LBJ LIBRARY NATIONAL SECURITY PAPERS TOUCHING ON ASSASS. AND COVERT ACTION IN CUBA
Originator: SSCIA
From: JOHNSON, LOCH
Document date: 07/21/1975
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

## Page 1

JFK Assassination System

Identification Form

Agency Information

Date:

6/29/201

AGENCY :

RECORD NUMBER :

SSCIA

157-10014-10096

RECORD SERIES: MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTTEE

• AGENCY FILE NUMBER : -_07-M-02

Document Information

ORIGINATOR:

FROM:

TO :

SSCIA

JOHNSON, LOCH

TITLE:

LBJ LIBRARY NATIONAL SECURITY PAPERS TOUCHING ON ASSASS. AND COVERT

ACTION IN CUBA

DATE: 07/21/1975

PAGES:

217

SUBJECTS:

ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNSEL

CUBA

CIA

DOCUMENT TYPE: SUMMARY

CLASSIFICATION: Declassified

RESTRICTIONS: 1B; 1C

CURRENT STATUS:

Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW:

03/08/2000

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS :

CCBOX 438

v9.1

DocId: 32423484

Page

---

## Page 2

Date :

Page :

08/06/95

1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY

SSCIA

RECORD NUMBER

:157-10014-10096

RECORDS SERIES

MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTTEE

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

07-M-02

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR

SSCIA

FROM

JOHNSON, LOCH

TO

TITLE : LBJ LIBRARY NATIONAL SECURITY PAPERS TOUCHING ON

ASSASS. AND COVERT ACTION IN CUBA

DATE : 07/21/75

PAGES

:217

SUBJECTS : CIA

CUBA

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNSEL

ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES

DOCUMENT TYPE :

SUMMARY

CLASSIFICATION

: TOP SECRET

RESTRICTIONS

:REFERRED

CURRENT STATUS

POSTPONED IN FULL'

DATE OF LAST REVIEW

: 01/05/99

OPENING CRITERIA

COMMENTS : CCBOX 438

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

DocId: 32423484

Page

---

## Page 3

LBJ LIBRARY

NATIONAL SECURITY PAPERS

TOUCHING ON ASSASSINATION AND

COVERT ACTION IN CUBA

A SUMMARY WITH KEY DOCUMENTS

COPY 1

21 July 1975

R522

Box 438

R 522

438-20

---

## Page 4

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

21 July 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR SENIOR STAFF

SUBJECT: Summary of Significant Documents Retried from the Lyndon

Baines Johnson Library, Austin, Texas

FROM: Loch Johnson

I have just returned from a trip to the LBJ Library where I in-

spected the National Security Files. I was allowed to examine the files

dealing with U.S. policy toward Cuba, the Johnson Vice Presidential

Security files, and NSC minutes. The Library staff sifted through the

Bundy papers for me, extracting anything relevant to Cuba for my inspection.

I was not permitted to examine either the Bundy papers or the Rostow

papers myself, since the Library has not yet cleard them.

Similarly, I

was unable to examine the Vietnam country files or the Lass country files

because we have not been given authority to do so yet.

Though these roadblocks were frustrating, I found I had my hands

filled for the moment simply working my way through the papers which

were available. I selected 44 documents to bring home, totaling 208

pages.

These documents range from a verification of information we

already know to some useful new information (see Items 21 and 22, e.g.)

to some startling new leads in the area of covert action (see Item

28): What follows is a capsule summary of each document presented in

chronological order. High priority items have tabs marked in red.

DốcFd:32423484

Page

---

## Page 5

July 21, 1975

SUMMARY OF JOHNSON LIBRARY DOCUMENTS

NSC Minutes, 5 May 1961 and NSC Record of Actions, 16 May 1961.

At the 5 May NSC meeting, Rusk

suggested that the U. S. must take

all measures to precipitate Castro's downfall or face the possibility

that all South America will come under Communist influence.

On the subject of Trufillo, the President said (25 days before the

dictator was murdered) that the U. S. should draw the line on becoming

involved

in the affairs of another country, such as active participation

in the overthrow of Trujillo. Instead, the United States should determine

appropriate courses of action in case Trujillo falls.

The 16 May Record of Actions emphasizes it was the President's view

that the U. S. should not initiate the overthrow of Trujillo before we

knew what government would succeed him. This same document outlines

U. S. policy toward Cuba; it was agreed that U. S. policy toward Cuba

should aim at the downfall of Castro, though specific mention of assas-

sination is not to be found among the many options outlined.

2. Letter from Lodge to Rusk, 13 September (1963?).

In an obviously anti-Diem letter, Lodge asks Rusk to send General

Lansdale to South Vietnam Nam to take charge of all U. S. relationships

with a change of government. Why Lodge so confidentally expected a

change of government is an interesting question.

3. A note from Bromley Smith to George Christian (undated, but presumably

early in the Johnson Administration, perhaps December, 1963).

A good example of the establishment of plausible deniability for the

President, at the suggestion of the CIA.

4. Memo from Chase dated 2 December 1963 and probably for Bundy.

Among other things, Chase recommends "a vigorous, tough, and nasty

policy" against Cuba, Including strengthening the covert action program

and continuing to explore "every avenue in order to make life as diffi-

cult for Castro and as expensive and unpleasant for the USSR as possible."

Moreover, "We should be prepared to meet any event which might offer the

opportunity of a sudden overthrow of Castro (e.g., the shooting down of

a U-2)."

DocId: 32423484 Page 5

---

## Page 6

- 2-

5. Memo from Chase to Bundy, 4 December 1963.

Plans for a meeting regarding Cuban policy. John Crimmins will

present several options for discussion, including unleashing of Cuban

exiles and the intensification of the covert program.

6. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 2 December 1963.

This memo is mainly important because it reveals who in the Admin-

Istration was dealing with Cuban policy.

The list of people to attend

the meeting on Cuba held this. day included:

Lyndon B. Johnson, Rusk,

Ed Martin, McNamara, McCone, Helms or Des Fitzgerald, Don Wilson, Bundy,

and Chase.

7. Memo, Bundy to Lyndon B. Johnson, 12 December 1963.

For a press conference, Bundy recommends the following language re-

garding Cuba:

...say...that you expect to take every available means

to stop and turn

back the spread of Communism in this hemisphere."

• 8. CIA Summary of Costs for Cuban Operations, FY 1960-1964, dated 15

December 1963.

This table reveals that the CIA spent $106,155,774 on Cuban Opera-

tions, almost 50 percent of which was spent on paramilitary action

($47,815,122) •

The total covert action budget (psychological and para-

military

warfare) was approximately $81,000,000 in this four-year period.

9. Chase minutes on meeting with Lyndon B. Johnson, 27 December 1963.

The meeting appears to be the first major briefing for the new Presi-

dent on Cuba..

Desmond Fitzgerald did most of the briefing, which in-

cluded a detailed description of CIA assets in Cuba, proposed sabotage plans,

and

attempts by the CIA to stimulate an internal coup which would

dislodge Castro.

The CIA was aiding two exile groups in particular:

one led by Manuel Artime, the other by Manolo Ray.

_Bundy recommends

that Lyndon B. Johnson take "a more vigorous line toward Cuba/ than

we have in the past."

10. Memo, Bundy to Lyndon B. Johnson, 9 January 1964.

Bundy recommends a Cabinet-level review of the whole principle of

covert sabotage against Cuba.

He notes that Rusk and McNamara do not

support the program of sabotage, while "McCone and the CIA are for it,

and so are most of the middle-level officers dealings with the Castro

problem."

Bundy concludes: "'...In your position, I would stop sabotage

attacks on the ground that they are illegal, ineffective, and damaging

to our broader policy."

DocId: 32423181 Page 6

---

## Page 7

- 3-

11. A second copy of the above memo.

12. Memo and attachment on Cuban policy from John W. Ford, FSO, to

Bundy, dated 18 February 1964.

The lengthy attachment appears to be a working paper on Cuba prepared

for Bundy by Rostow's staff in State.

The authors

write:

"If we are to be realistic about our intent to get rid of the

cancerous potential of Castroism, 1s an attack on the symptoms enough?

Is it not essential to get at the disease itself?" (10). And, later,

....if we were publicly to acknowledge the extinction of the Castro

regime/ as our aim, would not a sudden blow seem a more logical way of

proceeding then the application of measured pressures?" (14). The paper

discusses the need for a plausible causus for action against Castro, asking

the question:

"would not a better bet be to provoke one?" (16). They

suggest that "something like the assassination of a prominent Latin American

leader"' (17a) would be sufficient provocation, if blamed on Castro, to permit

U.S. action.

13. Memo, Chase to Bundy, with various attachments, no date, but probably

early March, 1964. Subject: Cuba, Covert Program.

Of special interest here is the attached letter from Desmond Fitz-

Gerald to Bundy, dated March 1964.

"Des" implies that CIA efforts to get

rid of Castro were carried out "only in response to what we understand to

be policy requirements...." (1). He makes the point that CIA-sponsored

sabotage raids were to serve as "a sort of firing pin for internal unrest

and to create the conditions

for a coup." However, only five low-key raids

were carried out (from August to December, 1963), followed by a three-month

hiatus. Des concludes that "a covert program at this time designed to

overthrow Castro is not realistic" (2). He does recommend, however, con-

tinuation of certain covert actions, each as " carefully concealed con-

tamination of lubricants" shipped into Cuba and "similar actions" (4).

A second attachment is a "Status Report on Autonomous Cuban Exile

Groups"', dated 30 March 1964, which underscores how truly autonomous

these

groups really were; the CIA had lost control over them by this time.

The third attachment is a CIA "Review of Current Program of Covert Action

Against Cuba," dated "about 1/25/64."

The ultimate goal of the CIA program

was "to stimulate dissident elements within the regime, particularly

in the armed forces, to carry out a coup"' (7);

The time frame for the

program was "about eighteen months from June 1963"' (7). The report notes

that the CIA has "continued to improve our own infiltration techniques

and

are still able to penetrate Cuba's defenses with good regularity"

(13-14). The five sabotage raids on Cuba run by CIA are listed at Annex I.

Docid: 32428484 • Page 7

pd.

---

## Page 8

- 4-

The final attachment is an unsigned report on "Spectrum of Courses

of Action with Respect to Cuba,

CiA document Respects can tee A Febte effect, had proere is no

point in discussing courses of action with respect to Cuba until the

fundamental decision is made as to whether or not it is possible for the

United States to live with Cuba." Without answering this question, the report

sets out a series of options or courses of action under two headings: (1)"Can and

Can't Live with Castro." Under the latter, the options range from covert

sabotage to invasion, but do not mention assassination of Castro.

Memo, Chase to Bundy, 23 March 1964, with attachments. subject: U.s.

Policy Towards Cuba, April to November, 1964.

Chase still recommends "the tough, nasty, but no military intervention/

blockade policy...." (7). The policy will include "a modest covert program'

(11). CIA sabotage efforts will be terminated, though the Agency will continue

trying to identify, seek out, and establish contact with potential dissident

non-Conmunist elements in the power centers of the Castro regime.

The possi-

bilities of talking with Castro are viewed positively (12). Chase suggests

that the realities of domestic political considerations "reinforce our

national security decision to keep a reasonable amount of pressure on Cuba...."

(15) •

15. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 7 April 1964.

Crimmins warns Chase that infiltration/exfiltration problems may create

noise regarding U.S. covert programs against Cuba.

16. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 10 April 1964, with attachment.

More discussions on the possibility of opening talks with Castro.

The attachment emphasizes the true autonomy from the CIA of the autonomous

exile groups.

Memo, Bundy to LBJ, 17 April 1964, with attachment (Memo, Taylor to LBJ,

March 1964).

The Taylor memo notes that LBJ asked the JCS on 4 March 1964. to think

of new ways to (1)gain OAS support for the overthrow of Castro and (2)

bring additional pressure upon Castro. Taylor concludes that the JCS "have

difficulty identifying promising actions against Castro which have not been

previously considered, and in some cases tried. It is a hard fact," Taylor

continues, "that little remains which offers premise of real effectiveness

in removing Castro short of a blockade or an ascending scale of military

DocId: 32423484: Page 8

---

## Page 9

-5-

action up to or including invasion."

18. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 21 April 1964.

Notes that Alexis Johnson is in charge of contingency planning for a coup

in Cuba.

19. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 14 May 1964..

This memo suggests that a primary goal of the Johnson Administration was

the noise level. The memo makes it clear that the exile raids were becoming

completely beyond U.S. control despite CIA financial support to the groups.

20. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 2 June 1964.

Chase notes that Castro has executed three anti-Castro Cubans and jailed

two others as CIA agents. CIA admits having a connection with the executed

Cubans "but that it is completely deniable."

Memo, Helms, DDP, to DCI, 10 June 1964. Subject: "Plans of Cuban

Exiles to Assassinate Selected Cuban Government Leaders"

The CIA was made aware of certain plans to kill Castro. The Agency told

the sources, according to Helms, that "the United States Government would not,

under any circumstances, condone the planned actions.". Apparently on 2 March

1964 a wealthy Cuban exile was approached with a Cosa Nostra offer to assassinate

Castro for $150,000.

The wealthy exile turned down the offer. Similar offers

were make to other Cuban exiles in early March. A leading tigure in the

negotiations was Byron Cameron, a shipping-businessmen from Ft. Lauderdale.

An agreement was finally made to pay the Cameron group $100,000 for killing

-Castro, plus $2,500 for expenses.

exile in New York was to pay much of the money, and did pay the $2,500 on

pay much ot tho

Julio Lobo Olavarria, a wealthy Cuban

25 April. Though Cameron's group remained anonymous, it was clear the Matia

was involved. Cameron revealed that his contact was a police officer in the

St. Louis (Mo.) Vice Squad.

Memo, Chase to Bundy, 15 June 1964. Subject: "Assassination of Castro."

Referring to the above memo from DDP to DCI, Chase notes that John

Crimmins feels the matter should be discussed at a Special Group meeting.

ĐäaId:32423484 • Page

9

---

## Page 10

'John's own inclination is that the U.S. Government cannot knowingly permit

any criminal American involvement in this sort of thing,

11 notes Chase,

"and should go all out to stop the plot." In marginal notations, Bundy

agrees with John and with the need to forward the matter to the Special

Group •

23. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 16 June 1964, with attachment (Des FitzGerald's

"A Reappraisal of Autonomous Operations") .

FitzGerald makes a defense of the autonomous operations. Tom Mann and

Chase disapprove of the operations, though for different reasons.

24. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 18 June 1964.

Chase warns that further U.S. support of the autonomous groups is more

likely to lead to a U-? shootdown and a Caribbean crisis than the overthrow

of the Castro regime.

Chase continues to be worried about noice levels

and the November election. This memo is very much like his 14 May memo

(see Item 19).

Memo for the Record, Peter Jessup, 22 June 1964.

In a reference to Helm's memo on assassination (see Item 21), it was

pointed out in a 303 Committee meeting of 18 June that "these reports, in

effect, put the United States Government on notice that fallure to take

preventive action could be construed as condonation. " The AG said Justice

would look into the matter.

26. Memo, McCone to Bundy, 19 August 1964.

McCone summarizes the FBI investigation of Cuban exile plots against

Castro as outlined in Helm's memo of 19 June (See Item 21).

The Bureau

interviewed many

people allegedly involved, most of whom denied the existence

of such a plan (The Bureau did not interview Cameron, since he was out of

the country). The most interesting finding was that Lobo had in fact

discussed the matter with CIA.

27. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 10 November 1964.

The election past, Chase et al. agreed that 'we can usefully do some

Mos:

DocId:32423484

Page 10

---

## Page 11

-i-

basic review work on Cuba." FitzGerald pushes for re-institution of CIA-

directed covert program.

28)

Memo, R.C. Bowman to Bundy, 12 November 1964, with JCS attachment

dated 30 October 1964. Subject: SQUARE DANCE

A contemptable proposal intiated by the Army to use germ warfare against

Cuban sugar and livestock. Bowman and Bundy agree that the White House should

"remain aloof from formal consideration of 'Square Dance' at this stage."

I believe this plan for covert action is even more shocking and unacceptable

than plans for assassination.

Ex""

Docld:32423484

Page 11

---

## Page 12

-U-

Memo, Chase to Bundy, 12 November 1964, and attachment (apparently

Bundy memo for a meeting with LBJ on 7 April 1964).

The Bundy memo suggests that LBJ approved various options "short of

war to get rid of the Castro regime," including the possible contamination

of sensitive Cuban imports (not food). The Chase memo indicates that a

Fitzgerald operation was underway in November 1964 to ship contaminating

elements into Cuba.

30. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 30 December 1964.

The Artime group is out of control, though State, Defense and CIA

(as well as Bundy) all agree that it would be unwise to try to interfere

with him at this stage.

31. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 5 January 1965.

Chase reports a plan told to Crimmins and the CIA about an Artime plot

to stage a "palace coup" during which Castro and other top leaders would be

"neutralized." D-Day was to be March 13.

This matter was to be discussed

at an upcoming Special Group meeting on whether or not "to cut off Artime's

water."

Chase notes: "CIA at this point is loath to make a hard evaluation

of the Artime/Cubela plot."

32. Memo to 303 Committee,

unsigned, 18 January 1965, presumably a CIA

document.

Discusses the virtues of continuing Underwater Demolition Teams against

ships in Cuban harbors.

If such activities are disallowed, the CIA should

be authorized to reduce its commitment in the paramilitary field.

33. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 8 February

1965.

This memo indicates that not even Artime had his group in control. The

memo also discusses CIA covert activities in British Guiana, such as pene-

trating the PPP and proping up the democratic trade unionism.

Memo, Murat. Williams (INR) to Peter Jessup, White House staff,

23 February 1965.

Recommends immediate termination of Artime support.

35. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 2 March 1965

Discussion of who is for maintaining a covert capability against Cuba

(presently on the shelf) and who is opposed. Chase guessed that CIA would

be opposed ("fish or cut bait"); State would not.

Rusk's general attitude

toward Cuba at this time was to keep the temperature low while sorting out

the Vietnam problem.

DöcҐđ:32423484

Page 12

---

## Page 13

- 9-

Memo, Chase to Bundy, 4 March 1965:

Chase recommends phasing out support to Artime. The CIA is consider-

ing diluting pesticides sent to Cuba; this is similar to the kinds of tactics

mentioned in Items 28 and 29 above and are a manifestation of the moral

bankruptcy of U.S. policy.

Also some talk here of backing a new exile

group, RECE, though not much enthusiasm for the idea from anyone apparently.

Oddly, CIA wishes to drop its paramilitary capability, while Dod and State

want the capability maintained.

37. Memo, Grant Hilliker (State) to Bundy, 18 June 1965.

This is a summary of U.S. policy toward Cuba.

The ultimate objective

Is still to replace the Castro regime. The memo notes that "the paramilitary

program involving CIA-controlled actions was set aside even before it really

started."

38. Memo, Bundy

to LBJ, 26 June 1965.

Adm. Raborn recommends reactivation of a paramilitary effort against

Cuba.

Bundy, Tommy Thompson, Rusk, McNamara, and Cy Vance are against this

chiefly because of the concomitant international noise level.

"Most of us, "Bundy

writes, "do not recommend visible violent actions against Cuba." Raborn's

recommendations

said nothing about assassination.

39. Memo, Rostow to LBJ, 30 May 1966.

Rostow notifies the President that a CIA exfiltration mission ran into

ambush and the agents were

captured. The President could expect "the noise

level of Castro's charges of 'threatened Yankee aggression' may go up."

40. Memo, Karamessines, DDP, to Rostow, 7 August 1967.

This memo is important because it lists the names of two or three Cubans

who worked on CIA missions. If they are in the U.S., it may be worthwhile

talking to them about their activities.

41. Memo, W.G. Bowdler to Rostow, 18 December 1967.

The new CIA emphasis is on developing contacts within Castro's inner

circle.

Dave Phillips was to be in charge of the new CIA Cuba program.

Bowdler advises that "we be alert to indications that Castro is looking for

accommodation or his disillusioned

lieutenants want to know where we stand

if they move to dump him."

DocId: 32423484 Page 13

---

## Page 14

- 10 -

Memo, Helms to LBJ, 12 June 1968.

Carlos Prio, former President of Cuba, is sponsoring a plan to

assassinate Castro.

Two Cubans have infiltrated Cuba from Miami to

implement the assassination.

"CIA has nothing whatever to do with these

attempts," writes Helms, "and learns of them only through penetration

of Cuban exile groups."

43)

Memo, Rostow to LBJ, 20 June 1968.

"CIA, Defense, and State agreed that, should an assassination or

an

assassination attempt take place, the U.S. skirts should be clean,'

writes Rostow. Therefore, State warned Cuban authorities via the Swiss

that reports had been received on a Castro assassination attempt.

So by

1968 we were warning Castro of attempts on his life!

44. CIA Intelligence Report, 18 November 1968.

...there is little chance...that a

plot against the

(Castro) regime

could

succeed

in the foreseeable future." (14).

Doct

---

## Page 15

NSC ACTIONS NOS. 2420-2425

TOP SECRET

COPY NO..

RECORD OF ACTIONS

by the

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

at its

FOUR HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-THIRD MEETING

held on

May 5, 1961

(Approved by the President on May 16, 1961)

The President presided at this meeting.

The Acting Secretary of the

Treasury and the Director, Bureau of the Budget, participated in the

actions below. The Attorney General; the Secretary of Health, Educa-

ticn and welfare; the Acting Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Di-

rector of Central Intelligence; the Director, U. S. Information Agency;

the Under Secretary of State; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Dep®

uty Under Secretary of State; Theodore C. Achilles, Special Assistant

to the Secretary of State; Stephen E. Smith, Assistant to MI. Achilles;

the Special Counsel to the President; the Special Assistant to the

President for National Security Affairs; Arthur Schlesinger, JI.,

Special Assistant to the President; the Assistant to the Special

Counsel to the President; the Assistant to the Vice President; the

Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA); the Adviser to the President

for Para-Military Affairs; the Military Aide to the President; the

Deputy Director (Plans), Central Intelligence Agency; the Acting

Executive Secretary, NSC; and Bromley Smith, NSC Staff, attended

the meeting.

ACTION

NUMBER

2420.

SUBJECT

U. S. POLICY TOWARD IRAN

Agreed that a Taak Force should be established under the

AssistanI Secretary of State for Nes, Fastern Affaira to

prepare and circulats a report on the subjeet by May 15

for discussion by the Council on May 19.

2421.

U. S. POLICY TOWARD KOREA

Agreed that a Task Force undar the Assistant Secretary of

Stata for Far Eastern Affairs should be established to

prepare and clrculate a report on the subject by May 15

for discussion by the Council on May 19.

MSC ACTIONS NOS. 2420-2425

•1.

TOP SECRET

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

DocId:32423484 Page 15

---

## Page 16

TOP SECRET

ACTION

NUMBER

2422.

SUBJECT

U. S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA

(NSC Action No. 2413-g; Memo for NSC, same subject, dated

May 4, 1961)

Agreed that U. S. policy toward Cuba should aim at

the downfall of Castro, and that since the measures

agreed below are not likely to achieve this end,

the matter should be reviewed at intervals with a

view to further action.

Agreed that the United States should not undertake

military intervention in tuba now, but should do

nothing that would foreclose the possibility of

military intervention in the future.

Agreed that the United States should not Impose a

naval blockade or attempt an al: war against Cuba;

it was noted that neither course had the support of

the Department

of Defense or the Joint Chiefs of

Staff.

Noted the importance the President attaches to ob

taining timely and adequate intelligence as to Cuban

military capabilities, especially the enhancement of

such capabilities by Sino-Soviet Bloc military assis-

tance, so that U. S. capabilities for possible inter-

vention may be maintained at an adequate level.

Noted the importance the President attaches to publi

cation in the Free World press of the terroristic

actions of the Castro regime, and to possible polit-

Ical action to end the current terror.

Noted the President's direction that the Central

Intelligence Agency, with other departments, should

make & detailed study of possible weaknesses and

vulnerabilities in the elements which exert control

in Cuba today.

Agreed that relations with the Revolutionary Council

should be improved and made more open, and while it

cannot be recognized as a gogermment-in-exile, sup-

port should ba given to it insofar as it continues

to represent substantial Cuban sentiment.

NSC ACTIONS NOS.. 2420-2425

• 2 .

TOP SECRET

DocId: 32423484

Page 16

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 17

TOP SECRET

ACTION

NUMBEAR

2422.

SUBJECE

U. S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA (Continued)

Agreed that no separate Cuban military force should

be organized in the United States, but that Cuban

nationals would be encouraged to enlist in the U. S.

armed forces under plans to be developed by the Seco

retary of Defense.

Agreed that Cuban nationals now holding U. S. visit

ors' visas will be given refugee status and assisted,

under a program to be developed and directed by the

Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, in carry-

Ing on their former occupations. Refugees now in Miami

will be encouraged io locate in other areas. Cuban

nationals entering the United States will be given

refugee status.

All refugees will be eligible to

apply for travel privileges, and it was understood

that they would also be eligible for citizenship.

1.

Agreed not to impose an inmediate trade embargo on

Cuba.

The Secretary of State agreed to send to the

President an analysis of the effects of a U. S. em-

bargo on trade with Cuba in relation to the

Battle

Act.

It was agreed that when an embargo is imposed,

exceptions for Canada and with Red Cross distribution

от вода вот

it should be as complete as possible, with certain

Agreed that the United States should at once initiate

negotiation to enlarge the willingness of other Amer

ican states to join in bilateral, multilateral and

OAS arrangements agalost Castro, such as (1) breaking

diplomatic relations with Cuba; (2) controlling sub-

versive activities of Cuban agents; (3) preventing

arms shipuents to Castro; (4) limiting economic rela-

tions with Cuba; (5) creating a Caribbean security

force; (6) Initiating a naval patrol to prevent Cuban

invasion of other states in the Caribbean; and

(7) denunciation of Castro as an agent of interna-

tional communism by all nations of this hemisphere.

NSC ACIIONS NOS. 2420-2425

• 3.

TOP SECRET

DocId: 32423484

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

Page 17

---

## Page 18

TCP SECRET

ACTION

NUMBER

24220

'SUBJECT

U. S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA (Continued)

1. Agreed that the Alliance for Progress should ba

strengthened by such measures as (1) rapid implemen-

tation of selected social development projects;

(2) acceleration of the implementation of other

Latin American aid; and (3) provision of additional

resources

for Latin American economic and social de-

velopment, including consideration of a supplemental

appropriation for development loans of the order of

$200-$400 million.

I. Agreed that the U. S. Information Agency would ex-

pand its existing program in Latin America, but not

initiate electronic warfare against the Castro re-

gime; means of propaganda should be made avallable

to non-U. S. groups.

I. Agreed that U. S. military officers, under general

guicance to be prepared by the Departmen of State,

would discuss the Castro threat to all Latin America

with Latin American officers.

g. Agreed that the Secretary of State should prepare a

report on a possible new juridical basis for effec-

tive anti-communist action.

R. Agreed that pending appoint of an Assistant Secretary

of State for Latin American Affairs, the Task Force

on Cuba should be continued under the chairmanship of

Richard N. Goodwin, Assistant to the Special Counsel

to the President.

2423.

U. Se POLICY TOWARD THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND HAITI

Agreed that the Task Force on Cuba would prepare promptly

both emergency and long-range plans for anti-communist in-

tervention in the event of crises in Haiti or the Dominican

Republic.

Noted the President's view that the United

States should not initiate the overthrow of Trujillo be-

fore we knew what government would

succeed nim, and that

any action agalost t'rujillo should be multilateral.

NSC ACTIONS NOS. 2420-2425

• 4

TOP SECRET

DocId: 32423484 Page

18

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 19

TOP SECRET

ACTION

NUMBER

24240

SUBJECT

U. S. POLICY TOWARD BRITISH GUIANA

Ageed that the Task Force on Cuba would considar what

can de done in cooperation with the British to forestall

a communist take-over in that country.

2425.

U,S, POLICY IN MAINLAND SOUTHEASI ASIA

&. Noted that efforts should be made to reassure Sarit

and Diem that we are not abandoning Southeast Asia.

Noted the President's view that Sarit could be told

that we are considering. inclusion of U. S. troops

in SEATO forces to be stationed in Thailand, the

timing to be dependent on developments during or

after the forthcoming 14 nation Geneva Conference.

Noted that the Secretaries of State and Defense would

be sending recoumendations to the President promptly

on U.S. training troops. In Viet Nam.

NSC ACTIONS NOS.

2420-2425

5

TOP SECRET

DocId: 32423484

Page

19

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 20

TOP SECRET

NOTES

Meeting of National Security Council, 5 May 1961

The President directed the establishment of a task force to study

the Iranian problem and suggested that Mr. Talbot head the group.

Mr. Rusk pointed out that General Bakhtiar visited the United States

comparatively recently and that a coup involving him would possibly

embarrass the United States. The President discounted the possibility. .

The President directed that a group study the Korean problem and

report its findings within two weeks. Mr. McConaughy will head the

group of Defense, CIA, State and Treasury representatives. Mr.

McNamara appointed Mr. William Bundy to represent Defense.

The President asked Mr. Nitze for a report on the Cuban situation.

Nitze replied that the Navy could blockade the island but results would not

be immediate but rather long-range, and in the course the reof unfavorable

world reaction would probably accrue. Admiral Burke pointed out that

only complete interception of all ships approaching Cuba would achieve

eventual success, and the job could be done with 24 ships. Mr. Rusk

interrupted Admiral Burke to point out that such action would be an act

of war and was wholly impracticable.

The President asked about a reported letter from Senator Goldwater

in which the statement is made that the Air Force could resolve the Cuban

situation. Admiral Burke replied that there had in fact been an Air Force

proposal with which other services had disagreed, especially the Marines.

In any case, the Air Force had made the suggestion that the Cuban problem

be resolved through rather heavy and perhaps indiscriminate bombardment.

The President immediately rejected such an idea, and added further that

there would be no Navy blockade. He emphasized the importance of more

effective watch committee action on Cuba. He also asked Mr. Dulles what

new information was available on foreign equipment going into Cuba.

Mr. Dulles replied that we know practically everything about the equipment,

but offered no specifics. The President directed that close surveillance

be continued including overflight with an American pilot. The President

approved flights of a frequency of every two or three days, but suggested

extreme caution.

The President suggested that all Americans be urged to leave Cuba

and asked Secretary Johnson to study ways and means of exit and transit

visas.

TOP SECRET

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

DocId: 32423484 • Page 20

---

## Page 21

TOP SECRET

MI. Murrow assessed world-wide reactions to the U.S. position

with regard to Cuba. He felt that the departure of the clergy, the reign

of terror, and such incidents as the imprisonment in the theater will

result in favorable reactions toward the U.S. and tend to considerably

offset the unfavorable ones. He felt that world-wide impressions of the

United States were improving generally. The President suggested that

the Iranian issue might be interpreted abroad as a possible result of

the failure of the U.S. to act in Laos. He suggested action by USIA to

discount this possible impression. Secretary Rusk suggested the over-

riding theme of U.S. rejection of Castro and went on to say that the U.S.

must take all measures to precipitate his downfall or face the possibility

that all South America will come under Communist influence.

The President asked what specific courses of action we should take

to prevent the crippling influence of the Cuban fiasco, assuming that no

military action by the U.S. will be taken. At the same time the President

asked what circumstances would have to exist before the United States

could move unilaterally against Cuba. Rusk stated that action could be

taken under Article 51 of the Rio Treaty. In this connection the President

asked if the U.S. could recognize the Cuban Government in Exile and what

might be expected of this group. Rusk replied that such recognition was

not possible because of the absence of certain essential elements of a

governmental organization, identity and territory. The question then

arose as to the status of the Cubans in the United States and Robert

Kennedy replied that they should be designated refugees and

legislation exists to handle them under this designation. The Department

of. HEW will begin registering the refugees with the assistance of CIA.

The President stated that the United States will invoke the Trading With

the Enemy Act across the board as far as Cuba is concerned at such time

as some overt act or incident occurs in Cuba. The President gave as an

example the shooting of a United States citizen. The President would

exempt from the restrictions of the Act some $30 million for food and

drugs.. At the suggestion of Mr. Fowler, Under Secretary of the Treasury,

the drugs should be donated to the Cuban people through the Red Cross.

The President suggested the acceptance of the policy to encourage all

Latin American states to sever relations with Cuba and to establish a

complete economic boycott. The United States however should draw the

line on becoming involved in the affairs of another country, such as active

participation in the overthrow of Trujillo. Instead, the United States

should determine appropriate courses of action in case Trujillo falls.

The common danger in Haiti should be included in these considerations.

2

TOP SECRET

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

DocId: 32423484 Page 21

---

## Page 22

LOPY

st.

TOP_SECRET

EYES ONLY

Saigon, September 13

Dear Dean:

I ask that youshow this letter to the President personally,

as it is vital that it not get into the governmental paper mill. for

maximum security I an typing itsemyself and am sending it to you by

messenger.

What I ask is that General Lansale be sent over here at once

to take charge, under uy supervision, of all U.S. relationships with a change

of government here.To function efficiently he must have a staff and I

therefore ask that he be put in charge of the CAS station in the Embassy,

relieving

the present incumbent, kir. John Richardson.

This is said without

casting any reflection on lir. Richardson.

Indeed I think of him as a devoted, intelligent and patriotic American. If

his loyal support in the past of the U.S. policy of winning the mar vi th

Diem has made it difficult for him to carry out a different policy now,

he has never said so or showed it.If,as I am inclined to think, Vietnamese

have naturally suspected him of being pro-Dien,it has not been his fault.

ly request to put General Lansdale in his place is not because

I have: anything but braise of Mir.Richardson, but because of uy belief that

me need a new face and that Geherallansdale has outstanding qualifications.

But I hope John McCone will be told my my nigh regard for l.

Richardson.

CAS telegram FVS-9617, September ll,is the most encouraging report

I have seen since arriving in Vietnam.And it is confirmed by a wholly

independant source in whon I have great confidence.

No written answer to this letter is necessary General Lansdale's

arrival will be a more than adequate response.

I hope you will tell the President how much I value his message

contained in Deptel 396.

With warm regards

As ever yours

Carn'd,

Henry Cabot lodge

Hon. Dean Rusk

Secretary of State

TOP_SECRET

EYES ONLY

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

DocId: 32423484

Page

22

---

## Page 23

The most pertinent reference to a Presidential reply at a news

conference with respect to alleged agent activities of the CIA in

Cuba is one dated October 31, 1963 at President Kennedy's news

conference at which the following question was put to him:

Question: Mr. President, Fidel Castro claims to have

captured some Americans whom he says are CIA agents,

and he says he is going to execute them.. Is there anything

at all that you can tell us about this?

The President: No, no.

It would seem that this is the proper reply for the President to make

to such a question, and we would suggest that, if the question arises

at a White House news conference a similar reply be made. If the

President or the press secretary wish to make a fuller statement,

it might be along the following lines:

"I see no useful purpose to be served by any comment

I might make on such allegations."

CRET

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

DocId: 32423484

Page

23

---

## Page 24

Gracele

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

To keange Cliniction

2uoek

For your information

Tile preseardo an

the gre

we are froun

CIA

DocId: 32423484

Page

24

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 25

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET

December 2, 1963

U.S. Policy. Towards Cuba

1. The objective of our policy is a free Cuba which poses no threat to its

neighbors; we do not intend to coexist with a Soviet satellite in this hemis-

phere. In moving towards this objective, we have rejected the option of

unprovoked U.S. armed intervention in Cuba. Instead, we are engaged in

a variety of unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral measures, both defensive

and offensive in nature, which stop short of invasion.

2. Our defensive measures primarily aim at three targets. First, we are

intent on ensuring that Cuba does not become again a military threat to the

U.S. or Latin America. To this end, we conduct intensive air and sea sur-

veillance over and around Cuba. So far as we know, we have been entirely,

successful in this effort. Second, we are intent, for domestic political, as

well as national security reasons, on effecting the removal of all Soviet mil-

itary personnel from Cuba. To this end, we have made it eminently clear

to the Soviets on numerous occasions that we cannot tolerate the permanent

assignment of Soviet t roops to Cuba. As a result of Soviet self-interest and

our pressures, there are now 4-7, 000 Soviet military personnel remaining

in Cuba, representing a drop of about 65-75% from the peak reached in the

autumn of 1962. Needless to say, the issue remains a highly delicate one,

especially in view of the fact that at any moment the Russians could arbitrarily

decide to send more troops back into Cuba.

Third, we are intent on impeding and, if possible, stopping Cuban-based and

supported subversion of the Hemisphere. To this end, we have made a special

effort, bilaterally and in multilateral forums, to direct the Latin American

attention to and to assist (materially, where appropriate) Latin American

efforts in the problem of controlling the subversive movement of people, funds,

arms, and propaganda between Latin America and Cuba. We have had some

success; one small measure is that, primarily through the use of travel con-

trols by Latin American governments, there has been a 50% drop, over the

past year, in the number of Latin Americans traveling to Cuba. On the other

hand, with Castro still exceedingly intent on producing "another Cuba" in the

Hemisphere and with many Latin American governments still unwilling or

unable to cope effectively with subversive efforts, much remains to be done.

