Rival Forces in Latin American Subversion
Originator: CIA
Document date: 1963-02-18 00:00:00
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA

RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10066

RECORD SERIES : National Security Files

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA

FROM :

TO :

TITLE : Rival Forces in Latin American Subversion

Released under the John F. Kennedy

Assassination Records Collection Act ol

1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW

56000 Date: 11-04-202

DATE : 2/18/1963

PAGES : 11

SUBJECTS :

DOCUMENT TYPE :

CLASSIFICATION :

RESTRICTIONS :

CURRENT STATUS :

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 59: Cuba Subjects, Cuban Subversion,

2/18/1963. Box 1

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SANITIZER MK: 01:059:5-3.0

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DRAFT BRIEFING NOTES

18 February 1963

RIVAL FORCES IN LATIN AMERICAN SUBVERSION

I. Since the October crisis, Fidel Castro has obviously

been trying to straddle the rift between Moscow and

Peiping over global Communist strategy. As Mr. Martin

aptly put it yesterday, Castro's heart is in Peiping

but his stomach is in Moscow.

II. This same split between all-out militancy and a more

cautious policy--call it coexistence or "two steps

forward, one step back"--is reflected on the extreme

left in many Latin American countries.

III. Thus Cuba at present not only seeks to serve two mas-

ters, but choose among rival servants in its Latin

American subversion.

A. Castro's views on what is good for socialism and

revolution in Latin America are more in line with

those of the Chinese Communists than the Soviets.

1. Latin American delegates to the East Ger-

man Party Congress last month told one of

our high-level and reliable agents in the

Communist party on their return that most

Latin American Communist party representa-

tives strongly supported the position of

the

USSR regarding the differences

between

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2.

3.

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it and China. Both the Cuban and Venezuelan

representatives took a "neutral position,"

that is, they did not support the Soviets.

(Veteran high-level Venezuelan Communist,

FALN leader, from Venezuelan delegate to

the congress.))

Last summer a group of dissident Brazilian

Communists who had split off from the regu-

lar party went to Cuba to seek Castro's sup-

port for their movement. According to one

of our established sources among the dissi-

dents ((former Central Committee member of

regular party, now on dissident central com-

mittee), they got it. Castro advised them

to organize guerrilla activities and launch

a revolution as quickly as possible. He

reportedly told the group that powerful

revolutionary movements were being built

up in Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, and

Peru.

The activities of the splinter-group

Com-

munists has

so rankled the regular party

that its leader, Luiz Carlos Prestes, a

veteran in the Communist movement in Latin

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America, left on 7. February on a trip to

Moscow, Prague, and Havana to build a

counter-fire against the dissidents. Ac-

cording to two reliable covert sources in

the regular party ((members of' national com-

mittee on organization and member of the

Sao Paulo state committee), Prestes planned

to stop in Prague to arrange with the Chi-

nese Communist Ambassador there to send two

representatives to Peiping to make a direct

complaint about support being given by Com-

munist China to the splinter group. Prestes

plans to stop on his way back in Havana to

discuss Cuban support for that same splinter

group. While in Moscow he reportedly will

discuss the Sino-Soviet ideological differ-

ences and assure the Soviets of his party's

support.

B.

Only the Cuban and Venezuelan Communist parties

are totally committed to terror and revolution. Else-

where in Latin America the Communist parties of-

ficially support more moderate Soviet views but

there are serious dissensions among some of the

leaders and within the membership. The Cuban mis-

sile crisis exacerbated these differences.

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1.

2.

The Brazilian case is the only clear split

so far noted in the major Latin American

parties, but the Paraguayan Communists have

just conducted a purge of some 34 members

and leaders for.

deviationist thinking.

The Ecuadorean Communist Party has dis-

owned two leaders who have attempted to

organize guerrilla bands without party sanc-

tion.

One of them, Manuel Araujo Hidalgo,

returned in early 1962 from a trip to China

where he

reportedly received

some support.

3.

Other parties have these problems as well.

There are

many impatient leaders and more

followers who want to get on immediately

with revolutionary economic, social and:

political reform.

IV. In spite of differences over tactics and timing be-

tween various Communist groups, all intend eventually

to deliver the Latin American countries into the Com-

munist-socialist bloc. The so-called Soviet "conserva-

tive" view,

as it is now espoused, is more intent on

trying to achieve power by legal means if possible and

by subversion rather than by force.

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A:

B.

Chile represents an inviting opportunity for the

Communists to take power legally.

1.

The present outlook is that there is at

least an even chance for election of an

anti-US, Communist coalition government in

2.

3.

4.

1964.

The Communist party, legal in Chile, is a

small but influential factor in the organized

opposition to President Allesandri's con-

servative government. The Communists effec-

tively control the left-wing coalition of

Communists, Socialists and National Democrats.

Socialist Senator Salvador Allende is this

coalition's presidential candidate in the

1964 elections. He was defeated by only a

narrow margin in the 1958 election.

