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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY

RECORD NUMBER

RECORDS SERIES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

PFIAB

206-10001-10009

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR

FROM

TO

TITLE

PFIAB

DOCUMENT TYPE

CLASSIFICATION

RESTRICTIONS

CURRENT STATUS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW

OPENING CRITERIA

COMMENTS

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD AGENDA

FOR MEETINGS OF DECEMBER 6, 1962 OF THE BOARD'S CUBAN

PANEL

DATE

:: 12/06/62

PAGES

10

SUBJECTS

: AGENDA FOR DECEMBER 6, 1962 MEETING

SUMMARY OF DECEMBER 6, 1962 MEETING

PAPER; TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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: 1B, 1C

RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

: 08/06/98

08/01/2024

2025 Release under the President John F

Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act ol

1992

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IR] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

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206-10001-10009

2025 Release under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of

1992

Sor foot rosa

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Item

1.

2.

PRESTOND'S PORCUCH INEEGLIGENGE ADVESORY BOARD

HOLIDA FOR MERCUIO DE DECEASER 6. 1962

DE DUE BOARD'S CURAL PANEL

1209

Suo lact

10.0022:0

•cuba - Reviow of Data Ascenoled by Board Staff

12:20

Depart for CIA leaguer ero

12:30

4: 00

T60on8 00 30rtsmar,

mo Generals Carrolly

Blake, and Sorter)

(ines will be served in the enurud of this

niceting.)

A approxinately 4:00 PoM. = or whenever

the Board Panel tocminaton Jua discussiOns

with the DCI's Committee,

the lane?

1111

reborn to the Executiot

Bullding

to continue its rovie of the material

referred to die cemete

0:00

Dischantons of the fud Poets with

Dr. Harold Drown, Director or Defenor

Rescarch and Engineering

*pee kaalan well donnents meeting at about tute loll.

murphy.

Army

10am

Pace:: 6:30pm

Doolittle

Визе

91864

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I.tem

i.

PRESIDENT'S FORFIGH INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

FANTASIVE AGENDA ROR MERELLO OR DECERER 71292

2702

Subject

1:00 - 4:60

Status of implemenantion of tolor Board

recommenciatione

Gral Report by Board's Cuban carele

2.

•30

9:30 - 10:30

20:30 - 1:00

5.

1:00 -21

1108

115

2:30

11657

-

- 2:30

4:00 - 5:30

9.

5:30 - Dad

Lunch

Dacentive S0661on

Discussion with Dro Charyl (Capsidea,)

scatus deport on

the Organisation, Programs

arid

!1am9 01

all donned by the bet eidolsen

Discussion of board's

Prelimkary Conclustong

-and Reconmendat jone. on

the

Pronieu.

Disctission of futurd Board Business

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IOR SECRET

LIMITE DISTRIBUTION

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Meeting of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Bord

December ó and 7, 1962.

The Board convened on December 6, 1962, at the call of the Chairman,

Dr. Killian, for a two-day meeting at the Board's offices, Room 297, Executive

Office Building.

Beginning at 10:00 a.m., Board members Murphy, Grey, Doolittle, and Baker

reviewed materials and summary memoranda which had been assembled as the result

of a study conducted by the Board staff of infornation then available concerning

intelligence aspects of the soviet military oulldup In Cuba:

: At 22:30 p.m.

the Board Panel on Cuba (Mesers. Murphy, Gray and Doolittle

and Messrs. Coyne and Ash, proceeded to CIA Headquarters at Langley, Virginia,

Purpose of the visit, was to discuss with DCI and the members of the DCI's ad hoc

comittee that committee's Interim findings which had been reached thus far

In Its study and preparation of a report on the actions taken by the u.s.

intelligence community relating to the soviet builaup in Cuba prior to Octover 14,

1962.(Detatls of the Board Panel's discussion with the DCI, et al., are set forth

in a separate memorandum in the Board's files)

At 6:00 p.m. Dr. Harold Brown, Direutor of Defense Research and Engineering,

Department of Defense, Joined the Board meeting for a discussion of some aspects

of advanced Intelligence collection capabilities.

Those present were Messrs.

Killiar, Murphy, Gray, Doolittle, Baker, Clifford, and Pace, and Messrs: Coyne and 152:

Dr. Killian informed, Dr Brown that the Board had in mind discussing Project

OXCARI WIth the President, and the Boerd anticipeted that the President would have

GOLIN

MAMOLE

PROJECTS:

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to maintaining coverage of activities in Cuba,

Dr. Killar next informed the Board that he was sunewhnt troubled by the

position of the Board with respect to the following: (1) Mi. Bundy once told

Dr. Killian that Inasmuch as a special. Cuban operation had beer laid on with the

Attorney General Involved, the MONgOOSE group would have particular jurisolction with

respect to cuba (2) during the height of the Cuba crisis the Board had not been

Included in the designated recipients of intelligence regarding strategic missiles

in Cuba, and (3) It would appeal essential that the Buard have an opportunity

to examine the records of the Special GrouD.

