MEMO: COMMENTS ON HSCA REPORT
Agency: CIA
Originator: CIA
From: BRECKINRIDGE. PRINC. COORD., HSCA
To: MULTIPLE ADDRESSEES
Document date: 06/22/1979
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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1104-10320-10121

22 JUN 1979

04679-05802

4-22-29

AURORANDU! FOR:

FROM

SUBJECT

Jack Sullivan,

sednaoui,

Dale Sumption,

Doris Haudescholdt,

Rodger Gabrielson,

Richard Rininger, OGC

S. D. Breckinridge

Principal Coordinator, HSCA

: Comments on ASCA Report

Attached are conments on selected aspects of the

ASCA Report.

which we have reviewed in printed proofs.

It is requested that you review thenana be prepared

9:00 a.m. on Wednesday

connent at a meeting to be held bravit be appreciated it

27 June 1979, in room

you would obtain an official position iron your owr

component so we can be

sure that the results can be

as the agency views.

/s! S. D. Breckinridge

S. D. Breckinridge

Actachment

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I

Horking Arrangements for the Warren Commission Investigation

The HSCA Report fails to describe the working arrangements

for the conduct of the Warren Commission inquiry. Such an

understanding is basic to any interpretation of what did and

did not happen during the inguiry.

Following the assassination of President Kennedy, President

Johnson designated the Federal Bureau of Investigation as

the principal investigative arm of the Government to investigate the

assassination:

This was a logical step as the Bureau had

the largest body of trained investigators. The role of the

Bureau continued in this respect during the Warren Commission

inquiry.

The Commission, which had a nuch smaller staff,

relied extensively on the Bureau for the exhaustive investigation

that was conducted.

As testified to by Mi. Helms, as cited in the HSCA

Report, CIA considered Itself responsive to Warren Commission

initiatives. In addition to Mr. Helms' testimony, however,

the record shows that CIA took a number of initiativen on

its

own in collecting information and reporting directly to

the Commission. Consistent with the understood arrangements

of the time, howevar, CIA reported the detailed information

that it had to the FBI in the latter's role aspinvestigative

arm of the Warren Commission

This involved both quality

reporting and a great dross of material that ordinarily

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might not be considered worth

reporting. À consideration raised

here is that intelligence analysts

routinely winnow out

useless and

marginal reports to

avoid

flooding the recipients

with unevaluated trash. That the HSCA has taken issue with

so few instances

of non-disseminated material indicates that

the practice worked well in the course of the Warren Commission

inquiry. IIn this respect the FBI and the CIA worked closely

together.] There are a number of instances in which initlad

reporting by CIA was the subject of an investigative follow

up by the Bureau, just as CIA responded to Bureau requests.

This constituted something of a team operation, providing

the available information at that time to the Warren Commission.

HSCA investigators seem to have treated the work of the

Bureau and CIA

as separate from one another. /criticizing CIA

for not conducting investigations that obviously were conducted.

by the FBI.

As testified to by the Deputy Director of Central

Intelligence, in his testimony before the HSCA, CIA is not

an investigative agency in the usual sense of the term.

While it does collect information abroad, its

sources

are

carefully selected for their potential access to very specialized

and sharply focused subject matter.

Those resouices are not

readily subject to redirection fox the purpose of police

type investigations. Further, CIA's representatives abroad

are under cover and should not expose their true identity by

enga 2g is the sual polica-type investigative techniques.

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They can seek assistance from those police and security

1250/ rectoragons

organizations where existing arrangements permita lout

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in any general polies type investigation they are limited by

cover, training und resources. LAs a result) There were a

number of instances in which CIA reports of information

possibly related to the assassination of President Kennedy

were actually investigated by FBI personnel assigned to the

established

location for

for at Inquiry This working arrangement and the

results, is overlooked in some of the treatment by the ESCA

Report.

While the HSCA did consider the question of how such an

inquiry should be conducted in the future, there seemed to be a

tendency to treat the Warren Cormission inquiry the way HSCA

staff investigators felt it should have been

done instead of how

it was done under the arrangements actually in effect at the time.

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II

Comments on Findings of the Committee

At page 12 in the Findings and Recommendations of

the Committee, Section I, D.4., there is a stark statement

that dIA "was deficient in its collection and sharing of

information both prior to and

subsequent to the assassination."

The unqualified nature of that finding conveys impressions

that are subject to disagreement. The Committee

is

entitled

to its conclusions, but by the same token, the Agency is

entitled

to express its reservations about them.

For instance

as a comment at this point, what CIA coula be expected to do

prior to the assassination is an interesting question in

itself, which the stark statement handles simplistically.

The fact is that CIA had no advance information of any

sort

on the assassination of President Kennedy in Dallas.

