CUBA AS A BASE FOR SUBVERSION
Originator: OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Document date: 00/00/0000
Document type: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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JFK Assassination System

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Date:

4/12/201

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OSA

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198-10001-10009

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GENERAL COUNSEL'S FILES

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TITLE:

CUBA AS A BASE FOR SUBVERSION

DATE: 00/00/0000

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18

SUBJECTS:

CUBA; LATIN AMERICA; SECRETARY MCNAMARA

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Redact

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COMMENTS: BRIEFING PAPERS/NOTES PREPARED BY STAFF FOR SECRETARY MCNAMARA'S

TESTIMONY TO STENNIS COMMITTEE

Heleased under the John F.

Kennedy Assassination

Records Collection Act of

1992 (44 USC 2107 Note).

Case#:NW 65360 Date:

11-17-2022

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CUBA AS A BASE FOR SUEVERSION

INDEX

Probles ..

Facts Bearing on Problen -

(and Country Appendices)

Summary Conclualong

Effoot of Missile Criste On Cuban and

Soviet Positions In Latin Averies ---

l Castro" induence and capability fos

intative surrerson

4

2. Castro's Options to Restore Els Appeal -

3. Bovlet Influence and Standing In Istin America -m 8

4.

Crlsis' Effect on Govermental Relations

With UBBR and Cube -

9

5.

Soviet's Fost-Orisis Vlews of Their

Capabillties and Opportunities --

Cuba and The Commmfat Chinese

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-15

PAGE

1

1

10009

APPENDIX TABS

Agentina

3021710

Braz11

Chile

Colombia

Costa Rica

Dominican Republic

Ecuador

NOFORM

Fl Salvador

Quatenato

Haiti

Honduras

Mexico

Nicaragua

Panama

Paraguay

See MIR last page

This document must not be

reproduced without perission

of the originating offica.

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FE SECRET NOFORN

APPERDIX TARS (Contimied)

Perr

Uruguay

Venezuala

Janalca

Trinidad/Tobago

Buriann & Hotherlando Ant1lles

French Guiana

Bxitish Qulana

bources

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MENORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: CUBA AS A BASE FOR SUEVERSION

PROBLEM

Io prepare a couatry-by-country analysis in relatios to Mo, Mcdone's

sta tements to the Stennis Committee:

1. "Ivery latin American country] has a Communtat apparatus

of greater or lesser extent, depending upon the country, and the

leadernhip, Every one of then are linked in an Intimate way to Havana,

end from Havana to Hoscon. There is so queation about the fact thät

this 1e the bridgehead of communtom into all of latin Aertos.

2. "[Central and South Ammica/ v1ll erode evay quite rapidly,

In uy opinion Is we don't get the domnists out of Oubs7."

Include in this analyots an estimate of the strengthe and weaineases

and future prospects of communism in Latin America and the extent to which

the strengthe and future prospects could be influenced by either continu-

ation or removal of a Communist government in Cuba,

FACTS HBARING ON TAR PROBLEM

see country tabe whieh are appended.

SUNMARY OSAGINS BOXE

During bod immediately after the crisle the regutation of lastro and

the soviets fell In Latin America, even among ardent supportere of Castro/

Communiam, Castro was criticized for handing Cuba over to the USSR and was

later derided for being ignored by his ally. The Boviets were held to be

blatantly aggressive in noving Into Cuba with ulsaile bases. later, they

PEPTIDUCTION DE THIS DOCT

IN WHOLE OR IR PART IS I

SECE'I WITH PERMISSION OF SA

ISSUING OFFICE . M

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lost face for backing off from the U.S. quarantine and further possible

sanctione. For the moment at least the climate was hostile to subversion

by local activiste and to penetration by the Soviet government.

By now the bitter edge of the reaction has worn off and the situation

In the ares has come increasingly to resemble what 1t vas pre-crisis.

