TAPE OF ROBERT MC NAMARA AND GENERAL TAYLOR
Originator: ROCK
Document date: 00/00/1975
Document type: SOUND RECORDING

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JFK Assassination System

Identification Form

Agency Information

Date:

4/22/201

AGENCY :

RECORD NUMBER :

ROCKCOM

178-10004-10393

RECORD SERIES:

ASSASSINATION FILE

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

A-III (C) INTERVIEW TAPES

Document Information

ORIGINATOR:

FROM:

TO :

ROCK

TITLE: TAPE OF ROBERT MC NAMARA AND GENERAL TAYLOR

DATE:

PAGES:

00/00/1975

3

SUBJECTS :

TAYLOR, MAXWELL®

OPERATION MONGOOSE

MIAMI

MC NAMARA, ROBERT

KENNEDY, ROBERT

EXECUTIVE ACTION CAPABILITY

ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES

CUBAN EXILES

CIA

BURKE, ARLEIGH

BUNDY, MC GEORGE

BAY OF PIGS

ASSASSINATIONS, FOREIGN LEADERS

DULLES, ALLEN

DOCUMENT TYPE: SOUND RECORDING

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

RESTRICTIONS: Consulted

CURRENT STATUS : Withhold

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 08/13/1993

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS :

Feleased under the John F. Kennedy Assassination

Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note

ase at bab late: 1414-4144

Two dictabelts and one audiotape in an envelope. Transcripts (McNamara #1781000210327 and

Taylor 1781000210337) are unmarked but may contain classified information.

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COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES .

Washington, DC 20500

April 15, 1975

2 Dictabelts and 1 Tape:

178-10004-10393

178-10002-10337

2 Transcripts:

178-10002-10327;

DECLASSIFID Released

•÷ Act of 1892

Review Board

By 1034

JFK Aggass. Rec. Colir

ACS, State CIA,

NARA date_ 5/17/00

MEMORANDUM

TO

: The File

FROM

: David W. Belin

SUBJECT

: Interview with Secretary Robert McNamara

Belin:

Secretary McNamara, we've had a brief interview

in your office on - late this afternoon - which

is April 15, 1975, and I have asked you a number of questions

and you have given me your best recollection for your answers,

and I'd like to get a summary of our discussion on this tape

and then send you a transcript for your editing, and then we

will either prepare an affidavit or perhaps we will still ask

you to come before the Commission, but I understand it is your

preference not to testify formally before the Commission,

because of

the nature of your present job. Is that correct?

McNamara: That is

correct. I wish to cooperate with the

Commission in every way. If necessary, of course,

I would testify before them, but I would much prefer to present

whatever information I have in the form of an affidavit.

B :

Fine.

During the Administration of President

Kennedy, you were Secretary of Defense. Is that

correct?

™ :.

That is correct.

B:

M:

And were you Secretary of Defense commencing at the

time of the inauguration of President Kennedy?

Yes. Starting January 20, 1961.

B:

And you were Secretary of Defense throughout the

Kennedy Administration.

Is that right?

M:

I was.

B:

M:

B:

--and into the

Administration of Lyndon Johnson.

until approximately March 1, 1968.

During that time you were personally close with both

the President and his brother, Robert Kennedy, is

that correct?

M:

I was.

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B :

•And you also were close to McGeorge Bundy?

M:

Yes.

B :.

As I understand it there was what I am going

to call a

"camaderie" in the relationship among

some

of the top people in the Kennedy Administration.

M:

Yes.

That is correct.

At any time during the Kennedy Administration did

you hear any person ever discuss a plan known as

"executive action plan" which in substance was defined

as a capability plan for possibly assassinating any foreign

leader?

M:

ever

I have no recollection of/hearing anyone discuss

such a plan.

B:

Did you ever hear anyone discuss any particular

plan concerning the possible assassination of

Castro in Cuba?

M:

No. I have no recollection of such a discussion.

B:

Did you ever serve in any group

known as either

the MONGOOSE group or the Special Group Augmented?

Does that ring a bell with you?

