R-1097
Originator: SSCIA
From: BISSELL, RICHARD
Document date: 09/10/1975
Document type: TRANSCRIPT

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157-10014-10093

2023 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

Jate : 08/06/94

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1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA

RECORD NUMBER

: 157-10014-10093

RECORDS SERIES

:HEARINGS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 13-H-02

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA

FROM

BISSELL, RICHARD

TO

..

TITLE : R-1097

DATE : 09/10/75

PAGES

: 84

SUBJECTS : BISSELL, RICHARD

LUMUMBA, PATRICE

DOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPT

CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED

RESTRICTIONS : 1A, 1B

CURRENT STATUS: RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/25/98

OPENING CRITERIA

COMMENTS :

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

HH 50955

DocId: 32423481

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ORIGINAL

Voli

Ohr Mnitro Statra Gruate

i Bubjeci

R1097

Report of Proceedings

Li

VENTORIL

BY BC

Hearing held before

Senate Select Committee to Study Covornmental

Operations With respect to Intelligence Activities

The Department of State has no objection to the

release or declassification of this document in full

under the provisions of the JFK Assassination Records

Collection Act of 1992 (PL102-526)

Reviewad on -

81298 mp

Wednesday, September 10, 1975

Washington, D.C.

see aped ase cuted over

WARD & PAUL

110 FIRST STREET, S. E.

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003

(202) 544-6000

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CONTENIE.A

TESTIMONY OF

Richard N. Bissell

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EXHIBITS

NUMBER

Bisgell Exhibit No. 1

Bisgell Exhibit No. 2

Bissell Exhibit No. 3

Bissell Exhibit No. 4

Bissell Exhibit No. 5

Bissell Exhibit No.6

Bissell Exhibit No. 7

Bissell Exhibit No. 8

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74

(Exhibits were retained by counsel.)

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shelburne

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EXECUTIVE SESSION

Wednesday, September 10, 1975

United States Senate,

Select Committee to Study Governmental

Operations with Respect to

Intelligence Activities,

Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:20 p.m..

In Room. 608, Capitol Hill Hotel, Senator Gary W. Hart

presiding.

Present:

Senator Hart of Colorado (presiding).

Also present:

Frederick A. O. Schwarz, JI., Chief

Counsel; Curtis R. Smothers, Minority Counsel; Frederick

Baron, Rick Inderfurth, Paul Wides, Rhett Dawson and Joseph

DiGenova, Professional Staff Menberg.

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Senator Hart of Colorado.

MI. Blagell, w1ll you

stand and be shorn.

Do you swear that the testimony you are about to give

Is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so

help you God?

Mr Bissell. I do.

Senator Hart of Colorado.

The same circumstances

apply as applied under your previous experiences before: the

Committee. You have the right under our rules to have a

member of the Committee present at all times if you choose.

And you have also your Constitutional right to counsel if you

so choose. You do understand?

Mr. Bissell. I understand.

Senator Mart of Colorado.

We will be under way now.

Mr. Baron. You are appearing here voluntarily today

without counsel?

MI. Bissell. I am.

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TESTIMONY OF RICHARD N. BISSELL

Mr. Baron. MI. Bissell, since we have talked with you

last about the subject of the Congo we have taken testimony

from a number of witnesses.

The first that we would like to

turn to is Bronson Iweedy, who in 1960 and 1961, as I am

sure you will recall, was the Chief of the African Division.

He indicated to us in his testimony that he had a number of

talk's with you, probably in the summer of fall of 1960,

where the prospect of assassinating Lumumba wae raised.

What can you tell us about those discussions?

Mr. Bissell. I am afraid I can't tell you anything.

I don't remember the specific discussions with him.

It seems

to me, however, entirely to be expected that such conversa-

tions took place. I think I testified previously, but in any

case, I remember assigning Justin O'Donnell to study

the possibilities and to make plans for the assagsination or

elimination of Lumumba.

And since that was in the Africa

area, I think 'It most unlikely that I would have done that

without saying something to the Division Chief about it.

MI. Baron. Mr. Tweedy's testimony was to the effect

that he was in fact not being informed of some on-going

operation or some instruction that was contemplated, but

rather that you and he were discussing the feasibility of

assassinating Lumumba.

Did such discussions take place?

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MI. Bissell. I don't happen to remember them, but

it seems to me entirely probable that they did. And if he

said so I would certainly accept that.

МІ. Вагоп.

And would you assume that if such dis-

cussions took place they would have taken place in the summer

or fall of 19607

Mr. Bissell. Yes.

MI. Baron.

Would such discussions have involved planning

for an actual assassination mission?

MI. Bissell. Yes, planning for, but not necessarily

any authorization to take specific steps to implement such

a plan.

Mr. Baron.

would planning discussions in the sense

that you are using the term included sending instruments of

assassination to the Congo?

Mr. Biggell. They might have, although again I

don't happen to remember that.

I am aware, I think, that

there is a record that something was said, but I had no

recollection that things went that far. But that still coula

have been included in what I mean by the term "planning and

preparing".

MI. Baron. Did you give Mr. Tweedy any specific

instruction as to steps he was to take to further a plan

to assassinate Lumumba?

Mr. Bissell. I may have. I don't remember them.

The

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only clear recollection I have is of what I think was

the initial discussion on this matter that I had with Justin

O'Donnell. And I believe that he and I had that alone, in

other words, that MI. Tweedy was not present in the dis

cussion I had with O'Donnell.

Mr. Baron.

We will turn later to filling out the

details of your conversation with Justin O'Donnell.

For the moment, sticking with Mr. Tweedy's testimony,

he also testified that during this same period of time he

composed cables that went to the Chief of Station in Leopold-

ville Inguiring at to if. the Chief of Station could gain access

to Lumumba for the purpose of assassinating him.

Did you send such cable?

Mr. Bissell.

I would think the record would show

whether they were

sent.

If they were went the record would

presumably also show if I signed them. And I expect that

if they were sent I would have signed

them. But I don't

happen at this distance in time to remember the specific

cables.

Mr. Wides.

If you had sent cables of that kind,

Mr. Bissell, would they have gone in the normal channels out

from the African Division, or might they more likely have

gone on a restricted bagis from yourself to the Station

Chief without --

•Mr. Bissell. I think it is very probable that it would

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have been the latter, although given the fact of conversations

with the Division Chief, presumably he would have been on the

distribution for these cables.

But probably it would have

bean restricted to the Director or the Deputy Director or

the Division Chief, and probably Mr.Hlelms'Deputy.

MI. BaIOn.

It was Mr. Tweedy's testimony that although

he composed such cables, they went out, as far as he could

recall, under your signature or from your office.

MI. Bissell. That would be a very normal procedure.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall discussing with Mr. Tweedy

the fact that he should write such cables, whether or not you

recall the specific cables?

Mr. Bissell. I really don't.

Mr. Baron.

Mr. Tweedy also testified that the cable

traffic that he was

sending to the Congo was part of a back and

forth communication in which he was receiving information from

the Chief of Station in Leopoldville about the kind of

access that he could gain to Lumumba.

Did you read such cables from the Chief of Station in

Leopoldville?

MI. Bissell.

I am sure I did.

I don't remember it

specifically.

Mr. Wides. Do you recall the question of access

being one part of the exploration that you were doing?

MI. Bissell. Yes, that indeed would have been a key

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part of it.

MI. Wides. Do you recall that being so?

Mr. Bissell. I don't specifically recall it. But

since I am clear that at least in the case of O'Donnell, and

I now presume in the case of Mr. Iweedy, I authorized and

indeed directed this planning and preparatory activity. A

major part of this would have been a search for ways in

which access could be gained.

Mr. Baron. And what kind of access were you looking

for at that time?

Mr. Bissell. Obviously I would say the access of an

individual who for one reason or another could get close to

Lumumba.

MI. Baron.

In the sumer and very early fall of 1960

this would have been access to Lumumba for the purpose of

assassinating him rather than snatching him from U.N. custody?;

Mr. Bissell. Well, it could have been for the pur-

pose really of eliminating him from his thenpolitical acts-

vities. And that could have been assassination, or it

could have involved some form of incapacitation, or it could

possibly have been, in your words, snatching him so

that he could be put into the custody of what we regarded

as friendly authorities.

Mr. Baron.

would you have sought information from

the Chief of Station on whether he could gain access to

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Lumumba for the purpose of poisoning Lumumba.

MI. Bissell. It could very well have. That was one

method of elimination, and that was obvlously thought about

at the time as part of the planning, and almost certainly

we would have been in touch with the Chief of Station to see

If he could gain access for that purpose.

Mr. Baron.

Were you also in touch with the Chief of

Station to seek access for the shooting Lumumba?

Mr. Bissell. I would guess that really the questions

to the Chief of Station would have had to do with gaining access

for whatever method - an access that could be used for

whatever method of eliminating Lunumba might be simple,

practical and

workable. And I doubt if the question would

have been a different one, depending on the device or weapon

to be used.

MI. Baron: Io retrace something you said a moment

ago, if Mr. Iweedy had authored cables seeking information

from the Chief of Station in Leopoldville about gaining

access to Lumumba, you would have approved such cables?

MI. Bissell. Yes, I would most certainly have.

Excuse me. Let me elaborate on that.

Given the procedures and relationships in effect, I

think MI. Iweedy, on the basis of an oral authorization from

me, would have had the authority to send such a cable without

my signing off on it. But in a matter of this sensitivity

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I think :lt highly likely that he would have drafted the

cable, Initialed it and sent it to my office for dispatch.

MI. Baron. And you wouldn't dispute his testimony that

he did so?

MI. Bissell.

Oh, no. His testimony seemed to me to be

absolutely consistent with my recollections, which, alas,

are somewhat inform. intire?

Mr. Baron.

Would your discussions with Mr. Iweedy have

involved discussing the possibility of poisoning Lumumba?

MI. Bissell. I suppose so.

Mr. Baron.

We have also taken testimony from the man

who was Chief of Station in Leopoldville during this period of:

time, from mid-gummer of 1960 throughout 1961, and he testified--

Mr. Bissell. Would you remind me who it was?

MI. Baron.

Off the record for a moment.

(Discussion off the record.)

Senator Hart of Colorado.

Back on the record.

MI. Baron. While we were off the record we explained

the arrangement under which the Chief of Station would

testify before the Committee under alias. And we will refer

to him here today as the Chief of Station, or by his alias,

which is that of Victor ledgman.

Mr. Bissell, when the Chief of Station testified before

us he indicated that at some point in the late summer or

early fall of 1960 probably toward the latter part of August

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or the very first days in September, he received a cable from

CIA headguarters to the effect that a messenger will come

to the Congo who you will recognize, and who will bring in-

structions which you are to carry out.

Did you send such a cable to the Chief of Station?

MI. Bissell. I could have.

But I have perhaps a peculiar reason for questioning

whether in this particular case I did. And my reason is

the following.

