## Page 1

104-10103-10112

*L2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

DST AICH

PRO.

POSED

ACTION

TO,

Chief, Special Affairs Staff

INFO.

FROM

Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT Operational/TYPIC/ AMTRUNK

Project AMTRUNK Operational Review

ACTION REQUIRED.- Ra

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED

HEADQUARTERS DESK

CAN JUDGE INDEXING

ABSTRACT

MICROFILM.

PRIORITY

ACTION: Request Headquarters decision on continuation or

termination of Project AMTRUNK.

ACCOM

PLISHEL

Attached herewith is an operational review of and progress

the AMTRUNK team for.

the period of 4 through 31 March.

Station views on the operation are summarized below.

The AMTRUNK operation has the following disadvantages or weak-

nesses:

MAREND

The AMTrunkers admit to being anti-KUBARK and to be working

these agents

is believed that if the operation were to develop, control would

diminish rather than increase in the advanced stages of the operation,

since

the need for KUBARK assistance will decrease as operational

successes increase.

hesitation

It is believed that AMICh 21 would have no

"selling out" the operation to any one of the major re-

fugee political groups

at any time that he felt it advantageous to

do so.

It is believed

if he is not already doing so, he is

most likely

to collaborate with either the Segundo Frente del Es-

cambray,

headed by Eloy,

Gutierrez Menoyo, or the MRP faction headed

by Manuel Ray•

the meantime AMICE/27 will attempt to have his

own

way with

He believes that he is receiving special

attention because of his ZRMETAL connections, and he

tate to go behind KUBARK!'s back to AMTRUNK/1,

Whet not hesi-

AMCAPE/ I And ODACIED

authority, If the operation or KUBARK handling of the

ATTRUNKS does not progress to his liking. Since AUTRUNK/1, acco mang

to AMCAPE/1, "masterminded" this operation in the first place, it may

be assumed that

will withhold nothing from AMTRUNK/1.

SZULC

I tron esoteat AMTRUNK :9-6-8%

Distribution:

Pe9611940-843

146 84 STATE,

3 - C/SAS w/attchs

DATE TYPED

DATE DISPATCHED

5. April 196RNPP

CROSS REFERENCE T@d Mun sutriti.

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

DESENSITIZED

malesalicelian

UFGA-8381

HEADOUARTERS FILE NUMBER

LASSiFICATO

105 6SX 47-43

TOR EIT

RETURN TO CIA

Background Use Only

\ Do Not Reproduce

---

## Page 2

CONTINUATION OF

DISPATCH

#SPATCH SYMBOL, AND NUMBER

UFGA - 8381

AMTRUNK/1 in turn may be expected to keep AMCAPE/1 fully informed.

"There IS hO KUBARK control over AMTRUNK/1 Or ANCAPEVI

B.

This operation has a verv high WilaR potential" if any AMTRUNK

agents are picked up by. the opposition in cuba.

Not only will

KUBARK stand to suffer, but ODACID will be tied directly in to the

operation, as may also QKFLOWAGE, by whom AMTRUNK/1 is employed,

and ances anis newspaper.

embarrassing and should be fully recognized as a possibility, if

not a probability, in the event any of the AMTRUNK team fall

Castro's hands.

NEW YORK TIMES

C.: The security of this operation has certain questionable aspects.

At least six people were told about the operation in varying degrees

prior to the time the team was safehoused.

mwo of the agents.

heir security during

is withholding information.of an unknown nature from his KUBARK con-

tacts.

An undercurrent of friction has recently developed between

AMICE/14 and AMTRUNK/3 which manifested itself in a fistfight on

29 March.

This was precipitated by AMTRUNK/3 who called AMICE/14

the Cuban term for a homosexual, the ultimate insult to a Cuban.

This in turn gives rise to the question whether AMICE/14, with a

possible history of homosexual activity (see UFGA-8411), has made

such an approach. to AMTRUNK/3.

The commitments made to AMICE/27 or which AMICE/27 claims were

made to him are

a matter of concern to the Station.

This is an

over which future misunderstanding or aggravation might easily

develop.

E: The Phase I landing point appears highly risky.

It is within

five miles of a cruise missile site radar, and in an area frequently

patrolled by sea.

RABEZ Nunez

Fions aimed a150 at penetrating high mitary levels tos the saera-

tions aimed also

Given the

the lack at control in the AMTRUNk operation,

the same

possibility of the two operations crossing or targetting on the same

individual will be present.

