## Page 1

1104-10335-10014

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS AGT OF 1992

104-10553-100

; :

1*

SSINATION

0?

Assassination Records Review Board

600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530

(202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457

REVIEW

BOA

IN THIS DOUG

January 28, 1997

Mr. John Pereira

Director

Historical Review Group

Center for the Study of Intelligence

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, DC 20505

Re:

Request for Additional Information and Records No. CIA-16

(Oswald Pre-Assassination Files)

Dear John:

Under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, 41

U.S.C. § 2107 (Supp. V 1994), the Review Board has the authority to "direct a ...

Government office to ... investigate the facts surrounding, additional information [and]

records...." Section 70)(1)(C)(ii). Pursuant to this authority, the Review Board is

seeking to resolve in a complete and comprehensive manner certain questions related to

files on Lee Harvey Oswald that CLA may have held prior to the assassination of

President Kennedy. Accordingly, we request that CIA provide complete and

comprehensive answers to the questions identified below.

On May 12, 1992, Director Robert M. Gates testified to the Senate Committee on

Governmental Affairs regarding CIA's records on Oswald prior to the assassination.

Mr. Gates testified that "[p]rior to President Kennedy's assassination, CIA held only a

small file on Lee Harvey Oswald that consisted of 34 documents amounting to 124

pages....." (The Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1972: Hearing Before the

Committee on Governmental Affairs, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1992) (emphasis added)

(copy enclosed). It is the Review Board's current understanding, however, that at the

time of the assassination, CIA held at least three separate files (including soft files) on

Lee Harvey Oswald: a 201 file (201-289248), an HTLINGUAL file, and an Office of

BOARD MEMBERS: John R. Tunheim, Chair • Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce • Anna K. Nelson

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: David G. Marwell

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## Page 2

13-00000

Mr. John Pereira

January 28, 1997

Page 2*

Security file! We have identified references to one or more other possible Oswald files

including possible soft files designated as follows: CI/SI, CI/SIG, CI/LSN, and

CS/LSN.

1.

Please identify, as specifically as possible, each file held by CIA on Oswald

at the time of the assassination of President Kennedy.

2.

Other than for the 201-289248 file on Oswald, please explain when each

Oswald file was opened, the purpose for the opening of the file, and the

documents that were in the file at the time of the assassination.

3.

For the 201-289248 file on Oswald, please identify which records (and the

total number that) were in the file at the time of the assassination.

To the extent that Counterintelligence and the Office of Security

maintained pre-assassination files on Oswald, please explain why those

offices maintained files on Oswald prior to the assassination. In

answering this question, please make appropriate references to the

Clandestine Services Handbook (CSHB) and to any other materials

(including organizational charts) that would help explain the

jurisdictional and organization reasons for which CI and OS would have

maintained such files.

For each question, please explain the basis for the answer and the sources (records or

persons) whom you consulted to answer the question. To the extent that you are not

able to answer a question completely, please so indicate and provide the best reasonable

answer. If, during the course of your research, you learn that any record relating to a

pre-assassination file or record has been destroyed, please provide us with all available

information related to the destruction of the records or files.

These queries should be interpreted in their broadest reasonable sense. To the extent

that you question whether certain responses may be within the scope of our request,

please let us know and we can advise you whether we would wish to include it. We

anticipate that the responses to these questions will be referenced in CIA's Final

Compliance Statement.

'One Office of Security file on Oswald (or relating to Oswald) may have been

numbered 351-164. In addition, Margaret Stevens may have held an Office of Security

"MS-" file on Oswald.

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## Page 3

13-00000

Mr. John Pereira

January 28, 1997

Page 3

We request that you make this information available to us by February 24, 1997. If this

does not provide you with sufficient time, please let us know, in writing, by what date

you believe you will be able to answer the questions fully. .

Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

David G. Marwell

Executive Director

Enclosure

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## Page 4

13-00000

* Hen

THE ASSASSINATION MATERIALS DISCLOSURE ACT

OF 1992

...-....

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED SECOND CONGRESS

SECOND 5E5510%

0))

S. J. RES. 282

TO PROVIDE FOR THE EXPEDITIOUS DISCLOSURE DE RECORDS

RELEVANT TO THE ASSASSINATION DE PRESIDENT DONE NANDIDA

MAY 12. !U

ranted for the use of the Committer on Creamtreti Attit

57-2:311 •.

I'S COVERNMENT "RINTING DEFIC'E

WASHINGTON : 1992

For sale hy the C'S. Circrument Primting Coltee

Superintendem of Documents, Congressmal Sales Coltree. Wishington Do cer:

ISBN 0-16-039035-4

---

## Page 5

13-00000

50

denied, you say postponed. I am curious as to how long the post-

ponement will be. Will it be until the national security or privacy

are no longer threatened? Do we want to require a mandatory

review every two years?

Going along, some

of the language is fairly broad. We had the

exchange here a few moments ago about an intelligence

tellin there is another section that gives us an exception "an in-

telligence method which is currently utilized, or reasonably expect-

ed to be utilized."

The one that troubles me most, although I know there is a

reason for it, but I just am concerned about the doors it may open,

is ".

an invasion of privacy of a living person, whether that

person is identified in the material or not.

am concerned abou

that being used as a ground for requesting postponement of disclo-

sure.

So I think, consistent with all that you have said here, I hope

that you will give us the benefit of your second look at that Section

6 of this proposed Act.

Chairman GLaNN. Thank you.

Senator Cohen?

Senator CoHEN. No further questions.

Chairman GLENN. Good. Thank you very much. We may have ad-

ditional questions. It has been a long session this morning here,

and we have additional questions from other members or questions

after we review. We would appreciate an early reply so it could be

included in the record. Thank you very much. We appreciate.

Mr. Stokes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SPECTER. Thank you very much.

Chairman GLENN. The next panel is the Honorable Robert Gates

Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Honorabl

William

1 Sessions, Director of the F'Bl. Gentlemen, you have been

very patient here this morning. I know we had told you you would

be on by about 10:00 here. We are about an hour late on that, or a

little over. We appreciate your forbearance this morning. We look

forward to your testimony this morning.

Mr. Gates, if you would lead off, we would appreciate it very

much.

TESTIMONY OF THE HON. ROBERT M. GATES, DIRECTOR,

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Mr. GATes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I am here

that relate to the assassination of John F. Kennedy.

Senator Sasser. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if the Director could

ould the mike just a little bit closer? Thank you

Mr. GATES. I very much appreciate the opportunity to speak os

this important matter.

Let me begin by stating that I am in complete agreement with

the purpose underlying the joint resolution, that eftorts should be

made to declassify and make available to the public as quickly as

possible Government documents relating to the assassination of

51

President Kennedy. We hope that opening up and giving journal-

Ists, historians and, most importantly, the public access to govern-

mental files will help to resolve questions that still linger over 28

years after the assassination. Further, I believe that maximum dis-

closure will discredit the theory that CIA had anything to do with

the murder of President Kennedy.

Even before the introduction of this joint resolution, I recognized

the need for greater public access to CIA documents of historica!

importance. Two months ago, I announced the establishment of a

new unit within CIA that will be responsible for declassifying as

many historical documents as possible, consistent with the protec-

tion of intelligence sources and methods.

This new unit, the Historical Review Group, in the Agency's

Center for the Study of Intelligence, will review for declassification

documents 30 years old or older and national intelligence estimates

on the former Soviet Union that are 10 years old or older.

In addition to the systematic review of 30-year-old documents, I

have directed the history staft in the Center for the Study of Intel

igence to assemble ClA records focusing on particular events of

historical importance, including the assassination of President

Kennedy. The Historical Review Group will then examine the doc-

uments for the purpose of declassifying the records.

Because of high interest in the JFK papers, I am not waiting fo

legislation or other agencies to start declassifying documents be

longing to CIA. The Historical Review Group, at my direction, al-

ready has begun its review of the documents related to the assassi-

lation of President Kennedy, and I am happy to report that the

urst group of these records, including all CIA documents on Let

Harvey Oswald prior to the assassination, has been declassified

with quite minimal deletions and is being transferred to the Na-

tional Archives for release to the public.

This is, I acknowledge, a small fraction of what we hold, but it is

an earnest of my commitment immediately to begin review for de

classification of this material. Indeed, as I speak, the reviewers art

going through a substantial number of documents and I anticipate

that many of these will be released shortly.

As we carry out our program to declassify Kennedy assassinatior

documents, our goal will be to release as many as possible. In fact

recently approved a new CIA declassification guideline for our

historical review program which specifically directs a presumption

in favor of declassification. I believe we can be very forward-lean-

ing in making these documents available to the public, and I have

instructed the Historical Review Group to take this attitude to

heart. In this spirit, the Agency today will make publicly available

these new guidelines for historical review and declassification.

To understand the magnitude of the effort involved in reviewing

these documents for declassification, it is important to place them

in some context. The CLA's collection of documents related to the

copies and originals of

information provided to the Warren Com-

mission and the House Select Committee on Assassinations, and 17

boxes of material on Lee Harvey Oswald accumulated after Presi-

dent Kennedy's assassination.

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## Page 6

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52

Unfortunately, and for reasons that I do not know, what we are

dealing with is a mass of material that is not indexed, is uncatalo-

gued, and is highly disorganized, all of which makes the review

process more difficult. The material contains everything from the

most sensitive intelligence sources to the most mundane news clip-

These records include documents that CIA had in its files before

the assassination,

a large number of records that CIA received

later as routine disseminations from other agencies, as well as the

reports, correspondence, and other papers that CIA prepared in the

course of the assassination investigations. I should emphasize that

these records were assembled into the present collection as a result

of specific inquiries received from the Warren Commission or the

House Select Committee on Assassinations.

Prior to President Kennedy's assassination, CIA held only a

small file on Lee Harvey Oswald that consisted of 34 documents

copy of Oswald's file as it existed before the assassination so that

you can see firsthand how slender it was at the time. As I have

already noted, we have declassified the CIA documents in this file

with quite minimal deletions and we are providing them to the Na-

tional Archives.

The records in this file dealt with Oswald's defection to the

Soviet Union in 1959 and his activities after his return in 1962. By

contrast, it was only after the assassination that CIA accumulated

the rest of the material on Oswald,

some 33,000 pages,

most of

which CIA received from other agencies after November 22, 1963.

The Committee has asked about documents in our possession

generated by other agencies. In fact, much of the material held by

CIA originated with other agencies or departments. For example,

in the 17 boxes of Oswald records, approximately 40 percent of the

documents originated with the FBI and about 20 percent originated

from the State Department or elsewhere.

