DCI MEETINGS WITH THE PRESIDENT 01 APRIL - 31 MAY 1964.
Agency: CIA
Originator: CIA
To: MEMO FOR THE RECORD
Document date: 1/1/64
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

## Page 1

Date: 11/29/99

Page:

1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

---

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY

RECORD NUMBER

RECORD SERIES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

CIA

104-10306-10001

JFK-MISC

CIA-DCI

FILE

Released under the John

F. Kennedy

Assassination Records

Collection Act of 1992

$44 USC 2107 Notel.

Case#:NW 55355 Date:

11=27-2017-

--—

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR

CIA

FROM

TO : MEMO FOR THE RECORI

TITLE : DCI MEETINGS WITH THE PRESIDENT 01 APRIL - 31 MAS

1964.

DATE: 00/00/64

PAGES : 31

SUBJECTS : DCI MEETINGS

PRESIDENT

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET

RESTRICTIONS : 1B

CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/19/98

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : JFK-M-06: F2 1998.09.19.13:09:33: 233031: ARRB REQUEST.

CIA - IR-28.

'CLASSIFIED

ATTACHME. -

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

HH 55355

DocId: 32401362

Page 1

---

## Page 2

MC I

5 May 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussion at Luncheon Meeting 5 May with The President,

Rusk, McNamara, Taylor, Bundy and McCone

Ambassador Lodge's May 4th cable #2108 was discussed

in considerable detail. The consensus was that the khanh sentiments

represent the most serious expressions since he has taken over, and

that Ambassador Lodge's comments, though brief, indicated that he

somewhat supported Khanh's appraisal of the situation and courses. of

action recommended although Lodgedid not say so. It was decided:

a. McNamara should proceed to Saigon at the

earliest, accompanied by Taylor, Bill Bundy and Forrestal.

An alternative suggestion was made that the three-named

parties precede McNamara by two or three days.

NOTE: Subsequently I discussed privately with

Bundy having intelligence support, particularly such as

Bill Colby, accompany or precede McNamara.

No

decision was made.

2. In discussing the pros and cons of dispatching a private

warning to Castro, pointing out the demands of the domestic political

situation, it was felt that any further discussions with Castro should

be through U Thant of the UN since Castro had addressed a letter to

U Thant.

- 3o Balance of the luncheon was consumed discussing the

numbered items 3 through 7 on the attached agenda, none of which

have particular intelligence interest except the decision was made to

continue the sale of Pratt-Whitney's T-30 engine (the engine for the

TFX), to the French even though doing so would enhance the French

nuclear capability.

JAM/mfb

NW 55355

DocId: 32401362

Page 2

---

## Page 3

_SECRET

Agenda for luncheon meeting, May 5, 1964

1.

Lodge's latest message and a draft answer.

Yesterday Lodge sent in a report of an extraordinary conversation

with General Khahn in which Khahn proposed that South Vietnam

go on a "war footing, " to include a major evacuation of Saigon,

warnings to Hanoi, and a break in relations with France.

The message is attached at Tab A, and I understand Secretary

Rusk will bring a draft answer for discussion.

2. Further discussion of Cuba. I believe that there are two subjects

which need discussion in a smaller group than the NSC.

(1) A possible private warning to Castro

(2) A possible private intimation to Castro that if things

stay quiet, 1965 might be a year for serious

discussions between Cuba and the U.S.

3. Plans for the forthcoming NATO meeting at Brussels --

Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara may wish to comment.

4.

A report on the problem of tanks for Israel -- Bundy..

5. The problem of military cooperation with France.

6. Plans for the MLF Congressional briefings.

7. A British proposal for a tripartite non-dissemination declaration.

SECRET

55355

DooId: 32401362

Page

---

## Page 4

wni" .

55355

DooId: 32401362

Page 4

---

## Page 5

-INCOMING TELEGRAN Department of Stute

TOP SECRET

32

Action

SS

Info

Kipines

yellow

CONTROL:

1458

RECD:

MARY 491964 5343 A.M.

FROM:

SAIGON

093

ACTION: SECSTATE 2108

DATE:

MAY 4j3 P.Mo

SEONE OFTWO

EXD IS

TOP SECRET

FROM LODGE

FOR THE SECRETARY, MCNAMARA, HARRIMAN, AND BUNDY

L0 JUST AS I WAS LEAVING THE HOUSE THIS MORNING, I RECEIVED

THE UNUSUAL MESSAGE TO CALL ON GENERAL KHANH AT 10:00 AM.

WHEN I CAME INHE SAID HE HAD ASKED ME TO CALL PARTLY BECAUSE

"I ALWAYS FEEL BETTER AFTER I TALK WITH YOU" AND PARTLY

20 SHOULD HE MAKE A DECLARATION THAT HE WAS PUTTING THE COUNTRY

ON A WAR FOOTING?

THIS WOULD INVOLVE MANY THINGS AT HOME AND ABROAD. AT HOME

IT WOULD INVOLVE GETTING RID OF THE SO-CALLED "POLITICIANS"

AND HAVING A GOVERNMENT WHICH WOULD FRANKLY BE A GOVERNMENT

O: ILCANICIANS• IT WOULD INVOLVES AS HAD BEEN THE CASE

UNDER LINCOLN IN OUR CIVIL WAR, THE SUSPENSION OF CERTAIN

CIVIL RIGHTS. THERE WOULD BE A CURTEW; SAIGON WOULD CEASE

TO BE A CITY OF PLEASURE; EVACUATION PLANS WOULD BE MADE

WHICH WOULD BE CAPABLE OF BEING CARRIED OUT IN THREE TO FOUR

MONTHS TO EVACUATE ALL OF THE TWO MILLION PEOPLE IN SAIGON.

