Agency: FBI
Originator: FBI
From: MM
To: HQ
Document date: 2/9/60
Document type: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

## Page 1

JFK Assassination System

Identification Form

Agency Information

Date: -

6/1/2015

AGENCY:

FBI

RECORD NUMBER:

124-90090-10116

RECORD SERIES: HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER:

105-84265-47

Released under the John

F. Kennedy

Assassination Records

Collection Act of 1992

144 USC 2107 Notel.

Cased:NI 54460 Date:

10-04-2017

Document Information

ORIGINATOR: FBI

FROM:

MM

TO: HQ

TITLE :

DATE : 02/09/1960

PAGES:

8

SUBJECTS :

JUAN FERNANDEZ DE CASTRO RODRIGUEZ

ROLANDO MASFERRER

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION : Unclassified

RESTRICTIONS :

1B; 4

CURRENT STATUS :

Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 07/15/1998

OPENING CRITERIA: INDEFINITE

COMMENTS :

MEMO

V9.1

HH

54460

23

DocId: 32330453

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## Page 2

BERIA

AGE

DVISED

SLIPISI

ALL INFORISATIEN CONTAINED

HEREIN IS

LASSIFIED EXCEPT

WHERE SHOWN

OTHERWISE.

OPTIONAL FORM

NO. 10

5010-104-01

•UNITED STATES

ERNMENT

Memorandum

CONFIDDNTIAL

TO

Director, FBI (105-84265)

DATE:

2/9/6005 mAc/48

PRONY

SAC, Miami (105-2307 Sub II)

08. 5-16-94

2h0066

JOKE GOT fun

SUBJECT:

JUAN FERNANDEZ DE CASTRO

RODRIGUEZ;

GEORGE VALDES AMABLE;

ROLANDO MASFERRER ROJAS - VICTIM

8k318

KIDNAPING - CONSPIRACY

CLASS.

EXT

BYSPE BIAL OMS

REASON-FCIM

I,

1-2.4.2

IS - CUBA

DATE OF REVEAW

813191

ReBuairtel 2/4/60, concerning recommendations

contained in Miami letter dated-1/29/60; Butel 1/29/60

concerning microphone surveillance utilizations.

With respect to the microphone installation

made in this instance, the following is submitted: p)

The microphone was installed in room 342 and

monitored in room 340, adjoining.

The installation.was

made in the following manner: Room 342 consists of a

foyer leading in from the hall, a bath just to the left

of the foyer and a sleeping-sitting area beyond the foyer

and bathroom.

The walls are plaster, the ceiling of the

sleeping area is plaster, and the foyer ceiling consists

oI fiberglass, acoustical tile approximately 24' × 24"

square, laid in "T"' channels in such manner that merely

pushing up on them lifts them out of the channel. They are

not fastened down in any other manner. *(U)

The microphone was placed in one section of acousti- 35

cal tile, located

as close to the sleeping-sitting area as

possible, and close tolthe Wall dividing rooms 342 and 340.

This was done by cutting out a rectangular portion of the

ti

pacept Deptile, is large enough to accommodate the Mouse

and microphone, down to, but not including, &U

N

116 Bureau TURM)

Miami

1,80

281/05-944265-47

RECEINED

LEB LL0KS

e HA

Mar 10

20 FEB 1I 1960

LOT: egh

(6)

NAT.

54460

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## Page 3

CONFIDE

INTIAL

MM 105-2307 Sub II

the textured finish surface of the tile so that replacing

the tile would make it appear the tile was whole, and no diff-

erent from any of the other tile in the ceiling.

Additional

soundproofing material, fiberglass, was placed over the top

of the microphone tó filter out extraneous noises and sound

coming from other parts of the hotel.