Our staff is still going through the material compiled at the re-

quest of the Warren Commission and the House Select Committee

on Assassinations, which includes 63 boxes of paper records and

one box that contains 73 reels of microfilm. The microfilms, in

part, overlap material in other parts of the collection. We estimate

that within the 63 boxes of paper records, approximately 21 per-

cent originated with a variety of other U.S. Government agencies,

private organizations, and foreign and American press.

Although our documents do include many documents from other

agencies, we nonetheless have a substantial collection of CIA docu-

ments that will require considerable effort to review, and as I said

earlier, at my direction, this review for declassification is now un-

derway.

A preliminary survey of these files has provided us some indica-

tions of what they contain. Although the records cover a wide vari-

ety of topics, they principally focus on CIA activities concerning

Cuba and Castro, Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union, and Os-

wald's subsequent activities in Mexico City and New Orleans. They

also include a large number of name traces requested by the staff

53

of the House Select Committee on Assassinations, as well as mate-

rial relating to the Garrison investigation and Cuban exile activi-

ties.

The CIA cannot release a number of documents unilaterally be-

cause of the limits in the Privacy Act which protect the names of

American citizens against unauthorized disclosure, the sequestra-

tion of many documents by the House Select Committee on Assassi-

nations, and the fact that many of the documents belong to agen-

cies other than CIA.

However, we have already taken steps to lift the sequestration,

the House of Representatives for a resolution permitting CIA to re-

lease the results of the declassification effort on the sequestered

documents.

While I expect a large amount of the material can be declassified

under our program, I assume that there will be information that

cannot be released to the public for a variety of reasons, including

privacy concerns or the exposure of intelligence sources and meth-

ods. Let me take a moment to give an example of this type of mate-

rial.

During the investigation by the House Select Committee on As-

sassinations, I understand that security and personnel files were

requested on a number of CIA employees. These files contain fit-

ness reports, or performance evaluations, medical evaluations, and

credit checks on individual CIA officers. Although irrelevant to the

question of who killed President Kennedy, these and other persona.

documents ultimately ended up in the sequestered collection of doc

uments. I do not believe that the benefit to the public of disclosure

of this information outweighs the clear privacy interest of the indi-

viduals in keeping the information confidential.

Similar privacy concerns exist with documents containing derog-

atory information on particular individuals where the information

is based on gossip and rumor. Our files also contain the names of

individuals who provided us intelligence information on a promise

of confidentiality. We would not disclose their names in breach of

such a promise. Where we cannot disclose such information to the

public, the Agency: will make redactions and summarize the infor-

mation in order to ensure that the maximum amount of informa-

tion is released, while still protecting the identity of an agent or

the privacy of an individual.

If legislation is not passed by the Congress and signed by the

President regarding the JFK papers, to enhance

relevant to the assassination, I would appoint a panel of distin-

guished Americans from outside of Government, perhaps including

distinguished former jurists, to examine whatever documents we

have redacted or kept classified. They would then issue an unclassi-

fied public report on their findings.

The effort required to declassify the documents relating to the

assassination of President Kennedy will be daunting. However, it is

an important program and I am committed to making it work.

Even in a time of diminishing resources within the intelligence

community, I have allocated 15 full-time positions to expand the

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54

history staff and to form the Historical Review Group that will

review the JFK documents and other documents of historical inter-

I believe these actions attest to the seriousness of our intent to

lassified and release

mains classified to outside non-governmental review.

matin classied to deeds on overmened, edito. els wastine

this background that in response to the Committe's request, d cite

our few technical reservations about the mechanism established by

the joint resolution to achieve this same result. I intend to address

only intelligence community concerns. I will defer to the Depart-

ment of Justice on any additional problems posed by the joint reso-

lution.

First, vesting in an outside body the determination as to whether

CIA materials related to the assassination can be released to the

public is inconsistent with my own statutory responsibility for the

protection of intelligence sources and methods.

Second, I am concerned that the joint resolution contains no pro

vision requiring security clearances or secure document handling

by the assassination materials review board or its staff

Third, I am concerned that the joint resolution does not provide

the Agency with the opportunity to object to the release of CIA in-

formation contained in documents originated by Congress or the

Warren Commission. Under the joint resolution, documents origi-

nated by these entities can be released directly by the executive di-

rector of the assassination materials review board without any

review by the President or other Executive Branch agencies.

Fourth, the joint resolution provision for a 30-day period for

agencies or departments to appeal decisions by the executive direc-

or to release information may not provide sufficient time fol

meaningful review of what could prove to be a large volume of ma-

terial at one time.

Fifth, and finally, Section 6 of the joint resolution, which out-

lines the grounds for postponement of public release of a document,

makes no provision for postponing release of documents that may

contain Executive privilege or deliberative process, attorney-client

or attorney work product information. While such privileges could

be waived in the public interest and, in fact, are not likely to arise

with respect to factual information directly related to the JFK as

sassination, they would be unavailable under the joint resolution in

the rare case they might be needed.

These are the technical problems that I believe can be solved and

that will, in fact, expedite the release of documents bearing on the

assassination of President Kennedy. But, again, whatever the

future course of this legislation, CIA is proceeding even now to

review for declassification the relevant documents under its con-

trol. Further, we will cooperate fully with any mechanism estab

lished by the Congress and the President to declassify all of this

I was and what I was doing.

55

I was a college student at William and Mary, and I can remem-

ber how the word spread like wild fire between classes of that hor-

nole event. I made my way to Washington that weekend and stood

at the intersection of Constitution and Pennsylvania Avenues,

where I waited for hours to watch the President's funeral cortege. I

will never forget it.

I entered public service less than three years later, heeding

President Kennedy's inaugural call, a call I think many in my gen-

eration heard. He said then,

"Now, the trumpet summons us again,

not as a call to bear arms, though arms we need, not as a call to

battle, though in battle we are, but as a call to bear the burden of

a long twilight struggle, year in and year out, rejoicing in hope, pa-

tient in tribulation, a struggle against the

common enemies of

man- tyranny, poverty, disease, and war itself."

Mr. Chairman, the only thing more horrifying to me than the as-

sassination itself is the insidious, perverse notion that elements of

the American Government, that my own Agency, had some part in

it. I am determined personally to make public or to expose to disin-

terested eyes every relevant scrap of paper in CIA's possession, in

the hope of helping to dispel this corrosive suspicion. With or with-

out legislation, I intend to proceed. I believe I owe that to his

memory.

Thank you.

(The prepared statement of Mr. Gates follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. GATES

32, The assi at he Matara Disclosure At to of 1992 and as decribe the.

"The Assassination Matering

and to describe the

nature of documents held by the CIA that relate to the assassination of John F.

Kennedy. I very much appreciate the opportunity to speak on this important

matter.

Let me begin by stating that I am in complete agreement with the purpose under-

lying the joint resolution- that efforts should be made to declassify and make avail-

able to the public as quickly as possible Government documents relating to the as-

sassination of John F. Kennedy. We hope that opening up and giving journalists,

historians and, most importantly, the public access to governmental files will help

to resolve questions that still linger over 28 years after the assassination. Further, I

believe that maximum disclosure will discredit the theory that CIA had anything to

do with the murder of John F. Kennedy,

Even before introduction of this joint resolution, I recognized the need for greater

public access to CA documents of historical importance.

Two months ago,

1 an-

nounced the establishment of a new unit within CIA that will be responsible for

declassifying as many historical documents as possible consistent withical Reviec

tion of intelligence sources and methods.

This new unit, the Historical

Group, in the Agency's Center for the Study of Intelligence, will review for declassi-

ication documents 30 years old or older, and national intelligence estimates on the

ormer Soviet Union that are 10 years old or older. In addition to the systemati

review of 30-year-old documents, I have directed the History Staff in the Center for

the Study of Intelligence to assemble CLA records focusing on particular events of

hat real group ceil the eathe e the document Preside purpose dy he sittor:

Because of high interest in the JFK papers, I am not waiting for legislation or

other agencies to start declassifying documents belonging to CIA.

The Historical

Review Group, at my direction, already has begun its review of the documents relat-

ed to the assassination of John F. Kennedy, and I am glad to report that the first

group of these records including all CLA documents on

Lee Harvey Oswald prior to

the assassination, has been declassified with quite minimal deletions and is being

transferred to the National Archives for release to the public. This is,

I acknowl.

edge, a small fraction of what we have, but it is an earnest of my commitment to

---

## Page 8

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56

egan review for declassification immediately of this material. And, indeed, as I

peak, the reviewers are going through a substantial number of documents, and 1

anticipate that many of these will be released shortly.

goa, will be to release as many ag

rects a presumption in favor of declassification. I believe we can be very forward

leaning in making these documents available to the public, and I have instructed

the Historical Review Group to take this attitude to heart.

To understand the magnitude of the effort involved in reviewing these documents

for declassification, it is important to place them in some context. The CIA's collec-

tion of documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy consists of ap-

proximately 250,000-300,000 pages of material. This includes 64 boxes of copies and

originals of information provided to the Warren Commission and the House Select

Committee on Assassinations and 11 boxes of material on Lee Harvey Oswald accu.

mulated after President Kennedy's assassination. Unfortunately, and for reasons

that I do not know, what we are dealing with is a mass of material that is not in-

dexed, is uncatalogued, and is highly disorganized-all of which makes the review

process more difficult. The material contains everything from the most sensitive in-

tolligence sources to the most mundane news clippings.

These records include documents that CLA had in its files before the assassina-

tion, a large number of records that CIA received later as routine disseminations

from other agencies, as well as the reports, correspondence, and other papers that

in the course of the assassination investigations. I should

emphasize

that these records were assembled into the present collection as a result of specific

inquiries received from the Warren Commission or the House Select Committee on

Assassinations. I have prepared a chart that illustrates this point.

As you can see, prior to President Kennedy's assassination, CIA held only a small

le on Lee Harvey Oswald that consisted of 88 documents (approximately 110

pages), some of which originated with the FBI, State Department, the Navy, and

newspaper clippings. Only 11 documents originated with the ClA. I have brought

along a copy of Oswald's file as it existed before the assassination so that you can

see first-hand how slender it was at the time. As I have already noted, we have de

classified the CIA documents in this file with quite minimal deletions, and we are

providing them to the National Archives. The records in this file dealt with

• Од

wald's defection to the Soviet Union in 1959 and his activities after his return in

1961. By contrast, it was only after the assassination that CLA accumulated the rest

of the material on Oswald-some 33,000 pages-most of which CIA received from

other agencies after November 22, 1968.

You have asked about documents in our possession generated by other agencies.