UNDER THESE PLANS THE GOVERNMENT WITH THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS

WOULD LEAVE SAIGON, AND AMERICAN DEPENDENTS WOULD BE EVACUATED.

40 ANNOUNCEMENT WOULD BE MADE

TO HANOI THAT ANY FURTHER

INTERFERENCE IN SOUTH VIETNAM'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS WOULD LEAD

AND. HE SPECIFICALLY, ASKED IF THE UNITED STATES

WOULD BE PREPARED TO UNDERTAKE TIT-FOR-TAT BOMBING EACH

TIME THERE WAS AN

INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF

SOUTH VIETNAM.

TOP SECRET

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS

_PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

NW 55355 DooId: 32401362 Page 5

---

## Page 6

TOP SECRET

-2- 2108, MAY 4, 3 PM, FROM SAIGON (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

5o CAMBODIAN WOULD BE TOLD: WE HAVE DONE WHAT WE COULD TO

HAVE GOOD RELATIONS WITH YOU, BUT WE WILL NOT RESPECT ANYTHING

YOU NEGOTIATE EITHER WITH HANOI OR WITH THE VIET CONGO

6 A DECLARATION OF A STATE OF WAR OBVIOUSLY WOULD HAVE TO BE

ACCOMPANIED BY ACTIONS TO PREVENT THE FRENCH SUBVERSIVE

ACTIVITIES HERE WHICH HE WAS SURE WERE GOING ON. FOR ONE THING

THERE WAS NO DOUBT AT ALL AS TO THEIR ACTIVITIES IN CAMBODIAO

THEIR PURPOSE OBVIOUSLY WAS TO GET THE UNITED STATES OUT OF

THE WHOLE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA• COLONEL LANG GENERAL VYS ANI

THE FORMER MANAGER OF THE CARAVELLE, HAD MADE

RUCLARATIONS UNDER THE POLYGRAPH IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS

BOTH DIRECT AND INDIRECT WHICH ESTABLISHED BEYOND DOUBT THAT.

GENERALS KIM AND XUAN WERE PV MAKE THE NEUTRALIST COUP•

THERE WAS A LETTER WHICH VAN TAM THE WELL-KNOWN FRENCH CAT'S

PAOS HAHE ENTES TONED EEWAKEN DIPLOCK SC REPATIONS WITH FRENCE

BUT KEEPING THE CONSUL®

17. HE ASKED ME WHAT MY PERSONAL REACTION WAS. I SAID, SPEAKING

PURELY PERSONALLY AND DIRECTING MY REMARKS TO THE INTERNAL

CHAN COME TARSTO

GIVEN THE STATE OF THE COUNTRY, WINNING THE WAR

ARIAD TITH DEMOCRATOO FORSA

THERE WOULD BE PLENTY OF TIME TO GO

8 HE SAID THAT HE COULD NOT ENTHUSE ABOUT JUST MAKING

THE AGONY ENDURE"

THAT IT WAS FUNDAMENTAL COMMON SENSE AND

LOGIC TO TRY TO MOVE AHEAD AND GET A REAL VICTORY, OTHERWISE T

WAS INEXCUSABLE TO TAKE 2 00D CASUALTIES AND LOSE

FIVE AIRPLANES.

AS THEY HAD DONE, SIMPLY TO ORDER TO SIAND STILL

BEFORE MAKING A DECLARATION THAT HE WAS PUTTING THE COUNTRY !

ONTO A WAR FOOTING, HE WOULD TELL THE PEOPLE AND THE WORLD:

WHY WAR HAD TO BE WAGED. KE WOULD SAY THAT AT THE TIME OF

THE NOVEMBER FIRST COUP THE GN HAD "LOST CONTROL" OF SOME

LEAVING FIVE

MILLION WHO WERE STILL NOT UNDER GN CONTROL.

IN ADDITION TO THE REGULAR MILITARY OPERATIONS,

THE GUN WAS

GAINING CONTROL' OVER MORE AND MORE PEOPLE. LAST WEEK THEY

GAINED CONTROL OVER 60,000. IT WAS INDISPENSABLE TO REGAIN

CONTROL OVER THE WHOLE COUNTRY, AND THIS WAS WHY

THE WAR

HAD TO BEVED.

LODGE

L GP -3,

ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 5/6/64, 9:10 AM.

PASSED WHITE HOUSE 5/4/64, 9:50 AM.

PASSED OSD FOR MCNAMARÄ 5/4/64, 10:35 A.M.

TOP SECRET

NW 55355 DooId: 32401362 Page 6

---

## Page 7

UNCLASSIFIED

INTERNA

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

CONF"DENTIAL

SECRET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

Chief, WH Division

building ficer designation, room number, and

1.

Deputy Director

for Plans

2.

DATE

OFFICER'S

INITIALS

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

S8 APR 199A It

COMMENTS a a line octo as column i the from ment

EVES ONLY

3.

Director of Central

Intelligence

5.

