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2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SEGMET

too.

10 October 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with Di. MIRO Cardone on 6 October

1. DI. MIRO arrived about 9:50 a.m. for the meeting we had

set at 10:00; again he was driven by his secretary whom he introduced.

As during the firat meeting, she remained outside in the car. Our

meeting lastod until 12:00 noon;

First, Dr. MIRO handed mo a note in longhard listing the

topics discussed with me on 5 October. These points are:

a. Groups conducting propaganda, etc, with Agency support

should receive their support and be coordinated through the Council.

b.. A propaganda campaign should be naged by the Council

aimed at:

(1) Cuba, via a long wave radio scation in loy West.

(2) Cubans in Miami and other U. S. areas by:

(a) Subsidizing Diario de las Americas:

(b) Contracting for time on radio stations.

(3) Latin America, with a plan such as the "Operacion

c. Underground Activities.

1) Provision of monthly funds to Courcil for procuring

Cuban pesos to send to the seven-odd resistance

groups in Cuba through reliable channels (auch as

previously sent through the Italian Embasay).

21.50

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ton as outlined in plan presented

october.

3. Commando

Then De

action prepared by

Colonel Manuel VA

Enrique DESPAIG

that they were o

¿me a plan (in English) for clandestine

Fy collaborators, whom he named an

etro, an officer of the Academy, Captain

lonel (nu) MONTEAGUDO. He stated

group and had been prisoners.

With respect to

the plan for clandestine operations in Cuba,

he stated that 300 men could be counted upon for commando action, part

of them here, part in Cuba. He reiterated that a commando operation

was essential to bolster morale among the anti-Castro elements in Cuba

and in exile as well as to conduct sabotage that would further weaken

Cuban economy and the Communist regime. He said that for this operation

U. S. help would be nacessary in providing weapons, ammo, demolitions,

equipment, and funds. He proposed that if this plan was considered to

have merit, that l arrange to have someone meet with his military men

to work out the details. After all preparationa had been made and

materiel provided, etc, the operation would be purely a Cuban affair,

(NOTE: Plan turned over to Thompson at our me eting at 15:30 on

6 October for transmission. )

4. Request for Arms, etc. to send to Escambray

DIMliO remarked that over a month ago he had made a request

to Clark for arms for the anti-Castro insurgents in the Escambray, but

to date had heard rothing relative to the request. He commented wryly,

"I ask but never hear an answer." He said that the fighters there should

oe supported. DI. MiRO stated that he had a boat (provided by us) and

a means for delivery of the arms. Osvaldo RAMIREZ is chief of the

Escambray group.

COMMENT: Has anything been done about this request?

5. Information on Arms Received by Castro Regime

would not dirulge the source of the information but commented, "You will

know. "

*Report turned over to Thompson on 6 October.

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DI. MIRO said there was no way to determine the accuracy

of the figures given of planes, guns, etc, received from the Soviet bloc

(and Italy and Canada) but ever. if the figures were exaggerated 100 per

cent, they would still be impressive.

He added that Castro is daily becoming stronger militartly

with weapons and with a large militia of close to 300, 000 being trained

to use them while the economy continues to doteriorate. Perhaps only

hall the militia would be effective.

But that is sizeable.

Thus, he said,

the longer the delay in positive military action to overthrow Castro, the

greater will be the task.

"We must act soon, vigorously and effectively,

to insure victory. Another defeat would bo disastrous and would make

Cubans, Latin Americans and others bolieve Castro to be invincible.

Then would come accommodations and even worse, the implanting of

Castro-backed regimes in the hemisphere.

And the U.S. would suffer.

worst of all, being discredited for defeat and "guilt of interference."

"In the UN no nation would stand beside the U. S. "

6. Рторовal that Council go to Cuba with Commando Group and

Establish a Government on Cuban Soil

DI. MIRO then declared that he was convinced that Castro

would never be overthrown by all the propaganda, the sabotage, commando

raids, guerrilla activities, rupture of diplomatic relations and deteriorating

economy, and that it was inconceivable to establish a government-in-exile

for nothing would come of it; that the only solution for defeating the

Castro regime was for the Revolutionary Council to so to Cuba and estab-

lish a government on Cuban soil, ask recognition by all friendly countrtes

and military assistance of its principal ally, the l. S., and that the U.S.

be ready to intervene immediately with its Forces.

"This would all have

to take place in a matter of 48 hours, otherwise it would fail.

