Document date: 00/00/0000

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File #:

62-116395

Serial Scope:

299X THnu 300

HH 55027

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The Attorney General.

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES

DENATE SELLOT COLTITTIE

ON INTELLIGINCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

June 18, 1975

1 - Ir. W. O. Cregai

1 - lix. K. A. lendenhall

Reference is made to a letter tron the sse datod

Lay 14, 1975, with attached appendices A thru D roquesting

certain docunonts and other inioration from the FBI.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to

SSC 1s the original of a nemozandun which responds in part

to one of the requests contained in above sec letter.

A copy of the menorandus is being furniched for

li yous records.

MDR-16

Enclosures (2)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

62-116395

DATE /2/4/0D. BY SPAALMEH

I - Tho Doputy Attorney General

Attention:

I. Willian O'Connor

Special Counsal for

Intelligence Coordination

(9)

IERCLOSURD

REG- 102

66- 116375-3100

Assoc. Dir. -

Dep. AD Adm. -

Dep. AD Inv. _

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

Comp. Syst. -

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com. _

Gen. Inv.-

Ident. _

Inspection

Intell. -

Laboratory

Plan. & Eval. -

Spec. Inv..

Train no

Telephone Ret

Birector Saly f

5-7S.1

TELETYPE UNIT

Page 2

GPO: 19750 - 569-920

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pret

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

(1 - Mx. J. B. Hotis)

1 - Mr. H. R. Hannall

62-110305

June 18, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. K. A. Mendenhall

UNITED STATES SONATO SELECT COTTITTED

TO STUDX GOVETITIESTIAL. OZERACIONS

HIIT RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACJIVITIES (SSC)

RE:

DORTILE DOCULTIS FENTAINING TO

MDR-l6

TILE ISI AND DEPAETENT OF JUSTICE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIES

DATE 0/4/00 BY / 3 ALIM/EHL

POLICIES AND PROCEDURIS

Assoc. Dir. -

Dep. AD Adm. -

Dep. AD Inv. -

Asst. Dir.:

Admin. -

Comp. Syst. -

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com.

Gen. Inv. -

Ident.

Inspection -

Intell. -

Laboratory _

Plan, & Eval. -

Spec. Inv. -

Training

Legal Coun..

Telephone Rm. -

Director Sec'y -

MAIL ROOM

TELETYPE UNIT

1Н 55027 DocId:32989610

Page 3

Reference is bade to lottos, vith attached

appendices, dated lay 14, 1975, to the Attorney Genoral

fron the Chalran of captioned Comittee, requesting cortain

documents and other information fron the

Federal Bureau

of IEvestigation (FBI).

Appondis D, Iten I, number 2 o2 referenced

appondices requested this Bureau to provide:

"Cornittoe

stall accesd to all so-called "g" files or othor conoral

polloy flIes with respoco to each file classification

routinoly used by the Intelligence Division for the period

1930 to the prosont." It is balieved this requost netually

rofors to the "00" flies of the FBI which contain policy

nonoranda anc other conmunications of a teneral natura

pertainine to a parcicular classitication.

Ai a contorenco haid on Lay su, 1975, botroct

N03023. John I. Ellief and Monk Citenatein of the Senate

Solect Connittee; Ix. I. Uillian O'Connor of the Darartmont

01 Justice; and Lesars. Tillian O. Cresar and Ilmen W.

Larson of the IlI, du was agread, in response to above request,

that this Buroau would nake available to appropriate

personnel of the ost strid, for review at isite, copies os

pertinent nolicy nenoranda and other connunications

ropresentativo of the type uaintained in the "00" 1110 as i:

relates to one classiflcation routinely investigated by the

Intelligence Division.

The classification choson beara tho

caption

"Investigations of Subversive Organizations and

Individuals" and instructions relating to investigations oi

individuals and organizations falling within this category

are contained in Section B7 of this Durenu's Hanual of

KAMisdis sage

(8)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

per

FRICLOSURE

11;

eNTE

GPO: 1975 0 - 569-920

1-300

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indi'."'

ND:

Furthor Docunents Portaining to

the FBI and Department of Justice

Policios and Procedurco

Inotzuctiono, Communications containod in this "00" file

portaining to apocial Agent in Charge (SAC) nonoranda and

rovisions to tho Manual of Instructions are not baing

provided for loview inasmuch as thoss itons are being handled

undor a separate roguest.

Fartinent docunente, belloved rougonsivo to above

asroomont, are now roady for reviow at FBIlQ by appropziate

personnal

of the SCC staft.

1 - The Attorney General

NOTE:

Section 87 of the MOl pertains to 100 classification

matters.

Memoranda and communications being made available

to SSC staff members were extracted from 100-00-28 thru

100-00-32 which covers the period 1960 to the present.

Request for SAC memoranda are being handled under Appendix B,

part 1, item la, attached to the SSC letter of May 14, 1975.

Request for revisions to the MOI from 1960 to present are

being handled under item l of the SSC memorandum dated

April 30, 1975.

Serial numbers of memoranda and communications

being furnished SSC have been noted on our copies of these

communications.

12 mo

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5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee:

¿ nate Select Committee

07 Report dated

6/18/75

Senate Select Committee.

Re; Further

Caption of Document: Documents Pertaining to the FEI

and Department of Justice; Policies and

Procedures. Appendix B, Item I, Number 2

- Date: (0/20/75

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

MDR

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

INCLASSIPIE

• 1..

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di..

OTE:

SEE INSTRUCTIONS' ON REVERSE

BEFORE COMPLETING.

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

var

TO:

Intelligence Community Staff

ATTN: Central Index

FROM:

Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

•Hor proven catch care tate to m

If a document was made available

ransmitted, so note.

* DOCUMENT

BRIEFING

INTERVIEW |

TESTIMONY

OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

6/18/75

FOR REVIEW

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)

MDR-16

SSC

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREINIS UNCLASSIFIED

HSC

DATE 10/41/00. BY SP. 2 ALMENC

. IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer,

interviewee, testifier and subject.

Further Documents Pertaining to the FBI and Department of Justice.

•Wise spoNse verbalise date and james, mber afive, suppose to formal request, other

subpoena, etc.

SSC letter, 5/14/75; Appendix B, Part 1, Item 2.

"'U"

HEy dunds fine rot empassariate koy words from the list provided separately: If key words not listed are

Operating procedures

8. SUMMARY (see

reverse

side before completing

this item)

At the request of SSC, copies of policy memoranda and other

communications of a general nature pertaining to specific

classifications Investigated by this Bureau are being made

available at FBIHQ for review by SSC members.

62-116395

TJM:1hb

(4)

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-TM

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN

CONVECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75. LFS 7-2-25

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

379| 16-751

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INSTRUCTIONS

• Type or print clearly in ink.

• Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

• Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

"FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the

information.

• If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to

HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a

copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing

substance.of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community

matters if appropríate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests

should be noted.

Commitments made to supply additional information should be

noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here,

e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether

interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript

is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional

pages may be attached if necessary.

:.....

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ORMONA, PORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOY

Memorandum

MENT.

TO

MI. MobI

DATE:

26-60

FROM

J. F. Malone

SUBJECT:

CHANNELIZING MEMORANDA

SECURITY-TYPE CASES.

MDR - 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

TERTINIS INGLAUSIPE

АТЕ 10/4/00 БУ САт/є

The purpose of this memorandum is to call atten-

tion to the problem of retaining channelizing memoranda in

field case files.

BACKGROUND: Under the present procedure, when data is

received from security informants either their

reports or a memorandum on data furnished is prepared and

is placed in the subfile relating to the particular informant.

A memorandum, which is called a channelizing memorandum, is

then prepared

setting forth the various items of intormation

furnished and copies are designated for each file for which

the contents of the memorandum relate. The original memo-

randum furnished by the informant is placed in the subfile of

the informants file.

Any memorandum which is prepared on the

basis of oral information is placed in this file and also

reierred to as a channelizing memorandum.

Many

suggestions have been received starting in

September, 1952, and up to April 18, 1960, to destroy these

memoranda

in case files after the information has been

incorporated into a report.

In all instances, these

suggestions have not been adopted.

The Executive Conference

on 7/6/53 considered this matter and was unanimously opposed.

The Domestic Intelligence Division has consistently opposed

these suggestions.

This matter was discussed at the Internal Security-

Espionage conferences, January 12-13, 1959, and recommended

study by the Training and Inspection Division during inspec-

tions of larger offices.

Un september 1i, 1959, in a memo-

randum Irom br. lamm to Mr. lolson, (100-00-1481), it was

recommended that the channelizing memorandum be retained

in individual subject files.

The inspection stall has frequently been presente

this problem during inspections.

In discussing-this matter

with field representatives, there is a divergence of opinion.

100-00-1485.

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Memo to Mr. ilohr

RE:

Channelizing Memoranda

security-type Cases

ADVANTAGES: Saving of file cabinets, office space and prevént

case files from becoming voluminous, particularly

in larger offices. As an example, during the last New York-

inspection (completed 3-25-60) in

four Internal Security case

files, there was an increase since the last inspection of 17,

20, 16, and 12 volumes respectively.

These files contained

some reports, letters and airtels, but the bulk of the files

was channelizing memoranda.. These examples reflect the increase

of storage space for these files.

DISADVANTAGES:

The purpose of these memoranda is to insure

that all information from informants pertaining

to a particular subject is placed in the subject's file and

readily available.

Comparisons of channelizing memoranda against

reports reflect all information from the memoranda is not in-

corporated into the report such as information of intelligence

nature.

Intelligence information available in channelizing

memoranda is often needed in conducting surveillances and other

investigation relating to a subject. If the memoranda were

destroyed, the Agent would be required to review numerous in-

formant subfiles to insure he had all information. It is a

possibility he might miss some valuable intelligence information.

Security reports are prepared for future prosecution. Should

there be an emergency, it would be virtually impossible for all

Agents

involved to review the original reports or original

channelizing memoranda due to the great demands which would be

made for such material.

CONCLUSIONS: While this matter has always been decided in favor

of retaining channelizing memoranda, we continue to

receive suggestions from the field that consideration be given to

destroying them once they have been incorporated into a report.

It is obvious there would be a great amount of filing space saved

11 this were possible. However, in view of the objections set

forth, it is believed this matter should again be considered by

the members of the Internal Security Espionage Confrence on

June 9 - 10, 1960, in an endeavor to establish whether it is

possible to overcome the enumerated objections. It is the con-

sensus of the Inspection Staff that if the material objections

can be overcome the destruction of channelizing memoranda after

they have been incorporated in a report would be desirable.

RECOMMENDATION: That this matter be discussed at the Internal

Security - Espionage Conference, June 9 - 10, 1960.

•2.

#H 55027 DocId: 32989610

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эппона коки ню. 10

UNITED STATES GOVER.

SENT

Memorandum

TO

: Mr. W. C. Sullivan

FROM

F.

J. Baumgardner

SUBJECT: SECURITY REPORT. WRITING -

THOROUGHNESS

DATE: June 12, 1962

MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREINIS UNCLASSIFIEN

DATE 10/4100 LY SPa

PAM/EHL:

from a review of investigative reports concerning security

matters in recent months a tendency has been noted on the part of

the field to report plans of a subversive group to take certain

action, without a tollow-up to report that the action did or did not

take place. This is an undesirable practiceas it may infer inadequate

investigation and could prove embarrassing because of the fact that

we disseminate information to many other agencies which rely on us

for the full facts in given situations.

Examples of the foregoing may be found in the following:

Bufiles 97-401-1291, 1292; 100-3-29-1162, 1163; 100-3-63-1037;

100-46808-820, 823. In all these instances the reporting period

encompassed the dates when certain activities were to have taken

place but the reports failed to resolve the actuality of the situ-

ation.

OBSERVATIONS:

It is basic that we are as much interested in actions taken ..

by a subversive group or individual thén what it or he may plan to

1do. To report only an intention or plan without the necessary follow-

up is to leave the matter unresolved in the mind of the reader. It

is believed that a reminder to the field in the form of an SAC letter

would be desirable and is therefore recommended.

ACTION:

Attached for approval is an SAC letter reminding the field

of anges nesses chozoughness in security report

writing. Manual

100-00-1494

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o. 6

-

November 17, 1964

Airtel

To: SAC, Los Angeles (100-00)

From: Director, FBI (100-00)

FRAUD AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT

SECURITY MATTER

MDR-16

'ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREINISUNCLASSIFIED

DATE 0/4/00

_ EY Sl2 ARM/ETL

Reurlet 11/3/64.

According to present Bureau policy, when security

fraud cases are referred by the intelligence agencies, they

are always accepted for investigation of the fraud violation

with the understanding that any investigation which the

interested agency desires to make pursuant to its responsibili

ties will not interfere with the investigative responsibilities

of this Bureau. The Bureau's policy in these cases has never

been to prohibit OSI from conducting an interview with the

subject at any time it chooses to do so. It would be advisable,

of course, for OSI to inform your office when it plans such an

interview

so that the two investigations could be coordinated.

It should be understood that OSI will furnish your

office the results of any OSI Investigation relating to a

fraud violation within FBI jurisdiction.

100-00-1504

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pet sit -

SAC, San Juan

Director, FBI

MDR -16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

3/24/66

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIES

DATE 10/5/00

BY SPRALLENC

FIELD SUPERVISION - INTERNAL SECURITY -

NATIONALISTIC TENDENCY MATTERS

During the period 11/10/65 to 3/18/66 in connection

with work handled by your office regarding various nationalistic

tendency matters it has been necessary for the Bureau to

initiate correspondence with the San Juan Office on 41 separate

occasions regarding nonsubstantive errors in conmunications,

other than teletypes, prepared by the San Juan Office.

An analysis of the 41 communications sent to San Juan

in this connection has revealed that 62 separate errors of

form were involved.. Fifteen of the errors related to incorrect

description or insufficient concealment of sources. An

additional 15 errors were of a typographical nature. In seven

instances errors were made in classifying reports and letterhead

memoranda prepared for dissemination.

Remaining errors were

in titles of communications (four); failure to submit evaluation

memorandum (three); inclusion of incorrect references in

communications (three); omission of character of cases (two);

incorrect designations of copies (five); failure to submit

material in form for dissemination (four); and one error each

for omitting place of preparation of a letterhead memorandum;

submitting partly illegible material for dissemination; failure

to date

report.

a memorandum; and omitting leads from an investigative

In going over the types of errors committed, 1t will

be noted that almost all of them could have been avoided by

the exercise of more care in preparing the communications or

in proofreading them.

Administrative correspondence to call the attention

of your office to errors committed is time-consuming and must

be reduced. The pattern shown here is indicative of a lack of

proper attention to details and to accuracy of material

prepared in the San Juan Office.

Reports and letterhead

memoranda are often given wide dissemination at the Seat of

•Government and you must assure that the material emanating

from your office is closely scrutinized from a standpoint of

quality and sccuracy.

100-00-1506

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ORVONAL PORM NO, 10

MAY 1982 EDITION

3010-106

REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES URNMENT

Memorandum

: Mr'. N. C. Sullivan

DATE: July 28, 1967

--

FROM

:C. D. Brennan/

SUBJECT BLACK REVOLUTIONARY GROUPS

INTERNAL SECURITY - MISCELLANEOUS

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

JATE D/ 5/00 BY SPaALMIEHL

racial tension and

The Summer of 1967 has shown a marked increase in

riots. The Bureau is now faced with the

problem of dealing with revolutionary groups which are out

side the civil rights movement. Leaders of these groups,

such as snour and

Anto the Studen

Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, and Wines as of the

Revolutionary Action Movenent, are calling for revolutions.

Several members of Congress have called E0z

legislation to landie inis problem. It appears that the

statements and actions of such individuals as those mentioned

above come within the purview of Title 18, Section 2385,

United States Code. (Smith Act of 1940) which makes it illegal

ot overthrowing of destroying the

to advocate, abet, advise, or teach the duty or desirability

Government of the

United States or of any State or political subdivision therein.

.'

The Act also makes it illegal to print, publish,

issue, or to distribute written or printed matter advocating

such actions.

A membership provision of the Act makes it illegal

to organize a group advocating such actions.

It is also

illegal to become a member of such group if

the person who

becomes

a member knows the purpose of the group.

OBSERVATION:

We have furnished the Department voluminous material

concerning such groups and individuals, including literature

and statements which appear to fall squarely within this

Law. The Department has given us no indication that it is

even considering action under Title 18, Section 2385. In

view of the many inflammatory statements being made by

leaders of these groups and the increasing pressure for

action against them, it is felt that we should go on record

Enclosure

100-00-1507

ITH 55027 DocId:32989610 Page 13

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Nemo to Mr. Sullivan

RE: BLACK REVOLUTIONARY GROUPS

with the Department concerning the possibility of

prosecution under this law.

There is enclosed a letter to

the Attorney. General asking whether the Department has

considered prosecution under Title 18, Section 2385.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the enclosed letter to the Attorney General

be approved.

1W 55027 DocTd:32989610 Pate 14,

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The Attorney General

DireCtor, FBI

MDR-16

SJulY 31, 1367

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

TEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 10/5/00 BY BP 2 ALM/FAC

'":"

BLACK CEVOLUTIONARY GROUPS

INTERNAL SECURICY • MISCULLANEOUS

This Bureau has furnished voluminous material to

you concerning the statemonis and actions of officials of

black cavolutionary grouns, such as exactat

i and

mas of the Student Monvinient Coordinating

Commstice, and la

smol the Revolutionary Action

Movement.

• review si their statements and actions imicates

that taey

may fall within the purvier of Tiile 18, Section 2335

of the United States Code. Please advise whether

the

Departmant has considored the possibility of proceeding

aguinst the individuals undor this lav.

- The Deputy Attorney General

- Ir: J. Walter Yeagley

Assistant Attorney General

100-00-1507

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OPTIONAL FORM NO, 10

S010-106

•MY 1DA? FOITION

OSA GEN, REG. NO, 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

•Mr. W.rC. Sullivan

*FROM

:C.

D,o

Brennan

SUBJECT: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

- DATE: 3/31/70

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

On 2/27/69, the Executives Conterence approved a

six-month suspension of investigations in selected Security

Matter - Communist cases as well as report writing in cases

involving Priority II and Priority III Security Index subjects.

This moratorium was imposed as amatter of temporary expediency

in order to make additional investigative personnel available

for organized crime investigations in the field.

At the

conclusion of the above six-month period,

evaluated and on 9/17/69,

that this moratorium would remain

i goate a sect one

the moratorium was.

a letter was sent to the field advising

in effect for an additional

six months.

Priority I of the Security Index includes those

individuals considered to be hard core national

and state

leaders of subversive groups and individuals with no organizational

affiliation who are believed to pose an imminent threat to the

internal security.

Verification of residence and employment of

individuals in this category are conducted every three months

and reports submitted annually.

Cases in this category have not

been affected by the moratorium.

Priority II of the security Index includes those

individuals considered to be the second level of leadership in

subversive organizations and individuals believed to be dangerous

but in less influential positions than those included in Priority I.

Verification of residence and employment in this category and

submission of reports

are performed on an annual basis. Cases

In this category have

been affected by the moratorium.

•.Д.

All other individuals in the Security Index are tabbed

Priority III. Cases in this category have likewise been affected

by the moratorium.

Prior: to 12/69, verification of residence

and employment

these individuals was conducted on a yearly

basis and reports were submitted every two years. In 12/69,;

for the purpose of streamlining om procedures, the Bureau, with

the concurrence of the Department, instructed

the field that

in the absence of unusual circumstances, annual reports no longer

need be submitted regarding Priority III, subjects.

100-358036-4022

IH 55027 DocId:32989610 Page 16

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Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan

SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

100-358086

As of 3/13/70, the Security Index contained 696

Priority, I subjects, 2065 Priority II subjects and 8286

Priority III subjects. In view of the above-stated changes

in procedures, should the moratorium be lifted at this time,

no reports need be submitted in the 8286 Priority III cases,

and reports need only be submitted on a periodic basis in

the 2065 Priority II cases.

This represents an approximate

73 percent reduction in report writing in these categories.

As the Bureau has gone on record in placing the

above moratorium into effect, it would be in the best interests

of the Bureau to similarly go on record, notifying the field

that the moratorium pas been suspender Ada nonali hIs

"*'**imperative that the moratorium be suspended to help regulate

size of the Security Index.

Manual of

Instructions requires

that subjects, after five years of

revolutionary

inactivity in a basic

group or three years of inactivity in a front

group,

be considered for Security Index deletion.

As a result

of the moratorium, no action has been taken by the field in

this respect in the past year, and the Security Index has

continued to grow. From March, 1969, to March, 1970, the

Security Index has increased by over

800 names, principally

because the necessary process of attrition has

been suspended.

It is recognized the moratorium was necessary when

instituted.

It is felt, however, that now is the appropriate

time for the moratorium

to be rescinded not only to enable

the Bureau to fulfill its responsibilities in the vital

internal security field, but because lifting of the moratorium

at this time will not create the burdensome increase in the

workload of the field that would have existed had not the

previously-stated changes in procedures been placed into

effect.

Attached is letter to all field offices advising

that the above moratorium has been rescinded.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the attached letter to all field offices,

advising of the lifting of the moratorium, be approved and

sent to the Mechanical Section in order that appropriate

copies be made.

ww 55027 DocId:32989610 Page 17

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## Page 18

OPTIONAL FORM NO, 10

7010 - 100

I MAY 1962 POITION

OSA OEN. RED. H0. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

•*"

TO

• MR:-TOLSON

•. FROM

W. M. FELT

DATE: April 17, 1970

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREINISUNCLASSIFIED.

DATE 10/5/00

- BY SPAALM/ENL

SUBJECT

SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS

OF INDIVIDUALS

Memorandum C. D. Brennan to Mr. Sullivan, dated March 31, 1970 (attached),

recommended rescinding of the moratorium imposed in February, 1969, relative to

certain security investigations of individuals. Questions posed by the March 31

meant at relation to tie deed fert 2, nano see tachen are

Melon. dipe in bie on ve mend eat no aton un be continued until / e

BACKGROUND:

On February 27, 1969, the Executives Conference approved a 6-month

suspension of investigations in certain specified Security Matter - Communist cases

and in the preparation of reports in cases involving Priority II and Priority III,

Security Index subjects.

This moratorium, which was imposed as a temporary

expedient to make additional investigative personnel available for organized crime

investigations, was extended on September 17, 1969, for an additional 6 months.

The moratorium has not affected Priority I, Security Index subjects, i.e.,

hardcore national and state leaders of subversive groups, and individuals with no

organizational affiliations who are believed to pose an imminent threat to the internal

security. Matters involving Priority II subjects (currently 2065 in that category),

individuals considered to be less influential in subversive organizations and/or who

hold positions of lesser influence, were affected by the moratorium in that verification

of residence and employment was not required and the submission of reports was

suspended. Cases relative to individuals in Priority III (representing about 8, 286

cases), the category of Security Index subjects considered to be least dangerous, were

affected by the moratorium in that these cases were not reopened and verification of

residence and employment of the subjects was not conducted.

It is the view of the Domestic Intelligence Division that the revoking of the

noratorium is desirable at this time in order to help regulate the size of the :

security Index, in order that the whereabouts of the subjects of Priorities II and III

nay be brought up to date, and in order that the Department and other Government

gencies with an interest may receive dissemination of information developed relative

o current subversive activities of the subjects of Priority II cases. •

inclosures

100-358086-4074

WW 55027_ DocId:32989610 Page 18

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## Page 19

Memo for Mr. Tolson

Re: Security Investigations of Individuals

OBSERVATIONS:

The setting of the moratorium on February 27, 1969, and its subsequent 6-

month extension in September, 1969, have resulted in a cessation in the dissemination

of reports relative to the over

2000 individuals who make up the secondary level of

leadership in various subversive organizations. Further, imposition of the moratorium

has caused the field to cease verifying the whereabouts of Priorities II and III subjects.

However, in spite of the moratorium, the field has in many instances remained

cognizant of the current whereabouts of those subjects through established sources,

and, of course, it might be expected that the whereabouts of many of the subjects.

has remained unchanged through the moratorium period.

The rescinding of the moratorium would result in requiring the preparation

and submission of reports in all Priority JI cases there are 2065 such cases) in which

cadilitional pertinent information had been developed since submission of the prior.

report, and would require the preparation and submission of an approved form or

other correspondence in other instances. Further, lifting of the moratorium would

cause the field to initiate investigation to verify the current whereabouts of the subjects

in Priorities Il and III (10, 351 cases).

Subsequent to the initiation of the moratorium, approval was given, with the

written concurrence of the Department, that the writing of reports on Priority III

subjects would be suspended. The appreciable savings of Agent, stenographic and

clerical man hours which resulted from this change would not be affected by a

continuation of the moratorium, since reports on individuals in the Priority II

category would still not be required.

The foregoing would indicate that the lifting of the moratorium would require

the assignment of additional personnel to the Security Index program throughout the.

feld, and that the additional communications generated in the field would impose ar

additional work load on Seat of Government clerical and supervisory personnel.

Rescinding the moratorium would increase the work load, both in the field

and at Seat of Government. In view of additional manpower requirements relative to

the Bureau's intensification of investigations of New Left terrorists, it would not appear

that the rescinding of the moratorium is justified or advisable at this time. This

intensification ordered by the Director will require a considerable manpower commitmen

and make necessary. the reassignment of personnel, both in the field and at the Seat of

Government, to this area of emphasis. Accordingly, the streamlining effect which has

resulted from the imposition of the moratorium should be continued.

-2-

CONTINUED - OVER

HH 55027 DocId:32989610 Page 19

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## Page 20

--064

Memo for Mr. Tolson

Re: Security Investigations of Individuals

RECOMMENDATION:

That the moratorium be continued until 1/1/71 at which time it can

again be re-evaluated.

ADDENDUM: DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

5/20 10

is we pointed out to the Inspector,

the Departnent,

which has

the over-all responsibility for the administration

1 0f

the Security Index Program, has not been advised as to this

moratorium; nor has Secret

Service, which receives the reports

and current information as to the residence and employment of

Security Index subjects.

If the above recommendation is approved, it is further

recommended that the department and secret service be advised by

letter of the moratorium until 1/1/71 in view of the high priority

need for manpower on investigations concerning organized crime

and the intensification of investigations of New Left terrorists.

55027 DocId:32989610

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21b1

+985-357469

irenegas

_MDR-16

ALLINFORMATION CONTAINED

DATE 10/5/00 BY SP& ALMEH

tr. 6108st 414-0

je: + 4195985648925

Assistant Attorney General

Internal Security Division

Diredtor, FBI

Apr11 27, 1970

s,:

PROCRAM FOR APPREFENSION AND

DETENTION OF FERSONS CONSIDERED

POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS TO THE

NATIONAL DEFENSE AND PUBLIC

SAFETY OF THE UNITED STATES

1223

ThE

Invensinication of investigative

responsibilities

as connection with organized crime matiers and the astivitles

Of New Left terrorists has resulted in an increased manpower

burden being placed on this Buresu.

Accordingly, it has baen nedessary to make several

changes

in the reporting of information concerning Security

Index (SI) subjects who are Included under the captioned:

program.

These Changes,

set forth as follows, will remain in

effect until January I,

reevaluatod.

1971; when

the situation will be

No reports concerning those 8x subjects designated

aB PrioIity II will be prepared during this period. Further,

investigation will be instituted for the purpose of veri

fying the current residence and employment of subjecte

designated as Priority Il or Fazority Ill.

The foregoing changes do not affect the handling of

those cases concerning subjects designated as Priority I.

100-358086-4021

55027 DocId:32989610

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## Page 22

date:

day 4, 1970

155793

154200004,

Director, United States Secret Service

Department of the Treasury ...

John Edgar Hoover, Diroctor

Subjeet:

SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIYIDUALS

the Intensification of investigative responsibilities

In connection with organized crime matters and the activities

of New left terrorists have resulted 11 an inoreased manpower

burden being placed on this Bureau.

•.1.

12444

=..

In connection with the above, it has been necessary

to make changes regarding the submission of reports in routine

HecurIty mather onese 1995 14 0001ut0 1044

molots wilk act be instituted for the purpose of verifying

surrent residence and employment of security subjeats.

Changes vill remain in effect until jantary 1, 1971, when the

"ituation vill be reevaluatod.

As you are aware, coples of reports relating to

security subjects have been furnished to you.

You have also

been advised when a change ocourred in the residence and/or

employment of these subjects.

This infornation has been

forwarded to you in order to assist your agency in fullilling

its responsibilities.

in view of the changes in our investigative procedures,

such information vill no longer be furnishod on a periodic basis.

In the event pertinent information does come to the attention of

this Bureau regarding these security subjects, you will, of course,

be advised.

100-358086-8021

- .

MDR-14

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED.

WH 55027

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OPTIONAL PORM NO. 10

5010-106

MAT IPAS EDITION

OSA GIN AIG. NO. 17

UNITED STATES

CERNMENT

Memorandum

Mr. C. D. Brennan

DATE:

7/28/70

R. D. Cotter

: SECTION87

¡MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS (MOI)

SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS

MDR-14

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

EREN SUNGLASSIFIEL

ATE 10/5/00 BY SP PALM/EHI

Current MOI chapter on security investigations is

extremely lengthy 110

0 pages and cumbersome:

This section,

which governs a substantial part of our security work, including

investigations of Marxist-leninist organizations and front groups,

New Left organizations, and Security Index subjects, has not been

overhauled for more than 15

years, and it is seriously in need of

streamlining, updating, and

reorganizing.

For the past several months, as time has permitted, this

entire

section has been reviewed, streamlined, and reorganized by

Supervisor John E. Keating of the Research Section who has worked

closely with inowledgeable supervisors throughout the Division in

connection with this project.

This proiect has now been completed

•and there is attached a revised Section 87 which it is believed is

far better organized and will prove more useful and more readable

both to Agents in the field and to our supervisory staff. Not

only is the revised section much shorter than the current version

(ess than half in length), but it has also been organized with

view to providing maximum convenience in locating subject matter.

and in combining related topics which are not scattered throughgut

this section.

The following specific changes have been made in

connection with this project:

1. All of the pertinent material relating to applicable

statutes has been combined in the initial section of the choter.

heretofore, pertinent statutes had been scattered throughout the

section.

At the same time, we have considerably streamlined the

statutory information especially to eliminate portions of the

Smith Act of 1940 and the Internal Security Act of 1950 which

have recently been declared unconstitutional.

Based on r'ecent

court decisions declaring these statutes invalid, we have also

deleted references to the National Defense Education Act of 1958,

i the National Science Foundation Act of 1950, and the statute.

concerning the right to strike against the Government.

1

100-00-1516

HH 55027 DocId:32989610 Page 23

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## Page 24

Memorandum to Mr. V. C. Sullivan

RE:

SECTION 87•

MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS (MOI)

SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS

2. We have substantially streamlined the current

provisions (87C) relating

to investigations and reports on the

Communist Party, USA, and other Harxist-Leninist groups to

eliminate redundancies of verbage and repetition..

We have broken down current Section 87D (relating

to security investigations of individuals into a number of more

meaningful and clearly defined subsections. Currently, 87D xuns

to some 80 pages and is most unwieldy and complicated.

In our

rewritten chapter we have broken this lengthy section

down into

such categories as policies and objectives, procedures, techniques,

administrative procedures, and dissemination.

4. Throughout the entire chapter ve have used stream

lined wording, eliminated repetition and verbiage, and sought to

organize the material under weil-defined and meaningiul subheadings.

5. A table of contents has

been prepared for the entire

chapter. Currently the chapter contains only a table of contents

with regard to 87D.

This rewritten version of Section 87 has been reviewed

and approved by the Internal Security Section which handles the

bulk of investigations involved.

Pertinent portions have also

been reviewed and cleared by the Nationalities Intelligence

Section (Cuban matters) and the Racial Intelligence Section

(communist infiltration of racial matters and black nationalist

-seen made in revisea versio

ACTION:

That attached rewritten version of Section 87 be

approved. Arrangements will be made so that when this Manual

change is issued, an SAC Letter will be prepared advising the

field of the major changes. At the same time, necessary

changes in the FBI Handbook will be separately submitted.

IW 55027 DocId: 32989610 Page 24

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## Page 25

tho Acting Attorney Goneral

April 28, 1922

Disector, FBI

CILARACTER DE COLSIUTICATIONS

SECURITY. MATIZO AND LACERMAL

SECURITY LITTER CACOGORIES

MDR-16

ALLINFORMATION CONTANED

HEREIN /SUNCLASSIFIEO

DATE 10/5/DO BY SPa ALME HL

term

It has become increasingly apparent that the

"New

Left" is not entirely applicaule to the curcont

broad-based, ants dovernment cevolutionary movement.

In

• 2101220n to

the preconinantly campus-based militant

rovolutlonaries who comprise the

so-cailed. lew Left novenent,

we are also concerned with other violence-prome revolucionny

groups not actually affiliated with the lew belt novement.

The torn "How Loft" as used by the

pross and understood by

the general public does not dopict the adhezents as the

militant, violonce-prone revolutionaries with whom we are

concerned in our current investigationg.

descriptive character of concunications

or indivicuals and organizations proviously icterred to as

"New Loit" will, in the future, be carried as "Revolutionary

Activities."

I • The Deputy Attorney General

1 • Assiscant Attornoy General

Civil Rights Division

I Assistant Attornoy Goneral

'D 2

Crininal Division

Jassistant Attorney General

Infernal security Division

10-9-75900

100-00-1529

NI 39027 DocId: 32989610

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## Page 26

GARIOMA 1000, 15..u

5010-106

+48 184880110N

082 68H. 88 168.31

URTED STATESE JUBENMENT

Memorandum

TO

FROM

SUBJFCT:

Mr. MAlaball

DATE: 3/20/73

MPR-Ib

P. F. O'Connell

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREINIS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE /D/5/D0 BYSD&ALM/ETTL

PROPOSED DESTRUCTION OF FILES IN THE

100 (INTERNAL SECURITY) AND 105 (INTERNAL

SECURITY MATTERS) CLASSIFICATION

CONTAINING VALUELESS FILE MATERIAL

BY THE RECORDS DISPOSAL COMMITTEE

FILES AND CONMUNICATIONS DIVISION

The purpose of this memorandum is to recommend the destruction

of files in the 100 (Internal Security) and 105 (Internal Security or Security

Matters - Nationalistic Tendencies other than Domestic) Classifications

containing record material which no longer possess sufficient historical,

investigative, intelligence, and reference value to merit retention.

The Records Disposal Committee, Files and Communications

Division, conducted a survey of our records holdings in the 100 and 105

Classifications which revealed that files over 25 years old occupy 585.

six drawer cabinets (100's occupy 565 cabinets and 105's occupy 20 cabinets).

A cross section aralysis of these files revealed that cases occupying

approximately 350 cabinets relate to alleged Espicnage, Sedition, Sabatoge,

Hatch Act, and Internal Security Violations as weli as alleged subversive

activity, subversive tendencies, sympathizers, members of subversive

organizations, suspicious actuates, recipient

of funds from foreign sources

and miscellaneous matters in which no violations are present and the

allegations were unfounded.

Also numerous files in the 100 Classification were opened on

outgoing letters to Field Offices based upon excerpis from other Bureau files

pertaining to subscribers to the Daily Worlier or publications of a similar

nature and/or alleged membership in o1 aftiliation with subversive organizations.

No further correspondence appears in these iles, therefore, all information

will be available in the original Burcau case lile alter these are destroyed.

U. R. (below 100-00-1531)

: •I = Intelligence Division

crisind in 62-3288-1126

MH 55027 DocId:32989610 Page 26

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## Page 27

Iviemorandum P. F. O'Connell to Mr. Marshall

Re: PROPOSED DESTRUCTION OF TILES IN THE I0O INTERNAL SECURITY)

AND 105 (INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS) CLASSIFICATION CONTAINING

VALUELESS FILE MATERIAL BY THE RECORDS DISPOSAL COMMITTEE

Files, which will be considered for destruction, contain valueless

information comprised principally of initial correspondence, and preliminary

reports or letters. They were opened based won rumor, personal grievances,

suspicions, non'specific allegations, nebulous information or forcign publications

mostly during World War II, for record or informational purposes. All of this

material has been extensively de-indexed and files which will be destroyed do not

contain any information reflecting unfavorably upon the character, loyalty or

associates of the subjects in the title or persons named therein.

Approximately

350 six drawer file cabinets of badly needed filing space will be reclaimed. The

destruction of these files will be handled on a most selective basis by experienced

Records Branch Personnel and will in no was adversely affeci the Bureau's

operations or Its responsibilities in the Name Check field.

The proposed destruction will include material in the 100-0 general

file and in the 100-0 Sub A file, where applicable. Archival Authority is

required for the destruction of original record material and will be requested by

separate memorandum.

It is noted that this proposal is very similar in nature to a recent

proposal involving files in the 65 (Espionage) Classification, which was approved

by the Bureau in memorandum P. F. O'Connell to Mr. Marshall dated 8/13/72.

Archival Authority was granted on 9/12/72 for the destruction of the valueless

Espionage file material.

It is recommended that this proposal be referred to the Intelligence

Division for its evaluation and comments.

• RECOMMENDATION:

That approval be granted for the destruction of files in the 100 and

• 105 classifications in accordance with the above guidelines in cases over 25

years old.

If approved, appropriate Archival Authority will be obtained.

НЫ 55027

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ADDENDUM INTELLIGENCE DIVISION 4/3/73

Attached to this Addendum is a list furnished

by the Files and Communications Division of the files

being considered for

• destruction.

A review was made of

a random sampling of these files

(those checked in red

on the list; one of each general

type; total of thirty

files).

The sample review bears

out the conclusion of

the Files and Communications Division that these files

have no apparent historical, investigative, intel igence

or reference value which would merit their retention.

The Intelligence Division concurs in the recommendation

of the Files and Communications Division thai such files

be destroyed after receipt of Archival authorization or

such disposal,

provided

that each and every file to be

destroyed is

first individually reviewed by experienced

Records Branch personnel to ensure they meet the destruc-

tion criteria and that their destruction will in no way

adversely aîfect the Bureau's operations or its responsibii-

ities in the name check or security field:

It is recommended

nowever,

that General Investigative Division

(Name Check

Section concurrence be auso obtained.