6.

MAND CARRY

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

FORM

3-62

A USE PREVIO

ITION

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

INTERNAL

USE ONLY

O UNCLASSIFIED

HH 55355

DocId: 32101362 Page 7

---

## Page 8

2. C. I A geared up wiel -

8. Antennis apeate

2) Ray-:

AH 55355

DooId: 32401362 Page 8

---

## Page 9

7 April 1964

MR. McCONE:

et the meeting today with the President on Cuba, McGeorge

Bundy has prepared a 1-1/2 page summary covering the following:

1. Collection of information.

2.

Covert propaganda.

3. Economic denial.

4. Contact with dissident groups.

5.

Contamination of ships.

(Bundy recommends continuation of all of the above. )

6.

7.

Maintenance of faiding capability.

Autonomous groups.

(On 6 and 7 Bundy states that opinion is divided and

this is the real point of the meeting. )

From the Department of Defense - Mr. McNamara, Mr.

Vance, and General Taylor will attend. From the Department of

State - Secretary Rusk, Mr. Mann and Mr. Johnson will attend.

Bundy will be present.

The weekly lunch of the President with Rusk and McNamara

is scheduled today at l o'clock.

W. Elder

?.!a

HH 55355

DocId: 32401362

Page

---

## Page 10

-TOP SECRET

5

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODE WORD MATERIAL

WARNING

This document contains classified information affecting the national

security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage

laws, US Code, Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits

its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to

an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial

to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any

foreign government to the detriment of the United States.

THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE KEPT IN COMMUNICATIONS

INTELLIGENCE CHANNELS AT ALL TIMES

It is to be seen only by US personnel especially indoctrinated

and authorized to receive COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE

information; its security must be maintained in accordance with

COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE REGULATIONS.

No action is to be taken on any COMMUNICATIONS INTELLI-

GENCE which may be contained herein, regardless of the advantages

to be gained, unless such action is first approved by the Direcior

of Central Intelligence.

GROUP 1

AND DECLASSIE DONNGRADIMG

TOP SECRET

1//111

///////

NW 55355 DocId: 32401362 Page 10

---

## Page 11

LOP SECRET DINAR

SC No.

02971/64

7 April 1964

WHITE HOUSE BRIEFING

FOR THE DCI

CUBA

I.

We have seen no change since the beginning of

the year in the size of the Soviet military

establishment in Cuba, but the evidence con-

tinues to point to an imminent turn-over of the

SA-2 surface-to-air missile system to the Cubans.

A. We believe there are still about 7,000 Soviet

military personnel in Cuba, making allowances

for as many as 2,000 more or less.

B. The majority--perhaps as much as 80 percent--

can and probably will be withdrawn when the

Cubans complete their SAM training later

this month.

C. An advisory and technical assistance group

of perhaps one or two thousand will probably

remain for some time.

II. Cubans have been conducting comprehensive air de-

fense drills throughout the island on an almost

daily basis since early February. The exercises

now include the tracking of live targets--in-

cluding our reconnaissance flights--and the

simulated destruction of MIG-21 targets flown

by Cubans.

FOP SECRET DINAR

HW 55355 DocId:32401362 Page 11

---

## Page 12

LOP SECRET DINAR

A. Cubans have already assumed control over

most early warning radar functions.

B.

The air defense system has been realigned

from the two-sector organization the Soviets

used, to conform to the three-sector pattern

of the Cuban armed forces.

c.

Some of the more sophisticated radar and

communications equipment we would not ex-

pect the Soviets to turn over has been re-

moved from the SAM sites.

D. Air defense activity conducted wholly by

Soviets has been declining steadily, and

Soviet radio operators are making increas-

Ingly frequent references to demobilization

in May. One operator, in an unfortunately

fragmentary intercept, referred to the

arrival of six ships in April, six in May,

and five in July.

III. Cuban naval and ground forces have been improv-

ing their combat capabilities with more intensive

and more realistic training, organizational im-

provements, and the streamlining of communications

procedures.

-2-

TOP SECRET DINAR

HH 55355

DocId: 32401362 Page 12

---

## Page 13

tOP SEGRET DINAR

A.

There are more and more joint exercises,

simulating the repulse of raiding parties

and landing forces.

B. Cuba apparently is going to draft about 25,000

men a year for the next three years, but with

simultaneous discharges, the Cuban force

level of about 100,000 probably will not in-

crease much, at least at the outset.

1.

Our photography, incidentally, has re-

cently showed the enlargement of exist-

ing barracks, and the establishment

and occupation of fairly extensive tent

camps with field kitchens. This prob-

ably reflects preparations to receive

the draftees.

IV. Our evidence is that there may be as many as

1,500 Cubans training in bloc countries at

present, suggesting that Cuba may be expecting

additional Soviet military equipment soon.

A. Last month Soviet ships carrying otherwise

non-military cargos brought in another six

of the fast P-4 Soviet motor torpedo boats--

making 12 in all--and some extra

surface-to-

air missiles.

-3-

TOP SECRET DINAR

HH 55355

DocId: 32401362

Page

13

---

## Page 14

1 OP SECRET DINAR

B. There have been three purely military cargos

delivered to Cuba this year, and a fourth

is on the way, probably carrying vehicles

and spare parts. One of the earlier ships

brought in 12 crated MIG jet fighters, prob-

ably as replacements, which are still sitting

in their crates at San Antonio de los Banos.