At page 24 of the Report, in the Section discussing the

structure of the investigation, the Committee observes that

its access

"was unprecedented by any congressional committee."

Of course, the permanent oversight committees, which have

institutionalized security procedures, have similar access

It is moré correct to say that no special investigative

committee has had similar access in the past.

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ITI

Comments on losenko

At page 8G the HSCA Report observes that "strangely,

while (Nosenko) was interrogated during this period (1964-

1968) he was questioned very little about Oswald.":

Without

defending the mistreatment of Nosenko or the mistakes in the

handling of his case, this aspect has an easily understandable

rationale, which was offered to the Comnittee.

As the

Committee omitted reference to it, it is repeated here.

One of the problems with what Nosenko said had arisen

out of inconsistencies as to what he knew about Oswald,

complicated by the question as to whether he was a bona-fide

defector or a dispatched agent.

It was not judged profitable

to belabor the Oswald issue and the decision was

taken to

try to resolve the question as to whether or not he was a

bona-fide defector..

If he was determined to be a bona-fide

defector, then the significance of his inconsistent statements

was reduced to the question of the reliability of what any

defector says in the early days of his defection. If, he was

determined to not be a bona-fide defector, then the significance

of those inconsistencies would assume major proportions.

The problem was reported to Chief Justice Warren at the

time and as the question was not resolved during the warren

Connission inquiry, Nosenko's testimony was not used.

Had it been used it would have tended to reinforce the

findings of the Warren Commission that there was no evidence

of Soviet involvement.

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IV

Comments on AMLASH

At pagés: 89-94 the HSCA Report discusses

what is

known as the AMLASH operation. It also discusses a study

written in CIA in 1977 referred to in the ISCA Report as

the CIA Task Force Report. First, there are certain things

that should

be understood about the AMLASH operation. While

the HSCA investigators read the 1977 CIA Task Force Report,

they

apparently did not appreciate a key consideration to

now the operation

was

handled during the life of President

Kennedy:

Both the Eisenhower and the Kennedy Administrations had

major programs aired at the overthrow of Fidel Castro's

governnent. Not only did this involve support of the Bay of

Pigs invasion attempt, it Involved economic and political

sanctions and government-wide programs directed at subversion

and clandestine

activities in Cuba. It was in this context

that AMLASH/1, as one of a number of Cubans, was contacted

to ascertain his attitude.

He stated his opposition to

Castro, and his willingness to try to mount a coup against

him. The reaction of CIA was that, because of the important

position held by the man in the Castro government, he represented

a contact with considerable potential, which should be exploited

if possible. However, the assessment of the man was that he

was not stable and not subject to discipline of the sort

required for a recruited agent.

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The decision we. "aken that the man could not be dealt

with as a principal agent and

that an attempt would have to

be made

to

Find

someone in his organization with whom the

necessary agent relationship could be established. The

problem thus became one of how to maintain the contact with

a man who claimed to have the organization and weaponry to

carry out a coup, while at the same time developing a way of

taking advantage of whatever eventuated.

The record is unequivocal in the conditional approach

that was settled

upon for dealing with the man. He would be

told

that he would be

given no advance support and that only

if he succeeded in

a coup

would he receive support. This

position

was given him on 29. October 1963. Subsequent reporting

FION FBI

and CIA sources made it clear that the man understood

that he had been rebuffed

and that he was outraged.

It was

clear that if CIA did not want to loose the contact, which

had as yet to be developed into anything tangible, steps

had to be taken to mollify him... AMLASH/1 was asked to have a

meeting with a CIA representative. A CIA case officer travelled

to europe, arriving the morning of 3 November 1963 and was 2a floss

meeting

with AMLASH, possibly at the time of the

assassillation

of the President:

The purpose of this summary is simply to point out the

tenuous

nature of the relationship of AMLASH/1 during the

life of the President. This tenuous quality was deliberately

because of the assessment of the ability of the Agency to work with

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the man. As a matter of fact, the Agency never did develop

a firm relationship with the man although it did

provide

what was intended to appear to him as tokens of its

support

in the form of weapons..

Consistent with its original assessment of the man, CIA

put AMLASH in touch with a Cuban exile leader, with whom

the Agency had a viable operational relationship. It was

hoped that through the Cuban exile leader and his organization

AMLASH/1 might come to fit into some future plan.

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1977 CIA Task Force Report

At pages 90-92, the ESCA Report misrepresents the 1977

CIA Task Force Report.

As stated in the HSCA Report, CIA responded to Book V

of the Church Committee Report by conducting an internal

inquiry. Essentially, the key consideration, so far as this

internal.

inquiry was concerned, was the significance of what

has come to be known as the "provocation theory, " i.e., CIA

plotted the assassination of Castro, Castro might have

learned of it, he might have dispatched

assassins to kill

President Kennedy in retaliation. As the provocation theory

apolied

especially to Cuba, the focus of the study was on CIA's

Cuban operations.