In this regard, proper exploitation of the discovery of the Cuban arms cache

in Venezuela might take us a long way towards getting whole-hearted Latin

American cooperation in the fight against subversion; such cooperation is a

vital key to success in this field.

TOP SECRET

DocId: 32423484 Page 25

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 26

TOP SECRET

-2-

3. Offensively, our ultimate target is to remove the Soviet satellite from

the Hemisphere. We hope we can achieve this by concentrating on three

intermediate targets -- intensifying Cuba's already-serious economic dif-

ficulties; increasing the cost and unpleasantness to the Soviets of maintain-

ing Cuba; and stimulating direct and indirect internal resistance to the regime.

Our chief weapons for achieving these offensive targets are two -- isolation

measures and covert measures (which, of course, also have an impact on

our defensive targets).

(a) The most outstanding characteristic of our isolation measures is

that they are exceedingly difficult to implement -- primarily because imple-

mentation depends on the cooperation of others and not merely on U.S. will.

Nevertheless, we have been suprisingly successful in implementation; while

one could have reasonably expected our isolation policy to break up as the

world moved away from the heat of October, 1962, in fact, this has not hap-

pened. Instead, over the past year, our isolation policy generally held the

ground already made in some fields, while making further progress in others.

About a year ago, only five OAS countries maintained diplomatic relations

with Cuba; the number not only remains the same now but the anticipated OAS

reaction to the discovery of the Cuban arms cache in Venezuela gives some

reason to hope for further ruptures. Free World shipping to Cuba in 1963

has fallen off by roughly 60% from the 1962 level; prospects for further re-

duction are good. The low level of Free World trade with Cuba, reached in

1962, has generally been maintained in 1963. Air isolation of Cuba has been

fairly successful; a dramatic demonstration of this. is the fact that many Latin

Americans have had to travel to and from Cuba via Prague.

The effectiveness of our isolation measures in hitting the target

is impos-

sible to gauge accurately.

While Hurricane Flora, in a few days, probably hit

the target more squarely than our isolation measures did in a whole year, it

is generally agreed that the economic chaos which now exists in Cuba and the

enormity of the Soviet aid bill is, in part at least, due to our efforts. Castro's

repeated and loud public protestations about our isolation policy and his serious

and strenuous efforts

to break out of Free World isolation substantiate the view

that the isolation measures probably hurt him, economically and politically.

(b) The most outstanding characteristic of our other chief offensive weapon,

covert measures, is that its potential for bringing about a basic change in

Cuba is still largely unknown. The program, which makes use of Cuban exiles

and which is not yet fully underway, has already achieved a degree of success

-- e. g. in demonstrating to Cubans that Castro is not invulnerable, in forcing

Castro to divert valuable resources for defense against covert activities and,

-perhaps, in stimulating the insurgency which is evident within Cuba. As yet,

TOP SECRET

DocId: 32423484

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

Page 26

---

## Page 27

TOP SECRET

- 3-

our covert program has not been directed in such a way as to inflict serious

economic damage on Cuba. There are those who believe that much can be

done in this regard.

4. In theory at least, our present offensive measures, vigorously pursued,

will lead finally to one of the following three results, each of which constitutes

a removal of the Soviet satellite from the Hemisphere.

(a) An overthrow of the Castro regime. (Dissident elements, most prob-

ably from the military and the bureaucracy, seize power with a direct or in-

direct assist from the U.S.; the people of Cuba, tired of economic hardship,

lack of freedom, and isolation from their Latin American brethren, embrace

the new group.) Most Cuban experts in the U.S. Government regard this as

the most likely of the three eventualities.

(b) Accommodation with Castro on U.S. terms (Cuba breaks its tie-line

with the USSR, ends its subversion efforts, and perhaps, renounces its Com-

munist ideology). While highly unlikely, it is not inconceivable that, such

factors as (1) U.S. isolation and covert measures, (2) further economic

deterioration in spite of Soviet aid, and (3) distrust of Soviet intentions, will

lead Castro to believe that he has no choice but accommodation. Indeed, there

is evidence that Castro may already be thinking along these lines. In the past

several months, he has made a number of accommodation noises, and since

he undoubtedly has a pretty good reading of our minimum terms, these noises

could conceivably indicate that he is willing to go a long way towards meeting

them. Che Guevera's reported nervousness at Castro's accommodation tend-

encies substantiate the view that Castro's desire to negotiate is genuine and

not merely a ploy to reduce U.S. heat on Cuba.

But there are obvious major problems with this alternative. Not the least of

these is whether the American people would tolerate accommodation with even

a reformed Castro, especially in view of Lee Oswald's pro-Castro connection.

Also, it is not now possible to gauge accurately the impact of President

Kennedy's death on Castro's apparent accommodation tendencies. Nevertheless,.

accommodation remains a distinct possibility, if not for now, then for later.

(c) A Soviet decision to quit Cuba. This may be the most unlikely of the

three eventualities. Yet such a Soviet decision cannot be dismissed categorically

in view of such factors as (l) the lack of real Soviet progress in making Cuba a

"show piece", (2) the obvious U.S. determination to make Cuba a Soviet "dead

end"' in the Hemisphere (no more Cuba's will be permitted), (3) the magnitude of

TOP SECRET

DocId: 32423484 Page 27

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 28

TOP SECRET

-4-

Soviet aid to Cuba, and (4) the extent of the USSR's own present economic

problems. At the least, these factors would appear to have a bearing on

how the Russians would view their eviction from Cuba either by an overthrow

of the Castro regime or by a Castro decision toaccommodate with the U.S. on

U.S. terms. Relief would probably mix generously with Russian grief, espec-

ially if the Russians could find a vaguely credible fig-leaf.

5. The $64 question -- Will our present offensive measures, even if imple-

mented rigorously and flawlessly, ever lead, by one way or another, to the

removal of the Soviet satellite from the Hemisphere? -- is impossible to answer.

Most people probably tend to be skeptical but there are also a number of optim-

ists; many of whom are among the closest observers of the Cuban situation.

Probably the most we can say for certain is that we appear to be moving in the

right direction; and this, of course, is important. A vigorous, tough, and

nasty policy probably lays the best groundwork for bringing about any of the

three eventualities which are noted above and which would each constitute a

removal of the Soviet satellite from the Hemisphere. From a domestic political

viewpoint this is probably fortuitous; a tough, but no-invasion policy is one policy

which the American people appear prepared to support at this time.

6. In closing, here are a few gratuitous and unorganized observations which

bear on the problem of U.S. action in the future. First, while always alert to

the danger of escalation in US/USSR relations, we should continue to explore

every avenue in order to make life as difficult for Castro and as expensive and

unpleasant for the USSR as possible.

Special attention should always be directed

toward finding new ways to (1) tighten existing isolation measures, (2) conduct

other forms of economic warfare against Castro, (3) strengthen our covert action

program, (4) deepen the now-visible rift between Castro and the USSR, and (5)

gain solid Latin American interest and support for further actions against Cuba.

Second, we should continue to press hard in our anti-subversion campaign, not

only for its salutary effect in Latin America but also for the effect it could have

on Castro. Recognition by Castro that there is no chance for a win in Latin

America could go a long way in convincing him that he must meet U.S. minimum

terms.

Third, we should stay flexible.

We should be prepared to meet any event

which might offer the opportunity of a sudden overthrow of Castro (e. g. the

shooting down of a U-2). Also, we should never close the door completely to

possible accommodation with Castro on U.S. terms; in this regard, Administration

officials should avoid making the point publicly that we are after Castro's head

per se.

Fourth, we should ever be cautious about our public posture on any

issue relating to Cuba. Generally speaking, we should try to keep Cuba in per-

spective and in a low-key. The Administration should try to convey the sense

TOP SECRET

DocId: 32423484 Page 28

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 29

TOP SECRET

= 5-

(L) that it fully recognizes and understands the substance and extent of the

threat which Cuba presents to the U.S. and the Hemisphere, and (2) that it

is working hard, steadily, efficiently, confidently, successfully, and with-

out fanfare, in controlling the threat. Conveyance of a sense of high danger,

normally, should be studiously avoided.

GC

Gordon Chase

DocId: 32423484

Page

29

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 30

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 4, 1963

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Cuba Meeting (Without President) Next Tuesday, December 10, 1963

1. I spoke to. John Crimmins at some length about preparations for the meeting

next week regarding new courses of action we can take, short of invasion, to

make life difficult for Castro. He plans to produce the following type of docu-

ment for the meeting.

(a) The paper will include State's recommendation on how we plan to

proceed in the OAS as a result of the Cuban arms cache issue. For

example, should we pugh for a break in diplomatic relations among

the "soft 5", a break in economic relations between Latin America

and Cuba, a break in communications between the OAS countries and

Cuba?

(b) The paper will then describe a number of possible bilateral and

unilateral actions which we can take (e.g. unleashing of the exiles,

low level flights, military feints (at a level which will make the

Cubans, but not the Soviets, jumpy), intensification of covert program).

There will be a brief discussion giving the advantages and disadvantages

of each of these courses of action, along with State's recommendation

in favor or against.

(c) John will get the paper distributed by Saturday afternoon so that

the agencies will have time to consider State's recommendations

before the Tuesday meeting:

2. John plans to meet with Alexis Johnson and the Secretary this evening.

Among other things he hopes to clear the above menu.

3.

Bromley feels that we should try to maintain this meeting as a Standing

Group meeting (among other things, this will allow us to invite the AG).

Attendence at the meeting would be roughly as follows: Ed Martin, somebody

from the 7th floor of State, John McCone, Dez Fitzgerald or Dick Helms,

Roswell Gilpatric, another person from Defense, Don Wilson, and the AG.

Do you have any problems with such a list? How about Douglas Dillon, Maxwell

Taylor, Ted Sorensen?

úC

Gordon Chase

cc: Bromley Smith

DocId: 32423484

Page 30

TOP. SECRET

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 31

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET

• December 2, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Cuba - 6:00 P.M. Meeting

Attached are 2 copies of the talking points which State

prepared for the

Secretary. I assume that the meeting

is on again. Is this right?

2. Assuming the meeting is on, the attendence list now

stands as follows: (1) The President, (2) Secretary Rusk, /

(3) Ed Martin, (4) Secretary McNamara, (5) another DOD

type, (6) Director McCone, (7) Dick Helms or Des Fitzgerald,

(8) Don Wilson, (9) you, and (10) me, as notetaker.

3. In good consetous I should point out that I heard through

the grape-vine that Ben Read cut State's invitation list from

3 to 2 in deference to the President's inclination to abhor a

crowd. Much as I would like to attend the meeting (I have

never attended a Presidential meeting) I will understand

perfectly if you feel I should stay home and mind the store.

If I do not hear from you, I will plan to attend.

Gordon Chase

TOP SECRET

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

DocId: 32423484

Page 31

---

## Page 32

December 12, 1963

MEWORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Re: Checklist al Toples the Foreign Press may raiso, and sbortband

1.

Meetlags with Foreign Statesmen and your travel plans.

I saggars that you explais exactly what you have dons and way.

Toughest probier is de Gaulle, where what is needed is good humored

and easy acceptanco that there appeary to have been & misunderstanding

and that me certainly have so objection il General DeGaulle feels he

stould not come to the United States in 1961. You yourself do not see

how you can get to Europe in that same time. Nevertheless this is not.

a cause for alarm or dispair.

2. Relations with the Soviet Union

Your fIst dipiamarie purpose mas to assure Milkoyan and

Kbrughcher of your denise to sustain lines of communication opened under

President Kennedy and your determination that the US will meet anyone

hall way for peace. You do sos expect a summit meeting but you do expect

to continuo discussion in search of possible agreements.. You will sot

wish to comment on specific lanues, and is particular you will want to be

careful about questions suggesting that the British are more optimiatic

than we are. The fact is that they are, but that me do not mant to maico

an issue of it publicly.

3. South Vletnam

Your determination to carry on the elfort there has been made

clear to all concerned. You and Lodge are in lha closast touca..

You

assume that walle so la on the job he will not engago in polities(!) You

believe that progress is being made both here and in the field toward

walty and as and of backbiting - which you detest.

4. Cuba

You bave indeed asked for a revien of Cuba policy (Max I rankel

story a couple of days ago) and you regard this as one dí the majos con-

tinuiag problems of our foreiga polley.

While that revier in under way

and until you have a chance to consider its results, you have nothing more

to say than that you expeci to taje every available means to stop and tura

bacis the spread al Communism in this bemisabere.

DocId: 32423484

Page 32

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 33

- 2

5. Alliance for Progress

There is no higher priority on your agenda and you are sorking

closely with Secretary Rusk to lind ways and means of increasing the

effectiveness of the Goverament's work on this whole subject.

6. On the Kennedy Round

Yon had a goid talk with Governor Herter this afterzoon; you

have cozlidence in him; the focus of discussion is now in Europe among

the members of the Six, on the agricultural issue, and this is not the time

for you to do more than to say that you have strongly supported the objec-.

tives of tbe Irade Expansion Act right from the beginning and that you

mean to carry on toward the basic objectives set by President Kennedy

iwo years ago.

T. Majaysia

There is a real prospect of new adventures by Sukarzo here, and you

will probably not want to say more than that the situation is ane which you are

watching vory closely and on which we are in very close consultation, not

only with the countries immediately concerned but with the United Kingdos

and Australia.

8. Cambodia

I think you will want to be very reserved. Sihanouk 22g bees

making outrageous statements, but the fact is the prodiem ia pathological

and aot diplomazic, and it would be dangerous to comment even off-tbe

record today.

Wheat Deal

¿on are in favor of ii, but the question is still one at prico

bargaining between the Russians and the traders, and your position is what

President Kennody's was: les the negotiators negotiate.

10. Yesen and the Middle East

I think you may wish to dodge the questions by saying this is another

of the satters you are having siudied and will be reviewing in the next two

days, and you would prefer not lo comment tonight.

11. MLE

You are well briefed on this, and made your own position clear

in Brussels earlier this jail.

McG. B.

DocId: 32423484 Page 33

Copy

E uterinara.

R Intereon lihrarw

---

## Page 34

DocId: 32423484

Page

34

SECHaT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Deputy Director (Plans)

Cost of Cuban Operations

Fiscal Years 1960 - 1964

Supporta/

Fiscal Year

Covertb/

Collection

Covert Actions/

Post-Invasion/

Paramilitary&/Brigade Support

1960

1961

1962

1963

1964

(est.)

Total

$319,534

6,293,580

3,599,274

5,343,973

5,030,000

20,586,361

PA/PropS/

$131,063

$1,677,161

457,633

5,168,584

793,8248/

6,444,098

1,738,9778/

5,786,797

1,767,500

3,520,000

4,888,997

22,596,640

Total

$318,409.

30,164,698

2,975,635

5,038,880,

9,317,500L/

$2,446,167

$1,627,824

4,176,000

3,899,830

565,000

47,815, 122 10, 268,654

43,712,319

17,988,831

21,808,457

20,200,000

106,155,774

administrative

administrative

Includes staff salaries,, purchase of/equipment and

supplies, rental of properties and

facilities, etc.

b/ Covert Collection:

Includes foreign intelligence collection operations and counter-intelligence

operations involving the use of classic agent operations, audio and other technical devices, use

of third-country intelligence and security services, refugee debriefings, etc.

Covert Action:

Includes the broad field of psychological warfare and paramilitary activities

encompassed by NSC 5412:

PA/Prop: Includes political action and propaganda operations involving the use of newspapers,

magazines, other publications, radio, television, etc.

Paramilitary: Includes maritime operations, air operations, training, military hardware, the

formation, development, and dispatch of groups in paramilitary operations.

Brigade Support:

Includes payments to dependents of Brigade 2506 wounded, missing, or killed in

action, medical and

rehabilitation costs of released Brigade members, direct payments to Brigade

members, erc.

il Includes a total of $345,000 for the operation of the inter-Agency Caribbean Admissions Center at

Opa Locka, Florida: $95,000 for fiscal year 1962 and $250,000 for fiscal year 1963.

h/ Includes $5,000,000 for support of autonomous Cuban groups under the covert program approved in

June

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

15 December 1963

SEGRET

---

## Page 35

THE WHITE HOUSE

IVASHINOTON

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

December 27, 1963

MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT - December 19, 1963 - 10:55 A.M.

SUBJECT: Cuba

Others Present: Acting Secretary Ball; Ambassador Thompson; Deputy

Under Secretary Johnson; Assistant Secretary Martin;

John Crimmins; Acting Secretary Gilpatric; Secretary

Vance; General Wheeler; Secretary Dillon; Acting

Director General Carter; Richard Helms; Desmond

Fitzgerald; Deputy Director Wilson; McGeorge Bundy;

William Moyers; George Reedy; Gordon Chase.

The primary purpose of the meeting was to brief the President in depth about

some of the basic Cuban issues.

Essentially, the discussion described where

we have been since January, 1963, where we are now, and where we can go.

(An outline which was prepared for the discussion is attached.)

1. A large part of the meeting was devoted to a briefing by Mr. Fitzgerald

and a general discussion on CIA's present covert program and on the U.S.

Government's economic denial program. Essentially, this part of the dis-

cussion covered 6 areas.

(a) Mr. Fitzgerald described covert intelligence activities directed

against Castro's regime, including the numbers, characteristics, and geo-

graphic spread of CIA assets within Cuba.

(b) Mi. Fitzgerald described ClA-controlled radio programs and other

propaganda media directed at Cuba which have been used to encourage low

risk, simple sabotage and other forms of active and passive resistance, and

to stimulate tension within the regime and between Cuba and the Soviet Bloc.

He noted the recent increase of spontaneous anti-regime propaganda inside Cuba.

to deny to Cuba commodities from the Frèe World which are critical to the

economy. The results have been mixed. For example, while we have been able

to penetrate certain European firms which deal with Cuba, we also know that

equipment vitally needed in Cuba, some of U.S. origin, reaches the island via

Canada and Great Britain.

DocId: 32423484 Page 35

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE Copy

Lyndon.B. Johnson_Library

---

## Page 36

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

- 2 -

The group agreed that this is not an easy problem; Mr. Ball said that our

allies have always been reluctant to interfere with private traders and have

always had a different view of Free World/Bloc trade than we have had.

Nevertheless, it was also agreed that we should intensify our efforts and that

there are still things we can do. First, Mr. Crimmins noted that we could

consider ways in which the new amendment to the Foreign Assistance Author-

ization Act (prevents assistance to any country whose planes or ships carry

commodities to Cuba) can be used to reinforce our economic denial program.

Second, Mr. Ball said that the question of Canadian trade in sensitive items

would be taken up with the Canadian Minister of Economics and Trade on

December 20; later, My. Ball will talk to other appropriate Free World gov-

ernments also. Third, the President directed that the agencies prepare a

detailed memorandum (including the names of companies and commodities in-

volved in Free World trade with Cuba) which, inter alia, will be useful for his

forthcoming talks with Prime Ministers Home and Pearson.

(d) Mr. Fitzgerald spoke about CIA's program to identify, seek out, and

establish contact with potentially dissident non-Communist elements in the

power centers of the regime with a view to stimulating an internal coup which

would dislodge Castro. Our effort is based on the premise that a popular up-

rising in Cuba is unlikely, primarily because Castro is capable of controlling

such

an uprising. Instead, we are trying to penetrate the Cuban regime's

power structure. In this regard, we have had only limited success. On the

one hand, we have been able to make an important penetration in the Cuban

army. On the other hand, the dissident elements, while willing to act, are not

yet willing to act together. They simply don't trust each other, mainly because

Castro has been successful, in the past, in penetrating dissident groups.

The President asked whether there is any significant insurgency within Cuba.

Mr. Fitzgerald said there is some but that there is no national movement on :

which we can build. Mr. Bundy noted that the insurgents generally seem to suf-

fer heavy losses at Castro's hands..

(e) Mr. Fitzgerald said that CIA has directed four small scale, externally

mounted sabotage operations for the purpose of stimulating resistance and

hurting Cuba economically. The discussion then focussed on a proposed attack

on a major target. -- the Matanzas power plant. Mr. Fitzgerald noted that this

would have a significant favorable impact, psychologically as well as econom-

ically; the dissidents would view the attack as evidence that the Johnson Admin-

istration is not giving up the fight for Cuba.

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

DocId: 32423484

Page 36

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 37

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

- 3-

But there are a number of disadvantages to the power plant attack. First, the

chances of total success (e.g. target destroyed, no one caught) are less than

50-50 while the chances of partial success (target destroyed, people caught) are

only somewhat better than 50-50. Second, if the raiders get caught, they will

undoubtedly admit their CIA connection. (General Carter believed this point

was weak -- we get blamed for everything that happens in Cuba anyway.) Third,

such an attack will be highly visible and will have a high noise-level.

-gay visible and wi

In this

regard, Mr. Bundy said that we might want to lie low for now so that Castro,

presently under a strain because of the arms cache discovery, will not be able

to shift the accusing finger in our direction.

slow up the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Cuba. Fifth, Ambassador Thompson

said that the timing seemed bad -- the Soviets now appeared to be in a situation

where they may be thinking of cutting back aid to Cuba. They will draw a lot

of conclusions from the first acts of President Johnson. An attack on a big

Cuban target could give Castro important leverage in his negotiations for more

Soviet aid.

General Wheeler thought that, to improve the chance of success, we might want

to try to hit the Matanzas power plant from the air; it should be noted that there

have already been some free-lance raids over Cuba. Alexis Johnson pointed out

that an air strike might cause retaliation against one of our U-2 flights.

In response to a question, Secretary Vance indicated that he was in favor of an

attack on Matanzas.

It was decided that there will be no air or ground attack on the Matanzas power

plant at this time, primarily because of its high probability of failure and be-

cause of the Soviet dimension. However, it was agreed, in principle, that low-

risk sabotage efforts could go forward along with the planning necessary to

develop an air strike capability.

(f) Mr. Fitzgerald described CIA's program in aiding two autonomous

Cuban exile groups, which will be operating from outside the U.S. One group,

which is headed by Manuel Artime, will start operating out of Costa Rica and

Nicaragua in February; the other group is headed by Manolo Ray who is some-

what to the left of Artime, but probably has the best following within Cuba. Both

of these groups will conduct externally mounted raids on Cuba, and will send

teams inside Cuba to conduct internal sabotage and to establish contact with dis-

sidents. Mr. Fitzgerald added that there are some disadvantages in these oper-

ations -- the groups aren't trained by CIA and they operate outside of CLA control.

But there are advantages too -- they operate from outside United States territory

and we will have relatively little trouble denying U.S. association with these groups.

DocId: 32423484 Page 37

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 38

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

-4-

Mr. Bundy noted, and Mr. Fitzgerald agreed, that these groups operate a

long distance away from the target; we cannot expect too much effect from

their raids.

2. Mr. Bundy gave a very quick briefing on some other aspects of the current

Cuban situation. (The group paused to read the attached CIA situation brief. )

(a) With respect to Soviet/ Cuban military strength on the island, Mr.

Bundy noted that one of our primary objectives. is to ensure that there is no

reintroduction of offensive missiles. The camera is our best inspector and, so

far as we know, there are no offensive missiles now in Cuba. Mr. Bundy added

that we are concerned about the transfer of SAM control to the Cubans in about

mid-1964, and we will have to watch this development carefully. As for the

Soviet troops, the general consensus of the group was that the big withdrawals

are over and that, from here on, the withdrawals will proceed more slowly.

(b) Mr. Bundy noted, in passing, our anti-subversion efforts. The key to

the problem is to build up the will and capabilities of the Latin American

countries to counter the threat. Our efforts in the field of controlling travel

between Latin America and Cuba are also important.

(c)

Mr. Bundy described briefly the very tenuous, sensitive, and marginal

contacts we have established with Castro himself. The initiative is on Castro's

part and we are essentially faced with a decision as to whether or not we are

prepared to listen to what Castro has to say. Mr. Ball noted that such U.S. /

Cuban contacts could have an unsettling effect on Soviet/Cuban relations.

3. MI. Bundy described several unilateral and bilateral courses of action we

can take in the future to make life difficult for Castro.

(a) Air attacks, unleashing of exiles (allowing them to use U.S. territory

as a base for attacks on Cuba), and low level flights are aggressive-type acts

which have distinct advantages but which are similar in that they all tend to

raise the noise-level. Low level flights, for example, would provide us with

more intelligence and would irritate and harass Castro.. At the same time, they

could precipitate the shooting down of a U-2.

(b) Mr. Bundy said that we can take further unilateral shipping measures

-- e.g. close ports and deny U.S. -financed commodities to lines engaged in

Free World shipping to Cuba. He noted, however, that we have found through

past experience that bilateral measures are more effective in reducing Free

World shipping to Cuba. At the same time, we should not deceive ourselves.

DocId:32423484

Page 38

TOP SECRET - SENSIT Copy

"Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 39

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

- 5-

We should recognize that the Soviets are capable of handling all Cuba's

shipping needs even if we are able to eliminate Free World shipping to Cuba.

(c) MT. Bundy said that the President could make a public statement in

the near future, taking a more vigorous line than we have in the past.

that in his November 18 speech, President Kennedy made two points about Cuba

-- the first was designed to encourage anti-Castro elements within Cuba to

revolt, and the second was to indicate that we would not permit another Cuba in

the Hemisphere.

(d) Bilaterally there are possibilities of increasing our pressures against

Free World trade to Cuba. Spain should be a high priority target.

NOTE: At this point the President left the room and there was a brief discussion

about the exiles in Florida. Mr. Crimmins said that resettlement remains our

basic policy. It is true that the exiles feel that the pressure for their resettle-

ment is intense. In fact, it is no more intense now than it has been for some time.

5. On the President's return to the room, Mr. Bundy introduced the subject of

the discovery in Venezuela of the Cuban arms cache.

(2) Mr. Helms gave a graphic presentation of the link between the arms

cache and a plot to upset the elections in Caracas.

(D) Mr. Martin explained the status of the OAS investigation of the arms

cache.

The evidence is convincing in showing that the arms were from Cuba.

The OAS investigating team is still working on its report. Hopefully, it will be

able to tie the arms cache into a general plot to subvert Venezuela. The report

should be ready by about January 10.

(c) Mr. Bundy described the types of action we can hope to get in the OAS

as a result of the discovery of the arms cache. The most interesting is the

surveillance action where we have essentially two basic choices - we may want

to push for a system which involves search and seizure of Cuban vessels on the

high seas; this implies the possible use of force. Or we can push for a system

involving the search and seizure of Cuban vessels in territorial waters; this

evades the'issue of force.. Mr. Bundy added that it is still too early to know

how far the Latin Americans will go in support of force against Castro. We.

have put out feelers.

6. Mr. Bundy brought up the problem of lifting travel restrictions on Americans

who wish to go to Cuba. Mr. Ball noted that a great number of students want to

DocId: 32423484

• Page

39

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE COpY

tyndon-B.-Johnson- Library

---

## Page 40

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

- 6-

go down to Cuba during the Christmas holidays and that Justice Department

recommends that we lift our travel restrictions. If we don't, we will probably

be obliged to put many of the students in jail when they return; this will be

embarrassing. Mr. Ball added that the State Department is tentatively opposed

to lifting the travel restrictions because of the effect it will have on Latin

American countries. We have been trying to get the Latin Americans to impose

restrictions on travel to Cuba; if we lift our own restrictions, our position will

be considerably weakened. Mr. Ball said that he would be meeting with the

Attorney General later in the day to talk about the subject.

Tentatively, the President indicated that he favored maintaining the travel

restrictions and a policy of selective prosecution.

Gordon Chase

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

DocId: 32423484

•Page 40

Copy

Lyndon-B.Johnson-Library.

---

## Page 41

C Cuta

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET - EYES ONLY

January 9, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Sabotage against Castro

Three small-scale sabotage operations have been approved by the

Special Group, but this recommendation is based on a routine con-

tinuation of broad policy guidance which I think you may wish

to review.. The three operations involved are:

(1) a commando sabotage operation against a coastal

warehouse and pier;

(2) a sabotage attack against naval or patrol vessels in

a harbor;

and

(3) a sabotage operation against a fuel barge proceeding

in coastal waters.

All of these operations would have been approved three months ago,

and indeed one of them is a rescheduling of an operation aborted

because of high seas.

While it is always hard to predict the noise

level in these matters, these operations seem comparable to the

small attack on a Cuban naval patrol which occurred in late December

which Castro promptly blamed on you (in fact it was an operation

approved before November 22 and not cancelled thereafter because it.

seemed to fall within the guidance you expressed in your first review

of the Cuban problem).

The policy question now is this: If we continue these even small

sabotage operations, Castro will certainly know it. Equally, if we

call them off, he will know it, and so will the Russians.

We thus

have an opportunity to choose.

I doubt if this choice should be made on momentum alone.

I therefore recommend a Cabinet-level review of the whole principle

of covert sabotage against Cuba. I know that Rusk has never liked it

and that McNamara thinks it does very little good.

McCone and the CIA

are for it, and so are most of the middle-level officers dealing with the

Castro problem.

I myself consider the matter extremely evenly balanced,

SECRET. - EYES ONLY

DocId: 32423484

Page 41

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 42

(

SECRET - EYES ONLY

- 2 -

Jan. 9, 1964

but before hearing full argument, my guess is that in your position

I would stop sabotage attacks on the ground that they are illegal,

ineffective, and damaging to our broader policy. I might then wish

to make a little capital from this decision with the Soviet Union.

McG. B.

SECRET - EYES ONLY

DocId: 32423484

Page

42

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 43

SECRET - EYES ONLY

January 9, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Sabotage against Castro

Three small-acale sabotage operaiiona bavo bean approved by the

Spactal Group. but this racommendation is based on a routina con-

tinuation a broad polley guidance which I thisk you may viab

to revione. The thres operadons laralved are:

(1) a commando sabotago operatios agrisat a coastal

TarAhouse and plas;

(2) a sabotage attack againsi naval or patrol vassala la

a harbor; and

(3) a sabotago operation againse a fuel bargo procoasting

la coastal waters.

All of those operallons would have been approved taros months ago.

and indeed one of them is a reschoduling al an oparation aborted

baçauso ol high seas. While it ls always hard to predies the soiso

level in those matters, thase oparations seam comparable to the

small attack on a Cuban saval patrol which occurrad in lata Decerabas

which Castro promptly blamed on you lin fact il was an operatios

approved before Novamber 22 and not cancallad thereafter because it

seemad lo fall wiibis the guidance you axpressed is your flist roviov

al tha Cabas probiara. ..

The policy question som la tale: Il me contisua thero anos small

saborage operadons, Castro will certainly know it. Egrally, il no

call tbem off, he will know it, and so will the Russians. We thas

havo an opportuatty to choose.

I doubt ll this choica sboald be made on momastus alosa.

I resoloro racosmand s Cabinet-laval savion of the mhole prisciplo

of conort sabotago agaizas Cube.

I know that Rusk has never liked le

and thas bicNamara thinks lt does very little good. idccone and la CLA

aro 10x18, and so aso most ol the middle-loval officara dealing wita tho

Castro prodlam. I mysall consider the matter extidmaly avanly balaaced,

SECRET - EYES ONLY

DocId: 32423484 Page 43

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 44

SECRET - EYES ONLY

Jas: 9, 196*

sus before bearing fall argument, my quess is thai in your position

I would stop sabotage attacks on the ground that they ara illegal,

ineffective, and damagiay to our broador polley. I might thes wish

to mako a little capital from this decision with the Soviat Unlos.

Me. B.:

SECRET = EYES ONLY

DocId: 32423484

Page

44

Copy

l unrion A

Inhason librarv

---

## Page 45

Cata Plin,

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Counselor and Chairman

Policy Planning Council

Washington

SECRET ATTACHMENT

February 18, 1964

Mr. MacGeorze Bundy:

Re: Cuba Paper

Herewith the paper which Tom Marn's office

riskodad I send to you.

By way of background, this 1s a rough draft

exposition of issues which need to be examined.

Ths terms of reference briefly were these:

"One conceivable way to deal with the Hanol and

Havana problems is by imosing overt, measured

sanctions against the source of aggression or

convincing the authorities in those capitals

that they were likely to suffer such reprisal to

the point

whers they would cease their Illegal

actions...

Under Bob Johnson for the Far East and under

mygelf for Latin America, we attempted to get down

on paper the results of an examination of an array of

Issues in both areas responsive to the terms of reference

"alt proposed. The results for the examination of

cuba are reflected primarily in pages 5 through 17r.

I suggest jou may wish to glance at the index.

I roemphasize this paper is = rough draft produced

within a four-day time frame by several officers in

S/P.

Sincerelys

Ford

FSO

Copy:

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

DocId:32423484

Page

45

---

## Page 46

SECRET

-5 -

III. Primary and Secondary Objectives

A. Primary

Our aim in this operation would be to end the potential

of the Castro regime, and of the USSR or Communist China through

the Castro regime, to extend Communist influence and power in

this hemisphere. Immediately, however, a very basic problem

arises: How can we hope to attain this object short of getting

rid of the Castro regime itself? It is entirely possible that

Castro might decide

at any given moment to foreswear in solemn

terms any intention of interfering in any way in the internal

affairs of other Latin American countries.

As a matter of

fact, he denies currently any such activity on his part.

Conceivably, if US pressures proved effective he might go

further

SECRET

DocId: 32423484 Page 46

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 47

SECRET

- 6 -

further and abandon identifiable activities such as the -

training of nationals of other countries, the dissemination

of insurrection propaganda, and insurrection inciting broad-

casts. But could we have any assurance that once he had

formally complied with our wishes and we had eased the

pressures mounted against him, he would not quickly resume

his previous course? Or that the end result of our efforts

would not merely be a more effective concealment of continued

Cuban manipulations?

The problem is not alone that Comunists in a situation

like this literally and as a matter of principle on their part

cannot be trusted. There is the added difficulty of the

peculiar character of Castro and certain of his closest

associates. • Evidently revolution is their raison d'etre as

political

SECRET

DocId: 32423484 Page 47

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 48

DocId: 32423484 Page 48

SECRET

-7-

political beings. We have every reason to believe that they

no more could give up their revolutionary agitations and

activities than they could stop breathing. We might hope that

the Soviet leaders, with their greater sense of responsibility

in a nuclear age, could be made to see the dangers and seek to

restrain Castro. But could we expect the Soviet leaders to

be effective? Such evidence as we have suggests that Castro

is quite capable of defying the wishes of Moscow:

(Witness the

test-ban fiasco.

Also consider Moscow's helplessness as

against the Albanians,

the North Koreans, and the North

Vietnamese.) If the Soviets applied strong sanctions, it might

be another matter. But even this is uncertain. And, obviously,

the fact of Communist China adds further complications. On the

one hand, the certainty of Peiping's seizure upon any Soviet

cautionary move to

score points in its cold war with Moscow

would have an

SECRET

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 49

SECRET

-8.

inhibiting effect on the Soviets. On the other, should the

Russians choose to ignore Chinese scorn and threaten to wipe

their hands clean of their dangerous tool, Communist China would

offer Castro an alternative, at least ideologically, and one.

to which he might well turn.

Perhaps of even greater moment is that the primary danger

we face in Castro is not what he does in the way of distributing

arms, disseminating propaganda, training subversives, and

dispatching agents, but in the impact the very existence of his

regime has upon the leftist movement in many Latin American

countries. Presume, for example, that Castro did abandon all his

efforts to export revolution, would this lead to an improvement

of the situation in Venezuela? The simple fact is that Castro

represents

SECRET

DocId: 32423484 Page 49

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 50

SECRET

-9. -

represents a successful defiance of the US, a negation of our

whole hemispheric policy of almost a century and a half. Until

Castro did it, no Latin American could be sure of getting away

with a connunist-type revolution and a tie-in with the Soviet

Union. As long as Castro endures, Communists in other Latin

American countries can, to use Stalin's words, "struggle with

good heart." Also, might not a massive US effort to achieve

the limited objective

of ending Castro's interference in

other countries actually increase rather than diminish his power

indirectly to stimulate revolutionary movements?

Would it not

suggest that except for this one thing, communist rule in Cuba,

together with the military and political ties with the Soviets,

was tolerable to us? Suppose again that Castro bowed to our demands

in this matter. Would we not then be at a point where continued

SECRET

DocId: 32423484

Page 50

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 51

SECRET

-10 -

continued hostility toward the regime was incongruous? Would

we not have moved a decisive step toward granting Castro full

respectability?

If we are to be realistic about our intent to get rid of

the cancerous potential of Castroism, is an attack on the

symptons enough?

Is it not essential to get at the disease itself?

