COVERT ACTIONS AGAINST CUBA
Originator: JCS
From: V.H. KRULAK
To: CHAIRMAN, JCS
Document date: 10/14/1963
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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202-10002-10131

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RECORD SERIES: TAYLOR PAPERS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

Document Information

ORIGINATOR: JCS

FROM:

V.H. KRULAK

TO: CHAIRMAN, JCS

TITLE:

COVERT ACTIONS AGAINST CUBA

DATE:

PAGES:

SUBJECTS :

DOCUMENT TYPE:

CLASSIFICATION:

RESTRICTIONS:

CURRENT STATUS:

DATE OF LAST REVIEW :

10/14/1963

13

COVERT ACTION - CUBA

PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

Top Secret

Consulted; IC

07/22/1997

OPENING CRITERIA: PENDING TREASURY REVIEW

COMMENTS :

Taylor Papers, Box 7, Number 5. Memo from Krulak to Chairman, JCS enclosing memo re: Covert

Actions Against Cuba.

v9.1

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FOIA_ Coordination_ Sheet

DOCUMENT UNDER FOIA CONTROL

DO NOT REVIEW

Document Coordination as part of case NW 21895 Box 7, Tab il

Document ID 24142739

Document Date: 10/13/1963

Subject:

Memo w/attachment

DOCID

24142739

Sent TO:

Sent TO:

AGENCY NAME

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Central Intelligence Agency

Declassifred in full

N/7/2017

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFT

To:

MEMORANDUM

Date

14 October 1963

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Subject: Covert Actions Against Cuba

It is recommended that you approve,

sign and forward the attached memorandum

to the Department of Defense Executive

Agent for Cuban Affairs.

Viegraded BB03ST

awaits

Major General, USMC

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/ concen in tes

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21 0CT 1963

Mograded S302 7

i

Minoris iu7/84

C17-949-63

BystRa/50 307514185

ME WORANDUM FOR THE DEPARTUENT OF DEFENSE EXECUTIVE

AGENT FOR CUBAN AFFAIRS

SUNECY: Covert Retiona dealer Cuba (8S) thy t 1 to Sere Vana

EXEMPT FROM

AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION

12958 3.4 (b

Copy.

of.

The purpose of this enemorandura la to propose for

consideration two forias ol covert action; both posalble of

accorplishment at relativaly amall coat and both casable al

contributing to the disraption of tranquillty in Cuba. The

actions cootemplated are:

&. The latroduction of counterfeit currency, and

b. The introduction of small arme and ammunition.

The eldespread dissemination of vell made, difficult-to-

recognise counterfeit currency arnong the Cuban populace would

serve to degrade the valua

ol genuine carrency and would generate

sorioud probloma lor Cuban governmental authorlties. They would

be compolled other so call

la and seplace all eurreney is cireula-

tion, an expenaive and troublesone procedure, or, alternatively, to

Impose penalties for possesalon of the lllogal billa and accept the

consequent enforcement problema. In elthor case, there would be

an adverse elloct upon the economie life of the country, and theo,

upon its internal stability.

10

3.

With rospect to small armo. It la noted that one ol

Castro's early

acto in 1959 was totally to dloarm the polvare

citinenry, theroby temoving a critical theast to his totalltarian

regime.

since that time he has had relativaly little to lear

from Internal violence, I now we were covertly to introduce

in many areas of Cuba quantilled of omall and slaple weasons

and ammunition, including platole and Alagaised lethal devices

caally concealed on the person, asme would come into the

possebalon

of people who would have a vuillagness to use them,

although it la recognized that many of the waapone so introduced

would fall into the haado of the Castro Goverament. Nevertheleno,

so more individual Cabana galned possesalon of a reapon, the

internal threat to functionariad of the Castro dovernment would

grow, aa would probleras of investigation, enforcement and

diselpiine,

Incidenta of assassination of oppressive officiale and

_0r.10

-copies each

-pages

series.

