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INTERVIEW OF THOMAS CASASIN

AUGUST 17, 1978

AMERICAN. EMBASSY/ PARIS, FRANCE

By Surell Brady

Casasin stated that he retired from the Central Intelligence

Agency in 1973. At the time of the assassination of President Kennedy

in November, 1963 he was stationed in Paris; he was working in the

area of Soviet operations, but had no official cover. He arrived

in Paris in September, 1962.

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He stated that in September, 1960 he was assigned defense cover

as Branch 6 Chief. He worked for two years in Section

Casasin said that during his assignment in Paris he had not

infrequent contact with the CIA station in Paris. He estimated that

the contact occurred every two and a half weeks.

The contact was made

on the outside by telephoninh a person with official cover. He said he

never made written contact with the station.

Casasin explained

that the function of Section 6 was operations

in support of the Soviet Russia Division of the CIA. He said the ,

work consisted of amassing information in support of

the SR Division;

he characterized that work as classical espainage work against the,

USSR. He said it involved penetration for the purpose of espionade

and included cartography,

demography, sociology, and experts in the

science and political science. He stated that the section

was in a "down" phase when he entered and that it consisted of only

20-25 persons.

Casasin worked in Japan from February 1955 to June 1960. He served

as

Chief of the Soviet Base of the North Asia Command. He said his

unit was attached to the Far Eastern Command. of the Armed Forces. He

explained that his unit was one of four bases: Soviet, Japan, North

Korea and Red China. Each of those geographical areas was a target.

The Soviet base in which he worked was therefore targeted against the

Soviet Union. He was assigned head

of that base in 1955.

He said the operations out of the Soviet base included espionage.

The covert operations consisted of psychological warfare and radio

transmission to internal Soviet audiences. He said the espionage also

included spying against Soviet naval and industrial targets in Soviet

ports, using mainly Japanese operatives who had access to the ports.

Casasin said that his base had extremely limited work with the

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military. He said it consisted primarily of briefing the military on

items of mutual interest. He said the CIA had tried to work with clan-

destine units of the military, including the Army (he said the Navy

had no clandestine units), but it was the opinion of the CIA that the

military had too low a degree of professionalism for the successful

operation of clandestine projects. Casasin stated that during this

time the military said it was actually running operations, but it was

never confirmed by the CIA and they found no evidence of such military

operations.

Casasin identified two military intelligence personnel in the

area when he was stationed in Japan: Captain Perez, OSI, and John B.

Stanley, Army head.

Casasin said, however, that the Navy did provide some operationai

support for his base. It consisted of providing cover/for persons

running operations against the Soviets.

Casasin

said he cannot recall any specific information that the

military was using American military personnel in any of its operations

He said, however, that there wa's occasional rumors that an American

serviceman was trafficking with suspected foreign subversives. He said

the individual intelligence agencies would have handled any such cases.

He stated that he never heard any concrete information of American

contact with the Soviets.

Casasin could not recall the name of the Chief of the North Asia

Command in 1955; he believed the man

was a retired vice admiral and that

his last name began with the letter "O." Harry Little succeeded that

person in 1957.

Casasin said that most of his communications during that time from

Japan went back to headquarters. He explained

that the North Asia Com-

mand at that time was tied up with the situation of Korea and Japan.

Casasin said that he does not know who had the oversight responsi-

bility or authority for the U-2 program. He cited that as an example

of how well compartmentalized their work was. He said he never learned

who was in charge of the U-2 program out of Japan. He said that

he

assumed it was some type of paramilitary operation. He said the

North Asia base ran no paramilitary operations and that most such

smaller units usually did not.

Casasin said he does not recall any discussions concerning

the

possible use of American defectors to penetrate the Soviets. He said

one reason for no interest in such use was probably that the First

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Chief Directorate of the KGB

would suspect any such American from the

beginning as being CIA connected. He said the CIA at that point knew

a lot about the KGB and its thinking because they had had experience

with displaced persons from the communist bloc.

Casasin explained further that American intelligence interests

were much more short range than the type of slow, long-range project

of working an American defector into some sensitive or intelligence-

productive position within the Soviet Union. He said that was simply

not the American way of conducting intelligence and that that thinking

precluded such programs.

