Originator: HSCA
Document date: 00/00/0000
Document type: REPORT

## Page 1

180-10147-10179%,

Lisa 2022 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 '

Classification: —

SEEREI

(This form is to be used for material extracted

from CIA - controlled documents.)

SDB

Cover Sheet

The attached package of paper is the property of

the House Select-Committee on Assassinations, and is

on loan to CIA under an agreement whereby CIA is not

to reproduce or copy the draft or any portion thereof.

Notes may be taken on materials in this package,

and rough notes may be prepared as a basis for infornal

and oral exchanges with HSCA representatives. Thesc

notes, however, are

to be held as though controlled and

are to be destroyed under agreed conditions with tISCA.

They are not to be copied or excerpted and are to be

held

until further instructions are received for

• eventual disposal.

These papers have been numbered for accountability

and reccipted accordingly. They are to be handled on

secure basis as though constituting sensitive papers

a need-to-know basis.

REPROTUCTION

RETURN TO CIA

Background Use Only

Do Not Reproduce

Copy. 50f6

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## Page 3

CIA

fromp.34.

- O delete line 20 toP P36/115

On Auguet 16, 1963, a Chicago Sen

Tin's atule reported. that the

Lada

neised that the scattet

Chatrol.

The memnanden stated:

1. Attached Is the only cupy la the geacy of a meruorandum on subject, the

ribbou cops of nibich

sons sent to the Attornes dieneral In May ne 1962 I mas

raguels anare of lue existence of such a memoranduru since I was Informer that

is lad

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as a result of a briefine siren by Onlonel Edriards and

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absence

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arallable on diency reintionships with subject. I lope that this will serre jour

Put so you are a refore eat the ento sa a ratest -

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D milder that August 1963 cas

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to assassinate.

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## Page 5

104

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Select Cmmitte in Decemba 19,1978.

Caldho

westion

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pper-62 - beginning w/last fullparagraph

This, as of Aerie 10, 1964, nearing the

negat sent denge the

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part upon CIA mithins, suffered firm

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gone place in Washingt,"SIbids Th

mmittee dos nite That these distn

reviewer while in Merico City, Isee

supra, pp 52-543 Nevertels, ao ith

Review. th CIA's

tephmi transcross and otte

inal since miteras, Slawson

his analyais gO owned's activites

in Megico City. I Slaw son memoranten

of Aprilza, 1964, Subj: Trop to Menico Cuts,

p. 243 The Committer irifre conclude

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## Page 7

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## Page 8

SECRET

Berk-writetussification:

(This form is to be used for material extracted

from CIA -controlled documents.)

Purpose and Scope of Study

The Central Intelligence Agency's performance

in its role of support to the Warren Commission

rublie concern aurer

las been a source of controversy since the pasT

fifteen years

neeption of the Weren commission. Critics

have repeatedly charged that the CIA participated

in a conspiracy designed to suppress information

relevant to the assassination of President Kennedy.

During 1976 the critic's

assertions were the subject of official inquiry

by the Senate Select Committee to Study

Governmental Operations (hereinafter SSC). The

SSC, in its report regarding "The Investigation

of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy:

Performance of the Intelligence Agencies" reached

Білалла

he following conelusion

The Committee emphasizes that it has

not uncovered any evidence sufficient

to justify a conclusion that there was

a conspiracy to assassinate President

Kennedy.

The Committee has, however, developed

evidence which impeaches the process.

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2

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Classification:

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from §ll wiser ed do neiligence agencies

arrived at their own conclusions

about the assassination, and by

which they provided information

to the Warren Commission.

This

evidence indicates that the

investigation of the assassina-

tion was deficient and that facts

which might have substantially

affected the course of the inves-

tigation were not provided the

Warren Commission or those

individuals within the FBI and

the CIA, as well as other agencies

of Government, who were charged

with investigating the assassina-

tion. (SSC, Bock I, P6)

This Committee has sought to examine in

greater detail the general findings of the SSC.

The Committee has particularly focused its attention

on the specific issue of whether the CIA or any

employee or former employee of the CIA misinformed,

or withheld information relevant to the assassina-

tion of President Kennedy from the Warren

Conmission. In addition, the Committee has

attempted to determine whether, if the Warren

Commission was misinformed or not made privy to

information relevant to its investigation,

the misinforming or withholding of

evidence from the Warren Commission was the

57

AT.

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-

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from ClA-controlled documents.)

result of a conscious intent to do so by the

Agency or its employees.

The Committee has sought to examine the

issue detailed above in both an objective

and disciplined manner.. In order to accomplish

this goal the Committee has utilized a 1977 Task Turee

Report by the CIA, Inspectoreeneral (hereinafter

TER

77 IGR). This Report was highly critical of

pertainingtothe AMLASHoperation

the SSC findings and asserted that the SSC

Final Report conveyed an impression of limited

effort by the CIA to assist the Warren Commission

TER

in its work. The 77 IGR was in fundamental

disagreement with this characterization of the

SSC findings and noted that "CIA did seek and

collect information in support of the Warren

Commission. Additionally, it conducted studies

and submitted special analyses and reports."

TER

(77 IGR, Introduction to Tab E.)

In order to demonstrate further the scope

of support provided by the CIA to the Warren

TFR

Commission, the 77 IER contained a comprehensive

listing of CIA generated material made available

SECAST.

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from CIA -controlled documents.)

to both the U.S. Intelligence Community and

the Warren Commission regarding the assassina-

tion of President Kennedy. In this respect,

the Committee agrees with the 17 forl

wherein

it is stated that "This compiliation (of

CIA generated material) is appropriate to

consideration of the extent of the CIA effort,

to the extent that it reveals something of

TEK

the results of that effort." 177 IER, Introduction

to Tab E)

In examining the Agency's comprehensive

listing of CIA generated material referenced above,

the Committee has paralled its review to the

structure given to these materialsby the 77 IGR.

In this regard the 77 IGR details four inter-

related compilations of Kennedy assassination

material. These four compilations are:

1) Agency dissemination of information

to the Intelligence Community (Förmal

and Informal Disseminations)

2) Dissemination of material to the

Warren Commission

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3) Agency dissemination to the FBI et al

regarding rumors and allegations

regarding President Kennedy's

assassination

4) Memorandum submitted by CIA to the

Warren Commission on Rumors and

Allegations Relating to the President's

Assassination 177 Fer?

Introduction

to Tab E.)

In reviewing these compilations,

the Committee

focused upon those

TER

CIA materials which the 77 IGR documented as having

been

^made available in written form to the Warren

Commission.

During the course of this study, additional

Agency files have been revieved. These files have

been examined in an effort to resolve certain

issues created by the review of the Agency's

compilations discussed in this report. Where

apparent gaps existed in the written record,

files have been requested and revieved in an effort

to resolve these gaps. Where significant substantive

PRET

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issues have arisen related to the kind and

quality of information provided the Warren

Commission, files have also been requested and

reviewed in an effort to resolve these issues.

As a result, approximately thirty files, comprising

an approximate total of ninety volumes of

material have been examined and analyzed

in preparation of this report.

Wants.

The findings set forth herein are subject

to modification due to the following considera-

tions.

During the course of the past fifteen

years, the CIA has generated massive amounts of

information related to the assassination of

President Kennedy. In spite of the Agency's

sophisticated document retrieval system, certain

documents reguested by this Committee for study

and analysis have not been located. Whether these

documents merely have been filed incorrectly or

destroyed, gaps in the written record still do

exist.

•ArO

000005

Secondly, due to dissimilar standards of investigative

Eg: CIA SFKassas materials provided the Roitsteller

Baneratelor vertendono

ission but carrsir

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relevancy adopted by the CIA and this Committee,

certain files requested by the Committee for

review::

.

'have been made available to

the. Committee in a santized fashion.

Therefore,

to the degree reflected by the Agency's denial

of access and/or santization of certain materials,

this study's conclusions are based upon the

best evidence available to the Committee though

this may not be all relevant evidence to which

the Agency has access.

One must, moreover, give due consideration

to the role that oral discussions, oral briefings,

and meetings of Warren Commission and CIA

representatives may have played in the supply of

assassination-related information by the CIA to

the Warren Commission. The subject and substance

of these discussions, briefings, and meetings

may not always be reflected by the written

record made the

• subject of this study.

Therefore, the Committee has conducted interviews;

depositions and executive session hearings with

000006

Maria Teresa Prozazu

adid ins

Jare nite

availabi@lassification ate sage to Agining

sanitization of the mone

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SassifiestigA: secret

This form

Trom

From CrA

controlled

→8-

Key Warren Commission staff and members and

former or present CIA representatives in an

effort to resolve questions

that

are not

addressed by the written record. The results

of the Committee's efforts to chronicle this

aspect of the working relationship between the

Warren Commission and the CIA will be a subject

for discussion herein.

In addition, this report will examine the

following subjects generated by the Committee's

study as outlined above, in the following general

order of discussion:

1)

2)

3)

the organization of the CIA's investigation

of President Kennedy's assassination;

the working relationship of the Warren

Commission staff

and those CIA representatives

concerned

with the Warren Commission inguffy;

the standards of investigative cooperation

which the Warren Commission staff believed

to govern the quality and quantity of

information supplied by the CIA to the

Warren Commission;

000007

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- 8a-

4)

5)

the CIA's concern for protection of its

sensitive sources and methods and the

consequent effects of this concern

upon the Warren Commission investigation;

and

the substance and quality of information

concerning Luisa Calderon passed to the

Warren Commission and the results of this

Committee's investigation of Calderon

and her significance to the events of

November 22, 1963.

II.

Select Commitica Stein 25

Information Made Available by CIA to Warren

Commission

see CIA page 2000517 in fra

for beginning of this section

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To be insated prior to section I

• I. Organization of CIA Investigation

of President Kennedy's Assassination

In his Executive Session testimony before the Select

Committee, Richard Helms, the CIA's Deputy Director for

Plans during 1963, described

the CIA's role in the

investigation of President Kennedy's assassination as

follows:

This crime was committed on United

States soil. Therefore, as far as the

Federal government was concerned, the pri-

mary investigating agency would have been

the Federal Bureau of Investigation without

any question. The role of the CIA would

have been entirely supportive in the sense

of what material we are (sic) able to

acquire outside the limits of the United

States with reference to the investigation.

... For investigative purposes, the Agency

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frem ELA— E8atF8lled daEuments:)

had no investigative role inside the United

States at all. So when I used here the

word "supportive," I meant that in the

literal sense of the term. We are (sic)

trying to support the FBI and support the

Warren Commission and be responsive to

their requests, but we were not initiating

any investigations of our own or, to my

recollection, were we ever asked to.

(Executive Session Testimony of Richard

Helms, 8/9/78, pp. 17-18.)

On November 23, 1963 Helms called a meeting of senior-

level CIA officials to outline the Agency's investiga-

tive responsibility vis a vis the assassination. (SSC,

Book V, P. 25.) At that time, Helms placed John Scelso, Headqu

MeXico

Branch Chief for CIA operations in Mexieo, Central

ADi

America mantiP

anana,, in charge of the Agency's initial

investigative efforts. (HSCA Class. Deposition of John

Scelso, 5/16/78, pp. 111-112, Exec. Session Testimony l

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controlled

of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, p. 10.1

Scelso testified before the Select Committee,

that he was given charge of the Agency's investigation

on the basis of two considerations: l)!his prior

experience in conducting major CIA security investi-

gations and 2) the observance of Oswald by CIA

surveillance in Mexico, (Scelso's operational concern)

less than two months prior to the assassination. (SSC

Book V, p. 25, HSCA Class. Deposition of John Scelso,

5/16/70, pp. 111-112.% Scelso also noted that

during the course of his investigative efforts, Helms

did not pressure him to adopt specific investigative

theories nor reach conclusions within a set period of.

8/9/78, pp. 9-10) *

* Raymond Rocca, Chief of Research and Analysis for

CIA's Counterintelligence Staff characterized Scelso's

responsibility not as a mandate to investigate but

rather to "coordinate

traffic (code facilitation,

telegram or telegraphic consideration) for working

with the DDP with respect to what was being done over

the whole world..."

(HSCA Classified Deposition of

R. Rocca, 7.17/78, p. 9.)

• Rocca referred to this phase of CIA activity as

the GPFLOOR phase. (Ibia.)

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Scelso described in detail to the Committee the

manner in which he conducted the Agency's investiga-

tion:

•practically my whole Branch participated

in the thing.

We dropped almost everything

else and I put a lot of my officers to work

in tracing names, analyzing files.

We were flooded with cable traffic, with

reports, suggestions, allegations from all

over the world, and

these things had to be

checked out.

We were checking out just dozens

and dozens of people all the time.

(HSCA Classified

Deposition of John Scelso, 5/16/70, p. 131)*

*. During the course of the Agency's invetigation, Liaison

with the FBI was handled for the CIA by Birch O'Neal.

(Ibid. p. 80.) At the time of the assassination Mr. O'Neal,

a former FBI agent, was Chief of the Special Investigations

Group of the CIA's Counterintelligence Staff. (HSCA Classified

Deposition of Birch O'Neal, 6/20/78, p. 7, 52.1 MI. O'Neal

characterized his functions with respect to the Agency

as follows:

(This footnote - Footnote

on bottom of page 5)

- continues

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Grassifisation:

Scelso stated during his testimony that CIA

field stations worldwide were alerted to the Agency's

investigation "and the key stations were receiving

tips on the case, most of which were phony. We did not

send out instructions saying everybody participate in

the investigation." (Ibid. p. 133.). It was his

recollection, however, that throughout his tenure as

coordinator of the Agency's investigation, the Mexico

City Station was the only CIA field station directly

Footnote *

-- continued from bottom of page 4.

I knew that we (at CIA) did not have the

basic responsibility for investigating the

assassination of

the President.

If there was

a crime commited in the course of this activity,

tsic) it belonged to the FBI. I recognized that

it was our responsibility to give the fullest

cooperation to the FBI to protect the Agency

with regard to any

aspects of our operations,

you understand, and at the same time giving them

cooperation, and I was in close contact with Mr.

Sam Papich (of the FBI), and always fully co-!

operated, and he always

(Ibid. p. 52.)

O'Neal noted that his office (CI/SIG) at the direction of

the Chief of Counterintelligence, James Angleton, was

designated the central point for collection of assassination-

related information made available to the FBI. (Ibid. pp. 52-53

ais

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Cs tom to s a materia extracte

involved in investigatory activities related to President

Kennedy's assassination. (Ibia? 134

During the latter half of December

Scelso

issued a summary report which described Oswald's

activities in Mexico City from September 26, 1963 -

October 3, 1963. Scelso characterized the summary report

as incomplete by comparison to assassination-related

information then available to the FBI but not provided

to. CIA until late Dec. 1963. (Ibid. pf. 114-115.) (CIA

Document Report by John Scelso to C/CI, Z4 Dec. 63.)*

Following issuance of this report, Helms shifted

responsibility for the CIA's investigation of President

Kennedy's assassination to the Counterintelligence

Staff. (HSCA Classified Deposition of John Scelso,

CF

5/16/78, p. 136, 8f. HSCA Classified Deposition of

Raymond Rocca, 7/17/78, p. 15 wherein Rocca states that

responsibility shifted from Scelso to CI Staff on

January 12, 1964.) Helms testified that this shift in

* Approximately two days after President Kennedy's

assassination, Scelso prepared a summary report,

provided to President Johnson by Helms.

