DEPOSITION OF RAYMOND G. ROCCA
Originator: HSCA
From: ROCCA, RAYMOND
Document date: 07/17/1978
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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JFK Assassination System

Identification Form

Agency Information

Date:

10/19/20

AGENCY: HSCA

RECORD NUMBER :

180-10110-10004

RECORD SERIES : SECURITY CLASSIFIED TESTIMONY

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 014718

Document Information

ORIGINATOR: HSCA

FROM:

[Restricted]

TO :

TITLE :

[Restricted]

DATE:

PAGES:

SUBJECTS :

07/17/1978

198

ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES

CIA, METHODOLOGY

MEXICO CITY

[Restricted]

[Restricted]

[Restricted]

WC

DOCUMENT TYPE :

TRANSCRIPT

CLASSIFICATION:

Unclassified

RESTRICTIONS: 3

CURRENT STATUS : Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 01/01/2003

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :

Two duplicates follow and are included in Box 2 in four folders.Box 1.

v9.1

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HORONITE: aph

CONFIDENIIAI

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SELECT COUMITTRE ON ASSASSINATIONS

subcommittee on the Assassination of John I. Kernedy

Mashington, D. C.

Monday, July 17, 1978

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(202)

554-2315

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Deposition of

=

REPORTES

WUlI.DTIG,

MENINGTON,

i2

RAYMCND G. ROCCA

called for examination by counsel for the subconmittee,

pursuant to notice, in the offices of the select committee

on Assassinations, Roon 3501, Youse Annex Mo. 2, Second and D

Streets, S. W., Washington, D. I., beginning at 9:50 o clock,

a.M.: when were present:

For the subcommittee:

Michael Goldsmith, Staff Counsei

Charles Berk, Staff Counsel,

Elizabeth Berning, Notary.

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Ms. Berning. What is the witness' name?

Mr. Goldsmith. Raymond Rocca.

Ms, Berning. Mi. Rocca; Would you stand please, and

raise your right hand.

Do you swear that the testimony that you are about to

give is true and correct?

Mr. Rocca.

I do.

Ms. Ferning. Thank you.

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Mr. Goldsmith.

Would you state your name and address

for the record, sir?

Mr. Rocca.

Paynona E. Focca. R-0-0-2-4.

The acdress is 400 Linden - I-I-N-D-E-N

-- Lane,

Falls Church, Virginia. The zir is 22042.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are you here today voluntarily?

MI. Rocca. I am, indeed.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are you here without the need to resort

to a subpoena on the part of the committee?

Mr. Pocca.

That is correct.

Mr. Goldsmith. Off the reccic.

(Discussion off the record)

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Rocca, do you understand that you

have a right to have counsel present today?

MI. Rocca. Yes, indeed.

Nir. Goldsmith. And do you waive that richt?

Mr. Rocca. I waive that right.

Mr. Goldsmith. At least for now.

Mir. Rocca.

Yep. I expect that I will be acle to judge

in terms of the caveats indicated here where to ask your

indulgence and just set aside and proceed.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine. No problem.

Have you received a cosy of the committee rules and

House Resolutions 222, 433, and 760?

Mr. Rocca. I have -- for retention.

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REPORTERS

BUILDING.

MACHTNGTON.

D.%.

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Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Have you had an opportunity to read Rule Number 4.

MI. Rocca. I have, indeeà. I mean, I've read it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you understand it as well?

Mr. Rocca.

understand it to the extent that it's

possible under these circumstances.

ir. Goldsmith. Do you have any questions about it now?

Mr. Rocca.

I have no questions about it now.

Mr. Goldsmith. Under the committee rules, Mr. Rocca,

a

witness has a right to receive a copy of a deposition transcript.

In other words, whenever a withess gives a deposition statement,

he has a right to receive a copy of the transcript.

However, the Central Intelligence Agency has asked the

comnittee to request of present and former Agency employees

waive their right actually to receive a copy of the transcript;

The Agercy is concerned that the transcript has classified

information in it and would not want the transcrint to leave

the committee's secure areas.

So, for that reason, I would like to ask you whether

you are willing to waive your right to receive a copy of the

transcript.

By doing so, however, you would still have the

full right to review the transcript for accuracy and to make

any necessary corrections. So, all you are waiving is your

right to receive

a copy.

Mr. Rocca.

I ao.

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Let me say that membership in the Agency has long since

comported the waiving of constitutional rights ir various

respects.

This is simply another --

Mr. Goldsmith. I won't be asking you to waive any more

rights; I hope.

I would like you to know that the Court Reporter will

be asked to certify the transcript as a complete, accurate,

and true record of all the testimony given.

Mr. Rocca. Mill there be an opportunity to correct it?

There are mis-speakings and that kind of thing, whatever that

word means. It has just been coined in the last year or so,

"I mis-spoke."

Mr. Goldsmith. You will be given an opportunity to review

the transcript for accuracy. If, in your opinion: it is not

accurate, there is a procedure for rectifying those types of

problems.

Now, are you retired from the Central Intelligence Agency?

Mir. Rocca.

I am.

Mr. Goldsmith.

Have you received a copy of Acting

Director Carlucci's 23 March, 1978 letter which, for the

record, corresponds with JFK exhibit number 94?

Mr. Rocca.

23 March, 1978 -- I have.

Mr. Goldsmith. That is the letter that specifically

discusses

the question of secrecy agreements and

authorizes

Agency empiovees to respond to relevant questions made by this

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committee.

Mr. Rocca.

Yes.

It also contains caveats which protect the continued

interest in sources and in methods, which I regara as adequate

under the circumstances, and therefore I accept this, and I

understand.

Mr. Goldsmith. You understand that letter?

Mr. Rocca. Yes. He wants me to tell you all you need

to know in order to get your job done.

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

I believe the letter indicates that so long as questions

relevant to the committee's mandate are addressed to the

witness, the Agency is authorizing you to answer those questions.

I would like to have this marked and offered as an

exhibit.

(The document referred to was marked Rocca Exhibit

Number 1.)

Mr. Rocca. I judge that this is the standard type

of thing.

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Goldsmith. I will indicate for the record that

this exhibit is one that we have used for every witness

that the committee either knew worked for the Central

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Intelligence Agency of thought might have worked for the

Central Intelligence Agency. We have, at times, given the

letter to witnesses who had no connection with the Agency.

How many years were you employed with the CIA?

Mr. Rocca. From its inception in 1937 to the 31st of

December, 1974.

Mr. Goldsmith. What position did you hold when you

retired in 1974?

Mr. Rocca. I was Deputy Chief of the Counter Intelligence

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staff.

Mr. Goldsmith. What position did you hold in 1963, at

the time of President Kennedy's assassination?

MI. Rocca. I was Chief of the Research and

Analysis

Division of the CI staff, the Counter Intelligence staff.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is that known as CI/RSA?

Mr. Rocca. That

is. Correct.

Mr. Goldsmith. What responsibility, if any, did you

have with regard to the CIA's investigation of the assassination

in 1963?

Mr. Rocca. My responsibilities, in my own words, were

serve as the working level point of contact and facilitation

to the Warren Commission staff, the working level point of

contact and facilitation.

That was initiated some time in January. There is a

memorardum. of record which represented the results of

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conversations at about that time, which informed me of this

decision. In other words, it was not a thing that I sought.

Mr. Golasmith. Before we go into your responsibilities

in more detail, would you describe for the record what the

Counter Intelligence Research and Analysis staff did in 1953?

In other words, what was the purpose of that unit?

MI. Rocca.

The unit was designed to bring to bear

analytical intelligence, analytical brainpower, which meant

all source, all overt source comprehension: a study of cases

that had ceased to occupy operational significance, that is,

closed cases; to maintain the ongoing record of overall

quality and quantity of counter intelligence being performed

by the entire DDP operational component: to -- operational

component -- the Deputy Director for Plans.

Mr. Goldsmith. That's just in caps -- DDP.

Mr. Rocca. DDP -- I have listed now three functions,

broadly speaking. To keep the community informed on the

organization's structure and operational potential, that is,

the threat of all intelligence services throughout the world,

that is, by supervising the writing of an encyclopedic

publication, which was cälled the NIS Section 56 at that time.

This was a specific responsibility of the component.

In other words, it was a research support for operational

components. The final major function, and this is important,

is training. We were responsible for the sucervision and

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performance of CI training.

So, we kept the CI indicators, the overall record of

CI organization throughout the world -- that is, the adversary

services -- we worked on cases when they had ceased to be of

direct concern to the operational components, and tried to make

relationships between cases.

We were concerned, obviously, on the training side in

working with other parts of the intelligence community, as

well as training inside, and so forth.

I think that those five broad topics -- I could narrow

them down --

•se.

Mr. Goldsmith. No, that's fine.

Mr. Rocca. I think this is sufficient to get us started

Mr. Goldsmith. Who was in charge of the CIA's investigation

into the assassination of President Kennedy?

Mr. Rocca. As far as I know, there was no formal

provision for investigation. The investigation was the FBI's

--

not.CIAls responsibility.

Mr. Goldsmith. Within CIA, isn't it fair to say that

initially Jack Whitter was given responsibility for conducting

the investigation?

Mr. Rocca. I don't want to nit-pick your language, but

that was not an investigative responsibility, as I understood

it.

The GP Floor phase, which he headed up --

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Mr. Golasmith. The CP Floor?

MI. Rocca.

Floor phase.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you define for the record what

GP Floor is?

Mr. Rocca. GP Floor

was the code name assigned by the

DDP, by Mr. Helms and Mr. Karamissines and the desks, to

characterize cable traffic during the initial phase of the

Agency's relationship with the various authorities and with

its own organizations or components overseas. This is a

code facilitation, a telegram or telegraphic consideration.

And, during that phase, it was indeed Mr. Whitten's respon

sibility. I think he did an extremely good job.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, GP Floor was a code name which was

assigned to cable traffic pertaining to the Kennedy assassination,

is that correct?

Mr. Rocca. As far as I know, during the period of

November through January, and then it was phased out.

Mr. Goldsmith. And. Mr. Whitten initially had

responsibility for --

Mr. Rocca. Coordinating traffic, for working with the

Dop with respect to what was being done over the whole world,

as far as I know. This was before I got into it.

Mr. Goldsmith. After Mr. Whitten no longer had

responsibility in that area, who took over the responsibility

for coordinating the Agency's investigation?

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Mr. Rocca. As far as I know, there was no further

cryptonym assigned to it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Nevertheless, without a cryptonym being

assigned to it--

Mr. Rocca. And therefore cables would go to the DDP,

would go to Mr. Helms or Mr. Karamissines, the various desks.

In other words, it became a decentralized responsibility.

In other words, there wasn't, as far as I can make

out, a formal placement of

an investigative responsibility.

Mr. Goldsmith. Informally, ho --

Mr. Rocca. I became -- or the CI staff and I for the

staff became then -- because by that time a commission had

been formed -- had "become the point of contact for the

commission.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, informally, the CI staff was

responsible for coordinating the CIA's investigation?

Mr. Rocca. This is where I wonder about the use of the

term -- that is, whatever we had done, whatever we were to do

or did to assist the Warren Commission focused in the staff.

Mr. Goldsmith. In the CI staff.

Mr. Rocca. In the CI staff.

Mr. Goldsmith. At the time, who was in charge of the

CI staff?

Mr. Rocca. Mr. Angleton, and Mr. Hunt was his deputy.

Mr. Goldsmith.

Was that Mr. E. Howard Hunt?

.:

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Mr. Rocca. No.

Mr. Goldsmith.

For the record, who is Mr. Hunt?

Mr. Rocca.

Mr. Hunt was Mr. James Hunt, a totally

different person.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know why the responsibility for

providing information to the Warren Commission was given to

the CI staff as opposed to Mr. Whitten?

Mr. Rocca. I do not.

I would juage -- and I am guessing now, this is purely

a guess - I never discussed it with him - that as Chief of

the Mexican Desk, which was his former job, the whole parameter

of the case had shifted from its initial phase of October and.

November, where traces came up involving his files and his

handling of the initial leads that developed out of the

Mexican resources, and that he no longer regarded it as

really his primary responsibility.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was there any conflict between

Mr. Angleton and Mr. Whitter regar&ing the manner in which the

investigation was to be conducted?

Mr. Rocca. As far as I know, there was none, and I

did not hear of any at the time -- or since.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is it true that initially Mr. Whitten

was given responsibility for the investigation and that

Mr. Angleton in some manner interceded in the investigation

being conducted by Mr. Whitten?

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Mr. Rocca. If so, I do not know this and cannot

sustain that allegation, by any information direct or indirect.

lI have never heard it even as hearsay.

By the whole line of questioning, I judge that you

have your own interests.

Really, Mr. Whitten sat here (indicating) in a

small

desk in WH for the Mexican area.. He was in a position

to develop through the assets of the Mexico station extremely

interesting material, which at the time was not recognized,

obviously, as pertaining to anything like what came out of it

in October of late September, and that was entirely appropriate

to the WH division and area, and functional division.

Mr. Goldsmith. WH stands for western Hemisphere?

Mr. Rocca. Western Hemisphere -- not White House --

underline that, please, because this is another of the canards.

As I say, it was entirely appropriate in the GP Floor

phase that he would have that. But the minute you had a

commission set up outside the line obviously had to be the

Director, and from the Director to his Chief of Operations

overseas, because the spread

involved then all of the divisions.

Here you had Mr. Whitten

being

asked to sign off on cables

that had to do with Netherlands, with U.K., with Australia,

and it would have seemed to me utterly administratively simply

hybrid monster.

So, in effect, the concentration of supervisory

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authority on the assistance being given the warren Commission

once they got underway was something, as I uncerstand it,

negotiated between the Commission itself and Mr. Helms.

Mr. Angleton was present.

I may have been present at the

meeting which decided that i & A would be the point of reference.

I cannot recall.

But there is a memorandum -- off the record -- there

and you should have it.

Mr. Goldsmith.

There is a memorandum for the record

which indicates -

Mr. Rocca.. In January, which indicates how that thing

got off. And it dispells, I think, any idea that there was

some kind of internal machination.

vir. Goldsmith. Where would that memorandun for the

record be found - because we have reviewed many files and

have not come across that particular memoranaum?

Mr. Rocca. Well, it shoula be founa in the file.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would it be in the Oswald file?

Mr. Rocca. It would be in the Oswald file, and it

should be around January.

Mr. Goldsmith. Who is the author of that memorandum?

Mr. Rocca. The author of that memorancum must have

been Mr. Helms himself, or MI. Karamissines.

It reflected

conversations that tookplace with Mr. Rankin. It may be a

Warren Commission memorandum.

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But that memorandum exists. Ana, as I say, the

memorandum, to me, represented a logical evolution of what

had gone on in the development of the case.

Mr. Coldsmith.

Would you be able to locate that

memorandum for the committee?

In other words, do you still have a relationship with

the Agency which would permit you to obtain that memorandum?

Mr. Rocca. Well: if you could arrange it for me to go

out there, I would.

Can we have a little bit of a diversion now and perhaps

go off the record? I want to ask about a number of other

people who helped, who would know this.

Mr. Golásmith. Fine. Let's go off the record for a

moment.

But I don't want to go off the record a whole lot

in this deposition.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Goldsmith. Let's go back on the record.

Mr. Rocca.

I have no formal knowledge of it by

direction or indirection, or hearsay.

Mr. Goldsmith. By "it" you are referring to --

Mr. Rocca. Of such a thing having haopened.

Mr. Goldsmith. You have to understand, Mr. Rocca, that

we went off the record. So, for the record, by "it, what

are ou referring to?

Mr. Rocca. The shift of the responsibility for overall

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coordination of what the Agency was doing, from WH, Mr. Whitten,

to the staff. This was an utterly logical and completely

what I would call inevitable in terms of cost effectiveness and

everything else.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did the shift take place right at the

time that the Warren Commission was established?

Mr. Rocca. I have in memory the date 12 January, and

this is something that just comes now right out of my head.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

Mr. Rocca.

So, it was pursuant to that.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why was the responsibility for the

investigation -- I am using that now in an informal sense,

because I think you feel more comfortable with that - why was

the responsibility given to CI staff as opposed to some other

staff within the DDP?

Mr. Rocca. Because that's our business. CI has

the business of dealing with activity involving espionage,

sabotage, subversion, terrorism, and the whole works.

It is

spelled out in 1-1, Chapter 5. You will find that absolutely

stated formally.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, of all the units within the CIA

in 1963, the CI staff, you are saying, was best suited to be

responsible for this?

Mr. Rocca. That's right, yes, because, in addition, th

staff had the résponsibility for the DDP, for maintaining the

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relations, the liaison relations, with the office of security

within the Agency itself, the office of security, and with the

FBI and other agencies. This was by directive 1-1, Chapter 5.

I underline the importance of 1-1, Chaoter 5.

Mr. Goldsmith. That is the CI staff charter?

Mr. Rocca. Charter -- and this shift was precisely

directly in line with the implications of that charter.

This

is my reading now in retrospect.

Mr. Goldsmith. What was the line of reporting within

the CIA with regard to information that was relevant to the

assassination? By line of reporting I mean once information

was

received, who did it go to?

I am talking now about the time the CI staff was

responsible for the investigation.

Mr.

Rocca. There were -- this is where you are going

off, because the CI staff never displaced Mr. Helms in his

direct relations with the Commission. The CI staff never

displaced the direct relations between the Soviet Division,

Mr. Murphy, Mr. Bagley, with the Commission. The CI staff

never displaced the direct relations between Mr. Whitten --

even after it had taken over. In other words, it was a

decentralized approach.

Now the material that did come through of a substantive

nature developed by these components, and particularly the

soviet division, were brought down in the normal flow of day

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to day work.

They were reviewed by me or by the assistants

I had, and they were Mr. Tom Hall, Mr. Thomas Hall, Ph.D.,

University of Chicago, in Slavic Studies, and our Russian

expert: Mr. Paul Hartman, who was a general research and search

man for the whole of the community and its resources: and

Mr. Arthur Dooley -- D-O-O-L-E-Y -- a former member of the

FBI who had transferred to the Agency many years before.

Now these people actually were dealing with the actual

working level in the various divisions, or the various

divisional elements, particularly in SB, would be working

with me.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let's see if we can clarify this for

a moment.

Overall responsibility was in the hands of Mr. Helms.

Mr. Rocca. That's correct. Now you're talking -- and

that never changed.

Mr. Goldsmith. That never changed from the very beginning?

Mr. Rocca. As far as I am concerned, Mr. Helms was in

charge, and Mr. Karamissines, his deputy, when he was not there.

For sensitive aspects, Mr. Angleton and these two were in

charge, or the division people.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was Mr. Angleton heavily involved in

the investiation, other than occasional sensitive matters

that arose?

Mr. Pocca. I think not. I think this is a correct

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appraisal of his role at that time. He attended the generai

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meetings.

Let me give you an example of what I have in mina.

Though I was the working level point of contact

with the committee, that is, I knew Mr. Slawson in particular,

and worked, I believe, closely and profitably with him, and

without reservation, there was another historian. In any

event, I was not cleared for the Nosenko case. So, I did not

attend ary of the discussions that took place on that matter,

and that, too, is a matter of formal record.

You should find that record to back that up -- if you

have not found it.

In other words, if you are looking for a fixed point of

investigation here, you have to keep in mind that again, you

haâ access to sources and methods and compartmentation was

observed, notwithstanding the fact that I was the working

level point of contact.

Mir. Goldsmith. So, the Nosenko case would be an

example of a situation where Mr. Angleton would have been

involved.

Mr. Rocca. It was Mr. Murphy.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was Mr. Angleton involved as well?

Mr. Rocca. I don't think he was at the meeting that

concerned it over at the warren

• Commission, because I had the

delicious experience of being asked to leave at a certain

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stage.

I know he wasn't there.

Mr. Goldsmith. What would

be ar examele of a sensitive

situation

that would prompt Mr. Angieton to have been involved

in the investigation?

fir. Pocca.

oh, he would have known all of that.

Whatever else, I have no similar story to tall about him.

I have the one 10 tell about myself aná the Nosenko case, which

I was not cleared for.

Mr.

Goldsmith.

But

earlier you said that other then

sensitive matters, is. Ingleton basically was not involved

in the investigation.

I am wondering if you can give an

example of a sensitive matter:

Mir. Rocca.

Well, I would imagine all of the matters

involving the intercept of correspondence, of Oswald's

correspondence - which I saw in 1975.

Mr. Goldsmith.

so, ir 1963, when you were working on

this case, you did not see the correspondence, the cable-traffic:

from Mexico City to CIA headquarters reporting Oswald's

contact?

Mr. Rocca. Very definitely that is not the case and

¡that is not what I said.

I'm talking about the correspondence intercented.

Mr. Goldsmith. Which intercent are you talking

about?

Mr. Rocca. I am talking

about the intercepted mail

¡correspondence.

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Mr. Colasmiti. Okay.

You are talking about the ADLINGUAl program?

Mr. Pocca.

I'm talking about that material. Fe would

¡have hancied that.

And indeed, when I read it in 1375, it was clear that

Mr. Papich had come over on Saturcay morning and had taken

all of the material on that file. But that was the first time

¡I knew that that part of -- in other words, there was very

strict compartmentation utilized within the whole groun in

¡order to protect sources and methods at the time that we weze

attempting to help this body.

That's the point that I'm

trying to make.

Mr. Angleton's role would have been, I vould have

imagired, in that connection.

1r. Goldsmith. Mas Mi. Angleton's role peripheral or

central to the investigation?

Mr. Rocca. How can you say with an asset like that

that it could be pericheral? I don't know, because I was not

privy to the materials. But I could guess that it must have

been important for him to but that material of Paçich's to use

immediately.

Mir. Goldsmith.

Well, now much material was generated

py

the HdLINGuAL program?

Mr. Rocca. I have no way of really recalling. It was

substantial file and I see no reason why you shouldn't have it.

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Then you can answer the question yourself.

Me. Goldsmith. I want to explain to you, Mr. Rocca,

that the mere fact that --

Mr. Rocca. I don't nean to be impertinent.

Mr. Goldsmith. -- files anc documents are mace available!

to us doesn't necessarily mean shat the files and documents

are accurate.

One of the reason for taking deposition statements

is because files and statements are not alvays accurate. In

fact, one of the purposes of this committee is to verify the

accuracy of the Agency's own files.

Nir. Rocca. I take your point on that.. Let me say that

in ohe respect, for that reason, the oswald file, which was

the file that R & A kept, that is, the material pertaining

i to

the 201 file -- you can be sure is the file because it

was computerized, and you can't change the computer order

without leaving a record. Therefore you can be sure that

everything that went into it is still in it.

Mr. Soldsmith. With regard to the HOLINGUAI. file, you

indicate before,: I believe, that the file was a thick one.

HIs that true?

Mr. Rocca. No, not thick... It must have contained

seven or eight letters or so. But the man who woald know

¡exactly is Mr. Birch O'Neill. He headed the project.

Mr. Goldsmith.

we've spoken to. Mr. Birch 'Neill.

Mr. Pocca. I mean, he must kno: this exactly, then.

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He must know this exactly.

Mr. Goldsmith. Again, the fact that we have talked to

other people does not mean

that re do not want information

from

you, if you have

that information.

Mr. Rocca.

Of course not.

Mr. Goldsmith. To the best of your recollection, how

many Oswald intercepts were there in the EDDINGUAL program?

Mr. Rocca.

Oh, this would be -- if you have to --

as I say, I read it in 1975 at the moment the Rockefeller

Commission was coming in. I'm sure they looked at the whole

thing -- Mr. Ford, or whatever is the name of the individual

who was concerned. I went through it cursorily with Mrs. Matson.

She is the person who handed me the file. There must have

been five, or six, or seven. But this is pure guess. There may

be twelve, there may be three -- I can't say.

MI. Goldsmith.

was there more than one?

Mr. Rocca.

Oh, there was more than one.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

Getting back to the question of organization, I think

I understand from your testimony --

Mr. Rocca.

: When I say more than one, it involves both

ends, that is, materials going out from Mrs. Oswald and material

coming in from him. I don't know what the proportion is or

even if there were things coming in, or if it was confined

solely to things going out.

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not a part of my bag.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine. I understand.

Getting back to the question of organization, I thin!:

you have indicated --

Mr. Rocca.

So, you have very clearly in mind now that

in two areas that were of significance, I nas

completely cut

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MI. Goldsmith.

Yes.

Mr. Rocca, I'm sorry to have. to ask you this again, but

you are going to have to listen to my questions, and please try,

i not to interrupt me.

Finally, getting back to the question of organization,

for purposes of clarification, now, I think you've indicated

very clearly that in terms of overall responsibility: it was

in the hands of Mr. Helms.

•Is that correct?

Mr. Rocca.

That is correct.

Mr. Goldsmith. Other than that, I think you have

indicated that the investigation was decentralized to some

extent in that different area divisions, primarily western

Hemisphere and Soviet Europe were sending information upstream

to headquarters -- and there may have been other divisions

¡as well sending irformation, but primarily it was western

Hemisphere and Soviet Russia -- is thât correct?

Mir. Rocca. Yes.

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Mr. Helms held weekly meetings at which these

generalizations were spread and wrich division chiefs complied

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MI. Goldsmit.

Now, all of the information that the

division chiefs were sending upstream at one time or another:

I believe, went through the CI/R&A staff, is that correct?

Mr. Rocca. I can't say that all of them did. Those

that are marked plainly on the record as having been were - is!

they are all, I don't know.

Mr. Goldsmith.

Fine. I realiza that you can't state

that all were.

Sut, as a matter of your best recollection now

Mr. Rocca.

Nr. Helms indicated that all material.

bearing on anything that could be of assistance to the

"Marren Commission should be seen by I staff and P: A ard

marked for us. He issued very, very strictly worded

indications -- they were verbal insofar as I know -- that we

were to leave no stone unturnec.

Mr. Goldsmith. And were MI. Helms orders generally

followed?

Mr. Rocca. As far as I know, they were followed to the

letter, by all that I know of.

Mr. Goldsmith.

so, if you were asking different

¡divisions to serd to CIR & A information sertinent to the

investigation, can we assume safely that most of that

information did, in fact, go to CI/REA?

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Mr. Rocca. Your question tuins on most of it. There

is no way that I can judge whether most of it dia or not.

That which struck some division chief or his assistant

would have come forward, and much dic.

Mr. Golcsmith.

Assuming that Mr. Heims' orders were

followed?

Mr. Rocca.

yes, assuming that they were followed.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

Could you indicate for the recora how the overall

responsibility for the investigation was divided between the

FBI and the CIA?

I understand that both organizations have diffetent

charters and different purposes. What was your understanding

of the CIA's responsibilities for the investigation, as opposed

to the FBI's?

Mr. Rocca.

Well, as you have already detected, I

object, I think, in principle to the use of the word

"investigation," to apply to the CIA.

Mr. Goldsmith. Well, how would you like me to phrase

the question?

I would be glac to do that.

Mr. Rocca.

CIA made its entire worldwide resources

available to the Commission to

assist it in gathering all

information within the powers of its operatives and its

operations.

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Mr. Goldsmith. Are you saying, then, that the CIA

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provided information but it dic not conduct an investigation?

Mr. Rocoa. But at times it made use of investigative

techniques. But I have read enough Bureau reports to know

that on a matter of this kind, the primary investicative

responsibilities were in the comestic authorities, and that

investigations done abroad, even those, were repeated by

the bureau.

Mr Goldsmith. So, the Bureau, in effect, was

conducting an investigation overseas?

Mr. Rocca. The Bureau was the primary investigative

authority.

Mr. Goldsmith. In light of that point -- which is

exactly the point I was trying to rake in terms of trying

to determine what the different areas of responsibilities

were between the Bureau and CIA -- in light of that point,

what was the responsibility of the CIA?

¡ Mr. Rocca. The CIA was to turn over and to develo

any information bearing on the assassination that could be

of assistance to the Warrer Commission.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was that information given directly

to the Marren Commission or directly to the Bureau?

Mr. Rocca. It was given to both in many cases.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, even though the PI isn't

technically authorized to conduct investications overseas,

are you saying that in effect the Bureau was the agency

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primarily responsible

for overseas investigations vertaining

to the assassination?

Mr. Rocca.

On matters that were of substantive

interest, I think that is accurate. That is certainly the

case

in Mexico, where your statement that they are not

technically

MI. Goldsmith. Authorized.

Mr. Rocca

-- authorized, I think is in a grey area,

and where it was never contested that they had primary

responsibility -- and therefore they repeated

investigations.

Mr. Goldsmith. What was the role of Mt. Mecone?

Mr. Rocca. I had no meetings with him during that

period that I can recall, at all.

I have nothing to say that would bear on this.

I am sure he authorized comolte support.

Mr. Goldsmith. But in terms of actual involvement

in the CIA's work in this area, do you know what his

responsibilities were?

Mr. Pocca. No. I can't speak to that.

Mr. Goldsmith. I would like now for you to refer

to a document which I will call CIA number 1876. FOr

the record I will incicate that the Agency has provided

documents to the committee. The Agency, for security reasons,

has numbered those documents so that the Agency can insure

later on that all of the documents have been returned.

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For my purposes I refer to these numbers so that they

can be used for the recora. So, the Agency's number, that

they use for security purroses, we use for reference purposes

here.

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I would like to refer you to CIA number 1876 and. ask

you to read the first question and the answer to yourself.

(Pause)

Mr. Goldsmith. Have you dona so?

Mr. Rocca. Yes. I wrote it after talking with (Don.)

Mr. Goldsmith. This is a memo for the recora datec

1 April, 1975, which I believe you say that you wrote.

Is that correct?

Mr. Rocca. That is correct. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. I only have a few questions concerning

that first paragraph.

Mr. Rocca.

Well, the multilevel -- you see, I used

the word "multilevel" there -- that is the word that I now

here refer to as decentralized.

Mr.

Goldsmith. I understand.

Mr. Rocca. I am glad there is

some concorcance.

Mr. Goldsmith. The question that I have for you -- in

this first paragraph you say that CI had own defector input.

What did you mean by that, if you remember?

Mr. Rocca. Oh, I remember it exactly, because I

handled it.

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This was Golitzin.

Mr. Golasmith. In other words, Golitzin giving

information to the CIA which -

Mr. Rocca. Giving it to me.

Mr. Goldsmith.

Giving is to you.

Mr. Rocca. Yes.

Mir. Goldsmit.

Which you would then forward on to

the proper authorities.

Mir. Rocca. Yes. It is the basis of the report -- it

is the basis of the report which you must have, I'm sure,

because it's been released. I have gotten a copy and I use

it over in the DIS course that I am giving, the seminar,

on Soviet intelligence. It is called the "Uses ef Assassination

and Executive Action by Soviet Intelligence.*

It's a memo, it's a combined memo, done by Mr. wiggen anc.

S3 -- VI. Migrer was Mr. Murphy's research and analysis person,

so we worked very closely together. Mr. Migren actually was

the supervisor of Mr. Brasko, who was the person who found

the Minsk photograph, which is the only substantively new

thing that was produced in the whole case.

And, in his memo,

this material of Golitzin was incorporated on the basis of

my debriefing.

Mr. Goldsmith. For the recora, how do you spell.

Golitzin?

Mr. Rocca.

G-O-L-I-T-Z-I-N.

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11r.

Goldsmith.

Now, earlier you referred in this

paragraph and in your testimony to the Minst photograph.

Mr. Rocca. Yes.

Nir. Goldsmith.

For the record, which photogranh are

you referring to now?

Mr. Rocca.

An.

This is the photcorapn that shows Oswald in the checkerec

shirt, and it had been either found down in that lady, that

Quaker lady's materials, or whatever it is. SB division

assignea an individual, Brasko, to 100k ever every photograph

in the DDI file in another part of the agency for here,

and that man, working lunch hours -- and I say this with some

heat because I still think this is one of the significant

contributions that has been unrecognized " by looking at

photographs submitted by the Los Angeles office of CIA,

¿one by two ladies --

Mr. Goldsmith, Cramer and Namen.

Mr. Rocca.

-- he saw

that shirt, that's all he sai.

It was an incredible shirt of houndstooth checks.

Thatiwas

it.

Here we had positive proof that he was in Minsk anc we

ain't have to go on any kind of --I personally -- that was

one of the working level things that I handed over to hin.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is that the photograph that shows

oswald with a group of other Pussians?

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Mr. Rocca.

And a car.

Mr. Goldsmith. In a car or and a car?

Mr. Rocca.. And a car -- because anywhere an Anerican

car went

son on —

well, this I think may have been a volkswager,

it may have been a German car -there were groups, and this

was right in the plaza at Minsk, the main plaza.

Mr. Goldsmith. This is the photograph that was

provided by two American tourists?

Mr. Rocca.

That's right. But if you notice, the

Bureau redid the whole investigation and there is no

indication in the report that it came from CIA.

But that's how it did it, and Mr. Brasko deserves

highest praise.

Mr. Goldsmith.

For the record, would you spell his

name now?

Mr. Rocca.

B-R-A-S-K-O.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know why that photograph would

have been taken by the domestic contacts division peonle, or

whomever contacted those two women who

took the photograph

in the first place?

Mr.

Rocca.

sure.

Mr. Goidsmith. In other words, the photograph was

obtained prior to the assassination.

Mr:

Rocca. Many years.

Mr. Goldsmith. Many

years prior to the assassination

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well, a

year or so prior to the assassination.

Mr. Rocca. A year or two.

Mr. Goldsmith. And at that time there was no particular

interest in Oswala, I take it.

so, do you know how that rather why that photograph

was

taken by the CIA officials involved?

Mr. Rocca. Yes.

It was one of a series of pictures turned in by these

two ladies in the normal course of what is the authorized

mission of contacts division, at that time located in the DDI:

of turning up useful foreign intelligence on -- by Americans,

who volunteer. That picture, on the extreme left, hac a

crane in it, an industrial item, in which we were specifically

interested.

That was the way the photograph had been selected!

That crane was cropped out when the picture was published.

Mr. Goldsmita.

Thank you.

That clarifies an important issue for us:

Did the CIA's effort to support the Warren Commission

by providing the Commission with relevant information reflect

any working hypotheses?

In other words, did the Poency say

that certain areas were to receive primary emphasis?

wr. Rocca. I can't speak for all of these other

authorities that were in touch.

I can speak only for what

came across.

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Our primary interest was in foilowing up Soviet leads

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on

the assumption that a person who spenas four years in the

Soviet Union, under his circumstances, had to be of specific

interest to Soviet state security and their collateral authorities

As a consequence, we lavored very strongly that the questions

that were to be delivered

to the Soviet Union for response

should include very specific inquiries with respect to what

he did -- not just this hospital record,

as it turned out,

135 pages of it - but just exactly what he did. And, as far

as I know, these were excellent questions. They, too, have:

been released.

I have not reviewed ther.

They would still

be useful questions to answer.

The Reporter. Excuse me, but did you say they have

or have not been released?

Mr. Rocca. They have been released, so far as I knov.

I am not sure of that.

