REVIEW OF SELECTED ITEMS IN THE LEE HARVEY OSWALD FILE REGARDING ALLEGATIONS OF CASTRO CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION
Originator: CIA
Document date: 1975-04-15 00:00:00
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

# DOCID-32353327

## Page 1

Date: 01/06/05

JEK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

-------------

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CIA

RECORD NUMBER: 104-10088-10035

RECORD SERIES : JFK

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 80T01357A

DOCUMENT

INFORMATION

AGENCY ORIGINATOR : CIA

FROM

TO

TITLE : REVIEW OF SELECTED ITEMS IN THE LEE HARVEY OSWALD FILE

REGARDING ALLEGATIONS OF CASTRO CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN

THE JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION

DATE: 04/15/1975

PAGES : 27

SUBJECTS : CUBA

ALLEGATIONS

ASSASSINATION

DOCUMENT TYPE

: PAPER

CLASSIFICATION

RESTRICTIONS

CURRENT STATUS

RELEASED IX PART PUBLIC - RELEASED WITH DELEIONS

DATE OF. LAST REVIEW

08/11/93

COMMENTS

JFK28: F1: 1993.08.11.18:15:18:280031 : LABELED

OF 186

61

Feleased under the John F. Kennedy Assassination

Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note)

Case# Nt 65924 Date: 10-25-2021

[R) - ITEM

IS RESTRICTED

104-10088-10035

NW 65924 Docld:32353327 Page 1

---

## Page 2

eRB;

SUBJECT:

REPRODUCTION

te have and ding Allega-

tions of CASTRO Cuban

in Involvement in the

John F. KENNEDY Assassination

REFERENCE :

•Letter by David W. Belin to

MI. E. Henry Knoche, 15 April 1975,

paragraph 3 (Regarding Public Statement

by CASTRO, etc.), attached

BACKGROUND

I. On Saturday evening, 7 September 1963,

Fidel CASTRO appeared at a Brazilian Embassy reception in

Havana; even more unusual,

CASTRO submitted to an informal

interview by the AssociatedhPress

correspondent,

Daniel HARKER.

2. HARKER'S InterfeR BUT dork on sunday,

8 September, and was

in print throughout the country on

Monday, 9 September. There can be no question from the

facts surrounding the CASTRO appearance, which had not been

expected, and his agreement to the interview, that this

event represented a more-than-ordinary attempt to get a

message on the record in the United States.

SECRET

0002665

61 o₽

PAGE

COPY NO.

186

NW 65924 Docld:32353327 Page 2

---

## Page 3

3. CASTRO's statements to HARKER covered a range of

topics but dealt principally with American political

leadership, in particular President KENNEDY, whom he ex-

coriated in extraordinarily provocative fashion

(" ... KENNEDY is a cretini's" ... the BATISTA of his

times

... the most

REPRODUCTION President of

all time ...").

A. The interview PROTNBITED uncomplimentary

reference to Senator GOLDWATER and Cuban delay in signing

the limited nuclear test ban. There were differences in

the replay by United States newspapers like the

New York Times and Washington papers, with a result that

CASTRO's "message" was significantly modulated.

5. In New Orleans, where Lee Harvey OSWALD resided

until the middle of September 1963, the HARKER story

appeared in the principal morning paper. the Times-Picayune,

on Monday. 9 September, page 7, under a three-column head-

line: "CASTRO Blasts Raids on Cuba.

Says U.S. Leaders

Imperiled by Aid to Rebels." The story followed under. the

HARKER by-line:

REPRODUCTION

leaders would be in danger if they helped

in any attempt to do away with leaders of

Cuba. '

2

SEERET

0002665

62

PAGE

COPY NO.

186

of

NW 65924 Docld:32353327 Page 3

---

## Page 4

"Bitterly denouncing what he called

xecent U.s. prompted raids on Cuban terri-

tory, Castro said:

'We are prepared to

fight them and answer in kind. U.S. leaders

should think that if they are aiding terror-

ist plans to eliminate Cuban leaders, they

themselves will not be safe.'

... World affairs ... seemed to be

entering a more peacefi

ago, but now this tr

REP PO DICTION

attacks.

