LETTER:IT HAD BEEN INDICATED EARLIER, IN DISCUSSIONS WITH MEMBERS OF/HSCA INTENTION TO PUBLISH CLASSIFIED ANNEX
Agency: CIA
Originator: CIA
From: BRECKINRIDGE. LEGAL COUNSEL OFFICE
To: BLAKEY. CHIEF COUNSEL, HSCA
Document date: 02/15/1979
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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UNICLASSIFIED

INTERNAL

USE ONLY

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

EXTENSION

S.D. Breckinridge

principal Coordinator, HSCA

TO: (Officer designation, room. number, and

building)

[Dolores Tuohy SA/DDCI

7E 12

2.

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S

INITIALS

NO

DATE

OLG 79-0113/d

16 February 1979

SAMENTS (Number each comment to show from vin

tu whom.

or a line across column after each comme

7.

8

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

FORM

3-62

EXECUTIVE REGISTRY

RILE # Speccut

670 USE MONOUS

EDITIONS

SECRET

CONFIDEMTIAL

INTERNAL

USE ONLY

UNCLASSISIED

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MEMGRANDUM FOR: SA/DDCI

Ezecuties #agin

79-472

Dolores g

The attached is a lengthy epistle to HSad on a

draft we formerly. were told was to be held as a

classified annex. Now we are told they want to

publisho

If the isca staff has persuaded itself that its

criticisms are so strong that they must seek publi

cation, the attached strongly worded letter is meant

to point out its ridiulously extensive errors, which

destroy the criticians the treatment has to offere!

Beyond that, it details security considerations?

It 1s tactical, persnal from me to Blakey, but

making it clear we are prepared to go past tie stall

to the Comittee member's, in order to make our polatst

I hope you do not feal it too strongly wordedy'

but I sense that sonething strong is necessary to get

shot Fang at

Blakey's attention.

It cant

$ Do Breckinridge

Date 16 February 1979

3075* 101 ESTONGUS

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SEENET

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGION, D. C. 20505

OLG 79-0113/d

15 Februarv. 1979.

Office of Legislative Counsel

Mr. G. Robert Blakey

Chief Counsel and Director

Select Committee: on Assassinations

House of Representatives

Washington, D.C.

20515

Dear Mr. Blakey:

It had been indicated earlier, in discussions with members of

your staff, that the section discussing Luisa Calderon and other

topics was not intended for unclassified publication. Mr. Gabrielson

understands from your recent comments that it now is your desire that

it be published in unclassified form. (U)

If Mr. Gabrielson's understanding is correct, it comes as something

of a surprise, as you undoubtedly realize that the draft treats in

explicit detail a number of sensitive intelligence activities and

arrangements that we are obliged to protect. It is doubtful that

the subjects treated, without reference to the quality of that

treatment, could properly be discussed at all in published materials.

As written, analysis and views are so closely interwoven with sensitive

materials that it does not lend itself to sanitization. After you

have reviewed these comments, it might be useful for us to consider

them together. We have classified it Secret in its present form and

request that you handle it accordingly. (U)

There are two areas of comment on the draft. The first, as

noted above, has to do with the detailed treatment of highly sensitive

subject matter.

The second has to do with the extensively incorrect

treatment of the substance. An advance summary of the latter might

be useful, as the separate comments may be fragmented.

The following

comments

are therefore offered at this point: (U)

(1) A telephone conversation by Calderon is assigned

an inference-quite tenuous and therefore debatable--based on

an early mistranslation of what she said. That inference

was then used as the basis for critical treatment of the

Agency's not reporting it to the Warren Commission.

When the

correct translation was brought to the attention of your

investigator-quite frankly, seriously further weakening the

basis for the original inference--your investigator held to

LAVATE CLIP

13190

COACIA CARDE

• _ Eeh 1985-

{160T

313

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MS0861

his original thesis, continuing to use the incorrect

translation, blandly preserving the original rationale, although

discussing the correction in a way that seems to deliberately

confuse it.

