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2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

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96-3620327

*E-0 *

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ACTION: EA/J (299)

DDO,

EA/XO

(4/W)

INFO: DCEA/OPE, EYESONLY, MDSX, ODPD, FILE, C/EA,

96 3620327

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001

TOR:

260842Z MAR 96

IN 3620327

TOKY 24344

SECRET 260832Z MAR 96

STAFF

CITE TOKYO 24344

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR.

FOR: LIMIT C/EA/J INFO CHIEF/EA, DCEA/OPE, EA/ XO

SLUGS: WNINTEL

SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - FOR C/EA/J - OFFICIAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF TOKYO

STATION

REF: DIRECTOR 700784 96 3598980

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: PLEASE INCORPORATE THE FOLLOWING INTO THE

*TALKING POINTS TO BE USED IN THE PRESENTATION TO THE<JFK>

* ASSASSINATION>RECORDS REVIEW BOARD.

AMBASSADOR MONDALE, THE EMBASSY AND THE STATION STRONGLY

OPPOSE RELEASE TO THE PUBLIC OF ANY REFERENCE TO THE EXISTENCE OF A

CIA STATION IN JAPAN.

SUCH ACTION COULD HAVE ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES

FOR US-JAPAN RELATIONS AT A TIME WHEN A NUMBER OF DIFFICULT SECURITY

AND ECONOMIC ISSUES REMAIN UNRESOLVED.

IT ALSO WOULD RISK REIGNITING

EARLIER CONTROVERSIES OVER ALLEGED CIA WIRETAPPING OF THE MAN WHO IS

TODAY THE PRIME MINISTER AND OVER PAST CIA FUNDING FOR THE LIBERAL

DEMOCRATIC PARTY. PUBLIC CONFIRMATION WOULD, WITHOUT A DOUBT,

DISRUPT COOPERATION WITH JAPANESE LIAISON SERVICES ON IMPORTANT

COUNTERTERRORIST AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CASES.

BY MAKING THE

STATION THE OBJECT OF GREATER PUBLIC AND POSSIBLY OFFICIAL SCRUTINY,

IT WOULD LOWER THE CONFIDENCE OF EXISTING AND NEW SOURCES IN OUR

ABILITY TO PROTECT THEIR IDENTITY AND SECURITY:

3.

IMPACT ON US-JAPAN RELATIONS: THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT DOES

NOT PUBLICLY ADMIT THAT IT COLLECTS INTELLIGENCE, AND AS A COROLLARY,

DOES NOT ADMIT TO HAVING LIAISON RELATIONSHIPS WITH US INTELLIGENCE

AGENCIES.

TOKYO AVOIDS PUBLIC ACKNOWLEDGEMENT BECAUSE IT KNOWS THAT

INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION IS ANATHEMA TO THE LEFT WING OF THE JAPANESE

POLITICAL SPECTRUM, AND ANY ADMISSION WOULD GIVE THE LEFT NEW

OPPORTUNITIES TO ATTACK THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY, WHICH WAS THE

RULING PARTY FROM 1955 TO 1993 AND IS TODAY THE PARTY OF THE PRIME

MINISTER AND THE LEADING PARTY WITHIN THE RULING COALITION. ANY

OFFICIAL CONFIRMATION THAT CONTRADICTED EARLIER JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

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DENIALS OF CIA PRESENCE IN JAPAN WOULD BE USED AS A CLUB BY THE LEFT

TO ATTACK LDP SUPPORT FOR THE US-JAPAN MUTUAL SECURITY TREATY AND THE

PRESENCE OF US FORCES: IN JAPAN. WITH A STATE VISIT BY THE US

PRESIDENT FAST APPROACHING AND DELICATE NEGOTIATIONS OVER US BASES IN

OKINAWA LIKELY TO CONTINUE INTO 1997, THIS WOULD BE A PARTICULARLY

BAD TIME TO OPEN THE DOOR TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS ABOUT US ACTIVITIES

AND INTENTIONS IN JAPAN.

4.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF CIA PRESENCE WOULD ALSO REVIVE OLD

CONTROVERSIES THAT HAVE LARGELY RECEDED FROM THE HEADLINES. IN 1995,

THE PRESS MADE A MAJOR ISSUE OF CIA FUNDING FOR THE LDP IN ITS

FORMATIVE YEARS.

ANYTHING THAT LENT CREDIBILITY TO THE STORY WOULD

BE A SERIOUS POLITICAL LIABILITY FOR THE LDP.