Attachment

.....

55027 DoeId:32989610

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ADDENDUM:

GENERAL IRVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

4-6-73,

The Name Check Section presently reviews various

Iiles of reference to select information of pertinency in

responding to name check requests from various executive

agencies and others.

In general, files containing non-

derogatory information or no intornation of inteliigence

Therefore, the authorized

destruction of any files having no apparent historical,

investigative, intelligence or reierence value should not

have any effect upon responsibilities of the Name Check

Section.

It would appear that any determination as to

selectivity of files for destruction should be made by the

Substantive Desk having supervisory responsibility for the

{les.

Therefore, the Name Check Section, which periorms

a servicing function in connection with review of Bureau

files, defers to the judgment of the Files and Communications

and Intelligence Divisions.

•г??

HH (55027

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## Page 30

"*

OPTIONNA SOON MO.

10

3010 - 104

MAY ITAT ININDM

USA 0102

110.н0.21

UNITED ST.ITES (DERNMENT

Memorandum

Ms. E. S. Miller

$AO.81

T. J. Smith

SUNJECT REVISION SECTION 87

MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS

awrin

DATE:

6/8/73

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIES

DATE 10/5/00 BY S/P.a. ARMi EHL

A recent proposed revision of Section 87 of the Manual of

Instructions (MOI) has been approved and is in the process of being

printed.

This revision makes reference to an MOI appendix enumera

ling statutes,

evidence of violations of which may be developed during

investigations of domestic subversive organizations and individuals and

foreign counterintelligence investigations.

All personnel conducting these

types of investigations should

be aware of these statutes and aleri for evidence of such violations.

Attached is proposed appendix.

• ACTION:

Attached be approved and prepared for Manual of Instructions

along with approved Section 87 revision.

Enclosure

...

,.."

U.R. (below 100-00-1532)

ciginal in 66-1934-81291

N 55027 DocId: 32989610 Page, 30

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MDR -14

• ALL INFORMATION CONTALMED

HEREIN ISLINCLASSIMIE

ATEND 5:00 BY UPZALM EH

•APPENDIX

Evidence of violations of the

following statutes may be developed during

investigations of domestic subversive

organizations. and individuals and foreign

counterintelligence investigations.

All

personnel engaged in such investigations

should be aware of these statutes.

Refer

to the United States Code Annotated for

full presentation of the statute and its

judicial case history.

117 55027 DoeFt: 32989610 Page 31

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## Page 32

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

...

Activities Against Foreign Governments

Conspiracy to Injure Property of

Foreign Governments

Comnission to Serve Against A

Friendly Nation

Enlistment in Foreign Service

Expedition Against Friendly Nation

Strengthening Armed Vessel of Foreign

Nation

Arming Vessel Against Friendly Nation

Advocating the Overthrow or Destruction of the

Government; Opposing by Force the Authority of

the Government; Related Activities

Treason

Misprision of Treason

Rebellion or Insurrection

Seditious Conspiracy

Advocating Overthrow of the Government

Anti-Riot Laws

Riots

Civil Disorders

]

1

2

2

2

3

3

3

4

5

-....

MDR-16

ALL INFORATION CONTAINED

- HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

...

L. H# 55027

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## Page 33

Page

Atomic Energy Act of 1954

Unauthorized Dealing in Special Nuclear

Material

Prohibitions Governing Acomic Weapons

Production Facility:

Suspension of Licenses During War Or

National Emergency

Security Investigations

Communication, Receipt, Tampering,

Disclosure of

Restrioted Data

Trespass Upon Conmission Installation;

Issuance and Posting of Regulations

phoingraphing, etce, of Conmission

Installations

Bomb Threats - Bombings - Interstate I'cansportation

Of Explosives

Prohibited Acis Under FBI

Jurisdiction

Civil Rights

Federally Procected Activitios

Crimes on Government Reservations

Laws of States Adopted for Areas within

Fedoral Jurisdiction

Arson within Special Maritime and

Terricorial Jurisdiction

Desecration of the Flag of the United States

Destruction of Government Property

Government Fropesty or Contracts

6

6

6

6

7

. . .

7

8

9

9

10

10

H₩ 55027

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• Page

Espionage

Harboring or Concealing Persons

Gathering, Transmitting, or Losing

Defense Information

Gathering or Delivering Defense Infor-

mation to Aid Foreign Government

Photographing and Sketching Defense

Installations

Use of Aircrafe for Photographing

Defense Installations

Publication and Sale of Photographs

Of Defense Installations

Disclosure of Classified Information

Violation of Regulations of National

Aeronautics and Space Administration

Conspiracy or Attempt to Establish

Totalitarian Dictatorship

Firearms Acts

National Firearns Act

Transfer's

Making Firearms

Identification of Firearms,

Destructive Devices

Definitionsof Various Fire-

arms and Destructive Devices

Prohibited Acts

10

:10

11.

12

12

12.

12

1.2

13

: 1.3

:.11

14

14.

14

•torines

WH 55027 DocId: 32989610 Page 34

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## Page 35

Page

State Firearms Control Assistance

Definitions

Unlawful

General. Prohibition on

Receipt, Possession, Transpor

tation of Firearms by Felons,

One Dishonorably Discharged from

Military, Mental Incompetents,

One who Renounced U. S. Citizen-

ship, and Illegal Aliens

Fraud Against the Government

Statements or Entries Generally

Interstate Travel in Aid of Racketeering

Loss of United States Nationality

Loss of Nationality by Native-born or

Naturalized Citizen; Voluntary Action,

Burden of Proof; Presumptions

Dual Nationals; Divestiture of Nationality

Neutrality Matters

Munitions Control

Illegal Expostation of War Materials

000

Seizure and Forfeiture of Materials

anô Carriers

Private Correspondence with Foreign Governments

(The Logan Act)

15

15

19

19

is: 20

21

23

23

23

?...

•".rї

HH 55027 DocId:32989610 Page 35

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.

-

Page

Protection of Foreign Officials and Official

Guests of the United States

Murder or Manslaughter of Foreign

Officials or Official Guests

Kidnaping

Protection of Foreign Officials

and Official Guests

Protection of Property Occupied by

Foreign Governments and International

Organizations

Protection of United States Officials and Employees

Assaulting, Resisting or Impeding Certain

Officers and Employees

Protection of Officers and Employees of

• the United States

Assault or Resistance

Congressional Assassination, Kidnaping and

Assault

Presidential Assassinations; Kidnaping and

Assault

Registration Acts

Agents of Foreign Governments

Foreign Agents Registration Act as

Amended (The McCormack Act)

Registration Act - Individuals with

Knowledge of Espionage or Sabotage -

by Foreign CountIy

Registration

of certain Organizations

24

24

24

25

25

25

26

26

2.7

27

27

27°

•28

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:

Page

Sabotage

Fortifications, Harbor Defenses,

Defensive Sea

• Areas

Destruction of War Material,

War Premises

or War Utilities

Production of Defective War Material, War

Premises or Was Utilities

Strategic Facilities

28

29

29

29

sedition

Activities Affecting Armed Forces Generally

Activities Affecting Armed Forces During

War

Recruiting for Service Against the

United States

Enlistment to Serve Against the United States

30

•...

31

31

31

.. ...

'"?.

-1÷.

'.....

'. .i

...

..." i:.0..

7H 55027

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ACTIVITIES AGAINST FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS

18 U.S.C.

956. Conspiracy to Injure Property of Foreign

Governments

Prohibits conspiracies of two or more persons vithin

the jurisdiction of the United States to injure or destroy

any railroad, canal, bridge, or other public utility or specific

property situated in a foreign country and belonging to a

foreign government or political subdivision thereof with which

the United States is at peace.

Commission of an act within

the jurisdiction of the United States by one or more of the

conspirators to effect the object of the conspiracy penalizes

the on in me

each of the parties to the conspiracy.

18 U.S.C. 958. Commission to Serve Against a Friendly Nation

Prohibits any United States citizen within the

jurisdiction of the United States from accepting and exercising

a commission to serve a foreign prince, state, colony,

district or people, in war against any prince, state, colony,

district or people with whom the United States is at peace.

18 U.S.C.

959. Enlistment in Foreign Service

Prohibits anyone in the United States enlisting or

entering himself or hiring another to enlist or enter, or

leaving the jurisdiction of the United States with intent to

enter or enlist in the military service of any foreign power.

18 U.S.C.

960. Expedition Against Friendly Nation

Prohibits anyone in the United States from knowingly

taking part in or supporting any military or naval expedition or

enterprise against the territory or dominion of any foreign

power wich whom the United States is at peace.

18 U.S.C.

961. Strengthening Armed Vessel of Foreign Nation

Penalizes anyone in the United States who strongth-

ens any armed vessel in the service of any foreign power

which. is at war against any. foreign power with whom the

United States is at peace.

MDR - 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIDO

o Im

1816-

Page Ch

DATE 10/5/00 BY SPRALMEHL

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## Page 39

18 U.S.C. 962. Arming Vessel Against Friendly Nation

Penalizes:

(1) Anyone within the United States who atcempts

to or does arm any vessel, with the intention that the

vessel shall be employca by a foreign power, to commit hos

tilities againsi any forcign power with whom the United States

is at peace, or

(2) anyone who commissions any vessel with the

above intent.

Bureau Classification 2

Manual of Instructions

• Volume III, Section 75

18 U.S.C.

ADVOCATING THE OVERTHROW

OR DESTRUCIION OF THE GOVERNKENT;

OPPOSING BY FURCE THE AUTIORITY OF IND

GOVERNMENT; RELATED ACTIVITIES

2381. Treason

Penalizes anyone who, owing allegiance to the

United Scates, levies war against the United States or

adheres to their enemies giving them aid and comfort within

the United States or elsewhere.

Note that this codifies the crime of treason as

defined in the Constitution.

It does not extend or restrict

or provide a new definition for the crime of treason.

Bureau Classification 61

• Manual of Instruczions

Volume IV, Section 95

18 U.S.C.

2382 Misprision of Treason

Penalices anyone who owing allegiance to the

United States

and having Inowledge of the cormission of

treasonable acts conceals and does not disclose such infor-

mation, toan appropriate official,

Burcau Classification 61

Manual of Instructions

Volume IV, Section 95

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18 U.S.C.

2383.

Rebellion or Insurrection

Penalizes anyone who incites, sets on foot, assists,

or engages in any rebellion or insurrection against the

authority of the United States or the laws thereof, or gives

aid or comfort thereto.

Bureau Classification 100

Manual of Instructions

Volume

III, Section' 87

18 U.S.C. 2384• Seditious Conspiracy

Penalizes each member of a conspiracy involving two

of more persons in any State or Territory, or in any place sub

ject to their jurisdiction, who conspires to overthrow the

Government of the United States, levy war against them, oppose

by force the authority thereot, or by force prevent, hinder,

or delay the execution of any law of the United States or by

force seize, take or mossess any property of the United States

contrary to

the authority thereof.

• Bureau Classification 100

Manual of Instructions

Volume III, Section 87

18 U.S.C.

2385. Advocating Overthrow of Government

(The Smith Act)

Penalizes (1) anyone who knowingly and willtholy

advocates, abets, advises, or teaches the duty, necessity,

desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying the

Government of the United States, any Stace, Territory, District

or Possession of the United States, by force or violence or by

assassination of any officer of such government; (2) anyone who

with intent to cause the overthrow or destruction of any such

government, prints, publishes, edits, issues, circulates, sells,

distributes, or publicly displays any written or printed matter,

advocating, advising or teaching the duty, necessity, desir

ability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying any govern-

ment in the United States by force or violence, or attempts

to ão so; (3) anyone who organizes, helps or attempts to

organize any society, group or assembly to engage in above-

''"see."s:

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listed activities or becomes a member of, or affiliates with

such a

group knowing its purpose to be overthrow of the govern-

ment by force or violence; (1) anyone participating in a

conspiracy to commit any above-named activities.?

Bureau Classification 100

Manual of Instructions

Volume III, Section 87

ANTIRIOT LAWS

18 U.S.C.

2101.

Riots

Prohibits travel in or use of interstate or foreign

commeice with intent to incite a riot or organize, promote,

encourage, participate in. or carry on a riot, or commit any

act of violence in furtherance of a riot, or aid or abet any

person in inciting or participating in a riot, or perform or

attempt to perform any overt act to incite or participate in

a riot.

18 U.S.C. 2102. Definitions

(a) "Riot" herein means a public disturbance involving

(1) an act or acts of violence by one or more persons part of

an assemblage of three or more persons which act or acts

constitute a clear and present danger of or shall result in

damage or injury to the property of any other person or to

the person of any other individual or (2) a threat or threats

of the commission of an act or acts of violence by one or more

persons part of an assemblage of three or more persons having

individually or collectively, the ability of imnediate

execution of such threat or threats, where the performance of

the threatened act or acts of violence would constitute a

clear and present danger of or would result in damage or

injury to the pronorty of any other person or to the pancon

of any other individual.

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(2) The term "to incite to riot" 'or "to organize, pro-

mote, encourage, participate in, or carcy on a riot" includes

but is not linited to urging or instigating others to riot.

It is not deced to mean the mere oral or written advocacy of

ideas or expression of belief.

18 U.S.C. 231. Civil Disorders

Prohibits:

(1) Teaching or demonstrating to any other person

the use, application or making of any firearm, explosive or

Incendiary device, or technique capable of causing death or

injury with knowledge or intention that they will be used in

a civil disorder affecting commerce or a federally protected

function;

(2)

Transportation or manufacture for transport

in commerce any such firearm, explosive or incendiary

device, with knowledge or intention that the same will be

used unlawfully in furtherance of a civil disorder;

(3) Interference or attempis to interfere wich

any

•fireman or law enforcement officer engaged in the performance

of his duties during a civil disorder which affects conmesce

ox any fedecally protected function.

18 U.S.C.

232. Definitions of "Civil Disorder," "Commerce,

"Federally Protected Function," "Firearm,"

"Explosive o1: Incendiary Device," "Fireman,"

and "Law Enforcement Officer."

18 U.S.C.

233.

Preemption

:: Congress did not preempt this field to the exclusion

of State or local laws and no provision of this statute is to

be construed to invalidate any State law unless the state law

is inconsistent with the purpose of this statute.

Burcau Classification 176

Manual of Instructions

Volume IV, Section 136

"i "

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ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954

Unless authorized by the U. S. Atomic Energy

Commission or under international agreement, the Act pro-

hibits the activities enumerated in 42 U.S.C. 2077, 2122!

2131 below:

42 U.S.C. 2077. Unauthorized Dealings in Special Nuclear

Material

(a) Transferring or receiving in interstate commerce

or transierring, delivering, acquiring, owning, possessing, or

receiving possession of or title to, or importing into or

exporting from the United States any special nuclear material;

(b) Engaging in the production of any special

nuclear material outside the United States;

42 U.S.C. .2122. Prohibitions Governing Atomic Weapons..

Transferring or receiving in interstate or foreign

commerce or manufacturing, producing, transferring, acquiring,

possessing, importing or exporting any atomic weapon.

42 U.S.C. 2131. Production Facility

Transferring or receiving in interstate commerce,

manufacturing, producing, transferring, acquiring, possessing,

using, importing of exporting any utilization or production

• facility.

• 42 U.S.C. 2138. Suspension of Licenses During War Or

National Emergency

The Atomic Energy Commission, whenever Congress

declares that a state of war or national emergency exists is

authorized to suspend any license, to recapture special

nuclear material and to order the operation of any licensed

facility.

42 U.S.C. 2165.

Security Restrictions

(2) Investigations by the FBI

"IE a personnel investigation of an Atomic Energy

employce develops any

information that such indiridual is

of questionable lovaltv, the matter must be referred to tho

... "Bi for a tull tieid anvestigation.

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(e) FBI investigation of any individual to be

employed or licensed by the Atomic Energy Commission may

be required by the President.

(f) The FBI is required to investigate individuals

.to be named to positions with a high degree of importance or

sensitivity with the Atomic Energy Commission.

RESTRICTED DATA

"Restricted Data" means all data concerning (1)

design, manufacture, or utilization of atomic weapons; (2)

the production of special nuclear material; or (3) the use

of special nuclear material in the production of energy.

Anyone with the intent or reason to believe that the U. S.

will be injured or a foreign nation be given an advantage

is prohibiie from:

42 U.S.C. 2274,5,6,7. Communicating, Transmitting or

Disclosing Restricted Data to

Any Person; Acquiring Restricted

Data; Tampering with Restricted

Data; or Disclosing Restricted

Data to One Known or Believed Not

to Be Authorized to Receive It

42 u.S.C.

2278a.

Trespass Upon Commission Installations;

Issuance and Posting of Regulations

Prohibits willful violations of entry and other

regulations of Atomic Energy Commission facilities.

42.U.S. C.

2278b.

Photographing, etc., of Commission

Installations

Prohibits photographing, sketching, etc., of Atomic

Energy Commission installations or facilities, information

about which is protected against general dissemination.

Bureau Classification 117

Manual of Instructions

Volume TI, section ?0

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BOMB THREATS - BOMBINGS -

INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF EXPLOSIVES

The FBI and the Treasury Department have concurrent

the Department of justice

treasury will handle subsections

having jurisdiction over the underlying telony. Violations

directed against diplomatic functions will be handled by the

Each agency handles violations directed at its own

functions, and postal authorities handle violations directed

against that agency's functions as well as matters involving

explosives sent through the mail.

18. U.S.C. 841. Prohibits: •

• (2)

Interstate transportation of explosives or

incendiary devices with intent to injure or

intimidate a person or damage property.

(e)

Use of telephone, mail

• or other instrument of

• Commerco to

transmit a

bomb threat.

(f) Use of explosives or incendiary devices to

damage any property ouned or used by the

U.S. Government or any institution or organi.

zation receiving Federal Iinancial assistance.

(9)

Unauthorized possession of explosives or

incendiary devices in a building owned or used

by. the U. S. Government.

(h)

Carrying or using explosives or incendiary

devices during the commission of any Federal

felony.

(1)

Use of explosives or incendiary devices to

damage any property used in an activity affect

ing interstate conmerce.

Bureau Classification 174

Manual of Instructions

Volume II, Section 23

• CIVIL RIGHTS

.18. 0. SiC.: 245..

Federally Protected Activities

Prohibits willful injury or interference with

(1) persons in the exercise of certain enumerated rights

by force or threat of force, whether or not the offenders

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are acting under color of law; (2) persons voting in any

election

articipatino in benerits of federa.

programs

r facilities, applying for or

enjoying Federal employment

or serving as

Federal jurors; (3)

persons on account of

public schools or

private or State employment, serve

as State jurors, use the

facilities of interstata commerce, or patronize enumeratec

places of public accommodation; (4) persons who afford others

opportunity to participate in

the activities listed above;

(5) persons not participating, for the purpose of intimi-

dating those who are participating, in the above-mentioned

activities: and (6) persons participating in a speech or

peaceful assembly opposing denial of opportunity to partici-

pate in these activities.

Bureau Classification 44•

Manual of Instructions

Volume II, Section 27

CRIMES ON GOVERNMENT RESERVATIONS

18 U.S.C.

•13.

Laws of States Adopted for Areas within

Federal

Jurisdiction

Makes the criminal law on a government reservation

conform to local law except when a particular

act has

been

defined as a federal offense.

18 U.S.C. 81. Arson within Special Maritime and Territorial

• Jurisdiction

Penalizes anyone who, within the special maritime and

territorial jurisdiction of the United States, willfully and

maliciously attempts to, or sets fire to or burns any building,

structure or vessel, any machinery or building materials or

supplies, military or naval stores, munitions of war,

• or any

structural aids or appliances for navigation or shipping.

Penalty is increased if the building is a dwelling or

if the life of any person. is placed in jeopardy:

....

→....

Bureau Classifiration 70

Manual of Instructions

Volume II, Section 33

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• DESECRATION OF U. S. FLAG

18 U.S.C.

700. Desecration of The Flag of the United States

prohibits anyone from knowingly casting contempt

upon the United States flag, standard, colors, ensign, or any

picture or representation of either by publicly mutilating,

defacing, defiling, burning, or trampling upon it.

Bureau Classification 180

Manual of Instructions

Volume IV, Section 138

DESTRUCTION OF COVERNMENT PROPERTY

18 U.S.C.

1361, Government Pxoperty ox Contracts

Penalizes

anyone no wililuily injures on commits

any depredation against any property of the United States, or

of any department or agency thereof, or any property which

has been or is being manufactured or constructed. for the

United States, or any department of agency thereoi.

Bureau Classification 52

Manual of Instructions

VolUme II, Section 50

ESPIONAGE

18

U.S.C. 792.

Harboring of Concealing Persons

Penalizes anyone who harbors or conceals any person

who he knows, has rcasonable grounds to belleve or suspect,

has

committed, or is about to cormit a violation of the

Espionage statute.

18 U.S.C. 793.

Gathering, Iransmitcing, or Losing Defense

Information

.. :

Prohibits anyone with intent or reason to believe

that the U.S. will be injured or a loreign nation will be

givon an advantage thereby from:

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(a)

(1)

Obtaining information concerning facilities,

equipment, etc., related to the national

defense;

Obtaining enumerated items, e.g, copies,

sketches,

photographs, etc., of anything

• connected

with the national

defense.

• (c).

(d)

(e)

(1)

(g)

Receiving, obtaining, or agreeing to obtain

enumerated items, e.f., documents, code books,

etc., related to the national defense.

Willfully making available items related to

the national defense by one lawfully entitled

to have

access to them to one not auchorized

to receive them, or to willfully keep such

items from one

entitled to receive them.

Willfully making available items related to

the national defense by one whose access to

such items is inauthorizca to ono not aücho

rized to receive them, or to willfully keep

such items. from one entitled to receive them.

Allowing items related to the national defense

in his lawful custody to be removed, lost,

destroyed, etc., or fails to report

such

occurrence.

Conspiring to violate the above provisions.

18 U.S.C. 194.

Gathering or Delivering Defense Information

to Aid Foreign Government

Penalizes anyone who with intent or reason to believe

that it is to be used to the injury of the United States or

advantage of a foreign nation attempts to or transmits to any

foreign power any of the enumerated items including any docu-

ment, writing, note or information relating to the national

defense:

no one tomaton relating

Penalizes anyone, who in time or war, with intent

that it shall be conmunicated to the enemy, collects, records,

• 1. 1

publishes or cornunicates of attempts to gather any informtion

regarding the Armed forces,

or information relating to the

national defense which might be useful to the enemy.

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1,8

U.S.C.. 795. Photographing and Sketching Defense

Installations

Prohibits the making of any photograph, sketch,

picture, drawing, map, or graphical representation of military

and naval installations and equipment designated by the

President

as requiring protection from general dissemination.

-18 U.S.C. 796.

Use of Aircraft for Photographing Defense

Installations

Penalizes the use of aircraft for the activities

enumerated in 18 U.S.C. 795.

18 U.S.C. 797. Publication and Sale of Photographs of

Defense Installations

Prohibits the reproduction, publication, sale or

giving away of ary photograph, sketch. or other graphical

representation of any military or naval installation or

equipment defined by the President as requiring protection

against general dissemination of information.

18 U.S.C. 798: Disclosure of Classified Information

Penalizes anyone who knowingly and willfully communi-

cates, furnishes, transmits or otherwise makes available to

an unauthorized person, or publishes, or uses in any manner

prejudicial to the United States' interest or safety or, uses

for the benefit of a foreign government any classified infor-

mation concerning communication systems or intelligence.

18 U.S.C. 799. Violation of Regulations of National

•: Aeronautics and Space Administration

Penalizes any conspiracy to violate or any violation

of any regulations or orders of the National Aeronautics ana

Space Administration for the protection or security of any

laboratory, station, base or facility or part of any of these,

•Or any aircraft, missile, spacecraft or similar vehicle or

part of any of these or any property or equipment of this

agency of any real or personal property, or equipment held by

a contractor under a contract with the National Aeronautics

and space Administration.

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i vi

ESPIONAGE

50 U.S.C.

783.

Conspiracy or Attempt to Establish Totalitarian

Dictatorship

Prohibits:

(a)

Any act which would substantially contribute

to the establishment within the United States of a totalitar

lan dictatorship which would be under the direction, control,

or domination of any foreign government, organization or

individual.

(b) Any United States employee from communicating

any classified information affecting the security of the

United States to a person who is known to be a representa-

tive of foreign government or an

officer or member of a

Communist organization.

(c)

Any agent or representative of a foreign gov

•ernment or member or officer of a Communist organization from

knowingly attempting to or obtaining or receiving any classi

fied information affecting the security of the United States

from any United States government employee.

Bureau Classification 65

Manual of Instructions

Volume II, Section 36

FIREARMS ACTS

National Firearms Act

26 U.S.C. 5812. Transfers

The transfer of a firearm requires a written appli

cation to the Secretary of the Ireasury for the transfer and

registration to the transferee.

The application must contain

Identification of the transferor; trarsferee;' and: firsarm.

involved.

і«б.°

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26 U.S.C. 5822. Making Firearms

Requires that any prospective maker of a firearm

must file with che secretary of the treasury a written

application indicating his intent to make a firearm.

The

application must contain the identificacion of the firearm,

the identity of the prospective maker including his photograph

and fingerprints, the proper stamp showing that the tax imposed

by this provision has been paid.

26 U.s.C.

5842.

Identification of Firearms, other than

• Destructive Devices

Manufacturers and importers of firearms other than

destructive devices are required to identify such items by

serial number or as otherwise prescribed.

26 U.S.C. 5845.

Definitionsof various Firearms and

Destructive Devices

26 U.S.C. • 5861. Prohibited Acts

(a)

to engage in business

as a manufacturer or

"importer of, or dealer in firearms without having paid the

required

tax or having registored as required by this

chapter;

(b)

to receive or possess a firearn transferred

in violation of requirements of this chayter;

(c): to receive or possess a firearm made in vio-

lation of this chapter;

(d).to

receive or possess an unregistered firearm;

(e) to transfer a firearm without complying with

requirenchts of this chapter regarding transfer;

(t) to make a firearm without complying with the

requirements of this chapter;

(g) to obliterate, remove, change, or alter the

serial number or other identification of a firearm required

by this chapteri

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(h) to receive or possess a firearm having the

serial nunber or other identification required under this

chapter obliterated, removed, changed, or altered;

(i) to rcceive or possess a firearm not identified

by a serial number as required;

(j) to transport, deliver, or receive any firearm

"In interstate connerce which has not been registered accora-

ing to regulations of this chapter;

(k) to receive or possess a firearm which has been

imported or brought into the United States for the use of the

United States or any United States department, independent

establishment, or agency of the United States, or any State

or possession or political subcivision of such State or

possession; or for scientific or research purposes; or solely

for testing or use as a model by a registered manufacturer or

solely for use as a sample by a registered importer or dealer.

Exception: The Secretary of the Treasury may permit the con

dizional importation or bringing in of a firearm for examina-

tion and testing in conneccion with classifying

che firoürm;

?:(1)

to make any false entry on any application,

return or required record, knowing such entry to be false.

State Firearms Control Assistance Act

This act deals primarily with the interstate trans-

portation of firearms.

18 U.S.C. 921. Definitions of Act Terms

18 U.S.C. 922.

(a) Unlawful Acts

(1) Engaging in the business of importing,

manufacturing os dealing in firearms or ammunition without

a license; shipping, transporting or receipt of any firearm

or ammunition in interstate or foreign comnerce by an

unlicensed person.

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(2) Interstate shipment of any firearms or

ammunition by a licensee to anyone other than another

licensee, with certain exceptions.

:

(3) Transporting of receiving by a non-

licensee in the State of his residence any firearm purchased

or obtained by him outside his state.

(4) Transporting destructive devices and

National Firearms Act weapons by other than a licensed

Importer, Licensed manufacturer, Licensed dealer or License

collector in interstate or loreign commerce, except as

authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury.

(5) Transferring, selling, trading, giving,

transporting or delivering a firearm by an unlicensed

person to another unlicensed person who. resides in another

state.

÷

(6) Knowingly making any material false

statement or use of any deceitful practice to attempt to or

to acquire a firearm or ammunition.

(b) Prohibitions Applicable Only to Licensees

(1) Sale or delivery by a licensee of any

firearm, other than a shotgun of a rifle, or ammunition for

a firearm other than a shotgun or rifle to anyone less than

twenty-one years old.

Sale or delivery by a licensee of any

firearm, or ammunition to anyone less than 18 years of age.

(2) Selling or delivering any firearm or

ammunition to an unlicensed person if the licensee has

reasonable cause to believe the purchase or the possession

of the firearm or ammunition would be in violation of

State or local law.

(3) Selling a firearm to an out-of-State

unlicensed resident except that this section does allow a

licensee to sell or deliver a shotgun or rifle to a resi-

...dent of a State contiguous to the State.of the licensee's

place of business if the purchaser's State of residence

permits such

said

or delivery by law

and if the sale con-

frame, to the late of the both statoo.

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(1) Delivering or sclling a destructive

device or a National Firearms Act weapon to any person un-

less authorized.

(5) Delivering or selling any firearm or

ammunition without making a record of the name, age and resi

dence of the purchaser.

(2) Prohibits a licensee from selling or otherwise

disposing of any firearm or ammunition to any person who:

(1) is under indictment for, or has been

convicted of a felony, or;

•(2) is a fugitive from justice; or

(3) is an unlawful user of or addicted to

marihuana or any depressant or stimulant drug or narcotic

drug;

•(4) has been adjudicated as a mental defec

tive or has been committed to any mental institution.

(e) Prohibits anyore from knowingly delivering

to a common carrier for transportation or shipment in inter-

state or foreign commerce to other than licensees any container

in which there is any firearm or ammunition without furnishing

to the carrier written notice that such is being transported

shipped.

This section provides that any passenger who owns

or legally possesses a firearn or ammunition transporting

such items

aboard a cornon carrier for movement with the

passenger in interstate or foreign commerce may deliver such

Items to the pilot, captain, conductor or operator of the

common carrier for the duration of the trip and will thus

not be in violation of this section.

(1) Moldsits any common or contract carrier to

transport or deliver in interstate or foreign commerce any

Iirearm or ammunition with knowledge or irasonable cause

to believe that its transportation or receipt would be in

violation of this statute.

(9), (h) Prohibits the shipping, transporting, or

receipt.of any firearm or anmunition in interstate or foreign

commerce by anyone who;

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(1)

is under indictment, or is a felon, or;

'(2) is a fugitive from justice or;

(3) is an unlawful user of or addicted to

marihüana or any depressant or stimulant drug or narcotic

arug; or

(4) has been adjudicated as a mental defec-

tive, or who has been committed to a mental institution.

(i) Prohibits anyone from transporting a stolen

firearm or ammunition in interstate or foreign commerce

knowing or having reasonable cause to believe it was stolen.

(j) Prohibits any person from receiving, con-

cealing, storing, bartéring, selling or disposing of any

stolen firearm or stolen ammunition or from pleaging or

accepting as security for a loan any stolen firearm or

stolen anmunition, which is moving as or is a part of

stäie or foreign concice, having reasonable cause to believe

FEEL

or knowleage that the firearm or ammunition was stolen.

• (k) Prohibits anyone knowingly from transporting,

shipping or receiving, in interstate or foreign commerce, any

firearn fron which the manufacturer's or importer's serial

number has been removed, obliterated, or altered.

:(1) Prohibits anyone knowingly from importing or

bringing into the United States or its possessions any firearms

or ammunition in violation of provisions of this chapter, or

from knowingly receiving any such firearm or ammunition so

imporied.

Keep under this statute.

18 U.S.C. 924. Contains the Penalty and Forfeiture

Provisions of Chapter

au 18-

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18 U.S.C. Appendix 1202 Receipt, Possession, Transportation

of Firearms; Persons Liable;

Penalties for violations

Prohibits receipt, possession or transportation in

commerce or affecting commerce, of any firearn by anyone who

has been or is a knowing employee of anyone who has been

convicted of a felony, or received a dishonorable discharge

from the Armed Forces, or has been adjudged by a United States

or State or local court of being mentally incompetent, or has

renounced his United States citizenship or is an alien illeg-

•ally or unlawfully in the United States.

Bureau Classification 4

Manual of Instructions

Volune III; Section 74

FRAUD AGAINST THE GOVERNHENT

18 U.S.C. 1001. Statements or Entries Generally

Provides criminal punishment for anyone who knowingly

and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick

scheme or device a material fact or makes any false,

fictitious

or fraudulent statements or representations, or makes or uses

any false writing or document knowing it to contain any false,

fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry in any matter within

the jurisdiction of the United States Government.

Bureau Classification 46

Manual or Instructions

Volume II, Section 47

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• INTERSTATE TRAVEL IN AID OF RACKETEERING

18 U.S.C.

1952.

Interstate and Foreign Travel or

Transportation in Aid of Racketeering

Enterprises

"";:

Penalizes anyone who travels in interstate or foreign

commerce or uses any facility in interstate or foreign comnerce

with intent to (1) distribute the proceeds of any unlawful

activity or (2) commit any crime of violence to further any

unlawful activity or (3) othervise promote, manage, establish,

carry on, or racilitate the promotion, management, escasteranois

or carrying on of any unlawful activity and performs or attempts

to perform any of the above-listed activities.

"Unlawful activity" is defined as (1) any business

enterprise Involving gamoling, liquor on which the rederal

excise tax nas not been paid, narcotics or prostitution offenses

in violation of the laws of the State in which they are committed

01 of the United States or (2) extortion, bribery or arson in

violation of the laws of the State in which comnitted or of

the

United States.

Bureau Classification 166

Manual of Instructions

Volume IV, Section 125

xie.

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LOSS OF UNITED STATES NATIONALITY

8 U.S.c.

1481.

Loss of Nationality by Native-born or

Naturalized Citizen; Voluntary Action;

Burden of Proof; Presumptions

•Overt acts which when performed by an American

citizen may cause termination of his citizenship:

(1) obtaining naturalization in a foreign state;

(2) taking an oath or making a declaration of

allegiance to a foreign state;

-* •

(3) serving in the armed forces of a foreign

state without specific authorization;

'.*,

(4)

accepting, serving in, or performing duties

of any office, post or employment under the government of

a foreign state if he has or acquires the nationality of

such state or if an oath, aifirmation or deciaration of

allegiance is required;

-У."

(5) voting in a political election in a foreign

state, participating in an election or plebiscite to deter-

mine

sovereignty over foreign territory or making a formal

renunciation of nationality before a diplomatic or consular

officer of the United States in a foreign country;

(6) making, in the United States, a formal written

renunciation of nationality when the United

States is in a

state of war;

(7) deserting the armed forces of the United States

in time of war, if and when convicted by court martial and

dismissed by reason of the conviction or ishonorably discharged;

(8) committing any act of treason against,

attempting

by force to overthrow, or bearing arms against the United States,

violating or conspiring to violate 18 U.S.C. 2383 (Rebellion

or Insurrection), willfully performing any act in violation of 18

U.S.C. 2385

(advocating Overthrow of the Government) violating

18 U.S.C. 2334 (Seditious Conspiracy) by engaging in a con-

spiracy to overthrow, put down or to destroy by force the

Government of the United States, levy war against them, if

convicted by a court martial or court or competent jurisdiction.

i 21 -

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(9) departing from or remaining outside the

jurisdiction of the United States in time of war or national

emergency to evade U.s. military service.

8 U.S.C. 1482. Dual Nationals; Divestiture of Nationality

Provides that persons who at birth acquired ual

nationality of the United States and of a foreign state,

having claimed benefits of foreign nationality and having

continuous residence of three years in the foreign state

after he becomes twenty-two years of age loses U.S. citizen-

ship unless during that three-year period of residence he

• takes oath of allegiance to the United States.

8 U.S.C. 1483. Restrictions on Expatriation

Provides that any national who within six months of

his eighteenth birthday claims United States nationality in

the appropriate manner even thouyi he may have commiliod any

of the acts outlined above which expatriate a national prior

to his eighteenth birthday shall not be deened to have expat-

riated himself.

8 U.S.C. 1485,6.

Inapplicability of section 1484 to

Certain

Persons

"Sets forth those situations wherein a United States

national does not lose his nationality although he has had

• extended residence abroad. Such situations include e.g.,

residence abroad because of employment by the United States

Government; residence abroad representing a bona fide American

organization; ill health, etc.

- 22.

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NEUTRALITY MATTERS

22 U.S.C.

1934. Munitions Contro1

This act, commonly known as Munitions Control Act,

and regulations issued thereunder provide all persons engaged

in manufacture,

• State and secure a license from State Department to import or

export these items.

22 U.S.c.

401. Illegal Exportation of War Materials -

Seizure and Forfeiture of Materials and

Carriers

provides for the seizure of war materials or any

vessel, vehicle or aircraft containing war materials, when

ever there is probable cause to believe there is an attempt to

export such items or they are intended to be or have been

exported in violation of law.

Such materials seized under

this provision shall be forfeited.

Bureau Classification 2

Manual of Instructions

Volume III, Section 75

PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE WITH FOREIGN

GOVERNMENTS (THE LOGAN ACT)

18 U.S.C. 953. Private Correspondence with Foreign

Governments (The Logan Act)

Penalizes any citizen of the United States who di-

rectly or indirectly communicates or carries on any correspon-

dence or intercourse with any foreign government or its

officer or agent with the intent to influence the measures or

conduct of any foreian government or its officers or agents

veran or no one ang

regarding any disoutes or controversies with the United States

or to defeat United States measures.

controvessies with the united estates

PROTECTION OF FOREIGN OFFICIALS AND OFFICIAL

GUESTS OF THE UNITED STATES

¡usia nose die no deiti..

inis legislation provides

the United States with

ranangaon+ 4199671

that of the States when cortain

prohibited acts are committed.

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18 U.S.C. 1116.

Murder or Manslaughter of Foreign Officials

or Official Guests

Makes murder or manslaughter of a foreign official,

a member of his family, or an official guest a Federal

offense.

18 U.s.C. 1201. Kidnaping

Makes the kidnaping of and conspiracy to kidnap

foreign official, a member of his family, or an official

guest, a Federal

felony.

Note:

Federal jurisdiction arises immediately

in the kidnaping of a foreign official or official guest:

The victim need not be transported in interstate or foreign

commerce.

18 U.S.C.

112.

