## Page 1

1104-10332-10001

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

document had 47 pg DIf-

so page court is

wrong

---

## Page 2

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CONFIDENTIAL

104-10332-10007

file"

DO guide

name:

7 January 1994

Cuba

MEMORANDUM FOR:

J. Barry Harrelson @ DA

FROM:

Bryant Rogers

MEETING WITH UNDATLORES

SUBJECT:

REFERENCE:

On 6 Jan we met with Linda Flores, from the DO to discuss HRG concerns with regard to CIA's contacts in the 60's with well

known Cubans and Cuban Organizations.

The outcome of this discussion was that the DO agrees that we can release the names of those major players with whom CIA

worked with as long as we stay within the 60-63 time frame, with some overlap into 1964 for continuity, when needed. We then

discussed our relationships with major anti-Castro organizations. It was agreed that we could release the fact that as a funding vehicle

for. the US Govt, CIA provided support including funding in general terms. In some cases we may find it necessary to reveal gross balipark

figures for annual budgets. The DO would prefer that we continue to protect specific funding amounts where possible. They were

specifically concerned about releasing specific amounts paid to individuals or families of Bay of Pigs members where individuals could

claim that one was paid more than another. In supporting these organizations it was acknowledged by the DO that we could release

generic operational activities such as publishing journals or financing goodwill tours by prominent exile Cubans to Latin America The DO

reminded us that in reviewing these relationships with Cubans and organizations, it was important to protect CIA personnel, agents and

assets and any specifics on tradecraft.

When asked about Bay of Pigs training sites, Linda felt that the actual location should still be protected in spite of the fact that

they have been mentioned in open literature.

With regard to DO location numbers (19 for Cuba) she thought this was OK for the 60-63 time frame but would check with LA

Div. She had no problem with the release of the Bell location in cables since it was no longer used.

CC:

J. Barry Harrelson @ DA

Richard D. Kovar-Y- @ DA

John F. Pereira @ DA

CONFIDENTIAL

---

## Page 3

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SECRET

8 November 1995

re?!.........

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Jeremy Gunn,

ARRB Staff

FROM:

Barry Harrelson,

CIS/CSI/HRG

SUBJECT:

Issues re Cryptonyms, Country

Designators, Action Indicators and

Employee True Names (U)

Attached is memorandum from the DO Focal Point for the

ARRE addressing the release of cryptonyms, country

designatorg, action indicators and employee true names..

memorandum is intended to provide guidance to you and your

staff and complements information

provided in previous

discussions.

the opportunity to diacuss •

5722

these issues with your staff. (U)

Attachment.

Unclassified When Separated

From Attachment.

SECRET

---

## Page 4

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SECRET

JFl:

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Historical Review Group

FROM:

Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.

DO, Focal Point for ARRB

SUBJECT:

Position on Release of Cryptonyms, Country

Designators, Action Indicators and Employee True

Names

During the period since the ARRB last met, the DO has

considered the four issues listed below that have not yet been

addressed with the Board. These issues appear throughout the JFK

collection and by stating our position up front we hope to

facilitate the Board's review and to reach an agreement that will

be mutually satisfying to the Board and the Agency.

Cryptonyms -Except for cryptonyms related to

operational assets

or activities involving Mexico or Miami,

the Agency will release the main component of cryptonyms and

withhold only the two-letter digraph.

Treating cryptonyms

in this manner will protect the nationalities of individuals

and operations that are not pertinent to Oswald or the JEK

investigation and render an easier reading of the written -

material.

Country File Designators - We will delete the first

element of operational activity and operational interest

files in those instances when the credibility of the

narrative is not affected.

The first element of the file

number corresponds to the alphabetical position of the

country name which is easily discernible, whereas the

subsequent two elements relate to type of activity of

interest and specific subject.

Action Indicator (Slug) Lines - Generally, we will

release the entire action indicator line of a document.

Occasionally, however, we will withhold portions when the

CL BY 0695930

DECL OADR

DRV HUM 4-82

SECRET

---

## Page 5

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SUBJECT: Position on Cryptonyms, Country Designators, Action

Indicators and Employee True Names

context identifies a source or a relationship with a

specific liaison service.

True Names of Staff Employees - In most instances we

will

release names of employees who have retired in an overt

status and were serving in Headquarters when cited in a

document:

We will continue to protect the true names of

employees cited as serving in a field position.

References

to field personnel in true name are uncommon, however, since

pseudonyms are normally used in correspondence between

Headquarters and the field.

for fredriag

. Wickham, Jr.

2

SECRET

---

## Page 6

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S.s

RECO

Assassination Records Review Board

600 € Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530

(202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457

TEW

в.Oр

November 9, 1995

HAND DELIVERED

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION

IN THIS DOCUMENT

Mr. John Pereira, Director

Historical Review Group

Center for the Study of Intelligence

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C., 20505

Re: ARRB requests for evidence

Dear John:

I thought that it might be helpful to you if I were to provide you with our current

assessment of the status of our review of the Agency's assassination records and point

to where we would like to proceed in the future.

I would like to begin by acknowledging the efforts made by the Historical Review

Group to facilitate our review of records. It has been, as you know, a difficult and time-

consuming process both for the Agency and the Review Board. We very much

appreciate the personal cooperation of you and your staff.

We continue to be concerned by the slow progress that has been made. Although we

perceive that the task has been more difficult and time-consuming than Congress

anticipated, we have found that the careful education process in which we have been

involved has helped educate us with respect to your concerns and, we hope, has helped

demonstrate to you the Review Board's concerns.

We must, however, begin to pick up the pace. In many circumstances we are reviewing

and then re-reviewing the same documents over and over again. We are also

frequently put in the position of not being provided with evidence in a timely manner

so that we can make our presentations to the Board. While many of these difficulties

are understandable - and perhaps even inherent to the start-up of the process in which

we are engaged - we must expedite the process. Rather than dealing with dozens of

records at Board meetings, we need to move towards a schedule where hundreds of

records will be reviewed at Board meetings. From our perspective, it seems that it is

essential that the Agency be prepared to allocate significant additional resources to the

process of reviewing the records and making evidence available to the Board.

BOARD MEMBERS: John R. Tunheim, Chair • Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce • Anna K. Nelson

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: David G. Marwell

---

## Page 7

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Mr. John Pereira

November 9, 1995

Page 2

We also believe that the Agency still is not providing the type of evidence that will be

the most convincing to the Board. Where issues exist that the Board has not yet

addressed, and where the Agency would like to see postponements upheld, specific

information must be provided to support a postponement. General statements, while

useful in identifying the underlying issues involved, do not provide the Board with the

complete knowledge and understanding of the issue that is necessary to make an

informed judgment regarding release of the information.

The Board is looking forward to receiving the CIA's evidence in support of the

postponement of true names. As you know, we have planned for some time to devote

the December (12 and 13) meeting to this important issue.

Additionally, you will find enclosed with this letter the next in our series of information

requests, covering boxes 7-9 of the Oswald collection. We are submitting these requests

now in an attempt to give HRG as much advance notice as possible of which records we

will be reviewing for the January 4 meeting. Evidence for records to be reviewed

January 4 should be provided no later than December 13, 1995.

We hope that during HRG's review of the January documents, the standards outlined in

this letter will be kept in mind. If at any point an issue is deemed so sensitive that a

briefing is required, ARRB staff will meet with you at your convenience.

Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely yours,

Daud Newell fa

David G. Marwell

Executive Director

Enclosures

---

## Page 8

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SECRET

11 December 1995

NOTE FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Briefing of JFK Board Staff: Cover

on 1 December, Barry Gibson, Deputy Chief of the

Office of Central Cover, briefed the Executive Director of

the Assassinations Records Review Board and other Board

staff members.

Also participating from CIA were John Goins

and Eleanor Neiman of IMS; (Linda Cipriani,'

Harrelson and I from HRG.

2. The focus of the briefing was on the need to protect

the names. of former Agency employees that appeared in the

JEK records.

Gibson discussed the risks involved for people

who retired under cover if they were identified in the

public record as former CIA employees.

He discussed the

efforts made by his office to obtain written statements from

the more than 100 individuals whose names appear.

3.

The purpose of the briefing was to assist the Boarc

in its review of names when it meets on *12-13 December

The

Agency was asked in particular to present, in writing,

evidence of risk for each of the names that will be

discussed at the Board's meeting.

Farien

John F. Pereira

CISY. 50185904.

CL FEASON:

CON 2-57-150

DECL ON:

XI

DIV FOM:

AHs. 70-1

SECRET

---

## Page 9

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MEMORANDUM

March 20, 1996

To:

Review Board

Cc:

David Marwell

CIA Team

From:

Subject:

T. Jeremy Gur

Ty N

Board Guidelines on Release of CIA Officer Names

The Staff understands the Review Board to accept the following general guidelines on

the release of true names of CIA officers:

When the true name of a CIA officer (i.e. past or present employee of CIA) appears in a

document, the Board will bring to its review a presumption that the true name will be

released. In order to overcome this presumption of release, CIA must provide evidence

demonstrating that release of the name would be harmful. In order to meet its burden

of proving harm, CIA must tailor the evidence to satisfy one of the three categories

identified in Part I (below). However, when the name of an officer is of such

importance that the public interest would not be served in postponing a name, the

Board may release the true name consistent with the principles identified in Part I

(below).

Part I. Categories of Officers.

1. Living officers. For living (present or former) officers, CIA must prove that:

(a) the officer is living outside the United States (or reasonably is expected to

reside or travel outside the United States in the foreseeable future); (b) the officer

is either working or is retired under cover; and (c) the officer objects to the

release of his or her true name. If CIA satisfies this burden, the Board

presumptively (see Part Il below) will release a pseudonym and postpone the

officer's true name until the year 2010.

2. Where current status of former officer is unknown. Where CIA has been

unable to contact the former officer because his or her location is unknown, CIA

must present a good faith showing that reasonable attempts have been made to

locate the officer. If the Board is convinced that CIA has made a good faith

showing that it was unable to locate the former officer, the Board will postpone

the true name until June 1, 1997. However, the Board may postpone the true

CIA HAS NO OBJECTIONTO

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

---

## Page 10

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- 2 -

name beyond June 1, 1997, if CIA provides to the Board, prior to May 1, 1997,

additional evidence that satisfies the criteria of either category 1 (above) or

category 3 (below).

3. Names having effect on current intelligence interests. If CLA believes that

the release of a true name may compromise currently existing intelligence

operations or might otherwise cause an identifiable harm, it must provide

evidence that: (a) the officer currently is engaged in clandestine activities; (b) the

release of the true name would compromise ongoing intelligence operations or

would compromise operations with current intelligence value; (c) the release of

the true name would reasonably be expected to cause significant harm to a living

person (including family members), or (d) the release of the true name would

cause a significant harm to the national security or the foreign relations of the

United States. If CIA satisfies this burden, the Board presumptively (see Part Ill

below) will release a pseudonym and postpone the true name until 2010 or until

such other date as CLA reasonably shows to be a date on which the release could

be made without causing harm.

Part Il. Names of Officers Who Are Important to the Assassination Story.

The Board presumptively will postpone the release.of names consistent with

categories 1-3 of Part I. However, for certain persons whose names appear in a

context that is important to the assassination story, the Board may nevertheless

vote to release the true name. In all such instances, the Board will notify CIA of

the importance of such a person and provide CLA with the opportunity to

provide additional information in support of postponing the release of the

names. These names shall be reviewed on a case-by-case basis, with due

consideration being given to the importance of the person to the assassination

story and such evidence of harm as CIA may provide.

---

## Page 11

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ADMINISTRATIVE : INTERNAL USE ONLY

...

From the Desk of Linda C. Cipriani 3

NOTE FOR:

FROM:

DATE:

SUBJECT:

Barry R. Gibson @ DO

Elaine S. Mathias @ DO

.. Linda C. Cipriani, O€C

03/04/96 09:26:53 AM

JFK - Central Cover appeal

The General Counsel and I met with the JFK Review Board on Friday and discussed, among other things; how to deal with the potential

public release of the identities of former employees retired under cover. The Board clearly wants to do the right thing here, but they feel:

they are not getting enough information to make that decision.

Jeremy Gunn (JFK Board's General Counsel) will soon provided me with some of the Board's suggestions on how to deal with this which I

will pass on to you (including how to deal with Whitten). I would at the very least like to be ablé suggest that we attempt contact again

(either through CIA or the Board) with those retirees who have not yet responded to our letter. Of course; any suggestions you have at

this point will be extremely helpful. My sense is that this issue of protecting retirees is something everyone at CIA will want to appeal

just on the principal of it, but that we should do everything possible to avoid an appeal. [Until we work out an agreement with the Board,

you should continue to prepare that appeal you are drafting]

In the meantime, can you please provided me the following figures:

1. The # of people we sent letters to regarding the potential Board releases. (isn't it 150?) and the following breakdown if

available:,

• # living abroad

- # of those retired under cover vs. those whose cover has been rolled back or lifted

• # of those who still work for us in covert/overt capacity

2. The # of responses we received to date.

3. The # of responses to date requesting that we don't release.

4. The # of responses to date saying that they didn't care.

I realize you are all out of the office these days, but I would appreciate getting this as soon as you can. Thanks.

CC:

J. Barry Harrelson

Eleanor E. Neiman @ DO

Frederick Wickham @ DO

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

---

## Page 12

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ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

8 March 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM:

J. Barry Harellson

John Pereira

Linda C. Cipiani

DCI/OGC/LD

JFK - March 18 Board Meeting

SUBJECT:

REFERENCE:

ADMINISTRATIVE • INTERNAL USE ONLY

From the Desk of Linda C. Cipriani

NOTE FOR:

Paula A. Sweeney @ DCI

Robert O. Davis @ DCI

Robert D. Caudle @ DCI

FROM:

Linda C. Cipriani

DATE:

03/08/96 02:50:39 PM

SUBJECT:

JFK - March 18 Board Meeting

I have been informed that Dave Edgers will be attending the next JFK Board meeting. If this is the case, it would seem that Jeff should

go as well.

Two issues need to be discussed with the Board: stations and cover employees.

1.

Jeff and the Board agreed in principal to a "window" in which all stations would be opened (1960:64). Of course, if

there are particular stations which need to be exempted from this the Board will consider it upon the presentation of substantive

evidence.

- HRG and the Board think this is a good idea that would enable them to avoid raising potential appeals every month

-Dave Edger needs to be signed onto this idea.

• Jeff, last month, presented additional information on Oslo, Stockholm, and Copenhagen. Jeff and Dave should be

prepared to answer questions or provide more information so that the Board will agree to protect these stations.

2.

