## Page 1

1104-10332-10009

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

ret

copy

_SECRET

BOX 11

Fldr 11

06678-3595

'5-31-78

Executive Registry

APPROVED FOR RELERSE 1933 in

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROCRAM

478-8.432/2

SĐC 29-19723 SUN 5 10 04 AN 78:

30 May 1º3F ECIAL COLLECTIONS

RELEASE IN FULL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence 2000

VIA

: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM

: S. D. Breckinridge

Principal Coordinator, HSCA

Office of Legislative Counsel

SUBJECT

: House Select Committee on Assassinations

Request for Access to the "Hart Report"

1. Action Requested: That you approve the recommendation at

paragraph 14 for limited access of selected House Select Committee

on Assassinations (HSCA) staff members to a classified, sanitized

version of the Hart Report.

2. Background: As you know, the HSCA Staff Director, Mr. Blakey,

has requested you in a letter dated 9 May 1978 (Tab A), to provide access

to a report prepared by John Hart in 1977 on the subject of the Agency's

handling of the Nosenko case. This request is part of an inquiry into

hypotheses arising from Epstein's book Legend, in which the view is

presented that Nosenko was a dispatched agent with the mission of

concealing KGB ties with Lee Harvey Oswald. Central to HSCA interest

is the question of Nosenko's bona fides. Additional to that issue, interest

has developed in the manner in which Nosenko was treated during the period

that his bona fides were suspect. These two issues are treated separately

below.

3. The Hart report is directed at the handling of the Nosenko case,

addressing the actions and conduct of various officers in the Agency.

These

matters cannot be treated without also considering the question of Nosenko's

bona fides, so there also is considerable review of the methodology employed

and the analyses of those handling the matter.

Mr. Blakey states in his

letter that he has been informed that the report contains no information on

the issues of bona fides, being concerned instead only with personnel and

internal procedures. This understanding on his part is incorrect, and

his letter suggests that he himself has reservations about it.

# 05948

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## Page 2

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SECRET

4.

The Agency has made available to the HSCA two studies conducted

in 1967 and 1963 by SE Division, both of which questioned Nosenko's

bona fides. A subsequent study by the Office of Security in 1968 has also

been made available; it reached a conclusion contrary to the preceding

studies and supports Nosenko's bona fides. Other Soviet defectors have been

interviewed by the HSCA staff, as well as knowledgeable CIA officers and

retirees. As a result, much of the information on the case has been

revealed to the Committee.

5. The two SE Division studies, concluding that Nosenko was a KGB

agent, were superceded by the Office of Security study, which prevailed.

The HSCA investigators reportedly have problems with how the earlier tio

studies could be rejected so shortly after their completion. As a result,

the HSCA seems focused on the issues as viewed at that time. The Hart

report has the advantage of having been prepared after a ten year period,

during which experience with the validity of Nosenko's information provides

the basis for an objective re-examination. It is relevant to HSCA interests

that the Hart Report constitutes a convincing statement of the bona fides

of Nosenko. Access to this portion of the Hart Report would help broaden

and complete the understanding of the HSCA of the matter.

6. Because of the above, the Agency has everything to gain and nothing

to lose in providing the Hart Report for its review of the issue of Nosenko's

bona fides. :

II

7. In addition to the central issue of Nosenko's bona fides, Chairman

Stokes has expressed interest in the treatment accorded Nosenko during the

period that his bona fides were in question. Nosenko reportedly has provided

the HSCA with some detail on this. We have made the point that how

Nosenko was treated was a result of the issue, not a part of it.

When we

questioned the relevance of this line of inquiry to the HSCA charter,

HSCA staff representatives assert that their charter extends to the conduct

of the intelligence agencies in the Warren Commission inquiry which

includes this. The rationale appears a bit contrived and stretched in terms

of the real issues. How Nosenko was treated may indicate how concerned

CIA was with the man's bona fides, but so far as relating further to the

inquiry concerning President Kennedy's assassination, it seems marginal at

best. The rationale is so far-fetched that we have been led to consider that its

dramatic qualities are attractive for the projected TV spectacular this

coming September. It also doubtless provides an opportunity for public

criticism for those staff members who have been acknowledged by Mr.

Blakey as hostile to the Agency.

2

-SECOET

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## Page 3

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SECREF

8. If the rationale of the HSCA for pursuing the question of

Nosenko's treatment is contrived, and largely peripheral to the real

purpose of the Committee, as we believe it to be, it should be faced

in those terms. No one would disagree with there being relevant

inquiries, but it is hardly proper to take an internal critique and turn

it against the Agency on a point irrelevant to the central purpose of the

face a hostile attitude that the Committee may not otherwise want to be

so obvious.. The Committee has the right to determine what is relevant

to its charter, but the Agency should also assert a similar right to defend

itself from truly peripheral and hostile fishing expeditions.

9. Therefore, while we believe that the Hart Report should be made

available to the HSCA staff, we do not believe that such action should be

taken prior to attempting to limit the use made of information contained

in the Report not related to the issue of Nosenko's bona fides.

III

10. There are aspects of the Hart Report that contain information on

foreign liaison services that should not be exposed to the HSCA. There is,

therefore, a question of some sanitization to be conducted prior to the

Report's being made available.

11.

A version of the Report has been prepared for the FBI in which the

names of employees below the DCI have been removed, as well as certain

modifications in more dramatic rhetorical phrases. That version is in

other respects faithful to the original Peport. It provides a working basis

for further sanitization. Sanitization prior to review is not foreign to the

HSCA, as the Directorate of Operations has had a continuing policy of

selected sanitization. Extending this practice to the Hart Report would

be consistent with the extant working relationship with HSCA. The Report

will remain classified.

12. If the paper is made available, classified and sanitized, it should be

on a highly restricted basis; the HSCA wants six named persons to have

access to it, which is at least three times the number needed for bona fide

research purposes.

13. Staff Position: This paper favors making a sanitized version of the

paper, in classified form

available to a limited number of the HSCA staff

representatives at the CIA Headquarters Building at Langley. Any such

release should be preceded by appropriate discussions limiting use of the

material by the Committee.

The General Counsel is of the opinion (Tab B)

3

SECRET

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## Page 4

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ritat if the paper is withheld, and a court test results, the Agency

nust expect to fail in withholding the paper. The Office of the General

counsel, the Office of Security, SE Division and CI Staff favor making the

paper available under the conditions set forth above.

14. Recommendation: That you approve granting access to a limited

number of staff members of the HSCA to a classified, sanitized

Ine Hart Report. Such access shall be conditioned on agreement to limit"

use of materials contained in the Report to those matters relating to the

•question of Nosenko's bona fides.

S. D. Breckinridge

Attachments

CONCURRENCE:

SIGNED

General Counsel

31 MAY 1978

Date

Chief, SE Division

Date

Chief, CI Staff

1

Director of Security

Date

JUN 1978

Date

APPROVAL:

Director of Central Intelligence

Date

MISAPPROVAL:

Direcior of Central Intelligence

Date

SECRET

---

## Page 5

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SUBJECT:

House Select Committee on Assassinations

Request

for Access to the "Hart Report"

Distribution:

Orig - Adse

- C/SE Div

- C/CI Staff

SA/DO/O

1

- OLC/Subj

- OLC/Chrono

OLC/SDB/ksn

• (30 May 78)

---

## Page 6

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die:

CIA SPEC

_LECTIONS

RELEA

N FULL

/ 200đ

11 March 1993

NOTE FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

FROM:

SUBJECT:

Peter Earnest

Chief, Media Relations

WASHINGTON POST Request to Talk to an Agency

Specialist on the Kennedy Assassination

the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the Kennedy

The WASHINGION POST is preparing a series of articles onl

assassination.

with

the help of CIC, we recently arranged for George

Lardner and Walter Pincus of the WASHINGTON POST to interview

former KGB officer Yuri Nosenko about his knowledge of Lee

Harvey Oswald during the time Oswald lived in the soviet

Union. To ensure that Nosenko's resettlement identity and

location would remain protected, I made the arrangements for

Nosenko to come to washington for the interview.

The POST reimbursed Nosenko for expenses and paid him a

$250 consulting fee.

The interview was done on Wednesday,

3 March, at the POST offices downtown.

I did not remain for

it. Lardner and Pincus also hosted a lunch for Nosenko which

was attended by Ben Bradlee.

Lardner and Pincus were very

pleased with their session with Nosenko and appreciative of

our making it possible.

I also spoke afterwards with Nosenko

who said he was satisfied with how the interview was

conducted and with the financial arrangements.

Shortly after the interview, Lardner faxed me a list of

the questions that he and Pincus had prepared for themselves

to use in checking out Nosenko's information.

They asked if

there was anyone at the Agency they could talk to about the

individuals named.

I told them that developing information

in response to their questions would probably take a good

deal of research and that I doubted the Agency would be able

to take on such a task at this time for the POST.

However, I

said I would take it up with the appropriate offices.

Although I told the POST that I do not believe anyone

would be willing to undertake research on their questions,

I'm wondering if there is anyone around who might be

knowledgeable of Nosenko's information who would be willing

to talk with Lardner and Pincus on background based or

his/her existing knowledge. I think Lardner®

be grateful for making such a person available even if

making suen a person avatabe even us would

for

circulation en

---

## Page 7

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SUBJECT: WASHINGTON POST Request

all their questions aren't answered. Considering that they

are trying to do serious research on the Kennedy

assassination, I

think any effort on our part to help them

would be seen

as a gesture of good will.

Ther

Peter

Earnest

Attachment:

As stated

Agree to having a specialist talk to them on background

about the Nosenko information if an appropriate person is

available.

No, do not want anyone from the do talking about the

Nosenko

information.

-

-

•...

---

## Page 8

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SUBJECT: WASHINGTON POST Request to Talk to an Agency

specialist in the Kennedy Assassination

DCI/PAI/Earnest :ncbx37758 (11 March 1993)

Distribution:

Original Addressee

1 ADDO

1

SA/DDO

1

DO Registry

D/PAI

1

D/DO/CIC

C/DO/NROC

C/DO/CE

C/CSI

*1

C/History Staff

---

## Page 9

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Names of Russians we should try to track down about Lee Haryey Oswald, Turi Nosenko and the

Ji's assassination:

1. General Olen M. Gribanor, head of the Second Chief Directorate of the KGB in the earty 1960%

where Nosenko says be worked, primarily against American tourists, as deputy chief of the Seventh

Department. Nozento described himself as sort of favored by Gribanov and he said Gribanon in-

structed him, wiver the JFK assassination, to retrieve the Oswald file from the Minsk KGB right

away.

2. Anatoliy Koralenko, deputy chief of the Second Chief Directorate of one of its departments, at

time of JIK assassination. Nosenko said when the file arrived from Minski, he and Koralenko were

going over the all-important first volume-and finding KGB had sothing to do with Oswald-when a

KGB aficer from the Fint Department came in and picked it up on Gribanor's orders, to review it

and write a summary of it.

3. The officer who picked it up was Col. Matreey, deputy chief] think) of First(or American) De-

partment, Secood Chief Directorato. Unhave first same.

4. Chief of thin First Department was Col. Sergei M. Fedoseyer or Fedoseey and presumably he

would have had a hand in or supervised preparation of the "sprayka" or summary.

5. Gribanor and more than 40 other KGB officers were kicked out because of Nosenko's defection,

according to Nosenko. That righti

Whet happened?

6. Maj. Georgi Rastrusin. Was in 1959 a senior case officer in KGB responsible for Intourist mat-

ters. Nosenko says that it was Rastrusin who told him about Osald and how he wanted to stay in

Soviet Unlon. Nosenko said Rastrusin said Oswald "doesn't present interest" to KGB and Nosenko

checked out with his superiors. Word came back not to bother with Oswald. Nosenko was told to tell

Rastrusin to tell Intourist to deal with him.

" Rastrusin returned next day and said we got a problem. Oswald tried to hill seu, em if:

washed hands of him, decided to let Intourist deal with him. Intourist then part of Ministry of For

eign Trade. Nosenko said he believes question of what to do with Oswald was run to top of that min-

istry and beyond, to Khruschey or one of his deputies. In any case, decision was made to let Oswald

stay in Minsk. But not, Nosenko says, by KGB.

8. In the fall of 1963, a KGB colleague, MaJ. Turalin, Service No. 2 (counterintelligence in foreign

countries), Füst Chief Dircctorate, told Nosenko orally that Mexico City station had just sent a cable

abouts request by Oawald for a visa to re-enter Soviet Union. What should be done.

Nosenko said be said, Trait a second. How come he's back in America!' At that point, Nosenko said

he hadn't know Orwald had gone back.

' 9. Nosento said he said let's go to chief of department who he identified as a Cal. Chelnekor or

Chelnenko, but later seemed to say his timing might be off and somebody else may have been chief of

Notenko's department at the time). In any case, Nosenko quoted chief as saying, in effect, Tremem-

ber this crasy mut. No. No. No. Tell them we don't have any interest."

Cable back to Mexico City advising KGB there get rid of Oswald by telling him to go back to his

oma country and apply for & visa at Soviet Embassy in Washington, etc, etc.

10. CoL Grunder, was chief of the KGB department in Minsk that was responsible for foreigners

there.

11. Oles Nechiporenko, one of three KGB officers stationed in Mexico City who reportedly inter-

rogated or dealt with Oswald on his visit to Embassy there. Now living in Moscow are

Other to Mexico City officers, both still alive in Russia: Valeriy Kostikoy and Pavel Yarzkov.

---

## Page 10

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f.le

3 March 1994

Memo to: C/HRG

Subject: Mangold Litigation

Today I alerted OGC (Theresa Wilcox/Kar RelA that

the JFK collections contains a significant number of

documents on Nosenko (5-6000 pages) which may impact on the

Mangold litigation.

As I understand it, the Mangold

Litigation is over the Angelton files and is several years

old. According to JEK reviewers

at the FBI, documents on

Nosenko's defection and treatment are part of case. I

talked with Theresa Wilcox who is the para-legal handling

the litigation, however, she was not familiar with the

documents involved.

She will consult with reilly, the lawyer

on the case, and get back to me.

I consider the ball in OGC's court. I propose that we

continue to review the Nosenko files. If there are Mangold

or other consideration to address, we can do so

after the

HRG review is

complete.

BarrY

---

## Page 11

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9 rarel44

Rei NOSENKO

Haverig deniened Be/ 45 - We

i press deart met competit

(1).

(2)

Yuring. Z.

-264 pos.

(Its to ni Box 45, FordEnS)

(ellasheen released iiVFK)-J1K62-F9

(all cancludes Nosenio to 900s)

"Case of Yun, I hosenko" (835 page steel)

dated Felwey 1967.

(ho indicaterin Clat I los heen released)

(Beleine it was prepared ii SB (pertup.

aps int GI/STAFF.

(3)

(147 past)

...aaled FEBRUARY 1968

(Il condudes to NOSENKO WitS

Mor Bone pide.)

(Dant Krain authone):

---

## Page 12

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INTERNAL USE ONLY

23 March 1994

Memorandum For: C/HRG

Subject: Nosenko and the Mangold Litigation

I received a call from Kathy Kelly, OGC, this morning

concerning the Nosenko files in the JFK files. I described

the files again (about 4000+ pages that include transcripts

of all his interrogations and numerous studies on his bona

fides and treatment by the Agency including the Solie and

Hart reports and an 835 page comprehensive study) . Since

Nosenko is an important figure in the JFK assassination

story and the files are part of the sequestered collection,

HRG is reviewing the files under the JFK Assassination

Records Collections Act. However, we were aware that some

of the documents were part of the Mangold litigation and

wanted to make sure that they were properly coordinated.

Kathy Kelly said that the Mangold litigation should not be a

factor in HRG's review.

If the files were subject to the

JFK Records Act, they should be processed under that Act.

When the review is complete, a list of the documents

released should be provide so that OGC can treat them the

same in the Mangold case.

I also talked with Kathy Stricker (yesterday) to get some

background on the handling of Nosenko files and what were

the "secrets" given what we know is publicly available.

She

said for years the agency "glomared" Nosenko except for the

Oswald information: however, once Golitsyn became public

that ended.

