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Date

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09/24/98

1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY

RECORD NUMBER

RECORDS SERIES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

PFIAB

206-10001-10007

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR

PFIAB

FROM

TO

TITLE

MINUTES OF BOARD MEETING OF AUGUST 6 AND 7, 1964

DATE

: 08/06/64

PAGES

: 11

SUBJECTS : AGENDA FOR AUGUST 6 AND 7, 1963 MEETING

SUMMARY OF AUGUST 6 AND 7, 1963 MEETING

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION

TOP SECRET

RESTRICTIONS

: 1B, 1C

CURRENT STATUS

-RELEASED WITH DELETIONS OPEN IN FULL

DATE OF LAST REVIEW

: 08/06/98

OPENING CRITERIA

08/01/2024

COMMENTS

g025 Release under the

President John F. Kennedy

Assassination Records Collection

ect of 1992

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

NW 88132

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206-10001-10007

2025 Release under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of

1992

AUg.

677

MINUTES

• F

RD

M

EE TINY

0 F

AUGUST 6 and 7, 1964

+

+

206=0001-10007

186-

dId: 2497

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MINUTE S

OF

BOARD MEETING

coF

AUGUST 6 and 7, 1964:

206E00O0

/U70 7

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PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD AGENDA

August 5, 1964 all mimbera+ gpè wexo

in Orche Enret Pinker init

1.

8:30 P.M.

Depart andrews ATs la Special Mission y

aircraft (Constellation)

2

11:00 P.M.;

CST

(approx.)

Arrive Offutt AFB

Remain overnight at Offutt Inn

Iteni

1.

3

4

7:

8

9:

10:

Time

8:00 - 9:30

9:30 - 10:00

10:30 - 11:00

11:00 - 12:15

12:15 - 1:00

1:00 - 2:00

August 6e 1964

Dei manbira enefit de

Subject

Meeting

with General Thomas Power, CINCSAC;

and SAC .Command Post Status Briefing

Intelligence Warning

Intelligence War Planning

Soviet Bloc Threat

a

Б.

Information Deficiencies

Coverage Deficlencies

Impact on the Single Integrated

Operational

Pian (SIOP)

Lunch

Continue with Item 4

2:00 - 2:30

Intelligènce Data Handling System (IDHS)

2:30 - 3:00

SAC-NSA Special Project

3:10

Depart Offutt AFB

9:10 (approx.) Arrive Andrews AFB

August 7, 1964

die mendere tere

9:00 - 9:30

9:30 - 26÷15

10:2.0

Chairman's Time

Current Intelligence Briefing on the

Situations In South Vietnam,

North Vietnam,

Laos, Cambodia, Communist China, Cyprus,

Congo, cuba

Mr. Ray Cline

Deputy Director of Intelligence, CiA

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GAMBIT/FULCRUM

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TOP. SECRET

Agenda For August 7: (Continued)

Item

TIme

Subject

3•

10:15 - 12:15

11: 15

The National Reconnaissance Program:

a

Resume of Operations - CY 1964

Concepts for Advanced Satellite

Reconnaissance Systems (GAMBIT 3,

FULCRUM,

others)

Budget Out 100k

4.

5•

6.

11:15 - 12:00

12:00

- 12:45

2.15

12:45

-

1: 00

• 1:00 -

2:00

Dr.

•Director, NRO wrech

Foreign Intelligence Budgeting and

Management:

Budget Patterns for this Fiscal Year

Budget Outlook as

to Principal Trends

and Probiems Over the Next Flve Years

Mr.

Kermit terdon

hiat Kero

Director, Bureau of

the Budget

Mr-Einere staats

Deputy Director, Bureau of the Budget

Mr. Robert Amory

Assistant' Director, Bureau of the Budget

Lunch - The White House Mess

. Дn1072

8

9:

2:00. -

2:15

2:75 -

3:15

2:403:30

GAMBIT/FULCRUM

measures Efforts of the Intelligence

Community:

2°

USIB conclusions and recommendations

on the organization and management

of the effort.