That the author was wed to the treatment he had

already contrived

seems to be the kindest explanation. (S)

Having asserted significance for Calderon, based on the

mistranslation (the assertion continuing after the translation

showed it to be in error.), the author then seizes on a suspicion

of a DGI defector that Calderon might have been a CIA-Or

American-agent. Without reference to what the defector

knew (which was nothing), the fact is that CIA did know.

Calderon was not a CIA agent.

That is quite clear.

And given

the Inter:-Agency Source Register, it was further clear that she vias l

not registered to any other American intelligence organization.

To cap it, local operating conditions were such that CIA had

further reason to know that Calderon was not an agent. Why

CIA should report to the Warren Commission the suspicions of

an uninformed defector, known to be incorrect, presents a

major question as to the thought processes of the author of the

draft report. (C)

The draft next asserts that Calderon's possible connections

with the DGI, and similar possible contacts with Oswald during

his visit to Mexico City, were withheld from the Warren Commission

by CIA.

It is noted that this is in error.

The 19 June 1964

memorandum cited at page 0000085 of the draft report makes it

clear that this information was made available to Mr. Willens

of the Warren Commission.

It was reviewed by your investigator

in June and August 1978. (U)

The assertions by the draft about a possible connection

between Calderon and American intelligence are simply in error.

The assertion of withholding information about the possibility

of ties between Calderon and the DGI, and about possible contacts

with Oswald, are gross error.

That leaves the telephone

conversation to stand by itself, so far as any shred of

significance is concerned. (C)

The overall Calderon discussion is better fiction than

professional fact and analysis.

Having decided to assign to

her some significance, the treatment twisted and turned to keep

the conclusion alive as each assertion proffered in support

collapsed.

And in doing so, left intact the mistranslation

that seems to have sown the seed from which it germinated in the

first place.

(U)

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(2) An erroneous working

summary by a Warren Commission

investigator (Mr. Slawson) is seized by the author of the draft

report as the basis for arguing that CIA did not provide information

from telephone intercepts to the Warren Commission until early

April 1964. Depicting this as a "delay," the assertion is

then made that in some way it prejudiced the Warren Commission'g

investigation (in the face of testimony to the contrary by

Warren Commission people about the cooperation of the Agency) •

To racer must be due author substituting his conclusiona

for fact, must be doubted.

When the present HSCA draft was first reviewed some time ago, the

author's attention was drawn to a 31 January 1964 memorandum from Mr.

Helms to Mr. Rankin, indicating that the nature of it had been discussed

some two weeks earlier between the two men.

the sensitivity of the sources was discussed in the earlier exchange

between the two men. Your draft makes it clear that the FBI had told

the Warren Commission about the sources, and it is quite possible that

Rankin--if not Slawson--knew. That Rankin signed a letter on the

subject can be likened to letters that you and I have signed to one

another, and that have not always been read carefully (as I know from

one or two discussions with you). (C)

The point is that the 31 January 1964 letter reported in

extensive detail what CIA then knew about Oswald's activities in

Mexico City. This included the very material that the author of the

report said was not provided the Warren Commission until April 1964.

he provided the here

While the sources were not specified in the letter, their reliability

was endorsed emphatically in a strikingly unequivocal manner. There

has been no significant addition to that information since then. (C)

It is not useful at this point to try and reconstruct the

failure of the Warren Commission investigator to focus on and react to

the facts in the 31 January letter.

That the information had been

available to him is a matter of record, if the draft report can be

trusted. That he did err in this regard is the unavoidable fact.

Your investigator, having built his argument originally on an erroneous

description of this fact, nevertheless seeks to preserve the original

argument even after the initial basis for it essentially has been

destroyed.

He is determined to perpetuate the error of the Warren

Commission investigator, and displays far less objectivity and flexibility

than did that gentleman. (U)

In the confused but categorical treatment of the subjects, the

author betrays his unfamiliarity with intelligence reporting procedures.