3.

In examining the strengths of the AMTRUNK operation,

group as a whole represents superior agent materiel. Three of the

four have been

They appear to have

number ve fair to vett placed contacts on the inside whom they ex-

pect to be able to call on for assistance.

Although they have

been out of direct touch with a number of

these contacts for periods:

ranging up to two years, this is frequently. the case in this type

of operation.

The objective of the operation is worthwhile.

4• ISadvantages outlined above, it is the recommendation of

Based on the attached operational rexiew and the advantages and

IMWAVE

Station that this operation be terminated at the

eartlest bossible

moment. Since this operation originated

Headquarters level

as requested that Headquarters

IMWAVE aS

the

meantime,

training and

to its decision.

will continue.

If Head-

quarters'

decision is

to continue with the operation

operational plans for

Phase I and Phase II

will be submitted as

this time,,

formulated.

END OF MESSAGE

37988

FOR

5-60

140'

53a

USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

2.

---

## Page 3

31 March 1963

RIOTed frOn ProfOOt AMTRU,VK

sorter: 169-6-8443

PROJECT AMTRUNK OPERATIONAL REVIEW

I. STATUS REPORT ON TRAINING AND PROCESSING, 4-31 MARCH.

The AMTRUNK Team, consisting of AMICE/27;

•and AMTRUNK/3 were safehoused on 4 March

AMICE/14,

AMTRUNK/2,

1963 at Safesite #164

on Plantation Key..

Andrew S. PARMERS, KUROAR instructor from

headquarters,

was already at the training site when the team

was brought there by the two case officers, Irving N. PEGGINS

and Hobart J. VANDEBORN. PARMERS remained

at the safesite

until 16 March during which time he conducted training in

clandestine methods and techniques.

This training included

security, cover and compartmentation, clandestine communica-

tions,

agent spotting, selection, recruitment and management,

and operational planning and reporting.

The training included

group discussion and participation in

a series of 'appropriate

operational situations, several problems,

and daily physical

training.

During this

two week period,

either PEGGINS or

VANDEBORN visited the safesite every

day, spending an average

of two or three hours with the group

in operational dis-

cussions and processing.

During the week of 18 thru 23 March,

both case officers spent a majority of the time with the group,

debriefing them in detail on

their operational contacts, workin

out operational details of their infiltration, and continuing

their training on an informal basis.

The week of 25 through

30 March was spent in PM-type training with emphasis on compass

and map reading, including two night problems,

and on weapons

familiarization

and firing.

During the period under dis-

cussion the AMTRUNK group were all LCFLUTTERED,

were assessed

by the KUROAR assessment team, were given an initial series

of immunizations, were issued

clothing, were processed for

alias documentation, were processed for disguises,

and were

further processed on cover and finance problems.

The re-

sults of the LCFLUTTER examinations were

under cover of UFGA-8111,

sent to headquarters

on 13 March 1963.

Based on DIR

26430,

no further LCFLUTTER is planned at the present time.

Transmitted as attachment "A" to this dispatch is PARMERS

report on his

training of the AMTRUNK group, transmitted as

attachment "B" are the results of the assessments of the

AMTRUNK group,

and transmitted as attachment "C" is the

training report for the week of 25 March.

II. AMTRUNK MISSION OBJECTIVE

the project autrunk mission objective is to overthrow the

•existing cuban government by means

high level military and civillan

culminating in a

coup d'etat which will oust both castro anc

DESENSIRZED

SPEN CHRITI

per GSH-49-45

---

## Page 4

= 2 -

the Communists from power. A secondary and subordinate

mission is to determine the climate prevailing among

the

populace in Havana for organizing resistance elements capable

of either passive or active sabotage.

This secondary mission

is exploratory

in nature only, through the first phases of

the project.

In order to accomplish the foregoing missions,

the operation has been split into two initial phases, which

the black untiltration of AMTRUNk/2 and & on the north coas

will. be compartmented from each other..

the north coast.

of Havana province.

These two individuals plan to go into

Havana for a period of approximately twe weeks, and then

exfiltrate black from the same point at which

they infiltrated.

Phase two.

involving AMICE/27 and AMICE/14, will consist of

black infiltration through the keys area on the north coast

of. Matanzas.

These two individuals will likewise_go into

Havana for a period of several weeks and then exfiltrate black.

These two phases are discussed in detail in following para-

graphs. Phase. One and Phase Two are preliminary infiltrations

designed to set up infiltration/exfiltration routes and to

make initial contacts among certain select high level military

figures in Havana.

