REFUGEE HANDLING
Originator: ARMY
From: JAMES K. PATCHELL
To: MR. CALIFANO
Document date: 02/26/1963
Document type: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

## Page 1

198-10007-10027

2022 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK Assassination System

Date:

Identification Form

Agency Information

6/24/201

AGENCY: ARMY

RECORD NUMBER :

198-10007-10027

RECORD SERIES :

AGENCY FILE NUMBER:

CALIFANO PAPERS

Document Information

ORIGINATOR: • ARMY

FROM:

JAMES K. PATCHELL

TO: MR. CALIFANO

TITLE: REFUGEE HANDLING

DATE: 02/26/1963

PAGES:

24

SUBJECTS :

CUBAN REFUGEES

DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION: Confidential

RESTRICTIONS: 1A

CURRENT STATUS: Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 04/08/1998

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS: Califano Papers, Box 2, Folder 13. Memo from Patchell to Califano re: handling of Cuban refugees.

Department of the Army EO 13528

A Declassity E Exclude → Exempt

Authority.

= Refer To -

Review Date LAUSIS ByLie OUn

v9.1

50955

DocId: 32424020

Page

36

1

---

## Page 2

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

February 26, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CALIFANO

SUBJECT: Refugee Handling

This paper, prepared by HEW, points up the problems of

refugee handling and recommends that only one plane peribe authorized

in the event flights are resumed. This recommendation is based upon

the ability of HEW to handle that number of refugees through an expanded

resettlement program (previously two of three planes per day. were

arriving).

There is no direct involvement of the Department of Defense

in this program. The major issues are as follows:

a.

The dicotomy of syphoning off resistance forces

versus the normal U. S. assistance to refugees.

b.

The dicotomy of assimilating refugees versus their

desire to be ready to return to a "new" Cuba.

c.

The problem of establishing an additional refugee

center to take the burdens.off of schools, housing, municipal

services, employment, medical and health and community

relations in the Miami area (the pros and cons of the establish-.

ment of a second center are outlined in the enclosure to the

paper).

There are intelligence and security implications in the estab-

lishment of a second center which are not fully reflected in the enclosure.

I suggest you take your lead from CIA and Justice on intelligence and

security matters (Defense could be involved if we were required to estab-

lish a second screening point, however, this is of lesser importance).

There is no indication that HEW or Labor have sought assistance

from private institutions other than those presently operating in the Miami

area which include one Catholic organization, one Protestant organization

and one interdominational organization.

NW 50955 DocId: 32424020 Page 2

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## Page 3

CAUTION:

Although it is not our business, suggest that care be exercised

in your placing your stamp of approval on any program which restricts

the inflow of refugees as this is against our fundamental principles.

Many of the problems are essentially economic and political

and we would do best to be listeners rather than givers.

Zwest, Pathee.

James K. Patchell

Lt. Colonel USA

NEXT ATTACHED

IS PREVIOUS ACTION

ON REFUGEES AND RED. CROSS FLIGHTS

AND SIMPS, (INFO ONLY - IT COULD

GET INTO CONVERSAMON),

HW 50955

Do01d: 32124020

Page 3

---

## Page 4

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---

## Page 5

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## Page 6

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---

## Page 7

CONFIDENTIAL

urgent

ATTA :

Chief, Contact Division

CAC Staiz

Chiot, Miani Field 01fice

Type of Refugees on Red Cross Flights

00D (S) 3-251,472

7 February 1963

ODA (2) - 6295

From 18 Jan - 1 Feb 63 we have had five Red Cross 11tghts-

arriving In Miami from Cuba carrying "US nittonals." Presumably

official

Washington believes that these people are

in truth bardship

cases, of US nationals who were prevented from leaving Cuba before

this date.

In reality the passengers reflect nore Cuben nationals

than US, and represent to s very large degree Cuban nationals

arriving in the US on the coat-tails of minor children who vere

born in the US.

The specific figures for the month of January

are 276 Cuban nationala and 217 US nationals. There were 196

children.

2. The Miani Fleld Office has been covering all Red Cross

flights at the airport, and has interviewed all male adults.

results have been extremely poor,

based on a large degree on the

very low caliber of the individuals who are coming in.

Appended

1s a memorandum prepared by @ Hunsaker concerning the type of

refugoes who are arriving, and me think it is completely accurate

based on our own observations while covering these flights.

3. While we do not believe that we have any influence over

continuance of Red Cross flights, we do feel that we should register

our opinion concerning the type of individuals who are being permit

ted entry into the US under the guise of being US nationals and

hardship cases.

4. Hunsaker nentions a number of mentally deficient. This

has been quite

true of the passengers on board the Shirley lykes

the African Pilot.

The Biscayne Boulevard Office within the Tast

week has Interviewed three individuals who had been contined in

mental hospitals prior to their departure for the us.

I encountered

a fourth case on a recent Red Cross Ilight.

Castro is obviously

getting rid of his undesirables.

JUSTIN TO GLRICHAUF

Attackront

CONPIDENTAD

---

## Page 8

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---

## Page 9

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMOBANDUM

TO : Justin. Gleichaut

FROM : Q. Hunsaker

SUBJECT: Type of Cuban Refugees Arriving

It seems obvious

that the Cuban Government

1s utilizing

• the Red Cross

transportation facilities

to foist off on the US great number of undesirables.

As has been well documented in reports secured from

the arrivals thenselves, (and the newspapers,, the

majority

of the passengers

, on the "African Pilot"

and the

"Shirley bykes" had little or no connection

with the Invasion Prisoners.

At the most, the "good"

ones could ascribe their departure frou Cuba to the

fact that they had property

the

Cuban Government

wanted.