In fact, much of the material held by CLA originated with other agencies or depart

ments. For example, in the 17 boxes of Oswald records, approximately 40 percent of

the documents originated with the FBI, and about 20 percent originated from the

State Department or elsewhere. Our staff is still going through the material com-

piled at the reguest of the Warren Commission and the House Select Committee or

Assassinations, which includes 69 boxes of paper records and one box that contains

72 reels of microfilm. The microfilms, in part, overlap material in other parts of the

collection. We estimate that within the 63 boxes of paper records, approximately 27

percent of the. documents originated with a variety of other U.S. Government agen-

cies, private organizations, and foreign and American press.

Although our holdings do include many documents from other agencies, we none-

theless have a substantial collection of CLA documents that will require considerable

effort to review, and as l said earlier, at my direction, this review for declassifica-

tion is now underway. A preliminary survey of these files has provided us some in-

dications of what they contain, Although the records cover a wide variety of topics,

they principally focus on CIA activities concerning Cuba and Castro, Oswald's defec-

tion to the Soviet Union, and Oswald's subsequent activities in Mexico City and

New Orleans. They also include a large number of name traces requested by the

staft of the House Select Committee on Assassinations, as well as material relating

to the Garrison investigation and Cuban exile activities.

The CIA cannot release a number of documents unilaterally because of the limits

in the Privacy Act (which protects the names of American citizens against unau-

thorized disclosure), the sequestration of many documents by the House Select Com-

mittee on Assassinations, and the fact that many of the documents belong to agen-

cies other than CIA. However, we have already taken steps to lift the sequestration,

coordinate with other agencies and to begin the process of declassitication. It neces

57

sary, l will ask the House for a resolution permitting CIA to release the results of

the declassification effort on the sequestered documents.

While I expect a large amount of the material can be declassified under our pro

gram, I assume that there still will be information that cannot be released to the

public for a variety of reasons, including privacy concerns or the exposure of intelli-

gence sources and methods. Let me take a moment to give examples of this type of

material. During the investigation by the House Select Committee on Assassina-

tions, I understand that security and personnel files were requested on a number of

Agency employees. These files contain fitness reports,

(performance evaluations),

medical evaluations and credit checks on individual CIA officers.

Although irrele-

vant to the question of who killed President Kennedy, these and other personal doc-

uments ultimately ended up in the sequestered collection of documents. I do not be-

lieve that the benefit to the public of disclosure of this information outweighs the

clear privacy interest of the individuals in keeping the information confidential.

Similar privacy concerns exist with documents containing derogatory information

on particular individuals where the information is based on gossip and rumor. Our

files also contain the names of individuals who provided us intelligence information

on a promise of confidentiality. We would not disclose their names in breach of such

a promise. Where we cannot disclose such information to the public, the Agency will

make redactions and summarize the information in order to ensure that the maxi-

mum amount of information is released while still protecting the identity of an

agent or the privacy of an individual.

of distinguished Americans from outside of Government to examine whatever docu-

ments we have redacted or kept classified. They would then issue an unclassified

public report on their findings.

The effort required to declassify the documents related to the assassination of

President Kennedy will be daunting. However, it is an important program and I am

personally committed to making it work. Even in a time of diminishing resources

within the Intelligence Community, I have allocation of 15 full-time positions to

expand the History Staff and to form the Historical Review Group that will review

the JFK documents and other documents of historical interest.

I believe these actions attest to the seriousness of our intent to get these papers

declassified and released, and to open what remains classified to outside, non-gov.

ernmental review. It is against this background that, in response to this Commit-

tee's request, I cite our technical reservations about the mechanism established by

the joint resolution to achieve this same result. I intend to address only Intelligence

Community concerns; I will defer to the Department of Justice on any additional

problems posed by the joint resolution.

First, vesting in an outside body the determination as to whether CIA materials

related to the assassination can be released to the public is inconsistent with my

statutory.responsibility to.protect intelligence sources and methods.

Second, I am concerned that the joint resolution contains no provision requiring

security clearances or secure document handling by the Assassination Materials

Review Board or its staff.

Third, I am concerned that the joint resolution does not provide the Agency with

the opportunity to object to the release of CIA information contained in documents

originated by Congress or the Warren Commission. Under the joint resolution, docu-

ments originated by these entities can be released directly by the Executive Director

of the Assassination Materials Review Board without any review by the President

or other Executive Branch agencies.

Fourth, the joint resolution provision for a 30-day period for agencies or depart-

dents to appeal decisions by the Executive Director to release intormation may no

rovide sufficient time for meaningful review of what could prove to be a larg

volume of material at one time.

Fifth, and finally, section 6 of the joint resolution, which outlines the grounds for

postponement of public release of a document, makes no provision for postponing

elease of documents that may contain Executive privilege or deliberative process

ttorney-client, or attorney work product information. While such privileges coul

be waived in the public interest and, in fact,

are not likely to arise with respect to

factual information directly related to the JFK assassination, they would be un-

available under the joint resolution in the rare case they might be needed.

These are the technical problems that I believe can be solved and that will, in

fact, expedite the release of documents bearing on the assassination of President

Kennedy.

---

## Page 9

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..=

58

But, again, whatever the future course of this legislation, CLA is proceeding even

now to review for declassification the relevant documents under its control. Further,

we will cooperate fully

with any mechanism established by the Congress and the

President to declassify all of this material.

Chairman GLENN. Thank you, Mr. Gates.

Mr. Sessions.

TESTIMONY OF THE HON. WILLIAM S, SESSIONS, DIRECTOR,

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION; ACCOMPANIED BY

DAVID G. LEITCH, DEPUTY ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL,

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Mr. Sessions. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, members of the

Committee. I have a complete

statement which I will file, and

there are some diagrams which I will also make available for the

record, and a photograph of the files themselves.

Chairman GLENN. Without objection, your entire statement will

be included in the record.

Mr. SEssIoNs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to appear

before you to testify about FBI investigative records relating to the

assassination of President John F. Kennedy. I applaud this process

and your efforts. It is fundamental that Government exist to meet

the needs of its citizens. An examination of these issues is directly

related to satisfying the intense interest and concern of our citizens

about the circumstances surrounding that tragic event some 29

years ago.

From the outset, I would like to state emphatically that 1 favor

maximum disclosure,,

consistent with the law and the legitimate

need to protect certain small but highly sensitive categories of in-

formation. I can assure you that the FBI will work cooperatively

through the Department of Justice with both the Senate and the

House to develop a comprehensive approach to these important

issues.

• As you know, the Government has conducted a number of re-

views of the assassination. The Warren Commission, the House As-

sassinations Committee, and the Church Committee all conducted

reviews that I believe can be best categorized as exhaustive. It i

ny understanding that the FBl provided massive amounts of intor

mation to those entities to help ensure that they accomplished

their missions. Once again, we desire to be as helpful as we are

able.

Immediately following the shooting of President Kennedy, the

FBI began a massive investigation. An intense effort was made. Re-

lated investigations were conducted and much information was ex-

chan ed, is i case Gates his noted, betten ons, those des

thousands. of

pages of documents were created to record the results of these ef

forts and to facilitate the investigations.

Many different kinds of information were recorded in the FBI

hes. The results of thousands of interviews of witnesses, other in-

dividuals with possible helpful knowledge, and contacts with conti-

dential informants were memorialized. Communications between

the FBI headquarters and our field offices, and vice versa, were in-

cluded, as were communications between the FBI and other agen-

cies. Forensic reports were recorded. In all, FBI files relating to the

59

assassination contained over 499,000 pages of documents,

with a

few more pages added every time the FBI follows up on a new alle-

gation or a new issue arises.

After Congress amended the Freedom of Information Act in 1974,

the FBI began receiving requests for information relating to the as-

sassination. By 1918, four years later,

over 200,000 pages of materi-

al had been processed and made available to the public through the

FBI's public reading room. Many authors, journalists,

historians,

and others have visited and revisited these materials, which

remain available today as a valuable source of historic information.

I would like to briefly describe to the Committee a breakdown of

FBl records relating in some way to the assassination. The FBl has

four core files that relate directly to the investigation of the assas-

sination. Our cooperation with the Warren Commission and the in-

vestigation of Lee Harvey Oswald and Jack Ruby-those are the

four core files. There are approximately 499,000 pages in these

files, 263,000 of which are duplicate pages that were cross-filed,

chird agency records, and some FBI records that have not been

processed pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act.

Approximately 223,000 pages, or 94 percent of the records we

have processed, have already been released to the public. In addi-

tion, the FBI has several other much smaller files as a result of

other directly related investigations, such as the investigation of

Marina Oswald, and these files comprise approximately 22,000

pages, 13,000 of which are duplicate, third agency, or unprocessed

ages. Fifty-eight percent of these pages processed pursuant to the

'reedom of Information Act have been released to the public

Of the pages available in the FBI reading room on the main floor

at FBI headquarters, approximately 189,000 pages, or 94 percent,

are available in their entirety. The remaining 12,000 pages in the

reading room reflect some degree of redaction. The information

that has not been disclosed or that has been redacted to some

degree falls within the exemptions that are enumerated in the

Freedom of Information Act and the protections of the Privacy Act.

This includes information that, one, is classified on the basis of

national security; two, would disclose the identities of individuals

who specifically requested confidentiality; three, would disclose the

identities of confidential informants or sources; four, is highly per-

sonal information about individuals; or, five, originated with other

Government agencies and those agencies specifically requested that

the information not be released based upon exemptions applicable

to those particular agencies.

While I strongly favor maximum disclosure under the law, there

are certain types of information that are particularly critical to

successful law enforcement investigations and national security; for

example, information that is properly and appropriately classified,

information that would identify confidential sources, and informa-

tion that would disclose sensitive investigative techniques or the

types of information the disclosure of

which could negatively

impact upon our ability to fulfill our mission. Information in FBI

files that has not been disclosed publicly falls largely within these

descriptions of information.

In any case, I believe it is extremely healthy for the country to

have these issues aired and to be resolved. The public interest dic-

---

## Page 10

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file.

CIA ST

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONEY

71ON8 97-062

31 January 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR :

FROM:

SUBJECT:

Fred Wickham

DO Focal Point

for JFK Board

Lee Strickland

DA Focal Point

for JFK Board

John F. Pereira

Chief, Historical

Review Group

Request No. CIA-16

from JFK Board

1. Attached is "Request for Additional Information and

Records No. CIA-16 (Oswald Pre-Assassination Files)", which

was received from the Assassination Records Review Board on.

29 January 1997.

The request is for additional details

related to files on Lee Harvey Oswald that may have existed

in the Office of Security and in the Do.

2. Please advise how you would like us to respond to

this request.

We are asked to make the information

available to

• the Board by 24 February 1997.