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One may take issue with the practice, but understanding it

should restrain the sweeping statements made in the draft. It is

standard procedure to report the facts, with

an evaluation of the

source, but not a specification of the source..

That practice was

followed in the written report, although it appears that oral

elaboration probably was provided as well. As a result, the HSCA

draft report is badly confused in its treatment of facts and sources,

and has sought to salvage the argument by referring to "original source

material" as a handwritten editorial insert. This transparent effort

to preserve the false presentation merely emphasizes its tendentious

nature.

(U)

(3) Having sought to establish a non-reporting by

CIA in the Calderon case, and of the material available from

telephone taps, the author reached down into his bag of ready

assertions and claims that this was due to CIA's concern for

sources and methods.

It should be most clear that CIA has no

problem reporting the facts, or in protecting its sources in doing

50 •

Well established practice makes this clear.

The gratuitous

observation that the FBI failed to report out of respect for CIA's

sensitivities, without a shred of evidence, serves merely to

emphasize the aberrant quality of the author's analysis. (S)

Having introduced this unsupported assertion as a statement

of fact, the

author tries to use it to reinforce his earlier

assertions.

He ascribes practices to the Agency in forms that

either are incorrect completely or that are unrecognizable as

described by him. It is clear that he is extensively uninformed

about the way the Agency functions in the reporting field. (U)

The detailed comments follow.. (U)

Fourth page.

Handwritten notes. Substitute A-l for Donald Bensen. (S)

Page 003. The two references to IGR in the second paragraph should

be TFR. (U)

Page 005.

Reference is made to "the Agency's sophisticated document

retrieval system." This is a reflection of the inexperience and lack of

knowledge on the part of the writer.

The ADP systems are not all that

unusual, in addition to which there are a number of manual systems that

cannot be called "sophisticated." The author has been told this, but

persists in the description.

While it is a minor point, it nevertheless

is an imprecise description. (U)

Page 006.

The footnote indicates the intention to use the symbol

A-1 in lieu of the cryptonym AMMUG.

Please do so in all places.

I note

pages 73, 81-85, 90, 94, and 95. (5)

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PERCEN

Page 007. The author of the HSCA draft report seems to have

a problem in viewing the entire working arrangement and the understandings

at the time of the Warren Commission.

at this point. However well or poorly conceived those arrangements,

the fact is that the FBI had responsiblity for primary investigative work.

CIA reported to it in detail. CIA also responded to all Warren Commission

requests, as well as taking the initiative in reporting materials that

seemed relevant and significant.

However, reporting to the FBl was, in

effect, appropriate reporting to the arm of the government that would in

turn report to the Warren Commission.

It is doubted that there was any

real misunderstanding at the time that this is the way it was being done,

or that it was appropriate.. It would be an interesting dine of inquiry to

consider how current investigators, who have different views of how things

were or should have been, would ask questions in interviews on the subject.

There is much room for inadequate communications on this. In any event,

the one-dimensional description of what Warren Commission people "believed"

is too simplistic to serve the public's right to really have it told in

clear

and accurate terms. (U)

Page 008. I can't identify CIA page 2000517 so cannot comment at

this time. (U)

Page 010. It would be more appropriate to describe this as Helms

designating WH Division to handle the matter, when initially it seemed

that the Agency's role would focus on Mexico.

Scelso happened to be desk

chief at the time, so got the assignment within WH Division. (U)

Page 011. Delete reference to ClA surveillance in Mexico. (C)

Page 012. Delete Birch O'Neal's name, mentioned four times. (C)

Page 013.

Scelso's recollection that the Mexico City Station (it

should not be mentioned in the unclassified paper was the only Station

directly involved in the investigation during his tenure is wrong, as ten

Stations were tasked four days after the assassination, and all of them

were tasked immediately after the assassination.

Same page. Delete 0'Neal's name. (C)

Page 014. The thirteenth of December is the first half not the

latter half of December. (U) •

Same page. The characterization of Scelso's "report" is incorrect,

• when given the description of stating

a "position."

