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198-10007-10029

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK Assassination System

Identification Form

Date:

6/24/201

Agency Information

AGENCY:

ARMY

RECORD NUMBER :

198-10007-10029

RECORD SERIES :

AGENCY FILE NUMBER:

CALIFANO PAPERS

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :

FROM:

TO :

TITLE:

CIA

C. TRACY BARNES

REPORT ON THE COLD WAR USE OF RADIO BROADCASTING BY CIA

DATE: 06/25/1953

PAGES:

15

SUBJECTS :

RADIO BROADCASTING - CIA

DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION: Secret

RESTRICTIONS: 1A; 1B

CURRENT STATUS : Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 04/03/1998

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS: Califano Papers, Box 1, Folder 2. Memo from Barnes re: Report on the Cold War Use of Radio

Broadcasting by CIA

JFK Ravian

epartment of the Army EO 1352

Declassify → Exclud

• Exempt

Authority_

• Refer To

Review Dare 222615 BYWhEn

v9.1

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25 June 1953

MEMORAN DUM FOR: (See distribution below)

SUBJECT

Report On The Cold War Use of Radio Broadcasting by CIA

Lo Ne have made a complete survey of the use of radio broadcast

ing in the cold war mission of CIA. The essential parts of the report

and recormendations are contained in the attached memorandum dated

15 kay 1953 and entitled "Report On the Cold War Use of Radio Broadcast

ing by CIA". (Operational information and other sensitive matter con

rained in the original, but deleted from the attached, will be sep

arately supplied where appropriate to

the interested area divisions.)

2. The policy outlined in the attached menorandum has been approved

by the Deputy Director for Plans, who has directed the following actions:

ao Undertake, in collaboration with each area division, a

country by country analysis of all indigenous broadcasting and

television systems for the purpose of devising plans for their

penetration, where feasible, or an explanation where it appears

not to be feasible.

bo Develoy and subnit; in collaboration with the appropriate

personnel and training offices, a plan for the recruitment and

training of officers qualified for covert broadcasting oporations.

co. Explore with the State Department the possibilities of a

Joint undertaking to exploit full's in the interest of efficiency

and economy, material derived from escapee interrogations and other

intelligence sources, covert as well as overt, to support all los.

propaganda efforts.

do. Develop and reconmend, in collaboration with area divinicas,

an improved method for the issuance and dissemination of poliey

guidance to the field.

Prepare and submit, in collaboration with General Ncd.elland,

a project to produce broadcasting devices capable of electronic

intrusion into Communist broadcasts; to develop special techniques

for their use; and to continue research and development of other

unconventional methods of hroadcasting suitable to our mission.

3o Chief of Op rations,

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3o Chief of Operations, DD/P, has authorized the circulation of

the attached material with the request, that you cooperate in the carming

out of the DD/p's directive. Particular attention is called to itom 2o a.

arove.

ho Mr. C. Lloyd Ignur, assisted by Mr.. Stanley Po Richardscr, have

been assigned the responsibility for staff coordination of these matters

on behalf of CPP and will be available to you for assistance in planning

and sunnorting broadcasting onerations.

Is/ C. Tracy Barnes

C. TRACY LARM S

Chief.

Political and Psycholorical

warfara

Attachment

As stated above

Distribution

DT/P - 1

1000 - 1

Cliefs, All Areas - 1

ea.

Chiefs, Senior Staffs - 1 ea

1/1" - 1

PT/C/OPS - 1

FF/CFY

u de

E*/C/PAD - 1

F'/Mr. Fenur - 2

RI

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15 May 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHILE, POLITICAL ANI PSYCIOLOGICAL VARFARE

SUBJECT

* Report On The Cold War Use of Radio Broadcasting by CLA

Attached hereto is our report on CIA radio broadcasting as & cold

war weanor. It is grouped into the following sections:

I. Section 1, Page 1, deals with RADIO AS A MIDTUM IN IT, COLAE.

It shous in the main that the countries having the most to

o tear tro

Comminism are doing the lcast to counter its radio propaganda.

