## Page 1

157-10014-10100

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK Assassination System

Identification Form

Date:

7/7/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY:

RECORD NUMBER:

RECORD SERIES :

SSCIA

157-10014-10100

MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTTEE

AGENCY FILE NUMBER: 07-M-06

Document Information

ORIGINATOR:

FROM:

TO :

TITLE:

SSCIA

SCHWARZ, FREDERICK A.O. JR.

NOTES ON GORDON GRAY

DATE: 07/04/1975

PAGES: 72

SUBJECTS :

ASSASSINATIONS

CIA

TRUJILLO

LUMUMBA, PATRICE

GRAY, GORDON

DOCUMENT TYPE: REPORT

CLASSIFICATION: Declassified

RESTRICTIONS: 1B; 1C

CURRENT STATUS: Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 05/05/2000

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS : CCBOX 450

v9.1

70900

D001d: 32423468

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Date : 08/06/95

Page :

1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA

RECORD NUMBER

157-10014-10100

RECORDS SERIES

MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTTEE

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

07-M-06

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR

:

SSCIA

FROM

TO

SCHWARZ, FREDERICK A.O. JR.

TITLE : NOTES ON GORDON GRAY

DATE: 07/04/75

PAGES

• 72

SUBJECTS

: GRAY, GORDON

ASSASSINATIONS

TRUJILLO

LUMUMBA, PATRICE

CIA

DOCUMENT TYPE : REPORT

CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET

RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED

CURRENT STATUS : POSTPONED IN FULL

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 01/05/99

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : CCBOX 450

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

NH 50955

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50955

Bax458

GORDON GRAY

450-0

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## Page 4

Tobin Enk Files

From: Frederick

Re: Notes

Date:

7/4/75

GORDON GRAY

ROCKEFELLER COUMISSION TESTIMONY

Page

2262

Subject

Biographical background

2268

2272

2273

2273

2274

2275

2276

2278-9

2281

2292

2293

Opinions on PFIAB generally

Never heard of Executive Action

"I know of no plan, plot, operational organization that

ever came to President

Eisenhower with respect ao any.

assassinations, "HKH (2272-3)

In 1960, Eisenhower "approved a four point program, inho:

sabotage,

stepped up

economic sanctiong, propaganda,

and the

the training of Cuban refugees"

There was one an

"well known individual" on PFIAB

who would ask at each CIA briefing on Vietnam

"have you

considered trying to bump off some of the leaders in Nor

Vietnan". Phumükmunthruxm Gray says that "Agency polle!

was against assassination on the ground that it didn't

accomplish anything"

"I know of no (assassination) plan or operational

capability that has ever been authorized at any high

level of government!

Imintin At a meeting with Gray and a representative

of the CIA In 1958,

"the President told me that he vanter

the 54/12 gropp to pass upon all activities of this

government which impinged upon the sovereignty or the

people of

some other nation....President Eisenhower was

very sensitive to the necessity of having the top people

in government from the appropriate agencies pass upon

the widdom, and In some cases, feasibility of those

kinds of operations."

Gray is unenthusiastic about proposal for Joint Congress

al roversight committee because of danger of leake

Gray recommends creation of a "chief intelligence office:

(either the DCI or a Bpecial Aesist. to the Pres. for In

Gray did not recall Ambassador Farland's

1960 that dissidents in the Rom. Rep. wan

high powered rifles with telescopic scopess and subseque

to provide them by the Assist. Ser

of State through the DCI.

Gray did not recall Special Group meetings at end of Eis

hower Admin. (11/29/60; 1/12/61) at which it was agreed

furnish arms to dissidents in the Dom. Rep.

-"'I would think our concern was, if we had that kind of

concern, was with being of assistance to the dissidents,

and not

assasssination, or that kind of activity."

HH 50955

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## Page 5

ToEER Rak Files

From: Frederick Bal

Re:

Notes

on

Date: 7/4/75

GORDON GRAY

Page

2262

2268

2272

2273

ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION TESTIMONY

Subject

Biographical background

2273

2274

2275

2276

2278-9

2281

2292

2293

Opinions

on PFIAB generally

Never heard of Executive Action

"I know of no plan, plot,

operational organization that

ever came to President

Eisenhower with respect ao any

assassinations, "XHH (2272-3)

In

1960, Eisenhower "approved" a four

point program,

gabnt

sabotage, stepped up

economic

sanctions, propaganda,

and the the training of Cuban

refugeas"

There was one we "well known individual" on PFIAB

who would

ask at each CIA briefing on Vietnam "have you

considered

trying to bump off some of the leaders in North,

Vietnam"

• Them@hAmenthyxux Gray says

that

"Agency policy

was

against assassination on the ground that it didn't

accomplish anything"

"I know of no (assassination) plan or operational

capability that has

ever

been authorized

at any high

level of government!

Rneatien At a meeting with Gray and a representative

of the CIA in 1958,

"the President told

me that he wanted

the 54/12

gropp to pass upon all activities of this

government which impinged upon the sovereignty or the

people of

other nation....President Eisenhower was

very sensitive

to the necessity of having the top people

in government

from the appropriate agencies pass upon

the widdom, and

in some cases, feasibility of those

kinds of operations."

Gray is unenthusiastic about proposal for Joint Congression

al soversight committee because of danger of leake

Gray recommends creation of a "chief Intelligence officer"

(either the DCI or a Special Assist. to the Pres. for Int.)

FRUJIZZO:

Gray did not recall Ambassador Farland's

report

in May,

1960 that dissidents in the Rom. Rep. wanted!

high powered rifles with telescopic scopes and

subsequentl:

received

authorization to provide them by the Assist. Secy

of State through

the DCI.

Gray did not recall Special Group meetings at end of Eisen-

hower Admin. (11/29/60; 1/12/61) at which it was agreed to

furnish

arms to dissidents in the Dom. Rep..

--"I would think our concern was,

if we had that kind of

concern, was with being of assistance to the dissidents,

and

not assasssination, or that kind of activity."

NN 50955 Docid: 32423488

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## Page 6

Ruk

Files

From: Frederick

BaL

Re: Notes

0 n

Date: 7/4/75

GORDON GRAY

Page

2262

2268

2272

2273

ROCKEFELLER COUMISSION TESTIMONY

Subject

Biographical background

2273

2274

2275

2276

2278-9

2281

2292

2293

Opinions on PFIAB

generally

Never heard of Executive Action

"I know

ever

of no plan, plot lisenhower with respect

operational organization that

President

assassinations, "AKH (2272-3)

ao. any.

In 1960, Eisenhower "approved a four point program, sakat

sabotage,

stepped

up economic

sanctions, propaganda,

and the

the training of Cuban

refugeas"

There was one we "well known individual" on PFIAB

would ask at each CIA briefing on Vietnam "have you

considered trying to bump off some of the leaders in North

Vietnam". Sham&hkmanthanxna Gray says that "Agency policy

assassination on the ground that it didn't

accomplish anything"

"I know of no (assassination) plan or operational

capability that has

ever been authorized

at any high

level of

government!

Imes*ien At a meeting with Gray and a representative

of the CIA in 1958, "the President told

me that he wanted.

the 54/12 grOpp

to pass upon all activities of this

government which impinged upon the sovereignty or the

people of

some other nation....President Eisenhower was

very sensitive to the necessity of having the top peoplê

in government from the appropriate agencies pass

upon

the widdom,

and in some cases, feasibility of those

kinds of operations."

Gray is unenthusiastic about proposal for Joint Congression

al soversight committee because of danger of leake

Gray recommends creation of a "chief intelligence officer"..

(either the DOI

or a Special Assist. to the Pres. for Int.)

& FRU3766O: Gray did not recall Ambassador Farland's

report in May,

1960 that dissidents in the Rom. Rep. wanted*.

high powered rifles with telescopic scopesx

subsequenti

received

to provide them by the Assist. Secy

of State through the DCI.

Gray did not recall Special Group meetings at end

of Elsen-

hower Admin. (11/29/60; 1/12/61) at which it was agreed to

furnish arms to dissidents in the Dom. Rep.

--"I would think our

concern was, if we had that kind of

was with being

of assistance to the dissidents,

not assasssination, or that kind of activity."

HH 50955

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These documents were pulled from

Special Group file by John Bayly.

They should be replaced after we

xerox those minutes we intend to

exhibits for the Gray testimony.

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GORDON GRAY

Chronology and Issues

Biographical Background

1:1942-1947

1919-1950

U.S. Army (Private to Captain)

1950-1951

1951

1751-1955

1955

1958

" 1958-1961

1961-1975

Department of Army (ultimately Secretary

of the Army)

Special Assistant to President TRUMAN

Organized for TRUMAN the Psychological

Strategy Board, which involved close

contact with intelligence community

President, University of North Carolina

Assistant Secretary of Defense for

International Security Affairs (ISA)

Director, Office of Defense Mobilization

SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT (EISENHOWER)

FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS (Head of NSC)

Member, PFIAB (President's Foreign Intelli-

gence Advisory Board) appointed by JFK

Chronology of Events

1959.

November 4

Special Group discusses Allen DULLES' "Cuba

Propaganda Project" for use of radio trans-

mitters.

GRAY said "he was sure (the project

would meet with high level approval" provided

it was acceptable to the President of Mexico.

BARIN

July 8, 1975

OP SECRET

Issues and Questions

GRAY represents President EISENHOWER

at Special Group meetings.

• HW 50955

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1960 (Cont'd)

February 12

February 17

March 9

March 14

TOP SECRET

A "special" NSC meeting was held on this day:

The only record of this meeting in the NSC

minutes states: "On instructions from the

Executive Secretary no memorandum was written."

(NSC Minutes)

Special Group approves evaluation of agents

for Cuban sugar mill sabotage.

GRAY "discussed

this matter with his associate" (Eisenhower)

and reported two tactical objections.

(SG Minutes)

GRAY tells Special Group that any covert action

like sugar mill sabotage should be undertaken

only after overall consideration of "whether

and how the U.S. wishes to move against CASTRO."

(SG Minutes)

At an NSC meeting, Allen DULLES "reported that

a plan to affect the situation in Cuba was being

worked on.

Admiral BURKE suggested that any

plan for the removal of Cuban leaders should be

a package deal, since many of the leaders around

CASTRO were even worse than CASTRO." (NSC Minutes)

At a Special Group meeting, after a paper

titled "General Covert Action Plan for Cuba"

was read, there was "a general discussion as

to what would be the effect on the Cuban

scene if FIDEL and RAUL CASTRO. and CHE GUEVARA

should disappear simultaneously." (SG Minutes)

April 7

"GRAY asked the [Special] Group's views on what

rating Del out the Dominic

happens after TRUJILLO, specifically how CASTRO

Dominican Republic."

vention after TRUJILLO departs. (SG Minutes)

Issues and Questions

Why were no minutes written?

Does context show that phrase "his

associate" refers to President

EISENHOWER?

Did such consideration involve

assassination plotting?

Was this "package deal" the simultaneous

triple assassination plot. that was

mentioned on November 3, 1960?

Does this simultaneous disappearance

plan refer to assassination planning?

Is there a connection between this

Special Group discussion and the NSC

discussion on March 14, 1960, re a plan

to remove Cuban leaders?

Did U.S. support TRUJILLO'S opponents

out

of a desire to keep CASTRO out of the

Dominican Republic?

---

## Page 10

1960 (cont'd)

TOP SECRET

April 14

April 14

June 30

July 1

July 5.

At an NSC meeting presided over by Vice President

NIXON, Allen DULLES reported "TRUJILLO'S position

continued to weaken and was now quite precarious.

[he] thought further attempts will be made to kill

or oust TRUJILLO."

Under Secretary of State

DILLON said "if TRUJILLO could be removed' from

power in the Dominican Republic while pro-CASTRO

elements were prevented from seizing power

in that country, our anti-CASTRO campaign

throughout Latin America would receive a

great boost. The Vice President agreed that

getting rid of TRUJILLO would be a favorable

development for us."