PRONIBITED

"'The U.S. is always

negotiate

and make promises which later it will not honor.

This has happened to promises made during the

October crisis. They have been broken as can

be seen with new attacks.

"'But I warn this is leading to a very

dangerous situation that could lead to a worse

crisis than OCtEPROQUCTION

6. The New Yorkla

erage on g Septembers

used a upt wire service RUMblE nitted any reference

to the warning and threat which gave the interview its real

significance.

The Washington Post did an abbreviated re-

write (9 September, page A-7) which, similarly, omitted

any reference to the main thrust of CASTRO's remarks.

3

0002667

PAGE

63

COPY

NO.

• 186

NW 65924 Docld:32353327 Page 4

---

## Page 5

= RI

The Evening Star of Washington, D. C., printed the HARKER

story nearly in its entirety in the second section of the

paper (9 September 1963, page B-4) and reworded the content

of the HARKER interview, placing the emphasis on the po-

litical aspects - in particular, highlighting the GOLDWATER

7. There is no evide OlD TEl on the KeNyany

assassination) that this CASTRO interview was considered in

following up leads or in dealings with the Warren Commission

and its staff although Mexico Station specifically directed

Headquarters attention to the AP story vert shortlk after

the Dallas killing. More important, the interview appears

to have been forgotten in the contemporary political consid-

eration of relations with CASTRO's Cuba.

There is no evidence

in the Agency records, either, that the Warren Commission

staff itself pursued the implication of the CASTRO interview

in dealing with the conspiracy hypothesis-

There is no

evidence in the files that anything along these lines was

stated by any other Cuban leader before the assassination.

8. The purpose of this review, undertaken

at Mx. Belin's

Fron testimony of Marif RSHBIT EDers - he read the

CASTRO warning and threat as reported above. The results

C002668

64 05

186

PAGE

COPY NO.

NW 65924 Docld:32353327 Page 5

---

## Page 6

of the review, admittedly heavily using the 20-- 20 quality

of hindsight, may be stipulated in summary:

a. There is no increment of credible

evidence, applying this phrase strictly, of

Soviet and/or Cuban political, intelligence

or security service involvement in

P the as-

sassination to what was developed and con-

sidered by the Warren Commission and its

staff. The Commission's finding that

Lee Harvey OSWALD was the killer of

President KENNEDY and Officer TIPPIT and did

them in alone andlor

REPRODUCe nation

stands.

upset or significantly modify this judgement

did (and does) not exist in Washington. But

such evidence could exist in Moscow and/or

Havana, whose voluntary inputs to the Warren

Commission were minimal in quantity and

quality, designed to cover up any admissions

of knowledge of, or connection with, OSWALD

which might be related directly or indirectly

with the assassination. Therefore, the belief

that there was sedalia alo

DGI) connection with OSWALD will persist and

PROHUBITED

0002663

65

PAGE

СОРУ

NO.

of 186

NW 65924 Docld:32353327 Page 6

---

## Page 7

"S:

grow until there has been a full disclosure _

by these governments of all elements of

OSWALD's handling and stay in the Soviet Union

and his contacts in Mexico City. The

Warren Commission report should haven left a

GARLANI

Tligence com-

ponent in the CIA in 1964. As was indicated

by Mr. Helms in his testimony before the

Warren Commission, CIA would continue to

regard this aspect of the OSWALD case as

still open. I

c. In the absence of additional or new

elements of "credible" evidence, there are

"nuances" in the record that emerge

as note-

worthy, in the light of other conclusions.

These are reviewed and summarized below, item-

by-item.

a. CASTRO'S

7 September 1963 -

DA OSWALD ard indeed read

NUNIDI IZU

Investigation of the Assassination of President John F.

KENNEDY. Hearings Before the President's Commission

on the

Assassination of President KENNEDY (Washington,

1964),

hereafter cited as Hearings, Vol.

V., pp. 120

÷ 129. See

especially p. 124 - "MI. Helms:

'Yes.

I would

assume

the case could never be closed.'"

6

C002670

-66

o1 186

PAGE

COPY NO.

