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177-10002-10105)

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK Assassination System

Date:

3/6/2018

Identification Form

Agency Information

AGENCY:

LBJ

RECORD NUMBER: 177-10002-10105

RECORD SERIES:

NSF, CF, USSR, VOL. 21, BOX 226

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :

FROM:

TO :

CIA

TITLE: SPECIAL REPORT--WEEKLY REVIEW

DATE: 09/13/1968

PAGES:

11

SUBJECTS :

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION: Top Secret

RESTRICTIONS: Consulted; Mandatory Review Material

CURRENT STATUS:

Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 07/06/1994

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS : . DOC. #57

v9.1

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## Page 2

TO:

2

3

ROUTING

NAME AND ADDRESS

James Mathis, Spec Access, NARA

DATE

V14/15

INITIALS

TOP SECRET

(Security Classification)

ACTION

APPROVAL

CONVENT

CONCURRENCE

REMARKS:

DIRECT REPLY

DISPATCH

FLE

INFORMMATION

PREPARE REPLY

RECOMMENDATION

RETURN

SIGNATURE

CONTROL NO. SC. No. 007871688 [BJ

COpY 3

OF

FROM: NAME. ADDRESS. AND PHONE NO

ennifer Cuddeback, IBS Library

DATE

1/14/15

Handle Via

COMINT

Channels

Access to this document will be restricted to

those approved for the following specific activities:

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

TOP SECRET

(Security Classification)

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## Page 3

Top Secret

No Foreign Dissem

5%

CENTRAL

AGENCY

CONCO LANS OF NE

DIRECTORATE OF

INTELLIGENCE

The Developing Soviet Submarine Force

Special Report

WEEKLY REVIEW

Handle via Comint Channels

Top Secret

1

13 September 1968

SC No. 00787/68B

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## Page 4

TOP SECRET

SPECIAL REPORTS are supplements to the Current Intelli-

gence Weeklies issued by the Office of Current Intelligence.

The Special Reports are published separately to permit more

comprehensive treatment of a subject. They are prepared by

the Office of Current Intelligence, the Office of Economic Re-

search, the Office of Strategic Research, and the Directorate of

Science and Technology: Special Reports are coordinated as

appropriate among the Directorates of CIA but, except for the

normal substantive exchange with other agencies at the working

level, have not been coordinated outside CIA unless specifically

indicated.

WARNING

The SPECIAL REPORT contains classified information affect-

ing the national security of the United States within the mean-

ing of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794,

and 798.

THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE KEPT IN COMMUNICATIONS

INTELLIGENCE CHANNELS AT ALL TIMES

The SPECIAL REPORT is to be seen only by US personnel es-

pecially indoctrinated and authorized to receive COMMUNICA-

TIONS INTELLIGENCE information; its security must be

maintained in accordance with COMMUNICATIONS INTELLI-

GENCE REGULATIONS.

No action is to be taken on any COMMUNICATIONS INTEL-

LIGENCE which may be contained herein, regardless of the ad-

vantages to be gained, unless such action is first approved by the

Director of Central Intelligence.

DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

The SPECIAL REPORT MUST NOT BE RELEASED TO FOR-

EIGN GOVERNMENTS and must be handled within the frame-

work of specific dissemination control provisions of DCID 1/7.

GROUP 1

Excluded from automatic

doungroding and

declassification

TOP SECRET

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## Page 5

TOP SECRET TRINE

No Foreign Dissem

THE DEVELOPING SOVIET SUBMARINE FORCE

The Soviet naval leadership, commanding the

firing submarine-are in production, and several older

classes are being improved and reconditioned. In ad-

duration of open ocean patrols by Soviet submarines

have been generally increasing.

Page :1

TOP SECRET TRINE

SPECIAL REPORT

13 Sep 68

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## Page 6

TOP SECRET TRINE

No Foreign Dissem

Fleet Modernization

The new Polaris-type sub-

marine--designated the Y-class--

carries 16 SS-N-6 ballistic mis-

siles with ranges of some 1,500

miles.