(NSC Minutes)

Allen DULLES predicted at an NSC meeting, that

one possible outcome with respect to CASTRO

was an assassination that would make CASTRO

a martyr. (NSC Minutes)

GRAY says "the U.S. has taken publicly about

all that it can afford to take from the

CASTRO government." (SG Minutes)

Memo from the Chief of CIA's Western Hemis-

phere Division to the Acting DCI recommending

delivery of high-powered rifles with telescopic

scopes to the

opponents of TRUJILLO.

memo said:

"approval for delivery of these

arms has been given by ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF

STATE ROY RUBOTTOM."

President EISENHOWER met with Secretary of

State HERTER and others to discuss the

Dominican Republic.

"The President thought

we should knock out of any documents on file

any reference to starting a revolution."

(Conference Memorandum)

Issues and Questions

Were these U.S. attempts to kill TRUJILLO?

DILLON'S comment indicates that the U.S.

had an active interest in removing TRUJILL

What did NIXON mean by "getting TRUJILLO"? *

Does this show that assassination was not

a favored alternative because it would

produce martyrdom?

General atmosphere of vehement opposition

to CASTRO.

Was the Special Group aware of this action

Was the President aware of the plan?

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1960 (cont'd)

TOP SECRET

July 1

July 21

Allen DULLEs reported to the NSC that the

Venezuelan government wants, the United States

to lead the way in breaking relations with.

TRUJILLO.

DULLes stated: The Venezuelan

government was engaged in an all-out effort;

through the OAs and otherwise, to isolate,

condemn and cause the downfall of TRuJILLo.

[Because) they have convincing evidence that

TRUJILLo was responsible for the assassination

attempt on BETANCOURT [President of Venezuelal

... BETANCOURT believes another attempt will

be made momentarily and therefore it his

government] wants a showdown without delay.

(NSC Minutes)

"Mr. DULLES stated that he believes, and the

intelligence community agrees, that the

problem of TRUJILLO must be settled before the

problem of CASTRO can be dealt with, "even

though CASTRO is the greater threat.

(NSC Minutes)

The NSC Minutes further state that BETANCOURT

was told that the U.S. cannot act without

ascertaining TRUJILLO'S successor.

will work with BETANCOURT and FIGUERES of

Costa Rica on suggestions for a successor to

TRUJILLO.

President EISENHOWER suggested that

a government in exile should be ready to go

into the Dominican Republic in the event of

TRUJILLO'S downfall. (NSC Minutes)

GRAY said "his associates" would favor the

development of sabotage operations in CUBA.

(SG Minutes)

Issues and Questions

The U.S. was under pressure to move

against TRUJILLO.

Did TRUJILLO'S attempt against BETANCOURT

make him "fair game" for assassination in

the eyes of OAS nations including the U.S.

Did the U.S. determine

Did the U.S. "act"?

successor?

"Associate" is the euphemism for Eisen-

hower.

Does sabotage imply the further steps

of assassination?

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1960 (cont'd)

SERIEN

July 20

August 12

August 16

August 25

August

(approx)

President EISENHOWER stated at an NSC meeting:

"Until TRUJILLO is eliminated, we cannot get

our Latin American friends to reach a proper

level of indignation in dealing with CASTRO."

In this regard, "the President said if we

attempted to take any action with respect to

Cuba before settling the TRUJILLO situation,

we would be the loser."

(NSC Minutes)

BISSELL outlines 13.3 million dollar budget

for Cuban operations which was to be laid

before "higher authorities" for decision.

(SG Minutes)

Dr. Edward GUNN (CIA Office of Medical

Services, receives box of Cuban cigars to

be treated with lethal poison for use against

CASTRO. (IG REPORT p. 21)

After the Special Group approved anti-LUMUMBA

operations in the Congo, "GRAY commented,

however, that his associates had expressed

extremely strong feelings on the necessity for

very straightforward action in this situation,

and he wondered whether the plans as outlined

would be sufficient to accomplish this .... It

was finally agreed that planning for the Congo

would not necessarily rule out 'consideration'

of any particular kind of activity which

might contribute to getting rid of LUMUMBA."

(SG Minutes; emphasis added)

At the NSC meeting, Mr. STANS suggested that

the U.S. might "throw out LUMUMBA by peaceful

means."

(NSC Minutes)

BISSELL asks EDWARDS to find underworld contacts

with Cuba to aid in an assassination operation

Issues and Questions

Does "elimination" mean "assassination"?

Were EISENHOWER, GRAY, OF DCI DULLES

aware of this?

Is this circumlocutious order for

assassination from the President?

indication that at the least, assassina-

tion was within the range of

acceptable

means for "getting rid of LUMUMBA"?

aware of this?

HH

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1960 (cont'd

September 8

September 21

October 24

November 3

TOP SECRET

During brief discussion of CONGO developments,

"GRAY said that he hoped that Agency people in

the field are fully aware of the top-level

feeling in Washington that vigorous action would

not be amiss."

(SG Minutes; emphasis added)

Allen DULLES stated at an NSC meeting that

"LUMUMBA was not disposed of and remained a

great danger as long as he was not disposed

of."

(NSC Minutes)

At an NSC meeting, Allen DULLES reported

that "five Congolese soldiers had attempted

to assassinate MOBUTO on the 15th of

October. The U.S. had prior information

of this attempt and had warned MOBUTO . . .

(NSC Minutes)

At & Special Group meeting, Mr. MERCHANT

"asked whether any real planning has been done

in taking direct positive action against FIDEL,

RAUL and CHE GUEVARA.

He said that without

these three the Cuban government would be

Leaderless and probably brainless. He

conceded

that it would be necessary to act against all

three simultaneously."

The minutes further state:

"General CABELL

pointed out that action of this kind is

uncertain of results and highly dangerous

in conception and execution, because the

instruments must be Cuban. He felt that,

particularly because.of the necessity of

simultaneous action, it would have to be

concluded that Mr. MERCHANT'S suggestion is

beyond our capabilities." (SG Minutes)

Issues and Questions.

Against LUMUMBA personally?

Did the NSC contemplate "disposing of"

LUMUMBA by assassination?

Did. this information prompt the U.s.

to plot the assassination of LUMUMBA

in retaliation or to protect MOBUTO?

Was MERCHANT referring to an assassina-

tion of Cuban leaders?

Shortly before this, CIA had made the

assassination contract with the Mafia.

Was General CABELL unaware of this CIA

contract? Was General CABELL expressing

a traditional CIA objection to assassina-

tion proposals? If so, on what other

occasion did Mr. GRAY hear the CIA

objection?

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1960 (cont'a)

December 29

1951.

January 12

Late Jan.-

Early Feb.

TOP

rii!

At a Special Group meeting, Mr. BISSELL gave

the broad outlines of a two-pronged plan

for proceeding with certain limited covent

activities directed against the TRUJILLO

regime, but "he also emphasized that the

proposed actions would not of themselves

bring about the desired result in the near

future, lacking some decisive stroke against

TRUJILLO himself."

(SG Minutes) (Source:

Minutes, December 29, 1960, by I. Parrott,

of Special Group Meeting, December 29, 1960,

02752)

Special Group approves the State Department

proposal explained by MERCHANT "that limited

supplies of small arms and other material

should be made available for dissidents inside

the DOMINICAN REPUBLIC." (SG Minutes;

emphasis added

DDP BISSELL asks William HARVEY to establish

an EXECUTIVE ACTION capability under project

ZRRIFLE. HARVEY'S notes are quoted as saying

that BISSELL said he had been "twice urged by

the White House" to establish such a

capability, including the capability to assassina-

ate political leaders.

Issues and Questions

TRUJILLO was assassinated on May 30,.

1961.

Did Mr. BISSELL or the Special Group

propose to approve aiding Dominicans

who might assassinate TRUJILLO to

effect such a "decisive stroke"?

Were these assassination-type weapons?

If not, was this Special Group action

used as implicit authority for sub-

sequent provision of weapons for the.

assassination of TRUJILLO?

Was the EXECUTIVE ACTION project initiated

or authorized during the EISENHOWER Adminis

tration?

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GORDON GRAY: Short Summary

Gordon Gray was Special Assistant to the President for National Security

Affairs from 1958-1961. During this period Gray represented President

EISENHOWER at Special Group meetings at which the following subjects

were discussed:

"any particular kind of activity which might contribute

to getting rid of LUMUMBA"; provision of small arms to opponents to

TRUJILLO in the Dominican Republic; and detailed planning for "how the

U. S. wishes to move against CASTRO"..

Gray's testimony should involve the following questions (see attached

list of exhibits) :

CASTRO

1. What was Admiral Burke referring to at the March 14, 1960, NSC meet-

ing when he spoke of "a plan for the removal of Cuban leaders should

be a package deal"? (Exhibit at Tab E)

2. Is there a connection between the plan referred to by Admiral Burke

at the March 14 NSC meeting and the discussion at the March 14

Special Group meeting on the "effect on the Cuban scene if Fidel and

Raoul Castro and Che Guevara should disappear simultaneously"?

(Exhibit at Tab F)

3. Were President Eisenhower or Mr. Gray aware that on August 16, 1960,

the CIA Office of Medical Services received a box of Cuban cigars to

be treated with poison for use against Castro? (Exhibit at Tab O)

4. Were President Eisenhower or Mr. Gray aware that in August 1960

Bissell asked Edwards to find underworld contacts with Cuba for an

assassination mission? (Exhibit at Tab R)

5. At the November 3, 1960, Special Group meeting, was Mr. Merchant

referring to planning for assassination when he asked whether plan-

ning had been done "in taking direct positive action against Fidel,

Raoul, and Che Guevara"? How does General Cabell's response (that

Merchant's suggestion "is beyond our capabilities") square with the

fact that shortly before November 1960 the CIA had made contact with

the Mafia for a Castro assassination effort? (Exhibit at Tab V)

TRUJILLO

1.

Was Vice President Nixon referring to assassination at the April 14,

1960, NSC meeting when he said "getting rid of Trujillo would be a

favorable development"? (Exhibit at Tab H)

AW 50955 DocId: 32423488 Page. 15 =

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- 2 -

2. Was the Special Group, Mr. Gray, or President Eisenhower aware that

Assistant Secretary of State Rubottom was reported, on July 1, 1960,

by the CIA Western Hemisphere Division Chief to have approved delivery

of high-powered rifles with telescopic sights to Trujillo opponents?

(Exhibit at Tab YZ)

3.

When President Eisenhower was reported at the July 28, 1960, NSC meet-

ing to have said that "until Trujillo is eliminated ...", was he

referring to an assassination? (Exhibit at Tab M)

4. On January 12, 1961, the Special Group approved making available

"small arms" to dissidents in the Dominican Republic.

Were these

assassination-type weapons such as the rifles with telescopic sights

referred to in Exhibit at Tab YZ? (Exhibit at Tab X re January 12

meeting)

5.

Did the attempts by Trujillo to assassinate President Betancourt of

Venezuela prompt the Special Group to favor supplying arms to Dominican

dissidents who might try to assassinate Trujillo? (Exhibit at Tab K)

LUMUMBA

1. When Mr. Gray commented at the August 25, 1960, Special Group meeting

that "his associates had expressed extremely strong feelings on the

necessity for very straight-forward action", was he referring to

assassination? Do Mr. Dulles' reservations indicate that he was

objecting to a suggested assassination? (Exhibit at Tab P)

2. When Mr. Gray said at the Special Group meeting on September 8, 1960,

that "he hoped that agency people in the field are fully aware of the

top level feeling in Washington that vigorous action would not be

amiss", was he referring to assassination of Lumumba? (Exhibit at

Tab S)

COMMAND and CONTROL

What was the command and control system for covert action operations

in the Eisenhower Administration?

Pertinent Relationships

President Eisenhower

DCI Allen Dulles

DDP Richard Bissell

Gray was the President's liaison to the

intelligence community and the National

Security Council (including the Special

Group) •

Gray met with Dulles in the Special Group.

Gray knew Bissell well. Bissell initiated

the CIA-Gambling Syndicate plot to assassinate

Castro and the Executive Action capability.

