CUBA
Agency: ARMY
Originator: JCS
From: V.H. KRULAK
To: CYRUS VANCE
Document date: 3/7/63
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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198-10007-10098

JFK Assassination System

Identification Form

Agency Information

Date:

6/24/201

AGENCY: ARMY

RECORD NUMBER:

198-10007-10098

RECORD SERIES: CALIFANO PAPERS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

Document Information

ORIGINATOR: JCS

FROM:

V.H. KRULAK

TO:

CYRUS VANCE

TITLE: CUBA

DATE: 03/07/1963

PAGES:

28

SUBJECTS :

MOVEMENT OF SUBVERSIVES

DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION: Secret

RESTRICTIONS: 1B

CURRENT STATUS : Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 08/12/1998

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :

Califano Papers, Box 3, Folder 12. Memo from Krulak to Vance enclosingthe Second Working Draft

of "Cuba: The Movement of Subversives and Subversive Trainees."

NO DECLASSIFICATON TON

MAR 2016

DATE:

JFK Review

Department of the Army EO 1352

A Declassif

1 Exclude

D Exempt

Authority.

Can 8 pose, Ke stren

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

MEMORANDUM

7. March 1963

Date

Mr. Cyrus Vance

To:

Subject:

Cuba

1. Attached is the current draft of

the paper on movement of subversive

trainees.

Additional copies have been

made available to Mr. Califano.

2. I have notified the Secretary

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that

this paper may be referred to the

Chiefs for a

short-notice review.

All Services, OSD and the Joint Staff

already have

copies.

destitut,

macular

KRULAK

Major General, USMC

Attachment

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MAR 7 1960

MAMORANDUM NO. 14 FOR CENERAL MARLE G. VREELER (J69)

CAPTAIN E. R. ZUKHALT, J% /03N(080)

MAJOR CENERAL C. W. ABLAMS, JA. 93A

BEAR ADMIRAL M. WENDT, 0O0

MAJOR GENERAL &.W. CARPENTER, USAF

SUBJECS:

moreontian summitton of Cuban elaniest

Moverant of Fubveralves

Aimed lo the loteet drall at tao paper es the movosent

ol subversives and mbversive tratoons proposed by the Sub-

Committee on Subversion of the subjoet committes,

* is raqueated that your commento ma this paper he

poimtited to so oct tater than 1700 houre thie evening, Thie

will ln the lact opportanity to commons oa this paper before it

le prescated to The Preotdent.

signed

Jocoph A. Collars, Jr.

Spaclal Asatatant to the

Secretary of the Amy

Attachment

as stated

AStI

Col PArchell

SECRETI OL IHE VENI

Ob.Ck

OSA, ASE Control No. 59281

1344.09

DI2L0019

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7 March, 1963

TO SERVICE, OSD. AND JOINT STAFF CONTACT POINTS:

This is the second draft of the paper which you

examined on Tuesday. It embodies changes resulting from

your suggestions as well as from a meeting of the Inter-

departmental Committee. Please make suggested final.

alterations and return them to my office by 1400 today,

Thursday, 7 March,

since the Interdepartmental Committee

must put 1t in final form tonight.

Service contact points are urged to ensure that

their superiors are aware of the developments on this

paper, since the Office of the Secretary of Defense will

probably send it to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their

urgent consideration.

Taken

1, KRULAK

Major General, USMC

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EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC

DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

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Second Working Draft

CUBA

THE MOVEMENT OF SUBVERSIVES

AND SUBVERSIVE TRAINEES

I.

Introduction

The actions proposed herein are designed to impede the

flow of subversives between Cuba and other Latin American

countries. Execution of any one or more of the enumerated

actions will ameliorate the situation; execution of them

all will not completely solve it. The practical problems

Involved are too numerous and complex.

With respect to diminishing legitimate travel to Cuba;

we face multiple problems in the policies and

attitudes of

those Latin American countries through which the

subversive

traveller must pass. From the viewpoint of these nations

the direct actions required have strong political and some-

times legal implications; implications which cannot be over-

come easily, even where the leaders of these

countries

choose to do so.

