WALT ROSTOW
Agency: SSCIA
Originator: SSCIA
From: SCHWARZ, FREDERICK A.O. JR.
Document date: 07/16/1975
Document type: REPORT

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JFK Assassination System

Identification Form

Agency Information

Date:

7/7/2015

AGENCY: SSCIA

RECORD NUMBER :

157-10014-10101

RECORD SERIES :

MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTTEE

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

07-M-07

Released under the John

F. Kennedy

Assassination Records

Collection Act of 1992

144 USC 2107 Note) .

Case#:NW 55355 Date:

11-24-2017

ORIGINATOR:

FROM:

TO:

TITLE:

SSCIA

Document Information

SCHWARZ, FREDERICK A.O. JR.

WALT ROSTOW

DATE: 07/16/1975

PAGES:

30

SUBJECTS :

ROSTOW, WALT

CIA

DOCUMENT TYPE : REPORT

CLASSIFICATION: Declassified

RESTRICTIONS: 1B; 1C

CURRENT STATUS : Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 03/21/2000

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS: CCBOX 450

v9.1

NH 55355

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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY

RECORD NUMBER

RECORDS

SERIES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

SSCIA

157-10014-10101

MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE

07-M-07

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR

:

FROM

TO

TITLE : WALT ROSTOW

DATE: 07/16/75

PAGES

:30

SUBJECTS : ROSTOW, WALT

SSCIA

SCHWARZ, FREDERICK A.O. JR.

CIA

DOCUMENT TYPE : REPORT

CLASSIFICATION

:. TOP SECRET

RESTRICTIONS

REFERRED

CURRENT STATUS : POSTPONED

IN FULI

DATE OF LAST REVIEW

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OPENING CRITERIA

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HH 55355 DocId: 32423489

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WALT ROSTOW

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July 16, 1975

Professor Walter Rostow

1 Wildwind Point

Austin, Texas 78746

Dear Professor Rostow:

We greatly appreciate the time you have devoted to

cooperating with the Committee's inquiry.

The Chairman

has asked me to levy one additional request upon you.

To complete the record on the events under considera-

tion in your testimony of July 9 before the Committee,

would you please prepare a notarized, sworn affidavit

answering the following questions:

1.

What recollections do you have concerning

the subjects discussed at your meeting

with MeGeorge Bundy and Richard Bissell at

the Hay-Adams Hotel on January 27, 1961?

2. Do you recall or have a record of any

other meetings, whether official or in-

formal, between yourself and Richard

Bissell between November 1, 1960 and

March 1, 1961? Was there

any discussion

between yourself and Richard Bissell upon

any of these occasions or in phone con-

versations during the same period that

was related in any way to the establishment

of a CIA project which included the capability

to assassinate foreign leaders?

What was the

content of any such discussions?

Thanks very much for your help in this matter.

Sincerely,

Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr.

Chief Counsel

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WILT ROSION

chronology and Issues

Biographical Background

1942-1945

ROSTON was in OSS, Research Analysis Branch (169)

1946

State Department, German-Austrian Section

1947

Teaching at Oxford

1949-51

Special Assistant to the Executive Secretary, Economic Commission

1951-1961

for Europe, Geneva

Mil, leaching faculty; consultant to Eisenhower Administration

Jan. 1961

DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

Dec. 1961

1964

Alliance for Progress

4/1/00-

1/20/69.

Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (in

this position ROSTOv chaired the 303 Committee)

Chronology of Events

1960

October (Approx.)

BISSEL, instructs JuStIN O'DoNNeLL to go to CONGO to plan

for the assassination of LIMUMBA (O'Donnell's testimony) on

initiative of BISSELL without prior White House approval or

knowledge (Bissell, 6/11, p. 55)

Late: '60

(ROSALLI, GIANCANA, TRAFFICANTE) • Lethal cigars had already

been prepared and poison pills were being developed.

1961

Jan. 20

ROSTOW apnointed DEPUTY ASSISTANT to the PRESMENT (KENNEDY)

for National Security Affairs.

Issues and Questions

BISSELL testified that he told

ROSTOW "the instruction as to

O'DONNELI, was my initiative.

(BISSELI., 6/11, P. 55)

Did ROSTOW learn any of this?

What briefings of new President

and his National Security advisers

took place? Did ROSTOW make

inquiries?

What areas of responsibility?

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(Walt Rostow)

1961 (cont)

Jan. 25-6

(approx)

April 18

April 28

TOP SECRE

BISSELL asks HARVEY to estahlish an EXECUTIVE ACTION capability

under project

todern deader The to eludin the dea iron as somete

that BISSELL was "twice urged" to do this by the White House.

HARVEY meets with SILVER, GOTTLIEB, and HELMS about it. (IG

Bissell testified: "There is little doubt in my mind that Project

RIFLE was discussed with ROSTOW and possibly BUNDY."

(6/11, P. 46)

He recalls that the conversations would have involved the general

capability ot perpetrating assassination, "all aspects of the

create possite that he discussed EisTR, Billo, and MARA

with ROSTOW as examples of assassination targets. (6/11, p. 50)

BISSELL testified that after Jan. 21, 1961 he met with ROSTOW

"quite frequently and very informally," occasionally several times

a week. (0/9, P. 81

BISSELL said that shortly after the advent of the JFK Administra-

there were weekly luncheon meetings at the State Department

with BUNDY, ROSTOW, CIA, State people and Defense. No agenda.

(6/9, D. 81) BISSELL testified the "two urgings" from the White

House could have come at successive meetings of this sort. But in

reporting on EXECUTIVE ACTION, he felt that rather than reporting

on developments to the luncheon meetings "as I normally operated

I would have replied more to ROSTOW in this case',

and he feels that

he did renort to ROSTOW in this way. (V. I, p. 82-3)

Rostow attends first meeting on Cuba which concerned BAY OF PIGS

mop-un (Rostow book, 209)

ROSTOW MEMO TO PRESIDENT

"If we can devise a policy for dealing with CASTRO short of a

commitment to remove him soon at our military initiative...world

opinion will support us in a policy of restraint on CASTRO and be

more likely to move with us on SEAsia."

Issues and Questions

Bissell said that "presumably"

Harvey's notes are accurate

(Bissell, 6/9, p. 51)

ROSTOW mentions these sessions in

his book. (169, Diffusion of

Power)

What was ROSTOW's functional

relation to BISSELL?

Assassination meets the

descriptions but it would not

be restraint.

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(Walt Rostow)

1961 (cont)

May 30

3 -

Issues and Questions

TRUJILLO ASSASSINATED

ROSTO testified: "the generalized flow of intelligence at that

time involved reports of plots to assassinate TRUJILLO... like

once every week.

And why we had to give guns to people who

had access to guns in the Dominican military I don't know...I can't

reconstruct the operation." (Rocky,178)

ROSTOW moves to STATE DEPARTMENT planning Council

Guns were tightly controlled

by DR Army.

Was ROSTON

privy to State cable traffic

on this?

December

1962

Sept. 3

ROSTOW MEMO TO TIE PRESIDENT RE CUBA

"I have not been following the matter closely over recent

months." Discusses "Soviet military deliveries to Cuba."

Under "Covert, Action"; ROSTOW said that the "limited, U.S.-

dominated, professional covert capability against CUBA"' does

not promise "a broadly-based political movement capable of

challenging the CASTRO regime's control system." (p. 5, #1)

Does this argue for assassina-

tion as quicker more direct

approach? Or does it imply that

the "control system"' would ait-

live CASTRO, rendering assassina-

tion pointless?

Sept 27

Oct.

1966-69

ROSTON's Memo reviews Lansdale's Two-Track Cover Operation:

1: Heightened effort along "present MONGOOSE lines" --inspire

conflict within top of regime.

Recruit Cubans,

within red mithout S, ao to imparment

"plan of operation which aims at the overthrow of CASTRO

primarily from within rather than by invasion from without."

Basing outside U.S.; one U.S. adviser "equipped to provide

finance, but not monitoring every move." (p. 6, top)

Special Group (Augmented) consider's ROSTOV paper. DDCI wants copy.

MISSILE CRISIS -- Mongoose dies.

ROSTOW IS SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS.

HH

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22

The Bay of Pigs

and Latin American Policy

CASTRO: A ROMANTIC REVOLUTIONARY CLOSE TO HOME

ENNEDY'S PROBLEMS WITH THE AGGRESSIVE REVOLUTIONARY

Romantics in Diakarta, Cairo, and Accra. were important; and

they involved strategically signifcant purts of the wor'c. The un-

Welding internecine tension or the Indian subcontirent was a'se a serious

meter, diverting, as it did, significant trents and resources from essentin!

casis of development on behaif of morc than a hall-billion human beings,

sering the political life of two major nations, and rendering ench, in

ferent ways, increasingly vulnerable to external infuence and manipu-

ation. But for a working American politicion these prosiems were rela-

cy peripheral compered to the presence of Castro in Cuba.

