Originator: SSCIA
From: CHURCH, FRANK
To: BUCHEN, PHILIP W.
Document date: 08/29/1975
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

## Page 1

JFK Assassination System

Identification Form

Agency Information

Date:

8/27/201

AGENCY: BUCHEN/DAN

RECORD NUMBER:

178-10003-10339

RECORD SERIES: CORRESPONDENCE

AGENCY FILE NUMBER: CORRESPONDENCE--BUCHEN, PHILIP (6)

Document Information

ORIGINATOR:

SSCIA

FROM: CHURCH, FRANK

TO :

BUCHEN, PHILIP W.

TITLE:

DATE:

PAGES:

SUBJECTS :

08/29/1975

20

CHURCH COMMITTEE

ASSASSINATIONS, FOREIGN LEADERS

ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES

DOCUMENT REQUEST, CHURCH COM

DOCUMENT TYPE: LIST

CLASSIFICATION :

Unclassified

RESTRICTIONS: IC

CURREN'T STATUS:

Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW:

07/28/1993

OPENING CRITERIA :

• COMMENTS :

Includes list of 117 quotations proposed for use in Church Committee assassinations report.

v9.1

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FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN

JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.

GARY MART, COLO.

WILLIAM Q, MILLER, STAFY DIRECTOR

FREDERICK A. O. ECHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL

CURTIE R, SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

WInited States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO

STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH

RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(PURSUANT TO 8. RES. 21, IITH CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

August 29, 1975

The Honorable Philip W. Buchen

Counsel to the President

The White House

Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. Buchen:

Pursuant to our understanding, we annex hereto

quotations from various documents which may be used in a

report on the assassinations allegations.

If you have

any questions, please contact

counsel.

incerely your

178-10004-10239

hand

!

178-10004-10088

lowr

178-10003-10339

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UNMARKED

MAY CONTAIN NATL SECURITY INFORMATION

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Memo, Sec. of State Herter to President Eisenhower

"the United States would immediately take political

action to remove Trujillo from the Dominican Republic

as soon

as a suitable successor can be induced to

take over with the assurance of U. S. political,

economic, and -- if necessary -- military support."

Memo, CIA to J. C. King

"c.

Would it provide a small number of sniper

rifles or other devices for the removal of key

Trujillo people from the scene?"

CIA memo

"Providing the arms as requested would contribute

significantly toward this

end."

CIA memo

"a.

Delivery of approximately 300 rifles and

pistols together with ammunition and a supply of

grenades,

to secure cache on the South shore of the

island,

about 14 miles east of Ciudad Trujillo.

PHOTOCOPY FROM THE GERALD R

"b.

Delivery, to the same cache described above,

of an electronic detonating device with remote

control features, which could be planted by the

dissidents in such manner as to eliminate certain

key Trujillo henchmen.

This might necessitate train.

ing

and introducing into the country by illegal entry o

a trained technician to set the bomb and detonator."

(Emphasis added)

Special Group Minutes

"the proposed actions would not, of themselves

bring

about the desired result in the near

future lacking some decisive stroke against Trujillo

himself."

LIBPARY

Special Group Minutes

"Mr. Merchant explained the feeling of the Depart-

ment of State that limited supplies of small arms

and other material should be made available for

dissidents inside the Dominican Republic. Mr. Parrott

said that we believe this can be managed securely by

CIA, and that the plan, would call for final trans-.

portation into the country being provided by the

dissidents themselves.

The Group approved the

project."

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Memo, Mann to Merchant

"Opposition elements have consistently asked us to

supply them with "hardware" of various types. This

has included quantities of conventional arms and

also, rather persistently, they have asked for

some of the more exotic items and devices which

they associate with revolutationary effort."

Memo, Scott to Merchant

"agreed in terms of Tom Mann's memo"

Cable, Dearborn to Devine

"delighted" "exotic equipment."

CIA memo

"the key to the success of the plot Ito overthrow

the Trujillo regimel would be the assassination

of Trujillo."

CIA memo

"(a) Ex-FBI agents who would plan and execute

the death of Trujillo.

(b) Cameras

and other items that could be used

to fire projectiles.