Mr.

Karamessines,

CIA

Mr.

Robert Bannerman, CIA

FInal ISIB assessment of audio penetra-

tions of U. So Embassy, Moscow

Mr.

Howard Osborn,

CIA

Mr.

G. Marvin Gentile, Department of State:

Executive Session

Status Report on Developments Pertaining

to the Defense Intelligence Agency

Lu. General Joseph F. Carroll, USAF

Director

Defense Intelligence Agency

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at 52

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TOP SECRET..

Agenda For August 7:

(Continued)

Item

TIme

Subject

0.

3:15 - 4:00

11.

12.

3:30 515

4:00 - 5:30:

5:30 - End of

Day

Status Report on the Implementation

of Prior Board Recommendations

Mr. Ash not comed

Discussions with the Director of

Central Intelligence

Mr. John A. Macone with Mr: terk.

Executive Session

patiik..

Mr.

alissord

the

Mr.

Malone will join

Board al 2:15 1414

13.

14.

lotus - dept of Remote CHemin

02000

GAMBIT/FULCRUM

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This done get Co

115.0!

NO 1-01 .

- Copies, Sona

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT:

August 6-7,

1964, Meeting of the

President'e Foreign Intelligence Advisory Beard

August 6, 1964

The first day of this scheduled 2-day meeting of the Board was devoted

to an all-day visit at SAC Headquarters, Offutt AFB, Omaha, Nebraska, on

August 6.

"n attendance were Messrs. Cllfford, Doolittle, Langer, Pace, Gray,

Land, and Coyne. Board members Murphy and Baker were unable to join the

meeting at SAC.

August 7, 1964

On the second day of its meeting the Board convened at 9:00 a.m. on

August 7 at the Board's offices. In the Executive Office Building, Wasningtoil,

D. C. Present were Messrs. Clifford, Doolittle, Murphy, Langer, Pace, Baker

and Gray; and Messis. Coyne and Ash. (Board member Land joined the meeting

a little later on.)

Chairman flifford commented on the valuable experience gained by the

Board in the course of its vialt to SAC headquarters the previous day,

during which the Board had an opportunity to examine some fundamental

Intelligence problems confronting the U. S. and the USAF. Mr. Clifford

mentioned the usefulness of the Board getting out of the ainosphere of "theory"

In Washington, in order to view intelligence activities and problems on the

scene. He thought tinat

the Board!'s visit to SAC might well lead to action

on the part of the Board with respect to some of the matters examined and

discussed at Omaha.

Mr. Clifford pointed. out.thatrevents.of the last few days in the Gulf

of Tonkin had necessitated some lastiminute changes in the agenda of the

Boaid's meeting, and that particular attention would today be devoted to

intelligence aspects of the Vietnam situation.

The Chalrman informed Board.

imbers that. Presidential action on the

Board's May. 2 report and recommendations, concerning the National Reconnaissance

Program awalts the outcome of pending considerations and discussions between

Mx. McGeorg? Bundy, Secretary of Defense McNamara, and the Director of Central.

Intelligence,

, Mr. McCone, Mr. Bundy, who has been following the McNamara-

McCone discussions In the hope of seeing those officials reach agreement on

the organization and management OfENRP activitles, recently asked Chairman

Clifford 1f the Board could take part inothese discussions with a view to,

facilitating agreementcon the part of the Secretary of Defense and the DCI.

Mr. Clifford speaking for the Board Stold Mro Bundy that the Board felt that

ARGON CORONA/FULCRUM/CAMBITY OXCART

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Increase is expected over the next 5 - 6 years (except for new reconnaissance

systems for which CIA might become responsible).

Mr. Gray asked for the DCI's views on the capability' of the intelligence

estimating mechanism to avoid being Influenced by the wishful thinking of

responsible officials, as in the case of the erroreous estimate on Cuba prior

to the Soviet missile

crisis in 1962.

