INTERVIEW WITH RAYMOND G. ROCCA, FEBRUARY 14, 1975, 2P.M.
Originator: ROCK
From: JAMES B. WEIDNER
To: FILE
Document date: 02/14/1975
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES

Washington, DC 20500

Nelson A. Rockefeller,

Chairman

David W. Belin.

Executive Director

John T. Connor

C. Douglas Dillon

Erwin N. Griswold

Lane Kirkland

Lyman L. Lemnitzer

Ronald Reagan

Edgar F. Shannon, Jr.

MEMORANDUM TO

FILE

From:

James s. Weidner

Subject: Interview with Raymond G. Rocca,

February 14, 1975, 2 р.m.

A. BACAGROUIND

Rocca is originally from San Francisco, anu

ne still maintains a home there.

ke was graduated from

the University of california in 1938 with an Al and in

1939 with an MA in international relations.

his thesis

related to the facist problem in the Meditarranean area.

In April, 1942, he joined the Research and

Nevelopment Section of the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence

Service.

With the collapse of Italy in Septenwer, 1943,

Rocca joined the Uss i2 group (which was indepenuent

although cooruinate with the counterintelligence USS unit).

Until carly July, 1944, when ne went to Rome,

Angleton assumed colland of the X2 unit in 1944. Rocca

eventually became Angleton's executive aide there.

Angleton left Rome in rovemuer, 1947. Rocca

remaineu, under student cover.

lie was not unäer "official

cover.

Rocca returned to the United States and

stayed a year in lIA heauquarters. ne attended the

vational

War colleye in 1954-55.

Rocca then joine

Angleton in the recently created counterintelligence (CI)

Staff of the CIA.

the Start was set up in jocemuer.

1954 or carly 1955.

Prior to that time, the counter-

intelliyence operation nau been sumerged in foreign

intelligence.

At this point, it was broken out to be

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an independent unit.) Kocca was assigned to be the chief

of the Research

and

Analysis (k anú A) component of the

CI Staff.

ie remained in that capacity until 1969 when

he became Angleton's ueputy, ne resigned/retired from.

the CIA on vecenwer 31, 1974.

ine overall objective of the Staff was to

form a uoctrinal vasis for i1. because. li nad not been

a separate unit theretofore, it was necessary to specify

precisely what its purpose and operational objectives

would ve.

these onfectives wore:

(1) penetration of

other agencies; that is, luentification of other agents

and achievement of placing oter ayents therein:

(2)

developiny uouble agents; (3) hanuling uefectors,

principally those cominy out of other services:

(4)

levelopment of types of controls; that is, interceptin

and deciphering of communications (l'he mail intercept

program would have fallen within this oujective.); and

(5) accomplishment of research.

this involved builuiny

files, analyzing

relevant information, and creatiny

vescriptive papers.

C. ODUCTIVIS UF RUSLARCH AND AVALYSIS

A. Rescarch anu Analysis

Inventoried initially, the status of

counterintelligenco work being

done by various of the cIA

stations.

This was necessary

• in order to determine the

scope of

such activity then in existence. ¿ventually,

approximately 133 people were engaged in

full-time CIA

work overseas.

13.

ircation of suction 50 of the

rational Intelliyence survey

inis was

commenced in 1950 and "finished" in

1955 Insotar as tie survey relatei to cI.

The report,

nowever, is still joing upiated.

this involved

collection

of information from various uranches of the CIA's clan-

destine activities and euiting the information.

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Providing support to casework

samples of this

support were the arrest of

Sobel in the 1950's (R and

on this case.) anu the Reino

mave a man available to work

rayhanen defection leading

to the conviction of Abel.

D. training

K anu A uoes part of the counterintelliyence

training.

Rocca gave me a detailed outline of the

organization of the li division.

A schematic of that

organization is annexeú icreto.

the organization retained

its structure until August, 1973, when its operations were

reduced

substantially.

(According to Kocca, approximately

100 of

the l'I personnel were shifteu to other areas.)

Mailiny Intercept Proyram

Rocca

knew nothing of the program at all until

1960 when R anu A commenced receiving through CUMIl

channels moderate

amounts Ino more than one or two pieces

a month! of descriptions or photographs.

he could not

recall the particulars of any of these matters.

He

assumed

tiat the

entire project had been directed and

properly approved.

The project was hanuled, insofar as

C'I was

involves, by the Special Investigations group.

It was nighly compartmented.

When Rocca became Angleton's

jeputy in 1969, he loarnou more concerning the existence

of the project.

ie understood that it was a special

project provucing niyi-yrade information on the main

auversary.

Rocca

saiu that he would classify the project

as a "strategic siynificance" because it yielded information

on indivicuals communicating with people working for the

KGb.

ne coulu not recall specific details.

Particularly

important, in his opinion, was the fact that the adversary

did not know that the project existed.

Rocca was not responsible on a ay-to-day

basis for the project even after he became deputy.

That

responsibility was

given to Fred nubbard, Angleton's

cxecutive virector, whom I believe had been appointed at

approximately the sale time as Rocca. Monthly reports

from the project would come to Kocca at which time he

reviowed them briefly and passeu them on to Angleton.

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Rocca says that ne la no particular discussions concerning

the project

with citner Angleton or hubbard which he can

recall.

In 1971 or 1972, however, Rocca

nau to

"defend" the projeut to naramessines. This was a part

of what constituted, in essence, an annual review by the

veputy virector of all significant projects in which CI

was involveu.

the task fell to Rocca because Angleton

was

then on

vacation.

liubbaru anu others involved

airectly in the project preparca a pro forma justification

for Rocca to present

to karamessines.

This was based on

the production of the project, as well as the high

security surroundiny it.

In July, 1973, after nubbard hai left, Rocca

and

the d'I had determined to abanuon the mail intercept

project.

Rocca was

assigned to wind own the operation.

At that

point, there were three or four cI people in

neauquarters

involved in the project.*

The project was

locateu in the lUMIii area on the seventh floor.

Because

CUMINi needed the space, kocca developed a new vault for

it on the second floor with tie remainuer of cI.

Mrs. Matson was reassigneú to Uperations, and the

two

translators were assigned

to R and i.

the proiuct of

the project still remains in the vault area on the

second floor.

Rocca hau no inowleuge of the specifics of the

operation in New York.

inis was vecause that aspect of

project was handled by the Office of Security.

In

essence,

the Special Investigations group of CI was a

"customer" of the Uffice of security.

In audition, cI

analyzed the materials and distributeu them to the

appropriate recipients. Angleton determined who would

receive the matorials.

rocca know nothing of the New Orleans

operation and almost nothing

avout the San Francisco

operation.

nis only connection with the latter was

when people from, ne believes, the Far cast operational

unit inquired of hin avout the rew York operation.

because Rocca know little of the operation, he referrei

cnem to Security.

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F. Vissiuent Uperation

Rocca knew nothing of this operation at the

time it was estavlisnod in 1967 except that he rucalls

having seen

the menoranium which specified that informa-

tion relatiny to forcign contacts of uissidents in this

country would be outained anu analyze.

he recalls that

in about 1966-67 Uver who hau been under nocca in R and A

was assigned to Uperations.

inere he became the Referent

for the vomestic Uperations vivision which nai ween

created in 1964. it that point, Ober left the CI area

on the second floor and established his own operation

somewhere else in the building.

