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T....

Date: 06/25/98

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1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY

INFORMATION

AGENCY

RECORD NUMBER

RECORDS SERIES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

NSC

145-10001-10202

213

Released under

the John

F. Kennedy

Assassination Records

Collection Act of 1992

i44 USC 2107 Note) .

Case#:NW 54214 Date:

10-10-2017--------.

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR

FROM

TO

TITLE

DATE: 04/04/63

PAGES : 21

SUBJECTS : NEW COVERT POLICY AND PROGRAM TOWARD CUBA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION

RESTRICTIONS : 1B, 1C

CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 02/24/98

OPENING CRITERIA

COMMENTS :

NO JOINT STAFF OBJECTION

TO DECLASSIFICATION

REQUIRES CONCURRENCE OF

CIA

DATE:

-MAR

-2016

[R]

- ITEM IS RESTRICTED

HH

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ECRET

ANNEX A

SUBJECT: A Covert Harassment/Sabotage Program against Cuba

I. This paper presents a covert Harassment/Sabotage program

targetted against Cuba; included are those sabotage plans which have

previously been approved as well as new proposals. While this program

will cause a certain amount of economic damage, it will in no sense

critically injure the economy of cause the overthrow of Castro. It may,

however, create a situation which will delay the consolidation and

stabilization of Castro's revolution and may cause some of his 26 July

followers to doubt Castro's ability successfully to create a new Cuba.

Losses in men and equipment with the attendant adverse publicity

must be expected. Even without such losses, U.S. attribution will be

claimed.

When the policy and guidelines of the overall sabotage program are

established, it will be possible progressively to develop up to a limit

additional covert assets and support capabilities. However, materially

to increase the pace of operations, a period of four to six months is

required. Ultimate limiting factors are weather, length of "dark-of-

the-moon" period each month and appropriate targets. A source of

additional agent personnel is from Cuban personnel trained by the U.S.

Military Forces under the recent programs, but released to civilian

status.

213

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• •

I. PREVIOUSLY APPROVED PROGRAMS

A. SUBTLE SABOTAGE PROGRAM

The use of a variety of propaganda media to stimulate

passive resistance and low-risk, simple sabotage actions by the populace

of Cuba. Acts such as the contamination of fuels and lubricants, the

introduction of foreign material into moving parts of machinery, and

administrative acts of omission and commission are illustrative examples

of type of activity which we will attempt to stimulate. This program was

later supplemented by approval to incite Cubans within Cuba to commit

acts of sabotage and harassment against Soviet personnel in Cuba, with a

view toward making the Soviet presence in Cuba increasingly more onerous,

embarrassing and untenable. Acts such as the use of "Russian go home"

slogans would be urged and unattributable mail propaganda will call for

more aggressive actions such as physical violence against Soviet personnel

and equipment.

CAPABILITIES

The keystone of the Subtle Sabotage program is the

unattributed mailing program. The mailing program is being

conducted from most Latin American countries, some

European countries, and the United States and currently

involves about 50, 000 pieces of mail per month. Propaganda

6.71

Excluded dom automatic

for rating 250

:A33

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and instructions are sent giving a variety of subtle sabotage

techniques in appropriate detail. Several hundred letters

are infiltrated into Cuba each month for domestic mailing in

support of this program.

The mailing program is being supplemented by

the use of short and medium wave broadcasts beamed at Cuba

from eight different stations. The main technique is to air

real or fabricated letters telling of acts of sabotage and

resistance within Cuba and referring to historical examples.

Thus without exhorting the Cubans to action, we are giving

them examples of what they can do and how to do it while

subtly encouraging them to participate. As other harassment/

sabotage programs progress, we plan to replay more and

more actual cases of happenings, both of our own activities

and of independent resistance elements. Our propaganda

efforts will also be intensified with increased emphasis on

stimulating active opposition to the regime and acts of

major sabotage and harassment.

PACE

The mailing program will remain at approximately

30, 000 pieces per month with the emphasis on subtle sabotage

CROUP T

SEC

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gradually being increased. We expect to increase the

infiltration of items for mailing within Cuba to about 800

pieces per month by developing additional diplomatic and

legal traveler channels. We are developing a comprehen-

sive pamphlet giving detailed instructions on the theory

and practice of resistance with an emphasis on subtle

sabotage.