NW 65924 Docld:32353327 Page 7

---

## Page 8

it in New Orleans - must be considered of

great significance in the light of the

pathological evolution of OSWALD's passive/

aggressive max PEP RODUCTION ki

General WALKER early

Cuban revolution which is directly trace-

able as far back as his Marine Corps

service in El Toro, California. CASTRO's

warning and threat, given to AP corres-

pondent HARKER, irrespective of whether

there was any formal mandate, or even

security service contact with OSWALD

by the Cubans or the Russians - was an

act

of singular irresponsibility and under no

circumstances was excusable as retorsion

for what the Cuban emigres were doing during

the summer of 1963.

CUBAN INTO YET TREPRODUCTION MA, CATFORTA

EARLY 1959 (3)

9. The testimony PROMiDiTi contains an assertion

of germinal significance to any review of the background of

Lee Harvey OSWALD's feeling toward and relations with

CASTRO's Cuba. DELGADO was probably the closest peer group

7

SIGHTI

0002671

67

0pl 86

PAGE

COPY NO.

NW 65924 Docld:32353327 Page 8

---

## Page 9

member to OSWALD during his specialist training period

at El Toro Marine Corps Base December 1958 - September 1959.

The Warren Commission Report takes note of this:

"OSWALD told DELGADO that he was in

touch with Cuban diplomatic officials in

this country, REPRODUCtOr.

to be one of he pROBiTED

believed. ' "2

10. Actually DELGADO's testimony says a lot more of

possible operational significance than is reflected by the

language of the report, and its implications do not appear

to have been run down or developed by investigation. Thus,

the record of the beginning of OSWALD's relationship with

the Cubans starts with a question mark.

11. The period was one of transition in U.S. - Cuban

relations after CASTRO's takeover. OSWALD, and DELGADO at

the outset, were CASTRO supporters, OSWALD being particu-

larly keen about how to get to the island. DELGADO testi-

fied:

• ... I didn'

REPRODUCTION

him, so

I told him the besp FIlIBITEDow was to

Report to the President's Commission on the Assassination

of President John F.

KENNEDY (Washington, 1964), hereafter

cited as Report, p. 687.

8

ERBI

COU2672

PAGE

COPY

NO.

68

of 186

NW 65924 Docld:32353327 Page 9

---

## Page 10

get in touch with a Cuban Embassy, you know.

But at that time that I told him this - we

were on friendly terms with Cuba, you know,

so this wasn't no subversion or malintent,

you know.

REPRODUCTION ver him.

I told him to sebt

contact with them ...

I seen this envelope in his foot-

locker, wall-locker, and it was addressed to

him, and they had an official seal on it, and

as far as I could recollect that was mail from

Los Angeles, and he was telling me there was

a Cuban Consul. And just after he started

receiving these letters - you see, he would

never go out, but stay near the post all the

time

... he had

REPROPICTIAN

he starte

receiving Letters PROMIBMTEDr.

It was

a man, because I got the call from the MP

guard shack, and they gave me a call that

OSWALD had a visitor at the front gate. This

man had to be a civilian, otherwise they would

have let him in. So I had to find somebody

'to

relieve OSWALD, who was on guard, to go down

9

SECRET

C002673

69

02186

PAGE

COPY NO.

NW 65924 Docld:32353327 Page 10

---

## Page 11

SECRET

there to visit with this fellow, and they spent

about an hour and a half, two hours, talking,

I guess, and he came back. I don't know who the

man was or what they talked about, but he looked

nonchalant about the whole thing when he came

back.

He never mentioned who he was, nothing.

WE IIENER REPRADUCTION

han, do you semen: PROHIBITED

"MT. DELGADO :

half,

two hours...

"MI. LIEBELER: You never asked OSWALD

who this fellow was that he talked to?

"MI. DELGADO: No. No ...

"Mr. LIEBELER: Did you connect this visit

that OSWALD had at that time with the Cuban

Consulate?

Rate to into PHA TED time no

at such a

late date - time.

hardly ever received mail; in fact he seldom

received mail from home because I made it

policy, I used to pick up the mail for our unit

and distribute it to the guys in there, and very

seldom did I ever see one for him. But every so

often, after he started to get in contact with

10

SECAET

0002674

70

of

PAGE

• COPY NO.