Today, the battle over his bona fides and how

he was treated are public knowledge. The Agency up until a

couple years

ago had not released some of the studies (she

mention Solie) but she was not sure that this was still the

case or if it was possible to continue to deny them.

DO has

protected the information provided by Nosenko on other

Soviet sources and leads for possible recruitment.

This

type of information should continue to be protected.

Kathy Stricker's comments are consistent with HRG's handling

of the Nosenko files.

We are considering all of the files

as related; his bona fides is a key element of the story and

there was a large amount of information including parts of

the studies on him in both the Oswald 201 and the JFK hard

copy collection.

We have deleted information provided on

other sources and operations not related to the JEK story.

We are also recommending release of the rest of the studies.

Although they contain potentially embarrassing information

for the Agency (as did the IG report on the Castro plots),

there doesn't appear to be grounds for denying under the JFK

Act.

---

## Page 13

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SECRET

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

Restrictions on Declassifying Material on Yuriy Ivanovich

NOSENKO

The following should be used as guidelines in

declassifying material files pertaining to the career and

"bona fides" of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO

CIA Knowledge of Russian intelligence tradecraft.

Specific information in the files about KGB targetting of

American citizens could reveal to the Russian Intelligence

service our knowledge of their tradecraft.

Russian services continue to target Americans, this

information should continue to be protected.

To protect a CIA asset. Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO

remains an asset of this agency, and is under contract.

Moreover, the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVRR)

remains

interested in NOSENKO's whereabouts and activities.

Russian intelligence services since the Second World War

have tried to track their defectors.

There are indications

that the Russian services remain interested in the NOSENKO

case.

At the time of his arrest, Rick Ames had some

{NOSENKO files

(AESAWDUST) in his possession.

The US

Counterintelligence Community is unsure if this

material was passed to the Russian service.

--Following NOSENKO's brother and mother's visit to the

United States, both were questionned by the Russian

service about

NOSENKO's activity and place and

residence.

5194

Lest pos.tion

C.I.

SECRET

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

---

## Page 14

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SEP 16 '94 09:50AM

Mr Robert FringIe

(2909' Rock Manor Court?

Hernãon, Virginia, 22071

P.3/4

Dear Bob,

It was very good to meet with you again in washington on June 12.

I am wilting to confiru our recent convereation about the CIA's release

of documents about se to the National Archives.. An I explained to you at

our meeting. I am very displeased that this was done without my knowled-

de and especially since my rhotograph was officially released by the

agency for the first time in thirty years.

As you know, it has come to my attention that the CIA released these

many hundreds of pages to the public without consulting me or telling

me that this was going to be done. I have already seen coples of two of

these

reports totalling nore than 700 pages. One is the October 1968

report sunporting me ky Bruce Solle; the other was a February 1968 re-

fort by the CI Stell which attacked my credibility. (This latter report

contalas a cofy of my photo from the late 1960s. I consider this a breach

of my personal security.)

I also consider many of the details in both of these reports to be of a

very personal nature. Other pages deal with with sone very seasitive

cases which I gave the Agency about other people. The Information In

these rerorts was given freely and accurately by me to the CIA officere

1s the 1960s under, terms of strict confidentiallty. Although 1t 1s very

a1ff1cult fox me to say this, I leel that my trust in the Agency has now

been seriously damaged.

This release particularly troubles me because for the past thirty years

I have remained very loyal to the Agency and considerate of 1ts wishes.

for instance, despite many requests, I have only aporen to a few jours

nalists, and only when the Agency advised me tolso. I have never sought

---

## Page 15

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16

194

09:51AM

P.4/4

age

2

on my own to publish my story in an article or look. Eut now, the CIA

has not returned this courtesy. Instead, 1t has released seneitive

information to the publio without speaking to me first.

Cader the circunstances, I would like to respectfully request the

follewing:

1. That you show this letter to DDO led Price, Director James Woolaey,

and the current beads of the CIA's Freedom of Information Office and

Historicel Revlew stell - so that they are aware of what has happened.

¿ I would l1ke to receive, in writica, an explanation Iron these res

ponsible. of why this release was done.

3. I would like to receive a list of the rajor reporte about ne walch

have already been released. Aside frow the twe reporte that I already

have seen, I would like to receive copies of any other major studies

that have been released. (For instance, il there are reporte released

by Peter Bagles, Newton Miler, dames Angletes, the CI Stall and Joba

Fart, then I would Ilke to see them as well.)

4. I would like to be given the Agency's wiltten assurance that further

releases will not ocour without consulting me first.

Bob, you should know that before I wrote this letter I have spoken

about this matter with my good friend George Kalaris. He too was troub-

led by what I told him, and he advised me that I should ask the Agency

for as explanation.

Bob, I apologize for troubling you with this matter; but I have no one

else to turn to for assistance.

Please lot me know il there is any respense as soon as possible.

Reapectfully yours,

---

## Page 16

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SEP 16 '94

09: 50AM

train's

wait

r.c4

Draft letter to Nosenko from the pro

SPECHL COLLECTIONS

Dear

RELEASE IN FULL

2000

The Director has asked me to respond to your letter

expressing concern that US Government declassification of

material could compromise your privacy and security.

In regard to your question about the documents that have

already been released, rest assured that I have directed

officers responsible for FOIA requests to take special care

in reviewing information concerning you in light of your

exaspecial circumstances. We will make full use of all

He via nata tu

possible exceptions to FOIA-mandated declassification in

order to protect your privacy.

As you know, in 1992 Congress passed the JFK Assassination

Records Collection Act, which required all US Government

agencies to release any records related to theVassassination

of the

of President Kennedy.

As Deputy Director for Operations, I

am of course connitted to fully supporting the DCI in

meeting this requirement, but I also appreciate your concern

about the files on you that are related to the :

assassination. I have therefore directed a senior officer

Histodison

in the Do to meet with the officials in the Agency's :

Revich

istorieal staff who are involved in the declassification

program.

This officer has had extensive discussions with

members of the stay and has worked closely with them to

Identity those portions of the files that include personal

and operational information.

As a result of this effort, we have postponed release of any.

scur information touching on your private life or on operational

Information pertaining to your debriefings. Under the JFK

law, a Presidential Review Board will make the' final

decision on the disposition of the material.

This Agency

values the sacrifices you have made for our country, and we

will present the Board with the strongest possible

case for

protecting information that could affect your privacy and

security.

Best wishes,

Secret

---

## Page 17

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UNCLASSIFIED

17 April 1997

Sue Amiano, SA/CIC, gave to Gary Brenneman to give to Barry

Harrelson,

Historical Review Group, X31825, 2 soft files

entitled:

1.

"WARREN COMMISSION/ OSWALD"

2.

"DOCUMENTS YURI Ivanovich NOSENKO/OSWALD"

found by Al Bonner, in the vault.

Natis

Received

17- APRIL-57

UNCLASSIFIED

---

## Page 18

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Administrat

CIA SPEC

RELE

Hre Internal Use Only

ROLLBA

CTIONS

• IN FULL

2000

30 April 1997

Note To: ARRB Staff

Subject: CIC Soft files:

1.

Warren Commission/ Oswald

2. Documents Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO/Oswald

The attached files were located in CIC.

They are soft

(or working) files containing information on Nosenko, Warren

Commission and Oswald.

It is not clear if the files date

from the Warren Commission period, or were created in

1975/76 (latest date of documents) in response to a request

or investigation.

Most of the documents are in the sequestered collection

(OGC folders) .

The other documents may be in the Norsenko

material put aside for discussion with the ARRB or in the

Microfilm part of the sequestered material (the Microfilm is

not indexed document by document) .

Administrative = Hre Internal toa anty

---

## Page 19

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Administrative - HRG Internal Use Only

30 April 1997

Note for the Record

Subject: CIC Oswald/Nosenko related

soft files:

1.

2.

Warren Commission/Oswald

Documents Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO/Oswald

1.

I advised sue Amiano, SA/CIC, that most of the

documents in the two folders are duplicates of documents in

the CIA JFK Collection sequestered by the HSCA. The other

documents are related to Nosenko,

but do not mention Oswald.

These documents are probably duplicated in the Nosenko

material set aside for discussion with the ARRB. I

recommended that we make the folders available to the ARRB

staff..

She concurred.

2. Documents will be made available to Michelle Combs,

ARRB staff, on her next visit.

Barry

Administrative - HRG Internal Use Only

---

## Page 20

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SECRET

file

TO:

FROM:

Eileen M. Wukitch

DATE:

James W. Zirkle

08/01/97 09:54:03

SUBJECT: Re: The Nosenko Papers

CL BY:(2034442

CL REASON: 1.5(c)

DECL ON: X1

DRV FROM: HUM 4-82

Eileen: Let me introduce myself. I am CIC/Legal. C/CIC asked me to touch base with you

concerning any possible ARRB release of privacy information concerning Nosenko. While we are

aware that such a decision to release is within the Board's discretion, we do believe that the

Agency, when giving this information over to them, should request that the Board protect such

information to the maximum extent possible. If I can be of help in that regard just let me know.

From the Desk of Dennis D. Lamb

NOTE FOR:

FROM:

DATE:

SUBJECT:

(Ron L. Seckinger

Dennis D. Lamb

07/31/97 10:44:28

The Nosenko Papers

CL BY: 0790429

CL REASON: 1.5(c)

DECL ON: X1

DRV FROM: HUM 4-82

At about 1020 hrs on Tuesday, 31 July, I received a call from Eileen Wukitch of the Agency's

External Support Group/Historical Collection Staff regarding Michelle Combs's interest in reviewing

the Nosenko papers for the upcoming meeting of the Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB)

on 5 August. (Wukitch said Combs, an ARRB staffer, is planning on taking 20 pages of the Nosenko

material with her. Wukitch wants to know whether we would like copies of the material Combs is

taking. I said yes. Wukitch said Combs appears understanding of our concerns in this case and to

this end wanted the following questions answered so she could put a human touch on our concerns

in explaining our position to the ARRB.

1. Is Nosenko married? (No one in CIC/AG knows.)

2. What part of the country is he living in? (This is known, but I can't see why she or the

ARRB needs to know.)

3. Did the Soviets actually sentence Nosenko to death? Or was this just his claim. (No one

in CIC/AG know, but it appears reasonable to assume that the Soviets did sentence him to death.)

4. Nosenko's current age? (No one in CIC/AG knows off hand. Henry's observation was

that Combs can find this out from open literature.)

SECRET

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According to Wukitch, Combs also wants to take to the ARRB two letters pertaining to the affair:

the letter Nosenko wrote in 1994 objecting to the release of his material without his being consulted

or advised, and the letter Ted Price wrote to him in response assuring him that everything possible

would be done to prevent further release of his papers. I don't see any problem with this since the

papers would support our position--unless the ARRB starts thinking about releasing the letters also.

(Wukitch said she told Combs CIC would have Bob Pringle, former Chief of AG/FIOB currently

serving as Officer in Residence at the University of Kentucky, flown in to address the ARRB if this

appears necessary. Combs will pass this on to the ARRB. Wukitch noted that Combs alluded to

the possibility that that ARRB might want to talk with Nosenko himself.

CC:

CC:

_John B. ENGBEBle ancy T. BRUNONE, Edgar C. BAUML, Dennis D. Lamb, Curtis L.

MACKIAN) Jacqueline Frankfort @ DCI, Ron L. Seckinger

SECRET

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MEMORANDUM

August 5, 1997

To:

From:

Subject:

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION ANDOR

RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

T. Jeremy Gunn

Michelle Combs

Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko

I have prepared this memorandum at your request for the upcoming meeting where the

Board will be briefed on issues related to the Soviet defector, Yuriy Nosenko.

Summary and Recommendation

The information on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko contained in the CIA Sequestered

Collection microfilm consists of approximately 3500 pages of interviews, transcripts,

memos, and reports. Of the total, approximately 1200 have been released to the public

as open in full or with only minor redactions. Of the 1200 released pages, roughly 800

contain information directly relevant to Lee Harvey Oswald and the Kennedy

assassination.

After my review of the Nosenko records and our discussion of the issues, it is our

judgment that the remaining 2300 pages are unrelated to the assassination of President

Kennedy and we recommend that they be processed as "NBR." These NBR records

consist of such items as general family and professional contact information, Soviet

intelligence methodology and operations, and Soviet navy information dating to

Nosenko's early career in Soviet Naval Intelligence. I suggest that we review carefully

these 2300 records to ensure that there is no assassination-related material, and, to the

extent this is correct, we should process them as "NBRs."

Background on Nosenko

KGB Lieutenant Colonel Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko first secretly contacted the CIA in

Geneva in June 1962. One and a half years later on February 4, 1964, he defected to the

United States for what he said were ideological reasons. His case became the single

most difficult counterintelligence case in the Agency's history to date. Nosenko's

information on the assassination of President Kennedy made his bona fides of more

importance than simply a means to determine his true identity or whether he was the

prototype of a KGB disinformation plot against Western intelligence agencies.

The conflict over Nosenko began two and a half years prior to his actual defection, in

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December 1961, when Anatoliy Golitsyn, a KGB defector, predicted that the KGB would

dispatch false defectors after him to discredit him and confuse Western intelligence

agencies as part of a massive disinformation campaign. Golitsyn, who had described a

darkly intentioned monolithic Russian master deception plan and Soviet intelligence

agencies of brutal efficiency, claimed that Nosenko was the most important of these

fake defectors and that any Soviet sources who came later and supported Nosenko's

bona fides would also be false. Golitsyn was wholly believed by Counterintelligence

Chief James Angleton, who shared Golitsyn's world view. Golitsyn argued that any

CIA officers who believed Nosenko should be considered as moles themselves.

Nosenko's first four meetings with the CIA in Geneva in June 1962 produced an

intelligence bonanza and the two CIA officers (George Kisevalter and Peter Bagley)

who met with him believed he had conclusively proved his bona fides. During his

debriefings in 1964, Nosenko provided detailed information about Lee Harvey

Oswald's stay in the USSR which, he said, had come across his desk routinely as the

deputy chief of the Second Chief Directorate (SCD) department responsible for

watching American visitors in the USSR.

With Golitsyn arguing against Nosenko's bona fides, plans were made in March 1964,

to imprison Nosenko and begin hostile interrogations to find any shifts in his

information. On April 2, Deputy Director for Plans Richard Helms and Soviet Division

Chief David Murphy met with the Deputy U.S. Attorney General and obtained legal

approval from the Justice Department to imprison Nosenko so that he could not

communicate with his supposed KGB controllers. On April 4, he was imprisoned in an

attic room in a CIA safe house near Washington. Nosenko was kept in solitary.

confinement, subjected to physical and mental torture, and submitted to hostile

interrogations from April 4, 1964 to October 27, 1967 first at the safe house and then in a

specially built cement house in Virginia. Despite over three years of severe treatment,

Nosenko's original story remained unchanged, no "confession" was forthcoming, and

no evidence was produced indicating he was, as Golitsyn still claimed, a fake defector.

On August 8, 1968, Nosenko was polygraphed for the third time by an Office of

Security specialist. During the examination, Nosenko was asked whether he had told

the truth about Oswald and the Kennedy assassination; the polygraph operator found

only positive responses to the questions. Security Officer Bruce Solie submitted a

comprehensive report in October 1968 which evaluated all of Nosenko's information, to

date, and concluded that he was what and who he had claimed to be all along. After a

review of his case by the Soviet Division, Nosenko was finally released from CIA

custody on March 1, 1969 and employed as an independent consultant by the CIA.

File 4.0.2 Nosenko

Combs e: \nosenko.wpd

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In the 35 years since Nosenko first approached the CIA in Geneva, no prima facie

evidence has ever emerged to prove that he was a KGB provocation and subsequent

defectors have affirmed him as a bona fide defector. He has identified many hundreds

of Soviet intelligence officers, provided a considerable quantity of useful information on

the organization, doctrine and methods of the KGB, and conducted numerous special

studies on Soviet subjects. Today, Nosenko is seventy years old, recently retired as a

contractor from the CIA, an American citizen, married, and living quietly in the

Sunbelt.