There were three pages.

Mr. Golasmit. Okay, let's not talk about those questions.

My question is a general one.

Which areas received emphasis?

Mr. Rocca. The areas that we concentrated or tended

to concentrate on were the Soviet areas because the people he

was in touch with in Mexico had traces, prior traces: as

KGB people.

They were there under consular cover and obviously

could have been doing and were uncoubtedly doing

a consular

job in those aarlier contacts.

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Eut the whole picture read in the context of that portion

of. KGB use of assassination, particularly the folitzin part,

which was not specifically indicated to rim, but which is

the part stating that all U.S. military defectors are reviewed

specifically by Department 13, which is now Decartrent B --

that part is Golitzin. He spoke from knowledge.. I got it

from him and I put it in the paper and we delivered it.

Mr.

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Mr. Rocca.

That is correct; but it has other things

to do, too, including sabotage and the preparation for

sabotage.

So, the assassination thing should not be highlighted.

Mir. Goldsmith. I understand.:

Mr. Rocca. I mean, I think this is; of course, when

you get off the beam, when you start assuming that it has to

be --

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understand.

What other areas, if any, received emphasis?

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca.

Other defectors that had gone to the

Soviet Union and had been processed in particular ways, his

documentation, his ability to travel anà avoid internal

controls which were exceptional under the circumstances:

reviews of books that were coming out.

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Mr. Goldsmith. But again, the overall focus was

on

the Soviet connection?

Mr. Rocca. I would say, on balance, that was,

as it

came out on our side of it.

Mr. Goidsmith. Fine.

I have another question, before I forget to ask you it;

in

reference to CIA number 1876.

That first paragraph says, "In addition, on sensitive

matters of concern to the investigation, Dick Helms and Murphy

also dealt directly with the connission."

MI. Rocca.

Which was, of course, in the central.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

were there any other sensitive matters that you can

think of?

Mr. Rocca.

That's the only one that I know of.

No.

Let me say that this was a very hastily put together memorandum

and I dia it jeallyin order to have something on the record.

I am delighted I dia, too. I have no regrets. But it could

have been more ample.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did the Warren Commission give the

Agency input as to what kind of information it wanted, what

types of leads should be pursued?

Mr. Rocca. Oh, yes.

That was what I was coming to when you asked the other

things that were done.

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For example, they wanted detailed information with

respect to hor he could have travelled. This was worked cut

by SB division.

There must have been other questions of that

kind that others at this stage -- if I had hac comprehension

of what you were going to ask me, I could have done some of

my own homework. But it is right off the ton of my heac now.

Mr. Goldsmith. There is no need for specifies at

this point.

ME. Rocca. I'm. embarrassed that I can't think of many

other things that we did.

vir. Goidsmiti:

Houlc. the tarren Commission go to

Mr. Helms requesting the information, or rould they go directly

to you?

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Mr. Rocca. In some instances Mr. Rankin mould go

directly to Mr. Helms. In other instances, le. Slauson would

cone right in on the horn and he was authorized to tall with

Mr. Hall or aryoody in 3& A about these matters.

There were other people -- there were other peonle in

the staff that had the same privilege. I can't rerenber whether

Liebler was one..

Mr. Goldsmith. Did Mr. Heins, as a matter of routine,

pass on to you the Warren Commission sequests for information?!

Mr. Rocca. Where it concerned us, I'm sure he did.

The record should refiect it, because these things were

invited in pieces of paper.

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For example, the whole matter of records and record

Keeping regarding assassination suspects was something that

was arranged at the Helms level, and which then I received,

either

by telephone call or by memorandum.. And we were able

to set them un for an entire revier of how the svald file

haa been machined,

recorded, and how intelligence pertaining

to operations was being computerized

and how literally this

should be the way the rest of the community should function.

so that; a whole portion of that report which reflects

recommendations regarding the mechanization of records, really!

came out of what they sai

over there.

Mr. Goldsmith. Which report are you referring to now?

Mr. Rocca.

The harren Commission report, over here

(indicating) .

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine. I understand what you are pointing

to, but the record needs to know.

Do you feel thât you were given by your superiors at

the CIA all relevant information concerning the assassination

which would have

insured. that the CIA could provice. the

Warren Commission with all the necessary information that it,

in turn, needed?

MI. Rocca. I think so - to the limit that they vere

informed and to the limit of my need to know.

Mr. Goldsmith. Here you informed --

Mir. Rocca. Incidentally -- if I may break in -- another

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point directly involved in the commission was the question

of the eightn man -- you Incw, this photograph of the man

--

Mr. Goldsmith. The Mexico mystery man?

MI. Rocca. Yes, the Mexico mystery man.

Mr. Goldsmith.

we will get into that photogrash

later on.

Mr. Rocca.

That was handled directly; too, and I

arranged it, I think, with we people present.

Mr. Goldsmith. He'll get into that issue in a little

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Commission about the Agency's anti-Castro assassination

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Mr. Rocca.

Never.

Mr. Goldsmith. A moment ago I asked you whether you

had been provided with all relevant information by your

superiors and I believe you indicated that you thought that

you had.

In your opinion, was the fact that the Agency hac

conducted anti-Castro assassination plots relevant to the

Agency's - relevant to the Warren Cormission's investigation

of the assassination of President Kennecy?

MI.

Pocca. This certairly was not staff responsibility.

This was a responsibility of another part of the staff -- of

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another part of the DDP... I was not even aware of the Harker

article having come out until much later.

Mir. Goldsmith. By this you're saying the anti-Castro

assassination plots had nothing to do with CI staff?

Mr. Rocca. Yes. How can I judge my superiors on the

basis of information that I had no neec to know?

Mr. Goldsmith. Well, the question really is, did you

have a neec to know that information?

Mr. Rocca.

Well, I was not investigating the thing.

I was a point of contact for the committee on matters that

would facilitate their investigation. You can arque, therefore,

that I should have known everything. But that's -

Mr. Goldsmith.

Mr. Rocca, please don't misunderstand

me. I'm not suggesting that you should have known.

Mr. Rocca.

But you were pointing out that I had

contradicted myself. I don't think I hac.

Within my limitations and need to know, I think I had

what I had.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Rocca, I didn't even

• mean to

suggest that you hac contradicted yourself.

Mr. Rocca. I withdraw that, then.

Mr. Goldsmith. I am only trying to clarify the record

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Mr. Rocca. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. After you indicated that you said you

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had received all the relevant information, my question was

so you think that the anti-Castro assassination plots were

relevant to the Warren

¿ Commission's investigation?

Mr. Rocca. My feeling is -- my answer to that question

is that this is a political diversion and that no political

action -- I an now speaking with 20-20 hinäsight -- that no

political action undertaken of the kind that has been described

and it has been described in various ways -- in any case sould

have justified action against the President. That I have to

regard, therefore, as a totally different set of facts.

If the Warren Commission had had it, I don't know what

they could have cone with it beyond what they did, and they

may have known about it. There is indication, at least press

references, that Warren did indeed know and had been told

about these things.

I can never say that Mr. Dulles, who was aboard when

the cuban thing started but had left it, didn't talk about it

on a personal basis.

But in any case, I consider it a

political diversion.

In other words, attempting - anything that was being

attempted against Castro through low level agents and all the

rest doesn't justify this kind of activity of --

Mr. Goldsmith. Assassinating President Kennedy.

MiT.

Rocca.

-- assassinating President Kennedy. I thinks

the whole thought is outrageous.

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Mr. Goldsmith. So, your position, then, is that even

though the Agency may have been attempting to assassinate

Premier Castro through low level agents, that would not justify

a retaliation attempt?

Mr. Pocca. Retaliation -- absolutely, absolutely,

absolutely.

Now, mind you, the Harker interview is a very clear

indication -- there is no question about it --

Mr. Goldsmith. Incication of what, sir?

vir. Rocca.. That there were political -- that there

were terminal risks invoived in persisting in attempts to

use cuban exiles. My understanding is, though, that that

interview was considered by those people who were engagaged in

this kind of activity in the Agency and in the community.

But I was not privy to it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Had you known about the anti-Castro

assassination plots, would you have given more focus, more

emphasis, to the possibility of a Cuban responsibility for

the assassination of President Kennedy?

Mr.

Rocca.

I would have done it anyway, in view of

the fact that he

was

in touch with the Cuoans.

Mr. Goldsmith. However, earlier when we asked you --

Mr.

Rocca. It would have simply intensified that

interest.

The answer to your question is yes.

But certainly there was all kinds of interest in the

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Cuban possibility.

ME.

Goldsmith. Earlier, when I asked you which areas

of the case received emphasis, I believe that you indicated

that on balance the primary area of amphasis was the soviet

connection.

" Mr.

Rocca.

That was certainly the one that I would

say dominated -- 100king at it fron my point of view.

Mr. Goldsmith.. Now, hac you known about the anti-Castro

assassination plots on the past of the CIA, would you have given

more priority, more emphasis, to the possibility of a Castro

conspiracy to kill the Fresident?

MI..

Rocca.

Again, I say that it would have simply

intensified it, that there was attention given to it, not

particularly by the staff. I had no capabilities on the

Cuban side.

The organization of their service and their operation

in Mexico was something entirely entirely within -- it was

an

enigna at the time. They were just getting started. This was

WH's area. This was win Scott's area of proficiency. So

the defectors had only begur to come out and they came out

later, the Cubar defectors.

So, I can't -- I really can't say that (a) the Cuban

connectior was ignored, because it wasn't. The press was

filled with it at the time.

The Harker interview should have been undoubtedly given

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greater attention in a generalized sense; but it was given

specific attention, I

was told at the time of the Rockefeller

thing.

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Mr.

Goldsmith.

In what way was the cuban connection

investigated?

Mr. Rocca.

I don't

know.

I don't know this. That

side of the report strikes me as being inacequate.

Mr. Goldsmith. Well, when I said to what extent was

the Cuban connection investigated, I don't mean by the

Warren Commission. I mean to what extent did the Agency

provide --

Mr. Rocca.

That I can't answer.

I certainly didn't

do it.

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Mr. Golasmith. Pardon me?

Mr. Rocca. Ne certainly didn't; in R& A.

Mr. Goläsmith. So, CI/P& A did not --

Mr. Rocca.

GO

into the Cuban side of it at all.

This was something left to the pechle who were concerned

specifically with Cuban intelligence and security operation.

Mr. Goldsmith. But I believe earlier we established

that Mit. Heins gave orders that information nertinent to the

assassination was to go through your office, correct?

Me. Rocca.

Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. And once information pertinent to the

assassination went through your office, I take you of Mr.

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Felms would decide whas information would be relevant for

the Warren Commission to see.

Is that correct?

Mr. Rocca.

Nell --

Mr. Goldsmith. Based upon what you knew?

Mir. Rocca. Mell: everything would go. yes.

Mr. Goldsnith. Therefore, you were in the position,

it would seem, to know what information was being generated

in the field that was going to the Warren Commissior.

Earlier I asked you which area received emphasis and

I believe you indicated that the Soviet area.

Mr. Rocca. Primarily, primarily. But I didn't mean

by that that it excluded the Cuban, because there was a lot

of material that came through and went to the Commission

that concerned the Cubans.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let's go off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Golismith. Let's continue.

Mr. Rocca. My recollection is that at the time the

great press manifestation was that Cuban exiles who were in

touch with CIA had been somehow involved in this.

This was

the great concern.

Mr. Goldsmith.

That's another possibility.

There

are different --

Mr.

Rocca.

Questions went down to WH: do you have

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anybody who could nossibly

have gotten involved in this

kind of thing.

There was

extraordinary diligence, I thought, exercised

to try to clarify that

side.

Pir. Goldsmith.

Do you think that the possibility of

an

assassination plot by Castro against the President was

adequately investigater?

(Pause)

Mir.

Rocca.

With the advantages of 29-20 hindsight, I

could say probably not. But ât the time it seems to me that.

they gave due attention to it -- within the information that

I had at my disposal.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Rocca, I also think that you indicated

that had you known about the anti-castro assassination plots,

the

effort would have been intensified.

Is that a fair statement?

Mr. Pecca. Well, I would have -- certainly I think

it would have been intensified. Everything would have been

intensified.

I think in the light of what has happened: a completely

different procedural approach probably woula and should have

been taken.

I mean, there are any number of things that you

can say in the light of histosy.

What I can't accept is that leads were deliberately

or otherwise ignored.

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Mr. Goldsmith.

When did you first learn of the

anti-Castro assassination

plots?

Mr. Rocca.. There were rumors of these activities

in the mid and late 'el's.

The first significant indication that I had that there

was Castro appreciation of an actual plot was the reference

to the Harker article in the Mexico City case log, which we

had accessioned for the file sometime in the late '50's, after

Win Scott's death, when Mexico City shipped its documentation

up here.

Mr. Goldsmith.

Are you familiar with Book 5 of the

Senate Report?

Mr. Rocca.

No.

Mr. Goldsmith.

Of the assassination plots?

Mr. Rocca. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

He will defer that till later

on, then.

Mr. Rocca. I got the Harker report myself and studied

it at the Library of congress in the course of the work that

I did for the Rockefeller Commission.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Focca, again, for the record, I

would like to be clear on this.

Is it your position that

the Agency itself did not

conduct an investigation, per se, into the assassination of

President Kennedy, but simoly was providing information to thei

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Warren Commission?

Mr. Rocca. I think our role was basically the pacvision

intelligence information, not an investigation. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are

you able to be more specific at all

as to what effort was made in examine the question of Castro's

possible responsibility for the assassination?

Mr.

Rocca.

No, I an not.

Mr. Goldsmith. I would like you to read CIA numbers

1904 and 1905; which is a

letter dated April 15, 1975 to Mr.

E. Henry Kacche -- K-N-0-C-I-I -- from David N. Belin, Executive

Director of the Rockefeller Commission.

(Pause)

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Rocca, do you know whether this

letter was ever referred to you for action?

By action, I near

for response.

Mr. Pocca. I do not, though I linow I rasponded to it

directly to Mr. Belin in conversation - that is, the substance:

of it.

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There was some other kind of letter which Mr. Belin

wrote that was referred to me. It is much shorter than this.

Mr. Goldsmiti. Nould you now review CIA number 1934.

(Pause)

MI.

Rocca.

Now you're talking here.

Mr. Goldsmith.

So, according to CIA number 1934,

which you have just read,. I believe it indicates that you,

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in fact, responded to the letter of April 15, 1975.

Mr. Rocca. I indeed remenber responding to this.

But this thing seemed utterly --

Mr. Goldsmith. But you weren't sure if you had done

so orally or in writing?

Mr. Rocca. Oh, no.

This is -- if I wrote this lindi-

cating): I must have had this (indicating).

So, I accept.

I withcraw my previous statement.

Mr: Golasmith. Fine.

In light of having read CIA number 1934.

Mir. Pocca.

This is what I recall.

But there is still another memo.

You see, I wrote

two memos for him. Are you aware of that?

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. I wrote two memos for Mr. Belin. Each

hac a letter which enjoined me, actually, to do it. They nere

from him.

(Pause)

Mr.

ROCCa.

I know there was a seconá memo.

The memos

are complementary, but concern different

aspects

of the subject.

Mr. Goldsmith.

Were they written at the same time?

Mr. Rocca.

They were written in succession and

grew out of his interest in the Cuban connection.

So, my vagueness aoout this probably grows out of the

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fact that there was a succession of memos.

This one seems

longer than the one that I

hac. But if I refer to it, I

accept it, obviousiy.

Mr. Goldsmith. Drawing your attention to paragraph

number two: would you

respond to the questions that are raised

in that paragraph?

Mr.

Rocca.

Iwould say that as far as I know, the

answers are negative. I certainly didn't -- because I didn't

know.

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ir. Goldsmith. In other words, because you didn't know

of the anti-Castro

assassination plots.

vir.

Rocca.

I couldn't have told them. I couldn't have

told them.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is it your position that the questions

posed in paragragh number two are answered in the negative?

isI.

Rocca. These have to be answered by others who

were in the chain of command and who would have had the

information.

Mr.

Goldsmith.

Now let's take à look at 1934, CIA

number 1934.

According to that document, it indicates that you

are responding to the questions raised in paragraph number three

of the Belin letter dated April 15, 1975.

Do you recall ever being asked to respone to the

questions in paragrapas number two and four?

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(Pause)

Mr. Rocca.

No, nor one.

The only one that I had any possibility of responding

to

on the basis of my knowleace of the possibilities that I had

in research was this: and this is where the -- of course, this

is the Harker followup of the public speech.

Mr. Goldsmith. When did you first learn from an Agency

source, if ever, that the Agency had been involved in anti-

Castro assassination plots?

Mr. Rocca. Very late.. I can't attach an exact cate

to it.

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Mr. Goldsmith. Did you know of the anti-castro

assassiration plots at the time that this letter was

reviewed by you -- in other words, in April of 1975?

Mir. Rocca. No. No. I still don't know of them.

I read, as I recall, Des Fitzgerald's report of his

visit to Paris when I delivered the report.

Mr. Goldsmith. When you delivered which report?

Mr. Rocca.

One of the two that I am talking about row.

Mr. Goldsmith.. The memos?

Mr. Rocca. Yes.

Now, that had just been found at the time.

Mr. Goldsmith. When did you say you retired fron the

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Agency?

Mr.

Rocca.

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In 1974. I was on contract at this time.

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Mr. Goldsmith. So, during. the time that you were working

with the Rockefeller Commission for the Agency, you were on

contract?

Mir. Rocca. Yes.

• Are we clear on that?

Mr. Goidsmith. And at that time

Mir. Rocca. Des Fitzgerald's letter:

which is the key

went to Paris, I talked with --

Mr. Goldsmith. AMLASH.

Mr. Rocca.

AMLASH, exactly.

AMLASH.

This letter turned up. It was found by a Wu researcher:

a

wH man at that time.

This was 1975.

And

so you were

asking me earlier how could I be

sure

that everything had been delivered to the staff. You see, I

mean, it's just not possible to taire the responsibility.

Of

course it wasn't. That letter had never been seen by me.

Mr. Goldsmith. That was just another example of

anti-Castro plot information that was not brought to your

attention?

Mr. Rocca. Des Fitzgerald, it is well known, very

closely associated with the Kennedys in political action anc

there is no question but that he had total legitimacy in

undertaking what he was doing.

Mr. Goldsmith. I am not questioning the legitimacy.

I am only questioning wather you had the information.

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MI.

Rocca.

I am using "legitimacy" in quotes: too.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is it your posision that --

Socca.

Iremember this little detail; which 1s

important. So I am able to respona. I think

it was after the

15th.

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Mr. Goldsmith. In light of the information available

to you today, are you able to respond to the questions posed

in paragraphs two and four?

Mr. Rocca. Not for myself.

For myself, I can say no to all of then.

Nell; let me read them first. I think that would be a

good idea.

Mr. Goldsmith.

You are referring, for the recorá, to

CIA 1904.

Mir. Rocca.

Did anyone with the CIA tell any member of

the --

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Mr. Coldsmith.

No.

Read paragraph two only.

Nir. Rocca.:

"There is evidence that Castro, prior

to 22nd February, 153, knew about the existence of such plans

and the possible involvement of the ü.s. Government, and that

the CIA at ary time prior to the completion of the Marren" --

have any documents or other information indicating that Castro

may have known about such plans. If the answer is yes, would

you please furnish us with copies of all such documents and

details of any such information.

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Mr.

Goldsmith. And now, paragraph number four.

Mir. Rocca.

"Prior to November 22, 1963, several months

prior to the assassination

то -

Mr. Goldsmith. No.

MI.

Rocca, please read paragraph

number four now.

You

are on three.

vir. Rocca.

"Would you please advise us if there is

any information that would seem to indicate that at any time

prior to November any foreign governments

or any foreign group

was considering the possible assassination of any American

leaders. If so, would you please advise us of all the details.

I would answer no. I know nothing about that.

Mr. Golasmith. Mr. Rocca, you have indicated that this

¡letter was given to you to respond to -- I take it in 1975.

And,

in fact, a memo was prepared by you responding to --

Mr. Rocca.

One paragraph.

Mr. Goldsmith. One paragrach.

MI. Rocca. But, as I say, I have the impression

that these topics were outside of my area of knowledge.

MI. Golasmith. Did the Agency respond to the questions

ithat were posed by Mr. Belin?

Mr. Rocca. As far as I know: I carnot -- as far as I

inow. I did not. They may have.

Mz. Goldsmith. So, you think that you --

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Mr.

Rocca.

Belin was in touch with everyboay, so he

could have.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, do you think that you were given

letter and asked to respond just to one paragraph in it?

•Mr. Rocca. Or to respond more generally to the question

of the background of Cuban Inowledge. They were not so specific

as this, because if I had received this as a basis, as a brief,

I would have had to research it. You see, I would have had to

go, then, and ask people. This would have been not only

presumptuous, but it would have taken years.

Mr. Goldsmith. That problem now that appears in the

record is that there was a letter that was given to you to

respond to, anc we have the responses to paragraph number three!

of that letter.

It would appear that you were asked to

respond to a letter that you did not have all of the complete

information with which to make a proper response as to the

entire letter.

Mr:

Rocca. Yes. But my answer doesn't say that I

hac the original letter. It says that it responds to a paragraph

of

it.

I may have been

shown it and used it as a point of

reference.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

Mr.

Rocca. With Mr. Belin, I had hours of conversations

across the desk in the most amicable fashion in which he

understood precisely my feelings and how they had matured over

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the years with respect to these needs.. And the first thing

I would have told hin would have been that to answer those

questions would have taken criginal research, and the people he

had to go to were the people who were in it.

Anyway, that is the best of my recollection at this

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Mr. Golâsmith. Please refer to CIA number 1940 and

read

I Section B, which continues to the next page.

(Pause)

Mr. Goldsmith. Mould you like to identify the entire

document that you are looking at, starting with CIA number 19367

Mr. Rocca.

Ah, yes.

This is the response that I wrote for him.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, there again, just a moment, in

CIA number 1936, the reference is to the Belin letter dated

115

April, 1975. Again, that suggested, ir fact, that you

sa!]

the letter;

does it not?

Rocca.

well, it would be in the file out there

if it is. But certainly the letter consists of much

more than

I. could respond to. Thanl: God I am stili talking about

paragraph three -- right?

Mr. Göldsmith. Yes. Let's tale a look --

ir. Pocca. In other words, I'm sticking pretty closely

to what I know, or to what i think I know.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let's look at CIA number 1940, the page

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that I referred you to earlier, section 5, on page CIA number 1941.

You indicate that

Mr. Rocca.

This is the nuances.

Mr. Goidsmith. You indicate that the Marren Commission

Report should have left a wider window for this contingency,

and I believe you were making reference to --

Mir. Rocca.

Foreign conspiracy.

Mr. Goldsmith.

Yes.

Mr. Rocca.

Foreign conspiracy.

Mr. Goldsmith.

I understand.

What did you mean by that, and why?

Mir. Rocca.

It would take literally a whole day to co

into this.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why don't you try to summarize it,

if possible.

Mr. Recca.

well, I don't want to appear impertinent;

lout as Mr. Helms said in his deposition, the case will never

be closed, and I regard that as really being the key: the logic.

Mr. Goldsmith. mould you be willing to prepare for the

committee a

statement

as to what you meart by that senterce

in CIA number 1941?

Mr. Recca.

well, I would prefer to tell you, to talk

¡to you about it, rather than to prepare a âocument.

Mr. Goldsmith. I would prefer to lister to you discuss

it row.

Sut if it is going to take an entire day, we can't do

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that right now.

MI. Rocca.

Hell, it would take longer than that to write

it, so

I think we ought to just discuss it -- though I'm not

adverse. to the other, it would really require the preparation

of

a monograph.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

Please, as best you can, realizing the time constraints,

briefly summarize what you reant by that sentance.

Mir. Rocca. First of all, let me say that to Mr. Belin

personally in the talks I made it perfectly clear that I

regarded the theory that oswald as a mandated assassin by

lany foreign intelligence or any other intelligence service to

be

false and that there was no credible evidence to

sustain

ithat view that he was a

mandated assassin, that this could not

pe done on the basis of the availaole evidence, or as I refer

to it here, credible evidence.

Indeed, I regarded it as very

dangerous and counterproductive -- if I can use that term --

inculge in public conversation along those lines, because it

leads inevitably to political consequences which are absolutely

impossible to control.

so, I don't believe, in other words, in my personal

yiew of the case, in the

position that I held in which I

operated with the Commission that he was sent to kill kennedy.

Rouper, I do believe that he

had contacts with

the

soviet

intelligence, or I think the evidence is stronger and certainly

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worth following up, that he had contacts with the KGB, both

inside and probably outside. I'm not saying in the United

States, necessarily, but before his arrival, with the KGB,

first.

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Second, that the soviets did not furnish us all of

the relevant documentation pertaining to his stay in the soviet

Union and that the contradictions, therefore, between what

they served up through the swiss and what we have derived

from people who have come out of the KGB, who are experts

on this -- I don't care whether you call them, whether they

are Nosenko, or Deriabin or Golitzin, whoever - the neople

in the other service there -- there is a manifest contradiction

between the amount of material that they furnished and what

would have beer normally his experience ir that country in

respect to that service,

and in particular with regard to the

element of contract and debriefing by the "Snetsotdel"

",but

the 13th Department, by the Special Department.

The questions that were furnished the Commission along

those lines were not delivered by the State Department, or

whatever happened. Therefore, we got no answers.

And, they

served to deepen, therefore, the importance and the occasions

of what I've just said.

In the third place, the people, fortunately or

unfortunately, casually or otherwise, that he was in touch

with in Nexico City during his trip, were KGB, according to

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the traces

held by us and by the FBI and other services.

Mr. Golcsmith. Do you recall which people these were?

Mr. Rocca. . I can't -- I could probably get them

out of my mind.

Mr. Goldsmith. Please proceed.

Mr. Rocca. It is absolutely patent that these people

could have been dealing with him and possibly were dealing with

him. I give, in other words, full faith and credit to all

these

theories,

and I'm talking now in a counter intelligence

laboratory sense, not in a public sense.

His whole comportment

as an individual in the United States after his arrival I find

very peculiar for its implicit and explicit evidences of

clardestinity.

vir. Goldsmith. Mould you give examples.

Mr.

Rocca.

The utilization of aliases in boarding

houses, incomplete details to his own wife, the whole matter

of the

"Walker"

and what she says, and Marina is a whole other.

story that has to be, I think, readjusted to this scenario.

On the other hand, I see flaws in his clandestine,

in his trade craft, let's put it that way. It makes me

believe that he may not have beer at the time that he was

operating in Dallas and in the other area an actual, even

in touch with them, because I regard not giving his wife his

alias at the boarding house so that when she phoned she blew

him as just one of those things.

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But I have gone over all of this in great detail with

Beiin. So, I see these things, I see these things as building

a picture of much more detailed knowledge about him, and

evaluation, and, of course, debriefing: because there is no

question in my mind that be had t-2 information on exact type

of flight.

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Mr. Goldsmith. What about on the Cuban side of the

picture?

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Mr. Pocca. And, on the Cuban side, from Delgado we

know he was a pro-cuban from the beginning, and the Delgado

information is critical -- I think quite undeveloped in its

implications.

So, it is this kind of thing that lies behind leaving

the window open. In other words, there would be information

relevant to an assessment of this man's motives as a self

activated killer in ar incredible conjunction which finds him

in a building which is going to be passed by by Cornally:

against whom he has a personal quarrel, going back to the whole

matter of his Navy career, and this whole business of what

he could have read in the "Fimes Picayune" about the Harkes

interview, the warning, and so forth.

I regard this, in other woras, this man, as a sels

generated killer, who could

very well have done this. But

that doesn't mean that there isn't information, not only in

Moscow, but also in Havana. But, as I said, this is a thing

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that I woüld have loved to have known more about in 1963

in the way that I know, or was beginning to know -- even at

that time I was no expert. I don't say I am now, but the KGB,

we would certainly have had that Rezidentura down in Mexico,

or Cuba, the DGI Rezidentura, better (pegged) and have been

in the position to have perhaps gotten Silvia Duran in a

situation where she would have had to answer.

No. Soidsmith. I'm sorry. I didn't understand

exactly what you said.

Mr. Rocca. But these --

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr.. Rocca, if I may interrupt you for a

minute, what dia you say you would have tried to have had

better peggea in Havana?

Mr. Rocca. The organization of Cuban intelligence -

Mi. Goldsmith. Fine.

Mr. Rocca. -- as a personal matter. I mean, after

all, these are matters of personal expertise. In this paper

I am speaking entirely as an independent expert.

Mr. Goldsmith. By this paper you are referring

to

CIA number 1934?

Mr. Rocca. Yes, what you are talking about.

And in the transmission mero, the Agency makes that

very clear.

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Rocca.. So please, let's make this point.

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Mr. Goldsmith.

Were Oswald's contacts --

Mr. Rocca. You know, in other words, this is right

off the top of my head.

Mr. Coldsmith. In other words, the Agency gave you a

asked you to respond to Mr. Belin's letter which requested.

certain information and the Agency's position was that your

response was off the top of your head?

Mr. Pocca. They said that this did not necessarily

reflect the Agency's views. There is another piece of paper

that says that, and I'm sorry, I don't thini: that that is a

proper qualification of it.

There is a transmission memo which says that we don't

necessary -- it's been released, I think.

Mr. Goldsmith. The Agency put you on contract to

work with the Rockefeller Commission.

Is that correct?

Mr. Rocca.

No, they didn't... I was under contract

as

a part of my normal phasing out and this cam e

up as a

part of that.

Mr. Goldsmith.

What were your responsibilities vith

the Rockefeller Commission?

Mr. Rocca. Simply to make myself useful, I suppose.

But this was not. the specific reason that the contract was

given.

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Nir. Goldsmith. I understand.

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Mr. Rocca.. This is what I'm trying to clarify.

nir. Colasmith. Were you the Agency's point of contact.

with the Rockefeller Commission?

Mr. Rocca. No, no.

As far as I know I wasn't. They were in touch

with the legal counsel) -- I mean, the Inspector General.

They sat there. They came to the staff to get the material.

They had the entire file.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know if Oswald had any

contacts with the DGI element in Mexico City?

Mr. Rocca. Well, you see, these are questions that

you should ask the wu experts.

My answer, completely uninformed, is that he was in,

his argument with the consul: took place in the very offices

that the DGI occupied and that the DGI chief of the component

must have been within hearing range. I have

forgotten his

name. But that area, in other words: was a part of it.

Azoue -- is that --

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

MI. Rocca. - the consul. Now I will think -- the

IGI chief at that time, he later went -- well -

Mr. Goldsmith.

we'll defer that line of inquiry

until later.

Mr. Rocca. Well, I am trying to clarify. what I meant

here.

It is that I felt, and still feel, that many answers

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with respect to Oswald's motivation, his backgrouna, his

techniques will be found in Moscow and Cuba and not here.

That's all. That's what I had in mind when I said the window

should have been left ooen, a wider window.

Mr. Goidsmith. Were you given information in 1963

pertaining to Oswald's

possible contacts with DGI?

Mir. Rocca. No. Not as far as I know.

Not as far as I can remember.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you have any dealing at all with

the Nosenko casa in 1964?

Mr. Rocca. No.

I was excluded from the case.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, in 1961, you didn't know what

information Nosenko had given on the Oswald case?

Mr. Rocca. I knew it -- I knew it by hearsay, by

simply listening to accounts and meetings that were very

limite and designed to satisfy need to know and so forth.

So. I knew it only in very general terms.

Mr. Golasmith. Do you know what Noserko has said

about the KGB's contact of lack of contact with Oswald?

Mr. Rocca. In general.

Mr. Goldsmith. And what is that?

Mr. Rocca. In general, his story was that he had had

the file in his hands sometime between the first and the

second contacts, that is, between

'E2 and '64, when he

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defected: that the file did not exist in Moscow

at the time

of the assassination; it had to bo sent un : it has to be

sent for to lins!., where tswald had been resettled: and that

he had not been a recruited KGB source.

Mr. Goldsmith.

Did Nosenko indicate --

Mr. Rocca. I mean, I don't know whether this is a

true reflection.

Mr. Coldsmith. You hac no direct knowledge one way

or the other?

Mr. Rocca. Yes, I had no direct knowledge.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine. Then let's not get into that

area.

Mr. Rocca. I mear, these are things that obviously

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work cut.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever talk to Mr. Angleton about

the Nosenko case?

: Mr. Rocca. Oh, we talked about it many times, but.

always: it's

always the generalization and not the specific

thing. I mean, there is a difference betweer reading what

the man says and what he said or a nolygraph. A polygranh

is critical and I have not read that material because he had

a number of them and these tend to be very important.

Mr. Goldsmith. Has Mr. Angleton ever indicated to

you what his chinion was regarding the validity of what

Nosenko said about Oswald?

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Xir. Rocca..

I nesitate to speak for him, but I judge

that he regards Nosenko's statement about Oswald to be

unreliable, to be truthful about it. I may be wrong.

I may say in that connection, if it doesn't again

interrupt this --I am trying to help --

MI. Goldsmith. Please do.

Mr. Rocca. -- that the people who made the determination

at that time were principally in the division, not in the staff.

In other words, they were Mr. Marghy and Mr. Bagley, and

the superiors.

Nir. Goldsmith. Do you know whether all information

pertinent to the Marren Commission's work was promptly

communicated te the Warren Commission?

Mr. Rocca. All of the material that I hac, as far as.

or that came within my canp, and that included the prime

version, was given.

:I know of none on the outside that did not go to them

in one form or the other.

Mr. Solasmith. So, any information that went through

your desk, through your staff --

Mr. Rocca. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith -- would have gone to the Warren

commission.

Mr. Rocca.

would have gone to the Warren Commission.

Mr. Goldsmith. And how long did it usually take

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for such information to get fior your desk to the warren

Commission?

Mr. Rocca. Less than a week, I would say.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was there any information touching

upon sensitive sources and methods that was not promptly

given to the warren Commission?

Mr. Rocca. None that I know of, in che form or other.

Mr. Golasmith.

What do you rean by one ferm or

other?"

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Mr. Rocca. Well, you see, when I read it ir 1975,

the LInGuAl materials, they did not go through me. They wert !

directly to the FBI. So, I mean, this is what I have to

exclude. I meari, I can't take on my back the total

responsibility.

Mr. Goldsmith. But other than the HDLINGUAL program,

everything else that went through your office --

• Mr. Rocca.

To the best of my knowledge, there was

nothing that my office handled that was backstopped, that mas

shortstopped or not given, as far as I know.

Mr. Golasmith. Did Allen Dulles play any special

role on the warren Commission, insofar as the CIA was

concerned?

MiT.

Rocca.

If so, I don't know.

I was in no position to really be -- I was not in a

position to really have that degree of intimacy.

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Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether he in any way

attempted to represent the interest of the Agency?

Mr. Rocca: It would have been unusual for him to

have done that, although he was certainly

used. as a channel

by the Chief Justice on matters--

Mr. Goldsmith. Coula

you give us some examples?

