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Pouti

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TO:

(Copies

Offices Checke

12-17-73)

SAC:

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Boston

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Chicago

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TO LEGAT:

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RE:

Date 12/20/15

DIRECTORS APPEARANCE BEFORE SENATE SELECT

COMMITTEE ON INTELLICENCE ACTIVITIES,

DECEMBER 10, 1975

Retention

For appropriate

For infonnation = optional Ca action

L Surey, by

C The enclosed is for your information. If used in a future report,

Ca conceal alt

sources, ( paraphrase contents.

Enclosed are corrected pages from report of SA

dated

Remarks:

ReButel to all SACs and Legats, 12/10/75.

Enclosed for each Office and Legat is

one copy of the transcript of questions which

were asked Mr. Kelley during captioned appearance,

along with Mr. Kelley's answers to those questions.

ASHCREE

62-110

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SEARCHE

SERIAL!

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Vol. 20

Oh Initen Statra Srnate

• Copy 5

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Select Committee to Study Governmantal Operations

With Respect to Intelligence Activities

INTEILIGENCE INVESTIGATION

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Wednesday, December 10, 1975

Washington, D. C

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STATEMENT OF:

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The Honorable Clarence M. Kelley,

Direcotor, Federal Bureau of Inve-

stigation

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INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATION

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Wednesday,

December 10, 1975

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United States Senate,

Select Committee to Study Governmental

Operations with Respect to

Intelligence Activities,

Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10

o'clock a.m., in Room 318, Russell Senate Office Building,

the honorable Frank Church (Chairman of the Committee)

presiding.

Present: Senators Church (presiding), Hart of Michigan,

Mondale, Huddleston, Hart of Colorado, Baker, Goldwater and

Mathias.

Also present: William G. Miller, Staff Director; Frederick

A. O. Schwarz, JI., Chief Counsel; Curtis R. Smothers, Minority

Counsel; Paul Michel, Joseph diGenova, Barbara Banoff, Frederiok

Baron, Mark Gitenstein, Loch Johnson, David Bushong, Charles

Lombard, John Bayly, Charles Kirbow, Michael Madigan, Bob

Kelley, John Elliff, Elliot Maxwell, Andy Postal, Pat Shea,

Michael Epstein and Burt Wides, Professional Staff Members.

..=

The Chairman. The Committee's witness this morning is

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the Honorable Clarence M..Kelley, the Director of the Federal

Bureau of Investigation.

Mr. Kelley was appointed Director in July of 1973 in a

troubled. time for the FBI. His experience as an innovative

law enforcement administrator in charge of the Kansas City

Police Department for over ten years, and his previous work as

a Special Agent of the FBI have made him uniquely qualified

to lead the Bureau.

The Select Committee is grateful for the cooperation

extended by Director Kelley in the course of its inguiry over

the past months. The Committee is also impressed by the

openness of the FBI's witnesses before this Committee, and

their willingness to consider the need for legislation to

clarify the Bureau's intelligence responsibility.

It is important to remember from the outset that this

Committee is examining only a small portion of the FBI's

activities. Our hearings have concentrated on FBI domestic

intelligence operations. We have consistently expressed our

admiration and support for the Bureau's criminal investigative

and law enforcement work, and we recognize the vital importance

of counterespionage in the modern world. But domestic

intelligence has raised many difficult questions.

The Committee has also concentrated on the past rather

than on present FBI activities.

The abuses brought to light

in our hearings occurred years and even decades before Director

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Kelley took charge.

The Staff has advised the Committee that under Director

Kelley the FBI has taken significant steps to rethink previous

policies and to establish new safeguards against abuse.. The

FBI is now placing greater emphasis on foreign related intelli-

gence operations, and less on purely domestic surveillance.

The FBI is working more closely with the Justice Department in

developing policies and standards for intelligence. These

are welcome developments.

Nevertheless, many important issues remain unresolved.

'Therefore, we have invited Director Kelley to share with the

Committee his views on some of the considerations the Congress

should take into account in thinking about the future of

FBI intelligence. Among these issues are whether FBI surveil-

lance should extend beyond the investigation of persons

likely to commit specific crimes; whether there should be

outside supervision or approval before the FBI conducts certain

types of investigations or uses certain surveillance techniques;

whether foreign related intelligence activities should be

strictly separated from the FBI's domestic law enforcement

functions, and what should be done to the information already

in the FBI files and that which may go into those files in

the future.

The Committee looks forward to a constructive exchange

of views with Director Kelley this morning, with Attorney •

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General Levi tomorrow, and with both the FBI and the Justice

Department in the next months as the Committee considers

recommendations that will strengthen the American people's

confidence in the Federal Bureau of Investigation. That

confidence is vital for the effective enforcement of Federal

law and for the security of the nation against foreign

espionage.

Director Kelley, we are pleased to welcome you, and if

you would have a prepared statement you would like to lead off

with, please proceed.

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STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CLARENCE M. KELLEY,

DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Mr. Kelley. Thank you very much, 'Senator Church and

gentlemen.

I welcome the interest which this Committee has shown in

the FBI and most particularly in our operations in the intelli-

gence and internal security fields.

I share your high regard for the rights guaranteed by the

Constitution and laws of the United States. Throughout my

35 year career in law enforcement you will find the same insis-

tence, as has been expressed by this Committee, upon programs

of law enforcement that are themselves fully consistent with

law.

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I also have strongly supported the concept of legislative

oversight. In fact, at the time my appointment as Director of

the FBI and was being considered by the Senate Judiciary

Committee two and one half years ago, I told the members of

that Committee of my firm belief in Congressional oversight.

This Committee has completed the most exhaustive study

of our intelligence and security operations that has ever been

undertaken by anyone outside the FBI other than the present

Attorney General. At the outset, we pledged our fullest

cooperation and promised to be as candid and forthright as

possible in responding to your guestions and complying with your

requests.

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I believe we have lived up to those promises.

The members and staff of this Committee have had unprece-

dented access to FBI information.

You have talked to the personnel who conduct security-type

investigations and who are personally involved in every facet

of our day-to-day intelligence operations.

You have attended numerous briefings by FBI officials who

have sought to familiarize the Committee and its staff with

all major areas of our activities and operations in the national

security and intelligence fields.

In brief, you have had firsthand examination of these

matters that is unmatched at any time in the history of the

Congress.

As this Committee has stated, these hearings have, of

necessity, forcused largely on certain errors and abuses. I

credit this Committee for its forthright recognition that the

hearings do not give a full or balanced account of the FBI's

record of performance.

It is perhaps in the nature of such hearings to focus

on abuses to the exclusion of positive accomplishments of the

organization.

The Counterintelligence Programs which have received the

lion's share of public attention and critical comment constituted

an infinitesimal portion of our overall work.

A Justice Department Committee which was formed last year

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to conduct a thorough study of the FBI's Counterintelligence

Programs has reported that in the five basic ones it: found

3,247 Counterintelligence Programs were submitted to FBI

Headquarters from 1956 to 1971. Of this total, 2,370,

less than three fourths, were

approved.

I repeat, the vast majority of those 3,247 proposals were

being devised, considered, and many were rejected, in an era

when the FBI was handling an average of 700,000 investigative

matters per year.

Nonetheless, the criticism which has been expressed

regarding the Counterintelligence Programs is most legitimate

and understandable.

The question might well be asked what I had in mind when

I stated last year that for the FBI to have done less than it

did under the circumstances then existing would have been an

abdication of its responsibilities to the American people..

What I said then, in 1974, and what I believe today, is

that the FBI employees involved in these programs did what they

felt was expected of them by the President, the Attorney General,

the Congress, and the people of the United States.

Bomb explosions rocked public and private offices and

buildings; rioters led by revolutionary extremists laid seige

to military, industrial, and educational facilities; and

killings, maimings, and other atrocities accompanied such

acts of violence from New England to California.

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The victims of these acts were human beings, men, women,

and children. As is the case in time of peril, whether real or

perceived, they looked to their Government, their elected and

appointed leadership, and to the FBI and other law enforcement

agencies to protect their lives, their property, and their

rights.

There were many calls for action from Members of Congress

and others, but few guidelines were furnished. The FBI and other

law enforcement agencies were besieged by demands, impatient

demands, for immediate action.

FBI employees recognized the danger; felt they had a

responsibility to respond; and in good faith initiated actions

designed to counter conspiratorial efforts of self-proclaimed

revolutionary groups, and to neutralize violent activities.

In the development and execution of these programs,

mistakes of judgment admittedly were made.

Our concern over whatever abuses occurred in the Counter-

intelligence Programs, and there were some substantial ones,

should not obscure the underlying purpose of those programs.

We must recognize that situations have occurred in the

past and will arise in the future where the Government may well

be expected to depart from its traditional role, in the FBI's

case, as an investigative

and intelligence-gathering

agency, and take affirmative steps which are needed to meet

an imminent threat to human life or property.

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In short, if we learn a murder or bombing' is to be carried

out now, can we truly meet our responsibilities by investigating

only after the crime has occurred, or should we have the

ability to prevent? I refer to those instances where there is

a strong sense of urgency because of an imminent threat to

human life:

Where there exists the potential to penetrate and disrupt,

the Congress must consider the question of whether or not such

preventive action should be available to the FBI.

These matters are currently being addressed by a task

force in the Justice Department, including the FBI,

and I am confident that Departmental guidelines and controls can

be developed in cooperation with pertinent Committees of Congress

to insure that such measures are used in an entirely responsible

manner.

Probably the most important. question here today is what

assurances I can give that the errors and abuses which arose

under the Counterintelligence Programs will not occur again?

First, let me assure the Committee that some very sub-

stantial changes have been made in key areas of the FBI's

methods of operations since I took the oath of office as

Director on July 9, 1973.

Today we place a high premium on openness, openness

both within and without the service.

I have instituted a program of open, frank discussion

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in the decision-making process which insures that no future

program or major policy decision will ever be adopted without

full and critical review of its propriety.

Participatory management has become a fact in the FBI.

I have made it known throughout our Headquarters and

Field Divisions that I welcome all employees, regardless of

position or degree of experience, to contribute their thoughts

and suggestions, and to voice whatever criticisms or

reservations they may have concerning any area of our operations.

The ultimate decisions in the Bureau are mine, and I take

full responsibility for them. My goal is to achieve maximum

critical analysis among our personnel without in any manner

weakening or undermining our basic command structure.

The results.of this program have been most beneficial, to

me personally, to the FBI's disciplined performance, and to

the morale of our employees.

In addition, since some of the mistakes of the past.

were occasioned by direct orders from higher authorities outside

the FBI, we have welcomed Attorney General

• Edward Levi!s

guidance, counsel, and his continuous availability, in his

own words, "as a 'lightning rod' to deflect improper requests."

Within days after taking office, Attorney General Levi

instructed that I immediately report to him any requests

or practices which, in my judgment, were improper or which,

considering the context of the request, I believed presented

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the appearances of impropriety.

I am pleased to report to this Committee as I have to the

Attorney General that during my nearly two and one half years as

Director under two Presidents and three Attorneys General, no

one has approached me or made overtures, directly or otherwise,

to use the FBI for partisan political or other improper

purposes.

I can assure you that I would not for a moment consider

honoring any such request.

I can assure you, too, in my administration of the FBI

I routinely bring to the attention of the Attorney General and

the Deputy Attorney General major policy questions, including

those which arise in my continuing review of our operations

and

practices. These are discussed openly and candidly in order

that the Attorney General can exercise his responsibilities

over the FBI.

I am convinced that the basic structure of the. FBI today

is sound. But it would be a mistake to think that integrity

can be assured only through institutional means..

Integrity is a human quality. It depends upon the

character of the person who occupies the office of the

Director and every member of the FBI under him.

I am proud of the 19,000 men and women with whom it is

my honor to serve today. Their dedication, their professionalism,

their standards, and the self-discipline which they personally

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demand of themselves and expect of their associates are the

nation's ultimate assurance of proper and responsible conduct

at all times by the FBI.

The Congress and the members of this Committee in

particular have gained a great insight into. the. problems

confronting the FBI in the security and intelligence fields,

problems which all too often we have left to resolve without

sufficient guidance from the Executive Branch or the Congress

itself.

As in all human endeavors, errors of juagment have been

made. But no one who is looking for the cause of our

failures should confine his search solely to the FBI, or even

to the Executive Branch.

The Congress itself has long possessed the mechanism for

FBI oversight; yet, seldom has it been exercised.

An initial step was taken in the Senate in 1973 when the

Committee on the Judiciary established a Subcommittee on FBI

Oversight. Hearings had been commenced, and we were fully

committed to maximum participation with the members of that

Subcommittee.

I laud their efforts. However, 'those efforts are of very

recent origin in terms of the FBI's history.

One of the greatest benefits of the study this Committee

has made is the expert knowledge you have gained of the complex

problems confronting the FBI. But I respectfully submit that

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those benefits are wasted if they do not lead to the next step,

a step that I believe is absolutely essential, a legislative

charter, expressing Congressional determination of intelligence

jurisdiction for the FBI.

Action to resolve the problems confronting us in the

security, and intelligence fields is urgently needed; and it

must be undertaken in a forthright manner. Neither the Congress

nor the public can afford to look the other way, leaving it to

the FBI to do what must be done, as too often has occurred in

the past.

This means too that Congress must assume a continuing role

not in the initial decision-making process but in the review of

our performance.

I would caution against a too-ready reliance upon the

courts to do our tough thinking for us. Some proposals that

have been advanced during these hearings would extend the role

of the courts into the early stages of the investigative

process and, thereby, would take over what historically have

been Executive Branch decisions.

I frankly feel that such a trend, if unchecked, would

seriously undermine the independence of the Judiciary and cast

them in a role not contemplated by the authors of our

Constitution. Judicial review cannot-be a substitute for Con-

gressional oversight or Executive decision.

The FBI urgently needs a clear and workable determination

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of our jurisdiction in the intelligence field, a jurisdictional

statement that the Congress finds to be responsive to both

the will and the needs of the American people.

Senators, first and foremost, I am a police officer, a

career police officer. In'my police experience, the must

frustrating of all problems that I have discovered facing

law enforcement in this country, Federal, state, and local, is

when demands are made of them to perform their traditional

role as protector of life and property without clear and

understandable legal bases to do so.

I recognize that the formulation of such a legislative

charter will be a most precise and demanding task.

It must be sufficiently flexible that it does not stifle

the FBI's effectiveness in combating the growing incidence

of crime and violence across the United States. That charter

must clearly address the demonstrated problems of the past;

yet, it must amply recognize the fact that times change and

so also do the nature and thrust of our criminal and subversive

challenges.

The fact that the Department of Justice has commenced

the formulation of operational guidelines governing our

intelligence activities does not in any manner diminish the need

for legislation. The responsibility for conferring juris-

diction resides with the Congress.

In this regard, I am troubled by some proposals which

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question the need for intelligence gathering, suggesting that

information needed for the prevention of violence can be

acquired in the normal course of criminal investigations.

As a practical matter, the line between intelligence

work and regular criminal investigations is often difficult

to describe. What begins as an intelligence investigation may

well end in arrest and prosecution of the subject. But

there

are some fundamental differences between these investigations

that should be recognized, differences in scope, in objective

and in the time of initiation. In the usual criminal case, a

crime has occurred and it remains only for the Government to

identify the perpetrator and to collect sufficient evidence

for prosecution. Since the investigation normally follows

the elements of the crime, the scope of the inquiry is

limited and fairly well defined.

By contrast, intelligence work involves the gathering of

information, not necessarily evidence. The purpose may well be

not to prosecute, but to thwart crime or to insure that the

Government has enough information to meet any future crisis

or emergency. The inquiry is necessarily broad because it

must. tell us not only the nature of the threat, but also whether

the threat is imminent, the persons involved, and the

means by which the threat will be carried out. The ability

of the Government to prevent criminal acts is dependent on

our anticipation of those criminal acts. Anticipation,

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in turn, is dependent on advance information, that is, intelli-

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gence.

Certainly, reasonable people can differ on these issues.

Given the opportunity, I am confident that the continuing need

for intelligence work can be documented to the full satisfaction

of the Congress. We recognize that what is at stake here is not

the interests of the FBI, but rather the interests of every

citizen of this country. We recognize also that the resolution

of these matters will demand extensive and thoughtful.

deliberation by the Congress. To this end, I pledge the

complete cooperation of the Bureau with this Committee or

its successors in this important task.

In any event, you have my unqualified assurance as

Director that we will carry out both the letter and the spirit

of such legislation as the Congress may enact.

That is the substance of my prepared statement.

I would also like to say extemporaneously that I note

that on this panel are some

gentlemen who were on the Judiciary

Committee which heard my testimony at the time I was presented

to them for candidacy as Director of the FBI. At that time

I took very seriously the charge which may possibly result

in the deliberation of this Committee and of the full Senate.

I have been well aware of the problems of the FBI

since that

time. I have also been well aware of the capabilities of

the FBI to discharge those responsibilities. I don't take

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them lightly. I am of sufficient experience and age that I

have pledged myself to do what is good and proper. I say this

not as a self-serving statement but in order that we might

place in context my position within the FBI. I could seek

sanctuary and perhaps a safe sanctuary by saying during the

period these things occurred I was with the local police

department in Kansas City, Missouri. Prior to that time,

however, I was in the FBI.

During the time I was with the FBI, during the time I

was with the police department, I continued throughout that

period a close acquaintance with and a strong affection for

the FBI.

I only want to point out that based on those years, based

on those observations, we have here a very fine and very

sensitive and a very capable organization. I feel that there

is much that can still be done. I know that we are not without

fault. I know that from those experiences I have had..We

will not be completely without fault in the future. But I

assure you that we look upon this inguiry, we look upon any

mandate which you may feel you have, that you should look at -

this is good and proper, and we do not intend -- I only want

to place in your thinking the fact that you have here a

matchless organization, one which I continue to say was

not motivated in some of these instances, and in most of

them, and I cannot justify some, that the motivation was of the

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best. I am not pleading, as does a defense attorney. I am

only putting in your thinking my objective observations as

a citizen who is somewhat concerned about the future of this

organization. It is too precious for us to have it in

a condition of jeopardy.

Thank you very much.

The Chairman. Thank you, Director Kelley.

I want to turn first to Senator Hart who won't be able

to remain through the whole morning. I think he has one

question he would like to ask.

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Senator Hart of Michigan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Mathias and I have Judiciary Committee hearings at 10:30:

Iahve several questions, and I'm sure they'll be

covered by others, but the ones that I have is a result of

reading your testimony and listening to it this morning, and

it relates to your comment at the foot of page 10 and at the

top of 11.

There you are indicating that you caution us about

extending the court's role in the early stages of investigations

suggesting that this might take us beyound the role comtemplated

for the courts under the Constutution.

Now as you have said, aside from the so-called national

security wiretap problem, the main focus of our discussions

and concern has been on the possibility requiring. court

approval for the use of informants, informants directed to

penetrate and report on some group.

And one of the witnesses yesterday, Professor Dorsen,

pointed our that really those informants are the most pervasive

type of an eavesdropping device. It is a human device. It's

really, an informant is really more intrusive on my privacy

than a bug or a tap because he can follow me anywhere. He

can ask me questions to get information the government would

like to have.

Now we certainly involve the courts in approval of the

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of the Constitution to have a neutral third party magistrate

screen use of certain investigative techniques. And the

informant is such a technique. He functions sort of like a

general warrant, and I don't see why requiring court approval

would violate the role envisaged for the courts.

And as I leave, I would like to get your reactions to

my feelings.

Mr. Kelley. I do not feel that there is any use of the

informant in intrusion, which is to this extent objectionable.

It has of course been approved, the concept of the informant,

by numerous court decisions.

Let us go down not to the moral connotation of the use

of the informant.

I think, as in many cases, that is a matter of balance.

You have only very few ways of solving crimes. You have

basically in the use of the informant, I think, the protection

of the right of the victim to be victimized. You have within

the Constitution certain grants that are under ordinary

circumstances abrogation of rights. The right of search and

seizure, which, of course, can't be unreasonable, but none-

theless, you have the right.

I think that were we to lose the right of the informant,

we would lose to a great measure our capability of doing our

job.

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Now I'm not arguing with you, senator, that it is not an

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unusual procedure. I'm not even going to say that it is not

an intrusion, because it is. But it has to be one. I think

that is by virtue of the benefits must be counted.