File 4.0.2 Nosenko

Combs e: \nosenko.wpd

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6 October 1997

Note To: DO

From:

Barry Harrelson

JFK Project Officer

Historical Review Group

Subject: Nosenko records in JFK Collection

The ARRB (JFK Board) staff has agreed to accept CIA's

designation of 25 folders of the Nosenko material in the JFK

sequestered collection as "not believed to be relevant"

(NBR). The staft plans to present their proposal to the JFK

Board at the 14 October meeting.

description of all NBRs to be made available to the public.

Please review the attached draft prepared by ARRB staff

member, Michelle Combs, for classification and public

release. The ARRB staff needs a response by COB Thursday if

possible. HRG/DO JFK reviewers here have no problem with

the draft and recommend release. If you have any questions,

call me on 31825. Thanks.

Barry

Per phane call fran

Denis Lamb. 80ct97

1:307 p.m CIC has no problem with

attached descriptin of Nesente

files.

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Folder Summaries of the Nosenko Material Not Believed to be Relevant to the JFK

Assassination

Reel 45, Folder 3

During July and August 1965, Peter Deryabin, a Soviet defector, conducted a series of

interrogations of Nosenko in conjunction with CIA efforts to establish Nosenko's bona

fides. This folder contains one 66 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions

which cover Nosenko's family, background, early career and Komsomol experiences.

Reel 45, Folder 4

This folder contains a 76 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by Peter

Deryabin which cover Nosenko's career, Party membership, Komsomol personalities and

procedures, military personalities and experiences, and his incarceration by CIA.

Reel 45, Folder S

This folder contains a 59 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by Peter

Deryabin which cover Nosenko's military career, KGB buildings, personalities and

procedures, and other Soviet intelligence people, roles, and titles.

Reel 45, Folder 6

All the documents in this folder, but one, have been released to the public. The NBR

document is a five page February 1964 memo from the Director of the Soviet Division

(C/SR) David Murphy to the Deputy Director of Plans (DD/P) Richard Helms on plans

to debrief Nosenko based on C/SR's belief that Nosenko is a Soviet plant.

Reel 45, Folder 8A and B

Folder 8A contains the 263 page "Conclusions and Comments in the Case of Yuriy

Ivanovich Nosenko" 1 October 1968 report by Bruce Solie, Deputy Chief of the Security

Research Staff which concludes that Nosenko is a bona fide defector and should be

believed. A sanitized version of the Solie report has been released to the public. The

NBR document in folder 8B is a 135 page report on Nosenko prepared in April 1969 by

N. Scott Miler of the Counterintelligence Staff (DC/CI/SIG) based on the comments and

questions of Anatoliy Golitsyn. The report contains Golitsyn's comments on

inconstancies he believes exist in Nosenko's testimony and his recommendations for

further questioning. Golitsyn believed Nosenko was a dispatched agent.

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Reel 45, Folder 13

This folder contains one document. The document is a ten page extract from the 835

page study "The Case of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko" by Peter Bagley. It records Peter

Deryabin's conclusions on Nosenko's bona fides. Deryabin does not believe Nosenko.

Reel 45, Folder 17

This folder contains an 89 page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter

Deryabin which covers Nosenko's career as a KGB officer, his marriage, and KGB

buildings, personalities, and procedures. A two page key to abbreviations in the

transcript is also included.

Reel 45, Folder 19

This folder contains pages 349-602, part IV of the 835 page study "The Case of Yuriy

Ivanovich Nosenko" prepared by Peter Bagley of the Soviet Division (DC/SB) in 1967.

The study analyzes Nosenko's biography, case work, and responsibilities as a Soviet

intelligence officer. The conclusion of the report is that Nosenko is a dispatched agent

under the control of the KGB.

Reel 45, Folder 20

This folder contains an 89 page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter

Deryabin which covers Nosenko's career as a KGB officer, and KGB buildings,

personalities, and procedures.

Reel 45, Folder 21

This folder contains an 85 page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter

Deryabin which covers Nosenko's experiences in and knowledge of Komosol and

Communist Party personalities, buildings, and procedures.

Reel 45, Folder 24

This folder contains pages 1-84, parts I, II, III, and IV, of the 835 page study "The Case

of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko" prepared by Peter Bagley of the Soviet Division (DC/SB)

in 1967.

Reel 45, Folder 25

This folder contains pages 85-348, part V of the 835 page study "The Case of Yuriy

Ivanovich Nosenko" prepared by Peter Bagley of the Soviet Division (DC/SB) in 1967.

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Reel 46, Folder 2A

This folder contains pages 603-835, parts VII, VIII, and IX of the 835 page study "The

Case of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko" prepared by Peter Bagley of the Soviet Division

(DC/SB) in 1967.

Reel 46, Folder 2B

This folder contains a variety of documents, some of which have been released to the

public. The NBR documents include: 14 reports of interrogations sessions with Peter

Deryabin in July and August 1965, an unsigned May 1965 memo for Chief, SR/CI on the

3-13 May interrogation sessions with a psychologist, an unsigned May 1965 paper

analyzing Nosenko's sessions with the psychologist which refutes the reported

conclusions of the psychologist, and a November 1968 Memorandum of Transmittal to

Chief, SB/CI/K on the 15 Deryabin-Nosenko July-August 1965 transcripts.

Reel 46, Folder 3

This folder contains most of the 186 page report by John Hart commissioned by the CIA

in June 1976. Chapter X, pages 159-176 inclusive are missing. The report is a

reinvestigation of the Nosenko case in the context of reviewing the techniques of

handling Soviet agents and defectors. It is highly critical of the Clandestine Services'

handling of the Nosenko case. The Hart report endorses the conclusions reached in

October 1968 by the Office of Security (the Solie Report) that Nosenko is a bona fide

defector.

Reel 46, Folder 5

This folders contains documents pertaining principally to personalities in the Minsk area

during Lee Harvey Oswald's residence there.

Some documents have been released to the

public. The two NBR documents include: a nine page 1964 "homework assignment"

prepared by Nosenko on KGB leadership in the provinces, and a four page memorandum

on KGB personalities in the Minsk area in the mid 1970's.

Reel 62. Folder 2

This folder contains an 82 page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter

Deryabin which covers Nosenko's background, marriage, and divorce.

Reel 62, Folder 3

This folder contains a 75 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by Peter

Deryabin which detail Nosenko's career progress, and a disciplinary problem and its

impact on his promotion schedule in the KGB:

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Reel 62, Folder 5

This folder contains two verbatim transcripts (33 and 46 pages) of interrogation sessions

by Peter Deryabin which cover specific KGB operations and a particular KGB operation

targeted against an American tourist.

Reel 62, Folder 6

This folder contains one 22 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by

Peter Deryabin which cover a particular KGB operation targeted against an American

tourist.

Reel 62, Folder 7

This folder contains one 84 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by

Peter Deryabin which cover Nosenko's education, Navy career, and a particular KGB

operation targeted against an American tourist.

Reel 62, Folder 8

This folder contains an eight page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter

Deryabin in which Deryabin encourages Nosenko to confess that he was sent under KGB

control and to think about becoming a double agent. Nosenko says that he has been

telling Deryabin the truth all along.

Reel 62, Folder 9

This folder contains 51 pages of 12 Deryabin reports on his interrogation sessions with

Nosenko in July and August 1965. The information in these reports summarizes

information detailed in the actual interrogation transcripts.

Reel 62, Folder 10

This folder contains a mix of intra and inter-Agency memoranda pertaining to the

handling of Nosenko and is labeled "TS Material from Deryabin Safe." This folder was

not examined by the HSCA staff. Thirty-seven pages of documents have been released

to the public. The 97 pages of NBR documents include: correspondence with various US

Government agencies and the Attorney General, memoranda on Nosenko's day to day

handling, emergency procedures for Office of Security guards assigned to Nosenko, a

report to the CIA Inspector General on the Nosenko case, Nosenko's request for political

asylum, copies of his subsequent contracts with the CIA as an independent contractor,

and additional reports, memos, and briefings concerning the Nosenko case and his

handling.

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10/08/97

IHLL 1O:UU FAS LUZ 124 U45%

MEMORANDUM

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION ANDIOR

RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

October 9, 1997

To:

Jeremy Gunn

Executive Director

cc:

From:

Subject:

Tom Samoluk

Deputy Director

Michelle Combs MC

Files on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko in the CLA Sequestered Collection

Microfilm Containing Information of No Believed Relevance to the

Assassination of President John F. Kennedy

The information on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko contained in the CIA Sequestered

Collection microfilm consists of approximately 3600 pages of interviews, transcripts,

memos, and reports. Of the total, approximately 1200 pages have been released to the

public as open in full or with redactions. Of the 1200 released pages, roughly 800

contain information directly relevant to Lee Harvey Oswald and the assassination of

President John F. Kennedy. Although all of these 800 pages have been released in

redacted form, we have asked the Agency to re-review them under the standards of the

JFK Act before we submit them to the Board.

After my review of the Nosenko records and our discussion of the issues, it is my

judgment that the remaining approximately 2400 pages are unrelated to the

assassination of President Kennedy and should be processed as "NBR." These NBR

records, which are described on the attached list, consist of such items as general family

and professional contact information, Soviet intelligence methodology, personalities,

and specific operations, and Soviet Navy information dating to Nosenko's early career

in Soviet Naval Intelligence. Much of the information consists of various attempts by

the Agency in the 1960's to establish Nosenko's bona fides. The October 1968 Solie

Report, which has been released in redacted form and will be re-reviewed under the

JFK Act, establishes Nosenko's bona fides. The conclusions of the Solie report were

reaffirmed in a 1976 report by John Hart. A brief summary of the conclusions of the

Hart Report will also be processed for release.

The approximately 2400 pages of proposed Nosenko NBR records have been reviewed

carefully to confirm that they contain no material helpful to a deeper understanding of

the assassination. During the review some additional material, not previously released,

which may add to an understanding of the Nosenko story, was marked relevant and.

identified for processing and review.

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ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

16 October 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Fredrick C. Wickham @ DO

DO JFK Board Focal Point

FROM:

J. Barry Harrelson

JFK Project Officer

OFFICE:

CSI/HRG

SUBJECT:

Agenda for ARRB meeting 17 November 1997

REFERENCE:

The following issues are tentatively scheduled for action at the next JFK Board meeting:

1. Date of release of Nosenko material; see memo on results of Oct. meeting.

If you or CIC have any comments on the proposal to change the release date (subject of Agency review and appeal) from 2017 to 2010,

please provide them to me by 23 October.

2. (State cover,

This issue originally surfaced in April and was scheduled but not addressed at the September meeting. I recommend that you review the

material we sent the ARRB staff for the September meeting to determine if you want to provide additional "evidence". Are there other

components that should be consulted on this issue? (Sue. Burggrat was involved in discussions in April.

3. DRE Monthly Reports. This is a long standing request from the Board staff. Please provide a status of the request by October 21.

CC:

John Pereira @ DCI

Eileen Wukitch @ DO

Sent on 16 October 1997 at 04:57:17 PM

ADMINISTRATIVE • INTERNAL USE ONLY

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FAY Rec'd TODAY

CIA SPECI

RELE

10/31/97 Re NOSENKO

LLAC FISS

IN FOLL

2000

28 October 1997

SUBJECT: Disclosure of Information on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko

1. The Board intends to declassify and release for public

consumption, approximately 2400 pages of counterintelligence

staff studies, interrogation reports, file reviews, and bona

fides studies

on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko.

These studies contain

sensitive personal and operational material completely unrelated

and irrelevant to Lee Harvey Oswald and the assassination of

President Kennedy. It has been officially stated and documented

that the remaining Nosenko records have been carefully reviewed

to confirm that they contain no material helpful to a deeper

understanding of the assassination.

Mr. Nosenko has adhered time

and time again to the stipulations of his Memorandum of

Understanding not to divulge his relationship with this Agency,

even in view of the less than satisfactory conditions this Agency

forced upon him during his early resettlement. Public disclosure

of the remaining documents would constitute an unwarranted

invasion of his personal and professional privacy not to mention

the breech of trust on the part of this Agency to protect his

right of privacy and above all, his security.

This trust was

reconfirmed in a personal letter from the former DDO, Ted Price,

in September 1994, stating that we would take special steps to

protect any sensitive information touching on Mr. Nosenko's

private life or on operational information pertaining to his

debriefings. The letter further states that this Agency valued

the sacrifices he made for our country, and every effort would be

made

to protect information that could affect his privacy and

security. The question has been asked before. Should we not

show the

same integrity that we expect from those who put their

lives on the line in defense of our national interests?

2. Furthermore, the recruitment of sources of high

intelligence value has always been this Agency's top priority.

Public disclosure of this information could do irreparable damage

to our ability to attract individuals who admire the US and might

be disposed to collaboration. Disclosure of cooperation with the

USG would cause any potential source to think twice before

placing his life in the hands of an organization who cannot

protect his information.

For those individuals such as Mr.

Nosenko, who placed their trust in this country in the past,

entered our resettlement program, and are now US citizens, the

indiscriminate release of information, some of it very personal

CL BY 0489514

REASON 1.5 (c)

DECL XI

DRV DEF 2-82

- SECRET

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SUBJECT:

and with no real relevance to any national issue, seriously

erodes this Agency's credibility and undermines our Resettlement

Program.

2

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CL BY: 611637

CL REASOE: Section 1.5 C

DECL ON: X1

DRY FRM: LOC 5-82

5 November 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM:

OFFICE:

SUBJECT:

John Pereira @ DCI

Fred Wickham @ DO

Lee Strickland @ DA

Kathryn Dyer @ DCI

Linda Ciprian @ DCI

J. Barry Harrelson

JFK Project Officer

CSI/HRG

17 November JFK Board Meeting-- CIA issues (update)

REFERENCE:

1. The following CIA items are on the agenda for the 17 November ARRB meeting:

• (5) Reconsideration of the release of Warrenton, Na. as the location of the CIA Record Center.

In addition to written evidence being prepared by DA, the Agency has been offered the opportunity to brief the Board.

Chairman Tunheim's proposal to advance the opening date of the Nosenko NBR Not Believed Relevant) material from the 2017 per

the JFK. Act to the year 2010.

The ARRB staff disagrees with the Board on this issue and will recommend that the release date remain 2017. However, they are not

confident that the Board will accept their recommendation and has requested the Agency's position on the 2010 date. If the Agency

opposes the 2010 change in the date, I will need a memo from the DO explaining why. We could offer a compromise-accept the 2010

date provided the Agency has the same right in 2010 as 2017 to review and appeal the release of the records. I have ask OGC for a legal

opinion. Please note that this decision affects only those documents designated "NBR" by ARRB. The documents declared to be

Assassination Records (AR) will be re-reviewed and released, either sanitized or in full, during the coming year.

• (S) Proposed release of reference to CIA employee being under integrated State cover"

We have provided written evidence (DO note coordinated with State, and copy of MOA between CIA and State). According to the ARR

staff, some Board members consider CIA use of state cover as an "open secret" and are inclined to release. We have been offered the

opportunity to brief the Board.

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Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) financial records.

ARRB staff plans to recommend to the Board that monthly summaries be considered ARs and the remaining material be designated NBR.

Samples of these documents have been provided to DA, DO, and DCI/IRO. If you have any comments or objections, please forward them

to me by COB Wednesday.

Documents containing long lists of names, crypts, companies, etc. These include both Agency documents and notes of HSCA

staffers. (FY - no action required at this time)

The ARRB staff will ask the Board to delay processing of such documents and, in some cases, declare them NBR. The staff considers

them marginal to the story and believes that they are not worth the time involved.

2. We need to advise the ARRB staff no later than COB 12 November (Wednesday), if we plan to brief the Board on Warrentan

and/or State Cover Written evidence is due to ARRB staff by COB 13 November (Thursday). They need at least one day to review the

material and prepare their presentations for the Board.

CC:

Eileen Wukitch @ DO

Becky Rant @ DA

SECRET

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SECRET

8.-

CL BY: 611637

C1 REASON: Section 1,5 €

DECL ONE X1

DRY FRM: COV 2-87

21 November 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR:

John Pereira @ DCI

Fredrick C. Wickham @ DO

Lee Strickland @ DA

Linda Ciprians @ DCI

FROM:

OFFICE:

SUBJECT:

J. Barry Harrelson

JFK Project Officer

CSI/HRG

ARRB meeting 17 November - Results

REFERENCE:

1. Reconsideration of the release of Warrenton as CIA Records Center:

The Board accepted the Agency's request for reconsideration; postponed until 2017.