Casasin said lessening of tensions between the United States and

the Soviet Union from such things as the Spirit of Camp David did

allow some shallow penetration. This consisted primarily of using

short-term tourists and foreigners on legitimate business within the

Soviet Union. But he said these projects had no direct or obvious

effects on our intelligence gathering against the Soviet Union.

I referred Casasin to CIA Document 435-173-A, which is a memo

dated 25 November 1963 from Thomas B. Casasin to Walter P. Haltigan

on Mr. Lee Harvey Oswald. Casasin says he does remember the memo.

I asked him to explain the cover memo dated 12 December 1963 by Robert

G. Lamprell to Chiefs of SR and WH re: GPFLOOR-Lee Harvey Oswald.

sinclair

Casasin explained that Lamprell (whose real name was William Rober

he died of cancer a few years ago) was one of Casasin's

contacts

in Paris. He said that Lamprell was the Senior Officer in

the Soviet Office in the Paris Station, and served as the second in 3

command. Casasin said that Walter Haltigan (whose real name was (James

Flint)

was his normal contact in Paris. He surmised that his memo

was sent out by Lamprell because Haltigan might not have been available

He does not know the reason for the delay between

the date of his

memo, 25 November, and the transmission by Lamprell, 12 December.

Casasin said he recalls that he wrote the memo spontaneously

when he heard a news cast about Oswald after the assassination. He

recognized Oswald when he heard the news information that Oswald had

lived in Minsk in the Soviet Union and had married a foreigner. He

remembered those details from State Department information he had seen.

Casasin explained the cryptonym REDWOOD as clandestine operations;

the Chief of the SR Division was responsible for that project. He

explained

that was separate from the REDCAP program, which was operatio

against Soviets outside of the USSR.

Casasin explained the relationship of the Counterintelligence

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staff to other divisions. He said Counterintelligence had primary

responsibility for staff review, but supposedly no command voice.

However, they did have their own closely held operations. Counterin-

telligence gave approval on every operation. Casasin said that it was

possible or even probable that Counterintelligence ran operations in

his geographical target.

Casasin said research was one of the functions of the 6 Branch.

But he cannot recall research's exact mandate within the 6 Branch.

He listed the branches besides 6 Branch: (1) Scandinavia; (2) Western

Europe; (3) Middle East and Latin America; (4) ? ; (5) Far East; and

the Inter-Branch.

Casasin said the the research unit of Branch 6 would get information

from defectors about Soviet realities and details about Soviet life

which could be used to assist persons working inside the Soviet Union.

He said such defectors were normally pumped about personal life in the

USSR. However, Casasin said he does not personally know of any defectors

being used as a source in his brief time in the SR Division. He said

the agency also benefitted from FBI debriefings of such defectors. In

part this was due to the CIA's limited charter domestically in the

United States. But the Contacts Division (00) did have a domestic

mandate within the U.S. Casasin said he thought the American defector

to Czechoslovakia, Fields, had been debriefed by the agency. Casasin

said he believed

a had boon

the agency also got information on Americans in the

Soviet Union

from State Department information about visas or from the

press.

Casasin said he cannot remember who served as Chief of the

Section 6 research branch while he was there. He said the deputy

chief was an older woman near the age of retirement. He said that

Rudolf Balaban worked with him and is still at the agency; he could

probably remember the names of the others in the section.

I asked when Casasin recalled the discussion took place which he

refers to in his memo. He said it was the last days of his work with

the section; he assumes it was the third or fourth week of July, 1962

when he left the section, so he believes the conversation about

Oswald

took place the first week of July, 1962.

Casasin said at the time he assumed Oswald had been sent out of

the Soviet Union by the KGB, so he exercsied caution and did

not

attempt to debrief Oswald.

Casasin gave the following dates in an effort to pin down when the

conversation took place. He said he left Japan

on June 25, 1960 and

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travelled through Europe on leave with his family until Spetember,

1960. He said therefore the conversation could not have taken place

in the summer of 1960 as the memo states. He said he used the wrong

year

in the memo.