Mr. Rocca.--of specific interest to the Commission,

growing out of their own discussions. I would say that there

is in the file a memorandum written by Mr. Murphy, Chief

$B, reflecting conversation at Mr. Dulles' house on some

matter that Mr. Dulles had been asked to probe or to get

information on. I recall that ard it shoul be available in

the record.

Well, the executive sessions of the Commission show

that they used Mr. Dulles as a kind of backboard for all kinds

of extraordinary hypothetical, I think.

Mr. Goldsmith. For the record, are you able to give

any examples of those types of situations, to your personal

knowleage?

Mir.

Rocca. From my personal knowledge, no. I mean,

have read the executive session records and they are

pertinent.

But not to my personal knowledge. In other words,!

Mr. Dulles never discussed this with me nor was I ever

present at any of those discussions on such points.

Mr. Goldsmith. It has been alleged in the press that

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President Ford, former

President Ford, in a sense "leaked

information to the FBI."

The same allegation has been made of Mr. Dulles leaking

information to the CIA.

Are

you able to

make any comment unon that?

Mr.

Rocca. No.

Again, I

may make the collateral comment. that a

revia. of the record -- this looks the record assembled

after the Rockefeller Commission, the material that you have

on this desk.

I am talking about the actual record in the

Oswald file from January to February and to March, piece by

piece.

15

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Rocca. That is what should be icoked at.

Mr.

Goldsmith. That file has been examined, Mr.

Rocca.

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: Mr. Rocca. Well, then that answers my point.

Mr. Goldsmith. How frequently were, rather was the

Agency in contact with Mr. Dulles during this perica?

vir. Rocca. I can't -- I have no way of judging thât

vir. Goldsmith. Did you ever have personal contact

with him during the period?

Mr. Rocca. On matters of the Warren -- during the

varren Commission, on Marren Commission matters -- I must

have ha

contact with him on one occasion, which is the one

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that Mr. Murphy went down to see him on. I was present or

another matter, unrelated entirely, and must have bumped into

him.

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But I have no recollection of talking with Mi. Dulles

about any matters relating to the Warren Commission at that

time of a substantive nature. I can't simply -- I would have

to say I really can't remember.

If I did, incicentally, there vould be a memorandum

of record, so you can refresh my memory.

(Pause)

Mr. Goldsmith.

would you please review CIA numbes

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Mr. Golasmith. Mould you identify that document?

Mr. Rocca.

Surely.

It's mine. I sent it to hir.

Helms for his information.

The purpose that I went down there for was entirely

cifferent.

Mr. Goldamith. First, let's identify the document.

Mr. Rocca. Yes. It's just an informal notation to

my Chies of a thing that I thought was significant at the tire

Mr. Goldsmith. Dic it pertain to a meeting with Mr.

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Dulles?

(Pause)

Rocca.

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This is my memorardum and it stands on the

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record.

I accept full responsibility for it.

It hears out,

I think, in essence, what I said earlier.

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand that.

What

I am asking you now is --

Mr. Rocca: I am delianted I wrote it.

MI. Goldsmith -- does it pertain to a meeting that

you had with Mr. Dulles?

Mr. Rocca. Indeed. But it was not on the purpose

of the memorancum. It was on the purpose of

a totally

different -- of a IV presentation of a defector,

and inasmuch

as the question was how the defector should be photographed,

all the rest, this was the topic now entirely collaterally --

and incidentally, this other thing came us which, of course,

waS

one of Mr. Dulles' things.

He had these and he called

this to my attention.

He wrote the answer, declining, and I reported it.

Mr. Goldsmith. By this other thing, we are now talking

about the question of the warren

Commission being concerned

with the issue of Oswald having been a CIA agent.

MI.

Rocca. The press, the press had had it.

Mr. Goldsmith. The Warren Commission wanted to resolve

that issue.

They had asked Dulles to serve as a contact with

the Agency as a means of expediting the resolution of this

issue.

Is that correct?

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MI.

Rocca.. I couldn't imagine.

I would not attach

great granitic quality to this prose. I mean, the thing to da

is to get the letter

from Rankin which bears on it. That

will tell you precisely what it was.

Mr. Goldsmith. Again, you should not assume that we

have not necessarily done that.

MI.

Rocca. Ask for it. 'I mean, my God, this is ar..

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I'm sorry.

Mr. Goldsmith. All I'm saying is that you should not

assume that that has not been done as yet.

We will return to this document later.

What role, if any, did the Mexico City station have

in providing CIA headquarters with information relevant to

the warren Commission?

Mr. Rocca.

It had a key role. It produced information

before the fact and it conducted a whole series of followup

activities on the material that it hac provided, plus other

material that came in in the course of dealing with people

who were in touch with the embassy and facilitating the FBI.

So, they were important. They were ore of the most significant

parts.

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Mr. Goldsmith. That was my next question.

Relative to other stations, was the role played by

the Mexico City station

a major one?

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Mr. Pocca. I would say it was, yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. And that is because oswald spent time

in Mexico City prior to the assassination?

sir, Rocca. Yes: uh-hun.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you have occasion to review the

cable and dispatch traffic that flowed betweer the Mexico

City station and headquarters that was relevant to the

assassination?

Mr. Rocca. I reviewed - this is another body of

information that I reviewed. for Mr. Belin, in which I commented

on these cables.

Mr. Goldsmiti. And in 1963, did you have occasion to

review all of the cable traffic?

Mr. Rocca. In 1963, these cables just came across

one at a time. Mr. Whitten handled them at the moment.

did not see them until later on, when ? : A came into the

case.

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So, the original action --

Mr. Goldsmith.

Yes, I understand. I didn't mean

to

suggest that when the cables were actually sent, certainly

prior to and immeciately after the assassination.

You

wouldn't have

seen then because you weren't involved in the

case at that point.

However, when CI/R&A came into the picture, did you

have occasion to review the cable traffic that flowed between

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the Mexico City station and headquarters?

Mr. Rocca.

Yes.

I think it was

anong the material ve facilitated in

passing to the Warren Commission and also we facilitated their

direct examination of the

materials in the Agency itself.

They came out to verify it.

Mr. Goläsmith. Did the Mexico City station have any

surveillance operations in effect in 1953 against the Cuban

and Soviet Embassy and Consulates?

Mr. Rocca. They did, as fax as these cables indicate.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall; generally, what types

of surveillance operations there were?

Mr. Rocca. They must have been telephone and

photographic.

Mr. Goldsmith. As a result of these surveillance

operations, was information pertaining to Oswald obtaine?

SIr. Rocca. Information rertaining to an unidentified

American was obtained and subsequently it was ascertained

that that unidentified American was Oswald. Anc, eventually,

it became associated with the body of the assassination case.

Mr. Goldsmith. That information was obtained as a

result of which surveillance operation?

Mr. Rocca. It was obtained only through the telephone

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Mr. Goldsmith. And,.

in fact, the telephone --

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There was no photographic coverage: as

far

as I know!.

Mr. Goldsmith. That picked un Oswald?

Mr. Rocca.

Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. The telephone tap operation in fact

dic identify that someone who identified himself as Oswald

had been involved in a telephone call.

Do you recall that?

Mr. Rocca. well, you are now going well beyond my

capacity to remember.

Mr. Goldsmith.

The only reason. I raise that guestion

is because you indicated that the information simply referred.

to an unidentified American; and our record indicates that,

in fact, at least one of the transcripts. contain Oswald

identifying himself, or whomever was in on the conversation

identified himself as Oswald.

• Mr. Rocca.

That was a subsequent tejegram.

Mr. Goldsmith. why don't I just show you the transcript

to refresh your memory, if I car find it.

Mr. Rocca. Yes.

(Pause)

Mr. Goldsmith. Please review CIA number 1963,

which is a copy of a transcrint of a telephone conversation

that took place on 1 October, 1963 at approximately 9:55 or

10:00 o'clock in the morning:

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Mr. Rocca. 1h, Kostikov, that's one of the names.

Mr. Goldsmith. Have you had a chance to read that

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Mr. Rocca. Yes.

This is the one where he identified himself.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, in other words: the surveillance

operation picked un more than just an unidentified American.

At least at some point it picked up a reference to Lee Oswald

Mr. Pocca. Indeed.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know when specifically the

Warren Commission was told about the fact that oswald ha

made telephonic contact with the Soviet embassy and, in fact,

that the calls came from the Cuban embassy?

Mr. Rocca. I have no idea of the time. They must have

been told very early because the whole community was told on

october 10, or October 3, or whatever.

Mr. Goldsmith. Well, that's when the community was

told.

However, the community was not necessarily told that

there was a telephone tap operation. They were just tola about

the contact.

Mr. Rocca. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. My impression is a very narrow one.

When was the Warren Commission specifically told that

Oswald had been in telephonic contact?

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Oh, I think they were told that immediately,

that the material went over in such a form that this could not

be disquised, and it haà to be.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, you are saying that the Marren

Commission was told about the telephone surveillance oneration?

MI. Rocca. They were given the transcrists.

MI. Golasmith. Do you know when they were given the

transcripts?

Mr.

Rocca.

It must have been in January or before

Mr. Whitten ended his

tenure.

There was no question of

disguising that fact. It could not be hidden.

and, of course,

as you know: they literally went down anc observed and

surveyed the place.

I mean, this was a

part of -- obviously the sources

and methods were supposed to be protected. But my feeling is

that tiey had to know this from the start.

• (Pausa)

Mr. Goldsmith. Was Oswald ever observed by the CIA

to have been in contact with the Soviet officials in Mexico

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Mr.

Rocca. You mean, actually seen?

Air.

Golasmith. Observed.

seen.

Mr.

Rocca.

Not to my knowleage.

Mir. Goläsmith. I mould like you now to read

CIA number 1979, which is a nember from Coleman - Slawson

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of the Warren Commission staff.

Please skim very quickly through the first two pages

until you get to paragrapn number three.

Read paragranh

number three carefully and stop there.

(Pause)

Mir. Rocca. I lave reaa this.

Mr. Coldsmith. If you want to place this here

(indicating), we can both look at it.

Mr. Pocca. It is, of course, totally erroneous.

This statement is erroneous.

I can't account for it or undersand why he did not --

Mr. Colasmith. This memo is dated 1 April, 1964.

The statement in the meno indicates that the CIA has reported

to the Commission that oswald was observed in mid-morning

in the office of the soviet military attache in Mexico City.

I'm not süggesting that the statement is accurate.

But the reasor. that we are concerned about it is because in

fact it apnears to suggest that this is what the Commission

staff was told.

Do you know anything about that?

Mr. Rocca. No.

Mr. Goldsmith.

Well, is it possible that the

Commission staff was given the information about mexico City,

the Oswald contact, without being specifically told about

the telephonic surveillance operation?

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Mr. Rocca.

I think not. I don't think so at all.

I mean, Mr. Slawson was given the actual text of

that

earlier telegram..

The intercept, as I recall, was from the

Cuban Embassy to the Soviet Embassy. Osvald - this was a

Saturday - Oswald had gone over and so forth.

So, this word, this is a mis-speaking again --

"observed." "observed" is the wrong word. He had been

reportea by, to have

been in the office.

This is a conclusion from the intercept. No one

can

draw any conclusion further than that.

Mr. Goldsmith. If we go and study this paragraph

carefully, it is apparent that the information that they are

relying upon here is the information that came directly from

the teiephonic intercept.

Mr. Rocca. Which was rendered in its entirety -

Mir. Goldsmith. Do the Commissior staff?

Mr.

Rocca. -- to the Commission staff.

That's my best recollection.

Mr. Goldsmith. You can tell from the way that the

author approaches this issue that he is talking about visual

observation.

Here he is concerned, in the rest of the paragraph

he is concerned about the possibility that this agency may

nave pickea Oswalá up under photographic surveillance.

Is it clear to you that he is referring to visual

observation?

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2ar. Rocca:

I think what Mr. Slawson has done, what

David has done, is just mixed up the eight man stuff and the

photographs and the intercent or the telephone, and it came

out that way.

It was simply a mistake.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine. I understand your opinion as to

what he may nave done:

But, is it clear to you, nevertheless, that his

impression was that Oswald had been visually observed?

Mr. Rocca. That's what he says here.

Mr. Goldsmith. Okay.

Mir. Rocca. To be observed would be to be visually

observed.

Mr. Goldsmith.

Excuse me for a moment.

(Pause)

Mr. Goldsmith.

would you like to break for lunch or

continue for a moment longer.

we will be here effectively

all day, I thini.

Mr.

Recca. I think we can continue for another hour

and eat later.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

It is no problem to us.

(Pause)

Mr. Goldsmith.

was there any concern about disclosing

a sensitive telephonic surveillance operation to the Warren

Commission staff?

Mr. Rocca.

I think there was inevitably, under the

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sources and methods concepts that prevailed at the time.

But

the nature ci the evidence precluded absolutely disguising it

in any way.

As far as I know,

there was never any attempt to

mislead with respect to the nature of the access:

and in

dealing with slawson, or with Belin, or with Lieber, it

was perfectly clear that thay understood that this was an

intercept on a telephone; on a camera, and, moreover, they

went down and actually saw the installations- this is my

conclusion --

and reviewed

them.

and, we eventually enced up by doing the translation

from Spanish,

or from whatever language was involved, in some

of them for them. So, they had to have the exact knowledge

of that aspect.

Mr. Goldsmith. Please refer now to CIA number 177.

(Pause)

: Mr. Goldsmith. Mould you identify for the record

what that document is?

Mr. Rocca. It is a telegram from the Mexico City

station which refers to an earlier telegram. It uses the

cryptonym, I guess for the operation that produced the material

Mr. Foldsmith. LIENVOY.

Mr. Rocca.

-- LIENVOY..

And, I think we've already seen it.

It says that

they have photographic coverage which

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they believe nay be the man.

Mr. Goldsmith.

No:, you say that this refers to ar

earlier cable.

Which cable is the earlier one that's being referred

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Mr..

Rocca. Nell, I assume that Kostikov and Byedikov

are the same two people that we saw earlier.

Mr. Golasmith.

That was in the transcript.

Mr. Rocca. In the transcript, yes.

lir. Goldsmith.

Ne saw a transcript earlier. But we

didn't see a cable earlier, did we?

Ms. Pocca. Well, my impression is that that thing

came in earlier. I would have to reproduce the materials

here in order.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you like to --

Mr. Pocca. Is it important?

Mr. Golasmith. No, it's not. But you just raised a

question on the recorá and I would like to clarify it. I

don't see a reference in this cable to an earlier cable.

Mir. Rocca. In other words, this is the first cable

that came in?

Mr. Golasmith. This is the first cable; according to

the record, reporting Osvala's contact.

Mr. Focca. You see; in that other, in the report I

did for Belin, I had set them out in actual order, the cables,!

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so that we knew what came in at what date. So this is, then:

the first cable reporting what they had heard, presumably.

Mr. Golasmith.

The date of this cable is --

Mr. Rocca. 9 October.

Mir. Goldsmith. 1953.

Mr. Rocca. It is my impression that there were

earlier cables; that there was an earlier cable. But I

can't,

from this cocumentation --

Mr. Goldsmith. And what was the suostance of that

earlier cable?

Mr. Rocca - I can't -- that there was someone down

there who wanted to go to Cuba.

I can't - without having

the entire run of that traffic! I can't reproduce it here.

I can't reproduce it without getting into more neea for

explanation.

It simply utilizes time.

Mir. Goidsmith. Neil, Mr. Rocca --

Mr. Rocca. What's the point here?

Mr. Goldsmith. --it woula become

important to

the committee if your memory is that there was an earlier

cable and we haven't seen it. It would become important

to resolve that question.

So, to the best of your recollection, was there an

earlier cable?

Mr. Rocca.

I - well, if this is the first cable,

this is it.

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informed of.

It is

possible that there was an earlier cable that

you saw and that we didn't, and that's my question.

vas there an earlier cable to your knowledge?

MI. Rocca.

Probably not, if this is the only one

that you've got on the record. I can't conceive that there

would be any question of fuzzing up the record on cables.

You see, it's a question of getting the dates.

The 27th to the 2nà -- I'm sorry.

Mr. Goldsmith. That was my first question.

If Oswald contacted the Soviet Embassy telephonically

on 1 october, why would it have taken eight days for the cable

reporting that contact to be sent to headquarters?

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. An American male who spoke broken Russiar

well, the answer to the question is not difficult to comprehend.

There is a lead time in the processing of material. There are

a lot of leads coming in that have to be selected -- spotted,

selected, translated, evaluated, and then cabled. But what

disturbs me here is the time.

Mr. Golasmith. What specifically about the time

disturbs you?

Mr. Rocca. Well: it seems to me too late, that

communication began earlier from Mexico City. But I can't

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prove it...I don't have these materials. And yet; I know

in this thing I did, I had every one of these things laid

out frem beginning to end. And at the same time I an conscious

of the fact that here I am raising a thine that could caise

embarrassment. I am obviously in the middle here.

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

MI. Rocca. And unintentionally. Doviously no one

wants under the Marcucci thing to create problems.

Could I ask you a question?

Do you have the outgoing cable to the community,

the date of the outgoing cable?

Mr. Goldsmith. The dissemination cable.

Mir. Rocca. The dissemination cable.

Mr. Goldsmith.

• Yes. I have that For you to review.

Mr. Rocca. You see, Jack whitten handled this. He

handled it by the book, as I see it. I think he did an

excellent job in doing it, so that this would remove the --

that would clarify it.

Mr. Goldsmith.

You asked for the dissemination

cable. I am going to show it to you now.

It is CIA document number 2140.

Here it is.

Mr. Rocca. Well: this must be the first one, then.

What I

see in here really reflects what is in this, plus -

Mr. Goldsmith. Nould you be more specific for the

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record as to why you think that the cable, that is, CIA number

177, must have been the first one reporting an Oswald

contact?

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Mr.

Rocca. Because it uses identical language here,

"American male."

Mr. Goldsmith. But that doesn't mean that a cable

couldn't have been sent up earlier reporting the contact

of Oswald with the embassy on 1 Cctober.

Mr. Rocca. Well, responding to that, I can't say

that it doesn't -- of course it doesn't. But I've not seen

it. That's the roint.

My impression was that there was a shorter gap here

between the two.

Here is the ninth. I think this was on the

eighth, sent on the eighth (indicating).

Mr. Goldsmith. This was sent on the eighth, that's

correct.

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This went out on the tenth. This is Titten, immediately

acting.

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So, this is the first cabie, yes.

The reason that it has

taken so long is essentially

the reason that is associated with the nechanics and the

handling of mechanics.

Mr. Goldsmith. For example, would it have taken

some time to translate the tape from Russian into English?

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Well, it would have to have been screered

It would have

then to have been reviewed and spotted. It

would have had to have been prepared as a suggestion for the

chief of station, who reviewed all of these, as i understand

it,. to send up.

So, that would take about three or four days, five

days maybe, depending on the amount of traffic that

is involved.

So, this is correct. It's this date (indicating)

that is really important, not that one (indicatina.)

That's when they really started to work on it

down there.

Mr. Goldsmith. By this date, for the record, which

date are you referring to?

Nr. Rocca. The seventh of October.

Mr. Goldsmith. And that is written in in script on

the botton of CIA number 177, is that correct?

: Mr. Rocca. That's right, yes.

So, that gives the point of reference to the Mexican

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Mr. Goldsmith. Getting away from CIA number 177

for

a moment, please read CIA number 2007 through paragrach one,

ending on -- paragrapa two, ending on CIA number 2009.

(Pause)

(Discussion off the recerd.)

MIT.

Goldsmith. Have

you had a chance to revier. that?

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Mr. Goldsmith.

through there, please.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith.

Paragraph two

on page 2009.

Read

would you identify what CIA number

2007 is?

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Mr.

Rocca. This was one of the -- this was,

I guess:

the grand-daddy piece that we sent over at the very outset

of the relationship. which summarized the information.

Mr. Goldsmith. What's the date on that?

Mr.

Rocca.

It's the 31st, January.

Mr.

Goldsmith.

1364.

Mr.

Rocca.

I think it was prepared by me in CI/ReA

presumably. I've forgotten who actually worked on it. It may

have been Mr. Hall, and

I certainly reviewed it. It

summarized the initial information in some of the cables,

or in the cables.

Mr. Goldsmith. Does this document make specific

reference to any telephonic intercept of an Oswald

conversation?

For examole, on page CIA number 2008, it reports the

Oswald contact, but does not give the nature of the contact,

does it?

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Mir. Rocca. No.

I think that this, again, was something that Me. Eelms

covered in his cover note.

"The compromise of the material

in its present form would lead directly to the destruction of

current sources and methods of this agency in Mexico ano

elsewhere," and that it was considered to be therefore "within

the legitimate interest in protecting those sources

not to state what the reliable and proven source was."

Mr. Goldsmith. Well, earlier we referred to a memo

that had been written by Slawson in which he apparently was

confused and thought that Oswald had been observed at the --

Mr. Rocca. He wrote that in March or April. This

was in Jaruary. Between January and Anril they had been over

and had actually seen the intercepts.

MI. Goldsmith. No. The trip to Nexico City was

in

the middle of April.

Mr. Rocca.

Yes, but they had been over to the Agency.

Mr. Goldsmith. Oh, they had been to the Agency and

hac seen the intercepts.

Mr. Rocca. Yes, yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, sometime after January 31 --

Mr. Rocca. They were actually shown.

Mr. Goldsmith. -- they were told.

Mr. Recca. I think they were told at the very time

that this was written, what we were talking about. Reliable

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and prover

sources --- this was telephonic.

vir. Goldsmith. So, is your testimony then that

despite the fact that the document itself makes no reference

to a telephonic intercept, orally this information was

communicated.

Mr. Rocca. That this was communicated without possibiliti

of misunderstanding.

Mr. Goldsmith. And who made that communication?

Mr. Rocca. I have no idea.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you do it personally?

Mr. Rocca. I'm sure that I referrec to it in ry own

talks with slawson, but whether it was on January or later,

I don't know.

Put it's perfectly clear from the start that

this material had to be from a very sensitive direct scurce.

dir. Goldsmith.

I would like to point cut also an error

here.

It indicates that in 9 October --

Mr. Rocca. I take your point. I take your point.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine. For the record I will have to

finish making the point, which is that

according to this, the

accument indicates that oswald's contact was on October 9,

his contact with the Soviet Erbassy. In fact, we know that it

was October first, and severai other times around that as well,

but not as late as October ?.

Is that correct?

MI. Rocca. I think that the mistake here was that

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on 9th of October, CI? headquarters was informed, was what

was interded, rather than Mexico City, and it just didn't

•come out.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine. I wanted to clear that up

for the record.

Mr. Socca. I noted that when I read it.

These are the terriole gans that come out.

Mr. Goldsmith. Getting back to CIA number 177, which

you hac occasion to review, paragraph one, I believe, reports

a contact

between Oswald and the Soviet Embassy. I take it

that by referring to the crypt LINVOY: the person receiving

the cable would know that this was a telephonic intercept.

Mr.

Rocca.

Exactly.

Mir. Goldsmith. In the second paragraph it indicates

"Have a photo."

I will read it.

: "Have photos. Male appears be American entering

Soviet Embassy twelve- sixteen hours, leaving twelve-twenty-

two on 1 October. Apparently age 35, athletic build, circa

six feet. Receding hairiine. Balding to?.

More khakhis and

sports

shirt.

Source, LISMPTY. "

Mr. Rocca. That's the photographic operation,

presumably.

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Do you know why this caole contains an incorrect

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description of Lee Harvey Oswald?

Mr. Rocca. It doesn't, I would say.

Mr. Goldsmith.

Please clarify.

It doesn't contain an incorrect description of Oswala?

Mr.

Rocca. No.

It contains a correct description of

a

totally different person.

Mr. Goldsmith.

Fine.

Then my question is why did the description of a

totally different person get linked to the information contained

in the first paragraph on Oswald?

Mr.

Pocca. I think that this, of course, lies in the

whole area of zeal, investigative zeal that involves simply

taking

assets that you have and attempting to make matches.

The question is one that I would address to, if he were alive,

I would address to win Scott, because it was his, this was

his particular bias at the time, and not only did he state

it

here, but he repeated it in one of the later telegrams,

even after he had been told the correct description.

Mr. Goldsmith. Scott repeated it in a later telegram.

Mr. Rocca. in a later telegram.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall when that was?

Was it pre-assassination?

Mr. Rocca. He didn't repeat the description. He

repeated the reference to it, and then he sent the photo.

Mr. Goldsmith. Okay:

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Mr. Pocca.

So, that -- correct that. I mean, he did

not repeat in a telegram. But he was given - my recollectioni

was that he was given a correct description in about the middle

of the month, though the wavy never did sesyond with a photograph.

Mr. Goldsmith.. Fine.

Do you know how the incorrect description, or the

descriotion of one person was tied in to Oswald?

Mr. Recca.

You see, this was simply the analyst's --

this was simply Win Scott, the FBI senior official: running

the case; and he was making a match, anc it was wrong.

vir. Goldsmith. well, Mr. Scott wasn't the person who

selected the photograph. Someone else presumably selected.

the photogranh.

Mr. Rocca.

Hell, someone showe it to him. And he

felt that there was enought of à --I judge, this is totally a

hypothetical: I never discussed it with him, as far as i can

recall, nor did he ever write it up in a remorandur or

record -- but this was a mixing up of two totally unrelated

things.

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Mr. Goldsmith. You see, the first paragraph makes

reference to a telephonic contact on 1 October -.

Mr. Rocca. A telephonic contact?

Mr. Goldsmith. Between Oswald and the Soviet Embassy.

Mr. Rocca. Which had taken a number of days to

process.

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Mr. Goläsmith. Yes. That telephonic contact makes

no reference to Oswalc going to the soviet Embassy. So, in

light of the absence of any reference by oswald that he was

going to be at the Embassy that day, way would Scott or anyonel

else at the Mexico City station have

selectea a photograph

of someone who was at the Embassy on 1 Octocer?

Mr

Rocca. Well, you don't raise the question as

to why they were selecting 1 october for scanning?

Mr. Goldsmith. Mell, I presume that they --

Mr. Rocca. They're using l October as a baseline, and

anything that came through that looked like an American was

a viable lead, he thought or would have thought. And this

was the only one, and he jammed it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know for a fact that this nas

the only one?

Mr. Rocca.

As far as I know it is. The rest of the

coverage shows no one else that was even an American. They

were all Latins.

MI. Goldsmith. Have you revieved the coverage?

Mr. Rocca. Only what came out during the course of

the Rockefeller thing. There were a series of photograrhs

take in front of -- what -- the Cuban Embassy, was it,

or the Cuban and. Soviet Embassies. And none of them appearea

to be Americans. I think that was what he was using as his

baseline.

There were others that were latins.

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But you can look at all the photos yourself.

I think you have to put yourself in his position,

trying to find any kind of --

Mir. Goldsmith.

Excuse me, Mr.

ROCCa.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. You have to put yourself in his position

and consider the problem of trying to find any lead, and

that's what he did.

I think, of course, it is unmercifully --

Mr. Goldsmith. Pardon me?

Mr. Rocca. It has unmercifully complicated the case

because it introduced a whole new lead --

Mr. Goldsmith. The possibility of someone --

Mr. Rocca.

-- as far as. I'm concerned. This is my

reading of it.

Mr. Golasmith. For example, one lead that it introduces

is the possibility of someone else impersonating Oswald.

Mr. Rocca. Oh, I mean - it's totally open-ended,

totally open-ended. It couló be quite the reverse. It

coula be just some ordinary person who was there on personal

business.

It's impossible to discuss it rationally, it seems

to me.

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Mr. Goldsmith. Did the Agency ever learn the identity!

of the person who was described in paragrapn two?

Mr. Rocca. Not as far as I know. Not up to the time

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Mr. Goldsmith. When was the Warren Commission first

tola

about this picture?

der.

Recca.

I think. they were told in the whole

span of time between january and March, when they were

working on it. They actually came over and viewed them.

I think the first time they had, they got the --

Mr. Goldsmith. Isn't it true that the Warren Commission--

Vir.

Rocca

-- they got a croppec photograph. That

was the thing that had started it. It started down in

Dallas

and worked its way up.

Mr. Coldsmith. Isn't it true that the warren Commission

dic not know about this photograph until Marguerite Oswald

testified before the Commission in February anc nade reference

to a photograph that she had been shown which

she alleged

depicted Jack Ruby, and that prior to that time, the Warren

Commission had not been told about this photograph?

Mr. Rocca. Well; they were told about it when this

thing went over to them - did it not?

Was it omitted at

that time?

I cannot arswer that. I can't say ore way or the

other whether they did or not.

MI. Goldsmith. Was there a desire on the part of

anyone at the CIA to wait out the Commission on the question

of this photograph -- in other words, not tell the cormission

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about

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surveillance

operation and nöt tell them about this

photograph?

Mr.

Rocca:

As far as I know, there was no such

conscious desire.

Nir. Goldsmith.

When was the warren Commission

specifically told about the connection tween this picture

and the Oswald contact?

By that I mean when was the warren Commission specificall!

told about Oswald having contacted the Soviet Embassy on

1 October and this photograph mistakenly being linted to him?

Mr. Rocca. They must have gotten it in its original

form when they read the cables.

Mr. Goldsmith.

And when were they given the cables?

Mr. Rocca. Those cables must have been given to tren

some time after that january memo.

Mr. Goldsmith. Hould there be a record at the Acency

as to when they would have been shown these specific cables?

Mr. Rocca. I don't know. I would hope so, but I

couldn't be sure.

Mr. Golismith.

were you the person that showed them

the cables?

Mr. Rocca. NC.

I can't say that I was, though I may have been.

But

I have an

impression that they were so important that they

would have been handled by someone higher up.

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But this is simoly a matter of conjecture at this

time.

In other words: it is possible.

Mir. Goldsmith. This is the photograph that had

gotten into the hands of the Secret Service: shortly after

the assassination it was sent up to Dallas from Mexico City.

Do you recall that?

Hi. Rocca. The photograph had gotten into the hands

of the FBI office in Dallas as a consequence of Mir. Scottis

feeling the afternoon that the assassination took place

that this photograph, though it had been impeached alreacy by

cable fion Whitter as not being Oswald; and he had seen

Oswald's photogrash on TV. he still

persisted in believing

that this could have had some relationship. As far as I know,

there is no reason to believe that. It simply came un in his

photographic coverage. He had the Air Attache or the Naval

Attache -- the Naval Attache -- fly it up to Dallas. And I

think the Bureau - this was sore in ccordination with the

Bureau representative in Mexico City, anc. there was a

transmission to the gureau office in Dallas. It was at that

point that the photo was taken by the Bureau and shown to

Mrs. Oswald. They cropped it in a particular way, and when

later on the picture was

shown to her, it had been cropped

in a different fashion by the Bureau office here. This was

the basis of her objection, in part, I judge, and so that

startec it.

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But my impression is that the Warren Commission

certainly knew about that shotograph before hei testimony --

going back to your question.

vir. Goldsmith. That is not consistent with the

Warren. Commission records.

Mr. Rocca. Well, it may well be.

Vr. Goldsmith. Let me show you CIA number 2139.

Would you please read that.

(Pause)

• Mr. Rocca. Is there an internal memorandum?

Is there a memorandur that went to the warren Commission?

Mr. Goldsmith. Iim sorry, Mr. Rosca.

Mr. Rocca. Is there a memorandum that actually went

to the Warren Commission on the basis of this? This undoubtedly-

this reflects conversation with regard to the handling of

material which has gotten into the hands of the secret service.

But the Secret Service is not --

Mr. Goldsmith. The second paragraph refers to the

oswald photographs.

Mr. Rocca. It refers to the photograph. It says,

"'ve are going to pass the material in substance in response"

"or the items refer to aborted leads."

Mr. Goläsmith. Yes.

Mr. Rocca. Now, for example, the famous six photographs

which were not of oswald -- in other words, these were rot

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considered pertinent.

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand.

It is fair to say, however, that accordino to some

of the language in CIA number 2139 there was a desire on the

part of Agency officials to wait out the Warren Commission

specifically with regard to showing the Commission these

photographs?

Mr. Rocca. Well, you're using exactly the language

here that I used in this meno and which I simply had not

recollected, which is on the record.

I can't see that these photographs are what they were

talking about un here.

"The levy of our material which had gotten into the

hanes of the Secret Service since 23rd of November" referred

probably to the whole file, not just to these people, these

photographs.

Mr. Goldsmith.. Okay. He'll get back to that point

later on.

sir.

Rocca.

I can't decide or really ascertain at the

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I think the point behind it was that they should go

to the Secret service and get it, ask them for it.

Mr.

Goldsmith. It appears that the Agency there again

is

concerned about revealing to the Harren Commission a

sensitive source of method of operation.

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Mir. Rocca.

I can't see that in the second paragranh,

where it says these are all things that

have been given to

them

or are recurdant, as far as the investigation is concerned.

At least at the time it seemed that way.

Mr. Goldsmith. the fact that material may have been

given to the Warren Commission

in substance is something

(a) first of all that was determined by the CIA, not by the

Warren Cormission: and secondly, if it was given in substance

and not verbatim, that reflects a desire, does it not, on

the

part of the Agency to withhold sensitive source or nethod

of operation from the Warren Commission?

Is that a fair statement?

Mr. Rocca. Well, I think this was the general

preoccupation that prevailed.

Mr: Goldsmith. So then, if there was information that

touched upon sensitive sources and methods, the Agency, in.

fact, was very concerned about it.

Mr. Rocca. It was concernec acout it, but certainly

not so concerned. that it would not either at that time give

the substance of the information or eventually give the entire

technique.

Mr. Goldsmith. Ve will return to this question in

little while, after we

obtain Mr. Rankin's letter which,

after you've seen it, I think you will realize that he was

concerned about the photographs in particular. Perhaps

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we can clarify that issue at that time.

Excuse me for a moment.

• (Pause)

Mr. Rocca.

With rescect to the photographs, I

recall

the Commission coming over, Slawson coming over ana

actually looking at them.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall when he did that?

Mr. Rocca. I don't remember the date of it. But he

mace a trip over and he brought somebody with him. There was

certainly more than one of them. They actually looked at it.

These were the ones that showed the background of the

gate, of the iron gate, and so forth. So there was, at that

stage anyway, certainly no question of not showing him the

actual photographic evidence so that he could examine for

himself whether or not this man was oswald and determine

whether or not it was relevant to the case.

Mr. Goldsmith. I think the record is clear that, in

fact, the larren Commission was allowed to view the photograph,

or photographs.

However, the question that I am focusing on right now

is when the Commission staff was given access to this material,

an, in fact, if that material was made promptly available.

Mr. Rocca.. Is there any record as to when they

came over? I mean, that would give at least a time, a point

of reference.

These small memoranda really reflect the kind

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of day to day ephemeral flow.

Mr. Golasmith.

We'll have to check into that

recara.