The provocation theory had not been perceived in 1964

during the Warren Commission investigation. The various

aspects of

the tensions between the Kennedy Administration

and the Castro Regime were recognized in

a broad sense as

possibly giving cause to extreme action by Castro against

the President. However, that specific operatione might have

a more specific effect simply was, not conceived at that

time. ' In fact, the HSCA: Report states that the provocation

theory was

first advanced

in 1967 by members of the criminal

syndicate. While CIA might be faulted for not perceiving

the provocation theory

in this form earlier, the fact is

that it did not. In any event, the concept is still a

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Statements to the effect that CIA "withheld" information

on specific operations directed

against Castro have the

connotation of a deliberate suppression of the information.

If one is to accept the HSCA conclusion that the concept was

not developed until 1967, then objective fairness would

require a modification of the characterization

accorded

the

absence of reporting.

The 1977

Task Force Report accepted

in principle the

hypothesis of

the provocation. theory. The report states, as

cited in the HSCA Report, that CIA should have taken broader

initiative than it did. Contrary to the HSCA

Report, however,

the CIA Task Force Report did not fail to say what should be

done, What it did was to undertake what was not done in

1964. It reviewed all Cuban operations

for any reference

to allegations of assassination plotting, or that night have

specially provocative aspect, There are many pages of

discussion of

instances /of reports found in the files

assassination plotting, the persons who were involved, and

what relationship

if any, CIA had with them.

Bach

was followed

with an evaluation as to whether it could have provoked a

retalitory attack on President Kennedy. This extensive

discussion was

seen by several members of the ASCA staff,

but apparently not by the author of the section of the ASCA

Report where it is said that CIA did not say what should

have been done about

it. This

assertion

in the HSCA Report

in error.

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At page 91 the HSCA Report makes the following statement:

"The '1977 Task Force Report'. reviewed the question

of Agency operations directed at Cuba, including, in

particular, the Mafia and AMLASH

plots. In every area

the report concluded that the Agency's 1963-1964 investigation

was adequate and could not be faulted, even with the.

benefit of hindsight.

The Task Force uncritically

accepted the Senate Committee's conclusions where they

favorable to the Agency, and critically rejected

the Senate Committee's conclusions, as in the case of

AMLASH, whenever some possible investigative oversight

was suggested."

In the first place,.

this is not what the 1977 Task

Force Report did, It took the provocation theory seriously

and as noted, reviewed all those activities that could be

identified with the plotting of assassination of Castro.

CIA already knew the limited character of the relationship

with AMLASH/1 and the difficulties in dealing with him that

led to the tenuous nature of the relationship. The report

specifically noted that the AMLASH operation was a particularly

bad example to support the provocation theory, It treated it

In detail because a third of the pages in Book Vof the Senate

Report dealt with it..

The position of the 1977 Task Force

Report was that the operation with the syndicate would have

been a better case because there was a plan to assassinate

Castro, as distinguished from the AMLASH operation. In fact,

that view was stated to the Church Cormittee members concerned

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with Book V of its final report at the time Book V was in

draft. The 1977 Task Force Report

specifically records that

view. (See comments concerning page 97 of ESCA Report-)

The 1977 CIA Task Force Report,

after presenting its critique

of the relevance of the AMLASH operation to the provocation theory,

made the following statement concerning

the significance of

its analysis:

"The result this has on the present comment

on the ssc Final

Report may

seem

anomalous. It

places CIA in the position of contesting the

interpretation given the AMLASH operation in the

SSC Final Report, and

to

that extent the thesis that the

presentation was supposed to support. At the same

time, however, we are inclined to acknowledge in

principle the possibility--not seriously considered

as a likelihood during the Warren Commission inguiry

that other operations could have suffered the

defects attributed to the AMLASH operation by the

SSC Report. In protesting the presentation in one

instance, and the specific conclusions it seeks to

support, the effect is to disagree with a substantial

portion

of the report as written.

on the other

hand we tend to not contest a general thesis that

more specific attention could have been given by the

Warren Commission to the anti-Castro programs of the

U.S. Government,

including CIA activities."

The thrust

öf the Task Force Report is at material variance

from the ISCA. characterization.of

it.

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VI

Miami

Page 92 of the HSCA Report states that the 1977 Task

Force Report made no inquiry into what was done in the

Florida Station, In fact, the 1977 Task Force Report specifically

described the frenetic and intensive

activity there in

connection with the

investigation following the

assassination

of President Kennedy.

The statement that the 1977 Task Force Report failed to

document or even discuss the details of efforts, or the

responses ef stations to CIA headguarters, is in error. There

is an

entire section in the Report devoted to intelligence

reporting

disseminated

to the intelligence community following

the death

of President Kennedy and during the investigation

of the Warren Commission, In addition, there is a section of

several pages

discussing the general nature of investigations

in the field, and reporting back from the field, with selected

examples of that reporting...