We don't like to use it. We don't like the problems that

are attendant. We take great care.

Now you say about the court having possibility taking

jurisdiction over them and guiding. I think that possibly we

could present the matter to the court but what are they going

to do insofar as monitoring their effort? Are they going to

have to follow it all the way through?

Also, there is; of course, urgency in the other contacts.

Must the court be contacted for each and approval of the court

given for each contact?

There are a great many problems insofar as administration

of it.

I frankly feel, and again, all I can do is give you my

idea -- I frankly feel that there is a satisfactory control over

the informants as we now exercise it today. Yes, there are

going to be some who will get beyond our control, but this

is going to happen no matter what you do.

Senator Hart of Michigan. Well, I appreciate your

reaction.

I was not suggesting that there is consideration here to

prohibit informants. I was reflecting a view that I felt and

hold that the use of an informant does require some balance, as

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you yourself said, and I would be more comfortable with a

third party making a judgment as to whether the intrusion is

warranted by the particular circumstance.

But I do understand

your position.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Hart.

(Senator Hart leaves the hearing room.)

The Chairman. Senator Baker, do you have questions?

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Mr. Kelley, I have a great respect for you and your

organization and I personally regret that the organization is

in political distress, but we've both got to recognize that

it is, along with other agencies and departments of the

government.

I think you probably would agree with me that even though

that is extraordinarily unpleasant and in many respects

unfortunate, that it also has a plus side. That is, it gives

us an indication of our future direction and the opportunity,

at least, to improve the level of competency and service of

the government itself.

with that hopeful

note, would you be agreeable then to

volunteering for me any suggestions you have on how to improve

the responsiveness of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or

indeed, for any other law enforcement agencies of the government,

to the Congress, to the Attorney General, to the President, and

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beyond that, would you give me any suggestions you have on

how you would provide the methods! the access, the documents,

the records, the authority, for the Congress to perform its

essential, I believe, essential oversight responsibility to

see that these functions, these delicate functions are being

undertaken, properly?

And before you ansver, let me tell you two or three things

I am concerned about.

It hasn't been long ago that the FBI Director was not

even confirmed by the Senate of the United States. I believe

you are the first one to be confirmed by the Senate of the

United States. I think that is a movement in the right

direction. I think the FBI has taken on a stature that, an

additional importance that requires it to have closer supervision

and scrutiny by us.

At the same time I rather doubt that we can become

involved in the daily relationship between you and the Attorney

General.

Therefore, I tend to believe that the Attorney General

needs to be more directly involved in the operations of the

FBI.

I would appreciate any comments on that.

Second, I rather believe that major decisions of the

intelligence community and the FBI ought to be in writing, so

that the Congress can, if it needs to in the future, take a

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look at these decisions and the process by which they were

made to decide that you are of you are not performing your

services diligently.

I don't think you can have oversight unless you have

access to records, and in many cases records don't exist

and in some cases the people who made those decisions are now

departed and in other cases you have conflicts.

How would you suggest then that you improve the quality

of service of your agency? How would you propose that you

increase the opportunity for oversight of the Congress of the

• United States? What other suggestions do you have for improving

the level of law enforcement in the essential activity that

is required?

ix. Kelley. I would possibly be repetitious in answering

this Senator, but I get a great deal of pleasure from telling

what I think is necessary and what I hope that I have followed,

one which is beyond my control, but which I think is very

important is that the position of Director, the one to which

great attention should be paid in choosing the man who will

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over me, did a pretty good job. I feel that it is most

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necessary that care be taken that his philosophy, his means

of management, his facility to adapt to change, his tendency

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that he be villing to, for example, go through oversight with

no reticence, and that I think that he should be chosen very

carefully.

I think further that he should be responsible for those

matters which indicate impropriety or illegality.

Senator Baker. Could you stop foi just a second? Who

does he work for? Does the Director, in your view, work for

the President of the United States, for the Attorney General,

for the Justice Department, for the Executive Branch?

Who does the executive. of the FBI, the Director of the

FBI, be responsible to,, who should he be responsible to?

Mr. Kelley. Jurisdictionally, to the Attorney General,

but I think this is such an important field of influence that

it is not at all unlikely that we can expand it to the

judiciary, the legislative, and of course, we are under the

Attorney General.

Senator Baker. Do you have any problems with the idea

of the President of the United States calling the Director öf

the FBI and asking for performance of a particular task?

Does that give you any difficulty? Or do you think that

the relationship between the FBI Director and the President

is such that that is desirable, or should it be conduited

through the Ittorney General?

Mr. Kelley. I think it should be in the great majority

of the cases conduited through the Attorney Genéral. There

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has been traditionally some acceptance of the fact that if

the President wants to see

and talk with the Director, he

may do so, call him directly.

It has been my practice in such an event to thereafter

report to the Attorney General, whoever it might be, that I

have been called over and I discussed and was told. And this

was revealed in full to them.

Senator Baker. I suppose we could pass a statute that

says the President has to go

through the Attorney General,

although I rather suspect it would be a little presumptuous.

But to go the next step, do you think it is necessary

for the pursuit of effective oversight on the part of the

Congress, to have some sort of document written, or at least

some sort of account of a Presidential order or an order of

the Attorney General given to a Director of the FBI?

Do you think that these things need to be handled in

a more formal way?

Mx. Kelley. Personally, it would be my practice in

the event I receive such an order, to request that it be

documented: This is a protection as well as a clarification

as to whether or not it should be placed as part of legislation.

I frankly would like to reserve that for some more considera-

tion.

I don't know whether it would be, but I think that it

can be worked very easily.

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Senator Baker.

Mr. Kelley, Attorney General Levi, I

believe, has already established some sort of agency or

function within the Department that is serving as the equivalent,

I suppose, of an Inspector General of the Justice Department,

including the FBI.

Are you familiar with the steps that Mr. Levi has

taken in that respect?

I think he calls it the Office.of

Professional Responsibility.

Mr. Kelley. Yes, sir, I'm familiar with it.

Senator Baker.

Do you have any comment on that? Will

you give us any observations

as to whether you think that

will be useful, helpful, or whether it will not be useful or

helpful, how it affects the fBI, how you visualize your

relationship to it in the future?

Mr. Kelley. I don't öbject to this, which is to sóme

extent an oversight within the Department of Justice under the

Attorney General.

Frankly, it just came out. I have not considered it

completely, but to the general concept, yes, I very definitely

subscribe.

Senator Baker.

How would you feel about extending that

concept of government-wide operation, a national Inspector

General who is involved with an oversight of all of the

agencies of government as they interface with the Constitutionally

protected rights of the individual citizen? Would you care

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to comment on that, or would you rather save that for a while?

Mr. Kelley. I would like to reserve that one.

Senator Baker. I'm not surprised. Would you think about

it and let us know what you think about it?

Mr. Kelley. I will..

Senator Baker. All right. Mr. Chairman, thank you very

much.

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The Chairman. Senator Huddleston.

, Senator Huddleston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Kelley, you describe on page 4 the conditions that

existed when much of the abuse that we have talked about during

this inquiry occurred, indicating that the people within the

Bureau felt like they were doing what was expected of them

by the President, by the Attornéy General, the Congress and

the people of the United States.

Does not this

s suggest that there has been a reaction

there to prevailing attitudes that might have existed in the

country because of certain circumstances rather than any

clear and specific direct instructions that might have been

received from proper authorities? And if that is the case,

is it possible in developing this charter, this guideline,

to provide for that kind of specific instruction?

Mr. Kelley. I think so, yes. •I think that they can

logically be incorporated and that

Senator Huddleston. You can see there would be a continuing

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danger if any agency is left to simply react to whatever the

attitudes may be.at a specific time in this country because --

Mr. Kelley. Senator; I don't contemplate it might be

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guidepost whereby we can, in the event such a need seems

to arise, know what we can do.

Senator lluddleston. Well, in pursuing the area which

Senator Hart was discussing, that is whether of not we can

provide sufficient guidelines would replace a decision by the

court in determining what action might be proper and specific.-

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desirable. How do we keep that informant operating within the

proper limits so that he in fact is not violating individual

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rights?

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be placed on the agent and the supervision of the FBI to assure

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that there is no infringement of rights.

Senator Huddleston. But

this is an aware we've gotten

into some difficulty in the past. We have assumed that the

particular action was necessary, that there was a present

threat that some intelligence prograns should be initiated, but.

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in many cases it has gone beyond what would appear to have been

necessary to have addressed the original threat.

How do we keep within the proper balance there?

Mr. Kelley. Well, actually, it's just about like any

other offense. It is an invasion of the other individual's

right and it is by an officer and an FBI agent is an officer.

There's the possibility of criminal prosecution against him.

This is one which I think might flow if le counsels

the informant.

Now insofar as his inability to control the informant,

I don't suppose that would warrant prosecution, but there is

still supervisory control over that agent and over that

informant by insisting that control is exercised on a continuing

basis.

Senator Huddleston. It brings up an interesting point

as to whether or not a law enforcenent agency ought to be

very alert to any law violations of its own members or anyone

else.

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If a White House official asks the FBI or someone to do

something unlawful, the question seems to me to occur as to

whether of not that is not a violation that should be reported

by the FBI.

Mr. Kelley. I think that any violation which comes to

our attention should either be handled by us or the proper

authority.

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Senator Huddleston. But that hasn't been the case in the

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Mr. Kelley. Well, I don't know what you're referring

to but I would think your statement is proper.

Senator Huadleston. Well, we certainly have evidence

of unlavful activity taking place in various projects that

have been undertaken, which certainly were not brought to

light willingly by the FBI or by other law enforcement agencies

The question that. I'm really concerned about is as

we attempt to draw a guideline and charters that would give

the Agency the best flexibility that they may need, a wide

range of threats, how do we control what happens within each

of those actions to keep them from going beyond what

was intended to begin with?

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Mr. Kelley. You're still speaking of informants.

Senator Huddleston. Not only informants but the agents

themselves as they go into surveillance, wiretaps, Or whatever

intelligence gathering techniques.

The original thrust of my question was, even though we

may be able to provide guidelines of a broad nature, how do

we control the techniques that might be used, that int themselves

might be used, that in themselves might be a serious violation

of the rights.

Mr. Kelley. Well, first, I don't know whether it's

germane to your question but I do feel that it should be pointed

out that the association to, the relationship between the

informant and his agent handler is a very confidential one,

and i doubt very seriously whether we could have any guide-

lines, where there might be an extension of any monitors here

because thereby you do have a destruction of that relationship.

Insofar as the activities of agents, informants of others

which may be illegal, we have on many occasions learned of

violations of the law on the part of informants, and either

prosecuted ourselves, through the reporting of it to the

United States Attorney, or turned it over to the local authority.

We have done this on many a time, many occasions. Insofar

as our own personnel, we have an internal organization, the

Inspection Division, which reviews this type of activity, and

if there be any violation, yes, no question about it, we would

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pursue it to the point of prosecution.

Senator Huddleston. But it could be helped by periodic

review.

Mr. Kelley. We do, on an annual basis, review the

activities of our 59 offices through that same Inspection

Division, and they have a clear charge to go over this as well

as other matters.

Senator Huddleston. Mr. Kelley, you pointed: out the

difference in the approaches when gathering intelligence, in

gathering evidence after a crime has been committed.

Would there be any advantage, or would it be feasible to

attempt to separate these functions within the Agency, in the

departments, for instance, with not having a nixing of

gathering intelligence and gathering evidence? Are the techniques

definable and different?;

Mr. Kelley. Senator, I think they are compatible.

see no objection to the way that they are now being handled

on a management basis. I think, as a matter of fact, it is

a very fine association whereby the intelligence, stemming as

it does from a substantive violation, is a natural complement.

Senator Huddleston. Now, another area, the FBI furnishes

information to numerous government agencies.

Is this properly restricted and controlled at the present

time in your judgment as to just who can ask the FBI for

information, what kind of information they can ask for, and

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who might also be inclined to call the Director and ask him

to do specific things?

Could there be some clearcut understanding as to whether

or not the Director would be obligated to undertake any such

project, that just anybody at the White House might suggest?

Mr. Kelley. It's very clear to me that any request must

come, from MI. Buchen's office, and that it be, in any case,

wherein it is a request for action, that it be followed with

a letter so requesting.

This has come up before during the Watergate hearings, as

I think it has been placed very vividly in our minds, in

take care that you just don't follow the request of some .

underling who does not truly reflect the desire of the President.

Senator Huddleston. Just one more question about

techniques, aside from the guidelines of authority on broad

projects undertaken.

Would it be feasible from time to time in a Congressional

oversight committee, would be able to discuss with the Department,

with the Bureau various techniques so that they could have

some input as to whether or not these actions are consistent.

with the overall guidelines, to start with, and consistent

with the very protections?

Mr. Kelley. Senator, I have already said.to.the

översight committee of the Senate that so far as I can now

see, the only thing that would be withheld is the identity of

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probably even more importantly, what restrictions can be put

on the use of that information once it has been supplied by

the FBI?

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Mr. Kelley. I think so, Senator.

Senator Huddleston. You think there are proper restrictions

now?

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Mr. Kelley. I don't know that we can ourselves judge

in all cases whether or not there is good and sufficient reason

for an Agency to inquiry. I think that there should be a

very close delineation by the agencies as to what they're

going to ask for, but I think that we do have sufficient rules

that at least to us we are satisfied.

Senator Huddleston. You're confident that the information

your agency supplies is not being misused, to the detriment

of the rights of any individuals.

Mr. Kelley. Senator, I'm only confident in what I

do myself. I would say that I am satisfied.

Senator Huddleston. I was wondering whether some

inclusion ought to be made in whatever charter is made as to

who specifically can request, what limits ought to be placed

on what the request, and what they can do with it after they

get it.

Mr. Kelley. Yes.

Senator Huddleston. I have some concern about the fact

that in intelligence gathering, you gather, you are just

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bound to gather a great deal of information about some

individual that is useless as far as the intent of the intelli-

gence gathering is concerned, but might be in some way embarras-

sing or harmful to the individual, whether or not there's any

effort to separate this kind of information out of a person's

file that is really initiated for a purpose, for a specific

purpose unrelated to this information.

Is there any effort, or could any direction be given to

doing that?

Mr. Kelley. We would be very happy to work under the

guidelines or rules or anything else to purge material which

is extraneous, irrelevant, or for any other reason objection-

able.

Senator Huddleston. And how about the length of time

that these files are kept in the agency?

Mr. Kelley. We are willing to work within that framework,

too.

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Senator Huddleston. I think that might be done.

Now, I think in developing the chain of command, so to

speak, it certainly would be very difficult to prevent the

President of the United States from calling up the head of

the FBI or anyone else and discussing any law enforcement

problem hé might so desire, and perhaps even give direction

to the agency.

But how about that?

What about White House personnel

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informants. We'll discuss techniques, we'll discuss our

present activities. I think this is the only way that we can

exchange our opinions and get accomplished what you want to

accomplish and what I want to accomplish.

Senator Huddleston. I feel that is an important aspect

of it because even though you have a charter which gives broad

direction for all the guidelines and to the types of projects

that enter into it, if we don't get down to specifics, such

things as how intelligence is to be collected, how evidence

is to be collected, what is done after it is collected, this

type of thing, it seems to me we are leaving a wide gap

again for the Bureau to assume that it has total instruction

and total permission to move in a certain direction and go

beyond what is intended or what was authorized.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Director.

The Chairman. Senator Goldwater?

Senator Goldwater. Mr. Kelley, as part of the FBI

electronic surveillance of DI. King, several tapes of

specific conversations, and later a composite King tape were

produced.

Are these tapes still in the possession of the FBI?

Mr. Kelley. Yes, sir.

Senator Goldwater. Have they been reviewed by you?

Mr. Kelley. No, sir.

Senator Goldwater. Have they been reviewed by any of your

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staff, to your knowledge?

Mr. Kelley. Senator, I think that they have been reviewed.

I know that at least some have reviewed it within the area of

this particular section. There has been no review of them

since I came to the FBI, I can tell you that.

Senator Goldwater. Would these tapes be available to

the Connittee if the Committee felt they would like to hear

them?

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Mr. Kelley. This, Senator Goldwater, is a matter which is

of, as I said before, some delicacy, and there would have to

be a discussion of this in an executive session.

The Chairman. I might say in that connection that the

Committee staff gave some consideration to this matter and •

decided that it would compound the original error for the

staff to review the tapes, because that would be a still

further invasion of privacy, and so the staff refrained from

insisting on obtaining the tapes, believing that it was

unnecessary, and quite possibly improper, in order to get at

what. we needed to know about the king case.

So the staff did refrain, and for that reason the issue

never came to a head. I just wanted to lay that information

before the Senator.

Senator Goldwater. I realize that's a prerogative of

the staff, but it's also the prerogative of the Committee if,

and I'm not advocating it, if we wanted to hear them to

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ourselves whether Mr. Hoover was off on a wild goose chase

or whether there was, in effect, some reason. Again, I am

not advocating it, I am merely asking à question. They would

be available if the Committee took a vote to hear them and

decided on it.

Mr. Kelley. I don't think it would be within my juris-

diction to respond to this, Senator. It would have to be the

Attorney General.

Senator Goldwater. I see.

Now, are these tapes and other products of surveillance

routinely retained even äfter an individual ceased to be a

target of inquiry?

Mr. Kelley. They are retained usually for ten years.

Senator Goldwater. Ten years.

Mr. Kelley. Yes, sir.

Senator Goldwater. What is the future value, if any,

to the Bureau of retaining such information?

Mr. Kelley. If there be guidelines that set out a

destruction or erasure, we will abide by it. We will, on those

occasions where we think that matters might come up within

that period of time which may need the retention of them, we

will express our opinion at that time, but other than that

we would be guided by guidelines.

Senator Goldwater. Is it your view that legitimate

law enforcement needs should outweigh privacy considerations

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with respect to retention of such information, or do we need

the clear guidelines on the destruction of these materials

when the investigation purposes for which they were collected.

have been served?

Mr. Kelley. We feel that there should be a good close

look at the retention of material, and we would of course like

to have an input. But we welcome consideration of this.

Senator Goldwater. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

Thank

you very much.

The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Mondale?

Senator Mondale. Mr. Director, it seems to me that the

most crucial question before the Congress is to accept the

invitation of the FBI to draw Congressionally imposed lines,

limits of authority so the FBI will know clearly what you can

and cannot do, so you will not be subject to later juagments,

and the question is, where should that line be drawn?

As you know, in 1924 when the FBI was created, and

Mr. Stone later became the Chief Justice, he drew the line at

criminal law enforcement. He said that never again will we

go beyond the authority-imposed upon us to get into political

ideas. We will stay in the area of law enforcement.

Would you not think it makes a good deal of sense to

draw the guidelines in a way that your activities are

restricted to the enforcement of the law, investigations of

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crime, investigations of conspiracies to commit crime rather

than to leave this very difficult to define and control area

of political ideas?

Mr. Kelley. I don't know whether I understand your last

statement of involving the area of political ideas. I say that

I feel that certainly we should be vested and should continue

in the field of criminal investigations as an investigatory

objective. These are conclusions, of course, which are based

on statutes in the so-called security field, national or

foreign.

These are criminal violations. I feel that they should

be in tandem. I feel, having worked many years in this

atmosphere, that you have more ears and eyes and you have

more personnel working together, covering the same fields..

I do not think there should be a separation of the intelligence

matters, because it is a concomitant: It naturally flows

from the investigation of the security matters and the

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criminal.

Senator Mondale. Mr: Kelley, what MI: Stone said was

this, that the Bureau of investigation is not concerned

with political or other opinions of individuals. It is

concerned only with such conduct as is forbidden by the laws

of the United States. When the police system goes beyond

these limits, it is dangerous to proper administration of

justice and human liberty.

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Do you object to that definition?

Mr. Kelley. I think that life has become much more

sophisticated and we have added to the so-called policeman's

area of concern some matters which were probably not as important

at that time. I think that the fact that the FBI has been in

touch with the security investigations and the gathering of

intelligence is something which has proved to be at times

troublesome and given us great concern, but it is a viable,

productive procedure.

I don't know what Mr. Stone was thinking of entirely

of this course, but I can tell you about the procedure today:

Senator Mondale. You see, I think you recognize, if

that further step is taken, as you're recommending here, that

at that point it becomes so difficult to guarantee, and in

fact, in my opinion, impossible to guarantee that we won't

see a recurrence of some of the abuses that we've seen in

the past, and I don't know how you establish any kind of

meaningful oversight.on a function as nebulous as the one

you've just defined.

