NORTHWOODS
Originator: JCS
Document date: 00/00/1962
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

## Page 1

202-10002-10104

Date : 10/15/97

Page

1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICA "ION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY :

JCS

RECORD NUMBER

: 202-10002-10104

RECORDS SERIES

JCS CENTRAL FILES

1962

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

3360 (7 FEB 62)

DOCUMENT. INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR

JCS

FROM

TO

TITLE : NORTHWOODS

DATE : 00/00/62

PAGES

: 197

SUBJECTS: U. S. MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA

CONTINGENCY PLANNING, CUBA

OPERATION MONGOOSE

UPRISINGS IN CUBA

COVERT OPERATIONS, CUBA

SOVIET BASE IN CUBA

CARIBBEAN SECURITY

PATROL POSTS

INVASION OF CUBA

JUSTIFICATION FOR I. S. MILITARY INTERVENTION

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCIMENT

CLASSIFICATION

: UNCLASSIFIED

RESTRICTIONS : 1C

CURRENT STATUS

RELEASED WITH DELE''IONS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW

10/07/97

OPENING CRITERIA

COMMENTS

.:?

JCS Central Files 962, Box 29. JCS Record Case, Code

Name Northwoods,

containing JCS Papers related

to JCS

recommendation to nvade Cuba and pretexts to justify

US military intervention.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

NW 47874 DocId: 32276301 Page 3

---

## Page 2

Assassination Records Review Board

Final Determination Notification

AGENCY : JCS

RECORD NUMBER

: 202-10002-10104

RECORD SERIES

: JCS CENTRAL FILES 1562

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

: 3360. (7 FEB 62)

October 20, 1997

Status of Document:

Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 0

Number of Postponements: 5

Postponement # 1 (Page DJSM-909-62,25 July 1962, pg 2):

• Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it touches on a matter currently relating to the

military defense, intelligence operations or conduct of foreign relations of the United States that properly

may be postponed under Section 6(1)(C) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: Operational Details

Release Date: 10/2017

8

pist

Postponement # 2 (Page JCS 1969/347, 2 May 1962,pp (,):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because il touches on a matter currently relating to the

military defense, intelligence operations or conduct of freign relations of the United States that properly

may be postponed under Section 6(1)(C) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: Operational Details

Release Date: 10/2017

• Postponement # 3 (Page JCS. 1969/347,Maritime Support, Operation Mongoose, 8 May 1962,pg 1):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it touches on a matter currently relating to the

military defense, intelligence operations or conduct of freign relations of the United States that properly

may be postponed under Section 6(1)(C) of the JFK Act.

NO JOINT STAFF OBJECTION

TO DECLASSIFICATION

1

MAR

2016

BATE:

NG 17874 DocId:32276301 Page 1

---

## Page 3

Substitute Language: Operational Details

Release Date: 10/2017

Postponement # 4 (Page JCS 1969/389, 23 July 1962,pp 14-15):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it touches on a matter currently relating to the

military defense, intelligence operations or conduct of fureign relations of the United States that properly

may be postponed under Section 6(1)(C) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: Operational Details

Release Date: 10/2017

Postponement # 5 (Page OP605F /br, Ser 000374P60, 24 April 1962,pp 2-4):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it touches on a matter currently relating to the

military defense, intelligence operations or conduct of foreign relations of the United States that properly

may be postponed under Section 6(1)(C) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: Operational Details.

Release Date: 10/2017

Board Review Completed: 10/14/97

2

NW 47874

DocId: 32276301

Page 2

---

## Page 4

Paper clip

202-10002-10/04

Declassification Review/Postponement Form

Originator:-

Date:

Multi

ICS / NORTHNOORS 3368(7 (7FES62)

Subject: _

Mongoose. & C461

Original Level of Classification: T. S

Third Agency Equities: C/A 10.5/

0CS.4

filthile

Remarks: RevR only Mongoose maerial a Mongouse related

Berlin

" Diumento not respongine

Page # of Postponement

Reason for Postponement IAW Section 6 of JFK Act

OSD: NO OBJECTONS

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

Backets

EXEMPTED FROM DECLASSIFICATION

B'' JOINT STAFF AT TABS

EEMPTION: 60C)

DATE:

0C10 71997

The Department of State has no objection to the

release or declassification of this document in full

under the provisions of the JFK Assassination Records

NO OBJECTION

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

10-8-97

DECLASSIFIED BY USIA - GC/D

MONTH_& DAY_

6 YEAR 97

AUTHORITY: JFK Act

No objectois to release

NH

17874

DooId: 32276301

Page 4

---

## Page 5

UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL

DECLASSIFICATION UNIT

DATED STATE

NORTAWOODS

(VES CASE NOI

336Ф.

7f88 62)

AGENC

THIS AGENCY HAS DECLASSIFIED ALL OF

USIA'S HOLDING IN THIS DOCUMENT IN

COMPLIANCE WITH

THE JFK ACT

DECLASSIFIED BY USIA - GC/D

MONTH_S DAY 6

AUTHORITY:

JFK Art

No objection ts rodeale.

NW 17874 DocId: 32276301 Page 5

---

## Page 6

THE JOINT STAFF

UNCLASSIHIES

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

TY TEST ANY SENT

BY JOS CH --

ELS CANCH CHINES

Ce: 1464/394

TOP SECRET NOFORN

SPECIAL HANDLING

Fifled

DJS71-503-62

2s July 1962

Well =57

REMORANDUM FOR THE JOIN.' CILEFS

STAFF

subject: US Contluency Flan No. 2a Cuba (s)

1. I have reviewed subject papar (JOS 1959/389) and

racornand that the follimina changes be made in order

so take full connizance of the possible requirement ton

roquoing military roaction time to leas than eighteen

(28) days.

Es Paga 12, parigrapt, 3a(3), change to read as f01l0ua8

"(3) US MIltony leaction

(a) With no prior varning ... result in minima

us and cavan casuities, Is there-requistment

dolete romainder of paragraph througi felf-reather (598

FARä$9&-0r6en+J

(D) A recassement to seduce BlEnificantly tha

119-8893415 pEriO HOUld DeCebsItate Incremental coumitrent

05 US forcas ad they could le asserbled and employed. The

¿Ins JeLIDa to 2849 DEsential U3 nilitary control may bo

appreciably extendad. Fouevor, reduation of US militarys re-

Ection time nay ba of overriding importanco: In such caso,

an airborna aspault could be initiated in Sive (5) dare

folloma by air landed units as soon on airflelds are

EXCLUDED FROM GDS

TOP SECRET-NOFORN

SPECIAL HANDLING

EXCLUDED AN AUTOMATIC

REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10

DOES NOT APPLY

UNAL ASSIFIED

NW 47874 DocId:32276301

Page 6

---

## Page 7

UNC: ASSINES

TOP SECRET-NOFORN

SPECIAL HANDLING

secured: Naw Marine al phibious "orots oould be conmitted

within eight (3) days; folloN on forces would be cormitted

En they become avallable: Incremental commitment of forces

Increased the risk of halvier casualties on both sides.

(c) The Cuban situation could demana more imicciate

reaction than employnent of airuorne amphibious forces can

provide, possibly to forustall drastic reprisal actions be

the Communist Cuban Covenuent. US milItary plans v11l

provide for a rapid. com: tent of alr poner, naval sunfire

and Initiation of a bleclade prior to the sisbore/emphibione

asBaUlt."

3. To be consistent with changes recommended above, page

14, paragraph 3b(3) should be changed in the first tro

sentencas as follorss

* (3)

16

TOP SECRET-NOFORN

SPECIAL HANDLING

ISIDENT D. RILEY

Vico Adulral, USa

DireCtOr

UN LASSIFRO

NY 47874

DocId: 32276301

Page 7

---

## Page 8

THE JOINT STAFF

ile: 1469/3811

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASH NGTON 25, D.C.

TOP SECRET-NOFORN

SPECIAL HANDLING

SYSTEMATICANLY EVENER

Jabled

CLASSIFICATION CONTINUI

DISH 903 62

25 July 1562

Well 2574

REMORANDUM FOR THIS JOIN' CHIEFS OF STATE

Bubfect: US Contirzoney Flan No. &, Cuba (s)

1. I have reviewed sibject paper (ICs 1969/389) and

racommand that tho follswing changes be mado in order

to take fuil cornirance of

(10) days.

a. Page 12, parisrapt 3a(3), change to read as follous:

"(3) IIS M1I1tary leaction

(a) With no prior sarcing . result 1n 1101n

Us and Cuban casuaitios, It-chere-t i requirement.

dolete roninder of paragraph through felf weather.frog

FARd646-0EöenJ

(b) l reonisement to reduce Burnificantly tho

2'9-8533Ul8 pasiod Mould secousitate

incresental comnitment

Of Us forcas as they could lie assembled and employed. The

tins requirad to saln osential US nilltart control may be

appreciabiy extendad. lonever, reduation of US nilitary re-

action time my ba of overriding importance. In such case.

an airborne assault could be initiated in five (5) dave

follomà by Bis-landed units as coon on airflelds are

EXCLUDED FROM GDS

TOP SECRET -NOFORN

SPECIAL HANDLING

EXCLUDED *M AUTOMATIC

REGRADING: DOD DIR 5200.10

DOES NOT APPLY

NY 47874 DocId: 32276301 Page 8

---

## Page 9

TOP SECRET-NOFORN

SPECIAL HANDLING

sacured. Naut Marine anphy? lous forcas could be committed

within elsht (3) dayal follew on forces Hould be cormitted

as they becone evallable. Incremental conmitment of forces

Inereased the fisk of heavity casualties on both Bidee.

(c) The Cuban ailuation could donand more immeciate

reaction than employsent of airborne/emphibious forced, can

provide, possibly to foreste l1 drastic reprisal actions by

fio Communist Cuban Governuent. US military plans will

provide for & rapid connitment of alr poror, naval sunfire

and 1n1tiation of 8 bloclade pelor to the sirhome enchibios

assault."

3. To be conaistent with changes recoumended above, page

14, paragraph 3b(3) should ke changed in the first tro

"(3) In concept, initial military operations commence

with a sea-ant-ate blockade.

On D day aparted ee concen

trated air strikes and coordinated laval gunfire to vald.

effeat destruction of enemy air pover and to neutralize

melteadfaatton and destroy deetruedden an auch as possible

of the enemy tank, arnor, artillery, and anti-air capability:

aG-ICh-aB-possibler The Iritlal als strikes .•

IdENT D. RILEY

Vico AQuiral, US!

Director

TOP SECRET-NOFORN

SPECIAL HANDLING

2

NH 47874 DocId: 32276301

Page 9

---

## Page 10

COPY NO.

Process

SPECENT DESTRIBUTION

JCS 1969/347

2. May $1962

Page 2215

NOTE B

SECRETARIDES

then

NONS OF STARE

Onl

NOR'

a reports on the above subject un submitted for consid

eration by the Joints chierd or-stara

HOUT

LENGELLDO

point Socretariat

Nou seproducede on mine

ro thu Necretar let

FOG RADING DOD DIRECLINE

5200, 10 DOES NOT APPLY

JCS 1969/34

UNLACSINE

NN 4787& DödId:

52246301

Pag

---

## Page 11

TUP SECRET

AND

LASSIFIED

NOFORM

within harbors to put these PT's out of action are risky

In that there is a probability chat agents/swimmers would be

captured with subsequent exposue and US complicity. After

the PT's commence to operate, their pattern of operations will

be studied so

as to establish methods to dispose of them

out-

side of their harbors.

A wider spectrum of actions with

less risk should become practical after their pattern of

operations is established.

4. Possible covert/clandestin: ways and means of putting

Cuban PT. craft out of action include the following:

UNCLASSIFED&

NN 47874 BODID: 32278301age 11

Al pendix to Enclosure

---

## Page 12

Or OLONCE FOrEGAL MANULIKE NOFORN

UHGLASIRED

UNQLASIRED

Appendix to Enclosure

NH 4787₫

DARE SECRET COCCIAL MANNINO

---

## Page 13

OrCUIRL MANOLIN

UNOLASSIIED

5. Although the Navy has ways ind means available to destroy

or neutralize the Cuban PT boats, none can be covertly

executed In Cuba without undue riik'of exposure until more

information 1s obtained on the degree of their security.

protection.

Under conditions of vert

warfare, the Navy can

quickly dispose of the Cuban PT's. The Navy will continue

to watch closely the activities of the Cuban PT!§

and will

recommend appropriate means to disjose of them when an

opportunity is presented.

/s! George i. Anderson

GEORGE W. ANDERSON

UNGLASS il opendix to Broloure

AH aT Dods Datas

---

## Page 14

DUP SECKER SPECIAL MANDLIND

NOFORN

APPENDIX 10 ENCLOSURE

DEPARIMENT OF THE NAVY

OFFICE

OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

WASHINGTCN 25, D.C.

In reply refer to

OP605F/br

Ser 000374P60

April 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject:

Maritime support, Operation MONGOOSE (TS)

References:

a. CM 610.62 of 16 Mar 1962

b. CNO menno for the JCS Ser 000314P60

of 20 Mar 1962

1. Reference a requested he Chief of Naval Operations to

provide specified Information on PT type craft, maritime

support needs,

and ways of putting the Soviet furnished Cuban

high speed boats out of actin. Reference b provided certain

data on

PT

craft and specified maritime support.

2. The Cuban PI's are fast (up to 45 knots), highly maneuver-

able, and possess a credible armament consisting of 4-25 mm

(twin) guns, 2-21" torpedo tibes (two torpedoes) and from

12-16 depth charges. In overt conventional naval war

operations these boats would be put out of action quickly,

although an anti-PT defense would have to be established to

protect our troop/cargo carrying ships until the PT's were

eliminated. The primary means of destroying PT craft would

be aircraft delivered rocket/sunfire and surface ship gunfire.

3. There have been no repots on the operations of the Cuban

PT's. They have been deliver.d by Soviet ships to Havana,

offloaded and sailed under thir own power to Mariel. Eight

boats are presently

located a:: Mariel.

Four PT's, delivered

In early April, were st1ll in Havana at last report, but are

expected

to move to Mariel in the near future.. The only way

to put these boats

out of action while they are in port is by

means of agents or swimmer (UIT type) sabotage. Operations

5

Appendix to Enclosure

NW 17874 DocId:

LOSeS EGRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN

---

## Page 15

DUP SECREI SPECIAL MANDLIKE NOFORN

within harbors to put these PT's out of action are risky

in that there is a probability that agents/swimmers would be

captured with subsequent exposure and US complicity. After

the PT's commence to operate, the r pattern of operations will

be studied so as to establish metliods to dispose of them out-

side of their harbors. A wider sectrum of

actions with

less risk should become practical after their pattern of

operations is established:

4. Possible covert/clandestine ways and means of putting

Cuban PT

craft out of action include the following;

a. Fuel contamination. Fuel contamination could be

accomplished either by insertin, foreign material (chemicals)

directly into the craft's fuel system or the fuel supply

ashore (POL). Delivery of the contaminant would be. by

agent or swimmer. Resultant darage would be temporary

mechanical.

Risk of detection rould be high, results would

be minimal in comparison..

b. Limpet mines/demolition charges. Underwater swimmers,

launched from submarines under cover of darkness could

penetrate the PT base. and attach limpet mines to the under-

water body of the craft. Agents

could install demolition

charges in the boats at their piers. Damage resulting from

limpete/demolition charges would be major resulting in

destruction and/or. sinking of thr: boat. Risk of detection

1n operations of this type again: t Havana or Mariel would

be high. PT berthe in both harbors are in secure areas

making agent delivery very difficult. Both harbors are land-

locked with narrow entrances fron the sea. The PT's are

moored at piers well inside the harbor and not on a direct

line from the entrance. The entrinces are guarded by con

tinuously manned machine gun posts on both sides of the

entrance. Boats are known to pat ol during the day, ro

information is available on night boat patrol activity.

The

6

Api endix to Enclosure

- or Does SECRET, SPECIAL MANDLING NOFORM

---

## Page 16

1UP DEGREI SPECIAL MANDLINS NOFORN

currents in the entrances ar: awift. This would possibly

require a swimmer to penetraie on a flood tide and remain

inside the harbor until the bo tide before he would be

able

to effect his escape. Under these conditions, the risk of

swimmer detection through acrident (equipment malfunction or

similar difficulty) would be higher than the benefits

to

be realized

by such operations.

• c. Logistic sabotage.. Sabotage of any portion of the

spare parts supply system would mintmize operational avalla-

billty of the boats. Agents vould be required to perform the

sabotage. Insufficient inforation is available on the

logistic supply system to eva uate the risks involved.

d. Floating debris. Placig floating debris (10gs,

fishing nets, etc.) in PT operating areas would create an

operational hazard. If a PT struck a solid object, the

resultant damage would range from minor hull damage to

destruction depending on the seed and angle at which the ab:

object was struck. Fishing ness, rope and similar material

would foul the screws and temp rarily disable the boat.

Operations of this type would lave to be carefully executed

to insure that the hazard was : ocalized in the PT area to

avoid danger to innocent shipping. While not feasible at

present since

the PT's have not commenced operations,

It may

be practicable at a later time.

e. Lures. Floating devices with explosive charges could

be made into attractive lures by bright paint, emission of

spurious signals (radio/noise) or given other distinguishing

characteristics which would enginder curlosity or demand

Investigation. These devices could be fuzed to explode in

• a number of ways (remote contro:, contact or by handling).

The devices would be planted in the PT operating areas after

they become know. Extreme care would be required in the

conduct of such operations to irsure that innocent shipping

'7

Appendix to Enclosure

TOP SECRET SPECIAL WANDLING NOFORN

DocId: 32276301 Page 16

---

## Page 17

DUF SEGME DECIAL MANULIN

NUrUMN

was not endangered. Damage resalting from detonation of the

Ture could extend up to permanent destruction of the boat.

f. Deception. When the operational

pattern is developed

for the PT's, It might be possible to conduct deception

operations that would result in their destruction. Drone

targets, electronic/visual signals, changing positions of

navigational alds or similar acts might be used to cause

the PT's to run into shoal witers or onto a reef. This

form of operation could also be used to divert the attention

ASSAN

of patrolling PT'& from othe: operations being conducted

5. Although the Navy has way; and means available to destroy

or neutralize the Cuban PT boatri, none can be covertly

executed in Cuba without undue risk of exposure until more

Information is obtained on the regree of their security

protection. Under conditions o1 overt warfare, the Navy can

quickly dispose of the Cuban PT's. The Navy will continue

to watch closely the activities of the Cuban PT's and w1ll

recommend appropriate means to (ispose of them when an

opportunity is presented.

/s/ George i. Anderson

GEORGE W. ANDERSON

8

Appendix to Enclosure

Booz. 27605 EGRET SPECIAL MANDLING

NOFORN

---

## Page 18

UNCLASSHED

URCLASSIRED

TOP SECRET SPECHH MANDLING NOFORN

THE JOINT *HIEFS OF STAFF

WASHIA GTON 25, D.C.

ENSE

1:

8 May 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAI, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject:

JCS 1969/3.17 - Maritime Support,

Operation : longoose (TS)

1. On 14 March 1962, th Secretary of Defense inquired

whether there is some

way of putting the Soviet furnished

Cuban PT boats out of action.

The attached menoran lum for the Secretary of Defense

memorandum from the Chief of Naval Operations,

which sets forth some poss ble ways and means of putting

the Cuban PT boats out of iction, but states in substance

that it is not practicable to carry out the operations at

this time and that appropr ate recommendations will be

submitted at a later date.

•3. Some possibie ways io.

out of action enumerated a

wing the cuben pr. boats

4. The Operations Deput es approved the attached memo

for the Secretary of Defenie,

together with its enclosure,

on 7 May 1962 for transmit;al to the Secretary of Defense.

• It is recommended that you approve and sign

the attached

memorandum for

the Secreta'y of Defense, which forwards

the CNO report.

WILLIAM H. CRAIG

Brig. General, USA

DOD/JCS Representative

Caribbean Survey Group

EXCLUDED I ROM GDS

URGLASSRO

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC

REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10

DOES NOT APPLY

FOP SECRET SPECIAL MANDLING NOFORN

UNCLASSIFIED

NW 47874

DocId: 32276301

Page 18

---

## Page 19

TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTO! I 25, D.C.

8 May 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, • OINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject:

JCS 1969/347 . Maritime Support,

Operation Mont oose (TS)

1. On 14 March 1962, the S-cretary of Defense Inquired

whether there is some way of lutting the Soviet furnished

Cuban PT boats out of action.

2. The attached memorandum for the Secretary of Defense

forwards a memorandum from th Chief of Naval Operations,

which sets forth some possibl: ways and means of putting

the Cuban PT boats out of action, but states in substance

that it 1s not practicable to carry out the operations at

this time and that appropriati: recommendations will be

submitted at a later date.

3. Some possibie ways. of utting the cuban PT boats

enumerated

del contamination, sabotage,

the follow ng: limpet/demotion charges,

floating debris, lures and de eption operations!)

4. The Operations Deputies

approved the attached memo

for the Secretary of Defense,

together with its enclosure,

on 7 May. 1962 for transmittal to the Secretary of Defense.

It is recommended that you approve and sign

the attached

memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, which forwards

the CNO report.

WILLIAM H.

Brig. General, USA

DOD/JCS Representative

Caribbean Survey Group

EXCLUDED FROM GDS

EXCLUDED FRO! AUTOMATIC

REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10

DOES NOT APPLY

TOP SECRET SPECIAL MANDLING NOFORN

NH 47074

DocId: 32276301 / Mage 19

---

## Page 20

INESSIE

COPY NO:

SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION

JCS: 1969/389

23 July 1962

Page: 2324

NOTE BY:

HE SECRETARTRS

Fune

JOINT CE

IMES OFA STAFT

Ons

NORI HWOODS. (S

A reporte on the above

subjectle submitted dos conside

Cation by the Joint, Chiets

of

caft

NUS INGELIDO

O. TORBES

so Int socretariat

BAUDD LON CDS

* Not reproduced gone file

Secrets at

ECLUDED FROM AUIOMATTCI

REGRADING DOD DEREONE

52001L0 DOES NOT APPLY.

TOP SECT

JCS

/38g

NW 47874 DocTa: 32276301

Page

20

---

## Page 21

b. Department of Defense Operations:

(1) When directec by higher authority, or as the

situation demands, the Department of Defense will

initiate preparatory actions for US military inter-

vention in Cuba. These actions may include pre-

positioning forces aid equipment by execution of

current cover and deeption plans.

(2) Upon final devision of the President, the Joint

Chiefs

of Staff will direct execution of military

intervention plans for Cuba.

(3) In concept, iritial military operations commence

with a blockade, concentrated air strikes and coordi-

nated Naval gunfire to effect destruction of enemy

air power and to neutralize and destroy as much as

possible of the enemy tank, armor, artillery, and

anti-air capability.

(a

14

NH

47874

DocId:

(Amended as directed by the Joint (hiefs of Staff - 27 July 1962)

PresS EGRE

age

UNG ASPED

HANAHNA

NAFARN

---

## Page 22

UNCLASSIFIED

(5) At such time as essential US military control

1s gained in Cuba, mat:ers of civil affairs and mil1-

tary government will b; given priority and undertaken

In accordance with policy established by the Department

of State. This includes provision for a provisional

military government prepared to assume full legislative,

executive, and judicial control until such functions

can

be turned over to other authority on direction in

an expeditious and orcerly manner. Remaining resistance

elements of the Commur ist Cuban government, armed forces

or other groups will ke isolated, contained and destroyed

or captured as rapidly as possible. US military combat

units will be scheduled for early return to the United

States consistent witl. security considerations.

c. Department of Stati Operations.

•(1) Phase I. The 'epartment of state will seek to

place the United Status in as broad a multilateral

context as possible.

(a) Immediatel, sound out Latin American

Governments to determine whether the United States

can count upon a 2/3 majority decision authorizing

the use of milltary forces under Article 6 of

the Rio Treaty.

MH 47874. Doota: 32716301

25 UNGLASSIFIED

(Amended as directed by the Joirt Chiefs of Staff - 27 July 1962)

SPECHE WANDLING

- NOFORN

---

## Page 23

IS GOUIDI DOLUEL HANULING

NUrUNN

:b. Department of Defeise Operations.

(1) When directed sy higher authority, or as the

situation demands, th.: Department of Defense will

Initiate preparatory ictions for US military inter-

vention in Cuba. The: e actions may include pre-

positioning forces ani equipment by execution of

current cover and deception plans.

(2)

Upon final decision of the President, the Joint

Chiefs of Staff will direct execution of military

intervention plans for Cuba.

(3) In concept, ini :1al military operations commence

with a blockade, concentrated air strikes and coordi-

nated Naval gunfire to effect destruction of enemy

air power and to neutri lize and destroy as much as

possible of the enemy tank, armor, artillery, and

anti-air capability.

(all In western Cuba airborne and amphiblous

assaults will be conjucted by a Joint Task Force

with the initial objective of seizing the city

of Havana and obtaining control'over the seat of

government. Army al borne units will secure the

major airfields in the area as well as major

port

areas required for fullow-on forces and logistic

resupply. Navy/Marine amphibious forces will

secure a beachhead il the vicinity of Havana and

designated Army unit: will follow the Marines over

the beach. The Marire amphibious forces will be

prepared

to re-embark for further operations as

directed.

(b) In eastern Cuba, Guantanamo will be re-

inforced by air- and sea-lifted Marines for defense

14

(Amended as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff - 27 July 1962)

NN 47874

TOP SECRET SPECIAL NANDLING NOFORN

DocId: 32276301

Page 23

---

## Page 24

the base. Additional Navy/Marine amphibious

forces will be employed in operations against Cuban

forces in the Santiago de Cuba complex or in other

operations in eastern Cuba as directed.

(4). Subsequent to he

seizure of Havana and San-

tiago and the success ul defense of Guantanamo,

operations will be conducted to defeat remaining

pockets of resistance, Additional amphibious and

airborne operations may be required. The most likely

areas for such operations are:

Matanzas, Nuevitas,

Nicaro,

Trinidad, Barla de Cochinos, and the Isle of

Pines.

(5). At such time is essential US military control

1s gained in Cuba, mitters of civil affairs and mill-

tary government will be given priority and undertaken

in accordance with policy established by the Department

of State. This inclides provision for a provisional

military government repared to assume full legislative,

executive, and judicial control until such functions

can be turned over to other authority on direction in

an expeditious and erderly manner. Remaining resistance

elements of the Com unist Cuban government, armed forces

or other groups wil be isolated, contained and destroyed

or captured as rapily as possible. US military combat

units will be schediled for early return to

the United

States consistent with security considerations.

c. Department of State Operations.

(1) Phase I. The Department of State will seek to

place the United States in as broad a multilateral

context as possible.

• (a) Immediately sound out Latin American

Governments to retermine whether the United States

can count upon i 2/3 majority decision authorizing

the use of miliary forces under Article 6 of

the Rio Treaty.

NN 4787₫

15

(Amended as directed by the J›int Chiefs of Staff - 27 July 1962)

TOP SECRET SPECIAL MANDLING NOFORN

DocId:32276301 Page 24

---

## Page 25

LINCLASSIFED

DEPARTMEN OF THE NAVY

CFFICE

OF THE CHTSE

OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

WASHINGT ON 25, D.C.

In reply refer to

OP605F/br

Ser 000374PFn

24 April: 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject:

References:

"Maritime Support, Operation MONGOOSE (IS)

a. CM 61í-62 of 16 Mar 1962

b. CNO mimo for the JCS Ser 000314P60

of 20 Mar 1962

1. Referonse a requested the Chief of Naval Operations to

provide specified informatin

on pT type craft, maritime

support needs, and ways of jutting the Soviet furnished Cuban

high speed boats out of action. Reference b provided certain

data on PT crait and specified maritime support.

2. The Cutar PT'S are fast (up to 45 knots), highly minéuvi

able, and possess

a credible armament consisting of 4-25 mm

(twin) guns, 2-21" torpedo üibes (two torpedoes) and from

12-16 depth charges. In overt conventional naval war

operations these boats would be put out of action quickly,

although an anti-PT defense vould have to be established to

protect our troop/cargo carr/ing ships until the PT's were

eliminated. The primary meais of destroying PT craft would

be aircraft delivered rocket, gunfire and surface ship gunfire.

3. There

have

been no reports on the operations of the Cuban

PT's. They

have been delivered by Soviet ships to Havana,

offloaded and sailed under their own power to Mariel. Eight

boats are presently located it Mariel. 'Four PT's, delivered

In early April, were stili 11 Havana at last report, but are

expected to move to Mariel ir the near future. The only way

to put these boats out of action while they are in port 15 by

means of agents or swimmer (DI type) sabotage.

Operations

DROL ASSIFI

EXCLUDED FROM GO:

---

## Page 26

- TUr StONE SOPLAL HANDLING NOFORN

withtn harnors to put those alls out of action are risi

In that there Is a probability that agents lowimmors voula be

captured with subsequent exposure and US complicity. After

the PT's commence to operate, t. eir pattern of operations will

be studied

so as to establish mithods to dispose of them

out-

side of their harbors. A wider spectrum of actions with

less risk should become practicil after their pattern of

operations is established.

4. Possible covert/clandestire ways and means of putting.

Cuban PT

craft out

of action include the following:

UNGLASSIFIED

N# 17874 Fobid: 3227690r

"Pat 26

---

## Page 27

TUP DEGLI OMEGIA. MANDLINS NOTORM

UNGLASSIFIED

UNAL

LASSRED

NN 47874 566fa: 32276361* Fage

27

---

## Page 28

OFCOHE MARULIN"

UNGLASS

5. Although the Navy has ways and means available to destroy

or neutralize the Cuban PT boats, none can be covertly

executed In Cuba without undue risk of exposure until more

Information is obtained on the degree of their security

protection. Under conditions of overt warfare, the Navy can

quickly dispose of the Cuban PT's. The Navy will continue

to watch closely the activities of the Cuban PT's and w111

recommend appropriate means to. lispose of them when an

opportunity is presented.

/s/ George . anderson

GEORGE W. ANDERSON

UNGLASSIFIED

---

## Page 29

SUr SEGMEO DOECIAL MANDLIND NOFORN

withtn herhors

to put those pole sit do action are r10l

in that there is a probability tat agents/awimmoro would be

captured with subsequent exposur: and US complicity. After

the PT's commence to operate, thiir pattern of operations will

be studied

as to establish me hods to dispose of them out-

side of

their harbors. A wider :pectrum of actions with

less risk should become practica: after their pattern of

operations is established.

4. Possible covert/clandestine ways and means of putting

Cuban PT craft out of action inciude the following:

•Fuel contamination. Fuel contamination could be

accomplished either by inserting foreign material

. (chemicals)

directly into the craft's fuel system or the fuel supply

ashore (POL). Delivery of the contaminant would be by.

agent or swimmer. Resultant camage would be temporary

mechanical. Risk of detection would be high, results would

he minimal in comparison.

b. Ilmpet mines/demolition charges. Underwater swimmers,

launched from submarines under cover of darkness could

penetrate the PT base and attach limpet mines to the under-

water body of the craft. Agenis could install demolition

charges in the boats at their 'lers. Damage resulting from

11mpets/demolition charges wou d be major resulting in

destruction and/or sinking of he boat. Risk of detection

in operations of this type aga nst Havana or Mariel would

be high. PT berths in both haibors are in secure areas

making agent delivery very dif:icult. Both harbors are land-

locked with narrow entrances from the sea. The Pr's are

moored at piers well inside the harbor and not on a direct

line from the entrance. The er trances are guarded by con-

tinuously manned

machine gun pests on both sides of the

entrance. Boats are known to latrol during the day, ro

Infornation is available on night boat patrol activity.