This report

adopted the position that oswald probably was a lone

assassin who had no

visible ties to Soviet or Cuban

intelligence though such ties could not be excluded

-rom consigaratio

A Relass: Depa: of JonnScelse00001s

5/16/71

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from dA controlled

ocunen

ocumenfs

responsibility was a logical development because the

investigation had begun to take on broader tones.

(Executive Session Testimony of Richard Helms, 8/9/78,

p. 14, see also HSCA Classified Deposition of John

Scelso, 5/16/78, p. 138.)

Helms' reasoning was expanded upon by raymond

Rocca who testified before the Committee that the

shift in responsibility described by Helms was caused

in part by the establishment of the Warren Commission.

7/17/78

(ESCA Classified Deposition of Raymond Rocca, pP. 12-13.)

Rocca added:

It was entirely appropriate in the

GPFLOOR phase that he (Scelso) would

have that (responsibility for the Agency

investigation.)

But the minute you had

a commission

• set up outside the line

obviously had to be the Director, and from

the Director to his Chief of Operations

overseas, because

the spread involved

then all of the divisions.

Here you had

MI. (Scelso being asked to selecherlands,

capes that nagto, do wit

with U.K., with Australiall

and it would

have-seemed to me utterly

simply a hybrid monster.

administratively

(HSCA Classified

Deposition Of R. Rocca, 1/11/78, p. 12.1

James Angleton supported Rocca's belief that "the

spread (of investigative responsibility) involved...

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all of the (CIA) divisions." Angleton testifed

to this Committee that the Agency's efforts to

gather and coordinate information related to

the assassination underwent a metamorphic

transition. Initially, Angleton noted, the

Director, Deputy Director, Division Chiefs and

Case Officers approached Warren Commission.

requirements in a piecemeal fashion. However,

Angleton testified the Agency was eventually

able to focus its

resources to avoid duplication

of effort and provide a system for the central

referencing of assassination related information

as such information was developed. (HSCA

Classified Deposition of James Angleton,

10/5/78, pp. 76-77, see also HSCA Classified

Deposition of raymond Rocca, 8/17/78,

p. 23.)

1.

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rom Sontrolled documents:

The record reveals that during this second phase

of CIA information collection efforts in support of

the Warren Commission investigation the concentration

of Agency resources shifted in emphasis from exploration

of Oswald's activities in Mexico City to his residency

in the Soviet Union during 1959-1962 and possible

association with the soviet intelligence apparatus. + segp faff)

(Ibia., pp. 32-33,44, Executive Session of Testimony of

Richard Helms, 8/9/78, p. 23.1 Affordingig, Rocca, commented

that during this phase primary interest in support of the

Warren Commission was to follow-up on Soviet leads:

on the assumption that a person who spends

four years**in the Soviet Union, under his

circumstances, had to be of specific interest

to Soviet State security and their collateral

authorities. (HSCA Classified Deposition of

Raymond Rocca, pp. 32-33.1 (seep dE for *e) 8,

Therefore, Rocca concluded, the areas the CIA tended

to concentrate on

concerned the Soviets:

Go topp- 1afe contination of text

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from ElA-*entrelled documents.)

*The following exchange between Mr. Rocca and Committee

Counsel sheds further light on the difficulties encountered

by the Agency related to its investigation of possible

Cuban involvement in the assassination:

Mr. Goldsmith.

Earlier, when I asked you which

areas of the case received emphasis, I believe that you

indicated that on balance the primary area of emphasis

was the Soviet connection.

Mr. Rocca. That was certainly the one that I would

say dominated -- looking at it from my point of view.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, had you known about the anti-

Castro assassination plots on the part of the CIA, would

you have given

more priority, more emphasis, to the

possibility of a Castro conspiracy to kill the President?

Mr. Rocca.

Again, I say that it would have

simply intensified it, that there was attention given

to it, not particularly by the staff. I had no capabilities

on the Cuban side.

The organization of their service and their

operation in Mexico was something entirely entirely (sic)

within -- it was an enigma at

the time.

They were just

getting started. This

was WH's area.

This was Win

Scott's area of

proficiency.

So the

defectors had only

-begun. to. come out and they came out later, the Cuban

defectors.

So, I can't -- I really can't say that (a) the

Cuban connection was ignored, because it wasn't.

The

press was filled with it at the time.

The Harker interview should have been undoubtedly

given greater attention in a generalized sense; but it

was given specific attention, I was told at the time of

the Rockefeller thing.

Mr. Goldsmith. In what way was the Cuban connection

investigated?

Mr. Rocca. I don't know. I don't know this.

That side of the report strikes

me as being inadequate.

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Kiris ferm is te be used for material cantonatad

*The following exchange between Mr. Rocca and Committee

counsel sheds further light on the difficulties encountered

by the Agency related to its investigation of possible

Cuban involvement in the assassination:

Mr. Goldsmith. Earlier, when I asked you which

areas of the case received emphasis, I believe that you

indicated that on balance the primary area of emphasis

was the Soviet connection.

MI. Rocca. That was certainly the one that I would

say dominated -- looking at it from my point of view.

Mr. Goldsmith.

Now, had you known about the anti-

Castro assassination plots on the part of the CIA, would

you have given more priority, more emphasis, to the

possibility of a Castro conspiracy to kill the President?

MI. Rocca.

Again, I say that it would have

simply intensified it, that there was

attention given

to it, not particularly by the staff. I had no capabilities

on the Cuban side.

The organization of their service and their

operation in Mexico was something entirely entirely (sic)

within -- it was an enigma at

the time.

They were just

getting started. This was WH's area.

This was Win

Scott's area of

proficiency.

So the defectors had only

-begun

to come out and they

came out later, the Cuban

defectors.

So, I can't -- I really can't say that (a) the

Cuban connection was ignored, because it wasn't.

press was filled with it at the time.

The Harker interview should have been undoubtedly

given greater attention in a generalized sense; but it

was given specific attention, I was told at the time of

the Rockefeller thing.

Mr. Goldsmith. In what way was the Cuban connection

investigated?

Mr. Rocca.

I don't know.

I don't know this.

That side of the

report strikes

me as being inadequate.

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Mr. Goldsmith.

Well, when I said to what extent

was

the Cuban connection investigated, I don't mean by

the Warren Commission. I mean to what extent did the

Agency provide --

Mr. Rocca. That I can't answer. I certainly

didn't, do it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Pardon me?

MI. Rocca.

We certainly didn't, in R & A.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, CI/R & A did not --

MI. Rocca. Go into the Cuban side of it at all.

This was something left to the people who were concerned

specifically with Cuban intelligence and security operation.

Mr. Goldsmith. But I believe earlier we

established that Mr.

Helms gave orders that information

pertinent to the assassination was to go through your

office, correct?

Mr. Rocca. Yes.

MI. Goldsmith. And once information pertinent

to the assassination went through your office, I take (it)

you or Mr. Helms would decide what information would

be relevant for the Warren Commission to see.

Is that correct?

Mr. Rocca. Well =

Mr. Goldsmith. Based upon what you knew?

MI. Rocca. Well, everything would go, yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Therefore, you were in the

position, it would seem, to know

what information was

being generated in the field that was going to the

Warren Commission.

Earlier I asked you which area received emphasis

and I believe you indicated that the Soviet area (did).

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Mr. Rocca.

Primarily, primarily. But I didn't

mean by that that it excluded the Cuban, because there

was a lot of material that came through and went to the

Commission that concerned the Cubans.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let's go off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

M. Goldsmith. Let's continue.

Mr. Rocca.

My recollection is that at the time

the great press

manifestation was that Cuban exiles who

were in touch with CIA had been somehow involved in this.

This was the great concern.

Mr. Goldsmith. That's another possibility.

There are different --

Mr. Rocca. Questions went down to WH: do you

have anybody who could possibly have gotten involved in

this kind of thing.

There was extraordinary diligence, I thought,

exercised to try to clarify that side.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you think that the possibility

of an assassination plot by Castro against the President

was adequately investigated?

(Pause)

MI. Rocca. With the advantages of 20-20 hind-

sight, I could say probably not.

to me that they gave due attention to it - within

But at the time seens,

information that I had at my disposal.

Gosan

Oswain

**In fact, SHO spent 2 years, 8 months in the Soviet Union

October 1959 - June 1962

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continues

from (2o)

(2000

because the people he was in touch with in

Mexico had traces, prior traces, as KGB

people. They were under consular

cover and obviously could have been

doing and were undoubtedly doing a

consular job in those earlier contacts.

(Ibia., p. 33)

However, Rocca did indicate that Cuban aspects

of the CIA investigation were not ignored "because

there was a lot of material that came through and

went to the Commission that concerned the Cubans."

(Ibid., p. 44)

Mr. Helms also testified that the possibility

of Cuban involvement in President Kennedy's

assassination was a source of deep concern within the

Agency. (Exec. Session Testimony of R. Helms, 8/9/78, P. 21)

Nevertheless, Mr. Helms stated that development of informa-

tion pertaining to Cuban knowledge of or participation •

.in the assassination was very difficult to-obtain.

(Ibia., p. 138)

Angleton was in agreement with Rocca's analysis

that during the second phase of the Agency's support

role to the Warren Commission the CIA concentrated its

resources or

alish? be Soviet influence on

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MIns torm is to Be used far marend extracte

Oswald. a Angleton, P. 86) He stated for the record

ith regard to the Warren Commission's investigation

(with the CIA's support) of possible Cuban involvement

in the assassination:

I personally believe that the United

States intelligence services did not

have the capabilities

to

ever come to

an adjudication (of the Cuban aspect).

I don't think the capabilities were there.

(ASCA ClasSified Deposition of James Angleton,

10/5/78/

93)

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F8m ElA-E8RtFsHed desument.:)

As noted above, the CI Staff assumed responsibility

in late December 1963 - early January 1964 for the

coordination of CIA efforts to assist the Warren

Commission in its investigation. At that time, Raymond

Rocca, Chief of Research and Analysis for CI Staff,

was designated point of contact with the Warren

Commission. (schlasseted Depesition uf Jemes

Angleton, 10/5/78, p. 77.) Rocca's Research and

Analysis component was concerned with:

"analytical intelligence,

brainpower, which meant

analytical

all source, all

overt source comprehension; a study of

cases that had ceased to occupy opera-

tional significance,

that is, closed cases,

to maintain the ongoing record of overall

quality and quantity of counterintelligence

being performed by the entire DDP operational

component;.

the Deputy Director for Plan

8/17/7979Ssified Deposition of R. Rocca,

"See also HSCA Classified Deposition

of James Angleton, 10/5/78, p. 77.)

Mr. Rocca testified that assassination-related

information generated by CIA components was directed

to his staff (as designated point of contact with the

Warren Commission) in the normal flow of day to day

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This form is to be used for material

extracted

So meat:

HSCA ClassDepo.58.20661,7/17/78

work (Foid., pp. 16-17.) This information was then

reviewed by Rocca of his assistants who included

Thomas Hall,

(Soviet Expert), (Paul Hartman (general

research and search man for the U.S. Intelligence

Conmunity and its resources), and Arthur Dooley, (who

had transferred to the CIA from the FBI a number of

years prior to the assassination) (Ibid. p. 17.)

During the course of the Warren Commission investi-

gation, Hall, Hartman and Dooley worked with those

CIA divisions producing substantive information

related to the assassination. (Ibid.)

Mr. Rocca testified that even though

CI/R&A was the Agency's point of reference with regard

to the Warren Commission, neither his staff nor the

CI staff in general displaced the direct relations of

MI. Helms of any other concerned Agency official with

the Warren Commission. (Ibid.; Rocca testified that heithér

CI Staff nor his staff displaced the CIA's Soviet

Division (represented by David Murphy, Chief of the

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79m ElA→ EgAtFsiled dacuments:)

SR division and his assistant,

Tennant Bagley)in

its contact with the Commission; nor did CI/R&A

displace John Scelso in his contact with the Warren

Commission.) Rocca testified that in some instances

J. Lee Rankin of the Warren Commission would go directly

to Helms with requests, and in other instances David

Slawson, a Commission Staff counsel, conferred directly

with Tom Hall of Rocca's staff. (Ibid. p. 36.)*

The record reveals that on certain issues of

particular sensitivity Rocca was not permitted to act

as the Agency's point of contact with the Warren Commission.

He testified that "compartmentalization was observed

notwithstanding the fact that I was the working level

point of contact." (ASCA Classified Deposition of Raymond

* Although James Angleton functioned as Rocca's direct

superior during the course of the Warren Commission

investigation, he did not participate on a regular

basis in the Agency's efforts to supply substantive

nformation to the Warren Commission nor did he dea

on a direct basis with Warren Commission representa-

tives. (excepting Allen Dulles on an unofficial basis;

HSCA Classified Deposition of Raymond Rocca, 78/17/78,

p. 17-18; HSCA Classified Deposition of James Angleton,

10/5/78, p. 78.) However, Angleton testified to this

Committee that he did attempt to keep apprised of

developments as the investigation progressed through

consultation with Rocca. (HSCA Classified Deposition of

James Angleton, 10/5/78, p. 81)

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(FRis f8Fm is 18 be used for material exterated

F8FR ElA-CantFsted documents:)

Rocca, 18/17/18, p. 18) Rocca cited by way of example

the case of the Soviet defector Nosenko. Rocca

testified that he did not attend any of the Agency

discussions pertaining to Nosenko's case (Ibia.)

Rather, (as it affected the Warren Commission investi-

gation) responsibility for the Nosenko case was

assigned to David Murphy, Chief of SR Division, in

addition to Richard Helms. (Ibid)

Rocca described the CI staff mail intercept program,

HTLINGUAL, as a second example of an Agency matter

about which he had no knowledge nor input vis a vis

the Agency's support role to the Warren Commission.

(Ibia., pp. 19-20.)

Rather, James Angleton and Birch

O'Neal handled the disposition of this particular

material (HSCA Classified Deposition of J. Scelso,

5/16/78, p. 113, wherein Scelso states that CI Staff

to provide

#THiNSuAn program

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In summary, it was Rocca's testimony that an internally

decentralized information reporting function best

characterized the organization of this second phase

of the Agency's investigative efforts to assist

che Warren Commission. (Ibid., p. 10; HSCA Classifiec

Deposition of James Angleton, 10/5/78, p. 75, 80.

See also CIA Doc. Rocca Memo for Record, 1 April 1975,

Subject: Conversation with David W. Belin, April 1,

o 1977, wherein it is stated that Helms remained senior

official in charge of the overall investigation,

with CI staff acting as a coordinator and repository

of information collected.)

