Document date: 1961-05-12 00:00:00
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

# DOCID-32626886

## Page 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA

RECORD NUMBER : 176-10037-10366

RECORD SERIES : Personal Papers of Richard Goodwin

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR :

FROM :

TO :

TITLE : Memo for the Record Re: Meeting with Manuel Ray

DATE : 5/12/1961

PAGES : 6

SUBJECTS :

DOCUMENT TYPE :

CLASSIFICATION :

RESTRICTIONS :

CURRENT STATUS :

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000

OPENING CRITERIA

COMMENTS : Goodwin Papers: Cuba, Covert Activities, Box 4. Box 7.

Released under the John F. Kennedy

Assassination Records Collection Act of

1992 (44 USC: 2107 Notel. Case#:NW

S60Q0 Date: 11-04-2021

NW 66000 Docld:32626686 Page 1

---

## Page 2

EYES ONLY

SECRET

1281-2554

За

12 May 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT

Meeting with log. Manuel Ray

PARTICIPANTS: Ing. Manuel Ray

Ernesto Betancourt

Rogelio Cisneros

James A. Noel

Ray did not return to Washlngton until early morning on Friday,

12 May 1961. He called me at 0700 from the airport. He was unable

to tie a definite hour for us to get together due to the fact that he was

expecting an appointment with a person he did not name some time.

during the morning. He later called a number of time from the Hotel

Ambassador to advise me that he still bad had no word on his appoint-

ment. At 1145, Mr. Betancourt called to cay that he wag with Ray

and "Eugenlo! (Rogello Cisneros) and could we get together 1 sug-

gested they drive out to the Clatendon Hotel Court on Wilson Boulevard

Where I had taken a room for bolding out meeting. They arrived in

Mr. Botancourt's car at approximately 1230 noon time and we first

went to the nearby Hogate Restaurant on Wilson Boulevard for lunch

before we got down to the business of the prospectus.

During lunch we did not discuse the plan but I did take the op

portunity to stress in a most serfous way the need for absolute secrecy

concerning our discussions today and any (uture discussions or devel-

opmento which might take place in the future with respect to our relaton-

ship. All agreed on the need for tight security

After lunch we drove to the Hotel Court and from approximately

1330 until 1730, we discussed the prospectus, Using Mr. Barnes! out.

line as a general guide, I stressed the Importance of being able to present

EYES ONLY

SECRET

NW 66000 Docld:32626886 Page 2

---

## Page 3

EYES ONLY

SECRET

+ 2-

to the proper people at the earliest possible time a carefully thought-

out plan of action which would set forth clearly the objectives -- what

the project hoped to achieve; a statement of the problem; the strengths

of the Castro regime following the ill-fated invasion; the status of the

underground and ite morale and capabilities; the extent of internal

support for and discontent with the regime, etc., etc.

lalso spoke of the need for describing the kind of activities

which the Ray organization planned to engage in and the assets and

capabilities which they have of can acquire to do the job. The need for

explaining the relationship and coordination of the plan with the Revolu

tionary Council wes discussed at some length.

5. Feuggested that he include in the plan an itemization of the kinde

of support which he would expect un to supply immediately as well as the

kind and quantity of support which would be required of us as the project

developed.

I also suggested that the plan include their views on how U. S.

liateon and coordination could best be worked out; how funds would be

tunneled into the project; what commo and other training would be re-

quired, whether U. S, "real estate" would be needed, etc.

7 Ray outlined some of his thoughts regarding his proposed plan

of action. According to him it contemplates action in three broad fields:

(a) Underground activity - principally sabotage +- in the

urban arena.

(6) Gradual buildup o largely through clandestino Infultra-

Mons of small bodies of men - of guertilla forces in mountala-

ous and defensible areao.;

(c) A psychological warfare campaign within Cuba and abroad

aimed at discrediting Castro and at the same time providing the

people of Cuba something to fight for

8. It is Raylo intention to depend almost entirely on maritime opera-

llons for the infiltration of personnel and matertel into Cube, He also

rules out of bie plan the creation of another invasion army but does con-

template the training of groups of perhape up to 150 men in other friendly

EYES ONLY:

SECRET

NW 66000 Docld:32626886 Page 3

---

## Page 4

EYES ONLY

SECRET

=3-

countries of South America (hé mentioned Venezuela as a poseibility)

and said he would explore the possibility of basing maritime operations

in non-U. S. porte.

9. Ray said some means, other than Swan Island, must be found

for reaching the Cuban population by fadio broadcaste. He spoke of

the possibility of short wave broadcasts from Venezuela and utiliza-

tion of a commercial station In Miami which he understands can be

clearly heard in Cuba

10. Ray spoke of the desirability of stimulating the organization

of "Pro-True Cuban Revolutionary" etudent groups in many countries

of Latin America (he said a successful organisation has been formed

in Puerto Rico) and of sending qualified representatives to those Latin

American countries where there is Soviet diplomatic representation to

contact atudent and labor groupe and leaders in an effort to present to

them the true picture of the sorry state of students, workers, and

Intellectuala In Castrole Cuba.

11.

Ray is also interested lo the possibility of putting out a "Newe

Letter" under MRP sponsorship which would discuss various aspecte of

the Cuban picture and set forth plane fox Cuba after the fall of Castro.

He thought such a news letter could go a long way towards correcting

mistakon impressions among American univereity professore and in

other circles as to the true nature of the Castro regime, He pointed

to the recent letter from 63 Harvard professore which was recently

published in the N. Y. Times as a "horrible example"" as to how mis-

laformed even university professors are on present day Cuba:

12.

