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176-10036-10073

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA

RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10073

RECORD SERIES : National Security Files

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR :

FROM : Johnson

TO : Rostow

TITLE : Meeting of Vietnam Task Force June 19 1961

DATE : 6/20/1961

PAGES : 5

SUBJECTS

DOCUMENT TYPE :

CLASSIFICATION :

RESTRICTIONS :

CURRENT STATUS :

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 193: Vietnam General 6/19/1961

6/30/1961. Box 1

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June 20, 1961

2 SECRET

Fannitized

N4K-75-26

NLx 02.310,103

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Meeting of the Task Force on Viet Nam on June 19, 1961

Intelligence Briefing

Among the interesting items reported in the intelligence

briefing was a response from Embassy Saigon on the Cambodian

border problem. Embassy Saigon did not agree with the view of

Embassy Phnom Penh that this is an insignificant problem.

present, Saigon reports, Cambodia is used primarily as a safe

haven by guerrillas in Viet Nam rather than as an area from

which operations are mounted.

The Embassy provided specific

information on VC activity in Cambodia which, it suggested,

should be shown to Sihanouk. There was also a report that the

Indian member of the ICC has stated in the ICC that that body

should investigate subversion.

This was said to have caused

the Polish member to ask for a recess of the ICC in order

permit him

1. to prepare a reply.

This report, if confirmed, is

in line with an earlier TDS indicating that instructions

along these lines had gone to the Indian member of the ICC.)

It was also reported that on Friday there may have been a

clash between Pathet Lao and South Vietnamese forces just in-

side Laos on the highway connecting Laos and South Viet Nam.

(Soüth Vietnamese forces have been in this area for some time.)

The following table on operations for May was also presented.

Killed

Captured

Viet Cong

GVN

824

30

240

158

surrendered

none

Deserted

none

:. '41

The Local Currency Costs Problem

Mr. Cottrell reported on the current status of the

problem of meeting

the local currency costs of the 20,000 man

increase.

A message has been sent to Saigon requesting the

Embassy to undertake negotiations with -the GVN and offering

three alternatives in

descending order of preference:

piasters, provided the GN proceeds without delay with

nate the batene of the out rene,

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b. If the proposal under a above is not adequate to

obtain GVN agreement, we would offer an additional $4.85

million in piasters.

This is estimated to be sufficient

to cover local currency costs in 1961 of the call-up of

the additional 20,000 men.

I neither of the above proposals proves accept-

able,

the U.S: would offer an additional $4.55 million ir

assistance in 1961 which, if the GVN would accept a dollar/

piaster rate of 73, would be sufficient to meet the piaster

cost for 1961.

As of yesterday afternoon, no reaction had been obtained

from Saigon.

In a long conversation with Ben wood, the Deputy

Director of the lask force, Thuan was told before he left the

On the basis of this

itiate the call-up of the 20,000 men, even in the absence of a

final agreement.

This problem, therefore, seems on its way

toward solution.

The Situation in Laos in Relationship to South Viet Nam

A large part of the meeting was devoted to discussion of .

draft memorandum that Cottrell read to the Task Force

taining his ideas with respect to the situation in laos and

what should be done about it. You are generally familiar with

his ideas as a result of your conversation yesterday with him.

I did not attempt to take detailed notes on the memorandum, but

his proposal runs along the following lines:

Cottrell does not believe that any arrangement to create

a neutral Laos will be viable. He does not believe that we

should withdraw in favor of the French in Laos.

The French

cannot be depended upon to do a good job and the reestablishment

of their presence will be deeply resented throughout the former

Indo-Chinese states. The military situation in Laos is alarming.

The Pathet Lao are now posing a serious threat in southern Laos.

The failure of the ICC to

stabilize the situation would provide such an excuse.

He would

then introduce Thai special forces and "hunter-killer" forces

now being trained in South Viet Nam into southern Laos in an

effort to clean out the Pathet Lao "infection" there.

In the

discussion of his proposal,

the question

raised as to

whether the introduction of U. S. forces would not be necessary.

Cottrell acknowledged that this was a real possibility and

emphasized the importance of our not letting our friends in

Southeast Asia down by refusing to use force if that should

prove necessary.

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Members of the Task Force were asked for their reactions

to the paper.

There was

a rather surprising degree

ment that something along this line must be done or it will be

virtually impossible to deal with the situation in South Viet

Nan.

(There was no State Department representative present at

the time except Cottrell himself.). The ICA member and the

representative of Jack Bell's office did raise questions as to

whether political and economic action by the Diem regime was

not a more important precondition to solution in Viet Nam than

military action in laos:

I made the following points about the proposal: First,

observed. that this would seem to me to raise important questions

of policy which had been considered and decided in the past at

the highest levels of government. I indicated that i would be

unable to take a personal stand on the issues raised. I ex-

virtually impossible to deal effectively with the situation in

Viet Nam.