B. Secondary.

While our major interest in the proposed operation

would

be to eliminate the dangers inherent in Castroism, an

added consideration would be to demonstrate to the Soviet Union

that not only is no money to be made from efforts to infiltrate

this hemisphere, but that mounting cost and grave risks

necessarily and inevitably will follow any such efforts. Quite

SECRET

DocId: 32423484 Page 51

Copy

London B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 52

SECRET

- 11 -

evidently the Soviet leaders are concerned for many different

reasons with the incompatability between their active pursult

of world revolutionary goals and Soviet national interests.

The occasion of this generalization is amply demonstrated by history

and

/nature of the conflict that has developed between the USSR

and Communist China. Our best hope for a favorable resolution

of the cold war is for this concern to grow to a point where

Moscow will decide once and for all that world revolution is

a luxury that it simply cannot afford. Perhaps the one thing

that stands in the way of such a happy decision is the prospect,

represented first by the success of Castro in Cuba and second

by the increasingly unstable situation in other Latin American

countries, that big gains can be made in this hemisphere and at

relatively little cost. If we can pull off a successful

SECRET

DocId: 32423484

Page

52

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 53

SECRET

-12 -

campaign against Cuba, this prospect would be all but obliterated.

The gain we would have made could, then, extend far beyond that

of simply increasing the immediate security of this hemisphere.

It could extend to the point of decisive forward movement toward

liquidation of our cold war with the Soviets. (It might also

cold

have implications for our second/war, that with Connunist China.)

IV. Key Issues

The Demand

"The first of a number of basic questions that will

confront us

has to do with the

nature of the demand we would postulate for castro.

In the case

of the missile crisis of October, 1962, a factor that made for

success was that our demand could be clearly and simply stated

and could be satisfied by a concrete action on the part of our

adversaries

It was all a matter of removing offensive weapons

SECRET

DocId:32423484

Page 53

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 54

SECRET

- 13 -

from Cuba. We could in this instance be equally straight

forward if we wanted to be. We could make it a matter of

Mit: + +44 -44490;50

Castro's ceasing"his efforts to export revolution. But where

would this leave us? As noted above, a Castro commitment to

conform to this demand, even if made with sincerity which

would be highly unlikely, would not take care of our problem.

And short of a sincere commitment, we could find ourselves with

a whole can of worms on our hands.

Castro could offer to trade

a commitment, which he could well have no intention of abiding

by, for a change in our policy of hostility; he could stop

for a period all of the objectional activities and leave us out

on a limb; he could more effectively go underground and perhaps

actually increase his potential.

SECRET

DocId:32423484 Page 54

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 55

SECRET

- 14, -

We might, on the other hand, make clear that nothing

less than the demise of the Castro regime would satisfy us.

But could we afford to be so candid? Having endured the regime

for seven years, and having taken a very great deal from it,

how could we justify suddealy

moving for its extinction? And

if we were publicly to acknowledge this as our aim, would not a

sudden blow seem a more logical way of proceeding than the

application of measured pressures? Also, the statement of this

as our objective would maximize the chances, which although

probably slight still must be taken into account, of Soviet

military support of Cuba. It would, in other words, throw down

the gauntlet for the Soviets and without the face saving escape

hatches that would be available if our objective was stated in less

sweeping terms.

SECRET

DocId: 32423484 Page 55

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 56

SECRET

- 15 -.

Probably the most judicious course would be to justify

our action on grounds of defense of the security of other

American states without any clarification of when and under

what circumstances we would consider the security threat at an

end. Once the mounting of pressures was underway, we could

gradually make clear that only a basic change in the regime

of its policies would meet the needs of the situation.

The Occasion

2. A second key question is how do we justify

inauguration of the measures.

Would it not be essential to have

a dramatic incident or action on which to peg our move. Given

the context, in which we would operate, that is the threat to

the security of other Latin American countries, would we not

require convincing and if

possible, alarming evidence that

the threat was real and immediate? With the possible exception

SECRET

DocId: 32423484 Page 56

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 57

SECRET

- 16 -

of the arms cache in Venezuela, such evidence is lacking. It

may be we can make the arms cache an adequate peg. If so,

however, it will be necessary to have an AS finding in regard

to the cache that willmake it a plausible causus for action.

Can we arrange such a reaction when the

matter is considered

in March? Would it not be of the utmost importance that in

addition to

a formal OAS reaction, we have anguished cries for.

succor from individual Latin American countries, if not from

Venezuela then at least from certain of the other Caribbean

countries?

should the arms cache prove a dud, which well way be the

case, should we not wait until we have a satisfactory peg.

Giyen

Castro's proclivity for irresponsibility, we can sit back and

wait with reasonable assurance for one to be thrown into our lap.

But would not a better bet be to provoke one?

SECRET

DocId: 32423484 Page 57

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 58

SECRET

- 17 -

The important thing about the occasioning incident is

that the nore serious it is, and the more the Latin American

countries themselves - in whole of in part -- get out in

front and scream about it, the less complex will be our

problem with regard to Latin American support and world

opinion generally. Should, for example, We rely upon past

actions, including the arns cache, we would necessarily face

a good deal of scepticism and apathy. The world has simply

gotten too used to these, and has, among other things, dis-

counted the actual dangers involved. Under even the most

favorable of circumstances (e.g., a strong OAS resolution re the

arms cache), US movement on the basis of warmed up complaints

of the past will have a ring of phoniness:

t:2455774499794755

If, on the other.

hand

SECRET

DocId:32423484 Page 58

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 59

SECRET

- 17a -

hand, we have something like the assassination of a prominent

Latin American leader, even if only indirectly traceable to the

Cubans, or some kind of arms clash affecting one of the

Latin American countries in which Cuban participation can be

Identified or made to seem plausible, the situation would be

altogether different, particularly if we moved fast.

C. Legal justification. However dramatic and

impressive the immediate occasion for US action, we will still

face the problem of legally justifying ourselves before the

eyes of the world. This will be all the more true since we

can be certain we will be confronted with strong charges 1I

signsanesthanarants +7: 559459-354653

KHAN-TOTEST

the UN, and since bloodshed if and as it occurs will raise the

question of whether pur counter-measures are not entirely

disproportionate to the particular incident occasioning the,

whatever its nature.

Our

SECRET

DocId: 32423484 Page 59

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 60

SECRET

: - 17b

Our legal position would have to rest in the first

instance on the provisions of the UN Charter recognizing the

right of nations to self defense and the right of regional

raw: co0o: 387-78-0-54

groupings of states to establish and maintain collective

security arrangements. With these Charter provisions as a

base, the direct legal case could be built upon subparagraph

3 of Resolution II of the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of

Ministers of Foreign Affairs at Punta del Este in January 1962.

This Resolution, with underscoring added, reads as follows:

"3.

To urge the member states to take those steps

that they may consider appropriate for their

individual of collective self-defense, and to

cooperate, as may be necessary or desirable;

to strengthen their capacity to counteract

threats or acts of aggression, subversion, or

other dangers to peace and security resulting

from the continued intervention in this

hemisphere of Sino-soviet powers in accordance

with the obligations established in treaties

and agreements such as the Charter of the

Organization of American States and the Inter-

American Treaty

of Reciprocal Assistance."

The

SECRET

DocId: 32423484 Page 60

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 61

SECRET

- 17c -

The wording of this paragraph is sufficiently broad

to cover any steps the US should take, even if it moved

entirely on its own. However, the force of the Resolution

would be greatly increased if the AS should specifically

sanction action under the Resolution, even if only after

action had begun. Moreover, the case would obviously be far

more defensible if at least several Latin American states

joined actively in the action program.

The fact that we have this legal cover for moving

against Castro would not still, or even affect, criticism

from the Communist side, of from many neutralists. The

simple fact is that even if we had an air tight legal case,

it would not be accepted in many quarters of the globe.

Perhaps

SECRET

DocId: 32423484

Page 61

Copy

London B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 62

SECRET

- 17d ~

Perhaps, therefore, we should not base our action simply

upon international understandings and agreements.

In the

final analysis, our case will be strongest, and will be most

respected, if we make full use of the inherent Fight of any

state to self-defense, as we did in the missile crisis of

1962. In this connection, we have and should bring into

immediate play the succinctly worded doctrine enunciated by

President Kennedy at his press conference on September 13, 1962.

This Kennedy Doctrine, which was categorically reaffirmed

on occasion of the settlement of the Missile Crisis and as

a caveat limiting the no-invasion "comnitment" but which seems

to have slipped into the background since, reads as follows:

"But let me make this clear once again. If at

any time the Communist build-up in Cuba were to

endanger of interfere with our security in any way,

including our base at Guantanamo, our passage to the

Panama Canal, our missile and space activities in

Cape Canaveral or the lives of the American people

in this

SECRET

DocId: 32423484 Page 62

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 63

SECRET

-17e -

in this country, or if cuba should ever attempt

to expand its aggressive purposes by force or the

threat of force against any nation in the heris-

phere or become an offensive military base of

significant capacity for the Soviet Union, then

this country will do whatever must be done to

protect its own security and that of its allies."

D. Hemispheric Coordination. Perhaps the most

consequential problem the US will face will be to get maximum

solidarity anong the American states for its action. This, as

was noted above, would be greatly facilitated if a serious new

manifestation of the Cuban threat is available.

He HuninT: 19.

Even in this

circumstance, however, great difficulties will be encountered

in securing the support of several key Latin American countries:

Under other circumstances, i.e., action on the basis of warmed

over charges, this support will more than likely be lacking.

The

SECRET

DocId:32423484

Page 63

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 64

SECRET

- 17f -

The fundamental question before us is, therefore, how

far we are willing to go without full hemispheric support, or

even in the face of important hemispheric opposition. If we

are not willing to assume a certain anount of stigma with

regard to a revival of "Yankee Imperialisn" a la the past,

which incidentally will certainly grow as our operations are

drawn out, of even to risk at least a temporary and probably

trying division within the family of American states, the

judicious thing would probably be to refrain from action unless

and until the Cubans give us a sufficiently dangerous justification

as to shock and alarm all.

should we decide thät we have no choice but to risk

friction with our southern allies, it will still be important

that we secure the active cooperation of as many of them as

possible

SECRET

DocId: 32423484

Page

64

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 65

SECRET

- 17g -

possible, and to give the operation an inter-American character.

How can we best do this? One possibility would be to move

for a decision for action (either as against the arms cache

case of against a new incident), seeking to force through a

majority vote in our favor, and after that working bilaterally

with those states sharing our point of view to

get an action

program underway. Does not experience.

suggest, however, that

we have a better chance of getting widespread support, and

keeping down at least the formalization of opposition, if we.

decide upon what we need and intend to do and then tell our

Latin American allies rather than ask about it? Do we not,

=27MM? 9100190-9

in fact, have reason to believe that many of the governments

would, in the face of their domestic political situations,

prefer such a course on our part? In any event, given a

conviction

SECRET

DocId: 32423484

Page 65

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 66

SECRET

- 17h -

conviction on our part that action is necessary. from the

standpoint of our security interests and our overall political

goals, can we afford to risk the delays, the dulling of the

sharpness of a justification when it arises, and the general

fuzzing up of issues that will inevitably follow on a regular

debate-decision making process in a forum of the gamut of

American states?

On the other hand, can we afford to go ahead

without at least the tacit approval of the hemisphere as a

whole? These are key questions that must be answered

E.

The Sequence.

How should the Us proceed in the actual

application of pressures? The underlying concept on which we

would operate calls for an ascending scale of actions that

would continue until the desired changes in the policies or

make up

SECRET

DocId: 32423484 Page

66

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 67

SECRET

-17i -

make up of the Castro regime were effacted. Should we from

the opening salvo of the operation signal our overall

intention as we did in the Missile Crisis? Or should we let

our purposes unfold and develop as incidents and counter-

incidents in the campaign took place? Logically, the nature

of the causative incident should play a large part in this

determination. Should Castro be nailed with an activity of

obviously great gravity, our best tactic would seem to be to

set forth our aims and intentions in maximal terms. But if

we have to move on the basis of a minor of questionable

provocation, would it not be best to tailor one immediate

response to that order of magnitude and leave it to subsequent

Castro actions and defiancies to justify stepping 'up the pace?

If we decide to start with mild measures, would we not need to

plan

SEGRET

DocId: 32423484 Page 67

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 68

SECRET

- 17j -

plan, and perhaps even make known, what sort of actions on

the part of the Cubans would be cause of further actions on

part?

Here, however, an important question arises.

No matter

how we begin, whether on low or high key, do we nothave to

decide from the first how far we are willins ultimately to go?

One thing that would seem axiomatic is that we cannot afford

another "Bay of Pigs" in one form or other. If we embark on a

program designed to achieve certain ends and the first measures,

whether relatively strong of mild, do not achieve those ends,

could we afford to back down and simply accept the status quo

ante, which might in practice leave Castro stronger and more

defiant than ever? But what if the difficulties proved greater

than foreseen and we found ourselves being forced nearer and

nearer to open warfare of even invasion, would our national

interest

SECRET

DocId: 32423484 Page 68

Copy

London B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 69

SECRET

- 17k-

interest be served thereby? Or suppose Soviet reaction were

more violent than anticipated, would we be prepared seriously

to risk a major nuclear war? And what if we found our Latin

American allies pulling completely away from us? would we be

willing to go it alone?

We have to allow the possibility that

the end of theroad will be more hazardous than the beginning.

This being so, should we get on the road in the first place

unless we are willing to see the hazards through to the end,

whatever they may be? Once our power and prestige are

committed, can we, without unacceptable damage to our

hemispheric and world position, yield our ground? Thus the

basic issue becomes not what we will or will not do at the

first or second stage, but what we will or will not do during

the course of the whole campaign.

•If we

SECRET

DocId: 32423484 Page 69

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 70

SECRET

= 17L-

If we decide that there are limits beyond which we wilt

not go, What escape routes can we provide for ourselves?

Would we be prepared to enter into a negotiated

settlement

whereby we would lift pressures in exchange for a verbal

commitment from Castro? What if we proved unable to get

even a verbal commitment? Would a feasible out be simply to

drop the pressures and unilaterally declare that if such and

such took place in the future, we would act with all force?

Might we have as an "alternate objective" a bargain with the

USSR whereby we would lay off Castro if it abandoned its ties

and support?

F. Orchestration

SECRET

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

DocId: 32423484

Page

70

---

## Page 71

SECRET

- 17m -

F. Orchestration.

In the actual application of measures,

we will necessarily be subject to two conflicting considerations.

On the one hand, we will need to get the job done as expeditiously

as possible in order to mininize the chances of adverse re-

actions, untoward incidents, etc. On the other, we will need

to hold damage to. Cuba and the Cuban people to an absolute

minimum.

Which of these should most affect our conduct?

Again, decisive weight might attach to the causative incident.

If it is grave, our best course will probably be to move

i.

both speedily and heavily. Othervise, would we not want to

rely for at least

a trial period on essentially indirect

methods, adding to these only gradually and as unfolding events

justify? However, are the possibilities here sufficiently

great to hold out any prospects of success?

We can tighten

economic

SECRET

Doç1d:32423484 Page 71

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 72

SECRET

- 17n -

economic screws by tougher policies toward our allies and

by a campaign to keep down the hard currency price of sugar.

But could we expect these to produce any more decisive results:

than other economic pressures in the past? We no doubt can

effect a substantial step up of clandestine and subversive

activities, but probably not to a point seriously to bother

the regime unless accompanied by important support from the

outside, which only we could furnish.

Would it be feasible to appear to be acting with restraint

while actually bearing down heavily? Would it not be possible

wait:: 9109.10:247253-05-70:=

for example, to deploy larger scale naval forces inthe vicinity

of Cuba and in effect harass shipping without declaring a formal

blockade? Also could we not, vithout any formal public

acknowledgment, instigate and blithely support a "war of

liberation" in Cuba, using refugees and trying to incite local

residents

SECRET

DocId: 32423484 Page 72

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 73

SECRET

- 170 -

residents to action, and furnishing any and all equipment

needed and desired? Our ain in this case would not be a

single, all encompassing blow, but a succession of little but

growing successes.

As we subjected the regime to the

weight of massive, but

generally unused, military forces and to a US managed and

supported internal war of liberation, we could expect (1) the

world to become accustomed; as in the case of the Communists

in so many instances, and (2) to precipitate particular incidents

of growing seriousness against which we could react with a

step up in the harshness of our measures. Thus, in time, we

could get ourselves in a position where we would be pulling

virtually all stops, but without a corresponding shock to world

opinion or a single take it or leave it challenge to the USSR:

SECRET

DocId: 32423484 Page 73

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 74

SECREI

= 17p -

G. Costs and Risks of Action. There can be little

question that a high pressure operation against Cuba will be

a costly and perhaps risky affair. AT one end of the spectrum is

the possibility of military involvement with the Uss?,. We

can, perhaps, heavily discount this possibility, but we cannot

ignore it.

The Soviet leaders are on record that they will

support Cuba against any military attack.. In a case of an

out and out US invasion, they would be hard pressed to ignore

their assurances without a severe loss of face. In case of a

gradual build up of US hostility, they would find an escape

much easier and would very probably take full advantage of

But we can never be completely sure.. Here, then, is a

chance we would simply have to take. Are the stakes sufficiently

high to take it?

The Uss will certainly take a licking in "international

public

SECRET

DocId: 32423484. Page 74

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 75

DocId: 32423484 Page 75

SECRET

=179 -

public opinion."

Our friends and even

some of our less

friendly friends, night secretely applaud our decision. But

they would keep their approval to themselves. Voiced opinion

will almost certainly be overwhelningly against us. And, in

truth, we will appear in a nasty light, and one which the fires from

our embassies here and there would surely intensify.

We will also face many difficult days in the UN.

Whether lasting damage will have been been done to our

relationship with the hatin American countries can only be

surmised. Certainly we can not escape without an increase in

the deep hostility of leftist inclined elements among the

Latins. And there well may be a revival of real concern arong

even conservative circles over the bugabos of US intervention.

there should be an

But among both radicals and conservatives, there should be a

offsetting increase in respect,

even if partly based on fear,

of the US.

SECRET

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 76

SECRET

-175 -

One immediate cost that will need to be weighed is

the interruption of the detente trend with respect to the

USSR. We can, of course, take the position, as to the Soviets

under similar circumstances, that inproving relations between

the US and the USSR are not incompatible with our liquidation

-=1669919.9

of an intolerable situation on ous own faculties: But at least

until the Cuban matter is finally settled, we can expect

renewed strains in our dealings with the Russians.

H. The Costs and Risks of Failure to Act. On the other

side of the coin are the fact that failure to bring Castro

to heed will: (1) increasingly complicate the problems of

ourselves and our friends in Latin America; (2) raise a real

possibility our having either to tolerate the establishment of a

Communist regime in one or more of the other Latin American

countries or use force to prevent it; (3) encourage the

• d...

SECPET

DocId: 32423484

Page 76

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 77

SECRET

- 175 -

Coumunists, and most importantly the Communists in the

USSR, to believe that this tactic of indirect aggression

can and will work; (d) necessarily erode domestic and foreign

confidence in the will and finness of the ÜS.. In short,

continued tolerance of the aggressive actions and intrigues

of Castro in this hemisphere will represent a self-imposed

but nevertheless serious handicap in our efforts to hold up our

end of the cold war, and otherwise to safeguard our national

security interests.

SECRET

DocId: 32423484

Page 77

-

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 78

(

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET - EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Cuba - Covert Program

1. Peter Jessup and I talked about the Special Group meeting

last week, and the intention to get higher authority's decisions this

week on a number of specific matters.

2. Attached is a collection of background documents which bear

on the problem.

Tab 1 - A letter, dated March 6, from Des Fitzgerald to you

describing a number of decisions which need to be taken.

Tab 2 - A memorandum, dated March 30, to the Special

Group giving a status report on autonomous Cuban exile groups.

Tab 3 - A memorandum, dated about January 25, which re-

views and evaluates the current covert program. Among other

things, it attempts to show how the covert program ties in with our

other programs directed against Cuba.

Tab 4 - A CIA memorandum, dated February 21, describing

our possible courses of action (a) if we decide we can live with

Castro, and (b) if we cannot live with Castro.

Tab 5 - A memorandum, dated March 17, which describes

the morale among anti-Castro Cubans.

3. In essence, the issues in the covert program seem to boil

down to the following:

(a) CI A now collects intelligence from within Cuba. It is

axiomatic that this will go on, and, thus, no decision from higher

authority is needed.

(b) CIA-controlled radio programs and other propaganda

media are now directed at Cuba to encourage low risk, simple

sabotage and other forms of active and passive resistance, and to

stimulate tension within the regime and between Cuba and the Soviet

Bloc.

SECRET

DocId: 32423484

Page 78

Copy

London B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 79

SECRET - EYES ONLY

-2 -

Higher authority may want to continue or disband this program.

(c) CIA is now working with State in its economic denial

¿ program.

Higher authority may want to continue of disband this program.

(d) CIA is now trying to identify, seek out, and establish

contact with potentially dissident non-Communist elements in the

power centers of the regime.

Higher authority may want to continue or disband this program.

(e) CIA is now supporting two autonomous Cuban exile groups.

These will be operating in the very near future. While withdrawal of

our support will not prevent these groups from raiding Cuba in the

short run, it will probably dry up this capability over the long run.

Higher authority may want to (1) withdraw support immediately

and try, if possible, to prevent any raids, (2) withdraw support if

and when the exile activities

seem to be leading to an intolerable

situation, or (3) continue support to the exile groups indefinitely.

(f) CIA now supports and directs a sabotage raiding apparatus

in Florida; this apparatus is now standing by, waiting for something

to do.

Higher authority may want to (1) disband the apparatus, (2) per-

mit the apparatus to go ahead with its sabotage program.

(g) CIA now has the capacity to sabotage Cuban merchant

ships calling at foreign ports.

Higher authority may want to (1) disband the program, (2) try to

keep this capacity on the shelf for a while longer, or (3) permit the

sabotage of Cuban ships.

4. Where do we go from here?

(a) Peter

Jessup is prepared to boil down whatever documents

in the folder you think the President ought to read before the meeting.

Please let me know which ones.

SECRET

Copy

DocId: 32423484

Page 79

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 80

SECRET - EYES ONLY

- 3.

(b) It seems to me that we might need another paper for

the meeting - perhaps a 3 or 4 page paper, which describes briefly

the pros and cons of the issues listed above under paragraph 3.

Such a paper might or might not include departmental recommenda-

tions.

Please let me know your views on this.

Gordon Chase

SECRET

DocId: 32423484

Page

80

Lyndon

Copy

B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 81

= YESONLY I

SECRET

6 March 1964

The Honorable McGeorge Bundy

Special Assistant to the President

The White House

Washington, D.C.

Dear. Mac:

Dick Helms and I are most appreciative of the

opportunity you gave us this morning for a thorough

discussion of the Agency's various operational problems

in connection with Cuba. It was very helpful to us and

has served to clarify to a great extent our own thinking

on the future of our various operational programs.

It

might perhaps be well to set forth, in this informal

tashion, a list of the various topics which we discussed

together

with the considerations that appear to me to

apply.

In the first place, as you know very well, although

the Agency appears as the proposer of most covert action

programs at the Special Group and elsewhere, we do this

only in response to what we understand to be policy

requirements and have no interest in either commencing

or perpetuating any programs which are not demanded by

policy and which are not geared to the accomplishment of

The interdependent program of

actions which we proposed last spring and which was

accepted in June was based on three propositions which

were accepted at the time: (a) that it was in the U.s.

interest to get rid of Castro; (b) that, in attempting

to do so, the U.S. did not wish either to employ overt

force or

to raise the international "noise level" to an

unacceptable degree; and (c) that the ultimate objective

of the program was not mass uprisings but to encourage

disaffected elements within the military establishment

and other power centers of the regime to carry out a coup.

SECRET

DocId: 32423484

Page

81

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 82

EYES UNIT

SECRET

2

The resulting program represented a maximum covert

effort but only a minimum overall national effort which

could result in overthrowing Castro. The percentage of

chance of achieving this purpose was admittedly never

too high even had the program proceeded on full blower.

In fact the economic part of the program suffered a

serious, if not fatal, reverse with the Leyland bus

contract and subsequent moves by European suppliers to

take advantage of Castro's improved cash position.

The

sabotage raids, built into the program as a sort of

firing pin for

internal unrest and tocreate the conditions

for a coup, which was to be the main force leading to

Castro's defeat, ran only from August to December and only

The effectiveness of these

five raids is certainly debatable; there are strong pro-

ponents on both sides of the argument.

Regardless of how

that debate might come out, however, five rather low-key

raids followed by the present three-month hiatus, the

latter clearly noted by pro- and anti-Castroites

alike,

adds up to a program of a much smaller dimension than

originally envisioned which could not be expected to have

had the desired detonating effect.

circumstances well known

a very low point indeed.

In my estimation, a covert

program at this time designed to overthrow

castro is not

realistic. Acceptance of risks and noise level of a

greater magnitude than we had in mind in June would be

needed to stand a chance in view of the developments

since last June. This then raises the question of what

should happen now to the various bits and pieces of the

June program. I would like to mention these separately

and refer to some of the considerations typical to each.

The sabotage raids are conducted by Cuban exile

groups held and trained in Florida and entirely subject

to our planning and control. There are three of these

groups totaling approximately 50 men. To place them in

position and recover them there requires an extensive

maritime apparatus in florida, which likewise serves

intelligence agent infiltrations and exfiltrations.

To maintain the raiding capability on a stand-by basis

is expensive but, more importantly, the raiding groups

SEGRET

DocId: 32423484 Page 82

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 83

EYES ONLY

SEORET

3

themselves have a relatively short shelf life; if not

employed their morale deteriorates and some of the

members, usually the best motivated,

drop out.

Replace-

ments can be acquired and trained but their caliber and

morale is in large part determined by the morale of the

exile community as a whole.

We probably can retain the

present raiding groups at roughly their current capa-

bilities for another month or two, although the well-

known Cuban volatility is capable

of causing sudden and

more rapid deterioration.

In short, we will need to know within a reasonable

time whether we should continue to effect repairs to

and keep in being our sabotage raiding apparatus. The

dismemberment of these raiding teams could be accomplished

without too much shock to the exile community. It would

se noticed, but, ii done carefully, particularly it it

coincided with the commencement of

it should not cause undue repercussions and polemics

against U.S. policy.

As you know, again as

part of the June plan, we are

supporting two "autonomous" exile groups headed respective-

ly by Manuel Artime and Manolo Ray.

In both cases we have

gone to maximum lengths to preserve the deniability of U.s.

complicity in the operation. Artime, who now possesses

the greater mechanical and paramilitary apparatus,

has

required a good deal of hand-feeding although still within

the context of deniability..

He will probably not be ready

for his operations against Cuba before April or May of

this year.

He possesses most of his hardware and maritime

equipment and has negotiated geographical and political

bases in Central America.

Manolo Ray has been

handled

on a much more independent basis. We have furnished him

money and a certain amount of general advice. He does not

possess the physical accoutrements that Artime has and is

probably not as well equipped in terms of professional

planning. Ray has a better political image inside Cuba

among supporters of the revolution and has recently

acquired, according to reports, some of the other left-

wing exile activist groups such as Gutierrez Menoyo and

his Second Front of the Escambray.

He is said to be ready

to move. into Cuba on a clandestine basis late this spring.

His first weapon will be sabotage inside Cuba, apparently

not externally-mounted hit-and-run raids.

Do01d: 32423484 Page

83

Copy

london B. lohnson Library

---

## Page 84

EYESONLY

4

If U.S. policy should demand that the "autonomous"

operations be suspended, we could of course cut off our

support immediately.

Artime and his group might or might

not disintegrate at once.

Manolo Ray almost certainly

would continue. Both groups are based outside the United

States and our only real leverage on them is through our

financial support but withdrawal of this support would

probably be fatal to their operations in time.

A cutoff

rumored, especially in the case of Artime, and the collapse

of the only remaining evidence of exile action against

Castro would hit the exile community hard which is what

it in turn would do to its favorite target, U.s. policy.

The exile of today, however, appears to have lost much of

capacity for causing domestic trouble which he had a year

or two ago. The Central American countries in which the

exile bases exist would be greatly confused, although we

have carefully never indicated to the governments of these

countries any more than U.S. sympathy for the "autonomous"

groups.

We have a capacity, which is increasing, to sabotage

Cuban merchant ships calling at foreign ports. We are

emphasizing in this program the more subtle forms of

sabotage as against large explosions obviously stemming

from agent-placed bombs and limpets.

The Cuban merchant

fleet,

among the most badly run in the world, can be

helped along to a measurable degree by this program.

On the economic warfare front, as you know, we have

for many months conducted a covert denial program based

on limited capabilities directed at very narrow targets.

The effectiveness of this program is dependent on the

careful selection of items to be denied in terms of their

critical value to a key element of the Cuban economy•

Despite the virtual collapse of the U.S. overall economic

denial program against Cuba, we still retain the capacity,

using unofficial and covert

methods, to hurt but obviousLy

not to destroy certain bits of the Cuban economy.

This

effort can be complemented by carefully concealed contami-

nation of lubricants and similar actions.

SECRET

DocId: 32423484 : Page

84

Copy

London B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 85

EYES ONIYI

022T

5

Our program to get in touch with and subvert members

of the military establishment and other elite groups in

Cuba continues.. Its chance of success naturally rises

and falls with the state of morale inside Cuba as influ-

enced by the success or inactivity of our other programs

• the Uos. posture in general.

Our intelligence program continues at full force.

It will be affected by anti-Castro morale but we believe

that we can offset the effects of further deterioration

in this morale by increasingly tightened and efficient

operations.

We are seeking your advice to know which of the above

lines of actions we should continue, which we should try

to retain as a shelf capability and which to abandon..

(Of

course, intelligence collection would continue.)

As parts

of an

integrated national program designed to have at

least a fighting chance to get rid'of Castro, they seemed

to make sense;

as separate pieces they can serve to

exert some braking effect on Castro's progress, but that

is about all.

Sincerely,

Desmond FitzGerald

DocId: 32423484

Page

85

Copy

London B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 86

E/CS ONLY

SECRET

30 March 1964

FROM THE COORDINATOR OF CUBAN AFFAIRS

TO THE SPECIAL GROUP

SUBJECT:

Status Report on Autonomous Cuban Exile Groups

I. The purpose of this memorandum is to inform the members

of the Special Group as to the current state

of operational

readiness of the

autonomous Cuban exile groups which receive

U.S. Government support and to indicate what might be expected

of these groups in the relatively near future.

2. As part of the covert program authorized in June 1963;

CIA is providing financial and some technical support to two

autonomous Cuban exile groups headed respectively by Manuel Ray

5 7-I

and Manuel Artime.

I our judgment, Artime

and, to a somewiat

lesser extent, Ray, now possess the hardware and maritime

equipment as well as the geographical and political bases in

Central America needed to launch independent infiltration and

sabotage operations against Cuba.

Both groups also appear to

have reached a state of training and psychological readiness

which could impel their leaders to launch operations against

Cuba at almost any time and with little or no notice to the

U.S. Government.

suonatis

774

DocId:32423484

Page 86

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 87

?.?.

374

2

3. The possibillty of imminent unilateral operations on

the part of the autonomous groups is brought to the attention

of the Special Group at this time since it is related to the

question of the luture of CIA-controllod sabotago aid harass-,

ment operations now under review by higher authority. This

relationship was described in Part V of the memorandum

entitled "Review of Current Program of Covert Action Against

Cuba," dated 24 January 1964, Ha

Tinald ba nobella

that if a policy decision is made to terminate sabotage and

harassment operations for the autonomous groups as well as for

CIA, it will be necessary to terminate support for the auto-

nomous groups as CIA would not be in a position to insure

that they would refrain from raids and sabotage even if so

THEn: 51555740424595iftolhenattssmp-

requested.

In fact, it

now appears likely that neither group

will disintegrate at once upon notification of termination of

U.S. subsidies. While withdrawal of U.S. financial aid and

moral support would probably be fatal to their operations in

time, they are likely to make strenuous efforts to find other

sources of support. In so doing and in order to prove their

viability to potential supporters, they would, in their des-

peration, probably feel compelled to launch one or more

dramatic raids against Cuba.

EVAS ONLY

DocId:32423484 Page 87

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 88

C20U?

Excluded fron automatio

doungrading and

declassification

This document con s ci-

is rages

No. 70f_

• Copies, Series A

557

3

Cibant 1/25/44

REVIEW OF CURRENT PROGRAM 08

COVERT ACTION ACHIKST CUBA

I. - The Current Situation in Cuba

DarIag 1953 the situazion 1n Cuba steadily worsened. Ira

economy continued its decline and castro vas not able

to balt:

she dosmard curve. Furticana Flora Intensified Cuba's econonio

problems. Disillusloment and apathy among the great rajority

of the populazion contimued to grou, and enthustasa was increasingly

restricted to a hard core. As popular support vared, coercion and

testor jere employed nore and sore to zaintala the sezius's control.

Castro a delive to convert Cuba into a standard communist prototype

caused Increasing disillusioment anong his original followers.

His stature in tie eyes of zany Cubang and Intia Anericana suftared

wich the realization, in the afternath of the October nissile cils1s,

that cuba had been a pawn snd castro a cipe of soviet pollay.

Despite extrsordinary efforts, Castro has not been able to.

stop acla of defiance against his regtue. Guertilla activity,

alcbough scattered and uncoordinated, continues.

Spontaneous

acts of sabotage are common throughout the island. At great

This refugees still elude his security foIces and sea patrols

to escape fron Cuba. In tals atrosphere, externally ecuated

Ialds against cubas targets hava sdded to Gastro's sease of

frustration and balped sustain hope anong the many Cubany d13-

111ns1oned vita bia regime.

During 1963 Cuba's Intestational situation seemad alrost as

bad as the domestic. Althougà chiaks appeared in the wall, the

U.S. palloy of econonle and diplomatic isolation of Gaja Las

balding up fairly well. Soviet-cuban Ielations clerly sere tarder

strain. Castro scored no foreiga policy victories to provida a

such needed psychological boost. His major effort to stivalato

Castto-type dined uprisings throughost latin Aneries failed to

distupt the Venezuslan elections of December and netted a potentially

enbartassing exposure that Cuba had shipped arms clandestinely to

Venezuela.

These intereal and international trends and develop-

ments brought cuba to a los point during 1963.

Withla the past few veeks, howaver, five developments have

given the Castro regias an importaat political-psycholozical

IIft

SICBET-SHISITSYS

DocId: 32423484

Page

88

Lyndon

B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 89

JELKIT-STASSILVE

• 2 o

They are:

1o. Te realtzation in the Caban Goverment that the

contimuinz high sugar prices in the world sarket

have enabled Cuba so espand 1ts convertibla

CASTEnCY TESSTYES IrOn abOuL $20 Billion to

alrost $100 Illlion daring tbe year.

2. The Sorlet-Cuban trade protocol for 1964, signed

on January 11, and the Khrushchevassuracces of

January 22, deconstrated a soviet willlagness to

mintain 1Es ald and trade prozran at a very

substantial level and to suppart Galan sugar

prices. Ta protocol calls for Cubaa-soviet trade

to Increase by 22 per coat over 1963. soviot

esports, about 40 pes sent of which will be on

.. credit, will Increase by at least 10 per cent.

3a

The distinct possibility that the linited States

pollay of econcule and diplomatle isolation of Cuba

may not be able to stard in the face of increasiag

pressures itca leatera countries to expord trade

with Cuba, extending cradit if necessasy.

Er1tish bus deal, with payment spread over a

five-year period, is an important political and

psychological trimph for castro. Its erosiVE

effects on porential Cubes suppliera are already

class.

4.

The receat rioting sod violence 1a Parma, in which

Castro had some band, will inject new sevolutionary

feIVDI isto CastIoits actividles. In addition,

Parima and its afterath will take the play anay

from the locident of tha Venazuela anua cache.

Tus revolt in Zaazibar, in which Castro also had a

band, is bound to Lapress latin America as vell as

other unstable areas with the length of Fidel's

ana and the poteray of his dectrive.

These

SEC

LVIS

DocId: 32423484

Page

89

Lundon

Capy

B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 90

- 3 .

Thesa recent developuents have provided the upsard

politicsl and psychological thrust Castro's ragine badly

seeded, He now has a flaner bass for his repeated clalma

tbat cuba has survived the full bront of a major United Stasca

effort-to destroy the Gabon revolutios, claina likely to 17

press mary latin Americans as vell as Cubans. In addition,

Castto noù bas the possibility of producing sona tangibla evidenca

that his regize can restore forward nonentum 1a the economy.

Conseruently, the general position of the Castro rezine la

mach Improved over that of three at lour sonths ajo.

I] - Cuszent I. S. Policy and Pooreena

Tue ultimata U.S. objective sa the replacement of te

present soverent in Guba by one fully compatible sath coe

goals of tha baited states..

Is attain its objective, ta are boying, by exerting

archam pressuze tierongà a11 neens short of the use of uill-

tasy force, to create a dessed of disorgasization, uncertainty

sad discontent la Cuba shicà 1111 (s) predisposa elesents in

eta nilliary and otter pover centers of the regime to briag

about the ovsrtiron of the Castzo/Commist group and tha

elimination of the sovies presence 11 Cuba: (D) realera Ebo.