The Board recently released the names of 16 cover employees. An appeal is being prepared (or so I am told). The

thirty days runs on March 18. We need to finalize with the Board how to handle this issue. At the last meeting the Board agreed that

this was a really important decision, but that they were not getting the information they need to make the right decision. At the last

meeting, the Board intimated that they might be willing to delay this release, if CIA and the Board could come to a mutually agreeable

way to deal with cover employees. I understood from Jeff that this is an issue that CIA will appeal on just the principal. If this is true,

the Board should understand what our ultimate position is on this, but that we are willing to cooperate with them to find a suitable

alternative (using pseudos or generic descriptions like "case officer")

I will be out all next week but Barry Harelison/HRG (30292) and John Pereira/CSI) (30373) will be happy to fill you

in on the details.

Barry will be contacting Bob Caudle next week to find out how the March 18 meeting will be handled.

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

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## Page 13

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ADM

ERNAL USE ONLY

29 July 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Chief Historical Review Group

FROM:

SUBJECT:

Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.

DO, Focal Point for ARRB

Proposal for Dealing with Employees' Names

1. Cover mechanisms are an integral part of conducting

clandestine operations.

We are concerned about individuals that

continue to be dependent on particular cover legends and on the

organizations that. cooperatively work with us to provide those

cover legends.

The following proposal is offered to streamline

the process of handling names and minimize the potential damage

an inappropriate release could cause.

A. Incomplete and Unidentifiable names:

a .

We will release the occurrence of a name when

common last name appears by itself or in conjunction

with

a common first name such that it does not tend

to specifically identify the individual.

b.

We will release the occurrence of a name if it

remains unidentified after a reasonable search is

conducted.

B. Identifiable names for employees that retired

overtly:

In most cases, overt employees' names will be released,

but in some cases overt employees may have a

portion of their employment remain under cover. Such

cases will require the same review as that of an

employee who remained under cover into retirement.

ADMINISTRATIVE-_INTF.BNAL USE ONLY.

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## Page 14

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ADMINISTRA

INTERNAL

USE ONLY

SUBJECT: Proposal for Dealing with Employees' Names

C. Identifiable names for employees that retired

covertly:

a.

We will make a reasonable attempt to locate a

current address and contact the person.

If the person"

objects to the release of his or her name

for reasons

associated with current life style issues, we will

object to the release of the name. If the person does

not have objections based upon personal circumstances we

will review the name for organizational issues, (See

para. C. c.)

b. If reasonable efforts fail to locate the

current address,

but it can be determined that the

individual is still receiving a pension, insurance or

other benefit based upon cover legend, we will need to

continue to protect the name since source of income or

benefits can not be altered without prior notification

to the individual.

If we fail to identify a pension or

other active benefit, we will review the name

for

organizational issues. (See para C. c.)

C.

We will make a reasonable attempt to review the

name to look for identifiable harm to the person's

safety, family,' ongoing operational activities, national

security. or foreign relations.

Assuming that none of

the previous concerns are identified, we will review the

potential damage to the cover mechanism or cover

provider by the specific occurrence of the name if

released.

2. Because families of deceased employees could be the

beneficiary of pensions or insurance provided under the employees

cover legend, we

must review them the same as we would the

employee.

We also have second and third generation officers

following in the footsteps of their parents that could be

negatively impacted by the revelation.

3:

Our efforts to locate

current addresses will include all

internal record systems maintained by Office of Personnel

Security, Retirement Branch and Insurance Branch.

We will

include a checklist reflecting completion of these searches

2

ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY

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## Page 15

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ADMINISTRATIVE

VERNAL USE ONLY

SUBJECT: Proposal for Dealing with Employees' Names

within the documentation when requesting continued protection of

the name.

4. We considered options of contacting IRS or OPM during

our attempts to locate current addressing information, but based

upon the fact that these offices would be unwitting of the cover

arrangement for the individual, it was determined to be an

unreasonable risk to the cover of these officers.

A/Diskede

Fredrick C. Wickham, JI.

ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY

---

## Page 16

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ADMINISTRATII

ISE ONLY

SUBJECT: Proposal for Dealing with Employees' Names

IMS/RPG Fwickham:mjk (29 July 1996)

Distribution:

Orig & 1 - Addressee

1 - C/OCC

1

- IMS/ESG/ALB

1

- IMS/ESG/IRB

-

IMS/ESG/HCS

IMS/ESG-OIT/MSG/RDP

ESG Chrono

---

## Page 17

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CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS

RELEASE IN FULL

2000

11 February 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM: Gary M. Breneman, IC

SUBJECT: Comparison of ARRB and DO Memoranda re

Treatment of CIA Officer Names in JFK

Collection

1. This memorandum is in response to an assignment to

compare a 20. March 1996 ARRB memorandum written by T. Jeremy

Gunn and The Directorate of Operations response dated 20

July 1966, authored by Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.

Both deal

with the treatment of CIA officer true names which appear in

the JFK collection -- when they will be postponed and when

they will be released.

2. First the ARRB Memorandum Gunn describes in legal

terms the Board's position on the postponement or release of

CIA officers' true names. He makes a proffer which states

that there is a presumption in favor of release akin to a

legal evidentuary rule which causes a burden to shift to the

other party (CIA) to prove something. In this instance, it

is factual evidence/proof sufficient to shift the burden not

only back to neutral but to the other side of neutral which.

permits postponement.

3. The Gunn memorandum then sets out the criteria

required to meet the burden under several situations.

---

## Page 18

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A. For officers who are still alive he states that the

proofs required to postpone release of a name are three in

number and all three must be met:

i. The officer must be living outside of the U.S.

OR,

(R)easonably be expected to travel outside of

the U.S. in the foreseeable future;

AND,

ii. The officer is either working….. (presumably

a current staff officer, contract employee,

or independent contractor) ….. or is retired

under cover;

AND,

iii. The officer objects to the release of his or

her true name.

COMMENT: Mr. Gunn's criteria are a little confusing

and reach beyond the Board's authority. First, note again

that the three elements are joined by an & AND$ meahing all

elements must be met to satisfy a postponement. Second, the

first requirement of living or traveling outside of the u.s.

is not tied to & cover.& Many officers who do not work

under cover all of the time are, in fact, provided cover

for overseas TDY's. Thus, any officer who might

& reasonably' be expected to travel outside of the U.s.

would warrant postponement of his true name. This would

---

## Page 19

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seem to include every CIA employee, contract employee and

independent contractor past and present.

With respect to the third element, Mr. Gunn and the

Board are simply in error.

To my knowledge they have no

authority to require that an individual be consulted

concerning his or her wishes to maintain cover, thus having

his or her true name postponed, or to give up his cover,

thus having the name released. This decision does not lie

in the first instance with the individual but is an

institutional decision which lies solely within the purview

of the Agency and the executive branch of the government.

CIA as an executive agency charged with the creation,

maintenance, and dissolution of cover mechanisms is the only

entity competent to make such a decision. It alone knows if

release of an officer's true name will compromise an

existing cover mechanism which will, in turn, expose others

who share or have shared the same cover. It alone knows if

release of an officer's name

will expose CIA sponsorship (a

cover entity) of a sensitive activity. It alone knows if

release of an officer's name will violate a promise of

confidentiality to a commercial cover sponsor which could

cause both embarrassment and possibly, financial hardship to

the sponsor and, in turn, substantially hinder the Agency's

ability to secure subsequent commercial cover sponsors.

Turning next to the wishes of a particular officer

(either current or retired) vis a vis staying with his or

her cover, these thoughts come to mind. For current

---

## Page 20

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employees, the decision is again not entirely theirs. If,

after careful review, the Agency does not have a strong

position on the employee maintaining the cover, the officer

should be permitted to decide. He or she should be

counseled however, that an action to remove cover could have

an adverse impact on future assignments or TDYs. With

respect to retirees, if, after careful review, the Agency

does not object to the removal from cover, the individual

should be permitted to decide. Note, that the responses to

this inquiry will be mixed. As a historical note, the

Agency over the years has been on an ever-swinging pendulum

with respect to & cover into retirement,& # cover for

life,& etc. There will be officers who petitioned hard

unsuccessfully to have their cover removed when they retired

and will gladly consent to lifting the cover. There will be

those officers who do not want their cover lifted under any

circumstance.

By way of summary, it is CIA not the Board and not the

individual officer who makes the initial decision concerning

the maintenance or lifting of cover.

B.

Former officers, status unknown. While the

heading to this section would seem to suggest the CIA does

not know the cover/non-cover status of some of its former

officers, the section does not rally deal with this issue.

Rather, within the section, Mr. Gunn simply recognizes the

fact the CIA may not be able to find all of its former

officers to ask if they want to be opened up or remain under

---

## Page 21

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cover. The test required by Mr. Gunn to satisfy the Board

and thus continue postponement until 1 June of this year is

a good faith showing that reasonable attempts were made

to locate the officer and failed.

The section contains the additional provision which

advises the Board may continue a postponement beyond 1 June

of this year (i.e., until 2010) if the CIA provides the

board with evidence which satisfies the criteria of either

category 1 or category 3. Such & additional evidences must

be provided by 1 May 1977.

The requirements or tests of this section for the

Agency are not onerous but should be set-out as a series of

uniform actions or check-off's taken in the attempt to

locate each & current status unknowns officer. The record

of these actions could then be presented to the ARRB in

support of a request for continued to postponement.. The DO

Memorandum mentions of the possibility of asking the IRs or

the OPM for assistance in this regard and this should

probably, be done. I recall however, that the Service will

assist, through cleared contacts at the National Office, but

only to the extent of determining the whereabouts of the

individual and then contacting him and ask that he be in

touch with his former employer. I have no current knowledge

of cleared contacts at the OPM but they existed in the past

and I assume they continue.

C. Names having effect on current intelligence

interests. The Gunn letter appears to subscribe a higher

---

## Page 22

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level of concern to this section and its criteria than the

previous two, not recognizing the plain fact that the

criteria of all three sections are inextricable. It sets

out four separate criteria which, if CIA satisfies its

burden, i.e. provides sufficient evidence to prove any one

of them, will operate to postpone a true name until the year

2010. Note again, the criteria required are four separate

ones, each separated by a comma and between numbers 3 and 4

and " OR." They are:

i. The officer must be currently engaged in

clandestine activities; OR,

ii. The release of the officer's name would

compromise ongoing intelligence operations or operations

with current intelligence value (presumably, the latter

permits a review into the officer's past activities, agent

relationships, and cover positions); oR;

iii. The release of the officer's true name would

reasonably be expected to cause, significant harm to la living

person (including family members) (read broadly, this

provision would include, the individual, former agents,

anyone who shared the same cover or cover position, i.e. a

dedicated Department of State slot within an embassy) ; OR,

iv: The release of the officer's name would cause a

significant harm to the national security or the foreign

relations of the U.S. (a criteria which is broad enough to

drive the proverbial Mack truck through) •

---

## Page 23

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4. In Part II, the Gunn memorandum takes back part of

what it gave in the previous section. It sets up a test of

# importance to the assassination story vs. evidence of

harm. &

Essentially, it advises that the Board will weigh

the CIA's evidence but, if within its view, the true name

being considered for postponement is important to the

assassination story, the Board will release it. This means

for those few individuals who may be viewed as & important

to the story.* truly substantial evidence must be brought

to bear.: Absent such evidence, the Board will release, and

the only recourse left to the Agency would be an appeal to

the President.

5.

The Directorate of Operations Memorandum. The

basic concern with the steps for handling names as contained

within the memorandum is as follows. For officers who

retired under cover, the first step will be to contact them

and ask if they want their true name released. Per the

comments on page three supra, this should be the last step

of the réview, not the first.

A. Other Comments.

The resources and data bases

which will be researched for each name should be clearly

established and followed in a uniform manner. Deviation

from a set, orderly process will open CIA determinations to

criticism, objections and dismissal, i.e. release of a name

that should be postponed.

B. In addition to the data bases described

retirement records, annuity pay records, the office of

---

## Page 24

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security, insurance lists -- consideration might be given

to the Northwest Federal Credit Union, and overt data bases

such as Phonedec. Like the IRS and OPM, the credit union

might not be able from a legal standpoint to provide an

address.

However, it would probably be prepared to contact

an individual and ask that he be in touch.

C. A comment must be made about the idea of

universally releasing the true names of overt employees. To

the extent that any current employee, even overt employee,

may be sent overseas on TDY under light cover, the release

of his or her true name via these JFK documents which will

receive widespread review could jeopardize his overseas

mission and possibly, place his life in danger.

6. These thoughts are intended to be talking points as

we commence to sort out the manner in which we will deal

with the true names. Clearly, we need to begin to quickly

identify those names which can be released, those on which

there is some question, and those few on which we really

need to dig in our heale.

6.

I would be glad to discuss with you any of the

issues raised herein.

Gary M. Breneman

---

## Page 25

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..

wak fil

SECRET - WORKING PAPER

...

5 March, 1997

Memorandum For: Chief/HRG

From:

Barry Harrelson

Subject:

Reference:

Name Issue / Status of Review

Meetings with ARRB staff (Marwell & Gunn)

4 March 1997

Name Issue

I met with Gunn and Marwell (separate meetings) to

discuss the reopening of the names issue per my memo to you.

Both Gunn and Marwell reacted positively.

They found the

proposal to be reasonable one and they are willing to work

with us in approaching the Board. However, both said they

could not predict the Boards reaction.

Per Marwell, one

member of the Board (Anna Nelson) seems to believe that if a

person worked for the CIA it should be known.

Apparently our timing is excellent.

Marwell is

planning to propose to the Board that they change the

process from the focus on individual postponements to

documents.. Under the new approach his staff would have the

authority to negotiate with the Agency on the release of

documents, and only issues/documents of disagreement would

be placed before the Board.

Marwell is convinced that even

with an additional year they will not finish the project

with the current approach.

He sees our proposal on the

names as an example of how the process would work.

Marwell recommends that we include examples of

documents containing names of little or no connection to the

story.

Bob Skwirot (he was in the meeting with Marwell)

said that there were a number of names that appeared in only

one document and that the number of names had reached 590.

Marwell wants to start immediately on preparing a joint Tist

of important/releasable individuals.

Action:

Advise DO, OGC, upper management of our proposal to

reopen the name issue (how?).

Need to decide what level

would sign the memo to the Board, and who would prepare the

memo.

If you agree I can send a copy of my memo to you to

‹ Linda

and Fred for background use.

HRG and DO team will collect examples of documents and

prepare (with ARRB staff) a list of individuals. The DO

should focus on any person on the list that needs protection

and prepare the evidence ASAP (i.e. not wait for the issue

to be resolved).