M:

No. You mentioned, if I may refer back to our at

previous conversation, that I was present at/least

one or more meetings of the Special Operations Group, I believe

you called it.

I have no recollection

of being present at

the meeting. I'm not suggesting I wasn't, but I have no

recollection of it.

I do seem to recall that there was such

a group, I doubt very much if I was a member of it.

B :

You might have been a participant at one or more

of these

meetings?

M:

I might have been a participant.

B:

At any such meetings, did you ever hear anyone

discuss

as a possibility the question of possibly

assassinating Castro or any other foreign leader?

M:

No.

I should interject here another point I made

earlier, as I have no notes - I did not take notes of

any meetings I attended with rare exceptions,

jand I have

no other basis for refreshing my memory and my memory of those

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years is very bad. I'm not saying this to in any way qualify

what

am saying

except that it is a fact that my memory is

poor

in relation

to the

period.

B:

I asked you whether or not Robert Kennedy ever had

any such discussions with you and you indicated no,

is that correct?

M:

--indicated two things. ' First that I have no re-

collection whatsoever of him ever having

discussed

assassination of anybody with me--or whatever you called it--

the executive.--

B:

executive action capability --

M:

executive action capability. Moreover, it is in-

conceivable to me that he would have discussed

such an action with me because I think he would have felt

that it endangered the Presidency and I believe he would

have had moral reasons for not supporting any such action

by the Government of the United States, and I base both of

those points on my appraisal of his evaluation of the Bay of

Pigs and the extent to which it weakened the presidency and

the ability of the

President to govern and his behavior

during the Cuban missile crisis when he strongly opposed

action which he considered contrary to the moral traditions

of this society.

B:

Do you have any other comments with regard to this

whole question of possibly assassinating foreign

leaders?

M:

You told me that you understand a plan to assassinate

one of more foreign leaders was in existence for

an extended period of time, during 1961-2-3. I said (a) I

have no recollection of any such plan, (b) I find it very

difficult to believe that if such 'à plan had existed its

existence wouldn't have been known to the top officials of

the CIA, and certainly if I had known of it I am positive I

would have made my knowledge known to the President, fRobert

Kennedy, neither of whom obviously can testify now, but to

Mac Bundy, to my deputy, Ros Gilpatric,

and probably to

Dean Rusk, and I would strongly urge that you check those

three individuals. In addition, Max Taylor was very close

to Robert Kennedy at the time.

He was brought in by President

Kennedy to examine the decision-making process of the Government

that could have led to such a failure as the Bay of Pigs.

He was very-Max was very close to both Robert Kennedy and

the President at the time. He was very close to the whole

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problem

of Cuban relations.

He played a major part in the

Cuban missile crisis

discussions because of his association

with the Kennedys and his work with the Bay of Pigs follow-on.

So I would urge you to talk to him about this as well.

And

if Mac didn't know about it, and Max doesn't know about it

and Dean Rusk doesn't and Ros Rilpatrick doesn't and I have

no memory of it, I very much doubt that any such plan was

known to the top officials of the Kennedy Administration.

B:

Well, assume for the moment that one of those people

did

know about such

1. a plan,

and assume for the

moment that the CIA documents

show that such a plan might

have been directed to be instituted by someone in the White

House,

who in the White House do you think would have had

the authority to institute such a plan?

M:

Well, I have said before that I felt the attacks

on the CIA -- CIA's covert operations, were unjustified

insofar as they assessed the primary responsibilities for

those operations against the senior officials in CIA and

absolve the rest of the senior officials in the Government

of responsibility. I said that because it was my experience

that all major CIA operations were approved by a group that

subsequently became known as the 303 Group. I don't know

what it was called during its early period, whieh included

representatives of the - the highest level representatives --

of the Secretaries of State and Defense, as well as the

President's Security Adviser.

B :

That was Mr. Bundy.