The following paragraphs discussing these

phases are not designed to be operational plans.

Detailed

operational plans for each phase will be forwarded as de-

veloped.

III. PHASE I.

A. AMTRUNK Personnel of

1. AMTRUNK/2 is a (21)year old Cuban who is mature for his

years, and in some degree experienced in clandestine opera-

tions.

He attended Catholic Social University in Havana for

two years,

majoring in Social Studies®

Prior to Fidel's

takeover A/2 was allied to student elements of the Partido

Autentico which upheld the constitution of 1940.

He supported

the revolution against Batista till it became apparent that

Castro had cast his lot for a Communist regime.

During his

university years from 1959 to 1961 he was actively engaged

in supporting anti-Castro groups with weapons and materials.

Following the Playa Giron invasion great many in the Havana

underground were rolled up but A/2 avoided compromise.

continued

He

Although A/2 does not consider

cooperative throughout

histraining.

He is a pensive individual who displays good

judgement 'rvait and see"

His present attitude "towards KUBARK appears to

be one

In

the meanwhile, he is con-

scientiously applying himself in preparation for his mission.

3/pV

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## Page 5

08. -3

2. AMTRUNK/3, a 22] year old Cuban, in contrast to A/2,

is

volatimate and impulse

On the other hand he is

quite loyal to A/2 and his quick wit is appealing to hi.

fellow team members.

He worked under A/2 in

the underground

as an action type,

principally engaging in sabotage.

His

underground work began

while he was

in secondary school

when in 1958 he supported the revolution against Batista..

In late 1960 he sided with the counter-revolutionaries and

began full time anti-Castro activities.

After

the crack

down following the Bay of Pigs invasion he avoided detection

and continued to engage in underground activities.

Finally

liami 19l Situation

became hopeless he left Cuba by air for

August J1962.

While A/3 has performed satisfactorily

in his training up to date, his performance falls far short

of the other three members.

A/3 feels KUBARK should onlv

monoport for this operation and should not inter-

ere in the actual plans of the operation

Fortunately his

role in this operation is comparatively minor and he appears

willing to comply with whatever A/2 decides.

Nevertheless,

direct control of A/3 offers problems in the future.

B.

TASKS

Conduct black infiltration landing at Punta La Jijira

farm manager at

Coords 9036145J08

2.

Through contacts of A/3 obtain transportation for A/2

to Guanaba or Havana.

3. Although not definite, A/3 may remain at his father's

farm and train assets in maritime reception and clandestine

Having completed this he would then be ex-

filtrated at Punta Jijira.

4.

A/2 will go to Havana and obtain safehouse and operational

support through his contacts.

5. A/2 will contact and develop two potential assets with

high level connections within the Rebel Army.

6. A/2 will train support and operational assets in clandes-

tine communications as well as arrange for transportation for

his exfiltration..

Exfiltration of A/2 at Punta La Jijira or Puerto Escondido

(AMS 3885 II).

---

## Page 6

C.

D.

INFIL-EXFIL PLANS

Punta La Jijira is 18 May

The tentative date fO t63 infiltration of A/2 and 3 at

The infiltrees will make

their way to A/3's father's farm one kilometer from the coast

and from

there A/2 will be provided with transportation to go

•to Guanabo or Havana.

The exfiltration of A/3 will occur three days after his

infiltration.

This arrangment, as yet, is not definite.

•The exfiltration of A/2 is tentatively planned for 31

May 1963 at Punta La Jijira or Puerto Escondido.

A/3 feels

that Puerto Escondido would afford a more secure point for

exfiltration but that a reconnaisance of the area would be

necessary before final decision is reached.

Prearranged

telegram signal

would indicate his preference.

dates fall within a favorable moon phase for

maritime operations.

In addition the infil-exfil schedule

for an extra margin beyond the 10 days which A/2

considers the minimum acceptable period of time to make his

contacts.

OPERATIONAL ASSETS WITHIN CUBA

1.

Following the successful infiltration of A/2 and 3 the 24

two men will work their way to aufarm owned jointly by A/3's

is married and has an elementary school education.

po record of underground activity.

A/3 will depend upon

o6 CRUZ to make the following contacts in order to obtain

Eransportation to Guanabo

o8 butcher shop in the area and also owns a truck.

б 137 to 40 years of age, married with six or seven children.

