The Domican Republic
Originator: WH
From: Rusk
To: Kennedy, John F.
Document date: 02/15/1951
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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176-10033-10152

2023 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA

RECORD NUMBER : 176-10033-10152

RECORD SERIES : Church Committee

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : WH

FROM : Rusk

TO : Kennedy, John F

TITLE : The Dominican Republic

DATE : 2/15/1951

PAGES : 7

SUBJECTS :

DOCUMENT TYPE : Paper, Textual

CLASSIFICATION : Declassified

RESTRICTIONS :

CURRENT STATUS :

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 8/28/2002

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :

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•THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET

February 15, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: The Dominican Republic

You have inquired regarding the assertion that

the elimination of the Dominican Republic's windall

sugar quota will lead to the downfall of Trujillo and

his replacement by a communist-oriented regime.

Economic Aspects

It is true that the Dominican Government is faced

with

serious economic difficulties.

Foreign exchange

reserves are kept secret by the Dominican Government

but they are believed to be low. Similarly, the current

budgetary position is secret but we assume that by

reductions which have been made in the public works pro-

gram and other civilian costs and by the increased taxes

which have been placed on imports and exports the budget

will be nearly in balance.

The level of business activity

is low, credit is scarce, unemployment high and the cost

of living has risen.

The principal causes of Trujillo's economic diffi-

culties are not to be found in our U.s. sugar policy

but rather in his excessive military and propaganda

expenditures coupled with unwise fiscal, financial and

investment policies and his systematic milking of the

Dominican economy for his own personal gain.

increasing U.S. purchases of sugar six-fold (the estimated

windfall quota for the Dominican Republic between April 1

million over the price which could be obtained on the

world market) would doubtless help the Dominican economy,

it is not proposed to eliminate his historic share of

the U.S. market (the Dominican basic quota for the

April 1 - December 31, 1961 period is approximately

83,000

TOP SECRET

SANITIZEO NUK: 98: 84

3/04

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TOP SECRET

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83,000 tons which represents a premium of approximately

$4

million over what could be obtained

on the world

market).

Since Trujillo owns directly or indirectly about

60 percent of the sugar-producing properties in the

Dominican Republic, a large part of the windfall accrues

not to the Dominican economy but to Trujillo personally.

Furthermore, with a personal fortune estimated to be

somewhere in the neighborhood of $500 million, a sub-

stantial part of which consists of liquid holdings abroad,

Trujillo has the personal resources, if he wishes to use

them, to provide substantial amounts of capital to the

Dominican economy.

Political Aspects

In spite of economic difficulties there is no solid

evidence that Trujillo's fall is imminent.

Trujillo rules

by force and will presumably remain in power as long as

the armed forces continue to support him. While there is

evidence of dissatisfaction on the part of a few officers

there is as yet no cogent evidence of large-scale defection

within the officer corps.

The underground opposition to Trujillo composed of

business,

student and professional people is believed to

be predominantly anti-communist.

They have substantially

increased

in numbers in recent years but have been unable

, to move effectively against Trujillo. In addition to

opposition groups in the Dominican Republic,

there are

numerous exile groups located principally in Venezuela,

Cuba, United States and Puerto Bico.

In some cases these

groups have been infiltrated by pro-Castro or pro-

communist elements.

In the event the Trujillo regime should fall the

degree of danger of a communist takeover would, according

to our intelligence, depend on whether the domestic or

the exile groups succeeded in gaining dominance.

danger would be less if the domestic opposition gained

power?

and it would be increased substantially if infil-

trated

exile groups should emerge as the next government.

Finally, account must be taken of the adverse effect

on our position of leadership in the hemisphere if we

support tyranny in the Dominican Republic. Our ability

to marshall

TOP SECRET

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to marshall Latin American support against the Castro

didatorship would be impaired; Venezuela has made it

clear that action against Trujillo is a condition

precedent to Venezuelan support of collective action

against Castro.

Comments have also been requested concerning the

progress which has been made in assuring an orderly

takeover by anti-communist elements should Trujillo fall.

Our representatives in the Dominican Bepublic have,

at considerable risk to those involved, established

contacts with numerous leaders of the underground

opposition.

These leaders look to the United States

for assistance.

They believe in a free enterprise

economic system, plan the nationalization of public

utilities with compensation to the owners, intend to

institute a land reform program based on agricultural

cooperatives and the nationalization of idle

agricultural land, and intend to confiscate all of

Trujillo's properties.

They have agreed on a president

to lead them, propose

to prevent the re-entry of

communist and

subversive agents and to hold election's

within a two-year period during which they plan to

carry out their program. No financial assistance has

been given these underground leaders but the CIA has

recently been authorized to arrange for delivery to

them outside the Dominican Republic of small arms and

sabotage equipment.

These leaders are believed to have considerable

support within the country and while they plan

immediately to seize control of the government if

Trujillo falls, their ability to carry out their plans

obviously depends to a large degree on the attitude of

the Dominican armed forces.

They believe they have

important support in the officer corps.

With respect to Dominican exile groups, CIA has

established useful working relationships and attempted

to distinguish between democratic and undemocratic

elements.

Conversations with them continue.