186

NW 65924 Docld:32353327 Page 11

---

## Page 12

SECRET

these Cuban people, he started getting letter

pamphlets and newspapers ...

and he also started receiving letters,

you know, and no books, maybe pamphlets, you

church, you know, but i'

Spanish, any of them, do you know?

"Mr. DELGADO: Not that I can recall,

no.

"MI. LIEBELER: Did you have any reason

to believe that these things came to OSWALD

from the Cuban Consulate?

"Mr. DELGADO: Well, I took it for granted

that they did after I seen the envelope, you

know ... something like a Mexican eagle, with a

big, impressive seal, you know. They had dif-

ferent colors on it, red and white; almost

looked like our colors, you know. But I can't

xecall the seal. REPRCDUCTION satin.

United, something

couldn't under-

"Mr. LIEBELER: You don't know for sure

whether it was from the Cuban Consulate?

11

SEERLI

C002675

71

PAGE

COPY NO.

NW 65924 Docld:32353327 Page 12

---

## Page 13

CRIT

"Mr. DELGADO: No. But he had told me

prior, just before I found that envelope in his

wall locker, that he was receiving

mail from

them, and one time he offered to show it to me,

but I wasn't much interested because at the

time we had wor REPRODUCTYold a ask

to see that paper again

correspondence with the Cuban Consulate was

about?

"MI. DELGADO: No, he didn't.

"Mr. LIEBELER: Did he ever indicate to you

that it had to do with the conversations that

you had about going over to Cuba?

"Mr. DELGADO: No. . The only thing he

told me was that right after he had this con-

versation with

the Cuban people was that he was

te - h

was going to Switzerland

12. OSWAD's applice ROHIBITED weitzer, college,

Churwalden, Switzerland, was dated 19 March 1959, and he

was presumably to report there on 20 April 1960. Destined

for discharge from the Marines on 7 December 1959, OSWALD

3

Hearings, Volume VIII, pp. 241 - 243.

• 12

FICRET

C002676

72 •г 186

PAGE

COPY NO.

NW 65924 Docld:32353327 Page 13

---

## Page 14

accelerated his exit on grounds of family hardship in early

September 1959. On 27 September 1969 he was issued a

U.S. passport valid for travel - among other places to

Cuba and the USSR.

Can na on 1 5sr. BPPODUCTION on Fron

on the male visitor who contacted OSWALD at El TOIo Camp

and talked with him for between one and

a half to two hours.

The event was unique in DELGADO's recollections, and actually

there is nothing like it - on the record - in everything else

we know about OSWALD's activity in the United States before

or after his return to the United States. The record reflects

no identification of the El Toro contact. DELGADO's presump-

tion is that he was from the Cuban Consulate in Los Angeles:

Assuning that, the questions are: Who was it, and was

there reporting from Los Angeles to Washington and Havana

that could, in effect, represent the opening of a Cuban

file on OSWALD?4

"PREDICTION" OF PRESIDENT

REPAIRSES BOSE BY COMMUNIST

PARTY CELL LEADER MORSE

OSTH l, 1902

14.

Guatemala Station

forwarded to Headquarters on

9 January 1964 a duplicate copy of a raw report by a

4

U.S. /Cuban diplomatic and consular relations

were severed

3 January 1961.

13

0002677

73

PAGE

COPY

NO.

of 186

NW 65924 Docld:32353327 Page 14

---

## Page 15

CRET

• penetration dated 5 January 1962 describing events at the

yearly Communist Party cell meeting. The cell leader,

Morse BENITEZ Zabola, said that the Communist Party

in

Guatamala should form a single new party; "We need

not

preoccupy ourselves over the politics of President KENNEDY

because we know, according to prognostications, that he

wall die within the pREPRODUCTION

15. This report apparently had been discounted when

DDOLIDITI

it was received and was moREa medel

il the Station

Ie-reviewed all of its material after the assassination.

The file reflects no follow-up or formal dissemination

of the report.