In the matter of clandestine travel, we are confronted

not only with the great depth of communist guile, born of two

generations

of experience in the international movement of

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subversives, but with the inexperience, ineptitude and

lack of awareness in these same matters on the part of

the Latin American community

In spite of this, the advantages do not all reside

with the communists. Cuba is an island. Its insular

character imposes certain sharp limitations upon personal

movement. Cuba has no frontiers with other states; every-

one who enters

the country must do so either by water,

or air. There can be no slipping through the barbed wire,

On the other hand, this same geographic situation

makes clandestine entry and exit reasonably simple.

There

are 3,825 linear miles of essentially unpatrolled Central

American coastline, between 175 and 850 miles of Cuba. There

are at least 93 airfields, other than United States, within

700 miles of the island, and the ships and craft, indigenous

to the Caribbean

and capable of supporting the subversive

ebb and flow, number well into the thousands.

Even in the face of these unfavorable factors,

program of direct restraints,

selected from among the actions

enumerated herein, can have favorable

effects.

Under the

proposed steps some travel would be stopped completely.

More - probably much more - would be rendered difficult.

Some hitherto legitimate movement would be driven underground.

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Previous clandestine movement would be impeded, compli-

cated

and harassed to the point where it becomes more

costly, more uncertain, more hazardous and thus, hope-

fully, less extensive.

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II.

Nature and Scope of the Problem

We do not know

enough about the movement of subversive

trainees into Cuba and - more important - out of Cuba. We

do not:

know enough about the volume of travel, or the media

employed. This is particularly true in the area of illicit

traffic, where our knowledge is extemely limited.

Regarding legitimate travel to Cuba, CIA presents the

following estimate:

Legitimate Travel into Cuba

Country No. of Legal Travellers Country No. of Legal Travellers

1962 Jan-Feb 1963

1962

Jan-Feb 1963

Mexico

4912

969

Argentina

Unk

Guatemala

80

Unk

Uruguay

Unk

El Salvador

100

8

Paraguay

500

115

60

400

Unk

Nicaragua

Costa Rica

Venezuela

Colombia

Ecuador

Peru

50

216

200

400

208

181

Unk

Brazil

Unk

10

Honduras

Unk

• 92

40

21

Unk

British

Guiana

Panama

Unk

56

1

Unk

Trinidad

Unk

Unk

Bolivia

Chile

500

551

Unk

Unk

85

Jamaica

593

Unk

Dominican

Republic

Haiti

None

Unk

Unk

Unk

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While some of these travellers proceeded to Cuba by

other routes, the great majority passed through Mexico on

their way. On the most conservative basis, then, it will

be seen

that there cannot have been fewer than 4912 travellers

to Cuba during the year 1962, while the average monthly

number passing through Mexico for the first two months of

1963 1s even higher than the 1962 average.

Of the total number visiting Cuba, the Central Intelli-

gence Agency estimates that at least 1500, and perhaps as

many as 2000, have received ideological indoctrination or

guerrilla warfare training. Many of these are still in

Cuba. Others have returned to their homelands; some by

legitimate means; some probably by 1ll1cit means.

Prior to the October crisis, Latin Americans travelling

to cuba usually moved by regular commercial airlines or, on

occasion, by specially chartered Cubana flights. Some

travelled to Trinidad or Curacao and thence by regularly.

scheduled Cubana or KIM flights to Havana. ' Others travelled

to Mexico, and from there by Mexicana or Cubana commercial

flights to Havana. With the cessation of service to Cuba

by. Pan American, KLM, Mexicana, and Iberia airlines in

October, the regular Cubana service between Mexico City

and Havana remained the sole direct and regular airline

connection betwen Cuba and the remainder of Latin America.

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The Cubana service between Havana and Mexico is scheduled

to operate twice weekly, but sometimes only a single flight is

completed per week. Aircraft now employed are British Bri-

tannias -- an obsolescent model. Cubana has requested, but

has not yet received, Mexican approval to substitute Soviet

IL-18 transports for the old Britannias.

Delay by the Mexicans

In granting this approval can have the favorable effect of

Impeding travel, as the Britannias are now in poor condition.

If, in addition, the British and Canadians can be induced to

suspend delivery of spare parts, the planes will soon become

Inoperative:

Iberia airlines resumed its regular twice-monthly

flights from Madrid to Havana on 11 February. This flight

makes one stop, in the Azores, before reaching Havana.