At the worst, the

"bad" ones would appear

to be Castro agents, Comuniets, nationalists, Ci

minals and physically disabled.

2. The arrivals on the Red Cross plane of 25

Jan

63 were just about the dregs of Cuban society.

The passengers made accusations against their fel-

low passengers, and fron the reports secured from

individuals, it was apparent that many of them were

would be Castristas, neophyte Conmunists, or genuine

Castro agents.

The arrivals on the

plane of I Feb 63 were

the worst collection of human beings it has ever

been my misfortune to view.

There vere four or

Live honest hardship cases of very old persone.

There were some who were obviously physical wrecks,

there were a number of mentally deficient, and there

were some who were obviously seriously ill with

disease, In addition to those there were extremely

low class people, there were almost illiterate negroes,

and there were self admitted Fidellatas,

and Naciona

istas who had left the US after the April 1961 invasion

to return to Cuba.

Apparently, however, 111e Bot

too tough for them

there or it was decided they

could bettor save

the causo hero.

CONPDEAMAL

---

## Page 10

CONFIDENTLAL

These people are not, in my

mind,

genuine

refugees.

They are (1) cast-offs of the Cuban

society,

(2) arrogant Castro agents, or (3) people

so devoid of political conviction that they could

owe no allegiance

to any country.

The wave of indignation experienced

by the

Immigration and Custons Inspectors is nost revealing.

These met

veterans of long years of experience in

denling with all types of humanity, have reached the

point where they make open statonents that "guch trash

should never be admitted to the uS,"

and before I

go on admitting people like this, I'11 take my re-

tirement."

6.

Somshow,

sonething should be done to call

the attention of Washington to this most sorry atate

of affairs.

This sovereign nation should say when

people will enter this nation, and should also say

who

should enter this nation, regardless of

how much

the

do gooders bowl about "humanitarianisa."

It is my

opinion that until facilities are again set up

properly to scroen these arrivals at Opa-Locka, no

more refugees should be allowed to come to the

7.

The other members of the Miani Field Office

Stafi

are in full accord with these recommendations.

Q. HUNSAKER

601

DIDENTME

---

## Page 11

TREOMING TELEGRAM

446-143

Action

ARA

Into

SS

G

SP

SHERAL

FROM: CUBAN AFFAIRS OFFICE MIAMI

TO:

Seoretary of State

NO:

2

FEBRUARY 17: 7 PM

Department of State

Controi:

Rec'd:

CIGH

12:09 41

1963

SCA

INA

RAK

PRIORITY

FOR COTTRELL OCA (FOR DELIVERY SIGO A.M, FEB. 18)

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY RESULTS (AND COMMENTS THEREON) OF COA/M

EXAMINATION OF BASIS FOR STATEMENTS MADE IN MEMO FROM CAS

FIELO OFFICE CONCERNING QUALITY PERSONS ENTERING US FRO CUSA

VIA RETURNING RED CROSS PLANES AND SHIPS. IN COURSE TATE EX

AMINATION, CCA/M DISCUSSED ISSUES RAISED SY STATCUTE THEMO

WITH ORIGINATING OFFICE, INS, HEW AND US PUELIC HEALT SERVICE.

ORIGINAL MEMO WAS NEVER INTENDED AS FORMAL, DOCIMENTED RE-

PORT TO BE GIVEN DISSEMINATION OUTSIDE IMMEDIATELY WE CERNCE

OFFICE IN WASHINGTON, RATHER IT WAS MEANT TO BE INTORAL MEMO

EXPRESSING PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS OF OFFICERS WHO HAD H4D 606-

SIDERABLE EXPERIENCE OVER NUMBER OF. YEARS IN INTERROGATING

THOUSANDS OF INCOMING CUBAN MALES, THESE OFFIGERS HAD GONE TO

BE DISTURSED AND IRRITATED BY ENTRY INTO US UNDER SPECIAL PRO

GRAM OF WHAT APPEARED TO THEM TO BE UNDESIRABLES AND PERSONS

OF LOW CALIBER, PARTICULARLY ON RETURNING RED CROSS PLANESE

2. WHEN THE BASIC MEMO WAS PREPARED AND FORWARDED TO WASHINGTON,

FULL STATISTICAL DATA NOT AVAILABLE TO THE OFFICE CONGERNED:

MOREOVER, SINGE THE MEMO, WAS NOT INTENDED ASTA FORMAL REBORT

IT HAD NOT BEEN PREPARED IN COLLABORATION WITH OTHER AGENCIES

INVOLVED WITH RECEIPT AND PROCESSING OF INCOMING BERSONS IN THES

SPECIAL PROGRAMS ORIGINATING OFF IGE CONSIDERS HANDI UNG GIVEN

MEMO

This copy must be teturned to h

I CENTE LOSS ALONE GEORIES AEROPOSE

I TISM

ANTON

• PROMICITEO UNTESS MUNGEASSTRIEDA

---

## Page 12

SECRET

-2- 2= FEBRUARY 170.7 PM, FROM: CUBAN AFFAIRS OFFICE MIAMI

MEMO IN WASHINGTON UNFORTUNATE.

3• IN LIGHT FOREGOING, MEMO SHOULD, IN MY OPINION, BE VICWED

AS HONEST, CANDID BUT NECESSARILY

INCOMPLETE STATEMENT OF THE

PERSONAL

IMPRESSIONS OF EXPERIENCED PERSONS TOWARD A SITUA

TION WHOSE FULL DIMENSIONS THEY DID NOT KNOW.