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-9-

A. Opinions of Warren Commission and CIA Representatives

Regarding Warren Commission-CIA Relationship

The Committee has contacted both representatives of

the Warren Commission staff and those representatives of

the CIA who played significant roles in providing CIA-

generated information to the Warren Commission. The

general consensus of these representatives is that the

Warren Commission and the CIA enjoyed a successful

working relationship during the course of the Commission's

investigation. (HSCA Class. Depo. of R. Rocca 7/17/78,

p. 18) (See also Exec. Sess. Test. of Richard Helms,

8/9/78, Rpl,24:) William Coleman, a senior staff counsel

for the Warren Commission who worked closely with Warren

Commission

staff counsel W. David Slawson on matters

which utilized the CIA's resources, characterized

the CIA representatives with whom he dealt as

highly competent, cooperative, and intelligent.

(See HSCA staff interview of William Coleman,

8/2/78.)

Mr. Slawson expressed a similar opinion

regarding the Agency's cooperation and quality

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of work. (Executive Session Testimony of W.

David Slawson, 11/15/77, p. 17;, see also JEK

Exhibit 23.)

J. Lee Rankin, General Counsel for the

warren Commission, testified that the Warren

Commission and its staff were assured by the CIA

that the Agency would cooperate in the Commission's

work

(ASCA Class. Depo. of J. Lee Rankin,

8/7/78, p. 4; HSCA Class. Depo. of John McCone,

8/17/78, p. 9)

John McCone, Director of Central Intelligence

at the time of President Rennedy's assassination

and during the Warren Commission investigation,

supported Mr. Rankin's testimony in this regard

by characterizing the CIA's work vis-a-vis

the Warren Commission as both responsive and

comprehensive. (HSCA Class. Depo. of John

McCone, 8/17/78, p. 5) Mr. McCone was responsible

for ensuring that all relevant matters were

see yello Red Changes

Hardwrl161.

11S: 11

000029

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trom ClA- controlled documents.

-10a-

conveyed by the CIA to the Warren Commission.

(Ibid., pp. 5-6) In this regard, Mr. McCone

testified that:

The policy of the CIA was to give the Warren

Commission everything that we had. I

personally asked Chief Justice Warren to

come to my office and took him down to the

vault of our building where our information is

microfilmed and stored and showed him the

procedures that we were following and the

extent to which we were giving him -- giving

his staff everything that we had, and I think

he was quite satisfied. (Ibid., p. 9)

¿ste the mamen commi

Materials Be Made Promptly Available By

CIA To Warren Commission

MI. Raymond Rocca, • fi aningier dimplorenter of ClA

Poing the warfer

the Warren Commission

investigation,

characterized the Agençy's role as one of

full support to the Warren Commission. Mr.

Rocca, who served as the Chief of the Research and

009030

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trois abre jortpored stadrientsraterial extracted

from ClA-controlled documents.)

-10b-

Analysis Divison for the Counter-Intelligence

Staff of the CIA, stated under oath that

Richard Helms had given the following

directive:

ралуі

• All material bearing in the way that

could be of

assistance to the

Warren Conmission should be seen by CIf

staff and Rant A and marked for us.

He

issued very, very strictly worded

indications - they were verbal in so

far as I know -- that we were to leave no

stone unturned.

(ESCA Class. Depo. of Raymond Rocca,

7/17/78, P. 24)

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SECAZH

Classification: -

ME. RoGaRis agARds thader usa for inchermarlen#saed Mr. Helms'

orders were followed fonthe lotuments.

che letter by all cla employees.

(Ibia. p. 24.) MI. Rocca concluded that on this basis:

"The CIA was to turn over and to develop any information

bearing on the assassination that could be of assistance

to the Warren Cormission." (Ibid., p. 26.)

A different view of the CIA's sole regarding the

supply of CIA's information to the Warren Commission was

propounded by Richard Helms. Mr. Helms, who served as

the CIA's Deputy Director for Plans during the Warren

Conmission investigation, was directly responsible for the

CIA's investigation of President Kennedy's assassination andthe

establishmen of ClA policy visa ris the Warren Commission.

(Ibid., p. 23.)

He testified to the Committee that the

CIA made every effort to be as responsive as possible to

Warren Commission requests. (Exec. Sess. Text. of Richard

Helms, 8/9/78, p. 10.) MI. Helms added further testimony

regarding the manner in which the CIA provided its infor-

mation to the Warren Commission. He stated:

An inquiry would come over (from the Warren Com-

mission). We would attempt to respond to it.

But these inquiries came in individual bits and

pieces or as individual items...Each individual

item that came along we took care of as best we

could. (Ibid., pp. 10-11.)

However, it was Mr. Helms' recollection that the CIA

provided information to the warren Commission primarily

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on the basis dhieher druth signed sos preteril extregeests. Under

from ClA-controlled documents.)

oath he supported

this proposition:

Mr. Goldsmith:

In summary, is it your position that

the Agency gave the Warren Commission

information only in response to speci-

fic requests by the Warren Commission?

MI. Helms:

That is correct.

I want to modify that by saying that

memory is fallable.

There may have been

times or circumstances under which some-

thing different might have occured, but

my recollection is that we were attempting

to be responsive and supportive to the

FBI and the Warren Commission. When

they asked for something we gave it to

• them.

As far as our volunteering information

is concerned, I have no recollection of

whether we volunteered it or not.

(Ibid., p. 34.)

Mr. Helms' characterization of fulfilling Warren

Conmission requests on a caserbasis rather than uniformly

volunteering relevant information to the Warren Commission

stands in direct opposition to J. Lee Rankin's perception

of the CIA's investigative responsibility. Mr. Rankin was

asked by Committee Counsel whether he worked under the

impression that the Agency's responsibility was simply to

respond to questions that were addressed to CIA by the

Warren Commission. In response, Mr. Rankin testified as

follows:

Not at all and if anybody had told me that I

would have insisted that the commission com-

municate with the President and get a different

arrange classificatione might not ask the right

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(This form is to be used for material extracted

rotti cram donioned useumehts. aterial extracted

from ClA_ controlled docüments.

-13-

B

questions and then we would not have the

information and that would be absurd.

(ESCA Class. Depo. of J. Lee Rankin,

8/17/78, p. 4)

MI. Slawson added support to Rankin's position

testifying that Warren Commission requests to the CIA

were rarely specific. "The request was made initially

that they give us all information pertinent to the

assassination investigation." (Exec. Sess. Test. of

W. David Slawson, 11/15/77, p. 29)

CIA's failera to Discres: 214 inri

Cutro disusination Pirini to Nerien

Commissim

yn unfortunate consequence

treCIA to provide tru

CIA:

mitirial isreficcolii

the subsequent exposure of the CIA's anti-Castro

assassination plots <(SSC Book V) see also (Alleged

Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, Interim

Report, SSC, 11/20/7517. Paradosiealtyrevenif

che

warrencomnission.had requested.informationon such

The record revends that the

otots,

tea CIA's point of contact with the Warren

Commission wg

i not narenbeer able to providenthe

dolce

2000521

cibosiff

soch art:

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=

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sassilcanon

Secret

cassitication

(This form is to be used for material extracted

frais deam controlted usedumentsmaterial extracted

from CIA * controlled documents.)

-13a-

commission wi

Information so requested. As

Mr. Rocca

MI. RoCca'3 testimony reveáls, # had no

knowledge at the time of the Warren Commission

investigation of Agency efforts to assassinate

Fidel Castro. (HSCA Class. Depo. of Raymond

Rocca, 7/17/78, P. 50, 1

geep.3c

Via:

@hesitinat

20.0522

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0D0035

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(This form is to be used for material extracted

from CIA * controlled documents:)

Had Rocca, as the CIA's working level representative

to the warren Commission, been requested by the

commission to research and report on any and and

CIA anti-Castro assassination operations, Rocca's

this wurking/suest

efforts would have produced no substantive informa-

tion. (Ibia., p. 4975

also

The record #ed revealS that the CIA desk

officer who was initially given the responsibility

by MI. Helms to investigate

Lee Harvey

Oswald, and the assassination of President Kennedy

had no knowledge of such plots during his investi-

specifical, gation.

(HSCA Class. Depo. of John Scelso, 5/16/78,

142-43 Withregard to the AMLASt aperation

pp. 73,

111-112)^ Mr. Scelso testified that had he

known of such assassination plots the following

action would have been taken:

"We would have gone at that hot and heavy.

We would have queried the agent (AMLASH)

about it in great detail. I would have

had him polygraphed by the best operative

security had to see if he had (sic) been

a double-agent, informing Castro about

our poison pen things, and so on.

would have had all our Cuban sources

queried about it." (Ibid., p. 166)

00003

As the record reflects, these plots were known

by few within the CIA. Mr. Helms' testimony regarding

Roice testified he was not in apositin to assuer questions related toriA.

Antise pois aged st eastr dur that prost hard to beans need a pries uno vereiitriain

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these plots reveals that the Agency compromised the policy of

its pirector

Its-promise to supply all relevant information to

(sex siatementor Jonn Mucont, ploaherein)

the Warren Commission. The following exchange

between Committee Counsel and Mr. Helms illustrates

the extent

Mr. Goldsmith:

of the Agency's compromise:

Mr. Helms, I take it from your

testimony that your position is

that the anti-Castro plots, in

fact, were relevant to the

Warren Commission's work; and,

in light of that, the Committee

would like to be informed as to

why the Warren Commission was

not told by you of the anti-

Castro assassination plots.

Mr. Helms:

I have never been asked to testify

before the Warren Commission about

our operations.

Mr. Goldsmith:

If the Warren Commission did not

know of the operation, it certainly

was not in a position

to ask you

about it.

Is that not true?

Mr. Helms:

Yes, but how do you know they did

not know about it?

How do you

know Mr. Dulles had not told them?

How was I to know that? And bestdes?

I was not the Director of the Agency

and in the CIA, you did not go

traipsing around to the Warren Com-

mission or to Congressional Committees

or to anyplace else without the

Director's permission.

Mr. Goldsmith:

Did you ever discuss with the Director

whether the warren Commission

should be informea of the anti-castro

assassination plots?

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Visit

16

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from CIA - controlled documents.)

Mr. Helms:

I did not, as far as I recall.

(HSCA Exec.

Sess.

rest. of Richard

Hedas, 8/9/78, pp. 30-31-j, emphasis

Mr. McCone testifed that he first became aware

of the CIA's anti-Castro assassination plots

involving CIA-Mafia ties during August 1963. He

stated that upon learning of these plots he directed

that the. Agency cease all such activities. (HSCA

Class. Depo. of John McCone, 8/17/78, P. 13)

When asked whether the CIA desired to withold informa-

tion from the. Warren Commission about the Agency anti-

Castro assassination plots to avoid embarrassing the

Agency or causing an international crises he gave

the following response:

"I cannot answer that since they (CIA

employees knowleageable of the

continuance of such plots) withheld

the information from. me.

I cannot

answer that question. I have never

been satisfied as to why they with-

held the information from me. (Ibid.,

p. 16)

Regarding the relevancy of such plots to

Warren Commission's work, Warren Commission counsels

Rankin, slawson and Spector were in agreement that

such information should have been reported to the

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from CIA: controllededocursents.)

Warren Commission.

(Exec. Sess. Test. of W.

David Slawson, 11/15/77, p. 27; Exec. Sess. Test.

of Arlen Spector 11/8/77, pp. 45-46; CF, Exec.

Sess. Test. of Wesley Liebeler, 11/15/77, p. 71

where he states that possible witholding of

information by CIA about Agency attempts to

assassinate Castro did not significantly affect

Warren Commission- investigation)

From the CIAls perspeetive, Mr. Rocca

testified that had he known of the anti-Castro

assassination plots his efforts to explore the

possibility of a retaliatory assassination against

President Kennedy by Castro would have been intensi-

fied. He stated that:

"

a completely different

procedural approach probably would and should have

been taken." (HSCA Class. Depo. Of Raymona Rocca

7/17/78, p. 45)

John Scelso, the above-cited CIA desk officer

who ran the CIA's initial investigation of President

Kennedy's assassination until that responsibility

was given to the CIA's counterintelligence staff,

offered a highly critical appraisal of Helms'

non-disclosure to the Warren Commission:

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Mr. Goldsmith:

Do you think MI. Helms was

acting properly when he failed

to tell the Warren Commission

about the assassination plots?

• Mr. Scelso:

No, I think that was a morally

highly reprehensible act, which

he cannot possibly justify under

his oath of office, or any

other standard of professional

public service.

(HSCA Class.

Depo. of John Scelso, 5/16/78)

Leges Responsib: 1i73

Agency concern for the Sanctity

of Sensitive Sources and Methods - Factors Affecting

CIA Resporse to Warren Commission Requests

The length of time required by the CIA to

respond to the Warren Commission's requests for

information was dependent upon l) the availability

of information;.. 2) the complexity of the issues

presented by the request and 3) the extent to which

the relevant information touched upon sensitive CIA

sources and methods. On the first two points, Mr.

Helms testified that when CIA had been able to

satisfy a Commission request, the CIA would then send

a reply back:

"and some of these inquiries obviously

took longer than others.

For example, some might involve.

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delete

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checking a file which was in washington.

Other inquiries might involve trying to

see if we could locate somebody in some

overseas country.

Obviously, one takes longer to per-

form than the other.

(Exec. Sess. Test.

of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, p. 25)

At times the ciA!'s concern for protecting its

sensitive sources and methods, caused the warrer

Commission to expérience greater difficulty in

getting relévant information than when the protec-

tion of such sources and methods was

not at issue.

J. Lee Rankin expressed the opinion that the Agency's

effort to protect its

sensitive sources and methods, particulur

with regard to CrAsurellane aper tin in Mexico City,

-affectathe quality of the

• information

which

the Warren Commission and its

staff were given

'23) As a result of the eA's concern, in

the Agency made tirestini

originalsaure

some Instances

initialle

while

The Committee has identified two

'areas of

concern in which the Agency's desire to protect its

sensitive sources and methodconflickwit

ispered the Harren

commission's investigation.

These are:

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1) Witholding information from the warren

re

that an

Commission

pertaining to the photo-

surveillance and telephonic surveillance

operations of the CIA's Mexico City Station

2) As a related consideration, the Agency's

reticence to reveal the origin of the photograph

now referred to as that of the "Mexico

City MYstery Ma", developed by the ains Moxicoloty photo-

GiArs Initial Concern for Revealina,

Sensitive Sources intmethods

The CIA's concern for revealing the existence

of sensitive technical operations, as outlined above,

was evident from

the inception of the Warren Commission.

MI. Scelso commented that

"we were not authorized

at first to reveal all our technical operations."

(Ibid., p. 158) But Scelso did testify that:

•We were going to give them intelligence

too. ee 1577111)

in Lell

infell

etf

procedires

gotten from the interrogation of silvia

Duran, for example, which corresponded

almost exactly with the information fror

(the telephone intercepts.]

Mr. Scelsco's characterization is supported by

examination of the background to the first major CIA

report furnished the Warren Commission regarding

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(This form is. to be used for material extracted

from CIA -controlied documents.)

Lee Harvey Oswald's trip to Mexico City. (CIA

DOC. FOIA #509-803/ 1/31/64, Memorändum for J.