KIM has not yet resumed its regular flights to Cuba

from the Netherlands Antilles. However, it is now considering

doing so. In this regard it is concluded that resumption of

scheduled flights by a United States carrier could serve as

an encouragement to KLM and others to do the same.

Soviet and Czech airlines serving Cuba do not stop

regularly at any other Latin American country, though the

Soviet Aeroflot line has occasionally sought and received

permission from Brazil to land at Recife, en route to Cuba.

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Some Latin Americans may have travelled to Cuba on these

infrequent flights and, should Brazil permit this arrange-

ment to become regularized, the movement of subversives

could

achieve a new order of magnitude.

A Canadian non-scheduled line has operated a few

flights from Canada to Havana and return, carrying both

material and personnel. The Canadians have been unrespon-

sive to our efforts to obtain identification of the passengers.

There are no regularly scheduled sea carriers operating

between Latin America and Cuba. However, a number of trainees

from British Guiana have travelled to Cuba aboard unscheduled

Cuban merchant vessels engaged in transporting rice from

Guiana to Cuba.

Clandestine sources report that transit of Latin

Americans through Mexico to Cuba often involves illict pro-

cedures. The Cuban embassy in Mexico City provides the

travellers, whom they identify as tourists, with special

Cuban entry papers; no entry is made in their passports,

and they are given pseudonyms for travel out of and

into

Mexico. This procedure is obviously designed to impede

any effort by the other Latin American governments subse-

quently to identify the travellers and to exercise surveil-

lance over their activities upon their return.

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Evidence at hand portrays a substantial flow of travel

by legal means.

This must be countered directly. Beyond

this, and perhaps of greater importance, 1s the problem of

11l1cit movement both into and out of Cuba, which will un

doubtedly assume growing proportions as legal travel is

curtailed, and about which our Intelligence is at present

most limited. Elimination of this void must be accorded high

priority.

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III. The attitudes of the Latin American Nations

Success of many of the overt actions proposed

in

the sections to follow will turn upon the attitudes of the

Latin American nations within whose borders the restraining

actions must take place. Presented briefly below is an

estimate of what can be expected from the various sectors

of Latin America in terms of participation in a coordinated

program of travel control.

As a general matter, the imposition of controls on

travel is not popular with the public in any Latin American

country.

This, coupled with their current lack of full

awareness of the danger represented by Cuba's training of

subversives, will diminish the willingness of some govern-

ments to impose controls unilaterally. This is especially

true since they recognize that unilateral

restraints will

have little effect on curbing the travel of their nationals

to cuba, if supporting multilateral action 1s not also taken.

It is likely, however, that most of the Latin American

countries would respond favorably - albeit in varying

degrees -- to US leadership in seeking to reduce the flow

of persons to Cuba for ideological or subversive training.

The Central American countries are more acutely aware

of the danger posed by Cuban-inspired subversion than is

Latin America at large, and can be expected to react

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favorably to proposals for reducing travel to Cuba which

President Kennedy might present at the San Jose Presidential

meeting•

However, their ability to carry out commitments

made under such circumstances will be limited by domestic.

legal and political considerations, as well as by their

countries: technical incompetence in such matters.

Since Mexico is currently the only hemisphere transit

point for legal travel of subversives to and from Cuba, the

attitude of that country toward the problem is of great

Importance. Mexico, to date, has taken three significant

steps with respect to travel between Mexican cities and

Cuba. It

has instituted close surveillance over travellers,

to include stamping passports to evidence travel to Cuba.

In addition, the Mexicans now photograph, covertly, all

persons arriving from or departing for Cuba, and have given

tacit approval to suspension of Cuban service by Compania

Mexicana de Aviacion (CMA) • These actions all suggest that

Mexico might be induced to take even further cooperative

steps, particularly on an unpublicized, bi-lateral basis,

wherein the political

hazards of a public lAs position are

not involved. In this regard, the Central American Presidents

would probably agree individually to seek the participation

of President Lopez Mateos of Mexico in specific cooperative

moves to restrict the flow of persons to Cuba through that

country.