He was jailed for a brief period in the past for counter-

revolutionary

*activities.

It (cruzJis unsuccessful'f

he will contact Augusto MACHIN Seoting HERNANDEZ] truck

•08 to A/3's father's farm.

Santa Cruz del Norte) in 1954.

He owns a jeep.

SECRET

19-6.

19/pV

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## Page 7

S

~ 5

06

c.

Another contact of A/3 is (Ramon CALZADILLE) age 21;

single,

8th grade education.

He provided support in

the form of food and safehousing to underground workers

of Havana.

to be safehoused in Havana.

2.

The following assets would be contacted by A/2 after

arriving in Havana.

They will be contacted in the order

listed.

Their function will be to provide safehouses and

vehicles for A/2.

a.

(Elsa Maria NEGRIN, 25) years of age,

born in Havana.

A/2 first met her when she was a student at the University

of Havana majoring in Social Sciences.

lives

with her aunt in Havana and A/2 has maintained cor-

respondence with her.

She has helped previously in

providing safehousing for the underground. She also has

06,00

Pedro IGLESIAS Betancourt, age 55) born in Havana.

He is &physician who lives and practices medicine) in

Havana.0(IGLESIAS) has helped A/2 in underground activi-

ties previously.

He has a brother, two daughters and

a son

now residing in the U.s.

His daughters live in'

New Jersey and were last seen

by A/2 about six months

ago.

Subject was a member of the Partido Pueblo Cubano

anti-Batista group,

and was a professor of medicine)б

as the former head of

(Railroad system in Cuband clamed to be

Subject was originally a member

of the Autentico Party

KUBARK con-

fidante during Castro's takeover.0MENDEZ has an apart-

ment and two cars and has previously helped A/2 in under-

fround activities. He has a daughter who works for thef

government but is not sympathetic to the regime.

husband of this daughter, howevel', works for (Che Guevara.

A/2 has maiptained correspondence

with MENDEZ.

d. isabel MENOCOL, age about (35) born in Havana,

single.

Subject is an English teacher who runs a small privat

& tutoring) school in English {n Havana

She was A/2's

08 English teacher) and offered support

to the underground.

06 MENOCOL lives by herself, has an

automobile and is a

close friend of A/2 and his wife.

3 •C RiE

26/pV

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## Page 8

i- 6 -

06

08

e. Gloria BAMCIALZA) age 23-24, born in Havana, single,

mother and father deceased. she attended_ the Universits

of Havana and Villanova from 1959 to 1960J

She became

a close friend of A/2 during their student days in

Havana. oShe has no record of underground work.

She

lives in Guanabo Beach during the summer:

A/2 felt he

might attempt to contact her if she was

living at

Guanabo Beach) in order to safehouse A/3 there if necessary

The following two operational assets will be contacted

A/2 after he is safehoused in Havana.

Their function will be

to spot Army officers disallected with the Castro Regime.

eVALS) age Late 30s early 105 Army 1ed.

holas the rank of (Captain)in the Rebel Army but

Subject

presently on active duty.OHe was a friend of Castro',

during the revolution and A/2 claims he still maintains

some contact with Fidel.. He also claims VALS has beer

working in a limited fashion against Fidel and was

originally associated with the MR and Monte Cristo

groups." VALS/ primary interest has been truing to or-

ganize his, friends within the Rebel Army against Fidel.

A/2 feels VALS) Is a very discreet individual who has

the G-2.

rusts him completely.

o (U.S. Army) during World War 11.

Jose DUARTE Oropesa) age early 40s served in the

(DUARTE) was Cientuegos ider of the lath Military District)

'ollowing the disappearanc

sently lives on an

Irom property confiscated by the government.

He said

06 DUARTE started working against Castro within the MRP

under Manuel RAY.

for a timene was the military ou

secretary of the

MRP and became quite involved 11

plotting against Fidel.06A/2 also stated that it was

rumored at the time that DUARTE was working for the

MRP that he was also a KUBARK agent.

Eventually

06 (DUARTE) was placed on a G-2 suspect list, but according

to A/2 DUARTE was able to evade detection.

has good connections

within the Rebel Army and re-

volutionary

A/2 trusts this individual

and has confidence

in him as a potential operational

lead in spite of conflicting reports which mention

06 QUARTE) as an opportunist.

CER

---

## Page 9

.

A/2 may also attempt to contact the following

operational asset if he has an opportunity

to make

contact.