It is a factual

presentation of what was then known.

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Page 015. References to the Netherlands, United Kingdom, and

Australia should be deleted. (C)

Page 018. The references to Win Scott and it, in connection with

Mexico, should be modified. (C)

Page 024.

References to Hall, Hartman, Dooley, and Murphy should

be removed.

(C)

Page 025.

References to Bagely and Hall should be removed. (C)

Page 026.

References to Murphy and O'Neal should be removed. (C)

Page 030.

The handwritten note in the middle of the page is literally

correct, but so phrased as to leave a distorted inference CIA did not give

the Warren Commission everything. For instance, if we had reports on why

the monkeys lost their tails in Zamboango, it would not be provided as it

had nothing to do with the Kennedy assassination (although some HSCA

investigators might think it so).

What the Agency did was to supply material

that was deemed relevant. (U)

Page 031. The first word in the 6th line of the quoted testimony

should be "instructions"

and not

"indications." (U)

Page 033-034. Helms' testimony giving his recollection on that CIA

took no initiative vis-a-vis the Warren Commssion, but was only responsive,

is incorrect.. The record reveals various CIA initiatives. The arrangements

at the time have a contribution to make to understending. The FBI had

primary responsibility for conducting the investigation; it alone had the

CIA provided all kinds of reports to the FBI,

in the context of

its primary investigative responsibility. It also responded to Warren

Commission requests, as well as providing other materials on its own as

The comments of the draft about the "unfortunate consequence" of

the Warren Commission's reliance on CIA seems to relate to the subsequent

revelations about the anti-Castro plotting.

While it is wished that

someone at the time perceived a possible tie between those activities

and the assassination of the President, the simple fact is that it was

not perceived.

The draft HSCA report, which we reviered at your offices,

makes the point rather strongly that the concept did not emerge until

the later 1960's, well after the Warren Commission inquiry. While CIA

accepts its failure to see what others did not (despite wide-spread

knowledge of the provocative nature of U.S. policies and activities

against Castro), the categorical condemnation of this presentation is

unbalanced.

hypothesis as fact:

Even now, the relevance uf the lastro plots

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Page 036. Scelso really didn't know the nature of the AMLASH

operation, yet nevertheless is prepared to speak broadly about it. An

indication of his gratuitous wisdom is his saying that he would have

AMLASH polygraphed.

He knew so little about the AMLASH operation that

he did not know that AMASH had refused the polygraph earlier.

clearly knew practically nothing about the nature of CIA's relationship

with him; it had no substance prior to the death of President Kennedy. (C)

Page 039. Scelso receives unusual space in the report. This is not

because he knew anything, but must be because he was prepared to speak about

things that he did not know. He was in the overall investigation a month

and a half, and speaks inaccurately about it. He was not in on the AMLASH

operation, but speaks of it. He would never qualify as a competent witness

in court.

Page 040. Title for Section Il. The word "Sanctity" should be

replaced by the word "protection."

(U)

Delete reference to CIA surveillance operation in

Page 041.

Mexico City: (C)

Same page. Delete surveillance references in Mexico. The statement

in the paragraph ending five lines above the bottom of the page about

limitation of access to "original source materials," reflects the difficulty

the Committee has with intelligence reporting. No distinction is drawn between

the providing of substantive information, with evaluation of the sources and the

reliability of the information, and protection of the actual identity of the

It is correct to say that initially CIA limited access to the source,

but it is incorrect to leave that without balancing it with a statement that

the substance of the reports was conveyed. Intelligence reporting traditionally

does not reveal its sources. Perhaps this should always be done for a Con

gressional investigation, but it is doubtful that such an unqualified practice

will be accepted.

In any event, the presentation of the draft is not accurate

or even-handed.

Mexico Cite wili have tence deleted phone and photograph operations ar

Same page. Scelso (speaking about telephone operations--which will

have to be deleted) was doing his best to explain reporting procedures

(protecting the sources) although he doesn't do this very well either.. (S)

Page 043.