When the discussions got around to the heed far conducting.

operatione at least "under the umbrelle" of the Revolutionary Counch,

and the need for obtaining Dr. Mirote concurrence before the U. S.

would be able to support any operation, it was obvious that neither

Ing, Ray nor Mr. Betancourt holds a bigh impression of the Council.

Both feel that there lf a strong possibility that the close public

identification of the Council with the recent invasion may well have

discredited the Council to such an extent that it commande no support

or respect within Cuba.

For the sake of argument they were willing to concede that the

political advantaged of maintaining the Council for the purpose of forcing

EYES ONLY

SECRET

NW 66000 Docld:32626886 Page 4

---

## Page 5

EYES ONLY

SECRET

unity of the various exile groups may well outweigh its other obvious

shortcomings. However, both feel, and Mr. Betancourt was quite

emphatic on this point, that the Council an a body is not capable of

directing clandeetine actions against Castro and as a matter of fact

is opposed to any further efforts at overthrowing Castro by sabotage:

and other subversive actions since they are completely "sold! on

the thesia that Castro can only be removed by direct U. S. military

action and therefore a continuation of Cuban underground activities

can only result in needless and futile loss of life. In the fact of this

attitude, Ray eald he does not expect to receive much encouragement

for his plan from the Council, although be lo fairly confident that

Dr. Miro's approval can eventually be obtained.

Mix. Betancourt thought that a workable solution might be found

to their problem if the Council would agree to concern itself exclusively

with (a) the current tack of untfying the opposition, and (b) planning for

its future assumption of power as the provicional government. Under

this arrangement, operatione aimed at the downfall of Castro could be

entrusted to those leaders and groups (such ae the MRP, MRR, and

possibly the MDC) which have both the assete and the will to do the

Job. Mr. Ray thought that it might be feasible to create an operations

planning board ot command among the groupe with demonetrated assete

and thue avoid unnecessary duplication and confucion and make possible

overall planning.It was obvious, however, that he would prefer to act

autonomously in the execution of his program.

Mr. Ray wag very critical of Artime and claimed he was in possession

of outficient "facts" to convince him that Artime, in collusion with ele-

mente of the camps, were planning to eliminate the MRP and its leadere

from the picture, when the invasion succeeded. He said he #nowe*

that artime was being financially cupported by wealthy ex-Batistianoe

ot the Miami area.

13: Ray binted at various times that the MRF may at some point:

find itaelf faced with the necessity of withdrawing from the Council and

going it alone. He says that the Council is composed of "good raen" but

they have no assets or significant followings and "have nothing to offer

the people of Cuba"a

and aithough the proclamation of the Counch, an

finally drafted, wan a good one the "progressivel arpecte of the proclam-

ation were forced on the Council by the Americane and do not roprosent

the true feelings of the majority of the Council members. He satd the

EYES ONLY

SECRET

NW 66000 Docld:32626886 Page 5

---

## Page 6

EVES ONLY

SECRET

- 5-

Cuban people are not likely to want to risk their lives on the basis of

promises made by the present membership of the Council. He feels

that acceptance of the Council would be improved by adding to its

membersbip two or three more people whose names would be signi-

ficant and meaningful to the Cuban people. He did not name any

specific candidates.

14. Mr. Ray let me read a 13 or 14 page report which he had

just received from the MRP coordinator in Cuba (Reinol Gonzalea)

which painted a dreary picture of conditions in Cuba since the failure

of the invasion; was critical of the inclusion of Batistianos and "ninos

bonitos" in the invasion force; conveyed the strong feeling that the

Cubane had been betrayed by the Americans; and indicated that while

the MRP organization was still pretty much intact physically, morale

was almost completely shattered.

Mr. Ray said be would provide me

a sanitized copy (there were some operational and personal detaits)

of the report for our information.

15; In vlew of this report from within Cuba, Mr. Ray eaid that

he will wieh to defer eubmitting his plan for our consideration until

he is able to receive word from Cuba concerning the capabilities,

willingness and feasibility of carrying out some.of the activities he

has lo mind. He sald it le useless to submit a program of action it

the human elemente to carry it out are lacking or completely demoral-

Ised. He thought he might be able to present ble prospectus within

approximately ton days He said naturally he will not give the people

Inside any indiation that he has been discussing a plan of action with

us.

16. 1 urged Ray to consider eubroitting at least a preliminary and

adraittedly tentative proppectus at this time based on the assumption

tbat his assete are still intact and will be willing to cooperate in order

that it may receive early consideration. However,

he stuck to his

belief that this would not be practicable and reiterated the need for

prior evaluation of the strength and raorale of his followings

17. Ray asked concerning the detainees at VicAllen, Tersa, and

wondered if they have been released. He was told that as far as 1

know they are still under detention. He said Mr., Goodwin bed taken

thets bames and promised to look Into the matter!

Mr. Betancourt

EYES ONLY

SECRET

NW 66000 Docld:32626886 Page 6

---

## Page 7

EYES ONLY

SECRET

- 6-

said he would check directly with Mr. Goodwin re their statue

18. I invited Mr, Ray and/or Mr. Betancourt to call me over

the weekend in case either should want to discuss the matter further.

I had the feeling that Mr. Betancourt was personally in favor of sub-

mitting now a plan covering "short terr" needs of their organization,

and it may be that euch a paper will be submitted after he has an

opportunity to talk with Mir, Ray In private.

JAMES A, NOEL

JAN/ate

Distribution!

Original & 20 A/DDP/A

C/wHID

AC/WH/4 & circulate

- Manuel Ray 201

EYES ONLY

SECRET.

NW 66000

Docld:32626886

Page 7

---