Document date: 00/00/0000
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

## Page 1

Released under the John

• Kennedy

Assassination Records

Collection Act of 1992

144 USC 2107 Notel.

Case#:NW 55075 Date:

04-12-2018

File #:

62-116395

Serial Scope:

267 THRu 268

268X1

269

269X1 THRee 275

277 THRu 280

282 THRU 288

290 THRU 293

295 THRU 299

HH 55024

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## Page 2

G2-I16395

2 - Mx. J. A. Mintz

(1 - Mr. J. B, Hotis)

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

June 17, 1975

1 - Mr. K. A. Mendenhall

UNITED STATES SENATE SELICT COMMITTEE

TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS

WITE RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: SUPERSEDED SECTIONS OF THE

MANUAT. OF INSTRUCTIONS

Reference is made to the SSC memorandur, with

attached appendices,

dated April 30, 1975, requesting

certais documents and other infornation fron the FBI.

Part one of referenced memorandun requested this

Bureau to nake available for review various superseded

sections of the Manual of Instructions (MOI).

Appendix A

attached to referenced memorandum set forth the sections

requested for revier.

Mr. Mark Gitenstein, SSC Staff

Menber, has advised FBI Special Agent Paul V. Daly that

revisions to the Mol should cover the period

January i,

1960, to the present.

these superseded sections are now ready fox

review at FBI Headquarters by appropriately cleared

personnel of the SSC Staff. It should be noted that for tho

period January 1, 1960, to

the present, there were no

revisions of lot sections 95 and 97.

I - The Attorney General

RAM:sdjs sdjs

(8)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

AWL INFORMATION CONTAINHD

LIRAN IS UNCLOSIFIE

ATE 0-25-2000

when

Assoc. Dir.-

Dep. AD Adm. -

Dep. AD Inv. -

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

Comp. Syst._

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com. -

Gen. Inv. _

Ident. -

Inspection

Intell. -

Laboratory.

Plan. & Eval. -

Spoc. Inv. -

Training

Legal Coun.

Telephone Rm. _

Director Sec'y -

MAIL ROOM L

"HH 55024 DocId: 32989609 Page 2

peri

TELETYPE UNIT L

(7-114-75-29918

"CLOSURE"

GPO: 1975 0 - 569-920

---

## Page 3

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTED

ON

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (35C)

2 - MX. J. A. Mintz

(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)

1. - Mr. W. R.

Hannall

June 17, 1975

I - Mr. W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. K. A. Mendenhall

casi

Roference is nade to a memorandum from the SSC

dated April 30, 1975, with attachod appandicos A thru C

requesting certain documents and othor information from

the FBI.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to SSC

is the original of a menorandum which responds to one of the

requests contained in above SSC memorandum.

A copy of the menorandun is being furnished for

your records.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

: 1 - the Deputy Attornoy Genoral

Accention: I. Millian O'Connor

Special Counscl for

Intelligonce Coordination

REC- 102

12-114575-299

ALI INFORMATION CONTAINE

HH

Assoc. Dir. _

Dep. AD Adm. -

Dep. AD Inv. -

Asst. Dir.:

Admin. -

Comp. Syst. -

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com.

Gen. Inv..

Ident.

Inspection

Intell.

Laboratory

Plon. & Evol, -

Spoc. Inv. a

Training -

Legal Cour. -

Telephone Rm. -

Direçto

Noply RoOM L

able Bar74:32989609

TELETYPE UNIT

Page

3

ії:

PLM

W. O@REGAR-4065-8874

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## Page 4

Re: Superseded Sections of the

Manual of Instructions

NOTE:

Pursuant to a prior SsC request, we furnished them

38, 95, 97 and 122.

those were made available for review only at rBillo.

107 and 130,

Listed below are the Intelligence Division

representatives and the wol sections reviewed for this

project:

Section 36-Espionage

Section 34-Registration Act

Section S6-Sabotage

Section 87-Investigations of

Subversive Organizations and

James W. Johnson

Dennis R. Dickson

Louis J. Brune

William N. Preusse

Thomas J. McNiff

Individuals

Section 88-Sedition

George J. Lex

Section 105-Internal Security-

James #. Johnson

Nationalistic Tendency

Howard W. Dare, Jr.

Dennis R. Dickson

Section 107-Internal Security

Edward P. Grigalus

Informants and Confidential

James W. Johnson

Sources; and Foreign Counter- Howard W. Dare, Jr.

intelligence Assets

R. Dickson

Section 122-Extremist Matters

Robert D. Shea

and Civil Unrest

Section 130-Extremist Informants Robert D. Shea

and Sources

As previously noted, there were no MOI revisions

during the period of interest to Section 95-Treason and

Section 97-Voorhis Act.

The revisions.of the Mol requested by ssc consists

not being attached to this memorandum.

CI-]

CI-3

IS-2

IS-2

IS- 2

IS-2

CI-1

CI-2

CI-3

IS-2

CI-1

CI-2

CI-3

IS-1

IS-I

- 2-

NW 55024 DocId: 32989609 Page 1

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## Page 5

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee:

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

DETR

17 Report dated_ 6/17/75

U.S.

Senate Select Committee.

Re: Superseded

Caption of Document: Sections of the Manual of Instructns!

Part I SSC memorandum 4/30/75.

3i/0n

Re sived by:

ALL INTORIATION CONTAINSO

DATE

MDR-16

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Page

5

---

## Page 6

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

BEFORE COMPLETING.

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

To:

Intelligence Community Staff

ATTN: Central Index

FROM:

Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (check

appropriate term.

If a document was made available

2. DATE PROVIDED

for review but not

transmitted, so note.)

DOCUMENT

BRIEFING

INTERVIEW

TESTIMONY

JOTHER

6/17/75

3. ТО WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)

SSC

C. Benz, Office Manager

HSC

IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; live name or identification number of briefer,

interviewee, testifier and subject)

Superseded Sections of the Manual of Instruetions

to formal request, other-

verbal request of (name), initiative,

subpoena, etc.)

SSC letter dated 4/30/75, Part I.

"7J9)

?. Keed upde fine rote passoriate key words from the list provided separately: if key words not listed are

ALL INFORMATION CONTALTED

Operating Procedures

DATE /0-25-2000

my -16

8. SUMMARY (see

reverse

side before completiné

this item)

At the request of SSC, specified superseded sections of

this Bureau's Manual of Instructions, covering the period 1/1/60

to the present, have been made available at FBIHQ for revlew by

SSC Members.

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-71*1

62-116395

TJM:1hb

(4)

379| (6-751

HW 55024

Doc Id: 32989609 Page 6

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN

CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75. LFS 7-2-75

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

---

## Page 7

INSTRUCTIONS

-

• Type or print clearly in ink.

• Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

• Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

• "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the

information.

• If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to

HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a

copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing

substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community

matters if appropriate.

Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests

should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be

noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here,

e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether

interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript

is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional

pages may be attached if necessary.

WH 55024 DocId: 32989609 Page 7

---

## Page 8

2 - Mi

A. Mintz

(1 - Mr.

J. B. Hotis)

1 - Mr.

W. R. Wannall

1 - Mr.

W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. R. D. Shea

June 17, 1975

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

ON INTELTIGENCE ACIIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to a letter, and appendices thereto,.*

from the SSC, dated May 14, 1975, requesting certain documents

and other intormation from the FBI.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the

Committee is an original of a menorandum which is responsive

to their request.

A copy of the memorandum is being furnished for your

records.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395.

1 - The Deputy Attorney General

Attention: K. William O'Connor

Special Counsel for

Intelligence Coordination

REG: 102

62.116315-798.

1!L 2 197,

ALL INFORMATION CONTAIN

FIRIN T& UNGLASSIEN

MDRIG

Assoc. Dir. w

Dep. AD Adm. -

Dep. AD Inv. -

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

Comp. Syst. -

Ext. Affairs -

Filos & Com. -

Gen. Inv. -

Ident. -

inspection -

intell. .

Laboratory

Plan. & Eval. -

Spec. Inv. -

Training

Legal Coun.

551975489865 PagE YETYPE UNTO

pir

5- Tril

GPO: 1975 0 - 569-920

---

## Page 9

no !

52-116395

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)

1 - Mc. W. R. Wannall

1-

Mr.

W. 0. Cregar

1 - Mr.

R. D. Shea

June 17, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

TO STUDY GOVERNINNTAL OPERATIONS

WITH RESPECE TO INCELLIGINCE ACIIVITIES

RE: REQUESE PERIATIING TO ELECZNONIC

SURVEILLANCE

Referenco is made to SSC letter to the Attorney Goneral,

with attached appendices, dated Nay 14, 1975, requesting certain

documents and other information fron the FBI.

In Appendix D, captioned "Request Pertaining to

Electronic Surveillance," the SSC desired a response to the

following request:

"all July and August memoranda from former

facial agent Bal red clark to the hastatut social igant

in Charge (ASIC) or the Special Agent in Charge (SAC) of the

Lewark, Now Jersey, Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation

(FBI), captioned "Protection of the President - Ihite House

Inquiry.""

In rogard to the aforementioned, a thorough review of

the files of the Newari Offioe of the FBI

did not reveal the

existence of a file bearing the caption, "Protection of the

President - Thito House Inquizy."

Flovever, this roview did

disclose the existence of a file bearing the caption, "protcotion

of the President."

A thorough revion oi chis Illa tailed to

uncove. any lchoranda enanating fron tormer SA deo I. Clark at

any time.

Assoc. Dir..

In addition, a thorough revicu of other files main-

- tained at the Fovarl Office believed relevant to the subject

Dep. AD iv. - matter of this inquiry, did not reveal any menoranda, lotters

Asst. Dir.:

Admin. -

at other type communications prepared by former SA Clark.

Comp. Syst. -

Ext. Affairs —

A thorough review of pertinent FBINQ filos discloses

Filos & Com. - no memoranda emanating fron formor SA Clark regarding this*.

Ident.

ratter.

Inspection -

Intell..

Laboratory -

I - The Attorney General

Plan. $ Evol. -

Spec. Inv. — RDS: jmn

Training

Legal Coun. _

(8)

mn

Telephone Rm. -

Director Sec'y - MAIL ROOM

TELETYPE UNIT

55024 DooId: 32989609

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1a7. 11021:

LERCLOSURE

SEE

NOTE

PAGE 2

79%

GPO: 1975 0 - 569-920

---

## Page 10

Request Pertaining to Electronic Surveillance

NOTE:

Telephonic instructions were issued to the Newark

Office to respond to Item 15, in SSC letter 5/14/75. BY airtel

datea 5/30/75 and teletype dated 6/5/75, Newark advised that

their review regarding Item 15 was negative.

Material reviewed

at FBIHQ included, the "Disruption of Democratic National

Convention; Information Concerning" file; records of the

Inspection Division regarding the

"Special Squad, Atlantic City,

New Jersey, National Convention, August 22-28, 1964," personnel

Illes of former Assistant to the Director DeLoach, Assistant

Director W. C. Sullivan, former SA's Leo I. Clark

and Frederick

Baungaraner.

Above material did not make reference to or con-

tain any memoranda prepared by SA Clark regarding the Democratic

National Convention held at Atlantic City, New Jersey, from

8/22-28/64. File review conducted by SA Robert D. Shea.

- 2.

Lawr

55024

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Page 10

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## Page 11

----

/ 5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Senate Select Committee

LTR

XJ LHM

•Report dated 6/17/7

ssc to study Govt Operations with Respect

Caption of Document: to Intelligence Activities. Re:

Request Pertaining to Electronic Surveillance

Date: 40/20/75

3:10

PM

Preived by:

Title:

Refurn this receipt to the Intelligence Divisiod, FBI.

ALL DORIS ATION CONTAINED

HW 55024

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Page 11

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## Page 12

'E:

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

i...

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO:

Intelligence Community

Staff

FROM:

ATTN: Central Index

Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW

PROVIDED (check

review but not

"trapsopriad, so moto.)

If a document was made available

2. DATE PROVIDED

DOCUMENT

BRIEFING

INTERVIEW

TESTIMONY X OTHER

6/17/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate

term; add specific names if appropriate)

SSC

C. BENZ, Office Manager

HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents;

five name or identification number

of briefer,

interviewee, testifier and subject)

Request Pertaining to Eleccronie Surveillance

5. IN PESONE To list date of it, maridito, esposa to al roquest, other-

6. CLASSIFICATION OF

drains gentor

SSC letter 5/14/75; Appendix D, Item 15.

"U"

weed under fint fote appropriate key words from the list provided soparately: If key words not listed are

Surveillance

SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)

SSC requested all July and August, 1964, memoranda captioned

"Protection of the President - White House Inquiry," prepared by

a former Special Agent of our Philadelphia Office.

Search of

Bureau records failed to uncover the existence of any such

documents.

ALL INFORVATION CONTAINED

DATE LEE SERACTING

DATE LOSS DR LO

TREAT AS YELLOW

11l

62-116395

IJM:1hb

(4)

379 | (6-75)

NH 55024 DocId: 32989609 Page 12

3

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN

CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75. LFS 7-2-35

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

---

## Page 13

INSTRUCTIONS

=..

Type or print clearly in ink.

• Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

• Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

• "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the

information.

• If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to

HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a

copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated..

SPECIFIC. ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing

substance of information and showing relationship tò Intelligence Community

matters if appropriate.

Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests

should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be

noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here,

e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether

interviewee is current or former employee, etc. It actual document or transcript

is provided: that fact should be noted and no summary is required: Additional

pages may be attached if necessary.

HH 55024

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Page 13

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## Page 14

Д.i

The Attorney General

Direcior, IBI

1 - Mr. D. W. Moore. *

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

(Mr. J. B. Hotis)

June 17, 1975

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

1

- Mr. W. 0. Cregar

1 - Mr. R. L. Moore

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

OT INTELLIGINICE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

ALL INTORMATION CONTAINED

DATE 4700

By letter dated lay li, 1925, with attached appendicess

the ssc requested certain Information and documents fron the

FB1.

Inclosed for your approval and forwarding to che

Committee is the original of a memorandum and enclosures which

serve as a response to one of the SSC requests.

There does not appear to be any relation between the

elimination of the FBI Crime Records Division and the mandate

of the Committee contained in Senate Resolution 21.

You may

approving the forwarding of the enclosed documents to the

Conmittee.

A copy of the memorandum with enclosures is being

furnished for your records.

Enclosures

(20)

62-116395

RES 103 = - 1161-292

I = The Deputy Attorney General

Attention:

K. lillian 0' Connor

3 HIll 2 1975

Special Counsel for

Intelligence Coordination

f. Dir.

1. AD Adm. -RiLM :mam

p. AD Inv. -

' Dir.:

(10)38.

min.

imp. Syst.

fiLM

%. Affairs

as & Com. -

h. Inv. -

nt. -

/ 2 ENGLOSURE

,pection

fell. ~

Laboratory

'on. & Evol. -

sc. Inv.

ining

Coun.

one Rm.

2UL 3м119750M

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PuM

GPO: 1975 0 - 569-920

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## Page 15

• =

62-116395

1 - Mr. D. W. Moore

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

(Mx. J. B. Hotis)

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

June 17, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

- Mr. R. I. Moore

DHIADO BIAZIS SENIRE DELCUE COLITIZOE (SSD)

TO GUDE GOVEROR LIZA OFDRAFIONS

VITE RECPICS 3O INZIILIGZICE ACZIVITIRG

RG: TORCHES DOCULINIC PREZAINIIG TO THE

FBI ATD DEFINI LOZ OF JUSTICE

ORGIELATIO, STRUCTURE, AD JURISDICEION

Rotoronce is paio to ipo letter datod lay 1,

1975y v1th attached

aprondices, requocting contain

documento and other information fron the FBI.

Furquant to your request in Appendix B, Fart II,

Iton number 15, for all Lauocanda anû other natoriule

relating to

the olinination of the rut Ceime Rocords

Division in lato 1972 or carly 1973, cholosed aro copies

DI MinO IDI COrTIniCadOnE.

Inclosuros (9)

1 - The Attorney General

RIM mam

19 Mili

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

REIN IS UNCLASSIFTH

LATE D 252MD BX SHININ ILI

MDR-16

NOTE:

The material furnished contains available intormation

with reference to the change in name and later elimination of

the Crime Records Division during the period 10/16/72 to 1/3/73.

This matter has been coordinated with Mr. David Divan of the

External Affairs Division. An extensive search by the Files and

Dep. AD Adm. _Communications Division has failed to locate the 10/4/72 memorandum

on referenced in M, A Jones to Ur. Bishop memorandum, lone letter to

the I. M. Walters memorandum to Mr. Felt, 12/14/72.

Comp. Syst. MT. Fletcher Thompson mentioned in the second recommendation,

Files& ComPage 3.0 the illo. domes to Misto memo am me metter ma

Gen I appreciation for the suggestion with reference to the

name of the Crime Records Division.

-PLM

Laborotory

Plon. & Eval.

Spoc. Inv.

Training

Legal Coun.

Telephone Rm. _

Director See y -

MAIL ROOM I

HH 55024 DooId:32989609 Page 15

I'nis document is prepared in response to tri me and is not for assema

10"

nation outside your Committee.

Its ase as lina? to official proceedings br

your committee and the content may nut be disclosed io unuuthorized person

nel without the express approval of the FBI

ENCLOSURE

1681509411

Pera

GPO: 1975 0 - 569-920

---

## Page 16

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

addressee:

Senate Select Committee

XI LHM Memo Report dated 6/17/75

Caption of Socient Study Govt Operations with Respect

to Intelligence Activities. Re;

Further Documents Pertaining to the FBI and Dept.

of Justice; Organization, Structure,

chard FEBI

appendix B, Part II

stem 15

1. pay lor Date: €6/233/15

Delivered by:

Rebeived by:

Offine Thana

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

WHEN L LEGS SPLAUD o

DATE 11-25-a

MOR-16

HH 55024

DocId: 32989609 Page 16

---

## Page 17

:"..

"I 'IMAL " NO. 10

0010-106

ON

1ка, N, 27

UNITED STA*

GO

RNMENT

Memorandum

He luckies tille

Ms. •Bishop

DATE: 10-16-72

•:

:?..

FROM

:

M.

A,' Jones

fired colone candies.

SL'BJECT:

¡SUGGESTED NAME CHANGE

/CRIME RECORDS DIVISION

indicated that

By memorandum dated 10-4-72, attached, it was

has suggested

a name change for the Crime Records Division to Office

of Public Information of some other more meaningful designation.

It was pointed out that

suggestion

was in line with informal discussions you (Mr. Bishop)

have had with members of your staff concerning a possible

name change for the Division.

In this connection, Mr. Gray has noted that •

he "can think of many reasons for changing the name.

What have been the nature of the reasons «for change discussed?"

• лать

With the formation of the Computer Systems Divisinn

and the resultant reassignment of the personnel and

the work of the Uniform Crime Reporting Section, including

the National Crime Information Center/Computerized Criminal

Histories file from Crime Records to Computer Systems,

the title "Crime Records,"

has indicated,

Is no longer meaningful insofar as the work of this

Division is concerned.

"Office of Public Information," which was

suggested by

would inaccurately reflect

the activities and responsibilities of this Division

and could result in confusion with the Office of Public

Information in the Department of Justice. This, of

• course, would be undesirable.

Enclosures

•ALL INFORMATION CONTAIN WI

MDR-16.

I'has document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi-

nation outside vour Committee.. Ils se i: limited to official proceedings by

your committee aid the content, may nut be disclosed to unauthorized person-

nel unthout the express approval of the FBL .

MH 55024 DocId: 32989609 Page 17

---

## Page 18

M..

A.

Jones to MI..

Bishop Memo

RE:

SUGGESTED NAME CHANGE, CRIME RECORDS DIVISION

,It is noted that this Division, which is presently

comprised of the Crime Research Section, and the Correspondence.

and Tours

Section, is primarily responsible. for conducting

extensive research pertaining to crime, crime prevention....

and other related matters in the law entorcement field.

This Division is involved in the review and préparation

of replies to correspondence regarding FBI Jurisdiction

and operations received from law enforcement, other Government

agencies, and the general public in those instances where

the Bureau has a responsibility to disseminate such information.

"The FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, " which is the

official publication of the FBI, is prepared and distributed

by Crime Records, as well as numerous pamphlets for the

instruction and information of Bureau employees, the law

enforcement profession and the general public. This Division

is responsible for supervision of tours of Bureau facilities

for Government officials,

law enforcement authorities,

and the general public; directs the program of distributing

informative and illustrative material on Bureau fugitives

to various media for the purpose of effecting the location

• ana apprenension i these criminais with ine nelp of citizen

cooperation;and coordinates and supervises the Bureau's

interests in the utilization of radio, television, and

publication outlets to enhance the discharge of our responsi

bilities in the law

enforcement field by acquainting the

public with the FBI's operations and activities.

In addition, this Division has the custody of'

a number of research and reference files which are maintained

in a current status and which are essential to the Division

in the fulfillment of its responsibilities to the Bureau.

:

Further,

this Division supervises the "Ten-Most-

"Wanted Fugitives" Program, as well as

"The FBI" television

series, both of which involve research for their sustenance

and success.

• D

While it is recognized, based on the foregoing,

that this Division is not completely absorbed in research

to the exclusion of other activities, "Crime Research"

CONTINUED - OVER

=2 .

NH 55024 DocId:32989609 |Page 18

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## Page 19

M.

RE :

A

Jones

to Mr.

Bishop Memo

SUGGESTED NAME, CHANGE, CRIME RECORDS DIVISION

'tie: in.

more accurately describes our responsibilities, it is

felt, than any other title suggested... It is noted ther..t

more likely alternatives discussed were "Research and.

Information Division" and "Research and. Correspondence.

•..

RECOMMENDATIONS:

approve the renaming of the

Crime Records i sinter see divison.

Giggird: 0. 10/22

0:02 #

2.

letter to

That in line with the foregoing, the attached

be approved and sent.

10/270

*to.

..

3

HH 55024

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19

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## Page 20

OFFICE OF TIK DIRECTOR

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

" WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535 .

(Typed October 27, 1972)

PERSONAL, ATTENTION

Memorandum to All Special Agents in Charge:

RE: "NAME CHANGE OF CRIME RECORDS DIVISION

TO CRIME RESEARCH DIVISION

In view of the transfer of the record functions

of the Crime Records Division to the Computer Systems

Division, I have approved changing the name of the Crime

Records Division to the Crime Research Division effective

immediately.

The Section formerly known as the Crime

Research Section has been renamed Research and Service

Section. Manual changes are forthooming.

I. Patrick Gray, III

Acting Director

'ALL INFORMATION CONTAINZO

IREN IS UNCLASSUFIHI

DATE 10-36-2000 B7 SAiAm Brp

ThDR-16

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi-

nation outside your Committee.

Its use is limited to official proceedings by

your Committee and the content may nut be disclosed to unauthorized person

nel without the express approval of the FBI .

H₩ 55024 DocId: 32989609 Page 20

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## Page 21

UPTIONA TORA, NO. 19

3010-108

MAT 19OZ EDITION

GSA GEN. PIG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOV

NMENT

Memorandum

TO

THE ACTING DIRICTOR

FROM

W. M.'FELT

DATE: 12-1-72

SUBJECT: REORGANIZATION - CRIME RESEARCH DIVISION

rangers incontrior.

" Pursuant to your instructions, Assistant Director Bishop is

being temporarily attached to the Training Division at Quantico for special

assignment until the effective date of his retirement, 2-1-73.

.. ':"•

Mr. Bishop will be assigned to the research and development of

a major case practical problem for use in the National Academy. This

is extremely important because our experience indicates that most of the

officers attending the Academy are unable to understand and handle the

ramifications of major cases.

kir. Bishop, with his extensive field back-

ground, plus his familiarity with news media problems, is ideally suited

to handle this assignment.

I he has time. Mr. Bishop will also analyze and develop

• meaningful practieal cases which will enable new agents to meet present-

day needs.

I have arranged with Mr. Jenkins for suitable office facilities

to be used by Mr. Bishop at Quantico and have instructed Bishop to report

to Mr. Jenkins on Monday, 12-4-72.

1/

•-

is being diverted from his current

inspection assignment in the Office of Legal Counsel to begin an immediate

survey of the Crime Research Division to determine the feasibility of the

transfer of its functions to other divisions.or to your office.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For information.

ALL INTORMATION CONTAINED

DATE 10-126-2000

This document is arenares in resphase to your vernest and is not for caseme

ao mentoo los use i loited to officio! proceedings by

now Counteed the cunt:" may nut be disclosed to unauthorized person.

55024 DocId: 32989609

2eagotnout the eness approval of the TBI.

---

## Page 22

UNITED STATES GOVIRAMENT

" Memoran

TO

. MR. FELT

DATE:

12/6/72

FROM

: . L. M. WALTERSY

SUBJECT:

SUPÈRVISORY REORGANIZATION OF

FUNCTIONS AND PERSONNEL;

CRIME RESEARCH DIVISION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 1226200 BY S/21M/22

MDR16

PURPOSE: : To recommend immediate supervisory reorganization and transfer

, of all functions and personnel of the Crime Research Division based

on survey and analysis conducted by Inspection Division.

Recommended transfer of functions and related responsibilities together

with appropriate personnel as follows:

•OFFICE OF ACTING DIRECTOR

To assume supervision of contacts with the Congress, press and other

nows media formerly bendled by Assistant Director Pishop, his front office Agent

personnel and the Administrative Review Unit (Congressical liaison).

Functions and Related Responsibilties:

Congressional liaison; Congressional correspondence; Congressional

telephone calls; progress of legislation of interest to or affecting the FBI; review

of bills and resolutions introduced into both Houses of Congress and all public

and private laws enacted; and review and analysis of the Congressional Record.

pages:-

Press, radio, television and motion picture contacts; field matters concerning

press, radio and television; correspondence relating to an editorial or to a commenta:

liaison with the White Flouse and Department press offices; review of editorials

and articles; review of magazines, newspaper clippings and Washington News

Service ticker items; news releases and press inquiries; SAC calls regarding

press releases; press contact program; coordinaie press matters or possible

füture use from FBIHQ Divisions.

Review statements and speeches by Director or matters affecting major

public relations; invitations for speeches by the Director; assigument of speeches -

to FBIHQ speakers; review speech manuscripts.

Review material for publication, first-name salutation mail, matters critical

ot and complaints regarding FBI; letters enclosing autographed photographs;

has donnent is broncredin roshonse o angeruast undsnot for dissem

nation outsile

Conimt ic.

It's use is limited to official proceedings by

your Committee and the cunient may nut be disclosed to unauthorized person

nel without the expross approval of the FBI .

. CONTINUED - OVER

HW 55021 DocId: 32989609 Page 22

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## Page 23

wupervisory Reorgan,

*Personnel; Crime R

tion of Functions and

arch Division

special photographs in Direcior's Office; American Legion and veteran liaison

maiters..

Recommended Agent Transfer:

OFFICE OF ACTING ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR

To assume/review and analysis of correspondence received by the Director

and the FBI and preparation of replies to the correspondence. Formerly handled by

the Special Correspondence Unit (correspondence of special importance to Director

and Nation) and the Non-Special Correspondence Unit (correspondence from the

public and requests for publications).

Functions and Related Responsibilities:

Replies to correspondence regarding subversive activities and field divisions;

-file reviews and necessary research to determine identity and pertinent background

of the correspondent; file review and research necessary to reply to inquiries and

requests from private citizens, law enforcement, Government representatives on

local, state and national level; initiate instructions to field offices in connection with

correspondence; processing of letters dealing with public relations, general news

media; requests and inquiries from law enforcement officials, Government

representatives and others in foreign countries; chronic mail; and requesis for

publications.

Recommended Agent Transfer:

OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL

To assume formal liaison with the American Bar Association, National

District Attorneys Association, National Association of Attorneys General,

federal Bar Association, and the American Law institute. these funcions tormei y

handled by the Administrative Review Unit. Also research and preparation of legal

briefs in connection with urgent policy matters (formerly handled by Research Unit).

Recommended Agent Transfer:

-2,-

CONTINUED - OVER.

HW 55021 DocId: 32989609 / Page 23

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## Page 24

j for Mr. Felt

Supervisory Reorganization of Functions and Person

Crime Research Diyision.rcdtt

TRAINING DIVISION

To assume operations and maintenance of the FBI Library; preparation

and dissemination of pamphlets, reprints and related material of special

interest in law ehforcement and

the crime problem; coordination and compilation of

material for presenting FBI operations and jurisdiction to law enforcement and the

public through movies; television and other news media; and specialized research

and preparation of material in connection with memoranda requested by the

Director and other Bureau Oficials, research for speeches and policy statements

of the Director and analysis of articles and statements made concerning the FBI.!

These functions were formerly handled by the Library Unit, Publications Unit,

Special Productions Unit and Research Unit.

.. Functions and Related Responsibilities:

'; e

-.....

Reference service to FBI officials, employees, and authorities from other

Government agencies and individuals authorized; maintenance of out-of-town telephone

directories covering United States; preparation of memoranda for Director and

other officials based o1 review of current periodi cals, police journals and scientific

magazines; purchase and sale of books to Bureau employees and the maintenance•

of the inventory and financial records pertinent to this project and operation of ?

lending library to Bureau employees.

Liaison with the Government Printing Office; preparation and dissemination-

of the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin (LEB); research for the Director's monthly

announcement on an important phase of law enforcement or crime for each issue

of the LEB; requesting and coordinating material from the field, editing,

preparation and distribution of "The Investigator"; preparation of "FBI Notes";.

preparation of Interesting Case Memoranda and maintenance of related indices; and

correlation and usage of FBI human interest items.

Monitoring movies and television for proper portrayal of FBI and maintenance •

of a running brief on developments pertinent to Bureu operations; surveys and

evaluations of matters for presentment to the public by information media;

day-to-day surveys of the media for consideration of the Director and Bureau

officials; custody and maintenance of recordings of the Director in connection with

policy statements or interviews with law enforcement or other Government agencies;

custody and maintenance of the general and official Bureau photograph file together

with indices; writing of mdio and television scripts involving FBI fugitives and

matters of FBI jurisdiction; distribution of Uniform Crime Reports Bulletin;

maintenance of cartoon file, illustrations depicting FBI and reference file on mis -

quotes of Director in news

media releases; monthly review of FBI dissemination of

information to the public, law enforcement and authorized individuals and organization:

-3-

CONTINUED - OVER

HH 55024 DocId:32989609 Page 24

---

## Page 25

;""

mo for Mr. Felt

de: Supervisory Reorganization of Functions and

Persönnel; Crime Research Division:

Research and coordination & materials in connection with speeches, by-

line articies and feature stories made or published by the Director; preparation

of memoranda concerning. books on law enforcement; review and analysis of magazine

and newspaper; manuscripts concerning FBI prepared by outside authors who request.

FBI review for accuracy; compilation of data and narrative form of material.

presented in the FBI's Annual Reports; outlines and research for speech data

requested by Bureau officials; maintenance of indices on research matertals.My:

Supervision of Public Law 670 concerning misuse of the name of the FBI;

analysis of Young American Medals Awards; maintenance of reference files pertinent

to FBI jurisdiction and law enforcement policies; reference files on sex offenders,

parole and probation violators, pornographic literature; supervision and statistics

concerning FBI speech program; and supervision and direction of Bureaujuvenile

project.

Recommended Agent Transfer:

ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION

To assume supervision for[special visitors on tours of Bureau facilities,

meetings and photographs with the Director and all other tours conducted for visitors

to the Eureau./ Preparation of data on Bureau employees for publication in home-.

town newspapers as recruitment aids. These functions formell y handled among

the Fugitive Publicity Unit, Special Productions Unit, Research Unit and Tour

Unit.

Functions and Related Responsibilities:

• Handling and processing photographs and other matters for personal autograph

of the Director; interviews, testing, lectures, classroom demonstrations, on-the -job

training and supervision of tour leaders; fingerprinting individuals requesting to be

fingerprinted in connection with Government employment, security clearances or

personal identification; telephone inquiries relating to law enforcement, National

Academy, services and responsibilities of the FBI and background data regarding

the Director; maintain tour statistics of visitors and sccurity of all tow areas;

prepare data on background and work functions of Bureau employees for arranging

publication in their home-town newspapers.

CONTINUED - OVER

HH 55024 DocId: 32989609 Page 25

---

## Page 26

for Mr. Felt

Supervisory Reorganzation of Finctions and

Personnel; Crime Research Division

coins

Recommended Agent Transfer:

GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

To assume/White House name checks and appropriate correspondence,

compilation of data and preparation of memoranda on individuals requesting special

tours or meetings with the Director; compilation" of data and preparation of background

memoranda for dissemination to authorized individuals; and preparation of informative

memoranda pertaining to organizations asking for data. These functions formerly

handled by the Summary Memoranda Unit, (In past years these functions were

performed in Name Check Section of General Investigative Division.)

Recommended Agent. Transfer:

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

To assume bverall responsibility for publicizing FBI fugitives through all

available media, prepare narrative and illustrative data for Top Ten Fugitive

Program, research and preparation of feature fugitive articles; preparation and

dissemination of material concerning fugitives maintenance of special indices concerr.

distribution and cancellation of fugitive material to media; and conduet intervieivs with

jesuns making telephonic ur perconal calls to EBIH@ concerning matters within tha

jurisdiction of the FBI or of interest to the Bureau. These functions were formerly

handled by the Fugitive Publicity Unit.

Recommended Agent Transfer:

OBSERVATIONS

Agent personnel and supervisory functions have been analyzed and dealt with

in the foregoing proposed reallocations; clerical functions have not. It is suggested

that clerical functions and personnel no simply move with the Agent desks and

units tö which they are attached. Questions of space also häve not been covered

and it is readily apparent that a substantial portion of the functions and personnel

suggested for transfer to Training Division might feasibly operate at Quantico

(e.g. Library, Special Productions and Publications Unit). Five units of Training :

Division are now located at Headquarters and the Research Unit of Research and

Service Section proposed herein for transfer to Training Division, likewise should -

remain at Headquarters. Accordingly*

formerly in the

Front Oilice of Crime Research Division, has been proposed for transfer to Training

Disision in order to act, during this transition period, as a special coordinator

of functions that may be divided between Headquarters and Quantico.

The questions of adequacy of clerical personnel, space reallocation, and

50024 Dold 25 cens to Quantico demaid greater study and inasmuch

DocId: 32989609

---

## Page 27

"fior Mr. Felt

Supervisory Reorganization of Functions and Personne

Crime Research Division

as. Training Division is scheduled for regular annual inspection next week, these

matters will be gone into in depth in connection with that inspection and coordinated

in consultation with Administrative Division.

It is the purpose of this memorandum

to promptly effect the desircd transfers of functions among affected Divisions in

order to provide for immediate routing of mail and upper level review and

supervision of the york product of all units previously composing Crime Research

Division.

RECOMMENDATION:

That transfers as outlined herein be approved.

2222200 OF MIN

Liday pers

in do in a Balllero do dr deir and in feed is benit, incrie

dile denioris Berlinee dire

perimenel that get effere see the trends.

sent of peered tre consiste

- funtime

(FOReGOING, typed oN followine pAGe)

Series this gir

4: 30.P

55021 DocId: 32989609 Page 27

---

## Page 28

ADDENDUM OF W. M. FELT

12-6-72 WMF:ert

this appears logical and feasible.. I snags develop we can

readjust. I agree that the Research and Service unctions, which will remain

under

shouid be reassigned to the Training

Division, I do not believe that this Section should be transierred to Quantico,

however, because there is daily need for access to files and other material

at Headquarters and occasional contacts with the public. Turthermore, were

is no availabla space at Quantico except in the Library Building. Accordingly,

I recommend that the FBIHQ Libracy.be moved into the Library Building ai.

Quantico. We would need to retain at TBIl@ the telephone directories and

encyclopedias which are used on a daily basis by other Divisions. The

space into which the FBIHe Library was to have been moved in the 9th and D

Suilding can be used and in fact is badly needed by the Domestic Intelligence

Division which is very crowded.

I recommend that you approve now the transier of functions and

that any necessary realignment of personnel be considered by separate

memoranda.

∞ 6

HH 55024

DocId: 32989609: Page 28

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## Page 29

TOSA

11. 18

UNITED STATES GON

Memorand

MENT

• MIR. FELT

DATE: December 14,1972 .

FRON

Les.

M. WALTERS

SUBJECT:

SUPERVISORY REORGANIZATION OF

FUNCTIONS AND PERSONNEL;

CRIME RESEARCH DIVISION

per prior approval of Mir. Gray

Effective immeciately, ail functions and personnel formerly assigned

to the Crime Research Division are reassigned as indicated elow.

Recipient

inspectors, section and Unit Chiefs promptly report to respective offices of

assignment.

Agent personnel are set forth together with assigned functions. Clerical

personnel usilized in hancing these assignments are to transfer with listed Agenis

in accordance with the tunctions formerly handled by them.

OFFICE OF ACTING DIRECTOR

To assume supervision of contacts with the Congress, press and

other news media formerly handled in the Front Oifice of the Crime Research

Division as well as the Administrative Review Unit which has been redesignated

as the Congressional Services Unit and will be handled by

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINI

Functions and Related Responsibilities:

Congressional liaison: Congressional correspondence; Congressional

telephone cails; progress of legisiation ol interest to or affecting the FBI; review

of bills and resolutions introduced into both Houses of Congress and ali public

A and private laws enacted; and review and analysis of the Consressional Record

Press, radio, television and motion picture contacts: field matters concer:

press, ra lio and televisicn; correspondence relating to an editorial or to a com

mentator liaison with the White House and Department press oices; review of

editorials and articles: review of magazines, newspaper clippings and Washington.

News service ticker items; news releases and press inquries; SAc calls regarcing

press retenses, pross contact progrars, ccordinate press matters of possible

future use irom FEINQ Divisios.

nation outsirls

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi-

C C CAN 7A76292

HH 55024

Docid: 32989045 theates uproval of the rBl.

disclost to muuthorized person

---

## Page 30

' Memo for Mr. Felt

Re! Reorganization of

Review statements and speeches by Director or matters affecting major

public relations; invitations for speeches by the Director; assignment of speeches:

to FBIIQ speakers; review speech manuscripts.

Review material for publication, first-name salutation mail, matters critici

of and complaints regarding FBI; letters enclosing autographed photographs;

special photographs in Director's Office; American Legion and veteran Liaison

matters:

OFFICE OF ACTING ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR

To assume review and analysis of correspondence received by the Director

and the FBI and preparation of replies to the correspondence. Formerly handled b:

the Special Correspondence Unit (correspondence of special importance to Director

and Natic) and the Non-Special Correspondence Unit (correspondence from the

public ald requests for publications).

Functions an Related Responsibililies:

Replies to correspondence regarding subversive activities and field

divisions; ille reviews and necessary research to determine identity and pertinent

bachground of the correspondent; file review and research necessary to reply tu

inquiries-and requests from private citizens, law enforcement, Government

representatives on local, state and national level; initiate instructions to field

offices in connection with correspondence; processing of letters dealing with public

relations: general news media; requests and inquiries from law entorcement

officials, Government representatives and others in foreign countries; chronic mail;

and requests for publications.

OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL

To assume formal liaison with the American Bar Association, National

District Attorney's Association, National Association of Attorneys General,

Federal Bar Association, and the American Law Institute. These functions formerly

handled by the Administrative Review Unit. Also research and preparation of legri

briefs in connection with urgent policy matters (formerly handled by Research Unit).

-2 -

CONTINUED - OVER

HN 55024 DocId:32989609 Page 30

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## Page 31

Memo for Mr. Felt

Re, Reorganization of

TRAINING DIVISION.

..

TeN 22C53228020225 129022

To assune operations and maintenance of the FBI Library; preparation

and dissemination of pamphleis, reprints.and related material of special interest

In law enforcement and the crime problem; coordination and compilation of

material for presenting FBI operations and jurisdiction to law enforcement and the

public through movies, television and other news media; and specialized research

and preparation of material in connection with memoranda requested by the

Director and other Bureau officials, research for syceches and policy statements

of the Director and analysis of articles and statements made concerning the FBI.

These functions were formerly handled by the Library Unit, Publications Unit,

Special Productions Unit and Research Unit.

Functions and Related Responsibilities:

....~ ' Reference service to FBI officials, employees, andathorities from ther.

Governmeni agencies and individuals authorized: maintenance of out-of-town telephe

nirectories covering United States; preparation of memoranda for Director ani

other officiais based on review of current periodicals: police journals and scientific

magazines; purchase and sale of books to Bureau employees and the maintenance

of the inventory and financial records pertinent to this project and queration of a

lending library to Bureau employees.

laison with the Government Printing Office; preparation and disseminatior

of the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin (LES); research for the Director's monthly

announcement on an important phase of law enforcement or crime for each issue

of the Lei; requesting and coordinating material from the field, editing,

preparation and distribution of "The Investigator"; preparation of "FBI Notes";

preparation of interesting Case Memoranda and maintenance of related indices;

and correlation and usage of FBI human interest items.

Monitoring movies and television for proper portrayal of FEI and mainiena:

of a running brief on develoyments pertinent to Bureau operations; surveys and

evaluations of malters for presentment to the public by information media;

day-to-day surveys of the media for consideration of the Direcior and Burcau

officials; custody and maintenance of recordings of the Director in connection with

policy statements or interviews with law enforcement or other Government gencies

custody and maintenance of the general and oificial Bureau photograph file together

With indices: writing of radio and television scripts involving FBI fugitives and

-3 -

CONTNUED - OVER

HH 55024 Do0Id:32989609

• Page 31

---

## Page 32

Memo for sIr. Felt

Re:

Reorganization of

matters of FBI jurisdiction; distribution.of Uniform Crime Reports Bulletin;

maintenance of cartoon file, illustrations depicting FBI and reference file on mis

quotes of Director in news media releases; monthly review of FBI dissemination f

information to the public, law enforcement and authorized individuals and

organizations:

• .