Protection of Foreign Officials and Official

Guests

(a) Penalizes anyone who assaults, strikes, wounds,

"imprisons, makes an offer of violence to any

foreign official,

or official guest.

(b) Penalizes anyone who willfully intimidates,

coerces, threatens, or harasses a foreign official or an

official guest or willfully obstructs a foreign official in

the performance of his duties.

(c) Outside the District of Columbia, prohibits

anyone from, within 100 feet of a foreign or international

establishment or the residence of a foreign official, parading,

picketing, displaying any flag, banner, sign, placara, or

device, uttering any word, phrase, sound or noise for the

purpose of intimidating; coercing; threatening; or harassing

any

• foreign official or obstructing a foreign official in the

performance of his duties.

.::

...?

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18

u.s.C.

970. Protection of Property Occupied by Foreign

Governments and International Organizations

Prohibits anyone from injuring, damaging, destroy

ing, or attempting to injure, danage or destroy any real cr

personal property belonging to, utilized by, or occupied by

a foreign government, international organization, foreign

official or official

guest.

Bureau Classification 185

Manual of Instructions

volume

IV, Section 116

PROTECTION OF UNITED STATES OFFICIALS

AND EMPLOYEES

18 U.S.C. 111.

Assaulting, Resisting or Impeding Certain

Officers and Employees

renalizes anyone who forcibly assaults, resists.

opposes,

impedes, intimidates or interferes with specified

United

States Governmental officials who are engaged in or

•on account of his performance of official duties.

Use of a

deadiy or dangerous weapon in the commission of any of the

above acts increases the penalty.

18 U.S.C. 1114.

Protection of Officers and Employees of the

United

States

This statute makes the killing of various enumerated

rederal officers and employees a federal offense.

Generally

officers or employees covered are those engaged in the per-

formance of investigative, inspection or law enforcement func

tions and includes United

States judges, United States

Attorneys, Assistant United States Attorneys, United States

Marshals

and Deputy Marshals, Federal Bureau of Investigation

officers

or employees.

= :25

H# 55027 DocId:32989610 Page 62

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The provisions of this law require that the

attack occur while the victim is engaged in, or be on

account of, the performance of his official

duties.

HOW-

ever, the official status of the victim is merely the

basis on which federal jurisdiction is asserted.

Know

ledge of the official status of the victim is not an

element of the offense itself.

18 U.S.C. 2231. Assault or Resistance

Makes it a federal offense to forcibly assault,

resist, oppose, prevent, impede, intimidate or interfere

with any person authorized to serve or execute search

warrants or to make searches and seizures while engaged

In the performance of his duties or on account of his

performance of such auties.

Use of any deadly or danger

ous weapon increases the penalty of fine and imprisonment.

18 U.s.c.

351. Congressional Assassination, Kidnaping,

and Assault

Penalizes the killing, kidnaping or assaulting

of a Member of Congress or Member-of-Congress-Elect and

attempts to or conspiracies to comnit above offenses.

Does not require that the offense occur while

the victim is engaged in or be on account of the perfor

mance of his official duties.

Bureau Classification 89

Manual of Instructions

•Volume II, Section 18

ion 26-

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18 U.S.C. 1751. Presidential Assassination, Kidnaping, and

Assault

Makes it a federal offense to attempt or to con-

spire to assault, of to kill or kidnap the President of

the United States, the President-elect, the Vice President,

the officer next in order of succession to the office of

•President, the Vice President-elect, or any individual who is

ácting as

President under the Constitution and laws of the

United States.

Bureau Classification 175

Manual of Instructions

Volume IV, Section 131

REGISTRATION ACTS

18

U.s.C. 951.

Agents of Foreign Governments

Requires anyone, other than a diplomatic; or con-

sular officer or attache, who acts in the United States as an

agent of a foreign government to notify the United States

Secretary of State.

22 U.S.C. 611 - 621. Foreign Agents Registration Act as

Amended (The McCormack Act)

Provides that no person shall act as an agent of a

foreign principal unless he has filed with the Attorney General

a registration statement and supplements as required unless

he is exempt from registration.

50 U.S.c.

851 - 858.

Registration Act - Individuals with

Knowledge of Espionage-or Sabotage by

Foreign Country

:.:.

Requires that any person (with certain specified

exemptions) iho bas knowicago si, icisived instruction or

assianment in the espionane, counteresnionan, or sabotage

55027 DocId: 32989610 Page 64

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service or tactics of a government of a foreign country or of

a forcign political party, shall register with the Attorney

General a registration statement containing information which

the Attorney General may prescribe.

Bureau Classification 97

Manual of Instructions

Volume III, Section 81

18 U.S.C. 2386.. Registration of Certain Organizations

The following organizations shall be required to

register with the U. S. Attorney General:

Every organization subject to foreign control which

engages in political activity;

Every organization which engages both in civilian

military activity and in political activity;

Every organization subject to foreign control which

engages in civilian military activity; and

Every organization, the purpose or aim of which, or

one of the purposes or aims of which, is the establishment,

control, conduct, seizure, or overthrow of a government or

subdivision thereof by use of force, violence, military

meausres, or threats of any one of more of the foregoing.

SABOTAGE

18 U.S.C. 2152.

Fortifications, Harbor Defenses, Or

Defensive Sea Breas

1 i.

(a) Penalizes anyone who willfully trespasses upon,

injures, or destroys any of the works, property or material

of any submarine mine, torpedo, fortification or harbor-

defense system of the United States;

НН 55027 Do0Id:32989610 Page 65

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(b) Penalizes willful interference with the opera

tion or use of any such submarine nine, torpedo, fortification

or harbor-defense system;

(c) Penalizes anyone who knowingly, willfully or

wantonly violates any Presidential order or regulation gov

erning persons or vessels within defensive sea areas designated

by the President.

The following statutes prohit anyone, who during

time of war or national energency, with intent to or reason

to believe his act may injure, interfere with or obstruct,

che United States or an associate nation:

18 U.S.C. 2153.

Destruction of War Material, War Premises, or

War Utilities

Attempts to or villfully injures, destroys, con-

taminates, infects any war material, war premises or war

utilities.

18 U.S.C. 2154.

Production of Defective War Material, War

Premises, or War Utilities

Attenpes to or willfully nakes, constructs, or causes to be made or con

strucied in a defcctive manner

any war material, war premises or war

utilities or tool, implement, machine, utensil

or receptacle used in

the production or repair of such items.

An act by any conspirator to effect the object of

a conspiracy to commit the above violations subjects all con-

spirators to liability.

Strategic Facilities

The following statutes prohibit anyone, with

intent to injure, interfore with or obstruct the national

defense of the United States, from doing any of the actions

cited::

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18 U.S.C.

2155.

Destruction of National-Defense Materials,

National-Defense Promises, or National

Defense Utilities

Attempts to of willfully injures, destroys, con-

taminates or infects any national-defense material, national-

defense premises or national-defense utilities.

18 U.S.C. 2156.

Production of Defective National-Defense

Material, National-Defense Premises of

National-Defense Utilities

Attempts to or willfully makes or constructs, in

a defective manner, any national-defense material, national-

defense premises or national-defense utilities or any tool,

implement, machine, utensil, or receptacle used in the

production of such

items.

An act by any conspirator to effect the object of

a conspiracy to conmit the above violations subjects all

conspirators to liability.

50 U.S.C.. 797. Security Regulations and Orders

Prohibits willful violation of regulation or order

promulgated or approvea by Secretary of Defense or military

commander designated by him for protection of property anc

places subject to jurisdiction of Department of Defense, its

subagencies, or officer or employee of that Department.

Bureau Classification 98

Manual of

Instructions

Volume III, Section 86

' SEDITION

18 U.S.C.

2387. Activities Affecting Armed Forces Generally

Penalizes anyone who with intent to interfere with

the armed

forces of the United states advires, counsels, urges

or causos or attenuts to cause insubordination, disloyalty,

mutiny, or refusal of duty by any member of the armed forces

• or distributes or attempts to distribute any vitton of printed

matter which counsels insubordination or refusal of duty.

DocTd:32989610 Pane 67

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•18 U.S.C. 2308. Activities Affecting Amed Forces During War

Penalizes anyone who when the United States is at

war willfully mains or conveys false reports or statements

with intention of intericsing vita succeesiul operacion of the

armod forces of the United statos or promoting tne success of

its chonies or williully causes oj attompis to cause insub-

ordination, disloyali?, mutiny, or refusal of duty in the

arma! forces of the taiied states or willfully obstructs or

attents to obstruct te recriting or chliscment service of

the Writed States or harbors or conceals any person who he

knows cr has rcasonable rounds to believe has violated or is

about to violate any provision of this subsection.

Penalizes each oi the parties to a conspiracy if

two or more persons conspir to violate this subsection and

one of more such persons act to effect the object of the

conspiracy.

:':

Bureau Classification 14

Manual of Instructions

Volume III, Section 88

18 U.S.C. 2389.

Recruiting for Service Against the

nited States

Penalizos anyone who recruits soldiers or sailors

within the United stites or areas within its jurisdiction to

engage in armed hosiility against the united states or opens

a recruiting station jor enlistent of soldiers and sailors

to seive in any nanner in armed hostility against the

United States.

Bureau Classification 61

Manual of Instructions

Volume IV, Section 95

18 U.S.C. 2390. Enlistment to Serve Against the United States

Penalizes anyone who enlists or is engaged within

the United States or in any place subject to the jurisdiction

of the United states with the intent to serve in arca hoctility

against the United States.

"..

.::.

H# 55027 DocId:32989610 Page- 66

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Airtel.

TO: SAC, Albany

From: Director, FBI

SECTIONS 87 AID 122

MANUAL OF INGTRUCTIONS

SUBVERSIVE AND EXTREMIST INVESTIGATIONS

8/3/73

acos

In connection with the various letters being directed by FBIHQ to all cifices

under individual organization captions which set out the suggested prodications

to be used in the future, the foilowing instructions apply.

The field may reproduce these letters as required to facilitate distribution

within their offices and notification to all interested personnel. Thashould,

of course, be treated as sensitive material in any distribution to Resident Agencies.

Based upon results of recent regional field conferences and further

consideration by FELIQ, it has been decided that a prodication for investigation

need not be incladed in material propared for dissemination (letterhead

memoranda or report) with resnect to os-roing investications which were pending

before 8/1/73 and concernine which inociation ias faresar bani reported in

a form suttole ior alesemmedo. sowever, in such cases an appropriare

predication must be snown in the tirst intraoifice communication prepared

after 8/1/73 and in the fizot intraBureau communication prepared after 8/1,73

which is directed to FBIQ. This would include the administrative pages of

reports or communications covering letterhead memoranda.

For example, If pending case exists on a subject as of 8/1/73 and information

concerning such subject has already been disseminated either by report or Ll,

subsequent Illis or reports prepared after 8/1/73 need not include a statutory

predication. However, ii a case is pending as of 8/1/75 anù no prior outside

dissemination has been made by Lit or report, the first such LIlvi or roport

prepared after 8/1/73 should include a statutory basis. In cleroz eveat, the

first intraoffice communication prepared alter 3/1/73 chould show the statutory...

2- All Field Offices

100:00-1516

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE /0/5/60

- BY SPRALM/EHL

TiT

5502.

Rage 69

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Airtel to albany

SECTIONS 87 AND 122

MANUAL OT WETRUCHTONS

SUBVURSIVE AND LATHENST ENVESTIGATIONS

basis as should the first intraBureau communication, copies of which are being

directed to rouis.

Advise FBIlQ if you have any questions concerning the foregoing instructions.

НЫ 55027

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OI TICIAL PORA NC. 10

5010-108

10. 21

UNTIED SINTES CHERNVENT

Memora dum

:Mi. E. S. Miller

FROM :T. J. Smith

SUIJECT: SCOPE OF FBI JURISDICTION

AND AUTHORITY IN DOMESTIC

INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS

DATE: 8/6/73

!

T. J. Smith to E. S. Miller izemorandum dated 7/24/73,

caplioned as above, enclosed a 43-page position paper prepared for

I. Patrick Gray, I, relating to captioned matter. This memorandum

also described previous efforts to got a request to the Attorney Generai

to seel a comprehensive Executive order whiel would provide definitive

guidelines for the FBI to conduck domestic intelligence-type investigations.

This memorandum pointed out that the political climate cl

suspicion and distrust resulting from disclosures coming cui of the

Watergate hearings could present an obstacle to getting an Executive

order signed at this time, but that the need is groat and such an order

would establish definitive guidelines which have heretofore been unclear.

We recommended that we go forward with a request for the Executive

order and leave it up to the Attorney Conerai and perhaps the White House

to make a final decision. In that way we would be taking a stop forward,

The Director noted, "There may be some obstacle in pursuing

ine recommended course, but lieel we shoud proceed rather than to wait

for a more favorable climate. We never progress by standing still. Con-

tinue as set out in memo which was an excellent review of the problen."

Pursuant to the Direcion's instructions, there is attached a

proposed letter to the Attorney General setting iorth the recit si for an

Execulive order and suggesting proposed language. The lotter plso taling

note of the necd for updated legislation.

URC

Enclosure

ciginatin 62-667271025

• MDR-ll

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIE

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## Page 72

Memorandum to Mi. E. S. Miller

Re: Scope of FBI Jurisdiction

and Authority in Domestic

Intelligence Investigations

i.

RECOMMENDATION:

and sent.

That the attached letter to the Attorney General be approved

:.

17 55027 Doeld: 32989610 Page 72.

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..

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

SCOPE OF FBI JURISDICTION

AND AUTHORITY IN DOMESTIC

INTELLGENCE LNVESTIGATIONS

August 7, 1973

14 55027

During our meeting on July 26, 1973, you referred to a discussion

you had with Senator Charlos hicC, Mathias, JI., of Maryland during your con-

fixmation hearings as to the statuiory authority of the FBI and the Department of

Justice in the field a domestic intelligence investigations. You thon asled

Mr. Wilham D. Ruchelshaus to work with the Fil in weighing the pros and cons

with regard to statutory authority in this area. I mentioned that rescarch was

boing performed on this subjcet at the present time and that we would be in

touch with ar. Fuciseishaus with regard to this matter when we have compicted

the results of our consideration and findings within the FBI.

Actually, a study has been going on in the FBI for more than two

years as to the scope of Fil jurisdiction and authority in domestic intelligence

investigations. When Mr. I. Patrick Gray, Ill, was designated as Acting

Director of the FbI, he instructed that a position paper be prepared concein.

ing the jurisdiction and authority of the FBI to conduct domestic inteligence

investigations. A position paper was prepared which in essence stated that

authority of the FBI in this field is based on legislative chectmants, evon

though we may have publiciy relied heavily on Presidential directives as the

basis for such authority. fir. Gray ordered an in-dopth study made of the

position and in August, 1972, i detailed report was furnished io lim. The

following is a summary of that report.

• Over a period of several months there were a numbor of public

etatements questioning authority and jurisdiction of the FBI to corduct comcatio

intedigenes-type invostigations, particularly where there is no clear-cut

legislative authority apparent. Che oi the nost saching inquiries was con-

tained in a paper presented by troiessor john I. Plug a a twe-sex conference

at Princeton University in Cutober, 1971, sponsored by the Conmitee for Public

Justice.

U. R. (icio 100-00-1545)

MDR-66

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIES

TATE 10/5/00

origins@in 62-66727-1824

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The Attorney General

A major thrust of Froiessor Elliff's paper concerned FBI authority

derived from legislative enactments as opposed to that derived from Presidential

directives, beginning with a directive issued by President Roosevelt in

September, 1939. Protessor Elliff is of the opirion that the 1939 directive,

which was reiterated on three subsequent occasions, was nagnified by the

FBI from its original purpose to a definitive order to conduct intelligence-type

investigations.

Senator San I. Ervin, as you know, had been probing into the

nature and extent ol FBI intelligenco-type investigations. Senator lirvin had

even announced that he intended to propose legislution to prohibit the FBI

from investigating any person without that individual's consent, unless the

Government has reuson to believe that person has commitied a crime or is

about to comnit a crime. Other Congressmen indicated a similar interest

in FBI investigative activities.

Our study revealed that the EBl had declared publicly over a

long period of time that its responsibilities in the domestic intelligence field

are authorized under legislative enactments, Presidentil directives, and

instructions of the Attorncy General. The Presidential directives are obviously

the 1) directive dated September 6, 1939, and reitcrated January &, 1943;

• July 44, 1950; and December 15, 1953, and 2) Executive Order 10450 dated

April 27, 1953 (and amended but not yet implemented by Executive Order

11605 dated July 2, 1971) •

In carefully analyzing the language of the first directive, dated

September 6, 1939, and considering that the subsequent directives are all

hinged on that one, we believe that there is a misconception as to the extent

of jurisdiction or authority conveyed to the FBI by these dircotives. It

appears that while the 1939 directive fixed responsibility on the FBI to handle

espionage, sabotage, and neutrality matters, it did not convey any authority

or jurisdiction which the FBI did not aircady have from lepislative ennetments.

It is difficult to read into this direclive or in any of those which followed any

authority to conduct intelligence-type investigations which would or could

not be conducted under an umbrella of legislative enactments.

= 2 =

HN 55027 DocId:32989610 Page 74

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Tho Attorney General

Az a matter of histozical fact, President Roosevelt in August,

1936, did request former Director i. Edgar Hoover to conduci investigations

of subversive activities in this country, including communism and iascism.

This request, however, was a confidential oral request and there is doubt

that any record ol li was made outside the FBI. This request, or Presidential

mandate, was based, incidentally, on the lact that the law provided that the

FBI could conduct such investigations il the Secretary of State should so

The study rovoaled that while the 1939 et son. diroctives did not

grant any special intelligence-gathering authority to the FEI, we were respon-

sible under these directives to collect all intolligence information furnished

by local, state, and Federal law enforcement agencies and patriotic citizens

and to silt and coordinate all such information for indicatione of subversive

activity covered by Federal statutes.

The study concluded that the FBI has the responsibility to con-

duct whatever investigations are necessary to determine if stututes reiating

to esplonage, sabotage, insurrection or rebellion, sedition, seditious con-

spiracy, advocacy oi overthrowing the Government, and other such crimes

allecting the national security have been violated, In this connection we

note that in a letter dated September 14, 1987, the Department of justice

advised thnt the EB! is continuaily alert to the problem of recurring riota

and is submitting intelligence reports to the Department of Justice concern

ing such activity. This lettor enumerated several Federal statutes and

atsted these could be applicable in using maximum availabla resources,

investigative and intelligence, to collect and report all lacts bearing on

the question of schemes or conspiracies to plan, promote or aggravato riot

activity.

In other words, the Department was requesting all possible

intelligence-type investigative activity based on the caistence of certain

statures. We see this as being no different from our intolligance-type

investigations relating to plans oi groups or individuals to overthrow,

dostzoy, intarfere with or threaten the survival of effective operation of

national, state, and local governments.

KH 15027 DocId: 32989610 Page 75

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The Attorney General

Based on this siudy, we believe that had thore nerer been a

single one of the Presidential directives in question the FBI would have

conducted and will, through necessity, continue to conduct the same intelli

gence-type investigations as were conducted from 1330 to the present dato.

We also believe, however, that in order to counter the critician and skept-

cism of such individuals as Professos Elliff and Scnator Sam J. Ervin that

an up-to-dute Executive order should be issued clearly establishing a need

for intelligence-type investigations and dolinetting a clear authority for tha

FBI do conduct such investigations based on guidelines established by the

Attorney Goneral and adhering to constitutional principles.

The study concluded with two basic recommendations.

1) That the Department of justica be reguested to sponsor comprehensive

legislation spelling out the FBI's investigative nuthority in the collection of

intelligence intornation relating to the national security and; 2) tant the

Department of Justice be requested to seek a comprehensive Executive order

which would cover any possible gay between statutory authority and Exscutive

necessity in protection of the national security.

At first glance these recommendations may appear to contradict

our position that we already have statutory authority to conduct security-type

investigations; thet this being the case we do not need additional legislatve

enactments, nor do we nced an Executive order. But being realiatle we think

that the basic statutes upon which we rely for our authority to conduct

domestie intelligence investigations need to be updated to fit 1973 needs.

Tide 18 U.S.C. Sections 2383, 2384, and 2385 relate in the national security,

but the legislative history of 2333 nd 2384 indicates that they were designed

for the Civil War cra, not the Twentieth Century, und Saction 2385 has been

reduced to a fragile shell by the Supreme Court. These statutes are unques-

sionably still valid, but updating is certainly indicated. The bills introduced

as H.k, 6046 and S, 1400 in the S3rd Congress appear to contain lunguage which.

should till our statutory needs, excopt perhaps for those groups, such as tho

Ru Klux Klan, which do not seok to overthrow the Government, but never

theless are totalitarian in nature and seek to deprive constitutionally guaranteco

rights.

HH 55027 DocId:32989610 Page 76

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The Attorney General

As to the need for an Executive order, we think that to issues

are involved. We have stalutory authority, but what we need is & definitive

requirement from the President as to the nature and type of intolligence data

he requires in the pursuit of his responsibilities based on our statutory

authority. In other words, there is a need, from our standpoint, for both

authoritative and definitive guidelines. The statutes rive us the authority.

The Executive order would define our national security objectives.

Members of Congress, including such men as Senator Robert C.

Byrd of West Virginia, have proposed legislation to spell out jurisdiction and

authority of the FEI in this field. It would appear that the President would

rather spell out his own requirements in an Executive order instead of having

Congress tell him what the FBI might do to help him fulfill his obligations and

responsibilities us President.

The political climate of suspicion and distrust resulting from

disclosures coming out of the Watergate hearings could present an obstacle

to getting any such Executive order signed in the immediate future. However,

the rationale is nevertheless valid and when scrutinized closely, the language

in the Executive order we hercinaîter propose establishes definitive guidolines

which have heretofore been unclear. It is my belief that we should go forward

- with this.

We therefore propose and recommend that an Executive order

along the following lines be submitted to the White louse with a strong

recommendation for ayproval. The language which follows is merely to

illustrate the type of Executive order which we think would be appropriate

and does not necessarily represent an ideal format or style which should

be subritted to the White louse.

EXECUTIVE ORDER

"Whereas the Constitution of the United States was established to

insure, among other things, domestic tranquility; to provide for the common

defcuse; and to promote the generul welfare for the people of the United States:

HN 55027 Do0Id:32989610 Page 77

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The Attorney General

"Whereas the President of the United States has the constitutionally

- imposed responsibility of defending the Constitution and the existence of the

Government thereunder; and

"Whereas there heve been continuing unlawful acts of violence

perpetrated agoinst the Government of the United States or against citizens

of the United States or against persons entitled to the protection of the

United States thereby endangering the domestic tranquility, threatening the

common defense, and jeopardizing the general welfare of the people-of the

United States; and

"Whereas the Congress has enacted laws prohibiting acts such as

treason, sedition, sabotage, espionage, insurrection and rebellion, seditious

conspiracy, civil discoedience, rioting, assassination, kidnaping, deprival

of civil rights, and conspiracies to commit such acts; and

"Whereas the President of the United States as Chief Executive

in the maintenance of the Government thereunder must have intelligence

information for appropriate decisions in the discharge of his constitutionally

imposed responsibilities;

"Now by authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes

of the United States and in the interest of orderly operation of this Government

and in furtherance of the domestic tranquility, common defense, and general

welfare of the people of the United States it is ordered that;

• "The Attorney General prepare and issue guidelines, contorming

to the principles of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, and outlining the

necessary direction, coordination, and guidance of investigations to assure

that the Federal Bureau of Investigation provides on a continuing basis

intelligence information essential to the execution of laws pertaining to sub~

versive activity and other such activity alfecting the national security,

domestic tranquility, and general welfare of the United States."

The Nation has been going through a time of terror. The concept

o urban guerrilla terrorism has been adopted by various extremist elements

iu the United States. Bombings of pliolic buildings and national institutions;

-8-

НН 55027 DooId:32989610 Pade 78

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The Attorney General

killing of police officers who, by their uniform, are a symbol of the democratic

establishment; hijacking of aircraft in furtherance of revolutionary movements;

terrorist assaults on foreign diplomatic personnel and establishments; and open

declaration of wai on our form of government are only a few of the violent acts

which have been perpetrated by domestic subversives who seek to destroy or

seriously cripple our Government. Terrorist guerrilla attacks which were

once continea to far away places and related to problems of no immediate con-

cern of ours are now possible in this country. Forcign terrorist groups in

collusion with domestic terrorists have laid plans for an airport massacre of

the type which recently occurred in Israel. Other foreign terrorist elements

have laid plans for terrorist attacks on American soil. Already one foreign

official has been assassinated, possibly by terrorists.

It would be folly to arlopt an investigative policy based on

the concept of investigation only when there is reason to believe a crime

involving the national security has been committed. The FBI must

obviously anticipate the crimes described above. We believe that in

order for the Government to be in position to defend itself against revolu-

tionary and terrorist efforts to destroy it, the FBI must have sufficient

investigative authority to conduct intelligence-type investigations not

• normally associated with enforcement of the statutes. In other words we

think the President has the inherent Executive power to expand by further

defining the l'BI's investigative authority to enable it to develop advance

information concorning the plans and aspirations of terrorists and revolu-

tionaries who seck to overthrow or destroy the Government. However, we

also believe that such expanded authority must be formally set forth in an

Executive order and that this recommendation is responsive in the Attorney

General's expressed interest in laying more formal guidelines to our work

in areas where definition is not now clear.

We consider the issuance of a new Executive order delineating

our jurisdiction, authority, and responsibility to gather and report intelligence

Information relating io the national security to be a very important and hign

priority matter. We believe the issuance of guidelines by the Attorney General

under Title 28, Section 533, United States Code, to be equally important.

IN 55027 DocId: 32989610

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The Attorney General

For your information, our own investigative guidelines as con

tained in our Manual of Instructions relating to domestic subversive invostiga-

dions have been completely rewritten to conform with the concept that our

domestic intelligence-type investigations are based on Ecderal statutes. These

guidelines provide thet in each instance, the domestic intelligence investigation

must be predicated on information indicating that the organization or individual

is engaged in activity which could involve a violation of specifc statutes relating

to the national security. A copy of the new guidelines was previously provided

to the Dapartment of Justice in connection with the request o Sonator Edward M.

Kennedy to obtain a copy of the FBI's Section 87 of the Manuai of Instructions.

The effective date of the new guidelines was August 1, 1973.

1 - The Deputy Attorney General

...

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TO

.....

OPTIONAL IORM NO. 10

3010-106

MAY 1862 EDITION

GSA GEN

11G. N0.87

UNITED STATES C ERNMENT•

Memorandum

Nir. E. S. Milleri

DATE: 11/15/73

пішання кий пісний

FROM R. L. Shackelford

SUBJECT SECTION 87

MANUAL OF IS MUCTIONS

SUBVERSIVE INYUSTIGATIONS

do.

MDR-16

• ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

PURPOSit :

To obtain ayproval to send attached airtel to all

offices which airtel reiterates instructions pertaining to

the proper character to be utilized in connection with

investigations of subversive individuals and organizations.

BACKGROUND:

section 8l, Manual of Instructions (Mol), was

extensively revised in that it now stresses a statutory

approach relative to investigations of domestic security

matter's.

Subsequent to its effective date of 8/1/73,

Headquarters supervisory personnel have noted while

revicking incoming mail submitted by the field that the

majority of the field offices continue to incorrecily use

"Revolutionary Activitios" as a character in connection

with the investigations of

subversive individuals and

organizations.

The use of

the character "Revolutionary

Activities" was terminated with the implementation of the

revised Section 87, MOI.

In this connection,

the revised

Section 87, MOI, sets forth specific instructions regarding

the correct charactor to be utilized in all subversive

individual

and organization investigations. However,

various field officos continue to disrogard these

instructions

and continue to use the "Revolutionary Activities"

character.

100-00-1553

Enclosurc

WW 55027 DocId: 32989610 Page 81

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-

Memorandum to hi: E. S. Miller

Re:

Section 87.

Manual of Instructions

Subversive Investigations

OBSERVATION:

Headquartors supervisory personnel have repeatcaly

brought the above discrenancy to the attention of investigative

and supervisory personnel in the liold but to date a consider

ablo number of field officos continue to incorrectly utilize

the "Revolutionary Activitios" character.

In view of this,

the attached airtel is being sent to all officos in order

to again stress the

importance of utilizing the correct

character in subversive investigations of individuals and

organizations.

RECO.MENDATION:

That attached airtel be approved and sent.

mascalson detames i made an it i

176 55027

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82

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winston 56454466 statutilatati

11/iC/2

'To: SAC, Albany

From: Plector, FDI

SCOTICT 87

MANUAD OF ANSERUCEIONS

SUDTERDIVE INTUSZICADIONS

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

ATE /0,5/00 BYUPaLL MIEH

manual. of

Instructions GOl), was recontly rovised.

As chen office in arcie, sation an this connections

the following instructions vore set forth relative to the

utilizucion of appropriate charactor with fespect to investi

gations of cubversive organizations and individuals.

Investigation of Organizacions

Section 07125, Paue 6, Perassank Zn(D:

"All cases should use charactor "Internal. Security"

e. 8o,

"Communist Party, USA; Intorani. Security'

In case

of subsidiary or front

group, character should show name or

subversive incultration coses sbould include name of subversive

ta ton orkers Party, Internal

Infiltration. of (Name of

Security - Si2.

111

Investigation of Individuals

Ecct103 87, MOE, Page 141 RORP/222i2 (9), (1) and (2):

Dosicuation 'Subversive Matter' for

abbreviation at chould be used in all cases:

Ada organiza-

tronal artiliation thea chict group with which sublectis

connoctod is under investigation of has approved thumbnail

100-00-1552

2 - All Officos

KH 55027 DocId: 32989610 Page 83

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## Page 84

-

Airtel to-saC, Albany

Re:

ECCtion 67

danunl

of Inacructious

Subversive investigations

sheich.

Example:

Subversive Matter - CCUSA, Subversive

Matter

- 512.

"(2) Whore meaningsul organisation affiliation

cannot be shown, use caption 'subvoreiro uttou.'"

Ileadqnartors notos thai a considerabie number of

fiçld officos continue io utilize to cucractore of Mi

evolutionary ictivities and/cr 18 • Acrolutionary hclivitico

which in boch instancos are incorreco aid

not in compliance

with instructions as sed forth in the rovisod

Lection 37, not.

Examples of correct character in organizatica coses

are:

Youth International. Party (XIP)

Internal Eccurity

Victnam Veterans Arainst the Tar/ Winter Soldier

Organization (VVI/USO)

Internal Cecurity

Students for a Danocratic Sociaty (SD0)

Internal Security

White Panther Party (VDP) .

Internal Security

Toi individual cases:

S: - VY.6H/WSO

S'I * CDS

CAl • H3A27E88231A0T

531 - TOP

1i do aroin streosod 15 cot crch cucitiesily i

Section 37, Mor,

organization affiliation

la tararisons of individuals le a sing fu!

cannot be shown the character

versive Matter must be utilized

HH 55027 DocId:32989610 Page 84

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## Page 85

a it to me in

:

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE DISINCE BY SPLALA EHL

Dare:

December 19, 1973

To:

Director, U. S, Secret Service

Frou: Clarence id. clley, Director

Cubject JOVEREIVE AND AXIRINST NVLNNIGATIONS

Under the teris of the 'Agreoment 3otreen the redoral Bur.2u

oi Investigation and the Unitod Elates i coret Corvice Concernue dao schr

liesponsinilties, " Lie tut lurnienes goar Lorree wita certai cats arice

of intorination. One category rei tes to "persons who thay de conci...rus

potentiaily dungorous to indivicuals prosetod oy the UCed oscruse oi tavia

backgrount or derivices, inclustur evidence of emotional inci alloy i

participation in groups engaging in activities inimical to the Galid imies."

In accora vita this provision, ve nave scon reguiarly disseminated; to

your curvice the resülts oi our iuvestigations of idoversive and usclist

subjects.

'The agreoment does not speciay where such dissemin tics Liould

be inade and, in prictice, we have seen tarniching copies oi racoxte did

letiorhead memoranda in these cases woth lo Eccrot corvice cordgurnors

dnd locally to the appropriate Locret dezvice ileld oitice. & arry volume

of such co:unication is involved, totaling several thousand such jair.

l be question has been raised ar to whether or not seen dusticate

dissemination is roquired by your survicei. e., whethor your local

alicis nave a ncotior copies oi all di reports and atold wrotein,

'unversive and entre vict suscott incca inver

Di ascurid init in you iscl that circenartion o sac act matcalo? at

in to dicenarge oi vour responioil id, the a it undous to coitua

lui: proccunte.

108-00-1555

55027 DocId: 32989610 Page 85

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... as are

«am.

DIRICTOR

... "

OEPARTMENT OF THE TREA! Y

UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE

WASHINGTON. D.C. 20223

January 4, 1974

TO.

: Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

From

:Director, U. S. Secret Service

Subject Subversive and Extremist Investigations

In response to your memorandum of December 19, 1973, we have

reviewed the necessity of FBI field offices disseminating to Secret

Service field offices the results of your investigations of subver-

sive and extremist subjects.

Members of my staff have met with members of your staff and we

are requesting that the present procedure of disseminating this

information at the field office level should be continued and that

this same information should continue to be furnished by letter-

head memorandum to Secret Service headquarters. We find that

much of this information is valuable to our field offices. We

I would therefore appreciate continuance of our present procedure.

MDR-16

AT& RET INFORMATION CONTAINED

ISIT IS UNCLASSIE LUD

LATE: 20/3/00.0% SP 2 ALM/EHL

H. S. Knight

100-00-1-556

WW 55027 DocId:32989610 Paye 86

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-OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

MAT IPAZ EDITION

3010-106;

OSA GEN. RIO. NO, 27

UNITED STATES GO

RNMENT

-Memorandum

TO

The Director

DATE:

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT

HEARING ON THE FBI'S

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE-GATHERING

FUNCTION

179/14

ALIN ORATION CONTANES,

Attached is a memorandum dated January 9, 1974, captioned

as above, which was hand delivered to me from Hugh M. Durham,

Chief of the Legislative and Legal Section of the Department's Office of

Legislative Affairs. The memorandum advises that the Attorney General

would be invited to testify February 6, 1974, before the Committee on

Internal Security of the House of Representatives concerning the FBI's

domestic intelligence-gathering function.

Ron Gainer in the Criminal Division of the Department has

been designated to play a major role in preparation of the testimony.

Mr. Durham's memorandum indicates that he will be in touch with us

in the future concerning the Bureau's contribution and that the FBI and

the Department will coordinate the presentation.

Attached to the memorandum is a copy of the Internal Security

Committee analysis of the statutory authority for the F'BI's domestic

intelligence activities dated October 3, 1973, and a copy of a letter

from Alfred M. Nittle, Legislative Counsel of the Internal Security

Committee, to Mr. Durham dated January 3, 1974,

The Committee hearings will continue the Committee's

inquiry, the results of the first portion of which were reported in the

attached Committee analysis..

100-00-1569

WW 55021

DocId: 32989610 Page 87

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## Page 88

Joh

- Memorandum to the Director

Re:

HEARING ON THE FBI'S DOMESTIC

INTELLIGENCE-GATHERING FUNCTION

RECOMMENDATION:

That this matter be referred to the Intelligence Division for

coordination with Ron Gainer of the Department's Criminal Division.

DooId: 32989610

Page

88

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## Page 89

in

„ssoc. Dir!"

st.

Form DJ-150

(Ed. 1-26-65)

.. UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT d

Memorandum

•"""

DEPARTMENE OF JUSTICE.

TO

SUBJECT:

Mx. Clarence M. Kelley

DATE:

January 9, 1974

Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

ATTENTION: John A. Mintz

Hugh M. Ducham

Chief, Legislative and legal Sectionp-516

Office of Legislative Affairs

Hearing on the BI's Domestic Intelligence-Gathering

Function

Attached is a copy of a letter recently received from

the Counsel of the House Committee on Internal Security

indicating that Attorney General Saxbe will be invited to

testify on February 6 concerning the FBI's domestic intelli-

gence-gathering function.

While it has not been determined whether the Attorney

Ceneral will in fact appear on the aforementioned date,

It is ilkely thas teatimony will be given by the Deparement

befose this Committee on this subject early in this session;

Accordingly, it is most important that we prepare draft

testimony and back-up material at an early date.

I have

contacted Ron Gainer in the Criminal Division and he is

prepared to be the point of contact in that Division and

to play a major role in preparing the material.

I will be in touch with you concerning the Bureau's

Input and we can work together in coordinating the presenta-

tion.

Attached is a copy of the Committee Print of an analysis

As tve "iSs tutory Authority foz the FBI'& Domestic Intelligence

U.R

beyinim 68-66727-1838

MDR-16

A TEN TO ATO CONTAINED

IN IS UNCLASSIETRO

CAT 10/5/00 BY 3P2 ALM/EHL

HH 55027 DocId: 32989610 Page 89

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## Page 90

CLAUDE PEPPER. FLA.

RICHARDSON PREYER. N.C.

ROBERT ". URINAN, MASS.

MENDEL :DAVIS, S.C.

FOSERT M. HORNER, STAFF DIRECTOR

WILLIAM M. HECHT, EXECUTIVE STAFF ASSISTANT

ALFREO M1. NITTLE, LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS

RICHARD H. ICHORD, MO., CHAIRMAN

January 3, 1974

JOHN M. ASHBROOX, OHIO

ROGER M. ZION, IND.

J. HERZERT BURKE, FLA.

TINNYSON GUYER, OHIO

DEWITT WHITE,

MINGRITY LEGAL COUNSEL

HERBERT ROMERSTEIN,

MINORITY CHIEF INVESTIGATOR

JAMES L. GALLAGHER,

SENIOR RESEARCH ANALYST

Hon. Hugh Durham

Chief, Legislative and Legal Section

U. S. Department of Justice

Washington,

D. C.

Dear Hugh:

MDR-16

ALL FEL INFORMATION CONTAINED

Bob Horner, our staff director, has asked me to contact you

so as to alert you to the fact that the Committee will resume its

inquiry into the FBI's domestic intelligence-gathering function.

You will recall that we had previously arranged for the appearance

of Deputy Attorney General Ruckelshaus for November 8, 1973. This

unforiunaily fell througn because of his resignation.

