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OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

FOR RELEASE

10 A.M., EST

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 10, 1975

STATEMENT OF

CLARENCE M. KELLEY

DIRECTOR

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

U. S. SENATE

WASHINGION,

D. C.

DECEMBER 10, 1975

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREINIS UNGLASSIFIED

DATE 10131/00 BY SP 2 ALjM lEHL

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I welcome the interest which this Committee

has shown in the FBI and most particularly in our

operations in the intelligence and internal security

fields.

I share your high regard for the rights

guaranteed by the Constitution and laws of the United

States.

Throughout my 35-year career in law enforcement

you will find the same insistence, as has been expressed

by this Committee, upon programs of law enforcement that.

are themselves fully consistent with law.

I also have strongly supported the concept of

legislative oversight. In fact, at the time my appointment

as Director of the FBI was being considered by the Senate

Judiciary Committee two and one-half years ago, I told

the members of that Committee of my firm belief

'in

Congressional oversight.

This Committee has completed the most

exhaustive study of our intelligence and security

operations that has ever been undertaken by anyone

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outside the FBI other than the present Attorney General.

At the outset, we pledged our fullest cooperation and

promised to be as candid and forthright as possible in

responding to your questions and complying with your

requests.

I believe we have lived up to those promises.

The members and staff of this Committee have

had unprecedented access to FBI information.

You have talked to the personnel who conduct

security-type investigations and who are personally involved

every facet of our day-to-day intelligence operations.

You have attended numerous briefings by FBI

officials who have sought to familiarize the Committee

and its staff with all major areas of our activities

and operations in the national security and intelligence

fields.

In brief, you have had a firsthand examination of

these matters that is unmatched at any time in the history

of the Congress.

As this Committee has stated, these hearings

have, of necessity, focused largely on certain errors

and abuses. I credit this Committee for its forthright

recognition that the hearings do not give a full or

balanced account of the FBI's record of performance.

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It is, perhaps, in the nature of such hearings

to focus on abuses to the exclusion of positive accomplishments

of the organization.

The Counterintelligence Programs which have

received the lion's share of public attention and critical

comment constituted an infinitesimal portion of our over-

all work.

A Justice Department Committee which was formed

last year to conduct a thorough study of the FBI's

Counterintelligence Programs has reported that in the

five basic ones it found 3,247 Counterintelligence proposals

were submitted to FBI Headquarters from 1956 to 1971. Of this

total, 2,370 - less than three-fourths - were approved.

I repeat, the vast majority of those 3, 247

proposals were being devised, considered, and many were

rejected, in an era when the FBI was handling an average

of 700,000 investigative matters per year.

Nonetheless, the criticism which has been

expressed regarding the Counterintelligence Programs

is most legitimate and understandable.

The question might well be asked what I had

in mind when I stated last year that for the FBI to have

done less than it did under the circumstances then existing

would have been an abdication of its responsibilities

to the American people.

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What I said then

1 - in 1974 - and what I believe

today, is that the FBI employees involved in these programs

did what they felt was expected of them by the President,

the Attorney General, the Congress, and the people of

the United States.

Bomb explosions rocked public and private

offices and buildings; rioters led by revolutionary

extremists laid siege to military, industrial, and

educational facilities; and killings, maimings, and

other atrocities accompanied such acts of violence

from New England to California.

The victims of these acts were human beings --

men, women, and children. As is the case in time of peril --

whether real or perceived - they looked to their Government,

their elected and appointed leadership, and to the FBI and

other law enforcement agencies to protect their lives, their

property, and their rights.

There were many calls for action from Members

of Congress and others, but few guidelines were furnished.

The FBI and other law enforcement agencies were besieged

by demands... impatient demands... for immediate action.

FBI employees recognized the danger; felt

they had a responsibility to respond; and, in good faith,

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initiated actions designed to counter conspiratorial

efforts of self-proclaimed revolutionary groups, and

to neutralize violent activities.

In the development and execution of these programs,

mistakes of judgment admittedly were made.

Our concern over whatever abuses occurred

in the Counterintelligence Programs -- and there were

some substantial ones -- should not obscure the underlying

purpose of those programs.