When Rocca became Angleton's ueputy, the

project had already been established anu was

fundeu

through the regular staff budget. Rocca never saw any

of the substance of the project.

his only connection

with it was signiny authorizations for expenses upon

Ober's request.

Ober did not explain what the expenses

were for.

This was typical where, as here, the operation

was fully compartmented.

Althouyi Rocca was generally in charge of

staft briefings on projects, he did not brief on this

project.

ine briefing was done by Ober of any personnel

who nau

the neeu to know.

Over dealt uirectly with aramessines or

nelms on this project.

he uid not deal through Rocca,

nor, so far as Rocca knows, uid he deal through Angleton.

Rocca said that this project was simply not within his

duties

as

a deputy, ana that he did not exceed the scope

of his

assignuent as a deputy.

G. Police Liaisons

As far as Rocca knows, l'I has not had any

contact with any local police to the extent that sucl

ontacts or liaisons would have occurred: this woul

have been done by the Office of security.

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1. Surveillance, breaking and interinge lapse etc.

Rocca was not aware of any such activity by

CI in the United States.

I. Present I Activities within the United States

Rocca said that me was aware of only four

areas in which it presently operates

in the Unite States.

1. ¿I handles four Soviet or bloc defectors

in the United States.

For example, lI has a man on the

cast loase who is a retired annuitant acting as a local

handler of a defector.

2. C'I has various consultants on projects

doing work in the United States.

these are people

actually working under a contract with CIA.

For example,

a woman is currently working

part time on a book relating

to the use of uisinformation. The contract rclating to

preparation of this jook calls only for its publication

abroad, and

a foreign publishing nouse has agreed to the

publication.

3. C'I has twenty former agents who previously

worked abroad, now acting under military cover in the

United

States analyzing the Soviet press for relevant

intelligence information.

4. C'I has several people who may not be CIA

personnel reporting on their contacts with Soviets.

soth in the United States anú abroau, these people may

also report on their contacts with people abroau who,

in turn, have contacts with the soviets.

J. Miscella.ieous Comments

Rocca

saiu that he believed that the informant

referred to in the Horsh article of lecember 29, 1974, was

a fraud.

thinks that the informant must have been

a

fraudulently posiny

as a former lIA agent because

the information contained in the article is, according

to Rocca, not only incorrect but does not even make sense

in the context of

the CIA.

kocca could not elaborate on

exactly what he meant but strongly suggested that we talk

to bill hood, wino was formerly Chief of vomestic Operations

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in ivew York before joining the cIA in Washington.

(It

seemed apparent to me that Rocca must nave spoken to

hood and did not want to incorrectly interpret what lood

had told me.)

based on the above discussion, Rocca sai

that he felt it was important that a Feieral law be

enacted which makes it a crime for a CIA employee or

former employee to reveal classified information which

he learns in the course of nis activities.

tnat it was ironic that such laws existeu

for other

agencies but not for the CIA.

Rocca also referred to the lersh article of

January 10, 1975, relating to the possible destruction

or CIA files.

said that contrary to the implication

in the article that files might ve uestroyed, he personally

wrote a memoranuull stating that no files should be

destroyed under any circumstances given the existence

of the present investigations. Rocca will proviüe a

copy of that memorandum.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT:

Leaving

• CIA - Raymond G. Rocca's Story

1. The immediate background of Mr. Rocca's departure

from CIA was a brief discussion between Mr. Angleton and

Mr. Colby late in the afternoon of 20 December 1974. The

gist of the discussion was related to Mr. Rocca by

Mr. Angleton at around 1800 hours when Mr. Rocca was

summoned to Mr. Angleton's office.

Mr. Angleton said Mr. Colby, after referring

to a forthcoming article by Mr. Hersh, which,

however, had not exercised a determining influence

in his decision, had asked Mr. Angleton to leave

his position as chief and take the advantages of

retirement.

In response to Mr. Angleton's question

about a successor, the DCI said he had not given

any thought to that, but had named three individuals,

presently overseas, as examples off the top of his

head.

Mr. Angleton, as Mr. Rocca understood it from

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him, asked the DCI whether the leadership

possibilities were extendable to Mr: Rocca or

Mr. Miler and was told, "that was negotiable."

It was stipulated that further discussion should

take place with the DDO, Mr. Nelson, and only

Mr. Rocca would be informed at that

stage.

2. On Saturday, the 2lst, Mr. Angleton telephoned

Mr. Rocca and expressed the view--with which Mr. Rocca

agreed--that he should ask Mr. Nelson to enlarge the range

of discussion by including Mr. Miler.

3.

Mr. Hersh's piece, falsely accusing CIA of running

a massive domestic surveillance operation, appeared on

22 December.

4. At. 1000, Monday, 23 December, Mr. Miler and

MI. Rocca were asked to accompany Mr. Angleton to a meeting

in Mr. Nelson's office. Mr. Nelson's deputy, Mr. Blee,

was present.

The discussion took place under considerable

time pressure because

as the meeting went on, it became

clear that a Special DDO Staff Meeting had been called for

1100, at which, presumably, the results of the discussion

underway would be announced. Among other details there

was an extensive discussion between Mr. Angleton and

2

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MI.

Nelson on two points:

a .

BY Mr. Angleton. That it would be a mistake

to retire him at that stage because it would be

universally interpreted as an admission of the New

York Times story. Also Mr. Angleton reviewed the items

of upcoming business that had already been programmed

in sensitive CI matters for January and February:

b. By Mr. Nelson. The absolute necessity to take

action necessary to assure the integrity of the investi-

gations which were to be foreseen.

MI- Angleton's removal as Chief/ CI, was assumed in this

discussion, presumably by derivation from the Friday talk

with the Director. Mr. Angleton reviewed the merits of

having

the succession in the staff passed to Mr. Rocca and/or

to Mr. Miler.

5. At a certain point Mr. Nelson asked what did

Mr. Rocca and Mr. Miler want to do. (It will be recognized

that there was, under the circumstances, no chance for

consultations, and, actually, no possibility of considered

thought.) Mr. Nelson did not offer either of these men the

succession to Mr. Angleton, neither did he ask MI. Rocca

(oI Mr. Miler) to leave the Agency. He did request that

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they stay on in their positions for a transition period.

6.

Mr. Rocca, in the absence of any indication of

interest by Mr. Nelson in him as successor,

stated he was

not desireous of remaining on in any task other than

counterintelligence. He would be willing to stay on for

the transition--under a contract, which Mr. Nelson had

stated would be possible--for whatever time was necessary,

and therefore he too would retire by 31 December, bearing

in mind the advantage of the joint cost-of-living increases

of 31 December and 30 June 1974.

7. To sum up, Mr. Rocca would not have retired on

31 December 1974 had he

been offered the command succession.

(That, as he understood it, would have been Mr. Angleton's

wish.) He was not made the offer. As he saw it, under the

circumstances, there was really no other option to retire-

ment in the interest of the CI function or in his own

interest.

Rebacca

Raymond

G. Rocca

27 February 1975

Langley,

Virginia

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COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES

Woshington, DC 20500

A.

B.

RAYMOND G. ROCCA

(Former Deputy Chief, Counterintelligence Staff)

Background

Mr. Rocca joined the Counterintelligence (CI)

Staff of

the CIA in 1955, having previously served

in Italy as a member of the X2 Unit of the oSS.

The

chief of his unit in the OSS had been Mr. Angleton.

Upon joining the CI Staff, Rocca became a

member of its research and analysis component. He

remained in that capacity until 1969, when he became

Deputy Chief of the CI Staff, under Mr. Angleton.