2. Section 2, Page 2, deals with CAPARILITIS. It embraces a.

discussion of the techniques available to CIA.

3a Section 3, Page 3, discusses broad TARGETS and appraises our

current and planned activities arainst them.

4o Section L, Page La deals with the principal PROFLEMs peculiar

to covertly directed broadcasting, and their solution.

So. Section 5, Page 10, contains RECONMENDATIONS for a body oi

principles to govern over all CIA nolicy In its present and future

activities in this field.

(For a detailed statement of present CIA radio broadcasting

assets, reference is made to CPY to CPP memorandum of 25 February 1953»

entitled "Preliminary Survey of lidio Broadcasting Media", IS 86069.)

(The original "Report On The Cold War Use of Radio Broadeasting

By CIA," from which this document is excerpted, was dated 15 May 1953,

TS 8646507

(The data on broadcasting hours by coúntries was obtained from

MID and VOA, that on available receivers {rom OSI/OR and VOA, and that

on Soviet jamming transmitters from ONE..)

/s/ Co Lloyd ligner

Co LLOYD LONER

Atüachnent, as statedo

PP/CLE&ha

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15. May 1953

REPORT ON THE COLD WAR USE OF RADIO BROADCASTING BY CIA

Io Radio As & Mediun in the Cold Wer

orgical warfare.

bo

The free world responds ulth 1,015 hours per week.

Co

This gives the enemy & numerical advantage of approxinetely

seven to five, In roslity, the Communist advantage Is much greater

bocause of their successful interference with free world broadcasts to the

Orbit through jamming and the penalties they impose on their own peoples

for Ilstening to foreign broadcasts.

It is estimated that these measures

reduce the effectiveness of free world broadcasts to the Orbit by as much,

If not more than, 50 percent.

An Inlustration is that the Communists

devote an estimated 900 transmitters to the jamming of free world broad-

casts.

There is no jamming of Orbit broadcasts. to the western world, nor

any restrictions on listening to them.

do Only the English speaking world holds its on mmerically in

the over.all radio war with the Orbit.

VOA, BBC and Canada together

broadeast 238 hours per week arainst the Orbit; whereas the Orbit countries

combined direet 222 hours per week to Inglish language audiences in North

America, the United Kingdom, and the Pacific area.

do In the rest of the world,

, the balance is drastically in

favor of the Cormnists, They broadcast 1, 173 jam-free hours to all

other countries around the world in multiple languages, compared with a

mere 26h hours broadcast to all Orbit countries by non-English speaking

nations of the free worid,

of the total of 1,015 broadcast hours beamed by all the free

world to the Orbits CIA, through TPTOIC and other quasi-clandestine

stations, breadcasts 513 hours, or more than half, in the name of exiles

from Communist dominated areas.

Éo Ino greatest disparity in effort is most noticeable in

Western Europe.

France, which receives 89 hours of broadcasts per week

from

the Orbit as a whole, responds with only 35 to the Orbito Italy

receives 97 hours fron the Orbit but broadcasts only hu to it, Spain 94

to 12, Grerco 89 to 9, Turkey 3u to 7o Even relatively argressive

Yugoslavia receives 194 broadcast hours from the Orbit against its output

to the Orbit of only 89 hours.

ho The one-sided

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ho The one-sided contest is even more marked in a comparison

of the broadeast.output of the ussh alone, without the satellites,

against Furope.

It subjects Spain, Greece and Italy together, for

instanco, to 140 hours of broadcasts per week. The combined broadcasts

of these three countries to the USSR, however, number only 19 hours per

week.

France and Turkey who, together, receive 64 hours per week from

the USSi, make no broadcasts at all to the USSR.

I. Appendix I gives a compilation by country or area of the

international broadcasts to and from USSR and the satellites. It shows

that the communists are outslugging the free world, and that western

Europe, in particular, is doing far legs than it should in the radio

propagande battle with the Orbit.