4, ONE OF MAJOR FACTORS IN SITUATION HAS BEEN LACK FROM BEGINN-

ING SPECIAL PROGRAM IN JANUARY OF: FULL KNOWLEDGE AMONG INTEREST

ED AGENCIES MIAMI AREA OF SPECIFIC CRITERIA ESTABLISHED BY USG

NUMBER CASES) EVEN THIRD-COUNTRY (NON-US, NON-CUBAN) NATIONALS

COMING IN ON FLIGHTS ON COAT-TAILS US NATIONALS, OFTEN MINOR

CHILDREN. INS FIGURES SHOW THAT OF TOTAL INTAKE OF 636 PERSONS

ON SEVEN RED CROSS FLIGHTS JANUARY 13-FEBRUARY 8, 277 WERE US

NATIONALS, 225 WERE.

: IMMEDIATE MEMBERS (HUSBANDS, WIVES, PARENTS,

CHILDREN) OF FAMILIES OF US NATIONALS, ANO 85 WERE MORE DISTANT

MEMBERS OF FAMILIES OF US NATIONALS, EXCEPT POSSIBLY IN CASE OF

THE LAST: GROUP, THERE WOULD SEEM TO DE NO REAL BASIS FOR COM

PLAINT

IF, AS CCA/M UNDERSTANDS, SELECTION IN HAVANA FOR THE

FLIGHTS WAS DETERMINED ON GROUND OF US NATIONALITY AND CLOSE

KINSHIP TO US NATIONALS, IN ANY EVENT, AGENCIES IN MIAMI AREA

SHOULO BE KEPT FULLY INFORMED THROUGH COA/M AND THEIR OWN

CHANNELS OF STANDARDS SELECTION FOR SPECIAL FLIGHTS AND SHIPS.

5. ANOTHER SOURCE CONCERN TO CAS FIELD OFFICE HAS BEEN REENTRY

UNDER SPECIAL PROGRAM (EDGA AS RELATIVES US NATIONALS) OF PER-

SONS WHO DEPARTED US FOR CUBA AFTER BREAK DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

OR EVEN AFTER BAY PIGS. NORMALLY THESE PERSONS WOULD BE DENIED

VISA WAIVERS BY VIRTUE THEIR ABANDONMENT US RESIDENCE AFTER

BREAK RELATIONS. NOW. HOWEVER, WITH DIFFERENT BASIS FLIGIBILITY

FOR END ALOO KINSTROUS NATIONALS, THEY CAN ENTER,

BUT

ALWAYS SUBJECT

IT. SHOULD BE EMPHASIZED,

TO ERETHERCINS CHECK

CASE PELO OFPTOE CONSIDERS PERSONS MHO FALL INTO THIS. CATEGOR

ANDATHERE HAVEABLENLA HANDEUL OUT CETOTAL

INTANA

SHIRTAND

TASECRET

PLANE

---

## Page 13

-3 2, FEBRUARY 179 79W FROM: CUCAN AFFAIRS SEE: MALAMI

PLANE, OF 34294 TO BE IT BEST EPPORTUNISTS.

O CORELY

TRUE THAT ORPORTUMIST LAGEL JUSTIFICO FOR LAURITE ILE GNALL

GROUP, BUT FENDINO CAREROL ANVESTICATION CACH LAD GEESEOILITY

CERTAINLY OXISTS SOME HAVE DRED GENTINGLY DISILLE 11 ANS

THERGEON REPRESENT AT LEAST ROTENTIALLY USCRULEEEEEGTRO

CLEMENTS. SHOULD BO NOTSO THAT WIS KIOX 541004

DENIAL VISA WAIVER TO PERSON WHO HAS NOW ENTER DECK SPELL

PROGRAM HA0 GEN BASCO ON SUSPECTED SUE ERST TIMES. 1E

A PORSON ENTERINO INOR SPECIAL PROGAAN VRE TO ME

VISA WAIVER ON SECURITY GROUNDS: HE WULD RE SUELT TO NORMAL

INS PROCEDURES AND. CONTROLS.

6. BASIC QUESTION RAISED BY MEMO 10: H4S THERE DR: & SUSSTAN-

TAL DIFFERENCE IN QUALITY IN ALL ABRICTS, INCHSIVE SECURITY,

HEALTH AND ECONCMIC AND SOCIAL CLASSIFICATIONE I TWEN GROUP

ENTERING UNDER SPECIAL PROGRAM AND "NGKYIL" INTAr" UNDER PAA

FLIGHTS PRIOR OCTOGER CUT-OFF? CAS MEMO TAKES PEEKI. THERE

HAS DEEN. AND STRONGLY ANGLES SPECIAL PERGRAM HAG 1A68 USED BY

•CASTRO AS MEANS GETTING RIO DE PERSONS - WANT: 101

? CURA

(INCEUDING MENTAL AND PHYSICAL INCOMPETENTS) CR FLIE IN US

WITH HESPECT PHYSICAL AND MENTAL CENDIFIGENE ALVALS) STATE

THAT DY AND LARGE

THERE MAS OCEANO CHATOR IN QUALITY, (SHOULD

" NOTED CAS NERALLY SEGO EDULE MALE CULTY INE A00 OSPHS SEC

ALL AGRIVALO: REGROES PLANTING. OR ENATRO MAERRONEERE OR

AGENTO DECELIAL MACULA LAS DEFICE ORIGIATREE LOVES

INGTOTNCEW DEROGATRY TTORKATIDE ON OR THEREFICION SE

ARRIVALO CURECENT SPECIAL FIGUTS (SHIP AERIAL TOILING

TAKEN INTO ACOUNT, CONSTOCRAGLY NICHNE THAN TO PRET

TrG.R

FLIGHTS.

