## Page 1

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09/24/98

1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION®

AGENCY : PFIAB

RECORD NUMBER

: 206-10001-10013

RECORDS SERIES PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

DOCUMENT. INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR

FROM

TO

TITLE

DATE

PAGES

SUBJECTS

PFIAB

MINUTES OF BOARD MEETING OF JUNE 4, 1964

: 06/04/64

: 29

: AGENDA FOR JUNE 4, 1964 MEETING

SUMMARY OF JUNE 4, 1964 MEETING

DOCUMENT TYPE

PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION

: TOP SECRET

RESTRICTIONS

: 1A, 1B, 1C

CURRENT STATUS

: RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

DATE ENING CRITERA: 00/06/98 08/01/2024

OPENING CRITERIA

COMMENTS

2025 Release under the President John F

Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act

at 1992

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

NW 88132

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206-10001-10013

2025 Release under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of

1992

MINUTES

BOARD

MEETING

O F

JUNE 4,

1964

06- 10001-10013.

NW SUP

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Bia Minutes

TOP SEGRET

2 260 930

106 10000

am is colittle.

PRESIDE'S POREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

AGENDA POR METING OR JUNE 4, 1964

TIE

1. 9:00 - 9:30

2. 9:30 - 9:45

3. 9:45 - 10:00

10:00 - 10:25

10:25 = 21100

ler:

/2:"

5-71:00 - 71745

22:45 - 12:00

3.

12:00 - 1:00

2:15

9. 1:00 - 2:00

SUBJECT

Chairman's Time

National Reconnaissence Program - Status Report

Kr. Coyne

Audio Penetrations of ü.S. Enbassv.

Moscow

Dr. Baker and Vir. Coyne

Executive Session m

USIB. Actions Related to Audio. Pentrations--

Roscon

Nir. Robert Bennerman

Chairnan, Security Committee, USIB

wr

Go Harvin Centile

Director of Security, Department of State

Assessment of Potential Damage to Cryptographic

Sustems Caused by Audlo Penetrations=-lioscow

Lt.

General Cordon Biake

Director, National Security Agency

Dr. Louls.

Tordella

Deputy Director, National Security Agency

Executive Session

Lunch - The Minite House Mess

Current intelligence Briefing on:

Ch1-Com Capabilitles and Intentions as

related

to Southeast Asla, India and USSR

The Situations In South Vietnam, Laos,

Cambodia and North Vietnam

The cyprus situation

The Cuba Situation

Mr. Ray Cline R dact Amah

Deputy Director of Intelligenge, CIA

with you. Clunton S

oger

7/82

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AGENDA GOA JUNE 4, 1964 (ContInued):

11.

12.

13.

14:

15.

16.

17•

TIME

2, 15

2100 - 2:45

2:45 - 3:00

8:4-5

8:00 - 3:30

3:30 - 4:00

4:00 - 5:30

=-5:30--6:30

6:30 - 8:00

Ci45

-8:00 - End.

of Day

1:30

SUB.TE.CT

Status

Report on Military (peripheral and

overflight) Reconnaissence Programs

(other' than satellite)

Colonel Ralpn D. Steakley,

US AT

Diroctor, Joint Reconnaissance Center,

Executive Session

On-tho-Scene Review at Moscow Embassy

of State Department's Counter-audlosurve11.

lance Measures to Safeguard u.

S. Classified

Systems and Information

Dr.

Jerome Wiener urt serena

M.I.T.

White House Consultant and former

Science Advisor to the President)

Status Report on the Implementation of

PrIor Board Recommendations

Ash

Discussions with the Director of

Central Intelligence

tr. John A. McCon

eit hit Kirkpatrict

romand Fig

gerals t

Executive Session

Roberte my

Dinner - Metropolitan Club

a)

Discussion of peripheral and over-

Illght reconnaissance

b) Discussion of audio proolem

c.)

Consideration of up-dated reouirements

for Annual. Reports

to the Board by

State, Defense, CI, and the DOI:

?

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

This documen! condlola.of .

19

June 17, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PILE

SUBJECT:

President's Poreign Intelligerce Advieory Board Meeting,

June 4, 1964.

This regularly scheduled meeting of the Board convened at 9:00 a.u.,

June 4, 1964, In the Board offices, 297 Executive Office Building.

Previously

scheduled as a 2-day meeting, it was compressed into one day in order to

accommodate other commitmente and to permit the holding of Board Panel sessions

on the following day.

Present were Chairman Clifford and Mesars. Pace, Murphy,

Langer and Gray; and J. Patrick Coyne and A. R. Ash.

General' Doolittle was

unable to attend because of transportation difficultics in Alaska.

Messis.::

Baker and Land were unavoidably late in arriving, and upon their arrival later

in the morning received a fill-in from the Chairman concerning the matters

which had been discussed up to that point.

Chairman Clifford pointed out that tha business of this mesting

confined to major subjects of particular importance: (1) recont developments

following the submission to the President of the Board's May 2 report and

recommendations on the National Reconnaissance Program (2) the recent discovery

of extensive microphone installations iü the U. S. Bmbassy, Moscow -- a most

serious penetration which had prompted the Chairman to request a Board Panel

study Innediately upon bis learning of the discovery, and (3) the subject of

acquiring intelligence on Coumunist China, a problem highlighted by remarks of

the Secretary of Defense when he was recently visited by Chairman Clifford,

Dr. Baker and Mr. Coyne -- at which time Secretary McNamaia expressed deep con-

cern over the absence of meaningful Intelligence on Chinese capabilities,

Intentions and activities (Mr. McNamara said that the USIB is not adequate for

his purposes in this regard; he ban to make decisions without the benefit of

adequate intelligence support; if ha can't get help from the USIB and CIA he

will attempt to get the required intelligence through other sources; and he

would welcome any assistanca the board might provide as a means of resolving

this intelligence collection problem.

With reference to the Board's report on the National Reconnaissance

Program, Mr. Clifford said that it had gone to the White House on May 2.

Thereafter two appointments with the President had to be cancelled, thereby

preventing discussion of the report with the President. Accordingly,

Mr. Clifford suggested to Mr. McGeorge Bundy that the matter was urgent.

The same day, Mr. Bundy took up the report with the President, with the

resulting decision that Mr. Bundy would obtain the views and comments of the

Secretary of Defense and of the DCI, Mr. McCone, concerning the Board's report

and recommendations, in order that further consideration might be given by

the President.

Handle via BYLMAN

Control System

IDEA LIST CORONA OXCART

NDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

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At Mr. Clifford's request, Mr. Coyne summarized the comments which had

been subnitted on the NRP report by the two officials In response to fir. Bundy's

memorandum.

The June 2, 1964, response from Deputy Secretary Vance expressed

concurrence of the Department of Defense in the report and its readiness to

carry out the recommendations when instructed to do so.

However, 1u his May 28

memorandum to. Mr. Bundy, the DCI reported that he found it difficult to distill

his thoughts in time for a wiltten expression of views for immediate consideration;

that he would be able to discuss the matter orally with the Board at this meeting;

that his written views could be submitted by June 15; and that meanwhile he

intended to discuss with the Director, NRO, any management problems the latter

mIght have in mind.

Chairman Clifford thought it gratifying that the Defense Department had

accepted the Board's NRP laport and recommendationa in toto, and he referred to

Infornally received indications that the Department of Defense is anxious to

get on with the actions proposed in the Board's report.

Noting that the pre-

Ilminary reply from the DCI was nonconmital, fir. Clifford thought it best that

the Board not engage in a discussion of the NRP report with the DCI when he

joined the Board meeting later in the day.

Mr. Clifford observed that the Board

had studied the subject in depth; it had reached conclusions and made recommenda-

tions to the President; Mi. Bundy had asked for comments to the President by

Messrs. McNamara and McCone; and it was desirable to keep the matter in that

channei, rather than reopening discussions with the DCI at this Board meeting:

(DI. Baker arrived at the Board meeting at this point.)

At the Chairman's request, Mr. Coyne sumarized for the Board the reported

successes and failures of satellite reconnaissance photographic missions since

January 1, 1964 (4 successful missions; 3 failures) and the NRO mission schedule

for the remainder of the year. (He also referred to the NRO report that OXCART

has been flown at Mach 3.2 at 81,700 feet.)

Chairman Clifford noted that the manner in which the NRO rerorts on its

satellite missions leaves much to be desired.