If the FBI possesses the authority to investigate

ideas that they consider to be threats to this nation's

security, particularly in the light of the record that we have

seen how that definition can be stretched to include pracii-

cally everybody, including moderate civil rights leaders,

war dissenters and so on, how on earth can standards be developed

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that would provide any basis for oversight?

How can you, from among other things, be protected from

criticism later on that you exceeded your authority or didn't

do something that some politician tried to pressure you into

doing?

Mr. Kelley. It might well be, Senator, that ten years

from now a Director of the FBI will be seated here and will be'

criticized for doing that which today is construed as very

acceptable.

Senator Mondale. Correct. And I have great sympathy

for the predicament the FBI finds itself in.

Mr. Kelley. And the Director.

Senator Mondale. And the Director especially, and that is

why I think it's in the interest of the FBI to get these lines

as sharply defined as possible, so that when you are pressured

to do things, or when, after the fact, people with good 20/20

hindsight can criticize you or the Bureau, that you can say

well, here are the standards that you gave us, and they specific-

ally say this, and that is your answer.. We

have to live by

the law. If we don't define it specifically, it seems to me

that these excesses could reoccur, because. I don't think it's

possible to define then, and the FBI is inevitably going to

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be kicked back and forth, depending on personal notions of what

you should have done.

Don't you fear that?

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Mr. Kelley. Not too much, Senator. I think we learned a

great lesson by virtue of Watergate, the revelations that have

come up as a result of this Committee's inquiries, the fact

that I think that we have a different type of spirit today

in the Bureau, the fact that, as I said before, you came in,

that I think the Bureau is a matchless organization, and they

are eager to do that which is vital and proper, and the fact

that we are getting a number of very fine young people in the

organization, people of the other ethnic backgrounds than we•

had years ago. I think there is a greater understanding in

the Bureau today of what is the proper type of conduct.

We may not be able to project this on all occasions,

because we must equate this with the need and with our

experience, but if the precise guidelines be the goal, you're

going to have trouble. If, on the other hand, there be a

flexibility, I think that we can work very well within those

guidelines.

Senator Mondale. I think, as you know, I don't think

there is a better trained or higher professionally qualified

law enforcement organization in the world than the FBI. I

think we all agrèe it is superb. But the problem has been,

from time to time, that when you go beyond the area of

enforcing the law into the area of political ideas, that you

are subject to and in fact you leave the criminal field, you

get into politics. And that is where, it seems to me, that the

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great controversy exists, and where you are almost inevitably

going to be subjected to fierce criticism in the future, no

matter how you do it. Once you get into politics, you get

into trouble.

Mr. Kelley. I agree to that, and I point out that in almost

every branch of the government and in every part, as a matter

of fact, every segment of our society, there are some who deviate

from the normal course. I feel that within the Bureau there is

less likelihood of this to happen, and I think that working

with you we can at least make some achievements that will be

significant.

Now, whether it be lasting, I don't think so, but I

think we've made a good start.

Senator Mondale. In your speech in Montreal on August

9th, you said we must be willing to surrender a small measure

of our liberties to preserve the great bulk of them.

which liberties did you have in mind?

Mr. Kelley. Well, of course, this speech has been mis

understood many, many times.

Senator Mondale.

Well, I want you to have

. a chance to

clear it up.

Mr. Kelley. All that was intended here was a restatement

of the approach which the courts historically have used in

resolving most issues of Constitutional importance, and its

recognition that rights are not susceptible to absolute

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protection. It's a matter of balance. Even in the Fourth

Amendment, for example, which protects the right of privacy, it

does not prohibit searches and seizures. I mention, it only

refers to those that are unreasonable.

I came from the police fiedd. What is more restrictive

to more people than traffic regulation? But what would be

more chaotic is of you did not have traffic regulation. We

do have to , in order to love in the complexities and

intricacies of today's life, have to give up some of our

rights.

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Some may construe this as an extravagant statement. If it

is os, I wish to say that I only was pointing out that there

has to be a balance:

Senator Mondale. So that when you say we have to give :

up some liberties, or as you just said, some rights, what you

mean -- let me ask. Let me scratch: that and ask again, you

have to give up some tights.

Which rights would you have us

give up?

Mr. Kelly. Well, under the Fourth Amendment you would

have the right for search and seizure.

Senator Mondale. "You wouldn't give up the Fourth Amend-

ment right.

Mr. Kelley. Oh, no not the right.

Senator Mondale.

What right do you have in mind?

Mr. Kelley. The right to be free from search and seizure.

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Senator Mondale.

There's no such right in the Consti-

tution. You can have such seizures, but they must be reasonable,

under court warrant.

• Did you mean to go beyond that?

Mr. Kelley. That's right.

Senator Mondale. That you should be able to go beyond

that?

Mr. Kelley. No, no. I do not mean that we should ever

go beyond a Constitutional right guarantee.

Senator Mondale. Well, would you say, Mr. Kelley, that

that sentence might have been inartful in your speech?

Mr. Kelley. I said that if it was misunderstood, I

made a mistake, because I should never make a statement which

yes, it was inartful.

Senator Mondale. I think I know about your record in

law enforcement well enough to tell you that I think you were

saying something different, that it was taken to mean something

different than I think you intended:

What you are saying is that in the exercise of your law

enforcement powers, the rights of individuals is determined

by the laws and the courts, but the courts, in the handling

of those issues, have to balance rights and other values.

That's what you're essentially saying, is that correct?

Mr. Kelley. Senator, I ought to have you write my

speeches so that I don't have any misunderstandings. I didn't

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understand that to be at the time anything that was unusual.

I have to admit that maybe I made a mistake.

Senator Mondale. What you are saying in effect is that

in effect, the rights: of the American people can be determined

not by the director of the FBI but by the courts and by the

law.

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You meant that.

Mr. Kelley. Indeed, yes, sir.

Senator Mondale.

All right.

Thank you.

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The Chairman. Senator Hart.

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Senator Of Colorado. Mr. Kelley, in response to

a question by Senaotr Mondale, one. of his first questions about

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laying down guidelines, it seems to me what you were saying was

we could work together.

That is to say the Bureau and the

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Congress, lay down guidelines that would not unreasonably

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But I think implicit in his question was also an area

that you didn't respond to, and that is how do you, what kind

of guidelines do you lay down to protect you and the Bureau

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from political pressure, the misuse of the Bureau by political

figures, particularly in the white House?

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predecessors, if not more, obviously were corrupted and Mr.

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restrictions so you could get on with your job, but that is

not what Senator Mondale and the rest of us are interested in.

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What kindof restrictions can we lay down to protect you

from political pressures? I'd be interested in that sign of the

coin, if you would.

Mr. Kelley. I would welcome any guidelines which would

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protect me or any successor from this type of thing. I think

that would be splendid. I have not reviewed the guidelines

as prepared to the present date by the Department. It might

be that they are well defined in there. But I welcome any

consideration of such directives.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Do you think this is a problem?

Mr. Kelley. No, sir, not with me.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Do you think that it has been

a problem for the people that preceded you?

Mr. Kelley. I think so..

Senator Hart of Colorado. And that's a problem the

Congress ought to address?

Mr. Kelley. I think so.

Senator fart of Colorado. The Committee received a

letter from the Department of Justice a couple of days, the

Assistant Attorney General asking our cooperation in carrying

out the investigation or their efforts to review the investi-

gation conducted by the FBI into the death of Martin Luther

King, Jr., in order to determine whether that investigation

should be re-opened. They asked our cooperation, they asked

for our transcripts, the testimony before the Conmittee, all

material provided to the Committee by the FBI which relates

to Dr. King and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

I guess my question is this: Why is the Justice Depart-

ment asking this Committee for FBI files?

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Mr. Kelley.. I don't think they're asking for files.

I think they're asking for what testimony was given by

witnesses whose testimony has nöt been given up. I don't know.

Senator Hart of Colorado. I'll quote it. "And all

material provided to the Committee by the FBI which relates

to DI. King and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference."

I repeat the question. Why is the Justice Department

asking this Committee for material provided to us by the

FBI?

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Mr. Kelley. Frankly, I don't know.

Do you mind if I

just ask --

(Pause)

Mr. Kelley. I am informed, and I knew this one..

Everything that was sent to you was sent through them. Did

they have a copy also? Yes, they had a retained copy. I

don't know why

Senator Hart of Colorado. So there's nothing you

provided us that's not available to the Justice Department?

Mr. Kelley. That's right.

Senator Hart of Colorado. And you can't account for why

an official of the Justice Department would ask this Committee

for your records?

Mr. Kelley. No, sir.

Senator Ilart of Colorado. You released a statement on

November the 18th of '74 regarding the FBI's. counter-intelligence

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program and you said you made a detailed study of COINTELPRO

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Committee and he stated he told the FBI on a number of.

occasions he planned violent acts against black people in

groups. And yet, he said few, if any, instances in which the

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How does his testimony square with your statement that

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Mr. Kelley. It doesn't, and I don't know if any of

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his statements contrary to what we have said is the truth.

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activities and reached the following conclusions, and I quote:

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"The purpose of these counter-intelligence programs was

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to prevent dangerously and potentially deadly acts against

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individuals, organizations and institutions both public

and private across the United States."

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Now we had an FBI informant in the other day before this

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and we know of no instances where,. for example, 15 minutes

and that type of thing has been substantiated.

Senator Hart of Colorado. You're saying the testimony

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he gave us under oath was not accurate?

Mr. Kelley. Right.

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• Senator Hart of Colorado. You also said in that statement,

and I quote: "I want to assure you that Director lloover did

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not conceal from superior authorities the fact that the FBI

was engaged in neutralizing and disruptive tactics against

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revolutionary and violence-prone groups.

Now the Committee has

received testimony that the New

Left COINTELPRO programs was not in fact told to higher

authorities, the Attorney Gereral and Congress.

Do you have any information in this regard?

I know in that statement you cite onw or two instances,

but in terms of the bulk of COINTEL programs, the record

seems to date at least to be clear that there was not systematic

information flowing upward through the chain of command to

Director Hoover's superiors?.

Mr. Kelley: May I ask that I be given the opportunity

to substantiate that with documentation?

Senator Hart of Colorado. Sure.

Mr.. Kelley: Or respond to it.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Dorector Kelley, just in

passing, do you agree with the statement madé by President

Ford that those responsible for harassing and trying to destroy

Dc. King should be brought to justice.

Mc. Kelley. Those who directly responsible and upon. whese orders

the activities were taken responsible. I don't know if he intended to say

that, but if he did not, I would say that it would be more proper. Insofar

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as my own opinion is concerned, that it be centered on those who said

' to do it and those who are responsible.

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I: took the responsibility for any such program and I

don't expect that those under me would be not acting in

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accordance with what they think is proper and may even have

some reservation, but they do it on my orders. I accept that

responsibility.

I think that it should rest.on those who instructed that

that be done.

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Senator Hart of Colorado. But you agree that the people

who give the orders should be brought to justice.

Mr. Kelley. I do.

The Chairman. Aren't they all dead?

Mr. Kelley. No.

The Chairman. Not quite?

Mr. Kelley. Not quite.

Senator Hart of Colorado. That's all, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.

Director Kelley, in the Committee's review of the

COINTELPRO program and other political involvements of the

FBI, it seems to me that we have encountered two or three

basic questions.

Since the investigation is over insofar as the Committee

is concerned, we're now turning our attention to remedies for

the future, what I would think would be our constructive

legislative work, it is very important that we focus on what

we learned in that investigation.

And one thing that we have learned is that Presidents of

the United States have fron time to time ordered the FBI to

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obtain for them certain kinds of information by exercising the

necessary surveillance to obtain. and to have a purely

political character, that they simply wanted to have for their

own personal purposes.

I think that you

I would agree that that is not a proper

function of the FBI,, and you agree.

Xet it's awfully difficult for anyone in the rBI,

including the Director, to turn down a president of the United

States if he receives a direct order from the President. It

is always possible, of course, to say no, and if you insist,

I will resign. But that puts a very hard burden on any man

serving in your position, particularly if the President puts

à good face on the request and makes it sound plausible or

even invents some excuse. It is alvays easy for him to say.

you know, I an considering Senator White, for an important

position in my administration, and I need to know more about

his activities, particularly of late. I've had some cause

for concern and I want to be certain that there is nothing in

his record that would later embarrass me, and I just want you

to keep careful track of him and report to me on what he's

been doing lately.

It's difficult for you to say back to the President, ir:

president, that's a very questionable activity for the Fbi,

and I frankly don't believe that you've given me the real

reason why you want this man followed. I think his opposition

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to your current policy is politically embarrassing to you and

you want to get something on him.:

I mean, you know, the Director can hardly talk back that

way, and I'm wondering what we cauld do in the way of protecting

your office and the FBI from political exploitation in this

basic charter that we write.

Now, I want your suggestions, but let's begin with one

or two of mine. I would like your response.

If we were to write into the law that any order given you

either by the President or by the Attorney General should be

transmitted in writing and should clearly state the objective

and purpose of the request and that the FBI would maintain

those written orders and that furthermore they would be

available to any oversight committee of the Congress. If the

joint conmittee on intelligence is established, that committee

would have access to such a file.

So that the committee itself would be satisfied that

orders were not being given to the FBI that were improper or

unlawful.

What would you think of writing a provision of that kind

into a charter for the FBI?

Ix. Kelley. I would say writing into the law any order

issued by. the President that is a request for action by the

Attorney General should be in writing, is certainly, in my

opinion, is a very plausible solution. I'm sure that in

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contemplation of this there would be some that will say yes

or some that will say no, but I think we could define an

area where you are trying to cure the abuses and we could

do that.

Now as to the availability to any oversight committee

of Congress, I would say generaily that I certainly would have

no objection to this, but I again, there may be some request

for something of high confidentiality that the Prèsident might

put in writing such as some national or foreign security

matter.

I would like to have such a consideration be given a

great deal of thought and that the oversight committee review

be conditioned with that possibility. I don't think it would

present a problem.

I have said previously that I feel I can discuss every-.

thing except the identity of the informants to the oversight.

committee. I welcome that.

The Chairman. Well, that has been of course the way we

proceeded with this Committee. It has worked pretty well,

I think.

Now Senator Goldwater brought up a question on the

Martin Luther King tapes. I would like to pursue that question.

If these tapes do not contain any evidence that needs

to be preserved for ongoing criminal investigations, and since

DI. King hàs long since been violently removed from the scene,

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why are they preserved? Why aren't they simply destroyed?

Is there a problem that we can help through new law to enable

the FBI to remove from its files so much of this information

that is has collected that it is no longer needed or may never

have connected the person with any criminal activity? And

yet, all of that information just stays there in the files

year after year.

ithat can we do? How can a law be changed? If that's

not the problem, then what is? ihy are these tapes still down

there at the FBI?

Mr. Kelley. Mell, of course, we do have the rule that

they are maintained ten years. Now why the rule is your

question and why right now are they maintained? Since we

do maintain everything since the inquiry has started and until

that's lifted, ve can't destroy anything.

I would say that this is a proper area for guidelines

or legislation and ayain, as I have said, there should be

some flexibility and I know that's a broad statement but there

might he some areas wherein that the subject of the investigation

himself may want them retained because it shows his innocence.

I think you have to deliberate this very carefully, but

it can be done and we are willing to be guided by those

rules:

The Chairman. Let ne ask you this. The FBI is conducting

thousands of investigations every year on possible appointees

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to Federal positions. As a natter of fact, the only time I

ever see an FBI agent is when he comes around and flashes his

badge and asks me a question or two about what I know of Mr.

so and so, who's being considered for an executive office.

And we have a very brief conversation in which I tell him that

as far as I know, he's a loyal and patriotic citizen, and that

is about the extent of it.

Then when this file is completed and the person involved

is either appointed or not appointed, what happens to that

file? I know it's full of all kinds of gossip because it is

in the nature of the investigation to go out to his old

neighborhoods and talk to everybody who might have known him.

What happens to the file? Is that just retained forever?

Mr. Kelley. We have some capability of destroying some

files and they are rather lengthy insofar as retention. We

have some archival rules which govern the retention of mateial

and is developed in cases

involving certain members of the

Executive Branch of the

government.

I see no reason why this would not he a proper area

for consideration of legislation.

The Chairman. Can you give me any idea of how much --

do you have records that would tell us how much tine and money

is being spent by the FBI just in conducting these thousands

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to Federal offices?

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HI. Kelley. I feel confident we can get it. I do not

have it now, but if you would like to have the annual cost

for the investigation of Federal appointees --

The Chairman. Yes. Plus, you know, plus any other

information that would indicate to us what proportion of the

time and effort of the FBI was absorbed in this kind of

activity.

Mr. Kelley. I can tell' you it is relatively small, but

I can get you, I think, the exact amount of time and the

approximate expense.

The Chairman. I wish you would do that because this is

a matter we need riore information about. And when you supply

that data to the Committee, would you also supply the number

of such investigations each year?

You know, I don't expect you to go back 20 or 25 years,

but give us a good idea

of the last few years. For example,

enough to give us an idea of how much time and how broad the

reach of these investigations may be.

Mr. Kelley. Through '70?

The Chairman. That would be sufficient, I would think.

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The other matter that is connected to this same subject

that I would like your best judgment on is whether these

investigations could not be linited to offices of sensitivity.

That is to say where legitimate national security interest might

be involved so that there is a reason to make a close check on.

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past associations, attitudes and expressions of belief.

I have often wondered whether we couldn't eliminate

routine Federal offices that are not particularly sensitive

in the national security sense from the reach of these FBI

checks.

And so when you respond to the series of questions, I

wish you would include the offices that are now covered by

such checks and give us an idea of how far down into the

Federal bureaucracy this extends.

Could you do that?

Mr. Kelley. Yes, sir.

The Chairnan. Fine.

Now there is a vote. The vote always comes just at

the wrong time, but Mr. Schwarz wants to ask you some additional

questions for the record, and there may be other questions,

too that would be posed by the staff, after which I will as!

Mr. Schwarz to adjourn the hearings. It looks like we're going

to be tied up on the floor with votes.

But before I leave I want to thank you for your testimony,

iir. Kelley, and to express my appreciation to. you for the

way you have cooperated with the Committee in the course of

its investigation during the past months.

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Mr. Kelley: Thank you.

The Chairman. And I hope, as you do, that as a result

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the FbI that will help to remedy many of the problems ve'1l

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Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Kelley, I'll try to be very brief.

On page 5 of your statement -

Mr. Kelley. What?

MI. Schwarz. On page 5 of your statement, the third

full paragraph, you said the following, and I would like then

to question about what you said.

"We must recognize that

situations have occurred in the past and will arise in the

future where the Government may well be expected to depart from

its traditional role, in the FBI's case, as an investigative

and intelligence-gathering agency, and take affirmative steps

which are needed to meet an imminent threat to human life or

property."

Now, by that you mean to take what kind of steps in what

kind of situation?

And can you give some concrete examples under your general

principles statement?

Mr. Kelley. I think that Mr. Adams addressed himself to

that the other day, where you have an extremist who is an

employee at the waterworks, and he makes a statement that he's

going to do something which is devastating to the city, and you

have no way to attack this under the ordinary procedures, and

so therefore you must take some steps to meet that imminent

threat to human life or property.

Mr. Schwarz. So let us take that case as a test of the

principle.

You are saying the extremist has said he is going

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to do something to the waterworks, poison it or something; and

he is on the way down there with the poison in his car.

Is that the presumption?

Mr. Kelley. We hadn't gone that far, but all right, you

can extent it.

Mr. Schwarz. All right, now, in that case you have the

traditional law enforcement tool, which is the power of arrest.

MI. Kelley. Not under probable cause where he has not

gone down there. The hypothetical we gave was one where he had

not taken any overt acts in perpetration of this.

Mr. Schwarz. Well, if he hasn't taken any overt acts,

are you then in what you would call in imminent threat of

human life or property?

Mr. Kelley. I think so.

Mr. Schwarz. How so? Unless he has taken an overt act.

to buy the poison of to get in the car with the poison, there

is not by definition any threat to life or property.

Mr. Kelley. Mr. Schwarz, I've been around in this business.

a long time. I've heard a number of threats which were issued,

and they thereafter materialized into actions. I don't think

take these threats as being empty ones, because so many times

they have been acted upon.