M:

That was Mr. Bundy, during the period you are

talking about, so that I am almost certain that

were an assassination contemplated, which, seems to me, as I say,

extremely unlikely, it it were contemplated or any action teen

taken to move in that direction, it would have had to have

received the approval of not just Mr. Bundy but other

officials at that same level, including my Deputy.. I think,

and M

Deputy never would have approved anything like that without

discussing it with me.

B:

What you are saying--at least if it came through

the White HOuse, certainly Mr. Bundy would have

known about it.

M:

himself.

Rusk and me or my deputy and Dean Rusk's undersecretary.

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B:

And if Mr. Bundy did not know about it, then the

only other person in the White House that might

have known about it, I assume, would have been the President.

Is that a fair statement?

M :

That's a fair statement but I think that's extremely

unlikely.

I can't imagine that anything relating

to the CIA operation of this kind would be known to the

President and not Mr. Bundy. I never knew of any such thing.

B:

So if it would have been known to Mr. Bundy it wonla ha

been known to the President. And vice versa?

M:

No, nono.

I didn't say that.. I said I couldn't

imagine anything relating to a CIA operation that wés

known to the President

and was not known to Mr.. Bundy.

imagine somethingswith

respect to CIA known to Mr. Bundy,

not known to the President either because they weren't that

important or conceivably because it was thought desirable

to protect the President from certain knowledge.

B:

With regard to the --

M:

If I may - add one word to that.

I can't imagine

Mr. Bundy himself supporting assassination. I

can't imagine him supporting assassination of a foreign

leader, without mentioning it to the President, even though

to do

so would by that action involve the President.

I say

I can't imagine him supporting assassination of a foreign

leader without the President's

knowledge because it is the

Pxesident who would pay if that action were undertaken and it

ever became known. Mr. Bundy recognized, more than the rest

of us, the importance of protecting the Presidency as well as

a particular president, and particularly protecting his ability

to govern.

B:

I want to correct one thing on the record. You

referred to my statement about one or more assassi-

nation plans.

The only particular plan of assassination

• that

you and I discussed that I said I knew anything about as to

be concrete affirmative plans involved just Castro. I said

there might have been indirect involvement in one other area, but

the only direct involvement thus far that I know of at this

time and that I discussed with you pertained to Castro.

M:

Yes, yes, you are quite right.

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B : :

Anything

else you want to add for the record?

M:

No, except I'm horrified by the whole discussion,

shocked by it and I just hope you will pursue all

these leads some of which you may already have--I am saddened

by it too.

B:

As a citizen I am horrified by it and I am saddened

by it, that my country which at one time became the

land of the free and the home of the brave would be involved

in situations of this kind, but we are trying to find out

what the

Facts are and hopefully it will not happen again.

Thank you very much, sir.

M:

Thank you:

(END OF TAPE)

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COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES

Washington, DC 20500

MEMORANDUM

TO

: The File

FROM

: David W. Belin

SUBJECT : Interview with General Maxwell Taylor

Belin:

General Taylor, we're here on the l6th day of May

1975 at the offices of the CIA Commission in Washington

and I have had an opportunity to review with you certain mat-

ters relating to your participation during the Kennedy Adminis-

tration in matters involving Cuba, and I've asked you a number

of questions and we've talked informally and now what I would

like to do is to have it in question and answer form. Is that

correct?

Taylor: Right.

B:

All right. First of all, you might tell me when you

came down

to Washington to first serve with the Kennedy

Administration in 1961.

T:

I came down at the end of April at the invitation of

the President to chair a group of four in the investi-

gation of the Bay of Pigs--to analyze the causes of its failure

and why it failed and whatever lessons that we decided the Presi-

dent--should be called to the President's attention.. My collea-

gues were Bob Kennedy, Allen Dulles and Arleigh Burke.

We worked !

on that report from the--the end--through the end of April and

May--as I recall they got a final report to the President some-

what after the middle of June.

B:

All right.

If we can stop this tape a minute, I think

I have

a document upstairs which will give us the exact

date which it was done.

So I'm going to stop the tape now and

check to see if it's recording and then I'll be right back down.