Lee Rankin from Richard Helms) Much of the

information provided to the Warren Commission

in this report was based upon sensitive sources

and methods, identification of which had been

deleted completely from the report.

The CIA policy limiting Warren Commission

knowledge of CIA sources and methods was articu

lated as early as December 20, 1963, at which

time a cable was sent from CIA headquarters to

the Mexico City Station which stated:

Our present plan in passing information

to the Warren CommissionIs to eliminate

mention of| telephone taps.) in order to

protect your continuing ops.

will rely

instead on statements of Silvia Duran

and on contents of

soviet Consular f1le

- which soviets gave ODACID. (CIA-DOC. FOIA:

#420-757, 12/20/63, DiF 90466)

The basic policy articulated in the December

20, 1963 cablesis also set forti in a CIA memorandum o •

of December 10, 1963 as it specifically concerned

the CIA's relations with the FBI

(CIA Memorandum

for File, 12/20/63, Birch O'Neal, included in with Soft

file materials) In that memorandum,

Birch O'Neal

of the cIa Counterintelligence/special Investigations

Group stelassification he had been advised by Sam

ICA3T

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ole

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Papich, EBfonias sentedled'decuthents.) that the FBI was

anticipating a request from the Warren Commission

for copies of the FBI's materials which supported

or complimented the FBI's five volume report of

December 9, 1963 that had been submitted to the

Warren Commission. Papich provided 'Neal with

this report which indicated that some United

States Agency was tapping telephones in Mexico

and asked him

whether the FBI could supply the

warren Conmission with the sourof of the telephone

taps/

O'Neal's memorandum shows that he discussed

this matter with Scelso. After a discussion

with Helms, Scelso was directed by Helms to prepare

CIA material to be passed to the Warren Commission.

O'Neal wrote:

SECREE

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(This form is to be used for material extracted

from ClA-controlled documents.)

He (Scelso) was quite sure it was not

the Agency's desire to make available

to the Commission at least in this

manner--via the FBI-sensitive informa-

tion which could relate tol telephone

3-

*

Gok

-ok

The opinion expressed by Scelso as of December

20, 1963 was set forth on January 14, 1964 in a

formalized fashion, when Helms expressed his

concern regarding exposure by the FBI of Agency

sources to the Warren Commission.

Helms wrote

that the CIA had become aware that the FBI had

already:

called to the attention of the

Commission, through its attorney,

that we have information (as deter-

mined from Agency sources)] coinciding

with the dates when Oswald

was in Mexico

City and which may have some bearing

on his activities while in that area.

(CIA dissemination to FBI, 1/14/64,

CIA

CSCI-3/ 779/510-5014474-191

- - Mr. Helms further indicated that the CIA might

be called upon to provide additional information

acquired from checks of CIA records and agency

sources.

He suggested that certain policies be

employed to enable CIA to work cooperatively

with the Commission in a manner which would

protect CIA information, sources and methods.

Among the policies articulated

were two which

Helms claimed would enable the Agency to control

the flow of Agency originated information. In

this way the CIA could check the possibility of

revealing its sources and methods inadvertantly.

The policies articulated were:

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C

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(This form is to be used for material extracted

from ClA-controlied documents.)

The CIA policy of eliminating reference to Agency

sensitive sources and methods is further revealed

by examination of an Agency cable, dated January 29,

1964, sent from CIA Headquarters to the CIA Mexico

City Station. (CIA DOC. FOIA 7398-204, 1/29/64""

DIR 97829) This cable indicated that knowledge of

Agency sources and techniques was still being with-

held from the warren Commission, and stated that on

Saturday, February 1, 1964, the CIA was to present

a report on Oswald's Mexico City activities to the

Warren Commission which would be in a form

protective of the CIA's Mexico City Station's

sources and techniques (Ibid.)

ok

(Footnote cont'd from pg. 23.)

1) Your Bureau not disseminate information re-

ceived from this Agency without prior concua

rence

2)

In instances in which this Agency has provided

information to your Bureau and you consider

that information is pertinent to the Commission's

interest, and/or compliments Isich or otherwise

e

is pertinent to information developed or

received by your bureau through other sources

and is being provided by you to the Commission,

you refer the commission to this Agency.

such cases it will be appreciated if you will

advise us of such referral in order that we may

congrate she periote sente interest o sheps to

meeting its needs. (Ibia.ladrr

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die did

225

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from CIA controlled documents:)

Telephone Taps

Mt. Helms offered testimony regarding the CIA's

reticence to inform the warren Commission, at least

during. the initial stage of the Commission's work,

of the CIA's [telephonic and photo surveillance

operations in Mexico City.

The reason for the sensitivity of these

[telephone taps and surveillance was not

only becuase it was

sensitive from the

Agency's standpoint.

taps were ruming Inebut the ten phone

the Mexican authorities and therefore,

if this had become public knowledge,

it would have caused very bad feelings

between Mexico and the United States,

and that was the reason.

(Exec. Sess.

Test. of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, PP. 51-52)

The CIA's unwillingness to inform the Warren

connission in the early stages of its investigation

of the above-described surveillánce operátions is

a source, of concern to this committee. It is

indicative of an Agency policy designed to skew

its favor the form and substance of informatin

the cIa felt uncomfortable proyiding the Weren

Commission. (HSCA Class. Depo. Of John Scelso,

5/6/78, p. 158) This process might well have

hampered the Commission's ability to-proceed in

291

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its investmen isole dou foregrees bested

before it.

As noted previously, on January 31, 1964,

the CIA provided the Warren Commission with a

memorandum that chronicled Lee Harvey Oswald's

Mexico City visit during September 25, 1963

substant. onl

(CLA Doc. FOIA #509-803 1/31/64)

october 3, 1963: That memorandum did not mentionano: asan

that Oswald's various conversations with the Cuban

nd Soviet Embassy/Consulates had been, tapped anc

y the Agency's Mexico City Statio

subsequently transcribed?

Furthermore, that memo-

randum did not mention that the CIA had [tapped

and transcribed conversations between Cuban Embassy

employee Sylvia Duran and Soviet officials at the

soviet embassy/consulate (for a pention made de delete

the conversations between cuban president dórticos

and Cubán Ambassador to Mexico Armas which the CIA

had(alsoftaaped and) transeribed./

On February 1, 1964, Helms appeared before the

Cormission and Hitely discussed the memorandum of :

January 31, 1964.

(CIA DOC. FOIA #498-204, 1/29/504, •

DIR 97829) On February 10, 1964, J. Lee Rankin wrote

Helms in regard to the CIA memorandum of January 31.

(JFK DOC. No. 3872) A review of Rankin's letter

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from ClA-controlled documents.)

indicates that as of his writing, the Warren

Conmission had no substantive knowledge of the hare

[telephonic surveillance operation of the production

i.e., the tapes and transcripts from that operation

Rankin inquired in the February 10, 1964 letter

whether Oswald's direct communication

with employees

of the Soviet Embassy (as stated in Paragraph I

al of January 31 memorandum) had been facilitated by l:

whitelephone or interview. Manifestly, had the warren

Commission

been informed of the [telephonic

surveillance operation and its success in(tapping]

Oswald this inguiry by Rankin would not have been

made.

Ranki

letters

Raymond Rocca's testimony tends to support

this conclusion. It was Rocca's recollection that

between the time period of January 1964 - April 1964,

Warren Commission's representatives had visited the

CIA's headquarters in Langley, Virginia and had

been shown various transcripts resulting from the

[CIA's telephonic surveillance] operations in Mexico

City. (SCA Class. Depo. Of Raymond Rocca, 7/17/78,

p. 99)

However, Mr. Rocca did not personally nake

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this material available to Commission representa-

tives and was not able to state under oath

precisely the point in time at which the Warren

Commission first learned of these operations. (Ibia.)

On February 19, 1964 the CIA responded to

(Q$384, FOL A NO 553-83814

Rankin's inquiry of February 10. The Agency

response did indicate that Oswald had phoned the

Soviet Consulate and was also interviewed at the

Consulate.

However, the Agency

neither revealed

the source of this information in its response to

the Commission nor indicated that this source

would be revealed by other means le.g. by oral

briefing). (Ibia.)

Warren Commission Knowledge ci CIA Telephonic Surveillance]

During the period of March - April 1964,

David Slawson drafted a series of memoranda which

among other issues concerned Warren Commission kraw- o

ledge of and access to the production material

derived from the CIA telephonic surveillance operations

in Mexico City. A review of these memoranda tends

to support the Committee's belief that the warren

Commission, through Mssis. Slawson, Coleman, and

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originalsonies

from CIA -controlled documents.)

surveillance materials until April 9, 1964. On

that date, Coleman, Slawson and Willens met with

Win Scott,| the CIA's Chief of Station in Mexico

City, who provided them with various transcripts

and translations (derived

from CIA telephone taps

of the Cuban and Soviet Embassy/Consulates.

(Slawson

Memorandum of April 22, 1964, Subject: Irip to

Mexico City p22.)

prior to April 9, it appears doubtful that

the Commission had been given even partial access

to the referenced material. Nevertheless, by March

12, 1964, the record indicates that the Warren

Commission had

at least become aware that|the CIA

did maintain telephonic surveillancelof the Cuban

Embassy/Consulate. (Slawson merorandum, March 12,

1964, Subj: meeting with CIA representatives).

Slawson's memorandum of March 12 reveals that. the Warren

Commission had learned that the CIA possessed trat

scripts of conversations between the Cuban Ambassador

al to Mexico, Armas, and the Cuban President Dorticosy

The

Dorticos-Armas conversations, requested by the

Harren

which hadbeen summarized in the

constances remora-duri

Doc. FoIA +8509-803, 1/31/0%)

Classification:

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# Slawson

Miscommittee

000051

became nue off the 4x1 classifiéd by derivation:

of citsurveillancoperitins

In Meret

probatiopriato-

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SECRET

Classification:

(This form is to be used for material extracted

from ClA-controlled documerite, MarinEz

Conmission representatives at nutrirg; with

CIA officials, including Richard Helms,. concerned

Silvia Duran's arrest and interrogation by the

Mexican Federal Police. (Slawson Memorandum of

April 22, 1964, pp. 3, 19, 45-46) Helms responded

to the Commission's request for access, stating

that he would attempt to arrange for the Warren

Commission's representatives to review this material.

(Slawson Memorandum of March 12, 1964, p. 6)

Another Slawson memorandum, dated March 25,

1964 concerned Oswald's trip to Mexico. In that memo

Slawson wrote that the tentative conclusions

he had reached concerning Oswald's Mexico trip!

were derived from CIA memoranda of January 31, 1964

and. February 19, 1964, (Slawson Memorandum of March

25, 1964, p. 20) and, in addition, a Mexican federal

police summary of interrogationsconducted shortly-

after the assassination with -

Slawson wrote:

A large part of it (the summary report)

is

simply a summation of what the Mexican

police learned when they interrogated Mrs.

Silvia. Duran, an employee of the Cuban

Consulate in

Mexico City, and is there-

fore only as accurate as Mis. Duran's

testimony to the police. (Ibid.)

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31-

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These comments indicate that Slawson placed

qualified reliance upon the Mexican police summary.

Moreover, there is no indication that Slawson had

been provided the Duran telephonic intercept tran-

scripts. In fact, by virtue of Slawson's comments

concerning the Mexican police report, it would

appear that the Warren Commission, as of March 25,

had been provided little substantive information

pertaining to Silvia Duran. As Slawson reveals,

the commission had been forced to rely upon the two

memoranda that did not make reference to the surveil-

lance operations, and a summary report issued by

the Mexican Federal Police. Thus, the Agency had

= for over three months: Preluded

- exposing

actual antasalys. 15

the surveillance operations to thereview of the

concerned Warren Commission staff members.

As was

Dok stated in the CIA cable of December 20, 196f to its

Mexico City Station:

Our present plan in passing information

to the warren Commission is to eliminate

mention of telephone taps, in order to

protect your continuing operations. Will

rely instead on statements of Silvia

K

Duran and on contents of soviet consular

file which soviets gave lODACID here.

(CIA DOC. FOIA #420-757, Dec: 20, 1964,3

GIAR 2144 DIR 90466)

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(This form is to be used for material extracted

from ClA -controlled documents.)

The Committee's belief that Slawson had

• [telephonia intercept ]

not been given access to the Duran transcripts is

further supported by reference to his memorandum

Ofts of March 27, 1961 fep59554 wherein he states his

conclusion that Oswald had visited the Cuban

at least this andprobataly an

ok Embassy of three occasions.

(Ibid, p. 2) This

again

conclusion, he wrote, was based upon an analysis of

Silvia Duran's testimony before the Mexican police.

This memorandum bears no indication that he had

reviewed any of the Duran transcripts. Furthermore,

had slawson been giver access to these transcripts,

certainly their substance would Have been incorporated

into kis analysis and accordingly noted for this

purpose.

His analysis would haver reflected the fact

of his review either by its corroboration or

criticism of the above cited Mexican police summary report.

delor surveillance eroduction would hate clarifiga

Logicaly, access to the cIA's telephonic

some

ambiguities.

For example,

September 27, at 4:05 p.m.

(Slawson Memorándum of Apmal 21, 1964, Subj: [Intercepts

from Soviet and Cuban

Embassies in Mexico, e- 2) per fot sentence

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Silvia DuraRis telephoned

stated that a merelle dos eesently at the

Cuban Embassy requesting an

in-transit visit to

Cuba. This American was later determined by CIA

analysts

to be oswald.

/ Again on

september 28, at 11:51

a.m.

Duran telephoned the soviet Consulate stating that

an American, subseqdently identified by CIA analysts

as oswald was at

the Cuban Embassy.

Had this' informatiom been made available to Slawson,

his calculatións of Oswald's activities in Mexico

City would have been more firmly established than

/retlcukdir.nis.nerndrindoor

they were as of March 27, 1964.

The record supports the Committee's finding

that as of April 2, 1964 the Warren Commission had

still not been given access to the drove testences

series|offtelephonic intercepts""A memorandum of

originalsourcenaterial

that date by Coleman and Slawson,

posed one

question to the CIA and made two. reguestsfor information

from the Agency. (Slawson - Coleman Memorandum Off

April 2, 1964, Subj: Questions Raised by the Ambassador

Mann File) Coleman and Slawson wrote:

1) What is the information source referred

to in the November 28 telegram that

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üstagra intendeded dors enteriel adrastein

from CIA -controlled documents.)

Odessa;

2) We would like to see copies of the

transcripts of the intercepts] translated

if possible, in all cases where the

intercepts] refer to the assassination.

or related subjects;

3) We would especially like to see the

(intercept) in which the allegation that

money was passed at the Cuban Embassy

is discussed (Ibid.)

The question initially posed by (Item I) in

the above-referenced memorandum of April 2 concerns

the|CIA telephonic intercept of September 27, 1963

at 10:37 a.m. (Slawson Memorandum of April 21,

1964. p. 1) Obviously, if Slawson found it necessary

to request the source of the information, he had Or

not as yet been provided access to the originallen..

11:

material by the CIA.

Item Number Iwo of the above listing tends to show

that the Commission had

not been giving access to the [intercep)

concerning the assassination.