Me felt that the Board should

a8k

for more meaningful reports from NRO, reflecting the number of missions acheduled,

the number that were launched, how many succeeded, and how many failed anú why.

Also Mr. Clifford thought that the Board should be fully informed on how the

USIB deteruines that the NRO has a capability to meet specified Intelligence

requirements through the launching of

"X!' number of missions over a given future

period, e.go, "two flights, per month".

Dr. Baker added that no one has efficiently organized the process of

analyzing the photographic take 'from satellite missions, for the purpose of

identifying Intelligence targets which warrant further "poin! search" on future

missions.

Turning to the matter of the technical penetration of the U. S. Embassy,

Moscow, Mr. Clifford racalled that he had asked the Board's Baker Panel and

Mr. Coyle to go lato the subject Immedlately upon Mr. Clifford's learning of the

discovery of the firat of the 41 microphones on April 23. He noted that

Mr. Bundy had asked Di. Jerome Wiesner to make an on-the-scene assessment of

the penetration during DI. Wlesner's visit to Moscow this past week on other

IDEALIST/ CORONA/ OXCART

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business, and he would join the Board meeting later in the day to report on

that assessment. Also, Mi. Clifford noted, the Board meeting would later

be joined by DI.

Iordella of NSA, Mr. Bannerman of CIA who chairs the USIB

Security Committee,

the

and Mr. Gentile who serves as Directer of Security In.

State Department.

Mr. Coyne summarized for Board members the highlights of the discovery

of the technical penetration of the Enbassy In Moscow, with Indicationg that

the 41 microphones,

1n the wall, have all been in place since 1952 when the Soviet Union completed

construction on the Embassy buiiding In preparation for ü. S, occupancy chich

took place in 1953.

(Dr. Land' arrived at the Board meeting at this point.)

Mr. Coyne drew attention to the fact that the icrophone installations

Included

coverage of the Embassy code room.

He referred in this connection

to the NSA damage evaluation dealt with in Tab C of the June 1 "Preliminary

Damage Assesoment" which had just been recelved from the USIB Security Comnittee.

Mr. Coyne thought it regrettable that the State Department security people in

Moscow had cut the cables upon discovery of the microphone and related in-

stallations. Mr. Clifford agreed, recalling that when he tirst learned of the

development

from Mr. Coyne be urged that efforts he made to keep the discovered

items

In place for

the time being.

MI. Coyne sald that chis was urged on the

State Department but certain State Department officials thought the Board was

getting into operations, and a cable went out to Ambassador Kohler instructing

him to proceed and to lodge a protest with the soviet government.

Mr. Coyne called Board members' attention to the summary of U.s.

Ambassadors'

assessments (appearing in the USIB's Security Committee report)

which discounted the likelihood of damage to the U.S. from the technical

penetration of the Embassy.

Mr. Coyne pointed to the 1962 report of the Soviet defector who informed

CIA (which In tun informed. the State Departuent) that the Embassy In. Moscow

was bugged

at various strategic locations.

Mr. Coyne said that he had recently

asked State Department representatives what had been done on the basis of the

defector's 1962 report, and it appeared that no action had been taken by State

Department sucurity technicians - until recent digging operations were begun

following receipt of a report from a second Soulet defector early in 1964 that

mIcrophones were in place in specific Embassy office locations.

Mr. Coyne

also related the substance of his inyuiries made of the State Departuent Chief

of Communications (Mr. Coffey) in the summer of 1963 when Khrushchev boasted

to

Governor Harilman that he could produce a copy of a message which Ambassador

Kohler had sert to Washington regarding the U.S. position on Soviet pipe-line

negotiations with West Germany (Mr. Coffey's finding. was to the effect that

no communications penetration could in fact be established).

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Chairman Clifford expressed the view that there appeared to have been

ralsed in this discursion a fundamental question to which the doaid might

well give its attention -- 1.e., the overall attitude of the U. S. Government

toward counterintelligence, Intelligence and the security of intelligence

matters.

In

this ingtance

the Board had raised an important point in urging

that the penetration cables not be cut precipitously when discovered in the

Embassy, but the Board'e urging was ignored,

MI. Clifforu thought 1t eppropriate

to determine just what forum does have cognizance in such Important developments

as this one, 1. e., whether the USIB, or the Special 5412 Group, or other group,

has cognizance

in these matters.. Mr.. Coyna read from NSC 5618 the policy re-

quirement that upon the discovery of listening devices, U.S.. agencies are

required to obtain high level deterinations as to whether the devices should

be left in place for purposes of exploitation against the foreign intelligence

service involved.

Mr. Gray expressed concern

about the possibility that the Moscow penetration

enabled

the Soviets to learn what the U. S. was doing and about to do with regard

to Cuba in the Fall of 1962.

In answer to the Chairman's Inquiry, Mr. Coyne reported that U. S. securlty

technicians do not today have a device capable of detecting a shielded cable

microphone imbedded 7 Inches in the wall, as. in the case of the 41 microphones

found in the U. S. Embassy, Moscow.

At 10:30 a.w. the Board meeting was joined by Mr. Bannerman of CIA

(Chairman of the USIB Security Committee); DI. Tordella, Deputy Direcior of NSA;

and Mr. Marvin Gentile, since March 1964, Director of the Office of Security,

U. S. 'Department of State.

Mr. Clifford indicated the Board's Interest in being

fully informed on the facts relating to the recent discovery of the penetration

in Moscow; the effecriveness of detection methoda used at the Embassy previously

and those available at present; and the information which led to the recent

discoveries. Mi. Bannerman suld that he could speak to the assessment of damage,

leaving to MI. Gantile the discussion of the history and effectiveness of tests

to detect the

presence of

listening devices.

Referring to the USIB Security Committee's June 1 "Preliminary Damage

Assessment", Mr. Bannerman explained that Army, Navy and Air Force had conducted

interviews of personnel formerly assigned to the Embassy (now scattered) but

the inquirles were along the line of possible compromise of military attache type

of information, exclusive of the compromise of communications. On the other

hand, State Department interviews of personnel previously assigned at the Embassy

were

made

on the assumption that the Soviets had access to conversations and to

communications as well.

(Army, Navy and Alr Force are still in the process of

reviewing their old traffic in

sn effort to see whether their communications

were compromised.) Mr. Bannerman pointed to the State Department conclusion that

no damage to U.S. foreign policy can be detected as a result of the buggirg of

our Embassy in Moscow. Mi.. Bannerman pointed to the conclusion in the USIB

assessment to the effect that the Soviets did get information on operations,

and on military attache movements, and on the intelligence targets in which they

were interested. He pointed out that the agencies report that important decisions

were not discussed aloud, but in whispers or in the form of written notes.

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(Chairman Clifford thought.

1t remarkable that such precautions would have

been consistently maintained over such a long period of 1l years.)

answer to Mr. Coyne's inquiry, Mr. Bannerman suld that the Security

Committee's preliminary assessment had been "noted" by the USio and USIB hai

approvad the recoumendations, with the request that the Security Committee

complete a final

assessment.

Mr. Bannerman said that it 1s most difficult to attempt to assess the

damage to U.S. Interests resulting irom the Moscow penetration.

First 18 the

task of identifying information to which the Sovlets may have obtained access.

The next task is to try and find instances in which Soviet reaction provides

evidence that a cumpromise of Information was effected. Moreover, since this

was a Sovlet Intelligence operation, tlie Information obtained by the Intelligence

operators would not be passed on to Soviet political desks or to Soviet bloc

allies without attributing to some source other than the technical penetration.

DI. Langer thought that, nevertheless,

all such information obtained by technical

penetration of the U.S. Embassy would be reviewed and utilized where possible by the

Soviet governsent.

Mi. Bannerman acknowledged that this would be the case, but he

emphasized the difficulty in observing and Identifying Soviet reactions and actions

as being baaed

compromised U.S. Information of communications.

Dr. Land

expressed the view that it 1s dangaroua to assume that our informacion was not

compromised because we cannot observe specific Soviet reactions to such informa-

t10n.

Dr. Baker wondered whether the assessment of the 3 U. S. Ambassadors

that no damage was

done 1g. In essence a finding that intelligence is worthless,

18 not needed, or 18 not used when it 1a obtained.