5 ук біліа

John Pereira

Attachment

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY-

---

## Page 11

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SECRET

27 February 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Barry Harrelson

Historical Review Group

Center for the Study of Intelligence

FROM:

SUBJECT:

Janet A. Ecklund

Chief, Information Management Branch

Office of Personnel Security

Request No. CIA-16 from JFK Board

REFERENCE:

CSI 97-062 dated 31 January 1997

1. (U) The Office of Personnel Security has researched

this request from the Assassination Records Review Board

relating to the existence of pre-assassination files on Lee

Harvey Oswald.

2. (U) In response to the specific questions listed

in Mr. Marwell's letter to the Historical Review Group, the

following responses are provided to those three questions

pertaining to the Office of Personnel Security (OPS) . These

responses are the best reasonable answers based on available

information. Please note OPS was known as the Office of

Security prior to 1 October 1994.

Question li (U) Please identify, as specifically as

possible, each file held by CIA on Oswald at the time

of the assassination of President Kennedy.

(U) At the time of the assassination, the

Office of Security (OS) held two files which contained

information on Lee Harvey Oswald. A file entitled Defectors

File (#0341008) contained a reference to Lee Harvey Oswald,

Regraded Confidential

When Separated From

Secret Attachment

CL BY: (0605636

CL Reason: 1.5(c)

DECL ON:

X1

DRV FROM: COV 1-82

SECRET

---

## Page 12

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SECRET

and the Office of Security also had a subject file on Lee

Harvey Oswald (#0351164). This information was reflected in

the automated security database known as the Management Data

Program/Personnel Security (MDP/PS). These files were

originally miscellaneous files which were converted to the

above numbers circa 1964. A'hand search was also conducted

of microfiche records which were superseded by the automated .

system. This hand search produced the same results as the

automated search of MDP/PS.

(U) In your request specific mention is made of an

HTLINGUAL file. MDP/PS reflects OS maintained four official

files under this project--#0077826 (an administrative file),

#0090079, #0093466 (a general file), and #0119144. All of

the HTLINGUAL files were destroyed on 8 April 1994 along

with numerous soft files. Since this material has been

destroyed, OPS cannot definitively state whether these files

contained any information on Lee Harvey Oswald. A search of

Oswald's name did not produce an index reference to any of

these files.

•(U) Attached is all of the available information

regarding the destruction of the HTLINGUAL files. This

information was retrieved from Lydia Hoffman of the

Information Management Branch/Records Control Section and

from a review of general office administrative files.

Question Zi (U) Other than for the 201-289248 file

on Oswald, please explain when each Oswald file was

opened, the purpose for the opening of the file, and

the documents that were in the file at the time of the

assassination.

Response:

(U) As noted above, all HTLINGUAL files have

been destroyed.

Since OS files are usually set up in

chronological sequence, a search of files with numbers in

close proximity to those recorded for HTLINGUAL was

undertaken. This search revealed the approximate opening

dates for the four official HTLINGUAL files as:

#0077826

#0090079

#0093466

#0119144

Opened approximately July 1952

Opened approximately February 1953

Opened approximately July 1953

Opened approximately May 1955

2

SECRET

---

## Page 13

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SECRET

(U) HTLINGUAL was a Directorate of Operations project

that involved opening incoming, and outgoing mail destined to

and from the Soviet Union, (China, (Pakistan,) and South

America. In OS this project was known as SRPOINTER with

subprojects identified as WESTPOINTER, INDIAN, BANJO, and

SETTER. OS conducted the actual opening and monitoring of

mail with the acquired information referred to the

Directorate of Operations.

(U) The Defectors File (#0341008) was established circa

1950 for the purpose of recording information on US citizens

defecting to other countries and information regarding

foreign nationals considering defection to the United States.

This compilation of information was received from press

clippings, Directorate of Operations reporting, the Federal

Bureau of. Investigation, the Department of State, and the

various armed services.

The pre-assassination documents

located in this file relative to Lee Harvey Oswald are:

a. Washington Star press clipping of 26 November 1959

entitled "U.S. Defector to Reds Turned to Marx at

15"

b. Department of State memorandum dated 25 October

1960 with attached list of American "defectors"

from May 1959 to October 1960

c.

Memorandum for Chief/Security Research Staff dated

31 October 1960 from M. D. Stevens, subject:

American Defectors

d.

Memorandum for Deputy Director of Security dated

1 November 1960 from M. D. Stevens, subject:

American Defectors

e.

Handwritten chart of defectors dated 26 August

1961

f. Defector outline prepared in October 1961 listing

known defectors to the USSR, Red China, Cuba, and

United Arab Republic.

3

SECRET

---

## Page 14

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SECRET

(U) The index reference to the Defectors File

identifies a list dated 13 September 1966 which was known as

the Defector Machine Listing. This listing was a computer

printout of defectors which reflected limited biographic

data on each name. This listing was maintained separately

from the actual Defectors File; notations within the

Defectors File show the Defector Machine Listing as

permanently charged to the Security Analysis Group of OS.

Efforts to locate this listing or determine the disposition

have been unsuccessful.

(U) Information regarding the purpose of the Defectors

File was gleaned from a quick review of selected holdings.

Katie Nakai of this office at one time was assigned to the

Security Analysis Group and recalls the Defector Machine

Listing. From her recollection, this machine listing was

approximately one and one-half inches thick and was in two

parts. One part consisted of an alphabetical index of

defector names with assigned numbers. The second part

listed the assigned numbers in numerical order and contained

limited information on each name.

(C) The Special Investigations Branch of Investigations

Division is the current operating component encompassing most

of the Security Analysis Group functions still conducted in

OPS. Gail Jewell of this office was queried regarding office

holdings relating to the Defector Machine Listing. Ms?

Jewell had no knowledge of the listing and suggested William

Gilbert as a resource.

Mr. Gilbert, CIC Liaison Officer,

could not recall the listing, opined it may have been

destroyed, and suggested contacting Zachary Filis of the

Counterintelligence Center (CIC) •

(C) CIC assumed many of the functions previously

conducted by the Security Analysis Group. Mr. Filig) was

ueried regarding the possibility the Defector Machine

Listing may have been transferred to CIC during the

realignment of duties. Mr. Filis advised the Defector

Machine Listing could not be located in CIC holdings; and he

has made inquiries with Directorate of Operations

counterparts regarding the listing.

SECRET

---

## Page 15

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SECRET

(U) The subject file pertaining to Lee Harvey Oswald

(#0351164) was established circa 1960. It appears this file

was created as a separate repository for the numerous press

clippings and reports received from other government

agencies on the defection of Lee Harvey Oswald to the USSR

and his activities following his return to the United

States. The first volume of this file appears to have been

preserved as the pre-assassination file, and the documents

contained in this file are as follows:

a. Department of State telegram #1304 from Moscow

dated 31 October 1959

b. Ike Washington Post press clipping dated

1 November 1959 entitled "Ex-Marine Asks Soviet

Citizenship"

c. Department of State Dispatch #234 from Moscow

dated 2 November 1959

d. Department of State telegram #1448 from Tokyo

dated 9 November 1959

e. Department of State telegram #1358 from Moscow

dated 9 November 1959

f. The Washington Post press clipping dated 16

November 1959 entitled "Rebuffed"

g. Evening Star press clipping dated 26 November

1959 entitled "U.S. Defector to Reds Turned to

Marx at 15"

h. Report Summary prepared by Soviet Russia Division

forwarded to Office of Security in March 1960

i. Department of State Instruction A-273 dated

13 April 1961

j.

Department of State Dispatch from Moscow dated

May 1961 with enclosure of Oswald letter

5

SECRET

---

## Page 16

13-00000

SECRET

k.

Federal Bureau of Investigation report dated

3 July 1961 from Dallas, Texas

1. Note to CI/SI]dated 28 September 1961

m.

Form 745 "Indices Search Request" dated

12 October 1961

n. Department of State Dispatch #317 from Moscow

dated 12 October 1961 with enclosure

Form G-135a Immigration and Naturalization

Service name check form to Central Intelligence

Agency dated

5 December 1961

p. Navy Department message to Moscow dated

3 March 1962

q. Department of the Navy memorandum to the Federal

Bureau of Investigation dated 26 April 1962 with

enclosure

I. The Washington Post press clipping dated

9 June 1962 entitled "Third American in 2 Months

Leaves

Soviet 'Home'"

s.

Federal Bureau of Investigation transmittal

of report from Dallas, Texas, dated 30 August

1962.

(U) In addition to those documents listed above, the

following documents were located in a subsequent volume of

the Oswald file and also appear to predate the assassination

of President Kennedy.

t. Undated summary of file information on Lee

Harvey Oswald

u.

Incoming cable #83858 from Mexico City dated

20 July 1963 (no mention of Oswald)

v.

Incoming cable #01325 from Mexico City dated

17 August 1963 (no mention of Oswald)

6

SECRET

---

## Page 17

13-00000

SECRET

w.

Incoming cable #36017 from Mexico City dated

9 October 1963

x. Outgoing cable #74830 to Mexico City dated

10 October 1963

Y.

Incoming cable #47041 from Mexico City dated

24 October 1963 (no mention of Oswald).

Question 4: (U) To the

extent that Counterintelligence

and the Office of Security maintained pre-assassination

files on Oswald, please explain why those offices

maintained files on Oswald prior to the assassination.

In answering this question, please make appropriate

references to the Clandestine Services Handbook (CSHB)

and to any other materials

(including organizational

charts) that would help explain the jurisdictional and

organization reasons for which CI and OS would have

maintained such files.

Response:

(U) It is believed that OS holdings on Lee

Harvey Oswald began in 1959 with his travel to Russia during

which he renounced his US citizenship. Oswald was in

contact with the American Embassy in Moscow, and the

Department of State prepared reports on these contacts.

Most likely because of counterintelligence concerns, the

Central Intelligence Agency was included in the distribution

, of these reports.

In the beginning this material was

probably retained in the Defectors File. As the number of

documents on this person increased, a separate file was

created to be the repository of information on the alleged

American defector. There is a notation in the Defectors

File that a separate file exists on Oswald.

(U) Both the Defectors File (#0341008) and the file of

Lee Harvey Oswald (#0351164) were handled by Marguerite D.

Stevens of the OS/Security Research Staff during the pre-

assassination time frame. Of the documents listed above, a

majority of them contain a notation or the initials of

Marguerite D. Stevens, leading one to believe she was the

officer responsible for the collection, analysis, and filing

of this information.

7

SECRET

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## Page 18

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SECRET

(U) The Security Research Staff (SRS) was the

component responsible for collecting, developing, and

evaluating information of a counterintelligence nature to

detect and/or prevent penetration of the Agency's

organization, employees, and activities by foreign or

domestic organizations or individuals. SRS conducted

research in connection with employee loyalty cases and

maintained records identifying personalities, environments,

and personal traits of individuals who had been of

counterintelligence interest over the years. SRS maintained

liaison with various government agencies in connection with

counterintelligence activities and coordinated the

counterintelligence effort throughout OS. Using

organizational charts of this time period, SRS reported

directly to the office of the Director of Security.