Following the conclusion of the present recess, the Chairman.

has indicated his desire to request the appearance of Attorney

General Saxbe at a hearing of the Committee to be set for February 6.

I anticipate that Attorney General Saxbe will receive a formal

request for his appearance on Chairman Ichord's return. If you have

any questions, please do not hesitate to call me.

• I do not recall whether I previously forwarded to you a copy

of the Comnittee resolution (adopted September 26, 1973) pursuant to

which the hearings are scheduled. I enclose a copy for your use.

With kind regards, I am

sincerely yours,

Call bittes

Alfred M. Nittle

Legislative Counsel

AMN: jC

Enclosure

HH 55027 DocId:32989610 Page 90

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## Page 91

RESOLUTION

BE IT RESOIVED, that the Committee on Internal Security, or any

subcormittee thereof appointed for such purpose, conduct investigation

and hearings, at such times and places as the Chairman may determine,

on subjects of inquiry as follows:

(a) The adequacy, efficiency, methods, and control of

domestic

intelligence operations in relation to threats to

the internal security posed by organizations, groups, or

individuals as characterized in subclause (b), of clause 12

of House Rule XI, or by the activities of foreign agents

within the United States;

(b) The jurisdiction, practices, and role of the

Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Justice,

and other Federal departments and agencies, and officers

and employees thereof, in the investigation, collection,

and dissemination of domestic intelligence with respect

to the aforesaid organizations, groups, and individuals,

ox in the administration. of programs affecting or related

to the internal security of the United States, and whether

or not authorized or mandated by acts of Congress;

(c) The activities of agencies, officers, and employees

in the executive branch of the Federal Government, or

contractors or subcontractors thereof, their employees

and agents, in the conduct or planning of investigations

or studies affecting or related to the internal or national

MDR-16

AIT FEI INTORMATION CONTALIED

A: 10/5/0055 SP3 ALM/EMC

HH 55027 DocId:32989610 Page 91

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## Page 92

-2-

security, or in the acquisition, compilation, and dissemi-

nation of domestic or foreign intelligence information in

relation to the administration and execution of loyalty

and security programs as applied to the determination of

suitability or eligibility of individuals for Federal

civilian employment, or for access to classified infor-

mation, or for other purposes, and whether or not authorized

by law or regulations and executive orders issued pursuant

thereto; and

(a) All other questions in relation thereto, for the

following legislative purposes:

(1) To ascertain compliance or noncompliance with the terms or

purposes of applicable or related.acts of Congress;

(2) To appraise and evaluate the application, administration, and

execution of such laws, and procedures

established pursuant thereto, to

determine the need or desirability of remedial or additional legislation,

and to ascertain facts essential to the formulation, consideration, and

enactment of such modifications or changes in those laws as may be

necessary or appropriate; and

(3) To assist the Committee

and the House in the consideration

of bills related to the foregoing

subjects of inquiry.

•is

"so".

HH 55027 DocId:32989610 Page 92

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## Page 93

[COMMITTEE PRINT]

STATUTORY AUTHORITY FOR THE FBI'S

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

AN ANALYSIS

PREPARED FOR THE USE OF THE

COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS

FIRST SESCION

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREINISYN CLASSIFIET)

DATE 10/5/00

(OCTOBER 3, 1973)

Cidade de Congo don de de glo no mad di e dragono de sisco do dedica agoria el ado se ser poisons

"' i for the use of the Committee on Internal Security

l'S. GOVERNVENT PRINTING OFFICE

NASHINGTON : 1973

NH 55027 DocId: 32989610 Page 93

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## Page 94

*.

Assistant Attorney General

Criminal Division

Director, FBI

HEARING BEFORE THE HOUSE

COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY

CONCERNING THE FEDERAL, BUREAU OF

INVESTIGATION'S DOMESTIC

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

March 29, 1974

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAIMED

PEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIET

Reference is made to your memorandum of March 25, 1974,

enclosing a transcript of the testimony of Deputy Assistant

Attorney General Kevin T. Maroney before the House Committee

• Internal Security (HCIS) on February 20, 1974-

Pursuant to your request there are enclosed herewith

single copies of the following documents:

1) Delimitations agreement dated february 20, 1949g

outlining

measures to coordinate the activities of the

EBl, the

Office of Naval Intelligence, the Intelligence Division of

the Army, and the Offico of Special Investigations of the

U. S. Air Iorce,

This also includes supplemental agreements

numbered lily IVVy

and Vi

A copy of supplemental

agreement is not includedinasmuch as this item was classified

"Secret" and relates to U. S. Navy responsibilities.

supplemental agreement cannot be furnished to the nels without

specific approval of the latter Department. It is noted that this

delimitations agreement is referred to on Pages 61-62 of the transcript.

2) A copy of & letter dated July 17, 1946, addressed

to the President by then Attorney General Clark dealing with the

use of listening devices in security investigations.

communication was referred to on Pages 76-77 of the

transcript.

3) A memorandum to the Director, FBI,

Attorney General Ramsey Clark dated September 14, 196%, directing

the IBl to collect and report certain intormation regarding

civil disturbances.

This memorandum was referred to on Page 89

of the transcript.

(COPY)

100-00-155911

HH 55027

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## Page 95

Assistant Attorney General

Criminal Division

4) An excerpt from the "U. S. Attorneys Bulletin" of

March 30, 1973, Volume 7, Number 279, consisting of Appendix II,

which outlines Departrental policies relative to Public Law 92-539,

the Act for the Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests of

the United States.

5) An undated set of "Investigative Guidelines" relating to

Title XI of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 pertaining to the

regulation of explosives. This document was furnished as an enclosure

to your letter to the Acting Director, FBI, February 28, 1973, entitled

'Investigative Guidelines for Violations of Title XI, Organized Crime

Control Act of 1970 (18 USC 844)."

6) A copy of a letter dated May 9, 1962, from the Attorney General

to the Director, FBI, captioned "Unauthorized Disclosure of Classified

Iniormation to the Press" which sets out Departmental policies relative

to the handling of so-called "leak" cases.

7) Copies of two communications from the Department to the

Bureau relative to investigations of American Indian extremist activities:

(a) a letter from Deputy Attorney General Sneed, dated February 9, 1973,

captioned "Fequest for Preliminary Investigation of Possible Violations

'of Federal Antiriot Laws or Other Federal Statutes by American Indians";

(b) your letter dated April 26, 1973, entitled "Request for Information

About Possible Future Indian Disorders."

8) An undated listing of those Federal statutes and Executive

Orders considered pertinent to FBI responsibilities in protecting the

internal security. Basic criminal statutes have been omitted from this

list although some of the individuals the FBI has investigated for intelli

gence purposes have been involved in ordinary criminal activity.

With reference to the oral directive issued to former FBI

Director Hoover in August, 1936, by President Roosevelt, mentioned on

Page 80 of the transcript, the following is noted. Instructions received

by Mi. Hoover from President Roosevelt were recorded in two FBI

memoranda. The originals of these memoranda cannot be located

- 2-

NH: 55027. DocId: 32989610

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## Page 96

Assistant Attorney General

Criminal Division

although copies are available. These communications indicated that two

separate meetings took place between the President and Mr. Hoover on

August 24 and 25, 1936, respectively.

At the first meeting the President indicated he desired to discuss

subversive activities in the United States, particularly communism and

fascism. Mr. Roosevelt expressed his keen concern over these matters

and his desire to obtain a broad picture of the general movement and its

activities as they may affect the economic and political conditions in the

United States.

The President arranged to meet with Mr. Hoover and Secretary

of State Full on August 25, 1936. At that meeting Mr. Roosevelt pointed

out he was desirous of having these investigations conducted and that, under

the Appropriations Act, the FBI would have the authority to conduct such

investigations il so requected by the Secretary ni State, A formal request

for such investigations was then made of Director Hoover by Mr. Hull.

In compliance with the wishes of the President, it was agreed this request

would not be in writing since the President desired that it be kept

confidential.

It is noted that at the meeting on August 24, 1936, the President

Indicated that he would put a handwritten memorandum in his safe at the

White House indicating he had instructed the Secretary of State to request

these investigations. The President further instrueted Mr. Hoover to advise

the Attorney General of this matter. Subsequently, Mr. Hoover recorded

that he informed the Attorney General.

We would have no objection to the foregoing information being

provided to the MCIS but it is not desired that copies of the two memoranda

in question be furnished to the Committee.

As set out on Pages 116-118 of the transcript, Mr. Maroney was

asked to provide the following material from the FBI: (a) a statement

from the FBI as to how it construes the duties imposed upon it by

Subsection (d) of Section 0. 85 (Title 28, Code of Federal Regulations);

(b) a statement from the FBI as to how it construes the duties imposed upon

It by Subsection (a) of the same Section.

- 3 -

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:

Assistant Attorney General

Criminal Division

With respect to the baste authority for investigative activities

of the FBi, this is generally derivea from Title 5, U. S. Code, Section

533, which authorizes the Attorney General to appoint officials to

(l) detect and prosecute crimes against the United States; (2) assist in

the protection of the person of the President; and, (3) conduct other such

investigations regarding official matters under the control of the

Department of Justice and the Department of state as may be directed

by the Attorney General.

Title 28, Code of Federal Regulations, Section D. 85, sets forth

the general functions of the FBI as defined by the Attorney General.

Included is the delegation of responsibilities to the FBI under subpara-

graph (a) to investigate violations of the laws of the United States and

collect evidence in cases in which the United States is or may be a party

in interest, except in cases in which such responsibility is by statute or

otherwise specifically assigned to another investigative agency.

Additionally, Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 305%, confers upon

investigative personnel of the FBI the power to carry firearms, serve

warrants and subpoenas, and make arrests without warrants under certain

circumstances.

Accordingly, there is no question as to the FBI's jurisdiction and

authority to investigate violations of Federal statutes which impose

criminal sanctions. The FBI obviously is charged with the responsibility

to investigate violations of Federal laws such as those involving kidnaping

and bank robbery, as well as those relating to espionage, sabotage, and

sedition.

Section 0. 85 under subparagraph (d) delegates responsibilities

to the FBI to carry out the Presidential directive of September 6, 1939,

as reaffirmed by Presidential directives of January 8, 1943; July 24, 1950;

and December 15, 1953, designating the FBI to take charge of investi-

gative work and matters relating to espionage, sabotage, subversive

activities, and related matters.

The question under subparagraph (d) is not really whether the

win. wish.has.the.authority.to.investigate.crimes.against the United.states.out.

whether its authority is limited to investigating crimes after they have

occurred with no authority to perform a preventive law enforcement function.

- 4=

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Assistant Attorney General

Criminal Division

The record is clear that historically law enforcement agencies

have performed the dual function of investigation of crime and crime

prevention. It would be ridiculous to believe that the FBI would be forced

to take no action until after the commission of a crime when its capabilities

would permit it to develop prior information regarding a kidnaping or a

bank robbery and thus be in a position to thwart the criminal act.

Likewise,

there have been no serious claims made that the FBI should refrain from

extensive counterespionage activities designed to identify foreign agents and

prevent the theft of vital and extremely sensitive national secrets atfecting

the security of our country.

It would seem to follow that the FBI also has the authority and the

responsibility to identity and follow the activities of individuals and groups

who secretly or publicly advocate or engage in activities which aze in

violation of laws of the United States designed to preserve the security of

this country and its citizens.

A recent decision in the Second Circult of the United States Court

of Appeals appears to be in point. In this case, the Director of the FBI.

and othere were sued in a civil action by the Fifth Avenue Peace Parade

Committee and other plaintiffs for alleged invasion of constitutional rights

and invasion of privacy. The plaintiffs complained that an FBI investigation

conducted immediately prior to the November 14-16, 1969, Moratorium

Demonstration in Washington, D. C., had a chilling effect upon the exercise

of the plaintiffs' constitutionally protected acilvity. The purpose of the

FBi's investigation in this case was to determine the number of individuals

who would be coming to Washington, their mode of transportation, time of

arrival, and to detect individuals who had a potential record of violence.

With regard to the FBI's authority to conduct the investigation,

the court said, "Beyond any reasonable doubt the Federal Bureau of

Investigation had a legitimate interest in and responsibility for the

maintenance of public saiety and order during the gigantic demonstration

planned for Washington, D. C. In fact, had it been ignored the agency

would be properly chargeable with neglect of duty." The court went on

to say no matter how peaceful the intention of the organizers the

assemblage of the vast throng planning to protest the Vietnam action and

HH

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',*.

Assistant Attorney General

Criminal Division

to express their sincere and conscientious outrage, presented an obvious

potential for violence and the reaction of the Government was entirely

justifiable. The court said, "That reaction was not to deter, not to crush

constitutional liberties but to assure and to facilitate that expression and to

minimize controversy which in the end would harm the cause of the plaintiffs

more than the disruption or violence would injure the Nation." (480 F2d

328 (1972)) The court not only condoned the FBI's prior investigation of a

constitutionally protected activity, it went further by stating that the FBI

had a duty.

With respect to the discussion set out on Pages 82-84 of the

transcript regarding Executive Order 10450 (Federal Employees Security

Program), the following observations are offered:

The U. S. Supreme Court in Cole v. Young, 351 V. S. 536,

Tame lI, 1956, held that Government employees can be dismissea under

Executive Order 10450 only it they occupy sensitive positions, 1. t.,

positions affecting national security. The Attorney General by memorandum

dated June 15, 1956, advised the FBI that the Cole decision involved only

processing of removal proceedings in connection with nonsensitive positions

under Executive Order 10450 and would not have any effect on the right of

the Executive Branch to investigate its employees or applicants for employ-

ment, as heretofore. The investigative role of the FBI involving individuals

has not changed.

The results of the FBI's investigations under Executive Order 10450

are sent to the Civil Service Commission, which sends copies to the

interested agency or department, for adjudication under applicable regulations.

It is noted that Section & of Executive Order 10450 provides that it is the

responsibility of the head of each department and agency to establish and

maintain an effective program.

As a result of its recent hearings, the HCIS found that departments

and agencies have virtually abandoned the practice of post-appointment

dismissals on loyalty grounds. The Committee also called for centralized

direction in a central loyalty-security review agency for the loyalty and

security programs pointing out that functions delegated to the Attorney

General ünder Section 13 of Executive Order 10450 "are at best adyisery.

only."

• 6 mi

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:

Assistant Attorney General

Criminal Division

The Department of Justice through the Acting Director, Department

Security Staif, is sponsoring a series of meetings of interested agencies to

discuss updating and revising certain functions of Executive Order

10450.

In connection with Mr. Nittle's inquiry as sei out on Page 123 of

the transcript, as of March 28, 1974, the FBI was conducting full-scale

investigations concerning a total of 5% organizations and groups within the

United States on the basis of information developed indicating a possible

violation of statutes relating to internal security.

It is noted that detailed observations of this Bureau with respect to

our jurisdiction and authority in domestic intelligence

investigations were

included in the following communications previously directed to the

Department: (a) letter to the Attorney General, dated August 7, 1973;

(b) letter to the Deputy Attorney General - Designate Fuckelshaus, dated

August 24, 1973; and, (c) letter to the Deputy Attorney General dated

October 1, 1913; all under the caption "sCope of fBi duristmon and

Authority in Domestic Intelligence Investigations." It is not desired that

the copies of these communications be provided to the HCIS; however, a

review of this material might prove helpful to Vi. Maroney in preparation

for his forthcoming reappearance before the Committee.

Enclosures - 14

NOTE:

See memorandum A. B. Fulton to Mr. W. R. Wannall, dated

3/29/74, captioned as above, and prepared by RDC:nlb.

sire. Pilo

•7==

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#H 55027

C919600848 PARMID 10

9010-108

158816180190

•CATED STSTES L VERNMENT

Memorandum

: Ail. Yennall

DATE:

3/29/74

MDR-16

i. B. fulton

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREINIS UNCLASSIFIES

nect: h52.10 BATORE THE HOUSE

DATE 215/00 BY PA ALMIEH

COAL ITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY

CONCLINING THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF

INVESCIGATION'S DOMESTIC

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

By letter 3/25/74 Assistant Attorney General Petersen,

Criminal Division, forwarded a transcript of the testimony of Deputy

Assistant Attorney General Maroney before the House Committee on

Internal Security (HCIS) on 2/20/71. Maroney's testimony dealt with

the domestic intelligence gathering function of the FBI.

During his testimony, Maroney was asked to supply copies

of various documents referred to which relate to FBI jurisdiction,

instructions given to the Bureau by the Department and other material

bearing on our observations in the field of domestic intelligence. In

his leiter of 3/25/74, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, _

requested that we make available copies of these various documents

and also that we furnish any pertinent comments relative to Maroney's

testimony. It is noted that Maroney is scheduled for a second appearance

before the HCIS on 4/1/74 and we have been requested to respond to

the Department's request cob today, 3/29/74.

ACTION: Attached is letter to Assistant Attorney General, Criminal

Division, enclosing various documents of interest in

connection with Maroney's testimony. This includes

copies of the delimitations agreement between the FBI

and military agencies; copies of several letters of

instruction directed to the Bureau by the Department;

copies of various investigative guidelines governing

operations in the security field; and a list of Federal

ENC. BEHIND FILE

statutes and Elsecutive Orders pertinent to Bureau's

internal security responsibilities.

100-00-1559-31

The attached letter also includes a discussion of televant

court decisions bearing on FBI jurisdiction and calls

attention to several prior Bureau letters to the Department

Which included the Bureau's observations as lo our

jurisdiction and authority in intelligent my. "rations.

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3010-104

May 2962. 100. so "1

UNITED STATES Ci

ERNMENT"

Memorandum

'TO

Mi. W. R. Wannall

DATE:

4/4/74

FROM

Nir. A. B. Fulton

SUBJECT:

JINTURNAL SECURITY NATTERS.

MDR-No

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HERE ONE SEALER

This is to recommend the attached airtel to all SACs be

sent emphasizing the importance of our comestic internal security respon-

sibilities particularly with respect to guerrilla-oriented criminal activity.

In recent years we have observed in the domestic internal

security field the rise of the urban guerrilla and the terrorist, often moti-

vated by Narxist-Leninist and related revolutionary theories and on occasion,

with ties and allegiances to foreign national ideologies. To meet this threat

we have concentrated our investigative attention on violence-prone and

terrorist oriented revolutionaries here.

The recent "first U.S. political kidnaping" of Patricia Campbel

Hearst by the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA) accentuates our need

to conduct continuing concentrated intelligence investications aimed at

identifying and determining the plans of

revolutionary, cerrorists who adopt

guerrilla-type tactics prosecutable under Federal and local statutes.

In the past we have witnessed two sources of revolutionary

violent action. The white revolutionary skilled in clandestine know-how who

generally targeted property and buildings for violence; and on the other

hand the black extremist-lype revolutionary who directed his violence

against individuals such as police officers. By contrast the current SLA

endeavor is multiracial and may represent a merger of the clandestine

abilities of intellectual-lype white revolutionaries with the more personal

violent propensities of black revolutionaries. Coupled with this is the

emerging practice of recruitment by revolutionaries of individuals confined

to penal institutions thus adding their criminal espertise to revolutionary

endeavors. These developments represent the possibility of an even great

thrcat in the domestic internal security fiold in the future.

1 00-00-1560

Enclosure -

CONTINUED - OVER

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Memorandum Mr. Fulton to Mr. Wannall

Re: INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS

The attached airtel brings this domestic security problem

to the attention of all SACs, refers to investigative aids currently available

to the field which can be used in coping with the threat and stresses the

need for all Agents, both criminal and security, to be made aware of

and alert to this problem in order to better recognize and combat guerrilla

activity.

SACs are instructed to insure all Agents (criminal and

(security) are cognizant of and kept abreast of developments in these

matters.

sACs are also instyucied to reevaluate the nature, extent, and

potential of the urban guerrilla problems within their territory and insure

I commensurate with that problem that appropriate investigative attention

is being given thereto.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the attached airtel to all SACs be sent.

$5027

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AIRTEL

472/74

TO: SAC. ALBANY.

FROM: Director, FBI

INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS

In recent years we have observed in the domestic, internar

security field the rise of the urban, guerrilla and the terrorist,

Many of

these individuals are motivated by Marxist-Leninist and related theories

and an investigation has shown that they often have ties and allegiances to

foreign national ideologies. To meet this threat we have been concentrating

our investigative attention in the domestic subversive field on such

violence-prone and terrorist-oriented revolutionaries here in the United

States.

The recent "first U.S. political kidnaping" of Patricia

Campbell Hearst by the Symbionese: Liberation Army (SLA) accentuates

the need for our concentrated investigation in this area, In the past we

have wimessed on the one hand the violent action of white revolutionaries

skilied in clandestine know -how who generally targeted property and build-

ings for violence; while on the other hand biack extremist-type revolutionaries

directed their violence against individuals such as police officers. Signiti

cantly, the current SLA afair was multiracial in nature representing a

possible merger of the clandestine abilities of intellectual-type white

revolutionaries with the more personal violent propensittes of the black

revolutionary. "Coupled with this has been the emerging practice of re-

cruitment by revolutionaries of individuals confined to penal institutions

thus adding their criminal expertise to revolutionary endeavors. All of

these factors represent the possibility of an even greater threat in the

immediate future in the domestic internal security field

100-00-1560

7H 55027 .DocId:32989610 Page 104

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Airtel to SAC, Albany, et al

Fie: INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS

Although many structured revolutionary and violence oriented

groups of the past have dirtused, the incividual extremist still exists and

in some instances has joined with others in such loose-knit clandestine "

guerrilla operations. Prime examples thereof include the SLA, members

o which have been identified as former Venceremos Organization activists

guided by the Revolutionary Union; the Black Liberation Army, which had

its origin in the Black Fanther Farty and other black nationalist groups; and

some communes in various paris of the country composed of individuals

with New Left and Marxist-Leninist backgrounds who have engaged in bomb

ings, theit of weapons and bank robberies in pursuit of revolutionary goals.

It is such individuals as these committed to violating laws through guerrilla

tactics outlined by the likes of Carlos larighella in his "Minimanual of the

Urban Guerrilla" that must ba our primary investigative targets.

Investigative aids to this end already exist and must be utilized

to the maximum by every field office, Section 122A, Item 8, Fages 6-9,

of the Manual of instructions generally sets forth identifying guidelines and

procedures for recognizing and combatting urban guerrilla-type operations.

Although this manual section is primarily aimed at black-oriented urban

guerrilla warfare, there is no restriction to utilizing these guidelines in

investigating any guerrule type operation by either black, white, nationality

oriented or multiracial conspirators. Periodic publications such as the

"IDI summary of 'Extremist Activities" and "*BI Police Bulletin" as well

as the Weatherman Photo Album, the Arab Terrorist Filoto Album and the

Extremist Photo Album are already in possession of each office and cun be

valuable background sources and investigative aids in dealing with guerrilla

activity.

It is imperative that all Agents including those working both

criminal and security matters are cognizant of and remain alert for violent

guerrilla tactics and endeavors by guerrilla-priented accivists. Each SAC

should reevaluate the nature, extent and potential of urban guerrilla problems

within his territory and insure thai commensurate with this problem appropriate

investigative attention is being given to it.

2

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OPTIONAL.FORM.80. 10

5010-108

HAT I

82 EDITION

GSA G N. RIG, NO. 27

UNITED STATES

*ERNMENT

Memorandum

:

Mr. W. R. Wannah

DATE:

FROM : A. B. Fulton

5/28/74

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN SUNGLASSIPION

DATE 10/10/00

BY SPaALIM:EHL

SUBJECT

GLOSSARY OF TERMINOLOGY RELATED

TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS

Attached for approval is the yellow fle copy of a document entitled,

"Glossary of Terminology Related to Internal Security Matters," which has been

prepared as a result of the suggestion by Inspector Thomas R. Dugan, 10/25/73,

with the concurrence onAssistant Director E. S. Miller.

The suggestion indicated that the glossary should be concise and

would serve as a ready-reference source of terms encountered by Special Agents,

especially those involved in investigations of racially or ethnically oriented

extremist organizations, "new left" revolutionary organizations and "old left"

or communist revolutionary organizations, as well as of members or followers

of such groups.

While the suggestion also called for descriptions of these organiza-

tions, none were prepared inasmuch as already existing characterizations are

available in field offices in ready-reference form, and an additional set of

characterizations might be confusing, would require regular updating of the

volume, and could not be done along with the terminology in a concise form.

Also, a listing of key personnel of the above groups was omitted from the document,

although suggested, in order to avoid unnecessary updating and to keep the

document brief.

The original of the glossary is being held in the IS - 3 Section,

which will arrange for printing and distribution to the field following approval of

the yellow copy, attached.

Enclosure

100:00

1565

-

MW 55027 DocId: 32989610 Page 106

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## Page 107

sisten

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall

Re: Glossary of Terminology Related to Internal Security Matters

RECOMMENDATION:

That the prepared glossary be approved for printing and dis-

tribution to the field.

HH 55027 DocId: 32989610

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## Page 108

GLOSSARY

OF

TERMINOLOGY

RELATED TO

INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS

MOR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 10/55/00_ BY 5.P2 MA

M. EHL

Federal Bureau of Investigation

U. S. Department of Justice

Washington, D. C.

May 24, 1974

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## Page 109

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

1

I. Introduction .

II. Terminology Related to Racially or Ethnically

Oriented Extremist Organizations

III. Terminology Related to "New Left"

Revolutionary Groups . . .

IV. Terminology Related to "Old Left" or

Communist Revolutionary Groups

2 - 8

9 - 11

••. 12 - 21

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INTRODUCTION

This glossary of terminology has been compiled as an aid

to Special Agents, especially those conducting investigations in the

field of internal security matters. While not all-inclusive in scope, it is

a ready-reference source containing a considerable number of terms

which are encountered in investigations related to racially or ethnically

oriented extremist organizations. "new left" revolutionary organizations,

and "old left" or communist revolutionary organizations, as well as to

members and followers of such organizations..

The terms and definitions thereof are related to the purposes,

ideologies, organizational setups, and activities of various groups in

the United States, some of which are under active investigation by the

FBI for possible violations of statutes related to internal security matters.

On the other hand, it should be noted that some of the terms and defini-

tions thereof have come into common use by elements beyond the scope

of FBI responsibilities.

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## Page 111

TERMINOLOGY RELATED TO RACIALLY OR ETHNICALLY

ORIENTED EXTREMIST ORGANIZATIONS

BABYLON

A derogatory term used to denote the United States.

BROWN

A Mexican or Mexican-American.

BURNING CROSS

The KKK symbol of terror, threat, and intimidation--the

forerunner of more drastic action.

BURN THE PIG

Kill a cop.

CADRE

Unit or branch of the Black Panther Party; workers or active

participants.

- 2-

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GESTAPO

Highway patrol.

A GOOD PIG

A dead policeman.

GRAND DRAGON

The head state officer (President) in each area of the KK.

GRAY BOYS

Boys of the Caucasian race.

HONKEY

Anyone who is white.

IMPERIAL WIZARD

The top Klan leader of a KKK organization.

JASPER

Used to describe a black of white pigmentation.

JIVE CAT

Insincere person.

JIVE TALK

Unreliable speech, or any verbal account that is not acceptable

. or is false.

4 ÷

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Ku Klux Klan.

KLAVERNS

Units in the Ku Klux Klan.

LIBERATE

To steal; known on the street as "rip off. "

LUMPEN

A term of derision applied to blacks who exhibit complacency

regarding the black status quo.

• MOLOTOV COCKTAILS

A homemade incendiary device, usually consisting of a bottle

filled with gasoline or an alcohol mixture, and usually a rag wick.

NEGRO

Persons of the black race who are mentally identified with the

"gystem"; someone who is mentally close to an "Uncie Tom."

NOISE IN THE EAST

STRIKE IN THE WEST

Diversionary tactics.

OFF THE PIGS

Kill the police.

5

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ding elsical la pie

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## Page 114

OREO

An Uncle Tom, literally a Negro, who like the cookie of the

same name. is black on the outside and white on the inside.

PANTHER CRIB

Living quarters for the Black Panther Party.

PIGS

All law enforcement officers.

PIG PEN

Police headquarters.

PIG POWER STRUCTURE

The U. S. Government.

POLITICAL PRISONERS

Revolutionaries, both black and white, who are serving prison

terms for criminal violations resulting from radical or terrorist activities.

PORK CHOP NATIONALIST

Group accepting Government funds.

POWER TO THE PEOPLE

Salutation.

- 6

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## Page 115

REVOLUTIONARY PAN-AFRICANISM

A concept exploited by black extremists which advocates the unity

of all people of African descent in a worldwide war of liberation against

imperialism. The white ruling class in the United States is seen as the center

of world imperialism; thus it must be destroyed.

SUPER PIG

TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT

FBI Agent; an assassin for the Government.

Arms, ammo, Molotov cocktails, et cetera.

TERRORISM

The use of violence, especially as a political weapon, to

intimidate or subjugate.

THE MAN

Police officer.

THIRD WORLD

A term "coined" at the Bandung Conference held in Bandung,

Indonesia, in 1955. The Third World encompasses all the nonwhite peoples

of the world not included in the First World--the Western World headed by the

United States, and the Second World--headed by the Soviets and the Soviet Bloc.

UNCLE TOM

Derogatory connotation referring to a Black possessing white

attitudes and values.

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## Page 116

URBAN GUERRILLA WARFARE

Usually violent criminal activity for revolutionary and/or

antiestablishment purposes, conducted within urban societies.

VANGUARD

First in line or leader of the revolution.

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TERMINOLOGY RELATED TO

"NEW LEFT" REVOLUTIONARY GROUPS

-

-

AMERIKKA

America or United States in derogatory sense or fascistic.

BABYLON

A derogatory term used to denote the United States.

COMMUNE

"New Left" revolutionary groups view a commune as an area

of living where two or more people of like or different sexes live in a life-

style which generally includes the sharing of sex, drugs, food and duties,

as well as to seek common social, economic, or political goals.

COP OUT

. To withdraw; to evade responsibility; to confess to the police.

CRASH PAD

A temporary place to sleep; apartment in a big city maintained

for revolving tenants, furnished wall to wall with bare mattresses.

ESTABLISHMENT

in a derogatory sense.

The power structure of American society; the "system," used

FADE

A white person; a Negro who prefers white friends or white

attitudes over those of his own race.

- 9 -

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FREAK OUT OF FLIP OUT

Any aberrant behavior, from having a nervous breakdown

to acting bizarrely, especially when under the influence of drugs.

HARD JOHN

Field Agent of the FBI.

LUMPEN PROLETARIANS

The de-classed section of society, i.e., skid row people,

pimps, prostitutes, dope addicts, et cetera. Originally a Communist term

but adopted by the New Left.

MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX

Alleged effort by military and industrial leaders to control

U. S. Government and society.

OFF THE PICS

Kill the police.

PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY

÷*.

SDS-originated theory that every individual has the right to

control his own destiny.

PLASTIC

Phoney or fake.

PROVOS

A group that helps hippies throughout the country, and who

claim to be made up of subversive elements that provoke law and order problems.

rive

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RIP OFF

To steal; liberate.

SAM

Federal narcotic agent.

THE MAN

The enemy, cop, the Establishment.

TRASH

Break windows or cause other type of damage.

VENCEREMOS

#We Shall Conquer."

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## Page 120

TERMINOLOGY RELATED TO "OLD LEFTY OR

COMMUNIST REVOLUTIONARY GROUPS

ANARCHISM

A theory that all forms of government interfere with individual

liberty and are thus undesirable and should be eliminated by violence if

necessary.

BOURGEOISIE

The "capitalist" class, which includes not only the wealthy but

also the middle-class. To communists, the bourgeoisie is a class enemy which

must be destroyed.

CADRE

The trusted inner circle of trained members and leaders on whom

the communist parties can depend to carry out policies and programs without any

questions or objections.

CAPITALSM

Capitalism, according to Marxist-Leninists, is an economio

system based on private ownership of property, the private control of the

means of production, and the private accumulation and use of profts. It

is regarded as a form of exploitation of one class--the proletariat or workers--

by a second one-the owners of property and the means of production.

CELL

The lowest organizational unit of a communist party.

CENTRAL COMMITTEE, ALSO REFERRED TO AS NATIONAL CENTRAL, COMMITTEE

OR POLITBURO

The leading leadership organization which conducts affairs of

communist parties between conventions.

- 12-

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CLASS

A section of a given population that, according to communists,

occupies a specific relation to means of production: (1) the capitalist or

bourgeoisie class which owns property and the means of production; and

(2) the wage-earners, proletariat, or working class. In highly developed

countries like the United States, there is also the "middle class" or "petty

bourgeoisie."

COEXISTENCE

(See Peaceful Coexistence)

COLLECTIVE, also CELL

The lowest organizational unit of a communist party.

COLONIALISM

The stage of capitalistic development, according to communists,

wherein capitalism captured overseas colonies in its search for markets.

Today, the word is applied by communists to almost any form of aid or influence

extended by the West to lesser developed countries.

COMMÜNE

Initially indicated small social units with common use and ownership

of land and implements and common sharing of production. In communist

context, refers to a group united for revolutionary purposes, as the Paris

Commune in 1871 which briefly held power.

13

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COMMUNISM (MARXISM-LENINISM)

A doctrine and program based on Marx, Engels, Lenin and others,

which regards history as a relentless class struggle leading eventually to -

a proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat with state owner-

ship of the means of production and control of social, economic, political, and

cultural activities by a single, authoritarian party that will eventually become

a classless society. Also known as Marxist scientific socialism.

CULTURAL REVOLUTION (GREAT PROLETARIAN CULTURAL, REVOLUTION)

A period of internal political struggle in the People's Republic of

China (PRC) during 1966-1969; interpreted by the West as an effort by

MAO Tse-tung to consolidate his power.

DEMOCRACY

According to communists, a capitalist democracy oppresses the

workers while only after communists seize power can there be a proletarian

democracy which will be supplanted under full communism with its classless

and stateless form.

COMMUNISM (stages of development)

The first or lower stage, called socialism, is the society immediately

after the proletarian revolution. The state is needed to suppress vestiges of

capitalism and the main principle will be "from each according to his ability, to

each according to his work." In this transitory period, capitalistic characteristics

will gradually disappear and the state will "wither away" as the threshold of

the final stage, communism, will be reached with a stateless, classless society

in which the main principle will be "from each according to his ability, to

each according to his needs."

DEMOCRATIC CENTRALISM

The rigid principle that the decisions of the highest body in

a communist party (even though dominated by one man) are binding upon all

lower bodies or organizational units in the party.

= 14 -

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DEVIATIONISM

A term used by Marxists-Leninists to identify "political errors."

A deviation from set policy and practice may result in discipline.

DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM

A doctrine stemming from Karl Marx and combining a materialistic

concept of the universe with the dialectical method, which states that there is

continual growth, change, and development in matter and the world. The

changes occur as in the dialectic (the art of reasoning) in which one idea (a

thesis) is tested against another idea (antithesis) to provide a synthesis, which

is a new idea produced by the clash of opposites inherent in the thesis and anti-

thesis and combining the best characteristics of both.

The materialistic belier and the concept of continual growth,

change, and development as applied to history is called the theory of historical

materialism. By this, communists explain that society has developed from

primitive communal forms through slave and feudal systems to the capitalistic

systemn which will, because of the inherent class struggle in that system,

later be overturned and communism will develop as the highest and final stage

of society for man.

DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT

The forcible dictatorship of a communist party whereby capitalist

opposition is crushed after the communist seizure of power and prior to

reaching the classless society of communism.

FASCISM

A political philosophy, movement, or regime standing for a one

party dictatorship, forcible oppression of the opposition, retention of private

ownership of means of production under centralized governmental control,

belligerent nationalism and glorification of war.

- 15-

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FRIENDS

A term used by the officials of the People's Republic of China

in referring to independent sympathetic revolutionaries as distinguished

from pro-Maoist-Marxist-Leninist elements referred to as "comrades."

HISTORICAL MATERIALISM

Historical materialism is the extension of the principles of

dialectical materialism to the study of history and a prediction that communism

will follow the overthrow of capitalism.

IMPERIALISM

The last stage of capitalism which develops when capital and

production become concentrated in the hands of a few individuals who practice

capitalist exploitation in colonial areas in seeking outlets for goods produced

and raw materials for manufacturing.

LABOR ARISTOCRACY

Usually, the highest paid element of the working class that has

been "bought" by capitalists.

LEFT DOGMATIST or LEFT SECTARIAN

A rigid purist in Marxist-Leninist ideology who will not sacrifice

principle, even if doing so temporarily might further long-range goals of the

revolution.

LENINISM

Development of Marx's theories on the class struggle and

revolution by Lenin into practical strategy and tactics to bring about a

revolution under leadership of a communist party.

-16-

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LUMPEN-PROLETARIAT

Phrase of contempt used by communists to describe workers

who take support from state or private charities but who reject communism.

Because of lack of militancy, these workers are considered useless to a

communist movement.

MAOISM

The name applied to the version of Marxism developed in and

for China by Chairman MAO Tse-tung, Communist Party of China. Maoism

also refers to the development of tactics for guerrilla warfare by which the

Chinese revolution was sustained.

MARXISM

• The political, economie, and social principles and policies

advocated by Marx in opposition to capitalism, including the class struggle,

revolution, and dictatorship of the proletariat.

MARXISM-LENINISM

A set of doctrines created by Marx and added to by Lenin for

application to advance the proletarian revolution.

MASS ORGANIZATION

Non-communist organizations, such as labor unions, churches,

fraternal organizations, cultural groups, peace groups, and the likes, are

the targets of Marxist-Leninists seeking to infiltrate, dominate, or indirectly

control such organizations. Marxist-Leninist endeavor to conceal their basic

affiliation while working in mass organizations to inject communist objectives.

MODERN REVISIONISM

Considered by Marxist-Leninists as the most dangerous perversion.

Modern revisionism declares Marxist-Leninism as outmoded, denies the necessity

of proletarian revolution and dictatorship of the proletariat and demands the

rejection of Leninist principles of organization and democratic centralism.

Maoists describe the Soviets as modern revisionists or social imperialists,

while the Soviets accuse the Chinese communists of distorting Marxism-

Leninism.