Chairman Clifford

asked whether it 1s possible to relate comprouised

U.S. Information to Sovlet actions

with respect to Cuba. Mr. Bannerman referred

to the USIB Secürity Committee assessment on that point.

Mr:

Gentile pointed

out that by 1962 an acoustically shielded conference room and an electronically

shielded code room had been Inscalled in the Embassy, and in addition the

practice has always been followed of writing out sensitive information.

MI. Gray

thought that the State Department assessment referred to in the Conclusions of

the USIB Security Conmittee report should be amended by adding to the effect

that "or, If the information was compromised, It was used by the Soviets with

such skill as to

conceal. whether in fact the information was compromised".

Mi. Pace wondered whether information obtained by the Soviets through

this technical penetration of our Embassy might not have resulted in the

Soviet Identification of any defectors serving as

U.s.

Mr. Bannerman sald that this 18 a possibility in the Perkovsky case,

and CIA is awaiting the ausessment reports of other agencles in ordes to study

this possibility further.

MI. Pace asked whether the USIB, In accepting other agencies' own

assessments of whether their information had been compromised, was not in

effect accepting self-serving statements rather than performing an abetract

assessment. Mi. Bannerman sald that each agency, Is considered to have the

greatest competence in assessing the extent of any compromise of its own

information.

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Mi. Gentile Informed the Board that the Embasay

In Moscow was first

designed and built as an apartment house.

Then in 1952 1t was made available

to the U. S.

for lease and occupancy

&8

an Embassy building and apartment

living quarters.

The U. So accepted the building, and In 1952 the Sovlets

added

three top floors for use as Embassy offices.

During the construction

period

no U.S: technical Inspections were possible because accese to the

construction work was limited to cursory inspectiong.

For a period of 3 weeks

in March 1953 no Americans were given access to the bullding,

and the con-

struction area on the top three floors was covered by plywood

screens

said to

have been put up to hasten the drying of plaster.

The U.S. occupied the

Embassy on May 1, 1953, under the lease.

Since that time there have been 27

Inspections

in an effort to locate listening devices. Plaster was chipped in

spots, floors were taken up lu some locations, and various searches made short

of terring rooms apart -- all :ithout locating any devices. Meanwille, over

the years Embassy personnel have been briefed and cautioned on the assumption'

that the Embassy was penetrated by. listening devices.

On June 20, 1962, ME. Gentile continued, his predecessors in the State

Department Office of Security received from CIA the Soviet defector's 1962

report that the Embassy was bugged.

This was made known to the State Department

resident security technician who sent to Moscow 3 months later.

There 18 nothing

in the files to indicate if any instructions went out of uny action taken on

the basis of the 1962 defector report. There is no Indication that the

Ambassador was informed.

In February 1964 the State Department resident security techniclan in

the Moscow Embassy returned to Washington and there was discussed the question

of the possible total destruction of

an Embassy room in an effort to fid

listening devices.

In March 1964 the State Department Security people recolved

the report given by the second Soviet defector, pinpointing locations of con-

cealed microphones.

Accordingly, the destruction of one room was authorized

by the Department of State Securlty Office (Room 10008 on the cop floor) and

on Apr1l 23, 1964, thy first of the 41 microphones was uncovered.

Mr. Coyne asked about the cutting of the cables. Mr. Genille said that.

this oscurred two days atter the aiscovery of the first microphone on April 23.

the decision was made in the Security. Office of State,,

by the chief techniciar

In Moscow. MI. Clifford

agked whether it had occurred to respongible official:

to consider the possibility of exploiting the microphones found.

Mr. Gentile

said that in the flost place it was assumed that the Soviets had spotted the

technical men who were sent in by State Department, and that the noise of the

jackhammer and other digging operations had alerted the Soviets that the dis-

Moreover, the microphones discovered were not con-

sidered unique finds requiring any unique technical atudy. Moreover, as part

of standing operations procedure, State notified the CIA and other interested

agencies Immediately on making the flist find, although this notification was

not made at the Secretaly level. It was decided that exploitation was not

feasible.

The decision to cut the cables,, however, was made by State Department,

Mí. Gentile said.

In answer to Mr. Murphy's question he said that State

Department desk officers and the Ambassadors were told, but their judgments

were not sought as to the matter of cutting the

cables.

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Mr. Bannerman stated that the prescribed procedure was folluwed on

the question of posgible exploitation. State Department people discussed this

with counterintelligence officers in CIA (Including Mr. Angelton) anü 1t was

decided that no exploilation was possible because the Soviets had undoubtedly

learned of the discovery of the ulcrophones uncovered by extensive and noisy

digging operations.

Mr. Gentile sald that much remains to be done, including (1) a complete

technical assessment of the fidelity of the Soviet devices (2) completion

the examination of the North Wing of the Embassy, and (3) the Initiation of a

search of the South wing.

Mr. Bannerman observed that a key factor is the tremendous disadvantage

to the U. So resulting from Soviet control of the construction of bulldings to

be occupled by U. S. personnol.

As for the level of soviet capability evidenced by the quallty and kind

of microphones discovered,

DI. 'Tordella

said that they are better than the ones

we have for this particular kind of installation..

DI. lordella expressed the opinion that the Moscow Installation resulted

in a comprodilse of our encrypted communications, particularly 1f you accord tu

che Soviets the capability of the U. s., U. K., and Germans.

From 1953-1959

State used the MCP code machine (identical to that used by U. S. military attaches,

1953-1954) which 1s vulnerable to audiosurveillance which can

detect the plain

text being printed by the machine.

Also the MCB machine could be cryptographically

reconstructed by the opposition.

(In 1948 an Army code toow

Sergeant defected

under circumstances indicating that he had photographed iterials

which would

have given complete information on.

the nachine.) So,

fxo 1953-1959 we must

assume the Soviets were capable of reconstructing the machine, and also of

reading the plain text from which the encryptions were made.

All Incoming and

outgoing encrypted traffic of the Embassy could have been read, as well as

traffic of other Iron Curtain U.S. posts using this system.

From 1959-1962

(before Installation is the electronically shielded code room

In the Embassy)

all Confidential encyphere! material was subject to audio attack.

Secret traffic

was vulnerable until 1961, as was Top Secret until 1960 when the use of 1-time

pads was required.. After December 1962 (when the electronically shielded room

was tristalled), according to tests run by NSA, there was no comromise of

Embassy traffic through audio or electromagnetic penetrations.

The screen

grill antenna found in the wall of the North Wing of the Embassy, with coaxial

cables attached, probably served as a Soviet means of electronic intercept of

emanations from the U.S. l-time teleprinter in the Embassy (and although this

effor: was frustrated in October 1960 when such machines were not permitted

to be used at U. So posts behind

the Iron Curtain, that rule was lifted with

respect to our Embassy in the USSR when the acoustically shielded room was

Installed in Moscow.

As for the microwave energy signal which has been beaned at the Embassy

building at least since 1957, Do. lordella believes that the purpose of the

signal 19 to harrass us.

7

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Ar. 12:05 p.u. Mesars, Tordella, Banneruan and Gentile departed the

Board me: :ing with the thanks of the Chairman for their assistance.

Following lunch,

the Board resumed its meeting at 1:00 p.m. at which

time Mr. R. J. Smith of CIA (Deputy to Mr. Ray Cline, Deputy ICI for Inte: iigence)

presented a briefing of the situation 1a Lans, South

Vietnam, North Vietnam,

Cambodia, Malaysia, and Indonesia. (Chairuan Clifford left the meeting in

response

to a telephone call from the President.)

Mr. Smith outlined

some CIA views concerning intentions and capabilities

of the Chinese Communists: (1) the Chicoms hope to see China become a center

of Communist authority world-wide,

setting policy even for the USSR (2) the

Chicom leaders presently wish to avoid high risk actions (3) Communist China

has not achieved a nuclear production capability (4) of the 15 SAM sites In

China, only 4 are operational, and the others lack equipment, and (5) the

Chicon Air Force 18 deterlorating and replacements are slow in coming.

CLA

belleves that Communist China will encourage Hanol to keep high level of pressure

80ing in Laos and South Vietnam; will continue efforts to subvert Malaysia; will

avoid hostilities with the U. S.; will avold a formal breach with the USSR, pre-

ferring to erode Soviet influence around the world; and will cuntinue to support

militant elements of Communist Parties in Africa, Latin America and Southeast

Asia.