Base for sLiversion in the lenisphere; and (6) Rss13t In

convincing the Sovlets that they are hacking a loslag and

expensive horse.

In order to create tha optina situation just describei,

De bave cera carzying out a progran of integratad, micially

retriorcing and sutually dependent courses of action, Taesa

congrise:

The econmala, political and ssycholorical isolation

Da Cuba frau the fae would

Dental of tase norld mats and sources of

suenly to Cubel: la have undertakes a voriasy.

of overt and covert sativities desigard to

redece frce world trads with Cuba and, especially.

to dany Cuba access to comraditles critical to

It=

DocId: 32423484

Page 90

КГ Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 91

3e.

4..

5.

DocId: 32423484

Page 91

econosy. Proposala for expandinz and intensi

fyiaz these sctivities are now being presented.

Too execution of these aiditional seasures deperus

basically on 3 decision to incur the considerable

political costs and risis that ara entailad.

The reduction of free sorld shinzine in the Ciska

trade: lie have maintained dipionatic pressure

on free-norld sationa to reduce and eventzally

eilmirazo their ships in the lista crade, lie have

denied U.5. finenced cargoes 17 U.S. posta ta

saips Lo the Cuba trade (lisal 220, 29 anended).

To the sume general end, we have employed oxtating

legislation, and the threat of additlonal legis

lation, zestricting econonic and silitary assist

ame to countzles with ships la tbe Cuba trade.

Ine reduction of free world, and the containment

SE SoUlet Bloc, a1E saulee to Cuba: le bave

maintalad dipluatic pressures on free-vorla

countries bavings or wishing to establisa, als

service ta cuba. He are lavaking Iccent legis-

Istlos denyiaz assistanca to countries shose

ships and alicraft carry comoditles to and from

Cuba. In addition, we have exerted diploustle

pressures on frce-carld countiles to deny their

facilities to Soviat Bloe and Gubza sizlinea

zerving of trying to serve Cuba, 05 kazaas 5101

airlines.

Dio liMitation of fEe mala dialonnie selationg

Na23 Gibs: As opportuity las offered, we have

exerted pressure to persuade lIce-norld countrles

to break diplosatic relacieas with Cuba or to

prevent the establisizant.of such zalations with

Efforts to Indemnine the Castro inane abread and

to fristrate cuben attents to enhauca that imizes

By sema of diplonatie, propaganda and covert

usaguTes ve have endervored to doronatrate the

reakuass, fallurea and betrayals of the Castro

IEZIID.

SECRET

IT Cepy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 92

Sut

ILVE

• 5∞

Bo Defense ssainst Castro-Comatst Subversion

tie.

Wishlo Cabs: an Lodicated abovo, all our efforts

to bilag about disorganiratics, uncertalaty and

discontent in lula sra Intended to venics tba

Cubas base for Castro/Corminis subversion.

2. Distsida Cuba:

Bulallatemal: he have sougut, t'arough the Qas,

to obtals soneral Latl7 Asarican recogaltion

of the seriousness of the subversiva threat

and apptoval of recommendations di seasures

to linit travel to and from Cuba, and the

transies ai funda and propaganda. dt tbe

present time, ve intend to expand and Intenaily

tads effort througa actions to le taken by tha

DiS on the basis of cha varezuelan complaint

against Cuba. Beyond the activitica in the 019,

no have made special efforts with the Central

rexican countzlas and Panana to tuva then

tighten controls on the activitles and sovanent

of suiversives, to develop inlazá zad iralore

sarveillance capabillilen, to crcite effective

Intallizeuce organizationg and to establisia a

systen of intolligence exchange.

Do

BILateral:

Tarough tratning, naterial assiat-

anc0 and crchanga di intollizonce, ue bave

worted to laprova the iaternal security

capabilittes of individual couatrios.

Unilateral: In addition to mitilateral and

bilateral nessures, de have continued to

maintala our surface patzola la the vicinity

of Cuba, to trave cur ona commications

systens and lo devolos ote osa latelligence

capabilities against eubversive activitles.

SECRET-SENSITLUE

Doc1d:32423484

Page

92

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 93

SLA

Ise recuation and eventual clinination of tha Sorter

2112Ü25Z PERERACE In Cuba

We bave maintained diplomatic pressure on tie Sortets

do contiana troopanitadazuals and ve have warned tta

Soviets that ne will not tolerato the use of soviet

forces 1s cuba to suppresa popular uprisiag.

Do

ake collection of Intellinerce

We have unintained ald improved out overt and covert

collection oi intelligenco to meet not only u.s.

strategie requiresents but also operational requires

ments cornected sita que covert activities vitain Cuba

We have maintained pestodic bigh-level overflighta

supplesented on a fe: occaalons by los level flighta.

He bave marned the soviets and Cubans against later

ferenca with these flighes..

Corent onerations to seatra and tradermine the Castro

A detalled discassion of lla coverE elesents of out

program appears in Section Illia

¿n stated above, ail these courses of action intezaet and

are LabsIdependenE,

For estaple, our coveri econonic denial

operations are designed to reinforca and ba relaforced by dis

overt scasures as econoute prossure: Bota types of activities

directed agalast los econouy are Intended to ageravate existing

econoule diffleulties and thus to increase the level of dis-

affection not only in the popular masa but particularly la

the gower canters of the rogies: Tuls disaffection enbauces

our ability to establish ncaningíul conteci vita figures la

tha military and atbar power centeIs and to develop latell1-

DANCE SOLICES"

This disaffection is in ture intesstiled by

the evidence of vulnerability to autsida atticis provided

"in

by the succasa of covert salotage and barrasment activitles.

By

SECRAT-SENSITIVE:

DocId: 32423484

9133

Page 93

Lyndon

- Copy

B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 94

SECRET-SENSLILYE

-7.

By the sane token, the failure or eltmination of one of these

mtas1ly supporting courses of action jeopardizes the orbers

and thus compronises the entira progran.

Toranga 1963, these courses of actton were baylag a neasuren

able paaitive impact, lia are noy confronted, honever, by a

serleg of developuents, described 1s Seczion I, which threaten

to arrest ar even reverse ous forward novement. The situation

1s particularly soute with respect to the mainterance of our

ecosonic pressures.

This fact mices this review of our covere

operations particularly tingly and important.

III. Consept of the Covert detion Progran

The CIA covert action progusy alus at astrtaining all

feasible pressures on cuba and at treating and sploitlag

sitzations in Cuis calculated to stimulato dissident elements

eithin the regise, particularly in the amed forces, to carry

out a cous. The objective of the coup tould be to renova

the Castro/Commists from the regime and to eliminato the

entlis soviet presenco Exon Cuba. Recognizing that the U.S.

19 engzged in a race againat time with luca and its Soviet

ally to obstruet the consolidation of Castro's IOgiza at tons

sad to prevent bia iron acioriaz bis arbitions in Latta

AceTies, ve sat the time frame for this prozian at about

eightzen sonths from June 1953.

An orialrally conceived and approved 12 June 1963, the

covert actios prograa vas based on the assumation that u.s.

pallay precludes a military investon on a full blocisdo of

Cuba unica could lesd to a confrontation with the Soviat Union,

In addition, the covert action progran was and 13 predicsted

on the thesis that Its chauce of success would depend beavily

on a sustaired and intanaiva effort in othar sectois, parti-

clariy the cuest economic emial and political isolation

programs, by all elements of the United States fovercent.

1ut, the intoriction of the overt and covert effort against

Cuba 1s Jogarded as a vital and treplaceable fastor 1f thera

1s to be any toço of accomplishing the overall sission

CIA's

SECRET-SENSITIVE

DocId: 32423484

Page 94

Lyndon

*B.

Johnson Library

---

## Page 95

SECRET -BEESITIVE

• 8∞

CIl's integrated covert action program consists of the

following Isterdependent courses of action:

Covert pollention of Intellitence to neet J.3.

IatIonal security Icruirements and to support

eastent and plained covert operstiors. It should

Da soted tbat clandestine maritina operationa sto

2n lategral part oi Intelligence collection.

Za Pronaganda actions to stimulate 1or-519" simple

saborare and other forms of active and passive

realatarca against the regime.

3a

Ecoratic dental actions la support of governaut

vida overt official U,S. eccrumle isolstion

12954e3.

4.

Emploitation and stimalation of alanifestion 1g.

thE CUbaR anci fOECES and Other SUaSE Cuntera oi

the remans to encourage these elements to custy out

s coup against the Castro/Courist factions. CIA

19 identifylog, contactinz and attempting to ego.

tablish chanels of conomication with these ladl-

viduals.

5e

General sabotage and harassment a9 an econonio neapon

and aa a stivulus to interal resístanca..

AS B3

ecoronic reapos, 1t 19 designed to supplement sad

support the overall econonic denial progran by

damaging economically laportant lestallations and to

add to Castro's appaonle problems by forcing him to

divert BONEy, manpower and JeSQUICes fran eCondale.

to Internal security ectivities: As a atimulus to

resistones, sabotage and physical barassuent operations

provida visibla and dimmatle evidenco of the existenca

and capability of organized resistance against toe

rogimes. To the estart that tbess operations are

successful, they also denonstrate to the Cuban

population and allte groups tha vulnerability oi tha

regins to nilitant actiour It is recogalzed that no

single act of saiotage by itseli can esterially affect

the economy or stimulata resistanes, but ve belleve..

that tha

SECRET-SENSITIVE

DocId: 32423484

Page. 95

London

B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 96

SECRET-SENSITIVE

на 9 0

that lie cumlativa psychalogiesl and political

Impact withia Cuta of sustaired sabotaga operations

18 a necessaty element in the accompliatrasat of our

misalon.

Suppost of entonmous unti-Castro Cuben exilo

GATOURIL®

Thase operations are intended to provida

a deniable activity, a seans of supplementing and

expanding out covert capability and a mans of takiag

advantage of untapped palitical and resistanca rescuscas

of the exile commity. the progian non includes too

satoconous aroups store credibilisy as to autonody 13

strengthened by the facts that:

They sto led by wen whose prominenca and status

1a the Cuban ezile commity rases plausible their

secess to funds, equirent and sarpover quite in

dependeut of the U.S.,

¿ot are based in the Caribbean area outajde of

D.5. DerrItory;

Soth have natural, willing allies in power lo

SEVeTal INCIN ¿NETICIN COUntIleS;

Both are Caban and esploy Cubes rationals

exclusively;

Every item of financial and logistie sapport has

been bandled in a marner as to provide marion

pratection agalast proof of CIA or U.S. parti-

01531200€.

The initial ain of thase cperations 15 to strengtben

the will to resist by increasing the tempo of sub

version and sabotage largely safatained until som

by ClA; the eventual sin is to take ine Ilyat

fias tha coastlisa to the interior of cuba.

The discentage of out astonomous cpurstions 18

that it 11 necessary to accept a lover order of

efficiency and esntrol tian rould be considesed

aCCEptable 1I CLA-TUD OPeTIZIORSE.

DE

SECETT-SENSITIVE

DocId: 32423484

• Page

96

London B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 97

15rs

- 10 .

Of the foregoing intez-locking courses of action, lteus

(1) end (2) are 1a brain and no polloy problems regardlaz tsem

are expected. ItEm (3) 13 the subject of another paper whica

1a being presented for concurrent consideration.

Item (4)

Is the essence of our progran and 1s dependent for its succesa

on the results of all other overt and covert courses of action.

Itea (5) bas been the subject of contimal revies sirce tha

-Iocepilon-0f tho progran and is the primary subject of talo

papET..: Consideration of Item (6) (autorcious overations) sizuld

taka place witi a discussion of sabotage and baresirent (Itan 5).

mess latter too liong ara discussed in nore detail la Section V.

belous.

IV. The Sabotate Partner in Retzossect

Le inon of at least 80 acts of interasi sabotago sad 60

dosed clashes betreen Cuban security forces and Insurgents:

alnce 1 Jung, Insurgency and sabotage inside Guis are tot

part of a coordinated program; tbey are acts of Individual

or suall froup defiance. They are strailated by nany factors,

and In onE factCI can ba assigued entire credit. Sabotage

Iacidents, thich Include a hizà proportion of sugar cane

binnings,

cavs a tendency to ba seasonal, a fact which furtisex

obscuses statistical enalysis+ Although it is true that frou

a low point in saborsge incidanta during the sumer of 1963

there was a heavy increase during the fall (folloin, the

councesent of ous taiding activity), se belleva that clez-or

11ght 1s shed on tue effecis of our harassuent prostan by the

atztements of vitresses of varylug points of vies withia Cuba

and by tos acts af the tuban ragina itsell.

&t tamatoda

3110911 August 1953, fire sabotage raida hare been.

All were successful: There was substantial

dange to tha target; all participants vere salely recoverod

no tue planstole deniability of tre operations 1az 101

ompromisede

lack

1o

Abrez I contalas a bile revieu of these operatlonse.

JEERSI-SENSITIYS

Lyndon

Copy

B. Johnson Library

DocId:32423484

Page 97

---

## Page 98

SECRET-SENSITIVE

Too lack of proof of U.3. Involveneat did not prevent

castro fron cortzlas the Cli Nith responsibility. Indeed,

almost every act of defiance against his regina has bera

credited to tbe Agensy.

Castro's erotional reactions to real or runDIed security

threats point up his acute sensitivity to lnternal resiatance

and sussests that be feals hia regina to la far fron secure

fras external threats.

The Sovlet Unlos, on the other bard,

han reacted to the savotage ruids with ruch less vigor and

blastes thos be milcipated, Thole only slurp Icaction,

asido fren the espected propaganda, followed a series of alr

ralds durlog auguat and septaber sponsored by Cuban exile

groups opcrating from floriin and for wich the Aginay had

They did no real danage, bit tiney did

denoustzate that the Cuban air defense systen could be

beachad, and they added substentially to the paycizalogical

IMPREt Of Our flIJI thO Izid3..

Too Agency sabotage raida produced sona very specific

resulta. For example, in the political and psyciolozicai

realis, Cmadian Abassador Nlid reportad in late duzust

cast the incidents that sonth, Including tha Santa lucia

and Casilda operations "disturbod the feelinz of ccnsol1-

dation mo tierrailly which tha Castro ragine had aucezaded

1a GIestLiz in recent ponths." He rsported tit tra Cubana

vere unocatala sad apprehensive over tha possibility of a

Us- camalga of subversion aná sabotage becausa of Cuba's

wilberchility to such a campaiga due to the "low ebò" of

enthugiasa for the Castro regina sung the people: la also

stated that the raids had "raised hopes of those opposed

to the regina" and that "dispiritad opposition had toceived

@ 11111p to 113 norale,"

In a Septaber seport, Ambassador Ried stated that

the "bost impediato effect of suca attacks is the psycho

logical bion dealt to the stability of the castio rogine

with consequent boost in opposition" in corala and

dejection in the counterrevolutionary santa of sons montha

830%

SOCRET-SENSITYNES

DocId: 32423484

Page

98

Lyndon

Сфу

'B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 99

15NO

60220

ago, he said, "has given tay to a save of optinian that tha

Katinum Leader 1a so longer necessaxily a permanent fisture."

Ambassador Kid also reported that Cha GuavarIa had indicated

concern that the ralda would divert such reeded unposer

and resources fron the econonia to the silitary sector.

on 4 Septenber a relladle clandestine soures lu cuba

reported that the scaction of tie average san oa the stscet la

Favans to the news of lso attacko on Casilda and Santa Luciu

129.

"astoundlag.""

Erior to the Cuban govarement's acnounce-

neût of the raida, the average san on the street seened

apathetie, depresaed and in 1 lou stato a norale.

Following

the anconcenest thair sood changed to one of pleasure, joy,

•asd hope,. Ine observationg of lula source sere reinforced

by rise statomento of Cuban refugeea una arrived in the Jas.

abortiy aftex the cubin amouncenest of tha raida.

A Forner injor in tha Euban Rebel Asuy vio broko with

GestIo reported after his exfillistion from Cuba 17 January

196% that the 23 Decenter Sizuanaa vald whica destroyed a

8o6 patral bost was a great boost to norale souz disaffected

Cubano.

A Caban layer with exterslive comections arong Cabin

govarment officials end in the testern cousinity in Bavara

bas just reported thai the "morale effecta of the recess

sabotaga operations are good anonz anti-regina sezuents of

•the population. Sach aces, to thes, indicate that the outsida

sorld 11 sot forgatting the Cuban people, that tha fight con-

flaves and suggests a possible prelude to some talitary action

againat Castso, Opposite noiale effecta are noted mong the

pro-regine segrents who have tended to renain notably quiet

about the regina ELLer SuCCeSSInI sabarage opeIatIoNs.

A Cuban commications technician employed. by the Cubar

rerament reported on 1 Januazy that tha "aet of sabotage

against the torpedo boat on the Isle of pises use yety succesa"

ful so the opinion os tha people end, for sane, publie opinion

saeded sorothing to stimulata 1Er thas happened at La Sigumas

-bad such sa effect: Although at tives failures are suffered

shich depress the people, they are andious for senathing to

bappen, "

Thes

SECRAT-SENSITIVE

DocId: 32423484

Page 99

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 100

- 13 m

The raids also had an Impact on the Cuban adlitary and

security foIces, Certain areas and ports vera placed on

special aloit status. Forces ara often rushed to dalensive

positions; grousd, saval, and air patiols are Irsquently

lamened or intensified; and defensive positions in ladastrial

os agricultural completes are named to met tia real or

Imagined thrests.

The ralds interfere not only with soutina

Illitary tralaing but also with tor's on conatruction and

agricultural projects waich use military personnel. Baul

Cistro personally Investigated the Siguanca incident.

In addition, Castro ampanded his coast ustchino satrari.

tron 461ob9errat1os posts at the end of Juna to 103 as tbe

cad of actober.

Those posts have radio commications and are

mamed by 10 to 25 full-tlso persomal. In a further effort

to scal Guia'a stores, at least 10 surface search radar stations

have been establisbed since Juce, and ta bave evidence tentio

traly identifying? sore.

Castzo's fear of sluing disaldenca and insurgeney la

reflected is bla initlation of a tide varlety of repressive

IRREUTES. luTy aro bound to baTe adveIse polltieal, psycho

L0g1esl of econonds ropercussiona Insião Cuba. Le bas con-

dacted alsost constaut a1t1-insurgent operations involvlog

malta of up to 2,500 uan. AlI, naval and ground forca

elerenta bave been put on special alert, elther on a local

or Island-wide basis, on at least 35 occasions dering 1953

as a result of innored ot actusl natitino operations..

dents 1o arcas of gueriilla activit; have been forcibly

relocated, and restrictions have bees placed on transportation

1a suspect arcas.: In August 1963 a nou laternal accurity

force, the Lucha Centra Firatas, waa forued to attempt ta

cope vita off-shore raiding parties, In Septinder ren traindag

courses vera initlared for cornard cadrea of "popular defense

mits:" Tha purpose of chase units 1a to organise the people

to defead thenselves against enemy attaci and to protect

Indestital centers and tastallation tron sabotage.

Despite thase seasures to norcase Caba's defensive

capsbillby agrisa 5a1ds, se have contimed to ImpIOra Our

oun infiltration rectaiques and ara still able to penetrato

Caba's

DocId: 32423484

Page

100

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 101

∞ 1/4 00

Cuba's defenses ults good regularity. Raiding operations of

this sort, hoverer, aluaya present rial and lie DisI assure

that captured Cuban agants will ravesl U.Se involvaaant as taay

bave dora in the past giviag lastio the opporboisy to make

vocItaTava propaganda against U.S. aggression. In addition,

although thrashchay bas not mide agescy harassing ralas the

subject of spocial protest (as he did la tha casa of tho

ex1le alI raids In August and September), a sajor step-up

17 the frequency or scale as, for lastanco, an attick on

?a major cesacnic target such da Matanzas or Santisgo, algat

-bring about = sovias protast.. The chance of a piysical

satallation by Castro as, for lastanco, an attace upor a

physical sat

Do3. Installation In the Caribbean, although wallkely,

cannot be entizely discounted.

Il Castro 1o to be brougit down without overt allitasy

settos the main effort vill bava to coma fion inside caba.

No belleva that there la sufficient entdance za shou that

sabotage raids, despite the rigs involved, are a necesaary

atinalas to intornal action which will need to ba continued fox

a considerabls period so parull cho tropo of inturnal acta to

saach a pojar shera 1t can becono salf-sustained.

V. Imact of Cessation of Sabotege. Onerations

Bocause of the tisials and dizmarte Isture of sabotage

operations, their cassatton would soon be noted by all

Interested parties to and observera aí U.3/Cuban relations.

Tue cessazlon of tbesa raids, louever, diocialmaula by the

I.So tha Inlis tientelras may be, tould probably is lateza

preted 1s latin Aneries sad costalaly Inside Caba za a suirca

of U.So polley from one of discreet cacouragenest and support

of aggressiva action agalast the tratio regina to ors of

"conxistence" and eventual acconsodation with a Castro/Camist

Gabe, H1ihont constant and visiblo signs of offensiva action

aga17st Caba, a neatening process would ta set in nation

ubich could tell lead the countites of latin saerica to draw

thair on conclusions fron these indicators and enjart ou

accommodation policies of their on. Those govercasnts la

Latis ArcTica alrendy threatened by Castzoitas la their own

"cogntiles arallikely to be subjected to evea atrunges domestio

PI9SA605.

As this

SEC

T-S2H5ZT7

71

32423484•

Page 101

R

Go

Inhicon lihrarv

---

## Page 102

100

-15∞

As this ballef sprasds, Hastern Europeaz and athor free

Moria constries eager to trada with Osba will coue to feel

thet thay say safely Ignore and evade, to an ever greater

artent that they do now, U.S. appeals fox the econcuic sad

political 1solation of cuba. ln important addizional economia

alfacI vould be ela rolesse into normal econante activity of

i do on

assposer and funds son tied un in defenso against raida.

Finally, and 10st importaat, this development 17 tire

la bond to bave a severa desoralizing ellect on the lateral

resistance agalaat Castro. The Cuban exila community and

particularly lts silitant and articulate elements would be

acately sensitiva to a cessation of ralds and can ba expected

to react vociferously, Judging from past esperteace, va

can expect a neu surje of domestic political agitation on

cho part of the munsIony Cuban exilos uho haya political

comections sitain tie los.

In tha event that it 19 decided to taradata CIA-

coutrolled sabotage and harastant operattons, it cannot be

nasuned that the autonooss groups, despita tha gicatex:

dentability oi thel activas, could take over entirely the

Idss10a of fundshing proof of vialble resistanca to castro

bad Inspiring internal clemenis to tajo the personal risks

necessary to set a coup in lotion, lutonamous groups aro

1s got untasted 1a their capability to condict successful

sabotage sad harassment operations on a sustained bazis.

It to unlikely that in the nezt months tua 2ut020a0us grolips "

u111 devalos the abtilty to match (la controlled operations,

alther 1a quantity or quellEy.

If sabotage and barassment operations were to be terminated.

for the satozonous groups as well as for the lizeney, ta

rappart to the aniasonous stoups vust also be terainated.

complataly as otherwiso sa bould not do in a position to

Ltsuza that they sould discoutsue raida and satotage.

Sach termination would coupound the effects of tha cessation

VI

DooId: 32423484

Page 102

Lyndon

B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 103

DELMES SNORESTS

- 16 .

VI. The Residual Portan

In the event it 13 docided to abandon the core of the

covert program, wa will be obliged to fall back on essentially

overt courses al sctlon which aId already operating but ubich

can be sofired and intensified, provided the political riska

nad costs dIa judged soceptable dnd ve recaive adequate

cooperation from our allies.

= An Action aralast free-horld accoonto ties with Cuba

Because of the recens erasica of our efforts in this

setor snd the clear intention of tha lubras and Soviets to

made and 1a son belfa presented. lie caste 19310 17 tila

recoumendations is our ability and willingness to incur the

political costs and Iltis that heightered econonde pressure

would Involve. Even li the recomendations sIa adopted

completely, ue could have no resl assurance that out attemita

to curtail Cuban-free morld economic ties would be succesaful.

On the other hand, if the actlons and comitments included

1a the racomendations are not adopted, 1t la a near certalaty

shaz; under present circuastances, our econonie pressuros will

ba reduced to ireffectiveness.. In zuy case, it must ba clearly

recogalzad that so enount of economto pressure can by itsele

biduz dun the Castro soverment, at least as lozy as the

Soviats sta prepared to subsidiza the tuban economy, Ira

cartsIlvanI and disTuption di Cuban econonto tles wità the

frea sold can only contilbute, and ther only over time, to

cos creation di the optima situation ta ars toglag to derelo?.

The effactiveness of this contribution vauld be at lozat

sharply lupalted by tha relation of the pressure created

by covert opstations, Beyand these considerations, te can

sever bave assursnce that a foreiga goverment cooperating

In the econondo progras vill not pall out and virtually.

collapae tha progran,. Entire of even liportant rellance.

on econonde pressura as a substituta fos the covert progran

sould te to deliver the fate of our polloy lato the uncertain

bands of goverments shich do not share our convictious und

anasa of priority vità Iespact to cubs.

C1S ACTION

DocId: 32423484

Page 103

Lyndon

B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 104

SENZET-SENSILVE

B. DAS Astlon

An a sosalI of the venezuelan charges azainat Cube arising

tros the arms cacha discovery, ve bava been considering a series

of pengunes wiica ma sould seei la the lAS. It stuld be noted

that the absosphere for a1s adoption of strong menyures bas

decentratad as a result of the paraznian crists.

the measures which ve hive been atudying includes

In A breas 11 diplomatic relations

Tha principal effects of this measore, which nould

men cellon by five countries, including Irazil,.

Galla and Mexico, would da to provide rather dracatio

evidence of Castro's isolation and to deny the Cubara

Joglas subversive facilitles offered by lis renaining

nIS31ONS 11 INtlI ANaTiCI. The mensure would neet

boary realatance fron larico, Chile and particularly

Brazilo;

Za A brezt In economic relations

Although this mould bava littla practical effect

econonically, 11 sould bave sons utility as a sears

of moral pressura on other fred orld cousiolen

trading s1th Cuba.

over live tbia sould losd to a radiction in tha

Cubin ability to nova subversives to and fIon Latta

Auctica:: It sould be uscéul aa a soans of soral

pIzasuse on otter free-soris countries baviags 0r

wishing to establisi, als services wits Cuba..

tha segative side 1i would sean the temporary 109a

of istelligence facilitics and rould have an adversa

2221

effect on Cuben elle morale by closing in extatiag

Escape saute for perscar laside Cuba,

SECRET-SUASINNE

DocId: 32423484

Page 104

Lyndon

*B.'

Johnson Library

---

## Page 105

SECRET-SEISTINVE

• 18.

4m

Aneroval for eooperative surrelllance nessurez

ersirst savement of aras and men

Tie singls Iost daraging dis action to Castzo vould bi

an authorleation for the usa of force la comection

with the navenent of arus ani sen.

Ios chances of

zettiag a politically acceptable rajority for sues

sna nas estinatad to be less thas aven berora the

eventa is Pasans ded the prosyects have diadolshed

since tien. Such DiS sctloa sald alsost certainly

danatira tho Cuban Istua donestically and luteI-

Datlonally. At tha present tizo, 1t appears that tha

curvelllance ayston which might be anthosized by the

cas sould Involte the use of force only in tbe

tessitorial natera of the countrica for unica the

airendog shipments ara destined..

Thua tho question

ai las saltotization fas the usa of farce on tha

higa seas will not artse,

Sa Conderazion os t'az Castra sestaa

This would be a sto forng actlon, with only linited

payeoLogie, 10r05.

GAY-TRAtLOn O1 PIEULOS CAS DeASNTES on contrOllia

UCCHEGGREG BПА 53001180 6431

lonever, a purely defendire measura.

In BU, thia seTles of CAS seasures vould certalaly be

helpfal. and would constitats important mitllateral progress.

Tha setlons, boverez, ata prlmarily payciological and

dafessiva.

Co Incrented efforte arginat subnerale,

la can probably Inerease and expand oux saltiZateral,

bllateral and unilateral afforts to Increasa the sollity of

"Intia daerica la IasiSt subVeTTiOn. Suca eÍfOTta dra purely

defensive and estorial to laba, "No corrada resulta can be

SECRET-SENSITIVE

gustanteed

DocId: 32423484

Page 105

Lyndon

'B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 106

SECRET-SENSITIVE

toleranteed, In sEy CaJe, 1E lLa Cabra base vera to be

strengtiened by the malaration of covert prassures or by

the venioning as econouds pressures, so will be fighting

#8a1n9t increasing odds.

D. Inereased psychological and pro

nananda, efforta

Ha can IntEnsIFy oUI seasures do this sector, Includiaz

major polloy declarations on Cuba by the President and otber

sEntor afficers of toe Coverment. The efficacy of suct

affoIta 19 entirely dependent, however, upoa tie substance

behind then. A propagadda offensiva sould be productiva

only 11 there vero credible evidenca that our barda vero

bedag accompanied by successful actions in other sectors.

VII. Conclusion

Ins residual progiam set out abora 1a subarantially

weaker than the present program. Accordlagly, the prospecte

10r attainlog our ultimate objective of replacing the Castrol

Commist regime, walch have been by no means certain even

ander the present prograt, sould la very measurably dislalshad

under the residual prozer. The elimination ai the core of

the present covert progran, especially 1f accompanied by a

rejaction or fsilura af the proposad expanded issaris of ecomeste

presaure, sould saise in sharp tama the question of the read -

to emerina the bro baste altersatives: the 1se of force oy

BECOM

madation.

VIII. Reconnendaties

That the corest progatin be continued la at lenot 168.

mesent jose dad scope.

SOREL- SENSITIVE

DocId: 32423484

Page 106

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 107

FLORET-SEASTLIN

Amnex I

The fire cabotago tolda Ina by CIA?

On 18 August tba POL storaga tanks az Casilda, I25

VIllas Provlaca vere attacied astoz 4,2 sortara.

son tank car bad destroyed and one starage tonk

broached, cansitiz considerable fire danage.

On 19 Angast the sulphurle acid plant at Santa

scla, PisEr dol RiO ProVincO was altacked.

There 138 considerable fire damage and fuel

Lines MeTo broken. He hava reporta that sala

found lEs way into the turbines as & result

of the raid causing additional dmago.

3.. On 30 september a lubermill dt Baba de

saravI, Orlenta ProVInCe, a minor Installatlos

of local economie impoxtznce, was 70 per cant

destroyed by & alding party..

4" On 21 OctObar su uNderuater denolttIon tEm

attacked a dredge in the harbor at la Isabela,,

. On 23 December an undersater denollton tear

attacied a CubIn Dival Pod patzol bost la the

Siguezes, Isla of Pines, naval bazo. The

patrol boat was serlously daraged and may haya

puri. Three Cuban naval personnel Nera killed

sad 18 others injured in the explosion.

DET -51

ISITIVE

DooId:32423484

Page

107

I undon

Cg y

Inhnson Library

---

## Page 108

4

21 February 1984

SPECIRUM OF COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO CUBA

Accopting 2s valid the Attorney General's statement

that

there is no point in discussing courses of action

with respect to Cuba until the lundamental decialon 19

nado as to whothor of not it 1s ponsiblo for the United

States to live with Castro, the following possible

courses of action are linted under the headingy "Can

Livo with Castro" and "Can't Live with Castro." Neither

of these headings is absoluto; the courses of action

listed under each aro indicativo of degrees of accepta

bility of the castro regine or conversely the urgency

to overthrow 1t.

COURSES OF ACTION

A. Can Live mith castro

1. Negotiato a detente with Fidel looking towards

full recognition of his regime and unlimited trade

between the unitod States and Cuba.

the negotiator of

tho detente would endeavor to secure fron Castro com

mitments not to engage in subversive activities 1n

Latin Anorica and not to engago in polenics against

the United States. Ho would also endeavor to reduce

or eliminato, an & result of our concessions, soviet

presence 1a. Cuba and reduco the Cuban milltary machine

to one coupatiblo vith the roguirements of a peacerul

Latin Anorican 1aland republic.

No covert activitias would be undertakes and

intelligenco operations would be of a nature compat-

ible with our relations with a neutral power.

$7.

Copy

DocId:32423484 Page 108

London B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 109

.......

-...i

Advantagos

Disadvantages

If the plas works, this

would ropresent & sat1g-

Inctory Bolution of the

Cuban problen, especially

11 the soviet presenco

could thereby bo allainatad.

Am plan almost suro not

to work, it tould have grave

LAtIn AROriCa ag Well a8

serlous domestio polltical

горогсивалого.

b.

Even 11 plan ultimately

successful there would

bo sbort torn domestio

political losses and

short torn weakening

U.S., position in Latin

America.

2. Do nothing.

No spocitio efforts will be nado

to arrango a rapprochement with fidol but we sould

remain receptive to any advances made by hia. No

covert operations would be undertaken and intelligence

operations would not includo black maritime operations

Into cuba.

It would be hoped that fidel, recognizing

the good faith and good will of the new Administration,

rould mako his ows advancos leading tovards a satis

factory detento.

Advantages

As 1n 1. above.

Disadrantages

a. As 10 1, aboro but legs

short term domestic and

Latta Anarican losses.

b..

sven 1038 charco of

3. The present lovel of intelligence operationa,

including U-t overtlights would be continued.

BlacK

maritino Intfitrationa and ex:iltrations of agenta and

caches of intelligance gear would continue but no action

operations mould be conducted.

He mould be "keeping an

eys on" fidel both in Cubs and abroad but would be making

no effort to hinder his internal development.

DocId: 32423484 Page 109

Copy

Lundon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 110

3

Maxinum effort rould be mado to increaso the

countersubversion capabilitles of Fidel's foreign

targot countries.

Advantages.

Disadvantages

Ho rould be maintaining

a clean hands attitudo

towards Castro and our

policy rould be nore

compatible with that of

our major allies.

Evidanco of American

inaction would bo

domestically assailable,

mould be quickly sensed

by Latin Amarican coun

tries and would further

demoralizo the exile

community.

b. : Ho would bo in elfect

helping Castro to con-

solidate his position

at somo and establian

his imago abroad.

In addition to intelligence collection as in

3., no mould engago in a "persuasive" economic denial

program employing diplomatic efforts and the coopera-

tion oi U.S. corporations.

covert subtle sabotage

agajast selected Cuban imports (e g contamination of

lubricant additives).

Advantages

A carofully targottod

dental program with effoc

tive subtle sabotago 1s capa-

ble of at least disrupting

the timing of Castro's

econonic efforts. .

It may

have a measurabla effect

on Cuba's one domestic

sOUrCo of econonia strengta -

sugar.

Disadvantages

Ho will remain at odds with

our allies on Cuba trado.

Ho may delay but not provent

Castro's progresa.

5. : In addition to actions in 3. and 4. abovo,

engage in surveillance of suspected vessels of aircraft

carrylag cuban arms shipments by means oi bilataral

agreements with individual countries in Latin America,

such surveillance to be accomplished without the usa of

force in international mators and the usa of force in

natioral maters.

DocId: 32423484

• Page 110

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 111

Advantages

Probably leasiblo

withis oAs.

b..survelllance.com

pletoly legal and

low noise lovel.

Disadvantages

a.

Does not attack pria-

cipal problem of

Castro's subversion

in Latin Aneries.

b. Castro may return to

policy of non-abipuent

•01 a5m8.

c. Probably will not result

in apprehending armg

carriers.

d.. Expensive.

6.

In addition to actions in 3., 4. and 5. above,

engage in soft sabotage operations by supporting

"autonomous" exile groups and continue to encourage

internal acts of sabotage by meang of radio, press and

leaflat campaigns.

Advantages

Disadvantages

2.

Some econonic advan-

tages and limited

encouragement to

antl-Castro sonti-

ment.

a. Results commensurate

with limited skills of

extle groups.

b.

Though fact of U.s.

support carefully

b. Deniability by U.g.

as U.S. s01l and

personnel not used.

guarded, Castro will

blame U.S. anyway.

C. Sono noise level.

In addition to actions 1n 3., 4., 5. and 6. abovo,

engago in soft sabotago operations employing CIA-controlled

Cuban groups against selected targets and at spaced

Intervals.

Advantages

Moro professional

operationg that aro

targattod and con-

trolled.

Disadvantages

8.

Constant danger of proof

of U.S. involvement.

DocId:32423484

Page 111

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 112

-..-]

5..

b.

Improvenont of moralo

anong internal anti-

Castro elorents.

Better domestio poll-

tical position ag

result of increased

noise lovel..

b. Continued exacerbation

of Castro without chanco

of delivering a mortal

blow.

8. In addition to settons 1n 3., 1., 5., 6. and 7.

above, relax the present policy banning independent Cuban

exile maritine ralds and air strikes against cuba from

U,s, territory.

