MEXICO STATION COVERAGE OF SOVIET AND CUBAN EMBASSIES (1963).
Originator: CIA
Document date: 1963-01-01 00:00:00
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

# DOCID-32392940

## Page 1

Date: 03/02/05

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CIA

RECORD NUMBER

: 104-10414-10356

RECORD SERIES

: JFK

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

: RUSS HOLMES WORK FILE

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

AGENCY ORIGINATOR : CIA

FROM

TO

TITLE

: MEXICO STATION COVERAGE OF SOVIET AND CUBAN EMBASSIES

(1963) .

DATE

: 01/01/1963

PAGES

: 6

SUBJECTS : PHOTO COVERAGE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER

CLASSIFICATION

: SECRET

RESTRICTIONS

: 1A 1B

CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED IN PART PUBLIC - RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW

: 11/18/98

COMMENTS : JFK-RH07 : F134 : 1998.11.18.16:56:23:013107

Released under the John F. Kennedy

Assassination Records Collection Act ol

1992 (44 USC 2107 Note]. Case#:NW

55990 Date: 11-01-2021

IRI - ITEM IS RESTRICTED: 104-10414-10356

NW 65990 Docld:32392940 Page 1

---

## Page 2

Best ava_-able image.

SENET SENSITINE

Mexico Station Coverage of Soviet and Cuban Embassies (1963)

1.

Unilateral Coverage:

•From the time the Mexico Station was opened in

April: 1947 until

the arrival of Mr. Win Scott as Chief of Station in

the Station had

developed a support apparatus to exploit leads from the Soviet Embassy in

Mexico City.

umbrella

ype proje

LIPSTIC

consisted of multiline

phone taps, three photographic sites, a mobile surveillance team and a

mail intercept operation.

Telephone taps (LIFEAT)

were placed by an employee of the local

telephone company who was handled by a Station case officer. The number

of lines tapped was limited only by the availability of a listening post

nearby and the availability of langauge (English, Spanish, Soviet, Polish,

Czech, etc.) transcribers.

Generally, these were Mexican or Mexican-

American

recruited

agents.

were handled by a Station case officer

thre

assisted by technicians on TDY. from Headquarters who advised the Station

on the best types of cameras, films, and concealment devices.

These

sub crypts under

LIMITED was a fixed site.

bassy (across the street) which had both a vehicle and a pedestrian en-

trance.. The gate to the Soviet Embassy. was on the northwest corner of the

E2, IMPDET

CL

BY 004645

CTRRSTIRENSITIVS

NW 65990 Docld:32392940 Page 2

---

## Page 3

→ SECRET SENSITIO

Soviet compound and the LIMITED site was diagonally across a double laned

street on the southeast corner of that block. (See attached diagram).

LIMITED was the first photo base and operated strictly on an experimental

basis in the early stages. This base, however, was closed

when the Sta-

tion received word that the photograph of the "unidentified man" was

being released by the Warren Commission.

LILYRIC

was an alternate photo-

graphic base. It was located in an upper story of an apartment building

on the same side of the street as the LIMITED site but in the middle of

the block south. It had a planted view-of the front gate of the soviet

Embassy.

LICALLAS

the third photographic site, was located

in one of a

row of four

houses on the south side of the Soviet Embassy compound.

This site

overlooked

the

garden

ot the Sovnet Embassy compound. The

purpose of this operation was to get good identification photographs of

Soviet personnel.

The three photographic sites were managed by a re-

cruited agent who was a Mexican citizen, the son of

an American mother

and Mexican father (deceased). This agent collected

the film

from the

LIMITED

and LILYRIC sites three times a week. The film was then

de-

veloped

and printed into 8 x 10 contact print strips.. LICALLA film was

originally processed in the Station but in early 1959, due to the resig-

nation of a technician, this film like that of LIMITED and LILYRIC was

processed

on the outside by a recruited agent.

2

SECRET/SENSITIVE

NW 65990 Docld:32392940 Page 3

---

## Page 4

STORE SOSIN

Mobile surveillance was conducted by tio American staff

officers.