Mail Intercept Program

Rocca knew nothing of the program at all until

1960 when R and A commenced receiving through COMINT

shannolo moderato amounts fro-mors. than-oro-Ja tra

pieces a month) of descriptions or photographs. The

program was highly compartmented.

When Rocca became Angleton's Deputy in 1969,

he learned more concerning the existence of the

project. He understood that it was a special project

the prone t

producing high-grade information on the main adversary.

The project was handled, insofar as CI was involved,

by the Special Investigations group.

Rocca was not responsible on a day-to-day

basis for the project even after he became Deputy.

That responsibility was given to Fred Hubbard,

Angleton's Executive Director. Monthly reports

from the project would come to Rocca at which time

he reviewed them briefly and passed them on to

Angleton.

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In 1971 or 1972, however,

Rocca had to

"defend" the project to Karamessines, the Deputy

Director for Plans.

This was a part of what con-

stituted, in essence,

an annual review by the Deputy

Director of all significant projects in which CI was

involved.

The

task fell to Rocca because Angleton

was then on vacation.

Hubbard and others involved

directly in the project prepared a pro forma justifi-

cation

for Rocca to present to Karamessines.

•Rocca has no specific knowledge of the

part of the operation which occurred in the

New York City Post Office.

This was because that

aspect of the project was handled by the Office of

Security.

In essence, CI was a "customer" of the

Office of Security.

In addition, CI analyzed the

materials and distributed them to the appropriate

recipients.

Angleton determined who would receive

the materials.

In July, 1973, Rocca was assigned to wind

after the DCI had determined to

Rosce moved the physical location of

the project within headquarters and arranged to have

the three or four people involved in the project re~

assigned.

The work product of the project remains

at headquarters.

C. Dissident Operation

Rocca knew nothing of this operation at

the time it was established, except that he recalls

having seen

the memorandum which specified that

information

relating to foreign contacts of dissi-

dents in this country would be obtained and analyzed.

He also knew that in 1967, Ober, who had been under

Rocca in Research and Analysis (R and A) was assigned

to Operations, where he became the Referent for the

somewhere else in the headquarters building.

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When Rocca became Angleton's Deputy in 1969,

the project had already been established. It was

funded through the regular staff budget.

Rocca' s

only connection with the project, even then, was

signing authorizations

for expenses which Ober

requested. Ober did not explain what the expenses

• were for.

Ober dealt directly with Karamessines or

elms on this project. Ober did not deal through

Rocca nor, so far as Rocca knows, did he deal through

Angleton.

D. Police Liaisons

As far as Rocca knows, CI has not had any

contact with any local police. To the extent that

such contacts or liaisons may have occurred, he

believes it would have been done by the Office of

Security.

E. Surveillance, Breaking and Entering, Taps, Etc.

..-Rusea is not anare of any such activity by

CI in the United States.

F. Present Counterintelligence Activities

within the United States

Rocca is aware of only four areas in which

CI presently operates in the United States:

CI handles Soviet or Bloc defectors in

the United States.

2.

CI has various consultants doing work

in the United States.

CI has former agents (who previously

wolked abroad) in the United States analyzing the

Soviet press

for relevant intelligence information.

4. CI has several people in the nature of

agents reporting on their contacts with Soviets

both in the United States and abroad.

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THÔMAS : mg i

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CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: Do you swear to tell the

truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you

God?

MR. ROCCA: Yes sir.

MR. BELIN: I am going to turn the questioning over

to Jim Weidner.

CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: Is there an opening statement?

TESTIMONY OF RAYMOND G. ROCCA

MR. ROCCA: I have prepared a small curriculum vitae.

It behooves a native San Franciscan to circulate it to his

constituents. There may be some extra copies. I will pick

them up.

MR. BELIN: Do you have anything you want to state

first before your interrogation?

MR. ROCCA: No sir. I have a statement there, an

aide memoire, which goes to the implications of what is going

on for counterintelligence. The only statement that I had in

addition is that my preoccupation in this discussion grows out

of the conviction, hased on operational facts, that hostile

espionage, political action, and counterintelligence -- in

other words, uncontested expansion of Soviet intelligence

presence, successful recruitments, penetrations, and disin-

formation by the soviets and the Bloc services of intelligence

and security and other conspiratorial organs -- will increase

during the period of detente.

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Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

410 First Street,

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The hard fact that KGB presence under Soviet official

cover has continued to increase throughout the world, parti-

cularly in areas of direct concern to us like western Europe,

Latin America, and Africa, makes it a matter of urgency for

CIA to devote a larger part of its energy to the CI problem.

The same thing has happened in the U.S.; the remedy, through

the appropriate Federal agency or agencies, will have to be

the same.

The fact that the KGB/Bloc services, including Cubans,

have continued in the past two years to undertake developmental

relations and have made pitches to and significant contacts

with American officials overseas at an undiminished rate, that

work out to one or more per week, is the complementary opera-

tional element that underlines the urgency for an effective

counterintelligence response abroad and domestically.

Overhead photography and sophisticated but remotely

operating equipment will not, and never will, tell us who the

Soviet, Bloc, and Cuban spies are. This inimical activity

originates abroad and is no respector of our organizational,

jurisdictional, or territorial distinctions. As we are pre-

sently organized in the United States, no one Federal agency

can hope to deal successfully with the growing threat alond.

This integrated, determined adversary can only he dealt with

by coordinated, innovative and aggressive defense through

counterintelligence and counterespionage operations which bring

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WARD

PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

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together the operational

capabilities of all Federal agencies

invested with the problem.

I have been a member now for 30 or more years of

one of the components invested with this job and my career has

ended by retirement. I contemplate the future in the statement

as well as the past and I want to say that as far as I know, the

component I have heen a member of CI staff, has engaged or

participated in no way in the domestic activities specified by

Hirsh in the New York Times, that is, in the Breakins,

physical audio surveillances and the other massive elements of

surveillance that he has charged.

With respect to the mail intercept program, I have

talked in detail with Mr. Weidner and I am prepared to discuss

that as well as anything else you have in mind.

MR. WEIDNER: Perhaps we should back up just a hit to

the time that you returned to the United States and joined

the CIA staff here. You have given us a biography that brings

us up to that point.

What position did you take in 1955 when you returned?

MR. ROCCA: I became Chief of the Research and

Analysis Division, it eas called at that moment. It became a

group later on. It numbered at no time more than 35 or 36

"people and it was concerned in the main with the topics that

I have outlined in my biography. It represented an attempt to

bring to bear brain power on the problem, research, hard

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research brain power on the problem of the identification,

neutralization and manipulation of Soviet agents and their

principals.

MR. WINNER: At that time was the counterintelli-

gence funcwion of the CIA just being established in a formal

sense?

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MR. ROCCA: The question turns in a formal sense

there had been counterintelligence in OS$, it had been indepen-

dent under feneral Donovan, it had heen headed by Jimmy Murphy,

it had its own cadre, it had its own ciphers, it was an

autonomous part of USS function, it was submerged as a function

to foreign intelligence during the SSU and following periods.

In other words, it became a subordinate part of what we call

foreign intelligence activities until late '54, early '55,

when it was finally broken out as a coordinate activity at the

staff level.

MR. WEIDNER: Was one of your early functions to

determine precisely what counterintelligence activities had

been going on up to that point that were not particulaxly

coordinated?