FB/RKK

7/8/75

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## Page 17

TO: Fritz Schwarz and Curt Smothers

FROM: Frederick Baron

DATE: July 6, 1975

SECRET

GORDON GRAY: SHORT SUMMARY

Gordon Gray was Special Assistant to the President for Natonal Security

Affairs from 1958-61. During this period Gray represented President EISENHOWER

at Special Group meetings at which the following subjects were discussed:

any particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of

LUMUMBA;" provision of small arms to opponents of TRUJILLO in the Dominican

Republic; and detailed planning for "how the U.S. wishes to move against CASTRO"

Gray's testimony should involve the following questions:

- Did any of the Special Group meetings implicitly or

explicitly contemplate or plan assassination attempts

against LUMUMBA, TRUJILLO, or CASTRO?

- To what extent were CIA plans against these leaders

authorized by or made known to President EISENHOWER,

Gordon GRAY, DCI Allen DULLES, or the Special Group as a whole?

- What were the general command & control practices?

Questioning of Gray should focus upon the following documents:

- Special Group Minutes, November 3, 1960.

- Special Group Minutes, August 25, 1960.

-.

Memorandum of July 1, 1960 from J. C. King, Chief, Western Hemisphere

Division to the Acting DCI.

- Minutes of the Special Group of January 12, 1961.

PERTINENT RELATIONSHIPS

President Eisenhower

DCI Allen Dulles

DDP Richard Bissell

President Truman

Livingston Merchant

Gray was the President's liaison to the

intelligence community and the National

Security Council (including the Special Group).

Gray met with Dulles in the Special Group.

Gray knew Bissell well. Bissell initiated the

CIA-Gambling Syndicate plot to assassinate CASTRO

and the EXECUTIVE

ACTION capability.

Gray was Secretary of the Army and

Special Assistant to the President

Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs

representing the State Department at Special

Group meetings.

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EXHIBITS FOR THE EXAMINATION OF GORDON GRAY

Castro*

Special Group Minutes, November 3, 1960.

Special Group Minutes, August 12, 1960.

Lumumba

Special Group Minutes, August 25, 1960.

Special Group Minutes, September 8, 1960.

Trujillo

Memorandum of July 1, 1960 from J. C. King, Chief,

Western Hemisphere Division to the Acting DCI.

Minutes of the Special Group of December 29, 1960.

Minutes of the Special Group of January 12, 1961.

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3 November 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 3 November 1960

PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Nouglas, Gray, Gen. Cabell,

Gen. Lansdale

1. Cuba

Mr. Gray inquired once more as to the status of planning for

problems which would arise post-Castro.

Mr.. Merchant said he

would check into the progress of the State Department group which

has been charged with developing recommendations on this matter.

From this the Group launched into a far-ranging discussion of

the entire concept of U.S. efforts against Castro. MI. Douglas,

supported by Mr. Gray and Mr. Merchant, expounded ine idea that

perhaps things have now progressed to a point where covert activities

of the type originally envisaged for ClA to undertake will not be effective.

MI. Douglas referred to the extensive program of the militia, Mi. Gray

cited the matter of arms from the Soviet bloc, and MI. Merchant dwelt

on the increasing effectiveness of Castro's measures to control the

population in ways which the Communists have developed so weil. The

latter said that he and others in the State Department had originally

thought that a popular rebellion would develop within Cuba and that

this could be augmented by the comparatively small-scale efforts of

exiles under CIA control. Now the same people are beginning to feel

more and more that despite the numerous defections and the economic

deprivations being experienced by the middle and upper classes, time

is actually working on Castro's side.

Mr. Merchant said that he

foresaw that there would occur a point in time beyond which covert

intervention would not do the job.

Mr. Gray expressed the opinion that we will never be able to

"clean up" the situation without the use of overt U.S. military force.

He suggested the possibility of using the ClA-backed exiles to mount a

simulated attack on Guantanamo in order to offer an excuse for overt

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Lead Lodid tidin

intervention. This led to an involved discussion, the general conclusion

of which was that such action on our part would not be desirable, but

that should Castro be foolish enough actually to attack Guantanamo

this would almost certainly mean war. Mr. Gray said that he had had

the subject of Cuba inscribed on the NSC agenda for next Monday in

order to be able to arrive at a top-level decision on this very point.

He thought it essential that the policy of the U.S. should be completely

understood by responsible officials, so that any overt Cuban act would

be met with a previously-agreed-on response.

Mr. Merchant stated thai, apart from any attack on Guantanamo,

he thought that some of the previous argumentation in today's meeting

was faulty, in that we could not have it both ways. By this he meant

thit it is not logical to conclude that an indigenous uprising is impossible

and yet that it is feasible for the U.S. to go in overtly and "clean up

the mess. " He pointed out that if Castro's support were such that an

uprising was out of the question then an open invasion by the U.S. would

be met by a hostile population and we would be plunged into a situation

like Algeria.

Turning to the immediate problem before the Group, Gen. Cabell

outlined the general proposal to establish bases in the U.S., with the

reasons for coming to this conclusion. He cited specifically the

possibility of U.N. investigation in Guatemala and the increased scope

of the program, which has been brought about by the increased strength

of the Castro regime. All members of the Group expressed serious

doubts as to whether such activity could be kept at all secure. MI.

Merchant said at one point, that although this does not represent a

final conclusion on his part, he is inclined to think that the proposal

embodies the worst aspect of both worlds; that is, the choice should

rest between continuing our operations entirely on foreign soil of

preparing to make the best possible case for overt intervention.

MI. Gray suggested that the decision could be put up to his

associates at the same time Tibet is discussed. Mr. Merchant agreed

that this is where it should end up, but asserted that he is not prepared

to move in that direction until a survey has been made of the possibilities

of keeping operations in the U.S. unrevealed.

In this connection Gen. Cabell mentioned the possibility of using

a refugee organization - either an existing one or a contrived onc - to

backstop the operations.

2

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MI. Douglas said that in any case he would be prepared to have

the Department of Defense investigate the availability of specific

locations that would be suitable.

Finally, Mr. Merchant asked whether any real planning has been

done for taking direct positive action against Fidel, Raul and Che Guevara.

He said that without these three the Cuban Government would be

leaderless and probably brainless.

He conceded that it would be

i.

necessary to act against all three simultereously. Gen. Cabell pointed

out that action of this kind is unsertain of results and highly dangerous

in conception and execution, because the instruments must be Cubans.

He felt that, particularly because of the necessity of simultaneous

action, it would have to be concluded that MI. Merchant's suggestion

is hevanil nur ranahilitias.

12.61

SENTER - EIDS CALY

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M4. Supply Drops - Cuba

Gen. Cabell explained that the Pinar de Rio supply mission had

not taken place because of the absence of specified communication

from the DZ, and the Escambray operation had been canceled because

of weather. He said that these missions are still planned, and assumed

that the Group had no objections. The members so signified.

V5. .U-2, Cuba

Gen. Cabell said that the photographic coverage on the first

flight had been only about 50%, because of cloud cover. He continued

that we are analyzing the exact results on a priority basis and that

some time after the middle of next week we should be in a position to

make recommendations for the missions required to extend the coverage.

Mr. Gray commented somewhat wryly that this was all right with

him since he "would certainly not be available to discuss anything of

this kind before the middle of next week. " The other members appeared

to have the same reaction.

6. Policy Consideration Re Cuban Exiles

MI. Gray

said that Assistant Attorney General Yeagley had spoken

to him after his meeting with Col. King and Messrs. Esterline and

Holman. He had said that the information given to him by the CLA

representatives, and the arrangements for future coordination if

necessary, were entirely satisfactory to him. He had stated, however,

that a problem remains with respect to action the FBI should take;

that is, the FBI needs guidance in its handling of Cuban exile groups

other than those under the direction of CIA.

The Group agreed that the best way to attack this problem would

be to have Mr. Yeagley attend next week's Special Group meeting and

discuss the matter at first hand. Mr. Parrott was asked to make

arrangements for this.

7.

Value of Cuba to the USSR as a Base Vis-a-vis

Cape Canaveral

MI. Parrott gave Mr. Merchant the gist of the OSI memorandum

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on this subject, which had been discussed with the rest of the Group

on 20 October 1960.

LaParratt

as

THOMAS A. PARROTT

02367

5

SIGRET - DIES CALY

it want to de

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SECRET

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15 ang60

12 August 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting - 11 August 1960

PRESENT: Messrs, Merchant, Gray, Dulles, and Bissell

X03-23 C17

2.

Budget for Cuban Opcrations: Mr. Bissell summarized tie

budget which had been prepared as a basis for seeking a release trom the

Reserve to finance Cuban operations for the balance of the fiscal year.

The budget for the year totals approximately thirten and a quarter million

dollars, not including provision for the replacement of material with an

estimated value of 1. 6 million dollars to be withdrawn from Agency

inventory. Since 2.5 million dollars of budgeted and Reserve funds have

been made available for this program by an earlier action, the balance

required is about ten and three quarters million dollars. Mr. Dulles

stated that a release of ten million would be requested at this time since

there is inevitably a wide margin of uncertainty as to what the actual costs

will turn out to be. Mr. Bissell stated the amounts required by major

sub-headings as follows:

Political Action

Propaganda

Paramilitary

Intelligence Collection

Counter Intelligence

Communications Support

support

$

$

960, 000.00

2, 152, 120,00

8,055,753.00

833,200.00

325.400.00

229,420.00

731,713.00

13,287.011.00

Total

PROPLIT:

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-2-

It was agreed that the operations in question must go forward and that

the amount did not seem unreasonable for activities of this scope and

scale but it was understood that Mesars. Merchant and Gray could not

state that they had reviewed in any detail the manner in which the

estimates had been arrived at. Following further discussion, it was

agreed that this matter should be laid before the appropriate higher

authorities and a presentation would be arranged hopefully within the

next ten days. This was believed to be wise, not because any actions

involving major political risks were to be taken in the near future, but

because the Agency would soon become committed to various gubstantial

expenditures which should not be undertaken without reasonable assurance

that the operation was to go forward.

Kil and 1u Ruell

RICHARD M. DISSELL, JR.

Deputy Director

(Plans)

EYES ONLY

SECRET

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SEGMET

-x-3

DOT C.3272)

ER: 0-5997

1 7a15 9950

Mar3uzDud 8038 doting Discotor of Central Intolligonce

VI4:

Depity Diroctor (Plans)

SUBJECTS

Clandestina iulivery of trag to Oppoaltion Lasicronip

20a tho Dentalcan Mapublio.

do Mis resorerdus racamanda actloa ly the icilna Dircctor of

Central Intalligence, duck sucatchiaion 10 contained 1n para Se

2o va1lo intansador l'arland use in too Daanicen ispublic, a pris

agal Icada of to oppocitian inquosiod that a lialtod mator of arso bo

nado amilablo buich could bo usai lo ircaipateto tia overtlirow of to

regina of careral infied Loaniasa iru,j1110.

Tess sins grasuadly would

ba used aguinat lay nonboro of the irujillo sugina.

unstablo duo to soilag oppoaltion vitala tho profechional and sidilo

alaonon to the execasas di tho dictatorallu. colilical opprocolon of

thoso dougs has traucht about surcoly suciucó roliciona badason tho

Catholic Church and to Inuillo regio, cost tunlocgoablo sourcon Lare

buan prodiang tast the fall of to rectro 1a lancat.

Sinco die fall of tho irujillo serus unrosio Inevitablo, la to the

Intercat al tia laù. liat our ralationa tita lio apposition bo as close

an ponalula, tortilis to area as requestal sould cartiliato algulfI-

cently tovard this croo

3o It is proposod to procure and dalfver to undaritour opposition

Parcoo In the intrican republle treito (12) sterilo lad. riiles, ibdol

1903 (ringfleld), with telesconio sighto, together uit liva lunired

(50U) Inuda of Inition to saso, iras and minition aro Icollitely

avallablo at 10ri dopots Apprazinato cost 1o 12100. It 10 placial to

collver thora mayono by sis timich lii locilitios providad crargamosts

can to varied out leth tho opposition for tole rosestion. if licy carrot

lo caliverad ly ai, plana aro curreatly boing strici 1n tha lA stail for

CallvEry by 001.

le horoval la dolivery of theo ares han boon alvan bo hasistent 1/

SocrOirty ol vista iot iubation, boo requerto tbit tho cas lo placed is

the lunds or tho opposition at the carliost posaiblo rareat.

02280

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SECRET

Pass to

5. It is recorandod that the opposttica 15 tha Dadrican Repabllo

Chior -

lestern Lendaghero Divinlon

00!