2o Capabilities

Several techniques are available to CIA for the use of radio

broadcasting in its covert psychological warfare mission.

a Overt international broadcasting on fixed frequencies under

cover of covertly controlled emigre groups.

This technique rormally

would be calculated to reach wide audiences by means of high power and

the use of multiple frequencies; but it invites heavy jamming, is costly

and presents security, control and political problems in the acquisition

and maintenance

of suitable bases and frequency allocations.

bo Quasi-clandestine broadeasts in the name of notional or

"captive" resistance movements using relatively low power and employing

a frequency switching technique to evade jamming. This technique presents

more manageable security and control problems, delivers a signal in spite

of jamming and costs less than high power, but it places a burden on

listeners and presents special problems in avoiding interference with

broadcasts of friendly countries.

c. Subsidization of overt nonpolitical, but anti-Comminist,

religious broadcasts. * * *

do Through covert penetration and/or support, the manipulation

Di free worla domestic broadcasting systems for the purpose (1) streng-

thening their anti-Communist broadcasts to the Orbit and or (2) influenc

Ing them to more aggressive anti-Communist, pro lestern attitudes in their

domestic services.

This technique lends itself naturally to clandestine

operations. It requires a minimum of U.S. personnel, presents no

problens concerning

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probions concerning bases and managenent, and requires relatively

amall investments and expense. It would

be advantageous beyond the

irmediate PP field. In such a post an agent could observe commnist

infiltration, spot forthconing politieal changes by observing changes

In governent propaganda directives, recruit agents with rollable

cover for other covert undertakings and cooperate in planning for

denial of the facilities to an enemy in the event of

hostllities.

We believe it should be the agency's established policy

to carry out such penetrations wherever opportunitles offer or can

be created.

A glance at the world nap is sufficient to indicate the

Imnensity of this field of potentialities, both as concerna the

countries on the pariphories of the USSR and Communist China in

Europe, the Near Fast and Far Last; and in Latin America as welle

We propose that an immediate start be made, in cooperation with Ares

Divisions; on & country by country survey of possibilities in this

ares and that action be taken to achieve penetration wherever this

study indieates it may be feasible.

HIT

d: Use of purchased or free time through covert channels

on existing radio systems in friendly countries- **

mectronie penetration of enemy broadcasts. campa

ho "Ghost" Voice operations of World War II. This technique i

discused in pars 5.C.(6) below.

Go To exploit the amateur

Than broadcasters, large

numbers of whon exist in fussis.

*A project is being drafted

to explore the posalbilities of this technique,

Broadcasting from airplanes

This has been carried out

experimentally in tuo areas with disappointing results due primarily

to operational and equiment linitations which make for limited aud

fence coverage at beste

It 1s, noreover, very costly and also bre

sents special security problens. It is not recormended, excopt for

possible hit and run operations. Airborne transmitters might be used

on occasion to simlate mesaages fron agents inside the USSR or sate

enlites.

This is a deception tochnique rather than broadeusting but

shouldy we belleve, be explored.

Targets in order of importance, with estimate of adequacy

01

present

To Jocus

USSR.nRadio 1s the only consistent medium for pierc

ing the Soviet iron curtain.

It is estinated that there are approssi.

mately 4,000,000 receiving sets in the USSA, of which 75 to 80 per

cent are believed to be equipped with frequency bands capable of

receiving foreign shortwave broadcasts. Virtually ald of them readily

receive long and nediun wave signals.. Noù all of these receivers are

in the hands of

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socurity Information.

In the hands of privato individuals, however; and the number of those

having secess to shortwave receivers is estimated to be constantly

decroasing due to Soviet efforts to increase groip listening by means

of wired networks

Nevertheless, it would appear that there will be a

sizeable potential audience for foreiin broadcasts in all three

wa e bands, for some time to come. One indication of this is the

faet that at present the USSR is broadcasting approximately 900 houre

to S8 10

per day over 160 trananitters in 26 or more languages to its own people.