ENIGMATIC THREATS BY CUBAN THIRD SECRETARY IN THE

HAUCE

7 NOVEMBER 1963

16. A sensitive liaison source, reporting after the

KENNEDY assassination, indicated that at the Soviet reception

on 7 November 1963, the Cuban Third Secretary,

Ricardo L. SANTOS Pesa, discussed the recent refugee raids

on Cuba and their implications with a host-country diplomat,

concluding with the admonition: " ... Just wait and you

be nore what we can to de on ekee to

"Just wait, just wait. PROHIBITED

17. These data were passed to the Warren Commission

by memorandum, 31 March 1964. SANTOS was reported to have

14

C002678

74

PAGE

COPY NO.

of 186

NW 65924 Docld:32353327 Page 15

---

## Page 16

SECRET

a history of medical instability and was summarily recalled

from The Hague reportedly for reasons related to that fact

in April 1966.

INTERCEPTED CONVERSAHEON

EMPLOYEE;

28. At 1730 MoxiC RQHIRT e Five hours after the

KENNEDY assassination, a Cuban Embassy employee named

"Luisa" received a telephone call in Spanish

from an uniden-

tified male outside.

19. The caller asked her if she had heard the latest

news. "Luisa" jokingly replied: "Yes, of course, I knew

it almost before KENNEDY ... Imagine, one, two, three and

now; that makes three [she laughs], what barbarians!

20. Both speakers agreed on the seriousness of the

assassination. "Luisa" also stated that the party at

Silvia DURAN's had been called off so it would not appear

that they were celebrating the death of KENNEDY, nor would

they have the party coincide with the burial. Finally she

said she planned to REPRODUCTIO Khe house of a

doct. Latin hyperin? ROHURITED

loost facto suggestion

of foreknowledge? This is the only item in the intercept

coverage of the Cubans and Soviets

after the assassination

that contains the suggestion of foreknowledge or expectation.

15

0002679

75

PAGE

COPY NO.

• 186

NW 65924 Docld:32353327 Page 16

---

## Page 17

22. The tenuous, enigmatic character of the conversation

is sharply highlighted by the following facts:

a.

"Luisa" was probably identical with

Luisa CALDERON, a cadre worker of the Cuban

Directorate General holate gence e.

she returned to elbal in 1961 alWNeported

to be working in o$ RAIDity in the.

b. The DGI element

fall of 1963 was headed by Alfredo MIRABEL Diaz

who had arrived on 2 September 1963, formally

•as the replacement of the Consul Eusebio AZCUE

(departed 19 November 1963). The deputy DGI

chief (and as of June 1964, MIRABEL'S successor)

was Manuel Engenio VEGA Perez.

c. The "Silvia DURAN" named in Luisa's

conversation

was the receptionist, a Mexican

national, who dealt with OSWALD during his known

visits on 27 and 28 September to the Cuban

installations in connection with a Cuban visa

silvia DURAN is

record regarding oswAlbisuadeletyl

Mexico City. Her testimony, however,

in its

entirety was taken and presented, solely, by the

Mexican Governmental authorities.

A direct

16

SECRET

0002680

76

186

PAGE

COPY NO.

of

NW 65924 Docld:32353327 Page 17

---

## Page 18

SECRET

confrontation with her was requested by the

Warren Commission staff but rejected by the

Mexican authorities. It is from Silvia DURAN's

statements that it was learned that OSWALD

became engaged in a personal altercation on

21 stee PRACTION

alias Marcos, and PROHIBITED

Rogelis RODRIGUEZ Lopez, were pos.

identified in February 1964 by two independent

sources as engaged in the active development

and facilitation of the training of Nicaraguan

5

agents for the purpose of assassinating

General Annstasio SOMOZA. VEGA, it is estab-

lished, was on post

in Mexico City during

OSWALD's stay there 27 September - 2 October

1963. He left Mexico City on 3 November 1963

for Havana. It was reliably reported about

VEGA that all individuals going to Cuba, legally

or illegally, had to pass through him first. He

took the biographical data and sent it to Cuba

for name checking,

Dorddedu

NEI NUDUG THO

took fifteen days. 5

PROHIBITED

For example, VEGA would have handled the details of the

visa action

and facilitation of the trip to Cuba via

Mexico City from 28 December 1962 - 21 January 1963 that

17

@002681

77

PAGE

COPY NO.

o? 186

NW 65924 Docld:32353327 Page 18

---

## Page 19

SEGREY

23. There is no evidence in the OSWALD case file that

Silvia DURAN was subjected to a systematic elicitative

interrogation that would have related her dealings with

methods, in

considering the fuss he allegedly made with AZCUE, for the

applications to be handled solely by a local employee and

a lame duck like AZCUE whose slot had been taken by the

DGI

chief? Whatever the answer to these questions, they

were not asked at the time.