- 17-

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OPPORTUNISM

Actions contrary to wishes of the communist party or any

approval of capitalism,

PAPER TIGER

Derisive Chinese communist term for the power of the Western

world, particularly that of the United States.

PARTY LINE

The total of a communist party's decisions, aims, programs,

and demands at any given time. Distinction must be made between the

deceptive party line (programs designed for public consumption) and the

real party line (the true party purpose designed to advance the interest of

communism).

PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE

A Leninist principle developed mainly by Khrushchev that sets

aside, but only on a temporary tactical basis, the open pursuit of the communist

goal of world conquest to allegedly engage in peaceful competition, especially

in economic matters, with noncommunist nations.

PERMANENT REVOLUTION

The theory of Trotsky that communism requires uninterrupted

revolutionary effort throughout the world, contrary to Stalin's decision

that communism should be well developed in one country before spreading

It throughout the world.

PROLETARIAT

The workers or the working class.

-18-

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42685

PROLETARIAN DEMOCRACY

The only "true" democracy, according to communists, because

it is controlled by the worker majority and not by a minority as alleged in a

capitalist democracy.

PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION

Seizure, by force and violence whenever necessary, of the

government or state political power by the proletarians or working class

led by the communist party--the vanguard of the proletariat.

RANK AND FILE

A reference to the general membership of an organization,

party or union as opposed to the leadership.

REVISIONISM (REFORMISM)

As used by communists, it is a criticism of any revision of Marxist-

Leninist principles which tends to be a drift to the "right." A drift to the "left"

is called dogmatism.

RIGHT OPPORTUNISM

Abandoning Marxist-Leninist principles in order to gain a

political advantage by working with the enemies of communism.

SCIENTIFIC SOCIALISM (MARXIST)

See Communism.

- 19-

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SECRETARIAT

The active officers or leaders of a communist party who usually

conduct the day-to-day business of the organization in behalf of a central committee.

SECTARIANISM

The refusal to adopt flexible tactics or to compromise for the

moment to achieve a greater gain later.

SELE-CRITICISM

A technique ostensibly to detect and correct weaknesses in

communist party circles, but actually to enforce communist discipline. Each

member is encouraged to constantly examine failures to do party bidding

by others and by himself.

SINO-SOVIET SPLIT

Friction between Moscow and Peking, apparent since mid-1950's,

burst into open controversy in January, 1963, with attacks and counterattacks

appearing in both Russian and Chinese communist official newspapers. The

Sino-Soviet split has disintegrated the monolithie international communist

movement. As of 1974, there is no indication the dispute between the Soviets.

and the Chinese is to be settled soon.

SOCIAL DEMOCRAT

One interested in reforms but not revolution.

SOCIAL IMPERIALIST

A descriptive reference used by the Chinese communists to describe

the revisionism of the Soviet Union, socialist country, collaborating with a

capitalist or imperialist country.

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STRATEGY

Marxists describe strategy as concerned with the long-range

objectives of a movement. Tactics are concerned with day-to-day operations.

TROTSKYISM

Marxism-Leninism as interpreted by Leon Trotsky; with emphasis

on permanent worldwide revolution and support for the Soviet workers state,

while critical of the Soviet bureaucracy and the abuses of Stalin. To the Soviets,

pro-Soviets, and the Chinese communists, Trotskyism today means a forbidden

deviation from the party line. Trotsky was exiled by Stalin in 1929 and

assassinated in Mexico in 1940 by a reported Stalinist agent.

TROTSKYITE, aka TROT

A follower of Leon Trotsky and archenemy of the Soviet Communist

Party.

TROTSKYIST

An individual who adheres to the teachings of Marx, Engels,

and Lenin, as interpreted by Trotsky.

UNITED FRONT

A revolutionary tactic designed to secure the support of non-

communists for Party objectives. This generally involves Party manipulation

of noncommunist groups, usually on some current issue such as "peace" or

"civil rights," whereby the Party, while maintaining its independence role,

cooperates with others to work for certain goals. To noncommunists the goal.

is advancement of the good of society; to communists, the revolution.

VANGUARD OF THE PROLETARIAT

Term applied to the role of the Communist Party as the leader or

teacher of the proletariat. Communists also talk of the Party as the "general

staff" of the revolution.

- 21-

WHY 55020

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Mr. No Ro Wannali

Ro L. Shackellord

CHARACTERIZATIONS OF SUBVERSIVE

ORGANIZACIONS AND POBLICATIONS

(THULENA IN. SKETCHES)

• .

PREDICATIONS FOR

INVISTICATION

6/24/74

MDR-I4

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFICE

DATE 19/5/00_ BY SP 3 ASMIEHL

SYNOPSIS

Recommendasdons being made that annual (6/1)

thumbnail

sketch program and method of preparing predica

tions for investigation ba sevásed®

Provailing sustruC

cions require that by G/h annually, idold le to submit for

Headquarters (uQ) approval characterizations of subversivo

organizations and publications These have consisted

two versions - 3

lengthy one for use in Security oi

Government Employees (SGE) and applicant type cases and

an abbreviatod one for use in security. typa cases.

develop uniformity and facility in handling this program,

2t is recommended that a singlo concise, bu complete.

characterization of each organization and publication

investigative interest be prepared for use in SGe and

applicant-type communications as well as those or a

secursty-type. the field will continue to prepare

skotches

of local interest, while HQ substantiva supervicors 111

henceforth prepare chose of Iield-wide interest, which are

the type that have been sent through ud channeis for approval

before dispatch to field for circulation to all offices.

Becauso descriptive information set forth in a predication

for Investigation of an organization s showing statutory

basis for sane a 1s sintiar to characterization of the

organization, leid will hencelorth utilize l approved

characterizations interchangeably as descriptive

paragraphs

in predications.

RECOMMENDATIONS • PAGE 1U

Enclosure

100-00-1576

HW 55027 DooId:32989610 Page 130

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## Page 131

Memorandum to Mc. H. R. Wannall

Re:

Charaoterizations

• Of Subversive

Organizationg And Publicationg

(Thumbnald Sketches)

Prodicationg For Investigation

•200-7254

RECOMVENDATIONS

I. That approval be grantod for preparation

of a single concise, but complete, characterization of

each organization and pubLication or investigative

Interest, in place on the presently required lengthy

and abbreviated versions.

Il. That substantive supervisors at HQ henceforth

prepare sketches of field-wide interest.

III.

That field be authorized to utilize HQ-

approved characterizations of organizations in connection

with predicationg for investigation.

An example of a

predication, that of the Conmunist Party, USA (CPUSA),

utilizing a characterization of CPUSA as descriptive

Information of the organization (paragraph tro), 1g

enclosed for assistance and information. (In instances

where a predication is reguared, boch paragraphs oi

enclosure. would be utilized.

In instances where a charac

torization is required, socond paragraph only of the

enclosuro would be utilized.

at I8 me

DETAILS - PAGE 2

HH 55027

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Page

131

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Memorandum to Ms. M. R. Wannall

Re:

Characterizations Of Subversive

Organizations And Publications

• (Thumbnail Sketches)

Predications for Investigation

200-7254

DETAILS

Prevailing Instructiong require that annualy,

.by 6/1, Lield (officas of origin) submit for HQ approva.

characterizations of subversive organizations and pubi

cations. these have consisted of two versions of each

sketch o a lengthy one for use in reports and letterhead

memoxanda (Lilis) In SGE and applicant-type cases and an

abbraviated one for use in security-typa cases.

FOllOW

Ing HQ review and approval by substantive desk

handling

case, a copy of each version has been stamped "Approved"

and

returned to the ariginator.

A small percentago of

those sketches, adjudged of field-wide interest, have

been sent through HQ channels for approval belore dispatch

to flold bearing stamp, "Field wide Interest." Upon recsipt

by olideo os origin, a sketch of fioid-wide interest bas

been reproduced there and one copy sent to each ¿ield office

by routing slip.

In compliance with instructions in revised

Section 87, Manual of instructions, predications of sub

versive organizations, leaders and

members wore dent to

the Ileld. These are used in communications prepared by

the liold to predicate each investigation on a statutory

basis.

Since tho President abolished the Attorney Genr

exal's (AG) list of subversive organizations by Executive

Order (e0) 11785 on 6/4/74, field has been instructed o

make no Lurther relerence to this diat. reLative to

citation by the AG under EO 10450, In characterizations

utilized in reports and lilis and predications for invest

gation, rield was also instructed to use the short form

or characterizatious only in commnications being preparod

for dissemination in Subversive Batters (SU), Internal

Security (IS) and Extremist Matters (IM) categories, and

advised

that annual characterization program was being

revised.

!

CONTINUED * OVER

HH 55027 DocId: 32989610

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## Page 133

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall

RE:

Characterizations Of Subversive

Organizations And Publications

(Thumbnais Sketches)

Predications For Investigation

100-7254

It is desirable that no develop uniformity in the

characterization progran. Experience with the annual progsam

has shown that field's preparation of two versions of sketches

- lengthy and

abbreviated - has been time consuming and com-

pIicated without adequate compansating resuits. bong and shoxo

versions are occasionally not in agreement as to information

set forth.

Consequextly, it has been necessary, on occasion,

to instruct fleid to resubmit corrected sketches, or corrections

have been handled by ud desk and the Lield appropriatoly advised.

It appears, therelore, thnt program could be handled with greates

Lacility by preparation of a single coucise, but complete,

characterization for each organization and publication, which

could be used in SGE and appiicant-type conmunications as well

as si, IS and ali communications.

The field will continue to pre

pare sketches or each organization and publication of local

Laterest and will be instructed to resubnit sketches already

Eubmitted in dual form.

EQ substantivo suporvisors will prepare

sketchos of field wide interest. Latter sketches, which are

presently prepared by the field

and approved through HQ channels,

could then be prepared with groater lacility at HQ.

Descriptive information set sorth in a predication

for investigation of an organization is often similar to the

sharacterization of that organization.

This similarity has

caused a certain amount of contusion in the fleid, which

occasionally fails to include EQ authorized predications in

communications. A recurring error in this regard is substi

tution of the characterization for the descriptive information

concerning the organization in the predication.

This problem

can be overcone by having field utilize approved characteriz

tions of organizations interchangeably as descriptivo paragraphs

In predications of those organizations. This will simpliy fleld's

reporting requirements and insure that

predications are nain

tained in a current status, since characterizations are regularly

reviewed as to currency. Appropriato instructions will be issued

to fleid and IQ supervisors concorning implementation of

rovised charactorization program and prepazation of predications

upon approval of foregoing recommendations.

0 3 00

HIH

55027 DocId: 32989610

Page 133

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## Page 134

PREDICATION FOR INVESTIGATION OF ORGANIZATION

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA (CPUSA)

This Investigation 1s based on Iniormation which

Indicates that captioned organization is engaged in activ

Itles which could involve a violation of Title 18, USC,

2385 (Advocating Overthrow of the Government), 2383 (Rebel

11on or Insurrection), 2334 (Seditious Conspiracy) ; o%

Title 50, USC, 781-798 (Internal Security Act Of 1950).

Title 50, USC, Section 78X (Internal Security

Act, of 1950) stated that, as a result or evidence adducad

before various committees oi the sere and Housa of repre

sentatives, Congress lound the existence of a world communist

revolutionary movement, whose purpose is to establish a

communist sotalitarian dictato.shty in the world's countries

through tbe medium of a world-uide communist organization.

Communist action organizations in various countrios endeavor

to carry out tho objoctivoo of tha vorld connunist movement

by bringing about the overthrow of existine governments by

any means.

The communist organization in tho United States

= the CPUSA = pursuing Lis statod objectivos, presents "a

clear and present danger to the security of the

United shtes."

The Subversive Activitles Control Board, established by

Section 791 of the above Act, found che

CPUSA to be a communist

aciion organization.

This finding was upheid by the united

States Supreme Court in June, 1961. The CrUSA has concinued

to be an aIm of the international communist movement dominated

by the soviet Undon.

The CrUsA, iD its dependence: on che

¿requently confor with Soviet

leaders to receivo guidance and direction on the polioles the

CPUSA IS tO fOllOW.

There has been no evidence that the primary

aims of the CpusA, as they conform to sovlot objectives, have

changed over the years.

+7195579611

HH 55027

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Page 134

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## Page 135

x*•. -----

Mz. Wo Ro Wannall

6/25/74

Ro to Shackolford

CHARACTERIZATIONS OF

SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATIONS

AND PUBLICATIONS

(THUMBNA IS SKETCHES)

FREDICATIONS FOR INVESTICATION

MD R-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 0/5/00

_ BY SPEALMEHL

SYNOPSIS

Recommendation being made that alitel be sent to oil

oldices advising of procedural changes in program celating to

annual preparation and submissions of characterizations of

organizations and publications, and that such characterizatione,

following approval by Headquarters (IQ), Mili now be utilized

as doscriptive paragrapus in predications for investigation.

single concise, but complete, characterizations win. now be

prepared and lo, supervisozsward preparo characteriza long o1

22osd-yide interest. These will be approved through HQ cian-

nels, routed through Spacial Investigativo Division for review.

Ellective annual date for preparation of fleld-wide stems io be

3/1, 12 advance o1 6/1 annual ante los field's preparatiou of

characterizations of local interest. This will appropriately

notily flold which organizations and publications not to be

characterized by rieiò.

MCCOMMENDATIONS

Io? That enclosed airtol ba sent to all olfices lux

328hing Instructions rolative to proccdura)*

"changos in annual

charactorization program and in preparation of predications for

investigation.

Copies of prodication for invostigation of Con

munist Party, USA, which was ploviously approved along with my

below-mentioned nomorandums are onclosod wich the alitor to

assist flold in understanding latter change.

100-00-1077.

Enclosures

RECOMMENDATIONS CONTINUED - PAGE In

HH 55027 DocId:32989610 Page 135

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## Page 136

Memorandum to Ms'. W. Ro Wannal}

По:

Characterizations O1 Subversive

Organizations and Publications

(Thumbnail Sketches)

predications For Investigation

It.

That effective annual date for prepazation

of {lold-vido characterizationg by HQ supervisors be set

at 3,2 and that such characterizations bo sent through HQ

channels for anproval, routed through Special

investigative

DIVISZOn fOX reVLeW.

• .

-Ia.

DETAILS - PAGE 2

- HH 55027

DocId: 32989610

Page 136

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## Page 137

Memorandum to Mr. N. R. Wannall

Re:

Characterizations

Of subversive

Organizations Aud Publications

Thumbnaid Skotchas

Predications for Invertigation

DETAILS

ly memorandum dated 6/14/74, which was approved,

reconmended that a single conoise, but complote, character-

1zation or each organization and publication of

investigative

interest be prepared in place of previously required lengthy

and abbreviated vorsions, and that substantive ll supervisors

henceforth prepare characterizations os field nide interest.

ELoid will continue to prepare characterizationg of osganiza

trong and

publications of Loour interest and is being zostzucted

to rosubnit characterizations aiready submitted in duad form.

It was also rocommended and approved thai field be authorized

to utilize Ha-approved chazacterizations as descriptive para-

graphs of predications for investigation of organtzations.

Approved changes rolate to annua? (6/2) character

Antion progran, which toquires that field submit choracioriza

bions of organizations and gublications for 1Q approval.

Lengthy versions were used in Security of Government Employees

(SGE)

and applicant. ype cases and abbreviated versions in

security-type cases.

Ior sake of uniformity and facility in

handling this program, a singlo concise, bus complete, character

2ZaCLOn WILL BOW bO prepared Lor uSe InJeports and Letterheac

memoranda (Lulls) in all cases. A small percentage of charactor

Izations that aro of fioid-vide interost were previoualy prepared

by the told and sent through Ild channels for approval belore

return to the originating oîfice bearing the scamp "Fiold-vide

Interest, " for repsoduction and dissenination of copies of same

by routing slip to all officos. these vill now be prepared by

HQ substantiva supervisois for sake offacility in bandling.

CONTINUED * OVER

on 800

11 33027

+3g6-137

---

## Page 138

Memorandum to Hi. W. R. Wannald

RO:

Charactorizations OL Subveraive

Organizations And Publications

(Thumbnail Sketches)

Predications for Investigatzon

Since descriptivo intormation set jorth an a

predication for investigation of an organization

showing statutory basis

¡ Los samo • is oiten sinclar to

the characterization of the organizatios, characterizations

will honcororth he utllized intorchangeably by the field

as descriptivo paragraphs in predications.

This change

was made to simplify field's reporting requirements and to

insure the currency of predications, inasnuch as character

izations are segularly reviewed to insure they have current

appalcability.

Inasmuch as characterizations of field-fide interest

Ward now be prepared at Hop

Intelligence Division suparvisors

w422 be separately instructed relative to handling. Approval

w111 bo medo of these charactersections throuch al choanolo,

routed through for revlow of special Investigative Division,

which utilizes such characterizatáona in SGE and applicant

type communications Upon approvel, these characcerizations

will be disseminated by HQ to all floid offices. To provide

¿leid with identisies of organizations and publicati.02g,

whose characterizations are regardod by HQ as of field wide

interest, effective date for praparation of Lield wide items

by uld supervisors should, in futuro, be in advance of the

general 0/1 annual characterization program. It is belleved

that an octective annual dato of 3/1 for this purpose would

permit proparation of Isold vice characterizations in sulli

cient time to enable the lield to be appropriately notified

and, therefore, to know which organizations and publicationa

20t

to be characterized by field. On some occasions, inior

mation relating to a newly investigated subversive organization

does not field a clear-cut basis for determination by an

office of origin as to whether a charactorization would or

would not bo of field-wide interest.

Field is being instructed

to commusicate with HQ in these instances

• for appropriate

guidance.

00 3 5

-17-55027-Doc1d:72989610 Page, 130

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## Page 139

AIREOL

TO: SAC, Albany (EnclOsure)

Ixom: DIreCtOr, FBI

CHARACTERIZATIONS OF SUSVERSIVE

ORGANILATIONS AND PUBLICATIONS

(JAIUMBNAIL SKETCHES)

PREDICATIONS FOR INVESTIGATION

DATE: 7-8-74

BoButels 6/6,7/14.

This lo to adviso you of procedural changes being

made in handling of annuad characterization program.

Illectivo immediatoly, preparation of characterita

tions in dual form Lengthy and abbreviated versions - is

alscorinued.

Henceforth, a single concise, but complete,

charactorization is to be prepared of each organization and

publication oi investigative interest, Characterizations or

Local intonock, which have already boon submitted under ths

former procodures, are to be resubmitted promptly in single for

fox, Headquarters

(80, approval.

Characterizations of Ileid wide interest, which may

be identitled by relesence to those prelously epproved and

returned to the lieid, will now be prepared by id substantive

supervisors.

Those will be disseninated by Hu to all field

offices, appropriatoly designated as of field-vido interest.

New: procedures apply to annual program of submitting

charactorizations by 6/1 as vellas to characterizations of

Jocad interost approved on a case-by-case basis throughout the

year®

Whenever a question arises as to whether a characieria?:

-

Lion of an organization that ta a new subject of investigation

3 = Ald Offices (Enclosuro)

UR. (abous

100-84-15973)

triginalin 100-7234-52088

HW 55027

MDR-1

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

"PEN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE I0 5/00 BYSPRALMENL

DooId:32989610 Page 139

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## Page 140

Alrtel to SAC, Albany

Re:

Characterizations of Subversive

organizations and Publications

(Thumbnail Sketches)

Predications for Investigation

1s or is not of field wide interest, furnish succinct background

of matter told for a decision and appropriate handling.

TO

further assist the field in lts preparation and submissions of

characterizations on the next program date (6/1/75), HQ will have

an effective date of 3/2/75 for the preparation of chazacterizations

These will bo sent to respective field

offices (o1 origin) sufficiently in advance to enable offices to

to be prepaced by the 1ie1d.

Another development in this matter involves the prep

axation of prodications ior investigation of organizations on

statutory basos.

Experience has shown that a certain amount of

confusion has existed in the lield relative to the reporting of

predications.

Ications,

offices have often substituted a characterization of an

paragranhe that had been approved st her This appoard to havo

been due to. cle

similarity that has often existed between character

izattons of certain organizations and descriptive information con

cerning these organizations in predications.

To eliminate this

problem and to simplify the fiold's reporting procedures, hencefortk

utilize HQ approved characterizations interchangeably as descriptive

paragraphs in predications.

You may continue to utilize predication

previously sont to the lield by so until the new characterizations

prepared under the revised program have been approved at HQ and

sent to fleid. Inclosed for your assistance in handling this new

procedure is a recently approved field-wide characterization of the

Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), appearing in paragraph tvo in a pred

ication for investigation of the Party. The second paragraph only

w121

now be utilized by the field in

reports and lihis, where

mention is made of the crusa, to characterize the CPUSA, which

was

not previously charactorized

In disseminative communications.

In

instances where a predication is required, both paragraphs of the

enclosure will be utilized.

You may reproduce instant communication and enclosure

as necessary to implement foregoing changes in your office. Manual

and FBI Agents Handbook changes to follow.

55027 DooId: 32989610

Page

140

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## Page 141

Arital to SAC, Albany

Re:

Characterizationa of Subversivo

Organizations and

Publications

Predications for Investigation

NOTE :

See R. L. Shackelford to Hr. N. R. Wannall

nemorandum, 6/25/74, prepared by IB:dlp.

HW

55027

DocId: 37989610 Page 11t

---

## Page 142

PREDICATION FOR INVESTIGATION OF ORGANIZATION

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA (CPUSA)

1

This investigation is based on information

• which indicates that captioned organization is engaged

in activities which could involve a violation of Title 18,

USC, 2335 (Advocating Overthrow of the Governmont), 2383

(RebeLLion or Insurrection), 2384 (Seditious Conspiracy;

or Tile 50, USC, 781-798 (Internal Security Act of 1950).

TItle 50, USC, Section 781 (Internal Security

Act of 1950) stated that, as a resuli of evidence adduced

before various committees of the Senate and House of

Representatives, Congress found the existence of a world

communist revolutionary movement, whose purpose is to

establish a communist totalitarian dictatorship in the

world's countries through the medium of a world-wide com-

Communist action organizations in

various countries endeavor to carry out the objectives of

the world communist movement by bringing about the over

throw of existing governments by any means. The communist

organization in the United States -- the CPUSA - pursuing

Its stated objectives, presents "a clear and present danger

to the security of the United States."

The Subversive Activ-

Itles Control Board, established by Section 791 of the above

Act, found the CPUSA to be a communist action organization.

This finding was upheld by the United States Supreme

In JuDe, I96L. The CPUSA has continued to be an arm co the

international communist maement dominated by the Soviet Union.

The CPUSA, in its dependeuce on the Soviet Union, has never

knowingly adopted a position contrary to soviet policy.

its

leaders frequently confer with Soviet leaders to receive

guidance and direction on the policies the CPUSA is to follow.

There has been no evidence that the primary atms of the CPUSA,

as they coniorm to soviet objectives, have changed over the

years.

HH 55027 DocId: 32989610

Page 112

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## Page 143

OPTIONAL FORM NO, 10

3010-108

MAY 196Z EDITION

OSA GEM. REG. NO, 27

UNITED STATES

CERNMENT

Memorandum•

Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE:

7/8/74

FROM, : MI. W. R. Wannall

SUBJECT X TESTIMONY OF W. R. WANNALL

'BEFORE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON -

INTERNAL SECURITY 6/4-5/74--

CONCERNING FBI JURISDICTION

MDR - 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIEO

DATE 10/5/00 BY SPRAL

On June 4 and 5, 1974, I appeared before the House

Committee on Internal Security, chaired by Congressman Richard H.

Ichord, to testify concerning FBI jurisdiction in security-intelligence

investigations. I was accompanied by Inspector T. J. Smith of

Intelligence Division and SA Robert Egan of Special Investigative

•Division.

Pursuant to rule adopted by the Committee, authority was

granted to revise and extend any testimony given before the Committee and

to correct such testimony where necessary.

Accordingly, a copy of the transcript of testimony was provided

to me for the purpose of making any corrections, and to revise and

extend my initial testimony as deemed necessary and appropriate.

I have reviewed the testimony and where appropriate I have corrected,

revised and/or extended the testimony for purposes of clarity correctness.

The corrections are shown in the attached copies in red. The original

testimony is retained in Intelligence Division and if the corrections made

in attached are approved, the original revised transcript will be

returned to the Committee by the Congressional Services Office of

External Affairs.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the testimony, as corrected, revised and/or extended, as

shown in attached, be approved for delivery to the House Committee on

Internal Segurity.

1 100-00-1567

Mh 50027 DocId: 32989610 Page 143

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## Page 144

OPTIONAL 1O1. NO, 10

5030-108

MAY "047

UNITED STATES GO • RNMENT

Memorandum

: Mr. Wannall

DATE: 7/10/74

FRON

: A. B. Fulton

MDR-1

SUINCT SUBVERSIVE AND EXTREMIST

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN SUNGLASSIPIOR

INVESTIGATIONS

DATE 10/5/00 BY 5P a ALM EHL

PROPOSED CHANGE IN REPORIING PROCEDURES

Reurmemo 6/28/74, recommending that for six-month trial period

we adopt summary reporting system in a number of our subversive and

extremist investigations. You recommended that at conclusion of trial

period we would resolve with U.S. Archivist whether it would be necessary

to retain full details of investigation in field office files.

Mr. Kelley inquired (1) why we do not resolve question of retention

of field files now and (2) why FBIHQ needs synopsis in these cases, i.t.,

whether we need any reports ai all. He suggested that similar practice has

already been used in certain types of cases. The following observations are

set forth in response to the Director's questions.

Question of whether we would have to retain details of investigation in

field files could be taken up with U.S. Archivist at any time, but we believe

this should be deferred until trial period is completed. Based on our experience

during this period, we may want to make certain modifications in new reportig

procedure. Thus, we will be in a better position to discuss matter with

Archives following the trial period and after any "bugs" have been ironed out

It we adopt summary-type reporting procedure permanently we can, of course,

do so regardless of the outcome of discussions with Archives. Concurrence

of latter is needed relative to issue of file retention in field but would not

preclude us from using summary procedure in any event. Under current rules;

our field offices maintain subversive and extremist files for a 20-year period

and the question of file retention is therefore not pressing.

With respect to Director's second question, it is true that in certam

criminal matters the field has not been required to submit anything to FBIHQ.

However, when dealing with security and extremist investigations, there are

considerations involved which make it mandatory that Headquarter's receive

certain essential information regarding each investigations? 16 1971

1-Beginning with President Roosevelt's dircetives of I939, the FBi

has been charged with the basic responsibility of serving as a clearing house

for all information affecting the internal security of the U.S. All law

NN 55027 DocId:32989610 Page 144

100-06-1574

---

## Page 145

Memorandum to Mr. Wannall

• Re: SUBVERSIVE AND EXTREMIST INVESTIGATIONS

PROPOSED CHANGE IN REPORTING PROCEDURES

enforcement officers and Federal agencies, as well as private citizens, have been

requested io report information regarding subversive and related matters to the

Bureau. We, in turn, have the responsibility of correlating this data and referring

.. information of interest to other Federal agencies to them. Unless we receive basic

information from the field as to the identities of subversive and extremist individuals.

we could not fulfill this responsibility.

2-Bureau has a number of specific agreements with other Federal agencies

requiring us to furnish them with information within their areas of interest. These

include the Delimitations Agreement between the Bureau and the armed forces

intelligence agencies; a Memorandum of Understanding adopted in 1955 by the

Departments of Justice and Defense; and our agreement with Secret Service regarding

Presidential protection. The receipt of summary-type reports from the field vill enas.

us to fulfill these dissemination responsibilities, but we could not satisfy our

obligations it all information were retained in the field.

3-Executive Order 10450 (Security of Government Employee program)

specifically requires the FBI to check the names of all civil applicants and incumbents

of the Executive Branch against our records. In order to meet this responsibility

FBIrQ records must contain the identities of all persons connected with subversive

or extremist activities, together with necessary identifying information.

4-In addition to the above commitments, it is believed that we should receive

at least a summary of all subversive and extremist investigations at FBIHQ in order

to meet our overall internal security responsibilities. As indicated in your

memorandum of 6/28/74, FBIHQ supervisors do not need to follow many of these

subversive and extremist investigations in detail nor do we require reports

containing every scrap of information developed during the field inquiry. However,

FBIHQ does have a broad responsibility to recognize and follow major trends and

patterns of subversive and extremist activity; to coordinate information being reportedl

by the various field offices; and to detect and remedy any deficiencies or poor

investigative practices developing in the field. It is believed that the receipt of

summary-type reports from the field with regard to rank-and-file subversives and

extremists will allow us to carry out these functions without bogging us dovn in

meaningless detail.

ACTION: (1) This is for the Director's information.

(2) I approved, we will prepare specific guidelines and institute the

summary-type reporting procedure throughout the fick on a sis-month trial basis.

HN 55027 DooId:32989610

Page 145

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## Page 146

OSiONAL M

ню. 10

3010-106

MAY 1902 RU.IION

SSA GEN, RIG NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT.

Memorandum

і ТО

: Mr. W. R. Wannall

FROM

• B. Fulton

SUBJECT HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INtERNAL

SECURITY (ICIS) HEARINGS ONABL

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE

GATHERING FUNCTION

DATE:

7/30/74

MDR-16 =

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLAGSIFIFO

DATEr 105/B0 YSP2-ALMEHL

Reference Franck to Callahan memo 1/28/74; Fulton to Wannall memo,.

5/17/74, captioned "Scope of FBI Jurisdiction and Authority in Domestic Intel-

ligence Investigations."

The HCIS

and the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on FBI Oversight

are currently conducting extensive and continuing hearings into our intelligence

collection jurisdiction and authority. Initial reaction appears to be acceptance of

our position explaining that authority, and, at present, the respective members

of these Committees do not appear to feel that there is a need for additional legislation.

The Director has appeared before the Oversight Subcommittee and

explained our position in all three areas of intelligence collection, viz., organized

crime, foreign counterintelligence, and internal security, in executive session, and

is making public statements before the Subcommittee on these three areas seriatim.

Mr. Wannall is engaged in a continuing series of appearances before the HCIS regarding

our internal security jurisdiction, authority and operations.

Referenced 5/17/74 memo directed a memo to the Attorney General

recommending possible clarification of our internal security jurisdiction and

authority via amendment to 28 U.S.C. 533, or in the alternative, amendment to

28 C.F.R. 0.85 (a), or an executive order. This recommendation was previously

made on 8/7/73. No response to either memo has been received from the Department

of Justice.

100-00-1571

NW 54027 DocId: 32989610 Page 146

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## Page 147

Memorandum to Mr. W: R. Wannall

Re: House Committee on Internal Security (HCIS) Hearings on FBI Domestic:

Intelligence Gathering Function

RECOMMENDATION:

Any action to propose legislation to amend 18 U.S:C. 3052, as

recommended in referenced memorandum, or in any other way to affect our intel-

ligenice jurisdiction and authority, be deferred until the conclusion of Congressional

hearings and a more clear determination if legislation is needed is reached; and

until the Department of Justice responds to our above memos.

HH 55027

DooId:32989610

Page 147

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## Page 148

airtel

To:

SAC, Albany

d=

-...

Horses

8/16/74

From:

Director, For,

ST-111

SUEVERSIVE AND EXTREMIST

INVESTICATIONS OF INDIVIUALS

STREAMLINED REPORFING

ated

Beginning 9/16/74 we are initiating sis-month trial of streamlined

reporting procedures relative to investigations of hidividualo under provisions of

Sections 8% and 122 of the fanual of Instructions. This system is described as

follows:

Excepi in certain types of cases viere detailed reporting will still ba

required, investigations of individual subversive and extremist subjects will be

reported in the form of a concice summary. This summary will set forth a

succinet recume of the subject's subversive or extremist activities and associ

atons together with essential identifying or background data. It should provide a

meaningtul picture of the nature and extent of subject's subversive or extremist

activities, but will not enumerate the details of investigation with each item of

information attributed to a opecific source. It is balieved that in most instances

these invectigative summaries will consist of a single page, although no hard-and-

fast rule is boing adopted with respect to their lengti.

These summaries will be submitted in LEM form accompanied by a trans

mittal letter or airtel setting out necessary administrative data. The caption

Y "Investigative fummary" should be set out immediately under the letterhead in full

capital letters and underscored. Fill details of the investigation will be maintained

in the appropriato field oîfice file and will be available if additional details are

later required in a particular case..

Enclosureg - 3

2 - All Offices (Enclosures - 3)

2 - All Logal Aitaches (Enclosures - 3)

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIE

DATE 10/5/00 BY SP2 AEM/EHL

100-00-15757

MH 55027 DocId: 32989610 Page 148

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## Page 149

Airtel to SAC, Albany

• Re: Subversive and Extremist

Investigations of Individuals

Streamlined Reporting

This system will apply to all investigations of subversive and extremist

individuals conducted under the provisions of Sections 87 or 122 of the Manual of

Instructions with the following exceptions:

1. ADEX subjects;

2.

Individuals who within the prior year are reported to

have personally and directly engaged in subversive or

extremist activities involving violence or preparations

for violence;

3.

Individuals who within the prior year are reported to

have been actively and directly connected with hoscle

or subversive foreign elemenis;

Cases involving probable prosecution under the Federal

statutes enumerated in Sections 87 and 122 of the Manual

of Instructions;

In other cases where detailed reports have been requested

by FBIHQ or where SAC believes special circumstances

warrant preparation of detailed reports.

Streamlined reporting system will apply to the initial communication

prepared in a case as well as to subsequent communications (so long as the case

does not fall within one of the five excepted categories outlined above).

Contents of Investigative Summary

A.

Predication

The first investigative summary should begin with a concise

statement identifying the subversive and/or extremist organization(s)

with which the subject is affiliated and specifying the statute(s) upon

which the investigation is based.

- 2 =

HH 55027

DocId: 32989610

Page 149

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## Page 150

Airtel to Albany

Re: Subversive and Extremist

Investigations of Individuals

Streamlined Reporting

This statement should not include a narrative description of the

subversive and/or extremist organization(s) in question. Instead

the notation" (See Appendix) should follow the first reference to

each such organization. Copies of FBIQ-approved characteri-

zations should then be appended to each copy of the investigative

summary in the order they are mentioned. Each characterization

should be set out on a separate Appendix page.

In the event an organization is mentioned for which there is no

FBIH@ approved characterization, a concise characterization

should be included at the end of the investigative summary itself

(not on an Appendix page) and an appropriate notation to this effect

should follow the first mention of the group (e.g., See description

below).

B.

Background or Descriptive Data

The first investigative summary should set out sufficient back-

ground information to clearly identify the subject. This should

include subject's full name and any aliases; date and place of

birth; sex; race; marital status; citizenship status i other

than U.S.; and current residence and employment (including

occupation). Other background or descriptive data should be

included only if it is relevant to an assessment of the subject's

subversive or extremist activities or capabilities. For

example, information relating to such factors as prior military

or weapons experience, past emotional instability, or a

previous arrest record on the subject's part could be pertinent

to such an assessment and, if so, it should be included in the

investigative summary. Background data which has no bearing

on the subjeci's subversive and extremist activities or

capabilities should not be included.

HH 55027

2.

Pertinent background or descriptive data should be reported

in a succinct fashion. The identities or characterizations of

sources from whom information was secured should not be set

out, either in the investigative summary or transmittal

communication, except in unusual circumstances where common

sense dictates that FBIHQ or recipient agencies would require

the information. (As will be outlined later, such details of

reinvestigation will be incorporated in the field office file.

1 4:

~ 3=

DocId: 32989610, Page 150

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## Page 151

Airtel to SAC, Albany

Re: Subversive and Extremist

Investigations of Individuals

Streamlined Reporting

c.

It a photograph of subject can be obtained through reasonable

effort, two copies should be forwarded to FBIHQ, one of which

will be furnished to U. S. Secret Service headquarters. A

copy should also be forwarded to Secret Service locally.

Detailed descriptive data (including height, weight, scars and

marks, etc.) should be set out on reverse side of subject's

photograph. If no photograph is being submitted with the initial

summary, such descriptive data should be incorporated in the

summary as succinctly as possible.

Whenever FBi Identification Number is available, it should be

reported.

No effort should be made to secure handwriting or

handprinting specimens: in these cases.

If pertinent background or descriptive items are not available

when an initial summary is submitted, they should be included

in subsequent communications as they become available. Any

pertinent changes in this type data (e.go, a change of employ

ment or marital status) should be reported in the next communi-

cation submitted. Cases should not be kept in a pending status

solely to obtain or report background data unless it is needed

to make a clear-cut identification of subject.

5.

If information is available indicating that subject could be

dangerous when contacted this should be included in the investi-

gative summary in an appropriate caution statement.

Subversive and/or Extremist Activities and Affiliations

Each investigative summary should set out in concise fashion

a resume of pertinent and previously unreported information

regarding subject's subversive and/or extremist activities and

affiliations, such as:

a.

Identities of subversive and/or extremist groups or

movements (including front groups) with which subject

has been identified, period of membership, positions

held, and a summary of the type and extent of subversive

-4=

.

NW 55027 DocId: 32989610,- Page 151

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## Page 152

Airtel to SAC, Albany

• Re: Subversive and Extremist

Investigations of Individuals

Streamlined Reporting

• 1

b.

c.

or extremist activities engaged in by subject (e. go,

attendance at meetings or other functions, fund-raising

or recruiting activities on behalf of the organization,

contributions, etc.);

Indications, through actual statements or otherwise,

that subject is aware of the subversive and/or extremist

character of such groups, especially the group's

involvement in underground operations, foreign subver-

sive elements, or in violent or unlawful activities;

Any information tending to show the subject's importance

in subversive or extremist groups, such as degree of

leadership or influence exercised, close association

with national or local leaders, or participation in policy

matters.

The identities or characterizations of sources from whom

subversive or extremist data was obtained should not be set

out, either in the investigative summary or transmittal

communication, except with respect to any item of information

which originated with sources other than those who have

furnished reliable information in the past. In latter event,

the information should be specifically attributed to the source

and an appropriate characterization included to describe the

source in the investigative summary (e.g., "a source,

contact with whom has been insufficient to establish his

reliability..."). Derogatory information initiating with

other Government agencies should aiso be specifically

attributed (e.g., "another Government agency which conducts

intelligence investigations...").