Research and coordination of materials in connection with speeches, by-

.**

line articles and featue stories made or published by the Director, preparation

of memoranda concerning books on law enforcement; review and analysis oi magazin:

and newspaper manuscripts concerning FBI prepared by outside authors who request

• FBi review for accuracy; compilation of data and narrative förm of material

presented in the FBI's Annual Reports; outlines and research ior speech data

requested by Bureau officials; maintenance of indices on research materials.

Supervision of Public Law 670 concerning misuse of the name of the FBI;

analysis of j'oung American Medals Awards; maintenance of reference files pertiner:

to FBI jurisdiction and law enforcement policies; reference files on sex cifenders,

parole and richation violators, pornograjhic literature; supervision and statistics !

concerning FBI speech program; and supervision and direction of Bureau juvenile

project.

ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION,

To assume supervision for special visitors on tours of Bureau facilities,

meetings, and photographs, with the Director and all other tour's conducted for visitor.:

to the Bureau. Preparation of data on Bureau employees for publication in home-

town newspapers as recruitment aids. These fünctions formed y handled among

the Fugitive Publicity Unit, Special Productions Unit, Research Unit and Tour Unit.

Functions and Related Responsibilities:

Handling and processing photographs and other matters for personal autogra

of the Director; interviews, testing, lectures, classroom demonstrations, on-the job

training and supervision of tour leaders; fingerprinting individuals requesting to be

fingerprinted in connection with Government employment, security clearances or .

personal identification; telephone inquiries relating to law enforcement, National

Academy, services and responsibilities of the FBI and background data regarding

the Director; maintain tour statstics of visitors and security of all tour areas;

prepare data ou background and work functions of Bureau employees for arranging

puolication in their home-town newspapers.

GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

HN 55024 DocId:32989609 Page 32

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## Page 33

Memo for Mi. Felt

•Re: Reorganization of

To assune White House name checks and appropriate correspondence,

compilation of data and preparation of memoranda on individuals requesting special

tours or mectings with the Director; compilation of juta and preparation of backgröu

memoranda for dissemination to authorized individuals; and preparation of informati

memoranda pertaining to organizations. asking for data. These functichs formerly.

handled by the Summary Memoranda Unit,

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DiVISION?

fri.

To assume overall responsibility for publicizing FBI fugitives through all

available media, prepare narrative and illustrative data for Toy Ten Fugitive

Program, research and preparation of feature fugitive articles; preparation and

..dissenaination of material concerning fugitives; maintenance or special maices

i dyini in

concerning aistribution and cancellation of fugitive material to media; and conduci

interviews with persons making telephonic or personal calls to FBIIQ concerning

matters within the jurisdiction of the FBI Or of interest to the Bureau. These

functions were fornierly handled by the Fugitive Publicity Unit,

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the Administrative Division arrange any necessary realignment

of space and handle memoranda instructing transfers.

2. That recipient otices promptly survey clerical functions and

responsibilities and submit appropriate recommendations in connection with

any needed realignment of clerical personnel; also prepare updated organizational

charts.

3. That attached airtel to all offices be approved.

HH 55024

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Page 33

=5 -

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## Page 34

airtel…"

December 15, 1972

To: SAC, Albany

From: For the Acting Director, FBI said seith

W. Mark Felt

Acting Associate Director

SUPERVISORY PEORGANIZATION OF

FUNCTIONS AND PERSONNEL;

CRIME RESEARCH DIVISION I

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINLO

DATE SUNGLASS RAMES

MDR16

For information of all offices, the functions and personnel formerly

assigned to the Crime Research Division have been realigned at FBING.

Mr. Gray has assumed supervision of contacts with the Congress, •

press and other news media.

Remaining functions of the Crime Research Division have been

reorganized and assigned as follows:

OFFICE OF ACTNG ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR

Review and analysis of correspondence received by the Director and

the FBI and preparation of replies to correspondence.

OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL

-*

Formal liaisen with the American Bar Association and other legal_

ongantiation

TRAINING DIVISION

Operation aild maintenance of the FBI Library; preparation and

dissemination af pamphlets, reprints and related material of special interest

2 - All Offices

T'his document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi

nation outside your Committee.

Its use is limited to official proceedings b

your Committee and the content may nut be disclosed to unauthorized person-

nel without the express approval of the FBl.

WW 55021 DocId:32989609: Paye 34

6:058

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## Page 35

Airtel to Albany

203°

Mozare Caress÷

Supervisory Reorganization of

Functions and Personnel;

Crime Research Division

In law enforcement and the crime problem, cooraination and comptlation of

material for presenting FBI operations and jurisdiction to law enforcement

and the public through movies

television and other news meaza; and specialized

research and preparation of material in connection with memoranda requested. i

by the Director and other Bureau officials, research for speeches and policy

statements of the Director and analysis of articles and statements made concerning

the FBI.

ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION:..

.•*,• . .

Special visitors on tours of Bureau facilities, meetings and photographs

with the Director and all other tours conducted for visitors to the Bureau.

GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

White House name checks and appropriate correspondence; compilation

of data and preparation of memoranda on individuals requesting special tours

or meetings with the Direcior, compilatiou vi daia aud prepuration si baekground

memoranda for dissemination to authorized individuals; and preparation of

informative memoranda pertaining to organizations asking for data.

SPECIAL INVESIIGATIVE DIVISION

Overall responsibility for publicizing FBI fugitives through all available

media; prepare narrative and illustrative cata for Top Ten Fugitive Program,

research and preparation of feature fugitive articles; preparation and

dissemination of material concerning fugitives.

Above furnished for guidance in routing communications to FBIQ.

HH 55024

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• 2 =

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## Page 36

MAY IPAS ADITION

OSA GIN, RRO. NO, 27

UNITED STATES GO VEP

Memorandum

MENT

ГО

MR. FELT

DATE:

12/18/72

FROM :N. P. CALLAHAN

SUBJECT: SUPERVISORY REORGANIZATION OF

FUNCTIONS AND PERSONNEL;

CRIME RESEARCH DIVISION

By memo dated 12/14/72 from Mr. Walters to Mr. Felt the

reassignment of Special Agent personnel of the former Crime Research

Division to other Offices and Divisions at Headquarters was set forth. The

purpose of this memo is to establish what clerical personnel will be assigned

to each Office or Division. This information is necessary to effect changes .

in appropriate records.

For control purposes, each of the listed individuals should advise

of the clerical personnel needed to carry out the functions and related

responsibilities reassigned to the respective Uttice or Division. Aii ciericai

personnel assigned to the former Crime Research Division must be accounted.

for. Accordingly, the listed individuals should consult with each other if'

there is any question concerning assignment, excessive or needed clerical

personnel, coordinating information with appropriate Office representative

or Division head. Identities, positions and grades should be set forth under

the respective Office or Division.

AIL INFORMATION CONTAINED

DATE 1 24 20 B3SP2AM

MDR16

RECOMMENDATION:

That the reassignment of the clerical personnel of the former

Crime Research Division be accomplished as set forth above with results

furnished to the Administrative Division so that appropriate records can

be adjusted.

nation aside von Con'":

This document is prepare du reson? a end is not for dissemi-

sover Committee and to eri

nel ivithout the cantess appiour us tu

•m!'" to oficial proceddings ou

ivivasi person

HH 55024

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## Page 37

TO

FROM

SUBJECT:

OPTIONAL PORM NO, 10

3010-108

MAT 1988

OSA GIN. MIG. P10. 37

UNITED STATES GC

RNMENT

Memorandum

Mr. Felt®

T. J. Jenkins

SUPERVISORY REORGANIZATION OF

FUNCTIONS AND PERSONNEL

wealth one edge o i

DATE: December 21, 1972

786106:021

Reference is made to memorandum L. M. Walters to Mr. Felt,

dated December 14, 1972, in captioned matter.

Bureau Library at FBI Headquarters

A survey has been made of the library, its books, facility and

personnel. At the present time, the library is housed in six rooms in the 4200

corridor at FBI Headquarters and has a staff of the following:

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

.

MDR-16

From a survey of the books, all books can be removed from the

library to the library at Quantico with exception to certain reference books

and out-of-town telephone directories which are necessary to be maintained at FBI

Headquarters for ready-reference purposes by the Bureau staff at Headquarters.

• In the library is a lending library which has about i00 members.

These members pay $1 every six months for membership dues and have the privilege

of using the library. Because of the minor use of this lending library, I am proposin

that we phase out this part of the library during the next six months, removing the

books at the end of that period to Quantico.

This document is goonared in response to your request and is not for dissemi-

nation outsile your Chinmilice.

Its use is lamild to official proceedings oy

your Commitice and the content may nut be disclosed to unauthorized person

pel without the express approval af the FBl.

CONTINUED - OVER

HH 55024 DocId:32989609 Lage 37

---

## Page 38

Memorandum T. J.

Jenkins to Mr. Felt a

Re: Supervisory Reorganization of

Functions and Personnel.

Crime Research Division

from the survey, I believe that the two library technicians, who are

presently assigned to the library, can handle the remaining reference books and

telephone directories and that when

I returns to work a decision can be

made as to what can be done with her.

Since practically all of the library will be transferred to Quantico,

it will be necessary to transfer certain employees of the library unit.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That all the books with the exception of the reference books,

lending library, and out-of-tow telephone directories be transferred to the Academy

at Quantico.

(2) That authority be granted to gradually phase out the lending

library, over the next six-month period.

:

(3) That

be transferred to Quantico

as Assistant Librarian and for lecture purposes at the Academy.

• (4) That

---

transferred to the Academy at Quantico.

be

(5) That the position of secretary be abolished and that

a be reassigned.

1W 55021 DogId: 32989609 Page 38

= 2-

---

## Page 39

i-..2.

Memorandum T. J. Jenkins. to Mr. Felt

Re: Supervisory Reorganization of

Functions and Personnel

Crime Research Division: 25

***: (6) That the two library technicians;

• be retained to handle the reference books and telephone directories

remaining at FB1 Headquarters.

Despistares.

(7) If above transfers

are approved, Administrative Division will

handle.

• .

-

sandi.

12/27

1:18P

= 3-

HH 55024 DocId: 32989609

Page

39

---

## Page 40

TO

FROM

SUBJECT:

UNITED STATES GO

NMENT

Memoranaum

Mr. Felt

T.. J. Jeplins

SUPERVISORY REORGANIZATION OF

EUNCTIONS AND PERSONNEL

CRIME RESEARCH DIVISION -9

DATE: January. 3, 1973"

Reference is made to the memorandum of. Mr. Walters to Mr. Felt:

dated 12/14/72, in captioned matter. A review has been made of the units assignes

to the Training Division from the former Crime Research Division, particularly

the Research and Service Section. As you know,

, has retired. I believe we can consolidate the Training Programs

Processing Section and the Research and Service Section at FBI Headquarters

into one section, calling it the Training Programs Processing and Research Sectio.

This would eliminate one section chief.

As you know, we have recommended and it has been approved that te

Library in the Crime Research Section be moved to Quantico. It is my proposal

with the Research Unit leaving three units from the iormer Research and Service

Section; namely, the Research Unit;

Unit.

Special Productions Unit and Publications

I have discussed with Mr. Callahan the transferring of the Suggestions.

Forms, Reports Management, Manuals and Chief Clerk Matters to the AdministraTe

Division and he is agreeable.

This would mean an addition to his division of one

Special Agent and seven clerical staff. The remaining units presently in the Trainiz=

Division would remain as is.

This would give the Section Chief of the Training Division stationed

at FBi Headquarters a total of, 18 Agents and 53 clerks under his supervision. I

believe that current Section Chief

is capable of handling this

assignment as Section Chief, particularly it!

is retained as

Number Orre Man of the Section.

has served as Number One Man in the

former Research and Service Section of the Crime Research Division.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 10-26-2000 Bx SiNAUm

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissem

nation ulside wong Committee.

Its use in limited to official proceedings oy

yorer Committce and the concent may nut be disclosed to unauthorized person

nel wilhout the caprcas androcal of the rEl.

NY 55024 DocId: 32989609 Page 40

---

## Page 41

22/256 206g Bear 240255

Memorandum T. J. Jenkins to Mr. Felt

Re: Supervisory Reorganization of

Functions and Personnel

Crimè Research Division

•in?

.....

mecharaching.

RECOMMENDATIONS

(1) That the old Research and Service Section of the former Crime

Research Division be combined with the Training Programs Processing Section of

the Training Division and be given the name Training Programs Processing and

Research Section.

..

(2) That the Suggestions, Forms, Reports Management, Manuals

And chiet Clerk Matters be transferred from the Training Division to the

Administrative Division.

2 9. . . . .o..

Division be retirea as Section Chief. OF

• current Section Chief in the Training

THE NEVATEN

51

wait

BLESIANTE

be retired as Number One Man of

(4) That

----

this new Section in the Training Division,

HH 55024

. DocId:32989609 | Page 41

---

## Page 42

ADDENDUM OF W. M. FELT

1-4-73

33967"22

I am in agreement with the above except for the proposed

new name Training Programs Processing and' Research Section. "I think

this sounds pompous and cumbersome.

I suggest and Mr. Jenkins has

agreed to naming the new section Police Training and Research Section.

I recommend approval with this modification.

Approred

gisol

HH 55024

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3-

---

## Page 43

DATIONAL IMAM NO, 10

581Q-100

OSA ÚEN, REG. NO, 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

• 1.....

TO

: Mr. Felt '

DATE: January 3, 1973 *

FROM : T. J.

SUBJECT:

SUPERVISORY REORGANIZATION OF

EUNCTIONS AND PERSONNEL

CRIME RESEARCH DIVISION

Reference is made to the memorandum bf.Mr. Walters to Mr. Felt,

dated 12/14/72, in captioned matter. A review has been made of the units assigned

to the Training Division from the former Crime Research Division, particularly

the Research and Service Section. As you know, the Section Chief of that Section,

Milton A. Jones, has retired. I believe we can consolidate the Training Programs

Processing Section and the Research and Service Section at FBI Headquarters

into one section, calling it the Training Programs Processing and Research Section.

This would eliminate one section chief.

As you know, we have recommended and it has been approved that the

Library in the Crime Research Section be moved to Quantico. It is my proposal

tici

die ius mes Library Juit, whai is left vi i here al Fbi Headqualiero, ve mergei

with the Research Unit leaving three units from the former Research and Service

Section; namely, the Research Unit;

Special Productions Unit and Publications

Unit.

I have discussed with Mr. Callahan the transferring of the Suggestions,

Forms, Reports Management, Manuals and Chief Clerk Matters to the Administrative

Division and he is agreeable. This would mean an addition to his division of one

Special Agent and seven clerical staff. The remaining units presently in the Training

Division would remain as is.

This would give the Section Chief of the Training Division stationed

at FBI Headquarters a total of 18 Agents and 53 clerks under his supervision. I

believe that current Section Chief, T. J. Brownfield, is capable of handling this

assignment as Section Chief, particularly if Mr. Lawrence J. Heim is retained as

Number One Man of the Section. Mr. Heim has served as Number One Man in the

former Research and Service Section of the Crime Research Division.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINIO

TNDR

¿. This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi-

nation outside your Committée.

Its use is limited to official proceedings by

your committee and the content man nut be disclosed to unauthorized person

TW 55024 DocId 329896091 Paye 43

nel without the express angrat of !,?

---

## Page 44

..

read thie. it.

Memorandum T. J. Jenkins to Mr. Felt

Re: Supervisory Reorganization of

Functions and Personnel

Crime Research Division

c...".

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That the old Research and Service Section of the former Crime

Research Division be combined with the Training Programs Processing Section of

the Training Division and be given the name Training Programs Processing and

Research Section.

(2) That the Suggestions, Forms, Reports Management, Manuals

A Chit Clerk Matters be transferred from the Training Division to the

Administrative Division.

-- to ate.

That SA T. J. Brownfield current Section Chief in the Training

Division be retented as Section Chief. Of HIS NEVAN

. =

→i did.

DESHENATI

(4) That SA Lawrence J. Heim be retired as Number One Man of

this new Section in the Training Division,

UH 55024 DocId: 32989609)

Page 44

---

## Page 45

•i".!:

2937

ADDENDUM OF W. M. FELT

1-4-73

192:33965222

I am in agreement with the above except for the proposed

new name Training Programs Processing and Research Section. Ithink it

this sounds pompous and cumbersome. I suggest and Mr. Jenkins has

agreed to naming the new section Police Training and Research Section.

I recommend approval with this modification.

Approved.

giroP

"..

...

55021 DocId: 32989609 Page 45

3

---

## Page 46

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

BEFORE COMPLETING.

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

TO:

Intelligence Community Staff

ATTN: Central Index

FROM:

Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

ippropriate term

If a document was made available

2. DATE PROVIDED

review

DOCUMENT

ransmitted, so note.

BRIEFING

INTERVIEW

TESTIMONY

OTHER

6/17/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED

(check appropriate

term; add specific names if appropriate)

*

SSC

C. Benz, Office Manager

HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; five name or identification number of briefer,.

interviewée, testifier and subject)

Further Documents Pertaining to the FBI and Department of Justice.

3. Wie spoNse Toflist date and lame number at ve, response to formal request, other-

subpoena, etc.)

6. CLASSIFICATION OF

INFORMATION (enter

Codevos TS or

SSC letter 5/14/75; Appendix B, Part II, Item 15.

"y"

7. kEe oRde fent for e pheropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed aro

Organization and Staffing

8. SUMMARY (see

reverse

side before completing

this item)

At the request of the SSC, documents relating to the .

elimination of the FBI Crime Records Division in late 1972

were furnished to the SSC for review.

ALL, INFORMATION CONTAINED

DAN 4S0393PMm/24g

MDR16

TREAT AS YELLOM

C

62-116395

IJM: 1hb

(4)

379| (6-75)

HH 55024

DocId: 32989609 Page 46

5.11H4

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN

CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75. 255

7-2-25

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

---

## Page 47

- INSTRUCTIONS.

• Type or print clearly in ink.

' • Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

• Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

"FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the

information.

• If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to

HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a

copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC. ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing

substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community

matters if appropriate.

Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests

should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be

noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here,

e.g., restrictions on review of a document,' if document was paraphrased, whether

interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript

is provided; that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional

pages may be attached if necessary.

Iv 53024

DooId:32989609

Page 47

---

## Page 48

TO

FROM

SUBJECT

:

OPTIONAL FORM NO, 10

3010-100

MAY 19D2 :DITION

OSA GEN. REG. NO, 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum:

Mr. Felt®

T. J. Jenkins

SUPERVISORY REORGANIZATION OF

FUNCTIONS AND PERSONNEL

CRIME RESEARCH DIVISIONS

DATE: December 21, 1972

Bi,

ATE INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSENHD

MDR-14

Reference is made to memorandum L. M. Walters to Mr. Felt,

dated December 14, 1972, in captioned matter.

Bureau Library at FBI Headquarters

A survey has been made of the library, its books, facility and

personnel. At the present time, the library is housed in six rooms in the 4200

corridor at FBI Headquarters and has a staff of the following:

Inspector Bernand M. Suttler, GS-16

Ilorarian lona triswann, Go-s

Assistant Librarian Eleanor In Denick, GS-€

Secretary Connie Hutchison, GS-4 (position is GS-5)

3 Librarian Technicians

Alica Brand, GS-4 (on extended leave without pay - due to illness)

Patricia, auber, Go-o (G0-4 position)

Ester Vtilanueva, GS-4

From a survey of the books, all books can be removed from the

library to the library at Quantico with exception to certain reference books.

and out-of-town telephone directories which are necessary to be maintained at FBI

Headquarters for ready-reference purposes by the Bureau staff at Headquarters.

from the survey, it was determined these books can be maintained in two rooms*

presently occupied by the library, thus freeing four rooms as surplus space.""

In the library is a lending library which has about 100 members.

These members pay $1 every six months for membership dues and have the privilege

of using the library. Because of the minor use of this lending library, I am proposing

that we phase out this part of the library during the next six months, removing the

books at the end of that period to Quantico.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi-

nation outside your Committee.

Its use is limited to official proceedings ou

your Committee and the content may nut be disclased to unauthorized person.

nel without the express approval of the FBI.

CONTINUED - OVER

HH 55024

'DocId: 32989609

Page 48

---

## Page 49

Memorandum T. J. Jenkins to Mr:

Re: Supervisory Reorganization of

Functions and Personnel

Crime Research Division

cutee lion Decorate Mccalled 242e%

From the survey; I believe that the two library technicians, who are.

To sin

i presently assiened to the library, can handlete elirin to refer dee book an d

made as to what can be done with her.

Since practically all of the library will be transferred to Quantico,

it will be necessary to transfer certain employees of the library unit.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That all the books with the exception of the reference books,

lending library, and out-of-toes telephone directories be transferred to the Academy

at Quantico.

(2) That authority be granted to gradually phase out the lending

library over the next six-month period.

-..

(3) That Inspector Bernard M. Suttler be transferred to Quantico

as Assistant Librarian and for lecture purposes at the Academy.,

(4) That Miss Iona G. Swann and Miss Eleanor L. Benish be

transferred to the Academy at Quantico.

-

it mad.

(5) That the position of secretary be abolished and that Miss Connie

Hutchison be reassigned.

N₩ 55024 DocId: 32989609

Page 49

---

## Page 50

3%.220

Memorandụm T. J. Jenkins to Mr:

Re: Supervisory Reorganization of

Functions and Personnel

Crime Research Division

Felt

.ic""".

- dt/sari in x: (6): That the two library technicians, Patricia Lauber and Ester y

Villanueva, be retained to handle the reference books and telephone directories

remaining at FBI Headquarters.

(7) If above transfers

are approved, Administrative Division will

handle.

Appeared. f.

13/37

1:18P

HW 55024

DocId:32989609 Page 50

3

---

## Page 51

TO

FROM

:

SUBJECT:

ÁN SONAL RESE NO. 10

0010-108

viral GEA

•EG. NO. 37

UNITED STA"

GOVERNMENT

Memorandum..ri

Mr. Bishop

DATE: 10-16-72

M. A.' Jones

2043

sassing tag

SUGGESTED NAME. CHANGE

CRIME RECORDS DIVISION

By memorandum dated 10-4-72, attached, it was

Indicated that Fletcher D. Thompson, SAC, Omaha, has suggested

a name change for the Crime Records Division to Offic

of public Information of some other more meaningful designation.

It was pointed out that Mr. Thompson's suggestion

was in line with informal discussions you (Mr. Bishop)

have had with members of your staff concerning a possible

name change for the Division.

In this connection, Mr. Gray has noted that

he "can think of many reasons for changing the name.

What have been the nature of the reasons for change discussed?"

With the formation of the Computer Systems Division:

and the resultant reassignment of the personnel and

the work of the Uniform Crime Reposting Section, including

the National Crime Information Center/Computerized Criminal

Histories

file from Crime Records to Computer Systems,

the title "Crime Records," as Mr. Thompson has indicated,

is no longer meaningful insofar as the work of this

Division is concerned...

"Office of Public Information," which was

suggested by Mr. Thompson, would inaccurately reflect

the activities and responsibilities of this Division

and could result in confusion with the Office of Public

Information in the Department of Justice. This, of

course, would be undesirable.

Enclosures

T

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

ASSIFLE

DATE 1054-2000 3x SAUMP

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissem

nation outside your Committee.

votion outrite can coote see tates to of proceed mess br

IT 55024 DocId: 32989609j Page 51

---

## Page 52

M

RE':":

lucil i do taparts die dare depart

Jones

to

MI.

Bishop.

Memo

SUGGESTED' NAME CHANGE;

, CRIME RECORDS DIVISION

It is noted that this Division, which is presently

comprised Of the Crime Research Section, and the Correspondencer

and:lours Section; 1s primarily: responsible for conducting:

extensive research pertaining

to crime, crime prevention

and other related matters in the law enforcement field.

This Division is involved in the review and preparation.

insanitara di int

of replies to correspondence regarding FBI Jurisdiction

and operations received from law enforcement, other Government

agencies, and the general public in those instances where

the Bureau has a responsibility to disseminate such information.

"The FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin,

which is the

official publication of the FBI, is prepared and distributed

by Crime Records, as well as numerous pamphlets for the

instruction and information of Bureau employees, the law

enforcement profession and the general public.

This Division

is responsible for supervision of tours of Bureau facilities

for Government officials, law enforcement authorities,

and the general public; directs the program of distributing

informative and illustrative material on Bureau fugitives

to various media for the purpose of effecting the location

, and apprenersion of these criminais with the neiy vi vilizen

cooperation;and coordinates and supervises the Bureau's

interests in the utilization of radio, television, and

publication outlets to enhance the discharge of our responsi

bilities in the law enforcement field by acquainting the

public with the FBI's operations and activities.

In addition, this Division has the custody of

a number of research and reference files which are maintained

in a current status and which are essential to the Division

in the fulfillment of its responsibilities to the Bureau.

Further, this Division supervises the "Ten-Most-

Wanted Fugitives" Program, as well as "The FBI" television

series, both of which involve research for their sustenance

and success.

While it is recognized, based on the foregoing,

that this Division is not completely absorbed in research

to the exclusion of other activities, "Crime Research"

CONTINUED - OVER

- 2-

HH 55024

DocId: 32989609 Page 52

---

## Page 53

M. A. Jones to Mr.

Bishop Memo

RE: SUGGESTED NAME CHANGE, CRIME RECORDS DIVISION

more accurately describes our responsibilities, it is

aw: felt, than any other title suggested:: It is noted the pistas

more likely alternatives discussed were "Research and.

Information Division" and "Research and, Correspondence.

""..

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That Mr. Gray approve the renaming of the

Crime Records Division to Crime Research Division.

2.

That in line with the foregoing, the attached

letter to Mr. Thompson be approved and sent.

101330

• ..

3

HW 55024

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Page 53

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## Page 54

TO

DITIONAL FORA, NO. 10

3010-104

ELAY 1P02 EDITION

GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

THE ACTING DIRECTOR

DATE: 12-1-72:

FROM

: W. M. FELT

2. 3:

*::.

Here"s

-.;.

SUBJECT: REORGANIZATION - CRIME RESEARCH DIVISION

coole cared go Baccagemen

Pursuant to your instructions, Assistant Director Bishop is

being temporarily attached to the Training Division at Quantico for special

assignment until the effective date of his retirement, 2-1-73.

Mr. Bishop will be assigned to the research and development of

a major case practical problem for use in the National Academy. This

is extremely important because our experience indicates that most of the

officers attending the Academy are unable to understand and handle the

ramifications of major cases. Mr. Bishop, with his extensive field back-

ground, plus his familiarity with news media problems, is ideally suited

to handle this assignment.

2 ' I he has time. Mr. Bishop will also analyze and develop

• meaningful practical cases which will enable new agents to meet present-

day needs.

I have arranged with Mr. Jenkins for suitable office facilities

to be used by Mr. Bishop at Quantico and have instructed Bishop to report

to Mr. Jenkins on Monday, 12-1-72.

Inspector Wilburn-K. DeBruler is being diverted from his current

inspection assignment in the Office of Legal Counsel to begin an immediate

survey of the Crime Research Division to determine the feasibility of the

transfer of its functions to other divisions or to your office.

RECOMMENDATION:

..

None. For information.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

ATE 02020LBY

MDR-16

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi:

nation outside your committee,, Its use is limited to official regengs ou

your committee and the content may nut be disclosed to unauthorized person:

WH 55024 DocId: 32989609}

2e without the express asproval of the FBI.

---

## Page 55

DIT AAR THEA

MATIRIDID"EN

nOSA cited

per. 110.28

UNITED STATES GOV

Memorandum:

24pa9

'TO

MR. FELT

DATE: Decembor 14, 1972

181°

FRON

I.. M. WALTERS

:;.

SUBJECT:

SUPERVISORY REORGANIZATION OF

AFI, INFORMATION CONTAINEN

FUNCTIONS AND PERSONNEL;

CRIME RESEARCH DIVISION

MDR16

per prior approval of Mr. Gray

Effective immediatein ail functions and personnel formerly assigned

to the Crime Research Division are reassigned as indicated oelow.

Recipient

aese faction aud vast Chiet promply repartto respective delices t

Agent personnel are set forth together with assigned functions. Clerical

personnel utilized in handiing these assignments are to transfer with listed Agen's

in accordance with the functions formerly handled by them.

OFFICE OF ACTING DIRECTOP

Inspactors Janes I. Bland, David W. Bowers, Jack I. Herington and

SA Harold P. Leinbaugh.

To assume supervision of contacts with the Congress press and

other news media formerly handled in the Front Office of the Crime Research

Division as well as the Administrative Review Unit which has been redesignated

as the congressional services Unit and will be handled by inspectors Jack i.

•Herington and David W, Bowers, ar

Chandard thos

Functions and Related Responsibilities:

Congressional liaison: Congressional correspondence; Congressional

teiephone cails; progress ci legisiation oi interest to or affecting the FBI; review

of bills and resolutions introduced into boch Houses of Congress and ali public

and private laws enacted: and review and analysis of the Congressional Record a

Press, radio, television and motion picture contacts; field matters concern

press, ratio and teievision; correspondence relating to an editorial or to a com-

mentator; liaison with the White House and Department press ottices; review of

editorials nnd articles review of magazines, newspaper clopings and washington:

news service ticker ems nows releases and press inquries; SAc calls regarcing

press releases; press contact program

/coordinate Bress matters of bossible ex

future use irom FBIQ Divisions.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi

nation outside

ree and the con

HH 55024

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---

## Page 56

- " Memo for Mr. Felt

• • Re: Reorganization of

Review statements and speeches by Director or matters affecting major:

public relations; invitations for speeches by the Director; assignment of speeches

to FBIHQ speakers; review speech manuscripts.

Review, material for publication, first-name salutation mail, matters critical

of and complaints regarding FBI; letters enclosing autographed photographs;

special photographs in Director's Office; American Legion and veteran liaison

mätters.

OFFICE OF ACTING ASSOCIATE DIRECIOR wer

Section Chief Gordon E. Malmfeldt and SAs Homer R. Hauer (Number One

Man), Ralph IV. Engelmeier, Marion S. Ramey, Paul L. Andrews, John W. Dalseg:

Robert C. Dean and Richard E. White.

.... To assune r'eview and analysis of correspondence received by the Director

and the FBI and preparation of replies to the correspondence. Formerly handled by

the Special Correspondence Unit (correspondence of special importance io Director

and Nation) and the Ñon-Special Correspondence Unit (correspondence from the

public and requests for publications).

Functions ad Related Responsibilities:

Replies to correspondence regarding subversive activities and field

divisions; file reviews and necessary research to determine identity and pertinent

background of the correspondent; file review and research necessary to reply to

inquiries and requests from private citizens, law enforcement, Government

representatives on local, state and national level; initiate instructions to field

offices in connection with correspondence; processing of letters dealing with public

relations: general news media; requests and inquiries from law enforcement

officials: Government representatives and others in foreign countries; chronic mail;

and requests for publications.

OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL

SA James C. Farrington.

To assume formal liaison with the American Bar Association, National

District Attorneys Association, National Association of Attorneys General,

Federal Bar Association, and the American Law Institute. These functions formerly

handled by the Administrative Review Unit. Also research and preparation of legai

briefs in connection with urgent policy matters (formerly handled by Research Unit).

CONTINUED - OVER

MH 55024 DooId:32989609 Page 56

---

## Page 57

Memo for Mr. Felt

Re: Reorganization. of

TRAINING DIVISION triadirecture cadetec ae

Section Chief Milton A. Jones, Inspectors. Bernard M. Suttler and

George I Quilite and SAs Lawrence J. Heim, John H. Campbell, Edward H.

Gooderham, David L. Divan, CarlJ.

-Hall, Louis'S: Lear, Donald G Manizug;

Robert B. Davenport, Robert C. Fay, George William Gunn and Fern C.

Stukenbroeker.ccco.4cfy

To assune operations and maintenance of the FBI Library; preparation

and.dissemination ofpamphlets.reprints.and.related.material.ofspecialinterest.

in law enforcement and the crime problem; coordination and compilation of

material for presenting FBI operations and jurisdiction to law entorcement and the

public through movies, television and other news media; and specialized research

and preparation of material in connection with memoranda requested by the

Director and other Bureau officials, research for speeches and policy statements

of the Director and analysis of articles and statemeits made concerning the FBI."

These functions were formerly handled by the Library Unit, Publications Unit,

Special Productions Unit and Research Unit.

functions and Relaied Responsibilities:

... Reference service to FBI officials, employees, andathorities from ther

Government agencies and individuals authorized: maintenance of out-of -town telepho:

directories covering United States; prepáration of memorandia for Director anci

other officiais based on review of current periodicals, police journals and scientific

magazines; purchase and sale of books to Bureau employees and the maintenance

of the inventory and financial records pertinent to this project and geration of a

lending library to Bureau employees.

Liaison with the Government Printing Office; preparation and dissemination

of the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin (LEB); research for the Director's monthly

announcement on an important phase of law enforcement of crime for each issue

of the LEB; requesting and coordinating material from the field, editing,

preparation and distribution of "The Investigator"; preparation of "FBI Notes";

preparaticn of Interesting Case Memoranda and maintenance of related indices;

and correlation and usage of FBI human interest items.

Monitoring movies and television for proper portrayal of FBI and maintenan

of a running brief on develoyments pertinent to Bureau operations; surveys and

evaluations of matters for presentment to the public by information media;

day-to-day surveys of the media for consideration of the Direcior and Burcau

officials; custody and maintenance of recordings of the Director in connection with

policy statements or interviews with law enforcement or other Government agencies:

custody and maintenance of the general and oificial Bureau photograph file together

with indices; writing of radio and television scripts involving FBI fugitives and

03 -

CONTINUED - OVER

HH 55024 DocId:32989609 Page 57

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## Page 58

-Memo for Mr. Felt

Re: Reorganization.of

matters oi FBi jurisdiction; distribution of Uniform Crime Reports Bulletin;

maintenance of cartoon file, illustrations depicting FBI and reférence file on mis

quotes of Director in news media releases; monthly revfew of FBI dissemination of

information to the public, law enforcement and autha ized individuals and

organizations.

...

Research and coordination of materials in connection with speeches, by-

line articles and featire stories made"or published by the Director, preparation

of memoranda concerning books on law enforcement; review and analysis of magazine

and newspaper manuscripts concerning FBI prepared by outside authors who request

liBi review for accuracy; compilation of data and narrative form of material

presented in the FBI's Annual Reports; outlines and research for speech data

requested by Bureau officials; maintenance of indices on research materials.

Supervision of Public Law 670 concerning misuse of the name of the FBI;

analysis of Young"'American Medals Awards; inaintenance of reference files perthent

to FBI jurisdiction and law enforcement policies; reierence files on sex cifenders,

parole and probation violators, pornographic literature; supervision and statistics !

concerning EBl speech program; and supervision and direction of Bureau juvenile

project.

ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION

SA William H. Stapleton.

To assume supervision for special visitors on tours of Bureau facilities,

meetings and photographs with the Director and all other tours conducted for visitors

to the Bureau. Preparation of data on Bureau employees for publication in home-

town newspapers as recruitment aids. These fünctions formed y handled among

the Fugitive Fublicity Unit, Special Productions Unit, Research Unit and Tour Unit.

Functions aud Related Responsibilities:

Handling and processing photographs and other matters for personal autograp

of the Director; interviews, testing, lectures, classroom demonstrations, on-the -job

training and supervision of tour leaders; fingerprinting individuals requesting to be

fingerprinted in connection with Government employment, security cleaiances or

personal identification; telephone inquiries relating to law enforcement, National

Academy, services and responsibilities of the FBI and background data regarding

the Director; maintain tour statstics of visitors and security of all tour areas;

prepare data on background and work functions of Bureau employees for arranging

publication in their home-town newspapers.

• GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

SAs Edward J. Kilday, II, and Anthony Edward Schiappa

HH 55024 DocId: 32989609 Page

58

0 4 =

CONTENTIA - DIFFE

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## Page 59

Memo for Mi. Felt

Re: Reorganization of

to assume white house name checks and appropriate correspondence,

compilation of data and preparation of memoranda on individuals requesting special

tours or meetings with the Director; compilation of lata and preparation of backgroun

memoranda for dissemination to authorized individuals; and preparation of informativ

memoranda.pertaining.to organizations asking for data. These functions formerly.

handled by the Summary Memoranda Unit.

W6025774

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION, 200/ #91200

SA Thomas B. Coll

To assune overall responsibility for publicizing FBI fugitives through all

available media, prepare narrative and illustrative data for Top Ten Fugitive

Program, research and preparation of feature fugitive articles; preparation and

dissemination of material concerningfugitives:maintenance.of

special indices

concerning distribution and cancellation of fugitive material to media; and conduct

interviews with persons making telephonic or personal calls to FBIHQ concerning

matters within the jurisdiction of the FBI or of interest to the Bureau. These

functions were formerly handled by the Fugitive Publicity Unit:

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the Administrative Division arrange any necessary realignment

of space and handle memoranda instructing transfers.

That recipient offices promptly survey clerical functions and

responsibilities and submit appropriate recommendations in connection with

any needed realignment of clerical personnel; also prepare updated organizational

charts.

3. That attached airtel to all offices be approved.

-5-

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## Page 60

OPTIONAL POLA NO, 10

5010-106

AULY SODA POITION

OSA GEN. REG. NO, 37

UNITED STATES GO VLA

AMENT

Memorandum

TO

MR. FELT

DATE:

12/18/72

FROM

:N. P. CALLAHAN

SUBJECT: SUPERVISORY REORGANIZATION OF

FUNCTIONS AND PERSONNEL;

CRIME RESEARCH DIVISION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

DARE DOES ALASTS LAUNER

DATE IDIO

MORI

By memo dated 12/14/72 from Mr. Walters to Mr. Felt the

reassignment of Special Agent personnel of the former Crime Research

Division to other Offices and Divisions at Headquarters was set forth. The

purpose of this memo is to establish what clerical personnel will be assigned

to each Office or Division. This information is necessary to effect changes

in appropriate records.

For control purposes, each of the listed individuals should advise

of the clerical personnel needed to carry out the functions and related

responsibilities reassigned to the respective Uitice or Division. Ail clerical

personnel assigned to the former Crime Research Division must be accounted

for. Accordingly, the listed individuals should consult with each other if'

there is any question concerning assignment, excessive or needed clerical

personnel, coordinating information with appropriate Office representative

or Division head. Identities, positions and grades should be set forth under

the respective Office or Division.

Inspector James F. Bland, Office of the Acting Director

Section Chief Gordon E. Malmfeldt, Office of the Acting

Associate Director

SA James C. Farrington, Office of Legal Counsel

Section Chief Milton A. Jones, Training Division

SA William H. Stapleton, Administrative Division

SA Edward J. Kilday III, General Investigative Division

SA Thomas B: Coll, Special Investigative Division

RECOMMENDATION:

That the reassignment of the clerical personnel of the former

Crime Research Division be accomplished as set forth above with results

furnished to the Administrative Division so that appropriate records can

be adjusted:

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi-

nation outside your Committee.

Its use is limited to official proceedings br

your Committee and the content may nut be disclosed to unauthorized person

nel without the express approval of the FBI.

. H₩ 55024 DocId:32989609 Page 60

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## Page 61

MAY I9N2 PONTION

I GIA GEN, REG. NO. 2%

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memoranaum

TO

VR. FELT

DATE:

12/6/72

FROM : I. M. WALTERS

SUBJECT:

SUPERVISORY REORGANIZATION OF

FUNCTIONS AND PERSONNEL;

CRIME RESEARCH DIVISION

ALI, INFORMATION CONTAINED

FREIN IS UNCLASSIN!

ATE 10-21-200 BYSUHM

. AASR-14

PURPOSE:

To recommend immediate supervisory reorganization and transfer

of all functions and personnel of the Crime Research Division based

on survey and analysis conducted by Inspection Division.

Recommended transfer of functions and related responsibilities together

With appropriate personnel as follows:

OFFICE OF ACTING DIRECTOR

To assume supervision of contacts with the Congress, press and other

news modia formerly handled by Assistant Director Bishon, his front office Agent

personnel and the Administrative Review Unit (Congressional liaison).

Fünctions and Related Responsibilties:

Congressional liaison; Congressional correspondence; Congressional

telephone calls; progress of legislation of interest to or affecting the FBI; review

of bills and resolutions introduced into both Houses of Congress and all public

and private laws enacted; and review and analysis of the Congressional Record.

Press, radio, television and motion picture contacts; field matters concerning

press, radio and television; correspondence relating to an editorial or to a commentato

liaison with the White Elouse and Department press offices; review of editorials

and articles; review of magazines, newspaper clippings and Washington News

Service ticker items; news releases and press inquiries; SAC calls regarding.

press releases; press contact program; coordinate press matters of possible

future use from FBHQ Divisions.

Review statements and speeches by Director or matters affecting major.

public relations; invitations for speeches by the Director; assignment of speeches -

to FBIHQ speakers; review speech manuscripts.

Review material for publication, first-name salutation mail, matters critical

Of and complanes

nation outside your Committee. Its use is timited to officiat proceedings on

your Committee and the content may nut be disclosed to unauthorized person

nel without the express approval of the FBI.

CONTINUED - OVER

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## Page 62

jut ver. Felt

supervisory Reorgan

cion of Functions and

Personnel; Crime Research Division

special photographs in Director's Office; American Legion and veteran liaison

matters.

Recommended Agent Transfer:

Inspectors James F. Bland, David W. Bowers and Jack E. Herington.

OFFICE OF ACTING ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR

To assume/review and analysis of correspondence received by the Director

and the FBI and preparation of replies to the correspondence. Formerly handled by

the Special Correspondence Unit (correspondence of special importance to Director

and Nation) and the Non-Special Correspondence Unit (correspondence from the

public and requests for publications).