SECRET

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## Page 26

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SECRET - WORKING PAPER

New ARRB Review Process

Marwell and I spent some time discussing how a new

process would work. He would like to test the process for

the April meeting. The following is a rough outline with my

comments:

HRG reviewers would review the documents the same

as they do now (postponements

would be blue highlighted).

[no change in our procedures]

2)

ARRB staff would review the blue highlighted

document.

a) If they agree, they would stamp the document

"ARRB approved"

and return it to HRG to process

for NARA.

b) If they disagree they would highlight in

yellow (creating green highlighting). If the two

staffs cannot resolve the issue, then the document

e the board.

would go before the Board.

[Major change: ARRB staff would no longer record all the

proposed postponements, no DO damage review, no detailed

determination letter requiring HRG reviewers to use the

"grid"

to determine what happen.]

3) Non-issue documents would be sent to the ARRB

staff when ready for NARA.

At that time the ARRB staff

would prepare a simplified final determination notice and

letter to the Agencies..

[ No action would be required; HRG would file the final

determination notice with the document].

4)

"Green" highlighted documents that go to the Board

would be handled the same as today.

[The expectation is that a lot less documents would require

Board action. l

Comments: With some fine tuning, I think this process could

work, and we would be able to complete the re-review of

documents released in 1993 and 1994 by Oct. 1998.

Completing the entire project will depend on how

quickly the

"non-related" material and the "addition records"

are

reviewed by the ARRB staff.

SECRET

---

## Page 27

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SECRET - WORKING PAPER

Pending Issues

As part of the change in process,

Marwell wants the

Board to focus on outstanding substantive issues as opposed

to micro managing the review.

We discussed the following:

1) Nosenko. ARRB staff needs to review the non-related

material and make a recommendation to the Board.

Marwell

leans toward not treating all of Nosenko as assassination

related. Could be a hard sell with some Board members.

Should we request that Nosenko meet with the Board? Marwell

thinks

they would react favorably.

2) Personnel Files. Again the first step is to have

his staff confirm that only a part of a file is related and

that those documents are in the released material.

3) (Gibson.

FBI file issue; we need to present case to

the Board

4) {LI 9. Continuing to protect will be a hard sell

given that Newman has published identity; we need to present

case to the Board.

5) CRC Financial Files. ARRB staff needs to review

Annual Report and Extension

Marwell ask me to draw you attention to the Annual

Report and the request for an extension. He would still

like a letter from the Agency (could be addressed to him)

along these lines:

"reviewed Annual Report"

"note that the Board has ask for extension"

"support the request/feel it is in interest of

Agency and public /or something along these lines"

Other issues (not discussed with Marwell/Gunn)

Linda (OGC) says CI Staff has ask Gunn to rewrite his

notes,

and opposes Gunn's suggestion to release pages from

the CI histories he reviewed.

Gunn indicated in his notes

that some of the pages should be released and might be

considered assassination records.

We are going to run into

similar problems with the other histories.

Gunn will be in

HQ tomorrow to re-do his notes. She will discuss the "pages

issue" with the goal of having him drop the request to

release.

As to the question of designating the pages as

assassination records, she will inform him that CI will

oppose. If he insist, she will refer back to HRG.

SECRET

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## Page 28

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01/23/97

WED 15:53 FAX 202 724 0457

_ARRB

E

R

S

H

To:

Fax #:

Subject:

Date:

Pages:

E

E

J. Barry Harrelson

703-613-3063

Segregated Collections

April 23, 1997

7, including this cover sheer.

Today the Board adopted the attached guidelines.

LUVA

FAX

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION ANDOR

RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

From the desk of...

T. Jeramy Gunn

General Counsel

Assassination Recorde Review Board

600 E Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20530

(202) 724-0088

Fax: (202) 727-0457

---

## Page 29

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WED 15:53 FAX 202 724_0457

_AKK

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

Assassination Records Review Board

Guidelines for Review of Postponements in the Segregated Collections

Adopted: April 23, 1997

Background

In order to ensure that the Review Board will be able to complete its task of reviewing

all identified assassination records, the Board recently took two significant steps. First,

on November 13, 1996, it adopted guidelines with respect to reviewing "Segregated

Collections" with regard to information that is "not believed relevant" (NBR) to the

assassination. Second, in February 1997, the Review Board requested Congress to

extend its tenure for one additional year.

It is the Review Board's judgment that, even with the assumption that our operations

may be extended through Fiscal Year 1998, the Review Board cannot hope to complete

review of postponements in the Segregated Collections under the current method of

review. In particular, a reasonable modification of current postponement standards

would greatly expedite and facilitate the release of additional information and records.

Otherwise, the Review Board might cease operations without having reviewed claimed

postponements in tens of thousands of pages of FBI and CIA records.

Postponement Criteria for the Segregated Collections

In a further effort to enhance the Review Board's work, the Review Board now issues

these revised guidelines for the review of records in the Segregated Collections.!

(These guidelines do not affect the FBI's Core and Related Files or the ClA's 201 file on

Oswald.) The four principal factors that underlie these review guidelines are: first,

continuing, to the greatest reasonable extent, the Review Board's established

guidelines for postponements that have emerged over the past two years; second,

establishing guidelines consistent with the Review Board's decision regarding NBR

records; third, establishing reasonable and workable guldelines that will enable the

'The regulations adopted by the Board on November 13, 1996, define

"Segregated Collections" as including first, FBI records that were requested by: (a) the

House Select Committee on Assassinations ("HSCA") in conjunction with its

investigation into the Kennedy assassination; (b) the Church Committee in conjunction

with its inquiry into issues related to the Kennedy assassination; and (c) by other bodies

(e.g., Pike Committee, Abzug Committee, etc.) that relate to the Kennedy

assassination; and second, CIA records including (a) the CIA's Sequestered Collection

of 63 boxes as well as one box of microfilm records and the microfilm records (box 64),

and (b) several boxes of GIA staff "working files."

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- 2 -

Review Board, the ARRB staff, the CIA, and the FBI to complete the significant amount

of work that remains; and finally, to provide reasonably consistent standards for the

review of postponements that would apply equally to CIA and FBI records.

The following are, in summary form, guidelines for reviewing postponements in the

Segregated Collections."

CIA Source and FBI Informant and National Security Asset Postponements

There are, of course, similarities and differences between FBI informants and CIA

sources. Like FBI informants and national security assets, ClA sources may or may not

be paid for the information that they provide and they may or may not be providers of

information over the long-term. When providing information to the Bureau, FBI

informants generally are understood to be cooperating with law enforcement officials for

a legal and legitlmate purpose. It is often the case, although not always, that FBI

informants understand that at some point their name might surface in conjunction with a

criminal prosecution and that they may need to testity in court. Foreign ClA sources

and FBI national security assets, however, are not necessarily deemed to be

cooperating with law enforcement officials but may, in fact, be committing the crime of

espionage against their native country by cooperating with US authorities. Furthermore,

unlike FBl intormants, CIA sources and FBI national security assets presume that their

names will not be released publicly and they certainly presume (in the ordinary course)

that their identities will not surface in criminal trials. As a practical matter, it is generally

much easier today for the FBI to locate a former informant who resides in the United

States than it is for the CIA and FBI to locate former sources and national security

assets.

Despite these differences - differences which would generally suggest a greater

degree of protection being owed to CIA sources and FBI national security assets - the

issues in terms of postponements are fundamentally similar.

"The existing "NBR" guidelines allow the Review Board to remove from detailed

consideration those records or files that truly have no apparent relevance to the

assassination. Nevertheless, a significant number of files in the Segregated Collections

contain records that shed some light on Issues that the HSCA explored as potentially

relevant to the assassination of President Kennedy. The following criteria would apply

to all records in the Segregated Collections, Including records containing some NBR

redactions.

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CIA Sources

The Revlew Board established guidelines, during its December 1996 meeting, for

handling CIA source issues and applied those guidelines at the January 1997 meeting.

These guidelines directed the protection of names and identifying information of ClA

sources in cases where the identity of the source is of low public interest or is peripheral

to the JFK assassination. The Board's decision was based on two factors: the concern

that since ClA sources generally live outside the United States, they could risk harm it

their identities were revealed. Moreover, many of the sources referenced in CIA.

records appear infrequently and are of relatively low public interest. Therefore, in

records where the identity of the source is of importance for understanding the

assassination, the ClA will be required to provide additional evidence to support the

protection of the source's identity." In cases where the identify of the source is

peripheral to the assassination story, the information will be postponed until 2017.

FBI Natlonal Security Assets

FBI national security assets should be treated in the same manner as CIA sources.

FBI Intormants

Informant issues represent the largest category of postponements in the FBl's

Segregated Collection, as they do in the "core" FBI assassination files. They also

provide the greatest opportunity for streamlining the review process. Currently, there

are ten members of the Bureau's JFK Task Force who are responsible for researching

individual informants in response to evidence requests from the Review Board." They

retrieve and review the infornants' files and attempt, through DMV, Social Security, and

other database. searches, to determine if the informant is alive. Under current Review

Board standards for "core" files, this work is necessary to provide evidence to support

redacting the informant's name, regardless of whether the informant provided

information. Removing the requirement of proving whether informants are alive in the

Segregated Collections would free up significant resources that could be deployed to

reviewing unprocessed HSCA subject files.

The new approach to HSCA subjects is to protect informant-identifying information,

'An example would be the case of John Scelso (pseud.). The Board found that

his identity is relevant to the assassination story and ClA offered evidence.of a

continuing need to protect the identity. In this case, "Scelso" documents would

continue to be scheduled for release in five years.

"Six work full-time on informant evidence, tour devote about half their time to

informant evidence.

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## Page 32

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- 4-

without requiring the Bureau to make a showing that the informant is alive. This

protection would extend to individuals characterized as symbol-number informants,

"PSis," "PCls," "established sources," "panel sources," and the like - designations that

indicate an ongoing relationship with the FBl. It would not extend to individuals who

requested that their identity be protected in an isolated contact with the FBI or to local

and state law enforcement officers.

The "informant-identifying information" to be protected would Include the customary

(l.e., informant-specific) portions of informant symbol numbers and file numbers;

informant names, and - at least potentially - descriptions of, and information received

from, the informant. How much, if any, of the latter type of information should be

redacted would be the principal focus of staff-level discussions with the FBI. The staff's

principal goal in this process, with regard to each informant, would be to release as

much information that is relevant to understanding the assassination as possible. In

discussions with the FBI, the staff would be prepared, if necessary, to concede

redaction of informant-identifying information that is unrelated to the assassination in

order to ensure that more pertinent information is released.

The presumption will be that an informant's identity will be released if the intormant

provides "positive" information about an assassination-related issue. To overcome this

presumption of release for informants with "positive" information, the FBI would need to

make a particularized showing that the identifying information should not be released.

To the extent that an informant's identity is protected, it will be postponed until 2017.

CIA Employee Name Postponements

Over the past year the ClA has addressed the employee name issue and has released

some names that it had previously asked the Board to postpone. But during that time

the list of names has grown to a size that had not been imagined at the time the work

began. To date, the Review Board staff has identified in the JFK Collection over 650

names of ClA employees. These names appear in more than 1000 documents already

reviewed by the Board and numerous additional records that have not yet been

processed. While some of these employee names are important to the assassination

story, many appear only a few times in the entire JFK Collection and seem to add little,

if any, important information.

SIn HSCA subjects, there typically will not be information about Ruby, Oswald or

the assassination itselt. However, in a file on, for example, Sam Giancana, there may

be informant reports on Giancana's support of anti-Castro activities, and reports from

the same informant on day-to-day numbers operations in the Chicago area. The staff

would set a higher priority on release of the former reports than on the latter.

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= 5.

CIA's argument to protect employee names emphasizes a number of points. First,

since many employees are "under cover," the maintenance of that cover is critical to

gathering intelligence. CIA argues that identification of a name can identify the cover

provider and jeopardize operations, Second, although the majority of names are of

retired CIA employees, CIA has a confidentiality agreement with them and many do not

want their past Agency affiliation released. The argument here is that release may

jeopardize business relationships or personal safety. Such arguments have already

been presented to the Board. Their merit can only be determined on a case-by-case

basis. However, due to the volume of names in the JFK Collection, the individual

review and evaluation of each case would delay significantly the review of documents

and ultimately lead to less total Information becoming available to the public.

CIA has proposed, and the Review Board agrees, that CIA employee names be treated

in a manner similar to that applied to Source names: to postpone until 2017 those

employee names that are of low public interest or are of peripheral interest to the

assassination. It will be presumed that employee names will be released if their

identities are important to the assassination story unless the CIA is able to provide

specific information of a potentlal harm of release. (CIA acknowledges the presumption

of release unless specific evidence is provided to the Review Board that harm to

national security or to personal safety would result from the release of the employee

name.)

FBI "Foreign Counterintelligence" Postponements

It is presumed that the FBI will, at least partially, carry over its post-appeal standards for

disclosing "FCI" activities targeting Communist-bloc nations. To the extent that the

HSCA subjects refiect "F'Cl activities against other nations that have not been

addressed by the Review Board in the "core" files, the FBI will be allowed to redact

direct discussion of such activities, unless the information in the proposed redaction

meaningfully contributes to the understanding of the assassination.

FBI and CIA Foreign Liaison Postponements

The criteria for these postponements would not, in the abstract, depart significantly from

the Review Board's current approach of releasing information received through liaison

channels, while protecting direct acknowledgment of the source of the information. In

practice, however, the staff would be more flexible in protecting text that implies,

although may not unambiguously state, that a foreign goverment is the source of

particular information. Nevertheless, the more significant the information is to any

assassination-related issue, the more information would be released under these

guidelines.

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## Page 34

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CIA Stations and Other Issues

Over the past two years the Review Board has established other guidelines that will

continue to guide the review process, some of which will be outlined here. For CIA

stations, all locations related to the Mexico City story will be released during the period

1960-69. Outside of that window, they will be released on a case-by-case basis should

the identity of the station be critical to understanding the assassination. Other stations,

except for those identified as particularly sensitive, will be released from the beginning

of the Kennedy administration until the publication of the Warren Commission report,

(I.e., January 1, 1961 to October 1, 1964). Outside of these windows, stations will be

postponed. Cable prefixes, dispatch prefixes, and field report prefixes would be

postponed or released according to the same windows as the stations to which they

refer. CIA job titles also are redacted or opened along with the station at which the

officer served.

Crypts would be released along lines similar to other information. All "LI" crypts, except

those considered particularly sensitive would be released through October 1, 1964, as

are "AM" crypts and U.S. govemment crypts, In other areas, only the digraph is

protected. Again, the exception is sensitive crypts, which would be protected in their

entirety. After October 1, 1964, the presumption shifts towards protection of the crypts,

except those that provide meaningful information about the assassination story. (For

example, crypts pertinent to Garrison-era documents would likely carry the same

presumption of release as those generated during the Warren Commission.)

