CONNECTION BETWEEN AMLASH OPERATION AND JFK ASSASSINATION
Originator: SSCIA
From: JOHNSTON, JIM/DWYER/GREISSING
To: HART, SEN. GARY/SCHWEIKER, SENATOR
Document date: 01/27/1976
Document type: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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157-10005-10421)

2022 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

40V

843106

N671

Date: 06/06/94

Page: 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA

RECORD NUMBER : 157-10005-10421

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OA

RELEASE QF CIA INFORMATION

IN THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED

RECORDS SERIES :

MEMORANDUM

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA

FROM : JOHNSTON, JIM/DWYER/GREISSING

TO : HART, SEN. GARY/SCHWEIKER,

SENATOR

TITLE :

CONNECTION BETWEEN AMLASH OPERATION AND JFK ASSASSINATION

DATE : 01/27/76

PAGES : 6

SUBJECTS :

AMLASH CONNECTION TO JFK ASSASSINATION

CUBA

CASTRO

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION : U

RESTRICTIONS : 1A, 1B, IC, REFERRED

CURRENT STATUS : X

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/07/94

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS :

BOX 353

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

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MEMORANDUM

TO:

FROM:

SECRET

353

SSCI BOX #

Senator Hart (Colorado) and Senator

Schweiker

Jim Johnston

Dan

Dwyer

Ed Greissing

January 27, 1976

Connection Between Amlash Operation and Investigation

of JFK Assassination

353=

10421

DATE:

SUBJ:

Background

The staff's memorandum of January 5, 1976, postulated that the

Amlash operation might have had some effect on

• CIA's response to

the investigation of President Kennedy's assassination. On January

9, 1976, the staff asked for access to the Amlash file at CIA; and

after a

delay which was not explained, the staff was permitted to

reinew the file on January 23 and 26.

Summary of Amlash File

Amlash initially contacted by CIA in 1961 met occasionally with

case officers through August 1962, at which time he was given instrue-

tion in secret writing and explosives.

Interest in Amlash continued

after the August meetings, but there was no further direct contact by CIA

agents until mid-1963. Why there was a year lapse in contact with Am-

lash cannot be determined; the Cuban missile crisis

in October 1962

undoubtedly made CIA cautious in dealing with Amlash.

In any event, DIR 48198*

Anwhip,

to Rome of 19 June 1963 states that

a Cuban exile who assisted CIA, had sent a letter as part of

an "activation effort to reluctant dragon." Presumably, Amlash was

"reluctant dragon" and was, by this letter, asked to recontact CIA.

In late August, Amlash traveled with a large contingent of Cuban

officials and athletes to Porto Alegre, Brazil.

He cabled Anwhip

about his arrival on August 29.

This cable apparently was the signal

that

he was prepared to meet Anwhip in Porto Alegre.

Awwhip and two CIA case officers met with Amlash in Porto Alegre

between September 5 and

8. The two case officers have testified to

the Committee about their understanding of events at this series of

meetings which they viewed essentially as a get acquainted session.

CIA messages tell a different story.

Porto Alegre 0704 to DIR öf 7

September stated that Amlash told Amwhip he felt there were only two

ways of getting rid of Castro.

The first was

an invasion by U.S.

forces which Amlash knew was out of the question and the second was

an "inside job."

Amlash indicated he was awaiting a U.S. plan of action.

He

referred to

the

explosives demonstration CIA gave him a year earlier

as "too cumbersome" for his purposes.

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

•DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

DIRs are messages sent from Langley.

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At the conclusion of the meetings with Amlash, Headquarters

cabled on 9 September that, based on

what little feel Headquarters

had, Amlash appeared hopeless as an intelligence performer and should

be

approached as

a chief conspirator allowed to recruit his own co-

horts.

He should

be urged to recruit a

few trusted friends to assist

him, initially in "FI and Ops reporting" and then progress to sabotage

and more serious matters on an orderly basis. (DIR 67110 to Porto

Alegre., JMWAVE and Rio.)

On 11 September, Porto Alegre 0708 to DIR summarized the intel-

ligence information Anlash had given on Soviet units in Cuba, saying

all IRBM and bombers had been removed. By this time Amlash had left

Brazil apparently heading for a vacation in Europe.

A document in the file dated 16 September and marked OFPA 72775

appears to be a transcript of a conversation obtained by covert means. ....

There is no indication as to where the conversation takes place, but

it probably is in the Cuban Embassy in Paris.

"Mary: I don't want to imagine things but

п..

this thing of Amlash.

Moreno:

It is either a tremendous secret or a

top

secret matter (unreadable then the

word "treason" or "reason").

Betty: I believe it is a top secret matter."

By letters of September 14 and September 16, Amlash stayed in

contact with Amwhip.

Paris

station apparently was picking up responsi-

bility for Amlash at this

time, since

Paris 0706

to DIR dated 19

September asks for some background material on Amlash.