Functions and Related Responsibilities:

Replies to correspondence regarding subversive activities and field divisions;

-file reviews and necessary research to determine identity and pertinent background

of the correspondent; file review and research necessary to reply to inquiries and

requests from private citizens, law enforcement, Government representatives on •

local, state and national level; initiate instructions to field offices in connection with

correspondence; processing of letters dealing with public relations, general news

media; requests and inquiries from law enforcement officials, Government

representatives and others in foreign countries; chronic mail; and requests for

publications.

Recommended Agent Transfer:

Section Chief Gorda E, Malmfeldt and SAs Homer R. Hauer (Number One

Man), Ralph W. Engelmeier, MarionS. Ramey, Paul L. Andrews, John W. Dalseg,

Robert C. Dean and Richara E. White.

OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL

To assume formal liaison with the American Bar Association, National

District Attorneys Association, National Association of Attorneys General,

Federal Bar Association, and the American Law Institute. These functions formedy

handled by the Administrative Review Unit. Also research and preparation of legal

briefs in connection with urgent policy matters (formerly handled by Research Unit).

Recommended Agent Transfer:

. SA James C. Farrington..

-2-

CONTINUED - OVER

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## Page 63

s for Mr. Felt

*: Supervisory Reorganization of Functions and Personnel;

i Crime Research Division a

TRAINING DIVISION

To assume operations and maintenance of the FBI Library; preparation

and dissemination of pamphlets, reprints and related material of special

interest in law enforcement and the crime problem; coordination and compilation of

material for presenting FBI operations and jurisdiction to law enforcement and the:

public through movies, television and other news media, and specialized research

and preparation of material in connection with memoranda requested by the

Director and other Bureau officials, research for speeches and policy statements".

of the Director and analysis of articles and statements made concerning the FBI,

These functions were formerly handled by the Library Unit, Publications Unit,

Special Productions Unit and Research Unit.

:. Functions and Related Responsibilities:

Reference service to FBI officials, employees, and authorities from other

Government agencies and individuals authorized; maintenance of out -of-town telephone

*directories covering United States; preparation of memoranda for Director and

other officials based on review of current periodi cals, police journals and scientific

magazines; purchase and sale of books to Bureau employees and the maintenance.

of the inventory and financial records pertinent to this project and operation of ?

lending library to Bureau employees.

Liaison with the Government Printing Office; preparation and dissemination

of the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin (LEB); research for the Director's monthly

announcement on an important phase of law enforcement or crime for each issue

of the LEB; requesting and coordinating material from the field, editing,

preparation and distribution of "The Investigator"; preparation of "FBI Notes";

preparation of Interesting Case Memoranda and maintenance of related indices; and

correlation and usage of FBI human interest items.

Monitoring movies and television for proper portrayal of FBI and maintenance

of a running brief on developments pertinent to Bureau operations; surveys and

evaluations of matters for presentment to the public by information media;

day-to-day surveys of the media for consideration of the Director and Bureau

officials; custody and maintenance of recordings of the Director in connection with

policy statements or interviews with law enforcement or other Government agencies;

custody and maintenance of the general and official Bureau photograph file together

with indices; writing of radio and television scripts involving FBI fugitives and

matters of FBI jurisdiction; distribution of Uniform Crime Reports Bulletin;

maintenance of cartoon file, illustrations depicting FBI and reference file on mis-

quotes of Director in news media releases; monthly review of FBI dissemination of

information to the public, law enforcement and authocized individuals and organizations

CHH 55024 DocId:32989609 Page 63

=3 -

CONTINUED - OVER

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## Page 64

mo for Mr. Felt

Supervisory Reorganization Of Functions and

Personnel; Crime Research Division

Research"ard coordination & materials in connection with speeches, by.-

line articies and feature stories made or published by the Director; preparation

of memoranda concerning. books on law enforcement; review and analysis of magazine

and newspaper manuscripts concerning FBI prepared by outside authors who request.

FBI review for accuracy; compilation of data and narrative form of material.....

presentea in the FBI's Annual Reports; outlines and research for speech data

requested by Bureau ofticials, maintenance of Indices on research mäterials portag

Supervision of Public Law 670 concerning misuse of the name of the FBI;

analysis of Young American Medals Awards; maintenance of reference files pertinent

to FBI jurisdiction and law enforcement policies; reference files on sex offenders,

parole and probation violators, pornographic literature; supervision and statistics

concerning FBI speech program; and supervision and direction of Bureaujuvenile

project.

Recommended Agent Transfer:

Section Chief Milton A. Jones, Inspectors Bernard M. Suttler and George T.

Quinn and SAs Harold P. Leinbaugh, Lawrence J. Heim, John H. Campbell,

Edward H. Gooderham; David I. Divan, Carl J. Hall, Louis S. Lear, Donald G.

Hanning, Robert B. Davenport, Robert C. Fay, George William Gunn and Fern C.

Brukonbrockor.

ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION

To assume supervision forspecial visitors on tours of Bureau facilities,

meetings and photographs with the Director and all other tours conducted for visitors

to the Eureau,/ Preparation of data on Bureau employees for publication in home-

town newspapers as recruitment aids. These functions formed y. handled among

the Fugitive Publicity Unit, Special Productions Unit, Research Unit and Tour

Unit,

Functions and Related Responsibilities:

Handling and processing photographs and other matters for personal autograph

of the Director; interviews, testing, lectures, classroom demonstrations, on-the-job

training and supervision of tour leaders; fingerprinting individuals requesting to be

fingerprinted in connection with, Government employment, security clearances or

personal identification; telephone inquiries relating to law enforcement, National

Academy, services and responsibilities of the FBI and background data regarding

the Director; maintain tour statistics of visitors and security of all tour areas;

prepare data on background and work functions of Bureau employees for arranging

• publication in their home-town newspapers.

-4

CONTINUED - OVER

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## Page 65

jfor Mr. Felt

Supervisory Reorganization of Functions and

Personnel; Crime Research Division

Recommended Agent Transfer:

SA William H, Stapleton

GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

To ässüme White House name checks and appropriate correspondence,

compilation of data and preparation.of memoranda on individuals requesting special.

tours or meetings with the Director; compilation of data and preparation of background

memoranda for dissemination to'authorized individuals, and preparation of informative.

memoranda pertaining to organizations asking for data. These functions formerly

handled by the Summary Memoranda Unit. (In past years these functions were

performed in Name Check Section of General Investigative Division.)

Recommended Agent Transfer:

SAs Edward J. Kilday, IlI, and Anthony Edward Schiappa

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

To assume overall responsibility for publicizing FBI fugitives through all

available media, prepare narrative and illustrative data for Top Ten Fugitive

Program, research and preparation of feature fugitive articles; preparation and

dissemination of material concerning fugitives' maintenance of special indices concerni

distribution and cancellation of fugitive material to media; and conduct interviews with

pisons inaking tolsphonic or personal calls to FBIH@ concerning matters within the

jurisdiction of the FBI or of interest to the Bureau.. These functions were formerly

handled by the Fugitive Publicity Unit.

Recommended Agent Transfer:

SA Thomas B. Coll

OBSERVATIONS

Agent personnel and supervisory functions have been analyzed and dealt with

in the foregoing proposed reallocations; clerical functions have not. It is suggestea

that clerical functions and personnel now simply move with the Agent desks and

and to edit aparent ached Butantial portion of the antinot be esence,

suggested for transfer to Training Division might feasibly operate at Quantico

(e.g. Library, Special Productions and Publications Unit). Five units of Training

Division are now located at Headquarters and the Research Unit of Research and

Service Section proposed herein for transfer to Training Division, likewise should -

remain at Headquarters. Accordingly, SA Harold P. Leinbaugh, formerly in the

Front Office of Crime Research Division, has been proposed for transfer to Training

Division in order to act, during this transition period, as a special coar dinator

of functions that may be divided between Headquarters and Quantico.

The questions of adequacy of clerical personnel, space reallocation, and

solocalieta. 314871% lynctions to Quantico demand greater study and inasmuch

---

## Page 66

Frigida rig i

sior Mr. Felt

Supervisory Reorganization of Functions and Personnel;

Crime Research DiviSion

as Training Division is scheduled for regular annual inspection next week, these

matters will be gone into in depth in connection with that inspection and coordinated

in consultation with Administrative Division. It is the purpose of this memorandum

to promptly effect the desired transfers of functions among affected Divisions in

order to provide for immediate routing. of mail and upper level review and

Sives son of the york product of all mits previously composing Crime Research

RECOMMENDATION:

That transfers as outlined herein be approved.

ill remain with enti offere o

That despectare Bland in Hering in FiSt.

Leintaugh will sinais in place; &

2AS5n20e dele. in

FALT

tacon and fritt lugo dene me can pain Lanen

-i public.

free tile untied "the dilig deten

• in ale epine no Bandilar con les cement condin feet to beat necalat

Ginninet of person the consisterio

chat

Change Dimini nine Aerie Chis to Giguessinal

WH 55021 DocId:32989609 Page 66•

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## Page 67

1204563

ADDENDUM OF W. M. FELT

12-5-72

WMF:crt

5/, This appears logical and feasible. I snags develop we car;

readjuste

hagree that the Research and Service functions, which will remain

under Section Chiet Milton A. Jones, should be reassigned to the Trating

Division. I do not believe that this Section should be transferred to Quantico,

however, because there is daily need for access to files and other material

at Headquarters and occasional contacts with the public.. Furthermore, there

is no available space at Quantico except in the Library Building. Accordingly,

I recommend that the FBIHQ Library be moved into the Library, Bullding at

Quantico. We would need to retain at FBIHQ the telephone directories and

encyclopedias which are used on a daily basis by other Divisions. The

space into which the FBIHQ Library was to have been moved in the 9th and D

Building can be used and in fact is badly needed by the Domestic Intelligence

Division which is very crowded.

I recommend that you approve now the transfer of functions and

that any necessary realignment of personnel be considered by separate

memoranda.

- 6 -

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## Page 68

1 - Mc. J. B. Adams

1 - Mic.

J. A. Mintz

1 - Mc. W. R. Wannall

June 17, 1975

1 - Mc. W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

The Actorney General

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COLMITTEE TO

STUDY GOVERIMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH

RESPECI TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIEN

6076

Inclosed for your infornation is the original

of a tenorancun concerning an interview by a Staff Member

of captioned Committee of retired FBI Special Agent

Ernest H. Belter. A copy of the memorandun is also enclosed

for forvarding to ir. James A. Wilderotter, Associate

Counsel to the President.

Enclosures - 2

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General

Attention:

K. William O'Connor REC- 102

Special Counsel for

Intelligence Coordination

1 - 67-

43.111:1-2960

(Personnel File Former SA Ernest H. Belter)

1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)

SFP: 1hb hb

(11)

Nonet dU Dally

3 JUL 2 1975

3

418/754

Assoc. Dir.

Dep. AD Adm. -

Dep. AD Inv. _

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

Comp. Syst.-

Ext. Affairs -

Files & Com. -

Gen. Inv. _

Ident. -

Inspection

Intell.

Laboratory

Plan. & Evol. _

PLi-

Legal Colle

Telephone Rme

Director So'y I/

MAIL ROOM L

$50l41

- Boc1a!92989609

TELETYPE UNIT

Page 68

Tww.0.C2-4/385"

GPO: 1975 0 - 569-920

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## Page 69

62-116395

1 - Ms. J. B. Adams

1 - Mr.

J. A. Mintz

1 - Mc. W. R. Wannall

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

June 17, 1975

U. S. SELATE SOLECT CORMITTEE JO

STUDY COVERNIISTDAL OFRRATIONS WITHI

RESPICE TO INTILZIGEICE ACCIVIIIES (SSG)

RE: INTERVIEO DE RETIRCO FBI

21070-81

spassmin

6026

Sot out belor Is infornation voluntarily fumiched

by Iz. Boltor to the FBI, on June 11, 1975. Bolter servod

in the IDI as on SA fron July 19, 1943, uncil his retirerent

on January 29, 1973.

Ch June 10, 1975, Eeltor tas contacted by SSC

Scaft kenber Michael.

Epstein who requested to intcruici

Belter at the SSC office.

On June 11, 1975, Bolter vas advised

by Ipstein that tha interview would concern hartin Luchor

vould cake place at 3:00 p.i. that day, June 11, 1975.

Balice vas inickvionad by Epsicin in SS0 quaricro

during the period of approvinately 3:00 p.ul. to 3:40 p.D. on

June 11, 1975. The intervict was not under oath and tas not

pursuant to a subpoena. The dotailo of the intervier are

sot out bolot, noi necessarily in chronological order.

Assoc. Dir.

Belter was asted and furnished the period of time

Dep. ADd he had served in the lashingion Fiold Office (UPO) of the FBI

and the date of his retirenant.

He ras asked and furnished

Admin. _

Comp. Syst..

Informacion as to his dubios in ITO at the time he sctired

Ext. Affairs

-and what they were in 1964. lle informed Epstein that he vas

Gen. In -the Supervisor of a Squad which handled cloctronic surveillances,

Ident.

Inspection -

- including both nicrophone and telephone survillances.

Then

Intell. .

Laboratory

(Personnel File Former SA Ernest H. Belter)

Plan. I Eval. 1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)

Spec. Inv..

Training -

Inb

Legal Coun..

_SFP: 1hb

(10)

Telephone Rm. -

Director Sec'y -

MAIL ROOM L

1N 55024 DooId:32989609

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-11

SEE NOTE PAGE

•111:375

GPO: 1975 0 - 569-920

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## Page 70

SENATE SELECT COLMITTIE ON INTCLLIGINCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RD: INTERVIR OF RETIRED FBI SA BX SSC

he was asked how many men worked under him on his Squad, he

told Epstein that he desired to consult with the FBI

representative who had accompanied him to the interview but

who tas not present during the accual intervier, that

representative remaining in an outer lobby of the SSC quarters.

Belter requested this consultation privilege as he belleved

the question vas outsido the indicated scope of the intervion.

ipstein Indicated he was withdraving the question, thus

eliminating the necessity for the consultation.

Belter was questioned and furnished infornation

concerning the organization of VO, from the Special Agent

In Charge down to the squad level. Belter indicated that

there verc several squads handling criminal cases, some

handling applicant-type investigations, and other squads

handling secucity york. He indicated that the security squads

vere under a security coordinator, ludvig ll. R. Oberndors,

now deceased.

Epstein advised Belter that the SSC Staff had

read Belter's deposition in the Halperin case. (Morion H.

Halperin; et al, vs. Henry A. kissinger, et al, United States

District Court, District of Columbia Civil Action rile

Lumber 1187-73.) On the basis of the deposicion, Ipstein

Indicated he was familiar with the administrative procedure

for instituting telephone surveillances and asked Belter

about the aininistrative procedures for instituting microphone

surveillances. It was Belter's roply that the administrative

procedures vere essentially the same for both types of

surveillances.

Epstein then had Belter recite the procedure fron

when an SA vould request from FBI Headquarters by form letter

authority for installing a microphone surveillance. Belter

told how the Headquarters vould first authorize the field to

-2 -

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## Page 71

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF RETIRED FBI SA BY SSC

conduct a feasibility survey, results of which would be

furnished Headquarters. Thereafter, if the installation was

feasible and justified, Headquarters would authorize by

correspondence the installation. Epstein asked whether the

authorizing comunication from Headquarters would mention

that the Attorney Ganeral (AG) had authorized the surveillance.

Belter told Epstein that in recent years he belleved that the

Bureau communication authorizing a surveillance would indicate

that the At authorization had been obtained; but Belter could

not recall whether or not this indication was shown during

1964. Belter also told Epstein that at one time he thought

that former FBI Director Hoover did not need to have At approval

In advance for a specific microphone surveillance. Epstein

Indiested he was already avare of this.

Epstein then inquired concerning a microphone

survelllance which the FBI had installed at the Willard Hotel

In Washington, D. C., concerning King. Belter was unable

to pinpoint when this occurred and told Epstein that he,

Belter, was bypassed in practically all metters relating to

this surveillance. The entire matter was handled by Security

Coordinator Oberndort

and Belter never saw any of the correspond-

ence relating thereto. Belter was only asked to rurnish sone

support personnel from his Squad for the purpose of monitoring

the survelllance. In response to further specifie questions,

Belter advised Epstein that he did not see any correspondence,

logs, tapes, or any other material relating to this surveillance.

Epstein inquired about the procedureof an Inspector

checking on such a surveillance at the time of a perfodic

Inspection of WFO. He asked if the Inspector would examine

the required correspondence relating to all microphone

surveillances the office had conducted. Belter replied that

an Inspector would look over matters of this nature but that

• 3 .

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## Page 72

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF RETIRED FBI SA BY SSC

In the case of the King microphone surveillance, as with

certain other extremely sensitive ones, Oberndorf would have

possession of the correspondence and Belter would ba unaware

of any examination of such correspondence by an Inspector.

Belter explained that this was part of the security precautions

taken in highly sensitive matters which vere restricted

within WFO to a need-to-know basis.

Epstein inquired as to whether Belter knew of any

other microphone surveillance on king in the Washington, D. C.,

arce at any time and Belter replied that he did not know of

any. Belter was asked if he was avare of any Interest or

participation by the Washington, D. C., Police Department in

the microphone surveillance at the Willard Hotel and he

responied that he was not aware of same.

Epstein Inquired as to the actual installation of

the microphone surveillance at the Hillard Hotel and wanted

to know who performed the installation. It was Balter's

recollection that the installation vas made by SA Wilfred

Bergeron, probably asaisted by SA William D. Campbell. Epstein

volunteered the name of SA Richard Suter and this refreshed

Belter's recollection to the extent that Belter indicated that

Suter also probably assisted. On Epstein's Inquiry as to the

whereabouts of these three individuals, Belter advised that

Bergeron 1s retired, residing in Bethesda, Maryland; Campbell

1s assigned at FBI Headquarters; and Suter is assigned to the

Houston Fleld Office.

Epstein Inquired whether Bergeron mentioned King's

name when Bergeron asked for assistance of support persomel

for monitoring purposes and Belter replled that King's name

was mentioned.

At the close of the interview, Epstein renarked that,

"We may be In touch with you again."

- 44 =

HN 55024 DooId:32989609 Page 72

---

## Page 73

1.

i="-8"

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF RETIRED FBI SA BY SSC

NOTE:

Prior to Belter's interviev, he contacted FBIHQ

to alert us and ask for assistance in the form of an SA for

possible consultation purposes. Belter had been previously

alet the my our contacted fee us and the woe typast

briefed by agistant Director Mintz as e a as Supervisor

S. F. Phillips of INID who accompanied Belter to the interview.

Debriefing of Belter as reported herein was by Phillips.

--.---

-

5

nin

55024

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Page

---

## Page 74

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

BEFORE COMPLETING.

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

TO:

Intelligence Community Staff

ATTN: Central Index

FROM:

FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

transmitted, te note.)

If a document was made available

DOCUMENT

BRIEFING

* INTERVIEW I

TESTIMONY

JOTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

6/17/75

3.

TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate

term; add specific names if appropriate)

SSC

The Attorney General with a copy for forwarding to

the White House

HSC

IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer,

interviewee, testifier and subject)

Memorandum reporting results of an Interview by an SSC Staff

Member of retired FBI Special Agent Ernest H. Belter

5. IN

RESPONSE TO (list date and item number

state verbal

ise date of (ite mer ative, esponse, formal request, other.

NA

6. CLASSIFICATION OF

INFORMATION (enter

Codevosd TS or

U

7. KEY

WORDS

(ento for emphasis)

the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are

Intelligence collection

Intelligence activities, domestic

Suzveillance

Organization and staffing

8.

SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)

Interview covered following topics:

Administrative procedures of FBI regarding electronic surveillance.

ARE INPORMATION CONTATNINO

SFPElhb

(4)

3791(6-751

MH 55021 DocId: 32989609 Page 71

FREAT AS YELLOW

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL, COMMUNITY INDEX IN

CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75. LFS 7-2-75

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

518

---

## Page 75

- INSTRUCTIONS

-=

• Type or print clearly in ink.

• Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

• Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

"FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the

information.

• If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to

HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a

copy of the original abstract, with the change 'indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing

substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community

matters if appropriate.

Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests

should be noted.

Commitments made to supply additional information should be

noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here,

e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether

interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript

is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional

pages may be attached if necessary.

1H 55024

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Page 75

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## Page 76

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

UNITED STATOS SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

ON INTCLLIGENCE ACTIVITIDS

(SSC)

2 - Ir. J. A. Hintz

(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

1 - Mr. H. N.

Bassett

June 12, 1975

1 - Mr. J. Cochran, Jr.

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. T. E. Burns

By letter dated May 14, 1975, with attached

appondices, the SSC rcquested certain infornation and

documents fron the IcI.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to

the Comittee is the original of a nonorandur containing

a response to one of the Cormitice's requests.

A copy of this monorandun is boing furnished

for your records.

FALL INFORNATION CONTAINED

Enclosures - 2

62-116395

MDR-16

1 - The Daputy Attorney Genoral

Attention: I. Milliam O'Connor

special Counsel lor

Intelligence Coordination

!!

(11)

REG- 102

62-116315-295

Assoe. Dir.

Dep. AD Adm..

Dep. AD Inv. -

Asst. Dir.:

Admin,

Comp. Systema -

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com. =

Gon. Inv. -

Ident.

Inspection -

Intell. -

Laboratory =

Plan. & Eval.

Spoc. Inf

Training

/ - ENGLOSUND

4

Telephone Rm..

Director Sec'y =

MAIL ROOM L

3 250PM 300clA52989605

PLM

TELETYPE UNIT L

Page 76

G00 951-794

---

## Page 77

.

62-116395

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)

1 - Hr. W. R. Wannall

1 - Mr. H. N. Bassett

1 - Mr.

W. 0. Cregar

1 - Mr. T. E. Burns

June 12, 1975

1 - Mr. J. Cochran, Jr.

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

TO STUDY COVENAMENTAL, OPERATIONS WITH

BESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE:

FURTHER DOCUMENTE PERTAINING TO THE

IBI AND DEPARTHENT OF JUSTICE

POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

lierence 1s nade to 83C lotter dated May 14, 1975,

with attached appendices, requesting certain documents and

other Intormation from the fBl.

Purquant to your roquest in Appendix B, Part I,

Iton 1, for guldellnes unod by the FBI Inspection Division

for inspocting flold offices and far Inspecting DiViSiONs

of the FBI, ve currently have such naterial avallablo lar

revioN at FBl Headquarters by appropriatoly cloarad personnel

of the Committee.

I - The Attorney General

'ALI EPORMATION CONTAINSO

(10) 1B

NOTE:

See H. N. Bassett memorandum to Mr. Wannall June 2,

1975, captioned

"Senstudy 75," wherein the Inspection Division

advised it has no objection to a review of the field and

headquarters inspection manuals by members of the Committee

staff provided the review is conducted in FBI space with an

Inspection Division representative present.

When SSC review

is requested, we will have the Inspection Division representative

make the manuals available.

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 2

Assoc. Dir.

DeD. AD Adm...

Dep. AD Inv.

Asst. Dir.:

Admin,

Comp. Syst.

Ext. Affoirs

Files & Com.

Gen. Inv.

Ident.

Inspection

Intell.

Laboratory

Plan. & Eval.

Sper. Inv.

Training

Legal Coun

Telephone Rm.

Director See'y

HH 55024

ENCLOSURE

MAIL ROOM L

DooId: 32989609

TELETYPE UNIT

Page 77

295

10 971.749

---

## Page 78

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTED

TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL, OPERATIONS WITH

RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(SSC)

HOTE CONTINUED:

The TRIIQ and field inspection manuals were reviewed

by Special Agent (SA) Thomas E. Burns, Jr. Determination to

furnish guestionable lield inspection manual sections concerning

PROSAB (Section 4 J 2.), AISAN (Section 5 L 10.) and BUPLANS

(Section 5 P.) was coordinated with IS - 2 (SA Edward P. Grigalus)

and IS - 3 (SA Russell Il. Horner) of the Intelligence Divisiol

and the Laboratory Division, Cryptanalysis Unit (P. W. Paddocks),

and

it was ascertained there is no objection to a Committee

review

of these sections.

WN 33024

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Page

---

## Page 79

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee:

Senate Select Committee

2J LHM

• Report dated _

6-12-75

Senate Select Committee: Re:

Policies

Caption of Document:

and Procedures

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ATT, ITFORMATION CONTATED

MDR-16

HY 55021

DooId: 32989609

Page 79

---

## Page 80

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

BEFORE COMPLETING.

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

TO:

Intelligence Community Staff

ATTN: Central Index

FROM:

Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (check

appropriate term.

If a document was made available

2. DATE PROVIDED

for review but

transmitted, so note.)

DOCUMENT

BRIEFING

INTERVIEW

TESTIMONY

OTHER

6/12/75

FOR REVIEW

3.

TO WHOM PROVIDED

(check appropriate term; add specific

names if appropriate)

Sherry Towell, Assistant Office Manager

SSC

HSC

4.

IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer,

interviewee, testifier and subject)

Further Documents Pertaining to the FBI and Department of Justice.

6. CLASSIFICATION OF

donor o Conten

SSC letter 5/14/75; Appendix B, Part I, Item 7.

?. KEy upde fonter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are

Operating Procedures

8.

SUMMARY (see

reverse

side pefore completing this item

At the request of SSC, material containing the guidelines

used by the FBI Inspection Division for Inspecting various aspects

of the Bureau's operations has been made avallable at FBIRQ for

review by SSC members.

ALT INTORMATION CONTAINED

MDR16

TREAT AS YELLOW

brie

62-136395

TJM:1hb

(4)

379| (6-75)

55024 DocId:32989609 Page 40

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN

CONNECTION WITH 'SENSTUDY 75. LES

7-2-25

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

---

## Page 81

INSTRUCTIONS

• Type or print clearly in ink.

• Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

• Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

• "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the

information.

• If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to

HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a

copy of the original

abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing

substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community

matters if appropriate.

Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests

should be noted.

Commitments made to supply additional information should be

noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here,

e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether

interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript

is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional

pages may be attached if necessary.

ÑH 55024

Do0Id:32989609

Page 81

---

## Page 82

FEDERAL BUNGAU OF INVESTIGATION

COMMUNICATIONS SECTIOM-

JARES IP CODE

TELETYPE

5838

PM NITEL JUNE 30, 1975 JMM

TOS

DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM;

TAMPA (105-9 1121)

SENSTUDY 75.

RE BUREAU NITEL JUNE: 28, 1975.

JAMES E. MC MAHON, 3110 COCOS ROAD, TAMPA, FLORIDA 33618,

AND DIRECTOR OF SECURITY, GENERAL TELEPHONE COMPANY, TAMPA;

FLORIDA, WAS CONTACTED ON JUNE 30, 1975, AND ADVISED OF THE:

SO TENTS OF REFERENCEO BUREAU MIEL. I: NO MAHON ADVISE

THAT IF HE IS CONTACTED BY THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE HE

VOULD INMEDIATELY NOTIFY THE SAC OF THE TAMPA OFFIGE AND

FILL CONTACT THE LEGAL OUNSEL DIVISION TO ASSIST HIM AS TO

-HIS OBLIGATIONS AS TO CONFIDENT IAL IIY OF FURNISHING INPORMATION

ACQUIRED AS AN FBI EMPLOYEE.

END

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HOLD

Assoc. Dir. -

Dep.-A.D.-Adm.-

Dep.-A.D.-Inv.

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

Comp. Syst.

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com.

Gen. Inv. ..

Ident.

Inspection

Intell.

Labnratory

Plan. & Eval. -

Spec. Inv.

Troining

Legal Coun.

Telephone Rm.

Director Sec'y

REC 20262-116395-293

HUL"

1975

poss

5

1975

N® FoLYL BocId: 32989609 Page 82

---

## Page 83

ERAL BUNEAU OF INVESTIGATION

MMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUN!'

TELETYPE

LARGES CE PLAIN

6$15PM NITEL

6/30075 EMM

-TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM CHICAGO (62-6211)

SENSTUDY • 75.

assoc. Dir.

Dep.-A.D.-Adm.

*Dep.-A.D.-Inv.-

Asst. Dir.:

Almin.

Cup. Syst.

Ext. Affairs

Fils& Com.

Gen. Inv. - nel

mith

Ident.

Inspection

Intell.

Laisratery

¡Plan. & Eval. -

Spec. Inv. -

Legal Cour.

Telephone Rm.

Dirertor Secy

AII INFORMATION CONTAINIO

MDR16

REBUTEL JUNE 28, 1975.

SA JOHN R. BASSEIT, CHICAGO DIVISION, HAS BEEN ADVISED

OF CONTENTS OF REBUIEL; HOWEVER, IT IS POINTED OUT TO THE

BUREAU THAT SA BASSETT HAS BEEN DISPATCHED TO PINE

FRIDGE, SOUTH DAKOTA, TO ASSISI IN BUREAU SPECIAL RESMURS.

for

ALÉTHIS TIME, CHICAGO HAS NO IDEA WHEN SA BASSETT MAY

- RETURN.

ABOVE FOR INFORMATION OF BUREAU IN EVENT THEY MAY

DESIRE IO ADVISE SENATE SELECI COMMITIEE OF SA BASSETT'S

PRESENT UNAVAILABILITY.

REG- 102

62-111-395-292

END

• JUL 2 1975

HOLD

CC: 67-

84 JUL 2

1975

14 55024

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---

## Page 84

. OPTIONA CORM NO. 10

5010-106

MAY 1962 EDITION

GSA GEN. REG. NO, 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Mr. W. Ro WannallwahuL

FROM: W. O. Gregat fif

SUBJECT:

i SENSTUDY 75

DATE:

6/24/75

ORIGINAL ONLY

Assoc, Dir..

Dep. ADmi

Dep. AD

Asst. Di

Admin.

Comp. Syst. -

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com.

Gen. Inv.

Ident.

Laboratory

Plan. & Eval. -

Spec. Inv. -

Training -

Legal Coun. -

Telephone Rm. -

Director Sec'y -

PURPOSE:

ALL INFORM

'AMON GOI

AYATITEI

HEREL

UNCLASSINED

DATE

GOBY

R 45021

To advise that CIA has agreed to have Bureau

representatives review 693 page CIA document containing

information relating to joint ventures; involving CIA and

other members of the intelligence community in sensitive

matters, and decision of CIA to furnish FBI with copies

of any document contained therein having a bearing on

FBI activities

DETAILS:

LMy memorandum to you captioned as above dated

6/20/75, advised that a representative of the Intelligence

Community Staff on that date, at FBI Headquarters,' briefed

appropriate Intelligence Division personnel of the contents

of a 693 page document prepared by CIA which contains

numerous memoranda relating to a wide variety of operations

in which CIA, to some degree, had contact or cooperated

with other members of the intelligence community in sensitive

matters. You were advised that members of the Senate

Select Committee have already had access to, if not actual

possession of, this document, and that a number of the operations

Inted in he document are of extreme sensitive to t

involving this Bureau.]

REC- 102

IIn order to enable this Bureau tobe in a position

to knowledgeably and accurately reply to SSC inquiries and

to fully identify operations listed in the document of

interest to this Bureau, contact was initiated with John Clarke,

Associate Deputy to Director of Central Intelligence for the

Intelligence Community, for: the purpose of obtaining a copy

of this document. On 6/23/75, Mr. Clarke advised that CI

Director William Colby authorized the reviewing of this

62-116395

CONTINUED - OVER

5

1975M: adn

DocId:32989609 Page 84

---

## Page 85

UNEXCISED VERSIONS OF DOCUMENTS FURNISHED

TO SSC

HH 55024

DocId: 32989609 Page 85

---

## Page 86

Du.

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall

Re: SENSTUDY

62-116395

(693 page document by Bureau representatives and this Bureau's

obtaining a copy of any memorandum contained therein having

a bearing on FBI activities.,

As the above authorization appears to be responsive to

this Bureau's need for reviewing the document for information

having a bearing on this Bureau's operations, arrangements

have been effected for Mrs. Harriett Mowitt, Executive Secretary,

Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of Intelligence

Community, to bring this 693 page document to FBI Headquarters

on 6/25/75 for review by selected personnel of the Intelligence

Division.

Copies will be obtained of any memorandum contained

therein believed to have a bearing on any, 'phase of this Bureau's

activities.

RECOMMENDATION:

Upon completion of above review you will be advised

of pertinent information obtained, accompanied by recommendations

as to additional action believed necessary in this matter.

whe

HH 55024 DocId: 32989609

Page 86

2

---

## Page 87

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

Intelligence Community Staff

•DCI/IC-75-0679

18 JUN 198

in, its

I5=

MEMORANDUM FOR: USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

SUBJECT

: Organization for Liaison with Select Committees

The attached CIA Employee Bulletin lays out the DCI's

organization for dealing with the Senate and House Select

Committees. It is provided to you for information.

-John M. Clarke

Acting Deputy to the DCI

for-the Intelligence Community

Attachment:

as stated

I. ENCLOSURE -

ALL BI IEORMATION CONTAINED

MDRI

REC- 102

62-116-395-290

• 3 JUL 2 1975

1975

DooId:32989609 Page

87

file

62-116395

---

## Page 88

EMPLOYEE

BULLETIN

No. 452

10 June 1975

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY

GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Mr. E. H. Knoche has been named the focal point within

the Agency for liaison with the Senate and House Select

Committees investigating intelligence activities. Mr. John

Clarke will continue in his capacity as focal point for the

Intelligence Community on that same subject. Any Agency

employee contacted directly by a Select Committee staff

member should refer the caller to the Select Committee Review

Staff under Mr. Knoche, on X4086.

AM TRATION CONTAINED

DISTRIBUTION:

All Employees

11:573-29.0

NCLOSURE

HH 55024

DocId:32989609

Page 88

---

## Page 89

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUN 2 8 1919

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir.

Dep.-A.D.-Adm

Dep.-A.D.-Inv.-

Asst. Dir.:

Admin. -

Comp. Syst

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com.

Gen. Inv. -

Ident. -

Inspect

Intell ewe

Laboratory

Plan. & Eval -

Spec. Inv. .

Training t

Legal Coun

Telephone RM. -

Director Sec'y

NRODI AL

COD

3:47 PM NITEL JUNE 28, 1975 L V.

TO DIRECTOR: (62-116395)

FROM ALBANY

(62-2368)

SENST IDY 75

"ALL INTORMATION CONTAT

DATE

MDR-16

RE BUTEL JUNE 28, 1975.

ON JUNE 28, 1975, FORMER SA MENRY G. ROWSE, JR., WAS

DONT ACTED BY ASAC JOHN J. HINCHOLIFFE AND ADVISED CONTENTS

RE BUTEL. ROWSE, STATED THAT SHOULD HE BE CONTACTED BY SCC, ME

WILL CONTACT BUREAU'S LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION. ROWS CIRRENTLY

RESIDING C/D P.O. BOX 65, SHELDON, VT., 95483, TELEPHONE NO .

do

LRF FIHQ CLR

JUL 1 1975

84 JUL 1

1975

1H 35024

DocId: 32989609 Page 89

---

## Page 90

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUN 2 9 1975

TELETYPE

ABBoc. Dir.

Dep.-A.D.-Adm.

Dep.-A.D.-Inv.

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

Comp. Syst. -

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com -

Gen. Inv. -

Ident.

Inspection

Intell. ..-

Laboratory

Plau. & Eval -

Spec. Inv. -

Training

Legal Cout. -

Telephone Ril. -

Director Sec'y.

NRO02 AT CODED

7:44 PM NITEL

JUNE 29,

TO :

DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: ATLANTA

SENSTUDY • 75

1975 ILL

RE BUTEL TO ATLANTA AND OTHER OFFICES JUNE 28, 1975.

• FORMER SA MARION CHEEK CONTACTED BY SAC, ATLANTA, JUNE

29, 1975, IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS IN RE TEL.

END

ATI INFORMATION DO LANTED

HARKIN IB. UN

DATEL A

MDR-16

TOW FBIHQ CLR

REG. 102

62116395287

3 JUL 1 1975

84 JUL 1

14: 35024

1975

DocId: 32989609

Page 90

---

## Page 91

На воs AT CODE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUN 2.819/5

TELETYPE

10: 40

AM NITEL JUNE 28, 1975 PG

TOS DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)

-FROM: ATLANTA

SENSTUDY 75

RE BUTEL TO ATLANTA AND OTHER OFFICES, JUNE 28, 1975.

ALL CURRENT AND FORMER AGENTS WITHIN ATLANTA DIVISION

CONTACTED BY SAC, ATLANTA, JUNE 28, 1975, WITH EXCEPTION OF

FORMER SA MARION CHEEK AND ADVISED IN ACCORDANCE WITH

INSTRUCTIONS, RE TEL.

FORMER SA CHEEK CURRENTLY BOATING ON SUWANEE RIVER IN

REMOTE AREA, FLORIDA, AND NO POTENTIAL FOR LOCATING UNTIL

EVENING OF JUNE 29, 1975, NEXT. CHEEK WILL BE CONTACTED BY

SAC AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, JUNE 29, 1975, AND BUREAU IMMEDIATELY

ADVISED OF CONTACT.

END

LRF FBIHQ CLR

Assoc. Dir.

Dep.-A.D.-Adia.

Dep.-A.D.-Inv.

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

Comp. Syst.

Ext. Affairg

Files & Com.

Gen. Inv.

Ident.

18Dec

tell WeATh

Laboratory

Plan. & Eval -

Spec. Inv. -

Training

Legal Coun

Telephone Rol. -

Director See'y

Wite

the

REG 102

62-116395-2880

3 JUL 1 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

FRETA IS UNCLASSIFTAD

JUL 1

1975

43.5024

-DocId: 32989609 Page 91

---

## Page 92

UFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL

WASHINGTON, DIC. 20530

JURI 2 0 1275

1O:

Antonin Scalia

Assistant Attorney General

Office of Legal Counsel

ALI, INFORMATION CONTAINED

SUREIN IS

DATE 115

FROM:

SUBJECT:

Douglas R. Marvin

Special Assistant to the

Attorney General

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.

Deputy Special Counsel for

Intelligence Coordination

Senatuly -75

Senate Select Conmittee Request: Appendix D, Item 17 -

Joseph Kraft

The SSC's request of Item 17, Appendix D, seeks "All memo-

randa and other materials reflecting written or oral authorization

and re-authorization by the Attorney General and/or the Directo

• of

the FBI for electronic surveillance of Joseph Kraft''.

By letter of May 2, 1975, to Kraft's attorney, Lloyd Cutler,

the Attorney General gave,

inter alia, the following assurances:

"Pending further Departmental action relating to the policies

RAMATIO

which will govern records of the type involved in Mr. Kraft's

MDR-HO

case, all documents, recordings, or other records of any type in

the Department's custody or control which constitute, surmarize,

of deside the steves of the verteria stat dras he result

members of his family will be placed under seal"

6225451595-285

62-16

It is my view (shared by Mr. O'Connor) and articulated,

well, by Cutler in telephone conversations with me on June 12, and

June 16, 1975 (the second call came after Cutler had conferred with

Kraft) that the material sought by the Senate Select Committee

distinct from that protected by seal and that, therefore, the

requested material be found, reviewed and forwarded to the SSC..

(Cutler advised that the Ervin Committee was given same).

May I have your views on this matter?

3

JUL 1 1.975

materins responsi

restrictions noted in adore us

62-

116392

5-aut

Восім ви

DocId: 3298960

---

## Page 93

СЛОНА ТОКМ МО. ТО

3010-106

MAY 1982 CONTION

"OSA GIN, PIG, IÚ. 39

UNITED STATES GI

ARNMENT

Memorandum

TO

: Mr. D. J. Brennan, Jr

FROM

S. J. Papich

SECRET

DATE: February 13, 1970

ALL. INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLAGSIFIED EXCEPT

SUBJECT: UNION FOR

REVOLUTION

WASRE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

CIA, lurhished the following to the

Liaison Agent on 2/10/70.3(8)

[CIA has

JEK Act 6 (1) (B)

will be restricted

this operation is to

The primary objective of

CIA hones thail

this develops, CIA will then proceed

From then on CIA

W211l

Аст/В.

CLASSIFIED BY

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X.

MOR-Ib

"In response to the Llaison Agent's request, CIA will

furnish

The Agent also asked

We should have such data

so that we can take the necessary investigative action in the

event any persons or organizations in the U.S. take an interest

In the captioned group.

We, of course, will also be interested

in international ramifications which could have a bearing on.

the activities of Leit Wing activity in this country:

alicials which will be related

At this stage there do:s not appear to be any conditions

or developments which would have an adverse bearing on our

operations or jurisdiction providing that CIA keeps us adequately

informed.

CIA asks that it be apprised of any information coming

to our attention concerning the organization.

CIA further requests

that Ite intorest not be revealed out in hasts Cy and that

information be handled on

Self: Wnk

•(5) Classif

6283

62116305-24

Exempt

IW 55021 DocIdDeol

CDS, Category SECte

ClassinettioN Indefinite

ENCLOSURE

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## Page 94

SECREN

•Memorandun to Mr. D. J: Brennan, Jr.

RE:

UNION FOR REVOLUTION

ACTION:

The above information is being directed to the

attention of the Internal Security Section and the

Nationalities Intelligence Section. Liaison will {ollow

an order to obtain samples of the propaganda referred to

above und will again reiteraie that we be furnished copies

of communications transmitted to the mazling addresses S

SECREL

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## Page 95

OPTIONAL TORM NO. 19

3010-108

MAY 1882 IDITION

GSA GEN, REG.

130.27

UNITED STATES G

ERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

Mr. D. J. Brennan, Jr

-

DATE: February 13, 1970

FROM

s. J. Papich

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS URCLASSIRED EXCEPT

SUBJECT:

UNION FOR REVOLUTION

...

WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

I CIA,

furnished the following to the

Liaison Agent on 2/10/70J(5)

{CIA has

JFK Act 6 (1) (B)

well be restricted

this overation is to

The primary objective of

CIA hopes that

If this develops, CIA will then proceed

From then on CIA

Lin response to the Liaison Agent's request, CIA vill

furnish us samples of propaganda. The Agent also asked that we

be given copies of communications sent to the mailing addresses

CLASSIFIED BŸ

Me by any organizations or individuals...