You will notice that the cable you have just shown me

that was sent out by the Director of Central Intelligence

in

late August, the cable was released by his initials.

And

it bears the notification that the only other distribution

was to be to MI. Helms, who was then, you will remember.

Deputy -- my deputy.

Now, it is virtually inconceivable to me, given my

knowledge of and involvement in this operation, that the

Director would have sent

a cable, denied circulation to me

and had it circulated to Mr. Helms, if I had been in

washington. And I suspect that we could establigh on the

record that I was on vacation when the message you have shown

me was sent.

MI. Wides. That was in early August?

Mr. Baron. Let's introduce as Exhibit No. I for

this session the document that you are referring to, which

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18 a cable dated August 26, 1960, from Allen W. Dulles to

Leopoldville. And this cable includes the paragraph:

"In high quarters here it 1e the clear-cut conclusion

that 1f LLL continues to hold high office inevitable result

will at best be chaos and at worst pave the way for Communist

takeover of the Congo with disastrous consequences for the

prestige of the U.N. and for the interest of the free world

generally. Consequently, we conclude: that his removal must

be an urgent and prime objective, and that under existing

conditions this should be a high priority of our covert action!

(The document referred to was

marked Bissell Exhibit No. 1

for identification.)

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MI. Baron. MI. Bissell, would Liu refer to Lumumba

in this cable?

MI. Bissell. I believe so.

MI. Baron.

And isn't it unusual that this cable

bears the designation Allen W. Dulles as opposed to Director?

Mr. Bissell. That is unusual.

MI. Baron. What does that signify?

MI. Biasell. I believe this cable was drafted by the

Director himself. That would be my inference from the format.

Mx. Baron. And does this appear to be Mr. Dulles' initiais

which are blurred in the copy we have?

Mr. Bissell. They may be there, but in any event, the

releasing signiature is definitely his.

If I may complete the answer to your question, for the

reason I have given you, my surmise is that I was

not

in Washington, and probably on vacation, when this was

sent. I suspect that I might be able to dig out calendars

and establish that if it became very germane.

If that is the case, it is quite possible that the

cable you asked me about stating that a messenger would

soon arrive in Leopoldville was

gent also in my absence.

Mr. Baron. If such a cable was sent in your absence

would you be apprised of it upon your return to headquarters?

Mr. Bissell. I suspect so, yes. In this case I would

be almost certain that I would.

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MI. Baron. And what would such a cable have referred

to?

Mr. Bissell.

well, I suppose just what that said.

Explicitly it rofers, as you quoted, or characterized it, to

a messenger with instructions to be followed.

Mr. Baron. And who was that messenger to be?

Mr. Bissell. I have no idea without digging back into tha

traffic.

Mr. Baron. And were those instructions related to

the assassination of Lumumba?

Mr. Bissell. It certainly sounds as if they were

:

related to his elimination in one way or another.

Mr. Wides. Why is that, Mr. Bisgell?

Mr. Bissell. Just because the method of transmission

is peculiar, and suggests. high sensitivity. But it seems

to me, on the basis of what you hue told me of the message,

it can be only inference.

MI. Baron. And one means of eliminating Lumumba con-

templated at CIA headquarters at this time would have been

an assassination?

Mr. Bissell. Yes.

Mr. Baron. In the testimony of the Chief of Station

who wag in Leopoldville at that time, he made the representa-

tion -- let me back track for a moment.

Did you ever discuss with

Sidney Gottlieb

the assassination

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of Lumumba?

Mr. Bissell. I think it is very probable that I did.

Mr. Baron. What would these discussions. have involved?

Mr. Wides.

Excuse me.

was Mr. Gottlleb at that time

science advisor to yourself?

MI. Bissell. I believe he wag.

I would answer that

question definitely if the record shows that he had not yet

taken that position. But I am almost sure -- I had better

not say that. Assuming that he had assumed the position

of science advisor, I think that my answer would stand, that

I very probably would have consulted with him.

Mr. Wides. For the record, while he was science advisor

to the DDP, was he also an official of the TSD component,

or was that a separate --

Mr. Bissell. No, he was not. His assignment to my

office was his full time and sole responsibility.

MI. Baron.

And you say that you probably did dis-

cuss with Sidney Gottlieb the assassination of Lumumba.

What would have been the substance of those discussions?

Mr. Bissell. It would have been discussing with him

possible weapons or other means to use. When he was my

science advisor, I frequently used him as in effect liaison

with the Technical Services Division, the person who had

been a member of it.

And he knew the personnel and he knew

a great deal about their programs. I presume that if I had

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had such discussiong with him I would have been asking him to

give thought to ways and means.

MI. Baron. And you were asking Mr. 'Gottlleb, then,

to think about the technical means by which an assassination

could be carried out?

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MI. Bissell.

Correct.

Mr. Wides. That

is

an

assumption that you were, or

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can you recall now?

MI. Bissell. No, it is an assumption -- 1t 1s an in-

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terence, 11 you like, from the circumstances. I think it 19

quite likely that I would have had such discussiong with him

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assuming, as I believe to be true, that he was the science

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advisor at that time.

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Mr. Wides.

But you have no recollection?

1÷

Mr. Bissell. No.

161

Senator Hart of Colorado:

Excuse me, Mr. Baron.

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I am going to have to go to vote, and I would just

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like the record to reflect your acquiescence that there is

Jui: no committee member here if in fact that is the case.

MI. Bissell. I do so acquiesce, and I am happy to

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continue.

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Senator Hart of Colorado.

With that understanding

you are willing to continue?

Mr. Bissell. Yes.

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Senator Hart of Colorado.

Thank you very much.

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Mr. Baron. Did you have äny other kinds of discussione

with sidney Gottlleb about the assassination of Lumumba?

Mr. Bissell. None that I remember.

Mr. Baron. Did you discuss with Mr. Gottlieb your

conversations with Justin O'Donnell?

Mr. Bissell. I just have no recollection of that.

Mr. Baron. Did MI. Gottlleb come to you and report to

you on his conversationg with Justin O'Donnell about the

assassination of Lumumba?

Mr. Blasell.

Again, I am sorry, I just have no

recollection one way of the other.

MI. Baron. Did Mr. Lottlieh make you aware that he had

in his shop, or he knew how to obtain the means to assassin-

ate Lumumba?

Mr. Bissell. Well, I certainly was aware in a general

way that various

means were available in the Technical

Services Division. I don't know whether I obtained that

information specifically from: Mr. Gottlieb, but probably I

did obtain some of it through him.

Mr. Baron.

But however you obtained this information,

you were aware that the means were available to assassinate

Lumumba?

Mr. Bissell. I think you put it too specifically.

I was aware that as part of it is on-going activity. The

Technical Services Division did a lot of work in the develop-

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ment of various weapons of a sort appropilate for a clandes-

tine service. And I was aware, I am quite certain, that

these included poisons, type of firearms, and a whole range

of capabilities. But my bellet today, and my recollection,

Is that I was aware of these as the products, I repeat, of

an on-going development program which itself was not targetted

at any type individual or operation.

Mi. Baron. And with whom did you have discussiong of

technical means that might be used to assassinate Lumumba

other than Sidney Gottlleb?

Mr. Bisgell. I do not know. I could have had with

Mr. Roosevelt, whom I think was still the head of the Techni-

cal Division.. I don't believe it would have been any but

those two.

MI. Baron.

This would be. Cornelius Roosevelt?

Mr. Bissell.

That is correct.

Mr. Baron.

Did MI. ;Gottlieb express to you his

reluctance to participate in an assassination plan?

Mr. Bissell. I don't ever remember his

so doing.

Mr. Baron.

Did MI. Gottlieb appear to be willing to

see what he could do to obtain or develop the means to be

used in such a plan?

Mr. Bissell. I really don't have any recollection that

would enable me to answer that. I do believe that -- if

he had demurred strongly, and urged its abandonment, or

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opposed it, I think it 1a likely that I would have remembered

that position on his part, because I do remember very clearly

Justin O'Donnell's reaction. And since I don't remember

any such negative reaction from Mr. Gottlieb, my inference 1s

that there probably was none.

MI. Baron. The Chief of Station in Leopoldville at

that time further testified to us that in very, early

September he recelved a visit from Sidney Gottlieb in the

congo.

Did you sent Mr. Gottlled to the congo at that time?

Mr. Bissell. Probably, 1f he went there, I certainly

would have been fully knowledgeable of it.

Mr. Baron. And you would have approved his visit?

MI. Bissell. Yes.

Mr. Wides. Particularly if this occurred when he was

your science advisor.

Mr. Bissell. Right.

Mr. Wides.

Is it correct that he would only have

gone there pursuant to your direction?

MI. Bissell. Correct.

Mr. Baron. What were ME. Gottlieb's instructions, or

what was his mission

at that time?

MI. Bissell. I do not know.I can draw inferences from

the circumstances that have already been mentioned.

MI. Wides. In the course of his duties as your science

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advisor, did he take frequent trips abroad?

Mr. Bissell. I would say infrequent.

It seemed to me

there were one or two others.

Mr. Wides.

would these trips be involved with

highly sensitive operations as distinct from scientific

evaluation?

MI. Bissell. I belleve that for the most part they

would not have been involved with highly sensitive specific

operations, but rather would have involved consultation with

people in the field on the effectivenegs of devices, tech-

niques, procedures, underdevelopment in the Technical

services Division.

Mr. Wides. And given the unugual of his going to the

Congo if he did in connection with clandestine operations

there, you would have no recollection of that today?

MI. Bissell. I don't have any recollection of that

today, no. This is the first time I realized, since many

years ago, that he had made such a trip.

Mr. Baron. Would he

also have been aware that he

had made such a trip?

MI. Bissell. Well, the Chief of Station obviously,

Bronson Tweedy, obviously. Quite probably the Director,

but not certainly. And several others. I assume that Mr.

Helms would have known about it at the time, because there

would have been some kind of cable traffic, and I strongly

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suspect that Cornelius Roosevelt would have known

about it.

Mr. Baron. Did Mr. Gottlleb's trlp have anything to do

with the assassination of Lumumba?

Mr. Bissell. I don't know, since I don't remember the

circumstances, I really can't say.

MI. Baron. Would you assume that Mr. Gottlieb's trip

have had something to do with the assassination of Lumumba?

Mr. Bissell. I think it might very well:

MI. Baron. And again we are talking about the plot

to assassinate Lumumba rather than Lumumba's ultimate demise?

Mr. Bissell. Correct.

MI. Baron.If Mr. Gottlieb's vielt related to the plot

to assassinate Lumumba, would such a sensitive operation

, have been made known to Bronson Tweedy?

MI. Bissell. I believe so, specially in the light

of the fact that apparently this possibility had been dis-

cussed with Bronson Tweedy more than once.

MI. Baron.

Is it possible that Bronson Tweedy would

have been cut out of the actual mounting of an assassination

operation despite the fact that the feasibility of an

assassination had been discussed with him?

