DISPATCH: TYPIC/OPERATIONAL PROGRESS REPORT AMTRUNK TEAM, PERIOD 1-30 SEPTEMBER 1963
Agency: CIA
Originator: CIA
From: CHIEF, SPECIAL AFFAIRS STAFF
To: CHIEF OF STATION, JMWAVE
Document date: 10/18/1963
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

## Page 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY CIA

RECORD NUMBER: 104-10309-10008

RECORD SERIES * JFK

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

LA DIV WORK FILE

Released under the John F. Kennedy

Aszassination Records Collection

Act of 1992(44 USC 2107 Notel

Casel:NU 53320 Date: 06-27-2017

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

AGENCY ORIGINATOR : CIA

FROM: CHIEF OF STATION, UMWAVE

TO : CHIEF, SPECIAL AFFAIRS STAFF

TITLE : DISPATCH: TYPIC/OPERATIONAL PROGRESS REPORT AMTRUNK

TEAM, PERIOD 1-30 SEPTEMBER 1963

DATE

10/18/1963

PAGES

*22

SUBJECTS AMTRUNK

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER

CLASSIFICATION : SECRET

RESTRICTIONS *

1B

CURRENT STATUS: RELEASED IN PART PUBLIC - RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW 09/04/98

COMMENTS JFK-WF04: 00: 1998.09.04.10:17:20:936128 : ATTACHED

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

[R] ITEM IS RESTRICTED

• 104-10309-10008

MH 53320 DooId:32373816 Page 1

---

## Page 2

SECRET

i ROUTING AND RECORD SHET

INSTRUCTIONS

SP

MER.

4.83

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2, on back. Detach back flap and

forward to RID.

2.

Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records

significant action taken or comments requir-

ing preservation.

FROM:

TO: ACTION BRANCH

It file no. and title shown are not proper, in-

sert proper file no, below and forward doc-

ument to RID/AN.

PROPER FILE NO.

RID/

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

TO

ROOM

mop

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S

ELPS

4.

Улу

5.

6.

Why do we get this

2'I years late

MICROFILMED

MAR 16 1965

DOC. MICRO. SER.

C

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17

RID/FI

TRACE

REQUEST

DATE MICROFILMED

GABSTRACT

Test sh

•Єн

WHN92061@pcD9H908816

Page 2

FILE TITLE

19 - 603-2/2

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)

DOCUMENT DA

180463

SECRET

DOCUMENT NUMBER

UFGA-11829

(40)

---

## Page 3

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

SECRIT

PRO

POSED

TO

Chief, Special Affairs Staff

INFO.

MICROFILME

MAN 1 6 1965

FROM:

AMTRuNK

0 Ps

PROCESSING

ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED

KEADOUARTERS DESK

CAN JUDGE INDEXING

ABSTRACT

MICROFILM

Chief of Station,

IMWAVE AKR

DOC. MICRO, SE

SUBJECT

TYPIC/Operational

Progress Report AMTRUNK Team, Period 1-30 September 1963

• ACTION REQUIRED, REFERENCES

Action Required: Please card asterisked names in attachments.

OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY

WASHESC

Project activity during the first eight days

only be described

as hectic.

As September began,

AMTRUNK-9,

on 23 August, was being

rushed through tradecraft and FI

training, being

briefed and briefed,

and trained in S/W and OWVL in preparation

for his re-infiltration on 9 September•

At the same time, com-

plications arose over

AMIRUNK-9's POA when his first LCFLUTTER

turned out inconclusively and when it was discovered that ODIBEX

had laid prior claim to his services.

The difficulty over the

LCFLUTTER was straightened out following a second LCFLUTTER test

at which time the results were much clearer to read and indicated

ODIBEX relinquished all claim to AMTRUNK-9 after

the Station had granted an interview to an ODIBEX case officer

with AMTRUNK-9 in order that A-9 could be debriefed on his knowl-

edge of AMFAUNA-3's activities. At the same time KUBARK offered

to assist ODIBEX by exfiltrating AMFAUNA-3 on the same operation

during which AMTRUNK-9 would be infiltrated.

In the midst of the rush to train and hold operational dis-

cussions with AMTRUNK-9, a newspaper article on changing trends

among high level personnel within the AMTHUG-I government written

by AMCAPE-1 appeared in a major daily newspaper.

AMCAPE-1 re-

portedly told a high level ODYOKE official that AMICE-27, the

AMTRUNK team Leader

was the source of his information.

riefing of AMICE-27 had produced information at considerabl

variance to that in AMCAPE-l's article.

Confronted with the ar-

ticle, AMICE-27 admitted talking to AMCAPE-1 but denied that most

of the information in the article was based on fything which

AMICE-27 had said.

As this article was creating considerable

furor in ZRMETAL, IrvingA PEGGINS escorted AMICE-27 on 5 Septem-

ber to ZRMETAL for further debrieringe ind operational discussions.

Attachments:

no anties is

A through E h/w

Distribution:

3 - c/sAs w/atts.

Denitiate

12 Oct

63

DOT 1 5.1963

S CHOS PEFERENCE TO 8 - 21e

Rio:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

UFGA-11829

IS COPY

Excludes Hi

5 aus

CLASSIFICATION

Huhe sEen

4 10 6 84/3-1

19 6 8413

ACCON

HW 53320 DocId: 32373816.

Page 3

---

## Page 4

CONTINUATION OF

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

SECRE

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

UFGA-11829:

Discussions with Headquarters personnel were held on 5 and 6

September, during which AMICE-27 continued to stick to exactly

the same story which he had given during his JWAVE debrief-

These discussions also covered the future direction

and scope of the AMTRUNK project.

No concrete meeting of

minds between KUBARK officers, and AMICE-27 was obtained dur-

ing these two days.

It was agreed that the discussions would

continue in the JMWAVE area.

On late 6 September,

27 proceeded alone to New

York City to contact Di, Raul

MRILLO Gomez,

former coman-

carded

dante in the Rebel Army and personal physician of AMTHUG-1,

to ask him to come to the JMWAVE area for discussions with

AMTRUNK-9 and KUBARK officers on the general AMTRUNK concept.

