THE DEFECTORS NOSENKO AND GOLITSYN.
Originator: CIA
From: WALLER, JOHN H., IG
To: DCI
Document date: 08/29/1977
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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2022 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

O2032E

INSPECTOR C

-77-19.06

29 August 1977

MENORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

Acting Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

John H. Waller

Inspector General

The Defectors Nosenko and Golitsyn

1. Action Requested:

Approve providing the SSCI with additional material

on above subject per Paragraph 4. belev.

2. Background:

This report concerns the extent of information on

the defectors, Yuriy Nosenko and Anatoly Golitsyn, which the

Agency has made known to the Rockefeller Commission and to the

Senate Church Committee and its oversight successor, the Senate

Select Committee on Intelligence.

NOSENKO: The record shows that the material listed

in Attachment A regarding Nosenko was passed to the Rockefeller

Commission in February 1975.

This material held by the

Rockefeller Commission was subsequently made available to the

Church Committee for its investigation. Additional material

gathered by the Rockefeller Commission

on Mosenko through inter-

views with former employees, etc. may also have been made avail-

able to the Church Committee but we have no record of it. The

Rockefeller Commission's brief mention of the Nosenko incar-

ceration in its final report is attached as Attachment B.

The material concerning Hosenko which was provided

the Rockefeller Commission included details of his background

in the KGB, his racruitment in 1962 and his role as an agent in

place, his defection in 1954, the nature of his involuntary con-

finement by the Agency during the period 1964-67 and the author-

ity on which the confinement was based. The Rockefeller Commis-

sion was also provided a 15-page summary, perhaps better termed

an apologia, prepared by the DDO's Soviet Russia Division and

E2 IMPDET

00777

RETURN TO CIA

Background Use Only

Do Not Reproduce

CL BY 055536

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increasessica

Picanton

20S1

CI Staff in 1967. This paper sets forth the doubts. concern-

ing Nosenko's bona fides, the inconsistencies in his debrief-

ings, his increasingly uncooperative attitude, and the indi-

cations of deception during his initial polygraph examina-

tions.

It describes how the determination was made that

Nosenko was a dispatched KGB agent with a deception mission,

and how Nosenko was then incarcerated to preclude any con-

ceivable means of communication with the KGB.

It was then

believed that intensive interrogation, coupled with a Spartan-

like existence in solitary confinement, would eventually break

Nosenko and bring about a confession as to his true status and

KGB mission. Nosenko withstood the arduous regimen and was

subsequently vindicated.

Other material furnished the Rockefeller Commission

on Nosenko included a rather short summary prepared by the Of-

fice of Security which touched on Nosenko's ultimate vindica-

tion, rehabilitation and current status as a Paid Consultant.

There is no indication that Soviet defector Golitsyn's original

stimulus to the Nosenko controversy was ever surfaced to either

the Rockefeller Commission or the Senate Select Committee.

Golitsyn has inspired and supported the CI Staff suspicion that

Nosenko was a dispatched KGB agent. A study of the Nosenko

case (which takes issue with the earlier suspicions toward and

treatment of Nosenko) prepared by retired annuitant John Hart

in early 1977 called "The Monster Plot" has not been shown to

the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and, of course, was

not finished in time to have been made available to the earlier

Church Committee.

It should be noted that there is a Memorandum for the

Record prepared by CIA's Legislative Counsel, John M. Maury, on

5 August 1969 entitled "Briefing of Key Congressional Contacts

on the Nosenko Case" (see Attachment C). This indicates that

Congressional oversight committees or oversight committee staf-

ters, at least, were privy to CIA concerns regarding Nosenko's

bona fides as long ago as 1909.

This memorandum includes re-

ference to CIA's incarceration of Nosenko, justifying it to per-

mit "prolonged briefing"

, with the concern he might be targeted

for "executive action" if.

the Soviets should discover his where-

abouts.

Nosenko's own attitude since his abuse by CIA seems

to have been philosophical and forgiving.

He has lodged no

complaint.s..

Nosenko continues to be fully cooperative and

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siated his feelings to the Office of Security in 1975 to the

effect that he desires no publicity; it would place him in

personal danger and it would certainly discouraga any Soviet

official from defecting for years to come.

GOLITSYN: Information provided the Rockefeller

Commission and the Church Committee on Anatoly Golitsyn, who

defected in 1967, has been minimal. According to Agency re-

cords, it was limited to recounting the documentation require-

ments, including passports in alias, for change of identity

procedures for Golitsyn and his family on three occasions.