I was criticized one time when there was a threat made to

kill me, and it was said later on, it's not rhetoric, it's

not rhetoric to me, because. when they say they're going to

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kill me, that just means one thing.

Mr. Schwarz. But I'm not disagreeing with you.

Mr. Kelley. But you are disagreeing with me. You're saying

on the basis of experience that you cannot detect a possible

threat. That's the whole area of concern that we have here, where

we don't lose the capability of doing something. We don't

say we should initiate ourselves. We say that we should go to

the Attorney General. We do not subscribe to the idea that

we should act independently because maybe we don't have the

judicial review, the capability of determining, but we do

think that we should report it and thereafter see what can

be done:

Mr. Schwarz. Well, have you changed in the course of

our discussion the standard on page 5.

On page 5 you're talking about an imminent threat..

Mr. Kelley. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. And I hear you now as saying a possible

threat.

Mr. Kelley. An imminent possible threat.

Mr. Schwarz. An imminent possible threat. All right.

Now, would a fair standard for either action, other than

arrest, I don't know what you have in mind, but something to

prevent the person from carrying out his activities, other

than arrest, for instance, what is an example of what you have

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Mr. Kelley. Removing him from his position or whatever

is necessary in order to make it impossible or at least as

impossible as possible to perpetuate this thing.

Mr. Schwarz. You mean have him lose his job or --

Mr. Kelley. I don't know what it would be.

Mr. Schwarz. Isolate him in some fashion.

Mr. Kelley. In some fashion perhaps.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, for such activity and for opening

an investigation into a domestic group, could you live with

a standard which said you would have to have an immediate

threat that someone was likely to commit a serious federal

crime involving violence?

Mr. Kelley. I think that this thing could be worked out

so that there could be an adequate basis for an evaluation.

Mr. Schwarz. So those words, without trying to, commit

you entirely to them, do not seem to you to depart far from

what you think would be an acceptable standard.

Mr. Kelley. Well, an imminent, immediate threat might

be, by virtue of the word "immediate" thät he's going to

do it the next minute. In that case it may be necessary for

you to, not with the presence of the possibility, not able

to do anything except put him under arrest of anything.

Mr. Schwarz. Of course, of course.

And nobody would at all disagree with that kind of action:

Mr. Kelley. I don't think they would either.

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Mr. Schwarz. But on the question, let's take the opening

of an investigation into a domestic group.

Is it basically consistent with practicality to make the

test immediate threat of a serious Federal crime involving

violence?

Mr. Kelley. To open a domestic security case.

Mr. Schwarz. Yes.

MI. Kelley. It appears to me that this is a terrorist

activity, in. effect. We certainly have terrorist activities

under our jurisdiction as a threat against the United States.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, are there other circumstances where

it is justifiable to open an investigation of the domestic

group where you do not have an immediate threat of serious

federal crime involving violence?

Mr. Kelley. Oh, I think there are other criteria, and

they have been well defined as to what is the possible

opening, the basis for a possible opening. We haven't been

discussing that, we have been discussing particular instances,

but there are other criteria that are used, yes.

Mr. Schwarz. What would the other criteria be?

Mr. Kelley. Well, the possible statutory violations

over which we have jurisdiction are, generally speaking, the

most used of thebasis, and then you have, of course, some

intelligence investigations which should, of course, be of

short duration. If there is no showing of this into action

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or a viable intent.

Mr. Schwarz. So that's what you're looking for in the

intelligence investigation?

Mr. Kelley. . By intelligence investigation, yes, you

are looking to prevent.

Mr. Schwarz: And what you are looking to prevent, and

what you're looking to find is a likelihood of action combined

with an intent to take an

issue?

Mr. Kelley. And the capability.

Mr. Schwarz. And the capability.

All right. I just have two other lines, Mr. Kelley, and

I appreciate very much your time.

Mr. Kelley. That's all right.

MI. Schwarz. Assuming à legitimate investigation has •

been started into a domestic intelligence matter, is it legiti-

mate for the FBI, in addition to obtaining information that

relates to what we've just been talking about, the likelihood

of violent action, is it also legitimate for the FBI to

collect, A, retain, B, disseminate, C, information concerning

let's say the sex life of a person on the one hand, and the

political views of a person on the other? •

Mr. Kelley. I think, Mr. Schwarz, that this is just what

many of our problems and perhaps the guidelines can define

this type of thing. I think probably you will agree that

within the determination of the deviations possibly of sex

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ordinarily it's not. And so far as political views, yes, I

think that this could be, if he is espousing some cause or

some view that advocates violence of the overthrow of the

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Mr. Schwarz.

Would those be the two limits on political

views?

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or advocants of overthrow?

Mr. Kelley. Well, I don't think because he's a Democrat

or a Republican it would be anything that would be damaging,

but it might on the other hand counter the report that he's

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sex life information, might be relevant? I suppose anything

might be relevant, but don't you think that as a function of

balance, it has to have a high degree of relevance before it's

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included in some reports as a result of the requirement that

that is what is required by our rules, that when a person

reports something to us, we do a report of the complaint. Insofar

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as a determination by guidelines that might be prepared later,

I think that we can certainly deliberate on this to see whether

or not this is something we should retain, and we would not

object to anything reasonable in that regard.

Mr. Schwarz. I just have one final question.

Taking the current manual and trying to understand its

applicability laid against the facts in the Martin Luther King

case, under Section 87 there is a -- permission is granted to

open investigations of the infiltration of non-subversive

groups, and the first

sentence reads: "When information is

received indicating that a subversive group is seeking to

systematically infiltrate and control a non-subversive group

ot organization, an investigation can be opened."

Now, I take it that is the same standard that was used

in opening the investigation of the Southern Christian Leadership

Conference in the 1960s, so that invéstigation could still be

open today under the FBI manual, the current FBI manual.

Mr. Kelley. We are interested in the infiltration of

clearly subversive groups into non-subversive groups inasmuch

as this is a ploy that is used many times, and having infil-

trated, they then get control, and they have a self-laundered

organization which they can use, and not, certainly, to the

benefit of the country.

Mr. Schwarz. But is the answer to my question yes, that

under that standard, the SCLC investigation could still be

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opened today?

Mr. Kelley. I think so.

Mr. Schwarz. All right, then, just one final question. .

Do you agree that special care needs tó be taken not only

of the standards for initially opening an investigation of a

group, but perhaps extra care needs to be taken when the investi-

gation goes beyond the initial target group to individuals

or people who come into contact with it?

Mr. Kelley. I don't know if I agree with that entirely.

If

you mean that we go into the

non-subversive group, that we

then investigate people in that non-subversive group, not the

infiltrators, but the non, that we conduct a lengthy investigation

of them without any basis for doing so other than that they

are in an infiltrated group, I would likely have said -- but

off the top of my head I would say probably that's not necessary.

Mr. Schwarz. Thank you very much.

Mr. Smothers. Just a couple of very brief lines of

inquiry, Mr. Kelley.

I think that the questions of the Chief Counsel. was.

raising is one that goes further into your statement, when you

talk about the difficulty of setting out the line between

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to distinguish some of this has been made.

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Putting aside for one moment the counterespionage

effort, and looking strictly at what we have been calling the

Domestic Intelligence, is it your view that the retention of

this function in the Bureau is critical to the Bureau's

law enforcement position?

MI. Kelley. My personal opinion is that the Bureau does

a splendid job in this area. I feel further that the background

of criminal investigatory activities and experiences which

all counterintelligence people have is very helpful.

It is help-

ful not only in gathering knowledge and experience, it also

enters into this field, a person with a broad understanding

of the rights and privileges, and you don't have so much that

spy type, that cloak and dagger, that very, very secret type

of an operation.

I subscribe to the present system heartily.

Mr. Smothers. Would it be of assistance to your mission

if within the Bureau guidelines were established that

effectively limited access or controlled dissemination of

the intelligence product? In other words, if we had a

situation where the intelligence product is critical to assist

the law enforcement effort, I don't think there's any question

that there should be access to it.

Isn't our problem one of controlling the use of that

intelligence product and preventing the kind of murky crossing

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law enforcement?

Mr. Kelley. There

is always a problem when there is wide

dissemination, because that just numerically increases: the

possibility of misuse, abuse or slander, libel, or anything

of that matter, and I think that it would be well worthwhile

to review the dissemination rules to make them subject to

close guidance in the guidelines that we're speaking of.

Mr. Smothers. Let me just raise one final area with you.

We talked a little bit about, or a question was raised about

the investigation now being conducted by the Justice Department

regarding the improper actions on the COINTELPRO, and the

King case in particular.

As we look at allegations of impropriety by your personnel.

I think it would be helpful for our record here to have some

insight into the procedure the Bureau would normally follow.

What does the Bureau do when you get an allegation that

an agent or administrative official in the Bureau has behaved

improperly?

Is an investigation conducted internally, or is it

routinely referred to the Justice Department?

Mr. Kelley. There may be a revision in this type of

procedure as a result of the establishment of the Council for

Professional Responsibility. At present it would be in the

great majority of the cases turned over to our Investigative

Division for investigation. There might, on some unusual

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occasion, be a designation of a special task förce made up;

perhaps, of division heads. That is most unlikely, but it is

handled internally at present.

Mr. Smothers. Would these internal determinations be

reviewed by Justice, or do you think that is a necessary

step?

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I guess what we are searching for here is, first of all,

I think you answered that, well, to what extent does the

Bureau police itself; and then secondly, is the Department of

Justice involved in the police determinations?

For instance, what if the Attorney General disagreed with

the assertion that only the higher up officials who ordered

the action against King should be the subject of investigation

and maybe prosecution?

How does the interplay work there between you and Justice?

Mr. Kelley. We do report to the Attorney General those

activities which we construe as improper or possibly. illegal.

There is a possibility that the Department, having been advised

of the situation, might take it on their own to do their own

investigating, and this is something that we feel is a

decision to be made only rather rarely, because we feel we

have within our own organization sufficient capability to

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That is all I have.

Mr. Schwarz. Thank you.

(Whereupon, at 12:12 o'clock p.m., the Committee recessed

subject to the call of the Chair.)

-

..

10

WARD & PAUL

12

13

14

1

5

16

17

18

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

20

21

22

23

24

25

-NW 55187

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## Page 80

• OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

EDITION

GSA FEMA (41 CFRI 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOV

KNMENT

Memorandum

TO

FROM

: ALL EMPLOYEES

(5151

SAC,

KNOXVILLE

DATE: 12/11/75

OFFICE MEMO NO. 47

SUBJECT: (A) DIRECTOR'S APPEARANCE BEFORE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, DECEMBER 10e 1975 (62-1109) - A copy of the

Director's statement delivered before the Senate Select Committee on

Intelligence Activities is being forwarded to all offices and will be

made available to interested employees on receipt.

(B) SOCIAL SECURITY EMPLOYMENT RECORDS (BALTIMORE SOURCE 4)

(80-248) - You are reminded that since 9/30/75, when making reguests

for checks with Baltimore Source 4, using form FD-266, this communication

must contain the following certification: "The information reguested is

reguired in an investigation of major importance to enable this Bureau to

meet its responsibility for protecting the national security."

(C) SPEEDY RECOVERY WISHES - PAT LENNON, Cleveland RA, has been

hospitalized in Room 208, Bradley County Memorial Hospital, Cleveland,

Tennessee, telephone 472-5411.

He is suffering from a peptic ulcer.

Last word from PAT and his doctor is that no operation will be necessary,

and he hopes to be out of the hospital in 3 or 4 days. We all wish PAT

a speedy recovery.

PATRICIA JONES has been hospitalized recently in Knoxville,

and there is no set date for PAT'S return to the Knoxville Office. We

all wish PAI a speedy recovery.

(D) CHILDREN'S CHRISTMAS PARTY, DECEMBER 19 - There will be a

Christmas party for children of employees here in the office on December

19, beginning at 4:00 PM. Santa Claus will make his annual appearance.

Cost is $1.50 per chila, payable to JEAN COX.

(E) ANNUAL CHRISTMAS COVERED-DISH LUNCHEON, DECEMBER 22 - A11

employees are urged to mark their calendar for December 22 at 12:00 NOOn,

which is the time set for our annual Christmas dinner. Agents who are

planning to eat lunch with us that day will contribute money toward the

cost of the meat, and the girls in the office will bring vegetables,

salads, and desserts. No calorie-counting that day!

18s BeN; - 8o betray the week - or - 99-12

1 - Each employee

1 - 66-3B

1-62-1109

1 - 80-248

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

NW 5519911 DocId: 32989769 Page

80

---

## Page 81

Routing Slip

0-7 (Rov. 12-17-73)

TO: SAG:.?

Alhany

Allaquerque

Aiexandria

Anchorage

Ationis

Baltimore

Binninghan

Boston

Buffalo

Butte

Charlotte

Chicago

Cincinnati

Cleveland

Columbia

Dallas

Denver

Detroit

El Paso

Honolulu

(Copies to Offices Checked)

Houston

Indianapolis

Jack son

Jacksonville

Kansas Cily

Knoxville

Las Vegas

Little Rock

Los Argeles

Louisviile

Memphis

Miami

Milwaukee

Minneapolis

Mobile

Newark

New Haven

New Orleans

New Yorks City

Nortolk

= Oklahoma City

Omaha

Philadelphia

Phoenix

Pittsburgh

Portland

Richmond

Sacramento

.

St. Louis

Salt Lake City

San Antonio

San Diego

San Francisco

San Juan

Savannah

Seattle

J Springfield

7 Tanpa

7 Washington Field

• Quantico

TO LEGAT:

D Beirut

Bern

Bonn

Brasilia

Buenos Aires

Caracas

Hong Kong

London

Madrid

Manila

Mexico City

Ottawa

Paris

Rome

Singapore

Tel Aviv

→ Tokyo

RE: DIRECTOR'S APPEARANCE

Date:-

BEFORE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

DECEMBER 10, 1975

1/5/76

Retention

For appropriate

S For inforation EJ optional

1 action

[J Surep, by

The enclosed is for your information. If used in a future report,

[ conceal all

sources, ( paraphrase contents.

Inclosed are corrected pages from report of SA -

dated

Remarks: By routing slip dated 12/30/75 and

captioned as above, all SACs and Legats were

furnished a copy of the transcript of Mr.

Kelley's 12/10/75 appearance before the

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

Activities.

Although the data contained in

the transcript may be made available to news

media representatives, used in answering

questions received from citizens, and other-

wise treated as being of a public-source nature,

the transcript itself should not be @epsoduged

for, or given to, anyone ou szoe the Bi

Dnc..

Bufile AS AC AF

SEARCHED.

-.. INDEXED

SERIALIZED

FILED.

Urfile

• JAN7 - 1975.

FBI - KNOXVILLE

NW 55187

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## Page 82

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

FOR RELEASE

10 A.M., EST

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 10, 1975

STATEMENT OF

CLARENCE M. KELLEY

DIRECTOR

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

U. S. SENATE

WASHINGTON, D. C.

DECEMBER 10, 1975

62-1109-12

55187

DocId: 32989769 Page 82

I Swith so

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## Page 83

I welcome the interest which this Committee

has shown in the FBI and most particularly in our

operations in the intelligence and internal security

fields.

I share your high regard for the rights

guaranteed by the Constitution and laws of the United

States.

Throughout my 35-year career in law enforcement

you will find the same insistence, as has been expressed

by this Committee, upon programs of law enforcement that.

are themselves fully consistent with law.

I also have strongly supported the concept of

legislative oversight. In fact, at the time my appointment

as Director of the FBI was being considered by the Senate

Judiciary Committee two and one-half years ago, I told

the members of that Committee of my firm belief in

Congressional oversight.

This Committee has completed the most

exhaustive study of our intelligence and security

operations that has ever been undertaken by anyone

NW 55187 DocId: 32989769 Page 83

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## Page 84

;

outside the FBI other than the present Attorney General.

At the outset, we pledged our fullest cooperation and

promised to be as candid and forthright as possible in

responding to your questions and complying with your

requests.

I believe we have lived up to those promises.

The members and staff of this Committee have

had unprecedented access to FBI information.

You have talked to the personnel who conduct

security-type investigations and who are personally involved

in every facet of our day-to-day intelligence operations.

You have attended numerous briefings by FBI

officials who have sought to familiarize the Comnittee

and its staff with all major areas of our activities

and operations in the national security and intelligence

fields.

In brief, you have had a firsthand examination of

these matters that is unmatched at any time in the history

of the Congress.

As this Committee has stated, these hearings

have, of necessity, focused largely on certain errors

and abuses. I credit this Committee for its forthright

recognition that the hearings do not give a full or

balanced account of the FBI's record of performance.

-

-2-

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It is, perhaps, in the nature of such hearings

to focus on abuses to the exclusion of positive accomplishments

of the organization.

The Counterintelligence Programs which have

received the lion's share of public attention and critical

comment constituted an infinitesimal portion of our over-

all work.

A Justice Department Committee which was formed

last year to conduct a thorough study of the FBI's

Counterintelligence Programs has reported that in the

five basic ones it found 3,247 Counterintelligence proposals

were

submitted to FBI Headquarters from 1956 to 1971. Of this

total, 2,370 -- less than three-fourths -- were approved.

I repeat, the vast majority of those 3,247

proposals were being devised, considered, and many were

rejected, in an era when the FBI was handling an average

of 700,000 investigative matters per year.

Nonetheless, the criticism which has been

expressed regarding the Counterintelligence Programs

is most legitimate and understandable.

The question might well be asked what I had

in mind when I stated last year that for the FBI to have

done less than it did under the circumstances then existing

would have been an abdication of its responsibilities

to the American people.

NW 55187 DocId: 32989769 Page 85

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## Page 86

What I said then -- in 1974 - and what I believe

today,, is that the FBI employees involved in these programs.

did what they felt was expected of them by the President,

the Attorney General, the Congress, and the people of

the United States.

Bomb explosions rocked public and private

offices and buildings; rioters led by revolutionary

extremists laid siege to military, industrial, and

educational facilities; and killings, maimings, and

other atrocities accompanied such acts of violence

from New. England to California.

*

The victims of these acts were human beings --

men, women, and children. As is the case in time of peril --

whether real or perceived -- they looked to their Government,

their elected and appointed leadership, and to the FBI and

other law enforcement agencies to protect their lives, their

property, and their rights.

There were many calls for action from Members

of Congress and others, but few guidelines were furnished.

The FBI and other law enforcement agencies were besieged

by demands:.. impatient demands...for immediate action.

FBI employees recognized the danger; felt

they had a responsibility to respond; and, in good faith,

NW 55187 DocId: 32989769 Page 86

-4-

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## Page 87

initiated actions designed to counter conspiratorial

efforts of self-proclaimed revolutionary groups, and

to neutralize violent activities.

In the development and execution of these programs,

mistakes of judgment admittedly were made.

Our concern over whatever abuses occurred

in the Counterintelligence Programs -- and there were

some substantial ones -- should not obscure the underlying

purpose of those programs.

We must recognize that situations have occurred

in the past and will arise in the future where the

Government may well be expected to depart from its

traditional role -- in the FBI's case, as an investi-

gative and intelligence-gathering agency - and take

affirmative steps which are needed to meet an imminent

threat to human life or property.

In short, if we learn a murder or bombing is to

be carried out NOW, can we truly meet our responsibilities

by investigating only after the crime has occurred, or

should we have the ability to prevent? I refer to those

instances where there is a strong sense of urgency because

of an imminent threat to human life.

Where there exists the potential to penetrate

and disrupt, the Congress must consider the question of

- 5 -

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DocId: 32989769 Page 87

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## Page 88

++,"

;

whether or not such preventive action should be available

to the FBI.

These matters are currently being addressed

by a task. force in the Justice Department, including the

FBI, and I am confident that. Departmental guidelines and

controls can be developed in cooperation with pertinent

Committees of. Congress to insure that such measures are

used in an entirely responsible manner.

Probably the most important question here

today is what assurances can I give that the errors

and abuses which arose under the Counterintelligence

Programs will not occur again?

First, let me assure the Committee that some

very substantial changes have been made in key areas of the

FBI's methods of operátions since I took the oath of

office as Director on July 9, 1973.

Today we place a high premium on openness --

openness. both within and without the service.

I have instituted a program of open, frank

discussion in the decision-making process which

insures that no future program or major policy decision

will ever be adopted without a full and critical review

of its propriety.