At the same time,

PEGGINS and Willard R.

NAUMAN from Head-

quarters returned to the WAVE area.

On 7 September AMICE-27

accompanied by TRILLO arrived in that area.

Discussions con-

tinued in the safehouse during 7 and 8 September.

At the same time, preparations were going forward to

infiltrate AMTRUNK-9 and to exfiltrate AMFAUNA-1, -3

and-34.

AMICE-14 was to be acting team leader for this operation, ac-

companied by the two team guides,

AMTRUNK-7 and-8.

8 September AMICE-27 escorted TRILLO to the airport for his

return to New York. Several hours later the infiltration

team consisting of

ANICE-14, AMTRUNK-7,

and -9 were loaded

on board the M/V Neptune for their infiltration scheduled for

the following evening,

The infiltration

AMTRUNK-9 and the exfiltration of four AMFAUNAS (AMFAUNA-13 was

included in the exfiltration party at the last moment) went off

Attached herewith as Attachment A is AMICE-14Us •

log of this

operation.

Due to the fact that the infiltration

area was rotted up because of an exile refugee infil in the

same area, AMICE-14 decided to clear the area one night

earlier than scheduled.

He therefore headed straight for

Marathon, arriving the

that town.

following morning within one mile of

At this point he had the misfortune to run out

to be picked up by the Coast Guard, and to be towed

into the town dock where the boat was greeted by police,

newspaper photographers and tourists.

This created consi

derable stir but the team was eventually picked up from local

authorities by the case officer without any team identities

becoming known. Through liaison with two local newspapers,

all photographs showing identifiable team member faces were

suppressed and obtained for Station files.

spectacular nature of the AMTRUNK re-entry at Marathon some-

what obscured the precise, professional manner in which the

team had carried out its assigned task during the entire

mission, including the feat of sailing a 16' Boston Whaler

with seven persons aboard across some 120 miles of ocean.

During the latter half of the reporting period consi

derable discussion continued between the case officers and

AMICE-27 as to the future direction of the operation. AMICE-27

continued to hold out for very grandiose schemes.

In essence

he wanted carte blanche to recruit more infil-extil agents,

to organize an amorphous Rebel Army group in exile, to re-

cruit, train and dispatch PM teams for resistance and sabotage

on the inside, to establish a commando unit on the outside,

and to run a propaganda program beamed from PBPRIME into

At one point in these discussions the COS, JMWAVE, was

introduced to AMICE-27 and laid out the general parameters as

to the Station's interest in AMICE-27's ideas. By the end

of the reporting period we had been able to reduce AMICE-27

again to a manageable size and were proceeding to spot and

recruit two candidates for the next ANTRUNK infiltration and

to work out a propaganda program to be handled by the Station's

HORM

5-60

53a

USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

ASSIFICATION

PAGE NO.

SEC

CONTINUED

2.

HW 53320 DocId:32373816 Page 4

---

## Page 5

CONTINUATION OF

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

SECRE

DISPA

SYMBOL AND NUMBER

UFGA-11829

PW Branch beamed at the Cuban Rebel Army.

During the re-

porting period two S/W messages were received from

AMTRUNK-11 and s/W messages were sent to AMTRUNK-10,

AMTRUNK-11 (2) and AMTRUNK-12... One OWVL message was sent

to AMTRUNK-9.

Transmitted herewith are several other attachments to

help bring the record of AMTRUNK activities up to date.

Attachment B is the account of the August infiltration

written by AMICE-27.

David is AMICE-14.

In this account, Leon" is AMICE-27,

Attachment Cis a more thorough de-

briefing of the AMICEs on their initial contacts on the in-

side. Attachment D lists the main operational contacts of

AMTRUNK-10, as obtained from debriefing AMICE-14 and 27.

trachment Pis a paper written by AvLeE-2C attempting

utline us ideas, following the discussions held in ZRMITA

AMTRUNK-1 told PEGGINS that this paper was originally about

twelve pages long,

but that he had helped AMICE-27 cut it

4-1 didn't think much of the paper just as he pro-

fesses notato think much of AMICh-274s ideas.

In this re-

gard twould appear that ANTRUNK-I has been of help to the

has been:

deflating. A-27's

2. INTELLIGENCE REPORTING

UFG-3596, 11 September 1963, Unexplained Presence of

Soviets at Playa Menendez & Presence of Hungarian Agricul-

tural Advisors at Finca Hatuey, Matanzas Province:

UFG-3608, 12 September 1963,

Militia Outposts and Patrols in

the Area

of the Coastal Keys North of the Bahia de Santa

Clara, Matanzas Province.

3. OPERATIONAL EXPENDITURES

Salaries

AMICE-27

AMICE-14

AMTRUNK- 7

$350.00

$250.00

$200.00

AMTRUNK- 8

$200.00

$1,000.00

Expenses (safehouse and

operational including

AMICE-27 ZRVETAL and New

York City trip):

Mileage

GRAND TOTAL

$493.87

$126.00

$1,619.87

Pesos

AMICE- 14

AMTRUNK-9

Peso Total

700.00

₽ 2,000.00

₽ 2. 700.00

FORM

5-60

53a

USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

CLASSIFICATION

SEE

CONTINUES

PAGE NO

3.

WH 53320 DocId:32373815 Paye 57

---

## Page 6

CLASSIFICATION

CONTINUATION OF

DISPATCH

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

UFGA-11829

4. PROJECTED PLANS

During the month of October, it is planned to

process and debrief the two new candidates for infil

tration, AMTRUNK-13 and -14, to prepare them to begin FI

and tradecraft training during the latter part of the

Continued planning for the propaganda campaign,

to be directed against the Rebel Army, will be carried

during the month of October.

In addition, further pro-

gress on the formation of a political platform is expected

during the coming month.

Other possibilities which wi11

be explored with AMICE-27 and -14 are the infiltration of

one or several radio operators to shore up the system of

communications with the internal ANTRUNK assets and the

formation of one action team to be infiltrated for an

indefinite period.