(Lester RODRIGUEZ, age late 30s early 40s,J married,

former member of the Partido Pueblo Cubano.

• fought with Raul Castro in the Sierra Cristobal Area

Following the Castro takeover he served as (nead of Jod

one of the military zones within Havana province.

Eventually

thinks headle was given

's now working esser assignments and A/2

He claims RODRIGUEZ assisted his underground group

during 1961 by supplying trucks for transporting

weapons and materials.

E.

COVER AND. COMMUNICATIONS

1. Cover .

A/2 will be issued documentation claiming he is an employee

of a local brewery in Havana.

A/3 on the other hand will be

issued documentation as a bus driver within the city of Havana.

also be issued drivers licenses and additional

items such as immunization certificates, Cuban receipts, etc.

The two men will also be outfitted with disguises.

2. Communications

Primary

communications will be established through an SW

system.

Both men will be given SW instruction and will be

accommodation addresses in Miami.

This instruction

and these addresses in turn will be passed on to the recruited

assets in PBRUMEN for use as the operation develops.

arranged signals will also be devised for use by the team via

telegram

to indicate their progress and confirm their place

and time of exfiltration. Both members will also be given an

OWV.L system to provide them with quick instructions in case

of an emergency.

F. OPERATIONAL AND SECURITY EVALUATION

1.

The operational aspects of Phase I portrays a mission which

has considerable potential but also considerable risk.

The

area of infiltration is within five miles of a cruise missile

site and its accompanying radar.

In addition boat patrols are

known to work this portion of the coast at frequent intervals.

Once infiltrated the team

will not have to travel far before

24

leather's farm)for any length of time and he does not want his

first contact.

A/3 is leary of staying at his

24 (father)to know of his presence in Cuba.

For this reason the

farm will not be able to serve as a safehouse.

paying the hat to do a day he lads.

A/2 plans on

This

presents

the

On approach is to take A/3

SECRET

---

## Page 10

S

to Guanabo or Havana and

safehouse him.

This, however,

may

jeopardize the operation because A/3 lacks the maturity and

patience necessary to stay put while A/2 goes about his busi-

ness.

He may take advantage of his visit to Havana to under-

take a clandestine assignment on his own.

When A/2 and 3

step ashore in Cuba, control will vanish.

Fortunately A/2

has a sufficient resource of judgement to go about his busi-

ness competently.

Unfortunately A/3 gives no such indication.

For this reason an attempt will be made to steer A/3 towards

developing assets around his (lather's farm)with maritime

reception capabilities.

2. . A/2,

on the other hand, appears to have a sufficient numbe:

addition both men are presently outside of the Cuban Army

organization and this position may dampen their effectiveness

While there is no

evidence to verify that DUARTE is pro-regime, there has beer

a recent report on him from AMLEO/3 which claims DUARTE is an

continued to aid him

still leaves a question

mark next to the worth of DUARTE which unfortunately can only

be resolved by direct contact between him and A/2.

There are

other security implications which should be discussed in this

evaluation.

Both A/2 and A/3 cannot be considered truly se-

curity conscious.

While safehoused A/2 wrote a letter to a

contact in Miami

which was to be transmitted by his case

officer.

The letter gave an indication that A/2 was seeking

contacts in Havana and conveyed the impression that a trip

was in

the dfing. A/2 has written several other letters

not seen by his C Os which might have given the same impres-

sion.- AB on the other hand talked quite freely about his

operation to Your friends in New York prior to coming to

and being salehoused He explained that he was joinine

AMICE/27 and AMTRUNK/2 on an operation that would take them

first to Miami and then to Cuba.

Once there they would go

to his

father's farm and begin to make contacts.

A/3 also

stated

that a man named DUARTE

would be one of their con-

tacts.

This loose talk

coupled with A/3's attitude that

KUBARK exists only to serve him makes him a marginal candi-

date for this operation. However, if A/3 is exfiltrated

•three days

after his entry into Cuba,

the operation will

gain, his usefulness and eliminate some of the risk he

presents.

---

## Page 11

3.. The above evaluation stresses the operational and

security

weaknesses in this operation.

In contrast to these weaknesses

are the positive considerations of this mission.

A/2 has the

intelligence, competence, and confidence to approach and re-

cruit two assets with the potential for developing anti-regime

operations. at a high level within the Cuban Army.

The results

which these anti-regime activities can accomplish is a matter

for conjecture but it appears that they carry potential.