The

SERIAI WANDLINE

NACODN

---

## Page 30

DUN SEEMLI

SPECIAL MANOLIN MOURN

rents in the entrances are swift. This would possibly

require a swimmer to penetrate on a flood tide and remain

Inside the harbor

until the ebb tide before he would be able

to effect his

escape. Under shese conditions, the risk of

swimmer detection through accident (equipment malfunction or

similar difficulty) would be h gher than the benefits to

be realized by such operation:.

c. Logistiö sabotage. Sabi tage of any portion of the

spare parts supply system would minimize operational avalla-

billty of the boats. Agents rould be required to perform the

sabotage. Insufficient information 1s available on the

logistic supply system to evaluate the risks involved.

d. Floating debris. Placing floating debris (logs,

f1shing nets, etc.) In PT operiting areas would create an

operational hazard. If a PT siruck a solid object, the

: resultant damage would range f''om minor hull damage to

destruction depending on the sjeed and angle at which the

object was

struck. Fishing net.s, rope and similar material

would foul the screws and temp rarily disable the boat.

Operations of this type would tave to be carefully executed

to insure that the hazard was localized in the PT area to

avold danger

to innocent shipping. ihile not feasible at

present since the PT's have not commenced operations, It may

be practicable at a later time.

e. Lures:

Floating devices

vich explosive charges could

be made into attractive lures b, bright paint, emission of

spurious signals (radio/noise) r given other distinguishing

characteristics which would enginder curiosity or demand

Investigation. These devices cruld be fuzed to explode in

a number of ways (remote contrc., contact or by handling).

The devices

would be planted in the PT operating areas after

they become know. Extreme care would be required in the

conduct of such operationa is irsure that innocent shipping

NH 8767 DO 6F CAFT

SPECIAI MAMOLIAR

---

## Page 31

IUE SLUMLI

OFECIAL MANULING

NU UMM

not endangered, Danage insuitina fom detonetier of the

lure could extend up to permanent destruction of the boat.

f. Deception. when the operational pattern 1s developed

for the Pr's, 1t might be possible to conduct deception

operations that would result In their destruction. Drone

targets, electronic/visual signals, changing positions of

navigational aids or similar sets might be used to cause

the PT's to run Into shoal wacers or onto a reef. This

form of operation could also se used to divert the attention

of patrolling PI's from other operations being conducted.

5. Although the Navy has ways and means

available to destroy

or neutralize the Cuban PT boats. none can be covertly

executed in Cuba without undue rsk of exposure until more

Information is obtained on the digree of their security.

protection. Under conditions of overt warfare, the Navy can

quickly dispose of the Cuban PI'il.

The Navy will continue

to watch

closely the activities

of the Cuban Ph's and 11l1

recommend appropriate means to dispose of them when an

opportunity is presented.

is/ George i. inderson

GEORGE W. ANDERSON

• A787S DOSECRET SPECIAL HANDLING

NOFORN

---

## Page 32

12/15/2014

National Archives and Records Administration

JFk Full Results

Kennedy Assassination Collection Full Results

Viewing/Orderin j Information

Back to Brief Results

Hits 1-1 of 1

Hit 1 of 1

Back to Search

Exit JFK

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS

RECORD NUMBER : 202-10002-10104

RECORDS SERIES : JCS CENTRAL FILES 1962

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 3360 (7 FEB 62)

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : JCS

FROM : [No From]

TO : [No To]

TITLE

: NORTHWOODS

DATE

: 00/09/1962

PAGES

:197

DOCUMENT TYPE

: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

SUBJECTS

:U. S. MILITARY INTERVENTION IT CUBA; CONTINGENCY

PLANNING, CUBA; OPERATION MONGOOSE; UPRISINGS IN CUBA;

COVERT OPERATIONS, CUBA; SOVIIT BASE IN CUBA;

CARIBBEAN SECURITY; PATROL PO: TS; INVASION. OF CUBA; .

CLASSIFICATION

JUSTIFICATION FOR U. S. MILITARY INTERVENTION

: UNCLASSIFIED

RESTRICTIONS

: 1C

CURRENT STATUS

RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW

:

10/07/1997

COMMENTS

JCS Central Files 1962, Box 2! JCS Record Case,

Code

Name Northwoods, containing J'S Papers related to JCS

recommendation to invade Cuba and pretexts to justify

US military intervention.

Audit history for this Record Identification Form

Hits 1-1 of 1

Back to Brief Results

Back to Searche

ww 19B.38099.322785698 agentst

Exit JEK.

1/2

---

## Page 33

JCS RECORD CASE NO.

3360 (7 Feb 62)

SUBJECT

NORTHWOODS

DATE

SOURCE

8

Feb

62

28 Feb

621

28 Feb 62 DepSecDef

Ї Mar 62

1 Mar 62

1 Mar 62

1 Mar 62

8 Mar 62

1.3 Mar 620

CJCS

10 Apr 62

8 May

62

8 May

62

8 May 62

DOD rep .CSG

8 May

62

8 May

62

& May

62

DOD

Rep

DOD Rip

CSG

CSG.

13. Jun 62

CJCS

25 Jul 62.

27 Jul 62

7 Aug 62

8 Aug 62

31 Aug 62

31 Aug 62

DepSecDef'

: 2

SC

T

T

T

T

T

T

T

T

T

T

T

T

T

T

T

T

T

T

T

T

T

T

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, 1). C. 20301

SECTION NO:

1

SEE SEC.

CY

JCS PAPERS

JCSM 103-62

JCSM 158-62

SM-240-62

SM-241-6?

SM-242-6?

SM-243-6?

JCSM-166-62

JCSM 272:62

JCSM

355-62

JCSM-355-62.

NO.

IR ACCESS NO.

PREPARED BY

REMARKS AND/OR SUBJECT

XX

JCSM 367•62

DJSM 909.62

JCSM: 564•62

DJS Unnum sered

CJCS Unnunbered

CJCS Unnur bered

CLASSIFICATION

SPECIAL ACCESS

JCS FORM NO. 2

JAM 69

NH 47874 DocId: 32276301 Page 33

JCS RECORD CASE CONTENTS

---

## Page 34

R&RA BR., JOINT SECRETARIAT

CROSS INDEX NO'S

3360 (7 Feb

Code - NORTHWOODS

Name. - CRAIG; B/Gen.

•3330

5740

JCS CASE FILE COVER SHEET

REQUEST INITIATED BY

BUBECT NORTHWOODS (S)

Report by Gen. Craig; Referred to JCS

DATE

#/7$P/$7/

7 Feb 62

AGENOY PAPER NO.

Decision on JCS 1969/303.

A. Report; Referred to JCS

Decision on JCS 1969/306

A Report - Referred to the Chiefs

A Report - Refered to the Chiefs

Decision on JCS 1969/311

Decision on JCS 1969/310=

A Report - Referred to JOS

A Report - Referred to JCS

A Report Referred to J6S

A Report Referred to JCS

Decision on JCS. 1969/314 & 1969/316

•A Report - referred to JCS

Decision on JCS 1969/321

Decision on JCS 1969/313

A Report Referred to JCS

Decision on JOS 1969/324

A Report - Referred to JCS

Decision on JCS. 1969/325

A Report Referred to JCS

A Report referred to JOS

Decdsion on JOS 1969/327

Decision on JCS 1969/328

Controlled Distribution

8 Feb 62

13 Feb 62

15 Feb 62

20 Feb 61

20 Feb 61

20-Feb-62

20 Feb 62.

27 Feb 62

27-Feb-62

5. Мат 62

5 Mar 62

7 Mar 62

12 Mar 62

13 Mar 62

7 Mar 62

20-Мar-62

21-Mar-62.

23-Mar-62

27-Мer-62

29 Mer 62 -1

29 Mar 62

727 Mar 62$414

30 Mar 62

ICE PAPER NO.

7989/893/

1969/303 *

1969/306 #

1969/310

1969/311

1969/313

1969/314 #

7769/375 *

1969/316

*

1969/321

1969/324

*

1969/325 +

1969/327 *

1969/328

*

THIS IS THE JOINT CHIEFE OF STAFF MASTER ( ASE MILE COPY,

REBEARCH AND RECOROS ANALYSIS BR. , DOCUMENTS

IT MUST BE RETURNED tO THE

DIVISION, JOINT BEGRETARIAT, ROOM 20840.

*INTAGON, WITMIN & DAYS OF THE DATE BORRO NED UNLESS OTHERWISE SPECIFIED.

REFERENSE PIe IEe -42-48060 sine en

GDS Review 16 SE ' 1974

NW 47074. DocId: 32276301

Page 34

---

## Page 35

RGRA BR.,

• JOINT SECRETARIAT

35665 (9-Feb-62)

CROSS INDEX NO'S

page 2

REQUEST INITLATED BY

SUBJECT

NORTHWOODS (S)

Paper

A Felong Referred to JCS

A Report. Referred to JCS

Decision on JCS 1969/334

Decision on JCS 1969/335

Report Referred to JCS

Report Referred to JCS

A Report Referred to JOS

Decision on JCS 1969/343

Decision on JCS 1969/344

Decision on JCS 1969/347

A Report referred to JCS

A Report Referred to. JCS

Decision on JCS 1969/366

Decision on JCS 1969/367

A Report Referred to JCS

Decision on JCS 1969/389

A Report Referred to JCS

Decision on JCS 1969/392

A Report - leferred to JCS

A Report - Referred to JCS

Decision on JCS 1969/411

Decision on ICS 1969/412

A: Report Referred to JCS

JCS CASE FILE COVER SHEET

DATE

9 A pr-62

9- Apr-02.

10 Apr-62

10-Apr-62

27- Apr 62

27 Apr 62

AGENCY PAPER NO

iCS FAFER NO.

1969/334 *

1969/335 7

1969/343

1969/344

1969/317

12-June-62

12-June-62

13 Jun 62

15 Jun 62

23 Jul 62

27721-62

2 Aug 62

8 Aug 62

31 Aug 62

31 Aug 62

31 Aug 62

31 Aug 62-

1 Sep 62

1969/366

1969/367

1969/389

1969/392

1969/411

1969/112 K

7969/113

*

JCS 16 JUNE 9 2

THIS IS THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MASTER ASE FILE COPY.. IT MUST BE RETURNED TO THE

REBEARCH AND RECORDS ANALYSIS aR., DOCUMENTS DIVISION, JOINT SECRETARIAT, ROOM 20940.

PENTAGON, WITHIN & DAYS OF THE DATE BORRIWED UNLESS OTHERWISE SPECIFIED.

REFERENCE JAR. 88(4) JAI 5760.1

Controlled Distribution

N. 47874

DocId: 32276301 Page 35

---

## Page 36

TOP

SECRE: SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN

THE JOINT HIEFS OF STAFF

WASHIN STON 25, D.C.

221969/392

8 August 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETAR OF DEFENSE

• Subject:

Consequence: of US Military Intervention

in Cuba (TS

1. On 2 August 1962,

Mongoose,

the

Chief of Operations, Operation

to the Special

The specific requirement

is to set forth

requirement for sustained or cupation,

mobilization required, and l'uban

counteraction.

2. It is recommended tha: you approve the attached

memorandum for distribution

to the Special Group (Augmented).

If more specific and detaild information is required by the

Group, I will be prepared to provide it orally.

L. L. Lemmi

L. L. LEMNITZER

BY JCS ON

CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED

EXCLUDED FROM GDS

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC

REGRADING:

DOD DIR 5200.10

DOES NOT APPLY

TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN

Ni 47874

Doold: 32276301.

Page 36

---

## Page 37

TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLIN? NOFORM

Re1544/373

•T August 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF

Subject:

Consequences

of Us

Military Intervention

in. Cuba (TS) (JCS 1969/392)

1. Pursuant to the discussion of the subject item at today's

meeting of the Operations Depities, the following material,

1s submitted for addition to inclosure A (page 4) of the

subject paper:

"3. The Commandant of the larine Corps, while agreeing

that positive and successful nilitary intervention in Cuba

1s fully within current us casability, is of the opinion

that the attached memorandum

Is unduly optimistic in. Its

appraisal of the force requir ments; duration, 'and con-

sequences of such an action. He has expressed the following

reservations with respect to she several elements of the

analysis:

'a. Cost (personnel,

_inits, and equipment)

I notice that this element is treated in

terms of the magnitude of for:e commitment and no specific

estimate is made of cost in tirms of personnel casualties,

material consumed, and equipment to be replaced

or rehabil.

Itated. Even 1f this treatmet is considered acceptable,

I do not consider that the ground forces now shown are adequate

for the intended purpose with the indicated time frame.

If the Castro regime is to be confronted with the prospect

of overpowering force, and casualties reduced by early

capitulation, I consider that a minimum of three (3)

Infantry divisions should be ntroduced immediately after an

entry point has been seized b; amphibious/airborne assault.

" 'D. Level of National Mobilization Required.

(1) Adequate grouid combat forces are avallable

In our current force levels even if the scale of intervention

EXCLUDED. FROM GDS

I a78 DecaDeSECRET SPECIAL MANDLING NOFORM

---

## Page 38

TOP SECRET

SPECIAL. HANDLIY"

NOFORN

1s increased as Indicated abore. The same situation does

not appear to apply with respect to tactical airlift and

military government/civil affairs units. If all elements

of the intervention force are to have the same degree of

readiness and preparation, It would appear necessary to resort

to partial prior mobilization in these areas.

1:

(2) The foregoing

consideration is addressed

only to direct commitment in (uba.

Restoration of our

capability to resporid quickly to heightened tensions in

other areas might well requir additional mobilization

approaching the scale of that undertaken during the Berlin

crisis.

" 'c. Effect on World-W de Ability to React.

A critical port here is the duration of

Involvement of major elements of our strategic reserve in

Cuba. From examination of tire and distance factors, and

assessment

of the probable leel of opposition, I cannot

agree that the indicated time frame Is adequate

to introduce

and deploy forces of this magistude, establish effective

control, Install an effective new government, turn

over control

to that government, withdraw ind rehabilitate our forces,

and place those forces in a r newed readiness posture in

CONUS.

In my opinion a much: onger time would be involved

and during this period our ab: 1lty to respond to other crisis

would be seriously reduced.

" 'a. Castro-Cuban Coun eraction. The statement 10 made

that Cuban defensive plans ar: believed to contemplate

a strong

Intlal resistance, followed iy a determined defense of

preselected keypoints, and finally by protracted guerrilla

warfare. This statement is f'om the current National

Intelligence Estimate which a so states that the present

military establishment as

a wiole 1s politically reliable.

2

A 17879 DoxaTEDSECRET SPECIAL MANDLING NOFORN

---

## Page 39

TOP SECRET SPECIAL MANDLIN® NOFORM

If Castro's Cuba is only partially successful in the execution

of Its defensive plans, combat operations could be of

considerably longer duration than anticipated with personnel

and materiel casualties increasing proportionally.

'e. Possibility of a Requirement for a Sustained

occupation.

The present wording makes no mention of the very

real probability that a US provisional military government

would be required for an extended period of time. Considering

the

size (44,206 sq. m1.) anc population (6,743,000) of Cuba,

Its long history of political unrest, and its tradition of

sustained and extensive guerrIlla and terrorist resistance to

constituted authority, the estimate that only a division-gize

force will be required subseqient to the assault phase appears

modest. I consider it more probable that a clean-up and

occupation force of three infantry divisions and associated

support units would be required for a considerable period.

This is in addition to the need for a military government/

civ1l affairs establishment capable of directing the civil

and econonic affairs of Cuba intil we can organtze and install

a successor regime capable of responsible self-government.

This period of transition, re-organization, and economic

rehabilitation might well concinue for several years.' "

C. H. HAYES

Maj›r General, U.S.

Diputy erier of starr (Planes

3

NN. 47074 . DocId

I SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING

NOFORN

---

## Page 40

TOP SECRET

SPEGIAL HANDLICS REQUIRED;

NOT ATLE GAP: ® TO FOREIGN

ATONAL S

• 8 August 1962

Decision on:

JCS 1969/392

(NORTHWOODS) (S)

SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWED

BY JCS CN -

CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED,

At their meeting on 8 August 1962 the Joint. Chiefs of

Staff approved the recommendations of the DOD/JCS Representative

for Operation Mongoose as set forth in paragraph 7 of the

subject paper, as amended in the Appendix to Enclosure A by:

Substitution, In the heading of paragraph 2 on

page. 5, of the word "Requirements" for the word "Cost".

b. Insertion, in subparagraph 2 a on page 5, of the

worde "key strategic areas in" after the words "seize

control of"

c. Substitution, in the first sentence of

subparagraph 3 e on page 6, of the words "were originally"

for the word "are" as well as the addition of the words

"prior to D-day" at the end of that sentence. Additionally,

deletion of the last sentence of that subparagraph.

d. Changing the end of the first sentence of

paragraph 4 on page 6 so as to read:- "

....achieving

control of key strategic areas of Cuba within 10-15 days.

Further, in the second sentence of the same paragraph,

the word "such" is substituted for the word "essential"

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED;

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

TOP SECRET

EXCLUDED FROM GD

Copy to: General Harris.

€.

-_01.

a copies each

of_

3 pages series

NW 47874 DocId: 32276301 Page 40

---

## Page 41

TOP SECRET

SPECIAL HANGING REQUIRED;

VUI MELEASABLE LO FOREIGN NATIONAL

August

(Dee on JOS 1969/392 - Conta)

e. Changing subparagraph 4 b on page 7 by:

• (1) Deletion, In the first sentence, of the

word "only".

(2) Insertion of a new second sentence to

read as follows:- "There may be a requirement for

amphibious lift for rapid redeployment and counter-

guerrilla activities until order has been restored."

(3) Substitution, in the present second

sentence, of the words "30 to 45" for the worde

"approximately' 20".

I. Insertion, at the beginning of the first sentence

of subparagraph 4 c on page 7 of the words "It is estimated

that the".

§- Deletion, in subparagraph 4 d on page 7, of all

after the words "would de fully committed".

h. Deletion, in the second sentence of subparagraph 5 c

on page 8, of all after the words "targets in Florida".

1. Deletion, in tie last sentence of subparagraph 5 d

on page 8, of all after the words "constantly increasing

capab1l1ties"

TOP SECRET

- 2 -

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED;

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

NW 47874 DocId: 32276301 Page 41

---

## Page 42

TOP SECRET

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED;

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

8 August 1962

(Dec on JOS 1969/392 - Conta)

I. Changing the end of the first sentence of

subparagraph 6 c on page 9 so as to read:- "

....will

consist of substantial Army follow-on forces with

such other sea and air support as may be reguired."

mongeldo

M.

• INGELID

Colonel, USAF

Secretary

Copy

to:

General Harris

TOP SECRET

- 3 SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED;

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONAL

NO 47874 DocId: 32276301 Page 42

---

## Page 43

TOP SECREI-NOFORN

SPECIAL HANDLING

TAUGGY:

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHI YGTON 25. D. C.

BY iGS'OM

SYSTEMATICALLY REVISILUALX

CUASAICATIOR

CONTINUEDE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject:. JCS 1969/3.2 - The Consequences of US Military

Intervention in Cuba (TS)

1. I have reviewed the subject paper and recommend the

following changes be made in order to amplify selected -

paragraphs therein as requested by Mr. Gilpatric on

6 August 1962:

a. page 7, paragraph 4 d - add new last sentence

as follows:

ione 'irn 'i" eni

"To replace the airberne troop drop capabillty

represented by 14 Air Reserve squadrons, 1t.w1ll be

necessary to degrade theater airlift capabilities

to the follöwing extent for approximately 15 days:

"(1) Loss of SE% Of PACAF tutal airlift and

15% of USAFE alrlift; or

"(2) LOSS Of ICO% Of USATE airlift and 50% of

PACAF airlift; or

"(3) LOS3 Of 7C% OI PACAP airlift and 50%

of USAFE airlift.

b. Page 15, paragraph 4 - change to read as follows:

"4. Effect on World-Wide Ability to React - The

strength of the Cuban opposition and the resultant

length of the operation will determine the total effeçt

upon the Us capability to react elsewhere.

when the

assault forces have keen committed to the cuban operation,

the strategic Army Forces In CONUS would be short the

supporting forces such as engineer, medical, military

police, signal and helicopter units for the remaining

f'ive divisions.

Presuming achievement of.

recognized,

nowever, that certain combat and support

elenents will have to be retained in Cuba for counter-

guerrilla and military government operations*. and

shab-eBganeer,-medleaty mttibary-pehiee,-atgnat-and

esvet-affafps-unita-wit}-be-requtred-to-suppert-theae

and-mtztbary geverameat-eperatteng, These support

TOP SECRET-NOFORN

EXCLUDED FROM GDS

SPECIAL HANDLING

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC

REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10

DOES NOT APPLY.

WW 17874 DocId:32276301 Page 43

---

## Page 44

TOP SECRET-I

•Ohir

SPECIAL HANDLING

c. Page 15, paragraph 4, last line - add new sentence

as follows:

"committed to a Cuban operation. To replace the

airborne troop drop cipability represented by 14

A1r Reserve squadrons:

1t will be necessary to degrade

theater airlift capab: lities to the following extent

for approximately. 15 rays:

"a.

Loss of 93% of PACAR total airlift and

15% of USAFE airlift; or

"b. Loss

of 100, of USAFE airlift and 50% of PACAF

airlift; or

"c. Loss

of

"70% Of PACAF a1rlift and 50% of

USAFE airlift.

The readiness posture of SAC,

HERBERT D. RILEY

Vice Admiral, USN

Director

TOP SECRET-NOFORN

SPECIAL HANDLING

2

NH 47871 Doeld: 32276301

Page 44

---

## Page 45

TOP. SECKET

BY JCS ON

SYSTEMATICALLY

7 August 1962

CONT

Tentative Decision on:

JCS 1969/392

_SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED;

(NORTHWOODS) NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIED

AVA!

on 7 August 1962 the doint Chiefs of Staff tentatively

approved the recommendation: of the DOD/JCS Representative,

Operation Mongoose, as set l'orth in paragraph 7 of the subject

paper itself amended in the Appendia to Enclosure A by:

2. substitution, in the first sentence of

subparagraph 3 a, of the words "in lieu of" for the

words "to obviate the necessity for".

2. The addition, to the end of the first sentence

of subparagraph 3 c, of the words, ", however, CINCLANT

and Headquarters USAF have been requested to prepare

alternative plans not involving any mobilization.".

Further, in the second sentence of subparagraph 3 c,

the word "other" is substituted for the word "additional"

C. The insertion, as a new firgt sentence to

subparagraph 4 a, of the following:- "When the assault

forces have been committed to the Cuban operation the

strategie Army forces in the CONUS would be short the

supporting forces for the remaining five divisions."

d. The insertion, in subparagraph 4 d, of the

word "CONUS" before the words "MATS airlift" and the

words

", If mobilized, would be" before the words

"about 30 per cent]D?. SECKEl

EXCLUDED FROM GOS

SPECIAL HANDUNG REQUI

NOT ROoPy 50: General Harria

1275

Copy-

0f_

_of_ I copies each

• pages series A

ND 47874 DocId: 32276301 Page 15

---

## Page 46

TOP. SECRET

SPECIAL WANDLING RECUTIED;

NOT RELFASABI E TO FOREIGN NATIONAL

e. The substitut..on, in subparagraph 6 b of

the word "may" for thr word "will" in the first

sentence and the deletion of all of the last two

sentences.

The Marine Corps requested « "hold" on implementation and

Indicated that 1t would phore-vote either (a) its final approval,

or (b) 1ts desire to add to the Enclosure a paragraph delineating

the Commandant, Marine Corps' reservations concerning the draft

memorandum contained in the Appendix to Enclosure A (in this

event, these reservations will be submitted in writing by

the Marine Corps). It was elso agreed that the Joint Staff

should dispatch an approprite message implementing the action

called for by the revision lo the first sentence of subparagraph 3 c

of the Appendix to Enclosure: A. (NOTE: Subject message was

subsequently dispatched as CS 5602) •

Should the Marine Cory's confirm that 1t desires to

include the Commandant's reservations as cited above, please

reschedule this item as Agerda Item 1 for the wednesday,

8 August meeting.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED

NOT DEITICADIE TRENDEI

X Sigelido

MCA. INGÉLIDO

colone, USAF

Secretary

Copy to:

General Harris

TOS: SECRET

NH 17871 DocId: 32276301 Page 46

---

## Page 47

IUN

SECKE

SPECIAL MANULIU

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHIN STON 25, D.C.

NUFUNN

Pº1919/389

SYSTEMATICALLY REVELI

BY LOS ON

CLASSFICATION CONTINUED

JCSM-564-62

27. July 1962

MEMORANDUM-FOR THE SECRECARY OF DEFENSE

Subject:

United States Contingency Plan No. 2,.

Cuba (S)

As requested in me norandum for representatives of

State, Defense, CIA and ISIA from Chief of Operations,

Operation Mongoose, subject: "Spontaneous Revolts in

Cuba, Contingency Planning",

, dated 14 June 1962, the

attached plan is forwardid for your approval, prior to

delivery to the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose.

2. It will be noted tat the alternative methods of

military intervention dealt with in this plan take

three

principal forms. These are, in descending order of

magnitude:

a. A deliberate, orderly, large-scale operation

capable of confrontin; the Castro regime with the

prospect of over-powering force.

b. An

accelerated initial reaction by lesser

airborne and amphibios forces building up as

feasible to the scale of the primary plan.

method entails greater risk, longer time to establish

fully effective control and the probability of greater

casualties on both siles.

c. An immediate and continuing air attack on Castro

military forces and facilities to support and assist

the revolting forces and to pave the way for subsequent

3. The above described alternative methods conform

essentially to current CINCLANT plans

for contingency

operations in Cuba.

EXCLUDED. FROM GDS..

EXCLUDED

PROM AUTOMATIC.

REGRADING: DOD DIR 5200.10

DOES NOT APPLY

TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN

NW 47874 DocId:32276301 Page 47

---

## Page 48

TOP SECRET SPECIAL MANDLIG NOFORN

4. This plan was coorlinated with the Department of

State during preparation in order to be consistent with

and complementary to the alternate plan prepared by State

which addresses the contingency of an internal Cuban

revolt but is limited to US actions less than military

Intervention.

5. Operations outlinel within this plan for the

Department of State, Censral

. Intelligence Agency and

US Information Agency were prepared by each agency

concerned.

Por the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

R.L. Berm

L. I: LEMNITZER

Chairman

Enclosure:

Plan

TOP SECRET SPECIAL MANDLING NOFORN

NT 47874

DocId: 32276301 Page 48

---

## Page 49

TOP SECRET

SPECIAL MANILING

NOT REL ASABLE If July 1962

TED,

TRONAL!"

Copy to:

General Harris

TOP SECRET

MW 47874 DocId: 32276301

Page 49

Decision on:

JCS 1969/389

(NORTHWOODS) (S)

S/STEMATICALLY REVIE NEU

BY JCS ON

CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED

At their meeting on 27 July 1962 the Joint Chiefs of

Staff approved the recommenlations of the DOD/JCS Represent-

ative to the Caribbean Survey Group as set forth in paragraph 9

of the subject paper as amended by:

a. The deletion, from the beginning of the

last sentence of subpragraph 3 b (3) (a) of the

Appendix to Enclosure A, of the words "when relieved

by Army units"

b. Substitution, in subparagraphs 4 b and 4 d

of the Appendix to En :losure A, of the word "CINCLANT"

for the words "the designated unified commander"

S. GSAFM 229-62 itself amended by the withdrawal

of paragraph i b.

d. A Marine Corp: Flimsy, this subject, dated

27 July 1962 itself anended by revision of the proposed

paragraph 2 c, containid in paragraph 2, so as to read:-

"c. An immediate and continuing air attack on.

Castro military force:: and facilities to support and

assist the revolting orces and to pave the way for

subsequent operations."

EXCLUDED FRO: A GDS

My angelido

INGELIDO

Colonel, USAF

Secretary of a i bach

of_ pages sories

A.

---

## Page 50

CEGRET

27 July 1962

Decision on:

JCS 1969/389

(NORTHWOODS) (S)

At their meeting on !:? July 1962 the Joint Chiefs

of Staff approved the recormendations of BGEN Harris as

set forth in paragraph 9 ol' the subject paper as amended

by:

a. A change to subparagraph 3 b (3) (a) of

the Appendix to Enclosure A.

b. Changes to subparagraphs 4 b and 4 d of the

Appendix to Enclosure: A.

C. CSAFM 229-62 Itself amended by the withdrawal

of paragraph 1 b.

d. A Marine Corps Flimsy, this subject, dated

27 July 1962 itself imended in paragraph 2 by changes

to the proposed paragraph 2c.

BY ICS ON

BY TENANCAL . : 87

CLASSIECANOO CONTINUED

mg Engelds

INGELID

Colonel, USAF

Secretary

Copy to:

EXCLUDED FROM GDS

General Harris

SCRET

NW 47874 DocId: 32276301 Page 50

---

## Page 51

THE JOINT STAFF

THE JOINT SHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHlIGTON 25, D.C.

SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEVA

• BY JGS CN

CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED

ile: 1464/389

TOP SECRET-NOFORN

SPECIAL HANDLING

Tabled

DISH 909-62

24 July 1962

Wed 257h

REXORANDP POR THE JOINT CHINFS OF STATT

Subject: US Contingency Plan No. L, Cuba (S)

1. I have reviewed susject papar (JCS 1969/389) and.

racomend that tno follo:ina changes be made in order

to take full corsirence f

the possible

(20 days.

%. Poga la, parugraph 3a(3), obange to road as 101108s

"(3) US NILtaNT A action

(8) Nich no prior warning: result in u1a1ma

Us and Cuban casuaities, thered requirement • •

dolete soninder of paragraph through felf-weathes (dre

(D). A reonise rent to reduce Rignificantiz the

DAg-asa3ult posiod would necessitate Incremental commitment

of US forces as thay could le assembled and employad. Tia

Elme PaTHird to Es19 Ossential US m1l1tar control say bo

appreciably astended. Emever, reduation of US nilitart re

action tia ray be of ovarsiding importance. In such cass,

on airhorna assauli could be initiated in five (5) dare

Polloned by alI-Janded into as toon as airflelds are

EXCLUDED FROM GDS

TOP SECRET-NOFORN

SPECIAL HANDLING

EXCLUDEL

CA AUTOMATIC

REGRADING: DOD DIR 5200.10

DOES NOT APPLY

NH 47874 DocId: 32276301 Page 51

---

## Page 52

TOP SECRET-NOFORN

SPECIAL HANDLING

securad. Navy Marine an phibious forcas sould be committed

within eight (8) days, follow on forces would be comnitted

as they bacome available: Incremental cormitment of forres

Ingreased the risk of heavier casualtios on both sides.

c) The Cubar altuation could demand nore Immediate

reaction than employment of airborne/anuhiblous forcos can

provide, possibly to farestall drastic reprisal actions by

tho Commnist Cuban doverment. US military plans. u11}

provide for. & rapid comitment of alr povor, naval zunfire

and 1n1t1st1oe of a blor kade prior to the asshares /ennhibions

assault.

3. To be consistent + 1th changes recommended above, page

14, paragraph 3b(3) should be changed in the first to

sentences as follows.

"(3) In concept, Initial military operationa commence

"1th a ser-and-ade blockade;?

On Aday A-parted-of

concen

trated air strikes and coordinated Naval gunfire to viad

effect destruction of eremy air power and to neutralize

neutratiention and destroy destruesten as nuch as possible

of the enemy tank, arnor, artillery, and anti-alr capability.

