## Page 1

202-10001-10187

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

Date

Page

08/28/98

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS

RECORD NUMBER : 20210001-10187

RECORDS SERIES: FOIA SERIES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOC 188

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR:

OSD

FROM

TO

TITLE : MINUTES OF MEETING OF THE SPECIAL GROUP ON MONGOOSE 6

SEP 62

DATE: 09/06/62

PAGES: 5

SUBJECTS: MONGOOSE

DOCUMENT TYPE : MEMORANDUM

CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET

RESTRICTIONS : 1B, 1C

CURRENT STATUS: RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/30/98

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS: Reviewed by JCS, OSD, CIA and State.

NO JOINT STAFF OBJECTION

TO DECLASSIFICATION

REQUIRES CONCURRENDE OF

AR

206

і прес

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTEL

NW 50955 DooId: 32424918 Page 1

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## Page 2

3

epcisitio

f.

General Carter pointed out chat reference to support of all

Cuban exile groups (number 48) 1s Impractical. The word was changed

to selected.

8: Mr. Martin cautioned that results of number 50 (actions to

be undertaken by other Hemisphere goverments) would not be expected

overnight.

General Carter urged that, In connection vich

number 22

1

(submarine broadcasts)

General Lansdale should be given more latitude

in working up other deception possibilities

Mr. Bundy felt, on the

other hand, that particularly because of the possible Cuban counter-

measures which had been outlined by Mr. Murrow, the Group should look

at other possibilities in some detail.

1. General Carter felt that a determination should be made as

to how far the U.S. Is prepared to go in economic harrassing actions.

He emphasized that sabotage operations such as chose under number 27

will not in themselves be especially effective in frecking the Cuban

economy .

PERTINENT bACKARAM

The Group then turned to a discussion of number 32 (agricultural

sabotage). General Carter emphasized the extreme sensitivity of any

such operation and the disastrous results that would flow from some -

thing going wrong, particularly if there were obvious attribucion to

the U.S. He went on to say, however, that it would be possible to

accomplish this purpose by mechods more subtle than those indicated in

the paper. He mentioned specifically the possibility of producing crop

HH 50955 DocId: 32424918 Page 2

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## Page 3

flue

m

4(1) (c)

failures by the introduction of biological agents which would appear

(to be of natural origin. Mr. Bundy said that he had no worries about

any such sabotage which could clearly be made to appear as the result

of local Cuban disaffection of of a natural disaster, but that we must

avoid external activities such astelease of chemicals, etc., unless

they could be completely covered up.

-5.

A suggestion was made that small explosives of incendiarles which

could be distributed to Cubans should be infilerated. General Carter

explained that che problem is not one of such supplies, since they can

be easily improvised, but rather that the people have shown no inclinat:

to use such materials despite many exile claims to the contrary.

t was suggested that the matter of attacking and harrassing of

Soviet personnel within Cuba should be considere

7.

The Attorney General and Mr. Bundy said that no reprisals against

exiles who undertake active operations on their own are contemplated.

8. It was suggested that the possibilities of counterfeiting be looke.

Into further.

9. General Carter urged again that a decision be reached as to how

much lacicude would be allowed the operating elements of the government

within broad policy lines. The Chairnan indicated that it would not be

a simple matter to delegate responsibilities of this kind Co any great

degree.

10. Mr. Bundy chen raised the basic question of che entire spectrum

NW 50955 DocId: 32421918 Page 3

---

## Page 4

- 3=

f.

General Carter pointed out that reference to support of all

Cuban exile groups (number 48) is Impractical. The word was changed

to selected.

go Me. Martin cautioned that results of number 50 (actions to

be undertaken by other Hemisphere governments) would not be expected

overnight.

epcisitio

6(1)(c)

1

General Carter urged that, in connection wich

General Lansdale should be given more latitude

In working up other deception possibilities

Mr. Bundy felt, on che

other hand, that particularly because of the possible Cuban counter-

measures which had been outlined by Mr. Murrow, the Group should look

at other possibilities in some detail.

i. General Carter felt that a determination should be made as

to how far the U.S. is prepared to go in, economic harrassing actions.

He emphasized that sabotage operations such as those under number 27

will not in themselves be especially effective in precking the Cuban

economy.

PERTINENT bACKARAMI

The Group then turned to a discussion of number 32

General Carter emphasized the extreme sensitivity of any

such operation and the disastrous results that would flow from some-

thing going wrong, particularly if there were obvious attribution to

the U.S. He went on to say, however, that it would be possible to

accomplish this purpose by methods more subtle than those indicated in

the paper. He mentioned specifically the possibility o

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## Page 5

aBle

4(1) (C)

4,

1, 21

4 =

Mr. Bundy sald that he had no worries about

any such sabotage which could clearly be made to appear as the result

of local Cuban disaffection or of

but that we musc

avold external activities such

-5.

suggestion was made that small explosives or incendiaries which

could be distributed to Cubans should be infiltrated. General Carter

explained that the problem is not one of such supplies, since they can

be easily improvised, but rather that the people have shown no inclinatic

to use

such materials despite many exile claims to the contrary.

t was suggested that the matter of attacking and harrassing of

oviet personnel within Cuba should be considered

7. The Attorney General and Mr. Bundy said that no reprisals against

exiles who undertake active operations on their own are contemplated.

8. It was suggested that the possibilities of counterfeiting be looked

into further

9. General Carter urged again that a decision be reached as to how

much laticude would be allowed the operating elements of the government,

within broad policy lines. The Chairman indicated that it would not be

a simple matter to delegate responsibilities of this kind to any great

degree.

10. Mr. Bundy then raised the basic question of the entire spectrum

---