Ey January 1g6I Castro was an acknowiedged part of the communist

world, handsomely backed by the Soviet Union and other communist states.

in was actively engaged in subversive action in Latin America and was

inding up to the continent a revolutionary solution for its many economic

ees socia ilis. The communist base nincy miles from Florida was a direct

moscapped challenge to a vital Americen interest long incorporatedin

se Vource Doctrine and a living part of the American political debate, Anc,

is the result et Eisenhowers order of Viarch tofe, Cuba opponents of

Sastro, assembed ir. Guatemala, were undergoing the final phase of military

tuning lor an invasion of Cuba, under the leadership and instruction o

oTicers of the United States governmont.

The Bay, of Pigs and Latin American Policy

209

THE BAY OF PIGS: ONE MAN'S EXPERIENCE

AT 7 A.M. on the morning of Tuesday, April 18, 19611-attended my

ust meeting on Cuoas The Bay-of-Pigs.operation had.began the day berore.

came to work carly I met Ted. Clifton, the Presicents mitary aite, In

the White House Situation Room and asked him how it was going. He said!

badly. Later MeGeorge Bundy asked me to come along; to a-meeting.in

the Cabinet Roona.

At the far end of the table were the three senior officers of the CIA:

Allen Duties, Pearré Gabed!, and Richard Bisseld. The President, Sundy;

Clifton, and I were the only others present.

Dulles reported the operation was failing: the men were trapped on the

beaches and Castro's forces were moving systematically against them.

I had o'd and close ties to the three inen reporting the incipient debacle:

Dulles I had known a litte from wartime OSS days, but well and warm!y

since 1951. With Cabe!! I had shared wartime years as a planner for the

Amicrican air torces in Surope.

selt was a friend of some thirty vears..?

Lowed my start as ar economist aner mucinimort

eling our wetter

resee are amde montes into his acminis-

tration, he was about to confront unmitigaied disaster.

They were wholly professional, Kennedy completely cam. But all were

evidently shaken.

After the meeting I asked! Bundy if I could help in the mop-up. I did

not know how my friends had gotten into this situation. I had no sense of

higher wiscom or virtue. But I thought a fresh man might be useful. Bundy

—and then Kennely-agreed. I went over to the CiA operational headquar-

ters, located in a temporary building along the Potomac, to monitor the

The reports coming in chronicled the closing in of Castro's forces on tge

beachhenc. The morale of the Washington team engaged in the operats"

progressively disintegrated. This was not the first tactical defeat Americens

had ever suffered, nor even the worst that I had observed!; but it was paintugr

see their composure brear up. Bissell, however, remained collected as #h

menaround him begged that he ask the President Once more to throw Amel

car military power into the balance. As the situation on the heuches mome

to final Cisaster curing the night, he asked that i call the President, who va

at a congressional reception, and arrange a meeting. lts purpose was to infour

Kennedy and permit him to exercise such options as were available. I didac

It ias a session in thereur Office no one present is likely to forge!

the President, Past, and MoNamara in white tie; General-byman Lemnig

and Admira! Arleigh Surike in full uniform with medals; the stark hur

ragedy of the men on the reaches and thie reports of the Revol tionary Coy

"one raidird disarrow Missel con"t irving but the ontions.

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THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION

The limits ned dilemmas of power — the relationship cl yower to the fate

o maman deings-was never mere cicar or polgnant.

connedy was deeply and personally concerned with the fate of the men

on the beachos, out he was not abcut to throw the full strength of the carrier-

paste arcraft into the battie and reverse his fundamental position that this

wis a confic: between Cubans, not a war between the United States and

Cusa. Te possibility. of the men moving off the beaches into the hills was

rasic, li became starkly cicar (to me, for the frs: time) that the optione:

moving.from.pmintasion-to-eguerrilia-operation-washreeludec.bygcog.nphy

enterre: cheice of the invasion-beach. Kennedy decided to permit a limited

'er of fighter sortics 10 procet the handft of o'd bembers operating in

cont of the operation. The purpose was te buy time in the hooc that at

some et the men might'se withdrewn. He ordered Americar. naval cra!t

ge in close for the same purpose. Rusk pointed out that we would thereby

s ore dcoply committed. Keancdy raised his hand just be'ow his nose and!

wis "Werenready initup to here.

Dissalt was instructed to infeum the entrapped men to disengage as best

rey coud, cither to beats or inte the countryside. As Bissell ictt the roon:,

nedy ted him to icee his chin up.

@-Berie andrerthur-Schtesinger were then dispatched from the meet-

og to the hardest mission of a"": to meet with the Revolutionary Council in

orida and internis members o the limits wishin which Konnedy was pre-

sonchow, it was dircult to go home that night. Sone of us stayed

ound until amost four in the morring

Four by hour. day by day, the fui

measure el the failure, with its reper-

cussions denome and aoread, pounded in Oi Kennedy and his advisers. Every

urt. Chere was eu intia, numbness. except for Kennedy who moved to

": fall persona' responsta ay and pull the nation and his administratien

ertther.Teaw oniv one refection of his inner fecling: sitting in the rocking

uirir ais ofice, he was coling at the Washingto:? News, whose head ines

•eved se Goal capture e the eupedition. Then he let the paper crumpic

we tie feer without a word.

Cartorim tennedy met with his advisers at length in the alternoon,

matomoon climaxed by the five d'clock arrival of the leaders of the Revolu

chary Counchit was a meeting at ones painful, dignified, and necessary.

tone point. in inic-afternech, the President left the room for n few

watus and Robert Kennedy solie in anguish. He said we would have to act

t" leged paper ngers by Moscow. ive just could not sit and take it. All the

ous ment assemble dround the Cabinc: table ought to be ab'e to think of

wingooon. There was ne response, as we awaited the Presicent's return.

saciel known Rober. Kennedy before his brother's inaugeration and

never betore secion serousty to him. asicd we could step out of the

The Bay of Pigs and Latin American Policy

2/1

that if you're in a light and get knocked off your feet, the most tangerous

thing to do was te come out swinging. Then you coud really get hurt. Now

was a time to dance around until our heads dearcc. We wouid heve ampie

oppertunity to prove we were ne: paper ligers in Berlin, Southeast Asia, anc!

elsewhere. This was a time to pause and trink. He looked up expressienless.

He finaly said: "That's constructive.

The next day he came back to me and posed the question: If we shouldn'!

net now, what should we do doout Cuba? He said I had a duty to come up

witha plan. I promised to collect and set down my thoughts.

On atpritza Kennedy delivercd his defiant speech to the American Soci-

ely o." Newspaper Editors and the nation knew it hac a leader who could!

absorb a severe b'ow and maintain command.l was the speech of a fighting

As I worked through those long days with my colleagues, I was troubled!,

however, that the obsession with Cuba would divert thought and ehergy from

the paths of action. on which Kennedy had begun therefore wrotelong

temorandum-te-him-on-April zyand eirculated it to Rusk, MeNomara, and

Bundy. It began in much the spirit of my talk with Rovert Kenncey:

Right now the greatest probiem we face is not lo have the whole

o our foreign policy thrown of balance by what we fee! and what

we do about Cuba itself. We have suftered a serious setback; but that

setback wili be trivia: compared to the consequences of not very sool:

regaining nomentum along the lines which we have begun in the

past three months."

Over the weekend Cuba was temporarily pushed off the front pages.

De Gaulle was at the peak of his troubles in Aigeria. There was a threat that

dissicent French paratroopers would descend on Paris. De Gaulle appented to

the French peonie to biock? coup d'état. On Sunday, April 23. Kennedy

called from Cien Ora and asked me to come into the White House quietly 1o

monitor what was happening in France and to keep him informed. I settled

cown in the White House shelter, where there was both communication.

equipment and a bunk. The only nes available, in face, came from David!

Scheenbrun's CES broadcasts from Paris.lt gradually became apparent that

the descent or. Paris would not take place; and I used the time to try my hand!

at. a new appreach te the problem posed by Cuba, as Robert Kennedy hac!

suggesica.

It had begun to be clear to me from Tuesday morning to Sunday night

how the Bay o! Pigs had come about. As Cubi emerged under communist

contro!, a viscera! renetion developed in the gevernment that this was an out-

come with which the United States couid not live. Bisenhower shared this

feeling, as his memoirs make clear, although his sentiments about Castro

cannot be troncated into a prediction of what he would have done about the

Piun" Dire n'an if he had come to the moment of decision. The tears were in

348

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=.?

"HE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION

pert millery, in part iccological, in part an ancestral sense that the Monroe

ect we hid been unacceptably violated. On the other hand, there was no

sassin. American foreign policy, OAS doctrine, or in international law that

isted she United States going to war because a Latin American nation had

sone communist. It had clearly happened because of the internal dynamics of

Cuor. not because.communist arms and men had moved fliegally across

eternational frontiers.