THEN FOREIGN MINISTER

AND LDP: PRESIDENT KONO YOHEI PERSONALLY ASKED AMBASSADOR MONDALE THAT

THE US GOVERNMENT NOT RELEASE DOCUMENTS ON THIS SUBJECT. . KONO

EXPLAINED TO AMBASSADOR MONDALE THAT THE LDP CAN DEAL WITH RUMORS AND

EVEN UNCONFIRMED LEAKS, BUT OFFICIAL CONFIRMATION OF CIA ACTIVITY. IN

JAPAN WOULD BE AN ENTIRELY DIFFERENT AFFAIR, THREATENING TO DAMAGE

BOTH THE CONSERVATIVE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AS WELL AS THE US-JAPAN

SECURITY RELATIONSHIP.

KONO EXPLICITLY IMPRESSED ON THE AMBASSADOR

THE NEED FOR THE US GOVERNMENT TO HOLD THE LINE AGAINST DISCLOSURE.

5. IN THE FALL OF 1995, A NEW YORK TIMES ARTICLE ALLEGED THAT

THE CIA HAD WIRETAPPED HASHIMOTO. RYUTARO, WHO HAS SINCE BECOME PRIME

MINISTER. IN RESPONSE TO THE ENSUING PRESS QUERIES, JAPANESE

OFFICIALS OF THE CONCERNED MINISTRY DISMISSED THE STORY AS

IF THE US GOVERNMENT DECLASSIFIES A DOCUMENT THAT

CONFIRMS CIA PRESENCE. IN JAPAN, IT WOULD HAND THE JAPANESE PRESS NEW

OPPORTUNITIES TO REOPEN THE ISSUE OF ALLEGED ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE AND

ATTACK THE UNITED STATES AND ITS FRIENDS WITHIN THE JAPANESE

6. DISRUPTION OF LIAISON RELATIONSHIPS:

THE JAPANESE SERVICES

GO TO GREAT LENGTHS TO KEEP THEIR RELATIONSHIPS WITH US INTELLIGENCE

AGENCIES SECRET. • IN THE CASE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT OF THOSE

RELATIONSHIPS, ALL CONTACT COULD BE SEVERED IN THE EVENT OF

DISCLOSURE AND EMBARRASSMENT.

SUCH A RUPTURE IN THE RELATIONSHIP

DEFIES EASY REPAIR.

THE SOUTH KOREAN AGENCY FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

PLANNING, WHICH SERIOUSLY EMBARRASSED JAPANESE LIAISON WHEN IT

KIDNAPPED OPPOSITION POLITICIAN KIM DAE JUNG FROM TOKYO OVER TWO

DECADES AGO, IS STILL TREATED AS A PARIAH TODAY.

7.

IMPACT ON CONTINUING OPERATIONS: OUR ONGOING COOPERATION

WITH A JAPANESE LIAISON SERVICE IN PURSUIT OF A MAJOR INTERNATIONAL

TERRORIST GROUP COULD BE TOTALLY DISRUPTED BY DISCLOSURE. EXTREMELY

IMPORTANT US LAW ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLIGENCE EQUITIES ARE AT STAKE

IN THIS COOPERATIVE ENDEAVOR.

AWARE OF THE EXTENT OF US INVOLVEMENT IN THEIR PURSUIT. DISCLOSURE

THAT REMINDED THEM OF THE POSSIBILITY OF US-JAPANESE COOPERATION

AGAINST THEM COULD BE DETRIMENTAL TO OUR ABILITY TO COLLECT

INTELLIGENCE ON THE GROUP.

8. IMPACT ON SOURCES: STATION'S RELATIONSHIP WITH AT LEAST ONE

*SOURCE PREDATES THE<JFK ASSASSINATION. › PUBLICITY ABOUT CIA PRESENCE

AND ACTIVITY, EVEN IN THE PAST, OFTEN CAUSES SOURCES TO WONDER ABOUT

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OUR ABILITY TO PROTECT THEIR SECURITY.

OLDER SOURCES, NOT

SURPRISINGLY, SEE EVEN PUBLICITY ABOUT THE PAST AS SOMETHING THAT

COULD FOCUS ATTENTION ON THEM AS INDIVIDUALS.

9. CL REASON: 1.5 (C); DECL ON: XI.

10. FILE: NONE. DECL OADR DRV HUM 4-82 .

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