There is still a real attraction among leftists for revolutionary solu-

tions to problems of backvardness. Support from Havans, 18 better than

none at all in the view of the latin Americon revolutionary left. More-

over, the Soviet Union continues to be attractive to entablished govern-

mante which seek to reduce their dependence on the u.B.

The Boviets will try to hold their position in Cuba and at the

same time they will continue to search for nos routes into latin America.

Both the Soviets and Castro are aware that a Commiet regina in Cuba,

should it be able to demonstrate to Latin America an abillty to flourish

economically, Improving living standards and maintaining the pretense that

lands have been distributed to the cormon man, would represent an appealing

example to the rest of the Western Hemisphere, Cuba was more prosperous

than most of latin America before Castro; there are Indications that even

at the current level of Sovlet economie ald 1t can by 1965 become so again.

Furthermore, Cuba has provided, Moscow/Havana doctrinal blend in the way of

training facilities in the Western Hemisphere, well suited for the Indoctrin-

ation of revolutionary tactics in latinos in familar climate and mores.

Moscow's and Havana's objectives may not always be identical, but they

have proven sufficiently compatible for a modus operandi thus far.

The Soviets are probably not trying to create another Cuba as such.

They will probably concentrate on Brazil, Chile and Argentina--nore or

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Jess In that order.

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Brazil currently offers the most promising opportunity

for long-range Boviet exploitation. Venezuela's close ties with the U.s.

tend to rule out a Boviet attempt to foster neutralism there and for this

reason continued foumnist and Castroite--efforte to aubvert the govern-

ment are l1kely.

The Sovleta' prime objective, expanding their Influence over estab-

Ilshed governments, can be harmonized with Cuban-pronted subversion

beause of the variety of opportunities in the area. In fact, the Boviets

can see e useful supporting role for Castro-sponsored violence in countries

tron walsh they are shut out, they will want Castro to avoid getting osught,

bowever, fearing that this rould justify additional U.S, and Iatin American

measures against Cuba and create more problems for the UsaR.

In short, while It 1s true that every latin American country has a

Comminist apparatus of greater or lesser extent, the evidence in that

Moscow's Influence came first and continues independently in all latin

American countries, Including Cuba, while Castro's Influence 1s superIn-

posed on that of the USSR and only in some instances overshadows Moscow's

Influence. It would be proper to speak of Havana being & bridgehead into

Bone partE Of latin America, It la mieleading to conclude that "'here 1s

no question about the fact that this le the briägehead of communiem Into

all of Jatin America."

With respect to the strengths, weaknesses, and future prospects of

Communiem In Iatin America, with or without Castro and a Cormunist Cube,

It 1s well to bear in mind that conditions of poverty, backwardnees, lack

of educational opportunitles, wealth concentrated into the hands of a very

few, etc., have made latin Anxioa susceptible to extremiet solutions

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(of the Right or Left) for many years, Ints 1s a chronic disease of the

ared. Moscow found sons support in every latin American country long

before Castro's Cuba came into beings were Cuba to sink beneath the

waves tonorton, Honoon's Influence, dirently or through otbar interandt-

aries, would contime to be felt.

While McCone's Judgment that Commism Will nake great strider

10 Into Asertes Ilght prove to be true, 1t would be ulelanding to attri-

bute this solely to Chatro/ComanIAn and Cuba. It 16 s fact that Castro'8

violent revolutionary appeals bave seized the inaginations of (primartly)

the youth in very Intia harteen countrles. To a8y, In HT. Metone's vards,

that "(Central and South Anerlea)ulll erode away quite rapidit, 1a sy

0p1R10n (15 ve don't get the Commits out of Cuba)" exacterates the role

and Influence of Cuba. The question ls a complex one which involves (a)

some IA countrles which are more strongly influenced by Castro/Conales -

such as Venezuela, (b) sons In countrles nich are nore strongly intluenced

by Moscow/Commien - such as Brazils (c) some Ill countries in which Leftlet

splinter parties split the influences and (d) indications of conflict be-

treen Moscos and Havana. No generalisation seems adequate on eurrent evidence.

