MEMO-ACCORDING TO STATEMENTS BY A SENIOR CIA OFFICER IN 1967, MADE TO THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, THE AGENCY WAS INSTRUCTED TO DEVELOP A CAPABILITY TO CONDUCT ASSASSINATIONS.
Originator: CIA
Document date: 1958-01-01 00:00:00
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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Released under the John F. Kennedy

Assassination Flecords Collection Act of

1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW

65997 Diate: 10.26-2021

November.

Headquarters noted the intent to use him as a utility.

agent in order to "(a) organize and conduct a surveillance team: (b)

intercept packages; (c) blow up bridges; and (d) execute other assign-

ments requiring positive action. His utilization is not to be restricted

to Leopoldville. Indeed, he may be subject to call by other African

'stations although it is expected for him to be resident in Leopoldville."

WIROGUE arrived in Leopoldville on 2 December 1960. His case

officer gave him the following instructions: (a) to build cover possibly

by opening a 08 ] shop; and (b) to try to spot persons for a

surveillance team, intelligence assets and paramilitary assets.

Shortly alter arrival, VIROGUE ran into QJWIN, who later told the

station that WIROGUE looked like an intelligence agent. In attempting

to recruit QJWIN for his "'erecution squad", WIROGUE erceeded his

instructions to avoid making approaches without checking with

Leopoldville Station.

: In January 1961, at the request of the Leopoldville Station,

WIROGUE was given permission to take lying lessons. By March,

he had obtained the position of 1 24

with 0% 7 in that capacity he was used by CLA ior the

purpose of gathering intelligence on L 24

sprit, the 24] more tring to wa him to outain arras and

Fatal

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instructors in Western Europe.

Aso, hd was then teaching the

C24

He departed Leopoldville in July because

he had run into difficulty obtaining a residence permit, and his ClA

contract was terminated in September 1961.

Africa Division believes that WIROGUE was recruited for his

Congo assigament because of his third country national background

in order to establish a support mechanism in Leopoldville. At the

time the Congo was in chaos, we had few asseta there, and the

likelihood existed that the political situation would degenerato

quickly. The Station poosibly also wanted to have a latent paramilitary.

Capability, An October 1964 assessment of WIROGÚE Indicates little

Lap potential with him since he knew little about the Agency. He spent

most of his time trying to develop contacts and was not directly involved

in any particular operation.

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Faur

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QJWIN

According to statements by a senior ClA officer in 1967, made

to the Inspector General, the Agency was instructed to develop a

capability to conduct assassinations: Termed an "executive action

capability," such a project was initiated in 1961, apparently assuming

-an existing cryptonym, ZRRIFLE. At the reguest of the case officor:

(the same officer providing this information in 1967), a clandestine

anset in Europe: RIWIN, was to be used in the project.. The tase

officer understood that QJWIN had been considered in 1960 for use

in the assassination of Patrice Lumumba, but that the proposed

operation was never carried out because the designated CIA case

officer declined the assignment.

The case officer in charge of ZHRIFLE also was involved in an

operation to assassinate Fidel Gastro, running from early 1962 to

mid-1963. However, QÜWIN was not used in this effort, reliance

being placed instead on a Cuban exile leader. QJWIN was never

briefed on the Castro Operation, according to the officer handling

ZRRIFLE and the Castro operation.

Records do show that QJIVIN was dispatched to the Congo in

1960, beirg there in November and December 1960, prior to the

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∞ то

(- ESCA

death of Lumunisa ai the hands of Congolese.

Howerer, there is no

evidence to suggest that QJIVIN was in any may intolied in Lunumba's

demise. The case officer who was the source of the information of

the contemplated use of QJWIN in such an activity undersiood that be.

ton

was never used in this manner. The following information seriems

esdsting knowledge beyond that summarized above.

A 13 October 1960 dispatch from

transmits notes to

headquarters froin one of the two officers who subsequently met

QJIYIN in Luxembourg. The notes list the names of police officials

and criminal elements and allude to the possibilities of finding salo-

crackers and document-suppliers.