Many of these transmissions are to areas and over frequencies which 1ie

within our transmitting capabilities.

Our assets for exploiting this potential audience,

Including projects still in the planning stage, are far from adequate.

D. Cosmunist China, Like the USSR, the Comminist goverament

of Chime ralies heavily on radio broadcasting for comnication with

the peooled It utilizes more than 50 hational and regional stations

for this purpose, operating chiefly on mediun and long wave but to

some extent, also, on shortwave. "#*

European Satellites The preponderance of CIA broad»

casting efforts are centered on this area. #*

do The Free World. Many countries afford opportunities

for relatively inexpensive exploitation by cover penetration of

indigenous broadeasting systems and use of free or purchased time. * * *

(See Para. 2.d.)

4 Problems of Covert Broadcasting

&o Cover

(1) & radio transmitter that can be heard cannot be

hidden. Put another ways there are no known methods for concealing

from technical monitors the geographical source of broadeasts,

although

the non-technical listening public can te and often is deceived.

Cover for broadeasting operations, therefore, presents a formidable

problem. Autononous emigre organizations, which offer the most

credible cover, generate factionalism as well as control, security

and manarem nt problems.

These difficulties could,

nowever

be

mininized by positive agency contros through a compartmentalization

which separates the cover organization from program and tranamitting

operations and lays down strict requirements on security, budget

control, and high professional standards? See Chart, Annex IIo

(2) Religious broadcasting presents few cover head

aches, but is of doubtful propaganda value.

(3) The best cover

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The best cover is alforded by covert penetration

of friendly systems, (a Western European nation talking back to USSR,

etto, as discussed in 2.d. above).

(4) Commercial broadeasting cover presents some possio

bilities in the free world but none for broadcasting to the Soviet

orbite

Do .

bases

(1) Because governents object to providing bases for

aggressive psychological warfare which they do not influence or control,

1t is difficult to find bases in areas suitable for broadcasting to the

orbite furchermore, adequate broadcasting facilities take time to

plan, build, and staff and long tenure is therefore

important.

Howe

ever, the polltical climate of a country can change abruptly, with

resulting uncertainty as to length of tenure. Munich, for instance,

which once furnished an excellent base for a variety of broadcasts

turgeted to the Orbit, appears to be becoming less and less satislactory.

Cover and control problems are closely related to

this. A base for & secure and competently managed operstion should be

less diffleult to obtain than for loosely organized one

(2) Seaborne transmitters offer mich in mobility but,

antenna limitations restrict their effective pover.. As in the case

of the VOA COURIIR, stationary antennas on land are required for

maximun effectiveness. Thus, the political problem becomes the same

as for land transmitter bases, and costs in investment and maintenance

are considerably higher

than land based operations.

Moreover, the

difficulties of providing credible cover for a covert seaborne operation

are manifest. While this office will contime to study VOA experience

In this fleld, it seas no prospect of any agency use for it.

(3) Tha VOA presently controls numerous broadcasting

bases and are developing additional bases, in areas of the world

suitable for our purposes.

The necessary agreements wich host

countrlos have already been negotiated; nover, housing,

cion and other logistics have been provided.

transporta

The present manages

ment of VOA are sympathetic to sharing these bases with CIA®

In addition to the saving in costs this would furnish us secure

i areas for transmitters with the minimn of housekeepiag problems.

as the dirtieult but not insumountable problem of cover can be

resolved, such locations would be idenl for our purposes.

co Information Support

(1) To supplement avnilable normal news sourcess

broadcasting to Orbit countries

Is depandent for program materia

upon Intelligence

• 5-

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upon intelligence reports, interrogation of refectors, escapees

and exiles, indigenous newspapers and a regular flos of intercepts

from enemy broadcasts.

These are indispensable to credible, inter

estings and timely broadcaste. Despite our vast potential resources

and large U.s. expenditures in these fields, the effective "take" is

far from adequate, rarely timely, and unnecessarily costly. FBIDe VOLD

and severad others monitor the same foreign broadcasts to extract the

sane or similar information.