- 6 -

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## Page 89

Participatory management has become a fact

in the FBI.

I have made it known throughout our Headquarters

and Field Divisions that I welcome all employees, regardless

of position or degree of experience, to contribute their

thoughts and suggestions, and to voice whatever criticisms

or reservations they may have concerning any area of our

operations.

The ultimate decisions in the Bureau are mine,

and I take full responsibility for them. My goal is to

achieve maximum critical analysis among our personnel without

in any manner weakening or undermining our basic command

structure.

The results of this program have been most

beneficial...to me personally...to the FBI's disciplined

performance...and to the morale of our employees.

In addition, since some of the mistakes of the

past were occasioned by direct orders from higher authorities

outside the FBI, we have welcomed Attorney General Edward

Levi's guidance, counsel, and his continuous availability --

in his own words -- "as a 'lightning rod' to deflect improper

requests."

Within days after taking office, Attorney General

Levi instructed that I immediately report to him any

-7-

NW 55187 DocId: 32989769 Page 89

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## Page 90

;

requests or practices which, in my judgment, were improper

or which, considering the context of the request, I believed

presented the appearance of impropriety.

I am pleased to report to this Cömmittee as I

have to the Attorney General that during my nearly two

and one-half years as Director under two Presidents and

three Attorneys General, no one has approached me or

made overtures -- directly or otherwise -- to use the

FBI for partisan political or other improper purposes.

I can assure you that I would not for a moment

consider honoring any such request.

•I can assure you, toò, in my administration of

the FBI I routinely bring to the attention of the Attorney

General and the Deputy Attorney General major policy questions,

including those which arise in my continuing review of our

operations and practices. These are discussed openly and

candidly in order that the Attorney General can exercise

his responsibilities over the FBI.

I am convinced that the basic structure of the

FBI today is sound. But it would be a mistake to think

that integrity can be assured only through institutional

means.

Integrity is a human quality. It depends upon

the character of the person who occupies the office of

Director and every member of the FBI under him.

- 8 =

NW 55187 DocId: 32989769 Page 90

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## Page 91

I am proud of the 19,000 men and women with

whom it is my honor to serve today. Their dedication,

their professionalism, their standards, and the self-

discipline which they personally demand of themselves

and expect of their associates are the Nation's ultimate

assurance of proper and responsible conduct at all times

by the FBI.

The Congress and the members of this Committee

in particular have gained a great insight into the problems

confronting the FBI in the security and intelligence fields --

problems which all too often we have been left to resolve

without sufficient guidance from the Executive Branch or

the Congress itself.

As in all human endeavors, errors of judgment

have been made. But no one who is looking for the cause

of our

failures should confine his search solely to the

FBI, or even to the Executive Branch.

The Congress itself has long possessed the

mechanism for FBI oversight; yet, seldom has it been

exercised.

An initial step was taken in the Senate in

1973 when the Committee on the Judiciary established

a Subcommittee on FBI Oversight. Hearings had been

:

-9 -

NW 55187 DocId: 32989769 Page 91

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## Page 92

• .

commenced, and we were fully committed to maximum

participation with the members of that Subcommittee..

I laud their efforts. However, those efforts

are of very recent origin in terms of the FBI's history.

One of the greatest benefits of the study

this Committee has made is the expert knowledge you have

gained of the complex problems confronting the FBI. But

I respectfully submit that those benefits are wasted if

they do not lead to the next step - a step that I believe

is absolutely essential - a legislative charter, expressing:

Congressional determination of intelligence jurisdiction for

the FBI.

Action to resolve the problems confronting us

in the security and intelligence fields is urgently needed;

and. it must be undertaken in a forthright manner. Neither

the Congress nor the public can afford. to look the other

way, leaving it to the FBI to do what must be done, 'as

too often has occurred in the past.

This means too that Congress must assume a

continuing role, not in the initial decision-making

process but in the review of our performance.

I would caution against a too-ready reliance

upon the Courts to do our tough thinking for us.

Some

proposals that have been advanced during these hearings

would extend the role of the Courts into the early stages

NW 55187 DocId: 32989769 Page 92

- 10 -

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## Page 93

1

of the investigative process and, thereby, would take

over what historically have been Executive Branch decisions:

I frankly feel that such a trend, if unchecked,

would seriously undermine the independence of the Judiciary

and cast them in a role not contemplated by the authors

of our Constitution. Judicial review cannot be a

substitute for Congressional oversight or Executive

decision.

The FBI urgently needs a clear and workable

determination of our jurisdiction in the intelligence

field, a jurisdictional statement that the Congress finds

to be responsive to both the will and the needs of the

American people.

Senators, first and foremost, I am a police

officer -- a career police officer. In my police experience,

the most frustrating of all problems that I have discovered

facing law enforcement in this country -- Federal, state, or

local -- is when demands are made of them to perform

their traditional role as protector of life and property

without clear and understandáble legal bases to do so.

I recognize that the formulation of such a

legislative charter will be a most precise and demanding

task.

NW 55187 DocId: 32989769 Page 93

- 11 -

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## Page 94

...

It must 'be sufficiently flexible that it

does not stifle FBI efféctiveness in combating the

growing incidence of crime and violence across the

United States. That charter must clearly address the

demonstrated problems of the past; yet, it must amply

recognize the fact that times change and so also do

the nature and thrust of our criminal and subversive

challenges.

The fact that the Depártment of Justice has

commenced the formulation of operational guidelines

governing our intelligence 'activities does not in any

manner diminish the need for legislation. The responsibility

for conferring jurisdiction resides with the Congress.

In this regard, I am troubled by some propósals

which question the need for intelligence gathering, suggesting

that information needed for the prevention of violence cán

be acquired in the normal course of criminal investigations.

As a practical matter, the line between intelligence

work and regular criminal investigations is often difficult

to describe. What begins as an intelligence investigation

may well end in arrest and prosecution of the subject.

But

there are some fundamental differences between these

- 12 -

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## Page 95

investigations that should be recognized -- differences

in scope, in objective and in the time of initiation. In

the usual criminal case, a crime has occurred and it

remains only for the Government to identify the perpetrator

and to collect sufficient evidence for prosecution.. Since

the investigation normally follows the elements of the

crime, the scope of the inquiry is limited and fairly

well defined.

By contrast, intelligence work involves

the gathering of information, not necessarily evidence.

The purpose may well be not to prosecute, but rather

to thwart crime or to insure that the Government has

enough information to meet any future crisis or emergency.

The inquiry is necessarily broad because it must tell

us not only the nature of the threat, but also whether

the threat is imminent, the persons involved, and the

means by which the threat will be carried out. The ability

of the Government to prevent criminal acts is dependent

on our anticipation of those unlawful acts. Anticipation,

in turn, is dependent on advance information -- that

is intelligence.

Certainly, reasonable people can differ on

these issues. Given the opportunity, I am confident

that the continuing need for intelligence work can be

documented to the full satisfaction of the Congress. We

NW 55187 DocId: 32989769 Page 95

- 13 -

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## Page 96

recognize that what is at stake here is not the interests

of the FBI, but rather the interests of every citizen

of this country. We recognize also that the resolution

of these matters will demand extensive and thoughtful

deliberation by the Congress. To this end, I pledge the

complete cooperation of the Bureau with this Committee

or its successor in this important task.

In any event, you have my unqualified assurance

as Director that we will carry out both the letter and

the spirit of such legislation as the Congrèss may enact.

NW 55187 DocId: 32989769 Page 96

= 14 -

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## Page 97

1R05D WA PLAIN •

9:4 OPM VITEL 12110/75 GHS

TO

•ALL SAGS

FROM DIRECTOR •

DIPECTOR'S APPEARANCE BEFORE SENATE SELECI COMMITTEE

ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, DECEMBER 10, 1975

A COPY OF THE STATEMENT I DELIVEPED BEFORE THE SEATE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON! INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES TODAY HAS BEEN.

SENT ALL OFFICES. FOR YOUR INFORMATION, THEPE FOLLOWS A

SYNOPSIZED ACCOUNT OF THE MAJOR AREAS OF THE COMMITTEE'S

QUESTIONS TO ME, TOGETHER WITH MY RESPONSES:

(1) REGARDING FBI INFORMANIS, QUESTIONS WERE ASKED

WHETHER COURT APPROVAL SHOULD BE REQUIRED FOR FBI USE OF

INFORMANTS IN INVESTICATIONS OF ORGANIZATIONS MY RESPONSE

WAS THAI THE CONTROLS WHICH EXISI TODAY OVER USE OF INFORMANIS

ARE SATISFACTORY); HOW CAN FBI KEEP INFORMANTS OPERATING

WITHIN PROPER LIMITS SO THEY DO NOT INVADE RIGHTS OF OTHER

PERSONS (MY RESPONSE WAS THAI RELIANCE MUSI BE PLACED O: THE

INDIVIDUAL ACENTS HANDLING INFORMANTS AMP THOSE SUPE VISING

THE AGENTS' WORK, THAT ITORMANTS WHO VIOLATE THE LAW CAN BE

Returned & Destroyed

Chatt.

O. R.

Cleve.Q

J. C.-ps

Tulla.

KX #1

KX #2/

KX #36

Orig,

&

redid.

AllY

parts

destroyed

except break-

downs

as obted.

SACHS

ASAC IT

SEARCHED.

_INDEXED

• SERIALIZE

- FILED

DEC 101945

FBI - KNOXVILLE

62-1109-11

NTWI

55187

DocId: 32989769

Page. 97

---

## Page 98

PARS TWO

PROSECUTED -- AS CAN ANY AGENT. WHO

COUNSELS AN INFORMANT TO

COMMIT VIOLATIONS) ; AND DID FORMER KLAI! INFORMANT GARY ROWE

TESTIFY ACCURATELY WHEN HE TOLD THE COMMITTEE ON DECEMBER 2

THAT HE INFORMED FBI OF PLANNED ACIS OF VIOLENCE BUT FBI.

DID NOI AÇI TO PREVENT THEM (MY RESPONSE WAS THAI. ROVE'S

TESTIMONY WAS NOT ACCURATE) •

(2). IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS REGARDING IMPROPER

CONDUCT BY FBI EMPLOYEES, I STATED. THAI ALLEGED VIOLATIONS. OF

LAW BY FBI PERSONNEL SHOULD BE INVESIIGATED BY THE FBI OP:

OTHER APPROPRIATE AGENCY, THAI THE INSPECTION DIVISION HAS

CONDUCTED INQUIRIES REGARDING ALLEGATIONS OF MISCONDUCI;,,

THAI AN OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY HAS JUST

BEEN ESTABLISHED IN THE JUSTICE DEPARIMENT,, AND WE WILL ADVISE

THAT OFFICE OF OUR MAJOR INVESTIGATIONS OF DEPARIMENTAL PERSONNEL,

INCLUDING FBI EMPLOYEES, FOR ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF LAW, REGULATIONS,

OR STANDARDS OF CONDUCT; THAT I WOULD

RESERVE COMMENT

REGARDING POSSIBLE CREATION OF A NATIONAL INSPECTOR GENERAL

•TO CONSIDER MATTERS OF MISCONDUCI BY EMPLOYEES OF ANY FEDERAL

AGENCY •

NW 55187 . DocId: 32989769 Page 98

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## Page 99

PAGE THREE

(3) IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS CONCERNING HARASSMENT OF

MARTIN LUTHER KING, JRO, I STATED THAT IHE PEPSONS WHO ISSUED

THE ORDERS WHICH RESULTED IN SUCH HARASSMEIT SHOULD FACE THE

RESPONSIBILITY FOR IT, RATHER THAN THOSE UÜDER THEM WHO CARRIED

OUT SUCH ORDERS IN GOOD FAITH; THAT THE FBI STILL HAS RECORDINGS

RESULTING FROM ELECIRONIC SURVEILLANCES OF KING; THAT WE RETAIN

RECORDINGS FOR TEN YEARS BUT WE ALSO HAVE AGREED TO A REQUEST

FROM THE SENATE NOT IO DESTROY INFORMATION IN OUR FILES WHILE

CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES ARE BEING CONDUCTED; THAT I HAVE NOI

REVIEWED THE KING. TAPES; THAT IF THE COMMIITEE REQUESTED TO

REVIEW THE KING TAPES, THE REQUEST WOULD BE REFERRED TO THE

ATTORNEY GENERAL.

• (4) IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS REGARDING WHETHER IT WOULD

BE ADVANIAGEOUS TO SEPARATE THE FBI, CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE

RESPONSIBILITIES AND OUR INTELLIGENCE

FUNCTIONS, I STATED

THAT WE HAVE FOUND THE TWO AREAS TO BE COMPATIBLE, AND I

FEEL THE FBI IS DOING A SPLENDID JOB IN BOTH AREAS.

(5) IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE ADEQUACY

OF CONTROLS ON REQUESTS FROM THE WHITE HOUSE AND FROM OTHER

GOVERNMENT AGENCIES FOR FBI INVESTIGATIONS OR FOP INFORMATION

NN 55187 DooId: 32989769

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PAGE FOUR

FROM OUR FILES, I STATED THAT WHEN SUCH REQUESTS ARE MADE

ORALLY, THEY SHOULD BE CONFIRMED IN WRITING; THAT WE WOULD

WELCOME ANY LEGISLATIVE GUIDELINES THE CONGRESS FEELS WOULD

PROTECI THE FBI FROM THE POSSIBILITY OF PARTISAN MISUSE.

A FULL TRANSCRIPI OF THE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS WILL BE

FURNISHED TO EACH OFFICE AS SOON AS IT IS AVAILABLE.

ALL LEGATS ADVISED SEPARATELY •

END

HOLD

NI 55187 DOOId 32989769

Page 100

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## Page 101

NRD50 WA PLAIN

9:4 0PM NITEL 12/10/75 GHS

TO ALL SACS

FROM DIRECTOR

DIRECTOR'S APPEARANCE BEFORE SENATE SELECT - COMMITTEE

ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, DECEMBER 10, 1975

A COPY OF THE STATEMENT I DELIVERED BEFORE THE SENATE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES TODAY HAS BEEN

SENT ALL OFFICES. FOR YOUR INFORMATION, THERE FOLLOWS A

SYNOPSIZED ACCOUNT OF THE MAJOR AREAS OF THE COMMITTEE'S

QUESTIONS IO ME, TOGETHER WITH MY RESPONSES:

(1) REGARDING FBI INFORMANTS, QUESTIONS WERE ASKED

WHETHER COURI APPROVAL SHOULD BE REQUIRED' FOR FBI USE OF

INFORMANTS IN INVESTIGATIONS OF ORGANIZATIONS (MY RESPONSE

WAS THAT THE CONTROLS WHICH EXIST TODAY OVER USE OF INFORMANTS

ARE SATISFACTORY); HOW CAN FBI KEEP INFORMANIS OPERATING

WITHIN PROPER LIMITS SO THEY DO NOT INVADE RIGHTS OF OTHER

PERSONS (MY RESPONSE WAS THAT RELIANCE MUSI BE PLACED ON THE

INDIVIDUAL AGENTS HANDLING INFORMANTS AND THOSE SUPERVISING

THE AGENIS® WORK, THAT INFORMANTS WHO VIOLATE THE LAW CAN BE

62-1199-11

/C 10 1975

FS! —KNOXVILLE

NW 55187 DocId: 32989769 Page 101

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## Page 102

PAGE 'TUO

PROSECUTED -- AS CAN ANY AGENT WHO COUNSELS AN INFORMANT TO

COMMIT VIOLATIONS) ; AND DID FORMER KLAN INFORMANT GARY ROWE

TESTIFY ACCURATELY WHEN HE TOLD THE COMMITTEE ON DECEMBER 2

THAT HE INFORMED FBI OF PLANNED ACIS OF VIOLENCE BUT FBI

DID NOT ACT TO PREVENT THEM MY RESPONSE WAS THAT ROWE'S

TESTIMONY WAS NOT ACCURATE •

•(2) IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS REGARDING IMPROPER.

CONDUCT BY FBI EMPLOYEES, I STATED THAT ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF

LAW BY FBI PERSONNEL SHOULD BE INVESTIGATED BY THE FBI OR

OTHER APPROPRIATE AGENCY; THAT THE INSPECIION DIVISION HAS

CONDUCTED INQUIRIES REGARDING ALLEGATIONS OF MISCONDUCT;

THAT AN OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY HAS JUST

BEEN ESTABLISHED IN THE JUSTICE DEPARIMENT, AND WE WILL ADVISE

THAT OFFICE OF OUR MAJOR INVESTIGATIONS OF DEPARIMENIAL PERSONNEL,.

INGLUDING FBI EMPLOYEES; FOR ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF LAW, REGULATIONS

• OR STANDARDS OF CONDUCT; THAT I WOULD RESERVE COMMENT

REGARDING POSSIBLE CREATION OF A NATIONAL INSPECTOR GENERAL

TO CONSIDER MATTERS OF MISCONDUCI BY EMPLOYEES OF ANY FEDERAL

AGENCY

NW 55187 DocId: 32989769 Page 102

---

## Page 103

PAGE THREE

(3) IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS CONCERNING HARASSMENI OF •

MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., I STATED THAT THE PERSONS WHO ISSUED

THE ORDERS WHICH RESULTED IN SUCH HARASSMENT SHOULD FACE THE

RESPONSIBILITY FOR IT, RATHER THAN THOSE UNDER THEM WHO CARRIED

OUT SUCH ORDERS IN GOOD FAITH; THAT THE FBI STILL HAS RECORDINGS

RESULTING FROM ELECIRONIC SURVEILLANCES OF KINGS. THAT WE RETAIN

RECORDINGS FOR TEN YEARS BUT WE ALSO HAVE AGREED IO A REQUEST

FROM THE SENATE NOT TO DESTROY INFORMATION IN OUR FILES WHILE

• CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES ARE BEING CONDUCTED; THAT I HAVE NOT

REVIEWED THE KING TAPES; THAI IF THE COMMITTEE, REQUESTED TO

REVIEW THE KING TAPES, THE REQUEST WOULD BE: RÉFERRED TO. THE

ATTORNEY GENERAL®

(4) IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS REGARDING WHETHER IT WOULD

BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO SEPARATE THE FBI CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE

RESPONSIBILITIES AND OUR INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS, I STATED

THAT WE HAVE FOUND THE TWO AREAS TO BE COMPATIBLE, AND I

FEEL THE FBI IS DOING A SPLENDID JOB IN BOTH AREAS.

(5% IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE ADEQUACY

OF CONTROLS ON REQUESTS FROM THE WHITE HOUSE AND FROM OTHER

GOVERNMENI AGENCIES FOR FBI INVESTIGATIONS OR FOR INFORMATION

NW 55187 DooId: 32989769

Page 103-

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## Page 104

PAGE FOUR

FROM OUR FILES, I STATED THAT WHEN SUCH REQUESTS ARE MADE

ORALLY, THEY SHOULD BE CONFIRMED IN WRITING; THAT WE WOULD

WELCOME ANY LEGISLATIVE GUIDELINES THE CONGRESS FEELS WOULD

PROTECT THE FBI FROM THE POSSIBILITY OF PARTISAN MISUSE.

A FULL IRANSCRIPT OF THE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS WILL BE

FURNISHED TO EACH OFFICE AS SOON AS IT IS AVAILABLE.

ALL LEGAIS ADVISED SEPARATELY.

END

HOLD

LNESS ROC

10M 89

---

## Page 105

NRAGS KY PLAIN. •

5:36. PM NITEL 9- 15-75 RCC

TO:

DIPECTOR (52-116395) JAC

• ATLANTA (62-2354)

CATIN: INID; W. O. GREGAR) .

FROM:

KNOXVILLE (62-1199)

SENSTUDY 75

P.F. BUPRAU NITEL SEPT. 17, 1975, AND ATLANIA IFL

SFPT. 18, 1975

FORMER SA CARL E. CLAIRBORNE WAS CONTACTED. IHIS

AFTERNOON AND ADVISED OF INFORMATION SET FORTH IN REFERENCED

TEL. MR. CLAIRBORNE'S INITIAL REACTION WAS QUITE STRONG

AND HE INDICATED THAI IF CONTACTED BY THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

STAFF FOR INTERVIEW HE WOULD HESITATE TO TELL THEM ANYTHING.