Simultaneously, nowever, a way of escaping the criemma appeared to

emorge. Cut of Castro's quite rea, bewaya. of his comraces in the July 26

V cement and of the humane comocratic socicty they sought, there had con:c

to the United States not Batista reactionaries, not mercenaries, but men

prepared to give their lives to undo the perversion of Cuban history Castro

nad brought about.

The appea' o supperting these mer on a clandestine basis was, under

the circumstances, irresistible-an appeal strengthened, perhaps, by the

successie: CaA-backed everthrow of President Jacobo Arberz in Guate-

mela some seven yours carter.

The Cuban operation, as it evolved, acquired, of course, a momentum of

its own: and it proved, of its nature, incapabie of being handed on a clandes-

on basis, it therefore lacked strategic surprise and was technically inadc-

quate in many respects, some of which are suramarized below. But the fata!

aw. as I saw it that Sunday right, lay in the failure to distinguish the kind's et

circumstances in which an American President could or could not bring

Amer can force overtly to bear. In the United States in the Vorid Arera! hac

It appears to be a characteristic of American history that this

nation cannot be cflective in its military and foreign policy unless it

clieves that both its security interests and its commitment to certain

morai principles require the nation to act. ... When idealism alone

seemed to be the basis for positions taken the nation did not back its

piay. ... Equally, the ration has not ocen effective when confronted

by situations where its power interests might be involved but where a

persuasive moral basis for American action was not present.

A covert cocration, by definition, cut across the "mond basis" for the engage-

mont of American forces. And, before the event, Kennecy and crawn a sharp

he setween supporting Cuban dissicents and sending Americin forces into

wit, Neverthcless, as I observed the derouement of the operation on Tues-

nicould not he'p fecling that some of the men involved had coms to

slove that in the inst analysis Kennedy would be unable to hold to the policy

had expressed repentedly. in public and private, before the event; namely.

? this was a confict among Cubans and regular Unise States forces would

nette availabid for it. Somewhere within them, one tolt, was the perhaps

screciousermont shet Kennedy simply coud not aford te let it fail. It

The Bay of Pigs and Latin American Policy

213

•was not only the men on the beaches who, until the end, had "an unshakabie

conviction that they wouid not be let down. it was inconceivable that they

would be stranded.*

But Kennedy did ho!d to his policy. The operation had failed. And Castro

had to be dealt with in other ternis.

Sitting in the White House shelter, I began by listing on a yellow pad

the specific dangers to the American interest that night arise from Castro's

Cuba: the training and infitrating of subversive agents and guerrillas; the

invasion of neighboring states with Soviet arms; Soviet missiles aimed against

the United States; an attack on Guantanamo or the Panama Canal; commu-

nist radio propaganda; and an example of economic and social development

that would prove attractive in Latin America.

For each I suggested lines of action legally and morally open to the

United! States and!, especially, to the hemisphere acting in concert on tic

principle of colicctive self-defense.

I called Robert Kennedy from the shelter and told him I would be ready

to respond to his question by morning. The next day I went to Hickory Hill

for an early breakfast. As ive walked around the grounds outline dis

formulated and he urged me to circulate it in the government. This i did

throug! the committee. headed by Paul Nitze, charged with coordinating poi-

ic; ¡eivard Cuba end' the fate of the Cuban refugees in the United! States."

THE BAY OF PIGS: A RETROSPECTIVE EVALUATION

THeRE have been a good many retrospective evaluations of the Bay of

Pigs operation, public and private." Evicently, itwas llaved interms of politie

cal and military intelligence. I could not be kept secret before the event and

there was no strategic surprise; no coordination with dissidents in Cuba; ag

underestimation of the cohesiveness and strength of Castro's ground and af

forces ard of his ability to round up and neutralize his opposition."t wis

Pawed tactically by the failure to provide sullicient air power and to protes

the supply ship with its critically important ammunition supply. (Technicall&

the operation ended with ar ammunition shortage.) And the option Kenneed

believed the men would have-of going to the hills if the invasion failed-?

was, in fact, foreclosed by the choice of the landing site.

The asic s regic low wis ofrousse polzienl. l some fieen hideo

men were to serve as a catalyst in the overthrow of Castro, the burden of the

ofort vould have to be borne by those already inside Cuba who were prey

pered to struggie for this result. Aad that meant organization, leadershin

planning, and close coordination. Such possibilities may have existed, bla

they were not built into the enterprise.

HH

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THE KENNEDY ADVINISTRATION

Al in al, it appears to have been an chlort beyond the capacities of the

C.A:: meant successfully. And in such a covert enterprise, it was impossible

o wang to scar a. the talents and resources of the American government that

word have been relevant.

That the par was inherited frem a previous administration by new men

a'so played a roie. Aer. Dates and his peopic were respected protessionals

and so were Lemnitzer and the loint Chiefs. It was hard for the new men to

i their negment with cancence against their predecessors; although the

esiden: Analy drew the hard line or his own by refusing to engage regulur

American forces to salvage the enterprise, i the initial plan felled.

And there ivas a brute political fact. Cuba was part of American politics.

connedy had taken an activist position during the campaigr. The dissolution

it's bugace in Guatemala woud have brought the men. back to Miami. The

stor would out. Kennedy would be charged with having lacked the courage to

ach an enterprise that Sisenhower had prepared to eliminate communism

from Cuen by the action o. crave Cubans.

Sorensen flatly states that Kennedy regretted not having called off the

operation"; and, athough worked closely with the President in the post-Buy

o Pigs days, I have no evidence to cha. enge that assessment. Cicarly, the

sher-run consequences el -evoking the p'an could hardly have been as pain-

ful as the debacle. In a larger sense, howeve, there may be some insight in a

udgment c the event from a rather unlikely source. Cunner Myrdci, for

winT had worked as a special assistant in the Economic Commission for

wrong in 1947-1949. came to Washington later in the spring. He grected me

certally by announcing we had a great Presicent. i said i thought so, but

we men i yet cone much to prove it. a asked him what led to his assessmen!.

win said: the Ray ef Pigs-it Kennecy had called it of, he woud have

an cained! politically at home. He never would have freed himself of the

¿arge that Castro's continued existence in Cuba was due to his failure io

nsi Eisenhower's plan. But if he had engaged Ainerican forces to salvage

"g covert operation, he would have been ruined abroad..low, suggested

"Cal, Kenneay could go on.

ind Kennedy was determined to go en. Talking about my memorandum

"trial, he said the United States could simply not afford to brood or suit

eurage in protracted debate or passive introspection. Britain had gone

rug such a phase over Suez, France over Algerin. And freedom could

sive peouse each represented only ip or 7 percent of the free world's

wower Out the United States was 70 percent of that power. I did not keep

'perspective. if we did not continue to act citectively, the whele celicate

cancerous eou: brium of poiver ir the world would come unstuck.

scrampic, Keancey brought his team back onto itsfeet. There was,

rowever. much persond. introspection and fresh thought about the organiz:-

and the exccutive branch. We-Kennedy and his men-were cicarly

ments"icter the debesic, not nostract bureaucratic entities. There was no

The Bay of Pigs and Latin American Policy

21.5

our business. Bundy wrote a reflective memorandum to Kennedy which was

as fine a piece of paper as i hed ever read in government. In his own wity.

cach of the others engaged in military and foreign policy asked: What went

wrong, what must we now do to avoid lurther error? Kennedy brought in

Warwell Taylor to conduct a formal inquest. He also told Bundy and me io

build up the Row of information to the Situation Room; and Bundy was asked!

in shitt from a comfortable, high-ceilinged room in the Executive Ofice

Ruilding to a small olice in the White House west basement close by the flow

o! trafic. (Remembering those days, & resisted all elforts to have that ollice

recione in White House modern when I occupied it in 1966-1959. I lett it

should remain as spare as a city coitor's oflice.)

In getting back on our feet we had an asset. We had all seen, in one

context or another, what tactica! dcleat looked like during the Second Work!

War. In my case, it was the dangerous and frustrating days o! 1942-1943

when it appeared quite likely that daylight bombers, in which America had

invested vast resources, woald fail to penetrate German antidircraft and

fighter defenses without unacceptable losses.) We had known what it was to

like stock, make new dispositions, and get on with the job. My wife caught

this mood one night. I came home at three in the morning. She was sitting p

in bed and said: "I've not seen you for years more chcerful or ellective.

Youre an odd lot. You're not politicians or intellectuals. You're the junior

oticers of the Second World war come to responsibility." tremains a not

had characterization of the Kennedy administration.

THE TWO PUNTA DEL ESTES

with the iccological and security challenges posed by Castro.

The dice. wan formallerconierence. the inter american-Econemic e

anch Socia!" Council." rowas the climay to the series of initiatives that had h

or March 13 formally launching the Alliance for Progress as a common ellort g

to move Latin America into sustained economic and social progress.