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from ClA -controlled documents.)

Item number three of the above listing

reveals that the [intercept]öf the Dorticos-Armas

conversation of November 22, 1964, in which the

passing of monies was discussed had not as of April

2 been provided to the Commission. The Commission

had specifically requested the Dorticos-Armas

transcripts at a March 12, 1964 meeting between

Commission representatives and Agency representatives.

(Slawson memorandum, March 12, 1964, Subj: Conference

with CIA on March 12, 1964)

On April 3, 1964, Coleman and Slawson expressed

their concern for receiving complete access to all

materials relevant to Oswald's Mexico City trip:

The most probable final result of the ...

entire investigation of Oswald's activities

in Mexico is a conclusion that he went

there for the purpose of trying to reach

Cuba and that no bribes, conspiracies,

etc. took place.

...In order to make such a judgment (that

all reasonable lines of investigation that

might have uncovered other motivations or

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possible conspiracies have been followed

through with negative results), we must

become familiar with the details of what

both the American and Mexican investi-

gatory agencies there have done. This

means reading their reports, after trans-

lation, if necessary, and in some cases

talking with the investigators themselves.

(Slawson and Coleman Memorandum, April

#3, 1964, Subj: Additional lines of

Investigation in Mexico Which May Prove

emphasisaddlet

worthwhile, p. 11.)

However, asthe rend tends to show

Manifestly, Coleman's and Slawson's desire

for a thorough investigation had bees

Imposed the cIA's concern fest tessa subject to valimitations

its sources and methods,

however relevant to the Commission's investigation,

beenposed. Considering the gravity and signi-

ficance of the Warren Commission's investigation

the

initial

originalsourer

Agency switholding of material from the

Commission start may have i perses abolis to reach

a curately reasoned conclusions with rerpect to Oswald's

activities while in Mexico City.

buttle,

Slandon

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(This form is to be used for material extracted

from CIA cantelled documents.)

On April 8, David Slawson, Howard Willens,

and William Coleman flew to Mexico City, Mexico

to meet with the representatives of the State

Department, FBI, CIA, and the Government of Mexico.

(Slawson

• Memorandum, April 22, 1964, Subj: Trip

to Mexico City, p. 1) Prior to their departure,

they met with Thomas Mann, the U.S. Ambassador to

Mexico during Oswäld's visit to Mexico City and at

the time of President Kennedy's assassination. (Ibid.)

Ambassador Mann told the Warren Commission representa-

tives that the CIA's Mexico City Station was actively

engaged in photosurveillance operations against the

Soviet and Cuban Embassy/Consulates (Ibia., p. 3)

Upon the group's arrival in Mexico City, they

were met by U.S. Ambassador Freeman, Claire Boonstra

of the State Department, Clarke Anderson of the FBI,

and

! Winston Scott of the CIA (Ibid. PP. 9-10)

That same day, during a meeting between the my

Commission representatives and. Win Scott, Scott made

available to the group actual transcriptsfof the CIA's.

telephonic surveillancel operations accompanied with

(Ilord

English-translations of the transcripts.

In addition,

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38

Classification:

he provided the totip

from

CrA controlled documents.

for the time period covered by Oswald's visit

that had resulted from photosurveillance of the

This

Cuban and Soviet Embassy entrances. David Slawson

wrote:

scott stated at the beginning

of his narrative that he intended to make

a complete disclosure of all facts,

including the sources of his information,

and that he understood that all three of

us had been cleared for TOP SECRET and

that we would not disclose beyond the

confines of the Commission

and its

imnediate staff the information we obtain-

ed through him without first clearing it

with his superiors in Washington. We

agreed to this."

(Ibia.)

Mr. Scott described to the Commission repre-

sentatives the CIA's course of action i==

directly

17 ÷

following the assassination, indicating that his

staff immediately began to compile dossiers on

Oswald, Duran, and everyone else throughout Mexico

whom the CIA knew had had some contact with Oswald

(Ibid.) Scott revealed that all known Cuban and Russian:

intelligence agents had quickly . been put under

surveillance following the assassination. Slawson

concluded :.

"Scott's narrative plus the material we

were shown disclosed immediately how

incorrect our previous information had

been dn

and Mexica aId's contacts with the soviet

Embassies. Apparently the

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39

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(This form is to be used for material extracted

distortionsoneddics adan's to which our

information had been subjected had

entered some place in Washington,

because the CIA information that we

were shown by (Scott) was unambiguous on

almost all the crucial points.

Wẹ had

previously planned to show

Scott, Slawson's

reconstruction of Oswald's

probable,

activities at the embassies to get Scott's

opinion, but once we saw how badly distorted

our information was we realized that this

would be useless.

Therefore, instead,

we

decided to take as close notes as possible

from the original source materials at some

later time during our visit." (EbRisPaLA)

A separate Slawson memorandum of April 21, 1964

records

the results of the notetaking from original source

materials that he did following Scott's disclosures.

These notes dealt exclusively with the telephonic

intercepts] pertaining to the Duran and Oswald conver-

sations for the period Sept. 2? - Oct. 1, 1963.

(Slawson

Memorandum, April 21, 1964 Subj [Intercepts)

from the Soviet and Cuban Embassies in Mexico City.

It is evident from Slawson's record that the

Agency's dem

'act et one to prouded uten Committion witz

source materials. in

case the te

'lephonic surveillance intercepts]-

мера.

Isty

affecte

the Commission's abilit

to draw accurately

reasoned conclusigns regarding/oswald's sogourn in

resaco City. It meant that as of Apriz, Ã0, 1964,

stil

bai!

Lie del Classification:

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000061

The

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-

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(This form is to be used for, material extracted

from ClA-controlled documents.)

nearing the halfway point of the warren Commission

investigation, the Comnission was foreed to retrace

the factual path by which it had structured

Oswald's

activities in Mexico City.

It further revealed that

the Agency

had

provided ambiguous information to

the Commission when, in fact "on almost all the

crucial points" significantly more precise materials.

could haye been made available for analysis by the

commission. (Isla. gus, the Agency's early policy

of not/providing the Commission with

vitatty relevant

information derived from sabin-sensitive sources

and methods had erous nestined the investigation

and possibly foreclosed lines of

investigation e.g.,

Cuban involvement, that might have been more seriously

considered had this material been expeditiousl

provided.

Mexico City Station Photosurveillance and ta

erico dity Hystery an Pauseph the in dog feel

On November 23, 1963, FBI Special Agent Odum

showed Marguerite Oswald a photograph of a man

bearing no physical resemblance to her son (Warren

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p8825

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Commission Repart is to es seches me to rag ad been

from ClA- controlad documents.)

supplied to the-fBI on November 22 by the CIA's

Mexico City Station

after Agency representatives

had searched their files in an effort to locate

Ibid.

Ook information on Oswald! (CIA DOC. DDP4-1555, 3/78/64-

Warren Comnission Doc. 67)F this photograph, which was one

in a series resulting from the CIA's photosurveillance

Koperations against the soviet and Cuban Embassy/entertes,

Prior to

o the assassination,

had been linked by

the Mexico City Station

1 to Lee Harvey Oswald. (Ibid.)

Richard Helms, in a sworn affidavit before the Warren

Commission, stated that the photograph shown to

outsaleofthecoidt..onm

Marguerite Oswald had been taken on-October 4, 1963

dal United States Sometime drinthe period

in Mexico City and mistakenly linked-at-that-time-to

1943 to Norember 23,1903

Oswalo.. (Warren Commission Affidavit of Richard Helms

of warrenCommissinnitir.ngs

• 8/?/64, VOl. XI, PP. 469-470)

On February 10, 1964, Marguerite Oswald testified

before the Warren Commission and recounted the cir-

cumstances under which she was shown the photogrape. o

(Warren Commission Report Vol Ip153)Mrs. Oswald testified

that she believed this photograph to have been of Jack

Ruby. (Ibia.)

090863

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Thereafter, on February 12, 1964, J. Lee

Rankin wrote to Thomas Karramesines, Assistant DDP

requesting both the identity of the individual

depicted in the photograph and an explanation of

the circumstances by which this photograph was

obtained by the Central Intelligence Agency.

(Letter of J. Lee Rankin, Feb. 12, 1964, JFK DOC.

#3872) F01A 543-233A

On that same day, in a separate letter,

Rankin wrote to DCI McCone regarding materials

that the CIA had disseminated since November 22,

1963 to the Secret Service but not to the Warren

Commission.

Rankin requested copies of these

materials which included three CIA cables. The

cables concerned the photograph subsequently shown

by the FBI to Oswald's mother of the individual

originally identified by the Mexico City Station

as Lee Harvey Oswald. (Letter of J. Lee Rankin

Feb. 12, 1964, JFK DOC. #3872) 541-237A

Among the materials disseminated by the CIA

Shite Horts conscio

•o then Secret Service wa.

November 26 dissemination.

alL (CIA DOC DIR 8517), 11/26/641

FUIA

106-851

That cable concerned

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disclosedthe

existence of [CIA telephonic surveillanceloperations

in Mexico City, at the time of the assassination

and Oswald's earlier visitbid

As a result the cia was

reluctant to make the material disseminated to

the Secret Service available to the Warren Commission

for in so doing the Agency would have necessarily exposed its

[telephonic surveillance operationsto the Commission.

John Scelso testified regarding the circumstances

surrounding the eventual explanation given to the

connission recounting the origion of the photograph in

question. Scelso stated:

"We did not initially disclose to the

Warren Commission all of our technical

operations. In

other words, we did not

initially disclose to them that we had

photosurveillance because the November

photo we had (of MMM) was not of Oswald.

Therefore it did not mean

anything, you

see?"< HSCA Class Depo of John"

Seedso: 5116778p1583

Mr. Goldsmith:

...So the Agency was making a unilateral

decision that this was not relevant to the Warren

Commission.Fkrd

Scelso:

Right, we were not authorized, at first,

to reveal all our technical operations.

In summary the records shows that

By February 12, 1964 the Warren Commission had

inadvertantly requested access to [telephonig] surveillance

production, a cause for concern within the foenay

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-44-

ok

due to the sensitivity of Agency sources and methods..

Similarly, the possible dis:losure of the photosurveillance

operations to the Warren Commission had also begun to cause

concern within the Agency.

On March 5, 1967, Raymond Rocca wrote in an

internal memorandum to Richard Helms that "we have

a problem here for your determination."

Rocca

outlined Angleton's desire not to

respond directly

to Rankin's request of February 12 regarding the CIA

material forwarded to the Secret Service since

November: 23, 1964.F1

Rocca then stated:

"Unless you feel otherwise, Jim would

prefer to wait out the Commission on the

matter covered by paragraph 2 (of the

above-referenced February 12 letter to McCone

requesting access to CIA reports provided

3873the Secret Service after November 22, 1963,

1UFK DOC: 39027.

If they come back on this

point he feels that you, or someone from

here, should be prepared to go over to show

the Commission the material rather than pass

them to them in copy.

Incidentally, none

of these items are of new substantive

interest.

We have either passed the material

in substance to the Commission in response to

earlier levies or the items refer to aborted

leads, for example, the famous six photographs

which

are not of Oswald...

"(CIA DOC. FOIA

#579-250, 3/5/64; see also HSCA Classified

Deposition of James Angleton, 10/5/78, pp. 31-132

ration: aSes

et i

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-442-

wherein he states that the only reason

for not providing the Warren Commission with

access to CIA surveillance materials

was due to the Agency's concern for

protection of its sources and methods)

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On March 12, 1964, representatives of the

Warren Commission and the CIA confered regarding

the February 12 request for the materials forwarded

ok to the secret service by the Agency.

(Letter of

FOIA 604-25601

J. Lee Rankin March 16, 1964, JFK DOC. # 3872, Slawson

Memorandum, March 12, 1964)

The record indicates that the Commission at

the March 12 meeting pressed for access

to the

Secret Service materials. Rankin wrote to Helms

on March 16. that it was his understanding that the

CIA would supply the Commission with a paraphrase of

each report or communication pertaining to the Secret

Service materials "with all indications of your

confidential communications techniques and confidential

sources deleted. KYou will also afford members-of

our staff working in this area an opportunity to

review the actual file so that they may give assurance

oK that the paraphrases are complete." (Letter of J. ryee

Rankin, March 16, 1964, paragraph 2, JER DOC. NO. 3872-

FDiA 601-250A

Rankin further indicated that the same

procedure was to be followed regarding any material

in the possession of the CIA prior to November 22,

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1963 which had not as yet been furnished because

it concerned sensitive sources and methods. (Ibid...

par. 3)

• Helms responded to Rankin's March 16 letter

o on March 24 (FOIA " 622-258) by two separate

FUIAG2S-J58

communications. (CIA Doc. DDP4-1554, hereinafter CD: 631,

5018621-259

00-3/24/64, CIA Doc., DDPA:-1555, 3/24/64, CD 674 hereinafter)

CD 631 provided the Commission with

a copy of the

October 10, 1963 CIA dissemination to FBI, State Dept.,

INS and Navy Dept. land to the Secret Service on

22 Nov.) regarding Lee Harvey Oswald and his

CODUSI

5, presence

at the Soviet Consulate in Mexico City.

The response

3

B

le further revealed that on October 23, 196A, CIA had

fyam the Navy

requested two copies of the most recent photograph

of Oswald in order to check the identity of the person

believed to be Oswald in Mexico City:

Is Furthermore,

the CIA stated, though it did not indicate when, that

it had determined that the photograph shown to Maliuenité

Oswald on Movember 22, 1963 did nọt refer to Lee

1588 Hearingson Vol 1, 3152)

Harvey Oswald." The Agency explained that it had checked the

photograp

against the press photographs of Oswald generally

available on November 23, 1963,710

CD 674 reveals that on Nov. 22, 1963 immediately follow

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extracted

the assassom Eif confled dodumvamber 23, 1963, three

• ... ias

cabled reports were received at CIA headquarters

from the CIA Mexico City Station regarding photographs

of an unidentified man who had visited the Cuban and

Soviet Embassies during October and November 1963.

0674.

Paraphrases of these cables, not revealing sensitive

sources and methods, were attached to CD $74à

Agency wrote that the subject of the photo referenced

in these cables was not Oswald. It was further

stated that:

"In response to our meeting of 2. March and

Cour memo of 16 MarchmStern

and, Nillens

to these at eminens torte secropies

of these

Service and the cables

based, as well as the photasros the unidenti-

which they were

fied man."

(CIA- DOC: DDP4-1555 CD634,24

March 1964) batarain ourfiles i

.On March 26, William Coleman wrote in a memorandum

for the record:

"The CIA directed a memorandum to J. Lee Rankin

O7 Marah 24, 1964 (Commission Document No. 631)

in which it set forth the dissemination Falile

the information on Lee Harvey Oswald.

that this memorandum is only a partial answer

to our inquiry to the CIA dated March 16, 1964

and I hope that the complete answers will give

us the additional information we reguested."

(Memorandum of William Coleman, March 2k, 1964)

Coleman went on to state:

"As you know, we are still trying to get an

explanation of the photograph which the FBI

shoned Marguerite Oswald

soon

after

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assassination.

