer of American intel-

ligence had been cleared by the KGB for travel abroad before the

nature of that contact had been satisfactorily determined by the

KGB.

This is in contradiction to all available informatior. con-

cerning KGB travel clearances, which are denied on the basis of

unauthorized contacts

between

soviet citizens and foreigners in

the Soviet Union, not to mention vesterr. Intelligence officers.

The draft, which corsisty of only three paragraphs. can

be sun-

marized briefly by paragraph to demonstrate the intenal contra-

dictions:

- To establish the nature of NINTERS: intelligence

activities in the USSR, six speciäl tasks will be carried

including round-the-clock surveillance, metka.

"Neptun-80," hiiden microphores. other. audio-devices.

and investigation of already idertified Soviet citizens.

- Because he already been identified as an irtelli-

and he has a hostile attitude toward the

USSR, there is no basis for recruitment; therefore the

actions outlined in the first paragraph will not be

carried out because they might alarm him and cause him

to leave the USSR prematurely.

- Despite the statemerts of the second paragraph.

which indicate that recruitment is out of the question

and which precludes putting into effect the measures

outlined in the first paragraph, this third paragraph

sets forth the expectation that just before wiltErs"

scheduled departure and depending on further accumula-

tion of materials on WINTERS: ard the prevailing polit-

ical climate a the time.

an opportunity is likely to

arise which will permit testing the possibility of

recruiting him.

TARA-CRET

---

## Page 72

14-00000

672.

If the WINteRS) operation plan vere a draft like the others in

this collection, the above co-fllcting and confusig paragraphs

might be explaired as variations jotted dom as possible ap-

proaches to presenting a plan for the future, as yet undecided

This document, however, is the one bhich--to

NOSE.KO's puzzlement--had beer, approved and sigred in draft by

KOVSHUK, as Chief of the U.S. Etbassy Section,

Anerican Depart-

ment. KGB Secord Chief Directorate.

The preparing case officer.

KUSKOV, had furthermore indicated to the typing pool that it was

to be typed in ore copy, which gives the document the appearance

of a draft which had been or was about to be made a matter of

The foregoing review of errors, contradictions, and dis-

regard for security corsiderations in preparation costitutes

evider.ce that this is not a genuine KGB draft Zocument.

(111) Tie Summary Or LANSELLE

A second document, a handwritten rote in what HOSENKO

identified as CHEREPRiOV's own randwritirg.

alse is pertinent

to the authenticity of the

papers arid of NOSaNKO's accourt on

CHERLPANOV.

is a short summary of the operational activity

of the CIA officer WiNGELLE, covering the compromise of POrOV.

The document says in part:

"Ir. January 1959 a letter with secret

writirg mailed by

a co-horker of the Embassy of the USA 11 Moscow,

WINTERS, was intercepted and was addressed. to a Soviet citizen.

POPOV, a worker of the General Staff of the soviet army.

ing to the cortents of the letter.

it was clearly established

that FOFOV was an American agert..."

This coincides precisely with NOSENKO's accourt of POPOV's

compromise (see Payes 532 and 6531.

Unlike GOLITSYN's recollec-

-don of the official report which he read, there is ro reference

in this document to the report of about 1957 from ar agent source

that there as a leak of GRU irformation; ror is there reference

to the indication that the KGS knew that LiNGELLE had been posted

to Moscow in order to nardle a special agent, for this reason

placing LANGELLE under heavy surveillance.

If bott. of these

items were in the official report which GoLitSyli read, their

omission from the sinary report in what purports to be cHiere-

PANOV's handiTiting is roteworthy, particularly since CHEREPANOV

was supposed to have been in the same office (roon) as the casa

officer working agairst LANGELLE during the time the LANGELLE/

POPOV cperation was investigated by the KGe.

The latter posi-

more detail, as well as conflictirg infornation, on the same

While it is reasonable that a sanitized case sumary

would conceal an agent source of a lead by imputirg the dis-

covery to surveillance, it seers less likely.

and indesc un-

necessary, to conceal a detection via surveillance by imputing

agent source.

In thus supporting NOSANKO ard others

as to the cause of ripoV's compromise, and contradicting

GOLITSYN (who

is supported by other evidence accurulated in-

dependently), this document too appears to be a XGa fabrica-

The authenticity of another passage in the save document

1B

likewise open to question. This is the description of LaNGELLE's

two visits to Lenin Hills, which the documents stated were for

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 73

14-00000

673.

the purposes of casing a drop site and putting down tre dead

drop, respectively.

The document further stated that the dead

dron had been put down for REPNIKov.

an agent of Attrican Intel-

ligence who had recently been arrested by the Moscow KGB.

TwO

errors of fact in this passago belie KGB practice as known from

mEnY SOUICES!

- There is no reason to doubt that the KGB observed

LANGELLE on the two occasions of his visits to Lenin Hills,

both times to case a proposed dead dios site.

soth sites

involved staircases, but they were two different stair-

cases in the same general area of the Lenin Hills park.

Since it is a fact that INGELLE did not put down a dead

arop on either occasion. KGB gurveillance could not have

seen him do so.

If the KGb nad reason to suspect that he

had done so, but could not locate it

since it was not

there). the KGB would feel the necessity--even more than

in the case of ABIDIAN and the Pushkin Street drop--to put

24-hour surveillance on the area for a reasonable length

of time, in order to apprehend the agent for whom it was

intended.

The dead drop was not actually put down until

7 June 1958 (during twilight), ten days after the second

casing.

Assumiig the KGB had not stopped its coverage

of the arta after only ten days, the CIA agent who did

put down the dead drop must have been observed doing this.

CHEREPANOV'S note thus erred by attributing to LANGELLE

an action which the KGB knew he had not taken and which

the KGB almost certainly knew someore else had taken.

- At the time the dead drop was put down, it had not

been designated for any agent, REPLIKOV ircluded. It

was a contingency dead drop, to be activated at some

time in the future as necegsary; the agent for whom it

might have been designated could conceivably not even

be recruited until long after the dead drop was loaded.

REPNIKOV, identified in the document as the person in-

tended to unload it, was not a recruited agent of Ameri-

can Intelligence either at the time of the drop-loading ,

or at any time thereafter; neither was any dead drop

contemplated for him in the event that he might be re-

cruited.

Nothing that was in the drop could have sug-

gested REPNIKOV as the intended recipler.t.

Again.

CHEREPANOV's note erroneously and groundlessly assigned

the dead drop to REPNIKOV whereas in fact this dead drop

was unassigned by cIA..

If this document were or purported to be the official

version of the activities of LANGELLE, in typed or printed

form, these errors

in fact could be interpreted as

intentional

and part of the sanitization, or part of

an effort to make the

KGB investigative work look better than it was.

As 1t is a

handwritten copy, supposedly in the writing of. the person who

intended to give the document to the U.S. Government and harm

the KGB, and since CHEREPANOV supposedly would have had access

to the true facts, the absence of some coment further indi-

cates that the document was intentionally inaccurate and in-

complete.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 74

14-00000

674.

(iv) Remarks

That at least two of the documents were not authentic is

evidence that the CHEREPANOV papers were designed by the KGB

for American Intelligence consumption.

There is no

sensitive information contained in any of the

documents; that is, they are not worth the risk of stealing

either in helpirg the west or damaging the KGB.

It is further

questionable how CHEREPANOV was able to steal drafts destined

for destruction which are dated August 1958, March 1959, and so

on, ¿i he tidd not acquired his motivation of bitterness

against

the KGB until 1961, as indicated by NOSENKO and other sources.

It is also possible to question numerous other aspects of the

CHEREFAVOV case, some datirg from the eariiest known history of

the man and others nore recent.

This seems unnecessary in view

of the analysis of the WINTERs document and the LANGELLs sunmary.

It follows that the CHEREPINOV incident was a provocative

plan of the KGB.

NOSENKO'S StorY about CHEREPANOV, a mutually

confirming source on KGB affairs, must be interpreted as an

indication

that he has deliberately lied in reporting

on the

CHEREPANOV case and his part in the investigation, now shown

to have been spurious.

He has also lied in attesting to the

validity of the CHEREPANOV documents and thereby to the validity

of his

own information on the same topics which those documents

also covered.

---

## Page 75

14-00000

67;.

C. Evaluatiu! of sourcing

1. Int-oductici

¡ostillo das able to provide logical anu plausible sourcing

for nost of his incrican

leids, through his clairza professional

hwong his foreign leads, these to which he had no

plausible direct access have been various!y sourced to hearsay

from case officer

friends las with VASSAli, from nis friend

CHURASOV)

ard irvoirerent in poripheral activities (ouch as his

IDy to thie city of Viadini: after the kit int to win

spotted as i humusexual during a visit

Guestion-

able sourcirg by NosElku has occurred in hig statenents ca his

one couble agent case, four incrican cases and three involving

foreigners.

revietsd celow because they include the

most important ieads NOSEiKO has providea.

2. Discussion

vol suit dorie to kich

There are two KGB Secol Chief Directorats operations in-

volvirg imericans which HOSEliXO has sourced inconsistently or

He denunstrated uncertainty in his knowicare of the facts

of the "AliDKLY"

case (Pages 413-426) by maring verse allusioas

to having heard of it in

"bits and pieces" fron i runber of case

officers involved in the case at different times; his first know-

lcdge of it, he said, las due to his own employment ir the U.s.

Embassy Section in 1953-1955,

"although I worked there quite a

bit later.

But it was kroin."

(In 1962 be repeatedly dated the

recruitment as

-1949-50.") Dayle SMITH, identified as "ANDFEY",

fixed his

recruitment cate around December 1953, und he did not

leave Mosco

until April 1954.

Sinse SMITH Was

jirectly sub-

ordinate to the

office of the Army Attache, which was responsible

for the Embassy's code room, NOSENiO as case officer for the Army

Attaches had a lcgical reason for knowing more than he claimed

about the case, including the agent's name.

MULE, who succeedea

VAN WETHEM aS

cryptographic security

officer and

SHITH's super-

visor, was supposed to be one of NCSENKO's more active cases at

this time.

It is clear from NOSiNKO's inability to claim direct

knowledge of the case that he has rot aware of these, facts.

In the case of Edward Ellis SMITH (Pages 458-469), the U.S.

embassy Security Officer fron 1954 to 1>55, HOSENKO's ignorance

of the objective facts of the case led him into statements con-

1962 he claired to have played a significant role in the attempt

to recruit S!ITH, but he admitted after the defection. that these

clairs were exaggerations designed to make him lock better

than

He said the case officer was KOVSHUK,

and

GRIBA:OV was personally cunning the operation, but that in

sense he did play a role; he was assigred to a phone watch in

support of surveillance during the final phase of the case.

Once

again it is clear that he did not inor tre dates of SMITH's

assigurent to Moscow (1954 to 1956) ser did he kroi that the

operation he has described tock place between l and 5 Jure 1956,

and that SMITH was recailed from Moscoir on 8 June 1956.

This 1s

a full year after NOSENIO said he transferred froa the U.S. imbassy

TOP SECRET

....

---

## Page 76

14-00000

676.

POSENKO claised to have tad a dirose role as tle surervibirg

case

officer in the BELITSKIS case in 115 1962 Gurera phase.

As

a first-hand source, however, he was rorg about the urigina of

the operation and igrorart of the content and the ofcrational plas-

ning of the 1962 sectings he vas supposedly supervising.

In th18

Instance, as in the Edward SMITH case, "OSENiO's lifornalion is

inadequare fur his sourcing.

•NOSETtO provided leads to nine KuB opcrationg which had orig-

Inated with the First Chiel Directorate.

six of these he claimed

to have learned about through his friend in that Directorate. our.

sho was persorally Involved in nogt of thege oprrarions."

0f the

other tbree, tuo--le Paris agent (JOilNSOY) and the

Brussels/sato

case--..e said he picked up in bits and pirces fru:: techniclans of

the Second Chie! Directorate's Special

section iho had asgisted in

thes.

for buch of the latter opriatiuns,

nuserous coln-idesces

were alleged by NOSEStO to have

enabled hia to obtain the traggen-

tary information frot lis sub-sources.

and he was never able to

clarify what paris he learned from which of the four techricians

be naned as sub-sources.

In describing his acquisition of information on the rinth

case,

"SASHA, " NOSENKO has cuntradicted hisself:

said be

had learned sbout "SASHA" frOs SHAlYAPIN, providing lorgthy and

Involved explanations of how he vecane acquainted with SHALYAPIS

at the tire of the latter's retirenot from the KGB in 1962.

Later.

under interrogation, JOSENKO did not recall his

SHALYAPIS WAS

the original source of the "SASHA" story.

first

attributing it to

others and later saying that he could not rezen-

bor wher and fron whos he first heard it,

but SHALYiPId and others

had talked about it.

This was despite ile fact that by the time

he heard of "SASHA" he had already met and agreed to cooperate

with CIA; furthereore, when asked if "SASHA" was an important lead,

ne agrced

that it vas a serious matter.

Except for this one

occasion he lad consistently falled to appreciate the significance

of such a lead, irdirating that it was nur considered important la

the KGB.

that;

Also castirg doubt on his SoUSing of "SASHA" is tre

first rrference to

and the Cuban sissile crisis

of Cctober 1962, NOSESKO said he had larred of this iten fron

SHALYAPIN, whereas later

he said it was rot from SHALYAPIS (but he

could not identify arother source frog whon he had heard this de-

tall).

Regarding MuSEKO's leads to

eriers.

the case. of

thu

illezal"

Canada -

Fictitise

Woes that--is partner as to sourcing.

LOSESKO

first sald

iriend CUK had told hin of the case in-

officially, GUK having

been involved in the operation in soscou.

When asked

why GiK should

be involved in a Caradian case in 1963

when he sas supposedly

working in the First Chief Directorate's

American Deparisent against American targets.

YOSENKO retracted

his initial stareseat and sald that GUK somehow got in contact

with his, not as a KGB officer but stoply as

an acquairtance.

Despite the non official

nature of GUk's relationship as thus la-

plied by NOSESKO, CLy

able to tell bia all the operational de-

tails ca-cerning tot

- except his nase.

This case has an odd

*Although he had net GUK many years before, NOSENKO indicated that

they did not becore friends. untal his visit to Geneva in 1962. aad

only theo did GUK begin to reveal operatioial detaila to hia.

TOP SECRET

?

---

## Page 77

14-00000

t?".

aspect nhich d05Eli0 failed io see: lo said that this non tad

cone to MosEct

on a soviet visa issud on a reparate

piece ne

paper, raiher than catered in tro

tan's pariport,

so that there

would

not ¿e a mer-anent record of hi: crave:

the isSR.

This

inplies, and

unfired, that

he

travelied

under his trie

nane to

Moscch.

_fur:hermore

confirned that he had sere

as a tourist,

¿he USSR en a soviet tuuris?

ship.

tr. view

of the

First

Chief

Direciorate's operaricaul jurisdiscion in this

otheriise normal tourist,

there tids

ar. obvious necessiry for coor-

dination betteen the

First Chief Directorste's Arorican Lepartient

and the Second Chief Directorate's

Tourist departerns, to prevert

any slippage (such as MOSEilO descrites in the

SH03!8

case, when

the CRU failed to

ccoidinate with

the Xor!.

Yes despiie logical

professional

need-t0-a01

On HOSENKO's pare,

he first

cade his own

snowledze unpificial, and then

his subsource's incalege unofficial

as well.

HOSEND nas unable tu

of santane French

subsource,

he clained tha?

he

Esbassy in

1953 Or 1959

raje a glass

of hine

to 842a

in hob he had leariel of che case

Wher: pressed for a

had

jitended a recepiion

at the Indian

GRILAYON,

and when

GFIFA.OV

she undersicos sorchos that

was

an agent of CRIbAidi's.

His sourcing for the case of the

rench businessian, Murices

! Page 484), is not unlike that off

muskre ie said he had known

that

there was a Freach businessman ine bas an acent.

On one occa-

sici.

when YOSEStO was duty officer for the second Chief Directorate

a call for GRIlANCY

asked cho nas calling.

Wher he

was told it was crai

* then he

sorehow tia: this was

GRIBASOV'S agEnt.

3.

Remarks

NOSENiO's errors concerning "ANDRIY" (particularir his early

insistence that "ANDREY" had loft Moscon years before NOSENiO en-

tered the XGB) make it impossible thur NOSESKO could have learned

of the case in the nay ho lates said he did.

NOSENKO's accounts of how he learned of the "Paris agent"' are

vazue and vary with each telliag; they

also depend hearily on coin-

cidence.

se is noteworthr too that he clained to have been told of

¿his one operation ly no less than four individuals, thereas the

rest of what he learned of First Chief Directorate operations in

eleven years of KGS service came fron only tho

other individuals.

Furthernore, his krowledge of "SASHA" stemsed fros elaborate and

apparently contrived sourcing chich he hinself nas

unable to recon-

struct when pressed for exact detalls.

NoSEsko's inability

give any clear and cunsistent account of hoi he heard of either the

'Paris agen:" or "SASHA" must be judged in tne lighs of the fact that

he first heard of both cases only just after proaisire to collect

such inforcation

for cha.

because these

here anoig. ine nost ispor-

tant and the nost fortuitous items he ever picled up, it could

reasonablj be expected that he rould retenber how he

did so, espe-

cially since only a little ovei a year elapsed until his next

Leeting with ClA.

NOSESXO's sourcing for therma

ande

leads seems

illogical and fabricated.

It also appears that suiEriO has given an

inaccurate version

of the way in which he would nave learred of

¡aot an Illegal as NOSENKO indicated, but an agent).

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 78

14-00000

678.

D. Exalnation of "OSENKO's Intelligence Carcer

1. Introduction

what follows

is an examination of NOSENKO's accounts of his

Soviet Intelligence career, beginning with

the yearg 1951 and

1952, 1n the naval GRU and continuing with his ll years in the

U.S.

Embassy Section and the Tourist Deparinent of the KGB Sec-

ond Chief Directorate.

XOSENKO'5 naval service opens the dis-

cussion primarily because, according to his story, it provided

a springboard for bis entrance into the KGB in 1953 with the

rank of lleutenant.

The discussion of rach pariod in his career las too con-

tral topics:

Firge, YOSENKO's own description of his positions.

responsibilities,

and access: and second, ar assessment of this

description from the point of view of internal consistency,

accuracy, and the consensurability of his knowledge, operational

activities, and performance with his clained senior

and respon-

sible posts with the KGB and his rise to these posts.

This

assessnent is based on a corparison of the infornation supplied

by NOSENKO with

collateral

information from a variety of overt,

official, defector, and clandestine sources.

NOSENKO's accounts of the various periods in his career are.

of course, cumulative in that his claimed positiors and activi-

tles during one stage necessarily affect those of succeeding

periods.

possible, each period is evaluated wittin

Itself and independently of conclusions earlier reacted.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 79

14-00000

TOP viL

679.

2. Naval GRU Service

a. Introduction

"NOSENKO's accounts* of his naval GRU service (Pages: 64-77)

have teen reviewed for their internal consistency and credibility.

and examined for accuracy against information from other sources.

b. Discussion

Briefly, the outlines of NOSENKO's account of his military

gervice are about as

fellows:

- He studied for the equivalent of 7th, 8th. Ith and

part of 10ch

school years in naval schools

in Kuibyshev.

Baku

and Leningrad.

This would normally have nothing to do with

military service, except that NOSENKO says he took the mili-

cary oath at the

Baku School in the fall of 1943, at the

age of 16.

(According to available collateral information,

oati--formal entry into the military forces--was at

no

time given

the age of 17, and never for purposes of

"morale" as NOSENKO claimed it was here.)

clains to nave deserted this

school after taking the oath.

Also, he shot hinself in the hand only about two months

after starting anew later the same year in the naval school

in Leningrad and never finished school properly.

- He was connissioned in the "reserves" in 1947 after

completirg his secord year

at the Ingtitute of International

Relations in Moscow.

However, he cannot renember what

branch of the service he was

in, except that it was not the

He avoided active military duty thereafter by volun-

tarily doing military translations at the institute.

at the Institute he contracted verereal disease at least

twice and this went on his record.

In the spring of 1950, he was assigned to the Navy

by a mandate connission at the Institute.

However, ne

failed one of his examinations ("'arxism-Leninism") upon

completion of the Institute of International Relations later

in 1950 which delayed dis ciplona--and hence entry into

the service--until successful re-examination later that

(At about the same time, he das

considered and turned

down by the KGB (then 4G3) because of his school record,

drunkenness, and other bad marks in his record.)

- He was processed for entry into the naval GRU in

He said he visited the GRU personnel office several

for interviews and to fill out questionnaires and

write his personal history in connection with the required

security check.

He was accepted into naval GRU despite a

record which

showed desertion, self-inflicted wound in

I9P-SEGRET

---

## Page 80

14-00000

isoline

680.

martine, Ururkenness, venereal disease, still-valid marriage

to a stalo criminal's daughter, rejection. for GB employ-

ment, Alid a bad academic record including failure of a

course in Marrism-Leninism just at thie-tine.

- He was called to active duty as a senior lieutenart

and without any indoctrination or train-

On 12 MariN 1951' four or five daya later in civilian clothes

for his first duty station, Sovietskaya Gavan in the Soviet

Far East.

NOSENKO claims to have chosen this post, con-

sidered gonerally to be the least desirable of all

assignments. on his own initiative, to prove to his father

that ne wor a man.

(The above was his account in 1966, in

all carlier accounts he said he went to the Soviet Far East

In the fall of 1950, and in fact said that he had two months

leave in 1952, one for each of two years there.

However,

20 the 1956 account, his

service there lasted only

one year.)

- In covetskaya Gavan' NOSElikO's job was to extract in-

fornation iron Murican publications reporting naval de-

Asked in April 1964 for any personal account

of his own work, HOSENKO was able to think of oniy "four or

small ships to the coast of Sakhalin,* and

to tutkaido, to drop or pick up agents. His own role,

he said, us as a trainee; he was taken along oniy "to iearn

how it was done;" he himself never traired or dispatched any

he know the identities or missions of any

#s also could not describe the ships he had travelled

Questinned on the location of Sovetskaya Gavan' in 1965.

NOSENKO inaisted that this city is Iccated in Primorskiy

Kray, although it is actually located in Khabarovskiy Kray.**

~ NOSKIKO said he returned on routine leave lor, accord-

ing to otter accounts, because of having contracted tubercu-

losis in April 1952.

spent tho months either in

his parerts'

Moscow home or, according to other accounts,

a sanitoriuo near Moscow under treatment for tuberculosis.

He said he was coughing up "half a glass of biood at a time."

(X-rays and medical

examinations from February 1964 have

detected no indications that NOSENKO ever suffered from

- At this time, the summer of 1952, NOSENKO said he was

offered in Moscow ar. opporcunity to attend the GRU strategic

intelligence school, the Military-Diplomatic Avademy, but

turned it down because he had already studied most of the

course matter in

the Institute of International Affairs; b2-

sides, NOSEiKO said in October 1966, he failed the physical

examination when sugar was discovered in his faeces.

• NOSENKO was then transferred--without returning to

the Far last--to the Intelligence Staff of the Baltic Fleet

at Baltiys'k. He irverted a story in 1964 about going there

In October 1556 NOSENKO was asked whether he had ever been

to Sakhalin; his answer was no.

** This is the equivalent of being stationed for a year in fort-

land, Oregor and thinking oneself in California.

TOP SFORET

---

## Page 81

14-00000

TOP SECRET.

681.

via Naval Intelligence Points in Berlin, Rostock, and Sass-

nitz, but then said this was a lie he told because he felt

his interrogators would not believe hit if he had said he

successfully turned down an assignsent to these points.

then closing down, and had travelled directly to Baltiysk.

(As pointed out to NOSENKO, the assignment to the cold.

damp Baltic climate of a recent ~B-gufferer appears unthirk-

able, particularly when that person is a Government Minister's

son; he acknowiedged this but said, "There were no other

positions available.")

- He could not remather the nane of the place he served

near Baltiysk.

He had named it as Primorsk in 1962 (which

fitted iis description of its size and location) but from

1964 on insisted it was Sovetsk.

There is no such village

in the area, but there is in the region a well-known city

by that name (the former Tilsit) far inland and far away.

He did not know (as contemporary Soviet maps show) that

a rail line went to Baltiyst. frcm Primorsk.

- In the Baltiysk area, he clained in 1962, he had

trained agent teang

to be sent behird enemy lines in time of

Under interrogation in 1964 he changed his description

of his functions, saying he merely prepared training mater-

ials and delivered supplies, never

having direct contact with

or knowledge of the agent work.

His service there was

limited to about six months,

since he said he left there at

the beginning of 1953. He either had had che or two leaves

from there,

depending

on which telling is accepted:

NOSENKO said that in August or September 1952 he was given

a special leave from his duties in Sovetsk to travel to Mos-

cow in order to formalize his divorce fron his first wife;

in April 1956 he wrote that he was divorces during his leave

before going to Sovetsk.

- NOSENKO said he returned to Moscow on his own initia-

tive and against the wishes of his commanding officer at the

end of 1952 and began steps to get out of the Gru.

told conflicting stories of where he stayed and in what

It was during this period, he said, that

conversation with KOBULOV led him to shift to the KGB.

- In April 1966 NOSENKO wrote that he was promoted to

the rank of lieutenant of the Administrative Services while

stationed in Sovetsk.

In earlier accounts he said that he

was promoted to the rank of lieutenant while stationed in

the Soviet Far East.

c. Remarks

The notes above on NOSENKO's career do not treat most of the

changes of story, contradictions, corrections, or inaccuracies in

NOSENKO's accounts:

Variations of dates may be attributable to

faulty memory, changes in the story might have resulted fron his

own elaborations and

exaggerationg, and inaccuracies might be

explained by his inattention or indifference to detail. If all

the details were to be considered, the story would become even

nore confused.

Certain general aspects stand out, however:

-TOP SECRET

---

## Page 82

14-00000

TOP

682.

(1)

If his stor of his personal life is truefe

Maint

HOSENKO would,

accursing

tO

ail suallaile intormation.

not have been accepted

into

the naval GRU, ore of the particularly sensitive parts

of the ravi.

Esther the life history is false, or the GR's

officur suivire 1s, or both.

she story is vague, unsubstantial, and contra-

dictoryi no substance lias been addca to the base outlines

of the story despite frequent questioning. One might expec

of an educated or reasonably intelligent person some recol-

lection of tilitary service completed 10 years eariler--the

locations where he served, whether he did or did not have

how and when he entered of transferred from one place to

another, and what he did or what he experienced.

(3) NOSENKO's knowledge of military procedures, of

the navy, and of the units with which he served is practic-

ally nor-exiztent.

He has provides no reason whatever to

make one believe

that he actually wus a raval officer.

(4)

The functions he claims to have fuifilled involved

no direst involvement or personai resporeibilities:

They

sound like the bare outlines of a legend, not like Ical life

or persoral experience.

That this perlod is fictitious

is supported by the findings

of the psychologist (Pages

665-611).

NOSE:KO's description of his naval GPJ service cannot be

accepted as

true.

On the basis of his statements, It appears

moreover that he was never a naval officur, nor an officer of any

other regular military service.

Since NOSENKO claims that his GIU status and service provided

him the platform for a transfer into the KGB (without such for-

malities as medical examination, personnel interviews or question-

naires), this conclusion is relevant to his clain of KSB staff

status from

1952 or 1953.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 83

14-00000

683.

3. Entry Into the KGB

a. Eligibility

The previous section discussed VOSTKO's eligisility for

admission to the raval GRU and concluded with the remark that,

on the bagis of what NOSEliKO has told CIA about his earlier

life, he could not have been accepted for service in Naval

Intelligence.

Ascorcing to inforrition available to CIA fron

several knowledgeable sources, the iGB has more stringent entry

requirements than any other Soviet organization.

The candidate's

family backgrouná, personal condusi. ard Party or Komsomol rec-

ord must be impeccable.

NOSE: KO would have American Intelli-

gence believe that in his case the KGb--specifically the offi-

responsible for signing their names to tre approval--accepted

a person whose record showed las noteù on pages 679-680 above)

desertion fros the armed forces, seif-inflicted wound in wartime,

drunkenness, venereal disease, previous

marriage to the daughter

of a stute criminal, a bad acadenic record including farture of

a course in Marxism Leninism, and a prior rejection by the KGB

itself:

Tre only change since the carlier rejection had beer,

according to NOSENKO, two years of undistinguished military ser-

vice in the Naval GRU.

Moreover, during this naval duty NOSENKO said he had con-

tracted tuberculosis,

for which he ias still under treatment

at the time he entered the State Security Service.

NOSENKO has

indicated on

separate occasions that his illness was a matter

of record with the Gru, and that the reason he did not have to

take a physical examination for entry into the KGB was the avail-

ability of GRU records.

According to DERYABIN, however, KGB

regulations at that time would have precluded admission to KGB

ranks if there was a recent history of tuberculosis even though

already arrested.

b. Date of Entry

NOSENKO has given a variety of dates for his entry on duty

with the KGB

and has provided severa! reasons for his charges of

stOry (Pages 36-89).

During his

first reeting with CIA, when

NOSENKO gave a brief personal and professional autobiography, he

said that he had joined the KGB i.: February or March 1953.

In

1964, however, first while scill attached to the Soviet Disarma-

ment

Delegation and later when reviewing and signing a bio-

graphic history prepared by CIA on the basis of his own account,

NOSENKO set this date back a jear, to early 1952.

During the

interrogations of April 1964, after naming several other dates!

NOSENKO returned to the original one, March 1953,

and has remained

with this version since

that time.

NOSENKO has given

two aif-

ferent reasons for this change of dates (which,

he said in octo

ber 1966, was conscious deception).

In the April 1964 interrogations.

he explained that he had failed his examination in Marxism-Leninism

at the

Institute of International Affairs, which forced hin to

take all his

exans over again and delayed his career:

This was

"unpleasant, NOSENKO said,

and he was attempting to conceal it

from CIA.

In the October

1956 interrogations,

NOSENKO gave a new

and different reason.

He described hod he had been rejected for

employment by State

Security while at the Institute and was trying

to cover up for this because he thought CIA would not believe

that he had first been rejected and then, later, accepted by the KGB.

April 1964 interrogations.

NOSENKO's explanations of why he re-

vised the story have been

inconsistent and have forced him into

InD SCRET

---

## Page 84

14-00000

...1.

684.

Because of this and, in the absence of

any pressure of any kind lincluding any apparent psychological

pressurel to lie about his date of entry, the most logical explana

tion for this change is that HOSENKO forgot in early 1364 either

when he joined the KGB ard/or what he had told CIA in 1952.

DERYABIN ras comerted on the significarce which the date of entry

holds for a KGB officer.

He expressed the opinion that it wou!d

be unusual for a KGB officer to forget this date.

NOSENKO was questioned at length by DERYABIN (Pages 616-619)

the tiring of his entry on duty with the kge.

result of this irterrogation it was determined that NOSENKO was

unavare that at the time he said he joined the KGB, the present

First Chief Directorate was designated the Secord Chief Direc-

torate and vice versa.

Therefore, NOSENKO would have joined a

component entitled the First Chief Directorate in March 1953,

not the Second Chief Directorate as le says.

NOSENKO did not

know or had forgotten various other facts,

including the date

that the MVD was

redesignated the KCB, and misstated che loca-

tiors and existerce of various buiidings and offices

vicinity of the KGB Headguarters buildirg in early 1953.

Ir. June 1962 NOSENKO said several times, in different meet-

ings, that the KGB agent "ANDREY" (Pages 413-414) had been re-

cruited and had left Moscow before he, HOSENKO, entered

the KGB.

He estimated the date as 1949-1550.

NOSENKO knew that "ANDPEY"

was associated in Moscow with RiODIS and when told that RHODES

was trere from 1951 to 1953, admitted that the date he gave might

be "tory.

NOSENKO continued to say, however, that "ANDREY" was

recruited before he

(NOSElKO) became

a KjB officer, and later

reverted again to his estimate that "ANDREi" was recruited in

1949-1950.

Wher. he returned to Geneva

ir. 1964, NOSENKO changed

this story and said that during has 1953-1955 tour in the u.s.

Enbassy Section he saw cipher specialist SELEZNOV, who had come

there io consult on the then-active

"ANDREY" case.

NOSENKO was

unable to explain how he could have been sure in 1962 that the

"ANDREY" case was before his time; when re said in 1961 that

this was not so.

Dayle SMITH confessed that he was

recruited by

the KGB in late

1953, and records show that he left Moscow in

early 1954.

c. Circuistances of Entry

NOSENKO has consistently related his entrance into the KGB

to discussions he had with General KOBULOV in early 1953 in Mos-

cow, after returning from the Baltic.

However, he has changed the

date of these discussions with KOBULOV virtually every time he

has told this story.

In June 1962, NOSENKO said he talked with

KOBULOV at the NOSENKO dacha while on leave in March 1953; during

the april 1964 interrogations he changed the date to February

1953; in April 1965 NOSENKO said he spoke to KOBULOV at the

KOBULOV dacha in January 1953 while on leave and that he liveo

at home and was at the

"disposal of GRU personnel" during Febru-

ary and March.

Finally, in April 1966, ROSENKO said he first

spoke to KOBULOV at KOBULOV's dacha on

New Years Day 1953, that

he was subsequently "resting" at a sanitorium connected with his

tuberculosis of the year befure, and that he spoke

again to

KOBULOV or. the day of STALIN's funeral, while home

for a few days

from the sanitorium.

It was at this second encounter with KOBULOV

that the latter promised to concern hinself with NOSENKO's entry

into the KGB.

TUF SECRET.

---

## Page 85

14-00000

1OP

685.

In 1962 NOSESTO described the simple procedure by which he

entered the KGS, volunteering that there has no need to fill out

a questionnaire

(arxetal as the KGB already had his files fron

the GRU.

In April 1964 when asked if he had not been required

to fill out any questionnaires or other docurents, NOSENKO des-

cribed the anketa and other forg he completed (saying he took

them home to do sol and his various interviews with. KGB per-

sonnel officers.

He was interrogated in detail on these claims

by

DERYABIN in 1965,

to whom he gave descriptions, albeit in-

accurate,

of the various forms and of his visits to KGB Personnel.

In 1966 NCSENKO wrote in his autobiography that there were no

talks with KGB Personnel before or after his acceptance and in-

plied that there were no forms to fill out.

d. Remarks

According to all of NOSENKO's stories, his GRU service was

the springboard for his acceptance into the KGB.

He mEt KOBULOV

while hore in Moscow from Primorsk/Sovetsk, he entered the KG3

as a lieutenant since this was his naval rank, his admission

according

to the early version was facilitated by the availability

was never a GRU officer

of his GRU personnel file; yet cin has concluded that NOSENKO

it appears highly improbable that he

waa ever in Primorsk under any circumstances.

On the basis of gererally available information concerning

soviet realities at the time of NOSENKO's clained entry into the

*GB, supported by the expert testimony of DERYABIN (who was in

then MVD, in Moscow at the time and h.d been himself a

KGB personnel officer until less than a year earlier), a person

with the background NOSENKO has given could rot be accepted into

the KGB in the marner he claims.

Ilis health alone would seem

to have precluded this, but in addition, NOSENKO descrited a

series of incidents in his life equally likely to cause rejection.

NOSENKO's mistakes,

changes of story,

and apparent fabrications

add to the unlikelihood of his account.

It is concluded that,

as in the case of NOSENKO'S GRU ser-

vice, either NOSENKO and those who have supported aspects of

his story have seriously distorted his past life, or he did not

enter the KGB.

TOP-SECRET.

---

## Page 86

14-00000

TOP S

686.

1. Initial Service in the U.S. Embassy Section

a. Introjuction

NOSENKO claims to have served in the U.S. Erbassy Section of

the American Department,

Second Chief Directorate, during the

period. from his entry on duty with the KGB until June 1955.

targets during these two years were at first Aserican correspond-

ents in Moscow and later American Aray Attaches at the Embassy.

NOSENKO sought to avoid discussion of his own or other KGB

activity during this period and on occasion he has tried to dis-

miss the whole period as

"not Iclevant" and "of ro

consequence.

NOSENKO has repeatedly said that he "found hinself" only after

his

initial service in the U.S. Embassy Section.

(He variously dated

his self-discovery as occurring in 1955, when he transired to

the Tourist Department; in June 1956, in conrection with is par-

ticipation in and award for the BURGI

case; and after iscuss 1956,

when the death of his father forced him to puil himscis

Before this, NOSENKO said, he has a vastrel and "did not pay

b. Work Against Anerican Correspondents

NOSENKO exempted himself fron reporting details of KGB work

against any specific American correspondent in Moscow in 1953-

1954 (Pages 93-96) by saying that,

as a new, very junior employee

he had no access to operational files and did not participate

personally in the handling of any of the currespondents.

Although

able to identify four correspondents in Moscow no were

then re-

cruited KGB agents, NOSENKO learned this information either in

conversations with his superior KOZLOV or at some point and in

some undefined way after he no longer was working against these

targets.

NOSENKO's early months in the job were spent reading

personality (not operational)

files on a number of the corres-

pondents

in Moscow

(none of which indicated the individual's de-

velopmental or agent status) and familiarizing himself with KGB

methods.

Later NOSENKO was assigned the "agent network" of

drivers, clerical personnel,

and domestics

surrounding four.of

the correspondents (two of

whom were recruited "GS agents at

the time); he met with them periodicaily to determine whether

they had. devaloped any important information.

Even here,

NOSENKO appears to have beer. given very little responsibility:

His superior KOZIOV often wert along to the reetings with. NOSENKO,

first to show him how to handle the agents and afterward when-

ever something interesting would begin to develop.

In fact,

according to NOSENKO, KOZLOV would accompany him to meetings

with these Soviet citizens-agents even when there was a

that something of interest might develop.

to identify some of these agents, but for all but a few he re-

called neither their names nor personalia concerning them.

c. Work Against Army Attaches

Regarding

NOSENKO's work against American Army Attaches, he

a specific area of KGB responsibility, one for which

alone was accountable and one about which something was previously

known fron U.S: records. Only 20 months at the longest, it is

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 87

14-00000

687.

the last period in which HOSENKO had no supervisory responsibility

to divert his attention fron personal operational duties.

NOSENKO could not recember when he toud over responsibility

for the Army Attaches, and he named two other iGB officers boforo

settling

upon BuDYLDIN

as the person from whon he received the

Attaches' files.

Then belittling his earlier respongibilities

for correspondents, he bas sald several times that he had been io

that job "only about six sonthg."

Assuming that NOSEVO entered

tbe KGB in the middle of March 1953, this would date his transfer

to work against the Attachos in

the fall of that year.

In dig-

cussing this transfer itsell, however, NOSENKO has congistently

said that it took place in 1954.

Asked when

in 1954, NOSENKO

has variously replied "at the beginning of 1954," January 1954,

and Mey 1954.

Under interrogation in early 1905, NOSENKO TE-

fused to estimate when he took over this responsibility.

He hag

always said that he turned over these duties and transferred fros

the U.S. Embassy Section in June 1955, when the Tourist Department

WAS

established within the Scoond Chief Directorate.

NOSENKO has said in different contoxts that as the American

Department case officer responsible for cperations against the

U.S. Arny Attaches he received and was responsible for assinilat-

1ng the product of a wide variety of sources on the individuals

who were his targets.

He has mentioned information received from

the KGB First Chief

(foreigo Intelligence) Directorate; the

Archives of the HGB/MVD/KGB; micropiones which were emplaced

about a year before MOSESKO entered the American Department*; a

network of Soviet chauffeurs, cooks, language instructors, and

other agents in the Eubassy who together provided little uscul

Information; permarent and roving surveillance patrois outside

the Embassy; fixed observation posts next to, across from and

Dear the Embassy; advance notification of intent to travel by

the Attaches and

their itfreraries; and reports fron outside Hos-

cow, including surveillance, agent networks, the Militia, and the

military.

The point of collecting and assimilating this infor-

matIon, NOSENKO said, was to be able to know what the Attaches

vere doidg in Moscow

ard thereby to control their intelligence

collection activities.

Far less important was the goal of re-

cruiting Military Attaches; NOSENKO knew of only several 10-

stances when this was atteupted, and all of these efforts failed.

Tbe KGB's priseipal interest in control rather than recruit-

ment has been NOSENKO's explanation for knowing little about the

backgrounds ard personal lives of his targets--such information,

ho stated, simply was not pertinent to the primary mission of

*On some occasions NOSENKO has said that the microphones in the

offices were his most valuable source of informa-

tion on his targets of 1954-1955; at other times

that he knew nothing of these microphones until he reentered the

U.S. Embassy Section in 1960; and at still other times he claimed

to have known only of their existence during 1953-1955 but

where any were located.

---

## Page 88

14-00000

688.

control.*

He has also used this explanation to support his clain

that there were no recruitments

of ailitary attaches during this

period.

