## Page 1

104-10103-10079

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

is.

SECRET. - SENSITIVE

Draft Memorandum to the DCI from William Harvey

Dated 27 November 1962

This is not a controlled item

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## Page 2

14-00000

BECRET - SENSITIVE

27 Novenber 1962

Mote:

Iscussed 27 Hovenhor

1962 by DD/I MAIL ICI

ANd ApprOted generE!!!

in principle by ICt.

uy DD/P.

TMORANDUN TOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH:

SUBJECT:

Doputy Director (Plena)

Operattonal Ples for Continuing

Operstions Agrinst Cube

I.: Actlon: Thie menorandus 19 foX. your laformatlou

and pursiant to jour roguest. Reconsendationa for sotlon tre

conteined 1a Peragraph V bolor. The purpore of this menciruru,

18 to dolinento an operational plan for the

action taict wr

bol1eve should be taken by CIA against Cubr for the predictable

suture. In sunnary the plan provides for enatinuine, even

Intons1ly106, the intalligenco effort ageinst Cuba and for

the roarientation of the curront effort into i long teri

denied aros typo of oporation of the highest prlority.

I. ASSUMPTIONS:

A. The United States Government will five fublic

assurances that, provided no nuclear or offenalve weapore ser

present or re-latroduced into Cuba, and provided Cubri dees

not tele action to threaten

the ponce and security of the

western lenisphere, the Unlted states does not Intand to

THIS DOCUMCUT IS

InvAde Cube or support an Invasion of Cuba.

A SCURC? !

IN CS HI

iCA?

SECAST - SENSITIVIS

PAPER RiO.

-DO NOT DESIROX.

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## Page 3

B. These assurances will preclude any meaningful CIA

action on a

phased basis to provoke a revolt inside Cubr, since

unless there are major changes in operational and internal con-

dItlone 1a Cuba, such a revolt 1f provoked would be totally.

destrojed by Cuban counteraction In a matter of hours or, at

Fe most

a few daye unless

ine supported by a major Unlted Btates

MilItary commitnent. In additlon, the non-Invasion assurAnces

as a practical matter will preclude invading Cuba on the pretext

of a contrived provocation such as an attack on Guantanano.

C. CIA operations involving a high nolse level and !

distinot glement of attributability, particularly paranilitary,

guerI1llã, and connando type operations will be unacceptable

as a matter of policy.

D. The Castro-communist regime will remain in power for

¡the indefinite future with its security and control apparatus

relatively Intaot and with the capability not only of crushlug

unsupported resistance activity, but of making operational

conditions 1n Cuba Increasingly difficult. While it ig

possible that recent and future developments including the

Soviet action in

renoving the offensive weapons from Cuba mey

serve to weaken and discredit Castro, there ls as yet no hard

indication that the control of the Castro-communist regine over

Cuba has been substantially weakenod.

The United States assurances of no Invasion and no

support olian Invasion will, in effect, constitute giving to

Castro and his regime a certain degree of sonctuary. This will

-2-

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severely image the norale and notivation of anti-rogine Cubane

both Inside sod outalde o1 Cube, which w1l1 make it Incrensingly

d1f11cult for un to recrult agents, unintain agents already

rocrulted, and continue or intenally our intelligence and other

eIforte against Cuba and the Castro-communiat rogino.

I. Despite the sbove lectors, Higher Authority probably

w1ll continue heavy prensure on the CIA for a meximun olfort

against Cuba and my ever continue to contend that the ultimate.

objective 1s the overthrow of the Castro-communist regine.

This 1o an unreallatle objective, however, except. on a very

Long-tora baglo as the Valtod Statos Government, we bollove,

will be unwilling to the Immediato luture to commit troops

to support such an overthron. The Unlted Statos Government

in 1ts overt dealinga with the Cuban extles probably will not

express the rbove factors to then in the context or with the

bluntnoss statod here.

C. In vien of these factors, the so-enlled "Track two"

course of action, 1.0., unlialted support ol Cuban exiles

and exile groups with no real control or objoctive purposes

In the hope that these groups will be sble to shake the

Castro regine will, although unrealistic, becove increasinly

attractive at various levels in the United States Government.

H. As a matter of policy, polltical pressures and

economie pressures short of blockede, taids, and aggressive

sabotage against Cuba will be continued.