Do dinounsion of Cube as a base for subveraion tould be complete

althout raference to Comariat Chlnese intluence, direct and Indirect.

The direct influence, unfortunately, cannot be assessed adequately on the

baste of our current intelligence. (One example: the numbers of Chinese

Communist advinors in Cuba have been Tarlously estimated as 30 11 One CaSe,

and 3,000 in enother.) The Indirect evidence, uhtle presumptive, relates

to the alose Ideological and tactical agreement between, for instance,

Che Guevara's VOris On gUerrIlS VATIATE and that of MaO FRe-luaf. Purthermore,

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at the tine of the misstle erlata 1n Cuba, huge demonetrations in favor of

Castro's "fIVe polsts" took place in China, Previous to the niselle erlala,

ve had roports that the umerically mall Chinese comnity 1n Cube had

one mies comanist Eutarse contral, Alter the slantle estela, contiming

to the present, ve bate received sumerous unconfiread reports from enteres

that one fort of cartro's amoyanee with the sorlots for ramorlag the

MINa and Illito Has a threat to turn to Commantet Calne for aupporti this,

bores, In Imponelbla for the Chinese to supply and may be diendered en

plean, Tant Cantro'a impatient push for Querrilla sotiona everyonero de

BAs MAngO in IAtIs ANArLOs MaTe DARTlY reSeMbIAN the ConAnist dAlBaRe

does at the present than the Sorlet, Is beyond question. Plually, that

the Commulet Chinese emphants on agrarion collectivization (horover

noRasfuL) l8 MaTe direetly applicable to Cube, and by extension to

IntIa luertes, as opponed to the sortet dilte tovart heavy induntry,

surely cannot have been ovarlooked elther by leo Tae-Jung se by Castro..

JEE ENVEST OF ME MISSILE CRISIS UPON THE CURAN AND BOYLE POSITE

145 1

LATIN AMRRICA

I, Centrols 1n1

mace end capabilIty for effectite sureralte sotton.

0. Poppier t18190942 - 11del Castro muffered a furtber des) 00 1a

pestonel attraction is virtually eresy country in latin duerica duttag

and Innediataly alter the erlala, The decline vas partloularly notionable

among LaDOr BrOUps, loftlat Iatellectuels, end pollticlans. His tueeo

was most parsoNaly ternished along the noncommist popular Erolipe valch

formerly had olther sympathizad passively with his anti-U. S, gyrations or

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had actively supported him in one way or another within their on countries.

Many former supporters expressed shock and disillusionment at the evidence

of his subservient reletionship to Moscow. These and others have had.

second thoughts regarding the wisdom of depending upon unconditional

support from the soviot Unton in attempte to achieve independence Iron U.S.

"Imperialisn"

Anong much of the revolutionary left, the trend of diesunsion shifted

to the need for indigenous, nationaliat revolutions, and eray from inter-

nationallan and alliance with Moscoy--oriented Conmnists and Fidelintas.

Castro has bean rejectod as a loader of the popular revolutionary sove

ment In the bentsphere by many noncomunist leftists, but they are uncertain

as to where next to turn.

A larger part of the publlo, fornerly passive or bostile tovard Centro

derided him as a weak puppet and as a bool uned by the soviets pilarily

to further their own nationel interests. The latin publie, always deeply

stirred by affronts to personal dignity, was disturbed by Castro's exclusion

from the crucial stage of

the U.8.-Bovtet negotiations over his country's fate

and by his inability to prevent the withdrawal of the wespons systems which

he regarded as vital to duba'a defense, The erials caused many nodorate

center and conservative groups to be more avare of the ageronsiva alms of

the USaR in this hemisphere and of the threat posed by fuba as an operational

base for the Soviets. At the same time, they were heartened by the debielve

U.S. гевропве.