These will be introduced in a variety of ways

at the appropriate time.

The radio broadcasts currently beam 270 hours

per week at Cuba from 8 different stations. Throughout

these broadcasts subtle sabotage themes are inserted.

Plans are underway to increase the broadcast hours to 350

per week, utilizing a total of 12 stations and gradually

stepping up the emphasis on subtle sabotage.

B. SABOTAGE OF CUBAN OWNED SHIPPING

Two types of sabotage have been approved:

(1) The placing of incendiary devices and/or explosives

with

suitable time delay within the hull or cargo to disable or sink Cuban

vessels and/or damage their cargos while on the high seas.

(2) Introducing abrasives or other damaging materials into

the propulsion, communication and other systems of the ship to inactivate

the ship.

Exi..":

Etamatla

and

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CAPABILITIES

At the present time there are

agent assets of

varying quality aboard 12 Cuban merchant ships (approxi-

mately half of the Cuban Merchant Marine). Although a

quarter of these agents agreed to undertake sabotage during

the crisis period of September-October 1962, none of them

was tested in this regard. Most of the others have not been

asked. We are confident that a major act of sabotage can be

achieved against two or three of these vessels. It may be

possible, however, to develop more limited acts of sabotage

in a larger number of ships.

PACE

Barring unusual circumstances, it should be possible to

accomplish an initial major act of sabotage on a Cuban ship

prior to mid-June. Following the initial effort and depend-

ing upon the reliability of the various recruited agents on

board, it should be possible to develop an operation of this

type at an approximate rate of one per month as long as

Cuban merchant marine ships visit alhamburg, Antwerp.

Capablance, of Vera Crui

It may be possible to use

Canadian Forts but in view of the difficulty of obtaining access

through the Candian:

they may be excluded.

Enelited

21

12.

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III. NEW PROPOSALS

A. ADDITIONAL MEANS OF SABOTAGE OF CUBAN OWNED

SHIPPING

The placing of explosive devices with suitable time delays

on the outside of ships either in Cuban of in non-Cuban ports.

CAPABILITIES

A six man Cuban underwater demolition team (UDT)

has been undergoing training and will be in operational

readiness by the end of June 1963. They are competent in the

use of open and closed circuit SCUBA and have been conducting

simulated limpet operations using inert materials. Their

training will be completed in June, culminating in a series of

exercises using live demolitions under operational conditions.

Adequate intelligence support and targetting data are available

to plan and execute UDI operations in selected ports. In some

cases non-UDT assets in small boats may be used to place

limpets on Cuban ships.

PACE

The first attack could be made in July 1963 and we

could mount one every other month thereafter, depending upon

the location and availability of targets. Preliminary targetting

icro dag and

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indicates that the first such operations would probably take

place at Cuban south coast ports such as Manzanillo or Niquero

or on a Cuban ship in a free world port permitting access to

the vessel.

The preferred port for doing this would be vera

Grea, Monical, but it could be done in some European porte

also. It is not anticipated that we could obtain sufficient

local support for such an action to undertake it i Comedela

BENEFITS

Increased strain on Soviet/Bloc shipping.

Destruction or damage to vital cargos.

Disruption of shipping schedules - particularly the

delivery of vital materials and spare parts.

Demoralization of Cuban crews.

REPERCUSSIONS

Allegations of U.S. sponsorship.

Alleged "murder" of Cuban sailors.

Claims that ships were torpedoed by U.S. submarines.

Possible reprisals against U.S. ships.

Estimate of Soviet Reactions:

Whenever an incident occurs, the Soviets will be quick

to suspect U.S. involvement; they are likely to set in motion

Excludes ten aste-atte

11

12

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their propaganda machines to allege at least U.S. connivance,

although this probably will not develop into a major campaign

unless the Soviets manage to turn up some tangible evidence

of U.S. implication. If there are recurrent incidents, the

Soviets may utilize diplomatic channels and possibly the UN

to bring pressure on the U.S. to get an end put to the program.