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Peru now has regulations which actually prohibit

travel to Cuba, but the regulations have engendered public

resistance, and are not enforced. The Dominican Republic

prohibits such travel. Haiti has no established policy,

but passports and exit permits are reportedly issued only

on personal approval of President Duvalier. Colombia

could legally impose restrictions by executive decree, but

has shown no inclination to do so. Other countries, such

as Venezuela, Chile, and the Central American nations,

plead the existence of legal or constitutional barriers

which preclude the prohibition of travel to cuba, but thus

far, they have made little effort to remove these barriers.

Five Latin American countries (Brazil, Chide, Uruguay,

Mexico, and Bolivia) now maintain diplomatic relations with

Cuba. Brazil continues its drift to the left and gives

little evidence of modifying its tolerant attitude toward

the Castro government. Chile, with a legal Communist Party,

exercises no restraints on travel to Cuba, either direct

or via third country. It is to be expected that these five

countries, with some possible exceptions in the case of

Mexico, will be the least cooperative in restricting travel

to Cuba.

The elimination of all legitimate passenger service:

to Cuba from Latin America could be achieved through

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Invocation of the Rio Treaty, but it is unlikely that the

hemisphere countries would agree to do so in the absence of

some major crisis similar to that involving the Soviet missiles

or a case of direct Cuban intervention in another Latin

American country. Nevertheless, a campaign on our part to

develop a full awareness of the danger represented by the

flow of Castro-trained subversives would probably create a

growing willingness

to take action oriented in this direction.

In this connection, however, it is concluded that resumption

of regular passenger service to Cuba by the United States

would render more difficult our efforts to persuade the

Latin American countries to take a grave view of the situ-

ation, and to participate in dynamic action.

Virtually, all the Latin American countries would be

willing to move against Cuban-trained subversives upon their

return to home countries, particularly when the trainee's

conduct gave clear evidence of his subversive intent. An

essential factor, however, is the realization that the efforts

of these nations will not be dramatically effective since, in

the area of internal security, all of them suffer from de-

ficiencies in technical skill, training, equipment and some-

times from a lack of a sense of urgency. The United States

can provide essential leadership in eliminating all of these

deficiencies.

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IV. Actions Concerning Legitimate Travel

Listed below

are specific actions contemplated to

impede legitimately executed travel, to and from Cuba.

Legitimate travel is characterized, for this purpose,

as travel on recognized public carriers, openly arranged

and involving travel documents which are presumed

to be in

proper order. Certain of the actions, it will be noted,

are partially in effect. Others have been proposed to the

OAS - wholly or in part - by the Special Consultative

Committee on Security.

a. Immediate Impact Actions

The following actions offer promise of producing

early, visible and effective results.

(1) Intelligence Actions

(a) Intensify U.S* intelligence efforts in

each country to identify persons who have traveled,

or intend to travel, to Cuba, arid report selected

information promptly to the host government, as

may be consistent with our own intelligence pro-

gram, and the requirement to protect our sources.

(b) Intensify current efforts to introduce

covert, U.S. - controlled agents from each country

into the Cuban training program.

(2) Administrative Actions

(a) Induce each Western Hemisphere country to:

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I. Stamp passports or other travel documents

issued to own nationals "not valid for travel

to Cuba"

2. Refuse exit permits for Cuba to any

national of a third country who cannot produce

a valid permit issued by his own country for

travel to Cuba.

3: Refuse to honor any visa for Cuba which

is not an integral, non-detachable part of the

travel document issued by the country of which

the traveller is a citizen.

4. Require accurate manifests of all carriers

departing for or arriving from Cuba, and furnish

copies of these manifests to diplomatic missions

of other Western Hemisphere countries which are

affected.

(b) Persuade Mexico to fingerprint, in addition

to photographing, all persons leaving for or arriving

from Cuba, and to provide data to the parent country

of the nationals involved.

(c) Make covert arrangements with police and

other security and administrative officials in

countries now being used for legal transit to Cuba

to impose administrative impediments and harassment

on Cuba-bound travellers, in order to increase the

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difficulty of travel and thus discourage pro-

spective travellers

(3) Actions in Regard to Common Carriers

(a) Prohibit resumption of air service to

Cuba by U.S, carriers, in order to provide a

favorable example to other nations who may be

contemplating similar steps.

(b) Expand current restrictions on foreign

shipping engaging in commerce with Cuba by

closing United States ports to all ships of

any shipping line which continues to send any

ships to Cuban ports.

