END OF PHASE I
Agency: OSD
Originator: OSD
From: BENJAMIN T. HARRIS
To: CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, MONGOOSE
Document date: 07/23/1962
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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195-10005-10023

JFK Assassination System

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Agency Information

Date:

6/16/201

AGENCY :

RECORD NUMBER :

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OSD

195-10005-10023

MCNAMARA PAPERS

Document Information

ORIGINATOR: OSD

FROM: BENJAMIN T. HARRIS

TO: CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, MONGOOSE

TITLE: END OF PHASE I

DATE: 07/23/1962

PAGES:

12

SUBJECTS :

CONTINGENCY PLANS - CUBA

OPERATION MONGOOSE - END OF PHASE I

DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION: Top Secret

RESTRICTIONS: 1C

CURRENT STATUS: Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 09/14/1998

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS:

McNamara Papers, Box 86 (42), Mongoose. Memo from Harris to Chief of Operations re:

accomplishments of Operation Mongoose Phase I, estimate of potential for intelligence collection and

military operations, etc.

v9.1

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c. PT Boats. DOD reconditioned a PT boat for possible

use by CIA. In addition, DOD obtained certain data on

characteristics and costs of PT boats manufactured by other

countries.

d.

Voice Radio Broadcasts from a Submarine. DOD

made a submarine available to CIA for the conduct of voice

radio broadcasts near Cuba by the CIA.)

e.

Overflights of Cuba. DOD has conducted several

reconnaissance and photographic missions over Cuba for the

CIA.

f. Utilization of AVON-PARK, Florida, by CIA as a Base

for the Training of Cuban Refugees. DOD investigated the

feasibility of using certain facilities at AVON-PARK for the

training of Cuban refugees in guerrilla warfare.

g. Oil Drum Mines. DOD transferred 40 oil drum mines

to CIA.

h. Detail of an Officer to CIA. DOD detailed an officer

to duty with CIA to be in charge of small boat operations at

Miami, Florida.

i.. Contingency Plan for Overt US Military Intervention

in Cuba. In order to insure a decisive US military capability

for overt military intervention in Cuba, CINCLANT's regular

contingency plan for Cuba has been updated. Attempts are

being made to reduce the reaction time required for imple-

mentation of this plan, without piecemeal commitment of US

forces.

j. Alternate Contingency Plan for Overt US Military Inter-

vention in Cuba. CINCLANT developed an alternate plan which

accomplished a reduction in reaction time but requires piece-

meal commitment of forces. In order to reduce the risk in-

herent in such an operation CINCLANT is seeking means for

reduction of the reaction time without piecemeal commitment.

k. Cover and Deception Plan. This plan has been developed

for the purpose of covering the prepositioning of forces allocated

to the contingency plans for overt military intervention in Cuba.

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also includes means designed to provoke Cuban reaction and

thus act as a triggering device for US intervention.

1. Air Strikes Against Cuba. A plan has been developed

for the use of airpower only following a national policy decision,

to suppress and/or neutralize Cuban forces pending the execu-

tion of an assault or to be executed in support of an internal

revolt.

•m. Air and Sea Blockade of Cuba. A plan has been develop-

ed for the complete air and sea blockade of Cuba within 48 hours

after decision.

n. Civil Affairs and Military Government. An outline plan

providing guidance for the conduct of civil affairs and for a

provisional militaty government for Cuba has been prepared.

o. DOD's Position as to its Stake and Proposed Role in the

Removal of the Communist Regime from Cuba. This paper

included a statement of conditions under which Defense believes

that overt military intervention in Cuba could be accomplished

without leading to general war and without serious offense to

public opinion.

p. [BW/CW-Capabilities-A.paperswas.prepared listing the

things that can be done against Cuba in B.W./CW field.

9. Air Re-supply. Four aircraft and crews have been

readied for air re-supply missions over Cuba.

I. Risk Estimate. An estimate was prepared concerning

the risk involved in air re-supply missions over Cuba.