I cor't have any record of their visits to the

Agency with me now.

Mr. Rocca. A large determination has to be based on

the whole rather

than a reading of a small part.

Mir. Goldsmith.

Nould you please read now CIA number

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(Pause)

Mr. Goldsmith. Before we discuss 2033, I would like

to go bac! for a moment to 2007 and establish for the record

that 2007 was a memorandum that you arepared or January 31:

1964.

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Is that true?

Mr. Rocca. Uh-huh.

Mr. Coldsmith.

Fine.

Let's get back now to 2033.

Mr. Rocca. Pardon me while I look this over.

Mr. Goldsmith. Certainly.

(Pause)

Mr. Recca.

This memorandun was preparea by Mr.

Dooley.

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Mr. Goldsmith. What is the date of the memcrandum?

Mr. Rocca. 23rd of July.

Mr. Goldsmith.

1964.

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This was at the point where the Commission

was

preparing for their report, and it was a question of

what should be included and what should not be.

Mr. Golasmith. Understood.

Now, from the text of this memorandum, which, although

it was prepared by Mr. Dooley, I believe it is signed by Mr.

Helms, and it's a memo to Mr..

Rankin -- from the text of this

memorandun, is it fair to say that the Agency was extremely

concerned about the sensitive nature of the photosurveillance

operation?

Mí. Rocca. Without a question. I nean, this was

a

statutory responsibility.

vir. Goldsmith. No one is questioning the legitimacy

of that concern.

I want to be very clear about that. The fact that

the

Agency was concerned about sensitive sources and methods is

not something that I am questioning the validity of.

You look puzzled. Are you?

Mr.

Rocca.

I will reserve.. I will reserve on this

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Mr. Goldsmith. I am just trying to establish for

the record that there was that concern.

Mr. Rocca. Basically: I think win just -- if we couldi

go off for a minute --

Mr. Goldsmith. I prefer not to go off.

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Rocca.

All right: forget it, then. He car

talk at lunch.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now: the second paragraph of this

letter, or this memo, indicates that the agency recommends

that the photograph not be reprocuced in the conmission's

report because it would jeopardize a most confidential and

productive cheration. In addition, it could be embarrassing

to the incividual involved, who, as far as the Agecy is

aware, had no connection with lee Harvey oswald or the

assassination of President Kenneay."

Does that language suggest to you that in fact the

Agency

knew who the indivicual invoived was?

Mr. Rocca. No, no.

It simply suggests the total hypothesis that has to

be taken into account when you are dealing with anybody's

rights in a matter of this kind. I'm sure that he had no

knowledge of it. It was just a possicility.

As far as I know, that individual has never been

icentified in any fashion, nor was he ever connected in any

way with any operation of interest of any kind.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether he made more than

one visit to the Soviet Embassy?

Mr. Rocca. I cannot answer that. I don't know.

Mr. Goldsmith. Please review CIA number 179.

(Pause)

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Mr.

Rocca.

(Pause)

Mr.

Rocca.

hitten's outgoing --

Mr. Golcsmith.

This is our friend Henry.

Now, this is mexico.

This is Jack

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MI.

Rocca. This is

response to Mexico's cable,

which we had already considered; incorporating the traces

that haà been developed on the basis of the available file

materials.

Mr. Goldsmith. What is the date of this response?

Mr. Rocca. The eleventh -- or the tenth of october.

I'm sorry, I mis-spoke. It's the tenth.

Mr. Goldsmith. Before discussing this cable ir

further detail, at the time

of Oswald's contact with the

Soviet Embassy

in October, 1363 -- in other words; prior

to the assassination -- was any particular significance

attached to the fact of this contact?

Mr. Rocca. No. Not as far as I kno::.

The ultimate of the significance could only have

been that he was a defector who was about to redefect, or

intended to, or was somehow of other involved' in that.

I can't say that there was even that conclusion drawn

in the earlier material.

My. Goldsmith.

when the Mexico City station first

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learned of the Oswald contact, was any significance attached.

to that in particular?

Mr. Rocca. I would say not.

MI. Goidsmith. Even though a cable was used to

communicate this information to headquarters, rather than a

dispatch, for example?

Mr. Rocca.. Os, I think you would find many other --

I think you would find examples to show that this was a

standard order of procedure in connection with Americans.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did Mexico City routinely notify

headquarters of every American whom it identified as having

been in contact with a Soviet or Cuban Embassy?

Mir. Rocca. Well, you used the word "routinely."

I can't answer on that. It did notify headquarters with

respect to Americans, as all stations do. I don't know, in

other words, what promoted Min Scott in this instance.

But

it would.

be a

part of the function of the station.

Mr. Coldsmith. To report the contact by an Americar

with a foreign embassy?

Mr. Rocca. Yes, to report that.

And, it would be

by cable.

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Mit. Goldsmith. Now, I note in the first paragraph

of CIA number 179, wich you have correctly identifiec as

the headquarters response to the Mexico city station cable,

that there is a correct descrintion of oswala, or a more

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accurate

description of Oswald contained in that paragraph.

Mr. Rocca.: That is the correct description of Oswald,!

as I know it.

MI. Goldsmith. Where would that information have

been obtained?

Mr. Rocca. I have no knowledge of that.

Does that strike you as being difficult?

Mr. Goldsmith. No. It does not necessarily strike

me as being difficult just because I asked the question.

Mr. Rocca. You

see, the file had been orened on him

by Mrs.

Eagerter.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, you would have obtained the

information from the 201 file?

Mr. Rocca.

She had the original State Department

list which named the defectors, and this kind of thing is

really information that you could probably have gotten over

a telephone -- I don't know. They rould be in a position to

say exactly where they got it.

Mr. Goldsmith. In fact, the first paragranh refers

to Oswald's 201 file and it is likely that she received.

that description from this file or from information contained

in this file.

Mr. Rocca. Well, the file would have been fairly

slim at that stage, though. You know, it would have been

really the opening action. Indeed, it contained

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this incredible error.

Mr. Goldsmith.

Which incredible error are you

referring to?

Mr. Rocca. Henry.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why would the file have been opened.

under the name "Lee Henry Oswald?"

Mr. Rocca. This I have never been able satisfactorily

to explain. Betty had retired well before I got into this

thing, when I noted it myself -- I hacn't at the time -- in

dealing with Belin.

But there was some cause for this, that

had to do with the opening action.

Mr. Goldsmith. I'm not sure that I understano that.

You say that there was some cause.

What do you mean?

Mr. Pocca. There was some analytical error that caused

this, either on her part of on the part of the cooyist who

actually opened the file.

Mr. Goldsmith. Miss

secerter actually opened the file;

Mr. Rocca. You mean, her action?

Mr. Goldsmith. Her signature appears on it.

Mr. Rcoca. Well, then, she made the error. But she

could have gotten it from the original source of information

which was the State Department list.

Mr, Goldsmith. Let's take a look at that list richt

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now.

Mr. Rocca. Whatever it is, I mean, this, of course,

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is ore of the warts

that you have to live with.

I mean, it is (straight.) And then, the thing I

prepared. for Belin, I wonder why you haven't seen that, because

it is the one that I argued fairly hotly about. Again,

quite personally, off the too of ny head

Mr. Goldsmith. Which list are you referring to now,

that you prepared for Belin?

Mr. Rocca.

This is a survey of all of the materials

that had come in since the case had, since the Warren

commission had pronounced,

hac issued its report, that on the

file seemec to have possible interest to a continuing

investigatior. It's broken down into large sections. It

has had a documentary appendix in wich each telegram in crder,

each intercept was listed.

I pointed out a number of these errors at that time

and said these are the inevitable results of people working

under large stress and shot time. I remember I used this

you have to take then, with warts and all, in discussing this.

But I have no real explanation

for this. In fact, I was not

aware of it myself until fairly late.

Mr. Golasmith.. I wanted to establish for the reccra

that according to CIA number 824: which was a list of American

defectors that was given to the Agency, Oswaid's name appears

with the correct middle name, so that the source

of the

information would not have been responsible for the incorrect

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middle

name.

Mr. Rocca. Yes.

So, it is not my impression that

the actual opening; file opening was done by her. She could

have instructed it to have been done.

Dic she write Henry?

No. Goldsmith. We'll lock at that document later.

Mr. Rocca.. Secause that would then, then she would

be in a position to explain it.

Mr. Goläsmith. Actually, I have the document right

in front of me so we will 10ok at it very briefly. It is

CIA number 788.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. This is my comment here (indicating.)

Mr. Goldsmith. So, you wrote in a notation that

the middle name is "Harvey," and that was done --

ME. Pocca. 34-75.

Mr. Goldsmith. - April, 1975.

Mr. Rocca. So, she dic it. She is going to have to--

well, they have to live with it.

Mr. Golasmith. I should point out for your information

that Mrs. Eagerter has reviewed this document and she bas

testified - at least that is my recollection anyway -- that

"Henry was not written in by her, but by someone else.

Mr. Rocca. That:

to me, makes sense. That is, it

seems to me that in the process there is a gar between mrs.

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Edgerter and the actual opening, which is down somewhere in

the PI section, and that this is an error at that level, which

then was never picked up and corrected. It just got done

that way.

Now I've talked at length with Mir. Hartman about it,

his suggestion was that that's the way it happened, that it

was the opening: the

actual formal opening was not done by

MIs. Bagerter, who was an extremely careful analyst.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why wouldn't she have written in the

miccile name at the time that she opened the file?

Mr. Rocca. Why?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. She had that information.

Mr. Rocca. It's right here on the form.

Well, you showed it to me a little while ago.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why wouldn't she have written it

and

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Mr. Rocca.

You're going to have to ast the peonle

in RI on this. There is an actual book that says how these

things happen, and there could have been a slippage at that

point in time.

In any case, I think her handwriting, which is this

handwriting, I would judge (indicating), is not this

handwriting (indicating.)

This is printing, and it's not hers.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, you think that someone wrote

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in the entire name "Lee Henry Oswald?":

Mr. Rocca.

That's right.

I think that this was done by another person who made

mistake.

so:

her testimony, in other words, is probably right.

Mr. Goldsmith.

Returning to CIA number 172, which

contains a correct description of oswald and the incorrect

middle name, this cable also gives background information

on Oswald having been a defector to the soviet Union. Mould

that in any way have escalated

the importance of Oswald's

contact with the Soviet Embassy?

sIr. Pocca.

Only in the sense that it would suggest

that he was considering redefection, which we later determined

he was.

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Vr. Goldsmith. And would that have made the contact

a significant one?

: Mr. Pocca. I think so. I think so.

For Mexico

it would have.

It would have given it meaning.

Mr. Goldsmith:

Would you refer to the last paragraph

of this cable.

Rocca. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Does that request aditional information

if such information becomes available?.

Mr.

Rocca. It does.

Mr. Golasmith.

Hac the Mexico City station prior

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to the

assassination known of Oswald's contacts with the

Cubạn Embassy,

should the Mexico City station have communicated

that information to heacquarters?

Mr. Rocca.

It may

not have processed it by that time.

It was

a different set of materials.

Mr. Goldsmith.

I understand that.

Mir.

Rocca. I understand the thrust of what you are

getting at.

Mir. Goldsmith. I understand that you wouldn't have

the

information as to whether they, in fact, knew. But I'm saying

that if, in fact, they knew and had processed that information,

should it have been sent to headquarters?

Mr.

Rocca.

Indeed -- if it had beer processed.

Mr.

Goldsmith. Yes. I understand.

Mr.

Rocca.

My impression is that they simply went back

over a lot of tapes and gathered. that information then.

In

other words, there was so much of it that it didn't just sort

of come up autoratically, and therefore that they sent what

they had or what they

recognized. But they were certainly

in no position to immeciazely correlate inasmuch as everything

had to be based on manual observation and translation and

selection at that time.

so, I would not hold them at fault in this at all.

In other words, you cannot credit them with hanäling more

than --

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Mr. Goldsmith.

Melt, my questionias phrased very

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narrowly.

I am saying assuming that the Mexico City station had,!

in fact, known of Oswald's contact with the Cuban Embassy and

that prior to the assassination this information had been

processed, should that information have been sent to headquarters:

Mr. Pocca.

And it would have been.

Yes. The answer

to your question is yes, and i thin's it would have beer.

My personal impression is that they processed it later,

anc therefore the flow of information was not as direct.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever as! anyone in the Mexico

City station whether they had that information prior to the

assassination?

Mir. Rocca. Prior to the assassination?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

I am asking you whether --

• Mr. Rocca.

• I had no knowledge of any of this prior

to the assassination.

Mr. Goldsmith. I an not asking you whether you asked

the question prior to the assassination. I'm asking you whether

at some time you asked anyone at the Mexico City station

whether the Mexico City station prior to the assassination

knew that Oswald had been in contact with the Cuban

Embassy

and Consulate.

Mr. Rocca.

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No, I had not. I would assume that that

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hac been reportea.

Mr. Goldsmith.

But you never asked anyone?

MI.

Rocca.. No.

Mr. Goldsmith.

Fine.

Now turning to CIA number 181, which is the last page

of this cable, I note that Thomas Karamissines is the

releasing officer.

what does the releasing officer to a cable do?

What is the function of the releasing officer?

MIr.

Rocca. He was simply substituting for Mr. Helms,

whose

signature would have been there as releasing officer

on this matter,

as it has been on others.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why would someone as high up in the

organization

Mr. Karamissines or Mr. Helms be a releasing

officer to a cable?

Mr.

Rocca. I think that you are coming now

to the

whole matter of defection and redefection.

You are beginning

to get people - (not) J.C. Kane actually, but a division

chief here: now - this is no longer a Whitten -- the whole

matter of the American and what his former relationships to

the armed forces were are coming through. This makes it a

matter of considerable concern.

You have also people in

CI concerned. The matter has become a little bit more

important.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

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I don't think you answered the question I rosed just

bit earlier.

What is the function of a releasing officer, for

the racord.

Mr. Pocca.

Nell, you know, you have to have a releasing

officer on cable... Presumably they represent the final revie

authority with respect to what is being said in te cable.

He is the ultimate bureaucratic end of the line on a cable,

according to the procedure which is established in the manual

He doesn't have to ce the DoP.

Mr. Goldsmith. Excuse me a minute.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. The releasing officer doesn't have

to be the DoP or the ADDP... That's all I'm getting at.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you now refer to CIA number

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• Mir. Rocca.

You see, it's quite clear.

You have

four other authorities involved.

Mr. Goldsmith. I'm sorry, you were just making a

20

point?

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Mr. Pocca. I mean, the content. I think the answer

to your question is implicit in the content.

You have four other authorities involved that are

outside of the Agency. These are all other agencies (indicating)

DNE was the FBI.

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Mr. Goldsmith.

One was the State Department.

Mr. Pocca, One was probably Secret service and the

other would be something.

Under those circumstances you would!

want to go to the boss.

Mr. Golasmith.

Why would. Secret Service have been

contacted?

Mr.

Rocca.

As a

defector -- I don't know whether

he is or not.

This is -- my Goà, why did I say this. I don't!

knch.

ver. Goldsmith.

Let's slow down and just move back for

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a moment:

You are referring now to CIA number 181, fifth paragran.

which indicates that this information was disseminated to other

agencies.

My recoilection is that they were State, FBI,

Immigration, and I don't know what the other crypt stands for.

I don't think it's Secret service.

Mr. Rocca. That's where I bow out.

Mir. Goidsmith. That's why I wanted to clarify that.

Sir. Rocca. I will bow out of that..

I don't recconize it.

Mr. Soicsmith. Are you saying that because this

information --

Mr. Rocca. Yes. Looking it over i can see ver!!

definitely why Mr. Kane would want his superior to know.

After all, he is the division chief and normally he would

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be the releasing officer for anything. But if you have this

kind of interdepartmental

concerr, very definitely you vant

the DDP or his

assistant to know.

It seems to me that this

is -- now the answer is still to why the releasino officer

and what are his functions. He has to se sufficiently high

up the channel of command to be able to take care of whatever

emerges

noW

as a consequence and se informed of it so that if

something happens, one of these could call him up and as!..

Mr. Golasmith. Would the fact that Karamissines

signed off on this as

releasing officer indicate that the

contact of Oswald with the embassy at this time was considered

to be significant?

Dr. Rocca.

No per se,

but in an intercepartmental

sense it would be, and

he would have to know.

Mr. Goidsmith. Please refer to CIA number 2140.

Mr. Rocca. By

george, you guys are beautifully

thorough.

2121.

Mr.

Goldsmith. It's 2140.

Mr. Rocca. That was the one I already had.

MI. Goldsmith. Oh, okay.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. It is a different copy of it, though, and

it has a

margin note which I don't understand.

Mr. Goldsmith. Car you identify this document?

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(Pause)

Mr. Recca. This document goes to the community.

I would

have to look at the earlier documents; the earlier

dissemination to the cormunity to distinguish what this does

that the other didn't. It seems to go over the same grouna.

Mr. Goidsmith. In other words, you think that there

was another dissemination cable to the community?

Mr. Rocca.

fell, maybe I'm just mixing that up with

the

one that --

Mr. Goldsmith.

There was a dissemination cable that

was sent

by --

MI.

Rocca. Mexico.

Mr. Goldsmith -- Mexico City station locally. That

could be what you are confusing it with.

Mr. Rocca. That's what I'm probably remembering.

Mr. Goldsmith. What is the date of this cable?

vI. Rocca. This is the tenth.

Mr. Goldsmith. This is the cable that was sent, I

believe, to the rest of the intelligence community.

Mr. Rocca. This was the first one, yes. It must be

the first one.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, this cable reports the contact

on 1 october by Lee oswald. Do you know why this cable

contained an incorrect description of Oswald?

MI. Rocca. Secause it reproduced the incorrect

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material that had been previously sent.

Mr.

Goldsmith.

However, the

same person who sent

the cable to Mexico City that gave the correct description

of Oswald sent this

cable.

vir. Rocca. But the correct description went out at a

different time, did it not?

Mr. Goldsmith. They went out effectively simultaneously.

Mr.

Rocca. My impression is that there is a time

difference which showed

some degree of appreciation.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. Yes, this incorporates that incorrect.

information.

Mr. Golasmith. This time is given in "zed" on CIA

number 179.

I'm not sure that you'll be able to correlate

the time.

(Pause)

Mr.. Pocca.

well, we will have to find out what the

times are.

This is 12 "zed" (Indicating) and what is this?

(Pause)

MI. Rocca. I associate this with being a later

dissemination than this. It is very important. It is important

I would say in looking back at it to know who dic the

actual drafting.

These were among the errors mace.

As I say, they

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nave to be marked as such and I think they were.

Mr. Goldsmith.

In this case the drafts were prepared

by legerter and charlotte Bustos:

Mr.

Rocca. Yes.

My impression is that it was Miss

Bustos -- whom I don't know, but the name I remember now that

you mention it - but they were obviously not tracking.

Mr. Goldsmith. In any event, do you have an explanation.

for why the --

Mir. Rocca.

I think that they wrote these in total

good faith on the basis of what they hac before them.

Mr. Goldsmith. Even though one cable went hack

the México City station that gave a correct description?

Nir. Rocca. Not if that went later.

Mr. Coldsmith. Not if that, referring to CIA number

179?

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Mr. Rocca. Yes. If that went later, then it means

that somewhere in between the two perception, true perception

developed, and that is my assumption.

Mr. Goldsmith.

Te can

easily check the record to

see the time.

Mr.

Rocca. I have never really pursued it, but I

recall that this came un when I went through this exercise

for Belin, and it was as clear as -- you know - there were

errors made in the way these things were sent.

But they are

miner.

They are minor things, though.

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I would like to say for the recorê that because of the

quality of the xerox, which in general is good, you cannot

make out the time with reliable accuracy. For that reason,

what

we will do is simply check the Agency's records to see the

time sequence with which these cables were sent.

vir. Rocca. The "z" time sequence can be compared.

In any case, the two ladies can be -- wall, I'm not going

to tell you how to do your work.

Hir. Coldsmith.

Why don't we take a break for

lunch now.

(Whereupon, at 1:21 o clöck,

p.m., the derosition

recessed, to resume at 2:15 o'clock, p.m.,

the same day.)

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(hereupon; at 2:30 o'clock, p.m.: the taking of the

deposition of Paymona G. Rocca continued.)

Mr. Goldsmith. I believe that this morning we

discussed the question of whether the Agency was giving the

Warren Commission the compiete information on the telephone

tap operation of the Mexico City station. I believe that

your testimony was that that information was made available

to the Commission.

Mr. Rocca. The substance, as far as I know.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was your testimony also to the

effect that the Warren Commission specifically was told about!

the telephone tap operation?

MI. Rocca. At what time? At any time during the

whole thing?

Mr. Goldsmith, Well, when, to the best of your

recollection, were they told about that?

Mir. Rocca. In my opinion: it could not have sat

very long without Mr. Dulles having told them himself as

member of the commission. I don't know the exact date that

they were informed of the materials.

It had to be very early because everyone understood

that this material was of a highly sensitive nature which

gi

had to be protected. It orinated with

a telephone tao.

You could just talk with slawson and your eyes would be

bugging out as he understood everything.

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So, whether it's in January or March -- at a certain

stage certainly there was no question because they did the

actual

taps, and they were asking them here are the criginals

and stuff of that kind. Ne had to explain why there were

no originals, that they had been erased, and that kind of thing.

But as far as I know, this was not done in writing. It was

cone verbally, in conversations.

But what the exact date was I cannot rin down.

Mr. Goldsmith.

Te saw, for example, the clauson-Coleman

memo that you examined this morning which suggested that

as of 1 April, 1961 Slawson aná Coleman did not lnow of the

telephone operation: either that or they were affirmatively

misinformed about the Agency having "observed Oswald."

I would like to show you cIn number 2144.

Please ex anine this document.

(Pause)

: Mr. Rocca.. This is one of the very early pieces.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let me ask you the question and you

will get a chance to explain that.

Mr. Rocca. Well, I can't explain it, obviously.

Mr. Goldsmith. Can you identify this rocument for

the record? Simply, what is it?

Mr. Rocca. This is

an outgoing cable in the GP Floor

phase. At the time the Western Semisphere Division was

responsible for the general coordination, outgoing materials.

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I judge that it vas prepared by Mr. Witten. The

date of it is 20 December, 1963.

And Mr. Whitten signed it,

presumably by authority of Mr. Helms: who was the de.

Mr. Folasmith.

What's the date on this? 20 December,

1953?

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Mr. Rocca.

That's correct.

Mr. Goldsmith. According to the first paragraph: it

indicates that the Agency's present plan in passing information

to Marren Commission is to eliminate mention of telephone

tays in order to protect their continuing operations.

"Will rely instead on statements of Silvia Duran!"

et cetera,

et cetera.

Can you explain this first paragraph in any way?

MI:

Rocca. Well: Mr. Whitten has to explain it.

It is certainly, in any case, by the time january came around

and the Warren Commission began to operate, this nad long

since been superseded.

Mir. Goldsmith. So, this was not the operating policy

the time the Warren Commissior was in full gear?

Mr. Rocca. As far as I'm concerned, this was not.

This was one of those early representations of sources and

methcas and their protection, which was simply unrealistic.

Mr. Coldsmith.

Is it fair to say that this document

is another example of the Agency's concern to protect sources

and nethods as authorized by -- well, not necessarily as

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authorized by law, but in the agency's interpretation of how

it was authorized by law?

Mr. Rocca. As it was interpreted in those times.

I think that the interpretation has changed, probably as a

result of this episode.

MI. Goldsmith.

Fine.

Did the CIA ever obtain a tape recording of Lee

Harvey Oswald's voice?

Nr. Rocca. As far as I know, there was no tape recording

ever preserved.

It was erased, in other words; the telephone taps.

Mr. Goldsmith. The question is did the agency ever

obtain a tape recording of Oswald's voice?

vir. Rocca. The answer to the question is yes.

Nr. Goldsmith. Fine.

Now you anticipatec me quite correctly.

At the tire of the assassination, dià the Agency have

in existence a tane recording of Oswald's voice?

Mir. Rocca. Io the best of my knowledge, no.

Mr. Coldsmith. When had the tape recording of Oswald's

voice been obtained?

Mr. Goldsmith.

. Some time in the earlier period

which we have reviewed this morning.

Mr. Goldsmith. Between September 2?, 1953 and Cctober

first or second, roughly?

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Mr.

Rocca.

Yes, yes.

And, it had been erased sometime during the period.

during the subseguent period, and before the whole evisoce

generated.

Mr. Golasmith. Do you know why the tape recording

was erased?

Mr.

Rocca.

This was by standara order of procedure,

according to the people on the

spot and in charge of the

operation, who are in a better position to testify to this

matter than I am.

In particular, the man who has written a book --

Mr. Goldsmith. David Phillips.

Mr. Pocca. - David Phillips. When I was working

on behalf of Mr. Belin's interest in compiling those two

papers, let me acc that the whole matter of the time lapse

did come up in my discussion with Phillips in trying to

account. for why did it take until the seventh -- aid we discuss

this this morning? I recalled at lunch that this was a

matter that I had seized on myself. And therefore, he was

division chief at that

time -- strike the therefore -- when

I talked with him in 175. I had a number of discussiors

with him on points relative to the technique that was used

in the handling of the tapes, because he was there at the time.

Now whether he was in a position to give testimony

of his own knowledge of whether it was his belief, I cannot say.

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But his statement to me, at the time, as I asked him

the specific question, what haryened to the voices - it was

erased

and it was normal that that be done within a cycle of

five

to six days. That is my recollection.

• Mr. Goldsmith. Hould the purpose of erasing the tape

sinply be so thas the tape could be reused?

Mr. Rocca. Exactly.

They had a large traffic which

they had to accommodate.

There is in addition to Mr. Phillips his chief of

office at that time who also was there and who would know the

answer to that question.

Mr. Goidsmith. That would be Herb Mannel?

Mr. Rocca. No.

It's a fellow with a latin name.

Mr. Colasmith.

In charge of which operation in

Mexico City?

MI. Rocca.

He vas Chief

of Ops when Mr. Phillips

was chief of Wa in 1975.

Mr. Soldsmith. Oh, in 1975.

MI. Rocca. He later went out to become chief of

station.

well, you can create the entire order of that.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let me snow you another document

dateà November 23, 1953, addressed to James i. Rowley,

who was Chief of the u.S. Secret Service at that time, from

J. Edgar Hoover.

The document deals with the assassination of President

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John F. Kennedy in Dallas, Texas, November 22, 1963.

I will have this marked as an exhibit.

(The document referred to was marked Rocca Exhibit

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number 2.)

Mr. Goldsmith. If i wanted to substitute a better

copy of that at some later time, is there any problem in

doing that?

The Reporter. Not that I know of, so long as they

are identical.

Mr. Goldsmith. Okay.

Turning to page 1 of this document, I would like to

ask you to read the paragraph that starts at the bottom of the

sage and continues on to the next page.

(Pause)

Mr. Coldsmith. Fave you had a chance to read that

paragraph?

Mr. Rocca. Uh-huh..

Mr. Goldsmith. That paragraph, I believe, males

reference to a tape recording that was provided to the abI

by the CIA and Mr. Hoover is indicating that some agents

of the FBI had reviewed that tape recording which, although

it was purported to contain à recording of Oswalá's voice,

the agents were of the opinion that it was not, in fact,

oswala.

Do you know anything about that tape recording?

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Nir.

Rocca. I regard this as

a total mixup of various

leads, inaccurate, and reflecting

at the moment - 23rd

November - no one had sorted out anything. I think this

collapses of its own weight on the basis of the evidence.

• Mr. Goldsmith. Did the Agency ever have

a tape recording

of someone whom it thought to be dewalc,

and it turned out

that the tape recording.

was; in fact, not of Oswald?

Mr. Rocca. Not to my linowledge. Not to my knowledge.!

Not to my knowledge directly or incirectly. I have

never heard of such, because this was one of the things that

I tried very hard to establish -- that is, was there any

corpus of evidence that coulc be associated directly with

oswald in the original things. I always drew a blank.

Mr. Goldsmith. What did you do to try to establish

this?

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Mr. Bocca. Asking paople about it, whether it

existed or not.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you talk to lin Scott about that

in Mexico City?

Mr. Rocca. No, no. I never talked to Min Scott during

the period at all. He was down there. After all, I was not in

a position to, and I have no recollection of having done it

later on when he visited..

But it may very well have come up

in the '65 or later visits that he had.

But in ary event, in my opinion, this is simply a mixuo.

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Again,

it's the photograph -- I would say you are going

to have to sort this

kind of thing out very carefully before

giving it evidential value.

Mr.

Goldsmith. Please review CIA number 197,

specifically paragraph number two.

For the recore, this is a cable dated 23 November, 1963

to headquarters

from Mexico City.

(Pause)

MI.

Goldsmith. Have you had a chance to review that

paragraph?

Mr. Rocca. Paragraph three?

MI. Goldsmith. No, two.

(Pause)

Mr.

Rocca. Yes.

It bears out what I

was saving earlier.

Mr. Goldsmith. The paragraph indicates in relevant

part that the station was unable to compare voice, Oswald's

voice, as the first tape had been erased prior to the receint

of the second call.

My question is as follows. Is it reasonable to infer

from

that that in fact, on November 23, 1963, one of the tapes

waS

still in existence because the author of the cable doesn't

say "station unable to compare voice as tapes have been

erased."

Rather, he indicates, "Unable to compare voice

as first tape had been erased prior to receipt of second call

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suggesting that in fact one of the tapes was still in

existence.

Mr. Rocca.

Well, I think that is a strained

construction.

It could be that both had been erased, and

that's what the meaning was, as far as I can see.

Mr. Goldsmith.

Have you ever reviewed this cable

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Mr. Rocca.

This was one of the cables thât I included

in a batch of materials that I assembled in going over the

thing for Mr. Belin.

I come bad!: to my statement that all of

the efforts that I made to try to yin down extant tapes

produced rothing with respect to Oswald,

and it was possible

only to get the tapes

after the 23Id preserved. And, to my

knowledge, they are still preserved, but I am not certain of it.

But I did not draw the inference you did, let's put it

that way.

: Mr. Goldsmith. when you read this paragraph, did it

occur to you possibly that that would be a reasonable inference

to draw?

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Mr.

Rocca.

No, no.

I certainly con't want to get into any lina of personal

difference here on it. I would not have drawn that inference.

Nix.

Goldsmith. Fine.

Mr. Rocca.

In the light of what I'd been assured.

Mir. Goldsmith. I want you to understand that I

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don't intend to force any inference upon you and I purposely

phrased the question in the sense that is it a reasonable

inference, and you have given your answer.

Let's take a look at CIA --

Mr. Rocca.

Let me 100k ât it again. I mean, after

all, it's been a while.

Again, this goes back to the people on the spot and

what they remember, not what I feel of thing about it, though

I recognize that if I should have spotted it. I should have.

But basically the peopie engaged at the time can answer, and

their statement is that these things were scratched, tere

rubbed

were removed, and they were not extant. And it was

only after the 23rd, after the assassination, you will

preserve all the material. I think that went out in a cable

that came out of headquarters.

"In view Oswald.

in Soviet Union, in fact he claimed on

1 Cozober, LIENVOY to have visited" -- station unable to

compare voice: --

Frankly, I think that this is again a very - my

feeling is that this is again an example of the kind of loose

language that is written and that you see on other parts of

the recorà.

Nir. Goldsmith. Fine.

MI.

Rocca. This, while it is possible that what you

say is so, my feeling is that this; in effect: says that they

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were unable

to make any comparison.

Mr.

Goldsmith.

Let's review now CIA number 205, which

is a cable from Mexico City to the director, also dated

23 November:: 1953.

Would you please read paragranh number four.

(Pause)

•Mr.

Pocca. Yes.

Mr. Goidsmith. Now paragraph number four indicates

that the transcriber of the conversations

involved stated

that Oswald was identical with the person who had called

from the Cuban Enbassy to the Soviet Embassy prior to October

first.

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Is it reasonable to infer from paragraph number four

on CIA number

205 that the transcriber made a voice comparison?

Mr. Bocca. Out of his heac.

Mr. Goldsmith.

Are

you indicating that --

: Mr. Rocca. And they are rood. I would have no cuestion

that he is right. But he didn't make any comparison. I dont

know him.

I don't know his talent. But that would be my

statement operationally.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, someone reading this paragraph

who does not have knowleage of Agency operating piccedures

or the manner in which transcribers operate or are trained

might, reacing this in a straightforward manner,

think that

a voice comparison had been made.

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Is that correct? Are you snaking your head yes?

We:1l go ahead ana let you verify it.

Mr. Rocca.

If I answer yes, this is a purely hypo-

thetical case.

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand that.

MI.

Rocca. As I say; it is like many other things

that occur in the record which can be interpreted hypothetically

as indicating intent or knowledge.

Mr. Golasmith. I am purposely qualifying the question

to say that if someone doesn't have any knowledge of agency

procedures or the talent and training that goes into the

making of a good transcriber, he might thing that a voice

comparison has been made from reading paragraph number four.

Do you have an explanation for this paragraph?

I think you gave one but I would like to hear it again.

MI. Rocca. Yes.

: The explanation is that this represents the typical

function of a transcriber in recalling what you would call

"eyeballing", but this is "earballing; what he hears.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, effectively,

seven weeks after

Oswald had contacted the embassy, the Cuban Embassy and the

Soviet Embassy, without having à chance to listen to the tape

and compare voices, you are indicating that the transcriber

could still have memory of that and make a valid comparison?

Mr. Rocca. Yes, and he would probably be able to do it

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Mr.

Goldsmith. Fine.

Did the Agency station in Mexico City ever obtain

photograph of Oswald as

a result of its photosurveillance

operations against the Soviet anc Cuban Embassy anc. Consulate?

Mr. Rocca. Is my knowledge, it did not.

Mr.

Goldsmith. Let's examine CIA number 248.

Mould you pleass reac this memo.

(Pause)

Mr. Goldsmith. For the record, this is a meno

that was passed n Mi. Papich of the FBI with information on

the photo coverage of the embassies in Mexico City. The meno

is

cated 2? Novencer,

1963.

Is it accurate to say that according to this memo,

the photographic coverage during daylight hours of the Cuban

and Soviet Embassies in Mexico City was continuous in

nature?

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Mr. Rocca. No, it is not accurate.

Mr. Goldsmith. What is your interpretation of the

mero,

Mar.

Rocca?

fir.

Rocca. Well, in the first nlace: I have no

competence to judge this memo because I have had no service

in Mexico City and must therefore rely on what has been given

to me in the course of experience over the years

by? people

who were.

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One of the points that I expiored, again in that thing

that I did for MI. Belin, was why there was no photographic

coverage on Friday.

Mr. Phillip told me that the machine was down on

Friday, therefore this is not right. But I don't know whether

it is or not. You see. I am in a bind here. I am telling

you what I dc know.

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand that.

Nevertheless, according to your answer on the record

MI. Rocca. On the record it's wrong.