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In vien of the above rasumptions paramilitary, commando

and sabotago operations, except in rare selective instances

w1l1 serve little purpose; alao they will be counter-productive

sInce, 1l undertaken, they will anke the collection of Intolli-

gence more difficult and should only be undertrisen in those very

fow lantances. where an unusually high returs can be demonstrated.

Regardless of what other pressures are placed on CIA for

action against Cube, It would appesr clear that Higher Autlinrity

WIll innist on! continued, even intensifled, Intelligence

coverago ot cuba.

In vlor of the pollcy lactors, in lucreased use of

Incilitien, real estate and bastas outalde the United States,

particularly In' latin Anorics, will be both nocessary and

destrable.

I. Adequate serial reconnalaaance of Cuba will continue.

II. OBJECTIVES:

Based on the above assumptions, the following objectiven

appear to be proper for continuing CIA operations agalnst

Cuba:

A. Take all fensible clandestine action to 1solnte

and asslat in Isolatlng tho Castro-communist regime in Cula

tron the rest of the lestern Bemisphere ind the rest of the

Free forid.

Bo: To the maximum extent possible, discredit the Castro-

communist regine in Cuba and 1n the lestern Fenisphere and the

rest of the world.

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C. Mainteln through clandestine nerns, short of commando

and guerrilla typo operations, the naxtaun econonio and

polltical pressures on the Cuban regime and economy not only

sor the purpose of hampering the Cuban regime, but for the

•additional purposo of insuring the naximus possiblo draln on

Bloc resources uned to support Cubs.

D. Maintain naxtou possible intelligenco and counter-

Intolligence coverage of Cuba, Including particular emphasis

1. Capabilities and intentions of the government.

2. Actluitles of the Cuban G-2 and 1t8 other

•3. Soviet and Bloc activitles: 1a Cuba.

1. State of potential résistance, including the

norslo ind tenper of the populaco.

5. Milftis and allitary order of battle

and equip-

mont.

6. The locl of pover and of possible stresses

and strains in the power centers in the Cuban goverument.

7. Bolstlonships between Cuba, USSR, Red China,

the Bloc, Latin American nations and other Free World

and uncommittad nations.

B..

The levol of and the wesknesses in the Cuban

econosy.

-5-

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E. Irko maxlaun action to Induce a split in the Cuban

rogime hnd maintala the capability of capltalizing Innediately

through clandestine neans to the extent possible on any

significent uprising, rovolt, reulatance, split in the resino,

or strains ind stresses anong Cuban leadership or 1n Cuban/

Bloc relationship.

XXI. OPEBATIONAL PLAN:

A. Espionage and Intelligence Colloction - All ferelble

effort should be undertoken to continue and intensify intolll...

gence collection concerning Cubs. The statua of, our Intelll

sance collection and related operational actlulty at the

premont iime and its development during the past air montha

15 delinented 1n deta1l In Attachnent A, Which was prepred to

serve as the basis for the il's report on this particular

matter to the President's Board of Consultants on Forelgn

intelligence.

You will note that this lengthy document

bresks dowa under numerous sub-beadings the intelligence

coverage which has been devoloped. by the Clandestine Service.

Set out below aro speclfios of operational action 1t 18

proposod to tako to continue and, as possible, incroase In-

telligence coverage of cuba.

1. Intelligence Exploitation of Refugees: As you

know, with the quarantine and the cessation of air

travel the heavy flon of Cuban refugees has dwindled

almost to nothing. In vle of this and 1n connection

- 8-

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## Page 8

with the contlugoncy planning for supporting any possible

mflItary sotlon in Cuba, the Opa-Locke Interrogation

Center as such was dismutled, although the personnel

of the Center have been retained Intact. In order to

re-establlsh. the flow of intelligence fron refugees,

It 1s proposed that Pan Anerloan Always and Kll be

Induced to coinstitute their regular 1l1ghts Iron

Havana to Miaml, Thla should be done as soon as

possible nitor the settlement of the current negotintlong

and UN dlscusBlons.: Colncident with this, the Ope-locka

refugee interrogation conter will bo re-established

Mith the sano personnel.

2. Resident Agents in Cuba: Every effort will be

made: to continue to exploit, to the fullest, preserve the

vlabillty of and, there necesenty, re-ostablish communten-

tons: with the 131 recrulted agonts now resident in Cubr.

To an exterit, the spood and effectiveness of this effort

M1ll of course depend upon the stringency of future

Cuban security and control action, which it is imposalble

as yot to accuratoly forecast.

