Originator: DOS
From: Ambassador Lodge
To: Rusk
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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176-10036-10169

2022 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA

RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10169

RECORD SERIES : National Security Files

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

:

ORIGINATOR : DOS

FROM : Ambassador Lodge

TO : Rusk

TITLE:

DATE :

PAGES : 3

SUBJECTS :

DOCUMENT TYPE :

CLASSIFICATION :

RESTRICTIONS :

CURRENT STATUS :

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000

OPENING CRITERIA :

Cables. Box 2

COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 201: Vietnam,10/29/63-10/31/63, State

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TOPSEÒREII:

FINAL SECTION OF THRES

SECRET

10106.026

VIA CAS SAIGON 2063 FROM AMBASSADOR LODGE DIG 3D103DZ

TO SECSTATE WASH EYES ONLY FOR RUSK, HARRIMAN, BALL, HILSMAN, HUGHES

OSD' EYES ONLY FOR MONAMARA, GILPATRIC, TAYLOR, KRULAK, MR. WY. BUNDY

WHITE HOUSE/EYES ONLY MCGEORGE BUNDY

INFO CASHONOLULU FOR ADM FELT EYES ONLY

CIA/EYES ONLY MCCONE, CARTER, HELMS

REF:. CAS WASHINGTON 79109

6

1D. WE ANTICIPATE THAT AT THE OUTSET OF THE COUP, UNLESS IT

MOVES WITH LIGHTNING SWIFTNESS, THE GUN WILL REQUEST ME OR GEN

HARKINS TO USE OUR INFLUENCE TO CALL IT OFF: I BELIEVE OUR

• RESPONSIBILITIES SHOULD BE THAT OUR INVLUENCE CERTAINLY COULD NOT

BE SUPERIOR TO THAT OF THE PRESIDENT WHO IS COMMANDER IN CHIEF AND

"THAT IF HE IS UNABLE TO CALL IT OFF, WA WOULD CERTAINLY BE UNABLE

TO DO SO AND WOULD MERELY BE RISKING AMERICAN LIVES ATTEMPTING TO

INTERFERE IN THIS VIETNAMESE PROBLEM. THE GOVERNMENT MIGHT REQUEST

AIRCRAFT. HELICOPTERS, FOR THE EVACUATION OF KEY PERSONALITIES

THAT WOULD HAVE TO BE STUDIED, CLOSELY, BUT WE WOULD CERTAINLY

NOT COMMIT OUR PLANES AND PILOTS BETWEEN THE BATTLE LINES OF THE :

OPPOSING FORCES. WE SHOULD, RATHER, STATE THAT WE WOULD BE, WILLING

¡TO

•ACT IN THIS FASHION DURING A TRUCE IN WHICH BOTH SIDES AGREE

TO THE REMOVAL OF KEY PERSONALITIES. I BELIEVE THAT THERE WOULD

BE IMMEDIATE POLITICAL PROBLEMS IN ATTEMPTING TO TAKE THESE

PERSONALITIES TO ANOTHER NEIGHBORING COUNTRY AND PROBABLY WE WOULD

BE BEST SERVED IN DEPOSITING THEM IN SAIPAN WHERE THE ABSENCE OF

PRESS, COMMUNICATIONS, ETC, WOULD ALLOW US SOME LEEWAY TO MAKE A

FÚRTHER DECISION AS TO THEIR ULTIMATE DISPOSITION. IF SENIOR

VIETNAMESE PERSONALITIES AND THEIR FAMILIES REQUESTED ASYLUM IN

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THE EMBASSY OR OTHER AMERICAN INSTALLATIONS, WE WOULD PROSABLY HAVE

TÖ GRANT IT IN LIGHT OF OUR PREVIOUS ACTION WITH RESPECT TO TRI

QUANG. THIS WILL UNDGUBTEDLY PRESENT LATER PROBLEMS BUT HOPE-

FULLY THE NEW GOVERNMENT MIGHT. FEEL DISPOSED TO HELP US SOLVE THIS.

PROBLEM.: NATURALLY ASYLUM WOULD BE GRANTED ON THE SAME BASIS AS

THE BUDDHISTS, I.E., PHYSICAL PRESENCE AT THE EMBASSY OR OTHER

LOCATION.