An exception, wherein the KGB did carefully compiie a great

deal of vulnerability data on ar. Army Attache, has described by

NOSENKO in connection with the approach to walter MÜLE (Page 104).

On the basis of these expianations, NOSENKO's knowledge of the

official and unofficial activities of his alleged targets in this

period deserves atrention.

NOSENKO knew almost nothing about the personal backgrounds

and families of the eight members of the Army Attache Office

whor he identified as his targets (Pages 99-100). hlthough he was

able to identify each by rant. and position in the rabassy--sone-

times inaccurately--ard

a few cases to describe certain of

their operational activities, he was unaware of or had

forgotten

such facts as:

and 1955, was

asso one arrested Mcce set the army ouasice of 955-

in 1954.

- Assistant Army Attache Ira RICHARDS was a language

student of GROMOKOVA (identified by NOSENKO as a KGB agent) ;

by RICHARDS' account she sought to elicit biographic data

from him during the lessons.

- William STROUD, the issistant Amy Attache, travelled

to kharkov in May 1955 to interivew an American defector.

(NOSENKO has identified Frank SISCOE, "ho accompanied STROUD;

as a suspected CIA officer; he nas coopted by CIA.)

NOSENKO, furthermore, was ignorant of important events, known

independently to CIA, which were within the sphere of what he

claimed was his direct, personal responsibility:

- NOSENKO claimed direct personal jesponsibility for

the file of and operational activity against Lieutenant

Colonel Howard FELCHLIN (Pages 191-103).

He ciaimed to be

receiving agert infornation on him but could not recall the

names or cryptoryms of

any such agents.

Gile said, sor

exarple:

•I think FELCHLiN must have had a maid,

and she

would have been a KGB agent.")

NOSENKO described FELCHLIN

as by far the most aggressive of his

targets

and hence the

object of special interest; yet he did not know or remember

ROSENKO himself, when giving the reason why he did not know

more details about the

U.S. Embassy Section's targets while

he was its Deputy Chief in 1960-1961, said that as a supervisor

he was too busy overseeing subordinates; hence,. NOSElKO con-

tinued, he could not be expected to remember as many such de-

tails

as would be possible had he been a case officer working

daily with only four or five files.

In another context, NOSENKO

explained why he was unable to supply the details of planning

and organizing operations

tourists in the period 1955-

1959; he contrasted operations against tourists, who often

cane and went in a matter. of a few days, to

the work against

the Military Attaches and diploats stationed in Moscow on

perarent assignments, who could be studied systematically and

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 89

14-00000

689.

anything about FELCHLIN's background, presurably well docu-

mented by the KGB because FELCHEI!: had been to the USSR in

two different capacities, merchant seaman and diplomatic

courier, prior to arriving in Moscow as the assistant Alms

Attache: also FELCHLIN had had prior official association

with GRU officers in Austria, Germany, and the United States,

and he continued to be ir. liaison with one of them in Moscow.

NOSEYKO could recall nothing about FELCHLIN's intelligence

activities in the USSR or his trips about the country, or

what had been done about them by the KiB. In speaking of

F'ELCHLIN's expulsion from the Soviet Union, NOSENKO reforted

the KGB file noted that FELCHLIN had been caught taking

photographs on some occasion, but he did not know trat FEI,-

CHLIN in June 1954 was arrested in Kiev with another Assist-

ant Army Attache, F.J. YENGER.

(Erroneously identifica by

NOSENKO as an Air Force Attache, YEAGER likewise should have

been NOSENKO's targe:. NOSENtO also did not know that

FELCHLIl, with another AImy Attacne and iwo Air. Force Attaches,

in September 1953 had rade an irprecedented train trip through-

out Siberia and that six months later, at the end of March

1954, had been the subject of a rewspaper article which

charged tr.at they had lost

"spy documents" on the train.

NOSENKO was unable to provide a date

for FELCHLIN's expul-

sior from the soviet Unior., and he knew nothing of the

un-

usual circunstances of FELCHLIN's departure from Moscow;

le insisted that nobody else was declarea persona non grate

along with FELCHLIN.

In fact, FELCHLIN was

expelled along

with dir force taJor alter MOHINNEY, and the Soviets re-

fused to permit the iwo to leave Moscow aboard the Ambassa-

dor's personal plane until imbassador BOHLEN hinself protested.

Confronted by his laci of krowiedge of the persona non

Irata action, NOSENKO said that he could noi be expected to

now the details because this incident occurred after he

transferred from the U.S. Embassy Sectior to the Tourist

Department in June 1955.

NOSENKO was

then told the recorded

date of the expulsion, 3 July 1954, and he replied that this

was not true.

- Discrepancies appeared in NOSENKO's account of one

of the best known incidents

in the history of KGB operations

against the American officials in the Soviet Union, the

subject of reports by GOLITSYN and other CIA sources and the

subject of training caterials. This was the seizure

sensitive technical collection equipment on 5 May 1955 in

Stalingrad from three Assistant Military Attaches from the

U.S. Embassy--Major John S. BENSON, Captain STROUD, and

Captain MULE--and their expulsion

from the Soviet Union two

days later.

NOSENKO claimed direct responsibility for KGB

work against these officers (Pages 103-105); he described

an earlier attempt to defect MulE, his own plans for seizing

this equipment at a railroad station outside Moscow, and his

role in developing plans for the successful operation in

Stalingrad.

When

NOSENKO was pressed under interrogation to

give the actres he said he eate operation es carried sona

non grata action,

after he was in the Tourist Department and therefore he knew

no more about it.

nhen

told that the operation took place

at least a month before

his alleged transfer, NOSENKO could

offer no explanation for his lack of knowledge.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 90

14-00000

-..-

TOP SECRET

690.

- NOSENKO identified George VAN LAÊTHEM as an Assistant

Air Attache in 1953 or 1954: he was a target of another U.S.

Embassy Section officer, and an unsuccessful KGB development

operation was carried out against him.

NOSENKO did not krow

that VAY LASTHEM was actually

an Assistant Army Attache, who

left Moscow in March 1953 and was succeeded by NOSENKO's Own

target halter MULE (ste above) .

What NCSaNKO additionally

did not know is that In Moscow VAN LiêThay was the Attache

cryptographic security officer, the superior of Dayle SMITH

(the subject of NOSE KO's "INDREY" lead--see below)

friend of the motor pool sergeart Roy RHODES,

a KGB agent.

NOSENKO furthermore did not know that on 19 March 1955,

again as an himy Attache, and unly two years after beirg

transferred from Moscow,

VAN LAETHEM was again sent to Mos-

cow, ostensibly on a PCS assignmert but actually on tempor-

ary duty.

During this latter assignment,

when NOSENKO by

account should have been responsible for him. VAN

LAETHEM was in Moscow to review thi entire electronics

progran at the Enbarsy.

(VAN L'ETHIN'S sEcond tour 1n

Moscow involved the planned use of the elestronic equipment.

which was seized In Stalingrad while VAN LAETHEM was still

in Moscow.)

d. Additional Reporting

His information or two other operatiors involving Americans

was said by NOSENKO to stem from his 1953-1955 service in the U.S.

Embassy Section.

One was the recrüitment of the military cipher

rachire mechanic having the KGB cryptonym

"ANDREY" (Dayle SMITH,

see Pages 413-426

and further comments in Part VIII.B.3. and

VIII.C.).

NOSENKO in 1962 was sure not only that this recruit-

ment

took place before he joined the KGB but that "ANDREY" had

left the USSR by then as well: he repeatedly estimated "ANDREY'S"

recruittent date as "1949-1950." At all times he has claimed

certainty that

"ANDREY" was the last KGB recruitment in the

Embassy until the time of NOSENKO's defection in Jaruary 1964.

In 1964, however, NOSE:,KO changed his story and said "ANDREY"

was active while NOSENKO was in the U.S. Embassy Section ii. 1954-

1955.

The other operation was an unsuccessful recruitment approach

to the U.S.

Embassy Security Officer Edward Ellis SMITH (see

Pages 468-469

and further comments in Part VIII.B.3. and VIII.C.

atove)

at

meeting with the KGB arranged through letters wnich

had been

sent to SMITH.

This occurred in 1954 or 1955, NOSENKO

said, and in support of the recruitment approach, he handled

the surveillance phone-watch,

SMITH admitted to J.S. authorities

having received four letters from the KGB between 2 and 5 June

1956 la year after NOSENKO dated his departure from the U.S.

Embassy Section), but he denied having had any personal meetings

with KGB officers.

e. Remarks

NOSENKO's accounts of the 1953-1955 period are confused,

contradictory,

incomplete and inaccurate.

He has been inconsistent in dating

his shift of responsibilities withir. the U.S. Embassy Section,

in dating his departure from the Section (viz., the timing of

the Stalingrad incident and the approach to SMITti), and in dating

his first knowledge of the microphones in the Embassy.

"Häving

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 91

# 4-00000

691.

detaila of inportance on the American correspondents,

NOSENKO nas proven unreliable regarding his work against Army

He misidentified two (YEAGER and VAN LAETHEM), he

claimed to have almost no information on the backgrounds and acti.-

vitles of the otheres and he lacked even the most important de-

tails on security affairs involving the majority of his eight

alleged targets.

Ing about the work of his colleagues in the U.S. Embassy section.

The statements by NOSENKO about this period therefore hold

so little substance and the manner of his reporting was so

vincing, that his claim to have been an officer of the u.s.

Embassy

Section in the years 1953-1955 cannot be true.

++762+6975-71-

TUP SEUNLI

---

## Page 92

1 4-00000

iTAS: 257.

692.

5. Tourist lojartment (Jure 1955 to Taruary 1950)

8. Introduction

NOSENKO's activities from June 1955 to January 1960, his

first period of alleged seivice with the ivericar-british-Canair

jan Section of tourist Department of the KGB Second Chief Diree-

torate, are described in Pages 107-151. For the purloses of the

followirg diecussion, it is convenient to divide this period i-to

two parts.

The first uf these covers the years fron Jure 1955

to June 1958, when NOSENKO said re

was a staff case officer,

hardling and

recruiting agents and planning and managing opera-

tional activity.

The second part covers liOSE:KO's service frois

June 1953 to the beginning of 1y60 as beputy chicá of tris section.

Apart fron his personal involüonent in a nurber of recruittent

operations in the latter perica,

it is this vervice which provides

a basis for MOSENKO to ciaim

marchess of cal importart arrests

of spies and recruitments from enong meritin tourists visiting

the soviet Union, it is also tils survice as Deputy Clief de Sic-

tion which NotExo ciles as a baris for has irvolveront in the

case of lee lariay OshiLl laside the soviet Union.

b. The Early Period (1955 to 1959)

(i) Ger.e=al

According to Noselito's story, he is dang the siist case

officers in the tourist lipartment.

le arrried there just as

the Department was beiry forned and took part with other officers

assigned in the acquisition of an agent retiori fron lithin

inturist, in the establishtent of facilities ard methods,

and

ir

generally "gettirg things going."

cipated in

what he says has his

Several norths later he parti-

first operation against an Ameri-

can tourist. This was NOSENKO's behind-the-scenes

(and hence

uncor.firmed) orgarization of an urseccussful attempt to compromise

Martin MALIA (Pages 112-113).

NOSENKO's next case

Ithe first

operation in which his participation is confirmed) took place a

year later,

in June 1956, when he assisted in the honosexual en-

trapment and recuitrent o! Richard BURGI (Pages 113-120).

This

recruitment, which cocurred close in time to the Minister NOSENKO's

death, was by NOSENKO's account a turning point in his personal

and professional life. Lith it, NOSENKO began to acquire a sense

of self-confidence and responsibility and began to

"grow" fron a

wastrel

into an effective and successful KGB officer.

As a re-

sult of this operation, the first successfui recruitnent in the

then short history of the Tourist Department, NOSENKO first came

into personal contact üith General GRIBAiOr.

iccording to ali

accourts prior to October 1965, when he retracted the claim,

NOSEIKO reCeived the

first of a series of KG3 awards for opera-

perforsance because of the SUrGI case--a lutter of cou-

within a sunth of this operation, Hostlito said, he

pronoted fron the rank of lieutenant to captair, his last

piomotion prior to defecting eight years later.

NOSENKO's direct operational activity in the next two years,

before his appoininient ay

reputy Chief of the Section, was

das-

cribed by NOSENtO as folli's:

Sometime in 1957 he was involved

in the attempted recruitinent of the German businessran that

(Pages 120-121); after surrourding him with agents, NOSENKO

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 93

04.00000

1077

-indesian

?..lwruxas 6209909675944-3629

693.

personally spoje to him.

MOSEHKO explained his (unconfisted)

participation in

this case, which was not arong the resporsibili-

ties of his sectiont deal vas drown to speak

c0ying there das no rGs citicer available

who spoke German

"a little Eng-

115,

a language in which dosanko ted fair fliercy.

In 1957

NOSENKO was also irvolved in the sexual and blacknarket entrap-

rent of Excelais sorwegian journalis: lagain, not a target of

NOSENKO's section, being neither

Anesican, Lritish or Canadian):

NOSENKO has rot expiained how he ca-e

to be involved in this

operation, but he said his role was that of insolving fishtwith

wonen

and

blacknares

recruit hin.

an individial w'ose role

correspords to the one NOSENKO claimed

as his own (Pages 121-122).

NOSENKO's third operation in 1957

was really not an eperation at a'l.

He was assigned to accompany

the British East tantand the lattery interpreter tastion

soviet publishing houses (Page 121).

NOSENKO BaLd his

purpose was only to watch this

i suspected irtelligence agent

or officer.

His presence was cunfired by tria

who recognized

NOSE KO's photograph.

ir..

This is the sun of NOSENKo's reported, ecretimes verified.

operatioral role ciring

the three years preceding his pronotion

in June 1958 to the position of Deputy Chief of the American-

Canadian-british Tourist Section, hereafter referred to as the

Arcrican Icurist Section.

The oniy case of the june 1955-Jure 1958 period resulting

in agent contacts abroad, and the one to which NCSElKO ascribed

the greatest importance, was the recruitment of BurGI. For this

reason, the BUPGI operation is discussed in detail below, with

particular attention being

given to those aspects of tre case

which reflect upon NOSENiO's own personal role.

(ii) The BURGI Case

NOSE-KO's statements of this operation generally agreed with

that BURGI provicca to

the FBI in 1957.

The part NOSENKO played

in the case, both in his brief initial presence with the two

homosexuals in the Moscow restaurar: on the evening of BURG!'s

compromise 120 Jure 1356) and in the fiev events 123-28 June 1990)

would appear to be one normally tarra by a KGB staff officer.

The identities of the other to kGs participants in the Kiev

recruitment, KOZLOV and PETRENKO, seen clearly

estabiishad.

There

were discrepancies

between NOSINKO's and BurGi's versions, but

most of these couls sten from NOSINkS's faulty nerory nine years

after the events.

¡Such discrepancies include losinKO's iailure

to remember his first Moscow meetings with BURGI: the identity,

role.

or even existence of the person "Anatoliy" whon BURGI says

introduced him

tO HOSENKO and participated in the homosexual

compromise; whether NOSENKO was at the kiev airport to meet BURGI;

the locatica of NOSENKO's bedroom in the

Kiev Hotel as compared

tO BURGI'S; NOSEIKO's reference to BURGI's "interpreter" when in

fact BURGI neither had nor needed one; and NOSEliKO's failure to

remember the unusual circunstances of BURGI's departure from

Kiev.)

Other contradictions and onissions in NOSENKO's reporting

relate to natters of greater operationai consequence:

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 94

14-00000

TOP SE

694.

- NOSENKO was Unable to say when or how the KGS first

learned that BURGI, tas a homosexual, nor could he remember

who flist proposed an operation agairst him.

- NOSENKO gave a confused and evasive account of his

dealings with the first Chief Directorate on this case.

- NOSENKO insisted that there was no official file on

BURGI, and that none was opened as a result of this opera-

tion.

The initiative for the operation came, he said, fron

the Second Chief Directorate, and when NOSENKO traced BURGI

in the First Chief Directorate, there was no information on

him there.*

The KGB's only information on

BURGI: at the

time of the compromise came from BURGl's visa application

(which showed him to be a professor of Russian)

and a few

agent reports from the preceding days in Moscow:

on the other hand, reported that during the recruitar:

senior Soviet present, shored knowledge of the

names of BURGI's sister, mother and father and knew the

sister's occupation; details of BURGI's background, work, and

military service, BURGI's relations with the russicum in

Pome, which

BURGI said he had never mentioned in the L'SSR:

and BURGI'&

acquaintance in the U.S. with Alexander KERENSKY.

NOSENKO cited "his" recruitment of BURGI in Kiev in 1956 as

one of the main reasons for his rapid rise in the NGB.

BURGI'S

story of the recruitmert, as reported to the FBI, definitely

establishes NOSENKO'&

role as having been subordinate to that of

KOZLCV--it was KOZLOV, not NOSENKO, who made the recruitment.

DERYABIN interrogated NOSENKO on this case.

NOSENKO'& answers

to such detailed questions

as how the

done, how

the travel to Kiev was arranged, details concerning the person-

nel involved, the contents of the file, and other mechanics

of the case, betrayed an almost total lack of memory.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 95

14-00000

695.

c. Promotion to Deputy Chief of Section

NOSENKO said that in June 1958, when the unit that rad

formerl: handled tourists from all countries was resiganized into

two sections, he was promoted from the rank or senior

cer to that of Deputy Chief of the newly created american Tourist

NOSENKO said that this section was the most important

Tourist Department,

and that he did not know why he,

in particular, had been chosen its Deputy Chief but was certain

that GRIBANOV had no voice in

d. Knowledge of Section's Staff and gent Persornel

NOSENKO has named with clarity and consistency the other

officers of the American Tourist Section during this period.

The

Soviet agents of his section whom NOSENKO has identified were

mostly his own; he said that the agents were corstantly shifted

from case officer to case officer and hence it was "difficult to

say just who handled which agents."

NOSENKO said he had approxi-

mately eight soviet agents in 1958 ard about 12 or 14 in 1953, -

most of them employed by inturist (Pages 109-112).

With the ex-

ception of the two homosexuals, YEEPElOV and VOLKOV discussed

separately below, NOSENKO cannot supply personal data on nis own

agents or remember specific jobs they did for the KGB.

Kncwledge of Section's Activities

As of June 1958, according to NCSINKO, the work of the

section of which he was deputy chief was

"just getting going."

Its mission was, first of ail, to detect western Intelligence

officers and agents anong the

increasing flow of tourists visit-

ing the Soviet

Union; only secondarily was the section directed

toward the recruitment of KGB agents from among these tourists.

In his new position NOSENKO was responsibie for supervising

other officers in the section in efforts along these lires.

Be-

cause of this and because at GRIBANOV's request he personally

reviewed KGB information on the use of tourist cover by western

intelligence

services and KGB counteraction through 1958 (Pages

• 145-146), NOSENKO made

a number of statenents concerning these

subjects during the 1955-1959 period.

CIA started its so-called "legal travelle."

program in

1955 and by 1958 was deeply committed to such operations.

there is: firm collateral information on what the KGB krew of

this operational program. In view of NOSENKO's duties in the

American Tourist Section and the section's prime mission, he should

have knowledge of agent compromises during 1958 and 1959.

over, thanks

to collateral holdings, what NOSENKO did and did not

compared with information from other sources. These

facts are reviewed below.

(1) BLAKE

A valuable source of information for the KGB in its planning

for the operational activity of its Tourist Department in the

late 1950'g and early 1960's was the Englishman, George BLAKE

(Pages 146-147).

BLAKE has confessed that in the summer of 1959

he-passed the KGB a 19-page summary of the results of a_three-day

meeting during the first week of June 1959, between representa-

tives of CIA and MI-6; these sessiong were

on the subject of

"legal travel" intelligence operations against the USSR. This

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 96

14-00000

696.

summary spelled out in detail the camplete CIA operational doc-

trine pertaining to tourist-type operations and stressed CIA's

reliance on tourist agents for the spotting, recontacting, assess-

ment, and camunicatiors support of interral assets.

While NOSENKO has displayed some familiarity with cIA modus

operandi in tre field of tourist operations, he has never

tiored that the KGB was in possession

of documentary reporting

which descrited these rethods in full detail.

not appear to be aware of who Blike was, nuch less of his 1m-

portance to the KGE.

NOSENKO never volunteered the name of

BLAKE in his debriefings, and when specifically asked in 1962

about SLAKE, the KGB

agent in British Intelligence, he said

that he had read the dossier and that BLÄKE had been "an agent

of the second (Britisti Department (of the Seccra

nearly es valuable as thes

Wor the other Engliseman" (VisiLl). Ey 1965 Fe

COJia r0E

any such agent of the Britist Department.

when the name BLAKE das mentiored, he asked:

BLAKE had, in addition, passed to thr KGB a photocopy of

a 21-page sunmary report of a secord, isliov-ip conference be-

tween CIA and MI-6 on "legal travel" op.! cions which was held

in Washington from 20 to 25 Aprli 1960.

iNSENKO, although not

in the Tourist Department at the time the latter report was

received by the KGB, said that he reviewed all important ma-

terials of the Anerican Tourist Section when he became its Chief

in January 1962.

Asked whether the Tourist Departrent had re-

ceived documentary irformation from ary agent source while

NOSENKO waS away

fron the department in the years 1960-1961,

he replied that none had and that he knew of no agent who could

have provided such documentary irformation.

(i1) GOLITSYN Document

NOSENKO in 1964 reported knowing that GOLITSYN at the time

of his defection in December 1961 took with him an official

top secret KGB documert concerning Western Intelligence oprira-

tional activity in the field of tourisn (Pages 147-149).

dià not mention

this fact in the Jure 1962 neetings.

Although

NOSENKO also stated that this document had been prepared by

the Tourist Department,

he has not been able to describe the

document in detail and specifically did rot mention that this

particular document was in large part based, as subsequent

analysis has shown, upon the above-mentored reports submitted

to the KGB by George BLAKE.

(111) Tour1st Agents

NOSENKO asserted that the KGB detected no agents among

American tourists during the years 1958 or 1959,

and that ro

tourists had been caught in the act of mailing letters,

servic-

ing dead drops, or contacting agents, except ore in 1959 whose

name.

NOSENKO said, was MacGuIre

(actually McGOWAN in 1958).

NOSENKO signed a statement attesting to these facts.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 97

14-00000

IUr SECRET

..... ..

697.

The KGB docurent supplied by GOLITSYN, however, refers to

a number of cases cf American tourists wo vere ioura by tre

KGB to be engaged in intelligence colieccion or intelligence

support activities.

In addition to MeGohi, the GOLItSyN docu:

the cases of SIYARD, GrAY and pElliCIS, all of then

CIA agents detected by the kGa

in 1358 and 1959.

Inese years

coincide with the time when NOSENiO clains to lave been Deputy

Chief of the section wich was responsible for monitoring and

uncovering

activities of this sort, bat NOSENKO has never zen-

Furtherture, the annual reports of the section

which HOSENKO would nave helred to write, by virtue of nis

clained position as Deputy Chief of the merican Tourist Sectioi,

presumably included all of these cases.

f. NOSENKO '& Tourigt Paper

NOSÈNKO was questioned at lergth on the review of western

tourist operations unici ne clained to have written for GRiZANOV.

He said he gathered the material for this study from carlier

annual reports

of the Tourist Departnent and by talking with

varinus case officers, then took the study to GRIDA:OV's

office. NOSENKO could rot remember whether he discussed his

firdings with GRIBANOV, could noù give any exanpies of the

information which re incluled in the report (other than statis-

tical information on the ircrease in foreign courism),

could

not recall what the report said about ClA tourist operations

lother than there appeared to be increased use of tourists

travellirg by automobile), and dij not knon what other american

Intelligence services were sending agents into the Soviet Union

under tourist cover during these years.

On the basis of his

Insearch for this report

and his cin experience, NCSENiO said

he knew that KGB operations againt tourists had been develop-

ing slowly and that.

at the time the report was written during

the tourigt. season

of 1959, the KGB knew little about the use

of tourism by the irerican services.

BLAKE'& confession that he passed documentary information

on this subject to the I'GB, but more particularly the intensity

of KGB operations against tourists ät this time as reflected

in the GOLITSYN docurent and other reports indicate, that this

statement by NOSESiO must be erroreois.

g. The OSWALD Case

According to NOSE:RO's account of his direct involvement

in the case of Lee Harvey OSWALD (Pages 136-114), his partici-

pation seemed to sten solely from his supervisory role

Deputy Chief of the Arerican Section.

In this capacity, NOSENKO

said, he was

the one wno made the decision that OSWALD was

"not normal" and of no interest to the KGB.

On other occasions

NOSENKO has reported that he made this decision together with

his subordinate

KRUPNOV, or that "they decided," or

decided."

NOSENKO's information or. the handling of OSWALD in

1959 is unique, and there is no collateral information against

which it can be reliably measured.

The resuits of the poly-

graph

examination in October 1966, hcwever, indicated that

NOSENKO lied in naving said that he was persorally connected

vith-any aspect-cf-the-ESWAiD-case-and_that.ne_hac heard_of

OSWALD before the assassinatior. of President Kennedy:

polygraph results aiso indicated that the KGB gave NOSENKO

special instructions on the OSWALD case and what he should tell

U.S. authorities about it.

10P SECRET

---

## Page 98

€33.

(i) General

NOSENKO appeared in une opcration snortly aft: tring pro-

noted to the position of Depuly

the recruitront of

American woran HAF.RIS in sepienber 17r3 on the osis of har

romantic involvement with à Soviet maie.

centativeiy

identified NoStro's photogrüph as thil of one oi cio Soviets

who approaches her

in Moscos and said that, of ths tan, lie was

"definitely the san in charge.

She denied haring had further

contacts with the i63 after leaving the

soviet Union.

loSEnKo said, te also supervised the sexual entriarent of crage

but did not becore personally involvei in the approach, which

was made by his superior

Sure time during this year,

NOSENKO said, he recruited

sisori of his pair of honosexual

agents, YEFREMOV.

Beginning in the siping of 1959 he used the

a series of succegs!u!

recruit-ent approaches

!In the case offi

as a comercial representatiie

sas in Moscow, was not tre

responsibility of NOSEYKO's section.

asr.ed to zake

the

apprcach because he was a "specialist" in this type of

operation.)

In 1959 NOSEYKO aiso use: these agents in opera-

tiors against to irerican guides at the Sokoiriii Exhibit.

BEANETT

and WILLERFORD. Firally, NOSEiD said, in 1959 he

accomplished the recruitmert of

the marican

Express Compary

representative in Moscow, FRippEL,on tre basis of sexual com-

promise.

(1i) The HonosexualS jEFREMOV and VOLYOU

There is a preponderance of horosciual recruitment opera-

tions in NOSE:iKO's account of his KGB carier.

In has referred

to several honosexual agents wich whon he has jorked on spe-

cific recruitrent-entrapent operaticas, iut said that he min-

self was never their official

officer.

They include

"SIRDYEV, " "NIKOLAYEV,"

"SIBIRYAK"

and kostkId.

romethered orly a fei of their nares and has supplied so

personality infoiratic. about thes. ic identified criy VOLOV

and YETREYOV as his our. agerts.

NOSENKO claimed to have re-recruited VOLKOV, a former

agent (cryptonyn "SHiELEY) and recruired YafRee icryptorio

"GRIGORIY"} and to have been their sole case officer from the

beginning of their KGB carcers in 1957-1958 until they were

deactivated in 1963 because they becane too well known.

them frequently, directing them in at least a dozen entrapment

operations or other homosexual encouniers.

NOSE::KO took then

with. hin when he transferred to the American Department in 1960

(but used then in no eperations duriry 1960 and 1961) and back

again in early 1962 to the Tourist Department (where they were

used only once, innediately after his retuin).

He gave a

tively clear account of the recruitment (Pages 107-108), but:

- He has never been able to remember YEFREMOV's

patrony..

- He does not know the home address, general area

of Moscow resijence,

family circustances, job details,

or other basic infomation about either of then.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 99

€93.

- He said that during

sle five or six jears he

handled then, he never has ai their hores, never met them

in a safehouse lonly on the street), and rover met either

of then alone without the ciner's presence.

not know about VOLKOV's and YEFREyoV's en-

counturs with and developrent of one Dutch ard fire other

anericans, irdependently known to clA.

of the Anericans,

three were ClA agents and 3 fourth was the well-known

azerican diplotat and author Charles !i. THAYER.

- He told about VOLKOy's and YETIE!Ol's compromise

of Robert BARFETT in 1959 (Page 126) but did not know that

they had met BARETT again in 1961,

startly before BAPPETT

was recruited on the basis of che 1959 conpronise.

- He did not know details of why or how VOLKOV and

YEPRENOV first cane into contact with treir most recent

target, W.E. JOHNSC:, lior how they

set up the compromige

tO liOSEliKO's ertry as a

"polist

official" under

the name Yuriy Ivanovich MiKOLAYEV (Pages 289-293).

(111) Pomosexual Entratie: L geerations

1959 NOSENKO said he made Iccruitment approaches

to five U.S. and

British citizens en the basis of homosexual

entrapment operations involving the agents YEFREMOV and VOLKOV.

All five approaches were successful, and the four l'esterners

who have

row been idertified have,

in turr, idertified resenio

in one way of another as the recruiting officer.

the ex-

ception of the FRiPPEL case and the horosexual compromise of

BARRETT and HILLORICRD (which did not result in approaches dur-

ing NOSENKO's tour in the American Tourist Section), these were

the onij operations in nhich liosE:"o tock

part in 1959 and

they represented,

in fact, the caly recruitnerts

by the section

during this

said.

He clained repeacedly in 1962,

1964, and 1905 that at the end

of 1359 he received a cormends-

tion

fron the GB Chairnan for his recruitment of the five homo-

Bexuals and FRIPPIL (discussed separatei! below). In October

1966, he admitted that this claim was untrue.

In discussing the gift case (Pages 123-124) #OSENiKO had

forgotten details which,

fron his confired participation,

he

certainly orce knew.

He said

that las with the signato case--

see below) another case officer (IVAl:OU) had the file

raterials

on the target before he did.

VOSENKO Stated that his agents

VOLKOV. and

YEFRENCY reported to NOSENKO in Moscan on

Custake

homosexcality

and then

"IVANOV and I and possibly GUSKCV, the

Section Chief, reported this to DUBAS," Chief of the Tourist

Department.

NOSElKO couid ros renember the arrangements for

taking the pictures,

nor in what yoscow hotel the photography

took place.

Wher

went to Leningras, NOSENHO was sent

there to

approach

All Leningrad

arrangements were made by the local kGB.

hin, flying alone las in the al aGa. cased

why he

sas assigned to

the case, JOSENKO replies:

told

to go."

Asked why IVAlOV could

not handle it, he

answered:

"He was not considared capable," his English was "not bad but

he didn't have enough operazional experience."

NOSENKO did

not rementer who wrote the request for permission to make the

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 100

1500000

700.

approach

aybe I did, or maybo I dictated it lo IVANloy", or

whether dewas staying in the hotel where the lenirgrad con-

promice

and apuroach took place.

the leningrad case

officer, FERFLETCV,

but said that he, luSElko, made the re-

cruitment ta

Baid another man was present.

NOSENKO '2 account in general matches

statements

on

this approach

(Pages 125-126).

The discre

incies, as well

as the onissions in the former's statements and his uncertainty

of the facts, may be attributable to faulty memory on the part

of NOSENKO.

Although HosENKO was at this time Deputy Section

Chief, when asked to explain his on selection as recruiting

officer, he said that he did not know why "they" chose him

and, when pressed as to tho selected hir, said

"DUBAS, I thint."

chen asked why the case officer VEILIISKIY, who originally hud

the materials on fate could not do he jot, he arowered:

"I don't know."

NOSE: 0 clains that he hinself arranged the

transfer of &

K53 "agent or operitional contact" the did not

remeriber which)

Odessa for this case,

and

said he did this only by phone calls, with nothing written.

He gave a physical description but had no other lionledge of

Lhis agent, neither name nor code name nor job nor background

пот KG3

status

("I wasn't interested").

The agent, he said,

travelled alone; NoSEllo did not arranje to receive hin in

Uzhgorod because the local KGB tock care of everything.

NOSZiKO

net him only oice, and ther in the company of a case officer

of the Uzhgorod KGB, whose name or ocher data he has also for-

gotten.

NOSENKO said he did not report to Moscon about progress

and plans on the case from Uzhgorod or other stops

in this

opcration, not obtain permission to travel alone with the ayent

to Lvov and Minsk after the recruitment; the local KGB's in

Uzhgorod, Lvov, and Minsk did that, he said.

NOSENKO Could

not

describe KGB arrangements and support in Lvov and Minsk,

where he said "the only thing I needed was a car from the air-

port to the city." a

Als said they travelled by train.)

Likewise, NOSENKO was unable to describe the KGB procedures

for clearance, tracing, reporting and other management of this

operation.

(iv) The Agent PRIPPEL

FRIPPEL (Pages 129-135) is the only American citizen with

whom NOSENtO ever had more than fleeting operational contact

in his whole KGB career and is the only foreiyn agent he claims

to have run for tore

than two bestings at any time in his car-

eer with the exception of rascals, pages 201-212, and "PROKHOR,"

Pages 173-181).

The Anerican Express Company representative

in Moscow, FRIPPEL has not recruited so that he could report

on American tourists visiting the Soviet Union, or on official

and unofficial

Anericans living there,

but in hopes of learn-

ing about approaches being made to members of Soviet delegations

visiting the United States.

with a weaith of reporting assets

in Moscow, NOSENKO said, the KGB did not need him there. When

PRIPPEL was reassigned to New York City, however, there

were

no plans to contact hin through the local KGB Legal Residency.

FRIPPEL is identified by. *GB cryptonym in the CHEREPANOV papers

as a suspected American Intelligence agent.

That FRIPPEL Was

considered such by the iGg is confired by statements of a self-

admitted KGB agent in contact with the Anerican tourist ROBERTS

in 1962.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 101

380000

TOP SECREI

anises A

701.

NOSEND said ?RIPPEL was his agent and said, repeatedly:

"I recruited him myself."

In 1962 no other KGB officer was

mentioned by NOSENko, who quoted from a ninter of his conver-

sations with FRiPPEL.

In 1964 NOSENKO said he and CHELNOROV

"had carried out the

recruitment together," but NOSENKO was the

case officer.

According to PRIPPEL'S account, CHELNCKOV bas

the senior officer in the recruitment and in the later reetings.

NOSENKO never met PRIPPEL alone while FRIPPEL was stationed

in MOscow.

The only times he ever did so were later, he said,

then PRIPPEL returned to the USSR, and these consisted of a brief

visit to FRIPPEL's hotel room during FRIP?EL'& visit to Moscow

in the sumer of 1962 and a short meeting in Odessa where FRIP-

PEs was on a cruiss in February 1963.

(Both of these meetings

took place after NOSENKO, in his 1962 contacts with CIA, had

exposed FRIPPEL as a XGB

According to PRIPPEL,

February 1963 meeting. NOSENKO phoned someone to ask whetrer..

he could accept PRIPPE!.'B invitation to boara the ship; tre

answer was evidently no.

NOSENKO denied this, insisting that

was no onc in Odessa superior to nim, and as a Deputy le-

partment Chief, he would not have to ask anyone anyway.

HOSENKO, CHELNUKOV, and their wives dined at FRIPPEL'&

house in voscow some time after FRIPPEL's recruitment.

acknowledged this to have been a most unusual procedure ard

could nane no parallel in KG3 agent handling.

Asked why it

happenes,

"Because he invited me,"

and when agred

why CHELNOKOV ard his wife went alung, NOSENKO said:

he was also involved in the recruitrent."

NOSENKO said he retained operational control of FRIPpEL,

then still Moscow representative of a tourist firm, when NOSENKO

shifted in June 1960 from the Tourist Departient to the Aceri-

can Department:

tor contact duting FeIPPEZ'& Visito do the USSR aler FRIPPEl.

PCS departure from Moscow in january 1961 and after his own re-

turn to the Tourist Department. According to FRIPPEL, who saw

no sign of change in NOSENKO's reponsibilities during his rela-

tionship with hin, he recalled neeting CHELNOKOV (who had

stayed in the Tourist Departsent) alone, without NOSENKO, prOb-

ably in 1960.

FRIPPEL Baid he was queried by NOSENKO and CHELNOKOV only

Embassy personalities, specifically on

BONDEN and WINTERS.

NOSENKO, who claimed

sponsibility for Embassy Security Officer ABIDIAN in 1960-1961

as well as for prippel said the two did not know each other:

in fact, they net socially several times.

NOSENKO could re-

call nothing which FRIPPEL ever reported to or did for the KGB,

the aubject on several occasions with:

"He never

gave anything of value."

The only question NOSENKO posed

when he cate to FRIPPEL in August 1952, FRIPPEL said, was

whether the agent krew what the newspaper editors he was es-

corting were going to ask KHRUSCHEV in an interview. Accord-

ing to FRIPPEL,

in the February 1963 meeting NOSENKO posed

no questions ard merely made polite conversation until PRIPPEL

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 102

31000.

TOP SECREI

70%.

During Lhe early 1965 interrogations, MuStilo volunteered:

•If you had buen clevor yoù could have maie me work inside the

USSR; you cuuld hase cintacted ne through prippel...."

was asked in October

1966 whether hn had expecte: or hopes ClÀ

would attempt to establish

contact with ain insice the USSR

through FRIPPEL. He strorsly denied this.

1. Remarks

MOSENKO clairg to have particiraici directly or irdirectly

in every recruitre: " operation with inarican icurists in the

jears 1955-1959.

¡is presence in Kit operations during this

period has sonetimes been ecafirned, but not aiways did these

involie tourists of the thice

nationalities--merican,

and Caradian--Evi which NOSE:KO saii his section was

responsible:

Years Nane

1955

MALIA

1956

BUPGI

1957

Nationality Status in USSP

Frerican

Tourist

Confired

NO

Anerican

Tourist

Yes

Cernan

British

Noriegian

Commercial/Tourist

Tourists (under in-

No

Yeg

vestigation)

Quasi-official visitor No

1958.

HARKIS

Anerican

Atericar.

Tourist

Tourist

Yes

No

1959

MERIT'S

BARRETT

WILLERFORD

FRIPPEL (to 1963)

American

British

British

British

Anerican

american

American

Ancrican

Tourist

Tourist

Tourist

ResiCent

Tourist

Temporary Resident

Temporary

Resident

Residert, later tour-

ist

Yes

NO

NO

Yes

Yes

NO

NO

Yes

This tabulation of 15 cases shows a higher number of operations

irvolving American (six)

and British (three) tourists than any

but it nevertheless intermingles citizens of

other nationalities and having different status in the ussr.

FRIPPEL and Mattere neither tourists for laccording to them

and NOSENKO used against tourists; Rain any ati were

from continental Europe; BARPETT and WILLERFOFD worked in Moscow

for several months.

The tabulation also shows that, according

to NOSENKO, his operational work was consideracly more irtensive

in the tine after he becane Deputy Chic: of the

section than.

before, when

as a serior case officer his administrative respon-

sibilities preyinably would have been far less demanding.

Although NOSE:KO's participation in five cases of the Aneri-

can Tourist

Section is confiraed, his ackrowledged role in five

othere of different varieties--with corzoboration by other

sources in two of them--raises doubts atout lnether he belonged

section as a senior officer. The doubts ara strengthened

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 103

14-00000

703.

by the

nature of his information about the four individual cases

reviewed at length above:

- In the BURGI case NOSENKO did not have knowledge

of the extensive background irforation on the recruitzent

target which the kgE possessed at the time of the approach:

or of other significant detaiis in what NOSENKO described

1s an operation of greatest importance to the American Tour-

ist section and to hinself persorally.

In addition, NOSENKO

has admitted lying about his having received an award for

his role in the recruitwent of buRgI.

- Regarding the DREW case, NOSENKO said he was chosen

for the approach

(made on the basis of homosexuality) be-

cause the regular case officer lacked operational experi-

By April 1359, however, the KGB had arranged "hur:dredg"

of homosexual compromises in the USSR, liOSENKo reported in

another context.

His earlier personal experience with

Western targets had been limited to a secondary role in

the BURGI case and a principai role in the HARRIs case.

the latter not an approach

on honosexual grounds.

difficult to comprchend how NOSENKO would have qualified

for the task whereas the case officer IVAiOV would not.

-. There are gaps in NOSENKO's information about a

of significant

aspecte in the estatecase, includ-

ing staff planning and management of the opcration, opera-

tional support arrungements, and on personnel of the outljing

KGB units involved.

NOSENKO was unable

explain why he

was selected to make the approach tobe

- CHELNOKOV was the senior case officer for FRIPPEL.