In answer to a question by Mr. Pace, Mr. Smith expressed the opinion

that if the U. S. moved

against Hano1 in the Alr, the Chicous would not react.

Mr. Smith also mentioned briefly the situations in Cuba and in India.

Mr. Smith concluded his presentation and left the Board meeting at 2:05 p.u.

At 2:10 the Board meeting was joined by Colonel Steakley, Director of

the Joint Reconnaissance Center of the JCS. Colonel Steakley described in some

detail the various COMINI, ELINI, Telemetry, and photographic collection

programs which are carried out through peripheral and overflight aircraft missions

under the monitorship of the JRC (including surface ship and submarine collection

of COMINT and ELINT along the China coast) :

Colonel Steakley referred to the

ELINT collection (plus some COMINI and telemetry) through RA-3B peripheral

flighto in the Artic; C-130 peripheral flights for COMINT collection in the

Pacific, European and Cubar areas,

including KC-135 missions near the Soviet

border; photographic missions (BOW TIE) flown with RF-101 aircraft by Chinat

pilota over coastal areas of Southeast China; covert photo collection on MATS

(0-97 G) fl1ghts over Europe and Indonesia; C-135 telemetry collection missiong

near the launch areas and impact areas invölved in Soviet space and missile

activities; and collection of telemetry from satellites over Africa.

Colonel Steakley described the lain functions of the JRC as pertaining to

il) monitoring

of military reconnaissance programs (2) review and evaluation of

misgiong proposed by the military (3) coordination of reconnaissance operations

at the national level (4) U.S. and allied cooperation (5) monitoring of actual

reconnaissance operations (6) coordination of policies and procedures, and

(7) monitoring of special OPLANS.

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In response to a query from Dr. Baker, Colonel Steakley ackno:-edged

that "ur reconnaissance activity gives the Soviets

"training' in detection and 1n

the development of countermeasures.

Mr. Coyne asked whether there is not considerable duplication of in-

telligence collectión

as a result of the multiplicity of reconnaissauce missions

being flown in the same target areas.

Colonel steakley said that some

¿uplication results, hut in any event a single LINT mission will nót alvays

pick up

all the desired intelligence, whereas follow-on uissiongwill pick up

emissions which might not have

been

encountered on the previoue run.

A question was asked by Mr. Coyne about the JRC's working relationship

with the NRO.

Colonel Steakley said that this 18 satisfactory, even though

not documented.

Dr. Baker asked whether the system is fagt enough to accommodate urgent

Intelligence requirements which might be formulated by non-military agenules,

calling for overflights of denied territory, for example.

Colonel Steakley

said that this capability is adequate and he cited the example uf the recent

Alaskan earthquake, photographs of which were delivered to Wachington within

15 hours after the request was made for them.

In answer to a query by Di. Baker

along this same line. Colonel Steaklay said that the System is capable of

exercising straight-llie channel uf command to meet intelligence requirement

which, e.g., the Secretary of Defenge might suddenly need to have fulfilled

such as a carrier-based U-2 mission over a particular intelligence target all

of a sudden.

Colonel Steakley expressed. confidence that the JRC mechanian and

Fesources

are such that suddenly-arising Intelligence reconnaissance needs can

be met quickly.

Colonel Steakley's vialt with the Board was completed and he departed

the meeting at 3:30 p.m.

In executive session (with Dr. Baker in the chair during Mr. Clifford's

absence) Board members considered and approved proposed letters from the

Chairman requesting that State, Defense, CIA and the DCI up-date and revise

the scope and coverage of their respective annual reports to the Board con-

cerning the conduct of their intelligence-related responsibilities. These

letters were approved and subsequently dispatched by the Chalrman.

At 3:55 p.I. Chairman Clifford returned from the President's office and

rejoined the Board meeting.

Tie Board meeting was joined at this point by the DCI, Mr. MeCone; and

Messr8. Kirkpatrick, Fitzgerald, and Meyers of CIA. Chairman Clifford sald that

the Board would appreciate hearing from the DCI concerning items of interest

to Board menbers as set out in the list previously provided to the DCI, as

well as any other mattors which the DOI might wish to cover.

At the DCI's suggestion, Mr. Fitzgerald took up the subject of Cuba

which he had discussed previously at the meeting of the Beard in April.

He reported the recent defection to the U.S. of a Cuban military officer who

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has been attached to Castro's security service since Castro came to power,

and who 18 in the process of being interviewed concerning the structure of

Castro's Intelligence organization (the defector being primarily knowledgeable

of Cuban external Intelligence activities in other Latin American countrles).

MI. Pitzgerald said that there is still the problem of getting agent

photography out of Cuba for examination

In the U. S.

As present the photo-

graphs are delivered by agents Inside Cuba to a friendly foreign diplouatic

mission which forwards them to the ClA In the U.S.

Efforts are still being made

to locate the Soviet SIGINT Installations

In Cuba.. A talkative Soviet truck delver who formerly had access to une of

the Soviet Installations has been transferred back; to the Soviet Union, so

that source 18 no longer avallable.

New mintaturized radios have now been supplied to 8 agents of the CIA

in Cuba.

There has been some difficulty encountered 1n

the operation of an

electronic "dead drop" which involves the use of a static recelver in a

friendly Embassy In Havana, which picks up messages fiom an agent coming

within a quarter of a mile of the Embassy.

Referring

to newspaper reports of exile raids and attempted raids on

Cuba, Mr. Fitzgerald said that there have been succeasful raids on sugar

centrals.

The reported executions. of 7 "CIA agents" did include 3 whö were

once serving as agents but who had been doubled some time ago.

The British

capture of a "raiding party" in the Bahamas actually Involved the seizure of

Manuel Ray, bis female secretary, and two or three others.

Incidents did cause the Castro government to set up the biggest military alert

in Cuba to date - which indicates the uneasiness prevalent there.

(Mr. Fitzgerald left the meeting at this point.)

Mr. McCone observed that 2 Soviet, ships have left Cuba for Russia In

the last

few weeks,

and 4 others are enroute to Cuba, so a further withdrawal

of Soviet personnel is expected. :

CIA does not know whether the SAM's have

been turned over to Cuban control yet. Castro has said he will shoot down

our U-2's.

Krushchev told Drew Pearson in Calro that U.S. U-? flights uver.

Cuba are unacceptable and that the U. S.

should rely. on its satellite recon-

naissance coverage instead.

The word sent by the U. S. to Khrushchev and

Castro is that we will continue U-2 surveillance of Cuba. We are in a difficult

weather season now but are getring satisfactory results from the 2 or 3 U-2

filghts flown each week, Mr. McCone said.

Chairman Ulifford asked about Cuban capabilities

for bringing down our

U-2's:

Mr. McCone said that they have that capabllity.

He recalled. that a

year ago CIA equipped Its U-2's with ECh's, but there 18 a difference of view

within the military as to whether this will be effective; and, moreover, the

JOS do not want the ECM's to be used over Cuba because this might compromise

the SIOP's.

(Mr. McCone said that the Secretary of Defense 1s not much worrled

about the latter.j Mr. McCone expressed the belief that U. S. reaction would

be violent 1f a U-? 18 shot down, and plans are in readiness for such an

ventuality

However,

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Mr. Myers referred to the difficulties of effecting agent penetration

uf North Vietnam and Laos.

South Vietnamese locals are being trained for

Infiltration 'into North Vietnam at the present time. (Mr. Myers concluded

his briefing of the Board at thie point.)

Mr. McCone answered a question from Mr. Murphy by saying that he feels

that the intelligence situation

in: Saigo. is unsatisfactory.

When Diem wag

overthrown, the new regime rolled up thu former agents of Nu who were operating

under CIA supervision in a penetration of the Viet Cong. One of the problems

1s that U. S, military elements in South Vietnam are less interested in broader

national intelligence objectives and are more interested in such data as order-

of-battle Information; however, USMACV 18 planning to drop 6-man teams into

North Vietnam.

With regard to USIB consideration of increased

Intelligence

coverage of

China, Mr. McCone referred to the scheduling of satellite missions

and to the

beginning

effort in the field of clandestine agen; coverage.

However, Mr. McCone

observed, China

is a difficult intelligence targ:

There appear to be

few

chances for exploitati: of dissensions among the Chicoms, even though the

econcay is a shambles, and even though the military are not being supplied with

the equipment they have been expecting.

At the game time, the

Chicoms seem to

be forging ahead

in an effort to achieve missile and nuclear capability.