3. Third Country Oporations: The priority on te-

crutting agents in third countries for dispatch to Cuba

will be reiterated and strengthened and every effort

will be nade to iacrease this coverage, both through

the development of additional resident agents in Cubs

-7-

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14-00000

and through the dovelopment of additioul legal travellers.

1. Ete180n Operations: We will cuntinuo to press

the Finison services tho are issisting us in the effort

agninst Cuba for additional coverage, Ineluding the

recrulting of agents within their own rrens for Joint

dispatch to Cuba. The services most effectively co-

operating at this point in this cousection are the

British, Dutch, French, Spanish, Itallan, Grook,

Norwegian, Danish, Nest Geruan, M

Mexican, Argentinian,

Uruguayan, Canacian, Chilean, and Israelt) Direct

approaches to several of these services either by you

personally or in your same, as you prefer, are

being separately reconnended. Personal ropresentation

by you to the services. underlined above would be useful.

In addition, we will re-survey all other lialson services

with which ve are in contsct and reiterate to those

appearing to have any assets usable against Cuba our

extroue interest in maximun coverage of this problem.

In connection with the Minison problem generally, we will

endeavor to induce all of the Jatson services to male

creater use of their national assets, both inside and

outside of Cuba. Porticular attention will bo given to

possible utilization of the Vatican.

•_5. Maritime Operations: In addition to increasing

efforts to get at serman gents and other maritime

assets through lininon services, we will continue our

unilateral third country efforts to recrult semen and

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4-00000

priticularly Cuban seanen, to increase the twenty

officers and crew members aboard six Cubin vessels we sro

now running as controlled agents.

G. Penetration of Cuban Installations Abroßd: At

the present time ve are running 12 Cuben diplomats

stationed outside Cube no controlled agents and have viable

operations ained at an additional 20 Cuban diplonate.

le proposo to continue and intensily the current progrem

of attempting to recruit or defect every Cuben official

represeutative abroad to whom we can galll access enc

concerning whom we have any reason to belleve a

susceptibility to approach exists. These additional

penetrations will be attempted both through unllaterI

operations and where appropriate in conjunction with

Tateon Bervices... ?

7. Audio Penetrations of Cuban Installations

Abroad: At the present time we have sudlo and/or

telephone tap coverage of Cuban officiel lnstallations

In Chile, Italy, Mexico, The Netherlanda, England,

Uruguay, Greece, Spain, Prance, and Canadad sio

me jor expansion of this covorage is presently

contenplated, but we will continue to survey addition:!

targets of opportunity and wherever possible install

coverage in those cases where the additional Intelli-

gence fron this type of source over and above what we

are now receiving fould appear to make such Installitin

• worthwhile.

-8-

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14-00000

1-0007

Connuntcrtions Inteiligence: le will contimun

ouf Present CIA Close Support coverage fron the KOlA

station in MianD at the same lovel end will continue

to press lisa for caditional coverage ai Cuben communlc..

tions. An the current situstion "nornelizes" it should

lie possible for NSA to reinstitute and perhaps even

Increaso thell seaborne intercept coverage of Cuban

soarunicationg.

9. Cosmunist Party Operations: A complete survey

has been nade world-wide of all Communist Party

penetration operations and wherever any such penetration

can be directed egainst Cuba either by dispatching the

sgent to cuba or by pointing the agent agsinst Cubin

targets, this will be done, except in those cuses whorn

such action would result in unacceptableprejudice to

the operations 1n the area where the agent is now baser.

It is bolleved that the nost lucrative fleld for the

redirection of such operations to the Cuban targot will

be Litin America where there are 65 penetrations of

varlous communist parties. Of this 65, the survey

we have conducted indicates that 23 have some direct

pertinent access to Cuban targete. All oi these 2? w111

be directed against these targets unloss in uny case

there ire overriding reasons to the contrary.. The

remalakag cases in the total of 85 aro bein Indirldurlly

examined to see 1s they can bo divertod to Cuban torgete.