11. AS TO REQUESTS FROM THE GENERALS, THEY MAY WELL HAVE NEED

OF FUNDS AT THE LAST MOMENT: WITH WHICH TO BUY OFF POTENTIAL

OPPOSITION. TO THE EXTENT THAT THESE FUNDS CAN BE PASSED

DISCREETLY, I BELIEVE WE SHOULD FURNISH THEM. PROVIDED WE ARE

CONVINCED THAT THE PROPOSED COUP IS SUFFICIENTLY WELL ORGANIZED

TO HAVE A GOOD CHANCE. OF. SUCCESS..

IF THEY ARE SUCCESSFUL,

THEY WILL UNDOUBTEDLY ASK FOR PROMPT RECOGNITION AND SOME ASSURANCE

THAT MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID WILL CONTINUE AT NORMAL LEVEL.

WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO MAKE THESE STATEMENTS IF THE ISSUE

IS CLEARCUT PREDICATING OUR POSITION ON THE PRESIDENT'S STATED

DESIRE TO CONTINUE THE WAR AGAINSI THE VO TO FINAL VICIORY... VOA.

MIGHT BE AN IMPORTANT MEANS OF DISSEMINATING THIS MESSAGE. SHOULD

THE COUP FAIL, WE WILL HAVE TO PICK UP THE PIECES AS BEST WE CAN

AT THAT IIME.'

WE HAVE A COMMITMENT TO THE GENERALS FROM THE

AUGUST EPISODE IO ATTEMPT TO HELP IN THE EVACUATION OF THEIR

DEPENDENTS. WE SHOULD. IRY TO LIVE UP TO THIS IF CONDITIONS WILL

PERMIT:

AMERICAN. COMPLICITY WILL UNDOUBTEDLY BE CHARGED AND THERE'

MIGHT BE SOME ACTS TAKEN. AGAINST SPECIFIC PERSONALITIES WHICH WE

SHOULD ANTICIPATE AND MAKE PROVISION AGAINSI AS BEST WE CAN.

SHOULD THE COUP PRÖVE INDECISIVE AND A PROTRACTED STRUGGLE IS IN

PROGRESS, WE SHOULD PROBABLY OFFER OUR, GOOD OFFICES TO HELP

RESOLVE THE ISSUE IN THE INTEREST OF THE WAR AGAINST THE V,C.

THIS MIGHT HOLD SOME BEA

LEGIT 'IN TERMS OF CONCESSIONS BY GVN

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WILL NATURALLY INCUR SOME OPPROBIUM FROM SOTH SIDES IN OUR ROLE: AS

HEDIATOR.

HOWEVER, THIS OPPROBIUM WOULD PROSABLY BE LESS

DISTASTEFUL THAN A DEADLOCK WHICH WOULD OPEN THE DOOR TO THE VC.

UE CONSIDER SUCH A DEADLOCK AS THE LEAST LIKELY POSSISILITY OF

THE IHREE.

12.: AS REGARDS YOUR PARA 16, I DO NOT KNOW WHAI MORE PROOF

CAN BE OFFERED - THAN THE FACT THESE MEN ARE OSVIOUSLY PREPARED TO

RIS! THEIR LIVES AND THAT THEY WANT NOTHING FOR THEMSELVES.

IF

I AM ANY JUDGE OF. HUMAN NATURE, DON'S FACE EXPRESSED OF SINCERITY

AND DETERMINATION ON THE MORNING THAI I SPOKE TO HIM. HEARTILY

AGREE THAT• A MISCALCULATIÓN COULD JECPARDIZE POSITION IN SOUTHEAST

ASIA. WE ALSO RUN TREMENDOUS RISKS BY DOING NOTHING.

IF WE WERE CONVINCED THAI THE COUP WAS GOING TO FAIL,

HE WOULD, OF COURSE DO EVERYTHING WE COULD TO STOP IT.

13• GEN HARKINS HAS READ THIS AND DOES NOT CONCUR.

TOP SECRE.I

.3p- 1

2S UNI

SI

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