This coalition has increased its popular sup-

port since 1958 by advocating wage increases

and social reform projects vetoed by Ales-

sandri on orthodox economic grounds.

Fron the Soviet point of view other Latin Ameri-

can countries also appear to be drifting in the

right direction.

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1.

2.

3.

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In Brazil an increasing number of leftists

have been appointed to positions of impor-

tance in the government. The government

has recently been loosening its traditional

ties with the United States and has

shown

signs of heading into the "neutralist" camp.

Its dire economic straits make it a likely

target for expanded Bloc economic exploita-

tion.

Bolivia has been controlled by a leftist

movement since the sweeping revolution of

1952. The government continually shows

favoritism to Communists. Vice President

Juan Lechin, recently made Ambassador to

Italy, has maintained liaison with the Com-

munist party over the past year. He is a

leading contender

in the presidential elec-

tion to be held in 1964.

In Argentina the extremely unstable politi-

cal and economic situations provide an ideal

atmosphere for the type of coalition maneu-

vering in which Soviet-influenced Communists

engage.

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v.

Direct

Soviet interest in Latin America is clearly

increasing.

A. An excellent example of this was the setting up

early in 1962 of a Latin American Institute in

the Academy of Sciences of the USSR.

1. The avowed purpose of this institute is to

raise the study of the problems of Latin

America, which in their own statements the

Soviets claim they have neglected, to the

highest possible level.

2.

Teaching of Spanish and Portuguese languages

is to be stressed in the institute and through-

out the school system.

3. A list of subjects on which this institute

intends to publish shows that it is to be

used to attack the Alliance for Progress; it

has already attacked the Alliance program in

Colombia--a showpiece of the Alliance.

4.

We have been reliably informed that posters

have been placed in some Colombian universi-

ties referring to the problems of the "na-

tional liberation and workers' movements in

Latin American countries" as topics which

will be studied by the institute.

Results

of these studies will be published in the

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near future in a magazine called America

Latina, intended especially for distribu-

tion in Latin America.

5. A pamphlet, apparently to be distributed

by the institute, and entitled Alianza para

el Progreso, will in the words of its

heralds, "unmask the economic expansion of

the USA" in Latin America.

6.

The institute expects to enter into close

contact with the principal Latin American

scientists and academicians during 1963.

VI. One of the most important Communist assets in Latin

America is large number of Bloc diplomatic and Cuban

missions. These missions are used to further Com-

munist subversive activities even in countries where

there are no Bloc diplomatic missions.

A. As

can be seen on this map the

USSR, and in some

cases some Satellites as well, have diplomatic

missions in Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay.

The USSR maintains relations with Bolivia but has

no resident mission there. Cuba maintains em-

bassies in Mexico, Brazil, Bolivia, Uruguay, and

Chile. The Chinese Communists, of course, have

no diplomatic ties in Latin America except with

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Cuba. That fact alone would make Cuban missions

important to the Chinese. Only seven Latin

American countries--Chile, the Dominican Republic,

Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Paraguay, and

Peru--have no official ties whatever with any

bloc country.

B. Uruguay offers a good example of how the Commu-

nists misuse diplomatic missions and the impor-

tance the Communists attach to them.

1. We have found that Communist subversive ac-

tivities in Uruguay are not now aimed at pro-

moting revolutionary activity against the

government. In this case even the Cubans

appear to be much more interested in retain-

2.

ing the good will of the government so that

they can continue to use the country as a

base of operations against Argentina, Para-

guay, etc.

Communist diplomatic missions, however, are

active in supporting local Communists and

other pro-Castro groups to retain enough

leverage within the country so as to pre-

vent the anti-Castro groups from forcing a

break in relations. The badly split Uru-

guayan government itself is anti-Communist,

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but is

highly tolerant of the activities

of these missions and of the Uruguayan

party itself.

3. The USSR, most of the Satellites, and Cuba

all have diplomatic missions in Montevideo--

some 70 or so bloc personnel. In addition,

couriers and travellers can go back and

forth between this city and the bloc coun-

tries and Cuba at any time.

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DRAFT BRIEFING NOTES

18 February 1963

CONCLUSIONS

1. .I

should like to conclude with a word of caution.

Some of the information I have given you is al-

ready public knowledge, but I have attempted to

include as much pertinent information as I can

without jeopardizing valuable assets and important

operations.

II. We are working with the Department of State to de-

termine how much of the information available to

us can be made public through some appropriate

channel in order to make plain the Cuban threat

to Latin America. In the case of certain informa~

tion from clandestine sources, we are attempting

to manipulate it to the surface without exposing

our agents. We have informed our stations of the

importance this government attaches to exposing

Cuban operations.

III. I am sure, however, that you gentlemen can realize

the sensitivity of information which comes from

high-level penetrations of Communist parties, and

the

vital importance to the United States of con-

tinued protection of these men.

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