(c) A chemical that could be rubbed on the palm

of one's hand and transferred to Trujillo in

a handshake, causing delayed lethal results.

(d) Silencers for rifles that could kill from a

distance of several miles. (Id.)"

CIA memo

". . . the members of our club are now prepared in

their minds to have a picnic but do not have the

ingredients for the salad.

Lately they have

developed a plan for the picnic, which just might

work if they could find the proper food.

They have

asked us for a few sandwiches, hardly more, and we

are not prepared to make them available.

Last week

we were asked to furnish three or four pineapples

for a party in the near future but I could remember

nothing in my instructions that would allow me to

contribute this ingredient.

Don't think I wasn't "

tempted.

I have rather specific guidelines to the

effect

that salad ingredients will be delivered

outside the picnic grounds and will be brought to

the

area

by another club."

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Cable, Headquarters to Station

.. • we should attempt to avoid percipitou

ction by the internal dissidents until oppositio

groups and HQs are better prepared to support

[assassination]*,effect a change in the regime,

and cope with aftermath."

CIA memo for the record

"especially on the insistence of the (dissidents]

that they be provided with

a limited number of

small arms for their own protection (specifically,

five M3 .45 caliber SMGs) :"

Pouch restriction waiver

"four M3 machine guns and 240 rounds of ammunition

on a priority basis for issue to a small action

aroup to be used for self-protection."

Special Group Minutes

"(a) Dominican Republic -- Mr. Bundy asked that

a memorandum be prepared for higher authority on

the subject of what plans can be made for a

successor government to Trujillo."

Berle memo of conversation

"On cross examination it developed that the

real plan was

no khow what eh the

to assassinate Trujillo and they

Herbert wanted

"I told him I could not care less for Trujillo

and that this was the general sentiment. But we

did not wish to have anything to do with any

assassination plots anywhere, any time.

Herbert

said he felt the same way."

Special Group Minutes

"The DCI referred to recent reports of a new

anti-Trujillo plot. He said we never know if

one of these is going to work or not, and asked

what is the status of contingency planning

should

the plot come off. Mr. Bundy said that this point

is covered in a Cuba paper which will be discussed

at a high level

in the very near future."

PI

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Special Group Minutes

"Gen. Cabell [Deputy DCI] noted that the internal

dissidents were pressing for the release to them

of certain small arms now in U. S. hands in the

Dominican Republic.

He inquired whether the

feeling of the Special Group remained that these

arms should not be passed.

The members showed no

inclination to

take a contrary position at this

time."

(Emphasis supplied)

State Department Document, Select Committee No. 313

"1.

The USG should not lend itself to direct

political assassination.

2. US moral posture can ill afford further

tarnishing in the eyes of the world.

3.

We would be encouraging the action, supplying

the weapons, effecting the delivery, and then

turning over only the final execution to

(unskilled) local triggermen.

4.

So far we have seen no real evidence of action

capability.

Should we entrust ourselves and

our reputation to this extent in the absence

Can we afford a precedent which may convince

the world that our diplomatic pouches are

to deliver assassination weapons?"

Memo, Battle to Bundy

"at their own initiative and on their own respons-

ibility in forming an acceptable provisional govern-

ment they can be assured that any reasonable request

for assistance from the U. S. will be promptly and

favorably answered."

Cable, Headquarters to Station

"armed assistance"

Cable, Dearborn to State

"too late to consider whether United States will

initiate

overthrow of Trujillo."

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25.

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26.

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27.

5/26/61

28.

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Cable, Headquarters to Station (not sent)

"(1)

To be so associated. with removal Trujillo

regime as to derive credit among dissidents

and liberal elements throughout Latin America;

"(2)

Io disassociate US from any obvious inter-

vention in Dominican Republic and even more so

from any political assassination which might

occur.

"former objective cannot, repeat not, easily override

latter."

Memo, Achilles to Bowles

"for Bundy to present tomorrow morning."

Memo, Bowles to Bundy

"Following up on our discussion of the Dominican

Republic at yesterday's meeting of the Special

Group, I am forwarding you a draft telegram which

we would like to send to Henry Dearborn, our Consul

General in Ciudad Trujillo, supplementing the

guidance he will be receiving on the recently

approved contingency plans."