DOCI

CCICURI

baputy isractor

(L'lans)

Date

Tre recamendation containod 1a

paragra s 5 11 apprOTOdE

CiSKED

Director oi leatial dalelllicaco

Diato

? JUL JASO

8k1b (1 5uJ 60)

Distribution:

Orig & 1 - Addressee

1

DDCI

1 a COPS

C/WED

FROPERTY OF

THE SHUTE MOUSE OFFICE

SECRET

02230

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29 December 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

-

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Mecting, 29 December 1960

PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Douglas, Gray, Dulles, Bissell

Air Drops - Cuba

Mr. Bissell notified the Group of plans for five supply drops in

the next three days.

5.

Dominican Republic

Mr. Bissell gave the broad outlines of a tvo-pronged plan for

proceeding ivith certain limited covert activities directed against the

Trujillo regime. He emphasized that although support would be given

to the Figueres group: there is no intention of establishing a para-

military force as such, since this would be impractical in view of

requirements for Cuba. He also emphasized that the proposed actions

would not of themselves bring about the desired result in the near future,

lacking some decisive stroke against Trujillo himself.

The Group agreed with the proposal as outlined and felt that it

should be mentioned at the Tuesday meeting.

It was noted that

Mr. Pawley feels that overt intervention in the Dominican Republic

should be mounted simultaneously with the Cuban operation.

The

consensus of the Group was that this would not be entirely consistent.

However, it was agreed that the plan is worth beginning at this time

no matter what the eventual decision on overt intervention may be.

to. Cuba

Mr. Merchant reported a brief conversation he had had with

Mr. Gray's associates this morning. The latter had made two points:

(a) it would be desirable to obtain the cooperation and support of

individual Latin American governments, (b) it would be desirable, ii

possible, for the U.S. to break relations with Cuba, in concert with

other countries, some time before January 20th.

2

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12 January 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 12 January 1961

PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Gray, Irwin, Dulles

13. Delegation from the 'Cuban Democratic Revolutionary Eroat

Mr. Dulles reported the information Icceived from General

Goodpaster to the effect that a large delegation from the above-mentioned

group, reportedly. will visit Washington on Saturday.

* 5.

Contingency Planning for Cuba

MI. Willauer outlined a proposal to establish a task force

consisting of representatives of State, CIA, Defense and the Joint Staff

to draw up contingency plans covering the possible eventual use of

overt U.S. forces.

All members agreed that such planning is an essential step.

Mr. Gray asked that a preliminary report of the task force be available

for the meeting of January 19th.

• 02/07

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Capture of Supplies in Cuba

In answer to a question, Mr. Barnes gave details of the Cuban

government's capture of materiel from two airdrops plus one cache.

THIS DOSCRAT IS

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19. Dominican Republic

MI. Merchant explained the feeling of the Department of State

that limited supplics of small arms and other matericl should be made

available for dissidents inside the Dominican Republic. Mr. Parrott

said that we believe this can be managed securely by CLA, and that

the plan would call for final transportation into the country being

provided by the dissidents themselves. The Group approved the project.

V11. U-2 Flights - Victnam

Mr. Dulles and Mr. Parrott outlined generally the results of the

three successful IJ-2 Llights.over Vietnam, noting that Hanoi had not

been.covered because of clouds, and that it is planned to fly a mission

to cover that arca as soon as the weather permits.

The Group agreed that no such flight should take place after

January 20th. They also requested a brief memo summarizing rcsuits,

for the meeting of the 19th.

09:1

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3 November 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 3 November 1960

PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Douglas, Gray, Gen. Cabell,

Gen. Lansdale

1. Cuba

Mr. Gray inquired once more as to the status of planning for

problems which would arise post-Castro. Mr. Merchant said be

would check into the progress of the State Department group which

has been charged with developing recommendations on this matter.

From this the Group launched into a far-ranging discussion of

the entire concept oi U.S. efforts against Castro. Mr. Douglas,

supported by Mr. Gray and Mr. Merchant, expounded the idea that

perhaps things have now progressed to a point where covert activities

of the type originally envisaged for CIA to undertake will not be effective.

Mr. Douglas referred to the extensive program of the militia, Mi. Gray

cited the matter of arms from the Soviet bloc, and Mr. Merchant dwelt

on the increasing effectiveness of Castro's measures to control the

population in ways which the Communists have developed so well. The

latter said that he and others in the State Department had originally

thought that a popular rebellion would develop within Cuba and that

this could be augmented by the comparatively small-scale efforts of

exiles under CIA control. Now the same people are beginning to feel

more and more that despite the numerous defections and the economic

deprivations being experienced by the middle and upper classes, time

is actually working on Castro's side. MI. Merchant said that he

foresaw that there would occur a point in time beyond which covert

intervention would not do the job.

Mr. Gray expressed the opinion that we will never be able to

"clean up" the situation without the use of overt U.S. military force.

He suggested the possibility of using the ClA-backed exiles to mount a

simulated attack on Guantanamo in order to offer an excuse for overt

IRO COCAINE IS

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intervention. This led to an involved discussion, the general conclusion

of which was that such action on our part would not be desirable, but

that should Castro be foolish enough actually to attack Guantanamo

this would almost certainly mean war. Mr. Gray said that he had had

the subject of Cuba inscribed on the NSC agenda for next Monday in

order to be able to arrive at a top-level decision on this very point.

- He thought it essential that the policy of the U.S. should be completely

understood by responsible officials, so that any overt Cuban act would

be met with a previously-agreed-on response.

MI. Merchant stated thai, apart from any attack on Guantanamo,

he thought that some of the previous argumentation in today's meeting

was faulty, in that we could not have it both ways. By this he meant

that it is not logical to conclude that an indigenous uprising is impossible

and yet that it is feasible for the U.S. to go in overtly and "clean up

the mess." He pointed out that if Castro's support were such that an

uprising was out of the question then an open invasion by the U.S. would

be met by a hostile population and we would be plunged into a situation

like Algeria.

Turning to the immediate problem before the Group, Gen. Cabell

outlined the general proposal to establish bases in the U.S., with the

reasons for coming to this conclusion.

He cited specifically the

possibility of U. N. investigation in Guatemala and the increased scope

of the program, which has been brought about by the increased strength

of the Castio regime. All members of the Group expressed serious

doubts as to whether such activity could be kept at all secure. Mr.

Merchant said at one point, that although this does not represent a

final conclusion on his part, he is inclined to think that the proposal

embodies the worst aspect of both worlds; that is, the choice should

rest between continuing our operations entirely on foreign soil or

preparing to make the best possible case for overt intervention.

Mr. Gray suggested that the decision could be put up to his

associates at the same time Tibet is discussed. Mr. Merchant agreed

that this is where it should end up, but asserted that he is not prepared

to move in that direction until a survey has been made of the possibilities

of keeping operations in the U.S. unrevealed.

In this connection Gen. Cabell mentioned the possibility of using

a refugee organization - either an existing one or a contrived one - to

backstop the operations.

2

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Mi. Douglas said that in any case he would be prepared to have.

the Department of Defense investigate the availability of specific

locations that would be suitable.

Finally, Mr. Merchant asked whether any real planning has been

done for taking direct positive action against Fidel, Raul and Che Guevara.

"He said that without these three the Cuban Government would be

leaderless and probably brainless. He conceded that it would be

necessary to act against all three

simultaneously: Gen. Cabell pointed

out that action of this kind is uncertain of results and highly dangerous

in conception and execution, because the instruments must be Cubans.

He felt that, particularly because of the necessity of simultaneous

action, it would have to be concluded that Mr. Merchant's suggestion

is havand nur canahilitias.

63:05

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11

14. Supply Drops - Cuba

Gen. Cabell explained that the Pinar de Rio supply mission had

not taken place because of the absence of specified communication

from the DZ, and the Escambray operation had been canceled because

of weather. He said that these missions are still planned, and assumed

that the Group had no objections. The members so signified.

v5. U-2, Cuba

Gen. Cabell said that the photographic coverage on the first

flight had been only about 50%, because of cloud cover. He continued

that we are analyzing the exact results on a priority basis and that

some time after the middle of next week we should be in a position to

make recommendations for the missions required to extend the coverage.

Mr. Gray commented somewhat wryly that this was all right with

him since he "would certainly not be available to discuss anything of

this kind before the middle of next week. " The other members appeared

to have the same reaction.

V6. Policy Consideration Re Cuban Exiles

Mr. Gray said that Assistant Attorney General Yeagley had spoken

to him after his meeting with Col. King and MessIs. Esterline and

Holman. He had said that the information given to him by the ClA

representatives, and the arrangements for future coordination if

necessary, were entirely satisfactory to him. He had stated, however,

that a problem remains with respect to action the FBI should take;

that is, the FBI needs guidance in its handling of Cuban exile groups

other than those under the direction of CIA.

The Group agreed that the best way to attack this problem would

be to have Mr. Yeagley attend next week's Special Group meeting and

discuss the matter at first hand. Mr. Parrott was asked to make

arrangements for this.

7.

Value of Cuba to the USSR as a Base Vis-a-vis

Cape Canaveral

Mr. Parrott gave Mr. Merchant the gist of the OSI memorandum

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on this subject, which bad been discussed with the rest of the Group

on 20 October 1960.

LaParratt

as

THOMAS A. PARROTT

09

5

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SECRET

EYES ONLY

15 augo

12 August 1960.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting - 11 August 1960

PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Gray, Dulles, and Bissell

4021-D3 CA

2. Budget for Cuban Operations: Mi. Bissell summarized the

budget which had been prepared as a basis for seeking a release trom the

Reserve to finance Cuban operations for the balance of the fiscal year.

The budget for the year totals approximately thirteen and a quarter million

dollars, not including provision for the replacement of material with an

estimated value of 1. 6 million dollars to be withdrawn from Agency

inventory. Since 2.5 million dollars of budgeted and Reserve funds have

been made available for this program by an earlier action, the balance

required is about ten and three-quarters million dollars. Mr. Dulles

stated that a release of ten million would be requested at this time since

there is inevitably a wide margin of uncertainty as to what the actual costs

• will turn out to be. Mi. Bissell stated the amounts required by major

sub-headings as follows:

Political Action

Propaganda

Paramilitary

Intelligence Collection

Counter Intelligence

Communications Support

Support

1030

960,000.00

2,152,120.00

8,055,753.00

833,200.00

325,400.00

229,420.00

731,718.00

$

13,287,611.00

Total

PROPELT: -

THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

EYES ONLY

SEGRET

THIS DOCUMENT IS

A SUDE.C

103

IN CS

PAPLI! 12

230

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SECRET

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-2-

It was agreed that the operations in question must go forward and that

the amount did not seem unreasonable for activities of this scope and

scale but it was understood that Mesars. Merchant and Gray could not

state that they had reviewed in any detail the manner in which the

estimates had been arrived at. Following further discussion, it was

agreed that this matter should be laid before the appropriate higher

authorities and a presentation would be arranged hopefully within the

next ten days. This was believed to be wise, not because any actions

involving major political risks were to be taken in the near future, but

because the Agency would soon become committed to various substantial

expenditures which

should not be undertaken without reasonable assurance

that the operation was to go forward.

Kel and Tu. Wisell

RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR.

Deputy Director

(Plans)

09002

EYES ONLY

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SE BET - EXES ONLY

25 August 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 25 August 1960

PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Gray, Irwin, Dulles

1. Congo

Mr. Parrott outlined broadly three (or as Mr. Dulles later

described them "2 1/2"') operational lines that we are following in

mounting an anti-Lumumba campaign in the Congo. These included:

operations through the chief advisor of the Christian Irade Unions;

the planned attempt of a Socialist labor Senator to arrange a vote of

no confidence in Lumumba; and a brand new contact with an alieged

leader of certain independent labor groups. He emphasized that the

latter had just come up and that we are now in the process of assessing

the bona fides and capabilities of the individual.