It is barely possible that if a pattern of incidents

develops the Soviets through their own sabotage apparatus, of

by inciting the Cubans, may engage in some sabotage of U.S.

vessels. They would hope in this way to get across the message

that two can play the game and thus to get the program stopped.

But the Soviets would be aware of the risks of getting caught at

this sort of retaliation and these risks are likely to have a

very considerable sobering influence on them. Perhaps some-

what more likely, the Soviets might encourage the Cubans to

supply ship crews with small arms with which to attack the

sabotage teams, if they are detected, and thus to ward off the

program. In general, however, forceful reactions directly

involving the Soviets seem unlikely.

Excle:

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B. HARASSMENT ATTACKS ON CUBAN SHIPS IN CUBAN WATERS

Surface attacks by Maritime assets firing on Cuban ships

in Cuban waters. Where the maritime asset cannot reach the target, shore

based attacks on shipping in port or passing among the offshore keys may.

be undertaken.

CAPABILITIES

Our present maritime assets have an acceptable

capability to attack Cuban ships with recoilless rifles, rocket

launchers or automatic weapons such as 20 mm. cannon. The

craft which we would probably use are sport fishermen manned

by Cubans and capable of speeds in excess of 30 kts. By the

end of July we expect to add two PT type, gas turbine boats to

our fleet, whose 40 kt. plus speed and maneuverability will

significantly increase our surface attack capability. Adequate

intelligence support and targetting data are available properly

to plan and execute these attacks on selected Cuban ships.

For shore based attacks two separate groups, one of

22 and one of 16 Cubans have been given thorough paramilitary

training and, while only a few have had any operational experience

to date, they are considered operationally ready for two or three

SIT

GROUP 1

Excluded froze autoralle

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SECRET

LY

10

man teams to be infiltrated on one of the off-shore keys or on

the approaches to a harbor from which they could fire on Cuban

ships with recoilless rifles or rocket launchers. Adequate

intelligence support and target data are available properly to

plan and execute these operations against selected Cuban ships.

PACE

The first surface attack could be launched in May with

one every month thereafter. With sufficient targets, two attacks

per month are possible. Preliminary targetting indicates the

first such operations would probably be conducted in the Cayo

Frances Area of Northern Las Villas or in the Gulfo de

Guacanayabo off Southern Oriente.

If surface attacks cannot reach a target, an alterna-

tive shore-based attack could be made in June 1963 and one

every month thereafter. Preliminary targetting indicates the

first such operations would probably be conducted off the

north coast of Camaguey in the Cayo Cruz area or off the south

coast of Camaguey in the Jardines de la Reina area.

BENEFITS

Disruption of coastal commerce.

Increased strain on Cuban land transportation.

--==

Excited too pedrallel

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Increased strain on Cuban patrol resources.

Increased morale of Exles.

Increased morale of internal resistance.

REPERCUSSIONS

Charges of U.S. sponsorship.

Increased vigilance of Cuban patrols.

Increased Soviet deliveries of sea and air patrol

craft.

Aggressive Cuban patrols may cause incidents thru

attack on innocent ships.

Possible reprisal attacks.

Estimate of Soviet Reactions:

As in the case of earlier exile attacks on Cuban shipping,

the Soviets will be intent on demonstrating or at least alleging

U.S. culpability and to draw from the U.S. some sort of a

commitment not to support further such activities. A sizable

Soviet propaganda campaign is probable including possible

recourse to the UN. Moscow is under some handicap, however,

in alleging U.S. involvement because if it makes too much of a

case it will lay itself open to Chinese assertions that it was

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.!.

• 12

gullible last October in accepting U.S. non-invasion assurances.

There almost certainly would not be any direct Soviet

counter-action outside the immediate vicinity of Cuba and, even

in the Cuban area, the Soviets are likely to let the Cubans

themselves carry the brunt of the response. Within these

general limits, the Soviets may supply the Cubans with additional

hardware (various small craft, aircraft with air-to-surface

weapons and coastal weapons) and training with which to counter

the program. The Cubans themselves might be encouraged to

undertake some bit-and-run raids of their own, though the

Soviets would recognize that if such retaliation were to escalate

into US-Cuban incidents a dangerous crisis could soon ensue.