Surveillance methods will be released if the nature of the surveillance has a material

bearing on information related to the assassination unless CIA provides evidence

demonstrating the political or operational sensitivity, in which case the information will

be released in 2017.

e:larrblregsleview.wpd

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## Page 35

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'APR 15 '97

04:55PM USGOVERNMENT

P. 2/14

SECRET

Central intelilgenoe Agency

Washingar A C 2050S

15 April 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT:

David G. Marwell

Executive Director

Assaggination Records Review Board

CIA Employees

(We request that this memorandum be returned to CIA

once the Review Board has completed its deliberationg on the

issues discussed below.)

1. (0) Jeane. The purpose of this memo 1s to relate

CIA'& COnCerns to the Review Board regarding the release of

the true names of CIA employees that appear in the JFK

Collection and to present a proposal on how this problem

might be addressed.

I. Factual Backaround

2. (U) To date, approximately 600 true names of CIA

employees have been identified in the JFR Collection. Some

of these employees are important to the JFK story, and CIA

will continue to work with the Review Board to release as

many of these names as possible.

Many names, however,

appear only a few times in the entire JFK Collection and

appear on a

to add nothing to the historical record.

3. (U)

Under guidelines adopted by the Review Board

on or about 20 March 1996, any names of CIA employees are

presumptively released unless CIA provides specific evidence

to the Review Board that harm to the national security or to

the employee would likely result from such release.

singe

these guidelines were adopted, it has become increasingly

clear that the number of names at issue, and, in most cases,

their tenuous connection to the JFK story, make this

approach unworkable with regard to both CIA's obligation to

CL BY:

2224130

CL REASON: 1.5(c)

DECL ON:

X1

DRV FROM:. HUM 4 - 82

SECRET

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'APR 15 '97 B4:55PM USGOVERNMENT

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SECRET.

Subject: CIA Employees

protect national security information and the Review Board's

duty to Inform the public about the JFK assaggination in a

timely and accurate fashion. The task of locating and

Informing hundreds of former employees scattered all over

the country and the world has been a formidable one. Some

reed be to deport

received.

It would not be surprising, therefore, if many

former employees ignored the letter for similar reasons,

even though they might have legitimate needs to protect

their identities.

(U) Contacting every named employee and

collecting

information on each of them to present to the Review Board

will clearly take more time and effort than any of us had

anticipated.

This will have obvious ramifications for how

and when the Review Board releases Information to the

public.

More importantly, the decision to publicly

acknowledge employees who may have been living for over 30

years under cover is a critical one that should be made not

by default, but rather by careful planning and

consideration.

5.

(U)

Relevant to this discussion is the fact that

the Review Board and CIA have recently agreed upon a policy

for releasing true names of sources of intelligence

information. It was agreed at that time that there would be

a presumption of protecting source names; but in cases where

a source was particularly important to the JEk story ano

Although the CIA recognizes that there

are some sensitivities involved with sources that do not

apply to covert employees, there are also many legal and

operational similarities,

which are described herein, that

justify gimilar treatment by the Review Board. As 18

further detailed in Section IV, CIA, therefore, proposes

that the Review Board adopt a general policy of protecting

employee names that appear in the Collection,. with

exceptions for those individuals whom the Board believes are

Important to the JER story.

II, Legal Considerationa

6.

(U) As both covert CIA employees and clandestine:

reporting assets are types of "human sources" of

intelligence, many of the same laws apply. Although Section

11(a) of the JFK Act provides that, when the Act reguires

release of information, it takes precedence over all other

laws that would otherwise prohibit release, there are strong

governmental national security interests in protecting the

true

names of CIA employees.

CIA believes that it 1s

2

SECRET

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subject: CIA Employees

important for the Review Board to reconsider the laws which

protect classified information, because they clearly reflect

a larger US Government policy to protect covert CIA

employees from disclosure.

7..

(U) By Executive order and statute, the President

and Congress have made the Director of Central Intelligence

responsible for protecting sources of intelligence.

In hig

Directive of 22 January 1946 that established the Central

Intelligence Group, President Truman made the DCI

responsible for protecting sources. With the establishment

of CIA, Congress also gave the DCI this responsibility.

The

National Security Act of 1947, Section 103(d) (3), codified

at 50 USC §403(3) (c) (5), reguires the DCI to protect

intelligence sources from unauthorized disclosure.

In

addition, §403(3) (d) (2) requires the DCI to ensure that

risks to

the United States and thoge involved in the

collection of intelligence through human sources are

minimized..

8. (U) Protecting the identity of individuals working

for CIA, not only covertly but overtly as well, has been of

rotectim ty out ove

particular concern to US lawmakers since the establishment

of the agency.

For example, with Section 6 of the Central

Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 USC §403g, Congress

specifically exempted the CIA from the provisions of any law

requiring the publication or disclosure of the organization,

functions, names, titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel

employed by the Agency.

9.

(U) In 1980, Congress pagged the Classified

Information Procedures Act (CIPA) which sets out pretrial,

trial, and appellate procedures for criminal cases involving

or potentially involving claseified information.

working

with the Department of Justice and the courts, CIA has

successfully protected the names of CIA employees from

public release even in criminal trials where there are

heightened (i.e.,

constitutional) considerations favoring

disclosure to the defendant of all government information

relevant to the defense.

sIPA allows for in camera ex parte

nearings in which the judge can rule on questions or

admissibility and relevancy of classified information,

Including the identity of CIA employees who may have

information pertaining to the defense, before it 1g

introduced either to the defendant, defense counsel, or in

open court. In some cases involving CIA, the juage has

ordered that CIA information be turned over to the defense,

but only in some unclassified form such as in a summary.

In

other cases, judges have reviewed the classified information

and ruled that the harm to national security outweighe the

3

SECRET

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Subject: CIA Employees

defendant's legal rights to the information.

In still other

cages, the defense was never notified that CIA even had

information bearing on the case, as the judge ruled that the

mere fact that CIA possessed this information was classified

and outweighed any rights the defendant had. Moreover,

prosecution in thoge cases where the risk to national

security is too great.

10. (U) In 1982, Congress again acted to protect CIA

employees by passing the Intelligence Identities Protection

Act of 1982, 50 USC §421 that criminalizes the revelation of

a covert employee or the identity of a source.

This act

subjects anyone who reveals information that identifles a

"covert agent" to prosecution and provides up. to 10 years in

prison and $50,000 in fines as punishment.

This act

specifically defines a "covert agent" as including "an

officer or employee of an intelligence agency... ."

11.

(0)

Most recently, President Clinton signed

Executive Order 12958 on classified national security

Information that became effective in October 1995. Although

it requires generally that agencies make greater

declassification efforts than under the prior executive

order, Executive Order 12958 affords human sources of

intelligence information, which would include employees,

extra protection from the declassification provisions.

Under E.O. 12958, information that is over 25 years old and

having historical value must be declassified within five

years. However, information revealing the identity of a

human

source may continue to be protected.

12.

(0)

The above federal laws show a long-standing

practice by the US Government to protect CIA employees from

disclosure to the public.

In carrying out its stacutory

obligations, the Review Board should give serious weight to

this policy and afford the protection of CIA employees a

nigh priority.

III. Operational Considerationa

13.

(0)

For current cIA employees whose names may

appear in the JFK Collection, the operational conaiderationg

for protecting their identity are similar to those for

sources. Many of these employees have worked "under cover"

for CIA. Cover is used to disassociate entire installationg

and offices from open linkage to intelligence activities, to

enable Intelligence personnel to enter and work effectively

in foreign countries, to shield Agency employees and

authorired clandestine activities from attention by hostile

elements and from media exposure, to facilitate access to

SECRET

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subject: CIA Employees

certain individuals of intelligence interest, to prevent

embarrassment to host foreign governments, and to permit

plausible denial of CIA's presence and activities in foreign

countries.

14. (U) The ability to maintain one's cover is

crucial to gathering intelligence.

In either a "hostile" or

"friendly" country, should the local service become aware of

who the CIA employees are,

it would increase surveillance

and make unilateral operations difficult if not impossible.

In some countries, the local government tolerates the CIA

presence and agrees to work with us as long as the local

population 1s not aware of the circumstances.

Once 1t

becomes known among the locals that certain us Government

officials are actually ciA, pressure may be placed on the

government to expel those Americans, disrupting liaison and

diplomatic relationships.

More importantly, covert

employees and their families would face increased risk to

their personal safety.

Even in "friendly" countries, our

employees could face some personal rieks as well as riska to

ongoing operations from extremists who may be living among

an otherwise benign local population.

In any of these

cases, should a covert employee's cover be publicly

compromised, that employee may have to be recalled from the

field; and 1t could be difficult to place him elsewhere in

an operationally and physically secure location.

thus.

maintaining cover is important to a case officer's

effectiveness and

I to the continuation of a career with CIA.

15. (S) Maintaining the confidentiality of cover is

also important to cover providers.

The Review Board will

recall from prior briefings by the Agency that covert CIA

employees, both in the United States and overseas, can work

under "official" (e.g., State Department) cover

or "non-

official" (e.g., private company) cover.

. Disclosure of a

covert employee would not only be official acknowledgment of

the specific cover mechanism employed by clA but would algo

negatively affect the governmental or business mission of

the cover provider, especially those who provide non-

official. cover.

Acknowledgment of an employee who had been

under non-official cover in a host country and possibly in

other countries could have a negative impact on the

provider's business interests and activities. It would also

cast suspicion on that provider's legitimate employees and

their families.

Further, exposure of cover providers could

affect the recruitment and cooperation of such providers by

the Agency and Intelligence Community:

(s) Although the majority of names that appear in

the Collection are retired CIA employees, the operational

considerations in revealing their affiliation

with ciA are

5

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subject: CIA Employees

not diminished.

Similar to sources, many former employees

still do not want their past affiliation with ClA revealed.

Perhaps their current friends, family, or employers are not

aware of this past affiliation; and revelation of that fact

could negatively affect personal and professional

relationships.

Some former employees still live overseas

where a revelation of CIA affiliation poses riske to their

personal safety. Other former employees travel overseas on

business,

where a revelation of a past CIA affiliation can

threaten their business interests and personal safety.

One example of an employee in this category is Robert

Fulton, whose name apparently appears only once in the

collection..

Fulton retired under Department of State cover;

he currently has a consultant business and frequently

travels to China.

Release of his name would jeopardize not

only his business but perhaps even his safety.

A similar

example 1s Walter McCabe, who also retired under State

cover.

He is now working in Russia and several East

European countries for a private firm.

He does not want his

name published, becauge it could be damaging to his current

employer and his professional status.

17.

(8)

Even if a former employee agrees to the

revelation of

his name in the JfK Collection, this might not

be possible for other reasons. In some cases, officially

acknowledging a covert employee could threaten ongoing

operations on which that employee worked.

Foreign nationals

recruited by the employee and still providing information to

the US Government would be at risk of exposure. Public

acknowledgment could reveal the location of CIA stations

where the employee worked throughout his career, including

some not released by the Review Board. Any individuals who

had substantial contact with a former employee overseas and

may have believed they were legitimately providing

information to a US corporate representative would be upset

to learn they were, in fact, aiding the US Government.

18. (U) Finally, the identification of case officers

by their own service would have a chilling effect on

prospective assets.

Prospective assets would be unlikely to

enter into a

clandestine relationship with American

intelligence if they believe that CIA does not protect even

its own staff employees from public disclosure.

IVe Rroponal

19. (U) In l1ght of the foregoing, CIA believes it 1a

important to work toward a general policy or protecting cla

employees identified in the JFK Collection, with exceptions

made for those individuals who are important to the story of

the assassination. The Agency proposes that in most cases a

6

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Subject: CIA Employees

substitution for the true name be used.. If the Review Board

is concerned about tracking particular employees throughout

the records, a particular identifying substitution can be

used for a particular employee.

20. (S) CIA believes that this approach will not

undermine the Review Board's obligationg under the JFK Act.

A revlew of the JFK Collection reveals that approximately 84

•of the 600 names appear only once in the entire Collection.

In such cases, it 18 difficult to see how the individuals'

identity can add anything of gignificance to the historical.

record; yet there may be some security concerng still

associated with these individuals. For example, Arthur H.

Stimson retired under cover and is currently living in

Europe.

When the CIA notified him that his name appeared in

the JFK Collection and was subject to public release, he

told CIA that he was opposed to having his name released and

believed such a release could pose personal and security

problems.

furthermore, he could not understand why his name

even appeared in the Collection, since he had no

recollection of being involved in anything related to the

assasaination.

(S) With regard to the approximately 500 names

that appear more than once in the Collection, the vast

majority of these individuals played almost no role in

•JER story. One example of this is former DO officer

Alexander Brasko.

His name appears approximately 20-30

times.in the Collection simply because he signed off on name

trace requests.

Mr. Brasko was a covert CIA employee and

retired under cover.

The public release of his name would

provide the public with no additional significant

Information about JFK.

Tom Flores is another example of a

covert CIA employee whose name appears in the Collection but

has little or no connection to the JEK story.

retired under cover, is living in south america, and objects

to the release of his name. Mr. Flores' recent

CIA 1s also attached for your convenience.

and in convenient..

Flores

22.

(S)

The Agency, of course, recognizes that some

names may be particularly important to the JFK story

regardless of how frequently or infreguently they appear in

the Collection.

One such example is former COS Mexico

Winston Scott who CIA has acknowledged as a CIA employee.

In such cases, the CIA will continue to work with the Review

Board for an appropriate resolution.

The CIA proposes that

the Review Board and its staff identify those individuals

whom it belleves are important to the JEK story and whose

names should be released to the public. These names would

sarry a presumption of release unless specific evidence 18

provided to the Review Board that harm would likely result

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Subject: CIA Employees

from such release.

The CIA will conduct the appropriate

searches to determine whether release would pose national

security concerns for the us Government or personal safety

concerns for the individual. In this way, ClA and the revieu

Board can concentrate their efforts on individualg who are

significant figures in the JFK story, expediting the review

of the seguestered collection:

23. (U) It 1s our hope that the CIA and the Review

Board can agree on and work out a mutually acceptable policy

regarding the identity of CIA employees that will not

undermine the important principle of protecting those who

work covertly for the US Government.

My staff and I are

ready to discuss this matter with you at your convenience.

this

Michael

O'Neil

Acting General Counsel

Attachment

A.

Tom Flores'

letter

8

SECRET

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## Page 43

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- APR 15 '97.