OJWIN was met in Luxembourg on 19 and 20 October 1960 by

_tWO Agency officers and was asked if he would undertake a trip to

Africa, presumably Dakar. (The appropriate dispatch, dated

. 2 November 1960, lists only Luxembourg and

as addressees. )

Ho was not given the true objective of his mission because of its

extremö sensitivity and pending a final decision to use him. Instead,

ho was told that the Soviets were operating in Africa among nationality

groups, specifically Corsicans, and he was being asked to spot,

assess, and recommend some dependable, quick-mitted persons for

our use. He agreed to go on the trip. On 2 November QUIIN vas

met la Frankfurt by an Agency officer, and he accepted an offer to

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proceed to Leopoldville. (Presumably the idea for sending him

there originated at headquarters because someone must have

considered him qualified to handle a potential operation there.) The

precise mission was not conveyed to QJWIN, and he las only informed

that the mission might involve a large element of personal risk. We

do not know and at present are unable to determine what the assigament

was. Subsequent cable traffic discusses arrangements for @JIlIN to g0

first to Leopoldville and then to Dakar.

On 8 December QJWIN was in Leopoldville where he cultivated

a closo personal relationship with a Yugoslav Air Force pilot. There

follow suggestions in cable traffic an what approach QJWIN should use

to recruit him. However, a special channel FI/D cable of 14 December

rates this target as marginal when considered against the framerork of

plans for QJWIN and instructs him to desist if action has not already

been taken. The first paragraph of this cable states that we "would

like restrict QJWIN to activity directly pertinent his mission

• Leopoldville or forthcoming mission Dakar and possibly elsewhere

(0.8, Milan) for FI/D purposes. He our only asset of this sype and

we with keep him clean of any operational involvement other than that

originally planned for him." This cable would tend to rule out.

involvement in an assassination plot, since it is highly unlikely that

AB CIT

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SS6.ST

an individual picked for such a sensitive and dangerous assignment

would be burdened with other chores or assignments immediately

thereafter.

Lumumba was stil' alive, albeit under arrest, as of the middle

of January 1961, and it seems clear that QJWIN had left the Congo

• 1a December 1960. A 19 December cable to Leopoldville authorizes

his relurn to Luxembourg on 21 December and instructs Luxembourg

8o pay him 1000 dollars for December salary, which is the final

payment for his services on this operation. Also, headquarters was

working out the details of a Congo assignment. An 11 January 1961

headguarters memorandum, which refers to T/A's dated 21 December

1960, states that the referenced amounts were given to QJWIN by the

Chief of Station, Luxembourg. This suggests that QJWIN was in

Luxembourg on or before 21 December.

Subsequently, it appears that QJWIN operated in Europe trying

to spot and assess individuals whom the Agency could use in safe-

cracking operations, in line with one of the principal missions of

FI/D. A 24 May 1962 cable to Luxembourg mentions that a decision

was made to keep him in Europe and that the Leopoldville assignment

had been cancelled. A transfer to Baden-Baden is deemed a good

choice. Also, a 24 April 196÷ disptach from Lurembourg, which

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500-800-999

, mentions the termination of QJIYIN's contact, refera lo the fact

that his only assigament since January 1962 has been to establish

cover.

Agency officers who were handling QJWIN in Europe were almoat

certainly unaware of the fact that he was being considered as an asset

by the senior Agency olfcial who had begun to become active la

-

February 1962 In the assassination plot against Castro. An undated

(EYES ONLY) memorandum from the Deputy Director (Plans) refors

to a 19 February 1962 memorandur and authorizes the retention of

the services of QJWIN in activities which we have identified as

coincidential with the assassination plot against Castro. The date of

the reference memorandum coincides with the time that the senior

Agency official became actively involved in this enterprise. A

memorandum of 27 June 1963 dealing with the further handling of

QJWIN mentions that this enterprise has been terminated, except

for one precautionary "life line."

In summary, it is almost certain that QJWIN had nothing at all

to do with the assassination of Lumumba, even though the contents and

language of available files are often cryptic and imprecise. If he had

been, it is highly unlikely that the number of Agency officers handling

and contemplating assignments for him would have been so large. The

EE C37

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SES ST

headquariers division tos whom he lorida was conceraed, inter

alia, with obtaining foreiga cipher and code books, and it is reasonable

to conclude that QJWIN's primary and exclusive responsibility was to

find individuals who could do this kind of job. One of lhe officers who

Irst met QJWIN in Luxembourg was on a trip overseas to find safe-:

crackers and document-suppliers. The 11 December 1960 cable

mentions keeping him clean and using him in Dakar and possibly Milas,

which was specifically mentioned in the 13 October dispatch as offering

good possibilities for finding safecrackers ind document-suppliero.

Further, good tradecraft practices would dictate that the last thing

that would keep an individual clean would be involvement in an

assassination plot. Although the Chief of FI/D coincidentally was

later assigned responsibility for the Castro Operation, there is

no evidence to suggest that he was privy to assassination plota prior

to his brieing in late 1961.