These 425-foot-long sub-

marines are currently being built

at Severodvinsk in the Soviet

Northern Fleet area.

The first

units should be operational soon

and 40 or more could be in serv-

ice by the mid-1970s.

,Two new classes of nuclear-

powered attack submarines are

also being built--one at Lenin-

grad shipyard and the other at

Gorkiy. At least one of these

classes probably was specifically

designed to engage enemy subma-

rines.

A third class of attack

submarine is under construction

in the Soviet Far East; its means

of propulsion is not yet known.

In addition to these new con-

struction programs, the Soviets

are reconditioning many of their

older classes of submarines.

There are no indications that

the Soviets intend to introduce

a new class of cruise-missile

submarine, however, and con-

struction of these submarines

love love Done desired

anticar-•

rier units.

Operational Implications

Strategic targets in the

midale of the US are beyond

reach of the 650-mile SS-N-5

carried on the older ballistic-

missile submarines, but are

within range of the SS-N-6

carried on the Y-class.

By

the mid-1970s, Soviet ballis-

tic-missile submarines may

present a strategic threat com-

parable to that of the US Polaris

fleet and be able to operate with

less

risk of detection than

earlier classes of Soviet mis-

sile submarines.

The introduction of the new

classes of attack submarines

suggests that the Soviets are

attempting to come to grips

with the Polaris threat.

The

Soviets apparently are counting

on their submarines to help

blunt that threat by attempting

to destroy. Polaris submarines

before they cân launch their

missiles.

Soviet ballistic-missile

submarines frequently patrol

within range of US Polaris

bases and could destroy a num-

ber of Polaris submarines by

attacking these bases.

The

new Soviet attack submarines

may be able to locate and de-

stroy a few Polaris submarines

in confined waters through which

those submarines frequently

must pass, such as the Irish

Sea or the Sicilian Straits.

Combined operations with new

Soviet suriace ships, such as

the Moskva-class helicopter car-

riers and Kresta- and Kashin-

class guided-missile ships,

will provide some antisubmarine

capability in the ocean approaches

Page 2

TOP SECRET TRINE

SPECIAL REPORT

13 Sep 68

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## Page 7

TOP SECRET TRINE

The Soviet Submarine Force

Kaliningrader:

Severomorsk

Northern Fleet

Baltic Fleet

Black Sea Fleet

Pacific Fleet

Sevastopol !

Nuclear-powered

Ballistic missile

Cruise missile

Attack

Diesel-powered

Ballistic missile

Cruise missile

Attack

Vladivostok

• Fleet Headquarters

BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES

Y-CLASS

Nuclear powered

Carries 16 SS-N-6 missiles in hull

125 feet long

Now being deploye

H-CLASS

uclear power

rries three SS-N-4 or SS-N-5 missiles in s

380 feet long

9 in service

7EE:

G-CLASS

Diesel powered

Carries three SS-N-4 or SS-N-5 missiles in sail

320 feet long

22 in service

Z-CONVERSION CLASS

Diesel powered

Carries two SS-N-4 missiles in sail

295 feet long

6 in service

SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

91849 8-68 CIA

TOP SECRET TRINE

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## Page 8

TOP SECRET TRINE

Nọ Foreign Dissem

CLASSES OF SOVIET SUBMARINES

Nuclear Powered

Ballistic Missile

Cruise Missile

Attack

Y.

E- 1

E-11

N

Diesel Powered

Ballistic Missile

Cruise Missile

Attack

One New Class "B"

91870 8-68 CIA

& Conversion

in comersion

R

W

SECRET

RELEASABLE TO UK AND CANADA

to the USSR and in the Mediter-

ranean.

Deployment Patterns

Soviet submarines are as-

signed to each of the four

fleets--Northern, Pacific, Bal-

tic, and Black Sea.

Because

of the restricted exits from

the Baltic and Black Seas, how-

ever, most of the missile-

equipped units and all of the

nuclear-powered units are based

in ice-free ports of the Kola

Peninsula (Northern Fleet) and

in the Pacific Fleet.