END OF DISPATCH

FORM

5.60

53c

:K-641.8

USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

ww 33320 DocId: 32373816 Page 6

CLASSIFICATION

SECTIN

PAGE NO

CONTINUED

19-609.310

843

---

## Page 7

SECRET

ATTACHMENT "A"

14 September 1963

LOG OF SEPTEMBER OPERATION

2

1.

We were left 2.7 miles from La Empalizada on the 9th of

September at 2210 hours

We arrived at the Tolo gulch at 0130 on

as to make contact as soon as possible and at the same time we

obtained information on the area.

ceived more information on the area and we

agreed with them on the (All

hour and place where Jose Lopez (AMTRUNK LO

would be picked up.

p. 1

They took David (AMICE-14) and Caxlos (AMTRUNK-7) in the boat, to

land, leaving Tomas (AMTRUNK-8) in charge of the boat with Jose.

3. David and Carlos arrived at AntoniotGarcia's house at

2400 hours on the 10th, and Antonio agreed to take Luis (Luis Garcia,

his brother) to the place indicated by David and Carlos, where they

would wait for the exfiltrees.

4.

Luis arrived at 0600 hours on the Ilth, agreeing to go to

the point where Julio, Richard and Hortensia (the AMFAUNA exfiltrees)

would be picked up,

having been informed of the place, time and

countersign as well as the place to where they were to be taken as

soon as they argived.. It was also agreed that on his return he

would take Jose Lopez, who would be picked up by car at 0530 on

the 12th at a point already agreed upon with Cando Diaz.

5. At 0800 on the llth David and Carlos returned to the boat.

6. At 2000 on the 11th David, Carlos, Tomas and Jose took the

boat to dry land, landing at 2100 hrs. on the 1lth.

At 2230 hrs. on

the lith we made contact with Luis and the group of exfiltrees, leav-

ing Jose with Luis to infiltrate.

it winni

7.

At 2300 hrs. on the Ilth we began leaving the area of infil

by boat. At 0230 hrs. on the l2th we arrived at the mouth of La

Empalizada, beginning our trip towards the U.S. We arrived in the

U.S. at 1130 hrs. on the 12th of September.

8. Information from September infiltration:

According to information submitted by the fisherman

Isaac Moreno, a helicopter was seen searching the

area on 9 September.

b.

On the llth and 12th planes flew over the area con-

stantly about every two hours.

SEC

tet

DocId: 32373816

Page 7

AS COPY

MICROFILMED

MAR 1 6 1965

DOC, MICRO, SER.

19-103-21

19. 420

---

## Page 8

- 2.

d.

e .

On the l0th two boats, armed, sailed through the

bahia of Santa Clara.

On the 12th two boats,

19 ft. and 28 ft.,

entered

La Palma river at ll o'clock and left at 14 hrs.

The militia searched the land and embankment around

Rio la Palma on the 9th, 10th, Ilth and 12th.

All the planes flew at about 2000 ft.

They were

single engine and twin motor planes but no other

identifying marks could be observed.

Conclusion:

These searches were due to the fact

that a boat from Miami had come to pick up some 30

persons. One of these had abandoned his car in the

canal of "San Mated This boat was under the com-

up by the GOC and MILIAN was caught.)

SE

HH 53320 DocId:32373816 Page 8

---

## Page 9

ATTACHMENT "B*

OPERATLOAY REPORI

- AmIck-

AMICE-I4

at dawn of ll August on the mothership "Kilo", towing the boat to be

used in the infiltration, which we will call "Pedro".

The mother ship went near the banks of Cay Sal, anchoring and re-

maining there until mid-afternoon. We proceeded in examining "Pedro"

finding that the drain corks were out of place and that there was ap-

proximately 5 inches of water in the boat. We took out the water and

put the corks in their places.

We tried out the main motor and placed

the gasoline tanks under the seat of the helmsman and under the lateral

seats (total of 3):

At sundown, "Kilo" went towards the destination point,

arriving at

about 10 p.m. to the chosen point,

that is, approximately 2 miles north

of the narrow channel called Empalizada. Here we installed the remain-

ing gas tanks, the silent motor and the equipment. We left for the en-

trance of the channel using the silent motor which, due to poor fune-

tioning in the intake of gasoline, stopped several times, so we decided

to use the main motor.

After an exploration necessary to locate the channel again, because

the boat drifted while we were stopped, we entered it and followed the

pre-established route. We only encountered two boats which were quite

far away, at the entrance of the Santa Clara bay. Once there, we went

to the Concunil lagoons where we ran into a white fishing boat with a

sail mast (it was later proved that it belonged to a militia informer),

so we decided to go to the nearest point of the entrance to firm land,

through the so-called Three Towers lagoon (Tres Torres), which joins

the Santa Clara Bay by the narrow channel called Lolo. In this place,

an entrance was selected (away from the principal lagoon). This en-

trance was approximately as wide as the boat,

covered with high and thick mangroves that covered the boat pretty well.

As an additional precaution, we used them to camoullage the boat by

making a roof for it. The boat was located in the middle of a mangrove

swamp without firm land, approximately 1.5 kms from the Santa Clara Bay

and 2 kms from firm land.

In the afternoon of the 13th, the entrance of a fishing boat was

detected. It had a motor of the type called "planta" (1 cylinder 12

h.p.), about 18 feet long, with a 3 member crew, and also a small

"chapin" type boat (punt or dory), which the fishermen usuelly use for

The owner of the boat identified bimself as

1st WORk oto taaccompanted cy his tather, Feliciano MORENO and

by a nephew.

Since these people were known to us, we approached them

and upon learning that they were willing to help us in our getivities,

they were asked to fish that day, and go to their departure point,

which was Menendez beach, where they were to contact oscar

send him to the lagoon.

vealed to them.

38

SECREI

A 63920 boct4:323x3816 Paje-97

MICROFILMED

MAR 1 6 1965

DOC. MICRO. SER

101-6003-2

1-274

---

## Page 10

- 2-

towing a "chapin" entered the lagoon.

The next morning, a fishing boat, about 20 feet lobiAz, Antonio

On it were Oscar

DIAZ (his son) and Candido DIAZ, who were the people we had sent for.