ICHBERT D. RILSY

Vico Aduiral, ESt

Director

TOP SECRET-NOFORN

SPECIAL HANDLING

NW 47874 DocId: 32276301

Page 52

---

## Page 53

SECRET

25 July 1962

NOTE TO CONTROL DIVISION:

Subject:

JCS 1969/342 - NORTHWOODS (S)

At their meeting on i5 July 1962 the Joint Chiefs

of Staff considered the suk ject paper along with

CSAFM. 226-62, DJSM-909-62 End a Marine Corps Flimsy, this

subject, dated 25 July, all of which were tabled at this

meeting, and agreed to defer this item. It was also agreed

to refer the subject paper and all purples to General Harris

for revision in the light of the discussion held at the meeting.

Further, It was agreed to tave this revision circulated with

a view towerd obtaining approval from each of the Joint

Chiefs on an individual

basis; should such approval not be

obtained, this item will be rescheduled on the Friday, 27 July

agenda.

SYSTEMATICALLY REVIE OM

ĐY 100 ON ----

GLASSIRCATION CONTINUED"

gongines

Colonel, USAF

Secretary

Copy to:

General Harris

ill

EXCLUDED FROM GDS

1304

NH 47874

DocId: 32276301

Page

53

---

## Page 54

TO.

TOP SECRET

JCS 1969/389

30 July 1962

• COPY NO. -

SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

DECISION ON JC: 1969/389

A Note by the lecretaries

on

NORTHWOOL'S (S)

Note by the Secretaries

1. At their meeting on 27 Jul: 1962, the Joint Chiefs of

Staff approved the recommendatiors in paragraph 9 of JCS

1969/389, subject to the followig amendmente:

a. A change to subparagrapt 3 b (3). (a) of the Appendix

to. Enclosure A.

b. Changes to subparagraphs 4b and 4 d of the Appendix

to Enclosure A.

c: CSAFM 229-62 1tself amerded by the withdrawal of

paragraph 1 b.

d. A Marine Corps Flimsy, this subject, dated 27 July

1962, itself amended in paragraph 2 by changes to the

proposed paragraph 2 c.

2. In that the Commandant had expressed direct concern of

the Marine Corps in this matter,

the provisions of Title 10,

US Code 141 (c), applied and were followed.

3. This decision now becomes a part of and shall be attached

as the top sheet of JCS 1969/389.

SYSTSMATICALLY RAVI

BY WITH :

Mac, F

9./602C0129

24001-E0

EXCLUDED FROM GDS

M. J. INGELIDO

R. C. FORBES

Joint Secretar

EXCLUDED TRO

Htr

47874

DocId: 32276301

Page 54

---

## Page 55

DIS

copy

NON SEN

COPY NO.

SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION

TOP SECRET

ICS 1969/389

23 July 1962

Page 2324

NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

to

the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

NORTHWC ODS (S)

A report* on the above subject is submitted for consider-

ation by the Joint Chiefs

of

Staff.

M. J. INGELIDO

R. C. FORBES

Joint Secretariat

EXCLUDED FROM GDS

* Not reproduced; on file in Jint Secretariat

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC

REGRADING; DOD DIRECTIVE

5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

TOP SECRET

JCS 1969/389

2: 24

NW 47874

DocId: 32276301

Page

55

---

## Page 56

TOP SECRET

SPECIAL HANDLIN® NOFORN

COFY

_OF COPIES

SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION

REPORT BY THE DEPARTVINT OF DEFENSE AND

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF REPRESENTATIVE ON THE

CARIBBEAN SURVEY GROUP

to tre

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

US CONTINGENCY PLAN NO. 2, CUBA (S)

EXCLUDEL FROM GDS

I XCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING:

IOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

I ors Do P.. SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN

---

## Page 57

TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLIN^

NOFORN

US: CONTINGENCY. PLAN NO. 2, CUBA (S)

THE PFOBLEM

1. As requested*

by the Chief of Operations, Operation

MONGOOSE, to develop an interagency contingency plan for US

military intervention in. Cuba.

ASSUMPTIONS

2. It is possible that a spontaneous uprising. could occur

In Cuba. A resistance movement against the Communist Cuban

government could develop a sitiation that the United States

may desire to exploit.

3. The United States will pursue the overthrow of the

Communist Cuban government.

FACTS BEARING (N THE PROBLEM

4. The Department of Defense /Joint Chiefs of Staff

representative to the Caribbear Survey Group is responsible*

for

the preparation of a contir gency plan for US actions

which Include milltary intervertion, In a situation of open,

wide-spread revolt in Cuba.

5. Normal readiness of forces will permit execution of

CINCLANT Operations Plan No. 3:4-61**

at any time subsequent

to eighteen (18) days after the decision to implement the

plan.

6. For additional facts bearing on the problem see

Enclosure

B.

DISCUE SION •

7. For discussion see Enclo: ure C.

CONCLI SIONS

8. The plan attached at Enc: osure A provides suitable

response to the requirement for

a contingency plan.

* Memo for representatives of State, Defense, CIA, USIA, from

"Spor taneous Revolts in Cuba,

B/ Lansdale, subjec'" dater. 14. June 1962; on file in Gen

Contingency Planning,

Harris' office.

** CINCLANT Contingency Operat: ons Plan No. 314-61 (cuba) (s),

dated 22 July 1961, as amenied; on file

in Joint Secretariat.

TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING

NY 47074 DocId: 32276301

NOFORN

---

## Page 58

TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLIN^ NOFORN

RECOMME! IDATIONS

9. It is recommended that

a. The contingency plait at Enclosure A hereto be approved

and forwarded to Chief of Operations, Operation MONGOOSE,

through the Secretary of Jefense.

b. A copy of this pape: be forwarded to CINCLANT and

CINCSTRIKE.

c. This

paper NOT be forwarded to US officers assigned

to NATO activities. .

d. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US

Delegation, United Nation: Military Staff Committee.

TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN

---

## Page 59

TOP SECRET SPECIAL MANDLIN® NOFORN

DRAFT

ENCLOSURE A

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: United States Contingency Plan No. 2, Cuba (S)

1. As requested in memorandum for representatives of

State, Defense, CIA and USIA from Chief of Operations,

Operation Mongoose, subject: "Spontaneous

Revolts in Cuba,

Contingercy Planning,"' dated 14 June 1962, the attached

plan is forwarded for your approval, prior to

delivery to

the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose.

2. It will be noted that the alternative methods of.

military Intervention dealt with in this plan take three

principal forms. These are, in descending order of magnitude:

a. A deliberate, orderly, large-scale operation capable

of confronting the Castro regime with the prospect of

over-powering force.

b. An accelerated initial reaction by lesser alrborne

and amphibious forces building up as feasible to the scale.

of the primary plan. This method entails greater risk,

longer

time

to establish fully effective. control, and the

probability of greater casualties on both sides.

c. An Immediate and continuing air attack on Castro

military forces and facilities to support and assist the

revolting forces and to pave the way for subsequent opera-

tions.

3. The above described alternative methods conform essen-

tially to current CINCLANT plans for contingency operations

in Cuba.

4. This plan was coordinated with the Department of State

during preparation in order to be consistent with and

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING;

DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

Enclosure A

(Amended as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff -27 July 1962)

NH 47874

DOCId: 32276301

TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN

---

## Page 60

TOP SECRET SPECIAL MANDLINE NOFORN

complementary to the alternite plan prepared by State which

addresses the contingency of an internal Cuban revolt but is

limited to US actions less than military intervention.

5. Operations outlined within this plan for the Department

of State, Central Intelliger ce Agency and US Information

Agency were prepared by eack

agency concerned.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

L. L. LEMNITZER

Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Enclosure A

(Amended as directed by the Joft Chiefs of Staff - 27 July 1962)

I or DO TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING MOFORM

---

## Page 61

TOP SECRET

SPECIAL MANDLIN"

APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE A

UNITED STATES CONTINGENCY PLAN NO. 2, CUBA (S)

NOFORN

•Appendix to

Enclosure A

5

TOP SECRET

SPECIAL HANDLING

NH 47874

DocId: 32276301

NOFORN

---

## Page 62

TOP SECRET SPECIAL MANDLINE NOFORN

DRA ?T

5412 SPECIAL GRO JP (AUGMENTED)

WASHINGTON

15, Do

C.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Secretary of State

The Secretar, of Defense

The Director, Central Intelligence

The Director, US Information Agency

Subject: United State; Contingency Plan No. 2, Cuba (S)

1. The attached plan delineates. the course of action to be.

pursued by the United States n the event that US military

intervention is undertaken

In support of open, wide-spread

revolt in Cuba.

2. Subject plan 1s effectie for planning on receipt and

for the conduct of operations when directed.

3. This document requires: pecial handling and is not

releasable to foreign nationas.

FOR THE 5412 SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED) :

EDWARD G. LANSDALE

Brigadier General,

USAF

Chief of Operations,

Operation MONGOOSE

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING;

DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

6

TOP

NH 47074 Docid: 32276301

"SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORM

---

## Page 63

TOP SECRET SPECIAL MANDLIN. NOFORN

TITLI PAGE

I. The title of this document 1s:

UNITED STATES CONTI GENCY PLAN NO. 2, CUBA (S)

2. The title of this document is classified SECRET. The

plan may be referred to as the Caribbean Survey Group for,

CSG) Plan No: 2, which name 1s unclassified unless related to

Cuba.

3. This document contains information affecting the national

defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage

Laws (Section 793 and 795, title 18; U:S.C.). Its transmission

or revelation of the contents thereof in any manner to an

unauthorized person Is prohibited by law.

4. Reproduction of this doc ment in whole or in part without

permission of the Director of perations, Operation MONGOOSE

1s prohibited except as necessary for the preparation of

supporting plans. Distributio, will be restricted to

those

US government agencies specifically reguiring knowledge of .

the plan on a "Special Handlins - Not Releasable to Foreign

Nationals" basis.

XCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING:

HOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

7

NH 47874

DocId: 32276301

LOPE SECRET SPECIA: HANDLING

NOFORN

---

## Page 64

TOP SECRET

SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN

US CONTINGENCY PLAY NO. 2, CUBA (S)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Letter of Promulgation

Title Page

Table of Contents

Distribution List

Basic

Plan

Page 1

Page 2

Page

3

Page 4

Page

5.

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING:

1OD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

DocId:32276301

TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN

---

## Page 65

TOP SECRET

SPECIAL HANDLINE NOFORN

US CONEINGENCY FI/N NO. Z. CUBA. (S)

DISTRIBUL ION LIST

AGENCY

Department of State

Department of Dejense.

*Department of the Treasury

*Department of Justice :

*Department of Health, Education and Welfare

*Department of Agriculture

Centrai Intelligence Agency

US Intormation Agency.

*Federal Aviation Agency

*Bureau of. the Budget

COPY NUMBERS

*Distribution to asterisked agencies will not be made until

such time as their particiu: tion is required in planning or

Implementation ot the plan.

When distribution is made tio

these agencies, only those portions of the plan which pertair

to their participation viii be disserinated.

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING;

DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

IM i DO TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING MOFORN

---

## Page 66

TOP SECRET

SPECIAL. HANDLING: NOFORN

UNITED STATES CONTINGENC I PLAN NO. 2, CUBA (5)

Reference:

Memorandum for lepresentatives of State, Defense,

CIA and USIA, from Chief of Operations, Operation

MONGOOSE, subjest:

"Spontaneous Revolts In Cuba,.

Contingency Plaining", dated 14 June 1962.

Task Agencies:

Department of State

Department of I efense

Central Intelli zence Agency

US Information Agency

1. Situation.

a. The purpose of this plan is to define the courses of

action to be pursued by affested agencies of the US

Government in the event that a decision is made that

the United States undertake nilitary intervention in

Cuba.

b. The assumed situation in Cuba is open, wide-

spread revolt. This contingency may be a non-US

initiated situation, similar to that rumored as being

activated for mid-June 1962.

US actions to exploit

the situation include the use of US military force.

c. It is assumed that this plan would be implemented

under the following conditins, and would be considered

for implementation under situations less severe. • An

internal revolt has created a chaotic situation in

Cuba where:

(1) The revolution is open and threatens

the. Communist regime;

I XCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING:

JOD IER 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

101

DocId: 32276301

TOT SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING

NOFORN

---

## Page 67

TOP SECRET

SPECIAL MANDLING NOFORN

(2) Areas ara taken and held by the revolutionaries,

and;

(3) Leadership of the revolt, unable to overthrow y

the government or sustain the revolution indefinitely,

requests

assistance from

the United States and/or the

Organization of American States (ONS).

d. The United States may, or may not, be able to determine

that

a rebellion is imminent tefore actual outbreak.

However, it is unlikely that the assumed situation will

occur all at

once and without notice.

More. probably it will

evolve from

a localized revolt which will provide some

advance notice and the opportunity to initiate necessary

diplomatic, propaganda, covert and military preparations.

• e. The strength, morale, disposition and equipage of

unfriendly forces will be assuned to be as described in

current estimates of the Unite! States Intelligence Board

(USIB).

2. Mission.

The United States will support and sustain the rebellion

in Cuba through all its resourses including the use of US

military force to assure replazement of the Communist regime

with a new Cuban government acceptable to the United States.

3. Execution.

a. Concept of Operations..

(1) When the likellhood ir emergence of a Cuban

revolt becomes apparent to the US intelligence community

it will be immediately brought to the attention of the

5412 Special Group (Augmented) through the Office of

the Chief of Operations, Operation MONGOOSE. Evaluation

of the situation by the Spectel Group will determine whether

1.1

NH 47874

TOP SECRET

DooId: 32276301

Page 67

SPECIAL MANDLING NOFORN

---

## Page 68

TOP SECRET SPECIAL MANDLIN® NOFORN

or not the President's cecision should be sought to

implenent this plan.

(2) The initial stages of a spontaneous revolt. will

be supported by the United States through propaganda,

covert operations and other actions as necessary, but

maintaining the appeararce of non-US involvement should

the revolt fail.. In the event that the revolt spreads

as a popular movement afainst the Communist regime, the

United States should be capable of rapid military action

.to forestall a concerte and drastic reprisal program in

the interest of humanity and the mission of this plan.

(3) US Military Reaction.

(a) With no prios warning and with eighteen (18)

days of preparation & coordinated airborne-amphibious

assault could be executed which, it is anticipated,

would gain control of key military installations and

the principal centers of population of Cuba within

ten (10) days and result in minimum US and Cuban

casualties.

(b) A requirement to reduce significantly the pre-

assault period would necessitate incremental commit-

ment of US forces as they could be assembled and em-

ployed. Under this circumstance the time required to

gain essential US military control of Cuba could be

appreciably extended. However, reduction of US mil1-

tary reaction time may be of overriding importance.

In such case, air ani naval forces could attack in

support

of the rebel Cubans with little delay from

the time = decision is made. An alr

assault

could be initisted within eight (8) hours,

an

airborne assault coujs be initiated within five

(5) days and a Navy/l arine amphibious force

could be committed three (3) days later with

NN 47674

12

(Amended as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff - 27 July 1962)

DocId: 32276301

DAD SECRET SPECIAL MAMOLING NOFORN

---

## Page 69

TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLIN^ NOFORN

a build up to the full-scale effort to follow.

(4) Execution of this plan will be in two (2) phases:

(a) Phase I. After Presidential decision, this

phase will be underteken by the Department of Defense

supported by other agencies of the government. It

will be initiated by

overt US military

assault on

Cuba under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

and will be terminated at

such time

as essential

military control is gained over the island. The

operation is to be conducted as rapidly as possible,

quichly to confront Cuban forces with sufficient

strength to be clearly beyond enemy capability to

resist and to reduce risk to US units initially

deployed, with a vier toward early capitulation of

Cuban military units and avoidance of needless loss

of life.

(b) Phase II. Flowing the establishment of

essential US military control of the island, this

phase will be primarily concerned with the restora-

tion

of law and order and the establishment of a new

Cuban government friendly to the US. US military

'efforts will be directed primarily to matters of civil

affairs and military government in accordance with

policy established by the Department of State. Mili-

tary operations essertial for the elimination of

small pockets of resistance and restoration of law

and order

throughout the island will continue. Major

US combat forces will be withdrawn as early as

security may permit. Operational responsibility of

the Department of Defense will cease at the time the

Department of state issumes responsibility for civil

administration of Cula.

13

TOP SECRET

DocId: 32276301

SPECIAL MANDLING NOFORN

---

## Page 70

TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLIN^ NOFORN

b. Department of. Defense Operations.

(1) When directed by higher authority, or as the

situation demands, the [apartment of Defense will

initiate preparatory actions

for US military inter-

vention

in Cuba. These

actions may include pre-

positioning forces and

equipment by execution of

current cover and decept on plans.

(2) Upon final decision

of the President, the Joint

Chiefs of Staff will dir ct execution of military

intervention plans for Cuba.

(3) In concept, initiil military operations commence

with

a blockade, concent ated air strikes and coordi-.

nated Naval gunfire to eifect destruction of enemy

air power and to neutralize and destroy as much as

possible of the enemy tark, armor, artillery, and

anti-air capability.

(a) In western Cuts airborne and amphibious

assaults will be condusted by a Joint Task Force

with the initial objective of seizing the city

of Havana and obtainin; control over the seat of

government. Army airborne units will secure the

major airfields in the area as well as major port

areas

required for follow-on forces and logistic

resupply. Navy/Marine amphibious forces will

secure a beachhead in he vicinity of Havana and

designated Army units will follow the Marines over

the beach. The Marine amphibious forces will be

prepared to

re-embark:or further operations as

directed.

(b) In eastern Cubi, Guantanato will

be re-

Inforced by air- and sta-lifted Marines for defense

14

(Amended as

directed by the Joint. Chiefs of Staff - 27 July 1962)

TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN

Docid: 32276301 • Page 70

---

## Page 71

TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLIN?

• NOFORN

of the base. Additional Navy/Marine amphibious

forces will be emploed in operations against Cuban

forces in the Santia,o de Cuba complex or in other

operations in easter Cuba as directed.

(4) Subsequent to thi: seizure of Havana and San-

tiago and the successfu defense of Guantanamo,

operations will be condicted to defeat remaining

pockets of resistance.

Additional amphibious. and

airborne operations may be required. The most likely

areas for such

operations are: Matanzas, Nuevitas,

Nicaro, Trinidad, Bahia de Cochinos, and the Isle of

Pines.

(5) At such time as issential US military control

is gained in Cuba, matters of civil affairs and mili-

tary goverrment will be given priority and undertaken

in accordance with poli‹ y established by the Department

of State. This include: provision for a provisional

military government preyared to assume full legislative,

executive, and judicial control until such functions

can be turned over to other authority on direction in

an expeditious and orderly manner. Remaining resistance

elements of the Communi: t Cuban government, armed forces

or other groups will be isolated, contained and destroyed

or captured

as rapidly is possible. US military combat

units will be scheduled for early return to the United

States consistent with : ecurity considerations.

C. Department of State (perations.

(1) Phase I. The Dejartment of State will seek to

place the United States

in as broad a multilateral

context as possible.

•(a) Immediately : ound out latin American.

Governments to deterr ine whether the United States

can count upon a 2/3 majority decision authorizing

the use of military forces under Article 6 of

the Rio Treaty.

NH

₫7874

15

(Amended as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff - 27 July 1962)

TOP SECRET SPECIAL MANDLING

NOFORN

DocId: 32276301

Page

71

---

## Page 72

TOP SECRET SPECIAL MANDLIN^ NOFORN

(b) IS 2/3 majority ís available, request the

Council of the Organization of American States to

convoke immediately a neeting of foreign ministers

under Article 6 of the Rio Treaty. and obtain Organi-

zation of American States (OAS) decision authorizing

use of

force:

(c) Seek agreement from at least two Latin

American nations (preferebly not Nicaragua or Guate-

mala) to provide token forces to join United States

forces:

(d) If 2/3 majoriti cannot be mustered, recognize

the anti-Castro forces as the Government of Cuba and,

in response to

Its appal for help, come to its

assistance with United States military forces and

whatever foreign token forces have

been made available.

(e) Keep key membe's of Congress informed of

significant developmen :s.

(f) Inform all fri ndly governments of our actions

and the reasons therefor; obtain public expressions

of their

support and o their sympathy for the anti-

castro forces. Warn them to expect communist directea

violence and offer ther assistance.

(g) Notify the OAS and the United Nations

(as

appropriate of our ac ions

and be prepared to defend

them in these international bodies.

(h) Engage in all-rut psychological warfare and

propaganda

stressing tle morality of United States

action designed to

ass: st the Cuban people throw off

the bonds of communist enslarstent.

(2) Fhase II - (not Mizesia:

(a) Provide imcod:

deargade, economic and

other assistance to i.

rampulace.

10

TOP SECRET SPECIAL MANDLING

DocId:32276301 Page 72

NOFORN

---

## Page 73

TOP SECRET SPECIAL MANDLIN^ - NOFORM

(b) Turn over as rapidly as possible to the Cuban

Government for admin stration of

the

territory taken

by United States trops and assist that government

to the

extent feasibe as it requests.

(c) Make prepara ions to provide the Cuban Govern-

ment with long range economic assistance.

(d) Take measure: to assist the Cuban Government

to control entry Intri and exit from Cuba.

(e) Re-establish the United States country

team

in Havana.

d. Central Intelligence Agency Operations.

• (1) CIA operations a ainst Cuba are controlled by a

component of CIA Headquirters, Washington. Operational

elements are located in the vicinity of Miami, Florida,

with sub elements at otier Florida locations.

(2) In the event of ocalized revolt, CIA will give

covert support to the r volt through introduction of

communications, arms, equipment and trained personnel as

appropriate and feasibl

(3) When US Military intervention is directed and

contingency plans are i plemented, CIA will fully support

the military actions

in accordance with the JCS/CIA

Command Relationship Ag'eement, whether it is implemented

or not.

(4), Liaison and comminications will be established

prior to implementation of CINCLANT and subordinate plans.

(5) CIA w1ll support military operations by clandes-

tine'intelligence, coun er Intelligence, propaganda,

political and paramilitry operations.

(6) After the Initia. assault and during the subse-

quent consolidation and occupation phase, CIA will

designate selected pers innel from CIA Headquarters and/

or CIA operations base, Florida, to proceed to Cuba and

conduct clandestine operations in support of US forces

and objectives. Ultima sely, the bulk of CIA Florida

based personnel will be transferred to Cuba to

establish

a permanent CIA station and bases.

17

TOP SECRET

SPECIAL MANDLING

NOFORN

DocId: 32276301

Page 73

---

## Page 74

TOP SECRET SPECIAL MANDLIN^ NOFORM

e. United States Information Agency Operations.

(1) The Agency will provide complete, but strictly

factual and impartial informational coverage to a spon-

taneous revolt in 1ts initial phase. The purpose of

such coverage will be to seep the people of Cuba, and

of the hemisphere, fully informed of developments, and

to set the stage for possible subsequent courses of

action. Extreme caution vill be taken to avoid the .

appearance of US involvemet during this phase so as to

nullify possible later chirges of US intervention (by

Cuba or other Latin Ameri :an governments) should the

revolt fail. In this con ext, the Agency during this

phase must carefully refr in from a type or tone of

coverage that might be costrued as incitement to riot.

(2) In the event of di ect US involvement, the Agency

will:

•(a) Assign informa :lonal specialists to work with

Defense Psywar units diring combat operations.

(b) Staff up a reg ilar USIS unit to move into

Havana with the Departient of State contingent at

the time and place to e decided on by the Department.

(c) Prepare for imiediate shipment all physical

equipment and resource: necessary to support a USIS

operation in Cuba.

(3) Basic consideratio is in Agency informational

support of direct US mili ary action:

(a) Medium wave'

rallo should receive priority

attention

for any over: combat operation in Cuba:

Immediately upon secur ng any beachhead

or other

enclave on the islaid, and perhaps immediately-prior

to or concurrent w. 'n iuch action, massive medium wave

broadcasting shouls bein. A

beefed-up Guantanamo

18

NH 47874

TOP SECRET SPECIAL MANDLING NOFORN

DocId: 32276301 Page 74

---

## Page 75

TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLIN NOFORN

transmitter, leased U.3. Florida facilities, floating

transmitters and, as

soon as possible, captured Cuban

station(s) should be assigned to this task. Short

wave facilities will also be increased to provide

necessary backup.

(b). The messages of this initial phase should be

simple and direct,

reassuring the people of their

personal safety and the protection of their individual

rights, instructions o1 the maintenance of pablic

order, the distributio1 of food and medical attention,

all done hopefully in 1 Cuban context and with only.

the minimum of referene to US military forces and

power necessary to mailtain order and to assuré

credibility of the ineritability of

Castro's rapid

and complete defeat.

(c) Care

must be ecercised, particularly with the

anti-Castro Cubans, to aoid alienating possible sup-

port by immediate talk of vengeance, or of indications

of possible loss of.

an/ gains (housing, land, social

benefits) which might lave

accrued

to the peasant and

worker groups during

the Castro regime.

(d) Given the rela ively high rate of literacy

in. Cuba, wall

posters ind leaflets reiterating the

themes of the broadcas:s should also be available

and utilized as soon a; practical, the leaflets by

air drop ahead of miliary action where deemed.

advisable.

(e) Any provisiona. military government must also

have a news bulletin fir factual news summaries and

instructions to tre civilian population.

(f) Tri all psychoi gical planning, special atten-

tion shoirld be givin t› avoiding in so far as possible

19

N# 47874

TOP SECRET

DocId:32276301

Page 75

SPECIAL HANDLING

NOFORN

---

## Page 76

TOP SECRET SPECIAL MANDLIN?

NOFORN

any indications of plans to return to the status que

ante, all informatior. output should be designed to

reassure the populace that the US supported movement

is designed to carry forward the realization of the

social and économic aspirations of the Cuban people.

f. Department of the Treasury

Department of Justice

Department of Health, Education and Nelfare

Department of Agriculture

Federal Aviation Ager Cy

Bureau of the Budget

Supporting functions will be undertaken to assist,

expedite and promote the efforts of Task Agencies:

a. As requested by Task Agencies, prior to

plan implementation, and

b. As requested by Chief. of Operations,

Operation Mongoose, when plan is implemented.

4. Coordinating Instructiors.

a. Implementation of this plan will be as directed by

the President:

b. Military operations, including clandestine and para-

military activities, will ke conducted by CINCLANT as.

directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The administration

of military government activities in Cuba will be conducted

by CINCLANT as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in

accordance with policy

established by the secretary of State.

c. Political, psychological and economic operations will

be accomplished in accordar ce with policy established by

the Secretary of State.

a. Supporting Plans are required from all Task Agencies:

Direct coordination betweer agencies should be effected for

planning purposes.

One cory of supporting plans is to be

provided Chief of Operatiors, Operation Mongoose, and

maintained in current statis.

20

(Amended as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff - 27 July 1962)

TOP SECRET SPECIAL MANDLING NOFORN

Docid: 32276301 Page 76

---

## Page 77

TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLIN^

• NOFORN

e .

During implementatior of the plan

the Chief of

Operations, Operation Mongcose, will act

as the coordinator

for the 5412 Special Group (Augmented) on inter-Agency

activities.

The coordinating office will be established

in the Pentagon, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

Room 2 B 913, telephone extension 59710.

21

•(Amended as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff - 27 July 1962)

DocId: 32276301

LOPSECRET SPECIAL MANDLING

NOFORN

---

## Page 78

TOP SECRET SPECIAL MANDLIN^ NOFORN

ENCLOSURI:

B

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff; on

22 May 1962 approved

CINCLANT Operational Plan 318-62* which provides cover for

• US preparations

for military intervention in Cuba.

2. Planning

for us milltary. Ir tervention in Cuba with

a reaction

time

reduced

to five (5) days is currently in

process but has

not been approvec by the Joint Chiefs of.

Staff.

*

3. CIA operations against Cuba are controlled by Commander:

Task Force "w" which is a component of CIA Headquarters in

washington. D.C. The primary operational element is the

CIA unit located in the vicinity. if Miami. with sub elements

at other Florida locations: CIA vill support the military

operation in the event US militar: action is taken against

Cuba.

4. Sub-paragraphs of the execu :ion paragraph of the basic

plan, outllning separate departme tal and agency participation,

were provided by the agency conce ned.

* CINCLANT Operations Plan No. 3:8-62: on file in Joint

Secretariat

• ** CINCLANT Operations Plan No 3:6-62: on file

in Joint

Secretariat

Enclosure B

22

TOP SECRET SPECIAL MANDLING

DocId: 32276301

NOFORN

---

## Page 79

TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLIN?

NOFORN

ENCLOSURE C

DISCUSSIJN

1. The approved military plan for US intervention in Cuba

can be executed in eighteen (13) days from a condition of

no warning. It is not anticipited that funds will be

expended nor units pre-positioned to reduce this reaction

time, unless, of course, such reparatory measures can be

clearly related to imminent military action.

Extensive troop

training at this time for a Cuan operation which may not be

executed within the next few years is of questionable value.

Similarly, prestockage of suppies, pre-positioning of forces

and activation of

ships from tie reserve fleet does not

appear justifled if such prepa ations have no likelihood of

being required in the

foreseea ile

future.

2. It is unlikely that a sp ntaneous uprising in Cuba could

develop and

sustain itself for an appreciable length of time

without active and

positive US military sppport.

It is

expected that the United State: would maintain an appearance

of non-involvement

prior. to an decision to intervene. It is

therefore important that US fo: ces be capable of more rapid

response than eighteen (18) da's, first, to sustain a revolt

and, second, to react adequate y to irrational acts or

reprisals by the Communist Cub: n government.

3. Although there are increi sed risks involved in commit-

ting US forces in incremental diployments such

risks may have

to be faced. The most rapid raction possible would be to

employ air power, which is cur: ently being planned by CINCLANT

as directed by the

Joint Chief: of Staff., This air plan coula

be the difference between succuss or failure of any popular

uprising in Cuba. The use of; ir power should be followed

as rapidly as possible by the : ir dropped/air-landed assault.

as planned in CINCLANT OPLAN 3: 6-62, with follow-on amphibious

forces introduced

as soon as fasible, and a build up. to the

full-scale effort of CINCIANI (PLAN 314-61.

23 •

TOP SECRET

DocId: 32276301 Page 79

SPECIAL MANDLING NOFORN

---

## Page 80

TOP SECRET

13 June 1962

Decision on:

JCS. 1969/366

(NORTHWOODS) (S)

SPECIAL MANDLING REQUIRED;

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

At their meeting on 13 June 1962 the Joint Chiefs of

Staff approved the recommeniations of the DOD/JCS Representative

.to the Caribbean

survey Groip as set forth in paragraph 9 of

the subject paper, as amended in the Appendix to Enclosure A

by :.

a. Substitution, In the

second sentence of

paragraph 2, of the wurds "urgency for" for the words

"complexity of" and dr letion of the words "and Increase

the risk of Soviet relallation elsewhere." from the end

of the sentence. Additionally, paragraph 2 18

redesignated as paragraph 3.

b: Deletion of paragraph 3.

C.. Deletion of tre word "However" from the beginning

of the first sentence of paragraph 4 and of the words

"In the face of increased risk of Soviet countermeasures

elsewhere." from the end of the sentence. Additionally,

all of the last sentence of paragraph 4 is deleted and

the paragraph is redesignated as paragraph 2.

BY JOS CN --

SYSTEMATICAL RET

GLASSIFICATION CONTINUED

hef onged.