In answer to a question by MI. Paco, the DCI sald

that COMINI has proved

to be of great value in covering Chicom troop deployment, 1.e., traffic analysis

of Chicom communications has produced such information.

Mr. McCone agreed with

Mr. Murphy's comment that the absence of an

intelligence capability out of Taiwan

is a disappointment, particularly in view of the fact that large numbers of the

Chicom military force were once under the command of Chianz.

Mr. McCone said

that during the last 6 months the Chinats have lost a dozen 6-man

Intelligence

teams sent into China.

Turning to the recent discovery of audio penetration of the U.S. Embassy

In Moscrir, Mr. MeCone noted that the Board had heard from Mr. Bannerman on this

subject earlier in the day.

The DCI said that he was astounded as

anyone else

at this development, because he had received the impression that technical sweeps

were made of the Embassy. CIA feels that there was an audio penetration of our

communications.

He said

that the problem of fixing responsibility is still

being studied,

and that as yet no one has gotten to the bottom of the matter.

Dr. Land wondered whether there should not be an over-riding responsibility and

authority to deal with such problems, rather than leaving them to the individual

agencies to solve.

MI. McCone said

that he is still studying that question but

is not yet ready to make recommendations.

He said that there is a need for

centralizing research and development efforts in the audio fleld (For instance,

Mr. McCone pointed out that CIA had developed a print which could have prevented

the audio penetration in Moscow, but CIA could not get it approved for use

because the color did not appeal to some users).

He said that State, Defense

and CIA have differing views on how to proceed in the audio field, and there are

several NSC directives which Mr. McCone wishes to sort out before he makes any

recommendations.

CIA has found that security instructions were ignored by

officials and other personnel of some agencies, e.g., sensitive information was

dictated and was subject to audio intercept.

In the DCI's opinion,

great damage

was done to the U.S, by the Soviet Technical penetration of the Embassy in

Moscow.

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Mr. Gray pointed out that assessments appearing in the June l

prelimicary report of the USIB Security Committee differed from the DCI's

estimate that serious damage was done. Mr. McCone said that General Carter

and Mr. Bannersan of CIA think that the damage was very severe; but the

DCI added that he had not studied the USIB report inasmuch as he was out of the

country attending the Honolulu conference.

Chairman @ifford remarked that the Moscow Incident Indicates a dis-

regard for securlty on the part of the U.S.,

for example, the 1962 report of

the Soviet defector was not acted upon.

Mr. Clifford thought the question 1s

what can we as Americans do to bring attention to and correct this fouled-up

situation.

Mr. McCone replied that in CIA there is an extremely competent

I group which is devoted to personael and other security matters.

The Dunlap

case study showed that ClA's personnel security program is particularly good.

Now there 1a a need for the State Department or some agency to be designated as

responsible for not only technical security sweeps but physical security matters

as well.

There must be an insistence on conformance with security safeguards.

Here Mr. McCone recalled that in Bangkok the U. S. Ambassador mentioned that

he had sent his furniture out to be upholstered by local people; and when the

DCI asked about the possibility of listening devices being planted in the

furniture, the Ambassador said that this had not occurred to him.

Mr. Mcion

observed that in varlous parts of the world, CIA would be happy for an oppor-

tunity to take advantage of a situation of that kind, for intelligence purposes.)

Chalkuan Clifford pointed to the loose security attitude that prevailed

In the Moscow situation, e.%, the cables were cut right away.

The DCI thought

that the propar procedure was followed with regard to State and Cla consultation

to determire exploitation possibilitles when the first microphone was found --

leading to a decision that the Soviets had by then been alerted to the discovery,

making exploitation infeasible. However, Mr. McCone thoughi that the cutting

of the coaxial cable was improper. Mi. McCone agreed with Mr. Clifford's

statement that there is a need to place responsibility on come approprlate agency

to ensure that security precautions are foilowed.

Mr. Pace said that there 1s also a need to ensure effective management

of research and development in the audio field. Mi. McCone replied that there

are jurisdictional problems; the Department of State has responsibility under

NSC directives; and Mr. McCone wants. the USTB to consider the matter, and

meanwhile he would defer making any recoumendations for now.

Chairman Clifford asked if Mr. McCone would comment on the status of the

DCI's efforts to coordinate the total U. S. intelligence activity.

Mr. McCone

said that with regard to the Board's recent report on the National Reconnaissance

Program,

he would have some alternative proposals to make along the lines of a

different approach to the problem, but he preferred to reserve this for a later

time.

In another area of the coordination effort, Mi. McCone said that the

intelligence community is faced with the question of the continued availability

of certain overseas bases which are used for intelligence purposes -- such as

Intercept stations on Cyprus; bases in Pakistan; and APTAC sites at locations

around the world.

In the USIB, an inventory of all overseas intelligence-

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related bases

18 being made with a view

to analyzing alternative courses

of action open to us

1E we lose specific bases, classified

and otherwise.

In the audio fleld, Mr. McCone sald that the USIB will have soce

recommendations to make.

As for information processing, the ICI referred to the SCIPS study

which

was recently made

In the USIB.

He considered this study to be a good

approach,

although it 18 difficult to apply a uniform program

in all intelligence agencies,

e.g., the State Department requires a coding system different from that which

might be used as a central system in the Intelligence community. So, Mr. McCone

18 urging that the SCIPS study be used by each agency as a model approach to

the problem.

With reference to contacts with the President, Mr. McCone said that the

CIA sends a dally check list to the President but he does not necessarily wish

to read it every day. CIA also sends over special Intelligence Items and a

weekly check list which General Clifton hande to the President for reading.

Mr. McCone said that he sees the President frequently including occasions when

others are present, e.g., at conferences on South Vietnam.

Some Itens the DCI

takes to the President

directly, when they are nf such critical or sensitive

nature that Mr. McCone does not want to handle them through routine chanels.

The Del said that he personally would prefer opportunities for intelligence

briefings of the President with the Secretaries of State and Defense piesent,

In order that these officials could express any differing views

to the President

(for example,

it 'is the Secretary of Defense's view that U-2 overf 1ghts uf Cuba

ars not required, whereas Mr. McCone says he feels that there 1s a need for them).

With regard

to the situation in South Vietnam, Mr. McCone said that this

had been discussed at the Honolulu meeting from which he had just returned.

Ambasgador Lodge and General Westmoreland reported a deterioration of the

situation.

Por one thing General Khahn. has not galned control of the people

as he claimed he would. MI. McCone said that he differed from others

at the

Honolulu meeting who are of the opinion that the situation in South Vietnam

has "bottomed out".

Io the contrary, MI. McCone belleves that the situation may

well deteriorate further and planning should be made on that basis.

He recalled

Ambassador Lodge's comment that South Vietnam 18 not a country but a place where

a lot of discordant people live.

As for Laos, Mr. McCone noted that the Pathet Lao had stopped its advance

after over-running the western pait of the Plain de Jarres.

Mr. McCone belleves

that the Pathet lao forces can take over the country if It wants to, without

the ald of the North Vietnamese.

In Mr. McCone's opinion, a token air strike on North Vietnam would probably

not produce a military reaction from either Communist China or North Vietnam.

If a strike were made by South Vietnamese pilots accompanled by U. S. "instructors"

(project FARM GATE) more damage would be done and more reaction would result.

An A-bomb attack would probably produce a strong Chicom reaction.

In any event,.

the U. S. will have to guarantee to Khahn that we will ball him out as necessary.

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Also, U. S. forcus would have to be extensively deployed to meet any reaction,

and the American people would have to be prepared

for the situation.

Mr.

McCone

feels that U,S. public opinion could best be prepared by the adoption ofa

Congressional resolution, which would also serve as a meaningful signal to

the Chinese.

In answer to Dr. Langer's question, Mr. MeCone thought it unlikely that

Khahn would be unseated by a military

coup in South Vietnam, although there are

disgruntled factiong. For him to contend with.

In answer to Mr. Murphy's query, the DCI saw no Immediate prospect fói a

South Vietnamese peretration of North Vietnam along

the lines of the successful

penetratione which have been made. Of South Vietnam from the North.

He sàid thất.

CIA had plans for such penetration, but they were taken over by U.s. military

forces the first of

this year, and the milltary are now organizing such activlty.