I hope that paragraph

4

of the memorandum of March 24, 1964

ICD 631Y sent Mr. Rankin by the CIA

is not the answer which the CIA intends

to give us as to this inquiry. " (Ibia.)

Marcha7

The following day, as agreed by Warren Cormission

and Agency representatives, Samuel Stern of the

Commission visited CIA headquarters in Langley,

Virginia. Menaiardia

initiate Misha".

Sterns' memorandum of his visit reveals that

he reviewed Oswald's file with Raymond Rocca.

Stern

indicated that Oswald's file contained those materials

furnished previously to the Warren Commission by

the cIA. the file also contained:

"Cable reports^of November 22 and November

1903

23, from the CIA's Mexico City Station

a person inoradiated

relating to the photograph of the unidenti-

the cubin dira sai

fied individual mistakenty belteved to be

Lee Harvey aswaldjand the reports on thase

CIA

cables furnished on november 23, talent

Tiä messagiere Ibi

the Secret Service, by the GIA."

(Memorand um.

Stern noted that these messages were accurately

paraphrased in the attachments to CD 674 provided the

#Pargraph 4 of ED 631 stated thut ElA voncluded tie

23,1945

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warren Confession contrelad @acuments 19647"1

He also

reviewed the October

10, 1963 cable from CIA's

Mexico City Station to

CIA headquarters

reporting Oswald's contact with the Soviet Embassy

Ibid

in Mexico City. In addition, Stern examined the

October 10, 1963 cable from CIA headquarters to

the Mexico City Station reporting background infor-

mation on Oswald." (Ibid.) Stern recorded

that these messages

were

repuried

Ook paraphrased accurately as set forth in the CIA's January

31 memo to the Warren Commission reporting Oswald's

Mexico City trip. Fbia

Lastly, Stern noted that Rocca provided him

for his review

a computer printout of the references

to Oswald-related documents located in the Agency's

electronic data storage system. He stated "there is

oic no item listed on the printout which the Warren com-.

mission hasnot been given either in full text or

paraphrased." (Ibid.)

Thus, by the 27th of March, a Warren Commission

representative had been apprised of the circumstances

surrounding the mysterious photograph.

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Luisa Calderon

Approximately five hours after President

Kennedy's assassination a Cuban government employee

in Mexico City, named "Luisa" received a telephone

from an unidentified man speaking Spanish.

ING97.

iC •L (CIA DOC. FOIA

SEXT 7705, 11/27/63, 173-615, attachuent)

This call had been intercepted and recorded by the

CIA's Mexico City Station as the result of its

LIENVOY (tel. tap) operation] (Ibia.) The Mexico

City Station,as subsequently reported to CIA

headquarters, identified the Luisa of the conversa-

tion as Luisa Calderon, who was then employed in

the Commercial Attache's office at the Cuban Consu-

late. (Ibid.)

During the course of the conversation, the

unidentified caller asked Luisa if she had heard

(of the assassination)

the latest news. Luisa replied in a joking tone:

"yes, of course, I knew almost before Kennedy. "

(Ibid.)

CIA'S

Paraphrasing the [telephone intercept transcript,

it states that the caller told Luisa

the person

#Parapirale of translator's intopretation

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apprehended for Kennedy's slaying was the

"President of one of the Committees of the Fair

Play for Cuba, Jaid

Luisa replied that she also knew

Thid

this.

Luisa inquired whether the person being

Fibid

held for the killing was a "gringo."

The unidenti-

fied caller replied, "yes."

Luisa told her caller

that she had learned nothing else about the assassina-

tion and that she had learned about the assassination

Ibid

The unidentified caller

only a little while ago.

commented:

We think that if it had been or had

seemed... public or had been one of

the segregationists or against

intergration who had killed Kennedy,

then there was, let's say, the

possibility that a sort of civil

war would arise in the ünited States;

that contradictions would be sharpened...

who knows

Ii.1

Luisa responded:

Imagine, one,

two, three and now, that

makes three. (She laughs.)

(Ibide De 2)

Raymond

Rocca, in response to a 1975 Rocke-

feller Commission request for information on a

possible Cuban conspiracy to assassinate President

Kennedy wrote regarding Calderon's comments:

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Latin hyperbole? Boastful ex post facto

suggestion of foreknowledge.

This

is the.

only item in thelintercept coverage of

the Cubans and Soviets after the assassina-

Hardly

tion that contains the suggestion of fore- mi

'knowlege of expectation.

(CIA DOC.,

irrelarin!

Memorandum of Raymond Rocca for DC/OPS,

5/23/75, P. 152* (see p. 55a for 15)

Standing by itself, Luisa Calderon's cryptic

comments do not merit serious attention. Her words

may indeed indicate foreknowledge of the assassina-

tion but may equally be interpreted without such a

sinister implication. Nevertheless, the Committee

has determined that Luisa Calderon's case should

have merited serious attention in the months following

the assassination.

In connection with the assassination, Luisa

B'sic Calderon's name first surfaced on November 27, 196%

in a cable sent by then Ambassador Mann to the

State

• Department (CIA Doc. DIR 85573, 11/27/63).

In that cable Mann stated:

•. Washington should urgently consider

feasibility of requesting Mexican authorities

Eusebio Azcue,

Luisa Calderon and Alfredo Mirabal.

The two

men are Cuban national and Cuban consular

officers.

Luisa Calderon is a secretary

in Cuban Consulate here." Ebid.)

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rom ciA controlle

-55a-

*Regarding the issue of whether Calderon's comments

could reasonably be interpreted to indicate possible

foreknowledge, the CIA position is as follows:

During the Rockefeller Commission inquiry,

Calderon's conversation was identified

possible item of information from

decisit

space

of a plot to assassinate the American Presi-

dent. This involves a faulty translation of an

answer Calderon gave to her caller.

In answer

to the latter's question as to whether she

had heard the latest news, Calderon said:

"Si, claro, me entere casiantes que Kennedy."

The verb entere is mistranslated. Me entere

(the first person of the verb enterarsede,

past tense)

should be translated as ".f.I

found

out (or I learned) /about it -- the assassination/

almost before Kennedy /did/."

In other words,

calderon was saying she heard about the shooting

of Kennedy almost at the time the event took

place..."

(CIA DoC., Memorandum Regarding

Luisa Calderon conversation, p.l).

The Committee fundamentally disputes the

narrow interpretation of Calderon's comments

assigned by the Agency. It is the Committee's

position that translation of Me Entere as

either "I found out" or "I learned about"

does not foreclose interpretation of Calderon's

comments as a suggestion on her part of possible

foreknowledge of President Kennedy's assassination.

The interpretation, inany event

shouldhaveiaon/eftto

Hejudgement of theidarren commission, not FrecIA

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Mars tom gontrobe degurpeaterial extracted

from ClA-controlled s'gsuments.)

This cable does not state the basis for

arresting Calderon.*

However, the CIA's copy of this

cable bears a handwritten notation on its routing

page. That notation states: "Info from Amb Mann

for Sec Rusk re:...persons involved with Oswald

in Cuban Embassy." Mann went on to state in urgent

Ist terms: "They may quickly be returned to Havana in

order to eliminate any possibility that Mexican

DIRES57S

government could use them as witnesses." (Ibiê.)

According to CIA files, Calderon made

reservations to return to Havana on Cubana Airlines on

December 11, 1963, less than four weeks after the

assassination. (CIA Doc. CSCI-316/01783-65, 4/26/63)

Calderon, Azcue and Mirabal were not arrested

nor detained for questioning by the Mexican federal

police. However, Silvia Duran, a friend and associate

of Calderon's and the one person believed to have

mann could not recall his motivation her nerviewer attacommities

'Is the comittee's belief that Mann was prompted

request the arrest of

Calderon on the basis of

Gilberto Alvarado Ugarte's allegation that Calderon

was present at the Cuban Embassy when Oswald

was allegedly given a sum of money presumably to

carry out the assassination of President Kennedy.

O! (CIA DOC.

DDP4-77474-2, June 1964, Attachment C)

jov.

15

1903

000077

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had repeated contact with Oswald while he was in

Mexico City, was arrested and questioned by the

Mexican police on two separate occasions. (CIA

F2:448-37

D: I DOC. DIR DIR 11/23/63, CIA DOC. DIR DIR 75113--595

11/27/63)

During

her second interrogation, Duran was

questioned regarding her association with Calderon.

There is no indication in the reinterrogation report

accounting for the questioning of duran about Calderon.

3: 557-÷

(CIA Doc. DDP4-0940, 2/21/64) The information regarding

Duran's interrogation was passed to the Warren Commission

on February 21, 1964, more than two months after

Calderon had returned to Cuba. (Ibid.)

Information was reported to the CIA during

May 1964, from a Cuban defector, tying Luisa

Calderon to the Cuban Intelligence apparatus. The

defector, (AMMUG-1, was himself a Cuban Intelligence

Officer who supplied valuable and highly reliable

information to the CIA regarding Cuban Intelligence

operations. (CIA Doc., Memorandum of Joseph Langosch

to Chief, Office of Security, 6/23/64) Calderon's

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ties to Cuban intelligence were reported to the Warren

Commission on June 18, 1964. (CIA DoC. FOIA #739-319,

6/19/64) However, the Committee has determined from

its review that the CIA did not provide Calderon's

conversation of November 22 to the Warren Commission.

Conseguently, even though the Warren Commission was aware that

SECAZI

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Calderon had connections to inteligence work,

as did other Cuban Embassy officers, the vital

link between her background and her comments

was never established for the Warren Commission

by the CIA. The Agency's oversight in this

regard may have forclosed the Commission from

actively pursuing a lead of great significance.

Calderon's 201 file reveals that she

arrived in Mexico City from Havana on January 16,

1963, carrying Cuban Passport E/63/7. Her date

of birth was believed to be 1940 (CIA DoC. Dispatch

hMMa21612, no date given) Calderon's presence ir

Mexico City was first reported by the CIA on July

15, 1963 in a dispatch from the CIA's Miami field

office to the CIA's Mexico City station and to the

Chief of the CIA's Special Affairs Staff (for Cuban

operations). (CIA DOC. Dispatch JrCAJ10095, 7/15/631

That dispatch had attached to it a report containing o

biographic data on personnel then assigned to the

Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. At page three of the

attached report Luisa Calderon was listed as Secretary

of the Cuban Embassy's commercial office. The

D0B080

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notation indicated that a report was pending on

No such report is present

Calderon. (Ibid., p. 3 of attachment) The

in Calderon's

201 File.

Agency has attempted, without success, to locate

the report.

Luisa Calderon's association with the Cuban

DGI was first [recorded by the CIA on May 5c.

..1964.

(CIA DOC.ABlind Memorandum of Harold Swenson!

FOIA

< 68-290 5/5/61) At that time, Joseph Langosch,

Chief of Counterintelligence for the Special Affairs

Staff, reported the results of his debriefing of

the Cuban defector, AMMUG-1. The memorandum stated

that 'AMMUG-1 had no direct knowledge of Lee Harvey

Oswald or his activities but was able to provide

items of interest based upon the comments of certain

Cuban Intelligence Service officers. (Ibid.) Specificaliy,

• AMMUG-1 was asked if Oswald was known to the:Cuban

intelligence services before November 23, 1953.

AMMUG-1 told Langosch "Prior to October 1963, Oswald

visited the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City-on two or

three occasions. Before, during and after these

visits, Oswald was in contact with the Direccion

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General De Intelligencia (DGI), specifically

with Luisa Calderon, Manuel Vega Perez, and

Rogelio Roariguez Lopez." (Ibid.)

Langosch thereafter wrote that Calderon's

precise relationship to the DGI was not clear.

As a comment to this statement he set forth the

CIA cable and dispatch traffic which recorded her

arrival in Mexico during January 1963 and departure

for Cuba within one month after the assassination.

(Ibid.)

On May 7, 1964, Langosch recorded additional

information he had elicited from AMMUG-1 regarding

Oswald's possible contact with the DGI. (CIA DOC

, < FOIA 687-295, attach. $, 5/1/64) Paragraph 3 of

this memorandum stated in part:

"a.

b.

Luisa Calderon, since she raturned

to Cuba, has been paid a regular

salary by the DGI even though she

has not performed any services.

Her home is in the Vedado section

where the rents are high.

Source (AMMUG) has known Calderon

for several years.

Before going

she worked in the

Ministry of Exterior Conmerce

in the department which was known

as the "Empresa Iransimport."

Her title was Secretary

General

of the Communist Youth in the

department named in the previous

sentence. (Ibid.)

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On May 8 Langosch further disclosed AMMUG'S

•L knowledge of the Oswald case. (Ibid, attach. s

Langosch paraphrased AMMUG's. knowledge of Calderon

as follows:

I thought that Luisa Calderon might have:

had contact with Oswald because I learned

about 17 March 1964, shortly before I made

a trip to Mexico, that she had been

involved with an

American in Mexico.

information to which I refer was

The

told to

me by a DGI case officer... I had commented.

to (him) that it seemed strange that luisa

Calderon was receiving a salary from the

DGI although she apparently did not do

any work for the Service.

(The case officer)

told me that hers was a peculiar case and

that he hinself believed that she had been

recruited in Mexico by the Central Intelligence

Agency although Manuel Pineiro, the Head

of the DGI, did not agree.

As I recall,

(the case officer) had investigated Luisa

Calderon. This was because, during the time

she was

in Mexico, the DGI had intercepted

a letter to her by an American who signed

his name OWER (phonetic) or something

similar.

As you know, the pronunciation

of Anglo-Saxon names is difficult in

spanish so I am not sure of how the name

mentioned by Hernandez should be spelled.

It could have been-"Howard" or something

different.

As I understand the matter,

the letter from the American was a love

letter but indicated that there was a

clandestine professional relationship

between the writer and Luisa Calderon.

I also understand from (the case officer)

that after the interception of the letter

she had been followed and seen in the

company or an American.

I do not know if

this could have been Oswald... (Ibid.)

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On May 11, Raymond Rocca wrote a memorandum

Director

Richard Helms regarding the information

Swenson had elicited from AMMUG (CIA DOC. FOIA 687-295,

5/11/64, Rocca Memorandum) Rocca proposed that "the

DDP in person or via a designee, perferably the

former, discuss the AMMUG-I situation on a very

restricted basis with Mr. Rankin at his earliest

convenience either at the Agency of at the Commission

headquarters. Until this takes place, it is not

desirable to put anything in writing.

" (Ibia. p. 2).

On May 15, 1964, Helms wrote Rankin regarding

AMMUG's information about the DGI, indicating its

sensitivity and operational significance. (CIA DOC.

FOIA 697-294, 5/15/64, Helms Memorandum) Attached

to Helms' communication was a paraphrased accounting

of Langosch's May 5 memorandum. (Ibid.) In that

attachment the intelligence associations of Manuel

Vega Perez and Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez were set forth.

However, that attachment made no reference whatsoever

to Luisa Calderon.