Copy to:

Colonel,

USAF

EXCLUDED FROM GDS

Deputy Secretary

General Craig

SPEGIAL MANDING REOS. IN? SECRET

фору

of-

Lar enutes each

_pages

series d

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIO

NW 47874 DocId:32276301 - Page 80

---

## Page 81

SECRET

13 June 1962

Decision on:

JCS 1969/366

(NORTHWOODS) (S)

At their meeting on 13 June 1962. the Joint Chiefs

of Staff approved. the recomnendations of BOEN Craig as

set forth in paragraph 9 of

the subject paper, as amended

in the Appendix to Enclosure A by:

a. Changes to paragraph 2 and redesignation

as paragraph 3.

b. Deletion of paragraph 3.

c. Changes to paragraph 4 and redesignation

as paragraph 2.

Ongelido

INGELIDO

Deputy Secretary

Copy to:

EXCLUDED FROM. GDS

General Craig

NH 47874

DocId: 32276301

Page 81

---

## Page 82

TOP SECRET

JOS 1969/366

14 June 1962

NO SECRET

COPY. NO.

SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

DECISION ON JES 1969/366

A Note by the Secretaries

on

NORTHWOODS (S)

Note by the Secretaries

1. On 13 June 1962, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the

recommendations in paragraph 9 as amended in the Appendix to

Enclosure A by:

a. Change to paragraph 2 anc redesignation as paragraph 3.

b. Deletion of paragraph 3.

ç. Change to paragraph 4 'ani redesignation as paragraph 2.

2. In that the Commandant had expressed direct. concern of th

Marine Corps in this matter, the Irovisions of Title 10, US

Code 141 (c), applied and were

followed.

3. This decision now becomes

a part of and shall be attached

as the top sheet of JCS 1969/366.

1. J. BLOUIN

1.. J. INGELIDO

,oint Secretariat

KOR SUCKIN

NH 47874

DocId: 32276301

Page

---

## Page 83

TOP SECKET

TOP SECRET

ICS 1969/366

12 June 1962

Page 2257

COPY NO.

SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION

NOTE BY THE S: CRETARIES

to ti:e

JOINT CHIEFS OF

STAFF

on

NORTHWOOL'S (S)

À report* on the above sub, ect is submitted for consid-

eration by the Joint Chiefs of Saff.

F. J. BLOUIN

M. J. INGELIDO

Joint Secretariat

* Not reproduced; on file in Joint

Secretariat

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC

REGRADING; DOD DIRECTIVE

5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

EXCLUDED FROM GOS

TOP SECRET

JCS 1969/366

225'

NOR SECRET

NW 87874

DocId: 32276301

Page 83

---

## Page 84

TOP SECRET

SPECIAL HANDLIN"

NOFORN

12 JunE 1962

PECIAL DISTRIBURION

COPIES

REPORT BY THE DEPARTMEN'! OF DEFENSE AND

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF REP ESENTATIVE ON THE

CARIBBEAN SURVY GROUP

to the

JOINT CHIEFS IF STAFF

on

SOVIET BASE IN SUBA (S)

DICLUDED FROM GDS

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING

DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.10

DOES NOT APPLY

NH 4787₫

TOP SECRET

DocId: 32276301

Page 84

SPECIAL HANDLING

NOFORN

---

## Page 85

TOP SECRET SPECIAL MANDLIN®

NOFORN

SOVIET BASE IN (UBA (S)

PROBLEM

1. In response to a request* f: om Chief of Operations,

Operation Mongoose,

to determine in appropriate course of action

for the United

States

to take invent that the Soviets establish

a military base

in Cuba.

-.

FACTS BEARING ON 'HE PROBLEM

2. The problem stated above wa; initially posed by Mr. Robert

Kennedy at the meeting of the

Spe :lal Group (Augmented) on

22 March 1962.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, loting the Increased

complexities attending

the delay if US Intervention in Cuba,

have previously recommended** tha; a national policy of early

military intervention be adopted y the United States which

should be undertaken

as soon

as possible and preferably

before the release

of National Guird, and Reserve forces on

active duty.

4. US military intervention will be required to assure the

final and successful overthrow

of the Communist Cuban

government. ***

DISCUSSION

5. For discussion see Enclosure B.

CONCLUSIC NS

6. The United States cannot tolerate the permanent existence

of

a communist government in Cubi.

7. Military intervention by tle United

States will be required

to overthrow the Communist Cuban regime:

* Memorandum for the Special Goup (Augmented) from Brig. Gen.

Lansdale, subject:

Status

o. Requested Studies, Operation

Mongoose

, dated 8 June 1962. on file in Gen. Craig's office.

** JCS 1962/335

***

"Guidelines for. Operation Mo igoose", dated 14 March 1962,

on file in Gen. Craig's offi:e.

2

TOP SECRET

At 47874

DocId: 32276301

Page 85

SPECIAL MANDLING NOFORN

---

## Page 86

TOP SECRET SPECIAL MANDLIN®

NOFORN

8. The establishment of a Soviet Base in Cuba will increase

the complexity of US military action in Cuba and increase

the risk of Soviet countermeasures elsewhere.

RECOMMEND/ TIONS

9. It is recommended that:

a. The Memorandum at Enclosure A, with its Appendix

which reflects the above concisions, be forwarded to the

Secretary of Defense

for approal in order that the

Memorandum for the Special Grap

(Augmented) may be

tabled at the meeting scheduler for 14 June 1962.

D. This paper NOT be forwared to commanders of unified

or specified commands.

c. This paper NOT be forwarred to US officers assigned.

to NATO

activities.

d. This paper NOT

be forwars ed

to the Chairman, US

Delegation, United

Nations Mil: tary Staff Committee.

3

NG 47874

TOP SECRET

Docid: 32276301

SPECIAL HANDLING

NOFORN

---

## Page 87

TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLIN®

NOFORN

ENCLOSUR.: A

DRAFT

Subject:

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRET. IRY OF DEFENSE

Soviet Base in Cuia (S)

1. Reference is made to Memorandum for the Special Group

(Augmented) from Brig. Gen. Lansdile, subject: "Status of

Requested Studies, Operation Mong ose", dated 8 June. This

memorandum requested the opinion if all participating agencies

having membership in the Special iroup concerning the appropriate

course

of action

for the United Sates to take in the event

the Soviets establish a military

jase in Cuba.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff r commend approval of the

attached memorandum

as the positin of the Department of

Defense.

Es the Joint Chiefs

of Staff:

LEMNITZER

Chairman

Joint

Chiefs of Staff

EXCLUDED FRON. GDE

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING

DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.10

DOES NOT APPLY

Enclosure A

NH 47874

TOP SECRET

DocId: 32276301

SPECIAL MANDLING

NOFORN

---

## Page 88

TOP SECRET SPECIAL MANDLIN® NOFORN

APPENDIX TO EN 'LOSURE A

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

Subject:

Soviet Base in Cubi

(s)

1. In response to a Memorandum: or the Special Group (Augmented)

from Director. of Operations, Opera ion Mongoose, subject:. "Status

of Requested Studies, Operation Mongoose," dated & June 1962, the

Department of Defense has considerd the problem of an appropriate

course of action for the United Sti tes to take in event

that the

Soviets should establish a militari base

In Cuba.

• 2. In the

event that a Soviet bise is established on the island,

the choice

of Us counteraction is letween long term acceptance of

a communist state in the Caribbean with an Increasing military

threat to the United States from

the south, or US military inter-

vention. It is considered that the

latter course of action would

be the only solution compatible with the security interests of

the United States.

3. It is belleved that military intervention by United States

forces will be required to successiully overthrow the Communist

Cuban

regime. Establishment of

a loviet Base in Cuba would

increase the urgency for US militaly action in Cuba.

EXCLUDED FROM GDS

EXCIUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING

DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.10

DOE: NOT APPLY

Appendix to

Enclosure A

NH 47874

(Page revised as directed by the Ji'S, 13 June 1962)

TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING

DocId: 32276301

Page 88

NOFORN

---

## Page 89

TOP SECRET SPECIAL MANDLIN® NOFORM

ENCLOSURE B:

DISCUSSIJN

1. The United States cannot to erate permanent existence

of a communist government in the lestern Hemisphere. The present

regime in Cuba provides communism with

a base

of operations

for espionage, sabotage and subve: sion against Latin America.

The stability of some

governments in Latin America 1s already

threatened by the overt and cover; actions of the Cuban

government. Continued existence : f this communist government

Increases the probability that on or more other nations in

Latin America will become communit or communist dominated. This

will greatly increase the problem: currently facing the United

States and the Organization of Am rican States. While considered

• unllkely, It 1s possible for the lino-Soviet Bloc to establish

military bases in Cuba similar to US installations around

the bloc periphery.. Establishmen of such bases would increase

Us defense costs. as forces were di veloped or shifted to meet

the threat.*

3. Time favors the Cuban regim and the communist bloc.

They are provided with the opportinity to continue with

their subversion

efforts in Latin America. Increasing

internal security measures by pol: ce

state methods decrease

the possiblllty of Internal uprisings within Cuba.

The

steady improvement in military del enses strengthens the

resistance which must be overcome

the event of

US military

intervention and could lengthen the time required

to secure

control of the government and the island. The continuing

Indoctrination of the Cuban youth creates a growing nucleus

for a communist underground after the elimination of the present

government.. This

creates a problm

for the future

which 1s

steadily Increasing in magnitude.

JCS 1969/335

E: CLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING

DUD DIRECTIVE 5200.10

DUES NOT APPLY

TOP SECRET

SPECIAL MANDLINGEnIONOFORN

NS 47874. DOCId: 32276301 Page 89

---

## Page 90

TOP SECRET SPECIAL MANDLIN® NOFORN

3. There is nothing to prevent the Soviets

from eventually

establishing their own base in Cura.

US acceptance

of a

Soviet base, or bases, in Cuba misht avoid the risk of

Soviet

retaliation to US military action but such acceptance would

also generate a greater eventual isk to the United States

from the Improved Soviet general var posture.

2

Enclosure

NH 47874

TOP SECRET

DocId: 32276301

SPECIAL HANDLING

NOFORN

---

## Page 91

IUT

SEUKLI

COME WANING WOUN

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

• WASHIN ¡TON 25, D.C.

13 June 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Soviet Base In Cuba (S)

1. Reference is made to Memorandum for the Special Group

(Augmented) from Brigadier Gineral Lansdale, subject:

"Status

of Requested Studies, Operation Mongoose"

', dated & June. This

memorandum requested

the opizion of all participating agencies

having membership in the Spe:lal Group concerning the appropriate

course of action for the Uni:ed States to take in the event the

Soviets establish a military base in Cuba.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Stiff recommend approval of the

attached memorandum as the pisition of the Department of

Defense.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

L. L. Fern

I. I. LEMNITZER

sy is on any

BY JES ON ---.

CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED

EXCLUDED FROM GDS

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC

REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10

DOES NOT APPLY

TOP SECRET SPECINL HANDLING NOFORN

NH 47874

DocId:32276301

Page 91

---

## Page 92

TOP SECKET

SPECIAI. MANDLINS MOTORM

28 June d

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GFOUP (AUGMENTED)

Subject: Soviet Base 1r. Cuba (S)

1. In response to a memorandum for the Special Group

(Augmented) from

the Director of Operations, Operation

Mongoose, subject:

"Status cf Requested Studies, Operation

Mongoose", dated 8 June 1962, the Department of Defense has

considered the problem of an appropriate course of action

for the United

States to take in event that the Soviets

should take steps to establish a military base in Cuba.

2. In the event of such a contingeney, the choice of

US counteraction is between long term acceptance of a

communist state in the Caribbean

with

an Increasing military

threat to the United States from the South or US military

intervention. Our present view

1s that the latter course

of action would be the only solution compatible with the .

security Interests of the United States.

EXCLUDED FROM CDS

NH 47874

•INE SECRET SPECIA. HANDLING

NOFORN

---

## Page 93

TOP SECRET

JCS 1969/347

9 May 1962

TOP SCORN'T

COPY NO.

SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION

JOINT CHIE'S OF STAFF

DECISION ON ICS 1969/347

A Note by th: Secretaries

NORTHW ODS (S)

Note by the Secretaries

1. On 9 May 1962, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the

recommendations contained in JS 1969/347.

2. In that the Commandant hid expressed direct concern of

• the Marine Corps. In this matte', the provisions of Title 10,

US Code 141 (c), applied and wire followed.

3. This decision now become; a part of and shall be attached

as the top sheet of JCS 1969/3.17.

F. J. BLOUIN

M. J. INGELIDO

Joint Secretariat

0/2/9403

EXCLUDED. FROM GDS

tOP

SECREA

NH 47874

DecId: 32276301

Page 93 ..

---

## Page 94

TOP SECKIT

COPY NO. _

SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION

TOP SECRET

JCS 1969/347

2. May 1962

Page 2213

NOTE BY THI. SECRETARIES

to the

JOINT CHIIFS OF STAFF

. (n

NORTHW ODS. (S)

A report* on the above subject is submitted for consid-

eration by the Joint Chiefs o1 Staff.

F. J. BLOUIN

M. J. INGELIDO

Joint Secretariat

Not reproduced;

on file in Jint Secretariat

EXCLUDED FROM GUS

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC

REGRADING; DOD DIRECTIVE

5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY •

TOP SECRET

JCS

1969/347

2: 13

FOR SEGRIEN

NH

47874

DocId: 32276301

Page 94

---

## Page 95

TOP SECRET

SPECIAL MANDLIK?

NOFORN

2 May 1962

COPY NO. L

_OF 3 CCOPIES

SPECIAL DISTRIBUT ION

REPORT BY THE DEPARTACNT OF DEFENSE AND

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF FEPRESENTATIVE ON THE

CARIBBEAN SURVEY GROUP

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF

"STAFF

Or.

MAR IT INE SUPPORT. OPE RATION MONGOOSE (IS)

AH

47874

DocId: 3

GSGWG

CONTROL # C.127

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC

REGRADING: DOD DIR 5200.10

DOES NOT APPLY

EXCLUDED FROM GDS

1

SPECIAL WANDLING

NOFORN

---

## Page 96

TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLIN:

NOFORN

MARITIME SUPPORT, OPE CATION MONGOOSE (IS)

THE PRO 3LEM

I. To respond to a request y the Secretary of Defense for.

a report on ways of putting th: Soviet furnished Cuban high

speed boats out of action.

FACTS BEARING 0:1. THE PROBLEM

2. On 14. March 1962, the Se retary of Defense requested*

a report on ways of putting thi: Soviet furnished Cuban high.

speed boats out of action..

3. On 16 Narch 1962, the Chief of Naval Operations was

requested to submit a report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

on ways of putting Cuban PT boits out of action.

4. On 3 April 1962, the Joir t Chiefs of Staff informed the

Secretary of Defense that the lavy was studying means to put

the Cuban PT boats out of actin. and that report

would be submitted when the stidy was completed. ***

5. On 26 April 1962, the Chief of Naval Operations submitted

the requested report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. **** Copy

attached (Appendix to Enclosure).

CONCLUS ION

6. The Memorandum, Enclosure, for the Secretary of Defense,

together with its Appendix, is an appropriate response to the

request from the Secretary of lefense for possible ways of

putting the Soviet furnished Ciban high speed boats out of

action.

RECOMMENI AT IONS

7.. It is recommended that:

a. The Enclosure; together with its Appendix, which

reflects the above conclusic, be approved and forwarded

to the Secretary of Defense.

*Memorandum on file in General Craig's office.

**CN 610-62 dtd 16 Mar 1962

*** JCS 1969/325

****On file in General Craig's office.

NW 47874

.U/ SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING

NOFORN

---

## Page 97

TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLIN® NOFORM

Do This paper NOT be forwarded to commanders of unified

or specified conmands.

c. This paper NOT be foiwarded to Us officers assigned

to NATO activities.

d. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US

Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee.

3

NH 47874

TOP

DocId: 32276301

•SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING

NOFORN

---

## Page 98

TOP SECRET

SPECIAI. HANDLIN"

NOFORN

ENCLC SURE

DRA FT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

• Subject: Maritime Suppost, Operation Mongoose (TS)

1. In response to your question* of whether there is some

way of putting the Soviet furnished Cuban high speed boats

out of action, the enclosed me norandum from the Chief of Naval

Operations has been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and

is forwarded for your information.

2. The enclosed memorandum sets forth some possible covert/

clandestine ways and means of jutting the Cuban PT boats out

of action but states in substance that none can be covertly

executed in Cuba without undue risk of exposure until more

information is obtained on the degree of security protection

afforded the boats and a pattein of operations has been

established.

3. The Navy will continue t, watch closely the activities

of the Cuban PT's and will recommend appropriate means to

dispose of them when an opport inity is presented.

NW 47874

*Memorandur. on file in brig General Craig's office.

EXCLUDED FROM GD.S

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC

REGRADING: DOD DIR 5200.10

• DOES NOT APPLY

4

DocId: 32276301

TOR SECRET SPECIAL MANDLING

Enclosure

NOFORN

---

## Page 99

TOP SECRET

SPECIAL MANDLIN®

NOFORN

APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE

DEPARTMENT O, THE NAVY

OFFICE OF THE. CHIEF

IF NAVAL OPERATIONS

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

In reply refer to

OP605F/br

Ser 000374P60

April 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject:

References

Maritime Su port, Operation MONGOOSE (TS)

CM 610-62 of 16 Mar 1962

CNO memo

1. Reference a requested the Chief of Naval Operations to

provide specified Information on PT type craft, maritime

support needs, and ways of put -ing the Soviet furnished Cuban

high speed boats. out of action. Reference b provided certain

data on PT

craft and specified maritime support.

2. The Cuban PT's are fast (up to 45 knots), highly maneuver-

able, and possess a credible a mament consisting of 4-25 mm

(twin) guns, 2-21" torpedo tubes (two torpedoes) and from

12-16 depth charges. In overt conventional naval war

operations these boats would b: put out of action quickly,

although an anti-PT defense wold have to be established to

protect our troop/cargo carrylig ships until the pr's were

eliminated. The primary means of destroying PT craft would

be aircraft delivered rocket/ginfire and surface ship gunfire.

3. There have been no reports on the operations of the Cuban

PT's. They have been deliverel by Soviet ships to Havana,

offloaded and sailed under their own power to Mariel. Eight

boats are presently. located at Mariel. Four PT's, delivered

1n early April, were still in lavana at last report, but are

expected to move to Mariel in the near future.

The only way

to put these boats out of action while they are in port 1s by

means of agents or swimmer (ULI type) sabotage. Operations

5

Appendix to Enclosure

TOP

SECRET SPECIAL MANDLING NOFORN

NH 47874 DocId:32276301

---

## Page 100

TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLIKE

NOFORN

within harbors to put these pl's out of action are risky

In that there 1s a probability that agents/swimmers would be

captured with subsequent exposure and US complicity.

After

the PT's commence to operate, their pattern of operations will

be studied

so as to establish nethods to dispose

of them out

side

of their harbors.

A wides spectrum of actions with

less risk should become practical after their pattern of

operations is established.

4. Possible covert/clandestine ways and means of putting

Cuban PT craft out of action 1 clude the following:

a. Fuel contamination.

ruel contamination could be

accomplished either by inse ting foreign material (chemicals)

directly. into the craft's fiel system or the fuel supply

ashore (POL). Delivery of he contaminant would be by

agent or swimmer. Resultan: damage would be temporary

mechanical. Risk of detect on would be high, results would

be minimal in comparison.

D. Limpet mines/demolition charges. Underwater swimmers,

launched from submarines unter cover of darkness could

penetrate the

PT base and a: tach limpet mines to the under-

water body. of the

craft. Arents could install demolition

charges in the boats at the:r piers. Damage resulting from

limpets/demolition charges vould be major resulting in

destruction and/or sinking ‹f the boat.

Risk of detection

In operations of this type i gainst Havana or Mariel would

be high.

PT berths in both harbors

are in secure areas

making agent delivery very ¿ifficult. Both harbors are land-

locked with narrow entrances from the sea. The Pl's are s

moored at piers well

Inside the harbor and not on a direct

line from the entrance. The entrances are guarded by con-

tinuously manned machine gur posts on both sides of the

entrance.

Boats are known

to patrol during the day, ro

• Information 1s available on light boat patrol activity.

The

6

NH 47874

Appendix to Enclosure

LQ SECRET SPECIAL MANDLING MOFORM

---

## Page 101

TOP SECRET

SPECIAL HANDLIK? NOFORN

currents in the entrances are swift. This would possibly

require a swimner to penetrate on a flood tide and

remain

inside the harbor until the ebb tide before he would be able.

to effect his escape. Under these conditions, the risk of

swimmer detection through

¿ccident (equipment malfunction or

similar difficulty) would be higher than the benefits to

be realized by such operations.

c. Logistic sabotage. Sabotage of any portion of the

spare parts supply system nould minimize operational availa-

bility of the boats. Agents would be required to perform the

sabotage. Insufficient information 1s available on the

logistic supply system to evaluate the risks involved.

d. Floating debris. Plasing floating debris (10gs,

fishing nets, etc.) in PT coerating areas would

create an

operational hazard.. If a FI struck a solid object, the

resultant damage would range from minor hull damage to

destruction depending on the speed and

angle at which the ap

object was struck. Flshing nets, rope and similar material

would foul the screws and temporarily disable the boat.

Operations of this type would have to be carefully executed

to insure that the hazard wis localized in the PT area to

avoid danger to innocent shipping. While not feasible at

present since the PI's have not commenced operations, It may

be practicable at a later time.

e. Lures. Floating devices with explosive charges could

be made into attractive lur's by bright paint, emission of

spurious signals (radio/noise) or given other distinguishing

characteristics which would engender curiosity or demand

investigation. These devics could be fuzed to explode in

a number of ways (remote.co.trol, contact or by handling).

The devices would be plantel in the PT operating areas after

they become know. Extreme are would be required in the

conduct of such operations o insure that innocent shipping:

7

Appendix to Enclosure

NH 47874

DocId: 3

L0PO SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING

NOFORN

---

## Page 102

TOP SECRET SPECIAL WANDLIK: NOFORM

was not

endangered. Damage resulting from detonation of the

lure could extend up to

permanent destruction of the boat.

I. Deception. When the operational pattern 1s developed

for the PT's, 1t might be fossible. to conduct deception

operations that would result in their destruction. ' Drone

targets, electronic/visual signals, changing positions of

navigational alds or similar acts might be used

to cause

the PT's to run into shoal waters or onto a reef.

This

form of operation could also be used to divert the attention

of patrolling PT's from other operations being conducted.

5. Although the Navy has ways and means

available to destroy

or neutralize the Cuban PT boats, none can be covertly

executed in Cuba

without undue risk of exposure until more

Information 1s obtained on the degree of their security

protection. Under conditions of overt warfare, the Navy can

quickly dispose of the Cuban FI's.

The Navy will continue

to watch closely the activities of the cuban Pr's and will

recommend appropriate means tc dispose of them when

an

opportunity is presented.

1s/ George is inderson

GEORGE W. ANDERSON

8

NW 47874

3001 SECRET

Appendix to Enclosure

SPECIAL HANDLING

NOFORN

---

## Page 103

TOP SEGRET

SPECIAL NANDLING NOFORN

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHI IGTON 25, D.C.

JCSM-367-62

8 May 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETA IY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Maritime Sipport, Operation Mongoose (IS.)

I. In response to your question of whether there is some

way of putting the Soviet

urnished Cuban high speed boats

out of accion, the enclose memorandum from the Chief of

Naval Operations has been approved by the Joint Chiefs or

Staff and is forwarded for your information.

2. The enclosed memoran lum sets forth some possible

covert/clandestine ways ani means of putting the Cuban PT

boats out of action, but scates in substance that none can.

be covertly executed in Cura without undue risk of

exposure until more information is obtained on the degree

of security protection afforded the boats and a pattern

of operations has been established.

3. The Navy will contine to watch closely the activities

of the Cuban PI's and will recommend appropriate means to

dispose of them when an opportunity is presented.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Gieler

G. H. DECKER

Acting Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Encl:

Memo from CNO

EXCLUDED FROM GDS

5/74,54

TOP SECRET SPECLAL MANDLING

EXCLUDED FRON AUTOMATIC

REGRADING: DOD DIR 5200.10

DOES NOT APPLY

NOFORN

NN 47874 DocId: 32276301

Page 103

---

## Page 104

TOP SECRET

SPECIA.

HANDLING

29E3T

HOFORCI

DEPARTVENT IP THE NAVE

OFFICE OF THE CHTEF

IF NAVAL OPERATIONS

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

In reply refer to

OP605F/br

ser .000374PFn

2 April: 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JCINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject:

References:

Maritime Support, Operation MONGOOSE (IS)

a.

CM 610-62 of 15 Mar 1952

b.

CNO memc for the ICS Ser 000314P60

of 20 Mar 1962

1. Refercroe

a requested the Chief of Naval Operations to

provide specified information on PT type craft, maritime

support needs, and ways of putsing the sovict furnished Cuban

high speed boats out of action. Reference.

b provided certain

data on PT craît and specified maritime

support.

C. The Curan PT's: ara fast (uy to 45 knoüs), nigily marcavui-

able, and possess a credible

a mament consisting of 4-25 mm

•(twin) guns, 2-21" torpedo cubes. (+wo torpedoes) and from

12-16 depth charges. In overt conventional

naval war

operations these boats would be put out of action quickly,

although an anti-PT defense would have to be established to

protect our troop/cargo carrying ships until the PI''s were

eliminated. The primary means of destroying PT craft would

be aircraft delivered rocket/g infire and surface ship gunfire.

3. There have been no repor is

on

the operations or the Cuban

PT's. They have been deliverel by Soviet ships to Havana,

offloaded and sailed under their oun power to Mariel. Eight

boats are presently located

at Mariel. Four PI's, delivered

1n early. April, were

stili in lavana at last report, but are

expected to nove to Mariel in

he near future. ine only way

to put these boats out of actin while they are in port 1s by

means of agents or swimmer (UD! type) sabotage. Operations

EXCLUDED FROM CEs

SPECIA MAMOURG

MOFAR"

---

## Page 105

SECRET

SPECIAL HANDLIN"

MOFORN

within herhore to put these pole but in action and michy

In ühat there 1s a probabillt! that agentolorimmors would be

captured with subsequent exposure and US complicity. After

the PT's commence to operate, their pattern of operations will

be studied so as to establish methods to dispose of them out-

side of their harbors. A wider spectrum of actions with

less rishi should becone practical after their pattern of

operations is established.

4. Possible covert/clandestine ways

and means of putting

Cuban PT craft out of action Include the following:

a. Fuel contamination. Fuel contamination could be

accomplisned either by inserting foreign material (chemicals)

directly into the craft's fuel system or

the fuel supply

ashore (POL).

Delivery of the contaminant would be by

agent. or swimmer.

Resultart damage would be temporary

mechanical. Risk of detection would be high, results would

he minimal

in comparison.

b. Limpet mines/demolition charges. Underwater swimmers,

launched from submarines urder cover of darkness

could

penetrate the PT base and ittach limpet mines to the under-

water body of the craft. gents could install demolition

charges in the boats at their piers.

Damage resulting from

limpets/demolition charges would be major resulting 1n

destruction and/or sinking of the boat. Risk of detection

in operations of this type against Havana or Mariel would

be high. PT berths in both harbors are in secure

areas

maring agent delivery very difficult. Both harbors are

lard-

locked wich narrow entrances from the sea. The PT's are

moored at

piers well inside the harbor and not on a direct

line from the entrance. The entrances are guarded by con-

tinuously manned machine gun posts on both

sides of the

entrance. Boats are known

to patrol during the day, ro

infornation is available or night boat patrol activity. The

NW 47874 DocId 32276301: Page

1d5

SPECUL HANDLING NOFORN

---

## Page 106

SECRET SPECIAL HANDLIN® NOFORM

currents

in the entrances are svift. This would possibly

•require a swimmer to penetiale on a flood tide and remain

Inside the harbor until the ebb tide before he would be able

to effect his escape. Under these conditions, the risk of

swimmer detection through accident (equipment malfunction or

similar difficulty) would be higher than the benefits to

be realized by such operations.

c. Logistld sabotage. Sabotage of any portion of the

spare parts supply system hould minimize operational availa-

bility

of the boats. Agents would be required to perform the

sabotage. Insufficient information 1s avaliable on the

logistic supply system to evaluate the risks involved.

d. Floating debris.

Plasing floating debris (logs,

fishing nets, etc.) in PT cerating areas would create an

operational hazard. If a If struck a solid object, the

resultant damage would range from minor hull damage to

destruction depending on the speed and

angle at which the

object was

struck. Fishing nets, rope and similar material

would foul the screws and temporarily. disable the boat.

Operations of this type would have to be carefully executed

to insure that the hazard wis

localized in the PT area to

avoid

danger to innocent shipping. while

not feasible at

present since

the

PT's have not commenced

operations, it may

be practicable at

a later time.

e. Lures. Floating devi:es

with explosive charges could

be made into attractive lur's by bright paint, emission of

spurious signals (radio/noise) or given other

distinguishing

characteristics which would engender curiosity or demand

Investigation. These devices could be fuzed to. explode in

a number of ways (remote costrel, contact or by handling).

The

devices would be plante! in the Pf operating areas after

they

become know.

Extreme care would be required in the

conduct of such operations is Insure that innocent shipping

TAD

WATErA DOLLOSECRET SPECIAL MANDLING NOFORN

---

## Page 107

TOP

SECHeT

SPECIAL HANDLIN®

NOFORN

was not andaronard, Dander tracitine fem Anemmotion se the

lure could extend up to pemanent destruction of the boat.

f. Deception.

when

the operational pattern is developed

for the Pl's, 1t might be j ossible to conduct deception

operations that would resut in their destruction. Drone

targets, electronic/visual signals, changing positions of

navigational aids or simil: acts might be used to cause

the PT's tö run Into shoal waters or onto a reer. This

form of operation could al:o be used to divert the attention

.of patrolling.PI's from otier operations being conducted.

5: Aithough the Navy has wiys and means avallable to destroy

or neutralize the Cuban PT boits, none can

be

covertly

executed in Cuba without undu: risk of exposure until more

Information is obtained on the degree of their security

protection. Under conditions of overt warfare, the Navy

can

quickly dispose of the Cuban ?T's. The Navy will continue

to watch closely the activitin of the cuban Prio and kill

recommend appropriate means t, dispose of them when an

opportunity is presented.

/s/ Ceorge i. Anderson

GEORGE K. ANDERSON

SPECIAL NANDLING

NOFORN

---

## Page 108

SPECIAL MANLE A REQURED;

NOT RELEASABLE TO FUREIGN NATIONALS

8 May 1962

Decision on:

JCS 1969/344

(NORTHWOODS) (S)

on 8 May 1962 the Jo:nt Chiefs of Staff approved

the recommendations of the DOD/JCS Representative to the

Caribbean Survey Group as let forth in paragraph 1l of the

subject paper.

84-

BY ICS ON

CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED

ngeledo

INGEI,IDO

Colonel,

USAF

Deputy Secretary

Copy to:

General Craig

•EXCLUDED FROM GDS

TOP SECRET

NOT RELASABLE TO FORE WAS ONE ' M i m

NN 17874 DocId: 32276301 Page 108

---

## Page 109

SECRET

8 May 1962

Decision on:

JS 1969/344

(NORTHWOODS) (S)

on 8 May 1962 the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved

BGEN Craig's recommendations as set forth in paragraph 11

of the subject paper.

hi angelidio

INGELID

colonel,

USAF

Deputy Secretary

BY JOS ON --

CROSIMONTION CCITINUED

ECLUDED FROM CĐ8

SI CRET

NH 47874

DooId: 32276301

Page 109

---

## Page 110

TOP SECHLI

SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASH NGTON 25, D. Ea

#: 196449234

JCS: -355-62

8 May 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRE CARY OF DEFENSE

Subject:

DOD Task No. 38, Operation MONGOOSE

1. Pursuant to the rejuirements set forth in DOD Task

No. 38 the Department of detense was requested to review

the present arrangements for granting asylum to Cuban

refugees at Guantanamo Nival Base, with the view of

granting

asylum to all Cibans

so desiring 1t, at the

Naval Base.