HT. STATED THAT HIS POSTURE IN THIS REGARD WAS BASED ON THE

FACT THAT HE DID' NOI WANT IO TELL THEM ANYTHING THAI WOULD

HURT THE BUREAU. HE INDICATED THAT HIS FEELING. AT THIS IIME

WAS THAT HE WOULD NOT SUBMIT TO INTERVIEW UNLESS SUBPOENAED;

HOWFVER, MP. CLAIRBORNE STATED IHAT IF HE, WAS CONTACTED BY

• THE COMMITTEE STAFF HE WOULD IMMEDIATELY ADVISE ME AND THERE-

AFTEP CONTACT. THE LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION OF. THE BUREAU FOR

FURTHER ADVICE.

L. END.

ACK FOR TWO TELS

SSP FBI ATLAVIA

• TKS/CLP

NO 55187

DocId: 32989769 Page 105

62-1109-10

---

## Page 106

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

Transmit the following in -

TELETYPE

Via

FBI

Date:

9/18/75

PLAINTEXT

NITEtype in plaintext or codes

(Priority)

TO:

DIRECTOR (62-116395)

ATLANTA (62-2854)

(ATTN: INTD, W. O. GREGAR)

FROM: KNOXVILLE (62-1109)

SENSTUDY 75

RE BUREAU NITEL SEPT. 17, 1975, AND ATLANTA TEL

SEPT. 18, 1975

FORMER SA CARI E. CLAIRBORNE WAS CONTACTED THIS

AFTERNOON AND ADVISED OF INFORMATION SET FORTH IN REFERENCED

TEL. MR. CLAIRBORNE 'S INITIAL REACTION WAS QUITE STRONG

AND HE INDICATED THAT IF CONTACTED BY THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

STAFF FOR INTERVIEW HE WOULD HESITATE TO TELI, THEM ANYTHING.

HE STATED THAT HIS POSTURE IN THIS REGARD WAS BASED ON THE

FACT THAT HE DID NOT WANT TO TELI THEM ANYTHING THAT WOULD

HURT THE BUREAU. HE INDICATED THAT HIS FEELING AT THIS TIME

WAS THAT HE WOULD NOT SUBMIT TO INTERVIEW UNLESS SUBPOENAED;

HOWEVER, MR. CLAIRBORNE STATED THAT IF HE WAS CONTACTED BY

THE COMMITTEE STAFF HE WOULD IMMEDIATELY ADVISE ME AND THERE-

AFTER CONTACT THE LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION OF THE BUREAU FOR

FURTHER ADVICE.

END.

HCS/KmT

st3p

(1)

wat

Approved: —

Sent AT 5:36

Special Agent in Charge

RM

Per R

#U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969 0 - 316-090 (11)

NW 55187 Docid:32989769 Page 106

62-1109-10

---

## Page 107

NRAA7 AT CODE

3:15. PM URGENT SEPTEMBER 18, 1975 LMM

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

KNOXVILLE

FROM ATLANTA (62-2854)

ATIN: INTD, l. O. GREGAR

SENSTUDY 75.

RE BUREAU NITEL. TO ATLANTA, KNOXVILLE, AND OTHER OFFICES,

SEPTEMBER 17, 1975:

FORMER SPECIAL AGENT, CARL E: CLAIRBORNE, MOVED FROM ATLANTA;

GEORGIA, TO KNOXVILLE, TENNESSEE, APRIL, 1975, AND CAN BE LOCATED

THROLIGH HIS, PARENTS AI

7840 CEDAR CREST. ROAD, KNOXVILLE TENNESSEE

37918.

KNOXVILLE CONTACT CLAIRBORNE. IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS

IN REFERENCED BUREAU TELETYPF.

END

TKS

WEH FBI!KX CLR FOR ONE

9184

Відь

872.

62-1109-

9

• SEARCHED.

SERALEEO R NDEXER.

SEP 1 8 1975

FBI - KNOXVILLE

NW

55187 DocId: 32989769

Page 107

---

## Page 108

NR067 AT CODE

3:15 PM URGENT SEPTEMBER 18, 1975 LMM

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395).

KNOXVILLE

FROM ATLANTA (62-2854)

ATTN: INTD, W. O. CREGAR

SENSTUDY 75

RE BUREAU NITEL TO ATLANTA, KNOXVILLE, AND OTHER OFFICES,

SEPTEMBER 17, 1975 %.

FORMER SPECIAL AGENI, CARL E. CLAIRBORNE, MOVED FROM ATLANIA,

GEORGIA, TO KNOXVILLE, TENNESSEE, APRIL, 1975, AND CAN BE LOCATED

THROUGH HIS PARENTS AT 7840 CEDAR CREST ROAD, KNOXVILLE TENNESSEE

37918.

KNOXVILLE CONTACI GLAIRBORNE IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS

IN REFERENCED BUREAU TELETYPE. •

END

WEH FBI KX CLR FOR ONE

IKS

62-1109 - 9

SEARCHED

SERIALIZEO R FLEXER

SEP 1 8 1975

FBI -KNOXVILLE

NW 55187 DocId: 32989769'

„Page 108

---

## Page 109

NRADE KX PLAIN

11-47 AM NITEL SEPTEMBER

1. 18, 1975: 1H0

TO

DIRECTOR. (52-116395)

FROM KNOXVILLE (62-1|09)

ATTENTION: INTD, !!. 0. CROGAR

SENSTUDY, 75

REBUNITEL SEPTEMBER 17, 1975.

FORMER SA IRVING R' ANDERSON WAS CONTACTED THIS A.M.

AND ADVISED OF INFORMATION SET: FORTH IN RETEL. SA

ANDERSON'S INITIAL REACTION WAS THAT IF CONTACTED BY THE

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE STAFF FOR INTERVIEW HE WOULD LIKE

TO, "TELL THEM TO GO TOM " HOWEVER, HE FELT. THAT

IF HE TOOK THIS STANCE, HE WOULD HURI THE BUREAU INASMUCH

AS THE BUREAU HAS PLEDGED COOPERATION WITH THE SENATE

SELECT COMMITTEE. HE SAID HE WOULD NOT WANT TO TAKE

ANY ACTION, EVEN THOUGH NOW A FORMER EMPLOYEE, IO HURT

THE BUREAU IN THE FUTURE. HE STATED THAT HE SERVED THE

BUREAU FOR MANY YEARS, STILL FEFLS HE IS PART OF THE

BUREAU, AND IS DEDICATED TO BEING USEFUL TO IHE BUREAU

IN. ANY MANNER WHATSOEVER.

ANDERSON STATED IF HE WAS CONTACIED BY THE SENATE.

SELECI COMMITTEE STAFF, HE WOULD DEFER THE INTERVIEW

62.1109.8

NW 55187, DocId: 32989769

Page 109

---

## Page 110

• KX 62-1109

PAGE TWO

AND IMMEDIATELY ADVISE ME.

HE ALSO STATED THAT PRIOR

TO SUBMIITING TO ANY INTERVIEW WITH THEM, HE WOULD CONTACT

THE BUREAU'S LEGAL COUNSEL TELEPHONICALLY FOR FURTHER

ADVICE:

FND .

AUN FBIHO CLR IU

NW 55187 DocId: 32989769 Page 110

---

## Page 111

-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

Transmit the following in

Via

TELETYPE

F BI

Date:

9/18/75

(Type in plaintext or code)

NITEL

(Priority)

AR002

TO DIRECTOR (62-]]6395)

FROM KNOXVILLE (62-1]09)

ATTENTION: INTD, W. O. CREGAR

SENSTUDY 75

REBUNITEL SEPTEMBER 17, 1975.

FORMER SA IRVING R. ANDERSON WAS CONTACTED THIS A.M.

AND ADVISED OF INFORMATION SET FORTH IN RETEL. SA

ANDERSON'S INITIAL REACTION WAS THAT IF CONTACTED BY THE

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE STAFF FOR INTERVIEW HE WOULD LIKE

IO "TELL THEM IO GO IO H__-"

• HOWEVER, HE FELI THAT

IF HE TOOK THIS STANCE, HE WOULD HURT THE BUREAU INASMUCH

AS THE BUREAU HAS PLEDGED COOPERATION WITH THE SENATE

SELECT COMMITTEE. HE SAID HE WOULD NOT WANT TO TAKE

ANY ACTION, EVEN THOUGH NOV A FORMER EMPLOYEE, TO HURT

THE BUREAU IN THE FUTURE. HE STATED THAT HE SERVED THE

BUREAU FOR MANY YEARS, STILL FEELS HE IS PART OF THE

BUREAU, AND IS DEDICATED TO BEING USEFUL TO THE BUREAU

IN ANY MANNER WHATSOEVER.

ANDERSON STATED IF HE WAS CONTACTED BY THE SENATE

SELECT COMMITTEE STAFF, HE WOULD DEFER THE INTERVIEW

HCS : at/jkb

(1)

62-1109.8

Approved:

-

Special Agent in Charge

NW 55187 DocId: 32989769 Page 111

Sent

11:40 AM PerM

U.S.Government Printing Office: 1972 - 455-574

---

## Page 112

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

Transmit the following in

Via

FBI

Date:

(Type in plaintext or code)

(Priority)

KX 62-1109

PAGE TWO

AND IMMEDIATELY ADVISE ME. HE ALSO STATED THAT PRIOR

TO SUBMITTING TO ANY INTERVIEW WITH THEM, HE WOULD CONTACT

THE BUREAU'S LEGAL COUNSEL TELEPHONICALLY FOR FURTHER

ADVICE.

END.

Approved:

Special Agent in Charge

NW 55187 DocId: 32989769 Page 112

Sent

_ M

Per.

U.S.Government Printing Office: 1972 - 455-574

---

## Page 113

NRAGS tA CODE

11:40 PM NITEL 9/17/75 MEB

TO ALEXANDRIA•

JACKSONVILLE

HEIr YORK.

ATLANTA

• KNOXVILLE

RICHMOND

ROSTON

LOS ANGELES

-ST. LOUIS

DETPOIT

• MEMPHIS

SAN DIEGO

SEATILE

JACKSON

• NEWARK

FROM DIRECIOR. (62-1.16395)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

SENSTUDY 75

REBUTELS MAY Z9 1975, AND SEPTEMBER 4, 1975, TO

ALL OFFICES AND BUTELS, SEPTEMBER 3, 1975, TO SELECTED OFFICES

INFORMING LAITER THAT SENATA SELECI COMMITIER (SSO) HAD

PROUESTEN IDENTITIES OF ALL SUPERVISOPS AND COORDINATORS FOR

COINIELPROS IN SELFCTED OFFICES FOR (1) NEW. LEFT AND BLACK

EXTPEMIST, 1967 THROUGH 1971, AND (2) FOR WHITF. HAIF, 1964

THROUGH 1971.

SSC ALSO REQUESTED LOCATIONS OF PERSONS NAMED IN FIELD

RESPONSES TO'

PEFERENCED SEPTEMBER

3,

1975., TFLETYPES, AND

LATEST INFORMATION IN FBIYA FILES HAS BEEN FURNISHED TO SSC.

SEARCHED

SERIALIZED.

CALE

SEP 1 7 1975

FBI - KNOXVILLE

NW 55187 DocId: 32989769'

Page 113

---

## Page 114

PÁGE TWO

SEC STAFF MAY CONTACI CURTARE ANDOR FREMO EMPLOYERS NAMED, *I

TO INTERVIEW THEM CONCERNING THEIR KNOWLEDGE OF COINTELPROS

IN WHICH THEY HAD SUPERVISORY OR COORDINATING RESPONSIBILITIES.

FACH OF THE FOLLOWING FORMEP EMPLOYEES EXCEPT MESSRS.

CROKE CUD LICMATUS IS TO BE CONTACIED IMMEDIATELY AND ALEPIED

THAT. HE MIGHT BE APPROACHED BY THE SSC SIAFE FOR INTERVIEW.

THE FORMER EMPLOYET MAY,

AFTER BEING CONTACIED BY SSC STAFF,

CONTACT BUDA'S LEGAL COUNSEL DIVITIDY BY COLLECT CALL FOR

FULL INFOPMATION TO ASSISHT" INCLUDING OBLIGATIONS AS TO

CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATIO! ACQUIRED AS FBI IMPLOYEF. II

'IS EMPHASIZED THAT BUREAU'S, OFFER OF ASSISTANCE IS NÓT:

TITENDED TO IMPEDE SSE WORK, BUT IS DONE AS COOPERATIVE

GESTURE AND TO SAFEGUARD SENSITIVE BUREA! INFORMATION.

CONTACIS WITH THEST FORMER EMPLOYEES TO BE HANDLED

PERSOVALLY BY SAC OR ASAC. IN EVENI IHIS IS "OT FEASIBLE

FOR JUST BAUSE, TO BE HANDLED BY A SENIOR. SUPERVISOR

REGARDING. FORMER SAS CROKE AID MCMANUS, SSC HAS BEEN

INFORMED OF THEIR POOR PHYSICAL CONDITION AND RENUESTED IO

IKE THIS INTO CONSIDERATION IN ANY ACTION CONTEMPLATED BY

SSr CONCERNING THEM.: WE DO NOT, HOWEVER, KNOW THAT SSO MILL

NW 55187 DocId: 32989769 'Page 114

---

## Page 115

PAGE IHREE

NOI CONTACI THEM: NEW YORK OFFICE, IN COORDINATION WITH

NEWARK SHOULD ARRANGE TO HAVE CONTACT MADE WITH CROKE AND

MCMANUS BY À FORMER ASSOCIATE IO MAKE FRIENDLY INQUIRY ÀS TO

THFIR CURRENT CONDITION. IT IS BEING LEFT TO DISCRETION OF

SAS NEW YORK AND NEWARK, BASED ON RESULIS OF SUCH INQUIRY,

WHETHER CROKE AND MCMANUS SHOULD BE INFORMED REGARDING

POSSIBLE CONTACT OF THEM BY SSC. FBIHO DOES NOT DESIRE

THAT THEY BE UNDULY ALARMED, BUT WOULD' NOT WANT THEM SURPRISED

BY CONTACT OF SSC STAFF IF THIS COULD IMPAIR THEIR HEALTH.

IMMEDIATELY AFTER CONTACI, RESULTS SHOULD. BE FURNISHED

BUREAU BY NITEL IN ABOVE CAPTION, ATTENTION INTD, W. O. CREGAR,

BRIEFLY INCLUDING REACTION OF FORMER EMPLOYEES CONTACIED.

IF

A! FORMER EMPLOYEE NO LONGER IN YOUR TERRITORY OR TEMPORARILY,

AWAY, SET DUI. LEAD TO OTHER OFFICE IMMEDIATELY WITH COPY TO

FBIHA!

ALEXANDRIA:

SETH F. EIKENBERRY, 5367 SUMMIT DRIVE, FAIRFAX, VIRGINIA

JESSE C. HALL, JR.; 4535 EATEN PLACE, ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA

ATLANIA:

CAPL E, CLAIBORNE, 1356 MARY LOU LANE, S.E., ATLANTA,

NW : 55187.

' Docid: 32989769 Page 115

---

## Page 116

PAGE FOUR

GRORGIA

GEORGIA

BOSTON:

RICHARD' H. DAVIS, 1147 WILD CREEK TRAIL, ATLANIA, GFORGIA.

CHARLES. S. HARDING, 2243 PINEGLIFE DRIVF, N

Fo, ATLANTA'S.

RICHARD HO BLASSER, 129 ACADEMY AVENUE, WEYMOUTH,

MASSACHI SETIS

MASSACHUSETTS

FREDERICK MO CONNORS, 15 LONGFELLOW POAD, MELROSE,

MICHAEL J. MCDONAGH, 28 SPRINGVALE ROAD, NORWOOD,

MASSACHUSTTTS

JOHN F. NOONA!!,

122 VERNON ROAD, SCITUATE, MASSACHIISETIS

DETROIT:

JACKSON:

ROBERI F. D'NEILL, 2551 IROQUOIS, DETROIT, MICHIGAN

ROY K. MOORE.,

197 SWALLOW DRIVE, RANDON, MISSISSIPPI

JACKSONVILLE:

• HERSHEL CAVER, 3714 NORIHWESI 40TH SIPFFI, GAINESVILLE,

, FLORIDA

KHOXVILLE:

NW 55187 DocId: 32989769 Page 116

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## Page 117

PAGE FIVE

LOS ANGELES:

TEVINO PO ANDEIS, DES PEROS DATUE CONCORD FERNESEE / 1/

CALIFORNIA

JOHN KEARNEY, 4140 MAYFIELD STREET, NEWBURY PARK;

1..

RICHARD J. SIILLING, 11648 AMESTOY STREET; GRANADA HILLS,

CALIFORNIA

JOHN S. TEMPLE, 2145

GRENADIER, SAN PEDRO, CALIFORNIA

• MEMPHIS:

PHILIP S. ENDRES, 22 SÖUTH SECOND STREET, MEMPHIS,

TENNESSEE

NEWARK:

BENJAMIN P. MCMAVUS, 25 MICHAFL. STREET, FDS NEW JERSEY

NEW YORK:

THOMAS J. CRÓKE, JR, 15 HOFSTRA DRIVE, GREENLAWN, NEW YORK :

JOHN J. DUNLEAVY, IM SOUTHVIEW.CI., CARLE PLACE, NEW YORK

JOSEPH'

Ha GAMBLE, 24 GREYSIONE. ROAD, ROCKVILLE\CENTPE,

NEW YORK

RICHMOND :

CHARLES F. HEINER, 25 IWIN LAKE LANE, RICHMOND, VIRGINIA

RANDOLPH E. TROLL, 1792 RANCH DRIVE, RICHMOND, VIRGINIA'

32989769

Page

117

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## Page 118

PAGE SIX

JOHN H. WAGNER,

3228 BARNINGHAM ROAD, RICHMOND, VIRGINIA.

SAINT •LOUIS:

JOHN J. BUCKLEY, 9469 HARALD DRIVE, WOODSON

TERRACF.,

MISSOURI

EDMUND

C. WELTON, 825, DEANDELL COURT, FERGUSON, MISSOURI

SAN DIEGO:

ROBERT S. BAKER,

4268 HORTENSIA,

SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA

SEATTLE:

WASHINGTON.

LEROY M: SHEETS, 5,725 TEND STREET, N. E.; MARYSVILLE, i

END:

RCC

•. FBI. KX. CLR

NW 55387

DocId: 32989769 Page 118.

---

## Page 119

NRO63 WA CODE

11:40 PM NITEL 9/17/75. MEB

TO ALEXANDRIA

JACKSONVILLE • NEW YORK

ATLANTA

KNOXVILLE

RICHMOND

BOSTON

LOS ANGELES

• DETROIT . . MEMPHIS. •

ST. LOUIS

SAN DIEGO

• JACKSON .

NEVARK

SEATTLE

FROM DIRECTOR (62-116395)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

SENSTUDY 75

REBUTELS MAY 2, 19,75, AND SEPTEMBER 4, 1975, TO

ALL OFFICES AND BUTELS SEPTEMBER 3, 1975, TO SELECIED OFFICES

INFORMING LATTER THAT SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) HAD •

REQUESTED IDENTITIES OF ALL SUPERVISORS AND COORDINATORS FOR

COINTELPROS IN SELECTED OFFICES FOR (1) NEW LEFT AND BLACK

EXTREMIST, 1967 THROUGH 1971, AND (2) FOR WHITE HATE, 1964

THROUGH 1971•

SSC ALSO REQUESTED LOCATIONS OF PERSONS NAMED IN FIELD

RESPONSES TO REFERENCED

SEPTEMBER 3, 1975, TELETYPES, AND

LATEST INFORMATION IN FBIHQ FILES HAS BEEN FURNISHED TO SSC.

62-

1109-

SEARCHED_

SERIALIZED.

GENES

:INDEXED..

SEP 1 7 1975

FBI -KNOXVILLE

NW 55187 DocId: 32989769 Page 119

---

## Page 120

PAGE TWO •

SSC STAFF MAY CONTACT CURRENT AND/OR FORMER EMPLOYEES NAMED,

TO INTERVIEW THEM CONCERNING THEIR KNOWLEDGE OF COINTELPROS

IN WHICH THEY HAD SUPERVISORY OR COORDINATING RESPONSIBILITIES.

EACH OF THE FOLLOWING FORMER EMPLOYEES EXCEPT MESSRS.