The goals defined and agreed on at Punta de! Este touched the who!ch

spectrum of Latin America's ordemic problems: housing, land reform, edl-a

cation, pent, tar reform, domestic price stability, export prices, economic

integration.

Fundamentally, however, the Charter of Punta del Este was a commit-&

ment.of the Latir. American governments to their eceples that economic and

social progress, in all their cimensions, would move to the center of politicall

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THE KENEDY ADMINISTRATION

Punth de! Este was agreement that "each of the countries of Latin America

w: 'emuaic a comerchensive ard well-conceived national program for the

cercionment of its own cconomy." The heart of the commitment for the

United Sortes was to supply, from pubtic and private sources,-some $20-bil-

iesforinvestment-in-Latin-America-of.the.s1oo.billion.cstimatcdas-neces

cary to achieve an average anmual 5 percent growth in CNP

Kennedy's rhetoric-the rhetoric of democratic revolution-aimed to

break through the crust of Latin American politics to strengthen and hearten

¡core in Latin America decicated to these purposes. The offer of enlarged!

American assistance was to provide not morely resources and increased!

American diplomatic leverage, but aiso a means of increasing the comestic

tea authority of those who, by generating serious measures of self-help,

wid permit their nations to qually for increased loans from public

Kennedy was not naive about the length of time this effort would require.

Fe agew bow deep-sentid the arentems of Latin America were and how

ading te satanion they were trely to be. But be knew 29g the: te

in emerging. competent and dedicated, oriehted id action rather tran

coric. And with these men and women he sought to make common causc.

nore was both clunger end unreality in the initial focusing o! the Alliance

on Prepress around Koredy and whas Vashington could and would provide.

was congerous becouse it encouraged the illusion that the resclution of

-ar America's probiems cou'd come from outside the arca, by some kinc.

*" Tort: American magic and mone.'It was unreal because, at most, oniv

no percont Of the marcriat rescurces required could come from the United

Pates. and a much smaller propertion of the political, institutional, and

wen eñent that was even mere important.

became apparent. therefore, that the machinery of the Alliance for

"regress should be altered so that, in image and in fact, it would he more an

enterprise. ot Latin Americar cooperation and less an aid program run from

"abington. As carly as Aprt toke Rusk underlined the abiding truth that

ünited States could be on'va "junior partner" in the Alliance for Prog-

"i "His insight, shared among thoughtfu! Latin Americans, led to thie

ention of the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress in

rewarder Ipos. a development Kennedy greeted with some enthusiasm in

les: maior statement on Latin Amcrica, in Miami. on November 18.

n erciuation e the Alliance for Progress belongs later in this hock

sco palow, 99. 421-125, 420-430). In Kennedy's time it was plagued by

outsid Wentnesses. As the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance

The Alance for Progress is now completing its third year. Given

iss essentic: character, it ivas inovitable that progress be relatively

The Buy of Pigs and Latin. A.merican Policy

slow in the initial stage. Past patterns of economic and social policy

canno: de suddenly halted and sharply reversed. It takes time lo

desperation pore my pro wenched are not mercy seatmens -

concept and exccution, to specific proiccis and tasks in the sectors ot

the economy. It takes time to forinalate, legislate, and execute pro-

grams of fiscal and agrarian reform, and to gather the fruits of ex-

panded educational, health, housing, and communily development

" takes time te prepare projects and negotiate loans for

their financing; but it takes even more time to execure projects and

thus to put to effective use the requisite fund's. It takes time to assemb'e

the men and to build the institutions necessary to implement the

economic end' socini objectives of the Punta del Este Charter. It takes

time to convince men and women throughout the Hemisphere that the

Alliance for Progress is a serious, sustained venture worth the com-

mitment of their minds and hearts, and worthy of their confidence.

Moreover, the years 1961-1062 were marked by a continuig

coterioration in the torme ci trade for Latin america which reduced

For all these reasons the over all figures der Lodia imarisun

growth did not achieve in 1962-1063 the targe: set at Rance do text

although they approximated the Punta de. Este targets. descreet

from the specific situation in two major countries.""

The two major countries were Argentina and Brazil, Caught in a step stage

of the stop-and-go policies that marked the inflationary pattern of their

Inaddition, as with A!D as a whole, Kennedy took more time than he

should have in getting the administration of the Alliance for Progress into

effective order at the Washington end. In one of the oddest sessions with a

Presicent I can recall, Kennedy once lound himself enmeshed with the prob-

lem of recruiting secretaries and mobilizing typewriters when he assembled

around the Cabinet table, the working-level oficials and tried to get to the

bottom of the initial bureaucratic confusion in the Latin American AID

office. The result was that American resources, even those committed as

icans, were not flowing out to Latir America at the promised rate in the

first tovo years.

Nevertheless, from 1961 Latin America, out of the interplay of its own

dynamics and Kennedy's leadership, was off on a new course.

Cuba was part of it. And Che Guevara undoubtedly chleyed his role at

Punta del Este in August. He could credit Castro with generating the Alliance

for Progress (a half-truth) and explain why it was hound to fail and give

way to the mode! of the communist revolution in Cuba, Kennedy was deeply

concerned with the possibilities of Cuba as a showcase. He did not see how,

with some Speo million in net annual Soviet aid, Cuba conte tail to become

in American Policr

2 1 9

on and it formai diplomatic conter.

abon delegation. headedy Estan

she borded touce cope:

Pert Of ls per diete de seen Cran

engs tock place die point it.

midst of the American delegation

licers returned the courtesy and the

vav at American policy; but he wis

ss sncering references to the Bay of

devara at the earlier Punta del Este

rexchede-Cuba-from-the OAS andto

AS institution:) -to-deal-with Cuban

come overtly embroiled with Castro,

let went beyond anything an Ameri

kican foreign minister produced the

d! that Bolivar had afirmed that the

uit of democracy and that absolute

olitica! life. He acknowledged that

Bolivarian goal; bus democracy te-

Now democracy was challenged in

rivalent of absolute monarchy: com-

y incompatible with the life of the

g, endless petience, and round-the-

eagues, Rusk sought with every re-

quage a unanimous resolution. In the

Ecessary mathicsomajority of foul

otes of Argentina,.Brazi!, Chile, and

e decisive formula, abstained on tha

further complex legal procedure wit

by expulsion. There was an undee

these reserved posite as were, simple

political strain in the lour countrics

tessure from its two great nerghbors

it is often in the past, to a larger

majority. The fourteenth vote w

resumed Americon support for ug

sh. for other reasons, never came

55

was an earnest and seriously meal,

er their domestic politics, democrate

left alone with the weight of Castre

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## Page 13

220

THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION

purations against them. They said they would be prepared to form with the

antic States a speciai grouping outside tie DAS to deal with Castro. This

I thor thie Cnited States nor the larger nations of Latin America wanted.

u: incisition, supperted by a call from President Kennedy to President

eras Camorge of. Colombia, vic ded the bare two-thirds vote to exclude

S. Da frem to CAS plus a resciution adopted unanimously (excepting Cuba)

cadming the doctrine of incompatibility and exciuding Cuba from the

ater-American Defense Beard

" was on these twe resolutions that Rusk and the foreign ministers con-

cantute: amidst the apparently shapeless swiri of a hemispheric diplomatic

vicunwhile, in a committee room inhabited by lesser ofcials, further

tons ce some consequence were hammered out io der. more directly

"tic arcat posed by Cuba. These incluced the creation of a Special

Cist tative Committee of Experts on Security Matters to monitor and sug-

" vasures to combat Cuban subversion; to suspend arms trafic to Cuba;

estudy the possible extension of a trace chibarge agains: Cuba. This

"! primory arena of activity. Following upon the work i had done in

wicke of the Boys" Pigs, Tought Consenay oraserof propositions which

ric-suppiymariegar-hemisphere_snesyor. deatso. Chly with furtaer

venesy but also with the danger. o. sovict or even Chinese

ise or cuba as a military base:

Who list of functional dangers set:

memorandum or.Aprr215ug0l, and in my exchanges with Robert

i language we negotiated with our colleagues in the basic security

musion inc uded the following

Te urge the member states to take those stops that they may

ensider appropriate for their individun' and collective self-defense,

and to cooperate, as may be necessary or desirable, to strengthen their

capacity to counteract threats or nots at aggression, subversion, or

otter dangers to peace and security resulting tem the continued inter-

vertion in this hemisphere of Sino-Soviet powers, in accordance with

re obligations established in treaties and agreements such as the

Charter of the Organization o. American States and the

American Treaty c. Reciproce! Assistance.