In those countries bordering the Caribbean, the orleis heightened

pressures for a final and definitive solution to the Cuban problem, and in

the aftermath there has been fear that the U.S, resolve would weaken and that

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Castro's position would be ensured. In most countries of Bouth America,

however, popular antagonian toward Castro resulting from the crisis has

cooled and many people regard the alfair as ended by the U.S. show of

resolva.

b. Subversive capebility momentarily lessened--The decline In

Castro's prestige as a renult of the missile arists has at least for the

momant roduced his capability for subverting popular groups and moving

them Into sotion against their on governments and against U.B. Interests.

With the decline in receptivity anong popular groupe to Castro's blandish-

ments, local Pdelistes bave encountered greater difficulty in mbll1siRg

mass support for antigovernment strikes, violence, and demonstrations on

other than local lasues. Fro-Castro agitators are concentrating their

efforte increasingly in the Interior as they have done in Peru recently.

In addition, there has been an increase in sabotage and other violence

perpetrated by extremists, of the sort not requiring the participation

of large popular groups, yet designed to provoke drastic counter-measures

by governments and to increase popular antigovernment sentiment.

c. Appeals fer govolution contique--Manhile, lastro continues

hie noX familler appeal for revolution In Istin America on the Cuban model.

His subversive apparatus remains essentially Intact. The Cuban news agency

Prenas Latina operates In at least four major citles. Havana radio

continues its schedule of broadcasts in support of antigovermment groups

in other Caribbean countries, and Cuba's diplonatic missions in Brez11,

BOlIVia, Chile, Mexico, and Uruguay still serve as Important channels

for subversion and propaganda, The hard-core element among pro-fastro

loftiat organizations continues to funation--in some cases (Icuador and

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Peru) with the expectation of Increased material ald from Cuba.

2. Castro's options to restore his appeal

a. Course of psuedo-Independence foreseen--Fidel Castro's Intransi-

gent posture againat on-site Inspection at the time of soviet Deputy Premier

Mikoyan's vialt raleed his stock in at least a few countries. His claims

to have got the better of the U.S. in the recent prisoner exchange may be

expected to have a similar effect. Moreover, merely staying in power 1n

Cube when the logloal outcome of the crisis seemad to many to indicate his

dowfall has taken the bitter edge off reaction against fastro among some

ant1-U,s, groups.

Castro probably stands to gain most by adopting a publle posture

Independent of Soviet political domination while at the sans time attempting

to demonstrate in Cuba the benefits of economic association with the

socialist camp. Buch a polloy of "pseudo-Independence" would involve a

minimun of fundamental polloy reorientation. Castro's Independent political

course might be easily developed through public harangues: a propaganda

campaign calling for violent reballion and guerrilla warfare in the country-

BIde, less emphasis upon Marxist-leninist dogne, re-enunciation of the

'original' aóth of July ideals, and s softening in the appearance of blo

domestio programs.

b. Bovlets' response--The Bovlets would welcone Castro's efforts to

demonstrate independence and would probably tolerate his militant stance

In Latin America If It did not run counter to Soviet polley, They would

hope that by helping him to refurbish hle imje, they could restore some

of his value as an agent of political subversion among restive popular

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groups. A campaign of independent-sounding oratory would allow Castro to

let off steam and preen his vanity without having measurable effect upon

Soviet 'peaceful' poliey objectives elsewhere in Iatin America.

At the same tine, a few big 'Impact' projects in Cuba

would seen to vindicate Castro's policy of close economie cooperation

with the USSR In the eyes of Latins elsewhere. Such projects would reduce

pressure for economic aid from the Cubans themselves and restore hope

among potential revolutionaries of securing economic ald in defiance of

the U,S. without risking foreign political controls.

3. Sovlot Influence and standing in Latin America,

a. Soviets shered. lestro's 1088 of aypeal--The Soviet Unton shared

Castro's setback in almost every country of Latin America. The revelation

of 1ts war-llke intentions and 1te plans for secretly Installing an offen-

sive base in Cuba detracted from 1ts carefully-cultivated 1mage as a peace-

loving nation. In areas within range of the Soviet missiles, it aroused

for the first time an awareness of the danger of nuclear destruction.