DULK SUCH CASES SEEMS FU RELATE TO PERE ME Wide Ri

TURNED TO CUGA FROM US ARTER BAX RUGSO INS, LOOKING AT ENTIRE

(SHIR AND PLANES) SPECIAL PROGRAM,

I, DOES NOT CONSIDER INCIDENCE

SUBVERS VE-TYPE CASES, TO BE HIGHER THAN IN "NORMAL" PRE-CRISIS

PROGRAMA SINGE OCTOBER KINS HAS DEVELORED ABOUT O suCH CASES

WHICH ARE UNDER LNVESTIGATIONS

STORE ON INS.

CASES AN OLVES CAGE

ACTIN

TATTEINORLNERUCLOORE

date AweS

---

## Page 14

SECRET

al - 2, FEBRUARY 17. 7PM, FROM: CUBAN AFFAIRS OFFICE MIAMI

ANY INFORMATION FETLFCTING FOSSIOLE AGENT ACTIVITY AND DL....

VELOPED IN COURSO: INTERROGATIONS CARRIED OUT UNDER CAS FICLO

OFFICE DIRECTION IS PASSED TO FRI, INS AND OTHER INTERESTED

CAS ELEMENTS&

7: RELATED. TO GENERAL QUESTION SECURITY IS NUMSERLENTANES

DEFERRED BY INSO DE GOO ARRIVING BY PLANE, INO DEFCARCO 128

OF WHICH APPROX IMATOLY 100 REPRESENTED PERSONS. CANO ILL MEMBERS

THEIR FAMILIES) ABOUT WHOSE US CITIZENSMIP THENG WAS SOME

QUESTIONE AGOUT 15 OF REMAINDER WERE PERSONS ( AND ALL HEMDERS

THEIR FAMILIES) WHO WERE MEDICAL "HOLOS" CA KHOSE THIRD-COUNTRY

NATIONALITY CREATED OCUBTS AGOUT THEIR ELIGIO LITY FOR REFUOEL

STATUS, REMAINDER WENE FORSONS LAGO ALL MEMBOES THEIR FAMILIES!

ABOUT WHCK SOME SECURITY QUESTION HAO DEIN RAISED. VERY LOW

FIOURE (3 FROM TOTAL ON R8Y4) OF DEFERRALS OF SHIP ARRIVALS

• NOT

MEANINGFUS; PRINCIPALLY DECAUSE NO ACANCE INFORMATION ON NAMES

AVAlLAGLCA CHECK LIMITED IN CASE IMMEDIATE PROCESSINO SHIP

ARRIVALS TO INS CARIOBLAY INDEX, THIS FOLLONED BY FULL INS

SECURITY CHECK ALL SHI ARRIVALS, WHICH IS NORMAL INS PROCEDURE

FOR ALL PLANE

ARRIVALS AS WELL.

8. IN OPINION CAS FIELO OFFICE, REACTIVATION OPA-LOCKA FACILITY

WOULD BE VERY HÖLPFUL FOR BETTER SORCENING ARRIVALS UNDER

SPECIAL.PROGRAME

AT PRESENT TIME, NECESSARILY QUICK INTERROGA

TION ADULT MALES CONDUCISO AT AIRPORT AND EVEROLADES E FOLLOWED

WHERE INDICATSO DY FURTHER INTERROGATION OF INTCRESTING CASES

IN TOWN MIAM

THIS CANNOT BE AS INTENSIVE AS. OPA-LOCKA

SYSTEM BECAUSE OF LIMITED NUMBER INTORROGATORS AND WUNCHING-

UP" OF LARGE NUNDER ARRIVALS, ESPECIALLY WHEN SHIPS ARE USED

BETTER INTERROGATION IN DEETH AT OFA-LOCKA WOULD AFFEOT NOT

ONLY PERSONS WITH POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION BUT ALSO

THOSE ABOUT WHOSE BONA FIDES THERE MAY BE QUESTIONE SUSPICIONS

ABOUT LATTER GROUR COULD BENTESTED MORE EFFECT IVELY THAN PRE-

SENTE SYSTEM PERMITS SITE ALVAYS BELUG UNDERSTOCO THAT WHSTHER

PESANTO ORALOR ARRANG MENTALED CASTELLO OFELCE NOT

ORNO DESIGNATE POR-L

THAI REACT IVATLO FORA-LOCKA NOLEO

SECRETT

IRRE SENT

---

## Page 15

SECRET

-5-2, FEBRUARY 170. 7PM, FROM: CUBAN AFFAIRS OFFICE MIAMI

REPRESENT NO ADVANTAGE IN ITS OPERATIONS AND THEREFORE IT IS

SATISFIED WITH PRESENT ARRANGEMENTS.

9. FOR GENERAL INFO, O TOTAL 2854 ARRIVALS DY SHIP, 1050 WERE

RELATIVES BRIGADE MEMBERS OF WHICH 542 WERE CLOSE (PARENTS,

WIVES, CHILDREN) AND 5O& MORE DISTANT. AS EXPECTED, AFRICAN

PILOT HAD MOST RELATIVES (712), SHIRLEY LYKES NEXT (328), AND

SANTO. CERRO VERY FEW 10)%

ADDITION TO DRIGADE RELATIVES,

SHIPS CARRIED 1209 RELATIVES OF OTHER CUBANS ALREADY IN US

150% CLOSE, T8E MORE DISTANT) AND 368 OTHER CUBANS INO RELA-

TION TO BRIGADE OR OTHER CUBANS ALREADY IN US.