On 19 September, JMWAVE 4580 to DIR warns that Amlash is part of

an anti-communist group in Cuba and details the membership of his group

as well as a communist group.

The message also notes that Fidel is

Nevertheless, Auwhip is asked to continue

to work with Amlash

and is assigned to accompany him around Europe.

According to Paris

0934 to DIR dated ? October, Amlash met with case officer O* on 5

october: Case ofticer O sat and listened permitting Amlash to get

everything off his chest.

Amlash seemed to be complaining about the

low level espionage matters that had been discussed at the September

meeting in Brazil, implying he had a more valuable role.

Case officer

O "provided necessary assurances his feelings not in fact true and

that his case receiving consideration highest levels. (emphasis added)!"

"With this problem which had undoubtedly been bothering Amlash con-

*

The files do not accurately identify these case officers.

Nestor

Sanchez and William Wainwrighs

03

, however, were the principal case officers.

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siderably, off his chest, a much more relaxed Amlash departed restating

his desire

return Cuba to undertake 'the big job.""

On October 15, London 5224 to DIR states case officer 0 met with

Amlash and Amwhip

on 13 October. Although the case officer had been

forewarned by Amwhip, he was not successful in discouraging Amlash's

request for a high level meeting.

"Amlash convinced that if such meet

does not take place at this time it will be almost impossible come out

again and we will be in same situation as last year with no definite

decision.

Also finds it difficult

to believe why REK who receives many

Cubans would refuse to see a major" such as Amlash. The message notes

the fact remains that Amlash does "have excellent entree to highest

target level which believe we cannot afford overlook.

This message seemingly moved Headquarters to re-evaluate Amlash's

role. DIR 75683 to London on 15 October directed case officer O to

return headquarters soonest for discussions of all phases of the case.

The next meeting apparently took place on October 29. One case

officer met Amlash holding himself out as the personal representative

of REK.

He informed Amlash, according to a 13 November MFR, that

the U.s. was prepared to render all necessary assistance to

any anti-

communist Cuban group which

succeeded in neutralizing the present Cuban

leadership and which

assumed significant control to invite the U.S.

to render assistance.

He emphasized that U.S. support could come only

coup. Amlash responded by saying that without Fidel,

the military would break up into 4 or 5 groups and the regime would

disintegrate.

He also said he was satisfied with the policy discussion

but desired to know what technical support he could get.

Since Amwhip was closer to Amlash than the case officers, he was

asked about Amlash's reaction to the

meeting.

His reactions are

summarized in Attachment A to Amwhip's Memo of Meeting dated 14 Novem-

Anwhip said Amlash was still not pleased with support from U.S.

government.

while Amlash was satisfied on policy grounds, he was not

assistance for the operation plan as he

Amlash could not under-

a final solution to the problem, while, on the other hand, the U.S. gave

nuch equipment and money to exile groups for their ineffective excursions

against Cuban coastal targets.

Amlash had accepted the fact he had to

work with the CIA,

but cla might lose him it it continued to procrastin-,

Amlash talked about going to the french

terrorist organizatioi

the OAS, but realized that was not feasible.

The memorandum ends with

what apparently is the author's conclusion:

"It is hoped that he does

realize that Havana must first be taken

.. or failing that, a

truly sizeable piece of land (say, almost an entire province) which

could be true rallying point.

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HEADE

CaME 0

In a Memo for Record dated 19 November, one case officer summarized

the actions to be taken at the next meeting with Amlash.

Amlash was

to

be told the U.S. was prepared to give full support to Amlash's coup.

He would be shown President Kennedy's speech in Miami of November 18

and told this reaffirmed support for Amlash's proposal. Headquarters

had approved giving Amlash scopes

and rifles

and other

equipment.

The

memo ended by stating that "C/SAS* requested written reports on Amlash

operation be kept to a minimum."

Pari 1564 to DIR of 20 November indicated Amlash had been called

on the night of November 20 and had agreed to postpone his return to

Cuba in order to see case officer O "if it something interesting."

CIA officer said he could not assure it was interesting but that it was

to be a meeting which Amlash had requested.

(Obviously, CIA wanted to

give Amlash the "technical support"

he felt he had not been promised in

the 29 October meeting.)

Case officer O flew from the U.S. so as to arrive in Paris on the morn-

ing of November 22 for this meeting.

Pari 1607 to DIR received at Langley at 6:25 a.m. on 23 November

is the only message in Amlash's file reflecting the fact the meeting

had taken place.

It indicated that Amlash was anxious to return to

Cuba and that case officer O was to arrive in Washington at 1810 that

day.

The file contains no outgoing cable to Paris on November 23 or

any other time telling Paris to break contact with Amlash. **

On 25 November, a contact report was prepared.

There is reason

to question the authenticity of this document which is three pages

and reports the 22 November meeting with Amlash.