MR. ROCCA: Yes sir. One of our first jobs was to

study first of all how many people were doing counterintelligenc

full time within our organization. We found the number to be

extremely small. As a matter of fact, they are still extremely

small and growing smaller.

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Fulltime counterintelligence at the non staff level.

people overseas and in headquarters divisional and branch

components.

MR. THIDNER: Did Research and Analysis have any

operational activities at all?

MR. ROCCA: At that time it undertook no operational

activities except in direct dealings on an ad hoc basis with

people like defectors who had something to contribute directly

to the research impact.

MR. WEIDNER: What sort of dealings did you have with

them?

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MR. ROCCA: As you know, by law we have the responsi

bility for resettlement of defectors and any number of Soviet

defectors, any number of incidents these people remained in

contact with us continuously and are handled as continuing

sources of information, in some instances compensated, in other

instances not.

MR. WEIDNER: Would the FBI have played a part in

this?

MR. ROCCA: FBI might or might not have played a

part. They have always participated in the continuing debrief-

ing of defectors.

For example, we have a number, the staff still

operates a number of these, I would say half a dozen of those.

The FBI sees on a continuing basis at least two of them. They

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continue to show photographs of incoming people, that is,

incoming Soviets, to try to pick up in these human sources who

have memories about that service people that they are still in

the Service and are coming into the country. So we are in

touch with the FBI.

MR. WEIDNER: This is activity within the United

States?

MR. ROCCA: This is activity within the United States!

with respect to defectors.

MR. WEIDNER:

We will return to other activities in

a more general sense. But you mentioned the mail intercept

program.

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When was the first time you became aware that such

a program was in existence?

MR. ROCCA: I became aware of the actual.content of

the program and of its existence in a formal sense on the 4th

of April 1960.

MR. WEIDNER: How is that?

MR. ROCCA: This fact is registered and I was able

to confirm by simply looking. At that point I was cleared

for the reception of material..

MR. WEIDNER: When you say it is registered, the

registration is the fact of your clearance?

MR. ROCCA: There is a card which indicates the name

of every individual who knows or knew.

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MR. WEIDWER: Excuse me.

program at that point?

What did you learn of the

MR. ROCCA: Nothing of its mechanics. My assumption

was that this was an authorized directed program and I simply

attempted to read and utilize the material, if that were

possible.

MR. WEIDNER: You say you assumed that it was a

directed and authorized program.

Did anybody ever tell you how it had been authorized

and/or directed?

MR. ROCCA: No, I got that knowledge later on and

specifically in the more recent events.

MR. WEIDNER: You mean in preparing for these

hearings?

MR. ROCCA: In preparing for these hearings and read-

ing the background of the actual discussions.

MR. WEIDNER: Up to that point you had no knowledge

of that subject?

MR. ROCCA: Of that subject, yes.

MR. WEIDNER: What sort of materials?

CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: Could he give us the dates at

which in his exploration he found the program was authorized

and by whom and so forth, if you have that?

MR. ROCCA: Early this year in reading a paper

prepared on the program, and its background, it was specified

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in the paper that the program had been originated in the early

"50's, and that it had been cleared by a succession of Post-

masters General and others, including an ex Attorney General,

as I recall. There was a specific reference to Mr. Allen

Dulles having gone to the Postmaster: General, it is my best

recollection; I think you have that in your attachment, and

to my knowledge is really effective based on that attachment.

MR. WEIDNER: The attachment you are speaking of is

the attachment Mr. Angleton submitted?

MR. ROCCA: Yes sir.

CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: The reason I raised the ques

tion was up to his testimony, I thought it was '53, he said

this program was initiated back in '49, I think. Was it '52?

Excuse me?

MR. ROCCA: It may have had a lapse.

CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: In a previous Administration.

MR. ROCCA: He may have had a lapse.

MR. WEIDNER: What is your understanding?

MR. ROCCA: My understanding is it was '55.

MR. BELIN: '52 Or '53.

CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: '53 officially by the higher-

ups it had been recommended and undertaken within the Agency

prior to that.

MR. ROCCA: This is quite without my knowledge.

CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: I couldn't even guess.

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MR. WEIDNER: What sort of material?

MR. ROCCA: My understanding is that the origin of

it went back to the component, thât actually in the clandestine

services or equivalent at the time actually had the function

of working against the Soviet Union. That was the SP Division.

MR. GRISWOLD: Could you speak yp. You are talking

to us, not to the people down there.

MR. ROCCA: I am sorry.

MR. GRISWOLD: Thank you.

MR. WEINNER: When you started receiving these

materials you were still in R&A; is that correct?

MR. ROCCA: Yes sir.

MR. WEIDNER: What sort of a flow in terms of numbers

of materials would you receive?

MR. ROCCA: It was a very small flow of material and

none of it sticks in my mind at this time as outstanding in

importance to what we were doing in RiA. I have better

recollection for later pieces of information that concerned,

that is, for information in the '60's when we became very much

interested in the problem of disinformation -- dez informatzia.

that is what the Soviets call strategic deception. This

information went, some of the coverage concerned one of our

specific targets who was an individual named Victor Louie and

on him we had as I recall from this material very good

coverage.

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MR. WEIDNER: Could you determine from the materials

you received whether these were letters to or from the United

States?

MR. ROCCA: No sir.

MR. WEIDNER: Just the substances of the information?

MR. ROCCA: These things came in, they were mostly

from the USSR, not the other way.

MR. WEIDNER: You became Mr. Angleton's Deputy in

1969, is that correct?

MR. ROCCA: Yes. First of July I judge was the date.

MR. WEIDNER: Did you gain any further information

concerning the mail intercept program at that point?

MR. ROCCA: Not at that point. At that point in the

staff's development I became, Deputy, leaving the position as

Chief of Research and Analysis, where my Deputy succeeded in

my place. I took with me a good number of jobs that I had

already begun on the research side and there was created an

executive officer and it was through him that the direct

oversight was continued in the project. Now, what had happened

is, more than what I had stated to you the other day, in

becoming Deputy, I did not succeed to the job which the

previous deputies had, and there had been two, Mr. Horton, and

MI. Hunt, had had which was simultaneously acting as Deputy

to Mr. Angleton's staff and Chief of Operations. I did not

succeed as Chief of Operations. Mr. Miler became Chief of

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882

Operations. So an executive officer was added, Mr. Hubbard

at this time, and he took over the chore of direct oversight

of the project though I remained on the distrihution for

materials as they came in on a routine monthly basis indicating

what had been covered in cryptic language, and I was in generali

aware of the project on that level until it was terminated, and

that was in '73, I judge.

MR. WEIDNER: Did there come a time when you had a

discussion with Mr. Karamessinas, who was the Deputy Director

of Plans, concerning the project?

MR. ROCCA: I did. At one time during this period

MR. WEIDNER: What period is that?

MR. ROSCA: 1971 is my best recollection. During Mr.

Angleton's absence, inasmuch as it was my function as Deputy

to act in his absence, there was some kind of a question that

had arisen that required the ppesentation of an indication of

the results as they had accumulated in the recent past, for

him, and to the best of my recollection Mr. Hubbard and I went

together to present these elements of proudction and security

review.

They were interested in how secure was the project

and so forth. And I.

presented these materials to Mr.

Karamessinas in written form, as I recall.

MR. WEIDNER: Was it Mr. Karamessinas' general mode

of operation to have annual or periodic reviews of projects

within his directorate?