We explained the cooperation needed from them and how to carry out the

activities that would be entrusted to them. They happily accepted

everything and showed their willingness to cooperate in every way they

could.

Through them we sent two mebrages.

Candido DIAZ would go to

Cardenas and would talk to Pedro BARBI to arrange for our transportation

us to Itabo or Marti:

The boat carrying Antonio DIAZ and Candido DIAZ

returned to the

Lagoon after having established contacts with Fermin GONZALEZ Fernan-*

dez. Using the "chapin" towed by the boat, Leon, David and one of the

guides that accompanied us from the exterior, moved to the end of the

mangroves, where the swamp area begins, adjacent to an abandoned salt

pit. the

three men went to the farm of Antonio GARCIA where at dawn

they were to be picked up by a chauffeur known as Mako, who passes through

that area as he has relatives living there

05 aa)

We arrived at that farm at 5:30 a.m.,

time agreed upon,

but due to

an interpretation error, the car didn't arrive until after ? in the

morning and didn't stop at the agreed place, so the three persons above

mentioned went back to where the boat was hidden and waited to estab

lish a new contact.

The next afternoon Juan PEREZ came to the lagoon

saying that he had prepared a new trip for nightfall.

0L4

ing the crossing of the lagoons, we met a "chapin" manipulated

190

by Juan Manuel and Luis Garcia, the latter a brother of Antonio Garcia.

The car was to come to Antonio's farm, and he offered himself to be

used as permanent contact point, as he was moving with his wife to that

farm within the next 10 days, in an independent house that would not

have dogs.

The group formed by Leon, David and the guide arrived at the farm

at nightfall, where they were received by Antonio Garcia.

Moments later

the car arrived and the infiltrees went to a mechanic's workshop 10-

cated in the town of Itabo, where Fermin worked.

On the patio of the

mentioned workshop, away from public sight, the infiltrees switched to

Fermin'S car, in which t

ey were taken to the fuipuzcoa sugar factory,

to the house of Esmeraldo MONTALVO, nicknamed VAldo".

Aldo is a negro

taxi driver who usually travels out of the area. Besides the mentioned

chauffeur and the infiltrees, there was also a cousin of the driver,

Angel, also a negro.

16 au

The departure for Havana was at 9 p.m., the trip was made without

any incidents, without searches or checks or any type of vigilance on

the highway.

SE

HW 53320 DocId:32373816 Page 10

---

## Page 11

1-3-

that the UCAL had been working jointly with the UR but that the UCAL

at this time is practically out of business.

6. AMTRUNK- 9

Asked if he had ever seen Fidel since February 1959, A-9 said

that he had not, although Fidel had twice asked him to come. see him

and he had declined. Under questioning, A-9 said that he has never

been arrested by the G-2 at any time.

However, he said that he was

accused in 1960 along with Sori Marin, of anti-government activities

but was not picked up.

He Said that he has been investigated by the

G-2 and interrogated by them although not actually arrested. The last

time apparently that he was investigated openly by the G-2 was in 1960.

He states however, that he is under surveillance from time to time and

his house has been staked out from time to time by the G-2. He says

that hevnows one G-2 Captain fairly well; an individual by the name

of Juan

Pe la Pena, alias Boris: He says that the alias comes from

the fact that De la Pena looks like Boris Karloff.

E

14 - 6-843

114 53320

DocId: 32373816 Page 11

---

## Page 12

, ATTACHMENT. D

27 September 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Contacts of AMTRUNK-10

MICROFILMED

MAN 1 6 1965

SOURCE: AMICE-14 and AMICE-27

DOC. MICRO. SER.

1.

The following are the most significant contacts of

AMTRUNK-10 as discussed with AMTRUNK-10 by AMICE-27 and -14

during their August 63 infiltration.

The background infor-

mation on these individuals comes from personal knowledge of

both AMICEs.

A. Rolando CUBELA Secades, Subject of 201-252234

CUBELA was born in 1933, in Placetas, Las Villas

Province.

His mother and father are divorced. He has

one sister, no brothers.

AMICE-14 met CUBELA while both

students at Havana University. CUBELA was In his 6th

year of medical school (med school is 7 straight years)

when he assassinated Inu BLANCO Rico, Chiet of SIM,

1n

1956.

This assassination was accomplished with the help

of two compatriots of CUBELA's in the Directorio

Revolucionario, one CARBO Servia (shot shortly thereafter

for his part in the affair) and Jose FERNANDEZ Cossio, who

drove the getaway car.

CUBELA hid out in Havana for about

4 months while being actively sought by Batista police (C HOMON)

and then fled to the United States where he, Faure CHAUMONT,

AMICE-14 and several others shared a home.

In January 1958, CUBELA re infiltrated into Cuba

with the 21-man "Directorio Expeditionary Force" under

the command of Faure CHAUMONT.

CUBELA was 2nd-in-command.

The group infiltrated at Nuevitas, Camaguey Province,

CHAUMONT split from the group at Nuevitas and proceeded to

Havana to organize the underground while CUBELA took the

rest of the group to the Escambray CUBELA remained in

the Escambray

for the rest of the war.

After the revolution was accomplished, CUBELA re-

turned to medical school in 1959. AMICE-14 comments that

with his war record and his position as President of the

University of Havana Student Association (which includes

all 13 colleges of the university), none of the professors

were disposed to give him anything but passing marks.

CUBELA finished med school in 1961:

E

IS 002Y

E T

AT

14-603. 2/2

- 7 41

---

## Page 13

SE

- 2 =

In 1962, CUBELA was an intern at Mercedes Hospital in

Havana and now, according to AMICE-14, is in private

practice. AMICE-14 says that CUBELA has no official

position in the government but that he is quite influ-

ential because of his close ties with Jose Antonio.

NARANJO Morales aka "Pepin", Mayor of Havana; Faure

CHAUMONT Mediavilla, Minister of Communications and

ex-Ambassador to the USSR; Jose LLANUSA Gobel aka "Pepe",

Minister of Sports & Recreation; Alfredo YABOR Maluf,

Minister of Justice; and Cdte. Raul DIAZ Arguelles, Chief

of "Departmento Technico de Investigation" (DTI).

