HSCA REQUEST DATED 6 MARCH 1978
Originator: CIA
From: BRECKINRIDGE, S. D.
To: SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE DDO
Document date: 03/20/1978
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

## Page 1

104-10059-10195

• 4.

2022 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 GiA

Bạck

UNCLASIFIED

WE SEGRET.

INTERNAL:

USE ONLY

HE CONT DENT AL

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

*AHSCA Request dated 6 March 1978

FROM:

Mom 2d 8049 AH478

Deputy Inspector General

6E19 Hatrs. Bldg•

TO: "¡Officer designation, room number, and

building)

DATE.

FORWARDED

5527

71. 2217

12: 29

OFFICER'S

INITIALS

DATE

2,02 MAR 1978

COMMENTS* (Number

to whom.p" Drow; a line

RECEIVED

2.

Mr

Shepanek (SA/DDO)

2D0109 Hatrs. Bldg.

Russ Holmes

- action

3.

5.

7:

8.

9..

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

FORM

3-62

• Pierce

610 USEORIONOUS

EDITIONS

SECRET

ECONFIDENTIAL

APPROVED FOR PELEASE 1933

CIA NISTORICAE REVIEW PROGRAM

INTERNAL

USE ONLY

UNCLASSIFIED

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CONFIDE

INSPECTOR GONERAL

78-580

20 MAR 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to the DDO

ATTENTION

FROM

SUBJECT

: Mr. Shepanek

S.

D. Breckinridge

Deputy Inspector General

REFERENCE

: HSCA Request dated 6 March 1978

: OLC 78-0448/1

-..:

1. In Attachment A is a document which refers to David E.

Murphy. It is provided for your review in relation to subject

request. Attachment B contains several items which mention

Boris Tarasoff which you should also review in relation to this

request.

2. Some of the material in Attachment B is contained in

the Task Force Report which was transmitted to the HSCA in

sanitized form and shown only to selected HSCA staff members

in unsanitized form at Headquarters. Limited access should con-

tinue to be provided.

OIG files contained no information on Ann Tarasoff or

James

Wilcott.

1S. Bull

S. D. Breckinridge

Attachments:

As Stated

CC:

OLC (Rodger Gabrielson),

w/o attachments

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993

CONFIDENTIAL

-SHA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

E2 IMPDET

CL BY 013190

3752

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P. 15

Who was the unidentified man at a meeting with Richard Helms

on 12 March 1964 who would have known if Oswald had been

CIA informant?

Answer:

The unidentified man who accompanied Mr. Helms to the 12 March

1964 meeting was Mr. David E. Murphy, then Chief of the Soviet

Russia Division, DDP. See paragraph 6 of the Tab 9 memorandum

of record of this meeting for Mr. Helms' reported remark that

he and MI. Murphy were the two Clandestine Services officers

who certainly would know whether or not Oswald had been an

agent for CIA in the Soviet Union.

18

-SPARET SENSITIE

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SECR

-8.

our nia 196 as te ten us on or nices.

for the telephone numbers of the Soviet, Cuban, and Satellite Erbassies.

With this forewarning, LIPEAT (unilateral coverage) was disconnected However,

as I recall, the Nexicans conrected 5 Cuban lines, 5 Soviet Ilnes, 3 Gzech,

? Polish, and I Yugoslav line. The basehouse listening post had a live

monitor who made short summaries of interesting conversations for a daily

resues which was recolved each day around 8 at (passed by flick to Goodpasture

to get to Scott before 9 a i.) Later (when the reel was completely recorded)

full transcripts were typed and passed to the station in the same way, however,

there was usually a time lag of a day or so.

Those transcripts which had

Russian or another language besides Spanish of English went out of the listening

post the day after the transcript (of other conversations on the reel)was

typed.

These reels were taken to another location where they were translated

and typed. In the case of the Russian translations, Boris Tarasoff usually ran

about a week behind the date of the conversation because of the volume of

Russian conversations

anong the members of the Soviet Erbassy. During this

period (fall of 1963) the reels were probably being brought into the station

and carried to Boris by one of the people from the Soviet Section or they nay

have been carried to hin by flick but I think I brought the reel in and gave

at to fierber lanel to take to Bors. Herbert Manetil and his use arbara

handled all of the processing of Soviet transcripts.