Mr. Gray pointed to an additional matter of concern to the Board, namely,:

the view expressed by Dr. Charyk that different Interpretations lad resultea from

the analysis of satellite and U-? photography of the same areas. Dr Kiiltan

agrced that this presents a most serious problem, because our Government could

induced to adout an unvarrantec attitude of disbelief regarding Soviet military

capabillties in the same ray that an attltude of ulsbellef was engendered with

respect to the likellhood of the soviet introduction of an offensive missile

capability into Cuba.

Mr. Grey, referring again to conments made to him by Di. Churyk, thougbt

that Dr.. Charyk had identified two aduitional problems which would seem to be or

concern to the Board, namely (1) the near shortage of photographic film which

prevalled auring the week of October 15, and (2) the fact that when U. 5. intelligence

operations detected the presence of C-Band radar in Cuba, the U.S. was surprised

by this and had no C-Band Jammers avallable except a laboratory model in the

possession of a Goverment contractor, despite the fact that ve had discovered

as early as 1961 that the Soviets possessed this radar capability With respect

to the latter point

andle Via COMINTE TAENT WMORE

Beker affirmed, the serlousness of the problen, poting

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that our ELINI coverage had revealed that this radar capability was denloyed in

tre USSR against our SAC forces but nevertheless our B-52-s still have uot

been egripped with a capability to jam this Soviet radar.

Mr. Clifford expressed the view that the Board has a peculiar and particular

responsibility tothe President in assessing intelligence aspects of the Cuba

experience, particularly in the light of the earlier debecle at the Bay of Pigs

at which time the President stated privately that he could not make correct

decisions without correct intelligence, and that he could not endure another

Cuba". Therefore, Mr. Clifford recalled, the President had established this Board

and one of the reas is for doing so was to bring professionalism into the field

of U. S. foreign Intelligence. Now the possibility nrises that valid refugee

reports on Soviet use of Cuban caves may be disregarded. Mr. Clifford also feared

that the Administration may now have adopted the view that everything is all right

again now that the missiles and the bombers are out of Cuba. Mr. Clifford

acknowledged that no policy advisory officials like to have a check mede on the

auvice they give to the President, and this is understandable, but on the other

hand the President looks to the Board to assess the intelligence aspects of the

policy advisory function. Mr. Clifford believed that CIA had made orrors in not .

conducting sufficient overflights, and top level Presidential advisers erred in not

proposing sufficient overflights of Cuba. And now that the Cuba crisis was

successfully met by the President, the feeling in responsible parts of Government

seems to be that things turned out all fight so why bother the President.

Mro Clifford said that he of course could not say what the President thinks about

the U. So intelligence Job that was done regarding Cuba, but the President did

say to the recent meeting of the Businese Adulsory, Council that the PCT hed been

the only one the had called the shots on what was going on in Cubed this Prompted.

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Mr. Clifford to observe that if the President thinks a good intrlligence operation

took place, this could have dangerous implications, and therefore the Board should

push on with Its thorough review of the subject no matter what attitudes of

resistance are encountered among the Government agencies involved. Dep Killian

expressed complete agreement with these observations of Mr. Cliffora.

General Doolittle questioned whether the Board was certain that the President

was not informed of the views expressed by the DOT in the cables which he dispatched

tO CIA from France: :

De. killion said he did not know the ansver to this, büt he

was disturbed at the manner in which the DcIwas making this case for himself

Mr. Murphy advised the Board that he had been told by the DCI that General Carter

had not informed the President about the cables received from the DCI. aDr. Killian

thought that this question of whether the DCI had communicated with the President

should be pursued with the DCI when he joined the Board meeting today. General

Doolittle added that it would be appropriate to ask whether General Carter had.

been instructed by the DcI to make the Dolls views known to the President

Mr. Chifford surmised that General Carter could have thought that the DCI vould

heve returned if he considered his views urgent:

Mr. Gray was of the opinion that lt was in the area of CIA's Deputy DCI/

Intelligence where the DCI's messages vere ignored, and theretore it would be

vell for the Board to talk to that Deputy.

Mr. Pace felt that the intelligence weaknesses apparent in the Cuba situation

indicate the presence of broader weaknesses. He thought that in highlighting the

weaknesses observed in the Cuba matter, the Board hould be in a position to make

recommendations for broader improvements in the foreign intelligence effort.