Advantages

Improvement of exile

norale and Intersal

resistanco spirit:

Disadvantages

8. General ineffectiveness

against targets.

b. Obvious employment of

U.S. so11.

c. AlI strikes however

Ineftoctiva begin to

arouse soviot response.

B. Can't Live with Castro

(It 18 assumod that maximum intelligence collection

will be continued.)

1. Engago in CIA-controlled as well ag "autonorous"

covert sabotago actions against larger econonic inpact

but higher risk targets such as Santiago refinery,

Matanzas power plant,

sto., employing Cuban personnel

8.

Advantages

This essontially minimum

plan evolved June 1963,

but never permitted to

develop, having some

chance to overthron

castro.

Disadvantages

High riak of capture

and exposuro.

b. High noise level.

C.

Posslbility of some

Soviet response.

b.

Measurable economic impact

and strong encouragement

to anti-castro elements.

SRORET

DocId: 32423484 Page 112

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 113

manne

Instituto an economie: denial progran based upon

the establlabnent of a "Proclaimed Liat" under the Tradiag

with the kneny Aot togother with all other leastble actions,

overt and covert, to deny to Cuba Itens eritical to 1ts

есолону.

Advantages

Disadvantages

a.. Considerablo increaso

Multiplication of U.S.

In Cuba'a diffloulty in

problems with najor a11108

proouring key inports.

Including possible loss of

allios' support of U.s.

D. U.S. obrtoualy "dolag

dollar.

sonathing about Castro."

b.. Loss of trade.

C. H111 not assure overthrow

of Castro.

3. Engage in sabotage operations as in bol. above

uging not only cuban but other nationalities Including

U.B. soldier of jortune teams.

Advantages

Improvod operations and

greator econonio damago.

Disadvantages

2.

Technical deniability

only and very high

noise lovel.

b. Will not assure over-

throw of castro.

4, Engago in violant largo-scalo non-deniablo

sabotago activities,

using U.S. service personnel where

necessary, such an aining Cuban harbors, attacking Cuban

shipping on the high seas and in the harbors uning drone

surisco craft, monk air attacke on koy installations, ate.

Advantages

Disadvantages

Huch nore affective opera..

tiona and roal ecosanto

danago..

No deniability.

b.. Very high noise level.

c.: II does not result

rapidly in fall of

Castro, w11l result in

Bay of Pigs typo of

critielse.

DocId: 32423484

Page 113

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 114

CUET

7

5. U.S. unilateral clone-la quarantine of Cuban

shippiag, ostensibly for the purpose of preventing

export of army to latin Anerica with the air of humi-

lating and degrading Castro.

Advantages

Proof of U.s. Intention

to stop Castro.

Dieadvantages

a.

W1l1 probably not catch

contraband.

11 vigorously pursued

againat all Cuban

Shipping, may provoke

Soviet response.

Very expensivo without

assuring fall of Castro.

Cutots of all communications (except radio) into

and out of cuba including a clandestine cutting of the

Jamaica cablo.

Advantages

Disadvantages

W1l1 at least for a

Congiderable outcry

period disrupt Cuba's

Iron surope and Latin

diplomatie and econonlo

America.

offengive and hindor

subveraive efforts.

b. Not fatal to Pidol..

A Presidantial publio declaration making cloar

that thoU.S. conalders the continued presence of the

castro regime an intolerable, barring any rapprochement

with 1t and encouraging ant1-Cautro, communiat disaident

elements within tho cuban arned forces to carry out a coup.

Advantagea

Disadvantages

Very elfootive Laside Cuba

just bo followed by some

and encouraging to latin

IOTH of effective action.

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

DocId: 32423484

Page 114

---

## Page 115

SEGRET

8

8. An official declaration that should Castro

engago in certala specified proscribed actions the

U.S. will In each instance destroy a major installation

inside Cuba (the "Roston Doctrine").

Advantages

Disadvantages

May forco Cantro to

stop his subversive

actions.

8.

May provoke Soviet

response either before

or after retaliatory

action taken.

b. whether rotaliation by

the U.J. Is required

or not, it will have

profound effeet on

anti-Castro morale.

b.

Difficulty in pinning

down clear-cut viola-

tiona by Castro.

c. Difficulty in avoiding

civilian casualties.

9.

Announce publicly and inform the soviet Union

through high level diplonatic channels that further sub-

version by Castro 1n Latin Amarica 19 intolerable and

that 11 Castro peralats in his present course the United

States will do longar fool bound by any inhibitiong

againat invasion of Cuba and will taka such measures as

it deems appropriato.

See Annex A.

Advantages

-

Proper baals for

future actiona.

b. Possibla deterrence

01 castro.

Digadvantages

a. Difficulty of clear

proof.

b. Poggible Soviet

reactiong.

c. Best method of mini-

mising soviet reaction.

10. Alter having established the appropriato basis

for such actios, Imposo a total blockade oi cube.

Adrastages

Disadvantages

The nost effective nethod

Possible Soviet reactlong.

of bringing don Castro.

SEGRET

DocId: 32423484. Page 115

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 116

9

11. After having establishod the appropriato basta

for such action, invado cube.

Advantages

Disadvantages

W1l1 bring down Castro.

8.

Possible Soviet

reaction.

b.. Probablo heavy

casualtias on both

sides.

0.

Increased d11f1cult10g

in post-Castro Cuba.

SEGRET

DocId: 32423484

Page 116.

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 117

Sconario for B-9

This doctrino is basod on the proposition that

the decision has been roached that the U.1. cannot 1179

with & Castro/communist sogina in Cuba which continues

Its prosent course of subversion and aggression in Latte

Anorice and that na are determined to taio appropriato

action to put an and to theso acts.

I. In the Vanazuelan arms cacho case now beforo

the OAf hold out for a "blank check" resolution. Settlo

fOS & 13 VOtO naJOIIty egardlens of Mexicas, BrAsilIal,

or chilean support.

3. II, despito l. above, OAS waters down resolu-

tion, vote against the watered-down version.

3. II "blank chock" resolution passed, proceed

to 5. balow.

4. If matarod-down resolution passed over our

protest, announce publicly that OAs no longer represents

an adogusto banisphoric safeguard and therefore that the

United States munt unflaterally declaro (100 5, belon).

5. Declara publiely that further aggrension and

subverstor by Castro 11 Latin America would be intolerablo

to the Unlted Staten and, in the event of & new act on the

part of castro of the natura and magnitude of the Venezuelan

Copy

DocId: 32423484

Page 117

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 118

arus cacho, the U.S. will take such seasures against

the Castro/communist rogine in Cuba as 1t deens appro

priato in tho circunstances.

6. Explain caretully through diplomatic

channals to the sovlot Union that the Unltad States

finds tho present bahavior of the Castro/communist

rogine la Cuba Intolorablo, that Cuba's activition 1a

Venezuola prove this to be so and that further scts

of violenco of comparablo danger or potential danger

on the part of Cuba vill cause the U.S. to jool no

longor bound by any inhibitions against Invasion or

other appropriato action. Urge the soviet Unlos, 1n

ordor to roduce tensions in the Caribbean and pormit

the U.S, to l1vo pescafully with tha Castro/commuaist

rogine 1s Cuba, to annure that Cube 1s restralrad

Iron ropesting 1ts dangerous practicon. Mato 1t plain

to the sorlot Undon that further behavior of this sort

by Crstro will compel the U.S. to adopt drastic neasures.

Point out to the sovlot Unlon the physical vulnerability

of Cuba as well an tha olfect a failuro to resolvo the

Cuban problem will have on the traditional policy which

the U.S. has pursued of not exerting pressures upon the

Sovlots' Europoan astollites. Make it plain that the U.s.

desiras perco in the Carlbbean and expocts the soviet

Union to achieve good behavior on the part of Castro.

DoO1d:32423484

Page 118

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 119

S50231

3

7. Declde upon the type of action on the part

of Castro which mould trigger action on the part of the

U.3. A tule of thumb could bo: such action as would

TopTeMent serioUs, roslized or potential, danger to the

stability of & Latla American state. By this critarion

20 Castro-tralnod sen and lour tons of arma introduced

into northeast Brasil might not constituto & t51880r,

whereas the sano offort by CAstrO 11 1 Central American

country night. The judgment can be unilateral and

subjactive on the part of the U.S.

8. Formulato a progran tos a post-Castro cuba.

giving full meight to the real changen which have taken

placo there durlag the past fivo yeurs and full recog-

nition to the nood for charneling Castro's unfiniahed

revolution into constructivo lines.

The abovo scenario should not ba conmenced unleas

It 1s recogntzed that, although thens astions aro

primarily designed to deter Castro ITON hia prosest coursa,

he may vory nell parsovero in his policy. Under such

ciscumstances the U.S., baving publiely embarked on the

doctrise, cannot then witharet iron the consequences.

DocId: 32423484

Page 119

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 120

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Tier, Bundy:

Zau ashid. to

su this again,

GC:

DocId: 32423484

Page

120

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 121

ITS, E.0.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 23, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Cuban Policy -- April to November,

1964

1. I refer to your request that I try to pull to-.

gether Cuban policy over the weekend and put it in

the framework of the President talking to the

Government.

2. Attached is a very rough first cut of how I think

the President might reasonably look at the problem.

On this first go-around, in an effort to see the whole

problem, I have tried to inject a realistic dose of

domestic politics; accordingly, this is not the type

of paper which should be distributed very far be-

yond the White House. On the next go-around, we

might want to frame the problem in a sanitized

NSAM or in a sanitized talking paper which the

President could use at an NSC meeting.

3. Please let me know how I can help.

CC

Gordon Chase

DocId: 32423484

Page 121

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 122

TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY

DRAFT

3/22/64

U.S. Policy Towards Cuba

April to November, 1964

I. General

The minimum objective of our Cuban policy will be a Cuba which poses

no threat to its neighbors (militarily or subversively) and which is not a

Soviet satellite.

In moving towards this dual objective, we will continue

• to reject the options of unprovoked U.S. military intervention in Cuba and

of an effective total blockade around Cuba - primarily bécause they would

risk another US/USSR confrontation.

Instead, we will continue to engage in a variety of unilateral, bilateral,

and multilateral actions and pressures, both defensive and offensive, which

stop short of military intervention/ blockade. The application of these actions

and pressures will be tempered slightly be the domestic political situation;

while we do not want to appear as "coexisting with the Soviet satellite";

insofar as possible, we will apply pressures against Cuba in such a way

that, in the absence of unusual occurrences, we will "keep the lid on" Cuba

and, maintain a low temperature in the Caribbean. It is axiomatic that we

will continue to be prepared and plan for the unusual - e. g. a revolt against

the regime, a U-2 shoot-down, a Castro decision to eject the Russians.

Here are some details of our objectives and of the measures we will take

between now and November.

TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY

DocId: 32423484 Page

122

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 123

TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY

-2-

II. Objective -- Containment of the Cuban Threat

We will try to insure that Cuba poses no threat to its neighbors, either

militarily or subversively. To this end we will continue to take a number of

defensive measures which aim at three primary targets.

A. Cuba, the Military Threat -- We will continue to insure that Cuba does

not become again an offensive weapons (e. g. missiles) threat to the U.S. or

Latin America.

To this end we will continue to collect intelligence from

within Cuba and to conduct intensive air and sea surveillance around and

over Cuba. In this regard; we will make it clear to the Cubans that dire

consequences will ensue if they interfere with our air surveillance of Cuba.

We will also make it clear to the Soviets that we do not intend to tolerate a

shoot-down of a U-2.by the Cubans; it is in the Soviet interest to do everything

possible to prevent the Cubans from doing this.

• To discourage possible Cuban military attack against its neighbors, as

appropriate, we will continue to put ourselves clearly on record that any

such Cuban moves will have extremely serious consequences for Cuba.

B. Soviet Military Personnel -- We will continue to try to effect the re-

moval of Soviet military personnel from Cuba. To this end we will continue

to make it eminently clear to the Soviets that we cannot tolerate the per-

manent assignment of Soviet military personnel to Cuba. As appropriate, we

will tell the Russians that they do not need a military establishment in Cuba

to prevent the Cubans from shooting down a U-2.

TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY :

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

DocId: 32423484

Page 123

---

## Page 124

TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY

- 3 - .

C. Subversion -- We will contínue to do everything we can to impede and,

it possible, to stop Cuban based and supported subversion in the Hemisphere.

To this end we will make a special effort, bilaterally and in multilateral

forums, to direct Latin American attention to and to assist (materially where

appropriate) Latin American efforts in the problems of controlling internal

insurgency and of controlling the subversive movement of people, funds, arms,

and propaganda between Latin America and Cuba.

Appropriate OAS action on the up-coming arms cache issue can take us a

long way in our effort to strengthen our counter-subversion program.

Specifically, we want the following.

1. We want the OAS resolution (Article 2) in flexible and general language,.

to wain Castro that the OAS will not stand by idly if he continues his sub-

versive efforts. This language will be cognate with a possible Presidential

statement along similar lines to the U.S. public and with a stern private

warning to the Russians that Cuban subversion is leading to a highly dangerous

situation. Hopefully, this language will deter Castro from further subversive

actions; among other things the Russians may find it in their interest to control

Castro more closely. Also, such language will provide a juridical umbrella

for, and preposition the OAS and/ or the U.S. to use force against Cuba in

the

future if it is deemed desirable to do so.

While such warning language is highly important and will be tough to get,

we will not bargain away the rest of the proposed resolution in an effort to get

it.

TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY

DocId: 32423484 Page 124

•sundan

Copy

R Inhnenn lihrary

---

## Page 125

TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY

-4-

2.. We want the OAS resolution (Article 4(c)) to call for the suspension

of all air and sea communications between Cuba and OAS countries. This

will considerably increase Cuba's difficulty in exporting subversives, es-

pecially if the Cuban/ Mexican air link is cut.

This article of the resolution is of high priority but may not be tough to

get.

3. We want the OAS resolution (Article 3) to call for the establishment

of a surveillance system which will permit the stopping and searching in

territorial waters of all vessels suspect of carrying arms and subversives;

a similar air surveillance system will also be established. While there are

some negative aspects to such a resolution (few, if any, arms will be found),

there

are good reasons for having it. First, since an arms cache is involved,

we must at a minimum make a bow towards the problem of controlling arms

shipments. Also, the resolution will be viewed as a tightening measure, and

the fact that no further arms shipments occur can be interpreted as a result

of the establishment of a surveillance system. Second, it will possibly deter

Castro somewhat from sending men and arms to Latin America. Third, it will

provide a peg on which to hang closer and more effective bilateral cooperation

which may be called for in the future. For example, the U.S. and Venezuela

may want to work out an arrangement whereby U.S. vessels can enter

Venezuelan waters to assist in the seizure of a suspect vessel. Fourth, while

it will give us an instrument to harass Castro marginally, it has no significant

escalation implications.

DocId: 32423484

Page 125

TOP SECREI - EYES OCOpY

I undon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 126

(

TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY

-5-

This article is of medium priority but should be relatively easy to get.

4. We want the OAS resolution to encourage further steps within the

Hemisphere to counter Castro/ Communist subversion.

We want a condem-

nation of the Castro regime (Article l), a renewed call for alert against

Castro/ Communist subversion and an endorsement of the Lavalle Committee

recommendations outlining specific measures on controlling travel, funds,

and propaganda for subversive purposes (Article 7).

These articles of the resolution should be easy to get, but are of low

priority.

IlI. Objective -- Removal of the Soviet Satellite from the Hemisphere

We will continue our attempts to break the Cuba/ Bloc tie-line and to re-

move the Soviet satellite from the Hemisphere.

A. General Description of U.S. Approach -- Generally speaking, we hope

to remove the Soviet satellite from the Hemisphere by a series of offensive

measures which will intensify Cuba's already serious economic difficulties;.

which will increase the cost and unpleasantness to the Soviets of maintaining

Cuba; and which will stimulate directly and indirectly, internal resistance to

the regime. This effort, complemented by our defensive measures, hopefully

will lead finally to one of the following three eventualities, each of which

constitutes

a removal of the Soviet satellite from the Hemisphere.

1. Overthrow of the Castro Regime -- By exerting pressure on Cuba, we

might be able to bring about a degree of disorganization, uncertainty, and

discontent in Cuba which will predispose elements in the power centers of

DocId: 32423484 Page 126

TOP SECRET - EYES ONCopy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 127

TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY

= 6-

the regime to bring about the overthrow

of the Castro/ Communist regime

and the elimination of the Soviet presence in Cuba; at some stage of the revolt,

it is likely that direct or indirect U.S. support will be needed to insure its

success.

Theoretically, the Cuban people, tired of economic hardship, lack

of freedom, and isolated from their Latin American brethern, will embrace

the revolt.

2. Accommodation with Castro on U.S. Terms -- Our present policy

could lead Castro to agree to break his tie-line with the USSR and stop his

subversion efforts. It is eu conceivable that such factors as (1) U.S. isolation

and covert measures; (2) further Cuban economic deterioration in spite of

Soviet aid; (3) distrust of Soviet intentions; (4) the psychological and real

impact on Castro of the OAS resolution; and (5) the realization by Castro that

he can never be the man he wants to be and that Cuba can never be the place

he wants it to be until he comes to terms with the U.S.; will lead Castro to

the accommodation option. Indeed, there is a substantial body of evidence

is net

that Castro may already be thinking along these lines, although there are also

at all chen what he with he milling to concede fer it the divated tie.

indications tat castro presently segares bisawn personat

#perms tie

tha Bloe.

3. A Soviet Decision to Quit Cuba -- A Soviet decision to quit Cuba cannot

be dismissed categorically in view of such factors as (l) the lack of real

Soviet progress in making Cuba a "show piece", (2) the obvious U.S. deter-

mination to make Cuba a "dead end" in the Hemisphere (no more Cuba's will

DocId:32423484 Page 127

TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 128

TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY

-7-

be permitted), (3) the magnitude of Soviet aid to Cuba, and (4) the extent of

the USSR's own present economic problems. At the least, these factors

would appear to have a bearing on how the Russians would view their ejection

from Cuba either by the overthrow of the Castro regime, or by a Castro

decision to accommodate with the U.S. on U.S. terms.

Relief would con-

ceivably be mixed generously with Russian grief, especially if the Russians

could find a vaguely credible fig-leaf.

B. Specific Measures We Will Take -- In puring the tough, nasty, but

no military intervention/blockade policy, which probably lays the best ground-

work for bringing about any of the three eventualities which would constitute

a removal of the Soviet satellite from the Hemisphere, we will take the fol-

lowing measures.

1. Political Isolation of Cuba -- We will continue our efforts to isolate

Cuba politically; we will continue to demonstrate that Cuba has taken a "wrong

turn" and is condemned for it by the Free Wold, and especially by Latin

America. One reason for this dimension of our policy is that there are

numerous indications that political isolation wounds Castro deeply on a

psychological level, Conceivably, the desire for acceptability by the West

a2.

eventually will be an important factor in

„Castro realization that he can't have

it both ways, and in an ultimate Castro decision to eject the Russians and

make peace with the West. Another reason for this aspect of our policy is

that political isolation hampers Cuba's subversive activities; for example, it

TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY

DocId: 32423484 Page 128

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 129

TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY

-8-

denies him the use of diplomatic missions in target countries to promote

revotutton. purpoes.

Appropriate OAS action on the arms cache issue can further our policy of

political isolation; accordingly, we want the OAS resolution to encourage the

following steps: First, we want the remaining five OAS countries, which

maintain diplomatic and consular relations with Cuba, to sever such relations

(resalation is it acted).

(Article 4(a)), Second, we want the suspension of all trade, except food and

medicines, between Cuba and the OAR's (Article 4(b)). Since such trade is

already very small this step may have greater political than economic signif-

icance (although, on the economic side, it will demonstrate OAS solidarity on

the question of trade with Cuba). Third, we want a general call to Free World

countries to cooperate with us in our effort to isolate Cuba economically and

politically (Article 5).

NOTE: In the context of the whole resolution, we regard the breaking of

diplomatic relations as a matter of medium priority; furthermore, we recog-

nize that it will be very tough to get. The priority of the suspension of trade

and of the general call for Free World cooperation, is treated betew in the

following section.

Economic Denial Program -- Generally speaking, we will continue in

our efforts to keep Free World/Cuban trade, particularly in critical com-

modities, at a low level - through overt and covert, legal and extra-legal,

diplomatic and private means. To this end a special effort will be made over

the next few weeks to obtain NATO, and particularly British, cooperation in

DocId: 32423484 Page 129

TOP SECRET - EYES ODOPY

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 130

TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY

1-9-

this over-all effort, especially with respect to the extension of export credit

guarantess to firms wishing to trade with Cuba.

Also, we will prepare now for the eventuality that our further efforts to

obtain voluntary Free World cooperation will not be successful. First, as a

matter of very high priority, we will push for language in the ecoming OAS

resolution which will provide a basis for possible unilateral U.S. action to

reduce Cuban/ Free World commercial relations (e. g. the proclaimed list)

and, more importantly, which will encourage as many OAR's as possible to

join us in our effort (Articles 4(b), 5, and 6). It should be noted that such

language will not be difficult to get.

At present, one of the major obstacles to our effort in the field of economic

denial is the non-OAS Free World argument that the U.S. is the only country

in the Western Hemisphere which is really concerned about Cuba. To counter

this argument, we must demonstrate clearly that the Hemisphere regards Cuba

as a threat, that the Hemisphere

supports the isolation policy, that the Hem-

isphere looks with disfavor upon traders who do business with Castro, and

that the Hemisphere intends to take appropriate action against such traders.

Second, sometime before the OAS consultative meeting on the Venezuelan

arms cache, we will complete a study which will project the level and type of

Free World trade with Cuba for 1964. This study will take into account our

present efforts in NATO. Third, sometime before the OAS consultative meeting

on the arms cache, we will complete a scenario of actions we can take to

increase the effectiveness of our economic denial program, in the event this is

DocId:32423484 Page 130

TOP SECRET - EYES ONCopy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 131

TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY

-10-

deemed necessary. This scenario will include, but will not necessarily

be limited to, a plan of action which will result in a meeting with hard-line

OAR's (e.g. Colombia, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Honduras, Sal-

vador, Paraguay, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador) to devise means

of implementing the economic denial language of the OAS resolution. Such

means, which may. differ from OAR to OAR, should make it clear to Free

World firms that they can't have it both ways and that they must choose be-

tween Cuba, with a population of 7, 000, 000 and selected OAS countries

whose populations. total in the hundreds of millions. In selling this proposal

to the OAR's, we will point out, inter alia, that they will not be forced to

few

sacrifice much in real terms since there will be relatively/Free World traders

who will ultimately choose the Cuban market in such circumstances.

Indeed,

only Cuba will be seriously hurt.

3. Free World Shipping -- We will continue our efforts to reduce Free

World shipping to Cuba. First, we will .try to ensure that the Lebanese finally

effect their proposed shipping legislation.

Second, we will continue our efforts

with HMG and individual British shippers to reduce British shipping to Cuba..

Third, we will continue our efforts to ensure that no new Free World faces

enter the trade to pick up the slack which recent withdrawals have left.

Fourth, we will keep in mind the favorable aspects of the OAS resolution

(Article 4(c)) which will not permit Free World ships to call at OAS ports if

they are proceeding to our from Cuba and which will therefore further discourage

Free World shipping to Cuba.

DocId: 32423484

Page 131

TOP SECREI - EYES ONLEO PY

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 132

TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY

-11-

4. Air Service to and from Cuba -- We will continue our efforts to reduce,

restrict, and harass Free World and Communist air services to and from

Cuba. Passage of an OAS resolution which suspends air communication be-

tween Cuba and OAR's (Article 4(c)) will be helpful in this regard.

5.

Covert Program -- Our policy of pressures against Cuba will include a

modest covert program; at the same time, this program will be consistent

with our intention of "keeping the lid on" Cuba and of maintaining a low

temperature in the Caribbean.

First, we will continue to collect intelligence.

Second, CIA-controlled radio programs and other propaganda media, directed

at Cuba will continue to encourage low risk, simple sabotage, and other forms

of active and passive resistence and to stimulate tension within the regime and

between Cuba and the Soviet Bloc. Third, CIA will continue to work with State

to deny to Cuba the commodities it needs.

Fourth, CIA will continue trying to

identify, seek out, and establish contact with potentially dissident non-Com-

munist elements in the power centers of the regime.

Fifth,

CIA will continue

sukipard

to aid autonomous Cuban exile groups and individuals. Of utmost importance in

these autonomous exile operations is that U.S. involvement must be clearly

deniable and that these operations will not lead to an intolerable escalation in

the Caribbean (e.g. a Cuban air attack on Nicaragua). If it becomes apparent

V.S.

that this is not possible, withdrawal of support will be considered.

Until further

notice, CIA will not direct any further sabotage efforts against

Cuba. In this regard, CIA will disband, as discreetly as possible, its sabotage

raiding apparatus

in Florida.

DocId: 32423484 Page 132

TOP SECRET - EYES O COPY

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 133

TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY

- 12-

CIA will keep on the shelf its capacity to sabotage Cuban merchant ships

calling

at foreign ports.

6. Contact with Castro -- We will establish a deniable contact with

Castro and delicately inject into the very tenuous and marginal U.S. / Cuban

dialogue an option which Castro presently may not think exists - i.e. that

we would consider assisting Cuba and guaranteeing Castro's existence if on

his part he would stop his subversion and break his tie-line with the Bloc.

(If consummated, such a deal would constitute a magnificent victory for the

U.S. - the ejection of the Soviets from the Western Hemisphere after the

penetration had been made.) There are a number of arguments in favor of

talking to Castro.

First, while it is obviously a long shot, Castro could conceivably buy

accommodation on U.S. terms. There is a substantial body of evidence

which points to Castro's unhappiness with the present state of affairs and to

his eagerness to negotiate a settlement. In this regard, the OAS resolution

may have a special impact on Castro. If it turns out to be a tough one, the

door which is now slightly ajar for Castro (deterioration of our isolation

policy) and which is giving him much comfort and psychological lift, will be

slammed shut. Second, talks with Castro will tend to intensify Cuban/ Soviet

tensions.

Third, U.S. / Cuban talks will tend to keep Castro cool during a

time when we want the noise-level low. For example, between now and

November we will be especially concerned about the possibility of Castro

shooting down a U-2 and causing a pre-election flap in the Caribbean. From

TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY

DoOId: 32423484

Page 133

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 134

TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY

- 13-

past experience it is fair to say that Castro will probably act with a certain

amount of restraint if he feels there is

a chance we might come to terms with

him.

Fourth, the disadvantages of talking to Castro appear minimal. There

will probably be no leakage in view of the fact that it is also in Castro's interest

to keep quiet. If there is leakage, we can probably deny it credibly - e. g. "This

is too funny for words. Castro accuses us daily of trying to destroy him and

hatching heinous plots against him. Many of our close allies (including

Senator Fulbright) tell us we are being too nasty to Cuba in our isolation

efforts. We are constantly being accused of moving faster than the OAS. This

is the most incredible charge yet." In the highly unlikely event that there is

leakage and we can't deny it, we can take the line which is essentially true

-- e.g. "Castro wanted to tell us something and we agreed to listen. We

would be derelict in protecting the national interest if we refused to listen.

Our policy is unchanged. So long as Cuba continues its subversive efforts

and maintains its ties with the Bloc, there can be no easing of tensions."

In going ahead with U.S. / Cuban contact, we will follow at least the

following basic guidelines. First, we will not, in any way, relax our present

pressures against Castro. These are our bargaining levers. Second, we

will ooze confidence. Castro should get the feeling that we are in no hurry

and are content to continue on our present course. However, we are reasonable

men and are not after Castro's head per se. Third, we will spin the negotiations

out; this will not be hard in view of the communication difficulties. At the

TOP SECRET - EYES ONLYCO PY

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

DocId: 32423484 Page 134

---

## Page 135

TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY

- 13a -

same time, however,

we will stay loose. If, per chance, it appears that we

can eject the Soviets

and,

at the

same time, believe it will benefit rather

than hinder the Administration in November, we may want to speed up the

time-table rather than wait to collect the dividend after November. (It might

be noted that a deal with Castro before November might not necessarily be

unmanageable from a domestic viewpoint. Obviously, the President could

not live with a headline which reads "U.S. Accommodates with Castro." On

the other hand, he might live superbly with headlines which read "USSR Ejected

from Cuba"' or "USSR/ Cuba Tie-Line Broken." The loyal opposition would

not be in a perfect position to complain.

After all, they permitted the

establishment of the tie-line and never could do anything about it via soft

methods -- before mid-1960, or by hard methods -- after mid-1960.)

IV. Objective -- Planning for Contingencies

We will continue to prepare for contingencies which may occur in Cuba.

We will also review all contingency plans which are in existence to ensure they

TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY

DocId: 32423484

Page 135

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 136

TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY

-14-

are current.

V. Objective - Containment of Cuba as a Negative Election Issue

The measures we will take to contain Cuba as a negative campaign issue

will detract little, if at all, from what our policy would probably be in the

absence of an electión.

These measures will be essentially mitigating in

character.

Here are some pertinent elements:

A. Public Posture -- The picture we will portray to the American public

will be one of confidence, strength, and determination: First, the U.S. is no

longer directly threatened by Cuba. We are firm in our resolve to maintain

this position.

Second, the real Cuban threat is subversion against Latin

America. While we intend to aid the Hemisphere as much as possible in the

fight against subversion, the control of subversion is and must necessarily be

primarily the responsibility of the target countries; in this regard, we and

other OAR's are confident that we can contain the Cuban subversive threat.

be

Third, "another Cuba" in the Hemisphere will not/permitted. Fourth, we are

doing everything reasonably possible to remove the Soviet satellite from the

Hemisphere by weakening the structure of the Cuban economy and by increasing

the Soviet burden of supporting Cuba. These economic measures also increase

Cuba's difficulties in finding the resources to support its subversive effortsy

B. Keeping the Lid On and the Noise-Level Down -- We will avoid actions

which appear to be only marginally advantageous to the furtherance of U.S.

policy and which are likely to lead to an increase of tension and temperature in

the Caribbean. For example, CIA will not conduct sabotage operations, which

DocId: 32423484 Page 136

TOP SECRET - EYES ONCO py

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 137

(

TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY

-15.-

can be convincingly traced back to us.

Or again, we will not take actions

against Cuba purely for the sake of needling Castro and which bring us no

concrete reward (e.g. stopping and searching Cuba ships on the high seas;

non-return.of Russian helicopter).

While there are excellent national security reasons for talking with Castro,

these talks,

as noted above, will also tend to temper violent Castro reactions

to unforeseen events which

are bound to occur between now and November.

C. Keeping the Pressure On Cuba -- Domestic political considerations

reinforce our national security decision to keep a reasonable amount of pressure

on Cuba - pressure which is still consistent with our decision against miliary

intervention/ blockade and which is still consistent with our decision to keep

the lid on Cuba:

Also, we must recognize that such things as the extent of Free World com-

mercial relations with Cuba have become, ta do peonton symbols to the

American public of U.S. resolve not to coexist wih Castro. Therefore, while

the limitation of Free World/ Cuban commercial relations is important on

on

national security grounds, it takes * added importance because of the domestic

political situation.

DocId:32423484 Page 137

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 138

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET

EYES ONLY

April 7, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Cuban Covert Program

I talked to John Crimmins about the meeting

today on Cuba's covert program. John felt

that one point may not have come up sharply

enough -- the President should understand that

even though sabotage operations are on the

shelf, it is still possible that other covert

activities will create noise. For example,

goof-ups in our infiltration/ exfiltration pro-

gram have caused noise level problems in the

past.

Gordon Chase

SECRET - EYES ONLY

DocId: 32423484

Page 138

Copy

lundon B. lohnson Librarv

---

## Page 139

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY

April 10, 1964

VEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

•SUBJECT: Cuba - Miscellaneous

1. Autonomous Exile Groups - You might want to glance over the attached

memorandum for the record which Peter Jessup drafted after your meeting

with Dick Helms and Des Fitzgerald. The memo implies that we can expect

to see some activity in the near future and indicates that you will ensure

that the President fully understands the implications of autonomous exile

group activities.

2. Talks with Castro - I have given Des Fitzgerald and John Crimmins a

rundown of the Bill Attwood/ Lisa Howard activities. Using a "need to know"

criterion, I gave Des a minimum dosage. He read the longish memorandum

covering my New York conversation with Lisa Howard. I also told him that

we have not replied to Castro's message to the President via Lisa Howard.

I gave John Crimmins a pretty full treatment. He read the Bill Attwood

chronology and several memos regarding my recent talks with Lisa Howard.

•John and I talked about the desirability of reopening the dialogue with Cuba

while Castro is at a low point. I pointed out the advantages of a slow dialogue

whose timing we could control. Among other things, even if it didn't lead

to the ejection of the Russians, it might prevent Castro from doing something

rash between now and November - such as shooting down a U-2. John was

surprisingly receptive and noted that Castro will be feeling very low during

this time-frame as a result of the trial of Rodriguez, the revolution in Brazil,

and the OAS resolution on the Venezuelan arms cache. He did not commit

himself, but seemed more receptive than he was several months ago.

3. OAS Resolution - Ward Allen estimates that the chances are better than

even that the Venezuelan arms cache will be taken up at a C/OAS rather than

at an MEM (attached is a cable which gives a flavor for the problem).

Ward said that a C/OAS resolution can come out just as strongly as an MEM

resolution. He guesses that we probably will be able to get about 75% of what

we want. The warning article may get watered down and we probably will not

get a recommendation regarding the breaking of diplomatic relations.' How-

ever, we may get just about everything else.

Doc10: 32423484 Page 139

Gordon Chase

TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 140

• CuGA

9 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

A meeting was held at 1015 on 9 April by Mr. Bundy,

Desmond FitzGerald

and Richard Helms to discuss the problem

of independent action by Cuban emigre groups headed by

Manuel Artime and Manolo Ray. The following points were made:

1.01550A5100.

verbal Fitzgerald dared that he did nots eleve ame

in his determination to mount an operation from Central

America.

Those present agreed that it was possible to

block the operation bj an air-sea search and by the

use of U.S. Navy destroyer but that this was a drastic

step.

Mr. Helms pointed out that this could write finis

to use of Cuban emigre groups and would radiate con-

siderable fallout elsewhere.

Mr. Bundy capsuled the problem by saying his worry

was whether an Artime attack would give the U.S. a hypo-

critical image when out of the other side of its mouth the

U.S. was plumping for votes at the OAS to outlaw subversion

and

armed attack.

He further said that he wanted to be clear as to whether

higher authority fully grasped the implications of the auto-

nomous exile group activity as discussed at Tuesday's meeting.

This he was going to check.

Mr. Bundy felt it would be extremely useful to regularly

publicize Castroite guerrilla activity both in Argentina

(thus far played only by the Christian Science Monitor.) and

in Central America as a contrasting backdrop to possible

Castro

slurs against Cuban exile activity.

DocId: 32423484 Page 140

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 141

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET

SENSITIVE

Passume the

Pres. saw theist

he can file.

EC

April 17, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: JCS Views on Cuba

You may not have seen the attached memorandum

from the Chiefs responding to your request that they

examine (a) possible ways of obtaining greater sup-

port from the OAS, and (b) additional ways of bringing

pressure on Castro beyond those presently authorized.

The Chiefs don't come up with much that is new, and

our best hope for effecting a basic favorable change

in the Cuban situation still appears to be one of con-

tinuing what we have been doing all along, with steady

pressure on our "friends" like the British, not to give

us the knife.

We will be reporting in the next day or

two on the latest

crane case.

McG. B.

TOP SECRET

SENSITIVE

DocId: 32423484

Page 141

I undon

Copy

B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 142

TOP SE 961

DENSITIVE

1041

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

JCSM-253-64

21 WAR 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Possible Actions Against the Castro Government (C)

1. At your meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on March 4, 1964,

you directed them to concentrate their attention on possible ways of

obtaining greater support from the Organization of American States

(OAS) in carrying out a program directed at the eventual overthrow of

the Castro government. Also, you asked that they examine additional

ways of bringing pressure upon Castro beyond those presently authorized.

2. With regard to possible actions by the OAS, the Joint Chiefs of

Staff consider that the United States Government should seek the cooper-

ation of the other OAS members in obtaining the complete isolation of

Cuba from other American States. Further, the United States should,

if possible, secure broad authority for a wide range of actions under

Article 8 of the Rio Treaty, including the possible use of armed force

to broad y their he he

against Cuba, should OAS members, individually or collectively, deem

such action necessary to prevent further intervention and aggression by

Castro.

With these possible objectives

for OAS action in mind, the

Joint Chiefs of Staff have studied the text of the proposed OAS resolution

which the United States has suggested that the Venezuelan Government

propose for the consideration of the OAS member states. They consider

that if such a resolution is adopted essentially in its present form, the

United States Government will have sufficient basis for action directed

at the further isolation of Cuba and for military action against Castro

in case of further aggression on his part.

Hence, for the time being,

they have nothing additional to suggest in this field.