Several U.S. agencies interrogate the

same exiles for PW information, whereas a

single interrogator, trained

in fw needs, could supply most, if not all, the requirements not only

for all radio but all other Ph activities better and faster. A cleared

consultant, on behalf of one of our more successful operations, pro

duced on abundance of excellent support information and evaluation

The same data, properly sterilized and speedily disseminated,

could equally serve the VOA and any other covert or overt Fl effort

targeted to the same area.

This complex problem needs a high level decision

by State and CIA and the appointent of a small tean of officers

experienced in hoth TW and interrogation work with power to devise

an effective and efficient program to exploit our rich resources.

do Jo Deliver a Signal, That Can Bo Hoard

(1) Soviet jamming of propaganda broadcasts raises

serious questions concerning our ability to deliver a signal that

can be heard above the jamming.

To be sure, some of our broadcasts

get through because they are unable simultaneously to jam broadcasts

in all areas nor do they in practice jam a given broadeast trang

mission at all hours.

For future plaming purposes, however, these factors

seen clear:

(a) Soviet capabilities for jarming are large and

on the increase.

(b) The degree of their janming seens to be re-

lated to their estimate of the harmful effect of the broadcasts on

their interests.

Hence, the more effective parts of our propaganda

are likely to be jammed even though other parts get through.

(e) We have no present capabilities to monitor

theis jorning if they uses they probably do in congested areas.

1ou-powered local Jammers.

(2) Prudent planning would, therefore, require that

any subatantial future investments by CIA in radio broadcasting

transmitters include provision for all possible techniques to ensure

our broadcasts being heard to the maximum in spite of janning.

(3) What techniques

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(3) What techniques are available to meet this require.

ment?

(a) To deliver a signal of such power as to be

heard above the jarming.

Here we are at a disadvantage in that

Lopowered and inexpensive local jammer is capable of rendering

unintelligible & signal of substantially higher power from a distant

point.

The greater the power of our transmitter the more complicated

the installation and the more expensive the investment. And the more

diffleult becomes the cover and security problems as well as the

political considerations involved in base negotiations. Since the

eneny is not required to equal. our poser with his jammers, we would

thereiore be fighting a losing battle if ve attempted to "slug it out*

or a power basis only.

(b) Jarming evasion through the device of vary

ing the frequency has so far proven to be an effective means of lay..

ing down a signal that can be heard clearly despite jarming. This

method requires constant dial changing by the listener and must

assume therefore a desire on his part to hear the program sufficient

to overcome the annoyance of dial twisting. When used in combination

with appropriate programming techniques and the use of two or more

frequencies simultaneously this has so far proven to be the most

effective means of jamming avoidance.

Such frequency shiftings cannot be accomplished

writhin the legal rules laid down for international broadcasting.

These must thereforo, be "black" broadeasts in the sense that they

can be credibly denied by our Government as well as the goverrment

of the host country. The movement at will through various frequencies

prodices en annoying interference for the listeners to broadcasters to

whom those frequencies are legally assigned. This interference, while

fully justified in the case of USSR and satellite assigned frequencies,

must be avoided in

the case of frequencies assigned to our friends.

Our broadcasts using this technique have so

far aroided annoyance to friendly countries by the use of very low

barget and that only on the periphery.

This limits us to a small part of the total Soviet Orbit

The same techniques can be

used with higher power and at greater distances from the target.

To avold interference with friendly nations! broadeasts the base

must be located in an area which, with the proper antenna adjust

ments, permits our signal to "skip" over the territory of friendly

countries in its pauh. An example would be that, given a transmitting

bass in Saudi Arabia for broadcasts to the USSR, the facility would

have to be engineared so that its signal would not interfere with

local broadcast recaption in Turkey and other friendly countries in

between

(e) The development of unconventional broadcasting

techniques for

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techniques for the penetration of enemy domestic radio broadcasting

services night well enable us to overcome the handicaps imposed by

the jamming of our conventional broadeasts to the Soviet orbit and

which he been helored thus tar

seize the cold war initiative in the radio sphere. It is a field

Some possibilitles in this area are described

in the "Project Troyi report of the Massachusetts Institute o1

Technology (Vol. IV, Annez 26) of 1 February, 1951.