- 10-

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14-011100

10. Illegally Infiltrated Agents: The two

succonsful black intiltrated teams (COBRA nad ANTORRID)

which have produced substantial intelligence will be

continued, resupplied, and roinforced but pointed

pitnarily at continued intelligence collection and nt

the recrultuent for intelligence collection purposes of

othor Cubans who aiready are logally resident in Cuba

In the aroas where the terms are operating (Pluar del

Rio and Oriente). In nadition, on the most carefully.

selected basis, where 1t appeare feasible, aúditional

agents and teans will be luffltrated black tato Cuba

1n an effort to duplicato the performance of the COBRA

and ANTORRID teans and particularly to rocrult and, te

posstble, tIals additional agents legally resident in

cuba..

11.. Exfiltration: As Persible, agente and potentiri

recruita now 1n Cuba will bo exfiltrated for

• training, Indoctrinstion, supplying ulth communications,

and motivation. They will then be re-infiltrated into

Cuba, primarily on Intolligence slealous, Where ponsible,

this will be done through legal travel channels, but

where this 1s not possible, it will be done wherever

feasiblo through our black infiltration-exfiltration

Incillties, Drinarily our uritine asseta.

-11-

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B. Much of the above affort as noted vill be primarily

directed tovards developing all posaible evidencen of streas

or strain within the reglme and between the reglue and other

antions, particularly the Bloc.

An intensive program will

be continued to take advantage of any possible opportunity

to weaken, subvert, or splft the regine in any possible.

fashlon:, This 15 baalcally a long torn effort. A grest deal

of work already has gone into this and the current

status of this progran and the proposed lurther expiotation

of the numerous 1asds no have developed 1s being nade, in

the interests of brovity in this senorandum, the subject bf

a sepaIEtO conpilation. The offoctiveness of sasets aimedl et

actually splittlag the regine, 1.6., a palrce revolt, will it

course depend..

to an extent, on the willlagness of the Unlted

stator Coverment to support then and it ta entirely possiule

thet any such offort night fatl unless supported with nilltary

forces which on the basis of the assumptions in Paragragh I

above would appear unlikely.

C. Sabotage: On the banls of the sanuaptions set out

abovo, comando type sabotego, minor sabotago, and other

acte of sabotage 1nsido Cuba Mould appear to serve 11ttl0

purpose and siould not be undertaken excopt in the rare

Instances where an opportunity is presented with acceptable

rias to do major damage to the Cuban econony. It 18 proposad

to continue searching for such llaited opportunitles, but.

no notiva or vica soule progran le contenpiated...

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D, Param111tarze Conmando, and Guerrille Type Oporattonin:

Given the assumptions 1a PRIEgIaph I abovo, no "ide scale

program of such actlvity should be undertaien. However, te

propose to maintain in being our present facilitles and

the erpabllity of undertaking such operatins in order to

-fully exploit sny substantial chango in Intornal Cuban con..

ditlong or any substantial revolt or uprising which night recur.

E.

Economie Herfare:. It ls proposod to continue sud

Intensily the progran already undertaken to deny through

clandestine and covert means critical materials to the Cuben

«сохошу....

This consists primarily of denlal operations, possibly

sOme preclusive buying and Inducing friendly U.S. and nilled

Iirms and governients to prevent the ahipmenta of strategic

materials to Cuba.

I. Counterintelligence: The current counterintelligence

sad counterespionage progran agalnst the Cuban G-2 and

related services will be continued end as possible intenalfied.

This program has developed substantially and it should be

possible althin the coming months to increase its effoctiveness

considerably ta countering not only Cubra but Bloc Intelll-

gence operatlung sounted against Unlted States Interests

from Cuba.

G.. Political Action, Fropaganda, Psychological Warfare:

In this stold the followlag tasks will be contizued and where

appropiiate intensified:

1. Assist and support State in any Irasible setlen.

- 13-

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14-00000

to dovelop and exploit current OAS and Latin Aneriorn:

Bttitudes favorable to the contalnment ind/or overthew

of the Cratricomunist regine.

2, Assist State in the development of post-Castro

concepts, leaders, and political groups.

3.

stimulato, support and guide covertly the

propaganda and political action activities of the CRC

and other Cuban political groups and Indlviduals, 'a

appropriato, who offer a potential for Impact ins1d0

• 4. Devolop, maintain and exploit the will of the

Cuban people to resist Castro-coumnlan, naking naximun

use of the domgrading of Castro and his regimo durius

the missile crisis.

5. DisCrodit and ridiculo Castro and his regine

in Cuba, In the Hemisphere and elsewhere, with empbas1s

on the theme the missilo crisis demonatrated con-

clusively that Castro is nothing but a mere pawa of

soviet imperiallsi.