I recognizo

that this is a bold plan, but boldness is necessary. There will be many

risks, many may be killed. As for myself, I don't care if I die. I have

lost all my personal possessions and my son is a prisoner. " He reiterated

that all must be well prepared in advance, there must be no vacillation,

everything must proceed rapidly. First, a commando raid in force to

seize a piece of Cuban territory, preferably near Guantanamo, and imme-

diately the members of the Council go ashore, proclaim a provisional

government, broadcast by radio to all nations an appeal for recognition

(and cables prepared in advance would also be sent out), request U. S.

assistance, and the U. S. should furnish such assistance at once in ade-

quate strength to ensure victory.

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Before such an action is undertaken, the enemy must be

softened by propaganda, sabotage, raids, underground action, and the

mass of the people of Cuba must be prepared to accept the provisional

government through propaganda, increased knowledge of the Council

and its unifying efforte.

DI. MIRO asked me what I thought of this project; did I think

that Castro could be overthrown in any other way. I admitted that

strong military action appeared necessary. I stated further that

of course his plan would have to be studied at the highest government

levels. He proposed that he might elaborate a plan with his militar y

collaborators, and I suggested that he do this so that it might be examined

and considered.

Dr. MIRO declared that he was convinced that this Communist

dagger in the side of the States could only be eradicated by such action,

that the U.S, is and will be blamed for all anti-Castro propaganda,

sabotage, etc. and that enemy states will denounce it for intervention

in Cuba, but that if the U. S, goes to the aid of a friendly revblutionary

tegime established in the country and helps it defeat the Soviet-backed

Communist regime, all friendly governments will applaud.

"I have no personal political ambitions, " declared MIRO.

"'I merely am trying to chair the Council, whose mission is to unify the

änti-Castro.elements inside and outside of Cuba. If the team isn't con-

sidered effective, then change the pitcher. But I believe the Council must

establish itself on Cuban soil, and soon.

Time is against us. ''''The Punta

del Este agreement will backfire against the U. S, if Castro is allowed

to remain in Cuba. In a year, after the politicos of the countries re-

ceiving U. S. aid have gotten their hands or U, S. gold, they will say,

'Thanks to Castro, we got this.' And they will spend it as in the past

with no benelits to the social and economic welfare of the people. "

7. Views about the Judges and Lawyere

I queried Dr. MIRO as to his views relative to the judges and

lawyers and their future status. He said he hoped that they could all

reunite and that they could be given assistance as in the past. He de-

clared that Dr. ALABAU was not qualified to be a justice and that he was

doing nothing but making politics and trying to discredi the Council

and MIRO and VARONA. Di. MIRO declared that he, as Prime Minister

in the early days of the Cartro government, had named ALABAU to the

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Supreme Court, but that now he considered ALABAU unt

judicial position.

hold any

8. Members of the Revolutionary Council

Dr. MIRO remarked that he had a meeting of the Council on

10 October. I asked what elements now composed it and what he pro-

posed to add. He named the following as presently in the Consejo:

Rescato

30 de Noviembro

MRR

Accion Democratica

20 de Mayo

AAA Independiente

MDC

Montecristi

He said he had invited to join;

MRP

Unidad Revolucionaria

and awaited their reply.

He would also like to have the Workers, Students, and the

Professionals (Doctors, Lawyers, etc.) come into the Council. He be-

lieves Batistianos and Comunistas and elements unwilling to cooperate

should be excluded, but that all other groups should be brought together

under the Council.

He contends that all anti-Castro activities, except clandestine

and military, should be coordinated by members of the Council, but that

the excepted activities should be known only to him (MIRO).

9. Probable Argentine Rupture of Relations with Cuba

DI. MIRO declared that he believed imminent the Argentine

vacationing in the U. S. after FRONDIZI's visit); that VILLANUEVA, a

Secretary of the Argentine Embassy in Cuba was coming to see MIRC

today; and further that he (MIRO) had received a phone call last nighl

5

Suici

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from a Spaniard (Nicanor FERNANDEZ) in Buenos Aires, urging MIRO

to go to Buenos Aires to arouse anti-Castro sentiment of the people,

• inasmuch as some Argentine action against Cuba appeared imminent..

(FERNANDEZ said he had already written MIRO a letter.) MIRO says,

"Of course, I cannot go. I have the Consejo meeting on the 10th.

Furthermore, I am going to New York. on October Ilth or 12th for the

SIP (Socieded Interamericana de Prensa) meeting and have been allotted

12 minutes to address the meeting. "

10.