According to AMICE-14, whose information comes also

from AMTRUNK-10, CUBELA is not a communist, is not even

particularly politically conscious but he is where he is

because he has gone too far to turn back and because he

enjoys the fruits of life as a member of Fidel's hierarchy.

Faure CHAUMONT Mediavilla

201-270370

AMICE-14 states that "CHAUMONT" is his legal name

but that he signs it "CHOMON". CHAUMONT was born 23 Febru-

ary 1929 in Victoria de las Tunas, Oriente. He has one

brother, Florial, who was a radio

announcer for "Radio

Reloj" and also for a Cuban station in U.S. Florial is

now

back in Cuba, present job unknown.

CHAUMONT supposedly studied in the School of Adminis-

trative Law at Havana University, but never graduated.

AMICE-14 cannot recall ever having seen him attend class.

CHAUMONT was apparently an agitator first, using the forum

of the University to make a name for himself, and a student

second.

1957--CHAUMONT was in the US for about 6-9 months after

the failure of the assault on the Presidential Palace (ob-

jective--assassinate Batista) where he was wounded in the

leg and arm.

January;

1958--Returned to Cuba as commander of the

"Directorio Expeditionary Force" of 21 persons.

The group

was infiltrated at Nuevitas, Camaguey,

where CHAUMONT split

off from the group and CUBELA, the 2nd-in-command, took the

rest to the Escambray. CHAUMONT proceeded to Havana to or-

ganize the underground but some of his weapons were discovered

and he was forced to flee back to the Escambray where he

fought (and distinguished himself) until the end of the war.

SE

E T

HH 53320 DocId:32373816 Page 13

---

## Page 14

- 3 -

January 1959-CHAUMONT still a Commandante but not

being paid by the government. CHAUMONT is supported

through "Directorio Revolucionario" treasury and by

friends such as AMTRUNK-10. CHAUMONT made a statement

to AMICE-14 and AMICE-14's cousin that Fidel would have

to be killed. Fidel was anti-Directorio and there was

personal dislike between CHAUMONT and Fidel because they

both wanted to be "El Maximo Lider" and Fidel won out.

1960--After over a year without any official position,

Fidel brought CHAUMONT into the government where he could

keep an eye on him and control him to a degree.

In late

1960 or early 1961, Fidel appoints CHAUMONT Ambassador to

the Soviet Union.

CHAUMONT is recalled from the USSR af-

ter barely I year as Ambassador. When queried by close

friends about the USSR, CHAUMONT replies "Rusia es un

gran mierda". Appointed Minister of Communications in

1962 where he remains.

AMICE- 14

states that CHAUMONT is a leftist, but not

a communist.

To a degree, he shares the same position as

Rolando CUBELA in that he has gone too far to turn back

and he enjoys the privileges of his position. According

to AMICE-14, CHAUMONT is highly intelligent and shrewd

and has a large personal following resulting from his long-

time revolutionary activities.

AMTRUNK-10 believes that he can approach CHAUMONT

safely.

He thinks that CHAUMONT may turn him down but

won't turn him in.

C. fnu NIEVES

NIEVES Is about 30 years old, a Commandante from

humble origins in bas Villas Province, NIEVES has little

education but regardless worked his way up to Commandante

while fighting in the Escambray along with AMTRUNK-10.

NIEVES is a member of the original "Directorio Revolucionario".

NIEVES is believed to be a troop commander in one of the

provinces, probably Las Villas.

NIEVES has a brother, also

fnu, who was aide to Camilo Cienfuegos during the war, who

was

arrested about 4 months ago with one AVERHOFF on trumped-up

charges of trying to kill Fidel.

AMTRUNK-10 considers NIEVES very reliable. AMTRUNK-10

believes that NIEVES can be approached and that he will

cooperate with AMTRUNK-10.

D. "But**TRAVIESO

TRAVIESO is about 25 years old, a member of the DR,

and formerly was executive officer to the Chief of the Air

Force, Sergio del VALLE.

TRAVIESO has since been thrown

• E

NH 53320 DocId: 32373816 Page 14

---

## Page 15

S E C

E T

- 4-

out of the Air Force because he was not "politically reliable".

According to AMTRUNK-10, TRAVIESO does not now hold any offi-

cial position. TRAVIESO could be valuable for his contacts in

the Air Force and his contacts in the Rebel Army which sten

from when he was a Captain under Camilo CIENFUEGOS.

AMTRUNK-10 considers TRAVIESO a possibility for recruit-

ment out he is not as sure of TRAVIESO as he is the other three,

CUBELA, CHAUMONT and NIVES.

E.

Captain Enrique VARONA aka "Varonita"

VARONA is the Cuban Commander of San Antonio de los

Banos Air Base. He is a pilot.

VARONA is a friend of AMTRUNK-10's,

but AMTRUNK-10 does not consider him reliable or trustworthy.

F. Captain Diego (2) FOQUENDO

OQUENDO is flying MIG of unknown type.

He is a friend

of AMTRUNK-10 and VARONA.

He might be willing to defect with a

MIG.

G. Captain Manuel ARTIAGA

ARTIAGA is an INRA official and AMTRUNK-10's supervisor.

ARTIAGO was a member of Fidel's bodyguard and is now Chief of

"Operacion Escambray", an anti-guerrilla operation in the Escam-

bray which has both military and agricultural responsibilities.

ARTIAGA is a communist and not to be trusted but AMTRUNK-10 plans

to attempt to elicit information from him.

Rule C: Haulla

Reuben A. HANNULA

SE

RET

19 - 603-2/2

+9-6-81/3

HH 53320 DocId:32373816 Page 15

---

## Page 16

ATTACHME

MICROFILMED

MAR 25 1965

DOG. MICRO. SER.

E

#CRET

16 September 1963

SUBJECT:

RESULTS OF OPERATION LEONARDO AND PLAN OF ACTION

(1) On 3 February 63 we formulated the preliminary plan of

hen min

and carrying out the overthrow of the Government.

