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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY

RECORD NUMBER

RECORDS SERIES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

NSC

145-10001-10170

124

Released under the wohn

'. Kennedy

Assassination Records

Collection Aet of 1992

144 USC 2107 Notel.

Case#:NW 54214 Date:

10-10-2017

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : CIA

FROM

: WILLIAM K.

HARVEY

TO

: BRIG. GEN.

LANSDALE

TITLE : MEMORANDUM

DATE: 07/24/62

PAGES : 7

SUBJECTS : OPERATION MONGOOSE--END OF PHASE ONE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION :

RESTRICTIONS : 1B

CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 02/10/98

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

24 July 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT:

REFERENCE:

Brigadier General E. G. Lansdale

Operation MONGOOSE - End of Phase I

Your Memorandum dated ll July 1962, Subject

as Above

1.

Pursuant to reference memorandum and in accordance with

our previous discussions, set out below are comments for inclusion

in your overall report to the Special Group (Augmented) at the con-

clusion of the firet phase of Operation Mongoose, 31 July 1962. In

preparing these comments it was found necessary to defer finalizing

them until we had an opportunity to review and check them against

the 23 July 1962 draft of NIE 85-2-62, a copy of which is available to

you.

2. BACKGROUND, PURPOSE, AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS -Phase I:

a.

On 16 March 1962, the Special Group (Augmented)

approved Phase I of Operation Mongoose authorizing and

directing that between that date and 31 July 1962, CLA mount

a concentrated operational program to collect intelligence

concerning Cuba and to develop, insofar as possible, clandes-

tine resistance cadres inside Cuba. This plan authorized

intelligence - political, economic, and covert actions, short

of those reasonably calculated to inspire revolt within the

target area or otherwise require U.S. armed intervention.

the plan required that actions taken during Phase I should be

consistent with overt policies of isolating Castro in the Wester,

Hemisphere and be undertaken in such a way as to permit U.S.

disengagement with minimum losses of assets and prestige.

Major operations going beyond the collection of intelligence

have required approval in advance by the Special Group

(Augmented).

b. Phase I of Operation Mongoose did not provide for

a maximum operational program against Cuba and did not

authorize any extensive use of U.S. military personnel,

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bases, and facilities. No decision was made to undertake a

phased operation to provoke a revolt with the commitment

that such revolt would be supported by U.S. military forces.

c. Within the policy limitations of Phase I, it was hoped

that the following would be accomplished:

(1) The development of an effective functioning

operational unit for the conduct of intelligence, psycho-

logical warfare and covert actions against Cuba.

(2) The development in depth of hard intelligence

coverage of Cuba.

(3) The establishment of limited resistance cadres

inside Cuba and an adequate assessment of the resistance

potential, as well as operational conditions affecting the

possibilities of organizing and inciting a major revolt.

(4) Keep alive, insofar as possible, the spirit of

resistance inside Cuba and exploit any possibilities that

appeared for the development of future Cuban leadership

and revolutionary doctrine.

(5) Determine the possibilities of and, if possible,

take action toward splitting the top Cuban leadership.

d. During Phase I the following has been accomplished:

(1) An effective operational unit for the conduct of

multi-purpose operations against Cuba has been established

and is functioning well. We of 23 July, 477 CIA staff per-

sonnel are devoting full time to this effort. In addition, a

very large number of additional personnel are devoting

part-time efforts to Operation Mongoose.

(2) Point c(2) above has been accomplished. Hard

intelligence coverage of Cuba at the present time exists

in depth and has increased substantially since the inception

of Phase I. Through this coverage we now have an excellent

understanding of military, political, economic and resistance

conditions and activities inside Cuba as reflected only by

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1,3

(a Xt)

403d

numerous individual intelligence disseminations, but

by the intelligence reflected in summation in the forth-

coming NIE 85-2-62. The plan for Phase I of Operation

Mongoose contemplated that we would have established

inside Cuba by 31 July 1962,

controlled reporting

intelligence agents, including legal travelers. In fact,

we have at the present time inside Cuba

controlled

Cuban agents and third country controlled agents,

a total of

agents inside the target area.

third country controlled agents, reporting sub-

stantially on Cuba, are located outside Cuba. A sub-

stantial number of these will in the near future be

dispatched on missions inside Cuba. In addition,

independent support agents are producing intermittent

intelligence reports with some frequency concerning

Cuba. The above figures do not include the extensive

reporting from the Opa-Locka Intelligence Center,

which is now totaling approximately 800 reports a month.