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883

MR. ROCCA: This is standard order of procedure for

all projects so I cannot say that that was what motivated this,

but certainly I can, I recall this episode in the fall of, as

I have it, in '71.

MR. WEIDNER: During that particular conference or

at any other time that you can recall was there any question

raised as to the propriety, the legal propriety of the project?

MR. ROCCA: No, not to my knowledge. Not to my

knowledge or recollection.

MR. WEIDNER: And you never had any particular dis-

cussion with anyone concerning the approval or legality of

the project?

MR. ROCCA: I did not, sir, ever.

MR. WEIDIER:. Now, what was counterintelligence's

relationship tothe mail intercept program?

I think the Commission has already been told that the

operation actually occurred in New York City?

MR. ROCCA: That is correct. The operation origi-

nated outside of CI. CI took it over as a customer and

dissemination point in 1955 or whenever. That was our relation-

ship to it. The actual work was done by another component

outside of the seat of Government.

MR. WEIDNER: You say the actual work, the actual

work of collection?

MR. ROCCA: The actual, whatever went into the

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884

mechanics of the handling of the material.

MR. WEIDNER: But the processing of it, that is the

analysis, was done in headquarters in Washington?

MR. ROCCA: That is correct, sir.

MR. WEIDNER: And that was done by counterintelli-

gence?

MR. ROCCA: That was done by a very highly compart-

mented small unit of Russian language specialists who were set

up in a comintarea, a vaulted area, under every possible safe-

guard, and they treated this material in accordance with their

skills, that is they translated or summarized or otherwise

prepared it.

MR: WEIDNER: Was that vaulted area in the part of

the building where CI is located or was it in a separate area?

MR. ROCCA: It was in a separate area for most of the

time that the project existed, as far as I know. They may

have started in 1955-56 in that area, in that timeframe, on

the same floor, but very quickly thereafter moved to the 7th

floor into comint area where a vaulted area had been prepared.

MR. WEIDNER: Was there any particular reason for that

move, that you can recall?

MR. ROCCA: I could only justify it on the basis of

the security and the handling of the material. It was handled

as comint also.

MR. WEINNER: Did you participate in the decision to

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885

discontinue the program, and I believe the testimony has been

that it was decided to discontinue it in approximately July

of '73?

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MR. ROCCA: I did not, sir.

MR. WEIDNER: Did you learn of that decision?

MR. ROCCA: I learned of it.

MR. WEIDNER: Who told you?

MR. ROCCA: Mr. Angleton.

MR. WEIDNER: Did he tell you why?

MR. ROCCA: The indication that he gave me was that

Mr. Schlesinger had agreed to go to the President to get a

top executive decision with respect to the contuance or

discontinuance of the program, that this issue had been raised

in a discussion between him, DI. Schlesinger and Mr. Colby,

before that; that DI. Schlesinger had agreed to take that

action, Mr. Colby, or someone was to talk with Cotter, or

someone, whoever it was.

MR. WEIDNER: Who was Cotter?

MR. ROCCA: As I understand it, he is the individual

on the Post Office side who was actually handling it, the

Post Office interest, and he refused to permit the time

necessary for DI. Schlesinger to go to the President. The

thing therefore ended sumarily at his choice.

MR. WEIDNER: At Mr. Cotter's choice?

MR. ROCCA:

Yes sir. I am giving you the name in

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complete good faith. It may not be correct, he may well have

been out of it by that time.

MR. WEIDNER: Were you told whether the impetus to

terminate the project had come from within the CIA or from

without?

886

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MR. ROCCA: No; I was not. I jusged that there had

been some difference with respect to the project inside as well

as out but I only know that by hearsay.

MR. WEIDNER: What difference?

MR. ROCCA: That the decision as to whether or not it

should be continued or terminated.

MR. WEIDNER: Did you play any part in the termina-

tion of the project, that is, once the decision was made to

terminate it?

MR. ROCCA: Yes, these decisions coincided with the

decisions made by Dr.

Schlesinger to compress personnel in the

Agency and as a consequence the first large hemorrage of per-

sonnel took place on the retirements that took place on 30

June 1973, and among them was the Executive Office.

MR. WEINNER: And the Executive Officer is Mr.

Angleton?

MR. ROCCA: Yes; MI. Hubbard. The job of winding

this down and taking care of the details became mine and I

did it.

MR. WEIDNER: What did you do?

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887

MR. ROCCA: Through our administrative officer and

the people. still engaged in the project, we, and under the

pressure of the need of our comint people for additional space

on the top floor, and they wanted, in other words, to usefully

employ the space we occupied, we secured new vault space of

similar level of security, securely transferred all of the

material to the new vault space where it remains together with

its indices and appurtenances.

MR. ROCCA: The new vault space is within the CI

counterintelligence area?

MR. ROCCA: The new vault space is on the same floor:

but physically dislocated from CI. It is, however, an approved

security office vault which meets, inother words, all of the

minimum standards. We created it, it had to be built.

MR. WEIDNER: The personnel were reassigned, then?

MR. ROCCA: The personnel were reassigned to other

tasks.

MR. WEIDNER: If the Commission wanted to look at

the records of this project to determine the substance of it,

are those records still in existence and intact?

MR. ROCCA: They are totally intact.

MR. WEIDNER: In this vault, newly created vault?

MR. ROCCA: Yes sir. And I am sure the Commission

would be welcome to examine them, both the vault and the

material, in its present status.

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MR. WEIDNER: Let me turn to a different subject.

MR.. BELIN: Before you leave that subject, there may

be a question of two some of the Commission might want to ask.

You have discussed

this entire area with Mr.

Angleton recently in interviews with members of the staff; is

that correct?

MR. ROCCA: Well, I read the attachment.

MR. BELIN: That Mr. Angleton prepared?

MR. ROCCA: Yes.

MR. BELIN: Or was prepared that Mr. Angleton

presented?

MR. ROCCA: Yes sir.

MR. BELIN: Is there anything in the attachment with

which you disagree?

MR. ROCCA: No sir. It seems to me like a perfectly

complete narrative, descriptive account, as far as I know.

COMMISSIONER REAGAN: This chart that you gave us

here, we have some difficulty identifying them. How do we

estimate the increase in the number of agents, foreign agents

they have?

MR. ROCCA: These are official personnel assigned.

here, sir, you see, and within the official personnel that they

assigned here on l6th Street. There is an institution known

as the Resident Toura which comprises those that work for

State Department and for GRU, Soviet military intelligence,

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889

so these charts reflect the growth of Soviet official presence

throughout the world and

in the United States, delineates in

another line, a solid bar, what we know among them to be

security and military intelligence operatives, and then it

draws another line, which is an estimate, and it is a minimal

estimate, the 40 percent line, which we have come upon as the

result of the research that I have been doing for years, as

the minimal. And as you see we are falling behind in our

identifications both here and abroad, and very seriously

abroad.

MR. CONNOR: May I ask a question on this subject.

Based on your experience, was the substance of the

material that was obtained from these written communications

back and forth of value to the counterintelligence group?

MR. ROCCA: I consider it sir, mind you, I am talking

now completely as an individual who was not privy to the begin-

ning of it and did not get into it until 1960, and therefore,

to a large extent impressionable. It seems to me that for the

'50's and '60's this what may be called a source of strategic

importance for counterintelligence. AS to the extent that the

Soviets did not know it we had it. It was capable of bearing

indications that would have given us identifications not only of

legals but of illegals and of other interests that the Soviets

had that we could get in no other way and that I could only

compare it to the overhead photography which functioned at the

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890

same time and gave us another type or for a good part of that

time of strategic information.