(2) The immediate objective of the operation was to estab-

lish contact with some of these elements, with the purpose of

converting into action their anti-communist sentiments and to

convince others who up to now had maintained a passive attitude

but who would be susceptible to being induced to act against the

Communist regime.'

(3) The basis for making us think of the feasibility of

"Operation Leonardo" had its origin in information received on the

following extremes:

a) The time had come for action of this kind, inasmuch as

favorable conditions were rapidly ripening.

b) The progressing moral and economic weakening of the

Communist Government and the internal tension among its members.

c) The favorable effect of President Kennedy's speech

made at the Orange Bowl to the Brigade 2506 in the last days

of 1962, which recognized this possibility.

(4) In order to prove these ends and take the first steps

towards the aforementioned coordination, we offered to land in

Cuba and establish contact with Rebel Army officers and Government

officials.

The object of this memorandum is to give a resume of

the conclusions to which we have arrived after fulfilling phase II

of "Leonardo"

CONCLUSIONS

We can definitely establish the following:

(1)

It is estimated that about 80% of the Cuban population

is against the Communist Regime. However it lacks effective

organization and necessary resources.to attempt the overthrow of

the Communist dictatorship.

(2) In addition, also opposed to the Regime although main-

taining a passive attitude is an important nucleous of the Rebel

w 68326 poetd: 623h3816

Page

16

19-6032/2

196 7413

---

## Page 17

2

NGRET

Army, Militia and Civil officials of the Regime. This group is

characterized by the following:

a)

For the most part these are men who took part in

the revolutionary activities against the Batista

Government and gave full approval to the Revolu-

tionary Government in those initial moments.

b)

They continue offering apparent cooperation and

help to the Regime.

c)

They maintain a state of total or partial inactivity,

due to the lack of means and coordination for the

fight against the Communist Government, in whose

invincibility they are beginning to believe,

AT THE SAME TIME THAT THEY HAVE DOUBTS ABOUT THE

FUTURE OF CUBA AND THE POSSIBILITY OF THE RETURN

OF CORRUPT REGIMES OF THE PAST.

(3) We understand

that the basic plan of "Operation Leonardo"

has been approved in its entirety.

Especially regarding

the exis-

tance of an important nucleous within the Government, Regel Army

and Militia, ready to lend collaboration to plans of internal

action "in crescendo", which would culminate in the overthrow of

the Communist dictatorship and the re-establishment of a democratic

regime based on a respect of God, Human Rights and which promotes the

general well being and social justice.

(4) It has also been duly proven that these men are ready to

act against the Communist Regime for purely ideological reasons,

AS LONG AS THEY ARE GIVEN A MINIMUM OF GUARANTY, which can be summed

up in the following terms:

(a)

Implementation of the principles which were first

decreed by the triumphant Revolutionary army at the beginning

of January 1959 and then betrayed by the Communist Government;

and the establishment of a democratic regime, with respect

towards God, and to human rights, which promotes the general

well being and social justice.

(b)

The non acceptance of individuals who have directly

or indirectly committed or been implicated in crimes and

tortures or have made illicit gains.

(c) The selection of capable men with clean public

service records, preferably from the Rebel Army,

• to direct

and orient the action against the Regime and the VISIBLE AND

DOMINANT PARTICIPATION of persons offering guaranties to in-

dividuals who still, apparently, represent the backing of the

imperious regime.

Said guaranty should not cover those indif

viduals stained by blood.

E

NW 53320 DocId:32373816 Page 17

---

## Page 18

I 3 ÷

S E'C

E T

(5)

That the above is possible and that there actually in

truth exist some individuals, anti-communists, who are ready to

act, was demonstrated by the following: a) the establishment in

Cuba of a growing organized nucleous and other contacts; b) the

establishment of communication with the exterior which is already

working; c) the organization of a route of entry and exit of the

Island whose effectiveness has already been proven.

Obliged by the growing rythmn of the organization in

Cuba,

which under no circumstances should be held back and where

for lack of action or contacts with the exterior the impression of

abandonment might be created, we urgently consider that Leonardo

should be continued on the following basis:

RECRUTTMENT of an integrated group in exile, of persons who

combine the characteristics described under item c) paragraph (4)

(4)

some of which are mentioned in our initial Memorandum of 3 Feb

63, which will have in its charge the following:

a)

Establish the ideological basis for the fight.

b)

Orient

and direct the propaganda towards Cuba. Said

propaganda should be in accord with the before mentioned

principles and very specially should project the

a') guaranties offered to collaborators who directly

or indirectly are the backbone of the imperious regime;

b' the implementation of the principles first offered

by

the triumphant Revolution at the beginning of

January 1959.

c)

Establish the contacts within Cuba, personally or by

whichever means possible in order to penetrate the

military, the militia and the civil section of the

Government.

đ )

Establish contacts within Cuba, personally or by any

other means possible and onganize a clandestine com-

batant net which will have in its charge, with the

help to be given from the exterior, the execution of

all types of action, which will tend to demonstrate

the vulnerability of the Regime and the disposal of

the people of Cuba to fight until the overthrow is

accomplished.

It is well to point out the importance of these clan-

destine actions by their effects: a') facilitating the

recruitment of persons who hold or are carrying out

Government charges.

b') Their favorable moral effect

on those already recruited, who feel they must continue

these actions against the group of which they are a part,

since their participation, directly in the fight, will

necessarily fall behind at the opportune moment at the

deciding level.

S E

C

E

T

HH 53320

DocId: 32373816 Page 18

---

## Page 19

+4 -

e)

Direct participation by the exile group in the fight

which will be produced in Cuba, at the moment con-

sidered most opportune by said group, and for which

effect they necessarily must transfer to Cuba.

The preceding represents the results of conversations with

various elements in Cuba, who offered their opinions and moreover

represented the opinions of the majority of the recruitable people.