2. The Joint Chiefs o: Staff recommend that the

recommendations outlined in the attached memorandum be

approved.

FOR THE JOINT CHIEI'S OF STAFF:

Audeler

G. H. DECKEK

Acting Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

EXCLUDED FROM GDS

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC

REGRADING: DOD DIR 5200.10

DOES LOT APPLY

TOP SECRET SPECIAL MANDLING NOFORN

NH 47874 DecId: 32276301

Vage 110

---

## Page 111

TOP SECRET SPECIL HANDLING

NOFORN

THE JOINT HIEFS OF STAFF

WASHIP STON 25. D.C.

J08N-356-52

Eins ijin

MENHANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

subject: DOD Tast ito. 46, Operation MONGOOSE

1. Pursuanü to the DOi Task 46, the Department of

Defense was requested to examine the possibility of

establishing patrol posts in the Caribbean area, with

particular emphasis on a United Stätes manned patrol

post in Haiti, to guard against any invasion attempt

at that country from Cube.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recormend that the

results of this examination, outlined in the attached

memorandum, be approvea.

FOR THE JOINT CHIEIS OF STAFF:

Rudecker

G. H. DECKER

Acting Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

317/, 17

EXCLUDED FROM GDS

EXCLUDED FROM AUTCHATIC

REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10

DOES MOT APPLY

TOP SECRET SPECIAL MANDLING NOFORN

.?::

NH 47874 DocId: 32276301

Page 111

---

## Page 112

TOP SECRET SPECIAL MANDLING NOTORN

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHII GTON 25, D.C.

8 May 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAY, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject:

ICS 1969/3+7 - Maritime support.

Operation

Mongoose (TS)

1. On 14 March 1962, the Secretary of Defense Inguired

whether there is some way of putting the Soviet furnisned

Cuban PT boats out of action.

2. The attached memorardum for the Secretary of Defense

a memorandum fron

the Chief of Naval Operations,

which sets forth some possible ways and means of putting

the Cuban PT boats out of action, but states in substance

that it 1s not practicable to carry out the operations at

this time: and that appropriate recommendations will be

submitted at a later date.

some possiule ways di muiting the Cuban PT boats

out of action

enumerated are fuel contamination, sabotage,

and one or more of the following: limpet/demolition charges,

floating debris, lures anc deception operations.

4. The Operations Depuiles approved the attached memo

for the Secretary of Deferse,

together with its enclosure,

on * May 1962 for transmittal to the Secretary of Defense.

It is recommended that you approve and sign the attached

memorandum for the Secretiry of Defense, which forwards

the CNO report.

al Mags Circlin I Craig.

WILLIAM H.

Brig. General, USA

DOD/JCS Represeniative

Caribbean Survey Group

EXCLUDED FROM GDS

EXCLUDED FRO• AUTOMATIC

REGRADING: DOD DIR 5200.10

DOES NOT APPLY

TOP SECRET SPECIAL MANOLING: NOFORN

• NG 47874

DocId: 32276301

Page 112

---

## Page 113

SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHI IGTON 25, D.C.

196/31/

8 May. 1952

MEMORA DUM FOR

THE CHAI YAi,. JOINT CHISFS OF STAFF

Surfect:

DUD Task 10. 38, Operation 11010003E

1. In accordaise wit! Task io. 29 the Department of

Defense was requested to undertake a review of tre

present

arrangements for the ust c: Ciantansmo Naval Base for

asylum.

The

review included all legal, political end

security aspects in

addition

to development of recommenda-

tions on

the feasibility

and desirability of granuing

asylum to all Cubans so desiring at Guantanamo aval Base.

• 2. The Operations Deputies approved such a document

responsive to

this

task

an & May

1952.

It is recommended

that you approve and

sign the attached memorandun

orwarding the results ci this review to the Secretary

of Defense.

Willisa N Caig

CRAIG

Brig General, USA C

DOD/JCS Representative

Caribbean Survey Group

EXCLUDED FROSA GDS

EXCLUDED FROM AUTCMATIC

REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10

DOES NOT APPLY

TOP SECRET SPECIAL MANDLING NOFORN

NH 47874

Docid: 32276301

Page 113

---

## Page 114

TOP SECREY SPECIAL MANDLID& MOFORM

THE JOINT SHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHI IGTON 25. D.C.

M+6:949/313

8 May 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRIAIT, JOINI CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: DOD Jas: No. 46, Operation M0 G003E

1. In accordance with Task No. 46,

the Dspartment of

possibility of

Particular

establishment,

to be purely United states.

co guard against any invision attempt at that country

from Cuba.

2. The. Operations DepIties approved the results of

this

examination

and rec immensations responsive to tris

-task on 8 May 1952.

It-s recommended that you approve

and sign the attached me orandum forwarding the results

to the

Secretary of Defeise.

Millim. Craig

WILLIAM

CRAIG

Brig General, USA

DOD/JCS Representative

Caribbeer: Survey Group

7/24, Mk,1%

EXCLUI ED FROM GDS

EXCLUDED. FROM AUTOMATIC

REGRADING: DOD DIR 5200.10

DOES NOT APPLY

TOP

SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN

NH 47074

DocId: 32276301

rage 114

---

## Page 115

TOP SECRET

JCS 1969/343

9 May 1962

TOP SECRET

COPY NO.

SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION

JOINT CHIEF; OF STAFF

DECISION ON J'S

1969/343

A Note by the Secretaries

0: 1

NORTHWO IDS (S)

Note

by

the .'ecretaries

1. On 8 May 1962, the Joint hiefs of Staff approved the

recommendation

set forth in par graph 11 of the paper.

2. In that the Commandant har expressed direct concern of the

Marine Corps in this matter, th provisions of Title 10, US Code

141 (c), applied and were follo red.

3. This decision now becomes a part of and shall be attached

as the top

• sheet of JCS 1969/34

F. J. BLOUIN

M. J. INGELIDO

Joint Secretariat

2(1. 8

EXCLUDED FROM GDS

NON SECREA

47874

DocId: 32276301

Page 115

---

## Page 116

TON SECRET

COPY NO.

SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION

TOP SECRET

JCS 1969/343

27 Apr1l 1962

Page 2209.

NOTE BY TIE SECRETARIES

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

NORTE WOODS (S)

A report* on the above subject is submitted for consid-

eration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

F. J. BLOUIN

M. J. INGELIDO

Joint Secretariat

EXCLUDED FROM GDS

# Nor reproduced; on file in Joint Secretariat

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING;

DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

TOP SECRET

JCS 1969/343

2209

TOY SECRET

NW 47874

-DocId: 32276301

Page 116

---

## Page 117

TOP SECRET

SPECIAL HANDLIK

NOFORN

3 Nay 1962

SPECIAL

REPORT BY THE DEPARTM INT OF DEFENSE AND

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 'EPRESENTATIVE

ON THE

CARIBBEAN S IRVEY GROUP

to :he

JOINT CHIEF; OF STAFF

0!1

SHMENT OF "P. IROL POSTS" (U)

N/CIUDED FROM GOS

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC

REGRADING: DOD DIR 5200.10

DOES NOT APPLY

CSGWG

CONTROL # 42211

NH 47874

Dox 54/20 SECRET SPECIAL MANDLING

NOFORN

---

## Page 118

TOP SECRET

SPECIAL. MANDLIN" NOFORN

ESTABLISHMENT OF "¡ATROL POSTS" (U)

THE PRCBLEM

1. Io respond to a request* from the Chief of Operations,

Operation MONGOOSE, to examine the possibility of establishing

"patrol posts" in the Caribbean.

'ASSUMPTIONS

2. The term "patrol posts" Is assumed to include any agency

or facility which could contribute to an anti-invasion and

infiltration surveillance systen. Such an agency could be

overt or covert in nature and cculd be purely US, bi-national,.

or multi-national in nature.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

3. By memorandum to the DOD/iCS Representative, Caribbean

Survey Group, dated 17 April 19€2, the Chief of Operations,

Operation MONGOOSE, requested ar examination of the possibility

of establishing "patrol posts" in the Caribbean. Particular

attention was to be given to the possibillty of such an

establishment, to be purely Us, in Halti, so as to guard against.

any invasion attempt at that country from Cuba.

4. For additional Facts Bearing on the Problem, see

Enclosure B.

DISCUS! ION

5. For discussion, see Enclosure C.

CONCLU: IONS

6. Cuban military forces lack the capability to launch a

meaningful military Invasion agi inst any Caribbean country

with the possible exception of laiti. In the case of Haiti,

the capability 1s limited to a ightly armed invasion using

a few aircraft and/or small boals. Surveillance of Cuban

coastal areas and the entire Caribbean is within the capability

of the US Atlantic Command. Foices of this command, assisted

by military forces of the county concerned, are capable of

combatting successfully any invision attempts by cuba.

*On file in General Craig's office

I Tore DOCTOPS ECREJ SPECIAL MANDLING NOFORM

---

## Page 119

TOP SECRET SPECIAL MANDLIN® NOFORN

7. From

a military point of lew, the primary value of air-

sea "patrol posts", would be in acquiring advance information

of Cuban actions and indication: of Intentions. Due to the

nature of the Ilkely Cuban threit, 1.e., Infiltration and

subversion supporting an indiger ous revolutionary movement,

the value of surface "patrol poits" is questionable.

8. Based upon the past experience of the Department of State

In exploring the possibility of arranging for bilateral agree-

ments with Central American gove mments to provide assistance

for defense against communist i filtration and subversion, it.

1s not feasible for the US to sonsor at this time the establish

ment of arrangements necessary for the "patrol posts" through

bilateral agreements.

9. At the 8th Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the OAS,

member States collectively took recognition of the threat posed

to the Western Hemisphere by

cor munist infiltration.

One of

the actions taken to combat this threat was the

establishment of

a Special Consultative Committee on Security to study the threat

and make recommendations on mea ures which should be taken to

preserve the peace and security of the hemisphere. It is

possible that this committee mas develop a multi-lateral pro-

posal for such action.

10. An early availability of an amphibious training and

staging facility' required in Haiti for use of Fleet Marine Force

elements of the Atlantic Fleet as previously expressed* by the .

Joint Chiefs of Staff, could assist in the performance of the

functions envisioned for a US manned "patrol post" in Haiti.

RECOMMEN JAT IONS'

11. It is recommended that:

a. The attached

memorandu, Inclosure A, together with

1ts Appendix, which reflects the above conclusions, be

forwarded to the Secretary o? Defense:

* Decision on JCS 570/547

Nt 47874

3

DocId: 32276301

IOP SECRET SPECIAI MANDLING NOFORN

---

## Page 120

TOP SECRET SPECIAL MANDLIKS NOFORN

b. This paper NOT be forwarded to commanders of unified

or specified commands.

c. This paper NOT be forwarded to US officers assigned to

NATO activities.

d. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US

Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee.

NH 47874

SPECIAL MANDLING

NOFORN

---

## Page 121

TOP SECRET

SPECIAL MANDLIN?

NOFORN

ENCLOST RE A

DRAIT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECI ETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject:

Establ: shment of "Patrol Posts" (U)

It is recommended that he attached memorandum, subject

as above,

approved and forsarded to the Chief of Operations,

Operation Mongoose.

• EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC

REGRADING:

DOD DIR 5200.10

DOES NOT APPLY

5

Enclosure A

NH 47874

DocId: 32276301

TOP SECRET SPECIAL. MANDLING

NOFORN

---

## Page 122

TOP SECRET SPECIAL MANDLIN®

NOFORN

APPENDIX TO EL CLOSURE A

DRAI 'T

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF OPEI ATIONS, OPERATION MONGOOSE

Subject:

Establishment o! "Patrol Posts" (U)

1. By memorandum to the DOD/: CS Representative, Caribbean

Survey Group, dated 17 April 192, the Chief of Operations,

Operation MONGOOSE, requested a examination of the possibility

of establishing "patrol posts" n the Caribbean manned by

personnel from one or several countries. Particular attention

was to be given to the possibil ty of such an establishment,

to be purely US, In Haltl, so a; to guard against any invasion

attempt at that country from Cuia. For the purposes of this

examination, "patrol posts" wer: assumed to be any agency or

facility which could contribute to an anti-invasion and

infiltration surveillance systell.. Such an agency could be

overt or covert in nature and could be purely Us, bi-national

or multi-national in nature.

2. Cuban military forces lac: the capability to launch a

meaningful military Invasion aginst any. Caribbean country,

with the possible

exception of laiti. In the case of Haiti,

the capability is limited to a ightly armed Invasion using

a few aircraft and/or small boa:s. Surveillance of Cuban

coastal areas and the entire Ca'ibbean Is within the capability

of the US Atlantic Command. These forces, assisted by military

forces of the country concerned, are capable of combatting

successfully any Invasion attem,ts by Cuba. In this respect, the

US through the Ambassador in th: Central American Countrtes,

Colombia and Venezuela, has Infirmed the Presidents of the

respective countries orally tha: the US was prepared to establish,

• upon request of the local gover ment, a system of air-sea

surveillance to assist in seekig out, and interdicting within

6

Appendix to

Enclosure A

TOP

NH 47874 DocId: 32276301

•SECRET SPECIAL. HANDLING MOFORN

---

## Page 123

TOP SECRET SPECIAI MANDLIN* NOFORN

national jurisdiction of the r'questing state, attempted landings

of armed forces, agents or sup illes by Castro-Communist i

elements and otherwise to assiit loçal governments to identify

and frustrate armed assistance to such subversive elements.

This committment was not afforied Haiti.

3. From a military point of view, the primary value of air-

sea "patrol

posts", would be 11 acquiring advance information

of Cuban actions and indicatiois of intentions. Due to the

nature of the likely Cuban thrat, 1.e., Infiltration and

subversion supporting an indig nous revolutionary movement

the value of surface "patrol posts" 1s questionable.

4. Based upon the past expe lence of the Department of

State in exploring the possibi ity of arranging for bilateral

agreements with

Central Americ. in governments to provide

assistance for defense against communist infiltration and

subversion (aversion to entering. into bilateral defense

agreements with the US), it 1s not feasible for the US to

sponsor at this time the estab ishment of "patrol posts"

through bilateral agreements.

5. At the Eighth Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the OAS,

member States collectively tool: recognition of the threat

posed to the Western Hemispher by communist infiltration.

One of the actions taken to corbat this threat was the

establishment of a Special Consultative Committee on Security

to study the threat and make r commendations on measures which

should be taken to preserve th peace and security of the

hemisphere. It 1s possible thit this committee may develop

multilateral proposal for such action.

6. By JCSM-5-62, * dated 4 January 1962, the Joint Chiefs of

Staff stated a requirement for in amphibious training and

staging facility in Haiti for use of Fleet Marine Force elements

of the Atlantic Fleet. In reply to the letter from the Deputy

*On file in Joint Secretariat

Appendix to

Enclosure A

TOP.

NH 47874 DocId: 32276301

SECRET SPECIAL NANDLING NOFORN

---

## Page 124

TOP SECRET SPECIAL NANDLIN® NOFORM

Secretary of Defense, dated 6 March 1962, which transmitted the

request of the Joint Chiefs of staff, tne Deputy Under Secretary

of State stated on 20 March 1962 that:

"The establishment of nilitary facilities in Haiti

raises a number of basic questions with

respect to our

policy toward the present ([uvalier) regime, and requires

most careful consideration."

The Departuent of State, is currently conducting an analysis

of our future policy in regard to the present

government of

Hait1. An early availability of a US facility in Halti,

however, could assist in the performance of the functions

envisioned for a US manned "patrol post" in haiti.

7. During this critical period, maximum use will continue

to be made of US forces in the Caribbean area (CINCLANT, CINCARIB,

MAAGs, Missions, and Attaches) in cooperation, where possible,

with Latin American military forces to perform the functions

envisioned for the "patrol posts." For example, training

operations at Guantanamo Naval Base, normal patrol activity,

and traffic between that base end US naval installations in

Puerto Rico provide effective cir-sea surveillance of eastern

Cuba and the island of Hispanicla including Haiti.

8. In view of the foregoing, it is recommended that no

further action be taken in regerd

to the establishment of

"patrol posts," AT this triné.

Appendix to

Enclosure A

I ATEr DE, IOP. SECRET SPECIAL. HANDLING NOFORN

---

## Page 125

TOP SECRET

SPECIA! MANDLIN" NOFORN

ENCLOS URE B

FACTS BEARING CN THE PROBLEM

1. The Foreign Ministers of the Organization of the

American States (OAS) at their eighth meeting* took

cognizance

of the

threats to the peace and security of the

Western Hemisphere as a result of communist infiltration.

The Council of the OAS (COAS) was requested to "maintain all

necessary vigilance, for the purpose of warning against any

acts of aggression, subversior, or other

dangers

to peace

and security, or the preparation of such acts, resulting from

the continued intervention

of sino-Soviet powers

1n

this

hemisphere, and

to make recomn endations to

the governments of

the member

states

with regard thereto.".

2. As directed by

the Foreign Ministers of the OAS at their

eighth meeting;

the COAS has established a Special Consultative

Committee of experts on security and has charged

this committee

with studying the threat to the hemisphere and recommending to

the COAS measures which

should be taken to maintain the peace

and

security. This Special Ccimittee is to submit the initial

report by 1 May 1962 and subsequent reports as available.

General Thomas D. White, USAF/Retired, is a member selected

from the United States.

3. On 10 May 1961, the Department of State by message*#

to

US Ambassadors of Central American countries explored the

possibility of consummating bilateral and later multilateral

agreements with various countries' to defend against communist

Infiltration and

subversion..

Responses

from addressees

indicated. most

governments vere not responsive

to

arrangements and opposition. could

be expected. This

such

* Final Act of the Eighth Meeing of Consultation of Ministers

of Foreign Affairs, Doc.

68 (English) Rev., dated 21 Jan 62;

on file in Joint Secretaria:

# *

Department of. State message, Circular 1761, dated 10 May 61;

on file in Joint Secretaria:

НЫ 47874

Enclosure B

Docid: 32276301

TOP SECRET SPECIA: MANDLING NOFORM

---

## Page 126

TOP SECRET SPECIAL MANDLIN® NOFORN

proposal was discarded and ins ead, the US

Ambassadors to the

Central American countries wer requested by message* on

2 November 1961, to Inform the Presidents and Foreign Ministers

of host countries orally that he US Government recognized the

• Cariween countries as likely argets of communist subversion or

attack and that it was preparer. to establish, upon request of

a local government, a system o: air-sea surveillance to assist

in seeking out, and interdictig within the national

juris-

diction of the requesting stats, attempted landings of armed

forces, agents. or supplies by (astro-Communist elements and

otherwise to assist local goveinments to identify and frustrate

armed assistance to such subversive elements.

In respect to

Haiti, the Department of State stated, "Serious question has

been raised as to whether materiel and other kinds of assistance

against indirect aggression in addition to that already being

made available to the Haitian (overnment should be given in

present circumstances, particu. arly because of the apparent.

aspiration of President Duvalisr to perpetuate himself In

office indefinitely."

4. On 15. May 1961, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by memorandum**

to the Secretary of Defense stited, "While it is recognized that

there may be overriding politi‹al considerations which dictate

the negotiation of such bilateral and multilateral assistance

agreements, they cannot be rec mmended from a military

point of view."

* Department

of State message, Circular CA-388, dated 2 Nov 61;

on file in Joint Secretarial

#*

Decision on JCS 1976/365

10

TOP SECRET SPECIAI WANDLING

DocId: 32276301

Enclosure

B

NOFORN

---

## Page 127

TOP SECRET SPECIAI MANDLIN®

NOFORN

ENCLO SURE C

DISCUSSION

1. The communist threat to the Western Hemisphere through

infiltration and subversion wa; recognized by the Foreign

Ministers of

the OAS at their 3th Meeting at Punta del Este and

action was initiated to find

means to combat it.

The results

of the COAS Special Committee

should provide measures which

could be taken on a collective basis to guard against and

combat the threat.

2. Cuban military forces lak the capability to launch a

meaningful attack against any atin American country with the

possible exception of Haiti. in the case of Haiti, the

capability is limited to a ligitly armed invasion using

a few

aircraft and/or small boats.

3. Any invasion of

a Caribb:an country by. Cuban forces would

serve only to further unite th governments of Latin America

and lead to collective-OAS

act on under the terns of the Treaty

of Non-Intervention. Further, a Cuban landing on the territory

of another country could provine

a valid justification for US

military intervention in Cuba. Any attempt to export communism.

from Cuba would be nost likely by infiltration and subversion

and

would take the form of an

ndigenous revolutionary move-

ment, supported by arms from Chiba and perhaps Cuban volunteers,

and would be made to appear as an uprising against the incumbent

government.

4. Surveillance of Cuban coi stal areas and the entire

Caribbean is within the capabiity of US aircraft and/or ships

essigned to the Atlentic Comman:. Also, US forces

and facilities

in

the Caribbeanare adequate ti prevent any, invasion of

Caribbean country by Cuban forces.

From a military point of

view, the primary value. of "patrol posts" would be in acquiring

advanced information of Cuba's actions and indications of

intentions.

The value of groud "patrol posts", even considering

governmental agreements could le effected, is questionable in

view of the nature of the threit from Cuba.

TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLINE NDFORN

---

## Page 128

TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLIN® NOFORN

5. Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider there is l1ttle

military justification for esta lishing multilateral forces for

use in the Caribbean

area, the colitical results of

such an effort

may have some value

in gaining

urther recognition of the threat

and in strengthening national tes between participating countries.

Based upon the past indications from Central American governments

In regard to the negotiation of bilateral assistance agreements,

and the present relations betwen the US and Cuba, it does not

appear feasible for

the US to sonsor a "patrol post" concept in

the Caribbean area at this

time

Additionally any consideration

of such a proposal must conside: the possible effects on the

treaty with Cuba for the use of Guantanamo Naval Base, 1f 1t 1s

to be used

as a

"patrol post."

6. In specific regard to a g: ound "patrol post" in Haiti, the

Joint Chiefs of Staff by memorandum* to the Secretary of Defense,

dated 4 January 1962, stated thire was a requirement for an

amphibious training and staging facility in Haiti and

requested

that the Department of

State, subject to political assessment of

the political considerations in olved, make necessary governmental

arrangements for the conduct of surveys and for subsequent

arrangements on specific requir ments that are developed. The

Department

of State has indicatrd a reluctance to negotiate with

the present Government of Haiti until a thorough analysis is

made with respect to US policy loward the present Duvalier

regime. The early availability of this facility, however, would

meet any requirement for a US "jatrol post" in Haiti. In the

meantime, training operations

al Guantanamo Naval Base, normal

patrol activity, and traffic

between that

base and US naval

installations in Puerto Rico provide effective air-sea

surveillance

of eastern Cuba anc the island of Hispaniola

including Haiti.

7: The most feasible course

if action, likely to be acceptable

to the countries concerned, to contend with Cuban Infiltration and

subversion of Caribbean countries lies in collective efforts of the

OAS. Past indications from governrents of Caribbean countries have

been to the effect that collective OAS efforts and actions are

defensible and rational, whereas unilateral and bilateral actions

NH 47874

Docka matain Faye.Trze Con 1547

---

## Page 129

TOP SECRET SPECIA! MANDLINP NOFORM

case, appropriate consideratior of the recommendations for

action, to be submitted by the Special Committee on Security

of the COAS, should provide a lasis to accomplish the objective.

8. During this interim perir1, maximum use should continue

to be made of US forces in the Caribbean area (CINCLANT, CINCARIB,

MAAG's, Nissions, and Attaches) and the Latin American military

forces to perform the functions envisioned for the "patrol

posts. "i

9. Any actions to establish "patrol posts" as such in the

Caribbean area would require apropriate "cover" to hide or

obscure the real purpose. While several means are available,

(civilian commercial interests, activities associated with the

Atlantic Missile Range, etc.), the ostensible purpose would

surely invoke strong reaction from the Cuban government and

might jeopardize the over-all sacurity of "Operation Mongoose."

13

DooId: 32276301

TOP SECRET SPECIAL MANDLING

Enclosure C

NOFORN

---

## Page 130

trappeas

IF DAGKET-NOFORN

SPECIAL HANDLING

JC3M-2/2-62

10 April 1902

MENORIODUM FOR WITH SECTIARY OF DEFENSE

Subjecü: , Cuba

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the Cuban

problen must be solved : a

the near ruture.

further, they

lice no prospect or carl"

success in

overthrowing the present

commist racine elther an a result of Incarnal us aing

or extornal political, ‹ conomic or paycholorical p. -sures.

Accorindly chop bolieve

that milliary intervention "y the

Unic seater will be it quired to overthrow the prevint

commundat regina.

2. She Untted Statce

cennot tolerate permanent ex: atence

of =

coverra: & in the wootern lenisphere.

presenc vagina

da Cube trovides commnion with a bage of

operations for copionag, sabotage und subversion against

Istin Azrica,

the stai ility of bone roverments in latir

Anerina as aldcoxy shrer bened by the overt ard covert actions

of the Cuban lovernment.

Continuod existence of this cor

munast governe incre: sos the probability that one or

nore oirer cations in ticin Auerica Will becone

or cozanise denimated.

Un1G Will proatly Increase the

problers

currenuly facils, the linited States and the Organiza

Amerton States

Whilo considered unlikely, it 1s

basea in Cuba Minilor E

Us installations around the bioc

perlousey.

Satsolicine: t of such laces would increase US

defenos costs no j'orces vero developed or unlited to met

tho threat.

3. Tire favors the chan regime and the commnist bloc.

They une provided with ine opportunity

to continue with

their subversive offort:

in letin Aerica. Increasing

Internal security measues by police state nethoda decrease

EXCLUDED FROM RUDERATIC

REGRADING: DOD DIP 5800.10

DOES NO?

i7FiY

T-NOFORM!

SPECIAL NANDING

EXCLUDED FROM GOS

21 My 8X

: 1, 46.

ti;

NH 47874 DocId: 32276301

Page

130

---

## Page 131

(rop

60MT C11

the possibility of internal uprigines within cuba.

The

steady Improvement

in military defenses atrengthens tho

restetance which must be overcons in the eveng of US

military Intervention and could lengthen the cine required

to secure control or the government and the icland.

continuing indoutrination of the Cuban youth crsaues a

growing

rucleus for a cimmunist undorground after the

elimination of the present sovernment.

This creates a

problem for the future which is steauily Increasing In

magnitude.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Steff believe that the Un!sed

States can underiake mi: itary. Irtervention in Cuba Ithout

rick of soneral var.

Wey aldo bellave that the lic evention,

• can be accomplished

rap: diy enough to minimize commist

for nolle: tation of Un sction.

avallable would escure

rapid essential military control of

Continued police action would be required.

5. In vier of the in reasing military. and cubversive

threat to the

Untted st: tos and the nations of the western

Hemisphora posed by the communiot rorime in Cuba, the Joint

of Staff reconmed that a national policy of early

military intervention ii Cuba be adopted by the United

they aiso reco mard that such intervention be

undertaken as soon as possible and piererably bolore the

release or Antional Cuad and Reserve forces presently

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

I. IN. LEN NITZER

Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECUE NOPCONT

SPECIAL HANDLING

KH 47874

DocId: 32276301

Page 131

---

## Page 132

TOP SECRET

ICS 1969/335

10 April 1962

TOp

COPY NO.

SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

DECISION ON JIS 1969/335

A Note by the lecretaries

1411

on

NORTHWOOL S (S)

Note by the Secretaries

1. At their meeting

on 10 April 1952, the Joint Chiefs of Staff

approved the recommendations in paragraph 6 of the report sub-

mitted by JCS 1969/335, after making amendments to the memorandum

in Enclosure A thereto.

2. The memorandum, as amended, was forwarded as JCSM-272-62,

to the Secretary of Defense.

•3. In that the Commandant had xpressed direct concern of the

Marine Corps in this matter, the provisions of Title 10, US Code

141 (c), applied and were followel.

4. This decision now becomes a part of and shall be attached

as the top sheet of JCS 1969/335.

3-n1,1

F. J. BLOUIN

M. J. INGELIDO

Joint Secretariat

NN 47874 DocId: 32276301

Page 132

TOP

SECRET

---

## Page 133

MOT

1100

1

COPY NO.

SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION

TOP SECRET

JCS 1969/335

9 April 1962

Page 2187

NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

to the

JOINT CHIFFS OF STAFF

WORTHY DODS (S)

A report* on the above subject is submitted for consid-

eration by the joint Chiefs of

Staff.

., F. J. BiOUIN

M. J. INGELIDO

Joint Secretariat

* Not reproduced;

on file in Jint Secretariat

EXCLUDED FROM CRS

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC

REGRADING; DOD DIRECTIVE

5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY.

TOP SECRET

JOS 1969/335

2:87

NH 7874

DocId: 32276301

Page 133

TOP

STORE'A

---

## Page 134

TOP SECRET

SPECIAL MANDLIKE

NOFORN

9 April 1962

COPY NO.

COPIES

SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION

REPORT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF RE PRESENTATIVE ON THE

CARIBBEAN SURVEY GROUP

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

•CUBA (IS)

EXCLUDED FHOM GO!

E. CLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC

RI GRADING: DOD DIR 5200.10

DIES NOT APPLY

NW 47874

IN SECRET SPECIAI HANDLING

NOFORN

---

## Page 135

TOP SECRET SPECIAL MANDLIKE NOFORM

CUBA (IS)

THE PRC BLEM

1. To develop the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

with reference to two question posed by General Taylor at

the meeting of the Special Group (5412), 5 April 1962, re-

lated to possible sentences for the invasion prisoners as

follows:

a. Do the Joint Chiefs of Staff belleve that the United

States should intervene?

b. Does the United States have the capability to

Intervene?

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. Past considerations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have

been reviewed for opinions or cecisions related to General

Taylor's first question. Two studies are appropriate; however,

both studies were directly concerned with the current Cuba

Project (Mongoose).

a. The first study,* dated 8 February 1962:

A significant conclusion of this study states that

the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe the overthrow of the

Communist Cuban Regime can ke accomplished without pre-

cipitating general war and vithout serious effect on world

public opinion if, among otter things, the impression 1s

created that there is an urgent, humanitarian requirement

to restore order in Cuba.

b. The second study, #*dated 16 March 1962:

This study repeated tie above decision, but further,

JCS

JCS.

1969/303

1969/313

2

NH 47874 DocId: 32276301

IDE SECRET SPECIAl. MANDLING

NOFORN

---

## Page 136

TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLIK: NOFORM

appended a list of circumstar ces which could be considered

sufficient provocation for U military intervention in Cuba.

One of

the situations listed. which depended upon degree of

seriousness, is stated:

"Execution of prisoner: - taken in the abortive attempt

of April 1961."

3. For additional facts bear ng see Enclosure B.

DISCUS ION

4. For discussion see Enclosire C.

CONCLUIIONS

5. The Secretary of Defense hould be advised during the

meeting of 10 April that execut on of 100 or more Cuban prison-

ers should be exploited (with petexts and an expanded propa-

ganda campaign if necessary) by the US as justification for

intervention.

6. The Secretary of Defense hould be advised that there

1s no question of US capability to intervene, and that the

deliberate course of implementig such action within 18 days

after decision is more prudent shan the faster but riskier

course of piecemeal force commi ments...

• 7. Inasmuch as the Joint Chiefs of Staff have not addressed

the question of US military intervention in Cuba except within

the context of Operation Mongoose It appears desirable that

military action be recommended to the Secretary of Defense and/

or the President as the only coirse which provides assurance

that the Communist Cuban regime can be removed in the important

time frame of the near future.