NOSENKO never met this agent

alone while he resided in

Moscow as the American Express Company representative,

and NOSENKO reportedly acted on a supervisor's instruc-

tions at their later meeting in Odessa.

Despite his occus

pation and his entree into the American connunity ir. Moscow,

FRIPPEL reportedly was

not exploited by the

tourists of U.S. Government employees but was targetted

to report on matters to which he had no access; hence

there seems to have been no logical reason for the FRIPPEL

case to have been transferred from the Arerican Tourist

the U.S. Embassy Section and back again.

though available infomation verifies

the continuity of

NOSENKO as FRIPPEL'S handler, it cannot be considered firm

evidence of NOSENKO having been an officer in either of

these sections and in fact lught be interpreted as evidence.

that he was not.

similarly, while familiar with some but not all of the opera-

zional activities of the homosexual agents VOLKOV and YeERuMOV,

• NOSINKO failed to support his clain to being their American

Tourist Section case officer; he has been unable to provide

rudimentary background informatior of these two individuals,

who allegedly were prominent in operations of the section.

NOSENKO's statement that he retired the files of VOLKOV and

TOP SECRET,

---

## Page 104

14-00000

Ters don Ta Crite as agree 3.

•i-.

..

704.

YLERANOV because they were too madl anon is incompatible with

his other reporting to the effect that neither took part in an

operation botveen 1959 and early 1962.

In further reference to NOSENKO's claime to having been

the case officer in these various operstiona, te has been agable

to recount in any detail KGB ataff procedures involved in these

operations, such as name-tracing, coordinating with other con-

ponents, obtaining approvala for action, etc.

Pinally, of his

54 months of service in the American

Tourist section,

NOSENKO '8 described activity againat foreigners accounts for

only about three monthes if the bulk of his time was spent with

recruiting or handling Soviet-citizen agents, he night be ex-

pected to remember something about some of then.

He can barely

remember names (and only a few),

has given confused accounts of

their recruitment, renembers nothing about any of their spe-

cific operations or activities for the XGB, and knew no per-

sonality background data on any of then.

Even if it were aggined that NOSENTO wag a case

officer of

the American

Tourist Section, his claim to the position of Deputy,

Chief cannot be substantiated. He himself could rot explain

his appointment to the job.

"legal travel" oparationa comprculaed to the KGB in 1958 and

1959 when he was allegedly in a supervisory capacity.

ROSENKO

knew nothing about the documents on such operations which BLAKE

gave the KGB and which can be presured to have been of the ut-

most interest to the American Toulot Section, among all KGB

Hendguarters elementa.

These documents offered caterial that

could have proven valuable to the preparation of NOSENKO's Own

paper on Western tourist operations; they were used in the genu-

Ine KGB paper written by the Tourist Department and passed to

CIA by GOLITSYN.

As with his status as a case officer in the

American Tourist Section, NOSENKO the Deputy Chief could not

describe how data on tourists was received, general and spe-

cific plans laid, events discussed, decisions made, and lpads

channeled.

88

not a senior case officer or the Deputy Chief of the Ameri

an Tourist Section.

while the methods of the Tourist Depart-

ment are not independently known in detail, it is conceivable

that what NOSENKO did on behalf of the KGB

(not necessarily the

American Tourist Section) could have been accomplished by a

principal agent.

These conclusiong do not cast doubt about

the facts presented by NOSENKO on the KGB investigations in the

OSWALD case but merely rule out the possibility of NOSENKO's

having been involved with this case in any way prior to the

assassination of President Kennedy.

TAD SEPRET

ir.

---

## Page 105

sensitive

source

705.

6. U.S. Embassy Suction (1960-1961;

a. Introdustion

È'rom January 1960 until January 1952 YOSENis claims

to have been

Deputy Chief of the U.S. t-bassy section of

the American Department,

KGB second Chics Directorate,

under KOVSHUK.

This period (descrited in Pages 152-285)

1s the sost significant in NOSENKO'; account of his KGB

careor for a numver of reasong:

- The section is the specifis unit workirg against

the u.s. Erbassy, by dosaild's own staterents the KGB's

most important courterintelligence targei in the USSR.

Its operations (characterized on Page 152) dirnctly

-Efect American security.

The section has the t're-

fold purpose uf knowing

of and controlling ali accesg

of Embassy personnel to soviet citizons ird e: collecting,

asgimilating, evaluating, and

ugiry informic.rn from

all possible

sources to recruit inericare siusioned

in Moscow.

- NOSENKO's position as Deputy Chief ef this sec-

provided hin his aucess to ost of tre rajor counter-

intelligence infornation ile has reported, incilding

recruitnents of foreign erbassy ufficials and micro-

phone operations against the U.s. Ebassy.

Most impor-

tant, it provided loselio with his authority for

stating that there were no succegsful

recruitments

of or agents arong official imericans in

Moscow for

this tro-year period, or for a tire both cetore and

(This is the same point rade by incirection in

the CHEREPANOV papers; jet this viea is cuntradicteo

cy information from GOLITSYN.

Although the latter did

serve in the U.S. Embassy Section,

of it and

gave leads

to KGB opcrational interest in

and possible recruitinents of official Americars in the

Moscow Embassy during this period.

Some of these appear

to be related to information items ¡OSEllO has provided.)

- The apparent importance of ¡OSENiO's information

on this period contrasts sharply with that

from other

His accounts of recruitments in

field covering the five years prior to this assignent

and the two years folloring have been checked thoroughly

and not one of them represents a penetration of ary

governmert; none nas access to classified information:

most were inactive, suspect, or already krown to

Western counterintelligence

- NOSENKO's work against tre U.S. Embassy is cOn-

firmed by filitand less directly by other soviet

sourced reporting to ClA and tre FBI.

It is cenied by

GOLITSYN.

(GOLITSYN has

said that NOSENKO was not in

the section during

these years.)

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 106

14-00000

706.

b. Entry into the Section

NOSENKO haR given a detailed account of how se cane to

be transferred into the U.S. Embassy Section, but he has

never given a precise date, usually saying "January 1960"

or "at the beginning of 1960."

As described on Pages 153-154, the shift was made at

GRIBAYOY'g insistence and against NOSL"KO's own personal

GRIBANOY tOld NOSESKO during a personal interview,

at which HOSENKD voiced his objections, that the transfer

was part of his (GRIBANOV's) plans and was primarily to put

new ilte into operations against American code clerks, the

primary target of the Second Chicl Directorate.

did not tell him why he, instead of another, had been

selected for this job, although NOSENKO had the impression

it was because of his

achievements in the Tourist Depart-

ment. (see Part VIII.R.3.).

NOSSNKO'S transfer could not

rave been a result of his close personal relationship with

GRIBANOV or because his father was a friend of GRIBANOV's:

NOSENKO has admitted that he exaggerated the closchess of

his relationship with the Chief of the Second Chief Directo-

rate and nost recently (February 1965) said that he had few

personal contacts with him outside of work; NOSENKO has also

said that his father never net GRIBANOV.

NOSENKO Initially said that he relieved nobody on

coming into the section.

He eventually recalled, however,

that BAKHVALOV was his predecessor but left the scction

before he (NOSENKO) arrived.

NOSENKO's confusion on this

point, his description of how he assumed custody of certain

from BAKHVAINV although the latter had transferred to

another department, and the opportunities NOSENTO had to

name BAKHVALOV as his predecessor before he eventually did

so are described on Pages 154-156.

c. Functions as Deputy Chief

In NOSENKO's view the transfer to become Deputy Chief

of the section from the same position in another section

was definitely an important promotion:

He now became

second-in-charge of the most important operational section

of the entire Second Chief Directorate.

As KOVSHUK's

NOSENKO had the right and obligation to be aware of

all activities in order to exercise his general supervisory

funstions and so as to be prepared to become the Acting

Chief of the section when necessary.

NOSENKO said that consequently nothing was hidden from

ties during the relatively recent years of 1960 ard 1961

and to know of all significaut opcrational successes achieved

in the years before and after this period.

alsa-said he

has told CIA all he knows of these activities.

It was on this

was able to say in 1965:

"Tell dr. McCone

that there were no recruitments. I was there."

When NOSENKO reported for duty, he and KOVSHUK agreed

on a division of supervisor; duties within the section.

KOVSHUK was, in addition to his over-all responsibility for

T

---

## Page 107

14-00000

707.

the section's operationg, to supervise in particular opera-

tional activity against American diplomatic personnel assigned

to the U.S. Fabassy.

NOSENKO had been specifically instructed

by GRIBANOV and American Department Chief KLYPIl to concentrate

his efforts on the supervision of operationg against the

most important American recruitment target, the code clerks

at the Embassy, with the alm of revitalizing these acti

vitles and making recruitments.

(NOSENKO said there had

been

none since

the early 1950's.) According to the agreed-

upon

division of labor, NOSENXO also assumed cese officer

for John ABIDIAl. the Babass! SeCuritY offI-

cer ridestified br

MISEiXO es a ClA ufficer.

bur acquallya

additionally, he was responsible for maintaining

the section's file on factors pertaining to the physical

security of the Embassy and for receiving and disseninating

materials frou the microphones concealed in various U.S.

These were functions held, JOSENKO said,

by his predecessor BAKHVALOV and were turned over by NOSENKO

at the end of 1961 to his successor GRYAZNOV: Apart fron

these duties, which apparently

were routinely assumed by

the Deputy Chief, NOSENKO supervised, during the early part

of 1960 (ag NOSENKO first said in 1965), : the work of the

officero responaiblo for operations agalnat: the Amorican

¡INCO tUSCON ALLACHOS IN MUSCOW; IN UCtOber 19GG, JOSENKO

reported that he was personally responsible during this

period for the operatioal activity against Naval and Marine

officers in the Naval Attache's office.

d. Knowledgeability as Deputy and Acting Chief

As deputy to KOVSHUK, NOSENKO said, he nas aware of

all the operationg being conducted by the section during

this two-year period; by his own

nothing was

kept Iron him.

There were in these two years a total of

over three months when KOVSHUK was ill or on leave, and at

these times NOSENKO was acting chief of the section.

the latter capacity, NOSENKO was responsible for supervising

the administrative work and operational activity of the en-

tiresection and,

in particular, assumed KOVSHUK's work 1n

directing operations against diplomatic personnel assigned to

in Moscow.

Therefore, pér:inent to his

clains are the facts presented in the following paragraphs.

NOSENKO could not remember any operational decisions

that he made as acting chief, or any specific or unusual

occurrences during these times.

In ansuer to a question,

NOSENKO said that the only specific responsibility of KOVSHCK's

which he handled in the Chief's absence was reporting to the

Chief of the First Department about all correspondence going

out of the U.S. Embassy Section.

NOSENKO did not meet any of KOVSHUK's agents during his

He could not remember any of KOVSHUK's agents,

except GLAZUNOV (whom YOSEYKO said in ipril 1964 was his own

agent and later said was

"KOVSHUK's and FEDYAÏlY'S") and

the American correspondent STEVENS (about whom NOSENKO had

reported in connection

with his responsibilities in 1953-55).

NOSENKO also said that in 1960 KOVSHUK recruited PREISFREUND,

although earlier he had reported that he (NOSENKO) had dose

(Regardless of who the recruiter migbt have beep,

KOVSHUK attended NOSENKO's meetings with PREISFREUND.)

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 108

14-00000

105.

NOSENKO KnEW

that hig innediate supervisor NOVSHCK had per-

under Ministry of Foreign affairs cover,

U.S. Elbassy

offisers and was aware that one of these had been

¡ He knew no details of KOVSHUl's contacis wi:t. (WINTERS,

cor that his own friend KISLOV, as well as his

frierd and fow-

quent source of operatioral inforration LOPCHlCi, were also in

touch with WINTERS.? He could not remember who else KOVSHUK

knew, or what kovsHuk was doing with them, or why:

knew neither that willian MORRELL (declared to the soilet Govern-

ment as a CIA officer) belonged to ClA nor trat KOISHUk, who

was aware of this fast, was in personal contact nith MoreLL.

Unlike KOVSHUI, ARTENEV, KOSOLAJO!, BORUDI!:, BIRYLKOV,

KRIVOSHEY and many other Second Chief Direcrorate officers,

NOSENKO rever had any direct contso-,

aen for cultivation

or issessment, with any imericar officials, either stacioned

in the intassy or visiting the USSr.

Hortver, his English

had been proven good enough to gualify him particularly for

tourist recruitments and his operational flair nod been tested.

(It was this which caused him to be picied for the dpEn,

iran and other approaches and the only reasor why he,

inglish speaker

üculd have been specially selectei to

wori on the German 4a

who spoie "some Englisi.")

DERYABIN and other defectors irom the KGB have stated

that the deputy chief of a section working against a isreign

erbassy in Moscow would be responsible for approving ana

retaining monthly schedules

for the planned use of salehouses

by the section;

that he would discuss agent recting schedules

with individual

officers and approve

and retain a list

of planred

agent meetings for

each case officer

on an indi-

vidual basis;

and that he would approve the acquasition of new

agents and sew safehouses and their transfer frot one opera-

tion to another.

By contrast, NOSEtiTO

first did not list

arong his responsibilities and later denied

that he had theu.

NOSE::KO did rot understand the questic?

when asxed whether he had any responsibility for supervising

the use of safehosses in Moscow (Paje 102) and saii that as

and the safehouses belonged to the case cificers,

they could

use them when and hoi they liked wichout informing

ar,yone; only when

they were meeting an active developient

agent was it necessary to report to NiSENKO and this only

after the meetirg.

said that, while he was seputyad

Chief of the section, three of four subordinate

officers

not remember the locatio. of any

Neither NOSENKO rer his

subordirates GRYANOV and

KOSOLAPOV had such apartments, instead using less secure

"weeting apartrents" lühich are used in the absence ce the

full-tire occupant). NOSENKO was able to locate his oun

"neeting apartment"

which he said he brought with him when

he transferred from the Tourist Departrent and iater took

back with him to the Tourist Department) by street and could

do the same for GRYAZNOV'S.

He was not gure of the location

of the apartment used by KOSOLAPOV.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 109

14-00000

Shortists

708:0.

e. Knowledgeability of U.S. Embassy Physical Security

According to

NOSENKO, he maintained tre file on physical

security at the U.S. Embassy, add it contained detailed

Iloor plans and photograpis of the installation.

NOSE XO mag

unable to give the

location or the floor of the office of

any single

individual or component of the Embassy, including

those of the Ambassador, or his

own targots (ABIDIAN, the

military codo rous.

and the Slato Departuent communica:dona

located in the "zune of sorrels," allen lo lan varloual;

reported as the "seventh, oighth, lanth,

and tonth floors,"

up," or the "top four floors."

NOSENKO did

not remember how

many floors there are in the Embassy, nor

was he even sure how many floors were included in the restric-

(The restricted area in fact consists of the top

three floors,

the cighth, ninth, and tenth.)

1. Knowledgeability about American Intelligence Personnel

XOSENKO said that not only the deputy chief but every

officer in the section could identify the known and suspected

Intelligence personnel in the Enbassy.

Nevertheless,

he hinself did not know about three ClA officers (MAHOYEY,

¡MORELL., and GARBLER) whom the NGB had definitely Identified

as such before their assignments to Moscow in 1960-1961.

announced by the

MORELL' Embassy to the Soviet Minister of Foreign

whose overt ClA affiliation was officially

was under direct and active cultivation by KOYSICK

and the

KGB First Chief Directorate officer K.N. SHIRSOY 1n

1960-1961; NOSENKO knew nothing about this (although asked

leading questions and given hirts) and did not identify

• HORELL as a CIA officer.

Four of the seven officers hom

he said

the KGB suspected to be CIA had never had any such

affiliation.

He could not give any information

the person

he said the KGB considered to be the CIA chief

in Moscow, KLOSSON, either on his Moscow activity and contacts

or on the

extent and results of KGB coverage..or on his per-

sonal situation

and background.

He could not explain why

KLOSSON waS

considered to be the CIA chief, but said that

"every officer thought he was."

8. Knowledgeability of KGB Code Clerk Operations

As his main task, the prime reason he was noved into

the U.S. Embassy

Section, NOSENKO alleged, was to supervise

the operational work againgt American code clerks.

capacity he closely guided the work of case officers CRYAZNOV

and NOSOLAPOV. *

NOSENKO shared an office with his two sub-

ordinates, and the three were within sight and hearing of

*According to GOLITSYN, to knew both men well. GRYAZNOV was

"a very experienced" case officer with some success; he had

spent about the last five years of his l6 years in the KGB

in the Amcrican Department and was a specialist in code

clerk operations.

that KOSOLAPOV had about

ten years' KGB

experience and, like GRYAZNOV, was specializing

against code clerks in 1960.

-TOP SECRET

---

## Page 110

00000

710.

another and used a single safe, which contained files

code clerks

and the agents involved with them.

NOSENKO sald that he carefully directed the work of GRYAZiON

• and KOSOLAPOV during these two years, discussing their cases

with then, taking part in operational planniug,

and approving

or disapproving all operational neasures. NOSENKO originally

asserted that he had also read and studied all the files

kept on the derican code clerks; under questioning on indivi-

duâl cases, however,

he retracted these statcuents and said

that ho say tave skinned some of the files, that he did not

study any of then, but that in any event he rcad all the

current incomfry naterials on the code clerks fron microphones,

and the like and then routed them to the case officer

CIA has two types of information against which the re-

ports Irom NOSENKO can be compared.

The first consistg of

the detailed debriefings of code clerks returaing frem

Moscow, adainistered routinely by the Department of State

and the milltary services; it also includes the special de-

briefings and interrogations of the Department of State,

the FBI, and CIA as a follow-up to KGB opcrational activity

which hag become known

from various sources.

On this basis,

CIA has

accumulated a considerable amount of colliteral

infornation on the activitles

of the U.S. Erbassy section

involving United States code clerks during the porind NOSEN-

KO sald be was its Deputy Chiel.

The second type of infor-

nation is the reporting on KGB operations by GULITSIN sho,

fron contacts with U.S. Embassy Section officers in loscow

and Helsinki, was able to provide several leads to what he

said were recruited American code clerks.

GOLITSIN's infor-

nation thereby directly contradicts ISENKO's statement that

the KGB had

no successes in its code clerk recruitment opera-

tions from the

earl! 1950's to the end of 1963, and none of

the

subjects of GOLIlSYN's leads have been positively identi-

fied.

Some of GOLITS"S's information has been gererally

substantiated by other

sources.

In one case, this confirma-

tion has core iron NOSENKO himself, whose information on the

STORSBERG operation, on the agent PREISFREUND's role in it,

and on GOLITSYN's knowledge of KGB use of PREISFELD pre-

srints

an explanation of one and possibly two vi GaLITSyn's

leads.* Another of GOLITSYN's leads, that concerning an

operational trip by KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki in order to estab-

lish contact with a code clerk, is confirmed by documentary

evidence that KOSOLiPOV did in

fact travel on the Helsinki-

Hoscow train with an American code clerk at the time and

under the cover GOLITSYN reported. NOSENKO denied that such

& trip was made by XOSOLAPOV.

NOSENKO has been questioned in detail about each of the

code clerks serving in Moscow during 1960 and 1961.

His in-

formation concerning KGB activities involving five of these

Americans (STORSBERG, JENNER, MOROSE, ZUJUS, and KEYSERS) and

##1-56-459999

*As discussed below, there are important differerces in the

accounts of GOLITSIN and NOSENKO, particularly regarding the

outcome of this operation.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 111

madfielly

Miradonage Poncertaiting a logant neon

14-00000

did awd.in

711.

d ..

his lack of information concesning a sixth (GARLAND) is

discussed in detail in Pages 166 through 219.

YOSENKO 's

Information on a number of other cases,

less important in

his opinion, 1s described in the tabulation of American

case leads giver. on

Pages 364-410.

Certain of these cases

are further

examined below to determine whether NOSESKO'g

knowledge equates with details which the deputy and acting

chief of the U.S. Enbassy Section could reasonably be

expected to know and retain.

(1) The STORSBERG Case

The operation against STORSBERG (Pages 166-185) was,

the nust important case he had as supervisor

of code clerk operations.

The KGB, while able to break

certain State Department ciphers, had had

no success with

military cryptographic systems,

and therefore NOSENKO

"dropped everything for a year" to involve himself with the

development of James STORSBERG, th military code clerk at

the U.S. Embassy.

The following facts are pertinent to an

evaluation of NOSENKO's story of this case.

NOSENKO originally raised the STORSBERG case indirectly

at his first meeting with ClA on 9 June 1962.

told how

GOLITSYN, during a visit to the American Department in 1960,

at a time NOSENKO was on leave, had requested permission

to use a U.S.

Embassy Section agent, a Finn, in his orn opera-

tions

in Helsinki.

During his discussions in the American

Department, GOLITSIN learned that this Finnish agent was

being

used

in operations against Embassy employees living in

America House.

NOSENKO said that the KGB realized that

GOLITSIT bad

passed

this information on to the Americans

following his defection, for the regulations goverring

visits to America House

by

third

nationals had been tightened.

At this mecting NOSENKO did not name the Finnish

agent or

specify

his involvement in any particular operational acti-

vity nor did he date the visit by GoLlISYN.

Later in the 1962 meetings NOSENKO gave a detailed

summary of the Finnish agent's involvement in the unsuccess-

recruitment attempt against an Ancricar military code

NOSENKO, without naming the Finn or the American,

sald that he personally conducted the recruitment confron-

tation with GRIBANOV present.

These early accounts were full

of quotes of what NOSENKO said to the American and vice

versa, descriptions of the American's reaction to the confron-

tation, and statements of NOSENKO'S admiration for the Ameri-

can despite his refusal to work.

Following his defection,

NOSENKO recounted the case in even greater detail, in fact,

in more detail than he gave for any other case.

He identi-

fied the Fion as PREISFREUND ard the American

as STORSBERG

and described ard referred to the case whenever possible

(over 50 times).

When asked for details of other code clerk

for example, he repeatedly diverted to discussion of

the STORSBERG CaSe

to illustrate how the KCB operated against

code clerks in general.

After defecting NOSENKO denied that he

personally con-

frosted STORSBERG.

He said that his personal

role was limited

to directing STORSBERG into the hotel rood where the approach

was made; after first saying that he had never

clained any

other role, he admitted that he may have been "paisting"

NA MID

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 112

14-00000

712.

hisself (exaggerating) is his descriiidons of 1962.

admission came only after the tape of NOSEKD's 1962

statezents had been played to him and he had successively

said that (a) it was not bis volce,

(b) he was druick in

1962, (c) the CIA case officer in Geneva had nade him

nervous, and (d) CIA probably spliced various pieces of

tapa together to nake this false one. Still, NOSENKO

said, he directed the entire operation from beginning to end,

it was his most important case..

Interrogated further

corcerning his role in the STORSBERG operation in October

NOSEYKO said that he had never read the KGB file on

STORSBERG, which was hold by GRYAZNOV.

GOLITSYN, as NOSENKO reported, didvisit the American

Department, did request permission to use PREISFREUND opera-

tionally in Helsinki, and did report this to CIA in late

1961 following his defection.

GOLITSY also reported that;

in denying his request, KOlSHUK told him that PREISFREUND

had recently been used in the successful recruitment of an.

American Embassy employce, possibly a military man and pos-

sibly a code clerk or diplomat; therefore, KOVSHLK said,

PREISFFEUND could rot be used for six morths or so in other

optrations, for otherwise the Anericans might becone suspi-

NOSENKO has not reported these details, but has said

only that GOLITSIN ras instructed

to drop interest in PREIS-

FREIND because PREISFREUND belonged to the American Department

of the Second Chief Directorate.

NOSENKO volunteered at his first meeting with CIA that

he was on leave outside of Noscow on

the uccasion of CoLITSYN's

visit to the inerican Department.

Since defecting he has

insisted with

absolute certainty that

this visit took place

in the late

spring or carly summer of 1961 and has described

his leave, wheie

he went and with whon. GOLITSlY's passport

and ClA travel data show that GOLITSY? was un TDY in Moscow

in danuary 1961.*

Told this, NOSESTO said that it is untrue,

that he recallrd being told of COLITSIN's visit after his

return fron leave in July 1961, and that he was certain that

ke (NOSENKO) was in Moscow in January 1961.

JOSENKO has indirectly confirmed that the oprration of

which GOLITSYN learned during this visit to the Ancrican

Department was the operation against STORSBERG. He did so by

bis assertion that PREISFREUND, his own agrnt, was used in

only one uperation, that against STORSBERG.

Thus, as to the

outcone of this operation, there is a conflict between NOSEN-

KO's infornation and that earlier provided by COLITSiN.

There is also a conflict between NOSENKO's statements that

the recruitment approach took place some time after May 1961

(NOSINKO's dates have varied from June to October 1961,

STORSBERG said it was in October 1961) and GOLIISTN's state-

ment that this approach had already been made in January 1961

when he learned of it.

OLITSYN provided a second lead which YOSENKO appear.

o confirm and which may be related to the STORSBERG case

GOLITSIN sald that during a visit to the Anerican Department

*GOLITSYN has based his assertion that JOSENKO was not in

the U.S. Enbassy Section in 1960 and 1961 partly on this visit.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 113

14-00000

713.

in the spring of 1960, * he learned Iron GRYNZiOV that he

(GRYAZOV) had devrloped an operation against an American

military

code clerk to the point that the KGB nas "99

poir cent" certain that a recruitient approach to this code

clark would be succesaful.

GOLITSiS said that ERYAZNOV

told hin that this would be the first recruitment of a mill-

tary

code clerk lag contrasted to a State Department code

clerk) in

the history of the American Department.

There

were only tho persons meeting this criterion who were in

Moscow at the tine GOLITSYN

placed this visit, STORSBERG

ard HURLEY; the superior of STORSilERG, HURLEY performed

hark-up cryptographic duties in STORSBERG's absencr.

If

SOStiXO's report that there was no developaont of or approach

tO MUKLEY can be accepted, this load from GOLITSIY would

apply to STORSBERG rather

than HIRLEY. There is s conflict

hotween NOSENKO's Information on the STORSBERis case and this

second GOLITSYY lead In that GOLITSIN described an operation

which was in its final stages in the spring of 1960, whoreas

JOSENO

(as

well

as STORSBERG) asserted that the STORSBFEG

op.:ration was just under way at this time and was long and

drawn-out.

(11) The JENNER Case

Apart from the STORSBERG operation, NOSENKO has been

able to supply the greatest amount of detail concerning the

opcration (also unsuccessful) against the State Departrent

pouch clerk Paul JEWER (Pages 186-196).

This case developed

as a result of an idea originated by NOSENKO himself shortly

after

he

arrived in the U.S. Embassy Section.

Because of

the iraccessibility of American code clerks to the KGB in

Moscow, It was JOSEiKO's plan to send a KGB officer to liel-

sinks in order to strike up an acquairtance with a code

clerk entering the Soviet Union aboard the Helsinki-yoscow

train.

The first (ard last) time this was attempted, NO-

SENKO related, was in March 1960, when the KCB learned that

JENNER, listed as a "secretary-archivist" and thus assumed

by thie?

KGB to be a code clerk,

was scheduled to transit

Holsinki en routr. to his assignsent at the ü.S. Embassy in

Under NOSENKO'S supervision KOSOLAPOr therefore

travrlled to Helsinki and boarded the same train as JENNER.'

Additionally, GRINNOV took a KGB female agert to the town,

of ryborg, on the Finno-Soviet border, and placed her on the

samE: train.

Botn KOSOLAPOV and the Somale agent met and

spoke with JENNER en route to l'oscow, and the girl gave him

her telephone number, asking hia to call her.

Aftor JANER'S

arrival in Moscow,

both KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZNOV subnitted

vritten reports to JOSENKO describing the contacts on the

train.

Although the KGB later found out that JENNER was only

a pouch clerk,

not a cryptographer, he was cunsidered of

interest and when JENNER failed to telephone the female

agent, the two were brought together in a

"chance neeting"

at the doscow airport.

JanER would have no part of the

agent's invitations, however, and the operation therefore

went no, further.

*When NOSENKO was told of the GOLITSYN visit in May or June

1960, he denled that it took place, sajing that he reces-

sarily would know if it had.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 114

4-00000

714.

JENNER repuried to the security Officer at the U.S.

Embassy upon his arriial that he lad been cortacted by two

Soviet students iron vyborg, a young mai and a ronar, on

the Holgink1-110scon train.

He alsu reported having boen

given a telephone nuther by the girl and later reported

having been recontacted by her at the Moscow airport.

CIA has documentary eviderce, in the forn of official

train manifests,

that JENNER travelled from Helsinki

to koscow by train on 31 March 1960.

This docusent shows

that JENNER travelled alone and no Soviets were aboard when

the train lett Holsinki.

CIA also has an official travel

manifest showing that KOSOLAPOY, using the name KOLOSOV,

travellod from Helsinki to Muscow by rall on 2 April 1960,

two days later, and that no Americans

travelled on this traid

with him.

HOSENKO identified KOLOSOV's photograph as that

of his subordinate KOSOLAPO!.

(NOSENKO earlier said that

he did not know whether KOSOLAPOV used an alias for this

trip, what that alias might have been, or whether KOSOLAPOV

had an alias passport; he agreed that he would have had to

authorize such a passport.)

that KOSOLAPOV did not travel on the same train as JENNER

and therefore could not have met and talked with him as

JOSENKO had reorted, NOSENKO relused to believe it; he in-

sistrd that he had read the reports of both KOSOLIPOV and

GRYAZNOY, and that the events were exactly as he described

them.

(111) The GARLAID Case

1:6:

i..

GOLITSYN told CIA after his defection that while he was

stationed in Helsinki, probabl; in November--not March --1960,

KOSOLAPOV travelled to Finland under alias and commercial

cover in order to make the acquaintance of an Anerican code

clerk on the lalsinki-joscow train.

KOSOLAPOV's arrival had

beca announced by a cable from KGB Headquarters to the

Helsinki Legal Residercy.

According to GOLITSTi, the Legal

Residency learned which train this American was

to board and

succecded in placing KOSOLIPOV in the same compartment with

him.

GOLITSYN Saw HUSOLAPOV board the train with this Ameri-

can.

later, when another American Department officer visited

Helsirki, GOLITSYN asked him how KOSOLAFOV's operation with

the code

clerk had gone;

fron the officer's refusal to anster,

GOLITSYN assumed that it had been a success.

CIA travel records show that KOSOLAPUV made a second

trip to Helsinki in Novender 1960, again under the KOLOSOV

alias. Finnish railroad manifests show that KOSOLAPOV left

Helsinki by train on 16 Novenber 1960 and that one

travelling companions on this train was GARLAND,

en route to Moscow to assume his duties as chief of the

State Department code room at the American Embassy (Page

198). There were no other Americans on this train.

Told that KOSOLAPOV had made a trip to Helsinki in

November 1960 and had travelled to Moscow on the same train

an American code clerk, one of his on targets, NOSENKO

said that this could not be.

He agreed that, as in the case

Of KOSOLAPOY's trip to meet JENNER, he would necessarily

have been involved in the planning of such a second trip

and would have had to approve arrangements and correspondence

in cunnection with it.

Even if such a trip took place wher

NOSENKO was out of lloscow, he said, the details of it would

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 115

94-00000

1OP SECRET

715.

Tri.

have beon known to him upon his return, and he would not

have

forkotten about the trip.

(In fact, CIA travel records show

that KOSOLAPOV arrived in Helsinki on 12 Novcaber 1960 and

that JOSENKO left Moscow for Ansterdam, en route to Cuba,

on 15 jovember.) NOSENKO has not changed his position that

there was no such trip.

(1v) The MORONE Caso

• Like the STORSBERG operation, the MORONE case was Bea-

tloned at NOSENXO's first meeting with CIA; he cited 1t as

an examplo of a technique which YOSENKO introduced for using

third nationals to obtain accessto American code clerlis ubo

were reluctant to establish contacts with Soviet citizens.

Accordirg to NOSENKO's most recent version, given in early

1965, the KGB learned that MORONE and a Marine Guard (BEGGS)

planned to travel to larsaw on leave.

KOSOLAPOV thereupon

drew up an operational plan, edited by NOSEVO and KOVSKUY

and approved by GRIBANOV, proposing that a ferale agent of

the Polish UB be introduced to MOROlE on the joscow to war-

saw train for the purpose of obtaining comprorising naterials.

KOSOLAPOV arranged with Polish liaison officials in Moscow

to have such an agent sent to Muscow, net her when she

arrived, and briefed her on the upcration.

She was then

placed

On MORONE's train together with a KGB techniciar.

whose task it was to obtain tape recordings of the compro

ud se.

Events went according to plan:

MORONE. "et the girl

and was intinate with tor on the train, but when the tech-

niciar. reported to NOSENKO the day after the train arrived

in Harsaw, he said

that the tape recordlugs were of low

quality and unsuitable for their intended purpose.

In a

further attempt to acquire conploaking material on MORONE,

KOSOLAPUV later brought the UB agent to Moscow, and on this

occasion plotographs were obtained of their intimacies in

a doscow

hotel

rOOm.

Still, the KGB felt, there was not

rhough blackmail matcrial to ensure recruitment, and it was

further planned to have the America House maid IVANOVA

attempt to lure MORONE to a roun in Moscow where truly

compraising photographs of intimacies with a Soviet citi

zen could be obtained.

Possibly because they noticed MORONE'S

interest in IVAJOVA,

NOSE:KO said, the Americans ordered

VORONE out of Moscow before further steps could be takes.

Although NOSENKO provided a considerable amount of

detail on MORONE's trip to Warsaw,

there were numerous

variationg in his different accounts.

In 1962 he said

that he had handled the entire operation himself,

including

telephoning tarsaw with the request for the girl; he also

said that the UB obtained compromising photographs in Warsaw

and that several nonths latei the female agent was brought

to Moscow expressly for the purpose of introducing MORONE to

a Suviet girlfriend.

This, NOSENKO said, was successful and

MORONE waS SOOn

having intercourse with a KGB agent.

abile

still in place in Geneva on 1 February 1964 NOSENKO gave a

different version:

"Re," he said, arranged for the girl by

& dispatch pouched to the KGB advisor in Warsaw; moreover,

the Poles,

who had obtained compromising photographs in Mar-

Saw, sent the KGB only pictures of the two kissing, keeping

the best ones for themselves,

and this is thy she had to be

brought to boscow.

NOSENKO told the FBI later in February

1964 that compromising photographs had been obtained in War-

sau but no recruitment was attempted because KHRUSHCHEV had

TOP SECRET,

---

## Page 116

14-00000

Tor detai

716.

given

instructions that no actions were to be taken which

might enoarrass then

existirg

good relations with the l'nited

States.

When in February 1965 it was pointed out that MORONe

arrived in Warsad on 14 December 1960 and that NOSENKO left

for Cuba on 15 November 1960, NOSENXO revised his story of

receiving the peisonal report of the technician to say that

he had perhaps read the technician's report after returning

from Cuba in jecember 1960.

CIA learned of the MORONE train trip ard subsequent

involvement with the UB agert in 1951 from a l'olish source

who had provided nuch sersitive and reliable information

previously.

The Polish source submitted a considerable

amount of detail ircliding the date of the operation (which

NOSENKO did not recalll and the fact that the Polish agent

was handled in Moscow by a KGB officer ramed "Volodya."

It was on the basis of this report that MORONE was .with.drawn

from Moscod in May 1961:

In accounta glven since his defection, NOSE:IKO has con-

gistently

nawed KUSOLAPOV as MORONE's case oificer.

KCSOLA-

POV drafted the plan for the operation on the train,

discussed

it with NOSENKO

and KOVSHUK, met with a U3 official

in MoscoW

to arranue for the agent, net the agent on her arrival, and

briefed her on her assignment.

NOSENKO has not been asked

and has not volunteered who specifically placed the agent

on the train.

Fecords show, horever, that MoRoNE left Moscow

on 13 November 1960, arriving in Warsaw on the l4th; from

12 to 16 November 1960, KOSOLATOV is confirmed to have been

in Helsinki, apparently in conrection with an operation in-

volving the herican code cler'. GARiND (see above).

also noted that travel records show that NOSENKO, the officer

supervisirg this las well, presumably, as KOSOLAPOV's trip

•to Helsinkil, left Moscow

on 15 November 1960 with a dele-

gation goirg to cuba.

NOSENKO has been questioned concerning the KGB agents

in contact with MORONE and what was learned

from then. He

reported that an Egyptian agent visited inerica House, met

MORONE there,

but did not report anything of interest

con-

cerning hin.

NOSEIXO also mentioned IVANOVA, a said

at

America House, who knew MORONE and whom the iGB wanted to use

to lure MOPONE into a compronising situatior. (see above).

NOSENKO said that he, himself, had set with IVANOVA several

times to discuss MORONE, but that he could not recall azy-

thing specific of interest or use that she reported concerning

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 117

14-00000

i mr 120rt 951'

717.

bin.

Another abent sho may have reported on MUROYE, JOSENKO

Bald, was an East Goraan girl sent to Anerica Hoise

to pose

as an Austrian; NCSENtO was not gure wnat she right have

reported or then this was, other than it occurred when he

Has wurking against SORONE and that lt was durira ABIDIAN's

tour in doscow, for he had coro tu Anerica llouse to question

the girl.

Various repirts indicato that 10:0'E Gas Involved in

1llegal currency speculation with the Epiptiar agent and

on at leas. une occasion the Egyptian Introduced MORONE

to a Soriet fenale, with

shOT HOROSE was inticate.

did not know that soRosE ras also involved in illeral cur-

rercy dealings with dabaidiathon NOSENKO has Identified as

KOSCLAPCi's akont aid whu, ne sald,

was Involved with and

reporting on NOSEstO's target ABIDIAN.

SuSENKO did not know

that IvANOvA ouce incroduced SORONe to a Soviet fenale, with

Thon VORONE vas Intinate; additionally MORO'E was reported

by a nunior of his co-residents al America louse to nave been

intinate with IVAlOVA herself (which MORO:E denied). Some

of those sand irericans reported also that MOROSE tas 1nt1-

mate

WItH LiMANETS, another XGB agent sdentllied by NOSENKO;

MORGE hiuself sald he knew LiANETS "uell."

Finally, the

incident Involving the East Gerran girl posing as an Austrian

MONTGOMERY.

(v) Te KEYSERS Case

Tho approach tu KEYSERS is the only tine during his

§CrViCe In

the U.S. Embassy Section that USENKO claing to

have had direct contact with an American stationed in dos-

cOW.

(NOSENKO said on ong uccasion that this was the only

free-tu-lace encounter he could recall;

and,

on another,

that it was possible that SlURSEFRG--the onl; other possibility--

may not have seen his on the nijht he was approached in the

Noscor hotel.)

KEYSERS therefore is the only independent

Americas solice ho could confirm that OSENKO was involved

1n opcrations ajainst Ascrican Exbassy porsonnel in 1960 or

1961.

NOSESKO hinself pollited out, horever, that this cor-

tact was of very short duration, and that it was possible

trat KEYSERS would not recognize him.

This was the case:

KEYSERS failed to identily NOSENKO's photograph and described

the officer no approached him as a man considerably older,

and probably of a much heavier build than NUSEKO

Although YOSESKO was able to provide a descriptio? of

this incident, he did not know much about the overall KGB

case against KEYSERS and a number of discrepancies have been

In 1962 NOSENKO first reported the approach to KEYSERS,

without naming hin, but sajing he was the successor to STORS-

defecting in

1961, JOSENKO has continued to

hin as STCRSBERG's replacement.

In fact, KEYSERS

was sent to Moscow as

an assistant to the Emhassy

medical

officer; he also worked in the office of the Alr Attache as

• collateral duty and for a short while in 1961 ras under

training in the allitary code roon as a "back-up" crypto-

grapher for STORSbERG.

STORSBERG's replacement in Hoscow

VAS

Zl'JUS.

1OP SECRET,

---

## Page 118

14-00000

718.

On 24 and 28 January 1561, before the defection, NO-

SENKO incorrectly ramed ZUJUS, who he said

STORSBERG 'S

replacement, as the target of this operation.

1964 NOSEYKO called a special aceting with hig ClA handlers

to correct this mistake.

He said that, in fact, KEYSERS

WaS STOKSBEFG's replacement,

and the approact had been made

(Thus HOSENKO had forgotten the name of the one

American Embassy official ha ever approached.)

In Pebruary 1965 NOSENKO said that the KGB belleved

that KEYSERS did not report the receipt of the defection

letter and that there was no indication that he had from

microphones

or telephone coverage of the U.S. Enbassy.

fact, KEŸSERS reported the letter at once in the office of

the Hilltary ittache, where a microphone was discovered 1n

NOSE KO had carlier said that this particular micro-

phone was being monitored around the clock by the kGB.