We must recognize that situations have occurred

in the past and will arise in the future where the

Government may well be expected to depart from its

traditional role -- in the FBI's case, as an investi-

gative and intelligence-gathering agency -- and take

affirmative steps which are needed to meet an imminent

threat to human life or property.

In short, if we learn a murder or bombing is to

be carried out NOW, can we truly meet our responsibilities

by investigating only after the crime has occurred, or

should we have the ability to prevent? I refer to those

instances where there is a strong sense of urgency because

of an imminent threat to human life.

Where there exists the potential to penetrate

and disrupt, the Congress must consider the question of

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whether or not such preventive action should be available

to the FBI.

These matters are currently being addressed

by a task force in the Justice Department, including the

FBI, and I am confident that Departmental guidelines and

controls can be developed in cooperation with pertinent

Committees of Congress to insure that such measures are

used in an entirely responsible manner.

Probably the most important question here

today is what assurances can I give that the errors

and abuses which arose under the Counterintelligence

Programs will not occur again?

First, let me assure the Committee that some

very substantial changes have been made in key areas of the

FBI's methods of operations since I took the oath of

office as Director on July 9, 1973.

Today we place a high premium on openness --

openness both within and without the service.

I have instituted a program of open,

frank

discussion in the decision-making process which

insures that no future program or major policy decision

will ever be adopted without a full and critical review

of its propriety.

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Participatory management has become a fact

in the FBI.

I have made it known throughout our Headquarters

and Field Divisions that I welcome all employees, regardless

of position or degree of experience, to contribute their

thoughts and suggestions, and to voice whatever criticisms

or reservations they may have concerning any area of our

operations.

The ultimate decisions in the Bureau are mine,

and I take full responsibility for them. My goal is to

achieve maximum critical analysis among our personnel without

in any manner weakening or undermining our basic command

structure.

The results of this program have been most

beneficial...to me personally...to the FBI's disciplined

performance...and to the morale of our employees.

In addition, since some of the mistakes of the

past were occasioned by direct orders from higher authorities

outside the FBI, we have welcomed Attorney General Edward

Levi's guidance, counsel, and his continuous availability --

in his own words -- "as a 'lightning rod' to deflect improper

requests."

• Within days after taking office, Attorney General

Levi instructed that I immediately report to him any

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requests or practices which, in my judgment, were improper

or which, considering the context of the request, I believed

presented the appearance of impropriety.

I am pleased to report to this Committee as I

have to the Attorney General that during my nearly two

and one-half years as Director under two Presidents and

three Attorneys General, no one has approached me or

made overtures -- directly or otherwise -- to use the

FBI for partisan political or other improper purposes.

I can assure

you that I would not for a moment

consider honoring any such request.

I can assure you, too, in my administration of

the FBI I routinely bring to the attention of the Attorney

General and the Deputy Attorney General major policy questions,

including those which arise in my continuing review of our

operations and practices. These are discussed openly and

candidly in order that the Attorney General can exercise

his responsibilities over the FBI.

I am convinced that the basic structure of the

FBI today is sound. But it would be a mistake to think

that integrity can be assured only through institutional

means.

Integrity is a human quality. It depends upon

the character of the person who occupies the office of

Director and every member of the FBI under him.

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I am proud of the 19,000 men and women with

whom it is my honor to serve today. Their dedication,

their professionalism, their standards, and the self-

discipline which they personally demand of themselves

and expect of their associates are the Nation's ultimate

assurance of proper and responsible conduct at all times

by the FBI.

The Congress and the members of this Committee

in particular have gained a great insight into the problems

confronting the FBI in the security and intelligence fields --

problems which all too often we have been left to resolve

without sufficient guidance from the Executive Branch or

the Congress itself.

As in all human endeavors, errors of judgment

have been made. But no one who is looking for the cause

of our failures should confine his search solely to the

FBI, or even to the Executive Branch.

The Congress itself has long possessed the

mechanism for FBI oversight; yet, seldom has it been

exercised.

An initial step was taken in the Senate in

1973 when the Committee on the Judiciary established

a Subcommittee on FBI Oversight.