Mx. McCone said that, a better example

than Cuba was the estimate on Brazil which was bitterly resisted by people

in Government who nevertheless later saw the accuracy of the estimate proved

by developments.

Chairman Clifford

observed that at SAC headquarters the day before,

SAC representatives suggested that they should have representation on COMOR

in USIB.

The DCI said that the AF already has a representative on COMOR,

and If SAC were specifically added then a similar request would be made by

other commands such as NORAD and CINCEUR.

Mr. Coyne observed that the

representation desired by SAC was on behalf of the SAC Commander in his role

on the Joint Strategic Planning Group.

In response to Mr. Murphy's query about Cuba, the DCI said that an

estimated 5,000 Soviets had departed since May 1, leaving 2,000 on the island.

The Cubans now have control of air defense and coastal defense but the question

is whether they have unlimited control of the SAM sites.

Chairman Clifford turned to another subject, asking for any new views

the DCI might have on the desirability of creating the position of "Chief.

U. S. Intelligence Officer" who would be divorced from direction of the CIA..

MI. McCone said he had thought a lot about it but does not helieve that such

an official could be effective if not linked to the CIA which by law has the

responsibility for coordinating all Intelligence from all sources.

Mx. Pace expressed the opinion that it is not possible for the head of

CIA to render abstract opinions in the capacity of DCI.

Mr. Clifford urged

the DCI to help the Board explore the possibilities of new organizational

approaches to this problem, now that 17 years have passed since the CIA was

established under the National Security Act. Mr. icCone said that he sees

the problem as having arisen because CIA has becone a member agency of the

Intelligence community as well as being charged by law to serve as coordinator

of all intelligence; and perhaps we are

not managing properly the arrangement

that presently exists.

Mr. McCone agreed to have a study made of the matter raised by the

Chairman,

as soon as possible.

Mr. McCone and Mr. Kirkpatrick departed the meeting at 5:10 p.m.

At 5:20 p.m. the Board adjourned, closing its 2-day meeting.

Mandle via BYEMAN

Control System

R.

Ash

52012

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"THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

August 3, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE BOARD

SUBJECT:

Audiosurveillance Collection and Countermeasures

Efforts of the Intelligence Community

In Executive Session Mr. Ash will brief the Board on

significant developments relating to the subject which

members may wish to keep In mind when USIB representatives

the matter with the Board.

Following Mr. Ash's briefing, Mr. Tom Karamessines,

Assistant to CIA's Deputy Director for plans,

and Mr.

Robert Bannerman of CIA's Deputy Directorate

for Support,

will brief the Board on the U. S. Intelligence Board's

conclusions and recommendations on the organization. and

management of the audiosurveillance effort. (On June 26,

1964 following the Board's recommendations to the President,

Mr. Bundy requested

the Director of Central Intelligence,

Chairman of the USIB, to present coordinated proposals

for the most effective possible organization, management,

and coordination of the intelligence community's resources

and capabilities for research and development, and the

operational application, of techniques for audiosurveillance

collection and audiosurveillance countermeasures. the

"organization and management aspects of this problem are

Indicated by the fact that under present arrangements:

(1) research

and development of audiosurveillance collection

and countermeasure devices and techniques are pursued

separately by State, Defense and CIA; (2) the coordination

of audiosurveillance collection operations is the responsibility

of the FBI in the U. 3., and is the responsibility of the sur

overseas; and (3) the coordination of audiosurveillance

countermeasures activitles is the responsibility of an NSC

Interagency committee chaired by the Department of State.)

Next Mr. Howard Osborne, Director of CIA's Office of

security, and Mr. G. arvin Gentile, Director of security

at the Department of State, will bring the boara up to gate!

on the USIB's final assessment of the audio and electromagnetic

penstrations of the US. Embassy, Moscow which were discovered

In April:

(At:

the last meeting the Board was provided with results

of USIB's preliminary assessment.of/dange caused. by these

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penetrations.