My job involved screening

the photographs as soon as we learned that the man calling himself Oswald was

probably an American. However, here again there was a backlag because the

photos were picked up three tines a week but the ones ricked up were usually

for dates a few days previously because

[the doctor processed the film on a

night time basis. Photographs were made usually until one roll vas used but

later we got it changed to one day coverage on each roll - in other words the

liter

operators

cleared the camera each day whether there was anyminatax a full

roll of film exposed. Instructions vere to covar office hours, chotograch each

D419

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SECIS

new Soviet and family, all foreigners and foreign liense plates. Fuman

error did occur but generally the agents were conscientious.

The Cuban

embassy coverage had more sophisticated equipment (a pulse camera) but it

Frequently devoloped nechanical dirricultios. [Bob Zanbarnerdi] and Spatter]

(I think) handled this film - pick up and delivery. Lorna Mackay screened

the film inside the station..

I am certain that the Oswald call cane to our attention from the

Soviet line. It was picked up and taken to Boris for a translation because

the caller was trying to speak Russian. Any delay was caused by waiting to

compare the photographs with the typed transcript. There were no copies of

transcripts every made in languages other than Spanish or English because Win

Scott could read only those two languages and he personally screened the

transcripts for operational leads he wanted pursued.

SENTET,

DU/2

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•- t

„SEGRET.

8/56-6/69

COS

DCOS

09

Winston M. Scott (deceased)

[7/56 - 7/58, AlfonsgRodriguez (retired)

10/587 12/62 [arren

Dean (retired)

6/63 - 9/65

Alan White

(retired)-

10/65 - 1969 Stanley HatsonJ (retired in Mexico)

COVERT ACTION

Prior to 1954

09.

(12/54-7/58

09 012/567-9/61

Howard Hunt (retired)

Williard Hill (resigned) OS

Stannard Short. (retired)

9/61

- 3/64

David Phillips C/(retired) ~

8/62 - 9/64

Gunnar Bec'ran Asst -03

2/64 - 6/65

Janes Flannery C/(retired) -

9/64 - 11/66

Harold Dalghren Asst

10/65 - 1967

66 - 68

Stanley Watson c/(retired) 03

Don Heath]

68 . - (711

Joseph: SmithC (retired in Mexico)

CUBA OPERATIONS

56)- 4/62

Thomas Hazlyn Chief

2/60 - 4/62 Jack Stewart] (retired Costa Rica)

4/63 - 4/65 Bob Shaw Chief -

9/63 - 7/65 Ray Swider 1.03

10/63 - 5/65 Lorna Kackay (retired)

8/63 - 6/65 David Phillips Chief (natued)

9/65 - 19/68 Joseph Piccolo

10/65 - 12/67 Pesgy Haggard]

03

SOVIET TARGET

0 5/57 105 or 8 on thier -

09 2/597-8/65 Barber&ianell -

5/64 - 7/65 Willian Bright

4/05 - 11,67 Cynthia Hausnann

6/65 - 7/67 Alice Pittinger

7/65 - 4/69 Paul Dillon Chief

SOVIET TRANSCRIBERS

6,56 - 8/58 Morris Gordon (resigned)

6/58 - 6/63

Georye Misko ~

6/63 ÷ 70

Boris Tarasoff (retired in Mexico) -

6/62 - 1/67 Prentice liarheine (ps)

(retired ?)