Cable, Smith & Clifton to Bundy & O'Donnell

".

• we must not run risk of U.S. association with

political assassination, since U.S. as matter of

general policy cannot condone assassination. This

last principal is overriding and must prevail in

doubtful situation."

"Continue to inform dissident

elements of U.S. support for their position."

Cable, Station to Headquarters

"HQS aware extent to which U.S. government already

associated with assassination.

If we are to at

least cover up tracks, CIA personnel directly involved

in assassination preparation must be withdrawn."

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29. 7/22/60

30. 5/14/62

31. 5/14/62

32. 5/14/62

33. 8/1/62

34. 8/7-10/62

35. 8/16/63

36. 11/18/63

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Cable, Havana to Director

"calculated risk"

Memo, Edwards to Kennedy

"At the time of the incident neither the Agency nor the

undersigned knew of the proposed technical installation."

Memo, Edwards to Kennedy

"Maheu stated that Sam Giancana thought that Phyllis MoGuire

might know of the proposed operation and might pass on the

information to one Dan Rowan, a friend of MoGuire's."

Memo, Edwards to Kennedy

"Approached by the FBI, he could refer them to me to be

briefed that he was engaged in an intelligence operation

directed at Cuba."

Contact Report, Case Officer 1

"could do something really significant for the creation of

a new Cuba. "

Contact Report, Case Officer 1

"It was not the act that he objected to, but merely the

choice of the word used to describe it.

'Eliminate' was

acceptable."

Cable, Station to Headquarters

"Have no intention give AMIASH-physical elimination mission

Memo, Case Officer 2

"C/SAS (Fitzgerald) approved telling AMIASH-1 he would be

given a cache inside Cuba. Cache could, if he requested it,

include...high powered rifles with soopes..."

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4/26/62

39. 5/14/62

39a. 5/14/62

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л::.

Memo for record, Edwards

"any prosecution in the matter would endanger sensitive

sources and methods used in a duly authorized intelligence

project and would not be in the national interest."

Memo, Houston to Edwards

"no major difficulty in stopping action for prosecution."

"doubted if we would want to give the full story to anyone

else in the Department.

"operational details."

"on grounds of security."

Memo for record, Edwards

"conducted during the period approximately August 1960 to

May 1961. "

"After the failure of the invasion of Cuba word was sent

to pay $150,000 for completion of the operation had been

definitely withdrawn."

Memo for record, Edwards

"On this date Mr. Harvey called me and indicated that he was

dropping any plans for the use of subject (Roselli) for the

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?.!:

Memo, Lansdale to Harvey

"liquidation of leaders."

"In compliance with the desires and guidance expressed

in the August 10 policy meeting on Operation Mongoose,

we will produce an outline of an alternate Course B

intelligence, Political, Economic, Psychological, Para-

nilitary, and Military.

Memo, Lansdale to Harvey

"Mr. Harvey: Intelligence, Political, (words deleted],

moten, (sabotage, e, mie a petion), and Para-

(Lansdale, Ex. 15, p. 1).

Memo, Harvey to Helms

"including liquidation of leaders."

Memo, Harvey to Helms

"The question of assassination, particularly of Fidel

Castro, was brought up by Secretary McNamara at the

meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) in Secretary

sensus at that meeting, in answer to a comment by Mc.

Ed Murrow, that this is not a subject which has been

made a matter of official recora.

I took careful notes

Memo, Harvey to Helms

"the inadmissibility and stupidity of putting this type of

comment in writing in such a document.

"would write no document pertaining to this and would

participate in no open meeting discussing it."

Memo, Harvey to Helms

"a matter of official record."

into t expecting any witten caments of stuly on this

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47.

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49.

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50. 8/10/62

51. 8/10/62

52. 8/10/62

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Minutes, Special Group Augmented

"stepped-up Course B"

Memo for Special Group Augmented

"exert all possible diplomatic, economic, psychological,

and other overt pressures to overthrow the Castro-Communist

regime, without overt employment of U.S. military."

Minutes, Special Group Augmented

"emphasized the desirability of attempting to create a split

between Castro and old-line Communists."

Minutes, Special Group Augmented

"would hurt the U.S. in the eyes of world opinion."