6. Continue "Radio Americas" and other CIA-

sponsored Cuban exile radio brondcasts is approprlate.

7: Lauach propaganda balloons after an operationnl

capability has been established and policy authority is

granted to conduct propaganda balloon operations.

8,, Continue the infiltration of propaganda saterin1

Into Cuba vin open nalls, legal travollers and courlers,

with spocial emphasis on selective black rperations.

-11 -

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H. Esploltation of Exile Gruups: We will continue

the cirndestine exploltation of ortle groups for intelligence

collectinn, psychologlenl warfare and other approved missions.

As fornible, ne w1ll not to mount as nuch of this effort er

poanibie from aress outside the continental Unlted States, rns!

particularly fron latin Anarica. It ligher Authority decides

on a "Track Tro" concept or on Rny slallar concept which

contemplates heavy uncontrolled and only generally directed

sction operations of Cuban groups egalast Cubs, 1t 18 bellever

that offorte should be made to transfer as much as possible

of the responslbility for this non-clandestine, non-intellleence

typo operation into the polltical flold, which 1s the province

/of the Department of State.

In this connection, it 1s belloved!

It would bo ravisable to press for tho creation within the

Dapartment of Stato of an offico of Cuban BEllO Affalre te

handle the overt government relatlonships with Cuban exilo

•IV. ORGANIZATIONAL, AND PROCEDURAL CHANGES:

Maximun triplonentation of the above plan which provides

for the most intensive fossible collection ul intelligenc»,

the implonentationor rolatod programs as outlined, and the

suintenance of capabilities to exploit targets of opportunity

as well as take advantago of any luturo substantial changes

1n Internal Cuban conditions will, 1t 1s belloved, peralt

and make ravisable the following:

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A. A gradual but substantial reduction In the expenditures

and personnel of Task Force W.

B. Consideration of the re-positloning of Task Force W

wIthin the Clandestine Service, posalbly is e major coampent

of. the #H Diviaion under different direction.

C. The abolition of the operational Mongoose mochantara.

I. The renoval of the past franework which required

dotalled considerntion by the speclal Group (Mugmented) it

even minor operational details and decision by connitter 1n

points which it

Is bolloved are completoly within the purvler

of the Dcl and those officers to whom he dolegates decision.

RECOHHKNDED ACTION:

A.. Your concurrence in the above general operational plan

1s recommended.

B. It 1s reconnended that you discuss this plan with

the Spocial Group (Augmented) ind secure Its concurrence.

C. It In recomended that you secure tron the Speeinl.

Group (Augmented) polley approval to attempt to Induce fan

Amoricnn AlIways and till to resune their flighte between lanl.

ind Hsvena at the appropriato time.

I'. It is reconnended that 1f any "Trick Two" concojit

1s proposed, you andesvor to transier to the Department ef

State all possible overt aspects of this type of uncontrolled

-10-

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subaldy and support or Cuban exile groups.

"It ts recommended that the Mongoose operational

mechnnion be sbollshod.

I. If you concur in this concept, specifie recommendationu

will bo made to you concerning the re-positlontag of Tusk Force.

W within the DD/P.

WILLIAM A.

HARVEY

Chlor, Trek Forco #

-17

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DIALSINN

23 Nor, 1962

A SECRET

SENSITIVE

O'ERATIONAL PLAN - CUMA

1. B11A7Z91!

A. The propose os into plen do to outllon the netton to ha

indertain by the Central Intolliaone Agrosy agalast the lanerol

Commantas go

27198. 11-63

portad in may be treetado

D. HoT the purpoRa of this plan the fallorlag sanespitenn

ara vindes

neston sett

aba doa

Isolate Castro/Commmlen fre othar Hastern

Hemlophore nations.:

THIS DOCUMENT IS

A SOUFCE REFERENCE

IN CS HISTORICAL -

PAPER; NO.

-DO NOT DESTROY-

sodersm isemone iand political prensare

pa cho Castro/Commin

higher:

Los ragles to retard devalop-

ment ol the Debe econosy sail malatato a drain

on Bloo 1080

888:

do: Malatain nastu coverage of Cuban Inta1l191py

regulzeneats.

Do proparad to capitalleo on any algalflent

platoe, spllt la cab

SECRET

enteradias and

SENSITIVE

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## Page 20

SECRET

SUISITIVE

- 200

on Caban-Bloc salationshiji.