Outside CO

SECRET,

J4419

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- 1-

8282a

SUPPORT ASSETS

24

[Unilateral phono taps

04 < 2949-1961

charles anderson III Chiet

4255-4/60

Peggy Haggard Asst

14/56 - 1/62

Frank Estancona Chief

2/60 - 10/64 Thomas Keenan u

9/64 - 12/67 Michael Farmer

49-71 ? Outside CO

David WILSTED (ps)

retired in Mexico

24

/Unilateral photo

Cubans

09[6/591 - 4/64 Robert Zambernardil (resigned karico)

09 (1/59]-6/62

Richard Scathar] TSD (retired)

unilateral photo Soviets

3/54 - 4/59. Harry T. Mahoney

(retired Chicago)

56 - 68 Outside Agent

Ramon Alvarez (resigned in Mexico)

5/57 - 8/64

A. Goodpasture (alternate CO -

and internal routing)

6/58 - 6/63

Louis D. Puckett (retired)

6/63 - 20/67 Thonas Tenan Nonent M. Feld mann]

65 - 66

Willian Bright

517)63 -

Cubana. Ol repenting

Lial on phone taps

1959 - 1969

Winston Scott (deceased)

09

12959-1960

Alfonso Spera (retired)

09 11959] - 1960 (Turner Smithy (outside, now retired)

09

1959)- 1960

(Training rept resigned)

1960-

1961 John Brady (retired)

1962 - 1968

A. Goodpasture -

1961 - 1971

(Charles Flick (outside TSD Staff lient - retired) -

Laison - surveillance

Prior 1954] /Robert Melberg (retired)

09 [3/54 - 4/59 Harry Mahoney (retired)

39.1037-190

Thomas Hazlitt

12/62 - 9/07 Robert Feldann

03

TSD Outside unit

(4/532- 12/03 Glen Hidden (retireà)

5/597-4/64

09

Joseph i. Resigno (ps) Unit blown and closed down

S30OE

O96XZI

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Mexico Station Coverage of Soviet and Cuban Embassies (1963)

1. Unilateral Coverage:

09

From the time the Mexico Station was opened in April 1947 until

the arrival of Mr. Win Scott as Chief of Station in 1955, the Station had

developed a support apparatus to exploit leads from the Soviet Embassy in

Mexico City.

This umbrella type project (LIPSTICK) consisted of multiline

phone taps, three photographic sites, a mobile surveillance team and a

mail intercept operation.

Telephone taps (LIFEAT) were placed by an employee of the local

telephone company who was handled by a Station case officer. The number

of lines tapped was limited only by the availability of a listening post

nearby and the availability of langauge (English, Spanish, Soviet, Polish,

Czech, etc.) transcribers. Generally, these were Mexican or Mexican-

American recruited agents.

Three photographic sites were handled by a Station case officer

assisted by technicians on TDY from Headquarters who advised the Station

on the best types of cameras, films, and concealment devices. These

operations had sub-crypts under project LIPSTICK (namely: LIMITED, LILYRIC

and LICALLA). LIMITED was a fixed site directly opposite the Soviet Em-

bassy (across the street) which had both a vehicle and a pedestrian en-

trance. The gate to the Soviet Embassy was on the northwest corner of the

7:97÷59

E2, IMPDET

Гl RY 004645

IN/2

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SECRET SENSITIE

Soviet compound and the LIMITED site was diagonally across a double laned

street on the southeast corner of that block. (See attached diagram).

LIMITED was the first photo base and operated strictly on an experimental

basis. in the early stages. This base, however, was closed when the Sta-

tion received word that the photograph of the "unidentified man" was

being released by the Warren Commission.. LILYRIC was an alternate photo-

graphic base.

It was located in an upper story of an apartment building

on the same side of the street as the LIMITED site but in the middle of

the block south. It had a planted view of the front gate of the Soviet

Embassy. LICALLA, the third photographic site, was located in one of a

row of four houses on the south side of the Soviet Embassy compound.

This site overlooked the back garden of the Soviet Embassy compound. The

purpose of this operation was to get good identification photographs of

Soviet personnel. The three photographic sites were managed by a re-

cruited agent who was a Mexican citizen, the son of an American mother

and Mexican father (deceased). This agent collected the film from the

LIMITED and LILYRIC sites three times a week. The film was then de-:

veloped and printed into 8 x 10 contact print strips. LICALLA film was

originally processed in the Station but in early i955] due to the resig-

nation of a technician, this film like that of LIMITED and LILYRIC was

processed on the outside by a recruited agent.