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2890V

osher armed action might be expected to increase. Castro would

bo faced with the

roquirement so bay up the arme at to engago in

extensive enforcement activities, in which lattar caes conditione

mighi resco auch levela of severity al lo allenate progressively

greater segments of the citizenry. In olthar event, the not eflect

ol Introducing quantitios of amall arma would be to disturb intornal

tranquility and provlde & growing base of dlucontent among the

people.

4. Introduction od comterioll carrency should be accomplished

¿radually over an extended seriod by maritime initration, willing

van arabablo agent network.

Randan scatterlag of currency frora the

air, while feasible, muld lessen to ollectivenoss of the operation,

clace the Castro Govorament would be immediately aleriod and could

into prompt counterruesoures. Inall rapone and amaualtion. on

the other hand, could boat be dietributed tidely by reens of alrerati,

pilored by Cubano, which, in a series of aorial forays throughout

Cuba, woulé drop quantities oí ladividually pachagod weapon attached

to orall rachuiod.

weapons could aloo be introduced by sea.

5. These

operations can be conducted in sachs way as to be

planaibly deniable by the United states. Gover wonld bo provided

by the mideupread and bighly publicized anti-Castro setivitiea of

rolagoe arousa barod in Latin Amorica, In this rogard, it has

already been reported in the preda that U.5. Treasary officialo

recently arronted cortain Cuban refagate in this country who sere

engaged la printing counterfeit Cuben currancy. This would support

future deniale by the U.F. of responsibility for any counterfetting

activity.

6. I lu rocommended that a prograra involving the setione

describod berela de developod in dotal by the Central latelligence

Agency. It la lurthor recoramended that the sesults of the Agency

analysis bo forwarded to the appropplate later agency group for

constdoration do lo the leasibility and desirability of early imple

mentlag actions.

(SEd) MAVELL D. TAYLOR

, 1-2 Jen

Vance

14-D5S

15-S5CS

6- Krulak

Deputy Secretary of Delense

Cy 3

768 xtra

Prepared by: LtCol Smith - 15 Oct 63

MAXWELLE, TAYLOR

Chair mas

Jotnt Chiafe of Stall

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DRAFT

(M-949-63

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE EXECUTIVE AGENT

FOR CUBAN AFFAIRS

Subject: Covert Actions Against Cuba (IS)

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to propose for

consideration two forms of covert action; both possible of

accomplishment at relatively small cost and both capable

of contributing to the disruption of tranquillty In Cuba.

The actions contemplated are:

a. The introduction of counterfeit currency, and

b. The introduction of small arms and ammunition.

2. The widespread dissemination of well made, difficult-

to-recognize counterfeit currency among the Cuban populace

would serve to degrade the value of genuine currency

and would generate (grave, problems for Cuban

governmental

authorities. They would be compelled either to call in

and replace all currency

in circulation, a most] expensive

and troublesome procedure, or, alternatively, to impose

penalties for

possession of the illegal bills

and accept

the consequent enforcement problems.

In

either

case, there

would be an adverse effect upon the economic life of the

country, and thus, upon its internal stability.

3. With respect to small arms, It is noted that one of

Castro's early acts in 1959 was totally to disarm the private

citizenry,

thereby removing a critical threat to his

totalitarian regime. Since that time he has had relatively

little to fear from internal violence. If now we were

covertly to introduce in many areas of Cuba quantities

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of small and simple weapons and ammunition, including

pistols and disguised lethal devices

easily concealed

on the

person,

some would come into

the possession of

people who have a willingness to use them, although

It is recognized that many of the weapons so introduced

would fall into the hands of the Castro Government.

Nevertheless, as more individual Cubans gained

possession of a weapon, the internal threat to

functionaries of the Castro Government would grow,

as would problems of Investigation, enforcement and

discipline. Incidents of assassination of oppressive

officials and other armed action might be expected to

increase.

Castro would be faced with the requirement

to buy up the arms or to engage in extensive enforcement

activities, in which latter case conditions might reach

such

levels of

severity as to alienate progressively

greater

segments of the citizenry.