As de from enunciating a general hemispheric doctrine, that resolution

as a're that nations couid work individually or in collective groups

"iT than tie CAS io delend themseives against communist security

"sTi Curiobcon nations thus had what they wanted; and DAS rations

"weety coacerned would net be automatically committed to action which

"aninful or incentenient. This resolution was later-in-

softly in the Cube missile crisis and was the backdren to the Amer:-

then GAS. interventionate Bonnicon tomis

The Bay of Pigs and Latin American Policy

221

Everyone went home reasonably well satisfied. What made the exercise

work was the really, beneath the surface of many tensions and diferences, of

on titimate loyalty to the Inter-American system. No one could dictate the

outcome, which, indeed, had to be created on the spot. On the other hand,

there was aiso a sense that all the various attudes in play had to be recen-

ciled, in one way or another.

Rusk was the first American secretary of state who entered with depth,

sensibility, and respect into the human emotions and politics that shaped!

Latin American diplomacy. He treated his Latin American colleagues pre-

cisely as he did his European colcagues: as mature men, working out ot

difficuit domestic settings, trying to make some order, trying to build islands

of security and progress in a dangerous worid. In his dealings with Latin

Americans of those from other developing regions, he whoily lacked the

implicit condescension of the Atlanticist view. He took them all as fellow

members of the trade union of foreign ministers; and this was a great strength

at Punta del Este.

Kennedy was pleased with the result, which reconciled his objective of

getting effective collective action without either splitting the OAS or putting

the United States at crosspurposes with the Latin American countries which

, found anti-Castro mensures an additional burden on their domestic political

life. He did asi, somewhat wistfully; why we had not generated i better

press: reporting of the conference had generally portrayed the ellort as essen-

tiaily an American arm-twisting exercise rather than as an effort to reconcile

thie interests of Caribbean and non-Caribbean states within the OAS.

Kennedy was determined to avoid in his time "another Cuba" in the

hemisphere. And he quictly set in motion contingency thought on how the

United States might move, if possible with others, to prevent it. The second

Punta del Este meeting proviced a political and legal basis for such a course;

although it did not determine what could and would be done in particular

circumstances.

It was the outcome of the Cuba missile crisis which lifted, for a time, the

weight of communist pressure on Latin Americh; but that crisis arose not

out of the pelitical dynamics of a developing region but from the other dimen-

sion of the post-Sputnik o!lensive: nuclear blackmail and the point a which

Khrushchev had chosen to test its eMicacy- Berlin.

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TOP SEGRET

TO:

FROM:

RE:

DATE:

FILES

FREDERICK BARON

WALT ROSTOW/ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION--RE ASSASSINATION ALLEGATIONS

JULY 6, 1975

WALT ROSTOW: TESTIMONY BEFORE ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION

(Volume 16, Page 169, May 5, 1975)

Biographical Background:

1942-1945, ROSTOW was in OSS, Research Analysis Branch. (169).

1946, State Department, German-Austrian Section

1947, Teaching at Oxford

1949-51, Special Assistant to the Executive Secretary, Economic Commission

for Europe, Geneva

1951-61; MIT, Teaching faculty; consultant to Eisenhower Administration

/December 1961, State Department, Head of Policy Planning Council

1964, Appointed by. LBJ as U.S. member, Inter-American Committee for the

Alliance for Progress

April 1, 1966 -- January 20, 1969: Special Assistant to the President for

National Security Affairs (in this position ROSTOW chaired the 303

Committee)

January, 1961: DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

ROSTOW testified that he was not involved in the 303 Committee and CIA

operation in his position as Deputy Assistant to President Kennedy. (171)

ROSTOW explained the division of labor between himself and BUNDY: BUNDY

handled "intelligence matters, but also the crises in Berlin, the. Congo,

kind of oversight of

the testimony whether ROSTOW continued to handle the same responsibilities

after he moved in December of 1961 to the State Department.

With regard to allegations of CIA plans to assassinate foreign leaders

including CASTRO, TRUJILLO, OR LUMUMBA. ROSTOW testified that he had no

knowledge at the time or subsequently of any such conduct nor did he ever

hear a discussion of that kind of operation

while he was in Government. (172)

April 1961: After the failure of the Bay of Pigs, ROSTOW attended his first

meeting on Cuba and aided in the "post Bay of Pigs cleanup matters." (173)

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January-February 1961: ROSTOW testifies that he had never heard the phrase

"EXECUTIVE ACTION CAPABILITY" until it was mentioned on the phone to him by

Davia Belin. (174)

ROSTOW recalls hearing President Johnson make vague references to assassina-

tion type activities that the CIA may have been carrying on in Latin America.

ROSTOW said that "two or three times in my hearing" LBJ mentioned that

"without hard evidence he had a feeling that the assassination of President

Kennedy might have been carried out at the instigation of Castro" and that

there might have been attempted assassinations "in which the United States

might have been involved". (174-5)

ROSTOW said, "the statements included, as I recall it, on all occasions,

perhaps three occasions when I heard him make it, a disclaimer of having

any hard evidence and I didn't think it was my business to probe him on

this matter." (175)

ROSTOW said that the most complete statement to this effect was made when

LBJ was taping a CBS show. (175)

ROSTOW testified that LBJ discussed the assassination of JFK, he displayed

"a very clear impulse that he had which was to leave behind him a sense

of reservation about the possible connection of Oswald to Cuba and possibly

U.S. action." (176) ROSTOW explained that this referred to U.S. action

against CUBA. (176)

ROSTOW commented generally that "the only rule that I think livable with

the international community is that . . : governments not engage in efforts

to assassinate the heads of other governments." (177). ROSTOW said that

"one exception that I know of in modern history which I regard as legitimate

was the engagement of our people in the plan to assassinate Hitler." (177)

ROSTOW said that if the "end product of our giving arms to certain men would

be the assassination of Trujillo . .

• I think we shouldn't have engaged in

it." (177)

TRUJILLO: ROSTOW said that "the generalized flow of intelligence at that

time involved reports of plots to assassinate Trujillo. . . like once every

week. And why we had to give guns to people who had access to guns in the

Dominican military, I don't know.

And I can't reconstruct the operation

that has been described to you." (178)

ROSTOW testified that "I don't believe the United States should engage in

the business of political assassination." (178-9) "What we can do is to be

scrupulous in not getting the United States involved in anything which

measurably increases the possibility of killing a chief of state. Now, how

you draw a line in implementing that policy depends on very detailed judgments

at the time and in context." (179-180)

ROSTOW

testified that when he took over as Special Assistant to the President

for National Security Affairs (1966), which put him in control of the 303

Committee, he instituted "a procedure of reexamining the whole body of covert

operations that were then in motion." (181) "Out of my experience I don't

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3

recall an occasion when we had to review an action which might lead to an

assassination." (182)

ROSTOW said that President Kennedy in 1961, sent a special letter to all

ambassadors making them the head of the CIA country team in their country.

(183) ROSTOW said "I don't believe we ever cleared a CIA operation which

the ambassador did not approve." (184)

ROSTOW said that under the mandate that the President gave to ambassadors

in 1961, an ambassador was "to be in effect the President's man on the spot,

and he had the power to appeal to the Secretary of State and indeed, to

the President, if he felt that any member of his country's team, from

whatever agency. was operating in ways that were contrary to his judg-

ment of what appropriate action was within the President's policy in that

country." (184) -- Note: Does this cast new light on the actions of the

ambassador in the Dominican Republic in requesting arms?

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The Organization of National

Security Affairs, 1901

HE ORGANIZATION OF WORK ON MILITARY AND FOREIGN POLICY

in the government is a subject which engages a small group of

experts and students of certain branches o! politica: science. There

i or one i ways rangering to be into the suiet: the work sould

When a man becemes President his working style has already been

set, even if he is, by Presicentin! starcards, young. His character ard

experience have already taught him how best to absorb information, hear

contlicting opinions, deal with subordinates, array the alternatives, assess

tre impact of one course in one area on all the cter areas where he bears

responsibility, weigh the timing for action in one field against things pro-

ceeding in others-and, finally, to reach a decision with whose heavy

consequences he will have to live, and, along with him, the nation and all

mankind. Vier do these things in quite distinctive ways. What matters is

what they decide, not how they reach a decision which, in its essence,

w always involve values and perceptions, memories and dreams they can

never whoily articulate.

Under the American Constitution only one man is commander-in-

chef; and he is also charged with the conduct of foreign allairs. In complex

ways those powers are shared with the Congress; but within the executive

manch oniy the President (anc! Vice President) have been elected. All

meters are appeinted y the President, or are responsible to appointed

wricials. They are there to serve the President.

to chows thnt the tass of the executive branch is to. respond to the

1160.]

The Organization of National Security Affairs, 1961

161

President's working style as well as to his policy. Having seen and done

some work in Washington under sir successive Presidents, I still find it

remarkable how that massive burcaucracy shifts its styie, tone, and manner

as Presidents come and go, white maintaining, in each et is departmenss,

a stubborn continuity of its own.