And there remains the more

fundamental question: accepting the DURAN story on its

face, could it have happened without the knowledge and

participation of the DGI personnel above cited? This

seems unlikely especially because VEGA is later fitedly

a Cuban DGI defector as having stated he was aware OSWALD

made several visits to the Cuban Consulate. It is clear

CASTRO's overseas intelligence

and security service could

was taken by Vincent Theodore

PROBI TED

organizer of the

Fair Play Committee for Cuba, with which OSWALD established

relations

from Dallas during

the period 19 April -

2 November 1963.

There is an overlap between LEE's and

VEGA's travels to Havana during that

departed Mexico City on 6 January for Havana and returned

on 13 February 1963.

18

BEERIT

6002682

78

PAGE

COPY

NO.

- 03186

NW 65924 Docld:32353327 Page 19

---

## Page 20

statements. Coming back to the beginning: "Luisa" -

Luisa CALDERON - as a member of the DGI unit in Mexico City -

could very well have known something that would make what

she said to her unidentified caller less a matter of

boastful self-indulgence than was assumed at the time.

BELYZA DURAN SUBSTANE RARING INDISTON OF

AECED PERSONAL RELAT PROHIBITED

LEE HARVEY OSWALD, 1960

24. The defects viewed in hindsight of the Silvia DURAN

testimony already have been suggested above. (In that

context of criticism

it would also be relevant to reconsider

the implications of the two intercepted telephone conversations

on 26 November 1963 between the Cuban President, DORTICOS,

and his Ambassador to Mexico, Joaguim Hernandez ARMAS,

because the thrust of the conversation dealt with the ques

tion whether Silvia DURAN had been asked about lor been

offered?] money payments by her Mexican interrogators.)

25. As of September 1964 Silvia DURAN gave up her

Cuban Embassy job.. In the spring of 1967 Silvia DURAN

was reported by a reliable and sensitive

source to have

cut all relations with Cubans. Her account, in 1967, of

how she had been taken RED RODUCT heen interrogated

already known.

source to challenge or elicit corroborative detail, that

19

SEERET.

C002683

79

186

of

PAGE

COPY NO.

NW 65924 Docld:32353327 Page 20

---

## Page 21

CPET

she had gone out with OSWALD during his stay in Mexico City

and claimed she had sexual relations with him.

LEGATIONS OF CONSPRATORPAA GONTASTILONEEN OSWALD AN

UBAN GOVERNMENT AGENTS' WITH PARNECULARI REFERENCE T

ALLEGATIONS OF (A)

(B) OSCAR CONTRERAS

26. As the Warren Commission reported, "Literally

dozens of allegations of a conspiratorial contact between

OSWALD and agents of the Cuban Government have been

investigated

...."6

Among these cases, which consumed

hundreds of CIA man-hours in Headquarters and abroad -

and similarly the FBI in the United States - was the

Nicaraguan walkin in Mexico City, 26 November 1963,

Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte.

27. The ALVARADO case is taken up in detail by the

Warren Conmission under the cryptograph "D."Y

ALVARADO

claimed that he had seen an American, whom he identified

as OSWALD, receive money some time in mid-September 1963

in a meeting in a patio of the Cuban Consulate in

See Report, pe 305 ARE BROOD HE TOON

were the cases

of Ylario ROJAS Villenueve in Cozumel

Guadaloupe,

the allegations of Enrigue tRuedoPTeONGpRA in New York City,

the claims of Robert Edwayatt, santa clara Prison

Farm, California, and the

7

See Report, pp. 307 - 308.