I said that, while I could see no objection to the

Viet Nam Task Force raising these questions, it seemed

that they should be raised much more clearly in the context of

the Viet Nan problem.

That is, the proposed memorandum should

make clear why the present situation in Laos will make it

difficult, if not impossible, to carry out an effective program

against the Viet Cong in Viet Nam. Cottrell agréed to take

r. account

of this suggestion (with which there seemed to be some

agreement in the Task Force).

I understand the reeling of frustration which has

prompted Cottrell to produce his memorandum.

I specifically

share his doubts with respect to getting the French back into

Laos: (I had thought that this proposal had been dropped as a

result of adverse reaction from various sectors.) The Cottrell

proposals, however, raise very directly the question of U. S.

military intervention in Laos.

It seems to me inconceivable

that his objective could be achieved without such intervention.

The proposals also would have the effect, it seems to me, of

merging the war in Laos with the war in Viet Nam. I do not

I think that there is a serious question as to whether the

situation in Laos is not deteriorating so sinteust that any

likely political solution will sos leave it as a serious source

of infiltration into both Viet Nam and Thailand. But I wonder

whether this question cannot be better reviewed in the context

of contingency

planning for Laos itself. In this connection,

I do feel that the military contingency plan that we have seen

for Laos is based upon too narrow a contingency -- l.'e:, a

clear failure to achieve a cease fire or the breaking of a

cease fire by the Communists. We need to plan against the

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possibility that the Geneva Conference will be prolonged in-

definitely and that meanwhile the PL will take over Southern

Laos piece by piece and bit by bit

as it appears to be doing.

I wonder whether you want to check again with Alexis Johnson

on the status of contingency planning?

I wonder whether it

isn't about time to have the NSC and the President review the

Laos situation?

Other Matters

I raised the question as to the next step in consideration

of Diem's proposal for a 100,000 man increase in GVN forces.

was told that the matter was being studied in Defense. It was

the view of the DoD representative that the possibility of such

an increase was academic until some time in 1963 because it

would take until then to raise the 20,000 men already authorized

and the 30,000 currently under consideration. (The 30,000 would

be a part of the 100,000 since Diem was using a 170,000 man base.):

I also raised the question of whether food supplies were

being cut off by the. Viet Cong(as suggested to you by a

•Vietnamese. I was told that the onlyxevidence of Viet Cong

action in this area was the recent seizure of seven barges

carrying sugar. However, it was

also stated that the GN has

given this fear as an explanation for reduction in rice ex-

ports.

That is, the GVN has withheld rice from international

markets because of a fear that the rice may be needed in Viet

Nam if the:VC should begin to cut food supply lines.

Thus it

may be related to the argument about GVN foreign exchange

parentert. e serves.

There seemed to be no great

with this as a current real probiencern in the Task Force

Following

the meeting I

talked to the ICA representative about whether it would be de-

sirable to build up Vietnamese rice stocks to relieve them of

their fear that rice supplies may be cut. off and thus to per-

mit them to sell more of their rice abroada

He indicated that

politically it was very difficult toljustify export of rice to

Viet Nam which was

itself a rice exporter.

(Today I talked with Jack King of: CIA. (ONE) about this

question.

He had not made a specific study of it, of course.:

it was his impression that, while there was some VC interference

with rice movements, the problem was not one of independently

serious proportions. That is, it was.a. reflection of the

general VC problem which was serious, but not in itself a cause

for alarm.

It was also his impression that GVN exports of rice

had been surprisingly well maintained.

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Stunt! 12

Finally; I raised the question of what planning was being

done to internationälize the border problem.

In response

Cottrell simply referred to his plan for dealing with the.

situation in Laos

Today I talked with Bob Cleveland in State

about the same point. He referred to the arrangements that are

being made for a meeting of MAAG and USOM Chiefs of countries

in the area sometime in July:

at which the border problem,

among others, will be discussed.

He also referred to the fact

that Ben Wood is currently working on a counter insurgency plan

to cover all of Southeast

Asia.

Defense had earlier been asked

to prepare such a plan but had

failed to do so.

(I find a

great inertia, apparently rooted in a basic lack of sympathy,

whenever I attempt to raise the question of finding some means

to involve the international community in the border question.

Neither Cottrell nor the State Department representatives.seem

very much interested. Have you ever discussed this question

with Alexis Johnson? I think it might be useful to do so.)

Following the meeting I followed up with Cottrell on the

conversation you had had with him in the morning; asking him

whether he didn't think it would be desirable to send General

Taylor to South Viet Nam to consider the request for g-1:00,000

man increase and also to make sure that our military

activities

in South Viet Nam

were really being reoriented. He reacted

negatively. to this

proposal, taking the view that it was un-

desirable to continue sending missions out to inspect the work

of people in the field...In a later conversation with someone

The more I think about it the more I am convinced that it would

be highly desirable. I very much share your uneasy feeling about

the situation::

BIN

Robert H. Johnson

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