(KEYSERS' bomosexuality and drinking problems rad also

been discussed widely ir: Embasay offices.

unaware of these discussions.).:

NOSENKO did not know correctly where or how the KGB

delvered to KEYSERS the letter which preceded the airport

approach which NOSEKO claimed to have made.

(vi). Other Code Clerk Cases

Frark DAY:

NOSESKO identified DAY as &

State Department

code

clers and the target of either KOSOLAPOV or GRYAZNOV.

As with all other code clerks, NOSENKO was asked whether he

knew of any interesting irfornation about DAY, whether be

knew of any

Of DAY's friends in Moscow, or of his travels

inside and outside the Soviet Union, etc.

SOSENKO answered

"no" to all these questions.

He said that the KGB had no

derogatory information on DAY, was unarare of any vulner-

abilities he might have had, and that no

operational mes-

sures were taken against hin.

Records show that DAY was in

Moscow fros ¿ay 1960 to October 1961:

1961 he tra-

velled to

the

caucasus with bis friend, the u.s. Agricul-

tural Attache BROWS, forcerly an overt CIA enployee. DAY

later reported that the two were under surveillance by five

persons at all times on this trip,

that on ore occasion they

found four "repairaen" in their hotel room upon returning

unexpectedly ahead of schedule, and that another time during

this

trip an

'attractive and available Soviet fenale" was

placed in their train compartment.

JOhn TAYLOR: NOSENKO Said TAYLOR waS a State Department

code clerk ard the target of KOSOLAPOY.

NOSENKO did not

know of TAILOR's previous service abroad or of any back-

ground information the KGB might have had about hin.

described an operation against TAYLOR wnich centered around

his intinacy with a Russian maid (a KGB agent) and his sym

pathy towards the Soviet Union

and its people.

No compro-

mising photographs were obtained of TAYLOR and the mald,

however, and no approach was made to him, possibly because

did not want to jeopardize the more important STORS-

BERG case by creating a "flap." According to TAYLOR, he was

intimate witn his maid fron about September 1960 until the

beginning of 1961.

On one occasion they were intimate 1o a

"friend's apartment" in Moscow.

NOSESKO did not know that

the maid told TAYLOR she pas pregnant or that TAYLOR offered

•*;

---

## Page 119

14-00000

719.

ber: soney for an abortion.

TAYIOR left boscow In February

1961, abercas

the approach to StORSeERG tes reported by

KOSENTO and STORSBERG to have occurred four to oight months

afterrard.

MaUrICE ZRANG:

NOSESKO Identifled 24.11G as a State

Departuent code clerk who was "actively sorked on" during

the 1960-1961 period.

An Egyptian agent. uhose nane lioSEN-

#O did dot recall, Introduced

ZHANG tO e jeralo NGB ageDt

1n an atreant to outain compromising orcicgraphs, but the

agent did not like ZwAiG and refused to have intercouise

with bin.

At tho tire OSENKO left the U.S. Enbassy Sec-

tion 1n Japuary 1962, there was no further astivity sur-

The KGB had no agenty in costact eith h1s,

and there sas no vulnerubility data concerning tia.

ZHANG was Intervlewed bi the State Departient arier returulog

fros his loscon assignment, a poligraph examination Indicated

that zuld had had intercourse with his Russian raid, else-

where identified by JoSENko

as a KGB ageat; titt adnitted

sisiting the maid's apartnent several ties but denied

intimacies.

In darch or April 1961. 8r IBjpUlal introduced

ZWANG to arother Soviet lenale; ZHANG also sonitrod viaiting

ber apartrent on several occasions, but azain denicd having

had intercourse with her.

ZhaNG mas reforted by varlous

other Americans stationed in Moscow to have beer accive 1n

currencY

speculation and birckrarketeering with the Egyptian

and lister and agert of ROSOLAPOr according to josEiro.

OSETto cas unaware of this.

.

÷i.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 120

14-00000

720.

1. Responselt 1or art Kroulege 28 33l0

NoSEStO sand that, as Deputy Chief of the l.5. Fatussy

section, hr was

direcils cesponsible, as case diceligibint.

all coerate uf the inbassy security Officer Join %.

This was destito's only indiridual target resporsibility.

end no

KGB officer shared de with his.

NOSESKO said that

he opened the koa pile or: AbIllay before ABidlal's arrival.

in Moscow in early 1950, and that he turned irls file over

officially to his successor. GriALiON, shen transterred from

the U.S. tabass: Section at the end of 1901.

It HIS MUSENKO

the Xo8 plar: for operations agginst AblD!Ay in

about Detober 1950.

ABIlIAY, aCCOrdina do jOShiRO, was cor-

sidered by the joB to ve a cli officer aud, as LA:GELLE's

succissor, "as also colsiderod to be the nost important

counterintelligence larger in the kobess!.

ABIDIAY waS thus

nade a spocial target uf surveillance pron the day of his

arrivel in the U'SSR; this scant he das alrays under surveil-

lance by juveral teams uf the KGB Seventh (Sur:cillance)

Directorate.

The inleisive corerage of AbIDIAN Included

nail censorship, telephore taps.

aid agent ie'urting; it was

institutes, NOSENiO said.

"in the nove that he nirht lead

thr Kub to anotrer PClOV."

ABINIA" waS jeieried, SOSFVKO

continued, in cirre letter-mailliks--ali to

agents already

under KGB

control.

ile mas seen to epier a sugricted dead

drop site on Pistlin Street, the significance of wich did

nut becone knows so the küB until later, anen it vas learued

that this

site sis to be used by PENrOYSilY.

In_ ile hostile

interrogacions uf carly 1905, HOSENiO agreed triai de sas the

single porson in tic

küb responsible sor knoting cierytring

possible about "bIDiaY.

NOSENKO said he kre notire about ArIDIll's personal

eucatin:, his studies 1: France, his nill-

lary sorvice, his date uf ertry into the Staic Department,

his State Departacut rank, his previous forrian assiganents

with the State Dupartacar, or his status as & Foreig. Ser-

vice Reserve, Sials, un Officer status !FSR, ESS, FSO).

ried to learn these things, but

the inforna-

tion was unerailable in the Second Chief Directuraie or 1n

files, and although le requested infornation

from the First Cries Directorate, nothing vas received.

The

only information the KGB had on ABIDIA!:, insofar as VOSENKO

in ABIDIAN's visa request and in

of the Legal Residencies in the United

States; the report provided a basis for belicrink hia to be

NOSENKO waS unaware of the meaning of the initials

F'SR, FSS, and FSO.

when asked whether he had checked the

Department of State Biographic Pegister for inforration on

ABIDIAN'S backaround, Te

replied that this docusen: tas not

available to the li.S. Embassy Section; he subsequently.

recalled that tiere das an old cops of

the Biographic Register

"fron about 1956" in KOislilk's office, but thai it contained

no intOrIaliOn On ABIDIA!.

NOSENKO reported that one of the reasors ABIDIAN was

considered a Cli officer vas his behavior

thile serving as

a Departmont of State Security Officer pIer KHHUSHCHEV'S

deiegation when the latter visited the trited States 1n

---

## Page 121

14-00000

721.

was his larediate subordinate and charca MoStio's

office la KGB lie:dquarters, was a member of this sare

NOSE'KO dId not know Where IRIDIAN'S OffICe was located

in the U.S. Erbagsy.

He sald we did not koot and was

unable to find out wiio ABIllAN's secretary mas.

He reported

that sone

agent told the kok that ABIDlAY lad a sign on

offire shich said "Security Offleci."

There was no such sion.

•OSENHO did not know where ARIDIAt's apartürnt vas

located.

not inus 1i5 cuntents and said that the

sut interested in tliis.

le did not ince whether

ABIDIAS changed apartents in Muscor, which re did.

NOSENKO IdE:LifiEd GROVAKINA, an Enbassy language

teacher, as a lot agent do nas valuable becauso she was

intelligent and tas able to provide perso.ality sketches on

her students lased un clageron discuerione.

associated ABIDIAN mich GRoWlsurA.

Hen told that ABIDIAY

had taken larguade lessons pron jer. sostso recalled that

ABIDIAN TOOK

"several" lessong dion didntikurd at the beginnirg

of his tour but discortined; she reported lothing uf 8ig71-

ficance and there ras no regular repurting tron her on

ABIDIAS, horever, reporird that he took regular,

Pusgian lessons fret 0004. 80%1 throughout his tour

in Xoscor and trat they discussed i: class his past personal

life.

travel, cducation, fiancee, and his trips abroad lo

see his fiancee.

HOSENKO knee that AbIDiad :avelled out of the USSR

two

or three times, bir lad no

place or what countries ABIDIAN visired.

as ABIrlAl's predecessor LASGFLIF. as known to nase travelled

outside the USSR for operational reasons

the FOrdi case, it would have teen of interest to learn

Where AbIDIAY

this

had gone, lut the KGR had no way of finding

out.

(Not.

in the

kncw. )

when lUSEsto's interrorator pointed nut the possibi-

11t!

uf photographing ABlDIal's passport upon sis return to

tre I'SSR, NOSENKO roplied tat tig jud durs sut photograpt.

the passports of foreign diplo-als enterig the soviet unlo...

NOSENKO said that ABlDid: rade no trips outside Moscow

and explaired ti.at.

as case officer. he

would secersarily have been aware of any suci trip as he

would have had to handle all arrangements for surveillance

during it.

When NOSENKO was told that ABIDIll travelled to

Soriet Armenia

ir October 1950. NOSESKO said for the first

time that le was on leave in thät tonth.

in October 1906 that he krew nothing of ABIDIl's trip.

NOSENKO said that he did nut know who vere ABIDIAN'S

close American friends in Muscon or his friends and profes-

sional contacts among foreigners there.

NOSENKO said at the erd of the January-February 1965

interrogations

concerning ABIDIAY that tie reason

le knew

so lattle about ABIDIlY das because ne was

"corking badly"

as ABIDIAN's case officer. The reason for his poor work, he

---

## Page 122

14-00000

122.

said, sas that ho had lu concentrate on super loing tie work

against code cierk aid ihere fore hnd very littlo lire

left for ABIDidS loce abors concerning code clortsi.

In 1962 SCStill correctly describre all of te lAr00

clandestine letter mallings carried out li ARIUlil it 1105-

cor at fIA request (pages 226-230).

He also provider! 81-

curats inforsation on Cll lettor-mallings in genera!.

pointing out that none ul all were mailed for a year and a

half after the arrest of 1AN0ELlE In, Cetober 1959. u

letters vera nailed fro: 12 february 1950 until l April

1961, when ABIDIAN nailed his first one.)

SOSE:KO explainca

that

the KGB cosplerely controlled this activity through the

use of notra, a thief poider spplied to the clothirs of

foreigner: in the USSR; a trace is leir on anything coming

into contact with treated areas, and this can be detected

by special machines trungh which all mail passes.

The fact that all of aBidia's letters vere mailed to keite

double agents and would thergfore have bert detected chyray.

it was metka, NOSESKO said.

which in each case led to their

initial identification.

after

has defection NoSaNKO described

how the metka had been applied to ABlulat's clothing (anc

hence to the letters) ly the agent ridoRolich, aho began

wurking as AbiDIA"'s maid several months aftor Allilad ar.

rived in Moscor in March l9i0.

NOSENKO insisied under inter-

rogation that FEDOROVICH was the only agent who had access

to ABIDIAi's aparteent, that he.

YOSENKO, hau persurally

briefed lies on

the application of netka, and that "i was

sure that ABIDIAS's letlers were detected by moans of autia.

From a ClA debriefing of ABIDIAS, rolever, it appears Enat

FEUOROVICH did not begin nurkins

an ABIDlil's maid until

some time in Juls 1961, mercas ARIDIlY salled 1s first

letter in luscor on l April 1961 and is socond letter on

2 Julj 1901.

ABIDIAt's third letter was railed on 1 septrm-

ber 1961, after FELUROVICH began to work ior him.

i.

Reporting or ABIDIAN'S Visit to the Pushkin Street Dead

Drop

NOSESKO's account of the visit by ABIDIAY to the

PENKOVSKIY dead drop site un Pushkin Street in Mosoct 1s

described in detail on Pages 231-235.

In suomary, SCrENKO

reported that at the end of 1960 or early 1961 KGB surveil-

lance followed ABIDIAN from the U.S. Embassy to Pushkin

Street, where AbIDIAN dos noted

to enter a residential building.

Upor.

exanination it was decided that this was a lifely

dead drop

site, and a stationary surveillance post eas

85-

sigued to watch

1t.

After thrue months, since nothing sus-

picious had beed noted, this post was renoved.

The true

significance of the location did not becone known to the

KGB until afler the arrest of PENOVSKIY in 1962.

JOSENYO

said he was still in the U.S. Enbassy Section ard was ABIDIAN'S

case officer when this event

took place.

He heard of 1t

while sitting in KOVSHUK's

office

on the day it haprened.

visited the site the fullowing day

with v.

KOZIdY (Chief of

the Anericen Department of the KiB Surveillance Directorate),

placed the original surveillance report in ABIDlAS's file.

and discussed the results of the stationary post tith kOZLor

on an alrosi daily basis during the first month ard periodi-

cally thercafter until the pust was renoved. It ras ECZLOV

who told NOSENKO trat alter three sunths the statiorary

---

## Page 123

14-00000

F;il

t'El'es

riitrialf

ä innids

ПіЧі

rletonthhtwin110992146 319

18?.

survesllance had beon t: rustirard. Mosisto did tot tell

ClA alout trla

1-eident in 1362, te sald, lecause

30 YrCE

trat she waich l.ad

bein dltrontlrued and thit moiring suy-

piedous had beon

sured: phurrfore, he thoiatit tlie anclde.e

would

not mave buen uf lutorugt to incrliar lutolligonce.

H'GLNTO bes stresSad that dulDlni Fos inoci sercial

a: loast tir surrelllàire tuans ut eil tizes

ard tia8, ua ire dey le tialied Muntkar firret, abILlAN zas

under curttnucas walch fron the sonorr he boft dle inbagsj.

HsEsK0 has terr aula to rlre a dateiled descriotior of

¡BILIAS'E colezenE do toe drad diuf tilte.

dispite tte special curvcillarre corerage uf adidii:,

SOSENK0 Sen0, as iawe

ary unusuai ureneats i;

ABIDlAl durltó ine days inmollaraly preceding his visit

io Fusnkin

Strect.

aStidu said tho: te kner dofiniiely

that surveillaroe had roporied nothirg unusual during this

period aud that he sas sur. ABIDIAY lad not eludal the sur-

veiliá: ce et ar.y

timo curing it.

Arcordini ln cla recoros.

three rays before aBlulAd wont to Fushila

sereet in response

l0 ladirations that tre drai drup las

yeer. loadrd. IBIDIAY

left the l'.S.

Eabassj in his privete car for sposeu ilnuse

at aburt i:ine o'clock

in.

Ile erening: al about too o'clock

the nett

corniny ho and LiANILER ICIA Chirl Of Station, vent

in IBlUlAt's car

to chock the teleplione pole for dte signal

PEIKONSKIY NOS

1o lrain us

part of liis sipral that the drop

had bein loaded.

Two Jays

before ABlDit'i sont lo Fustiin

Streer to drove

pis car to the arartnoni of Air Force Captain

DAVISOS; he again checked the reicpione pole frun à viidos

in ihe apartzent and ihen

"alked by it or ioot.

JOSiNKO

sdentified GArButRias a loü. raval officor but not as & CIA

emploree (sce atuir).

Asked siy, ir his pinion, iBillaY sent to fustkin

Street at ihe

tite he did, NCSESKO replied that la about

D6U

an Arcrican luuris8 ur delegation uezber had zone tu

this

addrrss.

It was the

"op1r10n uf the Seeurd Chlel

Directorare" that lhas mnprican had selccied lhe site as a

dead drop lucetion.

and thiat ASIDIAs dent there acrely

to check the suitability of the

sile for this purpose.

fact, AbIDIAN sint tu iushkin Sticet la responço to mhat

appeared lo be & prearrenged telephone sirnal frea PEMOlSil:

signalling that ie had Ioaded the dead drop shere.

It has

been confiraed that FilKOVSKlY did not give this signal

and, LECBuse

of the circuastances and type of signal given,

the possitility of coircidence bas been ruled cut. ClA has

therefore concluded that the signal cane fron thie KGB.

The Pusakin Street dead drup site das proposed by

PENKOISKIY hinself i7 the August 1960 letter through which

he initially contacted clA.

There 18 no record that a

"tourist or delezation neuber" visited this eddress.

onls krown visits by dgericans to the bualding on Fusbkin

Street--the onl? ones laving any connection mith 1i5 use

as a dead drop lucalion--uccurred on 12 jovember ard 4

Decenber 1960 slien the ClA ufficer MAHONEY checked the

sodress fron ourside, and on 21 lanuary 19G1 when MAHONEY

entered the bullding

aid dhecked the specilic lacation of

tlie dead drop.

AAHONiY iS knumD to have been Identifled

to the KGB as a CiA uffirer before arliving in luscos ald

was tte larget of heavy survelllanre t'roughout ris tour.

(NOSEIXO did Dot inon abuut MAMINEY ur ais ClA statug.)

---

## Page 124

14-00000

724.

InSErO's date of "late D60 or carli l9l" sy irroritet,

almosi exactly by a soar.

¡OSESKO cald hE CUriO ABIDIAN'S

111e

Over tO GAYALTON aunut 28 Deceaber 1261.

checked the Fushkin Spirer dead diop en 30 Perceber 1961.

NOSEido has duscriboá his perticipatio: In an approach 10

tho American sourlEt M.E. JOHNSON as happenir? "right after

recurriry to thie Touriul Departrent in 1962."

Because

NOSESKO'S partipallon 1n this CeSe daS COntired by cOlLiSOS.

and because tho

Approach to JOHiSCh took place on s January

1962 (e reported

it to the U.S. rivasgy

at oncal, 1t car.

be said with

certainty that jOSENdu's ertire story of hig

own participation

in the survelllence of the Pushiin Street

dead

drop siii is false.

SCSENKO: (a)

could not have

visitro

the dead drop site with KUZLO: (ahn in any event

was not in luscow at the tino;

(b)

could riot haie placed

the

orialael surveillance report in AbIDIAt's filE,

which GRIALSON hold ag of 28 l'ecember 1961:

could not

have rocrived alaust dalli reports fros KOZLOr for about a

north aud perlodic reports trereafter; and (d) could not

have neglected to tell ClA of ABIDlAY's vIsli to the drop

in 1952 on grounds that the surveillance of Pushkin Stroet

had beer discuntinued after three months without anjaring

suspicivis vairg noted.

(NOSESKO waS In Genera 07 15 Merch

1962, onlj

two and a half months after AbIDIl; checked the

dead drop.)

NOSENTO has refusid tu adult that lie lird about ris

part in this ircident.

The page containing tie contradic-

tons listed in the preceding paragraph wes the urly page of

a "protocol" walch dUSENio retused to sixu during the hostile

interrogations of early 1965.

In October 1900, unen he ras

again askid whother he went to the Puihkin Street dead

drop site with NOZLOY, NOSkiKO sald that le could noi renca-

ber whether he had gone thore at all.

---

## Page 125

14-00000

....

725.

J. Responsibility of Supervising Military Attache Operationg

On 29 January 1965 NOSEAXO told his interrogator that

for the first five or s1x sonths of 1960, Immediatoly after

transferring to the U.S. Embassy Soction and as part of his

responsibilitles as 119 Deputy Chlo!, he supervised Second

Chief Directorato activitlos against American service at-

taches in koscow.

Ey this ho meant, NOSE'KO said, that when

GAVRILENKO (the Case OffICer for Air Force Attaches),

KURILENKO (Army Attaches), or BELOGLAZOV (Naval Attaches and

Marines) had

any questions of reports to submit, they would

come to his rathor than to KOVSHUK, the Chief of the section,

about six months he wag relieved of tbis duty because

his other duties did not allow sufficient time for this

function and because it was considered more suitable that

ALESHIN, recently assigned to the American Department as

Deputy Chief, be given this responsibility.

NOSENXO had previously been questloned in detail on

his resposibilities in the U.S. Embassy Section, and had never

bofore mentioned this one.

JOSEKO told CI.' in June 1964

that when he reported for duty in the U.S. Egbassy Section

in January 1960,

DR.1''0% was tho responsible case officer for

the laval Attaches and Marines.

Soon after his own arrival,

NOSENKO sald.

DRANOV was transferred fron the section and

his responsibilities were taken over by BELOGLAZOV, who had

earlier been as-üting DRAYOY agalnst these targets.

jOsEnKo said on 20 October 1966 that inmediately upon.

or at the latest a rew weeks after, arriving in the u.s.

Embassy Section,

he vent on leave for a month.

immediately belore or right after this leave KOVSHUK told

him that he would be respousible for activities against

the Naval Attaches.

DRAVOY sas retiring and gave NOSENKO

the files on Naval

and darine personnel.

This was NOSENKO'8

first mention either of the leave period Ic early 1960 or

of having had case officer responsibilities for personnel

of the Naval Attache's office in joscor.

he gaid that he had lied about going on

leave in November

was reninded or 25 October 1966 that he had

said in 1965 that in 1960 he was supervisor of operations

egainst all U.S. service attache personnel.

"I took the files only on the Navy, but I was working

on (supervising) all of thea."

NOSENKO hag never volunteered details of specific

operational activity he handled as the case officer for U.S.

Naval Attaches or supervisor of operations against.all

attaches in early 1960.

He said that Marine Colonel DULACKI'g

contact with (or attenpt to recruit) the Indonesian KGB aget

which he has described in detail (see Page 488)

Patter he sas relieved of these functions.

TOP SECRET

-

---

## Page 126

726.

k. IDY to Bulgaria and the LUNT Case

In the spring of 1361, NOSENKO said, four nonths after

returning fron Cuba, he was told unexpectedly that in about

a week's time he would leave for bulzaria to consult with

the Arerican Departuent of the Bulgarian MVR corcerning

operations against the Anerican Legation in Sofia

(Pages

279-283)•

NOSENKO flew to Sofia in early April 1961, where

he was net by A.S. HOLLOV,

an advisor there and a forker

employee of the Second Chief Directorate whom NOSEYXO had

known at KGB Headquarters.

NOSENKO remained in Bulgaria

until about the middle of May:

while there he discussed

matters and particular

cases with the Bul-

garians, gave

several lectures on operations against Aneri-

can installations and personnel as well as against tourists,.

and finally

directed the successful homosexual operation

against the American Professor LUST.

Aside from being told that he would be advising che

Bulgarian service on operations against Americans at the

Legation in Sofia, NOSENKO auparently received no prepara

tion for this trip.

He said in answer to specific questions

that nobody told him what he was supposed to discuss with

the Bulgarians, that he did not meet with the Bulgarian

liaison representatives in Moscon before leaving, and that

ie knew nothing of the organication, personnel, area of

responsibility, or problems of the

Arerican Departmert of

the Bulgarian service before arriving in Sofia.

NOSENKO was selected for this mission despite the fact

that he was extremely busy with his duties in the U.S. Erbassy

Section (see above

discussion of his responsibilities for

code clerks, ABIDIAN, and the military attaches) and despite

the fact that KOLLOV was

permanently assigned

as an advisor

in Sofia.

POSENKO described KOZLOV in another context as a

"very experienced officer" and has said that KOZLOY was. Chief

of the American Departeent until 1953 and then from June 1955

until sometime in 1958 was Deputy Chief of the Tourist De:

partment, Second Chief Directorate.

(KOZLOV, assisted by

NOSENKO, had recruited BURG! in June 1956.)

Asked why KOZLOV

could not have advised the Bulgarians, NOSENKO said that he

was too busy advising on higher levels and had been away

from active operations in Moscow too long.

NOSENKO gave only a general description of his duties.

as an advisor on operations against the American Legation.

On the other hand, he accidentally became involved

in a homo-.

sexual ertrapnent operation against an American tourist sho

was visiting Bulgaria, and he has described this operation

in considerable detail.

(NOSENKO's previous speciality was

tourist operations, particularly those involving homosexual

compromise.)

NOSENKO's story about his role in the LUNT case changed

greatly between 1962 and 1964.

During the first meeting

series he described in detail

set the operation ur

and what he said to LUNT when he personallv confronted the

American with

the evidence.

ever, NOSENKO has said that he took no personal part

Since defectionin part in the

approsch itself, that he remained in his office, and that he

merely advised hon to set it up.

of his account

and that of LUNT indicates that he was not on the scene at

the tine.)

TUP SECRET

---

## Page 127

14-00000

727.

• NOSENKO said that the Bulgarian service lecgne si are

of LUNT's homosexual tendencies only after he san LUST's

name or bcaniir mentioned; he recognized the name as that.of

a professor who had been assessed as a homosexual when

carlier visiting Moscon, and

traces with the KiR Second Chief

Directorate confirmed that this has the same man.

Instate-

ments made to U.S. authorities after the approach

he had had horosexual relations at least fire

ashierent fimes

with a Bulgarian

during in earlier trip to sofia.

gave this Bulgarian travellers' checks, which the latter

planned to sell on the biacknarket,

on one uccasion

stcpped on the sireet with min by a suliarian civil police.

ran, and corresponded with hin in the interim between his

first visit and the one during which the arproach took place.

LUNT had Written the bulgarian honosexual

that he was retirring

to sofia jefore arrivine on the second occasion.

The U.S. Visa and the Cuba TUY

NOSENKO said thät in October 1960 he sas assigned to

accompany a delegation of autonotive specialisti on a visit

to the United States but that when this tris

ias icicelled,

IDY to Cuba (lages 271-278).

pleted arransoments for his passport and hid submitied his

true name to the U.S. Embass! for a visa, the soviets vere

inforied by U.S. authorities

that the dilegation could not

then be accepted in the United States.

At about the

tine, a

delegation of nickel industr: experts

readied for departure to Cuba.

At first, NOSENtO explained,

it was not considered ricessary for a security office: to

accompany this delegation to

a friendly country, but a? the

last roment, two days before the delegation was

scheduled to

leave Moscow,

the Central Commiitee

that such an officer go along.

no time to do otherwise, rOSENiO las

chosen for

this job

since he already had a valid passport and

authorization. to

l'isa arrangerents nere

for the transit

countries and NOSENKO left with

delegation, returning to

Moscow in mid- or late December 1960.

NOSENKO's U.S. visa

request submitted to the U.S. Em-

bassy in Moscow on 29 October 1960 was his first use of this

name in connection with travel abroad.

(lis travelled to

England in 1957

and 1958 aS SIKOLAYEV, MUSEYKO

said

because

he had used this name wich

itish cirizens the

in the Soviet Union; as

suspected of

Deing an intel-

NOSENKO was exposed under this identity.

He applied for us. entry: under true nane.

horever, Gespite

the fact that he had also used the NIKOLAYEV nare with

Americans; one of them has rippel sno, according to the

CHEREPANOV papers and one other source, has suspected by the

KG to be an American

intelligence agent.

NOSE! KO further

explained that

he could not use the name MIXOLAYEV because

the automotive jelegation cover he piarned to use in the

United States conflicted with the sports/cultural cover he

used in Great Britain,

and the KGB feared that this.

would be noticed when the

American and British services ex-

changed notes.

The proposed automotive cover, however,

flicts in

the same way with the Ministry of Foreir Affairs

cover NOSENKO used, again under true nane, in Geneva in 1962.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 128

14-00000

TOP SECRET

728.

NOSENKO nald that the decision to send him to Cuba

was rade tro days before the delegation left Moscow because

a security officer vas

required and be happened to have a

passport and authorization to travel.

-The delegation left -

Moscuw on 15 November 1960, ard thereföre

was reached on 13 November or thereabouts.

this decision

NoSEsKO, who

had been transferred to the U.S. Embassy. Soction in order

to supervise and revitalize operations against code clerks.

tho Section'& most inportant recruitsent target, consequently

left Moscow on the day that SOROSE also departed by tralo

for Warsaw and at a time that his subordirate KOSOLAPOY ras

in Helsinki (12-16 Novenber 1960), apparently in consection

with an operatior against Joha GARLAND.

NOSENKO has given widely divergent accounts of the

purpose of his assignment to Cuba.

In 1962 he related in

detail how he had been sent to investigate how the Cuban-

intelligence service was operating agairst Anericans sta-

tioned in Havana, particularly intelligence officers. and

described what he did to fulfill this mission.

1964,

however, NOSEiKO has clalaed

merely to bave been

the security

officer

with the delegation.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 129

14-00000

729.

1. Personal HandlER of Agenta

Then KOSENKO transferred fros the Tourist Departeent

to the huerican Departoint, ho took along a nusber of the

agents he had used in tourdar operationo with tia:

and POLiOr, FRIpPEL, DUITRIYEY, and gYTOVA..

Durdrg this

period he also handled LEVINA, a librarian and larguago

teacher at the U.S. Enbassy who was turned over to hin by

Erbassy Section case officer MASSYA in 1960; and

PREISFRELID and er8aiatho were used in code clerk opera-

These agents and NOSENKO's handling of thea are dis-

cussed below.

(1) JERRENOY and YOLKOV

JOSEStO continued to meet tich these too homosetual

sgents during his two years

as Deputy Chief of the section.

not use them in aly way, horever, according to his

Ite ocly contact of the too known to Cla ass E

aCCling 10 1961 with BiRKFTT.

In 1959, while in Xoscos and

a Cl: AgeD:, BARRETT waS COmprOMiSed iS YETREOV and VOLÄOY:

is 1961, shortly after an

apparently charce scaring with

BARKETT ves recruited by

the KGD on the basis of the

obtained in 1959.

Nosetro descritid the compro-

giSe CI BARRETT In 1959 and knew that he had been recruited

in 1961. He did not know of BARRETT's contacts with YEFRE-

HUV and VOLKOV in 1961.

(11) FF.IPPEL

NOSENKO said he continued to handle FRIPPEL during tie

196U-1961 period, despite the fact that he never provided

anything of value, because he and CHELSOKOV (the

the Tourist Department who was always present at these

[cetings)

"kept hoping he would give sumethind."

left the Soviet Union in January 1961, but NOSENO cortinued

to be registered as his case ofticer.

(111) DMITRIYEV

DUITRIYEY, a specialist on Japan and Thailand uho

spoke Japanese and English, had been NOSENKO's agent during

the 1955-1960 period.

DHITRIYEV was then caploied by tre

Japanese Exhibition in Hoscow, and SOSENKO did not indicate

how he was used in tourist operatious.

NOSEsiO did not

describe any opcrational use of hin in 1960 or 1961.

(iN) RITOVA

RYTOVA waS NOSE:KO's agent in the Tourist Departuent

after 1956 or 1957, at which tize she was exployed at the

Russian Permenent Exhibit in Moscow.

An English speaker,

she reported any interesting inforsation conceroing visitors

to the exhibition.

NOSENKO has not referred to any KGB opera-

tions in Moscow in which she participated during his service

(v) LEVINA

LEVINA sorked as a language teacher and librarian at

the American

Embassy and NOSENKO handled her because she

had a number of code clerks in her language classes.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 130

14-00000

730.

not with lEVINd a sucher of tinca, lut she never reportca

anything interesting and

tes never used directly in opere-

t10r8: 10r0lv1r.g tie Merleans.

she ras fired fros the

Embassy al tre end of 1900 or earls 1951.

(v1) Johen PREISFREUND

AS

described in Pages 173-131 and discussed above,

PREISFRELAD DAS,

HOSENKO sald, recruited by KOVSilK in 1960

and was bardled vy HOSINiO in the operation against janes

STORSBERG.

Both NOSENKO and PREISEREUAD Bald

that this 898

the only

operation in which he took part.

JOSENKO suggested

to CIA that PREISIREUND would be able to attest to hig

description of this case, and ClA interviered PREISTREUND

1n Helsinkl and Stockholn during the surmer of 1965.

PREIS-

FREUND's account generally agreed w1tr SOSENKO's und he mas

able to supply a considerable amount of personzilty and

background information concerning his foruer case officer.

Fron PREISTRFUND's manner during these intervierg, the nature

of his responses and statements, and his actiong after the

interviers were completed, there was no reasonable doubt

that ho remaired under KGB control while meeting the ClA

representatives.

(511)

STEAD KGB cryptonym "SARDAR") was recruited by NoSEN-

Ko in 1501.

first targetted agallst

Anerica House

in Gencral,

was chen used

only in the developnent

uncration

against

ZUJUS, the successor to James STUNSLEHG as nilitary code

clerk in Moscow.

arianel and developed ZlJl'S, but nothing

had cose of the operation

at the tine SOSESKO transferred

fron the imerican Department.

No other use nas made of this

agent and there was io

approach to Lift's.

YOSENKO first

suggested that ClA actempt a

"false

flag" recruitient of

Elausing his (NOSENNO'S)

name fur this purpose; he pro-

vided CIA with esthetin Dasascus

that

contact could be established.

Tater NOSENKO said that sells

like PREISFRELND, could verify JOSENdU's position as

his

handler in the ZUJUS operation (Pages

209-212)

CIA Inter-

viered ZUJUS, who vaguely recalled

having eet Eith

not

recall his naze and denied that his relationship

with

vag

as close as NOSENKO reported.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 131

14-00000

731.

I. Transfer to the Tourist Department

Of GRIBINOV's decision to pronote hinto the position of

Deputy Chief of the eatire American Department:

JOSENKO. -=

however, knew that his chief and friend KOVSHUr ranted the

Job. and that FEDOSEYEV (Chief of the Department) also favored

KOVSHUK for this position.

Realizing that his own appoini-

ment would therefore place him in a difficult position ard

wighing to avoid this, SOSENKO spoke to the Chief of the

Tourist Department, CHELSOKOV, about returning there. At

CHELSOKOV'6 SUGGeStIOn, NOSENKO went to GRIBAYOV with the

request to be returned to the Tourist Departuent as Chief

of the American Tourist Section, with the understadding that

he would be rade Deputy Chief of the fourist Department

upon the retirement of the incumbent. BALDIN, in July 1962.

To this GRIBANOV

agreed.

NOSENKO said that GRIBINOV did

not discuss with himhis reasons for wanting to appoint him

Deputy Chief of the American Department or for appointing

him Chief of the American Tourist Section, nor did he discuss

with JOSENKO his personal requirements for these positions.

On one occasion,

in early 1965, NOSENKO said that it was

because GRIBANOY "thought I was a tough guy, a good case

officer.

In 1959 I saw hin often and

was involved in a lot.

of questiors which vere reported to him."

According to

his most recent version, NOSENKO was officially trangferred

fron the American Department at the end of December 1951

and reported

for duty in the Tourist Department on about

3 January 1962.

KOVSHLK, who was also a candidate for the job as Deputy

Chief of the

American Department, had earlier held

this po-

sition, according to NOSENKO and COLITSYN.

lie liad been per-

sonally involved in many of the nore significant American

Department operations during the previous decade.

cluded the recruitments of RODES

Of NOSENKO's nost important leads, according to NOSENKO):

the handling of SHAPIRO; the attempts to recruit STORSBERG,

HARNSTOSE, and HANNHEIM; the development of the ClA officer

MINTERS) ard the interrogation of LANGELLE in connection Eith

The POPOV arrest.

By contrast, GRIBANOV's original candidate forothe job,

NOSENKO, was present when KOZLOY recruited BURGland himself

recruited HARRIS and five honosexual tourists who visited

the Soviet Union in 1959: Furthermore, NOSENKO's perfor-

mance as Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section. as he

admitted under interrogation, was "not good."

NOSENKO has given many contradictory dates for his

transfer to the Tourist Department.

at various times that this took place in January 1962 and

In February 1962: in 1964 he tined the transfer as falling

some time between 15 and 20 January 1962; and in February

1965 ke arrived at the date of 2 or 3 January 1962, after

it was pointed out that he appeared in the approach

to w.E.

JOHNSON on 5 January:

COn this basis, he said that the

official order sas issued about 25 December 1961 and that

he turned over his files to his successor GRYAZNOY several

days later.)

NOSENKO contradicted this latter estinate.

however, by sajing that he was in the U.S. Embassy Section

for the entire perlod of the three-nonth surveillance of

10P SECRET

---

## Page 132

14-00000

732.

the Pushkin Stroet dead drop, lie:, until late March 1962,

and by his insistence that he had roturned to the Tourist

15 January 1962 and refused to belleve the correct date of

15 December 1961.

D. Remarks

For no single responsibility has NOSENKO substantiated

his alleged service as Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy

Section in the years 1960-1961.

His statements about the

appointsent to and transier fron this position have been

Inconsistent; bis comparatively narrow experience and his

acknowledged falschoods about a persodel relationship

with

the Chief of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, GRIBANOV,

dispel the likelihood that those personnel asgiganents were

made in the way be claims.

Repeatedly he has been contra-

dictory about his activities during this two-year perlod,

shifting his story to suit the occasion and ignoring bou

each succeeding version nade all of his claius increaglogly

¡acredible.

The limited extent of NOSENKO's information

betrays a lack of faniliarity with detalls on the duties,

targets,

and most of the operations which he has ascribed

to hirself; in a certain few instances, however, such as

his description of ABIDIAN's route to

the Pushkin Street dead

drop, he has recounted events jugt as they are known fron

other sources to have occurred.

Nevertheless, where col-

lateral information has covered the few subjects on which

he provided derails, it has almost invarlably contradicted

bim and showed his to be ignorant of significant facts.

The reporting by HOSENKO thus was 5o

superficial._so in-

and so demonstrably erroneous ag to suggest without

reservation that he never cerved as an. officer. in the u.S.

Embassy Séction, zuch less as its Deputy Chief..

All avail-

able evidence, excluding that from certain Soviats who were

CIA and FBI sources (see Parto VIII.H. and VII.I. below),

combines to formulate this conclusion.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 133

14-00000

733.

7. Tourist department (1962-1964)

a. Introduction

NOSLUKO agreed during the interrogations at che beginning

of 1965 that he must have reported for duty as Chief of the

American Tourist Section on about 3 January 1952.*

In tris

job he was responsible

for pianning and supervising KGB acti-

vities against all tourists of Anerican, British, and Caradian

nationalities arrivirg in the UssR, and

his duties also encon-

passed preparations fur the coming tourist season (Pages 295-

287).

In July 1962, in conformity with GRIbANUV's intentions,

NOSENKO was pronoted to the position of Deputy Chief of the

entire Tourist Department; it had a taule of organization o!

to 100 staff officers, was responsible for handlarg overa-

tions against all tourists to the Soviet Union, and mairtined

used in these operations.

A year later NOSENKO

received the title of First Deputy Chief of the Departnert, a

"paper" pronotion as there was no other deputy.

During this

pericd in the Tourist Department, in addition to his supervi-

iconcerning which he has not been questioned in

detail), NOSEliKO took personal part in approaches to several

tourists, organized and directed the arrest of an American

tourist on horosexual charges, and met wich a number of agents.

It was his serior supervisory position that involied him in two

of the nost widely publicized cases of this pericd, the arrest

Of BARGHOORN and the case of OSWALi.

b. ibse:ices from Moscow

During

his two years in the Tourist Department, NOSENKO

was available to perform his assigned duties only part of the

time. After arriving in the American Tourist Section and after

the approach to JOHNSON on 5 January 1962, NOSENKO spent sev-

eral weeks

"getting the feel" of things by talking to case offi-

cers, reviewing reports of the section's activities during the

previous tro years,

and discussing plans for the up-coning tour-

ist season.

In mid-February he began preparations for his

assign-

ment to Gereva with the Disarmament Delegation.

NOSENKO has

...-

said that this involved discussions with the Eleventh Depart-

ment of the Second Chief Directorate, responsible for arranging

for security coverage of Soviet delegations going abroad, as

well as with the case officers responsible for the irvestigation

of suspected American agent SIlAKHOV.

NOSENKO said that he did

this on a part-time basis in addition to his regular duties,

but has lited in another context that these preparations required

sufficient time to make it impossible for him to take a personal

part in the recruituent of BIENSTOCK ir. February 1962.

15 March 1962, NOSENKO arrived in Geneva, remaining

there with

the delegation until 15 June, when he left Geneva by train to

to Moscow to reassume

his duties as Chief of Section.

He said that he had no deputy chief in this position, and it

is unclear who performed these functions in his absenca.

according to NOSENKO's account, of the six months he was Chief

" This date was settled upon after he acknowledged that his

approach to the American tourist W.E. JOHNSON must have

occurred on 5 January. as CIA records show.

Tir SeCRET

---

## Page 134

14-00000

734.

of the Anerican fourist Section, he sis in Morrow only three

months ard for ruch of this time was involved in breaking ir

or his rew job or in preparing for his temporary assignment

abroad.

Posaliko said he hed "no accorplishments" in this

period.

