Memorandum for the Record
Document date: 1961-05-12 00:00:00
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA

RECORD NUMBER : 176-10031-10069

RECORD SERIES : Goodwin Papers

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR :

FROM :

TO :

TITLE : Memorandum for the Record

DATE : 5/12/1961

PAGES : 6

SUBJECTS : Cuba

DOCUMENT TYPE : Memoranda

CLASSIFICATION : Secret

RESTRICTIONS : 1C

CURRENT STATUS :

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/22/1998

OPENING CRITERIA :

Released under the John F. Kennedy

Assassination Records Collection Act ol

1992 (44 USC 2107 Note]. Case#:NW

66000 Date: 11-04-2021

COMMENTS : Goodwin Papers: Subjects: Cuba, Covet Action Box 4, Document 3A

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12 May 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT

:Meeting with ing. Manuel Ray

PARTICIPANTS: Ing. Manuel Ray

Ernesto Betancourt

Rogelio Cisneros

James A. Noel

1. Ray did not return to Washington until early morning on Friday,

12 May 1961. He called me at 0700 from the airport. He was unable

to fix a definite hour for us to get together due to the fact that he was

expecting an appointment with a person he did not name some time

during the raorning. He later called a number of times from the Hotel

Ambassador to advise me that he still had had no word on his appoint-

ment. At 1145, Mr. Betancourt called to say that he was with Ray

and "Eugenio" (Rogelio Cisneros) and could we get together. I sug-

gested they drive out to the Clarendon Hotel Court on Wilson Boulevard

where I had taken a room for holding our meeting. They arrived in

Mr. Betancourt's car at approximately 1230 noon time and we first

went to the nearby Hogate Restaurant on Wilson Boulevard for lunch

before we got down to the business of the prospectus.

2. During luach we did not discuss the plan but I did take the op-

portunity to stress in a most serious way the need for absolute secrecy

concerning our discussions today and azy future discussions or devel-

opments which might take place in the future with respect to our relation-

ship. All agreed on the need for tight security.

3. After lunch we drove to the Hotel Court and from approximately

1330 until 1730, we discussed the prospectus. Using Mr. Barnes' out-

line as a general guide, I stressed the importance of being able to present

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to the proper people at the earliest possible time a carefully thought-

out plan of action which would set forth clearly the objectives - what

the project hoped to achieve; a statement of the problem; the strengths

of the Castro regime following the ill-fated invasion; the status of the

underground and its morale and capabilities; the extent of internal

support for and discontent with the regime, etc., etc.

4. I also spoke of the need for describing the kind of activities

which the Ray organisation planned to engage in and the assets and

capabilities which they have or can acquire to do the job. The need for

explaining the relationship and coordination of the plan with the Revolu-

tionary Council was discussed at some length.

5, I suggested that he include in the plan an itemization of the kinds

of support which he would expect us to supply immediately as well as the

kind and quantity of support which would be required of us as the project

developed.

6. I also suggested that the plan include their views on how U. S.

liaison and coordination could best be worked out; how funds would be

funneled into the project; what comme and other training would be re-

quired; whether U. S. "real estate" would be needed, etc.

7. Ray outlined some of his thoughts regarding his proposed plan

of action. According to him it contemplates action in three broad fields:

(a) Underground activity - principally sabotage.- in the

urban areas.

(b) Gradual buildup - largely through clandestine infiltra-

tions of small bodies of men -- of guerrilla forces in mountain-

ous and defensible areas.

(c) A psychological warfare campaign within Cuba and abroad

aimed at discrediting Castro and at the same time providing the

people of Cuba something to fight for.

8. It Is Ray's intention to depend almost entirely on maritime opera-

toas for the infiltration of personnel and materiel into Cuba. He also

rules out of his plan the creation of another invasion army but does con-

template the training of groups of perhapa up to 150 men in other friendly

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countries of South America (he mentioned Venezuela as a possibility)

and said he would axplore the possibility of basing maritime operations

in non-U. S. ports.

9. Ray said some means, other than Swan Island, must be found

for reaching the Cuban population by radio broadcasts. He spoke of

the possibility of short wave broadcasts from Venezuela and utiliza-

tion of a commercial station in Miami which he understands can be

clearly heard in Cuba.

of Latin America (he said a successful organization has been formed

in Puerto Rico) and of sending qualified representatives to those Latin

American countries where there is Soviet diplomatic representation to

contact student and labor groups and leaders in an effost to present to

them the true picture of the sorry state of students, workers, and

intellectuals in Castro's Cuba.

11. Ray is also interested in the possibility of putting out a "News

Letter" under MRP sponsorship which would discuss various aspecta of

the Cuban picture and set forth plans for Guba after the fall of Gastro.

He thought such a news letter could go a long way towards correcting

mistaken impressions among American university professors and in

other circles as to the true nature of the Castro regime. He pointed

to the recent letter from 63 Harvard professors which was recently

published in the N. Y. Times as a "horrible example" as to how mis-

informed even university professors are on present day Cuba.