Among them is the "intrusion," or "side-band

injection," technique which was used successfully by the Russians

against Germany during World War II. It would enable us to intrude

our own propaganda messages into radio programs being broadcast on

enemy home channels.

It would enabie us in effect to talk to the

Soviet, satellite and neutral radio audiences over enemy facilities

of compel the enemy to disrupt his own broadcast service in an effort

to prevent it.

It. could also be used in turing Soviet propaganda

broadeasts to Western Europe to the advantage of our friends. The Troy

report observes as to the technique itself:

"This would be an effective and annoying

technique which would be extremely difficult to counter."

Utilization of this technique appears to be

within our capabilities at the moment. It has been field tested

and is ready for use an soon as the necessary technical adaptationg

can be made to conventional tranmitters.

The time and cost involved

in mounting a facility for utilizing this technique is now being

explored by ADCO at the suggestion of this office.

Another unconventional technique being devel

oped by an agency consultant and now almost ready for field testing

1s the so-called "euddling device.

This operates on the theory that

we can transmit an interfering signal into an orbit domestic radio

service which will cause the listening audience to shift to our

nearby program in endeavoring to tune out the interference on his

orn home program.

Other unconventional means of carrying the

cold war to the Orbit by neans of clandestine radio might be cap

able oi Invention and development, and the scientific and practicai

potentiallules in this field should be explored to the utmost.

This office is convinced that emphasis must

be placed more and more on unconventional radio broadcasting tech-

niques if the cold war of the eir waves is not to become more one-

sided than it already is

• In favor of the Communists. Properly davel-

oped and utilized, those techniques already perfected or in the pro

cess of perfection and those which might be invented might even be

the means of

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the means of snifting the shole radio propaganda wer balance in our

favor. They would be indispensable in the event of hot war.

We,

therefore, are impressed with the necessity of developing our capaci

tles in this direction to the utmost and proceeding immediately with

the covert procurement of bases and equipment noeded for the task.

To rocapitulate, it would seem desirable for

CIA to limit its present and future conventional radio broadeasting

scitvities to the absolute mintwn and that any new undertakings

should provide:

A marimm transnitter power of

100,000 watts capable of accommodating:

Built In jaming evasion capabili-

tless and

2 Built in unconventional broadeasting

capabilities.

Bases in seeure and proteeted areas

which permit the use of the jaming evasion technique without inters

ference with friendly countries. A study of base possibilities 1o

now being made by this office.

Load Time

(I) (a) Radio broadeasting facilities cannot be created

over night.

From the time that plans are finally approved, it takes

12 to 18 months to design, construct and instell a transmitter.

prior to such approval time is required for the planning cycle, negotia

tion for bases, the staffing problem, ete.

tions or systems likewise require time for development

(2) All in all, It would be prident to estimate that

upwards of two years are required from the conception of a project

for broadeasting and its implementation. Hence, the planning mist

ba long range. It is not possible to improvise broadeasting capabil

Itles for targets of opportunity, such as Stalin's death.

&. Control ani Manarment

(1) Control by CIA of the substance of broadeast and

the management of broadeasting operations should be absolute and through

officers directly responsible to agency control.

(2) The doctrine of compartmentalization should be

strictly enforced. No one, excepting the handful of technicians roquired

to operate

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site.

wises

operation of the transmitter as wall as from'any other activities of

the cover organisation. If two or more language groups use the game

facilities they should be compartmented from each other # # #

(See Para, dia. (1))

Go Evaluation.