Mi. Bissell. Yes, it is possible.

MI. Baron.

Was that the case?

MI. Bissell. I don't remember.

But if you ask me to !

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guess, I think I would --I think my guessing would come down

slightly on the side of his having been cut out rather than

knowledgeable.

Mr. Baron. Why would that be?

Mr. Bissell. Well, I repeat, I am guessing about this,

and the reasoning that leads me to make that remark 1s that

my recollection is that my assignment to O'Donnell was very

narrowly held. And I do not remember discussing that assign-

ment with Bronson Tweedy. And so I think there is a real

possibility - and it 1s a guess, trying as best I can to recon-

struct what was going on at the time, but not based on any

recollection of actual discussiong -- but my guess, as I say,

would come down very slightly on the side that O'Donnell's

assignment was not known to Bronston Tweedy, and that he, there-

fore, was cut out of this phase.

Мт. Baron.

And would have been cut out of knowledge

of Gottlieb's visit to the Congo?

Mr. Bissell. Could have been, although that is

more unlikely. It seems to me that if he was being cut out

of knowledge of the specific operation, that he would have

had to be knowledgeable of the visit, and would have been

given an explanation of the visit other than the postulated

true explanation.

Mr. Baron. In the light of that, Mr. Bissell, is it

llkely that the cable traffic that Mr. Tweedy describes going

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back and forth between himself and the Chief of Station

in the Congo concerning gaining access to Lumumba could have

unbeknownst to him related to gaining access to Lumumba for

the purpose of an assassination plot that was further along

the line than Mr. Tweedy knew?

Mr. Bissell. It could have. I would put it another

way. It seems to me that the information gleaned in that

interchange was probably an input to the planning -- the prep-.

atory activity that identify with O'Donnell.

MI. Baron.

To repeat for a moment, Gottlieb's

visit to the Congo would have been known to the Chief of Sta-

tion, yourself and Director of Central Intelligence, and

possibly Bronson Tweedy?

MI. Bissell.

I think probably Bronson Tweedy, and

almost certainly a few other people.

I repeat, I think

Cornelius Roosevelt would have known of it. I think Richard

Helms would have knwon of it, and I think several others.

I am making a distinction between those who would have known

of the visit, an event that would not be easy to keep secret

from a number of people in the Agency, and knowledge of the

true purpose of that visit, if indeed its true purpose were,

as was suggested.

Mr. Baron.

Did you have any discussion with Richard

Helms about the assassination of Lumumba?

Mr. Bissell. I don't remember -- wait a minute. No,

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I believe I:did not with Mr. Helms.

Mr. Baron.

You paused for a moment there. Has there

some discussion that you were

thinking about that could have

related to Lumumba?

Mr. Bissell. Yes.

I think what came into my mind was a later and

subsequent conversation with Mr. Helms sometime after.

And this had to do with O'Donnell, and I seem to remember

MI. Helms making a remark that he was a somewhat -- on

occasion a somewhat unsable person. And at that point the subi

ject may have come up with Mr. Helms.

But my impression is

that any such conversation with Mr. Helms was a good deal

later.

Mr. Wides. Mr. O'Donnell indicated that after he spoke

to you and told you that he would not participate in the

assassination effort, that he went essentially nextdoor to

your office, to MI. Helms' office, and recounted his dis-

cussion with you to Mr. Helms.

Do you recall any discussion about that time that

Helms might have come back to you to find out about?

MI. Bissell.

Let me explain, the dim recollection

that I have just voiced of a conversation with leims after

the termination of O'Donnell's assignment, and Helms comment

on it. But I still believe that MI.Helms did not know of

this until after what I would refer to as the termination of

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O'Donnell's involvement, which was the occasion you have just

referred to.

Mr. Wides.

It was.not described by Ms. O'Donnell as

the termination of an assignment.

MI. Blssell. All right, that is my phrase, but as I

have already testified, my recollection -- and it 1s recollec-

tion -- is that MI. O'Donnell came in to me -- I thought it

was a matter probably of at least several weeks, but I

could be wrong on the timing -- after I had originally

given him the assignment, and expressed both his personal

reluctance to attempt to carry it out, and his belief that

it was the wrong way to proceed.

Whether he so stated to MI.

O'Donnell, it certainly was my decigion at

that time that it

be dropped. And to the best of my knowledge and belief,

no further action was taken.

MI. Schwarz. By "it" in that example do you mean the

assassination of Lumumba, or 'Donnell's involvement in the

assassination of Lumumba?

Mr. Bissell.

At any rate, D'Donnell's involvement,

the project that he had been asked to plan and prepare for,

that that would not be continued.

Mr. Baron. And that was the assassination of Lumumba?

MI. Bisscll.

Yes.

Mr. Schwarz.

You mean one officer comes in and gives

you a negative; and then you decided to turn off something

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that you had been looking into for weeks because one

officer says he wouldn't do it?

MI. Bissell. To turn it off, or at least if it be

continued, to change not only the people connected with it, but

probably the whole modus operandi. And the reason for that

decision, Insofar as I can recollect it, 1s, my grave concern

that, given O'Donnell's reaction, there was a risk that the

planning of such an operation would be blown.

Mr. Schwarz. You mean if it was done he would expose

the conversation?

Mr. Bissell. Something of that kind could happen,

yes.

Mr. Dawson. Who were you worried about O'Donnell in

that case exposing it to? Certainly not the press.

Mr. Bissell. I can't recally answer that, except by

surmise, but I do remember that this had been in my mind

a very sensitive assignment to him, limited - with the

knowledge of it to be limited very nariowly even within the

Agency. And it is difficult to separate recollection from

inference on occasion. But I seem

to recollect that after

this conversation with him I wanted this put very much on

the back burner

and inactivated for quite some time.

Now, that doesn't rule out the possibility that some

action through completely different channels might have gone

forward. But the best of my recollection is, I viewed this

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not only as terminating the assignment for him, but also

as reason for at least postponing anything further along that

line.

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Mr. Schwarz. Who had knowledge within the Agency of your

assignment to O'Donnell and its true, purpose.

MI. Bissell.

I would guess that --

Mr. Schwarz. Not guess, who did?

MI. Bissell: I don't know. What I was going to say is

that I think the Director did.

Mr. Schwarz.

Guess, think, don't know. You have got to

have a basis, MI. Bissell, for testifying to something.

Mr. Bissell. All right.

The basis is, as has been in so much of my testimony,

how business was conducted within the Agency at that time.

There had been, as the Exhibit 1 cable suggests, there had

already been consideration at high levels in the Agency and

elsewhere of the elimination of Lumumba: Obviously I had

been involved in conversations with the Director on that sub-

ject. Given the way business was conducted, I would infer that

I would have told the Director of my assignment to o'Donnell.

Mr. diGenova. Mi. Bissell, you are telling us that

you don't remember this, is that correct?

Mr. Bissell. That is right.

MI. diGenoya. You have seen this Exhibit No. 1 which

says:

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"In high quarters here it is the clearcut conclusion

that if Lll continues to hold high office inevitable result

will be chaos.

And then it goes on and says:

"Consequently we conclude that his removal must be an

urgent prime objective and that under existing conditions

this could be a high priority covert action".

That is dated August 26, 1960, signed, according to your

Identification of his signature, by Mr. Dulles personally.

And it follows by one day a meeting in the White House of the

Special Group attended by the President of the U.s., where

Dulles said he would proceed --

Mr. Baron. I don't think this meeting was attended by

the President.

Mr. diGenova.

Excuse me, attended by Mr. Dulles --

where he said he would proceed as vigorously as the situation

permitted. And it was agreed that the planning for the

Congo would not necessarily rule out consideration of any

particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting

Iid of Lumumba.

Does that in any way refresh your recollection about

what was happening at that time?

Do you remember anything independently of what Mr.

Dulleg was talking to you about?

We had trouble areas in the

world, including Cuba, and the African Continent in particular.

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Does that refresh your recollection in any way

independently?

Mr. Bissell.

Well, my recollection, I think, 1s

pretty clear about the atmosphere at the time. And I think

it is quite: eloquently described in the cable which you

have just quoted. And I have already said that I think

probably, from the evidence of the format of that document,

I was absent from Washington at the time when it wag

sent.

But I certainly would have seen that when I returned, and

it certainly would have been the subject of conversation

between Dulles and myself. It is for that reason that I

draw the inference that Justin O'Donnell's agsignment would

have been reported by me to Allen Dulles.

MI. diGenova.

But you personally don't remember

discussing this with Mr. Dulles?

Mr. Bissell. No.

Mr. diGenova. You conclude now that you must have be-

cause of the physical evidence?

Mr. Bissell. Could I just interrupt for a moment to

say, I used to see MI. Dulles almost daily during these years.

It was rare that we would meet without touching on perhaps

severl on-going operations or plans or prospects. And this,

over a period of séveral years. It is not, I think surpris-

ing that rarely have I been able in the course of my testi-

mony to say, I specifically remember a particular meeting, and

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even roughly what was said of 1t.

Mr. diGenova.

Mr. Bissell, that is somewhat important,

obviously, because the idea is to try, 11 possible, to estab-

Ilsh what the precise facts were.

Now, I am sure you don't mean to say that the assassina-

tion of a foreign leader blurs into the everyday activity of :

the Agency because it was so commonplace -- or is that what

you mean to say?

Mr. Bissell.

No, I don't. But I do mean to say

that, the Agency had put a top priority, probably, on a range

of different methods of getting rid of Lumumba in the sense

of either destroying him physically, incapacitating him, or

eliminating his political influence. And a conversation

about this particular facet of what was a many-gided attack on

the problem doesn't stand out

in my mind.

Mr. diGenova. What you are saying, then, is the de-

tails of any specific day or meeting or cable you don't

recollect, but you don't have any trouble recollecting the

fact that the assassination of Lumumba, among others,

was part of a strategy at that time, if needed?

Mr. Bissell.

Yes.

Mr. Baron. And that was part of a strategy at the

level of the National Security Council as well as within the

AGency?

Ms. Bissell. I believe that the language quoted would

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Bo indicate, yes.

Mr. Schwarz. Did you attend any meeting of the National

Security Council?

MI. Bissell. I don't remember any on this subject,

and I don't think I did.

I very rarely attended the NSC

as such, or its so-called planning committee. Robert Amory

was the agency representative on that, and I have already

said -- well, I did not by any means always, I would say not

more than half the time, attended Soecial Group meetings.

And since I also think I mas out of town when that was

sent, it seems to me highly unlikely that I was at the Special

Group mecting the day before that cable was

sent.

MI. Baron. I think we should introduce for the record

as Exhibit 2 the memorandum for the record of that

Special Group meeting of August 25, 1960, which

records Mr.

Dulles being present, and does not list yourself as one of

the participants.