05:03PM USGOVERNMENT

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SECRET

Subject: CIA Employees

DCI/OGC/LD/LCCipriani

76124

OGC-97-50971

Distribution:

Original - Addressee

1 - GC

1 - Lit File - LDG00021

1

- LCC Signer

1

- RDC - FYI

1

- OGC Registry

(10 Apr 97)

SECRET

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## Page 44

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Secret

26 June 1997

Memorandum to: Jeremy Gunn

ARRB Staff

From:

Barry Harrelson

JFK Project Office

CIA/CSI/HRG

Subject:

Reference:

Employee Names Scheduled for ARRB Review

201 File and "A" Names Lists

(We request that this memorandum and its attachments be

returned to CIA once the Review Board has completed its

deliberations on the names discussed below.)

.1. The above reference lists identify the protected CIA

employee names in the Oswald 201 file and on the ARRB

staff's key figures list scheduled for action by the ARRB at

its 9-10 July 1997 meeting. This memorandum is a partial

response to the ARRB's request for evidence and addresses

those individuals on the list currently employed by the

Agency and the changes in status of names.

201 List

Current employees requiring continued protection. (see

attached Cover

Staff reports):

Walter C. D'Andrade (Andrade, FNU)

Robert J. Austin

Robert F. Litviak

Release:

FNU Coplewood

Joan Field

N. Judkins

FNU Patten

Harrison L Scott

Carl Trettin

W. Walker

Corrections:

Remove Kurt Johansson (source)

incorrectly identified as an employee

Add Barbara Graham (B. Graham) --

incorrectly dropped from latest list

CL BY :

611637

CL REASON: 1.5 (c)

DECL ON:

X1

DRV FRM: COV 2-87

SECRET

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## Page 45

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Secret

Key Figures (A) List

Release:

FNU Connally

FNU Feinglass

Daniel Flores

Lorna McKay

George Misko

David Wilsted

2. For the remaining 38 names on the lists, we will

provide evidence supporting their cover status and the need

for continued protection as available.

By 7 July you should

have either specific evidence or a

status of search

statement for each individual.

Barry Harrelson

Attachments:

Cover history printouts (3) lavailable in CIA SCIF]

SECRET

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## Page 46

13-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

(When Filled In)

#19-297

SECRECY AGREEMENT

1. I, Morton Mowbray fa

=, understand that upon enter-

ing on duty with the Central Intelligence Agency. I am undertaking a posi-

tion of trust in that Agency of the Government responsible to the Presi-

dent and the National Security Council for intelligence relating to the

security of the United States of America. I understand that in the

course of my employment I will acquire information about the Agency and

its activities and about intelligence acquired or produced by the Agency.

2. I have read and understand the provisions of the Espionage Act, Title

18, USC, secs. 793 and 794, and I am aware that unauthorized disclosure

of classified information relating to the national defense may subject

me to prosecution for violation of that Act, whether such disclosure be

made while I am an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency or at any

time thereafter.

3. In addition, however, as I am undertaking a position of trust, I have

a responsibility to the Central Intelligence Agency not to disclose any

classified information relating to the Agency without proper authoriza-

tion. I undertake, therefore, not to discuss with or disclose to any

person not authorized to hear it such information relating to the Central

Intelligence Agency, its activities, or to intelligence material under

the control of the Agency. I further understand that this undertaking

is a condition of my employment with the Central Intelligence Agency, that

its violation may subject me to immediate dismissal for cause or other

appropriate disciplinary action, and that this undertaking shall be equally

binding upon me after my employment with the Agency as during it.

4. I understand that the burden is upon me to ascertain whether or not

information is classified and if so, who is authorized to receive it,

and, therefore, I will obtain the decision of authorized officials of

the Agency on these points prior to disclosing information relating to

the Agency, and failure to obtain such a decision will be grounds for my

dismissal.

5. I understand that my unauthorized action or utterance in the nature

of a publication or which would reasonably be expected to result in pub-

licity on intelligence or intelligence activities would be in violation

of Government and Agency regulations and would be grounds for my dismissal.

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM NO. 368 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

1 DEC 55

---

## Page 47

13-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

(When Filled In)

6. I understand that for all grievances and complaints there are estab-

lished procedures within the Agency permitting appeal by any employee of

the Agency and to carry any such grievance or complaint outside the Agency

will be considered a violation of the undertaking set forth above in

paragraph 3. If the appeal procedures are inadequate in any situation,

I am aware that the Inspector General is at all times available to any

employee with a legitimate criticism, grievance, or complaint.

7. I further understand and agree that my employment by the Central In-

telligence Agency is conditioned upon my understanding of and strict

compliance with CIA Security Regulations, and the appendices thereto.

8.. Inasmuch as employment by the Government is a privilege not a right,

..in consideration of my employment by CIA I undertake not to publish or

participate in the publication of any information or material relating to

the Agency, 1ts activities or intelligence activities generally, either

during or after the term of my employment by the Agency without specific

prior approval by the Agency.

9. I agree that all information or intelligence acquired by me in con-

nection with my official duties with the Central Intelligence Agency

remains the property of the United States of America, and I will sur-

render, upon demand by an appropriate official of the Agency or upon

separation from the Agency, any material relating to such information

and intelligence in my possession.

10. I take the obligations set forth above freely, without any mental

reservations or purpose of evasion.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have set my hand and seal this.

July, 1962.

I day of

mato Morebra, Palma E(sea2)

Witness:

Dorid Shea

JUL 1962

Date

CONFIDENTIAL

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## Page 48

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SECRET

2.

THE UNCLASSIFIED SAE, COORDINATED IN DRAFT WITH

CCS/OSB, IS AS FOLLOUS:

SUMMARY:

TRILINGUAL SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE OFFICER

(DEPARTMENT OF STATE 1962-1990) WITH EXTENSIVE EXPERIENCE

WORKING WITH THE U.S. CONGRESS, MORE THAN 16 YEARS WORKING AND

LIVING IN LATIN AMERICA (ECUADOR,

PERU AND. MEXICO) .

ELEVEN OF THOSE PEARS WERE IN SURERVISORY

•AND SENIOR MANAGEMENT POSITIONS.

RECEIVED A SENIOR EXECUTIVE

SERVICE AWARD FOR HAVING MADE OUTSTANDING CONTRIBUTIONS TO

OVERALL RELATIONS WITH THE VARIOUS HOUSE COMMITTEES CONCERNED

APPROPRATIONS, SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTEELAGENCES RULEET

APPROPRIATIONS, • SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,

COMMITTEE ON NARCOTICS, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS) •

THIS WAS

COMPLEMENTED BY INDIVIDUAL LETTERS OF COMMENDATION FROM

MAJORITY. AS WELL AS MINORITY MEMBERS OF THOSE COMMITTEES.

MEXICO, MAINTAINED FRUITFUL CONTACT WITH CABINET MEMBERS

WAS A MAJOR PLAYER IN THE DIALOGUE AND POLICY GUIDANCE BUILDING

UP TO (INTER ALIA) THE DEBT NEGOTIATIONS AGREEMENT AND ENSUING

COMMERCIAL OPENINGS.

DETAILS:

-TOP SECRET AND SPECIAL COMPARTMENTED CLEARANCES.

-DRAFTER AND/OR COORDINATOR ON MYRIAD POLICY, POSITION

AND GUIDANCE PAPERS IMPACTING ON US PUSLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR

RELATIONSHIPS WITH MEXICO.

MAJOR PLAYER IN ENSURING THAT

HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE USG FULLY UNDERSTOOD THE COMPLEXITIES OF

THE EVOLVING POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION IN MEXICO.

-DAILY INTERLOQUTOR WITH MEXICAN CABINET OFFICERS

DURING SLIGHTLY LESS THAN FOUR YEARS IN MEXICO CITY.

-IN PREVIOUS WASHINGTON ASSIGNMENT, DEALT EXTENSIVELY

WITH THE FULL RANGE OF FOREIGN POLICY ELEMENTS OF THE USG.

GAVE IN HOUSE AS WELL AS NUMEROUS INTER AGENCY SPEECHES ON A

VARIETY OF MATTERS OF MUTUAL CONGERN.

-1980-1984 - FLAGGED. THE THEN EMERGING SENDERO LUMINOSO

AS A SERIOUS THREAT TO PERUVIAN SECURITY AND WAS THE FIRST

SENIOR OFFICIAL TO INSIST THAT PERUVIAN COCA PRODUCTION WAS TEN

TIMES THE PREVIOUS ESTIMATES. (SADLY, BOTH OBSERVATIONS HAVE

TURNED OUT TO BE ALTOGETHER ACCURATE.

-IN 1978-1980 PERIOD, WORKED FOR THE OFFICE OF

LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS WITH RESPONSIBILITIES FOR OVERALL RELATIONS

WITH ALL COMMITTEES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

RECEIVED

A SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE AWARD AND EFFUSIVE LETTERS OF

APPRECIATION FROM MEMBERS OF SIX COMMITTEES.

- IN VARIOUS MANAGEMENT POSITIONS, TWICE WAS IN CHARGE

OF UNITS WHICH EXCEEDED TWO HUNDRED PERSONS.

HIRED, FIRED,

NEGOTIATED, AND PROVIDED ADVICE, GUIDANCE AND DIRECTION AS

APPROPRIATE.

SECRET

i. +

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## Page 49

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I understand that the Summary of Agency Employment (SAE)

defines the

outer limits of what I may disclose to unauthorized

persons concerning my employment by the Central Intelligence

Agency. I further understand that disclosure of information

about my Agency employment which is not contained in my SAE may

constitute a violation of my Secrecy Agreement. I promise that

all statements which I make to unauthorized persons concerning

my Agency employment will be consistent with my SAE and limited

by its content.

11 025/989

Date

Mitar 1.

Signature

Cella

---

## Page 50

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SECRET®

MEMORANDUM FOR:

VIA:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

OCC-95-149

97 DEG 1995

JFK Assassination Records Review Board

Associate Deputy Director for Operations

Associate

Resources

Deputy Director for. Operations/Human

and Programs

Eric L. Qualkenbush

Chief,

Office of Central Cover

Proposed CIA Name Release

1.

The Agency strongly objects to the release of names. of

individuals presently under cover, whether active employees or

separated employees.. As described below, this action woulo

reach Agency commitments to these individuals who agreed to work

under cover in addition to breaching our obligations. to the cover

providers.

2. Employees sign a secrecy agreement (Attachment A) upon

entering on duty with the Agency. This agreement pledges. the

employee's secrecy to information which is classified and has not

been publicly acknowledged by the Agency and requires the

employee to protect such information from unauthorized

disclosure.

This secrecy agreement, as long as it remains in

force by mutual agreement, obliges CIA to prot'èct the identities

of Agency employees, our cover providers and covert activities.

3. Because this secrecy agreement creates a moral as well

as legal bond between the Agency and the employee, it is Agency

policy to protect the names of former employees who have

separated under cover unless the Agency and the employee mutually

agree to remove the cover. Identifying as CIA those employees

who are mandated by the Agency to use a cover story, i.e.,

Department of State or the "ABC" Corporation, for their entire

Agency career as well as into their years after separation from

the Agency, jeopardizes:

• the personal safety of former employees;

WARNING NOTICE

INTELLIGENCE SOWRCES

OR METHODS INVOLVED:

CL 0489932

CL REASON: 1.5. (c)

DECL ON: X1

DRV FROM: COV 2-87

SECRET

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## Page 51

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SECRET •

SUBJECT: Memo to JFK Assassination Records Review Board

• the second careers of former employees:.

• the cover and identity of other employees who worked

with the covert employee whose name is released as

CIAi and,

the protection of sources and methods (what

individual would agree to a clandestine relationship

with American intelligence knowing the secret

association would become public knowledge?).

4. Examples of how identifying covert employees as CIA will

affect individuals follows:

• Mr. Walter McCabe retired under Department of State

cover and is currently working in Russia and several

Eastern European countries for a private firm which

converts "wartime" factories into peacetime use.

Revealing his name would damage his relationship

with his current employer, his position with the

firm and would be awkward at best regarding the host

countries. Attachment B is Mr. McCabe' s

acknowledgement that he was aware he would be denied

as a CIA employee and Attachment C is his signed

secreCy agreement.

• Attachment D is a signed ackowledgement from Mr.

John Whitten who retired under cover in 1970 which

shows that he was aware that he would be denied as

an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency from

the date he entered on duty through the date of his

departure. Attachment E is a personal letter

received from Mr. Whitten after he was notified that

his name might be released in connection with

declassification of CIA documents. Attachment E is

Mr. Whitten's signed secrecy agreement.

It should

be noted that Mr. Whitten resides in Austria.

• Attachment G is a Summary of Agency Employment (SAE)

written by Mr. Morton M. Palmer and approved by the

Agency.

Attachment H is a certification by Mr.

Palmer that he will abide by what is contained in

his SAE and understands disclosure of other

information would be in violation of his secrecy

2

SECRET

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## Page 52

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SECRET'

SUBJECT: Memo to JEK Assassination Records Review Board

agreement. Attachment I is Mr. Palmer's signed

secrecy agreement.

It should be noted that Mr.

Palmer resides in Mexico.

5:

Our relationship with cover providers would be

jeopardized if it became publicly known that they were providing

cover to CIA employees.

The Department of State could very well

raise objections to our future use of State cover. Of increasing

importance to the Agency at this time is the critical use of

private sector (nonofficial) cover providers. The private sector

would no doubt drop contact and avoid future dealings with us if

we reveal a covert relationship. Identifying covert

relationships with cover providers would paralyze Agency

operations which in turn could severely damage national security.

In addition, in the past it has exposed CIA to legal liabilities

and substantial monetary damages.

6.

Headquarters Regulation

(HR) 240-1 is the Agency's

regulation on cover.

It states that "cover is required for all

Agency operations,

activities and installations abroad, including

personnel in PCS or TDY status."

HR 240-2, the Agency's

regulation on cover after separation, states that "the

determination that

an employee will retain all or a part of his

or her cover after separation from the Agency will be based upon

the judgment that separation in an overt status could result in

damage to the national security by compromising intelligence

sources, methods, activities, and/or information, or cause harm

to foreign relations.

This determination will be made on a case-

by-case basis."

Please note that all Agency employees who retire

abroad must retire under cover.

7.

Release of names of former employees who separated under

cover will make the entire Agency cover program vulnerable and

detract from our continuing efforts to enhance cover and conduct

sometimes dangerous activities necessary to carry out the '

Agency's mission.

We can

accept the purpose of the JEK

Assassination Records Review Act to declassify documents for

public consumption; however, we submit that the release of true

names of former Agency employees adds no value to the documents

in addition to risking physical harm to these individuals from

our public detractors.