(U) Don Staton of the OPS/Management Staff was queried

regarding the mission and functions of SRS during the pre-

assassination time period. Mr. Staton made inquiries

relating to the above request, and the OPS/ Information

Management Officer Ronda Allen retrieved retired policy

records for review.

" The information on the mission and

function of SRS was retrieved from the archived Office of

Security administrative and historical files as well as a

review of the security file on Marguerite D. Stevens.

3. (U) For your information, a page-by-page review of

the documents contained in the Defectors File (12 volumes)

and Lee Harvey Oswald's file (7 volumes) has not been

conducted for the purposes of this request.

Our efforts

were concentrated on the pre-assassination time frame.

4.

(U)

OPS/CD/ IMB),

This review was conducted by Katie Nakai/

secure

405527

Ecklund

Attachment

8

SECRET

---

## Page 19

13-00000

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

On 8 April 1994, the complete set of SRPOINTER and

HTLINGUAL security support files

and indexes held by the

Office of Security were destroyed in accordance with the

guidelines set forth in the approved Records Control

Schedules 31-76 and 31-83 and by the Office of General

Counsel.

---

## Page 20

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APR 06

194.

03: 15PM USCOVERNMENT

P.2/6

SECRET

OGC-94-51066

6 April 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR:

VIA:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

(Terrs Lagal

Information Review Team

Office of Security

Robert J. Latinger

Iltigation Division

stephen R. DiRubio /

Information Management Officer

Office of General Counsel

HTLINGUAL/ SRPOINTER File Destruction

1.

This responds to your memo of 9 February 1994

requesting confirmation that the security support files of

the HILINGUAl project are not the subject of a current

litigation, investigation, or other inquiry that would

preclude their destruction pursuant to normal guidelines for

A review of occ files located no

currently active cases involving the HTLINGUAi project.

I'herefore, OGC poses no objection to destruction of the

files if authorized by your approved records disposition

schedule.

2.

For your information. I have attached a copy of a

March 1990 memorandum in which OGC provided guidance to the

DO regarding destruction of MECHAOS and HTLINGUAL project

f1les.

According to that memorandum, files pertaining to

HILINGUAL maY be destroyed only if:

criteria for destruction on the applicable Nara approved

records disposition schedule; (2) are not responsive to a

FOIA or Privacy Act request currently being procesed by the

office concemned; and (3) do not document the initiation,

implementation, and termination of the projects, or

conatitute files on U.S, persons of foreign intelligence or

counterintelligence value which the Agency 1g required to

maintain.

As the attachment indicates, NARA's requirement

that the SSCI concur in any proposed destruction has already

been met.

CL BY

21713581

DECL

OADR

DRV EM SEC 13-87

SECRET

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## Page 21

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N.3/6

SCRET

SUBJECT: HTLINGUAL/ SRPOINTER File Destruction

3.

request.

assistance.

• apologize Ior che deday 1a responalng to you

dease det me Xnow 11 I may be or curthe

_Stephen K. DiRubio

Attachment:

As Stated

2

SECRET

---

## Page 22

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5.410

gECR

B. T

SUBJECT: HTLINGUAL/SRPOINTER File Destruction

DCI/OGC/RIG/SKD1Rub10 ska/76195) (6 Apr 94)

Distribution:

Original - Addressee

1 - OGC Registry

3

SECR

E T

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## Page 23

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P.5/6

• 44

03: 17PM USGOVERNMENT

0GC090050612

19 March 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

REFERENCE:

C/OIT/IME!

W. George Jameson

Chief, Litigation Division, OGC

Destruction of MICHAOS and HILINGUAL

Project Files

Reguest for Authorization to Retain of

Destroy Questionable Records: 141C's for

MICHAOS and HTLINGUAL Projects, Erom

IMS/MPG/IRMB, dated 18 December 1989

The referenced reguest seeks concurrence fox the

destruction of MICHAOS and HILINGUAN files in accordance with

routine records destruction schedules approved by the National

Archivist.

Subject to the qualifications set forth below, the

proposed destruction can procead without legal objection.

2.

On several occasions over the past 12 years, DO/IMs has

proposed that the Agency identify and destroy MiCHAOS and

HTLINGUAL raCords in acCordaNce with routine records

destruction schedules.

The major reason not to do so has been

the existence of litigation that has necessitated retention

of

those records. With the settlement of the National Lawyers'

Guild litigation, a major obstacle to routine records

destruction appears to

have been alininated.

3.

That case alone, however, does not govern the records

retention or destruction of MCHAOS OI HILINGUAL fIleS.

addition, destruction may proceed only in accordance with the

records disposition authorization provided by the Archivist on.

17 March 1978. (Job Nos. NC1-263-77-18 and NC1-263-78-1). The

approval given by the Archivist is subject to essentially the

following conditiong: (1) fllas

and documents that are the

objects of FOlA and Privacy Act requests, or those involved in

any other litigation, are not to be destroyed; (2) files that

document the initiation, implementation, and termination of the

projects, and other files on U.S. persons of foredgn

intelligence of counterintelligence value which the Agency is

required to maintain, are not to be destroyed; (3) no disposal

will occur prior to review and concurrance of the Senate select

Committee on Intelligence.

In reviewing the materials you have provided. I have

able to conclude that then ssch Chairman, Birch Bayn, in

the records disposal lists approved by the Archivist. In my

---

## Page 24

13-00000

5.010

vien, therefore, condition number (3) has been satisfied.

Accordingly, with the exception of the case of Hurrita ve

United States, there appear to be no ongoing court cases

ralating to MiCHAOS or HILINGUAL files that necessitate the

retention of those materials. All HILINGUAL materials relating

to Leo I. Huswitz, therefore, should be retained. In addition.

any records pertaining to DI. Sidney M. Reck (PeCK 4, CIA)

should be retained.

I am not aware of any other matters that

would require retention of the files at the present time, but

you should contact the Agency's FOIA Coordinator to determine

if there are any outstanding FOlA or Privacy Act requests

relating to MiCHAOS of HtLInGUAL that should not be destroyed.

If so, materials should be retained in accordance with the

raguiraments of the records Disposal List. Finally, of course,

Information that the Agency must maintain that is of foreign

Intelligence value also should not be destroyad.

4. I would also point out that the terms of the National

Lawyers Guild settlement require that all agencies of the

Federal Government, Including the CIA, shall not use, release

or disclose, within or outside the Government, certain

Information relating to the National Lawyers Guild and its

subunits.

Accordingly, if there is CIA Information derived.

from the FBI's lavestigation relating to the National Lawyers'

Guild, Agency records, files or indices must be appropriately

marked so as to permit implementation of the settlement

agreement.

This means that, to the extent MiCHAOS records are

not isolated but are contained in other agency iiles, some

means of ensuring that the information is not disseminated must

be made.

5. Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any

questions.

CC:

CHALD/OGC

i here mean

---

## Page 25

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9 February 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

OGC/Litigation

STEVE

Terri Eagal

Information

Review Team

Files Scheduled For Destruction

_On ? February 1994, this office was given direction

by Mr. Archibald, Legal Advisor for the Office of Security,

to deal directly with your office in reference to the

attached:

2. If you have any questions about the attached,

please feel free to call on 40615. Your prompt assistance

in this matter is

greatly appreciated.

3.

Thank you for your coordination and cooperation in

assisting the Records Control Schedule Analysts; Terri Eagal

40615) and Lydia Hoffman 40616).

Information Review Team

---

## Page 26

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EBC8B:

9 December 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM:

James Archibald

office of security,

Legal Advisor

Terri Eagal

Information Review

• Team

SUBJECT:

HT LINGUAL Security Support Files/SR POINTER

Files

on I December 1993, this office coordinated with Barry

on (47411,

Zeeman/of DO/IMS' Files/SR POINTER Files:

in reference to the HT LINGUAL

I asked Mr. Zeeman if

his office had any problems with our office destroying these

files as they were within our guidelines for destruction.

responded by saving that they had retired their files in 1991 ano

would have to look into it further.

On 8 December 1993, Mr.

Zeeman called to say that his office, DO/IMS, had no problem with

us destroying our support files to their HT LINGUAL project as

they destroyed their files in the late 1980's.

The few

they retired in 1991 were on the Administrative and Policy issues

of HT LINGUAL.

Since the DO no longer has a need for the information

in these files (list is attached) and has essentially approved

their destruction, we have supplied to you copies of our own

Security Records Control Schedule which verifies that these files

meet destruction criteria. As you can see though, by the comment

litigation open before we destroy.

In light of paragraph 2, our office now awaits OG

approval:

Your coordination with

OGC in this effort 1s greatly

appreciated.

Please note, destruction of these files include the

SR POINTER name index which is currently utilized by this office

for the Freedom Of Information Act (FOIA) and Privacy Act (PA)

Destruction of this index will aid in decreasing

unnecessary review and research on part of FOIA and PA.

Thank you.

If we can be

any assistance to.you,

prease cant either Barbara Deavers on (4026%, Terri Eagal on 40615

or (Lydia Hoffman) on 40615.

Verri Eagal

Information Review Team

Distribution:

Original --

Jim

Archibald

CC

Len Kaplan;

CL, BY

2039256

DECL

OADR

DRV FM SEC 13-87

SECRET

---

## Page 27

13-00000

RCS

31-83

128

29

30

32

"SECREATION

SILTS BOINTIFIC

Security. File Review Log.

Lists of security filed received by External

Activitiag.Branch. personne:

In connection with

external activities"

requests, and cover and

documentation mattere

security Duty Office

Ing Files.

security Duty office events reports.

Duplicate

coples of reporte prepa

ed by Security Duty

officers concerning

duals who contact the

Agency.

(published inthe

Federal Register,

CIA-51, Notificat on

ystems of Records,

Privacy Act one

Federal Register must

be amended 1?

As changed or

discontinued.

security Duty.

Instruction E

ational and

instruction

eports, guard post

duty officer rosters.

bo.

record cost

backst oper

equests for telephone

VOIDIMI

1190090810 DNEDHNEDING

•TEMPORARY. Destroy when 6 months old.

TEMPORARY. Destroy 5 years after

cutoff. Cut off at end of each

calendar year, hold in current files

area for 2 years, transfer to AARC for

3 years, then destroy.

TEMPORARY. bestroy when superseded

obsolete, or no longer needed.

TEMPORARY. Destroy 3 years after

cutoff. Cut off when backstop

arrangement is terminated, hold in

current files area for 3 years, then

destroy.