Nevertheless,

It the operation continues,

it will bear

close

watching in terms of security and control for these factors

will jeopardize the operation as well as KUBARK's position

if not properly contained:

IV. PHASE II

A. AMTRUNK PERSONNEL

senior member of the AMTRuNK group

is a 41

year old PBRUMEN citizen from

a wealthy

"hign class family.

His father, now deceased, was a prominent individual in law

and

politics and was at one time a senator. A/27 himself

graduated from law school in Habana and was a practising

lawyer.

In 1959 he became legal adviser to Camilio Cienfuegos.

Following the disappearance of Cienfuegos in October 1959,

A/27 began to engage in counter-revolutionary activities.

In May 1961,

at which time he held the position of Under-

Secretary of Public Works, he felt that his underground

• activities. had come to the attention of the government and

he took refuge along with his wife in the Venezuelan Embassy.

He was

given safe conduct from the Embassy to PBPRIME in late

1961.

Subject is intelligent, articulate, and highly moti-

vated.

He has some experience in counter-revolutionary

activities and has demonstrated an excellent capacity for

learning clandestine techniques.

He has a very large ego,

and aristocratic pride, is very sensitive,

and is quick to

take offense

He is frank to

Of KUBARK, that he is not a KUBARk a

sents any, implication

states

that he is working for

r the overthrow of the present

regime in his own country and that he will accept KUBARK aid

and advice but will not accept KUBARK control.

His attitude

although not hostile, is frequently critical, and he pre-

sents a difficult handling problem.

2.

AMICE/14 is a 26 year old Cuban citizen who is also a

law graduate of the University of Havana.

He has been in-

volved much of his adult life in clandestine activities.

Subject arrived by small boat in June 1961 in PBPRIME.He

is highly motivated, is intelligent and objective, and has

a very highly developed security

consciousness, developed

from his counter-revolutionary

experiences.

From January

to July 1961 he made four hacky

miltration/exfiltration

trips to and

and has an excellent

knowledge of the northen as area.

He is easy to work

19-6-811

---

## Page 12

- 10 ÷

with and has

evidenced tittle of the hostilities or anti-

KUBARK teelings shown by AMICE/278

o Cardents area was took

•AMTRUNK/4. Subject is a 49 year old fisherman from the

refuge

"in PBPRIME in February 1963.

He had previously assisted A/14 in infils and exfils and

will

be used as a maritime guide.

B. TASKS

1.

operations.

2.: Through contacts on Cinco Leguas Key, organize a ratline

into the mainland,

including making arrangements for trans-

portation into Havana.

Through the mechanism established above, move to Havana

and obtain safehousing. and operational support.

Make all necessary arrangements for subsequent exfil-.

tration and future infiltrations.

5.

Approach and recruit two key individuals with contacts

among important military figures.

6. Establish internal and external communications.

7.. Exfiltrate from Phase II.

C.

INFIL-EXFIL PLANS

3 April

Subjects will take a small boat with silent motor

nto the Keys area and remain in the area for approximatel

three days, during which time they will remain black, keep

the boat hidden in the mangroves, and contact individuals

known to them on Cinco Leguas.

They will make arrangements

with contacts at that point to re-activate contacts of AMICE/14

on the mainland at Casualidad (Map 4085 III, Grid Square 1747)

and contacts in the town of Marti and Cardenas. Plans will be

at which time AMICEY2Y

and AMICE/14 will

again go into Cinco Leguas and expect to b

passed on through these contacts to Havana.

Subjects will

exfiltrate by small boat on or about 26 April and will be met

by the parent craft in

open water to the north of Cayo Cruz

del Padre (Map sheet 4085 IV).

HENCERIE T

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## Page 13

I C REIT

D. OPERATIONAL ASSETS WITHIN CUBA

1.

Cayo Cinco Leguas.

This key is used for productión of

Residents are reported solidly anti-

Communist.

A/1t has two contacts here that he used previousl

"Tango" (Garcia Lezcano. a

lando is a brother of netialian Cannis Lencane (001.2072201011

whom A/14 wanted to use as a guide in this operation, but who

was already being utilized elsewhered The other contact is

the owner of the Salina (salt drying beds)

been able to recall this individual's name 08 A/14 has not yet

2. Finça Casualidad. This area is directly south of Cinco

,. on the mainland.

Key contacts here are Antonio 06

Garcia' (not related to Tango,

above) and Pablo Lopezy both

of whom

have small farms in

the area.

and has a jeep which

was used previously by A/14 for operational purposes.