RECOMMENDATIONS

8. It is recommended. that:

a. Conclusions 5 and 6 akove be reflected

as the position

of. the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the meeting with the

Secretary of Defense 10 April 1962.

3

NH 47874

Docal Go SECRE! SPECIAI. MANDLING

NOFORN

---

## Page 137

TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLIK: NOFORN

b. The memorandun at Enc. osure A be forwarded to the

Secretary of Defense to expiess the views of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff concerning US mili' ary intervention in Cuba outside

the context of Operation Mor goose.

c. This paper NOT be fomarded to commanders of unified

or specified commands.

d. This paper NOT be forvarded to US officers assigned

to NATO activities:

e. This paper NOT be for arded

to the Chairman, US

Delegation, United Nations / 1litary Staff Committee.

NW 47874

JUr.

7630 46) SPECIAL

MANDLING

NOFORM

---

## Page 138

TOP SECRET SPECIAL MANDLIKE NOFORN

ENCLO! URE A

• DR. FT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE S!:CRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Cuba (IS)

• 1. The Joint Chiefs of Stafi believe that the Cuban problem

must be solved in the near futire.

Further, they see no

prospect of early success in o'erthrowing the present communist

regime either as a result of ir ternal uprisings or external

political, economic or psychol gical pressures. Accordingly

they believe that military intervention by the United States

will be required to overthrow the present communist regime.

2. The United States cannot tolerate permanent existence

of a communist

government in the Western Hemisphere.

The

present regime

operations for

in Cuba provide: communism

with a base

of

espionage, sabotage 'and suversion against

Latin America.

The stability f

some governments in Latin

America is already

threatened ty the overt and covert actions

of the Cuban government. Continued existence of

this con-

munist government increases the

probability that one or

more other nations in Latin America will become communist

or communist dominated. This vill

greatly increase the

problems

currently facing the Inited States and the Organiza-

tion

of American States:

while considered unlikely, it is

possible for the Sino-Soviet Bloc to establish military

bases in Cuba similar to US installations around the bloc

periphery. Establishment of sich bases would increase US

defense costs

as

forces were developed or shifted to meet

the threat.

3. Time favors the Cuban regime and the communist bloc.

They are provided with the opportunity to continue with

their subversive efforts in Latin America. Increasing

internal security measures by folice state methods decrease

EXCIUDER FROM 170%

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC

REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10

DOES NOT APPLY

Enclosure A

(Page revised as directed by the JOS, 10 April 1962)

NOFORN

---

## Page 139

TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLIKS NOFORN

the possibility of internal u risings within Cuba.

The

steady improvement in military defenses strengthens the

resistance which must be overcome in the

event of US military

intervention and could lengthen the time required to secure

control of the government and the island.

The continuing

indoctrination of the Cuban yeuth creates a growing nucleus

for a communist underground after the elimination of the present

government. This creates a problem for the future which is

steadily increasing in magniti de.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the United States

can undertake military intervention in Cuba without risk

general war. They also beliere that the intervention can be

accomplished rapidly enough tr minimize communist opportunities

for solicitation of UN action.

Forces available would assure

rapid essential military contiol of Cuba. Continued police

action would be required.

5. In view of the increasirg military and subversive threat

to the United States and the rations of the Western Hemisphere

posed by the communist regime in Cuba, the Joint Chiefs of Staff

recommend that a national policy of early military intervention

in Cuba be adopted by the United States. They also recommend

that such intervention be undertaken as soon as possible and

preferably before the release of National Guard and Reserve

forces presently on active duty.

6

Enclosure A

(Page revised as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 Apr 6c .

NH 47874. DocId:

TOP, SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING

NOFORM

---

## Page 140

TOP SECRET SPECIAL MANDLIK. NOFORN

ENCLOSIRE B..

•FACTS BEARING 01: THE PROBLEM

1. With regard to the question concerning ÜS capability to

intervene in Cuba, Implementatin of CINCLANT OPLAN 314-61 will

assure forceful and rapid overt) row of the Cuban government

within 10 days after forces

are committed.

As recently as 3

April 1962 CINCLANT (in respons: to a Joint Chiefs of

Staff

query concerning the adequacy

0l' forces in his OPLAN) has

advised that contingencies

which: could complicate the campaign

against Cuba have been recognized and considered acceptable

hazards. CINCLANT states, ". . . It is my judgment that the

forces in CINCLANT OPLAN 314-61 are adequate to gain essential

control of Cuba within the estinated 10 days." CINCLANT quali-

fies this judgment to depend on the following:

"a. Intelligence avallabl: to this command concerning the

current strength, capabiliti.s, morale, and locations of

Cuban military forces is ess intially correct.

"b. The amphibious assaul: lift now available in LANICOM

and PACOM 15, as an absolute minimum, maintained at no less

than present levels and improved and increased as feasible.

"c. Certain of the "on ca I" army forces now listed in

the plan are reclassified as reserve forces and put in motion

in time to arrive in the obj ctive area on or before D plus

10. "

2. While the fastest means o: assuring completion of the total

task in Cuba 15 OPLAN 314-61, tie situation may require Initial

reaction by the US In less than 18 days. A calculated risk could

be considered, providing piecem al commitment of US forces as

rapidly as they and their trans ortation become

available. This

1s CINCLANT OPIAN 316-61, and a though not approved by the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, was returned t CINCLANT for rewrite. Represen-

tative reaction times, proposed in OPLAN 316-61 from a condition

Enclosure B

7

NOFORN

---

## Page 141

TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLIK:

NOFORN

of no warning were:

2 ABN Divisions

5 days

4 Marine BLIs

7-8 days

~Artillery and Armor - 1)-12 days

Follow-on Forces

15-18 days.

Enclosure B

8

DocId: 32276301

IDPOSECRET SPECIAL MANDLING

NOFORN

---

## Page 142

TOP SECRET SPECIAL MANDLIR? NOFORM

ENCLOSURE C

DISCUE SION

1. In addition to related considerations of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff, additional factors which support US intervention in

Cuba, if 100 or more prisoners are executed, are:

a. Guidellnes establishe for Phase II of Operation Mon-

goose, already amroved by tre Special Group, indicate that mili-

tary intervention must eventually be resorted to for overthrow

of the Communist Cuban regine.

b.. The passage of time favors Castro rather than the US.

c. Justification

for US intervention will probably be more

convincing to the rest of the world if it can be related to

a real and valid provocation rather than based entirely on

manufactured pretexts which entail some risk of compromise.

The US could, however, bolster the justification for Inter-

vention, if required, to provide a stronger case for US

military action.

d. Execution of significant numbers of prisoners would

adversely affect the faith ad resolution of refugee Cubans

and the Cuban underground in future attempts to resist the

Communist regime, if they feel

that the US has ignored, in

apparent disinterest, the fial chapter of last year's

invasion attempt.

2. US intervention in Cuba could trigger Bloc diversionary

tactics in other parts of the world (most

probably. in known

trouble spots such as Laos, Sou:h Vietnam, Korea, the Offshore

Islands, Berlin or possibly the Mid-East) and would likely

engerider propaganda campaigns t, include use of the UN forum

for pressure against the US. Hwever, the essential and most

Important element of the US pla, against Cuba is speed.

CINCLANT'S OPIAN states, "Some , days

subsequent to gaining

control, conditions should perm t withdrawal of assault forces,

Enclosure C

9

Nt 47874 DocId:

1s, SECRET SPECIAL MANDLING NOFORM

---

## Page 143

TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLIK®

• NOFORN

leaving small military units tr conduct civil affairs and counter-

guerrilla mop-up

operations." Estimating from.D-5 therefore, 1t

should

be expected that US forces committed to Cuba will be

unavailable for other continger cies for only about 20 days,

although the Marine Division Wing Team from the West Coast will

be in poor position for immedi: te redeployment for some time

longer •

3. The fastest means of applying

force against Cuba would

be through the use of US air power (Naval plus USAF), although

this would be an interim measure until surface forces could be

deployed. This capability, nor being prepared by CINCLANT as

a new and separate plan, could be utilized for destruction of

Cuban air power, reduction of round forces (especially armor),

and disruption of Cuban communications and utility.

systems.

This plan to be operable in 6 Yours in the strength desired by

CINCLANT will require prepositioning of 12 Air Force Squadrons in

Florida..

LAF, SECRET

SPECIAL NANDLING

Enclosure C

NOFORN

---

## Page 144

TOP SECCIT SPECIAL MANCLING NOFORN

EXPLAIIATORY NOTE

One of the requirements which evolved from the JCS Meeting,

That document has been

reasons:

a. JCS 2304/30 was wr: tten in April 1961 to expand

forces Involved in CINCLINT Plan 312-60, from two battle

groups to a force level ‹onsidered adequate to cope with

the improved Cuban militiry capability. Force levels are

Increased from two battl groups to two divisions plus

a third division in reseive.

This plan was overtaken

by CINCLANT OPLAN 314-61 which further increased the

total forces required to the extent that the augmented

plan 312-60 was superseded. The plan for Cuba 1a co

2304/30 be eithdrawn.

1s no longer valid; the plan should

b. Much of the relater information included In JCS 2304/30

not strictly concerned with the military plan is reflected

in the more current papels published in support of the

Cuban Project (Operation Mongoose) •

NW 47874

DocId: 32276301

Page 144

---

## Page 145

10 „pr11 1962

1969/334

At their meeting on 10 April 1962 the Joint Cheifs of Staff

considered the subject papers which were tabled at the

meeting.

JOS 1969/334 was roted

and used as a background

paper by the Joint Chiefs ir their discussion with the Secretary

of Defense at their 1430 meeting this date.

mis 18 aN Extract from the Jos minutes of 10 Apr11. (07151nal

of the minutes 18 flled ta

in Searter, JeS file.

NH 47874

DocId: 32276301

Page 145

---

## Page 146

TOP SECRET

ICS 1969/334

10 April 1962

T0I0 SNOREX

1

СОРУ NO.

SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

DECISION ON JJS 1969/334

A Note by the jecretaries

on

NORTHWOO IS (S)

Note by the Se:retaries

1. At their meeting on 10 Apr 1 1952, the Joint Chiefs of

Staff. noted the talking paper su mitted by JCS 1969/334 and it

was used by them as a background paper in the discussion at their

10 April 1962 meeting with the S cretary of Defense.

2. In that the Commandant had expressed direct concern of the

Marine Corps in this matter, the

provisions of Title 10, US Code

141 (c), applied

and were followed.

3. This decision now

becomes i part of and shall be attached

as the top sheet of JCS 1969/334

F. J. BLOUIN

M. J. INGELIDO

Joint Secretariat

EXCIUDED FROM GOS

ES CLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING

DID DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

TOP SECRET

NW. 47874

Docid: 32276301

"Page

146

---

## Page 147

TOP SECRET

COPY NO.

SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION

TOP SECRET

ICS 1969/334

2. Apr1l 1962

Page 2186

NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

to the .

JOINT CHIE'S OF STAFF

NORTHWO ES_ (S)

A talking paper* on the : bove subject is submitted for

approval by the Joint Chiefs o: Staff.

F. J. BLOÜIN,

M. J. INGELIDO,

Joint Secretariat

NH 47874

DocId: 32276301

* Not reproduced; on file in Joint

Secretariat

TOP SECRET

JCS 1969/334

218;

Page 147

SCUIDED FROM GUS

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC

REGRADING; DOD DIRECTIVE

5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 148

TOP SECRET SPECIAL MANDLINS NOFORN

9 April 1962

Talking Paper for the Chairman. JCS for the Secdef Meeting,

10 April 1962

Subject: US Interventin in Cuba

Background - At the meeting

of the Special Group (augmented) on 5

Apr 62,

General Taylor questioled the US course of action in

the event Castro decided to ex cute about 100 of last April's

invasion prisoners.

Inconclus.ve discussion led General Taylor

to ask

"Suppose Castro decidel to shoot them all, what would

we do then?"

Mr. Johnson, for

state, expressed the opinion that

even this extreme would not provide

sufficient justification

for US military action.

Mr. G :lpatric

for Defense

Parker for the JCS,

Indicated hey reit both the seb and the jes

would stand firm for military intervention.

During the JCS me ting, 6 Apr 62, discussion of

this subject developed two basic questions:

a, Do the JCS believe th: US should intervene?

b. Does the US have the capability?

Discussion - Past consideratiois of the JCS have been reviewed

for opinions or decisions relaced to General Taylor's first

question.

Iwo studies are app'opriate; however,

both studies

were directly concerned with

tie current Cuba Project (Mongoose).

a. JC3 1969/303, 8 Feb 62:

A significant conclusion of this study states that the

JCS believe the

overthrow of the Communist Cuban Regime

can be accomplished without precipitating general war and

other things,

urgent, humanitarian requirement to restore order in Cuba.

b. JCS 1969/313, 16 Mar 32:

This study repeated tre above decision, but further,

a list of

circunstances which could be considered

sufficient provocation for US. military intervention in

One of the situatlons listed, which depended upon

degree of seriousness, 13 stated:

"Execution of prisoners taken in the abortive

attempt of April 196]."

- In addition to trese related considerations of the

JCS, additional factors which support US intervention in Cuba,

if 100 or more prisoners are executed, are:

a. Guidelines established for Phase II of Operation Mon-

Gary Intervention rose ever tually de resorted to for over-

indicate. that mi

throw of the Communist Cuben Regime.

b..

The passage of time favors Castro rather than the US.

c. Justification for US intervention will

convincing to the rest of the world if it can be related

to a real and valid provoc: tion rather than based entirely

on manufactured pretexts wi ich entail some risk of compromise.

EXCLUDED FROM GDS

NH 47074

Bocxa10/o, SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORM

---

## Page 149

TOP SECRET SPECIAL MANDLIN® NOFORN

bolster. the justification for inter-

Ten is could rehave to provide a stronger case for US

vention,

military action.

d. Execution of significent numbers.

of prisoners would

affect the faith ind resolution.of

refugee Cubans

and the Cuban underground ir future attempts to resist the

Communist regime,

if they

feel that the US has ignored in

apparent disinterest, the final chapter of last year's in-

- With regard to the question concerning Us capability

to intervene in Cuba,

implementation of CINCLANT OPLAN 314-61

will

assure forceful

and rapid overthrow of the Cuban government

within 10 days after forces

art

committed; forces c an

be com

mitted 18 days after the order is given.

As recently as 3 Apr

62 CINCLANT (in response to a . CS

query concerning the adequacy

of forces in his OPLAN) has

ad ised that contingencies which

could complicate the campaign i gainst Cuba have been recognized

and considered

acceptable hazaids.

CINCLANT states

•it

is my

judgment that the forces in CINCLANT OPLAN 314-6i are ade-

quate to gain

essential contro

of Cuba within the estimated

10 days."

CINCLANT qualifies his judgment to depend on the

following:

"a. Intelligence availabie to this command concerning the

current strength,

capabilit es,

morale,

and locations of

Cuban military forces is es: entially correct.

"b.

The amphibious assau t lift now available in LANTCOM

and PACOM 15'levels and imp oved and

maintained at no less

than present

an absolut: minimull' increased as feasible.

"c. Certain of' the 'on cill' Army, forces now listed in

the plan are reclassified a; reserve forces and put in

time to arrive in the objective area on or before

D plus 10."

- While the fastest neans of assuring completion of

the total task in Cuba is OPLAY 314-61,

the situation may re

A cal-

culated risk could be considered

nent of US forces as rapidly a; they and their transportatior

become available.

This was proposed in CINCLANT OPLAN 316-01,

and, although not approved by

was returned to CINCLANT

for rewrite.

Representative raction

316-61 from a condition of no varning were:

the Justines, proposed in OPLAN

2 ABN Divisions

5 days

4 Marine-BLIs

7-8 days

Artillery and Armor

10-12 days

Follow-on Forces

15-18 days

- The fastest means of applying force against Cuba

would be through the use of Us

air power (Naval plus USAF),

although

this would be an interim

measure until surface forces

could be deployed.

This capatility, now being prepared by

CINCLANT as a new

and separate plan, could be utilized for

reduction of ground forces

(especially armor), and disrer tion of Cuban communications and

utility systems.

(especially armor ints plan te

be operable in 6 hours in the

strength desired by

CINCLANT will require prepositioning of 12

Air Force Squadrons in Floride.

• US intervention in Cuba could trigger Bloc diver-

sionary tactics in other parts of the world (most probably in

known trouble spots such as Lios, South. Vietnam, Korea, the

NH 47874

LOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING

NOFORN

---

## Page 150

TOP SECRET SPECIAL MANDLIK?

NOFORN

Offshore Islands,

Berlin or possibly the Mid-East) and would

Likely engender propaganda can paigas to include use of the UN

forum for pressure against the US.

However, an essential and

most important element of

the US plan against Cuba is speed.

CINCLANT'S OPLAN states,

"Some 5 days subsequent to gaining

control, conditions should peimit withdrawal of assault forces,

leaving

small military units io conduct civil affairs and

counter-guerrilla mop-up oper: tions."

Estimating from D-5

therefore e unavailable for ther contingencies for only

it should be expeced that US forces committed

to

Cuba will

about

0 days.

although the Marine livision Wing

Team from the West

coast will be in poor positio!. for immediate redeployment for

some time longer.

Recommendations -

a. SECDEF should be adv: sed during the meeting of 10 Apr

that execution of 100 or m-re Cuban prisoners should be ex-

ploited (with pretexts and an expanded propaganda campaign

if necessary) by the US as justification for intervention.

b. SECDEF should be adv. sed that there is no question of

US capability to intervene

and that the deliberate course

of implementing such actio: within 18 days after decision

is more prudent than the fister but riskier course of piece-

meal force commitments.

c. Inasmuch as the JCS lave not addressed the question

of US military Interventio1 in Cuba except within the context

of Operation Mongoose it a pears desirable that military.

action be recommended to tie SECDEF and/or the President as

the only course which prov des assurance that the Communist

Cuban regime can be removel in the important time frame of

the near future.

Opinion as to Recommendations :

DOD/JCS Representative

Caribbean

Survey Group

(Concur) (Nonconcur)

Director, Joint Staff_

(Concur) (Nonconcur)

Talking Paper prepared by: C)lonel C. S. Seamans, USAF

Contingency Plans Branch, J-5

Estension 59057

NW 47874

TOP

DocId: 32276301

"SECRET

SPECIAL MANDLING

NOFORN

---

## Page 151

3 April 1962

Decision on

JCS 1969/328

(NORTHWOODS) (S.

At their meetin; on 30 March the Joint Chlofs

of Staff approved the foiwarding of a memorandum (CM-628-62)

with attachment to the Sucretary of Defense.

LOUI

Rear Admiral, USN

Secretary

Copy for:

General Craig

B:CLASSIFIED RY:

DECLAOSIFIONTION BRANCH

EXCLUDED FROM GDS

NH 47874

DocId: 32276301

Page 151

---

## Page 152

TOP SECRET

JCS 1969/328

3 April 1962

WE SHORES

COPY NO.

SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION

JOINT CHILFS OF STAFF

DECISION ON JCS 1969/323

- A Note by the Secretaries

en

NORTHW ODS (S)

Nute by the Secretaries

I. At their meeting on 30 March 1962, the Joint Chiefs of

Staff approved the forwarding ci a memorandum (Cl1-628-62), with

attachment, to the Secretary

of Defense.

2. In that the Commandant had expressed direct concern of

the Marine Corps in this matter, the provisions of Title 10,.

US Code 141 (e), applied and were followed.

3. This decision now becomes a part of and shall be attached

as the top sheet of JOS 1969/323.

2103

Pray it.

F. J. BLOUIN

M. J. INGELIDO

' Joint Secretariat

EXCLUDED FROM GOS

EXCLUDED, FROM AUTOMATIC

REGRADING; DOD DIRECTIVE

5200:10 DOES NOT APPLY

NựT

47874

DocId: 32276301

Page 152

---

## Page 153

TOP SECRIF

COPY NO.

SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION

TOP SECRET

JCS 1969/328

29 March 1962

Page 2179

NOTE: EY THI: SECRETARIES

to the

JOINT CHI FS OF STAFF

on

NORTH' IOODS (S)

A reports on

the above ubject is submitted for consid-

eration by the Joint Chiefs 0: Staff.

. F. J. BLOUIN

M. J. INGELIDO

Joint Secretariat

* Not reproduced; on file in Joint Secretariat

EXCLUDED. FROM. GDS

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC

REGRADING: DOD DIRECTIVE

5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

TOP SECRET

JCS 1969/328

Nh 47874

Doold: 32276301 Page 153

2179

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

OFFICIAL. FILE COPY

JCS RORA BR E 20 900

a !.. 1716 46& 199

---

## Page 154

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHING TON 25, D. C

3. April 1962

Decision on

JCS 1969/327

(NORTHWOODS) (≤ )

At their meetig on 27 March 1962 the Joint

Chiefs of Staff noted tke assumptions which had been agreed

to by the Special Group for Operation MONGOOSE.

BLOU T

Re ar

Admiral, USN

• Secretary

Copy for:

mini is General Craig

DECLABZIFIED BY:

JOS DECLAS

TION BRANCH

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED;

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

EXCLUDED FROM GDS

of -

/....

-pages serios

_conlos each

NO 47874

DocId: 32276301 Page 154

---

## Page 155

3 April 1962

Decision on

JCS 1969/327,

(NORTHWOODS) (S)

At their meetirg on 27 March 1962 the

Joint Chiefs of Staff acted the subject paper.

Flun

J. BLOUSI

Rear Admiral, USN

Secretary

Copy for:

General Craig

DEC! ABBIFIED RY:

DECLE

ITION BRANCH

DAYE..

21. Ma, 57

----.

EXCLUDED FROM GDS

НИ 47874

DocId: 32276301

Page 155

---

## Page 156

TOP SECRET

ICS 1969/327

3 Apri1 1962

LOW SACRED

COPY NO.

SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION

JOINT CHI: FS OF STAFF

DECISION ON JCS 1969/327

A Note by tlie Secretaries

NORTHW ODS (S)

Note by hi Secretaries

1. At their meeting on 27 Mirch 1962, the Joint Chiefs of

Staff noted ICS 1969/327.

2. In that the Commandant hid expressed direct concern of the

Marine Corps in this matter, the provisions of Title 10, US Code

'141 (c), applied and were foli, wed.

3. This decision now becomes a part of and shall be attached

as the top sheet of JCS 1969/347:

F. J. BLOUIN

M. J. INGELIDO

Joint Secretariat

3028

EXCLUDED FROM: GDS

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC

REGRADING; DOD DIRECTIVE

5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

47874

DocId: 32276301

Page 156

---

## Page 157

TOt

TOP SECRET

JCS 1969/327

29 March 1962

Page 2178

COPY NO.

SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION

NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

tc

the

JOINT CHIIFS OF

STAFF

NORTHY DODS (8)

A. report on

the above subject is submitted for consider

ation by the Jóint Thiefs of staff.

F. J. BLOUIN

M. J.

INGELIDO

Joint

Secretariat

* Not reproduced; on file in loint Secretariat

EXCLUDED FROM GDS

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC

REGRADING; DOD DIRECTIVE

5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

TOP SECRET

JCS 1969/327

2178

NH 47874 DocId: 32276301 Page 157

---

## Page 158

TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLIN? NOFORM

GUIDELINES, PERATION MONGOOSE

The Special Group (Augmenied) agreed that planning and

preparations would proceed on the basis of the following

assumptions:

(extracted from Gen Lansdale's copy, of the "Guidelines"

, dated

14 March 1962)

"a. In undertaking to caise the overthrow of the target

government, the United Stat's will make maximun use of

indigenous resources, interal and external, but recognize

that final

success will require decisive US military inter-

vention:

"b. Such indigenous resources

as are developed will be

used to prepare for and jussify this

intervention, and

thereafter to facilitate anl support it"

EXCLUDED FROM GOS

1469/327

NH 4787& DocId

130030 SCE SPECIAL HANDLING

NOFORN

---

## Page 159

TOP SECRE• SPECIAL MANDLING NOFORN

THE JOINT SHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHS IGTON 25, D.C.

13 March 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject:

Justification for US Military Intervention

in Cuba (7S)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the attached

Memorandum for the Chief cf Operations, Cuba Project, which

responds to a'requesi of that office for briei but precise

description of pretexts which would provide justification

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the

proposed memorandum be forwarded as a preliminary submission

It is assumed that there

will be similar submissiors from other agencies and that

these inputs will be used is a basis for developing a

time-phased plan.

Indivicual projects can then be

considered on a case-by-case

basis.

3. Further, it is assured that a single agency will be

given the primary responsibility for developing military

and para-military aspects of the basic plan.

It is

recommended that this rest onsibility for both overt and

covert military operations be assigned the Joint Chiefs of

Staff.

For the Joint Chief's of Staff:

May S4

sumits

L. L. LEMNITZER

Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

• Enclosure

Memo for Chief of Opera :ions, Cuba Project

EXCLUDED FROM GDS

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC

REGRADING: DOD DIR 5200.10

DOES NOT APPLY

TOP SECRET SPECIAL MANDING NOFORN

159=

NH 47874

DocId: 32276301

Page 159

---

## Page 160

TOP SECRET

JCS 1969/321

12 March 1962

Page 2165

TO"

SECRET

COPY NO.

SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION

NOTE BY THE ¡ ECRETARIES

to he

JOINT CHIEF:: OF

STAFF

O1:

NORTHWO DS (S)

A report* on the above

sul ject is submitted for consider-

ation by the Joint Chiefs of

Stiff.

F. J. BLOUIN

M. J. INGELIDO

Joint Secretariat

# Not reproduced herewith; on fie in Joint Secretariat

EXCLUDED FROM GDE

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC

REGRADING; DOD DIRECTIVE

5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

TOP SECRET

JCS 1969/321

216!

TOP SECRET

• NH 47874

DocId: 32276301

Page 160

---

## Page 161

TOP SECRET

SPECIAL HANDLIR: NOFORM

9 March 1962

COPY

COPIES

SPECIAL DISTRIBURTON

REPORT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

AND

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF REPRESENTATIVE

ON THE

CARIBBEAN SURVEY GROUP

to. the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

CUE 1 PROJECT (IS)

The Chief of Operatiors, Cuba Project, has requested

that he be furnished the

views of the Joint chiefs

of

Staff

on this matter by 13 March j962.

EXCLUDED FROM GDS

DocId: 32276301

SPECIAL MANDLING

NOFORN

---

## Page 162

TOP SECRET

SPECIAL HANDLIK: NOFORM

JUSTIFICATION FOR US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA (TS)

THE ROBLEM

1. As requested* by Chief of Operations, Cuba Project,

the

Joint Chiefs of Staff are to indicate brief but precise

description of pretextswhich they consider would provide

justification for US militar, Intervention in Cuba.

FACTS BEARI IG ON THE PROBLEM

2. It is recognized that iny action which becomes pretext

for US military intervention in Cuba will lead to a political

decision which then would led to military action.

3. Cognizance has been taen of a suggested course of

action proposed** by the US lavy relating to generated

instances in the Guantanamo trea.

4. For additional facts sie Enclosure B.

DIS PUSSION

5. The suggested coursego: action appended to Enclosure A

are based on the premise tha: US military intervention will

result from a period of heigitened US-Cuban tensions which

place the United States in tie position of suffering justif-

lable grievances. World opi iion, and the United Nations

forum

should be favorably a'fected by developing the inter-

national image of the Cuban overnment as rash and irresponsible,

and as an alarming and unpre lictable threat to the peace of

the Western Hemisphere.

6. While the foregoing primise can be utilized at the

present time it will continu: to hold good only as long as

there. can be reasonable certinty that US military intervention

in Cuba would not directly 1 volve the Soviet Union. There 1s

* Memorandum for General Criig from Chief of Operations,

Cuba Project, subject:

" peration MONGOOSE", dated

5 March 1962, on file in ieneral Craig's office.

**

Memorandum for the Chairmin, Joint Chiefs of Staff, from

Chief of Naval Operations, subject:

"Instances

to

Provoke Military Actions in Cuba (TS)", dated 8 March 1962,

on file in General Craig'; office.

2

IN AT DOcTA10/, SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN

---

## Page 163

TOP SECRET SPECIAL MANDLIN^ NOFORM

as yet no bilateral mutual sipport agreement binding the USSR

to the defense of Cuba, Cuba has not yet become a member of the

Warsaw Pact, nor have the Soliets established

Soviet bases

in Cuba in the pattern of US bases in Western Europe. Therefore,

since time appears

to be an important factor in resolution. of

the Cuba problem, all projects

are suggested within

the time

frame of the next

few months

COr CLUSION

7. The suggested courses ef

action appended to Enclosure A

satisfactorily respond to

the statement of the problem. However,

these suggestions should be forwarded as

preliminary submission

suitable for planning purposes, and together with similar inputs

from other agencies, provide a basis for development of a single,

integrated, time-phased

plan to focus all efforts on the

objective of justification for US military intervention in Cuba.

RECOMMENDATIONS.

8. It is recommended that:

a. Enclosure A together with its attachments should be

forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for approval and

transmittal to the Chief ‹f Operations, Cuba Project.

b. This paper NOT be ferwarded to commanders of unified

or specified commands.

c. This paper NOT be forwarded to US officers assigned

to NATO activities. •

d. This paper NOT be frwarded to the Chairman, US

Delegation, United Nation: Military Staff Committee.

3

NW 47874

Doora 30 SECRET SPECIAL NANDLING

NOFORM

---

## Page 164

TOP SECRET

SPECIAL HANDLIN? NOFORM

ENCL SURE. A

RAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECHETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject:

Justificatio!, for US Military Intervention

in Cuba (TS)

1. The Joint Chief's of Stiff have considered the attached

Memorandum for the Chief of perations, Cuba Project, which

responds to a request* of thit office for brief but precise

description of pretexts which would provide justification

for US military intervention in Cuba.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Stiff recommend

that the proposed

memorandum be forwarded as a preliminary submission suitable

for planning purposes. It i assumed that there will be

similar submissions from oth r agencies and that these inputs

will be used as a basis for , leveloping

a time-phased plan.

Individual projects can then be considered on a case-by-case

basis.

3. Further, it is assumed that a single agency will be

given the

primary responsibi Ity for developing military and

para-military aspects of the basic plan. It is recommended

that this responsibility for both overt and covert military

operations be assigned the Jont Chiefs of Staff.

* Memorandum for Gen Craig f'om Chief of Operations, Cuba

Project,

subject,

"Operati »n MONGOOSE", dated 5 March

1962, on file in Gen Craig's office

Enclosure A

I ATra Doora:, SECRET SPECIAL MANDLING

NOFORN

---

## Page 165

TOP SECRET SPECIAL MANDLIN:

NOFORN

APPENDIX T) ENCLOSURE: A

• RAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF O' OPERATIONS, CUBA PROJECT

Subject: Justificatio, for US Military Intervention

In Cuba (TS)

1. Reference is made to m morandum from Chief of operations,

Cuba Project, for General Cr 11g, subject: "Operation MONGOOSE",

dated 5 March 1962, which re juested brief but precise

description of pretexts whic, the Joint Chiefs of Staff

consider would provide justi 'Ication for US military inter-

vention in Cuba.

2.

The projects Ilsted in the enclosure hereto are forwarded

as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes.

It is assumed that there will be similar submissions from

other agencies. and that thes: inputs will be used as a basis

for developing a time-phased plan..

The individual projects

can

then be considered on a case-by-case basis.