There is separate treatment of

information from Mexico City, where Oswald had visited. The

ESCA Report ignores (or the HSCA staff ignored) the detailed

presentation in the 1977 Task Force Report.

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VII

The 1977. CIA Task Force Report on the Mafia Plot

At page 97 of the HSCA Report the statement appears that

CIA, with the Senate report, held that the plot with the Mafia

was irrelevant to the inquiry into President Kennedy's assassination.

This miscepresents the Task Force Report and CIA's actual

view of the matter:

As stated cls-there, it was felt that the AILASH opecation

was irrelevant to the investigation, simply because the

relationship with AHLASH had not materialized into anything

involving commitments or agreements during President Kennedy's

life. However, in the context of the provocation theory,

CIA felt that the operation involving the criminal syndicate

cane closer to filling the bill. It contained an actual plot,

a missing ingredient in the AMLASH operation. Representations

to this effect were made to the Church Committee subcommittee

that prepared Book V of the Church Committee Final Report. The

1977 CIA Task Force Report contains the following statement:

"This viewpoint (that the AMLASH operation was

irrelevant) was conveyed to the Subcommittee prior to

publication of the report. At the same time It was

observed that theoretically there was greater

possibility of leaks from the earlier operations

involving the criminal underworld, although there was no

known evidence of such leaks, While general, rather than

specific, this could have provided more reasonable support

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for the Subcommittee's view

that there were CIA operations

that

should have

been reported to the Warren Commission.

The SSC Subcommittee

saw otherwise...."

Further, the 1977 CIA Task Force Report engaged

sin

considerable discussion of the Mafia plots, which, interestingly

enough, seems to have been adopted in toto by the discussion in

the RSCA report, although

the HSCA report would lead one to

believe there is no such treatment.

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VIII

Gilberto Policarpo Lopez

At page 98 of the HSCA Report there is a discussion of

a man named Gilberto Policarpo Lopez,

an American citizen of

Cuban extraction. This man who, flew, to Havanna on 27 November.

CIA reported on the man's flight, and then over the succeeding

days reported

additional information concerning his travel

through Mexico and his departure.. This information was

passed, to the FBI. Under the arrangements at the time, the

FBI conducted extensive investigations. of the man in

the United

States. CIA had no investigative resources in Cuba, and

with the exception of interviewing

a refugee from Cuba who

knew something about Lopez it was unable to add to its earlier

reporting.

The confusion in this particular case arises out of a

report sone months after the man's departure from Mexico.

It was filled with erroneous detail on facts already reported

accurately, and clearly was a report that could not be

accorded any validity. The report was not disseminated

because of this, although a CIA cable addressed

to the

reporting source in the field, made the mistaken comment

that the information jibed with that already available.

Quite frankly, that cable was in error. There was no reason

to do anything further. The decision against its dissemination

at that time remains valid today.

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IX

Luisa Calderon

At pages 1-2 DII-PATS, the HSCA report discusses

information concering a Cuban employee by the name of zuisa

Calderon. This discussion is based on a memorandum written

in 1975 by a CIA employee for the Rockefeller Commission,

It cites a field report of a conversation that calderon had

taken place some five hours after the assassination of

President Kennedy which quotes her as stating "I knew almost

before Kennedy"" (emphasis added) ,

On the basis of this the HSCA perceives it

as possible

that the statement constitutes an indication of foreknowledge

of the assassination of President Kennedy on the part of

Calderon.

the HSCA Report does not discuss the full information

about the Calderon conversation.

The quotation tael

isne

"knew" was based on an incorrect translation whereby the

more positive "knew" should have appeared as "learned."

Further, and to put the entire conversation into perspective,

she also said that

she had just learned of it, i.e-y five hours

later.

The ISCA treatment of this subject is based on a memorandum

by a CIA employee, in turn stimulated by an unverified mistranslation.

It also omits those elements of the reported conversation

that place the comment in context, removing the inference placed

on the mistranslation.

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the evolution of thissection of the HSCA Report is

interesting to the extent that it reveals attitudes on the

part of the HSCA Staff.: Calderon had suspected DGI (Cuban

intelligence service) connections. An early ESCA draft

report alleged that CIA withheld this information from the

Warren Cormission, This was joined with a presentation that

tried to make Calderon out as a CIA agent.

the heavy implication

of CIA deception was unconcealed.:.

As the

evidence proving

that these statements were untrue was brought. forward, they

had to be dropped, not without reluctance.