3. With regard to measures designed to put additional pressure on

Castro beyond those presently authorized, the Joint Chiefs of Staff

recommend a resumption of the program (which is presently approved

but on which no actions are currently being taken) involving the employ-

ment of covert assets to conduct interdependent operations, including

TOP SEBRET

CroY

-0.2

_Copies each

-pages series

_ "A"

F2p.0dudt1on of this document in shole

on in part is prohibited except with

permission of the issuing office.

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC

REGRADING: DOD DIR 5200.10

DOES UNT APPLY

SENSITIVE

DocId: 32423484 Page 142

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 143

TOP SEGREI

the covert collection of intelligence, propaganda actions, economic

denial actions, and externally mounted sabotage operations against

Cuba.

As this program unfolds, they would favor expanding and

intensifying it while maintaining a continuing evaluation of the reactions

of Castro, the communists, and the Free World. Concurrently, they

favor the development and conduct of a hard-line propaganda campaign,

integrated with the foregoing actions, to estrange the Castro regime

from the Cuban people and the remainder of the Free World.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff continue to believe that the ultimate

United States objective toward Cuba must be to establish a government

in Cuba that is acceptable to the United States. However, they have

difficulty identifying promising actions against Castro which have not

been previously considered, and in some cases tried. It is a hard fact

that little remains which offers promise of real effectiveness in removing

Castro short of a blockade or an ascending scale of military action up to

or including invasion. They will keep this problem under continuing

review and advise you should any new and promising courses of action

be uncovered.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Такти D day on

MAXWELL D. T

Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

2

TOP SECRET

DocId: 32423484

Page 143

SENSITIVE

topy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library.

---

## Page 144

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET

EYES ONLY

April 21, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Possible Luncheon Meeting Items - Cuba

Here is a suggested Cuba menu for today's luncheon meeting, which you

may want to use in full, in part, or not at all.

11. Contingency Plan for Shoot-Down of a U-2 -- In view of the most recent

Cuban statements (Castro on Sunday, and Dorticos on Monday) you may

want to brief the President, if he hasn't been briefed already, on our con-

tingency planning in the event Castro shoots down a U-2. The plan is at-

tached at Tab 1.

" Z. Talks with Castro -- You indicated that you might want to discuss with

the President and the two Secretaries the question of resuming the tenuous

and marginal dialogue with Castro. This track may have special significance

in light of Castro's Sunday speech; one of its attractions is that it might tend

to keep Castro's temperature low and "the lid on" over the next six months.

Attached at Tab 2 is a recent staff memo which points up some of the dimen-

sions of the problem. Attached at Tab 3 is a possible scenario for resuming

the dialogue.

3. Rules of Engagement -- If you think it appropriate, you might see if the

President has approved DOD's Rules of Engagement covering a situation in

which the Cubans attack friendly foreign military aircraft or ships operating

in the area around Cuba.. An answer to DOD is over-due.

4. Contingency Plan for a Coup in Cuba -- You may have handled this one

already. I'm not sure, however, and put it before you again, primarily in

deference to Alexis Johnson; on two occasions he has suggested that the

President be informed of the existence of the plan (on one occasion, he sug-

gested that the two Secretaries be present). Attached at Tab 4 is a staff memo

which briefs and covers the package from Alexis Johnson regarding contingency

planning for a coup in Cuba.

• Gordon Chase

TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY

DocId: 32423484 Page 144

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 145

SECRET - EYES ONLY

THEWHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 14, 1964

13110/0.

Cars ce.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Special Group - Cuba

1. Continued exile raids are going

to make it tougher to keep the lid on Cuba

between now and November.

This is just the sort of thing that evokes a highly

emotional response from Castro.

As things stand, he seems convinced that

we are tied into the raids -- as indeed we are.

2. There seem to be two things we can do.

(a) We can make a real effort to stop the raids. While CIA says that this

can't be done, I wonder if that's true. For example, the cessation of assistance

and pressure on countries like Nicaragua to cease providing facilities might do

the trick.

This step is a drastic one and could lead to angry charges (in the U.S. and

elsewhere) that we are lending positive support to Castro. It is probably a step

we would not want to take unless it became clear that these exile raids, which we

can't control, were propelling us to the brink.

(b) We can cut off all our ties with these erile groups (e. g. money, equipment,

intelligence information). The exile grapevine is a sensitive one and the word

will get around that we are really not involved. Hopefully, this word will get to

Fidel and he will keep his eye focussed on the exiles rather than on us (specifically,

a U-2).

In sum, at a minimum, we might want to be impregnable to the charge

that we are connected in any way with these exile activities.

3.. This strikes me as an urgent problem which we should grapple with now. More-

over, there may be a good deal-of support in town in favor of doing something. My

talks at State indicate that Alexis Johrison, Tom Mann, and John Crimmins are

also unhappy about the presenttend of events.

4.

You may want to initiate a discussion of this matter at the Special Group meet-

ing today.

P.S, We might want to made i diti Cordon Chaga

hetuen Espes of raida.

SECRET - EYES ONLY C"Tolsable,

DocId: 32423484

Page 145

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 146

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET - EYES ONLY

June 2, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: British Guiana and Cuba

1. British Guiana - Janet Jagan Quits Post -- As you have probably read in

the cable traffic, Janet Jagan has quit her post as Minister of Home Affairs.

The apparent reason is that she was frustrated because she had no concrete

control over the police force, which, by the way, is predominantly African

(1300 out of 1500). It is not yet clear what the significance of her step might be;

it could turn out to be a negative for our side in that it may encourage the East

Indians to stir up more trouble.

The situation in British Guiana does not yet seem to be excessively grim, but

we seem to be watching it closely.

2. Cuba - OAS Resolution -- State says that soundings on whether to hold an

1FM or a C/OAS are running in favor of an MFM. Frequently expressed reasons

V are (a) that an MFM meets Venezuelan desires, (b) that an MEM enhances the

importance of the resolution, and (c) that the legality of sanctions taken under a

C/OAS are questionable.

Mexico and Chile favor a C/OAS.

3. Free World Trade with Cuba -- State informally guesses that a projection of

I Free World trade with Cuba for 1964 would show exports at about $180 million;

this compares with about $110-120 million in 1963.

I have been needling State to get on with some contingency planning in the event

we decide that the level of trade for 1964 looks as though it may be intolerable;

Sta, no in the prodie paperwhich misse ove soverestine otto

buy from firms which trade with Cuba in significant quantities of goods. This is

an interesting thought since much purchasing in Latin America is probably done on

government account.

4. Execution of Anti-Castro Cubans -- Attached is a ticker indicating that the

Cubans have executed three anti-Castro Cubans and jailed two others as CIA agents..

CIA tells me that we did have a connection with the executed Cubans but that it is

ompletely deniable. The Agency is still checking on the other two.

SECRET - EYES ONLY...

DocId: 32423484 Page 146

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 147

SECRET - EYES ONLY

-2-

5. Congressman Rogers - Evasion of U.S. Radar System -- I spoke to Congress-

explore the situation thoroughly. I assured him we would look into the matter.

Aside from the public relations problem, which is probably manageable, I am

still not completely satisfied myself as to what can slip through our radar system

and what cannot slip through. I intend to get a DOD briefing and to obtain the results

of a study which JCS now has underway. I will keep you informed.

6C

Gordon Chase

SECRET - EYES ONLY

Copy

DocId: 32423484

Page 147

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 148

CIA EXECUTIONSS

HAVANA--THREE MEN DESCRISIS NO "EILENS SE

AGENCY"

HAVE DEEN EXECUTED

CASTRO'S REVOLUTIDNARY

TwO JinER

CURATINY.

"CiN MEN" MERE JUNTENCLO TO FRISDE FON TARÃS OF UNOP-CIFILE

MANGAL PANCHA CON MD -i•

The tag

no inn

FORIdA GOVARDON OF CAGAGULT.

LiONE CLUS ITERNATIONAL,

"The

Cia FLant

I'd joy

TAN MI,

U/B-E29544

DooId: 32423484

Page

148

Copy

London B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 149

S-E-C-R-E-T

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CON ROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

File

10 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

Plans of Cuban Exiles to Assassinate

Selected Cuban Government Leaders

1.

The following report was compiled from informa-

tion obtained by Agency officers from persons who were

parties to the actions described.

Agency officers made

clear to each of the sources that the United States

Government would not, under any circumstances, condone

the planned actions.

Presumably the sources of the

report, in submitting this information, were motivated

in part by the belief that by disclosing the information

they would obtain immunity against legal action should

they succeed in implementing the plan.

A Cuban exile was approached on 2 March 1964 by

an acquaintance who wished to discuss a plan, which was

still in the embryonic state, to assassinate Fidel Castro.

The acquaintance was described as a businessman and a

Shipowner who owns at least one ship which sails under

the British flag,

and who also has a legally sanctioned

interest in distributing and placing slot machines in

gambling houses.

The involvement of the acquaintance in

the slot-machine business brings the man in contact with

elements in the

underworld, primarily through his partner

who is a former police officer from St. Louis and through

whom there is a tie-in with elements of "Cosa Nostra."

The "Cosa Nostra" elements are alleged to have numerous

contacts still available to them in Cuba,

and they have

offered to assassinate Castro for $150,000; no advance

funds were requested. If the mission cannot be accom-

plished, or if the plan is unsuccessful, an amount not

to exceed $10,000 would be paid for the

travel and living

expenses of five men involved in the mission.

The Cuban

exile commented that he believed he had been

approached

with this plan because of his family's wealth; he told

GROUP 1

Excluded trom automatic

downgrading and

declasslicatias

S-E-C-R-E-T

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/ BACKGROUND USE ONLY

DocId:32423484 Page 149

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 150

Ä-E-C-R-E-T

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CON HOLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABHUAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

his acquaintance that he was not interested and suggested

that an approach might be made to someone who has much more

money.

3.

Another Cuban exile reported that Byron Cameron,

owner and operator of the M/V CAYMAN HOPE, whose address

is Caribe Trading Co., Ltd., Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, met

with several Cuban exiles on 3 March 1964.

persons attending the meeting were Teofilo Babun Franco,

co-owner of the Antillean Marine Shipping Corporation,

Miami, and two of Babun's employees, Oscar Fernandez

and Eliseo Gomez Fernandez.

Babun and Cameron

friendly shipping-business competitors in the Caribbean

area. During the course of conversation at this meeting,

Cameron mentioned that he was in contact with an unidenti-

fied group which would be willing to assassinate selected

Cuban officials for cash; specifically, the Cameron group

is interested in

assassinating Fidel Castro, Raul Castro,

and Ernesto "Che" Guevara.

4. After a preliminary discussion at the 3 March

meeting, it was thought that the amount of $150,000 for

the assassination of Fidel Castro, plus $5,000 expense

money, payable in advance, was too high, and Babun felt

that

this situation was just another attempt to swindle

patriotic Cuban exiles.

Another meeting was then held

on 5 March and a counter-offer of $100,000 was made for

the assassination of Fidel Castro, plus $2,500 for ex-

penses, payable in advance.

Cameron promised to check

with his contacts after returning from a trip to the

Caribbean.

During a meeting on 15 March attended by Cameron

and Babun and his associates, the following terms were

agreed upon for the assassination of the Cuban officials:

Fidel Castro, $100,000; Raul Castro, $20,000; Ernesto

"Che" Guevara, $20,000; and $2,500 for expenses, payable

in advance.

The time-limit for the proposed mission

would be 90 days from the date when Babun could verify,

to the satisfaction of Cameron, that he had $100,000 at

his disposal for the payment.

The contract for payment

- 2 -

S-E-C-R-E-T

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

DocId: 32423484 Page 150

---

## Page 151

NU FOREIGN DISSEM/CONROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABRUAD/BACKGROUNE USE ONLY

would be honored only upon the presentation of evidence

that the three Cuban officials died at the hands of the

assassins connected with Cameron's contacts.

6.

In early April 1964 Eliseo Gomez Fernandez met

with Jose "Pepin" Bosch.

Bosch agreed to advance $100,000

and Babun and his associates would

advance $2,500 for

expenses.

Julio Lobo Olavarria, a wealthy Cuban exile

in New York, subsequently agreed to the terms, provided

that his name was not involved. Accordingly, Babun gave

Cameron $2,500 on 25 April. Cameron then advised his

group, and

on 25 April he reported that his group had

already called its man in Cuba and told him to proceed

as planned and that "their other man" would be heading

for Cuba shortly. The final comment was "we hope to

have some good news for you between 20 and 25 May."

Lobo planned to fly to Miami on 19 May to arrange

the transfer of $100,000 to a safety deposit box, the

keys to which are to

be held jointly by Cameron and a

confidant of Lobo.

7.

The identities of the persons in the Cameron

group and how they plan to proceed with this mission

are not known. Babun's associates are reluctant to

make any unnecessary queries because they have invested

$2,500 and because Cameron made it fairly clear at the

beginning that the Mafia was involved. Cameron re-

vealed during the negotiations that his contact was a

police officer in the St. Louis, Missouri, Vice Squad

who was about to retire and who has numerous connections

in the Mafia.

Cameron implied that "the other man" in

question is in Spain.

Cameron knows that he could be

indicted for conspiracy and that if there is any

treachery on his part,

Babun and his associates would

not hesitate to sink his ship, the M/V CAYMAN HOPE.

8.

In late May 1964 a prominent Cuban exile who

spoke with Jose "Pepin" Bosch reported that Teofilo

Babun and Eliseo Gomez had a plan under way to assas-

sinate Fidel Castro for the payment of $150,000. Bosch

claimed that he had committed himself to furnish

$50,000 and that he was hoping he could get the balance

- 3.=

S-E-C-R-E-T

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

DocId:32423484

Page 151

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 152

S-E-C-R-E-T

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONIROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABOAD/BALAGROUND USE ONLY

of the money from the United States Government or from

other sources.

Bosch indicated that he believes that a

quick change for the better in the Cuban situation can

be brought about only by the physical elimination of

Fidel Castro and that his elimination is well worth

$150,000. In pursuing his attempts to raise an additional

$100,000, Bosch

tribute at least $50,000.

Richard Helms

Deputy Director for Plans

-

4

S-E-C-R-E-T

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

Copy

DocId: 32423484

Page 152

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 153

S-E-C-R-E-T

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONIROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEN ABHOAD/BACKGROUND USE UNLY

CSDB-3/661, 653

Orig: The Director of Central Intelligence

CC:

Special Assistant to the President

for National Security Affairs

Assistant Secretary--Inter-American Affairs

Department of State

The Director of Intelligence and Research

Department of State

Coordinator of Cuban Affairs

Department of State

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The

Attorney General

The Department of Justice

The Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director for Intelligence

-5 -

S-E-C-R-E-T

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

.......

Copy

DocId: 32423484 Page 153

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 154

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET - EYES ONLY

June 15, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Assassination of Castro

1. Attached is a memorandum from CLA describing

a plot to assassinate Castro which would involve, U.S.

elements of the Mafia and which would be financed by.

Pepin Bosch.

2. John Crimmins is looking into the matter, is plan-

ning to talk to Alexis Johnson about it, and feels that

the matter should be discussed at a Special Group

meeting. John's own inclination is that the U.S. Gov-

ernment cannot knowingly permit any criminal American

involvement in this sort of thing and should go all out to

stop the plot. This would involve sicking the FBI on the

American criminal elements involved and intervening

with Bosch.

I have not yet thought this one through and respectfully

withhold judgment.

ayre vie.

6C

Gordon Chase

fo 2o

the wit lie

SECRET - EYES ONLY

Copy

DocId: 32423484

Page 154

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 155

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET

June 16, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT:

Reappraisal of Autonomous Operations

1. Attached is a copy of Dez Fitzgerald's "'A Reap-

praisal of Automous Operations."

It was apparently

• instigated by Tom Mann's expressed feeling that if

we mean what we say under the warning paragraph of

the OAS resolution (subversion is aggression), we

should keep our own hands clean and cease support of

autonomous exile operations. The meat of Dez' paper

begins on page 5 (at the paper clip); much of his logic

and conclusions, frankly, leave me stone cold.

2. In essence, my own view differs from Tom Mann's

in that I dislike the raids primarily for a different

reason -- i.e. because Castro now appears to have the

capability to shoot down a U-2 and because I regard

Castro as the type of man who can react highly emotionally

and irrationally when excessively provoked. The corol-

lary of this view is that the raids would be somewhat more

tolerable (though still troublesome between now and Novem-

ber) if we could somehow remove Castro's shoot-down

capability -- i.e. find an alternative to the U-2.

Gordon Chase

SECRET

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

DocId: 32423484

Page 155

---

## Page 156

June 3, 1964

JUBJECI: A Zeappraisal of lusononous Operations

I. Or1z1a of Autonomove Operations

The Integratod Covert Action Progiaa lor Cuba, saproved

by higher authority la June 1503, provided for "support o1

autononows aat1-Eastr0 cuban grougs to suppleners and ass15t

11 tHA EReCUTIOn" Of thE OthEr COLISES O1 JOtiON aFIrINed

under this prograo.

Tha concapt of autonorous brougs doriyed

Iren dr. Daltar Boston's proposal for a "Irack tro' approach

to cuban aporations.

Parallal to the regular CIl-cantrolled

and disciplinod Cuban tears, SlA would entead Ilnancial aid and

a salalams of advice and guidance to indopenient ane ancontroliod

Cuban lanierg such aa ManueL say.

iaplicit in too sutanazous

concept 1y the understandlag that the loacership gould possess

A dOgICE O1 OpIatlOBal sell-catsInisatia maica 10 certala

circumstaased, such as during the recent overiligit crista,

could coniliat with U.J. EeCUrity 1018r9975.

In addition ta a sumbar of iniornal consorsations betrcea

Stato lepartzent and CIA Dificans concorning too cractical

application of the autonomous concept, losara. Aleria Johason

ans ¿ónta Lastla indicated to fI. Bicharo Melas. on 28 Lecerber

1962 anois deglig tbat cla proceen as soon as tonyibie to

ITOrIdO TIscà To" assistarco to tir. Manuel say.

às lacorporated tato the duns 1993 prograd, tho fallamins

"ruins u? engagenent" sure set sorti to govers the coniuct oi

these autarous uporatiods?

(1) It 1a tho reyatons of autoasous operations

thst: they will be executed exclus1y911 1y Cuben 123103113

not1vutad by too conviction that the crartaron of the

Castro/Connaist rogine must be accomplished by cubans,

bota lastdo sad outside Cuba actiaz le consonance.

(2) To effort usll probably cast auro cubaa 1170s..

Il thla cost la 11ves becomes unaccopiabla io the 1.9.

conscience, autonouous aparations can be eftertirely

halted by tho tiradrayal di U.s. support; but once halted,

1t cannot bo resured.

(3) . Al1 antonomous operations till to sountad out-.

side the sorritory of the United stazes.

(4) Too United States Gorermont Just so preparud to

dany publicly say participation la these nots so sitter

hos loud of even hon accurate say be the laports of ü.s.

cosplicity.

• DocId: 32423484 Page 156

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 157

SECRET

(5)

Tho valied states presenco and direct partlo1-

pation 1a the oporation sould ba kept to an assalute

alaimun. Bejara entaxing 1nto a1 Opgrztiona1 Islation

galp with a grOuD, the U.s. represeasative I1ll raio

1t claar that his Governant has no latention ol inter-

vening n1l1tar115, except to counter intervention by

tha Soviets. An experienead cid officei rould ba assigzed

to tort tith the group 1n a 11a1301 Capicliy. La MuniC

PIOViCE JOSeIal SÚrICO sE reqUested as vail

neCeSSarY sAterIal suppOrt. Ma May De espected ta Influenco

but not contral the conivet of operations.

(6)

Thoso operations vould not be nadertaken vithia

a fired ties sebocalo.

In a latter datod l Harch 1963 to MI. IGeorga Bundy

TerieTlas vaIlous aperational problesa 1n coscection mita cuba,

Mã, issnona VitaGerald sado tia lolloning casorrations portais-

1ag to autonosous operations:

"As you knOt, agala as part of the jura pias, mo

aTo supportlag ito "autononous" estio sroujo besded :

respoctively by lamel Artino and lanolo Ray. In bots

Casos to baJO gODe tO MaJIam lenziS tO pIOsArTE tie

dentability o1 U.3. complicity 1n tao ogeration. Artios,

5h0 aoy possesses the greater sechanieri aud paraailitary

apparatus, has requirod & gooù ceal o1 baaù-teociag

although still nithin tre context of deniabilaty.

w111 probably Dot bo ready for his operationo agalast

Cuba 0B10T0 Ayr1l or Hay 0l tis yeus. Ex jassesses 208t

of his harovaro and maritino aquijaent and tas z0goslaiod

geogrIpaical nad politIcal dases in cantInl dnerica.

Masolo Ray 2ay been handled on a micò soro inderendent

basis. Ho have furniadod his money and a certata anouat

to dong not posters tie pbysical

accontramonta that dItion sas snd 11 probably soi 2s vall

egulpped in tarra of profesaional planaing.

Ray has a

bottar politteal 1a9g9 125140 Cuba mong eupporteis oi

the rarolation and hss recently senulred, accordiaz to

Jaports, 90n0 of the otnos left wing eIlla actitist sonos

Juch as GUIlOTIna MeJOyO aLd DiS SeCODU rout of tho

Ea 1a sald to de seady to novo lato cida os

a glandestino basta lato tuls sprias.

Ills fiast Heagos

"111 be sabotago laside Cuba, apparently not exterzally-

nounted hit-and-ran raiza.

"II U,S, polloy should dezand that the "ratononous"

oporations Do suspondod, fe could of course es$ oii our

aupport imediataly.

Artime and his group sigit os nigbe

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

DocId:32423484

Page 157

---

## Page 158

SECRET

sot disintegrato at onca.

1180010 23y 21103t CartelaY

pould continue. Both senups are based outside tar

Caited Staten and our baly real leveragg on tres 19

through our siaancial support but #itadraral of this

support yould probably Do fatal to tuela sjerations i1

t1:00.

A cutoll of this sapport, even thougi t11s 5250057

has bees untraceable in a trehnical sense, would have a

considerable impact nitsia too exilo comanity. U.S.

support is sonarod, espocially la the case of artleo, and

tina collapse of tha only ramainins oridence af exils action

agalast Castro mould bit tho estla comanity tard mulch

1n that it 10 tura rould do to 1ts ianorita targes, 8.3.

polley.

To estla of today, jorator, appeara to bara lost

much of his sorror and, is any caso,

d00S 101 Feet t3

haro the capac1iy for causing domestle trouble mulei ino

had a jear of too ago.

To Cantral Asericza Co:Latr195 11

unloh the estle bases salst muld la greatly confused,

although to have casefully neyar ladiested 10 1 408

neaty pi those countried ary sore thas 5.3. syapashy 1or

tho "autOnomous" groupe."

This lottos, tacluding the pararraphs osted abore, ma sabi

mittod to tho Special GrOUp On 30 irIch 1951. Ca tho sana

dato, snotier menarandus entitlod "Status lapart on Antononous

Cuban Exila Groupy" was presentod to tha Epecial Group to

alost that body to the sact that both the lay did NittIo 150478

aad roached a stago of aparational roactcosa la whic: actions

aga1sst Cuba could ba expected at say t1rs, The zerorards

"130 po381b11157 ol Inninont antiateral operationa

on the part of the autonomous gioupy ly brougut to

the attention o1 tho special soup at this tine alaca

1I 15 rolatod tO tho question of the futurs of ClA

controlled sabotago and 19529370nt Operating Don under

TOYIEY 1Y 113595245491489. Th19 19124100418 199 e

CTIDON IN PAÑT Y OI tHO BOIUIANODS GUIIILaN MEATION OI

CUTTant FTOgIIS O1 COTPIt ACtIOn AgaInst suba," dated

34 january 1901, subaltied by tha coordinatos of Cuban

ALIaLIs to the spoulal Crous. The pagar aldo toted trat

11 8 Dolley dosialon 19 nato do terainata sabotago ano

nara95n031 OperatIons IOT tiO autOnATOuS 350:p0 a3 7911

as 10r ClA, 1t 1111 Do nocosaasy to tarainate support.

105. tha autonomous groups as CIA morid not to la a

Doeltion to 1agure that they sould rairala fros 1a1dg 110

aabotago eves 11 Bo jaquestod. In Isct, 11 00y 39524153

112a1y that no1thos group u11l distatograto at sica

upon notifica:ion of coralratlos of U.d. subaldlok.

wulla altidraval of U.S. 111as01al a10 Sad A0r8: suppart

muld probably Do Iata, tO 1i01E OperaSION In LAA,

DooId: 32423484 Page 158

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 159

Stones

tUDY aFO 11B01J tO NAbO SITAIUOUS AllOTtS to Lind Othes

SOVICES of support.

In so doing and la otter to prOve

trals v1ab111ty to potantial supportars, tuay sould,

1a thelr cesperation, probably feel compelled to laurea

one 0I sore dranatic raids ayainst cuba. "

On 13 Lay tho port of Dilos In southern Oriento mes Strick

by

ang o1 Artisa's comrando groups.

danaged 21d, secording to sa 0111c1a1 Cuban ancounceseat,

apprOxinately 70,000 SOsS 01 sugar Valued 2i abOut ous a11l103

dollars vera destroyod.

"e understand that Artino la planaiaz

anothar 5a1d on tro radar lastallatloss saIly la due.

Jasnol Ray departod on 11 Hay loT Cuba anid a rajor pabli-

that ho has not jat lasdad on cubaa soil.

Janici

DocId: 32423484

Page 159

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 160

II. Qurrent statas

Agalast this bastzrousd, tho question si contiaued U.3.

BUTTOTE LOF tHESE AUTONOUCLS

stowes has once again been

raisod. It bas ben suggested that a resppIsizai of sarono-

Dous aporations would be 1a order 11, as 3 result of an 0d3

5520117101 ED the Venezuelas aJay Cacho, 1512039103 18 10 59

redefind to jaclade subreralon.

It in argied that the u.3.

should, 11 1t 19 t0 0spL01t the CAS sODIutIOn, sot 145011

engage

.1s tso proscalbed activities.

gould cave to

adopt a "clous hands" position vig-a-vis Saia end tals stato

of clesalliosa must be mistained inderlaitaly 11 tho 1.3.

1a to renala ln a position to apply sanctions againt sastro

ahould ho again bo caught toa-handed.

11I, CORSICOTRILOBa ALTOCtION E.S. Suyport to iNtozorous GroupE

Is 1o assed that 1t roanias U.9, policy to get Ild of

¡ides Gastro by an scceptable nonas.

11 this premise ia

COTIOET tO ILIST tRNS O1 thO pOlIcyRRieS in eruzining the

18SUOA DRIBLI DIESENtOd lI tO balanCO tha tHO COUrSAS of

action proposad - 1.0. (a) a continuation if sutonarous

OFETITIONa DId (D) DI ALClUBITA TAllARCA On DAS saMEtiOan -

in teran 01 thelf elLectifaresa ln achiggias cut 2asic

511520359.

Ten tha June 1903 prostan, of uhich autonosons operatloza

are a part, mas approved by higher autsority, 1t ras agreed

tiat thia proses prosented the MEdium that couló la dodo

along covert 11n09, that end part of the progran supported

each other; and that the eventual succesa of the progran rolld

rest on the sizultaneous application of 1ll of the courses of

action agroed to, including sabotago and harasaent, and those

intersation on arch othes.

of succors of this program could to presented so a porcentilo

basis, it mas understood that the progras mald not jave boon

appropsiatoly seated 11 sot sizea a fall 18 sontis to rus.

In Januasy 1951 unIlaterally controlled sabotago opera-

tons vera stood doss, but this partial erosion of the prograa

Das been 1a ease nonsuro cosposestad 10s, at lesot 1a psycio-

10z1eal TarIaTa tONs, by tID racant MIdely reported activitiea

of the autorosons groups shich resched a cllast of sorts with

tho Pilon sa1d and Ray'a reported departure for Cuba under

do2+116 (170228131095.

DooId: 32423484

Page

160

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 161

€

Dexpito the truncatod natura of tbe grogias, it afpears

to uy that thezo bara boea nauy Indicatio9s 01 suecesis.

havo deea abla to astadllss a diract corralatios betreea sae

scries of alnos sabotagy oporations during tbe latter vart

0l 1953 azd a risa 1y 1nserusl sagistaico sod sajotaga.

The

P1loo rsid and nera of Bay's plaas to Istura to Cuba 133

agu1n sat 011 nilltary alorty and otter Intornal seasiros

zot obberted ln Cuba sisca tha October 1963 sisailo crlsts.

The lact that Castro tas tilling vader dues slla prova

catlos to sttiy bls sastorles and case fiolda mould 1061caze

a dogres of psyrzological tureat operatlas on his zegiãe lar

out of proportion to the plysical tureat or rists tajes by is.

320 logal path 1nto1ye9 seljasco upon sone 20ra of CAS

rogolation applylag luturo sanctiong asalnat sioe 1a the

event sha la onca again caught rod-landod la subtersiTe

activizios.

In the 313a1 asslysia the epplication ti theso

ssactionn x11l rogt vith tao l.3. sfter furthes coneultation

mith tho sis.

clonrly the funlskaent contenplated 1s tha u.s.

aso of arned lordo thetber 1t bo jy pay oi blocrade, Invasjon.

os selectiva destructivn of Cuban tasgsis.

#121 &o U.9. prs-

posa sucà actlon and u111 the dás la tho 11na1 aualyala auriova

It 1s submittod that a cleas choica seed noù bo aada

betaeen thesa tho altornatives.

Faving alrsady denled pur-

selyes unilaterally controlled raiding actiuno and avlag

taien precautlos sot to 109yo proyablo lingerpriaty on tze

sutoaodous oforatlons, nay to not proceed along doct tracas

1n the1s TurTont diroctios, desydD5 stoatly eu 1570170200}

11 tDo 1110ga1 actlvitles and theredy grertly Increasiry

tho odde il acdlonlad our satlanal jurgosa?

N8 I59 cartalr

to bo accused of rospolsibillty sor otbes erlla actirizias

1a talch pe aro bot 1avoltad.

Our Ianacanco vill Do 15

di111oult to entabllan as roald ds ou involreseas lo the

case of our autoronoua operalioas.

I7.

Conzoquences o1 Toruinatiag U.S. Eupport fos Auronoscus

GTOUDS

Is as a consoquasca os sollowing the "legal track" jt 1a

polt that D.E. suppost to autoronous srnupa should coase,

lolloninz considerationa ahould bo valstod 10 reachiag a 11ra

decision:

Copy

DooId:32423484 Page 161

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 162

:?..=

(1)

Is 2ust do assured trat suspeastos of support

to autononons groups #11l cone as a bittor blos to the

Londory No will lose nO t1n0 1n maitas JubliC tielI

pions and Latarpretations of thia action.

Tha Consation

of support will ba Interproted as a furtier indication

that the U.S. 1s no longar laterested in tae activo

Ilberation ol Cuba and la soving in ¿30 diractioa ol

rapprochement and acconsodation vith the castro ragino.

The alloct of this 1111 be to denoralive fartier tie

anti-Castro abans both Inside and outaida Suda sad to

aap that resistance spirit still renalas. le have had

many reports to the 0119ct that highly placed fersone

1asido Cuba Do fool that Castro's greatost sistake vas

Dia breas dith tha U.S. Pertapa even Ildel bolleres

th1s 3150. A C93sa110s of anti-astro raids and other

operations pould lanediatoly bo read as a sign or u.s.

detenta #ith Castro and a consequent prastigo-restories

MICtOry jOr CastIo's tigat-ropo soliedee.

It sass alno bo espoctod tast the sigalilcanco

of ceasing support of these groups sill be ezaggeratod and

alsisterproted in Latin Anarica and Burope, therody setting

019 anothes round of diplonatic, political and excroste

nores togard an accomodation with the Castro regies.

+218 2750874929

it is possible that even the credibiaty

of the dis resolution say be adversely aisected cala

can onij guess at tho douestic repercussions si

publicity, but 1t 19 11k01y that anti-asaintatzation

elements u1ll attenpt to orploit the situation to their

polltical advantago, particularly li 1t cones before tao

Navender alectiona.

(3) The goverazonta of Nicaragua and Costs Rica,

=itos boing agoured by 1:1. officlals tiat support of

Artino and pay sould not coaflict tith u.s. foreign

policy, nava afloried thosa groupa base jacilitles on

thair soil. If 1t 19 decidod that 8.S. 545p0TT 10T

antononous aroups should cease, 1t folloss that the u.s.

rould bure to adviso these soveranents that their cor-

tined support of the groups has becono datilantal to

U.S6 D0110y.

M1thout suca advico thers gorerasesta sould

contime to support tha autonazous groups.

(3) la pointod out 1a the 30 Marca senorandas to

the special Group ciled abovo, 1t appears Ilkely tist

neither oro of the autonoscus groupa sill disintegrato

Lmediataly after notificatios of termination of t.8.

DocId: 32423484

Page 162

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 163

ald.

Is ordar to desonstrato thair viabllity to

potential supportors and contributors, thess groups

ars ll'ely to loal compolied to coatizus and perhaps

atop up thosa raldo, 10 dellanco of U.J. s1stos 1$

ПАСОВУЙБУ.

It la possiblo that the fraatration sad

indignatlon that rould flon Iros s teralantion ol

support sould load to s cinico of activities ca the

part of these troupa that sould bavo a bigher "noise

lovel" thas at prozoat,

issiudiaz sorelations of fast

U.3. баррозі.

(1) Adoption os tha "logal track" as a basis 10X

dealing vith the castro probles and tho attendant

appllcation of tha "clean lands" theals ould havo

ranifications 50r covert setirities directed against

Cuba that so far boyond antorosous raiding operazions.

Isfiltrat1on and caching operationg lor sabversive

Jurposos such as those presently being attempted by

Ray vould also bo lacluded.

me principle of "cleas

handa' quot 3180 bo applied to a1l carast maritiao

1nf11459t10n/ exfiltration operationg for Intalligares

collection purposos as well sa cachiag operations for

Internal Intelligenos and zoristares operations. Tuls

nould result in a raduotion la our latalligenca collec-

t1on and support capabilities. To esphasize this potat,

1t 19 705th rocalliny that the "los incideni" in Uctober

1933, ane of the noet tidoly publicized and consanted-

upon uperations in the past too yeass, 1350170d chly

an inflltration and cachiag operation. no sabotago or

other fors of violenco was contesplated for this sisalon.

Yst the esposurs of the sother sulp and the resaltins

pubiletty costituted as such a yiolation of tho "clean

banda" pIlsciplo as any sabotago niasion.

Taus, 11ttio

useful puspose would bo served la termiasting support

to autononova groupa la order to scharo to tho "legal

track" and "clean bands" concopta phila other covert

OperAtIOns, egUalLy surCepLIDLe os DeLDE expaNed ay

"OUDrarA1T0" 18 ItUTO, II7017la8 aRTitizo intiitiatlos

У.

Conclusions

TerAInatIOn of U.S, supporE for the autorosous frouya

#111 DOt DOCESAATIly assUrO LO cesAAtion of extercally

nounted connando raids on Cuba.. In 1sct, it 1a I1kaly that

the f1rst reaction of the autononous groniza will be to

conduet highor "nolso loval" notivities than at pretent,

Сору

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

DocId: 32423484 Page 163

---

## Page 164

Ireludiag, forhaps, rovolations of past U.S. support.

15959

nay also be artlo ralds vith thich no hato so coRsection, 9.t.

tho SINS or Alpha 88 - for wbich thoU.S. sould cutonatically

Da blanod.

Adoption of tha "logal track" rould hato razipications

for copert oporations estending far boyand autorosous raiding

actions.

iaz1t1no lnf1ltraticn/esliltration 1or intelligenco

and caching ojerations, both nutonosous and ulllateral ClA,

rould havo to ba lnsluded in tho san 11 the "clean bands"

prisciple 1a to be applied in a cossistoat and

SENDIASILI

ПаДИВІ•

Tho cesastion of autonomous connasdo operatioas a tte

only semainlog external sabotago activity sinco unilateral

CiA operations of this typa verg stood dons 1n insuary 1334 -

sould affectivoly s1l1 the renaining canaces of carrying out

the objectives of the Integrated Covert Action Progran

laitiated 1n Juso 1983.

walls the cost would bo high, 11 a181s tall to porth the

gacrifico 11 the U.D. 15 prepared

for armed intervention 1a

Cuba and 11 too ais till unequivocally support it.

DocId: 32423484

Page 164

SENATE

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 165

• SECRET - EYES ONLY

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 18, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Special Group - Autonomous Exile Groups

I understand there will be a general discussion of autonomous exile groups

at the Special Group meeting today. Here are a few points which you might

find useful.

I. There are a number of disadvantages in the status quo. First, at best,

these raids will make it tougher to keep the lid on Cuba between now and

November. This is just the sort of thing that can evoke a highly irrational

response from Castro.