12. When the discuasions got around to the need for conducting

operations at least 'under the umbrella" of the Revolutionary Council,

and the need for obtaining Dr. Miro's concurrence before the U. S.

would be able to support any operation; it was obvious that neither

Ing. Ray nor Mr. Betancourt holds a high impression of the Council.

Both feel thas there ie a strong possibility that the close public

identification of the Council with the recent invasion may well have

discredited the Council to such an extent that it commands no support

or respect within Cuba.

Fos the sake of argument they were willing to concede that the

political advantages of maintaining the Council for the purpose of forcing

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unity of the various exile groups may well outweigh its other obvious

shortcomings. However, both feal, and Mr. Betancourt was quite

emphatic on this point, that the Council as a body is not capable of

directing clandestine actions against Castro and as a matter of fact

is opposed to any further efforts

at overthrowing Castro by sabotage

and other subversive actions since they are completely "sold" on

the thesia that Castro can only be removed by direct U. S. military

action and therefore a continuation of Cuban underground activities

can only result in needless and futile loss of life. In the fact of this

attitude, Ray said he does not expect to receive much encouragement

for his plan from the Council, although he is fairly confident that

DI. Miro's approval can eventually be ebtained.

Mr. Betancourt thought that a workable solution might be found

to their problem if the Council would agree to concern itself exclusively

with (a) the current task of unifying the opposition, and (b) planning for

ita future assumption of power as the provisional govemment. Under

this arrangement, operations aimed at the downfall of Castro could be

entrusted to those leaders and groups (such as the MRP, MRR, and

possibly the MDC) which have both the assets and the will to do the

job. Mr. Ray thought that it might be feasible to create an operations

planning board or command among the groups with demonstrated assets

and thus avoid unnecessary duplication and confusion and make possible

overall planning... It was obvious, however, that he would prefer to act

autonomously in the execution of his program.

Mr. Ray was very critical of Artime and claimed he was in possession

of sufficient "facta" to convince him that Artime, in colluaion with ele-

ments of the camps, were planning to eliminate the MRP and its leaders

from the picture, when the invasion succeeded. He said he "knowa"

that Artime was being financially supported by wealthy ez-Batistianos

of the Miami area.

13.

Ray hiated at various times that the MRP may at some point

find itself faced with the necessity of withdrawing from the Council and

going it alone. He says that the Council is composed of "good men" but

they have no assets of significant followings and "have nothing to offer

the people of Cuba" and although the proclamation of the Council, as

finally drafted, was a good one the "progreasive" aspects of the proclam-

ation were forced on the Council by the Americans and do not represent

the true feelings of the majority of the council members,

He said the

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Cuban people are not likely to want to risk their lives on the basis of

promises made by the present membership of the Council. He feels

that acceptance of the Council would be improved by adding to ita

membership two or three more people whose names would be signi-

ficant and meaningful to the Cuban people. He did not name any

specific candidates.

14. Mr. Ray let me read a 13 or 14 page report which he had

just received from the MRP coordinator in Cuba (Reinol Gonzalez)

which painted a dreary picture of conditions in Cuba since the failure

of the invasion; was critical of the inclusion of Batistianos and "ninos

bonitos' in the invasion force; conveyed the atrong feeling that the

Cubans had been betrayed by the Americans; and indicated that while

the MRP organization was still pretty much latact physically, morale

was almost completely shattered. Mr. Ray said he would provide me

a sanitized copy (there were some operational and personal details)

of the report for our information.

15. In view of this report from within Cuba, Mr. Ray said that

he will wish to defer submitting his plan for our consideration until

he la able to receive word from Cuba concerning the capabilities,

willingness and feasibility of carrying out some of the activities he

has la mind. He said it le useless to submit a program of action if

the human elements to carry it out are lacking or completely demoral-

Ized. He thought he might be able to present his prospectus within

approximately ten days. He said naturally he will not give the people

inside any indiation that he has been discussing a plan of action with

us.

16. I urged Ray to consider submitting at least a proliminary and

admittedly tentative proppectus at this time based on the ascuraption

that his assets are still intact and will be willing to cooperate in order

that it may receive early consideration. However, he stuch to his

belief that this would set be practicable and reiterated the need for

prior evaluation of the strength and morale of his following:

17.

Ray asked concerning the detainees at McAllen, Texas, and

wondered if thay have been released. He was told that as far as I

know they are still under detention. He said Mr, Goodwin had taken

their names and promised to look into the matter. Mt. Betancourt

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said he would check directly with Mr. Goodwin Fe their statua.

18. l invited Mr. Ray and/or Mr. Betancourt to call me over

the weekend in case either should want to discuss the matter further.

I had the feeling that Mr. Betancourt was personally in favor of sub-

mitting now a plan covering "short term" needs of their organization

and it may be that such a paper will be subritted after he has an

opportunity to talk with Mr. Ray in private.

JAMES A. NOEL

JAN/ dia

Distributton:

Original & 2 - A/DDP/A

1 - C/ WHD

1 - AC/WH/4 & circulate

1 - Manuel Ray 201

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