The Soviets are apparently

trying to reduce the dispropor-

tion between the two major

fleets--the Northern and the

Pacific. Although the North-

ern Fleet still holds the favored

position,

several nuclear sub-

marines have been transferred

under the polar ice to the Pa-

cific and a number of modern

diesel units have joined the

Northern Sea Route convoy in

past summers.

The Baltic Fleet is re-

sponsible for protecting Soviet

coastal waters and for furnish-

ing diesel submarines for pa-

trols off the US Polaris base

at Holy Loch. Moscow has also

begun sending Baltic Fleet sub-

marines to the Mediterranean to

take some of the strain off the

Northern Fleet, which has been

furnishing most of the units

operating there.

There are no

nuclear submarines in the Bal-

tic, and the few cruise-missile

units there operate in coastal

waters.

The Montreux Convention

of 1936 places severe limita-

tions on the passage of Soviet

submarines through the Turkish

Straits.

Black Sea - based

submarines can pass into the

Mediterranean only if they are

headed for another fleet area

for repairs.

For this reason,

only older diesel units are

based in the Black Sea.

Once

in the Mediterranean, however,

these units operate there for

about on sayee stipya way to

Patrol Activity

Most of the increase in

the level of Soviet submarine

ing of a force of six to ten

submarines--mostly diesel attack

units--in the Mediterranean since

Page 4

TOP SECRET TRINE

SPECIAL REPORT

13 Sep

68

•

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TOP SECRET TRINE

No Foreign Dissem

June 1967; at least one nuclear

unit is usually included in

the force.

There was an over-

all increase of nearly 20 per-

cent in the number of Soviet

submarine patrols beyond local

fleet operating areas in 1967,

but if the trend noted so far

this year continues, fewer sub-

marines will deploy

in 1968.

Patrols this year have been of

longer duration, however,

thereby resulting in more sub-

marine time at sea.

Soviet

Submarine Deployments

1965-1968

No confirmed patrols by

H-class ballistic-missile units

have been noted since late 1966,

and there have beenperiods dur-

ing the past year when no Soviet

ballistic-missile submarines

have been on patrol in either

the Atlantic or Pacific.

The

G-class is the only such sub-

marine now being used for mid-

ocean patrols.

Conversion and overhaul

of first-generation ballistic-

Total 138

Total 116

Total 114

Total 102

77

43:

2.

1965

14

1966

201

1967

NORTH

BALTIC

BLACK

Number of deployed units, not including routine interfleet transfers or fleet exercise participants.

91946 9-68 CIA

1968

PACIFIC

TOP SECRET TRINE

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

RELEASABLE TO UK AND CANADA

Page 5

TOP SECRET TRINE

SPECIAL REPORT 13 Sep 68

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## Page 10

TOP SECRET TRINE

No Foreign Dissem

missile submarines and the re-

assignment of their crews to

new Y-class units have probably

been at least partly responsible

for the decline in ballistic-

missile submarine activity.

In

addition, the loss of a G-class

submarine in the Pacific in mid-

March apparently resulted in a

three-month standdown in patrols

by these units.

That incident

probably caused the Soviets to

implement new safety measures.

Moreover, as the Soviets prepare

to deploy new Y-class submarines,

they may be reassessing the

military value of

sending their

diesel-powered units into the

mid-Atlantic and mid-Pacific

patrol areas.

older W-class units are equipped

to launch cruise missiles, but

chese, too, operate only near

Soviet shores and probably are

being retired from service.

Recent patrols by diesel

attack submarines in the Medi-

terranean have been extended

to as long as six months through

the use of Arab and Yugoslav

ports for upkeep, reprovision-

ing, and

crew recreation. Pre-

vious patrols by Soviet sub-

marines

in

the Mediterranean

had lasted less than two months.

Until mid-1967, E-class

cruise-missile submarines con-

ducted regular patrols in the

Atlantic.

Since June 1967,

patrol

activity in the Atlantic

has diminished; however, a

series of single E-class units

has been almost continuously

present in the Mediterranean.

Some of the submarines on re-

cent patrols have also engaged

in other activities such as

hydroacoustic research and

support of naval training ma-

neuvers. J-class diesel-powered

cruise-missile submarines ap-

parently have been used primarily

tor peripheral defense.