We should have such data

so that we can take the necessary investigative action in che

event any persons or organizations in the U.S. take an interest

in the captioned group.

We, of course, will

also be interested

in international ramifications which could have a bearing on.

the

activities of Loit Wing activity in this countiys

The Agent

also asked for the nanes of the officials which will be related

to the Union for Revolution. Je)

LAt this stage there do s not appear to he any conditions

or developments which would have an adverse bearing on our

operations or jurisdiction providing that CIA keeps us adequately

informed.

CIA asks that it be apprised of any information coming

to our attention concerning the organization.

CIA further requests

that its interest not be revealed outside of the Bureal and that

this information be handled on a need-to-know basis.

Classified by

10283

""(6)*

Exempt from CDS, Category_

SECRELL CONTINUED - OVER

Date of Declassification Indefinite

H# 55024 DocId: 32989609 /Page 95

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## Page 96

Memorandum to Mr. D. J: Brennan,

RE:

"ro

UNION FOR REVOLUTION

ACTION:

[The above information is being directed to the

attention of the Internal Security Section and the

Nationalities Intelligence section.

Liaison will follow

in order to obtain samples of the propaganda referred to

above and will again reiterate that we be furnished copies

of communications transmitted to the matling addresses.(S)

SECREM

•0 2

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__.

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## Page 97

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee:

Senate Select Comnittee

O'LTR

[XJ LHM

• Memo

• Report dated_ 6/11/75

U.S. Senate Select Committee: Re: Other

C'aption of Document:

Specific FBI Practices and Procedure

Item #24, Part III, Appendix C

FBI

Originating Office:

Delivered by:

Kulvilaly

eu tielles

Date: 6/13/25-

Received by:

Title:

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBi

014,523

---

## Page 98

clis

=12: 30

NW 55024 DocId: 32989609 ° Paye"98

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## Page 99

ALt INFORMATION CONTAINED

MDR-IY

HH 55024

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ENCLOSURE

62-116 395-284

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## Page 100

•TE:

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

BEFORE COMPLETING.

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

TO :

Intelligence Community Staff

FROM:

ATTN: Central Index

Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information al

O Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term.

If a document

made available

2. DATE PROVIDED

for review but not

transmitted, so note.)

6/11/75

DOCUMENT

BRIEFING

INTERVIEW

TESTIMONY

OTHER

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED

(check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)

SSC

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNLE

WHERE SHOWNT OTHERWISE.

MIFIED EXCEPT

HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents;

give name or identification number of briefer,

interviewee, testifier and subject)

Other Specific FBI Practices and Programs

5.

a SPoNse eral sedate of amo, merative, supposed formal request, other-

state verbal request of (name),

SSC letter 5/14/75, Appendix C, Part III, Item 24.

• CLASSIFICATION O

NFORMATION (ente

Codew S. TS or

11g"

7. KEY

WORDS (enter

the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are

used underline

for

emphasis)

14615-2800

COVERT ACTIVITIES E

CLASSIFIED BY SIZALM/Bm

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X_/

MDR-16

8.

SUMMARY (see reverse

side before completing this item)

With agreement of CIA, SSC as furnished with copy of

documents maintained by the Bureau relating to establishment by

CIA in this country of a "notional" Marxist-leninist organization.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

EDSEELS ME

DATE I-

UNCLASS AR

hote: Original

bat dacion to Central Comminity Index

in connection pipe erstidy 75,

1116Ca

ELut

TJM:1hb

(4)

62-116395

AS YELLOW

SECRET

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

I 55028 Dootd:3299609 Page 2p0/2-11545954244

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## Page 101

INSTRUCTIONS

• Type or print clearly in ink.

Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

• Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

• "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the

information.

• If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to

HS) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a

copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing

substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community

matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests

should be noted.

Commitments made to supply additional information should be

noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here,

e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether

interviewee is current or former employee,

etc. If actual document or transcript

is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional

pages may be attached if necessary.

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## Page 102

2 =

d7.

W

Att.

Ilo

A.

tinte

&

3. B. Hotis)

Vannall

Cregar

Paluar

551375

56961.31

devore.s.s

The Attorady Geraral

Director, FB1

UNITAD STATES UNTARS SALAC

ON INIETLIGENCE ACTIVITI

ITTEE

Defaronce 20 BAdO dO BONOrANOJO ITOR 201039

seloet Conuittas, dated lay 14, 1975, and appendices

chorato, roquentiar certais comente and oider 10l0rne

1101

tron the Fal.

Astachod lex your approval and formarding to $h0

Cosmittan in the original as a

phich 10 101p

AUTG 10 020

tho Comitteets requesia.

cops of tuo sonorandus and ste enclosora is

boing providod for your recores.

Bactereros (1)

62-126995

1 n Tho baptity attornoy seerad

stteation:

Special

P.U. 14509518

Inteligence Coordination

10DEpTO

101

Wardelerenced

REC- 102

1-12-95 Af

Pou Dial

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINAL

DATE SOS SESMAR

42-116345-284

3 JUL' 1 1975

Assoe. Dir. -

Dep. AD Adm, -

Dep. AD Inv. _

Asst. Dir.:

Admin. _

Comp. Syst.a

Ext. Affairs -

Files & Com.

Gen. Inv. -

Ident.

Inspection

Intell. _

Laboratory

Plan. & Eval

Spec. Inv.

Training

Legal Coun.

Telephone Rm.

com

pu

SECRET MATERNI ATTACHER

MALISSON

710:3

9896

9

TELETYPE UNIT

Page

102

GPO 954-546

---

## Page 103

SURA

88-118395

SECRET

2 - MI.

1

Mr.

A. Hintz

Ит .

J. Bo Hotla)

R. Wannall

0. Cregar

1

Bo

Palmer

kr.

"o DAJO, JI.

June 11, 1975

THITED STAITS SENATE SELECT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

ONKITTLE TO STUDY COVININERTALIS

GEN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT

OPIBATIONS VITA RESPECT TO

WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

IATILLIGINCE ACTIVITIES

HI: OTHER SPECIFIC YBI PRACTICES AND PROGRANS

Rotoresco la sade to monorasan fron captioned

comulttoo dated May 14, 1975, and the appondicon therero,

valet come in resente for deer ler are charties

14-15-2000

CLASSIFIED BY SPRACM

DECLASSIEY CN: 25X

1216

althis the valted states.

In reports to tien nurser i, tart dits appendit e,

selonad for tho committon 1o a copy of a nonorandon itor

1970, captianod "Uaten For Ronolution,

Lafarantion tron CIA atvialny of the establishsent of a

"Bottonal" Martist-Lonlalat arganization by tho cia.

lthongh tha FAl did, as sorod la other reaponson to ta

omalttoo, antabldas and direct nuca sotional organizations

no inforantion has bana donoloped indentia tho FBI

consulta tita cla retarding alI catabli i et creation 2)

ANGLOBUTO

POLAESTL

moRti

1 - The Attoraoy Gonoral

Assoc. Dir.

Dep. AD Adm. -

Dep. AD Inv. -.

Asst, Dir.:

Admin.

Comp. Syst.

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com. _

Gen. Inv.

Ident.

Inspection

IND: prd

(9)

pid

Intell.

Laboratory

Plon. & Eval,

Spec. Inv. -

Training

Legal Coun.

Telephone Rm. -

MAIL ROOM

pie55624 Docid:32989609

SECRET

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

Clans111es by

Exampt fros GDE

SECRET 62-116-375-284

TELETYPE UNIT L

Page

103

ENCLOSURE

T10 557-576

---

## Page 104

SE

SECRET

The Attornoy Genoral

YOTE:

LSee somorandus I. O. CrogaI to HI. M. B. Hannall,

dated 6/6/75, which adrisod of CIA's clearance to forward

memorandun datod 2/13/70 to the Conalitoo.

In enclogure

dated 2/13/70, the nane of the CIA Agent tho furnished

the Infornation has boon excinod per ClA's roquest.

Henarandus datod 3/23/70 and captionod "Union For

spoottle roguest.

ot CIA's notional operation by thie Bureau. 5)

That nexorandun deals with an evaluation

[stanetftat "focrot? 1n accordanco with CIA's

claralfloátion of Ita inforiation per ir. Valt Elder, CA. 7(5)

SECRET

HH

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104

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## Page 105

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

MAY 1962 EDITION

GSA FPAIR (41 CFA) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

: Mr. J. B. Adams

FROM

: Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

**.

DATE:

6-9-75

sst. Di

Admin

ComptSyst

Ext. Affairs

Filos & Com. -

Gen. Inv. -

Ident. -

wreation

tell.

Laboratory

Legal Coun.

Spec. Inv.

Training -

Telephone Rm. -

Director Sec'y -

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINT

2008УL

R-16

DATE

By memorandum dated 6-4-75 you were advised that

captioned Committee was preparing what they termed case studies on

COINTELPROS in four separate areas. The areas defined were Black

Panther Party in San Francisco, White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan of

147/1

Mississippi, the Professor Morris J. Starsky incident, and the

Fred Hampton case (Black Panther Party leader in Chicago who was

killed during a police raid in Chicago, Illinois).

Mr. Lester B. Seidel advised SA Paul V. Daly 6-9-75 '

that in addition to the aforementioned areas he also wanted to include the

Muhammad Kenyatta case in Philadelphia. As an observation, two of the

areas cited by Mr. Seidel are areas where the Bureau currently is façing

lawsuits, namely, the Hampton and Kenyatta cases, and a third area is

one which we could well be involved in a lawsuit, that being the Starsky

case. Mr. Seidel indicated the Bureau can expect correspondence from

the Committee concerning these matters.

RECOMMENDATION:

REC- 102

42-119375-783

For information.

pus

TISH/DUD

PRIM

62-116395

1 - Mr. Wannall

1 - Mr. Mintz

1 - Mr. Cregar

1 - Mr. Hotis

1 - Mr. Daly

1 - Inspector J. T. Kelly

PVD:kjs (8)

84 JULEN

1975

N 55056andoc.Id: 329896 Buy FaS Sayings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

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## Page 106

CODE

TELETYPE

URGENT

6-9-75

1 - Mr. Wannall

TO SAC SAN FRANCISCO

Attn:

Cregar

1 - Mr. Gebhardt

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

(62-126385) -2824

- Mr. Mintz

- Mr. Hotis

SENSTUDY 75 REC- 102

1 - Mr. Daly

THIS IS TO ADVISE YOU THAT PURSUANT TO REQUEST FROM THE

SENATE SELECI COALITIKE ON INTEGLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (S8C) I HAVE

MELEASED YOU AND POPMER SU DAVID I. TOID FROM APPLICABIE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

IMPLOYEE SECRECY AGRESMENTA FOR THE PULPOSE OF A STAFF INTERVIEW

AS8IAI

BY SEC COCERMING COINTELPRO AND THE INVESTIGATION AT

BY

„SAN FRANCISCO OF THE BPP. LESTER B. SEIDEL, STAFF MEMBER OF SSC

UNCL

WILL TRAVEL TO SAN FRANCISCO TO CONDUCT MHE INTARVIENS IN

CAPPROXIMATELY THO WEEKS.

HEREIN

DATE

AN AGENT WILL BE AVAILABZE DURING INTERVIEW TO ASSIST IN

MAKING A DETERMINATION AS TO PIETHER OR NOT A FARTICULAR

QUESTION SOULD BE RISPONDED TO, IHIA AGENT IS NOI TO BE

COMSIIERED PRIVATE COUNSEL AND WILL HOT BE PRESENT DURING INTER-

VIEW.

YOU, AN ABAC, OR SENIOR AUPERVIDOR CONTACT FORMER SA DAVID

E. TODD TO ADVIES HIN OF THE WAIVER OF THE APPLICABLE SECRECY

Assoc, Dir.

Dep. AD Adm. -

Dep. AD Inv. _

AGREIKENT AND DETAFINE WEETHER HE IS EBBINOUS OF HAVING AN

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

Comp.Syst..c

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com.

PVD: eek

(7) FEDERAL :BUREAU, OF INVESTIGATION

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

¡Bt;

Gen. Inv.

Ident.

Inspection

Intell.

Laboratory

Plon, & Eval.

Spec. Inv..

Training

JUN 0 9 1975

THERE 10K

4013

TEK*

1975

COME

DocId:32989609

TELETYPE UNIT [

Page 106

10 959-546

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## Page 107

i. B.

PAGE TWO 62-116395

AGENT AVAILABLE DURING INTERVIEN. FOR YOUR BACHGROUAD INFOFMATION

TODD HAS PREVIOUSLY BEEN IN CONTACT WITH LEGAL COUNSEL

DIVISION CONCERNING THIS INTERVIEW AND HAS BEEN BRIEFED

CONCERNING HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL, ETC.

SUTEL RESULTS OF CONTACT WITH TODD. YOU SHOULD CONTACT

LEGAL COUNSEL, DIVISION FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING

YOUR INTERVIEW.

NOTE:

BY memo 6-2-75 captioned as above it was recommended

and approved that sAc Charles W. Bates, former SA David E. Todd,

and Assistrat Director Robert E. Gebhardt be released from

applicatle secrecy agreements for purposes of interview by sSc.

We are soperately advising Assistant Director Robert E. Gebbardt

of thia decision.

- 2 -

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## Page 108

OPTIONAL FORM NO, 10

MAY 1962 EDITION

I GSA EPAIR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoe, Dire =

Dap. Apadi

Dep. Ap Inv.

TO

: Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 6-2-75

FROM

Legal Counse

(SUBJECT; SENSTUDY 75

Comp. Systo

Ext. Affairs

Filos & Com. -

Gen. Inv.

Ident.

Inspection

Intell.

Laboratoryk

Legal Coun

Plan. & Eval.

Spec. Inv. -

Training

Telophone Rm. -

Director See'y -

ANN

The purpose of this memorandum is to advise that

Lester B. Seidell, staff member of the Senate Select Committee, has

intormed us that the Committee intends to interview former SA David E.

Todd, SAC Charles W. Bates, and Assistant Director Robert E. Gebhardt

and to request that the aforementioned employees be released from existing

employment and or secrecy agreement for purposes of a staff interview.

On the evening of 5-29-75, Lester B. Seidell telephonically

ALT INFORMATION CONTA

advised SA Paul V. Daly of this Division that in accordance with the

"guidelines" existing between the Committee and the various intelligence

Cool 3Y

agencies under review, he was giving notice that he as a representative

of the Committee was going to San Francisco in approximately two to three

weeks, and it was his intention to interview SAC Charles W. Bates, former

SA David E. Todd, and former Assistant to the Director Alan H. Belmont.

He also requested Assistant Director Gebhardt be made available for staff

DATE

interview in Washington, D. C. He asked that the Bureau take the necessary

steps to release the Agents from any existing employment or secrecy

agreements. For the purposes of this interview, he stated he would inquire

of each of the interviewees as to their knowledge and participation in counter-

intelligence activities directed against the Black Panther Party. With regards

to this discussion, he specifically mentioned a Bureau airtel to San Francisco

dated 5-11-70, titled "Counterintelligence and Special Operations (Research

Section)." He stated this document was one of the documents released by

the court in the suit by newscaster Carl Stern. He was asked as to whether

6/9/25-

PHD/2012

he could define more precisely the areas to be covered in the interviews and

stated he could not inasmuch as he did not khow the varous aspects

counterintelligence program against the Black Panther Party in the San Francisco

area. Additionally, he advised he was making a request for documents'5

JUL 1 1975

1 - Mr. Wannall

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. Gebhardt

1 - Mr Frotis

1 - Mr. Cleveland

1 - Mr. Daly

1 - Mr. Mintz

I - Personnel File, SAC Charles W. Bates

1 - Personnel File, Assistant Director Robert E. Gebhardt

1 - Personnel File, former SA David E. Todd

MPVD: dkg (12)

CONTINUED - OVER

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

NH 5502d0-DvcId: 32989609

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## Page 109

Legal Counsel to J. B. Adams

Re: SENSTUDY 75

in writing, which would coincide with the aforementioned topic of interview.

He described these interviews as being "abuse" interviews which according

to the Committee's understanding precludes the presence of an agency

representative during interview. However, an Agent may be available for

consultation purposes.

Mr. Seidell was advised by SA Daly that former Assistant

to the Director Belmont was in poor health and that before attempting interview

of Mr. Belmont, he should ascertain his current physical condition. Mr. Seidell

requested SA Daly determine Mr. Belmont's physical condition. Assistant

Director Cleveland advised SA Daly on 5-30-75 that Mr. Belmont was very

seriously ill and was suffering from the Shy Drager Syndrome. This informa-

tion was brought to the attention of John Elliff, Task Force Director on

Domestic Intelligence Activities of captioned Committee, and Elliff expressed

dismay that Seidell had made an inquiry concerning the interview of Belmont.

Elliff requested that we not take any action concerning Seidell's request as

ito Belmont at this time.

Former SA David E. Todd had previously contacted this

Division and as set forth in memorandum dated 5-16-75 from Legal Counsel

to J. B. Adams, he was advised of his rights, the existence of an employment

secrecy agreement signed by him, of the provisions of Attorney General

Order 501-73, and to his right to a private attorney. He was also advised

that an Agent would be made available for consultation during the interview

if he so desired. Mr. Todd did not indicate at this point whether he was

desirous of having a Bureau representative available for consultation during

interview. Todd, according to Seidell, stated he would not consider to be

interviewed in the absence of a release of a secrecy agreement by the Bureau.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That former SA David E. Todd, Assistant Director

Robert E. Gebhardt, and SAC Charles W. Bates be released from their

employment and secrecy agreementsfor purposes of a staff interview concerning

our Cointelpro activities against the Black Panther Party.

RECOMMENDATIONS

CONTINUED - OVER

- 2 -

HH 55024 DocId:32989609 Page 109

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## Page 110

i +

Legal Counsel to J. B. Adams Memorandum

Re: SENSTUDY 75

(2) If approved, the employees and former employee will

Elitizer

be advised and briefed generally concerning the making available of a

Bureau representative for consulation during such an interview and

other pertinent matters to be considered during interview.

PUD

for was

per

gra

- 3-

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## Page 111

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

5010-106

MAY 1962 EDITION

GSAY GEN. REG.

NO. 27

UNITED' STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SEC,

ET

FROM

: Mr. W. R. Wannall

we olpelesar

1

1

1

1

- Mr.

J. B. Adams

~ Mr. J. A. Mintz

(1

- J. B. Hotis)

DATE: 6/17/75

- Mr. W. R. Wannall

- Mx. H. E. Helgeson

- Mc.

W.

0. Cregar

- Mo: J. P. Thomas

Assoc. Dir.

Dep. AD As

Dep. AD Idly

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

Comp. Syst. -

Ext. Affairs —

Files & Com. -

Gen. Inv. -

Ident.

SUBJECT" SENS TUDY 75

Labpratory -

Plan. & Eval. _

Spec. Inv. -

Training.

Legal Coun.

Telephone Rm. -

Director Sec'y -

This is to record meeting of Task Force (TF)

leaders with Mr. James Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the

President, at the Executive Office Building on 6/13/75.

Aforementioned meeting was called and chaired by

Mr. Wilderotter, and was attended by representatives of The

White House, Justice, Defense, FBI, CIA, and State.

Project

Manager W. 0. Cregar

and Supervisor J. P. Thomas, Section CI-2,

INTD, represented the FBI.

Committee

Vir. Wilderotter reported that the Senate Select

(SSC) has agreed to specifically identify a limited

number of "abuse areas" which it will investigate from top to

bottom.

"Notices" should be issued to agencies very shortly

defining certain terms and specifying the SSC targets. If

these areas can be fully investigated, with assistance of the

intelligence community,

the SSC agrees

to not extend its inquiries

"beyond the specified areas. If the SSC does so limit its

inquiries, this will be to the advantage of the intelligence

NND BY

4-2060

community

in that it will minimize the SSC's straying into

91-2

various nonper tinent matters; the Trs can present the intelli-

gence community's

side on the topics examined; the Trs should

be able to expedite the Committee's inquiries and thereby limit

the duration of the SSC investigation.

DECLAS

The FBI has responsibility for the TFs on "Political

Abuses," TF leader Insp. H. E. Helgeson, and

"Use of Notional

Organizations," Tr leader Supv. J. P. Thomas. We cannot fully

address either topic until receiving the SSC notices defining

the extent of the proposed inquiries.

Contrary to the initial concept of the Trs, they will

not prepare comprehensive papers regarding their topics, but in

some areas it may be advantageous for a TF to prepare an

"opening statement" type paper for the SSC.

Enclosure

REC-100

• 62-116371

-280

CONTINUEL

OVER

62-116395

JPT: bkb6Kb

(8)

SECRET

Classified by

68751P7

Exempt from

ADS,

Category Number

1, un 27107 Ct

Date of Declassification Indefinite

® ALYN 3o71175989609 Page 111

---

## Page 112

i ..

SEXPET

Memorandum to

Mr.

Re:

SENS TUDY

75

62-116395

W. R. Wannall

The purpose of the TE and functions of the TE

leaders were discussed.

Briefly, each TE leader is to become

a substantive expert on the particular topic assigned to him

(e.g• political abuses), locate all documents, identify

potential witnesses,

develop strategy for presenting subject

matter to the SSC and work to minimize any delays which might

be caused by the Third Agency Rule. TF leaders will not

themselves be witnesses unless their activities other than as

I leaders are subjects oi testimony. I leaders will, In

consultation with legal counsel, define terms pertinent to

their topics.

They will outline directly to the SSC staff,

insofar as the SSC is receptive, the scope and direction of

pertinent inquiry, who is and is not competent to testify,

what documents are available, and what areas may or may not be

pertinent to the Committee's

interests.

TF leaders will prepare

themselves to be able to answer any inquiries from the

White House on their topics. Although TF leaders must know

the location of all documents pertinent, the documents them

selves will be made available to the SSC by the agency having

custody of same and each agency may negotiate with the SSC

regarding access by the Committee to material on a case by

case basis.

The agencies will, of course, coordinate first

with their

own legal counsel and then with the White House

before releasing documents.

On sensitive matters, such as notional organizations

or proprietary organizations,

the SSC has agreed that it will

not be necessary for agencies to furnish the names of U. S.

citizens and companies who have cooperated with the u. S. unless

those persons or companies have received notoriety (e.g.

Hughes

Tool Company, Sam Giancana). It is reportedly understood that

agencies must protect their ongoing operations. Agencies are

free to attempt to negotiate with the SSC regarding the extent

and form of their responses.

Attached is a copy of an intelligence community staff

memorandum 6/10/75 showing the TE assignments and, in the left

margin notes as to the agencies expected to have input into

each subject.

ACTION:

For record purposes.

SECIET

= 2 -

pur

HH 55024

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SECRET

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

• WASHINGTON, D. 6. 20505

Intelligence Community Staff

DC1/IC-75-0119

O June 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

SUBJECT

Memorandum dated 6 June 1975 re

Task Force Assignments

1.

This memorandum is a follow-on to subject memorandum

and in addition to completing the principal officer assignme nts also

lists task force members assigned by other agencies:

•Subject

Principal

Agency

Principal

Officer.

Task Force

Assignments

•CIA

State

DOD

Assassinations

•White House

Mr. Wilderotter

IDS 145-7094

James Gardner,

State Dept.

• IDS 101-29034

CIA

Army

Drug Abuse

(Testing of drugs)

CIA

Sayre Stevens

IDS 143-4303

* Malcolm Lawrence

State Dept.

IDS 101-2869,4

FBI; CIA

W. House Political Abuses

DofJ:.

(1:964)

ALL

Domestic

Surveillance

(incl. 17 taps,

Hus ton| Plan, etc,?

Justice

Hunter Helgeson

THAT+

4344609

IDS 17VE UJFK Act 6 (1) (B) -

V303

John Martir

IDS 187-4555

CIA

ALE FEI ITORMATION CONTANTED

DАшЕ1-122Мь зУ дегАтівн

Verne St. Mars

State Dept.

IDS 101-29448

CLASSITIED BY _ 006805

1621110375-200

EXCEPT FROM GENERAL DECIASGIFICATION

SCHECULA OFF. O. 100", "YSM?MON CATLOORY:

§ 50(1, O. lil or (1) (rirals one or more)

ENCLOSURE

HH 55024

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(unlese impossible, insert dute or excat)

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## Page 114

SECRET

Subjcct

Principal

Agency

Principal

Officer

Task Force

Assignments

FBI

Electronic

CIA (Clarkesurveillance

DOD

and Warrantless

Wiretap

Justice

George Calhoun

IDS 187-4401

William Jones.

State Dept.

IDS 101-20370

FBI

CIA, DOD

Use of Notional

Oxganizations

FBI

John Thomas

335. 1.702 4609

IDS: 1.701

GREEN V303

FBI

•CIA

Use of Proprietary

Organizations

CLA

Lee Peters

State Dept.

JFK ACt 6 (1l(Bj9403

FBI.

CIA

DOD

Mail Cover and

Intercept

justice

Phil White

IDS 187-4674

(to

be

defined

by SSd)

Watch List

DÖD

Benson Buffham

NSA

688-7222

DOD:

Army

Surveillance

DOD

DI. David Cooke

695-4436

2 The following officers from the Department of State have been

named to assist in the CIA preparation of comprehensive papers on the

following geographic and subject areas:

Greece

James Gardner

IDS 101-29034

Dominican Republic

Jämes Gardner

IDS 101-29034

James, Hender son

Dast Asia Bureau

The Congo

Bayard King

IDS 101-21504

Indonesia

Patricia Barnett

IDS 101-22369

2

HH 55024

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10.1

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## Page 115

SECRET.

Katzenbach Report

Emerson Brown

-- IDS 101-21504

3. The proposed DCI's letter to the Chairman of the House

Select Committee on Intelligence is in final coordination and is expected

to be available for Community review shortly. Following this,

Mx. Wilderotter will meet with the General Counsels to review and

coordinate on the final language.

'simmer.

Hied Turret

Harriett Mowitt

Executive Secretary

USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

CC:

MI. Buchen

IviI. Fills

Distribution:

1 - Mi. Wilderotter

1 = Mr.

Latimer

1

.- Nir.

Hyland

1

. Mr.

Morell

• 1

Mix.

O'Connor

- Mi. Cregard

- MI.

Knoche

1 - Mr.. Clarke

• NY 55024 -DocId: 32989609

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a man i

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## Page 116

43 ? (Rev. 1511-73)

Date of Mail

6/12/75

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Section.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

MDR 16

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

Subject

JUNE MAIL SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Removed By

File Number

17 9 JUN 2 7 1975

62-116395-279

Permanent Serial Charge Out

DOJ/ FBI

NH 55021 DocId: 32989609 Page 116

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## Page 117

OPTIONAL FORM NO, 10

MAY 1062 EDITION

GSA FPAR (11 CFRI 101-11.6

UNITED STATES

ERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.

Dep. AD Adm. -

Dep. AD Inv. _

1 - Mr. McDermott-ENC. Asst. Dir.:

1 - Mr. Wannall-Enc.

Comp. Syst. -

TO

• - Mr. Mintz-Hn

Ext. Affairs

: Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 6-11-7

Filos & Com. -

Gen. Inv. -

1 - Mr. Cregar-Enc.

Ident.

FROM

: Legal Counsel r

Inspection

1 - Mr. Hotis-Enc.

Intell. -

1 - Mr. Daly-Enc.

Loboratory

Logal Cour.

Plan, & Eval. -

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Spec. Inv. -

Training

Telophone Rm. _

On 6-10-75, K. William O'Connor, Special Counsel for

Diractor Soc'y -

Intelligence Coordination, Office of the Deputy Attorney General, furnished

Inspector John B. Hotis a copy of a letter from Senator Frank Church (D-Idaho)

to the Attorney General dated 5-28-75, requesting any files or documents

in the Department or the FBI concerning five members of the Senate Select

Committee on Intelligence Activities. The files requested pertain to Senators

Gary Hart (D-Colo.), Walter D. Huddleston (D-Ky.), Charles McC. Mathias

(R-Md.), Walter F. Mondale (D-Minn.), and Robert Morgan (D-N.C.).

Senator Church emphasized that the request is made pursuant to Senate

Resolution 21, which established the Select Committee and not under the

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) .

Mr. O'Connor also provided a draft of a proposed response

to the Senator's letter by the Attorney General. General Levi pledges

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

cooperation in this matter and suggests that the scope of the request should

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFDED

300087 5821

be clarified. He also states that while the request is not made under FOIA,

exemptions in the Act indicate the kind of concerns the Committee might

weariage.

want the Department to bring to its attention before disclosure is made.

The implication is that certain information in the files, particularly materials

which would violate individual privacy may be withheld."

It should also be noted that the Attorney General intends to

advise Senator Church that he is preparing the necessary materials and

DATE

asks for early discussions to determine how best to proceed. Accordingly,

it is felt that we should promptly review any files that might exist concerning

each of the above-named Senators and be prepared to furnish appropriate

information to the Attorney General upon request.

RECOMMENDATION:

EX-115

REC-49

165114395-2784

5 MA: 13 1376

That the FOIA Section, Files and Communications Division,

institute an immediate review of Bureau files for any doeuments or other

records concerning each of the above-named Senators.

3 ENCLOSURSI

1/75775 DRW: MLH

+ 12

Enclosure

B: kg (8) By YS. Sayings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

---

## Page 118

-d..

•FRANS' CHURCH, IDAHO, FIAIRI

JOHN G. TOWERATEXAS, VICE CHAL.

PHILIP A. HÄRT, MICH.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.

WALTER*S. MONDALE. MINN.

BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.

WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.

CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.

ROSEFE MORGANN.C.

RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

GARY HARTE

I WILLIAM GUMILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR

FREÖERICK A. ONSCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL

5271.1'75

75

I ESTICE

1÷31

ACREY

¿Inited States Benate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO

STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH

RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(PURSUANT TO S. RES, 21, S4TH CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

May 28,-1975*"

JUNE 1976

ON CONTA TED

24CT

FBI INTFORMIANI

130STY

RIATURAT

1419

The Honorable Edward H. Levi

The Attorney General

Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

On behalf of the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental

Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, we write to

request the delivery forthwith to the members whose names are listed

in the attachment hereto of any files on them or documents concern-

ing then that are in the possession, custody or control of the

Department of Justice, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

This request is made pursuant to the mandate of the senate,

contained in S. Res. 21.

That Resolution requires us to investigate

"conduct of domestic intelligence or counterintelligence opera-

tions against United States citizens by the Federal Bureau of

Investigation or any other Federal agency".

One means of accomplishing this objective is to review the

material, if any, which the Department of Justice has gathered on

members of the United States Senate.

This request is made pursuant to the Committee's mandate and

not under the Freedom of Information Act. The exemptions to that

Act are designed to allow federal agencies and departments the

degree of confidentiality necessary to conduct the ongoing activities

of the Executive Branch, not to prevent a duly constituted Congres-

sional Committee from understanding the nature, legality, and

propriety of some of those activities. Whether as a matter of agree-

ment between the Committee and the Department some material that may

be in any such files should be withheld depends upon an analysis of

the weight of the particular reason put forward for the proposed

mitholalng balanced against the connittee need to exercise its a

mandate.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTIC

Obviously, material received by the members

of

the

select

8

JUN 6 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTANAD

FIBRIAN ISNUNCI

DATE /11,20

mo

i SProute (16-395-176X

ENCLOSURE!

K.A.0.

GUE OF LAUSATTE

WW 55024 DocId: 32989609

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## Page 119

skin.

2

Committee would be handled in a secure manner, consistent with the

Rules of Procedure of the Committee and other

arrangements for the

special handling of particularly sensitive material.

We look forward to receiving the material responsive to this

request

as soon as possible.

Jhe tower

-

HH 55024

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-...

Select Committee Members Requesting Files

Senator Gary Hart

Senator Walter D. Huddleston

Senator Charles McC. Mathias

Senator, Walter F. Mondale

" Senator Robert Morgan

ATI, FBI THRONIZATION CONTAINED

62-111-395-27811

ENCLOSURE!

NH 55024

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## Page 121

Dear

TTY

WESTIE!

7. BANCT

I have just today received your letter dated May 28.

It apparently reached the Department of Justice on June 8.

It requests "the delivery forthwith to the members whose

names are listed in the attachment hereto of any files on

them of documents concerning them that are in the possession,

custody, or control of the Department of Justice, including

the Federal Bureau of Investigation."

The Department wants to cooperate with you on this

matter. But I think we first ought to clarify the

scope

of your request. I assume, for example, that your request

is not intended to encompass

copies of all letters between

the members and the

Department. I would suggest that we can

reach an understanding on issues of this kind by consulta-

tions between us.

, Your letter says that "Whether as a matter of agree-

ment between the Committee and the Department some material

that may be in any such files should be withheld depends upon

an analysis of the weight of the particular reason put forward

for the proposed withholding balanced against the Committee's

need to exercise its mandatje."

I take that to mean you would like us to go over the

files and to raise with the Committee such problems with dis-

closure as may or may not exist. I realize this request is

ALL SOFIATION CONTAINED

HERMIND UNCLESLETHO

ток-

62-1163855

274)

ENCLOSURE

HH 55024 DocId: 32989609 Page 121

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## Page 122

-2-

not made under the Freedom of Information Act, but as we

review the material in the file, exemptions in the act

indicate, I think, the kind of concerns the Committee might

want the Department to bring to its attention before dis

closure is made. For example, if material in a file would

violate the privacy of an individual other than the member

if it were revealed, would the Committee insist that such

material be revealed?

We are beginning averepare the material so that

no time will be wasted;

out I would Like discussions to

begin quickly so that we can agree on how to proceed. That

done, I would think that we could deliver the documents that

you have requested.

MTH 55024

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## Page 123

TO

EPTIONAL POTA, NO. 10

5010-106

MAY 1962 EDITION

GSA GEN. REG, NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Mr.

HI. R. Wanna ages

FROM

W.

0. "

egar

SUBJECT:

MELECTRONIC SURVEILIANCE

LEGISLATION

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

(1 - Mx.

J. B. Hotis)

DATE:

6/11/75

1

- MI.

R. E.

Gebhardt

- Mx.

- MT.

W.

Ro

Wannall

0.

Cregar

-

Mr.

R.

H. Horner

Mr.

B.

P.

Murphy

- MT.

I. F. Schwartz

Assoc. Dir.

Dep. AD Adm. -

Dep. AD Inv. _

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

Comp. Syst. -

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com. _

Gen. Inv. -

Ident. -

Inspection.

Intoll. -

Loosen 14 i

Legal Coun:

Spoc. Inv..

Training -

2 Telophone Rm. -

- Director Soc'y —

Attached is a copy of a memorandum dated 5/27/75,

which was furnished by the USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

for the Intelligence Community with advice that it bad been, a

prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

The memorandum analyzes current pending legislation

(S. 743, H. R. 141 and H. R. 214) all of which would repeal

•the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act.

passed, such legislation could seriously allect the bureau

and other agencies of the intelligence community.

RECOMMENDATION:

Attached memorandum should be forwarded to the Legal

Analysis Unit of the Office of Legal Counsel for its use in

any analysis that it may be making of the legislation

described above.

wise/perm

ALL INPORMATION CONTAINIO

MADA

6'

Enclosure

;"..

(10)

11615989609 Page 123

REC•100

62-116 3345-2188

SECRET' MATERIAL ATTACHED

I7. JUN 27 1975

---

## Page 124

SEGHET

27 May 1975

At ther

6/10/IVILES

, $

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Electronic Surveillance Legislation

1. Over a dozen bills have been introduced in Congress to date

aimed at restricting electronic surveillance conducted on national security

grounds. Although impelled by concern for the Fourth Amendment rights of

American citizens, the major bills in this area (S. 743, H.R. 141, H.R. 214)

are characterized by a heavy-handed approach which poses a serious threat

to the exploitation of foreign SIGINT sources, both within the United States

and overseas. (Signals intelligence subsumes communications intelligence

and electronic intelligence.)

2. The 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act (18 U.S.C.

2510, et seg.) established certain procedures which require the Government

to obtain a court order issued on probable cause prior to conducting wire or

oral communication interception in the investigation of certain offenses.. In

section 2511(3) of that Act, Congress specifically disavows any limitation on

the constitutional powers of the President in national security matters and

recognizes that the President has inherent constitutional authority to engage

in certain foreign intelligence activities:

(n)othing contained in this chapter or in

section 605 of the Communications Act of

1934 shall limit the constitutional power of

the President ... to obtain foreign intelli-

genice information deemed essential to the

security of the United States, or to protect

national security information against foreign

intelligence activities. (emphasis added)

The emphasized language implicitly recognizes that foreign intelligence

surveillances may be distinguished from national security surveillances

aimed at the discovery and prosecution of criminal conspiracies and activity.

3. In reliance on these Presidential powers and congressional

recognition thereof, foreign intelligence signal and communication interceptions

may be conducted within the United States without judicial warrant.

ALT FBI NTORIINHON CORTAUVEND

FONTMAN IS UNCLASSIO

62116385-276

ENCLOSURE

HH 55024 DocId:32989609 Page 124

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SECRET

4. Sentiment that the provisions of 18 U.S.C. 2511(3) (quoted above).

are incompatible with Fourth Amendment rights has spawned a Senate bill and

over a dozen House bills (some of these identical) aimed at closing what the

sponsors view as "the national security loophole" in current surveillance laws.

A distinctive approach to national security surveillance is taking shape which

would prohibit the use of warrantless surveillance for any reason whatsoever,

treating national security surveillance under a single rubric, without distin-

guishing between gathering foreign intelligence on the one hand, and national

security surveillances aimed at the discovery and prosecution of criminality,

on the other..

(a) S. 743 by Senators Nelson and Kennedy would amend

18 U.S.C. 2510, et seg., as follows: First, repeal 18 U.S.C.

2511(3) thereby withdrawing whatever congressional recognition

that section gave the foreign intelligence surveillance powers of

the President.

Second, prohibit intercepting the communications

of an American citizen or alien admitted for permanent residence

until a prior judicial warrant is obtained issued on probable cause

that a specific crime, e.g., espionage, has been or is about to be

committed. Third, prohibit intercepting the communication of a

foreign power or its agent until a prior judicial warrant is obtained

by establishing probable cause (a) that such interception is

necessary to protect the national defense (note narrower standard

than national security); (b) that the interception will be consistent

with the international obligations of the United States; and (c) that

the target is a foreign power or foreign agent. (A foreign agent is

defined as any person, not an American citizen or alien lawfully

admitted for permanent residence, whose activities are intended

to serve the interests of a foreign power and to undermine the

national defense. Each application for such an interception would

be made to the D. C. Federal District Court on personal and written

authorization of the President and would provide detailed informa-

tion on the target, the purposes and justification of the interception.)

Upon court approval, only the FBI would be authorized to intercept

the communication. Fourth, require that every American citizen

targetted be informed of the specifics of the surveillance within a

month of the last authorized interception. (This disclosure could

be postponed if the Government satisfies the court that the target

is engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise or that disclosure

would endanger national security interests. A foreign power or

its agent need not be informed of interceptions.) Fifth, require the

Attorney General to report to the Congress, at least quarterly, the

details of each interception undertaken on national security

grounds, to be filed with the Senate Foreign Relations and

Judiciary Committees and the House International Relations and

Judiciary Committees.

HH 55024 DocId:32989609 Page 125°;

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SECRET

(b) H. R. 141 by Representative Kastenmeier, Chairman of

the House Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the

Administration of Justice, which has legislative jurisdiction for

surveillance, is similar to the above bill. It would repeal

18 U.S.C. 2511(3) and amend Title 18 to permit communications

interception in national security cases only under court order

issued on probable cause that an individual has committed one of

several enumerated offenses or is engaged in activities intended to

serve the interests of a foreign principal and to undermine the

national security. (From the language of the bill, it could be

argued that the foreign agent's activities would have to constitute

a criminal offense before a warrant could be issued.) The bill

"does not mention the communications of a foreign power.

Each application for an interception would have to be authorized

by the Attorney General and made to a Federal judge of com-

petent jurisdiction. The targetted individual would be informed

of the surveillance within ninety days. The President, Attorney

General, and all Government agencies would be required to

supply Congress, through the Senate Judiciary and Foreign

Relations Committees and the House Judiciary and International

Relations Committees, any information regarding any interception

applied for.

: (c) H. R. 214 by Mr. Mosher and seven identical bills

co-sponsored by over 70 Congressmen from both parties, would

prohibit any interception of communications, surreptitious entry,

mail-opening, or the procuring and inspection of records of

telephone, bank, credit, medical, or other business or private

transactions of any individual without court order issued on

probable cause that a crime has been committed. Like S. 743

and H. R. 141, reviewed above, H.R. 214 would repeal 18 U.S.C.

2511(3). Unlike the above bills, H.R. 214 does not provide for non-

law enforcement surveillance. It would also strike out pro-

visions for summary procedures for intercepting communications

during emergencies and would require that detailed information

on each application for a communication interception be reported

to the House and Senate Judiciary Committees.

5. Intelligence Community Interests: These bills, through

imposing judiciary administration over all surveillance, would impair existing

responsibility to conduct electronic surveillance in gathering foreign positive

intelligence, which now reaches wholly domestic communications, those both

transmitted and received within the United States; wholly foreign communications,

those both transmitted and received abroad; and transnational communications,

international communications received in or transmitted from the United States.

HH 55024 DooId: 32989609

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SIGINT provides a broad range of foreign intelligence ranging from early

warning indicators to the most mundane information. The importance of any

single intercept or series of interceptions cannot be anticipated in advance;

therefore, the probable cause standard and the proposed requirements of

"particularity" are inappropriate in connection with this method of foreign intelli-

gence collection. (Furthermore, the House bills would impair existing responsibility

for using other intelligence gathering techniques against foreign subjects within the

United States, e.g., medicepts, photo surveillance, etc.)