The FOIA document was reviewed but denied. Delete

reference.

: (C)

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Same page.

be deleted. (S)

References to Mexico City and telephone operations should

Same page. The word "State" instead of "ODACID." (C)

Same page. Again, O'Neal and telephone operations.

(S)

Page 044. Delete reference to 0'Neal and telephone operations.

(C)

Page 045. 0'Neal. (C)

Same page.

The discussion of Helms! desire to protect sources makes

it sound as though this was unique during the Warren Commission period.

was merely a continuing application of established practice, however unfamiliar

to the uninitiated. (U)

Page 046. Delete Mexico City Station. (C)

Page 047. Delete references to telephone and photograph operations in

Mexico City and liaison relationships.

(S)

Same page.: The 31 January memo laid it all out.

Additionally, the

covering memo makes it appear that the sources had been discussed with Rankin.

Rankin's letter of 10 February is viewed by the HSCA as demonstrating that

he did not know about the telephone operations.

Yet we know that Sam Papich

had already told the Committee in December that there were telephone operations

by one of the American agencies. (5)

Page 049. The statement at top of page is incorrect.

Substantive

knowledge had been given (31 January report and Calderon debriefing). (C)

Same page. Reference to telephone operations must be deleted. (S)

Page 050. Section Title--references to telephone operations there

as well as in the text. Delete. (S)

Page 051.

Win Scott, telephone operations, and Mexico Station.

Delete. (C)

Same page. The paragraph is wrong as well as referring to an intel-

ligence operation. It says "it appears doubtful that the Commission had been

given even partial access to the written material." The author knows that is

not true.

It does reflect accurately the misunderstending that initiated his

line of treatment.

The fact is that the Commission had the substance in detail

with emphatic positive affirmation of the reliability of the information. Beyond

that, while

the preceding statement says the Warren Commission didn't see it unti

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9 April, the draft also says it knew about it on 12 March. The writer

has difficulty keeping these facts straight, without reference to

security considerations. (C)

Page 052.

What Slawson thought about the 31 January 1964 memo,

that was so different from what his April memo said, is difficult to.

understand today. He at least eventually got it right. (U)

Page 053. The author focuses on the transcript, ignoring the

detailed information that had been provided from it in another form.

He was not, in fact, limited to the Duran report.

Same page.

References to the Mexico City Station. In the quotes

the word "State" should replace "ODACID." (C)

Page 054.. The author still dwells on the transcripts even though

he knows that the Warren Commission investigator Slawson had all the

information. (C)

Same

page.

The reference to intercepts at the bottom of the

page, below the portion marked for deletion, should also be deleted. (S)

Page 055.

The author

continues to fail to distinguish between access to the information and

knowledge of the source. By now he has also forgotten they were aware of

the fact of telephonic coverage. (S)

Page 056. Delete two references to the intercepts. (S)

Same page. The rhetorical conclusion of the paragraph in the

middle of the page might have stated alternatively that Slawson

simply mishandled the information that he had in considerable detail. (U)

Page 058.

Bottom of page. After treating this subject in an

inaccurate and confused manner, the author continues to hold tenaciously

to his thesis that "initial withholding of original source material...

may have impeded" the Commission's ability to reach accurately reasoned

conclusions. It did no such thing. Slawson erred, but it didn't hurt

his ultimate findings. He at least had the quality of correcting his

No evidence-other than some ESP quality of the author--supports

the assertion that the Warren Commission's inquiry was affected by what-

ever happened. (U)

Page 059. References to phone and photographic operations and Win

Scott and Mexico City Station should be deleted. (S)

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Same page. Clark Anderson's name

without "e." (U)

Page 060.

References to photograph operations and Win Scott

should be deleted.

(s)

Page 061. References to Win Scott should be deleted as should be

the coverage of the Cuban and Soviet Embassies in Mexico City by CIA.