The microphone leads

were then attached to a section of shielded microphone wire,

taped and the microphone wire fed through a hole in theppar-

tition between the two rooms, and brought out into room 340

through a hole made by removing one of the corresponding

tiles in room 340. The hole in the partition was already

4ode bye ende

existent as a result of feeding conduit and airconditioning

ducts between the zooms at the time of original construction. X(24)

All of the above wire work, of course, was concealed

above the afore-described ceiling in the open space between

the tile ceiling and the actual poured cement ceiling, a

space approximately two feet high. *(U1)

The tile contaning the Mouse microphone was placed

back into position and the area carefully checked for any

fallen debris that might cause suspicion, and all such

matter was carefully removed.

*(i)

In room 340 the microphone wire was fed into the

input side of the Mouse power supply and the outputs fed,

(1) the 500 Ohm output fed into the 500 Ohm input of a

Magnecorder tape recorder, (2) the High Impedance output at-

tached directly to a pair of crystal earphones. A(21)

Preliminary tests of the above installation showed

it to have better than average pick-up of conversations in

room 342 with, of course, no extraneous noises, such as running

water, radios playing or the television set turned on, any

conversation in the room to a point below usefulness. &

one of which would tend to decrease the intelligence of any

The above installation was made by SA ROBERT E.

SUNKEL,

Soundman assigned to the Miami Office, and was completed

approximately two hours before the contemplated meeting.

*(4)

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CONFIDENTIAD

MM 105-2307 Sub II

series or parallel, cutting these leads might or might not dis-

connect service to

other rooms in the hotel. In addition,

in view of subject's expressed suspicions, it was decided

not

to do anything with the loudspeaker at all; if both the tele-

vision set and the loudspeaker were out of operation, subject's

suspicions would most certainly be aroused.

It is also pointed out that subject was then

occupying a room in the hotel, which was known, and he would

therefore most certainly be suspicious of any appointments

not in room 342 which he normally would have in his own room.

Therefore, the television set was not removed.

*****

With respect to the three points raised in Bureau

airtel of February 4, 1960, the following is submitted:

(1) SA GEORGE E. DAVIS was aware of the kidnap

plot against MASFERRER, and the possibility that MM-635-S

might be involved was considered; note MM-635-S arrived in

Miami around noontime, January 27, 1960, the same day that

VALDES, an unidentified aide to RAUL CASTRO, and SA HOLLOMAN,

acting in an undercover capacity, were scheduled to meet at

about 7:30 P.M. At 12:45 P.M., January 27, 1960, MM-635-S

advised he had just arrived from Havana and was being detained

by Immigration and Naturalization Service, Miami, for question-

ing. No attempt was made by SA DAvIs i vestion him at that

time for obvious security reasons..

At about 1:20 P.M., Mrs. CATHERINE TAAFFE tele-

phonically advised-SA ROBERT JAMES DWYER that. she had been

informed by VALDES that an aide to RAUL CASTRO had arrived

in Miami.

She claimed the aide had met with VALDES, and was

anxious to meet with the local police officer concerning the

kidnaping of MASFERRER.

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CONF

NTIAL

MM 105-2307 Sub II

Miami determined from the District Director, INS,

at about 4:30 P.M. that MM-635-S was still in custody of

INS, had been in continuous custody since he arrived, and was

due to be released within a few minutes.

This information,

therefore, appeared to preclude the possibility of MM-635-S

being involved, inasmuch as being in INs custody,

not have met with VALDES as reported by TAAFFE. *(U)

At approximately 5:15 P.M., MM-635-S telephoned

SA DAVIS, stating he had just been released by INS and was

calling from a nearby pay phone. The following interroga-

tion took place by SA DAVIS in a further effort to establish

if MM-635-S might be involved in the kidnaping plot. MM-

635S stated he was nearby, but had to leave imnediately for

an appointment for which he was already late due to his

detention by INS, and that he

was supposed to have called

JOHN EK (phonetic) earlier in the afternoon, that he was

spending the night at ER's (phonetic) home. SA DAVIS asked

MM-635-S if he was going to meet any other Americans that

evening, having in mind the local police officer the Cuban

Agents were scheduled to meet. MM-635-S answered in the neg-

ative.. DAVIS then brought up the matter of a meet with

MM-635-S who suggested 8:00 the same evening. He was ad-

vised that SA DAVIS had two other appointments that evening

and would be busy at 8:00 P.M., but that MM-635-S should

call him later in the evening in case of any urgent develop-

ments.