We propose and emphatically encourage

that pseudonyms, aliases or

generic job descriptions such as desk

officer be used in place of true names which would not diminish

the impact of the documents.

3

SECRET

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## Page 53

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SECRET '

SUBJECT: Memo to JEK Assassination Records Review Board

After your review and consideration of the above

information, we would appreciate notification of your final

decision prior to taking any action.

Eric I. Qualkenbush

Attachments:

As stated

above

CONCUR:

Christine W. Wiley

Associate Deputy Director for

Operations/Human Resources

and Programs

DEC 0 8 1995

Date

David N. Edge:

Associate Deputy Director for

Operations

Date.

DEC 1 8 1995

SECRET

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## Page 54

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SECRET'

SUBJECT: Memo to JFK Assassination Records Review Board

DC/OCC/OS3/EMathias:lae/37076 (6 Dec 95)

Distribution:

Orig & 1 - JFK Assassination Records Review Board

1 - IMS/HRS

•1 - ADDO

1 - ADDO/HRP

2 - DDO Secretariat

1 - DO/IRO

1 - OGC/LD - Linda Cipriani

1 - OCC Chron

1 - OCC/OSG Chron

1

-

OCC/OSG

File

785-120-034

SECRET

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## Page 55

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DEC 11 '95 11:14AM

P.1

YER

FAX

Th:

MT. Buiry Eiarxel800

Fax #

(703) 351-2114

Subjects

Deceinher mocding

Date:

December 11, 1995

Pagions

3, Including this cover stoch.

COMMENTS:

The types of Information that the Burd needs to know ebout each of the true names on

the attached list for which CIA seeks continued pratuction are llsted below.

1. Is the individual a current os forner CIA cmplayee? If so, In what capacity

did that individual serve, and did he of she serve overtly or covertly? if

currently a retired CIA employee, did the individual retire under cover?

2 It not a ClA officer, did the Individual serve CLA as an agent or asset or in any

other capacity?

3. Is the individual ailve or dead? Ii alive, where is he or shic residing and Wiral

is his or her current activity?

4. What specific and compelling danger would release of this individual's truc

nanc pose to hion or her at this time?

Of course, you do nnt need to do unything other than identify those individuals whose

true names CIA no longer serks to protect.

- Secret Attachment-

Fram the cook of.

Technical husketund for Runarch and Analych

asastenation Recorda Pontom Boerd

8OO E AMARE, NV, SacoRd Floor

Washdaron, DE. 20430

He 1802) 724-9099

---

## Page 56

By 00000

DEC 11 '95

11:18AM

W.. O'Brien.

104-10017-10042

F.N.U. Patten

104010015-10183

Riefe

104-10016-10006

Bonnie Raush

104-10015-10138

Dave Reardon

104-10095-10001

Milly Rodriguess,

104-10095-10001

Jane Roman

104-10015-10163

Tom Ryan

104-10018-10096

D. W. Schroeder

104-10017-10142

Forrest Shivers

104-10017-10031

Mi. Snight

104-10015-16143

Mr. swanson

104-10015-10233

Swider

104-10015-10298

"P.1

SECREI

Dr. Stanojavic

104-10017-10001

Boria Tarasoli

104-10095-10001

Pelegrin Tomas

104-10018-10062

RT. Walsh

101-10015-10386

(Sams es Mr. Waish in

10410017-100358)

T. Ward

10410007-10257

Franklin Anthony Whoslock Garcia

104-10015-10192

LEiter sicK

104-10017-10456

SECRET

---

## Page 57

13-00000

P.2

ded

SCRET

NAMEY WHICH CIA CONTINUES TO PROTECTIN DOCUMENTS HEPARED FOR

THE DECEMBER 12-13: 1995 ARRA MEETING

Charlotte Alverg

104-10018-100R9

Anderson

104-10095-10001

Ray Bacter

104-10015-10001

Peter Buranowell

10410016-10013

Brogdar

104-10016-10033

Dague 104-10027-10052

Loans Caner

104-10018-10099

Dasinti

104-10018-10062

Dunca 104-10035-10043

DeSanti

104-10018-10062

D'ALATO

108-10015-10305

PL, Dilloa

104-10017-10042

Charike Flick

10410095-10001

Grady

10410015-10043

Godinos

John Harvoy

Willlam Johnson

103-10015-10396

("Johnson" released la 104-10015-

10375)

Jim Jung

104-10017-10002

Tom Kocnan

104-10095-10001

Pam Los

104-10015-10160

Mallery

10410015-10110

Manell

104-10019-10339

Anne Mclonnell

10410015-10155

SECRET

---

## Page 58

13-000,00

SUBJECT:

(Optio

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

ed CIA Name: Release

FROM: Blaine, Mathias

DC/OCC/OSG

6B4403 0HB

EXTENSION

37076

TO: O

DATE

Dec: 95

COMMENTS gime

thom

or dim so hot on mon

from whom

Pleaser call Lisa for hand

ca

sTy at

0X3 2429

suer sunggra

684403 OHE

Cibson

DC/OCC

684401 OHB

3.

¡EricheQualkenbush

C/OCC

6344014OHB

Reends Renes: Bal

DDO:

secretariat

7727

MOHE

DEO 0 7 1995

6. christine, wa

Wiley

ADDO/

4HRP.

40

7 David No Eager

ADDO

10

68440310HB

118

5

610 EF) SERVOUS

EDITIONS

SECREL

---

## Page 59

13-00000

SECRET

OCC-95-149

07 DEC 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR: JFK Assassination Records Review Board

VIA:

Associate Deputy Director for Operations

Associate Deputy Director for Operations/Human

Resources and Programs

FROM:

Eric L. Qualkenbush

Chief, Office of Central Cover

SUBJECT:

Proposed CIA Name Release

1. The Agency strongly objects to the release of names of

individuals presently under cover, whether active employees or

separated employees.

As described below, this action would

breach Agency commitments to these individuals who agreed to work

under cover in addition to breaching our obligations to the cover

providers.

2. Employees sign a secrecy agreement (Attachment A) upon

entering on duty with the Agency. This agreement pledges the

employee's secrecy to information which is classified and has not

been publicly acknowledged by the Agency and requires the

employee to protect such information from unauthorized

disclosure. This secrecy agreement, as long as it remains in

force by mutual agreement, obliges CIA to protect the identities

of Agency employees, our

cover providers and covert activities.

3.

Because this secrecy agreement creates a moral as well

as legal bond between the Agency and the employee, it is Agency

policy to protect the names of former employees who have

separated under cover unless the Agency and the employee mutually

agree to remove the cover. Identifying as CIA those employees

who are mandated by the Agency to use a cover story, i.e.,

Department of State or the "ABC" Corporation, for their entire

Agency career as well as into their years after separation from

the Agency, jeopardizes:

the personal safety of former employees;

WARNING NOTICE

INTELLIGENCE SOURCES

OR METHODS INVOLVED

CL 0489932

CL REASON: 1.5 (c)

DECL ON: X1

DRV FROM: COV 2-87

SECRET

---

## Page 60

13-000,00

SECRET

SUBJECT: Memo to. JFK Assassination Records Review Board

• the second careers of former employees;

• the cover and identity of other employees

who worked

with the covert employee whose name is released as

CIA; and,

• the protection of sources and methods (what

individual would agree to a clandestine relationship

with American intelligence knowing the secret

association would become public knowledge?).

4. Examples of how identifying covert employees as CIA will

affect individuals follows:

• Mr. Walter McCabe retired under Department of State

cover and is currently working in Russia and several

Eastern European countries for a private firm which

converts "wartime" factories into peacetime use.

Revealing his name would damage his relationship

with his current employer, his position with the

firm and would be awkward at best regarding the host

countries. Attachment B is Mr. McCabe's

acknowledgement that he was aware he would be denied

as a CIA employee and Attachment. C is his signed

secrecy agreement.

• Attachment D is a signed ackowledgement from MI.

John Whitten who retired under cover in 1970 which

shows that he

was aware that he would be denied as

an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency from

the date he entered on duty through the date of his

departure. Attachment E is a personal letter

received from Mr. Whitten after he was notified that

his name might be released in connection with

declassification of CIA documents. Attachment E is

Mr. Whitten's signed secrecy agreement.

It should

be noted that Mr. Whitten resides in Austria.

• Attachment G is a Summary of Agency Employment (SAE)

written by Mr. Morton M. Palmer and approved by the

Agency: Attachment H is a certification by Mr.

Palmer that he will abide by what is contained in

his SAE and

understands disclosure of other

information

would be in violation of his secrecy

2

SECRET

---

## Page 61

13-000,00

SECRET

SUBJECT: Memo to JFK Assassination Records Review Board

agreement. Attachment I is Mr. Palmer's signed

secrecy agreement. It should be noted that Mr.

Palmer resides in Mexico.

5.

Our relationship with cover providers would be

jeopardized if it became publicly known that they were providing

cover to CIA employees.

The Department of State could very well

raise objections to our future use of State cover. Of increasing

importance to the Agency at this time is the critical use of

private sector (nonofficial) cover providers.

The private sector

would no doubt drop contact and avoid future dealings with us if

we reveal a covert relationship.

Identifying covert

relationships with cover providers

would paralyze Agency

operations which in turn could severely damage national security.

In addition, in the past it has exposed CIA to legal liabilities

and substantial monetary damages.

6.

Headquarters Regulation (HR) 240-1 is the Agency's

regulation on cover.

It states that "cover is required for all

Agency operations, activitles and installations abroad, including

personnel in PCS or TDY status."

HR 240-2, the Agency's

regulation on cover after separation, states that "the

determination that an employee will retain all or a part of his

or her cover after separation from the Agency will be based upon

Loyee

the judgment that separation in an overt status could result in

damage to the national security by compromising intelligence

sources, methods, activities, and/or information, or cause harm

to foreign relations.

This determination will be made on a case-

by-case basis."

Please note that all

Agency employees who retire

abroad must retire under cover.

• 7. Release of names of former employees who separated under

cover will make the entire Agency cover program vulnerable and

detract from our continuing efforts to enhance cover and conduct

sometimes dangerous activities necessary to carry out the

Agency's mission.

We can accept the purpose of the JEK

Assassination Records Review Act to declassify documents for

public consumption; however, we submit that the release of true

names of former Agency employees adds no value to the documents

in addition to risking physical harm to these individuals from

our public detractors.

We propose and emphatically encourage

that pseudonyms, aliases or generic job descriptions such as desk

officer be used in place of true names which

would not diminish

the impact of the

documents.

3

SECRET

---

## Page 62

13-000.00

SECRET

SUBJECT: Memo to JFK Assassination Records Review Board

8. After your review and consideration of the above.

information, we would appreciate notification of your final

decision prior to taking any action.

Eric L. Qualkenbush

Attachments:

As stated above

CONCUR:

cuil

Associate Deputy Director for

operations/ Human Resources

and Programs

8 Dec'95

Date

Danil Ele

Associate Deputy Director For

Operations

8:

Date

SECRET

---

## Page 63

13-000.00

SECRET

SUBJECT: Memo to JFK Assassination Records Review Board

DC/OCC/OSG/EMathias: lae/37076 (6 Dec 95)

Distribution:

Orig & 1 - JFK Assassination Records Review Board

1 - IMS/HRS

1 - ADDO

1 - ADDO/HRP

2 - DDO Secretariat

1

- DO/IRO

1

- OGC/LD - Linda Cipriani

1

- OCC Chron

1 - OCC/OSG Chron

1 - OCC/OSG File 785-120-034

SECRET

---

## Page 64

13-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

(When Filled In)

SECRECY OATH

John M. Whitten

—am about to ternate Dy aSSOCIatIO:

with the Central Intelligence Agency.

I realize that, by virtue of my dutie:

with that Agency, I have been the recipient of information and intelligence which

concerns the present and future security of the United States of America.. I am

aware that the unauthorized disclosure of such information is prohibited by the

Espionage Laws (18 USC secs. 793 and 794), and by the National Security Act of

1947 which specifically requires the protection of intelligence sources and

methods from unauthorized disclosure. Accordingly, I SOLEMNLY SWEAR, WITHOUT

MENTAL RESERVATION OR PURPOSE: OF EVASION, AND IN THE ABSENCE OF DURESS, AS FOL-

1. I will never divulge, publish, or reveal iy writing, word, conduct, or

otherwise, any information relating to the national defense and security and

particularly information of this nature relating to intelligence sources, meth-

ods and operations, and specifically Central Intelligence Agency operations,

sources, methods, personnel, fiscal data, or security measures to anyone, in-

cluding but not limited to, any future governmental or private employer, private

citizen, or other Government employee or official without the express written

consent of the Director of Central Intelligence or his authorized representative.

2. I have been invited to submit in writing any monetary claims which I

may have against CIA or the United States Government which may in any way neces-

sitate the disclosure of information described herein. I have been advised that

any such claims will receive full legal consideration. In the event, however,

that I am not satisfied with the decisions of CIA concerning any present or

future claims I may submit, I will not take any other action to obtain satis-

faction without prior written notice to CIA, and then only in accordance with

such legal and

security advice as CIA will

promptly furnish me.

3. I do not have any documents or materials in my possession, classified

or unclassified, which are the property of, or in custodial responsibility of

the Central Intelligence Agency, having come into my possession as a result of

my duties with the Central Intelligence Agency, or otherwise.

4. During my exit processing and during my period of employment with the

Central Intelligence Agency I have been given an opportunity to report all in-

formation about the Agency, Its personnel, and its operations which I consider

should receive official cognizance. Hence, I am not aware of any information,

which it is my duty in the national interest to disclose to the Central Intel-

ligence Agency, nor am I aware of any violations or breaches of security which

I have not officially reported, except as set forth on the reverse side of this

sheet or on other attachments.

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM

- 62

305

USE

(12)

---

## Page 65

13-00000

SECREI

SECRECY AGREEMENT

Contra i WIN, undered to y oration and into i co

which concerns the present and future security of the United States and which be-

longs to the United States. This information and intelligence, together with the

methods of collecting and handling it, are classified according to standards set

in the State, War, and Navy Departments.

I have read and understand the pro-

visions of the Act of Congress of June 15, 1917 (Espionage Act), as amended,

concerning the disclosure of information relating to the National Defense ad I

am familiar with the penalties provided for violation thereof.

2. I agree that I do not now, nor shall I ever possess any right, interest,

title or. claim in or to any of the information or intelligence or the methods of

collecting or handling of it which has come or shall come to my attention by

virtue of my connection with the Central Intelligence Group, but shall always

recognize the property right of the United States of America in and to such

mat ters.