V. Castro himself has recently been preoccupied with

economic matters and with the re-trial of Marcos

Rodriguez, an old-line Communist charged with

having betrayed student conspirators to the

Batista police. Castro steered the second trial

to center the blame on Rodriguez personally,

rather than the party, thereby heading off a

possible purge of the old guard Communists and

putting them further in his debt.

A. The immediate economic concern is the sugar

harvest now under way. Indications are the

1964 crop will be no bigger than last year's

3.8 million tons--possibly less.

B. Clandestine reporting and intercepts show

that the crop is being adversely affected

by labor shortages, by a somewhat lower

sugar content in the cane, and by damage to

the cane by the mechanical cane loaders.

-4-

TOP SECRET DINAR

HH 55355

DocId: 32401362 Page 14

---

## Page 15

TOP SECRET DINAR

C. In general, however, Cuban officials are

cocky about their economic

situation at

present, and optimistic over prospects for

improvement. You have probably read Che

Guevara's gloating remarks at the UN Trade

and Development Conference in Geneva. The

Cubans are convinced they have, as they

say, "broken the back" of our economic denial

effort.

D. The Cubans had a balance of about $100 mil-

lion in convertible currency, largely from

sugar sales, at the end of 1963. The sugar

agreement Castro negotiated with the Soviet

Union on his January visit makes them feel

that sugar earnings will continue to increase.

This confidence seems to be reflected in the

credit ratings the Cubans are getting.

1.

Intercepts show that the Cubans are also

working out repayment schedules for

balances owing a number of Free World

countries, such as Japan and Italy.

2.

Against this background, Cuba is becom-

ing a much more attractive market for

non-bloc countries, so much so that the

Cubans feel they may be in the driver's

seat.

- 5-

TOP SECRET DINAR

HH 55355

DooId: 32401362 Page 15

---

## Page 16

TOP SECRET DINAR

3.

Japan used to be Castro's biggest single

trading partner in the Free World, but

last year both exports and imports fell

off. Now

the Cubans are telling Japanese

firms that unless they trade with Cuba,

Havana will feel compelled to switch the

business it does in Japan to Western

European firms.

_6-

TOP SECRET DINAR

55355

DooId:32401362

Page

16

---

## Page 17

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

TO? SECRET

Action

SS

Info

CONTROL:

1503

RECD :

MAY 4, 1964 7:25 A.M.

FROM :

SAIGON

ACTION:

SECSTATE 2103

MAY 4,3 P.M. SETWO OF TWO

DATE:

EXDIS

'TOP SECRET.

FOR INE SECRETARY, MCNAMARA, HARRIMAN, 'AND BUNDY

FROM LODGE

19. I ASKED HIM THE SPECIFIC QUESTION WHETHER HE THOUGHT

THERE WAS ANY POSSIBILITY AT ALL OF A COMMUNIST VICTORY

SIMILAR TO THAT WHICH HAD BEEN WON AT DIEN BIEN PHU IN 1954,

THAT IS,

A KEY BATTLE SOMEWHERE WHICH WOULD HAVE A TOTALLY.

DEMORALIZING EFFECT AND CAUSE CAPITULATION IO THE COMMUNISTS.

11. SPEAKING AGAIN TO HIM PERSONALLY, I SAID THAT I THOUGHT

ANYONE CONTEMPLATING STEPS OF THIS KIND WOULD HAVE TO FIGURE

OUT WHERE IT ALL MIGHT LEAD AND WHAT REPRISALS THE ENEMY

MIGHT TAKE. IT WAS ONE THING FOR THE US AND THE GUN TO BOMB

; NORTH VIETNAM BUT HOW WOULD THEY RETALIATE? IF WE BLEW UP

THEIR GASOLINE REFINERY, WE SHOULD EXPECT THEM TO BLOW UP OURS.

IF WE DESTROYED THEIR POWER DAM, THEY WOULD DESTROY OUR POWER

•DAM• WAS IT CERTAIN AT THIS TIME THAT IN SUCH AN EXCHANGE

WE WOULD COME OUT AHEAD?

1?. THEN I SAID THAT IF NUN UNDERTOOK TO INVADE SUN WITH ITS

ARMY, THAT WOULD RAISE A HOST OF NEW QUESTIONS OF VERY ACUTE

INTEREST TO THE UNITED STATES. THE POSSIBILITY OF THE CHINESE

ARMY ITSELF COMING IN HAD

"IO BE CONSIDERED. HE ASKED WHETHER

THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE PREPARED TO FOLLOW THROUGH WITH

ALL THE CONSEQUENCES WHICH MIGHT VERY WELL INVOLVE CHINA.

ULTIMATELY, NUN WOULD HAVE TO BE LIBERATED: FROM CHINA.

IF THE CHINESE ARMY CAME IN, SAID I, THE QUESTION AROSE AS

TO WHETHER THIS ARMY COULD BE PREVENTED FROM FUNCTIONING BY

TOP SECRET

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS

_PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

NW 55355 DooId: 32401362

Page 17

---

## Page 18

TOP SECRET

-2- 2108, May 4, 3 P.M., (SECTION 2 OF 2), From Saigon

BOMBING ITS SUPPLY LINES AND THIS IN TURN RAISED THE QUESTION

IN MY MIND AS TO WHETHER THE SUPPLY LINES COULD BE EFFECTIVELY

INTERDICTED WITH CONVENTIONAL BOMBING OR WHETHER NUCLEAR

WEAPONS WOULD BE NECESSARY: I DID NOT HAVE THE ANSWERS TO

THESE QUESTIONS,

BUT OBVIOUSLY THEY WERE ONES THAT ANY

SENSIBLE PERSON WOULD ASK. HE AGREED.