And it contains a paragraph substantially

as MI. diGenova related it where Gordon Gray, who was

at

that time Special Assistant to the President for National

Security Affairs, commented that his associates -- and we have

testimony by Thomas Parrott, the secretary who took these

minutes, that Mr. Gray's associate was a euphemism to refer to

the President.

(The document referred to was

marked Bissell Exhibit No. 2 for

identification.)

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Mr. Biasell. Correct.

Mr. Baron. "Mr. Gray commented that hig associates

had expressed extremely atrong feelings on the necessity for

very straightforward action in this situation, and he wondered

whether the plans as outlined were sufficient to accomplish

this.

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"Mr. Dulles replied that he had taken the comments re-

ferred to seriously, and had every intention of proceeding as

vigorously as the situation permits or requires, but added that

he must necessarily put himself in a position of interpret-

ing instructions of this kind within the bounds of necessity

and capability. It was finally agreed that planning for the

Congo would not necessarily rule out 'consideration' of any

particular kind of activity which might contribute to

getting rid of Lumumba".

Then the next day after this meeting MI. Dulles

sends out the telegram or the cable that we have already

discussed.

MI. Bissell. Right.

Mr. Baron.

Would you assume that Mr. Dulles'cable,

which was sent to Leopoldville, was a direct outgrowth of

this meeting that he had attended the previous day?

MI. Bissell. Obviously, sir.

MI. Dawson.

Do you know?

Mr. Bissell. I think there is no question on the

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basis of the documenta.

Do you assume that assassination was one

of the means of removing Lumumba from the scene that is

contemplated within the language of Mr. Dulles' cable?

Mr. Bissell. Correct -- and also the language reported

in the minutes of the Special Group.

MI. Baron. And that would be in essence language--

Mr. Blssell. Could I just interrupt to say in

elaboration of that point, you may remember that I perhaps un-

fortunately used the word "circumlocutioug" in earlier testimony

to describe the way this kind of topic was discussed. This

1s a prime example of it. When you use the language that

no particular means were ruled out, that is obviously what it

meant, and it meant that to everybody in the room.

Mr. Wides.

Meant what?

Mr. Bissell. Meant that if it had to be assassination,

that that was a permissible means.

And that this was permissible in the eyes

of the President, whose sentiments -- who was being repre-

sented at the meeting by Gordon Gray?

MI. Bissell. At least permissible by his representatives

sitting in the room.

You don't use language of that kind

except to mean in effect, the Director is being told, get

rid of the guy, and if you have to use extreme neans up

to and including assassination, go ahead.

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Mr. Baron. And in effect the Director is being told

that by the President?

Mx. Bissell.

Right.

Ms. Baron. Through his representative?

Mr. Bissell. Right.

Mr. Schwarz.

Did Mr. Dulles tell you that President

Eisenhower wanted Lumumba killed?

MI. Bissell. I am sure he didn't.

MI. Smothere.

Did he ever tell you even circum-

locutiously through this kind of cable?

MI. Bissell. Yes, I think his cable says it in effect.

MI. Smothers.

Was this a thing that was clearly under-

stood here by everyone? What was that in your experince with

the Agency that had prepared you to understand this kind of

coded dialogue, if you will?

Was assassination something

that was discussed fairly often?

Mr. Bissell. No, I would say really very infrequently,

very infrequently even discussed, let alone

attempted.

But I submit that the language just quoted from the minutes

of the Special Group was not language internal to the Agency,

it was language from a Cabinet level committee.

You may remember another document that was offered earlier

in my testimony which was again minutes of a Special Group

meeting, and it quoted Livingston Merchant, the State Depart-

ment representative, again asking if there was no way to get

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rid of the Castro leadership in that case.

I am sure you

remember that document.

Now, when senior political officers meet in a Cabinet

Committee, especially when some kind of a record is being

kept, they do talk around a subject of that kind. But it

doesn't mean that it is obscure or not understood by anyone

there. I believe in both of these caeeg it is perfectly

clear -- in the first Livingston Merchant case it is clear that

he was raising a question at to whether physically getting

Iid of these people was possible, and in the second case, the

one just quoted here, it seems to me that -- if you like to

call it that -- the consensus of the Special Group was that

"no means should be excluded in the effort to get rid of

Lumb.

And that, I repeat, is not CIA language.

If it ig

gobbledegook it is on a good high level.

Mr. Dawson. Is MI. Gray in this cable or memorandum

for the Special Group on August 25, 1960, conveying the feeling

of his associate, which we have identified clearly

aS

President Eisenhower?

Mr. Baron. Moving back now to the testimony of the

Chief of Station who was in Leopoldville in 1960, he said

that shortly after he received this cable that a messenger

would come whom he would recognize and who

would give him

instructions to carry out.

He received a visit from Mr.

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¡Gottlleb.

And we have discussed that visit. He then goes

on to testify that Di. Gottlieb gave to him, or told him that

he would very shortly thereafter receive, some lethal biologi-

cal substances, and the tools for administering those sub-

stances, namely, a syringe, gauze masks, and rubber gloves.

Were such lethal biological substances sent down to the

Congo?

Mr. Bissell. I don't know.

I assume the record shows

one way or the other. I don't have a recollection of that.

I was really rather surprised on the occasion of

the earlier testimony to have it reported that they had been

sent.

Mr. Baron.

Would you assume now, hearing this testimony,

that indeed such substances were sent to the Congo?

MI. Bissell. I think what you have told me, repeating

the evidence of the Station Chief, that Dr. Gottlieb told

him to expect that, is that correct?

Mr. Wides.

The testimony is that the materials were

brought by Dr. Gottlieb or essentially arrived while he was

there, and that he went over their use with the Station Chief.

That doesn't refresh your recollection at all with regard --

Mr. Bissell. No, it doesn't. But I am sure if the

Station Chief so testified it is correct, there is nothing

in mind that I remember that would be in conflict with that.

Mr. Baron.

It would not have been against the policy

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at that point for the AGency to have proceded to the point

of sending poison to the Congo?

MI. Bissell.

No, It would not.

Mr. Wides. You draw a distinction before between what

you called the planning stage and the implementing stage. I

take it it was not common to send lethal means by the use of

such a highly unusual messenger to a foreign country and

turn them over to a Station Chief as distinct from experi-

menting in the laboratory in Washington?

Mr. Bissell.

The phrase I used, or tried to use,

most of the time was the phrase of planning and preparation

versus the phrase of

implementation.

Mr. Wides.

By implementation do you mean simply the

actual commencement of --

MI. Bissell.

Of an active assassination, yes.

To answer your first question as directly

as

I can,

It was the practice, if I remember correctly, that devices

or agents, biological agents, or other things of this sort,

that some stocks of these were kept in certain major

stationg

overseas. I would be very surprised if that were not the

case. S'-LUad not earlier been the case in theigermanstation

ati frankfurt) and in theirokyo

stations, because these were,

big organizations.

Mr. Wides.

Those were lethal biological agents?

Mr. Bissell. I suspect, yes.

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Mr. Dawson. And the purpose for there stockpiles would

have been --

Mr. Bissell.

In case there was a sudden need for their

use, so that there would not be a logistic problem.

MI. Dawson.

To use for what? To kill people?

MI. Bissell. I suppose 8o, 1f they were truly lethal

agents.

MI. Wides.

You say you suspect so.

Do you have any recollection that you were at the time

aware of such

stockpiles abroad?

MI. Bissell. If there were I am sure I was aware of

it, and I seem to remember that in the two biggest oversças

stations there were one of two or three staff members who in

effect represented the Technical Services Division.

I could be wrong on this, but that, for what it is worth, is

my recollection of the organizational?

pattern.

Now, to come back to your question again, however, it would

indeed have been rather unusual to send such materials --

a specific kit, if you like, of thig sort -- out to a rela-

tively small station, unless planning for their use were

quite far along.

Mr. Wides. Is it fair to say, then, that your

dichotomy between planning and your use of the term imple-

mentation would mean that if -- let us take a different

example -- a sniper rifle and special bullets were sent

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to the city where they were to be used, and there was re-

connaissance, and every step necessary to actually carry out

the execution, that the implementation as far as your use

of the material would not start until someone actually picked

up the rifle and pointed it at him?

MI. Bissell.

Let, me try to sharpen it by reference,

if my memory serves, to the Dominican Republic, It is there,

1f I remember, that submachine guns were sent down to the

Station by CIA. The State Department never authorized the

release of those to the anti-Trujillo plotters. And I

believe they never were released.

Now, in that case, to take that example, I would say

that implementation would have started at the moment that you

turned those over and they passed out of our control.

I

would say that as long

as any weapon of any kind remained

securely within the Agency's control, that you were still

short of what I would call --

Mr. Schwarz.

Doesn't that turn on the nature

of the order to the Agency personnel who has them?

Mr. Bissell. It does, right.

Mr. Schwarz. In the Lumumba case, was the AGency

person who had the lethal agents authorized to use them to

kill Lumumba?

MI. Bissell.

To that question

I do not know the answer.

Clearly the Station Chief had been not only authorized but

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encouraged, as we have developed -- as you have developed --

in this testimony to seek out individuals who might have

close access to Lumumba for the purpose of hostile action

against him.

Clearly the Station Chief was then Bent, or

a kit was then brought out to him and put in his possession,

presumably so that if and when an individual with suitable

access and other appropriate circumstances materialized and

authorization was given, if lt was still required, the

operation could proceed.

Mr. Baron.

Let me see if I can refresh your recollec-

tion on that one point, whether authorization had been given.

--

The Chief of Station testified that when Sidney

Gottlieb

gave him poison or instructions in the use of poison, he

also made it very clear that these were for the purpose of

assassinating Lumumba, and that he should proceed to carry

out the assassination of Lumumba if it were possible, that the

use of poison was not a sine qua non to the assassination,

if he could find another way to do it, that would be fine,

but that it was

clear that he was to proceed with an assassin-

ation operation if he could find a way to do it successfully.

Mr. Bissell. Accepting that testimony, then, the

authorization was given.

Mr. Schwarz. But we are dealing with your testimony,

MI. Bissell. WE have his testimony, and

your comments on his

testimony doesn't add much to the record.

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Mr. Bissell. No.

MI. Schwarz. Did you of anybody else, as far as you

know, authorize him to do the act?

Do you recall any fact which bears upon that? Or is

your mind ablank on that subject?

MI. Bissell, I am afraid, as far as recollection is

concerned, that my mind is a blank on that subject. I know

the Committee doesn't find inference particularly helpful,

but I would strongly infer in this case that such an author-

ization did pass through me, as it were, if sid Gottlieb

gave that firm instruction to the Station Chief.

Mr. Baron. You

say passed through you. From what

source would it have passed?

Mr. Bissell. From the Director. As I would recon-

struct the sequence of events, the Director, after the meet-

ing and the cable in late August, made it clear that this was

to go forward -- to me that this was to go forward if and

when feasible circumstances permitted

it, and it was on that

basis.that I would have authorized Gottlich to deliver by

word of mouth such instructions

from the Station Chief.