The Group agreed that the action contemplated is very much

in order. Mr. Gray commented, however, that his associates bad

expressed extremely strong feelings on the necessity for very

straightforward action in this situation, and he wondered whether

the plans as outlined were sufficient to accomplish this. Mr. Dulles

replied that he had taken the comments referred to seriously and had

every intention of proceeding as vigorously as the situation permits

or requires, but added that he must necessarily put himself in a

position of interpreting instructions of this kind within the bounds of

necessity and capability. It was finally agreed that, planning for the

Congo would not necessarily rule out "consideration" of any particular

kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba.

Mr. Irwin commented that certain individuals in Defense have

given thought to the possibility of using high officials of the Catholic

Church in Africa to promote the general objectives of the West. In

this connection, he cited a preliminary assessment which had been

made of the Negro Cardinal recently appointed by the Pope - the

assessment being that the individual in question is a man of not

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outstanding intelligence, ability or drive, but that he is obviously

well motivated. Mr. Irwin asked whether there might be other

individuals of similar, although naturally lesser, stature in the church

hierarchy who could be useful.

Mr. Merchant commented that the Catholic Church in Black

Africa is not a very substantial force. Mr. Dulles

concurred in this,

but added that this would be something to keep in mind as appropriate.

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SECTER - DUS COUV

V4. Cuba

The DCI summarized the progress we have made in establishing

contact with certain dissident groups within Cuba. In this connection

he also noted the apparent fulfillment of a sabotage requirement which

had been levied on one of these groups as a test of its capabilities

(after this action had been cleared with the Special Group).

2. He also said that we hope to have a paramilitary force of

approximately 500 people ready to operate by November. In answer

to Mr. Irwin's question, he outlined two possible ways of initiating

the tactical combat phase.

Mr. Gray then told the Group of a talk he had had with the

Director of the Bureau of the Budget. The latter had told Mr. Gray

that he had discussed the Cuban project with Mr. Macy and that as

a result of this discussion he, Mr. Stans, had two reservations that

he would like Gray to look into.

One of these had to do with the statement by Macy that in his

discussion with CIA representatives in connection with the latest

withdrawal from the Reserve, he had received "no evidence" that any

effective resistance had been identified within Cuba. (Mr. Gray had

answered that in the formal presentation last week, Mr. Dulles and

Mr. Bissell had mentioned a number of such groups.)

The second point had to do with a feeling that we might not

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know enough about the political attitudes of the members of the Frente,

particularly as to basic freedoms, their attitude toward restoration

of seized American property, etc. (In answer to this, Mi. Gray had

pointed out that the Frente is composed of people who have broken

with Castro, at least on the basic philosophies.)

In an attempt to clarify the situation with respect to the first

point, Mr. Parrott told the Group about last Monday's meeting with

Mr. Macy, at which Mi. Barnes had covered in considerable detail

all aspects of the Cuban project. He said that he was at a loss to

understand how Macy could have received the impression that CIA

is not aware of dissident groups. He went on to say that in answer

to Mr. Macy's question as to the outlook, Mr. Barnes had stated -

and had developed at considerable length - the thesis that our view

was one of limited optimism, and that he had explained in detail just

why this is so; this explanation had included specific comments on the

steps that have been, and are being, taken to identify such groups and

to assess their apparent leaders. Mr. Parrott said further that the

point had been made forcibly to Macy that it would be out of the question V

for CIA to attempt to mount an invasion of Cuba by itself, without the

participation of large numbers of disaffected individuals within the

country.

Or the second point, Mr. Dulles said that we do know a good

deal about the basic political sympathies of Frente members, and

cited as an example the position that had been taken as to the inclusion

of certain ultra-conservative groups. He said that the Frente bad

issued a statement of its aims, which he summarized very broadly

as being to preserve the principles of the revolution. He said that as

to specific stands on restoration of U.S. property rights, etc., this

was thought to be unwise because it would give the rente the appearance

of being a tool of the Americans. He agreed, however, that Mr. Stans'

point was a valid one to bear in mind and

said we would certainly do

so. He added that he expects to lunch with Mr. Stans in the near future

and would take that opportunity to discuss these matters further, as

appropriate.

Mr. Parrott said that there was no disagreement that the political

ideas of these individuals must be constantly assessed and must be

clearly established before the operation actually comes off. He

added, however, that it should be borne in mind that once these

politically-screened individuals had issued their general statement

of objectives, our primary operational task has been to hold the ERD

together, and that at this particular stage it would not be practical

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to insist on a more precise spelling out of individual or group

VIEWS.

Mr. Parrott also said that Mr. Macy had raised a related

point which Mr. Barnes and he had agreed had validity, and that

MI. Barnes had undertaken to assure Macy that it would be given

adequate attention by the interagency planning group. This was a

concern expressed as to planning for the support - fiscal and otherwise -

of a new Cuban government immediately after a successful overturn

of the present one. Mr. Merchant said that he agreed fully with the

necessity for making contingency plans of this sort, and had in fact

directed three weeks ago that State officials begin to draw them up.

C.

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While agreeing that the Government could not take an official

stand, Mr. Merchant expressed his personal opinion that if the

companies should suspend operations, this would give the Soviets a

great opportunity, given the fact that the Cuban economy is so dependent

on oil. He pointed out that no alternative leader to Castro has yet

emerged, and that the United States would be held liable for any

economic crisis that might be precipitated in this way.

Mr. Gray related the consideration of this sort of action to the

sugar project discussed three weeks ago by the Group. He emphasized

that in his opinion these are isolated actions and that any moves of

this kind should be made only after an over-all consideration of

whether and how the United States wishes to move against Castro.

Mr. Irwin took some exception to this, indicating that he thought it

wa's possible and perhaps desirable to take such actions as those

contemplated in the sugar proposal, apart from any concerted across-

the-board program. Mr. Dulles emphasized that in any case we will

have to decide before long whether covert action should be taken in

Cuba.

It was then agreed that a special meeting of the Group should be

held on Monday, March l4th, to consider what might and should be

done in Cuba.

It was agreed that in addition to the regular members,

Mr. Rubottom, Admiral Burke, Mr. Bissell, Mr. King and perhaps

Colonel Lansdale should attend.

There was then a brief discussion of Admiral Burke's letter to

Mr. Merchant. It developed that the attachment to this letter has now

been given the status of a JCS document but that it has not been forwarded

to the NSC as the JCS had desired. (Mr. Irwin said that he had held

up this action because of the informal nature of the letter.) Mr. Merchant

said the Department is preparing comments and that he hoped the JCS

paper would not be considered apart from State's comments.

Mr. Dulles said that we would require a policy decision on

whether a black radio could be established on U.S. territory, probably

in the Florida Keys. It was agreed that this proposal should be staffed

through the Scott office.

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7 April 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting ? April 1960

PRESENT: Mr. Merchant, Mr. Douglas, Mr. Gray, Gen. Cabell

Dominican Republic

Mr. Gray asked the Acting DCI whether he had anything to add

on the situation in the Dominican Republic to what had been covered

by himself and the Secretary of State that morning at the NSC meeting.

General Cabell replied that he would only like to add the comment

that it appears evident that Trujillo will not consider making any

arrangements for an orderly succession to bimself, but that he will

either hang on to the bitter end or flee the country on short notice,

à la Batista.

Mr. Gray asked the Group's views on what happens after Trujillo,

specifically how Castro can be kept out of the Dominican Republic.

General Cabell commented that so far no worthwhile opposition to the

Benefactor has been identified, and that in his opinion it might well

become necessary to dispatch U.S. forces, openly identified as such,

to the country in the immediate aftermath of the demise or flight of

Trujillo. Mr. Merchant said that his preliminary thoughts were that

there would probably be a good chance to get OAS support for a move

of this kind to forestall Castro; on the other hand, we might expect

some internal revulsion at the arrival of U.S. forces because of the

memory of the Marine occupation.

Mr. Merchant added that Mr. Rubottom was thinking seriously

of a plan to seal off the land approaches to the Dominican Republic

via Haiti, thereby requiring any sizeable Castro, effort to be an

amphibious one. He said that this plan has not yet been formally

• 4. Cuba

C2202

Mr. Gray expressed satisfaction with the organizational

arrangements for interagency groups considering the continuing

development of the Cuban situation.

In this connection he expressed

some concern that USIA and CIA might be working on parallel or

conflicting lines with respect to radio. General Cabell assured him

that the top people in USIA are aware of CIA plans and there should.

be no crossing of wires.

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28 April 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 28 Aprik 1960

PRESENT: Messrs. Hare, Gray, Dulles

MI. Joseph Scott of the Department of State sat in as an

obseryer.

v 8. Cuba

Mr. Gray said that he had discussed with his associates the

organizational entities within the U.S. Government which have been

- established to deal with the Cuban situation. He noted that a number

of different groups and committees, with varying interests and

objectives; are concerning themselves with this situation and that

there seemed to him to be no "chief of staff" to whor all could lcok

as a central point.

He said that the opinion had been expressed to him that ir.

Dillon should assume this function, but that in Dillon's absence,

Mr. Hare should take on the responsibility and should inform himseif

of the general outlines of what has been going on in the Government.

Mr. Gray said that it had been felt essential to have such an official

available over the coming weekend, because of the expected May Day

troubles, and that since this official should be of such a stature as

to permit access to the highest levels, Mr. Hare had been decided

upon, pending Mr. Dillon's availability.

In this connection it was agreed that Mr. Dillon should be brought

up to date at an appropriate time on the status of covert operations

with respect to Cuba.

62002

Inter alia, Mr. Gray expressed concern and some surprise at

statements and actions by UAR officials with regard to Cuba..

MI.

Hare explained at some length his conviction that Deputy Foreign

Minister Sabri (older brother of Ali Sabri) is largely responsible for

this kind of thing, and that it does not Icpresent the feelings of

Nasser or Ali Sabri. He traced the brother's backgroud and described

him as

a "twisted personality."

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2 - EDS CLY

19 November 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 19 November 1960

PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant and Mann; Douglas and Gen. Lansdale;

Gray; Dulles and Bissell

12. Cuba

Mr. Merchant began by stating that in his opinion we are putting

more burden on the Guatemalan government with our training base than

that government can support for very long.

He noted that Mr. Mann

believes the solution is to move our training activities to the U.S.,

but Mr. Merchant does not think we can get away with this, particularly

if an increase in numbers is contemplated: Therefore, the only solution

would seem to be to move to another base or bases in other countries;

this would involve the same burden on the other countries as now exists

with respect to Guatemala. Although he has not discussed this point

with Secretary Herter, Mr. Merchant believes that it is time to take

another look at Cuba and if the U.S. attitude toward Castro remains

unchanged then we should consider shifting our entire posture. This

would involve a break in diplomatic relations, the support of a govern-

ment in exile, and other activities mostly overt, including some

training in the U.S.

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singled " bald lind

Mi. Mann commented that he thinks we cannot maintain training

anywhere in Latin America indefinitely, although he does think we

could maintain small airstrips without too much danger. He said that

he believes everyone in Guatemala knows by now the true nature of

our activities there, and that if they are going to be publicized before

the world he would rather have them exposed in the U.S. rather than

in Latin America. He recognized that this would be highly embar-

rassing for this country, but that for most Latin American governments

it could be fatal. He spoke of the impending OAS investigation of

Guatemala, and conceded that OAS support would be required to carry

out training successfully in the U.S. Io this, Mr. Merchant replied

that he did not think exposure of such activities on American soil would

be acceptable, particularly in the U. N.

Mr. Bissell then said that he has agreed for some time with

Mr. Mann's point as to the strain on Guatemala. He said that we have

developed an evacuation plan to be used in the event of outside investi-

gation, but that this is not a satisfactory answer to the problem. He

said that within about four weeks an alternate site could be established

in Nicaragua but that this would be very expensive, would tie us into

the Somoza brothers, and would call attention to Nicaragua in the same

way as Guatemala.

Mr. Bissell said that he foresaw several possibilities for

constructive change in the training operation, some for the immediate

future and some over a period of longer range. They include:

a. A sort of refugee camp in the U.S. ostensibly

designed for temporary care of Cuban exiles.

This story

could be defended but it is difficult to say for how long

or how. effectively.

b. A guarded military facility in the U.S. This

could be handled more securely, but the existence of

an area where peculiar things are going on could not

be kept secret indefinitely. An alternative would be

private property such as the King Ranch, but this would

take longer to arrange than a military base.

c. Vieques Island, off Puerto Rico. This is fairly

remote, but the government of Puerto Rico is already

trying to get the U.S. Marines out.