This affirmation is also a result of the manifestations made by an

ex-Comandante of the Rebel Army during a recent trip to this city,

which are voiced in some of his writings before he returned to

continue the development of "Operation Leonardo"

SE C

E T

19-603-2/2

196-843

HH 53320

DocId: 32373816 Page 19

---

## Page 20

- 3-

mang

Since we arrived in Havana at 2 a.m. and could not establish

tamediately the contact, we deetded to go to the house of 41me at

mother and sister where we waited until 6 in the morning,

which Leon contacted Teresa Azcarate

and David went to contact his

family.

At 10 a.m., Leon, accompanied by Teresa Azcarate, and David, ac-

companied by his aunt, were to make the first contact with Orozco,

which could not be done, as the person was not home, so they went to

the house of David's aunt, from where they tried to contact Orozco

again, unsuccessfully.

Leon then moved to the house of Teresa Azcarate,

where he joined Adoltina Suarez More to whom he gave the first in-

structions on S.W. He slept in that house, and got ready to make con-

tacts with the principal targets the following day.

He was able to

make on contact in the nue of pedro tomo

including Orozco and

18 aug

Carded

The next day contact with. Jose

Vazquez was made and Leon attempted

to contact Suarez More and Fernando/Fernandez. Supervielle, but without

success since they were out of town'and were not expected to return for

a couple of days.

Nevertheless, contact with the wile of fernandez

Supervielle and with the sister of Suarez More was made, and the matter

was discussed with them.

That night we slept in the house of Mrs.

Vazquez.

(AMTRUNK-10)

The next morning we had an interview with Guin, and it lasted

almost all day. That night Aldo's car arrived, accompanied by Angel

and Fermin, and we returned to the infiltration area, accompanied by

Orozco. Upon arriving at the mentioned area, in the town of Marti,

we were informed that the car which was to be used to take us to the

the boat was located, walking through the fields. We made the trip

without approaching any house of inhabited areas, arriving the next

morning. - 20 lul

That morning we saw a helicopter combing the area east of Playa

Menendez, and, thinking of the possible contact of one of the ex-

filtrees,

Termin, with a G-2 informer, we decided not to wait for

"Kilo" and that night we left for Cay Sal.

This was done without im-

portant incidents, except the fact of not being able to use the silent

motor, as it did not function properly, apparently due to the gasoline

pump as it was explained above.

The arrival at Cay Sal was at about 8:30 a.m.,

23 August. We ob-

tained the cooperation of the persons there, and were able to call

Jorge Volsky by radio telephone, as we'd agreed, giving our position.

This was done at 8:45 a.m.

HW 53320 : DocId:32373816 Page 20

---

## Page 21

S

EGRET

At about 6 p.m. we found out that a boat without visible flag

was approaching the place, and informed that it was a North American

coast guard boat, we went to retrieve the equipment that was drying.

Later the boat sent a motor boat, with 4 persons. As it approached

and the men landed, we realized they were English. There was no time

to hide the weapons and ammunition, for which upon searching us and

finding it, they asked us to go on

the boat. At this time another

boat arrived, apparently a recreation boat, handled by Fred, among

other persons.

Once on the British ship, the group was put under custody waiting

for the Nassau authorities to decide the situation. On the ship a for-

mal interrogation was given basically addressed to Leon. The police

inspector and the ship's officer informed us that the most probable

decision would be to hand over the group to the American authorities

in Key West with all the equipment, but without the ammunition.

Nevertheless, they made clear, that the final decision depended from

Nassau, since that was only a suggestion of theirs.

The group remained on the mentioned ship until 25 August at which

time they were authorized to land, accompanied by a member of the

American Immigration Department,

and they were given all the equipment

except weapons, maps, infra red light, ete. etc.

ammunition,

SE

E T

ITH 53320 DocId:32373816 Page 21

---

## Page 22

ATTACHMENT C

MICROFILMED

MAK 1 6 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORL

DOC. MICRO. SER.

SUBJECT: Initial Operational Debriefing of AMTRUNK Team

1. Pick-Up by the British

The AMTRUNK team was picked up by the British destroyer

"Caprice" at Cay Sal on the afternoon of 23 August approximately 20

minutes before the KUBARK boat "Matusa Times" reached them. The

cover story given to the Brits was that they were a group of refu-

gees fleeing from Cuba.

Although it is quite obvious that the

British did not believe this story fully, they were never able to

break the team's cover.

The personal documents of the team members

were never checked by the British.

The team members gave the fol-

Lowing names, none of which are true names:

", AMTRUNK-8 used the name "Rodrigo Fernandez

Lopez"', (AMTRUNK-9 used the name "Jose Lopez', and the sixth member

of the group Fermin Gonzalez used the name "Ramon Lopez". (From the

names given to the British, it looks as though most of the Lopez' in

Cuba came out on this Boston Whaler!)

When the team was landed at Key

West and reported to Immigration there, the names given to Immigration

were the alias documentation names for

the first four members of the

team, the name "Jose Lopez Lopez" for AMTRUNK-9, and the true name

for Fermin Gonzalez Fernandez:

The weapons picked up by the British

and not returned consisted of one FAL, three M-3 sub-machine guns, two

9 mm Brownings, one Colt 38 Detective Special, one Smith-Wesson -38

Chief's Special (personal weapon of AMICE-27) and one •38 automatic

belonging to AMTRUNK-9. Team members were not searched by the British

and were not interrogated separately. The majority of the talking was

done by the team leader AMICE-27.

In addition to the weapons listed

above, the British took a set of 1:50,000 maps of the north coast of

Cuba and maritime charts of the Santa Clara Bay area. They also took

one dynalite which was not returned.

2.

Information on Fermin)

Gonzalez Fernandez

see

tulạch

Subject was the other individual exfiltrated by the AMTRUNK

team along with AMTRUNK-9. He was born 7 July 1931 in Marti, Matanzas,

Cuba and his last address was Finca Favorito, Itabo, Marti, Matanzas.

He was an auto mechanic by profession, is married and has one child 20

months old.

His father's name is Gumersindo Gonzalez Gonzalez and his

mother's name is Catalina Hernandez Suarez.

Fermin acted as coordinator

of numerous underground activities in the Marti area.