I'm going to continue now, General Taylor, and according to the

notes I have you report--your memory is very good, by the way,

for events that took place nearly fourteen years ago--your re-

port was dated June 13, 1961 by way of a letter sent to Presi-

dent Kennedy, and it refers to an April 22, 1961 letter from

President Kennedy to you directing you, together with Robert

Kennedy, Admiral Arley Burke, and Allen Dulles as Director of

UNMARKED

MAY CONTAIN NATL SECURITY INFORMATION

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Central Intelligence, to undertake a study with regard to the

Bay of Pigs, and also certain recommendations.

According to

this document, President-elect Kennedy--or President Kennedy--

first learned about the existence of plans for the overthrow

of the Castro Government because of the call on him at Palm

Beach by Allen Dulles and Richard Bissell, who was the Deputy

Director of Plans of the CIA and who had overall coordinating

supervision of the Bay of Pigs operation, and according to

your--the document that you prepared which I assume was based

upon your study of the facts, that the first formal briefing

of President Kennedy was on January 28, 1961 with Vice Presi-

dent Lyndon Johnson, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of

Defense, Director of Central Intelligence, Chairman of the

centrat intelligeste

Joint Chiefs of Staff and others present at that briefing.

Does that sound like perhaps it might be accurate so far as

to what the events were?

T:

it sounds correct.

Obviously I don't recall speci-

fically the details you mentioned.

B:

I also noted that one section which I happened to note

had language along the lines of this.

noted than the sa

It said "We also

feel that the occasion offers the President the opportunity to

express to his principal assistants and advisers his sense of

the need of a changed attitude on the part of the Government

and of the people toward the emergency which confronts us.

The

first requirement of such a charge is to recognize that we are

in a life-death struggle which we may be losing and will lose

unless we change our way and marshall our resources with an in

censity--(I can't read my own writing here)--intensity associated

in the pastfIX

times of war."

And then the remaining part of

the paragraph it said the Director of Central Intelligence had

not participated in it says "To effect this change we must give

immediate consideration to taking such measures as announcement

of a limited national emergency, the review of any treaties or

international agreements which restrain the full use of our re-

sources in the cold war and the determination to seek the respect

of our neighbors without the criterion of international popularity

and the policy being taken into account the proportioning of

foreign

aid to the attitudes

shown us by our neighbors.

In the

light of the

strained situation in Laos and the potential crisis

building up over Berlin, we should consider at once affirmative

programs to cope with the threat in both areas.

I don't know

It you remember that that might have been part of it at all

or not?

T:

Well, yes.

Again, I don't recall the specific language,

but I would say that was rather consistent with our

frame of mind. This was not the height--at least one of the high

points--in the Cold War and the Khruschev threat on Berlin was

very much on our minds, the question of whether Castro and the

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activities in the Caribbean were related in any way to the

pressure being placed on Berlin.

All these things were in our

mind, plus the fact that we had

demonstrated in the Bay of Pigs

operations that here in Washington we just had never thought

through the problem of utilizing resources from numer--several

departments for purposes such as this--the Cold War purposes.

B:

Now, during the time that you prepared this paper,

were you aware of any assassination plots against

the lives of Castro or anyone else that might have been under-

taken by the CIA?

T: . I was not.

B:

Were you ever aware of the existence of any plans to

assassinate Castro?

T:

I was not.

B:

Did you ever have any discussions with either the

President or the Attorney General or the Director

of Central Intelligence, concerning the possibility or the

existence of plans to assassinate Castro--either the possi-

bility or the existance?

T:

Certainly not with the President. Now in the case of

Bob Kennedy and Allen Dulles we talked about so many

things during the Bay of Pigs as one sits around the table, I

couldn't say that--that the desirability of the disappearance

of Castro or what would happen if he were assassinated in Cuba

--that was not raised, I don't recall.

B:

You don't recall any specific conversation one way

or the other?

T:

No.

B:

Did you ever have any conversations with McGeorge Bundy

or Walt. Rostow about it?