REMAINING 147

CONSISTED US NATIONALS AND FAMILIES, AND THIRD-COUNTRY NATIONALS

AND FAMILIES (VERY FEW ON GOARD) FOR WHICH NO BREAKDOWN AVAIL-

ABLE (ALLOWANCE FOR SMALL MARGIN ERROR SHOULD BE MADE IN ALL

ABOVE FIGURES,

10. WITH RESPECT CUBANS LACKINO PROPER DOCUMENTATION /VISAS,

VISA WAIVERS), THERE ARE NO FIGURES AVAILABLE ON THIS POINT

FOR ARRIVALS BY FLANCA THERE WERE A TOTAL ON THE FLIGHTS OF

16 CUBANS NOT RELATED IN ANY WAY TO US NATIONALS). FOR SHIPS,

1122 OF A TOTAL ON 2064 DID. NOT HAVE PROPER DOCUMENTATION

1399 ON AFRICAN PILOT, 137 ON SHIRLEY LYKES AND 286 ON SANTO

CERROT. IF POSSESSION OF US VISAS OR VISA WAIVCAS WAS A PRE

REQUISITE FOR DEPANTURE FROM CUDA, AND I HAVE SEEN INFORMED

BY CCA THAT IT WAS 4: LEAGT IN THE CASE OF THE SANTO CERRO,

THIS HIGH FIGURE SHOWS LAXITY IN SWISS AND/OR RED CROSS SCREEN

ING IN HAVANA,

114 IN SUMMARY, CONGIDER MEMO, GASCO AS IT WAS ON PERSONAL

REACTIONS AND MPRESSIONS AND INCOMPLETE DATA,. TO WEFRESENT

ONLY A PARTIAL UNCOOREANATED AND THEREFORE OVERDRAWN PICTURE

OR TOE SITUAT LONGE

I WISTATO EMPHASIZE THAT THE ORIGINATING

OFFICE NEVER INTENDED THE MEMO TO BE CONSIDERED AS ANYTHING

MORE THAN AN INTERNAL DOCUMENT EXPRESSING PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS

ASTA RESULT OF A EXAMINATION OF THE GENERAL SITUATION.

SATISFIED THAT

ON SELECTION AND FLAMENO

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## Page 16

SECRET

-6-2, FEBRUARY 17: IM. FROM: CUBAN AFFAIRS OFFICE MIAMI

WELL INFORMED ENOUGH OF THE PROCEDURES THERE TO BE CERTAIN

THAT JUDGMENT IS COMPLETELY ACCURATE), THE GENERAL QUALITY

OF THE SPECIAL PROGRAM ARRIVALS HAS NOT BEEN APPRECIABLY

DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF ARRIVALS UNDER THE PRE-CRISIS "NORMAL"

PROGRAM. IN OTHER WORDS, THE USE, IN MY VIEW, IS NOT NOW

BEING "HAD" ANY MORE THAN IT WAS DEFORE OCTOBER 22. FURTHER..

MORE.! AM SATISFIED THAT, WITH ONE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION (OPA-

LOCKA), THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN EXIS-

TENCE IN THE MIAM! AREA NOW FUNCTION AS WELL AS THEY DID BOFORC

THE CRISIS. IN FACT, IN ONE VERY IMPORTANT RESPECT - THE HANDL-

ING OF VERY LARGE CONCENTRATIONS OF ARRIVALS - THE VARIOUS

AGENCIES HAVE MET AND OVERCOME IMPRESSIVELY PROBLEMS NOT EN-

COUNTERED UNDER. THE NORMAL PROGRAM.

12. RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) STEPS BE TAKEN INNCOLATELY IHROUGH THE SWISS AND RED CROSS TO

ASSURE THAT BASIC USG CRITERIA FOR SELECTING PERSONS TO ENTER US

UNDER SPECIAL PROGRAM ARE CLOSELY ADHERED TO IN HAVANA.

(2) ALL MIAMI AGENCIES CONCERNED DE KEPT. FULLY AND PROMPTLY

INFORMED OF CRITERIA GOVERNING SELECTION IN HAVANA.

(3) ALI. MIAMI AGENCIES CONCERNED EE GIVEN AS MANY DETAILS AS

POSSIBLE AS FAR IN ADVANCE AS POSSIBLE OF PLANNED FLIGHTS OR

SHIP MOVEMENTS UNDER SNECIAL PROGRAM, THIS TO INCLUDE ADVANCE

PASSENGER L1Si5

(4) THE OPA-LOCKA INTERROGATION FACILITY TO BE REACTIVATEO TO

HANDLE SPECIAL PROGRAM ARRIVALS, ON THE GROUNDS THAT THIS WILL

IMPROVE INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND

WILL NOT AFFECT SIGNIFICANTLY UNS OPERATIONS.

GRIMMINS

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## Page 17

February 25, 1963

Department of Health, Education, and Welfare

POSITION PAPER IN REGARD TO THE HANDLING OF CUBAN REFUGEES

IF FLIGHTS WERE TO BE RESUMED

Question:

WHAT SHOULD THE UNITED STATES DO TO HANDLE THE ASSIMILATION,

TEMPORARY OR PERMANENT, OF CUBAN REFUGEES ARRIVING AT THE

RATE OF 400 TO 500 A DAY?

The answer to this question must be considered from the standpoint of

two alternative assumptions:

(1) Continuation of the entry of the refugees into Miami with no

provision for immediate mandatory Government directed movement

(not resettlement in the strict sense of the word) to other

areas; or

(2)

Initial entry into other areas of the United States directly

from Cuba or by Government directed movement from Miami

immediately after arrival.

Were daily arrivals into Miami to be resumed but at an increased rate

of from 400 to 500 a day with no provision for immediate mandatory Government

directed movement elsewhere, an intolerable situation would develop in Miami

because social, economic, and health facilities of that city are already

overburdened by the existing Cuban refugee population.

During the calendar year 1962, approximately 82,000 refugees registered

at the Miami Center and about 35,000 were resettled, leaving a net gain in the

refugee population in Miami of 47,000 persons.