Mr. McCone made reference to the recently published book: "Bay of Pigs"' as

: being most damaging to the CIA.:

A most serious claim in the book is the statement

the invasion brigade was told by CIA to be prepared to go ahead with the Invasion

even if President Kennedy should call it off.

, Mr. McCone said that he had caused

a thorough inguiry to be made of this allegation; Including Intervlews of the

Cubans who were supposed to have made the allegation.

Mr. McCone said that the

Inquiry produced no evidence whatsoever that any Deputy DCI or other CIA official

cler issued any

such order, nor any Chi representative outside of Washington, and

the

official records do reflect the issuance of any such instruction. At nost,

the DCI's Inquiry turned up only an instance or two where:

in the heat öf the

cperation statements were made to the effect that the operation was

ready and""

nothing could make it fail.

Mi. McCone

also referred to the book, "Invisible Government", which is

about to be publishes and has been revlewed in Look Magazine.

The book makes a

complete disclosure regarding the Radio Free Europe program and other CIA

proprietaries; it identifies ClA-personnel whose names have never appeared: in

public-print before; and specific reference is made to the Specläl NSC 5412/2

Group by name and function.

The authors came to see Mr. McCone last August

and he had a luncheon meeting with them.

The authors said that they were dustin

starting preparation of the book. Mi. McCone asked them to come see him again,

and to submit the manuscript for checking as to accuracy and security,

but they.

d1d not do 80.

CIA later

obtained a manuscript copy. from Random House covertly.

MI. McCone tiled to get the publishers to kill the book but was told that it

had already been paid. for.

Some 2000 copies have already been printed, and

the book 1s most damaging to the CIA, Mr. McCone said.

Following dinner at the Metropolitan Club, the Board

meeting resumed.

DI. Jerome Wiesner (and Spurgeon Keeny) who had

just returned

from a «cience

meeting in Moscow, gave the board a preliminary report on DI. Wiesner's review

of the recently-discovered microphone penetracion of the U.S. Embassy, Moscow.

DI. Wiener said that a surprising job had been done by the Soviets.

Most of

the microphones found were still operable after 11 years.:

They were imbedded

in the walls 8 inches deep, with wooden tubes extending out to the wall surface.

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The wires from the nicrophones ran out inside the exterlor building walls

to avoid detection.

During construction before the U.S. occupied the

"ourpeople gave instructions to the Soviets 88

where to sun telephone and electrical eiring to serve Embassy offices

to

In affect almost glving the Soviets

an advance blueprint of the layout of

Embassy offices.

As a result of the Soviet technical installation they had

access to the sounds of machines and conversationg In the Embassy up to the ..

time that shielded rooms were Installed.

They had microphones in the Embassy

rooms where U.S. intercept operations were going on.

The State Department's

resident security technician on the scene (Mr. Musser) is still surveying the

situätion, including the significance of the coaxial cables and grid antenna

which have been uncovered in the walls of the Embassy. There is as yet no.

real evidence that the Soviets were able to pick up brush sparks from the U.S.

cryptographic machines, but they were certainly able to pick up acoustic signala.

(There was an operable

microphone, right next to the printer location prior to

Installation of the shielded room.)

The microwave signal which is known to

have been beamed at the Embassy since 1957 may be a diversionary activity, or it

could be illuminating passive devices.

(The trouble 1s that Mi. Musser does

not have the resources to determine the use to which the signal is being put.)

An effort should be made to intercept the

signal outside the Embassy building

in a line with the direction of the beam which is coming from a Soviet guarded

apartment building nearby.

(Por a long time now no activo countermeasures have

been tried against the signal, and the attitude seems to have been not to

disturb it.)

Dr. Wlesner said that even if our Embassy security people had dug a trench

around the rooms where microphones were installed this would probably not have

uncovered the devices.

Dr. Wiesner feels that Mr. Musser 18

an able man but doesn'e have the

resources to help him do the job.

There is a need for trained people to use

adequate detection devices, and experts to oversee the job. There should be

Installed such

equipment as & standard video alarm in Embassy rooms, and it

should be possible to develop and use transistorized devices to detect radiation.

(Mr. Musser stated his belief that there could be a duplicate of the soviet

system as yet undiscovered.)

Dr. Wiesner thinks that the teletype machines are

well protected in the electro-shielded rooms.

But MI. Musser needs help which

he seems reluctant to ask for because "hit-and-run" visits by various experts

would hinder the efforts he is now trying to make.

Chairman Clifford asked what measures Dr.. Wleaner would take if he

were charged with responsibility for security

of the Moscow Embassy, DI. Wiesner

said that he would (1) complain to the Soviets about the microsuve signal (2)

do a more thorough tearing down of a room to see if other systems are present,

and (3) scan the walls and floors with an appropriate radiation device, e.g.,

radioactive cobalt taken in on the Ambassador's plane -- although you could not

be sure even then that an eavesdropping system was not installed.

that there is a view that the acoustically shielded rooms should also be glven

electromsgnetic shielding.

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Mr. Clifford asked whether a dafense could be devised, assuming that

we are unable to seatos.

that concealed microphones remain in place.

Dr. Wlesner

sald that aside from the measures already mentioned, one could literally destroy

1 or 2 rooms, 1.e.,

take them apart thoroughly and rebuild them.

It might also

be well to panel, or paint, the office walls, starting with the offices of the

Ambassador, the reputy Chief if Mission, and the military atraches -- but you

could not be certain that this defense would be totally effective.

Dr. Wlesner said that he and Mr. Keeny had visited the 2 Intercept rooms

In the Embassy, and the operating personnel talked freely about what they were

doing, with no apparent fear that they were being overheard by the Soviets.

Mr: Gray asked why the Soviets would damage the Embassy switchboard and

leave it out of commission as reported in a dispatch just recelved from Ambassador

DI. Wiesner said one could speculate that this was done to salvage

something left behlid in the switchboard or telephone system.

He added that

the switchboard is

un the ground floor area of the Embassy which 18 guarded by

Soviet guards; and Messrs. Wiesner and Keeny and their wives found it easy to

walk through the ground floor area unchallenged.

(Dr. Wiener and Mt. Keeny

were not told of the burglary entry and damage to the switchboard even though

they were in conversation with the Ambassador and other Embassy officials after

the incident occurred.

They heard about it from their wives who had learned of

the Incident in conversations with Embassy personnel.)

DI. Wiener also questioned the security of the Embassy fractice of sending

so many information coples of coded messages to other U. S. posts.

He said that

he found.no.evidence.ofparticular.concern.on.the.part of Embassy

to the bu88ing development:

around the clock.

Mr. Musses, on the other hand, Personnel with

was working

"Dr. Wiesner said that he had lunch with Ambassador Thompson

who said he felt that any Soviet intercept of bis conversations in the Embassy,

and of his messages, would only have served to confirm to the Soviets the

sympathetic attitude with which he looked upon the problems faced by the Soviets.

Chairman Clifford, on behalf of the Board, asked DI. Wiener to give the

Board a brief memorandum suggesting steps which the U.S.

Government should

consider taking in the direction of getting complete security of the Embassy

yin Moscow.

DI. Wiesner said he would do so, but pointed out that his suggestions

would probably be hose already proposed and considered by others, but not acted

on for various reasons including lack of funds.

He said that Mr. Musser'g

¡principal need is for more experts on the : cene.

DI. Wiesner and Mr. Keeny completed their visit with the Board

and departed

at 9:00 p.m.

In executive session, Chairman Clifford emphasized the gravity of the

Moscow penetration development, and stated his intention to have a special

Board Panel study made, as soon as the USIB completes its appraisal and report

on the subject.

With regard to the Board's May 2 report to the President on the National

Reconnaissance. Program, Mr. Clifford said that when the DCI's comments

received at the White House, and If the White House asks for Board recommendations,

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Directive should be lesued along the lines already proposed, Mi. Pace

thought that the Charman ghould proceed in that fashion without necc-sarily

having to call another Board meating on the subject.

The Chairman noted approval given to the proposed letters be would

send to Defense, State, CIA and the DCI requesting updated coverage of matters

dealt with in their annual reports to the Board on their Intolligence activities:

The next regularly scheduled meeting of the Board was set for August 6

and 7.

The Board adjourned 1ts meeting at 9:35 p. .