Casasin identified KUJUMP as the Operations Division. He said it

had a contacts division for debriefing persons. He said the "suitable

channels" for debriefing referred to in the memo were the Immi gration

xo do re an opene

and Naturalization Service and the FBI. He said he believed he had

received maybe one State Department dispatch on the returning American.

He said the dispatch probably originated if Oswald had given up his

passport at the Embassy in Moscow and had had to reapply to the embassy

to be able to return to the United States. Casasin said he believes

no hat had to,

Oswald's contacts with the Embassy in Moscow were initiated by

Oswald. Casasin said he only knew whatever appeared in the State Depart

ment dispatches about Oswald.

He said his statement in the memo that Oswald looked "odd" was the

CIA's evaluation of Oswald. This was based on the fact that he was

allowed to live in the Soviet Union and permitted to marry

a Soviet

citizen. Casasin said he believed some type of controlled intelligence

station

should approach Oswald; they would be able to contact and talk

to him in a perfunctory manner

for debriefing purposes.

Casasin said that during the period 1945-60 no more than 10

American defectors came to their attention from the State Department

and

the military.

program. It involved using persons to give information about the

such as scientists, etc.

casasin said the agency which conducted the debriefing of these

people and defectors would write the information and pass it on. He

believes therefore that if Oswald had been debriefed he would have seen

the informacion in that torn

Casasin said he believes it is inconceivable that Oswald would

have

been any type of operative of the CIA. However, he also gave his

opinion that the nature

of KGB operations made it conceivable that Os-

wald could have been a "lay-low" Soviet operative.

I asked about the CIA interest in Minsk which is reflected in

Casasin's memo. Casasin said it was known that there were some type

of special design plants in Minsk which were of interest to the CIA.

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Casasin said that type of special design plant dealt with aviation,

nuclear energy, bacterialogical warfare, etc. He said that he cannot

remember specifically which type of plants were located in Minsk, but

the city was of interest for that reason. Additionally, anyone in the

area of those plants was of interest to the agency. Casasin said he

is : confident that Oswald was not working in any type of security faci-

lity. He said even with the presence of the design plants, Minsk was

not identified as a security or military priority area. Casasin said

also that he believes they had some type of encyclopedic information

at the agency on the radio factory in Minsk where Oswald worked. He

said that kind of information was maintained in the Office of Research

and Reporting. Casasin said he was not aware of a KGB facility in

Minsk.

Casasin said the Legal Travellers Program was headed at the time

of his memo by Alexander Sokaloff (phonetic) of the Soviet Russia

Division. He said the program began pre-1960 with the lessening of

tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. He said Soka-

loff had come out of the Soviet Union with his parents

as a child.

He explained that defectors such as Sokaloff were kept at arms length

for security reasons by the agency.

The Legal Travellers Program operated in such a way that the

agency contact was in touch with the traveller well before the pro-

posed trip and would be informed as to which areas would be visited,

what he would be doing in the country, etc. The agency contact would

then be able to give the traveller the agency's "requirements" for

information while he was abroad. Casasin said he was not involved in

the program. He said

he was opposed to it because it was too short-

term

to

justify the investment of resources and the risk involved.

He said he believes

the travellers

were told that their contacts were

CIA, but he doesn't know for sure. He said cover may have been used by

the contact.

I asked Casasin what the reference to the "Harvey Story" in the

last line of his memo referred to. He said at first that it must have

been some kind of

cryptonym he was using at the time. He pondered a

while. Then he said he would need some kind of prompting of his

memory. He said he doubts that it would have been someone's true name.

Casasin said he has never been contacted by anybody, including

the Warren Commission, about the memo.

He said that his interest in Oswald as expressed in the memo was

just a lead. He said the fact of no follow-up on that lead was not

unusual. He said Oswald's going to the Soviet Union was unusual, but

that left him open to the possibility of KGB contact. He therefore

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ultimately was of only marginal interest to the agency.