In

late

1966, the first of these

units to venture into the

Mediterranean broke down and

limped back to its base in the

Northern Fleet. Some of the

Last year, a submarine

support group

operated

for nearly

six months off the west coast

of Africa in a program to study

the feasibility of submarine

operations from a floating base.

The

group consisted of a sub-

marine tender and a missile

supply ship, and was assisted

briefly by a survey vessel and

two intelligence collection

ships.

Several other ships

provided logistic support.

Four

submarines participated in the

group's operations.

these--a nuclear-powered unit--

was away from home waters for

more than six months.

Once the new ballistic-mis-

sile submarines go on patrol,

the Soviets may make greater

use of such floating support bases

on the high seas. Floating base

ships would be vulnerable

Page 6

TOP SECRET TRINE

SPECIAL REPORT

13 Sep 68

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## Page 11

EA

TOP SECRET TRINE

Soviet

Submarine-Launched

Missiles

1500 nm range

-(Covers allUS)

- 650 num ange

(100 fathom line

2043.

300 mm

line

TOP SECRET TRINE

CRUISE

MISSILE

US

DESIGNATION

SS-N-3

10C

1961

OPERATIONAL

WARHEAD

RANGE

WEIGHT

250 NM

1,000-

2,000 lbs.

BALLISTIC

MISSILES

SS-N-4

1960

300 NM

About

2,200 lbs

SS-N-5

SS-N-6

1963

Probably

1968

650 NM

1,500 NM

1,600-

2,400 lbs

700-

1,700 lbs

SECRET

NO FOREIGN :

DISSEM

REMARKS

Carried by E-l and E-lI.

class nuclear submarines

and by J-class diesel units.

A few W-class diesel torpedo

attack submarines were modified

to carry this missile. Surface

launched.

Carried by most G-class

diesel submarines and by

some H-class nuclear units.

A few Z-class diesel torpedo

attack submarines were

modified to carry this missile.

Surface launched.

Carried by most H-class

nuclear submarines and by

some G-class diesel units.

Underwater launched.

Probably intended for the

new Y-class nuclear sub-

marines. These 16-tube

Polaris-type units first

went into service in

mid-1968.

TOP SECRET TRINE

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## Page 12

TOP SECRET TRINE

No Foreign Dissem

wartime, but ballistic-missile

submarines operating from such

bases

south of the Azores, for

example, could remain on-station

off the

Us coast longer

than

could units deployed from the

Kola area.

Cruise-missile and

attack submarines would also

profit from mid-ocean bases,

reducing the number of long

transits to and from patrol

areas.

The USSR recently has

achieved

several technological

advances in submarine support.

New and more powerful radio

transmitters

serving submarines

on distant patrols are now in

operation in the USSR. A navi-

gation satellite system cur-

rently being tested may permit

Soviet submarines to determine

their positions with greater

accuracy even inthe most un-

favorable weather and sea con-

ditions.

Hydroacoustic re-

search ships have conducted

surveys in the past few years

in areas of the Atlantic and

Pacific where the Soviets might

hope to detect Polaris subma-

rines and in the Canary Island

Basin and Philippine Sea where

they may intend to operate their

own submarines. (TOP SECRET TRINE

NO FOREIGN DISSEM EXCEPT UK AND

CANADA)

*

Page

8

TOP SECRET TRINE

SPECIAL REPORT

13 Sep 68

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JFK Assassination System

Identification Form

Agency Information

Date:

3/6/2018

AGENCY: LBJ

RECORD NUMBER :

177-10002-10105

RECORD SERIES :

NSF, CF, USSR, VOL. 21, BOX 226

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :

FROM:

TO:

TITLE :

CIA

SPECIAL REPORT--WEEKLY REVIEW

DATE: 09/13/1968

PAGES:

SUBJECTS :

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION : Top Secret

RESTRICTIONS : Consulted; Mandatory Review Material

CURRENT STATUS : Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/06/1994

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :

DOC. #57

v9.1

---