John F. Kennedy Control Record
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TITLE : John F. Kennedy document Control Record

COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 382: Disarmament, 7/63-10/63, item 4B.

Box 1

Released under the John F. Kennedy

Assassination Records Collection Act of

1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW

56754 Date: 09.22-2022

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EXEMPT MR 01-383-311-4%06

TOWARD A NEW DISARMAMENT STRATEGY

Introduction

Until recently general and complete disarmament and a nuclear test

ban were the keystone of U.S. disarmament policy. Our success in negotiat-

Ing a limited test ban treaty has changed the situation, for Premier Khrush-

chev has made clear that he has withdrawn his offer of three on-site in-

spections and, therefore, & comprehensive test ban treaty 1s no longer a

major factor in future negotiations. Although the Soviets will undoubtedly

continue to use their proposals for general and complete disarmament as a

political weapon, Premier Khrushchev's recent private comments indicate no

interest whatever in destroying missiles. All of this indicates that in the

fall of 1963 we should consider shifting our disarmament strategy to new

ground.

Present proposals for general and complete disarmament are fremed in

a political void which implies that all nations and weapons are created

equal. In our future policy we may wish to draw a greater distinction

between nuclear powers and non-nuclear powers and between nuclear weapons

and conventional weapons. It could recognize the fact that nations are not

equal -- that nuclear powers do have more power and, therefore, should have

greater influence and control in any International agreements. Finally, 1t

should cone to grips with the issue of China and France.

Since the advent of atomic weapons in 1945, the control of nuclear

weapons on a world-wide basis has been one of the primary objectives of

U.S. national policy. There is no reason now to change our objectives.

ECONTIVE

7OP

OUTL

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The bot line, observation posts, and proposals to destroy B-47's may be

worthwhile but they should not be allowed to distract our attention from

the primary issue, the control of nuclear weapons. The shift we should,

and to some degree have made, is to emphasize agreement among the nuclear

powers rather than an international agreement. While resulting conventions

should be open to signature by all nations, they should be negotiated and

Inspected primarily by the nuclear powers. It is no accident that both

DeGaulle and Khrushchev have emphasized negotiations by nuclear powers

while China has called for a world-wide disarmament conference of all

nations.

Therefore, we should be prepared to negotiate a strategic force

freeze without requiring concurrent reductions in conventional forces.

As long as we can freeze the present strategic nuclear balance, then the

question of whether the Soviets have five or ten divisions, more or less,

in Central Asia is not a controlling factor. In any confrontation between

Chins and the United States, the Chinese are less Iikely to use their local

conventional superiority in the face of our atomic superiority. This 1s

not to suggest that conventional force reductions on the part of the Soviet

Union or other nations are not desirable, but rather that they can and

should be analyzed separately.

THE IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE OF U.S. POLICY COULD BE TO GAIN WORLD-WIDE

ACCEPTANCE OF LIMITATIONS ON INCREASES IN STRATEGIC FORCE LEVELS. THIS

SHOULD INCLUDE LIMITING STRATEGIC DELIVERY VEHICLES AT THEIR EXISTING LEVEL,

A CESSATION OF PRODUCTION OF FISSILE MATERIAL FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND A

BAN ON BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSIUMS. THIS NEED NOT MEAN DISARMAMENT

AT THIS TIME.

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In broad outline, our strategy could be based on a two-phase

progrem, as follows:

Phase I - the nuclear powers agree to freeze strategic nuclear forces

at their existing levels, forbid the construction or deployment of anti-

ballistic missile systems, and stop the further production of atomic mater-

ials for military purposes under adequate inspection. They concurrently an-

nounce that, when all the militarily significant states sign the treaty

which is open to all nations of the world, they will meet together to

negotiate reductions in their existing strategic force levels.

Phase II - Participation of all important nations will be sought in

the above treaty, Including China and France.

In the Washington disarmement debate, there has been great dispute

between those who advocate the continuation of our present arms build-up

and those who advocate proposals to the Soviet Union to agree to sharply

cut back nuclear delivery systems and warhead stockpiles. Little or no

attention has been given to the possibility that the Soviet Union would be

willing to agree to freezing its nuclear forces at existing levels. To

be sure, such a position contradicts all Soviet disarmament statements,

but such an agreement might serve Soviet interests within the Communist

world and confirm what the Soviet Union may do regardless of agreement.