This taken together with the six or seven defectors

that ame out in the '50's, who gave us living examples and

identifications, and the three penetrations that we had going

in the '50's of the Soviets, they were Popov, and Penkovsky, ani

Goyeneveskt, three people working inside those surfaces over a

period of time from '53 to '61. We had the foundation of a

strategy response to the Soviet threat and all you have

to do is to read the '60's and you read the results because

at no time in the history of Soviet intelligence and counter-

intelligence have they been hit so hard as in the decade of

the '60's. We got Blake in '61. We got Philby in '63. We

got Pak, these are two UK fellows, Vassil, another UK one, in

'64. Pak in France in '64. Felfe, the Chief of German

Counterintelligence, West German, about the same time. There

are a number of NATO cases that grew out, all of them, of this

combination of what I call strategic CI weaponry. Defectors,

penetrations and unfortunately all of these penetrations were

compromised. Penkovsky was tried and shot, Popov was tried

and shot. Only one got away, and that is Goyenevsky.

So I would say that this was an extraordinary resourde

particularly in view of the way it was handled for counter-

intelligence. I can't go beyond that because, as I say, I

don't know where every distribution went to the Bureau, how

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many went, how many reports went with the Bureau, you have that

data and can gauge it for yourself. To me it was part and

parcel of an advantage which was extraordinary and it hurts

me to talk about it now.

MR. GRISWOLD: What was the relation of this to the

defectors. I haven't found that connection.

MR. ROCCA: Well, a defector will talk about collec-

tion by true name and in some instances in this project, in

this material, we found that individual writing to people here,

and so by that kind of correlation of identification of names,

the project makes its contribution to an ongoing lead which

began with a defector. So that the idea of backing up

operations with research involves using all of these tools

against the target.

That is a specific example that I can recall offhand.

COMMISSIONER CORBIN: You have given an example of

mail coming from USSR. What about mail originating in the

United States?

MR. ROCCA: As I say, the stuff I saw came from the

USSR. I can't make anything out of the other at all because

I was not that close to it.

COMMISSIONER BELIN: Basically the defectors were

of prime importance?

MR. ROCCA: Absolutely gilt edge..

COMMISSIONER BELIN: And the technical observations

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through the U-2 and satellites?

MR. ROCCA: This is another thing.

COMMISSIONER BELIN: And both of those were far more

substantial than the mail intercept program; isn't that true?

MR. ROCCA: I can't argue the merit really in that,

with that fineness of degree of detail because they were laid

to different --

COMMISSIONER BELIN: To follow through the question

Mr. Corbin asked, was there anything that you can specifically

remember that was gleaned from intercepting the mail of an

American citizen going to the Soviet Union?

MR. ROCCA: I have not that capability, not because

it doesn't exist, in fact I think there are some specific

examples cited in the report.

COMMISSIONER BELIN: In Mr. Angleton's report?

. MR. ROCCA: Yes. But maybe other witnesses could

clarify that.

COMMISSIONER LEMINITZER: You don't know whether

it went to the FBI?

MR. ROCCA: I am sure the reports were shared with

the FBI. I am sure they were. Sir, what I don't know is in

response to Mr. Belin's question, how important it was, whether

they made any cases, that kind of thing.

COMMISSIONER BELIN: Mr. Weidner.

MR. WEIDNER: I would like to turn to the operation

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concerning dissidents or information relating to foreign news

or contacts with American dissidents.

I believe the project was established sometime in

1967. The record will show that.

At that point you were sitll in R&A; is that correct?

MR. ROCCA: That is right.

MR. WEIDNER: Were you aware that this particular

project was being established?

MR. ROCCA: I was aware of it when it was announced

in the regulation. It was not discussed with me before it was

announced, before the action was taken. I was not privy to

that kind of thing as Chief of Research and Analysis though

the very man chosen had spent sometime in Research and Analysis

working specifically on machine records and techniques which

was a matter of grave concern to him, and interest. He was

specifically interested in developing and perfecting the

techniques of ADP control over data. I recall him, Mr. Ober,

a fine officer, who spent sometime in R&A before he went down

to OPS, from whence he went into this unit.

COMMISSIONER GRISWOLD: Excuse me. What do you mean

when it was announced?

MR. ROCCA: I would say there was an actual announce-

ment by Karamessinas which said as of such and such a date a

unit has been created under the headship --

COMMISSIONER GRISWOLD. This was an internal announce-

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ment?

MR. ROCCA:

Within the DDP.

COMMISSIONER GRISWOLD: Not a public announcement?

MR. ROCCA:

No.

COMMISSIONER GRISWOLD: Do you know about when that

was?

MR. ROCCA: I would guess it was '57, sometime in

157.

COMMISSIONER GRISWOLD: You mean '67?

MR. ROCCA: '67. I am sorry.

COMMISSIONER GRISWOLD: Thank you.

MR. WEIDNER: Mr. Ober was transferred out of R&A

at about that time, or was it before then?

MR. ROCCA:

Before then. Because he did a'.:

transitional tour. I had nothing permanent for him to do in

R&A besides this work that he was doing. We have our own

machine, I had my own machine records, so he went to OPS as

referent, as we call it, as the OPS Supervisor for the Domestio

Operations Division.

MR. WEIDNER: Was this program a part of the

Domestic Operations Division, do you know?

MR. ROCCA: No, I don't think so.

MR. WEIDNER: Well, then, did he leave Domestic

Operations, the referent desk?

MR. ROCCA: As the referent he was in CI and in the

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part of CI known as CI Operations which had a number of

referents for each of the major counterintelligence jobs that

was being done overseas or in the United States as in this

instance it turned out.

MR. WEIDNER: What I am driving at, whether this

project was a part of the Domestic Operations. Division or

whether this was a separate project, the dissident project.

Do you know?

MR. ROCCA: It was a separate project as far as I

know.

MR. WEIDNER: When you became Mr. Angleton's Deputy

in '69, did you gain any greater knowledge about this project?

MR. ROCCA: I gained no greater knowledge because

it was absolutely compartmented and sat in another part of the

building. What I gained was the opportunity of administra-

tively seeing budget and travel accounts pertaining to Mr.

Ober's activity and his people's activity within the United

States.

MR. WEIDNER: Did he specify to any degree what those

activities were?

MR. ROCCA: I was never told what those activities

were. In fact, I am sure I would not have been even had I

asked because these were known as compartmented activities.

MR. WEIDNER: Did Mi. Ober deal through you as Mr.

Angleton's Deputy?

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MR. ROCCA: Never dealt through me to Mr. Angleton.

MR. WEIDNER: Other than for the expense request?

MR. ROCCA: Other than these.

MR. WEIDNER: It seems to me that the mail program --

MR. ROCCA: He dealt with MI. Karamessinas and Mr.

Helms on these matters. I would say that he was with us for

rations and quarters. This would be something that General

Leminitzer recognizes.

MR. WEIDNER: There seems to be a certain parallel

between the mail program and what I will call the dissident

program, that is, both seemed to have a chain of command, if

you want to call it that, somewhat out of the ordinary. Is

that a fair statement?

MR. ROCCA: Yes, I think that is probably a fair

statement and in both instances I think the differences pertain

to the sensitivity of the activity.

MR. WEIDNER: You never had any discussion with any-

one concerning the propriety of the dissident program?.