Howard willens of the warren Commission

requested as a follow-up to the May 15 memorandum,

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access to the questions used in Langosch's

all interrogation of AMuG. (CIA DOC. FOIA 739-316, 6/19/64,

Memorandum) On June 18, 1964 Arthur Dooley of

Rocca's founterintelligence Research and Analysis

Group took the questions and AMMUG's responses to

the warren Commission's offices for Willen's review.

Willens saw Langosch's May 5 memorandum. The only

mention of Calderon was as follows: "The precise

relationship of Luisa Calderon to the DGI is not

clear. She spent about six months in Mexico from

which she returned to Cuba early in 1964." (Ibia.)

However, Willens

was not shown

Langosch's

memorandu of May 7 and May 8, 1964 which contained

much more detailed information on Luisa Calderon,

including her possible association with Lee Harvey

Oswald and/or American intelligence. (Ibid.)*

The Warren Commission as of June 19, 1964,

had little if no reason to pursue the Luisa Calderon ®

lead. It had effectively been denied significant

* It should be noted that these memoranda of May 5,

7, 8, 11 and June 19 with attachments, are not

referenced in the Calderon 201 file.

(See CIA

Computer printout of Calderon 201 file)

Their

existence was determined by the Committee's

independelassificertioni: other agency files.

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background information. This denial may have

impeded or prevented

the Commission's pursuit

of Calderon's potential relationship to Oswald

and the assassination of President Kennedy. But :

even if the warren Commission had

learned

of Calderon's background and possible contact with

Oswald it still had been denied the one significant

piece of information that might haveraised its

interest in Calderon to a more serious level. The

Warren Commission was never told about Calderon's

conversation of November 22, 1964.

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the Calderon 201 tiTe pear

reference to the conversation nor does it indicate

that it was ever made known to or provided the

Warren Commission for its analysis. (CIA Compute)

print-out of Calderon 201 file)

In an effort to

determine the manner in which the

treated the Calderon conversation this Committee

posed the following questions to the CIA:

1. Was the Warren Commission or any Warren

Commission staff member ever given access

to the transcript of a telephone conversa-

tion, dated November 22, 1963, between

female employee of the Cuban Embassy/

consulate in Mexico City,

identified

as Luisa, and an unidentified male speake

ing from outside the Cuban

1 Embassy/Con-

sulate?

If so, please indicate when

this

transcript was provided to the Warren

Commission or its staff, which CIA official

provided it, and which Warren Commission

members or staff reviewed it.

2. Was the Warren Commission or any member

of the Warren Commission or any Warren

Commission staff member ever informed

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orally or in writing of the substance of the

above-referenced conversation of November 22,

1963? If so, please indicate when and

in what form this information was provided,

and which CIA official provided it. (HSCA

request letter of August 28, 1978)

The CIA responded by memorandum:

"Although the (Mexico City) Station considered

the conversation of sufficient possible

interest to send a copy to headquarters,

the latter apparently did nothing with

it, for there appears to

be no record in the

Oswald file of such action as may have

been

taken.

A review of those Warren

Commission documents containing information

provided by the Agency and still bearing a

Secret or Top Secret classification does

not reveal whether the conversation was

given or shown to the Conmission."

(CIA DOC., Memorandum Regarding Luisa

Calderon conversation, p. l)

The available evidence thus supports the

conclusion that the Warren Commission was never

given the information nor the opportunity by

which it could evaluate Luisa Calderon's

significance to the events surrounding President

Kennedy's assassination. Had the Commission been

expeditiously provided this evidence of her

intelligence background, association with Silvia

Duran, and her comments following the assassination,

it may well have given more serious investigative

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consideration to her potential knowledge of Oswald

(This form is to be

used for material extracted

and the cubaim exeronald documente involvement ir

a conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy.

Two difficult issues remain which are raised

by the Committee's finding. First, why didn't

the Agency provide the Calderon conversation to the

Warren Cornission; secondly, why didn't the Agency

reveal to the Warren Commission its full knowledge

of Calderon's intelligence background, her possible..

knowledge of Oswald and her possible connection to

the CIA or some other American intelligence apparatus..

The first question can be explained in benign

terms. It is reasonably possible that by sheer

oversight the conversation was filed away and not

recovered or recollected until after the Warren

connission had completed ep nesteget pontan as fortnoenerein

published its repors.

(See above CIA explanation)

As for the Agency's withholding of information

concerning Calderon's intelligence background, the

record reflects that the Commission was merely

informed that Calderon may have been a

member of

the DGI. (CIA DOC. 5/5/64,

I Swenson Memorandum)

The memoranda which provided more extensive examina-

tion of her intelligence background were not made

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available for the Commission's review. Significantly,

the May 8 memorandum written by Joseph Langosch

following his debriefing of AMMUG-1 indicated that

AMMUG-1 and a second Cuban Intelligence officer

believed Calderon to be a CIA operative. (CIA DOC.

FOIA 687-295, attach S, 5/8/64) It is possible

that this information was not provided the Warren

Commission either because there was no basis in mi

fact for the allegation or because the allegation

was of substantive concern to the Agency. If the

allegation were true, the consequences for the CIA

would halfbeen serious. It would have demonstrated

that a CIA operative, well placed in the Cuban Embassy,

may have possessed information prior to the assassina-

tion regarding Oswald and/or his relationship to the

Cuban Intelligence Service. and that Services

possible involvement in a conspiracy to assassinate

President Kennedy.

Regarding Calderon's possible association

with the CIA, Agency files reviewed reveal no

ostensible connection between Calderon and the CIA.

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However, there are indications that such contact

•between Calderon and the Agency was contemplated.

A September 1, 1963 CIA dispatch from the Chief

of the Special Affairs Staff to the CIA's Chief

of Station in Mexico City states in part:

...Luisa Calderon has a sister residing

in Reynosa, Texas, married

to an American

of Mexican descent. If (CIA asset) can

further identify the sister, our domestic

exploitation section might be in a posi-

thon to followe

tion to follow up on this lead...Please

levy the requirement on (CIA asset) at

the next opportunity. (CIA Doc.

HMMW-

11935, 9/1/63)

• An earlier CIA dispatch from the CIA Chief

of Station in Mexico City to the Chief of the CIA's

Western Hemisphere Division records that:

(Wilfredo of]the Cuban Consulate, (Tampico,]

reported that Luisa Calderon has

a sister

residing in Reynosa, Texas...Luisa may go

up to the border to visit her sister soon--

of her mother may make the trip--details

not clear (CIA DoC. HMMA 21849, July 31,

1965)

3

At the very least, the above dispatches

evidenced an interest in the activities of Calderon

and

her family. Whether this interest took

the form of a clandestine-agent relationship is

not revealed by Calderon's 201 file.

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(This form is to be used for material extracted

from ClA-controlled documents.),

The Committee has queried David Ronis, the

author of the above cited dispatch requesting

that Calderon's sister be contacted by the CIA's

"domestic exploitation section." (HSCA Class.

Staff Interview of David Ronis, 8/31/78) Ronis

was a member of the CIA's Special Affairs Staff

at the time he wrote the dispatch. He worked

principally at CIA headquarters and was

responsible

for recruitment and handling of agents for collection

of intelligence data.

Mr. Ronis, when interviewed

by this Committee, stated that part of his responsi-

bility was to scour the Western Hemisphere division

for operational leads related to the work of the

Special Affairs staff. Ronis recalled that he

normally would send requests to CIA field stations

for information or leads on various persons. Often

he would receive no response to these requests,

which normally indicated that no follow-up had

either been attempted or successfully conducted.

It was Ronis' recollaction that the above-cited

domestic exploitation section was a task force

within the Special Affairs Staff. He also stated

that in 1963 the CIA'S Domestic Contacts Division

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might have been requested to locate Luisa Calderon's

sister

Ronis told the. Committee that he had no

recollection of recruiting any person associated

with the Cuban Intelligence Service. He did recall

that he had recruited women to perform tasks for

the Agency. However,

he did not recall ever recruiting

any employees of the Cuban Embassy/Consulate in

Mexico City. Finally, Mr. Ronis stated that he had

no recollection that Luisa Calderon was associated

with the CIA. (Ibid.)

Various present and former CIA representatives

were queried whether Luisa Calderon had ever been

associated with the CIA. The uniform answer was

that no one recalled such an association. (Cites:

Exec. Sess. Test. of Richard Heims, 8/9/78, p. 136;

HSCA Class. Depo. of Raymond Rocca, 7/17/78, p. 148;

HSCA Staff Interview of Joseph Langosch, 8/21/78,

Piccolo, Interview offust':

1978

Thus, the Agency's file on Calderon and the

testimony of former CIA employees have revealed no

connection between Calderon and the CIA. Yet, as

indicated earlier, this file is incomplete:the

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most glaring omission being the absence; from

Calderon's

her 201 file..of

cryptic remarks

following the assassination of President Kennedy •

Buckground

This Committee's investigation of Luisa

Calderon has revealed that a defector from the Cuban

Intelligence Services provided the CIA with signi-

ficant information about Lee Harvey Oswald's contacts

with the DGI in Mexico City. This defector was

assigned the CIA cryptonym AMMUG-1 (A-1 hereinafter) .*

• CIA files reveal that. A-l defected from the

DãI On April 21, 1964| in Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada.)

When he defected, A-l possessed a number of DGI

documents which were subsequently turned over to

the CIA. (CIA DOC. [OTTA [IN 68894, 4/24/64)

Following his defection, a CIA officer, Joseph f.

Langosch, went. to Canada]to meet A-1, debrief him,

and arrange for A-l's travel into the United States.

(Ibia.) On Nay 1, 1964, 22 reels of Langosch's

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Therefore, the possibility exists that d-1 had

provided other information to taffery deriwitchi

rel

tO

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72

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debriefing of A-l were forwarded to the Chief of

Station in Óttawa] Canada.] (CIA Doc. Dispatch OCDA

7763, 5/1/64) Effective on May 1, A-1 was under

contract with the CIA for operational purposes.

(CIA Doc. Contract Approving Officer Nemo, $/6/64)

By June 23, 1964, Langosch was convinced that A-1

would be of great value to the Agency. He stated:

There is no question in my mind that

AMMUG-1 is a bona fide defector or

that he has furnished us with accurate

and valuable information concerning

Cuban intelligence operations, staffers,

and agents. (CIA Doc. Langosch Memo

Director of Security, 6/23/64)

As an officer of the DGI, A-1 from August of

1963 until his defection was assigned to the DGI's

oL. Illegal Section B ICIA DOC. (O79A] IN 68894-4/24/64)

which was responsible for training agents for

assignment in Latin America. His specific responsi-

bility pertained to handling of agent operations

in El Salvador. (CIA Doc. Personal Record Questran- a

i naire 6/4/64; CIA DOC. LOtta In 68894 4/24/64)

A-1 identified for the CIA the Cuban Intelli-

gence officers assigned

to Mexico City. Langosch

described A-l's knowledge of DGI operations in

Mexico as follows:

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In Mexico City, he knows who the

intelligence people are.

One is the

Cuban Consul Alfredo Mirabal. He is

called the Chief of the Centre.

That

is his title but he is actually the

intelligence chief, or at least he

was until the l6th of April at which

time a replacement was sent to Mexico

to take over.

This fellow's name is

Manuel Vega.

The source says that

the Commercial attache whose name is

Ricardo Tapia or Concepcion (he is

not sure which is an intelligence

officer) and another one is Rogelio.

(I might say that some of these names

are familiar to me.)

(Langosch debriefing

of A-1, 4/30/64, p. 5 Of reel 4, 4/23/64)

Thus, A-1 was able to provide the CIA soon

after his defection with accurate information

regarding DGI operations and DGI employees in

Mexico City.

In sert from p72

The Committee has reviewed the CIA's files

concerning A-1. This examination was undertaken

to determine: 1) whether A-l had provided any

valuable investigative leads to the CIA pertaining

to the assassination of President Kennedy; and 2)9g

whether, if such leads were provided, these leads

and/or other significant information were made

available to the Warren Commission.

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The Cormittee's initial review of the

materials provided by the CIA to the Warren

Commission did not disclose the existence of the

AMMUG files. However; the Committee did during

the course of its review examine a file containing

material passed to the Rockefeller Commission. That

file made reference to A-l.

Included in this

file was a memorandum of May 5, 1964 written by

Joseph Langosch which concerned information A-l

provided about the Oswald case. (CIA DoC. FOIA 68-290

Langosch Memorandum, 5/5/64) Also contained within

this file were the A-l debriefing memoranda of

May 7, and May 8, 1964 previously cited with regard

to Luisa Calderon. (CIA DOC. FOIA $687-295, attach's

' 3 and 5) Following review of the memoranda, the

Committee requested access to all CIA files

OI

concerning referring to A-l.

From review of these materials the Committee

has determined that the Warren Commission did learn

during mid-May 1964 that Lee Harvey Oswald probably

had come in contact with DGI officers in Mexico City.

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the warren Commission

Prior to learning of Oswald's probable contact

with DGI officers, James Angleton, Chief of the

CIA's Counter Intelligence Staff passed an internal

memorandum to Raymond Rocca, also of the Counter-

intelligence Staff, which stated that he had been

informed by the DDP, Richard Helms, that J. Lee

Rankin had contacted John McCone to request that

the Director consent to an interview before the

Warren Commission on May 14, 1964, (J. Edgar

Hoover also appeared before the Commission on

that date prior to McCone's appearance. Warren

Commission Report! 7p1729) CIA DOC. FOIA 689-298,

Memorandum of James Angleton, 5/12/64) Angleton.

also wrote:

ra sad

I discussed with Mr. Helms the nature of

the recent information which you are

processing which originated with the

sensitive Western Hemisphere source.

I

informed him that in your view this would

raise a number of new factors with the

Commission, that it should not go to the

to the

Commission prior to the Director's appear-

ance unless we have-first had some pre-

liminary reaction or made

sure that the

Director is fully aware of the implica-

tions since it could well serve as the

basis for detailed questioning.

The DDP

stated that he would reviaw this care-

fully and made (sic) a decision as to

the question of timing. (Ibia.)

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white rause source referrec

to in Angleton's memo was A-1. This conclusion is

based in part upon the date of this memo which

was quite close in time to A-l's defection. In

addition, Rocca's staff prepared

prior

to DCI McCone's appearance before the Warren

a "Brief

Commission for Fresentation to the Warren Commission

outlining various positions adopted by the CIA vis a

vis its investigative efforts and assistance to the

Commission. (CIA DOC. FOIA 695-302-A, 5/14/64)

At Tab E of this brief it states:

Within the past week, significant infor-

mation

has been developed by the CIA re-

past

garding the relationship with Oswald of

certain Cuban intelligence personnel in

Mexico City and the reaction in Havana

within the Cuban Intelligence Service

to the news of the assassination of

President Kennedy.

The Commission Staff

is in the course of being briefed on the

Cuban asspect. (Ibid., Tab E)

On May 15, 1964, the day of McCone's interview,

the Warren Commission received its first formal

communication regarding A-1. (CIA DOC FOIA 697-294,

5/15/64)

However, the Agency did not at that time

identify A-l by his real name or cryptonym nor did

the Agency indicate that the source of this information

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was a defector then residing under secure conditions

in the Washington, D.C. area. (Ibid.) The May 15

cormunication did

state that the Agency had

established contact "with a well-placed invidivual

who has been in close and prolonged contact with

ranking officers of the Cuban Direccion General de

Intelligencia." (Ibid.)