3. I do solennly swear that I will never divulge, publish nor reveal either

by word, corduct, or by any other means such classified information, intelligence

or knowledge, except in the perfomance of my official duties and in accordance

with the laws of the United States, unless specifically authorized in writing in

each case by the Director of Central Intelligence.

I understand that no change in my assignnent or employnent will relieve

re of ny obligation under this oath and that the provisions of this oath will

remain binding upon me even after the termination of my services with the United

Stated.

5. I understand that my employment by the Central Intelligence Group is

conditioned upon my understanding of and strict compliance with "Security

Regulations CIG," and the appendices thereto.

I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose

of evasion.

In witness whereof I have set my hand and seal this 22ndday of AUGUST 1947

John. While ca)

Rebecce

My Commission lixpires March 22, 1851

Daucros

SECRET

(711)

---

## Page 66

13-00000

To Bert Mili:

& objit volent,

I the revel stan of very have

regardless of the ler, Sere are some reasous;

forms abret my bakeground. I usad my retired Stale comer

Tirce under Cuestra

and from 1983 X the prest, I have actread lugh

ins i sarisis Musical lodes,

Wth Johan Straws Sirit, and Die President o

Socily, and san person rely

in Accenter 1993.

to exist her becausi

is withings coating distema of 2 post offic, sevent small

ay districe of the concert hath and

the apers. Where canyon diphents this for me?

Icing my

infessed, tat the Us Arn

i thin, for fland me and shot me.

7am sive

4: Sin is pully Selam tervorist: There have

---

## Page 67

13-00000

REFERENCE

Stas in recent years. Under distrain law, 7, as

foreigner, can not eun get a pisted hire. You nonet here

about to kidnaping and hilling of our colleagues

4. I have time testifiel lofar House and fanat

commiter dat Thin the into an e

called-tre The

jound hot an oo-calld tust ariain

name in expired, I will abrawly har

porcheer

He ate i he die then can 3

located.

" wife and s love living here for many reason,

and learing would be a cried and need his fate.

I regard this law as dishonorable and

O you

in it Unite set ge Board and

and new spared myself; in the outfit I worked hard,

pearless in desting with my soprians (Card Meyes

and Dich Helm can testify & that and my adversarin.

I wordst even think of threatering t expose things

I will be employing in attra

I will not deny, that I consider you and

every one else implimentin

i thin cam if the

engegy in distorable condist, unward s

our soon met service,

---

## Page 68

13-00000

& 2 the late 1960's while sering in Teenin under

Terest d Austran Milita, Dittezen that a low.

promise of storey.

priapin can not sarove and wideed should

not survive.

position, fill a strong cald bad me the shamefull

order was retracted.

I have inventid ant $ 5d, 000 in my.

mosty and angrover out. f

last more I Viewin Cast me about $ 15,000 min

sen freight and inserane. I will neve get on my

Brees and ach to be made whole if you expose me,

but I may resort te court, I am a retired

leadto a prond counting's

WI'It when

provide thin it nie el lint a me to

alont 25 year after I WII the Britist.

wer called, and lien the "room conversation,'

"transcripsi

---

## Page 69

13-00000

of to conversatian Pola had i their roomma

wake by bigh ranting obs a

high-ranting fellow"

mansion, Newcomer were veded by the old

in thin than in Ta on thing a

espet the war. Thi excellent britis mites pissed

vetiran association, l

Geschwader, sent people & London & get

biddin that, in acinto readsion, the stin

busmend than that erizon

Corten hide in the

Lashed,

11,

1994 I cras

content made sporm

up and down try

" all Cho musen, with

hare mad it tigressing

he nest serien

diffiend for me a stand up, calli, a even si?

for very lay. In an few days, when its

are her, will beginn

20-weck himcopathic cure t the spasma

under Pr, Schramm, a-

specialist his. I cant very well leare

for Tri, rate.:

---

## Page 70

13-000Q0

Yon will the contacted momental by mif may

Congressm

and Senator.

With bitter resolve,

John D. Which

---

## Page 71

13-00000

•і і

SECRET

RETIREMENT AND RESIGNATION EXIT COVER BRIEFING

NAME (Last, first, middle)

WHiTTen

GRADE

65-16/5

RETIREMENT

RESIGNATION

LWOP

AGENCY JOB TITLE

John Toss

ECURITY

213-12-1338

FORM

DATE(S)

3102

5F -2801

31 July 1970

STAFF OR

DIVISION

FI/OPS

VOUCHERED

FUNDS

AGENCY EOD

CCS FILE NO.

3562

UNVOUCHERED FUNDS

ATTACHED

22 aug 1947

LAST WORKING

DAY

3/ July 70

FROM

aug 47

May 48

Sept 52

Man 55

foot 55

July bo

Mal L2

19 aps 70

CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY INCLUDING OVERT PERIODS (include both domestic and overseas assignments)

DATE

AREA OF ASSIGNMENT

COVER

COUNTAY

may 48

Sept 57

Mar 55

oct 55

Washington

CITY

P, <.

DAL

DAC

18 кр170

vasmugton Die.

vienna.

Vienna

austri, Urenna

Kola

washington, Di<.

Washivigton D.c.=

DAC

DAC

State

state

State

tate

NOMINAL

INTEGRATED

in Froked!

PLACE

MATTER OF RECORD AT (include acknowledgement by OP)

DATE USED

PLACE

DATE USED

No

FORM 2554

5 - 70

PREVIOUS

SECRET

OROUP 1

CLABSTFICATI

(89-12-28)

---

## Page 72

13-00000

SECRET

FUTURE EMPLOYMENT PLAN'S

U.S...orm

OVERSEAS

RETIREMENT

CIVIL SERVICE

CIA

FOREIGN TRAVEL PLANS

Plaus to resdo Vienna, austua

GOVERNMENT

NONGOVERNMENT

OTHER (specily)

SENSITIVE. SPECIAL. OR COVERT SITE

ASSIGNMENTS

LIST RELATIVES EMPLOYED BY CIA

EMPLOYEE HAS NOT BEEN DECLARED OR COMPROMISED

EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN

DECLARED

COMPROMISED

CREDIT BUREAU RECOROS INDICATE

MEDALLION

INTELLIGENCE MEDAL

OTHER (specify)

CIA AWARDS

CERTIFICATE OF DISTINCTION

| LENGTH OF SERVICE CERT.

Hosterd in CES tit

AGENCY NONAGENCY

COVER BRIEFING

ACKNOWLEDGE AGENCY EMPLOYMENT FOR COMPLETE PERIOD OF ASSIGNMENT

DO NOT ACKNOWLEDGE AGENCY EMPLOYMENT, USE INSTRUCTIÓNS AS OUTLINED BELOW

ACKNOWLEDGE PARTIAL AGENCY EMPLOYMENT AS INDICATED BELOW

THE EMPLOYMENT HISTORY ON PAGE 1 IS THE ACTUAL DESCRIPTION OF SERVICE, THE EMPLOYMENT HISTORY BELOW IS THE COVER

STORY CONTRIVED FOR USE AFTER DEPARTURE FROM AGENCY EMPLOYMENT.

DATE

AREA

TYPE

OF

COVER ORGANIZATION

FROM

aug 47

Sept52

mar 55

1ooct55

July 60

JOB TITLE

OF ASSIGNMENT

COVER

Washington

DAC

DAC

mar 55

Oct 55

18 кря 70

14 4p1 70

Washungton

austra

кожі.

castia

-Kolea

wackingter

DAC

DAC

Ant

but

but

GutsECRET

State

State

State

State-

Pol off.

att Pol. Off

Prore at ollar 2-

---

## Page 73

13-00000

SECRET

TYPE MEALTH INSURANCE CARO ISSUED

LIFE INSURANCE

GEHA

NACS

OTHER (specify)

OTHER (apecily)

CONVERT

WILL NOT CONVERT

FEGLI

WAEPA

DEPARTING

EMPLOYEES ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

UBLIC

I acknowledge that I have been briefed by the Central Cover Staff on the date

Denied

noted below and do understand

that I will be

as an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency from the date I entered on duty through

the date of departure in accordance with instructions as outlined above.

I have been informed as to the employment references applicable in my case.

15 JUlie

1970

REMARKS

CCS/OCM

Maces/ocs

COORDINATION

CCs/oco

CCS/NC

SIGNATURE OF COVER OFFICER

Tilleant

FINAL APPROVING AUTHORITY

SECRET

=4-

---

## Page 74

13-00000

SECRET

FAX BRIEFING SUMMARY

N.A.

BANKING INSTRUCTIONS

101

IV

v

N.A

FOLLOW-UP ACTION TO BE TAKEN BY COVER OFFICER

BLOCK RECORDS IN OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

YES

NOTIFY OFFICE OF FINANCE

TO. HANDLE THE CSE

COMPUTATION FORMS IN A COVERT

MANNER FOR BLOCKING RECORDS

AT CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

YES

OBTAIN REFUND OF

cIvIL

SERVICE

RETIREMENT FUNDS IN A COVERT MANNER

YES

RETURN OF CIARD FUNDS FROM CSC

OVERT

APPLICATION TO PURCHASE CSC CREDITS

OVERT

CREDIT UNION QUERRIED

FORWARDING ADDRESS

MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION PERTAINING TO DEPARTING EMPLOYEE

NEW EMPLOYMENT ADDRESS

NO

NO

NO

DATE

DATE

DATE

COVERT

COVERT

YES

NO

IDENTITY AND ADDRESS OF

EMERGENCY CONTACT

IF SUBJECT HAS APPLIED FOR NEW

EMPLOYMENT PRIOR TO CONTACTING

CCS WHAT EMPLOYMENT REFERENCE

DID SUBJECT

USE?

HAS SUBJECT BEEN QUESTIONED

TO

ASSURE HE OR SHE DID NOT USE AGENCY PERSONNEL FOR REFERENCE

SUBJECT

HAS

HAS NOT RETURNED ALL COVER DOCUMENTATION

YES

NO

IDENTIFY DOCUMENTS THAT HAVE NOT BEEN RETURNED.

CONTACT

INSTRUCTIONS

1099 MAILING INSTRUCTIONS

SUMMARY OF

AGENCY EMPLOYMENT

MEDICAL RECORDS

WILL REQUEST

SHOULD NOTICE OF RESIGNATION BE RESTATETED INHOUSE

DATE RECEIVED

DATE APPROVED

WILL NOT REQUEST

SECRET

SOCIAL SECURITY CREDITS

YES

NO

- 3

---

## Page 75

13-00000

70978

SECURITY REMINDER

Walter C. McCabe

Agency, I have been the recipient of classified

information and

information concerning intelligence sources and methods, and

that my Entrance on Duty Secrecy Agreement requires me to pro-

tect such data.

Moreover, I have been given an opportunity to

review my Entrance on Duty Secrecy Agreement.

2. I have also been reminded that I am not permitted to

retain

any documents or other materials which are the property

of the CIA or the custodial responsibility' of CIA, and I affirm

that I do not have in my possession, nor am I taking away from

CIA any such documents or materials.

3. Finally, I am aware of my responsibility to notify the

CIA promptly in the event I am called upon by properly constituted

authorities to testify of provide information that I am pledged

not to disclose and I will advise said authority of my secrecy

agreement and request that my obligation to testify be established

before I am required to do so.

otebuy 23 6 1980

Witness:

Signa tue

29

Date

Jaquead

-Bet. 1980

FORM

5-77.

305

ObSOLETE PREVIOUS

EDITIONS

---

## Page 76

13-00000

SECRECY AGREEMENT

- (print full name), hereby agree to accept as a prior condition of my.

being employed by, or otherwise retained to perform services for, the Central Intelligence Agency, or for staff elements of

the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence (hereinafter collectively referred to as the "Central Intelligence Agency"),

the obligations contained in this agreement.

2. I understand that in the course of my employment or other service with the Central Intelligence Agency I may be

given access to information which is classified in accordance with the standards sel forth in Executive Order 12065 as

amended or superseded, or other applicable Executive Order, and other information which, if disclosed in an unauthorized

manner, would jeopardize foreign intelligence activities of the United States Government. I accept that by being granted

access to such information I will be placed in a position of special confidence and trust and become obligated to protect the

information from unauthorized disclosure.

3. In consideration for being employed or otherwise retained to provide services to the Central Intelligence Agency, I

hereby agree that I will never disclose in any form or any manner any of the following categories of information or

materials. to any person not authorized by the Central Intelligence Agency to receive them:

a. information which is classified pursuant to Executive Order and which I have obtained during the course of my

employment or other service with the Central Intelligence Agency;

b. information, or materials which reveal information, classifiable pursuant to Executive. Order and obtained by me

in the course of my employment or other service with the Central Intelligence Agencs but which, because of

operational circumstance or oversight, is not formally marked as classified in accordance with such Executive Order

and which I know or have reason to know has not been publicly acknowledged by the Agency;

c. information obtained by me in the course of my employment or other service with the Central Intelligence

Agency that identifies ans person or organization that presently has or formerly has had a relationship with a linited

States foreign intelligence organization, which relationship the United States Government has taken affirmative

measures to conceal. :

4. I understand that-the burden will be upon me to learn whether information or materials within my control are

considered by the Central-Intelligence Agency to fit the descriptions set forth in paragraph 3, and whom the Agency has

authorized to receive it.

5. As a further condition of the special confidence and trust reposed in me by the Central Intelligence Agency, I

hereby agree to submit for review by the Central Intelligence Agency all information or materials including works of fiction

which contain any mention of intelligence data or activities, or contain data which may be based upon information

classified pursuant to Executive Order, which I contemplate disclosing publicly or which I have actually prepared for public

disclosure, either during my employment or other service with the Central Intelligence Agencs or at any time thereafter,

prior to discussing it withor showing it to anyone who is not authorized to have access to it. I further agree that I will not

take any steps toward public disclosure until I have received written permission to do so from the Central Intelligence

Agency.

6. I understand that the purpose of the review described in paragraph 5 is to give the Central Intelligence Agency an

opportunity to determines

Whether the information or materials which I contemplate disclosing publicly contain any

information which I have agreed not to disclose. I further understand that the Agency will act upon the materials I submit

and make a response to me vithina reasonable time.

7. I understand thất alinformation or materials which I may acquire in the course of my employment or other service

with the Central Intelligence Agency which fit the descriptions set out in paragraph 3 of this agreement are and will remain

the property of the United States Government. I agree to surrender all materials reflecting such information which may

have come into my possession or for which I am responsible because of my employment or other service with the Central

Intelligence Agency, upon demand by an appropriate official of the Central Intelligence Agency, or upon the conclusion of

my employment or other service with the Central Intelligence Agency.