2. CIA use of State Cover:

The Board did not find the Agency's evidence persuasive; released.

This determination affects 16 documents ( 3 duplicates) that were pending Board action. Future documents will be impacted by this

decision. Copies of the documents have been sent to DO and OGC for reconsideration/appeal review.

3. Release daté of Nosenko NBR records:*

The Board moved the release date from 2017 to 2010 giving the Agency the right to review and appeal at that time.

4. Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) Financial Records:

The Board accepted the ARRB staff's recommendation (concurred in by CIA) that only "General Statement for Month" records

for January 1960 and to January 1995 be processed as Assassination Records, and that the approximately 6,000 remaining pages of

financial records be declared to have "no believed relevance (NBR)" to the JFK assassination.

5. Ramparts Damage Assessment Document:

The Board accepted the ARRB staff's recommendation (concurred in by ClA) that the paragraphs on the one relevant

SECRET

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organizatior be protessed as a assassination record, and that the remainder of the CIA Ramparts Memorandum be declared NBR. The

memorandum discusses the truth or fallacy of the allegations in Ramparts the Agency used non-governmental organizations for support

and funding of worldwide anti-Communist operations. Over one hundred organizations are mentioned in the Ramparts article. The

relevant organization is the International Rescue Committee; the IRC aided Oswald on his return to the US:

6. Book Cables Dissemination Lists:

The Board accepted the Agency's request that book cable dissemination list be protected in full even if they contain stations

that are releasable.

7. Document # 104-10072-10232:

The Board rejected the Agency's request to protect the full crypt LINLUCK). The document has been sent to the DO for

reconsideration/appeal review.

8. Other Documents:

The Board accepted the Agency's and ARRB staff's recommendations on 204 additional documents.

Reconsideration and Appeals:

If the Agency wishes to ask the Board to reconsider a decision or plans to appeal to the President, the ARRB staff has

requested that it be notified prior to the letter to the Agency informing the DCl of the Board's decision. We expect the letter on or around

Dec. 1st; the Board's determinations will also be published in the Federal Register on that date. As mandated by the White House, the

Agency has seven days after notification to appeal a JFK Board decision to the President.

CC:

Eileen Wukitch: @ DO

Kathryn-Dyer @ DCI

Becky Dyer @ DA

Sent on 21 November 1997 at 05:04:45 PM

SECRET

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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NOTE FOR:

FROM:

OFFICE:

DATE:

SUBJECT:

J. Barry Harrelson

Fredrick C. Wickham @ DO

10/10/97 12:10:24 PM

Nosenko Records

I have reviewed the descriptions of the folders proposed by the ARRB Staff. While I see this as a success to have them support our

position and have some concern about the detail included within the descriptions. We had an occasion in the past to ask for a legal

opinion about a former employee's access rights to Nosenko's file and were told he is entitled protection under the Privacy Act. Nosenko

has already personally expressed (in a letter to the Agency) his concern and objection about potential release of information about him. I

think we should carefully consider the amount of detail included in the public release and whether it violates his rights under the Privacy

I trust the judgment of those that have reviewed these descriptions as to content in relationship to other released material and

classification but I just want to raise a mild concern about the detail contained in the descriptions of folder content. I will not object to

the these if everyone feels compelled to accept them to protect the success we have achieved as long as they are determined to not be in

violation of his privacy rights.

In future efforts to protect NBR information, I would like to see less detail in the description if at all possible.

CC:

Eileen M. Wukitch @ DO, Lee E. CarleY. @ DO

Sent on 10 October 1997 at 12:10:24 PM

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

---

## Page 39

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Classification of Material Transmitted

HISTORICAL REVIEW GROUP

CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF INTELLIGENCE

Phone # 703-613-1806

PLEASE DELIVER IMMEDIATELY

+*********

+*****

CLASSIFIED FAX

*******

SUBJECT: Dosendo

FROM:. Bang dariek

SENDING FAX NO.

703-613-3060

DELIVER TO Dino dail

RECEIVING FAX NO. 893-4346

DATE TRANSMITTED: 10/1C PAGES TRANSMITTED: Y

(including cover sheet)

****************************++7777747+7777777*7779

MESSAGE:

*****

Classification of Material Transmitted

---

## Page 40

13-0000/0/09/87 THU 15:00 FAX 202 724 Ü457

AKKE

MEMORANDUM

October 9, 1997

To:

Jeremy Gunn

Executive Director

CC:

From:

Subject:

Tom Samoluk

Deputy Director

Michelle Combs pAC

Files on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko in the CIA Sequestered Collection

Microfilm Containing Information of No Believed Relevance to the

Assassination of President John F. Kennedy

The information on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko contained in the CIA Sequestered

Collection microfilm consists of approximately 3600 pages of interviews, transcripts,

memos, and reports. Of the total, approximately 1200 pages have been released to the

public as open in full or with redactions. Of the 1200 released pages, roughly 800

contain information directly relevant to Lee Harvey Oswald and the assassination of

President John F. Kennedy. Although all of these 800 pages have been released in

redacted form, we have asked the Agency to re-review them under the standards of the

JFK Act before we submit them to the Board.

After my review of the Nosenko records and our discussion of the issues, it is my"

judgment that the remaining approximately 2400 pages are unrelated to the

assassination of President Kennedy and should be processed as "NBR." These NBR

records, which are described on the attached list, consist of such items as general family

and professional contact information, Soviet intelligence methodology, personalities,

and specific operations, and Soviet Navy information dating to Nosenko's early career

in Soviet Naval Intelligence. Much of the information consists of various attempts by

the Agency in the 1960's to establish Nosenko's bona fides. The October 1968 Solie

Report, which has been released in redacted form and will be re-reviewed under the

JFK Act, establishes Nosenko's bona fides. The conclusions of the Solie report were

reaffirmed in a 1976 report by John Hart. A brief summary of the conclusions of the

Hart Report will also be processed for release.

The approximately 2400 pages of proposed Nosenko NBR records have been reviewed

carefully to confirm that they contain no material helpful to a deeper understanding of

the assassination. During the review some additional material, not previously released,

which may add to an understanding of the Nosenko story, was marked relevant and

identified for processing and review.

---

## Page 41

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I 15U0

FAX ZUZ 1Z4 U401

ARRO

2

NBR Folder Summaries

Each folder also contains an HSCA signature sheet. At least one member of the HSCA

reviewed all but the last of the folders listed below.

Reel 45, Folder 3

During July and August 1965, Peter Deryabin, a Soviet defector, conducted a series of

interrogations of Nosenko in conjunction with CIA efforts to establish Nosenko's bona

fides. This folder contains one 66 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation

sessions which cover Nosenko's family, background, early career, and Komsomol

experiences.

Reel 45, Folder 4

This folder contains a 76 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by

Peter Deryabin which cover Nosenko's career, Party membership, Komsomol

personalities and procedures, military personalities and procedures, and his (then

current) incarceration by the CIA.

Reel 45, Folder 5

This folder contains one 59 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by

Peter Deryabin which cover Nosenko's military career, KGB buildings, personalities

and procedures, and other Soviet intelligence people, roles, and titles.

Reel 45, Folder 6

All the documents in this fulder, but one, have been released to the public. The NBR

document is a five page February 1964 memo from the Director of the Soviet Division

(C/SR) David Murphy to the Deputy Director for Plans (DD/P) Richard Helms on

plans to debrief Nosenko based on C/SR's belief that Nosenko is a Soviet plant.

Reel 45, Folder 8B

This folder contains a 135 page report on Nosenko prepared in April 1969 by N. Scott

Miler of the Counterintelligence Staff (DC/CI/SIG) based on the comments and

questions of Anatoliy Golitsyn. The report contains Golitsyn's comments on

inconsistencies he believes exist in Nosenko's testimony and his recommendations for

further questioning. Golitsyn believed Nosenko was a dispatched agent.

---

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ARRB

3

Reel 45, Folder 13

This folder contains one document. The document is a ten page extract from the 835

page study "The Case of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko" written by Peter Bagley of the

Soviet Branch (DC/SB) in 1967. The document records Peter Deryabin's conclusions on

Nosenko's bona fides. Deryabin does not believe Nosenko.

Reel 45, Folder 17

This folder contains an 89 page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter

Deryabin which covers Nosenko's carcer as a KGB officer, his marriage, and KGB

buildings, personalities, and procedures. A two page key to the abbreviations in the

transcript is also included in this folder.

Reel 45. Folder 12

This folder contains pages 349-602, part IV, of the 835 page study "The Case of Yuriy

Ivanovich Nosenko" prepared by Peter Bagley in 1967. The study analyzes Nosenko's

biography, case work, and responsibilities as a Soviet intelligence officer. The

conclusion of the report is that Nosenko is a dispatched agent under the control of the

KGB.

Reel 45, Folder 20

This folder contains an 89 page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter

Deryabin which covers Nosenko's career as a KGB officer and KGB buildings,

personalities, and procedures.

Reel 45, Folder 21

This folder contains an 85 page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter

Deryabin which covers Nosenko's experiences in and knowledge of Komsomol and

Communist Party personalities, buildings, and procedures.

Reel 45, Folder 24

This folder contains pages 1-84, parts I, II, III, and TV, of the 835 page study "The Case

of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko" prepared by Peter Bagley.

---

## Page 43

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ARRB

WUUI

4

Reel 45, Folder 25

This folder contains pages 85-348, part V, of the 835 page study "The Case of Yuriy

Ivanovich Nosenko" prepared by Peter Bagley.

Reel 46, Folder 2A

This folder contains pages 603-835, parts VII, VIII, and IX of the 835 page study "The

Case of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko" prepared by Peter Bagley.

Reel 46, Folder 2B

This folder contains a variety of documents, some of which have already been released

to the public. The NBR documents include: 14 reports of interrogation sessions with

Peter Deryabin in July and August 1965; an unsigned May 1965 memo for Chief SR/CI

on the 3-13 May interrogation sessions with a psychologist, an unsigned May 1965

paper analyzing Nosenko's sessions with the psychologist which refutes the reported

conclusions of the psychologist, and a November 1968 Memorandum of Transmittal to

SB/CI/K on the 15 Deryabin-Nosenko July-August 1965 transcripts.

Reel 46, Folder 3

This folder contains most of the 186 page report by John Hart commissioned by the

CIA in June 1976. Chapter X, pages 159-176 inclusive are missing. The report is a

reinvestigation of the Nosenko case in the context of reviewing the techniques of

handling Soviet agents and defectors. It is highly critical of the handling of the

Nosenko case by the Clandestine Service. The Hart Report endorses the conclusions

reached in October 1968 by the Office of Security (the Solie Report) that Nosenko is a

bona fide defector.

Reel 46, Folder 5

This folder contains documents pertaining principally to personalities in the Minsk area

during Lee Harvey Oswald's residence there. Some documents in this folder have been

released to the public. The two NBR documents include: a nine page 1964 "homework

assignment" prepared by Nosenko on KGB leadership in the provinces and a four page

memorandum on KGB personalities in the Minsk area in the mid 1970's.

Reel 62, Folder 2

This folder contains an 82 page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter

Deryabin which covers Nosenko's background, marriage, and divorce.

---

## Page 44

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THU 15:01 FAX 202 724 0457 -

ARKE

5

Reel 62, Folder 3

This folder contains a 74 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by Peter

resting impact den ail promote acher progress and a disciplinary problem and its

Reel 62. Folder 5

This folder contains two verbatim transcripts (33 and 46 pages) of interrogation sessions

by Peter Deryabin which cover specific KGB operations and a particular KGB operation

targeted against an American tourist.

Reel 62, Folder 6

This folder contains one 22 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by

Perter Deryabin which cover a particular KGB operation targeted against an American

tourist.

Reel 62, Folder 7

This folder contains one 84 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by

Peter Deryabin which cover Nosenko's education, Navy career, and a particular KGB

operation targeted against an American tourist.

Reel 62, Folder 8

This folder contains an eight page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by

Peter Deryabin in which Deryabin encourages Nosenko to confess that he was sent

under KGB control and to think about becoming a double agent. Nosenko responds

that he has been telling Deryabin the truth all along.

Reel 62, Folder 9

The folder contains 51 pages of 12 Deryabin reports on his interrogation sessions with

Nosenko in July and August 1965. The information in these reports summarizes

information detailed in the actual interrogation transcripts.

Reel 62, Folder 10

This folder contains a mix of intra and inter-Agency memoranda pertaining to the

handling of Nosenko and is labeled "TS Material from Deryabin Safe." This folder was

not examined by the HSCA staff. Thirty-seven pages of documents have been released

---

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ARRB

10008

to the public. The 97 pages of NBR documents include: correspondence with various

US Government agencies and the Attorney General, memoranda on Nosenko's day to

day handling, emergency procedures for Office of Security guards assigned to Nosenko,

a report to the CIA Inspector General on the Nosenko case, Nosenko's request for

political asylum, copies of his subsequent contracts with the CIA as an independent

contractor, and additional reports, memos, and briefings concerning the Nosenko case

and his handling.

Combs e: \nosenko4.wpd

File 4.20.5, 4.0.2, and 2.4

---

## Page 46

13-00000

P.2

DEC 12:

192

09: 47PM

MEMORANDUM

September 22, 1998

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION

IN THIS DOCUMENT

TO:

Laura Denk

Executive Director

CC.

From:

Bob Skwirot

CIA Team Leader

Michelle Combs Michelle Comba

Associate Director for Research and Review

Subject

Working Files on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko Containing Information Not

Believed Relevant to the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy

Previously, the Review Board voted to declare NBR approximately 2400 pages of

material on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko contained in the CLA sequestered collection

microfilm unrelated to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

The Review Board staff has since examined an additional two boxes of working files on

Nosenko produced as a result of the search for records related to the Kennedy

assassination. This material either duplicates or is the original copy of the sequestered

collection microfilm material previously declared NBR. For example, many of the

original tapes from which transcripts were produced are found in the working files.

The Board previously declared the transcripts, which are found in the sequestered

collection microfilm, to be NBR. The files contain no new material which would add to

the understanding of the Nosenko story.

I recommend that the Board declare the contents of the two boxes of working files on

Nosenko to be NBR

el combs inbr nosenko.wpd

File 24,4.02, and 4.20.5

---

## Page 47

13-00000

SECRET

CI-277-94

31 August 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussions with Center for the Study of

Intelligence on the

Release of Material Relating

to Yuriy Nosenko

1. On 3 August I had a series of discussions with the

staff of the Center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI) at

the Center's office in the Ames Building. Our discussion

centered on the disposition of more than

3,200

pages

relating to the career of former KGB officer--and current

CIA independent contractor--Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko.

The

documents are being reviewed for declassification and

release as required by the

JFk law.

2.

The Declassification Problem: CSI's de-

classification staff has carefully reviewed the Nosenko

material.

Ellie Neiman--a career Directorate of Operations

officer--is representing the Do in the review process.

MS: Neiman noted that the material can be divided into two

parts:

• Approximately 800 pages that deal with Nosenko's infor-

mation about Lee Harvey Oswald's life in the Soviet Union

and his relationship with the KGB.

• A body of counterintelligence staff studies, inter-

rogation reports, file reviews, and bona fides studies on

Nosenko totaling

some 2,400 pages.

These studies contain

sensitive personal and operational material. For

example:

- Information on how CIA conducted operations in

Moscow ("sticks and bricks"), material on how

bona fides analysis is conducted, and details on

how we evaluated the KGB's operations.

WARNING NOTICE

INTELLIGENCE SOURCES

OR METHODS INVOLVED

CL BY SIGNER

DECL OADR

DRV HUM 4-82:

SECRET

---

## Page 48

13-00000

SECRET

SUBJECT: Discussions with the Center for the Study of

Intelligence on the Release of Material Relating

to Yuriy Nosenko

-- Extensive personal details on US citizens the KGB

assessed and pitched (approximately 100 cases)

and on Americans Moscow Station used as assets.

One Us citizen the KGB developed is now a

senior professor of history in California.