(c) Request Latin American countries to

prohibit ships arriving from or departing for

Cuba from embarking or disembarking passengers

in thier ports.

(d) Request Latin American countries to deny

their ports to Cuban ships.

(4) Propaganda Actions

(a) Pursue a hemisphere-wide publicity campaign

to expose the scope and purpose of Cuban training

of the nationals of other countries for sub-

versive purposes, in order to discourage pro-

spective trainees and impress the governments

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and the peoples concerned with the urgent

need

to halt the travel of Latin American

nationals to Cuba.

b. Longer Range Actions

The following actions should also be undertaken

without delay.

Their ultimate results may be of far-

reaching importance, but probably will be longer

in realization.

(1) Political Actions

(a) Renew and intensify bilateral negotiations

with the five Latin American governments which

have not done so to sever diplomatic relations with

Cuba.

(b) Through bilateral negotiations press

countries with inadequate legal restrictions on

travel to Cuba to adopt laws enabling the prohibi-

tion of such travel and providing severe penalties

for evasion. Recommend that rewards be offered

for identification of evaders.

(c) In separate diplomatic

approaches to each

country, urge full and effective cooperation with

appropriate OAS bodies, and bilaterally among the

several states, in the interchange of information

concerning travel of persons to Cuba and other

Castro-Communist subversive activities.

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(d) Propose periodic regional meetings of

ministers of the Central American nations to review

the implementation of steps taken by two or more

of them to combat subversive movement in the

Caribbean.

(e) Urge other Latin American nations to

negotiate separately and/or collectively with

Mexico, Uruguay, Brazil and Chile in order to enlist

cooperation in adopting specific measures to prevent

the movement through their countries of third

country personnel to and from Cuba.

(2) Intelligence Actions

Intensify our action in making available to

each country selected intelligence concerning the

extent, nature, and insidious implications, of

Cuban subversive activities, as consistent with the

requirement to protect our own intelligence program.

(3) Administrative Actions

(a) Encourage Latin American governments to

institute administrative procedures, such as

exhaustive examination of manifests, air-worthiness

checks of aircraft, baggage inspection and inspect-

ion of health and other documents, all designed

deliberately to delay and otherwise make difficult

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the carrying of passengers to Cuba.

(b) Request governments of Latin American

countries which persist in maintaining diplomatic

relations with cuba to expose the falsification

of travel documents by Cuban embassies or con-

sulates, and take punitive measures, such as the

expulsion of Cuban diplomatic personnel, to bring

such illegal activity to a halt. Provide U.S.

technical assistance as requested.

•(c) Intensify technical assistance to Latin

American countries in improving immigration and

customs controls.

(4) Actions Related to Common Carriers

(a) If unable to cause Mexico to halt Cubana

Airlines service altogether, persuade Mexico to

refuse the introduction of Soviet-made aircraft in

the Havana-Mexico City route on technical grounds.

This will create an obstacle to Cubana, since the .

Brittania aircraft now used are in disrepair.

(b.) Request again of Great Britain, Canada, and

any other potential supplier that they cut off the

supply of spare parts for Cuba's Britania aircraft.

(c) Conduct negotiations with the Netherlands,

Mexico, Canada and Spain to persuade those countries

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to stop, or refrain from reestablishing,

commercial air flights to Cuba.

Enlist the

cooperation of other Western Hemisphere countries

normally providing terminal service for any of

the airlines involved, such as Venezuela and

Trinidad, in applying pressure.

(5) Propaganda Actions

(a) Intensify USIA and CIA input of propaganda

in Latin American public information media discredit-

ing the Cuban training effort, exposing the hazard

which it holds for Latin American tranquility,and

discrediting persons who have undergone subversive

training, in order to discourage possible volunteers

and develop popular opposition to such activities.

(b) Identify returned trainees who are dis-

satisfied with thier Cuban training experience and

exploit thier capabilities for provision of intelli-

gence and propaganda material for exposing and

discrediting Castro-Communist subversive activities.

(c) Initiate a publicity campaign throughout

Latin America, not attributable to the United

States,

which focusses unfavorably on the use of Mexican,

Uruguayan, Brazilian, and Chilean transit facilities

for movement of persons of other countries to and

from Cuba for subversive purposes.