There is an estimated 100,000

plus Cuban refugees now living in Miami who are severely taxing the total facilities

of the area.

Arrivals at the rate of 400 to 500 a day, or 146,000 to 182,500 a year,

is a 75% to 120% increase over 1962.

Assuming that we were successful in

increasing the resettlement figure to 52,000 persons per year, the increase in

the Cuban refugee population in Miami would be between 94,000 and 130,000 a

year. Accordingly, if the 400 to 500 daily arrivals were to begin on

March 1, 1963, Miami's refugee population would approach, or be in excess of,

200,000

by March 1, 1964.

This would have an extremely heavy impact upon the

total economy of Miami and would exceed by far its ability to provide necessary

housing, educational, social, health, and other facilities required by the refugees.

Examples of problems which would be created are:

lo Housing. This would probably be one of the areas of greatest impact.

Exact statistics are lacking, but what follows sums up prevailing conditions in

Miami. About one-half of the 100, 000 refugee population live near the central

Miami city region. One quarter are in other sections of the city and the

remaining one-quarter reside in county regions adjacent to the city or considerably.

removed from it. Recent surveys indicate that while there are no real slum

conditions as yet, there is already considerable over-crowding in refugee

dwellings.

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Housing will be further complicated by area re-development and expressway

construction already underway in Miami which will eliminate housing currently

used by Negroes.

An unestimated number of refugees will also be affected.

There is every

likelihood that Negroes will penetrate the fringes of the so-called

"Cuban" areas in

search of housing and that both elements will become

competitors seeking low-cost housing.

The result will be to add to existing

real or imagined economic dislocation of both Negroes and the refugees with the

inevitable local public opinion supporting the local Negroes.

School facilities. The public schools presently accommodate about

18,000 refugee children.

The parochial system has about 5,000. The capacity

of the latter has been at the overflow level for some time. The public school

system is also at the point where its facilities are being stretched to the

utmost.

Use of portable buildings, double shifting, and "bussing" of refugee

children to other areas already exist.

Under the impact of the 1962 net increase in Miami's refugee population

of 47,000 persons, the public school's refugee child load rose from about 11,000

at the start of 1962 to about 18,000 by the end of the year. If one applies the

1962 ratio of 150 students for each 1,000 rise in the refugee population to the

estimated net increase in the population (were arrivals to reach 400 to 500 per

day), the public school system would have to absorb at least another 14,000

students by March 1, 1964.

This would give them a total refugee child school

registration of at least 32,000 which is far in excess of available or

anticipated facilities.

3. Employment.

There are no solid figures for the number of refugees

who have full or part-time employment in the Miami area.

However, with about

100,000 refugees in the area-60,000 of whom are receiving assistance--it is

reasonable to assume that 15,000 heads of refugee families have jobs of some

kind. Despite the lack of solid data, it is safe to assume that refugee

employees have dislodged others, particularly Negroes, from former jobs.

A net population increase (as computed previously) of at least 94,000

refugees would probably add at least another 30,000 potential job seekers in

Miami who would be competing with other refugees and larger numbers of

indigenous Negroes and whites.

Total unemployment in Miami is already high-

currently estimated at about 12% to 14%.

Miami does not have an industrially-based economy. New plants are coming

into the area, but they will also attract skilled labor from other parts of the

nation. There is no foreseeable time when Miami's economy will be able to

absorb its present native and refugee employables.

4o Municipal services such as police, fire, sanitation, etc. No effort

is made here to calculate the impact upon these facilities of the already

existing or hypothetical refugee population in Miami. But it seems quite

obvious that there will be a heavy impact which would require substantial

expansion of services. Federal financial support would undoubtedly be sought

for this purpose.

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So Medical and health facilities.

The primary source of these services

for refugees at present is the Miami Center's medical dispensary and cooperating

hospitals. The dispensary will be working to full or over capacity even with

the planned increase in staff and facilities in terms of the present refugee

population.

Out-patient, in-patient facilities at county and private hospitals

are also severely taxed by the current refugee population level.

A 100% increase

in the refugee population would add an unsupportable quantitative load to the

Center's dispensary and outside facilities. Over 1,200 patients are now being

treated each week at the Center dispensary

and another 300 to 400 are treated at

the hospitals.

Community relations. Difficult to assess--although not an acute

problem at this time--it is doubtful that public officials or the general

population in Miami and Dade County would accept without serious complaint a

renewed refugee influx of the magnitude proposed by the question. A 100%

increase in the refugee population would obviously add to current economic and

social problems and create increased hostility. toward the Cubans.

The HE Cuban Refugee Center is currently planning an organized community

relations project to assuage the resentment that now exists based on real but

mostly exaggerated situations. We seriously question whether any community

relations program could successfully cope with the impact in Miami of an annual

increase of 100,000 additional Cuban refugees.

General Observations: If the refugee influx goes to 400 to 500 persons

a day; one of the following would have to be accomplished to avoid a substantial

increase in the Miami Cuban refugee population.

2o

remove at least 100,000 refugees a year from the Miami area either

through resettlement or mandatory Government directed movement.

Based upon

experience over the past two years, an orderly, planned resettlement program of

this magnitude is almost impossible of accomplishment.

The implications of

Government directed movement would require policy decisions at the highest

level of Government.

bo

construct or make use of existing facilities to serve, as reception

or processing: centers and to house refugees in transit residence.

Such a

facility would have to provide lodging, mess, medical, protection, and social

services as a minimum.

School facilities would also have to be provided for

children, and language training, etc., for adults.. No effort has been made to

compute the costs involved, but they

would run into the millions of dollars.

More importantly, the "refugee camp," a concept which is highly undesirable

for reasons that

are obvious, should be avoided.

