FACSIMILE COVER SHEET: I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR INPUT ASAP/DRAFT LETTER TO NSC
Originator: CIA
From: WITHHELD
To: BARRY HARRELSON. HRG
Document date: 01/23/1996
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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104-10331-10088

2022 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JAN 23 996 01:30PM

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Facsimile Cover Sheet

To: Barry Harrelson

Company: HRG

Phone: 30292

Fax: 703-243-8343

From: Linda C. Cipriani

Company: CIA

Phone: 703-874-3124.

Fax: 703-874-3208

Date: 23 January 1996

Pages including this 4

cover page:

I would appreciate your input ASAP. I just spoke with Mary Griggs of the National

Counter-Intelligence Center and this letter will be presented to the Board on 1 Feb 1996. Based

on a quick read, I think the letter is a good idea.

Linda.

23/01196

Note

CHRG concurred with Lindads comment;

suppested informatina be acclecl

agency's actions (Linda will

approxinel.

deletions!.?

quit he mines.

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DRAEX TA

ER TO ANILION LAID

NATIONAL SECURLIX COUNCIL

December 4. 1995

Honozable Anthony wake

Assistant to The Eresident for

Nacional Security Affairs

The White House

Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Me. Lake:

No other ethic is as well-established and as

essential to the success of the intelligence community

as

che prosection of intelligence sources and methods and the

safeguarding of confidences.

The effectiveness of the U.S.

Covezament's intolligence and counterintelligence programs

is signiticantly actributable co che historical commitment

by the agencies which cosduct these activities to those

principles.

Disclocure of chu identities of sources has

had and may be expected to have a profound effect upon the

ability of the incelligence agencios to obtain the

confidential assistance of persons whose cooperacion 2s

dependent upon assurance of continuing confidentiality.

Similarly.

the disclosure of informacaon about intelligence

sources and methods has caused and will prediccably resuls

in the development of countermeasures which will altect the

ability of the United States to provide the, President wich

camcly and high-qualicy intclligence and detect and addzess

hostile incelligence activities directed against the

United States.

The agencies represented by the National Counter-

intelligence Policy Board unanimously chare, and hercy

express, their concera that these fundamental principles could

be compromised by an inappropziate commitment to disclosure

Dy the Assassination Records Review Board (the Board) in

ics administzation of the John I. Kennedy Assassination

Records Colleccion Act of 1992 (the Act).

DRALL TRITER. 10 ANTHONY LACE, NATIONNE

SECURITY COUNCIL

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DRAFT LETTER 10 ANTRONY LAKE.

NATIONAL, SECURIY COINCID

Honozable Anthony Laks

To date.

the response by the intelligence agencies

to Board reguests

for the Telease of documents has been

unprecedented.

The Federal Burcau of Investigacion (FBI) , for

examole, has released over 613,000 documents to the National

Archives and Records Administration and has requested that

disclosure be postponed wich

xespect to porcions of only 4.37

percent of chose documents.

The FBI has sought poseponement

with respect to limited portions of that modest number of

records based upon expressed concern by foreign governments

which contributed or originated the information and reluetance

to reveal the identities of intelligence assets or intelligence

sources and methods.

The Act permits the postponement of disclocure upon

presentation of clear and convincing evidence that the threat

to the miliary defense,

intelligence operations, or foreign

relations of the Unized

States posed by public disclosure

outweighs the public interest in disclosure and that such

disclosure would reveal:

(A)

an intelligence agent whose identity currently

requires protection: or

(3) an intolligence source or method which is

curzently utilized. of reasonaoly expected to be

utilized, by the United States Govezament and which

bas not been ofticiolly disclosed. the disclosure of

which would

intertere wich the conduct of intelligence

activities.

(See Act, Sectioas 6(1) (A, (A,3) )

The Ace furcher permits the postponement of

disclosure upon a showing, by clear and convincing evidence,

that public disclosure would compronise

understanding of confidentiality currently requiring protection

between a government agent and a cooperating individual or a

foreign governmens, and public disclosure would be so hambul

thas it ourweighs the public interest. (See Act, Section 6(4))

DRIFT LEXTER TO ANTEONE LIKE

NATIONAL SECURITY COINCIT:

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FROM

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DRAET LEXTER TO ANTRONX LAER.

Honorable Anthony Lake

NATIONAL, SECURTTY COUNCIL

The Board's rejection of postponements proposed

under these Sections of the Act dismisses che face that che

incelligence agencies are uniquely qualified co assess che harm

to intelligence operations which would result from disclosure

ot the identities of intelligence assets of revelations about

intelligence sourcos and methods.

It remains essential that

the U.S. government stand by assurarces to persons and foreign

goveraments that information they provide on the basis of those

assurances will remain confidential for as long as is necessary

to protect those persons or govemments.

It is simlariy

essential that sources, methods, and technigues which have

bad value in the past and could

be expected to have valug in

identities of intelligence assets or revelation of souices

and methods, including the confidential cooperation of

forcign goverrments, would enervate U.S. intelligence and

counterintelligence programs and discourage che confidential

coopezation on which the successful conduct of effective

intelligence is dependent.

would reste

The intelligence comunity believes

that the harm which would result from such disclosures would

demonstrably impair the national security of the United States

and that the clear and convincing evidence scandard does acc

require that it divine, with absolute precision, the specific

manner in which that harm will arice.

The National Counterintelligence Policy Board

icspectfully requests, thercfore, that these concerns be

bought to the attencion of the Board and chat the position

of the intelligence conmunity with respect to the disclosuze

of intelligence asset identitice and intelligence sources and

incthods be considered in any subscquent review or final

determinations by the Board.

Respecefully yours,

Nora Slackin, Chairperson

National Counterintelligence

Policy Board

DRAXI. LET

- 3-

ANMIONX LAKE. NATIONAL SECORITY COUNCIL

*OTA P.uS

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