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c. Organization of American States (OAS) Actions

In view of the important political, psychological,

and, hopefully, material benefits to be derived from

any success achieved through the OAS in combatting

Cuban subversive activity, the following measures

should be pursued by the United States in that body,

at times and under circumstances which give regard to

the need to preserve hempsheric solidarity, and

give recognition to the fact that progess will

probably be slow.

(1) Pursue adaption by the OAS of a resolution :

calling upon all member states to sever diplomatic :

relations with Cuba, thus impeding the travel of

subversives to Cuba by legal means, and at the same

time, creating serious obstacles to other related

Cuban subversive activities.

(2) Propose a recommendation by the OAS to member

governments of a program of steps, on both the

national and international levels, to control travel

by their nationals to Cuba, utilizing the proposals

in the report by the Special Consultative Committee

on Security (SCOS) as. well as the specific recommen-

dations set forth herein.

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(3) Once the initial comprehensive program in

(2) above is recommended, utilize the appropriate

DAs bodies to follow up on implementation through

such means as multilateral exchange of information,

meeting of experts, and utilization by individual

countries of the services of the Special Consultative

Committee on Security.

(4) Propose adoption by the OAS of a resolution,

binding upon all member states, to terminate air and

maritime carrier traffic with Cuba.

(5) Recommend action by the OAS to establish a

public information program focussing on the threat

to the hemisphere posed by Cuban subversive training

activities.

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Vo

Actions Concerning Illegal Travel

As the actions outlined in the preceding sections

become effective, one of the results will be to force the

hitherto legitimate travel into clandestine channels. It

may, therefore, be expected that measures to impede illegal

movement will acquire steadily increasing importance.

The steps proposed herein are listed, as in the

preceding section, in terms of immediate Impact projects

which promise early and visible results, and longer range

projects which, while of great importance, cannot be ex-

pected to mature as rapidly.

a. Immediate Impact Actions.

(1) Intelligence Actions

(a) Increase greatly.our penetration and other

intelligence efforts to identify persons engaging

in illegal travel to Cuba, and determine routes

and methods employed. Report selected information,

consistent with the requirement for protecting our

own intelligence program, to host government.

(b) Utilize US intelligence capabilities

to

determine the nature and extent of clandestine

aircraft and small boat traffic between Cuba and

other countries in the Caribbean area, with special

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attention to Mexico, Honduras, Jamaica; Haiti and

the Dominican Republic, Use evidence obtained to

persuade governments concerned to institute sur-

veillance and other control measures:

(2) Surveillance and Reporting Actions

(a) Continue current US sea and air surveil-

lance of the Caribbean area contiguous to Cuba

(b) Continue the improvement, at high priority,

of Us communications in Latin America, in order to

improve alerting, reporting and control capabilities.

(c) Establish Intelligence centers at Caribbean

Command and Caribbean Sea Frontier Headquarters

for rapid processing and dissemination to countries

concerned via the American Ambassadors, of intel-

ligence on subversive movements.

b. Longer Range Action

(1) Surveillance Actions

(a) Establish a coordinated Caribbean surveil

lance system involving:

1. Continued close-in surveillance of Cuba

by Us forces.

2. A US military alerting system; by which

intelligence of subversive movement will be

rapidly transmitted to the American Ambassadors

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to countries concerned through intelligence

centers at Caribbean Command and Caribbean Sea

Frontier Headquarters.

3. A unilateral surveillance and inter

ception effort by each country in its own

territorial waters.

4. US assistance in final interception

in territorial

waters, upon request by the

country concerned.

(2) US Military Assistance Actions

(a) Review Military Assistance objectives

and planning guidance to provide selected countries;

especially in the Caribbean, and Central American

area, with small patrol craft, training and

logistical support, Including fuel for operations

If required, to enable these countries to establish

an effective patrol of their own coasts

(b) Provide US Navy, Air Force, and Coast.

Guard

training assistance, as required, to develop or

improve coastal patrol capabilities of Latin American

military personnel.. This may take the form of a

Canal Zone training activity, employment of mobile

training teams, or a combination of both.

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(c) Urge the accelerated improvement of inter-

nal

security forces and police forces in Latin

American countries and the intensification of

patrol and intelligence activities

aimed at pre

venting clandestine departures and apprehending

returned trainees. Provide equipment, training

and advice as required.

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