Minutes, Special Group Augmented

"led to the suggestion by General Taylor that we should

sonsider changing the overall objective [of Mongoose] from

one of overthrowing the Castro regime."

Minutes, Special Group Augmented

"old-line Conmunists."

Minutes, Special Group Augmented

sabotage, and to emphasize measures to foment a Castro-

oldline Communist split." (August Memorandum, p. 2) .

* **

"Action to be taken:

CIA to prepare a new version of its variant plan, in

accordance with the above-summarized discussion.

This

should be ready by Wednesday, August 15."

(August 10

Memorandum, p. 3).

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Memo, Lansdale to Harvey

"in compliance with the desires and guidance expressed

in the August 10 policies meeting on Operation Mongoose,

we will produce an outline of an alternate Course B.

Effort) will be used as the starting basis."

Minutes, Special Group Augmented

"will risk inviting an uprising, which might result in a

Hungary type blood bath if unsupported."

"emphasized that the stepped-up plan should not be under-

taken unless the U.S, is prepared to accept attributability

mil the necessary actions, including the eventual use of

would avoid all of these dangers because it would not invite

an uprising."

Memo, Mocone

"I recall a suggestion being made to liquidate top people

in the Castro regime, including Castro. "

"I took inmediate exception to this suggestion, stating that

the subject was completely out of bounds as far as the USC

(U.S. Government) and CIA were concerned and the idea should

no and one i Did tone on not or erica tha

(MoCone Ex. 4) .

"At no time did the suggestion receive serious consideration

by the Special Group (Augmented) nor by any individual re-

sponsible for policy.". (McCone, Ex. 4) .

"Irmediately after the meeting, I called on Secretary McNamara

personally and re-emphasized my position, in which he heartily

agreed. I did this because Operation Mongoose--an inter-

departmental affair-was under the operational control of (the

Defense Department) ... (MoCone Ex. 4) .

Memo, Harvey to Lansdale

"the Special Group (Augmented) is not expecting any written

comments or study on this point."

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58. 5/14/62

59. 5/14/62

60. 11/3/60

61. 4/26/62

62.

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• ::

......

Memo, Osborn to Helms

"the DCI was briefed and gave his approval."

(6/24/66)

Memo for record, Edwards

"then briefed the proper senior officials of (thel Agency."

"duly orally approved."

"knowledge. "

"Kept to a total of six persons."

Memo for record, Edwards

"cautioned him (Harvey) that I felt that any future projects

of this nature should have the tacit approval of the Director

Minutes, Special Group

"Finally, Mr. Merchant asked whether any real planning has

been done for taking direct positive action against Fidel,

Raul and Che Guevara. He said that without these three the

Cuban Goverment would be leaderless and probably brainless.

He conceded that it would be necessary to act against all

three simultaneously. General Cabell pointed out that action

of this kind is uncertain of results and highly dangerous in

conception and execution, because the instruments must be

Cubans. He felt that, particularly because of the necessity

Meantos suggestion obey have to capabilities, that

Minutes, Special Group Augmented

["field trip to Miami upon his return. "]

Memo, Helms to Mocone

"vaguely aware."

"I assume you are aware of the nature of the operation

discussed in the attachment."

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63.

4/22/61

64.

6/13/61

65.

7/21/61

66.

10/5/61

67.

10/6/61

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68.

10/6/61

69.

10/5/61

Letter, President Kennedy to Taylor

"our practices and programs in the areas of military and

paramilitary, guerilla and anti-guerilla activity which

fall short of outright war."

Memo No. 4, Report to the President

"We have been struck with the general feeling that there can

be no long-term living with Castro as a neighbor. His

continued presence within the hemispheric community as a

dangerously effective exponent of Communism and Anti-

Americanism constitutes a real menace capable of eventually

overthrowing the elected goverments in any one or more of

weak Latin American republics."

*

**

"It is recommended that the Cuban situation be reappraised

in the light of all presently known factors and new guidance

be provided for political, military, econamic and propaganda

Memo for record, Special Group Meeting

"is to provide support to a U.S. program to develop opposi-

cion to Castro and to help bring about a regime acceptable

to the U.s."