In the fall of 1962, NOSEiKO wont an leave for a north in

Sochi with his wife urd

NOSEiXO has estimated that 1x

morths of 1963 were spent on verdous temporary assignments

the soviet Union outside of Moscon, plus 3 ore-month's vacation

From 15 june 1962 to tus arrival

Sensiva on 19 Jariu-

ary 1964, a period of 18 months, MUJENKO was absent from KGS

Headquarters for eight months.

Tus an the persod 1962-63.

holding supervisory positions,

NOSEilO was absent or "reading

in" for about 13 months, or alout 50 percent oí the time.

c. Persoral Participation in Operations

NOSEIKO had direct operational cortact with three imericans

during 1962 ard 1963.

Tho of these (the approach to JOHNSON

and thie

interrogation oi birdlocki vere

unusual In that they

were provosations without any aitinot to recruit the target:

NOSEiKO could nane no coher examples of such operations.

both cases, the victim oi the provoration has verified NOSENKO's

preserce.

The thard case,

the recruitnent approich to Bravis,

was unsuccessful.

additionally, sosFiko

supervised

the rono-

sexual conromise ot kOTEr, who was closely ried in

with erase!

sensitive scarce and related.

(1)

The W.E. JCHNSO: Provocation

JOHNSON (Pages 289-293), NOSEKO said, was in Moscow as

a tourist in early January 1902 ard was considered for recruit-

ment, but

a decision was

made that he was not worth the effort

as he had no access to clissifies materiuls and lived too far

from the KGB Legal Residencies in rashirigton and lew York city.

(JCHNSON's home was in Texas.)

Several days after this deci-

sion vas

made, postal interceprs showed that JCINSON was writing

abusive letters concerning

ine Soviet Union.

They were "so

bitter"

and critical that the Kod decided that something had

to be done to stop him.

At abuit the sane

time the KGB received

an indication that JOHiO was a runosexual, ard it was decided

to entrap him

on this basis and furce him to promise not to

write any more letters or criticizo the USSR in articles

when

he returned to

the United States.

The compromise was effected

by use of NOSEnko's homoserual agents, and NOSENKO was able to

describe the confrortation scene, his second meeting with JOHN-:

SON; and JOHNSON's frigatened telephore call to the U.S. Enbassy

reporting that NOSENKO had recortacted him.

NOSENKO told CIA in June 1962 that he had taken part in

this operation

"In January."

then he contacted CIA in Geneva

in 1964 he had a scrap of paper on

name and the date "5 January 1962, "Which was noted JOHNSON's

This was the actual date

of the approach, but NOSENKO insisted that the date bore no

relationship to the name, and that the approach to JOHNSON took

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 135

#4-00000

735.

place in the surmer of 1962, a fact he recalled distinctly be-

cause he wore no overcoat.

It was only when confronted with

official U.S. records that NOSENKO agreed in early 1965 that

the apprcach was in January and recalled that it was made

immediately after NOSENKO returned to che Tourist Department.*

NOSENKO said that when JOHNSON first arrived in Moscow

there was consideration of recruiting him, but that there was

a decision against this as he was of little intelligence value.

Then JOHNSON mailed insulting letters which were picked up

through postal intecept. About the sane time there were indi-

cations of homosexuality.

Then the operation was mounted

This implies a very tight time schedule. JOHNSON

arrived in Moscow on 31 December 1961; NOSENKO said he reported

for duty as Section Chief on 3 January 1462, JOHNSON reported

his first contact with NOSENKO'& homosexual agent VOLKOV the

evening of 4 January; and the approach by NOSENKO was on 5 Janu-

Although NOSENKO implied in 1962 that his homosexual agents

where

they came

fron.

JOHNSON reported that he first met the

agent VOLKOV on the evening of 4 January when the latter sat

down at his restaurant table; on this same occasion VOLKOV in-

vited JOHNSON to his hotel room ihe lext day.

The fact that

VOLKOV joined JOHNSON uninvited and set hin up for the approach

without leaving the table suggests that there had,

in fact,

been signs of his homosexuality beforehand and that operational

plans had been laid by this time.

NOSENKO has described the caution taken in other homosexual

entrapment cases and has named several which were called off

because of a risk of

It is, therefore, unusual that

the KGB would take this risk merely to force JOHNSON.

American and a Baptist minister, to stop writing insulting let-

ters and articles.

NOSENKO did not know why he became involved in this opera-

tion the day after he reported for duty in the senior position

of Section Chief.

He said only that BOBKOV, a Deputy Chief of

the Second Chief Directorate, told him to do it.

talks with JOHNSON, NOSENKO introduced himself to JOHNSON as

"Georgiy

Ivanovich NIKOLAYEV, (rendered by JOHNSON as NIKOLOV)

the "Chief of Police."

(11) The BARGHOORN Provocation-Arrest

The arrest of Professor BARGHOOR! (Pages 3U4-309) took

lace at the end of October 1963, at the time NOSENKO said he

as First Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department.

NOSENKO has

T How NOSENKO's self-stated and confirmed participation in a

Tourist Department operation on 5 January 1962 carries

implications for his account of ABIDIAN's visit to the

PENKOVSKIY dead drop is aiscussed above.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 136

14-00000

736.

into fros sargltive anarce

described in detail the selcction of BragilOafli as a hostage for

IVAiOV Ithe KGB office:

arrested

shurtiy befris

in New sort.

City as a resulton, res

the fiair.ing

of the provocation,

wtiich were not related to the provocation.

BAYCHOORY'B aLICEE

in Muscow, and the early stages of his interrogation.

Except

fo= sone varlation in dacs, MOSENKO'E aCcounis of BARGHOORis

movements and of-the:

sequence of events in the provocation-

arrest matched that. of BAPGilOOP!!.

This case is in two wajs

similar to the approach to w.e.

JOHNSO!:

It was an operation

in which there was no thought of recruitment, and BARGHOOt was

able to identify NOSENKO as a participant.

BARGHOOR'! reported that the day after his arrest he vas

questioned by the same officer who had interrogated him the

evening before about the "compromising materials" which had

been planted on

hin.

with this officer on this one occasion

was his "chief, " whom

BARGHOORN subsequently identified by photo-

graph as NoSEliKo.

NOSENKO has gald that he was told by the

Chief of the Tourist Departnent that GRIErMOV wanted hiM (''OSENKO)

present in the interrogation room it the time when BARGHCOPY

admitted that he had the. compromising

information in his fosses-

sion it the tine of arrest.

NOSENKO did not binow why his par-

ticular presence was needed or denirca, tut he complied despite

the faci

that he did not want to reveal his face to BARG!OOPY

as he kncw BARGHOORN would be relcased.

Nosauro said that he

stayed in the interrogation room only until the interrogatirg

officer secured this acnission and then he left.

BARGHOSRI

has ruported

that NOSENiO attended one of the interrogatic?

sessiors, that this session covered only biographic and barkground

patters,

ard that the conpromising docents and his possession

of them

had been discussed

the previous evening, right afier his

In describing

the planning of this provecation, NOSENKO

told ClA that the suggestion to pruvide BARGHOOFY came free.

GRIBANOV, who took the idea of arresting BARGliDORN to KGB Chair-

Man SEMICHASINYY,

but did not divulge to him that it would be.

based on provocation.

This was on the day before the arrest.

SEMICHASTHYY agreed with the idea of the arrest and secured

permission to carry it out from BREZHNEV, as KiRUSHICHEV bas

out of Moscow at the time.

Reliable sources show,

however,

that KHRUSHCHEV was in Moscow on 30 Detober, the day when SEMI-

CHASTNYY allegedly called BREZINEV, and was

also there on 31

October, the day of the arrest.

BREZHEV was not seen by

Westerners in Moscow fron 29 October until 2 Novenber 1963.

•(111) The Approach to BPAUNS

NOSENKO said he personally approached the American tour- -

ist BRAUNS (Pages 293-295)

shortly after returning to Moscow

from Geneva in

1962.

BRAUNS had lived in Leningrad until horid

lar II, had left with the fleeing Germans, and had eventually

settled

in the United States, where he was a technician woking

at an "interesting company raking computers, adding machines,

or other instruments."

NOSENKO had originally irstructed hig

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 137

14-00000

wide die insti

17057777 97

737.

Bubordinate KRUPNOV to handle the case, but KPUPSOV kas not able

to get anywhere with BRAUNS and in the middle of the approach.

called NOSEliKO for tel?.

NOSEURO went to the Moscon Hotel where

KRUPNOV and BRAUNS were talking, and he eventually secured.

ERAUNS!

agreement to cooperate,

againgt threas of inprison..ent

for treason

on the basis of his wartins flight from the Sovlet

Union.

for Leningrad, and be-

Cause NOSENKO felt the

BRAUNS left Moscow the next day-shaty," KRUPON was:

recruitment wag

sent after him to consolidate the agrecent.

BRAUNS refused

tO SCE KRUPNOV hOMeVEI, so again HOSENKO dent to help him.

It

was clear to MuSeuko, however,

that Britis. was so frightened

that he would never work for the KGB; NOSENKO

thereupon decided

to terminato the case, and BRAUiS HaJ sent on his usy.

NOSENKO could not recall his position at the tine he approached

BRAViS, he did not know why gRAViS had visited ti. Soviet Unic?,

and ha was unable to name ary Soviet citizens with wron eralis

ERAUiS, ir fact,-had spent

almost a week in Moscow before the approaci nas rade.:

During

spent his days with an Inturist tour ard his even-

ings with an old girlfriend he bad known tefore the var.

She

had been writing to BRaUNs in the United States for about a year,

telling him of her unhappy marriage and impendiry divorce.

visit the USSR, and

travelled specially from her home in Leningrad to Moscow to

According to the account given by BRAUNS, the ran (NOSENKO,

according to HOSENiO) who joined him and his original interro-

gator in Moscow was the person who first approached him in Lenin-

This suggests, if correct, that it was NOSENKO who was

sent there to consolidate the recruitnent, not krup!aY.

BRAUN'S

was unable to identify HOStiKO's photogrash but expiaired that

he was so frightened that he probably could not recognize any-

one

involved.

Other aspects of his story therefore may be cor.

fused.

(iv) The Arrest of KOTEN

NOSENKO said he supervised the horosexual provncation and

arIEst of Anerican tour quide KOTE! in 1963 and the develop-

ments in the case were reported to him (Pages

298-3031; he was

not in

face-to-face cortact with KOTE!:. HOSENKO

explained that

KOTEN, a member of the CPUSA, had frequently visited the USSR

since

the war, has numerous

suspicious contacts there, and las

considered possibly to be a "plant" (presumably of the FBI)

munist Parzy.

Prior to his arrival

in 1963. gives

Legal Residency reported

KOTEN was in contac

with

important anagent in es

that he was carrying

the address of relatives of this agent with iim on his trip.

and tirat he intended to visit them.

on this basis, it was

considered that he might have the mission of investigatina

the

Do agert inside the l'553. Fulf

It was suspectea

ilut tardier

trips

that

KOTE.

was a homosexual, the KGB planned to compromise hir, arrest

him, break hill,

and provide time for the fits agent to make his

escape from the United States.

KOTEN. was arrested, but the fli

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 138

14-00000

738.

agent refused to icave the United States, and wien the CPUSA

protested the

ariest of one of its members, KOTE." was rcleased.

POTEN was a long-tine Communist,

and there air no apparent

reasons why the

should doubt his loyalty.

11s bemogexuality

was well-known to his acquaintances within the CPUsh, and at

the time of his trip to the

soviet Union he nas acting as a tour

guide for the lew York fimm

"afton Tours," which is owed by

SVENCHANSKIY.

(NOSENKO said tha: SVENCHANSKIY, also a Conunist.

was his. Own agent at the time of KOTEll's arrest.)

NOSENKO was able to give a considerable

amo

ing data on the "importantasiasauent"

This aacrt had bren identi

tIl

The fact

that KOTEN And been

arcosted on charges of hono-

sexuality has leaked by

Inturigt to pruss scivicus tho days

after the raported date of the arrust, resulting in wide pub-

licity

in lestern rewspapers.

lina U.S. Ombassy was no" nuti-

fied officially until two days later.)

There was no apparert

reason fer

this extrenciy unusu?l step by the KG:, which

cal

be agsumed to manipulate Inturigt for operationai support pur-

poseS.

After the CPUSA had protested the action, KOTE: was re-

leased fIch prisci.

He was told that the incident was a mistake

which had been

corteuted, that he was free no go anywhere he

wanted in the soviet Union, and that re co. id return anytime.

Wells the falagent, has since repatriated to the soviet

d. Agents Handled by ROSENKO

When NOSENKO transferred fron the U.S. Embassy Section to

the Tourist Department, he took with him the two homcsexual

agents

VOLKOV and YEFREMOV, PREISFREUND, BESEE and PYTOVA

(Pages 287-289)

The homosexuals he used the day after his

return, in the operation against w.E. JOhNSON.

This was their

first operational use since the fall of 1959; they were rever

used again before being terminated at the end of 1962 or early

1963, NOSENKO said, because they were "too well known."

PREIS-

FREUND was considered compromised to merican Inteiligence

following the defection of GOLITSYN, so he also was never used

again, although NOSENKO met hin socially when PREISFPELHD re-

turned to Moscow on business trips as recently as 1963.

During

the first part of 1962, on instructions from KOVSHUK and the

- Chief of the imericon Department, NOSENKO continued to meet

with late who was still involved in the developtent of aujus.

the American code clerk.

NOSEIKO last saw dark before going

to Geneva in March 1962; WEISS left the Soviet Union to return

to syria while NOSENKO has away.

RYTOVA, NOSENKO said, had

seen his agent since 1956 or 1957.

Some time in 1962

she moved

from her position as an instructor of Greek at the Institute.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 139

34-00000

739.

of International Relations to a position in the school of the

CPSU Central Committee and ceased agent work.

Altreigh she

was inactive, NOSENKO continued to be registered as ¿er case

officer until 1964, when he defected.

(1) PRIPPEL

Having left his assignment in Moscow in early 1951, FRIPPEL

(Pages 129-133' and' Part VIII.D.5.) returned several tines to

the soviet Union in 1962 and 1963.

NOSENKO, who remained his

case officer although FRIPIEL now lived and worked in New York

City, met him each time.

FRIPPEL said there were three such

occasions, in February 1962 when he net once with liOSEiKO and

CHELNOKOV

in Odessa, and two later times in Moscow and Odessa,

when NOSENKO came alone.

NOSENKO denied that he

met PRIPPEL

in Odessa in February 1962 with CHELNOKOV, but said that he met

twice with him alone after returning to Moscow from Geneva.

The first of these meetings was in the gurmer of 1962 when

FRIP-

PEL was accompanying

a group of American newspaper editors tour-

ing the Soviet Union:

FRIPPEL said NOSENKO called briefly at

his hotel room to enquire what questions the editors planned

to ask KHRUSHCHEV during a planned interview.

When FRIPPEL

said he did not know, NOSENKO departed and FRIPPEL later re-

ported that he did not see NOSENKO again on this trip.

(NOSENKO

said he called again after the interview to learn the

"reactions"

of the editors.)

The second meeting was in Odessa, when FRIPPEL,

visited the Soviet Union as a guide on a tour ship. According

to FRIPPEL,

it was on this occasion that NOSENKO apparently made

a phone call to ask permission to go aboard FRIPPEL's ship, and

It might have been at this meeting or the earlier one that

NOSENKO told him something of his personal background.

(FRIPPEL

knew a considerable amount of information about NOSENKO's father

and family.) NOSENKO denied the possibility that he would have

to request permission to board the vessel and said that if he

had told FRIPPEL anything about himself, it was when! he was

drunk.

Both FRIPPEL and NOSENKO agreed that FRIPPEL provided

no information of value during any of these meetirgs..

(11) SVENCHANSKIY

NOSENKO has cited SVENCHANSKIY, KGB cryptonym "ANOD," as

an example of the Second Chief Directorate's use of foreign

travel agents to signal the KGB when an interesting tourist is

about to visit the Soviet Union (Pages 295-298).

SVENCHANSKIY

was recruited for this purpose, NOSENKO said, in 1961 and used

to send open-code signals to the Tourist Department by marking

visa applications whenever he spotted anything significant.

Some of SVENCHANSKIY's signals had been, considered, NOSENKO

said, "of definite operational interest."

NOSENKO took the case over from the previous handling officer,

NOSKOV,

and his name was listed in SVENCHANSKIY'} file as the

responsible officer.

NOSENKO first said that he had read SVENCHANSKIY's file

then changed this to say that he had only skimmed it.

met twice with his new agent, once in September 1963 and once

later in the year.

On both

occasions, NOSROV was present.

TOP SFPRET

---

## Page 140

14-00000

MANITAT

740.

NOSETTO said that at the tine SVENCHANSKIY das recruited

in 1961 that, because SVENCHANSKIY was known to have had con-

tacts with AUTORS ir. New York,

there was some suspicion that

he might be an FBI agent. NOSENKO was unable to be more pre-

cise as to the basis for these suspicions ard, when asked how

NOSKOV had resolved them, was able to say only tha: NOSKOV

"felt" that SVENCHANSKIY

was not an Anerican agent.

NOSENKO Knew little about SVENCHANSKIY's baciground from

the one-volume file kept on him in the tourist Department:

He

did know that SVENCHANSKIY was recruited in 1961 on the promise

of commercial favors, that he had at one tine been detected

in blackmarket transactions in the USSR, and that in addition

to his travel agency, SVENCHANSKIY ran a Russian-language book-

store in Chicago.

PBI and CIA records show that SVENCHANSKIY

has been employed by a series of registered Soviet Government

organizations in the United States since the early 1930's,

that he was released from his position as a United ations radio

officer broadcasting to the Soviet Union in 1952 when he failed

to answer questions of the Senate Interral Security Committee

concerning

alleged subversive activity, and that both his travel

agency ard his book store are affiliated with registered Sov-

¡et agencies,

Inturist and Mechkniga.

Allegations on file of

SVENCHANSKIY's Communist sympathies and probable Soviet espion-

age activities date back to

the second World war.

In August

1950,

Harry GOLD linked SVENCHANSRIY to the Soviet espionage

network in the United Stateg during the war.

The FBI

has re-

ported

confidential secretary of

GOLOS, the

"director of Soviet espion-

age in the

United States."

(NOSENKO knew that someone called

Sonya worked for SVENCHANSKIY in New York, but said that she

is not a KGB agent and was not the one who marked the visa

applications.

e. The OSWALD Investigation

As First Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department.

NOSENKO

said, he was directiy irvolved in the investigation of OSWALD's

activities in Minsk which was ordered after the assassination

of President KENNEDY (Pages 136-144 and Part VIII.D.5.).

is from his role at this time and his reading of the Minsk KGB

file on OSWAID that NCSENKO derived his authority to state that

the KGB "washed its hands of OSALD" after his attempted sui-

cide in the USSR, that there was no attempt to recruit either

OSWALD or his wife, and that KGB interest in OSWALD while he

lived in Minsk was restricted to passive observation.

f. The CHEREPAiOV Investigation

discussion of the CHEREPANOV

in which

ber 1962 while Deputy Crief of the Tourist

Department.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 141

4-00000

741.

g. Remarks

Leaving

aside NOSENKO's unsubstantiated claims to super-

visory jobs in the Tourist Departnent in 1962-1953, when he

indicated he was absent frow KGB Headquarters nearly half of

the tine, his persoral rose in operations and investigations

of the period

appears artificial in sone instances and in-

plausible in others.

HOSENNO'& knowleuge of the origins of

the JOHNSON case is incomplete, the timing conflicts with other

activities attributed to hirself, the expressed purpose of

the compromise in

urigue, and the outcoas seems to have little

consequence beyond enabling JOHNSON to confirm

that NOSENNO

appeared in it.

Although BRAViS way have been

in a position

to corioborate

NOSE:tO's appearance

in

chat operation, he has

rot done so and his staterents contradict NOSENKO on the part

the latter plajco.

so too do the statements of BiGHOORN, who

recognized

NOSENKO as a person who was seen briefly during the

interrogation sessions; certain facts from other sources con-

tradict NOSENKO on one

important detail (KHRUSHCHEVs presence

ir. Moscow) of the bArGHosfi arrest,

explaired as a retaliation

hostage

actich for events in attend

NOSEIKO'S

intormatys.

ine iteracar Communist

simply to have confirmed

earlier information ten

ROSENKO'&

information on

the bachyrsed

operation 13

fragmentary.

lacking eve?

the most inportant facts krown fron

several, mainly overt, scurces: his atrendance at seetings

with SVENCHANSKIY: was confined

to the tro times when the

original

handler was also present.

The position of NOSENRO in

the FRIPPEL ard OSWALD cases is discussed in Part VIII.D.5.

In sunmary, NoStiko's operational work was not comersurate

with that of a Section Chief and Deputy

department Chief, nor

with that of a case officer, regardless of rank.

where the

participation of NOSEStO in

Tourist Departmert activities has

been or might be confired by other souices,

it is

therefore

unproven that he was in a supervisory position in the KGB or

that he was even a case

officer.

• TOP SECRET

---

## Page 142

14-00000

782:

E. Examination of other Aspecto of NOSENKO's Biography

1. KGB Awards ant Ranks

a. Awards

At various times since contacting CIA in 1962, NOSENKO

described a series of awards and decorations which

he received

over the years

for his parformance of duties in the Second Chief

Directorate

(Pages 313-321).

le claired to have received the

Order of Lenin, the Order of the Red Star, and the Order of the

Red Banner, he said he received a special

commendation fron

KGB

Chairman SEROV for nis role in the BURGI recruitment and

the same award in 1959 for his recruitment of all of the Ameri..

can or British tourists recruited that year by

the KGB (three

American homosexuals).

NOSENKO told of a

number of other conmerdations which he received--almost one

year--for his

"general good work."

In October 1966 NOSENKO

said that he never received any awards for his KGB operational

performarce, only a medal for satisfactory completion of 10

years of KGB service and a Red Arny anniversary medal.

b. Ranks

NOSENKO's descriptions of his various rark promotions fol-

low a similar but more complicated pattern (Pages 322-326).

He has given

trio

separate sets of circumstances

for his.first

promotion, from junior lieutenant to lieutenant.

According to

the first of these, the one NOSENKO adhered to during 1964 and

1965,

he was prototed to che rank of lieutenant while serving

in the far East with the raval GRU at the beginning of 1951.

NOSENKO explained

that the required time in grade is sometimes

cut in half

for officers serving at this undesirable post, and

that this is why he

was promoted after only six months of

active duty.

In 1966 NOSENKO gaid for the first time that he

did rot enter on active duty until March 1951 and that his

promotion to lieutenant was in mid-1952, while stationed in

Sovetsk, on the Baltic.

In all his accounts, NOSENKO has said

that he

entered the KGB with the ank of lieutenant as this

had been his rank in the naval GrU.*

During his first meetings with CIA in Geneva during 1962

NOSENKO claimed then to be a KGB major and said that he had

already completed the necessary time in grade for a lieutenant

colonelcy.

gave an apparently accurate description

of the structure of his salary as a

major (so nuch for rank,

so much for longevity, etc.) and pointed out that he was fill-

ing a position (Chief of Section) normally held by a lieutenant

On contacting CIA again in 1964, NOSENKO claimed the

rank of lieutenant colonel.

He supported this claim with the

TDY authorization issued for the CHEREPANOV search, " which

See Part VIII.D.2. for a discussion of the likelihood that

NOSENKO served in the naval GRU.

See Part VIII.B.T.C. for an analysis of the CHEREPANOV

case.

Hin mile & slid

TOP SECRET

• 7710Y

---

## Page 143

14-00000

783.

gave NOSENKO's rank as lieutenant colone! and vas signed by

GRISkiOV himself and testified to it by his signalure on the

"official biographical statement" prepared in Frankfurt.

The first major change in NOSENKO's story of his promo-

tions cane durirg the interrogations of january 1965 wnen he

volunteered out of context and for no clear Icagon that he had

never held the rani of major but rather, because of a series

of administrative slip-ups and GRIBliOV's advis: and help, haà

jumped directly from the rark of caprain, which

ho received

in 1956, to the rank of lieutenant coionel in I:to 1963.

NOSENKO was later to claim that he had never said

in 1962 tha:

he las a major."

In an unsolicited statelent given to cIA i April 1966,

NOSENKO wrole that he was only a captain and that the TDY authori-

zation for the CHEREPNSOY search had been filled out in error.

c. ¡emarks

NOSENKO's admissions regarding his awirds and pionotions

directly affect his self-portraiture as a successfu! and rapidly

rising KG3 officer.

They also have a bearing

of the

alleged reasons for this rise Clientsan

GRIBANOV's favoritism.

NOSENKO ALTOSE INVALULI

linked GRI-

BrOV's name to each of the awards

earlier clained to have

received.

In most cases it was GIBAOV who decided that

NoSeNko should get a particular iward; in the rest, it was

GRIFANOY who physically

presented the chard to resenko.

The

same is true

of

josEnko's account of his rank picnations:

GRIBANOV, NOSSHKO said, had promised him that he would be pro-

moted circotly from senior lieutenant to major in 1959; when

the Persorrel

Department made a mistare an

aaly vromoted

NOSENKO to captain, GRIbAiOV advisci him to accept this rank

and promised that when he had completed sufficier: time in gride

for pronation

to major, GRIBhilOV would sce to :: that he was

pronoted directly to lieutenant colonel.

this is what happened,

NOSINKO said in

1965, and after he received his rank of lieu-

tenant colonel, GRIBA!OV called hin in und congratulated him.

On the basis

J: NOSENtO'S admissiois, there is aiditional rea-

son to question his relationship witt. GRIBAVOY.*•

NOSENKO carried with him to Geneva.

against I09 regulation

and for no reason he could explain, an official kos dozument

listing hin as a lieutenant colonel and signed by GRIBANOV him-

self as well

as by two provincial authorities.

This suggests

strongly that the lie concerning HOSElKO's rani das not NOSENKO's

in fact, as pointed

out above, the CHEREPANOV

papers were

fabricated by the KGB, then there was no genuire search

for CHEREPANOV and NOSENKO's document is also fabricated and

as NOSENKO claims.)

This change of story coincided closely in time with a change

in the information

reported by Ugli

Shortly

after NOSENiO's

defection Hideshad said that remaris by his KGB associates

made

it PORES

lieutenant colonel.

that

was

only a capadin.

** NOSENKO'S retractions and changes

of story

concerning his

personal and peratioral relationship with GRIBANOV are

discussed elsewhere (Pages 327-336).

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 144

14-00000

748.

2. Affiliation with Communist parti Organs

a. Introduction

NOSENKO drifted into the komsomo:, he said, in 1943 or

1944 without giving the step any thoight whatsoever.

all of

his friends at the Baku school were joining, so NOSENSO did

too.

He remained an Indifferent member of

this

Communist

youth organization throughout his school and university years,

and during his first year as a KGB officer.

Ог.

arriving in the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Depart-

ment in 1953, NOSENKO told CIA, he was appointed secretaly of

the small Komsomol organization of the Second Chief Director-

ate, a group of about 17 members.

b. Discussion

NOSENHO was questioned by DERYABIN on his duties as Kom-

somol Secretary (Pages 623) and, although able to give a super-

ficial account of these functions, was fourd to be unaware of

certain basic information which DERYABIN felt a person

in this

positior.

should have.

Thus, for example, NOSLiKO provided a

description of the system of levying dues on konsomol mambers

which was substantially incorrect and was unavare that a kom-

somol Congress (the first in sany years and therefore a major

event) had been hold during his claimed tenure as secretary.

NOSENKO said that he held the position of Komosmol Organi-

zation Secretary

until the late spring or early summer of 1954,

when he got into trouble for naving used official KGB alias

documentation to conceal the fact that he received treatent

for venereal disease contracted from a prostitute.

Immediately

after

this incident, said NOSENKO, he was removed

from nis

position

and a

"strict reprimand"

was placed in his Kom-

sorel file.

Several months thereafter, on the eve of his 27th

birthday, NOSENKO was forced out of the Konsonol because he was

too old.

For over a year, until January 1956 when NOSEliKO was

admitted as a candidate member of the Cormurist Party of the

Soviet Union. he was the orly officer in the KGB who was neither

a Komsorol nor a

Party member.

LOSENKO's accourt of his expul-

sion

fron the Konso=ol

on reaching his lith birthday is con-

tradicted by the official Statutes of the Konsonol in effect

at that time.

These regulations stipulate a maximum age of

25 years and

NOSENKO should therefore have beer forced out at

the

end of October 1953, upon reaching his 26th birthday.

This

was explained to HOSENKO, biho

insisted that he remained a member

until he became 27 years old and that no special exceptions

were made in his case.

c. Remarks

The fact that NOSENKO is incorrect regarding the age limi-

tation sakes

it doubtful that his account of the venereal

disease incident and his removal from the Komsomol Secretary-

ship is true.

The date which he gives to this incident is

after that on which he should have been expelled from the Kom-

(Additionally, NOSENKO's descriptions of the veneral

disease incident, his

use of false documents, and his subsequent

punishaent by the KGB and the Komsomol have been inconsistent:

HELE

see Pages 80-81).

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 145

soo weblike.

745.

The eridence that NOSENKO lied about this particular

aspoct of his first tour in the U.S. Embassy Section further

suggests that his entire account for this perlod of hla

career 18 labricated (See Part VIII. D.3.).

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 146

PUr SECRET

746.

3. Schooling

a. Irtroduction

There is relatively little reliable collateral irformation

concerning

NOSENKO's schooling up until 1950.

Other than what

he himself has reported, available information consists of over!!

press releases pertaining to the Minister NOSENKO's career land

giving his location at various times) and comments by one KGB

officer and one defector.

NOSENKO's own account, together with

references to these other sources, is summarized below.

With the exception of minor variations in dates, attrlbut-

able to memory, NOSENKO's. story of his early years until the

• beginning of World War II, when he had just completed the sixth

grade ir. Moscow, has been generally consistent in its varioug

tellirgs.

Moreover, his accourts of having studied in Lenin-

grad and Moscow agree with information concerning the positions

and movements of the elder NOSeiko during these years.

In con-

trast,

the period immediately following, during which NoSENKO

allegedly received his early training in naval matters is char-

acterized with frequent changes of story, contradictions, and

admitted falsehood.

b. Discussion

In 1968 and 1965 HOSENKO recalled that he enrolled in the

Moscow special naval school in the summer of 1941, immediately

after the Germans attacked the Soviet Union, and was evacuzled

with the entire school from Moscow to Kuybyshev in September

to begir. studies in the seventh grade.

(As article in tre Sou-

Let Arny newspaper Kragnaya Zvezda (Red Star) on 14 Jeruary 1967

confirmed that seven special naval schools were established in

the Soviet Union in April 1940.

Ore of these was in Moscow.

However, to be eligible for admission, one had to have completedi

the seventh grade. The article did not indicate that the Moscow

school was evacuated.) In April 1966, NOSENKO remembered that

he did not go to Kuybyshey at this time but rather had been

evacuated so Chelyabinsk with his mother and entered the seventh

grade of a regular school.

In keeping with his respective accounts, NOSENKO said in

secured admission to the Leningrad Naval Preparatory

with which he was evacuated by train to taxu in

the fall of that year.

In April 1966, after Inserting the year

spent at Chelyabinsk with his mother, NOSENKO moved all events

up a year and wote in his autobiography that he enterca the

Kuybyshev school in the fall of 1942 rather than the fall of

NOSENKO also wrote at this time that he transferred to

the leningrad preparatory school and travelled to Baku in the

fall of 1943, not 1942.*

" Describing the reasons for his transfer to the Leningrad Naval

Preparatory School, HOSENKO explained that the Moscow special

scrool was evacuated further to Achinsk in Siberia and

that this was farther from home than he wished to go.

Red Star article mentioned above said that the special naval

schools were all closed in

The special school

•apparently therefore was not transferred further to Achinsk,

but was shut down.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 147

14-00000

lUI ULUILA

747.

Again to acconiudate the added year

in Chelyabinsk, lioStHrO

said in 1956 that he spent half a year lactually, accordirg to

about thezemonthsinbaku belorctin-

ning

back to Moscow in January 1984.

In

earlier accounte he said he las al the preparatuiy school there

from Cotober 1942 until Jarsary 1944. Earlier he had also

yiver.

expansive and chargirg

accounts of his escape from school

to join the soviet front against the Germans at Tuapse; now he

admitted thet this was a lie.

By cuttirg the time he was in

Baxu from 1s months to about three, MUSENKO also admitted im-

plicitly that his accounts of the basic trainirg he received

in the preparatory school, of the summer he spert working at

the school rather than returning to Moscow on vacatic., ard of

his "certainty" that he celebrated his 15th birthday in Baku

were also false.

NOSINKO has been relatively consistent in recounting the

events of 1944.

In 1964, 1965 and again in 1366 he told of

studying as an external"

student in yoscow to complete his

ninth year of schooling and of rejoining his classmates from

Baku when the naval preparatory school returned to Lenirgrad

in the autumn of 1÷44.

On

several occasiong during 1964 and

1965, NOSENKO described how he and his classmates spent October

and November 1944 working in the woods near 'Ler.ingrad before

beginning their terth grade studies late in the

year; he omitted

this account from nis April 1966 autobiography.

NOSENKO's account of the next years is similarly marked

with a rumber of inconsistencies and falsehoods.

(In the

latter category he has claimed and later admitted as untrue that

he atterded

the Frunze Haval Academy

from 1943

to 1244, that

he was on active military duty until being demovilized

in 1915,

and that he was shot ir the hand by a jealous young

naval offi-

cer in 1945.)

According to the account given under interroga-

tion in April 1964, NOSE:KO was shot in

the hand at a party in

the end of April 1945, was hospitalized, resigned

from the

preparatory school, and received a certificate of satisfactory

completion of the

tenth

grade, although he had been in school

only since November 1944.

In 1965 and 1966 NOSENKO said, re-

spectively, that he was shot by a naval officer in february

or March

1945

and that he shot hinself in

"early" 1945; since

the 1964 interrogations he has claimed only that he received

a statement of the courses he had attended at the preparatory

school and that he completed the tenth grade at the Shipbuild-

ing Tekhnikum in Leningrad.

The earliest collateral information specifically

concern-

ing NOSEYKO's educational background eni

General serica described

SHAN

defector

ARIAMONOV said he attended á naval

preparatory

school with

NOSFUKO during the period 1914 to 1946.

ARTAMONOV, after

NOSENKO's defection was publicized,

had known a son of the Minister NOSENKO in the naval school in

Leningrad from 1944 to 1946.

He was then shown a picture of

NOSENKO and confirmed this

However, according

to NOSENKO's statements, NOSENKO would have been about two

TOP SEGRET

---

## Page 148

14-00000

710.

classes behind MISciOU, and wouid rave heen at the school

for orly about two months.

It 15 corcellsale trat the presence

of the son of the Minister o! Snipruildiry nould be widely krown

1n the school and later remembered, but so would trut son's

self-inflicted wound ard disappearance, "hich

ARTAIO:DY has not

mertioned.

It is unlikely, morcover, that ARIAMONOV could 120

years later) reliably recognize a photo of a person who had been

a short tire aná not in ARThlONOV's class.

(NOSEZiKO

claims rot to have know ARTAMO:IOV nor to recognize the name.)

In all accounts, incliding his 1962 statementy, NOSETKO

has

said that he entered the Irstitute of International Rela-

tiong 1n Moscow in 1915. His descriptions of suurses, events

and friends are as vague and unsubstantial

is his accourts

of

his earlier schouling..

He has given various dates for his

graduation and has explaired that he did so to cover up the

fact that he failed his final exanination in the subject of

"Marxism-Leninism," of which

he was ashamed.

MOJENKO inOSt Ie-

certly ciained that he

Inceived his cidiona

tre end of the

Ster of 1950. 0

c.

Remarkg

NOSENKO 'g orn admissions,

as vchl

as the small amount of

collateral informatior. available, make it clear that much of his

account uf his education hag teen false.

the reasons for tris

are not at all clear and perhaps,

ir. fact, there is no logical

explanation.

The CIs psychologist ino tested and questioned

NOSENKO atout his youth surgested that, under corditors of

interrogation, he may lie for no other reason other than his

nec¿ to saje face.

Inli tied is an accurate description of

NOSENKO's behavior when questioned in detal: on this and other

aspects of his pre-iGE lifs: it is not so witt. regard to ques-

tioning on his

intelligence carcer.

Nor does the psychologist's

view appear to

explain why NOSENKO iorgot or vas unwilling to

tell CIn about

an entire year of his life. particularly such a

significant one, after corsistently ard apparently accurately

(judging from the Soviet press accounts of the Minister's

activities)

describing the years preceding it.

It is rot

apparent way NOSerKo originally voluntecred the story of his

travel to Baku in the fall of 1942, when this nas untrue, or

why he said that the Moscod Special laval School was evacuated

to Achinsk in 1943, when he must be aware that the school was

closed, if he was

there."

• The possibility that NOSEiKO is not the person he claims

to be land with a completely false life history, or one

lived by someone elsel has been examined caresully, but

conclusion

can be drawn or the basis of

available

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 149

14-00000

749.

itros.....=...o

Loser, ii

P. Appraisals of NOSENKO, his Motivation, and Other Opera-

Fional Circunstances

1. Introduction

Appraisals of NOSENKO the uan and of his notivationg

must be founded, as with any source, on lactors which are

often immeasureable, but fever reservations need be attached

to an appraigal of the other circunstances allecting the

course of events in Geneva in 1982 and 1964.

These opera-

tional circumstances can be analyzed.and evaluated in much

the sano nagner as were NOSENKO's production.

sourcing,

and

blography for they are tangible pleces of evidence.

In the

next portions of this paper are

presented these appraisals,

which draw chiefly upon Pages 603-641 (for NOSENKO the man),

Pages 20-29 (for his motivations), and Pazes 11-19 and 30-

43 (for the operational circustances).

2. NOSENKO

The CIA specialists who assessed NOSENKO foubd hin to

be of above-average intelligence, one of them sayiog that

"his effoctive intelligence is nore cleverness than intel-

lectuality, more shrewduess than efficlency."

he is capable

of good menory and, as illustraled ba bis repeating certain

other hand, there were

numerous internal cöntradictious in NOSENKO's recountings

of varlous events, he himself claimed an odd or poor menory,

was the oxceptioral defector by having been totally

debriefed within a rolatively short period.

Parts VII.D. and VIII.E. discuss NOSENKO's truthfulness

with reference to his Soviet

Intelligence ard

personal

backgrounds.

Here may be added other observations by the

CIA specialists:

NOSENKO can exercise deception cleverly,

he improvised

was evasive under interrogation, and he

has & "renarkable" disregard for the truth where it serves

his purposes.

The results of the polygraph examination were

that NOSENKO "attempted deliberate deception."

227225

The gaps and errors in, NOSENKO's testinony therefore

do not seem attributable to

low intelligence or to consis-

tently poor memory, but to a couscious attempt to mislead

Independently, then, this conclusion

raises the questions of whether NOSENKO vas dispatched by

the KGB and 11

so, why he was chosen.

Regarding the latter

point, it 1s noted that a CIA csychiatrist observed:

"This

man is capable

of playing a role and playing it effectively,"

and that a CIA psychologist stated:

"From a distance NO-

SENKO looks very good [to his KGB superiors)

as a possible

but close up he leaves much to be desired."

penetration agent; in the CIA debriefings and interrogations,

It was "close up,

that NOSENKO displayed an inability to explain the gaps and

errors in his reporting.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 150

14-00000

oratese.

750.

3. Motivation

Part of one's sotivation for such a drastic act as

treason or defection may not be wholly cooscious, and there

may be underljing causes which any source night not sent

or be able to adait even to hinself.

Thus, That lOSENKo

said about notivation need not be taken at face value, and

Ior this reason the whole question of his motivation must

remain a minor weight in the overall assessent of bona fides.

NOSENKO has tried to present a meaninglul expla-alloa

and

has changed or adjusted his story to this end.

initlally insisted

that he had no ideological motives but

simply vanted to "make a deal" in order to get out of

trouble; yet this claim is open to question:

The anoust of

operational money which NOSENKO needed to replace vas hardly

enuugh to have driven hia to treason, especially sisce

there were friends

in Genera like GUK and MISLOV uto might

have helped hin sake up his loss.

Furtherzore, only tre

days after ClA had rescued him with the funds. NOSENKO

the CIA noack in

snother drunken debauchery (with the

same companion) and came back needing more.

The discre-

pancy between the degree of the nerd and the seriousness of

of the act was so evident that the CIA case officer commented

to JOSENKO at the outset that there must be some deeper

explanation for his act. Thereupon YOSENKO added set

reasons:

His distaste

for certain aspects of the regise,

his resentment of KHRUSHCHEY, aad his liking for imericans.