City of Cardenas.

Contact is Pedro Barbiowner of the

, Bate Marino restaurant Subiect is a close friend of A/14

who assisted him previously with transportation for maritime

receptions obBarbi) would be used to take A/14 and A/27 to

Havana. Owns a car.

City of Matanzas.

A-14 has a friend here named Carlos, 06

Pedraza who also assisted A/14 in underground activities in

Subject is 6000years old, married, and is a forman

Subject has a son Carlos now.

will be contacted for transpor-

tation to Havana. Owns a car.

"pfo". Binetro)owns a car and was formerly a

close friend of A/14.

Subject was formerly active in the

used by A/14 in the event he could

7. Havana

06

Subject is single and lives

of AMICE/27 (possibly

mis-

Subject is

1) sister of Rafael (Suarez) More, a Commandante inthe Navy )

yho, according to A/27, was at one time (chief of naval

operations. His present assignment or

location is

unknown.

0б

23/pl

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## Page 14

support,

and safehousekeeping. Was formerly a Lt.

in Oriente under Calixto Garcia, but no longer in army.

A/1.4 believes he

is now an adminstrator of some type of

industry in Havana.

Maria Josefa (Isalgue)) Subject is aunt of A/14

and can be used as safehouse keeper.

She is single, lives

alone except for ten cats.

Does not have a car.

formerly

a teacher but now has a pension and does not work.

Gonzalo (Lopez) de la Torre) Subject is a relative of

A/27 and can be called on

for ops support

or safehousing.

Subject has a car, is married, no children, is in his

sixties.

Bebo (Orozgo)

To be recruited by "A/14 as his prin-

Havana.

Subject and A/14 previously

together in the underground.0Orozco)wäs in the Sierra

with Castro and also fought in Camaguey :

He resigned from

the army in February. 1959, although he has maintained many

contacts within the army.

Was one time active in the

Movimiento Democratico Martiano and was a friend of Capt.

Bernardo Corrales who was shot by Castro in Pinar del Rio.

Subject came to PBPRIME in April 1961 with A/14 to obtain

arms and remained there 10 days, infiltrating back into

Cuba without his absence having been known to the authori-

Was responsible for safehousekeeping(Vargas Gomez] d

for nearly one month when authorities were searching for

Will be used for intel collection and spotting on

defectable army officers.

He is also known to A/27,

not well.

A/14 was last in touch with Orozco by letter

about two months ago.

f.

Subject to be recruited by A/27

as principal

Ramon (Guin) Dia would be used for operational in-

telligence and spotting among disaffected army officers..

Would be kept entirely compartmented from Orozco)0 Guin

is an army Comandante, now managing a large INRA farm

complex outside of Havana.

He is known to A/27 and A/14,

both of whom believe he can be contacted safely.

He is

anti-Communist and is one of the group of Camilo Cienfuegos

officers contacted by A/27 in early 1961 to join in an

overthrow of. the government.

SECRET

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## Page 15

- 13

g.

Target personalities who are suspected of being dis-

affected

and

on whom A/27 and A/14 will

attempt to gather

information in Havana are as follows:

1.

Comandante "Macho" Parra

Cdte. Oscar Guerra

3.

Jose Pinares

4.

5.

Capt.

FNU Lawton

Manuel Avila

6

7.

Codte. Rene de los Santos

Pedro Miret

8.

Capt.

Juan Nuiry

9.

Cmate: Rafael Suarez More

10.

Capt.

Fernando Fernandez Superville

11

Capt. FNU Guerra Matos

12.

Capt. Sandy Olivares

13.

Jose Fernandez Alvarez

These names have all been checked through JMWAVE RI and

in most cases also with AVindo/3.

In a majority of cases

there appears to

be some evidence to indicate the subjects

may be disaffected.

In the case of Jose Pinares however,

it would appear that he is completely loyal to the regine

This information was passed on to A/27 and A/14. RI files

were negative: on Avila and Lawton.

E.

COVER AND COMMUNICATIONS

AMICE/27 and AMICE/14 will live black during their entire stay

in Cuba.

They will be equipped with alias

documentation and

with disguises.

Both of them have previously lived in the

Havana

area

and know the city well.

They will be trained in

Secret Writing (SW) and will plan to train at least two and

possible three agents in Havana in SW, prior to their own

exfiltration.

In addition, it is planned to train A/27 and

A/14 in OWVL. At the time of infiltration, exfiltration plans

will have been laid on with the agents.