A. R.

Ash

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET

June 1, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE BOARD

110:190

SURJECT:

judlo Penetrations of the U.S. embassy,

.. '

Moscow

REFERENCE:

Board Agenda Items (3, 5, 6, 12

7:0020,

Since the last meeting of the Buard there have oeen

discovered 41 microphones concealed in the walls of our

Embassy in Moscow.

These have been located at strategic

points covering virtually all of our key offices incaudin&

those of the

the Army

¿Communications and

Embassy conference and typing rooms, the office of the Army.

"Alr Force,

Political, Economic, Agricultural Attaches,

to conventional. bugs deeply imbedded in the

walls of the imbassy, there also have been discovered threes

coaxial cables and

a large (3' x 9') antenna which may besider

assoclated in

some manner with the unusual signal which is

known to hai! been

targeted against key offices in the

Embassy for at least seven years.

lemmedlately following the discovery of the first of the

41 microphones,

the Chairman directed that appropriate inquiry

be initlated.

In llne therewith the Baker Panel was convened,

and discussions were held with appropriate personnel of the

White House,

the State and Defense Departments, the NSA, CIA,

In addition at the request of Mr. Bundy, Dr. jerome

Wesner

former Science Advison to the President, was briefed

on the subject preparatory to his making an on-the-scene review

in Moscow of the steps being taken by the State Department, with

respect to this development.

Further, special studies were

nequested on behalf of the Board relative to the degree of

Jeopardy which may have resulted to our encryption systems. as

consequence of

these penetrations.

(A couple of weeks after

the Chairman Initiated Board

Inquiries

concerning this matter,

the USIB began

a review of the subject and at that time the

USIB was requested by Mr. Bundy to report the results of l's

findings and recommendations to the Board In time for consider-

ation at this meeting.)

In keeping with the foregoing, the Board will be briefed

on the following significant aspects of the subject (as

reflected in the agenda):

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Agenda 1 tem 3:

The writer will brief the Board on the

details of these penetrations.

Baker w1ll brief the

on the technical judgments which have been made on the subjec

by the Baker Panel.

see enclosed draft report prepared by

the Panel.)

This Panel consists of the following individuals:

Dr.

William O. Baker - Board Member

DI.

Edward E. DavId.

- Director, Visual & Acoustic Research,,

Bell Telephone Laboratories

Dr. Andrew M. üleason-

Department of Mathematics

Harvard University

Di. John W. Tukey

Mr. J. R. Plerce

• - Department of Mathematics

Princeton University

- Research Staff

Bell Telephone Laboratories

Agenda Item 5:

Mr. Robert Bannerman, Chairman of the

security Committee, will brief

the Board on the highlights

of the study which his Committee has made thus

far with respect

to the general security Implications of the audio penetrations

of the Embassy in Moscow.

(Hopefully, by Board meeting time,

we will be in possession of a written

USIB report on th13

subject as requested by Mr. Bundy.)

Mr. G. Marvin Gentile

Director of security, Department of state, will join the Bo

for. Mr. Bannerman's presentation and will be prepared to respond

to any questions which the members may have relative to the

Internal operations of the State Department's security system.

(In Iron Curtain countries the State

responsible for the security

"sweeps" epartment is primarily

and associated actions

which are taken in an effort to detect and counter hostile

penetrations which-may be attempted

against official U. S.

Agenda 1tem 6:

General Blake, Director of NSA, and/ or

Tordella, will brief the Board on the technical

assessments thus far made at NSA relative to the Impact, If any;

of these penetrations on the cryptographic systems which are

employed by

elements' of the State and Defense Departments and.

CIA In the handling of classified conmunications, between

Washington and our officlal installations in Iron Curtain

countries and elsewhere.

Agenda Item 12:

Dr.

have resulted from his examination at the Moscow Embassy of the

actions taken and contemplated with respect to these very

serious penetrations.

f. Patieh Cogna

Latrick coyne

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This docusent consists of 2 pages.

Number 20f 5 coptes,

Series

Arri

Su.

June 1, 1964*

Fat!

"w?

TO:

FROM:

Mr. J. Patrick. Coyne

Menber, President's Foreign

Intelligence Advisory Board

The Witte House

Washington, D. C.

G. Marvin Gertile

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security

In reply to your verbal request for information concerning-the -7-June,

1962 eSc1/3/770,797 defector tapurt,

the following persons vere appraised of

the contents of this report in addition to Mr. John f. Reilly, Deputy Asgtota

ant

Secretary for

Security:

bradeey night:

Mr. Maclyn Musaer - Resident Engineer, Moscis

Beatles of par

' Edwin R. Hiller • Officer in Charse offthe At ii0 Secice

Frankfurt Test Center W274Y M400e

the cod:

Mr. Bluer D. Kill - thon Chief of the Division of tuna e02

Technical Services.

i.: 143

The referenced documont was

received in the Division of Technical Services

on June 21, 1962, just prior to Mr. Hiller's departure for Frankfurt wtiere, as

Officer In

Charge of the Frankfurt Test Center, he was responsible for all of

the Moscow technical inspectiong.

Mr. Musser, the now Rusident Engineer in Moscow, departed for Moscow in

Octobar of 1962 and ias aware of this information prior to his arrival in

Moscow.

6. 2,

4. 13 # 199.2

This report stated the defector "saw reports with the red stripes, in

connection with which were mentioned, he balieves, the room or office of the

stated that living quarters

'beyond question' bugged, as are any Embassy rooms to which

Soviet citizens are permitted access, iut that sons rooms in the anbassy might

Other than calling this memorandum in the attention.of per

sonnel directly Involved in the techaical program, the records of this Office

indicate no specific action was taken by the Offico of sacurity since the con-

tents of the report apparently vere considarod only e re-confirmation of con-

victlons heid that such installations were indeed present. Since Mr. Reilly

GROUP I'

Excluded from automatio

downgrading and

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and Mr. H1l1 are no longer connected wich this Office exaet reasoning ca not

be supplied and only sumised.

Inquiry will so nude of Mr. Miller and Mi.

Musser to determine whether they can furnish turther pertinent details concern-

Ing this natter. The results of this inquiry will be furnished to you as soon as

posalble

.50

It should be noted that primary interest in Moscow at thatstime was in the

resolution of the nature of the microwuve signals directed at the west wall of

the Embassy, as llitle vas actually knowm prior to Mr. Musser's arrival of the

exact characteristles of the signal.

In regard to your request

for the position of the department. of state In

connection with Mr. "Khrushchou's allegation that he possessed a State cable:

Mx. John W. Coffey, Dopucy Assistant Secretary for Comunicationg, has fürnloned

the following statement:

"In response to Mr. Coyno's request we have reviewed the position

of the pipe amargo message as stated last September in the light

of the discovery of microphones in the American Embassy lioscow.

:Un the basis of evaluationa to date, we assume the possibility

that the bulk of classified telegraphic information handled at

Moscow batween occupancy of the bullding in 1953 through 1952 may

have been compromised.

Classifled telegraphic communicatios ex-

clusive of Iron Curtain posts would not have been affected.

le

sosume no penetration of cryptographic system at Moscow

since the

Installation of the shielded enclosure in late 196? foi the commin-

Ications operations.

"The microphone discovery doed not alter our position with respect

to Mr. Khrushchar's allegation unlesa it

1s assune that a telegrem

"originated in Moscow prior

to December 1962 1s. that in question:

As you know, bassador Kohler, in paragraph

2-u Bobted 3571 of 24

Mas 1964, xelterated his earlier position denying the existence of e

the alleged telegrun."

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RNATIONAL

se teching

Many: informied

that! the

Premier had overstage this wal-

core in Revot. Bight me in the final day

Nikita contained

to shock

Aral sensolities But long before then:

Decadet abate profited

from an old

Become sayog as colorful as one of his

ach achy proverbs from thr

Driul:

Ukraine:

your milk whole fresh, for it.will

Ann sour if

long Kept.

occipied be the embart

counselor, who acts as:

inter

of mission.

With crosbars and drats the drarines

took down the inside walls and carefully

carted tie debris down to the embassy

basement for silung. Alter the wrecking

operation was completed, Washington

revealed last week, more tam 10 tiny

microphones were found in the debris.