Co.

use of Miami as a transit port of entry with Government directed

movement within 24 hours of arrival to the location of one or more Centers

elsewhere in the United States.

do by-passing Miami as an initial point of entry and establishing such

points in certain key locations. This would be the equivalent of establishing

new refugee centers in a number

of localities.

It might be easier to by-pass

Miami completely in the first place than it would be to force movement from

Miami after entry®

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For a review and analysis of the "considerations involved in establishing

a second Cuban refugee center," see the attached

summary of a study made in

'March 1962. While the figures in that report are no longer valid, the paper

presents a fairly comprehensive review of virtually every factor-social to

fiscal-and lists eleven factors "militating against the establishment of!!"

another refugee center.

(Incidentally, the additional costs are understated

based on current information, and such

costs would be further increased if the

influx vere approximately doubled over that contemplated in the paper.)

The study

was concerned with the establishment of a second center in New Orleans. However,

the same basic considerations would be valid for other areas.

A highly developed resettlement program (either out of Miami or out

of Miami and one or more additional Centers) is an essential part of any approach

to the handling of additional refugees relating to restoration of flights

regardless of the rate of arrival per week.

Regardless of what is done to reduce the impact on Miami, planned

resettlement remains in our judgment the only long-range, constructive

approach either to handling the present refugee population in Miami or any

new refugee concentration elsewhere.

As previously stated, the prospect

of reaching and maintaining an over-all resettlement rate at a 100,000a-year

level within the foreseeable future cannot be expected.

There are several steps which could be taken to enhance resettlement

opportunities.

Several of these require high-level policy decision but are

of great importance to an acceleration of the resettlement program. These

items include, among others:

(1) Adjustment of refugee status from that of parole or waiver to

that of alien admitted for permanent residence;

(2)

Control over the type of refugees admitted to the United

States;

(3)

Screening out of those who should be eliminated for reasons

of mental and physical health with due regard being paid to the

humanitarian aspect of reunion of families.

However, even if these steps were adopted, it is questionable whether

the voluntary approach to resettlement could reach more than a 50,000-a-year

level.

Conclusions and Recommendations

It is our judgment that the foregoing information substantiates the

following conclusions and recommendations.

Conclusions:

(1) That the facilities of Miami are such that it cannot accept a

restoration of an influx of Cuban refugees of a magnitude approximating 400

to 500 a day•

Furthermore, were this influx to be forced upon Miami, public

opinion would react violently against such a move.

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(2). That there are considerations of service and cost which make the

desirability of opening a second center subject to substantial question.

(3) That the question of Government directed movement of either the

existing Cuban population or new arrivals from Miami should receive the

highest possible policy consideration within the Government.

The use of

facilities as reception centers should also be subject to the same type of

scrutiny.

(4) That not more than 50,000 Cuban refugees a year can be resettled

from the Miami (or other) area through a voluntary resettlement program.

Recommendations:

Based upon the four above listed conclusions, the Department of Health,

Education, and Welfare would strongly urge that the number of new Cuban refugees

permitted to enter this country be restricted to a number which would not exceed

our ability to resettle them within the various communities of this country.

This maximum figure for the foreseeable future appears to be 50,000 a year, or

approximately 1,000 a week. This would represent approximately one flight per

day. This is only about one-third of the number who would enter if 400 to 500

Cuban refugees were admitted a day: Additional consideration can be given to :

this matter after appropriate exploration is made of alternative courses of action

such

as the use of reception centers and Government directed movement.

Consideration

should also be given to the possibility of controling emplanement of passengers

in Cuba to assure that to the extent possible priority is given to parents of

unaccompanied children and to close relatives of Cuban refugees already in the

United States.

HH

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3/1/62

SSA STAFF PAPER * CONSIDERATIONS INVOLVED IN ESTABLISHING A

SECOND CUBAN REFUGEE CENTER IN NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA

The establishment of a second Cuban refugee center in New Orleans has been

proposed as one method of relieving the mounting pressure upon the social,

economic and health facilities of Miami due to the increasing number of

Cuban refugees who enter the United States at Miami, Florida, and remain

there®

To be effective, it would be necessary that. Cuban refugees coming to the

United States be diverted from Miami.

Thus, if no substantial number of

additional refugees were to arrive in Miami

and the voluntary agencies in

the Miami center would continue their resettlement activities with some

success,

the pressures on Miami would be lessened,. The optimum effect of

a second Cuban refugee center would be to reduce the migration of addi

tional refugees to Miami to a trickle and to relocate a number of those who

were in Miami prior to the establishment of a second center. To achieve

the above objectives, it is essential that:

l. The great bulk of Cuban refugees who would otherwise enter the

United States at Miami would be directed to New Orleans. Refugees

might travel to New Orleans via Miami where INS Inspection would

take place, or travel directly to New Orleans.

2=.

Services similar to those in Miami be available to Cuban refugees In

New Orleans.

If a stop-over in Miami was not made, the necessary

services would include INS inspection and Federal center registration,

In any case, it would be necessary to provide financial assistance,

health care, education, resettlement, and employment for individuals

and families and care

and protection of unaccompanied children.

In weighing the feasibility of a second refugee center, consideration should

be given to whether a second center would achieve the desired objectives

and if so, the price (financial and otherwise) which would need to be paid.

Important to this consideration are the current situation in Miami, the

flow of Cuban refugees to the United States, the cost of establishing a

second center for Cuban refugees and of providing the necessary supporting

services in New Orleans, and the effect any such move would have on Federal

State relations and National Policy with respect to the refugees.

A. Factors in Favor of Establishing a Second Cuban Refugee

Center In New Orleans, Louisiana

1. A second refugee center located in any part of the United States

should drastically reduce the entry of Cubans in Miami. Boat travelers would

continue to arrive in Miami and undoubtedly some refugees entering at New

Orleans would find their way to Miami, But the overall effect in relleving

the social, economic, and health pressures upon Miami should be significant.