Securit

Recora,

operators

Officer

Encorrespondence and reports on

Eles in connection with

projects.

TEMPORARY. Destroy 3 years after

cutoff.

Cut off at termination of

project, hold in current files area

for l year, transfer to AARC for

2 years, then destroy..

REGURUS

SUNROL

SCHEDULE

anor sitt

CHAGSIFICATION

SECRET

1A11

35

---

## Page 28

13-00000

RCS

31-76

¿ITEM NOISI.

NEW

ITCM

NO.

. CLASEGIILT

FILES IDENTIFICATION

SPECIAL PROJECT MATERIAL

Record copies of reports pertaining to

the SRPOINTER Project.. (Discontinued).

VOLUME

DISPOSITION INSTRUCTIONS

Temporary. Hold in current file

area until litigation concluded then

destroy.

---

## Page 29

13-00000

security Support Files. for HT LINGUAL /

SR POINTER Files

(David G. Ellis

Mail Intercept

Program

MAuley, Peter F. SEN 156003?

MCAuleYe Peter Ear-

99358 PROJECT CHAPERON

OS-PROJECT POINTER

PROJECT SETTER SEN 159144

"..".

'"":

PROJECT SETTER

SRINDIAN SEN 507356

PROJECT SRINDIAN

SR POINTER/REDSKIN

SR POINTER

PROJECT SR POINTER

PROJECT SR POINTER Cuban Watch List

SR POINTER/HT LINGUAL Material Duplicated from CI Staff..

Report JAN 29 75

Draft Memorandum on Background of SR POINTER Prepared

23DEC74

OS Personnel Directly and Indirectly Involved with SR

POINTER

WESTPOINTER SEN 583870

PROJECT WESTPOINTER

SSD Mail Cover

U.S. Post Office Liaison

File with no name related to Mail

SR POINTER INDEX

VOL 1 SEN 93466 SR POINTER GENERAL

VOL 2 SEN 93466 SR POINTER GENERAL

VOL 3 Record of BANJOES Received

VOL 4

PROJECT HT LINGUAL Clearance #90079 29NOV56-29NOV63

VOL 5

SR POINTER General Admin and Policy April 63

VOL 6

Original SR POINTER Documents

VOLT

Documents Reviewed by George Clark OGC

VOL 8 SR POINTER SFN 119144 Informant BANJO

VOL 9 PROJECT SR POINTER Admin 11JUN52-5FEB58 #77826

VOL 10 HT LINGUAL Statistics SFN 119144

VOL 11 SR POINTER GENERAL SEN 93466

VOL 12 PROJECT Outline and Cronology #77826

VOL 13 Record of BANJOES Received (VOL 6)

в 5тоn0200, 0171826

VOL 14 SR POINTER Statistics JAN68-MAR70

VOL 15 SR POINTER

VOL 16 SR POINTER GENERAL File Admin and Policy 18JAN62-

29MAR63

VOL 17 SR POINTER 13MAR70 #90079

VOL 18 SR POINTER GENERAL File Admin and Ploicy 27JUL54-

19DEC61

VOL 19

PROJECT HT LINGUAL #90079 1FEB56-2SEP58 Memos to CI

VOL 20 PROJECT HT LINGUAL #90079 9SEP58-15AUG60 Memos to CI

---

## Page 30

13-00000

Security Support Files for HT LINGUAL / SR POINTER Files:

VOL 21 PROJECT HT LINGUAL #90079 26AUG60-6JUN62 Memos to CI

VOL 22 PROJECT HT LINGUAL #90079 25JUN62-25MAR64 Memos to CI

• Staff

VOL 23 PROJECT SR POINTER Informant BANJO SEN 119144 Special

BANJO File 2JUL53-27DEC57

VOL 24 PROJECT SR POINTER Informant BANJO SFN 119144 Special:

BANJO File 8JAN58-22DEC58

VOL 25 PROJECT SR POINTER Informant BANJO SFN 119144 Special

BANJO File 7JAN59-22DEC60

VOL 26 PROJECT SR POINTER Informant BANJO SFN 119144 Special

BANJO File 3JAN61-27DEC61

VOL 27 PROJECT SR POINTER Informant BANJO SFN 119144 Special

BANJO File 23JAN63-2MAR64

VOL 28 PROJECT HT LINGUAL SEN 119144 BANJO 25MAR64-23DEC64

VOL 29 PROJECT HT LINGUAL SEN 119144 BANJO 4JAN66-29MAR6i

VOL 30 PROJECT HT LINGUAL SEN 119144 BANJO 30MAR67

VOL 31 FANFOLD Coding System #90079

VOL 32 Watch List JAN66

VOL 33 #90079 DC Survey

VOL 34 #94866 Radio Moscow

VOL 35 SFN 77826 PROJECT SR POINTER Post Office Department,

Relations With

VOL 36 PROJECT DAYLIGHT SFN 243550

VOL 37 Review of HT LINGUAL Project Outline 10AUG59

VOL 38 POINTER

---

## Page 31

13-00000

SR. POINTER Information

BT LINGUAL- A DO project. Opening U.S. Citizen's mail going

to other countries

(mostly Soviet Union) & mail incoming

from other countries (1950's).

Most mail was opened in NY.

Actual opening & monitoring of mail assigned to OS with info

turned over to the do.

SR POINTER- O$ name for HT LINGUAL

WESTPOINTER- Opening mail in San Fransico (also known as MK

SOURDOUGH) • Targeted the Chinese.

PROJECT INDIAN- Targeted mail to/fron Pakistan

BANJO- Actual letters (copies) intercepted.

PROJECT SETTER- Mail opened in New Orleans, targeting South

America.

Project

was exposed in Rockefellar Connission report.

Project names release with JFK info

- 3-4

---

## Page 32

13-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

06 December 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

REFERENCE:

Phil Boycan /

Services Team Leader

William Marshall/

Services Team

Transfer of POINTER and related files

Memorandum, dated 23 November 1993 from

(Leonard Kaplan) (C/IRI) to Jim Archibald)

(OGC)

Memorandum, dated 23 November 1993,

from /Jim Archibald) (OGC) to Leonard?

(Kaplan) (C/IRT)

1.

On 30 November 1993, Investigations and Services Branch

•(I&SB) received a copy of an Office of General Counsel (OGC)

memorandum, dated 23 November 1993, wherein Jim Archibald)

advised that it would be prudent for I&SB to transfer the

below list of files to the Information Review Team (IRT) .

2.

In accordance with this memorandum, I&SB (3504)

(Stafford) transferred the below list of

files, on 06

December 1993, to Leonard Kaplan, (C/IRI) via Barbara Deavers)

(G20

Stafford) •

Therefore, as of 06 December 1993, I&SB considers

itself absolved of the responsibility as custodian of the

files. Conversely, as of 06 December, IRT assumes the

responsibility as custodian of the files.

FILES TRANSFERRED FROM OS/I&SB TO OS/IRT:

1. HT LINGUAL (BANJO) ..

2. WESTPOINTER

3.

SR POINTER

4. DAVID G. ELLIS FILE :

5. PROJECT INDIAN ......

(Continued on next page)

0119144

..... 0583870

No case number visible

No case number visible

...... No case number visible

WARNING NOTICE

INTELLIGENCE SOURCES

OR METHODS INVOLVED

CL BY 0701140}

DECL OADR

DERV FRM COV 1-82

CONFIDENTIAL

---

## Page 33

13-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

(Continued)

6.

HT LINGUAL

.. 0090079

7.

' . . . . ...

SR POINTER/OS PERSONNEL ......No case number visible

8.

HT LINGUAL

. 0090079

9.

PROJECT HT LINGUAL

.

0090079

10. HT LINGUAL

' . ...

0090079

11. SR POINTER

0077826

12. SR POINTER

0093466

13. SR POINTER

14. SR POINTER

(BANJO)

(BANJO)

0119144

0119144

15. WATCH LIST

...No case number

• visible

16. HT LINGUAL

...

...

0119144

17. DC SURVEY

0090079

18.

PROJECT DAYLIGHT

0243550

19.

20.

SR POINTER (CUBAN WATCHLIST) No case number

visible

HT LINGUAL (BANJO)

0119144

21.

HT LINGUAL

...No case number

visible

22.

SR POINTER (BANJO)

0119144

23.

RADIO AMATEURS IN USSR

'...

No case number

visible

24.

FANFOLD CODING SYSTEM.

• 0090079

25.

SR POINTER (MAPS)

.....No case number visible

26.

RADIO MOSCOW

0094866

27.

PROJECT CHAPERON

....

•. 0099358

28.

SR POINTER ......

.....No case number visible

29.

MAIL INTERCEPT PROGRAM...

....No case number

visible

30.

SR POINTER .....

. ..

0090079

31.

PROJECT OUTLINE CHRONO/SR POINTER ....•

. 0077826

32.

33.

PETER MEAULEY ..

........0156003

US POST OFFICE LIAISON

•No case number visible

34.

SSD MAIL COVER ..

...No case number

visible

35.

PROJECT SETTER ...

.0159144

36. SR POINTER/REDSKIN

..No case number visible

37. SR POINTER ....

•No case number visible

38. OS PROJECT POINTER

..No case number visible

39. RECORD OF BANJOES

No case number visible

40. SR POINTER/HT LINGUAL

•No case number visible

41. SR POINTER .....

..No case number visible

42. HT LINGUAL

. .

•.No case number visible

43. SR POINTER

' ' ' ...

... 0090079

44. ORIGINAL SR POINTER

..No case number

visible

45.

SR POINTER/BANJO

•. 0119144

46. SR POINTER/BANJO

. 0119144

47. SR POINTER/BANJO

0119144

48. HT LINGUAL

. . .

•. 0119144

49. SR POINTER

...No case number visible

(Continued)

CONFIDENTIAL

---

## Page 34

13-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

50.

PROJECT HT LINGUAL .:

51.

PROJECT SR POINTER

52.

SR POINTER

. .

53.

SR POINTER

54.

SR POINTER

55.

BANJO

56.

57.

CLAUDETTE BOUFFARD ..

58.

CLARE LENK

STOLEN AGENCY CREDENTIAL.

59:

SR POINTER

. 0090079

• 0077826

. 0093466

.. 0093466

• No case number visible

No case number visible

..No case number visible

..No case number visible

No

case number visible

• . 0090079

O It C41

William Marshall (C)

OS/I&SB

Barbara Deavers

OS/IRT

(C)

::

: . .

CONFIDENTIAL

---

## Page 35

13-00000

. UNCLASSIFIED

INTERNAL

USE ONLY

-ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

SUBJECT: (Optioned)

REMOVAL OF SRPOINTER FILES FROM

3504 STAFFORD

G20 STAFFORD

FROM:

Leonard M. Kaplan

C/IRT

G20 Stafford

TO: (Otton deolgnaton, room number, and butting)

EXTENSION

NO.