Such an agreement would advance the joint interest of the United States

and the Soviet Union against the minor or aspiring nuclear powers. Para-

doxically, a U.S. proposal for a cut-off of fissionable material and

cessation of production of arms has never been thoroughly studied or

staffed because Soviet approval was not expected since such a proposal

would be so obviously in the Interest of the U.s.

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This memorandum discusses primarily the Phase I proposal and includes,

1n IAB F and G, an outline of a possible approach to France and China.

The Soviet View

Military Analysis

This agreement has military advantages for the Soviet Union. If

implemented on a world-wide basis, 1t would close the doors of the nuclear

club, thereby strengthening the milltary position of the Soviet Unlon vis-a-

vis both the non-nuclear powers and the minor nuclear powers, Britain and

France. This agreement would, in effect, confirm Soviet military superiority

over all nations of the world except the United States.

On the other hand, it has the disadvantage that it would clearly freeze

Us strategic superiority.

Long-Range Bombers

ICBMS

Sub-Launched Missiles

*Medium-Range Bombers

Medium Range Missiles

U.S. and Soviet Strategic Delivery Vehicles

1964

1965

1966

US

USSR

US

USSR

US

USSR

630

185

630

175

630

175

855

200-260 1055

270-350

1205

300-450

346

254

449

292

608

328

663

900

337

850

75

800

54

700-750

54

700-750

54

700-750

* Due to overseas bases and tankers U.S. medium-range bombers can attack

Due to shortage of tankers very few Soviet medium-bombers

sonia, a goer pot too late to the do exto i Alasta, Sortet

Clearly the Soviet Union would prefer not to accept a position of

strategic inferiority if they had an alternative. They do not. Now

that the United States Polaris and Minuteman progrems are hitting &

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production rate of better than a missile per day, it is very doubtful

that the Soviet leadership could believe that they have any reasonable

chance of obtaining parity with the United States. If this truth is

perceived by the soviet leadership, then they have no choice but to

accept numerical inferiority which does not alter the qualitative

balance. Therefore, the determining factor in the Sovlet view will

undoubtedly be, not the balance of thermonuclear power, but the

political impact of such an agreement within the Communist and non-

Communist world.

Another disadvantage would be the fact that the Soviet Union would

have to permit inspection. Clearly this would be odious to the Soviet

leadership. On the other hand, It need not represent an insuperable

obstacle. Khrushchev's test ban offer of three on-site Inspections,

if made in good faith, would Indicate that 1f the political benefits

of the agreement were high enough, the Soviet Union would allow in-

spection. In Western terms, adequate Inspection for a production cut-off

could be achieved with relatively modest inspection, to-wit, permanent

parties at declared production plants plus a few on-site inspections of

suspicious plants. This inspection network which would be primarily in

fixed locations should be far more acceptable than the mobile inspections

that would be required for any agreement on force level reductions.

Political Analysis

The current Sino-Soviet dispute has brought and will probably continue

to bring about changes in Soviet political assessments. The recent Soviet

acceptance of the long-standing Western offer for & partial test ban treaty

was undoubtedly primarily due, not to economic pressures or any shift in

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the military balance of power which have remained relatively static, but

to & changed Soviet assessment of the value of the treaty in their dispute

with the Chinese. This proposal would have a number of political advantages

for the Soviet Union:

(1) It would Increase pressure against diffusion, consolidating the

nuclear status of the USSR, U.S. and Britain, and probably further dividing

France from its NATO allies.

(2) It could save the Soviet Union billions of rubles.

(3) It would seriously hinder the formulation of the MLF.

It would also have some disadvantages:

(1) It would permit Western Inspection in the Soviet Union.

(2) It would guarantee continued U.S. nuclear superiority.

Despite these arguments, probably the principal Incentive for the Soviet

leadership would be their assessment of the political utility of this proposal,

both in strengthening their hand within the Communist movement and in dividing

the Western alliance.

If the Soviet Union could justify the treaty in terms of advancing

the cause of the International-Coumnist Party and Soviet leadership,

this agreement might be viewed by Moscow as a powerful tool in strengthen-

ing their policy of peaceful coedstence. If not, this fact in itself

would probably be sufficient to cause the rejection of the proposal.