There will always be those who believe they know better than the

Presicient what cught to be done, who believe if he were only belier in-

'ormed, he would agree with them. And they may postpone, dellect, dilute,

even defy orders-or take their case to the press. There will always be

abicing burcaucratic vested interests and habits. For example, Kennedy

once, in his carly days as President, wanted a sign removed which he

thought inappropriate. He asked, casually, that a subordinate take care of

the matter. He was toid a few days later by the attorney general that il

was still there. He tried again. The effort failed. He finally determined the

obscure unit of bureaucracy which had responsibility, the exact poin

within it where power. over signs lay, and personally gave the order. Hs

concluded: "I understand now. A Presicent must say something three tinie:

to be obeyed." And most Presidents will find something like this true, fro:?

time to time, in far graver matters.

But when al! this inevitable personal proprictorship over the nationa

interest and bureaucratic inertia is taken into account, the responsivenes

of the exccutive branch to the single individual who leads it is a kind o

minor recurrent miracie.

It took some time, but the military and foreign policy compler wa

reshaped by Kennedy. The heart of it lay in two men: his secretary o

defense and his secretary of state.

In Robert S. Mc. Vamara he found a man to whom he was prepared ti

entrust extraordinary and rarely diluted authority in the Pentagor

McNamara chose his own team of civilian subordinates. And, with Max

wel! Taylor's movement to the-post of chairman of the Joint Chieftar

Stall on October 1, 1962, Kennedy had a military team with which he W:

comfortable.

Despite his undisputed primacy in the Pentagon, McNamara dec

plined himself to a perception which greatly cased' the task of both Ka

nedy and Johnson, as well as Rusk. He understood that military power y

the servant of larger political purposes. He knew that military acto

intermingling of military and political policy and action is so deep Fl

clean lines can only rarely be drawn. He consciously and systematica

deferred, therefore, to the secretary of state when Rusk took a firm so

tion. And his formal advice to the Presidents he served was routine

the form of craft memoranda, symbolizing his total acceptance c'

decision at which the President would arrive after weighing all the ec

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:f.?

THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION

sidcrations bearing on the problem. In McNamara's time the Pentagon!

generated, of course, an ample range of difterences with the State Depart-

noner working levels. These were usually quietly resolved uy the two

secretaries. The intimacy, ease, and mutual loyalty with which McNamara

and Rus worked was only matched in the post-1945 years, perhaps, by

the Acheson-Lovett team in the Truman administration.

Dean Rusk was at least as self-disciplined as McNamara, but in a

essary. He knew aiso that, in the world as it was in the goos, force was

nescapable element in the equation of diplomacy. For example, his

"st request of me, between Kennedy's clection and the Inaugural, was to

set down the best answer I could to the thought most on his mind: How do

we deal with the world while avoiding nuclear war? He ster referred to

"'is trade union" of foreign ministers. He felt it to be a club of men whose.

duty it was to see if the human race could come through a terrible passage

of history without destroying civilization. His evident sincerity on this

ain: was recognized by his colleagues and often evoked an answering

Ac'ministratively, Rusk's problem was vastly more compler than

Vc.Vamara's because Kennedy was determined to deal intimaiely wit

neign aairs and to reshape foreign policy, piece by picce. Vic.Vamara's

corgunization of the Pentagon and of the American force structure was,

-whans, even more radical than Kennedy's innovations in forcign policy:

" Kennedy did not monitor that reorganization in the way he engaged

ereign policy.

For a strong President the difference was inevitable. The President is,

iscopably, a major cay-to-day actor in foreign affairs, as well as the

architect of foreign policy. He meets and negotiates directly with an endless

"o el chiefs of government and foreign ministers. On small occasions

and lorge, he is expected to articulate foreign policy in detail not expected!

" tim in military affairs. Therefore, many more hands were at work, in the

White House and elsewhere, in forcign than in military affairs during Ken-

socis time.

"r this setting. Rusk drew a sharp line between his two roles: adminis-

mater of the State Department and personal adviser to the President. He

cecry respccied the post of sceretary of state. He never forgot he was in a

o stretching back to lefiersen. But modeling himself or. George Mar-

siell. Rusk kept his ego under extraordinarily tight rein. He was, I think,

"east self-indulgent man I ever worked with. He was the serior adviser

" the President, rendering advice on questions he believed men "should

apprence en their knces." He systematically avoided debate in large mect-

was in his wish. nonpropriate to his office and of no service to the

• The Organization of National Security A Mairs, 1961

•163

ael privately the Presidents ed gire arion who the Presidentia a

cost. He could not fully brick his suberdinates on all that transpired be-

tween himself and the President. The risk of leaks was always real; and it

President needs and deserves private counse!, with free give and like, not

promptly spread throughout the burcaucracy. But that meant Risks's sub-

ordinates in the State Department from time to time were lying blind-a

situation Rusk felt they should accept with the same equanimity is officers

who execute orders without knowing all the considerations which led the

commanding genera! to issue them. On the other hand, within the State

Department Rusk encouraged at planning mectings of senior aides wide-

ranging discussions, including. the advancing of "unthinkable thoughts."

In the nore or less regular sessions we had together, usually over the week-

end, when I was Statc Department planner, he was speculative, reflective,

and candid. But advising the President was his ultimate duty, as he saw it,

along with executing the President's decisions. The only show of emotion

I ever saw Rusk allow himself was in a disheartened and disheveled meet-

ing immediately after the Bay of Pigs debacle. It took place in the Cubinet

Room. The President had stepped out. He pounded the arn: of the Presi

dent's chair and said: "It is this man we must think about."

Unlike McNamara, Rusk did not choose all or even, many of his

initial suborcinates. Ee lived and worked with an array of men Kennedy

wished to see engaged on one aspect or another of forcign aflairs. This

Rusk accepted, dealing with all in an even-handed, reserved wily which

did not exclude moments of sensibility and humor, as well as shrewd assess-

ment. Like a high-ranking general in the field, he accepted the flow of

subordinates that came his way as decreed by distant higher authority;

although, also like a high-ranking general, he used his influence occasion-

ally to get the.key men he wanted most. The degree to which he woulg

share his thoughts inevitably varied among his subordinates; but there wers

no "Rusk men" in his State Department, only fellow soldiers of the ling

The post of secretary of state in the tOoos was certainly the most

exacting post in the government. It was loaded with inescapable overheig

commitments: protracted ordeals before congressional committces; ovel?

seas trips to international conferences; an endless Now of meetings wigh

ambassadors; White House and diplomatic dinners; state visits, with ties

need for fine-grained exchanges witi foreign ministers; an intense series al

bilnteral exchanges at the annual gathering of the foreign ministers f

September for the United Nations General Assembly-al! this plus 18.

need to idminister a large department; to be fully informed on the state 6i

a fissionable world; to be responsible for the daily low of cables to every

corner of the globe, of which a half-dozen were liable to curry heavy freigh

and require that every word be weighed; and then, the need to be prepared!

to render advice to the President at any hour of the day or night.

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THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION

ices his business in his home or some other congenial place; he has

water contro! over his schedule and over whom he sees; he is debarred

irom appearing before congressional committces; and his stalf is small.

c his she is

Both the President and his advisers were caught up in the igoos in a

little noticed but quite revolutionary change in the scale and intensity of

foreign affairs which had occurred in the period between, say, 1945 and!

root. The change in scale arose from the coming to statchood of a great

many former colonial nations. Vembership in the Crited Nations,

exampic, was 59 in 1949, and 112 in 1963. Even more important, hew-

ever, was the growing intensity of the probiems in the southern continents,

as the crive for modernization accelerated and the focus of the Cold War

struggle came to rest upon them.

" is chly a partiai exaggeration to say that the secretary of state from

1945 to 19.52 was a super-assistant secretary of state for Europe. America

faced difficult probiems in postwar China; the Japanese occupation and

the Treaty; the troubled birth of Israel; and war in Korea. But Latin Amer-

ca was quiet. The ferment in Africa, the Middle East, South and South-

cost Asia was primarily a heacache for the European colonial powers.

Achesons life as secictary of state was overwhelmingly taken up with prob-

ens dong the axis from Loncon to Moscow. His most important act in

sion American policy was, perhaps, to order George Kennan's explosive

-sport of March 950 to be sequestered-"locked away and hidden from

mocent eyes."" Acheser's advice to Truman that tie United States face

up to the arach in Korea in tune 1950 was determined rather more by his

concern for the balance of power in Europe than in Asia: he viewed the

nitaci as a direc: challenge by Moscow to Washingtor that had to be met

nascent NATO were to emerge as viable.

Kennedy and Johnson, Rusk and McNamara dealt with a quite

Terent world. The plane: had become a singie, sensitively interacting

glebal community. From the point o! view of American policy, as well as

wussian and Chinese, history had destroyed the shield of colonialism; and

Jatin America was in a new state of ferment. In the tooes the intensity

of communications between Latin America and Washington, and the

gravity of the issues, almost matched those of Europe in the immediate

postwar years. Africa, the Middle East, and Asia proved capable of gen-

crating. at any moment, crises of the first order of magnitude; and this

meant they required endless attention and monitoring, even in apparently

quiet times. In short, the traditional orientation of American foreign policy

across she Worth Atlantic had demonstrably ended.