8. I agree to notify the Central Intelligence Agency immediately in the event that I am called upon by judicial or

congressional authorities to testify about, or provide, information which I have agreed herein not to disclose.

9. I understand that nothing contained in this agreement prohibits me from reporting intelligence activities which I

consider to be unlawful or improper directly to the Intelligence Oversight Board established by the President or to any

successor body which the President may establish. I recognize that there are also established procedures for bringing such

matters to the attention of the Agency! Inspector General or to the Director of Central Intelligence. I further understand

that any information which I may report to the Intelligence Oversight Board continues to be subject to this agreement for all

other purposes and that such reporting does not constitute public disclosure or declassification of that information.

FORM 368

OBSOLETE PREVIOUS

9.79

EDITIONS

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## Page 77

13-00000

RESTRICTED

20978

SECRECY AGREEMENT

1, WALTeR Cassatt Me CarE, underetand that by virtue of my duties in

the Central

Intelligence Agency, I may be the recipient of information and intel-

ligence which concerns the present and future security of the United States and

which belongs to the United States. This information and intelligence, together

with the methods of collecting and handling it, are classified according to

security standards set by the Central Intelligence Agency. I have read and under-

stand the provisions of the Act of Congress of June 15, 1917 (Espionage Act), as

amended, concerning the disclosure of information relating to the National Defense

and I am familiar with the penalties provided for violation thereof.

2.

I agree that I do not now, nor shall I ever possess any right, interest,

title or claim in or to any of the information or intelligence or the methods of

collecting or. handling of it which has come or shall come to my attention by

virtue of my connection with the Central Intelligence Agency, but shall always

recognize the property right of the United States of America In and to such

matters.

3. I do solemnly swear that I will never divulge, publish nor reveal either

by word, conduct, or by any other means such classified information, intelligence

or knowledge, except in the performance of my official duties and in accordance

each case by the Director of Central Intelligence.

4. I understand that no change in my assignment or employment will relieve

me of my obligation under this oath and that the provisions of this oath will

remain binding upon me even after the termination of my services with the United

States.

5. I understand that my employment by the Central Intelligence Agency is

conditioned upon my understanding of and strict compliance with "Security Regula-

tions CIA", and the appendices thereto.

6. I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or pur-

pose of evasion.

In witness whereot I have set my hand and seal this Lay or Febavary 19'53

Witnessed

by me thie / 6 a.

Walter Molate

_(Seal)

day of 2r6.

. 1953

at

WASHINGTON, D. C.

Rehecca D. Vaughan

FORM

ост.

1950.

ґ8-j9

RESTRICTED

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## Page 78

13-00000

SECRET

KH

RETIREMENT AND RESIGNATION EXIT COVER BRIEFING

1E (Last, First. Middle)

R-9274

Me. CAbe, Walter

EMPLOYEE NO.

20

ADE & STEP

august

28

61360

• SECURITY NUMBER

AGENCY EOD

S15

445-20-9032

167eh 53

X

RETIREMENT

RESIGNATION

FUTURE EMPLOYMENT PLANS

u.s.

OVERSEAS

BEIGN TRAVEL PLANS

ToY's to Western Everpe) -- on contract -

STAFF

CONTRACT

OVERT

"TAFF OR DIVISION

DDO/PCS

COVERT

cr.';

6353

SFPARATICit

DATE

2/29/80

MATERNITY

LEAVE

LAST

WORKING DAY

2/29/50

L.WOP

MATE OF DETURN

DATE DIE:

GOVERVAENT

= Contrait

NONGDVERNMENT

VSITIVE, SPECIAL. OR COVERT SITE ASSIINMENTS

EMPLOYEE HAS NOT BEEN DECLARED'OR COMPROMISED

EMPLOYEE HAS "BEEN

DECLARED

BACKSTOPPING IS NECESSARY CIVE

REASON

COMPROMISED (specify)

COVER BRIEFING

ACKNOWLEDGE AGENCY EMPLOYMENT FOR COMPLETE PERIOD OF ASSIGNMENT

DO NOT ACKNOWLEDGE AGENCY EMPLOYMENT, FOLLOW INSTRUCTIONS OUTLINED BELOW

ACKNOWLEDGE PARTIAL AGENCY EMPLOYMENT AS INDICATED BELON

'E EMPLOYMENT HISTORY BELOW IS THE COVER STORY CONTRIVED FOR USE AFTER SEPARATION FROM THE AGENCY.

DATE

FROM

AREA

OF ASSIGNMENT

TYPE OF

COVER

COVER ORGANIZATION

JOR TITLE

Ich 53

Lug 44

2uq 64

State

2554.

USE

PREVIOUS

EDITIONS

1109-12-211

SECRET WNSISM

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: 011180

---

## Page 79

13-00000

..

SECRET

FOLLOW-UP ACTION TO BE TAKEN BY COVER

OFFICER

BLOCK RECORDS IN OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

YES

GLÜCK CREDIT RECORDS

YES

BLOCK TELEPHONE LOCATOR RECORDS

¡YES

X.

NO

NO

NO

EFFECTIVE DATE

•EOD

EFFECTIV

DATE

EOD

PREPARE

ISSUE .I.D. CARD

W. 2. FORM

TYPE: STAti

MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION PERTAINING TO DEPARTING EMPLOYEE

IF EMPLOYEE HAS APPLIED FOR NET EMPLOYMENT PRIOR TO CONTACTING COS WHAT EMPLOYMENT REFERENCE WAS USEDY

COD

HOSPITALIZATION INS. CARD

AGE

SUBJECT

HAS

;.AS

NOT

RETURNED ALL COVER DOCUMENTATION. IDENTIFY DOCUMENTS THAT HAVE NOT BEEN RETURNED.

RELATIVES EMPLOYED BY CIA (name

and

relationship)

disse:

DEPARTING EMPLOYEES ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I certify that I have been briefed by the Central Cover Staff on this date and I

understand that:

_ I will be acknowledged as an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency in

accordance with the instructions set forth in the Cover Briefing Section above:

X I will not be acknowledged as an employee of the Central Intelligence

Agency.

I have been informed of the employment references applicable in my case.

1980

REMARKS

DATE/

SIGNATURE

ID #189485,

JAE: 'S 70680

9-11-78. elp 1885-

Retriment addrioo!

i total ado

2401 'H" ST, NEU

Wask, De

on contract

Jils: IPC

CEnco 3-03-80

COORDINATION

CCS/ CCB

CCS/ OCB/M

CCS/DFB

CCS/OCB/S

NAME AND SIGNATURE OF COVER OFFICER

Jutiy Hill

CCS/COB

CCS/CS8

COMPONENT

CCS/ET

DATE

2-25-80

SECRET

---

## Page 80

13-00000

•DEC 07 '95 11:54AM

SECRECY AGREEMENT

P. 3/3

1. I, —

_ (print full name), hereby agree to accept as a prior condition of my

being employed by, or otherwise retained to perform services for, the Central Intelligence Agency, or for staff elements of the

Director of Central Intelligence (hereinafter collectively referred lo as the "Central Intelligence Agency"), the obligations

contained in this agreement.

2. I understand that in the course of my employment or other service with the Central Intelligence Agency I may be

given access to information or material that is classified or is in the process of a classification determination in accordance

with the standards ser forth in Executive Order 12356 as amended or superseded, or other applicable Executive order, that if

disclosed in an unauthorized manner would jeopardize intelligence activities of the United States Govemment. I accept that by

being granted access to such information or material I will be placed in a position of special confidence and trust and become

obligated to protect the information and/or material from unauthorized disclosure.

3. In consideration for being employed or ocherise fptaing ta,provide services to the Central Intelligence Agency, I

hereby agree that i will never disclose in any form or anymanner, to ady person nor authorized by the Central Intelligence.

Agency to receive it, any information or material in either of the following categories:

a. information or material received or obtained in the course of my employment or other service with the Central

Intelligence Agency that is marked as classitied or that I knew is classilled;

b. information or material received or obtained in the course of my employment or other service with the Central

Intelligence Agency that I know is in the process of a classificarion determination.

4. I understand that it is my responsibility to consult with appropriate management

Directorate that employs me or hasverained my services, or with the Central Intelligence A

it l am no longer employed by or associated with the Agency, in order to ensure that 1 la

within my knowledge or control tharl

pake reason to believe might be in either of

considered by the Central Intelligence

o fit in either of those categorie

uthorities in the component or

y's Publications Review Board

lether information or material

sories ser forth in paragraph 3 is

whom the Agerty has authorized to

receive such information or maseria

5. As a further condition of the special

ace and trust repo

me by the Centra-mtelligence Agency, I here-

by agree to submit for review by the Central Int

спос мердсу

18 or pthey preparation in any forn, including a

work of fiction, which contains any mention oninell

gr contairs any other information or material that

might be based upon either of the Categories set forth in paragraph 3, ther, contemple disclong publicly or that 1 have

actually prepared for public disclecure, sithey during my employmender other service wich the Central Intelligence Agency of

at any time thereafter, prior ip discussing it with or shows a si

set forth in paragraph 3. I further agree than will nor take any steps toward public

disgrosure entil I have received written

permission lo do soil

oaf the Centals

ence Agency.

6. I unde!

opportunity to

or marenal that !

response to me

thas the informa:

sources. My failure

whether the information or material that I contemplate

Ve the Central Intolkgence Agency an

esther do some further were the copter ey let upbely yan toy in mation

reasonable sime. Flusher understand that if I dispure the agency's initial determmation on the basis

may be called upon to

crycally identify such

so may byitsel result in denial of permission la publish or other

disclose the information

or marenial in dispina

7. I understand th

or materal thar saay geome In

its coursel

aproyment of other service with

syrigt his either of the palegories ser forth in paragraph

ints agreement are and will remain

he property of the United 'Stares Government unless and ant otherwise determi

appropriare official or tinal ruling

of a court of law. I agree to surrender anything consticuting, containing or reflecting rech

formation or material upon demand

by an appropriate official of the Central mtelligence Agency, or upon the conclusion of my employment or other service witk

the Central Intelligence Agency.

8. I agree to notify the Central Intelligence Agency immediately in the event thar I am called upon by judicial or con-

gressional authorities, or by specially established investigatory bodies of the executive branch, to testify about, or provide, in-

formation or material that I have agreed herein nor to disclose. In any communication with any such authority or body, I shall

observe all applicable rules or procedures for ensuring that such information and/or material is handled in a secure manner.

9. I understand that nothing contained in this agreement prohibits me from reporting intelligence activities that I con-

sider to be unlawful or improper directly to the Intelligence Oversighs Board established by the Presidene, or to any successor

body shas the President may establish, or to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives or the Senate.

I recognize that there are also established procedures for bringing such matters to the atention of the Agency's Inspector

General or to the Director of Central Intelligence. In making any repors referred to in this paragraph, I will observe all applicable

rules or procedures for ensuring the secure handling of any information or material that may be involved. I understand that

any such information or material continues to be subject to this agreement for all other purposes and that such reporting does

nor constitute public disclosure or deciassification of that information or material.

100t 368

10-91

EDITIONS PREVIOUS

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## Page 81

13-00000.

•DEC UP YS II:SUHM

'10. I understand chat any breach of this agreement by me may result in the Central Intelligence Agency taking admin-

"strative action against me, which can include temporary loss of pay or termination of my employment or other service with

the Central Intelligence Agency. I also understand that if I violate the terms of this agreement, the United States Government

may institute a civil proceeding to seck compensatory damages or other appropriate relief. Further, I understand that the

disclosure of information that I have agreed herein not to disclose can. in some circumstances, constitute a criminal offense.

11. I understand that the United States Govemment may, prior to any unauthorized disclosure that is threatened by me.

choose to apply to any appropriate court for an order enforcing this agreement. Nothing in this agreement constitutes a waiver.

on the part of the United States to institute a civil or criminal proceeding for any breach of this agreement by me. Nothing in

this agreement constitutes a wavier on my part of any possible defenses I may have in connection with either civil or criminal

proceedings that may be brought against me.

12. In addition to any other remedy to which the United States Government may become entitled, I hereby assign to she

United States Government all rights, title, and interest in any and all royalties, remunerations, and emoluments that have resulted

or will result or may result from any divulgence, publication or revelation of information or marerial by me that is carried our

In breach of paragraph 5 of this agreement or that involves information or material prohibited from disclosure by the terms of

this agreement.

13. I understand and accept that unless I am provided a wristen release from this agreement or any portion of it by the

Director of Central Intelligence, or the Director's representative, all the conditions and obligations accepted by me in this agree-

ment apply both during my employment or other service with the Central Intelligence Agency, and at all times thereafter.

14. I understand that the purpose of this agreement is to implement the responsibilities of the Director of Central Intel-

ligence, particularly the responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods, as specified in the National Security Act of

1947, as amended.

15. These restrictions are consistent with and do not supersede conflict with or otherwise alter the employee obligations.

rights or liabilities created by Executive Order 12356; section 7211 of title S, United States Code (governing disclosures 10

36, seton T211 of lice

Congress); section 1034 of title 10, United States Code, as amended by the Military Whistleblower Protection Act (governing

disclosure to Congress by members of the Military): section 2302(b)(8) of title 3, United States Code, as amended by the

Whistleblower Protection Act (governing disclosures of illegality, waste, fraud, abuse of public health or safery threats); the

Intelligence Identities Protecdon Act of 1982 (S0 U.S.C., 421 er seg.) (governing disclosures that could expose confidential

Goverment agents), and the starutes. which protect against disclosure that may compromise the national security, including

section 641, 793, 794, 798, and 952 of title 18, United Scates Code, and section 4(b) of the Subversive Activides Act of 1950

(50 U.S.C. section 783(b)). The definitions, requirements, obligations, rights, sanctions and liabilides created by said Executive

Order and listed statutes are incorporated into this Agreement and are controlling.

; 16. I understand that nothing in this agreement limits or otherwise affecis any provision of criminal or other law that

may be applicable to the unauthorized disclosure of classified information, including the espionage laws (sections 793, 794 and

798 of Ticle 18, United States Code) and she Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982 (P.L. 97-200; 50 U.S.C. 421 es

seq.).

17. Each of the numbered paragraphs and lettered subparagraphs of this agreement is severable. If a court should find

any of the paragraphs or subparagraphs of this agreement to be unenforceable. I understand that all remaining provisions will

continue in full force.

18. I make this agreement in good faith, and with no purpose of evasion.

19. This agreement shall be interpreted under and in conformance with the law of the United States.

Signature

Date

The execution of this agreement was witnessed by the undersigned, who accepted it on behalf of the Central Intelligence

Agency as a prior condition of the employment or other service of the person whose signature appears above.

WITNESS AND ACCEPTANCE:

Signature

Printed Name

Dare

---