20

GECRET

0002684

80

PAGE

of

186

COPY

NO.

NW 65924 Docld:32353327 Page 21

---

## Page 22

Mexico city. ALVARADO's story was ultimately broken by the

use of the polygraph, on which ALVARADO showed evidences of

deception, and by bringing ALVARADO's former Nicaraguan

security service control into the case.

28. The ALVARADO story is a particularly acute repre-

sentation of the difficulties that beset the evaluation of

observed evidence: certain elements of the story persist

despite the impeachment of its major premises. ALVARADO,

the Warren Report in October 1964

the presence in the cuban PRORABlE Elition of a Negro

with red-dyed hair.

29. Elena GARRO de Paz is a mecurial, articulate and

socially prominent Mexican writer, married, but separated

from a high-ranking Mexican foreign service official.

She

is also the cousin of Horacio DURAN, the husband of

Silvia DURAN, cited above. There is a strong personal

antipathy between the two women descending from

Elena GARRO's trenchant anti-Communism

30. From October 1964 until his retirement in the fall

of 1969, a U.S. Embassy officet Charles THOMAS, persistently

account of what had actually

between OSWALD, the

Cubans and in particul OVIBUTEn september 1963,

including a repeated reference to a Negro with red-dyed hair.

• 21

SECRET

0002685

81

of

PAGE

COPY

NO.

186

NW 65924 Docld:32353327 Page 22

---

## Page 23

SECRET

31.

The, first reference to the GARRO story was noted in

a Mexico Station Memorandum of Record dated 12 October 1964:

"Elena GARRO [said] that she and her

daughter were invited to a party at the Cuban

Embassy during the period she now finds out

that OSWALD was

assassination:

"was

secretary in the cybi UnifTEre husband

is a cousin of the GARRO family THoracio DURANI.

At the party she saw three Gringos, not

drinking, not mixing and more or less just

standing around together like three bumps on a

1og.. They were so obviously out of place that

she asked someone in the Cuban Embassy about

them and was told that 'they were just passing

through.' She claims that on the way these

three Gringos stood out she took a good look

at them as did her daughter. When the

assassination occurred and OSWALD's picture was

spread into the newspapers, both Elena and

her daughter immed bLD

was one

of the three Grange Erou U GauSe Ne the

party."

PROMIBITED.

32. GARRO repeated her

harles William

THOMAS, an Embassy political officer on 10 December 1965:

22

SECR

0002606

82

PAGE

COPY NO.

186

• of

NW 65924 Docld:32353327 Page 23

---

## Page 24

In September 1963 after her return from abroad, she went

to a party, accompanied by her daughter, at the home of

Ruben DURAN (emphasis added]. Ruben is one of the two

brothers of Horacio DURAN, who married her cousin. She

At the party

she was discouraged

Other guests

ere the Cuban Consul ARQUE, Genenal [Clark FLORE

Silvia DURAN, who she later learned was OSWALD's mistress

while he was here, Emilio CARBALLIDO and a Latin American

Negro man with red hair [emphasis added]. In November 1963

when the identity of the assassin became known, she and

her daughter went to the Cuban Embassy and shouted

"assassins" and other insults at the staff there.®

Shortly

afterward, she and her daughter were visited by a friend,

Manuel CARVILIO [or CALVILLO], then an official in the

secretariat of the Gobernacion and were told he had orders

to escort them to a small and obscure hotel in the center

of town.. They were kept there for eight days under pretext

that they were in danger. When she told CARVILLO she wanted

to so to the an i can i A A 7 that the Khan of

OSWALD, she was told

Embassy was full of

Communist spies.

PROHIBITED

33. On 25 December 1965 and 9 January 1966 in further

interviews with THOMAS, GARRO and her daughter elaborated and

8

These particulars were not confirmed by independent observers

at the time.

CRET

0002687

83

PAGE

COPY NO.

186

of

NW 65924 Docld:32353327 Page 24

---

## Page 25

CRE$

in certain particulars significantly modified her earlier

account. She also acknowledged that she and her daughter

had been interviewed by Embassy officers to whom she claimed

they did not give a very complete story because the

Embassy officers did

REPRODS @ViOlan exedence to

anything they said.