By his defection in 1964 NOSENKO changed the course of

his life, although he had said in 1962, forcefully aad

unequivocally.

that he would never do so unless in acute

In 1964 he could give no conerent explanation for

the change of heart and in October 1966 he denied, for the

first time, that hehad said in 1462 that he would not de-

fect. His

only motivation was that, having risen to the

Level of Deputy Departent Chief, be would not get to travel

abroad any more.

(This contradicts NOSE'KO's 1962 state-

anticipating innirent prosotion to Deputy Department

Chief, he said that he would leave the USSR at least once

a year in the future.)

For no visible reason NOSESKO seems

to have abandoned a purportedly successful and promising

career, an undisturbed janily life and children of shom

lond, cast shane on his father's menory and his re-

maining relatives, and departed forever fron his ors country.

His own unease concerning his motivation evidently con-

tinued until, in 1965,

he wrote one cohesive explaiation.

No part of this statement was ever borne out by his conduct,

attitudes, remarks or reactions.

He appeared, wherever his

reactions

seemed spontaneous,

to dislike the United States,

to have no interest in it politically, culturally.

scenically, and to preserve a preference for the üSSR.

CIA graphologist commented on NOSENKO's "strong enotional

traditionel background," while a CIA psycholo-

gist reported:

he has not defected in spite

of his attempt to intellectually rationalize that he bas."

The psychologist also said that it is

"alnost impossible to

determine his true loyalties and true beliefs."

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 151

14-00000

• тра чало ..

751.

4. Operational Circumstances

a. Presence in Genera (1962)

1502

men he case to Genera in old March 1962% JOSESTO

was a newly appointed Section Chlef In tre KGB Second Chiel

Directorate,

havirg held this position for tro months.

He bieself acknouledged to CIA that it appeared strerzo

sur the KGB

to send a new Section Chief on an ertended trip

abroad unconnected with his own turk.

His reasong for being

in Genera havo variad and to sone degree contradict ont

snother:

The Disarnagent Conference was not expected to

last core then "a few seeks," but NOSE KO did not begin his

work against SHAK'lOV (one uf the main reasons for bis being

there) until six weeks after arrival: GRIBAYOY played s

role in his TDY,

but sosziko later denied this: there scre

1n

1962 "nes rules" roguiring a staff officer to accoupany

a Sovict delegation, but in 1965 USENO said he did not

renember such

regulations.

He mas permitted to go to Geneva

In 1962 and 1961, as well

85 to Cuba in 1960 and Frgland

in 1957 and 1959, under no supervision or restrai: despite

lis clain to a socord so bad that he was not cleared by the

KGB far personent posting do Ethiopia in 1960.

b. Fresence in Geneva (1969)

IGSENNO sald on une occasion that GRIBAYOY vas one of

tliose who allored him to core to Genera in January 1964,

as a personal lajori* he later not only dcaled this tut said

in 1965 that GRIBANOV knew arthing about the thY.

He re-

ported the 126: TDY night, tecause of his men positio!,

ve his last trip to the desi,

hence the "favor" of his

superiors to perait his this

last trip; in 1962 NOSENKO

said he had the assurance that as Deputy Uepar:rent Chief

(which he knew he was about to tecore) ho would in the future

cone to the dest at least once a year. Also, JOSENKO could

not explain why & First Deputy Departaent Chief, 11 allowed

out of the USSR as a "treat," would ko abroad for a conference

which could be expected to last many vecis, probably months.

This question is compouided by the fact that MOSAiRO mould

be needed in Moscow:

He said that a kig conference to plan

the handling of the tourist season

this tire, and he stuck to this story even aiter admitting

that the telegras recalling him for this Moscow conference

vas an invention (see below).

c.

Access to XGB Residency and Availability to CIA

NOSENKO in 1962 routinely visited the KGB Legal Resi-

dency in Geneva

every weekday nornirg, although he clained

that

he had

no reason and that it is normally forbidden (as

other sources have confiraed).** When asked

hor and thy he

sergitive source

arcited GRIBANUY's personal authorization of NOSENKO's

trip

in the lace of derugatory inforsation as ore cause of

‚GRIBANOV's dismissal.

**NOSESKU said he did not visit the KGB legal Residency In

London sore

than once during his visits

there in a sinilar

capacity in 1957 and 1958, nor during his trip to Cuba in

1960.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 152

14-00000

752.

did so in Geneva, NOSENKO has given different ansters at

different trees.

Hig stories of sleply "dropping in and

hangirg arourd" for lack of anything better to do are

unacceprable in terus of know or likely Sovlet practice.

His explanation that it was due to ISYMBAL's auspices or

or Intervention vere contradicted by: First, his oft con-

fused eccounts of his relationship with ISYUBAL; and second,

his own statements at other tines that it yas GUK who ras

primarily responsible for NOSENtO's visits to the Residency.

NOSENKO had a full day free for meetings on l1 JuDe

1962, although thereafter he liaited meeting tines to shortei

and

shorter perlods until his departure.

This seemed

natural at the time since he dould presumably huve his own

responsibilities and would need to be seen by his Soviet

colleagues in his proper surroundings.

However, in 1964

he seeged not to tave any official respoasibilities or any

calls on his time:

He was willing to spend all his time in

seetings with CIA. Although this could be explained by the

fact that he plained to defect anyaay, it nevertheless would

have tavolved unnecessary risks to a geruine source about

to becone a defector.

Ho showed no concern at the time.

but later (1n 1966),

he said that he had been in fact afraid;

It was for this reason that he invented the Moscoo recall

telegran,

in order to hasten nis defection and put an end

to his fears of getting caught.

It is, of course, impossible

to nake conclusive judgments on Soviet practice, but one

would expect.

If NOSENKO were not engaged in security duties,

that he would be required to participate for cover reasons

in nore of the Soviet delegation's official activity.

He

said that any absence could be explained as "security duties,"

since everyone on the Soviet Delegation knew or suspected

that he was a KGB officer.

This unconcern for the suspicions

of otber Soviets conforms neither with observed Soviet

practice nor with reports fron other sources thet Soviet

intelligence and security officers under cover go to 50ue

pains to hide their true affiliation.

NOSENKO explained the contrast betreen his freedom

and availability

by the fact that in 1964 he had no personal friends iD

Geneva; in 1962 both GUK and KISLOV expected to see bia 1o

his free time. (This story does not explain tis ability in

1964 to get asay during conference working hours; seitker

GUK nor KISLOV affected this in 1962.)

d. Timing of 1962 Contact

NOSENKO had been in Geneva for three months in 1962

when the incident which brought hin to CIA occurred; it

was only tro weeks before his departure..

He cane to David

MARK only 10 days before leaving.

This had the effect of

liaiting CIA's time with him.

JOSESTO's contact case only

about 10 days after CIA had corpleted, in the same city, a

serles of neetings with BELIISKIY, a Soviet interpreter

who

bad been recruited and handled as an agent by ClA during

NOSE:K, as one of the two

eaTlier Visits to the West "sell" revealed that bELlISKIY

primary itens he wanted to

had been under KGB control fron the outset (Page 517).

1005

TOP. SECRET

---

## Page 153

14-00000

853.

:..

-...

1. 6.14.

e. Willinaress to Meet CIA

Although in 1962 MOSENKO claimed that te wanted to

sell only two specific items for the noncy he had lost, and

cher. aisappear, there were indications from the outset

that

se expected and

planned to core back for further meetings

with CIA.

At this first meeting he called attention to

certain infornation in his possession about POPOV, hinting

that he would tell it later; even as he protested his unwilling-

ness

to continue meeting with cla,

he was giving ample

detaiis about himself which would inevitably have compro

mised him to CIA and forced his future collaboration.

Befora

he finally agreed to return for more incetings,

he said:

"Mayte I'll reet you again Monday' (tlio days after the firs:

neeting).

NOSESKO refused, despite

repcated inducerents,

to ncet

on the intervening

Surday.

In fact, siren he did

IETUITI

on Monday, he said that he had spent Surday

with

friends, drinking and discussing

recent iSSk foreign policy

roves and speeches by KlRUSiCHE!."

f. Tre Recall Telegra

NOSENKO's confession that ho labricated the story of

his havina been urdunt!: recited to

consow by a telegran

leaves only two

possible irterpretations:

- There was a telegian, but NiSENiO's mind has

slipped and he is no longer

able to distinguish between

fact and fancy.

This, horever, is not bore out by

his general conduct nor his performance under interro-

gation in 1966.

- There was, in fact, no telegrat.

(This is borne

out by Special

Intellicerce.)

Thus, the irvantion was

AND nOt NOSENiO's but the

KGB's;

LIE #GU DrIELed HOSENKO to report to CIA that a

telegram was sent; and CSENKO made an error in later

admitting that it was rot.

g. Remarks

The operational circumstances so far reviewed point

out the facts that:

- NOSENKO was inconsistent if not cortradictory in

stating his reasons for being in Geneva in 1962 and

1964;

- He had unusual access to the KGB Legal Residency

and an availabiliiy for meeting CIA that seemed to

impinge upon his security:

- He was willing to return to meetings with CIA al-

though having

at first said that there were but two

iters of information for sale:

- He was "in place" as a CIA source for the last

six of his 100 or so days in Geneva in 1962, thus

restricting the anount of time he could provide continu

ing reporting on the local legal Residency: and

- After 12 days in the same status in 1964.

forced the defection by the KGB recall telegram, which

appears to have been a fabrication.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 154

14-00000

754.

Taken

together, these facts suggest the possibilities

that the KGB sent NOSENKO to Geneva on toth occasions for

the purpose of contacting CIA, that the KGB wanted the

opportunity to gauge ClA's reactions to the walk-in 1o 1962

and to the defection plans in 1904, and that the KGB guld d

NOSE.KO after contact was established in both years.

A further examination of the operational circunstances

1n

Geneva lends credence to these possibilitles.

During the

1962 meetings. NOSENKO would frequently. anster ClA questiong

"I will have to think about that tonight,

"I viil have some time tonight to jot down and prepare a

ne the tong

"or

good angver for you," or "I don't ant to give you an answer

to that right off--1 an afraid to mislead you."

He would

return to a later meeting with the inforuation, after having

visited the Legal Residency.

In 1964 there were other

exasples of what may have been backstage guidance by the

KGB:

-Ho called for an urgent special neeting to cor-

rect sunething he had said in an earlier deeting.

Initially NOSENKO had named ZUJU'S instead of KEYSERS

as the U.S. Embassy code clerk

whom he had personally

approached in 1961.

This seened remarkably urgent and

important to him at the time, and in retrospect this

case gains special importance:

It was the only time

he claimed to have had direct contact with a U.S.

Embassy staff employee

during his alleged tour in the

American Department in 1960-1961. If he could not

remember this one name, it might call his entire story

into question.

It is hard to find gnother explanation;

had he simply made a careless mistake, with his cus-

tomary indifference to names and dates. NOSENKO mould

be unlikely to mull over what he had said at the meeting

nor to bother about correcting a minor misstatement.

luch less would he feel compelled to call an energency

meeting to do so.

-He cane to meetings with "chance" itens picked

up at the Legal Residency, each of which would require

quick action and the commitment of assets on the part

of CIA in Geneva.

Also, NOSENKO originally said in

January 1964 that he wanted to defect right away, but

various steps taken or planned by his ClA handlers

kept him in place for a time.

Each step, however. was

quickly negated-usually at the dext meeting--by some

information NOSFNKO bad picked up by chance.

-He asked, out of context and without any explana-

tion, whether

GOLITSYN had told CIA that the President

of Finland was a Soviet agent, and laler could not

coherently explain

where be had heard this,

why he had

not told CIA about it in

1962, and why he had asked.

In addition, the Soviet reactions to the defection were

unprecedented and contrasted sharply with, for example, the

Soviets' avoidance of

publicity concerning GOLITSYS's defec-

t 100 in 1961.

The post-defection actions bj the Soviet

Government created publicity which had the superficial effact

of underlining NOSENKO's authenticity, establishing him as

• public figure, confirning that he had a fanily,

and veri-

Iying that his defection vas of alarming consequence.

These

TOP SEC.RFT

---

## Page 155

14-00000

755.

reactions seen purposeful in light of the approach in paris

In 1966 of a soviet photographer to Parla Match; the photo

rapher passed photographs of NOSENKO's wife and childrer

as part of a proposed story to aramatize the

abardoned

farily of a "top soviet intelligence officer" whose defec-

tion had caused the "biggest blow ever suffered by soviet

Intelligence.

18 no independent press in the USSa,

no soviet journalist

allowed to publigh as he pleases, anc

he Soviet Government in the past has shown no predisposi.

tion to dranatize defections from its most secret agency.

The photographer can only be presumed to have been acting on

RGB instructions.

TOP SFERFT

---

## Page 156

14-00000

lui SECRET,

79%..

G. Sources SUppOrting MOSENKO

1. Introduction

Tle pieceding fortions u! fart VIll: presen: an

analysis of the Michko caso without givira detailed con-

cideration to information about hin from asoviets re-

porting

te CIA and the EBl. vecause their

avicence generally

runs cuurte: to the results of the foregoing analysis, i:

in reviewed lere separately so that tie curcentrated examina-

cion

of dOSE:KO ncull not bo diverted by asides as to the

authenticity aid

riinbility of there soviets.

is indicated

belon.

the Cia and iBI sources who have dil

sucosrtzá

Ansa ko's intelligenca barkground are de

Fined sensitive sources

Campaircas and the dorictors

2.903

Jane GOLI-SYN.

CoLlist! claincd l'e inod

creonsily

to have worked with him, and fix!tO cintridiciod GodltaY

by saying they had rever ret.

Jon: of thor, as well as

CHEREPiNOV, suppirted dosed Indirectly through oierlapping

information on specific KGb operations, but this arpect

of their reporting is revicher in Purt

1x.

2. CurroboraticH of PosEiro:

The statements ofd

NOSE"KO Was a

KG3

office

50r6 1:80

Intelliuence Carser

•the sources confirm

that'

il! access

to sensitive irformation:

3221. 72

KGB licutenant colonel (later

change to captain, a frierd and protege of the head

of the KG3 Secund Chief Virectorste.

GRIBAiOV,

Who

approved NOSINMO's

(:968)

TOY

Gercia.

CANET SI

SCSErKJ

wis a kis

"chief.

cass

datails on. KG3

spera-

tions agairst the U.s.

Errassy, an! "as most Iccently

naputy chief of the Tourist repartment.

lie also stated

that NOSENKO, with his information on U.S. S-bassy micro-

pliones and KGi operations involving correspordents and

tourists,

has "roie valusule lio American intelligence)

than

KGB

"will

(1.e., until 1950).

Ile described the repercussions

the

KGS caused by

• NCSENKO's defection:

nei К53 гези-

lations

to

increase security, the lismissai of many

KGB officers inclusira

CaiLalon and the cocal: of raay

hsies

NISENKO could ke a

expresser

the

conta

sensitive sourco

WANTS

#stared

that USENKO had attenied the SPU's Mill-

ary-Diplomatic Academy (NOSE!KO has indicated he de-

clined

the

opportunity to enroll

in this strategic

intelligence

school in the

early 1950'g.)

ifterwards.

NOSE.iKO served in the GrU

and then entered

---

## Page 157

14-00000

757.

source

According to

• NOSE!KO was in "Intelli-

gence.

His

defection

brought

about the recall of a

KGB

secretary

from Gereva,

the

rumored tralisfer of some

60

soviet

officials fron

assignments

abroad, and the

dismissai

of KGB personnel including "OSE O's friend

GUK,

whc

had

recommended

the TDY to Geneva.

In addi-

tion,

faction s

betas reported,

immediately after the de-

sopresentative of the Exits Cormission of

the CPSU Ccutral

Cotmittee went to Girova to

speak to

the sovict. Goveriment employees there.

said that NOSENKO had been tried in dugertza

In "osCOW

for treason and sentenced to death (see Pages

46 and

312).

- GULITSY!: Eciled to content hien shown iOSENKO'g

name 1a 1969.

ut there is to tor at his syr laving

merloned moanko pator to the lessera press anacance-

ment or she defection in 1964. even brough te had named

people kanin to mim in the imerica apart no ci the

KGB Second Chief Directorate.

-isncely after Celecting

GorTiST said that he hau visited inis Department in

1960 and at the turn of the year 1560-1951.1

after

NOSENKO defected, GOLITS!! was given a surmary of

NOSENKO'S LIOgraphy.

Thcreupen GOLETSYN reported that

NOSE!KO was a kGB officer phon he first met in 1953 and

last saw in 1953.

Frch 1253 to 1957 or

1958, GOLITSYN

stated, MiCSE!IKO bas in the U.S. Embassy

section of tre

American Department, resporsible for coreiage of U.s.

military personnel and later either for others in the Nos-

cow Faiassy or for correspondents.

ÀS Of 1953, GOLITSY::

said, NOSEiKO was a senior officor in the

Tourist Departent;

as of 1960, ho was definitoly not in the merican Depart-

ment.

GOLITSYN added that GUK, CHUPRiOV,

ard KASHCHEYEY

were friends in the KG3 whom

he shared with NOSENKO (see

TarOS

343-344).

So:-ce

soviet source, atlasties, indicated she had

been

told

by her KGB friend SylfIl that JOSENKO was a

"civilian": he had nevertheless provided information on

microphones in the l'.s.

Babassy and had caused "considerable

damage."

are wanna also have cor

oborated certal? non-inteiligence aspects uf HOSENKo's

background.

3. Rerarks

joirce,

that NOSEiKO was ù senior

3 aside, the Soviet sources have certifies

KGB officer, an all asserted or

implied that he had aicess to information valuable to Ameri-

can Intelligence--the microghougs in the u.s. Erbassy beirg

one item in comnon. Pasts

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 158

14-00000

TOP SECRET

759.

8394249. Most of them have described the serfous repercus.

sIOn: Of HOSENKO's defection.

The possihilities witt: regard to

the accuracy of these sources' rejorting are:

First, they are correct. If so, the foregoirg

aralysis 1s in error, they die valld sources,

POSENKO 18 what he clains to be:

a genuirs defector

sose previous positions in che Xob crabled hir to

dulge all important detailg on opcrations against

Hesterners, mainly Americans.

Second, they are misinforned. If so, the fore-

goirg analysis is correct, they may le valie sources.

and NOSEiKO has always been under kou control.

FOI

tals to le true, it nould have teen necessary for the

KSB to disporch Nosando with only a hugtly restricted

runter of fiß peisonnel lincluding ERItHiOr) aware of

tre actual circunstanceti of the uneratio...

The k33,

at tire

sane time, would have propaguted within and out-

side of the

soviet Intelligenre Services the fiction

that NOSEiKO was an a-lual but aisloyal KGB officer

and would have sinorted this fabricacion in various

loss oi distitio, etc.!.

Third, they have keen

purposefully misleading

merican Intelligence for their own

NGB purposes.

If so, the foreguing analysis is correct, ara some or

all of them have participated in a kgs conspiracy to

support the bora fides of Mojartio, a KGS-controlled

These posstbilitles are discussed further in Part IX.

the raor spraadir.

TOP SECRETI

---

## Page 159

14-00000

TOP SECRET

759.

H. Alternative Explanations

1. Introduction

• Parts VIII.B. through VIII.P. have discussed the

inaccuracies, self-admitted contradictions, inconsistencies,

and incompleteness

of NOSENKO's reporting about himself and

the KGB.

Coldectively,

these important flaws in the story

of and by NOSENKO make

it necessary to choose an explanation

for his actions and the nature of his information.

There

are three alternatives:

Pirst, NOSENKO was a KGB officer but (a) has

a faulty or

selective

mesory, has embellished or

boasted, or his reporting has been influenced by a

combination thereof; or (b) he is irsane.

Second, NOSENKO lied about himself in order to

save face.

Third, NOSELKO has misrepresented himself, either

on his own

of at the instigation. of the KGB.

Each of these mutually exclusive alternatives is discussed

below.

2. First Alternative

According to one postulate, NOSENKO was an officer in

the KGB but has

a faulty menory,

has a selective memory,

and/or has embellished or boasted:

a. Faulty Memory

NOSENKO himself has repeatedly appealed for understanding

that "different peple have different memories"

and that

his own is "funny," and

this is supported by his forgetful-

ness and errors concerning events he is known indesendently

to have lived through, such as

the BurGi and tell cases.

But it

cannot be said

that he is, In general.

"very bad with

names, ' because he nas almost total

recall of names and

positions of hundreds of iGB officers in the erican and

jourist Departments.

He has a good memory for teces and

rarely failed to recognize photograng of

people he claimed

to know.

He remembered consistently details about certain

operations (the compromise and investigation of PENKOVSKIY,

the surveillance of ABIDIAN to Pushkin Street, the JENNER:

case, the arrest of BARGHOORN, and the search for CHEREPANOV.

to cite a few examples).

NOSENKO was precisely accurate in

his recollection of most of his dealings with CIA personnel

from

June 1962 onward.

b. Selective Memory

Although having a selective nemory is probably true of

nearly everyone, a CIA psychologist has described NOSENKO as

a psychopath who would register each passing event only in

relation to its effect on himielt at that moment.

This

would inevitably make him indiffurent to the characteristics

of other people,

for example, and to the sequence in which

events transpired; the aspects important to him might rot

appear so to a nore objective observer.

such a person would

.: SECRET,

---

## Page 160

14-00000

-

!:::

760.

suppress unpleasant menories and would have no real appro-

clation of or respoct for an

"objective truth."

Hig re-

porting, like his perception and his menory, might therefore

seen distorted.

He right recount events according to tig

mood of the moment.

Thus, fo example, 11 real attachronts

to family or friends is Irpossible for a psychopath, there

be an explanation as to why NOSENKO cannot easily remember

his childrens' birthdays, why in 1962 (or 1965) he appears

to have lied-or been indifferent to the truth--about hig

older daughter's schooling, and why be cannot recall when

he first married.

In theory this bypothesis can explain

any aberration, sinco 1t involves the unknowable.

In itg

most extreme form, by describing NOSENKO as one unable to

discriminate between fact and fancy, it would encompass and

explain away the facts that his story i8 obviously untrue

and contradictory in major ways; that his account of his

personal and professional life and his rendition of the.

Information he knows are so vague and unsubstantial; that

he cannot (and/or does not care to) remender or recount

how he did the things he did.

Most important,

it woula

dismiss any conciusions based on NOSENKO's testimony siace

nothing NOSENKO said

could be taken seriously.

This hypo-

thesis,

however, is unsupportable because of several

factors.

First, NOSENKO claims--and other sources confirn--that

he quickly rose to high supervisory responsibility in a

counterintelligence organization which is known to require

attention to detail.

He would have risen in the KGB while

overconing the black marks in his file:

scandal, indiscip-

line,

negative backgroud factors, and bad Party

record.

NOSENKO

admits that his performance was not good; he was

luattentive and inactive and almost none of his

operational

activity was carried

out unaccompanied.

That his rise re-

sulted fron his father's influence or GRIBANOV's is unten-

able, for his father died in 1956 and GRIBANOV's patronage

(itself open to the strongest doubt) would not and could not

be dispensed upon such a mental case.

Mental aberration to

the degree which would explain his poor performance under

CIA interrogation would necessarily have hindered his per-

formance of KGB duties, denied him special privileges,

and

and hence cost him the carcer which NOSENKO has claimed for

himself.

A second factor negating this hypothesis of a psycho-

pathic personality is that such a person could be induced

to recall certain details with the help of discussion,

questioning, and reminders, whereas NOSENKO's vague and hazy

reports seem to represent the absolute limits of his memory

or knowledge.

Years of questioning have not succeeded in

dredging up any ner details or incidents.

when reminded,

he could not recall, for example, one of KOSOLAPOV'S IDYS to

Helsinki, the details of the seizure of electronic equipment

fron the U.S. Army Attaches at Stalingrad, the correct date

of GOLITSYN's defection, or the presence

of KHRUSHCHEY in

Moscow at the time of the decision to arrest BARGHOORN.

Another factor is the impossibility of applying this

hypothesis to the totality. of NOSENKO's reporting.

hypothesis holds that some things are important to him and

are not,

and that he therefore rememhers the former

and forgets the latter, it 1s refuted by the inability to

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 161

14-00000

761.

find a catogory of information about himself which he con-

sistently remembered nor Ras that he consisiently forgot.

If what is important is his con direct experiences, fur

example, it is odd that he recalled the operations of otbers

better than his van; he renembered the danes of hundreds of

but could not recall names of his own agents

and people

invoived in his own carrer; he could recount

details of the PENNOVSKIY investigation, in which he did

not participate, but not of the discovery of American spies

among tourists,

such

aS MCGONAY, for which he ras responsible;

he reneubered details of the 1955 MALIA case in which he

did not meet the target personally but forgot details of the

1961 KEYSERS case in which he did. If it is the importance

to him of recruitment operations against U.S. Embussy en-

ployees which permitted hin to recall some details of the

STORSBERG and MULE opcrations, it is nut inportant enough

to help hin recall

some of the other details which were

equally pertinent to nim personally; and it is not selectivo

memory which made him forget alsost every

detail about CIA

personnel in Moscow and KGB action against them.

If it 1s

said that his parental family is importart to him & hence

his memory of his father's funeral and the names of his

uncles and aunts), it is odd that he cannot recall details

about his childhood. If drinking with important people 15

meaningful to him, it would explain why he rememberg one

GRIBANOV evening with

sharp ciarity, but it does not explain

why he cannot remember the other two times, not even in what

scagon of the year or in what restaurant they took place.

Finally, with reference to the "selective menory" hypo-

thesis, it is precisely in matters NOSENKO said he remembers

best and which he told cost confidently that the majority of.

Inexplicable contradictions arise.

from his claim to have been directly responsible for ABIDIAN

or on his story of the Pushkin Street dead drop, among

numerous examples.

c. Embellishment

The third possibility is that he has simply embellished

and boasted, while underlying his story is a core of truth

somewhere near

what he has reported.

NOSENKO has, after all,

admitted many "white lies" and boasts ("painting"

he called it). Also, in the interrogations there were

repeated signs that he was fabricating and improvising, often

in ways which led him into more contradictions and further

admissions of white lies.

Perhaps then, according to this

hypothesis, he simply invented,

on his

ons, various aspects

of his career.

Perhaps he dated his entry

earlier to make himself seen more experienced, and invented

his service in the American Department to make himself nore

interesting to American Intelligence. Perhaps he was only

a principal agent, not a staff officer, but learned enough

from his operations and fron his handlers to think be could

pose as one.

This hypothesis would certainly explala sany

of the dublous aspects:

the story of his career, his lack

of information on KGB staff procedures, his ignorance of

major KGB events and sources, the degree of his relationship

with GRIBANOV, etc.

This theory, however, founders on &

number of points:

• 100 SECRET

---

## Page 162

14-00000

• 782.

Tho sOlNceS

-The validitj of the inforastion he lias priviled.

To get such laformaiion tr

sould have

tu be a NGR

staff ulflier, aust have worked in both the A-crlcan

and Tourist Dipartuents as to saj's he did, asd auri

have leen a fairly senior officer with brued respur-

sibilities (in vieu of the number of Tourist Depa:isent

operations revealed ly nase ir his 1964 rotes!.

name a few other

exarples frun arong hundreds possible:

(a) NOSENTO not only knew the identity of a KGB

double agent agarast CIA,

BELI'ISKIY, but fare checkable

datails fron inside the case, Including the renes by

which the ClA case oificers

identified thrascives to

the double agent;

(b) MUSENKO vas able to report, with almost com-

plete accuracy, tliat ClA ceased clandestine letter-

mailires inside the Soviet Union for over a yoar after

the arrest of Russell LANGELLE in late 1359;

lie identified several Americans recruited or

approached by the KGB in operations in which he said

"ASDREY"

SHAPIRO;

NOSENKO krow inside information on Americars

at the inbassy in doscow.

including operational activ-

ties of Juhr ABIDIAS, WINTERS) nailing of a letter to

POPOr, the horusexually of too diplorallo officers.

etc; kId

(e) 'Ho krew certain details of the story of Alek-

sandr CHEREF.INOY which

would not have been available

outside the KGB :taff.

Thus there would not be any great nerd nor nuch roos

for eabellisurent.

-The confirnations of others.

He appearet before

BArGHOCKY and other KGB targets

as a "chief," and

se:sitire sox-cels

aubsuurces confirzed AUSEO's unusual

that he was a Deputy Departzent Chict in

the CB, that his defection was

a severe blow to Soviet

that he was more importait

Intelligence; soviet journalist told Paris Watch that

than PENKOrSKlY,

and so on.

NO ESKO's defection was the greatest Toss aver suffered

by Soviet intellin

reported the recall to doscow of many ior staffers as

a result of the defection, and these officers did

indeed return to the Soviet Union.

Thus any embellishaent must

concern only alaor details such

as his rank, which he has

already admitted.

d. Corbination of Abore

Another possibility night be that NOSEIXO's poor per-

rsycho-

pathologically selective menory, and embellishnent.

while

this theory is intrinsically more logical and night correct

and round off sone obvious weaknesses in anj one of the

3 €

? SEGRET

---

## Page 163

14-00000

..::

763.

individual theorles, le cairol explain the counterargusents

discussed unuer corponent parts above.

e.

Insaalty

It night ie puriulated sat OSIrO went iusano ard that

this ties the causo not onl oi his scenagly unmotivated

contact with ClA la 1962 kut u! shortconings In hig story.

However, lioSilKO thereafter landled sundor AGB functions

well enova, to be pronoted diu to be purritted abroad in

1961; he tas beca

excuined peric.lically by a ClA psyci:olo-

8158 and a ClA psychlalrist; lie has bron in contact over

considerable periois of time and under verglik degrces of

stress with experleneed ClA and FBI personnel; ic has sain

rained his caullibrium under difficult circur.stances.

Nore

of the foregoing results in an truacation of trianity and

tere are countless other argunents which would irvalidate

thes hypothesis.

3. Second ¿ltcrpative

It has also been postulated that NOSENtO li a psycho-

path,

1s what ho saj's ile 15,

hut that lor psychological

reasons and while undur irterrogation, he dia rot want to

tell that he iner.

By this line of reasoning, jOSENKO has

lied for no other

rcason than to

save face; by diellin; on

the inconsistencies in SOSEStO's statements, the interro-

gator nerely caused more ironsisteroirs or

elso recelied

the false ansoors tuat JOSETO did

not know or did not ro-

r.caber the lucts.

Under Interrogation, howere!, NOSEINO

recalled ard reycared what he had previousiy said in the

less inhibiting atnusthere of the relaxed debriefings prior

to 4 April 1901.

This alternative explanation

thus does aot account for the factual contradictions in

NOSENKO's reporting lefore the Interrogations, such as the

dates, in sourcing on the

"ANDREY"

case, in de-

rails about the Pushkin Stiert doad drop, etc.

fails to account for NOSESKY's retrartions about his rank as

lieutcrant colorel, in the face of the HGB TDY travol autho-

ahich shows his to ve a lieutenant colonel, aud

The suggestior it.at YOSENiO lied_ to

save face consoquently ca: be

disnissen.

4. Third Alterzative

The only other postulate is that NOSLYKO is not what

he clalas to be,

in which case his sisreprescotation

done esther on his own or as part of a KGB operation.

If he is ulsrepresenting hirself on his own, there are

(even in theory) only tuo pussibilities:

He 15 ecrols exag-

gerating (discussed above, under the "First Alternative") or

he 1s a fabricator.

He cannot be a fabricator, horever, since

the Soviets have cortifled him in nany ways; includirg his

plotte south cy concenter in saintial

soviet officials'

remarks in various ereas of the

world, and

reports fros destinak other sources or his KGB

status and

Inportance.

si:sitive so=ca aad

P SECRET

---

## Page 164

14-00000

764.

There remains the possibility that NOSENKO has misrep-

resented himself and is a witting part of a KGB operation.

Thig

hypothesis could accormodate the argument that the KGB would

not dispatch. a KGB staff officer as a double agert against a

hostile service because, whether of not the argurent is valid,

NOSENKO las indicated in Part VIII.D, above) has not proven his

claim to having

served as an officer of the KGB. If he has

been and is now

under iGB control, it would appear that he was

being built up for years to look like an officer and was showr

to lesterners in certain recruitment oferations.*

This could

explain NOSENKO's revelations to FRIpPEL and others about his

family and background; the otherwise pointless W.E. JOHNSON

case, and NOSE!KO's aypearance in the BARGHOORN interrogation.

It could explain NOStliko's uneven memory and performance under

detailed questionir.g: Much of what he should have known by

personal experience could have been mercly memorized as part

of his KGB briefing.

Nothing in liOSEN"O's procuction (see

Part ViIl.B. above)

would preclude his being a KGS-dispatched

agent.

That he was a KGB-dispatched agent was the conclusion

independently arrived

at by the cla speciaiist who administered

a polygraph

examination to NCSENKO in April 1964.

4. Pemarks

The first alterrative above has been rejerted while the

possibility that lOSE:NO or. his own mistepreserted himself

is unacceptable.

The remaining possibility is that NOSENKO •

has been manipulated by the iGg in an operation directed

against American

Intelligence.

His American

repartment service in 1960-1961 was not supported

by any

such "show"

ppearances--he did not insist or

the

truth of his claim to participation 1. the KEYSERS case,

which, moreover

KEISERS

sou'd

iot confirm: PREISFPEUND is an

unreliable witness; and i

•is not accessible to

intervied.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 165

900000

763.

•sitive

sinces

1: Sungary of Couclusions

CIA has considered every major asport of the SOSENKO

case for tho purpose of reachine a definitive corclusion

about the bone sides

of this zan

2h0 5as5 he 15 8 KGB

officer detector collaburating with daerican Intolligence.

As this point-bj-point analysis has denonstrated,

there li no reason

to accept ars or SUSENtO's claima

a career as an officer tr. Soviet Intelligence, to aithority

concerning the rango and defice u! IGE uperatiunal successes

In the USSR Sparescularly with U.S. officials and privato

citizens), to accurate krowledir regarding rajor security

that country, ur to couporation with drerican Intel-

It would be sufficient proof of his mala pides to

verify that NoSENio lied about a sinale sognent of 71s

career in t'e KGb.

lic canno: have been truthful in saging

that he was the Deputy Cilot of the U.S. E: bassy Section,

recricar Departacit,

AGB secon: Chief Mlrecturain: in 1900-

1961 and a Deputy Calef in the Turist Urpartment of the

sale directorate iron 1y62 until als difection.

indications make it duubtful

that SOSENKO, as he contended,

belonged to the

naval GKU in

1951-1952, to the li.s. Labassy

Section in 1953-1955, and

the American Tourist

in 1955-1959.

To support his allebed staff

officer status in the EGB, providing incumplete

ard Inaccu-

rate information un his sub-sourres and oa

such topics as

Headquarters staff procedures

wallo making illogical stata-

rents on mous opcrandi.

Neither &

supervisor nor, pro-

bably, a caso ollicer, it renains dublous but possible that

lie was a KGB principal agent whose specialiiy in the past

was coprosising

western hoarsesuals.

Natevor the capacity

In which HOSENKO served, It sas not in the NGü ranks, holding

the KGB titles, or with the KGB honors he has ascriled to

hirself, ard this fact is chough to prove the falsity of

his clains to being a sinuine defector.

There 15 no question, honever, that NOSENKO has had

the benefit of inside inforsation fron the kob.

ke ras

Eaid so, othur sources have said so, the Sovie: Governuent's

reactions to the difection replard

as nich.

and his reports

contain details which could have coze culy

fron thr KGB.

He was introduced tito

several opcrations, the first as

as

1959, in a positlon

aypraring "senior" to known kGb

staff officcis:

He has provided data on organization, per-

sonrel, and methods coople-unting aid suprienenting

that fron

othors affiliated with the NGB.

Purposefully nisleadirg

about hirself, MOSEiKO has alto bean decealtul in discussias

the compromises of CHEREPLION,

PASHUISKIY, and PerLaps POPY,

although here is reporting ofte: correlates with that from

scugal transmith emanatha

Analysis shous

=='NUSENiO and uters to tod

contrary - CHEREPAYOY ARS

a NGB provocateur, PLYOVSKIY was detected at

the latest in

early 1961 not 1952, and POPUY das probably uncovered earlier

than January 1959 bccause of & NCB agent rather than survell-

lance.

SOSENKO thus has not cerely misrepresented biasell but

has practiced deception under KGB guidance.

Appraisals o!

NOSENXO 's performance under literrogatioa, his allezed nosiva-

tion, and the operational circunstances support this vier.

---

## Page 166

14-00000

TOP SECRET

766.

Furtherzore, It 18 tho only acceptable oxplanation,

BIONS

the alternatives,

for what bas transpired since contact eith

CIA begRo 1a 1962.

'IA'& coaclusion about the bora fides of NOSENKO 1

neguivocal: ie i8 a dispatched agent controlled by the KGB

Part IX costains a discussion of tho Impilcations o!

the sorcroire conclusion ior the Sovlet scurers

• have corroborated the bona

...n

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 167

14-00000

BOLC23

nares on or such

Liestion

ano conclusion that noseixo did not serve 1a the XJB

positions he claimod contradicts information seported to CIA

(the chees canno

These sources.

of

whom have claimed to be collaborating honestly dith merican

Intelligerse, stated or inpiled that Noseido heid ernior

positior.s

in the KGS Secord Chief Directorase.""

if the con-

clusio..

this study of SEito's bona ilges

is accurate, nome

of the

oscurces can de correct.

ind

they mist

therefcre be

elther

nforned about NOSENiO oi firposefull! misleadirg.

in assessing whether and now

could have been inocently distaforned abour

desecied, it is iccessary to consider the ways in which. the KGB

night have creates and suppoited a legend for a courterfeit KCB

officer-defector lake NO-ENKO.

Tre igB night have accurplislied

this sy the followiry mear.s:

- NOSaNKo's legend rould have equired the kos to

brief tim in depth on rune:ous cases and various türgets

hier. he hould be free to discuss nata cia.

would also have to fanillarize nim nien KGP stuff organi-

cationa! structure and prucedutes, ""*

protirent in his story le go. GUn, NOISHuK, TSAMaAl.

GRIENIOVI so that he couls not unly recognize trell

protographs but also ler? reality to his remarks about

rosario would also have co visit KS3 installations

and other areas whirh appeared

in his leger.d.

sources whose reporting terded to support iosENko but who

have rot been members of the Soilet Incelligence Services

are eliminated irom detailed consideration here because

their conrections with NOSEiKO are less direct thar the

sources with service in the KCB and Cru.

never reen a Soviet Intelligunce officer,

for ¡USENKO has been relatively imited.

sowever, he re-

ported on repercussions in Geneva caused by lOSENKO's de-

fection and like NOSENKU, he said that ite kgs suspected

the U.S. Stase Department officiai David "Alk of belor.jing

He has also reported

on cercain personalities

prominert in NOSENKO's reporting, Including Yu. I. GUX

and V.V. VAKRUSiEV.

* Although. all of then supported NOSENKO by corfirning his

KGS status.

there is nevertheless a distaret differer.ce

COLiTSY's opinion about him anc the statemerts

by the other

GOLITS' belleved NOSENKO to be a

KGB-iispatched agent, while the rest indicated that he las

a genuine defector.

•**That these preparations were inperfect,

or at least that

NOSEYKO imperfectly mastered his

briefing, has shown in

his performarce urder interragation.

Sounds!

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 168

14-00000

140 0

769.

Most treat and does paste pree racion in chees

and dOTTIstIablO PAIELCIT.TCIOn IN CRIE-

prenurably this sould

so done so that testerness is. g.,.

BARTIOURN,

TRIÜPEL,, ard

M.I. JaMäN) could sortily that they had seum Mosaiko in

somó such role. "

- The KGB presumably would have restricied the number

of its officers aware of sone or all of the operational

plans it would ronotheless be laced with che problem of

how public krowledge of liesarko's delection might affect

others in the service.

KGB officers abroad uninformed of

the oferational plan night be indiscieet with foreigners.

1n meeling Westerr, double ageris,

or before nicrophorts 1n

their tio.es and offices,

niking such remarks as

heard of tris man MOstlo or speculating close to the

Tras the KGg alght here tried to roller the rare

v....

a Dy the aprescing of li:ir

runors about his authentaciey lthis on the part of tre:

limited ded aware of the laces of tir casel, by recaling

KGS CREiCeIS frOn

the poste

1n the west fostersibly tri-

cause they were krona

to sOsa.k0). 5y arnouncing the whole-

sale dismissal

those resporsitie

Inciudirg GRIERiOY

(although in fact they ray have

routirely retired cI ray

rave been scored

from the miln strean

KGB Headquarters

activitiest.

ard jy making general announcenerts within

-=e

"lass

urred i:

he defection dusta

Furcher-

511.531t

1s co.non savit fruciice to mare a bad ex-

ample of jefectois.

such arrouncereats

might be expected

to derigrace Moscito is a

"sad charactei

with venereal

disease: an odá Party record, self-inflictel wound,

ete..