CROKE AND MCMANUS IS TO BE CONTACTED IMMEDIATELY AND ALERTED

THAT HE MIGHT BE APPROACHED BY THE SSC STAFF FOR INTERVIEW.

THE FORMER, EMPLOYEE MAY, AFTER BEING CONTACIED BY SSC STAFF,

CONTACI BUREAU'S LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION BY COLLECT CALL FOR

FULL INFORMATION TO ASSISHIM INCLUDING OBLIGATIONS AS TO

CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION ACQUIRED AS FBI EMPLOYEE. IT

IS EMPHASIZED THAT BUREAU'S OFFER OF ASSISTANCE IS NOT ..

INTENDED TO IMPEDE SSC WORK, BUT IS DONE AS COOPERATIVE

GESTURE AND TO SAFEGUARD SENSITIVE

BUREAU INFORMATION.

CONTACTS WITH THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES TO BE HANDLED •

PERSONALLY BY SAC OR ASAC. IN EVENT THIS IS NOT FEASIBLE.

FOR JUST CAUSE, TO BE HANDLED BY A SENIOR SUPERVISOR,

REGARDING FORMER SAS CROKE AND MCMANUS, SSC HAS BEEN

INFORMED OF THEIR POOR PHYSICAL, CONDITION AND REQUESTED, TO

TAKE THIS INTO CONSIDERATION IN ANY ACTION CONTEMPLAIED BY

SSC CONCERNING THEM. WE DO NOT, HOWEVER, KNOW THAI SSO WILL

NW 55187 DocId: 32989769

'Page 120

---

## Page 121

PAGF. THREE

NOT CONTACT THEM. NEW YORK OFFICE, IN COORDINATION WITH

NEWARK SHOULD ARRANGE TO HAVE CONTACT MADE WITH CROKE AND

MCMANUS BY A FORMER ASSOCIATE TO MAKE FRIENDLY INQUIRY AS TO

THEIR CURRENT CONDITION. IT IS BEING LEFT TO DISCRETION OF.

SAS NEW YORK AND NEWARK, BASED ON RESULTS OF SUCH INQUIRY,

WHETHER CROKE AND MCMANUS SHOULD BE INFORMED REGARDING

POSSIBLE CONTACT OF THEM BY SSC. FBIHQ DOES NOT DESIRE

THAI THEY BE UNDULY ALARMED, BUT WOULD NOT WANT THEM SURPRISED

BY CONTACT OF SSC STAFF IF THIS COULD IMPAIR THEIR HEALTH.

IMMEDIATELY AFTER CONTACT, RESULTS SHOULD BE FURNISHED

BUREAU BY NITEL IN ABOVE CAPTION, ATTENTION INTD, W. O. CREGAR,

BRIEFLY INCLUDING REACTION OF FORMER EMPLOYEES CONTACTED. IF

; • A FORMER EMPLOYEE NO LONGER IN YOUR TERRITORY OR TEMPORARILY

'AWAY, SET OUT LEAD TO OTHER OFFICE IMMEDIATELY WITH COPY TO

FBIHQ.

ALEXANDRIA:

SETH F. EIKENBERRY, 5367 SUMMIT DRIVE, FAIRFAX, VIRGINIA

JESSE C. HALL, JR., 4535 EATEN PLACE, ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA

ATLANTA:

CARL E. GLAIBORNE, 1866 MARY LOU LANE, S•E., ATLANTAS

NW 55187 DocId: 32989769 Page 121

---

## Page 122

PAGE FOUR

GEORGIA

RICHARD He DAVIS, 1147 WILD CREEK TRAIL, ATLANTA, GEORGIA

CHARLES S. HARDING, 2243 PINECLIFF DRIVE, N. E., ATLANTA,

GEORGIA

BOSTON:

RICHARD H. BLASSER, 129 ACADEMY AVENUE, WEYMOUTH,

MASSACHUSETTS

FREDERICK M. CONNORS, 15 LONGFELLOW ROAD, MELROSE,

MASSACHUSETTS

• MICHAEL J. MCDONAGH, 28 SPRINGVALE ROAD, NORWOOD;

MASSACHUSETIS

JOHN F. NOONAN, 122 VERNON ROAD, SCITUATE, MASSACHUSETTS

DETROIT:

• ROBERT FO O"NEILL, 2551 IROQUOIS, DETROIT, MICHIGAN. -

JACKSON:

• ROY K. MOORE, 107 SWALLOW DRIVE, BRANDON, MISSISSIPPI

JACKSONVILLE:

W. HERSHEL CAVER, 3714 NORTHWEST 40TH STREET, GAINESVILLE,

FLORIDA

KNOXVILLE:

NW 55187 DocId: 32989769 Page 122

---

## Page 123

PAGE FIVE

IRVING R. ANDERSON, 1029 PERCH DRIVE, CONCORD, TENNESSEE

LOS ANGELES:

JOHN KEARNEY, 4140 MAYFIELD STREET, NEWBURY PARK, .

CALIFORNIA

RICHARD J. STILLING, 11648 AMESTOY STREET, GRANADA HILLS,

CALIFORNIA

JOHN S. TEMPLE, 2145 GRENADIER, SAN PEDRO, CALIFORNIA

MEMPHIS:

PHILIP S. ENDRES, 22 SOUTH SECOND STREET, MEMPHIS,

TENNESSEE

NEWARK:

BENJAMIN P. MCMANUS, 25 MICHAEL STREET, FDS NEW JERSEY

NEW YORK:

THOMAS

Ja CROKE, JR, 15 HOFSTRA DRIVE, GREENLAWN, NEW YORK.

JOHN JO, DUNLEAVY, ID SOUTHVIEW CT., CARLE PLACE, NEW YORK

JOSEPH H. GAMBLE, 24 GREYSTONE ROAD, ROCKVILLE CENTRE,

NEW YORK

RICHMOND:

CHARLES F. HEINER, 25 IWIN LAKE LANE, RICHMOND, VIRGINIA

RANDOLPH E. TROW, 1702 RANCH DRIVE, RICHMOND, VIRGINIA

N: 55187

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PAGE SIX

SAINT LOUIS:

MISSOURI

SAN DIEGO:

SEATTLE:

WASHINGTON

END

.RCC

FBI KX GLR

JOHN H. WAGNER, 8220 BARNINGHAM ROAD, RICHMOND, VIRGINIA

JOHN J, BUCKLEY, 9469 HARALD DRIVE, WOODSON TERRACE,

EDMUND C: WELTON, 825' DEANDELL COURT, FERGUSON, MISSOURI .

ROBERI S. BAKER, 4268 HORTENSIA, SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA

LEROY W. SHEETS, 5725. 72ND STREET, N. E., MARYSVILLE,

NW 55187 DocId: 32989769 Page 124

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## Page 125

63933 lA COng

5: 79P!: 9/4/75 MITEL AJ"!

TO ALL SACS

FROM DIPECTOR (62-116395)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

SENSTUDY 75

REBHIEL MAY 2, 1975.

PURPOSES OF INSTANT TELETYPE ARE TO CID REITERATE THAT

FRI HAS PLEDGED FULL COOPEPATION WITH THE SENATE SELECT

• COMMITTEE (SSC) AND WISHES TO ASSISI AND FACILITATE ANY

INVESTIGATIONS UNDERTAKEN BY THE SSC WITH RESPECT IN THE, FBI;

AND (2) SET FORTH NEW. PROCEDURE RELATING TO SSC STAFF

INTEPVIE"S OF CURRENT AND FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES.

• FOR INFORMATION OF THOSE OFFICES WHICH HAVE NOT PREVIOUSLY

HAD CUPPENT OR FORMER EMPLOYEES IN ITS TERRITOY INTERVIEWED

BY THF. SSC, THE BURTAI FREQUENTLY LEARMS FROM THF SSC OR •

OTHFRWISE THAT FORMER EMPLOYEES ARE BEING CONSIDERED FOR

INTERVIEW BY THE SSC STAFF. INSTRIICTIONS ARE ISSUED FOR THE

FIELD OFFICE TO CONTACI THE FORMER EMPLOYEE ID ALERT HIM. AS TO

POSSIBLE INTERVIEW, REMIND HIM OF HIS CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT

WITH THE BUREAN AND SUGGEST THAT IF HE IS CONTACTED FOR

M

just

ito

# 3

Aster.

62-6109-6

SEARCHEDS

_INDEXED.

SERIALIZENL PILED_

SEP 41975

FBI - KNOXVILLE

NW 55187 Docid: 32989769

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PAGE - TWO

INTERVIEW, HE MAY CONTACI THE LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION BY

COLLECI CALL FOR FURTHER INFORMATION. IN THE USUAL CASE,

AS CIRCUMSTANCES UNFOLD, THE FORMER EMPLOYEE IS TOLD(I) .

THAT HE HAS A RIGHT TO LEGAL COUNSEL, BUT THAT THE BUREAU

CANNOT PROVIDE SAME; (2) THAT THE BUREAU HAS WAIVED THE

CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT. FOR THE INTERVIEW WITHIN SPECIFIED

PARAMETERS; AND (3) THAT THERF ARF FOUR PRIVILEGED AREAS IN

WHICH HE IS NOT REQUIRED TO ANSWER QUESTION: THESE AREAS

ARE RELATING IO INFÓRMATION WHICH MAY (A) IDENTIFY BUREAU

, SOURCES; (B) REVEAL SENSITIVE METHODS/TECHNIQUES; (C) REVEAL

IDENTITIES OF THIRD AGENCIES, INCLUDING FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE

AGENCIES, OR INFORMATION FROM SUCH AGENCIES; AND CDS ADVERSELY

AFFECT ONGOING BUREAU INVESTIGATIONS. .

HERETOFORE, BUREAU HAS OFFERED INTERVIEWFES CONSULTATION

PRIVILEGES WHEREBY A BUREAU SUPERVISOR WOULD BE AVAILABLE

NEARBY, ALTHOUGH NOT ACTUALLY AT INTERVIEW, SO INTERVIEVEE

MIGHT CONSULT WITH HIM SHOULD QUESTIONS ARISE AS TO PARAMETERS

OF INTERVIE! OR PRIVILEGED AREAS. THE CONSULTANT DID NOT ACI

AS A LEGAL ADVISOR.

EFFECIIVE IMMEDIATELY, BUREAU WILL. NO LONGER PROVIDE

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PAGE THREE

ON-THE-SCENE PERSONNEL FOR CONSULTATION PIIRPOSES TO ASSIST

EITHER CURRENT OF FORMER EMPLOYEES. PROSPECTIVE INTERVIEWEES

SHOULD BE TOLD THAI, IF THEY DESIRE ASSISTANCE OF THIS NATURE

, DURING AN INTERVIEW, THEY MAY CONTACI EITHER PERSONALLY (IF

• INTEPVIEW IS IN WASHINGION, D. C.) •OR BY COLLECI CALL, THE

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, MR. V. R.

"ANNALL, OR, IN HIS ABSENCE, SECTION CHIEF W. O. CREGAR.

THIS CHANGE IN PROCEDURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED AS

LESSENING THE ASSISTANCE WE ARE FURNISHING TO CURRENT AND

FORMER EMPLOYEES. *

FOR YOUR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION, I AM WORKING WITH THE

DEPARTMENI IN EXPLORING AVENUES TO ARRANGE LEGAL REPRESENTATION,

WHEN NECESSARY, FOR CURRENT AND FORMER EMPLOYFFS WITHOUT

EXPENSE TO THEM. YOU WILL BE KEPT ADVISED OF DEVELOPMENIS

IN THIS REGARD.

END

PLS RETURN TO TALK

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## Page 128

NRA33 WA CODE

5:09PM 9/4/75 NITEL AUN

TO ALL SACS

FROM DIRECTOR (62-116395)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

SENSTUDY 75.

• REBUTEL MAY 2, 1975.

PURPOSES OF INSTANT TELETYPE ARE TO EI) REITERATE THAT

FBI HAS PLEDGED FULL COOPERATION WITH THE SENATE SELECT

COMMITTEE (SSC) AND WISHES TO ASSIST AND FACILITATE ANY

INVESTIGATIONS UNDERTAKEN BY THE SSC WITH RESPECT TO THE FBI;

AND (2) SET FORTH NEW PROCEDURE RELATING TO SSC STAFF

INTERVIEWS OF CURRENT AND FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES..

FOR INFORMATION OF THOSE OFFICES WHICH HAVE NOT PREVIOUSLY

HAD CURRENT OR FORMER EMPLOYEES IN ITS TERRITOY INTERVIEWED

BY THE SSC, THE BUREAU FREQUENTLY LEARNS FROM THE SSC OR

OTHERWISE THAT FORMER EMPLOYEES ARE BEING CONSIDERED FOR

INTERVIEW BY THE SSC STAFF. INSTRUCTIONS ARE ISSUED FOR THE

FIELD OFFICE TO

CONTACT THE FORMER EMPLOYEE TO ALERT HIM AS TO .

POSSIBLE INTERVIEW, REMIND HIM OF HIS CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT

WITH THE BUREAU AND SUGGEST THAT IF HE IS CONTACTED FOR

62-1109-6

BERATES PIEXPRE

SERIALIZEX

SEP

41975

FBI - KNOXVILE

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PAGE TWO

INTERVIEW, HE MAY CONTACI THE LEGAL GOUNSEL DIVISION BY

COLLECT CALL FOR FURTHER INFORMATION.• IN THE USUAL CASE,

AS CIRCUMSTANCES UNFOLD, THE FORMER EMPLOYEE IS TOLD&IS

THAT HE HAS A RIGHT TO LEGAL COUNSEL, BUT THAT. THE BUREAU

CANNOT PROVIDE SAME; (2) THAT THE BUREAU HAS WAIVED THE

CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT FOR THE INTERVIEW WITHIN SPECIFIED

PARAMETERS; AND (3) THAI THERE ARE FOUR PRIVILEGED AREAS IN

WHICH HE IS NOT REQUIRED TO ANSWER QUESTION• THESE AREAS

• ARE RELATING TO INFORMATION WHICH MAY (A) IDENTIFY BUREAU

• SOURCES; (B) REVEAL SENSITIVE METHODS/TECHNIQUES; (C) REVEAL

IDENTITIES OF THIRD AGENCIES, INCLUDING FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE

AGENCIES, OR INFORMATION FROM SUCH AGENCIES; AND (D) ADVERSELY.

AFFECT ONGOING BUREAU INVESTIGATIONS.

HERETOFORE, BUREAU HAS OFFERED INIERVIEVEES CONSULTATION

PRIVILEGES WHEREBY A BUREAU SUPERVISOR WOULD BE AVAILABLE

NEARBY, ALTHOUGH NOT ACTUALLY AT INTERVIEW, SO INTERVIEVEE

MIGHT CONSULT WITH HIM SHOULD QUESTIONS ARISE AS TO PARAMETERS

OF INTERVIEW OR PRIVILEGED AREAS. THE CONSULTANT DID NOT ACT

AS A LEGAL ADVISOR.

EFFECIIVE IMMEDIATELY, BUREAU WILL NO LONGER PROVIDE

NW - 55187

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PAGE THREE

ON-THE-SCENE PERSONNEL FOR CONSULTATION PURPOSES TO ASSIST

EITHER CURRENT OF FORMER EMPLOYEES, PROSPECTIVE INTERVIEWEES

SHOULD BE TOLD THAT, IF THEY DESIRE ASSISTANCE OF THIS NATURE

DURING AN INTERVIEW, THEY MAY CONTACT EITHER PERSONALLY (IF

INTERVIEW IS IN WASHINGION, D. C.). OR BY COLLECT CALL, THE

ASSISTANI DIRECTOR OF THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, MR. W. Ro

WANNALL, OR, IN HIS ABSENCE, SECTION CHIEF W. O. CREGAR.

THIS CHANGE IN PROCEDURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED AS

LESSENING THE ASSISTANCE WE ARE FURNISHING TO CURRENT AND

FORMER EMPLOYEES•

FOR YOUR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION, I AM WORKING WITH THE

DEPARTMENT IN EXPLORING AVENUES TO ARRANGE LEGAL REPRESENTATION,.

WHEN NECESSARY, FOR CURRENT AND FORMER EMPLOYEES WITHOUT

EXPENSE TO THEM. YOU WILL BE KEPT ADVISED OF DEVELOPMENTS

IN THIS REGARD.

END

PLS RETURN TO TALK

NW 55187 DocId: 32989769 Page 130

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## Page 131

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

EDITION

GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVEr

ENMENT

Memorandum

FILE

62-1109)

TO

:

FROM

SUBJECT:

DATE:

7/18/75

-

SENSTUDY 75

At 5:25 PM, today, Supervisor PAUL DALY of the Legal

Counsel Division telephonically advised that the Senate Select

Committee is to interview SA JOHN BENTON on Tuesday morning,

7/22/75. DALY stated that SA BENTON should report to the

Atlanta Office by 9:00 AM, Tuesday morning, for a conference

with Supervisor SEYMOUR PHILLIPS of the Intelligence Division.

He stated that the Committee, in addition to interviewing SA

BENTON, would interview five other Agents of the Atlanta

Office. He stated that this would be a staff interview and

not under oath. He stated that the interview concerned the

MARTIN LUTHER KING case.

• HCS/wsw

(2)

ADDENDUM: SA BENTON was telephonically advised of the above

information. at 575:40 pm 7/18/15-

JUL 1 8 i9T

FBI — KNOXVILLE

-

62-1109-5

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-110-

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## Page 132

FILE

(62-1109)

7/18/75

SAC HAROLD C. SWANSON

SENSTUDY 75

At 5:25 PM, today, Supervisor PAUL DALY of the legal

Counsel Division telephonically advised that the Senate Select

Committee is to interview SA JOHN BENTON on Tuesday morning,

1/22/75• DALY stated that SA BENTON should report to the

Atlanta Office by 9:00 AM, Tuesday morning, for a conference

with supervisor SEYMOUR PHILLIPS of the Intelligence Division.

He stated that the Committee, in addition to interviewing SA

BENTON, would interview five other Agents of the Atlanta

Office. He stated that this would be a staff interview and

not under oath. He stated that the interview concerned the

MARTIN LUTHER KING case.

HICS/WSW

(2)

ADDENDUM: SA BENTON was telephonically advised of the above

information. at S: topu

7/18/25

50L1 7378

FBI - KNOXVILLE

NW: 55187 DocId: 32989769 Page 132

62-1109-5

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NRO03 WA CODE*

7:26AM NITEL 6-28-75 IJT

TO ATLANTA

BIRMINGHAM

ALBANY

JACKSONVILLE

FROM DIRECTOR

(62-116395)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

SENSTUDY 75

KNOXVILLE

LOS ANGELES

TAMPA

CHICAGO

REBUTEL MAY 2, 1975.

INQUIRIES MADE OF BUREAU BY SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC)

CONCERNING A NUMBER OF PRESENT AND FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES,

INCLUDING THEIR CURRENT WHEREABOUTS, SUGGESTS THEY MAY BE

INTERVIEWED BY SSC STAFF CONCERNING BÜREAU'S FORMER INVESTIGA-

TION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. SET OUT BELOW ARE NAMES AND

LAST KNOWN ADDRESSES ÖF FORMER BUREAU EMPLOYEES AND OFFICE OF

ASSIGNMENT OF INCUMBENTS, ALL OF WHOM SSC HAS INQUIRED ABOUT.

EACH OF THESE FORMER 'EMPLOYEES IS TO BE IMMEDIATELY.

CONTACTED AND ALERTED THAT HE MIGHT BE APPROACHED BY THE SSC

STAFF ABOUT THE KING INVESTIGATION. THEY SHOULD BE TOLD THAT

SA Brital

LAC.