3. Nosenko's Sensitivities: I discussed with

Ms. Neiman Nosenko's concern about the impact of the release

of information on his personal life. I informed her of

Nosenko's recent letter to the DCI complaining about the

release of material related to his association with CIA, and

of his concern that future releases would endanger his

privacy and security.

The bona fides studies dwell in great

detail on Nosenko's

personal life, including his problems

• with venereal disease and his relationships with women.

Since the bona fides were based on detailed analyses of

Nosenko's life, their release would reveal modus operandi of

sensitive clandestine operations and further embarrass a man

who has served as a CIA employee for more than three

decades.

4.

Following my discussions with Ms. Neiman, I met

with John Pereira,

Acting Director of CSI, and Barry

Harrelson, a member of his staff.

I recommended that CIA

move to release the material dealing with Oswald, but--

citing the operational costs, embarrassment to prominent

American citizens, and threat

to Nosenko's privacy--strongly

suggested that the other material be held back. Mr. Pereira

the law did allow CIA to withhold certain information to

antomation co

protect national security or for reasons of privacy.

told me in closing that later this year the Agency would

have to justify to the Congressionally-mandated review board

the reasons for withholding.

I promised that I would raise

the issue with the Chief of

the Counterintelligence Center

and said I believed we could provide the justification.

teth

Robert fe

2

SECRET

to tri

---

## Page 49

13-00000

SECRET

SUBJECT:

Discussions with Center for the Study of

Intelligence on the Release of Material Relating

to Yuriy Nosenko

CONCUR:

John Pereira (AD/CSI)

2 Sapt 94

Date

Barry Harrels

(CSI)

2 Sept 94

Date

Ellie Neima

6 Sept 94

Date

3

SECRET

---

## Page 50

13-00000

SECRET

SUBJECT: Discussions with Center for the Study of

Intelligence on the Release of Material Relating

to Yuriy Nosenko

DO/CIC/AG/FIOB/RPringle:ek/76246 (31 Aug 94)

Distribution:

Orig - John Pereira, Barry Harrelson, Ellie Neiman

for Concurrence and

Return to CIC/AG

1

Neiman

C/CIC Chrono

- CIC/AG Chrono

- CIC/AG Defector File

SECRET

---

## Page 51

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530

of the factors I had to consider in connection

ed it, and I will continue to accept it until some

ridence, not opinion.

22090/20

Igs that Nosenko states is that the KGB never p

They didn't interview Oswald when Oswald state

ey didn't interview Oswald when they decided

d sent him to Minsk.

your knowledge of Nosenko, based on your know

d on your knowledge of KGB procedures and tech

, credible when he says they never interviewed

what is meant by interview, a formal interview.

KGB headquarters, if that is what is meant

ring to is a KGB oficer speaking tace to face with

g himself as & KGB oficer, but speaking to him

shooses;

Nosenko says that never happened. My

lis credible?

best of his knowledge, I will have to-I will

scept that?

•ppen.

the KGB didn't have a large book on him.

er done to check out the feasibility of statements

sing to see what the experiences of other defectors

debriefed by KGB officers? Was that ever done,

individual had been interviewed for some other

the Oswald case because the Oswald investigation

some who were in Russia in a proximate period

ed, it is very possible. You would almost have to

veriod of time because the international situation

se comparison should be within the approximate

how many lie detector tests, to your knowledge?

y or all of these tests to have been valid?

test to be a completely valid test; that is, the

su be in actual discussion concerning the poly-

se from our office because I am not an operator.

nd I will only confine myself to questions relat-

lie detector information into your report.

onsider them to be valid, is that correct?

ily to not be valid, to be completely invalid.

ay that Lee Harvey Oswald was a minor aspect

bona fides?

icterize the Oswald aspect?

art to be considered.

it received the full consideration and the

Lee Harvey Oswald aspect?.

us amount of investigation done in 1964.

en that Nosenko was not truthful in his rela-

arvey Oswald, would that be significant as to

18 bona fide?

I would have to consider.

sible that he could be lying about Oswald and

e was lying about Oswald.

he was lying about Oswald, do you think that

whether he was bona fide?

531

E7, EXCERPTS OF DEPOSITION OF DAVID MURPHY BE-

TORE THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSAS

ASINATIONS ON AUGUST 9, 1978

INTRODUCTION

Having heard from Nosenko and from an intelligence oticer who

thelieved him to be bona fide, the committee spoke to the ClA oficial

who had overall responsibility for the interrogation of Nosenko dur-

ing the years 1964-67, when Nosenko was kept in soitary contine-

ment, Among other things, he was asked about the reason Nosenko

was placed in solitary confinement,

about why he questioned No.

senko's credibility, and about Nosenko's charge that his statements

to the Agency were inaccurate because he had been drugged by the

Agency. Portions of that transcript follow.

EXCERPTS OF DEPOSITION OF DAVID MURPHY BEFORE HOUSE SELDOT CONTIE ON

ASBABSINATIONS ON AUGUST 9, 1978

Mr. KLEIN. When Nosenko defected in 1961, when he came to the United States,

was he in the custody of the Central Intelligence Agency at that time?

Mr. MurpHy. I don't want to be cute by saying I believe so. I am not exactly

sure of the legal-I mean what his legal status was. Insofar as physical facts,

he was in the custody of the IO.

Mr. KLEIN. What division or unit of the Central Intelligence Agency had pri-

mary responsibility for Nosenko?

Mr. Murpay. The Soviet Russian Division.

Mr. KLain. Of which you were the Obief?

Mr. MUEPHX. Yes, sir.:

Мг.

KusIN. And what year did you leave the Soviet Russia Division?

Mr. MurpHy. Beginning in 1968.

Mr. Kuak. And up until what year did the Soviet Russia Division have

primary responsibility for Nosenko?

Mr. MurpHy. I don't recall the exact time but it was certainly up until the

spring of 1967.

Mr. KLeIn. The investigation by Bruce Solie began at the end of 1967. At that

time did the control or responsibility over Nosenko change from the Soviet

Russia Division to another division?

Mr. MurpHy. My recollection is that it changed in the spring or early summer

of 1967 and the responsibility was turned over to the Office of Security of which

Solie was a member.

Mr. KLeIN. As Chief of the Soviet Russia Division, did you have the primary

responsibility for what happened to Nosenko? And when I say happened, where

he was kept, what he was asked?

Mr. MUrPHY. I was responsible for the case.

Mr. KLEIN. OK.

Mr. MUrpHx. Although the case was handled by one of the groups within the

Division.

Mr. Kun. But they would réport to you?

Mr. MUrpHy. Yes.

correct?

Mr. MurpHy. I am not sure I agree with the formulation of the question.

Mr. KLEIN. Well, elaborate.

•Mr. MUrPHY. No; the previous pattern of voluntary discussion of issues under

consideration changed and Nosenko was not permitted to evade questions or to

decide when he would or would not watt to respond.

Mr. KLIn. Could you describe for us what the pattern was before, as far as

conditions and how it was changed?

---

## Page 52

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532

Mr. MUrpHy. Well, the pattern before was one of pretty much permitting

Nosenko to call the shots. In other words, we wanted his cooperation and we

wanted to discuss these things in a reasonable manner, but his preference was

not to sit still for a full day's briefing, to want to go out socially all the time,

which made it difficult the next day to continue to work. And the most important

aspect, I think, of the change was the decision to confront him with inconsisten-

cies as opposed to taking what he said and passing it on.

Mr. KLeIn. What about the day-to-day living conditions, were they changed?

Mr. MurpHY. Well, he was not permitted to leave. He was not permitted to

depart.

Mr. KLeIn. Other than that, his day-to-day treatment, not the actual interroga-

tion sessions, but his food intake, his recreation, was that changed at that time?

Mr. Murphy. I don't think so, not that early. I don't remember that.

Mr. KLEIN. Subsequent to April 4, is it correct that Nosenko was interrogated

by people from the Soviet Russia Division?

Mr. MurpHy. That is right.

Mr. KLeIn. And how were the particular subareas on which he was interrogated

Mr. MurpHY. I am not sure. I don't know. Subject areas? This is a guess, this is

a recollection, but I think the decision was made based on what the CIA people

thought offered the best opportunity to get an admission and to break on that.

In other words, I think it was based on points that they had collateral on. By

that I mean other information which said what this man is saying is not the truth

or this man does not know about this and, therefore, let us hit him hard on this.

And so it was a fully tactical, these were tactical considerations relating to pos-

session of information in the hands of the interrogators which then offered the

best opportunity to get through and get the truth.

One breakthrough it was felt, as is normally the case, gives you other break-

throughs.

The decision on what subjects to be interrogated was essentially a fac-

tor of the tactics of the debrieing.

Mr. KLEIn. Would it be fair to say that after April 4 the subject areas were

determined by a desire to try to catch him, to break him, as opposed to a desire

to gain knowledge that would be of use to you in your role as an intelligence

agency? In other words, knowledge of the operation.

Mr. MURPHY. That is an acourate impression. The answer is yes because by

the end of April there was a view that the man was not telling the truth, that

parts of what he was saying were known to be untrue and that, therefore, made

no sense, and although the reasons for his behavior and his statements

were

not clear, it made no sense then, it did not appear to make sense to accept as

valid any data he might provide unless you could be sure that that data was in

fact correct, and there were so many doubts about this, leaving aside the moti-

vation for it, the contradictions or the way in which he presented it, that the

information was not considered acceptable.

Mr. KLEIn. Were you aware of the substance of what Nosenko had to say about

Oswald?

Mr. MurpHY. From the very irst. I mean, when he first said it back in February

or March.

Mr. KLEIN. Do you recall now the substance of it?

Mr. Murphy. No; not exactly, anything I said would be polluted by so much

back and forth. I know that the thrust of the message was that Oswald was

never of interest to the Soviet Intelligence Services, that he was never debriefed

by them, and I can guarantee that because I was personally involved in the

affair. There is more detail, but I can't really pin it down.

Mr. KLeIN. Did you accept this statement by Nosenko?

Mr. Murpiy. I did not. I did not believe that it would be possible for the

Soviet Intelligence Services to have remained indifferent to the arrival in 1959

in Moscow of a former Marine radar operator who had served at what was an

active U-2 operational base. I found that to be strange. It was only later, I think,

that as the Nosenko case and its other ramifications began to emerge that it

seemed to me that the Oswald story became even more unusual.

I think I mentioned the other day it seems to me almost to have been tacked on

or to have been added as though it didn't seem to be part of the real body of

---

## Page 53

13-00000

532

refore was one of pretty much permitting

words, we wanted his cooperation and we

reasonable manner, but his preference was

ng, to want to go out socially all the time,

o continue to work. And the most important

e decision to confront him with inconsisten-

id and passing it on.

lay living conditions,

were they changed?

rmitted to leave. He was not permitted to

--to day treatment, not the actual interroga-

recreation, was that changed at that time?

that early. I don't remember that

is it correct that Nosenko was interrogated

ision?

ular subareas on which he was interrogated

know. Subject areas? This is a guess, this is

n was made based on what the CIA people

to get an admission and to break on that.

on points that they had collateral on. By

aid what this man is saying is not the truth

and, therefore, let us hit him hard on this,

vere tactical considerations relating to pos-

f the interrogators which then offered the

et the truth.

normally the case, gives you other break-

ts to be interrogated was essentially a fac-

that after April 4 the subject areas were

him, to break him, as opposed to a desire

use to you in your role as an intelligence

the operation.

impression. The answer is yes because by

it the man was not telling the truth, that

wn to be untrue and that, therefore, made

or his behavior and his statements were

id not appear to make sense to accept as

is you could be sure that that data was in

doubts about this, leaving aside the moti-

o way in which he presented it, that the

able.

ubstance of what Nosenko had to say about

rean, when he first said it back in February

stance of it?

ning I said would be polluted by so much

ist of the message was that Oswald was

ince Services, that he was never debriefed

ecause I was personally involved in the

eally pin it down.

lent by Nosenko?

relieve that it would be possible for the

mained indifferent to the arrival in 1959

operator who had served at what was an

it to be strange. It was only later, I think,

er ramifications began to emerge that it

me even more unusual.

eems to me almost to have been tacked on

dn't seem to be part of the real body of

533

the other things that he had to say, many of which were true. You understand

that Nosenko wag much of what he said was true.

Mr. Kumn. You are talking about other areas?

Mr. MurpHy. Yes, sir. This one seemed to be tacked on and didn't have much

relationship, and it seemed to be so totally dependent on not just one coincidence

but a whole series of coincidences, for him to have been there and all that sort

of thing. That is what I mean.

Mr. KLeIn. Do you recall any other specifics about what you could not accept

in Nosenko's statements about Oswald?

Mr. MurpHy. Yes, that they just—-this is part. of the first one no contact was

ever made, that he went up to Minsk and lived happily and well with no contact.

The Soviet Union with foreigners don't do that. I mean, he is the only person.

Read the accounts of what happened to this poor gentleman, what happened to

Jay Crawford in Moscow and their intensive debriefing of him on the layout of

the American Hmbassy. It didn't seem to be possible.

Now, again, that does not constitute proof, doesn't constitute any breakthrough.

It seemed to me to be strange.

Mr. KLEIn. Would you distinguish between first the fact that nobody debriefed

Oswald when he first came to the Soviet Union, nobody tried to find out what he

knew as a marine, as a radar operator, and, second, the fact that once they

decided to allow him to stay, nobody debriefed him to find out if he was some

kind of a Western security agent or working for OIA?

Mr. MURPHY.

Yes,

they would be two different points. The first point clearly

involves the KGB and GRU. This is simply a chap arriving with this background

and no one taking the time just from a military intelligence technical point of

view, telling us how it worked when this thing came in at 90,000 feet what did the

blips look like. I don't think they had many American radar operators handling

operational traffic involving U-2's.

Mr. KIet. How would you react to & statement by Nosenko that although

the KGB knew

Oswald was a marine,

they did not bother to question him,

and because of that, never knew that he was a radar operator or that he

worked at the base from which the U-2's took off and landed?

Mr. Murpey. I think it would be strange.

My other point, going back to your first question, that is, the first aspect of

your question, which is the initial arrival and lack of debriefing.

There is no

indication here that the GRU was advised, which in the case of a defector,

there is no operational interest in a defector. GRU would be properly the out-

fit that would want to be talking to any marine. They will talk to a marine

about close order drill. You follow me? It doesn't require that he be known to

have been a radar operator or that he be known to have been a— they would

talk to him about his military affiliation just as we would.

I realize that there is a body of thought which says that some people think

the Soviets are 10-foot tall. I don't believe they are. I think

they are very,

very, very much the other way. What I find dificult on the part of many Ameri-

cans is that they will not ascribe to the Soviets the same elemental competence

that we have.

That is all I ask. And, therefore, we in Germany will talk to a

private in the Hast German Border Guards, period. The GRU would be interested

in talking to a private. He was a corporal in the Marine Corps, who had stated

to a consul in a consular ofice,

which is manned by the Soviets, Soviet locals

and what have you, fully accessible to the Soviets, unlike the higher floors of the

Embassy, that he wanted to talk about his experiences, that he wanted to tell all.

I guess I found it difficult to believe this is one of the things that made, or many

other aspects of the case, but this is one of the things that created an atmosphere

of disbelief that there must be something to this case that is important, vitally

important to the Soviet Union and we can't understand it.

Yuri may be right, he may be right, but at the time it was very hard to

belleve.

Mr. KLEIN.

And on the basis of your experience and knowledge gained over

almost 30 years, is that what is giving you trouble with Nosenko's statements

about Oswald?

Mr. MurpHy. And other things.

Mr. Kumn. Do you know of comparable situations where somebody wasn't

questioned like this, was just left alone, as Nosenko says Oswald wäs?

---

## Page 54

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534

Mr. MurpHY. I honestly couldn't find anyone, or I am not aware of anyone

that the division or the CI Staff, that is, those officers concerned with this

case, were handling it directly. I don't know of any former Soviet intelligence

officer or other knowledgeable source to whom they spoke about this matter

who felt this would have been possible. If someone did, I never heard of it.

Mr. KLein. During this interrogation period, beginning in April 1961, would

it be fair to say that the questions relating to Oswald and the problems which

you have just been discussing relating to

Oswald constituted a major area

for questioning and in interrogating Nosenko?