No. None of those officials. Again, under the same

terms as I indicated in the

case of Bob and Allen Dulles,

that they -- in the course of the daily work, we see men constantly

and you're thinking so much about the Cuba problem,

I couldn't

say that assassination in the abstract--"Wouldn't it be a nice

thing if someone bumped Castro off"--that could well have been

said, but I just don't recall it.

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B:

T:

Do you recall the existence of any approval to have

the CIA undertake such a --

Never!

B:

of

__-

Did you ever hear the phrase "executive action

capability" which was defined as a standby capability

assassinating

foreign leaders. Did you ever hear

T:

B:

--that's a code phrase, meaning like you indicate?

Well, a phrase called and which refers to the capability

of

assassinating foreign leaders?

T:

No.

B:

Now, you

also told me that you attended a meeting of

the

Special Group (Augmented) that occurred on or

about August 10, 1962 at the Department of State.

T:

I assumed that I did. I don't specifically remember •

that date or what the agenda might be, but by looking

at the documents you have shown me I was the Chairman of the

Mongoose aspect of the Special Group and I assume I was there.

B:

General Lansdale worked with you?

T:

He did.

B:

In what capacity?

1':

He was in charge of putting together a feasible programs

-program or programs--which would include ways and means of

restraining Castro.

We were very much concerned whether in

the ebullience of victory at the Bay of Pigs he might not inten-

sily a campaign already begun as a matter of fact, to infiltrate

agents in Latin America, as the

saying was, to export Communism

• to Latin America, so we were thinking of ways and means and pro-

grams that might be devised to prevent that.

B:

Do you have any recollection of what might have been

said at a meeting that might have occurred in August

of 1962?

T:

No.

I couldn't recall any specific meeting. If you

had the minutes

of something I'm sure it might suggest

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B:

Do you have any recollection as to whether or not

someone at that meeting might have raised the possi-

bility of the liquidation of Castro?

T:

Well, as you

say, it might have possibly occurred, it

might possibly have occurred, but if it did, I don't

recall it.

B:

Do you recall any conversations that might have occurred

at

any

such

meeting?

T:

Again with the minutes, if you have them, I'm sure may

stimulate

my memory.

B :

How long did you stay in Washington in your

service

with the Kennedy Administration?

Well I stayed in the White House as the Military

Representative of

the President in which capacity I

was generally his alter ego if you will for military and intel-

ligence matters.

On October 1, 1962 he designated me to become

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and moved out of the

White House and gave up the White House-related position.

B:

You took over from General Lemnitzer?

T:

Yes.

B:

And then you remained as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of staff until when?

T:

Until July 1964 when

I went to Vietnam as Ambassador.

B:

Do you have any information that you think might in

any way be

relevant to the investigation of this Com-

mission so far as possible unlawful

domestic activities of the

CIA is concerned?

T:

No, I really don't, except as I mentioned to you before

we

started to tape this that

there was a mass of Cubans

in the United States based generally in the Miami area who cer-

tainly had many of them there who would like to see Castro dead

and would be--would have been very happy to collaborate with

getting him

that way.

Whether or not, conceivably low-level CIA

agents, as is sometimes the case, overzealous subordinates ever

encouraged any or talked to them

or made any propositions to them,

I don't know, but clearly it's a possibility. But I certainly

never saw anything in my relations with the senior CIA officials

to suggest that they this as a proposition, as something they

were recommending or supporting or advising the President to do.

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B:

1:

Anything else you can think of that might be relevant?

No, I don't think--I don't.

B:

Any information that you think might be relevant so far.

as the

assassination of President Kennedy is concerned

that you don't think is public information now.

T:

No.. Absolutely nothing on it.

B:

Well, we thank you very much for coming down. If you

want--if we want to send a copy of the transcript to

you for you to see and perhaps initial, to where should we mail

it?

T:

B:

T:

2500

Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Apartment 1.

And is there a zip code on that?

20008

B:

And do you have a phone number there?

T:

483-5050.

B:

All right. And thank you very much for your cooperation,

Sir, and I had better check to see if this actually re-

corded here.

(END OF TAPE)

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