Once more, Slawson's errors are used by the author to support criticism

of CIA. (S)

Page 062. Delete Mexico City and photo operations. (S)

Page 063. Delete Mexico Station and photo operations. (S)

Page 064. Delete Mexico City and CIA photo operations. (S)

Page 065. Delete telephone and photo operations and Mexico City. (S)

Page 066. Delete photo operations. (S)

Page 070. Delete Mexico City Station. (C)

Same page. References in first quote should be CD 674. (U) *

Page 071. Delete CIA Station in Mexico. (C)

Page. 073. Telephone intercepts and Mexico Station. Delete. (S)

Page 074. This detailed discussion cannot be declassified. An

excerpt from a casual telephone coversation five hours after the assassination

of President Kennedy, is assigned a significance by the HSCA draft that the

actual words do not support.

case

for the significance of the speaker, thereby reinforcing its

significance.

dead presence eight are by te ree the the ration

The draft then attempts to build a further

asserted

It then returns to the conversation, criticizing CIA for not

reporting a meaningless item that did not merit reporting. (S)

The following presentation in the HSCA draft provides the basis for

the present comments:

During the course of the conversation, the unidentified

caller asked Luisa if she had heard the latest news (of the

assassination). Luisa replied in a joking tone:

"Yes, of course, I knew (sic) almost before Kennedy." (Ibid.)

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PSORET

Paraphrasing the CIA's telephone intercept transcript,

it states that the caller told Luisa the person apprehended for

Kennedy's slaying was "President of one of the Committees of the Fair

Play for Cuba.": Luisa replied that she also knew this. Luisa•

inquired whether the person being held for the killing was a "gringo."

The unidentified caller replied, "yes." Luisa told her caller that she

had learned nothing else about the assassination and that she had

learned about the assassination only a little while ago.

The

unidentified caller commented:

(S)

"We think that if it had been or had seemed. -public

or had been one of the segregationists or against integration

who had killed Kennedy, then there was, let's say, the possibility

that a sort of civil war would arise in the United States;

that contradictions would be sharpened. Who knows."

Luisa responded:

"Imagine, one, two, and now, that makes three. (She

laughs.)"

The HSCA presentation then quotes a memorandum by a CIA employee,

written in 1975, based on the above mistranslation of what Luisa Calderon

said.

The translation apparently was accepted at face value.

The

memorandum discusses the telephone coversation as the only item in the

intercept coverage "that contains the suggestion of fore-knowledge of

expectation. " (S)

In fact, the translation on which that is based, and that is used

in the HSCA draft, is in error.

The author knew this, but still elected

to employ the mistranslation, probably because however tenuous the

significance given it, the argument (developed before the correct

translation was brought to his attention) is best served by using it

instead of the correct one. (S)

In handling the reams of information that it receives, CIA.

regularly appraises information before disseminating it. It

, does

not disseminate bad reporting. In the present instance, when the

transcript was received at Headquarters, the correct meaning was noted.

It should have been translated

as follows:

(S)

"Yes, of course, I found out (learned about it) almost

before Kennedy."

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The context and timing of the conversation is clear. It was

a joking conversation (as admitted in the HSCA draft), five hours after

the assassination, when the television news broadcasts had been filled with

details. Luisa Calderon and her unidentified caller both had the same

incorrect information about Oswald's association with a Fair Play for

Cuba Committee (it was learned later that there was no such committee,

and that Oswald had developed a sham Committee, apparently to develop

credentials) •

Calderon, however, did not know as much as her caller,

not knowing that the assassin was a "gringo," having to ask.. Joking

about the death of a public figure she probably considered unfriendly

to Cuba, she made the casual remark:

"...I learned about it almost before Kennedy."

The draft seeks to give this major significance, retaining the

incorrect translation and all, although followed by her elaborating

statement "that she had learned about (it) only a little while ago."