If any subversive or extremist organizations are named in

investigative summary (which have not been referred to in

a predication paragraph), the words" (See Appendix) should

follow the first mention of each organization concerning which

there is an FBIHQ-approved characterization. Copies of the

- 5-

NW 55027 DocId:32989610

Page 152

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## Page 153

Airtel to SAC, Albany

Re: Subversive and Extremist

investigations of Individuals

Streamlined Reporting

characterization should be appended to each copy of the

summary in the order they are mentioned. On organizations

for which there is no FBIH-approved characterization, a

concise characterization should be included in the summary

itself.

If subject has been interviewed, pertinent information developed

should be succinctly set forth in the investigative summary.

The investigative summary should include a property statement

and any necessary classification markings. In most instances,

however, the summarization of subversive or extremi st data

will preclude the need to classify. The investigative summary

should not indicate the status of investigaion, which is to be

shown in the transmittal letter or airtel.

II.

Contents of Transmittal Communication

A.

The transmittal airtel or letter should include pertinent information

regarding the following: office of origin; copies, including any local

dissemination made: references to prior communications; notations

as to any enclosures; any necessary justification statement if either

the investigative summary or transmittal communication is classified;

and status of case. The transmittal communication should also set

out any outstanding leads and it should call attention to any factors

which would be of particular interest to other Federal agencies, such

as individuals employed in or having access to Key Facilities or

affiliated with reserve branches of the armed forces. Refer to

Section 87 D of the Manual of Instructions for additional suggestions

along this line.

B.

Where available, the identities of subject's immediate family should

be set out in the transmittal letter or airtel together with readily

available identifying data and any information of particular interest.

= 6 =

NH 55027 DocId: 32989610

Page 153

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## Page 154

Airtel to SAC, Albany

Re: Subversive and Extremist

Investigations of Individuals

Streamlined Reporting

C.

D.

concerning such relatives, such as employment in a sensitive

position or by U. S. Government. The transmittal communication

should also set out the names of any other individuals identified in

the investigation which should be indexed at FBIHQ.

(his will include varials hourers intend exo em se sue setsy, e

transmittal communication should be accompanied by an FD-376,

appropriately filled out. This form can serve as a transmittal

communication in disseminating the investigative summary to Secret

Service, both at Headquarters and in the field.

The transmittal letter or airtel should account for any obvious gaps

in the investigation and include observations with respect to any

matters which logically require further explanation.

E. The transmittal communication should ordinarily not include the

specific identities of sources utilized; documentation regarding the

information included in the investigative summary; the identities of

Agents who conducted investigation; or information as to the investi-

gative period involved.

F.

When available, two photographs of the subject should be forwarded

as an enclosure to the FD-376. Remember to include available

descriptive data regarding the subject on the reverse side of these

photographs.

III.

Field Office File

Details of all investigation conducted, including negative contacts, must be

recorded and retained in the field office file concerning the subject. Ordinarily,

this would be accomplished through the preparation of memorandum(a) for the file

by the case Agent which would set out the identities of Agents conducting inquiries,

the names of persons or sources contacted, dates of contact, and full details of

information developed.

HW 55027 DocId: 32989610 Page 154

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## Page 155

Airtel to Albany

Re: Subversive and Extremist

Investigations of Individuals

Streamlined Reporting

!

Specifically, the field office file should document information from all

confidential informants utilized during the investigation using the following format:

Identity of Source

Nature of Information

Location

The first column should identify the particular informant; e. go, SE 2000-S

or NY 1500-PSI. Under the second column there should be shown in a word or

phrase the category or categories of information originating with the informant;

e:g., "CP membership, " "attendance at PLP meeting," "revolutionary statement

by subject 5/15/73, " or "travel to Los Angeles 8/73." The third column should

indicate the file and serial number of the original recording of the information.

Where more than one category of information originated with an informant,

separate entries will be necessary in the second and third columns. For example:

Identity of Source

Nature of Information

Location

SE 1000-S

CP membership

134-1000-300,

302, 307, 310

134-1000-347

Travel to Los Angeles

• 8/73

Intraoffice memorandum (a) recording details of the investigation,

including the above-described documentation of confidential informant data, must

be prepared no later than time when the investigative summary is submitted to

FBIHC. Following preparation of such memorandum(a), the field office file may

be purged of channeling informant memoranda.

It is contemplated that this streamlined reporting system will be tested

for period 9/16/74 to 3/15/75. At the conclusion of this time, we will determine

whether to adopt the system on a permanent basis. At an appropriate time, the field

will be asked to submit its evaluation of this system including an estimate of its

impact on manpower (both Agent and clerical) and its overall effectiveness.

=8 -

1H 55027 DocId:32989610 Page 155

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## Page 156

Airtel to SAC, Albany

Re: Subversive and Extremist

Investigations of Individuals

Streamlined Reporting

Each office should carefully review these instructions and thoroughly

brief interested personnel. All offices are encouraged to raise any questions

or call attention to any apparent problems in connection with this system either

prior to or following its implementation on 9/16/74.

Attached are samples of investigative summary, transmittal letter and

FD-376 prepared at FBIHQ.

You may reproduce instant communication and enclosures as necessary to

implement these changes in your office.

NOTE:

See memorandum A. B. Fulton to Mr. W. R. Wannall, dated 8/9/74,

captioned as above, and prepared by RDC:nlb.

in.

-9 -

_ HH 55027 DocId: 32989610

Page 156

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## Page 157

8010-108

902 F011 2N

OSA CEN.

116, N0 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum.

42. W. R. Wannall

ians R. I. Shackelford

*I NICT SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF

INDIVIDUALS

'EXTREMIST INVESTIGATIONS OF

INDIVIDUALS

DATE: 10/2/74

i MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

PURPOSE:

To recommend the establishment of a uniform policy

of handling investigations of members of subversive or extremist

organizations who are candidates for and/or elected to public office,

and to so advise the Department, Secret Service and appropriate

Bureau personnel:

DETAILS: The proliferation in candidacies for public office on the

part of members of subversive and extremist organizations currently

being investigated by this Bureau under statutory basis has created™

a serious problem. Continued investigation during the time of can-

didacy could leave Bureau open to unwarranted charges of abridging •

individual's Constitutional rights by interfering with lawful

political processes.

However,

termination of such investigations

would establish the undesirable precedent of granting investigative

immunity to subversive and extremist candidates for public office.

In the past, such matters were handled on an individual case basis.

Recent substantial increase in such candidacies, mainly by organi-

zations attemoting to generate an aura of political responsibility,

coupled with the likelihood of civil suits being filed against this

Bureau by such individuals under investigation, dictates need for

uniform field-wide handling of this type investigation.

In instances referred to above, it is recommended that a

field office, upon learning of the candidacy for public office of a

subject under investigation, should furnish FBIHQ with a dissemi-

native communication to that effect incorporating previously

unreported pertinent information concerning the activities of that

subject. In the absence of evidence indicating a vialation of a

specific Federal statute, no investigation should be conducted.

until the individual's candidacy for public office is mesolvea.

Intormation received during the period of candidacy indicatingta

specific violation of Federal law(s) should be furnished FBIHQ by

mans consistert with evirencios of situation along with recome da-

ions for additional actor merrimi, Other uneclicked attire

MR (ClIc 100.00.1570)

WE s027 DocId: 32589610 Page 157 Pairalin 100.358086 -4237

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## Page 158

55027

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall

• RE ::

Security Investigations of Individuals

Extremist Investigations of Individuals

information received from informants and sources or obtained inciden-

tal to other investigations should be channeled to the individual's

file and, when appropriate, furnished to FBIHQ in disseminative

form with recommendations

; as to additional action warranted.

Results of candidacy in each instance should be furnished

to. FBIHQ.

Should the candidate have been defeated, necessary

. communication should contain recommendations as to additional

action

warranted.

Should the candidate have been successful, necessary

communication should contain statement that, in the absence of

information indicating a specific violation of Federal statute, no

additional investigation will be conducted. At such time as the

individual ceases

to serve in public office, field should submit

such information to FBIHQ accompanied by recommendations as to

-additional action warranted. Should information be received

indicating a violation of a specific Federal statute while individual

is in office, field should submit pertinent information to FBIHQ by

means consistent with the exigencies of the situation along with

recommendations as to additional action deemed warranted.

Apropos of the foregoing, FBIHQ memorandum to the

Department dated 7/3/74 and letter to all offices dated 7/17/74, both

concerning National Caucus of Labor Committees

(NCLC), advised the

Department and instructed the field along similar lines concerning

was contained therein, however, concerning investigations of

individuals holding public office.

OBSERVATIONS:

Inasmuch as the foregoing has a direct bearing on

Bureau investigations

conducted under statutory basis and could have

bearing on future litigation involving this Bureau, a memorandum

will be forwarded to the Department advising of the policy being

instituted above. As subjects of security and extremist investiga-

tions are of interest to U.S. Secret Service (USSS), a similar letter

will be forwarded to that agency.

Correspondence to. the Department

and USSS will be handled under the more descriptive title "Investi-

gations of Members of Subversive and Extremist Organizations Who Are

Candidates for and/or Elected to. Public Office."

There is attached a memorandum to the AAG, Criminal

Division

(Co), and a letter to wass advising of the area.

2250

attached is a Memorandum to Ail jacs advising of esiaiiisine. oi a

uniform policy handling investigations of a type described above.

If approved, appropriate changes will be made to Manual of

Bostrysi805 • Page 158

CONTINUED - OVER

---

## Page 159

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall

RE:

Security Investigations of Individuals

Extremist Investigations of Individuals

RECOMMENDATION: That the attached memorandum to. AAG, CD; letter

to USSS and Memorandum to All SACs be approved and sent.:

HH 55027

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## Page 160

Date:

October

1974

tO:

FrOM :

Subject:

Director

U.S. Secret Service

Clarence M. Kelley, Director

XINVESTIGATIONS

OF HERERS OF SUEVERSIVE

AND EXTROLIST ORCATIZATIONS NEO ARE

CANDIDATIS FOR AND/OT ELICIED ZO PUBLIC OFFICE

As evidenced by recent communications funished

your agency by this Bureau, the number of members of

subversive and extremist organizations seeking public

office has increased substantially.

Inasnuch as investigation of such indiviâuals

for possible violations of security related Federal statutes

could possibly be misconstrued as interfering with lawful

political processes and abridging rights guaranteed under

the Constitution, this Bureau will not, in the absence of

evidence of a violation of a spocific Federal statute,

conduct invescigations of such individuals during the period

of their candidacy for public office, or, if elected, during

the period they occupy public office.

unsolicited pertinent

information indicating a specific violacion of Federal Law(s) ,

as well as other pertinent related subversive infomation

similarly obtained, concerning such individuals during the

above periods, will be promptly furnished to you. At such

tine as individuals referred to above no longer are candidates

for or hold public office, investigations of such individuals

w111 be

resumed, it necessary, and

followed to a logical

conclusion. Results of investigations conducted under the

latter category will likewise te furnished you

55027 DocId: 32989610 Page

160

100-3580864237

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## Page 161

• м.

Assistant Attorney General

Criminal Division

October 4r 1974

Director, FBI

INVESTIGATIONS OF MEMBERS OF SUBVERSIVE -

AND EXTREMIST ORGANIZATIONS WHO ARE

CANDIDATES FOR AND/OR ELECTED TO PUBLIC OFFICE

As you are aware, recent correspondence from this

Bureau

has, shown a considerable increase in the nunber of

candidacies for public office on the part of members of

organizations under investigation by the FBI concerning

possible violations of Title 18, U.S. Code, Sections 2383

(Rebellion or Insurrection), 2384 (Seditious Conspiracy),

2385 (Advocating Overthrow of the Government, and related

statutes.

Inasmuch as investigation of such individuals

could possibly be misconstrued as interfering with lawful

political processes and abridging rights guaranteed under

ihe Constitution, this Bureau, unless instructed by you to

the contrary, will not, in the absence of evidence of a

violation of

a specific Federal statute, conduct investigatio

de such individuals during the period of their candidacy

yor pubLIC office ot, It elected, during the period they

actually occupy puolic ottice.

Unsolicited pertinent

information indicating a specific violation of Federal

law(s), as well as other pertinent related subversive

information sinilarly obtained, concerning such individuals

during the above periods. will

be promptly furnished to you

along with a statement as to additional action contemplated

by this Bureau in each instance.

At such thatsias

individuals referred to above no longer are candidates for

or hold public office, investigations undor above-enumerated.

Logical pill be resumea, ur necrazarre and followed to a

conclusion.

HH 55027

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100-35 8086-61237

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## Page 162

UNITED STA

GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Clarence M. Kelley

TO

Director, federal Bureau of

Investigation

FROM

William B. Saxbe

Attorney General

DATE: 0C1• 10, 1974

MDR -16

ALLINFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN SUNGLASSIFIE

DATE 0/5/00

O BY SPa ARM EHL

SUBJECT:

Revision of FBl Regulations

no or i are

This is in response to your memorandum which proposes

amending regulations governing the Federal Bureau of

Investigation so that the Bureau would be authorized to

"detect and investigate" violations of law rather than to

"investigate" violations as presently provided. 28 CER

10.85 (a).

As you note, the Attorney Coneral is authorized to

appoint officials

"to detect and prosecute crimes against

the United States"

for "investigate" in the regulations governing the Bureau.

But to use both words is to imply either (1) that "investi-

gate" means something beyond "detect"

, or (2) that

"investigate" is merely one category of activity included

within the broader term

"detect."

The first implication

would render the new regulation in excess of my statutory

"detec since I am only empowered to confer authority to

" The second implication would cast doubt upon.

the extent of the powers which the Bureau had before the

new regulation was adopted, in pursuing some matters

which are now in litigation.

It is and has been my understanding that the words

"detect" and "investigate" are equivalents for present

purposes.

see Black's Law Dictionary, Po 536 (4th ed.

1951); Worcs and Phrases, "Detection.

This was the

thrust of tle recent testimony of DAAG Maroney before the

House Commitee on Internal Security (February 20, 1974).

100-00-1581

ITH 5502 DocId: 32989610 - Page 162

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## Page 163

2

Though it may be possible to assign each of the words a

separate meaning, I do not consider it advisable to alter

at this point the interpretation we have adopted in the

past. It is important to maintain a record consistent with

the proposition that the Bureau has been operating under

delegation of the full powers I am authorized to confer.

Thus, whatever might have been desirable as an

original matter, in the present circumstances I think it

advisable to leave the regulations in their present form..

HH 55027 DocId: 32989610

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Page 163

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## Page 164

tstas-stlsa-v098 4474-44-806-86853

OFTIONAL PORA MA, 10

3010-108

PRAY ITER COITION

G$A GEN, REG. NO, 21

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

: Mi. J. B. Adams

DATE: 10/17/74

FROM : Mr. W. R. Wannall

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

SUBJECT:/DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

INVESTIGATIONS IN THE

DATE 105/D0 BY SP2AEM/EML AEM/EML.

SECURITY FIELD

PURPOSE:

To recommend Assistant Director, Intelligence Division,

and or Inspector Number Two Man, Internal Security Branch,

Intelligence Division, personally brief personnel conducting

domestic intelligence security type investigations in key field

offices handling a substantial volume of such investigations con-

cerning the sensitivity of our investigations with emphasis on lebte

of privacy consideratious and their relationshin to domestic security.

investigations.

BACKGROUND:

The current developments in the application of rights

of privacy and general recognition of such rights by the public, as

well as pending legislation in this regard, have caused a number of

changes in the handling of our internal security investigations with

particular emphasis on the sensitive nature of these investigations.

While in New York on another matter, Assistant Director, Intelligence

Division, had an opportunity to brief appropriate personnel regarding

the sweeping changes which have been effected in the handling of

domestic security investigations.

These briefings went into detail

regarding the history of FBI jurisdiction in security investigations,

the basis for the current change to statutory predication for these

investigations and the importance and necessity for personnel to

understand the sensitive nature of investigations in the security leia,

ba ticularly in lisa on their eat on hinto privacy a too,

well received, clarifying new directions we are taking and insurin;

field and headquarters personnel are working in closc concert toward

100-00-1579

CONTINUED - OV Cr

HH 55027 DocId:32989610 Page 164

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## Page 165

Memorandum to Mr. J. B. Adams

Re: Domestic Intelligence Investigations

in the Security Field

the common goal. It is felt attendance of field personnel at these

briefings contributed to their increased morale and engendered

enthusiasm for thoughtful review of the problems the Bureau faces

in this area and hopefully would be applied in their day-to-day

investigative efforts.

It is felt these briefings should be conducted in other

key offices where there is a substantial volume of internal security

work. Set forth below are eleven offices which have consistently

exceeded 1, 300 total cases in the Security category each month according

to monthly Administrative Reports submitted. These offices would

be those offices having the greatest concentration of the Bureau's

security investigations.

Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit,

Los Angeles, Newark, New York, Philadelphia,

San Francisco, Washington Field

As noted above, appropriate personnel have already

been briefed in the New York and Washington Field Offices and because

of the volume of internal security investigations being conducted in

the other offices listed above, it is felt briefings in these offices would

serve a beneficial and worthwhile purpose. It is anticipated that the

briefings at the Baltimore and Philadelphia Offices, if approved, would

be attended by Assistant Director W. R. Wannall and Inspector

P. L. Mack, so that Inspector Mack, newly assigned as Number

Two Man in the Intelligence Division, would have the necessary

background in this area prior to handling briefings alone in three

other offices listed above. In addition to briefings at Baltimore

and Philadelphia, Assistant Director Wannall would brief the personnel

at Newark, Boston, Los Angeles and San Francisco; and Inspector

Mack would handle the briefings at Cleveland, Chicago, and Detroit.

Each of the offices would be contacted to establish a convenient date

for the proposed briefings and to determine if the particular oftice

desires any other areas in the security field be discussed.

The specific dates selected and the identity of ih?

CONTINUED - OVER

HW 55027 DooId:32989610 Page 165

---

## Page 166

Memorandum to Mr. J. B. Adams

Re: Domestic Intelligence Investigations

in the Security Field

offices involved will be furnished to you:

RECOMMENDATION:

That the briefings of the above nine offices be approved.

HH 55027

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166

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## Page 167

Form DJ- -50

(8284-26-03)

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

NEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

TO

: Director

¡ federal Bureau of Investigation

DATE: October 22, 1974

'Henry E. Petersen

Assistant Attorney General

criminal Division

SUBJECT: 'Gathering and Reporting Data.

Regarding Civil Disturbances

MDR-16

ALL IBI INTORMATION CONTAINED

EUREIN IS UNCLABSDYIEHD

DATE/0/5/D0 BY SPSALM/EHL

Reference is made to your memorandum to the Attorney

General dated August 6, 1974, captioned as above which enclosed

a copy of a teletype dated July 31, 1974 from your Baltimore

field office reporting a disturbance at the Glen Burnie Fair,

Glen Burnie, Maryland, July 30-31, 1974. You requested guide-

lines with regard iu gathering una reporting information con-

cerning civil disturbances and suggested that your reporting be

limited to those particular situations which are of such a

serious nature that Federal military personnel may be called

upon fox assistance.

While the Department recognizes and appreciates that the

FBI expends a significant amount of manpower in gathering and

, reporting data on civil disturbances, it also feels that the

guideline suggested is not practical. If such a criterion were

used, it would place the burden on the Bureau of determining,

at least initially, whether military personnel may ultimatcly

be needed in connection with a particular disorder.

As YOU

know, that responsibility legally rests with the Président, not

with

the FBI, and is based on the advice and information he

receives from the Attorney General.. One source of such infor-

mation would, of course, be the FBI. In only rare and extreme

situations in the country's history have Federal military forces

been requested to put down domestic disorders. More often,

National Guard units have been activated by the state to.supple.

mont local and state police forces in handling scrious disturhy

ances.

In that rogard, the Constitutionzortiaic iv, S4 providos

that the federal government wouldsprotect the states, upon

WiR. (alone 100-00-581)

17 55027 DoeId:32989610 Page 167

arisin (x 157-6-3177

---

## Page 168

application of the legislature or the executive, against

domestic violence.

On April 1, 1969, the President designated

the Attorney General as chief civilian officer to coordinate the

Government's response to civil disturbances. Without timely

information the president, the Attorney General, and othex

interested Government officials and agencies could not adequately

meet the constitutional responsibility to protect the nation's

security. See also, 10 U.S.C. $331, et. seg. While this power

is rarely used, it is incumbent upon the Federal government to

remain abreast of potential situations where it may be requested

or invoked.

It is our opinion that the FBI, as the investigative arm

of the Department, should continue to gather and report on

significant civil disordess throughout the country so that the

Attorney General and appropriate Government agencies may be

fully informed of all situations which may develop into major

Incidents of violence. This information should include all

significant incidents of civil unrest and should not be re-

stricted to situations where, in the judgment of the Bureau,

military personnel eventually may be used. On the other hand,

the FBI should not report every minor local disturbance where

there is no apparent interest to the President, the Attorney

General or other Government officials and agencies.

The Bureau should continue to report all disturbances

where there are indications that extremist organizations such as

the Comnunist Party, Ku Klux Klan, or Black Panther Party are

believed to be involved in efforts to instigate or exploit them.

These situations should be reported promptly and fully because

of the great potential for rapid nationwide exploitation.

AS

Deputy Assistant Attorney General Kevin I. Maroney testified

before

the Comnittee on Internal Security of the House of

Representatives on Febrüary 20, 1974;

, the viölent nature of an

organization maybe a süfficient basis for investigating so that

the Attorney General may be apprised of potential civil disturb-

ances

"Of course, any possible violations of rederal law,

such

as the anti-riot statute, 18 U.S.C. S2101, should be investigated

fully.

HN 55027 Do0Id:32989610 Page 168

---

## Page 169

- 3 -

Regarding coverage of potential disorders, the Bureau,

" through its liaison with local and state police departments and

other law enforcement agencies, should be aware of disturbances

and patterns of disorder which would be of interest to the

President, the Attorney General, and other Government officials

and agencies, and should make timely reports of significant

disturbances, even when no specific violation of Federal law is

indicated.

such situations would cover, but would not be limited

-to, cases where (1) extremist groups or individuals are involvea

or may attempt to exploit the situation, (3) the disorder may

develop into a major disturbance, (3) it may become a matter of

national attention, (4) the disturbance or disorder is of obvious

interest to the President, Attorney General, or the Department,

:0, (5) the incident is of particular interest to the Secret

•Service in fulfilling its protective function. You should also

insure that copies of all such reports are disseminated promptly

íto the Department's Analysis and Evaluation Unit in the office

-of the Deputy Attorney General, and where appropriate, you

'shoula continue to keep local U.S. Attorneys' offices advisea.

The Department recognizes that assessing the need to re-

port information regarding civil disturbances requires some

judgment in the initial stages on the part of the Bureau's field

divisions and rBI Headquarters, and it is urged that whenever

possible the Bureau focus its reporting efforts on those incidents

and patterns of disorders which may fit the above criteria, rather

than reporting each and every relatively insignificant incident of

a strictly local nature coming to its attention.

NH 55027 DocId: 32989610 Page 169

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## Page 170

OFf'DNAL FORM NO. IO

3010 -106

118 li01 80111016.

O3A GIN. RIG HO, 2У

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

: Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 10/30/74

KOM : Mr. Jo Go Deegai

UBJECT: GATHERING AND REPORTING DATA.

REGARDING CIVIL DISTURBANCES

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

BY 5P2. ALM/EHL

This informative memorandum summarizes mandate from the

Department concerning our activities in gathering and reporting..

data concerning civil disturbances.

We wrote the Attorney General (AG) 8/14/73 asking For

guidelines to follow in gathering and reporting data concerning

civil distubances. On 3,6,74 we again wrote the AG for guidance

bui in this letter we expressed the view that our activities be

limited to those situations of such seriousness that Federal

military personnel may ba called upon for assistance.

We are now in receipt of Department letter 10/22/74

which makes following significant points: (1) Department recogniz:

and appreciates our expenditure of significant anount of manporer

in this work but believes our suggested guideline noü practical

as it would place on FBI burden of determining whether military

may be needed,aresponsibility which is the President's based

upon advice from AG. While use of Federal troops to pat dow

domestic disorders has been rare in our history, it is incumbent

upon lederal government to remain abreast of potential situations.

(2) As the Dapartmenü's investigative arm, I'BI should continue to

gather and report on significant civil disorders so AG and othar

agencies may be fully informed of all situations wich may

develop into major incidents of violence.

This should include

all significant incidants, not jusi thosa where we baliève

Federal troops may be eventually used. We need not report on:

every minor: disturbance of no apparent Federal interest.

(3) Included among disturbances to ba reported are thosa there.

extremist and subversiva organizations are belicved involved in

instigating or exploiting sitvation. (4) Possible violations of.

Federal law such as anti-riot statute should ba fully

U.R. (alue 100-00-1581)

HH

55027 DocId:32989610 Page 170

origina in 157-6-3176

---

## Page 171

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall

Re:

Gathering and Reporting Data Regarding Civil Disturbances

157-6

investigated. (5) Through liaison with local law enforcement

agencies, FBI should be aware of patterns of disorder of Federal

interest

and make repoits on significant disturbances, even when

no specific Federal law violation is indicated. (6) Summarizing:

Department enunerated situations to be covered

as (a) extremist

ox subversive groups or individuals involved; (b) disorder may

develop into major disturbance; (c) disturbance may become

matter of national attention; (d) disturbance of obvious interest

to President, AG, Ox Department generally; and (e) incident of

particular interest "to Secret Service.

OBSERVATIONS:

The guidelines and desires of the Depariment are consis-

tent with what we have already been doing for the past several

years both in the gathering of intelligence and reporting aspects

relating to civil disturbances. Significantly, however, we not

have an official, written mandate from the Department supporting

our efforts in this area. We will continue to gather intelligence

in the areas enumerated by the Department and will continue to

disseminate the results to the Federal agencies of interest, boü

at Headquarters and local level. In connection with the

Department's interest in patterns of disorders and potential

factors, we will continue to disseminate to the interested agencie.

semiannual assessments which all field offices prepare. Specific

instructions to the field as a result of the Department letter

are unnecessary as the field is already fulfilling the stated

objectives. However, we will separately prepare a letter to all

offices putting them on notice as to the current Department

mandate as a means of emphasizing the importance of this work

as weed as letting then know that our auchority is derived iron

the Department, lurther, we are presently rewriting the section

of the Manual of Instructions which includes civil unrest matters

and will incorporate into it

excerpts from the Department's letter

CONTINUED - OVER

-H₩ 55027 DocId:32989610

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?

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## Page 172

AIRTET

TO: SAC, Albany

Exom: Directoi, FBI

SUBVERSIVE AND EXTRINIST

INVESTIGNTIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

SIREIILIRED REPORTING

11/29/74

MBIR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 10/5/00 BY S.Pa. ALM/EHL

• Re Director's airtel to Albany 8/35/74.

A review of comunications submitted to FBINQ

utilizing the stscanlined reposting indicaces thai implemen

tation has been successiully accomplisned in the vast majority

of cases tore utilized.

During the siest 15 days of

Implomentation, 1125 Reports and tras involving invoctigatios

of indiviinals

vere submitted. Of this cotal, 548 utilized

the curiont ili and Report format and 577 u4111200

the strean-

linca method. Of this oscaldom, cucient Ins and Reports

avoraged five pages each and the

scrcamlined notho avesaged

ennee pagos each.

Several matters have arisen which appear to require

clarificacion to facilitate preparacion of Investigatire

sumaries and to insuce that they convey maningtul recults of

our investigacion of individanls undos Seccions 87 and 122 01

the Manual of Instricazong (40I) •

It should be clearly undoretood that the example

contained in referonce airtel was not au absoluto quide to the y

prepazacion of all investigacive Sumarios and should not be

followed cocaly.

The contents of .ecch investigative Siuucary

shoulá ba dotormined by the facts of tha caso and bachgzound

, dạta

tollosad to the noedo of cach case.

2

2 - 211 Officos

UR(abore 100-00-1582)

originalin 100-358086-4241

NH 55027 DocId: 32989610 Page 172

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## Page 173

Airtel to Albany

... Re: Subversive and Extremist Investigations

of Individuals

Matters of form such as copy count are to be followed

as set out in the do oi

as instructed by Headquarters in

particular invastigations.

Also, the property statement should

be attached to Investigative Summaries as was noted on page

six of referenced airtel, although erroneously omitted from

the example.

The following are problem areas which appeared most

frequently and should be clarified with appropriate personnel:

The caption "INVESTICATIVE SUMIARY" must appeal

immediatoly under the letterhead in full capital letters

and be underscored. This serves as a flag to recipients

of our dissemination and is descriptive of the information

which follows.

Regarding predications, when an Investigativo

Sunmary is the first communication for dissemination sub

mitted to FbIHO or where no previously submitted communication

for dissemination has contained a predication (by error os

some other reason), the Investigative Surmary must bagin wich

a predication.

The predication

should be a concise statement

of the specific statutes upon which the investigation is based

and identify the subversive and/or extremist organization or

activity in which the subjoct is involved.

The laiter data

was noted as being frequently onitted in Investigative

Summaries received at FBItO.

Utilize "(see appendix)"

following the ficse reference to each subversive or extrenisc

organization mentioned in the predication and any other such

organization nentioned laver in the Investigative Summary.

Because of the succinct nature of Investigative

Summaries, care must be taken to avoid mattributed opinions

not supporiod by facts.

This critique can apply equally vell

to Reports and letterhead Memoranda.

such unattributed co

•nents as "subjoot is considored a member of..." or "it was

HH 55027 DocId:32989610 Page 173

!

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## Page 174

Airtel to Albany

Re:

Subversive and Extremisi Investigations

of Individuals

the opinion thai...," without any facts supporting it must be

avoided. II the opinion is pertinent, the Invescigative

Summary should identify who had the opinion, i.e., a specifio

organization's leader or member.

If the facis

creating the

opinion or consideration are know, the facts should be

succinctly set out.

What must be avoided is conveying the

thought that it was the FeI's opinion or consideration.

It is incumbent upon field supervisors to see that

Agents preparing Investigative Summaries are avare of the

general guidelines.

It has been noted that several communi

cations have been sent the FBIIO labeled Investigative Summary

which were nothing more than xegular Letterhead Memoranda.

This type of situation merely diminishes any good wich

can come fron this effort foi cificiency and sets a poor

precedent for all future Investigative Sunnaries prepared

by the Agent or patterned after his work product.

Field Supervisors are encouraged to raise any questions

or call attention to any apparent problems with this streamlined

reporting.

Additionally, considerations and comments are re

quested regarding the errect investigative summaries have

on supervision of those cases

in the field.

Each otice should review these instructions in

conjunotion with the original instructions contained in

reforenced airtel and brief interested personnel.

Instant

communication may be reproduced to facilitate advising

appropriate personnel.

HH 55027 DocId: 32989610

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## Page 175

2-1 - A Nat

(1 - Its.

J. B. Hotis)

I - Mr. W. R. Wannall

1 - Nr. W. JunErgiar 1075

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

ON INSANE AVIES (SCS TEE

/

Reference is made to a letter from the SSC dated

May 14, 1975, and appendices thereto, requesting certain

documents and othor intornation fron the FEI.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the

Committee is an original of a memorandum which constitutes

response to some of the requests.

A copy of the menorandum and a copy of each of

the 22 documents responsive to the Cormittee's request are

being furnished for you records.

In accordance with the request of x. I. Villian

O'Connor, we

are deferring to him any action necessary to

to giving the Conmittee Staff access to the above

ments.

It is noted a prerequisite to SSC's examination of

the

22 documents would be the furnishing to that Cormittee

on had zone, she ta report of the lateragency come ee94

on Intelligence (Ad Hoc).

Inclosures (24)

REG-102

9 AUE 8 1014

MPR - 16

62-116395

ALLA FORMATION CONTAINEE

ENGLOSING

CITE 10/2/00 3Y SP 3 ALM/CHL

I - The Deputy Attorney General

Attention:

K. William O'Connor

Special Counsel for

Intelligence Coordination

Assoc. Dir.

Dep. AD Adm.

Dep. AD Inv.

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

Comp. System

Ext. Affairs —

Files & Com. -

Gen. Inv.-

Ident. .

Inspection

Intell.

Laboratory

Plon. & Eval.

Spec. Inv.

Training

Legal Coun

Telephone Rm.

irector Seca

HH

5002

JHJ :dan

3: 20m

" MAIL ROCIM L

Tdocfdt32989610

TELETYPE UNIT

Page 175

FOR SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED BUM

GPO 954-546

---

## Page 176

Lottex to Tho Abtornay Conoral

Unitod States Sonato Solect Conaliseo

On Intolzironce Activlutes (SSC)

Tho documont boing furnishod horovath aro not for

forwarding to the SSC inasnuch no only accens f02 rovicy ne

TOIO la boing affordod tho Committoo State.

HH

55027

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## Page 177

62-110090

SECRET

2

- Hr. J.

A. Hintz

(1 - Hr. J. B. Hotis)

10/2/00

1 - Hx. W. R.

Wanna11

mDR-16,

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

CLASSIFIED SY: SP 2 ALMIEHL

REASON: 1.5 (C )

DECLASSIFY ON: X_/.

Junc 17, 1975

DUIIED ETAZUS SELTATE SELICT COLIITINE

TO SIUDY COVEINNUEETAL CROTACIONE WITE

REOPEGT 20 M/NCELIGIICE AGTIVIRINS (SSC)

DOCUMINTIS DERFATTING 70 TIE COMIIICR'S FNJOR REQUSOIO

DOCUMELNS

PERCALILNG 3O TAR "EUSTON PLIN," COTITICLPEO,

AND CHIEN FIACTICES ANID FROGRALIS

DUGICI FLANT AND DELATNO DEVELOPLENIS

ALL INSCAMATION CONTAIARO

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIER

EXCEFFWICRE SHOWN

ants lastenoe

soits3

ідён"

Feierence io mnde to lottor inted Lay 14, 1075,

to the Attozney Gancral aron tho Chaiznnn oi capttoned

Committeo, and appondices thoreto, thicl roquested cortuin

docuncuts nnd other inforuation frou the FBI.

Appendix A, Itom 6, requestod a cony of the Epccial

Deport dê the Interageney Connittee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc)

datoe June, 1070, This rcqueat hns becn reterrcd to tho

Thite HouJe-

Appendis E, Fazü I, Iteno 14, 12, and 10, requested

the foltouing:

Iten Il, al1 nenorande and othes noterialo prepared

ox corpiled by ILI porsonnel agsigned to the Interngency

Connáttee on Intolligcnce

(dd Hoc) Foxtina eroup fron Juno 5,

1970, to Jwo 25, 1970.

Iton 1a, lotter fron FBI Dircetor Hloovos to Actorney

Concral Mitchell datod iuly 27, 1970, cogarding the "uston

Plan,

Assoc. Dir.

Dep. AD Adm.

Dep. AD Inv.

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

Comp. Syst. .

Ext. Affoirs

Files & Com. -

Gen, Inv. _

Ident.

J:dane'

Inspection

Intell. -

Laboratory.

Plan, & Eval. -

Spec. Inv. -

Training -

Legul Coun.

Telephone Rm.

Director Sec'y -

MAIL ROOM I

HH

55027

DooId: 32989610

Iten 1S, all menoranda or othor naterials pertaining

€0

nectings ox conversatciono botycen Mll Diractos Hoover and

Artosnoy

39%0, concorning the YJuaton Dlan."

Genean1 Iatcholl aron duly 25, 1070, throach duly Bugl

Page

TELETYPE UNIT I

177

SECRES

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

SECHET MATERIAL ATTACHEU

Jiel

GPO 957-545

---

## Page 178

der"

SECRET

Documenta rosponsivo to tho Committoo'o request

have been assoablod and are avallablo for rovion nt Tello,

by approprintoly clearod soo porconnot.

Enclosures - 22 (For Attorney General only)

I = The Attorncy General

...=

The

furnishing of attached Ill to the SSC advising

material is available for examination at FBIHO, is dependent

upon White House's decision to furnish the Special Report of

the Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc), date

June, 1970.

Is the thite House lurnished the special Report

to the sSo,

this would

preclude the need for any third agency

clearance os material in the report or related memoranda.

Letter Ixon Acting Director to Assistant Attorney General,

Criminal Division, dated 5/19/73, represents an excellent

resume relating to the preparation oi the special Report.

Enclosed

in response material are five memorandum,

furnished by Iix. Benson I. Buffham, National Security

Agency (NSA) on

5/22/75 to SA W111ian O. Cregar, which set

corth minutes ot the 6/9, 14, 18/10 meetings.

Memorandum

of hr. 1. C. Sullivan to Mr.

lolson dated 6/26/70, which is enclosed,

sets forth the Director's instructions that each Committee

member insure that all working copies of the report should be

destroyed.

The five NSA menorandum are thermotax copies of

poor quality and in accordance with agreoment should have been

destroyed,

...11:

- 2

SUST

NH 55027

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## Page 179

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee:

SENATE

SELECT

COMMITTEE

US SENATE SELECT CORMITTEE

• Report dated _

FATAININE TO PRIOR REQUESTS; DOCUMENTS PERTAINING

Caption of Document:

TO THE MUSTON PLAN, "COUNTELPRO", AUD OTHER

PRACTICES AND PROGRANS

HUSTON PLAN AND RELATED DEVELORHNS

Originating Office: -

FRI

310

I giverg by Mechard Saylos, Taylos, Dato: 8/5/75

Title: Exesser

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

appense, PartI,

11,17,13

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

EREING UNCLASSIFIES

DATE 10/2/60 BY SP 2 ALM/EH

ENCLOSURE

GOER: +16-355-2451

NN 55027 DocId: 32989610

Page 179

---

## Page 180

1, 097-71747517

TO:

Intelligence Community Staff

ATTN: Central Index

CLASSIEY AS APPROPRIATE

FROM:

"OTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

BEFORE COMPLETING.

EBT

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

• HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available

review but not

ransmitted, so note..

I DOCUMENT | BRIEFING INTERVIEWT

2. DATE PROVIDED

I TESTIMONY

OTHER

For lesson?

3. ТО WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)

6/27/75

4.

SSC

HSC

IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer,

interviewee, testifier and subject)

Menoronau

if in response to formal request, other-

state verbal request of (name),

subpoena, etc.)