Soviet ability to support the Cubans militarily would of course

be very limited. The Soviets are therefore likely to be quite

cautious in encouraging any aggressive Cuban responses.

C. EXTERNALLY MOUNTED HIT AND RUN ATTACKS AGAINST

LAND TARGETS

Attacks by external assets against targets of minor economic

importance would be primarily harassment, while attacks against major

economic targets would be sabotage. Illustrative examples of harassment

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targets are the molasses tanker anchored off Cayo Frances (North Matanzas),

the petroleum storage facilities at Casilda, unidentified government activity

on various keys and capes such as Cabo Juan Tomas (North Pinar del Rio)

and Cayo Frances (North Matanzas), the military airfield at Baracoa (North

Oriente), naval refueling and base facilities at Tunas de Zazas and Jucaro

on the south coast of Las Villas and Camaguey provinces, and railroad and

highway bridges near the coast. Sabotage targets include the petroleum

refinery

Fo Sandlago de Cuba and electric power plants such as the one lean

I. Matanzes.

CAPABILITIES

Iwo separate groups of Cubans, one of 22 men and

one of 16 men, have been given thorough paramilitary

training and while only a few have had any operational experience

they are considered operationally ready, the effectiveness of the

men under combat conditions is unknown. The size of the team

to be infiltrated for the attacks will vary, depending on the target

and method of attack. Sophisticated targetting and planning will

be required and may necessitate specialized training and equip-

ment. The operational tasks envisaged in harassment, such as

recoilless rifle or mortar fire, on selected Cuban installations

are simpler than the more complex ones associated with the

SECRET -

----

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sabotage attacks. The harassment targets will usually be much

more accessible than the sabotage targets and the limited

missions assigned will be of relatively short duration - a few

hours ashore at most and then out - all of which will enhance

the chances of success. As the men gain experience under

fire, they will become more willing aggressively to press

their attacks which in turn will increase the impact on the GOC

of these activities.

As operational experience is gained the capability for

complex sabotage operations will be enhanced but we feel the

possibility of this type of complex operation going awry will

remain high and the risk may prove to be unacceptable. Our

targetting and planning capability for this type of operation is

considered adequate but will improve with additional experience.

PACE

The first harassment attacks could be mounted in

April. Preliminary targetting has been done on an oil storage

facility at Casilda near Trinidad, Southern Las Villas and this

tentatively would be the first target.

The first sabotage operation could be mounted in May.

Preliminary targetting has begun on the Santiago

oil refinery

Excleted tom actonali

denie.

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"ist

as the first target. Thereafter, one harassment attack per

month or one sabotage attack every six weeks to two months

could be programmed. The number of sabotage targets which

can be attacked in this manner is limited.

BENEFITS

Harassment Attacks

Increased morale in exile community.

Some increase in morale of internal resistance elements.

Minor or short term economic disruption.

Increased strain on Cuban land and naval patrols.

Sabotage Attacks: Same as above except

Major economic disruption.

Increased strain on Soviet aid.

REPERCUSSIONS

Charges of U.S. sponsorship.

Increased vigilance of Cuban patrol forces.

Increased Soviet deliveries of patrol craft.

Aggressive Cuban patrols may cause incidents thru

attacks on innocent ships.

Increased internal security force activities.

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Possible reprisal attacks.

Estimate of Soviet Reactions:

In this case, the Soviets would be under rather more

pressure than in the previous ones to come to the direct support

of the Cubans since actual attacks on Cuban territory would be

involved. Ultimately, the Soviets would however still be con-

scious of their inability to provide meaningful military support

without running high risks of escalation.

Consequently, Soviet responses would be much as

those indicated in the previous case: A propaganda-political

campaign to establish U.S. involvement designed at a minimum

to pillory the U.S. and at a maximum to get the U.S. to stop the

program; and additional supplies and training for the Cubans to

enable them to resist the incursions more effectively. As in the

previous case, the Soviets might encourage the Cubans to do some

raiding of their own but they would take care not to become

directly lavolved in such activities and to leave open avenues for

their own disengagement in case the situation began to escalate

into a dangerous crisis.