"tis this revelution in the world's political structure that explains

more than anything eise the rise in importance of the post of special assist-

ant:o the President for national security alairs.

This new dimension in the organization of national security affairs

megan to take shane in the Issos, as experience unfolded with operating

The Organization of National Security Afairs, 1961

165

the structure created by the Nationa! Security Act of 1947 and the advisory

counch it set in motion.

From the begining, the heart of the matter lay in two quite distinct

problems: first, how the President chose to receive advice on national

security matters; second, how coordinated stalt work should be generate!

among all the arms of national security policy at a time when diplomacy

itself, in the old-fashioned sense, no longer sullicce!. Intelligence, forcign

aid, information projected overseas, stockpiling at home, and, above all,

military policy had to be woven together with conventional diplomacy.

On the first issue, Truman, like his successors (including Bisen-

hower), did not use extensively the full formal structure of the National

Security Council (NSC) in actually arriving at critical operational deci-

sions. He sought the advice of the men he wanted to hear when he wanted

to hear them on specific matters as they arose—notably, George Marshal!

and Dear. Acheson, Robert A. Lovett and Averell Harriman.

With respect to the second problem, coorcinated stall work wils gen-

erated, based on older wartime and immediate postwar precedents, bring-

ing State and Defense closer together; for example, the re-examination of

military policy after the first Soviet nucicar explosion in 1949, called NSC

68.

When the Soviet Union acquired nuclear weapons, and the possibilities

of a stando! in major weapons became more real, the psychological cle-

ment in the struggle also rose in priority. After a protracted examination,

the problem of psychologica! warfare came lo be conceived primarily as

the task of making and executing a policy that would dramatize the areas

of overlap between the purposes of the United States and these of other

nations.

The Eisenhower administration recognized and accepted this conclu-

sion when in 1953 it converted the Psychologica! Strategy Board into thei

Operations Coordinating Board, whose function was to assure coordinated

execution of policy decisions already arrived a by the President.

ge

Eisenhower also clevated the formal status of the NSC and the NSg

Planning Board. And, there emerged, as well, a most useful Thursday

lunch at the under secretary leve!, chaired by the under secretary of stall

As an occasional consultant to the Eisenhower administration, I wat

able to observe the evolution of its formalized NSC structure. I came fe

share a judgment arrived at also by some of the men most centrally in

volved. We-concluded that both therNSE-Pianning Board and the Opera

tions- Coordination Board (OCBY had become instruments for. generaung.

papers that did not, in fact, come to grips with the heart of the problend;

they addressed! At formal NSC icetings the President was forced to sit

through the elaborate exposition of problems that told him little he did net

already know and which did not clearly pose the questions which he had to

decide. Ore man chorged with making i part of this apparatus work, lai

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1:5

THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION

in the Eisenhower administration, concluded: "If we make Ike sit through

many more of these pointiess meetings, we'll literally kill him.

The reason for this atrophy was quite simple. A strong secretary.Of

-state does not wish to "place" critical" and sensitive issues into interdepart

meatat-commiticesmewyccially when they expand out to include representa-

tves of departments only marginally invoived. Foster Dulles was cute

copubie c! translating this wish inio action. A strong secretary of defense

may wish to lay his hands on some of the key issues of diplomacy, but

cous not wish his critical pieces of business spread about for general debate

and acrice. So, also, with a strong secretary of the treasury; ard most na-

onal secanty probicms have price tags attached to "em. Thus, extremely

ase men were busy, day after day, drafting papers on prostems where the

key components were missing.

After citing the many departments and agencies involved in foreign

aTairs. Eisenhower's own conclusion was this:

Policy decisions affecting these far-flung operations were my re-

spons:bility, out for daily coordination, I early organized the Opera-

ions Coordinating Beard (OCB). Its membership included

important oficinis of agencies which were directly in charge of spe-

cilic forcign operations. It functioned fairly we!!.

However, I came

Snaily to believe that this work could have been better cone by a

Nighly competent and trusted official with a small stall of his own.

rather than by a committee whose members had to handle the task on

a part-time basis."

Indeedi, for this very reason, a key figure in the Eisenhower adminis-

vation wradrew Goodpaster, functioned as a personal cite. Foreshadowing

sis MeSeorge Buncy and his successors would undertake, Goodpaster

eat with all manner of national security probiems requiring the Presi-

cent's participation, on occasions when the secretary of state or defense, thic

«rector of Central Intelligence, the chairman of the AEC, etc., did not

cheese to take up the matter directly with the President.

All this was quite well known to Kennedy when he asked Bundy and

me to go to work in the White House on national security affairs-a

perspective underlined for him by a special report of Senator Henry Jack-

son's Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, published shortly after

he 1çdo clection. We knew Kennedy would wis? our advice on how to

organize or dispose of the machinery and star we had inherited, We

tely discussed the problem in Cambridge before going to Washington;

agreed we would proansly recommend a simpler pian, but agreed, also,

that we should study the situation on the spot rather than recommend

action on the basis c! our existing information and prejudice.

In coming te a responsibe judgment in Washington, I read a sampling

one tops a huncred porning and OCD papers; talked with stall members

The Organization of National Security Afairs, 1968. 167

who had helped operate the machinery; and probed hard at the question

of whether a reform of the existing machinery could render it vital.

I concluded! that the problem of getting full cooperation from the

Department of Staie was insurmountable, because i strong secretary of

state could, would!, and, perhaps, should keep out of large interdepart-

mentai committees critical clements in the diplomatic equation. I agreed,

in chect, with a dictum of C. D. Jachson's addressed to precisely this

problem: "Since you can't lick 'em, join 'em." Itheretore proposed that ther

_lush Of interdepartmental coordination be-passed on to: the secretary of

statemanda-much-smaller: staff be built-around-Bundy to serve-narrowly

-presidential purposes: Interdepartmental coordination of the hind reflected

in the papers: had read was an essential part of government; and such

working-level papers should be available to the President. They represented

raw materials which the President's senior advisers should have available:

but they were not-and could not be-focused with sullicient precision on

the issues the President would have to decide at a particular moment.

Bundy had arrived at a similar conclusion.

We took our plan to kennedy, who approved. But he noted that we

were somewhat odd bureaucrats: here we were, handed a substantial

empire-slots, budgets, and all-and our first recommendation was to liqui-

date a good part of it.

The essential decision was to separate two parts of the abiding NSC

probiem: assistance to the President in preparing for and executing his

decisions; and the task of interdepartmental stalt work. The latter we

would monitor with our small staft, but not try to manage from day to day.

The@CB-was-formally abolshed.ou.Fcbruary.19,1967,

In Present at the Creation, Acheson saic!: "I saw my duly as gathering

a!l the wisdom available and communicating it amid considerable competi-

tion. The alternative we have seen in doubtful operations in the Roosevelig

Kennedy and Johnson administrations, when the President has used the

White House stall as the agency for collection and evaluation of wisdom."E

Acheson, I beliove, misjudged the matter. If he had served as secretary of

state in the robos, he would, I suspect, have recognized the need for, inc

welcomed, the Bundy staff. The flow of business that orly the Presideng

could, in the end!, decide had become so massive and the preoccupations of

the sceretary of state so wide-ranging that an extra man, and staft, wagg

required:

I. be keep the-President-fully informed;

ooId

2. to watch over the tinkages between State, Defense, ATD, the

Treasury, Agriculture,-aad other departments increasingly ne

volved in foreig! affairs;

to follow closely the development.of-issues-within-the.bureaucracyi,

so that the President would know what lay behind recommenchy

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1019

THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION

tions coming forward—-notably the options sejected or washed out

by burcaucratic compromise and the precise reasons why others

were proposed;

4. to assist the President in his expanded personal role in diplomacy:

spceches, visitors, and foreign correspondence; press contacts and

trips abroad; bricfings for mectings with his advisers;

5. lonele sure the President's decistons were executed:

A man charged with this kind of responsibility ought to be one whose

judgment the President would wish to hear, among others, before he made

a decision. Kennedy and Johnson did solicit the views of their special

assistants for national security alairs. But the existence of the post emerged!

from brute necessity, not as an effort to dilute the powers of the secretaries

of state and defense.

Kennedy was, from the first, lucid about the mission of his special

assistant for national security affairs. He explained it in identical terms to

Rusk, McNamara, Bundy, and me. He did not wish us to substitute for the

secretaries of state and defense. He was conscious of Franklin Roosevelt's

icchnique of creating overlapping authorities and profiting from the fric-

ten, and he wanted no part of it-No decision in their fields" would be

taken without hearing the two secretaries" and giving their advice heavy

paight. On the other hand, he wanted to make sure-that-he-had-available -

te be imprisoned by the options the bureaucracies might generate and lay

befcie him. It was the duty of the special assistant for national security

alfairs to assure that independent statement of the options.