Manufacture of Soviet Aircraft. A survey was made con-

cerning the US capability for the covert production of facsimiles

of Soviet aircraft.

t.

Military Intelligence. A detailed list of Essential Elements

of Information was prepared in February 1962 covering the require -

ments of the Caribbean Survey Group and CINCLANT and was levied

on the Intelligence Community for fulfillment. Reconnaissance

activities consisting of overhead reconnaissance, air patrols,

electronic collection and special operations were implemented.

Specific intelligence requirements to be used in the interrogation

of knowledgeable refugees covering items of military, political

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nd economic interest were provided to the Caribbean Admission

Center, Opa Locka, Florida. All information obtained from these

sources was processed through the Intelligence Community's

channels. The flow of information concerning Cuba has been

greatly improved as a result of these efforts. However, gaps

still exist, particularly in details of military order of battle.

Increased efforts are being made to fill these gaps..

u. Utilization of US Naval Base, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, for

Joint Navy/CIA Intelligence Operations. DOD investigated the

possibility of using Guantanamo as a base of operations for the

collection of national level intelligence, in light of the present

policy limitations and possible policy changes in the future.

v. Establishment of "Patrol Posts" in the Caribbean. In

response to a request from the Chief of Operations, Operation

Mongoose, DOD examined the possibility of establishing "patrol

posts"' in the Caribbean.

w. Psychological Operations: A survey was conducted

in an attempt to increase Naval Base Guantanamo's role in

psychological operations.j As a result special OSD funds were

made available for Special baseball sportscasts over the base

radio station]

3. Operational Estimate of the Potential for Intelligence Collection.

a.

Reconnaissance - a summary of the Cuban reconnaissance

operation is given below:

Completed

Vehicle

WV -2Q

A3D-2P/20

USS Moale

RB 47

Submarine /UDU

Code Word

Melrose

Fitbolt

Operation

Frequency

13

4

19 Mar - 12 Apr 62

1 May 62

5 - 6 May 62

Continuing

F3D-20

AD-50

C-130

A3D-2P

Navy DD

Navy P-2V

Call Money

Sleepwalker

Quick Fox

6 - 11 per month

2 per month

10 per month

6 - 8 per month

daily

twice daily

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e. Summary - Our knowledge of Cuban military order of

battle, especially ground order of battle, has dropped off con-

siderably in recent weeks. Changes in unit organization and in

the numbering system as well as the militia nature of the organi-

zation itself make OB material perishable. Until such time as a

definite target date and objective is set making it possible to

inject a sufficient quantity of trained observers into the area with

specific targets, this situation will probably continue.

4. Estimate of the Potential for Military Operations within Cuba -

Should a policy decision be made to militarily intervene in Cuba, the

U.S. could:

a.

With 18 days of preparation, execute a coordinated airborne-

amphibious assault which it is anticipated would gain control of key

military installations and the principal centers of population of Cuba'

within 10 days and result in minimum US and Cuban casualties.

b. Should the situation demand, a piecemeal commitment of

US forces could be made with reaction times approximately as follows:

2 Airborne Divisions

4 Marine BLTS

Following Forces

5 days (para-drop units only)

7 - 8 days

15 - 18 days

(This operation would involve a dangerous element of risk. )

c. In conjunction with either of the actions described in a and b,

above, cover and deception plans have been developed which, if executed,

would result in prepositioning of forces assigned to the invasion of Cuba

and could thereby result in an over-all reaction time of approximately

12 days for a coordinated assault.

d. Air strikes could be conducted against selected targets in

Cuba within 6, 12 or 24 hours; the time dependent upon aircraft

availability and desired intensity of attack.

Air-sea blockade can be initiated within 24 hours with effective-

ness increasing to a complete blockade within approximately 48 hours.

5.

Factors Worth Considering in Deciding on One of the Following Four

Courses of Action for the United States to Follow in Relation to Cuba:

a. Cancel operational plans; treat Cuba as a Bloc nation; protect

Hemisphere from it.

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