Many leftiat intellectuals who are still drawn to the Cuban

model condemned the Soviet Union for its cynical exploitation of the revolution

for 1ts own purposes. To some extent, they shared the general disdain felt

by most latins for what appeared as a cowardly backdown from riaky con-

frontation with the U.s.

Nevertheless, the rationale for Soviet behavior propounded by

Moscow and by local cormunist parties as well--that the Soviet tactice have

succeeded in guaranteeing Cuba's safety from U.S, invasion--has been accepted

by those who have a strong desire to maintain their faith. Moreover, although

the Soviet actions during the crisis period detracted from the reputation of

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the Soviet Union in Latin America, they are not likely to have lasting

111 effecte on the usual type of Soviet moves to expand their influence

in the area.

b. Moscoy beherdor criticized by latin commnists--There are few

Indications of any change in relations between Moncow and local Latin American

communist parties, although the communist parties have undergone varying

degrees of soul-searching and recrimination. Parties have found it more

aifficult to get members out in the streets for propaganda projects and

demonetrations since late October, In Argentine and Guatemala, commnist

leaders have been asked for explanations of the soviet novas by party

members who viewed the witharawal as a humillation for Cuba. In Peru,

Costa Rica, and Venezuela, longetanding rifts within the partias over

personalities and local pollcies have been widened by disagreement on the

wisdom of the soviet actions; most of the 'old guard' supports the soviet

policy and many 'young turk' dissidents condern it as & show of weakness.

According to one report, demoralization of Ecuadorean communists has been

severe enough to threaten a takeover by Feiping-liners.

4. Gr1s1s' effect on govermentel relations with the UBBR and Cube.

The missile orials led to bangos in the attitudes of a number of

governments toward the soviet Union and dimmed the possibillty of new

diplomatic gains by the Soviets in

some countries. It also caused several

of the five governments maintelning diplomatic ties with Cuba to consider

breaking relations with the Castro regime.

The crisie enabled President Paz Estenssoro of Bolivia to move

ahead--If only momentarily--in his effort to keep Bolivia allied with

the West. The left-wing faction of Paz's governing MIR party had been

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pressing him to adopt a new program of "positive neutralien", hostile

to the U.S., strongly pro-Cuban, and involving closer aid and trade ties

with the bloc. Resietance by the public to the new leftist line grew

as a result of the crisis and permitted the government to lay aside for

the time being consideration of closer relations with Noscow.

Mexico, which had remined aloof from strong efforts to block soviet

penetration Into this hemisphere, turned its legalistic approach to vorld

problems against the UBBR. It accused the Sovlets of intervening in the

Internal affairs of Cuba and of denying the Cubans self-determination in

natters pertaining to their on welfare, With the relesation of the

arIals, however, the Mexioun Government was able to avoid taking a forth-

right stand on Cube and has now determined now to prejudice domestic

polities by breaking with Cuba.

The first flush of enthusiasm in favor of breaking diplomtic ties

with Cuba by other countrles like Mexico which still retain them has

dissipated In the pst-crisis atmosphere. In Chile, which might have

broken with Castro under U.S, pressure in the early days of the crisis,

domestic political considerations again hold sway and the government 1s

unwilling to glve leftist opposition groupe a political windfall by

arousing pro-Cuben sympathies. In Uruguay, popular sentiment in favor

of a break has quieted down, and joliticians prefer to let the lasue l1e.

In Brazil, the developments in the Geribjean have been offset by domestic

economic problems which are straining relations with the U.S. and inclining

President Goulart to l00k to the bloc for economic aid.

5. Soviets' post-crisis views of their capabilities and opportunities

a, No lestles damage foreseen--The Soviets probably think of their

capabilities and opportunities in latin America In much the same say as

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they did before the missile crisis. They see no lasting damage to their

Influence in the area despite temporary anti-Castro, anti-soviet reactions.