MR. ROCCA: No, I would never have thought of it as

being improper. The National Security Act in its provisions

with respect to limitations on our powers does not proscribe

that we live in another country in doing our operations and

my assumption had always been, and I have not seen any evidence

to the contrary, that Mt. Ober's activity, the activity of

this unit, at all times looked to fruits abroad, which is

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precisely where we were supposed to operate.

MR. WEIDNER: You say that is your assumption. Do

you have any specific facts on which you would base that?

MR. ROCCA: I don't know Mr. Ober's operations.

He:

had them because, as I say, I know the budgetary line-up of

the period and, therefore, I am sure you can get them from him

They were never explained to me under this need to know

principle.

One operation that I know is his, and maybe you

already know about it, is the penetration of Agee in Paris.

MR. WEIDNER: Perhaps you can tell us about that.

MR. ROCCA: Agee is a defector, an American intelli-

gence defector, as far as I am concerned, the only one we have

had, and he has just written a book that is going to be a

massive blow to the security and identity of our operations

in Latin America. It comes out in England. He was an

individual recruited in the late '50's, he operated in Latin

America in the '60's, and left us under what he himself called

very friendly circumstances in 1968 in Mexico City after his

personal affairs had become completely mucked up as a conse-

quence of the collapse of his marriage.

One of the final things he did was to write the

Director - this is again hearsay, I have not seen the letter,

but I believe my sources are good on it -- a letter in which

he said no hard feelings, I will always be your principal

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backer, and so forth. This is 1968. By 1971 we knew that he

had made two trips to Cuba. The origins of his ideological

conversion, whatever they might be, in Mexico City, after he

left us, presumably, he went to the University of Mexico, he

had, as I say, marital problems, another woman, whom he has

since left. I can't judge. But when he became by his action

a threat we only had to point out what the nature of that

threat was and to assess it. It is, I am told, that the

individual who succeeded in placing an agent within the zone of

confidence in Paris was Mr. Ober and this was one of his

operations, perfectly legitimate operations, as far as I am

concerned, because while it involved an American, I think,

maybe not maybe, it was in Latin American, but whatever, it

took place outside of this country and it presented us with

extremely useful information on the basis of which we could

assess the potential damage and intention of Agee, all of which

has come to pass.

MR. WEIDNER: You say this was a part of Ober's

special operations?

MR. ROCCA: As far as I know this is one of Agee's

operations and it should figure as one of the big cases.

MR. WEIDNER: I think you mean one of Ober's

operations?

MR. ROCCA: Who did I say?

MR. WEIDNER: Agee's.

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MR. ROCCA: Ober. I am sorry. Now, that is one I

do know about by the unconventional route of just listening

but I can't cite any of the others at all.

MR. WEINNER:

Let me turn to another subject, or

perhaps if anyone else has any questions on this one before I

do?

COMMISSIONER BELIN: I think we had better move

forward because we have one more witness.

MR. WEIDNER: Let me touch briefly on two other

subject matters which have come to light, at least in publicity.

and that is the liaison with local police forces and/or this

use of surveillance, breaking and entering, and the like,

within the United States.

Are you aware of any such activities by counter-

intelligence?

MR. ROCCA: No. And as far as police are concerned,

we have no relations with, we have never had any relations

with local police..

MR. WEIDNER: What about surveillance and the like?

MR. ROCCA: As far as I know the staff has never

done any surveillance of any kind. It has no capability to do

it or experts to ủo it, and we have a TO officer that was as

high as 202 and it is now down to 78, and each I think can be

if necessary summoned and questioned on the point. No breakins,

no surveillances, involving audio or physical activity, no

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no contact with police in the mail operation that I have told

you about or otherwise.

MR. WEIDNER: What about wiretaps?

MR. ROCCA: No wiretaps. *

MR. WEIDNER: Are you aware now of any activity?

MR. ROCCA: We were interested in other people's

capabilities of wiretapping us. As I told you, we had a

specialized component that studied Soviet capabilities of

tapping our communications and we reported to the

community regularly on this.

MR. WEIDNER: ARe you presently aware of any CI

counterintelligence activities within the United States?

MR. ROCCA: At present CI activity in the United

States outside of our headquarters building involves contacts

with the Washington area and in one major city, Eastern

Seaboard city, with defectors, Soviet defectors, and we have

contacts in this area with about five. I am in personal

contact with some of these people at least on a weekly basis.

I have an officer in touch with them nearly on a daily basis.

The exception outside of the Seat of Government in this major

city is handled by anothr officer, former staffer, who is now

a hired annuitant. So these are defector contacts that we

have. These are highly specialized relations dealing with the

main enemy as I have described him and I consider them entirely

within our legal brief. So we have a half dozen defectors that

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we are in direct touch with and to whom we move and from whom

we move, each on a regular basis.

Second, we have three consultants. These are

private individuals who are experts in international communism,

or on disinformation, and there again the contact is direct.

We don't buy all of their time, we buy some of it, and those

are, in other words, consultants.

MR. WEIDNER: What sort of work. Can you give me an

example?

MR. ROCCA:

One of the topics, one of the consultants

is on tap for disinformation. I think we have contact with

the person who is probably the world's best authority on this

topic and we simply pay for a part of his time.

MR. GRAY: Would these be university professors and

similar people?

MR. ROCCA: They could have been formerly. This

person is not.

COMMISSIONER BELIN: By disinformation you mean

intentionally misleading misinformation released by the

Soviets?

MR. ROCCA: Yes sir.

COMMISSIONER BELIN: Or some other?

MR. ROCCA: Yes sir. For example, before the Xom

Kippur War telling us through various cables they were tired of

the Arabs and the Arabs couldn't shoot straight and this and

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that and the other, that is disinformation. No question it

would have been good to have recognized it then instead of now.

MR. WEIDNER: These consultants are U.S. citizens

under contract with the CIA; is that correct?

MR. ROCCA: Yes.

MR. WEIDNER: Do you have any other activities within

the United States in which counterintelligence is involved?

MR. ROCCA: We have a group of 20 former agents.

These are people who work for us abroad that we keep under

appropriate cover here in Washington, official cover, working

on overt Soviet publication, that is things in the Russian

language, that they read and from which they extract information

dealing with Soviet intelligence and security matters. These

people have cover status in official buildings, they don't

figure as CIA. We pay them salaries and we interact with them.

I think that is the entire extent of it.

MR. WEIDNER: Do you have any people through whom

you maintain contact with other Soviets here in the United

States or abroad?

MR. ROCCA: Thes might be uncompensated contacts

who would really figure in the area of agents or double agents.

either active or under development, and there are such. Again

perfectly legitimate developmental activity.

COMMISSIONER BELIN: There has been a lot of comment

about possible wiretapping by CIA people. Could you tell us

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what the Russians are doing in this country? Summarize what

they might be doing insofar as wiretapping or eavesdropping

on phone conversations?

MR. ROCCA: The Russians' sophistication in this area,

Mr. Belin, if you are interested in it, to the extent that you

seem to be, should be gained from someone who has expert

knowledge, and I think you ought to lay the question on for

NSA or someone, but it is phenominal. Their ability to cover

communications, including microwave, is astounding, ad I am a

layman in this, therefore, I am giving you what I have been told

in the course of briefings designed to keep me from using even

our own phone, a 351 number, even the 351 number. They have

the degree of sophistication of coming in and discriminating,

if you use a microwave, on that kind of a code. So this is an

extraordinary thing. It is going on right here in your back

yard.