That is a highly unusual procedure, even in a sensitive

matter of this sort.

Mr. Schwarz.

What is unusual about it?

MI. Bissell.

That the authorization should have been

by word of mouth rather than by cable. I don't mean a cable

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setting it forth in as many words, with you this would have

been identified with a project name by this time, and it is

most unusual that even with a highly sensitive project that

the nature is known to very few, probably only to the Station

Chief itself.

What I would have expected is an authorizing cable saying,

Implement project such and

such.

Mr. Schwarz.

But in the normal.course.of.cIA

assassination activity, if I may use that term --

Mr. Bissell. In the abnormal course.

Mr. Schwarz. - you would have been instructed by

Mr. Dulles to do something?

MI. Bissell.

Instructed or authorized.

MI. Schwarz. And then you would have spoken to or

cabled some other

officer?

MI. Bissell.

correct. And knowing Mr. Gottlieb,

It Is literally inconceivable to me that he would have acted

beyond his instructions.

Мг. Baron.

The Chief of Station, to be fair to his

testimony, indicated that he was greatly surprised when he

received such instructions, and he was doubtful about the

practicality of pulling off such an operation, at the

least he was convinced it would be difficult.

But he did

say -- he added that

as

a fairly junior Chief of Station he

might have checked back before he could have mounted

such an

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operation. But he added that he bellevedthe assassination

was expected of him, and he left Mr. Gottileb with the im-

pression that he would proceed to try to perform such a mission.

Mr. Wides.

He also cabled.

MI. Baron.

Now, the next step that the Chief of

Station took after Mr. Gottlieb departed Irom the Congo,

according to his testimony, was to cable to headquarters

for confirmation of such an extraordinary mission.

Did you receive such a cable from Leopoldville?

MI. Bissell. The record would have to show that.

don't remember it.

Mr. Baron.

The Chief of Station also testified that

he shortly thereafter received confirmation back in cryptic

fashion to the effect that he was to proceed with the in-

structions to carry out the instructions he had been given.

--..

Did you sent such. confirmation to him?

Mr. Bissell. I isgume so, if the cable went out.

MI. Baron.

And that confirmation would have come

from yourself directly as opposed to Bronson Iweedy or anyone

else in the African Division?

Mr. Bissell.

Probably.

But again, if you have that cable, the initials would

show who signed off on it, and so on.

MI. Schwarz. These cables have not been found.

Mr. diGenova. The Committee is making an effort to find:

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them, and the AGency has not been able to produce them yet.

Mr. Bissell.

If It la any help for me to say, this

sounds highly likely as an account if it is established, as

evidence seems to have established, that DI. Gottlied brought

such instructions, I would expect the Station to seek con-

firmation. And I would expect, given the background, that

that confirmation would have been forthcoming. And I would

also be almost certain that I would have signed off on such

a cable, or signed such a cable, initialled it, even if it

had been going to Mr. Dulles for final approval.

MI. Baron. These events occurred in early September.

which was prior to your conversations with Justin O'Donnell

about the assassination of Lumumba?

MI. Bissell.

Yes.

Mr. Baron.

So at that point an assassination mission

had in effect been mounted in the Congo?

Mr. Bissell. Right.

MI. Baron. After you spoke with Justin O'Donnell,

did you send a cable to Leopoldville to stand down the

assassination mission?

MI. Bissell. Again, I would have to go back to the

record.

• Mr. Wides.

WAs it your testimony earlier that you

nave no recollection of discussing with My. Gottlieb the

possible assassination of Lumumba?

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MI. Bissell. I thought I testified earlier this

afternoon that I might well havediscussed it with him, but

I don't have a specific recollection.

Mr. Wides. Let me read you an excerpt from your testi-

mony on June 11, where Mr. Schwarz was asking you about your

conversation with Mr. O'Donnell, and your request that he

investigate, in your

words, the possibility of

assassinating

Lumumba.

And then on page 54 -- we should mark this --

Mr. Schwarz.

Just read it in.

Mr. Wides.

"Did you tell him this in connection with

making plans to go see the passer of the poison, Mr. Gottlieb?:

"MI. Bissell. I think I probably did."

was

that a ecollection at that time that you had

sent O'Donnell to see DI. Gottlieb?

MI. Bissell.

No, I think that comes in the category

of

inference rather than recollection, because I don't re-

member specifically telling De. Gottlieb.

MI. Wides. Or speaking to

DI. Gottlieb, explaining

the possible means to O'Donnell?

Mr. Bissell. I don't recollect it.

MI. Baron. In the testimony of the Chief of Station

-....

in Leopoldville he

said

that during his visit with Dr.

Gottlieb, as I have related, he was

extremely surprised when

he received these instructions. And the instructions were

so specific that he wanted to be very sure that the authoriza-

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tion for this mission was equally as specific. And he probed

DI. Gottlieb on the source of the authorization, and said --

something to the effect, who authorized this mission.

The answer was, it came from the top, or something to

that effect.

And then the Chief of Station pushed on to pin it down.

And the response he got from DI. Gottlieb was, something to

the effect that --

MI. Schwarz.

Will you read the exact answer?

Mr. Baron.

I will read you from Mr. Hedgman's testi-

mony. At page 30, quoting from the testimony of the Chief

of Station in the congo at that point, testifying under the

allas of ledgman, the Chief of Station said:

"In essence I must have -- and again I am guessing

as to what my wording was -- must have pointed out that this

was not a common or usual Agency tactic, and I may have

probably said that I had never heard of it being done -- which

I had not, never in my training or previous work in the

Agency had I ever heard any reference to such, in my recollec-

tion at least, such methods.

And it is my recollection, I

asked on whose authority these instructions were issued.

"Mr. Wides.

And what did Mr. Gottlich reply?

"Mr. Hedgman. It is my recollection that he identified

the President -- and I cannot -- the President of the u.s. -

and I cannot recall whether he said the President or whether

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he identified him by name".

Then the testimony proceeds to the bottom of page 31:

"Mr. Wides.

Can you recall whether he said 'the Presi-

dent' or 'President Eisenhower'?

"Ma. ledgman.

I cannot recall whether he just said -

whether he said the President or whether he said President

Eisenhower.

"Mr. Wides.

But it was one of those two, is your

best recollection?

"Mr. Hedgman.

I would say almost certainly".

Further down the page MI. Hedgman continues:

"I have tried to go back in my mind on that, and I

think, I believe -- but again now this one is pretty loose in

my mind -- It was something to the effect that the President

had instructed the Director".

And then on page 33 MI. Dawson says:

"You are not the least unclear whether or not you

came away with a very clear impression that the President's

name had been invoked in some fashion?

"Mr. Hedgman.

Yes, I came -- certainly that is my

recollection".

Did Mr. Gottlieb make you aware at this point that he

had made such a representation to the Chief of Station?

MI. Bissell. I have no such recollection.

Mr. Baron. Was Mr. 'Gottlieb authorized to make such

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a representation that the President of the U.S. had authorized

the assassination of Lumumba?

MI. Bissell. I can't answer that question. But what

probably occurred was --

Mr. Dawson.

Wait a minute, Let's not do it that way.

Is there any doubt that you would have undertaken --

assuming that you did so instruct Mi. Gottlieb to carry this

poison into the Congo -- that you would have done this with-

out Mr. Dulles' authority?

Mr: Bissell. There was no possibility.

Mr. Dawson. Is there any doubt in your mind that you

would have then assumed that Dulles had received the

President's okay to do so?

Mr. Bissell. Well, I might well have believed that the

Director was proceeding under the mandate of the Special

Group as reported in

the minutes of the meeting.

Mr. Schwarz.

Did you tell Gottlieb anything about

President Eisenhower?

MI. Bissell. I probably did, but I don't remember.

Mr. Schwarz.

Did Dulles tell you anything about

President Eisenhower?

Mr. Bissell.

He almost certainly would have told

me a good deal about that meeting.

Mr. Schwarz. By that meeting --

Mr. Bissell. The Special Group meeting.

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I think it is probably unlikely that Allen Dulles would have

said either the President or President Eisenhower

even to me.

I think he would have said, this is authorized in the highest

quarters, and I would have known what he meant.

Mr. Baron.

And you have communicated that to Mr.

Gottlleb?

MI. Bissell. I could very easily.

MI. Schwarz. Is all of that line that we have just

went through could and would and might, and inference, or

1s any of that recollection?

Mr. Bissell.

I am afraid it has to be described as

inference.

MI. diGenova.

But you didn't make up the minutes of

the Special Group meeting on August 25 and you didn't make up

the cable which Mr. Dulles signed either, did you?

Mr. Bigsell.

No.

MI. diGenova.

So that was actually sent out, wasn't

it?

Mr. Bissell. Yes.

MI. diGenova.

And Mr. Dulles wasn't one who used

highest quarters, was he?

Mr. Bissell.

Yes - and also the minutes of the

Special Group referred to Mr. Gray's associate.

MI. Wides.

And your testimony a moment ago in response

to Mr. dawson's question was, even though this fell within

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what you regarded as the planning stage, this meaning if 1t

occurred, Dr. Gottiled taking the poison to the congo, that

you would

not have taken that step without the approval of

the Director, was that your testimony?

Mr. Bissell.

What I will: now say at any rate is that

the mere act of taking the kit to the Congo I would classify

as still in the planning stage. But if it be taken as es-

tablished that Mr. Gottlieb took specific instructions "to

implement", I would say that we had then passed into an im-

plementation phase.

MI. Wides.

Let me read to you from your testimony on

June 11, and then ask you a question based on that.

On page 54 MI. Schwarz said:

"Who authorized you to tell Mr. D'Donnell to take steps

to move toward assassinating Mr. Lumumba?"

And you said: "No one".

And then Mr. Schwarz:

"Did you inform the White House of that?"

"No."

"To the best of your knowledge did anybody inform the

White House of that?"

"MI. Bissell.

To the best of my knowledge, no.

"Mr. Schwarz. Why did you seek to assassinate Mr.

Lumi mba?

"Mr. Bissell.

I didn't seek to assasginate him. I

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told the members of the clandestine service to make plans

and develop the capability so to do if it were approved and

ordered."

Now, in regard to your answer that no one had told you

to tell Mr. O'Donnell to take steps to move toward assassinat-

1ng Mr. Lumumba, I take it that reading that now in the

context of other information we have, that answer was not

intended to mean that -- page 54 -- you were not then testi-

fying affirmatively that no one had spoken to you at a higher

level about trying to assassinate Lumumba, but merely in

regard to your discussion with O'Donnell, which you did recall?

Mr. Bissell.

My recollection - and this I will des-

cribe as a recollection, it may be faulty -- is that it was

my own idea to give O'Donnell this assignment.