6. Effect on Intelligence Community Interests: The bills reviewed above

would severely restrict domestic communications interception for föreign intelligence

gathering purposes; raise serious questions respecting authority to intercept

transnational communications; and would even raise questions concerning the

foreign intelligence community's authority to conduct electronic surveillance abroad

free from judicial intrusion or other conditions. (Moreover, the House bills

would restrict the use of other intelligence gathering techniques against foreign

targets within the United States.)

(a) Domestic Electronic Surveillance: An operation

mounted against a foreign target within the United States to

gather foreign positive intelligence would apparently not meet the

court test unless the specific message targetted involved an anti-

cipated, demonstrable and direct threat to the national defense.

S. 743 explicitly confers interception authority to the FBI alone.

It also explicitly raises the issue of the consistency of surveillance

with international obligations, e. g, the Vienna Convention, and

thus challenges the position taken by the State Department that no

current international obligation precludes targetting foreign

facilities within the United States.

(b) Transnational Electronic Surveillance: Proposed

legislation would apparently subject the interception of trans-

national communications from a situs within the United States to

the probable cause standard. It could also provide grounds for

arguing that interceptions of transnational communications from

facilities outside the United States would be subject to the same

standard.

(c) Foreign Electronic Surveillance: The bills

reviewed above are broadly written and the prohibitions are not

expressly limited to the territory of the United States. While the

reach of this legislation should be subject to the built-in limitation

that the authority of a federal court to issue warrants is confined

to its territorial limits, repeal of 18 U.S.C. 2511(3) and the

articulation of probable cause standards for foreign intelligence

gathering activities could have a grave impact on overseas

intelligence collection by bringing into play a body of exclusionary

rule case law (developed in ruling on the admissability in a

Federal criminal trial of evidence obtained overseas by electronic

surveillance). Suffice it, here, to say that this could result in

HH 55024 DooId:32989609 •Page 127

SEGNET

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## Page 128

SEGRET

subjecting overseas foreign intelligence surveillance to the proposed

probable cause standards as a test of the "reasonableness" required

by Fourth Amendment protections. Moreover, this legislation could

raise complex questions in situations where an element of the inter-

ception process falls within the jurisdiction of the federal court, e.g.,

the physical presence of the surveillance device. Even if these bills

would not directly affect authority to conduct foreign electronic

surveillance, they could ultimately weaken it by raising the

opportunity to argue that this authority rests only on three

bases--assertion of inherent Presidential intelligence-gathering

powers, congressional recognition and judicial acceptance. Repeal

of 18 U.S.C. 2511(3) may be viewed as weakening the argument that

Congress has recognized foreign intelligence gathering authority

inherent in the President and delegated to his Executive branch agents.

7. Summary:

--Proposed legislation would repeal 18 U.S.C. 2511(3) and would

impose judicial administration of a "probable cause"

standard over foreign intelli-

gence electronic surveillance. At the very least, this would restrict communications

interceptions against foreign targets within the United States to situations

involving an anticipated, demonstrable and direct threat to the national defense.

Also, this would probably subject the interception of transnational communica-

tions, from either an overseas or domestic situs, to the same judicial standards.

Finally, this would raise difficult questions concerning the ability of CIA, NSA,

and the service cryptologic agencies to conduct electronic surveillance overseas

against foreign targets without conforming to the standards of Fourth Amendment

"reasonableness" articulated in this legislation. In sum, enactment of proposed

legislation would severely restrict the collection and processing of foreign

SIGINT and would seriously impair the production of all-source intelligence.

--By repealing 18 U.S.C. 2511(3) and by introjecting the judiciary

into the field of foreign intelligence gathering, proposed legislation raises a

constitutional challenge insofar as it purports to withdraw sanction of and

place limitations on the President's inherent power to conduct foreign

surveillance. This infringement could undermine the Executive sources of

authority upon which the intelligence community depends. To be sure, the

proposed requirement of prior judicial authorization of foreign intelligence

surveillances is altogether impractical. But the fundamental constitutional

objection is that it purports to share Executive authority with judicial officers

having no expertise in or responsibility for national security or foreign

affairs.

The necessity of a foreign intelligence surveillance is simply

inappropriate for judicial resolution. It is a matter committed to the Executive

branch by the Constitution and an area for which there are no judicially

manageable standards.. An arrangement by which federal judges decide

what foreign intelligence the President may have in his conduct of foreign

5

SEGRET

55024

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SECRET

relations is incompatible with the Chief Executive's inherent foreign

intelligence gathering powers. Since this Presidential authority is

constitutional in nature and stems from a fundamental separation of

governmental powers, a Congressional attempt to require its sharing

with the judiciary would certainly lead to protracted constitutional

litigation. Moreover, Congress implicitly authorized the use of elec-

tronic surveillance in foreign intelligence activities and this legislation

would circumscribe the very functions which Congress intended the

Agency to perform.

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3 - Mr.

1. A. Mintz

(Mr. J. B. Hotis)

(Mr. P. V. Daly)

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

• June 4, 1975

1 - Mr. E. W. Larson

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES

SENATE SELECT_COMMITTEE

ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to my letter dated May 6; 1975,

enclosing a memorandum, same date, which proposed that an

TBI position paper dated July 31;

1972, be withheld from the

Senate Select Commiitee on the basis that it was considered

to be an internal deliberative document.

Reference is also made to a conversation May 28,

1975, between Deputy Assistant Attorney General K. William

O'Connor and Special Agent Paul V. Daly during which

Mr. O'Connor advised that it was the Department of Justice

decision to make the July 31, 1972, position paper available

to the Senate Select Committee. In view of this decision,

we will make this document available for review at FBI

Headquarters.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the

Conmittee is the original of a memorandum advising the Committee

Assoc. Dir. --

Dep. AD Admie.

Dep. AD Inje

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

Comp. Syst.

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com. -

Gen. Inv.-

Ident. -

Inspection.

Intell..

Laboratory -

Plan. & Eval. -

Spec. Inv. *

Training

Legal Coun.

Telephone Rm.

Ding 2661

Enclosures - 2

LIL TIMOT PATTA CONTAINLD

62-116395

MY R16

1 - The Deputy Attorney General

Attention:

K. Willian O'Connor

Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination

EWL: ekw/1hb/h'

REC-100

62-116395-277

(10)

Si 8314/15 T5A6

gra

SEE

i NOTE PAGE 2-

87, MIN 271975

Wor

RDOM

: 32989609

TELETYPE UNIT D

Page

130

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The Attorney General

NOTE:

By memorandum 5/6/75, we advised the AG that the

position paper in question was

an internal deliberative document

which was the direct basis for a formal statement on FBI

authority to conduct internal security investigations embodied

FBI, to the AG dated

the requested position

paper be made available to the ssc.

In conversation between Deputy Assistant Attorney

General O'Connor and SA Daly,

reierred to above, O'Connor

Indicated that it was the decision or the vepartment to make

this paper available to the SSC.

our position concerning the paper to the AG, it does not appear

that

there would be any purpose served disputing his decision.

However, since it is an internal deliberative document, it is

felt that the paper should be made available for review rather

than

given outright to the ssC. Also, ve are setting a

condition that no notes be taken during the initial review,

subject to negotiation of further requests by the Committee.

- 2-

₩ 55021

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Page 131:

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• 7

62-116395

3. - Mr.

1.

Mintz

Mr.

J. B. Hotis)

(Mr.

P. V. Daly)

1 - Mr.

W. R. Wannall

1 - MI.

W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. E. W. Larson

June 4, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

TO STUDY GOVERNHENTAL OPERATIONS WITHI

RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: LEGAL AUTHORITIES

"ALL INFORMATION CONTADI

URMN IS UNCLABBLI

BY L214 BA

No evened in made to lecter dator March 19, 195,

to the Attorney General from the Chairman of captioned

Conmithce, which enclosed certain requests for documents and

othor information fron the Jederal Bureau of Investigation (IBI).

Under I., Legal Authorities, a general request was

made for memoranda

discussing the legal authority of the fBI to

(1) investigate internal security matters, (2) collect intel-

ligence information, and (3) engage in counterintelligence

activities.

Material responsive to this request nas deliverod

to the Committee during April, 1975.

Since the receipt of the above-mentioned material,

the Cormittee has indicated a specific interost in a position

paper datod July 31, 1972, discussing the "Scope of FBI

Authority, Jurisdiction and Responsibility in Donestic

Intelligence Investigations."

This paper has been located and

will be available for review at IBI Headquarters by Mx. John

0I1111 and/or Ux. Mari Gitonstein of the Committee staff.

dur position is that the July st, 1972, papor is an

Internal deliberative docent the contents of which were

refined In a formal statenent on IBI authority to conduct

internal security investigations embodied in a memorandum fron

the Director, 1B1, to the attorney tenera:, dated August l, 1573.

A copy at this darter document has been nade available to tho

Assoc. Dir.

Comnittce:

Under these circumstances, ve vould request that

Dep. AD

the July 31, 1978, document be reviewed in this contest and

Dep. AD

Asst. Dir.:

that no notes be taken during this initial rovlow.

Should this

Admin.

arrangenent be unsatisfactory to the Committee, upon completion

Comp. Syst.-

of the initial review ve vill certainly considor any further

Ext. Affairs m

Files & Com.

request for the document in a paraphrase form acceptable to

Gen. Inv. -

the Committee.

Ident. -

Inspection

Intell. -

- The Attorney General

(i

Laboratory

Plan. & Eval ' EWL: ekw/1hb lhb

Spec. Iny. ta

Troining

Legal Count

Telephone R'm.

Director Sec'y D

HH

55024

MAIL ROOM LAf: "TELETYPE UNIT I

DocId: 32989609

Page 132

762-11863955

GPO 954-546

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## Page 133

-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee:

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE 6/4

• Memo

Senate Select Committee to Study

5/30/75

Caption of Document: Govt. Operations with Respect to

Intelligence Activities. Re: Legal

Authorities

Originating Office:

Delivered by:

FBI

- Date: 6/5/25-

Received by:

FAO Schwarte

Title:

Cret Counsch

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTADTELI

HEREE IS UNCLISSIFLAD

MOR-14

HW 55024

DocId: 32989609

Page 133

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•)

POSITION PAPER

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

SCOPE OF FBI AUTHORITY, JURISDICTION

AND RESPONSIBILITY IN DOMESTIC

INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS

ALL INFORNATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFDET

ĐẠT 1-420 BY SIAm

Thomas J. Smith

Chief,

Research

Section

Domestic Intelligence Division

July 31, 1972

62-116395-277

ENCLOSURE

HH 55024

1 DocId: 32989609 Page 134

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## Page 135

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Background.

Authority Derived Presidential Directives

Authority

Conveyed

Even

Before 1939 Directives.

Presidential Directives Subsequent to 1939..

Implementation of 1939 Directive. ' 'en :

Expansion of Authority Contained In 1939 Directive.

Directives Supplemented or Superseded by Statutes

Validity of the Smith

Act

Directives

Versus Legislative Enactment

Investigations Under Statutory Authority.

Preventive

Investigations

Intelligence Investigations

•.

Executive Order 10450

Statutory Authority and

President's

Constitutional Power.

Special White House Request

..•

Need for Current Executive Order.

Development of Investigative Policies

Preventive Investigations

Intelligence Investigations

and civil Liberty

..

Interpretation of Authority by Substantive Sections

Extremist Intelligence Section Views.

Nationalities Intelligence Section Views.

Internal Security Section Views •

Revolutionary Activities Section Views.

Official Recognition of Intelligence Investigation.

Former Study of FBI's

Investigative Responsibilities.

Recent Executive Intent

Conclusions

•

..

•

Recommendations .

..

HW 55024 DocId:32989609 Page 135..

2

8

20

22

23

24

26

28

28

28

30

32

34

37

37

39

40

42

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## Page 136

SCOPE OF FBI AUTHORITY,

JURISDICTION AND RESPONSIBILITY IN

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS

BACKGROUND

Over the past several months there have been

an increasing

number of public statements made fxom

various quarters questioning

or contesting

authority and jurisdiction of the FBI to conduct

domestic intelligence-type investigations, particularly where

there is

no clear-cut legislative authority apparent.

most searching inquiries was contained in a paper presented by

Professor John T.

Elliff at a two-day conference at Princeton

University in October, 1971, sponsored by the Committee for Public

Justice.

Professor Elliff addressed himself to the matter of

FBI authority derived

legislative enactments as opposed to

that derived from

Presidential directives.

He went into some

detail in connection with the Presidential directive issued by

President Roosevelt

in September, 1939, which was

subsequently

reiterated on three occasions.

Elliff

questioned whether Roosevelt

was even aware that he was

shifting FBI

authority from congressional

Presidential directive when he issued the September,

directive since he probably assumed he had granted such

authority in 1936 when he requested intelligence investigations

of fifth columnists.

Elliff accused the FBI of magnifying the

September, 1939, directive

into a definitive order.

Over a long period of time Senator Sam J. Ervin has been

probing into the nature

and extent of FBI gathering and retention

of domestic intelligence information.

In April, 1971,

Senator Ervin made a request of the Department of Justice to

furnish detailed information concerning the Department's (the FBI's)

policy and practice on investigating and reporting the political

beliefs and activities of persons not under investigation for

violating the laws.

interest was specific infor-

mation on the constitutional authority and power exercised by the

Executive Branch to conduct such investigations.

Subsequently, Senator

Ervin announced that he intended to

propose legislation to prohibit the FBI from investigating any

person without his consent, unless the Government has reason to

believe that person has

committed a crime or is about to commit

a crime.

Other Congressmen have either introduced or announced

plans to introduce legislation or resolutions calling for special

activities, particularly

in the area of domestic intelligence

operations.

HH 55024 DocId: 32989609 Page 136

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## Page 137

Based on these developments it became apparent that

an in-depth study was in order to clarify any misconceptions

which might have grown up concerning the scope of FBI intelligence

and investigative

authority, particularly where it concerns

domestic organizations and/or individuals.

A detailed and

exhaustive study has now been completed, and

the following is

the result of that study.

AUTHORITY DERIVED PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVES

In the testimony of the late Director J. Edgar Hoover

before the House Subcommittee on Appropriations on March

2, 1972,

under the subject of justifications on page 2 the statement is

made that "The FBI's responsibilities in the domestic intelligence

are authorized

directives

under legislative enactments, Presidential

and instructions of the Attorney General. They include

investigative jurisdiction over matters

relating to

espionage,

counterespionage, sabotage, treason, sedition, subversion, and

related internal security functions.

Subjects of investigation

include the activities

of the Communist Party, USA,

communist

front groups and other totalitarian organizations, including

individuals or groups who are alleged either to seek overthrow

of the Government of the United States by force or violence or to

conspire against the rights of citizens." Similar language has

appeared in Mr. Hoover's testimony in prior years.

assumed that the Presidential directives referred

to in Mr. Hoover's testimony are (1) Directive dated

September 6,

1939, and reiterated January 8, 1943, July 24, 1950, and

December 15,

1953; (2) Executive Order 10450 dated April 27,

amended but not yet implemented by Executive Order 11605

dated July 2, 1971).

It is believed that there is a misconception concerning

the extent of jurisdiction or authority which was conveyed to

the FBI by the Presidential directive dated September 6, 1939.

All of the succeeding directives appear to be hinged on

the one

issued in September, 1939.

Therefore, the language of that first

directive becomes a

very important issue. Perhaps even more

important are the circumstances leading up to the issuance of

that directive and the intent of the President at the time

it was issued.

Prior to the issuance of the September, 1939, directive

President Roosevelt issued a statement or confidential

directive

to the heads of the

various Government Departments

on June 26,

1939, which stated,

"It is my desire that the investigation of

espionage, counterespionage, and sabotage matters be controlled

and handled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the

Department of Justice, the Military Intelligence Division of

War Departmont, and the Office of Naval Intelligence of the

Navy Department. The Directors of these three

agencies

function

as a committee to coordinate their activities."

- 2 -

NH 55024 DocId: 32989609 Page 137

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## Page 138

"No investigations should be conducted by any investi

gative agency of the Government into matters involving actually

or potentially any espionage, counterespionage, or sabotage,

except by the three agencies mentioned

above."

"I

shall be glad if you will instruct the heads of all

other investigative agencies than the three named, to refer

immediately to the nearest office of the Federal Bureau of

Investigation

any data, information or material that may come to

their notice bearing directly or indirectly on espionage,

counterespionage, or sabotage."

It is to be noted that in this statement or directive

the language, with the

deals with

The September, 1939, directive stated, "The Attorney

General has been requested by

me to instruct the Federal Bureau

of Investigation

of the Department of Justice to take charge of

investigative work in matters relating to espionage, sabotage,

and violations

of the neutrality regulations.

"This task must be conducted in a comprehensive and

effective manner on

a national basis, and all information must be

carefully sifted

out

and correlated

in order to avoid confusion

and irresponsiblity.

"To this end I request all police officers, sheriffs,

and all other law enforcement officers in the United States

promptly to turn over to the nearest representative of the

Federal

Bureau of Investigation

any information obtained by them relating

to espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, subversive activities

and violations of the neutrality laws."

In this document it is particularly important to note

that the language says the FBI is

to "take charge of investiga-

tions"

and not "assume jurisdiction" or "have authority to

investigate" matters relating to espionage, sabotage, and

violations of the neutrality regulations.

The statutory authority

to investigate the enumerated crimes was

already present, but

directive fixed responsibility for the FBI

to conduct the

investigations.

In other words, this directive conveyed no

authority not already possessed

by the FBI by legislative enactment

but merely established that no

other investigative agency should

handle the matters.

- 3 -

HH 55024 DocId:32989609 Page 138

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## Page 139

Ine last paragraph of this particular directive, which

was actually a request

of all local law enforcement agencies,

used the words "counterespionage" and "subversive activities."

However, the context of the statement appears

to merely be

designed to broadly define activities which might touch

on the

national security so that all such matters, irrespective of the

legal definition or name, would be turned over to the FBI.

A logical

conclusion, based purely on examination of

the language used in the september, 1939, directive, 1s that

the directive merely put everyone on notice that the FBI had the

responsibility to investigate the statutory crimes named; that

it provided no so-called "constitutional" or "executive

authority" for the FBI to investigate matters not covered

Legislative enactment. This is not to say that the President

constitutional authority (he has), but only that it

was not exercised here.

As a matter of particular interest, Professor Elliff,

in questioning whether President Roosevelt was aware that he

was shifting FBI authority from Congressional enactment to

Presidential directive since he assumed that he had granted such

authority in 1936, was at least half correct.

While no shift

of authority appears to have occurred as a result of the 1939

dircctive,

we have historical evidence to show that the President

instructed the FBI

to conduct subversive intelligence-type

investigations of radicals in 1935.

In this regard, there appears

to be little doubt that Roosevelt conveyed some degree of

Executive authority to the FBI.

AUTHORITY CONVEYED EVEN BEFORE 1939 DIRECTIVES

Confidential

memoranda written by Mr. Hoover

in August

and September, 1936,

clearly reveal that President Roosevelt was

very concerned about the subversive activities of fascists and

communists in the United States

and discussed the matter with

Mr. Hoover during personal meetings.

memoranda indicate

that President Roosevelt was obviously cognizant of the lack of

statutory

authority to conduct intelligence-type investigations

of fascism

and communism.

Yet, the President desired the FBI to

conduct such

investigations.

Mr. Hoover pointed out that the

FBI appropriation contained

a provision for the FBI to conduct

investigations if such

matters were referred to it by the

Department of State.

The Presideni was hesitant of having a

formal request come

through State Department, however, because

of the many leaks in

State Department.

- 4-

HH 55021 DocId:32989609 Page 132

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## Page 140

However,

during a meeting between the President,

Mr. Hoover and the Secretary of State on August 25, 1936,

the

Secretary of State

did ask the FBI to conduct investigations of

"Fascist and Communist activities, under the provisions of the

Appropriations Act.

In the discussion preceding the request,

however, it must be noted that the president stressed the fact that

and communism were international in scope, and that

communism in particular was directed from Moscow; that this was a

which fell within the

scope of foreign affairs over which

the State Department would have a right to request an inquiry to

be made.

According to the information presently available,

President Roosevelt agreed to place a handwritten memorandum of

his own in the White House safe, concerning the request of the

State Department for investigations of fascism

communism.

President asked Mr. Hoover to speak to the Attorney General

The

about

the matter and that the Secretary of State also discuss the

technique to be followed with the Attorney General.

Mr. Hoover

recorded that he did inform the Attorney General on September 10,

1936, of a conference he had with the President on September 1, 1936,

at which time the Secretary of State was

present,

and at which

time

the Secretary of State - at the President' suggestion - requested

of Mr. Hoover to have investigations made of the subversive

activities in this country: including communism and fascism.

The Attorney General verbally directed Mr. Hoover to proceed

with

the investigations and to coordinate these matters in the

possession of the Military Intelligence Division, the Naval

Intelligence Division, and the State Department.

considered this the authority upon which to proceed.

The circumstances

surrounding the manner in which the

President had the State Department request investigation very

likely explains why the September, 1939, directive did not

contain

any language relating to subversive activities.

President Roosevelt

was fully aware that the FBI was

already conducting confidential

investigations of the activities of fascists and communists who

represetned a threat to the national security at that time.

was obviously a private and understandable confidential agreement

between all interested parties, including the other Federal

investigative agencies who had an

interest.

There was no need

to mention subversive activities in the

first part of the directive

since the pertinent Federal agencies were already on notice and

local agencies would turn over all matters relating to the

national security.

~ 5 -

55024 D0010:32989609 Page 140

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## Page 141

Based on the foregoing, reliance on the September, 1939,

directive or even the carlier

confidential arrangement worked

out by the President, whether considered a Presidential directive,

Presidential mandate, or some other manifestation of Executive

power, for current investigative authority appears to.

Placing the 1939

directive and the earlier arrangement inunwise.

proper perspective is very important.

Both were laid in a period

when the world was on the brink of World War II.

The concern for

national security was

related to two international movements. There

were no laws, such as

the Smith Act of 1940 or the Internal

Security Act of 1950.

Although there were undoubtedly some purely

American

groups which received no direction or control from abroad,

there was no national

cosiurn for indigenous anarchists or other

groups desiring to overthrow the Government.

PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVES SUBSEQUENT TO 1939

As mentioned previously, the directive dated

September 6, 1939, was reiterated subsequently by directives

dated January 8, 1943; July 24, 1950; and December 15, 1953.

The directive dated January, 1943, signed by President Roosevelt,

was broadened only to the extent that it called on all patriotic

organizations and individuals as well as local law enforcement

officers to report information to the FBI. The

July, 1950,

directive, signed by President Truman, contained

the phrase

"subversive activities and related matters," which on the

surface would indicate that President Truman intended to broaden

the scope..of authority it might convey to the FBI.

However,

closer examination reveals that the Truman. directive

actually

misquoted the earlier two directives of President Roosevelt and

included the phrase

"subversive

activities and related

which did not appear in the Roosevelt directives.

Since no information is available concerning Executive

intent behind the issuance of the 1950 directive, it

determined whether President Truman was aware of the possible

additional authority he might have conveyed to the FBi

result of changing the language of the two prior directives to

include the phrase "subversive activities and related matters."

The fact of the matter is, the United States was at the

engaged in the "police action" in Korea and there was

unquestionably a great deal of

domestic subversive activity

at the time, most of which could be traced to the Communist Party.

We do know that President Truman

signed the 1950 directive

on the advice of the National Security Council.

There is one document available which tends to reveal

the concern President Truman had

relative to increased subversive

activity involving domestic cases.

In

a letter dated July 17,

1946, the Attorney General said he felt that in the troubled

period in international affairs, accompanied by an increase in

- 6 c

HH 55024 DocId:32989609 Page 141

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## Page 142

subversive activity at home, it was imperative to use special

investigative measures (wire taps) in domestic cases.

Mr. Truman

concurred with the Attorney General and authorized the special

investigative measures.

There is one important point, however, which bears on

any feelings President Truman might have had on

the issue of

domestic subversive activity. When the Congress passed the

Internal Security Act of 1950, consisting of two subchapters,

Truman vetoed the bill, citing as a reason that Title 11 of

the Bill - The Emergency Detention Act - constituted a threat

to the democratic process.

In "The American Constitution

Its Origins and Development" by Alfred H. Kelly and Winfred A.

Harison,

the authors declared that President Truman roundly

condemned the Internal Security Act as grossly unconstitutional.

They said that his veto message called the registration provisions

of the law

greatest danger to

freedom of press, speech

assembly since

the Sedition Act of 1798."

A drastic new sedition

statute, derived from the earlier Mundt-Nixon bill which was

up in

the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1948, was

incorporated in the Internal Security Act.

Mr. Truman thought

the phrase prohibiting a person to "substantially contribute"

to the establishment of a totalitarian dictatorship so vague as

to cast grave doubts upon whether it met the standards of

accuracy

necessary for due process in criminal statutes.

not even touch on the emergency detention subchapter

The political climate at

the time, however, in spite of

President Truman's

censure and veto, was

such that the Internal

Security Act was passed

over the veto and became law.

While the

1950 directive of President Truman incorrectly

stated "On September 6, 1939, and January 8, 1943,

a Presidential

Directive was issued providing that the

Federal Bureau of

Investigation of the Department of Justice should take charge

o1 Investigative work in matters relating to espionage, sabotage,

subversive activities and related matters.," the directive issued

by President Eisenhower on December 15, 1953, said nothing about

the FBI being responsible for such matters.

Rather, the 1953

dIrective began by stating, "On September 6, 1939,

January 8,

1943, and July 24, 1950, Presidential Directives were issued

requesting all enforcement officers, both Federal and State,

to report promptly all information relating to espionage, sabotage,

subversive

activities,

and related matters

representative of the

Federal Bureau of Investigation. "

This language can, of course, be interpreted to mean

that the FBI is responsible

for investigating these matters

otherwise the directive would not have noted that enforcement

officers were requested to furnish all information to the FBI.

- 7-

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The 1953 directive actually did not reiterate either

of the

three previous

directives except for the language quoted above.

Instead, it cited the FBI's responsibility to investigate all

violations of the Atomic Energy Act and requested all patriotic

organizations and individuals as

well as all enforcement officers

to report violations of the Atomic Energy Act to the nearest

representative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

IMPLEMENTATION OF 1939 DIRECTIVE

All of the foregoing

documents have obviously been

subject to various interpretations.

However the language might

be interpreted, the September, 1939, directive, was implemented by

the FBI and Congress was made fully aware of the extent of

investigative activity the FBI was conducting as a result of the

directive. In Mr. Hoover's testimony on November 30, 1939, in

connection with an

emergency supplemental appropriations bill,

he said,

"In September, 1939, we found it necessary to organize

a General Intelligence Division in Washington.

The establishment

of: this division was made necessary by the President's proclama-

tion directing that all complaints of violations of the national

defense statutes and proclamations be reported to the Federal

Bureau of Investigation.

This division now has compiled extensive

indices of individuals,

groups, and organizations engaged in

subversive activities, in espionage activities, or any activities

that are possibly detrimental to the internal

security of the

United States.

"The indexes have been arranged not only alphabetically

but also geographically, so that at any time, should we enter

into the conflict abroad, we would be able to go into any of

these communities and identify individuals and groups who might

be a source of

grave danger to the security of the country."

During the same testimony Mr. Hoover was asked if any

of the funds being requested in the emergency supplemental

appropriation would be spent for any of the purposes for which

funds were denied at the previous session.

Mr. Hoover replied

they would not; that the entire sum would

be spent for intelli-

gence work.

Subsequently, in June, 1940, Mr. Hoover again testified

before a House Subcommittee on Appropriations.

time he

referred to his appearance before the committee the previous

wherein he testified that authority had been requested to set up

a separate division with the

FBI to handle national defense

matters under an

assistant director. Mr Hoover offered a chart

showing the organizational structure of five divisions of the

Bureau, one of which he referred

to as the National Defense

Division.

He said that this Division would handle and direct all

investigations dealing with espionage, sabotage, national defense

matters, and violations of neutrality

statutues.

-8 -

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## Page 144

Mr.. Hoovex testified that in line with the President's

order of the

previous september (september 6, 195g) there nac

been close coordination

ot all the intelligence services. He

pointed out that the President, on September 6, directed the FBI

to coordinate the functions on

national defense

matters in

intelligence work.

Mr. Hoover also related that he wanted to

refer to

general intelligence index which

mentioned in

previous hearings.

He said that that index included the names

of persons who might become potential enemies to our national

security,

espionage agents, known sabotuers,

members of the Communist Party,

and the bund.

explained that this index had been compiled very carefully, and

confined

solely to persons engaged in activities detrimental

to the United States.

Later,

on February 19, 1941, when Mr. Hoover appeared

before Congress in connection with a deficiency appropriations

bill for 1941, he went into some

detail concerning the activities

of the FBI prior to the then national emergency.

In response to

a question concerning this, Mr. Hoover replied that prior

emergency our activities

covered

genexally the investigation of

all Federal statutes except counterfeiting, narcotics. income

tax, and postal violations.

jurisdiction, he said, included

kidnaping, extortion, bank robbery, white slavery, motor vehicle

theft, impersonation of Government officers, frauds against the

Government, antitrust investigations, etc.

Mr. Hoover then incorporated into the record a list of

major crime laws passed between 1934 and 1941, showing the

legislative jurisdiction of the FBI during the period.

exception of nine of these laws, all dealt with

violations of law.

The exceptions included a prohibition on

exportation of arms

and ammunition to Spain during the civil

war; the prohibition of making photographs, sketches or maps of

vital military and naval defense installations; the Hatch Act,

which among other things related to employment of individuals by

the Government who were members of political parties advocating

the overthrow of the Government; amendment of the act requiring

registration of agents of foreign principals; the Neutrality Act

of 1939;

amendment of the Espionage Act; the Smith Act of 1940;

act requiring registration of certain organizations (Voorhis Act);

amendment to the Sabotage Act.. There was a special note

listed under the amendment of the act requiring registration of

agents of foreign principals.

This called attention to the Presidential

dixective dated September 6, 1939. From this structure inference

can be drawn that the directive was related to this amendment.

- 9 -

HH 55024 DocId:32989609 Page 144

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## Page 145

EXPANSION OF AUTHORITY CONTAINED IN 1939 DIRECTIVE

Further in his testimony Mr. Hoover was asked if any other

agencies of the Government were covering the same work that

emergency employees of the FBI were covering.

He replied that

he would like to leave the committee a publication listing the

statutes, proclamations

and Executive Orders pertaining to

national defense matters.

He then stated that the President in

1939 directed that all invest ations dealing with espionage,

sabotage, subversive activit

and national defense

activities,

would be handled by the FBI "..ept those arising within the

Army or Navy.

He went on to say that other governmental agencies

were instructed under this Executive order to report to the FBI

any information showing any violation dealing with national

defense matters.

No Executive Order could be located which contains

language used by Mr. Hoover in this instance.

He might hav. the

been referring to either the directive or statement made by

President Roosevelt in June, 1939, or the directive dated

is

September 6, 1939. However,, the above-quoted language is much

much

broader than used in either of these documents.

In considering the

full impact of the June and September,

1939, Presidential directives,

and how they subsequently influenced

jurisdiction and responsibility, it must be borne in mind

the Nation was at the very brink of World War II.

President

Roosevelt issued

a proclamation on September 8, 1939,

declaring

that state of national emergency existed in connection with the

observance, safeguarding, and enforcement of neutrality, and

strengthening of the national defense within the limits

of peace-

time authorizations.

An Executive Order (No.8233) dated September 5,

1939, prescribed regulations

governing the enforcement of the

neutrality of the United States.

The War Department, Navy Department,

Treasury and Commerce Departments, and the Governor of the Panama

Canal were

assigned certain enforcement duties.

The Justice

Department (FBI) was given responsibility of enforcement of the

neutrality of the United States not especially designated to other

departments, independent offices and establishments of the

United States Government, and prosecution of violations of the

neutrality of the U.S.

Unquestionably in time of national emergency the broadest

possible interpretation was being applied to every statute, resolu-

proclamation, Executive order, Presidential directive or other

lawful order or mandate in the interest of the preservation of peace,

the national

defense and

general welfare of the

country. Undoubtedly

there are many other documents recording Executive intention,

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Executive instructions concerning broad, sweeping authority for the

FBI, which cannot now be found for one reason or another. Certainly

there is indication that

at least President Roosevelt had more than

one conversation with Mr. Hoover concerning the necessity for the

-FBI to conduct investigations beyond the statutory authority it

normally used.

DIRECTIVES SUPPLEMENTED OR SUPERSEDED BY STATUTES

Eventually, however, there were legislative enactments

which broadened the scope of

our statutory authority, increased

our legal jurisdiction and added to our investigative

responsi-

bility.

Following the September, 1939, directive, which has

been used as a source of FBI authority to conduct certain types

of domestic intelligence investigations, the Smith Act of 1940

Several successful prosecutions resulted

from

the

Smith Act,

although

some parts of it were invalidated

by the

Supreme Court.

The revised statute (Title 18, U.S.C. 2385) remains

on the books

and is enforceable.

Legal Counsel's Office

analyzed Title 18, USC 2385,

in June, 1972. It was noted that this statute contains the

substance of the original Smith Act.

The House of Representatives

committee on Judiciary, Report No. 1869, 74th Congress,

First Session, made clear the purpose of the original

legislation:

reported bill is based on the natural right of

self-preservation inherent in every government. It simply

authorizes

exercise of the power of the government to defend

itself against those who

seek by force and violence

to destroy

clarification of the legislative objective was

made by Representative John W. McCormack, who said,

"And by

the way, this bill is not alone aimed at

communists; this bill

is

aimed

anyone who

advocates the overthrow of government

by violence and force."

VALIDITY OF THE SMITH ACT

The Supreme Court held in 1951 that teaching the

doctrine of forcible overthrow of the United States Government

was a violation of the Smith Act where there was a clear

and

present danger that a substantial public evil would result.

•The Court further held

that the Act did not violate the First

Amendment.

Chief Justice Vinson, who wrote the majority opinion,

used language which must be considered at this time to be

significant in deciding whether the Government may in

fact conduct preventive-type investigations in the interest

dion ..

of self preservation.

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Justice Vinson wrote, "The rule we deduce from

these

cases

(a series of earlier Supreme Court decisions - namely the

question in every case is whether words used are used in such

circunstances and

are of such nature as to create a clear

present danger that they

will bring about the substantive

evils that Congress has

a right to prevent.') is that where

is specified by a statute in nonspeech or nonpress

conviction

relying upon speech

or press

as evidence

of violation may be

sustained only when the speech or publication

created a 'clear and present danger' of attempting or accom-

plishing the prohibited crime."

In this case, applying this rule, the court said,

"Obviously, these words cannot mean that before the Government

may act, it must wait until the putsch is about to be executed,

the plans have been laid,

and the signal is awaited--we must,

therefore,

reject the contention that

success or probability

of success

is the criterion."

In addition to the Smith Act of 1940, Congress also

passed legislation which

further increased

authority of

the FBI to

deal with subversive activities. The oorhis Act

(superseded in 1948 along with original Smith Act) which is

Title 18,. USC 2386, provided for registration of organizations

subject to

foreign control which

engage in political activity

among other things. The Internal Security Act of 1950 was

passed over the veto of President Truman and provided not only

a prohibition of conspiracies or attempts to establish a

totalitarian dictatorship and a long list of measures having

with Communist organizations

(Control of Subversive

Activities) but also for the emergency detention of suspected

security risks.

Further, in 1954, Congress enacted the Communist

Control Act to

provide additional investigative authority in

dealing with the communist threat to national security:

DIRECTIVES VERSUS LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENT

These legislative enactments were unquestionably

designed to give the FBI a cloak of statutory authority to

investigate not only the communists, which were a grave concern

to President Roosevelt when he requested investigations of

communism by the FBI in 1936, but

also any other group which

activity aimed at

overthrow of the Government by

force or violence.

And, whereas President Roosevelt relied

on the element of

foreign relations

and the international

character of the fascist and

communist movements to have

State Deparment make a request for FBI investigation, the

statutes referred to above do not require a dependence on

foreign elements, notwithstanding the

congressional finding

of necessity in connection with the Internal Security Act of

1950 and the Communist Control Act of 1954.

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The question to be resolved, then, is divided into

several interrelated parts. First, if the Presidential

directives described heretofore are actually valid. Secondly,

assuming that the directives are

completely valid, why have

they been cited as one of the bases of FBI investigative

authority? Thirdly, if, as it appears from the foregoing, the

directives are valid, but do not

convey the investigative

authority we have heretofore contended, what effect will this

have on our past and future domestic intelligence investigative

activity?

Insofar as the validity of the Presidential directives

is concerned, there can be no question but that each directive

was issued completely in accord with the President's executive

The evidence shows that the first directive in September, :

1939, was not only implemented with the knowledge of Congress,

but by appropriating money to the FBI for its implementation

Congress in effect gave the directive the full force of law.

None of the directives from September, 1939, to the one issued

by President Eisenhower

in 1953 have been secret.

of fact, all were directed to the public at large,

support of local law enforcement officials and patriotic

organizations.

Numerous times the directives have

been cited

in FBI appropriations testimony.

The second part of the question becomes more difficult

to answer.

Over the years, whenever it has been necessary and

proper to

describe our investigative authority, and this has

been a requirement in justifying our annual budget, we have used

what we have considered all of the different bases

for such

authority.

Although it now seems obvious that the September,

1939, and July, 1943, directives did not actually order the FBI

charge of any investigations not actually covered by

statute, i.e.,

espionage, sabotage, and neutrality laws, it did

enforcement

officers

to turn over to the nearest

representative of the FBI all information relating to subversive

activities and

counterespionage as well as the three statutoxy

crimes listed.

It is apparent that the language here was intended

as a catch-all so that law enforcement officers would turn over

information of any sort whatsoever if it might affect the

national security.

In analyzing the language used in that first directive

of September, 1939, everything must be put into its proper

perspective.

In 1939 the Nation had been conditioned to a state

of near-war. From. January 30, 1933, when Adolf Hitler became

of Germany, through the nonagression pact between

Germany and the Soviet Union in August, 1939, the specter of war

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over America.

Anti-German, anti-Italian

and anti-soviet

sentiment swept over the country. People began to look for spies

under their beds.

It became very necessary to direct the

Nation's

energies in that regard into a single channel:

We could

not have every police officer, sheriff and special deputy sheriff

in the country running around

investigating spies. By the same

token, it was very necessary for the Government's

resources to be

directed towards identification

and neutralization of very real

espionage rings and potential saboteurs.

The June, 1939, directive

assured that the FBI would take charge of domestic internal

security instead of several

agencies

working at cross purposes.

The September, 1939, directive placed local

law enforcement.on

notice and simultaneously provided for information of possible

value to be funneled to the FBI which was responsible for the

coordination and investigation.

The September,

1939, directive, although not conveying

any investigative authority to the FBI, did result in an

additional workload for the FBI by virtue of the fact that local

police and other Federal

agencies were referring matters to the

FBI for investigative attention which were not previously called

to our attention.

While some of the matters could be logically

fit into one of

the statutory crimes of espionage, sabotage or

neutrality regulations, others could not be since

the original

information was often nonspecific or so nebulous that it could

be categorized only after some

inquixy was made locally.

We were also faced with the reality of war and the

fact that Germany, Italy, Japan

and the Soviet Union had espionage

apparatuses

directed against the United States. While we might

not ordinarily institute an investigation before the commission

of a crime,

the case of a bank robbery, motor vehicle

theft, etc., the crimes of espionage and sabotage relate to the

national security.

It would have not only been folly, it would

have been insane

to wait until we had evidence of the commission

of crimes of espionage or sabotage.

Rather than wait until

a complaint alleging the commission of one of these crimes

we went out and conducted intelligence-type investigations to

determine if there were espionage rings operating or if

were persons conspiring to sabotage the national

defense.

So the

September, 1939, directive did affect our investigative operations.

Not by giving us some new investigative authority, but by assigning

us the responsibility of coordinating all investigative activity

in this regard. We were, of course,

already in the intelligence-

gathering business as a result of the confidential arrangement

agreed upon in August and September, 1936, among

President Roosevelt, Director Hoover, and the Secretary of State.

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For these reasons, it can be seen why the FBI used the

September, 1939, directive as

one of the bases

for its investi-

gative authority. The unfortunate thing is that the 1939 directive

was never really updated, in spite of the

reiterations of 1943,

1950, and 1953.

It was

really never broadened to incorporate the

Executive request made in 1936, and to reflect the Executive

intent that became so obvious in the succeeding years up to this

very time.

It would be very difficult to convince

someone

examining

our legal

authority for conducting intelligence-type

investigations that we derive any authority, particularly any

reiterating it.

What we have, it appears, is

perpetuation of a concept of authority (or better, responsibility)

which had some basis in

19.39, and perhaps even through the

Korean War years, but which has long since ceased to have any

bearing on FBI investigative operations.

leads us to the third part of the question and

that is what effect the lack of authority derived from the

directives will have on past and

future domestic intelligence

investigations.

Although there is division of opinion by some

supervisors and officials in the Domestic Intelligence

Division as

to how much investigative activity has in the past and will in

the future depend on the nebulous authority of the directives

in question, examination of all the evidence leads to the

conclusion that in the past our investigations have to some

degree depended, not on

the language of

any of the directives,

but rathers

the Executive request of President Roosevelt in

1936 andon basic authority derived from the many statutes.

relating to the national security, both before and after the

issuance of all the directives in question.

INVESTIGATIONS UNDER STATUTORY AUTHORITY

Argument

has been advanced by some in the Domestic

Intelligence Division that it will be impossible to carry out

our internal security responsibilities of conducting purely

intelligence-type investigations using statutory authority only;

that the only way we have been able to

do this in the past was

from the authority contained in one or more of the directives

in question.

If this were true, i.e, that we have conducted

some investigative activity solely

the basis of the directives,

the FBI would be in for a rough time if the efforts on the part

of several congressional figures to look into our operations

ever come to pass.