I1. MISSIONS

covartly support tbe above alted U. $. national

objectimo ulta respect to Cuba.

III. ZANESI

2. Provido the antina Intallisenes coverage of tito

with partlculas euphasta ca the followings

a, Capabilitles and satentious of the Castro

gpp:

Do A601v1E1e8 01 Gabon 02.

soviet sativillas 1s Cubs.

do stata of restorasca, Ladladlay the tona and

5i9;

tospor of tha population.

a Military sad adlitle order of battlo.

Jour as pores and/os streno and strata matia

the "ponsr centero" la the Subes gover me,

8. Sortet/Cubas and Coinaso/Cubea relationahips.

b. Econorato.

B.. P0l1t1sa2:

do: Assist and support State in any lassible sotiori to

¿devalop sative D48 md LettI-ANSIICaN CONNTIY AND:"?!:

for the contai

SEcreTer than of castro.

OROUP 1

Excludad trom automatic

SENSITIVE

dingrading and

rele-silication

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## Page 21

AND SECRET

SENGITIVE

And at stata 1a ran sea sires care

concepro, londers, and possedeal groupa.

provide covert suppo

Cabda political!

volopica

lasprofslata.:

contary"

of the treme

reptitting the

1. Partlaipate la Istaruagensy dosasado action Mlarilra

mid/ernoutlon.

Prevent essential naterial an aupplias fron reachlag

Babe:

Herers tron Horld Trade Melth Gubre

matt she well of she seshen

0/000a1

3, Dovalop and explait canalone batusen Coba sad Parla,

blos' nesbors.

B. 19818t89001

L Do prepared to coverely pronda lodred personed!

SENSITIVE

duded from automatic

dowagrading and

deslass/ilcation

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## Page 22

SECRET

SENSITIVE:

restataace group or uptLalag.

2, 86 prepared to support approvad U. B. l11ter 1) 1194

ega1nst Cabs.

To undertaka the above lleted taska, CIA mould be requirti

to demolor tor colone tro

Intell gence C

MCounter Intelligence

Tha pass bullo up of latelligenas sesaco munt bo

Iateral lied end expeaded, The follering types of notleni

1. SpockLag/sacrudElaa/ExaLaLnE of legally enlalls ri?

Cubaas ta Caba «

satebliebaras sad malatorenza of reilable, atsa

M consentions nill becoma mona caleical en pellen

stato controla tsareaso.

¡astionele reelient la Caba.

Si spottlog/590ru1t1ag/iza1nlas of logal tInvalera

Sy to tba 002, pollco, and Eú.L1t1a REED. (73a1r

SEE Problem,)

SENSITIVE

Exclula: li. 1 automatic

d # clac.ng and

11ing

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## Page 23

14-00000

IOD SEGRET

SENSITIVE

34 Malatala rofigen debrtaling prograas.

Tomboli rato

o Alials oviservices for above peréera.

1304

ThO PIOGIAN MES PIISATILY CODOCRETADO ON ANA

meso tha cuber popolazion.

Ton follouing psychol. 12n1

ma desed escontlal!

roada balleon; lennehing capab111 ty por

propalate pallay chesity to conduct prey-gen

balloon lanchlez operatlons.

2. Goatiaca sad expead tha prosent propaganan

tha open Ballo, Laza) trovelare, os cOnTiera.

S. Coatinos. prop

progosslonal, peltacal, anudent, and other armga

shich bens

a parential fox gatting thair moreria

ta chalr constasparta instra of caba.

Tho prostenvill ba basically for developing ens

maintalalas a sdatena scend-by caprb111ty 105 u2s 2% tha

avat of a algallicent ip slalas ax 1n the evoni ef

InplmentarlOs Of lo S. MIltary plass.

Tha fallatos progrsa lo conaiared 68809t: 911

1o Malntala che capabllity to infiltrata/arilltrar

SENSITIVE

F. iu 1 from automatic

7iadlns 800

issiestlan

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## Page 24

SENSIVE

10 40

2. Maintals suffiolent covert nosero to mat regalia.

anate lovled on arl la approved I, 8. illliary

contingeasy pless.

hibera Anternal 28185a nx*

not evelleble, se

my ba bold externally.

THED TROM OTHER A

Norad

VI. ASTONTED COSY TO CIA!

1. 80580000}

.. Sainted Pode!

TY

' 64

PID SECRET

SENSITIVE

GROUPT

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