In either

event, the

net effect of introducing quantities of small arms would

be to disturb internal tranquility and provide a growing

base of discontent among the people.

4. Introduction of counterfeit currency should be

accomplished gradually over an extended period by

maritime infiltration, utilizing the available agent

network.

Random scattering of currency from the air,

while feasible, would lessen the effectiveness

of the

operation,

since the Castro Government would be immedi-

ately

alerted

and

could take prompt countermeasures.

Small weapons and ammunition, on the otherhand, could

best be distributed widely

by means of

aircraft, piloted

by Cubans, which,, In a series of aerial forays throughout

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Cuba, would drop quantities of individually packaged

weapons attached to small parachutes.

Weapons could

also be introduced by sea.

5. These operations can be conducted in such a way

as to be plausibly deniable by the United States.

Cover would be provided by the widespread and highly

publicized anti-Castro activities of refugee groups

based in Latin America.

In this regard, it has already

been reported in the press that U.S. Ireasury officials

recently arrested certain Cuban refugees in this country

who were engaged in printing counterfeit cuban currency.

This would support future denials by the U.s. of responsi-

bility

for any counterfeiting activity.

6. It is recommended that a program involving the

developed an do faul

actions described herein be undertaken by the Central

Intelligence Agency.

done be formini to for appropris asleeper.

so to adanacted vest, da tessiodie, orang ingredien.

Deputy Secretary of Defense

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O78 Certain

ARmy. Cia

in a t's did to fine ferr

dal wid ignitiste .

tong

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CONTROL NUMBER

6999

REGISTER OF PERSONNEL HANDLING CLASSIFIED DOCUMENT

DATE RECEÍVED

23 Sept 63

I CLASSIFICAT

RETURN TO:

Office,

Chairman, JCS

Room 2-E 865, The Pentagon

TOP

DOCUMENT NUMBER

COPY NUMBER

Memo from Secy. Cyrus Vance

Cys 1-3

DATE OF DOCUMENT

23 Sept 63

TO

2

3

Preliminary Planning on DOD Support of CIA Covert Operations

Against Cuba (TS)

The above-described document has been received in this office. Clculation of this document will be limited to

individuals indicated below. The document will be returned to the Administrative Office for record prior to dispatch to

another office, or other disposition.

THIS FORM WILL NOT BE REMOVED FROM SUBJECT DOCUMENT.

NAME

INITIAL

REMARKS

CHAIRMAN, ICS

EXECUTIVE

Orig + 1.(cys1-2) - SJCS for action

SPECIAL ASSISTANT (Policy)

CHAIRMAN'S STAFF GROUP

SHITH

MILITARY ASSISTANT (PA)

MILITARY ASSISTANT (LAL)

ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT

SECRETARY TO CHAIRMAN.

Linter

pK

FORM

SD, NOV 8B

349

831691

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for absti

SENSITIVE

23 SEP 1963

Don, is:

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT:

Preliminary Planning On DOD Support of CIA Covert

Operations Against Cuba (TS)

Reference:

Secretary of the Army Memorandum, subject: DOD

Support of Covert Operatione Conducted by the CIA

Against Cuba (IS), dated September 23, 1963

By reference memorandum I have requested the vlews of the

Joint Chiels of Stalf on the desirability of prearranging DOD alr or

surtace support for the protection of CLA raiding craft in the event

such craft are subjected to hot pursult in international waters by

Cuban aircraft or surface vessels. In the event an affirmative deci-

sion is subsequently made on this polley question, ClA may requemt

DOD support for the sabotage operation approved by the Special

Group on September 5, 1963, which provides for the sabotage of a

lumber mill at Marabl in northern Oriente. This operation was

originally scheduled for September 25, however, I am informed it

will now be conducted on the night of September 28-29, 1963.

In view of the possibility that DOD will be directed to support

this operation on short notice and since detailed preliminary planning

and coordination with CLA is essential, I am convinced that we must

initiate this planning today li we are to be prepared to provide support

for this operation. The short span of time presently available already

reduces our fledbility for providing effective support.