Dr. tanger cautloned the Board to consider, however, that out of the thousands

of refugee, reports coming in there vere bound to be reports contalning false and

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misleading Infórmation.

Mr. Pace observed that if that ilne of thinking were

pursued to 1ts conclusion the question would arise as to why we should have a

refugee interrogation program. Mr. Pace was of the opinion, however, that the

Interrogation program offered an unprecedented opportunity to obtain information

and CIA should have made the most of 1t. Mr. Pace recalled that the Board had

received articulate brieflags on Cuba from Mr. Cline of CIA, who also reportealy

briefed Prime Minister MacMillan, the President and others, vut Mr. Pace wondered:

on what firm intelligence basis these briefings had been conducted Mr. Murphy

noted that Mi. Coyne's study reflected that on August I4 Mr. Cline had issued ian

order not to publish any information on missile bases unless it had been checked

out with NPIC. Dr. Killian then suggested, and Board members agreed, that an

effort should be made to have a discussion with Mr. Cline during this meeting

of the Board

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Secretary of Defense. (Dr. Killion expressed the view that the DCI, as coordinator

of the overall U.S. Intelligence effort, should certainly have the right to look

at the budget of any element of the intelligence community, and Mr. McCone said

he thought that he could work this out.) The DCI went on to say that the total

Department of Defense Budget is $3 billion whereas the CIA budget is around $400

million and the Defense budget 1s up over the previous $2z billion figure because

the Secretary of Defense has added the cost of the reconnaissance program. the

result 1s, Mr. McCone said, that the USIB 1s unable to look at this large budget

and therefore Mr. McCone is endeavoring to discuss it with Secretary McNemara.

As for the CIA budget, Mr. McCone had thought that it could be kept at last year's

Level througe rearganization steps and cutting down on vasteful expenditures, and

at the same time an effort has been made to absorb salary Increases within the

existing budget. The DCI said that despite hard work on the CIA budget by all CIA

elements, then there had to be added on the cost of the Cuba operations, so the

former buaget of CIA is up to $425 million, exclusive of $146 million involved in

OXCART and NRO. The Bureau of the Budget cut this down to $381 million by charging

the Cuba budget to the CIA's Contingency Reserve over the opposition of the DCI who

feels that the Reserve should be held intact for use in unforeseeable emergencies.

Mr. McCone said he was not sure how all this would finally be resolved with the

Bureau of the Budget.

Turning to another subject, Mr. Mccone explained the MONGOOSE project In

ansver to an inquiry from Me C1 ford y

the DoT said that this project developed

out of a discussion last fall between himself the President and the tormey Generat

sect to create dissensiong a Cuba Cal lead to revol tier nE

the Castro regime and to the unseating of Ceatre, leying the Cubent to forge

govemment ofather ong. Choosing

Some 526 mi100 oF the ClA budget upontes

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to activities authorized by the MONCOOSE Committee (Composed of tbe Special Group,

plus the Attorney Ceneral and 2 or 3 other officials). MONGOOSE plans are developed

under the coordination of General Lansdale who worke with State, Defense, CIA and

USIA elements for this purjose. Mr. McCone said that the first phase of the project

was an intelligence gathering effort. The second phase was to Involve sabotage,

Insurgency and other actions which vere tentatively agreed upon at the MONGOOSE

meeting of August 10 bu which then fell into limbo during the Cuban crisis until

two days ago when the Executive Committee of the NSC tentatively renewed consideration

of the project. Mr. McCone said that he personally does not favor sabotage or

guerilla activity for a few months until the dust settles. The DCI said he was

disturbed over the possibility of a new confrontation by the Soviets who could take

the stand that there had been compliance with U. S. demands for removal of offensive

weapons and therefore any continuance of U. S. cerial surveillance of Cuba will be

countered by shoot-downs of our surveillance aircraft by SA-2's. Dr. Langer suggested

that the SA-2 defenses might be for the purpose of meeting an anticipated invasion of

Cuba by the U.S., but Mr. McCone thought not, pointing out that the SA-2's would

be easy to knock out if an Invasion should take place.

Tuming to the NRO, Mr. McCone said that the Defense Department/CIA agreement

had not worked out too well because the Director of NRO feels he should have fiscal

control over Department of Defense as well as CIA resources, through a review of

programs and the allocation of funds on a monthly basis. This approach, Mr. McCone

stated, puts accounting and fiscal responsibility into NRO, l.e., into the Air Force,

in effect. Mr. McCone said that he favors more CIA control because it is necessary

for CIA moneys spent for VRO purposes have, to be defended before special Congressional

Committees in a special way, and since $150 million of this CIA money is tied up in

NRO OxcART the DOT feels he will have s hard time explaining how this money got

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