Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

## Page 1

176-10036-10001

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA

RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10001

RECORD SERIES : National Security Files

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

ORIGINATOR :

FROM :

TO :

TITLE : Recommended Course of Action in the Congo

DATE : 12/13/1962

PAGES: 4

SUBJECTS :

DOCUMENT TYPE :

CLASSIFICATION :

RESTRICTIONS :

CURRENT STATUS :

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : Congo Cables; restriction information innacurate/missing; box 1

to essed

---

## Page 2

till Dice 3.109

Burdy Congot

10a. un meeting

This document consists of

copy ind of

36

pages;

December 13.1962)

SECFET

MEMORANDUM FOR THY. PRESIDENT

Subject: Recommended Course of Action on the Congo.

1.

We are seeking to reintegrate ühe Katanga, to strengthen and

maintain a noderate goveronent in leopoldville that can, in fact, run

the country, and to prevent an increase in Communist influence in the

Congo•

2. Efforts to

reintegrate the Katanga have bogged down as a result

of Tshomba's intransigence and Adoula's rigidity. Horever; what could

prove a major breakthrough occurred yesterday with Tshombe voluntarily

agreeing that the UMAK should turn over its foreign exchange and revenues

to the Monetary Council foz division between the Central Goverrment and

the Katanga. (Some of Ishonke's conditions may be troublesome, but me

are taking his reply as acceptance and are proceeding accordingly.)

3o In light of this development, the following course of accion is

recommended for the immediate future:

(a) Adoula should be persuaded that this is a significant development

which he should seize upon as a basis for re-entering negotiations

with Ishombe on the other mejor elements contained in the UN

Reconciliation Plan (division of powers between the Central

Governent and the Katanga, an amnesty, military standstill in

North Katanga),

In this connection, we should seek to re-establish

discussions between Elisabethville and Leopoldville through an

acceptable intermediary, presumably Cardiner. "(Io accomplish this,

if necessary

SCE SECRET

---

## Page 3

4

SEE SECRET

-2-

If necessary me should insist that Adoula prorogue the Parliament

and govern srith

backing of a pro-lestern group headed by

Mobutu.)

(2) To restore GOC confidence in its position and exert additional

pressure on Ishorbe, he should seek Uil agreement that if Katangan

military planes continue to attack, not only mill the UN interdict

them in the air, but also destroy them on the ground.

(e) We should also support advance staging of a "COC air force" through

additional CIA efforts.

4o Given the UN's financial plight and the anticipated decrease in

its military strength with the scheduled withdrawal of Indian troops in

January, very little time renains to achieve our objectives. Te believe

that a maximum of

two weeks can be allowed for the working out of the

payments scheme and substantial progress on other elements of the plan.

If, in fact, the payments plan does not eucoced, and if the other practical

aspects of reintegration are not accomplished within this period, we should

be prepared to move on to stroncer measures than purely economic. The

econonic measures contemplated beyond the UNK scheme are likely to he

drawn out and ineffective and would require considerable and probably

unproductive consultations with our allies.

5, In these circumstances, we should decide now/a contingency plan

for the adoption of stronger measures by the UN and the United States to be

put into effect in two weeks if significant progress has not in fact

(not just in

TOM SECRE

• .

---

## Page 4

(

BAD SEGRET

=3-

(not just in nords) been achieved.

The major raquirement of such a policy mould be the creation of

adequate UN military strength to make the possibility of a forceral

solution of the Katangan secession problen credible to Ishombe and

evidence of our determination to use it. The use af such a strengthened

UM position, both as a deterreni and as a force, should be adjusted to

a graduated scale of pressures. For example, if negotiations failed.

the UN could stop all rail traffic in Mlisabethville.. If this did not

achieve its desired result, the UN would announce that it planned to

extend its perimeter to include Jadotville and Kolvezi in order to bring

about control of Katangan exports so that payments required under

Congolese law nould be paid to the GOC.

While the UN will have adequate ground forces during the next six

weeks to carry out such missions, a substantial increase in the IN air

arm would be required.

A number of additional planes from Uh members are on the may. However,

it is doubtful that there would be enougn to perforn the task adequately

and a contingency decision is required now that the United States would,

in the last analysis, use its own power in order to prevent chaos,

large-scale massacres, and/or a major Soviet presence called in by radical

successors to Adoula. This would mean in practice, this the United States,

once it has decided that practical progress is stalled, would make available

to the UN a fighter unit for use in the Congo which should have both psycholog-

ical and military value to the UN force. This squadron would be under UN Command.

it is not

5S2 SECRET

---

## Page 5

4

FOE SECRET

-4-

It is not certain that the Secretary-General would accept such an

offer, but making it would be a concrete indication of our determination

to see the UN's policy succeed, We have considered and discarded the

possibility that such an offer would result in a counter-offer of the

Soviet Union's being accepted.

The above course of action raises serious issues requiring at the

appropriate tine full consultations with Congressional leaders, the UN,

and our allies, particularly the United Kingdom and Belgium.

M:iCHcOhee/IO:HCleveland/IO:UNP:JJSisco:#BBuffun/ck

December 13, 1962

SOR SECRET

---

## Page 6

Lestra eupey p. a canot sen]

SAL SECRET

-3

(not just in words) been achieved.

The major requirement of such a policy would be the creation of

adequate UN military strength to make the possibility of a forceful

solution of the Katangan sacession problem credible to Ishombe and

evidence of our determination to use it,

The use of such a strengthened

UN position, both as a deterrent and as a force, should be adjusted to

a graduated scale of pressuras. For example, if negotiations failed,

the UN could stop all rail traffic in Mlisabethville.. If this did not

achieve its desired result, the UN would announce that it planned to

extend its perimeter to include Jadotville and Kolwezi in order to bring

about control of Katangan exports so that payments required under

Congolese law would be paid to the COC.

While the UN will have adequate ground forces during the next six

weeks to carry out such missions,

substantial increase in the UN air

arm would be reouired.

A number of additional planes from Ul members are on the way. However,

it is doubtful that there would be enough to perforn the task adequately

and a contingency decision is required now that the United States would,

In the last analysis, use its own power in order to prevent chaos,

large-scale massacres, and/or a major Soviet presence called in by radical

successors to Adoula. This would mean in practice, shes the United States,

once it has decided that practical progress is stalled, would make available

to the UN a fighter unit for use in the Congo which should have both psycholog-

ical and military value to the UN force. This squadron would be under UN Conmand.

it is not

FOR SECRET

---