NSAM 100

"In confirmation of oral instructions conveyed to Assistant

Secretary of State Woodward, a plan is desired for the

indicated contingency. "

Minutes, Special Group

"possible removal of Castro from the Cuban scene."

Memo for reoord, Special Group Meeting

"a contingency plan in connection with the possible removal

of Castro from the Cuban scene."

Memo for record, Parrott

"what was wanted was a plan against the contingency that Castro

would in some way or other be removed from the Cuban scene."

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71. 10/5/61

72. 10/5/61

73. 10/5/61

74. 1961

75.

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76. 1961

78. 11/15/61

Memo for record, Parrott

"the presence and positions of Raul (Castro) and Che Guevara

must be taken into account."

Memo for record, Parrott

"the President's interest in the matter not be mentioned."

Memo for record, Parrott

"on the covert side, I talked to Tracy Barnes in CIA and

asked that an up-to-date report be fumnished as soon as

possible on what is going on and what is being planned."

Memo for reoord, Parrott

"contingency that Castro would in some way or another be

removed' from the Cuban soene."

"The Situation and Prospect in Cuba," CIA Board of National

Estimates.

"His (Castro's) loss now, by assassination of by natural

causes, would have an unsettling effect, but would almos

ertainly not prove fatal to the regime... (i) ts principa

surviving leaders would probably rally together in the face

"some sort of power struggle would almost certainly develop

eventually."

"significantly."

Cover letter to CIA Estimate Report, Lansdale

"seems to be the major evidence to be used to oppose your

project."

Report, CIA Board of National Estimates

"it is highly improbable that an extensive popular uprising

...could be fomented."

Cover letter to CIA Estimate Report, Lansdale

"conclusion of fact quite outside the area of intelligence."

Memo, Lansdale to Kennedy

"picture of the situation has emerged clearly enough to

indicate what needs to be done and to support your sense of

urgency concerning Cuba."

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79. 11/30/61

80. 1/19/62

81. 1/20/62

82. 1/30/62

83. 2/20/62

84. 1/30/62

Memo, White House to Secretary of State, et al.

"use our available assets...to help Cuba overthrow the

Communist regime."

Memo, McManus

"Conclusion Overthrow of Castro is Possible."

"...'a solution to the Cuban problem today carried top

oriority in U.S. Government. No time, money, effort

or manpower is to be spared. '"

"'Yesterday….. the President had indicated to him' that final

napter had not been written - its got to be done and wil

e done."

Memo, Lansdale

"demands a change from business-as-usual and a hard facing

of the fact that you're in a combat situation where we have

been given full command."

Minutes, Special Group

"policy determination."

"Program Review of Cuba Project, " Lansdale

"open revolt and overthrow of the Communist regime."

"Resistance."

"attack on the cadre of the regime, including key leaders."

"This should be a 'Special Target' operation...Gangster

actions agains povide the best religenet potential for

Memo, Craig to Lansdale

"a concept for creating distrust and apprehension in the Cuban

Communist hierarchy."

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"informer."

"goverment officials."

"2₫"

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86. 3/2/62

87. 3/5/62

88. 3/5/62

89.

3/5/62

90. 4/71/62

91. 4/10/62

Memo, President Kennedy

"kept closely informed."

Memo, Lansdale

"popular revolution."

Minutes, Special Group Augmented

"...any actions which are not specifically spelled out in

the plan but seem to be desirable as the project progresses,

will be brought to the Special Group for resolution."

"Guidelines for Operation Mongoose."

"The Special Group (5412 Augmented) is responsible for

providing policy guidance to the (Mongoose) project, for

approving important operations and for monitoring progress."

Memo, Lansdale to Helms

"for each week as far into the next twelve months as possible

...the members and type of agents you will establish inside

cuba... (and) brief descriptions...of actions contemplated.'

Memo, Lansdale

"be submitted to the Special Group for decision, ad hoc."

Memo, Harvey to MoCone

"To permit requisite flexibility and professionalism for a

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92.

9/14/62

possible, be made less restrictive and less stultifying."

MEmo, Special Group Augmented Meeting

"...made it clear that this did not constitute a blanket

approval of every item in the paper and that sensitive ones

such as sabotage, for example, will have to be presented ir

more detail on a case by case basis."