Salvage from the crisis includes the presence of Soviet troops and advanced

defense systens In Cuba..

Seen through Comminist eyes, latin America 1s ripe for violent social

revolution. The Alliance for Progress recognized this possibility, and yet,

so the soviets probably belleve, 18 poverless to produce the social and

economic changes needed to alter the trend. Reforn proposals only make

the economic elite nervous end the population restless. The prospects for

evolutionary reform are nil because of the olite's predatory and defeatist

outlook, The latin form of capitaliam is fundamentally different from

that In Westem Europe, where Increased production and wider distribution

of goods 1s creating modern industrial democracy on the U.S. pattern.

According to the soviet view, many dominant groups in leading

Latin American countrles, now in control or with a good chance to take over,

are ready to seek a way out of their frustrations by maneuvering between

the two great powers. Popullat forces, although shocked by the missile

crisis, are again deeply absorbed in their own problems. These groups are

trying to appear as advocates of rapid shange, For this reason, they are

available as allies to the side demonstrating the most force and confidence

In pressing for radical change.

The rovolutionary left, moreover, lacks another alternative. In

the revolutionary left view, Castro's economic failure 1s not critical since

economic development is secondary to "social Justice". The revolutionary

left is driving to upset the established order and to rebuild on a

totalitarian model, not to maximize INP. The Cuban example shows social

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revolution is possible, even in a small country near the United States,

If the Soviets lend a helping hand.

b. Another Cube not desired--The Soviets are obviously aware of

a wide range of very different possibilities, Many of the countries are

falrly sintlar to Cuba, Viz., Central American and Andean republics. In

the foret view one ally of Cuba's quality is probably enough for now. Cuba

1s a test-proved case of how far the Soviets can go In the ares, and the

pott is now made. In setting up shop In Cuba, moreover, the Soviets

have become avare of the problems and expense involved, and they now

recognize, since the missile crisis, that there 1o & l1mit on returna to

be expected.

some countries probably Interest the Soviets as trouble spots

where agitation by lastro/Communist forces can have a destructive Impact

on reform movements and governments now amenable to Soviet ties and Influence.

The governments in these countries, which are among the most hostile to

the Soviets in any case, can be harassed through popular pressures,

sabotage, and other means.

c. Concentration on more developed countries Ilkely--Il the Soviets

are not working fox a prollferation of satellite regimes in latin America,

their focus is probably on some of the larger countrles which can be seen

as hesitating between dependence on the U.s, and & new course. These

countries, in the Soviet view, can be pushed from a status guo economic

and political alignment with the U.S. Into neutralism, relying on Western

and Eastern Europe, holding the U.s. at arms length, and sooner or later

breaking through to violent social revolution.

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In opening new courses for the major Latin American countries,

Cuba has been and continues to be the key, though not the model. It

stands for a pledge of sovlet support encouraging goverments to use

existing U.S, assets (outstanding loane, private Investments) as loverage

to force new U.S. aid without any guid pro quo in the shape of reform.

d. Prazll a prime objective--The preferred targets for Boviet

planners are probably those countries where the U.S, has a large stake,

where the polltical systen ls responsive to popular pressures, and where

the dominant forces are inversed in acute economia a1ff1cultled, Erastl

must seem secessible and also crucial in Boviet planning. With the

greatest potential of any Latin American country, Brazil 1s caught

in a morass of economio and political problems. In seeking to solve

these problems, the Goulart regime could take a course leading on to

neutralism and even more radical solutions.

doulart's government, chafing at the conditions lald down by the

U.s. for economic ald, made suggestive gestures toward the USSR in the

latter half of 1962, negotlating for expanded trade and exploring

possibilities for large-scale econome assistance. fuch gestures were

¡ In part a tactle aimed at gaining U.S. concessions on the pre-conditions

for ald. Goulart may well accept some Soviet economic offers and he

might even accept large-scale Soviet old in an effort to make his threat

to the U.S. more credible.