In his cackground.

The ice might also have taken pains

to support lOstiKo curther by

havirg western Intelligence

sources, notably double agents

reiognized by the KGB to

be sich, told of the seriousress oi

the defection.

sergitive s.urces

It 13 within this

ane might judge whetter

the reports oa

MRs concerr.ing NOSENKO

were unwittirg repetitit=s of

Etsaomirated misinformation,

or whether inear reports consinited puiposeiul passage of XC3

disinformation.

Their direct and indirect support of Nusanko's bona fides.

as well as the statements by COLIISY!,

are presented and evaluated

in the rext sections below, together wich presentations ard

appraisals of their informatich on topics of ieportira in cormon

with NOSEiKO'S.

certain reports by eatenaN

Souce

"It is noteworthy that such

participation was linited to Tourist

Depistr.snt operatror.s.

NostiTo did no= claim physical partici-

pation la any contacts with irerican arbassy officials during

the periods 1953-55 or 1960-61, except for MULE and STORSBERG

luhere his clared roie was urcheckable since it involied only

folding a door)

and KIXZERS (whiCh. KEYZERS did

not confirm

ard on wnich dosaid did not insist.

adretting that he doubted

KIYZERS would remenber or recognize

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 169

14-00000

769.

LUÁNCOS

¿ are also coraldered bocauso they

although by saying he was a

clvillas, d

cha contradictod his clai

to XG3 otaff

OffICES STACUS.

A number of pereral correiationa betteen the

•operations

are then reviewed.

the final section ot

Fart IX

sumary of conclusions about the relationship

butweer

the NOSEXO

cane

*he reporting about him by GoLIasiN.

sensillite sorrees

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 170

14-00000

TOP SEC.ET

C.

..

1. te01011

••.

1.l

1..:

..........

seed debe degree told did sophere led line?

.'!

nil jedic

and moral'd of

the large coriop oi dostito's aniormation and coi.-

mini the ila cuis off rors who hau iner

theon negate cortin informer

1100:

Tils.

::114

freed lul,

...::i

÷ 1.1.:.

:::'.:.

'.":::.."

1'.:

':::

•::.

i..

icio.1ei

1.r1's

remel warm che

-nul Horilkd, ind

.:'::

•::'

sil:

Mise. depos Wien

•i..

.:..

11':

ict

:. =

'-''

reited.

• 3010191.

i=r..

•' cou!! s.Y

''ret.

in dide be la.!

11 WaS POl ij Vin iD tol.T..

ironmitl in or. 11:1

On 10 telluesy 1169 Nibitio's airiction tiri thie Soliet Dis-

arnament releja ion

Santinolard Win

publicited, includ-

ing tAs NGE i:1l1:011011.

ately incalled tini duie i:or

"jitte:" ird sortierline and linicd

POSEiRO to 11: he lorenpor seated tilur

recailed testiko as a

member us lie sucona Chel directoria dotilng mainst Michicar

c'tizens.

und ie this time he

participition

ins given sore backgoror

the sun. tud in indication of CIn's

ner the next several

reservations about corones be hieri

runs GallIStl was providen

1101 080: the 1962 and 1964

meetings with NOSEd in Sitticrland, iu at is request was

supplied niti all the ivall..le biogriphac

assist him in unalgrimy lie operaiden.

On 23 Ju: 1264, GOLIN'SYN

was intervened en detes un the subject of title.

He confirnica

NOSENKO's Identaly i the don of the former Mirisect or Ship-

buildeny und said that he vas a kos etilver mu had worked in the

itericar. Depirement mu the tourist boy alient or the lay's Second

Chief Directorali.

it 1111.16 1t is o

¡is care in pure the information

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 171

14-00000

i!: 1797:

• *:

The dujiko case lus not been discussed with GoLITühi siner

the 29 june 1968 interved thus he his not been questioner

further on the circuit nces which led to the encounters with

HOSENKU described by hi, nor have the results of subsequent

detaller reinterroçutions of lisaNtO - discussed at length in

the foregoing sections of this paper - been made available to

him for revlen, anolysia, or comment.

?. Resume and Discussion of Infcamation*

Anerican Department - 1953

Nusilko his sald that he entered the KGB in isrch 1953**

and was flist asgiqned to the U.S. Embaasy Section of the merican

Department of whit is now the Second Chief Directorate, KGB. He

steted that his dutles from 113 entry until sometime in 1954, per-

haps about June, were to work on files of inerican correspondents

on permanent assignment to doscos and to meet with the soviet

citizens who were agents of informants reporting on the corres-

pondents to the koB.

COLIISY stuted that he met NOSENKO ir. the imerican Depart-

ment of the Internal Counterintelligence Directorate*re a couple

of times in 1753 when he, CULITSYN, was there on other matters.

COLITSNY had earlier identified his own job between becember

1952 and Apr1l 1953 as Chief of the imerican Sector, Counter-

Intelligence (Ninth) Departmert, Foredgn Directorate, under the

Chlef Intelligence Directorate (formed in December 1952 and re-

organized in april 1953). Prom April 1953 until his departure

•The relationship between the reporting by GOLITSYN and NOSENKO

on specific operutions 1s shown on Pages 594-595, with comments

thereon appesring on Pages 647-659, while in this section are

a discussion and an evaluation of what GLITSYN sald about

NOSENKU's assignments In the Sacond Chief Mirectorate (see

pages 383-3448.

• mong the various dates given by NOSENKO for this entry, March 1953

has begn given worn often than others and 1s more consistent with

the rest of NoSeNku's story.

Top

nea lo now insinated tha KGB Second Chief Directorato.

SEir:

---

## Page 172

14-000000

.. sau. 1.

for vienna in uctober 1953 Gullaini was deputy chief of the

Emigre jecter, Counterintelligener department, forelgn Intelligene:

Dopartment, Foreign Intelligence Directorate. GULITSY has not

Indicated the nature of his responsibilitles in esther of these

positions which would have necessitated his visiting the American

Department of the Internal Counterintelligence Uirectorate, although

certain activitles of cormon interest with the latter would appear

logical. RUSETO's description of his alleged dutles with corres-

pondents, however, did not encompuss his having official contacts

with representativas of any component of the courterintelligence

jejartrent of the Foreign Directorate. iccording to MOSENKU'=

description of the location of his claimed office in the irerican

Department, and his description of the dutles of the co-worrers

he said shared it with tin, chance contacta there with such d

representative would have been precluded. Even by NOSEiKOg account.

then, an encounter between JULITSYN and rinself could not have

been in the course of interdepartmental liaison between their

respective units, nor could it have occurred in MOSaiKO's office.

GOLITSYd's lack of reporting on KCB operations against Amerisan

" correspondents lother than his conversation with KOVSHUK in 1956

or 1957 about Henry SHAPIRO) 19 further evidence that his businees

In the hoerican Department was unrelated to NOSENKO's claimed

sctivities at that time, and GOLITjIN's own statement on the 1953

encounters implied that his meetings with N03ENiO were accidental.

Pleeting as their contacts would therefore have been, it could

have led GULITSYN to make the unfounded assumption that NOSENKO

was a member of the staff within the auerican Departrent.

Inerican Lepartment/Your 1st Department - 1955-1960

NOSENKO stated that he transferred from the American Depart-

ment to the tourist Department in June 1955, and remalned in the

Toulat Department until 1960, becoming a deputy chief of section

thare in 1958.

GOLITST, however, insisted that NOSENTO InnainAd in the

American Department until at least 1957, or possibly as lato as

1958.

CoLITSyN added that the KGB would not ba aware that ho knew

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 173

14-00000

TOP SECRET,

Mustnu's true j0s1t10n do the merican departuent in 1957 or

195e. COLITini dis nut Indicate how he acculied his knowindye

on this nor why the KGU subsenuently would hive in an unable to

detestine thit is hid. If ila access to this information was in-

deed that remote las GULiTSAls as:igurent in 1957 and 1958 could

Indicate - ses below), It 1s readily apparent that It could 11k3-

wiso ba sorewhat garbled. COLTin vas unable to explain the

fact thut MosaiKo's physical presence in exclusively Tourist

department cases hid been issitively established through photo

Identifications made ly several of the individuals involved, who

met UjENKO as early as 1956.

From 1955 to 1959 Ithe game years when NOsEiKO claimed to

hare beon in the Tourist anjurtment) COLITjY. was enrolled in

the KCB Higher School. lie was detached from the school, In the

per.lod January-larch 1959, in order to gither material for his

thesta. At that time GOLIShi spent just under two months in

the Touriat Department, " but GOLIISTN's vort did

not involve hla

• In any day-to-day operational activitles of this department. He

has reported having "occasionally" net N055K0 in 1959; although

he d1d not specify that it was at precisely this time, it seems

probable that 1t would have been. GOLITSYN sald thut he asked

NOSEIKO In 1959 where he was working and NOSEUKO told him the

Tourist Department. igain it appears fron this that his encounters

must have been brlef, superficial, and not work-related, hence

insufficient for GOLITSyN to arrive independently at a well-founded

conclusion as to NOSENKO's actual status and function sith the

Touriat Departrent.

"In describing his own and others' responsibilities in the Icurist

Department, MOSRiKO has made no reference to this unst havino a

fomnal of regular relatlonship with tho KGB school or to atudents

from the school having been detached to the depurtment.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 174

14-00000

TOP Steric:

Information te ullable to coLliN

Tio detullod Interrogationg di ibssile rumernian lis clalms:

to Xis positions betwean 1953 and 1964. did not take place until

Many months after CullIidid nade hls statenentis, and they sere: based

upon all collatersl infornation knonprelating to each phase. None

of the results of chese interrogations vas mode svallable to

COLITSiN, so ho was not aware of the countlrys prints on which

NOSENIO contradicted known facts and revealed hia Ignoranco of

activities which were carried out by the KGB during his alleged

tenure in these departments.

3. Corments on COLITSYS

several factors influence the evaluation of COLlISHi's states

ments On MOSaNNOs

- F1rst, as stota in Part VIII. I.. 1t 15 concluded

that Nosanku did not serve in the liG3 positiong ho elaimed.

COLITSY!'s tescimony verified this conclusion insofar as

NOSEKO's clains about service in the U.S. Embassy Section

of the American Department in 1960-1961 are corcerned. liore-

over, In 1962 COLlISHl concluded that the KGB "letter-writer"

(actually NOSDIKO) was under KGA control in subaltting infor-

mation to imerican Intelligence. At Issue, therefore, 1s the

evidence from CLITSYN to the effect that HOSENKO vas an

officer in the imerican Department (unt 1l 1357 or 1958, WherEaS

MOSaiKE sald he was reassigned from the department in 1955)

and In the Tourist department subsequently.

- Second, GOLITSYN made no corment about or Identification

DE NOSENKO pIlOI to the publie announcement of the latter's

defoction, despite many previous opportunities to do so le.g..

In discussions of GUK, CURiliOV, and KAHQlEYEV) ard despite

COLITSM's proven excellence of memory for names and taks of

KGB personnel. GULITiTi gave little detail on the clrcum-

stinces of his encounters with NUSUiKO, and. he has not been

questioned further about then. Nevertheless. as Indicated la

the foregolns remarks on the circumstancos 1u1 which tho two

men could have met. It seens apparent that any contact would

hava been bales, infrequent, cagual, extra-official,

and:

.0.8en0=9

IDP SECRET

---

## Page 175

he follading dricuion conridera rulitsi's information.

about Nuisau in conjunition with Husadda dental stout havin:!

been in contret with ublijr.s." cossible explinetion: for

CULITSYN's having referred to their ercounters but having mis-

Identified usanKu's positions in the ch ara: flIst, GULlISTl

could have erindy second, COLITiY could have lied for personal

reasons, and thira, COLlISAl could have 11rd st the direction

of the KGB beciuse he

(11xe HUSaiKO) 1s under 1:G3 control. to

exumine euch of these points separutely:

-GüLlIStil could have erred. Apart frco !' donia!

by Mustitio, who 1s un unreliable source, there 13 no evirience

to Infute COLITSY's statement that he aru SOsaito met in

the inerican department in 1953 and in the Tourist Sipurtment

In 1958 or 1958. (ane conclustons sa" art VIII.I. about

Nosmiko's bona flies do not rule out the possibility that

- he vas physically present on occasion on the pramises of the

two departments in these yoars, although not in the capacitles

that he has cl.ilmed.) The nature of their encounters, however.;

could have

been such that GOLITSYl erred in assuming - becsuse

ÉOSELiKO was seen on of near the premiges of the two departments.

and because NOSENKO told GOLITSYA in 1358 or 1953 that he iras

In the Tourist Department - that NOSElKO was therefore an

officer of these specific elements of the :35 Second Onlef

Directorate. Thus, 1f COLITSYN met NOSENKO as he gaid. he

mistakenly identified NOSENKO as being i menber of the staffs

of the imerican and Tourlet Departments at these times.

- GOLITSYN could have lied for personal reasons. He may

have belleved that to say he met liOSeNKo or to say he knew

• There 1a Insufficient Information available to reach a conclusion

about, or even speculate on, why MOSLitO was so certain GOLITSY's

defection occurred in January 1962, as contrusted with the fict

that 1t took place on 15 December 1961.

TOP SECRFT

---

## Page 176

174-00000

TOP SECRET

suitiku's poedtion: in the full would aid uthenticity to

11o gorlier evalu cson of thi susarer intonation of 1962,

to hig contradictions of MiLKUg st.strments concernins

service in the U.j. Enhissy jection and the oferations of

thut section, und to his contention that the KGB would try

to counterict his (GULITSM's) informition by spreading

purportedly juthoritative but purposefully mislerding reports

on the same subject matter. In summary, COLITS'A's intention

1n lying about dosaro could simily have been te add greater

condibility to his expressed opinion that :licio was & iriD

provucateur.

- CULITST could huve lled it the direction of the KGB.

an explanation that is examined here for the sake of completeness

ind not because Cla has any reason to talieve GoLITSyl is under

KG3 control. This emplanation would mean that coLitsti.

although offering furtial confirmation for Osa:KO's claims.

directly attucked the bona fling of anöther KGB-diapatched

agent of allegedly comparable rank and knowledgeability. acting

under XG9 instructions, CoLITsy would huve sought to undermine

NOSENKO 'y acceptability, regardless of thr fact that NOSiNKO

sald he was providing rellable and comprchensive information

about XGB operations aginst imerican officials and tourists

in the vijr. At the sume time, Nosilko wis not giving an

account of their relationship that was consistent with COLITSYN's.

by Implication NOSEIKO was distorting or diluting tho earlser

reports of GOLITSYN on KGB operations in the soviet Union.

and NOSEiKO was seexing to guin acceptance by CIl equal to that

experienced by GoLltin. Iccording to this hyrothesis, tho

sources under KG8 control - each striving for acceptance -

dellbertaly guve conflicting stories of their =slationghip.

and each triod to undermine the bona flass of the other.

GOLITSYN explictly and Mostlo by iplication. Mis explanation

1s so 1110-cal, as well as so detrimental to tho KGB. that

It must be rejected frun serlous consideration.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 177

TOP SECRET

'hs cholci thus serma to lin between the first tro explinucions

for auLIrisis misidentification of lujlitio, one in understand dole

error of sssumption drawn from their fed chancs ancounters, the

other a misguided uttempt that had no sinister goals. In esther

CAse, COLITiN's testimony does not entribute to a determination

of the ststus of Nojenko within tho KOB as of the yoors jolor

to 1960.

There are two explanitions for lilialko'a dental about having

met GibItitii. One explunation is that they were never in personal

contact, the KGB wus aware of this fact, and - unjrepared lor

GiLITSY's statements to the contriry - the KGB brlefed NOSIO

accordingly. If in this particular Instance NOSEO told the

truth und (as discuseed above) VOLITSIN did not, no additional

or alfferent conclusion cun be drun jibout the bona fides of

JOsEixO and his claing of servico in the KGB. The second explenition

19 that, as GOLITSYN sa1d, these encounters did take plece in 1753

and again in 1958 or 1959, but beciusa of their cagual and fleeting

nature. NOSENKO (unlike COLITSYN) has not remembered them.

1 TOP SECREN

---

## Page 178

186.

2.

Kaung C!-101er19s 100°

thror:

1 18i00.5.

sad he personal so isray nee

#l:+1e-01:00880 8118:

fail p. isy incilson of

the 10e.c08

18. 108

1101l. a cumponell dot liar andered :curaly

derectorite.

unid again as 1958 and 19%9.

On the orter hard.

HOSE:KO

das arable to dor:caly COLlIsAl's pro:orroph ard he dended

seer. ill:

and

KASTCETEV WerE

learnes of lostito as tell as of rulitin.

(NOS-

ElIKO clislined

KGH OffIeTS:

de.

with rid har do. mrdig 83:al ureal Motlitin's three-north TDY

1953

118

11.0.

800-88098 8 88-0838.

17.7

Tolen mone them the best of fronds)

from

10 1 Tle88 Tle88 880010888888983 100

1le: 1i80081:s8.

d!1e.r.. 11

#:+0-8111 888-8888

1.0

190.11SYN

sertion

or dr.

the brorscar.

erparemens. as of the

with varros orfacers chese in Apral-une 1960 and January 1961-*

COLTSTi spoke there will offacer: mirro MUSENKO claims as close

colleaçires

and would do.tclegs

rave kron 1! Mir lO vice supervisiny or ochertise involved in

coje clurk cprrat. 10r:s.

Ir. sutrary

CILITSYN corrobor sted some

on cine Kol Second Chil Directorate

cut not

311 o1 cien

that the ano men lind i pr

rIDE

F's on

Decraids 1952 9:l11 Apral 1913 GOLlYSY Has "hief of

the toric: icar. Desk

countertilellegerer: Department. Forcign

Directorate. Gojis delse Miss

and for most of the period from

Jaruary :0 !'arch 1959 lie das on TDs training assiciniones to che

Seiond

ChloE 118818898-9940

in che firer sub de lease •OLITSYN

presumäoly wuld liave hid regular dalings wich che US. Embossy

SectIOr:.

ali parings:, also in che secund he wuul. have been in

contact with

rhe

forsage tripartment, In wilch NOSENKO claimed

do ta. been the servang

Lespier flins and dei gere. lis

proven exorllene: Ol m0108f fur the: runs and tasks of keill

persornel, dalgild derr mentioned megfid an debrarings

during the years 1962 rid 1963. nor camiculed on his name on

the two occasions wiien it was shown to him. although he had

numerous opportunities to mercion him ir. conneeson wirh the

• rames of CURAit, tWiNiEYEV.

anu

silk.

The relatior lip berwich the reporting by fan. HYN and

PsstiNto on specifie operations 1s sluwa on l'ore:: 501-595.

livereun appearing on Piges 687-659 disale 1n

the section wich follows below are a discussio. are an

evaluation of war COLlISY: saId anour NOSENKOs assignments

in the secord Chief Mirectorate. s desirated on Piles 183-344.

ahs staled in lars Vlll.l., however. I8 1s nol crrdinln that

NUSENKO Served

this U..S. Embassy jeetion in 1957.50 or

1. 1960-196%.

TOP SECRE

---

## Page 179

TOP SECRET

t xi

TOP SEGRET

---

## Page 180

14-00000

TOP SEinE: 1

11.

Hell: 410001

region why 80lt:14:0. af he had

To live. dragon.

i would bion gaven NOSFiKO

conciere diport for his clins of kii stuff surveer:

Inch to be in question.

contrary, However, NOSIiKO consIs-

tently denied any contace aru rinufaceured a deonstrably false

story lo explair his od. itserce during COLiTSils

admatred visit

to the section

1n whach 10Sai0 clains lo have seriod an Jaruary

(son lage lus, secule fautrote. y

on the ortce huid, Colitel's ilam must le reasured against

tuckeround ind carcilnst5...0g of fug

statemoris.

In the ab-

sence of any comrints a10u: or sderellication

LiC SENKO by GCLIT-

Sy prove to che miblic urrubcanent of his defrition fran the

KGH, allo

in vicia of clie aroine

of infamo: son male avillabla to

him trom rustlio mater sais prior to 18a n189 any alatetents

about has alleged acquairlance with har. GOLlISils "Identifica-

tion" of :OStiKO as a ¡GE staff officer kriown to him persorally

canrot be considered as :pritaicous or uncontaminared information.

The weight of ardepersent evidence

lostiko's alleged

service in those positione wich GoLliSi corrolorated.

with the conflict kerreen GoliTsts and MOSEXO's testimony about

their personal arjuantencestap.

makes al impossible to iccept

GOLITSYN'S VerIfIcatIon Of HOSE:KO's Clasmed VGB seatus during

any stage of the lactors carrior...

*It Is not ilkely that he would forget it. Direct relationship

with or knowledge of a defector would be Interesting and in-

portant to rencirang irl oftirers, even

1f tomporarely forgotten,

post-defection reminiscerces lould alrost certairly bring bick

menorses of such recert ard direct contacts as COLITSYN relates.

TOP SECRET.

---

## Page 181

14-00000

1.21

2. NOSENRO'! lackaround and Carpor

Date c! Information

19 Fabruary 1966 (RE-

ported to!the FuI on

12 February 1964)

774.

10 February ly6s (re-

Posted to

the FRI on

• FebrUary 1Dia!

Information Peported by

NOSENKO was affiliated with the

KG?

for

approxi-

mately 16 vears, since about

101?, and

employee of the

Second

Chief Dircctorate

in

Moscow.

Mis lather, now dead, wag. a Deputy to

the Prime Minister of the soviet thion and also

Minister of the shipbuilding

Industry.

There

is i shipyard numed after NOSENKO's

father

in

the lirainc.

The plotograph which appeared in u.s

pacers 1s

not that of toSEnkO."

worker! with NOühiNkD fer

several JO!is

in FiB

Hadirtars; he described NOSLNKO as a person

¡ixes to be fashionably deussed it 111

times no is cord. of women, by nature a tricndly

individual on! generally will-lated

fei-

NOSENKO worked in the second

chica birecturite.

Ird quite certain

machut NOSENKO ha:l

the

colonel

j.n

tho

KGB. "

10 FebrUary 19U4

(re:-

the

FRI On

1= February 19691

in tebruary isfi (Re-

suIted

tre:

E'TI Cin

20

Februsty 196.d1

.-÷.

jaentified

is a "clean" Soviet diplomat at

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 182

175.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 183

776.

F'BI

on Do to 19585

on 20 Febru..

to the FBI

Febrairy 1964)

(poported

Fli

1909)

CIn

by

lebruary

asked sa

whether ho felt

RS

actually

defected

whether ho felt

Lection might ve a

by the kGB.

#replied that from his own krowledge

matter,

he

was convinced that NOSENKO'&

defection was not a "trick" by the KGa.

NOSENiO worked against personnel stationed at

the U.S. Inbassy in Moscow, and with his help

agents were developed among these smoricans.

It is assumed by the KGß that he is familiar

with the number and location si microphones in

the u.s. Embassy.

PrIOr tO NOSENKO's defection he was Deputy to

the chief of a departmint

in the second

Chief

DIrectorate.

while working in the sevget

(survcillanca) Directorate in Mosrowi

on three sepurite vscaiions participated in

conferences between

"important poopin" of the

Second Chiof Directoratu and the Seventn Direc-

torati.

NOSENKO was present at all

of there.?

Nithough NOSINKO was a Deputy Chief he hold

oniy the rant of captain in the KGB, Fames

attributed this (the disparity betweun

jou and

rank) to

the influence which

GRIBANUY exerted

oir the behalf of Nosinko..

: 15734

---

## Page 184

14-00000

DATE

4/12/94

LOST/MISSING MATERIAL

THE DOCUMENT OR PAGE(S) LISTED BELOW WAS/WERE MISSING

DURING THE DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW BY THE HISTORICAL

REVIEW GROUP, CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF INTELLIGENCE.

DOCUMENT NO.

DATED: _

PAGE (S)

OR

777

FROM:

CIA JOB NO.

Box No. Reel 46

ZA

FOLDER NO.

---

## Page 185

778•

10 Februe

•1?64

10 tod

DO FBI

i2 Eubrycry

4964)

180-

on

10 teL

(Re-

FRI On

1904 180-

191 01

port

Because of his long tenure in the KGB, NOSENKO

would have a great deal of important informa-

tion which he could impar: to intolliger'e

agencies of uther countries.

Certainly, le

would be acquainted with many KGB employces

and could iuentify them.

He also would be

intimatoly acquainted with a large number of

soviet agents working inside the USSR igainst

American ind Britirh nationale.

Thr Will Of HOSENtO's knOwledgc concerning HGB

activittes

could revolve around

the intelli-

gunco eprationg

of the kos in Moscow and aldo

MCi percenalitier working in Headquarters.

olit

iJsC

unawdrodly joniliar wach

all

Ko: porcialities

and

certainly knew

50.1?

FCB

cordilties

an ethcr countries.

0118

ployees

gtruc

HOSEUKO had lBAn 11

rALO

for about lo yours

ilmost ill of thorin-

nrcetorate.

He wiIs

0!

Y.Gi

and knows miny

Jerson.

Chief

D)ir.

ictorate.

TOP SECRET

as

deputy to

thi

chrei it thc

tourist department,

had in

nis possession

a telephone

directory

which

lasted

the

names of some 10,000

KGB cm-

ployees

in

MOSCOW.

Only Chiefs and

of

had these phone

Deputy

books.*.

expressed the opinion that 'NUSENKO

---

## Page 186

14-00000

779.

FBI

• 1964)

is much mura valuablo to the FBI and CIA than

was Oleg PENKOVSKIY becauso of the fuct that he

knows so much about the methods of work of tho

First und Second Directorates of the KGB ind

is familiar with so many irdividuals in the KGB

both

in Moscow and abroad. ans

that PENKOVSKIY was able

to furnich anorican

and Britich Intelligence with a lot of informa-

tion concerning defenuo societs of the soviat

Union, but NOSENKO is much more knowledgeable

in intelligence and counterintelligence opera-

tions of the KGl."

NOSE: KO krows many of the chiefs and deputies

of the KGB directora-es and departments at KGB

Headquartors

In Moscow.

In 103 Headquarters

wani are four acpirate dining rooms for per-

sonnel who work there; one such dining room is

reserved for chiafs and deputies uf departments.

Because of this

fact, NO$ENKO has a vist know-

ledgo of tho hicrarchy of the KGB."

FBI on

23 Yarch Fäul

* TOSINKO volunteered for the first time during the January-March 1965 interrogations that he had eaton

occasionally in

the chiefs' dininy roon."

He had not mentioned this dining room earlier.

.....

---

## Page 187

14-00000

780.

Report te

• Che Fer o

20 May

106

ported to

on 21 May

•There seems to be

unanimous opinion among the

KCB chiefs.

iythat NOSENKO.

the KgB a truirema

anount of harm: could do

NOSENKO

in his position as a deputy chief in one of the

departments of the

Serand Chief Directorate

would have been entitled to have one personnel

directory

of approximately 30 pages setting

forth the identities cf

all of the

supervisory

officials

in KGB leadguarters.

NOSENKO would

also have had a 200-paco directory listing by

nate ind telephone number all the rank-and-

file umployces working.

The opinion

was expressed by some

HGB "chiefs"

We that If NOS

NKO were merely

dore

mor these two directories available

to

uneracan Intelligenes, lthe KOB would be soverely

damaged for the present and for several years

to come."

The KGU was lucky tht |the Amerloans found only

40 microphones in

the l.s. Emoassy

in duscon.

Actually,

about 200 microphones

by the soviets in the

cencealed

Embassy.

feelg

quite aure that NOSENKO was Lest

furnishing information to the mericing whach

resultra in the microplonus being found.

It

was his opinion that NoSENkO knew only the gen-

eral location of the 40 microphones which were

found and does not have any knowledge of the

remaining ones.

by the

11 June

• See above; NUSENKO did not mention these direutories.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 188

4-00000

on

22 June

by the F9I

Fabruary 1845)

--—

781.

The aroral consensus amongGu employo

anises ls thut in the future the kCu will

Le trelang sharply the effects of NOSEND's eS-

cape to Americin

Intelligence.

NOSENKO i8 COn-

sidered to be vastly more

important than

either

GOLITSYN OF DERYABIN.

This opinion appears to

be based on coveral factors:

First, NOSENKO

worked against personnel

stationed at tho U.s.

bimboaag. In Mencow and with his help

ayints word

Javelopud among thrue Anericans.

socond, it

15 assured by KGB personnel

that because of

his closeness to the u.s.

Ambassy in the pagt,

roseNio would also be familiar with the number

uf. microphones which had bren installed in

the tabassy by

the KGls and

the locations of

¡tiese microphones.

infid, as a Deputy Chief

of a department, NOSENiO wpuld normally love

nad access to a telephone lirectory 11s2139

all personnel in all directorateg

of the KGs in

MOsCOW.

Anothor toctor, whilen le a formilable

one lit

the monds of other den employces,

that

BOSENNO

travelled in a rather rflucntial

carcle.of trends in Mo:cow whi

the soviet Government.

these

comments cited

being an

for hactican

Intel-

one in the

KGB

really knows exactly how much information

NOSENKO had concerning the KGB.

The amount of dainage caused by NOSENiO's de-

fuution is "unprodiotable."

NOSENKO know foW

employees of the First Chief Directorate work-

ing abroad, but knew many such umploycas serving

in KGE Headquarters by virtue of sceing them in

the dining room which is reserved for chiofs

and deputy chiefs of KGB departments.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 189

782.

Moted to tie Fat on

20 50: 11059960)

TOP SECRET

TOP SEGRET

---

## Page 190

783.

iro-

to

culen.

NOSEiKO.

di not i:

where NOSENio worseni

15

"more

chan casually mili

TOP SECRET

ironin

provided

110

instratio.

Coldent

---

## Page 191

784.

2à Februa:;

TOP SEnte

TOP SEShOTE

---

## Page 192

4-00000

ЧоліЙР

d?irt

l?.0-

nentre

te,

IU!iun

•p iirul Taás)

""..!'

HACNA

15:

retd

1::

: :

1kr

А

785.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 193

4-00000

mriported

Ori

d9E:!

rg;

786.

have hoen

estableshed by the CPSU

fur tire pus poses:

i.dy

to

dutermino why Kel ci

ployers such.

DENYABIN,

GOLITSYN, and rOSENKO

detached while serving abroad; and

ib) to attempt

to clininate

"erati" KGH employees and inprove the

efficioney of the keR.

cindestatewines

-

M:

investigating commission of the CPSU Contral

contes: cherking into the circumstances sur-

rounding 10k6k0's cufuction has

thus far been

responsible for.

the expulsion fron the KCB of 15

second! chirt birectorite employces.

These in-

clude

GRIPANOV, who was also expelled from the

CI'SU

and was

strapped of his rank of lieutenant

general.

GRIBiNOV has been given a very small

pension, like an ordinary Soviet citizen.

This

drastic

aütion

was taken sinde the primary re-

sponsibility for the defection was placed on

GRIDANOV.

it was scalized that, in addition to

being thiet of the second Chiot Directorate at

TOP SEOSE

---

## Page 194

4.00000

787.

the time of the defection, GRIBANOV was a por-

sonal friend of NOSENKO and had more or less

treated NOSENKO as a protege and had taken many

steps to further NOSENKO's career within lhe KGB."

It was fult that GRIBANOV should have been aware

of NOSENko a plans ta derect.

nroe of GRIBANUV's deputae, were also expolled

the KGB, one of whom was a Majur General

BANNikes of the ll other second Chief Direc-

nployees expeller.

have been porsonal

i come werko and some

of them were found to have confided to NOSENKO

details of on

hey were working.

S.M. GOIUBEV,

a KGb oificor stardonca in vashington, woula de

fur roscow becaus:

the investigating com

had deterrined

" mutual frienc

Of NOSENKO and GOLUBEV tOlJ NOSENKO that GOLUBEV

had been assigned to the Washington Legal Resi-

GOLUDEV had hingülf worked with NOSENKO

in KGB Headquarters sometime in the pust, but

subsuguently NOSENKO

ind GOLUEV würe given dif-

ferent assignments within tie KGB and thereafter

assuciate with. onc

another in tha course

of their daily activities.

See Pages 327-336 In which NOSENiO's description of his relationship with GRIBANOV. is

discussed.

MoSE!is identified GOLUBEV by nane anl photograph as a First Chief Directorato countcrintelligence officer,

who had served in New York. City under United Nations cover in 1960 and

NOSENKO said

that he first

met GOLUBEV In 1950 and know nothing of his earlier carcer.

Because GOLUDEV had at one point been asgigned

to Genova with

the Soviet Disarmament. Delegation, NOSENKO went to him in 1902 for a briefing on Forcign

Ministry personnel in the delegation before his

own assignment to Geneva.

NOSENKO said he last daw GOLUBEV

in KGB Headquarters in 1963.

At that time GOLUBEV was assigned to the New York Direction of the Counter-

intelligence disastment of the first Chief Dircutorate, and NOSENKO said that GOLUBEV had been in this

Departmont as jury as he had known him.

---

## Page 195

788.

FBI On

Mopested to cra by

thie FAI On 9 Ecb13-

35y 19651

It is common knowledge among KGB employees that

GRIBANOV was expelled

from the KGB and

CPSU and

is now on pension, partial rather than full, as

a result of the NOSENiO defection.

When NOSENKO

was being congidered for assignment to Geneva

(in 1961), a summary statement of his activities

as prepared li

the decond Chief Directorate and

¡ent to GRIBANOV.

This sunnary

containca con-

minerable

"compromising information" concerning

MOSENKO: 1f doted upor properly, at would have

renored his fron connideration

for this trip.

GRiBiMOV rund the sumnary

material, ran a

lind

riiroug! all of it, und

udded the notation: "Sond

hin lo foreva. "

The gencral feeling is that

GKiMANOV was willing

a lot of MOSENKO's

deraciencies because of GRIBANOV's lon-time

trendship with NOSENiO's fathor."

GRIBANOV has been dismissed

from

the EGB, eX-

pulled fion the CrSU,

and is presently living

on a small pension.

lis dismissad

accurred

immoditely after NOSENKO's defection. "'

addition, not less

than 50 other pusple wore dis-

massed, mary of whom were close

frionds of GRIBANOV.

Most of these were from the First and second Chief

Directorates, with the majority from the second

Chief Discctorate.

The present Acting thick of

the second chief Directorate is a Major Genoral

ANilK, whose appointmont has not yut benn approved

by the Central Comnittee of the CPSU.

has deputies is a Major General (F.A.) SHCHERBAK.

• NOSEND sad thunis father and GRIBiNOV were not acquainted.

•' GRIBANOV was reportidly in operational contact with a senior Western diplomat in Moscow as recently

as late autumn oi 1164.

It that time he curnud his contact over to another KGB officer.

you van sal!

в ...

---

## Page 196

4-00000

TOP StunGi

-ne.

789.

Early sure 1965 (Ke-

Major Gineral BANNIKOV 18

currently temporary

Chief of tho second Chief Directorate, having

replared GRIBANOV whis was expellod from tho KGB

trecause he supported NOSENKU in his carcer."

GRIBANOV is working in a snall city outside

inscow as the chief of security at an import-

ant military plant and is now a "nothing."

nor 1?651

after the deluction dt HOSENkO the KGb conducted

in intergelo iritoriyatien to detormire which

emplojoes tner him

and the niture of their rela-

this TAPABRIN was questiored;

• dui: he know tingtik?. but onty

cosually and

mir townsed lamard contacts

within the kGb.

aho arrestication doturmite, nowever, thät

that TARALiIN attenord several parties

Is invited by NOSENKO

described one such

Threatle:.

TAuRIN was afforded d hear

1ng ited ins abond em wallfully concealing

ital infurmation.

Is a result he was expelled

from the kGb and

CosU and was deprived of

all.pansion raghts.+*

Nestlin said that it was painint to authorlied his

19ga trip to Geneva, during

which he defected, and

nat in the bust of ris ironlody, Grinitor did not know that he (NoSENiOl nos making this trip

holces, NosauRo said chu no moutht that GalBAtoY might be fired toon the ko3 s a result of his dafectior

because "he was responsibi: tor gusring

me sheud."

NOSENTO SOLd that PiNNIKOY Nould not be punished because

he had dore nothing utin: than gurgnit hin as a candidata fur the 1901 Gonova assignment (sce Pages 333-334).

chief of the british reparuncht from 1958 to 1963, at which time he bo-

caine Deputy Chief or

"curvice do. 2," the reorginized counterintellignes Depurtment

of the First Chiof

Directorate.

NOSE KO said he saw GRibaddo tHron timon so:tally during has KGB carour:

on each oucasion TARABRIN way presont.

NostiNio reportod that to providi giole

in 1902 and 1963, but not 1n

1961.

"le could not recall ant citall: u:

190r burty lo.y.,

the girls were, whore they went,

what they did,

lic was, horiver, into tü

desurthe the 1903 pill

when took place in Uctober or.

Novamber,

in

con-

siderable ictail enou

---

## Page 197

4-00000

23 Mor

TOP SECRET

790.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 198

TOP Si

TOP SE

---

## Page 199

TOP SEO:

---

## Page 200

-00000

1Ur Sbi.

7?.

•te deGtnó's carttarlilien diil

if wants lealing

Suiiiics dss

acfolichs:

- la 1:819996 11 MlodESD MgiD ile diClebe

Wegt dato"i.:

rio:+

•tr. i.s.

•l.e Mncüreneni

E?iGittg

c1t0ll! 1l böell Githt CloRlhd, Dut 20

riegir ic: gi:au.

rivel in ti

"ee Postde dent waledsa-

Corir.. 10. 0l.ld1d

2aoed er deearedots is

ihe

rtargrrdi.ts

to the

ti.ing

ini facir id

"!1.

olrm1.r0 MiSCUSted

wit.:

Hauhd wirlte Ciok 1.4.

-oetitet.

-Cal CarlolGoils ddll E Mee0 dloio daring the

nornira re la punita!:

tic

then notifies,

and tid cohirotta::

ipins latr n the aituraceo

Sai.t

TOP SEONET

---

## Page 201

TOP SECHET

794.

TOP SECHET

---

## Page 202

TOP SECRET

ri.

:.

TNP SEONE:

---

## Page 203

TOP SECRET

i6.

if: 4.90.

TOP SECL!

---

## Page 204

114-00000

TOP SECRET

79%

(1) Introduction

eatpand susao agree on only coe aspect of the

PENKOVSKlY compronise (sce Part VIll.B.G.b.):

They both

attriburn the initial cospronisat kGB

surictllance.

though dermiss report agrees with suSeNko that

the KGB learnod oi

inerican participation in the operation

only after PENKOlSKiY was arrested, Fsibsequent reports

contradict this by tying

the corprovise dirrctly to survoll-

lance of U.S. Enbass:

personnel visiting the Pushkin Street

dead drop site. smitte story of the events

stenning frou

the corpronise of the cuad drop site is at odds both with

the facts of the case and with all other reporting by

Soviet sourers of CiA and the FBl.

(i1)

Discussion

Bathe tearport not 903-tre

terminated the operation--indicated that the

KGB had been aware

of PErsOVSKIY's involveneat with Aneri-

cans, and spocifically with the Cli officer JICOB, for about

two and one half months prior to the arrests.

ment is inaccurate concerning JACOB, win vas a last-ninute

substitute for the servicins of the Pushkin Street dead drop

on 2 liovember 1962 and lo nover botore had persoually par-

ticipated in the operation. @celia staterents otherwise

NOSENKO's subsegent report and the "official

report' regardanz KGB igrurance of the role of American

Intelligence in the PENKOlSKlY cose.

Ariport or the case, horever, is contra-

tu his first report and to the othei sources:

n1953 that surveillance of U.S. Embassy tar-

detected a visit to the Pushkin Sircet sita by an

American, and that the resultirg 24-hour surveillance of the

site caught PENKOVSÄlY visiting the same location, whereupon

he was arrested and confessed.

however, has

dence besides the statements bartleste that PENKOVSKIY ever

went to the Pushkin Street site after it was visited by ClA

personnel.

3101963 0й

Wireported at greater length about

the roie of Pushkin Sireet in PENKOVSKIY's coupromise.

this

time he explained that the imerican had visited Pushkis

Street not once but twice:

surveillance had observed him on

both uccasions wien de went inside the entrance.

but followed

•him inside only on the secon visii.

The surveillänt who

entered the building reported that the icerican appeared to

be tying his shoe; although this was not unusual in itself,

datecontinued, the lact that it was the second visit to

the same address

for no visible purpose caused suspicion,

and as a result the KGB installed a (Josed circuit lY camera

to provide 21-hour coverago of the site.