These two officers organized

a surveillance team

six recruited agents

which used late model cars and a panel truck for surveillance. The team

could be activated by radio from the LIMITED site whenever someone of

interest left the gate of the Soviet Embassy. These agents were aware of

the LIMITED site since they had been issued LIMITED photographs for

identification purposes.

The Station also conducted a unilateral mail intercept operation,

LIBIGHT, which was handled by an American

case officer. A recruited

Mexican agent, who had

a semiofficial status, obtained

selected letters

from a subagent employed

by the Mexican postal

system.

2. Liaison Coverage:

Liaison coverage was unreliable and insecure as characterized by

the nature of the Mexican services at that time. The Mexican Direction

of Federal Security (DFS), with which we conducted liaison, was a hip-

pocket group run out of the Mexican Ministry of Government. This Ministry

was principally occupied with political investigations and control of

foreigners. Their agents were windra Tenst, and corrupt. A Station

officer trained

a number of them in name tracing and travel control. In

1958, at the instigation

of a Mexican official, a joint telephone tap

operation came into existence. The operation, which became known as

3

STORET SENSITIVE

NW 65990 Docld:32392940 Page 4

---

## Page 5

SECRET/SENSITIVS

DENVOY

was run by a Mexican officer. The listening post had 30 lines

connected at one time. The transcription room was staffed by Mexican

Army officers. In 1961, because of mismanagement by the Mexican prin-

cipals, the Station chief, himself, became the project case officer. A

Station officer

assisted him in the daily supervision of the listening

post, and in picking up the transcripts and the tapes. There was also

an American technician inside the listening post.

3. Oswald Coverage:

In mid-1962, the Mexican officer in charge of LIENVOY (the

joint tap operation) asked

the American officer at the LIENVOY Tistening

post for the telephone numbers of the Soviet, Cuban and Satellite Em-

bassies in anticipation of possible coverage. The Station immediately

disconnected all of the unilateral telephone taps on these Embassies so

that they would not be discovered when the Mexicans hooked

up their

taps.

The Mexicans

soon thereafter connected five Cuban lines, five

Soviet lines, three Czech lines, two Polish lines, and one Yugoslav

line.

At the listening post, a live monitor made short summaries of

conversations of interest which were then included in a daily resume

for the Chief of Station. Later, when a reel was completely recorded,

full transcripts were typed and passed to the Station; however, there

was usually a time lag of a day or two.

Reels which contained Russian

SECRET /SENSITIVE

NW 65990 Docld:32392940 Page 5

---

## Page 6

SaraScasht

r a language other than Spanish or English were taken to another location

for translation and typing. Mr. Boris Tarasoff did the Russian transla-

tions but because

of the volume of Russian conversations, the translations

usually ran about a week behind the date of the conversation.

As soon as the Station learned that an American identifying him-

self as Lee Oswald phoned the Soviet Embassy, Miss Ann Goodpasture of the

Station started screening all photographs. However, here again, there

was a backlog because the photographs were picked up three times a week

but those picked up were usually for dates a few days before since the

technician who was processing the film, did so on a night-time basis.

Further, photographs were not made initially until a complete roll of

film was used. Later this was changed and

the operator cleared the camera

at the end of each day regardless

of amount of unused film remaining.

The instructions were to

cover the entire work day (office hours) and to

photograph all

Soviets, their families, all foreigners, and cars with

foreign license plates.

Human error did occur but generally the agents

were conscientious. The Cuban Embassy coverage had more sophisticated

equipment using a pulse camera which frequently developed mechanical dif-

ficulties.

Oswald came to the attention of the listening post operators

from a tap of the Soviet line. It was picked up and taken to Mr. Boris

5

SECRET SENSITIVE

...NW 65990 Docld:32392940 Page 6

---

## Page 7

Tarasoff for translation because the caller was trying to, speak

in Russian.

There was some delay because Station personnel

waited

to compare

photographs with the typed transcript.. All transcripts were made in

either Spanish or English since the Chief of Station could read only

these two languages and because he personally screened the transcripts

for operational leads.

SECRET SENSITNE

NW 65990 Docld:32392940 Page 7

---