Mr. MurpHy. Probaby not.

Mr. KLEIn. Why would that have been?

Mr. MUrpHY. Because there were many other areas which posed equally inter

esting aspects yet about which we knew much more and which had occurred

abroad and involved collateral knowledge, which obviously is not easy for us

to obtain in the Soviet Union.

Mr. KLEIN. Who in the Soviet Russia division made the decision as to who.

would question Nosenko, subsequent to April 4?

Mr. MUrPHY. [OIA employee], chief of the group.

Mr. KLeIn. And do you know of any criteria that he used to pick his inter-

rogators?

Mr. MUrpHY. Some knowledge of Russian, as Nosenko's English was not good,

the fact that he had been exposed. Well, that is one of the aspects of the CLA

interrogation. You try not to use too many people because you then lose. In the

first place, you are dealing with a potentially hostile guy who is liable to go

back to the Soviet Union, or return to the other side, and so you don't want to

expose too many officers, plus the fact it is not a good idea to simply bring a lot

of people in. You have to have people who studied the case and became in depth,

know it in depth and therefore, so they use the officers that they had available

and there were a variety of criteria.

Mr. KLEIN. As I mentioned to you in our conversations about a week ago, it is

our information that the person who interrogated Nosenko about the Oswald

matter had no background whatsoever in

Oswald, he didn't know anything

about Oswald's background or really about Oswald at all. Is there any reason

that such a person would be used that you can tell us?

Mr. MURPHY. I am not sure I understand. I thought the point was that he had,

he was not a man of a lot of background in the CI debriefings or interrogations.

I wasn't sure of the point he didn't know about Oswald. I am not sure very

many of us knew very much about Oswald than was available at the time.

Mr. KLarn. Two points

Mr. MurpHY. The reason that the chap was chosen was because he was level-

headed, extremely toughminded, and was going to be with the case for the

long pull. He was not going to be changed. That is why he was used.

And his

career since then has borne out the judgment of many, he is a very good oficer.

Mr. KLeiN. But wouldn't-

Mr. Muspar. I don't know that he didn't, that he wasn't what you are saying,

he knew nothing at all about Oswald's case. I find that difficult to believe. But I

don't know. 'Well, if I asked you to consider a hypothetical situation, where I

Mr. KLeIN.

told you the oficer who interrogated Oswald knew nothing about Oswald other

than what he learned from

Nosenko, would you think that was unusual that

they would not, if they didn't have somebody already who knew about Oswald, at

least given somebody a thorough briefing from A to Z, everything that the CIA

knew about Oswald, would you think it was unusual, that they didn't do that?

Mr. MurpHy. I would certainly think so.

Mr. KLeIN. The second part of my question was the other point I made to you

a week ago when we spoke, to our knowledge, let me be frank, we spoke to the

particular oficer in a deposition, so that our knowledge is gained from that,

it is possible that since I have not seen the typed up deposition that what I say

might not be exactly what the deposition says, but my recollection of it is that

he also had little or no prior interrogation experience, and my question is would

that be

Mr. MurpHy. That wouldn't surprise me because there were very few people,

relatively few people, in the Division or indeed elsewhere who had a lot of

interrogation experience. We hadn't done a lot of very many hostile CIA debrief-

ings. People who might have been used were probably otherwise, either abroad,

---

## Page 55

13-00000

one, or I am not aware of anyone

those officers

concerned with this

of any former Soviet intelligence

om they spoke about this matter

omeone did, I never heard of it.

d, beginning; in April 1964, would

0 Oswald and the problems which

Oswald constituted a major area

er areas which posed equally inter-

ich more and which had occurred

which obviously is not easy for us

sion made the decision as to who

0up.

ria that he used to pick his inter-

Is Nosenko's English was not good,

t is one of the aspects of the CIA

sople because you then lose. In the

ly hostile guy who is liable to go

her side, and so you don't want to

t a good idea to simply bring a lot

died the case and became in depth,

be officers that they had avallable

nversations about a week ago, it is

gated Nosenko about the Oswald

swald, he didn't know anything

)swald at all. Is there any reason

•an tell us?

thought the point was that he had,

le CI debriefings or interrogations.

bout Oswald. I am not sure very

an was available at the time.

i chosen was because he was level-

sing to be with the case for the

That is why he was used. And his

of many, he is a very good officer.

sat he wasn't what you are saying,

find that dificult to believe. But I

a hypothetical situation, where I

knew nothing about Oswald other

you think that was unusual that

ready who knew about Oswald, at

• A to Z, everything that the OIA

unusual, that they didn't do that?

was the other point I made to you

:, let me be frank, we spoke to the

r knowledge is gained from that,

ped up deposition that what I say

s, but my recollection of it is that

verience, and my question is would

cause there were very few people,

leed elsewhere who had a lot of

of very many hostile CIA debrief-

probably otherwise, either abroad,

535

might have had experience, but I know it might sound strange, There just wasn't

squads and squads of highly trained fluent Russian speaking CI experienced

interrogators.

Mr. KLeIN. One thing I would point out to you is that I have listened to a

number of tapes, and all of the ones I have listened to were totally in English,

there was no Russian.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Mr. KLEIN. My question is,

was the questioning of Nosenko considered a major

operation in the Bureau in 1964?

Mr. MURPHY. It was an important operation, an important case.

Mr. KLEIN. And yet there was nobody with interrogation experience who

could be used to interrogate him?

Mr. MUrpery. I am sure some of the people had interrogation experience.

mean (CIA employee] himself had a lot of background in this field. I can't explain

why the officer who debriefed him on Oswald did not have prior brieing on Oswald

except what I mentioned to you the other day, because it was not a thing that

we thought we were going to get through on, because we were weak in that

area at that time.

Mr. KLEiN. Was Nosenko ever given any drugs?

Mr. MUrpHY. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. Kron. Were there ever any conversations in which you took part about

whether to give him drugs in order to get him to tell the truth?

Mr. MUrpHY. There were many, many conversations all the time about various

things that could be done, all the techniques that are known, to get him to talk,

but as far. as. I know and in discussions with the medical officer who handled

the case, there was never any decision made or any attempt made to use these,

because none of them appeared to be likely to produce results and they all would

be very harmful and, therefore, not produce results.

Mr. KLEIn. Between 1964 and 1967 when you lost control over the case, in

those years, it is your statement that if any drugs were given to him, to get him

to tell the truth, you would have known about it, and no such thing happened?

Mr. MUrPHY. That is correct.

Mr. KLEIN. Are you aware that Nosenko was given a lie detector test in 1964,

Mr. MurpHy. Yes, sir.

Mr. KIrIn. Do you know the result of that test?

Mr. Muspiy. It indicated he was lying on several key points.

Mr. KLaN. Do you have any reason to believe that test was invalid?

Mr. MURPHY. No.

Mr. KLEIN. Are you aware that he was given a second lie detector test in

1966?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Mr. KIKIN. Do you know the result of that test?

Mr. MurpHy. Same thing.

Mr. KLeIn. And do you have any reason to believe that test was invalid?

Mr. MURPErt. No; I believe the operator who gave him the test in 1966 was the

same operatot who gave him the test in 1964.

Mr. KLun. That is correct.

V. EXCERPTS OF DEPOSITION OF JAMES C. MICHAELS

AND ALEKSO POPTANICH, AUGUST 11, 1978, BEFORE

THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINA-

TIONS

INTRODUCTION

In a further effort to clear up the facts surrounding Nosenko's claims

that his statements to the CLA should not be used to impeach his pres-

ent testimony, the committee took depositions from FBI and CIA

agents who were present during the 1964 interviews. These agents were

---

## Page 56

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INVESTIGATION OF THE ASSASSINATION E

OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY

842.8

TUS?

т: 3

cy't

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

OF THE

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

SEPTEMBER 18, 19, 20, AND 21, 1978

VOLUME III

Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Assassinations

41-372 0

U.8. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 1979

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Washington, D.C. 20402

---

## Page 57

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748

TO STATETRAC

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Ie for the deposition of Mc. Nicholas

Kh day of

• Marchig

Notary Public in and for

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County of Westchester

State of New York:

749г

On September 25, 1978, Mr. Katzenbach mailed to the committee

the following letter supplementing his testimo*%a aob saboond air:

6,58

IM bon aphi

September 25, 1978.

The Honorable Louis S

Select Committee on Assassinatione

U.S. House of Reprementatives

331 House Office Building, Annex 2

Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairmany

In my testimony before the Committee on Thursday, September

21, I stated that I had abeclutely po recollection of meeting with Mr.

Helma with respect to the Nosenko case. I understand that Mr. Helms

said there was such a meeting, and it took place on April 2, 1964

On my return to my office this morning I checked on the notes

of meetings which were kept by my secretary, and they confirm Mr.

Helms' recollection. I am attaching a copy of the relevant page of the

calendar. Although it is clear from this page that there was such a

meeting, I continue to have absolutely no recollection of it, and there-

fore cannot tell you what was discussed beyond what is stated in the

calendar itself.

It was not my custom to make notes on such meetings, and I

doubt that there are in the files of the Department any notes made by

me. However it is possible that Mr. Yeagley or Mr. Foley made such

notes. I believe Mr. Foley is now deceased, but Mr. Yeagley is now

a judge in the District of Columbia, and perhaps he would have some

recollection of the meeting

period dealing with the assassination and the creation of the Warren

---

## Page 58

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750:

Aaron bit i

col 200l asader

this calendar does not refresh my recollection and therefore would not

change my tesumony, It did seem to me that hasness to both the

Committee and Mr. Helms I should make it avatlable to you.

Respectfully yours,

Hales slanets

CC:

Mr. Gary Cornwell

Hon. Richard C. Helms

Edward Bennett Williams, Esq.

---

## Page 59

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750:

cogestad aM a0el du cormatro? no

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seem to me that in tairness to both the

ouldimake

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Respectfully yours;

751

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Thursdas, Aoril 2, 1964

trirola Keis

sol Lindenbaum

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Joseph Dolan.

Rights

David Tilvaroff

briefing

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David Filvaroff

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Marshal McShane

David Filvaroff

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---

## Page 60

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INVESTIGATION OF THE ASSASSINATION 2

OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY

ANC

-US3

ipyt

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

OF THE

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

SEPTEMBER 22, 25, AND 26, 1978

VOLUME IV

Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Assassinations

41-378 0

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 1979

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Washington, D.C. 20402

Stock Number 052-070-04906-5

---

## Page 61

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20

ave a say in what happens with respec

tainly was involved with decisions

on

to end; but I was not the controlling

re were three major agency reports that

the Nosenko case; specifically there was

by the Soviet Russia Division, another

I the Office of Security report, and then a

red to as the Hart report.

ther you are familiar with all three of

Il any longer whether I read the first two

vriefed on their contents. The Hart report

the agency in early February 1973 and I

onnections with it since.

ing his defection in 1964 and upon his

tes was Yuri Nosenko in the custody of

I missed the question.

; asking precisely during his defection in

in the United States, was Yuri Nosenko

That was an accepted procedure under

ragency Defector Committee that defec-

intry were handled by the CIA, through

settling period, whatever had to be done

at the legal authority under which he

k that perhaps, Mr. Chairman, if you

like to answer that question a little bit

dulge me.

nly.

50, un September 20, 1978, I received a

• before this committee in executive ses-

reviewing that transcript I noted that,

er, I characterized Mr. Yuri Nosenko's

between 1964 and 1969 in a number of

is an area of obvious interest to the

, take this opportunity to describe my

t greater detail as to what Mr. Nosen-

entral Intelligence Agency was.

a lawyer nor a judge,

so I was not.

conclusions about Mr. Nosenko's tenure

e Agency. I'm sorry, I am not prepared

Geneva,

Switzerland, Mr. Nosenko re

ed to defect to the West. Mr. Nosenko's

panied by a claim that he could give a

ee Harvey Oswald's contacts in connec-

Oswald's stay in the Soviet Union be-

= the significance that Yuri Nosenko's

ivestigation of President Kennedy's as-

turned out to be a bona fide defector, if

21

his information were to be believed, then we could conclude that

the KGB and the Soviet Union had nothing to do with Lee Harvey

Oswald in 1963 and therefore had nothing to do with President

Kennedy's murder.

abolt, on

the other hand, Mr. Nosenko had been programed in

advance by the KGB to minimize KGB connections with Oswald, if

Mr. Nosenko was giving us false information about Oswald's con-

tacts with the KGB in 1959 to 1962, it was fair for us to surmise

that there may have been an Oswald-KGB connection in November

1963, more specifically that Oswald was acting as a Soviet agent

when he shot President Kennedy.

"If it were shown that Oswald was in fact acting as a Soviet agent

when he shot President Kennedy, the consequences to the United

States of America and, indeed, to the world, would have been

staggering. Thus, it became a matter of the utmost importance to

this Government to determine the bona fides of Mr. Yuri Nosenko.

Mr. Nosenko arrived in the country in February 1964. By the end

of March it was clear. to us that the task of evaluating Mr. Nosen-

ko's credibility would not be easy.

On April 2, 1964, as Deputy Director of Plans, I, along with

David Murphy, Chief of the Soviet Bloc Division, and Mr. Lawrence

R. Houston, the General Counsel to the CIA, met with Mr. Nicho-

las Katzenbach, then Deputy Attorney General of the United

States; Mr. J. Walter Yeagley, Chief of the Internal Security Divi-:

sion of the Justice Department; Mr. William E. Foley, who was

then Mr. Yeagley's First Assistant in the Internal Security Divi-

sion; and Mr. Harold F. Riese from the Office of Legal Counsel in

the Justice Department

The meeting took place in Mr. Katzenbach's office in the Justice

Department. The purpose of the meeting was to define Mr. Nosen-

ko's legal status in the United States and to anticipate what kind

of legal problems might arise in connection with the Agency's

ongoing custody of Mr. Nosenko.

* The Agency provided me a copy of the memorandum for the

record written by Mr. Lawrence Houston describing this meeting

on April 2, 1964, and a second memorandum which reflects the

substance of a telephone call from Mr. Foley on the following day,

April 3, 1964. These documents were in part declassified by the

Agency on September 18, 1978, and I would like to make them part

ot the record of these proceedings.

i During the meeting of April 2,

, 1964, the Department of Justice

was fully informed of Mr. Nosenko's status with the Agency and

the Department's opinion was requested as to the scope of the

Agency's ongoing authority with respect to Mr. Nosenko.

Mr. Nosenko's technical

us in tou United States as onlate, ex sion and panical

which means that the Immigration and Naturalization Service had

technically excluded Mr. Nosenko from the United States but had

also temporarily "paroled him" to the custody of the Central Intel-

It is my understanding that the terms of the parole provided that

Mr. Nosenko would remain in the custody of the Agency unless it

was determined whether Mr. Nosenko should be deported or

whether he should be permitted to settle in the United States.

---

## Page 62

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24

statement of some employee or something. He was designated by the present Direc-

tor to come' here and present the story

familiar with it since he had reviewed it for the CIA.

because he was supposed to be the

He stated in substance, Mr. Nosenko was taken into custody in this country by

the CLA after defection or after alleged defection, held in a so called safe house on a

diet of tea and porridge twice a day, was allowed no reading material. The guards

were instructed neither to talk to him or smile to him. He was subjected to 48 hours

at, a crack interrogation. This being while they built a separate facility somewhere

else in the country; namely, a device described by him as a bank vault, and then

built a house around the bank vault to put this man in and then kept him there

under the equivalent of some 3 years with that kind of thing, 1,277 days to be

specific, at which point they finally gave up and gave him some emolument and put

him on their payroll and let him go.

And then they gave as their-I questioned on the authority to do a thing like

that. Did they have any kind of process, and they said other than the fact that Mr.

Helms had conferred with you and gotten your OK, that this would be legal.

And I just found it awfully difficult. to believe that. And that is why-and I don't

imagine it would be the kind of thing that you would be asked to OK enough that

you would not rather clearly remember the incident if it had occurred.

Mr. KATzenBach. If the facts that you have just set forth to me, Congressman,

had ever been made known to me, I would recollect it, I am certain; and I would

hope to goodness I would not have given the legal advice that is claimed

Mr. Saywer. It makes me feel better about it. Thank you.