It warranted no attention then, nor does it merit it now. Its

treatment is inaccurate (tenaciously holding to the mistranslation that

made it a question at all) and exaggerated beyond reason.. (S)

Page 075. We agree with the statement appearing following

the quotation--"Standing by itself, (the) cryptic comments do not

merit

serious attention.

Read in

the context discussed above, this

correct judgment is reinforced. (C)

Page 077. The correct citation of the CSCI in the next to last

paragraph; was 1965, not 1963. It post dates the Warren Commission. (U)

Page 080. We would prefer no reference in an unclassified report

to what is in the Calderon 201 file. (C)

Page 081. Langosch/Swenson. Replace true name with pseudonym. (C)

Page 084. Langosch/Swenson. (C)

Page 085. The 19 June 1964 memorandum reported showing a number

of debriefing reports to the Warren Commission investigator.

Among them

were reports of the defector's reference to Calderon's possible DGI

connections, as well as her reported contact with Oswald during his

Mexico visit.

The HSCA investigator

seems to have become confused

in his notes of this exchange.

The facts do not support his statements.

(U)

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Reference to possible ties to CIA or American intelligence

must be designated as a remarkable assertion. The defector was

speaking to American intelligence, which knew Calderon had no

such ties; the defector was not qualified to speak authoritatively.

except as to someone's suspicion of the possibility. He was

speaking to the authority.

Surely, there is no requirement for

CIA to report something it knows to be untrue? (U)

Page 087. Delete references to the telephone conversation. (S)

Page 088. Delete Mexico City Station. (C)

Page 089. In response to the rhetorical questions at the top of

the page, ClA did provide the Warren Commission with information about

Calderon's alleged DGI ties, and her possible knowledge of Oswald.

The 19 June 1964 memorandum cited on page 0000085 of the draft HSCA

report shows that the defector debriefings on these points were shown the

Warren Commission investigator. As for why alleged ties with CIA or

American intelligence were not reported, the source was the defector,

who expresses suspicions on the subject. However, his suspicions

cannot be given the sort of credence the author would wish, to build

the case of CIA not reporting, when CIA knew these were erroneous

statements. The author of the draft report seems confused on who was •

saying

what to whom, no serious claim should be made that this erronous

information should be passed on. (U)

Same page. Langosch/Swenson. (C)

Page 090. Having beaten around the bush he states the finding

that Agency files reveals no "ostensible connection." They reveal no

connection. Any other statement is untruthful. (U)

Page 091. Line 13. CIA Document Dispatch No....

(U)

Line 23. CIA Document Dispatch No.

(U)

Page 092. Dave Ronis' name appeared six times. Delete. (C)

Page 093. Ronis' name two times and Piccolo. Delete. (C)

Page 094. Delete Ottawa reference. Cite IN 68894. (C)

Page 095. Line 2. CIA Document Dispatch No.... (U)

Same page. Delete the Ottawa references, per above.

(C)

Page 101. Line 17. CIA Document Dispatch No.

. (U)

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Page 101. The statements about CIA's "withholding" are worth

addressing again. ClA did not withhold.

The author takes a very thin-

if not non-existent--interpretation of significance in a telephone

conversation, and uses it as the basis for making strong statements of

an unqualified nature.

He then seeks to reinforce the tissue of his

case with a series of hopefully mutually supporting untrue statements on

other points.

While there may be disagreement on the significance of

Calderon's statements (if the Committee feels committed to staff attitudes)

there can be no disagreement with the record. CIA did report the defector's

statements about Calderon's possible DGI ties and possible Oswald

contacts. (S)

Same page. The presentation of the whereabouts of the memorandum

bearing the sequential number 40 serves to demonstrate the author's

inability to surrender a position once he had become committed to it,

whatever the evidence. (U)

The question arises from a memorandum of the debriefing of a

Cuban defector on the subject of Oswald.

Memoranda of debriefings of the

defector were numbered sequentially, and the one on the debriefing about

Oswald does not bear the number 40, which it would be expected to bear

in that sequence.