Alt that was

loft of the original dramatic presentation was a mistranslation

that omits qualifying facts-

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Elena Garro

At page 3, DII-PATS there is treatment of statements by

Elena Garro. Information concerning statements by this

person about Oswald's 1963 visit to Mexico City, came into

the possession of CIA in late 1964, after the Warren Commission

report had gone to press. It was duly reported to the FBI.

It is correct to say that there was a

tendency to discount

the source, but CIA had no direct access to the person in

question. It is observed that Footnote 16 at the bottom of

page 3 makes

it obvious that CIA did collect some information

on the subject although

the body of the text suggests

that

it did not. Under the arrangements at the time, FBI headguarters

received additional information on the subject.

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Alleged Refusal of CIA to Make Available Sources In Mexico

At page 3, DII-PATS, Footnote 15, the HSCA Report states

that the "Committee's investigation in Mexico City was further

inhibited by the refusal of the CIA to make available its

sources on the Elena Garto allegation."

This statement is incorrect. CIA had no influence over

the persons in question (they were not established or controlled

contacts) and the Connittee had to rely on Mexican authorities

who, also, labored under difficulties in locating or compelling

contacts by its citizens or resídents. The Committee was made

aware of this, and this misstatement is despite information

to the contrary.

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XII

Contreras Allegations

At page 4, DII-PATS, at footnote 17, the HSCA Report states

that

"(t) Contreras story . . . was not

adequately pursued when it first came

to the attention of CIA". Contreras alleged that he met Oswald during

his visit to Mexico in 1963. The Contreras allegation vas

first reported

by the American Consul

in Tampico, Mexico, in May 1967, two and a half

years after the conclusion of the Warren Conmission investigation. CIA

representatives interviewed Contreras in June 1967. It was felt inappro-

priate for CIA to be further involved directly, and the Agency recommended

that additional inquiry be conducted by Mexican authorities. CIA

disseminated the information from its interview, as it did with the

report by Mexican authorities.

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XILI

Maurice (Morris) Bishop

At pages 11-13, DII-PATS, the HSCA Report discusses a man by the.

name of Antonio Veciana, Bland and a man named Maurice Bishop with whom

he says he had contact. Veciana was involved with a Cuban exile group

called ALPHA-66. Veciana E

atate le fisce he knew the man for aver 13

years and that be met with the man on over 100 occasions. The HSCA

tried to establish the identity of this man Bishop, and nis organizational

affiliation. The HSCA was concerned that he might be from CIA and the

Report leaves the question somewhat up in the air.

CIA has

There is a very specific requirement for review and approval of

continuing operational contact

and ef recruitment of agents. A record

on this is required to be maintained in detail. Obviously impromptu and

one-time contacts may not be subject to such a controlled procedure, but

even those usually are reported. There is no way that a CIA employee

would have had operational contacts with a man such as Veciana, in the

way described by him, without there being a rather full record of it,

from approval of the relationship through detailed reports on it. Not

only would this be in operational files, but it would be in financial

records.: Any involvement with his organization would be similarly minan da?

recorded.

Above and beyond this there would have been some record of a man

with the name Maurice (Morris) Bishop, if he were from CIA. CIA never

had an employee by that name nor has any of its employees ever received

approval to use

such a name as

an alias or a pseudonym. Additionally,

Veciana's organization, ALPHA-66, was not one of those organizations

supported by the CIA.

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walt ti

Maurice (Morris) Bishop (continued)

The former CIA employee who recollected knowing of

someone by the

name of Maurice Bishop

is highly imprecise. He did not know the man

personally. He did not know where the man was assigned or what his

responsibilities were.. He only recollected that someone had pointed

him out to him in the hall.

Given the controls and records

of Agency employees and the persons

¡tis clear

with whom they are authorized to deal, there is, no one by the name of

Maurice (Morris) Bishop, orpusing that name, uh had a CA connection.

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XIV

Trafficante-Ruby

At page 25, DII-PATS, the HSCA Report erroneously attributes to a

State Department cable information concerning a British journalist who

said that in 1959 an American gangster-type named Ruby visited an

American gangster in prison in Cuba, The name given the imprisoned

gangster was "Santos". This repart was passed to the FBI, And (subject

to Bureau verification) was included in its reporting to the warren

romanission on Ruby.] There was subsequent reporting casting considerable

doubt on the stability and reliability of the journalist. Contrary to

the statement in the HSCA Report, to the effect that CIA did nothing

further on the subject, following a search of Agency sources, a six page

report concerning the man was provided the FBI.

Today, it is speculated that the Santos"mentioned in the report

(1940-61)1

from bondor nay be the same as Santo Trafficante,

No

one made the

possible connection in 1964, and those who knew about Trafficante's

involvement in the Castro plot probably did not see the cabled report.

At page 41, DII-PATS, the HSCA Report states that "Ruby may have met

with Trafficante". It goes on to suggest that CIA knew that in 1964 and

discounted it; the fact is that the report about such an encounter did

not name Trafficante, but a man by the name of Santos instead. The

treatment by the Committee on this point is misleading.