3. This plan, incorporating projects selected from the

attached

suggestions, or fron other sources, should be

developed to focus all efforts on a specific ultimate

objective which would provide adequate Justification for

US military intervention. Sich

a plan would enable a logical

build-up of incidents to be combined with other seemingly

unrelated events to camouflaze the ultimate objective and

create the necessary impression of Cuban rashness and

irresponsibility on a large scale, directed at other

countries as well as the United States. The plan would also

properly integrate and time phase the courses of action to

be pursued. The desired resultant from the execution of

this plan would be to place the United States in the apparent

position of suffering defensible grievances from a rash and

Irresponsible government of Cuba and to develop an inter-

national Image of a Cuban threat to peace in the Western

Hemisphere.

5

Appendix to

Enclosure A

MH 4787& DocId:

.10P SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING

NOFORN

---

## Page 166

TOP SECRET SPECIAL MANOLIK: MOFORN

4. Time is an Important l'actor in resolution of the Cuban

problem. Therefore, the plin

should be so time-phased that

projects would be operable lithin the next few months.

5. Inasmuch as the ultim te objective is overt military

Intervention, it is recommended that primary responsibility

for developing military and para-military aspects of the plan

for both overt and covert m litary operations be assigned the

Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Appendix to

Enclosure A

SPECIAL MANDLING

NOFORN

---

## Page 167

TOP SECRET SPECIAL MANDLINS NOFORM

ANNEX TO APPEND X TO ENCLOSURE A

PRETEXTS TO JUSTIFY US M LITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA

(Note:. The courses of ac iion which follow are a preliminary

submission suitable only for planning purposes. They are

arranged neither chronologicilly nor in ascending order.

Together with similar Inputs from other agencies, they are

Intended to provide a point i departure for the development

of a single, Integrated, tim:-phased plan. Such a plan would

permit the evaluation of individual projects within the context

of cumulative, correlated actions designed to lead inexorably

to the objective of adequate justification for US military

Intervention in Cuba).

1. Since 1t would seem desirable to use legitimate

provocation as the basis for

US military intervention in Cuba

a cover and deception plan, to Include requisite preliminary

actions such as has been de eloped in response

to Task 33 c,

could be executed as an initial effort to provoke Cuban

reactions. Harassment plus

deceptive actions to convince the

Cubans of imminent invasion would be emphasized. Our military

posture throughout executio

of the plan will allow a rapid

change from exercise to intrrvention if Cuban response justifies.

2. A serles of well coor inated incidents will be planned

to take place in and around Guantanamo to give genuine

appearance of being done by hostile Cuban forces.

a. Incidente to estab ish a credible attack (not in

chronological order):

(1) Start rumors (lany). Use clandestine radio.

(2) Land friendly jubans in uniform "over-the-fence"

to stage attack on base.

(3) Capture Cuban friendly) saboteurs inside the

base.

(4) Start riots neir the base main gate (friendly

Cubans) .

Annex to Appendix

to Enclosure A

47874

Door 19/0 SECRET SPECIAL MANDLING

NOFORN

---

## Page 168

TOP SECRET SPECIAL MANDLIN: NOFORN

(5) Blow up ammunition Inside the base; start fires.

(6) Burn aircraft in air base (sabotage).

(7) Lob mortar shells from outside of base into base.

Some damage

to installations.

(8) Capture assault teams approaching from the sea

or vicinity of Guantar amo City.

(9) Capture militi: group which storms the base.

(10) Sabotage ship in harbor; large fires - napthalene.

(11) Sink ship near harbor entrance. Conduet funerals

for mock-victims (may be lleu of (10)).

b. United States woul respond by executing offensive

operations to secure watr and power supplies, destroying

artillery and mortar emp. acements which threaten the base.

c. Commence large sca: e United States military operations.

3. A "Remember the Maine'

incident could be arranged in

several forms:

a. We could blow up a US ship in Guantanamo Bay and

blame Cuba.

b. We could blow up a drone (unmanned) vessel anywhere

in the Cuban waters. We could arrange to cause such. incident

In the vioinity of

Havan:: or Santiago as a spectacular result

of Cuban attack from the air or sea, or both.

The presence

of Cuban planes or ships merely Investigating the intent of

the vessel could be fairy compelling evidence that the ship

was taken under attack. The nearness to Havana or Santiago

would add credibility especially to those people that might

have heard the blast or lave seen the fire. The US could

follow up with an alr/se., rescue operation covered by US

fighters to "evacuate" r maining members of the non-existent

crew.

Casualty lists in US newspapers would cause a helpful

wave of national indigna :lon.

4. We could develop a Co munist Cuban terror campaign 1n

the Miami area, in other Florida cities and even in Washington.

8

Annex to Appendix

• to Enclosure A

NW 47874 DooId:

LO SECRET SPECIAL MANDING

NOFORN

---

## Page 169

TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLIN: NOFORN

The terror campaign could be pointed at

Cuban refugees seeking

haven in the United States. We could sink a boatload of Cubans

enroute to Florida (real or simulated). We could foster attempts

on lives of Cuban refugees in the United States even to the

extent of wounding in instarses to be widely publicized.

Exploding a few plastic bomks in carefully chosen

spots, the

arrest of Cuban agents and the release of prepared documents

substantiating Cuban involvenent also would be helpful in

projecting the idea

of an 11 responsible government.

5. A "Cuban-based, Castri-supported" filibuster

could be

simulated against a neighbor ing Caribbean nation (In the vein

of the 14th of June invasior of the Dominican Republic). We

know that Castro 1s backing subversive efforts clandestinely

against Haiti, Dominican Rerublio, Guatemala, and Nicaragua at

present and possible others. These efforts can be magnified

and

additional ones contrived for exposure. For example, advantage

can be taken

of the sensitivity of the Dominican Air Force to

Intrusions within their national air space.

"Cuban" 3-26 or

C-46 type aircraft could male cane-burning raids at night.

Soviet Bloc incendiaries could be found. This could be coupled

with "Cuban" messages

to the Communist underground in the

Dominican Republic and "Cuban" shipments of arms which would

be found, or intercepted, or the beach.

6. Use of MIG type aircreft by US pilots could provide

additional provocation. Harassment of civil air, attacks on

surface shipping and destruction of ÜS military drone aircraft

by MIG type planes would be useful as complementary actions.

An F-86 properly painted world convince air passengers that they

saw, a Cuban MIG, especially if the pilot of the transport were.

to announce such fact. The primary drawback to this suggestion

appears to be the security lok inherent in obtaining or modify-

ing an aircraft. However, leasonable copies of the MIG could

be produced from US resources in about three months.

9

Annex to Appendix

to Enclosure A

NH 47874

T01 SECRET SPECIAL MANDLING

NOFORN

---

## Page 170

TOP SECRET SPECIAL MANDLIK?: NOFORN

7. Hijacking attempts against civil air and surface craft

should appear to continue as harassing measures condoned by the

government of Cuba. Concurrently, genuine defections of Cuban

civil and military air and surface craft should be encouraged.

8. It is possible to create an incident which will 'demonstrate

convincingly that a Cuban aircraft has attacked and shot down

a chartered civil airliner enroute from the United States to

Jamaica, Guatemala, Panama cr Venezuela. The destination would

be chosen only to cause the flight plan

route to cross Cuba.

The passengers could be a group of college students off on a

holiday or any grouping of persons with a common interest

to

support chartering a non-scheduled flight.

a. An aircraft at Eglin AFB would be painted and

numbered as an exact duplicate for a civil registered

aircraft belonging to a CIA proprietary organization in the

Miami area. At a designated time the duplicate would be

substituted for the actual civil aircraft and would be

loaded with the selected passengers, all boarded under

carefully prepared aliases. The actual registered

aircraft would be converted to a drone.

b. Take off times of the drone aircraft and the actual

aircraft will be scheduled to allow a rendezvous south of

Florida. From the rendezvous point the passenger-carrying

aircraft will descend to minimum altitude and go directly

into an auxillary field at Eglin AFB where arrangements will

have been made to evacuate the passengers and return the

aircraft to 1ts original status. The drone aircraft

meanwhile will continue to fly the filed flight plan. When

over cuba the drone will being transmitting on the inter-

national distress frequer cy a "MAY DAY" message stating he

is under attack by Cuban MIG aircraft. The transmission

will be interrupted by destruction of the aircraft which will

be triggered by radlo signal. This will allow ICAO radio

10

Annex to Appendix

to Enclosure A

NW 47874

Doot 5260 SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN

---

## Page 171

TOP SECRET SPECIAL NANDLIK: NOFORN

stations in the Western Hemisphere to tell the US what

has happened to the aircraft instead of the US trying to

"sell" the incident.

9. It is possible to crete an incident which will make it

appear that Communist Cuban MIGs have destroyed a USAF aircraft.

over international waters ir an unprovoked attack.

a. Approximately 4 or 5 F-101 aircraft will be dispatched

in trail from Homestead /FB, Florida, to the vicinity of cuba.

Their mission will be to reverse course and simulate fakir

aircraft for an air deferse exercise in southern Florida.

These aireraft would con uct variations of these flights at

frequent intervals. Crevs would be briefed to remain at

least 12 miles off the liban coast; however, they would be

required to carry live a munition in the event that hostile

actions were taken by the Cuban MIGs.

b. On one such flight, a pre-briefed pilot would fly

tall-end Charley at cons: derable interval between aircraft.

While near the Cuban Islind this pilot would broadcast that

he had been jumped by MI's and was going down. No other

calls would be made. Th pilot would then fly directly

west at extremely low al:itude and land at a secure base, an

Eglin auxiliary. The al craft would be met by the proper

people, quickly stored ad given a new tail number. The

pilot who had performed she mission under an allas, would

resume his proper identisy and return to his normal place

of business.

The pilot ind aircraft would then have

disappeared.

c.. At precisely the same time that the aircraft was

presumably shot down a sibmarine or small surface craft

would disburse F-101 parts, parachute, etc., at approximately

15 to 20 miles off the Cuban coast and depart. The pilots

returning to Homestead would have a true story as far as

they knew.. Search ships and aircraft could be dispatched

and parts of aircraft feund.

11

Annex to Appendix

to Enclosure A

wATer Docta 50/2 SECRET SPECIAL NANDLING NOFORN

---

## Page 172

TOP SECRET SPECIAL MANDLIK?

NOFORN

ENCI SURE B

FACTS BEARIN; ON THE PROBLEM

I. The Joint Chiefs. of Stiff have previously stated*

that US unilateral military intervention in Cuba can be

undertaken in the event that the Cuban regime commits hostile

acts

against US forces or property which would serve

as

an

incident upon which to base vert intervention.

2. The need for positive lotion in the event that current

covert efforts to foster

an internal Cuban rebellion are

unsuccessful was indicated** by the Joint Chiefs of Staff

on 7. March 1962, as follows:

" - = - determination shat a credible internal

.: :

revolt. is Impossible of astainment during the next

9-10 months will require decision by the United States

to develop a Cuban "provo ation" as justification for

positive US military acti›n."

3. It is understood that she Department of State also is

preparing suggested courses f action to develop justification

for US military intervention

in Cuba.

JCS 1969/303

**

JCS

1969/313

Enclosure E

NW

47674. DocId:

Its SECRET

SPECIAL MANDLING

NOFORN

---

## Page 173

TOP SEGRE SPECIL MANDLING MOFORN

THE JOINT • HIEFS OF STAFF

WASHIN STON 25. D.C.

SM-243-62

1 March 1962

MEMORANDUM TOR THE COLMA IDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

Subject:

ascedures to be Followed in Handling

Contral telligence Agency, State

Departnor. ind US Intomation Agency

Requesta

cow 020 Support in Connection

isith the

lotivicies

cr the Caribbean

Survey Group (CSG) (5)

The Department of I :fense has been requested to be

prepared to assist the Cintral Intelligence Agency,

the Department of State ind the US Infornation Agency

1n activities

connected "ith the operations of the

Caribbean Survey Group. The enclosure sets forth the

procedures to be followed by the Services in handling

such requests

for support.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

F. J. BLOUIN

RAdm, USN

Secretary

Enclosure:

Subj as above

CO RUN DE

978)4,5%

EXCLUDED FROM GDS

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC

REGRADING: DID DIR 5200.10

DOES NOT APPLY

Dis

TOP SECRET SPECIAL NANDLING

NOFORN

47874

DocId: 32276301

Page 173

---

## Page 174

TOP SECRE. SPECIAL MANOLI-S NOFOIN

THE JOINT & HIEFS OF STAFF

WASHIN ;TON 25, D.C.

SM-242-62

1 March 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF

STAFF, US AIR FORCE

Subject:

Procedure, to be Followed 17 Handling

Central Intelligence Agency, State

Departmen; and US Intornation Agenes

Requests

'or DOD Support in connection

with the setivities of the Caribbean

Survey Griup (GSG) (S)

The Department of Difense has been requested to be

prepared to assist the C intral Intelligence Agency,

the Department of State ind the US Infornation Agency

In activities connected iith the operations of the

Caribbean Survey Group. The enclogure

sets forth the

procedures to be followel by the Services in handling

such requests for support.

Por the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

F. J. BLOUIN

RAdm, USN

Secretary

Enclosure!

Subj as above

EXCLUDED FROM GDS

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC

REGRADING:

COD DIR 5200.10

DOES NOT APPLY

TOP

SECRET SPEC AL MANDLING NOFORN

CSGWGUNI

- MH

47874

DocId: 32276301

Page 174

---

## Page 175

TOP

SECHE*

keil

SPEGIIL HANDLING NOFORN

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHIP GION 2J. D.C.

SH-241-62

I liarch 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Subject:

Procedures to be Followed. In. Handlin

Central Intelligence Agency, State

Departmert ars

Requesta

with

The Department of lefonce has been requested to be

prepared to assist the (entrui. Intelligence Agency,

the Department of State and the US Information Agency

In ectivities connected with the operations of the

Caribbean

Survey Group.

The enclosure sets forth the

procedures to be followed by the Services In handling

such requests for support.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

5/2/ay 84

F. J. ELOUIN

USN

Enclosure:

Subj as

above

EXCLUDED FROM GDS

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC

REGRADING: DOD DIP $200.10

DOES NOT APPLY

TOP

SECRET SPECIAL MANDLING NOFORN

CSt girin

4..9

NW 47874

Doold: 32276301

Page

175

---

## Page 176

SECHE• SPECIAL MANDLING NOFORM

THE JOINT :HIEFS OF STAFF

WASHIS GTON 25, D.C.

Sti- 240-62

1 March 1962

MUMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF, US ARMY

Subject:

Procedure, to be Followed in Handling

Central Intelligence Agency, State

Departnen: and US Intormation Agency

Requests

or DOD Support in Connection

with the ictivities of the Caribbean

Survey Group (CSQ) (S)

The Department of D:fense has been requested to be

prepared io assist the Cintral Intelligence Agency, the

Department of State and he US Information Agency in

activities connected wit; the operations of the

caribbean Survey Group. The enclosure sets forth the

procedures to be follovel by the Services in handling

such requests for support.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

71. Many 87=

Enclosure:

Subj as

above

F. J. BLOUIN

RAdm, USN

Secretary

EXCLUDED FROM GDS

EXCLUDED FROM AUTCRATIC

REGRADING: DOD DIR 5200.10

DOES NOT APPLY

TOP SECRET SPEC AL MANDLING NOFORN

CSEWS CAT:

NW 47874 DocId:32276301 Page 176

---

## Page 177

TOP. SECRET NOFORN

SPECIAL HANDLING

1 March 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, CUBA PROJECT

Bub jeet:

Procedures for DoD Support of the operations

of cha, the state bepartment, and the usta

The Jolat Chlefs of Staff and Mr. Gilpatric have

approved the attached paper, which 1s forvarded fer

your Information.

WILLIAM H. CRAIG

Brig General, USA

DOD/JCS Representative

Caribbean Survey Group

SYSTEAINOALY

RID?

EXCLUDED FROM GOS

TOP. SECRET NOFORN

SPECIAL HANDLING

NW 47874 DocId: 32276301 Page 177

DONNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;

DECRASSIFIED AFTER DE YEARS.

DOD DIR 5200.10

---

## Page 178

TOP SECRET SOCIAL HANDLING NOFORN

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WAST NGTON 2a, D.C.

28 Feb 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DCD/JCS REPRESENTATIVE

Caribbean Survey Group

;.

Subject: Cuba Froject

The attached procedures are approved for

forwarding to the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project,

as the DOD position with respect to support of the

CIA, the State Departnent, and USIA activities

connected with the Caribbean Survey Group.

France Tipatie

Enclosure:

DOD Procedures

EXCLUDED FROM GDS

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC

REGRADING: DOD DIR 5200.10

DOES NOT APPLY

TOP SECRET SPECIAL NANDLING NOFORN

NW 47874

DocId:32276301

Page 178

---

## Page 179

NUY SHONET

SPECUL MANULID" MUCUNN

ENC: OSURE

PROCEDURES TO BE FOLLOWED IN HANDLING CIA.

STATE

USE! PUNIESTS FOR DOn

SUPPOR

DEPARTMENT

IN CONNROTION

UTaH

DUE NOT TUTTES

OF THE CARIBBEAN SUR''EY GROUP (CSG) (S)

1. Wion approved by the Scretary of Defense the DOD will

support fuil, on a high prio:ity basis requests for support

received in writing from the CIA, the State Department, and the

Us Information Agency in conjection with the activities of

the CSG.

2. CIA, State Department nd the US Information Agency

should submit requests for DuD support to the Secretary of

Defense (Assistant

to the Se retary of Defense (Special

Operations)). These request; should contain sufficient infor-

mation of the overall plan o: project to permit a determination

of the equipment best suited for accomplishrent of the mission

and

should include

a code wo: d to indicate the requested

assistance

is in support of his project.

3. Upon receipt of such a request in writing the following

procedures will apply:

8. The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special

Operations) will forward the request to the DOD/JCS

Representative of the CSG.

b. The DOD/JCS Represen ative will consult with the

Services and then secure tie comments and recommendations

of the Joint Chiefs of Sta'f. He will then return the

request with recommended a ition to the Secretary of Defense

for decision. The Service; and the Joint Chiefs of Staff

will be advised of the dec sion,

4. CIA, State Department aid the US Information Agency,

requests for DOD support Inv lving significant numbers of

military personnel, amounts if equipment, or equipment in short

supply will require the approval of the Secretary of Defense

prior to the furnishing.of. sich assistance.

1

Enclosure

NW 47874

EXCLUDED FROM GDS.

DoaBo EGRET SPECIAL MANDLING NOFORN

---

## Page 180

MU! SECHEN SPECIAL MANOLIT DONOM

5. Military personnel and/o equipment requested by the CIA,

the Department of State and the US Information Agency from the

DOD wili de retained under the control of the DOD when easible

and consistent with the accomp ishment of the mission.

6. As determined by the Sec etary of Defense DOD agencies

will be reimbursed

for support rendered CIA, the Department

of State and the US Informatio: Agency in accordance with

existing procedures. Otherwiss, such support wiil be provided

within the resources available to the DOD. Determination of

reimbursement will not in any vay delay the implementation of

the support requested.

7. Advance security plannin: will be made a part of all

projects that provide support o the CIA, the Department of

State and the US Information Aj ency.. This advance security

planning will be in conformanc: with the provisions of DOD.

Directive 5200.1, dated 8 July 1957.

8. In the event the Service: receive requests for support

direct from the CIA, the State Department and the US Information

Agency, which involve significint numbers of military

personnel, amounts

of military equipment, or equipment in

short supply, they will inform the DOD/JCS Representative of

such requests.

2

Enclosure

NH 47074

100

Docta 344 630, S6

SPECIAL HANDLING

NOFORN

---

## Page 181

TOP SECRET

ICS 1969/311

TOP SECRET

COPY NO._

SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

DECISION ON JCS 1969/311

A Note by te Secretaries

BY JOS CN --

CLASCIFICATION CONTINUED

NORTHW JODS (S)

Note by th. Secretaries

1. At their meeting on 20 february 1962 the Joint Chiefs

of Staff approved the recomme idations in paragraph 1 of

JCS 1969/311 as amended by ch inges in paragraphs 1, 3b, 4 and

6 of Appendix 1. to Enclosure 1.

2. At their meeting on 23 'ebruary 1962, the Joint Chiefs

of Staff reconsidered JCS 196/311 and approved the recommen-

dations in paragraph 1, amended as indicated above, and as

further amended by changes to paragraph 2 and subparagraph 3b

of Appendix 1 to Enclosure. C.

3. The memorandum in Encloure C was forwarded as JCSM-158-62,

dated 28 February 1962, to the Secretary of Defense. The meno-

randum in Enclosure B was forvarded to: Chief of Staff, US Army

by SM-240-62; Chief of Naval (perations by SM-241-62; Chief of

Staff, US Air Force by SM-242-62; and Commandant of the Marine

Corps by SM-243-62. All SM's were dated 1 March 1962.

4. In that, the Commandant lad expressed direct concern of

the Marine Corpa in this matter, the provisions of Title 10,

US Code 141 (c), applied and were followed.

5. This decision now becomes a part of and shall be attached

as the top sheet of JCS 1969/311.

NH 47874

NOTE:

THIS PAPER IS

DocId: 32276301 page 110504 Este

SECRET

---

## Page 182

SECRET

TOP SECRET

JCS 1969/311

20 February 1962

Page 2152

COPY NO._

SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION

NOTE BY TH: SECRETARIES

to the

JOINT CHI IFS

OF STAFF

NORTHW ODS (S)

A reporti on the above

sibject is

submitted for

consideration by the Joint Chi fs

of Staff.

J. BLOUIN

M. J. INGELIDO

Joint Secretariat

* Not reproduced; on file in Jint Secretariat

TOP SECRET

JCS 1969/311.

EXCLUDED FROM

AUTOMATIC REGRADING;

DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY.

FNCLUDED FROM GU:

2112

70202

SECRET

MH 17874 DocId: 32276301

Page 102

---

## Page 183

TOP SECRET - NOFORN

SPECIAL HANDLING

NOFORN

IUP SECRET

SPECIAL HANDLING

REPORT BY THE DO.)/JCS REPRESENTATIVE OF

THE CARIB JEAN SURVEY GROUP

io the

: JOINT CHEFS OF STAFF

on

PROCEDURES TO BE FOLL WED IN HANDLING CIA, STATE

DEPARIMENT AND US INFIRMATION AGENCY REQUESES FOR

DOD SUPPORT IN CONNOTION WITH THE LUPTVIRIES

25 THE CAPIBB AN SURVEY GROUP (AL

1. The DOD/JCS Representa :Ive of the Caribbean Survey Group

recommends that the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

a. Note the contents o' Enclosure A and Enclosure B.

b. Approve and forward Enclosure C, with Appendices, to

the Secretary of Defense.

c. After approval of tie proposed procedures (Appendix 1

to Enclosure C) by the Secretary of Defense, transmit

Enclosure D to the Chief Staff, US Army, Chief of Naval

Operations, Chief of Staf?, US Air Force and the Commandant

of the Marine Corps.

1

2

3

4

5

7

8

9

10

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMARIC

REGRADING; DOD DIP 5200.10

DONS NOT AFFLY

EXCLUDED FROM GDS

cy... / of 20 apies

TOP SECRET - NOFORN

SPECIAL HANDLING

Amended as directed by

the Joint Chiefs of Staff -

20 February, 1962

FORET

DIGFORM

NH 47874 DocId:32276301

Page 103

---

## Page 184

TOP SECRET - NOFORN

SPECIAL HANDLING

10P SEGRET

ENC OSURE A

MOFORN

DRAFT

MSZA MANIONS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN.. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF •

Subject:

Procedure o be Followed

in Handling Central In-

telligence Agency, State Department and US Inform-

ation Agency Requests for DOD Support in Connec

tion with the Activities of the Caribbean Survey

Group

1. The attached memorandim for the Secretary of Defense recom-

mends procedures to be follwed. for DOD support of the operations

of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), State Department and

• Us Information Agency (USIA in connection with the activities

of the Caribbean Survey Grolp.

Past experience indicates the

need for such procedures.

2. The recommended procelures are based upon the results of a

conference held with the Dejuty Secretary of Defense on 30

January 1962 by the DOD/JCS Representative on the CSG.

3. The procedures recomminded

to the Secretary of Defense.

will afford full DOD suppor to the operations of the CIA, the

State Department and USIA i. connection with the activities of

the CSG. At the

same time, from the over-all point of view of

the US Government, it will protect the best interests of the DOD.

4. The procedures provid for the submission in writing of

requests for DOD support by the CIA, the State Departnent and

USIA to the Secretary of De: ense, who will in turn refer the

requests tó the DOD/JCS Rep esentative on the CSG for evaluation.

The DOD/ICS Representative? ill secure the comments and recommend-

ations of the Services and he Joint Chiefs of Staff and then

forward the request with re ommendations to the Secretary of

Defense for decision.

WILLIAM H. CRAIG

Brig General, USA

DOD/JCS Representative

Caribbean Survey Group

TOP SECRET -NOFORN

SPECIAL HANDLING

2

Enclosure A

TOP SECRET NOrUn.

SPECIAL HANDLING

N7 47874 DocId: 32276301 Page

18₫

---

## Page 185

COP SECRET

OPENSE GORUEN

SPECIAL HANDLING

VA SENd

ENC OSURE B

GrECIAL HANDLING

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

Subject:

Guidance from the Deputy Secretary of Defense

and his Reaction to Original Proposed Policy

for CIA Support by the Department of Defense

of Caribbea Survey Group (30 January 1962)

Mr. Gilpatric did not like this paper at all.. He indicated

the paper was too negative and restricted as though a policy

towards an enemy like we are dealing with the Germans or Itallans,

not a fellow department of our Government. Tats is a red line

operation with the blessin of the President and approved by

him as a most important taik. This is probably the most

Important mision we have n the government today. When a

request comes In fron CIA, you (Craig) will evaluate. It and

request the Joint Chiefs o' Staff for their evaluation and

recommendations. The Secritary of Defense will determine,

after considering the advise of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, what

the decision will be, not she Joint Chiefs of Staff. This

decision is the prerogative of the Secretary of Defense.

We do not want to get involved in a case-by-case basis. We

do not want individual actions on each case. We do not want

masses

of Individual actions. This is a red line priority

problem and must be handled with dispatch and without getting

Involved in minutia regarcing

expenses and reimbursement or

other details. Department of Defense may have to do It themselves

regardless who foots the 11ll. In some cases, CIA will be

required to reimburse if; o determined by the Secretary of

Defense. This 19 a matter which must be decided by the

Secretary of Defense - no: the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The

Department of Defense bud jets for some CIA support. We have

equipment of some types liring around not being used and should

not require reimbursement for this type, as a general rule. This

must be decided by the Se:retary of Defense after considering

an evaluation by the Services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

TOP SECRET - NOFORN

SPECIAL HANDLING

3

Enclosure B

TOP SECRET

TOFORN

SPECIAL MANDLING

NH 47874

DocId: 32276301. Page 185

---

## Page 186

TOP SECRET - NOFL. LN

SPECIAL HANDLING

TOP SECRET NOFURN

There are some assetsPEGAl HANDLINd without and should make

these types available to the CIA without necessarily being

reimbursed for 1t. Mr. Gilpatric does not object to the

Joint Chiefs of Staff recomending to the Secretary of

Defense what equipment should be used for accomplishment of

stated mission and specific projects.

I explained to Mr.

Gilpatric that we were not trying to obstruct the operation,

that we read our message loit and clear. I showed him Mr.

Bob Kennedy's Ifstructions concerning which hu stated: "I

can't add anything to that.'

I discussed my meeting with Mr. McNamara of last Saturday

with Mr. Gilpatric. He indicated that Mr. McNamara had been

preoccupied on the Hill and had not known of latest developments

on this project, that he wold inform him in regard to Mr.

McNamara's apprehensions as expressed to me last Saturday

concerning security, numbers in the Department of Defense who

knew of the project, etc. Ir. Gilpatric said I could inform

the people necessary regarding the project in order to get

the

job done.. This was up to my judgment. Mr. Gilpatric made

it clear that I was the DOD Representative and he wanted me to

make recommendations concerting requests for CIA support.

I emphasized the urgert requirement that the Services

and Chiefs should determine the proper personnel and equipment

to be used for specific tasts since they were better qualified

as to capability and limitaiion of their equipment and personnel

than the CIA.

In summary, Mr. Gilpairie recognized the need for the estab-

lishment of a policy on thii. subject. He was most emphatic

that the

decision as to whether or not a request was approved

was the prerogative of the lecretary of Defense NOT the Joint

Chiefs of Staff. However, he Secretary of Defense would l1ke

to have evaluations and recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of

TOP SECRET - NOFORN

SPECIAL HANDLING

Enclosure E

TOP SECRET NOFORM

SPECIAL HANDLING

NH 47874

DocId: 32276301

Page 186

---

## Page 187

TOP SECRET -

SPECIAL HANDI

ECUAL HANDUNG

NOFORN jUP SECRET

Staff available for considerition

in making important decisions

on the subject. He considered the approach used in our

original recommendations mih too

negative and directed me to

adopt a more positive approach

In

new

proposal.

WILLIAM H. CRAIG

Brig. General, USA

DOD/JCS Fepresentative,

Caribbean, Survey Croup

TOP SECRET - NOFORN

SPECIAL HANDLING

5

Enclosure B

SEAL MAN UNE NOFORN

NN 47874

DocId: 32276301 Page 187

TOP SEGRET

---

## Page 188

TOP SECRET - NOFORN

SPECIAL HANDLING

HOFORN

EN CLOSURE C

TOP SECRET

DRAFT

SPECIAL HANDLING

MEMORANDUM FOR TH: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject:

Procedures t, be Followed in Handling CIA,.

State Depart sent,

and USIA Requests

for

DOD Support in Connection with the

Activities o: the Caribbean Survey Group.

1. Reference 1s made to tie memorandum for Brigadier

General William H. Craig, USA, from the Assistant to the

Secretary of Defense, subject:

"Special Projects", dated

17 January 1962.

2. The referenced memorar dum states:

"b. Department of Defense must be prepared to assist

fully Central Intelligence Agency and Department of State..

In * * * operations as Defense commitments of men, money,

and materials are required."

and. invited formal recommenc ations conceining

the Defense

role and contributions..

3. Enclosure l recommend procedures for DOD support

of the operations of the Certral Intelligence Agency, the

State Department and the US Information Agency in connection

with the activitles of the (aribbean Survey Group (CSG) .

4. Enclosure 2 is a draf: of a recommended memorandum for

the Secretary of State, the Director, Central Intelligence,

and the US Information Agen y setting forth procedures

governing DOD support of th operations of the CS.

5. Issuance of the recomiended memoranda should assure

that the procedures governi ig DOD support of the operations

of the CSG are followed.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

• 18

19

20

21

22

BACLUDES FROM AUTORATIC

ROGRAGING; DOD

DUR 6c06.70

DOES NOT APPLY

TOP SECRET - NOFORN

SPECIAL HANDLING

6

Enclosure C

TOP SECRET

NOFORN

SPECAL WONDRO

NH 47074

DooId: 32276301

Page 100 -

---

## Page 189

TOP SECRET

SPECIAL MANDLIN" NOFORN

ENCLOSUE B

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Subject:

Secretary of Siate

Director,

Cental Intelligence Agency

Director, Unitid States Information Agency

Procedures to e Followed in Handling

Requests

for D)D Support in Connection with

the Activities of the Caribbean Survey Group

1. Roference is made to the ctivities of the Caribbean

Survey Group (CSG) .

2. Requests for DOD support in connection with the activities

of the USe should be submitted in writing to the Secretary of

Defense (Assistant to the Sacre ary of Defense (Special

Operations)). In order to facilitate and expedite the

furnishing of such support, car; request should contain

sufficient information of the overall plan

I or project to

permit

datermination of the personnel and/or equirment best suited

for accomplishment of the missim and an agreed code word to

indicate that the

requested assistance is in

support of this

project.