Evidence from the present Moscow-Peiping debate indicates that the

Soviet Union has already begun to defend the nuclear status quo as a Soviet

(not U.S.) advantage. (See Tab C.) In their August 20 reply to the CPR

government, the Soviet leadership clearly implied that Soviet strategic

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forces are adequate to "shield" the Socialist camp and that the present

nuclear balance is in the interests of the Comminist movement. It would

appear that this ideological position could be readily extended to cover

an agreement to freeze the present balance of forces. Certainly 1f the

Soviet Union takes the position that the present balance of forces has

changed to their advantage, they should not find 1t hard to argue that

Ireezing the present balance would be in the Soviet interest. In order to

increase the likelihood of Soviet acceptance if such an agreement were

worked out, we should indicate to the Soviet Union that we would be willing

to Include In a separate communique a statement that "et such time as all

militarily significant states have signed this treaty, the original

signatory powers agree that they shall confer to seek agreement to reduce

their military forces as a further step toward the common objective of

general and complete disarnament." This would put the responsibility for

disarmament failure on China and possibly France.

To date, the lack of any lengthy substantive Soviet discussion on

nuclear delivery vehicle limitations may be due to the fact that they

have no expectation whatever that the United States would agree to such

Imitations at this time. The Soviet leadership, like the U.S. leadership,

must be very wary of proposing new agreements which are rejected, parti-

cularly if they include concessions. Last October at the U.N. Mr. Gromyko

indicated Soviet interest in cutting back strategic vehicles and this

spring Mr. Isarapkin said the Soviet Union would permit on-site inspections

as controls on an agreement to limit strategic delivery vehicles; but

neither statement evoked any apparent interest in the U.S. The US Government

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has never made clear to the Soviet Union a specific proposal which would

result in a freeze or a reduction in nuclear delivery forces.

Therefore,

the very existence of a firm U.S. proposal would profoundly change the

existing situation and require a searching reappraisal by the Soviet

leadership.

The US View

Military Analysis

While this agreement would significantly alter existing US military

plans, its military advantages appear to out-weigh the disadvantages.

According to present plans (SIOP-63 and future force projections) on

1 July 1965 the strategic power of the U.S. measured in initial delivery

capability vill be stabilized at approximately 4100 warheads and 9200

megatons. Therefore, despite appearances such an agreement will not have

a major effect upon the size of U.S. strategic force:

NUMBERS OF WEAPONS

IX 63 FY 64 EX :65

EY 66 FY GT WY 68 EX 69 EX TO

Missiles

Bombs

Total

436

834

1034

1178

1378

1507

1507

1507

2800

3000 3100

2850

2850

2850

2650

2650

3236

3834

4134

4028

4228

4357

4157

4157

Missiles

Bombs

Total

MEGAT'ONNAGE

IY 63 EX 64 FY 65 FY 66 FY 67 EX 68 FY 69

FY 70

1250

1890

2130

2300

2390

2450

6350

7200

7150

7100

2450

6650

2450

7600

9090

9280

7100

9400

7100

9490

6650

9550

9100

9100

If we provide weapons from our existing stockpile, either k

Act 5 (9) (2)(D)

OR SECRE

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70

or to a MLF, this would result in a relatively small decrease in U.S.

strategic forces but no net decrease in NATO strategic forces. The

major impact would be a freeze in the qualitative strategic arms

race.

The current transition from manned forces such as the B-47 and

B-52 to invulnerable missiles such as Minuteman and Polaris would be

halted. Nevertheless, by 1 July 1967, relatively large invulnerable

forces will be in operation. The following chart shows this transition.

U.S: SIRATEGIC INVENTORY

1 JUly 1964

1 July 1965

I July 1966

Aircraft

Operational Iotal

Operational Total

Operational Total

B=52

630

705

630

699

B-47

483

1071

257

630

695

1065

1063

B-58

80

_89

80

185.