PENKOVSKIY was ob-

served checking it (sce preceding paragranh,: an incrican

was observed loading a dead diop behind a lubby heating unit

(radiator); the KGB tagged the dead drop naicrial with a

radioactive substance; PESKOVSKIY was observed unloading the

dead drop and proceeding to his office where he secreted the

TOP SECRET

18.8

---

## Page 205

14-00000

TOP SECRET

тоё.

salerial an a concoalaent area in lis desis; the did also

contanued in sorrcalline us the dedi diu:

PistonAl he. GOn, 11101 10

smuggery was then corfroated

wah erotaphic cadence is the lascines and inloadiags and

offer rio defar..i..

reprit is the caly indicatien

frus a Sovirt source that the fog ind surreilled the

Struel site madoiy do. Fabasoy vi-

ficers: male races repurt stored cort one dacrican

visated ine sito ture. in fart iro difiren: inericars

the sile once rach, l'AhoNlY on ll daruary iyEl ard

¡BIDIA: on 30 Incontr

(jii)

(iv)

Renarks

The Pushrin Streat dead drop was never ised for communl

cation to painoUStlY. and in fact was loaded only coce, then

the HoP. did su ard activatoe it on 2 sovenoer 1962, thereby

apprehendigg jACOB.

lurcover, the first visit to Pushkin

196!, prodated any persoral contact bet-

torn Intelligence, either Aberican of

Thus,

report on Ascricans visiting there

is only partially

unair. and the use of these

visits as an

esplanation for how the KGB detected PEriOrSKI!

in reporting incorrectly or

this matter.

mancoala have cared risely because his iub-souices lone

urnamed, the athe: apparently saddle despite

the conflict in

reportiro Lour his positioni recested arronects infoia-

tion in his preserie.

reiorilales, is tre only siarce to teveai that the

of the winkir Struot dead dost is ei:

21 caruar:

detricted free the bora fidie of doseli

ti shabing

KGЭ anarcress

of i ci: officer noting gone to the dead drop

reaths iciore cutbird's tirit

there, and cia. before

PERRoShTy Sinally sacciourd in establishing porsonal contact

with lipstern intellige:co services.

I= was the isidIAN visit,

said, snich first arruse: iss intorest in the site at

Pushrin Stre?i.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 206

14.00000

TOP SDE:

10P ?.

---

## Page 207

14-00000

TOP SEGNET

63i.

TOP SECHET

---

## Page 208

4-00000

TOF

Liduiù uus

---

## Page 209

TOP :

TO?

---

## Page 210

14-00000

OF S

TOF

---

## Page 211

14.00000

TOP SENTE

---

## Page 212

14.00000

TOP SECRET

TOP SEATE"

---

## Page 213

14-00000

TOP SECTET

TOP SECOS

---

## Page 214

14-00000

TOP SEGTF-

o .

TOP SEGRE!

---

## Page 215

14-00000

TOP SECRET

80%.

D.

Introsuctior.

while in general terma corroboratin: losailo's claims to

service in buth the GR!! and the KGB, saltie has supplied some

details wich are ircompatible with the starcherte by lioSello on

his intelllarr.ce career.

Althourh no: as prolific a reporter on

BOSTiKO as CEnt is had several topics in

carton with dUstico:

Fut.

PENNOVSKIY, CrEPETRICY, SHUBIN.

SLESINGER, and tre contacla retween thie GRu officer

BOLSHAKOV and

Attorrey Gineral Fobert FEiNfDY In 1952

when compared with

NOSE!KO's information, the reports ky-ca

Mon the case of FOPOV.

PRiKOVSkIY, and CiEREPAON ere interlock:i

Zand NOSENKO agree trut FOPOV was compromised

after

his return to Moscow fron

East berlin In Hoverber

1958

ard in consequence of KGB surveillance.

- CHIEREPIYOV and MOSEIKO likewise agree about POPOV's

coT.promise.

concurred with NOSENKO by indicating that

a genuino source of Americar.

Intelligence, and

CIEREPAIOV WIS

this statcmer.t

He wonderi

i learned some of his

details on the compronise oi

FINKCYSKIY,

ROSENKO lave indicated that this compromise resulted from

KGB surveillance of PERCUSKLY's Britis!: contacis in Moscow.

Presented below are

Has remarks about joSENKO, follored by

a review of the topics

cormon

to these too sources.

2.

Statements on NOSENKO

When discussing liOSENKO for the first tine.

said on

that

13184

Win that they were not

acquainted,

"various fersons" ir. Moscow (wion he did rot identify) had

spoken to him about Yoseiko.

The staterents by splits and NOSaNKO

on the latter's background are compared in the following tabulation:

NOSENKO

As a young man, NOSEliKO attended

NOSEKO said his entire ser-

the GRU's Military-Diplomatic

vice in the GRU, Ir. the year:

Academy (NDA)

and then was in

1950-1953, consisted of duty

the GRU Irforration Department--

in the Naval GRU, first in

in all, perhaps a year of service

the far East and then in the

in the

Baltic.**

" Until the late 1950's, the course at the MoA, the strategic

intelligence school of the GRU,

lasted for four years; more

recently, the course has been of three years duration.

**During the 1950-1953 period and before, the Naval GRU was

separate from the rest of the GRU.

TOP SE!"--

---

## Page 216

14-00000

TOP SECRET

810.

A "very urdisciplined person"

in the GRU

and "not very

good, " NOSEiNO was to have beer.

discharges from the GRU.

NOSENKO

NOSENKO's statements about him-

self durirg the 1950-1353 period

appear to agree with the evalu-

atlon, but he has said rothing

about facirg discharge by the

daval GOU.

HOSENKO's father.

"a very in-

shipal person to the netsty

get NOSpiKO trarsferred to the

His transfer fror the saval GRU

to tire $G3 1n 1953.

kosziKO

said, wis at the initiative of

KGA Genera! KOBULi!, & friend

uf rio father: tri cider NOSENYO

was "linister of silybuliding.

NOSEiKO was "an important boss"

in the KC3 (directorate or

departmert unkno.n) .

Pecordina to liseiro, his most

recent ke3 title prior to de-

festing was jeputy Chief,

Department, NG3 Second

MinE Direstorate.

stated that NOsENio gave vers, very guad information"

united states,

to K'3B information

which included "all toans uf KS! coverage

of people in Moscow,

coptere systems in the embassies, etc."

'. Enkas Enkassy, Los

Fontinued,

had found microphones on the basis of infornation

that MiCSENiO had provided.

3. Parallels with liOSENKO's Reportirg

a. The CHEREPAVOV Case

(1) Summary

One of the two ways

has corroborateá NOSENKO

on the authenticity of CIEREPANOV

a geruine source of Arerican

Intelliger.ce nas

to cite information in hac learned eron tollate

CHEREDRICT

lonely served in

CHEREPATOV

sone papers to the U.S. Embassy in iloscor,

which returned then to che Soviet Mirisery of Foreign Aifairs

(MFA).: the MFA turned the papers over to the jiGB, which traced

them by analysis to CHEREPANOV: nearinnile, CHEREFAYOV had tried

to flee the USSR, but he was captured near the Turkisn border and

executed.

In every major respect, therefore demitagrees

NOSEiKO's version of the case.

When asked whether the CHEREPAVOV

incident might

have been

"a trick" by the kGS to excarrass the

U.S. Embassy,

replied that it was definitely not.

The second way in wrich offlash has certified that CHEREPANOV

was a genuine source is ircirect.

Like NOSEIKO and noof the

CHEREPANOV documents, East had indicated trat KGB sury: llance

of a U.S. Embassy officer

trought about the compromise of POFOV.

(il) Remarks

KGB provocation

against the

that statements suggesting the contrary could have been made a

TOP SEC

---

## Page 217

14-00000

TOP SE!--

311.

agreement with

both.

causs of popov's comprorise,

rowever, appears to do based on can

sata direct irvoiverent, and

does rot appeer to be attributebie

30

sub-gources having provided

him with erroreous inforestion; this 19 discussed fürther below.

b. The compromise of PEcKOVSKIY

Line dates on d'u compraise of PE:KOVSY.IY are at vari-

ence

with licsaiko's art they digagree on vrecher the KGB knew

Ane=ican Irtelligence to de Insolved in this operation befcre

JÀCOB of CÀ was apprenerded at the pushkin sireet deed drop on

2 Movember 1962.

soth saiIces stated, lobeier, that curveillance

led to the detection

of Pixcist!?.

although açain tley diff-r on

the person with

whon PEirOUEKiT das first seen by the KGB: ventrat

said this individual was tre British busiresstar wynE, while NOs-

ENKO said it was the Erglishwotan dis. CHISCL

Accordirg turrett

paciouSxIi had been orring openly

with

WYNE, explianig

Lat he hes tryin, to careiop WiNNE, and

che KGB learned of their meetirgs through surveillance ciA

recoras

show that whind cet PainDUStY in Moscow dirira Aor11-

ar 1961, May-June 1961.

qust 1961, aл1 Jure-Juir 196°

Jane report that PLiKOVSkly came inder ruspicion in day 196%

therefore 1s

not

consistent with tis

staterent about KGB surveil-

lance of the HItE-PINKCVSKIY meetings, nor does this report co-

incice witi. tho eviderce iron liyill himsels that the kos was

sufficiently suspicious of their meetings to record a conversa-

tIrI

they had hadestion 1901 lone year carlier than in the

NOseiro dated the FENTOVSKIY compromise at a

month or two after he has jirst seen.

but at the time not iden-

tifled, in contact with. Mis. GilSHOLM in liovenber or December

1961.

Whereas NOSENKO said the KGB was unavare of the participa-

of smerican Intellicrce in the FEiKOVSKIY operation

JACOB las detained,

reat reported that while PENKOVSKIY was

at a reception in doseci,

te was joserved making contact with an

American in a lavator;.

sadid -or date this event. but

CIA records show that it "as or

27 August 1962. alast added

that the KGB "irvented" tre incidert ai Fushkin Street or. 2 lov-

ember 1962, the morth after PEllOVSKIY's arrest, in order to

catch the merican unloading the dead arop. **

PErKOVSKIY

was

T.0t

personally crown to him,

Trans stated.

Jai no other sub-sources were

reamed.

* The sane statement was made by NOSEiKO ard in the official

KGB document or. PaNiCUStIY's compromise.

**This is obviously true, although the date of PInkoVskIy's

arrest may have tets more tran a month refore.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 218

14-00000

TOP SECT

812.

c. The Corpromise of POPOV

(1) Introduction

Of all the sources avallable to merican Intelligence.

is the best placed to report on tre compromise of POPOV:

information

intr. that provided

by NOSBiKO and

CHERETAIOV, as well a3

that in the 16 Septerber 1959 message from.

POFOV to CIA (tolieved to rave been dictated by the Kub).

four sourceg have

inficated that the comprorise resulted fron KGb

surveillance of a U.s.

Embassy official folluring the recall of

POPOV in Neventer 1958. 8aes12 Forever, tas not precisely dated

the incidert (dateà by

inierence ij the others at 21 January 1959),

has associnted it niih or Merican

Intelligener dead drop for POPOV

whereas the others have said it was la's malling uf a letter to

POPOV), and lias nor

tie Cih officer irvoived (George WINTERS):"

Me evidence from hike tra: fron Mosturo,

CIEREPANCY, and

the pofci message, confireis with that from cüLITSyN whose state-

ments on the compromise of rOpOV are supported by aralysis of events

in 1957 and 1358

on which HOPOV Irported (56: Pages 663-665).

(ii)

Details

Eleporteir

on the POPOV com-

FOrD's corresponderce

Austrian girlfriend@ra

appears to have been the prelude to the POPOV compromise:

said det had rade a "very serious mistake" by using an

accomojation acáruss supplied by American Intelligence to receive

nail from a girlfriend in histria.'*

"In

SCire

Fashion" this came

to the attention of tre Austriar police, Mika laP and

it bas determined that she had been sunding nail

Soviet offi-

cer in Berlin.

The fustrian police notifies the Soviets, and

eventually Forgi was conironted by the chief of his GRu

in berlin.***

component

CRu Headquarters was notified, POPOV

was recalled

aference to fopol's compronise

Lithat POPO rade the mistake

providing in.

IOIT.BELON

Taseec!

so hinsel.

No sub-source for this remark

was given irra

santa and since then lints has not

resolved the discreparcy between this version ana the other

one treated ät length here.

#*

CiA did not supply POPOV with an accormodation addresg, but

he did secretly correspond with KOCHANEK.

went to the lustrian police on 25 August 1958 with

information that inclided the idertification of POPOV as &

soviet Intelligence officer.

POpoV's superior confronted hin

on & November 1958 about KOCAVSK and received from him an

admission to having had some correspondence with her corcern-

ing his search for operational leads: the superior told POPOV

that the Sovieis believed "she was working

for someone" ard

that "possibly she

is tre cause" of the berlin unit's opera-

tional difficulties.

POPOV was recalled to Moscow on 11 Nov-

ember 1958 ostersibly for a weex's ThY to discuss the case

of an imerican whom he was developing under CIA segis. He

did not return to berlin.

TOP SEGRET

---

## Page 219

14-00000

JUP SecarT

813.

to Moscow to explain the situation.

and nhen he was inable to do

so, the faers were turned dier to the KG3 for full-scale investiga-

tion. Ch dcs installey it not been for popov's

correspordense with än Austrian Worün,

"they would never have

caught hin, " and that FOppy was "arrested because of a connection

with a sirl;" also, ping at me cha of 1950 popov

was recalled to Moscow

While the foregoing KGB investigation was in

routinely placed under surveillance a U.S. Embassy official in

roscow.

This person was observed rentirg a boat

in corkiy Park,

going to tre vicinily of a rew bridge near the Moscow Stadium.

and there taking photographs of the bridge and surrounding area.

Its suspicions

aroused, the KG3 covered

and observed

POPOV unloading a dead drop.

He was arrested, doubled, and

"opcrated" against suerican

Inteligence for a year ard one-half.*

Eventually, the KGB put in notion a plar to attempt to compromise

the American official who was reeting POPOV.

The XGg photographed

a meeting in a Moscow restaurant, then arrested

the official and

stoved him pictures of his meeting with ropc: and of FOPov un-

loading the dad drop at tri oridge.

riter the Alerican refused

for thie KGB, he was released

and ucclared persong non

grata.**

Mast cli questionac.

On POPOV'S

He sald it tis lime that lie hid heärd POPOV ras

apprehended through a dead drop.

PLYOV "apparently was under

sispicion there

in Perlin.

(presumably the GRU)

recalled him to Moscow, they wondered who his future contacts

would be.

and they were told the following:

'KGB workeis place

inbassy employees "ider surveillarce.'

They observed an

Americar. at the staircase... and they found a

dead dicp under the

So they estabiished coverage of the dead diop and ob-

served POPOV come and unload the drop.

They made a report, and

after this POPOV was under surveillance...

Then he was called in

and told thus-and-so.

I'ney showed him photographs.

They told

him he was going

agreed to 1t...

iano work for them to expose his cortacts.

Since POPOV returned to Moscow in November 1958 and LANGELLE

was arrested the following October, he could rot have been

doubled against CIA for more than eleven months.

** Starting on 4 January 1959, POPOV had a series of six brush

in Moscow with the CIA officer Russell LAGELLE of

Embassy, culmirating in the detention and interview

Of LANGELLE by the KGB on 16 October

***As previously stated, no Moscow

dead drops were used by CIA

in the POPOV operation, but LANGELLE did

survey the possi-

bilities for dead drops to be used ir. other operations. One

of these was located interin killer-an area of Moscou not

far from the new bridge near Moscow Stadium,

situated beneah a stairrase: misuse

28 May 1959, but the dead drop was loaded

by a CIA legal travel agent lon

7 June 1958) rather than by

LANGELLE.

The CHEREPAiNV document, discussed on Pages 563-

564. stated,

in the course of reviewing LAVGELLE's operation-

al activities in Moscow, that this dead drop was for use with

an agent named REPNIKOV; in fact, it was not intended for

the REPNIKOV

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 220

14-00000

TOP SEGRET

814.

1111) Gun-nourcing.beg

That lie lad learred these

monise gi lord! irom a corversation i

1325403

¡OrUV deranse it

the timo he ras amir

a taus thiend" the sar su:- source was cited by

re supplied CiA in

#reported.

incecurately, tiat Arrican Intelilgence

gaie lui::

an acconnuda: ion

addross 18: erli:, that a deas drop

wes vill in the "loscow pirase ci

the operation,

and that the KGB

doubled HOPOV for a year and ore-half before terminating ine case.

Tach of

SÄT.CE

Asta participared in the investigation of

ie

would have recognized the to be untrue.

One

splanation for the inaccuracies mig: be thit strati

pIrcisely

what he had been told, but schases i elberataly mis

intornud him.

There is, however, no trident Ivason why sirlw

world have done this.

Another explanation might be tha'delh

misunderstood nis sub-source, ur in

relaving the information to

CESAZUNANNIVENA

it garbled

the details.

Tiis

would ean airs

mias less then folly

attentive to d.tails on a parsonal acquairince who had gained

rotoriety, details

irict. tr

was

told at

a tine when ne was in a

position

CA.

•le

intact

with

intelli-

genice

explinetions seems

ertirely

satinctory, aru the answer may lie elsewhere.

has been inconsistent alout the degree of suspicion

EUITOUN

eg POtOV lihen ne wai recalled to fior ou

i- sorenter 1958

in cornoction with his correspondence with

Cr. one hand,

in 1962 deckindicated that the kor surveiance of the U.S.

Eatassy officer was coincidental with the separate investigation

of POPOV's relationship with this distrian wonan.

Ci; the other

hard.

in estatalkimolied that as a resul:

of the suspicion

of FOPOV in Derli:..

trere was interest in POFOV's future

contacts

ir. Moscow, an irterest which would he covered by the KGB's sur-

veillance of U.j. Erbassy emuloyees.

*However, in anuther versiorda

Illegals rejoited tieir compromise

immediately

fell linder

suspicion.

statenerts has not been resolved.

said that as soon as the

1r. January 1956, POPOY

The conflict between

TNP SEBE**

---

## Page 221

14-00000

TOP SEGRET

A15.

d.

SULTIN,

BESINGER_ ALA BOISHPNCY

I- three Iristance

961 NOSaitO confimed reporis made by

analer the 130

Afication of SHUEIN as a GRU agent,

the

Soviets' gaspicions that SLiSINGER was in cortact with che fbI, and

the status of FOLSHAlOV as a GRU officer.*

SHUBIN was previously known to have been associated with two

GRU Illegals in the United States during

the 1940's, but indepen-

dent of NOSMiKO and sta there 19

no verification of his having

nore reccatly been

in agent of the Gal.

*SI.

POLSHAKOV, the only claimed mutai!

acciaintance of ful

and NOSEliKO, has not bien nored as a cal officer by any other

r.OL

has he inen obcorved ir Fattings with GRU agents. Both

Pachet and resenio spose of BOlStiat's having met attorray

General RODert KEVNEJY In iSE2.

"OSaird adjed that, in Initlating

thie contact, the Attorney Gercral kiew HOLlOV to

be a "military

intelligence officer," bur tris report has rot been corroborated.**

4.

Couments on s

confirmation that ustiko is a genuire KGS officer-

defector

15 comprised of hearsay evidence. and honce the corclusion

that

ARiKO vas dispatchod by the igs would not recessarily bring

vora tides into guestior: much would depend upon d

SUb

ces, as yet unidentified.

and NOSEvKO ara

!! 0

supportina on

the compromise

of porol,

Marisa, and both

have authenticated

ine validity of a GiERE-

PANOV

document which concorred une ForoY compromise and which was

prepared

the KGB fot transmittal to inerisan Intelligence.

addition,

spand Nestino support ore another about the PENKOV-

SKIY compreriise.

bout the contact between siSHAKOV ey

Cans and Robert KEiNEDY, and about ShUgIN and

Their inFormation or BOLSHAKOV and SaUDIN is unique; on SLESINGER

it is corrororated by actions

taken by the kob.

as reported by

SLESINGER; On POTOV, PENKOVSKIY, and CHSREPAIOV it is confirmed

by KGS controlled sources.

the exception of his details on FCEOV,

report-

ing on NOSENiO

cormon topics can be explairca.

individually.

by misinformation

preceived ard innocently passed

along.

These items taken together, howeier, in the light

state-

ments

or. the compromise of POPOV (which conflict

witn

SYN'&

reporting and

analytical evidence) are irdications that

15 controlled by the kGB.

**If Rohert KAiNEDY indeed knew bOLSHANOV to be a GRU officer.

the question remains as to how dosalio was

aware of the fact.

since Statewas the only source to have made this Identifica-:

tion before the time when KENNEDY and BOLSHAKOV met.

TOP SENTET

---

## Page 222

14-00000

TOP SECRET

816.

"dt. it.

---

## Page 223

1-00000

817

TOP SETTE

sensitiv.'

source

..=.

---

## Page 224

400000

TOP SEGAZT

618

1: -

57, .

TOP SEGNA.

---

## Page 225

4-0000

. "w oode oep!

•wwiai..

......1.:. :an. ==.

----.=-

TOP SEGHET

619

TOP SECTE!

---

## Page 226

400000

820

ti-

if " Bos

v..

--

- —

TOP SEORET

---

## Page 227

14-00000

TOP SECRET •

822.

F.

1.

Introduction

Meet she courterintelligence production has then ex-

For the most part she has provided only super-

ficial reports, generally

ir. response to muestioring and

frequently cling her own lack of access

to irformation of value.

Her professed persoral irvolverent in, ard dramatic accounts of.

certain situaiions on which HOSENKO's reporting is demonstrably

false is therefore

acreworthy in the context of her total perfcim-

Mehnals reporting

on NOSDiKO, despite vagueness

and contradictions, las the ret effect of supporting his bona

fides and affirming the importance of the information he nas re-

Her accounts of the CHEREpaNor case emphasized the depth

of nis treason ard tie retribarion of the KGI--thereg intr

her reports on the compromise ci PENnoiskiY, while differing

mariodly from lOSEiKO's in basis,

scope, and detail, curfirmed

alsost to the nonth ¡USErko's datirg of the compoo-ise.

confessed priticipation as an agent of the KGB second Chiles

Directorate, despite her repeated claims to crow rotarg of im-

portance concernirg its

operations, has placed her in NOSEiKO's

milieu,

and the ics officers who figured in her reporting are

two exceptions)

personalities who have previously been

identificd

as kGB officers orly by NoSeiKo.

NOSENKO'S Fackground and Career

i has claimed no first-hand or authoritative

knoileage of NOSENKO, reporting at various times that

heard gossip, had heard about him from ter KGB friend SVIRIN

Into she believed only "knew about" NOSeiKO, i.e. did not know

him personally), or had heard about him from

"someone fros the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ro= SVIRI:l.".

She has reported frag-

ments on HOSENKO's cackground: his father's position, his mucher's

ethnic background, and NOSEiKO's ron-KGe status.

She initially

said that NOSElKO's father was a general, later

said she was rot

sure of that, ard stiil latur amended her description to "general

or minister,

"idding that he nas Ukrainian - thus

approachirg

an accurate.

statement only after several conversations about

Her consistent statement that NOSENKO's mother was Jewish

and involved

in black market astivities has not been elsenhere

reported,

and her statement that NOSTiO was a civilian, rather

than a KGB officer.

contradicts his own account and that of

other sources who have confirmed his KGB status.

sourcing of her limited information on HUSKiKO to her kGu iriena

SVIRIN nevertheless denonstrates at least potential access to

sume information about NosenKo.

ISVIRIN waS identified by

NOSENKO as an officer

of the third Section of tre emerican

Department, Second Chief Directorate, since 1963, and befcre

that of the Third Department of the Directorate

of the Kos

Second Chief Directorate, where he participated

an award for his part in the investigation of PENKOVSKIY.)

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 228

14-00000

Tipri

TOP SEGRET

3.

ROSENKO 'S K-ONlOCTe- DaMage t2 the X33

Anericars concerring the micropro..es ir. the U.s.

only

reference to inforatior he might love provides - or. each

occasion when she has discussed deSErto.

SvIRIli the renark in October i9t5 that MusEko had done consider-

able tarm to tre

soviet Union by reucaling this information, tris

land specifically only in this cortext) underscoring the importence

of NeSBiKO's information.

rosairo hinsels tas characterized this

information as the nos: important he las provided. l

The context

in which she has discussed MOSaUKO has beer. the gereral one of

defectors fion the jover Urion: she has refeatedly emphasized

that the Soviets atterpt to convirce all Scrirt citizens that

"anybody who defesis

will fird his crave

1.3r8 of KG5

mith rcererce co loStiko, she

day be extermirared, trus rearly implyirg that NoSao was a

genuine defector.

4.

Parallels.with.sCSEiKC'shrintting

a.

The CHEREDiNDi Case

Aka Rays accourt ce DiEREPAiOV's alsaifention, treason,

entiras in general citlire and in

sot dose inner lams direct knowledge of tre

emphasis

case through ter orn aro

Brard's persoral frierdship with

CHEREPANOV

and his wile.

ancestriced her husbard. in

fact, as the only frierd of

CiEF-shiON who auralred falthful

after CHETEPA

downfall to call

Or. CHEREPINOV's widod,

whose address coat

parable to thai of visi

ar.d

Tris direct rnowledge 15 con

She introduced her accoat of the CiERtAiOV case, as in her

discussions

of NoSEiKO,

by refererces to the determination ard

effectiveness of the KGB in apprehending

and executing those wo

were

"runnirg

aray"; she offered GiEFEPANo: as an example'of a

Soviet traitor ino had teen caught and executed. Her account ce

the details, horever, differs sharply fron that of NoSeiKo (ard

others).

Her identification of CHEPEPrOY as & classmate of her

husband at the GRy's Military Diplomatic Academy (MA) from 1955

• to 1959 is unique amorg the sources to hate reported on cHERE-

PANOV.

For the period during wrich earth ash sald CiEREPAON

attended the MA,

NOSEiiO has made no specific statements cor.-

cerning CiEREPAYOV's career: he has said only that at some un-

specified date after CiEREPAiOV's return from Belgrade (elsewhere

reported as mid-1956) and before early 1960 CHEREPANOV had been

assigned to the U.S. Etcassy Section

STerican Department, KC3

Second Chief Directorate.

spare pulse stated, however.

that after his graduation Irom ine MuA ir 1959, ¿HEREPANOV

"finally" obtained a job in the Ministry of Foreign Irade,

nesting that he had no intervering assigment:

There NOSDiXO

failed to establish a clear motive for GiEREPAYOV's ravirg

collected KGy docurerts during his assignment to the U.S1 a-bassy

Sellen der mere deral to the America, on Lena

described his ircreasing bitteriess from the date o:

the MDA in 195c.

She was not sure chat he had bee. a KGB officer:

she neither mentioned ror did her account allod for his assigu-

ment to the U.S. Entassy Section in 1960-196! las stated by

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 229

14-00000

TOP SECRET

823.

bY NCSEXO): and she described the docinents which he turned over

as ravir? core fror. che Miniatry of Forelgn Trade.

She stäted, therefore, rather than dexcristrated, the point that

"Eliege were such important documinis, imporiant enough that... he

was shot."

Dinirg her sesand account of the CillErior affairs

Rary sourned her

ircomation dirccroraly ard added first-hard

decalls nich she had pievlously caselamed baring.

"In tão days this man has arrestrà..in tua -onths he mas siot.

also at variance with NUStic's acroure of a K3B Investiga-

of up to 20 er 25 days.

folluded by the Kir offiser's visit

tO CHEPEFAIOY On 8 DeCEMier 1963, GiLaEPidOV's filght, ard a sever.-

day search for him before his arres=.

i.

The Compromise of PRiKOVSKIY

closely corformirg in this ragrase to Mostiko's accoint ce

PEiKOVELY's compromise.

anyplaced tre date of initial

suspicion of Pal"OiSkiY

at about

Coroser or Noverber 1961.

Her

statemer's of the casis for this suspicion, hodever, difier con-

pletely

iron the reasons advanced sy PosEkO (and other sources).

Her ascout is vague, in consonarce with her claimed lack of any

first-hund contemporary knowledge cá tre irvestiçation leading to

is colored Dy her expressed personal dislike for,

FENKOISKIY the mar and by the professicaal sfe;

oand which resulted from lENKOVSKIX's arrest.

her Ko3 friend

SVIRIs as the source of some of her information.

as the source of the ardirect darriru to her rusband to stay away

fran FAiKOVSKIY,

and as soreone "re kre'd docut PRIKOVSKIY's trial

and lüd beer.

sonehow assoriated with the irvestigation - thus

cor.fimaing NOSEijO on SVIPIN's participacion in the PENKOVSKIY

investigation.

c.

Reports or. NGS Fersornel

Nathas rened reiatively few KC9 officers who have

figured in for career as a kÖB ager: or about lton she sculd re-

port ary suistance.

Of hsI KGB handlers:

- CIA has been urable to idertify ore. Gennadiy Fedor-

ovich, whose last rame she did rot krod, her handler nile

ste worked at the Embassy of lepal in 1964. NOSE KO ras not

referred to operatiors against this Embassy.

- Two KGB handlers were assigned to

Lenirgrad - V. i. DIVIDOV and Georgiy PCiELIN.

officers had previously beer identified by NOSENKO as officers

of the Leringrad KG3 and have not been identified by any

other source.

Frey were tho of the total of four leningrad

KCE officers named by NOSENiO.

- Her KGB hardler while she was employed by a Caradian

correspondent ir. Moscow has Vladinir Ivanovich KOSTYRYA.

OnlY NOSENKO ras identified RiSTYPYA as the KGB officer who

had been in the United States

under the rare Vladinir

Vixtorovich VLADiMIRi": NOSESin scridered this, as he said

этогд KGB per-

ornel.

L.S. URGE: 1NI5515E

COVETEET

relationship with his was not related to her earlier

saturist

work, hovever, but her connection with a foreigr corres-

pordent. which was KOSTYRYA's responsibility after h18 18-

turn to

MoscoW.

---

## Page 230

14-00000

TOP SECRET

824.

Of the four other KGB ofíicers on whom.

reported in

any cepth, thrce were previously identitled by ?OSEO

and only Ly lOSEriO:

-V.G. SVIRIN, her KGB frierd, 1s a. ubiquitous figure

in much of her repurting on

other subjects ard in her acco.rt

of her personal life.

neli as her primary cardidate for a

western recrultrent

S'IRIN had previously been

identified by HOSEiKo es a KGB oilicer of the trierican De-

partrert, Secord Chief Direstoraic, previously involved in

tle DE:ÄNUSKIY anvestigation (both of which assignments

pestad Asr.as confirnied).

- Ir connectior. dith SVIRIN.

incidert in which a küB officer ninom she

described in deroga-

tory terms,

valerin Mazellik, hid narrowly escaped disaissal

as a result of a cruntica bravl with a milicianan.

MUZEYiIK

had not only survived, however.

hit continues to bear a

higher NGB rail: than his former friend, colicague,

ard sit

ordinate. SIRIN.

SOSTiKO said MULEYNI" was

an officer of

of thie KGB Second Chie Directorate.

- Vadim iskYLUV was identified by

K3B officer under Novasti cove,

ag the

the

dosamu had preriously given information

concerning BInrukov,

a KJB officer of the

Terth Departrent, KGB Second Chief

Directorate, targetted against foreign correspondents.

5.

ReTarks

There is corfusior in

s sub-sourcing for her

information on NOSENtO and

sistercy in her statements that.

on one tard, he was a civilian but or the other, He was aware of

ir the U.S. Embassy.

These facts irdicate that if she

vas brigira no the Kes to report to merican Intelligence on ::05-

Aljas inadcquately prepared.

Mas personally supported the bona fides of NOSEiKC

by offering

chreet confirmation of the bona fides of cherephior.

by corrocorating NOSEill's details or the PENKOVSKIY compromise.

his identification of KGB Second Chief Director-

ate personalities.

lose: Aside from her support of Nostic and CHERE AYON,

are many aspects of the carisahat case which in-

deperder.tly led ClA and other lesterr. services to conclude

that she is a KOB-jispatched agent. Some of these aspects

- The circunstances of her claimed relationship with

the KGB contradict KGB practice as known frea other sources.

description of her husband's recall

from Stockhe 1'

has punistmore for harira previousli

worked as a GRU colleague of FEiKOVSKIi in the GINNR fit

neither the treatrent of other GRu officers shon PENKoV-

SKIY also identifiid nor the logi: of the situation:

husband was

sent to stockholm after PENKOVSKiY was un-

even after he was arrested. (That the brief

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 231

14-00000

TOP SECRET

825.

assignment in Stockholm may lave iner, à kill orgentica pre-

lude to the dufection of delang is also suggested by

the fact that the oin operaili.

salaut ber hustard 1s

to have had there was a restein dounle agent, and

AnNa vas able to provide idinestyrg data on this

- Nearly all o

Soviet Intelligence perso.

s identifications os

n'ere previously kroon.

- She has given conflic:ing accounts of her motivation

for defectirg, of her relationship sith hor husband, and of

her associations with KGs personnel.

- Agarst the Lackground of the claimed difficulties

in which ste and r

huskard fould themacives,

likely that

would have reen permitted to leave

the USSR.

- There are oddities in her reiationstay wich the

Canadiai, corespondent who employei res

was her alliged KGB target, as well es in her corduct in

In her husband's situation and bchavior since

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 232

14-00000

TOP SECRET

;ie..

G.

Mea1k201na1t"

1. ?410103101 010!

i.

LEPERPUII-

I- C.iHH16E

tis reeren dy toweall

tilldiires soitrs;

". ?.'..

:1°.

...:"

r.?i

soviet

diirgals .é:u

i.::da

:l.:..

108k0'e 10trci-

fauble arü mreuinet leoda

.!!!:

ti!:.8

thar wich ane Gera tinncee6 dadG10lG1Güli COnplesncho è:.3

not scert!ry chir ioe gaere:et rng oet ela ii

osriroas.

Сой-.

sidc.irg tio cotclofii

•.' li.:

hettli.

•toscaki,

t.hr:

lhttle to catlifice

Essur11ra. dan :1" mind i1i:

muliorlt ö llld: celn leh. tir tiuthtn Den Tütr lain 1r.

Lhe circuistidce cla? e le cua.. 10:

•ett9: Mlirrat CÉ COTIDLO-

nisr lerüuté

l.wa1? ret1111d d!1:

c!::

sine posed dafii-

cait trdiore pueole::o

•lullde le td Gwdid"t

a.ries,

ar.

Pei80t 1rd

::0:.

:]

'd°

.".16

i.ine 80. f8,803

the iosrniü

1038 109

e1:

..=.

•ol.io

iiiitil iole

itacis

icürilted inalder"

i:oot:1

ioun Ureülsusi!

CO.T.-

ioniser.

'a':?S

t1:..

i.i.

placnty

inyt tieir

ACC "55

io ciitssild

1F.

TOP SECNT*

---

## Page 233

14.00000

TOP SEE?ET

IP S: 827

sensitive sources

TOP SECEN

---

## Page 234

14.00000

.....

1OP SEGNES

828

sensitive snurces....

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 235

14-00000

&29

TOP SECRE

sensitive sources

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 236

14-00000

TOP SEGREI

??";

t.??

¿riti':

1I.E11.13º

C..751. 11:

lE.•

C:

: 71: 1:2.

rainai..

e!..

.,:

г.-:

0..

:**.

la totale etle d1 :.

-14:1119

0/÷1:79: 10:0

cale pltdtl.d.11.0re69

1. 7:.3:110. di:!

•!..

iju

.:.

......

:.?...

1.3:1.-j

I:..

inciato:

"tin ti.

c.t.diiond

partickla-);

1-311 ;

.l::

:.*

"nis

:1•1

l.¿?

des

?r.0

1? 391.

1c:"

# FOl158

•÷ 523:1

also di:! rit:

TULEINASKI NaS

TOP SEGRET

---

## Page 237

14-00000

TOP SECRET

.?!.

another

260:01.0es

cin1e1 1al10us joalces tale confirmed 0nr

inclice

followIny:

12:126.

KGis

parc.tora'r

Iniludre speral pairt invisible

to the naked ?:

d'u"

cardian tie

o1 a spichal deiice

closing

It

13

used dr.

television

at

waS

deserved us

treats

r:

similar castnilie

crapedà spreas:

nu:10.5

co dogs id: 10ü

85.3%

'::.

Lne

rransmai.rrl=

÷. t

SOVIEt

(..1or. i

culmitist.

31!4

or inis trothlike

develop*u

"nat irey cer.

also car Le corresi

Hotel

Personi. and

devices nato

3120

!::n

1 рад: от і ті.

53ult.

El:aped

Triey

i rivers uterus.

Thus

•nE tiE tO lIStEN tO

Pathsis. partliUlarly at

tre

real

SU. li TITIatUIIZEd

MOCHENGI COLITSM

•e CHEN PAYOU papers

papess gave ire KGB

inter sila

syp.or.yn a;

of

16:-p..

"OscuW tO 3

1a:009

opileng the KiB recrnique

mera tot tie l S. Embassy

miare trily are intercepied

by à sovier porirg

as

Were the bLIk of NOSEiKOs repurtir, or liGH occrations was

corcerred dein those or the seidid Cali: Dire torate. this ras

Ward A

SHEES

nave aiso

O:.

ties

eddarlor

sla. cments

assets wirnt...r.e

U35%

cupie oi

Tire

inturmar:or facia.

Bara

and

THERE

aulE

chies Dire.-orate 2er.1usag

an Anerican employsa al

ine

He

repuried 1s€

tor's discovery of

SOKOLnIKI ExMIDIT.IOn

IT. MOSCOW

1n

• The existence and leasibilly of suir a cubs: ance has rot been

verified.

TOP SEC*-

---

## Page 238

14-00000

TOP SECRET

232.

clar.destdr.e

contüil mith ai unluchelinn suriet Errale.

(Inis

contact

sny fà retrodo al the Exhibation

in 1959.1

die agrore of iir: kills dinalod: ut al marican Intelia-

gence deadirop urder a brit. an cho arce ci it. agricultural

Exhibition.

Ho said

crai che 1i5 corticlind a.!!'S. agent con-

tacts

In MOSCOr,

Including ono wier an old ar 1a his 60'5 lics-

ĐiKO

reported

onan individual

who may te jamiel with tras

agent).

whic!,

operariO..s

¿lared re ris: colfilled furstions

rave cestuad as alictid proseciure ar

apair.s:

toreignora and

jodits

ini die tra Soviet Ur.107.

salt

shenos a socord Cuire Di:chiorare ager.t

itic

repeleis

and Iat++

29115°

thE

RemaERs

As prevIcusly 1n::00::

1°.

the genuire sourcee poliisti

Intelligerco beger io 18.a::0

10:210n ardinoally curiccoraslie

information fro. uctrra

on the acrillin. Of car 10B Eccord Jisf

and surve:llance inserto:dies:

Th..

tirino si this anforma lon

therefore appuars to li significant

1: aifitson to the overlap of

specifir de elis

dij of chiese sources, even

.scita bicond Chilet Diree-

parited ti decision to em-

corace1r.format1cai.g

phasiz: cs sacrlilit 1i

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 239

4-0000

m... H..

TOP SECRET

833

TOP SEGRE

---

## Page 240

4.00000

TOP SEORET

83k

sensitive

source (s)

c... ... aar.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 241

14-00000

TOP SECRET

835.

H. Evaluation

The corclusion tha: liniENtO 15 or a K'l l1i55100 could carry

danagarg implications lo: the imerica.

intelligence sources ano

have supported

ereir itatenents or NogrKo

car.

be convir.can..ly explair.ed

es annoter? repertsior of miginfor-

marion spread by tre tail within tne sovice corvices, Enese source:

might be conciuces io rave been celiberareiy misleading

PIOTioTOIS ce InfIr odt prirsonal interests or as parties

corspiracy.

¡egarding voLItin. tre opiniu: of ciA is tha: lie purpose-

fully gave

false suppore for HostilO in ar artemo. to make bus

opirions nore cuiroritative:

satisractory explana-

¿ins. for the remarks on NUENko bi did

hodtver, trere

seein to be no personai

support de costlo's bona fides mina tarr serve. The choice

thus seens lo l1t permeon intre enree viiicers being certine

sources of imerican irtelagenie

cut crold.1rg crannels of KG3

misinésrmation

arS, Oi the olner riard, one or more of them being

in

league with treNCh.

I'ne possibility tiis

are under

KJE carirol las

tested

THe NiSEiKO opera-

11cr ay reviedirg paralleis in erer

Triportirg ard his. and Cineral

correlations

that

27:6:21

rion ure case to anorror.

At the same

srom for compar-

Mas tO:nd

cirat would eliminate

then deland tron consaderation as possibly being

KGE proiocation agent=

This eximiration

against the conclüsion err NOSENKC is

#irto sErIous quEStIor.

ras brought tre pona tides of cluesent

mosesko is a disgatcred

ine NGB, these cther so-ices

reiin also to se.

TOP SE

---