He had, I

believe, recently completed

some other, or there was a change

of position of some kind, and he was available. And given

the background which has here been established this afternoon,

I believe it was my notion to give him this

assignment

in

parallel to any other things that were still going forward.

It would have been. unusual to have advised anybody

outside the Agency of a specific assignment to an individual

of that sort.

MI. Wides.

And the implication of the lack of authori-

zation from above yourself, or discussion with anyone above

yourself, was confined simply to the giving of the asignment

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to Mr. O'Donnell?

Mr. Bissell. That is correct.

And it is my recollection, as I have testified in

part earlier this afternoon, that when O'Donnell came later

and declined the assignment and expressed the view that this

was not the way to solve the problem, that I shut off the

O'Donnell operation completely.

Mt. Wides, Let me go back to that if I can. MI.

O'Donnell's testimony, which I believe we went over with you

when you testified, we might ask you to see now if you have

any different recollection.

In essence it is the following:

that you called

him in and asked him to go to the Congo for the purposes

of trying to see if Lumumba could be assassinated, that

very evening you asked him, right at that moment, and it was

toward the end of the day, as he recalled it, you asked him

to see DI. Gottlieb; that he expressed reservation about

assassination, but did go down to see

DI. Gottlleb. And

Dr. Gottlieb discussed with him several lothal means, and he

immediately came back to your office and said, I won't

do it, and raised legal questions, moral questions --

MI. Dawson. I don't think he testified that he imme-

diately came back.

Mr. Schwarz. The

same day.

Mr. Wides. Same day -- and that he then went

next

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door, as I say, and discussed it with MI. Helms.

This is Mr. O'Donnell's testimony.

MI. O'Donnell further testified that he told you he

would be willing to go to the Congo to explore the possibility

of neutralizing him in other ways, and that shortly thereafter

in the space of a few days went to the Congo. And I believe

the record suggests that he was there from October through

December, and that while he was looking into the possibility

of trying to get Lumumba out of the property away from effect-

ive custody of the U.N. with the thought that if the

Central Congolese Government obtain control of him, they might

try him for capital crimes, and this might result in his

physical removal. And this was mooted by Lumumba's escape and

recapture and death, and he then came back.

Is it still your recollection that there was a period

of several weeks between the time you broached the subject

of an assassination and the time that Mr. O'Donnell

expressed his opposition to it?

Mr. Bissell. I shouldn't be firm on the several weeks.

But my recollection of the course of events differs in, I

think, only one -- or is inconsistent with his recollection

as you reported it in only the one respect, that the impres-

sion I carried away was that at a minimum some days -- and

I had thought a period of at

least a week elapsed between

my giving him the assignment and his coming back to decline

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the assignment and recommend a different approach.

What

you further quote from his testimony I had not remembered, but

it does now seem to me that I do remember -- part of my

original recollection was that when he came back to me I have

several times used the phrase, this was

not the way to deal

with the problem of Lumumba.

And that is wholly consistent

with his having proposed other means of neutralizing Lumumba

short of using physical violence on him directly. I do seem

to recollect that.

And although I had not remembered it, I do now seem to

recollect that he went out there and with the assignment,

most of it in his recollection rather than mine, of looking

at other ways of neutralizing Lumumba. But my recollection

simply differs from his on the matters of the timing and how

soon he came

back.

MI. Wides. Do you recall when you proposed to Mr.

Harvey, in what I think we concluded was

most probably very

early 1961, that he explore executive action capability,

and that two people who had been cut in in some way on earlier

considerations or explorations of assassination, and two

people whom therefore he might discuss this with, were Mr.

03

Silver and sidney Cottlieb?

Mr. Bissell.

I can't say honestly that I

recollect

that. But especially with respect to fottlieb, this would

have been absolutely -- I am reasonably sure that is what

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I would have done.

Mr. Wides.

But you don't recall guggesting -- or if

he brought it up, approving -- his discussing it with them, in

part from a security angle, because Mr. Gottileb had already

been cut in, so to speak, with regard to prior considerations

of assassination possibilities?

Mr. Bissell.

Well, I amisorry to have to retreat

the inference.

I think I would have encouraged him to talk

to them myself. And I don't think I would have particularly

worried at that point about the security implications.

Mr. Wides. Do you recall why you would have encouraged

him or suggested that he speak to armad silvera

03

MI. Bissell.

No, unless [snold Bliver had had some

connection with this operation.

And I don't remember what

the circumstances

were.

MI. Baron. Do you recall an agent who went by the

cryptonym of QJWINN that I believe we discussed in your

earlier testimony?

Mr. Bissell. I dimly remember that there was such,

yes.

MI. Baron.

Do you recall that he worked for O'Donnell

in the congo and was sent there by arnold Silver who had

03

recruited him in Europe?

Mr. Bissell. I didn't recollect that.

Mr. Wides.

Does it ring a bell of any sort?

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MI. Bissell.

Well, there was an agent recruited in

Europe who was used against the Lumumba faction in the

Congo.

Now, the agent I have in mind, he was extremely success-

ful. He made a deep penetration of not only the Lumumba

sympathizers, but also of those individuals physically 1o-

cated in Europe who were supplying Lumumba with money, and in

some cases giving him logistic support. This agent was ob-

viously engaged in an extremely hazardous business, because

If his cover had been blown he certainly would have been,

I think, killed.

Now, this may be the agent in question.

I do not

remember that agent ever being put under O'Donnell's contiol.

But if

O'Donnell was given the assignment to find ways of

neutralizing Lumumba, given that assignment to O'Donnell

when he went out there, it is very possible that this

agent would have been put in touch with him.

Mr. Schwarz.

why did you pick O'Donnell, incidentally,

for the initial assignment, the part that was killing him,

as opposed to other methods of neutralizing

him?

Mr. Bissell. My recollection is that I regarded him

as highly competent in the craft, I think correctly. I

regarded him, I think incorrectly as the events turned out,

as a very tough guy

in the sense this guy Harvey had, that

such reputation, and I think with hindsight deserved it.

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And I suspect I have some recollection that about that

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time, In the fall of $1960, O'Donnell'became available from

some previous assignment.

Mr. Wides. And you had had contact with him in regard

to his being Station Chief in fucker

during the U-2 program?

MI. Bissell. Yes, I guess so.

And other contacts.

had known him in the agency.

Mr. Baron. Let's see if this refreshes your recollec-

tion on the use of QUWINN. He subsequently became the

principal asset in the ZRRIFLE program under Harvey's

direction?

MI. Bissell. Yes.

Mr. Baron. And Harry apparently arranged with

sives, who was

supervising QJWINN in Europe, to have QJWINN

spot potential assets for the ZRRIFLE program in Europe.

Does that refresh your recollection as to QJWINN'S

mission in the Congo?

Mr. Bissell.

It suggests to me that the man I had

in mind was not QJWINN, but a different agent. And I don't

remember, I don't remember a thing about it.

Mr. Baron.

What was QJWINN's mission in: the Congo?

MI. Bissell. I can only surmise that he had some

connection -- that either he had the means of "getting close

to Lumumba", or that he had connections that might provide --

Mr. Baron.

I will represent to you that there

is a

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memo on November 2, 1960, sent by wiillam Harvey in his

capacity as chief of stall o to fool we insen a copy

going to Bronson Tweedy that describes QJWINN, and talks at

great length about his mission in the Congo, without pin-

pointing it. The memo talks about the fact that it is an

extremely sensitive operation, and that QJWINN himself wouldn't

be told the purpose of it before he is sent down there.

Does that refresh your recollection about his mission?

Mr. Bissell. I am afraid not.

Mr. Baron. If there were a mission in the Congo at

that point for Staff D purposes, what would that mission have

been?

Mr. Bissell. The Staff D was concerned with communicatións

intelligence, as you know. And I would surmise that a Staff

D connected mission in the Congo would have involved : ?..

planting means of listening to conversation or traffic or in

some other way intercepting communications. That is the

competence of Staff D and its responsibility.

Mr. Baron. Planting by means of surreptitious entry

or by other means?

Mr. Bissell.

Yes, although Staff D wasn't concerned

with bugging people's rooms or this kind of thing. It is

concerned with true communications intelligence, or it was

at that time.

Mr. Baron.

If you had informed William Harvey at the

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point when executive action was being sent up that ashok Silok

Warwas already cut in on the discussions of an assassination

capability, would you assume that that referred to mincide

BUTOR®

suprevision of QWINN.

Mr. Bissell. Well, It could have. It sounds that

way.

Mr. Baron: When you told Harvey that Gottlieb had

already been cut in on the discussions of an asgassination

capability, fit that refer back to Gottlleb's activities in

reference to the Congo?

MI. Bissell. Well, it probably referred to those -- and

perhaps to earlier discussions or more generalized discussions

with Gottlieb in his capacity as science advisor, and there-

fore someone who would be knowledgeable of weapons of various

kinds.

MI. Schwarz.

Did you have such discussions with him?

Mr. Bissell. I believe so.

Mr. Schwarz. And that, now, is a recollection, I

take it from the way you are speaking?

MI. Bissell. It is closer to that than most

of what I have to say.

Mr. schwarz.

What is your recollection of the dis-

cussion with Gottlieb?

Mr. Bissell. Over a considerable period of months

when he was in that capacity --.

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59

.: *

Mr. Schwarz.

which started when?

MI. Bissell. I don't remember.

Mr. Schwarz.

1960?

Mr. Bissell.

I think it was 1960.

And the back-

ground, as I am sure the record shows, was that Dr. Gottlieb

had been in TSD,

and he had then gone for a tour of duty, I

15-21

believe, to Mimicti

where he continued in the same kind of

work.

But he had a much closer connection with espionage

operations and counter espionage in the field. When I brought

him back his mission in effect was a very broad one, it really

was to find ways and means -- to concentrate on technical ways!

and means, meaning by technical within the general area of

the physical and biological sciences, of improving the effect-

iveness of all kinds of covert operations.

Now, in a sense that wag: the mission of the Technical

Services Division itself.

But Gottlieb's role was to pay

special attention to the interconnections between

the

technical people in TSD and the operators in the rest of the

clandestine service, and to find out whether the technical

requirements that TSD was striving to meet were appropriate,

in other words, did they really know what the operators needed:

and wanted, and also to find out if the operators knew what

TSD had available. It was that kind of a thing.

Now, I had many conversations with him on that, because

this was a success that interested me a great deal. And I

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had great respect for his, judgment. And especially given

this Congo involvement, I certainly would have discussed with

him, probably on a number of occasions, the availability of

means of incapacitation, including assassination.

Mr. Schwarz. And those discussions are prior to your

Harvey assignment?

MI. Bissell.

Yes, I believe so -- yes, they would

have.

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Mr. Schwarz. Would have been or were?

Mr. Bissell.

Well, Harvey's agsignment wasn't until

January of 1961,

so they obviously were.

MI. Wides.

