Originator: HSCA
Document date: 09/26/1978
Document type: OUTSIDE CONTACT REPORT

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180-10110-10145

2022 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 199:

JFK Assassination Syster

10/21/20

Identification Form

Agency Information

AGENCY: HSCA

RECORD NUMBER : 180-10110-10145

RECORD SERIES: SECURITY CLASSIFIED FILES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER: JFK-171

Document Information

ORIGINATOR: HSCA

FROM:

TO :

TITLE :

DATE: 09/26/1978

PAGES:

3

SUBJECTS :

CIA, ADMINISTRATION

DOCUMENT TYPE: OUTSIDE CONTACT REPORT

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

RESTRICTIONS: 1A

CURRENT STATUS : Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 06/13/1997

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS:

Box 5.

v9.1

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KENNEDY

COMMITTEE SEN

OUTSIDE CONTACT REPORT

014168

DARE 9/26/78

TIME 10: 00

I .

Identifying Information:

DENESLYA

DONALD DUSTLANA

Name

Telephone

Former employee of Soviet Russia Division of CIA:

Address

Type of Contact:

Telephone

Person

II.

IIT.

Summary of Contact:

Together with Ken Klein I interviewed Mi. Deselma about his

work in the SR Division and specifically his work with Golitsin.

Deselyya explained that in 1962 and 1963 he was employed as an

administrative aide to work at Golitsin's home when Gorttsin

first defected. Deselyna's work involved assisting Golitsin in

getting access to printed material and publications. He said e

was not aware that Deselyna had an Agency connection, because

Ghad not liked it when he learned that Deselynas predecessor

was in fact employed by the CIA. However, Deselyna reported back

to the Agency while coring & and was privy to the reports on

G's debriefing sessions.

Deselyna said that in one debriefing report he read G had told

the CIA that the Soviets were developing a "contingency plan"

for the assassination of Richard Nixon if Nixon were elected

president. The plan was in existence prior to the 1960 election.

Deselyna said he could remember no details about the plan and

did not know what other specifics & had provided. He said this

debriefing info was corroborated by Col. Lennie Wagner, Deselyna's

case officer, who also told him G had given information about

the existence of such assassination plans.

Deselyna said he was prompted in part to come forth to the Com-

mittee with this information because of his belief that the

recent testimony by John Hart was not an accurate characteriza-

tion of G or the information he provided to the CIA. He gave his

opinion that & was remarkably knowledgeable about soviet affairs,

probably more so than any other KGB defector the CIA had received

Recommended Follow-up (if any) :

COMMITES SENSITIVE

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Deselyna interview

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COMTENTEE SERSIM

He said G had

an excellent memory and also that none of the information

ever provided by G had been disproven. He said much of it was so

intricate and involved that it was only years later that the full im-

pact of what he had reported began being known.

Deselyna explained that G's brief stay with the British was brought

on by the deteriorating relations with his CIA handlers, and not

through G's "paranoia." Deselyna said G had angered and frustrated some

of the higher-ups at the agency because he often went, over their heads.

Deselyna gave as an example of the deteriorating trust that it was

knwon that when the CIA received word that the KGB knew G was living

in the Washington area and were likely to try to kill him, the CIA

filtered the word down to G's babysitters that if the KGB tried a hit,

the CIA men were not to stand in the way.

Deselyna said that another position he held in the SR Division was in

Foreign Documents; his job was to maintain files on all of the techni-

cal and scientific industries in the USSR and to translate scientific

and technical materials from Russian to English.. In that capacity he

was routed a contact form in July or August 1962 which related that a

former Marine Corps officer

• Deselyna thought the rank was either

"Cpt." or "Cpl." - was redefting to the U.S. with his family. It said

the defector had lived in Minsk and worked in a radio factory there.

The report contained information provided by the defector about the

size of the Minsk plant, number of employees, type of work, etc. He

said the Agency also had other information on that Minsk plant from

the Industrial Registry Office at the agency; he said it is possible

this contact report on the Minsk information

He said the contact reports often do not contain the name of the in-

dividual being contacted, and this one did not. He said the origin of

the memo was the New York contacts office. He said that meant either

that it originated from a contact in New York, or quite possibly

that

it had been pouched over by the American

said

the memo did not contain any type of erytonym or codes which

might indicate a particular project or interest.

•Deselyna said he testified about this contact memo before the Senate

Intelligence Committee in 1975. He said he thought the Senate had not

been able to confirm this information. He said also that he had heard

in 1975 about a memo in which some CIA employee discussed the possi-

bility of debriefing Oswald upon his return to the U.s.

Deselyna sug-

gested that we contact the writerof that memo to determine if he knows

about this contact report. (NOTE: We did not inform Deselyna that we

have interviewed the man

who wrote that memo.)

Deselyna said other persons he worked with in the SR Division should

be able to confirm the

substance of G's debriefing reports; it should

be contained in the initial debriefing reports. He identified John

Mc Mann, a Mr. Whtiehead,

who may be retired, a man named Polling

and Howard Osborne. He said he would not mind it if we mentioned his

name to the CIA or Golitsin when we follow-up on this. He said G

knew him as Donald Denison.

COMMITTEE: SENSTIVE

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COMMITTEE SENSITIVE

I asked Deselnya if he knew the name Talbot Bielefeldt; Bielefeldt

has been identified as a friend of Ruth Paine whom Ruth's mother

contacted when they were in Washington, D.C. in 1964 to testify before

the Warren Commission. Deselnya said Bielefeldt was the head of

the Soviet branch of the Foreign Documents Division when he was there.

He said he did not believe Bielefeldt had any operational activities

at that time, but that he did not know what type of work Bielefelat

moved to next. He said the Foreign Documents Division did not actually

run: any operations that he knew of. He said if they ever received any

reports which reflected any operations or sources, that fact was

always disguised or the source of the document would be dummied to

hide the real interest.

We asked why G would not have told us this story about the Soviet

plan to possibly assassinate Nixon when we interviewed G. Deselnya

said he did not know why, but that it is possible he was

"warned off"

of discussing certain areas by the Agebsy, although Deselnya said he

did not know what G's present relationship with the CIA was.

Possible follow-up:

1. Reinterview Golitsin about the Nixon plan

2. Get access to the debriefing reports on G which mention the plan

or cover the initial time periods he was being debriefed

3. Interview and/or depose the responsible CIA officials to determine

a) what action was taken on this information; b) whether this

information was disseminated to the Warren Commission

4. Locate through the Industrial Registry or the Foreign Documents

Division the memo about the debriefing of the defector

• (NOTE: Casasin said also that he thought a file or index was main-

tained on the industries in Minsk; he thought the information would

have been kept in the Office of Research and Reports; I do not

believe it still exists, but Ted says info from that old office

has been farmed out to several other components)

5. Interview and/or depose the responsible CIA officials on

a) the location of this memo; b)

whether it was ever disseminated

to the Warren Commission; c)

what action was ever taken on it

6. Attempt to locate the individuals who conducted the debriefing

Team 5 (CIA) has also spoken with Deselnya.

COMMITTEE SENSITIVA

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