The fact of the matter is, we have had

ample authority to do just what we have done without the

directives. Administratively perhaps, we

could have been more

precise in advertising

our investigative jurisdiction and

authority. And unquestionably, we could have been more careful

in writing reports

and other

records of our investigative activity

to show that our investigations were predicated on information

indicating violation or possible violation of statutes.

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This brings

up another point mentioned by

• Professor Elliff in his study.

Elliff related that

had a policy from Mr. Hoover's appointment as Director

until 1936 of "closed end" investigations, but that this policy

gave way to intelligence coverage involving continuing investiga-

rive activity within a broad range of delegated authority. By

"closed end" investigations, Elliff means that a crime was

committed, a prosecutive opinion was received, an investigation

was conducted, a prosecutive opinion was sought and the case

was either prosecuted

or closed for want of prosecution.

the other hand, an intelligence-type investigation would involve

continuing investigation without any thought of closing the

case by virtue of prosecution or inability to prosecute.

a case involving a purely criminal act, it can be seen that

a "closed end" investigation is possible. But in the fast-moving

world of today, with its organized crime problem tied into space-

age concepts even in purely. criminal cases,

the "closed end"

investigation is often far from a reality.

PREVENTIVE INVESTIGATIONS

In analyzing. the concept of "closed

end" investigations

versus continuing intelligence-type investigations, several

factors must be considered, especially where the national security

is involved.

Ordinary criminal acts such as the bank robbery,

burglary, fraud, etc.,

can in no way be compared to crimes

involving the national security.

Usually we would have no

occasion to conduct investigation prior to the commission of any

of the above-named crimes.

But, a crime against national security

entirely different matter.

No one but a fool or one

dedicated to the destruction of democracy would advocate that the

Government take no action to prevent a crime which could destroy

the Government. In other words, it would be an unusual case to

conduct a "closed end" investigation of an attempt to overthrow

the Government by force

and violence.

It would appear that the

FBI would have a constitutional obligation to conduct the

necessary preventive investigation (intelligence?) to insure that

an attempt to overthrow the Government does not occur.

Taking into consideration that any court in the land

would take judicial notice that the Soviet Union and its satellites

are engaged in espionage directed against the United States and

that it employs intelligence-gathering techniques against us, it

logically follows that the same courts would take judicial notice

that the United States Government would have to employ counter-

espionage and counterintelligence methods to combat this threat.

It is believed that the same can be said for other situations where

are such to lead any prudent and cautious individual to

believe that a threat exists to commit sabotage; to incite to

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insurrection or rebellion; to engage in seditious conspiracy; or

to plot the overthrow

of the Government.

Under such circumstances

it would seem that the FBI not only has

the duty to conduct

investigations to prevent the crimes, but has the obligation to

do whatever is necessary within the

to neutralize such

threats.

It is true that this type of investigation might be

contrary to the

established concept of investigating only after

there is evidence of crime.

It is also true that such investi-

gations might take place over

a long period of time without any

indication or prospect of presecution.

However, as pointed out

by legal Counsel in his memorandum dated 7/14/72 on Wiretapping,

that "Running through the whole (decision) is a golden thread

of philosophy that when the functions essential to the preservation

of a nation itself are at stake, the nation has the power to take

the action reasonably necessary

to protect itself."

While this

comment had to do with

a particular court decision not related

to the national secuirty, it is very apropos.

unrealistic to contend that the FBI could only investigate

or potential crimes affecting the national security

the crime has been committed. How ludicrous this would be.

Right on point in this regard is another part of the

majority opinion upholding the Smith Act

convictions in 1951.

Chief Justice Vinson wrote, "Likewise we are in accord with...

the trial court's finding that the requisite danger existed. The

mere fact that from the period of 1945 to 1948 petitioners'

activities did not result in the attempt to overthrow the

Government by force

and violence is, of course, no answer to the

fact that there was a

group that was ready to make the attempt.

The formation by petitioners of such a highly organized

with rigidly disciplined members

conspiracy,

subject to call

when the leaders,

these petitioners, felt the time had come for action, coupled with

the inflammable nature of the world conditions, similar uprisings in

other countries, and the touch-and-go nature of our relations

countries with whom

the petitioners were in the very least

Ideologically attuned, convince us that their convictions were

justified on this score.

"And this

analysis disposes of the contention that a

conspiracy to advocate, as distinguished from advocacy itself,

cannot be constitutionally restrained, because it comprises only

the preparation. It is the existence of the conspiracy which

creates the danger. (Emphasis mine) If the ingredients of the

reaction are present,

we cannot bind the Government to wait until

the catalyst is added."

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Some might say, "this is all very well and good where

prosecutive action is used or intended, but what of the cases

where the only purpose of the investigation is to produce

intelligence information, with no hope or intent of prosecutive

There are unquestionably situations where prosecution

would be impossible, but it is doubtful if any situation could be

conjured up involving the national security where the elements of

one or more

statutes would be present to lend statutory authority?

to an investigation or reason for investigation.

INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS

Recently, in connection with

a lawsuit filed by the

Fifth Avenue Peace Parade Committee because of investigation

by the FBI relative to

a huge demonstration in Washington, D.C.,

the Department of Justice cited Title 28, USC 533, as the

authority of the FBI

conduct the investigations in question.

The investigation at issue had to do with

contacting various

transportation facilities in an effort to determine the nature

and size of

groups traveling to Washington for the demonstration.

In a sense, this

was purely intelligence-type

investigation.

statute cited was nothing more than the statute enabling the

Attorney General to direct the FBI io conduct investigations.

This same statute has been cited

for other types of

investigations where the Department of Justice has requested the

conduct investigations

where we might not have

clearly

seen or understood the underlying authority or reason. It can be

seen, however,

that under the statutory authority granted to the

President in Title 10, USC 331-333, to call up troops io assist

governments to put down

insurrection or restore order,

the Attorney General would be within his statutory authority as

the President's Chief Legal Advisor to ask the FBI to provide all

possible information which might assist the President in making a

determination under Title 10. Thus, the FBI would conduct an

intelligence-type investigation under the statutory and constitu-

tional authority

flowing from the President, through the

Attorney General to the FBI.

In this case we might not immedi-

ately see the potential for prosecutive action, although with the

statutes covering antiriot and

civil disorder we would no doubt

be alert for indications that riots

or disorders would occur

and that evidence could be collected which would support prosecur

Here, we would be conducting investigation before a

violation takes place, not only for the intelligence data needed

by the President, but to determine if a Federal violation of law

might also occur.

EXECUTIVE ORDER 10450

What other

authority is also available to the FBI?

sometimes lump Presidential directives and

Executive orders into

one category as if they were the

same. This is a common practice,

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even on the Executive level.

The Executive orders are numbered,

whereas the directives usually are not.

From information

available it appears that Presidential directives and Executive

orders carry equal weight. They take on the force

of law if

acknowledged by resolution of Congress and are published in the

Register.

All this leads up to a very significant

document which over the years has provided substantial investi-

gative authority to the FBI.

It is commonly known

as Executive

Order 10450, although it has been revised and will be known

Executive Order 11605 if it is ever implemented.

Executive

Order 10450 is captioned as

"Security Requirements for Government

Employment" and, as the name implies, is related to employment

by the Government of individuals who might constitute a national

security risk.

This Executive order grew out of Executive

Order 9835, dated March

21, 1947, which provided for an

investigative procedure affecting persons entering competitive

civil service.

The order established a Loyalty Review Board

and procedures for handling of cases where loyalty of an

employee was questioned.

Executive Order 9835

followed the

establishment of the President's temporary commission on loyalty

under Executive Order 9086, dated November 25, 1946. Executive

Order 10450, dated April 27, 1953, superseded

Executive Order 9835.

The important

thing about these two Executive orders is

that the Attorney General was

required to furnish the Loyalty

Review Board current information concerning the subversive nature

of foreign or domestic organizations, including totalitarian

Thus, the FBI, acting under

lawful authority of the

Attorney General, was bound to conduct the necessary investiga-

to fulfill his responsibility

to the Loyalty Review

Executive Oxder 10450, in revoking

Executive Order 9835, also disbanded the Loyalty Review Board

and provided that the Attorney General would furnish the same

information regarding

subversive organizations to the head of

each department and

Attorney General was also

requested to render to the heads

of departments and agencies

advice as may be requisite to enable them to establish

and

maintain an appropriate employee-security program.

Under Executive Orders

9835 and 10450. the

Attorney General had the responsibility to designate

organizations as totalitarian, fascist, communist or subversive,

or as

having

adopted apolicy. of advocating or

approving the

commission of acts of force or violence to deny others their

rights under the Constitution of the United States, or as seeking

to alter the form of government of the United States by uncon-

soverene or the bit toe statos bi

stitutional means. Under provisions of Executive Order 11605,

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dated July 2, 1971, the Attorney General still has the responsi-

bility of furnishing names of organizations, to the heads of

departments and agencies. However, instead of the organizations

being designated by the

Attorney General,

the new Executive

Order provides

that the Subversive Activities Control Board

shall, upon petition of the Attorney General, conduct hearings

to make the same

determination formerly made

by the

Attorney General.

The new Executive Order also sets up a much

broader criteria for establishing the subversive nature of

organizations.

Unfortunately, the Subversive Activities Control

Board, which

was initially established under the Internal Security

Act of 1950, is under attack from Congress.

Congress refused

to provide

any funds for the Subversive Activities Control Boaxd

after July 1, 1972. There has been indication that Congress may

also take steps to repeal the remnants of the Internal Security

Act of 1950.

Should this happen, we would lose a broad base of

current authority for conducting many of our security-type

investigations.

Executive Order 11605 has not actually been

implemented; therefore, we are bound to the provisions of

Executive Order 10450.

Basically, however, the responsibility

under 10450 (or even 11605 if it is ever implemented) falls on

the Attorney General,

and for this reason the Department of Justice

should now provide guidance as to what investigations are required

by the FBI to fulfill the Attorney General's obligations under

the existing Exeuctive order.

STATUTORY AUTHORITY AND PRESIDENT'S CONSTITUTIONAL POWER

What other investigative authority or jurisdiction do

we have? Attached to this study is a collection of statutes

documents which

grant investigative authority for conducting the

various types of investigations falling with the primary super-

vision of the Domestic Intelligence Division.

Included in this

collection of laws are statutes such as civil rights statutes,

are the basic responsibility of the General Investigative

Division, but which nevertheless convey statutory authority in

investigating totalitarian organizations

as the Ku Klux Klan

and other hate-type

groups. Civil rights statutes might also

likely be involved in other situations where

organized groups

act in such a manner as to deny other persons their constitutional

rights.

The fraud statutes are included since many groups

engage

in

activities which are covered in one way or another

by such statutes.

There are, of course, the basic statutes such

as

espionage, sabotage, treason and foreign agents registration

act.

and others which cover an extremely broad spectrum of subversive

activity.

But isn't there some additional authority under the

constitutional power of the President to protect the national

security?

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It was under just

such constitutional powers that

President Roosevelt requested the FBI to investigate the fascist

and communist movement. And, of course, it was under just such

constitutional powers

that the president authorized the

Attorney General to approve without a warrant electronic

veillances on both domestic and foreign organizations engaged

in activity detrimental

to the national security.

However, the

Supreme Court has considerably narrowed the President's

consti-

tutional authority as a result of the Keith case.

In essence,

the court stated that insofar as domestic organizations are

concerned, the President does not have the power

to abrogate

the First

and Fourth Amendments.

In other words, the President

cannot order an act (investigation) which would interfere with

abridge the First Amendment rights to assemble or redress

grievances, or to enjoy freedom of speech, or the Fourth Amend-

ment rights requiring the issuance of search warrant in connec-

tion with

the seizure of evidence.

The courts have considerably broadened their inter-

pretation of both the First and Foürth Amendments.

libertarians have proclaimed that any activity on the part of the

Government which might have a "chilling effect" on an individual's

legitimate right to dissent constitutes

a violation of First

Amendment rights.

In some cases the courts have adopted this

the same token, Fourth Amendment rights have been

broadened to include overhearings of conversation,

and the issue

of invasion of privacy is being raised more and more.

factors being considered there are,

however, numerous

situations bearing on the national security where

the President

unquestionably has the constitutional authority to have the

FBI obtain information which will enable him to fulfill his

broad responsibilities under the Constituion. With the exception

of the recent keith decision, the courts have declined to define

or circumscribe the President's constitutional power.

Ordinarily, when we speak of the constitutional

power of the President we think in terms of a specific order

such as a directive or Executive order or some other tangible

evidence.

However, over the yeais, beginning with the years

preceding World War II, Mr. J. Edgar Hoover established a

rapport with the President which resulted in the President

making requests of the FBI under his inherent Executive authority.

The request made by President Roosevelt in 1936 as described

herein is an excellent example of a long series of Presidential

requests extending through a long line of Presidents and at least

until Mr. Hoover's death.

Presidents from Roosevelt to Nixon

confided in Mr. Hoover and

sought his advice and product of

FBI investigative skill, particularly in matters affecting the

national security. One very excellent example of the confidence

the President has

had in the FBl is the confidential Presidential

7

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directive of 1941 instructing that the FBI set up a Special

Intelligence Service covering the Western

Hemisphere to handle

and coordinate all intelligence work within the hemisphere.

There are

many other

examples, but a more

recent one is the fact

that President Nixon, in spite of responsibility assigned to

CIA, asked that the FBI establish Legal Attaches in several

countries where there had been a dearth of good intelligence

information.

SPECIAL WHITE HOUSE REQUESTS

Over

a period of years

the President came to rely on the

FBI to provide first-hand intelligence information concerning

both domestic and foreign situations bearing on policy affecting

the national security.

As a result of numerous conferences in

which the various Presidents outlined to Mr. Hoover their needs

for information which

assist him and his staff in

policy decisions, Mr. Hoover instrucied that important developments

concerning the national defense or which might otherwise be of

value to the White House should be reported

directly to the

President or one of his high-level staff members.

instances the same information was made available to the Attorney

General simultaneously.

Over the years it became a

common practice

for White House staff members to telephone requests for information

or investigations to Mr. Hoover's office or the office of one of

his officials.

Such requests were usually considered as being

within the constitutional Executive power, and

such requests were completely legitimate and well within the

recognized scope of the FBI investigative authority.

Occasionally, however, requests

were made - and complied

with - which in

retrospect appear to have been beyond any recognized

Executive

authority.

An example is a telephone request to furnish

all available information to the

White House concerning a forth-

coming barth Day rally in 1970. The rally, which was sponsored by

groups concerned with pollution and ecology, attracted the

attention of a few subversive elements, but

appeared to be very

much under the control of the sponsors. Senator Edmund S. Muskie

spoke at the rally in Washington, D. C., and Rennie Davis, an

antiwar activist with a subversive

background, appeared on the

same platform with Senator Muskie.

A few minor disturbances

erupted in some areas, but overall the Earth Day rallies were

peaceful and

attained their general objective, the calling of

attention to

environmental problems.

Muskie, who learned

that the FBI

covered the rally in Washington, was incensed that

FBI was involved.

We had a poor defense

and in this case, at

it is doubtful that there

was any legitimate Executive

authority to have the FBI involved. In any event

that such requests should flow

through channels, including tappear

Department of Justice where possible, to assure

that unreasonable

and improper requests are made for investigative activity.

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It is quite understandable that various staff members

at the White House have assignments or projects to prepare

reports on a wide variety of matters relating to the welfare

of the country.

It is

also quite understandable that such

so quite un

individuals would turn to the FbI to develop information through

investigative activity or from its

files.

However,

the fact that

the FBI has specific responsibilities and jurisdiction under

the law may not be known to these staff members and in their

ignorance of the situation they could ask us to engage in activity

beyond the scope of our investigative authority.

Over a long period of time the FBI has disseminated

intormation directly to the White House as it was developed

when the information had a bearing on national defense or possible

foreign policy planning.

The White House has come to expect this

kind of rapid. dissemination.

Much of the information disseminated

has been of specific interest to the National Security Council

of which the President, Vice President and high level members of

his staff

are members.

Even though CIA has the basic responsibility

under the National Security Act of 1947 to coordinate all

intelligence data relating to national defense, the nature

rapid

changing situations makes it impractical

to disseminate all

important intelligence information to the National Security

via CIA channels.

It is not believed that the White House

• would sit still for the FBI cutting off dissemination on nationai

security information.

NEED FOR CURRENT EXECUTIVE ORDER

Dissemination, however, is but the product of investi-

gative activity:

The question, then, is not to whom we should

or should

not disseminate, but rather when and when not should

we investigate. All of which leads to the issue of what consti-

tutes Executive or Presidential authority under the constituion,

and how can such a determination be made? Granting that the

President does have broad constitutional powers which he can

exercise in the interest of national

security, how

power be conveyed to the FBI to cover possible

gaps in our

statutory authority? It is not believed that individual requests,

particularly from lower

level White House staff members, actually

any power of inherent Executive authority,

requests may have originated from the President himself.

What appears to be sorely needed, then, is a clear-cut

memorandum

of understanding - possibly in the form of a comprehensive

order or Presidential directive - outlining areas of

investigative activity required and the investigative product

needed by the Executive to fulfill his national

security

responsibilities.

i i

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DEVELOPMENT OF INVESTIGATIVE POLICIES

By examining our investigative policies and procedures

over the years

readily be seen that procedures

out of necessity, such as those developing

out of the period

preceding World War II, in time come to be accepted as gospel

both within and outside the FBI.

The intelligence-type investi

gations originally ordered because of circumstances existing in

1936 and even before, continued after World War II, and in reality

became necessary again during the Korean War period. And although

actual basis of authority in 1949 and 1950 was not the same

as in 1936,.

we evidently considered it the same and obviously the

Department of Justice and White House did also. Even though the

Congress provided legislative authority to investigate subversive

acts, it appears that we did not feel that the type of investi-

gations necessary could be conducted except under an authority

which did not require collection and preservation of evidence

a view of eventual prosecution, but rather to gather information

only for the purpose of determining the nature and extent of

subversive activity.

This is not to imply that the statutes were not used.

On the contrary, the statutes were used and a large number of

top level Communist Party functionaries were convicted under the

Smith Act, but we still conducted investigations based on what

we considered to be authority under constitutional power of the

President - investigations which Professor Elliff has called

continuing investigative activity within a

broad range of delegated

authority.

While this study has not gone into the procedures

and policies developed by the FBI in connection with investiga-

tions relating to our Emergency Detention Program, various

documents were examined and it is known that this

the Emergency Detention

program preceded

Act, which was a part of the Internal

Security Act of 1950.

great deal of investigative activity,

dating back to the 1930's, was conducted concerning the Security

Index, an integral

part of the Emergency Detention Program. as a

matter of interest, the Emergency Detention Program, which was

a program devised

to insure that individuals constituting a

threat to national

security would be arrested and detained in the

of a national emergency.

The Department at one point felt

that the constitutionality of

such a program was highly question-

However, the program was implemented and was in existence

at the time the Internal Security Act of 1950 was passed.

And most curiously of all is the fact that even

the Internal Security Act of 1950 became law, providing a legal

basis for the program in

existence, it was not until the 1960's

that our Emergency Detention Program was switched over from an

emergency plan

under Presidential powers to the authority

vested by statute. Of course, the part of the Internal Security Act

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authorizing emergency apprehension and detention was repealed

in October, 1971.

Under the Emergency Detention Program, while

it existed, a great deal of continuing investigative. activity

conducted concerning thousands of individuals who were

believed to represent a threat to the national security in time

of national emergency. Some of our investigative practices today

are based on criteria authority growing out of the original

Emergency Detention Program.

Now this is

not to say that the FBI is in a position of

having to defend its investigative policies or practices.

been but a single thread of continuity running through our

investigative practices

and procedures over the years it is that

the individual's constitutional rights are paramount; that nothing

is so important as a citizen's rights under the law.

Counsel

pointed out an extremely important point last year

time of the Princeton Conference where a group of FBI critics

gathered to expose the FBI's faults.

He noted that for years

preceding the Miranda decision and the Escobedo decision the FBI

had been warning persons of their rights prior to taking any kind

of statement.

Every Special Agent knows that the first and

perhaps most

important element in preparing for a prosecution is

preserve the individual's rights guaranteed under the Constitution.

FBI has legally conducied investigations of individuals

and organizations whose philosophies include the overthrow or

destruction of the United States Government by force or violence.

Whether conducted under a Presidential order or statutory

authority any such investigations were absolutely necessary and

continue to be so. For administrative reasons documents reporting

xesults of investigations often have not always clearly shown the

authority, statutory or otherwise. A caption has usually been

used for routing and supervisory purposes which is not clearly

indicative of the nature or purpose of the investigative activity.

such captions

might well be confusing to one not connected with

the FBI and they might well lead to the conclusion that investi-

gation was not based on any legal authority.

For example, the

caption

"Security Matter - Miscellaneous" or "Internal Security

Revolutionary Activity" means little to

someone outside the FBI.

To those in the Domestic Intelligence Divison such designations

identify the type of case and supervising unit at Headquarters.

In other words, there has been nothing wrong with the

.conduct of our investigations.. Only those deserving of investi-

gation under statutory provisions have been investigated.

While

we would have been more precise to predicate our investigations on

a specific authority, whether

statutory or Executive order (10450),

we have not engaged in extra-legal investigative activity

simply because we failed to cite any specific authority to

conduct the investigation in such

a way as to make it

a "closed

end" investigation such as Professor Elliff described.

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PREVENTIVE INVESTIGATIONS

While there has been

some disagreement by one or two

supervisory personnel in Domestic Intelligence Division

as to

how long an investigation may be carried on under statutory

authority or whether a "preventive" investigation can be carried

on under that authority, it is my own contention that intelligence-

type investigations can

be carried out under statutory authority;

that there is no constraint imposed by law governing the length

of time in which

an investigation can be conducted.

There are

many reasons why continuing investigative activity would be

necessary,

even when a statutory violation is involved.

cases involving the national security a conspiracy of some sort

is involved. Conspiracies frequently go on for years. When

the preservation of the

Government is involved, who is to say that

we either prove a conspiracy within a specific

period of time or

stop investigating.

Whether a conspiracy is evident or not, the FBI would

an investigation of

any type unless information was first

received that a violation of Federal law was involved or that the

national security was threatened.

This is how our so-called

intelligence-type investigations

are usually started.

A citizen,

an informant, or a law enforcement officer furnishes information that

there is a group in existence which includes in its philosophy an

advocacy of overthrow or destruction of the Government of the

United States by force or violence. It would appear to be entirely

logical that under at least three separate

Federal statutes a

violation would occur if this group did attempt to overthrow the

Government. And the Supreme Court has said that the Government

does not have to wait until the putsch is about to be executed

and that proof that success or probability of success must be shown.

While the examples cited hereafter might not be good legal

analogy, there does not seem to be any reason why the preservation

of our Government warrants any less consideration under the law.

The courts have upheld cases,

such

as have been developed in the

Washington, D. C., metropolitan

area, where a nearby jurisdiction,

which prohibits importation of liquor from Washington, sets up

surveillance near the larger purveyors of liquor.

When

a car

bearing Virginia or Maryland license plates is observed to be

loading up

what is obvioulsy

more liquor than

can be imported into

states, a surveillance is instituted

and when the

the state line he

and charged with

violation of state liquor laws.

It can be argued that such is

possible only because of the broad police powers delegated to

states by the Constitution.

Perhaps.

But under

Constitution it would appear that

somewhere there is a rationale

that it a statute exists prohibiting the overthrow or destruction

of our Government, the Government

should

have the

same degree

of power to see that persons do not overthrow it.

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But the same problem exists in

many areas covered by

Federal statute.

In the narcotics field tremendous intelligence

programs

are in

existence to stop the spiraling increase in drug

addiction and traffic in narcotics by organized crime.

Even

broader intelligence programs are being planned.

It is true that

violations are

occurring.

And some arrests

being made as the

result of excellent police work following the violations.

the Government is also concerned with preventing drugs from even

getting into the United States,

and from preventing any that do

get here from being sold to our children.

So, we are conducting

preventive investigations in the narcotics field. We are conducting

intelligence-type investigations.

Certainly prosecutions will

be sought wherever possible, but we are conducting

the same type

of investigations in the narcotics area as we are in the field of

national

security.

We are doing what has to be done, and the

are the basis of what has to be done.

In the field of organized crime we know that the Mafia

and the Cosa Nostra have spread like a cancerous

very economy of the Nation.

i the a open cathy hoto

growth into the

are violations of

law.

Statutes of some sort are usually involved. Many of the

statutes involved are outside the primary investigative jurisdiction

of the FBI.

What has to be done?

The individuals controlling

the organizations of crime syndicates must be identified and the

nature of their activity analyzed to see what - if any - Federai,

or even local,

crimes are being committed.

In other words, we

know that syndicated criminals

are engaged in crime, yet we do

not know exactly what crimes.

We are therefore conducting

intelligence-type investigations to first identify the criminal

and then identify the crime.

I fail to see why there isn't a

parallel between intelligence-type investigations conducted to

prevent criminal depredations on the public at large and the same

kind of investigations to protect the Nation from the nihilists,

anarchists, terrorists, revolutionaries and other subversives.

While drawing a parallel between criminal investigations

and national security investigations, there is no intent here to

show that both

types of investigative

activity can be or should be

conducted alike.

The two types of activity are as diametrically

opposed as the two poles of the earth. One is concerned with the

individuals and organizations which are involved purely for

financial

The other is concerned with

the individuals and

organizations which are involved purely for ideological and

philosophical reasons.

a vast difference between

Intelligence-type investigations are necessary in the

field of narcotics and other

areas of organized crime and they

are conducted without the need

for any inherent Executive power

being conveyed.

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oxigin to the common-law concept of a sovereign's rights to

protect itself to the 1939 et sea, directives and

Executive

Oxders 9835 and 10450. Included in this group were (1) National

Association of Black Students

(NABS) which originally had as its

stated purpose to. serve as an information center and communications

network for blacks on college campuses.

This was in 1969.

There was an enormous

amount of violence and upheaval on college

campuses at that time.

Damage and injuries from arson, sabotage

and malicious vandalism grew

into the millions.

In a number of

instances black students

were in the center of the activity.

NABS was considered a potential source of danger during any

strife, particularly since the national coordinator of the

Gwendolyn Marie Patton, had been a member of

an extremist

group cited as an extremist group by the House Committee on

Un-American Activities.

The Black Panther Party and other

revolutionary-type organizations attempted to organize and

penetrate black student groups such as this.

(2) The Center for Black Education (CBE) came under

investigation when its founder was determined to be a former member

of the Black Panther Party and described as one of the leading black

militants in San Francisco prior to his move to Washington, D. C.

CBE has been publicly described

as an educational institution

designed to train technicians who will work to liberate the

African people and develop the African world.

The CBE has as its

"the independence of the African People." Members have

engaged in firearms training.

The Drum and Spear Bookstore (DSB) in

Washington, D. C., opened in 1968 and was publicly described as

a retail bookstore having the largest collection of books about

Africa, Asia, and the Negro in America. It also had protest

and books concerning the socio-economic conditions in

the U. s.

It was determined through investigation that the

bookstore was apparently not being used as a front for underground

or subversive activity and investigation was closed.

1970.

(4) The Congress of African Peoples (CAP) was formed in

It initially advocated the unification of all blacks,

th e

complete rejection of the

"white imperialist, capitalist system,"

the

establishment of a black nation, the

formation of a National

African Party and ultimately a World African Party under the

revolutionary ideology of Pan-Africanism.

During a CAP conference in July, 1971, CAP leaders

vociferously

advocated the need

to engage in

disruptions

as

means of ending "acts detrimental to blacks," the formation

of a paramilitary "defense unit," and the establishment of

communication lines with other

black revolutionary movements

abroad. The CAP has established communication links with the

Chinese communist diplomatic

establishment in Canada.

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INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS AND CIVIL LIBERTY

One of the biggest distinctions between the criminal

and security-type investigations is the fact that national

security investigations, which involved the ideological factor,

are almost without exception concerned

with the concept of

political ideology.

No matter how radical the political ideology

might be, it is nevertheless considered by the people involved -

and often by many intellectual idealists - as a right guaranteed

under the Constitution.

As a result of a great deal of liberal

thinking on the part of the civil libertarians and groups such

the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), there is a much

greater hue

and cry when

intelligence-type investigations are

surfaced

and it developed that the purpose of the investigation

had something to do with an individual's so-called political

beliefs.

The potential problem

for the FBI in conducting purely

intelligence-type investigations: even when based on statutes,

the investigation broaches or gets real close to rights

protected under the First and Fourth Amendments.

As pointed out before, however, the Supreme Court has

emphatically stated that the President has no constitutional

power to abridge these two Amendments. Therefore, no Executive

order,

no matter how broadly worded to convey investigative

authority for intelligence- type investigations, could

enable the

FBI tO

avoid the same pitfalls regarding areas

of activity

covered by the Fiist and

Fourth Amendments.

Therefore, even though

a definitive Executive order would be desirable from the stand-

point of fixing our responsibilities and bridging any gaps between

statute and Executive necessity, the FBI would still be in a little

better position than it is at the present time under purely

statutory authority.

INTERPRETATION OF AUTHORITY BY SUBSTANTIVE SECTIONS

At this point it appears appropriate to introduce comments

offered by

representatives of the various substantive Sections of

the Domestic Intelligence Division

as to their interpretation of

Executive power flowing

trom the 1939 et sea, directives and

the types of investigative matters that possibly cannot be conducied

solely under statutory authority.

EXTREMIST INTELLIGENCE SECTION VIEWS

The Extremist Intelligence Section described four

investigative matters

where it appears that investigation, at

least initially, would not or could not have been grounded in

specific Federal statutes, but where the FBl nevertheless was in

a sense fulfilling intelligence responsibility tracing its

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COMMENT - REBUTTAL

It is believed that in at least three of the above-

described situations the FBI

would have been able to conduct

investigatons based on statutes relating to advocacy of over-

throw of the Government, seditious conspiracy, inciting to

insurrection or rebellion, civil disorders,

antiriot,

neutrality laws (foreign relations)

and perhaps sabotage. The

questionable case, the Drum and Spear Bookstore, would have

probably been brought adequately to our attention from various

public sources or through our informant coverage of overall

matters affecting the national security.

NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE SECTION VIEWS

The Nationalities Intelligence Section listed four

situations wherein,

generally speaking,

much of the FBI's

investigative activity has not been based on statutory authority,

but has been designed to develop intelligence data regarding

individuals

organizations which have established themselves

a potential threat to the security and safety of the

United States Government or its citizens. Listed

are the following:

The Jewish Defense League (JDL). Although involved

in terror-type bombings covered by statute, FBI investigation of

also deveioping information regarding future plans and

activities, particularly violent acts against Soviet diplomats

diplomatic establishments and pro-soviet groups and indivi-

In the case of JDL, Department of State has a specific

interest from the standpoint of U.S. relations with other

countries.

Certain of our intelligence-type investigations of

JDL are aimed at satisfying State Department requirements.

(2) A1

Fat ah

and

Popular Front for the Liberation of

Palestine are two organizations that are well known for violence

potential.

In light of statements and actions of members

leaders, it is obvious that the FBI should conduct intelligence

investigations when these organizations are active in the U.s.

(3)

Revolutionary Union

and Venceremos Organization are

groups which adhere to

a pro-Chinese communist political

philosophy and pledge overt action through use of weapons to

bring about revolution in this country.

With this

in mind, we

have undertaken intelligence-type investigations to identify

those involved who may be responsible for carrying out violence

directed

against the U. S. Government or the citizens of this

country.

!

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(4)

Puerto Rican independence groups, specifically those

who seek to bring about independent status for Puerto Rico by

means

of force and violence, are the subject of intelligence-

type investigations.

No groups seeking independence of Puerto Rico

by lawful means

are investigated. The violence-prone groups have

acts ranging from

attempted assassination of the President,

accompanied by murder, to acts of terrorism involving bombing,

arson, and shootings.

Much of the violence-prone groups' activity.

is planned in

communist Cuba.

Many of the leaders of the violent

pro-independence groups are communists

or followers of Leninist-

Marxist philosophy.

Nationalities Intelligence Section is of the opinion that

the aims and activities of the above-mentioned groups and similar

organizations border on

statutory violations; that while we do not

statutory

prohibitions for authority

to investigate them,

it must be recognized that the reason investigations are initiated

approaches

the elements involved in conspiracy violations.

Nationalities Intelligence Section opines that if we must 100k

written authority for this kind of investigation,

it appears

we must rely on the Executive order (directive?) dated

September 6, 1939,

and subsequent reaffirmations of that order,

noting that

the 1939 directive and later supporting directives

were published at

a time when this country was involved in armed

hostilities

abroad.

Nationalities

Intelligence Section observed that it

at this time to seek a properly worded Executive

order which

clearly sets forth the desires of the President in

his capacity as the chief administrator of our country.

Such an

order should carefully distinguish between acts which

are clearly

opposed to the constitutional basis under which we operate and

those which, no matter how unpopular, are nothing more than an

expression of ideas.

Finally, Nationalities Intelligence suggests

guidelines from the Attorney General

should be

issued, based on the

Executive order or directive.

COMMENT - REBUTTAL

While I agree completely with the suggestion that a

detailed Presidential order

is needed, along with guildelines

issued by the Attorney General, I disagree that we

cannot investigate

the violence-prone

Puerto Ricans and the Revolutionary Union and its

spin-off,

the Venceremos Organization, under existing statutes.

feel also that all we need to cover the JDL and the Arab terrorists

like a blanket is a request from the Secretary of State to the

Attorney General under the statutory authority relating to

foreign relations which has previously been described herein

and in

accordance with Title 28, USC 533, set forth in the

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exhibit accompanying this study.

Some additional authority is

also present, at least

for the time being, in Executive Order

10450 (based on Executive Order 9835). Additionally, there is

authority, particularly with respect to JDL, under statute

having to do with assaulting foreign diplomats.

INTERNAL SECURITY SECTION VIEWS

The Internal Security Section pointed out that the

security investigations supervised within that Section are

conducted within the purview of authority set out in original

position paper of the Domestic Intelligence Divison dated

May 19, 1972, entitled "Investigations of Subversion," which

been discussed during meeting of the Bureau's

Executive Staff with Mr. Gray at Quantico the last week of May.

The position paper was

abandoned by Mr. Miller in favor of a

different position, the essence of which has been expressed

in this study.

authority referred to by Internal

Security Section

essentially is based on both statutory and Presidential documents,

including the 1939, et seq, directives.

Internal Security pointed

out that it should be stated at the outset that while FBI

investigations conducted with specific reference to a statute

will develop some intelligence it is not possible to base all FBI

activities in the

collection of intelligence on statutory

authority alone.

Internal Security further points out that it is

true that the initial Presidential directive(s) of 1939 picked

the term "subvexsive activities" as incidental to their

primary thrust, but that it is

just as true that President Truman's

directive of July 24, 1950, however intentional or

unintentional it may have been specifically stated, said that the

FBI had charge of investigative work in matters relating to

espionage, sabotage, subversive activities and related matters.

Internal Security feels that whether or not the initial Presidential

directives fully embraced the concept of subversive activities

appear irrelevant after such a definitive order signed

by Truman. Internal Security Section is of the opinion that whether

it spelled out beforehand is unimportant because obviously

Truman's order of July 24, 1950,

made our investigative interest

in subversive activities valid at that time.

COMMENT - REBUTTAL

Without going into detailed rebuttal here,

the Truman

directive is discussed in

detail heretofore, it must be reiterated

that Truman's directive contained a misstatement of fact concerning

the previous directives, and I feel that undor the magnification

of a critical analysis

of the Truman directive, particularly by

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individuals unsympathetic to the FBI, we cannot glibly state

that whatever the intention or unintention may have been, Truman

signed the order and therefore it made everything fine.

VIEWS CONTINUED

The Internal Security Section believes that reliance on

statutory authority alone for the collection of intelligence

would severely limit the scope of FBI activities to the detriment

of our national security.

They feel that

a statutory basis must

impose reasonable and definable limits and for the most part

investigations conducted with regard to statute are "closed

Internal Security points out that we investigate violations

or allegations of violations; that we do not investigate indefinitely

on the supposition or speculation that by "fishing" we may

find sonebody who violates a Federal law. Internal Security notes

that such

a concept is repugnant to the

democratic process and

clearly indicates a police state mentality.

They go on to point

out that on the other hand it is also clear that there are some

- particularly where the integrity of the Government

is at stake -- where we must conduct intelligence-type investigations

to detect conspiracies

and actual attempts which go to the very

heart of the Government's existence.

COMMENT - REBUTTAL

Here,

again, I must interject with

a point of rebuttal.

As pointed out

before, I feel that investigation under statutory

or other legal authority does not require the so-called "closed

end" type of investigation in every

But the most important

want to bring out is that I

cannot see the logic of saying

that investigations based on the possibility of violations to

destroy the Government (intelligence investigations actually)

are repugnant to the democratic process when performed under

statutes forbidding such activity and are indicative of a police

state mentality, whereas there is nothing repugnant, nothing

wrong with conduct the same type of investigations under some

nonspecific Presidential power to protect the integrity of

the Government. I personally, as

a citizen, would rather

have a system wherein I could not be investigated unless there

was some indication that I was planning to violate the law,

or had already done so.

As a law-abiding citizen I have no

fear of intelligence-type investigations aimed at discovering

plots to violate the law.

I would have fear of a government

which permitted intelligence investigations based on

someone's - anyone's: Presidential or otherwise - interpretation

of what an individual may say, do or think. The law is a

guideline and states clearly what I may do or not do.

Vague interpretations subject to the caprices of undisciplined

politicians

could result in

a virtual police state if the law is

not the basis of our investigative activity.

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VIEWS CONTINUED

Internal Security Section recognizes that our investi-

gations are conducted

under both the authority conferred

under

Executive orders (10450)

and statutes and notes that as

practical matter the statutory provisions cited as a basis for

intelligence-type investigative

authority must bear a reasonable

relationship to the activity investigated and must be brought to

a logical conclusion within a reasonable period of time.

also point out that it would be extremely difficult to justify

continued investigative interest in a mere member of the Communist

Party on the basis of the smith Act or the Internal Security Act

of 1950.

It is further pointed out that this points up again

the necessity for reliance not only on statutory authority but

for the broader. intelligence-type authority conferred by

Presidentail directives and Executive orders.

REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES SECTION VIEWS

The Revolutionary Activities Section furnished

several

specific examples of work of that Section which does not fall

within the purview of existing Federal statutes. Included in

those examples are the following:

(1) Students for a Democratic Society/Worker

Student Alliance (SDS/WSA) is the largest faction of SDS

in existence at the present time. It has an estimated

membership of 750 members. This

group Is

described

a revolu-

tionary, predominantly campus-based organization dominated and

controlled by the communist Progressive Labor Party.

The group

has engaged in recent widespread

anti-Government demonstrations

throughout the country which have led to numerous arrests,

property damage, and

injuries to law enforcement officers.

purpose of our

investigation of SDS/WSA is to obtain intelligence

data in order to have a day-to-day appraisal of the strength,

dangerousness,

and activities of the organization and to keep

the Department. of Justice and

other interested agencies advised.

Revolutionary Activities Section states that authority

for investigation of SDS/WSA is based on Executive Order 10450,

but that additional authority is derived from

Presidential

directives dating from September 6, 1939, 28 Code of Federal

Regulations 0.85 (d) cites FBI authority

to carry out Presidential

directives.

They also note that "inherent" responsibility of the

President derived from the Constitution to "insure domestic

tranquility," (Preamble) to "take care that the laws be faithfully

executed," (Article II, Section 3) and to protect the states

against invasion and domestic violence (Article IV, Section 4)

provide power to the President.

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(2) The Socialist Workers

Party (SWP) is the inter-

national

Trotskyist movement founded in the 1920's when Leon Trotsky

lost out in a power struggle to

Joseph Stalin for control of the

international communist movement.

The basic philosophy of the SW

is that only violent revolution can

destroy capitalism; that

all political groups other than their own

are counterrevolutionary

must be destroyed.

We rely on Executive Order 10450 for

investigative authority.

(3) The Venceremos Brigade consists of a loosely knit

group of over 1500 individuals who have travelled to Cuba in

separate contingents since November, 1969.

Positive information

has been developed that the organization is being used by

various hostile intelligence services for spotting purposes

and recruitment of intelligence agents and support personnel.

group is under investigation because it appears to be under

control and domination of a hostile power.

Revolutionary Activities Section states that Presidential

directives (supposedly the 1939, et seq directives) have given

the FBI responsibility to investigate matters relating to the

internal security of the country.

They point out that after the

first contingent returned to the U.S. in February, 1970, the

White House (nonspecific) instructed the Director

to conduct an

intensive investigation of the group to determine the extent of

indoctrination afforded these individuals while in Cuba and to

assess their potential dangerousness to the country. In addition,

the Department of Justice has requested information to support

indicia that members of various contingents have been trained as

espionage and intelligence agents for the Cubans and North Koreans

and may be operating as such in the U.s.

(4) Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW) is a revo-

luationary antiwar group currently of major concern in view of

its potential for violence.

The organization is made up of many

Vietnam war veterans who have advanced training in explosives and

weapons and many have records of narcotics use.

One VVAW

national coordinator stockpiled arms and ammunition and advocated

"political elimination squads."

Revolutionary Activities Section

relies on the Presidential directives (1939 et seq) and Executive

Order 10450 as a basis for investigation in the absence of

specific statutory authority.

(5) Weatherman is the name adopted by a group which is

a revolutionary Marxist-Leninist organization dedicated to the

overthrow of the Government through force and violence. A number

of Weatherman leaders are current Bureau fugitives in connection

with violations of Federal antiriot laws, Bombing and Gun Law

statutes, as well as the fugitive Felon Act.

Revolutionary

Activities Section cites as specific authority for investigation

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of the Weatherman organization that Presidential directives have

instructed the FBI to take charge of investigative work

relating to espionage, sabotage and subversive activities and that

Executive Order 10450

provides additional authority.