2.

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d. The CIA site on Saipan. This would be very secure

but would require a large amount of airlift.

e. Fort Randolph, in the Panama Canal Zone.

At this

location the trainees could be kept secure but would almost

certainly know where they were.

Mr. Douglas said that a military base could be made available,

such as Laughlin Air Force Base near Del Rio, Texas. He said that

the use of such real estate might be tied into some sort of cooperation

with Tracy Voorhees' Committee on Cuban Refugees. He felt also

that the U.S. capability for intervention in Cuba will probably not be

effective enough unless there is more overt participation than has

been contemplated to date. Gen. Lansdale said that he and Gen. Bonesteel

were of the same opinion.

Mi. Gray supported this general position, stating that when the

current Cuban plan was approved, the situation in that country was

different than it is now. Since then, the Cubans have received sizeable

amounts of bloc arms and have organized a militia, and Mr. Gray

wondered how effective a few hundred exiles could be.. Mr. Dulles

acknowledged that it would be necessary to have internal support if

the Castro government were to be successfully overthrown; be felt

that there is reason to believe such support might develop, perhaps

within the militia itself.

Mr. Mann expressed the opinion that the way to proceed is to

seal Cuba off from the rest of Latin America and to settle down for a

one or two year wait, presumably. to see whether the tide might not turn

in our favor. He said that in the meantime we could infiltrate small

groups of trained Cubans as a token, but that we should postpone a

• decision on a striking force for four or five months. In this general

connection, Mr. Bissell said that even if it is finally decided that overt

U.S. forces should be used, there still should be a nucleus of trained

Cubans available. Therefore, our present activities should be continued

in any case.

Summing up, the Group decided that the possibility of splitting

the present body of trainees into three or four groups should be examined

urgently (particularly in view of Mr. Mann's estimate that the OAS

investigation might take place in two or three weeks). Alternate sites

to be examined would include Vieques, Laughlin AFB and Fort Rardolph.

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The latter location should absorb no more than 200. Mr. Douglas

cautioned that the use of DOD facilities should at the present time

be considered as a holding operation rather than a continuation or

stepping up of present training. The possibilities of establishing a

kind of CCC under the Voorhees auspices should be examined.

V3. Advice to Assistant Attorney General

Mr. Parrott tabled the draft of suggested advice to Mr. Yeagley

in connection with Cuban exiles. Mr. Douglas felt that it was not

desirable to give Mr. Yeagley any piece of paper.

He suggested that

Yeagley should simply be advised that the Group feels the best method

of procedure might be to prosecute one test case, e. g. Masferrer,

but not to institute wholesale prosecutions. In answer to a question,

Mr. Parrott stated that he did not know whether this procedure would

satisfy Mr. Yeagley, but that he would discuss it with Mr. Gray, who

had by that time left the meeting. (Later, Mr. Gray talked to Yeagley,

uhn anneared satisfied

with the nral onidane. l

• 5. U-2 for Cuba

Mr. Bissell summarized the results of the first U-2 flight over

Cuba and asked for the Group's permission for two additional sorties

to fill in the remaining 50% coverage. The Group agreed, subject to

Mr. Gray's concurrence. (This was obtained later.)

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23 November 1960

NN 70953

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Mecting, 23 Navember 1960

PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Gray, Gen. Lansdale, Dulles and

Bissell

~2. Cuba

Mr. Bissell reported that further consideration following the

meeting of last Saturday had led to a tentative conclusion that Saipan

would be the best place to which to move the bulk of the Cuban trainees.

He emphasized the security advantages of the location, and said that

it is believed the move can be accomplished with our own transportation

plus two roundtrips by C-124s. These we would request the Department

of Defense to provide. We would probably move some small

commando-type units - about 50 men - to Fort Randolph. Mr. Bissell

also stressed the fact that additional construction costs would be

significantly less at Saipan than anywhere else.

02

The DCI agreed in general with this preliminary thinking. He

urged, however, that the matter of morale of the trainees be borne

constantly in mind, and that the move not be accomplished all at once.

Gen. Lansdale agreed. Mr. Dulles also asked that President Ydigoras

be informed.

Mr. Bissell concluded that plans would not be firmed up until

receipt of Defense's report on facilities available in the U.S.

Mr. Bissell then spoke of the report of a possible attempt by

Cuban dissidents to take over the Isle of Pines.

He explained that we

have nothing to do with the plan and would in fact be unable to give much

support to it. He said that it is highly questionable whether this attempt

will take piare in be repored time schedule, or indeed at all, but

emphasized that this illustrates how initiative might be taken by others,

so that we could be presented with drastic requests for assistance on

very short notice. Mr. Bissell also mentioned the report of possible

major sabotage to be carried out in the very near future. In addition,

he said that we now have six B-26s, plus eleven crews, available for

combat, with other aircraft for supply. He noted that Nicaragua might

be used for refueling in the event of actual operations, but that the

immediate objective would be to obtain strips on the Isle of Pines.

Mr. Dulles remarked that this would of course require an active revolt.

Mr. Dulles also mentioned the proposal by Peter Grace to encourage

Father Peyton (described as a sort of Catholic Billy Graham) to carry

out activities in Cuba.

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30 November 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 30 November 1960

PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant and Mann; Douglas; Gray;

Dulles and Bissell

/ 2. Cuba

•021

Mr. Gray solicited the Group's assistance in arriving at a

consensus of views as to what exactly had been decided as a result

of the high-level meeting of the day before. The following points were

agreed:

a. MI. Gray's associates stand ready to deny U.S.

activity based in Guatemala, even though it may become

blown (Mr. Douglas urged that every effort be made to

make it possible to deny plausibly).

b. If the program is enlarged, additional facilities

may be obtained, but at this stage not in the U.S. No

training of Cubans will be conducted in the U.S. under

present circumstances. (Mr. Bissell told the Group of

the possibility of an additional finca in Guatemala.)

c. Evacuation plans should be kept in readiness:

(Mr. Mann said that he thought he could arrange a week's

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notice before any OAS committee actually visited

Guatemala and that it might be possible even then to

avoid actual investigation on the spot. MI. Bissell

said that if we do have a week, evacuation could be

carried out by Agency aircraft; if more speed is

required DOD assistance might be necessary.

Mr. Douglas, with Mr. Dulles and Mr. Bissell

concurring, felt that the possibility of emergency

evacuation to Florida under the guise of ordinary

refugees should be kept in mind.)

Mr. Dulles suggested that questions on Cuba might be asked at

the next Presidential press conference and that we should be prepared

with a statement along the lines that we do not entirely discourage

revolutionary activity. Mr. Merchant said he would arrange to have

a draft prepared along these lines.

In this connection, Mr. Parrott

reported the request from Assistant Attorney General Yeagley for

guidance as to possible action against an alleged collaborator of

General Pedraza. (Note: Mr. Yeagley was later told that we have no

operational interest and no objection to the Department of Justice's

pursuing the case. Mr. Yeagley said that they would proceed with

investigation, but that it is by no means certain the case will ever

come to trial.)

" .

Mr. Gray then outlined his understanding of his friends' desires

with respect to organization of the anti-Castro effort. He said that the

principal need foreseen was for an individual to serve as a focal point

for diverse interests in this situation, and to be available to meet with

Mr. Gray's friends at any time. In addition, someone should be

available to deal with the ERD and to talk to other Latin American

governments.

After a considerable amount of discussion, the consensus of the

Group was as follows: Probably two men will be required, one to handle

the overt and the other the covert aspects.

They would work together

on a daily basis and both would have the entire picture in mind, but

responsibility for the execution of covert operations would have to rest

with CIA. The overt man should ideally be a government official,

preferably someone senior in the Foreign Service or the Department

of State. There should be a sort of "board of directors" to oversee

all aspects of the operation.

This should be the Special Group plus

Secretary Anderson when matters of major policy are considered.

(MI. Gray was not entirely sure that his friends would accept the two- '

man concept but Mr. Dulles and Mr. Merchant emphasized that whether

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SL

there were one man or two, CIA would have to maintain its own

organizational integrity.)

There then ensued a lengthy examination of qualifications and

availability of a number of individuals. It was finally decided that,

taking all things into consideration, including the aspect of quick

availability, Ambassador Willauer would probably be the best choice.

On the ClA side, Mr. Dulles nominated Mr. Barnes. It was recog-

nized that these nominees would have to be checked with Mr. Gray's

associates.

MI. Mann suggested that Mr. Willauer might also do the FRD

job, but the DCI pointed out that this requires a covert approach and

must be done by the Agency.

As to Mr. Pawley, it was decided that it would be unwise to have

him embark on a grand tour or to endow him with official government

status. Mi. Merchant said he would not object, however, to Mi. Pawley's

talking to President Frondizi..

Mr. Gray then mentioned the report which had reached his

friends about a representative of the ERD who had apparently just

returned from a trip around Latin America. It was noted that the

individual referred to was probably Sardinius, and Mr. Dulles said

he would obtain a written report of the trip, for passage to Mi. Gray's

associates.

Mr. Bissell reminded MI. Douglas of the outstanding request

to the DOD for thirty-eight NCOs and officers for service outside the

U.S.

Laboratt

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17 February 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 17. Eebruary 1960

PRESENT: Messrs. Gray, Irwin, Dulles

11

Mr. Joseph Scott of the State Department sat in as an observer.

/1. Cuba

The project providing for covert spotting and assessment of

potential agents for eventual sabotage of sugar mills was discussed

at some length. Within the limits outlined - that is, that no action

wouid be initiated under the terms of any approval reached at this

meeting, but rather that approval would cover only the icentification

and evaluation of assets - the Group expressed general approval.

Mr. Dulles reiterated that he was not asking for approval actually

to proceed with operations.

Mr. Irwin stated that he and Secretary

Douglas were enthusiastic about the project. It was agreed that it

should be presented to the Secretary of State and that Mr. Gray would

discuss it further.

(Later Mr. Gray reported that he had discussed this matter

with his associate. The latter had made two points:

a. He doubted the efficacy of the proposed action,

feeling that if it were successful in denying money to

the Castro regime which could otherwise be used for

subversive activities, the Cuban government could

obtain offsetting funds from other sources.

b. He would not agree to identifying assets for this

particular sabotage operation. He would agree that the

Agency could proceed to spot and assess potential agents

for a variety of possible tasks. He said that once this

IS

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Until big didn

was done and a comprehensive program of suggested

action was drawn up, it should be submitted to the

Special Group, and if the Group recommended approval

it should probably then be discussed with him.. It was

stipulated that in any case no action should take place

until his return from the trip on which he is about to

embark.

li Sier

Mr. Scott

also reported later that Mr. Herter had made exactly

the same point as outlined in b. above.)

V2. Dominican Republic

There was a brief discussion of the

situation in the Dominican

Republic.

Mr. Irwin commented that the Defense Department is most

interested in determining whether or not a sort of Third Force can be

identified.

02062

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28 December 1960

'MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 28 December 1960

PRESENT: MessIs. Merchant, Douglas, Gray and Dulles

12. Special Meeting on Cuba

Mr. Gray said that it is desired to set up a special meeting on

Cuba for 9:00 AM Monday, 2 January. His associates wanted particularly

to make certain that everyone concerned "clearly sees the sequence of

events. " He also said that Mr. Pawley had had a recent conference in

the White House.

Mr. Gray asked that Mr. Merchant and Mr. Dougias determine:

whether their respective Secretaries wish to attend. He said that

Mr. Willauer wouid also be on hand. Finally, he asked that the Army

colonel (Lt. Col. Egan) who had given such an enlightening description

of the qualities of the Cuban volunteers be on hand for the meeting.

It was noted that Col. Egan is currently out of the country, but the

DCI agreed to have him brought to Washington for the meeting.

PROPERTY OF

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SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

CONCLUDING REMARKS

You will, I hope, permit me some personal, but I think

not unimportant observations. I hope that you will complete your

work as expeditiously as possible as I feel very strongly the need

for a viable Central Intelligence Agency operating, of course, within

its charter. I believe that the present furor about C.I.A. is

impeding it in the performance of its mission and the sooner it is

able to go about its business, not in a fish bowl, the better our

country will be served. I believe that we will continue to need

effective, intelligent collection and analysis for our policy makers

and I think there will be occasions when covert activities should be

undertaken in the interests of our National security.