Mr. Goldsmith. I didn't ask. you about the accuracy

of what the memo says. I only asked you if according to the

meno the coverage was continuous in nature. I am not asking

you whether the memo was right or wrong. I am simply asking

you whether accorcing to the meno the coverage was continucus

in nature.

Mr. Rocca. That's what the memo says.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

I will also indicate for the recora that the memo

continues to say, "However,

weather conditions and other

factors affecting any photographic efforts required of the

coverage not be considered as total or complete."

Mr. Rocca. Again, my

researches in 1975 showed

that there were large lapses and very grave difficulties

because of the operational situations that prevailed in the

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various quarters.

Mr. Goldsmith. What was the reason that you discovered

for why the photosurveillance unit did not obtain a photcarash

of Oswald?

Mr. Rocca. Because -- I think the question was directly

raised by Mr. Belir. How come you didn't get a picture of him?

Mr. Goldsmith. That was the reason that you gave

Mir. Belin?

10

Mr. Rocca. That the machine was down.

Mr. Goldsmith. For how many days was the machine

down?

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Mr. Recca. I cannot answer thât. It was doun on

Friday, and pernaps on Saturday.

As I say, this is noted in the memo that I wrote in

:75 and it's based on a conversation with Mr. Phillips and

with his people.

Mr. Golismith. Do y0u recall when that memo was

written?

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NI. Rocca. I don't know whether I have a note on

the

date.

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Mr. Foldsmith, Did you retain a copy of the mero?

Mr. Pocca. I did not retain a copy oé the memo.

ão not have a copy.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, the reason that was:

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given by Mr. Phillips or Mexico City station was that, at

least according to your knowledge, the photo mechanism was not

working on that day.

Is that correct?

ME.

Pocca. That's right, and that doesn't assume

that there might not have been some other reason for not

getting the

coverage.

Mr. Goidsmith. Now, if we were to reconstruct Oswald's

visits to the Cuban and Russian Embassies -

Mir.

Rocca. That's what I did in that memo.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mell, we're going to get a hold of that

memo; I assure you. The Agency: at this

time, for some reason:

has

not made it available to us.

But if we were to reconstruct his visits, we would

see

that he made visits not only to the soviet Embassy, but

to the Cuban

Embassy as well.

so, did Mi. Phillips or whomever

gave you the explanation indicate that both cameras were

¿own?

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Mr. Rocca.

I cannot recall that detail. But that, too;

would be taken care of -- and bear in mind that these were

different implantments; these were different, and they had

different problems in management. As I say: I am telling you

only what I know by hearsay. The people who were there

• are

the ones who will have to explain.

Mr. Goldsmith. Dia it strike you as unusual that

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oswald was able to visit the Embassies a total of at least

five to six times without ever being photographed?

Vir. Rocca. No, not one bit. Not one bit.

I have been in the field -- I was in the field 20

years, and anyone who trusts machines and machine coverage

is just placing his reliance on a false device.

Let me say another thing. Saturday coverage was not

undertaker. So this was another thing.

You see, there are a number of things here, there are

a number of substantive details that you don't have.

Saturday, now I recall-- and this was recorded in the

memo

-- Saturday coverage was not -- the coverage was stopped

because the embassy was closed presumably on that day.

so, it would be: generally speaking: beneficial to get

a hold of that, because i tried to go over some of these

points as jest as I could.

I must say that I don't have the

information I thought

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MI. Goldsmith. Did the Agency ever consider it to be

unusual that Oswald was able to gain admittance to the Cuban

Embassy on a Saturday when the embassy was closed?

Vr. Rocca. No. All you has to do was press a button

and there was a guard, and he let you in. But inasmuch as it

was a closea day, coverage was not extended to that period.

at that time.

They did it afterward. As I recall, that was

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Mr. Golasmith. If the Agency's records indicate

that by the entrance to the cubar consulate there was an

impulse camera that was activated automatically and that that

camera was in operation on September 27, which was the first

day that oswald made a visit to the Cuban Embassy, would you

think that a photograph of oswald would have been obtained?

Mr. Rocca. There are two many hypotheses.

This is

a cascade of hypotheses, and I would really: before answering

in any way that would affect your questions ic others, want

to know very, very clearly what the mechanics were, which

is something that I don't krow now.

Mr. Goldsmith. I'm not in a position by virtue of my

agreement with the Agency to go into detail with you now on

the nature of the photo coverage. So, I will withdraw the

question.

: Mr. Pocca. Again, let me say that these lapses

in coverage are absolutely a built-in part of the hazards of

the business.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was the Mexico City station ever

criticized for failing to obtain a photogrash of Oswaid?

Mr. Rocca. Not as far as I know.

Mr. Goldsmith. Critized -- was the Mexico City

station criticized?

Mr. Pocca. No. I saw nothing to that effect in any

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of the outcoing material or in any of the discussions.

Mr. Goidsmith. So, even though Oswald visited the

embassies, you are not surprised by the absence of a photogragia?

Mr.

Rocca.. I was not.

Mr.

Goldsmith. Do you know whether the T3I had any

independent telephonic surveillance of the Soviet and Cuban

Embassy and Consulate?

Mi. Rocca. Mo, I do not.

Mr. Goldsmith.

Are you familiar with the cryptonym

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Mr. Rocca. I am.

This is a cryptonym for a Cuban defector, who is

unkrown to me, but who ai a certain stage provided material

that was given to the Warren Commission by the staff, or

directly, or both.

Mi. Goldsmith. Did you ever meet with AMMUG?

Mr.

Rocca. NO, no.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is it fair to say that AMMUg provided

the CIA with information relevant to the assassination

sometime in 1964?

Mr. Rocca. I can't judge that. I do not know.

I can't really appreciate the thrust of his material.

Mr. Goldsmith. When did you have occasion to review

the material that AMMUG had provided to the CIA?

Mr. Rocca.

I actually never went over it, except to

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the extent that it's in the oswald file.

I an not trying to

be evasive. I simply cannot rememcer what the thrust of this

information was.

My impression was that he provided the first really

significant, hard information on the DGI chief. Now his name,!

was struggling for it this morning, it must have been

("Rodriguez.")

Mr. Goldsmith. P-O-G-E-I-I-0 Lopez?

Mr. Rocca. That's the man.

As a consequence, this was of significance. But it

came in later, after, 1964 or some time. Is that correct?

Well, I'm asking you.

Mr. Goldsmith. I will show you some documents which

will refresh your memory in a moment.

Mr. Rocca. Anyway, this was considered very sensitive

and was being handled by a case officer, appropriately

equipped with AMMUG. I häd no direct cognizance of that,

for example, as I had with the Golitzin material on the Russian

side.

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Mr. Colasmith. Did you know about AMdUG in 1964?

Mir. Rocca. The name and that he had information I

had heard, yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you know that he was a former

DGI agent or case officer?

Air. Rocca.

the question is where.

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Mr. Goldsmith. Pardon me?

vr. Bocca. There he was. I mean, he was not in

Mexico, as I recall, was he?

I think he was somewhere else.

Yes.

The answer to your question is yes. He was a

DGI defector.

But I thought he came out of Paris or London

or something like that.

Mr. Goldsmith. We'll show you some documents that

will refresh your memory on hin in a moment.

Mr. Rocca. This is, again, a part that I an not

really expert on in any way. But I am perfectly willing to

ie used as a backboara for anything.

Me. Goldsmith. Dia Mr. Belns or Mr. Angleton ever

express any concern about ANUG being disclosed to the Warren

Commission?

Mr.

Rocca. Not as far as I know. As far as I know,

they disclosed him to the warren Commission.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was the Warren Commission told about

AMMUG being a DGI employee?

Mr. Rocca. That's my impression. I may be totally

wrong about this.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall what information, if

any, AMMUG provided to the CIA in reference to the Kennedy

assassination?

Mr. Rocca.

As I said, I think he provided the

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first inside information on the DGI's aspect of the Rezidentura

in Mexico City. But precisely what he said with respect to

who was where in Mexico City at the time I cannot say at

this moment because I don't have it in my memory.

Just a second, now. Let me try to work it out.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Rocca, for your sake and the

purpose of refreshing your memory somewhat, I would like to

show you some CIA documents pertaining to AMMUG which, I think,

after they are reviewed, you may have a somewhat better

recollection of this particular individual.

I am going to give you CIA number 1879 and would like

to ask you to skim that through CIA 1892 -- no, CIA 1894.

That would probably take you ten minutes or so.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. Well, I haven't read it in detail, but

certainly I recall this.

The case officer was Swensen and

we did provide the questions that he was able to elaborate.

What can we talk about?

Mr. Goldsmith. Was there another case officer who

debriefed AMMUG?

Mr. Rocca. As far as I know, no. I mean,

Swensen

was the individual who was in charge.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether a CIA case

officer, whose last name was Langash or Langosh ever debriefed

AMMUG?

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Mr. Rocca..

No.

"Langash" -- I remember no such name.

Mr. Goldsmith. According to a memo dated 5 May, 1964,

CIA number 1879, the first paragraph indicates that prior

to October, 1963, Oswald visited the Cuban Embassy in Mexico

City on two or three occasions. Before, during, and after

these

visits, Oswald was in contact with DGI, specifically

with Luisa Calderon, Manuel (Dega) Perez,

and Rogelio

Rodriguez Lopez.

Mr. Rocca. Who was the chief.

Mr. Goldsmith. Rodriguez was the chief?

Mr. Rocca. My recollection is that he was the chief.

That's why AMMUG gave us the first real information on the

organization of this Rezidentura.

Mr. Goldsmith. What followup was done on Oswald's

apparent contact with DGI?

Mr. Rocca.

Well, there was no followup, quite

apart from just this information. I mean, these are the

people - there was nothing to be done. Luisa Calderon

was one of the people that we had gotten a telephone tap on.

She is one of the persons who made a very peculiar comment

in the course of it, as I recall. These other people are simply

on the spot. It is not possible to get any additional

information if the station doesn't develop the assets.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did AMMUG give any information as

to

whether Silvia Duran was a DGI employee or agent?

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Mr. Rocca.. I do not know, unless it's stated here.

She was the receptionist, serving a mixed bag, there, of

people.

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So I don't know that.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether Luisa Calderon

was a DGI agent?

Mr. Rocca.

No, not except for this, which says

that she is.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was this information all given to the

Warren Commission?

Mr. Rocca. As far as I know -- all of the AMMUG

information was given.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether Luisa Calderon was

ever employed in any capacity by the CIA?

Mr. Rocca. No. I do not know that.

Mr. Goldsmith. Please refer to CIA number 1892 and

1893, starting with this paragraph (indicating). Just

read this paragraph through to here (indicating.)

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. I have no comment on this.

As far as I know, there were no traces that sustain

this allegation.

Mr. Goldsmith. For the record, the allegation in that!

document is that Calderon was or may have been connected

to the CIA.

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Is that correct?

When I say "is that correct," I'm saying is that

what the allegation is.

Mr. Rocca. Yes, that is the allegation. But this

involves almost three levels of hearsay.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

I don't want you to infer anything as to the committeel's

view on this particular issue.

Mr. Rocca. I'm not going to underwrite that at

all.

I just don't believe it.

Mr. Goldsmith. We're not asking you to underwrite it

We're simply asking you whether you have any information that

would either rebut or verify that allegation.

Mr. Rocca. I understand that. Ultimately the question

really ought to go to

the people in WH division, Mexico-Cuban,

who have the records and are in a position to verify this.

They forwarded no information bearing on such a thing.

I

assume, therefore, that the thing is not so.

Mr. Goldsmith. When you read this memo at the time that

you were working on this issue for the Rockefeller Commission,

were you concerned by the allegation that Calderon was a

CIA agent?

Mr. Rocca. No, no, no. It didn't come to my mind

at that time. I don't remember where in that memo I gave it

any attention, either.

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Mr. Goldsmith. Apart now from that allegation which

I understand to be hearsay --

Mr. Rocca. Well, Piniero, the head of the CIA, did

not agree.

Piniero is the chief of the service.

Mr. Goldsmith. He is head of the DGI service?

Mr. Rocca. Yes. I mean, he is a very important man.

You know, this is -- we are really spinning things out

here.

If there is no factual suppört for this, then we

shouldn't tarry and try to give it evidential or factual

significance.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Rocca, no ore is attemptingto

attach evidential significance to these documents. The

purpose of this

session is to address questions to you that

would help us shed light on the documents. I don't want you

to think that we infer from the documents that everything

contained in the documents is accurate.

: In fact, that's the reason we are going over the

documents.

The record does not speal: for itself.

Mr. Rocca. That's very good. As I said, I don't want

to get into a position of hostility here, because that is not

my purpose.

On the other hand, as you stated yourself, certain

of these paragraphs read in completely legalistic fashion

by individuals who really have not been exposed to the

operational vicissitudes -- let's put it that way -- will draw

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conclusions that simply aren't correct.

Mr. Goldsmith. The reason that I am deposing you

today and have deposed

many other Agency employees is to attempt

to clarify questions that are raised by the record. That

perhaps gets back to one of the first points that was made

earlier in the deposition, where you made reference to the

record and I indicated that the record needs to be examined

and we can't rely exclusively upon it.

Mr.

Rocca.

She's a mysterious character anyway.

As far as I know, that has never been clarified. There

are

subsequent reports about her, as I recall, travelling

around and being set up by the DGI. So, you can just keep

that in the back of your head. You are going to have a

continual problem with her.

Mr. Goldsmith. These memos also mention that as well

Mr. Rocca. There is a whole stage of receding

mirrors that you can't really ever get to the bottom of, without

ever getting her into this kind of proceeding, settling down

and questioning her.

ME..

Goldsmith. How, CIA number 1900 is a memo

dated 5 May, 1974, which basically consists of the results

of the debriefing of AMMUG. It lists a series of questions

that were presented to AMMUG and the answers to it.

I show you that only for reference purposes now.

Mr. Rocca. My recollection is that these questions

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were very carefully thought out by members of the staff,

members of my group, and that we made the thing fully available

to the Warren Commission, which is really the thing that

concerned me more than anything else.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

Please listen to the question that I have for you

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I just showed you a document that was dated May 5, 1964.

On May 6, 1964, according to document number 1898, some

followup questions were presented for the purpose of having

them be addressed to AMMUG. So, we have a second set of

questions.

Now, the memo dated 8 May, 1964, which is CIA number

1891, was prepared by case officer Harold F. Swensen. That

is the one I would like you to examine now in a bit more detail.

It appears that what Mr. Swensen did, unlike his earlier

report where he specifically mentioned or listed the question

that was addressed and gave AMMUG's response, here he simply

summarized the briefing session.

I am wondering if you noticed that when you examined

this document for the first time?

Furthermore, why did Mr. Swensen depart from the

earlier procedure?

Mr. Rocca. Well, it gave us relevant information.

I think that is what probably what we were primarily concerned

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Frankly, I would not have held to this format.

This is the format you were referring to in the earlier question.

Mr. Goldsmith.

Yes.

MI. Rocca. The sixth of May.

Coming back on the eighth, he is giving us the results

really in capsule, I would judge, rather than setting them

down, and that would anticipate that this thing would simply

be written up more formally somewhere.

Is there such a sort of wrap-up report where the

things are?

Mr. Goldsmith. No.

Mr. Rocca. Well, this may be all he did, then, on

the thing.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, you don't have an explanation,

then, on the departure from the form that was given to Mr.

Swensen to address to AMMUG?

Mr. Rocca. Here again, it would be a question of

consulting with Mr. Dooley or Mr. Pratt-- I think that Mr.

Pratt had joined us by this time -- to find out exactly

what had transpired between them and Swensen - one or the

other or both -- to determine whether there was any kind of

Mr. Goldsmith. What was Swenson's position at that

time?

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MI.

Rocca.

Fie was the case officer for AMMUG.

Mr.

Goldsmith.

He was simply a case officer?

Mr. Rocca. Yes.

He was handling him. Presumably

he was very keen, as the memo reflects, on keeping the man

safe and out of the public eye.

Mr. Goldsmith. Were you satisfied with the completeness

of Swenson's report?

Mr.

Rocca.

I certainly didn't raise anything at the

time. It seemed to me to tell us a lot of new information that

bore directly on the question on the Cuban side of it for the

first time, which, you remember, as I said this morning, was

a part of the whole situation there, from the CI point of

view, that I know least about. The KGB Rezidentura was clear

but what we really didn't understand was the Cuban setup.

For the first time we were beginning to get information.

But mind you, this man did not have direct information

about it.

He had heard it from people.

Mr. Goldsmith. When you say "this man", you are

referring to AMMUG?

MI. Rocca. AMMUG.

In other words, he is not a Golitzin or a Deriabin

or that kind, that is, who can tell you directly.

Mr. Goldsmith. For the record, would you indicate

who Golitzin and Deriabin were?

Mr. Rocca. These were Soviet defectors who had come out.

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Derlabin is a soviet defector who defected in Vienna

in 1953-1954, and Mr. Golitzin defected in 1961. They are

KGB officers.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was all of the information contained

in the AMMUG memos prepared by Mr. Swensen given to the

Warren Commission?

Mr. Rocca. As far as I know, it was.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know in what form --

Mr. Rocca. That's what I don't know at the present

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Mr. Goldsmith. Was it given in memorandum form or in

briefing form?

Mr. Rocca. I would judge that it should have been

I have actually - I have almost the conviction or feeling

that we promoted a meeting between members of the staff of the

Warren Commission and the case officer. In other words, they

were allowed to confabulate.

They were encouraged to.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, you think there was a conference

between the case officer and --

Mr. Rocca.

And the Warren Commission statt.

Mr. Goldsmith. Which staff members were involved?

Mr. Rocca. '

That I couldn't say.

Mr. Goldsmith. Certainly there would have to be a

record of that meeting at the Agecy.

Mr. Rocca. There would have to be a record at the

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Warren Commission, too, if it happened. Now I am not saying

that it did happen. I have the impression, however, that

there was certainly no intent to deny the Commission full

access to the information.

• Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether the Warren Commission

was given the information that AMMUG provided with reference

to Luisa Calderon?

Mr. Rocca. I'm almost certain they had to have it

because there was an intercept on it, and this bound down one

aspect of the intercept, which was a very peculiar phrase that

she used -- "He got what he deserved" -- or something like

that.

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momentarily.

Mr. Rocca. So, I must say that this Calderon thing

must have gone to them.

: Is there not a memo by Mr. Dooley there which says

that the information went to the Warren Commission?

Mr. Goldsmith. I am going to show you now what the

Agency has indicated to us was made available to the Warren

Commission.

In response to your question, there is no particular

memo from Mr. Dooley indicating what went to the Warren

Commission.

I would like you to examine CIA number 1929 through

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CIA number 1933.

This is a document that was made available to Mr.

Rankin on May 15, 1964 in reference to the information that

had been provided to the Agency by AMMuG.

I would like you to review the document and then

specifically to review the actual information that was

made available to the Warren Commission.

MI. Rocca. Do you mean that Mr. Rankin is not a member

of the Warren Commission?

Mr. Goldsmith. I didn't mean to differentiate between

Mr. Rankin and the Warren Commission.

Basically, what I was saying is that the document

number 1929-1930 is the memorandum, the transmittal memorandum;

that indicates what information is going to be provided,

and the

source of the information. And then, what you'll see in pages

CIA number 1932 and 1933 is the actual information that was

made available.

(Pause)

Mr. Goldsmith.

Have you had a chance to review

those materials?

Mr. Rocca.

Uh-huh.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do those materials make any reference

to Luisa Calderon?

Mr. Rocca. I

see it -- and I say that they do not.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, AMMUG provided information on

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MI. Rocca.

I don't see it -- here, anyway.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, AMMUG provided information on

Manuel (Vega) Perez and Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez and Luisa

Calderon and the memo that you're studying now refers only

to

(Vega) Perez and Rodriguez Lopez.

Is that correct?

Mr. Rocca. And Duran.

Mr. Goldsmith. And Duran, yes. But there is no

reference to Luisa Calderon, is that correct?

Mr. Rocca. There is none.

But, as I say, I cannot explain -- Mr. Hall, who did

this, certainly did not include that on it. But I cannot

accept that that material did not get to the Commission

somehow in some way.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let me review another document

with you.

: Mr. Rocca. That is, my impression is that Mr. Dooley

passed all of the information to them.

There certainly would have been no reason to omit

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Mr. Goldsmith. I would ask you at this point to review

CIA number 1907, which is a brief for presentation to the

President's Commission on the Assassination of President

Kennedy dated May 14, 1964.

I would like to ask you to review specifically CIA

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number 1927 and indicate to me whether there is any reference

to Calderon specifically or any of the other DGI individuals.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. There are no specifics worked out.

There

is simply the generalization that a source is being debriefed

and the Commission staff is in the course of being briefed

on it.

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Mr. Goldsmith. Who actually gave this briefing?

Mr. Rocca. I have no idea.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would that have been Mr. Helms or

Mr. McCone?

Mr. Rocca. I judge Mr. Helms, but I can't be certain.

I would rather imagine Mr. Helms.

Mr. Goldsmith. Please review CIA number 1906.

(Pause)

Mr. Goldsmith.

My question pertains to this document

right now.

Let's identify it first.

would you identify for the record what this is?

Mr. Rocca. It's an internal memorandum from Mr.

Angleton to me indicating that the DDP, Mr. Helms, has been

scheduled to go before the Commission and he wants a short,

but comprehensive, memorandum which highlights the basic

issues or positions entered into by the Agency and its dealings

with the Commissions.

In other words, that's presumably what came out of it.

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Mr. Goldsmith. Now, this is dated 12 May, 1964,

is that correct?

Mr.

Rocca.

That is correct.

Mr. Goldsmith. The memo for you from Mr. Angleton

is dated 12 May, 1964.

Mr.

Rocca.

Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is it fair to say from the text of this

memo that the Agency was extremely concerned about the

sensitive source, AMMUG? In other words, here was an example

of the Agency being concerned about a sensitive source?

Mr. Rocca. Well, there is always this sensitivity.

Mr. Goldsmith. I'm asking you to look only at CIA 1905.

Mr. Rocca. But you've already shown me the brief.

That's what I was looking at.

Mr. Goldsmith. Okay. You'd like to look through

the brief again?

: Mr. Rocca. No.

I was only going to point out that the very first

paragraph of the brief refers to the sensitive source, which

is AMMUG -- somewhere along here -- it's one of the tabs,

Tab E, I quess.

So, there was within the limits of the prescription

comprehensive and at the same time extensive information,

Mexican

and Cuban phases.

In other words, is the point that

we weren't mentioning it -- because we did mention it?

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Mr. Goldsmith. There are a variety of points and I

really am not able to indicate to you right now what all the

points are, MI. Rocca.

My concern here with document number 1906 simply is

whether the Agency was concerned about the sensitivity of

AMMUG and therefore wanted to protect him as a sensitive

source.

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Mr. Rocca. My recollection is that it wasn't any greater

than anything else that was coming along.

Mr. Goldsmith. The AMMUG defection was no greater

than anything else that was coming along?

Mr. Rocca. Than any of the other techniques, sources,

and methods that we had been concerned with.

In other words, I'm trying to - you were asking me

whether this qualitatively was of greater significance than

anything else that we were engaged in protecting, and I can't

remember that it was.

Mr. Swensen considered it as very important from the

standpoint of his own security

and the security of

his agent.

But I don't recall any draconian impositions, "Don't say anything

about AMMUG."

Mr. Goldsmith. What did Mr. Angleton have in mind

when he said the following to you in the memo: "I informed

him" -- that is, Mr. Helms - "that in your view this would

raise a number of new factors with the Commission; that it

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should not go to the Commission prior to the Director's

appearance unless we have first had some preliminary reaction

or made sure that the Director is fully aware of its implications

since it could well serve as the basis for detailed questioning."

MI. Rocca. (Nods negatively)

I haven't the faintest notion at this time of what

was involved in that.

Mr. Goldsmith. You'll have to speak up a bit, Mr.

Rocca.

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Mr. Rocca..

I mean, it doesn't bring to mind a par-

ticular series of considerations unless they would relate

directly to the handling of the individual, who he was, what

position he had, and all the rest - in other words, involve

the actual surfacing of the source.

Mr. Goldsmith. According to this memo, it also

indicates that the DDP, Mr. Helms, stated that he would review

this carefully and make a decision as to the question of timing.

Was the Agency concerned about the question of timing

in terms of when material would be made available to the

Warren Commission?

Mr.

Rocca.

I think it refers to timing with respect

to this particular matter, in view of the fact that AMMUG

had just come out.

Overall I would say that they were not concerned with

the question of timing.

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Mr. Goldsmith. Please review CIA number 1950 through

1954.

This is an excerpt from a memo that was prepared by

you on 23 May 1975 in response to the letter of April 15,

1975, from Mr. Belin.

(Pause)

Mr. Goldsmith. Have you had occasion to review those

pages

now, Mr. Rocca?

Mr. Rocca.

Yes.

This is the memo I wrote for Mr. Belin.

Mr. Goldsmith. For purposes of clarification, were

there any other memos that you prepared for the Rockefeller

commission?

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Mr. Rocca. Yes, there was another memo.

There were

two memos that I prepared.

: Mr. Goldsmith. Then there is one other one.

Mr. Rocca. There is another one, and it had a

total documentary appendix which won't tell you anything

you don't know. But it simply sets it out in what I consider

to be the necessary way to try to make any sense about anything.

This is not that memo.

Now it's very clear here that I have evolved in my

views with respect to the importance of Calderon.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you tell us for the record

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what the subject matter of CIA number 1950 to 1954 is?

In other words, you've just reviewed several pages.

They've pertained to Luisa Calderon.

What is the nature of the relevance of Luisa Calderoni

to this

case?

Mr. Rocca. The relevance is that if she is a DGI

agent, then the intercept becomes important. But this was

not something that I recognized in 1963. I recognized it

in 1975, because at that time I read the whole case.

Mr. Goldsmith. For purposes of clarification, what

is the substance of the telephone intercept that you are

referring to?

What does Luisa Calderon say?

Mr. Rocca. She doesn't say a thing. That's why it

is totally nuance, and I would never go public on a matter

of this kind.

Mr. Goldsmith. What is the nuance to which you are

referring?

Mr. Rocca. The nuance is that she is -- she phrases

what possibly had happened to Kennedy as "what barbarians."

I mean, it indicates an emotional setup, an emotional

attitude toward what had happened.

Mr. Goldsmith. More fundamentally, doesn't her

statement suggest the possibility of foreknowledge on her

part?

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Mr. Rocca. I used the word. I used that word and

you used it just now. But I'm not going to go into a court

and say that it does because I have no evidence that that

indicates foreknowledge. In and of itself it could indicate

anything, because we don't know enough from the intercept

about it. That's why I said

this was nuance.

Mr. Goldsmith. Right.

Now, at first glance, on reading that transcription,

it would not necessarily take on any particular significance

standing alone. I believe the way you refer to it is possibly

boastful self-indulgence or hyperbole, on the part of an

individual.

However, does it not to you take on added significance

in light of Luisa Calderon's alleged connection with DGI?

Mr. Rocca.

If we could prove it. All the evidence

is against it.

Piniero denies it.

Mr. Goldsmith. No, no, no.

Piniero denies that she was CIA. He does not deny

that she was DGI.

We can refer back to that memo if you would like

to clarify that.

Mr. Rocca. No. I think you're right, yes.

Mr. Goldsmith.

We have AMMUG making a statement

that --

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Mr. Rocca. I mean, AMMUG is our source, yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. And AMMUG says she is DGI.

Mr. Rocca: I'm obviously going under here. I'm

beginning to lose the track.

Well, you're at the very point I was, to be utterly

frank with you, in compiling that memo.

Mr. Goldsmith. The point I am trying to make is

if she were DGI, that statement would take on added

significance.

Is that a fair statement?

Mr. Rocca. That was the reason I put it in. But I

would, in any event, make it a cause

for state intervention

or that kind of thing. It's another one of these things --

it's what I call the laboratory level of counter intelligence,

where you consider evidence,

really, the way you consider

it, say, at a moot court, in a law school, that kind of thing.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was the Warren Commission ever given

a transcription of the conversation involving Luisa --

Mr. Rocca. Without question I would say that.

Without question.

They had the Calderon followup. They had the Dorticos

followup. They had the whole works. Not only did they have

it here, but they had it also

when they were down at the

station.

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Mr. Goldsmith. Let me show you CIA number 1928.

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Mr. Rocca. It just becomes incredible to see these

formalistic indications that they were not informed about

these things because I know they were.

Mr. Goldsmith. Please read that document.

(Pause)

Mr. Goldsmith. It is just one page.

Mr. Rocca. The fact that there is no reference to

Calderon doesn't mean that there was no transmission. It

means that this simply covered other materials.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would there be another record of the

Calderon transcription having been given to the warren

commission, and if so, where would it be?

Mr. Rocca. It has to be in this very record. This

is the first I have heard which even suggested that the

Calderon intercept had not been passed on.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let me just go back and review this

document with you briefly.

Mr. Rocca. As I say, this is not an exclusionary

document.

This simply covers what it covers.

Mr. Goldsmith. Okay.

This is CIA document number 1928. This document is

dated 10 April, 1964. It has the heading, "Material from

P-8593, Station Oswald File Shown to Warren Commission."

I take it that's the Mexico City station's Oswald

file.

Then the document lists the translations of calls

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made by Oswald that were given to the Commission. It also

refers to two other conversations that were given to the

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MI. Rocca. But they already had had it in Washington.

This only refers to presumably what happened in Mexico City.

It may not be the full record of what they gave them down

there.

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Mr. Goldsmith. Did the Mexico City station make

the Calderon transcript, at least according to this memo,

available to the Warren Commission?

Mr. Rocca. I can't say that, not from this memo.

It doesn't state that.

Mr. Goldsmith. The memo makes no reference at all

to Calderon, is that correct?

Mr. Rocca. It does not.

That does not affect the Commission's knowledge because

it simply doesn't make any sense that they wouldn't know of

the Calderon aspect, in my opinion, at this stage.

Mr. Goldsmith. Where would we be able to find a

formal record of the transcriptions that had been made

available to the Warren Commission staff?

Mr. Rocca. They should be in the formal record of the

material transmitted to the Warren Commission and in their

own records ana logs.

(Pause)

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Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Rocca, assuming that the committee

would be able to get clearance for you with the Agency, do

you think that you might be able to find the record of this

transcription having been given to the Warren Commission?

I think you can understand the importance of the

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Mr. Rocca. Of course.

Mr. Goldsmith. Thank you.

We will attempt to arrange that to see if you can

help us on this point.

Mr. Rocca.

That would include, obviously, going to

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us verify this particular issue or resolve this particular

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Mr. Rocca. The thing that would be of greatest use

would be if you could get the other memo.

Mr. Goldsmith. We will also make an effort to obtain

that memo, I assure you.

Mr. Rocca. Because, it had, as I say, a selection

of documents which represented in a sense the only education

that the Inspector General had had on the case, and they

kept it in their file.

I had intended it to be used as a basis

for the

selection of materials to be given to the Rockefeller

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Commission.

Mr. Goldsmith.

Fine.

We will make an effort to obtain these materials

and to review them.

Do you know whether --

Mr. Rocca. That is absolutely -- I find it absolutely

impossible to believe that this was not among the papers

that were given to you, and I would want to assemble my

troops and damn well ask them about it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether the Agency had

any penetration agents in the Cuban Embassy in 1963?

Mr. Rocca. In Mexico City?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Rocca. I do not know that.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let's refer to CIA number 1977.

Please read paragraph number 5.

Mr. Rocca. Uh-huh.

This is Ambassador Mann.

Mr. Goldsmith. That's

Ambassador Thomas Mann?

MI. Rocca.

Uh-huh.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, CIA number 1977 is part of a

cable that was written, in effect, by Ambassador Mann.

Paragraph five indicates that Ambassador Mann wanted

Luisa Calderon arrested.

Do you know why Ambassador Mann wanted Luisa Calderon

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arrested?

Mr. Rocca. Because of the implications of her

involvement, possible involvement, as a consequence of the

intercept, I would assume. It's 27 November. The intercept

had taken place on the 23rd, the afternoon of the 23rd.

The Dorticos thing had been on the 24th or the 25th. So, the

only basis that they would have had for any such action

would have been those materials. They had them in the field.!

Mr. Goldsmith. What about Azcue?

Mr. Rocca. He was presumably present and had the

altercation.

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Mr. Goldsmith. Why would that be a basis for arresting

the man?

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Mr. Rocca.

To find out what he knew about it.

The general tenor of this suggestion was pretty much

(scarehead) anyway,

so you immediately arrest anybody that

had any possible relationship to the man who did the killing

--

is the way I would have interpreted it.

So, they are all related -- in other words, co-related,

in the documentary materials which had been assembled by

that time.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let's take a recess briefly.

Would you like a 10 minute break or so?

(A brief recess was taken.)

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Rocca, are you generally familiar

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with the allegations that were made after the assassination

the Nicaraguan named Alverado?

Mr. Rocca. It's one of the cases that I wrote up in

the memorandum I think I gave to Belin.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you summarize generally for the

record what the allegation was?

Mr. Rocca.. I think my summary probably wouldn't be

worth the paper it's written on.

But, in essence, Alverado walked in the Embassy on

Christmas. Day of something and said that he had been in the

Cuban Embassy of in the courtyard and had seen a red-headed

Negro pass money to a young man he identified or who in his

view was Oswald.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

The gist of the allegation was essentially that

Alverado saw --

Mr. Rocca. The money was $5,000 or something.

Mr. Goldsmith. -- a Cuban, a red-headed Latin American

pass money to Oswald at the Cuban Consulate and that there

was some discussion which could have pertained to a possible

assassination.

Does that strike you as a fair summary of the gist

of the allegation, without going. through the entire record?

Mr. Rocca. Well, yes.

He was discredited, of course, as a source, eventually,

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by the polygraph.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

When were these allegations by Alverado resolved by

the Agency?

MI.

Rocca. I judge some time in February, March,

or April.

I cannot recall exactly when, but they are a part

of the record, certainly.

Mr. Goldsmith. Were the allegations by Alverado

resolved at such time as

he took the polygraph and failed it?:

Mr. Rocca. My feeling was that everyone regarded this

as the best thing since Pepsi Cola until that happened.

And then it just went down the drain.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let me give you a document, CIA number

2099, dated 10 December, 1963, which is the summary of the

Alverado polygraph test that had been given to him.

Would you please briefly skim through these three

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Mr. Rocca. Please recall that I have not read this

document at all, earlier.

Mr. Goldsmith. This is the first time you are

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Mr. Rocca. This will be my first reading.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. Yes?

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Mr. Goldsmith. According to that polygraph result,

Alverado did not pass the polygraph, and after being told

that he did not pass the exam, he essentially said, "The

machine doesn't lie."

Is that a fair statement?

Mr. Rocca. That's correct.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is it fair to say or appropriate

to say that based upon that, the Alverado allegation had been

resolved, so far as the Agency was concerned -- if you know?

MI. Rocca. I do not know.