82

TOTAL Aircraft

1193

1865

967

1849

705

1840

Missiles

Atlas

Titan

Minuteman

Polaris

Regulus

Mace B

TOTAL Missiles

138

117

600

346

0

54

1255

1560

137

117

800

449

54

1557

1952

131

117

950

608

54

1860

2389

Such an agreement would, of course, stop the deployment of any

ballistic missile defense system. At present we probably do not know

how to build a ballistic missile defense system with high-kill probabilities

against more than ten warheads each equipped with 10 heavy objects and

known penetration aids, due to

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Interceptor self-kill, decoys, etc. An agreement to freeze Soviet

ballistic missile forces would not seem to increase the vulnerability

of U.S. cities and strategic forces. While the level of Soviet bomber

defenses will influence our attack capability, It is recommended that

we do not explicitly negotiate such an agreement but privately convey

to the Soviet Union that Increases In Soviet or U.S. air defense would

result in abrogation. (An attempt to limit air defenses would raise

major inspection problems and would undoubtedly ultimately require

limitations on all aircraft because of the air defense capabillty of

tactical aircreft.) Similarly, we would have to insure that the Soviet

Union did not suddenly launch a major civil defense program. Since this

too is amenable to Intelligence checks, It 1s recommended that this be

made clear to the Soviets in private but that no explicit agreement on

this be established.

The cut-off of fissionable material would in Itself limit two basic

areas of future weapons development. First, the development of a

ballistic missile system which would already be forbidden by the treaty.

The other area of emphasis is current fissile material production for

tactical nuclear weapons, particularly atomie artillery. The develop-

ment of more efficient small nuclear weapons would not be ruled out by

such an agreement for these weapons could be labricated from fissile

material in the stockpile including materlal fabricated from obsolete

weapons. Because of the short life time of tritium, which is essential

for a number of our strategic weapons, it 1s essential that, explicitly

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or implicitly we be permitted to maintain our tritium stockpiles at

existing levels by producing sufficient quantities to compensate for

losses due to radio-active decay. Relatively small quantities, a few

kilogrems, are Involved.

Finally, while it Is walikely that this proposal will Immediately

lead to a cessation of Chinese efforts to build atomic weapons, it

might well be the first step in a series of events which would lead

to this result. Certainly the position if agreed to by the Chinese

would make production of Chinese weapons impossible. In summary then,

an agreement of this kind could well be in the interest of the United

States Goverment.

Political Analysis

A successfully negotiated agreement on these terms would probably

gain broad support throughout the free world including many "neutralists".

By opening the treaty to all nations of the world a clear line would be

drawn between those goverments supporting limitations on nuclear weapons

and those rejecting such limitations. Probably all European countries

with the exception of France and Germany would support the agreement.

The Germans probably could be persuaded to support it by continued as-

surance that the U. S. would maintain arms in Germany and/or by US/FRG

cooperation in a multilateral force constituted from nuclear delivery

vehicles in existence prior to the effective date of the treaty. (The

multilateral force would have to be constituted by transfer of some

existing United States weapons rather than the construction program

which is now envisioned.)

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JFK Act

Such an agreement would represent a moment of trutlEk Act 5 (9) (2) (p)

On the one hand, limitations on proposals for nuclear delivery vehicles

has been the position supported burk Act 5 (9) (2) (p)rom the moment WEK Act 5 (9) (2) (D)

(9) (2) (D)Inally proposed it in 1953 untJEK Act 5 (g) (2) (Post recent state-

ment following the signing of the test ban. We can and should take the

position that we are willing to share some of our

JFK Act 5 (g) (2) (D)

JFK Act 5 (g) (2) (D)

delivery vehicles JFK Act 5 (9) (2)(D)111 agree to the

test ban and a cessation of further production. JFK Act 5 (9) (2) (p)ay or may

not agree to participate on such terms. In any case, the political

pressure for agreement should be very great. (This is discussed in

JEK

Act 5 (g) 12

\ (D)

It is almost certain that the Chinese goverment would reject the

proposal but it would further divide the Commnist world and undernine

support of the revolutionary wing of the International-Communist Party.

Furthernore, It would put both the USSR and the United States Govern-

ments on record against a ChiCon acquisition of nuclear weapons, thus

Laying the foundation for later Initiatives.

Domestically the agreement should probably fare about as well as

the test ben treaty. That is to say, there would be a vocal minority

rabidly opposed but the clearly demonstrable advantage to the United

States should gain broad support in all of American society, Including

the United States Senate.

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