When the team re-

cruited Fermin to help them shortly after their infiltration, they also

promised to exfiltrate Fermin if he got into serious trouble. During th

time that the team was in Havana, Fermin was approached by a negro named

Jose LNU who had infiltrated with two other persons from the Miami area

in recent days and whose boat had run aground and was leaking. Jose LNU

attempted

to recruit Fermin to help him. Fermin suspected this indi-

vidual of being a G-2 informer and declined to help.

He later heard

that Jose LNU had been denounced to the G-2 by a local chivato but that

the G-2 had not come and arrested Jose. According to his story, this

19-603-2/2

SEC

MELT

sie burd

Mt 53320 Dociit32713816 Pate

22

14, t

---

## Page 23

S

RET

confirmed his suspicion that Jose was a G-2 and was out to get informa-

tion on Fermin.

He requested exfiltration from the AMTRUNKers and they

agreed to bring him out.

3. Initial Team Contacts in Cuba

On the first night when the team infiltrated they went to a

point at coordinates 139514 Map 4085 III, the entrance to a large lagoon

into which they hoped to sail and hide the following day. At the en-

trance to this lagoon they saw a boat and they therefore kept moving in

a westerly direction to point 133512, at which a natural canal heads in-

to the mangroves in a southerly direction.

towerly

They steered into this canal,

down through two small lagoons, and into a third larger lagoon located at

130495.

This lagoon was the site of their base camp where the Boston

Whaler was kept hidden in the mangroves during the entire stay.

first contact that they made was with a fisherman by the name of Isaac

#Moreno who was recognized and previously known by AMTRUNK-7 and 8.

was approached on the following day in the large lagoon and was asked to

send word to the team's first contact Oscar *Diaz, the uncle of AMTRUNK-7•

Oscar, his son Antonio *Diaz Torres,

and Candido Diaz (no relation to

the others) next showed up in a small fishing boat.

These men recom-

mended Fermin Gonzalez Hernandez as the best man to be able to help them

in the town of Marti. Fermin was then contacted by one of the Diaz! and

came out by boat along with another man by the name of Felix

Munoz, to

discuss the operation.

In the meantime Oscar Diaz had recruited one

Juan Perez another fisherman, to act as a guard and to fish outside

the lagoon in order to give warning of any approaching boat.

4. Transportation

The first car used was that owned by Candido Diaz who has an old

car in which he transports fish between the Casualidad area and Cardenas.

In this car Candido Diaz went to Cardenas and contacted AMICE-14's old

friend Pedro Barbi. Candido took the team members AMICE-27 and AMICE-14

no a contacted 22 and A k11

from Casualidad in his old car to Itabo. In the outskirts of menendez

the road passes the house of a chivato named Brau 1o.

latter's entire family is a chivato family and reports to the G-2 on any

strange traffic passing on the road to Playa Menendez- At Itabo the two

agents were passed on to Fermin Gonzalez who took them in his own car to

Marti. In Marti the team was passed on to a negro named Emeraldo

#Montalvo, nicknamed "Aldo" ar "Aldito" who works in a sugarmill near

Marti and also drives a taxi. He was recommended both by Fermin Gonzalez

and by Pedro Barbi. Aldo picked the team up and took them from Marti to

troldo pickon tana

Habana. On the return trip from Habana, Aldo again drove from Habana to

Marti, and the procedure was reversed.

5. Underground Activities in Marti

Fermin Gonzalez claimed to be a member of the Union Cubana de

Accion Libertadora (UCAL):

He said that the coordinator of this organi-

zation had been Daniel Carde but that subject had been caught in July

and was executed in mid-August as a counter-revolutionary. Gonzalez said

SE

E

T

IN 53320 DocId:32373816 Page 23

---

## Page 24

SISRET

-3-

Since we arrived in Havana at 2 a.m. and could not establish

immediately the contact, we decided to

go to the house of Angelis

mother and sister where we waited until 6 in the morning,

tume fat

which Leon contacted Teresa Azcarate and David went to contact his

At 10 a.m.,

Leon, accompanied by Teresa Azcarate,

and David,

companied by his aunt, were to make the first contact

with Orozco,

which could not be done, as the person was not home, so they went to

the house of David's aunt, from where they tried to

contact Orozco

again, unsuccessiully. Leon then moved to the house of Teresa Azcarate,

where he joined Adolfina Suarez More to whom he gave the first in-

structions on S.W. He slept in that house, and got ready to make con-

tacts with the principal targets the following day.

He was able to

make the contacts from noon until late nigh

including Onozco and

Ravelo, and slept in the house of Pedro Gomez,

The next dal Contact with Jose vazquez was made and Leon attempted

Carad

to contact Suarez More and Fernando Pernandez Supervielle, but without

success since they were out of town and were not expected to return for

a couple of days.

Nevertheless, contact with the wife of Fernandez

Supervielle and with the sister of Suarez More was made, and the matter

was discussed with them.

That night we slept in the house of Mrs.

Vazquez.

(A MTRUNK-10)

The next morning we had an interview with Guin.

and it lasted

almost all day.

That night Aldo's car arrived, accompanied by Angel

and Fermin, and we returned to the infiltration area, accompanied by

Orozco. Upon arriving at the mentioned area, in the town of Marti,

we were informed that the car which was to be used to take us to the

safehouse on the coast, was being used by the militiamen of the area,

so, being accompanied by an expert of the zone, we decided to go where

the boat was located, walking through the fields.

We made the trip

without approaching any house of inhabited

areas, arriving the next

morning. - 20 (u4

That morning we saw a helicopter combing the area east of Playa

Menendez, and, thinking of the possible contact of one of the ex-

filtrees, Fermin, with a G-2 informer, we decided not to wait for

"Kilo" and that night we left for Cay Sal. This was done without im-

except the fact of not being able to use the silent

as it did not function properly, apparently due to the gasoline

pump as it was explained above.

The arrival at Cay Sal was at about 8:30 a.m., 23 August;

tained the cooperation of the persons there, and were able to call

Jorge Volsky by radio telephone, as we'd agreed, giving our position.

This was done at 8:45 a.m.

T

---