-....:

"an antonatle

ng and

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D. SUPPORT OF INTERNAL RESISTANCE ELEMENTS

Provide guidance and support, both materiel and personnel,

to internal resistance elements to permit them to undertake a variety of

sabotage and harassment operations. This will be an intensification and

augmentation of the subtle sabotage program previously cited. In some

cases, it will be possible to control or influence the choice of targets and

methods of attack; in other cases the internal elements being supported will

attack targets of their .own choosing and in their own manner. The use of

internal elements will be particularly effective against economic targets,

such as electric distribution systems, electric plants, oil refineries in

(savanand the Mean hickel plant which our external assets cannot attack 11, 11

within acceptable risk limits. In the main, however, the targets attacked

by the internal elements will be targets of opportunity in line with the

capabilities and desires of the individuals or groups participating and will

be relatively small operations with a cumulative and hopefully snowballing

effect.

CAPABILITIES

We have one black team now in place which has a

significant potential for sabotage and harassment attacks if

we provide the required guidance and support. The infiltration

of additional teams i underway as part of our intelligence

Excluded "

• actoratic

:201

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1.8

collection program. We can re-orient some of these teams

for sabotage harassment purposes. A number of singleton

agents are also in place in Cuba. Their potential for

sabotage and harassment varies but will be explored and

exploited as appropriate.

Materiel is available to support the internal assets

and a variety of means exist for getting it to them - the

principal means being maritime infiltration, diplomatic

channels, and concealment in open mail. The reliability of

these infiltration mechanisms will be a limiting factor.

Every effort will be made to have the internal assets utilize

indigenous materials which can be procured legally or illegally.

Trained agents are available for infiltration to provide know-

how and leadership to internal elements which have the capa-

bility to safe-house and utilize them. Instructions on methods

of attacking various types of targets and other forms of opera-

tional guidance are available and can be made available to

internal elements in a number of ways.

PACE

The existing team in Southern Pinar del Rio, the

recently infiltrated team in Northern Las Villas, ansthe

i Exctured ten automatle

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singleton agents now in place can be queried immediately as

to their capabilities for sabotage and harassment, the support

they would require, and the probable timing of the actions.

If appropriate, materiel could be delivered relatively quickly

by maritime infiltration; the utilization of other means will

have to be further explored but it is certain that at least

some types of materiel could be introduced within 30 days.

Initial sabotage operations would probably take place within

30 days.

Other teams scheduled for infiltration or being held

for other programs could be oriented toward sabotage and

harassment and could attempt to develop such programs upon

infiltrating.

A series of caching operations could be started

immediately to provide a source of supply for assets which

might develop. The number of such operations per month

would depend on the allocation of maritime assets but initially

one per month could be undertaken without prejudice to

previous cited sabotage programs.

SECRET

Excluded tram automatl:

da.?

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A: i

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BENEFITS

Possibility of major economic damage.

Increased morale and inoperation for internal

resistance elements.

Increased strain on Cuban security forces.

Evidence to world that Castro has not succeeded.

REPERCUSSIONS

Probable loss of some of our intelligence assets.

Increased repressive security measures.

Allegations of U.S. sponsorship and involvement.

Possible reprisals in U.S.

Estimate of Soviet Reactions:

Soviet responses to this type of activity are again likely

to be largely in the propaganda and political realms. The Soviets

might, however, offer more active support to the Cubans to help

suppress internal resistance elements. And they might judge

the risks of their involvement in such counter-action to be

smaller than in the previous cases because it would be occurring

within Cuban territory. But it is uncertain to what extent Soviet

equipment and forces now in Cuba are suitable for internal

SANY

CAST

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security operations. More importantly, the Soviets would not

be keen

either to risk the lives of their own personnel or to

become openly involved in killing Cubans. Consequently, their

support would probably be largely in the form of supplies and

perhaps training, although they probably do not have much that

they

are able to teach the Cubans in how to conduct irregular

warfare.

in automatic

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