13. I SAID THESE WERE VERY LARGE QUESTIONS INVOLVING THE

HIGHEST LEVEL IN TME US GOVERNENT, THAT I DID NOT PRETEND

TO HAVE THE ANSWERS, THAT I PERSONALLY HAD BEEN BROUGHT UP

ON THE IDEA, SO OFIN VOICED BY GENERAL MAC ARTHUR, THAI IN:

ASIA THE UNITED STATES COULD HAVE GREAT INFLUENCE WITH ITS

AIR POVER AND ITS NAVY AND IN WORKING IN SUPPORT OF ASIATIC

ARMIES BUT THAT IT WAS OUT OF THE QUESTION FOR THE UNITED

¡STATES TO COMMIT A LARGE LAND ARMY TO THE MAINLAND OF ASIA.

FOR EXAMPLE, I DID NOT VISUALIZE THE UNITED STATES EVER:

PUTTING AN

ARMY INTO ASIA COMPARABLE TO THE ARMY IT

HAD PUT INTO EUROPE DURING WORLD WAR II.

14.

HE APPRECIATED IHIS; BUT HE HOPED THAT WE WOULD CONSIDER

THE

BIG THINGS WHICH COULD BE DONE WITH AN "ARMY CORPS."

¡OF US SPECIAL FORCES. HE THOUGHT THAT ANY "ARMY CORPS"

@ SPECIAL FORCES NUMBERING 10, 332 MEN COULD DO IN ASIA WHAT

AN ARMY GROUP HAD DONE IN EUROPE. HE SAID ONE AMERICAN CAN

MAKE SOLDIERS OUT OF TEN ORIENTALS. IF AN ARMY GROUP IN

EUROPE COULD COVER A HUNDRED MILES, HE THOUGHT AN ARMY CORPS

OF SPECIAL FORCES COULD COVER THE WHOLE CAMBODIAN-LAOTIAN FRONTIER:

INCURRING CASUALTIES "JUST IN ORDER TO MAKE THE AGONY ENDURE"

HE FELT THAT THE SHOW OF DETERMINATION WHICH HE WAS OUTLINING

WOULD MAKE THE VIET CONG CHANGE AND THAT IT WOULD NOT BE

NECESSARY TO GO TO THE ULTIMATE LIMIT, BUT HE WANTED TO BE

HONEST AND CANDID AND HAVE US FACE UP TO THESE ULTIMATE LIMITS.

16. I ASKED WHETHER HE WANTED TO CONTINUE WITH THE PRESENT PLAN OF

CONCENTRATING THE EFFORT IN

THE PROVINCES

AROUND SAIGON, AND HE SAID BY

ALL MEANS BUT THAT MUCH MORE

THAN THAT OUGHT TO BE DONE

IN ORDER TO DEVELOP A REAL SHOW

OF DETERMINATION AND AN OFFENSIVE SPIRIT.

COMMENT: THIS MAN OBVIOUSLY WANTS TO GET ON WITH THE JOB

AND NOT SIT HERE INDEFINITELY TAKING CASUALTIES. WHO CAN

BLAME HIM?

TOP SECRET

NW 55355 DooId: 32401362

Page 18

---

## Page 19

TOP SECRET

-3- :2108, MAY 4, 3 P.M., (SECTION 2 OF 2), From Saigon

HIS DESIRE TO DECLARE A STATE OF WAR, LEAVING OUT SPECIFIC

DETAILS SUCH AS THE PLANS FOR EVACUATING SAIGON,

SEEMS WHOLLY

MENTALITY.

IN LINE WITH OUR DESIRE TO GET OUT OF A "BUSINESS; AS USUAL"

HE IS CLEARLY FACING UP TO ALL THE HARD QUESTIONS AND WANTS

US TO DO IT, TOO.

GP -1.

CEN 10. 1954 11 12 13. 14. 10,000 15 16 - LODGE

NOTE:

ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-0 AT 9:36 A.M., 5-4-64.

PASSED WHITE HOUSE 10:31 A.M., 5-4-64.

PASSED OSD FOR MCNAMARA 10:59 A.M., 5-4-64.

TOP SECRET

74 55355

DooId: 32401362 Page 19

---

## Page 20

SEGRET

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 5, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

The decision to seli the IF-30 aircraft jet engine to France should be

reassessed since it has developed that the French may use it in a new

aircraft with a strategic as well as a tactical capability.

The TF-30; one of the most advanced jet engines in the world, has been

developed by Pratt and Whitney for use in our TEX aircraft. Last fall,

Pratt and Whitney agreed to sell to France two TF-30 engines for use

by SNECMA, a French engine firm with close operating ties with Pratt

and Whitney, and is now negotiating the sale of an additional dozen.

It was originally assumed that the TF-30 would be used in the French

Mirage II V, a relatively short range, tactical fighter bomber with a

vertical take-off capability.