(3) With regard to Point c(3), we have been less

successful. The original maximal planning under Phase

I contemplated that we would have infiltrated into Cuba

by 31 July 1962 at least 23 illegal intelligence reporting

and resistance cadre teams. By the conclusion of thie

phase, we will have actually infiltrated no more than

eleven such teams. In addition, four caching operations

and one 1, 500 pound re-supply operation will bave been

completed. During August 1962, barring presently

unforeseen operational failures or aborts, five more

teams should have been infiltrated into Cuba, as well

as two additional cache operations and one 3, 000 pound

re-supply operation. Our failure to meet the original

schedule of team infiltrations primarily was due to two

factors: (a) lack of policy approval by bigher authority

to make any extensive utilization of Department of

Defense personnel and support, and (b) a series of

operational failures and aborts due to weather, enemy

action, failure of inside agents to keep rendezvous and,

in a few instances, missions aborted by the Cuban agents

involved for various reasons, including their dissatisfaction

with U.S. lack of aggressiveness against Cuba. Since

1 April 1962, in addition to the operations involved above,

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19 maritime operations have aborted or failed due to one or

more of the factors listed immediately above. Had we been

permitted to mount a more intensive and aggressive effort,

the original infiltration schedule probably would have been

met, possibly exceeded. You will recall that it was pointed

out to the Special Group in March 1962 that the full imple-

mentation of the operational plan for infiltration would

require use of Defense facilities which were not subsequently,

as a matter of policy, forthcoming. The speed with which

and the extent to which we can in the future infiltrate black

teams for resistance purposes into Cuba will of course depend

upon policy approvals by higher authority and the amount of

support we can count on thereunder. Although we have had

losses in connection with the teams infiltrated, Phase l has

demonstrated that we can successfully infiltrate such teams

and that, given proper policy approval and sufficient support,

we can greatly increase the resistance cadres and activities

inside Cuba.

(4) With regard to Point c(4) above, our activities,

we believe, have had a substantial effect in supporting a

spirit of resistance inside Cuba. This effect has not of

course been as great as it would have been had we been

able to mount a maximum covert action, paramilitary and

psychological warfare operation. We have not been success-

ful in developing an effective revolutionary movement or

leadership around which a Cuban revolt inside Cuba could

be rallied at the present time.

(5) With regard to Point c(5) above, we have developed

a number of promising leads to the top Cuban leadership, but

no immediate current possibility of splitting it.

3. OPERATIONAL ESTIMATE:

8.

The operational estimate of conditions and possibilities inside

Cuba is well reflected in the forthcoming NIE 85-2-62. In summation,

based on the intelligence collected and our operational experience

during Phase I, it is our conclusion that there is a sufficiently sub-

stantial resistance potential inside Cuba which, given a maximum

operational effort, could be organized and incited into open revolt

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provided the Cubans could be assured that if they themselves

revolted their revolt would be supported by U.S. intervention

and that the U.S, would not permit it to be crushed by Castro's

military and police counteraction. It is our opinion that there

is an excellent chance such a revolt could be incited by late

1963 if we embark on a maximum operational program now

Possible dissatisfaction with the Cuban regime inside Cuba has

materially increased over the past several months and is likely

to continue to increase for some time. It is not likely to result

in spontaneous revolt of in major widespread resistance

without organized assistance and support from the U.S.. The

Military/Security/Police apparatus of the Castro regime is

effective and its effectiveness can be expected to increase.

It is and will remain, in our opinion, for the foreseeable future,

capable of containing and eventually destroying the bulk of any

unorganized, unsupported resistance or revolt which may arise

in Cuba. If a revolt in Cuba is organized and incited, it will

be destroyed at best within a matter of a few days if it is not

supported by substantial military force.

b. With regard to the influence of Castro and Cuba else -

where in the Western Hemisphere, the appeal of Castroism as

such has dimmed appreciably in other Latin American states

during the past several months, although there are many indica -

tions that Castro's Cuba is still active in subversive activities

elsewhere in the Hemisphere, including firm evidence that Cuba

provided $10, 000 to the 13th of November Guatemalan revolutionary

group in Mexico City. It cannot be overstressed, however, that

the Cuban regime has proven that violent social revolution and

a break with the U.S. is possible in Latin America and will be

supported by the Soviet Bloc without the USSR necessarily insist-

ing on complete traditional communist control. The appeal of

the Cuban example will increase in other Latin American states

if reform lags and if hopes and promises remain unfulfilled.