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2. The absence of a large, well-established Cuban community in New

Orleans might facilitate resettlement..

There would be much less informal

help to Cuban refugees in finding housing, jobs, and adjusting to American

life than in Miami and less attraction to remain in New Orleans.

There is a limit to the number of refugees Miami can continue to

absorb without serious consequences for its permanent residents and Cuban

refugees. It is not possible to determine accurately what this absorption

point might be, but it would seem that a city with a population of 980,000

could not absorb many more than the approximately 100,000 Cuban refugees

already in Miami®

B. Factors Militating Against the Establishment of a Refugee

Center in New Orleans

. Getting the refugees to go to New Orleans instead of Miami. Unless

we can either stop existing direct flights from Havana to Miami or coerce

the choice of New Orleans, the Port of natural selection will continue to be

Miami, The only apparent

means of reversing the process of natural selection

would be to use our influence so that the only direct flights available from

Cuba would be to New Orleans. With no other choice, presumably the New Orleans

flights would be filled.

2.: In setting up another center in New Orleans, the Federal Government

would be creating a local problem.

The community would not be asking for

help because of problems created by natural in-migration.

As such, DHW

would be soliciting cooperation of State and local authorities to act as the

agent of the Federal government in providing certain services or in making

their facilities available to Cuban refugees.

This was the converse of the

situation in Florida, Hence, there is no assurance that State and local

authorities would cooperate willingly with the Federal government, or that

they would be willing to absorb certain costs, such as the Florida State

Department of Public Welfare and Dade County school system have done.

3. A second refugee center in New Orleans would add to program costs.

For example, to provide a level of assistance payments to Cuban refugees In

New Orleans commensurate with the public assistance programs would require

a monthly average payment of $85.85 per case whereas the Florida Department

of Public Welfare estimated assistance payments for March 1962, at about

$72,55 per month.

This alone would require an additional 4 million plus

dollars.

In addition; salary and office costs are higher in New Orleans

than in

Miami.

It is also assumed that Louisiana and New Orleans would

expect to be reimbursed the full cost of educating children of Cuban refugees,

and that it would be necessary to accord similar consideration to Florida.

In addition, the very fact of a second center would involve an increase in

such items of expense as

overhead, rental of IBM equipment, as well as con-

siderable communications, record-keeping; and coordination problems, with

resultant additional costs.

4.

A

second center may Increase total resettlement and job placements

but not necessarily in direct proportion to the staff engaged in resettlement

or job finding.

Actually, two centers might be competing for approximately

the same potential number of resettlements and jobs.

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5.

The additional resettlements expected from a second refugee center

might be realized by merely increasing the present resettlement staff in

the Miami center. Increasing the resettlement staff in Miami would consti-

tute a relatively small part of the additional cost of operating a second

refugee center.

6.

Cuban refugees in New Orleans would need more help from agencies in

locating housing and in using community services because the smaller Cuban

community in New Orleans could not provide the help furnished refugees by

the large and well established Cuban community of Miami. Stated in the

positive, the Miami Cuban community provides invaluable help to Cuban refugees

in adjusting to a new culture and in attaining self-support. : Because of a

lack of a large Cuban community in New Orleans it is also contemplated that a

higher proportion of registrants at the Center would apply for financial

assistance than is the case in Miami..

?. It would be difficult to justify the separation of families and to

prevent refugees with relatives or friends in Miami from gravitating there.

8.

Coordinating work of two centers would be complicated, time-consuming

and expensive, and would probably require a sizeable administrative organization.

9. If the second center does not succeed in resettling refugees quickly,

it is possible that the result might be another Miami, so that instead of

solving one serious problem the Department may be confronted with two serious

problems.

10. It would be difficult to arrange air transportation from Havana to

New Orleans. No airline is flying that route presently and the cost of

transportation to New Orleans would probably be double the cost to Miami.

Since fares are now payable only in Cuban pesos which must be spent in Cuba,

It would probably be necessary for the Federal goverment to subsidize the

operation.

1l. There are approximately 1,500 Cuban refugees now living in the New

Orleans area who, it is estimated, would file for financial assistance.

lores present policies only persons residing in the Miami area are eligible

for such assistance.

Pros and Cons of Stop-Over in Miami En-Route to New Orleans

Pros:

1. The advantage of a stop-over in Miami is that the facilities availablé

for inspection by INS and registration by the Cuban Refugee Center in Miami

could be used to perform these functions for

Cuban refugees entering the United

States at New Orleans, Louisiana, without any additional cost. This would avoid

the necessity of duplicate facilities in New Orleans to perform like functions

with the attendant problems of recruiting and training staff and finding

suitable office space, and securing additional appropriations.

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2i It would not be necessary to arrange for direct flights to New

Orleans and charter arrangements from Miami to New Orleans are readily

accomplished.

Cons:

To arrange a stop-over in Miami for screening and registration would

entail the operation of a congregate housing and feeding program in order

to carry out these functions efficiently and

to prevent refugees from

entering Miami.. The organization and operation of a congregate housing

and feeding program would necessitate housing facilities, staff, equipment,

etc., all of which would have to be provided by the Federal government.

Furthermore, there is no way to forcibly ship anyone to New Orleans after

this process even if it were considered

possible on policy grounds.

will be a natural desire to join relatives and friends in Miami. Certainly

this would complicate the work of the Department of Health, Education, and

Welfare in administering the Cuban refugee program. Though additional costs

would be entailed to screen and register refugees in New Orleans, these

costs would be partially offset by the savings resulting from reducing the

volume of this work in Miami.

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