That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

Having heard Mr. Katzenbach's testimony of yesterday, can you

reconcile his testimony to this committee with your statement just

read to this committee?

Mr. Herms. 1 can only say, Mr. Stokes, that it is very hard to

reconcile. I think the basic point at issue here is really whether the

meeting with him took place at all. What happened after the

meeting is something he was not responsible for as far as I am

aware.

Let me read to you the memorandum for the record which Mr.

Lawrence R. Houston, the General Counsel of CIA, wrote on April

3, 1964. 1 have a copy in front of me. It is headed Memorandum for

the Record and the subiect is the Nosenko case.

It reads:

Mr. Helms, Mr. Murphy, and I met with Mr. Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, J. Walter

Yeagley,

William E. Foley, and Harold F. Ries, on April 2, 1964. Mr. Helms outlined

the problems foreseeable in our future relations with Nosenko and asked the opin-

ion of the Justice representatives on what we could do to control the situation. I

pointed out. that his

technical status is one of exclusion and parole-or more

technically, deferment and parole.

Paragraph 2:

After some discussion, Mr. Foley stated it was his opinion that Agency representa

tives could take any action necessary to carry out the terms of the parole. Mr.

Katzenbach asked Mr. Foley to check this and let me know and Mr. Foley later

confirmed this position by telephone.

interpretation the the on into viewed ity, a role of ement attached her an

Also, I informed Mr. Foley of this interpretation.

Signed, Lawrence R. Houston

General Counsel.

• The attachment is a memorandum also dated April 3, 1964. It is

signed by Lawrence R. Houston, General Counsel. It is a memoran-

dum for the director of security. That would be the officer who was

the director of

of the Central Intelligence

Agency. The subject is Parole status of defectors:

On 2 April 1964, we had a discussion with the Department of Justice on the status

of aliens whose inspection by INS-

---

## Page 63

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PAGE

LEVEL 1 - 20 OF 80 STORIES

Copyright 1993 American Broadcasting Companies, Inc.

All rights reserved

ABC NEWS

SHOW: 20/20 (ABC 9:00 pm ET)

August 27, 1993

Transcript # 1337

TYPE: Show; Show

SECTION: News; Domestic

LENGTH: 8240 words

HEADLINE: Case Closed

GUESTS: MARK LANE, Author/Attorney; GERALD POSNER, Author

PEPPER JENKINS; Sheriff JIM BOWLES,

ROBERT OSWALD, Brother

Lynn Sherr reports on a new book about the JFK assassination, and interviews

author Gerald Posner, who says computer enhancements prove Leeharvey Oswald

acted alone, and was not a Mafia or KGB agent.

BODY:

BARBARA WALTERS, ABC News: Good Evening. I'™ Barbara Walters. Hugh Downs is

on vacation. This is 20/20.

ANNOUNCER: From ABC News, around the world and into your home, the stories that

touch your life, with Hugh Downs and Barbara Walters - this is 20/20.

Tonight, 30 years after the Kennedy assassination, will a powerful new book end

controversy once and for all? Investigative journalist Gerald Posner says he

has the answers about Oswald, the magic bullet, and every conspiracy theory to

come along. Lynn Sherr's explosive report - 'Case Closed.'

And-

SELMA SCHIMMEL, Breast Cancer Survivor: Esp?] Who is equipped to think of dying

in your 20'5 or 30'5?

ANNOUNCER: -if you think it only happens to older women, you're wrong.

KERI DEARBORN, Breast Cancer Survivor: And everyone told me I was too young to

have breast cancer, and I thought they were right.

ANNOUNCER: It's happening more and more, and doctors admit the younger you are,

the harder it is to detect.

Dr. TIMOTHY JOHNSON, ABC News Medical Editor: Mammography can have an error rate

of up to 40 percent in young women versus a rate of less than 15 percent in

older women.

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ANNOUNCER: For women in their 20's and 30's, Dr. Timothy Johnson has some

shocking news -'It Could Happen to You.'

Plus, can gay men be made straight? This therapist says he transforms

homosexuals. This man once preferred men. Today, he's happy with his wife.

JOHN STOSSEL, ABC News: And now is sexuality an important part of your marriage.

RICHARD COHEN, Nicolosi Patient: Oh, yes. We have good sex, if that's what

you're asking.

ANNOUNCER: Others claim treatment is helping them-

'ALEX, ' Nicolosi Patient: For the first time in my life, you know, 30 years of

my life, I feel alive.

ANNOUNCER: -but in the gay community, backlash.

GAY MAN: This is not a disease. There's no such thing as a cure.

ANNOUNCER: John Stassel brings you the hot debate over gay men. Are they 'Born

or Bred?' Those stories tonight, August 27, 1993, after this brief message.

[Commercial breakl

Case Closed

BARBARA WALTERS: The Kennedy assassination was back in the headlines all this

week when more than 900,000 pages of previously classified government files were

finally opened after nearly 30 years. And while close to half the current

population wasn't even alive at the time, the controversy surrounding that event

continues to haunt us all.

The fact is a majority of Americans don't believe the Warren Commission, and do

believe some form of conspiracy was involved. But now, a powerful new book

claims to have the last word. Its conclusion? Lee Harvey Oswald did indeed act

alone. The book is titled Case Closed, but is it?

[voice-over] Whatever side you're an in this still-raging controversy, you'll

want to see Lynn Sherr's report now.

LYNN SHERR, ABC News: [voice-over] No period in an American presidency has been

as controversial, as

thoroughly analyzed or as frequently written and speculated

about as the final six seconds in John F. Kennedy's life.

Ist NEWSCASTER: [?] Three shots were fired at the President's motorcade as it

passed out of the downtown area of Dallas.

SHERR: [voice-over) No detail about the final moments of the president's life

has been spared scrutiny. Every eyewitness account, ballistics test, photograph,

medical conclusion and investigative finding has been challenged, reinterpreted

or dismissed,

truth about what happened in Dealey Esp?] Plaza on November 22, 1963.

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MAN: [?] The President of the United States, John Fitzgerald Kennedy, is dead.

Let us pray.

SHERR: The official version of what happened is that from that sixth-floor

corner window, acting alone, Lee Harvey Oswald fired three shots, the third of

which ended the life of America's 35th president. But that's too simple an

explanation for a great many Americans, and for conspiracy theorists,

convenient that one man alone did it. Doubters insist that the shot or shots

that killed the President came from behind that fence on the grassy knoll, or

from a railroad overpass just beyond.

MARK LANE, Author/Attorney: Shots came from at least two directions. A bullet

hit the president in the back. A bullet hit him in the throat. It came from the

front. A bullet hit him in the head. It came from the front. That was three

shots. At least one bullet hit Governor Connolly Isp?l, One bullet missed,

struck the curb.

SHERR: [voice-over] Attorney/author Mark Lane, one of the most persistent and

prolific of conspiracy theorists, has long insisted that the Warren Commission

was wrong, and covered up critical evidence that might make it possible to

identify the President's assassins.

Mr. LANE: Today, with hundreds of thousands of documents in the vaults of the

CIA, the DI [?], and the FBI and the National Archives - which we can't see -

the cover-up is

continuing.

SHERR: [voice-over] But another lawyer-turned-author, Gerald Posner, says

evidence available to researchers and conspiracy buffs for years led him

directly to the only person who could possibly have shot the president.

GERALD POSNER, Author, 'Case Closed': Lee Harvey Oswald killed Jack Kennedy,

acting alone.

SHERR: [voice-over] Posner, author of Case Closed, the culmination of a

three-year, exhaustive reexamination of the kennedy assassination, concedes that

in identifying a familiar culprit, he's not likely to win over many conspiracy

buffs. But he says the evidence didn't allow for any other suspects.

Mr. POSNER: Most people who have written conspiracy books started with their

conclusion already done. They knew it was a conspiracy in their heart, and they

went around to prove that case.

SHERR: [voice-overl One of the major assassination controversies Posner seeks to

resolve is the number of shots fired, where they came from, and which ones

struck the President. Using recently-developed computer enhancements of the home

movie taken by Abraham Zapruder, Posner explained for 20/20 how he says he was

able to count the shots, for which he says Oswald had more time than the warren

Commission believed.

Mr. POSNER: Oswald's first shot, which missed, was fired much earlier than

anyone realized - just after the car turned

the corner. Evidence of this is

overlooked by most experts. It's in the film. In the upper righthand corner of

your screen, you'll see a little girl. She's heard that shot and turned. In the

car, the President and Mrs. Kennedy and the Governor also heard the shot and

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turned. After this shot, Oswald, still had over eight seconds, not five, for the

next two.

The second shot is fired. This bullet hits both Kennedy and Connolly. After

passing through kennedy,

you see it go through the Governor, as his suit lapel

flaps forward. A computer technician discovered that crucial detail just last

year.

SHERR: [voice-over] This is the so-called 'magic bullet' that seemed to zigzag

through the two men.

Mr. POSNER: This computer animation illustrates that the second bullet needed no

magic. Because of the way the two men were lined up, this bullet passed directly

through them. It turned only after it slowed down and shattered Connolly's wrist

- no zigs, no zags.

SHERR: How could that bullet have emerged so clean, with no flaws on it, really,

whatsoever?

Mr. POSNER: I was skeptical about that bullet, and I think that was the thing

that stops many people from believing Oswald did it alone. It emerged so clean

because that it went through kennedy, it slowed up. When it went through

Connolly's chest, it slowed up. By the time it hit the big bone in his wrist,

which everybody thinks would damage it, it was traveling at half or a third of

its speed - fast enough to crush the bone, but not fast enough to deform the

bullet.

SHERR: [voice-over] The sudden backward motion of the President's head as the

third and final bullet struck, blowing away part of his skull, has led many to

believe that the shot came from the front, but Posner says normal neurological

reflexes make the body stiffen when struck, causing it to move back.

And Dr. Pepper Jenkins, one of the physicians attending the President at

Parkland Hospital, points to yet another possible factor, the brace President

Kennedy wore for his chronic back pain.

Dr. PEPPER JENKINS: He was so tightly wound into a brace that- the metal coming

up his back, and he was tied to the metal or strapped to the metal with an Ace

bandage.

SHERR: In the Zapruder film and in all the pictures we've seen- well, how do you

describe what the body is doing, having seen the brace?

Dr. JENKINS: Well, I would think you couldn't fall forward. I think you'd have

to fall backwards

or aside.

SHERR: Because?

Dr. JENKINS: Because the brace held him in such a position.

znd NEWSCASTER: 1?1 At approximately one o'clock, the President is dead. The

doctors were working too frantically to revive him to notice the exact moment.

SHERR: [voice-over] Dr. Jenkins also has a very poignant memory of Mrs. Kennedy

sometime standing next

to him.

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Dr. JENKINS: She had such a drawn look. I really feel like she was in shock, and

she was just holding her hands, one above the other. And one of the times, she

nudged me with her elbow and handed me something in

her hand, which is part of

his brain that obviously was in her lap- with his head in her lap as the car

came to Parkland. Bad moment.

SHERR: [voice-over] After examining computer animation of the presidential

limousine and its passengers, Posner sought to show where in Dealey Plaza, the

shots came from.

Mr. POSNER: Kennedy and Connolly are placed into computer animation, and working

back from their wounds, the computer determines the only possible location for

the assassin, as indicated by the yellow shading. Notice that Oswald's

sixth-floor window is right in the center of it.

Nr. LANE: Posner believes the magic-bullet theory. Next, I guess, we're going to

hear about the Tooth Fairy. It's just mathematically impossible. No one has ever

been able to recreate what

it is said that Lee Harvey Oswald did.

SHERR: Well, they've done it- he's done it now with a computer enhancement-

Mr. LANE: I know that.

SHERR: -and he claims the computer shows that it's absolutely the way it

happened.

Mr. LANE: Well, he's entitled to his computer. The American people were there,

and they testified, and two-thirds of them said they know shots came from the

wooden fence.

SHERR: [voice-over] What about that reported fourth shot fired from the grassy

knoll? When the House Select Committee on Assassinations concluded in 1978 that

there was a 95-percent certainty of such a shot, conspiracy theorists were

heartened, but the committee's finding, according to Dallas Sheriff Jim Bowles

(sp?], was based on a static-filled Dictabelt recording of a Dallas police

motorcycle radio stuck in the on position. The sheriff says the motorcycle

wasn't even in Dealey Plaza, but the committee heard four shots. We couldn't

lear anyen in

interviewingl You have a copy of that tape, right?

Sheriff JIM BOWLES, Dallas: I certainly do.

SHERR: Why don't you play it, and let's take a listen. Is that a shot?

Sheriff BOWLES: No, that's the motorcycle slowing down, see?

SHERR: I didn't hear any shots.

Sheriff BOWLES: Neither has anyone else. They listened to the same belts we

listened to, and they claimed to hear four shots.

SHERR: So where do you think the four shots came from on the House Select

Committee's tape?

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Sheriff BOWLES: You have to ask them.

Mr. POSNER: They clearly went down the wrong path. The National Academy of

Sciences reviewed their work later, and pointed out all the flaws in it. They

just made an error on that Dictabelt. There is no fourth shot. There's no shot

at all, even, to hear.

SHERR: Even if people accepted the physical evidence gathered here in Dealey

plaza, and agreed that it tended to support the warren Commission's findings,

that would not end the speculation. Surveys show that most Americans doubt that

Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone, belleving instead that he was either part of or

himself became a victim of a conspiracy.

LEE HARVEY OSWALD: I didn't shot anybody, no, sir.

3rd NEWSCASTER: [?] Oswald has been shot!

SHERR: What about the Ruby- the Jack Ruby-organized crime connection? Clearly,

there was a connection there.

Mr- POSNER: No question. As a matter of fact, I think the warren Commission

underplayed Jack Ruby's organized crime connections.

SHERR: Isn't there some evidence, then, that he might have been acting on their

behalf to wipe out Oswald?

Mr. POSNER: Right. No. If he had a contract from organized crime, why didn't he

shoot Oswald when he saw him for the first time two days earlier? On the day.

Ruby finally killed Oswald, it was only by chance that their paths crossed. He

was not acting on behalf of organized crime. He was acting for his own

note the stand tests me attache to the that a senate une

stain and the stigma attached

President's murder.

SHERR: You're saying Jack Ruby acted all by himself,.a lone-gunman theory once

again?

Mr. POSNER: Without any doubt.

SHERR: [voice-overl Posner also explained his views on the many conspiracy

theories about the assassination.

ROBERT F. KENNEDY: Did you say, 'That S.0.B., I'll break his back'?

JIMMY HOFFA: Who?

Mr. KENNEDY: You.

Mr. HOFFA: Who's the 'who'?

SHERR: The Mafia wanted the President killed, because that would get rid of

Bobby kennedy, who was going after organized crime.

Mr. POSNER: I would not be surprised if the Mafia, in 1962 or '63, sat at a

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table with some of its key henchman, and discussed killing President Kennedy.

They did hate him. They might have even had a conspiracy afoot. There is no tie

between Lee Harvey Oswald and organized crime. There's not opportunity for him

to have been their assassin. In essence, he beat the Mafia to Kennedy.

SHERR: How about, as in the Oliver Stone movie, JK, the military industrial

complex?

Mr. POSNER: The movie, JFK, served what I call the kitchen sink. If you can't

just have one of them, let's have everybody in the plot, because they all have

some reason to knock off kennedy.

JIM GARRISON: We have the mystery of the assassination of the President solved,

and there is no question about it.

SHERR: What about the Garrison investigation?

Mr. POSNER: He had great delusions on the assassination. I think it's a

disgrace. It was a travesty of justice, a miscarriage of justice. Garrison knew

it. I discovered files of his investigation - documents, affidavits, memos from

his investigators - which showed the extent of this scam that was pulled on the

American public. Here was a man who knew better. I think his behavior actually

crossed the line to being criminal.

SHERR: Is there any evidence- do you believe at all that Lee Harvey oswald was

working on behalf of the CIA to kill the President?

Mr. POSNER: No. I don't believe the CIA had any connection, not only to kill the

President, but they had no connection to Oswald at all. And the reason that I

can say that so confidently to you is actually an unusual source. It's the KGB

files. The KGB files, which had surveillance on Oswald for day in and day out

for nearly two years

in Russia, came to the conclusion that he was not a sleeper

agent, that he had no American intelligence contact.