• While QJWIN was considered for use in the "executive action

capability", there is no information available to suggest that he had

ever been approached in this regard, much less used in any of the

planning.

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Based on available evidence

if scems clear that the Asency

was in no way involved in the assassination of Lumumba. However.

in the course of our rescarch, two aspecis of the Lumumbs story

surfaced that indicate Agency involvement in a plot. In the one.

instance, our 1967 source mentioned the name of an Agency officer

. who was designated as the case officer for an assassination plot

against Lumumba, but reported that he had declined the assignment.

That officer was the originator of a 19 Decerber 1960 cable to.

Leopoldville in which he authorized the return of QJIVIN sO

Luxembourg on 2'Ï December to await further instructions and the

payment of 1000 dollars to him for his December salary by the

Luxembourg Station. The last paragraph of the cable advises

Leopoldville that headquarters is working out the details of a Congo

assignment for QJWIN. The same officer was the originator of a

31 January 1961 memorandur dealing with payments to QJWIN.

• In the second instance, a 17 December 1960 cable from

Leopoldville deals with the activities of a newly recruited agent,

WIROGUE, whose mission was to try to spot persons for a

surveillance team, intelligence assets (with emphasis on Orientale

Province), and paramilitary assets. The second paragraph of the

cable mentions that he resided in the same hotel as QJWIN (although

neither knew of the others CIA connection) and that he approached

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the latter on 14 December with an offèr of 300 douars per month so

participate in an intelligence net and to be a member of an "execution

squad." When QJWIN said that he was not interested, WIROGUE

added that there would be bonuses for special jobs. The cable

mentioned in paragraph 6 that the Station was concerned with the free

wheeling of WIROGUE, his lack of security, his inability to handle

finances, and his unwillingness to follow instructions. The Station

was willing to keep him on probation, but believed his recall would

Do the best solution A rugseated alternative was to put hima sa

Stanteyville to try to obtain immediate intelligence on that area.

In an attempt to reconstruct events, Africa Division was apprised

of the above and was asked to search its records in an attempt to

clarify what WIROGUE was up to in the Congo and his reference to an

"execution squad. " The research did not clarily the matter to any

great extent, although some assumptions can be made on the basis of

circumstantial evidence. On 19 September 1960, two members of

Africa Division met with WIROGUE to discuss an operational assign-

ment in that division. In connection with the assignment, be was to

be trained in demolitions, small arms, and medical immunization.

In October 1960, a cable to Leopoldville stated that he was being

prepared for a deep cover assignment to arrive Lcopoldville late

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'SECrET

November. Headquarters nored the intent to use him as a utility.

agent in order to "(a) organize and conduct a surveillance team; (b)

intercept packages; (c) blow up bridges; and (d) execute other assign-

ments requiring positive action. His utilization is not to be restricted

to Leopoldville. Indeed, he may be subject to call by other African

atations although it is expected for him to be resident in Leopolaville."

WIROGUE arrived in Leopoldville on 2 December 1960. His case

officer gave hira the following instructions: (a) to build cover possihly

by opening a photographic shop; and (b) to try to apot persons for a

surveillance team, intelligence assets and paramilitary assets..

Shortly after arrival, WIROGUE ran into QJWIN, who later told the

station that WIROGUE looked like an intelligence agent. In attempting

to recruit QJWIN for his "execution squad", IIROGUE erceeded his

instructions to avoid making approaches without checking with

Leopoldville Station.

: In January 1961, at the request of the Leopoldville Station,

WIROGUE was given permission to take Jying lessons. By March,

he had obtained the position of adviserto the Congolese Air Forcel

with the rank of majory in that capacity he was used by CIA for the

purpose of gathering intelligence on the Congolese Air Force By

April, the Congolesg were trying to use him to obtain arms and

EIS CUY

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in.

S5..

instructors in Western Europe.

Mso; he was then teaching the

§Congolese to fly aircralts? He departed Lcopolaville in July because

he had run into difficulty obtaining a residence permit, and his ClA

contract was terminated in September 1961.

Africa Division believes that WIROGUE was recruited for hig

Congo assignment because of his third country national backgrownd

in order to establish a support mechanism in Leopoldville. At the

time the Congo was in chaos, we had few asseta there,

and the

likelihood existed that the political situation would degenerato

quickly. The Station possibly also wanted to have a latent paramilitary

capability, An October 1964 ässessment of WIROGÚE indicates littlo

flap potential with him since he knew little about the Agency. He spent

most of his time trying to develop contacta and was not directly involved

in any particular operation.

SECRET

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