Thougt the bugs" had apparently

been installed by

Russian

work rath

RUSSIS:

cleven. years ago,

when the new em.

bassy was readied for U.S. occupation,

The Walls Have Ears

many were still in workdog order. Washe

Tree sets age this summer joseph

ingion, however, feebly attempted to

Saran anopoly ordered the U.S.

minimize the security leakage boy asiste

Em-

ing that the microphones conid not have

basty a Moscoir moved out of the con-

done serious damage since matters of

ler at town so that he would not have to

real importance are generally discussed

look at it every time he went in and out

only in "safe rooms" inside the embasty.

0.S. 'tronghold! in Moscow: More than 40 mikes were listening

of the Kremlin. Not long

aftervard

Still died-ichercimon the Soviet For

(A safe room is a room within a soon

which gives the appearance of being

cine Office apologetically called up U.S:

suspended in space. Its walls, colling.

olficiais and told them that the embassy

floor and even supports, are made of

need not move after all. But U.S. socu

transparent plastic so that nothing can

Tilv

experts,

declaring that the new

be inserted withont being detocied.)-

building selected for the embassy was

Undoubtedis.

more safe rooms will

a "dream"

from the security point of

now be installed in the Moscow ei.

vies, insisted on going through with

bassy. But the fact that the Soviet wall

the moie..

microphones had survived three ambas-

Last summer it turned out that ibnt

sadors and eleven years of sccurity tests

security mon thought was a dream had

before being discevered could scarcely

Pured into a nightmare.

The

tip-off

fail. to arouse among laymen some

came islien Premier Nikita S.

Khru

doubts as to the securly experts' assur-

shchev informed Averell Marimas that

he kner U.5. Ambassadur Foy Kohler

ances that safe roons are, in fact, safe.

Was opposed to. West Germany selling

RUMANIA

the Rustling steel

Pipe.

"Don"t try to

deny it" 0e told: Harriman.

"We didn't

lenin trat from our spies.

* With that, in-

Dynamite

tolligened agents; began looking, Inside

Romanian:

delegation cune to

the U.S. Embassy's walls. After a series,

"Washington last week on what seemed

uf tests by technicians loaded down ivih

mctal-detrong devices, the

the dullest of. errands-negotiating a:

trade-expansion agreement, But the mis-

rine guards at the embassy were or

sion involved core potertial political

dered to tear down the ofice noimally

dynamite for Rastam Europe than any-

32

thing since: this

Fir

somic

fronths,

Mannuains

bare bern

trying to

Luisim domination.

the Sino Societyang,

they publicly

famed die coutboe af all world Corne

moist parties in deir now-famous April

22 decration of independence. in pri-

vate, they have Mone eten faber, is.

marian

party

tenders are renege

treme codeloud too pardon, Blunt

Nervous to ther dudd

rule and lic.

Secrat Scats: Moscow, Ruddanias

dra bome "told, is poor their rede

ony modatesde for Been person

President Cbcorate CheorgaaDey ra.

fused to subordinate the barrot indus.

trial desciopment to the Kreodhis plas

for Eastern Europer

Sostet

security

agents tried to incite Rumanians do over

throw his covertmont-and Pienior Ni

Bucharest to deuten the use of Saved

Poles were

in 1G0 in

Madesh Commanio be Deepaned to

restat "with all possible means."

là dies explosie situation, that die

Rumanians want medt is a suresentif

U.s. sympathy for ducir centil once

in, world

Premier - Clearahe Caston Nir, No

and heads the Perche delevator, issued

V.S. is aul for Rumanion ladezendence,

but it the sone tone footh the to

serve is one interests in Basterd Exa

rope be gotta the Ramsabicos to purce

to internal hoeralization as a quid peo

quo. To Under Secretary of State Nl

Averell Marriaran Ane Caken the Achede

task of adancing both causes, and rect

wack's joint communioud will shot five

howy stecessful he has. been:

CYPRUS:

Crossed Fingers

It seemed too good to beitrie:

more than four nights not a shot had

been fired in the blood! drenchd itteels

of Nicosio. "The situation in Crois is

coproving tremendously,"

sid U Thant's

special represent.rtite Calo

Plasa.

course,

" Die added,

"Ci

Angers: erosiod."

"we are keeping our

And for, & feethe

i Cypais.

bustly ham estate their crani

warm: Meditermed son.

All daiti

• timental touch to the springtime amity

the ViN, announced that one of is 7,000

soldiers had broome enragid: in

Greck: Cypriot girl.

But the lull was short-lived a patri!

of Finnish UN, troops sent to i shrat

Neravack, June 1, 1964

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29,42

ENTRA

Tap SECE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 2E. D.".

OFFICE OF DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGUNCE

Coyne

3 Juna 1964

The Honorable McGeorge Bundy

Spircial Assistant to the Precident

For National Security Affaire

The White House

#ashingion, D. C

Dear Sir, Bundy:

Ad requested in your memorantum of 14 May, the

attached Proliminary Damago Aagosarnont of the Technical

Surveillance Pinetration of the U.S, Embaesy, Moacowe

is transmitted herewith.

The United States Intelligence Hoard today noted the

attachod security Committee report und approved the

recommendationa as contained tharain,

As you alno requested, coples it the attached report

hare been furnished to the President's Ferdign Inteiligence

Advisory

Board.

Falthfully yours,

(signod): Marshall S. Carter

Marshall S, Carter

Lieutenant Genaral, USA

Deputy Diroctor

Attachment

PB#2012

Joker

/ Meeting)

6- 1=64

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Prosident' Foreigu Intelligence Advlsory Board

TS:)38539-04

Copy No.

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PRESIDENT'S FORETON INEILIGNNOS ADVISOR BOARD

May 29, 1954

Dear John t

Tho next meeting of the Trentdent '& fureten

Intelligence: Advisory: Board an scheduled to be

hold on June 4, 3904, and in 1tne with eateblahed

practtoo it would be very mich appreciated 1f you

would coet with us on the afternoon of that day,

beginning at 4:00 p.n.

Ny the time of your meeting with us.

be belstue 18 you would be prepared to osbouse the

oublecte outlined in the attachment.

Sincerely,

/s /

Clame Me

cliccord

Chairman

Attachment

(вух: 0041/64)

Me. Jchzi A. NoCone.

Direotow of Cantral Intelligence

Langley, Virgins

JRC MEC

Handle via BYEMAN

Control System

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OP SECRET

Got Gott

2.

3

BYE 0041/64

PRESIDENT'S FOREIAN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BCARD

Sub jeats

Suggested

by Board Memoers for Discussion

by the Director of Contral Intelligence Wien ile

Meets with the Board on June 4x 1264

intellisonoe .Community Capabllities for coverage (other

than

SIGINT) of significent Targets on the china iai

land and in South Cost 1918.

a.. Extont or photographia coverage in past

weave months partioulary of cnicom ens Nortr

Vietnam taraots! throuch satellite and manned vohioles.

Extent of clandestine agent coverage in

past treive months (particularly as regards the china

Mainland,

•Laos, Combedia, Norch Vietnam and Chicon-AVN

support of the

Viet Cong

In South Vietnan).

C ;

ricasures contemplated by the United States

IntollIgence Board to improve collection capebilitles

relating to a and b, above.

Cuba

Progress achieved thus far in outalning

signifIcant intelligence on Cuba through the implementa-

tion, of the series of carlior Board recomendationa

to the President on this subject.

Status of planning for nounting Innovative

clandestine coliection activities on Cube, Including,

agent collection and excluding collection by satollite,

Counterintelligence Responsiollities Retating to Audio

Penotrationa of U.S, Installatione to Communiot Countries.

Any oral comments the DoI may wiuh

to make In

amplifloation of the report on the bugging of the Moscow

Embassy to be subnitted by the usms for consideration

it the June 4

meeting of the Board.

(See Mr, Bundy's

memorandum of May 14, 19642)

Reladirnahlp of thia probiom to the dol'e

responsibillby for protection of intolligence, and

Intelligense sourcas and machoos,

CORONA/GAMBID/ TORALIST/DA

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as to whethos elthar the CIA or

elements

of the Department of Defense should perfom

any operational audiosurvelllance countermeasure rois

in U, 8, inetallatione behind the Iron Curtain.

4.

Coondtnation of U. S. Foreten Intelllkence Istlvltlep

Identifioation of major problems: sopa and

deficiencles enoountered by the pol in brase Involving

the coordination of the U. S. Foralgn Itelligence

effort, remedial aationa takon or contempleted.

5.

Any sither matters which the pol may wish to raise with

the Board.

CORONA/GANBIT/ DEALEST/L

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