2

SECRET/SENSITIVE

Бр4l

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Mobile surveillance was conducted by two American staff officers.

These two officers organized a surveillance team of six recruited agents

which used late model cars and a panel truck for surveillance. The team

could be activated by radio from the LIMITED site whenever someone of

interest left the gate of the Soviet Embassy. These agents were aware of

the LIMITED site since they had been issued LIMITED photographs for

identification purposes.

The Station also conducted a unilaterall mail intercept operation,

LIBIGHT, which was handled by an American case officer. LA recruited

Mexican agent, who had a semiofficial status, obtained selected letters

from a subagent employed by the Mexican postal system.

•2. Liaison Coverage:

Liaison coverage was unreliable and insecure as characterized by

24

the nature of the Mexican services at that time. The Mexican Direction

of Federal Security (DFS), With which we conducted liaison, was a hip-

pocket group run out of the Mexican Ministry of Government. This Ministry

was principally occupied with political investigations and control of

foreigners." Their agents were weeks Titt, and corrupt. JA station

officer trained a number of them in name tracing and travel control.

1958, at the instigation of a Mexican official, a joint telephone tap

operation came into existence. The operation, which became known as

24

3

SECRET/SENSITIVE

IMl8

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2.4

LiENVOY, was run by a Mexican officer? The listening post had 30 lines

connected at one time. The transcription room was staffed by Mexican®

.24

Army officers.] In 1961, Gecause of mismanagement by the Mexican prin-

cipals, the Station chief, himself, became the project case officer. A

Station officer assisted him in the daily supervision of the listening

post, and in picking up the transcripts and the tapes. There was also

an American technician inside the listening post.

3. Oswald Coverage:

24

In mid-1962, the Mexican officer in charge of LIENVOY (the

joint tap operation) asked the American officer at the LIENVOY listening

post for the telephone numbers of the Soviet, Cuban and Satellite Em-

bassies in anticipation of possible coverage.] The Station immediately

disconnected all of the unilateral telephone taps on these Embassies sol

that they would not be discovered when the Mexicans hooked up their

taps. The Mexicans soon thereafter connected five Cuban lines, five

Soviet lines, three Czech lines, two Polish lines, and one Yugoslav

line. At the listening post, a live monitor made short summaries of

conversations of interest which were then included in a daily resume

for the Chief of Station. Later, when a reel was completely recorded,

full transcripts were typed and passed to the Station; however, there

was usually a time lag of a day or two. Reels which contained Russian

SECRET SENSITIE

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## Page 12

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ir a language other than Spanish or English were taken to another location

for translation and typing. Mr. Boris Tarasoff did the Russian transla-

tions but because of the volume of Russian conversations, the translations

usually ran about a week behind the date of the conversation.

As soon as the Station learned that an American identifying him-

self as Lee Oswald phoned the Soviet Embassy, Miss Ann Goodpasture of the

Station started screening all photographs. However, here again, there

was a backlog because the photographs were picked up three times a week

but those picked up were usually for dates a few days before since the

technician who was processing the film, did so on a night-time basis.

Further, photographs were not made initially until a complete roll of

film was used.. Later this was changed and the operator cleared the camera

at the end of each day regardless of amount of unused film remaining.

The instructions were to cover the entire work day (office hours) and to

photograph all. Soviets, their families, all foreigners, and cars with

foreign license plates. Human error did occur but generally the agents

were conscientious. The Cuban Embassy coverage had more sophisticated

equipment using a pulse camera which frequently developed mechanical dif-

ficulties.

Oswald came to the attention of the listening post operators

from a tap of the Soviet line.. It was picked up and taken to Mr. Boris

5

SECRET SENSINNE

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@SECRET SUISITNE®

Tarasoff for translation because the caller was trying to speak in Russian.

There was some delay because Station personnel waited to compare the

photographs with the typed transcript. All transcripts were made in

either Spanish or English since the Chief of Station could read only

these two languages and because he personally screened the transcripts

for operational leads.

6

SECRET SENSITIVE

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