Casasin said it was normal to not make a check for a 201 file

on a person like Oswald, meaning that it was not unusual that he did

not check for Oswald's 201. He

said this was epsecially not unusual

since they had made the decision not to use Oswald. It's possible

that a colleague of Casasin's might have checked, but Casasin said

he doesn't recall any such check.

was the liaison

devices). He said deputies in the branch were David Chachavadze (in

1960 for three or four months), A.T. Stewart (possibly Averill); Stewart

stayed on in the branch and Casasin believe he could be of more help

in remebering details about the branch; also, Becky Balaban, who is

married to Rudolf Balaban.

Casasin said that the purpose of a 201 is to indicate that a

request had been made for provisional operational approval. He said

the file would indicate operational interest and would then refer one

to the specific office with the interest in the individual. He said

he doesn't know that actual criteria for opening 201's. He said also

that after initial interest was shown in an individual by the opening

of a 201, the number might remain with the

• individual without the

persen actually being developed as an asset.

Casasin mentioned that agency people were assigned to the military

base at Atsugi.

Casasin referred agin to the "Harvey Story" reference in his memo.

He sated that "Whatever I meant by Harvey had nothing to do with him

(Oswald). "

showed Casasin the Personality (201) File Request form from

there total /at to stood

Oswald's 201 file. He said he had never seen it before and did not know

there actually existed a 201 file on Oswald.

Referring to the source

of the form, CI/SIG, Casasin said Ci stood for Counterintelligence.

He said he thought SIG stood for Signal Intelligence, but he was not

sure. He said that notation would mean that NSA or the military had

picked up Oswald's name in some type of transmission. He asked if Oswald

had access to any type of radio transmissions. He said he thought the

201 section of the Registry Office could answer questions about the

notations on the form.

Referring to the "AG" notation in the Other Identification

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block on the form, Casasin said he does not know what it stood for.

I asked him if he understood why some of the notations were crossed

out and new notations had been made; he said he could not explain that.

He said he thought the Permanent Charge notation meant that the file

would stay in the Office of Registry and that the file therefore had no

operational significance. In this file he said he thought it would be

routine to open a file on defectors such as Oswald, so it may have had

some other office charge because of

that. He said Branch 6 did not

have an interest in the Oswald file.

•I asked how he would have come across the State Department commu-

nications on Oswald. He said the normal distribution of such State

Department information would mean

that the dispatches would be circu-

lated for information and then routed back to registry where they would'

be kept on file as Third Agency documents. He said he believes from

the dispatches he saw on Oswald that they

were in a consecutive series

as received from the State Department. He believes from the memo that

he must have seen several such dispatches with information about Os-

wald.

Casasin explained the operational interest various divisions

within the agency might have in this way:

DDO

Foreign

Counter-

intelligence

Psychological

Political

Paramilitary

Line Divisions

He said he believes the 201 Personality form in Oswald's file is

passive and not operational and sees nothing to indicate operational

interest. He said the above scheme means that only the line divisions

would carry the operations, and he does not see any indication of such

an interest on the form. The fact that only Counterintelligence is

indicated on the form seems to preclude any operations.

Casasin talked further about suspicions about Oswald. He expressed

the feeling the Oswald and Marina got their visas to leave the soviet

Union too easily. He expalined the "unusual behavior" of Oswald as

being his defection: his reasons were unknown, he seemed disoriented,

he married a Russian. Casasin said that while he does not believe Os-

wald was sent back to the United States by the Soviets, he cannot pre-

clude that possibility.

I asked if the Americans were able to follow Oswald's activities

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while he was living in the Soviet Union. Casasin said he doesn't believ

we were able to monitor him inside the USSR. He said it would have

been too risky to run the chance of exposing any operatives inside the

country.

I asked if Oswald's threat at the Embassy in Moscow to reveal

milit ary secrets to the Soviets wouldn't have made Oswald of more

intelligence interest. Casasin said if he had revealed secrets he

would have been of interest for security.

I asked Casasin if a memo would have existed from the time of

the conversation referred to in his 1963 memo about interest in Oswald.

He said he doesn't think so; he said it was not customary to write

memos about such leads which were discussed and not follow up. He does

not remember preparing any such

memo.

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