Mr. Bissell, with regard to the earlier

discussion with your

sense of authorization, you said that

you do recall the discussions with O'Donnell, and that although

you can't remember specific discussions with Tweedy, in

general you recall that you were looking into the

possibility

of exploring and planning the possible assassination of

Lumumba?

Mr. Bissell. Right.

Mr. Wides.

In the light of the documents from the

group and Mr. Dulles' cable that have been read, do you have

any recollection now whenet

you thought at your level you

had sufficient authority that even though you had not done

so you could direct people below you to carry from the •

planning stage into the implementation stage an assassination •

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TOP SECRET.

61

of Lumumba at that time?'

Mr. Bissell.

I probably so believed. I think, how-

ever, given the context, it is very unlikely that I would

have taken such a step without clearing it with Allen Dulles.

Mr. Wides.

You say you probably so believe.

that based at all on a recollection, or simply inference?

Mr. Bissell.

It is the way my mind worked then, and

probably still does. You are asking me a question about whe-

ther I believed I had authorityar'':.

MI. Wides. Yes.

Mr. Bissell.

A good many years ago, and I am saying

that given the evidence here and the background

as it has

been developed here

this afternoon, it is my recollection thatl

given the way my mind works, I probably did think I had

authority.

But it is also very unlikely.

Mr. Schwarz.

There

are two parts of your answer which

were at war with each other. On the one hand you say, based

upon having seen

some Special Group minutes and a cable,

both of which say in effect that killing should not be ruled

out as a matter of consideration --

Mr. Bissell. Right.

Mr. Schwarz.

On the one hand you say that based upon

those two items, you probably believe you had authority to

order action?

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Mr. Bissell. Right:::

MI. Schwarz. Move from contemplation to action or

consideration of action?

Mr. Bissell. Right.

Mr. Schwarz. On the other hand you say, well, yes,

although I probably believed that, on the other hand I

probably spoke to Mr. Dulles about it, or would have spoken

to MI. Dulles about it.

MI. Bissell. You will recognize that here again I am

talking about the pattern of my relationship with him and the

way the Agency worked.

Now, here was a matter in which the authorization, such

as it was, had come down clearly from the Special Group to

MI. Dulles personally.

Mr. Schwarz.

Now, we are talking about the exhibits

which show an authorization -- assuming you read the words

as meaning killing --

Mr. Bissell. Not excluding, yes.

Mr. Schwarz. -- an authorization to consider that.

Mr. Bissell. Right.

Mr. Schwarz. And that had come down?

Mr. Bissell. It had come down to me via Allen

Dulles, and in terms that Allen was in effect being strongly

encouraged to pursue the course of

action outlined in the

exhibit. I think under these circumstances that I would have

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gone back to him with, for instance, any cable of authoriza-

tion or other-instruction before sending it out even if I

did believe him.

But let us say in his absence from washington I had the

authority to send.

MI. Dawson.

You say unlike the.case.of the White House

where you would not take details back, in the case of Mr.

Dulles you would discuss the details of a specific operation?

MI. Bissell. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz.

But it is not really amatter of details,

Mr. Bissell. That is an important distinction. We have

been talking about a chain that starts with two memos, or threa

memos.

We have talked about contemplation or consideration,

don't rule out killing, it doesn't use the word killing, but

it could be read to mean killing, don't rule out killing

from

the items to be considered.

Now, moving from doing it is not a detail, is it?

MI. Bissell.

No, I wouldn't call it a detail by any

manner of means, but I would read that language as authorizing

any decision by the Director or the Director's authority.

Mr. Schwarz. You would read the language of the two

exhibits, one of which comes

from the Administration

and one of which is the Director cable --

Mr. Bissell. Right.

Mr. Schwarz.

You would read the language of the Special

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Group minutes --

Mr. Baron. Of August 25, 1960.

Mr. Bissell. Right.

MI. Schwarz. May I see that?

After talking about extremely strong feelings, straight-

forward action, and Dulles commenting on taking this ser-

lously, proceeding vigorously, the agreement is:

"It was finally agreed that planning for the Congo

would not necessarily rule out 'consideration' of any

particular kind of activity which might contribute to

getting rid of Lumumba".

Now, the first point, you read that to mean not

-uling out killing?

MI. Bissell. Correct.

Mr. Schwarz.

Now, was it just your testimony that

you believe that the agreement that planning for the Congo

would not necessarily rule out possible consideration of -

and now I will substitute the word killing -- is authority

to actually order the killing -- sufficient authority?

Mr. Bissell. May I look again at the other exhibit,

Mr. Dulles' cable of the next day.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Schwarz. Back

the record.

There is a pending question.

Mr. Bissell. It is my belief on the basis of the cable!

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drafted by Allen Dulles that he regarded the action of the

Special Group as authorizing implementation if favorable

circumstances presented themslves, if it could be done

covertly.

He speaks of targets of opportunity. He authorized,

as I remember the words of the cable "even more aggressive

action".

• And the tone of the cable clearly gives the Station

Chief a lot of latitude and conveys a sense of very great

urgency.

Mr. Schwarz. And whether of not that is a proper con-

struction of the Special Group is not really something we need

to discuss.

Finish the Congo, then.

MI. Baron. I have one more question on Mr. Gottlieb's

visist. And that is, in the light of the entire atmosphere

at the Agency and the policy at the Agency at that time,

Mr. Gottlieb's representation

to the Chief of Station that

the President had instructed the DCI to carry out this

mission would not have been beyond the pale of Mr. Gottlieb's

authority at that point?

Mr. Bissell. No, it would not.

Mr. Baron.

For the sake of the record,. let's intro-

duce as an exhibit the memo that I referred to earlier as

November 1960. And I will ask you one question

about it.

This is a memo going from the Chief of KUTUBE/D.

And that

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1s the (Poreign Intelligence Division, which would have been

William Harvey at that time.

MI. Blasell.

I belleve 80.

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for identification.)

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i Me baron Dia you receive a copy of this cable?

Mr Bissell. I think it 1s doubtful. And I don't

believe I would have. It is rather narrowly an operational

matter.

5

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Mr. Baron. Thank you.

Next, let's turn to a cable that was sent on September

16, 1960, to Leopoldville from CIA Headquarters which we will

mark Exhibit 4.

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Mr. Baron. This is a cable that we reviewed, Mr.

Bissell, before we began your testimony today. And I will

turn your attention to the paragraph that says:

"It is. still difficult to determine whether Mobutu

had sufficient control army to enforce decisions announced

night 14 September.

Station advised" --

And then there is a sanitized paragraph --

"Station advised two moderate Congolese politiciang

'try work with xey Congolese contact' in effort eliminate .

Lumumba. Fear UN protection will give Lumumba opportunity

organization counterattack. Only solution is remove him

from scene soonest".

Now, the night of September 14 was the night of a coup

in the Congo where Mobutu took power, is that correct?

Mr. Bissell.

Correct.

Mr. Baron. And does this cable refresh your recollec-

tion as to the attitude at the Agency toward Lumumba even

after he was in U.N. custody?

Mr. Bissell. Yes. It seems to say rather clearly

that it was still desirable to eliminate him.

MI. Baron. WAs it still your recollection, then, that

there was a continued sense of urgency about eliminating

Lumumba after he was in U.N. custody?

Mr. Bissell.

Yes.

Mr. Baron. And this would account in part for the fact

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that there was no clear order to stand down the assassination

mission after Lumumba was in U.N. custody? .

MI. Bissell.

That is correct.

Mr. Baron. There is a set of NSC minutes from September

21, 1960, that I would like to introduce as Exhibit 5.

(The document referred to was

marked Bissell Exhibit No. 5

for identification.)

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Mr. Baron. You are, not listed as a participant iat the

meeting, although Mr. Dulles is present, and the following

paragraph relates a remark of Mr. Dulles:

"Nobutu appeared to be the effective power in the

Congo for the moment, but Lumumba was not yet disposed of

and remained a grave danger as long as he was not disposed of"

Does that accord with your understanding of the policy

of the National Security Council toward Lumumba even after

he was in U.N. custody?

MI. Bissell. It does.

Mr. Baron. And the language "disposed of" would contem-

plate assassination at least as one means of disposing of

him?

Mr. Bissell. As one means, as one possible means, if

necessary.

MI. Baron. I have one further exhibit which

we

will mark Exhibit 6, that is, a cable dated December 17, 1960

sent to the Director from Leopoldville.

(The document referred to was

marked Bissell Exhibit No. 6

for identification.)

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MI. Baron. And this cable deals with an incident where

an asset of the Chief of Station who was knownby the cryptonym

WIROGUE made an approach to agent QJWIN. And the cable says:

"QJWIN, who resides same hotel as WIROGUE, reported that

he had lived Alaska, Japan, South America, Germany and other

parts Europe. QWIN said, WIROGUE smells as though he in

intel business. Station denies any info on WIROGUE. 14

December QJWIN Ieported WIROGUE had offered him $300 per

month to participate in intel net and be member execution

squad. When QJWIN said he not interested, WIROGUE added

there would be bonuses for special jobs.

Under OJWIN

questioning, WIROGUE later said he worked for P:B. PRIME

Service".

Do you recall this incident?

Mr. Bissell.

I don't, no.

MI. Baron. Does P.B. Prime Service refer to the

American Intelligence Service?

Mr. Bissell. Yes, it does.

Mr. Baron.

Namely, the CIA?

Mr Bissell. Yes.

Do you recall anything about the formation

of an execution squad in the congo during this period?

Mr. Bissell. I take that to be a phrase used by an

agent.

(Discussion off the record.)

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Mr. alGenova. Mr. Blasell, I wait to switch, unfortunately,

from the Continent of Africa and go to Cuba. This is the same

time period, however, it 1a July of 1960.

I had a conversation with you on August 6 over the

telephone. You may recall the conversation. I have in front

of me a cable which we will mark as Exhibit No. 7.

(The document referred to was

marked Bigsell Exhibit No. 7

for identification.)

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Mr. Baron. And this is a cable sent from headquarters

to the Havana Station dated July 21, 1960.

The first

sentence of the cable reads:

"Possible removal top three leaders is receiving

serious consideration at headquarters".

The cable is signed by E. H. Hinkle by direction Tracy

Barnes for DDP, and about E.H. Hinkle by direction J.C. King,

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division as authenticating officer.

Relseasing officer was Tracy Barnes.

Do you have any independent recollection of that, cable

and what surrounded its:issuance at headquarters?

Mr. Bissell. I don't remember it until you mentioned it

to me in the telephone conversation to which you have alluded.

MI. diGenova.

Having had some time to think about it

since we spoke on August 6, does it ring any bell at this

juncture?

Mr. Bissell. It does not, I am afraid.

MI. diGenova.

It is apparent that this cable was

sent out at a time when

you were having conversations in the

summer or the fall of 1960 with MI. Tweedy and Mr. O'Donnell

concerning MI. Lumumba, is that correct?

Mr. Bissell. Correct.