SHERR: [voice-overl So if Oswald wasn't working for the CIA, how about the KGB?

After all, he spoke

Russian, defected to the Soviet Union in 1959, married, a

Russian, and lived in Minsk

for two years.

Mr. POSNER: A popular early theory, popular that we now see in the documents

just released this past week in washington. The KGB was high on the CIA's

possible list of targets. The KGB did not want Oswald from day one. They

realized Oswald had problems, psychological problems.

URI NOSENKO, Former KGB Agent: Isp?] I do not think that Oswald will be trusted

by any intelligence.

SHERR: [voice-over] Uri Nosenko is someone who might know. Before defecting to

the United States in 1963, Nosenko was Oswald's KGB handler, and had access to

nis file. He insists Oswald never worked for the KGB. Still

concerned about his

own safety, Nosenko asked 20/20 not to show

his face.

Mr. NOSENKO: Lee Harvey Oswald was mentally unstable.

SHERR: [voice-over] But unlike Posner, Nosenko says he doesn't believe Oswald

could have shot the president for a very simple reason.

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Mr. NOSENKO: In Minsk, he was shooting rabbits with shotgun. Would you believe

it? He never shoot a single rabbit. And here we see person shooting rifle on a

long aistance, and shooting three, four shots in several seconds.

Mr. POSNER: He didn't get a rabbit, and therefore that's used as evidence that

he couldn't kill the President? But talk to those who actually knew what Oswald

was like with a gun, his brother who used to go out with him.

ROBERT OSWALD, Brother: We have shot cottontail rabbits with .22's on the run,

okay? We're shot squirrels in the trees with -22's.

SHERR: [voice-overl Robert Oswald says his younger brother was always interested

in guns. He still has the pistol Lee Oswald bought when he was 16.

Mr. OSWALD: My experience with him in the field with a shotgun or a .22 was he

usually got his game.

SHERR: [voice-over] And Lee Harvey Oswald used the same rifle that killed the

President only weeks earlier in a failed attempt to murder to retired Army

general Edwin Walker. In other wards, according to author Gerald Posner, Oswald,

a loser in life, wanted to accomplish something.

MAN: [?] Lee Harvey Oswald, 0, S, W, A, L, D.

REPORTER: Did you fire that rifle?

LEE HARVEY OSWALD: That's the facts that you people have been getting, but I

emphatically deny these charges.

SHERR: [voice-over] If, as you say, Lee Harvey Oswald was not working with the

mob or with the ciA or

with the koB or with the military industrial complex, why

did he kill the President?

nr. POsNER. I think that oswald killed the President, because this was to be

almost his fulfillment, his moment in the sun. Three days before kennedy arrives

in Dallas, he's given a gift on a silver platter. Jack Kennedy's going to pass

in front of the Depository. It's not ideology, it's not because he's Communist,

but it's because he has that opportunity to place himself in history. Here we

are, 30 years later, talking about him. He was successful. He got his wish.

WALTERS: Well, there's a lot of proof. Is the case closed?

SHERR: Well, certainly, Gerald Posner believes so, but out experience is that

people on the other side are so dug in, it's unlikely anything is going to

change their mind. You know, even at bealey plaza, there are people just walking

around, telling you what their theories are. And incidentally, Barbara, bealey

Plaza-

WALTERS: Which is where assassination took place.

SHERR: -which is where it took place-

WALTERS: Yeah.

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SHERR: It's so much smaller in real life-

WALTERS: Really?

SHERR: -than it appears-

WALTERS: I think of it as a huge-

SHERR: Right.

HALTERS: -kind of highway.

SHERR: It's quite small, and Posner points out that if all the eyewitnesses wha

have come

forward were in fact there that day, it would have been elbow to

elbow. In fact, it was not very crowded that day.

WALTERS: Nine hundred thousand documents released this week- what, 10,000 more

to come. Is that going to settle anything?

SHERR: Unlikely. That, however, is the one area where both sides agree -

unclassify all those documents. Otherwise- and even so, this is going to be

argued for generations to come.

WALTERS: Probably. Probably. Thank you, Lynn.

Next, most people feel that breast cancer only attacks women over the age of 50.

[voice-over] But Dr. Tim Johnson reports that more and more young women are

discovering they have a special battle

to fight. What should you know? After

this.

[Commercial breakl

It Could Happen to You

BARBARA WALTERS: The American Cancer Society's meetings on breast cancer are

taking place in Boston this week, and from that conference come reports of a

ent younge women bi

disturbing new trend - younger women diagnosed with the disease at a growing

rate. Though diagnostic tests have improved over the years, breast cancer in

younger women presents a special and quite serious set of problems.

[voice-over] And as Dr. Tim Johnson reports, if you are under 40, much of what

you previous learned about the disease may not apply to you.

TERESA ROBERSON, Breast Cancer Survivor: I had lumps before, they were all- they

turned out to be cysts. But I knew this was different.

GAYLE RUSSELL, Breast Cancer Survivor: I had no history of any type of cancer in

my family, 50 I was very surprised.

KERI DEARBORN, Breast Cancer Survivor: And everyone told me I was too young to

have breast cancer, and I thought they were right.

Dr. TIMOTHY JOHNSON, ABC News Medical Editor: [voice-overl A disease they

thought they were too young to get, but more and more, the woman on the

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LEVEL 1 - 15 OF 80 STORIES

Copyright 1993 Chicago Tribune Company

Chicago Tribune

October 3, 1993 Sunday, FINAL EDITION

SECTION: TEMPO; Pg- 1; ZONE: C

LENGTH: 1949 words

HEADLINE: THE CASE AGAINST CONSPIRACY;

GERALD POSNER, ACTING ALONE, HAS WOUNDED THE JFK COVER-UP INDUSTRY

BYLINE: By Paul Galloway, Tribune Staff Writer.

BODY:

The rendezvous was arranged for a weeknight last fall at a Turkish restaurant

near CIA headquarters in Langley, Va. The proprietor would be expecting him.

When author Gerald Posner said he was there to meet George and his wife, as

he had been instructed to do, the proprietor led Posner and his wife, Trisha, to

a private table in the back room.

George was the code name for Yuri Nosenko, a KGB officer who defected to the

U.s. in 1964 and now lives under another name in an undisclosed part of the

country. Posner was researching a book about the assassination of John F.

Kennedy, and Nosenko had agreed to speak for the first time exclusively about

the Soviet intelligence agency's surveillance of Lee Harvey Oswald during his

stay in the Soviet Union from late 1959 until June 1962. Nosenko had suggested

that he and Posner bring their wives, Posner said, because the sight of two

couples dining together would serve as cover for their interview.

"Yuri supervised the Oswald file in Moscow and was familiar with the KGB

files on Oswald's time in Minsk, which I had seen," Posner said. "I knew he

• could be extremely helpful in reconstructing that period of Oswald's life."

A chapter in Pasner's new book, "Case Closed: Lee Harvey Oswald and the

Assassination of JFK," is devoted

to Nosenko and his assessments of Oswald.

As the title suggests, Posner finds Oswald to be kennedy's assassin, acting

alone, just as the warren Commission said. Further, he was not a ClA agent, not

a KGB agent, not an innocent patsy but a sociopath and loser who had grandiose

notions of making a mark in history.

Posner is as surprised at the book's conclusion as the conspiracy buffs are

riled.

"I'm getting some very personal, vindictive calls from the conspiracy people.

If it's any consolation, I never set out to do a book that would say here is the

final answer, here is who did it," Posner said during a visit to chicago.

Posner's intention was to write a primer of sorts about the assassination

after examining the welter of conspiracy theories to see what was credible and

what wasn't.

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2

Poking in the garbage

"When you read all the conspiracy books, it's apparent they can't all be

right because they flatly contradict each other," he said. "I knew there was

garbage on the record. I didn't know how much."

after he debunked as many inaccuracies and false leads as he could, he

assumed there would be some issues that would require further investigation;

perhaps questions about acoustics or ballistics or possible Mafia involvement.

Yet toward the end of his research, Posner notified Bob Loomis, his editor at

Random House, that he had taken an unexpected turn.

"I was convinced the Warren Commission had gotten it right. The evidence was

overwhelming," he said.

osner also was aware, of course, that a large majority of the populace

thinks the warren Commission had gotten it wrong, maybe on purpose.

He got a feel for such skepticism when Loomis, vice president and executive

editor of Random House, took his own poll at the next meeting of the publishing

house's top editors, who periodically gather to report on works in progress.

seriesty gather

"Bob told them about what I'd found and asked how many believed the Warren

Commission was right," Posner said. "Remember, these are some of the brightest,

best-informed, best-educated people in New York City, and no one raised a hand

except Bob Loomis."

Posner was not dismayed. "When people cite polls showing 70 or 80 or even 90

percent of the public as believing the assassination was the result of a

conspiracy, I say I'm surprised it's not 100 percent when you consider that

people have essentially heard only one side for three decades."

'JFK' an 'abomination'

A 1978 congressional investigation estimated that 2,000 books, including

those that are self-published, had been written on the

handful present a variety of sometimes-elaborate scenarios about plotters,

motives, killers and cover-ups, and as a rule, the conspiracy books make

bestseller lists, while the others don't.

"Then there are the TV documentaries, which are invariably pro-conspiracy,"

Posner said. "A recent one was a five-hour British film for Arts & Entertainment

called 'The Men Who Killed Kennedy.' "

And most influential of all, he said, is Oliver Stone's $50 million movie,

"JFK," released in late 1991.

"Half of our country's present population weren't born (as of) November 1963.

Stone's movie is a historical abomination that's filled with demonstrable

falsehoods, but to young people, it's a documentary.

"Even if they read articles criticizing it, they say, 'Well, Stone may have

exaggerated, but there's got to be something there.' Believe it or not, there's

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What's especially galling, Posner said, is that Stone based his movie on the

investigation of former New Orleans District Atty. Jim Garrison, including his

prosecution of businessman Clay Shaw as an alleged conspirator.

"Garrison's prosecution of Clay Shaw was disgraceful, criminal and has been

thoroughly discredited. There was coercion of witnesses and changing of

testimony," Posner said. "The jury took only 45 minutes to find Shaw not guilty,

and one of the jurors said it would have been 20 minutes but that

several jurors

had to go to the bathroom."

Stone has said "JFK" was a "counter-myth" to the "myth" of the Warren

Commission.

The no-longer magic bullet

Amang the doctrines of conspiracy literature bolstered by "JFK," Posner

noted, is that the so-called magic bullet found on Texas Gov. John Connally's

stretcher at Parkland Hospital was almost pristine, couldn't have struck Kennedy

and Connally, as the warren Commission said it did, without zigzagging in

midair, and was probably planted.

"If ballistics tests didn't prove conclusively the bullet struck Kennedy and

Connally, which they do, use your common sense," Posner said.

"At the time the

bullet was found, the conspirators wouldn't know if the bullets fired at

Connally and Kennedy were still lodged in their bodies or had been recovered.

"If they wanted to shield the conspiracy, there can only be three shots.

More than that, and the single assassin doesn't have time to shoot. So why risk

exposing the conspiracy by planting a fourth bullet that wouldn't match

ballistically with remnants of the other rounds?"

And what about Jack Ruby, the Chicago native who moved to ballas to run strip

clubs? Did he just happen by the Dallas jail on Nov. 24 and shoot Oswald on the

spur of the moment?

"Ruby's murder of Oswald does more to undermine this case in terms of getting

the truth out than anything else," Posner said.

"First, it prevents the trial of

Oswald, where the evidence would have convicted him. It also gives us a second

assassin, with ties to organized crime. It's hard for people

to believe this was

a coincidence, so you're off and running with a conspiracy."

Posner's account of Ruby's life and his actions during the assassination week

demolishes any notion he was a conspirator.

According to the trade

journal Publishers weekly, six books by major

publishers will appear this fall to coincide with the 30th anniversary of the

assassination, with "Case Closed" standing alone in its anti-conspiracy stance.

Posner has been heartened by promising sales and positive reviews. "Many

readers are put off by conspiracy books that select only material that's

favorable to their position, whether it checks out or not. I think these people

are buying the book."

Thumbs up from the critics

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Chicago Tribune, October 3, 1993

Three weeks after its release, it is eighth on The New York Times national

best-seller list and seventh on the Tribune's list of Chicago's best sellers.

U.S. News & World Report, which ran excerpts from "Case Closed," writes:

"posner achieves the unprecedented. He sweeps away decades of polemical smoke,

Harvey Oswald.

Harvey oslayer it quates stephen aare segranner of bight Eisennower and

Richard Nixon: "The chapter on the (magic) bullet is a tour de force, absolutely

brilliant, absolutely convincing."

New York Times book critic Christopher Lehmann-Haupt writes that "posner

effectively refutes hundreds of claims that have added up to conspiracy

theories."

In a Tribune review, author Jeffrey Toobin writes that "Case Closed" is

"utterly convincing in its thesis, which seems, in light of all that has

transpired over the past 30 years, almost revolutionary."

Posner, 39, didn't set out to be a writer, instead complying with the wishes

of his father, a union official in San Francisco. "My father dealt with a lot of

lawyers. He said, 'Son, these fellows charge fees you can't believe.' "

So Posner attended law school at the University of California at Berkeley,

where he was an honor student, then joined a prestigious wall Street law firm,

leaving two years later to form his own firm.

In 1981 he represented Jewish victims of Dr. Josef Mengele, the notorious

Nazi war criminal who escaped from Germany after World war II and died in hiding

in South America.

"It was a pro bono case, and I sued the Mengele family and the German

government," Posner said. "Nothing came of the suit, but I accumulated 25,000

documents about Mengele, 50 I thought I'd write a book."

"Mengele: The Complete Story," which he co-wrote with John ware, was

published in 1986, prompting Posner to leave the law and write full time.

"Case Closed" is his fifth book. "A weakness of mine is that I tend to

underestimate the difficulty of each project I undertake. This was true with

this book, but as I kept going I kept finding answers to things I didn't think I

could get answers to."

The real cover-ups

Posner agrees with critics of the Warren Commission who say its investigation

was flawed.

"There was a cover-up by the FBI and the CIA, but they weren't attempting to

conceal their involvement in the murder of the

inefficiency and bungling," Posner said. "I go into detail in exposing these

be interpreted as evidence of

president but rather. their own

cover-ups, but they can't be interpreted as evidence of conspiracy."

The warren Commission's work also was tarnished by a dubious finding of the

1978 investigation by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, Posner said.

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"The committee's acoustics experts tested a Dictabelt recording of radio

traffic on Dallas police channels and said they were 95 percent certain there

had been a fourth shot, therefore a second shooter and a conspiracy."

A retest by the National Academy of Sciences discredited the committee's

experts, concluding that the recording was made a minute after the shooting,

Posner

said.

Half of "Case Closed" is a meticulous examination of Oswald's entire life,

culminating in an almost day-by-day chronicle of his movements in the last two

months before the assassination. "Many conspiracy books almost ignore Oswald.

But he's the key, and it's amazing how much is known about him," Posner said.

"It's certainly enough to disprove all the theories that he was a spy or a

patsy.

"My technique was to go to original sources. Too many books quote secondary

sources, some of which are passing on misinformation, which means the garbage is

disseminated again and again, becoming fact.

"Here's an example. 'JFK' opens with Rose Cheramie, a prostitute, warning her

doctors that the Kennedy assassination is going to take place in Dallas and

naming Ruby as involved. I found her doctor, who said she was psychotic and

didn't mention the assassination until the day after it happened or Ruby until

the day after he killed Oswald."

Posner paused. "I can go on."

GRAPHIC: PHOTO GRAPHIC

PHOTO (color): Gerald Posner, debunker of conspiracy theorists, at Smyth

School on West 13th Street, which Jack Ruby attended. Tribune photo by Charles

cherney.

GRAPHIC: The three shots. From: "Case Closed: Lee Harvey Oswald and the

Assassination of JFK," by Gerald Posner (Random House, Sept. 1, 1993.)

See microfilm for complete graphic.

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

LOAD-DATE-MDC: December 7, 1993

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