These

exile groups have received limited financial assistance

and propaganda assistance in the form of certain radio

broadcasts.

Should the

TOP SECRET

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TOP SECRET

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Should the underground leaders with whom we are

in contact fail to obtain the support of the Dominican

armed forces and should they call on the United States

for assistance, a question arises as to whether the

United States would be prepared to intervene militarily

either unilaterally or collectively with other American

States.

This question needs study and a review of the

entire plan is desirable. It is recommended that

Mr. Berle's Task Force be assigned this task.*

There is enclosed a memorandum containing additional

background information.

Drankuck

Dean Busk

* This has bren done.

Enclosure:

Background Memorandum.

TOP SECRET

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CONFIDENFIAL

Background Information

Generalissimo Rafael Leonidas Trujillo came into

power in the Dominican Republic in 1930. He was first

a non-commissioned officer and later a commissioned officer

in the Dominican Constabulary established auring

U.S. Marine occupation which lasted from 1916 to 1924.

In 1930 he came into power by a coup d'etat. Since that

time either Trujillo or his nominees have been "elected"

as President of the Dominican Republic but the real power

has been Trujillo.

Because of his savage repressive methods Trujillo

has deservedly acquired the

reputation throughout the

hemisphere as the most distasteful dictator in the Americas.

thought been the principal target of Latin American liberal

"for decades.

The United States has been frequently

criticized for having created, during the occupation period,

conditions propitious to Trujillo's rise to power.

have also been accused of deliberately perpetuating hi's

rule.

For some time Trujillo has intervened in the internal

affairs of other Caribbean States.

In 1950, the Council

of the OAS warned Trujillo against meddling in the affairs

of Haiti.

In the spring of 1960 the Inter-American

Peace Committee called attention to the flagrant violation

of human rights in the Dominican Republic.

In July 1960,

after an assassination attempt on the President of Vene-

zuela, that country called for a meeting of Foreign

Ministers under the Rio Treaty and charged the Dominican

Republic with aggression against Venezuela.

A conmittee

of the council of

the OAS found after investigation that.

the Dominican Republic was implicated in the attempt to

assassinate Betancourt.

In August 1960 the Sixth Meeting of Foreign Ministers

condemned the acts of aggression and intervention by the

Dominican Republic against Venezuela, agreed to terminate

diplomatic relations with the Dominican Republic, to

prohibit the export of arms and implements of war to that

country and agreed that the Council should study the

feasibility and desirability.of extending the suspension

of trade to other commodities.

On

GONFIDENTIAL

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On January 4, 1961 the Council of the AS in effect

recommended to American Governments that they suspend

exports to the Dominican Republic of petroleum and petro-

leum products,

trucks and spare parts for trucks.

Both

at the San José meeting and at the meeting of the Council

in Washington, Mexico, Venezuela and Colombia took the

lead in pressing for sanctions. Brazil led a small group

of States which sought to avoid effective economic sanctions.

The attitude of the Brazilian Government may have changed

as a result of the Quadros inauguration.

The question of the feasibility and desirability of

extending export controls to other commodities remains

under study in the Council.

The Council has authority to

lift all sanctions when the Dominican Republic ceases to

constitute a danger to the peace and security of

hemisphere.

the

I1

Trujillo's Personal Holdings

Trujillo has through the years expanded his property

interests in the Dominican Republic. Approximately 60

percent of sugar properties are owned directly or indirectly

by Trujillo, and he also owns or has a major

interest in

he brewery, flour mill, cement plant, paper mill, ship-

yards and other business enterprises.

It is difficult to

say with precision what the total value of the property

owned by Trujillo inside and outside of the Dominican

Republic is,

but it is probably somewhere in the neighbor-

hood of $500 million.

A considerable portion of this is

in the form of liquid assets believed to be held in

Switzerland other places.

III

American Investments

American investments in the Dominican Republic

are now estimated to have a value of approximately $150

million including principally properties of the soutr

verto Rico Sugar Co., the United Fruit Co., Alcoa

and a small telephone company owned by a New York corpora-

tion.

The value of American holdings would have been con-

siderably larger except for Trujillo's practice of

encouraging through veiled threats the sale of American

investments to himself.

Trujillo

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFID

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Trujillo is likely to nationalize all American

properties if additional economic measures are taken

against him, including the reduction of his windfall

sugar quota.

IV

Trujillo's Recent Attitudes Toward the United States

Trujillo was incensed at the failure of the United

States to condone at the San Jose meeting his act of

aggression against President Betancourt.

Since that

meeting his principal propaganda instrumentality, Badio

Caribe vermonted in tits orectives. Combined with

attacks have been threats to align himself with the

Soviet Bloc and with Castro. To the best of our nowledge,

ayproaches by Trujillo's representatives in Europe to

Soviet Bloc representatives have not yet been successful.

V

Trujillo's Relations with the. Church

During the past year the Church has taken a strong

attitude in condemning Trujillo's excesses and brutality

in dealing with opposition elements within the Dominican

Republic.

On two separate occasions the Church has

issued Pastoral Letters along these lines which brought

forth strong reaction from Trujillo. He has since

attempted to intimidate the Church to cease its criticism.

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