SSC lotter: 5/14/75, Appandiz A, Item 6;

/ppendis 6, Port 1, Items 11, 12 and 13

ts .

7. KEy dunde fint for emphasipriate key words from

the list provided separately; if key words not listed are

Intelligenee collection

8. SUMMARY (see

reverse

side before completing this item

for review at IDINO by SSC Staff Members, Special Repoze.

of the Interagency Camittec on Intolligence dated 6/70. Thia •

request has beon raferred to the lite Housc. All menorando anti

other nateriols prepared or corpiled by FBi personnal assigned

to the Interagency Comittee on Intelligence working group fron

6/5/70 to 6/25/70. Letter fron FIL Director te Attomney Goneral.

Mitchalz 7/27/70 re "Fluoton Fler", Menorando or other naterial :

pertaining to nestings or conversations betucen Director FDI and

Attorney Gonaral, Mitchell 7/23/70-7/20/70 concerning "juston

Plan

MDR-16

62-176395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN S UNCLASSY 5P 2 ALM|EHL

I'woC

(4)

DATE 1D 2./0.0m

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX

IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

CLASSIFY AS

APPROPRIATE

379/16-751

55027 DocId:32989610 Page 180

---

## Page 181

INSTRUCTIONS

• Type or print clearly in ink.

• Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

• Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

• "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the

information.

• If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later seht to

HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a

copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing

substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community

matters if appropriate.

Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests

should be noted.

Commitments made to supply additional information should be

noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here,

e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether

interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript

is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional

pages may be attached if necessary.

HH 55027

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## Page 182

-

OPTIONAL EORM NO. 10

5010-106

MAY 1962 EDITIPIA

GSA GEN. REG. NO, 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

Mr. DeLoach

DATE: June 5, 1970

FROM : W.C. Sullivan

SUBJECT:

INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

(ESTABLISHED BY THE PRESIDENT ON JUNE 5, 1970)

This memorandum is for the record and for possible

reference use by the Director.

Following his conference with the President this

morning, the Director advised me that the President had

appointed him Chairman of a special Intelligence Committee

for the purpose of coordinating a more effective intelligence-

gathering function as a Joint effortor the part of the Bureau

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),

National security Agency

(NSA) and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to insure that

comprehensive information is -being obtained for

use inTel well provide hinth a worldwide elatire of new th

and other subversive activities.

The Director advised me that among those present at

the meeting with the President were Richard Helms, Director

of the CIA: Admiral Noel A. M. Gayler, head of the NSA;

General Donald V. Bennett, head of the DIA; and Mr. T.

Huston, White Staff, Assistant, all of whom

C.

the President had

designated to serve

on the Committee under the direction of

the Director. Additionally, there were present Assistant to

the President H. R. Haldeman; John D. Ehrlichman, Assistant

to the President for Domestic Affairs; and Robert H. Finch,

Secretary of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare.

The Director stated he wanted immediate action on

He advised me that he wanted all of the men on the

Committee contacted and instructed to be in his office for a

Committee meeting at 11:00 a.m. Monday morning, 6/8/70.

This

has been arranged and has been made the subject of a separate

memorandum.

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 10/2/00 BY SPaÄCM/EHL

nel without the express approval of the FBI.

NY 55027 DocId: 32989610 Page 182

---

## Page 183

Memorandum to Mr. DeLoach

RE:

INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

(ESTABLISHED BY THE PRESIDENT ON JUNE 5, 1970)

-

The Director also instructed that a working committee

meeting comprising the same individuals should be scheduled

Tor luesday,

the Committee on Monday are carried through in specific detail

by members of the Committee on Tuesday. Arrangements have also

been made for this meeting to be held Tuesday afternoon at

3:30 p.m. utilizing the facilities of the United States Intelligence

Board conference rooms.

committee should henceforth meet each Tuesday and Friday for

the purpose of implementing his instructions with the aim of

completing a draft paper by June 22, 1970, which the Director

and others may review for approval and sign prior to its

presentation to the President on July 1, 1970. Arrangements

for this will be implemented at the working committee meeting

9, 1970.

The Director will be promptly

furnished with a report on each meeting.

RECOMMENDATION:

For the information of the Director and for the record.

=2

HH 55027

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---

## Page 184

TO

FROM

:

OPTIONAL FORM NO, 10

5010-106

MAY 1962 EDITION

GSA GEM. REG. NO, 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Mr. DeLoach

W.

ullivan

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

DATE: June 5, 1970

-

SUBJECT:

INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

(ESTABLISHED BY THE PRESIDENT, JUNE 5, 1970)

Pursuant to the Director's instructions and relative

Monday, 6/8/70.

I talked personally to the following individuals who

will be there:

Mr. Richard Helms, Director of the Central

Intelligence Agency, General Donald V. Bennett, Director of the

Defense Intelligence Agency; Admiral Noel Gaylor, Director of the

National Security Agency; and Mr. Tom Huston, Staff Assistant to

the President at the White House.

The first three mentioned indicated they would like to

take one of their assistants with them; however, they had not

decided which one, therefore, the names are not

available. As soon

as they make the decision, I will submit the names of these assist-

ants in a separate memorandum.

The details for the meeting of the

working group are being

worked out. At this point it is expected it will be held at

3:30 pm on

"separate memorandum.

Tuesday afternoon. This also will be the subject of

RECOMMENDATION:

For the information of the Diregtor.

MDR-14

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 10/2/00_ BY SPa ALMA /EHL

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi-

Its use is limited to official proceedings br

your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized person

nel without the express approval of the FBI.

NH 55027 DocId: 32989610 Page 184

.....

---

## Page 185

TO

FROM

SUBJECT:

ORTIGERAL FORM NO. 10

5010-106

MAY 1962 EDITION

G$A GEN. REG. NO, 27

UNITED STATES Gi

ERNMENT

Memorandum

Mr. C. D. Deloach

W

C. Sullivaa

DATE:

6/6/70

INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

(Established By The President June 5, 1970)

Reference is made to my memorandum to you dated

June 5,

1970, captioned as above which indieated that the

Director will meet with the heads of the Central Intelligence

Agency, the National security Agency,

the Defense Intelligence

Agency and a representative of the White House staff in the

Director's office, instructions I will be present.

at 11:00 a.m. 6-8-70. In accordance

mIth the Director

Unless

there is

an objection I will have with me. Mr. C. D. Brennan,

Chief of the Internal Security Section which will have the

responsibility of preparing our portion of the report on

the New Left and related matters.

I believe Mr. Brennan

should hear and will benefit from the Director's remarks.

I have been advised that as of this date the neads

lof the other agencies do not now plan to have any of their

assistants with them, except Admiral Gaylor of NSA who

an assistant, Benson

Buffran.

will bring

It occurred to me that in addition to the remarks

Ithe Director has in mind he may wish to give consideration

to some of the major points in the enclosed statement prepared

for him.

RECOMMENDATION:

That this memorandum and the

enclosed statement be

furnished to the Director.

Enclosure

WCS:sal

(6)

MDA-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 10/31/00. BY SPa AET/EHL

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi-

Its use is limited to official proceedings by

your committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized person

nel without the express approval of the FBI.

IN 55027 DocId:32989610 Page 185

---

## Page 186

Kal

-

INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE MEETING

I am sure you gentlemen will all agree with me

that our meeting with the President on Friday was of very

special significance. The President clearly recognizes

that we are confronted today with unique and complex problems

arising from subversive activities on an international scale.

There is a distinct relationship between these activities and

much of the disorder and violence which increasingly

threatens our internal security. The President made it.

abundantly clear that he expects us, as members of the

intelligence community, to do more than we have been doing

to bring the worldwide picture of these problems into better

perspective for him.

Having been designated by the President as Chairman

of the Committee to meet this challenge, I feel a special

responsibility. First, I would like to state that I agree

completely with the President's view of the situation.

Соп-

sider what has transpired in the 1960s.

We have witnessed

the emergence of widespread racial unrest which threatens

to grow much worse before it gets better.

the emergence of a new left militancy which has consituted

massive mob rule in action. From what we have learned to date

at 101: 210m ht mẻ a

We have also seen

it is apparent these are not solely domestic problems. There

are definite foreign links to our domestic disorders.

Yet, the föreign aspect of the problem is different

than that which we experienced in the past. Prior to the

1960s, foreign-directed intelligence and espionage activities

constituted the main threat to our security.

We in the

intelligence community geared ourselves accordingly and met

that problem successfully.

We coordinated our activities in

doing so. But the nature of the problem pas such that it

left us to a marked degree free to operate independently in

Today, it is mandatory that we recognize the changed

nature of the problem confronting us. Unless we do so, we

will be incapable of fulfilling the responsibility levied

upon us by the President.

The plain fact is that there currently are thousands

of individuals inside this country who want to see our form of

government destroyed. They have in fact pledged themselves

publicly to achieving this goal. They have put their words.

MDR-16

• ALL INFORMATION CONTANEO AT

PEREIN IS UNCLASSIPIE

DATE 10/aJO0 BY SPRALMEHL

55027 DooId:32989610 Page 186

---

## Page 187

into actions constituting revolutionary terrorism, and the

total effect of their actions to date has been disasterous.

In addition, they are reaching out seeking support

from this nation's enemies abroad to further their objectives.

Thus the links to Cuba, China, and Iron Curtain countries

already have been established

and promise to grow because of

the equal determination of various international communist

elements to destroy our form of government.

In contrast to the rigidly structured subversive

organizations of past experience, the current

subversive

forces threatening us constitute widespread, disjointed, and

varied autonomous elements, the destructive

potential of which

is manifold.

Individually, those of us in the intelligence

community are relatively small and limited.

Unified, our

own combined potential is magnified and limitless. It is

through unity of action that we can tremendously increase

our

intelligence-gathering potential and, I am certain, obtain

the answers the President wants.

I am establishing a working committee to insure

that we achieve the desired unity.

It will be the job of the

committee to (1) assess the overall nature of the problem as

we know it today, (2) examine individually and together the

respective resources of each Agency to insure full utilization

of them for the benefit of all, and (3) devise coordinated

procedures designed to penetrate the current nebulous areas

of subversive activities here and abroad as they relate to

our domestic problems.

The first meeting is set for tomorrow afternoon,

Tuesday, June 9th, and you have been furnished the details

as to the time and place.

The working committee will hereafter meet each

Tuesday and Friday for the purpose of preparing a comprehensive

study to be completed in rough draft form by June 22, 1970,

for presentation to the President on July 1, 1970; in final

form.

This should serve as the foundation of our committee's

existence and purpose and as the basis for a coordinated

intelligence effort best suited to serve the country's

interest at this time of crisis.

-2 -

HH 55027

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## Page 188

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

5010-108

MAY 1902 EDITION

GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

:

MR. DE LOACHOW

FROM

W. C. SULLIVAN

DATE:

6/8/70

SUBJECT:

INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

(ESTABLISHED BY THE PRESIDENT, JUNE 5, 1970)

My memorandum 6/5/70 advised that the details for

the meeting of the working group of captioned committee are

being worked out. Arrangements have been made for the

working group to meet in the United States Intelligence Board

Conger ends

; Tuesday afternoon,

, 6/9/70.

time, the folloting members have been designated:

FBI - Mr. William C. Sullivan....Acting for the Director

CIA - Mr. Richara Heims, Director of CIA

Mr. James Angleton, Chief, Counterintelligence Staff, CIA

DIA - The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) member has not

yet been designated.

In addition to the DIA member,

there will be representatives from each of the three

military services - Army, Navy, and Air Force.

NSA • Mr. Benson K. Buffham.

Mr. Buffham is head of

P-Group at National Security Agency (NSA) and

Number Three blan at NSA.

White House - Mr. Tom C. Huston, Staff Assistant to the

President.

Arrangements have been made for use of the Conference

Room and all of the above members have confirmed their

attendance. When the DIA representatives are designated,

you will be advised.

ACTION:

For information.

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

(6)

-

nation outside your Committee.

nel without the express approval of the FBI

NW 55027 DocId: 32989610 Page 188

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## Page 189

i OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

1010-106

HAY SE42 EDITION

ON GEN. REG. HO, 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ET

TO

KI. DeLoad

DATE: June 8, 1970

FROM

SUBJECT:

MDR -16

W. C. Sullivan

DECKASSIFIED BY SP. 2ALM/EHL

oN 10/3/00

INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

(ESTABLISHED BY THE PRESIDENT, JUNE 5, 1970)

MEETING IN DIRECTOR'S OFFICE, 11 AM, JUNE

8, 1970

This memorandum is to record meeting of captioned Committee

in the Director's Office I1 am, Monday, 6/8/70, which was chaired by

the Director with the following persons present: Mr. Richard Helms,

Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) ; General Donald V.

Bennett, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA); Admiral

Noel Gaylor, Director of the National Security Agency (NSA); and his

Assistant Mr. Benson

K. Buffham;

Mr. Tom Huston, Staff Assistant

to

the President at the

White House; as well as Racial Intelligence

Section Chief George C. Moore and myself.

The Director pointed out to the Committee that the

President, in establishing this special intelligence Committee,

recognized definite problems arising from subversive activities

on

the international scale and expected the Committee to coordinate and

plan so that the worldwide picture could be better brought into

perspective for the President.

recognized the importance of the work of this Committee and he stated

that along with organized crime this is equally important.

The Director further commented concerning the foreign aspect

of today's subversive domestic problem and stated that prior to the

1960's, the main threat to our security was foreign-directed intelli-,

gence

espionage activities but today we have a different problem

marked by highly organized dissident groups seeking to destroy our

form of Government.

In outlining the work of the Committee, the Director pointed

out:

(1)

The situation should be thoroughly explored to determine

exactly what the problem is.

(2) Each agency must explore the

facilities which must and can be used in order to develop facts

a true intelligence picture.

The Director noted the President

mentioned restrictions which were hampering our intelligence opérations

and accordingly we should list för the President in detail such

wCS: chsC (5)

Classified

3676

SAL 6/18175

Exempt fron

AGDS, Category, 2+ 3

Date of Decl

silication Indefinite

NATIONAL ESCURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorired Disclosure

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SEI

CRET

MH 55027

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## Page 190

evest

Memorandum to Mr. DeLoach

RE:

INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

ESTABLISHED BY THE PRESIDENT, JUNE 5, 1970,

MEETING IN DIRECTOR'S OFFICE, 11 AM, JUNE 8, 1970

restraints.and restrictions together with the pros and cons involved

so that the President can make a decision as to which ones should be

utilized. (3)

The Director stated it was most important that the

foreign connections of domestic problems be determined pointing out

thạt we know Cuba, Red China and the Soviet-bloc are deeply in the

picture. The Director also commented the importance of ascertaining

what is happening in foreign countries concerning this same subversive

problem and how it has been dealt with by those countries; for

example, the Director mentioned that the water cannon had been used

nost effectively against the hippies in paris,

and maybe the application of this tactic should receive consideration.

application on this tact.

as well as elsewhere

In this regard, the Director commented the picture of what goes on

abroad would more appropriately come within the purview of the CIA,

DIA and NSA.

The Director stated he was establishing a working sub-

committee headed by Assistant Director William C. S

Sullivan and

composed of designated representatives of the other agencies present

andthe first meeting would be at 3:30 pm, 6/9/70 at the U. 'S.

IntellIgence Board Meeting Room and subsequent thereto a meeting

would behely every Tuesday and Friday in order to draw

together the

raw material in order

ö present a final report to captioned Committee

for scrutiny and evaluation

•The submission of the final

The Director

emphasized it was most vital that all agencies give this matter top

priority.

Following the Director's initial remarks, those officials

present commented that the aims and goals presented by the Director

were realistic and that all present would cooperate in the fullest

in getting organized and getting on with the highly important task

which faces the special Committee.

During the discussion all agreed that the initial primary

problem facing the Committee was to concentrate upon methodology in

intelligence collection.

The Director stated although brevity is the

key, a detailed listing of all the items which are currently

obstructing the FBI and other intelligence agencies in attaining their

goals must be set out clearly with pros and cons so that the President

is able to make a determination as to what he is willing to let us do.

• Some of the

_matters

to be considered

in this regard mentioned by the

-=..

-. 2

XP THET

CONTINUED - OVER

1N 55027 Do0Id:32989610 Page 190

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## Page 191

P SEARET

Memorandum to Mr. DeLoach

INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

(ESTABLISHED BY THE PRESIDENT, JUNE 5, 1970)

MGETING IN DIRECTOR'S OFFICE, I1 AM, JUNE 8, 1970

Director were: (1) breaking of embassy codes with assistance of

"black bag" operations, (2) limitations on telephone surveillances

and (3)

penetration of embassies with microphone and telephone

surveillances.

It was agreed that the President is extremely anxious

for the utmost degree of cooperation among all the agencies in

coordination of this matter and the Director pointed out that

there is certainly no problem with respect to coordination and

the Director wanted it understood that the President expects

the group. to work together as a team.

At the close of the meeting, the Director again emphasized

that the importance of this matter dictated that each agency put its

top experts to work on this matter and that it be given the highest

priority in order that this deadline is met as expected by the

President.

ACTION:

You will be advised as to the results of the meeting

of the working committee which takes place tomorrow, 6/9/70,

at 3:30 pm.

- 3 -

I 55027 DolId: 32989610 Page 191

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## Page 192

OPTIONAL FORM NO, 10

5010-106

MAY 1962 EDITION

GSA GEN, REG. NO, 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

MR. DE LOACH!

DATE: 6/9/70

FROM : H. C. SULLIVAN

SUBJECT:

INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

(ESTABLISHED BY THE PRESIDENT, JUNE 5, 1970)

My memorandum 6/8/70 set forth the members of the

working group of captioned committee, which will hold its

first meeting in the United States Intelligence Board Conference

Room at 3:30 p.I., Tuesday, 6/9/70, with the exception of the

Defense Intelligence Agency members.

Set forth below are the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)

working group member and the member from each of the three military

services. The additional names listed are the alternates for

each of the agencies.

DIA

FOIA (b) (3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

Deputy Chief,

Office of Counterintelligence and

Security, DIA

Lieutenant Colonel Donald F. Philbrick

Mr. Elihu Braunstein

Navy - Captain Edward G. Rifenburgh,

Director, Naval Investigative Service,

NavaL Intelligence Command

Mr. Harry Warren

:

Air Force - Colonel Rudolph C. Koller,

Jr.,

Commander, 1127 U.S. Field Activities Group,

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,

Air Force

Colonel D. E. Walker

ACTION:

For information.

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

, DATE 10/3/00 BY SPaALM/EHL

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi

nation outside your Commit.se.

I's use as limited to official proceedings b

your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized person

nel without the express approval of the FEI.

HH 55027 DocId:32989610 Page 192

---

## Page 193

TO

FROM :

SUBJECT:

APTIONAL FORM NO, 10

ALAY 1902 EDITION

9010-106

GSA GEN, IEG. NO, 27

UNITED STATES GO

Memorandum -

MT. C. D. DeLoac

Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: June 10, 1570

MDR- 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAMED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIES

HATE 10/3/08_ BY SPaHN EHL

INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

(ESTABLISHED BY THE PRESIDENT JUNE 5, 1970)

MEETING OF THE WORKING SUBCOMMITTEE TUNE 9, 1970

This memorandum records the results of the Working.

Subcommittee meetine on June 9. 1970.

Mr. Tom C. Huston, hite House, spelled out the desires

of the President, furnishing members with a "Top Secret" outline

(copy attached).

This outline addresses itself to the Purpose,

Membership,

Procedures, and Objectives of the Committee's Review.

In his oral presentation, Huston emphasized the President was not

interested in being told

what the current problem is, but rather

what the future problems will be and what must be done to counter

them.

He stressed the Committee should provide the President with

the pros and cons of any restraints so that he can decide what

action is to be taken.

It was agreed that all papers and reports prepared by

the Committee will be classified "Top Secret - Handle Via Comint

Channels Only" because of the President's desire that the existence

and work of the Committee be tightly controlled. (The reference to

Comint Channels refers to communications intelligence and insures

that this matter will be handled in a secure manner.)

i seen

the necessary intelligence.

In accordance with the President's

instructions, the next meeting of the

Working Subcommittee will

consider all restraints restricting intelligence collection efforts

across the board, as well as submissions on defining and assessing

the existing internal security threat, both domestic and foreign.

It was agreed that the Working Subcommittee would next

meet at 1:30 p.m., June I2, 1970, in the Conterence Room of the

U.S. Intelligence Board.

Results of this meeting will be promptly

furnished the Director.

ACTION:

For information,

Enclosure

WCS: lag/chs/.

TO SEES MATERIAL AN AGICI

HH 55027 DocId:32989610 Page 193

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## Page 194

TOP

ECRE

USIB SUB-COMMITTEE ON DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE

1.

Purpose

(A) To define and assess the existing internal security threat.

(B) To evaluate the collection procedures and techniques

presently employed and to assess their effectiveness.

(C) To identify gaps in our present collection efforts and

recommend steps to close these gaps.

(D) To review current procedures for inter-community

coordination and cooperation and to recommend steps

to improve these procedures.

(E) To evaluate the timeliness of current intelligence data

and to recommend procedures to increase both its

timeliness and usefulness.

(F) To assess the priorities presently attached to domestic

intelligence collection efforts and to recommend new

priorities where appropriate.

Membership

(A) FBI, Chairman

(B) CIA

(C) NSA

(D) DIA

(E) Military Services

(F) The White House

MDR - 16

DECTASSIFIED ES SP 3 ALM/EHL

ON 103/00

NATIONAL SECURITY IT'ORATIT

Unauthorized Disclosure

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

HH 55027

TOPSECRET

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## Page 195

TOP SECRET

- 2.

IlI. Procedures

(A) Although the sub-committee will be officially constituted

within the framework of USIB, it will in fact be an

independent, ad hoc, inter-agency working group with

a limited mandate.

• (B). Operational details will be the responsibility of the

chairman. However, the scope and direction of the

review will be determined by the White House member

(C) The sub-committee will submit its reports to the White

House and not to USIB. Report will be due by July 1, 1970.

(D) To insure that the President has all the options available

for consideration, the WH member may direci detailed

• interrogatories to individual agencies in order to ascertain

facts relevant to policy evaluation by the President.

Information resulting from such interrogatories will,

if the contributing agency requests, be treated on a

confidential basis and not be considered by the sub-

committee as a whole.

IV. Objectives of the Review

(A) Maximum coordination and cooperation within the

intelligence community. The sub-committee may wish

to consider the creation of a permanent Domestic

Intelligence Operations Board, or some other appropriate

mechanism io insure community-wide evaluation of

intelligence data.

(B) Higher priority by all intelligence agencies on internal

security collection efforts.

including increased agent and informant penetration by

both the FBI and CIA.

TOP sECRET

HH 55027

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## Page 196

TOP

ECRET

- 3-

(D) Clarification of NSA's role in targeting against

communication traffic involving U.S. revolutionary

leaders and organizations.

(E) Maximum coverage of the overseas activities of

revolutionary leaders and of foreign support of U.S.

revolutionary activities.

(F) Maximum coverage of campus and student-related

activities of revolutionary leaders and groups.

(G) More detailed information about the sources and

extent of financial support of revolutionary organizations.

(HI) Clarification of the proper domestic intelligence

role of the Armed Services.

(I)

Development of procedures for translating analyzed

intelligence information into a format useful for

policy formulation.

HH 55027

IOP SECRET

DocId:32989610 Page 196

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## Page 197

OPTIJNAL FORM NO. 10ª

HAY 1962 EDITION

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

: Mr. C. D. Deloach

FROM : Mr. W. C. SullIvan>

DATE: June 15, 1970

MPR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIES

DATE 10/3/00 BYEP? ALMEHi

SUBJECT:

INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

(ESTABLISHED BY THE PRESIDENT JUNE 5, 1970)

HEBTING OF THE WORKING SUBCO-MITTEE DUNE 14, 1970

This memorandum records the results of the Working

Subcommittee.

At the meeting of June 12, 1970, the Committee agreed

"Ion an outline for the report to be furnished to the President

by July 1,. 1970.

'Of interest:

(a) an assessment of the current internal security

threat along with the likelihood of future violence; (b) a

listing of the current restraints which deter the development

of the type of information the President desires; (c) an

evaluation of interagency coordination.

With regard to an assessment of the current internal

security threat, the Committee agreed the President does not

desire a recitation of history but rather desires information

as to what the problem is and an estimate of what the future

problen will be.

The White House representative advised the restraints

portion of the Committee report to the President should include,

in addition to identifying the restraints and a listing of the

pros and cons oi removing or modify the cestraints, a briel

paragraph allowing the President to indicate what action he

desires be taken. Specifically, this would provide the President

the opportunity to indicate whether he desired the restraints

to be continued, relaxed, or that he needed additional infor

nation upon which to make a decision. It was the sense of the

Committee regarding the third portion of the report that a

permanent operations

committee was needed to coordinate operations,

prepare estimates of potential violence during future demonstra

tions, and to develop new policies. The creation of such a

committee was endorsed by the White House representative who

indicated such a committee would probably be desired by the

President.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi.

WCS: 12g

(7)

nation outside your Committee.

Its use is limited to official proceedings by

your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized verson-

nel without the express approval of the FBI.

CONTINUED - OVER -

55027 DooId:32989610 Page 197

---

## Page 198

-st:

=

Hemorandun Sullivan to DeLoach

Re: INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

The next meeting is scheduled for June 17, 1970,

at which time the Conmittee will consider the first draft

of the report.

ACTION:

For information.

2

MH 55027

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198

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## Page 199

C'JIONAL FORM NO, 10

40: 1902 ED:TION

5010-106

GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SECRET

TO

: Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: June 19, 1970

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

FROM

NARZIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

W. C. Sullivas ExCEPT WHERE SHOWN

OTHERWISE,

SUBJECT:

INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

(ESTABLISHED BY THE PRESIDENT JUNE 5, 1970)

MEETING OF THE WORKING SUBCOMMITTEE

June 18, 1970

In two previous meetings of the above-captioned committee

general discussions took place and the ground work was prepared for

dealing with the substance of the report. Yesterday, a third

"neeting was held which extended throughout the afternoon and into

the early evening.

Memoranda has been prepared and submitted to

the Director on the previous two meetings.

Yesterday, the members

of the four intelligence organizations worked out the

report. I

received the impression that Admiral Noel Gaylor of National Security

Agency may have been a moving force behind the creation of this

committee. The la Program which we discontinued a few

(5)

years ago was raised immediately and figured prominently in the

discussion.

ALM/EHL

10/3/00

CLASSIFIED BY SP 2

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X.

MDR 16

At the very beginning, the White House representative

made it very clear to all members that the report had to be a

working subcommittee report andany opinions, observations, con-

clusions of recommendations of individual agencies should not and

could not be set forth with one exception

He said that the

President did want a definitive recommendation relative to creating

a group or committee which could deal with operationai

problems

and

objectives of the member agencies and present estimates, evaluations,

and interpretationson the current security threats

and problems

kiese tele secess evolute say, the tissdent

the opinion that all government agencies involved in intelli-

gence activities would have something to contribute and that throush

such a group or board authority

would be exercised to better

coordinate the collection of

The men representing the Army, Air Force, wary, vational

Security Agency and Defense Intelligence Agency went into great

detail concerning intelligence operations, techniques, Jurocedures,

devices and et cetera, following a detailed discussion concerning

the nature of the security threat to the United States today.

While all present were very friendly and cooperative to

each other, nevertheless, the fact remains that in such

area as intelligence operations,

ifficult and serious issuen lee

are

bound to come up concerning which there will be disagreements.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissomi

nation outside your Committee.

Its use is twind to official proceeding by,

wow Committee one the content may no? oschorrieD - ovER

nel without the

---

## Page 200

Memorandum to Mr. DeLoach

RE:

INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENC

(ESTABLISHED BY THE PRESIDENT JUNE 5, 1970)

MEETING OF THE WORKING SUBCOMMITTEE June 18, 1970

In view of this it is probably fortunate that no member was

permitted to make any decisions, recommendations, or conclusions,

et cetera, in that the President reserves this right for himself

only. Each controversial issue, has been so set up in writing

that the President may quickly and sinply indicate whether he

wants or does not want any changes made.

decides. it is

For example, the reactivation of the tea

•Program, et cetera. (s)

We are completing the first draft of this report now.

as soon as this is done, the report with a cover memorandun

explaining the various issues involved will be furnished to

the Director either late today or early tomorrow morning.

RECOMMENDATION:

For the information of the Director.

SECRET

IN 55027 DocId:32989610 Page 200

---

## Page 201

OPTIONAL FORM NO, 10

MAY 1902 EDIT ON

5010-106

ÓST'GEN. REG. NO, 37

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

•Mr. C. A. Tolson

FROM :W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 6/20/70 MDK-/Y

ALLINFORMATION CONTAME:

¡EREIN UNOLASSIFIE

ATE 0/3/8 BY SP 3 HEM /EL

SUBJECT: INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

(ESTABLISHED BY THE PRESIDENT, JUNE 5, 1970)

Attached for the Director's consideration is a copy

of a first draft of the report prepared by the working committee.

in connection with captioned matter.

The first 36 pages of this draft present an assessment

of the present internal security threat under appropriate

captions. This is material with which the Director is

thoroughly familiar and it is not believed he need spend too

much time reviewing it unless he so desires. There is nothing

(controversial in this portion of the report.

Material relating to investigative restraints and

'limitations discussed by the working committee is set forth in

Section V (pages 37-59).

This material is set forth in

laccordance with the President's request, with the pros and cons

outlined and with no recommendations of

any kind made by the

committee.

It is clear that in this portion we have controversial

cost electine the Bureau as well as the other azencies on the

The final section of the report (pages 60-65) sums up,

in accordance with the President's request, the committee's

observations concerning current procedures to effect interagency

coordination and suggested measures to improve coordination of

intelligence collection through the establishment of a permanent

interagency committee chaired by the Director or a person

designated to act for him.

I do not

-

agree with the scope of unis proposed committée

nor do I feel that

an effort should be made at this time to engage

in any combined preparation of intelligence estimates. I can see

that a committee could be helpful if it was limited to_ meeting

periodically to determine how to better coordinate operational

activities against particular targets in the intelligence felt

The working committee is scheduled to meet aga?h at!'

2 P.M.e Tuesday, June

inal draft of this report.

in order to reach agreement on a

#CS: bsf

(3)nis document is prepared in response to your request CONSTATED diSONER

nation outside your Committee.

Its asc is limited to official proceedings by

your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized person

nel without the express approval of the FBI.

HN 55027 Do0Id:32989610 Page

201

---

## Page 202

Memorandum to Mr. C. A. Tolson

RE:

INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON

INTELLIGENCE

OBSERVATIONS:

If committee agreement is not reached at Tuesday's

meeting on the controversial points involved, it would appear

we have four possible courses of action:

(1)

We can offer no objection to the report and

wait to

see what the President decides. (I think this would

be unwise.)

(2) The Director can voice his objections to the

President verbally.

(3) The Bureau can take a position in writing in the

report opposing any relaxation of the investigative restraints

discussed on the grounds that the arguments supporting these

restraints outweigh the arguments opposed.

(4) The Bureau can take a position in writing in the

report that it is opposed to the extensive scope and ramifi-

cations of the proposed new committee, while at the same time

noting that we would have no objection to a committee which

would be limited to meeting periodically in order to effect a

better operational coordination among member agencies with

regard to particular targets in the intelligence field.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That approval be given for the Bureau to include

in the final committee report a statement opposing the

relaxation of investigative restraints which affect. the Bureau.

(2) That the Bureau take a position at Tuesday's

meeting of the working committee that it is opposed to a new

committee of the scope described in the attached draft. but

that we would not object to

a committee limited to better

coordination specific intelligence operations or problems.

- 2 -

CONTINUED - OVER

NH 55027 DocId:32989610 Page 202

---

## Page 203

Memorandum to Mr. C. A. Tolson

RE: INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGINCE

RECOMMENDATIONS CONTINUED:

(3) That, in addition, the Director give

consideration to expressing his objections verbally to the

President.

meeting of Director, 11 the Director's schedule permits, final

s committee take place in his office at

Thursday, June 25. At that time the Director can

Inquire

11 a Mo IT other committee members have any further comments

and, if not, he can present them with a copy of the final

report perse thy tractor Post tate til pespat this

appropriate transmittal letter for liaison to handie.

-3-

HH 55027

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## Page 204

OPTIONAL FORMA NO, 10

MAY 1962 EDITION

5010-106

OSA GEN, REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

it.

TO

: Mr. Tolson

DATE: June 24, 1970

MDR -16

FROM : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 10/4/00 BY SP 2 ALM/EHL

SUBJECT: INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE (AD HOC)

(ESTABLISHED BY THE PRESIDENT, JUNE 5, 1970)

The final meeting of the working committee was

held on 6-23-70 and there is attached a proposed final draft

of a report for the Director's review.

During the final working committee session, a

number of changes were made in the prior draft which the

Director has seen. Significant changes include the following:

1. Two of the investigative restraints previously

listed have now been completely eliminated.

These related

to investigations involving clearance with

State Department

regarding diplomatic personnel and surreptitious optical

surveillances.

2. The FBI's objections to the six remaining

restraints have been

spelled out specifically in appropriate

footnotes which include the basis for our position.

In

addition, some of the key wording in the narrative has been

modified

in accordance with the observations the Director

made to me Monday. For instance, the term "restrictions"

in the decisions section relating to electronic surveillances

(page 28) has been changed to "procedures." In the same

write-up (page 26), reference to electronic surveillances

having been

"substantially reduced in recent years"

has been

taken out.

3. In the section dealing with evaluation of

interagency coordination (pages 42-43);, the reference to

restrictions on FBI and CIA Headquarters liaison contacts.has

been removed and the specific reference

the proposed chairman of

interagency to the Director as

deleted.

Instead,

*sport merely indlcates that the

committee has been,

chairman would be haned by the President.

Enclosure

I'hes document is prepared in response to your request und is not for dissemi

nation outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by

your Committee and the content may not de disclosed to unauthorized person

WCS:mea: 1jz

(3) nel without the express approval of the FBI.

HH 55027 DocId: 32989610

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---

## Page 205

Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. Tolson

- RE: INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

(AD HOC)

4. The prior draft contained a number of

proposals relative to a permanent interagency committee

including a full-time working group staffed by the various

intelligence agencies. In the proposed final draft, these

proposals have been

toned down somewhat and the proposed

full-time working group is mentioned only in passing as

a possible future eventuality*

In fact,

after considerable

discussion the wording of this whole section was framed

with a View of eliminating any suggestion that the

proposed interagency committee would interiere with the

internal operations of any individual agency. In addition,

a footnote was added expressing the Bureau's specific

views. concerning any such committee orgroup.

5. The section on budget and manpower

restrictions (pages 40-41) was revised to make it clear

that the FBI does not have any problem with regard

to review and approval of its budgetary requests.

Copies of this proposed final draft are being

furnished to the member agencies for their review so

that all interested parties will be fully cognizant of its

contents

in advance of the final meeting of the

Director's Committee in his office at 3 p.m., Thursday,

June 25, 1970.

Those present will be Mr.

CIA; Lt. General D. V. Bennett, DIA; and Vice Admiral Noel Gaylor,

NSA. Each man will no doubt be accompanied by an aide.

ACTION:

Upon approval, this report will be printed ano

assembled and then delivered to the Director's Office with

a transmittal letter to the President in time for the

Director's meeting. Due to the extremely sensitive nature

of the report, each copy is being numbered and a record

will be kept of each recipient.

The Director will note that

at the beginning of the President's copy there will be a

form to be signed by each agency's head indicating aporoval

of the report.

*Since the concept of a full-time working staff was all

but eliminated, a footnote was not taken regarding this item.

- 2.

HH 55027 DocId: 32989610 Page 205

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## Page 206

TOP SECRET

Л.

June 25, 1970

The President

The White House

Washington, D. C.

MDR- 16

DECLASSTFLED BY SPS ALM/EHL

ON 106/00

Dear Mr. President:

The Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc),

which you established on June 5, 1970, has completed its assessment

of the current internal security threat and related matters. A

special report setting forth the findings of the Committee is attached.

This report is divided into three parts. Part One

sets forth a summary of the current internal security threat.

Part Two summarizes various operational restraints on intelligence

collection and lists both the advantages of maintaining these

restrictions and the advantages of relaxing them. Part Three

provides an evaluation of interagency coordination, including

suggested measures to improve the coordination of domestic

intelligence collection.

This report has been approved by all of the members

of the Committee representing the Central Intelligence Agency, the

Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the

Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Sincerely yours,

- aside..

Enclosure

TOP SECRET

HANDLE A SONINT CHANNELS ONIT

i wes/mea

NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

(4). /

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

• Unauthorized Disclosure

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

NH 55027 DocId: 32989610 Page 206

---

## Page 207

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

5010-106

MAY: 1902 EDITIO. i

OSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GUVERNMENT

Memorandum

: Mr. Tolson

TO

MDR-166

DATE

June 26, 1970

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

EREIN IS UNGLASSIPIE

ATE LO/4COD BY SP 2. ALM/EHI

SUBJECT: INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE (AD HOS)

(ESTABLISHED BY THE PRESIDENT, JUNE 5, 1970)

The Director, as Chairman of captioned committee,

held the final committee meeting in his office on the

afternoon of 6/25/70.

Present were the other committee

members; namely, Mr.

Richard Helms, Director of Central

Intelligence Agency; Lleutenant General D. V. Bennett,

Director of Defense

Intelligence Agency; and Vice Admiral

Noel Gayler, Director of National Security Agency. Also

present were Mr. Tom C. Huston, White House Presidential

Assistant who had served in a liaison capacity with the

committee;

Assistant Director designate C. D. Brennan of

the Domestic Intelligence Division; and the writer, W. C.

Sullivan.

The purpose of the meeting was to review in final

form which the President had instructed the committee to

prepare to assess the current internal security threat to the

@untry and evaluate the capacity of the intelligence community

to deal with that threat.

The Director opened the meeting by commending the

committee members for the outstanding effort and cooperative

spirit they had displayed in working together to compile the

comprehensive report.