His thesis that Soviet defectors could not be trusted and his

role in working with the CI Staff on an exercise to identify

possible Soviet penetrations of CIA are not believed to have

been known to the Rockefeller Commission, the Church Cormittee

or the present Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Neither

John Hart's report on Nosenko, nor Bronson Tweedy's report on

Golitsyn, which analyze these situations, written after the

Church Committee investigations, have been shown to the Senate

Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI).

It should also be noted that a staff member of the

current Senate oversight committee (Senate Select Committee on

Intelligence), Mr. Jean Malot Evans, was a DDO, CI Staff

careerist until his retirement in June 1974. It is our under

standing that he is, therefore, personally conversant with much

of the background and developments in the Nosenko and Golitsyn

cases, although we do not know how much he has recorded for

the SSCI's benefit.

EDUARD OUN: The Rockefeller Conmission report, on

page 170, mentioned a case where a defector was physically

abused, though not seriously injured, by an Agency employee.

It added that the employee was subsequently discharged by the

• ferrats was dis henged from actin 19us suitability proceedings,

3. Recent Actions:

At your request, I briefed the Staff Director of the

sobi, Pir.

William Miller, on 25 August 1977 in broad outline,

and described the incident of Nosenko's incarceration

by CIA

From 1964-1907, which he was, of course, already ramiliar with.

• also briefed him in cenaral

terms -- without naming specific

officers -- how the careers of certain CIA officers had been

3

J/BR

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harmed by unsubstantiated suspicions that they were Soviet

KGB agents, based on the theories and reasoning of defector

Golitsyn.

This situation had not been previously known by

Miller or the SSCI (although the SSCi's Cl Staff expert,

-vans, as noted above, had previously worked on the DoO's

CI Staff under James Angleton and thus may have had some

familiarity with this episode in the Agency's history).

I also told Mr. Miller that newsman David Martin

seeins to be digging into the Mosenko and Golitsyn cases

and is trying to interview various former CIA employees.

explained that it is possible, therefore, that there may be

public surfacing of some or all of the story.

I offered more complete briefings to the SSCI,

should it so desire.

4. Recommendation:

I recommend that we be prepared to offer Mr. Miller

additional briefings of the Nosenko case and the Golitsyn

case, should he request more detail.

eller

Jóhn H. Waller

Attachments - 3

Attachment A

Attachment B

Attachment C

7s/ Stansfield Turner

APPROVED:

Director of Central Intelligence

DISAPPROVED:

Director of Central Intelligence

DATE:

31 AUG 1977

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:

ДА:

SEGRET

Attachment A:

Titles of documents sent to the Rockefeller Commission

and to the Department of Justice

1.

IITLE

Memorandum for: The Inspector General

Subject

: The Nosenko Case

DATE

1967

Attachment

: Summary of 1967 Document which outlines

the Nosenko Case.

(This 15-page report presents the SR. Division and

CI Staff position that Nosenko was a dispatched

KGB agent and discusses Nosenko's involuntary

confinement by the Agency for approximately three

years.)

2. Memorandum to Dept. of Justice from OGC listing nine

documents requested by the DJ and attached.

(1) Nosenko's request for political asylum dated 4 Feb 1964.

(2) Nosenko's Secrecy Agreement dated 21 April 1959.

(3) Nosenko's contract with CIA as Independent Contractor

or Consultant, dated 21 April 1969 ($16,500 per annum).

(4) Nosenko's contract with CIA dated 1 March 1970

($18,500 per annum).

(5) Receipt for advance of back salary, April 1957-March 1969,

dated 25 Oct. 1972 ($35,000).

Receipt for full payment of back salary, April 1964-March

1969, dated 16 Nov. 72 ($52,052 in addition to prior:

payment of $35,000).

(7)

Nosenko's Acknowledgement and Release to CIA, deted

12 July 1973.

(S)

M/R of 13 July 1973 concerning 12 July 73 acknowledgment.

release.

(9) Nosenko's revised contract dated 9 lay 1974 ($23,750 per

annum).

30 Jan 1975

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3.

M/R from John M. Maury, Subject: Briefing of Key

Congressional Contacts

on the Nosenko Case.

This briefing paper, for the Senate and House

Appropriations and Armed Services Committees,

reflected the DDO's continued concern re

Nosenko's bona fides. Copy attached as Tab C.)