(C)

Certain things are clear. There was one complete debriefing of the

Cuban on the subject of Oswald.

There is a memorandum of such a

debriefing, at the time it should have occurred, but it does not bear the

number.

There is no memorandum in the file, numbered 40. It so happens

that there was a follow-up question on one subject,

and this resulted in a

debriefing of the defector on that question. The significance of this

event is that it provides the answer to why the memorandum of the

debriefing on Oswald did not bear a number. (C)

The follow-up memorandum recites the handling of the earlier

debriefing and memorandum.

It states that the memorandum was dictated

to a secretary in CI Staff (which was a different component from that

handling the debriefing, and which also was responsible for the Agency's

suport of the Warren Commission inquiry. The memorandum was typed in

that component..

Simply stated, the secretary who typed the memorandum

was not a part of the component that usually handled these memoranda,

and was not a part of the procedure that provided the sequential numbering.

(C)

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## Page 17

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03.257

There was one complete debriefing of the defector on Oswald.

There is a memorandum of that debriefing. It happens to not bear the

number 40. And why it does not has been made clear. The author may not

admit that he understands it, but no alternative answer is conceivable.

I believe that you have my earlier letter of 29 September. 1978 on this

subject. (U)

Page 102. Line 20. Delete Hidalgo and Piccolo. (C)

Page 105. Lines 10 and 20. Delete 201-749651. (C)

Page 108.

The references to the AMLASH trial in 1965 should

be deleted. Reportedly, Castro told the HSCA that he knew that AMLASH

was Cubela; that is not for us to confirm. (C)

Page 110. Were

the 1977 Task Force Report "intended as a

rebuttal" it would not have accepted some of the SSC views, nor would

it have explored new areas as it did. Anyway, how does the author

know.

As seems to be his practice,

he relied on his instincts

rather than evidence; he never inquired. (U)

There is one major section of the 1977 Report which takes

issue with Book V of the Church Committee Report.

This has to do with

the AMLASH operation. The report accepted in principle certain of the views

of Book V of the Church Committee Report and carried its inquiry into

yet other areas, and beyond those of the 1967 IG Report.

The 1977 Task

rorce Report did, in fact, conclusively refute the Church Lommittee

presentation of the AMLASH operation in Book V. But that is not all

the report did.

The narrow, specialized, focus of the author seems to

have contributed to his misreading this too.

(U)

Page Ill. Langosch who really didn't know anything about the

AMLASH operation, as he has revealed in statements he has made about it,

speaks broadly once again.

He wasn't privy to the operation and what he

knew when he testified to HSCA must be based on what he thinks he has

learned since.

He is not a qualified witness, however much of what

he says appeals to the author of the report. (U)

As this paper has been designated as one that you wish to

publish in unclassified form, it occurred to me that it might be

appropriate to bring these preliminary comments to the attention of

key Committee Members--Chairman Stokes, as well as Mr. Preyer and

Mr. Devine, Chairman of the Kennedy Subcommittee and Ranking Republican

Member, respectively. If they are to judge any eventual issues

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that may arise over papers such as this one, it would be useful

if they had the opportunity of developing some personal appreciation;

comparison of these comments with the staff draft may help serve that

purpose. Three extra copies, in addition to the original addressed

to you, are therefore included. If you decide to not make the

copies available as I suggest, it would be appreciated if you would

so advise me.

Of course, I stand ready to discuss with them any

questions that they may have. (U)

Meanwhile, it is suggested that after you have reviewed the

above comments, we arrange to discuss them together. . (U)

Very truly yours,

pett Buschile

S. D. Breckinridge

Principal Coordinator, HSCA

Enclosure

Distribution:

Original - Adse

7 - SA/DDCI

1 - LC

1 - Mr. Rininger

1 - Mr. Holmes

1 = Mr. Sturbitts

- Mr. Sullivan

1 - OLC/Subj

1 - OLC/Chron

OLC/SDB/ksn - 15 February 1979

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