3. In regard to the funding if the operations, it is

desired that, as determined by she Secretary of Defense, DOD

agencies be reimbursed fur support rendered in accordance with

existing procedures.

Determina ion of reimbursement will not

in any way delay the implementa ion of the support requested.

In the event agreement cannot b: reached quickly on the

funding: I propose that the funling problem be resolved at a

later date.

4. I trust that the above meits with your approval and

that you will inform me accordi gly.

3

Enclosure B

NU 47874

TOP SECRET SPECIAL MANDLING NOFORN

DocId: 32276301. Page 189

---

## Page 190

TOP. SECRE

TOP SECRET-NOFORN

SPECIAL HANDLING

NOFORN

EN :LOSURE D

RAFT

SPECIAL MAMOLING

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Subject:

chief of sal perations

Chief of Naral

Chief or Stut

US Air Force

Commandant if the Marine Corps

Procedures. io be Followed in Handling Central •

State Department and US

Intelligenc? AgencyRequests for DOD Support in

Information Agency

Connection vith the Activities of the Caribbean

Survey Grous (CSG)

The Departesat of Defense has been reques: to-be prepared

to assist the

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Department

of State, and the US Information Agency in activities connected

with the operations of the Caribbean Survey Group. The en-

closure sets forth the

procelures. to be followed by

the Services

in handling such requests for support.

EXCLUDED FROM AUTONATIC

EEGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10

DOES NOT APPLY

TOP SECRET-NOFORN

SPECIAL HANDLING

10

Enclosure D

TOP SECRET MOFO.

1328000

NH 47874 • DocId:32276301

Page

190

---

## Page 191

TOP SECRET SPECIAL MANDLIN®

ENCLOSURE A

NOFORN

STATE DEPARTMENT

USIA REQUESTS FOR DOD SUPPORT

OF' THE CARIBBEAN SURIGY GROUP (CSG) (S)

1. When approved by the Secretary of Defense the

DOD will

support fully on a high priority basis raquants for

support

received in writing

from the ilk, the State Department, and the

Us Information Agency in connotion with the activities of

the Csü.

2. CIA, State Department ard the Us information Agency

should submit requests tor. DOI support to the Secretary of

Defense (Assistant to the Sacretary of Defense (Special

Operations)), There requests should contain

sufficient infor-

mation of the overail plan or

project to permit a determination

of the equipment best suited ior

accomplishment. of the mission

and should include a code wore to indicate the requested

assistance is in support of this project.

3. Upon receint of such a jequest in writing the following

procedures will apply:

• a. The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special

Operations) will forward tie

request. to the DOD/JCS

Representative of the. C5G.

b. The DOD/JCS Represent ative will consult with the

Services and then

secure

tle conments

and recommendations

of the Joint Chiefs of

Starf. He will then return the

request with recommended

a. tion to the Secretary of Defense

'for docision.

The

Service: and the Joint Chiefs of Staff

will be advised of the dee: sion.

4. ClA, State Department aid the US Information Agency

requests for DOD support invo. ving significant nunbers.of

military personnel, amounts o: equipment, or equipment in short

supply will require the appro-al of the secretary

of. Defense

prior to the furnishing of suh assistance.

Enclosure A

(Amended as directed by the Juint Chiefs of Staff on 20 & 23 Fel

TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING

NW 17874 DocId: 32276301 Page 191

"NOFORN

---

## Page 192

TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLIN^

NOFORN

5. Military personnel and, or equipment requested by the CIA,

the Departnent of State and ile US Information Agency from the

DON will be retained under th control of the DOD when feasible

and consistent with the accom lishment of the nission:

6. As determined by the s: cretary of Defense DOD agencies.

will be reimbursed fo: suppor rendered CIA, the Department

of State and the US Informatin Agency in accordance with

existing procedures.

Ocherwie, such support will be provided

within the resources availabl. to the DOD. Determination.of

reimbarsement will not in any way delay the implementation of

the support requested.

7. Advance

security plan: ng will ba made a part of all

projects that provide sueport in the CIA, the Department of

State and the US Information, gency. This advance security

planning. will be in conformane with the provisions of DOD

Directive 5200.1, dated & Jui, 1957.

8. In the event the Servies receive requests for support

direct. from the CIA, the Stat. Department. and the US Information

Agency, which Involve signifi ant numbers of military

personnel, amounts of militar, equiphent, or equipnent in

short supply, they will infor! the DOD/JCS Representative of

such requests.

Enclosure A

(Amended as directed by the loint Chiefs of Staff 20

& 23 Feb 62

TOP SECRET SPECIAL MANDLING NOTORM

NH 17874. DooId: 32276301

Page 192

---

## Page 193

TOP SECRET

1 March 1962

TOP SECRET

COPY NO.

SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION

NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

tc the

HOLDERS OF JCS 1969/311

A Note by tie Secretaries

NORTHW JODS (S)

Holders are requested to substitute the attached revised

Decision On and to destroy the superseded Decision On in

accordance with

security regulitions.

F. J. BLOUIN

M. J. INGELIDO

Joint Secretariat

EXCLUDED FROM GDS.

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC

REGRADING; DOD DIRECTIVE

5200.10 DOES NOT. APPLY

TOP SECRET

2nd N/H. of JCS

1969/311

TOP SECRET

NW 17874. DocId: 32276301

•Page 193

---

## Page 194

TOP SEBREI

7 February 1962

Decision on:

JES 1969/303

(NORTHWOODS) (S)

CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED

At their, meeting on 7 February 1962 the Joint Chiefs

of Staff approved the recommendations of the DOD Representative

to the Caribbean Survey Group as set forth in paragraph 13

of the subject paper, as amended by changing the second para-

graph of Enclosure A 8o as to read:

"2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that

the attached proposal be adopted as the official DOD

position and forwarded to the Chief of Operations;

Cuba Project."

It was also agreed trat General Craig should convey to

the Deputy Secretary of Defense the Joint Chiefs' position

that General Craig should be the JCS Representative ag well as

the DOD Representative to the Caribbean Survey Group. It was

further agreed that, in regerd to clearances for NORTHWOODS,

the access list would be extended to include the four Service

Intelligence Chiefs, the Deguty Commander of TAC, the Deputy

Conmander of CONARC, and the Commander of the 18th Airborne

waitinGs

EXCLUDED FROM GDS

Copy to:

General Craig

AX Angelido

colone., USAd

TOP SECRET

Deputy

Secretary

Copy-

-copies eah

of d pages

series_

NN 17874 DocId: 32276301 Page 194

---

## Page 195

SECRET

7 February 1962

Decision on:

JOS 1969/303

(NORTHWOODS) (S)

At their meeting on 7 February 1962 the Joint Chiefs

of Staff approved BGEN Craig's recommendations as

set forth

in paragraph 13 of the subject paper, as amended by changes

In the second paragraph of inclosure A.

BY JES CH

CLANGE CADA CONTINUED

...e"ni.

Hey Angelido

M.

J. INGELIDO

Colonel, USAF

Deputy Secretary

Copy

to:

General Craig

.: 991

EXCLUDED FROM GL

EXCLUDED FROM GE.

SECRET

NH 47874

DocId: 32276301 Page 195

---

## Page 196

SOP SECRETNOFOi..!

SPECIAL HANDLING

SECRET

JCS 1969/303

8 February 1962

COPY NO.

1

SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION

JOINT. CHIEFS OF STAFF

DECISION OI JCS 1969/303

A Note by the Secretaries

on

NORTHY OODS (S)

Note by tre Secretaries

I. At their meeting on 7 February 1962 the Joint Chiefs of

Staff approved the recommendations in paragraph 13 of JCS

1969/303 as amended by changes in the second paragraph of

Enclosure A.

2. This decision now becomes a part of and shall be attached

as the top sheet of JOS 1969/313.

SE Pa, 84.

DARE ON

F. J. BLOUIN

M. J. INGELIDO

Joint Secretariat

EXCLUDED

FROM AUTOMATIC

REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10

DOES NOT APFLY

EXCLUDED FRO A GD$

TOP

NY 47874 DocId:32276301 Page 196

SPECIAL

SE IN NOFORM

---

## Page 197

TOP SECRET NOT RI

SPECIA. HANDLING

SPECIAL HANDLING

IOP SECRET

REPORT BY THE DEPARTM INT OF DEFENSE AND THE

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF REPRESENTATIVE OF THE

CARIBBEAN SURVEY GROU ' TO THE CHAIRMAN,

JOINT CHIE 'S OF STAFF

01

CUBAN PROJECT

EXCLUDED FROM GDS

NW 47874

TOP SECRET

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC

REGRADING:

DOD DIR 5200.10

DOES NOT APFLY

DocId: 32276301

Page 197

TOP SECRET NOFORE CSGWG.CH3I

S8S0220 MR M000i0s

NOT SUCER I-NOFOR

---

## Page 198

TOP SECRET

TIP SECRET

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED

NOFORN

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

POSITION OF DEPARTME IT OF DEFENSE, CUBA PROJECT

TH: PROBLEM

i. so requested by the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project*

to dovernine a firn US position regarding the stake and role

of the Department of Defense in the event US assistance is

requested in support of Cuba, insurgent efforts to overthrow

the

astro government.

ASS IMPTIONS

'onal Security Policy concerning overthrow of the

Dadspoparde is as agreed it the 9. May 1961 meeting of the

Marioned dicurity Council.

das dicuation In Cuba will be as. reflected in current

***

Nationel intelligence Estime tes.

i.Oeicaciose against the Castro governnent will be covert

In the interers.

. Tune farine tse Castr government.

FACTS BEARDIG ON THE PROBLEM

.. At the 5 May 1961 mee 1ng** of the National Security

Council it was agreed that is policy toward Cuba should ain at

the downfall of Castro. Ot ler significant elements of policy

determined at that ineeting ere:

a. The United States should not undertake military inter-

vention in Cuba at that ine but should do nothing to fore-

close

the possibility of military intervention in the future.

b. The United States should not impose a naval blockade

or attempt

an air war against Cuba.

* Memorandum from Brigadier General E. G. Lansdale, USAF, for

Brigadier General W. H. Craig,.

USA,

subject:

"Specia]

Project" dated 17 Jan 1962, not on

file in Joint Secretariat

** Enclosure to JCS 2304/:6

***

SNIE 85-61, dated 28 Nev 61, also NIE 85-62 to be published

7 Feb 1962, both documents

will be available through Joint

Secretariat

TOP SECRET

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED

NORORN

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

FOP SECRET

NH 47874

DocId: 32276301

Page 198

---

## Page 199

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

SPECIAL HANDLING. REQUIRED

NOFORN

LIMINAD DISTRIBUTION

c. The direction of th: President that the Central

Intelligence Agency, with other departments, should make

a stalled study of possi le weaknesses and vulnerabilities

da too elements which exet contral in Cuba, was noted.

7. For additional facts, see Enclosure B.

DISCUSSION

&. For discussion seen lose c.

CO ICLUS IONS

?. The basic milltary implications of Castro's Communist

governs are as follows:

.

exposes the west irn Hemisphere to an Increasingly

acto threat to its security. mhis increases our

2. Lunt vulnerability ant defense costs as forces are

awelc ad of shifted to miet this threat.

?. " provider the Sovlet Union with the most effective.

Was they have ever had for spreading Communism throughout

tir wasiern Hemisphere.

Chis in turn greatly increases

t: pilbility that addliional Latin American countries

r. 31. con inder Communist control. Elimination of this

inde would demonstrate to the other nations of the world that

the United States will no tolerate such intrusions.

Comnunist control of addicional countries would or could

result in:

(1) Increased Commust capability for attack on

other nations of the western Hemisphere;

(2) Ingreased Commu at capability for spreading

Commune throughout latin America;

(3) The tope of existing and/or potential bases, training

ares, Feel and into a welde sources o

stratesp materiale necessary to our military capablity;

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED

NOLORNE "

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

N 47874

DocId: 32276301

Page 199

---

## Page 200

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED

NOFORN

LIATED DISTRIBUTION

(4) An Increased tr.reat to US usage and control of

the Panama Canal through subversion and sabotage.

10. The urgency of the recuirement to remove the Communist

i, goveannant, from Cuba is made

apparent by Castro's constantly

incroasir capabilities for attacking other nations of the

Westurn Henisphere and for spreading Conmunier throughout

thencrisphere.

This senne (f urgency is gresuly Increased 1f

counses of action within ihe capability of the Conmunists are

considered:

= * soviets could ( stablish land, sea and/or air bases

in Curr.

¿re Soviets could 1rovide Castro with a number of

indistic nissilos with luclear warheads; or they could

tants: the missiles and maintain joint control of the

li. In when ai she facior: set forth above, the Department.

of parents holds that the Cummunist regime in Cuba is

incomattle with the minimin security requirenents of the

Weston Martsphere. The Department of Defense is prepared to

overly support any popular movement inside Cuba to the extent

of musting the

Colmunist re ime and installing a governnent

accariabr: to

the United Stites. While the possibility of

Communist Bloc reactions

in

areas other than Cuba is

recognized, it is believed hat the project objective can be

acconplished

without precip tating general war, and without

serious effect on world pub lie opinion if the following four

conditions prevail:

a. If the impression is created that there is an

urgent, humanitarian reguirement to restore order in Cuba

and/or the United States is responding to an appeal for

assistance from a goverr ent... representative of the

Cuban people.

TOP SECRET

3.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED

NOFORN

FINITED DISTRIBUTION

KEN SECRET

NN. 17874

DocId: 32276301

Page 200

---

## Page 201

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED

NOFORN

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

b. If 1t is announced rior to the overt military action

tist the United States ant/or other members of the OAS are

cring into Cuba for the surpose of restoring order and

holding free elections, and that they will imnediately

withdraw as soon

as the new government advises that they

have the capability

to maintain order withoat further

assistance from OAS natics.

c. If the military operation is conductel as quickly

as possible and with sufficient force so that the Communist

Blos': abililty to take effective counter-measures in support

of So: Castro regime is reduced to a minimum.

i, Do, if the Cuban regime conmits hostile acts against

0: roscas or

property which would serve as an incident

which to

base overt US interventions.In this event,

Entinable portions of a b, and c above apply.

Ia. The Department of Defense is also prepared

to covertly

provide support in SIA and itate, or through these agencies,

to any US approved popular i ovenent inside Cuba, in terns of

supplies: craneportation, personnel and bases.

RECOI MENDATIONS

13. It as rocommended tha: :

a: The

menorandun at linclosure A hereto, which reflects

the arove conclusions,

br: forwarded to the Secretary of

lefense.

b. This paper NOT be. orwarded to comnanders of unified

or specified comnands.

c. This paper NOT be 'orwarded to US officers assigned

to

NATO activities.

d. This paper NOT be orwarded to the Chairman, US

Delegation, United Natio is Military Staff Conmittee.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED

NOFORN

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

• TOP SECRET

SECRET

NH 47874 DocId: 32276301

Page 201

---

## Page 202

TOP SECRET SPECIA: HANDING NOFORN

ENCLOSURE A

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Cuba

1.

Pursuant to the objectives of the Caribbean Survey Group,

the Department of Defense was requested* to construct a firm

position with respect to the Department's stake and role in the

removal of the Communist regime

In Cuba.

2. The Joint. Chiefs of Staff recommended that the attached

proposal be adopted as

the officlal DOD position and forwarded

to the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project.

*Memorandum from BrigGeneral E. G. Lansdale, USAF, for

BrigGe eral W.H: Craig, USA,

subject:

"Special. Project"

dated 17 Jan 1962; not on file in Joint Secretariat

As amended by JCS at meeting on 7 Febraary 1962

NH 47874

TOP SECRET

DooId: 32276301

Page 202

SPECIAL HANDLING

© NOPORN

---

## Page 203

TOP SECRET

TODD SECRIT

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED

NOFORN

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

APPENDIX 1 TO ENCLOSURE A

• DRAFT

MEMON LISTM FOR BRIGADIER CE ERAL E. G. LANSDALE,

Chief of Oper tions, Cuba Project

Subject: Cuba Projec:

Peference:

Memorandum "rom Your Office for

BrigGen W.

"Special Pr ject", dated

subj:

1. Craig, USA, 17 Jan, 6a

1. As requested in referinced memorandum, the position of

the Department of Defense, vith respect, to the military stake

anc. wale in the removal of she Connunist regime in Cuba, has

been autormined based upon

the following factors:

a. Vational Security Policy, determined by thü NSC during

We ircuting of S May 1961.

b. Current intelligerse

estimates of the situation in

c. Operations agairst the Castro regine will be covert,

at lears Initially.

d. Time favors the Cistro government.

?. The basis military irplications of Castro's Conmunist

governme. are as follows:

a. it exposes the Western Hemisphere to an

Increasingly

cerious threat to its

security. This increases our national

vilne-ability ard defenie costs as forces are developed

or shifted to meet this threat.'

b. It provides the Soviet Union with the most effective

base they have ever had for spreading Comnunism throughout

the Western Hemisphere. This in turn greatly increases the

possibility that additi nal Latin American countries will

come under Comnunist coitrol. Elimination of this base would

demonstrate to the othe nations of the world that the United

States will not tolerat:

such intrusions: Communist

control of additional cuntries would or could result in:

TOP SECRET

Appendix 1 to

Enclosure A

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED

NORFORN

LIMITED PISTRIBSIEOCRET

N# 47874 DocId: 32276301

Page 203

---

## Page 204

TOP SECRET SPECIAL MANDLIN: NOFORN

(1) Increased Communi it capability for attack on

other nations of the Wessern Hemisphere.

(2) Increased Communt it capability for spreading

Communism

throughout Latln America..

(3) The loss of existing and/or potential bases,

training areas, facilities and rights, as well as sources

of strategic materials necessary to our military

capability.

(4) An increased threat to US usage and control

of the Panama Canal through subversion and

sabotage.

3. The urgency

of

the requirement to remove the Communist

government. from Cuba is made apparent by Castro's constantly

Increasing capabilities for attacking other nations of the

Western Hemisphere and for spreading Communism throughout the

hemisphere.

This sense of urgency is greatly increased if

courses of action within

the capability of the Communists

are considered:

a. The soviets could establish land, sea and/or air

bases in

Cuba.

b. The Soviets could provide Castro with a number of

ballistic missiles with nur lear warheads; or

they could

furnish the missiles and me intain

joint control of the

nuclear warheads.

4. In view

of the factors et forth above, the Department of

Defense holds that the Commun: st

regime in Cuba 1s incompatible

with the minimum security req irements of the Western

Hemisphere.. The Department o: Defense 1s prepared to overtly

support any popular movement : nside Cuba to the extent of

ousting the Communist regime nd installing a government

acceptable to the United Stat.s. While the possibility of

Communist Bloc reactions in a eas other than in Cuba is

recognized, it. Is belleved thit this can be accomplished without

precipitating general war, ant without serious effect on

world public opinion if the flowing conditions prevail:

2

Appendix 1 to

Enclosure A

INN 47874

Doora 100, SECRET SPECIL MANDLING NOFORN

---

## Page 205

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED

NOFORN

LIPPED DISTRIBUTION

a. It the impression ii created that there is an urgent,

huraniterian

requirement 1o restore order. in Cuba and/or the

Urtico States

is zéspordig to an appeal for assistance from

a government

representative of the Cuban people.

w. if it is announced : ncident to the overt military

action that the United Sates and/or members of the OAS are

ncring into cuba for the lurpose of restoring order and holding

free elections, and that

hey will Inmediately withdraw as soon

as the new government adv ses that they have the capability

to maintain order without further assistance from the OAS

nations.

o. if the nilitary

ope ation is conducted as quickly

as posssole and with suit cient force to that the Communist

Bio's ability to take ef 'ective counter-measures in support

Oã the castro regine is riduced to a minimuin.

d. Dr: It the cuban re jime commits hostile acts against

US forces or property whih would serve as an incident upon

which to base overt US in ervention. In this event, applicable

portione cr a, b, and c arove apply.

5. The Department of Defeise is also prepared to covertly

provide support to CIA or stite, or any US approved popular

novement inside Cuba, in teris of supplies, transportation,

personnel and bases.

TOP SECRET ,

3

Appendix 1 to

Enclosure A.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED

NOFORN

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

POT SECRFT

NH

47874

Docld:32276301

Page 205

---

## Page 206

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED

NOHO-N

LIM TED DISTRIBUTION

FACTS BEARIIG ON THE PROBLEM

1.. The over-all plan* for the overthrow of the Castro

gover went is responnive to he following objective:

he US objective

is tr help the Cubans overthrow

che conmunist regime from within Cuba and institute a

rew government with which the United States can live in

pease."

2. It is becoming increas ngly evident that the Castro regine,

aide matesially, morslly anl financially by the Sino-Soviet

Bloc, has become firnly entrinched. Over the cast two and one-

half jeano, the Castro regim: has graduaily built up a police

state on the Sino-Soviet model. The first stew was the

Inmentee replacement of the existing Cuban Arny and police

force by revolutionary units which had fought with Castro during

the revolution in the hills ind in the underground. Changes in

the Navy and Air Force were ccomplished through purges of top

personnel.

Toward the end o? 1959 as disillusionment and opposi-

tion over the drift

toward closer association with the sino-

Soviet Bloc began to crystalize within the regular armed forces,

the regime again shifted its basis of power, this time to the

newly-formed civilian worker -peasant-student rilitia. Dr. Castro

looked upon this militia as a presumably more reliable military

force. For almost a year the militia maintained its status as

a para-military organizatior under labor union and student

federation leadership.

on ¿) September 1960, Castro reorganized

the nilitia along military Iines and the chief of the corresponding

military district took over conmand of the militia units.

specifically trained officers replaced the original militia

commanders and military training was

accelerated.

* Program Review by Brigadier General E. G. Lansdale, USAF,

subject:

"The Cuba Project"

', dated 18 Jan 1962; not. on

file in the Joint Secretariat.

TOP SECRET

Enclosure B

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED

NOFORN.

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

TOP SECRET

NH 47874 DocId: 32276301

Page

206

---

## Page 207

TOP EXCRE

Ta 1 SECRET

SPECIAL INDLING REQUIRED

NOW'ORN

LECTED DESTRIBUTION

3. Simataneously, the Caitro regime was also buildingits

secur-ty network*

: In Jure: 961, the process vulminated with

the establishment o" & Minis ry of Interior with reponsibility

for antoning "puttic orde:". The decree certralizes the

variiis pojice and investiga ion units under the new ministry.

• It also gave the Ministry au hority to suvervise the activities

of "Commistees for the Dorenie of the Revolurion". These

comaste. aro respundibic for inforning authouities of "counter-

revoiationary' activities or attitudes. A campaign is under way

to establich 100,000 of such committees with 50, 000 'volunteer"

nembers in offices, factories, schools, churches, conneratives,

residents areas, ete. By entraiizing the police function

and combscing it wiür a vast network of itorners, the Castro

regine haa estaolished a security systen on the

Communist Bloc

nodel.

4. In spport of this military and security build-up, Castro

forcos have been equipped wish arms and materiel from the Sino-

Soviet Bloc countries, i.e., Czechoslovakia and Russia. In-

formation indicates the cuba, force 1s well equipped with

modern weapons and that there 1s .1n Cuba an actual surplus of

military equipment for the force in being. Some accounts

indicate that certaln material is rather sophisticated, and

Includes EW radar, fire contcol systeils, advanced fighters,

short and possibly mediun range rockets.

It becomes obvious

that the Castro forces are keing trained and equipped for

operations far beyond that required to maintain law and order

and internal security. This represents a continuous threat to

the Western Hemisphere, and is a Communist stronghold for the

* Department of State White Paper,

subject:

"The Castro Regime

in Cuba"

, recently publisted but undated; not on file in

Joint Secretariat

TOP SECRET

2

Enclosure B

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED

NOFORN

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

SECRETI

NW 47874 DocId: 32276301 Page 207

---

## Page 208

" O" SECRKT

TOP SECROL

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED

NOFORN

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

continued spread of Conmuniim to other countries of the

inter-Anerican System.

5. In response to a request* by the President in April 1961

the Defense Department has ready planned for the over-

thre vi the Castro governmnt by use of military force. In

the event formal, overt comitment of US forces in Cuba should

becone necessary there are now two US nilltary plans** in being

elt to? which could be im lemented. Both plans provide for

tid ipinyment of sizeable l'S forces and are designed, anong

cia things, toward the ovir-throw of the Castro-government as

PAparag :: cossible.

a. CINCLANI OPLAN 314.61, ** approved*** by the Joint Chiefs

suit, provides for a simultaneous amphibious and airborne

.:au:" within 18 days a'ter the execution order, assuming

pr? alert on prepos tloning of forces. After the intial

li is e.timated that overthrow of the Castro

goverunar aid the gain of essential control of Cuba would

he assured in 10 days.,

b. CINCLANT OPLAN 316-61, ** designed for al faster commitment

u? US forces, provides for an airborne assault within 5 days

of the execution order. However; since this plan deploys

fewer forces initially, o estimate is made concerning the

length of time required

for overthrow of the governnent or

control of Cuba. This latter plan, not yet approved by the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1s in process of minor revision by

CINCLANT.

* JCS 2304/29

CINCLANT Contingency Oferations Plan

plans on file in Joint Secretariat

***

JCS 2018/306

and

both

TOP SECRET

3

Enclosure B

SPECIAL HANDEING REQUIRED

NOFORN

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

COP SECRET

47874

Doold: 32276301

Page 208

---

## Page 209

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED

NOFORN

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

ENCI OSURE C

I ISCUSSION

1. Although 1t is possible that a Cuban counter-revolutionary

• leader could energe with suificient appeal to enable the anti-

Caste: elements to unite in an attempt to seize power, such

eventuality does not seen 1: kely unless fostered and supported

by the United States.

To dite, exiled Cubans have failed to

pruduce such a leader.* Evn the loss of Castro by assassination

o: by natural casues, while unsettling on the government, would

aimost certainly not prove : atal to the regine.** It is there-

fore expected that no Cuban leader or insurgent group can

iileperdently undertake a

s: gnificant subversion effout against

the government with any rea onable chance of success:

2. Even a cursory look a; Castro's military preparations to

defend Cuba indicates that purely overt attempt to overthrow

• the Castro government can oily be accomplished by a well conceived

military plan in significan: force, requiring milltary inter-

vention by the United

States.

3. As 10ng as Cuba does not becone a member and an accepted

military partner of the War saw Pact the threat of general war as

a result of US military intervention in Cuba does not appear to

exist.

4. It is expected that te Castro governnent will avoid giving

the United States sufficiert provocation for arned intervention.

For this reason Cuban forces are not expected to be committed to

•an attack on the US Naval Ease at Guantanamo Bay. Neither is it

* J-2 DM-400-61, "After

tre Assassination of Castro ' What?"

dated 27 October 1961; cn file

in J-2

** SNIE 85-61,

"The Situation and Prospects in Cuba", dated

28 Nov 61; on file in Jint Secretariat

TOP SECRET

Enclosure C

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED

NOFORN

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

NOR SECRET

NW 47874

DocId: 32276301

Page 209

---

## Page 210

1 DP SECRET

TOP SECRET

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED

NOFORN

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

expected that Castro will a low a definite relationship to becone

known or apparent between his governient and communist

attempts

at infiltration and subver: ion of other Latin American states.

5. It is postulated ther fore, that to progress in following

tt.: curablished national po icy of aiming at the downfall of

Castro, it will be necessa: y for the United States to support

a selected Cuban Insurgent : ttenpt from the outset

and to be

prepared to sustain such in urgent program is e

successful

conclusion, including overt military intervention as the final

and decisive step.

6. It: is clear that the linited States cannot afford repetition

of the infortunate miscalcu ation of the political aspirations.

of Fidel Castro in the desi:e to sus an end to the Batista regine.

It would appear that a sign ficant lesson of

this costly mistake

is the requirement for emphisis and Improvement in US Intelligence

efforts to evaluate the tru: colors of potentially capable

personalities and groups wh ch

eventually may have to be

recognized and supported by the United States in future counter-

revolutionary undertakings.

7. The basic military im lications of Castro's Communist

government are as

follows:

a. It exposes the Wes ern Hemisphere to an increasingly

serious threat to its security. This increases our national

vulnerability and defens: costs as forces are developed or

shifted to meet this

thrat.

b. It provides the Soilet Union with the most effective

base they have ever had or

spreading Communism throughout

the Western Hemisphere. This in turn greatly increases the

possibility that additional Latin Anerican countries will come

under Communist control:

Elimination of this base 1n Cuba

would demonstrate to the other nations of the world

that the

US will not tolerate

suc.1 intrusions. Communist control of

additional countries would or could result in:

TOP SECRET

2

Enclosure C

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED

NOFORN

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

TOP SECRET

NIT 47874

DocId: 32276301 Page 210

---

## Page 211

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED

NOFORN

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

(1) Increased Communist capability for attack on other

nations of the Western Hemisphere.

(2) Increased Conmunist capability for spreading

Communism throughout Itin America.

(3) The loss of existing and/or potential bases, train-

ing areas, facilities and rights, as well as sources of

strategic materiels

necessary to our military capability.

(4) An increased threat to US usage and controlof the

Painana Canal through : ubversion and sabotage.

8. The urgency of the recuirement to remove the Communist

government from Cuba is made apparent by Castro's constantly

increasing capabilities for attacking other nations of the Western

Henisphere and for spreadins Communisil throughout the hemisphere.

This sense of urgency is

greatly increased 1f courses of action

within the capability of the Communists are considered:

a. The Soviets cuuld ‹ stablish land, sea and/or air

bases in Cuba.

b. The Soviets could i rovide Castro with a number of

ballistic missiles with luclear warheads, or they could

furnish the missiles and maintain joint control of the

nuclear warheads.

9. In view of the factor: set forth above, the Department of

Defense holds that the Commnist regime in Cuba is incompatible

with the minimum security r quirements of the Western Hemisphere.

The Department of Defense 1; prepared to overtly support any

popular movement inside Cub, to the extent of ousting the

Communist

regime and instal.ing a governnent acceptable to the

United States. While the possibility of Communist. Bloc

reactions in areas other thin in Cuba 1s recognized, it is

believed that this can be a :complished

without precipitating

general war, and without serious effect on world public opinion

if the following conditions prevail:

TOP SECRET

3

Enclosure C

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED

NOR ORN

LIMITED DISIRIBUTION

TOY SECRAT

NW 47874 DocId: 32276301 Page 211

---

## Page 212

TOP SECRET

MDP SECRET

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED

NOFORN

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

a. If the impression s created that there is an urgent,

humanitarian requirement to restore order in Cuba and/or

the United States is res onding to an appeal for assistance

Croi a government representative of the Cuban people.

b. If It is announced incident to the overt military

action that the United Siates and/or other members of the OAS

are moving into Cuba for the purpose of restoring order

and holding free electicas, and that they will Immediately

withdraw as soon as the new government advises that they.

have the capability to maintain order without further assis-

tance fron OAS nations.

c. If the military of eratior: is conducted as wickly

as possible and with suificient force so that the Comnunist

Bloc's ability to take « ffective counter-neasures in

support of the Castro regime is reduced to a minimum.

d. Or, 1f the Cuban regime comnits hostile acts

against US forces or property which would serve as an

incident upon which to lase overt US Intervention. In this

event, applicable porting of a, b, and c above apply.

10. The Department of De: ense is also prepared to covertly

provide support to CIA,

or through these agencies, to any US

approved popular novement nside Cuba, in terms of supplies,

transportation, personnel

und bases.

TOP SECRET

Enclosure C

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED

NOFORN

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

TOR SECRET

•N 47874 Docid: 32276301

Page 212

---