Document date: 04/17/2018
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA

RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10228

RECORD SERIES : National Security Files

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR :

FROM :

TO :

TITLE : John F. Kennedy document Control Record

DATE : 9/11/1963

PAGES: 14

SUBJECTS :

• DOCUMENT TYPE :

CLASSIFICATION :

RESTRICTIONS :

CURRENT STATUS :

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 383: Disarmament, 7/63-10/63. Box 4.

49061

DocId: 32626324

Page

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10 m

CONFIDENTIAL

September 11, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Biological Warfare Ban;

Campaign Against Biological Disease

In following through on my memorandum of May 29, I would

like to inform you that we have been working on a tentative

proposal for a Biology for Peace program.

The tentative

proposal embodies your idea of a ban on biological warfare

coupled with a constructive international program in biology

and medicine.

The ban and the cooperative international

program to combat plant, animal, ana human diseases could

be one aspect of broad international scientific cooperation.

Our primary conclusion so far is that it would be

premature to consider the ban prior to a major re-evaluation

of U.s. policy regarding biological weapons and biological

warfare.

The re-evaluation should encompass the technical

potential of biological weapons development and its political

and military implications. It should take into account the

hazards of developing these relatively cheap instruments of

mass destruction including large-scale production and domestic

and extra-continental field testing of biological agents.

We planto take the initiative in such a re-evaluation in the

immediate future.

If acceptance of a ban or other controls on biological

weapons is consistent with the results of the re-evaluation,

the US will be confronted with a procedural problem in

arriving at an international

agreement.

The Soviets

and

others might exploit the fact that the United States did

not ratify the Geneva Protocol of 1925 outlawing chemical

and biological warfare whereas the Soviet Union and other

CONFIDENTIAL

Group 3

Downgraded at 12 year

intervals; not

automatically declassified

HH 49061 DocId:32626324 Page 2

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10a

CONFIDENTIAL

2-

major powers are signatories. Because of the linkage of

biological warfare and chemical warfare in the Geneva

Protocol and the difficulty in drawing a line between

the

two, it may be desirable or necessary to extend the

_scope

of

our investigation to include chemical warfare.

We are

studying the political and legal problems of proposing a

ban in light of the Geneva Protocol.

In regard to the peaceful side of the Biology for

Peace proposal, we should rely heavily on the guidance of

scientists to select the most constructive areas for coopera-

tion.

One attractive possibility suggested by biologists is

for joint research and standardization in the field of fund-

amental toxicology and ecology of disease organisms and

environmental health hazards.

The combination of the ban

and peaceful cooperation also offers a unique opportunity for

restraint on biological weapons development in other countries

through an active scientific exchange:

/s/ William C. Foster

CONFIDENTIAI

NH 49061

DocId: 32626324

Page

3

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## Page 4

1000

CONFIDENTIAL

September 11, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT:

Biological Warfare Ban;

Campaign Against Biological Disease

In following through on my memorandum of May 29, I would

like to inform you that we have been working on a tentative

proposal for a Biology for Peace program.

The tentative

proposal embodies your idea of a ban on biological warfare

coupled with a constructive international program in biology

and medicine.

The ban and the cooperative international

program to combat plant, animal, and human diseases coulo

se one aspect of broad international scientific cooperation.

Our primary conclusion so far is that it would be

premature to consider the ban prior to a major re-evaluation

of U. So policy regarding biological weapons and biological

warfare.

The re-evaluation should encompass the technical

potential of biological weapons development and its political

and military implications. It should take into account the

hazards of developing these relatively cheap instruments of

mass destruction including large-scale production and domestic

and extra-continental field testing of biological agents.

we planato take the initiative in such a re-evaluation in the

immediate future.

If acceptance of a ban or other controls on biological

weapons is consistent with the results of the re-evaluation,

the US will be confronted with a procedural problem in

arriving at an international agreement.

The Soviets and

others might exploit the fact that the United States did

not ratify the Geneva Protocol of 1925 outlawing chemical

and biological warfare whereas the Soviet Union and other

CONFIDENTIAL

Group 3

Downgraded at 12 year

intervals; not

automatically declassified

HH 49061 DooId: 32626324

Page 4

---

## Page 5

10.a

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

major powers are signatories. Because of the linkage of

biological warfare and chemical warfare in the Geneva

Protocol and the difficulty in drawing a line between the

two, it may be desirable or necessary to extend the scope

of our investigation to include chemical warfare.

We are

studying the political and legal problems of proposing a

ban in light of the Geneva Protocol.

In regard to the peaceful side of the Biology for

Peace proposal, we should rely heavily on the guidance of

scientists to select the most constructive areas for coopera-

tion.

One attractive possibility suggested by biologists is

for joint research and standardization in the field of fund-

amental toxicology and ecology of disease organisms and

environmental health hazards.

The combination of the ban

and peaceful cooperation also offers aunique opportunity.for

restraint on biological weapons development in other countries

through an active scientific exchange.

/s/ William C. Foster

CONFIDENTIAI

HH 49061

DocId: 32626324

Page 5

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