Mr. Goldsmith. At the time that you were involved in

the Agency's investigation for the Warren Commission, at the

time that you were involved in providing information to the

Warren Commission for the Agency, was the Alverado issue

still a live one?

MI. Rocca. I believe so -- and it continued alive

until sometime after this date. That is my recollection.

That is, into

January of 1964.

I can't account for this thing here (indicating)

because it is definitive, and that time lapse that I recall.

But it certainly continued and there were people on the

Commission who were interested in the Alverado who were

dealing with people in Mr. Whitten's group on the details

of the case, is my recollection, and continued.

Mr. Goldsmith. So,

even though Alverado had failed

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to pass the polygraph prior to December 10, the issue was

still a live one at the time you became involved in the

investigation?

Mr. Rocca. It was still being mooted, yes, discussed.

It was still being discussed.

I would say that it had come to its end, though,

sometime around the end of January, or

that time. But these

are just terribly impressionistic judgments.

Mr. Goldsmith.

Fine.

I believe you discussed this this morning, but again,

for my purposes, when did you become involved in the CIA's

relationship with the Warren Commission?

Mr. Rocca. On of about the twelfth of January,

from that point on.

You get

the evidence of it, I think,

by the 31st, very clearly.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now,

in CIA number 2100, it indicates

that he, Alverado, stated that he wanted to protest his

unjust treatment and the fact that he was given money, since

he does not believe in negotiating over death.

Do you know anything about this allegation --

Mr. Rocca. I do not.

Mr. Goldsmith -- by Alverado that he was given

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Mr. Rocca. NO.

He was an informer, of course, of the Nicaraguan

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service and had been for some time. They had busted him

out.

or he had been blown, or something, and was moved to

Mexico City and this thing developed. So, he could well have

been referring to that kind of termination pay that is

normal or whatever.

But, as I say, this is my first reading of it and

I cannot comment to it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Well, were you told in 1963 that

Alverado had made a statement about being offered money?

Mr. Rocca. No, no.

I was told solely that he had failed the polygraph

and that upon told that he was being deceptive that he had

agreed -- is basically the story I heard. This is hearsay,

now.

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But it's not -- it's not too far off what that

says, I see now.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether his allegation.

that he was offered money by someone was ever examined?

Mr. Rocca. I do not know that. I do not know

that.

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But this should be followed up with the station people

or the people who were in the station at the time, or who

handled the case.

You could probably find the man who actually handled

Alverado and question him about that, that aspect.

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The interesting thing -- if we're finished with that

and if I may just interject --.

Mr. Goldsmith. Please do.

Mr. Rocca. -- is the fact that he talked about this

red-headed Negro, because the red-headed Negro then comes

into the story told by a woman.

Mr. Goldsmith. Elena Garro de Paz?

Mr. Rocca. Yes.

Elena de Paz -- D-E-- new word -- P-A-z.

So, if you believe in stream of consciousness in

the way things happen, here they go. • But my explanation for

that is that she read it in the Warren Commission report

of in some of the newspaper coverage, and that's the way it

came out.

But I still took note of it in the memo that I put

together for Belin as to those elements that suggested

nuance, because she was very persistent in repeating her

story. But she also happened to be a personal

enemy of one

of the other people involved.

Mr. Goldsmith. Silvia Duran?

Mr. Rocca. Silvia Duran. So, there is a question

of conflict of interest.

But there were people in the embassy who believed

her and continued to report, and there is at least one

State Department man who reported right up to the very moment

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of his retirement.

Mr. Goldsmith. I would like to show you --

Mr. Rocca.

On this detail.

Mr. Goldsmith. --CIA number 1983, which is dated

April. 15, 1964.

It's a memo to Mr. Rankin from Mr. Coleman and Slawson

in reference to progress in their area, which was Oswald's

foreign travels. Specifically, on page: 6 of that memo, on

paragraph number 7, it indicates that the Warren Commission

at that point had not yet been given a complete report of

the Alverado story from the CIA.

I wonder if you could respond to that?

Mr. Rocca. I can't.

I have no response to it because this has been long

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Mr. Goldsmith. That's paragraph number 7.

: Mr. Rocca. What is the date of it?

Mr. Goldsmith. April 15, 1964.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. This is following their trip there

and undoubtedly reflects their conversation on the spot.

I think their note that we 'know informally and through

highly digested written reports that the allegations have

been thoroughly investigated in estabiishing beyond a

reasonable doubt as false" has really taken care of it.

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Mr. Goldsmith. Yes, although it would seem that

the allegation had been resolved several months earlier,

and it is now the middle of April and they haven't received

a complete report as yet. That's what I'm focusing on right

now.

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MI. Rocca. Well, as I say, I think they got this

as a result of being restimulated by their Mexican trip --

if I am correct in the timing. Obviously, if they wanted

a final wrap-up report, they were certainly entitled to it.

But they had the gist of it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever send them a final

wrap-up report?

MI. Rocca. As far as I know, I do not recall such.

Mr. Goldsmith. Paragraph eight refers to additional

information of a confidential nature. Do you know what

they are referring to there?

: Mr. Rocca. With respect to your previous question,

let me say that they did discuss this in their report.

Mr. Goldsmith. In the Warren Commission report.

Mr. Rocca. In the Warren Commission report.

Mr. Goldsmith. I am aware of that.

Mr. Rocca. And it seems to me impossible that they

could have written what they did without having a complete

and thorough knowledge of what had gone on.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did the FBI participate at all in the

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investigation of the Alverado story?

Mr. Rocca. To my knowledge, they did. But I have

not read their reporting.

Mr. Dooley would have read that. That was one

of

his functions, reading those.

Mr. Goldsmith.

Fine.

Turning to paragraph eight, would you indicate if

you know what the additional information of a confidential

nature is that is being referred to there?

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. I haven't the vaguest notion.

Could I look at the rest of the memorandum to see

what the other topics are, because that's the only way.

It may be a reference to the working out of the schedule

in Helsinki. It could be a matter of the gun, the weaponry.

It could be a matter of the Minsk business.

: Mr. Goldsmith. I would just assume that you not look

at the rest of the memo at this time, simply because it's

very long. If it becomes necessary to show it to you in the

future, we'll certainly make it available to you again.

Mr. Rocca. I can't guess at it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

(Pause):

Mr. Goldsmith. While MI. Berk is checking something

for me, let me show you CIA number 2088.

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This is an information report on an individual;

the individual specifically is Luisa Rodriguez Calderon.

dated 26 April, 1965.

It's

The source apparently was AMMUG.

Mr.

Rocca.

1965?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

The document contains

a statement to the following

effect: "It is requested that the addressees take no action

on any of the individuals mentioned in the personality

reports without first checking with this Agency."

I am wondering what would be their reason.

Mr. Rocca. That would be routine.

This is a

dissemination.

Mr. Goldsmith. That does not indicate to whom the

report is being disseminated.

Mr. Rocca. Well, there is a letter and the letter

is simply not reproduced here. But normally this would have

gone to all agencies in the intelligence community that had

a counter intelligence interest.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

What would the purpose have been of the qualifying

or restrictive language in that paragraph?

Mr.

Rocca. The caveat.

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr.

Rocca. I would say that it represents the normal

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practice

in

dealing with a live source of this quality and

sensitivity and represents inter-agency practice.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. I mean, this is simply a question of

keeping other people from getting into the source, without

letting you know that they are doing it or getting on to

the development of the leads.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would ail disseminations to other

agencies

contain restrictive language like that?

Mr. Rocca.

I can't say that all do, but I have

written many of them myself

and I have read many of them

myself --

Mr. Goldsmith. And it is not at all uncommon for

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Mr. Rocca -- that

is it exactly. I wish I had stated

it that way.

It is not uncommon.

In fact, it is quite common.

Then again, it is designed to keep the channels --

Mr. Goldsmith. Please refer to CIA number 1991,

which is a memo dated 1 June, 1964 in reference to Alverado.

The memo is to Mr. Rankin from Mr. Helms. Specifically

refer to paragraph four of that memo.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether the Warren

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Commission ever received a

copy of the Alverado polygraph

report?

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Mr.

Rocca.

I do not.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would there be a record of that

fact, had the report been given to the Warren Commission?

Mr. Rocca.

Mr. Hall prepared this.

He was a

very careful operator -- he has passed on.

It strikes me that somewhere there must be another

memo that goes along with this.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would there be a record of the polygraph

report having been transmitted to the Warren Commission if,

in fact, it was?

Mr. Rocca. Not necessarily. There might have been

a memo saying we regret or something of that kind. But, as

say, I can't say one way of the other.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, the Agency never compiled a list

of materials that had been provided to the Warren Commission?!

Mr. Rocca. In a single 10g?

Mr. Goldsmith.

Yes.

Mr. Rocca. As far as I know, no.

This I regret,

to be utterly frank with you.

In other words, this is the final report that they

were talking about:

Mr. Goldsmith. I'm not sure I'm following you.

Mr. Rocca. This is the wrap-up report that Messers

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Coleman and Slawson were complaining -- well, not complaining,

strike that -- that they were saying had not been received.

Now I dealt with both of them in a very friendly way.

Mr. Goldsmith. So that report was made available to

them on 1 June, 1964?

Mr. Rocca. Which follows very closely after their

report and we were struggling to get some of these things

done, and it took time.

•Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether the Warren

Commission was ever told about Alverado making the allegation,

that he had been offered money?

Mr. Rocca. I cannot say that at all. I have no

recollection of it.

MI. Goldsmith.. If he had --

Mr. Rocca. I read it for the first time in that

statement that you gave me.

Mr. Goldsmith. And the Warren Commission makes no

reference to that.

Mr. Rocca. Well, the reference is enigmatic, as I

see it. It could refer to a lot of aspects that might not

be directly relevant to what was going on.

Mr. Goldsmith. Certainly.

Nevertheless, had the information been given to the

Warren Commission -- I am not saying one way or another

whether or not it was -- but had it been given to the

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Commission, it is conceivable that the Commission would have

wanted to examine that point further.

Are you familiar with the allegations that were made

by a Mexican citizen named Gutierez?

Mr. Rocca. You would have to tell me more about

Gutierez, because I don't recognize it from that name,

though it may again be one of the things that I took up.

Mr. Goldsmith. Gutierez was the Mexican citizen who

said that he saw an individual whom he later recognized to

be Oswald leaving the Cuban Consulate with another individual

and that the individuals were discussing something sinister.

Gutierez may have further alleged that he saw

money change

hands as well.

Please read number 1979, which will adequately refresh

your recollection, I think, on his statement.

(Pause)

: Mr.

Rocca. Oh, this is the famous "observed in

mid morning."

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. I would simply have to restudy the

whole thing. It just doesn't register with me. I mean,

I would have to go over the report. I think this is another

matter that they did discuss, the Gutierez lead.

The real question that comes up in my mind there

is whether this might not have been done more or less in

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the FBI line. It certainly doesn't ring any bell to me.

Mr. Goldsmith.

Essentially, to refresh your memory,

Gutierez alleged that he saw Oswald and someone else leaving

the Cuban Consulate, that the individuals got off in a car,

took off in a car. He overhead a conversation that was, at

least to him, sinister in nature and made an allegation that

a payoff was supposed to have occurred; possibly in that car

Does that -

Mr. Rocca. This is something that, as I say, I have

no recollection of,

and my feeling is that the Bureau did

whatever was followed up.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why would the Bureau have investigated

this matter as opposed to the CIA?

Mr. Rocca.

Their jurisdictional authorities, I mean,

were de facto in Mexico and they ran over everything.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did the Bureau investigate Alverado?

There, it seems, that the Agency was responsible

for resolving that issue.

Mr. Rocca. That might have been some kind of local,

private treaty.

But de Paz, for example, they did the

initial work and discredited her as a source.

It was we,

that is, Win and the Embassy man, who continued the interest

in it, with the Bureau's knowledge.

But my feeling is that they would not have accepted

our investigation in a matter of that kind. They would have

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gone over it themselves, and they dia. They spent hundreds

and hundreds of hours just going around Mexico City checking

up on Oswald.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, your impression, then, is that

the Bureau, rather than the Agency, investigated this issue?

Mr. Rocca. Could have. I mean, I'm trying to explain

why I don't remember anything about it. That certainly

doesn't strike a bell.

Now, it may strike a bell with whitten or somebody

else that actually was vested with this area.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did the Agency ever attempt to

determine whether it had obtained a photograph of Gutierez

outside the Cuban Consulate or Embassy?

Mr. Rocca. I cannot respond to that.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether Gutierez was

ever polygraphed?

: Mr. Rocca. No, I do not.

You see, I draw a complete blank on this one.

Mr. Goldsmith.

Fine.

If you don't remember, I'm not going to press you

on it, Mr. Rocca. We are certainly not here to attempt

VEO

simply: create testimony. So, if you don't remember,

I am

just going to withdraw.

MI.

Rocca.

Well, you will find people who will

remember, I am sure.

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Mr. Goldsmith. Please refer to CIA number 2020, and

read that document.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. I know of no followup or anything of that!

kind, as a matter of fact.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you identify the document

for the record.

Mr. Rocca. It is a cable to the intelligence, the

counter intelligence community -- White House, Department

of State, and the FBI from the Agency on Oswald on the

26th of November, stipulating of setting forth information

from Mexico regarding an alleged relationship between Oswald

and Arnesto Rodriguez, who lives in New Orleans -- Arnesto

Rodriguez -- and runs a Spanish language school, and is

anti-Castro.

Mr. Goldsmith. Does the cable

also make reference

to a tape recording?

Mr. Rocca. According to Maria Rodriguez de Lopez,

her son-in-law has a taped conversation

1 with Oswald.

Mr. Goldsmith.

Do you know whether this allegation,

either of Oswald's connection with Arnesto Rodriguez or

the fact of a possible tape recording was ever investigated

by the Agency?

Mr. Rocca. No -- and it would not have been.

Mr. Goldsmith. The reason for that would have been

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what, sir?

Mr. Rocca.

This is strictly within the investigative

responsibilities of the Bureau.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether the Bureau

ever pursued this lead?

MI. Rocca. I do not.

This is not a matter -- in other words, this cable,

in its entirely, is not anything regarding which I have any

background information. I don't know, therefore, whether

this was investigated.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

MI. Rocca. I assume, however, that it was.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now earlier, Mr. Rocca, you made

reference to an allegation by a woman named Elena Garro de

Paz.

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Mr. Rocca. That's correct.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you state generally for the

record what that allegation was.

Mr. Rocca. Well, again, I would prefer to answer

the question having the benefit of a re-reading of the

summary that I gave for Mr. Belin. But not having it at

this moment, it was

she who came in around Christmas Day,

not Alverado.

Mr. Goldsmith. Right. Alverado came in shortly

after the assassination.

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Mr. Rocca. So, I correct that part. It was she.

She had become involved -- she is a highly

controversial right wing personality, (a poet), and had

become involved in a situation with the secretary or the

receptionist at the Cuban Embassy.

Mr. Goldsmith. Silvia Duran?

Mr. Rocca. Silvia Duran -- was a relative.

They were hostile to each other. There was a long,

apparently, background to that effect.

But she came in with a story which concerned

essentially the passage of money by a red-headed Negro at

the Cuban Embassy. But I cannot recall what her evidential-

what the crux of her evidence was in this.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall whether she was referring

to having seen this red-headed Negro at the Cuban Embassy

or rather at a party that was being thrown by Horatio

Duran?

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Mr. Rocca. You're quite right. It was at a party.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether this allegation

was ever investigated by the CIA?

MI. Rocca. My feeling is from just reading the

record -- and this came after, when I was working on the

thing, reading the file in connection with Mr. Belin's

request -- that Mr. Scott pursued it very thoroughly.

Mr. Goldsmith. Incidentally, you indicated that

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trainit

the ran

Mrs. de Paz went to the Embassy around Christmas Day.

Do you recall what year that was?

Mr. Rocca. Oh, yes.

It was the end of '63, early '64. And, if it wasn't

Christmas Day, it was New Year's Day or the weekend, because

there was -- her story was that her life was in danger.

She had reported her information to the Minister of Interior

or to the Gobernacion. They had put her up in a hotel.

I mean, there was an entire scenario which she read.

There were very few probative and evidential details to

sustain her story.

According to the record,

as I remember it, the FBI

representative regarded it as simply not so.

Mir. Goldsmith. Do you know whether she was given a

polygraph?

Mr. Rocca. No, I don't think she ever -- I remember

nothing in the record that shows that she was polygraphed.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know why she was not polygraphed

whereas Alverado was polygraphed?

Mr. Rocca. Was she?

Mr. Goldsmith. I'll rephrase the question.

Do you know why she would not have been polygraphed

when someone such as Alverado was polygraphed?

MI. Rocca. No, I can't answer that.

I think that probably it was because of the -- I

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certain couldn't -- I certainly can't answer for the people

who were making the operational decisions on the spot. I

can guess that her story was simply not believed or there

was sufficient disbelief not to warrant that extent of

imposition on her personality.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are you certain that Elena Garro de

Paz went into the embassy in December of 1963 or January

of 1964?

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Mr. Rocca.

No, I'm not. I mean, I'm guessing

entirely.

Could it have been a year later?

Ah.

Of course. It was the next year that she walked in.

It was the end of '64 or the beginning of '65. I recall

now that this gives the link, because the Warren Commission

had already issued its report which had mentioned the

red-headed Negro and the lead, and therefore in reading her

story, there always occurred the virus that she had simply

taken advantage of an evidential detail which was already

in the public domain.

This is now my recollection.

This is after the Warren Commission had completed

its work.

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Mr. Goldsmith. For the record, according to CIA

number 1957, which is part of the lengthy memo that you

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prepared for Mr. Belin, you indicate that the first reference

to Elena Garro de Paz, or the first time she formally made

an allegation on. the record, was on 12 October, 1964.

Mr. Rocca. And the Warren Commission came out on the

first of October.

Mr. Goldsmith.

would you plese read through CIA

number 1957 through 1959, those three pages.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. Yes, indeed. This was my writeup of

the case, retrospectively, as one of those elements

that had happened after the Warren Commission had looked

after this, that suggested the possibility of Cuban involvement

or that something further could be and should be done about

the Cuban aspect, should be undertaken.

Mr. Goldsmith. That document makes reference to an

individual named Carvillo, who allegedly detained Elena Garro

de Paz at the Vermont Hotel in Mexico.

Do you know whether Carvillo ever had any connection

with the CIA?

MI. Rocca. No, I do not.

Mr. Goldsmith. What about June Cobb? Do you know

whether she ever had any connection with the CIA?

Mr. Rocca. I do not.

She is a -- I thought you were going to say DGI.

Doesn't she come in in some kind of --

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Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether she ever had any

connection with DGI?

Mr. Rocca.

This is what has been alleged in the

record, but I can't accept that as evidence.

As far as I know, there is no investigative

substratum for that.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether anyone ever

approached Carvillo and asked him--

Mr. Rocca. No, I do not.

Mr. Goldsmith. -- why he detained Elena Garro de

Paz?

Mr. Rocca. No, I do not.

Certainly that part of it entered into the period

of '63, if she was telling the truth. Of course, we don't

know whether she is telling the truth because she told her

story for the first time, as far as the record is concerned,

in '64, at the end of the year.

For that reason I inserted this into the record of

episodes that struck me as being at least interesting from

the standpoint of re-reviewing the file, from the Cuban

point of view.

Mr. Goldsmith. Please refer to CIA number 2055.

Mr. Rocca. Where would that be? Are we using

this number (indicating)?

Oh, I see.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you review that item?

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Mr. Goldsmith. Would you identify that document?

Mr. Rocca. This is a response by Mr. Helms to

-

a memorandum by Mr. Helms to Mr. Rankin, General Counsel of

the Warren Commission, regarding allegations pertaining to

an intelligence training school in Minsk, U.S.S.R.

Mr. Goldsmith. What is the date of the document?

Mr. Rocca: I'm trying to find it up here. Maybe

you can help me.

Mr. Goldsmith. The document appears to be undated,

so we'll just have to refer to it again as CIA number 2055.

It is possibly 5 June, 1964?

Mr. Rocca. I would say that that's close enough,

inasmuch as Tom Hall, again the analyst who worked on Soviet

matters in R & A, prepared it.

The allegations -- what would you like me to say about

this?:

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Mr. Goldsmith. According to that document, there

was no reliable information indicating that there was a

training school, an intelligence training school in Minsk,

is that correct?

Mr. Rocca. That's correct, yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether subsequent to the

time that this document was written any information was

obtained indicating that, in fact, there was a training school

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of an intelligence nature in Minsk?

Mr. Rocca. As far as - to my knowledge, there was

no such.

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Mr. Golasmith. Mr. Rocca, I think that this might be

an appropriate time to break for the day.

I have, I would say, no more than two hours of

questions remaining.

I would ask you to refrain from discussing or

disclosing any of the testimony that you have given today

to anyone else.

May I have your assurance on that point?

Mr. Pocca. You may count on it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Thank you.

The reason I make that point is because the committee,

when it takes a deposition, does not have the same effective

authority as it does when it conducts a hearing in Executive

Session.

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Mr. Rocca. I note that from your ground rules.

But you may rest assured.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

I didn't want you to infer from the fact that I was

asking that that I consider that a risk in this particular

case. That is a question or a statement that I routinely

make.

In any. event, I think that we will resume questioning

....

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tomorrow morning at 10:00 o'clock.

Thank you for your time today.

Mr. Rocca. All right.:

(Whereupon, at 5:00 o'clock, p.m., the taking of

the deposition of Raymond G. Rocca recessed, to recommence

on Tuesday, July 18, 1978, at 10:00 o'clock, a.m.)

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SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

Subcommittee on the Assassination of John F. Kennedy.

Washington, D. C.

Tuesday, July 18, 1978

Continuation of the Deposition of

RAYMOND G. ROCCA,

called for examination by counsel for the Subcommittee,

pursuant to recess from the preceding day, in the offices

of the Select Committee on Assassinations, Room 3370,

House Annex Number 2, Second and D Streets, S. W., Washington,

D. C., beginning at 10:20 o'clock, a.m., when were present:

For the Subcommittee:

MICHAEL GOLDSMITH, COUNSEL

CHARLES BERK, STAFF MEMBER.

-

(The witness, Raymond G. Rocca, having been

previously sworn, was called and testified as follows:)

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Rocca, I would like to thank you

for being here today.

I would like to remind you that you are still under

oath.

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Before we get started on the actual substance of

the deposition, I would like to ask you whether you discussed

the substance of yesterday's deposition with anyone?

Mr. Rocca. I did not.

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Mr. Goldsmith.

Fine.

I believe yesterday we finished the session with a

brief discussion of whether there was an intelligence training

school in the city of Minsk, and you indicated that in 1963

there was no reliable information indicating that, in fact,

there was such a school in Minsk.

Do you have any other information that pertains

to that point?

Mr. Rocca. I think you have summarized exactly

what I said, that there was no confirmation available

that there had been or was during the time that Oswald was

in Minsk a training

school of the service in that city.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever receive any indication

subsequent to 1964 that, in fact, there was no such school

in Minsk?

Mr. Rocca. As far as I know, there has never been

any confirmation or indication.

Mr. Goldsmith. One way or another?

Mr. Rocca. One way or other.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

Mr. Rocca. We're talking now about the KGB central

headquarters, the people who would be actually responsible

for the training.

Mr. Goldsmith. Right.

Mr. Rocca. I know nothing about what local schools

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or local provisions might be made by the White Russian --

this is the White Russian -- SSR -- republic. As far as

I know, they have no school training there either.

Mr. Goldsmith. So far as you know, the warren

Commission was given all of the information that was available

on that point -

Mr. Rocca. Yes, indeed.

Mr. Goldsmith. -- and there has not been any additional

information since 1964 that touches upon it?

Mr. Rocca. That's correct.

Mr. Goldsmith. Turning to another area, now, would

you indicate for the record what a 201 file is?

Mr. Rocca: A 201 file is a jargon expression that

grew up, I suppose, out of the old army system, 201 files in

World War II. It was applied when our files, CIA files,

were set up in 1947. I am speaking now out of hearsay.

The phrase applies to files created on personalities, for

dossiers on personalities. They are referred to, in other

words, broadly speaking, as 201 files.

Mr. Goldsmith.

So, a 201 file essentially is a

personality file?

Mr. Rocca. (Nods affirmatively.)

Mr. Goldsmith. Does a 201 file contain information

of operational significance?

Mr. Rocca. Yes, it can. It depends on how the

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material has been selected and put together.

Mr. Goldsmith. What is the criterion for the opening

of a 201 file?

Mr. Rocca. These are specified exactly in a handbook

which is written and to which I refer you. The criteria

have changed, or were changed, over the years, at the beginning

to apply to individuals who were either agents or suspect

agents of adversary services, all adversary services,

intelligence, counter intelligence, sabotage interest,

our own agents, collaborators, and others, at the determination,

again in terms of criteria, who fell within the mission of

the Agency.

These categories are specified and I refer you, then,

to that publication. It's at the Records Integration Center.

Mr. Goldsmith. Have you had occasion to open a

201 file?

: Mr. Rocca. Personally?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Rocca. No.

I always would indicate this and have other people

do it. As far as I know, I have not ever done the process,

except perhaps as a part at one point of my formal training

or other. But I have no recollection of having opened a file:

Mr. Goldsmith. On those occasions when

someone from

the CI staff opened a 201 file on an individual, would the

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primary purpose of such an opening be to obtain information on

a person who was of potential counter intelligence significance?

Mr. Rocca. It could be that.

It could be of purely passive interest. It is to

serve as a repository for the accession of additional informatior

of whatever kind, overt, covert, or whatever.

So, it does not necessarily indicate any kind of

aggressive interest at all.

It simply serves as the receptacle or repository

for the retention of information, and recovery of information.

Mr. Goldsmith. If an individual is perceived as a

counter intelligence threat, would a 201 file normally be

opened?

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Mr. Rocca. Yes.

At the time that the file was opened on Mr. Oswald,

which would be 1958 or 1959, my impression is that U.s.

defectors were not in the list of individuals on whom files

would be opened automatically by the Records Integration

Division, which actually could do this and did it as a

matter of formal duty.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, there are categories, categories

of individuals, which automatically result in the opening

of a 201 file, whereas in some cases you are saying that

the opening of a file is discretionary.

Is that accurate?

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Mr. Rocca.

It's an analyst's choice.

Mr. Goldsmith. But in some cases it might be

mandatory, and in some cases it would be discretionary?

Mr. Rocca.

Well, according to the handbook it would

be mandatory. Whether it would be done or not would depend

upon the analyst's capacity to judge whether this fell within

the mandate.

Mr. Goldsmith. Please review CIA number 796.

(Pause)

Mr. Goldsmith.

Have you had a chance to review that

document?

Mr. Rocca. This is a State Department document.

Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. What is the date of that document?

MI.

Rocca. October 31, 1959.

Mr. Goldsmith.

That document indicates in

substance, does it not, that Lee Harvey Oswald appeared at

the American

Embassy in Russia to renounce his American

citizenship? It indicates that he had applied for Soviet

citizenship. It indicates,

among other things, that his

attitude was

arrogant, aggressive, he had recently been

discharged

from the Marine Corps, and it says he has offered

the Soviets any information he has acquired as an enlisted

radar

operator.

Now, would the information contained in this State

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Department telegram, which was routed to the CIA and which

we have obtained from the Office of Security at the CIA --

would the information contained in this telegram normally

lead to the opening of a 201 file?

Mr. Rocca. It depends on where it went in the Agency.

If it went to the Office of Security, they would have opened

their own file on it. But if a copy did not go to the DDP

at that time, the Deputy Director for Plans, there would be

no way of knowing about it.

So, I cannot respond.

But normally, that would have been actionable,

I would say retrospectively. And I have no knowledge whether

or not it ever did come into our hands at that time.

Mr. Goldsmith. Right.

We will get into that momentarily.

Mr. Rocca. As a matter of fact, I think the substance

of this cable was reported in the newspapers.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is there any formal communication

channel between the Office of Security and DDP which would

serve the purpose of having communications of this kind

be passed to the appropriate office for action?

Mr. Rocca. Not necessarily. There obviously should

be.

But if the people in the Office of Security will receive

this, inasmuch as it concerns an American, and it was

presumably relevant to their interest in Americans, and possible

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security interests from the defensive security point of view

of CIA itself, they might not do it, in which case the

normal liaison, which would be via a liaison officer

or simply a routing slip from the chief of the Office of

Security would not take place.

Mr. Goldsmith. More specifically, then, is there

any link between the Office of Security and the CI staff

which would serve the purpose of passing information of this

kind to the CI staff, as it would seem that the information

contained in this memo is relevant to the CI staff in

particular, rather than any of the divisions within DDP?

Mr. Rocca. Well, you are again looking at it with

20-20 hindsight. There certainly were all the channels

that one could expect in an organization, as. I indicated

on the chart yesterday, for the passages of such a piece

of material. In point of fact, State should have routed

it to the DDP.

It is in that kind of routing and selection that you

could get slippage.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, if I understand your testimony,

it is that, in fact, there was a communication channel

between Office of Security and CI staff which would serve the

purpose of passing along this type of information. whether

or not the information in fact was passed along is another

question. But there was a channel.

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MI. Rocca. Oh, indeed.

Mr. Goldsmith. I would like you to review a document

that is known as Warren Commission Exhibit 917.

I might note for the record that at the bottom of the

exhibit there is an indication that the document was routed

to the CIA, although there is no indication specifically

which office at CIA received this document.

Warren Commission Exhibit 917, for the record, is a

confidential message from the Navy to the Chief of Naval

Operations.

(Pause)

Mr. Goldsmith. Have you had a chance to review that

document?

Mr. Rocca. Yes, indeed.

Mr. Goldsmith. We just might note for the record

that this document is somewhat briefer than the earlier

one you just reviewed, the State Department cable dated

10-31-59.

This one also states that Oswald was in the

Marine Corps as a radar operator and has offered to furnish

the Soviets information he possesses in U.S. radar.

Again, would the information contained in this type

of communication normally lead to the opening of a 201 file?

Mr. Rocca. In the DDP. At that time, as I say,

it was not automatic.

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand. Your testimony is

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very clear on that. It would have been something

discretionary.

Mr. Rocca.

Yes.

Defectors was added as a mandatory category as a

consequence of this whole case.

Mr. Goldsmith. I might point out that --

MI. Rocca. So, if I were reviewing this thing and

it had come across my desk, I would certainly expect it to

go to a 201 file.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

MI. Rocca. But there would be other 201 files,

or other files, that ought to receive it, too, including

the Office of Security.

Mr. Goldsmith. What is CITSIG?

Mr. Rocca.

CI/SIG is Counter Intelligence, Special

Investigations Group.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know what the purpose of that

group was in 1959 to 1960?

Mr. Rocca. Well, this group was set up originally

when the staff was set up and before I joined it. So, are you

limiting your question only to that time or to its general

functions?

Mr. Goldsmith. My question was focusing on the period

1959 to 1960.

(Pause)

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Mr. Rocca. The point is that it was set up to handle

especially sensitive cases in the area of security of personnel

and in particular, cases involving security of personnel

who were also of operational interest, as were operators.

In other words, it was an interface with the Office

of security.

Mr. Goldsmith. In other words, when you say

security of personnel, you are referring now to CIA --

Mr. Rocca. DDP personnel, and Agency personnel to

the extent that they might affect the DDP's interests.

This was the channel to the Office of Security.

MI. Goldsmith. So, is it fair to say here that the

purpose of the CI/SIG unit was to insure that DDP was not

being penetrated by a foreign intelligence service?

Mr. Rocca. That, I think, would probably be one of the

sensitive kinds of cases that they would be interested in.

Mr. Goldsmith. What other types of sensitive types

of cases would they be interested in?

MI. Rocca. I think they would probably have been

interested in any kind of case involving security of DDP

personnel, or operations like the LINGUAL operation, which

was placed within its purview. That involved, in other

words, sensitive work against the Soviets designed to

produce information, again bearing chiefly on the security

of personnel and of operations.

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Mr. Goldsmith. When would someone within the

CI/SIG unit have occasion to open a 201 file?

Mr. Rocca. I would imagine that they would have had

that occasion whenever a question a rose that concerned

people that came within the purview of the mission that I

have described, namely, the pepetration of our operations

or the advancement of our particular interests with respect

to the security of those operations. These now become very

difficult questions to answer without some thought, because

I would have to think of, really, general trains of operations,

and in that area I was not, of course, briefed. But I think

in substance what I have said covers what I know about it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Okay.

You just made a reference to --

MI. Rocca. I mean, there were many sensitive areas

that involved aspects, that involved sources and access to

materials that were of higher classification than what you

have shown me.

Mr. Goldsmith. You just made reference to having

been briefed.

Would you clarify for the record what you mean by

having been briefed.

Mr. Rocca. Did I say -- I did not say that.

Mr. Goldsmith. I think that you did, and what I

suspect you referred to was during your time in the Agency

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things that you may have been briefed upon.

MI. Rocca. Oh, yes. I mean, I was not briefed

on the entire range of their operations.

Mr. Goldsmith. You were not briefed by the Agency

for this deposition, were you?

MI. Rocca. I was not.

Mr. Goldsmith. You weren't briefed by anyone of the

staff prior to taking the deposition?

MI. Rocca. Indeed not. I have had no contacts

whatsoever about this.

MI. Goldsmith.

Fine.

I just wanted to clarify that.

(Pause)

MI. Rocca. The specific purpose that lay behind

the creation of this office I think grew out of the penetrations

of OSS by the Soviets.

Mr. Goldsmith. Okay.

Getting back to the concept of a 201 file, will a

201 file always indicate whether the individual involved

had a relationship of some kind with the Agency, either as

an agent, a source, a contract employee, whatever? By looking

at a 201 file, will you always know whether, in fact, the

person had a relationship with the Agency?

MI. Rocca. One of the categories for opening a file,

for opening a 201 file, was the contractual or fiduciary

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relationship, and if that was the case, if the file had

been opened in that instance, it would either be manifest' in

the file or there would be an indication in it directing

whoever had the file to go to whatever place had the

responsibility for the fiduciary relationship.

Now, as I stated, this is only one category in the

list of criteria for the opening of files, and as far as I

know, the 201 file that was opened on Oswald was opened by

Mrs. Edgerter pursuant not to that, but to the potential

interest that she, as an analyst, felt lodged in the fact

that he had been a defector and it figured on that list.

Mr. Goldsmith. I think that you are anticipating

my questions, and we will get to the Oswald 201 file in

particular momentarily.

Let's get back to the question that I asked a moment

ago.

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relationship with the CIA, if there was such a relationship?

Mr. Rocca. As far

as

I know, it would.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, if someone were an agent, source,

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or --

Mr. Rocca. The whole purpose of the file, and the

opening of that file, would be to prevent others from recruiting

the same agent, from making use of the same agent, for

other agencies who perhaps had been in contact to do that,

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and therefore it would have to appear in some way or other

on the face of the file.