Cuba also represents and will continue to represent a danger

because its subversive activities might at any time provide

the spark that would set off explosions in unsettled countries,

for example, Venezuela and Guatemala. In addition, Cuba

represents of course the dangerous example of a communist

regime within the Western Hemisphere in defiance of the United

States and breaching hemispheric solidarity.

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4. FUTURE COURSES OF ACTION:

Set out below are comments on the four possible future courses of

action outlined in Paragraph 5 of reference memorandum:

"a. Cancel operational plans; treat Cuba as a Bloc nation;

protect hemisphere from it:" If this course of action is adopted

by higher authority, it will not result in the overthrow or probably

in any material change in the Castro regime in the foreseeable

future. If this course of action is adopted, the extent of effort

currently being devoted by CIA and other agencies to Operation

Mongoose should be reviewed and reconsidered and probably

seriously curtailed. If this course of action is adopted, the U.S.

Government will of course receive increased pressure from the

multitudinous Cuban exile groups and will be faced with an

increasing level of irresponsible unilateral Cuban actions based

in and from the U.S:

"b. Exert all possible diplomatic, economic, psychological

and other pressures to overthrow the Castro-Communist regime

without overt U.S. military commitment:"

This course of

action, which is very close to that undertaken in Phase I of

Operation Mongoose, is not likely to result in the overthrow of

the Castro regime in the foreseeable future and unless it is

intensified to the point of substantially raising the "noise level"

inside and outside the U.S., its effectiveness is likely to be

limited to the collection of intelligence and to the containing of

Cuba at about the present level. If this course of action is

adopted, certain portions of the present ClA effort probably

should be terminated, particularly the infiltration of black

resistance teams, since without some phased plan for action

these teams are being jeopardized to little purpose.

"c. Commit U.S. to help Cubans overthrow the Castro-Com-

munist regime, with a step-by-step phasing to ensure success,

including the use of U.S. military force if required at the end.:"

This is, in effect, the original operational proposal presented to

the Special Group (Augmented) and disapproved in favor of Phase

I on 16 March 1962. If this course of action is adopted, and if we

are permitted thereunder in the immediate future to mount an all-.

out maximum operational effort to establish and support resistance

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inside Cuba with full covert use of military facilities and personnel,

there is an excellent chance of inciting a revölt inside Cuba by late

1963. This would require maximal effort keyed to a phased plan

and would require decision now to commit U.S. Forces to support

such a revolt since, even if incited, such a revolt cannot be kept

alive more than a few days in the face of Cuban military and

security counteraction unless the revolt is supported by substantial

military forces. This phasing is necessary too since, unless we

can assure the Cubans that if they are able to revolt they will be

supported, our chances of inducing them to engage in resistance

and revolt to a sufficient extent to constitute more than an irritant

to the Castro regime are remote. Details and specifics of the

necessary actions to implement this course of action have been

discussed with you on a number of occasions. Basic to success -

ful implementation of such a course of action, and particularly

the clandestine operational phases thereof, are a series of policy

decisions by higher authority at the inception which would permit

the operational units sufficient flexibility and freedom of action

and decision within clearly understood policy parameters to

effectively implement the operations involved on a phased basis.

"d. Use a provocation and overthrow the Castro-Communist

regime by U.S. military force:"

This course of action involves

a policy decision by higher authority beyond the purview of CIA.

If higher authority decides on this course of action, CIA is of

course prepared to assist in developing the necessary provocation

to justify such intervention and to assist in implementing this

course of action with full intelligence and covert assets.

5. It is hoped that the above comments will be of some assistance

to you in preparing your overall report on Phase I of Operation Mongoose

to the Special Group (Augmented). It would be most appreciated if you

would make available to us copies of your report to the Special Group in

order that we may comment as appropriate. If any further details of

comments from us would be helpful, please let me know.

(signed)

WILLIAM K.

HARVEY

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