Finally, one thing that bothers me, Mr. Chairman, is that

there is tremendous concern now -- and I don't suggest that it is

improper -- with the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency,

while at the same time people seem not to be equally concerned

about what the Soviet Union is up to in this country, especially

through its very many KGB agents here. I would hope that a

Congressional Committee would be interested enough to investigate

this most serious matter.

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PERSONS/ ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

PRESIDENT EISENHOWER, DOUGLAS

DILLON, GENERAL GOODPASTER

July 5, 1960

TRUJILLO

Land Unless

state

OCCURRENCE: On July /5,

1960 President Eisenhower met with Secretary

of State

Herter, Secretary of tho Treasury Dillon.

Also present were Gen. Goodpaster and

The memorandum of the conference

stated: "With regard to the

Dominican Republic, Mr. Herter said there are various things being done which

could result in a provisional government being set up. The President said if such

a government were set up we should recognize it quickly. We could then move in with

troops on their request if need should arise.

In so far as the question is one of

internal intervention, we must use the CIA in order to avoid attribution. The

President thoughtwe should knock"out of any documents On file any reference to

starting a, revolution."

SOURCE:

Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower

(Whitman File) (DDE DIARY SERIES) - AbiLeve

FILE:

STAFF:

Kelley

DATE July 6, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

VICE PRESIDENT NIXON, MR. GRAY,

DOUGLAS DILLON

DATES:

March 14, 1960

CATEGORIES:

CASTRO

MONGOOSE

OCCURRENCE: At a National Security Council meeting on March 14, 1960 Mr. Dilion

said: "Our objective is to bring another government to power in Cuba... there is

no apparent alternative to the present government in the event Castro disappears.

Indeed the result of Castro's disappearance might be a Communist takeover.

'Mr. Dulles reported that a plan to affect the situation in Cuba was being

worked on. Admiral Burke suggested that any plan for the removal of Cuban leaders

should be package deat, since many of the leaders around Castro were even worse

SOURCE:

Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower

(Whitman File) (NSC meeting series) 436th NSC meeting,

March 10, 1960 - Abilewe

FILE:

STAFF:

Kelley

DATE July 6, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

VICE PRESIDENT NIXON, DOUGLAS

DILLON, H. SHELDON (CIA), MR. LAY

DATES:

April 14, 1960

CATEGORIES:

TRUJILLO

OCCURRENCE: Al a National Security Council meeting on April 14, 1960, Vice

President Nixon presiding,

": "Mr. Dulles reported.. Trujillo's position continued

to weaken and was now quite precarious... (he) thought further attempts will be made

tokill or oust Trujillo."

'Mr. Dillon said there was one favorable aspect...if Trujillo could- be-removed

from power in the Dominican Republic while pro-Castro elements-were-prevented from

seizing power in that country...our anti-Castro-campaign- throughout Latin- America

would receive a great boost.

The Vice President agreed that getting rid of Truiillo

woutd be a favorable development for üs."

HH 50955

SOURCE:

Presidential Papers of Dwight Eïsenhower

(Whitman File) (NSC meeting series, 441st meeting, April 14,

1960) - Abileve

FILE:

DocId: 32423488 Page 58

STAFF:

Kelley

DATE July 6, 1975

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## Page 59

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

VICE PRESIDENT NIXON, DOUGLAS

•DILLON, H. SHELDON (CIA), MR. LAY

DATES:

April 14, 1960,

CATEGORIES:

TRUJILLO

OCCURRENCE:

reported that a SR.

On April 14, 1960 at a National Security Council meeting Mr. Dulles

Betancourt /no relation to Venezuelan leader/ had defected

from Cuba and predicted three outcomes with respect to Castro:

(1) an assessinat

that wout make Castro a marty; (2) Castro's suicide as a result of the failure

of the Cuban experiment and (3) a trend to a socialist dictatorship and a Batista

terror regime.

Pree this in deare ilet assass ens of a ferneed allernative

SOURCE:

Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower

(Whiteman File) (NSC meeting series, 441 st meeting, April 14

FILE? - AbILeNe

STAFF:

Kelle

ATE July 6, 197

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

PRESIDENT EISENHOWER, VICE PRESI-

DENT NIXON, DOUGLAS DILLON, ALLEN

DULLES

DATES:

July 7, 1960

CATEGORIES:

TRUJILLO

CASTRO

MONGOOSE

OCCURRENCE: At a National Security Council meeting on July 7,

1960 Mr. Dulles

"The Venezuelan government was engaged in an all-out effort, through

the OAS and otherwise, to isolate, condemn and cause the downfall of Trujillo.

An important reason for the vigor of the Venezuelan efforts was the fact they

have convincing

evidence that Trujillo was responsible for the assassinat on

attempt on Betancourt /President of Venezuela/***

''Betancourt believes anvaner

attempt will be made momentarily and therefore it wants a showdown without

Mr. Dulles further explained that the Venezuelan Foreign Minister wants

the United States to lead the way in breaking relations

with Trujillo and that

Betancourt wants a meeting of the OAS nations to deal with the Trujillo problem.

SOURCE:

Presidential Papers of Might Risenhovor

Chit Malad did med dog serdon, bood Nite mood lol.

14060.:% 10001

- Nations,

STAFF:

MATRON 10. 1041

PERSONS/ENTILIES:

PRESIDENT EISENHOWER, VICE

PRESIDENT NIXON, DOUGLAS DILLON,

ALLEN DULLES

DATES:

July 7, 1960

CATEGORIES:

TRUJILLO

CASTRO

MONGOOSE

OCCURRENCE:

stated that he befleves,

On July 7, 1960 at a National Security Council meeting Mr Dulles

and the intelligence community agrees, that the problem

of Trujillo mist be settled before the problem of Castro can be dealt with ever

though Castre is the greater threat."

The NSC minutes

further state that the United States told Betancourt of

Venezuela that the United States can't act without knowing who the successor to

Trujillo would be.

The U.S. will work with Betancourt and Figueres of Costa

Rica on suggestions for a successor for Trujillo.

President Eisenhower suggested

a government in exile be ready to go into the Dominican Republic in the event

of Trujillo's downfall.

SOURCE

HH 50955

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(Whitman File) (NSC meeting series, 450th NSC meeting,

= Abilene

Page 59

STAFF:

Kelley

DATE July 6, 1975

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## Page 60

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

MR. GRAY, PRESIDENT EISENHOWER

DATES:

July 28, 1960

CATEGORIES:

CASTRO

TRUJILLO

MONGOOSE

OCCURRENCE: On July 28, 1960 at a National Security Council meeting President

bisonhower said: "Until Trujillo is elimineted, we cannot get outatin-American-

friends to reach a proper level of Indignation in dearing with castro. It was

noted that Venezuela was trying to separate the Cuban and Domincan Republic prob-

lems in OAS forms.

On this matter,

"The President said if we attempted to take

any action with respect to Cuba before settling the Trujillo situation, we would

be the loser."

Does "elimination" weari" ass assinator

SOURCE:

Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower

(Whitman File) (NSC meeting series, meeting of July 28, 1960

FILE: Abileive

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

PRESIDENT EISENHOWER, MAURICE

STANS, MR. GRAY

DATES:

Aug. 25, 1960

LUMUMBA

STAFF:

DATE KelleY

•July 6, 1975

CATEGORIES:

OCCURRENCE: On August 25, 1960 the minutes of the National Security Council

meeting that day state:

"The President suggested the United Nations might re-

Mr. Stans suggested that we might base ourselves on Tshombe

and Kasavubu and throw out Lumunba by peaceful means."

(page 15)

SOURCE:

Presidential Papers

of Dwight Eisenhower

(Ahit man File) (NSC meeting series, meeting of August

F25E 1960

-Abilene

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

PRESIDENT EISENHOWER, GORDON GRAY,

DATES:

Sept. 21, 1960

STAFF:

Kelley

DATE July 6, 1975

CATEGORIES:

LUMUMBA

OCCURRENCE:

On September 21, 1960, at a National Security meeting, Mr. Dulles

said: "A recent attempt to assassinate Mobutt had farted.

***Mobutu appeared

to be the effective power in the Congo for the moment, but tummba was not

Il disposed of and remained a great danger as long as he was not disposed of."

SOURCE:

Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower

(Whitman File) (NSC meeting series, meeting of Sept. 21, 1960),

FILE:

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Kelley

DATE July 6, 1975

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## Page 61

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

PRESIDENT EISENHOWER, GORDON GRAY

DATES:

Oct. 24, 1960

CATEGORIES:

LUMUMBA

OCCURRENCE: On October 24, 1960 at a National Security Council meeting Mr.

Dulles reported:

"An intercepted UAR /Egypt/ message indicated that five Congolese soldiers

had attempted to assassinate Mobutu on the 15th of October.

The U Shad prior

information of this attempt and had warned Mobut if he had riot beer warned,

it was probable that he would have beer caughtal (page 16)

SOURCE:

Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower

(Whitman File) (NSC meeting series, minutes of meeting,

PEtpber 24, 1960) - Abilene

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

GORDON GRAY, MARION W. BOGGS

DATES:

Feb. 12, 1960

STAFF:

DATE Kelley,

1975

CATEGORIES:

LUMUMBA

CASTRO

TRUJILLO

OCCURRENCE: On Febraum, 12y 1960-a "special" National Security Council meeting

was held, and Marion W.

Boggs, Deputy Executive Secretary, attended as Acting

Executive Secretary.

The only record of this meeting appearing in the NSC meeting

series of minutes is a one-page notation which states:

"On inotructions. from

the Exeeutive Secretary no menerandm was written

What was discusse

2Zis Not indicated in doccerment

SOURCE:

Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower

"Whitman File)

(NSC meeting series, special NSC meeting,

Feb. 12, 1960

FILE:

Abilene

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

STAFF:

Kelley

DATE July 6, 1975

CATEGORIES:

OCCURRENCE:

SOURCE:

FILE:

NW. 50955 " DocId:32423488

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STAPF :

DATE:

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## Page 62

HOTE ON GRAY TESTIMONY FOR FAOS:

short summary

If we don't re-write the

Gray shenaningy, you

should note to the senators that

since wew

drafted it we have received a new batch of

key documents from the Eisenhower library

which are reflected (quoted) in the

Gray Chronology.

Ald won to shot tomany

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To: Files

From:

Frederick Baron

Re: DELETION IN SPECIAL GROUP MINUTES OF NOVEMBER

3, 1960

Date: July 7, 1975

In a phone conversation with Jim Wilderotter of the White House,

Wilderotter assured me af that after the line "beyond our sa capabil-

ities" on page 3, there was a double space followed by

Item 2, which deals with the African continent (not Congo);

followed by a double space, then Item 3, which deals

with Southeast Asia.

• Wilderotter assured me that neither item related to

our inquiry. He said that there was nothing deleted on

page 3 that related to KCuba.

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EXHIBITS FOR THE EXAMINATION OF GORDON GRAY

Castro*

Lumumba

Trujillo

Special Group Minutes, November 3, 1960.

Special Group Minutes, August 12, 1960.

Special Group Minutes, August 25, 1960.

Special Group Minutes, September 8, 1960.

Memorandum of July 1, 1960 from J. C. King, Chief, Western Hemisphere

Division to the Acting DCI.

Minutes of the Special Group of December 29, 1960.

Minutes of the Special Group of January 12, 1961.

The Special Group Minutes of February 17, 1960 could be used for

two purposes: (1) To establish the general atmosphere in the

Special Group of planning, sabotage, operations in Cuba; and. (2)

the fact. that, at least in this case, Gray's "associate" was

President Eisenhower.

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MEMORANDUM

TOP SECRET

TO:

Files

FROM:

Frederick Baron

DATE: July 5, 1975

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW WITH GORDON GRAY

GENERAL BACKGROUND

1. Staff Responsibilities Under Eisenhower:

Gray said that the structural chain of command ran directly from the

DCI to the President during the Eisenhower adninistration. Allen Dulles

was able to approach Eisenhower directly, rather than through Gray.