MM-635-S agreed.

It was decided to meet personally

the following morning. &(V)

The fact that MM-635-S suggested an 8:00 P.M. meet

with SA DAVIS on the evening of January 27, 1960, seemed to

further preclude his involvement in the kidnaping plot, as

the Miami International Hotel meet was scheduled for 7:30

P.M. The probability that he was not involved was made known

to SA HOLLOMAN and SA ALBAUGH, therefore, by SA DAVIS. JU)

SA DAVIS refrained from volunteering the name of

VALDES to MM-635-S for reasons of security, and at no time

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## Page 6

SENTIAL

MM 105-2307 Sub II

did MM-635-S mention this name. SA DAVIS did not participate

in the arrests at the Miami International Hotel on

the evening

of January 27, 1960. No further contact was had with MM-635-S

by DAVIS until after his arrest, and this office had no

reasonable

way

of knowing about his involvement prior to his

arrest.

In mitigation of the informant's position, it is

noted he has claimed he did not know the purpose of his con-

tact with VALDES until after his last contact with SA DAVIS,

at which time it was apparently too late for him to withdraw.

It is also noted he subsequently explained to SA DAVIS he

was not thinking clearly at the time he was last contacted by

SA DAVIS because of loss of sleep and prolonged questioning by

INS: that he would have immediately reported the facts to

SA DAVIS after the

meeting if he had not been arrested.

(2) SA HOLLOMAN was aware of the informant's

identity by name only prior to his meeting with the subjects.

He had no reason to believe the informant would be involved

and had, in fact, kept in close contact with SA DAVIS prior

to the meeting in order to determine whether there was any

possibility that the informant might be in contact with VALDES.

There was no indication the informantiwas involved in the

plot; therefore, when a man by the same name came to the

meeting with VALDES, SA HOLLOMAN concluded that if this was

actually the informant, he must be double-crossing the Bureau.

In any event, SA HOLLOMAN concluded it was too late at this

point to logically cut the informant out of the conspiracy

without revealing his status to VALDES, and thereafter pro-

ceeded to treat him as a subject. When the meeting had reached

its conclusion he thereupon voiced the

agreed signal for the

agents in the next room to move in and make the arrests.

(3) The microphone surveillance of the meeting

between SA HOLLOMAN and the subjects was rendered practically

useless because the television in the room occupied by

* 21)

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CONFIDANTIAL:

MM 105-2307 Sub II

HOLLOMAN and the subjects was plugged in by one of the sub-

jects immediately after the latter entered. None of the

conversation of the subjects, and only part of the conver-

sation of SA HOLLOMAN was understandable in the next room.

Supervisor ALBAUGH was monitoring what conversation could

be understood, with one ear against the connecting door, and

the other with an earphone. It was possible thereby to over-

hear the agreed signal from SA HOLLOMAN to move in and make

the arrests.

Supervisor ALBAUGH, upon entering the room oc-

cupied by HOLLOMAN and the subjects, placed one of the sub-

jects (who turned out to be FERNANDEZ) under arrest and

searched him for weapons. ALBAUGH did not recognize him

personally, never having seen him before; however, upon re-

questing his name and comparing his features with

the identi-

fication card in his possession, he first realized he must

be MM-635-S.

At this point it was too late to do anything

other than treat him as a subject, which was done.

XU1)

Previous inquiry at the hotel had revealed GEORGE

VALDES was registered alone. There was no indication as to

the identity of the person or persons who might accompany

him to the meeting.

Other agents had been assigned to dis-

creetly observe the public facilities of the hotel in an

effort to identify any other Cuban intelligence agents who.

might be around; however, their efforts produced no affirma-

tive results. It was not possible to observe the room in

which VALDES was registered without being obvious.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

In consideration of the above, I believe that the

overall handling of this matter by this office was one

reflecting alert and decisive action in which a difficult

problem was resolved without causing a long and costly in-

vestigation.

-7.

CONFIDANTIAL

54460

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