In order to got this planning underway without delay, may 1

suggeat that appropriate repreventatives of the Joint Stall be designated

to work with Mr. Joseph A, Califano, Jr. (extension 79235) in developing

15 0224

3

7

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a support plan which can be implemented on short notice l1 directed.

Mi. Callfano has advised General Krulak and his staff of the nature

of this problem and CLA is prepared to meet with DOD representa-

ives to accomplish necessary coordination.

(Signed) Cyrus R. Vance

Cyrud R. Vance

Secretary of the Army

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CONTROL NUMBER

*REGISTER OF PERSONNEL HANDLING CLASSIFIED DOCUMENT

DATE RECEIVED

6998

23. Sept63

RETURN TO:

*Office, Chairman, JCS

Room 2-E 865, The Pentagon

DOCUMENT NUMBER

COPY NUMBER

SENSIT

CAP

SECRET

DATE OF DOCUMENT

Memo from Cyrus Vance,

Orig + 2 (Cys 1-3)|

23. Sept 63

SUBJECT: Secretary of the Army

Department of Defense Support of Covert Operations Conducted by the

Central Intelligence Agency. Against Cuba (TS)

The above-described document has been received in this office. Cliculation of this document will be limited to

individuals indicated below. The document will be returned to the Administrative Office for record prior to dispatch to

another office, or other disposition. THIS FORM WILL NOT BE REMOVED FROM SUBJECT DOCUMENT.

TO

NAME

INITIAL

REMARKS

CHAIRMAN, JCS

Orig,+ 1 (cys 1-2) - SJCS for action

EXECUTIVE

SPECIAL ASSISTANT (Policy)

₴

3

CHAIRS MISTRE

GROUP

MILITARY ASSISTANT (PA)

MILITARY ASSISTANT (LEL)

ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT

SECRETARY TO CHAIRMAN

Fillo

PK

FORM

SID, NOV 88

349

B31691

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NOP SEGRE SENSITIVE

23 SEP 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT:

Department of Defense Support of Covert Operations

Conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency Against

Cuba (TS)

A program of covert operatione against Cuba conducted by the

Central Intelligence Agency (CLA) with assets under their control was

approved some time ago by highest authority. Externally launched

operatione already conducted under the program have not included

Department of Defense (DOD) support during the actual operational

phases nor is such support provided for under the approved program.

Nevertheless, it is anticipated that the CLA will in the immediate

future raise the insue of prearranged DOD support, on a contingency

basis, in the event ClA controlled raiding vessels are subjected to

hot pursuit in international waters by eithet Cuban aircraft or surface

vessele. Under existing Rules of Engagement, the prearrangement

of DOD support of this type will require approval by the highest authority.

The presantation of a DOD position on this sensitive policy

question will probably be required at the next meeting of the Special

Group (NSC 5412/2) on September 25, 1963. As the DOD Erecutive

Agent for Cuban Altaira, it would be most helpiul to have the views

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this urgent matter by the close of buri-

ness on September 24, 1963 so that these views can be fully considered

in the development of the DOD position.

In consideration of this policy losue the limitations imposed

by currently approved national policy should be adhered to as far as

possible. First, there is a continuing requirement to prevent attribut-

ability in sabotage operations against Cuba, Second, the provieion

of DOD support on the contingency basis outlined, should be vlewed

PyCUPP ENCE OF:

11, ASG Control No.75 0223

7

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within the scope and pace of the ClA program already approved and

under way. Within these parameters, I would appreciate the viewe

of the Joint Chiefe of Staff on the following specifle questione:

Would it be desirable to prearrange DOD alr

or suriace support lot the protechon of an raiding craft of l. S.

rogletry in the event such craft are subjected to hot pursult in inter -

natonal watets by Cuban alrcraft of surface vesselo?

Is such prearranged support desizable for CIA

controlled raiding craft of foreign registry?

(Signed) Cyrus R. Vance

Cyrue R. Vance

Secretary of the Army

2

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