Andrew Goodpaster staffed President Eisenhower on many of the same

subjects that Gray worked on. Gray was responsible for long-range planning;

Goodpaster was responsible for spot work. Gray said that Goodpaster and he

kept each other "intimately inforned". However, Gray said that any covert

action program would go through him and not Goodpaster. "Although I would

tell Goodpaster about anything I discussed with the President." Some covert

action programs were extremely tightly held, for example, on the U-2 incident

only the following people were knowledgeable: Eisenhower, Goodpaster, and John

Eisenhower.

"I didn't live with Eisenhower 24 hours a day. I don't know everything

that he did. But I do think I knew every major decision, approval, or action

of Eisenhower's."

2. Special Group Function

At the 54/12 committee, Gray said, "I represented the President's interest,

that was my role."

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Gray said that shortly after the BENLIN TUNNEL, Eiscolower said,

"I want the 54/12 colnittee to consider any action that impinges upon

the sovereignty of another country."

TOP

Gray said that in alnost every case, a proposed covert action would

have been discussed with the State Departnent and would have been staffed

out before Special Group meeting. "Most of the rest of us did not have a chance

to roflect before the meeting."

Gray said that during his tenure, there was no chairman of the 54/12

(Special Group). But perhaps Merchant conducted the meetings.

Gray said that during the transition to the Kennedy administration, he

asked McGeorge Bundy to promise him that the Special Group would not be

washed out. Gray explained that the Special Group was necessary for the

protection of the President. The Special Group discussions allow the President

the chance to know in advance about actions which are potentially embarrassing

to him. The President's ropresentative to the Group (Gray, then Bundy) has the

right to object to an action and take it up with the President. The President

has a chance to know about everything that goes on in the Special Group, and

through his Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, the President would

have a chance to say "'no" to a proposed action. Gray said that the presence

of the Special Group would protect a President from operations such as assass-

inations.

3. "His Associate":

Initially, Gray did not recognize the phrase used by Parrott in the

Special Group minutes 'Mr. Gray's associate" or "his associates". Gray's

first reaction was that "his associates" would probably refer to members

of his NSC staff.

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- 3-

But after seeing the minutes of the Special Gioup mecting of

February 17, 1960, Gray said that it was clear that in those minutes

"his associate" referred to President Eisenhower.

Gray said that he never used the phrase "associate"', that was

Parrott's phrase.

Gray was not aware the phrase was used at the time

in those minutes and couldn't, without reconstructing each minute, be

sure it referred to the President in each case. He said that when he

attended the meetings, he would refer to "the President" directly.

(Note: Since the phrase "the President" is never used in Parrott's

minutes, it is fair to assume that at least some of the references to

"Mr. Gray's associate"' are euphemisms for President Eisenhower.)

NSC DOCUMENTS

Gray recalls that the

President called him, and perhaps Allen Dulles,

into his office shortly after Gray's appointment and said that "no

minutes, notes, or memos of Special Group meetings are to be kept, except

by the DCI and they are to be kept in the DCI's files." Gray said that

Dulles was not present at this neeting. He knows that he would have told

Dulles shortly afterwards.

Gray did not keep personal notes of the Special Group meetings.

Although he did defy the Presidential directive in one specific instance,

by deciding to make a memorandum of every meeting with the President relating

to the subject of Cuba. These memoranda are on file at the Presidential

Library in Abilene, Kansas:

Gray said that he never reviewed Thomas Parrott's minutes of the

Special Group. But the NSC minutes were passed to the principals at the

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meeting for their review. Gray propared the "records of action" for

the NSC, along with Jimmy Lay, Gray's assistant.

LUMUNBA

Gray said that he did not remember the August 25, 1960 meeting at

which it was reported that Gray commented that "his associates had expressed

extremely strong feelings on the necessity for very straight-forward action"

in relation to LUMUMBA. Gray said at first that he did not remember

LUMUMBA's position in the Congo. Gray said that he did not remember talking

with Eisenhower about LUNUMBA.

However, Gray does remember that "ve were anti-LUMUMBA and wanted to

see him removed from his position of responsibility."

In reference to the August 25 meeting, after he had seen the minutes

of the meeting, Gray said that "when I said 'straightforward action', certainly

assassination would be one possibility." Gray continued to say that Allen

DULLES was consistently in opposition to assassination and "he was probably

saying to me that assassination was one of the things we shouldn't do."

With reference to testimony received by the Select Comnittee fron Robert

JOHNSON, a State Department official who was a member of the Policy Planning

Council, he said that he had no recollection of a meeting in the summer of

1960, at which President EISENHOWER ordered the assassination of LUMUNBA or

said words to that effect.

Gray said that he knows Bronson TWEEDY, but he never discussed LUMUMBA

with TWEEDY.

TUP

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TRUJILLO

"I am sure there was no discussion with EISENIIOWER about the

assassination of TRUJILLO."

"I don't see how the DCI and the Department of State could have

approved arms shipments without going up to the Special Group.. The

DCI should have taken a

suggested course of action to the Special Group

after checking with State."

Gray said: "A high-powered weapon with a telescopic site would

connote to me that it would be used for the purpose of assassinating an

individual."

CUBA

Gray said that President EISENHOWER would frequently remark at

meetings on Cuba that an operation should be planned so that it would be

carried through successfully, otherwise it should not be planned at all.

Referring to the minutes of the Special Group meeting of February 17,

1960, Gray said that at some point during that period.of time, Allen

DULLES brought his sugar mill sabotage plan to President EISENHOWER, who

listened attentively. Afterward, the President said, "I don't think

sabotage of sugar mills will do sonething significant. Bring me a complete

plan." Subsequently, DULLES brought the President a four-point program:

propaganda; economic sanction; sabotage; and the training of Cuban exiles.

GRAY said the President approved this memo. (Note that Gray also said that he

made a memo of this meeting and subsequent meetings on Cuba.)

NH 50955 DocId: 32123488 Page 69

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-6-

After the BAY OF PIGS, Gray called President EISENHOWER and

offered to show him all of the memos that Gray had prepared on Presidential

meetings on Cuba. Gray said that JOHN EISENHOWER obtained the memos and

• brought them to Gettysburg. Gray and President EISENHOWER reviewed the

memos. Gray said that the President objected to the word "planning" in

reference. to a Cuban invasion, on the basis that there was no actual military

planning. EISENHOIER suggested that the page should be retyped to change

the word "planning"'. Gray said they did retype the page.

Gray said that although in his mind and EISENHONER's, there was no

military "planning", definitely FISENHONER knew that Cuban exiles were being

trained for an amphibious landing in Cuba.

President BISENHOWER went so far in contingency planning, said Gray, as to

advocate to Allen DULLES the formation of a government in exile anong the

Cuban community. But, Gray said, the Cubans could never settle anong them-

selves who would constitute the leadership of such a government.

Referring to the minutes of Special Group meeting of August 12, 1960,

Gray renembers the presentation by Richard BISSELL of a budget for Cuban

operations over. 13 million dollars, with a heavy emphasis on paranilitary

operations. Gray said that the reference at the end of the meno to laying.

this budget before "higher authorities" for approval clearly referred to

President EISENHOWER.

Referring to the minutes of the Special Group meeting of November 3, 1960,

at which MERCHANT asked

a question about whether there had been planning "for

taking direct positive action against FIDEL, PAUL, and CHE GUEVARA," Gray said

TOP SOone

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•HH 50955 DocId: 32423488

-7-

that he did not remember the meeting. Gray acknowledged, however, that.

the phrase "direct positive action" in this context "could have included

assassination." Gray said that the reaction by General CABELL that such

action would be boyond CIA capabilities, was the "usual DCI reaction".

Referring to the Special Group minutes of December 28, 1960, Gray said

that "the special meeting" mentioned therein is clearly a meeting with the President.

Gray though that this must have been the last meeting on Cuba with the

President, the purpose of which would have been to clean up the Cuba project

for the new administration. Gray said that there must have been dozens of

meetings on Cuba (all of which will be reflected in the Gray nemos in Abilene).

CASTRO/GAMBLING SYNDICATE OPERATION, PHASE 1

Gray saïd that he was completely unaware of any conversation between

Richard BISSELL and Sheffield EDWARDS about establishing underworld contacts

for the purpose of an assassination attempt on CASTRO. Gray also said that

he was unaware of any development, within the Technical Services Division of

the CIA, of assassination devices to be used against CASTRO such as lethal cigars.

Likewise, he was unaware of the development of any devices designed for the

disorientation or embarrassment of CASTRO.

Gray said that he knew BISSELL well, but not EDWARDS.

Gray said that, if such operations were in progress, the DCI should have

known about them. Gray said that if the DCI knew about such operations, "he

would have raised it at the Special Group or with me. He didn't. I think I

would have known if Allen DULLES had discussed such subjects with the President."

Gray said that it was possible that BISSELL was acting unilaterally on this

TOP SOMET

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## Page 72

- 8-

matter. Gray said that he'd talked to Andrew GOODPASTER about the recent

news stories which indicate that there was assassination planning against

CASTRO during this period of time, and GOODPASTER said that he'd never

heard about such things.

EXECUTIVE ACTION

"I never heard of EXECUTIVE ACTION until David BELIN mentioned it to

me."

ASSASSINATIONS GENERALLY

Gray said that he remembered two mentions of assassination: (1) When

NASSAR was riding high, someone at the planning board said 'we ought to bump

him off"'. But Gray said this was not a serious discussion. Assassination was

not an option that went to the President. (2) At the PFIAB meetings, one

member consistently would ask the CIA "about bumping off the leadership in

Hanoi". Gray did not think this was a serious suggestion. Gray said the

member who suggested this is "well-known" and he was reluctant to provide the

name to

US.

"I followed closely any covert operations I was interested in." Gray said

that "if I had known of any assassination attempt, I probably would have called"

the responsible official to stay abreast. He said he didn't know of any such

attempts.

TOP

SPORT

731

•Gi:

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## Page 73

Interview Questdons For Gordon Gray

TRUJILLO

1.

MEMO of July 1, 1960 from J.C: King, (Chief, WHD) to Acting

DCI kalett recommending the delivery of

arms (high-powered rifles

with telescopic scopes) to the opposition of TRUJILLO.

The Memo

says

that "APPROVAL FOR DELIVERY OF THESE ARMS HAS BEEN GIVEN

BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE ROY RUBOTTOM"

-Imamthem Were there any proceedings of the Special Group at

this time which authorized delivery of arms? (We don't have

record of any authorbzation until January 12, 1961 S.G. Minutes)

-If not, did the DCI and Assistant Secretary of State exceed

their authority?

-Generally, what was the procedure in the Eisenhower administratior

for handling the approval of such

a project?

-Could the DCI approve it under his own authority?

-Did the Assistant Secretary of State exceed his authority

by not requestingall receiving approval foom the Secy of Stat

- Shouldn't the Special Group have been consulted?

2. SPECIAL GROUP MINUTES of 12 JANUARY 1962. GRAY was present.

The Group approves shipment of arms to "dissidents inside

the Dominican Republic"

-Do you knes remember

this event?

Are the minutes accurate?

-What was the policy

behind the approval?

-Weren't the weapons

intended for use in assassination?

50955

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To;

Files

From: FDB

Re:

NOTES ON TESTIMONY OF ROBERT H. JOHNSON (6/18/75)

Date: 7/5/75

Biographical Background

1951-62

National Security Council staff member

1962-67

State Department, member of Policy Planning Counchl

Chronology of Events

Summer, 1960 Johnson attended a meeting of the NSC to discuss

developments in the CONGO.

"At some time during that

discussion, President EISENHOWER said something

I can

no longer remember his words - that came

across to me as an order for the assassination

of LUMUMBA... There was no discussion;

the meeting

simply moved on."

- Johnson

said he might have omitted the statement

from his de-briefing memo due to its sensitivity.

-- J.

said probably Allen DULLES and Gordon GRAY

were present at the meeting (in the Cabinet Roon).

--The formal record of decision by the NSC is

unlikely to contain infommation on this subject,

he

said.

-The

memos which Johnson did on the meetings would

be with President Eisenhower's papers. (10)

"I was surprised t...that I would ever hear a President

say anything. like this in my presence or the presence

of a

group of people. I was

startled."

ITH

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