As things stand, Castro seems convinced that we are

tied irto the raids -- as indeed we are.

Second, at worst, these raids could

touch off a U-2 shootdown and a first class Caribbean crisis. As a matter of

fact, is is probably more likely that autonomous raids will produce a shoot-

down than that they will produce an overthrow of the Castro regime. In this

regard, it can be argued that even without autonomous raids, the odds against

a shootdown are not all that good.

Third, Tom Mann would probably argue that

the continuance of autonomous raids would make more difficult the enforcement

of the warning language in the OAS resolution -- i. e. our own hands should be

clean.

2. Assuming we don't like the status quo (I, for one, do not), there seem to be

the following courses of action open to us.

(a) We can make

a real effort to stop the raids. While CIA says this can't

be done, this may not be true. For example, the cessation of assistance, in- .

creased U.S. surveillance of the Caribbean, and pressure on Nicaragua and

Costa Rica would probably do the trick.

But this is a drastic step and would lead to angry charges in the U.S. and else-

where that we are lending positive support to Castro. It is probably a step we

would not want to take unless it became clear that these exile raids, which are

out of our control, were propelling us to the brink.

(b) We can search harder for an alternative to the U-2. With Castro's

shootdown capability removed, the raids would probably be somewhat more

tolerable -- though still troublesome between now and November. (State and DOD

are still looking into the possibilities of alternatives to the U-2. Preliminary

reports, however, are not particularly hopeful.)

SECRET - EYES ONLY

DocId:32423484 Page 165

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 166

SECRET - EYES ONLY

-2-

(c) Using our support as leverage,'

we can try to discourage the exile

groups from making raids of the higher noise-level variety -- e.g. externally-

mounted raids are bad but internally-mounted raids, which smack less of U.S.

involvement, are O.K.

÷ (d) We can cut off all U.S. ties with these exile groups -- e.g. money, equip-

ment, intelligence information. The exile grapevine is reportedly a sensitive

one and the word would get around that we are really not involved. Hopefully,

the word will also reach Castro, and if further raids occur (as CLA says they

will), he will keep his eye focussed on the exiles and not on us.

In cutting off support, we can take the line with the autonomous groups that we

have been disappointed with such things as highly colored press conferences;

misinformation about intentions (Artime told us he was going to attack one place

and he attacked another); and indiscreet conversations (Ray with Tad Szulc).

After due consideration we have decided in favor of a "hands-off" policy. We

wish the exiles well, but they are on their own from here on in.

One argument against this course of action is that Artime and Ray will blab to

the world that they had been getting support from the U.S. This might not be an

insuperable obstacle -- e. g. we survived a similar and more potent situation in

1963 when we cut off the CRC's water.

ni

John Crimmins

tells me that the Special Group may be faced with some

decisions this afternoon. Manolo Ray recently asked the U.S. Government for

three things -- (a) a special grant, (b) our influence with the Puerto Ricans in

getting them to allow Ray to move a boat from Puerto Rico, and (c) our assistance

in getting the Dominican Republic to allow Ray to establish a base in that country.

1 0 one to chang tie same a tel, i en inval o eating revercine

party, seems another story, however.

We might not want to tie our hands in this

way until we are certain that we are not going to change from our present course.

Gordon Chase

SECRET - EYES ONLY

DocId:32423484 Page 166

Copy

London B. Johnson Library.

---

## Page 167

22 June 1964

2

3.

Memorandum for the Record

Subject: Preliminary Meeting with Attorney General, 19 June 1964

Reference

: Minutes of Meeting of 303 Committee of 18 June 1964 on

overall subject of Cuba.

In accordance with the decisions made in paras 4 and 7

of reference minutes, the undersigned, at the direction of Mr. Bundy,

met with the Attorney General for what he identified as a preliminary

meeting.

CAlECL

In regard to Major Oliva, The Committee had reached the

was the person with the most

prestige and influence who would be likely to dissuade subject from

seeking support at this time for large scale, high noise level operations

against Cuba. When this proposal was made to

the Attorney General he

indicated his hight regard

for the Major and stated that he was not

willing to reject tably?

ôvertures unless alternatives were offered. It was

pointed out that since Oliva was an activist and a man of strong purpose,

he was Not likely to accept alternatives. The Attorney General stated

that he would be willing to discuss the matter at a forthcoming 303

Committee meeting.

In regard to the memorandum to the DCI concerning alleged

underworld connections with Cuban exile groups for the purpose of

assassinating key figures in the §stro regime,

it was pointed out that

these reports, in effect, put the United States Government on notice

that such plotting was afoot, and failure to take preventive action

could be construed as condonation. The Coumittee"s finding that this

was assentially a law enforcement problem was cited. The Attorney General

indicated that the Department of Justice would look into the matter.

PETER "JESSUP

DoOId:32423484

Page 167

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 168

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

19 August 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable McGeorge Bundy

Special Assistant to the President for

National Security Affairs

SUBJECT:

Status of FBI Investigation re Plans

by Cuban Exiles to Assassinate Cuban

Government Leaders

1. This memorandum is for your information in response

to a 303 Committee query of 30 July 1964 regarding the status of the

Federal Bureau of Investigation's investigation of reported plans by

Cuban exiles to assassinate Cuban government leaders.

2. The following is a summary of the investigation to date.

3. Subsequent to CIA's dissemination of information regarding

"Plans of Cuban Exiles to Assassinate Selected Cuban Government

Leaders" (report disseminated by CIA to the 303 Committee and selected

key officials as CSDB-3/661, 653 dated 10 June 1964), the Federal Bureau

of Investigation has interviewed all of the people involved in the plot

except Byron Cameron. Cameron is now in Mexico on a business trip;

he may possibly return to Miami on 7 August at which time the FBI plans

to interview him regarding the plan. The FBI has not decided if it will

interview CIA's other source or if it will re-interview all of the people

involved in the plan.

4. The FBI, as a result of its investigation, has disseminated

a total of seven (7) reports regarding this matter. A summary of these

reports follow:

a. Teofilo Babun Selman specifically denied to the FBI that he

had any involvement in, or knowledge of, any plan to assassinate selected

Cuban government officials. He admitted contact with Julio Lobo

Olavarria, but denied discussing the plan with him and stated that

Eduardo Garcia Molina was present during the meeting with Lobo and

that Garcia could verify his statements.

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

DooId:32423484 Page 168

---

## Page 169

b. Eduardo Garcia Molina advised the FBI that he knew

of the plan and that he was present when Babun discussed it with Lobo.

c. Julio Lobo Olavarria advised the FBI that Babun had told

him of the plan and of Byron Cameron. Babun had asked him to con-

tribute funds for the plan and he tentatively agreed to furnish funds,

but later declined. Lobo also told the FBI that he had discussed the

plan with CIA.

d. Jose M. "Pepin" Bosch informed the FBI that he had

heard of the plan in general terms and that he had reported it to the

CIA. He denied that he had agreed to furnish funds for the plan.

e.

Eliseo Gomez Fernandez informed the FBl that he had no

knowledge of the plan.

f. Ceferino Oscar Fernandez Veiga informed the FBI that he

had no knowledge of the plan.

g. Major John Doherty of the St. Louis, Missouri, City Police

Department advised the FBI that he is now in charge of the Field

Operations Division of the St. Louis Police Department and formerly

was connected with the Vice Squad of this department. Doherty stated

that he had no idea as to who would be involved with the Mafia and who

would be in a position to participate in plans to carry out executions of

Cuban government officials.

h. All other people interviewed by the FBI denied knowledge

of the plan.

JOHN A. McCONE

Director

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

DoOId:32423484

Page 169

---

## Page 170

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

EYES ONLY

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 10, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Cuba - Miscellaneous

John Crimmins, Des Fitzgerald, Joe Califano, and I met to talk about miscel-

laneous Cuban problems. Here are some of the items which came up.

1. Aranzazu Incident - John Crimmins said that we have completed our

"investigation" of the Aranzazu incident and that the Spanish have now asked

us to give them our evaluation of the various reports we have furnished to

John is now working on a paper of talking points he will use with the

Spanish (he wants to keep it oral if possible). The general pitch he will

probably want to use will take into account such facts as (a) that we want to

give the Spanish the minimum necessary to keep them from thinking that we

are trying to deceive them and (b) that the Spanish, themselves, probably

evaluate Artime as the prime suspect. Specifically, such points as the

following might be made to the Spanish: First, while we cannot rule out

the possibility that the Cubans sunk the Aranzazu, it is probably more likely

that the exiles did it.

Second, there are a number of exile groups that have

the capability of doing the job. Third, the most likely of the exile groups is

probably Artime. But the fact that Artime's boat was in Curacao would seem

to rule him out; and even if this could be explained, we could still not prove

that Artime is the culprit. Fourth, (if pressed) by a process of elimination,

the attack would seem to have come from the Dominican Republic (the Spanish

already strongly suspect this - see attached cable). In any event, we are sure

it did not come from the U.S.

John Crimmins plans to clear his talking points with the Special Group before

he talks to the Spanish.

Special Group Items - Des mentioned that a dissident group of Army people

inside Cuba have contacted Artime's people; reportedly, they have picked

Artime because they feel that anyone with his resources must have the support

of the U.S. Government. Des feels that we should let this contact develop and,

in this connection, he believes that the Special Group should permit the con-

tinuance of our support to Artime for another 60 or 90 days and, if absolutely

necessary, allow Artime to make one more attack (more or less controlled

by CIA) on Cuba. If we drop Artime precipitously, the dissident group in

DocId: 32423484 Page 170

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE - EYES ONLY

CODY

Lundon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 171

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE - EYES ONLY

=2-

Mr. Bundy

November 10, 1964

Cuba will assume that Artime is not worth contacting and their willingness to

express dissidence may tend to dry up. In all of this discussion, Des emphasized

that he is no great admirer of Artime and that the above is not an Agency device

to keep Artime's group alive. This item will probably come before the Special

Group on Thursday.

Des

also mentioned the possibility of passing on to Dorticos, in an unattributable,

deniable fashion, the message that, while the U.S. cannot live with Fidel Castro,

it might well be able to live with Dorticos. Des feels that Cuba is in terrible

shape, that Dorticos knows it, and that a move like this could conceivably

produce a big dividend. At best, it will start Dorticos plotting; at worst,

(if Castro finds out) it will help to sow some seeds of dissension and distrust.

This item will probably come up at a later Special Group meeting.

3. Erosion of Cuban Economy - Des was very hopeful that Cuba will be in

very bad economic shape by the end of 1965. To this end, CIA has arranged

to have shipments of faulty additives sent to Cuba; some of this is going in

already, and some is on the way. Emphasizing the extreme sensitivity of

the operation, Des said that the effect on large amounts of Cuban machinery

could be brutal.

The point was made that there was, these days, a general recognition by the

European missions in Cuba that the Cuban economic situation is grim and

that, in fact, the isolation policy is not entirely a farce. To some extent,

this realization coincided with the timing of the recent Cuban restrictions on

credit.

4.

British Channel to Castro - John Crimmins said that Patrick Gordon-Walker,

in his meeting with Secretary Rusk, suggested that the British would be pleased

to act as a middle man for a dialogue between the U.S. and Cuba. The Secretary

has asked John to look into the desirability of this. The initial feeling of the

group was that it was not a good idea.

Among other things, if we want to

establish a dialogue with Castro, there are better channels than the British.

5. Basic Review of Cuban Policy - The group agreed that, with November 3

behind us, we can usefully do some basic review work on Cuba. To this end,

John Crimmins agreed to write a paper which would outline the major problems

and the possible options, including accommodation. This will be ready in a

few days' time and will be distributed for comment. We can then decide where

to go from there.

DocId: 32423484 Page 171

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE - EYES ONLY

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 172

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE - EYES ONLY

MI. Bundy

- 3-

November 10, 1964

Des Fitzgerald said we should consider the re-institution, in the near future,

of the "unilateral" CLA-directed covert program which had scored a number

of hits last year. The group agreed, however, that a decision on this should

probably wait until some of the basic review work on Cuba had been completed.

•Gordon Chase

DocId: 32423484

Page 172

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE - EYES ONLY

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 173

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

12 November 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Policy Toward Cuba

In the attached paper the ICS recommended to the SecDef that

he forward the Army study entitled, "Square Dance" to the Inter-

departmental Coordinating Committee for Cuban Affairs for appropriate

interagency coordination as a basis for further consideration by the

JCS.

In the course of preparing a Chairman's position on "Square

Dance," I pointed out that the covert operations proposed would involve

serious injury to Cuban civilians, and probably

should not be elected

without very serious provocation -- perhaps greater than that required

to justify invasion. In addition, even if consistent with US values on

"just" international behavior, it is highly unlikely that we could under-

take such operations without having our role discovered and resulting

serious international liabilities.

Finally, even if "Square Dance"

were successfully implemented, there would be no guarantee that the

Cuban government would change its position. More likely, Soviet aid

and control would be increased.

As you are aware, Bill Smith participated in this study, though I

understand he did not subscribe to all of its contents.

I recommend,

however, that the White House remain aloof from formal consideration

of "Square Dance" at this stage.

Then if the Coordinating Committee

and the JCS should recommend action in accordance with study proposals,

we can consider their recommendations without any precommitment.

R.

KCK

C. BOWMAN

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

CoDy

Lyndon

B. Johnson Library

DocId: 32423484

Page 173

---

## Page 174

TOP SI DRET INFORMATIC

COVER SHEET

CONTROL MUMMER, SI

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARI

Of dEFENSE

TOP SECRET INFORMATION COVER SHEET

COPY NO.

DECORUSCS 2504/277-1

The attached TOP SECRET information contains date

the security aspect of which is paranount, and unauthos.

ized disclosure of which would cause EXCEPTIONAL GRAVE. DANGER TO THE NATION. Special care in the handling, eus.

rady, and siorade of

the attached information must be

exercised in accordance with the security rezulations.

This cover sheet is NOT A RECEIPT but a record of persons who have read all or any part of the documene(s) ider.

rified by number above.

Sach person receivine the attached

TOP SECRET information shall. sign and fill in the information roguired

DATE

RECERNEO

MENTASIO

REMARAS

rendicale portiona end all of documents readi

NANC

Yes ReBorn

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

Destruction of this

date of destruction

sheet is

authorized one year from

the

document attached hereto.

194

PREMIDUS EDITICES OF THIS FORM ARE ERSOLETE.

(When as

TOP SECRET INFORMATION

COVER SHEET

645333

Copy

Lyndon

B. Johnson Library

DocId: 32423484 Page 174

---

## Page 175

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

ICS 2304/244-1

30. October 1954

Pages 2 - 8, incl

SECRE

COPy NO.

DISTRIBUTION G

REPORT BY THE J-5

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SQUARE DANCE (U)

Reference: JCS 2304/244

DECISION

1. At their meeting on 6 November 1964, aftez

making

amendments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recor

mendations in paragraph 12 of this report.

2. This Decision replaces page 2. Holders are requested

to substitute the additional revised page 7, and revised

white pages 3 and 5, incorporating

the amendments, and to

destroy the superseded pages in accordance with security

regulations.

3. The memorandum in the Enclosure, together with 1ts

Appendices A, B, and C, was forwarded as JCSM-942-64,

dated 9 November 1954, to the Secretary of Defense.

4. In that the Commandant had expressed direct concern of

.- i'-..

the Marine Corps in this matter, the provisions of Title 10,

US Code 141 (c) applied and were followed.

DISTRIBUTION:

dittis paper

Gen. Wheeler

IC/JCS

Gen.

Johnson

(CSA

Aam.

McDonald

•(CNO)

Gen. LeMay (CSAF.)

Gen. Greene (CMC)

Gen

Palmer

DC/S

Gen.

Burchinal (D/JS.

Gen.

cd timeone foriding

Adn.

Mannart (VD/JS): nomen vern in orda

Davis (DD/JS)

Adm.

Mustin J-3)

te carry ou treir siticiandes

Gen.

Emrick

(J-5)

Gen

Anthis

SACSA

090/22 290

18C%

tony

mOP!

JAS

970y39 s02

687 190

DocId: 32423484 Page 175

---

## Page 176

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

SQUARE DANCE (U)

THE PROBLEM

1. To respond to

a memorandun" by. the Chief of Stafi,

US Army, to consider a proposai that the Joint Chiefs of

Staff recommend to the President that the United States

1

2

3

covertly attack the Cuban sugar industry.

4.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. On 21 March 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in responding**5

to a Presidential request for new ideas relative to cuba,

6

stated that the President would be advised of any new and:

promising courses of action which could possibly bring pressure.

7

8

upon

the

Cuban regime.

S

3. On 1 September 1964, the Chief of Staff, US Army, sent

IC

a memorandum*, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarding. a

11

study on the feasibility of undermining the Castro regime

12

by covertly attacking the Cuban sugar industry.

The Chief

13

of Staff, US Army, racommended that the Joint Staff accomplish 14

interagency coordinasion on the study proposals; and

that

the Joint Chiefs of staff approve the study and forward it

15

16

by memorandum to the President, Informing him that

the joint

Chiefs of Staff support the conclusions and recommendations

17

18

of the

study

and consider that the outline program therein

19

20

provides an adequate

framework for the development of detailed

supporting programs and plans for participating agencies.

21

4. On 2 October 1964, the Operations Deputies considered

the recommendations of the Chief of Staff, US Army, and agreed

to refer the matter to the Joint Staff for the preparation

22

23

24

of a report.

25

*Attachment to JCS 2304/2÷4

** Enclosure to JCS 2304/213-3

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

5-52304/244-1

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

3

TOP

SECRET

DocId: 32423484 Page 176

---

## Page 177

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

5. On 5 October 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were

presented with

a briefing on the study and discussed some

of the issues

of the proposed

actions.

DISCUSSION

6. For discussion, see Appendix A.

CONCLUSIONS

7: The Joint Chiefs of Staff continue to believe that the

ultimate US objective toward Cuba must be to establish a

government in Cuba that is acceptable to the United States.

8. The proposal to covertly attack the Cuban sugar

industry is within existing or attainable capabilities and

marits consideration by other appropriate

governmental

agencies

another option, in concert with

other actions,

for causing the collaose of the castro regime.

9. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that there are

possible political consequences which could result from

proof of Us invoivement in a program

such as that proposed.

• 10. The Interdepartmental Coordinating Cormittee for

cuban Affairs is the proper agency to accomplish the inter-

agency coordination:

11. The study should be forwarded to the Secretary of

Defense for referral to the Interdepartmental Coordinating

Committee for Cuban Affairs for comment and recommendation

preliminary to

submission to the President by the Joint

Chiefs of Starf:

1

-5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

18

19

20

RECONMENDATIONS

12. It is recommended that:

a. The nemorandum in the Enclosure, together with its

Appendices A, B, and C, which reflects the above conclu-

sions be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense

Copy

Lyndon

B. Johnson Library

22

23

24

25

26

27

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

JCS 2304/244-1

4-

TOP

SECRET

DocId: 32423484 Page 177

---

## Page 178

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

b. This paper NOT be forwarded to the commanders of

unified or specified commands.

c. This paper NOI ba forwarded to US officers

assigned

to NATO activities.

d. This paper NOI be forwarded to the Chairman, US

Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee.

Action Officer:

Captain J. O. Sherman, USN

J-5, Extension 78926

1

?

4

5

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

JCS 2304/244-1

5. 1

TOP SECRET

DocId: 32423484

Page 178

---

## Page 179

TOP

SECRET

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

ENCLOSURE

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Cuban Actions (U)

1. On 21 March 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in respond-

Ing to a Presidential request for new ideas relative to cuba,

stated that the president would be advised of any new and

promising courses of action which could possibly bring

pressure upon the castro regime..

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have completed

a review of a

study which examines world sugar economics

and

the vulner-

abilities of cuba's sugar industry. The study proposes an

outline program which would undermine Castro's economy,

deprive him of convertible currency, and cause

political

instability in cuba through covert

attacks against cuba's

sugar industry coupled with US stabilization actions on the

world sugar market. Basically, the proposal

envisions a

three- to six-year program, beginning with a 30 per cent

reduction of anticipated 1966. Cuban sugar production, by

introducing aerially from off-shore, a sugar cane plant

parasite, Bunga.: Subsequently, the economic and political

disturbances caused by this attack could be exacerbated and

1

2

3

4

5.

7

8

9

10

11

13

14

15

16

17

18

exploited by such measures as spreading hoof-and-mouth disease 19

among draft animals, controlling rainfall by cloud seedings

mining canafields, burning cane, and directing other acts

of conventional sabotage against the cane milling and

20

21

22

transportation systems.

23

GROUP. I

EXCLUDED FROM,

AUTOMATIC

DOWNGRADES PAND DECLASSIFICATION:

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

JOS 2304/244-1

Enclosure

DocId: 32423484 Page 179

TOP

SECRET

---

## Page 180

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

3. The joint Chiefs of Staff continue to belleve that the 1

ultimate US objective coward Cuba ust be to establish a

2

goverment in Cuba that is acceptable to the United States.

3

The concept of attacking the cuban sugar industry by covert

4

means would furnish another option to the United States in

5

bringing about the collapse of the Castro regime.

4. Although the joint Chiefs of Staff recognise the

possible political

consequences

from

proof of the US involve-

8

ment in such a program,

they believe that proposais related

9

to the expansion of US Influence over the world sugas market, 10

the stabiiization of the free marliet, and the covert intro-

duction of Bunga into Cuba, merit serious consideration.

Other forms of attack proposed in the study. might be taken

subsequently to exploit resulting economic and political

turbulence. Additional discussion is provided in Appendix

hereto.

11

12

13

14

15

16

5. It is recommended that the attached draft memorandum

(Appendix B) and study (Appendix C) ba forwarded

to the

17.

18

Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee for Cuban Affairs

for appropriate interagency coordination and comment as a

19

20

basis for consideration of further recommendation by the

Joint Chiefs of Staff.

21

122

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

7

Enclosure

TOP

SECRET - SENSITIVE

JCS

2304/214 - 1

(Revised by Decision - 9. Noveroer

• 1954)

TOP

SE

T

DocId: 32423484 Page 180

---

## Page 181

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

APPENDICES A, B, AND C

(6 pages)

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

JOS 2304/244-1

Copy

Lyndon

B. Johnson Library

8

Appendicés A, B, and C

TOP SECRET

DocId: 32423484 Page 181

---

## Page 182

SECRET

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

APPENDIX A

CONSIDERATIONS OF A PROPOSAL TO ATTACK...

COVERTLY THE CUBAN SUGAR INDUSTRY

1. The uitimate success of the proposed program would

depend, in part, upon the effectiveness of the economic

controls for the stabilization of world sugar prices.

It would serve no purpose to reduce Cuba's total annual

production of sugar if a subsequent rise in the price of

sugar could net the Castro regime the same amount of

convertible currency

as it had before the program was

undertaken.

The arguments and rationale in favor of the

economic proposals in the study appear to

have validity.

However, world economics is a

most complex

subject

and

involves many variable factors. The important points on

economic controls should be coordinated with appropriate

agencies in the government having responsibility for such

matters.

2. Assuming that success of the actions of the outline

program can be achieved, it must be acknowledged that this

would not assure the downfall of the Castro Government, or

that

if

it did

fall, a government friendly to the United

States would be installed. Russia has too much

at

stake,

politically, to allow an overthrow of a communist regime

for economic reasons alone.

success of the proposed actions

would, however, create serious difficulties for the Castro

Government

and would be an additional means of exerting

pressure against that

government.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

CODY

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

. It

1

Appendix A

TOP SECRBT

DocId: 32423484 Page 182

---

## Page 183

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

3. There are disadvantages to the program proposed by

the study.

The approval for implementation of such a

concept would introduce a new dimension into cold wai

methods and would require a major change in national

policy.

There is the possibility of retaliation in the

event of discovery. There is also an obvious political

risk associated with this proposal. Should any creaible

evidence of. US involvement ever be obtained, the political

lOSS

to the United States

would

be great. Quite apart

from the propaganda impact of

such

discovery,

the influence

of the United. States in international organizations such

as the United Nations and the Organization of American

States would be impaired

seriously.

4. Nevertheless; it is the responsibility of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff to keep the Secretary of Defense and the

President apprised of the capabilities of

the military

establishment.

The subject study presents measures which

should be

considered, and if found to be acceptable after

coordination with appropriate government agencies it would

represent another option for positive actions

against the

Castro regime.

5. NSAM 213* dated & January 1963, established a

committee to coordinate the management of all aspects

of US policy toward Cuba. The President looks to the

Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee for Cuban Affairs

fos the effective coordination of the execution of policy

decisions and for timely recommendations on new courses

of action.

The subject study should be referred to

this

committee for the necessary coordination preliminary to

reporting

to the President..

1

2

3

4

5

"6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

Copy

* Enclosure to JOS 2304/ljndon

B. Johnson Library

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

2

Appendix A

DocId: 32423484 Page 183

---

## Page 184

ASCARE

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

6. The joint Chiefs of Start have a responsibility to

provide military advice in the Commonder in Chief and the

Secreiary of Defense. It is appropriate, therefore, that

a matter such as the proposals under consideration, bo

sent to the Secretary of Defense with the recommendation

that the study be forwarded to the Interdepartmental

Coordinating Committee

for coordination and corment as

basis for consideration of furtaer recommendations by the

joint Chiefs of Stair.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Copy

B. Johnson Library

TCP SECRET

- SENSITIVE

Lyndon

3

Appendix A

(Revised by Decision - ý) Novenber 1964)

07.62CN17

DocId: 32423484

Page 184

---

## Page 185

TOY SECRET

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

APPENDIX B

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COORDINATOR,

INTERDEPARTMENTAL

COORDINATING COMMITTEE FOR CUBAN AFFAIRS

Subject: Cuban Actions (U)

1. On 21 March 1964, the Joint Chiefs

of Staff

informed

the President that they would continue to review the problem

of putting additional pressures on Castro and that the

President would be advised it any new

and

promising

courses

of action were uncovered.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have forwarded a study on

the feasibility of undermining the Castro regime by attack-

ing

the Cuban sugar industry.

The study examines the world

sugar market

and

the vulnerabilities of Cuba's sugar industry,

and

proposes

a phased interagency program which would:

a. Initially reduce Cuban sugar production by

approximately 30 per cent from the anticipated 1956

production level.

b. Expand US influence in the world sugar market

by assignment of quotas and other actions to insulate

the free market from the effects of Cuban sugar losses.

3. Apart from economic measures, the proposals made in

the study are within existing or attainable military capa-

bilities. Several actions are proposed. Key among these

is the introduction into Cuba of Bunga, a plant parasite

against sugar cane. It appears feasible to introduce

gradually Bunga into Cuba and maintain a basis for plausibly

disavowing US involvement.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

10

11

12

I3

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

SOLDE GO AUTOMATIC DOiNGRADING

BACLUDED

Lyndone Beclonsonminorary

4

Appendix B

DocIl: 32423184 Page 185

---

## Page 186

00RXC867

TOP SECRET - SENSTARE

4. Mindêul of the risks attending such actions, the Joint

Chiefs of Staff nave reviewed the proposals of the stury and

2

believe that they offer an option fos exerting new prescures

3

against Castro. They believe that proposals related to the

expansion of us influence over the worla sugar maricet, the

4

5

stabilization of the

free market, and the covert introduction

6.

of Bunga into Cuba, merit serious consideration. Other forms

of attack proposed in the

study might be taken subsequently

to exploit resulting economic and political turbulence.

5. The study is forwarded herewith with a request that

7

8

9

10

the concept and actions proposed in the outline program or

1]

-

the study be coordinated by your commitee with other govern- 12

mental departments and

agencies. Upon completion of yous

review

and coordination, it is further requested that your

13

14

comments be made available to the Secretary of Defense and

the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

15

16

IOP SECRET. - SENSITIVE

(Revised cy Decision"

Copy

Lygdon

3. Johnson Library s

-Moverber 1064)

TOP SACRET

DocId: 32423484

Page 186-

---

## Page 187

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

APPENDIX C

Army Report on

SQUARE DANCE (U)

( See

Attachment to JCS 2304/244,

beginning on page 6 of

the white attachment)

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

6

Appendix C

Doc Id: 32423484. Page 187.

---

## Page 188

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

5 November 1954

2

TOP SECRET

COPY NO.

DISTRIBUTION G

NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

to the :

HOLDERS OF JCS 2304/244-1

A Report by the J-5

on

SQUARE DANCE (U)

FIRST CORRIGENDUM

At the request of the originator, holders

are requested

to substitute the attached revised page 7, and destroy the

superseded page in accordance with security regulations.

R. C. FORBES

J. E. MANSFIELD

Joint Secretariat

UNclASSIFIeD WIthout_Attachment

TOP SECRET - SASTRIVE

Ist Coorig to JOS: 2304/244-1

TOP SECRET

DocId:32423484 Page 188

---

## Page 189

THE WHITE HOUSE

TOL SECRET-SENSITIVE WASHINGTOY

EYES ONLY

November 12, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Shipments of Contaminating Elements to Cuba

1. I refer to your interest in hearing more about the

Fitzgerald operation which involves the current shipment

of contaminating elements to Cuba and which is aimed at

bringing about a breakdown of a substantial amount of

Cuban machinery.

2. Attached is a copy of a memo which I believe you drafted

for a meeting with the President on April 7, 1964. Item 5

would appear to cover the type of operation which Fitzgerald

is now conducting.

I have not come across any minutes of the April 7 meeting.

(As I recall it, you intentionally kept the attendance restricted

and were the sole attendee from the NSC staff. ) While.I do

not recognize the handwriting or the doodles on the attached

, that Items l through 5 were O.K. and that the only serious

• problems concerned Items 6 and 7.

3. I assume that you still want to hear a status report on the

Fitzgerald operation at the Special Group meeting today and I

will pass this word to both Des and Peter Jessup.

I think this operation is probably too far down the road to stop,

if indeed we do want to stop it. In any event, you will be able

to find this out, by some gentle questioning, when Des gives

" phis status report.

EC

Gordon Chase

"I'Le cine as OK

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE - EYES ONLY

DocId: 32423484

Page 189

Copy

lundon B. Inhrison lihrarv

---

## Page 190

TOP SECRET

April 7, 1964

Memorandum for Discussion of Covert Program Against Cuba

U.S. covert operations against the Castro regime have recently

been reviewed in the Special Group (54/12), and a number of

issues are presented which require discussion and decision at a

higher level.

The present covert program is designed in support of a general

policy of intense economic and political isolation of Castro,

accompanied by methods short of war to get rid of the Castro

regime. Parts of the program authorized in July 1963 have in

fact been held up for various reasons, and it is now important to

decide whether or not certain substantial and expensive activities

should be (a) actively continued; (b) held in readiness; (c) reduced,

or (d) abandoned.

Covert programs against Cuba fall into the following categories:

1. Collection of intelligence, to include the infiltration and ex-

filtration of agents and covert supply of agent operations.

it eit

Recommendation: It is unanimously recommended that this pro-

What We gram be continued..

Covert propaganda aimed to encourage low-risk forms of

active and passive resistance and to stimulate tension within the

regime and between Cuba and the Soviet bloc.

Recommendation: It is recommended that these programs be

continued with regular review of their operational guidelines.

3. Cooperation with other agencies in economic denial by selec-

tive economic action with respect to products critical to the Cuban

economy.

Recommendation: It is recommended that this program be con-

tinued:

4. Attempts to identify and establish contact with potential

dissident elements near the power centers of the regime.

Recommendation: It is recommended that this program be con-

tinued.

TOP SECRET

Copy

I undon • B. lohnson Library

DocId: 32423484 Page 190

---

## Page 191

TOP SECRET

5. Indirect economic sabotage with a low level of visibility and

detection. Programs of this sort involve possible overseas

sabotage of Cuban ships and possible addition of contaminating

elements to sensitive Cuban imports (not food).

Recommendation: It is recommended that these programs be

continued.

6. CIA-controlled sabotage raiding apparatus in Florida which

conducted five raids in the summer and fall of 1963, before

authority for such raids was suspended for political reasons.

Recommendation: Opinion is divided on this issue and it is recom-

mended that higher authority hear the arguments of different parties.

7. CIA-supported (but not directly controlled) autonomous Cuban

exile groups operating from Central America. These groups will

begin operations soon unless action is taken to try to stop them.

Recommendation: Again opinion is divided and it is recommended

that higher autbority hear the arguments.

Copy

DocId: 32423484

Page 191

1h-99

---

## Page 192

• SECRET - EYES ONLY

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 30, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Artime

I talked to John Crimmins again about the Artime situation. Here is the

picture up to now.

1. If we decide to try to stop Artime, the most appropriate scenario

appears to be as follows:

(a) A decision to stop him must be made by 9:00 A.M. on Thursday

morning.

(b) Locate the Artime ship by plane tomorrow morning. (It is not

certain that we would be able to find it, but we think we probably

could.)

(c) Send three fast destroyers from Gitmo to the scene.

(d) These destroyers would circle and shadow the Artime ship. John

Crimmins guesses that the chances are 50-50 that this sort of

approach would be successful in deterring Artime; presumably,

he would be afraid that the security of the operation was jeopardized.

2. As for the desirability of interfering with Artime, State, Defense, and

CIA all oppose. The main arguments, in their bare bones, are as follows:

(a) Interference will be interpreted as a case of aiding Castro and, as

such, will probably be very hard to justify to all sorts of audiences

(e.g. Latin America, Congress, the American people). We could

hardly expect Artime to keep it quiet.

(b) The operation would have to take place relatively close to Cuba.

Conceivably, this could bring Cuban forces into the picture.

(c) Artime could use the opportunity to get us involved. To the Cuban

Government, the destroyers might look like cover for Artime and

Artime could use us.

SECRET - EYES ONLY

DocId:32423484 Page 192

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 193

Mr. Bundy

SECRET - EYES ONLY

-2-

December 30, 1964

3. All things considered,

it seems to me that the best course is to sweat

this one out (Artime may not make it even if we leave him alone - e. g.

the usual mechanical difficulties), and to work in the future on ways to

stop Artime before he gets so far along in his operation and so close to

Cuba.. If you feel differently, please let me know immediately and I will

crank up a special Special Group meeting for tonight or for 8:00 A.M.

tomorrow morning. (For your information, the knowledgeable people

around town on this one are Vance, Fitzgerald, and Crimmins.)

Gordon Chase

12/30/04

Me GB aques

ite firme

with

7, co, -

this

ore?

6C

SECRET - EYES ONLY

Copy

DocId: 32423484

Page 193

Lyndon B. Johnson Library.

---

## Page 194

SECRET - EYES ONLY

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 5, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Artime's Contact with Dissident Leader

I went to a meeting with John Crimmins and a couple CIA types to hear about a

recent Artime meeting in Europe with a Cuban dissident named Cubela. Here

•are the barebones of the Artime/ Cubela meeting, as reported by Artime to a

ClA agent.

.1. Cubela told Artime that there are three groups in Cuba with which he has

• contact and which are ready to act against Castro. First, there is a group

•which Cubela heads himself. Second, there is a group headed by a man named

del Gado who is a fairly high-level official in the Cuban Government. Third,

and most important, there is a group headed by Frias, the Commander of the

Western Army. This army is the largest in Cuba and consists of roughly

• 75,000 people. At the least, the Frias group seems to include the Deputy

Commander of the Western Army and the Commander of the Artillery of the

Western Army. (We don't know how loyal the Army would be to Frias in the

crunch.)

Cubela told Artime that there are others who are ready to act. One of these is

Machado, the Minister of Health.

2. Cubela and Artime agreed tentatively on the following scenario for removing

Castro:

(a) On D-Day minus 30 days, Artime would try to step up his attacks on the

coast, largely for psychological purposes.

There would not have to be

many attacks to make a large psychological impact since the dissidents

could count on Castro to over-react.

(b) Before D-Day, Artime would infiltrate people into Pinar del Rio to make

a "safe area." What this would amount to is an area to which the dissi-

dents could run in case their attempt at a coup failed.

(c) On D-Day minus 7 days, Artime would himself enter Cuba.

SECRET - EYES ONLY

DocId: 32423484 Page 194

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 195

MI. Bundy

SECRET - EYES ONLY

-2-

January 5, 1965

(d) On D-Day there would be a "palace coup'' during which Castro and other

top leaders would be neutralized.

(e) After the coup, a junta would rule the country. The junta would be made

up of 3 internal dissidents, Artime, and 2 lesser-known political prisoners

who are now on the Isle of Pines. Artime would be President of the junta.

(The CIA agent explained that Cubela and other internal dissidents feel

that they need Artime. They have a guilt complex about the fact that

they have been living with Castro for so long without apparently doing

anything about it; they feel that, with Artime, the U.S. would accept the

new regime.)

3. Artime said that he would be meeting in Europe again with Cubela in about a

month to discuss the plan further.

4. As for the timing of D-Day, Artime said he was thinking of March 13 (Fidel

will be speaking at the University on that day), which is an important historical

date for the group (the DR) which Cubela represents; he says he has not yet

suggested that date

to Cubela.