Many other functions emerged, but those were our instructions in

January 1961.

Kennedy had initially thought I might take the post of State Depart-

ment planner. For good and sufficient reasons Rusk preferred an old

friend and collague, George McChee. For ten months I functioned as

deputy special assistant to the President for national security affairs.

There was plenty for both Bundy and me to co. We first split up

the crises. He desk Cuba, the Conger and-Berin, although I joined in the

tatter from time to time. 100k-54059

vening Indonesin and the devel

ee tire organization of policy plan-

ing from the White House end.

It was not an ideal bureaucratic arrangement, especially for Bundy.

But the urgency of the tasks, old friendship, mutual respect, and devotion

to a common boss made it viable; and there was more than enough for

soth of us to co. I moved to the planning job at State when McGhee was

crated to the post of deputy under secretary of state, in a massive reorga-

mation c November zool.

•The Organization of National Security Afairs, 1961

160

Given the responsibilities borne by the United States in the logos, 1

would guess something much like Bundy's post would have had to be

invented later if it had not been created in January 1961. 1 am inclined 10

think Rusk and McNamara would agrec.

Bundy's mission, as it emerged, is to be understood primarily as a

substantial expansion of Goodpaster's role under Eisenhower, He became

a major source of advice, as well as organizer of advice, for the President.

But Bundy executed his mission with extraordinary sensitivity to the pre-

rogatives of the secretaries of state and defense. He was constantly aware

of the need to bring and hold close together the three critical actors: the

President, Rusk, and McNamara. What the bureaucracy saw was the vital

new figure, and his lively staft, probing, questioning, voraciously gathering

intelligence and cables, making sure the President's interests, outlook, and

decisions were effectively communicated to the bureaucracy. What the

burcaucracy did not see was Bundy's awareness. of the problems confronted

by Rusk and McNamara, and his quiet actions to try to lighten their bur-

dens as well as the President's.

A word about planning. As Kennedy came to grips with the ines-

capable crises on the national agenda, he interested himself personally in

the design of a planning program. The planners themselves met wotkiy

an pencing on the sUbrec!

Buncysanc-myseltIrom.the White House.

245095

ammo, had gone over carfully and

approved a list of nineteen tasks arrayed under five headings, the fourth

of which was Kennedy's own innovation:

I. Problems of military force and policy; e.g, the deterrence of

guerrilla warfare.

Certain urgent situations; e.g., Berlin, Vietnam.

ge

Fore sicable prob expon hie pianing avail action should venge

range of choice; e.g, reappraisal of our relations with Nasser.

4. Potential points of strength where purposeful action might beg

effective in consolidating or improving our position; e.g., Turkcy#

5. Arcas relating to possible future negotiation with the Sovich

Union; e.g., scientific cooperation.

Assignments were made to named individuals, in an eflort to avoic

the anonymity and dilution of committee products; and target dates sof

for each report. The lists were revised with the Now of events, special tasks

forces emerging, for example, on Berlin (under Acheson) and Sout!

Korea. By the end of May the list had been exparded to some fifty items?

with eleven subjects selected as high priority which might call for NSC

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170

THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION

treatment or some other form of Presidential decision within two or three

menths.

The general image of Kennedy's first days as President is sometimes

projected is one of light-hearted improvisation until the sobering experi-

ence of the Bay of Pigs. For those engagec intimately with him in foreign.

aftairs, it was a sober-even somber--time from the beginning, although

confronted with a certain visceral good cheer. He once greeted Bundy and

me as we came into his ofice: "What's gone against us today?"

But it was also a time of planning, of looking ahcad to better days.

Some of the planning exercises launched then rar into the sand; others

laid the foundations for major lines of action.

I recall in those early days running into a party of four late one cold

night, between the White House and the Excutive Office Building. The

two lead characters plodding through the snow could be identified by the

glow of cigars at markedly diferent levels. They turned out to be the

President and his shorter companion, Charles Bartlett, accompanied by a

pair of men from the Secrct Scrvice. Kennedy, evidently in a cheerful

mood, asked why I was working so late. I told him I had a tough boss.

Briefly serious, he said he wanted to make sure we in the White House got

on top of planning and stayed there. Kennedy, in fact, did enter into the

planning business more deeply in those early days than any other postiar

President.

19

Military, Arms Control,

and Space Policy

BUDGETS AND DOCTRINES

ILITARY AND SPACE EXPENDITURES LIFTED SHARPLY IN KEN-

nedy's first year (fiscal 1962): and they continued to rise

-sowly in the former case, rapidly in the latter.

Space Research

National Defense

and Technology

(in billions of dollars)

FY 1961

FY 1962

FY 1903

FY I964

47.4

SI.I

52.3

53.0.

1.3

2.6

4.2

22

Page

Kennedy's first move on the defense budget came on March 28, 196

when he sent a special message to the Congress proposing changes fet

FY 1962 outlays. These reflected the bipartisan consensus of the late 19 skis

(which Mc.Vamara's initial study of the military establishment confirman

as well as his vigorous new civilian management of the Pentagon.!

The proposed net incase of Siso milion refected sorewint over

billion dollars in new outlays and proposed savings for the coming yeir gi

about $400 million.

McNamara moved swiftly to bring the military budget toward's great:

rationality by using two devices: the program packages; and cost-bene

analysis applied to each major component of expenditure within

packages.

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## Page 23

To: Files

From: Frederick Baru.

Date: 7448717175

7 July 75: ROSTOW PHONE CONVERSATION

Rostow confirmed our meeting at 4:00 at Cosmos Club.

Rostow advised that

we read his book:DIFFUSION OF POWER IN

the following parts:

a) pp.160-170 (Organization of National Security Affairs)

esp. 169-170

b) pp. 208-221, Including his comments

on his approach

to

the second

Punta del Este congerence, which is his

post Bay of Pigs approach.

On BISSELL: Rostow said he is a close social fhrma friend of

Bissell's.

I asked him to check his personal papers for any

references to conversations with Bissell between the election

and late February 1961. He said he belleved that his social.

caldndar would show that he had dinner with Bissell once or

twaice baronex during that period of time.

But he is us sure

that he did not discuss EXECUTIVE ACTION with Bissell.

Rostur said that the only professional contact he had with

Bissell during this time involved asking him to

write

a planning paper on how

to 1 organize the godernment.

Theyx Bissell was a part of the Organization of Planners

(George McGee and other planners) with which Rostow

would

meet.

HH

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TRUTILLO

saw normal

deplonte tuffed - No CA

Iversigny

or egyot for dissis,

Wee barkled it

I dont know who

Lis ration a to Goocha,

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24

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TRUTILLO

Some time I desissed

DR reshapectirely The

5/29 Rusk Cable is not

The detailed one is smale,

That one dealt to lae

potential successor ta

detailed assessment.

I toas not in The

HH 55355

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## Page 26

Frequent metrip w

Brill? Stayed as

his house for several

V. 1.

But to heet o

at cross the line

Mact I drea

Nor 15,1961 - I was

Vietnam - Heard no

mention of The Brill telk

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## Page 27

Me 3 contreto a Cula

O) Panta del Site II

B teport to NATO

Lussion pulits

Landale remin reflare

in The 9/3 Merid

+ I lid a planwing

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## Page 28

1961

SUKARAD

twelf. one

o Mali

DEM

Do his death is shally for

ocamento, - Pentagon japan,

7600

HH

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28

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## Page 29

General

Assass s Unturkble for JFK =

great sense of primes fate

Dow botheed to for ho he

Knew he dont do it

Wh's Noter.

O No. Worry

D Thosts on an litorian

") personall, regent.

6) counter - productie

c). US vulnerabit, - more

Boat go - hat at

estizument.

mostle That elisa,

would he dissed of

lunch.

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## Page 30

I sent hand to to

That se sould build

a defame to snid

sender

aunt me acros

into frontier

Tit 70-To die state

HH

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## Page 31

I cant textily to wood

i CIA at That fume

er I didn't get malied

a court go until

CONGE

> No recall

Congo wasnt my best

It never secured to

he That Eisenhowers

Adwin would have her

involied in Le essas,

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## Page 32

As CONVULTANT to

IKE ADMIN

2 Progerts:

China -

BOSS Rest Bell,

fenswer

A publi record,

Both resulked in books,

Then drafted" What to do

apor Stalins deal.

For Rocky

The

Quantro panel.

NH. 55355 DOCId: 32123189 Paye 32

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## Page 33

At Never heard one

Could

How could if ha

sue scares

enterise

@ mesemberator chame

3) Order from fres

I find it hand to

Celieve That arras

I would go forward

a definite orde

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