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93.

3/5/62

94. 10/16/62

95. 11/5/62

96. 4/11/62

97. 3/14/62

98. 3/2/62

99. 8/8/62

100. 8/10/62

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Minutes, Special Group Meeting

"preliminary actions... involving such things as spotting,

assessing and training action-type agents."

"keep its hand tightly."

"that many of the agents infiltrated would be of an all-

urpose type; that is, they would be trained in para-

nilitary skills, as well as those of exclusively intelli-

gence concern.

It was noted that once the agents are

within the country, they cannot be effectively controlled

from the U.S., although every effort will be made to

attempt such control."

Memo, Helms

"pointed out that (Mongoose) had been underway for a year

• that there had been no acts of sabotage and that ever

he one which had been attempted had failed twice.

Memo, McManus to Helms

"During the past year, while one of the options of the

project was to create internal dissension and resistance

leading to eventual U.S. intervention, a review shows that

policymakers not only shied away from the military inter-

vention aspect but were generally apprehensive of sabotage

Memo, Lansdale

"essentially an intelligence collection."

"Guidelines for Operation Mongoose."

montos, ate priority objective of U.S. efforts in the coming

"short of those reasonably calculated to inspire a revolt."

Memo, Lansdale

"must be inconspicuous."

Memo, Lansale for Special Group Augmented

"stepped-up Course B plus."

Minutes, Special Group Augmented

"CIA variant."

"old-line Cormunists."

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101. 10/4/62

102. 8/23/62

103. 10/4/62

104. 10.16.62

105. 9/9/62

106. 8/31/62

107. 9/12/62

108. 4/19/62

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Minutes, Special Group Augmented Meeting

"is concerned about progress on the Mongoose program and

feels that more priority should be given to trying to

mount sabotage operations."

"considerably more sabotage."

"all efforts should be made to develop new and imaginative

approaches with the possibility of getting rid of the

Castro regime. "

NSAM 100

"in light of evidence of new Bloc activity in Cuba."

"with all possible speed."

Minutes, Special Group Augmented

"for the time being."

Memo, Helms

"more personal attention."

Minutes, Special Group Augmented Meeting

" sons supersto that the mates of a te king and harassing

Memo, Lansdale to Special Group Augmented

"to provoke incidents between Cubans and Bloc personnel to

exacerbate tensions."

Memo, Lansdale to Taylor, Rusk, and McNamara

"emphasizing such activity."

"cause actions by Cubans against Bloc personnel."

"considerations will be given to provoking and conducting

shysical attacks on Bloc personnel.'

Memo, Lansdale to Special Group

"Upon the return of Mr. Harvey from his current field visit,

nore specific information on the status of agent training

and operations should be made available.

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109. 4/26/62

110. 4/26/62

111. 4/27/62

112. 5/3/62

113.

4/14/67

Memo, Lansdale to Special Group [Augmented]

"initiating a new series of agent infiltrations."

Memo for record, Macone

"attend the next meeting and report on agent activities."

Memo, Elder to Harvey

"inmediately on your return to discuss the Task Force

activities."

Memo, Harvey on Special Group Augmented Meeting

"agent teams."

"general field of intelligence."

Memo, Mocone to Helms

"dispose of Castro."

"knock off Castro."

"the overthrow of the Communist Goverrment in Cuba."

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114. 1/13/60

115. 3/14/60

116. 11/3/60

117.

3/14/60

Memo, Special Group Meeting

"the CIA did not have in mind a quick elimination of Castro"

Special Group Minutes

"there was a general discussion as to what would be the

effect on the Cuban scene if Fidel and Raul Castro and Che

Guevera should disappear simultaneously."

Special Group Minutes

"whether any real planning had been done for taking direct

positive action against Fidel, Raul and Che Guevara"

"that action of this kind is uncertain of results and highly

langerous in conception and execution, because the instruments

must be Cubans.

He felt that, particularly because of the

necessity for simultaneous action, it would have to be

concluded that (such action) is beyond our capabilities."

Special Group Minutes

"Admiral Burke said that the only organized group within Cuba

today were the Communists and there was therefore the danger

they might move into control."

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