4. Office of Security memoranda re confinement

instructions for Nosenko,

5. Memorandum for USIB from DDCI Marshall Carter

advising of Nosenko's defection.

6.. Memorandum for McGeorge Bundy from DDO

advising of Nosenko's defection.

7. Memoranda from the Office of Security to

I&NS re Nosenko's alien status:

8. Memorandum from DCI to I&NS recommending

permanent residency status for Nosenko.

9. Asst, Atty General Memo to DCI concurring

in permanent residency status.

10. OGC memo to D/OS advising that CIA has

responsibility for Nosenko.

11. C/SR Div. M/R re discussion with Deputy

Attorney General on basis for Nosenko detention.

12. Office of Security summary on highlights

of Nosenko case.

13. The Executive Registry indicates this additional

information was passed to the Rockefeller Commission:

a.

Selected short summaries prepared by DGC

for the DCI.

b. D/OS memo to I&MS advising of Nosenko's

imminent arrival in the USA.

c. OGC meinos to D/OS re Parole Status of

Defectors.

5 Aug 1959

10 July 1964

12 Feb 1964

11 Feb 1964

18 July 1959,

24 July

1969

9 Oct 1969

20 Oct 1969

3 Apr 1964

2 Apr 1964

CA 3 Feb 1975

: 14 Apr 1975 .:

11 Feb 1964

3 Apr 1964

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2Aote

d.

OG!; icemo to D/05 entitled Nosenko

Options (Rehabilitation program).

e.

Memorandum to David W. Belin fron DDCI

responding to specific questions about

Nosenko's period of confinement and about

nature of Agency support for Golitsyn.

f. Meniorandum to David W. Belin from DDCI

listing identities for previous material.

IDENs only were used.

BEGRET

14 Feb 1969

22. Jan 1975

24 Feb 1975

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{

170

irconcendition. (21)

She ClA should strictly adhere to established legal procedures

soverning access to federal iicome tas information.

irconimendation (25)

CIA investigative records should show that the investigation

was duly authorized, and by whom, and shouid clearly sei forth

the factual basis for undertaking the investigation and the results

if the investigation.

C. Handling of Defeciors

Investigation of detectors is the responsibility of the CIA under a

National Security Council Intelligence Directive, assignig this duty

to the Agency as a service of common concern" to the intelligence

conmarty as a whole.

Within the CIA, the Onice of Security is charged with providing

proper security for the handling of persons who have defected to the

I nited States from other nations. A careful procedure has been devel-

oped for such handling.

Generaly a defector can be processed in a fer months' time. In one

instance howero:, a defector was involuntarily confined to & CLA in-

callation for approximately three years. For much of this time, the

detector was held in colitary confinement under estremely spartan liv:

ing conditions. The defector was apparently not physicilly abused.

The justification given by the CIA. for the lengiby confinement arose

out of a substantial concern regarding the defector's bond fides. When

the issue was finally resolved, the defector was given total freedom and

became a Linited States citizen.

The confinement of the defoctor was approved by the Director of

Comral litelligence on the written advice of the Gencral Counsel. The

FBI. the Attorney General, the United States Intelligence Board, and

solecied Members of Congress were all awair to some extent of the

continued confinement.

twid

In one other case. a defector was physically abused, although not.

seriously injured. The Directos of Central Intelligence discharged the

employee involved.

Conclusions

Such treatment of individuals by an ngency of the United States

is anlawful. The Dircein: of Contral Intelligence and the Tospector

General must be alert to prevent repetitions.

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010 03-0675

§ingres 1057

102 19 10015

SuEJECT: Bushag o! isy Congion loral Cantacio ca tes

Iden I

11. The Direcior Having approrad ine proposal in my drait remo

oE 19 Juso i7ú7 (copy alichod) segandng the briellag of day cosgressional

costacto os tha biscory and aiatus cê tuo Iden 1.

casC, 1

heve brissà tue ioliaina siail officaro oi ducasy congicacianal Subcosi-

mittess aloag le linus proposed ds ina daies indicatoi:

•Ersa: Slstinsbek, Asciatazê Chicá Counsel, Mouse

Armai Barricas Commitico -- 23 july 1959

Villiam roodril, Assistant Gile Clori, Sanata

Appropriaziona Commiiaa - 24 Jug 1209

Idrard braswell, Chici of Biail, Serate Arasd

Serrices Coriniltac -- 24 July 1953

Suberi Michasls, Sicil Arpistari, Iiousa éparopriations

Corrittee - 21 July 1903

•2. I suggesiad to caca thai tay merito the matter to the rospactiva

chairmon viboa and ii they iboughi ii appropriato. None of tho stai effeers

registaied persicular co:coro of curiosity aiout the caos and libial it

doubsiul that all oi our caairmos baro leet inimod. Dovericicea, 1

thini ne rava adeguaioly corared tue mular ard sce no reca io purosa it

furter ai this tira.

ingialtive Couns=1

Miotrismion:

Original - ChC Subjoct inie

1- Chiai, 58 Ciüsion

i- CÜC

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SECRET

49-1257

DRAFT:IMA - 19 JUna 1909

SUBJECT: Brieing of lay Congressional Contacts on the Iden 1 Cass

The foliowing paragraphs are proposed as guidance for briefing ey

congressional contacts on the history and status of the iden 1

case.

They are based primarily on material providad by SB Division, and bave

bean cleared by SB, CI Staff and the Office of Security. It is proposed that

che Chairmen and/or senior staff officers si each of ta Agency Subcommittees

ba brisied along the lines indicated.

1. This case goes back sometime into history a=d you may recall

having heard of it sevaral yeais ago, From time to time it has receivea

preas play, both when it first broke in early 1964 and occasionally since.

2. Iden 1,

a Stali Officez of the Committee OF

State Security (KGB) oí the USSR, and son of a iormer Minister of Sain-

building in the SSR, dejecied to the Agency in Geneva, Switzerianc, in

1964. He was then brought to the rited States where be has

since been in the custody of the Agency undargoing extensive dabrielings

by ouicars of the agency and tho i3i.

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3. Iden l had been a nue ditcer dottera:

-a 1e2?5

at te tima oi his céiecrioi. iden 1 has providad a larga guantity oi

courter-intelligence data and a limited amount of positive intelligence.

....Eor exampie, one of his reports played a part in the negation oí a majos

hostile penetration in Great Britain. Where appropriate, his information

has been sharad with the FBI, other Ü.S. Government agencies and

foraiga Laiaon services. This has resulted in extensive and continuing

investigative activity. In addition. Iden 1 identified many hundreds of

Soviet Intelligence Officers and prorided a considerable quantity of useful

information on the organization oi the IG3, its operational doctrine and

Its Lecaniques and methods.

.. In debriefing him it became apparent that Iden 1, the privileged

and undisciplined son of a iormer ranking Minister of the Soviet Governmeat,

was a particularly complex personality, one given to exaggeration of his own

imporiance. In this regard, certain aspects of his life history, when

weighed against other incormation already in our possession, raised soma

dolois concerning his veracity. To permit extensive and prolonged debriedag,

arrangements were made to accommodate

Iden l under highly secure

coaditions.

Thesa arrangements were dictated, during the initial phases

at least, by cho additional iced to proride Iden 1 with continung personal

Protaction sinca thoro wau too distinct possibill; that, as añGB oilico-,

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F3R 977

de word detergened for "emecutive

action" li tre Sariats should discover

his whereabouts: With the passage of tirin, this lattee factor is crisidares

to ba sufficiently diminished to justily a phased normalization of Iden l's

situation--this despite the fact thai some points remain unresolved concertiag

his bona fides.

5. Ibe Agency, with the assistance of the FBi, is continuing to .

look into those questionable aspects of the case, while remaining aleit to

the possipility of hostile interest. However, during the ull period of his

stay in the United States Iden 1 has cooperated with his interrogators and

with the other officers responsible for ais safety and meliare, and our

current efiorts are being directed toward his gradual adjustment to a normal,

independent status. As a step in this direction, he is now living in his own

private apartment, aubject to some protectiva surveillance.

6, This action is being taken in iull ecogrition of the normal

problems oi readjustment experienced oy many defectors as well as the

¡aci that Iden 1 'is a potentially greater problam than most.

Fie is an

individual whose actions during resettlement may not always be precictabie

or wise from the point of view of his own security.

We are hopeful that

Ident is sensible enough to realize that undue publicity caused by any rasi

action on his part could inad to unpleasant, purhaps even dangerous consectase.,

particularly dor himseli. We taezdiore believe i appropriate to take this

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