(6) Unaffiliated individuals who are a part of the New

Left Movement. Revolutionary Activities Section notes that

although the New Left Movement has no definable ideology of its

own, it does have strong Marxist, existentialist, nihilist

anarchist overtones.

In some instances there are individuals

without any organizational affiliation who by their revolutionary

activities and statements, establishing a rejection of law

order, reveal the individual to be a potential threat to the

security of the U.s.

Such individuals do, in fact, engage in

violence or unlawful

activities and their potential dangerousness

to the internal security is clearly demonstrated by their state-

ments, conduct

and actions. According to Revolutionary Activities

Section, specific authority to conduct our investigations of

unaffiliated individuals is derived from

Presidential directives

of September 6, 1939, through December 15, 1953.

This Section states that in all these examples there is

a likelihood that evidence may

be developed at

some future date

that activities of these organizations and individuals constitute

violations of specific statutes.

It is further stated that our

authority io conduct investigations in these cases cannot be

based on the speculation that evidence of some violation might be

developed; however, until such time as we obtain a substantial

allegation that a violation has occurred,

we must base our

"intelligence" investigations on the Presidential directives and

Executive orders issued by the President delineating oux

responsibility in regard to national security.

COMMENT - REBUTTAL

At the risk of being monotonous, there appears to be

ample indication here that a great deal of statutory authority

is present, but not being cited.

The Smith Act of 1940

statutes dealing with the national

security provide the basis for

investigating all of these

sroups.

The espionage statutes

as basis for investigating the Venceremos

Brigade.

Certainly

the authority conveyed by Executive Order 10450 is

not questioned.

And in the case of the Weatherman group, the Fugitive Felon

gives us a

tremendous latitude for conducting all the intelligence

investigation we may need in

an effort to locate the Weatherman

fugitives.

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OFFICIAL RECOGNITION OF INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATION

Although the cold facts indicate that the Presidential

directives dating back to 1939 do not convey any authority to

the FBI which

it did not have already by legislative enactment,

it is obvious

that intelligence-type investigations are necessary

in the protection of the national security.

Various documents

emphasize the necessity for developing intelligence data.

example, the report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil

Disorders

(Kerner Commission, 1968) emphasized that law enforcement

organizations must develop the means to obtain adequate intelligence

for planning purposes and that law enforcement. should "gather,

evaluate, analyze and disseminate information on potential as well

actual civil disorders."

Similarly, the President's Commission on Campus Unrest

(1970) took special

note of the need for intelligence in effective

law enforcement.

The Commission stated in its report, "It is

an undoubted fact that on some campuses there are men

and women

who plot, all too often successfully, to burn and bomb, and

sometimes

to maim and kill."

The report concluded that

best, and sometimes the only, means law enforcement has to thwart

or prevent such plots is through "clandestine intelligence work."

A memorandum for the Director of the FBI from

Attorney

General Ramsey Clark, dated September 14, 1967, stated that "In

of the seriousness of the riot activity across the country,

it is most important that you use the maximum available resources,

investigative and intelligence, to collect and report all facts

bearing on the question

as to whether there has been or is a

scheme or conspiracy by any group of whatever size, effectiveness,

ox affiliation, to plan, promote or aggravate riot activity."

The memorandum went on to state that "In this connection

the following federal statutes could be applicable depending, of

course, upon the factual situation that develops." Ten Federal

statutes were then listed and

it is particularly significant to

note that the Attorney General was instructing that the FBI

collect intelligence information - not on some specific allegation

that a crime had been committed, but to determine whether

has been or is a scheme or conspiracy. In other words,

the FBI

instructed by the Attorney General to conduct intelligence

investigations

to determine if any

of the ten Federal laws might have

been violated in connection with riot activity.

FORMER STUDY OF FBI'S INVESTIGATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES

In an exhaustive study of the "role of the FBI in

Clandestine Foreign Intelligence Collection in the United States,"

conducted and reported in a document dated April 29, 1966, by

a committee more commonly referred to as the "Papich

Committee"

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considerable information was brought out concerning the FBI's

investigative

authority.

Of great interest is

the impact the

National Security Act of 1947 had on the gathering of intelligence

in the United States.

et sed, established the National Security Council (NSC) and under

• National

This Act, which is reported in 50 USC 401

it the Centeral Intelligence Agency (CIA). The legislative

history of the Act notes the concern Congress had that CIA could

develop into a gestapo if permitted to become operational in the

James Forestal, then Secretary of the Navy, testified in

a hearing before the

Committee on Expenditures in the Executive

Departments, that "The purposes of the Central Intelligence Agency

definitely to purposes outside of this country, except

collation of information gathered by other government agencies."

He went on to say, "Regarding domestic operations, the

Federal Bureau of Investigation is working at all times in

collaboration with General Vandenberg (then head of CIA). He

relies upon them for domestic activities. " The Papich Committee

study noted that there is tacit acknowledgement in Section 403 (e)

of the National Security Act of 1947 that the FBI gathers

information affecting the

national security:

"That upon the written

request of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the

Director of the FBI shall make available to the Director of Central

Intelligence such information for correlation, evaluation, and

dissemination as may be essential to the national security."

The Papich Committee report reveals that there is ample

indication that Congress was aware of FBI intelligence functions,

particularly with respect to

foreign intelligence activity in

the U.S. The Executive Branch was obviously depending on the FBI

to provide intelligence

data which CIA, by law, could not collect

in the U.S. A task force headed by General Mark Clark in 1955

took notice of the fact

that the FBI dealt in security intelligence.

The task force

report cited the fact that the FBI was one of

four members of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC),

created by the National Secuirty Council, approved by the President,

March 23, 1949, to coordinate "the investigation

of all domestic

espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, subversion, and other related

matters affecting internal security."

It was noted that the IIC charter did not disturb

responsibilities of its member agencies but made mandatory

action by those agencies deemed necessary to insure complete

investigative coverage

compliance with

the needs of the IIC,

which had full responsiblity for coordination of the investigation

of all domestic espionage, counterespionage, etc.,

affecting

internal security.

The task force mentioned

above, in commenting on the role

of the FBI, noted "The Federal Bureau of Investigation, however,

is the recognized center of the domestic

aspect of internal

security including counterintelligence within the United States

and. its possessions."

It is to be noted that this task force took

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cognizance of the fact that President Roosevelt as far back as

1939 had directed the FBI to coordinate and conduct domestic

counterintelligence activities. (Underlined part taken

Papich Committee report and is not necessarily the actual language

used in the task force

report.

In any event, we know this is a

very broad interpretation of the 1939 directive.)

RECENT EXECUTIVE INTENT

Even more recently the White House exhibited its own under-

standing of the intelligence role and functions delegated to the

Attorney General and the FBI.

By confidential memorandum from

the White House to the Secretaries of State, Defense, Treasury and

Commerce; the Attorney General; Director of CIA; Military Represen-

tative of the President; Administrator, Federal Aviation Agency;

and Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, dated June 9, 1962

(National Security Action Memorandum 161), President Kennedy

stated that he

would look to the

Attorney

General to take the

initiative in the Government in insuring the development of

programs,

and action proposals to protect the internal security

of the United States.

memorandum directed that the two

interdepartmental committees

concerned with internal security --

the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (Chaired by J. Edgar

Hoover)

and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security

(Chaired by a representative of the Department of Justice) which

had been under the supervision of the National Security Council,

be transferred to the supervision of the Attorney General.

One of the greatest problems in conducting a study of this

type is the location of pertinent documents and material which

bear on the issues.

We have located

copies of the documents

related primarily to the heart of this issue,

our basic authority

in the national security field - namely, the

presidential directives

and Executive orders which we have cited in addition to statutes

as being our sources of authority - but there may be other very

pertinent documents bearing on the Executive intent to have the

FBI conduct intelligence-type investigations.

A good example

is evidence used by the

Papich Committee, but not found during

this study, which shows that President Roosevelt called

White House conference on May 9, 1934, attended by the Attorney

General, Secretary of Treasury, Secretary of Labor, Director of

FBI, and

Chief of the U. S. Secret Service to deal with the problem

growth of fascist organizations in the United States. The

ference agreed that there should be an investigation of

groups and their activities

for intelligence purposes.

the only Federal law believed applicable at the time was the

Immigration Law, the President decided that the Commissioner of

Imnigration and

Naturalization Service should confer with the

Chief of Secret

Service and the Director of FBI to work out

details of the investigation.

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Mr. Hoover immediately issued orders to FBI personnel to

conduct an intensive investigation of the Nazi movement.

This,

evidently, was the

first general intelligence investigation made

by the Government into fascist activities in this country. But

note that this general intelligence investigation was based in

law, namely the Immigration Law. We have here an

example of

the exercise of inherent Executive power tempered by the fact

that the Presidential desire for intelligence investigations would

be implemented because there was a statute covering the situation.

Basically, the same applies to the 1936 arrangement between the

President, the Director of the FBI and the Secretary of State.

The law permitting the Secretary of State to request the Attorney

General to investigate certain matters was the legal basis for

the subsequent FBI investigations.

CONCLUSIONS

In summary

and conclusion, it is believed that the facts

clearly show that while there is a

labyrinth of conflicting infor-

and opinions concerning the FBI's authority to conduct

intelligence-type investigations in the national security

field,

there are a few

basic points requiring clarification.

is believed that we must first sweep

away the myth that the FBI

now has any investigative authority based on the Presidential

directives dating from 1939, and that any investigative

responsibility we derived from those directives is so outdated as

to be very questionable if not entirely void.

This is, of course,

taking into consideration the national situation at the time the

directives were individually issued.

secondly, it 1s believed thai the fBl does have a valid

reason to conduct intelligence-type investigations based on

the fact that there are

laws prohibiting all the various

types of

congrating no

subversion truly affecting the national security and that the

Government has the right to protect itself from destruction by

conducting whatever preventive or intelligence-type investigations

are necessary to see that individuals and organizations

do not do those things, in violation of the law, which could

investigations would include the use of confidential informants

and sources of information, the calling on law enforcement officers

and patriotic citizens

organizations to furnish all information

concerning subversion to the FBI, the collection of overt

intelligence data from publications and other public source

material, including congressional hearings, and the full scale

investigation of allegations received from all sources.

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Our intelligence-type investigations, however, should

meticulously adhere to guidelines which would

clearly prohibit

any intrusion or abridgement of an individual's rights

guaranteed

under the Constitution, particularly the First, Fourth and Fifth

Amendments.

To assure

that the proper guidelines are drawn we

should request the Department of Justice to issue them and then

afford the closest possible supervision of investigation, both

in the field and at Headquarters to see

that our intelligence

investigations are kept within these guidelines.

The voicing

of this

need does not indict our

existing guidelines or careful

supervision, but merely recommends that our responsibilities be

described and, where necessary, circumscribed by the Attorney General

whose duty under the law is to

supervise our activity.

It appears that the most effective means of laying to

rest the persistent complaints of various

critics that the FBI

engages in political surveillance (investigations) in violation of

Amendment rights is to have definitive legislative

enactment carefully state what the FBI must do to protect the

national security.

such could be resolution or statute, but should

cover in complete

detail what acts should be investigated by the

FBI, and, in particular, that the FBI must conduct preventive or

intelligence-type investigations to protect the national security.

Under the political climate existing in the country today,

however, the

passage of either a statute or a resolution of the

type needed is very remote.

Because of the misconceptions and

misapprehensions surrounding investigations relating to subversion,

atmosphere of suspicion in congressional

likely stifle any attempt to formulate any such legislation

at this time.

We should, however, recommend to the Department chat

consideration be

given immediately to sponsoring some comprehensive

legislative enactment along the lines needed.

In the meantime, for the benefit of the FBI, the

Department of Justice and the rest of the Executive Branch of

Government, including the

staff at the White House, it appears

that the next best thing is to have a comprehensive Executive

order issued, under the inherent Executive power, outlining

exactly what

responsibilities the FBI has in the protection

of the national security and in furnishing the President

the data he needs to fulfill his responsibilities under"the

Constitution.

To be effective such Executive order would have to

clearly define the FBI's intelligence collection responsibilities

and would necessarily have to contain language which

would

satisfy the courts

that First and Fourth Amendment rights are

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not being abrogated in any manner.

Language in such an order

would ideally follow the basic language and purposes of Executive

Ordex 11605, since this deals with virtually every type of

subversive activity confronting the country today.

It is finally concluded that this study has shown that

FBi has in the past conducted no intelligence-type investigations

which were not permissible under the law, particularly under the

concept that intelligence-type or preventive-type investigations

are lawful when the product and purpose of the investigation

Is to prevent a violation of a statute.

believed, however,

that every area of our national security investigations

should

be reviewed for the purpose of determining what

additional

constitutional safeguards should be considered. This is particularly

in light of the fact that much of our investigative

activity

in the past was

geared to the Emergency Detention Act, which was

repealed in October, 1971.

We should make absolutely certain,

for example, that the procedures adopted in setting up our

Administrative Index, following repeal of the Emergency Detention

Act,

are not being used to circumvent the repeal of the

Emergency Detention Act.

In this regard, it is to be noted that

a detailed study of the Administrative Index has been underway

and is almost complete

as of this date.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1.

That upon completion of a final draft of the study

dealing with this matter, a letter to the Department be prepared

containing the essence of this study, pointing out our findings

and requesting

(a) The Department's opinion concerning our findings,

particularly directives discussed herein; (b) The Department's

opinion concerning the legality of intelligence-type or preventive-

type investigations based on existing statutes; (c)

Requesting the

Department to issue comprehensive investigative

guidelines for

future investigations of the intelligence or preventive type;

(d) Requesting

the Department to sponsor comprehensive legislation

spelling out the FBI's investigative authority in the collection of

intelligence information relating to the

national security; and

(e) Requesting the Department to

seek a comprehensive Executive

order which would cover any possible gaps between statutory

authority

and Executive necessity in protection of the national security.

2. That a penetrative study be completed at the

earliest possible date concerning all our current national

security investigative guidelines to insure that

every possible

safeguard is in effect to protect the individual's rights

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kis""

protected by the constitution; that the current

study of

procedures

relating to

the

Administrative Index

specifically

determine if any procedures are in effect which could be interpreted

as a means to circumvent repeal of the Emergency Detention Act.

THOMAS J. SMITH

CHIEF, RESEARCH SECTION

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

,

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NOTE:

part = t

ONS ON REVERSE

ETING.

TO:

Intelligence Community Staff

ATTN: Central Index

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

FROM:

FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

HOw PROVIDED (check

for review

appropriate

If a document was made available

but not transmitted, so note.)

DOCUMENT

BRIEFING.

INTERVIEW

TESTIMONY

JOTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

6/4/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)

SSC

HSC

4.

IDENTIFICATION

(provide descriptive data for documents;

five name or identification number of briefer,

interviewee, testifier and subject)

Memorandum advising sSC that a document it desires is available

for review only at FBI Headquarters.

5. IN RESPONSE TO

(list date and item

number if in

response to formal request, other-

verbal request

of (name), initiative,

subpoena,

etc.)

SSC letter 3/19/75, Part I, Legal Authorities.

6. CLASSIFICATION OF

INFORMATION Center

Codewas Ts

U

7. KEY WORDS (enter

the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are

used underline

emphasis)

Authorities - legal

Intelligence activitles, domestic DArEL

ALI, INFORVATION CONTATNEIO

8. SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this

item)

Memorandum advises that in response to SSC request for an FBI

position paper dated 7/31/72, discussing the "Scope of FBI

Authority, Jurisdiction and Responsibility in Domestic Intelli-

gence Investigations,' the paper is being made avallable for

review only at FBI Headquarters and with further condition that

no notes be taken during this initial review.

TREAT AS YELLOW

5

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IN 55024 DocId:32989609 Page 179

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN

CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.

6-24-75 455

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

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-

INSTRUCTIONS

..

I'ype or print clearly in ink.

• Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

• Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

"FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the

information.

If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to

HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a

copy.of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing

substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community

matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests

should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be

noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here,

e.g., restrictions on review of a document, it document was paraphrased, whether

interviewee is current or former employee, etc. It actual document or transcript

Is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required.

Additional

pages may be attached if necessary.

ing,

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OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

MAY 1962 EDITION

GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GO

Memorandum

5010-106

RNMENT

Assoc. Dir. -

Dep. AD Adm. _

Dop. AD Inv. -

Asst. Dir.:

Admin..

Comp. Syst.

Atto

FROM

MR. WANNALI WiSH

H. N. BASSETT Hi°

Ext. Affairs

DATE:

6/2/75

Filos & Com. _

Gen. Inv..

Ident. -

nspection

Intellite

Laboratory

Lagal Coun...

Plan. & Eval. -

SUBJECT:

SENSTUDY 75

Spec. Inv. -

Training

Telephone Rm. -

Director Sac'y -

In response to the Church Committee's request for Inspection Division

guidelines used for inspecting field offices and divisions (item #7, Appendix B

of Senator Church's letter to the Attorney General da ed 5/14/75), this Division

has no objection to a review of the field and headquarters inspection manuals by

Members of Committee Staff, provided the review is conducted in FBI space

with an Inspection Division representative present.

1 - Mr. Wannall (Mr. Cregar)

1 - Bufile 62-116395

FBG:wmi

(4)

ALI INFORMATTON COF MAIN-

in an an in said

REC-100

84 JUN 2 7 1975

IN 55024 DocId:32989609 Page 181

621163851

47. JUN 27 1975

52732187T

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OPEETNAL, FORATIO, 10

5010-106

MAY 1962 EDITIÓN

GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

FRO

Wog

1 - Mr. T. J. Jenkins

1

. - Mr. J.

B. Adams

1 - DATE: 5/29/75

E. W. Walsh

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

- Mr.

W.

, 0. Cregar

I - Mr. S. F. Phillips

SUBJECT

SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. D

Dop. AD

Dep. AD

Asst. Dir.: (

Admin,

Comp. Syst. -

Ext. Affairs -

Files & Com. -

Gen. Inv.

Ident.

Laboratory

Legal Coun. _

Plan. & Eval. -

Spec. Inv. -

Training -

Telephone Rm. -

Director Sec'y -

This memorandum recommends that

• Bureau space be

provided Senate Select Committee (SC) Start for review of

Bureau material and interviews of Bureau employees.

V

SSC Staff is in a phase of its inquiry concerning

Bureau operations which includes (1) review of considerable

SAC memoranda, etc.

members by Bureau officials and supervisors.

For many very

sound reasons it would be to the Bureau's distinct advantage

to provide limited, but suitable space within the J. Edgar

Hoover Building to

the SSC Staff.

Because we have been able

to obtain the Staff's agreement to review much of our material

at FBIHQ,

rather than its insistence on turning the material

over to the Staff, we are in a position of insuring the

security of our material by maintaining it in our space at all

times.

Also, by having the SSC Staff

conduct its review of

the material

in our space, we can have personnel readily

available to answer their

inquiries, thus precluding the

necessity for preparing otherwise needless correspondence and

eliminating the necessity for having our personnel present

throughout their reviews if they took place elsewhere.

Further, from a psychological standpoint, it is to our

advantage that our employees be interviewed in our space rather

than in SSC offices.

Finally, space made available to SSC

Staff will also provide a desirable site for the various briefings

our people are giving to them.

It should be noted that the

providing of the space which this memorandum recommends is

similar to what we have already done for the General Accounting

office in connection with its audit of our operations ?5

62-116395

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SFP:mjg/j2

JUN 264 1975

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ALL INFORMATICI CO: "" I

CONTINUED

OVER

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SWASoN 200d07532989609

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Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall

Re:

Senstudy 75

62-116395

6/20175

Space required should be sufficient to accommodate

three desks and three chairs plus two or three file cabinets;

and including the necessary desks, chairs and cabinets.

i Space should approximate that currently used to accommodate

Section Chief's offices

in the INTD.

Because the SSC Staff has already commenced some of

its review of Bureau material and has already engaged in some

briefings, it is essential that urgent attention be given this

request.

INTD has already surveyed its space and would be

unable to accommodate the need involved.

ACTION:

Upon approval, Administrative Division will

immediately take necessary steps to provide for the necessary

space and equipment described above.

locatio

area. wall

We have initiated space

t gun than i han

Do see if here he fute

in you

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OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

A 1962 EDILION

5010-106

SA GENI

REG. NO, 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

EG i3 - Mar. 3: B. Minaz

(1-J.B.Hotis)

TO

MR. W. R. WANNALI

DATE:

May 27, 1975

CERO

MR. W.

0!

(1-Mr.P.V.Daly)

Assoc. Dir.

Dep. AD Adm

Dop. AD Invi

Asst. Diffi

Admin.!

Comp. Syst. -

Ext. Affairs _

Files & Com. _

Gen. Inv. -

ident.

•'CREGAR

1 - Mc. W.

'R. Wannall

ntel

"" IORMATION CONTAND 1 - Mr. I. W. Leavitt.

Laboratory -

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

I UNCLACOIRED ELCEPT - Mr.

W. A. Branigan

Plan. & Eval. -

SHOWN OTHERWISE.

1 - Mr. W. O. Gregar

Spec. Inv. -

Training -

Legal Coun. -

This memorandum reports the results of a meeting*

Telephone Rm. -

Ditector Sech

between Mr. John Elliff, Senate Select Committee (SSC) Staff,

who is in charge of the

task force looking into the FBI, and

Messrs. Wannall, Leavitt, Branigan, and Cregar. Purpose of the

meeting was to acquaint Elliff with the work of the CounterIntelli-

gence Branch in the Intelligence Division.

House Select Committee (HSC)

LASSIFIED LOND

WECLASSIFY ON: 25X

ADRI

Elliff advised that the SSC is concerned with how the

HSC plans to conduct its probe of the intelligence community.

He anticipates HSC may hold hearings very shortly and possibly

prior to the time the SSC gets underway. At the present time,

Elliff knows of no agreement or plans to provide the HSC with

copies

of intelligence community documents the SSC has been furnished.

Department of Justice

• According to Elliff, Kevin I. Maroney, Deputy Assistant

Attorney General, Criminal Division, has agreed to allow Staff

Members of the SSC to review the Department's file on the

Intelligence Evaluation Committee (this was a Committee chaired

by the Department and evalved from one of the recommendations set

out-in the "Hpuston Plan." During its existence the Bureau had

several representatives assigned to the IEC).

Mr. Maroney has also advised the SSC Staff that in the

1966-67 period the Department of Justice did an extensive study

on the legal authority for the conductof electronic surveillances.

Elliff was quite pleased that the Justice Department planned to make

this study

available for review by Staff Members of the SSC in the

Department's Building and expressed the hope that the Bureau would

also see fit to allow Staff Members to review research and studies

the: Bureau might have conducted in the area of sensitive investi-

gative techniques.

RECIDA 62-116-345-2

62-116395

WOC: ekw

READE

*5/22/75

I CONTINUED

- OVER

17 JUN

27 1975

0 SHUN 47 19/6

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## Page 185

•*

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall

RE: SENSTUDY 75

SECRET

62-116395

Sensitive Investigative Techniques

Mr. Elliff felt that much could be accomplished in

responding to the SSC request of 5/14/75 if the Bureau could

pull together the basic FBI documents delineating our legal

authority to engage in the following investigative techniques.

(1) Electronic surveillances, including consensual

electronic surveillances; (2) all forms of mail surveillances

Including covers and openings; (3) physical surveillances

including Special Agent (SA) infiltration of target groups;

photography and remote viewing and sensing devices (laser

beams); (4) surreptitious entries; (5) incommunicado interroga-

tions; and (6) bank credit, and other personal information.

It was Elliff's opinion that if the Committee could

be allowed to review the legal authority for such surveillances

along with the documents showing how the decision-making process

worked in instituting, approving and discontinuing such operations.

much of the misunderstandings some members of the Committee have

would be clarified. Elliff also felt a detailed briefing of the

Committee with whatever limitations the Bureau desired to place

on the number and level of those to be briefed would be extremely

helpful in assisting the Committee in developing some authority

for the FBI to legally engage in such sensitive activities in

the future.

Three Top Priority Items of the SSC

Elliff advised that in his judgment the three top

priority items of the SSC regarding the FBI are as follows.

(1) Develop legislation to clearly delineate the Bureau's

jurisdictional authority in the security and counterintelligence

field. (2) Provide the Bureau with some authoritative basis,

either statutory or otherwise, to engage in certain counter-

intelligence activities, l.e., surreptitious entry, electronic

surveillances, incommunicado interviews, in national security

cases when the need for such activity has been clearly established.

(3) To improve the coordination between the FBI and the rest

of the intelligence community.

- 2 -

HH 55024 DocId:32989609 Page 185

SECKIEU

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## Page 186

Memorandum to Mc. W. R. Wannall SECRET

RE: SENSTUDY 75

62-116395

Elliff was questioned about the reason for the

nird priority. He responded by noting that one fresident

(Nixon) had stated that in 1970 there was a breakdown in the

relations between the FBI and the rest of the intelligence

community. Elliff was informed that this was not so, that the

discontinuance of a formal liaison relationship with

• Central

Intelligence Agency (CIA) and subsequently the rest of the

intelligence community in 1970 did not mean that there was a

breakdown in coordination. Elliff asked why the Bureau dis-

continued a formal liaison relationship with CIA in early 1970.

We briefly reviewed for Elliff the Thomas Riha case pointing

out that Mr. Kelley had personally caused a review of that

case in an effort to determine whether it, in fact, was the

reason for the discontinuance of our liaison relationship with

the CIA. Elliff was informed that this was the case. In

addition, we discussed with Elliff the 1966 understanding

between CIA and the FBI and made it quite clear to him that

we felt the relationship with not only CIA but the entire

intelligence community was excellent.

Other Matters of Interest

During the course of the briefing, Elliff was shown

charts depicting the inordinate increase of Sino-Soviet bloc

official presence in the U. S. from 1959 through January, 1975,

the growth of the presence of foreign hostile intelligence

officials in the U. S. during this same period compared with

the static number of SAs we had working against this threat

during this same period. Elliff was concerned over the fact

that the presence of Sino-Soviet bloc officials as well as the

intelligence officers increased substantially while the number

of SAs dedicated to counterintelligence investigations remained

static. He wondered why this was so. Elliff was advised that

lit was a question of manpower and priorities. He was told that

during the 1959-1975 period there was a considerable demand for

the usecof SA personnel in the fields of organized crime, civil

Fights,&ghetto riots.

In addition, during that period of time

additional investigative responsibilities were placed upon the

FBI by virtue of new legislation.

- 3 -

HH 55024 Do0Id:32989609 Page 186

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## Page 187

SECRET

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall

RE: SENSTUDY 75

62-116395

Elliff was also interested in knowing whether our

legal attaches were operational in the counterintelligence field.

He was advised they were not.

Elliff also asked whether CIA

made available to the FBI their latest technical developments.

He was advised that we believed they did. JEK Act 6 (1) (B)

Finally, Elliff desired to know whether the FBI had

received, any documents

wherein_

'He was advised that this

would have to be researched and that we would be in touch with

him on this particular subject.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) We have already begun to examine the material asked

for regarding

; the FBI's legal authority and implication of

sensitive investigative techniques. Once examined and analyzed,

we will submit recommendations as to how we should proceed taking

into consideration the observations and suggestions of Elliff.

JFK Act 6 (1) (C)

(2) We are pulling together the documents regarding

and with approval will suggest

Elliff submit his specific request in writing through the AG.

alvesed

To 56816175

SECRET

- 4'-

HH 55024 DocId: 32989609 Page 187

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## Page 188

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

5010-106

• MAY 19O2 PEDITION

GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

(1 - Mc. J. B. Hotis)

TO

: Mr.

W. R. Wannall

Assoc. Dir.a

Dep. APTA

Dep. AR nv

Asst. Di

Admin

Comp. Syst. —

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com..

Gen. Iny.

Iden

ROM

H. o. cregarant

DATE: June 17, 1975

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

1

- Mr. W. O. Cregar

- Mr. J. W. Dalsee

- Mx. T.

MCNX 1]

Laboratory

SUBjECtS

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

Plan. & Eval. _

Spec. Inv..

Training.

Legal Coun..

Telephone Rm. -

Director Sec'y_

Reference is made to memorandum from

Office

of

Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams, dated June 10, 1975, captioned

as above, (copy attached) wherein it was recommended and approved

that representatives of the Intelligence Division meet with.

Mr. K. William O'Connor, Special Counsel for Intelligence

Coordination, Office of

the Deputy Attorney General, for the

purpose of briefing him concerning the contents of a Bureau letter

to Mr. George P. Williams, Associate Counsel to the President at

the White House, dated July 23, 1974, captioned "Electronic

Coverage Placed

at the Request

of the White House."

By way of background, the Senate Select Committee (SSC)

has requested certain documents and information relating to the

so-called "Kissinger 17."

Some of this information has already

been prepared and

furnished to O'Connor with the caveats that the

Government has not publicly admitted to 15 of the coverages involved

and some material relating to the remaining two has been impounded

by court order due to pending civil suits.

The decision was left,

to the Department as to whether or not material prepared in resporse

Ito SSC requests should be made available to that Committee.

Mr. O'Connor on June 9, 1975, requested of Assistant Director®

John Mintz a briefing as to the contents of the above July 43, 15x4,

letter which he believed summarized information available to the o

Bureau concerning the 17 wire taps. •

On June 17, 1975, Special Agents John W. Dalseg and

Thomas J. McNiff met

with Mr. William O'Connor and the latter's

assistant, Michael T.

Shaheen, in the office of Mr. O'Connor. Afte

ya briefing on the contents of the July

letter Mr. O'Cognor

concluded that information contained

enclosures is too sketchy to enable a knowledgeable determination

be made as to whether or not requested material should be released

to SSC. Mr. O'Connor stated he 'believed such a determination could

only be made after a review of the entire file relating to the

Enclosure

REC- 102

62-116-395-21

ENGLOSURE

62-116395

CONTINUED - OVER

1 - 65-75085

AIL INFORMATION CONTARCH

17 JUN 26 1975

ADDENDUM PAGE 3

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED Compt 57,082

dis sen

(8)

8450261915

DATE

DocId: 32989609

5/10/82 BY28s8seflefnde

Page 188

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## Page 189

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall

Re:

Senate Select Committee

62-116395

"Kissinger 17" and he stated his office would, in the near future,

prepare a letter to the Director similarly requesting that

Mr. Shaheen or some other designated representative of his staff

be granted authority to review the Bureau file concerning the

matter in question.

OBSERVATIONS:

During the above conversation Mr. O'Connor appeared to

be primarily interested in the completeness of the Bureau file with

regard to matters relating to the "Kissinger 17" and to what degree

information in this file had been made public. It was explained to

Mr. O'Connor, who appeared knowledgeable concerning the history of

these documents, that this file contains all communications known

to be in existence concerning the "Kissinger I7," but no one can

state with certainty, due to the manner in which this material was

handled at the specific request of the White House, that the file

contains

all communications prepared in this

matter.

With regard

to publicity afforded these documents, Mr. O'Connor

stated he is

familiar with the documents which had

been made available to the

Department for referral to various Committees and he is familiar

with excised versions of these documents which had been published

by these Committees.

He indicated that the Department's present

problem is that no record has been located in the Department to

date as to just which material or in what form such material

furnished by the Bureau to the Department was subsequently turned

lover to the Committees by the Department. O'Connor stated it

could be embarrassing at this time to make available to the SSC

material which had

not previously been made available to the

Congressional Committees and equally embarrassing to withhold

from the SSC material which was previously furnished Congressional

Committees.

ACTION:

None. Above submitted for information.

aut jord

sail

- 2 -

HW 55024 DocId:32989609 Page 189

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## Page 190

ADDENDUM:

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

TJM: 1hb

6/19/75

In anticipation of Department's request cited in

instant memorandum to review Bureau

• files concerning the so-called

"Kissinger 17' Special Agent (SA) Robert F. Peterson, Office of

egal Counsel, on 6/18/75 contacted Department Attorney Edwar

hristenbury: who is handling the Halperin Civil Suit, t

determine if the United States District Court's (USDC) impoundment

would prevent this Bureau making available this file to

representatives of the Department. Christenbury, late 6/18/75,

advised SA Peterson that he, Christenbury, had contacted plaintiff's

(Halperin) attorney, who advised he had no objection to this

file being made available to a Department representative for

review.

Christenbury then attempted to contact USDC Judge

John Lewis Smith, who issued the impoundment order in this matter.

Christenbury spoke to Judge Smith's law clerk, who advised that

in view of the position taken by plaintiff's attorney, he did .

not believe that Judge Smith would interpose any objection to

the Department's anticipated request. The law clerk stated,

however, that he would contact Judge Smith at the earliest

opportunity to obtain a ruling and would advise Christenbury of

the results.

You will be advised of the results when received.

We on Cr

you for

com

HH 55024 Do0Id:32989609 Page 190

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## Page 191

OPTIONAL FORM NO: 10

MAY 1262 EDIZIDA

OSA IPMA (41 CFR 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

: Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 6/10/75

FROM

: Legal

Counsel 1'

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

On 6/9/75, Mr. K. William O'Connor telephonically

advised me that the Committee is interested in information concerning

certain electronic surveillance coverage instituted at the request of the

White House concerning seventeen individuals. Mr. O'Connor said that

he understands that a letter was addressed to the White House by the

Bureau furnishing copies of documents that summarized the information

available to the Bureau concerning the alleged seventeen wiretaps.

„Mr. O'Connor requested that he be briefed concerning this matter

in order for him to discuss the Committee's requests.

It appears that Mr. O'Connor may be referring to a ietter

dated July 23, 1974, that was addressed to Mr. George P. Williams:

Associate Counsel to the President, at the White House.

A memorandum

was addressed to the Attorney General also dated July 23, 1974, captioned

"Electronic Coverage Placed At The Request of the White House, " which

advised the Department that pursuant to the authorization of the Deputy

Attorney General certain documents had been furnished to Mr. Williams

at the White House.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Intelligence Division identify the materials involved

in Mr. O'Connor's request and provide him with an appropriate briefing.

1 - Mr. Wannall

1 - Mr. Cregar

1 - Mr. Hotis

1 - Mr. Daly

1 - Mr. Mintz

JAM:mtm

AsIat- Dir.

Des AD ins. -

2555. Dira:

Comp Syst.

Ext- Affairs

Files & Carto.

Ser. Inv.

ПуреЕтіол

ATtall. -

Lsitanstary.

Lagal Cour.

Flar- 3 Evci..

Scare. Inv..

Training

Teephone Rit. -

Diactor Sec'y-

HH

J.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

WEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED CAmp # 87.082

DATE 5/10/82 BY 285458//nde

277)

62

116393

phillip's

ENCLOSURE

DOCId: 3298203 109

191

Samos Ronds Reonlarly on the Pavroll Savings Plan

---

## Page 192

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

MAY 1962 EDITION

GSA FPAIR (41 CFN 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Mr. J. B. Adams

LITO

FROM

DATE:

Legal Counsel

6-18-75

4322

SUBJECT:

‹SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir.

ep. AD Adm

Dep. AD Iny,

Asst. Diff:

Admin.

Comp. Syst.

Ext. Affairs -

Filos & Com. -

Gon, Inv. -

Idont. -

Inspection -

Intell.

Laboratory

Lagal Cou

Plan. & Eval._

Spoch Inv. _

Training

Telephone Rm. _

Diroctor Soc'y -.

By memo dated 6-10-75, you were advised that

K. William O'Connor, Special Counsel for Intelligence

Coordination in the Department, requested he be allowed to

review

a summary prepared concerning the so called "Kissinger,

17" wiretaps since the Senate Select Committe had included a

request for information concerning them in their letter of

May 14, 1975. Mr. O'Connor and his Deputy, Michael Shaheen,

reviewed the

summaries.

At Mr. O'Connor's request, a conference was held

with Messrs O'Connor and Shaheen and SA Robert Peterson,

SA Paul V. Daly, Inspector John B. Hotis, and Assistant

Director John A. Mintz, present to discuss the SSC request for

documents concerning the "Kissinger 17" wiretaps and his concern

that the furnishing of such documents might adversely impact

on existing litigation involving the Bureau, and may subject the

Bureau to additional lawsuits.

Most of the documents in question

are also under a protective order of the Court in the Halperin

Case and therefore, a release must be orchestrated with the

Court.

Mr. O'Connor suggested that a summary of existing

summaries of these wiretaps be prepared by the Department and

with the acquiescence of the Court which issued the protective

order be made available for review by the Committee in the

1 - Mr. Wannall

(Attn: Mr.

1 - Mr. Mintz

1 - Mr. Hotis

1 - Mr. Daly

Cregar)

(6)

"LL INFORMATION CONTAINES

AT 10-16-2000 BE SD2AN

MMDR-14

REG- 102

62-115385-7

(CONTINUED - OVER)

32R5C5AN0

47 JUN 26 1975

12 6 1975

HH

55076-DocId: 32989609

Buy Pase Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

---

## Page 193

...

Legal Counsel to Adams, Memo

Re:

SENSTUDY 75

Department of Justice. Mr. O'Connor also mentioned that the

summary would, of course, have to set forth the sufficient

information to allow the Committee to make a determination that the

information derived from these wiretaps was not used for political

purposes. Mr. Mintz expressed concern that the publication

or leaking of information from summaries could expand the number

and nature of suits facing the Bureau

and suggested the Department

should, in obtaining the Court approval for making the summaries

available, request the Court to issue appropriate safeguards

against publication of such information. Mr. O'Connor stated

that such a recommendation to the Court would be proper and that

this would be done.

Mr. Mintz told Mr. O'Connor that the Bureau at this

time cannot make a commitment to the making available of the

summaries to the Committee without further study and approval,

and

I an approval would be sought expeditiously.

Additionally,

Mr. Mintz requested that the Bureau be given the opportunity to

review

the summaries prepared by the Department to insure the

Bureau's interests are protected.

RECOMMENDATION:

That we notify the Department that we are in agreement

concerning the preparation of summaries based on existing

summaries of "Kissinger 17" wiretaps with the provision that

we be given the opportunity to review these summaries prior

to the Department seeking Court approval for making them

available.

goo

pus

FEM

-

2

NH 55024 DocId: 32989609 Page 193

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## Page 194

:

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

ONE ACT SEES COCTE

ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

2 - Ir. J. A. Mintz

(1 - HIr. J. B. Hotis)

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

1 - Mr. W. 0. Cregar

June 9, 1975

1 - Mr. R. H. Horner

I - Mr.

T. E. Burns

By letter dated Hay 14, 1975, with attached appendices,

the SSC requested certain information and documents fron the FBI.

Inclosed for your approval and forwarding to the

Committec is the original of a memorandum containing a

response to one of the Committee's requests.

A copy of this nomorandun is being furniched for

your records.

Enclosures - 2

G2-116395

I - The Deputy Attorney Genoral

Attention: K. Hillian O'Connor

Spocial Counsel for

Intelligence Coordination

TEB : amt dit

(10)

ST, INCORMATIUT CONTAIN

MDR-16

Assoc. Dir. _

Dep. AD Adm. -

Dep. AD Inv. -=

Asst. Dir.:

Admin,

Comp. Syst..

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com..

Gen. Inv. _

Ident. _

Inspection

Intell.

Laboratory

So. he al'

Training -

Legal Coun.

Telephone Rm.

REC- 102

62-132 270

97 JUN 26 1975

,BOOM L.

32989609

TELETYPE UNIT

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1180 401-749

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## Page 195

our on

62-716395

2 - Мг. J.

A. Mintz

(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)

1 - Mr.

W. R. Wannall

1 - Mr. W. 0. Cregar

1 - Мг.

B. H. Horner

1 - Mr. T. B, Burns

June 9, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH

RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE:

REQUEST PERTAINING TO ELECTRONIC

SURVEILLANCE

ALL IHORMATION CONTALVED

MDR-16

Reference is made to SSC letter dated May 14, 1975,

with attached appendices, reguesting certain documents and

other information Iron the fBI.

Iten number 21, Appondix D, roquests that with

respect to each occasion on which the Director of the FBI

testified bafore the House Appropriations Committee from

1965 until the present, the number of warrantless electronic

surveidlances in operation be provided for:

(a) The date of such testimony;

30 days prior to such testinony; and

{c) 30 days subsequent to such testimony.

Set forth below is the number of warrantless

electronic survelllances in operation with respect to oach

occasion on which the Director of the FBI testilled before

the Houge Appropriations Comnittee fron 1965 until present.

Also sot forth for part of 1967 and all of 1968 through 1972

are the number of such varrantless electronic survelllances

in operation approsinately 30 days prior to such testinony

and approximately 30 days subsequent to such testimony.

As

a rasult of the manner in which our filing systen is presently

constituted, strtistice covering the period 30 days before the

Director's testimony and 30 days following his testinony for

the years 1965, 1966 and part of 1967 are not availablo as a

practical matter. Furthermore, the number in operation 30 days

Assoc. Dir.

Dep. AD Adm. -

Dep. AD Inv. _

Asst. Dir.:

Admin. -

Comp. Syst. -..

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com. -

Gen. Inv. -

Ident.

Inspection

Intell.

Laboratory

Plan. & Eval. -

Spec. Inv. _

Training -

Legal Cour. -.

Telephone Rm. -

Director Sec"y -

HH 55024

TEB:dmt

(9)

SES NOTE PAGE 3

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi

nation outside your Committee.

Its use is himited to official proceedings by

MAIL ROOM

Wow Committee and the content may not he disclosed to wouthorized pot ea

rel without the tree approve of the a li

TELETYPE UNIT

DooId: 32989609

1-546

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## Page 196

INITED STATES SENATE SBLICI COMMITT

SO STUDY GOVERNMINTAL O'ERATIONS WITI

RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

prior to and 30 days subsoquent to the Director's testimony

could not be determinad in all instancos and tharafore, the

figures provided aro for intos as close to the sunday time

frane as practicablo.

Finally, the Director ceased testifytag before

the House Appropriations Conmittee rogarding the number of

MarIantIess eloctIOnIC BurvOlllanCas in operation subsequent

to hia March 2, 1972, appearance and therefore the request

In unanamorable with respect to 1973, 1974 and 1975.