MI. diGenova. Did Mr. Dulles at any time during this

period or prior to

it or subsequent to it ever issue a directive

assigning assassination as an agency

action?

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Mr. Bissell. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. diGenova. Do you have any knowledge as to whether

or not MI. Dulles knew about the issuance of this cable which

stated that the possible removal of the top three

leaders in

Cuba was receiving serious consideration at headquarters?

Mr. Bissell. I don't have knowledge of that, no.

You yourself quoted internal evidence from the cable and!

the one that was sent, a followup the following day, suggesting

that he may have ordered it countermanded.

Mr. diGenova.

The duty officer at that particular time,

that evening, indicated that he had sent this cable, and that

he had been instructed, as he recalled it by MI. Barnes, to

send this cable, and that the wording came from Mr. Barnes.

Now, the duty officer also said that the next day when

he came in there was a cable, which we have, and we

will mark that

as Exhibit No. 8, which in toto said:

"Do not pursue reference, would like to drop

matter."

And that was signed singly by Tracy Barnes.

(The document referred to was

marked Bissell Exhibit No. 8

for identification.)

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Mr. diGenova. Now; the duty officer who had issued the

first cable about serious consideration, he had no personal

knowledge, but he had heard that Mr. Dulles had countermanded

the original cable, talking about the possible removal,

and authorizing the approach': to the asset, the Cuban pilot,

who actually attempted the crash of the plane which would

carry Raol Castro from Prague to Havana.

Do you have any personal knowledge as to why Mr. Dulles

would have countermanded, assuming

that he did?

Mr. Bissell. I don't have any recollection.

I could

surmise lots of things.

Mr. diGenova.

What I want to ask you is this: do

you have an independent recollection that any assassination

efforts against the Cuban leaders which were being considered

contmmplated simultaneous action against

all three, other-

wise it would be useless

action?

Mr. Bissell. The only evidence I know of, hard evidence,

is the Special Group minute to which I referred earlier,

which was an exhibit in earlier

testimony.

Mr. diGenova. You are referring to the Merchant cable

exchange of November 3, 1960?

Mr. Bissell. That is correct.

MI. diGenova.

Now, Mr. Hinkle, the duty officer, .

has no personal: knowledge about the rescission of that cable.

Does it seem to you upon reflection, knowing what you

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know -- for example, MI. Dulles cable to the Congo personally

authorizing, apparently, the assassination of Mr. Lumumba,

and $100,000 to do it - is it inconsistent to your way of

thinking that he would have authorized that

assasgination and

would have rescinded this cable that would have apparently

authorized the assassination of Raof Castro.

MI. Bissell. Not inconsistent at all. I think it may

well have embodied a judgment on MI. Dulles part that this

effort concerning Raof Castro was altogether too risky, and

technically not sufficiently likely of success.

MI. diGenova. During our initial telephone conversa-

tion on August 6 you speculated, and you clearly identified it

as mere speculation, that one of the reasons that MI. Dulles,

assuming he did, ordered that

initial cable countermanded was,

first, too many innocent persons on the plane would have

been killed, and second, that it was so risky because there

had been just an initial approach of the asset and it wasn't

known whether or not he was a double agent, and thirdly, it

appeared that the contemplation of all three, the assassina-

tion of all three was being considered, and, therefore, since

only Raol would be on this plane that it would have resulted

in the dilemma that they sought to avoid, that is, if

he had been killed there would have been two left over, and

there may have been a reason that he ordered the countermand.

Would you take by that as a form of speculation at this

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'*'

point as one of the reasons that he would have countermanded

that cable?

Mr. Bissell.

I would.

Mr. Schwarz. Could I follow up on the Congo, Exhibit

2, the Dulles cable

to Leopoldville.

Now, we apparently read to you when I was out of the

room the first paragraph at least, which talks about the clear-

cut conclusion:

"If he continues to hold high office the inevitable

result would be chaos and at worst pave the way for Communist

takeover. Consequently, we conclude that his removal must

be an urgent and prime objective, and under existing conditions

this must be a high priority of your covert action".

And you have read that language as meaning killing, right?

Mr. Bissell.

Yes.

Mr. Schwarz.

I want to ask you if you continue to

read it as killing in the light of the third paragraph of

the cable which reads as follows:

"To the extent that Ambassador may

desire to be con-

sulted you should seek his concurrence. If in any particular:

case he does not wish to be consulted you can act on your

own authority where time does not permit reference here.

"Paragraph 4, this message has been

seen and approved

at competent level of the Department of State".

Do you still believe in the light of the authorization

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to discuss the matter with the Ambassador that assassination

was involved?

Mr. Bissell.

Yes, especially since there is evidence

here that it was discussed with and.: approved at State, and

in the light of the background in this Special Group.

Mr. Schwarz.

You don't think this is referring to

a coup?

Mr. Bissell. I don't think so.

But I can't be

perfectly certain.

But I think it refers to more than that.

I think actually it is saying, his removal by some means or

other is the very high priority objective. I would infer

from this that what we know was discussed at least in the

Special Group, and that is that removal might be by the means

of assassination, although obviously others would be preferred.

Could I add one word in answer to that question. I am

almost certain

I am correct, that the then Ambassador to

the Congo was Edward Gullion.

Mr. Baron. I believe it was Timberlake.

MI. Bissell. I think Gullion had arrived by this

time. But certainly in Gullion's regime there was extremely

close collaboration between the Ambassador and the Chief of

Station. And the Ambassador was an individual who would have

been quite prepared to contemplate this kind of action.

Mr. Wides.

MI. Bissell, just

to make sure the record

is complete in terms

of your efforts to analyze that, if I

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represented to you that at the time thaswas traffic between

the station and headquarters in the normal African Division

channels regarding U.S. efforts to influence President

Kasavubu and others to dismiss Lumumba from political power as

premier, and also traffic relating to a takeover of the real

power by certain military figures such as MI. Mobutu, would

your reading of that cable still be that it suggests authori-

zation of assassination as opposed to possibly discussing

only authorization of removal of him from political power?

MIT Bissell.

I think it authorizes removal. And I

think that probably Mr. Dulles would have said, if you

can possibly really remove him through political power, that

is obviously the preferred

course of action.

But I think this authorizes the whole tone of it very

strong measures indeed.

I say in support of that, there had been

a record

established that even after Lumumba had been removed from

political power and had taken refuge in

the U.N. he was

still widely regarded

as a menace.

Mr. Dawson.

I would like to follow very briefly on

this. I would like to ask you about this agent that you did.

have a firm recollection of being President of the Congo. lie i

was described as being a well-placed or a very good agent,

was he not?

Mr. Bissell. I think he was a very good agent, and

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also he made an effective penetration of Lumumba's supporters

both in the Congo, and as

it were, in the line of funding

and supply in Europe.

Mr. Dawson.

So, he was in place, so to speak?

Mr. Bissell. Yes.

In other words, he was a dual agent.

Mr. Dawson. Did he have

access directly to Lumumba?

Mr. Bissell. I think he did, yes.

MI. Dawson.

Do you remember having been told that he

sometime in November or December went

to Stanleyville?

MI. Bissell. I don't remember the specific case, but

it fits the pattern very well. What I do remember is one

operation.

But he knew of,he was close enough to -- he

was used as a courier from Lumumba, I think, first in the

capitol, and then later from Stanleyville to Europe.. And

on one occasion, because he had penetrated so effectively, he

was aware that a large amount of cash was being taken by two

other couriers down to the Congo, and as a result of his

awareness of that, and all the details of that trip, that

ghipment was intercepted.

MI. Dawson.

The Chief of Station testified about

having an agent that had access.

Would this have been the agent that he believed he

would have access to?

Mr. Bissell.

I believe he would have, yes.

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MI. Dawson. Thank you.

Mr. Wides. Mr. Bissell, touching balefly on Indonesiay

-when you testified to the Rockefeller Commission, and this

was reviewed very summarily when he testified before us, that

you recalled some possibility -- some planning of a possibility

of assassinating Sukarno progressing as far as the identifica-

tion of an

asset who might be recruited for this purpose,

but the plan was never reached and never perfected to a

point where it was decided to go ahead.

Do you recall anything, or do you have any information

that would be relevant to our information that a Moslem asset

from the Middle East was recruited who was considered for

an operation infindonesia against sukarng with the crypt

ATION, and/an operation that in regard at least to the

assassination aspects had been started by kim Roosevelt be-

cause of his ties with the Mid-East?

Does that ring a bell at all?

Mr. Bissell. No, sir. That one I don't remember at

all.

I remember enough of the plan that I referred to

know that what you speak of was a different activity.

MI. Wides. And the one you referred to involved

indigenous

ndonesians?

Mr. Bissell. _ I think it involved -- I don't know

what nationality the asset, but I think lt involved

member of an air crew on a commercial airline, -- not on a

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cormercial, I will take that back, on a flight that might

be chartered,

for Sukarno

Mr. Wides. Either when you became DDP or before,

whether of not you were personally involved, did you ever hear

anything regarding any efforts by the CIA to assassinate Nasset

and to send teams, assassination tems into Egypt for that

purpose?

MI. Bissell. No, I never did. I could almost go so far!

as to say that that was one that was never even thought of.

Mr. Schwarz, We forgot to ask you a question which we

ask almost all the other high

people who come down here

to

testify.

Looking back on things, now, -- and I hate to use the

word get rid of, but let me --do you think the U.s. should get

rid of assassination as a tool?

Mr. Bissell. I think in today's atmosphere the answer

is yes.

Mr. Wides.

Why do you think that?

Mr. Bissell. I think that to use means for the

advancement of policy of such a soit that in the pre-

vailing climate these days would be almost certainly dis-

approved of by a large majority of the legislative arm, and

the public at large, and everybody else, is unwise unless

you can have absolute confidence of total security.

And by

security I mean that outside of the two or three people who

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undertake the effort, nobody else will ever know about it.

Now, that circumstance doesn't obtain today, it never

has, but it certainly doesn't today. And I think the climate

1s as I have described. And I, therefore, would eliminate this

method.

MI. diGenova. I just have one question.

I apologize for

jumping around, but part of this is to get you out of here.

When the phrase"receiving serious consideration" in

headquarters was used in that cable that we alluded to in

regard to the attempt to kill Raol Castro, what does that mean

to you when Tracy Barnes authorized that sort of language

to be used in a cable?

Mr. Bissell.

It means that he had fought and talked

about this, and almost certainly that I have. And it

may refer to considerations with Allen Dulles. I can't

tell how wide ranging they would be. They would probably

have involved J.C. King, the head of that division.

Mr. Schwarz.

Did Barnes work for you?

Mr. Bissell. Yes, he did.

Mr. Schwarz. He is now dead, isn't he?

MI. Bissell. Yes.

Mr. diGenova.

But that was not light language when

it was sent to a station?

Mr.. Bissell. No.

It was

gent to encourage careful planning.

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Mr. Schwarz. Thank you very much.

84

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