In the event that a

change in time or location of exfiltration becomes necessary,

an OWVL message could be sent to the agents.

Any urgent

and

immediate message which might have to be sent by the

agents

during their short stay in Havana would be on a prearranged

open code system by commercial telegram.

Such a system will

be worked out to cover several possible

contingencies.

In-

ternal communications of whatever net is organized by A/27

and A/14 will be arranged by courier, cut-out, live and dead

drops.

F. OPERATIONAL AND SECURITY EVALUATION

vere inconclusive

case officers and the training personnel who have been i

close contact with these individuals that both agents

are

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## Page 16

highly

motivated and strongly anti-communist,

this point will

remain basically unresolved since it is almost certain that

A/27 would refuse a second LCFLUTTER examination if asked.

It is helieved that a 27 was withholding information curing

the chutes and subsequently

The nature, seriousness, and

possible consequences oi this are as yet not clear.

2. A/27 bas told at least two people something ahout this

aperation.

Although he says

that he did not give any

' details

of the operation, he does admit to having discussed it in

very general terms with two individuals whom he named at

the time of the LCFLUTTER test.

One of these is a friend

suspicio

AMICE/27 has not seen his contacts in the army for the

past two years.

Although it is difficult to assess how well

he knows various persons in the military about whom he speaks,

officer's opinion that few of these contacts

might be considered really close.

AMICE/14 has been out of

direct touch with his operational contacts since July 1961.

4. The infiltration into Cayo Cinco Leguas is dependent

upon having a good guide in the boat.

At this time,

Phase

II is awaiting the recruitment of AMTRUNK/4 as guide.

5 .

Control over AMICE/27 and AMICE/14 is basically lacking.

Some control can be exerted through

the implied threat of

withholding support to the operation.

Control however will

remain

tenuous at best and A/27. will continue to be a dif-

ficult handling problem.

6.

On the positive side of the ledger is the calibre of the

agents, both of whom are well educated, astute, and highly

motivated.

clandestine entries and exits and has many operational con-

tacts.

To date both have performed in a superior manner in

training.

V. FUTURE PLANS

Duringthe week of 1 through 6 April,

the team will receive

During the week 8 through 13 April,

maritime instruction training, possibly OWVL training, dis-

they will receive SW

guise training, and further operational planning sessions.

VI.

COMMITMENTS

1.

According to AMICE/?7, the following principle, which he

enunciated during his

SAP&C RIE T

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## Page 17

S

government which

is anti-Communist and which operates on

democratic principles;

ODYOKE does not desire to impose a

government of its own choice upon Cuba"..

A/27 has made

big point of discussing this "commitment".

It is apparent

that he intensely dislikes (or fears?) Batista and his

followers.

It is also apparent that in his mind he links

Batista and KUBARK, and fears that KUBARK would back Batis-

tianos in à post-Castro government.

AN ANTRUNK group members think that they received a

comment thile in ZRMiTAl that ObYOkE" would support their

operational plan, with funds.

trainina

Logistica, support

and technical

assistance, but would leave control of the

operation entirely in

their hands

In other words. they

are not working for ODYOKE or KUBARK in any sense.

On this

point they are

very sensitive.

Another commitment which AMICE/27 claims to have discussed

"""'O In ZRMETAL is that ODYOKE should give "official recognition"

to members of a conspiracy which culminates in a successful

coup d'etat, following the coup, in order that these individual:

not be treated as political criminals by a future regime.

This means recognition of an individual's participation in

the conspiracy, not a promise of recognition of a specific

government formed by the conspirators themselves.

4.

Discussion of the above "commitments" has been pressed

several times by A/27.

PEGGINS has not agreed to any of these

commitments with A/27. However, A/27 feels that the com-

mitments have already been made by ODYOKE in ZRMETAL.

PEGGINS

"commitments" back

to ODYOKE to determine 1f, in fact, ODYOKE considers them as

commitments.

The.entycommitment.made_by INWAVF through_ PEGGINS has

been that if any of the AMTRUNK group were killed or captured

issisted for a

PEGGINS declined to state what that time would be or now much

financial assistance would be involved.

6.

One further negative commitment has been discussed between

PEGGINS and A/27.

mitment will be made at this time to support any internal

group organized by the AMTRUNKS with weapons or explosives

and that this extends specifically to no promise to support

active sabotage with demolitions.

N.

19-6-5111

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