Attached to the May 15 communication was a

copy of Langosch's above reference memorandum of

May 5, 1964 regarding knowledge of Oswald's pro-

bable contact with the DGI in Mexico City. The

attachment made no reference to the source's status

as a defector from the DGI. (Ibid., attachment)

As set forth in the section of this report.

concerning Luisa Calderon, on June 18, 1964, Howard

Willens of the warren Commission reviewed Langosch's

May 5 memo and the questions upon which the informa-

tion set forth in the memo was elicited. Neither thee

questions nor the memo shown to Willens made

reference to the source's status as a defector col-

laborating with the CIA. (CIA DOC FOIA 739-319,

6/19/64).

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Based upon review of the Langosch memoranda,

the Committee has determined that significant

information regarding Luisa Calderon, specifically

of Nov. 22

details of her

her conversation and association with Cuban Intelligence

were

withheld from the Warren Commission. This

information as described above, was derived from

However,

debriefings of A-l. From the Committee's review

of the A-1 file provided by the CIA, the Committee

has not found any credible evidence indicating that

other information provided by A-l to the CIA was

relevant to the work of the Warren Commission. However,

in its review

the Committee has determined that a

as

specific document

I referenced in the A-1 file is

not present in that file.

The missing itemisof considerable concern to

the Committee.

It is a debriefing report of A-1

entitled "The Oswald Case." ICIA Doe Dispatch urew-

5035, 3/23/651 On March 23, 1965, a CIA dispatch*

records the transmittal of the report, along with

eleven other A-l debriefing reports. (Ibid.) Next to

the listing of the "Oswald Case" debriefing report

is the handwritten notation "SI." A CIA employee

who has worked extensively with the Agency files

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system told a Committee staff member that this

notation was the symbol for the CIA component

known as Special Intelligence. Other CIA

representatives believed the notation was a

reference to the Counterintelligence component

CI/SIG. IN a CIA memorandum dated September 27,

1978, the CIA has adopted the position that

debriefing Report No. 40 is a duplication of

the original Langosch memorandum of May 5, 1964

concerning AMMUG's knowledge of Lee Harvey

asia membrandin.

officers regarding additional information that A-1 may

have supplied about Oswald. Joseph Langosch, when

interviewed by the Committee, stated that he did not

have contact with the Warren Commission and does

not know what information derived from A-l's de-

briefings was supplied to the Warren Commission. (HSCA

Staff Interview of Joseph Langosch, 8/21/78; Cite also

Paine:

Interviews of Hildago & piccolo!

He also stated that

he does not recall that A=l provided any other information

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*The CIA memorandum states in part as follows:

When CI Staff learned of AMMUG-1's defection

and considered the possibility that he

might have some knowledge of the Oswald

case, CI Staff submitted a list of questions

to WH (Western Hemisphere) for debriefing

AMMUG-1...WH desk records reflect that

AMMUG-1 was debriefed on 4 May 64 regardin

this questionnaire.../B/ecause the debriefing

on the Oswald case

was handled

as a sensitive

matter, it was dictated directly to a CI

(Counterintelligence) stenographer on

5 May 1964.

/Note:

A-1 was debriefed on

several subjects on 4 May 64. The procedure

was to assign each subject discussed a

debriefing number and they were written

up in contact report form by the WH case

officer.

The instructions from CI staff

were to handle the Oswald case debriefing

very closery and not to keep any copies in

The "Oswald Case" was

logged in the WH notebook log as debriefing

report number 40, but the report itself

was dictated by the WH Case Officer directly

to a CI staff stenographer.

There would

be no reason to include the number 40 on

the report of this special debriefing for

CI staff, since it was their only debriefing

report.

We are certain it is the debriefing

report (#40) because the date is the same;

it is the only debriefing report on Oswald

listed in AMMUG-1 records; and it it (sic)

the only AMMUG-1 debriefing report in

Oswald's 201 file.

(CIA Doc., Memorandum for the Record, Regarding

AMMUG-1 Debriefing Report on the Oswald

Case, 27 September, 1978, p. 1)

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This form in is made me made go

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Mates

on Oswald's contact with the DGI except for that

set forth in the Memoranda of May 5, 7, and 8

as discussed herein. (Ibia.)

In a further effort to clarity thel substance

of information that A-1 provided to the CIA

regarding Oswald, the Committee, has attempted

to locate A-1,

The CIA has also attempted to

locate A-1, whose present relationship with

the agengh is ambiguous, but has been unable

to determine his present whereabouts see pila for i)

Thé CIA's

inability to focate

A-1 has been a source of

concern to this/Committee, particularly in

light of his long association with the Agency.

-emains, incomplete

Thus,

may have

Tius,

supplied the CIA about

Oswald. Howerer, with

the exception of the Calderon episode and on the

basis of the CIA's written reocrd, it appears that

the CIA provided the Warren Commission with all A-1

information of investigative significance.

A separate question remains, however. The

Agency, as noted earlier, did not reveal to the

Warren Commission that A-l was present in the

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*An April 1978 CIA comnunication to the FBI regarding

A-1 states in pertinent part:

Since 1971 (A-1) has not been involved

in any CIA operation in Miami or elsewhere.

(Joseph Norris) is the alias of a CIA

representativelwho periodically debriefs

(A-1) on personalities and methods of the

DGI. There is no other CIA involvement with

Rodriguez. (CIA DOC. 0807602, CIA 202417, 4/3/73

V01. 4, A-1 File 201749651)

However, a CIA handwritten index card concerning

the Agency status of A-l states:

Informed "Calvia" on 15 April 1977 that

A-1) is still an active contact, not

eceiving any salary, but could be paid i:

and when used in an operation. No problems

here. SPOB will keep his contract in an

active folder] (CIA Doc., Handwritten Note,

15 April 1977, contained in Vol. 4 of A-1 file

201-749651)

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WashingtonronDCt-arellahdocumender controlled

conditions, accessible to the Commission. Giving

due consideration to the CIA's serious concern

for protecting its sources, the fact that A-l's

status was not disclosed prevented the Warren

Commission from exercising a possible option,

i.e. to take the sworn testimony of A-l as it

concerned Oswald and the Kennedy assassination.

On this issue, as the written record tends to

show, the Agency unilaterally rejected the possibility

of exercising this option.

In light of the establishment of A-l's

bona fides, .

, his

proven reliability and his depth of knowledge of

Cuban intelligence activities, this option might

well have been considered by the Warren Commission.

The ALASH Operation (to be inue gorated nto crittisa dineral

During 1967, the CIA's Inspector General

issued

a report which examined CIA supported

assassination plots. Included in this report

was discussion of the CIA-mafia plots and an

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Agency project referred to as the AMLASH

operation (CIA Inspector General Report 1967

pp. 1-74, 78-112). The AMLASH operation involved

a high level Cuban official (assigned the CIA

cryptonym AMLASH/1) who, during 1962 while meeting

with a CIA representative expressed the desire to

assassinate Fidel Castro (Ibid., p. 84). As a

result of AMLASH's expressed objective and the

CIA's desire to find a viable political alternative

to the Castro regime, the Agency subsequently

provided AMIASH with both moral and material

support designed to depose Fidel Castro. (Ibid.,

pp. 80-94).. The AMLASH operation was terminated

by the CIA in 1965 as the result of security leaks.

(Ibid. pp. 104-106) During 1965, AMLASH and his

conspirators were brought to trial in Cuba for plotting

against Castro. AMLASH was sentenced to death, but

at Castro's request the sentence was reduced to

twenty-five years imprisonment. (Ibid. pp. 107-110).

In its examination of the AMLASH operation

the 1967 IGR concluded that the CIA had offered both

direct and indirect support for AMLASH's plotting (Ibia.

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The most striking example of the CIA's direct

offer of support to AMLASH reported by the

1967 IGR states

"it is likely that at the very

moment President Kennedy was shot a CIA officer

was meeting with a Cuban agent in Paris and giving

him an assassination device for use against CASTRO."

(Ibia.)

The 1967 IGR offered no firm evidence confirming

or refuting Castro's knowledge of the AMLASH operation

prior to the assassination of President Kennedy •

-..The

1967 IGR did note that in 1965 when AMIASH was

tried in Havana, press reports of Cuban knowledge

Of AMLASH's association with the CIA weredated from

November 1964, approximately one year after President

Kennedy's assassination: (Ibid. p. 111).

The Church Committee in Book V of its Final

Report examined the AMLASH operation in great detail.

(SSC, Book. V, PP. 2-7, 67-69)

The Church Conmittee o

concluded:

The AMLASH plot was more relevant to the

Warren Commision work than the early CIA

assassination piots with the underworld.

Unilke those earlier plots, the AMLASH

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operation was in progress at the time

of the assassination; unlike the earlier

plots, the AMLASH operation could

clearly be traced to the CIA; and

unlike the earlier plots, the CIA had

endorsed AMLASH's proposal for a coup,

the first step to him being Castro's

assassination, despite Castro's threat

to retaliate for such plotting. No one

directly involved in either investigation

(i.e. the CIA and the FBI) was told of

the AMLASH operation. No one investi-

gated a connection between the AMLASH

operation

and President Kennedy's

assassination. Although Oswald had been

in contact with pro-Castro and anti-

Castro groups for many months before the

assassination, the CIA did not conduct

a thorough investigation of questions

of Cuban government or Cuban exile

involvement in the assassination. (Ibid. p.

5)

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In 1977, the CIA issued a second-Inspector

General's Report concerning the subject of CIA

sponsored assassination plots. This Report, in

large part, was intended as a rebuttal of the

•17.

Church Committee's findings. The 1977 IGR states:

The Report (of the Church Committee)

assigns it (the AMLASH operation)

characteristics that it did not have

during the period preceding the assassina-

tion of JFK in order to support the SSC

view that it should have been

reported

to the Warren Commission. (1977 IGR P. 2)

The 1977 IGR concluded that prior to the

assassination of President Kennedy, the AMLASH

operation was not an assassination plot.

Nevertheless, the 1977 IGR did state:

It would have served

to reinforce the

credibilxty of (the Warrer Commission)

its efforts hadit taken a broader view

I the matter dor normal avene o:

Investigation.

The clA, too, coul

laye considered in specific terms

what most then saw in general terms--

the possibility of soviet or cubai

involvément in the assassinatior

because of the tensions of the time.

It is not enough to be able to point

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to erroneous, criticisms, made today.

the Agency should have taken broader

nitiatives then as well, That

CIA employees at the time felt--as

they obviously did--that the activities

about which they knew/had no relevance

to the Warren Commission inquiry does

not take the place of a record of

conscious review. (Ibid. p. 1})

Trialecian 319

Richard Helms, as the highest level CIA

employee in contact with the Warren Commission on

a regular basis, testified to the Rockefeller

Commission that he did not believe the AMLASH

operation was relevant to the investigation of

President Kennedy's death.

(Rockefeller Commission,

Testimony of Richard Helms, 4/24/75 pp. 389-391,392)

In addition, Mr. Helms testified before this

Committee that the AMLASH operation was not designed

to be an

assassination plot (Exec. Sess. Test. of

Richard Helms, 8/9/78, pp. 26-27).

A contrasting view to the testimony of Mr.

Helms was offered by Joseph Langosch who in 1963

was the Chief of Counterintelligence for the CIA's Special

The

Special Affairs Staff was the CIA component

responsible for CIA operations directed against

the Government of Cuba and the Cuban Intelligence

Services (HSCA Class. Affidavit of Joseph Langosch,

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Sept. 14, 1978, p. 1) The Special Affairs Staff

was

headed by Desmond FitzGerald and was responsible

for the AMLASH operation (SSC, Book V, pp. 3, 8, 79)

Langosch, as the Chief of Counterintelligence

for the Special Affairs Staff, was responsible for

safeguarding SAS against penetration by foreign

intelligence services, particularly the Cuban

Intelligence Services (HSCA Classified Affidavit

of Joseph Langosch, 9/14/78, P. 3). It was

Langosch's recollection that:

...the AMLASH operation prior to the

assassination of President Kennedy was

characterized by the Special Affairs

staff, Desmond Fitzgerald (sic) and other

senior CIA officers as an assassination

operation initiated and sponsored by the

CIA.

(Ibia., p. 4)

Langosch further recollected that as of 1962

it was highly possible that the Cuban Intelligencer

Services were aware of AMLASH and his association

with the CIA and that the information upon which

he based his conclusion that the AMLASH

operation was insecure was available to senior

Level

CIA

Ascepssator#;

officials, including Desmond FitzGerald. (Ibid., p. 4)

However, the issue before this Committee is

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*In response to Langosch's sworn statements, this

Committee has received from the CIA an affidavit

executed by Kent L. Pollock (CIA pseudonym) who "served

as Executive Officer for Desmond FitzGerald during the

entire period in which he was Chief of the Special Affairs

Staff...and discussed with him the AMLASH operation as it

progressed." (CIA Doc., Affidavit of Kent I. Pollock,

executed Oct. 5, 1978, p. 1) Mr. Pollock specifically

contested Langosch's assertion that the AMLASH operation

was characterized by the Special Affairs Staff, Desmond

FitzGerald, and other senior level CIA officials as an

assassination operation.

In pertinent part, Pollock

drew the following conclusions:

To the best of my knowledge, Mr. FitzGerald

considered the AMLASH operation

to be a political

action activity with the objective of organizing

a group within Cuba to overthrow Castro and the

Castro regime by means of a coup d'etat.

I heard

Mr. FitzGerald discuss the AMLASH operation

frequently, and never heard him characterize it as

"assassiantion operation."

Mr. FitzGerald

stated within my hearing on several occasions

his awareness that coup d'etat often involves

loss of life. (Ibid., par. 3, p. 2)

He also stated:

Desmond FitzGerald did not characterize the AMLASH

operation as an

"assassigntion operation"; the

case officer did not; I, as Executive Officer,

never

discussed any aspect of the AMLASH operation with

Joseph H. Langosch; the Deputy Chief, the other •

the special assistants could not

have so characterized it since they did not know

about the pen (the pen was specially fitted with a

hypodermic syringe in response to urgings by AMLASH

for a means to start the coup by killing Castro.)

The case officer offered the pen to AMLASH on the day

of President Kennedy's death.

AMLASH rejected the

pen with disdain. /Ibid., par. 1, p. 3/), (Ibid.,

par. 6, p. 3)

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could have happened back in 1964.

I think there would have been a

much better chance of getting to

the heart of it.

It might have

only revealed that we are involved

in it and who approved it and all

that.

But I think that would

have at least come out.

(HSCA Class.

Depo. of J. Lee Rankin, 8/17/78, p.91)

The Committee

is in agreement with Mr. Rankin

that had the AMLASH operation been disclosed to

the Warren Commission, the Commission might have

been able to foreclose the speculation and conjecture

that has surrounded the AMLASH operation during

the past decade. As history now records, the AMLASH

operation remains a footnote to the turbulent

relations between Castro's Cuba and the United States.

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