The Director then furnished each committee member a

copy of the report and carefully covered in a concise manner

all of the items dealt with in the report. On each and every

point the Director solicited observations by each committee

member to insure that they fully understood every issue analyzed

and were in complete agreement with the contents of the report.

In this connection, Mr. Hélms and Admiral Gayler suggested three

minor additions be

made.

After securing the concurrence of all

committee members, the Director instructed that this be done

immediately.

WCS: pab

(3)

CONTINUED - ORER

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi-

nation outside your Committee.

I's "ce is imitail to official proceedings by

your Committee and the content may noi ?? disclosed to unauthorized person-

nel without the express approval of the FBI:

55027 DooId: 32989610 Page 207

---

## Page 208

-

Memorandum to Mr. Tolson

RE:

INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE (AD HOC)

(ESTABLISHED BY THE PRESIDENT, JUNE 5, 1970)

With that, all committee members signified their

full and unqualified approval of the full report and so

indicated by

affixing their signatures thereto along with

the Director's as Chairman of the committee.

The Director

stated that he would arrange for the transmittal of the report

to the White House promptly on 6/26/70.

The Director instructed each committee member to

insure that all working copies of the report at the agencies

involved should be destroyed and fixed this responsibility

..on the agency heads who were members of the committee along

with the responsibility of insuring that copies of the final

report retained by them for reference should be affordea the

utmost security.

The Director then concluded the meeting by thanking

the respective members of the committee and so dismissed the

committee.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

-....- —

= 2=

HH 55027

DocId: 32989610

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---

## Page 209

# 3

WAS TO INTELLIGENCE:

Che od 10 8. lo, Jase 9, 1979

FBI

• HI. 4112103 C. DallItan

NT. HOURIA B. MONIT

Mr. Goorge C. WasTo

•XI. F1111an 0, Crosgar

Mr. trod J. Cranidy

Contial IntellIgence Ageser (SIA).

; i

Phoss:

Codo 148, Extenslas 5575

Gray Phosa: Estension 8353

Groon PhONA: ITtUBSION J146

*''t, Jance Angloton

Phone:

Code 148, Artession 8076

GrOOn PRODA!

EXTRINIOR 3145

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

EREIN IS UNCLAOSIHI

DATE LO/41/00 BY SPa ALMIEHL

GA .

separat outin inny

/COlONO) JOiA 1. Doralo

PLoDo: Code 11, Istoss1os 77927

Mr. Elibu Brautatols

Code t82,

isxteag1an 0900

Departsant ut tha favy

l Captala Royard f.

Rifenburg

Phase:

Code 158, Intession 0198

MI. Farry VarTeD

Phase: Code 159, Ittenslos 9005

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi

nation outside your Committee.

Its use is limited to official processarion - ivas

your committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized person

nel without the express approval of the FBl.

HH 55027 DocId:32989610 Page 209

---

## Page 210

Ispartabat of tha A1r Forco

/ Colonol Rudolph E. foller,

P1:020

Codo 193,

Extabaton 103.1;

6010n01 D. S. 18l40r

Phope: Cade 192, ExtezzIon 1200;

FatIonAl SeourttI Agency

•Mr. Banson R. Suffhas:

Phono: 888-7345 1009 ostelds dial toB+)

Groy Prosa: 93, Istenston 3335

JEK Act 6 (1) (A)

FOIA (b) (3) - 50 USC 402 Note Sec

6

- NSA

MAStO HOUSE

i HT. Ton C. Muston

Phope: Code 149, Estension 2527.

-

NH 55027 DocId: 32989610

Page 210

---

## Page 211

1

Juse 10, 1870

INTERAGENCY CONMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

FORKING SUBCOMAITTEE

Minutes of

..

Pirat Hooting

Room 78-26, CIA Headquartera Building

June 9, 1970, 3:30 to 4 p.=.

W1111aX C. SullIVeD

Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Invastigation

Presiding

MEHAKRS PRESENT

HT. Richard Heirs, DCI

MI. JASOS ADgIetOn, CIA

MT. Janos Stilvall, DIA

Col. John Downie, Aray

Col. Rudolph Holler, Air Force

Иг. Ток с.

BustOn,

Naite House

Capt. Edrard Rilenburgh, Mavy

Mr.

BonBOn K. Bullham, NSA

HI. GeOrgo C. MOOre, FBI

NI. Donald E. Hoose,

FBI

Nr. Willian O. CIOIRS, FBI, Secretary

FOIA (b) (3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

Observora:

Mr. Charlas Sithor. Os1

MPR-16

DECLASSIFIED AS ERD ALMEHL

10/4/00

•

Mr. Elthu Braunstein, ATRY

Mr. Harry FarTen, NaVy

..Col. D. B. Malkar, Air Force

Kr. Fred J. Cassidy,

FBI

JFK Act 6 (1) (A)

FOIA (b) (3) - 50 USC 402 Note Sec 6 - NSA

TOR VECRET

BANDES THA SONIKT FRANK GOONEY

Group 1

excluded iron

nutonatic

10705510188-8335

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

declassifdation

Unauthorized Disclosure

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

HH 55027 DocId:32989610 Page 211

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## Page 212

TAND

STOP ENCRET

VIA CONATE CHANTALE ONLY

ICI-4-1

June 10, 1970

MDR-16

1.

Prefatory Renarka

„Prefatory remarka of Hilltan C. Sullivan circulated

to all neubers at the meeting.

2. Background to the Creation of Connittee

•• Mr. Ton C. Huston of the Mhite House briefed the

Committee on the Presideat's concern over the energence of

the threat Iron sporadic violence and anarchiga fron the New

as well as the President's concern as to whether the

intelligence coumunity is doing everything possible to cope

w1th the problem.

hr. Huston enphasized that an effort aust

be nade for community-wide analysis and asseggnent of intor-

nation so as to be in a position to advise the President as

to what 18 going to happen in the future and what position

the intelligence community will be in to be aware of those.

developaents.

of the Committee, as well as procedures and objectives of

the Committee's review, was distributed at the meeting by

• Mr. Huston.

3. Classification Matters

The Chairman asked for comments regarding the lovel

of classification for papers or reports prepared by the

Comnittee.

HT. Buffhan of NSA suggested the adoption of a

code word. After sone discussion, Mr. Helns, Director of CIA,

recommended the classification "Top Secret - Handle Via Coxint

Channels Only." In addition, Mr. Relms suggested the mainte-

DAnCe Of a "Bigot List" reflecting the names of all persons

1n each member agency or departeent who will work on or have

knowledge of the mork of the Committee.

The Connittee

unanimously concurred in adopting both

suggegtiong.*

*Members

secretary

are raquested to furnish their "Bigot List" to the

the meeting of June 12, 1970.

OP SECRET

HANDLE VIA COMINI/CHANNELS ONLY

- 2-

NW 55027 DocId:32989610 Page 212**

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## Page 213

DALY

4. Requironents for Next Hooting

It sas agroed that at the next seeting reubore will

table a list of those restralots which they consider sampor

their intelligence-collection activition.

The list should

include the pros and cona of theso reatraints.

' Mr. Bullhar noted that in the outline distributod

by ar. Huston the Connittee yas called upon to define and

assess, the existing internal security threat. Mr. Buffban

felt this was sonothing tant abould be worked on insodiately

by the exports fros the samber agencies or departzente.

Mr. Huston suggoated that the FBl prepare such a paper

fros

the donestic standpoint and CIA Iron the foreign standpoint.

All sembers concurred, and it vas agreed CIA and FBI *1l1

distributo these prpers for the Committee's consideration at

the next neeting.

5. Security of Committee's Work

Heabera took cognizance of the

necessity for tight

sacurity to insure the existence and nork of the comsittee

not bocose known to unauthorized persons.

As a result, 1t

was agroed that the Committoe nould continue to neet in the

CIA Headquarters Building.

6. Next Heeting

The next seating will be at 1:30 p.u., June 12,

1970, Roon 7D-64, CIA Headquarters Building. *

*Hombers please note change in

rOOM

nunber.

= 3-

N 55027 DocId: 32989610 Pate 213

---

## Page 214

linutes ot

Saront trotil:

Conforonre Poon

7-i)

CIA Menderiora Tidin•

June 12, 1970, 1:30 10 :.".".

Willian C. Sulliv.n

Asslitant Director, Federal Pureru of lifestlintion

Presiding

MEMBCHS PRESENT

FOIA (b) (3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

i". Mr:; C. Huston, Hiite

house

col. dain Doinie, Arny

HI. Charles sither, Air Force

Capt. iraid Mlienhur.", Navy

lir. Parson li. Buffhat,

Fish

lix. Grosse C. linore, IGI

Mr.

fi. loore, Fir

lix. Willin 0. Cropar, FBI, Secretary

Observer::

col. Rudolph Koller, Air Forcé

Lt. Col. Donald F. Philbrick, DIA

Mr. Flihu Braunstein, Army

Ar, Harsy Harren, kavy

MDR-16

HiT.. Fred J. Carsidy,

JFK Act 6 (1) (A)

FOIA (b) (3) - 50 USC 402 Note Sec 6 - NSA

FBI

JFK Act 6 (1) (B)

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

HANDHE VIt et

Grovo '1

Excluded

automatir

declaries

iRis L80912

HH 55027 DocId: 32989610 Page 214**•

---

## Page 215

Made

pi"iov.n of circion of the virgi

MDR-16

11.0

DECZASSIPTED I SRAALMEHL

ox 10/4/00

t minutes of the first sea:

•lth no chares.

Distrthution of FBI Submiasion Enti/let "e-Ling and

The 'FRI contribution was circulate: to all nonberg.

It was surrested by Hr. Huston of the while Hailse that iie

report be lobled to pormit an in dopth moir; bi all seabers

and that the contents of the subnission be di,.u..od at.

the

next necting.

In this regard, fir. Huston reilainicd that the

assessnent pager should rot be lengthy; rhould assess the

current thrcat and estimate what the future threat will be.

3. CIA's Submission Entitled "Defining md Asocusing the

Estate euterual Security Tureat • com"

The CIA representative advised his irency's suimission

mould be circulated to all membors in time for an in-depth

discussion at the next Committee meeting.

4.

Distribution and Discussion of "Lirt of lortraints

Inhibitin, Intellircuce-Collection ifforts"

The restraints papers submitted were read by all

members. Mr. Huston indicated that the EBl suhnission was in

the form he desired. He suggested the restraints portion of

the report be patterned after the FBI submiscion with a con-

cluding pararraph atter each individual restraim providing

the President with the option of continuing, or modifyin, the

ristraint or asking for additional incormation on which to

b.ise' a decision.

:

5. Preparation of Report

A surgested outline distributed to all members as

read and approved. It was agreed that the FBI would prepare

HANDLE

VIA

SECRET

TO CHANCES ONLY

2 -

NH 55027 DocId: 32989610 Page 210m

---

## Page 216

tho tart mit to be ctrectated to ill " on June 16,

1970, jolloving sabaission of inputs 1

; norbers no

later thra 10 a no, June 15, 1970.

Committon senbors discussed tir.vi: stility of

recomendin the establisonent of a meni mr:

intriliscace

operaiirns committee.

1c. Huston surrestri

ti: report address

itself to this and include (1) how the come could be

constituted, (2) to whom it would report, iü) procedural

matters, and (4) the committee's arca of riponsibillty to

Include oporntions, preparation of estimates, ind development

of policy recommendations.

6. Next Meeting

The noxt nocting will ba held on liednesday, June 17,

1970, in the U. S. Intelligence Board Contcrence Room 7E-26.*

*Members please note change in room number.

TOR SECRET

FLANDLE VIA

COKE CHANNELS CALY

-\3 -

-HH 55027

-ы...

adiates a nonete

DooId:32989610

Page

216

---

## Page 217

CARITA

1.: -1-?

divi tire

1370

WORKING SUBCONMITTIL

AGENDA

Third Meetin:

Trots.

Wednesdry, duno 17, 1070, ai 1ii. 1.19.

1.

Approval ni Minutes or

secund Heeting

Filli:n C. Sullivau

2.

DISCUSSiON Of DOCUReAtS bY

Fil and CiA Entitie

and Aisessil, lhe

36121308

Interual Security

Thront"

All Mentiers

---.

Discussion of Documenes Sub

"Tist of Restraints

Th bidino

Intellirance-Col lesTion Efforti"

$.

Revien of First Draft si

Conutice Report Cuculatai

to All Moniers Junu

To, 1070

5.

Date and Place of Next Meeting

10/4/00

DECLASSISTED BY SE 2 ALMEHL

0 10/4/00

All Members

Williau C. Sullivan

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SECRET

EANDLRLE COTT CIANNELS ONLY

IOUD I

droit autonatic

Exelude

AH 55027 DocId:32989610

Page

217

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## Page 218

ICI-A-3

June 19, 1970

INTERAGENCY CONKITTBE ON INTELLIGENCE

HORKING SUBCONMITTEE

AGENDA

Fourth Heeting

USIB Confarence Room TE-26

on Tuasday, June 23, 1970, at 2 P.I.

1.

Approval of Minutes of

Third Hesting

Willian C. Sullivan

2.

Revier of socond Draft 'of

Committee Raport to be

Circulated to Ali Menoers

Willian C. Sullivan

3. Date and Place of Next Moeting

3PM) thunday. ""''.

In itoover, office

MOR-16

DECLASSIFTED BY SP a ARMlEHL

• ON

10/4,160

FOR SECRET

BANDLE VIA CONTAT CHANNELS ONEY

Group 1

fron automatic

cosngrading and

dOCIREBINICAtION

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Tạt:

HH 55027 Do0Id:32989610 Page 218

---

## Page 219

ICI-'-3

Mine: 19, 1970

INTERAGANCT COMMITTER ME ANTILI NI

HANG SUECOKNETTHE

1: M0x08

Th :id,

Meeting

• Moon 7E-36

CIA

manuarter wildis

June

1070, 8. 10. 61.0.

all're C. sullivan

desistadt Director, irderal

Turnald

presidini

RENTERS INESIST

Hir. Ion C. Huston, Whils

Air. James innie:on. CIA

iloufOIA(b) (3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

Col. Join Dounit, Aray

MOR-16

Mr. Charles Sither, Al

Слой.

Taward Riisnoursh, Navy

ox 10/4/00

Ar. Benson k. triflam, tig

Circles D. Doorbon, Nüi

Nr. Grorse C. Moore, Fri

ar, Willian O. Crogar, Ell: Secretary

Observers:

D. E. Holkor,

Flinu

Braunstein, fi;

Нт.

Warren, NAFT

Mr. B. l. Willard, Not?

i..

JFK Act 6 (1) (A)

JFK Act 6 (1) (B)

NI.

Fredly. Canaldiy,

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

ANI CHARTES FILI

Group

"Virom

My and

cation

20109t16

72*

174 55027

DooId:32989610 Page 219

==--

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## Page 220

IC2-B4-3

June 19, 1970

1. Approval of Minutes of Second Meetin!.

The minutes of the second meeting were approved

with, 10 changes.

2.

Items Iwo and Three on the Agenda

The Chairman suggested that items two and three

appearing.on the agenda for the third mecting not be discussed

snasnuch as the information contained therein had been in-

corporated into the draft report. The Coimittee concurred in

this suggestion,

3. Review of First Draft of Committee Report

Detailed discussion developed

refarding the draft.

All members contributed valuable suggestions in ways to improve

the

report. It was agreed that the FBI rould attempt to incorporate

surgested

changes into a second draft.

Thits draft is to be

circulated to all members as soon as possible, after which the

recipients v1ll

attempt to obtado appropriate hirh-level con-

currence within their respective agencies or departments.

4. Date and Place of Next Meeting

The next neeting will be held on Tuesday, June 23,

1970, in the U.S. Intelligence Board Conference room 7E-26.

*1.

ieivie.....

• -HANDLE VIA

I CANES ONLY

- 2 -

-HW 55027 DocId:32989610 Page 220sar

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## Page 221

SPTIONAL FORM NO, 10

MAY 1982 EDITION

DEA GEN.

REG. NO, 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

і то

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

10/4/08 BY SP BiAM E7C

DATE:

5/18/73

: Mr. Felt

FROM :

E. S. Miller EFf

SUBJECT: INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE (AD HOC)

Pursuant to the request of Acting Director Ruckelshaus,

I contacted Mr. J. Fred Buzhardt, Special Assistant to the

President on 5/17/73.

Mr. Buzhardt requested our co-operation in providing him

with a comprehensive outline of the history and activities of the

Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc). A copy of the

"Special Report" prepared by this Committee was found among

highly sensitive material in the papers of former Special Counsel

to the President John Dean.

A detailed review has been made of Bureau files in this matter.

In summary, the Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc) was

established under the chairmanship of former Director Hoover

following a conference between Mr. Hoover and President Nixon on

6/5/70. Its purpose was to make recommendations for the more

effective coordination of the intelligence gathering efforts of the FBI,

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Security Agency (NSA),

and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and to examine existing

limitations on the use of certain intelligence collection techniques.

Members of the Committee included CIA Director Helms, Director

Gayler of NSA, Director Bennett of DIA and White House Staff Assistant

Tom Huston.

Following a number of sessions of a working subcommittee

headed by Assistant Director W. C. Sullivan of the Bureau, the

Committee issued a 43-page "Special Report" which was delivered to

the White House on 6/26/70. This report summarized the internal

security threat facing the United States, reviewed limitations on

intelligence collection and suggested measures to improve the co-

ordination of domestic intelligence collection by the various Agencies.

It was approved and signed by the head of each member agency

RDC:nlb (3)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi-

nation outside your Committee.

Its use is limited to official proceedings b?

your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized person

nel without the express approval of the FBI .

(CONTINUED - OVER)

H# 55027

DocId: 32989610 Page 221

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## Page 222

-

Memorandum to Mr. Felt •

Re: INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE (AD HOC)

By memorandum 7/23/70, Mr. Huston advised that the

President had reviewed the "Special Report" and had reached

certain decisions. According to Huston, the President desired

a relaxation of restraints in a number of areas and the creation

of a permanent interagency committee on domestic intelligence.

A copy of Huston's memorandum, along with pertinent

background information, was sent to Attorney General Mitchell

by letter 7/27/70. Mr. Mitchell was requested to furnish a prompt

expression of his views and was advised the FBI was taking no action

to implement the instructions contained in Huston's memorandum

pending his reply. The Attorney General's attention was called to

Mr. Hoover's opposition to the lifting of various investigative

restraints and to the creation of a permanent interagency committee

on domestic intelligence. The letter noted, however, that the FBI

was prepared to implement White House instructions at Mitchell's

direction.

The restraints referred to in the "Special Report" included

limitations on the use of electronic surveillance of foreign establish-

ments, the use of student informants on college campuses, covert

and overt coverage of the mail, and surreptitious or illegal entry

(so-called "bag jobs").

Our file does not show any further developments subsequent

to the 7/27/70 letter to AG. There is no indication Mitchell ever

responded to this communication or that any further action was

taken by FBI.

However, it is the recollection of knowledgeable personnel

that, on instructions which apparently originated with Mr. Hoover's

office, the original of Huston's memorandum of 7/23/70 was

returned to Huston about 7/30/70. It was the understanding of

supervisors handling this matter at the time that a converstation

had taken place between Mr. Hoover and Mitchell; and that Mitchell

had reached an understanding with Mr. Haldeman at White House

that the Huston memorandum would be returned without any

acknowledgement or action being taken with the entire matter

being a closed issue. No documentary evidence exists to support

the foregoing.

55027

DocId:32989610 Page 222

2

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## Page 223

Memorandum to Mr. Felt

Re: INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE (AD HOC)

In any case, Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc)

was terminated on 6/25/70 upon approval of its report.

It is noted that former Assistant Director W. C. Sullivan

might have additional information concerning this matter,

particularly regarding the basis for our returning Huston memorandum

of 1/23/70 to the White House with no action being taken thereon.

We are not recommending, however, that Sullivan be interviewed

at this time. It is felt this should be left to the discretion of the

White House and/or the Department.

ACTION:

Attached is a letter to Assistant Attorney General Petersen

of the Criminal

Division advising him of Mr. Buzhardt's

request. We are providing Petersen with a letterhead memorandum

(attaching copies of pertinent communications from our files)

which summarizes the work of the Interagency Committee on

Intelligence (Ad Hoc). Mr. Petersen is being asked to advise

whether the Department has any objection to our providing this

data to Mr. Buzhardt at the White House.

Providing the Department interposes no objection, we will

immediately furnish Buzhardt with this information following a

response from Petersen.

*".".

HH 55027

DocId: 32989610

Page 223

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## Page 224

Asaistant Attorney Goneral

Criminal Division

Acting Director, FBI

SURAGENCY COMITIN ON INTELLIGINCE

(AD HOC)

Mas 15, 1973

On May 17. 1973, Mr J. Fred Buzhardt, Special

Assistant to the

President, requested the assistance of

the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in providing him

with & comprehensive statement regarding the history and

activities of the

Interagency Connittee on Intelligence

Hoc), which was established by President Niaon in 1979.

A "Special Report," prepared by this Committee,

was included

in materiel found

In the papers ci former Counsel to the

22osident John Dean.

There is enclosed a letterhead memorandan

dated hay 1s, 1973, wich sets out a summary ot pereinent

intorantion in our

files regarding this Cormittee together

with observations based on the recollection of knowledgeable

FBi personnel.

You are requested to advise whether the

Deparinent wouid

have any objection to our furnishing this

intornation to Mr. Buzhardt.

It is noted that 3ix. Buzhardt

has requested an expeditious response.

It 1s poisted out that forner sureau offICIali

V.C. Sullivan might be able to provide additional infor-

nation regarding

this natter, particularly as to to

circunstances surrounding the recall of the White House

monorandun of July 23,

1970.

No stens are being trooMaY.

however, to contact ax. sullivan at this time.

Enclosures - 6

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 10/4/00 BY 5P2 HAM/EHL

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissem

notion onsite a concent as use is mies to f finat roceed nos on

nel without the express approval of the FBl.

. HH

55027 DocId: 32989610

Page 224

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## Page 225

-

MDR-16

DECLASSIFIED BY SP 2 ALMIEHU

oN 10/4/00

May 18, 1513

INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON INTELIGENCE

(AD HOC)

Federal Bureau of Investigation (EBI) files disclose the

following information regarding the captioned Committee:

During a conference with President Nixon on June 5, 1970,

FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover was appointed chairman of a special committea

to coordinate more eifectively the intelligence-gathering efforts of the FBI,

the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Security Agency (NSA) ,

and the Defense Intelligencs Agency (DIA) so as to assure that the President

tras being furnished a comprehensive picture ci subversive activities.

Present at the time of Hr. Hoover's meeting with the President were CLA

Director Richard Helms; NSA Direcior Vice Admiral Noel Cayler, General

Donald V. Bennett, Director of the DIA; and Nr. Tom C. Huston, White

House Stait Assistant; all of whom were designated by the President to

serve on the special committee. Also present were Presidential Assistants

H. R. Haldeman and John D. Ehrlichnan, and Secretary Robert H. Finch

of the Department oi Health, Education, and Welfare.

An initial meeting of the Interagercy Committee on intelligence

(Ad Hoc) was held in Mir. Hoover's office on June 8, 1970. This meeting

was attended by Mr. Helms, Vice Admiral Gayler, General Bennett, and

Mr. Huston. Mr. Hoover stressed the President's keen interest in this

matter and outlined the general objectives of the Committee. He instrueted

that a working subcommittze be established, composed of representatives

of all of the member agencies and headed by Assistant Director William C.

Sullivan of the FBI.

This working subcommittee subsequently held a series of

meetings beginning June 9, 1970. At the initial meeting of this group,

Mr. Huston provided nembers with a written outline detailing the purposes,

membership, procedures, and objectives of the Committee. A copy ot

this outline is attached. (Attachment 1)

RDC: glwa

(5)

Dani.

TER

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

HN 55027 Do0Id:32989610 Page 225

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## Page 226

Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc)

It was agreed that all papers and reports prepared by the

Committee would be classified "Top Secret - Handle Via Comint Channels

Only" in view of the President's desire that the work of the Committee be

tightly controlled, and since the Committee report would be based in

part on Comint data.

-

During subsequent meetings of the working subcommittee,

representatives of each member agency submitted written material for

use in compiling the report being prepared for the President. Detailed

discussions took place regarding this material, and a drait report was

prepared. The final meeting of the working subcommittee was held on

June 23, 1970, at which time a consensus was reached on a final draft

of the report to be issued by the Interagency Committee. This "Special

Report," which was dated June, 1970, and numbered 43 pages, was

signed and approved by the heads of each member agency at a final

meeting of the Committee held in Mr. Hoover's office on June 25, 1970.

A copy of the report was delivered to Mir. Huston at The White House

on June 26, 1970, with a brief transmittal letter dated June 25, 1970,

addressed to the President by Mir. Hoover. A copy of this letter is

attached. (Attachment 2)

The "Special Report" was divided into three main sections.

Part One set forth a summary of the internal security threat. Part Two

summarized limitations on certain intelligence collection techniques

(e•E•, electronic surveillance coverage of foreign establishments) and

cited advantages of maintaining such restrictions as well as the advantages

of relaxing them.. Part Three consisted of a brief evaluation of interagency

cooperation together with suggested measures to improve the coordination

of domestic intelligence collection.

By White House memorandum dated July 23, 1970, addressed

to Mir. Hoover, with copies for the President and Mr'. Haldeman, Mr. Huston

advised that the President had carefully studied the "Special Report" and

had made certain decisions with respect to the issues raised therein.

A copy of Mr. Huston's memorandum is attached. (Attach-

ment 3) According to this communication, the President's decisions called

for a relaxation of existing restraints on intelligence coverage. ir. Huston

-2=

HH 55027 Do0Id:32989610

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## Page 227

Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc)

also attached an undated memorandum outlining the organization and

responsibilities of an interagency group on domestic intelligence and

internal security which the President had ordered be established. A

copy of this memorandum is also attacheci. (Attachment 4)

Following receipt of this memorandum, the FBI directed a

• letter dated July 27, 1970, to Attorney General Mitchell, furnishing him

with pertinent background facts regarding the interagency Committee on

Intelligence (Ad Hoc) and providing him with a copy of Mr. Huston's

communication. This letter stressed Mir. Hoover's opposition to the

lifting of various investigative restraints as well as to the creation of

a perinanent interagency committee on domestic intelligence; but it noted

that the Bureau was prepared to implement White House instructions at the

Attorney General's direction… The memorandum requested a prompt

expression of Mitchell's views concerning the matter and noted that the

FBI would take no action to impiement the June 23, 1970, White House

communication pending the Attorney General's reply. A copy of the

Bureau's letter of July 27, 1970, is attached. (Attachment 5)

The FBI file in this matter does not show any further,

developments subsequent to the July.27, 1970, letter to the Attorney

cine

General. There is no indication that Mitchell ever responded to this

communication or that any further action was taken by the FBI.

However, it is the recollection of knowledgeable FBI

personnel that, on instructions which apparently originated with

Vir. Hoover's office, the original of Mr. Huston's memorandum of July 23,

1970, was returned to ruston on about july 30, 1970. It was the under-

standing of supervisors handling this matter at the time that a conversation

had taken place between Mr. Hoover and Attorney General Mitchell; and

that Mitchell had reached an understanding with Mr. Haldeman at The White

House that the Huston memorandum would be returned without any

acknowledgement or action being taken thereon, with the entire matter

being a closed issue. It is stressed, however, that no documentary

evidence exists to support the foregoing.

In any event, the Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad

Hoc) was terminated on June 25, 1970, upon approval of its report to

the President.

Enclosures (5)

ты-

HN 55027 Do0Id:32989610 Page 227

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## Page 228

1.4 tr

May 18, 1973

BY LIAISON

" ..

Honorable J. Fred Buzhardt

Special Counsel to the President

The White House

Washingson, D. C.

MDR-16

ONCLASSIFTED BY 6. PA. ALM/EHL

-10/4/00

Dear Mr. Buzhardt:

Pursuant to your request on May 17, 1973, of Assistant Director

B. S. Miller of this Bureau, there is attached a letterhead memorandum

dated May 18, 1973, together with five attachments which summarize

pertinent information regarding the history and activities of the Interagency

Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoe), which was established by President

Nixon in 1970.

It is noted that former Bureau official W. C. Sullivan might

be able to provide additional information regarding this matter, particularly

as to the circumstances surrounding the recall of The White House memorandum

of July 23, 1970. No steps are being taken, however, to contact Mr, Sullivan

at this time.

at, tom.

Sincerely yours.

Enclosures (6)

Big brant.

William D. Ruckelshaus,

Acting Director

nation outside your Committee.

nel without the express approval of the FBI .

SECEPT MATERIAL, ATTACH

IN 55027 DocId:32989610 Page 228

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## Page 229

NBLE

CRET

MOTE CHANNE

ЭNЬX

The Attorney General

July 27, 1970

Director, FBI

MDR-14

DECLASSIETEDBY ERa ALMEHL

oN 10/4/00

INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

There is enclosed a copy of a letter dated July 23,

1970, with attachment, addressed to me from Mir. Tom Charles

Huston, White House Presidential Assistant.

For your information, on June 5, 1970, the President

established an ad hoc interagency committee on intelligence chaired

by me and also inclucing the Directors of the Central Intelligence

Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Security

Agency. Mr. Huston served in a liaison capacity with the committee.

This committee was requested by the President to submit a report

assessing the current internal security threat, providing an evaluation

of intelligence collection procedures, identifying gaps in our present

collection efforts with recommended measures to close such gaps,

and reviewing current procedures for interagency coordination with

recommended steps to improve such procedures.

The final report of this committee was completed on

June 25, 1970, and delivered to the Fresident. This report set forth

eight specific areas (corresponding to the eight numbered paragraphs

in the attached letter from Mr. Huston) which had been reviewed by

the committee. The first six related to current restraints on intel-

ligence collection procedures; the seventh was concerned with budget

and manpower needs in the event the various restraints were relaxed;

and the eighth area dealt with the possible establishment of a permanent

interagency committee on comestic intelligence. In each area the

report of the committee was presented to show the advantages and

disadvantages of any changes in current policies and also to allow

the President to indicate his desires.

Enclosures - 2

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

(5)

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As set out in the attached letter from Mr. Huston,

it is noted that the President has directed the relaxation of four

investigative restraints directly aliecting the responsibilities of

the TBI. These include:

1. Intensified use of electronic surveillances and

penetrations to effect coverage of individuals and groups in the

United States who pose a major threat to the internal security, as

well as foreign nationals and diplomatic establishments in the United

States of interest to the intelligence community. In this connection,

in the report presented to the President on June 25, 1970, I made

clear the FBI's opposition to the relaxation of our present policy

of selected coverage on major internal security threats through

the use of this technique. I pointed out that the FBI believes

electronic surveillance coverage is adequate at this time, but

that we would not object to other agencies seeking the authority of

the Attorney General for any coverage required by them and there-

atter instituting such coverage themselves.

2. Removal of instructions on legal mail coverage

and relaxation of covert mail coverage to permit use of this technique

on selected targets of priority foreign intelligence and internal security

interest. In this connection, in the report of June 25, 1970, I made

clear the FBI's strong objection to implementing any covert mail coverage.

It is the FBI's position that if covert mail coverage is implemented,

it is likely that information would leak out of the post office to the

press and that serious damage would be done to the intelligence

community because of the very nature of this coverage. We haye no

objection to legal mail coverage, provided it is used on a carefully

controlled and selective basis in both criminal and security matters.

3. The removal of restraints on the use of surreptitious

entry to permit the procurement of vitally needed foreign cryptographic

material and against other urgent and high priority targets. In the

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report of June 25, 1970, the FBI was clearly on record as being

opposed to the surreptitious entry of embassies for the purpose of

obtaining cryptographic materials, because the increase in the

number of police guarding these embassies increases the operational

hazards involved. I would like to point out further that the FBI no

longer is equipped to canduct such operations against foreign embassies.

Accordingly, in the event this technique should be employed against

foreign embassies in the future, I feel strongly that it should be

implemented by the particular agency requiring its use, and not loy

the FBI.

4. An increase in coverage of violence-prone campus

and student-related groups and the removal of all restraints which

Limit such coverage. In the report of June 25, 1970, the FBI specifically

objected to removing any of the present controls and restrictions

relating to the development of campus sources. It was pointed out

that to relax these restrictions would severely jeopardize our inves-

tigations and could result in leaks to the press which would be

damaging and which could lead to charges that investigative agencies

are interfering with academic freedom.

In connection with the proposed establishment of a

permanent interagency committee on domestic intelligence, in the

report of June 25, 1970, I specifically made clear my opposition to

such a committee while pointing out that the FBI would approve of

preparing periodic domestic inteiligence estimates.

Despite my clear-cut and specific opposition to the

lifting of the various investigative restraints referred to above and

to the creation of a permanent interagency committee on domestic

intelligence, the FBI is prepared to implement the instructions of

the White House at your direction. Of course, we would continue to

seek your specific authorization, where appropriate, to utilize the

various sensitive investigative techniques involved in individual cases.

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The Attorney General

I would appreciate a prompt expression of your views

concerning this matter, noting the raquest set forth in Vir, Huston's

letter that an interagency committee be constituted by August 1, 1970.

We are taking no action to implement the instructions contained in

Mr. Huston's letter pending your reply.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHiNGTON

July 23, 1970

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

J. EDGAR HOOVER, DIRECTOR

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

SUBJECT:

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE

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DECLASSIFIED BY SP 3 ALM EHL

10/4/00

The President has carefully studied the Special Report

of the Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc) and made

the following decisions:

1. Interpretive Restraint on Communications Intelligence.

National Security. Council-Intelligence Directive Numher 6 (NSCID-6)

is to be interpreted to permit NSA to program for coverage the

communications of U.S. citizens using international facilities.

2. Electronic Surveillances and Penetrations. . The

intelligence community is directed to intensify coverage of individuals

and groups in the United States who pose a major threat to the

internal security. Also, coverage of foreign nationals and

diplomatic establishments in the United States of interest to the

intelligence community is to be intensified.

3. Mail Coverage. Restrictions on legal coverage are to

be removed.

Restrictions on covert coverage are to be relaxed to

permit use of this technique on selected targets of priority foreign

intelligence and internal security interest.

4. Surreptitious Entry. Restraints on the use of surreptitious

entry are to be removed. The technique is to be used to permit

procurement of vitally needed foreign cryptographic material and

against other urgent and high priority internal security targets.

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5. Development of Campus Sources. Coverage of violence-

prone campus and student-related groups is to be increased. All

restraints which limit this coverage are to be removed. Also, CIA

coverage of American students (and others) traveling or living

abroad is to be increased.

6. Use of Military Undercover Agents. Present

restrictions are to be retained.

'7. Budget and Manpower. Each agency is to submit a detailed

estimate as to projected manpower needs and other costs required to

implement the above decisions.

8. Domestic Intelligence Operations. A committee

consisting of the Directors or other appropriate representatives

appointed by the Directors, of the FBI, CIA, NSA, DIA, and the

military counter-intelligence agencies is to be constituted effective

August 1, 1970, to provide evaluations of domestic intelligence,

prepare periodic domestic intelligence estimates, carry out the

other objectives specified in the report, and perform such other

duties as the President shall, from time to time, assign. The

Director of the FBI shall serve as chairman of the committee.

Further details on the organization and operations of this committee

are set forth in an attached memorandum.

The President has directed that each addressee submit

a detailed report, due on September 1, 1970, on the steps taken

to implement these decisions. Further such periodic reports will

be requested as circumstances merit.

The President is aware that procedural problems may

arise in the course of implementing these decisions. However, he is

anxious that such problems be resolved with maximum speed and

minimum misunderstanding. Any difficulties which may arise should

be brought to my immediate attention in order that an appropriate

solution may be found and the President's directives implemented in

a manner consistent with his objectives.

Tom Charle Mentor

TOM CHARLES HUSTON

Aitachment

cc: The President

H. R. Haldeman

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ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS OF THE INTERAGENCY

_GROUP ON DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE AND

INTERNAL SECURITY (IAG)

1. Membership. The membership shall consist of

representatives of the FBI, CIA, DIA, NSA, and the counter-

intelligence agencies of the Deparments of the Army, Navy, and

Air Force. To insure the high level consideration of issues and

problems which the President expects to be before the group, the

Directors of the respective agencies should serve personally.

However, if necessary and appropriate, the Director of a member

agency may designate another individual to save in his place. .

2. Chairman. The Director of the FBI shall serve as

chairman. He may designate another individual from his agency to

serve as the FBI representative on the group.

3. Observers. The purpose of the group is to effectuate

community-wide coordination and secure the benefits of community-

wide analysis and estimating.

When problems arise which involve

areas of interest to agencies or departments not members of the

group, they shall be invited, at the discretion of the group, to join the

group as observers and participants in those discussions of interest

to them. Such agencies and departments include the Departments of

State (I & R, Passport); Treasury (IRS, Customs); Justice (BNDD,

Community Relations Service), and such other agencies which may have

investigative or law enforcement responsibilities touching on

domestic intelligence or internal security matters.

4. White House Liaison. The President has assigned to Tom

Charles Huston staff responsibility for domestic intelligence and

internal security affairs. He will participate in all activities of the

group as the personal representative of the President.

5. Staffing. The group will establish such sub-committees

or working groups as it deems appropriate. It will also determine and

implement such staffing requirements as it may deem necessary to

enable it to carly out its responsibilities, subject to the approval of

the President.

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6. Duties. The group will have the following duties:

(a) Define the specific requirements of member agencies

of the Intelligence community.

(b) Effect close, direct coordination between member agencies.

(c) Provide regular evaluations of domestic intelligence.

(d) Review policies governing operations in the field of

domestic intelligence and develop recommendations.

(e) Prepare periodic domestic intelligence estimates which

Incorporate the results of the combined efforts of the intelligence

community.

(f) Perform such other duties as the President may from

time to time assign.

7. Meetings. The group shall meet at the call of the Chairman,

a member agency, or the White House representative.

8. Security. Knowledge of the existence and purposes of

the group shall be limited on a strict "need to know" basis. Operations.

of, and papers originating with, the group shall be classified "Top

Secret-Handle Via Comint Channels Only. "

9. Other Procedures. The group shall establish such

other procedures as it believes appropriate to the implementation of the

duties set forth above.

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