Goulart, however, does not occupy a wholly secure position in

domestic politica. His moves are circumscribed by the tenuousness of

his own position. It may be assumed that any Soviet response to hie

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actions will take this factor into account, especially the contingency

that an overly hasty and overly zealous response could lead to a reaction

Inside Brazil that would remove Goulart from power. Despite these

Imitations, the soviets probably would be willing to pour substantial

suns Into Brazil.

For the longer run, they are not able to supply by themselves

an adequate substitute for U.S. aid. Brazil's need to look to Western

Europe for supplies, markets, and even capital would tend to discourage

the Soviets from pushing for violent social revolution in Brazil. A

reasonable Soviet target in Brazil is a neutraliat government.

e. Other Sordet poss1b1l1tlen--In other major countries of the

ares, the soviets can probably see interesting situations, that promise

returns through manipulation of governments to defy the U.S. and through

support to populist movements linked with the Commnists. The communist -

linked popular front (FRAP) in Chile could win the elections scheduled for

1964, open the way for a Chilean expropriation of U.S. copper company

holdings, and move the country to neutralism. The future political course

Of Argentina 1s still uncertain enough to suggest desirable possibilities

for a Peronist alliance with the Communists and a resultant break with the

United States.

Venezuela le a more complex problem. Because Venezuela 18 so

closely Interlocked with the U.S. economy, neutralisn seems out of the

question, and the Soviets probably consider Venezuela closer to the Cuban

case than to opportunities in Argentina, Brazil and Chile. Noscow will

thus probably exercise caution with regard to Venezuela. The same cannot

be said of Havens, which hopes to exploit the serious tensions there

between rich and poor, old and young, local and foreign.

AST SECRET

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1. Soviets' edrice to Castro - Il Castro Inalata on playing a

strong revolutionary fole throughout latin America, he could induce strains

In his relations with the Sorlets. Overly militant tactles would run

counter to higher soriot strategy in some countries of the area, and in

othere it might Involve Borlet prestige in undesirably riaky situstions.

Nevertheless, Moscow will probably be willing to go along with Castro/

Comuatet subversiva activity la cortala canes. It has a real value 1a

countases where neutrellen has no future; 1t 18 a means to preeipitate -

vIolent social revolution by Innob1l1zing goverment reforu novemento,

friettentag off foreian capital, and promoting the flight of donastio

croltal. While toleratlag the destructive tole that suite Castro's nature,

the sovlets will probably encourage him to stay out of the countries

unish they hope to propal into a neutrallat course and to concentrate on

those where insurgency has a funetion.

CUBA AND THIS CONMINIST CHINESE

I. Communist Chinese Post-Grlels Vleva Of Their Capabllities and

Opportunities

a. Bino-sortet Schlem - Presumptively, the Commentet Chloese

must are Cuba as en attractive meane to furtber their positlos on violent

revolution, The eridence consists mostly of publla statements by Calvese

leadera which the THIS has reported. Hoverer, the parallel of Chinese

Coumnist end Castro pointo-Of-view on strategy strikes all observers

forcefully, While necessarily speculation, Castro's reportod pique with

the Bovlets, combined vith doctrinal agreement with the Chinese Jeade

many Intolligence enalysts to belleve that 11 China could supply Castro's

vItally seeded economic holD, the Coumuist Chinese and Castro-Comminiots

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would make common cause.

Since the Conundot Chinece connot provide

petroleum and other eritically short Items, Castro apponse to have so

alternative to the soviets as backers at the puesent da

b. AsTarleß Perelle - The Commnlet Gate

probably 1oo en

opportunity in Cuba und Latin Ansrice besed on t

occupation with aerioulture, the sintlarity of their earls

with tbase of the latinos, and hopes to o

long-tart.

Bob Maulelstam

and ft coe

loaning

16

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