40285)

DATE

DATE

OFFICERS

INTIALS

23 Nov 93

COMMENTS. (lumber each comment to shom tom whom do whom.

Dren a lino actors column alter arch commant)

1.

2.

OS/Legal Advisor

RECENED

18-24

FORWARDED

11-27

4

6

Liza -

I have bain fired that the

The Hewite files. of recenty

reconnell to os that it colint,

with the Do's Imbs and the

Ageney's ForA flie to litermine the

ultin it disprait ion f there files.

In the interin, of agree that t

world be pricest to allow you

spie to retain there files. Pleme

call me I pou's like to discus

this nither futher.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.Please call when

signed:

Thank you.

15.

FORM 610 USE PREVIOUS

EDITIONS

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

INTERNAL

USE ONLY

UNCLASSIFIED

---

## Page 36

13-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

23. November 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR:

James Archibald, OS Legal Advisor

6N20 Stafford Building

FROM:

SUBJECT:

Leonard M. Kaplan

chief,

Information Review Team

Office of Security

Removal of SRPOINTER Files from (3S04

Stafford/ (I&SB) to (G20 Stafford/(IRI)

Per a telephonic conversation with will Marshall of

the OS/Investigations and Services Branch (I&SB), this memo

will formally request a transfer/relocation of the noted

SRPOINTER files to OS/Information Review Team (IRT).

2.

I&SB is currently holding the SRPOINTER files as

Mr. John Daley, formerly an I&SB Security Officer, served as

the OS referent, as well as for his historical perspectives

of the files. (Mr. Daley, has since retired and it has been

informally agreed that IRT will serve as the focal point

holder of the files.

3. A formal transfer will serve to alleviate I&SB's

role as an "intermediary" in the occasional to frequent use

of the SRPOINTER files for IRT's formal responses to Freedom

of Information and Privacy Act requests. Additionally, as

IRT serves as the focal point for other public and Agency

requests, it is necessary to reference these files.

4. Your concurrence is required per C/I&SB

instructions for a formal move of the SRPOINTER files from

3S04 Stafford to G20 Stafford.

Fracas

Leonard M. Kaplan

Concurrence:

* Si rote on sorter

James Archibald

WARNING NOTICE

INTELLIGENCE SOURCES

OR METHODS INVOLVED

CL BY 21291123

DECL OADR

DERV ERM COV 1-82

CONF IDENTIAL

---

## Page 37

13-00000

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL

USE ONLY

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT (Optional)

Request No. CIA-16 from JFK Board

FROM

J. Barry Harrelson

Historical Review Group/CSI

(2E20 IPB/

TO (Officer designation, room, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

Extension

NO.

DATE

(31825)

CSI 97-210

9 May 1997

FORWARDED

OFFICIAL'S

INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whor

whom. Draw a line across column after each commen

1. John Pereira, C/HRG

(2E20 IPB/

2.

3. (Janet A. Ecklundy

CAMB, OPS

(1S12 Stafford

4.

5. J. Barry Harrelson

CSIHRG

(2E20 (PB)

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

112.

13.

14.

==

FORM

610 (EF)

1-92

USE

EDITIONS

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL

USE ONLY

---

## Page 38

13-00000

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

CSI 97-210

9 May 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR:

VIA:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

REFERENCE:

Chief, Information Management Branch

Office of Personnel Security

Chief, Historical Review Group

Center for the Study of Intelligence

Barry Harrelson

Historical Review Group

Center for the Study of Intelligence

Request No. CIA-16 from JFK Board

A. Memo for C/IMB, dta 27 Feb. 97,

Same Subject

B.

Memo for DA/DO IROS (CSI 97-062).

dta 31 Jan 97

The following actions need to be taken to complete the

Agency's response to the JFK Board's Reguest for Additional

Information and Records No. CIA-16 (Oswald Pre-Assassination

Files:

a.

Response to Request: CIA has to provide an official

response that will become a part of the public record.

The

response should be a releasable version of your memorandum of

27 February 1997; according to the classification markings, most

of the text is unclassified.

I recommend that you send me an

annotated copy indicating what can be released.

I will prepare

the response and coordinate it with you. Also please review the

attachments to the memorandum for possible release. The JFK

Board may consider documentation of the destruction of

potentially relevant files as assassination records.. HRG will

handle any additional coordination (OGC, DO, etc.) required.

b. Transfer of Oswald's OS File(#0351164): The original

Office of Security subject file on Oswald currently held by the

Office of Personnel Security should be transferred to the

Historical Review Group.

The file will be incorporated into the

Agency's JFK Assassination Collection and reviewed for release

under the JFK Act of 1992. Most documents in this file will

probably be duplicates of documents in the HSCA sequestered

niles are considered assassination records.

¿, however, under the JFK law all "Oswald"

The ARRB staff has

asked for access to the file when practical.

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

---

## Page 39

13-00000

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

SUBJECT: Request No. CIA-16 from JFK Board

=C: Defectors File (#0341008): The ARRB staff has requested

access to the parts of the Defector File that contain the Oswald

documents, items a-f, listed in your 27 February memorandum.

(We were unable to locate documents "e" and "f" in the HSCA

sequestered collection.)

Assassination- and Oswald-related

documents in this file will most likely be declared assassination

records. HRG will handle any third Agency coordination required.

Please let me know when it will be

staff access to the files.

ground purposes only, and any notes taken will be reviewed by

your staff and HRG.

If a file is considered sensitive, access

HRG .

If you any questions, please give me a call, secure 31825.

J. Barry Harrelson

==

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

---

## Page 40

13-00000

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

SUBJECT:

Request No. CIA-16 from JFK Board

DCI/eSI/HRG/JBHarrelson:bas/x31806 (9 May 97)

g:hrg/req#160S.doc

Distribution:

Original - Addressee

1

C/IP&CRD

1 (Linda Cipriani, OGC

1 - C/HRG

1 - B. Harrelson

1 - HRG File

3

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

---

## Page 41

13-00000

5 June 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Review of OS Records on LHO and Defectors

FROM:

Gary M. Breneman, IC

Over the course of three half days, 29 May, 2 and 4

June, 1997 ARRB Staff member Michelle Combs reviewed the

Office of Security files on Lee Harvey Oswald and a multi-

volume file collection entitled "Defectors."

made available by Ms. Janet Ecklund in OS offices in

Stafford Building.

2. At the request of OS, the undersigned was present

during the review.

Mrs. Combs took notes of items of

interest and put yellow stickies on a number of documents.

She advised us Ecklund that she (Mrs. Combs) would write a

memorandum on what she had done and pass it to Mr. Gunn.

Further, she advised that Mr. Gunn might want review the

files personally.

Ms. Ecklund stated she would keep these files

segregated within her office for quick retrieval if we

wanted to see them again.

Gary

Breneman

---

## Page 42

13-00000

.

27 October 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM:

Janet A. Ecklund

Chief,

Information Management Branch

office of Personnel Security

SUBJECT:

OSWALD, LEE HARVEY

AIN: 0351164

The Office of Personnel Security was tasked on 31

January 1997 by the Historical Review Group/Center for the Study

oI Intelligence (HRG/CSI), via the Directorate of

Administration/Information Review Office, with researching pre-

assassination files on Lee Harvey Oswald. The tasking was:

generated by the John F. Kennedy Board's desire to review and

declassify relevant material. The results of this réview were

forwarded to the HKG/CSI on 21 February 1997.

During the Informa:ion Management Branch's

(IMB) research in response to the above tasking it was noted that

Volume V of the Oswald files las not on the shelf where Volumes

I-IV and VI-VII were located. A search of the entire area where

the volumes had been

maintained failed to locate Volume V. The

IMB Files Section was subsequently charged with conducting an

all out search for the missing volume. The search failed to find

Volume V.

3.

In July 1997, the Oswald files were reviewed page by

page prior to being turned over to. HRG/CSI and another attempt

was made to locate Volume V of to locate persons who might know

what happened to it. Volume V wiss not located nor were any

persons located who were knowledgeable of its status.

time gap was apparent and no one was located who could recall

ever seeing Volume V. This would suggest that either Volume V

had been

consolidated into other volumes or that Volume V never

existed, but that a numbering error resulted in what should have

been Volume V being labeled as Volume VI. The use of Roman

numerals on the cover of the volumes might have caused this

error to occur.

---

## Page 43

13-00000

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

24 December 1997

DI. T. Jeremy Gunn

Executive Director

Assassination Records Review Board

600 E. Street, N.W. (2nd Floor)

Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Dr. Gunn:

Re: Request for Additional Information and Records •

No. CIA-16 (Oswald Pre-Assassination Files) and

No. CIA-IR-24 (Defector File)

This is a partial response to the ARRB's referent

request for pre-assassination files this Agency may have had

on Lee Harvey Oswald.

It is believed the following comments

and two enclosed documents fully respond to the Office of

Security questions. The DO response is pending.

1. At Tab A is a 22 December 1997 memorandum

containing information from the Agency's Office of Personnel

• Security which provides details about the files it had on

Oswald prior to the assassination plus when and why they

were created.

These include the Office of Security file on

Oswald, a general file on Americans who had defected to

another country and information about HTLINGUAL files:

2. Also enclosed at Tab B is a 27 October 1977

memorandum from the Office of Personal Security which

explains the numbering of that Office's file on Oswald. In

particular, it explains why the "missing" volume V may never

have existed.

3. An ARRB staff member has reviewed the Oswald

Security file and the file on American defectors.

4. The Oswald Office of Personnel Security file and

those pages of the defector file deemed relevant by the ARRB

factor cite

staff member have been forwarded to HRG for review and will

be processed according to current release guidelines.

If you have any questions about this response, please

advise.

Sincerely.

TIONS

J. Barry Harrelson

---

## Page 44

13-00000

22 December 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

1. Pursuant to ARRB "Resquet No. CIA-16, the Office of

Personnel Security conducted research for and existing pre-

assassination files on Lee Harvey Oswald. The following

These responses are

the best reasonable answers based on available information.

Please note OPS was known as the Office of Security prior to

1 October 1994.

Question 1: Please identify, as specifically as

possible, each file held by CIA on Oswald at the time

of the assassination of President Kennedy.

Response:

At the time

of the assassination, the Office

of Security (OS) held two files which contained information

on Lee Harvey Oswald.

One

file entitled "Defectors File"

(#0341008), contained a reference to Lee Harvey Oswald, and

the second file was Office of Security subiect file on Lee

Harvey Oswald (#0351164).