Subsequent to the last meeting the President

requested the Chairan, USIB, to provide a final assessment

of damage in time for consideration by the Board at 1ts

August 6-7 meeting.)

COM

Addendum:

Enclosed for the information of the Board 1s a

memol andum entitled "Bugging of the l. . Embassy Messer'

which was submitted to the chairman by Dr. Jerome

following his oral presentation to the Board subsequent

to his on-the-scene examination of developments at the

Embassy in Moscow.

8 215

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET

June 24, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Mr. Clark M. Clifford

Chairman, President's Foreign Intelligence

Advisory Board

SUBJECT:

Bugging of the U. S. Embassy, Moscow

During my recent trip to Moscow I visited the American

Embassy and had a number of conversations with Mr. Musser

who has the responsibility for assuring that the building

1s secure against listening devices.

"I also examined a

number of key offices in the Embassy building, Including

several in which microphones had been found, and examined

the special secure rooms that have recently been Installed.

I formed the following judgments regarding the present

situation.

There is no convincing basis for concluding that

adaitional Ilstening systems do noc exist in the building.

2. The soundproof rooms and the special room contain-

ing the teletype equipment appear to be secure, though the

former are not electrically shielded.

The lack of shielding

I's probably not serious because the rooms are in the interior

of the building and under guard at all times so that the use

of microphones or of electromagnetic listening devices in

them would be extremely difficult.

The physical security of the building seemed a

bit less than adequate. For example, it was possible for

us to go in and out of the room housing the telephone switch-

i no one bei

board with no one but the telephone operator--who I belleve

was a Russian girl--seeing us. I understand that at night

no one is in the room.

Physicäl security 1s: complicated

somewhat by the fact that the buflding 1s also the residence

for embassy employees and by the fact that the local guard

staff is very small; none the less. this 1s a problem that

should receive attention.

4.

Mr. Musser 1s extremely competent but the, task at

the Embassy

Is more than any one person could. handleratie

this time.

139

I would recommend the following measures.

Provide Musser with some assistance. He has had

some help from the American forces in Germany from time to

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time but when I was there he was working by himself add to the

of the housing shortage the Embassy is reluctant to

staff.

The fact is, as I have already sald,

In spite of

Musser's outstanding ability he cannot do the job that now

must be done without substantial continuing assistance. He

also needs additional equipment.

A very complete physical examination must be made of

any room that is to be used for confidential conversations.

This should include x-ray or neutron examination of the walls,

floors and ceilings 1f:

possible.

Possibly other techniques

can be found which would also help locate hidden equipment.

3. If x-ray examination 1s not feasible, physical

examination of the outside of the building should be considered.

In critical arcas new wall surfaces should be provided.

Expert

advice is needed to determine whether plastering or

paneling would provide the best protection.

Dr. Land's proposal for inducing masking sounds into

the walls should be pursued.

It should be possible to Introduce

such sounds directly into the walls without creating objectionable.

sound leveis in the rooms. Ints should be investigated belore

a decision is made regarding new wall covering.

Screening should be provided against electromagnetic-

reflection listening devices:

The possibillty of providing continuous monitors for

signals from

such devices

should be investigated.

•8.

More effort should be made to understand the purpose

of the microwave signal directed at the Emkassy, or failing in

this,

to stop it.

It is hard to understand why we have been

so unconcerned about 1t.

An effort should be made to insure that the telephone

system cannot be used as a distribution system for listening

devices:

10. I understand that head setsand microphones exist

that permit secure conversations. Though they may be awkward

they should he used for confidential discussions held oütside

of the secure rooms until greater confidence can be established

in the security of the building.

11.I belleve that there is a desperate need for a:

• 200

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professional group in the government to develop protective

a group should work with

develo! sophisticated penetration devices so that 1ts work

1s effectively directed against all of the real threats that

can be imagined.

Dr.

'Oe B. Wiesner

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