MR. WEIDNER: If they want to they could get every

conversation coming out of Capitol Hil, or most conversations?

MR. ROCCA: That is too much. I haven't the

expertise to say that but I think if you are interested in it

get the experts.

(Off the record discussion)

COMMISSIONER BELIN: Mr. Rocca, Mr. Corbin has one on

two questions.

CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: I want to ask a question.

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And that is, what in your opinion caused the downward curve

of identification of agents starting in 1968?

MR. ROCCA: This is on the domestic chart?

CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: Domestic. Then it has picked

up again but you show a lag there.

MR. ROCCA: That is right. This is the Bureau

record. It is directly related, sir, I believe to, there are

a number of explanations or points bearing on an explanstion.

One of them is it is directly related, I believe, to a 12

percent decline in Bureau manpower expenditure, which I am not

showing and which I am just giving you.

CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: Is that true on a worldwide

basis, too?

MR. ROCCA: On a worldwide scale we have simply gone

off line in our counterintelligence work. I think Mr.

Angleton said so in his statement that we are looking for

other things, we are not analyzing resident tourists, and our

gap is getting resident toura. That word means resident toura.

That is the word that means the organized intelligence and

security component within each Soviet Embassy or Consulate.

It has its own capabilities, its won ciphers and its own

operations.

We used to study those and we knew them everywhere

in the world back in the good old days, but along with manpower,

and we have been cut well into the bone, not just to the bone.

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We have I think to face up on our side to the fact that our

priorities have been shifted and now I think with these

revelations we are dead in the water.

COMMISSIONER BELIN: When you said Bureau do you mean?

FBI Or CIA?

MR. ROCCA: This is the domestic figures.

COMMISSIONER BELIN: You used the phrase Bureau with

regard to curtailed 12 percent.

MR. ROCCA: That is the Bureau.

COMMISSIONER BELIN: That is the FBI?

MR. ROCCA: Yes sir.

COMMISSIONER CONNOR: In Washington parlance FBI

is called the Bureau and CIA is called the Agency.

MR. ROCCA: That is right.

COMMISSIONER BELIN: I would like to have the court

reporter make these charts a part of your interrogation together

with your statement, so we will give you two copies of the

charts so they will be in the transcript.

(The above referred to charts follow)

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BIOGRAPHY

-

Raymond George Rocca, born 22 February 1917 in

San Francisco, which is family home.

Sherman Grammar School,

Galileo High School ('34).

University of California,

Berkeley, AB - '38 in Political Science.

Phi Betta Kappa.

MA - '39, Highest Honors in International Relations.

Worked

for Doctorate 1939 - April 30, 1942, successfully completed

orals.

(Unclassified)

Joined Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, Washington,

D. C., 3 May 1942 as Italian broadcast analyst.

(Unclassified)

Joined OSS Counterintelligence component, April 1944.

Arrived Rome, Italy, July 1944.

Remained in

Italy in

service

of OSS and its

successor agencies, the Strategic Services Unit

and CIA, under military and as of end 1947, under non-official

cover, until 1953. Temporary duty assignments abroad:

1956, 1959, 1964, 1967, 1969, 1971, and 1973. (Secret)

1955,

National War College, class

of 1954-55. (Unclassified)

Joined DDP/CI Staff, July 1955 as Chief of its Research

Analysis Group.

Functions: production and editing of

finished CI studies, case studies, briefings, defector

debriefings, accumulation of CI doctrine, and research,

stimulation, and participation in CI training. Deputy Chief,

CI Staff (as of July 1973 renamed CI/OPS) , July 1969 -

31 December 1974. Principal functional concerns:

General staff administration oversight and

bureaucratic detail.

b.

Responsibility for specific Soviet and Bloc

defector development..

c. Soviet Deception and Disinformation.

d. Development of liaison relations with selected

Western intelligence and security services on case

study and analyses.

(Secret)

allachinest

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055431

EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION

SCHEDULE CF E. O. 11052, EXEMPTION CATEGORY:

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SECRET

Aide-memoire for the Commission on

CIA Activities Within the United States

My preoccupation in this discussion grows out of the

conviction, based on operational facts, that hostile

espionage, political action, and counterintelligence--in

other words, uncontested expansion of Soviet intelligence

presence, successful recruitments, penetrations, and

disinformation by the Soviets and the Bloc services of

intelligence and security and other conspiratorial organs--

will increase during the period of detente.

The hard fact that KGB presence under Soviet official

cover has continued to increase throughout the world,

particularly in areas of direct concern to us like Western

Europe, Latin America, and Africa, makes it a matter of

urgency for CIA to devote a larger part of its energy to

that CI problem.

The same thing has happened in the u.s.;

the remedy, through the appropriate Federal agency or

agencies, will have to be the same.

Clackment. 15"

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CLASSIFIED BY -

055431

EXEMPT FROX GENERAL. DECLASSIFICATION

SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11352, EXESIPTION CATEGORY:

§ SB(1). @ (3) or (1) (sirelo and or sore)

AUTONATICALLY DECLASSIPIED ON

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SECRET

.-...

The fact that the KGB/Bloc services, including Cubans,

have continued in the past two years to undertake develop-

mental relations and have made pitches to and significant

contacts with American officials overseas at an undiminished

rate, that work out to one or more per week, is the

complementary operational element that underlines the

urgency for an effective counterintelligence response:

abroad and domestically.

Overhead photography and sophisticated but remotely

operating equipment will NOT, and never will, tell us who the

Soviet, Bloc, and Cuban spies are. This inimical activity

originates abroad and is no respector of our organizational,

jurisdictional, or territorial distinctions. As we are

presently organized in the United States, no one Federal

agency can hope to deal successfully with the growing threat

alone. This integrated, determined adversary can only be

dealt with by coordinated, innovative, and aggressive defense

through counterintelligence and counterespionage operations

which bring

together the operational capabilities of all

Federal agencies invested with the problem.

Washington, D. C.

17 February 1975

2

CINDET

ROCCa

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10,600

Soviet Offical and Intelligence & Security!

Presonco--lorld-1de, 1959--1974

HIEALLLLAETTAT

The "Counterintelligence jap": tho

relative docline in identifications of

known and suspect soviet security and

intelligenco operativos in the US and

gas orlà-wide (excluding ine countries)

8006

7000

-Soriot Officials

-Identified Soviet

Intelligence and So-

curity operatives

•40% Line--the accepted

minimal estlated

Soviet Intelligence andi

socurity deployant

overseas

SECRET

8,93%

7503

5/206

7792

6O00

.. 5000

9000.

3,535

2,840 12012

3490i

2000

isne

4434

985

16574

1990

CRET

1959 60

62 65 64 65 66 67 68 69 90 4 127314

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sovist Ufficial and intelli ener & scurity

Fres-nce--Uniied sintes, 1959--1974

400

780

The "Count-rintclligence Gap":

the

relativo declino in identificationg of

known and suspect soviet security

and

intelligence operatives in the US and

orld wide (excluding Bloc countrios)

•••Soviat Oficials

•Identified soviet

Intelligenco and Se-

curity operatives

•40% Line--tho accopted

minimal estimated

soviet Intelligenco

and Security deploy-

ment

overseas

SECRET

966

3154

18266.

600

5620 - 1530

500

45%

11497

ETEI

599

1386

333

1128г

1224

zell

67

170

RET 1959 60 67

65 64 65 66 67 68 69 7 1 12 1 99

220:20

attachmet 76

5075780527

DICC4#1

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