Hearings had been

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commenced, and we were fully committed to maximum

participation with the members of that Subcommittee.

I laud their efforts. However, those efforts

are of very recent origin in terms of the FBI's history.

One of the greatest benefits of the study

this Committee has made is the expert knowledge you have

gained of the complex problems confronting the FBI. But

I respectfully submit that those

benefits are wasted if

they do not lead to the next step - a step that I believe

is absolutely essential - a legislative charter, expressing

Congressional determination of

intelligence jurisdiction for

the FBI.

Action to resolve the problems confronting us

in the security and intelligence fields is urgently needed;

and it must be undertaken in a forthright manner. Neither

the Congress nor the public can afford to look the other

way, leaving it to the FBI to do what must be done, as

too often has occurred in the past.

This means too that Congress must assume a

continuing role, not in the initial decision-making

process but in the review of our performance.

I would caution against a too-ready reliance

upon the courts to do our tough thinking for us.

Some

proposals that have been advanced during these hearings

would extend the role of the Courts into the early stages

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of the investigative process and, thereby, would take

over what historically have been Executive Branch decisions.

I frankly feel that such a trend, if unchecked,

would seriously undermine the independence of the Judiciary

and cast them in a role not contemplated by the authors

of our Constitution. Judicial review cannot be a

substitute for Congressional oversight or Executive

decision.

The FBI urgently needs a clear and workable

determination of our jurisdiction in the intelligence

field, a jurisdictional statement that the Congress finds

to be responsive to both the will and the needs of the

American people.

Senators, first and foremost, I am a police

officer -- a career police officer. In my police experience,

the most frustrating of all problems that I have discovered

facing law enforcement in this country - Federal, state, or

local -- is when demands are made of them to perform

their traditional role as protector of life and property

without clear and understandable legal bases to do so.

I recognize that the formulation of such a

legislative charter will be a most precise and demanding.

task.

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It must be sufficiently flexible that it

does not stifle FBI effectiveness

in combating the

growing incidence of crime and violence across the

United States. That charter must clearly address the

demonstrated problems of the past; yet, it must amply

recognize the fact that times change and so also do

the nature and thrust of our criminal and subversive

challenges.

The fact that the Department of Justice has

commenced the formulation of operational guidelines

governing our intelligence activities does not in any

manner diminish the need for legislation. The responsibility

for conferring jurisdiction resides with the Congress.

In this regard, I am troubled by some proposals

which question the need for intelligence gathering, suggesting

that information needed for the prevention of violence can

be ácquired in the normal course of criminal investigations.

As a practical matter, the line between intelligence

work and regular criminal investigations is often difficult

to describe. What begins as an

intelligence investigation

may well end in arrest and prosecution of the subject.

But

there are some fundamental differences between these

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investigations that should be recognized - differences

in scope, in objective and in the time of initiation. In

the usual criminal case, a crime has occurred and it

remains only for the Government to identify the perpetrator

and to collect sufficient evidence for prosecution.. Since

the investigation normally follows the elements of the

crime, the scope of the inquiry is limited and fairly

well defined.

By contrast, intelligence work involves

the gathering of information, not necessarily evidence.

The purpose may well be not to prosecute, but rather

to thwart crime or to insure that the Government has

enough information to meet any future crisis or emergency.

The inquiry is necessarily broad because it must tell

us not only the nature of the threat, but also whether

the threat is imminent, the persons involved, and the

means by which the threat will be carried out. The ability

of the Government to prevent criminal acts is dependent

on our anticipation of those unlawful acts. Anticipation,

in turn, is dependent on advance information -- that

is intelligence.

Certainly, reasonable people can differ on

these issues. Given the opportunity, I am confident

that the continuing need for intelligence work can be

documented to the full satisfaction of the Congress.

We

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recognize that what is at stake here is not the interests

of the FBI, but rather the interests of every citizen

of this country. We recognize also that the resolution

of these matters will demand extensive and thoughtful

deliberation by the Congress. To this end, I pledge the

complete cooperation of the Bureau with this Committee

or its successor in this important task.

In any event, you have my unqualified assurance

as Director that we will carry out both the letter and

the spirit of such legislation as the Congress may enact.

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