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•XV

CIA Records on Uswald

At page 59 of DII-PATS, the HSCA Report emphasizes the possibility

that CIA may have a significant record concerning Lee Harvey Oswald that

has

not been found. While one must assume that this is a theoretical

possibility, it is a most unlikely possibility. There obviously are

many casual contacts with persons of no

interest, on whom there are will

not be a record simply because there was no reason to make a record.

However, in

instances

in which "an individual was affiliated with the

Agency", as stated

in the HSCA Report, there would be a record. There

were records on Lee Harvey Oswald, but they show no contact with him.

Further, the Agency has

conducted such an extensive search for all

manner of records concerning him

that it is

safe to say that all significant

references te him have been found. The Committee's attempt to cover

the possibility of there being such a record is more than slightly

overstated.

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XVI

Oswald's File

At page 62, DII-PATS, the MSCA states that "according to the

Agency" the Oswald file was opened because as an American defector he

considered to be of continuing intelligence interest.

This comes

from a memorandum written in 1975-

In fact, the Oswald file was opened.

as a simple matter of bureaucratic convenience in response to a request

from the Department of State, as is shown later in the report. The

"Agency" so stated it to the HSCA, pointing out the error in the 1975

memorandum.

At page 63, DII-PATS, the HSCA reports that no Agency witness could

explain why Oswald se dare are showed as "Henry" instead of

"Harvey".

The explanation was simple and was given, as stated in the following

comments in the HSCA Report. It was a bureaucratic error.

Attention is given to the meaning of

*AGarat page 63 DII-PATS, of

the Oswald form. At one point the HSCA investigators pursued the

possibility that this might be some sort of abbreviation for, "agent".

The Committee report elects to accept a recollection of a former employee

to the effect, that the symbol "AG" was initiated subsequent to the

opening of the Oswald file.The memory of the former employee is in

error on this point. Although it is not a significant issue, Agency

records show that the symbol was in use at least a year prior to the

opening of the Oswald file, and HSCA representatives were so advised.

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## Page 28

000

XVII

Possibility of a Dual Filing System

At page 65, DII-PATS, the HSCA Report states that "the Committee

was aware of the possibility that a dual filing system" could have been

used to disguise the relationship with Oswald. This so-called awareness

stems from the fact that an instance came to the attention of HSCA

investigators

in which two CIA employees contemplated establishing a

false file in order to conceal the true records of a sensitive operation.

The HSCA Report failed

to acknowledge

that what had been contemplated

by the two employees was, in fact, not carried out. False or dual

files

were not used. Any familiarity with the Agency filing system--whatever

popular views to the contrary--would make it clear why the contemplated

dual files were not employed and why it is

not a realistic consideration.

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## Page 29

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XVIII

Debriefing Oswald

given to the possibility of debriefiny Oswald at the time of his returni

from the Soviet Union.

The HSCA Report is correct in stating that

Oswald was not contacted or debriefed. It omitted an interesting aspect

of the matter in which the officer who wrote the menorandum on the boint

conmented on the apparent instability of Oswald and the resulting

question about the desirability of such a contact.

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## Page 30

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XIX

Ked-flagging the File of a Foreign Service Ufficer /

At page 73, DII-PATS, the HSCA Report states that CIA personnel

were unable "to explain adequately" the red-flagging of a file belonging

to a short time employee of CIA, who left the Agency in 1950 for the

Foreign Service. An explanation was offered, which would bè reasonable

to persons familiar with such considerations. Following the individual's

departure from CIA, the fact of his earlier brief employment with CIA

could impair his future usefulness in the Foreign Service, if it was

known that he once was with CIA. It is an appropriate concern of CIA to

save former employees from such embarrassment.

White this is a reasonable

explanation, there is no record today that specificaly supports it.

If this is an inadequate explanation by HSCA standards, then so be

it. That it probably is correct, however, is the point that should be

kept in mind.

05: 30

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## Page 31

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XX

CIA Reporting on Oswald Before the Assassination

The HSCA Report criticizes CIA reporting both before and after the

assassination of

President Kennedy. Because the point is made in that

way, it is important to keep in mind that prior to the assassination

there was no particular reason to report in depth on a man by the name

of Lee Oswald Who was something of a nonentity.

CIA learned that a man calling himself Lee Oswald (not Lee Harvey

Oswald, as stated in the HSCA Report at page 98, DII-PATS) contacted the

soviet embassy in Mexico City on 1 Detober 1963. Ilhis was duly reported.

to appropriate Government agencies in Washington. At that time CIA had

additional information about contacts with both the Cuban and Soviet

facilities by unidentified persons.