Advised fat

ASAC-

62-1109-4

SEARCHEDCC

SERIALIZER

INDE"

JUi::

1975

FSI-KOALLI

SAC

NW 55187 DocId: 32989769 Page 133

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PAGE TWO

IN THE EVENT THEY ARE INTERVIEWED AND DURING THE COURSE OF

SAME, QUESTIONS ARE ASKED WHICH RELATE TO SENSITIVE BUREAU

OPERATIONS (SOURCES, METHODS, TECHNIQUES, THIRD AGENCY RULE

AND ONGOING INVESTIGATIONS), THEY MAY REQUEST THAT AN FBI

AGENT BE PRESENT. BUREAU WILL PROVIDE AGENT ON REQUEST OF

INTERVIEWEE. AS A PRELUDE TO INTERVIEW, THE FORMER EMPLOYEE

MAY, AFTER BEING CONTACTED BY SSC STAFF, CONTACI BUREAU'S

LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION BY COLLECT CALL FOF FULL INFORMATION

TO ASSIST HIM, INCLUDING OBLIGATIONS AS TO CONFIDENTIALITY

OF INFORMATION ACQUIRED AS FBI EMPLOYEE. IT IS EMPHASIZED

THAT BUREAU'S OFFER OF ASSISTANCE IS NOT INTENDED TO IMPEDE

SSC WORK BUT ÏS DONE AS COOPERATIVE GESTURE AND TO SAFEGUARD

SENSITIVE BUREAU INFORMATION. CONTACIS WITH THESE FORMER

EMPLOYEES TO BE HANDLED PERSONALLY BY SAC OR ASAC. IN EVENT

THIS NOT FEASIBLE FOR JUST CAUSE, TO BE HANDLED BY A SENIOR

SUPERVISOR.

INCUMBENT EMPLOYEES TO BE ADVISED THAT IF CONTACTED BY

SSC STAFF FOR INTERVIEW, LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION TO BE

IMMEDIATELY NOTIFIED THROUGH SAC..

IMMEDIATELY AFTER CONTACT, RESULIS SHOULD BE FURNISHED

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PAGE THREE

BUREAU BY TELETYPE IN ABOVE CAPTION. IF A FORMER EMPLOYEE IS

NO LONGER IN YOUR TERRITORY OR TEMPORARILY AWAY, SET OUT LEAD

TO OTHER OFFICE IMMEDIATELY WITH COPY TO FBI HEADQUARTERS.

ATLANTA: INCUMBENIS - DONALD P. BURGESS, RICHARD E.

FUGATT, EDMUND F. HAGGERTY., O. RICHARD HAMILTON, CHARLES I.

HAYNES, WILBUR W. SEITZER, ROBERT W. THOMSON. FORMER -

MARION E. CHEEK, 1613 GAIL AVENUE, ALBANY, GEORGIA 31705;

CHARLES I. HARDING, 2243 PINECLIFF DRIVE, NORTHEAST, ATLANTA,

GEORGIA 30345.

BIRMINGHAM: LAWRENCE T. GURLEY, 1340 WESTMINISTER

PLACE, BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA 35235.

ALBANY: HENRY G. ROWSE, JR., 39 NORTH MAIN STREET,

ENOSBURG FALLS, VERMONT D5450.

JACKSONVILLE: WILLIAM LEE BOLYARD - INCUMBÉNT.

KNOXVILLE: W.. JOHN BENTON - INCUMBENT.

LOS ANGELES: JAMES M. KELLOGG - INCUMBENT.

TAMPA: JAMES E. MCMAHÓN, 3110 COCOS ROAD, TAMPA;

FLORIDA 33618.

CHICAGO: JOHN BASSETT - INCUMBENT.

END -

ALL OFFICES PLS RETURN TO TALK

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## Page 136

3427-

NRA03 WA CODE

7:26AM NITEL 6-28-75 TJT

TO ATLANTA

BIRMINGHAM

ALBANY

JACKSONVILLE

KNOXVILLE

LOS ANGELES

TAMPA

CHICAGO

FROM DIRECTOR (62-116395)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

SENSTUDY 75

REBÚTEL MAY 2, 1975.

INQUIRIES MADE OF BUREAU BY SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE. (SSC)

• CONCERNING A NUMBER OF PRESENT AND FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES,

INCLUDING THEIR CURRENT WHEREABOUTS, SUGGESTS THEY MAY BE

INTERVIFMED BY SSC STAFF CONCERNING BUREAU'S FORMER INVESTIGA-

TION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. SET OUT BELOW ARE NAMES AND

LAST KNOWN ADDRESSES OF FORMER BUREAU EMPLOYEES AND OFFICE OF

ASSIGNMENT QF INCUMBENTS, ALL OF WHOM SSC HAS INQUIRED ABOUT.

EACH OF THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES IS TO BE IMMEDIATELY

CONTACTED AND ALERTED THAT HE MIGHT BE APPROACHED BY THE SSC

STAFF ABOUT THE KING INVESTIGATION. THEY SHOULD BE TOLD THAT

62-11.09-4

EARCHED CLINDEXED

RIALIZENCO «FEED.

1975

FDI-K:0

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## Page 137

PAGE TWO

IN THE EVENT THEY ARE INTERVIEWED AND DURING THE COURSE OF

SAME, QUESTIONS ARE ASKED WHICH RELATE TO SENSITIVE BUREAU

OPERATIONS (SOURCES, METHODS, TECHNIQUES, THIRD AGENCY RULE

AND ONGOING INVESTIGATIONS, THEY MAY PFQUEST THAI AN FBI

AGENT BE PRESENT. BUREAU WILL PROVIDE AGENT ON REQUEST OF

INTERVIEVEE. AS A PRELUDE TO INTERVIEW, THE FORMER EMPLOYEE

MAY, AFTER BEING CONTACIED BY SSO STAFF, CONTACT BUREAU'S

LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION BY COLLECT CALL FOF FULL INFORMATION

TO ASSIST HIM, INCLUDING OBLIGATIONS AS TO CONFIDENTIALITY

OF INFORMATION ACQUIRED AS FBI EMPLOYFE. IT IS EMPHASIZED.

THAT BUREAU'S OFFER OF ASSISTANCE IS NOT INTENDED TO IMPEDE

SSC WORK BUT IS DONE AS COOPERATIVE GESTURE AND TO SAFEGUARD

SENSITIVE BUREAU INFORMATION• CONTACIS WITH THESE FORMER

EMPLOYEES TO BE HANDLED PERSONALLY BY SAC OR ASAC. IN EVENT

THIS NOT FEASIBLE FOR JUST CAUSE, TO BE HANDLED BY A SENIOR

SUPERVISOR.

INCUMBENT EMPLOYEES TO BE ADVISED THAT IF CONTACTED RY

SSC STAFF FOR INTERVIEW, LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION TO BE

IMMEDIATELY NOTIFIED THROUGH SAC.

IMMEDIATELY AFTER CONTACT, RESULTS SHOULD BE FURNISHED

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PAGE THREE

BUREAU BY TELETYPE IN ABOVE CAPTION. IF A FORMER EMPLOYEE IS

NO LONGER IN YOUR TERRITORY OR TEMPORARILY AWAY, SET OUT LEAD

TO OTHER OFFICE IMMEDIATELY WITH COPY TO FBI HEADQUARTERS.

ATLANTA: INCUMBENTS - DONALD P. BURGESS, RICHARD E.

FUGAIT, EDMUND F. HAGGERTY, O. RICHARD HAMILTON, CHARLES I.

HAYNES, WILBUR W. SEITZER, ROBERT W. THOMSON. FORMER -

MARION E, CHEEK, 1613 GAIL AVENUE, ALBANY, GEORGIA 31705;

CHARLES I. HARDING, 2243 PINECLIFF DRIVE, NORTHEAST, ATLANTA,

GEORGIA 30345.

BIRMINGHAM: LAVRENCE T. GURLEY, 1340 WESIMINISTER

PLACE, BIRMINGHAMS. ALABAMA 35235.

ALBANY: HENRY G. ROWSE, JR., 39 NORTH MAIN STREET,

ENOSBURG FALLS; VERMONT 0545,0.

JACKSONVILLE: WILLIAM LEF, BOLYARD - INCUMBENT.

KNOXVILLE: W. JOHN BENTON - INCUMBENT.

LOS ANGELES: JAMES M. KELLOGG - INCUMBENT.

TAMPA: JAMES E. MCMAHON, 311& COCOS ROAD, TAMPAS

FLORIDA 33618.

CHICAGO: JOHN BASSETT - INCUMBENT.

END

ALL OFFICES PLS RETURN TO TALK

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138

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## Page 139

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

JULY 107S EDITION

GSA FPMR 141 CFRI 101-11.8

UNITED STATES GOV

MENT

Memorandum

TO

:

ALL EMPLOYEES

DATE:. 5/22/75

KNOXVILLE

OFFICE MEMO NO. 18

SUBJECT:

(A)

SENSTUDY 75 (62-11092 - In connection with the work of the

Senate and House Select Committees, its representatives may try to contact

our office for information.

Accordingly, it is important that you be aware

of the fact that in one instance, a representative of the Senate Select

Committee telephonically inquired as to the identity of a SAC in a parti-

-

cular office during 1970. In handling such inquiries, insure establishing

bona fides of representative by having him display credentials on personal

contact or if telephonic contact by telephoning back to Committee.

Unless information is of a public nature, as in the instance cited above,

FBIHO clearance is necessary prior to supplying any information. FBIHO

must be expeditiously advised of all information furnished. As stated in

Office Memo No. 16, Item A, it is reiterated that the FBI has pledged full

cooperation to assist and facilitate any investigation undertaken by the

Committee concerning the FBI.

(B) ECONOMY (66-118) - In accordance with a suggestion made by the

Inspection staff, all employees are again reminded to make every effort to

continue practices which enhance the economy of operations in this office.

Exercise restraint in travel costs, communications, and any other phase of

oux operations which do not adversely affect Bureau operations. Your sug-

gestions in this regard are solicited.

(C) - FORMS AND CORRESPONDENCE - OFFICE PROCEDURE (66-647) - In my

memorandum to all employees,

5/7/75, concerning this matter, I stated that

the CCO is now routing FD-302's, inserts, and memos received on dictation

belts and in rough draft form directly to the steno pool without being.

matched to the file. It was also pointed out that FD-302's, inserts, and

memos pertaining to more than one file could now be placed on a single

dictation belt.

This new procedure would not, however, permit the incor-

poration of communications such as letters and reports, where the belt must

be matched with the file, to be included on the same dictation belt.

Recently such instances have occurred, thereby delaying the receipt of the .

dictation belt in the steno pool.

Accordingly, in those instances where

is necessary to match dictation belt with the file, the dictation must

relate to one individual file.

This does not interfere with the procedure

previously established, permitting FD-302's, inserts, and memos pertaining

to more than one file to be on a single dictation belt.

-

1 - Each employee

1 - 66-647

02-1109-3

1 - 66-38

SEARCHED

1 - 66-1922 .

D - 62-1109

HCS/WSW

1 - 66-118

OVER

5010.110

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KX 66-3B

OFFICE MEMO NO. 18

(D) CONDOLENCES - Our sincere condolences go out to DENNIS W.

* SHANAHAN and his family due to the loss of his step-father, Dr. WALTER J.

BARTH, who died of natural causes in Chicago, Illinois, on 5/19/75.

(E) RETIREMENT MATTERS - SAC J. GORDON SHANKLIN, Dallas Division,

retires from the Bureau, 6/27/75. A book of letters is being prepared,

and anyone wishing to send him a letter may forward it to Secretary

NANCY J. COLLINS, Dallas, by 6/17/75.

ALVIN A. STAFFELD, JR., Inspector - Deputy Assistant Director,

Special Investigative Division, FBIHO, retires 6/6/75, after more than

30 years of Bureau service. A book of letters is being prepared, and

those desiring to send one to be included in the book should sent it to

•Mrs.. DARLENE BELIUS, Room 1742, Justice Building, by 6/2/75.

PAUL F.:O'CONNELI, JR., Inspector - Deputy Assistant Director,

Files and Communications Division, Washington, D. Co, will retire on

6/20/75, after more than 32 years of Bureau service.

Anyone wishing to

send PAUl a letter for inclusion in the book being prepared may forward

it to Miss BESSIE P. ROSS, Room 5829, JEH Building, by 6/13/75.

Any letters sent to the above individuals should be unfolded

and the envelope marked "personal."

(E) FBIRA BOWLING LEAGUE (66-1922) ~ The kick-off bowling league

finished its Spring season, Tuesday night of this week, and special honors

go to Team #7, who finished first in the league, because of the outstand

ing performance of its members, CHARLOTTE HENRY, BOB STROM, CAROLYN FULLER,

and MIKE FULLER. Additional honors go to the following individuals for

individual and team cooperation:

High Individual Game: JERRY COX - 201; CAROLYN FULLER - 216

High Individual Series: JERRY COX - 512; CAROLYN FULLER - 501

High Team Game: Team #2 - 731 (LINDA SAMSON, PAUL SAMSON, RUTH BOST, and

SONNY BOST)

High Team Series: Team #2 - 2073

Most Improved Bowlers: JEAN COX - raised average 28 pins:

PAUL SAMSON - raised average 15 pins.

(G) BIRTHDAY GREETINGS - To the following employees who will be

celebrating their birthdays during the forthcoming week: JOE STARNES

on May 24 and DEBBIE CATES on May 25.

-2-

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## Page 141

NRA36 WA CODE

4:38PM NITEL 5-20-75 PAW

TO ALL SACS

FROM DIRECTOR (62-116395)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

SENSTUDY - 75.

REBUTEL. MAY 2, 1975.

IN CONNECTION WITH WORK OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE SELECT

COMMITTEES, ITS REPRESENTATIVES MAY CONTACT YOUR OFFICE FOR

INFORMATION.

IN ONE RECENT INSTANCE, A REPRESÉNTATIVE OF THE SENATE

SELECI COMMITTEE TELEPHONICALLY INQUIRED AS TO IDENTITY OF SAC

IN A PARTICULAR OFFICE DURING 1970:

IN HANDLING SUCH INQUIRIES INSURE ESTABLISHING BONA FIDES

OF REPRESENTATIVE BY SHOW OF CREDENTIALS ON PERSONAL CONTACT OR,

IF TELEPHONIC CONTACI, BY TELEPHONING BACK TO COMMITTEE.

UNLESS INFORMATION IS OF A PUBLIC NATURE, AS IN THE INSTANCE

CITED ABOVE, OBTAIN FBIQ CLEARANCE PRIOR TO SUPPLYING ANY •

INFORMATION. FBIHQ MUST BE EXPEDITIOUSLY ADVISED OF ALL

INFORMATION FURNISHED.

END

PLS RETURN TO TALK

62-1109-2

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imAY201975

FBI — KNOXVILLE /

d4t+18

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## Page 142

NR036. WA CODE

4:38PM NITEL 5-20-75 PAW

TO ALL SACS

FROM DIRECTOR (62-116395)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

SENSTUDY - 75.

REBUTEL MAY 2, 1975.

IN CONNECTION WITH WORK OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE SELECT

COMMITTEES, ITS REPRESENTATIVES MAY CONTACT YOUR OFFICE FOR

• INFORMATION:

IN ONE RECENT INSTANCE, A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SENATE

SELECT COMMITTEE TELEPHONICALLY INQUIRED AS TO IDENTITY OF SAC

IN A PARTICULAR OFFICE DURING 1970.

IN HANDLING SUCH INQUIRIES INSURE ESTABLISHING BONA FIDES

OF REPRESENTATIVE BY SHOW OF CREDENTIALS ON PERSONAL CONTACT ORg

IF TELEPHONIC CONTACT, BY IELEPHONING BACK TO COMMITTEE.

UNLESS INFORMATION IS OF A PUBLIC NATURE, AS IN THE INSTANCE

CITED ABOVE, OBTAIN FBIHQ CLEARANCE PRIOR TO SUPPLYING ANY

INFORMATION. FBIHQ MUST BE EXPEDITIOUSLY ADVISED OF ALL

INFORMATION FURNISHED.

END

PLS RETURN. TO TALK

102-1109-2

SARAH DO TE

MAY 2@1375

FBI - KNOXVILLE

NW 55187 DocId: 32989769 Page 142

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## Page 143

NRO74 WA CODE

952PM NITEL 5-2-75 MSE

TO ALL SACS

FROM DIRECTOR, (62-116395)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

SENSTUDY 75

- CAPTIONED MATTER PERTAINS TO. BUREAU'S HANDLING OF REQUESTS

FROM SENATE AND HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEES TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL

OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. IN CONNEC-

TION WITH WORK OF THESE COMMITTEES, STAFF MEMBERS MAY SEEK

TO INTERVIEW, CURRENT AND FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES.

RECENTLY, THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) STAFF HAS

INTERVIEWED SEVERAL FORMER EMPLOYEES AND IT IS ANTICIPATED

THAT MANY MORE SUCH PERSONNEL WILL BE CONTACTED.

THE FBI HAS PLEDGED FULL COOPERATION WITH THE COMMITTEE,

AND WE WISH TO ASSIST

AND FACILITATE ANY INVESTIGATIONS UNDER-

TAKEN BY THE COMMITTEE WITH RESPECT TO THE FBI. HOWEVER, WE

DO HAVE AN OBLIGATION IO INSURE THAI SENSITIVE SOURCES AND

METHODS AND ONGOING SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIONS ARE FULLY

sol

62-kead

Never

Afte

62-1109-

13%.

SAC

NW- 55187

_DocId: 329

---

## Page 144

= M. =

PAGE TWO

PROTECTED. SHOULD ANY FORMER EMPLOYEE CONTACT YOUR OFFICE AND

HAVE ANY QUESTION REGARDING HIS OBLIGATION NOT TO DIVULGE INFOR-

MATION OBTAINED BY VIRTUE OF HIS PAST FBI EMPLOYMENT, HE SHOULD

BE INSTRUCTED IO CONTACI LEGAL COUNSEL, FBIHQ, BY COLLECT CALL.

YOUR CONVERSATIONS WITH FORMER EMPLOYEES MUST BE IN KEEPING WITH

OUR PLEDGE. IT IS BELIEVED SUCH A PROCEDURE WOULD INSURE PROPER

PROTECTION AND ALSO FACILITATE THE WORK OF THE SSC.

THE ABOVE PROCEDURE ALSO APPLIES TO CURRENT EMPLOYEES

OF YOUR OFFICE. HOWEVER, CONTACT WITH THE LEGAL COUNSEL SHOULD

BE HANDLED THROUGH THE SAC.

END

RETURN TO TALK ON THE CONFERENCE

NW 55187 DocId: 32989769 Page 144

---

## Page 145

NROTA VA CODE

952PM MITEL 5-2-75 MSE

TO ALL SAGS

FROM DIRECTOR (62-116395>

PERSONAL ATTENTION

SENSTUDY 75

CAPTIONED MATTER PERTAINS TO BUREAU'S HANDLING OF REQUESTS

FROM SENATE AND HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEES TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL

OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. IN CONNEC-

TION WITH WORK OF THESE COMMITTEES, STAFF MEMBERS MAY SEEK

TO INTERVIEW CURRENT AND FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES.

RECENTLY, THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC> STAFF HAS

INTERVIEVED SEVERAL FORMER EMPLOYEES AND IT IS ANTICIPATED

THAT MANY MORE SUCH PERSONNEL WILL BE CONTACTED.

THE FBI HAS PLEDGED FULL COOPERATION WITH THE COMMITTEE

AND WE WISH TO ASSIST AND FACILITATE ANY INVESTIGATIONS UNDER-

TAKEN BY THE COMMITTEE WITH RESPECT TO THE FBI. HOWEVER, VE

DO HAVE AN OBLIGATION IO INSURE THAI SENSITIVE SOURCES AND

METHODS AND ONGOING SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIONS ARE FULLY

62-1104-

---

## Page 146

PAGE TWO

PROTECTED• SHOULD ANY FORMER EMPLOYEE CONTAGT YOUR OFFICE AND

HAVE ANY QUESTION REGARDING HIS OBLIGATION NOT TO DIVULGE INFOR-

MATION OBTAINED BY VIRTUE OF HIS PAST FBI EMPLOYMENT, HE SHOULD

• BE INSTRUCTED TO CONTACT LEGAL COUNSEL, FBIHQ, BY COLLECT CALL.

YOUR CONVERSATIONS WITH FORMER EMPLOYEES MUST BE IN KEEPING WITH

OUR PLEDGE• IT IS BELIEVED SUCH A PROCEDURE WOULD INSURE PROPER

PROTECTION AND ALSO FACILITATE THE WORK OF THE SSC.

THE ABOVE PROCEDURE ALSO APPLIES TO CURRENT EMPLOYEES

OF YOUR OFFICE. HOWEVER, CONTACT WITH THE LEGAL COUNSEL SHOULD

BE HANDLED THROUGH THE SAC.

END

RETURN TO TALK ON THE CONFERENCE

NW 55187 DocId: 32989769 Page 146

---