This information was reflected in

the automated

security database known as the Management Data

Program/Personnel Security (MDP/PS). These files were

originally miscellaneous files which were converted to the

above numbers circa 1964. A hand search was also conducted

of microfiche records which were superseded by the automated

system.

This hand search produced the same results as the

automated search of MDP/PS.

2. Within the ARRB request is specific mention of an

HTLINGUAL file.

MDP/PS reflects OS maintained four official

files under this project--#0077826 (an administrative file),

#0090079, #0093466 (a general file), and #0119144. All of

the HTLINGUAL files were destroyed on 8 April 1994 along

with numerous

soft files.

Since this material has been

destroyed, OPS cannot definitively state whether these files

contained any information on Lee Harvey Oswald. The search

of Oswald's name did not produce an index reference to any

of these files. Attached is all of the available

information regarding the destruction of the HTLINGUAL

files.

This information was retrieved from the Information

Management Branch/Records Control Section and from a review

of general office administrative files.

---

## Page 45

13-00000

Question 2: For other than the 201-289248 file on

Oswald, please explain when each Oswald file was opened, the

purpose for the opening of the file, and the documents that

were in the file at the time of the

assassination.

Response: As noted above, all HTLINGUAL files have been

destroyed.

Since OS files are usually set up in

chronological sequence, a search of files with numbers in

close proximity to those recorded for HTLINGUAL was

undertaken.

This search revealed the approximate opening

dates for the four official HTLINGUAL files as:

#0077826

#0090079

#0093466

#0119144

Opened approximately July 1952

Opened approximately February 1953

Opened approximately July 1953

Opened approximately May 1955

3. HTLINGUAL was a Directorate of Operations project

involving the opening incoming and outgoing mail destined to

and from the Soviet Union, China, Pakistan, and South

America.

In the Office of Security this project was known

as SRPOINTER with subprojects identified as WESTPOINTER,

INDIAN, BANJO, and SETTER.

The Office of Security actually

conducted the opening and monitoring of mail with the

acquired information being referred to the Directorate of

Operations.

4. The Defectors File (#0341008) was established circa

1950 for the purpose of recording information on US citizens

defecting to other countries and information regarding

foreign nationals considering defection to the United States.

This file contained information was from press clippings,

Directorate of Operations reporting, the Federal Bureau of

Investigation, the Department of State, and the various armed

services.

The pre-assassination documents located in this

file relative to Lee Harvey Oswald are:

a. Washington Star press clipping of 26 November 1959

entitled "U.S. Defector to Reds Turned to Marx at

15"

b. Department of State memorandum dated 25 October

1960 with attached list of American "defectors"

from May 1959 to October 1960

c.

Memorandum for Chief/Security Research Staff dated

31 October 1960 from M. D. Stevens, subject:

American Defectors

2

---

## Page 46

13-00000

.. ....

d.

Memorandum for Deputy Director of Security dated

1 November 1960 from M. D. Stevens, subject:

American

• Defectors

e.

Handwritten chart of defectors dated 26 August

1961

£ .

Defector outline prepared in October 1961 listing

known defectors to the USSR, Red China, Cuba, and

United Arab Republic.

5.

The index reference to the Defectors File

identifies a

list dated 13 September 1966 which was known as

the Defector Machine Listing.

This listing was a computer

printout of defectors and provided limited biographic data

on each name.

This listing was maintained separately from

the actual Defectors File; notations within the Defectors

File show the Defector Machine Listing as permanently

charged to the Security Analysis Group of the Office of

Security. Efforts to locate this listing or determine its

disposition have been unsuccessful.

6. Information regarding the purpose of the Defectors

File was gleaned from a quick review of selected holdings.

An employee of this Office was, recalls the Defector Machine

Listing as being approximately one and one-half inches thick

and in two parts.

One part consisted of an alphabetical

index of defector names with assigned numbers. The second

part listed the assigned numbers in numerical order and

contained the limited biographic data on each name.

7.

The subject file pertaining to Lee Harvey Oswald

(#0351164) was established circa 1960. It appears this file

was created as a separate repository for the numerous press

clippings and reports received from other government

agencies on the defection of Lee Harvey Oswald to the USSR

and his activities following his return to the United

States.

The first volume of this file appears to have been

preserved as the pre-assassination file, and the documents

contained in this file are as follows:

a. Department of State telegram #1304 from Moscow

dated 31 October 1959

b.

The Washington Post press clipping dated

1 November 1959 entitled "Ex-Marine Asks Soviet

Citizenship"

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Department of State Dispatch #234 from Moscow

dated 2 November 1959

d. Department of State telegram #1448 from Tokyo

dated 9 November 1959

e. Department of State telegram #1358 from Moscow

dated

1 9 November 1959

f. The Washington Post press clipping dated 16

November 1959 entitled "Rebuffed"

g. Evening Star press clipping dated 26 November

1959 entitled "U.S. Defector to Reds Turned to

Marx at 15"

h. Report Summary prepared by Soviet Russia Division

forwarded to Office of Security in March 1960

i. Department of State Instruction A-273 dated

13 April 1961

j. Department of State Dispatch from Moscow dated

May 1961 with enclosure of Oswald letter

k. Federal Bureau of Investigation report dated

3 July 1961 from Dallas, Texas

1. Note to CI/SI dated 28 September 1961

m.

Form 745 "Indices Search Request" dated

12 October 1961

n. Department of State Dispatch #317 from Moscow

dated 12 October 1961 with enclosure

0 .

Form G-135a Immigration and Naturalization

Service name check form to Central Intelligence

Agency dated 5 December 1961

p. Navy Department message to Moscow dated

3 March 1962

q. Department of the Navy memorandum to the Federal

Bureau of Investigation dated 26 April 1962 with

enclosure

I.

The Washington Post press clipping dated

9 June 1962 entitled "Third American in 2 Months

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Leaves Soviet 'Home""

S.

Federal Bureau of Investigation transmittal

of report from Dallas, Texas, dated 30 August

1962.

8. In addition to those documents listed above, the

following documents were located in a subsequent. volume of

the Oswald file and also appear to predate the assassination

of President Kennedy.

t.

Undated summary of file information on Lee

Harvey Oswald

u.

v.

Incoming cable #83858 from Mexico City dated

20 July 1963

(no mention of Oswald)

Incoming cable #01325 from Mexico City dated

17 August 1963

(no mention of Oswald)

w.

Incoming cable

• #36017 from Mexico City dated

9 October 1963

x. Outgoing cable #74830 to Mexico City dated

10 October 1963

Y. Incoming cable #47041 from Mexico City dated

24 October 1963 (no mention of Oswald).

Question 4: To the extent that Counterintelligence

and the Office of Security maintained pre-assassination

files on Oswald, please explain why those offices

maintained files on Oswald prior to the assassination.

In answering this question, please make appropriate

references to the Clandestine Services Handbook (CSHB)

and to any other materials (including organizational

charts) that would help explain the jurisdictional and

organization reasons for which CI and OS would have

maintained such files.

Response: It is believed that oS holdings on Lee

Harvey Oswald began in 1959 with his travel to Russia during

which he renounced his US citizenship. Oswald was in

contact with the American Embassy in Moscow, and the

Department of State prepared reports

on these contacts.

Most likely because of counterintelligence concerns, the

Central Intelligence Agency was included in the distribution

of these reports.

In the beginning this material was

probably retained in the Defectors File. As the number of

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documents increased, a separate file was created to be the

repository of information on the alleged American defector.

There is a notation in the Defectors File that a separate

file exists on Oswald.

9. Both the Defectors File (#0341008) and the file of

Lee Harvey Oswald (#0351164) were handled by Marguerite D.

Stevens of the OS/Security Research Staff during the pre-

assassination time frame.

Of the documents listed above, a

majority of them contain a notation or the initials of

Marguerite D. Stevens, leading one to believe she was the

officer responsible for the collection, analysis, and filing

of this information.

10.

The Security Research Staff (SRS) was the

component responsible for collecting, developing, and

evaluating information of a counterintelligence nature to

detect and/or- prevent penetration of the Agency's

organization, employees, and activities by foreign or

domestic organizations or individuals. SRS conducted

research in connection with employee loyalty cases and

maintained records identifying personalities, environments,

and personal traits of individuals who had been of

counterintelligence interest over the years. SRS maintained

liaison

with various government agencies in connection with

counterintelligence activities and coordinated the

counterintelligence effort throughout OS.

Using

organizational charts of this time period, SRS reported

directly to the office of the Director of Security.

11. A representataive of

the Office of Personnel

Security /Management Staff was queried regarding the mission

and

functions of SRS during the pre-assassination time

period. He made inquiries relating to the above request,

and the OPS/Information Management Officer retrieved retired

policy records

for review.

The information on the mission

and function of SRS was retrieved from the archived Office

of Security administrative and historical files as well as a

review of the security file on Marguerite D. Stevens.

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file cy

/CIA. SP

" COPE SOTIONS

RELASS LARSAL

2000

16 September 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

Ms. Laura Denk

Executive Director, ARRB

J. Barry Harrelson

JFK Project Officer, HRP/OIM

CIA-16, Oswald Pre-Assassination Files

1. This is further to my letter of 24 December 1997 in

response to referent request.

2. That letter, was a partial response which provided

the Office of Personnel Security's information.

Directorate of Operations' (DO) response was still pending.

The DO response was provided on 2 September 1998 and it is

attached.

3. Please note that both responses are contained in the

Agency's Compliance Declaration dated 2 September 1998 at

Attachment V (2).

4. This completes the Agency's action on CIA-16. If

you have any questions about this matter, please advise.

Sincerely,

Encl.

A/S

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## Page 51

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DO Response to Board Request CIA - 16

Oswald Pre-Assassination Files

The Directorate of Operations reviewed the DO

records to determine if there were

any additional files

containing pre-assassination records relating to

Oswald.

Research identified a document in the Oswald

201 which appeared to be a file inventory.

The

document identified CI Staff as the file custodian.

CIC has confirmed that all CI Staff holdings were

incorporated into the 201.

Prior tô establishing a 201, any documents received

would have been placed in an operational interest file.

We found no reference to the existence of an

operational file.

If such a file had existed, however,

it might not have been registered in the central index.

It was standard procedures that upon opening a 201, the

documents from an interest file would be transferred to

the 201.

Given that Oswald was a subject of the HTLINGUAL

operation, it is reasonable to believe that there was a

file on him. We destroyed all of the HTLINGUAL files

under court order, and no record was made of what files

existed. We did not review all of the Do record system

to destroy all copies of material which may have been

derived from HTLINGUAL material.

We know, for

instance, that there are HTLINGUAL items related to

Oswald in the HSCA sequestered collection

In sum, the 201 on Oswald contains all the

information we are aware of that we had prior to the

assassination.

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