This information was in CIA

files, but it was not until after the assassination that it was reviewed

and some of

it was identified, by analysis, as involving Lee Harvey

Oswald. The point is that prior to the assassination Oswald's name had

been made known only in connection with his contact with the Soviet

embassy on 1 October.

There had been no research of

the files prior to

the assassination, and it was only by analysis after the assassination

that the other contacts became known. The fact is that CIA did report

what it knew at the time that infe was discen in the gout.

At page 101, DII-PATS, of the HSCA Report, it is stated that

"the Committee was unable to determine whether the CIA did in fact come

CIA

into a photograph of Oswald". The answer, categorically, is that

di

not.

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## Page 32

XXI

Reporting to the Warren Commission

At page 102, DII-PATS, of the HSCA Report, there is discussion

about reporting to the Warren Commission. In this discussion, a statement

by Mr. Helins that CIA responded only to specific requests is joined to

a statement that the working level focal point in the Agency for

dealing with the Conmission did not know about the anti-Castro plotting.

Two points should be made on this. First, Mr. Helms' recollection

on this point is partly inaccurate. The record is replete with reporting

by CIA to the Warren Commission, on its on initiative and not solely in

response to specific requests. Of course, it reported extensively to

the FBI which in turn reported to the Warren Commission

The footnote 8 cited on this page seems to accept the provocation

theory as fact. By not reporting operational details, therefore, CIA is

Judged as failing to meet its responsibility. It is only noted here, as

is stated elsewhere in these comments, that the provocation theory did

not emerge until 1967 and remains a theory to this date. Those who knew

about the assassination plotting did not consider it at that time to

bear on the Issue confronting the Warren Commission.

in 1924-

A moment's reflection is worthwhile. It was generally known, that

FA, as wettar othere

genetes, had hostile programs directed

against Castro and his regime, which might today be considered provocative.

Some perspective might be gained from the thought that during the

Warren Commission investigation no one thought to have a detailing of

those operational activities, which might then have broadened the scope

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## Page 33

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Reporting to the Warren Commission (continued)

of the inquiries. With the advantage of hindsight, it would have been

desirable had the concept becn developed then as

it was later, according

to the SCA Report, in 1967. And perhaps it would have been useful if

all

ASCA had inquired intonthose other activities

aS

well. CIA conducted

its review following articulation of

the provocation theory in Book V of

the Church Committee final

report. The findings of that review are in

the 1977 CIA Task Force Report and was available for review by

HSCA investigators,

36-33

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## Page 34

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XXII

Calderon

At page 102, DII-PATS; Of the HSCA Report, the view of

the Committee

on the significance of the Calderon conversation is raised

agrin. This

time the report states "the CIA was

unable to explain the omission" in

not reporting the Calderon conversation.. The explanation that the

conversation was meaningless by reasonable standards was

offered, whether

or not it was acceptable to the Committee.

35-34

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## Page 35

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Reporting from Sensitive Sources

At page 102, DII-PATS, of the MSCA Report, it is/stated that "with

the exception. of that which was obtained fron sensitive sources and

methods, CIA information, in general, was accurately and expeditiously

provided to the Warren Commission. In cases of sensitive sources and

methods, rather than provide the Commission with raw data which would

have meant revealing the sources and methods, the substance of the

Information was submitted in accurate summary form."

This statement constitutes the/thin residue of a series of complicated

treatments of early drafts in which the sCA staff first attempted to

demonstrate that CIA withheld information in order to protest its

sensitive sources. In practically every case, CIA demonstrated that the

information was reported, in detail, with evaluations of the validity of

the reported information.

The issue really arises from the lack of familiarity of the !SCA

staff with intelligence procedures and a certain visceral disfavor on

the part of some HSCA staff members for those procedures.

It is normal procedure in the world of intelligence to report

collected information, when it is worth reporting, without disclosing

its source. If the source were to become known it could be lost, so

it is protected. A source may be described and an evaluation may

be placed on the information, but it is the information which is critical,

and it is provided.

As its "case in point" the HSCA Report, de page 102, DII-PATS,

discusses the handling of CIA infornation on Oswald's contacts with the

35-35

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## Page 36

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Reporting from Sensitive Sources (continued)

Soviet and Cuban installations in Mexico City. The Warren Commission

was not fully organized until the end of 1963. In mid-January 1964, Mr.

Helms informed the Staff. Director of the Warren Commission about this

information..

It was provided in considerable written detail the end of

that month, with an unusually emphatic endorsement of its accuracy and

reliability. That a Warren Commission investigator seems not to have

absorbed this information until April 1964 cannot rationally be attributed

to the fact that the source was not specified.

In this particular "case", the original HSCA draft on this subject

Charged that

the information was not provided the Warren Cormission

until April,

emphasizing in the harmful effects of the alleged delay,

and attributing it to the protèction of sensitive sources. As the

basis for the criticism collapsed in the face of the facts, the draft of

the report was simply modified to provide a new criticism, however

thin.