34. It developed thR Q/BATE nter had been

interviewed by the Legal Attache on 17 and 21 November 1961.

Her information had been similar to what she claimed in her

account to THOMAS but had not been substantiated by inquiries.

The FBI representative therefore considered the matter closed

and reaffirmed his disengagement from the matter to the CIA

Chief of Station on 27 December 1964 and to the Ambassador

on 25 February 1965.

35. The Embassy Political

his interviews and repottin

nO one sun of conversation,

13 July 1966, GARRO identiNealthel Lace to which she had been

taken by CALVILLO as the Hotel Vermont.

(This detail checked

out affirmatively.

GARRO was at the Hotel 23 - 24, 25 - 27

and 28 - 30 November 1963.) In another, on 7 February 1967,

GARRO's continuing vicissitudes with the Cubans are set out.

And finally, upon THOMAS's retirement from U.S. Government

service, the Department of State, at his request,

28 August 1969, disseminated to CIA and FBI a compilation of

his reporting of the Elena GARRO interviews.

24

0002688

186

84 01

PAGE

COPY NO.

NW 65924 Docld:32353327 Page 25

---

## Page 26

•RIT

36. There the matter rests. GARRO's chronology of the

events she described as having occurred in the Mexican capital

in September 1963 never coincided with the confirmed data

Of OSWALD's presence there.

Her story, however, had two

points congruant wiREPRODUCTitins xegaxing

a. ALVARADO PRICHIBIT Egarding the

Negro with

the red-dyed hair Ithis detail could,

however, have been gleaned from the

Warren Commission's published account of the

"D" casel and

b. Silvia DURAN's later claim of

intimate personal contacts with OSWALD.

37. Beginning in March and amplified in May 1967, the

American Consul, Benjamin J. RUYLE, in Tampico developed a

contact with a local Mexican journalist,

Oscar CONTRERAS Lartigue, who claimed to have encountered

OSWALD with other pro-CASTRO students at the

officer:

PROHIBITED

He studied law at the University of Mexico

for three years, approximately 1960 - 1964. He

belonged to a clandestine pro-CASTRO revolutionary

group at the University. Regarding the OSWALD

25

0002689

85 or 186

PAGE

COPY NO.

NW 65924 Docld:32353327 Page 26

---

## Page 27

SECRET

case he was extremely cautious and although he

was not able or willing to give dates and

names, he said OSWALD visited the University

of Mexico campus shortly after the Cuban

Embassy refused him a visa to visit Cuba.

OSWALD met CONTRERAS and four other persons

as they came out of a round-table discussion

held in the faculty of Philosophy. OSWALD

told the group it was urgent that he visit

Cuba and the Cuban Embassy had denied him a

visa.. He requested aid from CONTRERAS' group.

CONTRERAS and others mistrusted OSWALD because

they felt he was a CIA provocation.

The group

allowed OSWALD to accompany them the rest of the

day, that night and part of the next day.

OSWALD

was very introverted and appeared to be slightly

crazy. OSWALD MEET RODUCT ION sassination

plot but kept bringing

travel to cuba in ROHIBITED

39. At this point, with FBI knowledge, the matter was

turned over to the Mexican authorities who determined that

CONTRERAS was indeed at the University of Mexico but only

26

0002690

PAGE

86

COPY

NO.

186

of

NW 65924 Docld:32353327 Page 27

---

## Page 28

for the years 1959 - 1960 and that he had been publicly

associated in protest activity for the Student Revolutionary

Bloc (BER) in January 1961. However, the group ceased

functioning as such in the middle of 1962, and

leaders. No further

work is reflected in

Dear COMERAS Was ME ROUT as allogations.

Apare or the natas a TE on as about

element that undermines the credibility of his account:

OSWALD's Spanish, which was barely adequate to get him meals

near the hotel, seems hardly likely to have permitted him to

carry on for an extended period with a University student

gIoup.

REPRODUCTION

PROHIBITED.

27

SECRET

0002691

87

PAGE

COPY

NO.

186

of

NW 65924 Docld:32353327 Page 28

---