MI. Goldsmith. Then the next step in the analysis

is the following one.

From the absence of any indication in the file,

in the 201 file, that someone had a relationship with the

Agency, either as an asset, agent, source, contract employee,

whatever - from the absence of such an indication, can one

safely infer that, in fact, there was no such relationship?

MI: Rocca. I would say so, yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are documents

ever removed from

201 files?

Mr. Rocca. They should not be removed from the

files.

That was, of course, part of the standard order of

procedure.

The fact is, however, the file itself passed through

many hands in the course of dealing with it, and it would be

technically possible to do so.

I cannot deny this. I mean, this is something that

exists on the face, as I see it.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, in theory, no documents should be

removed from a 201 file, but it is possible to remove

documents from a 201 file?

MI. Rocca. Well, it could have been -- it could have

been done.

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Mr. Goldsmith. When someone removes a document from

a 201 file, is it required to indicate on the file that a

document has been removed?

MI. Rocca. Well, of course -- and the purpose, and

it would have to be signed for.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

MI. Rocca. Now this is the advantage of using the

machine.

Mr. Goldsmith. Which machine are you referring to,

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Mr. Goldsmith. What purpose does the computer

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Mr. Rocca. The computer serves to give a permanent

record to a title, and the removal of that title cannot take

place without creating a record, and therefore it is always

traceable. This represented, therefore, as these questions

were being discussed during the '50's, the answer to either

arbitrary or inadvertent removal. At least it always seemed

to be that way and a lot of other people agreed.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. Let me say, in addition, on that point

that the system employed, as I

recall it, a numbering device

which worked from the

first paper, which was number one, up,

so that any paper that had been removed lower than the top

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paper would, unless it had been replaced by another, or if

the entire numbering system had not been altered, have appeared

immediately as absent. This was the device for internal

control that functioned during the first years of the system.

Mr. Goldsmith. Normally, in a 201 file, are the

documents filed chronologically? By that, I mean the earliest

document, the first document to go into the file, which might

be the field personality file request form that led to the

opening of the file, that would be the first document, and

then the next document in time would go immediately on top

of it, and so on, so that effectively documents are in the

file in the same sequence in which they were made available

to the file.

Mr. Rocca. But the 201 would not be the repository

for a personal history questionnaire: and that kind of thing;

that is, the key documents in establishing a fiduciary

relationship would not be in the 201. They would be in a

separate file held by the desk and whoever was handling the

individual.-

MI. Goldsmith. That's a separate question.

Aside from that, however, would the documents normally

go into the file in chronological order?

MI. Rocca. Let me assure you, Mr. Goldsmith, that

there are people who are far better informed on

this topic

than I am, and therefore whatever I say should be taken cum

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grano sale, as they say, with a grain of salt.

Mr. Goldsmith. Normally in a 201 file, will the

documents be filed sequentially?

Mr. Rocca. And I want that to be very well

understood. The whole matter of records, in other words, is

a matter for which people are paid very high salaries, and

they have been in charge in this area from the very beginning.

But changes and modifications to the system have taken place.

But I would defer to their statements with respect to a

number of the questions that you have asked.

Mr. Goldsmith. Have you had occasion to review

any 201 files?

Mr. Rocca. Yes, I've read many, many of them.

Mr. Goldsmith. Hundreds of them?

MI. Rocca. Not hundreds, I would say. I can't --

a figure like that -- but I have read many of them.

: Mr. Goldsmith. To the best of your recollection,

did the files that you read contain their documents in the

chronological order in which the documents arrived? In

other words, I am asking you to respond to the question that

I raised earlier.

As a matter of routine, are the documents filed in

the 201 file in sequential or chronological order, so that the

earliest document would be on the bottom and the last document

would be on top?

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Mr. Rocca. Normally. Normally that would be the case.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now you mentioned the PRe's, the

personal record questionnaires. You indicated that they

would not be in the 201 file.

Where, to your knowledge, would they be located?

MI. Rocca. They would be located in particular files!

held by the desk responsible for the agent.

MI. Goldsnith. would they be located in an operations

or projects file?

Mr. Rocca. I think that probably is the correct

term, yes.

MI. Goldsmith. Please examine CIA number 788, which

is the field personality file request form that was used in

the case of Mr. Oswald.

I think you had occasion to review that yesterday.

(Pause)

: Mr. Rocca. I see nothing different here from what

I saw yesterday.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

I hope that you don't see anything different from what

you saw yesterday since it's been in the safe all evening.

According to that document, when was a 201 file opened

for Lee Oswald?

Mr. Rocca. Nine December, 1960, is the date for

the request.

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Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

Is there anything unusual about the Oswald 201 file

being opened over a year after the Agency was initially

informed of Oswald's defection and the fact that he was

alleged to have offered information to the Soviets?

Mr. Rocca. I find that not unusual in view of the

flow of work and the pressure of work. I couldn't explain

that gap in terms of anything, except just the normal flow

of business, in view of what I know about the opening of it.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, you think the normal flow of

business might account for a delay of over a year?

Mr. Rocca. Well, it depends on what was the date of

the material that we got from State.

Mr. Goldsmith. Rather than reviewing all that now,

I will just indicate that the material from State started to

arrive in late October or early November of 1960.

: Mr. Rocca. So, the flow is correct, I would say,

in terms of what was going on. There was an obvious interest

in this kind of material.

Mrs. Edgerter exercised an analyst's choice in

opening the file.

I think there is nothing in the time lapse that

would indicate anything, except the flow of work.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now Mrs. Edgerter was a member of

the CI/SIG unit, is that correct?

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MI. Rocca. Yes, indeed.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is it unusual for the CI/SIG unit,

which was involved in very sensitive operations -- not

operations, investigations pertaining to possible penetrations

of DDP personnel - was it unusual for this unit to open a

201 file on someone like Oswald?

I guess the gist of my question is I don't see how

Oswald is relevant to the primary purpose of CI/SIG.

Mr. Rocca. Well, I would disagree with that.

Mr. Goldsmith. Please explain.

Mr. Rocca. I would consider this to be fully within

the competence of this unit, especially in view of the large

number of defectors that had accumulated by this time.

There were others, Americans, in many instances, people

that, it is my recollection, we regarded as more serious,

potentially, losses. I can remember one who had the

specifications of a nozzle that prepared plastic in a

particular fashion. There was press stuff in the interim,

two clippings that had come out. Patricia Blake had

written her articles.

In other words, there was an accumulation of material

which concerned Americans, and a gathering interest at that

time, 1959 and 1960, in the KGB, ultimately confirmed by

Golitzin, as I reported yesterday, that no defector from the

American armed forces - and that list that we had from

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State consisted of

at least two or three other military

defectors from West Germany, and I would have considered it

a dereliction not to have opened a 201 file.

Mr. Goldsmith. Well, I certainly agree that a 201

should have been opened

at that time, and it would also seem

that the appropriate unit within the Agency to open the file

would have been the CI staff.

My question is more narrowly focused in why would

CI/SIG in particular have been opening the file.

MI. Rocca. Because of their concern, basically,

with the problem of Americans and they were the recipient

of the materials, probably from the Office of security,

if not the actual copy of that material, certainly the chit

chat. Bruce Solie was -- B-R-U-C-E S-O-I-I-E -- constantly

in touch with Mr. O'Neill and with Mrs. Edgerter, I am sure.

Mr. Goldsmith. But from the face of it, it does not

appear that Oswald posed any sort of a counter intelligence

threat in terms of the penetration of DDP personnel.

Mr. Rocca. Of the U.S. security interest. At a very

high level, though, he did, involving other departments

and agencies of the

government.

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand, and I am not suggesting|

that a file should not have been opened by the CI staff.

I am just trying to determine why CI/SIG in particular, which

was concerned about DDP penetrations, would have been opening

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the file.

Mr. Rocca. Let me go back and open a little parenthesis

about this. What I regard now, in the light of what you said,

is probably a too narrow view of what SIG was interested in.

They were also concerned with Americans as a security

threat in a community wide sense, and they dealt with FBI

cases, with the Office of Security cases, and with other cases

on the same level, as they dealt with our own, basically.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, how would the function of

CI/SIG --

Mr. Rocca. At least, that's as I would represent

it. But again, Mr. O'Neill would be the person to judge

exactly and I would defer to him.

Mr. Goldsmith. How would the function of CI/SIG

in that case be different from in the office of security,

in general?

Mr. Rocca. It would be with respect to where and

what had happened to DDP materials with respect to a defection

in any of these places.

Mr. Goldsmith. Again, though, Oswald had nothing

to do with DDP at this time, at least apparently.

Mr. Rocca. I'm not saying that. You said it.

Let me take the Dunlap case.

Mr. Goldsmith. I'm not familiar with that case.

Mr. Rocca. If we can get off of this, because I

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don't want any misinterpretation.

Mr. Goldsmith. Neither do I.

Mr. Rocca. This is an NSA case. A defector, a

Soviet agent, has committed suicide and subsequently it was

determined that by finding the materials in his house he had

actually stashed away a large number of reports coming

from the DDP, and indeed coming from Soviet defectors that

had provided the material.

That case, and the handling of the relations with

NSA on Dunlap, was a matter handled by SIG and by Ops jointly:

They worked together on that. It illustrates, therefore,

in another area the community wide aspect to security and

security problems, on the assumption that against the KGB

you've got to work together in cases involving security

and penetration of you are going to be had separately.

This concept is, I think, very definitely an

authorization for the opening by SIG of the file in these

circumstances. And indeed, I would say that to test it, one

should look at whether or not files were opened on the

other names in the State Department list.

If you find that that is the case -- and it is my

belief that that is the case, although I have no way of

proving it because it has never actually ever been put to the

point where it was necessary to do this as a test -- I think

that the question you are getting at is answered.

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It is a formal part of their responsibility.

MI. Goldsmith. Fine.

Turning to CIA number 788, again, I would like to

direct your attention to the box that is labeled "other

identification." In that box there is a number one, next to

which someone wrote in the letters "AG."

Do you know what those letters would stand for?

Mr. Rocca. I do not.

Mr. Goldsmith. At the bottom of the page, at the

bottom of this document, it indicates that Oswald's file is

a restricted file.

Do you know why the file would have been restricted?

Mr. Rocca. My impression would be that this would

have been restricted in order to assure knowledge in SIG

in this as one of a category of files involving American

defectors; that they would want to know about in the event

that anyone else developed information or expressed an

interest of any kind.

For example, the Lee Harvey Oswald file was restricted

when it was taken over by R& A, when it was given to me.

Mr. Goldsmith. So that, if anyone --

Mr. Rocca.

So that, if anyone came in and checked

that file --

Mr. Goldsmith. You would know about it.

Mr. Rocca. -- I would know immediately who he was.

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I would be asked, "Can this person look at the file, " and

obviously I would permit that.

So, in other words, it is a subsidiary form of

control which permits some kind of internal order in the

processing of the material.

(Pause)

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you please examine CIA number

943, which is a Xerox copy of three file cards. Please

confine your attention simply to the top two file cards,

both of which pertain to Lee Harvey Oswala.

(Pause)

Mr. Goldsmith. Have you had a chance to review this

document?

Mr. Rocca. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Turning your attention to the top

card, which as I indicated refers to Lee Harvey Oswald,

in

the upper right hand corner of that card there is an

indication which says 'CI Project/RE, 9 November, 1959."

Do you know what "CI Project/RE" refers to?

Mr. Rocca. The CI Project refers to -- I don't

know what the Re is at this point, but I may figure it out

by the time I finish talking, answering the first part of

the question -- CI Project is simply a name of convenience

which was used to describe the HILINGUAL OF HDLINGUAL,

or whatever it was. But the RE may be a name or initials of

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people. I can't associate that.

This is the first time I have seen these cards,

as

far as I know.

Mr. Goldsmith. But the term "CI Project" to the

best of your knowledge refers to the HDLINGUAL program?

Mr. Rocca.

To the mail intercept program, and

that was the convenient form, that was the phrase that Mr.

O'Neill used when he talked about it.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, this suggests that oswald may have:

been the subject of this mail intercept program or one of the

subjects.

Mr. Rocca. It suggests that there was something

in it that was actually accessioned, or that they were given

this as a warning to be on the alert for it in their screening

of the materials. I cannot determine that from this.

In other words, it may have been a watch list card that flowed

naturally out of the opening.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. Ah -- RE means Rueben Efron.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you spell that for the record.

Mr. Rocca. This is my guess, now, as I say.

R-U-E-B-E-N E-F-R-O-N.

And he was a translator on the project.

Mr. Goldsmith. So that suggests that there was a mail

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intercept that --

Mr. Rocca. No. It suggests only that there was a

warning that there should be an alert for it.

Mr. Goldsmith. To him?

Mr. Rocca.

Well, to whomever was using

that watch list because it would be used by people surveying

the materials.

You can readily answer your own question by just

going through the materials and spotting them, as far as

the contents are concerned.

MI. Goldsmith. I would like you to review a document

marked CIA number 2035. This is a document dated 20 February,

1964, and it's a memo to you, Chief of the CI/R& A unit.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca.

Who gave it to me?

Mr. Goldsmith. Have you had a chance to read this

document?

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Mr. Rocca. Yes, yes.

"The machine's listing of documents officially

recorded as being - was requested and is attached. The

actual -- of this type was begun in '63. A few vitems of

previous dates were also recorded. A comparison of the

documents physically available and the 201 file, and those

reports as being as shown -- 37 documents that should be

in the 201 file are not available." This total is made up

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of two dispatches, seven memorandum from the FBI, one CSCI,

two State Department documents, and 25 cables."

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you remember receiving this

memorandum?

Mr. Rocca. No. But it's not of any particular

import. These materials had been simply displaced for

separate handling on the 201, and I judge that this was

something that Mr. Hartman prepared or had prepared

for me, which I handled through him.

Mr. Goldsmith. The memo doesn't have a signature

attached to it.

Mr. Rocca. Well, it has to be written by someone

who knows, who has access to the material. He and the RID

people are those ones.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is it customary for those memos

not to contain signatures of the authors of the memos?

: Mr. Rocca. It depends on how rapidly they are written.

This I think is his signature, is his writing (indicating.)

Mr. Goldsmith. By that you are referring to the.

script notation?

MI: Rocca.

Yes.

MI. Goldsmith. Now why do you say that this is of

no particular import?

Mr. Rocca.

Because we know that there are two

dispatches. We know that there are seven memoranda which

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were being probably read by MI. Dooley and therefore were not

in the file. We know that there is a CSCI and therefore

all of these are accountable pieces of paper. In other

words, they haven't disappeared. The 25 cables were probably!

in the materials that went back to the GP Floor period.

MI. Goldsmith. Well, how do we know, in fact, that

the materials have not disappeared?

Mr. Rocca. Well, I would say that we know that by

simply going back and looking at the file at the present time,..

to begin with. This was not, in other words, an attempt to

trace materials that had disappeared from the file.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now this document makes reference to

an attachment of the missing --

Mi. Rocca. It says that they should be in the 201

but they are not in it. But that doesn't mean that they are

not present.

: Mr. Goldsmith. The document makes reference to an

attachment which contains a list, a more detailed list, of the

specific documents that are not in the file. The committee

staff has been unable to locate that attachment in the Oswald;

201 file.

What would be the best way to determine whether, in

fact, the documents that were unavailable on this date had,

in fact, been returned to the file?

Mr. Rocca. Ask Mr. Hartman to do it and he will

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give you the answer to it. I obviously asked for this, and

as I say, my recollection is I would have asked him for it

pursuant to an attempt to get a grasp over exactly what

should have been -- what should be in the file when we

machined it.

Mr. Goldsmith. If the document is of no particular

import at all, why is it marked "Secret, Eyes Only?"

Mr. Rocca. Everything is marked "Secret, Eyes Only."

MI. Goldsmith. When you say "everything," you --

Mr. Rocca. This is an occupational disease. So

that does not give me great trauma.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are you suggesting that the documents

in the Oswald file commonly contain the sensitivity indicator

known as "Secret, Eyes Only?"

Mr. Rocca. Well, most of them do, I would say.

Or, a good number of them do. I think the point is academic.

I mean, the classification was one applied by a secretary,

whoever typed the memo.

In other words, these papers are not -- this is not a

list of papers that have been removed from the file permanently.

And, I don't recall the circumstances under which at this

time this request was made. But I think the person who worked

on it is a person who probably could shed some light on it.

Mr. Goldsmith. I should indicate for the record that

the staff's review of the Oswald file has uncovered extremely

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few documents with the specific notation "Secrety, Eyes Only,"

which is one of the reasons that we focused on this particular

memo, as it suggests that there are materials that are not

in the file, which should be, and particularly because the

attachment referred to is not available in the file itself.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. Where do you find the reference to the

attachment? This is what I can't find.

"It is attached, "is that it?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes, in the first sentence.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca.

Well, as I have stated, I have no

recollection of the episode. My best recollection on the

basis of the handling of the time was that this was an

effort to make sure that we had everything together. We

requested this kind of review. This answer came back. I

have no way of explaining why it was "Secret, Eyes Only."

I don't regard it necessarily as of any great significance,

per se. The person who did it would have to explain it.

But I am certain that the next step that I would take

would have been to say to get these items into the file.

Mr. Goldsmith. Of course, we don't know which items

specifically they are.

Mr. Rocca. Well, I mean -- two dispatches, seven

memoranda from the FBI, one CSCI -- I mean, the file at this

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stage, this is February, 1964, the machine file was in the

process of being accumulated. The file itself was in

use.

We were right at the beginning, in other words, of

assembling the machine record which eventually we would show

and did show to the Warren Commission later on that year.

In other words, I would characterize this document as an

interim summary, a status report, on the attempt to create

the final mechanized record of the file. I in no way would

attribute to this language the fact that these actual materials

were missing.

Mr. Goldsmith. You have indicated that the handwriting

in the lower lefthand corner of the page is Mr. Hartman's.

Mr. Rocca. That would be my guess.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you read for the record what

that script writing indicates.

Mr. Rocca. "Please keep loosely in the last volume

of Oswald's 201" and it's scratched out. It is X'a out.

I don't know what this is (indicating.)

Mr. Goldsmith. I can't make that handwriting out

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Mr. Rocca. Well, if it isn't Mr. Hartman's handwriting,

he could help identify it. That's the point.

Mr. Goldsmith.. Would there be any reason to keep

this document in the last volume of Oswald's 201?

Mr. Rocca. Well, the last file means it is the last

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one that's been opened, I mean, in the serial performance,

in a looseleaf sense.

In other words, it would be the most

recent one.

Mr. Goldsmith. Okay.

Mr. Rocca. Last in the sense of the most recent one.

Mr. Goldsmith. Please refer to CIA number 2075, which

is the second page of a memorandum to the Director of the FBI!

dated 30 January, 1964. The subject matter is Jack Ruby.

My question is a very narrow one.

This page contains some cross references indicating

which files received a copy of this memorandum, and among

other listings it indicates that a copy went into a file that|

is referred to as a dummy file. This parenthetically indicates

dummy -- "CI/R&A (Dummy) " .

What is a dummy file?

MI. Rocca.

Whoever wrote this kept dummy files,

which would be a file for his own purposes of what he had

sent to us.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is a dummy file then simply a soft

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Mr. Rocca. A soft file or whatever you want to call

it. It would be eventually destroyed, I suppose.

It would be for his reference in checking off what

had been sent.

Mr. Goldsmith. Okay.

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Mr. Rocca.. That would be my best guess under the

circumstance.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you have any basis today for thinking

that Oswald may have been an agent of the KGB?

• Mr. Rocca. I would have to say what I stated

yesterday, that there is no credible evidence at this moment,

at this time, on the basis of the records that we have that

he was a KGB agent in the United States.

If you are asking me as a counter intelligence specialist,

generally what my feelings are on balance regarding his

relationship to the KGB, I would answer that there is no question

that he was debriefed in detail by at least two eschelons of

Soviet authorities, one of which, if not both of which, were

KGB, and if there are indeed two, one was the Thirteenth

Department. I am relying now on defector information for

that judgment.

He himself in his statement, which you have reminded

me of, indicated that he felt free to give that information.

I think it is now ascertained beyond reasonable doubt that he

knew from direct observation enough about U-2 to give that

as a most significant item of information to the Soviets, and

that he himself, as he said, felt free to give radar information.

So, placing together the contact at the camp in California,

the Marine Camp, going back to the Delgado testimony, the

rapidity of his release from the Marine Corps, presumably on

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compassionate reasons

which turned out to be a trip to the

Soviet Union and all the rest, I would say there is no question,

therefore, about the debriefing and his cooperation.

Mr. Goldsmith. What would the other eschelon have

been that debriefed Oswald?

Mr. Rocca. It would have been one of the screening

units connected with the journalistic apparatus or foreigner

apparatus of the fourth - of the American Department of the

Second Chief Directorate group of the Internal Group which,

however, defers on matters of military specialties-- I

understood this from a defector; I think this is sustained

by others - to the Special Department.

So, there is no question in my mind that he was,

therefore, in their hands.

At that point, it becomes purely speculative, except

that there is much more circumstantial evidence involved

in his handling and treatment in the U.S.S.R. that can be

more pertinently commented to, and was in part pertinently

commented to, in the memoranda submitted to the Warren

Commission, but can be I think more fully and pertinently

commented to by the defectors available today, which show

highly specialized and favorable treatment.

There is also the fact - and this is just pure --

are we on the record?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

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Mr. Rocca.. This is just pure counter intelligence

lab work, and as I say, it's absolutely impossible

• to talk

about these things in public, but Minktenbaugh, a confessed

Soviet spy -- M-I-N-K-T-E-N-B-A-U-G-H -- another who went to

the Soviet Union in 1959 and 1960 -- he was connected with

Johnson, the Sergeant Johnson case -- was assessed, trained,

and returned to the United States on a separate mission. He

had made his contact in Berlin, as had Johnson.

The interesting thing is that they presented him to a

woman who was to come to the United States with him as a wife.

under the guise of a wife. He is a homo, and so the thing

did not work, though they tried. But the M-O, if you put the

Marine business together, is close to exactness on the

methodology, that is, the setting up of a couple, but the

timing is what is interesting -- 1960.

These are just things that keep you thinking in the

middle of the night. Was the case officer who handled

Minktenbaugh and who we know by his own confession and polygraph-.

now he is out and serving time and he has, as I judge, told

his story completely -- was he part of the same -- here,

Minktenbaugh is an Army defector, or Air Force, whatever.

Think about the problem of recruitment in a gross sense that

the Soviets would have. Note these associations in time and

space.

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Mr. Goldsmith. Was the Warren Commission told about

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this defector, Minktenbaugh?

Mr. Rocca. This has all been developed since then.

Mr. Goldsmith. When did the Minktenbaugh case break?

MI. Rocca. Oh, it broke after 1964 - 1965.

MI. Goldsmith. Do you know whether the woman companion

to Minktenbaugh was a witting collaborator to the plot?

Mr. Rocca.

Oh, she was, indeed.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. Now I trust you understand that I am not

stressing this. I am simply stating it as a fact on the table

in a laboratory sense, which counter intelligence people are

supposed to be dealing with. It is not for publication.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are you familiar with the allegation

that Lee Harvey Oswald was a CIA agent?

Mr. Rocca. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. When did this allegation first arise?

Mr. Rocca. It came out almost immediately. It was

in the press immediately, as I recall.

Mr. Goldsmith.

Was the allegation ever brought to your

personal attention?

Mr. Rocca. No, not for any action.

Mr. Goldsmith. Were you ever directed to conduct an

investigation into this?

Mr. Rocca. No.

I certainly sent Mr. Hartman around to ask people

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whether there were any traces in all of the files of the agencies

to which we had access to ascertain whether there was ever any

contact with this man.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why did you do that?

Mr. Rocca. Because it disturbs me greatly that the

thing could even be suggested.

Mr. Goldsmith. And when did you send Mr. Hartman

around to conduct this?

Mr. Rocca.

Oh, it was in that period and later.

Mr. Goldsmith.

What was the result of Mr. Hartman's

investigation?

MI. Rocca. There was no indication that was ever

produced that Lee Harvey Oswald was ever in any kind of

fiduciary relationship.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall what Mr. Hartman's

investigation entailed?

•MI. Rocca. No, I don't.

I mean, he went around simply asking people in the

various desks, in the various components, in the Contacts

Branch.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did he submit to you in 1963 or 1964

the results of his investigation?

MI. Rocca. I cannot recall that.

He certainly did verbally, which was that there was no

substance to the claim.

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Mr. Goldsmith. Do you think that the issue is

sufficiently important to have warranted a written report to

you in 1963 or 1964?

Mr. Rocca. Well, if there was no substance to it, I

think not.

We were not investigating this. I mean, this was a

matter actually of pertinence to the Office of Security,

to the Director, to MI. Helms, and the others, and if there

were to be a formal investigation, I would have said they

would have done it.

Certainly in the staff meetings this question was

raised at the highest level -- has this man ever been in touch?

So, this was not one of the, in other words, one of the

questions that I was given formally to work on. It was a

matter of personal interest.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall whether Mr. Helms

ever asked you to examine this question?

MI. Rocca. As far as I know, he never asked me, no.

Nor did MI. Angleton.

That is the best of my recollection at this moment.

Mr. Goldsmith. Please review CIA number 201 through

208.

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This is a memorandum for the Chief of the CI staff

dated 18 September, 1975, subject matter is the allegations

of Lee Harvey Oswald's connection with the Agency.

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MI. Rocca.. 1975?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Rocca: Your question referred to the earlier

period.

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Mr. Goldsmith. I know.

Now, in 1975, you were no longer Chief of the CI

staff, were you?

Mr. Rocca. I never was the Chief of the CI staff.

Mr. Goldsmith. Thank you.

I stand corrected.

(Pause)

MI. Rocca.

Hah -- he did remember it.

(Pause)

MI. Rocca. Well, I find this -- I'm glad it exists.

It bears out my recollection.

Mr. Goldsmith. Okay.

Mr. Rocca. But bear in mind that this was something

that I did out of absolute deep, deep personal animus.

Well, that's the wrong word —- that is, the suggestion that

to me I still find greatly offensive. This is the last man

in the world who could have ever been -- who would have

ever met our criteria for recruitment.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you be more specific in the

reason for that?

Mr. Rocca.

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Well, I mean, his whole background, his

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psychiatric record, his conduct -- this is now on the basis

of what we learn from the record, and it just seemed to me

just so incongruous and vicious that -- I lose my temper,

I'm sorry.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are most of the agents that work with

CIA case officers necessarily stable individuals?

For example --

MI. Rocca. There are some very definite rules

governing the psychological stability of agents, and these

rules break down into about, among others -- one is their

background record in terms of family and associations;

second, their innate qualifications on testing; third, whether

they

have told you everything about themselves, whether you

know

everything about them; and finally, whether they are

psychologically stable.

So, you have

a whole series of qualifications that he

would fail.

MI. Goldsmith. The criteria that you are referring to

now which pertained to whether someone would meet the Agency's

requisite for serving with the Agency as an agent, are these

criteria formally adopted in any Agency regulations or

documents of some kind?

MI. Rocca. They're in a handbook.

Mr. Goldsmith. And was the handbook in existence in

1959?

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Mr. Rocca. Indeed.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, it would be very easy, for

example, simply to --

Mr. Rocca. This was a part of the training. The CI

staff wrote the handbook. I wrote it, or edited it.

Mr. Goldsmith. What is the title of the handbook?

Mr. Rocca. It's called "Criteria for Double Agents."

In this case it would have been a person in touch with two

services.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would the same criteria apply to someone

who is not necessarily a double agent?

MI. Rocca. It would apply to all agents. They apply

to all agents.

Mr. Goldsmith. And such a handbook was in effect in

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Mr. Rocca. That handbook was in existence and was a

part of the formal training program I referred to in R& A.

It was a part of the job of R & A to draw up these criteria,

which had not been previously drawn up in the OSS history.

So, on my record of observation of individuals, the

study of the background and history of the entire topic --

and we covered it in detail, that is, reading the background

this man would have been rejected out of hand. He would never

have been considered.

Now I have the suspicion that maybe the Soviets got

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to the same point with him.

But this is off the record -- this is not off the

record. I mean, this is just a joke.

Mr. Goldsmith. Referring again to 201, to CIA number

201, this is a memo that was prepared apparently by Mr.

Hartman.

Do you know at whose request Mr. Hartman would have

prepared this memo dated in 1975?

Mr. Rocca. He prepared it at my request, I think.

Mr. Goldsmith. No, this memo -- well, you were no

longer with the Agency formally in 1975. Would he have

prepared this memo for you in 1975?

MI. Rocca. I was still on contract with him, and

this was still, this was certainly pertinent to what the

Rockefeller Commission was doing. It is my recollection,

inasmuch as I have already recalled it in part -- you see,

when I mentioned that your previous question had referred to

1963, well, I recall that part where he did refer to 1963.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, in 1975, you asked --

Mr. Rocca. I simply asked him to do this because

I recalled that we had at my instance undertaken within the

staff on my own responsibility this kind of thing.

Mr. Goldsmith. What was the purpose of your asking

him to prepare this memo in 1975?

Mr. Rocca. To

get on the record his recollections of

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what had happened in 1963 with respect to this gross

allegation.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, by asking him to do that, were

you recognizing that Mr. Hartman had not gotten on the record

in 1963 when he conducted the initial investigation?

MI. Rocca. No, no.

At that time he did this and reported to me. It was

a purely internal matter. But by 1975, it seemed to me

worthy of putting down on the record.

Mr. Goldsmith. But in 1963 it was not put in the

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Mr. Rocca. As far as I know, it was not.

Let me say that we were, of course, hamstrung by

allegations in the record which we informally checked out

in that fashion. So, I mean, this was perfectly, I think,

normal.

Mr. Goldsmith. I note that the 1975 memorandum goes

into very great detail as to all the steps that Mr. Hartman

took to determine whether Oswald had any connection with the

Agency.

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Does this extensive detail strike you as somewhat

unusual for a memorandum written twelve years after the

investigation was actually conducted?

Mr. Rocca. No:

I told him to simply put down everything he could recall

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about where he had gone.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, I notice that in CIA number 2106,

letter E, he indicates that through the Security Research

Section of the Office of Security, he had the security files

checked. There was no record of Oswald.

Now, in fact, the Security Office did have a record

on Oswald in 1963. Did that strike you as an incongruous

Mr. Rocca. I don't think that view is referring to --

that that was referring necessarily to the topic of the

interest, namely that there was any kind of a relationship

with him that involved the Agency, or else they simply

didn't tell him. It certainly would be incongruous if they

had a file.

Mr. Goldsmith. Well, we have seen several Office of

Security documents pertaining to Oswald, preassassination.

Mr. Rocca. That's right, and you have to know which

office in the Office of Security you are talking to. I can't

judge this one at all, except in terms of these two elements:

(a) that it may have been a part of the Ofice of Security

that literally didn't have a file; or that the file that

they showed him was totally derivative, consisting of press

and other well known items, and therefore he did not consider

it really new information or significant information within

the terms of the memorandum.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, on CIA number 2108, he indicates

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that there are five documents which had been sent to the Agency

before the assassination. "Two of the documents have been

sent to us" -- referring to the Agency -- "by the FBI, two

by the Department of State, and one by the U.S. Navy."

So, in other words, Mi.Hartman felt that prior to the

assassination there were five documents from other agencies in

Oswald's 201 file.

MI. Rocca. Well, some of them you have actually

shown me, or I thought so -- I mean, they seem to have been

in the file.

(Pause)

Mr. Goldsmith. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Rocca. Is the point whether it is five or one?

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Burke is attempting to locate the

document that I was going to refer you to at this point.

The specific one I have in mind is a --

MI. Rocca. Well, I can check this record against the

actual records in the files. I assume that this represented

his best statement.

MI. Goldsmith. In fact, that statement contradicts

the listing of documents that was given to the Warren Commission

by Mr. Helms in 1964.

Mr. Helms indicated that there were,

or at least his list indicated that there were more than

five documents received from otheragencies.

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Mr. Rocca. Well, Mr. Hartman erred, then, or at least |

I would assume on this, unless he actually had some kind of

consultation with the record, which he could have had, inasmuch

as these materials were at hand. I would say that there is

no doubt that -- in other words, there is no definitive

significance to be attached to that expression. On recounting

he may find six, or he may find four. He was not, I think,

in putting this memorandum together --

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know what a DBA is?

MI. Rocca. DBA, I would judge, is a bureau, is a

bureau indicator.

Mr. Goldsmith. According to that memorandum by

Mr. Helms, there were substantially more than five documents

in the file. I am wondering what the reason for the inconsis-

tency is between the Helms record and the Hartman memo.

Mr. Rocca. I think that you could undoubtedly work

it out and it would turn out to be something completely

(excusable) because the DBA memo -- this is a cryptonym

for bureau material.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Burke has located the document.

According to this document, which is CIA number 2038,

prior to the assassination, included in Oswald's 201 file

were seven documents from the FBI, ten from the Department of

State, two from the Department of Navy, one from the

Immigration and Naturalization Service, and then there were

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internal CIA documents and newspaper clippings.

Mr. Rocca.

So, he is just wrong.

His talley is in error.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, at the bottom of 2038 there is

a notation which I would like you to review. In parentheses

it indicates "inventory of documents contained in file

attached for all but addressee."

Let me bring that to your attention and see if you can

explain that to me.

Mr. Rocca. Oh, we did not attach the actual documents

to anybody but the addressee.

We gave them just a list of

those documents, apparently.

That would be my reading of

this.

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Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

Mr. Rocca. I mean,

it would have required a large

scale reproduction.

• Mr. Goldsmith. Would a file search conducted by

Mr. Hartman in 1963 definitely have resolved the question of

whether Oswald was ever connected with the Agency in any

way?

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Mr. Rocca. As far as I'm concerned it would have.

Mr. Goldsmith. Assuming things were done in the

ordinary course of business.

MI. Rocca. Assuming that he had checked all the places

that he had said he checked and that we knew about, that would

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have been definitive.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, you indicated earlier that you

did not regard it unusual that Oswald's 201 file was opened

over a year after the first indication of his giving information

to the Soviets was. obtained by the Agency.

MI. Rocca. But only within a few months of the

receipt of the first information regarding this as I under-

stood it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Well, the information was initially

received in October of 1959.

The file was opened in

December of 1960, over a year after the initial receipt of

the information.

In October or November of 1960, the State Department

sent information and it was sometime after the State Department

communicated to you and Oswald that the file was opened.

Mr. Rocca. In other words, we're arguing here the

stimulus and how close to the action the stimulus was.

MI. Goldsmith. Exactly.

MI. Rocca. I'm saying that the stimulus -- speaking

for Miss Edgerter, I don't know what prompted her to do this,

or the timing, because it was not my component. I had no

knowledge that the action even was being done. In fact,

I was pleasantly surprised on the 23rd, which was a Friday,

to know that we -- and I learned this on Saturday morning

when I went into the office -- that we even had a 201 on

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So, I'm simply giving you my best guess, Mr. Goldsmith.