MIRO to attend Homago to LACERDA (Brazilian who

Precipitated QUADROS' resignation) on October 15

Dr. MIRO said he planned to remain in New York City (after

11 and 12 October SIP meeting) until October 15th to attend the homage

fOr LACERDA, the Governor of Guanabara province in Brazil. MIRO

probably will stay at the Park Chambers Hotel, but will advise Clark

of his location.

I commented that I would probably remain in Washington next

week in view of his plans, but that I might go to New York City to meet

with him; if so, I would get in touch with him and arrange a meeting

time and place through Clark.

11. Propaganda Commission

I asked DI. MIRO about his ideas on the future organization

and structure of the Propaganda Commission. He stated that it is out-

side the Consejo and not under his direct control, although the Council

accountant has been passing funds to it. He said CASTRILLO had resigned

as head of Propaganda and that he would like CONTE AGUERO to handle

it. He claimed that MESTRE had not done anything with propaganda.

12. MIRO's Views Relative to Supreme Court Justice or PRIO

being Recognized as Head of a Provisional Government

I asked Dr. MIRO if he believed that there were many anti-

Castro Cubans (both in and out of Cuba) who favored PFIO, or the head

of the Supreme Court to be the provisional president if a government were

to be established on Cuban soil. Dr. MIRO declared that the revolution

is a fact, and that practically nobody wants to go back to any former

regime.

The people in Cuba would resist any such possibility. He de-

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nounced PRIO's activities against the Council and its efforts to unify

the anti-Castro elements. He said that the people should be given an

opportunity to elect their chief of state after Castro's overthrow and

reestablishment of order in the island.

13. Olfices of Council (Consejo Revolucionario)

When questioned about his business and private telephones,

MIRO said, "The business phone is also in my house. I have no office

except in my house, but that phone is always busy (JEfferson 2-4680).

So use the other phone (JEfferson 4-2751) when you wish to call me. "

'I need to have a small office somewhere away from my home

because all the activities there are driving my wife crazy. I wart to

find something inodest so that no accusation can be made of ostentation -

merely a room for myself, one for my secretary, and one for meetings.

of the Council, etc.

The FRD had a place but at that place also was the

press, the refugee center, etc. It would not be satisfactory. The FRD

is now practically dead. It was the forerunner of the Consejo as the

unifying agency of the anti-Castro resistance. "

14;

MIRO's Views on Coordinating the Activities of Other Exile

Groups

After Dr. MIRO reiterated his view that he should be the

channel for funds and coordinating the activities of groups outside the

Consejo such as the Students, FORD (Labor), etc., I said that I under-

stood that some of these elements were unwilling to function under the •

Consejo; and that in view of that situation, did he consider that an

Activity Committee might be organized with a delegate from each of

these groups and under the chairmanship of a member of the Consejo.

This would serve to coordinate their activities, give them a tie-in with

the Consejo, yet not make them subservient to it. Dr. MIRO replied

that this would merely set up another Consejo outside of and parallel to

the existing Consejo. I did not pursue this further, not having enough

background of these organizations to be able to discuss the matter

effectively.

15. Telephone Conversation with MIRO or. 7 October

Before my departure from Miami for Washington on 7 October,

I telephoned to Dr. MIRO frown the airport. He appreciated the call and

asked if I had seen in the morning paper the action taken yesterday by

!."'

Caria:

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the ALABAU Lawyers' group, in proclaiming Julio CARCERAN (one

of the chief justices in exile) as "President of Cuba at War." He ex-

pressed his indignation at this unilateral "political" move by ALABAU

and his adherents among the exiled lawyers and judges.

He added his

best wishes to me and reminded me that he would probably go to New

York on October Ilth or 12th for the SIP (Sociodad Interamericans de

Prensa) meeting.

I replied that I would appreciate if he would contact

Clark after his arrival to give his location in New York City, and that

Clark might have a reguest from me for an appointment with him, i

this seemed desirable. I suggeated that in future phone conversations

I would be known as JUANITO. He agreed with pleasure that this would

be a good procedure. I wished him Godspeed and he roplied likewise

to me.

16. Comment

During these firat two meetings I endeavored to establish

myself favorably with Dr. MIRO and therefore refrained from bringing

up details of budget or opposition to any of his specific proposals.

I listened, asked various questions, and he talked at length.

In future meetings, after I have gained further background and

have more policy guidance, I shall be able to discuss with him specific

issues and endeavor to reach agreements or compromises, as may be

required.

SAGINE

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