(2) In the Preliminary Survey of Radio Broadcasting

(25 February: 1953-IS 86889) -attention was called to the need for a

continuing evaluation of ill radio broadeasting operations with partic

alar reference to coverage and impact, and sources for the essential

information were outlined.

(2) PP/OPS, in collaboration with this offico, has

initiated this much-nesded undertaking.

No Personnel

(1) There is a shortage of professional and technical

personnel qualified for covert radio broadcasting. A program of

selective recrüitment should be undertaken in coordination with any

plans for new radio projects.

(2). A training program in covert broadcasting techniques

should also be initiated: This training should be undertaken in safe

houses by detail of qualified instructor, from covert training for basie

indoetrination; to be supplemented by area instruction by the area desks

and specialized radio training by Coimo. and this office.

50

Recommendations

Pending clamfication of CIA's future responsibility in the

cold was we have made certain assumptions as to the criteria which

should govern agency activities in radio broadeasting.

Our thesis is that CIA should use radio broadcasting in

covert Psychological Warfare only under the following conditions:

That the tack cannot be performed by VOA or other

overt media.

bo

That any contemplated operation follow striet con.

cepts for clandestine operations, Including

(1) Positive and direct agency control of both

management and polier.

(2) Strict security requirements ineluding com

partmentation of all elements of broadcasting operations.

-10-

(3) Maintenance of

SE CORE-T

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noble dendal of eat none of a e on one to te sorr

ment.

That no diroct broadeast operation be undertaken by

CIA until every possibility has been exhausted to have the task under

taken by another country (or countries) through penetration, manipula

ton and or contras of, or covert purchase of time on, ingenous radio

facilities.

•Our foremost objective should be to exploit the

broadcastin; systems of friendly and neutral countries. This generally

1s posible in two ways:

(2). To stimulate our friends to greater aggressive

extore in their international broadcaste to the Soviet orbit; and

(2) To influence the output of the domestle sen

vices o' friendly and nestral states in the interests of the Western

recou endations:

Within this frame of reference we made the following

(1) Proceed to exploit the many possibilitien to

use indigenous railo systems in filendly and noutral nations with the

oljectives of (a) increasing the amount and elfectiveness of thair

propaganda efforts against USSR and the satellites,

(b) exposing and

i hibiting Commi'st fifth column activities and (6) the meintenance

of pro-U.s. and pro-hestern attitudes.

these missions should be undertaken in closest

collaboration with the UsIs missions to the end that all that can be

accomplished overly.

(2) Undertake a recruitment and tratning progran to

make avallable highly qualified and thoroughly indoctrinated officers

preferably wth-natural cover to undertake and to support such nisaions.

(3) In coopera ion with State, develop a positive

progran for information support of all propaganda activities through.

maximum une of intelligence and defector sources.

(1) Strengthon and streanline the machinery for

palley guidance,

wth washington headquarters responsible for broad

polley only and the flold missions to be given the widest ponsible

latitude in the application of those policies to local requirements

and the esploitation of targots it opportunity. A nature staff offleer

experienced inh. should be available in the mission to (a) feed

propaganda lines, (p) expedite P.W. support (e) coordinate with USIS

and (d) generally

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Security Information

and (d) generally. backstop the operation.

(5) Establish machinery los evaluating the substance,

coverage, Impact and management of radio operations.

(6) Proceed with the development of capabilities to

electionically intrude upon and othennise explott the Commist radio

broadesting to their on and foreign audiences. Id le important to

have those facilitles seacy at the earliest possible date for possible

use: In the cold war lot to have then available at the outbreaks of

hot war would be a tragle mistake.

# 0 2 7*

Note: Recommendations with respect to speeific

targets have been trannitted to the appropriate

division

(10) A snall stall element should be ereated to

supervise CIA planning and operationa in cevert radio broadeasting.

This start should be instructed to expedite the implementation of

the above recommendatione and provide a continuing review of CIA

Polley and Progran for the use of thie Media.

/s/C. lloyd Egner

C. ILOYD EGNER

15 May 1953

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