And I don't regard it as unusual.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you regard the fact that the Agency'

never debriefed Oswald or that there is no record of such a

debriefing upon Oswald's return from the Soviet Union as

unusual in any way?

Mr. Rocca. No, not at all.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why not?

MI. Rocca. Because under the delimitations agreement,

he was strictly the Navy's baby, and the FBI's baby, and

that is it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Even though he may have had information

of --

Mr. Rocca. I'm going to Indian wrestle with you on

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this one.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Rocca, I want to indicate to you

that, again, you should not infer from my line of questioning

that we --

Mr. Rocca. I'm not. I'm joking. I'm joking.

Mr. Goldsmith. -- are predisposed in any way towards

the resolution of this issue. And, I don't want to arm

wrestle with you.

Mr. Rocca. Well, you are aware of the delimitations

agreement and the specifications that it sets out with respect

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to the approaches to and the responsibilities for the security

of members of the Armed Forces, former members of the Armed

Forces. It's a very, very strictly adhered to code that

Mr. Over and the members of the domestic community drew

up in 1940, and which we respected very, very carefully.

This is a decentralized approach to security. It has its

disadvantages and any kind of cooperation that you get has to

come from -- on cases, has to come from mutually arrived at

agreement.

And this man, as a Navy man, a Marine, was strictly

their baby. And that would be my answer to it.

MI. Goldsmith. What is the formal name given to this

agreement between -

Mr. Rocca. It is called the Delimitations Agreement.

It is a primary document in trying to understand the very

grave difficulties we have in working against an integrated

adversary.

Mr. Goldsmith. And this agreement was promulgated in

1940, roughly?

Mr. Rocca. 1940, and revised at various times

periodically. It still exists and it governs and lays down

the ground rules.

And, if anyone asked me in R & A at that time whether

or not we should debrief this man, the first thing that would

have come to my mind was stay away from it, it's a Navy

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matter, a Marine matter, and a Bureau matter, and they should

have priority.

No one did, incidentally.

MI. Goldsmith.

Even though Oswald may have had

information of a positive intelligence nature, in other words,

not only did Oswald pose an interest to the American

intelligence community because he may have been a counter

intelligence security threat, but he also had access to

information on the Soviet Union that might have been of

positive intelligence significance, is your position still

that no component within the Agency would have had an

interest in debriefing him?

MI. Rocca. Would not have had a legitimate interest

on its own to have done this. It would have had to

coordinate with the Navy or with whatever component had the

responsibility under the Delimitations Agreement.

Mr. Goldsmith. Despite the fact that Oswald may have

had positive intelligence information?

Mr. Rocca. Indeed, indeed.

Mr. Goldsmith. Please refer to CIA number 2137,

which is a memo for Mr. Rankin dated 1 July, 1964, specifically

dealing with the question of how Oswald was able to make

the trip on a direct flight from London to Helsinki on

October 10, 1959 and arrive at his downtown hotel in

Helsinki by midnight of the same day, when the only flight

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leaving London was a FinAir flight that would have arrived

in Helsinki at 11:30, a time that would not have permitted

Oswald to have cleared customs and made the trip to the

hotel.

• This has been an issue that has received some attention

recently. I am wondering whether the Agency was ever able

fully to resolve this question.

Mr. Rocca. As far as I know, they were not. They

gave up -- there was a time schedule worked out and passed

to this Commission. This was a report done by Mr. Murphy's

people, that Mr. Wigren, who I mentioned yesterday, worked

on. I cannot judge its relevance without reading it. But

I do agree that there is a - he did move fairly fast.

But that may be just traveller's luck.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. I can add nothing to this.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was the Agency ever able to resolve

the question of how Oswald was able to obtain a visa to enter

the Soviet Union as quickly as

he did?

Mr. Rocca. This, too, was a matter prepared by

the appropriate component. I cannot recall its specific

details or really judge it in terms of its definitive

quality. I think probably we did the best job we could

on it.

You see, on the memo that you have just shown me,

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which 2137, Duncan was the researcher in SB Division who

worked on the problem and prepared the memorandum.

I certainly am not qualified to challenge conclusions

they reached.

Mr. Goldsmith. I am not asking you to challenge their

conclusions.

I am asking you whether any additional information

ever came to your attention pertaining to this issue.

MI. Rocca. Ah, that's another matter. I'm sorry, I

didn't understand that.

No.

Mr. Goldsmith. According to CIA number 2047, which

I will read to you in relevant part, it indicates that an

Agency source stated that there was no record that there was

any request for a U.S.S.R. visa processed through normal

channels for Oswald at any time during 1959, and the source

indicated it was difficult to explain how Oswald might have

received his visa in two days without going through normal

channels.

"The only conclusion which can be drawn is that

Oswald must have received his visa directly from the soviet

Embassy in Stockholm, which occasionally has done special

cases." But the source has no evidence to confirm this

assumption.

Do you know whether the Agency was ever able to

resolve the question of how Oswald was able to obtain his

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visa so expeditiously?

Mr. Rocca. No. I do not believe that they were able

to do that. This is, however, one of the open questions

that should be worked on.

Mr. Goldsmith. Does that suggest in your mind that

Oswald may have had an intelligunce connection of some kind?

Mr. Rocca. Indeed.

Let me -- strike that. It would suggest that if

indeed it turns out that he did have facilitation in his visa

of that kind--in other words, that visa facilitation would

tend to suggest that and not the other way around, as I

originally indicated.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would Mr. Hartman's investigation

into the question of whether Oswald was connected with the

Agency also have led him to determine whether Oswald was an

agent o some other U.S. intelligence agency?

Mr. Rocca. I think probably not.

Mr. Goldsmith. You mentioned earlier that --

MI. Rocca. Though I reserve. If he mentions in his

memorandum the Inter-Agency Source Defector List, which I

think he should have checked, there should have been a

reference there.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would that conclusively indicate

whether Oswald was an agent of another agency?

Mr. Rocca. If all of the provisions that were -- and I

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misstated the list -- this is the Inter-Agency Source

Register, not the Inter-Agency Defector List -- the Inter-Agency

Source Register -- and I believe he did check it. If the

provisions governing coordinating had been carried out,

there would have been a drop card in there.

So, the answer to your question would be yes, at least

as a start.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall whether the warren

Commission was at all particularly concerned with regard to

the question of whether Oswald was an agent of the CIA?

MI. Rocca. No questions of that kind, as far as I

can recall, were directed through this working level association

that I had with Slawson and Coleman and others on this

point, as far as I know.

Mr. Goldsmith. Although apparently there was a meeting

with Mr. Dulles that you attended where Dulles indicated to

you that the Warren Commission had asked him to investigate this-

question..

Mr. Rocca. The meeting with Mr. Dulles, as you kindly

noted yesterday, was for another purpose, and he simply brought

that in as a matter of collateral, reading the memorandum,

as he tended to do, of course. This was a matter that had

come up.

So, there was, apparently, an interest to

the extent

that Rankin talked to him about it.

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But I was not brought in on that phase.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why was Mr. Dulles disinclined to

get involved in this issue?

Mr. Rocca. I think it was -- I'm simply guessing,

now --. I would say that it would involve a whole matter of

conflict of interest; that is, as a member of the Commission,

he should be objective in these matters. That would be my

guess.

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Mr. Goldsmith. How would you evaluate the significance

of Oswald's early discharge and relatively expeditious

discharge from the military?

MI. Rocca. I think it shows palpable and manifest

bad faith on his part and I can't go beyond that because

I don't know any more facts.

Mr. Goldsmith. Bad faith in the sense that he was

getting a hardship discharge and then took off for the Soviet

Union?

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MI. Rocca. That's right.

Yes. Is that the correct word to use, when a person

gives an excuse that is not sustained by his subsequent.

actions?

Mr. Goldsmith. Well, does the fact that he obtained

this early discharge suggest to you that Oswald may have had

intelligence associations of some kind?

Mr. Rocca. Not necessarily. People would have.

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done this -- lots of people get out of the armed forces

for various reasons. I don't think that alone can really

stand the weight of the interpretation that you have

suggested here, taken together with the meeting with

presumably the Cuban, whoever it was, that Delgado describes,

the Schweitzer correspondence, which apparently should be

looked at again in terms of whether or not it was really a

screen, because if it was, then it shows a degree of

deliberateness which associates itself with the request for

compassionate departure from the Marine Corps. It tends then!

to accumulate points on a line that this was a deliberate

course of action.

But even when you put all of that together, you are

far from anything that would exclude any contrary hypotheses,

and that is what you are trying to get out of analysis.

For that reason, as I said yesterday, you have to be

very, very careful in drawing conclusions.

Mr. Goldsmith. Excuse me.

(Pause)

Mr. Goldsmith. You indicated yesterday that you did

not have any memory of the Gutierez allegation.

MI. Rocca. I was unable to do any kind of reading.

in the report, or in the depositions to the Warren Report

last night, so it still is a vague and hazy affair.

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Mr. Goldsmith. Did you have any responsibility

with regard to the CIA's handling of the Nosenko issue?

Mr. Rocca. During the time of the Warren Commission?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

• Mr. Rocca. None at all.

Mr. Goldsmith. Which unit was responsible for

Nosenko at that time?

Mr. Rocca. The handling responsibility was SB

Division.

Mr. Goldsmith. Does that stand for Soviet Branch?

MI. Rocca. Soviet Branch, Soviet Division - Mr. Murphy.

In the staff which would have had an interest, the components

concerned would have been Ops, the Ops component, it would

have been Mr. Hunt.

Mr. Goldsmith . What's Mr. Hunt's first name?

MI. Rocca. James Hunt - not Howard Hunt.

And, perhaps even Mr. O'Neill and SIG, although I

cannot say on this.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever have any involvement

in the Nosenko case?

Mr. Rocca. Later.

Mr. Goldsmith. When was that?

MI. Rocca. In 1966 - 1967.

Mr. Goldsmith. What was your role at that time?

Mr. Rocca. If it's relevant to your interest, I mean

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Mr. Goldsmith. The reason that it would be relevant

is because of the manner in which Mr. Nosenko was handled by

the Agency vis-a-vis the information that was given about him

to the Warren Commission. It requires the committee to look

into both his treatment in 1964 as well as years subsequent

to that time.

MI. Rocca. My entry into the Nosenko case -- I am

perfectly wiling to discuss this -- I think it enters into

certainly Mr. Marcucci's indication -- was in connection

with the review and appraisal of the final report prepared,

or the first draft final report prepared by the Soviet

Division on the case, and their proposed recommendations

for the handling of the case which, as I say, took place

in '65, '66, or '67.

I was asked -- by that time, in other words, the case

had reached a concrete stage of, a pile of, a report that

was nearly a foot high. I was asked to read it and to comment

upon it and its recommendations.

Mr. Goldsmith. What was your assessment of that report?

Mr. Rocca. My assessment of the report was -- and this

is on the record, and there is a report, and I defer all of

my remarks here to that paper, because the question is a

complex one--that the report should be cut down by at least

half; that it was too long; and that the overall diversity

of the report, which included a lot of other elements that

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were not related to the Nosenko case, concerned other

aspects, like the Golitzin case, be cut out of it, because

they simply encumbered it; that overall, the appraisal that

was made that he was a dispatch defector -- and that certain

action should be taken by the FBI to confirm this or to review

it and to take further action with respect to his stay in

the United States -- should be looked at with great care

because he had rights under the circumstances.

Mr. Goldsmith. Who made the actual decision to detain

Nosenko under hostile conditions during the period in which

he was in CIA custody?

Mr. Rocca. The Chief of SB Division, to the best

of my knowledge.

Mr. Goldsmith. What input did Mr. Angleton have

on that?

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Mr. Rocca. I think he was opposed to that.

Mr. Goldsmith. What was MI. Angleton's suggestion

for the way that Mr. Nosenko should be treated?

Mr. Rocca. This is not within my competence to

answer because I don't know the thing. It concerns -- in

other words, you are asking me questions that deal with the

period that was antecedent to the time that I came into the

case.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did Mr. Angleton ever discuss that

with you?

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Mr. Rocca. On the basis of hearsay, then, discussions,

MI. Angleton would have wanted a much longer period of

interrogation based on the actual materials that had been

accumulated before anything like hostile interrogation was

undertaken, if at all. In other words, to my recilection,

in my recollection, there was a significant difference on

this point. But it was ex post facto;: the decision had

already been taken and made and that was irreversible at

that time.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know what role Mr. Helms had

in making that decision?

Mr. Rocca. I do not.

Mr. Goldsmith. I would like to discuss with you briefly

a hypothetical, and I am aware of the Agency's position regarding

Nosenko today.

Hypothetically, if it could be established without

any doubt that the story that Nosenko gave to the FBI and the

CIA regarding the manner in which Oswald was handled in the

Soviet Union -- if it could be established that that story

was completely untrue or completely unbelievable, what

significance would that have on the question of whether

Nosenko was a bona fide or a dispatched defector?

MI. Rocca. It might have no significance, or it might

have much significance.

He could be a bona fide defector who had been fed

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these materials on the basis of some kind of preknowledge

that it was his intent to go and that he is therefore an

unwitting bearer of a version of the case. Or, on the

other hand, it could indicate that he is a controlled channel

of communication.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, your opinion is --

Mr. Rocca. And there are shades of in between

these two.

Mr. Goldsmith. Your opinion is that that doesn't cut

either way, then, in terms of the accuracy of his --

Mr. Rocca. No, it doesn't. It cuts both ways.

I mean, this is the point. It doesn't resolve it to the

exclusion of any other hypothesis, which is what I was

talking about is the nature of the evidence that you need

here, and until you get it, you've damn well got to keep it

out of the press, it seems to me, because you create problems,

then, at the human level that are really irresolvable. That

is what is, of course, dangerous.

I thought you were going to ask a totally different

question, which is how would it affect the whole hypothesis

of Oswald in the KDB, which would strike me as being a

much more relevant question to ask.

Mr. Goldsmith. Well, Mr. Rocca, I'm afraid that you

anticipated my next question.

MI. Rocca.

Oh, I'm sorry.

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Mr. Goldsmith. Why don't you answer that one now.

Mr. Rocca. Well, I would have to do it the same way,

Mr. Goldsmith.

It would take, in other words -- it would take very,

very hard evidence either of an agent character or of a

cipher breakthrough to convince me that he was a mandated

killer to begin with, because the nature of the crime, his

conduct and association with the deed are such that this

responds entirely to what I would consider a self-motivated

act.

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So, even if, in other words, he were in touch with

the KGB and an agent--and that would be the implication if

you drew the evidence on Nosenko as being a phony agent,

right -- coming back to your question - I still believe

you would be far from the point of being able to go into the

World Court or the United Nations or into a diplomatic

demarche or indeed into something even more serious and

state this to have been the causative act.

Is that being fair on the evidence?

It seems to me this is what is required in a case of

this seriousness.

Mr. Goldsmith. I just have one more question to ask

you prior to taking a brief recess.

Mr. Rocca. Let me add, however, what I said yesterday,

that notwithstanding that question, there is no question in

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my mind that there is additional information in both Havana

and in Moscow that bears on this motivation and conduct.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you please review CIA number

2041, which is a cable dated 6 January, 1964, dealing with

an individual named Mohammed Reggab.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca.

Let's see. This is a person in Berlin.

I don't know that I have reviewed this.

(Pause)

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Reggab was an individual who came

forward and indicated that at one time he had been a boyfriend

of Marine Oswald, and he gave the authorities on her background

that differed from the story that Marina herself gave.

I an wondering if you are familiar with Mr. Reggab's

story?

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MI. Rocca. No.

Mr. Eisenstedt, who originated this, is still present.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether Mr. Reggab ever

worked for the Agency?

Mr. Rocca. I do not know that.

Mr. Goldsmith. The memo suggests the possibility that

he was going to start working for the Agency.

Do you know whether that was ever pursued?

MI. Rocca. I do not know that.

I simply am not cognizant of the facts here.

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Mr. Rocca. Incidentally, are you still talking

hypothetically?

MI. Goldsmith. Well, if you would like to discuss

something hypothetically, I am open for it.

• Mr. Rocca. I want to revert to the Minktenbaugh

analogy and the woman and the case, the Mo.

Mr. Goldsmith. Please do.

Mr. Rocca. These things, identities in time and space

and method, are significant, at least at the laboratory level,

so that the kind of thing that the Soviets might have had in

mind for Oswald and Marina--if that is her true name,

whatever her identify is, and if we do know all about her,

and my great regret is that she was not polygraphed, as Ruby

was -- I think this is very definitely a portion -- because

she certainly to Patricia Blake said things that I had not

heard on the record before about her past.

The Walker thing fits better into the pattern of a

special kind of operational thing, if you, indeed, can believe

that Walker was a part of Oswald's interest, as she claims

it was.

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hypothesis, that element of taint with Oswald on the part

of the KGB. But I do feel that however you press it on the

basis of the present "evidence" -- in quotes -- it still

falls short of suggesting that he was a mandated killer in

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this instance.

I want to make that perfectly clear.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

Let's take a brief recess at this time.

• (A brief recess was taken.)

Mr. Goldsmith. I would like to inform you, Mr.

Rocca, having just taken this brief recess, that I have had:

occasion to review some additional documents that were

provided to me by the Agency.

Yesterday you made reference to a second memorandum

that you had prepared with regard to the work of the

Rockefeller Commission and that document has now been made

available to us.

Mr. Rocca. In its entirety?

Mr. Goldsmith. So far as I know, in its entirety,

so that many of the points that were raised yesterday, where

you made reference to the memorandum, will be pursued by

my staff and myself. But I just wanted to clarify that

because there was some suggestion that there was a memorandum

that was missing and, in fact, it has turned up.

Mr. Rocca.

Good.

Mr. Goldsmith. I have a few questions to address

to you. Basically they are of a wrap-up nature, followup

questions based upon our review of yesterday's discussion.

First, dealing with Luisa Calderon, the suspected

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DCI agent who may have had contact with Mr. Oswald, I would

like you to refer to CIA number 1843, which is a cover

page to a transcript. The transcript is the one that

contains the conversation in which Luisa Calderon makes

her cryptic reference to the Kennedy assassination and

suggests that she may have had foreknowledge.

I am not going to go into any detail with regard to

the transcript itself as you and I have already discussed

the substance.

I would simply ask you to read 1843 and tell me if

you can identify whose handwriting appears on that page.

Mr. Rocca. Oh, you are not asking me to read this.

we talked about this yesterday.

I'm afraid I cannot recognize it, I'm sorry to say.

It just makes no impression. It looks like a woman's

handwriting, but these are just guesses.

Mr. Goldsmith. The handwriting indicates that a

transcript is to be sent to someone named Galbond--

G-A-LAB-O-N-D -- via Kingman.

Do you know who those individuals were?

MI. Rocca. I do not. My guess would be that

this has to do with the Warren Commission and their receipt of

the material.

Mr. Goldsmith. The notation, the handwritten notation,

also indicates the following comment: "Nothing to Buro" --

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and Buro is spelled B-U-R-0-- "yet."

Do you know whether this transcript was ever given

to the FBI?

Mr. Rocca. No. Whether that transcript was or not,

I cannot say. They already knew the substance of it, of

course, from the earlier transmissions. My guess is that

this was the translation from Spanish that was done for the

Commission by the Agency.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether the FBI was

specifically informed about the conversation that Luisa

Calderon had in which she made the reference to the Kennedy

assassination?

Mr. Rocca. I'm certain of it -- that is, I can't

prove it by the papers that were shown to me yesterday. But

I would be certain of it in my own mind.

(Pause)

MI. Rocca. As I say, it is my recollection that

these things were translated for the Commission by the Agency:

They would be done by people in WH Division who had the

competence in the language, and therefore there would be

different components involved and different routings,

obviously.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall ever seeing any cable

traffic that made specific reference to Luisa Calderon

and this conversation?

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Mr. Rocca.. No. I would not exclude that there had

been such, though. But I don't remember any.

Mr. Goldsmith. Can you indicate that the Bureau

received via transmission this conversation?

•Mr. Rocca. Oh, I am certain of it.

Mr. Scott would have taken it up directly with his

Bureau colleague at a certain point, when it was indicated

that there should be lateral transmission.

Mr. Goldsmith. I would like you to refer now to

CIA number 2206, which is a summary of events that took place

during the visit by Warren Commission staff to the Agency

station in Mexico City in 1963. Paragraph seven of this

document specifically indicates the information that was

unavailable for review by the Warren Commission staff.

Would you please review paragraph seven of this document.

(Pause)

• Mr. Rocca. I have reviewed this.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

Is there any reference in that document, specifically

in paragraph seven, to the Warren Commission staff being given

access to a transcript of Luisa Calderon's conversation?

Mr. Rocca. There is no reference. There is no

specification that among the items listed is that piece.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now yesterday we discussed this issue

and I asked you whether you would be willing to assist the

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in trying to resolve it. I recall your response as affirmative.

MI. Rocca. I will always volunteer for anything.

Mr. Goldsmith. We will attempt to make arrangements

with the Agency to give you access to some of these materials

so that we can determine conclusively whether or not this

information was given to the Warren Commission staff.

Mr. Rocca. At what point or --

Mr. Goldsmith. We are interested in whether the

information was given to the Warren Commission and when.

Mr. Rocca. Ever -- ah.

This memorandum is Win Scott's summary memorandum.

Again, things can be omitted from memoranda, and I would

assume that that's the case in this instance.

He was so firmly committed -- Win was, personally --

to the fact of Cuban involvement. In fact, he went far

beyond what I would regard as publicly discussible, inferential

judgments in that regard, in his discussions with me that I

can't believe absolutely that he would ever withhold it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you give us a summary now of

what Mr. Scott's theories were with regard to the possibility

of Cuban involvement.

Mr. Rocca. He felt that there was very definitely

the possibility of Cuban involvement with Oswald, but he

could not arrive at any definite information. And frankly,

I don't remember getting down to details that would be of

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really significant use to you in your own investigation

here, beyond the statement that he also had this conviction.

He also: felt that way about the Soviets, of course.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, yesterday we also discussed the

photograph that had been taken of the individual who has been

referred to by the press as "The Mexico Mystery Man," and

I showed you a document labeled CIA number 2138, which is

a memo dated 12 May, '64, from MI. Angleton to you, in which

a statement is made to the effect that the Agency might

consider waiting out the Commission with regard to this

issue.

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I'm sorry, I referred to the incorrect document.

In fact, it is number 2139, and the date is 5 March, '64. The

memo is from you, Mr. Rocca, to Richard Helms, and you indicate

that Mr. Angleton does not desire to respond directly to

the request from Mr. Rankin for some materials.

In the second paragraph you indicate that Mr. Angleton

would prefer to wait out the Commission in the matter covered

by paragraph 2.

Would you please review this at this time.

(Pause)

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know when the Warren Commission

was given the full story on the photographic surveillance

operation in Mexico City, and specifically the relationship

between that operation and the Mexico mystery man?

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Mr. Rocca.

Could I ask a question here as a matter

of information?

Mr. Goldsmith. Certainly, please do.

Mr. Rocca. "This is responsive to paragraph three

of Rankin's letter, see reference tab" -- is that here?

Mr. Goldsmith. No.

In fact, the letter was not attached to the document,

although it is indicated that it was.

Ms. Rocca. "J does not desire to respond directly

to paragraph two of that letter which made a levy for our

material which had gotten into the hands of the Secret Service

since 23rd of November. We found that except for three

telegrams

• all that the Secret Service had was material we

had sent to McGeorge Bundy at the White House. Apparently

he had simply passed it to the Secret Service as a matter of

internal information. Unless you feel otherwise, Jim would

prefer to wait out the Commission on the matter covered by

paragraph two, which is a levy for our material which had

gotten into the hands of the Secret Service since the 23rd

of November and which has previously been described. If

they come back on the point, he feels that you or someone

from here should be prepared to

go over to show the Commission

the materials rather than pass them to them in copy.

Incidentally none of these items"-- is --"of new substantive

interest.

We have either passed the material in substance

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to the Commission in response to earlier (levies) or the

items refer to aborted leads -- for example, the famous

six

photographs which were not of Oswald (and) the passenger

manifest of an airline which also did not pertain to Oswald.

If you desire to take note of the levy in paragraph two,

we would recommend that you indicate on the attached" and

so forth.

Well, we don't have the Rankin thing. But my

recollection is that very shortly thereafter this --

Mr. Goldsmith. Incidentally, for the record, I just

want to indicate that we've reviewed the Rankin letter and

it is unclear specifically what it is referring to. That's

why I haven't bothered to show it to you.

Mr. Rocca. Well, it's very clear that this is unclear.

too, because it refers to something unclear, it seems to me.

In other words, it sounds like something that had been

gotten to Rankin in a kind of vague and hazy way, that was

really not substantively new, that he made an issue of, and

that this refers to simply avoiding duplicating needlessly

a paper that had already been disposed of, or taken care of,

or was in the process of being taken care of.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now nevertheless, there is language

to the effect there that Mr. Angleton was concerned with

waiting out the Commission.

Mr. Rocca. Well, in other words, if he could show

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that this material was not of any new substantive interest

and

" that it was already being taken care of, it would avoid

a needless stage of reproduction and of discussion -- I think

is the intent behind this.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you when the Warren Commission staff

was told about the Mexico City photograph?

Mr. Rocca. I cannot recall the date of it, but they

came over and received the photograph and looked at it from

my very hands. I had in my hand an envelope containing the

entire run of the photographs that had been submitted to me

by the desk, the WH desk, Mr. Whitten, as of that time.

What date that was -- it could be May, it could be

April, it could be March. I think it was later -- it was

sooner rather than later.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let me show you a document labeled

24 March, 1964, The subject is Mexico City, CIA dissemination

of information on Lee Harvey Oswald. The document, rather,

is labeled March 26, 1964, and it is an internal memo,

Warren Conmission staff, CIA number 2221 and 2222. In 2222,

the author of the memo indicates as follows: "As you know,

we are still trying to get an explanation of the photograph

which the FBI showed Marguerita Oswald soon after the

assassination. I hope that paragraph four of the memo of

March 24, 1964, sent Mr. Rankin by the CIA is not the answer

which the CIA intends to give us to this inquiry."

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would you please review that.

MI. Rocca. Could I ask you again what paper this is?

Is it from the Commission?

Mr. Goldsmith. It's a Commission internal memorandum

slawson - Coleman, to Rankin.

(Dause)

MI. Rocca.

of March 24?

Do we have paragraph four of the memorandum

MI. Goldsmith. That letter, unfortunately, is not

available. The Agency did not send that to us.

Mr. Rocca. My recollection is that whatever this

confabulation implies, that at some particular point -- and

I don't remember the date, it was either at the end of March

or April -- they came over and I showed them personally--

Mr. Goldsmith. Youwould certainly agree that by the

end of March, that on this day, the --

Mr. Rocca. As of this day it sounds as if they don't

have it.

Mr. Goldsmith.

satisfactory?

--the explanation given was not

Mr. Rocca. Well, I mean, they may have -- one thing

that came out of my reflections on our talks yesterday and

also today is the fact that these are all bricks assembled

in a particular fashion.

What appears to be lacking is a sense of the operational

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relationship with which these bricks were handled at the time.

In this particular case, while they may not have had

the final explanation or even an explanation that we ourselves

were satisfied with inasmuch as we were dependent on reports

from Mexico City, they certainly were aware of the fact that

the thing was being worked on and that the issue existed.

In other words, there was no question of withholding -- and

this took place at the conversational level and was obviously

unrecorded in any way. I find myself impossible here to fill

in the proper cement on the operational level that would make

some of these bricks more plausible than they would seem,

as they are taken out and just held up.

But I have an absolute recollection of giving them

these photographs, and in the memorandum that you've

gotten

today, you will see that it turned out that there were even

more photographs in the file -- not of the particular eight

men, but of others in the coverage which they provided in

'75.

Now this comes out of the desk.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you agree, nevertheless, that the

author of this memo was not satisfied with the explanation

that the Agency had provided with regard to the photographs

as of that day?

Mr. Rocca. Yes, yes.

He was certainly reflecting that in his internal

memorandum --memoranda.

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Mr. Goldsmith. Was there ever any effort on the part

of the CIA to coordinate testimony given to the Warren

Commission with the FBI?

MI. Rocca. None that I know of.

Mr. Goldsmith. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record)!

Mx. Goldsmith. What efforts, if any, were made to

prep Mr. McCone prior to any briefings that Mr. McCone

gave to the Warren Commission?

Mr. Rocca. I'm afraid I have to refer to whatever is

in the record, if any, on that, because I did not deal

personally with Mr. McCone on these matters.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was there ever a concern evinced by

Mr. Angleton or yourself or Mr. Helms that Mr. McCone give

consistent testimony, either testimony of statements, to the

Warren Commission?

Mr. Rocca. The thought would never have crossed my

mind and, therefore, speaking for myself, the answer is

negative. I have never - I have not heard of anything

involving either Mr. Helms or Mr. Angleton in that respect,

to the best of my knowledge or recollection.

Mr. Goldsmith. Reading from CIA number 2138, which

is a memo for MI. Rocca from Mr. Angleton dated 12 May, 1964,

it indicates as follows: "The DDP wishes to have from you

a short but comprehensive memorandum which highlights the

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basic issues or positions entered into by the Agency in its

dealings with the Commission. For example, Rankin indicated

that the Commission would wish to hear the Director's views

to how

improvements might be made in protecting the

President's life. Further, they will probably ask questions

regarding the possibilities that a conspiracy existed.

Such general questioning certainly necessitates that the DCI

be made aware of the positions taken during previous

interviews."

That language suggests that there was some concern

for

MI. Rocca. Well, this was a concern for a briefing

paper, as to what the main lines of response should be.

This

is a perfectly normal and regular procedure, followed in

the Agency before and since and in other agencies, and I think

we saw yesterday the briefing paper that went up, that was

the product of, a combined product. But how the paper was

used by Mr. Helms is something that I can't respond to.

You asked me whether or not --

Mr. Goldsmith. Either Mr. Helms or Mr. McCone

apparently--

Mr. Rocca. You asked me about Mr. McCone.

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes, and apparently the briefing --

MI. Rocca. So, I have no way of knowing what Mr.

Helms did with the paper, with Mr. McCone, or whether it

was used at all. It would seem to me that as you read their

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depositions before the Commission, they had obviously read

the paper or it had been reviewed. However, what they said

was far less substantial than what was indicated there. So

I can't say anything on the basis of a simple analysis at

all at that point.

But this is a routine request for preparing material

for the boss.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was there any concern that the boss

woul start making inconsistent statements?

MI. Rocca. Why, I can't believe it. That wasn't

what prompted it. It was that he would have a formal basis

for saying whatever he had to say that would be responsive

to the Commission's needs.

Mr. Goldsmith. During its review of the Agency's

Oswald file and related files, the staff of this committee has

come across transcripts of telephone conversations involving,

for example, Mi. McCone, Mr. Whitten. My question to you is

whether as a matter of routine telephone conversations were

either taped or transcribed by the use of a stenographer

listening to the conversations?

Do you have any knowledge of this taking place in

1963 and 1964?

Mr. Rocca. I have no knowledge that this took place

as far as CI is concerned at any time, which is what I can

seak to. That it was a practice of the Director to have these

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conversations recorded is something I think that came out

of the Watergate matter and is therefore a matter of record

for his own use.

But whether any of that was done in 1963, now, is

simply - this is the first I've heard of it.

Mr. Goldsmith. I would like to show you a transcript

of a telephone conversation between Mr. McCone and Mr. Hoover

dated 26 November, 1963. It is CIA document number 2134.

Does that appear to the a transcript of a telephone

conversation?

Mr. Rocca. Yes, it does.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you read the middle paragraph,

which makes reference to an FBI informant.

(Pause)

MI. Rocca. That's LIENVOY.

That's their material

with the Mexican authorities, because we ran that whole

operation with the Mexicans.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, how would. --

MI. Rocca. I would interpret it that way. .

I have

never read this piece of paper that I recall. That would be

my reaction.

Mr. Goldsmith. For the record, let's get this clear.

The Director of the FBI, Mr. Hoover, is making reference

to an informant that the FBI had in Mexico City, and he is

indicating that the informant has informed the Bureau as to

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the contents of Oswald's conversations in Mexico City.

From your answer, I take it that you assume that Mr.

Hoover is referring to the LIENVOY operation.

Mr. Rocca. And he is subtly letting Mr. McCone know

that Mr. McCone's resources down there were not unique, that

they, too, had access to the Mexican operation.

Mr. Goldsmith. LIENVOY was an operation that was run

by the CIA and the Mexican Government?

MI. Rocca. It was a joint operation with the

Mexicans, is my impression, yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. It was a liaison operation with the

Mexicans and the CIA?

MI. Rocca. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith.

So, how would Hoover have had access

to this information?

MI. Rocca. By the 26th, or by after the event, he

would have been able to get from the Mexicans I think

everything. I think they just rushed to give him everything.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, he would have had a Mexican

informant, do you think, that might have given him this

information?

Mr. Rocca. I think that that terminology is sort of

standard terminology that he would have used to cover and

sort of mythologize their coverage down there, and that what

he is referring to are Mexican resources that the Bureau would

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have independently developed on the case by that time. I

would defer, obviously, to a Bureau man in reading it. But

I think that this is the correct line of interpretation.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know Anne Goodpasture?

MI. Rocca. The name is familiar and I must have met

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Mr. Goldsmith. She was a case officer in Mexico City

working with Win Scott.

Mr. Rocca. She wrote that wonderful summary -

Mr. Goldsmith. Which summary are you referring

' to?

Mr. Rocca, — of the case, of all the file. It's

a thick collection which summarizes every document in the

Mexican file.

Mr. Goldsmith. In the Mexican Oswald file?

Mr. Rocca. Yes, in the Mexican Oswald file. I

don't know. I mean, it may well be, but I certainly have

not dealt with her -- well, I hesitate to use the word

"intimately," but in the sense of this case.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

Do you know Mr. Scott Breckenridge?

Mr. Rocca. Only in terms of the formality of concern

of the Inspector General.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether he was ever

involved in the investigation of the Kennedy assassination?

Mr. Rocca. I don't know at all.

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The individual over there who was involved was Lieder,

John Lieder at the time I left.

Mr. Goldsmith. MI. Rocca, I have no further questions

to ask you.

• I would like to thank you for making yourself available

to the committee staff for the past day and a half. You've

been very patient and you've been very generous with your

time.

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I would like to ask for your assurance that you will

not disclose your testimony nor the questions that were

asked of you to anyone else.

MI. Rocca. I give you that assurance.

Mr. Goldsmith. Thank you.

We will be in contact with you in an effort to resolve

some of the questions that arose by virtue of this deposition.

Thank you very much, sir.

Mr. Rocca. Not at all.

Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Berk.

Mr. Berk.

Thank you very much.

(Whereupon, at 1:27 o'clock, p.m., the taking of the

deposition of Raymond G. Rocca concluded.)

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