The first two pages

have dark type as

though prepared on a typewriter with a new ribbon.

The type on

he third pare is much lighter as though prepared on

with an old ribbon.

timade no mention of the passins

'a poison pen to Amlash.

On November 27, Pari 1669 to DIR reports information obtained

in

October possibly by clandestinely listening devices.

plained bitterly about official (Cuban) visitors to Paris and how they

denigrate the revolution. The source said she wished she had a con-

cealed tape recorder to record these conversations. She named Amlash

as one of these visitors.

* Desmond Fitzgerald

**

In its 1967 report, the IG stated such a message had been sent •

but could not be found.

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also promised arms which will have to be furnished through

JMWAVE's operations.

A series of confusing cables passed between Headquarters and IMWAVE

on December 6, 1, and 8.

Apparently, Headquarters first gave JMWAVE

authority to drop a cache of arms in

Cuba.. Then Headquarters called

off the operation.

it is noted "major

top level Cuban/Caribbean policy review seheduled early next week which

should provide basis for decision."

JWAVE complained about the

change in orders in a cable of 8

December. JWAVE 8702 pointed out that one Headquarter's message

indicated December infiltration operations were approved by higher author-

Ity but a second message indicated a scheduled operation should be de-

layed and not run in December.

Headquarters responded in DIR 87880. Headquarters procedure

waS

to present infiltration operation plans to

"higher authority"

even though there is a reasonable chance operation may be postponed

or delayed as was case with the scheduled operation.

"This procedure

will secure approval for the operation with only telephonic reconfirma-

tion needed when previously relaxed operation finally mounted."

Head-

quarters recommended delay until January after considering and equating

objectives against risk factors for Amlash and others.

"Believe by

assets. " CIA should be in position better evaluate status of intemal

By Pari 1914 of 13 December, Paris reported that Amlash left

Paris for Prague on November 27 but did not seek recontact with case

officer.

DIR 90966 to JMWAVE of 23 December reported that Havana radio

on 2 December stated Amlash arrived Cuba on 1 December.

The last document in Amlash's file for the period ending December

1963, is a long report on Amlash, but it does not contain information

relevant to the October-November

activities.

Nevertheless, in red pen

on the cover page

"Dec 1963 Not to leave this office

(Sanchez) erders." Followed by initials that appear to be "GM."

on Nestor's

One later document in the Amlash file contains more information

about the November 22, 1963 meeting.

a graphie in ormation sheet on enlast tent an done

appears to have been prepared in 1966 at the time of Amlash's arrest

for a later plot against Castro. It states:

"22 Nov. 63 Mr. Fitzgerald

and Mr. Sanchez assured subject that this Agency would give him every-

thing he needed (telescopic sight, silencer,

all the money he wanted).

the situation changed when Mr. Sanchez and Mr.

Fitzgerald left the meet-

ing to discover that President Kennedy had been assassinated. Because

of this fact, plans with subject changed and it was decided that this

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Agency could have no part in the assassination of a government leader

(including Castro) and it would not aid subject in his attempt.

This

included the following.

'We would not furnish the silencer, nor scope

nor any money for direct assassination; furthermore, we would not lift

a finger to help subject

escape from Cuba should he

assassinate Castro."

The same document states this message was communicated to Amlash

in November 1964 by MI. Sanchez.

Despite this decision, the CIA in fact continued to assist Amlash

through a cut-out until Amlash's arrest in 1966.

Later documents on Anlash are also relevant to the September-

November 1963 Amlash operation.

Several

such documents report informa-

tion received to the effect that Fidel Castro had long been aware of

Amlash's plots against him.

For example, Amlash's one time Cuban

mistress was believed to be working

for Cuban intellirence and her

brother was

known to be with Cuban

intelligence. uRani 8242 to DIR

in December 1964 warns that Amlash's objective

may

many Cubans.

And, one CIA informant reported in 1966 on one known

double agent of Cuban intelligence working for CIA and said the CIA's

Cuban operations had been penetrated at a high level by Cuban intel-

ligence. He identified this latter individual only as one of the Cuban

exiles who was knowledgeable of a number of the most important opera-

detalled analysis of Amlash's file contains nothing to indicate any

possible penetrations of the CIA's Amlash

operation,.

although a cryptic handwritten note on at least one re-

port rejects the suggestion that Amlash was himself reporting to Castro.

One other document bears on the testimony Amlash's case officers

gave before the Select Committee to the effect that Amlash was given

a poison pen for self-protection.

That document reports that Amlash,

and other Cuban officials in Paris in 1963, were carrying pistols for

self-protection throughout their travel in

'Europe.

Finally, although the staff has not reviewed all possible CIA

files to determine what other operations

Castro might have

been

re=

file indicates

ferring to in his September statement in August were the only other

that some coastal landings of supplies

CIA operations conducted

against Cuba in this time period..

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