It now appears, however, that the French may also use the TE-30 engine

in a new aircraft, the Mirage III F, which although advertised as a tactical

fighter bomber, will have a strategic capability comparable to the Mirage

IV, the present French

strategic bomber.

A separate and equally important consideration is that the French appar-

ently hope to market the Mirage Ill E as an alternative to our TEX,

anticipating that its lower cost will compensate for its reduced capability.

The availability of this French aircraft, powered by U. S. engines,

probably would put pressures on this country to make the TFX available

to our other allies, a decision we have deliberately postponed for reasons

relating to its strategic capabilities.

The arguments in favor of continuing the agreement to sell the TE-30

engine to France, despite the above considerations, is that: (1) Cancel-

lation of the existing agreement to sell the TF-30 engines would probably

have significant political repercussions; and (2) the French could buy a

comparable engine for the Mirage III B from the British (i.e., the SPEY

engine produced by Rolls Royce).

McG. B.

SECRET

55355 DocId: 32401362 Page 20

---

## Page 21

-...

EYES ONLY

4 May 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH

SUBJECT

:

Deputy Director (Intelligence)

: Comments on Saigon LimDis Cable 2108

(Attached)

We have the following comments on Khanh's remarks to Ambassador

Lodge:

1. Khanh has had several recent sessions with Lodge

at which he had an opportunity to raise some of the very

fundamental points referred to in this telegram and did

not do so.

Thus, we wonder whether the views here at-

tributed to Khanh

do not, perhaps, represent more of a

rainstorm than a well thought out program.

In any case,

they indicate increasing impatience possibly even bordering

on desperation.

These views might reflect an over-reaction

to the weekend's events in Saigon.

However, we do not feel

that the overall situation warrants such sudden, extreme

We are surprised that the Ambassador did not reflect

this in his reporting or comments.

Frankly, we find it dif-

ficult to factor out the Ambassador's views

from those of

Khanh®

2.

Taken at face value, Khanh's remarks reflect a

very disturbing, new element in his approach toward the war.

In many respects, these views run counter to the basic strategy

against the Viet Cong which has been recently and painfully

worked out. While Khanh indicates that he should continue

"province-by-province basis," the impatience

he displays, not only with the progress of his efforts, but

with the long,

grinding process

that our strategy involves is

fundamentally inconsistent with much of what the US now be-

lieves as necessary to defeat the Viet Cong.

EYES ONLY

NW 55355 DocId: 32401362 Page 21

---

## Page 22

EYES ONLY

3.

Evacuating Saigon, eliminating all vestiges of a

democratic government and injecting a substantial number

of American combat troops into the war would, in our view,

be extremely counterproductive: Khanh is just now beginning

to achieve a certain degree of popular support and sympathy.

These particular measures would almost certainly produce

just the opposite reaction to that which Khanh (and pre-

sumably Lodge) anticipate:

they would be widely inter-

preted as signs of weakness and despair, and would give

the Viet Cong considerable psychological

and propaganda

advantage.

4. We are, of course, in complete sympathy with the

desire to inject a greater

GVN and US sense of urgency into

the struggle.

We also agree that these ends could be served

by certain carefully chosen and calculated new US military

moves in South Vietnam and adjacent areas.

We

feel that the general philosophy involved in the oil spot

approach is still valid and that we and the GVN must face

up to a long, tough, gradual process of extending GVN in-

fluence and control

and reducing that of the Viet Cong.

In this context, we still think that the GN has a long way

to go in mobilizing the assets, resources, and people

available for fighting this war and to do this effectively,

Khanh must demonstrate a steady sense of purpose and present

inspiring and confident leadership.

I discussed this message briefly with Sullivan over

the phone.

He told me that he had talked to the Secretary

of State

about it who in turn was going to discuss it with

the President.

Sullivan also said there will probably be

no official US reaction to this until Secretary McNamara

deals with it in Vietnam on 12 May.

lesh

Chairman

CIA South Vietnam

Task Force

-2-

EYES ONLY

NW 55355 DooId: 32401362 Page 22

---

## Page 23

5 May 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT

Director of Central Intelligence

: Khanh's Data on "Population Control"

(Paragraph 9, LimDis Cable 2108)

Khanh's figures re population control warrant close

examination.

For one thing, the figure of 7 million

claimed as being lost to Viet Cong control as of last

November is considerably higher than the most pessimistic

MACV estimate, which puts it at 15 percent of the 15.3

million population.

More important, Khanh's claim to

have "recovered" 2 million people during his administra-

tion is invalid.

The only real gains made in country-

wide clear and hold operations have been in Binh Dinh

Quang Tin Provinces.

These gains can be measured in

thousands - rather than millions - of people,

and

actually occured in areas shown on existing situation

maps as already being under government control. Gains

in these areas may, in fact, have been offset by losses

in other areas,

particularly the Delta, where the Viet

Cong drive continues unchecked.

RayS Cliss

RAY

CLINE

Deputy Director

(Intelligence)

55355

DooId: 32401362

Page

23

---

## Page 24

TOP SECRET

April 7, 1964

Memorandum for Discussion of Covert Program Against Cuba

U. S. covert operations against the Castro regime have recently

been reviewed in the Special Group (54/12), and a number of

issues are presented which require discussion and decision at a

higher level.