DATE OF

BEFORE

DIRECTOR'S TESTIMONY

AFTER

March

1965

44

ENP

SCriAVaL DO

racticable (KNP

FebruBIy 10, 1966

RNP

February 16, 1987

ENP

JanUAry 15, 1968

33

Karan 29, 1968

February 5, 1970

38

Fabruary 16, 1971

February 23, 1988

January 31, 1972

32

Apr11 17, 1969

49

March 5, 1970

36

karch 17, 1971

38

March 2, 1972

34

1 - The Attorney General

RNP

March 13, 1967

42

March 22,

1968

kay 15, 1969

50

Apr12 G, 1970

Apx11 17. 1972

March 31, 1972

35

- 2 -

NN 55024 DocId: 32989609 Page 196

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## Page 197

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COLLITTLE

TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH

RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

NOTE :

The above material which ve are furnishing the

Committee was supplied by the Special Records and Rolated

Research Unit of IS - 3 which has responsibility for

information in the requested area. Similarly, this Unit

deternined that the infornation requested was not retrievable

as a practical matter with regard to 1965, 1966 and part

and 1075 the 30-day timo framo, and for the years 1973, 1974

-3 -

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197

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## Page 198

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

bedressee:

Senate Select Committee

gence activities.Re: Request Pertaining to

Electronic Surveillance

Originating Office:

FBI

Delivered by:.

_Date: 66-13-25-

Received by: -

shut Ella,

Title:

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ATT. INFORMITTE

HH 55024

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Page

198

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## Page 199

BOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

BEFORE COMPLETING.

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

Intelligence Community Staff

ATTN: Central Index

FROM:

Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term.

If a document was made available

2. DATE PROVIDED

for review

but

transmitted, so

note.)

6/9/75

DOCUMENT

BRIEFING

INTERVIEW

TESTIMONY

JOTHER

3.

TO WHOM PROVIDED

(check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)

SSC

J. I. Elliff

4.

HSC

IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer.

nterviewee, testifier and subject

Request Pertaining to Electronic Surveillance

5.

RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, other-

state verbal request

of (name),

initiative,

subpoena, etc.)

SSC letter 5/14/75, Appendix D, Item 21.

"U"

1. KEY

'order dent for e phasiariate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are

emphasis)

i i",

•**""TIC"T COLTANTED

SURVEILLANCE

• T00 NOM EX

8. SUMMARY (see

reverse

side before completing this

it em)

Furnishes SSC with number, where available, of warrantless

electronic surveillances operated by FBI at time of Director's

testimony before House Appropriations Committee, as well as

number in effect approximately 30 days prior and subsequent to

such testimony.

NOTE:: Ouginal via diaison to Cential Community Inde

onnection with senstudy 75.

6-24-75 2F5

IVO

TREAT AS YELLOW

TJM:1hb

(4)

62-116395

379| 16-751

HW 55024 DooId:32989609 Page 199

5-TIM

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

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## Page 200

INSTRUCTIONS

-

• Type or print clearly in ink.

• Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

• Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

• "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the

information.

• If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to

HSC) or changes'to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a

copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing

natters if appropriate.

should be noted.

Commitments made to supply additional information should be

noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here,

e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether

interviewee is current or former employee, etc. II actual document or transcript

is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional

pages may be attached if necessary.

HN 55024 . DocId: 32989609

Page 200

---

## Page 201

OPTIONAL FORMANO, 10

HAT4PSZÈDITION

GSA FPAIR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

: Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 6-6-75

Assoc. Dir. _

Dep. AD Adm. -

Dap. AD Inv. -

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

Comp. Syst.

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com. -

Gen. Inv. -

Ident.

indiaton

FROM

SUBJECT:

SENSTUDY 75

ATT INTO MTATOR COMMATIED

pec. Inv. -

Training

Telophone Rm. _

Director Soc'y -

Mark Gitenstein, staff member of captioned Committee

who has been doing an extensive inquiry into the "official and confidential"

tiles reportedly maintained in former Director Hoover's office,

telephonically contacted SA Paul V. Daly 6-5-75 and requested the

identities of the employees who had brought the material from the

Director's office during May, 1972, to Mr. Hoover's residence and

to Mr. Felt's office.

By way of background, Mr. Gitenstein has obtained through

interview of Mr. Felt, former Assistant to the Director John P. Mohr,

and other Bureau personnel familiar with the operations of the Director's

office, considerable knowledge concerning the official and confidential

files.

There is also an extensive request contained in captioned Committee's

letter of 5-4-75 pertaining to information surrounding these files.

Additionally, we responded to a request of the Committee contained in their

letter of 4-28-75 pertaining to the allegation of removal of certain material

from Mr. Hoover's residence after the death of former Associate Director

Clyde Tolson. We have not, at this point, determined that Bureau documents

have been removed from Bureau space to Mr. Hoover's residence or any

other place outside the Bureau. However, it is apparent that Mr. Gitenstein

has information, or believes he has information, relating to the removal

of Bureau documents.

BEC 88

62

-/1.3

MI. Gitenstein stated he had recontacted tormer Assistant

-269X1

to the Director John P. Mohr on 6-5-75 and Mr. Mohr, in response to

Mr. Gitenstein's question, stated that the identities of employees who may

have brought material from the Director's office to Mr. Hoover's residence

and to Mr. Felt's office subsequent to Mr. Hoover's death could be learned

through an inquiry in the Mechanical Section supply room.

62-116395

₴ 1111!

1 - Mr. Wannall

1 - Mr. Hotis* -

1 - Mr. Cregar

1 - Mr. Walsh

1 - Mr. Bassett

1 - Mr. Daly

2 - Mr. Mintz

PVD:kjs, (10)

CONTINUED - OVER

84

3 1 1975•

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

HW 550340-0DocId: 32989609

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## Page 202

Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams

RE: SENSTUDY 75

In light of this response, Mr. Gitenstein requested that

the Bureau identify the personnel involved and it is his obvious intention

that the personnel will be interviewed.

Inasmuch as the Inspection Division is conducting inquiry

into this matter, it would appear proper for that Division to determine

the identities of such personnel and,

if deemed necessary, interview in

connection with the current inquiry.

It is also believed that while this

request is oral in nature from the Committee, we should consider

furnishing the information as to the identities of employees to the

Committee inasmuch as if we do not respond to the oral request •

Mr. Gitenstein indicated, because of the Committee's interest in this

matter, there would be no problem in his obtaining authority to turnish the

request in writing. It is apparent at this point that we would not be able

to keep such information from the Committee if such a written request were

to be received. Additionally, by responding to the oral request it will

encourage the Committee, in the areas they described as "abuse-type,"

to give us an advance indication as to their inquiries.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Inspection Division make the necessary inquiry

concerning the identities of the employees and, if deemed advisable,

make available to the Legal Analysis Office that information which will

be furnished to the Committee.

- 2 -

HH 55024

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Page 202

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## Page 203

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis

The Attorney General

May 29, 1975

Director, FBI

1 - Mc. H. R. Wannall

1 - Mr. H. O. Cregar

u. s.

SATATE SELICI COURTE IO

STUDY GOVERIMENTAL, OPERATIOUS VITH

RESPECT TO INTOLLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Inclosed for your information is the original of

a memorandum concerning the interview of retired Special

Agent Charles D. Brennan by members of the Senate Select

Committee Staff. A copy of this memorandum is also enclosed

for forwarding to Ix. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel

to the President.

Enclosures - 2

62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

WOC : ektr

(10)

K!!

DATE 2.20:81 BY SP4URMM

6076

NOTE:

See memorandum W. O. Cregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall,

captioned "Senstudy 75," dated 5/28/75, prepared by MOC:el.

1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)

1 - 67-428100 (Personnel File of Charles D. Brennan)

PIl, 9104

id i

Assoc, Dir. -

Dep. AD Adm.

Dep. AD Inv..

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

Comp. Syst.

Ext. Affairs...

Files & Com. -

Gen, Inv. .

Ident..

Inspection

Intell.

Laboratory

Plan. & Evaldf

pec. Inge

raining

Legal Coun

Telephone Rm. =

Director Sec'y

MAIL ROOM

ROBe

14:32989609

His: del

REG. 102

87 JUN 26 1975

TELETYPE UNIT

Page 203

Did: 400229"

UNREC COPY AND COPY

ENCL FILED IN

GPO 954-345

---

## Page 204

62-116395

INFORMATION CONTAINED

UNCLASSIFIED

RE:

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams

1 - Mr.

J. A. Mintz

1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

May 29, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

U. S. SENATE SELECI COMITILE TO STUY

GOVERIMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH

RESPECI TO INTELLIGIICE ACTIVITIES

INTERVIEW DE RETIRED SPECIAL AGENT (SA)

CHARLES D. BRENNAN BY STAFF MEMBERS OF

THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC)

HEREIN IS

Set out below is information voluntarily furnished

'to the FBI by retired SA Charles D. Brennan following his

voluntary interview by Mark Gitenstein ani two other Indiviusals

whose names Brennan did not get.

Gitenstein as well as the

two umaned Inütvicuals lüentifled themselves as Staff Members

of the SSC.

The Interview which took place in Washington, D. C.,

on May 22, 1975, lasted approximately two hours. Brennan was

not provided with a copy of Senate Resolution 21; was not

provided with a copy of the Rules of Procedure of the SSC;

nor was he advised of his rights including his right to private

counsel.

The interview, which was not conducted under oath,

covered three specific areas: the organizational structure

of the FBI; Martin luther Ring, JI.; and COINTELPRO.

With regard to the organizational stzucture, they

askeú frennan to describe what a unit, section, and division

constituted at FBI Headquarters. They showed him several copies

of C. D. Brennan to l. G. Sullivan memorania asking him about

Assoc. Dir. -

specific facts containe in these memorancia.

When Brennan falled

Dep. An in. to have intimate krorledge of the memorande, they wondered why

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

he had such a poor memory when in fact they were memorande from

Comp. syst. him. Brennan then proceedes to explain hor such memorantia tere

Files & Com..

preparent coate Ass Brent Street, name, Suitivan, but chief,

Laboratory - WOC: ekw

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

Training -

Legal Coun.

Telephone Rm.

Director See'y -

HH 55024

MAIL ROOM I

TELETYPE UNIT

DocId: 32989609 Page 204

ENCLOSER 1-111

2: 40351385

---

## Page 205

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: INTERVIEW OF SA CHARLES D. BRENNAN BY SSC

With regard to Martin Iuther King, JI., Brennan advised

that he got the impression from the Staff Members they felt

the Bureau hau an "Illegitimate" interest in King. Brennan

countered by saying the basis for the FBI interest in King

was predicated on the communist influence surrounding King.

He was asked if the Bureau employed many wiretaps against king

to which he answered that most of the information obtained was

derived from live informants.

Relative to the COINTELPRO, Brennan advised the

Staff Members he couldn't be very specific regarding COINTELPRO

Inasmuch as he did not pay too much attention to it. They

questioned him about this statement and Brennan stated that

COINteLPrO was "Deanuts.

Brennan was asked why he didn't recommend COINIELPRO be dis-

continued to which he replied "If City Hall wants 1t, you give

them that they want."

NOTE:

See memorandum W. 0. Cregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall,

captioned "Senstudy 75," dated 5/28/75, prepared by WOC:ekw.

HH 55024

DocId: 32989609 Page 205

---

## Page 206

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

BEFORE COMPLETING.

10:

Intelligence Community Staff

ATTN: Central Index

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

FROM:

FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (check

ppropriate term.

If a document was made available

review

ransmitted, so note..

DOCUMENT|

BRIEFING

35 INTERVIEW

TESTIMONY

OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

5/29/75

3.

TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)

SSC

Provided to Attorney General with copy for forwarding

to the White House.

HSC

4.

IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; live name or identification number of briefer,

interviewee, testifier and subject)

Memorandum reporting results of Interview by SSC Staff Members

with forner FBI Special Agent Charles D. Brennan.

IN RESPONSE TO (list date

wise

and item number if in response to formal request, other-

state verbal request of (name), initiative,

subpoena, etc.)

NA

6. CLASSIFICATION OF

INFORMATION (enter

CodewS, IS or

U

7. KEY

WORDS

used

underline for emphasis

the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are

Organization

Operating procedures

MDR-16

8. SUMMARY (see

reverse side before

completing

this item)

Interview covered three specific areas:

1) Organizational structure of FBI

3)

THEN AS YELLOW

5-8

SrPilhb

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN

(4)

CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.

62-116395

6-24-75-255

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

379| (6-751

WW 55024 DocId:32989609 Page 206

---

## Page 207

INSTRUCIIONS

• Type or print clearly in ink.

• Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

• Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

• "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the

information.

• If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent tc

HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a

copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing

substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community

matters if appropriate.

Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests

should be noted.

Commitments made to supply additional information should be

noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here,

e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether

interviewee is current or former employee,

etc. If actual document or transcript

is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional

pages may be attached if necessary.

1H 55024

DooId: 32989609

Page 207

---

## Page 208

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

DEC 1 9 1975

TO:

Mike FROM:

SUBJECT:

John A. Mintz, Assistant Director

Legal Counsel Division

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.

Special Counsel for Intelligence

Coordination

House Select Committee Request

Attached is a letter from the House Select •

Committee requesting access to certain Bureau

information on the U. S. Recording Company. Please

prepare an appropriate response.

thats

TJie

PVD

CC :

Paul Daly

Ranack,

suresser,

airsest

17/20/76.

Keekaw

ALL INFORMATIO CONTARVED

REC-100

#:: 11:004-26841

Co FEB 19 1075

: =2...

12-22-75

$ 4058 1 8 19782989609

Page

208

---

## Page 209

NEr

TO: John A, Mintz, Assistant Director

Legal Counsel Division

Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM:

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.

Special Counsel for Intelligence

Coordination

SUBJECT: House Select Comnittao Request

Attached is a letter from the House Select

Committee requesting access to certain Bureau

information on the U. S. Recording Company.

Please

prepare an appropriate response.

co: Paul Daly

MDR16

HH 55024

DocId: 32989609

Page

209

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## Page 210

OTIS G, PIKE, N. Y., CHAIRMAN

ROBERT N. GIAIMO, CONN.

ROBERT MCCLORY, ILL.

JAMES V. STANTON, OHIO

RONALD V. DELLUMS, CALIF.

MORGAN F. MURPHY, ILL..

JAMES P. JOHNSON, COLO.

ROBERT W. KASTEN, JR., WIS.

LES ASPIN, WIS.

DALE MILFORD, TEX.

PHILIP'H. HAYES, IND,

WILLIAM LEHMAN, FLA.

A. SEARLE FIELÒ, STAFF DIRECTOR

AARON B. DONNER, COUNSEL

TELEPHONEs: (202) 225-9751

Select Committee on Intelligence

M.S. House of Representatives

¿Hashington, D.C. • 20515

December 18, 1975

MI. Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.

Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination

U. S. Department of Justice

Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Shaheen:

In order to complete our analysis of the cost of

intelligence,

we request access to any and all financial

analyses compiled by the FBI with regard to transactions

between the FBI and the U.S. Recording Company•

Since we are under time constraints, we hope you can

provide access to these figures at your earliest possible

convenience.

Sincerely,

Ashl the

A. Searle Field

Staff Director

ASF/TO/mas

AIL INFORMATION CONTAINL

ERAIN IS UNCLAOSTIN

ATS 1016-2000 BX SPRAN

RECEIVED

UtL 17 :975

121

HH 55024

DocId: 32989609

Page 210

ENCLOSURE

268k1

62-116464

---

## Page 211

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

5010-106

MAY 1962 EXTON

ESA'GEN, 'REG. NO, 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1

- Mr.

J.

B.

Adams

1 - Mr.

J.

A.

Mintz

1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis

:MR.

W. R. WANNALL

DATE: May 28, 1975

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

FROM

:MR.

L INFORMATION CONTAMEN".

0. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

OREOS UNCINERY 4

Assoc. Dir.

Dep. AD, Adm

Depi ADllav.!1

Asst. piral

Admin.

Comp. Syst. —

Ext. Affairs

Files &,

Gen. In

Ident

L abbratory -

This memorandum reports the results of a tete=

Direphone Rm te

Diractor

phonic conversation with former Special Agent (SA) Charles D.

Brennan and recommends that the attached letter to the Attorney

General with enclosures be sent.

On the morning of 5/23/75 the Department of Justice

advised Assistant Director Mintz that former SA Brennan has or was

to be interviewed by Staff Members of the Senate Select Committee

(SSC). On that same date I telephonically contacted Mr. Brennan

to advise him that the Bureau had been alerted to the fact he was

going to be interviewed by the SSC Staff and should he desire, a

representative of the Bureau could be available during the interview

for consultation. It was made clear to Brennan that the role of

the

Bureau representative would be to insure that he could consult with

the representative at any time during the interview should the

of inquiry reveal; the identity of sensitive FBI sources, method!

or sensitive investigative techniques; information derived from

third agencies or friendly foreign intelligence services; or any

information which Brennan felt could adversely affect sensitive

ongoing FBI investigations.

100

chat. At what appeared to be the conclusion of the conversation,

Cregar asked Brennan if he had been contacted by the SSC Staff. S

Brennan advised that he had received a telephone call earlier in the

week inviting him to an interview in Washington, D. C., and in fact

was interviewed on 5/22 by SSC Staff Members Mark Gitenstein and

two others whose names Brennan did not get.

Brennan showed some concern over the fact that the Staff

had invited him to be interviewed earlier in the week but only

notified the Department subsequent to his interview.

(At the

outset of the conversation with Brennan, I had advised him that

the SSC had Informed the Departmend Tch in turn informed the,

62-116395

Enclosures - Sont 5-30-75 edm

62-116395-5

1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, JI.)

1 = 67-428100 (Personnel thie ot Charles D. Beman) 361975 OVER

PRodUN 2001029500 Kn

12989609 Page 21:

---

## Page 212

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall

RE:

SENSTUDY 75

62-116395

Bureau that he was to be interviewed). Brennan stated he was

not furnished a copy of the Senate Resolution or its Rüles of

Procedures and was not advised of his rights or the fact that

he could be represented by counsel. He was not put under oath,

and was not given any indication as to the scope of the inter-

view prior to his appearance in Washington. In response to a

question by Cregar as to what areas the interview covered,

Brennan stated the interview covered three specific topics.

(1) The organizational structure of the Bureau; (2) Martin Luther

King, JI.; (3) the COINTELPRO.

With regard to the organizational structure Brennan

advised that the Staff Nembers appear to have little understanding

as to the way the Bureau was structured. He stated they had no

appreciation of what a unit, section, or division was comprised

of.

They showed him several copies of memoranda from Brennan to

Sullivan;

and proceeded to ask him about the contents of these

memoranda. When Brennan was unable to describe the background

or details surrounding a specific memorandum, they voiced

wonderment as to why he had such little recollection about a

memorandum he apparently wrote.

Brennan advised the Staff

Members that just because the memorandum was written from him

to Sullivan did not mean that he necessarily wrote the memorandum

or even saw it.

In respecttto Martin Luther King, JI., Brennan got

the impression that the Staff Members believed the Bureau was

"illegitimately" interested in King. Brennan advised that he

hit back hard on this stating that the Bureau's interest in

King was predicated on the communist influence surrounding

King. They asked if the Bureau had employed many wiretaps

against King. Brennan advised that most of the information

obtained on King derived from live informants. Brennan voiced

the opinion that the Staff Members wererather disappointed with

Brennan's defense of the Bureau in the King investigation.

Staff Members showed some disappointment in Brennan's

inability to remember circumstances surrounding COINTELPRO.

Brennan responded by saying that he never paid much attention

- 2 -

HH 55024 DocId: 32989609 Page 212

---

## Page 213

Memorandum to Mr.

RE:

SENSTUDY 75

62-116395

W. R. Wannall

to COINTELPRO and when compared to such activity as to the

Bay of Pigs and the Glomar Explorer, the COINTELPRO was

"peanuts."

At' the conclusion of the conversation, Brennan advised

that SSC Staff Members indicated they would want him to return

for additional interviews. I advised Brennan that should he

receive a subpoena to return or should he be invited to return

to Washington, D. C., to be interviewed under oath, it would be

wiseffor him to contact the FBI's Legal Counsel Division for

advice to insure that he was in compliance with the Attorney

General's order relative to the release of information obtained

while an employee of the FBI. Brennan indicated he would contact

the Legal Counsel Division should he be contacted by the SSC and

would probably ask that a Bureau representative be available for

consultation during a subsequent interview or testimony.

ACTION: If approved, the attached letter to the Attorney General

and its enclosures reflecting the results of the debriefing of

Brennan, be sent.

pur

gma

-

• 3

-

MH 55024

DocId: 32989609

Page 213

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## Page 214

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

1-75

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

May 28, 1975

I steal,

/ 'EMORANDOM TO ALL. EMPLOYEES

RE: INTERVIEWS OF FBI EMPLOYEES

All employees are advised that Congress is conducting

an inquiry into activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Congressional staff members are conducting interviews of former

and current FBI employees. This Bureau has pledged its cooperation

with the Congress.

You are reminded of the FBI Employment Agreement

(copy attached) with which you agreed to comply during your employment

in the FBI and following termination of such employment.

Also, you are reminded of Title 28, Code of Federal

Regulations, Section 16.22 (copy attached), which reads as follows:

"No employee or former employee of the Department of

Justice shall, in response to a demand of a court or other authority,

produce any material contained in the files of the Department or disclose

any information relating to material contained in the files of the Department,

ALL INFORMATION CONTATIN

or disclose any information or produce any material acquired as part of

the performance of his official duties or because of his official status

ORIGINAL FILED

FIRKIN IS UNCLASSINED

016-2060 BY SPRE

without prior approval of the appropriate Department official or the

Attorney General in accordance with Section 16. 24."

Also, you are reminded of Department of Justice Order

MOP-16

Number 116-56, dated May 15, 1956, (copy attached) which, among

other things, requires an employee upon the completion of his testimony

to prepare a memorandum outlining his testimony.

Our cooperative efforts, of course, must be consistent

with the above cited authority. Therefore, if you are contacted for

purpose of interview or testimony you are to request approval as

required by the Employment Agreement and await authorization before

ENCLOSURE

furnishing intormation, testimony, or record material.

02-116398

Enclosures (3)

Mittee TOT RECORDED.

46 SUN 26 1975

Clarence M. Kelley

Director

19 7 1975

WH 55024s DocId: 32989609 Page 214

---

## Page 215

FD-291 (Rev. 11-1-73)

EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT

As consideration for employment in the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), United

States Department of Justice, and as a condition for continued employment, I hereby declare

that I intend to be governed by and I will comply with the following provisions:

(1) That I am hereby advised and I understand that Federal law such as

Title 18, United States Code, Sections 793, 794, and 798; Order of the

President of the United States (Executive Order 11652); and regulations

issued by the Attorney General of the United States (28 Code of Federal

Regulations, Sections 16.21 through 16.26) prohibit loss, misuse, or un-

authorized disclosure or production of national security information, other

classified information and other nonclassified information in the files of

the FBI;

(2) I understand that unauthorized disclosure of information in the files

of the FBI or information I may acquire as an employee of the FBI could

result in impairment of national security, place human life in jeopardy, or

result in the denial of due process to a person or persons who are subjects

of an FBI investigation, or prevent the FBI from effectively discharging its

responsibilities. I understand the need for this secrecy agreement; there-

fore, as consideration for employment I agree that I will never divulge,

publish, or reveal either by word or conduct, or by other means disclose to

any unauthorized recipient without official written authorization by the

Director of the FBI or his delegate, any information from the investigatory

files of the FBI or any information relating to material contained in the files,

or disclose any information or produce any material acquired as a part of the

performance of my official duties or because of my official status. The burden

is on me to determine, prior to disclosure, whether information may be disclosed

and in this regard I agree to request approval of the Director of the FBI in each

such instance by presenting the full text of my proposed disclosure in writing to

the Director of the FBI at least thirty (30) days prior to disclosure. I understand

that this agreement is not intended to apply to information which has been placed

in the public domain or to prevent me from writing or speaking about the FBI but

it is intended to prevent disclosure of information where disclosure would be

contrary to law, regulation or public policy. I agree the Director of the FBI is

in a better position than I to make that determination;

(3) I agree that all information acquired by me in connection with my official

duties with the FBI and all official material to which I have access remains

the property of the United States of America, and I will surrender upon demand

by the Director of the FBI or his delegate, or upon separation from the FBI, any

material relating to such information or property in my possession;

(4) That I understand unauthorized disclosure may be a violation of Federal

law and prosecuted as a criminal offense and in addition to this agreement may

be enforced by means of an injunction or other civil remedy.

I accept the above provisions as conditions for my employment and continued employment

in the FBI. I agree to comply with these provisions both during my employment in the FBI and

following termination of such employment.

(Signature)

(Type or print name)

Witnessed and accepted in behalf of the Director, FBI, on

-, by

, 19

HH 55024

DocId: 32989609 Page 215

(Signature)

---

## Page 216

By.

LIT INFORMATION CONTAIED

FORINT IS

UNCTUSSIFIHD

101016-2020

MDR-16

'1H 55024

Office of the Attarney General

Washington, A. 0. 20530

January 18, 1973

ORDER NO.501-73

RULES AND REGULATIONS

Title 28- JUDICIAL

ADMINISTRATION

Chapter I-Department of Justice

[Order 501-73]

PART 16-PRODUCTION OR DISCLO-

SURE OF MATERIAL OR INFORMA-

other authority is issued for the produc-

or disclosure of (1)

anv material

contained in the files of the Department,

(2) any information relating to material

contained in the files of the Department,

acquired by any person while such per-

son was an employee of the Department

as a part of the performance of his of-

ficial duties or because of his official

Subpart B-Production or Disclosure

in Response to Subpenas or De-

mands of Courts or Other Authori-

This order delegates to certain De-

partment of Justice oficials the author-

ity to approve

the production or dis-

closure of material or information con-

tained in Department files, or informa-

tion or material acquired

by a person

while employed by the Department.

It

applies where a subpena, order or other

demand of a court or

other authority,

such as an administrative agency, is is-

sued for the production or disclosure of

such information.

By virtue of the authority vested in me

by 28 U.S.C. 509, 510, and 5 U.S.C. 301,

Subpart B of Part 16 of Chapter I of

Title 28, Code of Federal Regulations, is

For purposes of this subpart, the

term "employee of the Department" in-

cludes all officers and employees of the

United States appointed by, or subject

to the supervision, jurisdiction, or control

of, the Attorney General of the United

States, including U.S. attorneys, U.S.

marshals, and members of the staffs of

those offcials.

§ 16.22 Production or disclosure prohib-

ited unless approved by appropriate

Department oflicial.

No employee or former employee of the

Department of Justice shall, in response

to a demand of a court or other au-

thority, produce any material contained

in the files of the Department or disclose

any information relating to material con-

tained in the files of the Department, or

disclose any information or produce any

revised, and its provisions renumbered,

to read as follows:

Subpart B-Production or Disclosure in Response

to Subpenas or Demands of Courts or Other

formance of his official duties or because

of his official status without prior ap-

proval of the appropriate Department of -

ficial or the Attorney General in accord-

Authorities

Sec.

18.21 Purpose and scope.

§ 16.23 Procedure in the event of a de-

16.22 Froduction or disclosure prohibited

mand for production or disclosure.

unless approved by appropriate De-

(a) Whenever a demand is made upon

partment offcial.

an employee or former employee of the

Procedure in the event of & demand

Department for the production of ma-

for production or disclosure.

terial or the disclosure of information

16.24 Final action by the appropriate De-

partment official or the Attorney

described in § 16.21(a),

he

shall

im-

General.

mediately notify the U.S. attorney for

.6.25 Procedure where a Department deci-

the district where the issuing authority

sion concerning & demand is not

is located. The U.S. attorney shall im-

made prior to the time a response

mediately request instructions from

the

to the demand is required.

appropriate Department official, as desig-

6.26 Procedure in the event of an adverse

ruling.

nated in paragraph (b) of this section.

(b) The Department officials author-

AUTHORITY: 28 U.S.C. 509, 510 and 5 U.S.C.

ized to approve production or disclosure

101.

under this subpart are:

jubpart B-Production or Disclosure

(1) In the event that the case or other

in Response to Subpenas or De-

matter which gave rise to the demanded

mands of Courts or Other Authori-

material or information is or, if closed,

was within the cognizance of a division

ties

of the Department,

the Assistant At-

§ 16.21 Purpose and scope.

torney General in charge of that divi-

sion. This authority may be redelegated

(a) This subpart sets forth the pro-

to Deputy Assistant Attorneys General.

sedures to be followed when a subpena,

(2) In instances of demands that are

order, or other demand (hereinafter re-

not covered by paragraph (b) (1) of this

¿erred to as & "demand" of a couNcloserin:

12116378

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## Page 217

(1) The Director of the Federal Bu- § 16.26 Procedure in the event of an ad-

reau of Investigation, if the demand is

verse ruling.

one made on an employee or former em-

If the court or other authority declines

ployee of that Bureau for information to stay the effect of the demand in re-

or if the demand calls for the production

of material from the files of that Bu-

sponse to a request made in accordance

reau, and

with § 16.25 pending receipt of instruc-

(il) The Director of the Bureau of tions, or if the court or other authority

Prisons, if the demand is one made on

rules that the demand must be com-

an employee or former employee of that

plied with irrespective of instructions

Bureau for information or if the de-

mand calls for the production of ma-

not to produce the material or disclose

terial from the files of that Bureau.

the information sought, in accordance

(3) In instances of demands that are

with § 16.24, the employee or former em-

not covered by paragraph (b) (1) or (2)

ployee upon whom the demand has been

the Deputy Attorney made shall respectfully decline to comply

with the demand. "United States ex rel

(c) If oral testimony is sought by the

lemand, an affidavit, or, if that is not

Touhy v. Ragen," 340 U.S. 462.

Dated: January 11, 1973.

RICHARD G. BLENDIENSI,

Attorney General.

[FR Doc.73-1071 Filed 1-17-73;8:45 am]

sired, must be furnished for submission

by the U.S. attorney to the appropriate

Department oficial.

Department official

Ceneral.

(a) If the appropriate Department of-

icial, as designated in § 16.23(b), ap-

proves a demand for the production of

material or disclosure of information,

he shall so notify the U.S. attorney and

such other persons as circumstances may

the demand to the Attorney General for

decision. Upon such referral, the Attor-

ney General shall make the final decision

na give notice thereot to the U.S. attor

ey and such other persons as circum

stances may warrant.

§ 16.25

Procedure where a Departmer

ecision concerning a demand is n

made prior to the time a response 1o

the demand is required.

gu anons contained in this subpart ar

form the court or other authority the

the demand has been,

the case may be,

ferred being, ne

prompt consideration of the appropriate

separtment oficial and shall respect

cully request the court or authority to

stay the demand pending receipt of the

requested instructions.

HH 55024

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## Page 218

OFFICE OF THE AITORNEY GENERAL

WASHINGTON, D. C.

May 15, 1956

ORDER NO. 116-56

It 1s the policy of the Department of Justice to extend the fullest

possible cooperation to congressional committees requesting information from

departmental files, interviews with department employees, testimony of depart-

ment personnel, or testimony of Federal prisoners. The following procedures

are prescribed in order to effectuate this policy on a basis which will be

mutually satisfactory to the congressional committees and to the Department.

•(Inis order supersedes the Deputy Attorney General's Memorandum No. 5, dated

March 23, 1953; and his Memorandum No. 97, dated August 5, 1954.

It formal-

Izes the Attorney General's press release of November 5, 1953, establishing

procedures to permit cormittees of the Congress and their authorized repre-

sentatives to interview and to take sworn testimony from Federal prisoners.

It supplements Order No. 3229 (Revised) dated January 13, 1953, and Order

No. 3464, Supplement No. 4 (Revised) dated January 13, 1953 (with Memorandum

of "Authorization Under Order No. 3464 Supplement No. 4 (Revised)" dated

January 13, 1953), Insofar as said orders have reference to procedures to be

followed in the Department's relations with congressional committees. In

support of this order, reference should be had to the President's letter

dated May IT, 1954, addressed to the Secretary of Defense, and to the Attorney

General's Memorandum which accompanied it.]

A. REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION FROM DEPARTVENT FILES

Bp

1.

Congressional committee requests for the examination of files

ALL INFORMATION CONTAMIL?

or other confidential information should be reduced to writing, signed by

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

_BYSPRAUM

the chairman of the committee, and addressed to the Deputy Attorney General,

who is responsible for the coordination of our liaison with Congress and

congressional committees. The request shall state the specific information

sought as well as the specific objective for which it is sought. The Deputy

Attorney General will forward the request to the appropriate division where a

reply will be prepared and returned for the Deputy Attorney General's signa-

DATE 10-16-2000

oture and dispatch to the chairman of the committee.

MUR-1

2. Ii the request concerns a closed case, i. e., one in which

there is no litigation or administrative action pending or contemplated,

the file may be made available for review in the Department, in the presence

of the official or employee having custody thereof. The following procedure

shall be followed in such cases:

55024 DooId:32989609 Page 218

a. The reply letter will advise the committee that the

file is available for examination and set forth the

name, telephone extension number, and room number of

the person who will have custody of the file to be

reviewed;

ENCLOSUR

62-1163951

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## Page 219

- 2 .

b. Before making the file available to the committee

representative all reports and memoranda from the FBI

as well as investigative reports from any other agency,

will be removed from the file and not be made available

for examination; provided however that if the committee

representative states that it is essential that information

from the FBI reports and memoranda be made available,

he will be advised that the request will be considered

by the Department. Thereafter a summary of the contents

of the FBI reports and memoranda involved will be

prepared which will not disclose investigative tech-

niques,

the identity of confidential informants, or

other. matters which might jeopardize the investigative

operations of the FBI. This summary will be forwarded

by the division to the FBI with a request for advice as

to whether the FBI has any objection to examination of

such summary by the committee representative. The file

will not be physically relinquished from the custody of

the Department. If the committee representative desires

to examine investigative reports from other government

agencies, contained in the files of the Department, he

will be advised to direct his request to the agency whose

reports are concerned.

3. If the request concerns an open case, 1. e., one which liti-

gation or administrative action is pending or contemplated, the file may

not be made available for examination by the committee's representative.

The following procedure shall be followed:

The reply letter should advise the committee that

its request concerns a case in which litigation or

administrative action is pending or contemplated, and

state that the file cannot be made available until the

case is completed; and

b. Should briefly set forth the status of the case in

as much detail as is practicable and prudent without

jeopardizing the pending contemplated litigation or

administrative action.

B. REQUESTS FOR INTARVIETS WITH DEPARTMENTAL PERSONNEL

I. Requests for interviews with departmental personnel regarding

any official matters within the Department should be reduced to writing,

signed by the chairman of the committee, and addressed to the Deputy Attorney

General. When the approval of the Deputy Attorney General is given, the

employee is expected to discuss such matters freely and cooperatively with

the representative, subject to the limitations prescribed in A respecting

open cases and data in investigative reports;

HH 55024

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## Page 220

-3-

2. Upon the completion of the interview with the committee repre-

sentative the employee will prepare a summary of it for the file, with a

copy routed to his division head and a copy routed to the Deputy Attorney

General.

C. EMPLOYEES TESTIFYING BEFORE CONCRESSIONAL COMVITTEES

When an employee is requested to testify before a congressional

committee regarding official matters within the Department the Deputy Attorney

General shall be promptly informed.

When the Deputy Attorney General's approv-

al is given the employee is expected to testify freely subject to limitations

prescribed in A respecting open cases and data in investigative reports;

2. An employee subpoenaed to testify before a congressional committee

on official matters within the Department shall promptly notify the Deputy

Attorney General. In general he shall be guided in testifying by Order 3229

(Revised) and the President's letter of May 17, 1954, cited at the beginning

of this Order.

3. Upon the completion of his testimony the employee will prepare

& memorandum outlining his testimony with a copy routed to his division head

and a copy routed to the Deputy Attorney General.

D. REQUESTS OF CONGRESSIONAI COMMITTHES FOR THE TESTIMONY OF FEDERAL PRISONERS

Because of the custodial hazards involved and the extent to which

their public testimony may arfect the discipline and well-being of the institu-

tion, it is the policy of the department not to deliver Federal prisoners out-

side the penal institution in which they are incarcerated for the purpose of

being interviewed or examined under oath by congressional committees. However,

when it appears that no pending investigation or legal proceeding will be

adversely affected thereby and that the public interest will not be otherwise

adversely affected, Federal prisoners may be interviewed or examined under oath

by congressional committees in the institution in which they are incarcerated

under the following procedures, and with the specific advance approval of the

Deputy Attorney General.

I. Arrangements for interviewing and taking of sworn testimony

trom a federal prisoner by a committee of the Congress or the authorized

representatives of such a committee shall be made in the form of a written

request by the chairman of the committee to the Deputy Attorney General.

2. Such written request shall be made at least ten (10) days

prior to the requested date for the interview and the taking of testimony

and shall be accompanied by written evidence that authorization for the

interview or the taking of sworn testimony was approved by vote of the com

mittee. Such request shall contain a statement of the purpose and the sub-

jects upon which the prisoner will be interrogated as well as the names of

all persons other than the representatives of the Department of Justice who

will be presente

3. A member of the interested committee of the Congress shall be

present during the entire time of the interrogation.

HH 55024 DocId:32989609 Page 220

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## Page 221

• 4 -

4. The sarden of the penal institution in which the Federal

prisoner is incarcerated shall, at least forty-eight (48) hours prior to the

time at which the interview takes place, advise the Federal prisoner concerned

of the proposed interview or taling of som testimony; and shall further

advise that he is under the same, but no greater obligation to answer than any

other witness who is not a prisoner.

5. The warden of the penal institution shall have complete

authority in conformity with the requirements of security and the mainte-

nance of discipline to limit the number of persons who will be present at

the interview and taking of testimony.

6.

The warden or his authorized representative shall be present

at the interview and at the taking of testimony and the Department of Justice

shall have the right to have one of its representatives present throughout

the interview and taking of testimony.

7. The committee shall arrange to have a stenographic transcript

made of the entire proceedings at committee expense and shall furnish a copy

of the transcript to the Department of Justice.

E. OBSERVIRS IN ATTENDANCE AT COMMITTED HEARINGS

In order that the Department may be kept currently advised in

matters within its responsibility, and in order that the Deputy Attorney

General may properly coordinate the Department's liaison with Congress and

its committees, each division that has an observer in attendance at a

congrssional hearing, will have the observer prepare a written summary of

the proceeding which should be sent to the division head and a copy routed

to the Deputy Attorney General.

/s/ Herbert Brownell, JI.

Attorney General

HW 55024

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Page 221

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## Page 222

1-

I-

W. R. Wanrall

Mr.

W. 0. Cregar

1 - Mr. R. H. Ross

URGENT

CODE

TELETYPE

TO SAC LOS ANGELES

JUNE 17, 1975

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

1 SENSTUDY 1975

THE FOLLOWING REQUEST IS BEING MADE IN CONNECTION WITH

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) HEARINGS. SUTEL, REPLY, ATTENTION

INTD, WILLIAM O. CREGAR.

DURING A RECENT HEARING, AN SSC STAFF REPRESENTATIVE QUES -

TIONED A WITNESS WHETHER OR NOT HE KNEW OF MAIL OPENINGS IN

LOS ANGELES BY FBI AGENTS RON MASCAR (PHONETIC) AND (ENU, BUT

POSSIBLY WILLIAM) MILIER. THE WITNESS REPLIED THAT HE WAS NOT

KNOWLEDGEABLE ON THIS MATTER AND NEVER HEARD OF THE ABOVE TWO

AGENTS.

IT WAS THE WITNESSES' OPINION THAT THE QUESTION MAY HAVE

BEEN POSED AS A TEST QUESTION ONLY AND ASKED THAT THE INFORMA-

TION BE CAREFULLY HANDLED BY THE FBI.

SO FBIHQ WILL BE IN POSSESSION OF ALL BACKGROUND INFORMA-

TION UPON WHICH WE MAY BE CALLED TO TESTIFY, LOS ANGELES ADVISE

REGARDING ANY DETAILS WHICH MIGHT ILLUMINATE THIS MATTER AND/OR

ALL DORMATION Co. UL)

RER: jmn imin

(5)

MOR-16

REG56

61-111

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

-267

Assoc, Dir.

Dep. AD Adm. -

Dep. AD Inv. _

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

Comp. Syst.

Ext. Affairs -

Files & Com. -

Gen. Inv. -

Ident.

Inspection

Intell.

Laboratory

Plan. & Eval. -

Spoc. Inv.-

Training -

Legal Coun. -

Telephone Rm. -

„SN7M13989609

75024

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUN 17/ 1975

TELETYPE

2 19 101s

TELETYPE UNIT V

Page 222

GPO : 1975 ' - 569-920

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## Page 223

PAGE TWO 62-116395

IDENTIFY SPECIAL AGENTS CONCERNED. IF SUCH ALLEGED ACTION

OCCURRED, ADVISE AS TO ALL DETAILS AND ANY COMMUNICATIONS OR

NOTIFICATION TO FBIHQ CONCERNING SAME.

HANDLE ON AN EXPEDITE BASIS.

NOTE :

Inspector John D. Tarpey, U. S. Postal Service advised

Liaison Officer I. A. Crescioli of above incident which occurred

in connection with Tarpey's 6/10/75 testimony before SSC. Tarpey's.

testimoney did not touch on any FBI mail cover activities and

question was posed to him by ssc stafi representative Paul Wallach.

Movement Desk was unable to identify Special Agents based upon

Kolombatovic memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall, dated 6/16/75, and

captioned "John D. Tarpey, Assistant Chief Inspector, Office of

Criminal Investigations, U. S. Postal Service, Appearance Before

Senate Select Committee

HH 55024

DocId: 32989609 Page 223

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