35-36

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## Page 37

XXIV

Characterization of AMLASH Operation

At page 163, Volure X of the HSCA Report, the Conmittee emphasizes

the recollections of a former CIA enployee called Langosch, to the

effect that the AMLASH operation was

characterized

as an assassination

operasion during

the

period preceding the death

of President Kennedy,

Langosch was

not aware of or privy to the details of the AMLASH

operation during the period preceding the

assassination of President

Kennedy. While he had a staff responsibility, as a counterintelligence

officer, for security

aspects of the relationship, he had hot been made

witting of the substantive details of what went on.. As has been

Stated

elsewhere AMLASH/1 had been evaluated as an unstable man who did

not

have the self-discipline to accept directions. or to serve in

the role of

a controlled agent. As a result, the records show that the decision wes

made to attempt to work through some of his colleagues while retaining

a

contact with him.

As a senior person in the Castro government, his

potential seemed great, whatever the difficulties of dealing with

him.

The problem was one of how to hold the contact open without getting

involved

in activities

that could not be controlled or influenced.

On 29 October 1963 Desmond Fitzgerald met with AMLASH/l and told

him he would be given no support in préparation for a coup in Cuba. AlT

of the planning papers showed that AMLASH/1 was to be told only that if

he succeeded would he receive

support, and that after the fact. The

report of the meeting shows that the plan was

adhered to. Later reporting

showed that AMLASH/1 considered this

as

a turn-down.

His strong reaction

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## Page 38

13-00000

Characterization of AMLASH Operation (continued)

was such that the decision was taken to make some gesture that had

sufficient tangible appearances to keep the contact alive. This took

the form of a pen, designed to contain a syringe to administer poison,

which was

offered to AMLASH/1 at about the very time of the President's

assassination in Dallas.

The point of this sequence of events is that during the President's

life, CIA had no commitment to AMLASH/1, and had made no representations

of support to him. Reporting showed that he knew this. The significance

of this is that--in the context of the provocation theory--he had

nothing that he could report or leak concerning U.S. support.

When Langosch testified before the Church Committee, he stated that

he could not recall the time frame of the activity. Yet, the time frame

was key to the analysis of the operational relationship with AMLASH/1,

particularly in the context of the provocation theory.

With the HSCA,

however, Langosch recalled a time frame for events, as well as facts

that are inconsistent with all the evidence about the development of the

operation.

The HSCA Report cites an affadavit by a former CIA employee known.

as Pollock, one of the two people living today who know the details of

the AMLASH operation at the time in question. He contradicts the state

ments made by Langosch as

to how the AMLASH operation was characterized

during the period preceding President Kennedy's death.

2

35. 38

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## Page 39

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Characterization of AMLASH Operation (continued)

It is of some interest that the HSCA investigators did not elect to

call as witnesses the two living persons who knew the details of

the AMLASH operation

at the time that it was going on. One of them, a

retired CIA employee, volunteered an affidavit by way of refuting

the

recollections of

Langosch. The existence of the other

one, whose

testimony is cited in the Church Committee report, was not secret. An

HSCA review of the AMLASH files. was not

extensive, reviewing only

one of

the folders of the entire file (14 in number) which was made available

for them.

The handling of this phase of the investigation by the HSCA staff

serves to confuse rather than clarify the issues.

35-39

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## Page 40

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XXV

1967, 16 Report

At page 188 of Volume X

of

the HSCA Report, there is emphatic

criticism of a statement in the 1967 IG Report on the plotting against

Fidel Castro. The offending statement is quoted in full:

"The gambling sypdicate operation had been taken

from him (Colonel Edwards), and, in retrospect, he

probably acted properly lin briefing the Attorney General

on only that aspect of the operation for which he had

been responsible and of which he had direct, personal

knowledge."

Edwards was the Director of Security, under whom the so-called Phase 1

of the Castro plot with the criminal syndicate was carried out.

The briefing of

the Attorney General was on 7 May 1962.. A memorandun

on the briefing, sent to the Attorney General at his later request, was

dated 14 May. On that same date, 14 May, Edwards wrote another menorandu

for the Office of Security file, stating that Harvey (the man taking

over what the 1967 IG Report termed Phase Il of the operational relation

with the syndicate), had told him that he was dropping the contact with

the members of the syndicate.

In 1967, when he was interviewed in connection with the IG inquiry,

Edwards could not recall that he knew that his assistant was in Miami

turning over his contacts to Harvey, at about the same time that Edwards

was briefing the. Attorney General. This specific point is recorded in

the IG Report, although the IG Report expresses the view that Edwards

must have known at the time (1962). It was not until 1975, in the

35-40

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