The present covert program is designed in support of a general

policy of intense economic and political isolation of Castro,

accompanied by methods short of war to get rid of the Castro

regime. Parts of the program authorized in July 1963 have in

fact been held up for various reasons, and it is now important to

decide whether or not certain substantial and expensive activities

should be (a) actively continued; (b) held in readiness; (c) reduced,

or (d) abandoned.

Covert programs against Cuba fall into the following categories:

1. Collection of intelligence, to include the infiltration and ex-

filtration of agents and covert supply of agent operations.

Recommendation:

It is unanimously recommended that this pro-

gram be continued.

2. Covert propaganda aimed to encourage low-risk forms of

active and passive resistance and to stimulate tension within the

regime and between Cuba and the Soviet bloc.

Recommendation: It is recommended that these programs be

continued with regular review of their operational guidelines.

3. Cooperation with other agencies in economic denial by selec-

tivo economic action with respect to products critical to the Cuban

economy.

Recommendation: It is recommended that this program be con-

tinued.

4. Attempts to identify and establish contact with potential

dissident elements near the power centers of the regime.

Recommendation: It is recommended that this program be con-

tinued.

TOP SECRET

55355

DocId: 32401362 Page 24

---

## Page 25

TOP SEGRET

-2 -

5. Indirect economic sabotage with a low level of visibility and

detection. Programs of this sort involve possible overseas

sabotage of Cuban ships and possible addition of contaminating

elements to sensitive Cuban imports (not food).

Recommendation: It is recommended that these programs be

continued.

6. CIA-controlled sabotage raiding apparatus in Florida which

conducted five raids in the summer and fall of 1963, before

authority for such raids was suspended for political reasons.

Recommendation: Opinion is divided on this issue and it is recom-

mended that higher authority hear the arguments of different parties.

7. CIA-supported (but not directly controlled) autonomous Cuban

exile groups operating from Central America. These groups will

begin operations soon unless action is taken to try to stop them.

Recommendation: Again opinion is divided and it is recommended

that higher autbority hear the arguments.

8 +.

HH 55355 DocId: 32401362

Page 25

---

## Page 26

7 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT:

Meeting at the White House 7 April 1964

Subject

- Review of Covert Program directed

against Cuba

PRESENT:

The President.

State Department: Secretary Rusk,

Deputy Under Secretary Johnson,

Assistant Secretary Mann, and

The Coordinator of Cuban Affairs,

Mr. Crimmins.

Defense Department: Secretary McNamara and

Deputy Secretary Vance.

JCS:

General Maxwell Taylor.

CIA:

The Director, Messrs. Helms and

FitzGerald®

White House Staff: Messrs. Bundy and Dungan.

Mr. Bundy presented to the meeting a memorandum to

guide discussion

categories

concerning the Cuban program against Cuba.

of activities were listed in this memoran-

dum as follows:

(1)

Collection of intelligence.

(2)

Covert propaganda to encourage low risk

forms of active and passive resistance.

(3) Cooperation with other agencies

economic denial.

(4)

Attempts to identify and establish contact

with potential dissident elements

inside

Cuba.

SEGRET

twing and

NH 55355

DooId: 32401362

Page 26

---

## Page 27

2

(5) Indirect economic sabotage.

(6)

CIA-controlled sabotage raiding.

(7) Autonomous operations.

2.

Mr. Bundy's paper recommended continuation of the

first five

items listed and recommended discussion of the

last two.

3.

There was a brief discussion of item (5) during

which various methods of economic sabotage were described.

There was no disposition on the part of those present to

interfere

with this program

4. With respect to sabotage raiding by CIA-controlled

assets,

Secretary Rusk said that two things presently mili-

tate against a resumption of the program: (a) the pending

OAS matter with respect to the Venezuelan arms cache which

may be strengthened by discovery of arms in the Argentine

as well as in Brazil, and

(b) the prospective turnover of

the SAM sites by the Russians to the Cubans in April or May.

Secretary Rusk said that we would wish to maintain a clean

hands posture while the OAS case is pending and that if the

Cubans are to misuse the SAMs we would wish the onus to be

fully on their backs.

Secretary Rusk said that in addition

he does not believe that hit-and-run raids are in any event

very productive; that they have a high noise level and,

furthermore, that he suspects the Cuban exiles who actually

raids of possibly wishing to leave fingerprints

pointing to U.S. involvement in order to increase that

involvement.

Mr. Bundy said that in the past he had been

an advocate

of sabotage operations, but in view of the

history of the program since June,

he had come to the con-

clusion that it is unlikely that an effective sabotage

program will be conducted.

In explanation he pointed out

that the policymakers,

each time for good reasons, had

turned sabotage operations on and off to such an extent

that a program of the type envisioned in the June paper

simply does not, in the nature of things, appear feasible.

8 June 1963

e 1963 Mich esthe daattention A the paper dated

s current

program against Cuba.

He quoted from the 8 June paper

as follows:

2304

NH 55355

DocId: 32401362

Page 27

---

## Page 28

3

Paragraph 2: "The ultimate objective of this

policy would be to encourage dissident elements in

and other power centers of the regime

to bring about the eventual liquidation of the

Castro/communist entourage and

the elimination of

the Soviet presence from Cuba."