CIA will be sending over to us a more detailed paper regarding the Artime/ Cubela

conversation on Wednesday. Also, the subject will be discussed at the Special

Group meeting on Thursday since, among other things, it has an obvious bearing

on the decision of whether or not to cut off Artime's water immediately because

of the raid he is now threatening to make.

It is pertinent to note that Cubela is not an unknown quantity to CLA. They have

been dealing with him for three years; to the best of CIA's knowledge, he has

never given them bad information. At the same time, CIA at this point is loath

to make a hard evaluation of the Artime/ Cubela plot. (I think this is fair in view

of the fact that we really don't know much about the plot; indeed, it may be that

Artime and Cubela don't know the answers to a lot of hard questions - e. g. How

much muscle could the Commander of the Western Army really muster?)

Gordon Chase

SECRET - EYES ONLY

DocId:32423484

Page 195

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 196

His.

SERRET

18 January 1965

ENSBANDER FOR:

SUBJECT:

The 303 Conalites

Futuro of CId's Juban Haramilitary PrOSTER;

Provasad UDI Sabotago Cperation

3. This papor rottesta sporoval for recommendationa

concerning CIs'a paramilitaty progran which are contained

1n paTagIApA 11.

ã. Beginatos in 1961, Clà developed a sajor capability

for parsallitary aporat10ns against Cuba. A subatzatial

nunber of Cabars bave been selected sad lnterairely trained

1a al] aspects of paronlitary sOIL, InClIniay costardo

tactica ind sabotage. Considerable ude sas nade of this

carability at one tine but since early 1564 the force bus,

due to policy consideratioss, bees restricted to enall

infiltration agerations ained at the developmost at internal

intelligenca agents, radto overators and sauport agents.

While this activity has bees siccessiul, only a small

persentage of the tratied personnel lay been employed, the

remalnder being bald is training or other pomoperationai

pursuits. The costs lavolved ln this stand-by status iro

considerablo.

$'4.31

DocId: 32423484 Page 196

1321

6130 1

¡Eschned luna aytazatio

can 2518976

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 197

EYES ONLY

3. To LEsLe DoN arises, In connection vita elforts

to reduca botà personnel and junds devoted to the Cubas

paranilitary progres, whether this capability should be

malatainod os its present scale or subatantially reduced.

1. This 19708 does sot, hoveves, arise as a result

of budget considerations alone. These remains the serious

probion of the salaterance ol the sorale and motivation

of the Cuban parallitary agents tho are not being used as

originally env1saged. These agents are bighly selected and

have shows an unusual degree of notivation; by the sane

token, hovever, they are becontag discouraged at laactios

1a direct proportion to their destro to help liberate theli

country. Furthernore, those who are content with the

present inaction, and

#ita whom we have lesa problens as

a result of inactivity, are the least destrable elevents;

on the otbor base, those tho have the highest notivation

aro increasingly likely to quit, either to sees otter

employaent of to engage in saranilltary adventures of theti

owl. Particularly affoctod are the menbers of the commando

grOUp, the underrater demolltion teas, and crews al various

clandentine lafiltration sea craft.

5: Some types of operations which the paranilitary

assets are capable of conducting have been judged by the

SVES

DocId: 32423184 Page 197

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 198

-3

303 Group to be clearly unacceptablo under preseat circus

stancos. Others aro li a borderline categary because of

the leaser risks isvolved. He are subaittiag an operation

al the lattor type for approval at this tine.

6. The propased operation would use the underuter

demolition teas to sink laban navy patrol vessels or other

Cuban targota of opportuaity, uhich fira latelligence shoma

are frequently located la the POrt of lA Isabela. The

ters, cansisting in toto of eight highly tralned underrater

demolition men, mould be divided into three sub- tears of tho

nen ench, plus s thomas bort crew.. The tean noald approach

the harbor duriag darkness 11 a 50100t Suilt or sintlar

vessel until it reaches a polat three miles north of La

Isabela. it this point it tould embart on a saaller boat

in which it 11] slonly proceed to Cayo ArbolIto, s suall

Island near the mouth of the hurbor. The boat and erer

would reusin hiddon an the lsland; after a brief recon

nassance and flaal bristing by tho lender, the teza 1tsell

would twin lato the harbor. It would then split into three

sub-beans and attach charges to the bulle of Cuban vessels

Ijinz at anchor. Pre sat tindag devices mould explode the

charges five bours alter placesent. The tean would leave

the target ares and upos retaraing to the island, bo

SIES ONLY

SEBRET

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

Lyndon D. Jonson. Lurary

completion of the review (which we think will come out positive), the CIA

is continuing, in a somewhat restrained fashion, its efforts (a) to pene-

trate the PPP, (b) to keep the PNC/UF coalition alive, (c) to support the

Justice Party, and (d) to prop up the democratic trade unionism in BG.

BC Rice Exports - There is a glut of rice in BG these days and we are

working overtly and covertly on ways of moving some of it into the export

This is important; as you may recall, one of Cheddi's major

claims during the campaign was that only the PPP was able to dispose of

BG rice (grown primarily by East Indians).

Cuba - Artime Group Attacks Cuba - Artime's group, apparently against

Artime's orders (he is in Europe), attacked some fuel tanks in Cuba on

February 2.

They apparently fired at the tanks with 50 caliber machine guns

and 57 millimeter cannons and caused little, if any, damage; no one was

caught during the debacle.

Later in the week,

the group had the hare-brained idea of going into Cuba,

capturing a couple hostages and holding them as an exchange for the captured

For a variety of reasons (including some wiser heads in the group),

this particular plot never hatched.

SECRET - EYES ONLY

DocId: 32423484 Page 198

Gordon Chase

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 199

townest senseste cas

--0:

-5÷3÷5

SIDE SONNENICATIONITO.

THE SCORETARY OF STATE

MASHINGTEN 16S.C

--?

::= -

is i

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

February 23, 1965.

MENORANDUM FOR MR. PETER JESSU?, THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Withdrawal of Support for the Artime Group

Ambassador Thompson has approved the enclosed

memorandum for Members of the 303 Committee, which

strongly recommends withdrawal of support for the

Artime Group. We believe you will want this memorandum

circulated to Members of the 303. Committee.

It will be noted that the Department recommends

that. this action be taken immediately and that

support be terminated as of February 28.

tilliam

Murat W. Williams

Deputy Director for Coordination

Bureau of Intelligence and Research

Attachment:

Memorandum for the 303 Committee.

73 .

-.

DOO1d:32423484- Page 199

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library.

---

## Page 200

adog

MEMORANDUM

This document e

Humber.

01 Jsts °

-pages..

• 1Q copies, Sertes...

SECRET -SENSITIVE

EYES ONLY

February 23,

1965

TO: Members of the 303 Conmittee

SUBJECI: Withdraval of Support fron Artisa Group

The Department of State strongly recommends that, in

light of recent developments in the activitles of the Artime

group, the 303 Committee adopt Innediately the following

course of action with respect to that group:

1. Artime will be sottfied ulthout deley that, la con-

formity mith previous statementa made to bin, us support for

his group vill be terminated as of February 28, Mth pbasia%

out of Us assistance to be carried out as quickly as possible.

2.

destine ill be not tease ten peation"

to his dealings with Curbela concerning the

that (A) 1t 18 our firm estimate that under present circum-

stances such an operation 1s impractical, unrealistic and almost

certain to fail; (b) we cannot be certain that the participation

by Internal Cuban elements is not a provocation and a trap; aná

(e) in any case, te went it clearly understood that we cannot

and will not make any coumitrents in advance concerning uS

support for such an operetion.

3. Through both diplomatic and Ageney channels, the

Nicaraguan, Costa Rican and Doulnican Goveraments w1l1 be 1n-

forned discreetly, but clearly, that (a) ve are ln no say sup-

porting Artime; (b) he is on his ow; (c) any arrAngenents nede

with, or facilities provided to, Artime by the Goverments con-

cerned are strictly between them and him; and (d) we would .

understand and would have no objection 1f the Goverments con-

cerned were to refuse assistarice to him or withdraw present

assistance from him.

SECRST-SENSITIVE

EYES ONLY

52002 1

Excluded iron automatic

downgrading and

deciassification

DocId: 32423484 Page 200

---

## Page 201

TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 2, 1965

6C

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Caribbean and Other

Here are a few items which came up while you were away and which you may

want to know about.

1. BG - Greenwood's New Look - Attached at Tab l is a cable from BG reporting

on Greenwood's recent trip to BG. It is a pleasant thing to read in that it tells

V about Greenwood's growing disenchantment with Cheddi and growing admiration

for Burnahm. Even divided by half, it sounds good.

2. BG Rice and our Covert Help - In order to help BG get rid of its rice export

bottleneck which is causing serious difficulties for Burnham, we are in the midst

of working out a deal whereby BG can sell some rice to Latin America. It is

going to cost us $200, 000 to break the bottleneck - i.e., to pay the difference

between what BG has gotten from Cuba in the past and what Latin America is

willing to pay now. Needless to say, this is all quite covert.

3. Cecil King - As of possible interest, attached at Tab 2 is a cable reporting

V Del Carlson's conversation with Cecil King. King mentions a talk with Bill

Tyler and you; he also makes a strong pitch in favor of a PPP/PNC coalition.

4. Secretary Rusk and Policy - The Secretary recently told John Crimmins

I that he wants no new initiatives on Cuba policy for the time being. Apparently,

he wants to keep the temperature low while we are sorting out our Vietnam

problem.

5. Cuban Deals with Spain and Morocco - Cuba recently concluded long-term

, sugar agreements with Spain and Morocco. The Spanish are willing to buy sugar

at a higher price than the Russians are willing to pay (so they can sell ships),

and this especially bugs us. Some details on these two deals are at Tab 3.

6. Covert Program - You are likely to be faced with a full Cuba menu at your

next Special Group meeting. First, State will probably want to cut off Artime's

water and stay as far away as possible from any internal Cuban dissidents; CLA

" may feel differently. Second, there may be some discussion of whether or not

TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

DocId: 32423484 Page 201

---

## Page 202

Mr. Bundy

TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY

-2-

March 2, 1965

it is desirable to maintain the CIA paramilitary capability which is presently

on the shelf. CIA will probably say "no" (fish or cut bait) and State will

probably say "yes" (with world scene hotting up, it may be good to have this

capability in reserve). Third, State, CIA, and DOD may ask permission to

offer some low-risk assistance to the new exile group, RECE (Oliva and Freyre).

I am against but thus far I seem to be alone. My memo to John Crimmins on

the subject is attached at Tab 4.

7. Communications Security Survey - The BOB study group has finished with

the Ranch and has completed about 2/3 of the Washington portion of its work.

The balance should go fairly quickly in view of the fact that we recently blasted

loose the information which the group needed on the telephone system at the

• White House and EOB. The group will probably not examine the emergency

locations. There is not much there that they can usefully do and it does not

seem worth the time and effort to override Ted Clifton's objections; besides,

this less urgent task can be done at some future date.

• The group is running behind schedule (report due on March 1). They asked for

another month, and I gave it to them; I'm fairly confident they will meet the

new deadline.

COC

Gordon Chase

TOP SECRET

EYES ONLY

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson. Library

DocId: 32423484

Page

202

---

## Page 203

TÔP SECRET - EYES ONLY

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 4, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Special Group Meeting - Cuba

Here is some miscellaneous information with regard to your Special Group

meeting this afternoon on Cuba.

1. Artime Cut-off - As you know, State is pressing to cut off Artime, largely

because of his recent irresponsible activity. CIA opposes State on this one

for the usual reasons. DOD, reportedly, will also take a somewhat reluc-

tant line on cutting off Artime. Vance may express the view that a cutoff

will drive Artime up the wall and that he will go off and do something that

could cause us

real trouble vis-a-vis our present conflict with the East.

For example, he might go off and sink a Soviet ship. DOD would probably

prefer that we phase him out slowly and keep a dialogue going over the course

of the next few months. The advantage of this would be twofold - First, it

would keep Artime quiet; second, his residual power to hurt us, when we

finally do cut him off, will be reduced.

On this one, I am inclined towards the DOD view.

2. Pesticides - The CIA will probably propose a deal whereby we arrange

to have diluted Cuban pesticides.

State and DOD are both likely to oppose this

one for such reasons as the following: First, it will mean going to the Dutch

Government; it is questionable whether we want to bring up such a proposal

with that government, especially if we think the odds are high that we will be

turned down. Second, there is the moral issue of whether or not we should

dilute pesticides which were given to the Cubans during the prisoner exchange.

Third, it would be highly embarrassing if this one ever leaked out from one of

the many bases that would have to be touched.

I don't like this one either.

3. Support to RECE - One question which will arise today is whether or not to

start giving some low-risk support to RECE. While State and DOD, at the

working levels, originally were in favor of it, they seem to have changed their

position. One reason - some of the arguments which are spelled out in the

TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY

DooId: 32423484 Page 203

Copy

Lundon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 204

TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY

- 2-

MI. Bundy

March 4, 1965

attached memo on the subject. Another reason - State does not want to com-

promise its position on Artime (i. e., If you give aid to RECE, how can you stop

aid to Artime?).

State and DOD will probably propose that, in turning down RECE, we give

them $17,000. The RECE people apparently had to tap a program fund of

its small contributors to keep going administratively over the last couple

months when Bosch cut them off; they want to return this money to the

small contributors. Arguments in favor of giving them the money are:

(a) it will lessen the shock of giving RECE a negative reply, (b) they will

not look bad among the exiles (we don't want them to look bad because they

are "good guys"), and (c) part of RECE's problem has not been their fault.

We have not been able to give RECE as prompt an answer as we would have

liked.

I continue to be in favor of not getting involved with RECE; I agree that

$17,000 is a small price to pay for a kiss-off.

4. Keating Gimmick - Both DOD and State are cold to the idea of having

Keating (I understand this now may be changed to Donovan) stir up trouble

between the Soviets and the Cubans. DOD feels that such goings-on might

be interpreted as some sort of Vietnam play. State feels that such a man

wouldn't get received at a high level; also, there are other ways to do the

job if it needs doing.

While I admire CIA's ingenuity and I sincerely think we should keep them

invention-minded, I must say that this one sounds like a Rube Goldberg con-

traption. I am against it.

5. CIA's Paramilitary Capability - Both DOD and State will probably oppose

CIA's proposal to drop its paramilitary capability. I agree with State and DOD

that, with the present world situation as it stands, this is a good capability

to keep on hand if we possibly can. I would agree to an abandonment of this

capability only if it were demonstrated that we could crank it up again in a

very short space of time.

6C

Gordon Chase

TOP

DocId: 32423484 Page 204

SECRET - EYES ONLY

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 205

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

SECRET-SENSITIVE

S/S

9698

June 18, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY

THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Summary Statement of U.S. Policy

Toward Cuba

In response to your request, the attached

summary statement concerning U.S. policy toward Cuba

has been prepared by the Coordinator of Cuban

Affairs. It has been approved by Assistant Secretary

Vaughn and Deputy Under Secretary Thompson.

Haut S. Hellhe

Grant G. Hilliker

Acting Executive Secretary

Attachment:

As stated.

SECRET-SENSITIVE

EXDIS

DocId: 32423484

Page

205

Copy

Lyndon

B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 206

SECRET-SENSITIVE

Summary Statement of U.S. Policy Toward Cuba

Present Policy and Courses of Action: Our ultimate objective

has been to replace the Castro regime.

The immediate objectives

have been (a) to reduce the will and ability of the Soviet-supported

regime to organize Latin America in a form inimical to our interests

and (b) to prevent the use of Cuba as an offensive base.

In practi-

cal terms, we have been (a) trying to maintain pressure in order to

exacerbate Cuban internal economic and political conditions; (b) try-

ing to strengthen the Latin American ability to withstand subversion;

and (c) hoping for the breaks that might produce a major change which

would serve both the immediate and ultimate objectives.

Our principal pressures have been economic (the economic denial ef-

fort) and paramilitary (externally mounted hit-and-run sabotage and

harassment actions, either directly under Agency control of through

"autonomous" groups). Both kinds of pressures have been exerted only

partially. The application of some economic denial measures has been

inhibited, and the introduction of others ruled out, by the judgment

that the risks of incurring political costs in our relations with

allies outweighed the advantages to our Cuban policy. Similarly, the

paramilitary program involving CIA-controlled actions was set aside

even before it really started, and the program of the

"autonomous"

groups was abandoned after a reasonable trial, because of the decision

_hat the damage to our broad interests, especially our relations with

the USSR and the Vietnamese situation, would be disproportionate to

benefits which we might obtain in terms of our Cuban policy. (In the

case of the

"autonomous" groups, moreover, there were, in practice,

very limited benefits.) The overflights issue has also been a major

factor in the calculation. These judgments have been influenced by

the belief that developments in Cuba and Latin America were moving,

even though slowly, in the right direction.

With respect to Cuba, this belief seems no longer to be warranted.

According to very recent estimates, the Cuban economy improved in

1964 and will probably continue to

move upward in 1965, principally

because of increased sugar production. The economy is probably now.

back at or close to the pre-Castro level.

Our economic denial pro-

gram, limited by broad political considerations,

has had only partial

effects. In 1964, when Cuba was flush with foreign exchange, we were

unable to prevent

its acquisition of Western goods up to the limits

of its exchange availabilities. In 1965, Cuban imports from the Free

World will almost certainly be sharply down as a result, not of the

denial program, but rather of exchange stringencies brought about by

the very low world price of sugar.

It is certainly true that we have

orevented sales of critical comnodities, that we have persuaded the

SECRET-SENSITIVE

EXDIS

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

DocId: 32423484 Page 206

---

## Page 207

SECRET-SENSITIVE

- 2 -

ajor Western powers to withhold further official credit facilities

on the basis that Cuba was not credit-worthy and that we have ham-

pered the development of the economy. But it has been a constant,

scrambling struggle to do even this, and there are very recent re-

ports that the British and the French are considering granting large

amounts ($50 million each) of credits. Moreover, we have always

been faced with the possibility that the Soviets will simply make

additional foreign exchange available to Cuba. The large (6 million

tons) sugar crOP,

the signs of economic revival in Cuba, the con-

tinued Soviet assistance, and the general lack of sympathy with our

economic denial efforts indicate that the program, as constituted at

present, will become more and more difficult to carry out and less

and less effective. With the decrease in external economic pressures,

the prospects for continued economic progress become brighter, even

though the economy will probably continue to be far from healthy for

the next one or two years.

With respect to the internal political situation, the regime is sub-

ject to some stresses, but its control is firm.

Morale among anti-

Castro elements is low because of the efficiency of the security

apparatus and the apparent permanence of the regime.

Externally, frictions between Castro and the Soviets and the Chinese

exist and are potentially helpful. The cormunity of interest is so

great, however, as to override current difficulties. In the sub-

version sector, Cuba, with Soviet acquiescence, if not encouragement,

has been trying to step up the pace.

At least

in the short term, the

Dominican crisis probably has improved the atmosphere in Latin

America for general Communist subversion. In spite of his uneasiness

about our intervention in the Dominican Republic as an augury for

himself, Castro almost certainly will try to capitalize on the situ-

ation and to intensify subversive efforts.

We have three gross options: (a) to continue our present programs;

(b) to increase pressures; or (c) to adopt a "softer" line.

a. A continuation of our present policy will probably mean that,

barring some fortuitous development, we will progressively lose

ground in terms of our objectives.' We will, however, incur rela-

tively few risks with respect to other national objectives.

b. On the assumption that we do not intend to resort to military

action, we can increase pressure by either taking additional eco-

nomic measures or returning to paramilitary activities. The ex-

SECRET-SENSITIVE

- 2013

DocId: 32423484 Page 207.

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 208

SECRET-SENSITIVE

-3 -

vanded economic program could include (1) putting foreign firms

rading with Cuba on a US proclaimed list, thus prohibiting business

transactions in the United States (high political costs in our re-

lations with our allies and limited effectiveness); (2) formally de-

nying US Government contracts to foreign firms trading with Cuba

(moderate political costs and potentially moderate effectiveness) ;

(3) vigorously applying the Cuban Assets Control Regulations in areas

hitherto considered politically sensitive (moderate political costs

and quite limited effectiveness); and (4) financially assisting Free-

World sugar producers to compete with Cuba (small political costs,

high financial costs and noderate effectiveness). In the paramilitary

field, the Agency could undertake a variety of actions involving sabo-

tage and harassment designed

to inflict economic and psychological

damage and to create political tensions. These measures would be

effective only if vigorously and continuously executed. They would

involve serious political risks, particularly in our relations with

the USSR.

c. The adoption of a "softer" line would entail a fundamental

change in policy toward accommodation. Basically, it would involve

the acceptance of a Communist state in Latin America, with a strong

effort being made to curb its aggressive tendencies, probably in

favor of a

"Titoist" orientation.

The chances are better than even

that the choice of this option would be seriously damaging to our

long-term interests, particularly in Latin America.

********

* **

There is a fourth, very broad choice:

The cessation of Soviet

sup-

port of Castro as part of a global settlement of outstanding

US-USSR issues. The analysis of this option is beyond the scope

of this summary statement.

SECRET-SENSITIVE

EXOIS

DocId: 32423484 Page

208

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library.

---

## Page 209

SECRET SENSITI

Sana 26, 1965

MEMORANDUN TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: COVATI Addos Agalass Cuba

do i thlak you shoald know that Admiral Rabors has recow.

mended resctivatos ol a paramiliary allors agalaos Cuba. This maitas

bas boss considarad la tha 303 committes (the committee uhich moaltors

all coveti operadona) Tommy Ihompsos, Ey Vasco, and l aso agalass.

ths recommandation,. buts slong with Raborn, to bave agreed to report

tho matios to yon in caso you mant to pursue ll further.

2. Iba Rabora recommendados calle los the fallowiag typar.

al aporatono:

(1). Maritima saldo by commando teame agalzat constel tas gars.

(2) Use of as anderwaros demalition team to biom up abipa

1a cobra porta.

13) Might attacho on major Cubes merchant vansido millo

In Cabas tarritorial waters.

(4) Air sombing al colected tangot to Cube by corate arerari.

13) Decaptlos aparations de rigood to give tha impression al

imminast livasion by U. I. foscas.

3. Too troublo 1ort al us 100 is such oparationa la that thols

Istarrational solna loval outweighe thair antl-Castra value..

Espacially

wits the Dandolcas probles beforo us, most ol la do not secommend

Molblo violaze actions agalast Cuba, I ballavo tada la also the opdodor of

Daas Bank and Bob McNamara, Bat ll you foal differently, me cas bana

the mattas exertoad agais.

Med. B.

Look at te agala

Leavo lt alono 105 nom

SECRET - SENSITIVE

DocId: 32423484

Page

209

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library:

---

## Page 210

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

IASHINGTON

and ser

SECRET -- SENSITIVE

May 30, 1966 - - p. p.m.

MEMORANDUM BOR THE PRESIDENT

The noise level of Castro's charges of "threatened Yankee aggression" may

go up as a result of two incidents which have occurred during the past

36 hours.

On Saturday night a CLA exfiltration mission ran into an

ambush. The two Cuban agents being exfiltrated were captured. Two

members of the exfiltration team, who went in to pick them up, were

killed. The Havana radio is broadcasting stories on this incident. If

past performance is any guide, the captured agents will spill the full

story of their involvement. Castro can be expected to relate this incident

to Guantanamo as further evidence of U.S. aggressive intentions.

2.

From commint we

learned of action by Cuban air and naval units

against unidentified surface vessels off the northwestern coast of Cuba

shortly after midnight this morning. The evidence is fragmentary. The

Cubans appear to have intercepted a launch, set it on fire, and picked up

two of the persons aboard. CLA assures me that none of their units were

involved. They speculate that the boat may have belonged to Cuban exile

free-lancers. Nothing has come out publicly on this incident yet.

W

• Rostow

SECRET -- SENSITIVE

DooId: 32423484

Page

210

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 211

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.G. 20505

This is the RePant mentioned

bir the DCL at our MeRtos at 1100

P. Jessup 1695

7 August 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Spocial Assistant for the President

Mr. Walt W. Rostow

SU

Attached Memorandum Concerning Six

Cubans on an Alleged CIA Mission

Tho attached memorandum is from Mi. Thomas H.

Karamessines, Deputy Director for Plane.

SECRET

GRIS 1

HATH IN

... Copy--

DooId: 32423484

Page 211

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 212

7 August 1967

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Surfacing on 6 August 1967 of Six Cubans

on Alloged CIA Mission

1. None of the six individuals surfaced in Havana

on G August 1967 were on a mission for the CIA at the

time of. their capture..

The men were

apparently captured

wallo on self-sponsored "Panily runs" or while on missions

on healt of indenendant exile grous (such as Algha 66

and the Second National Front of Escambray). They were

obviously being surfaced at this time for maximum propas

ganda exploitation beforo the delogates and Journalists

at the LASO Conferenco.

2. Tho following are the names and pertinent

preliminary data ou the individuals who wele surfaced:

Francisco AVILA AZCUY

In March 1965 some thought was given to

using him on an extiltration operation. However,

he was never contacted nor used by CIA.

DPOB:

circa 1946, Consolacion del Norte.

AVILA arrived in the U.S. by boat 1n 1962, resided

In the Mlami area.

b. Pablo GARCIA Roqueta

There is no cacord of any affiliation with

the Agency.

He was reported in April rectas.

planning &

"family run" and was hoping to contact

all alleged internal clandestine group to plot the

assassination of Castro:

DPOB: 24 May 1934, Las VIllas Province.

RA".

SECRET

chow 1

Endured lino Minsalis

SARZEILDILS ALA

DooId: 32423484

Page

212

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 213

SECRET

-2-

Jose ROIG Rodriguez

erroheously reported in the press

aS ROY,

was trained as a radio operator and 1n

clandestine tradecraft. He participated in two

operations in September 1964 and July 1965 as &

a general cutback.ln Special Operations being

conducted at the Miani Station.

DPOB:

28 January 1942, Havana.

Ho was

detained briefly by Cuban authorities in May 1962

on suspicion of plotting against the government.

Ho arrived in the United States as a rofugee on

21 August 1962.

d. Alberto LAUCERICA Diaz

There aro no identifiable traces.

e. Vincent GONZALEZ

HIgoya

Subject served from

5 June 1964 as an o1ler

on the mother vessels used in maritime infiltration

oporations. In this capacity he participatod in

some 18 oporations

which was

sold 1n 1966,

currently being sold. He wag last used on an

Infiltration operation on 21 Narch 1967.

He was

terminated on 30 April 1967 because of the cutback

In Special Operations. It appears that he was

captured ghile on an independent "family run" in

bring relatives out of Cuba.

DPOB! 19 July 1935, Cruces, Las Villas

ProVinCe. GONZALEZ was a member of

the 26 of July

Movement in 1960 and later of the 30 November Movo-

ment until he left Cuba in August 1961. He reportedly

was arrested twice for political reasons while in

Cuba.

In 1963 he made a "family run" back to Cuba

hoping to get his family to leave. His wifo and

family were reportodly still in Cuba as of May 1964.

SEGRET

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

DocId: 32423484 Page 213

---

## Page 214

-9-

Jose Ricardo RABEL Nullez

As 01 20 february 1963,

, subject was used

as a spotter and debriefer in the miami area.

In

May 1964 he made an unsuccessful attempt to conduct

an independent infiltration to bring out his

family despite Miani Station warnings against such

& mission.

He was terminated on 9 July 1964,

In

September

1964 he made another "tamily run" and was

arrested shortly after his arrival.

DPOB:: 7 April 1922, Havana. RABEL. 1S

son of a farmer and sugar planter.

From 1938 to

1940 he attended High School and Tulane University

In New Orleans.

In March 1941 he entered the U.s.

Army and was honorably discharged at the end of

World War II.. After graduation from the Cuban

Military Academy he served as Cuban Liaison Officer

with the U.S. Army Mission in Cuba in 1954 to:

1956, In April 1956 he was arrested for participation

1n an attempted military coup against Batista. He

wAs jailed

for 35 days. He joined the Castro

movement and after the Castro takeover became a

captain in the National Institute of Agrarian

Refoim. He defected to the United States In

December 196%.

SECRET

DocId: 32423484

Page

214

Copy

Lyndon: B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 215

MEMORANDUM !

SECRET -

SENSITIVE

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGION

Monday - December 18, 1967

NOTE FOR WALT ROSTOW

SUBJECT:

Cuba

DocId: 32423484 Page 215

Last Friday I had a most interesting talk with CIA's new man on Cuba.

He is

Dave Phillips -- one of their more sophisticated operators who

performed so well in the DR following the 1965 revolt.

Dave is revamping the Cuban operation. The apparatus mounted

following the Bay of Pigs is obsolete.

It was aimed at stimulating

Castro's overthrow from the outside with propaganda, infiltrators,

supplies, etc. For this purpose they had a large and not well-

camouflaged establishment in Miami.

The Miami operation is being

phased out.

The sizeable sea-borne infiltration-exfiltration capability

is being dismantled and a small, more efficient one established for

stand-by use. Radio Americas on the Swan Islands is being discon-

tinued.

The new emphasis is on developing contacts within Castro's inner

circle.

We need to know more about who his main advisers are and

what they are thinking. If there is to be a change in Cuba, it is more

likely to come from defections in

this group. If Castro were to start

looking for accommodation, one of them would be the first to know

and probably the channel for feelers.

Dave agrees that Castro finds himself increasingly hemmed in. The

loss of "Che" and the insurgency effort in Bolivia on the heels of the

big LASO splash has been a serious blow. The outlook for the sugar

crop this year is not good: only 5-5. 5 million tons. Cuba is committed

to deliver 5 million to the USSR alone. Relations with the Soviets are

probably the testiest since the missile crisis, as reflected by Cuba's

actions during the 50th anniversary ceremonies.

All this makes it most important that we:

_ develop our intelligence on what is going on inside the regime.

-- be alert to indications that Castro is looking for accommodation

or his disillusioned lieutenants want to know where we stand if

they move to dump him.

I am happy to

see as politically sensitive an operator as Dave Phillips

on the Cuban job at this time.

WGBow@Upy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 216

SLORET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

12 June 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

I. On 7 June 1968, Guantanamo Naval Base reported that

according to a clandestine source, a group of about thirty of-

ficers and men from a nearby Cuban tank unit are planning to

seize six or seven tanks, assault the communications facility and

armory at the camp, and speed to the Guantanamo Naval Base seek-

ing asylum. Along the way, they will fire against any resistance.

The Base sent the informant back to the conspirators with the

message that the United States does not endorse the plan, will

not support it, and recommends that it not be attempted. Further,

that if the operation is undertaken, the United States must have

more advance notice than the forty-eight hours cited, and that

the group must stop their tanks outside the fence surrounding the

Base• The Guantanamo Naval Base considers the exfiltration plan

feasible if security is maintained until execution time, but

estimates that there is only a fifty-fifty chance of this.

2. Germane to the Guantanamo report is a CIA dissemina-

tion of 4 June. According to several sources, Carlos Prio, former

DocId: 32423484 Page 216

Copy

London B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 217

1291

-2-

President of Cuba, is sponsoring a plan to assassinate Fidel

Castro. This developed after two Cubans exPiltrated Cuba via

Guantanamo on 16 April with a message from dissident Cuban mili-

tary officers at the tank and artillery battalions near Guantanamo.

They offered to eliminate Castro and proclaim Prio as President;

Prio in return agreed to recognize the Cuban Armed Forces as the

sole security force in Cuba. Two Cubans have now infiltrated Cuba

from Miami to implement the assassination. At last report -

6 June - they were in Havana. (CIA has nothing whatever to do

with these attempts and learns of them only through penetration of

Cuban exile groups.)

3. Not related but relevant, CIA recently evoked a radio

response from Manuel Pineiro, Chief of Cuban Intelligence, to a

clandestine broadcast to him. The purpose was to provide him a

private communications channel, should he be or becone disaffected.

The possibility that Fidel Castro approved of the contact should

not be discounted. Discussions are being held with the Department

of State on this development.

Richard Helms

Director

DocId: 32423484 Page

217

0200ET

Copy

London B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 218

INFORMATION.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET-SENSITIVE

LITERALLY EYES ONLY

Thursday, June 20, 1968

6:20.p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

I discreetly checked with Nick Katzenbach about whether Senator

Mansfield or "anyone at State" was doing anything to get closer to Castro

at this time. Nick responded promptly and as follows:

-- he knows nothing about Senator Mansfield's activities in this field;

-- he himself has taken only one step with respect to Castro:

two men came to our base at Guantanamo; told our people that

they planned to assassinate Castro; and they left to return to Cuba.

CLA, Defense, and State agreed that, should an assassination or

an assassination attempt take place, the U. S. skirts should be clean.

Therefore, Nick empowered State to inform the Swiss that they might

tell Cuban authorities that there had been recent reports coming to

us of a Castro assassination attempt.

Nick says that exhausts his policy connection with Cuban matters.

WaRT Rostow

SECRET-SENSITIVE-LITERALLY EYES ONLY

Copy

DocId: 32423484

Page 218.

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

## Page 219

deadlin destitue d duplind

(dog SECRET

25. There is no doubt that Castro's popularity

and the morale of the civilian population have de-

clined somewhat this year and that there have been

various, isolated acts of opposition and sabotage.

But no evidence exists of an organized anti-Castro

effort anywhere in Cuba.

Moreover, there is no evi-

dence of unusual activity or vigilance by Cuban mili-

tary and security forces.

Persistent rumors among

refugees that Major Armando Acosta, Major Calixto

Garcia, and others are leading antiregime groups in

the Sierra Maestra have proved to be the merest gossip.

On 6 November, Garcia appeared at a public function

in Havana and

Acosta also seems to be in Castro's

favor.

There have been no indications, moreover, that

regime officials who are

certainly aware of the rumors

spreading through the exile community are concerned

about possible armed or organized opposition.

26.

It is possible that a handful of disaf-

fected Cubans have fled to remote areas of eastern

Cuba in an attempt to escape the totalitarian con-

trols of the regime.

They may be escaped prisoners,

army deserters, bandits, and brigands. It is also

possible that a few exile infiltrators may have

landed in Cuba.

Such individuals, however, do not

constitute a

threat to the regime. Privately owned

weapons have been very scarce in Cuba since the re-

gime conducted several campaiyns to confiscate them.

It is possible--as some refugee reports have al-

leged--that individuals or small groups may have at-

tempted attacks on small military outposts in the

hinterlands.

If that is true, or if army deserters

were able to bring weapons and ammunition with them,

there may be a few armed men in the hills.

27.

In any case, the military and security

forces could easily isolate and quickly exterminate

such individuals.

The Interior Ministry's Mountain

Troops, which were successful by early 1965 in

eliminating a few counterrevolutionary bands from

the hills of eastern and central Cuba, have apparently.

increased their capabilities during recent years.

They could call into use some of the approximately

100 air force helicopters to locate counterrevolu-

tionaries. Thus, it is unlikely that an organized

- 12-

SECRET

---

## Page 220

я порол7

Adog SECRET

element that posed even a temporary or isolated

threat to the regime could long survive. It is

likely, moreover, that as long as the military and

security forces remain loyal to Castro, he can

deal with threats to his position from

any other

internal source or combination of internal forces.

Conclusion

28.

As Castro's dictatorship has become more

totalitarian, civilian morale and economic condi-

tions have deteriorated somewhat but there is no

evidence of organized opposition anywhere in Cuba.

It is difficult to gauge the extent of Castro's

popularity; it seems, however, that regardless of

the course he follows, he will retain the hard-core

support of the peasants, many students and youths,

and leading members of the party and mass organiza-

tions.

By ceding greater power to his followers in

the military and security forces, Castro has granted

supreme institutional power to the group that is

most loyal to him.

These forces are large and ef-

ficient and can probably contain any internal threat

to Castro in the foreseeable future.

29 .

Thus his rule is contingent only on the

continued loyalty of his military entourage. Any

threat to him from this group would also have to

be against his brother Raul. It is extremely un-

likely, however, that Raul would take part in any

move against Fidel. If however, a significant num-

ber of majors were to become convinced that Fidel

were either mentally or physically unable to rule

and that Raul could not be separated from his

brother, they could conceivably attempt to limit

Fidel's power. At 42, however, Fidel is in robust

good health.

30 .

Castro has at times vaguely discussed

the possibility of reducing his role at the top,

and there have been occasional reports that he may

eventually step down as prime minister.

He might

resort to such a gesture if

major economic plans

failed disastrously or if civilian morale and

economic conditions worsened considerably. It prob-

ably would be only a ploy, however, similar to his

resignation as prime minister in July 1959, when

-13-

SECRET

DocId: 32123184 Page

220

---

## Page 221

Adog SECRET

for a few hours he was technically out of office

while the Cuban President was forced to resign.

In any case, there is little chance either that

Castro will

voluntarily relinguish any significant

part of his absolute power in Cuba or that a plot

against the regime could succeed in the foresee-

able future.

-14-

SECRET

DocId: 32423484

Page 221

---