With respect to the interdependence of the

various courses of action comprising the program,

he quoted from paragraph 5 of the paper as follows:

"Unless all the

components of this program are

executed in tandem,

the individual courses of action

are almost certain to be of marginal value, even in

terms of achieving relatively limited policy objec-

This is clearly a case where the whole is

greater than the sum of its parts."

With respect to the sabotage program, he quoted

from paragraph 6.E. as follows:

"It must be recog-

that no single act of sabotage by itself can

materially affect the economy or stimulate significant

resistance.

However, it is our opinion that a well-

planned series of sabotage efforts, properly exe-

cuted, would in time produce the effect we seek."

sabotage operations since June 1963 do not in effect con-

stitute a test of the program and that the statements

quoted from the 8 June paper remain valid. He said that

there was a surge of anti-Castro sentiment during the fall

of 1963, corresponding with the period during which the

sabotage raids were conducted, but that resistance senti-

ment has now fallen into apathy. He said that the five

items for which approval is recommended in Mr. Bundy's

paper would not have the effect envisioned by the 8 June

paper although they might have the effect of slowing

Castro's consolidation of his regime.

6.

The Secretary of State said that part of our

problem has to do with the Soviet Union which

is now

going through a crisis period, particularly with respect

to the Sino-Soviet split. He

said that he felt sure that

were Ambassador Thompson present at the meeting he would

8.028

NW 55355 DooId: 32401362

Page 28

---

## Page 29

CREATE

handed

indicate the danger of forcing Khrushchev to take a

militant defensive attitude with respect to Cuba.

Secretary Rusk said that should the Cubans shoot down

a U-2,

raid peaceful shipping off the coast or should

there

be a strong OAS resolution, the question of the

conduct of sabotage raids could be reconsidered.

do not think that I am in error in quoting the Secretary

as equating a U-2 shootdown with a good OAS resolution

as a basis for resuming raiding operations.)

7.

Mr. Mann said that his attitude towards CIA-

conducted raiding operations would depend upon getting

a clear legal basis for action against Cuba out of the

He said that he doubted that all seven courses of

action combined would result in the overthrow of Castro.

He said that he

leans away from CIA-conducted raids and

towards autonomous operations.

He said that at the present

time, particularly in the light of the Brazilian events,

favorable action by the OAS on proposed paragraph two of

the resolution looks like a fifty-fifty chance.

In reply

to Secretary Rusk's query, I said that I believed that

CIA-controlled raiding assets could be held together for

another two months pending the resolution of the Secretary?s

two points (OAS and Cuban use of SAMs).

8. I briefed the President on the present status of

autonomous operations, including the fact that Artime is

planning to launch his operational program on the 12th of

April.

There was some discussion of these plans but no one

appeared disposed to try to stop Artime.

I said that

Manolo Ray's plans were not as well known to us but that

he had made it clear that he intended to move by May.

9.

The Secretary of Defense said that it was his

opinion that the covert program has no present chance of

success in terms of upsetting Fidel Castro.

He suggested

that it might be useful,

for reasons which

had not been

brought out at this meeting, and pointed out that the

principal decision to be made was a broader one - pre-

sumably what the overall U.S. attitude should be with

respect to Fidel Castro.

He said that

he felt that the

present raiding assets should be held in being pending

resolution of Secretary Rusk's two points but that in the

meanwhile the fundamental question should be debated.

Mr. Vance said that he agrees with the suggestion of con-

tinuing these assets in being but that he believes that

NW 55355 DooId: 32401362 Page 29

---

## Page 30

5

the program, if permitted to go forward as planned, would

at least have the advantage of hindering Castro in

the con-

solidation of his power.

He pointed out that the noise

level of the raiding operations had not in fact been very

high.

He would advise resuming raiding operations following

the resolution of Secretary Rusk's points. General Taylor

said that the Joint Chiefs favor the program in its

entirety, that they believe the program has never been

given a fair test and that we should move forward with

it in the interests of making Castro's life as hard as

possible. Mr. Bundy said that the CIA covert program is

the only matter to be resolved today, that the matter of

our negotiations with the British on

the economic program

and

sugar support would be ready for discussion next week.

10. Secretary Rusk recommended to the President that

we keep the raiding assets in being for the next two

months and that the question be discussed again following

the resolution of OAS events and the Cuban use of the SAM

sites.

11. The President accepted this recommendation.

Deer

Desmond FitzGerald

Chief

Western Hemisphere Division

SEE ATTACHED ADDED NOTE BY DCI

55355

DocId: 32401362 Page

30

---

## Page 31

8 April 1964

Dictated by Mr. McCone:

McCone went on to say the real issue to be considered at the meeting and by

the President was a question of whether we wished to implement the policy

as outlined in the 8th June paper and also less specifically in the paper

circulated in the meeting by Mr. Bundy, or abandon the basic objective of

bringing about the liquidation of the Castro Communist entourage and the

elimination of Communist presence in Cuba and thus rely on future events

of an undisclosed nature which might accomplish this objective.

Specifically McCone said that he could envisage such issues as extreme

economic distress caused by sharp drop in sugar prices or other external

factors arising which might cause Castro great pain and, ultimately, his

downfall. In summing up his position McCone stated that the actions

favorably looked upon, that is, intelligence gathering, propaganda, economic

denial and surreptitious acts against Cuban ships all would have some effect

but definitely would not accomplish the stated objectives.

JAM/ mfb

55355

DocId: 32401362

Page

31

---