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157-10014-10109

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK Assassination System

Identification Form

Agency Information

AGENCY :

RECORD NUMBER :

RECORD SERIES :

SSCIA

157-10014-10109

MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE

AGENCY FILE NUMBER: 07-M-15

Document Information

ORIGINATOR:

FROM:

TO :

TITLE:

SSCIA

DATE: 06/25/1975

PAGES:

19

SUBJECTS:

HARVEY, WILLIAM

ZRRIFLE

OPERATION MONGOOSE

DOCUMENT TYPE: REPORT

CLASSIFICATION: Declassified

RESTRICTIONS: 1B; 1C

CURRENT STATUS : Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 03/08/2000

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS:

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v9.1

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Date :

08/06/95

Page

1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA

RECORD

NUMBER

: 157-10014-10109

RECORDS

SERIES: MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

: 07-M-15

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR :

SSCIA

FROM

TO

TITLE:

DATE: 06/25/75

PAGES : 19

SUBJECTS : HARVEY, WILLIAM

OPERATION MONGOOSE

ZRRIFLE

DOCUMENT TYPE : REPORT

CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET

RESTRICTIONS

: REFERRED

CURRENT STATUS

:POSTPONED IN FULL

DATE OF LAST REVIEW

: 01/05/99

OPENING CRITERIA

COMMENTS : CCBOX 418

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

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BOx 418-

MEETING 25 JUNE 75

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AGENDA

TWENTY-FOURTH MEETING OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

10:00 A.M. ON JUNE 25, 1975 IN 457 RUSSELL BUILDING

Testimony by Mr. William Harvey

INVENTFARPILA

L1 1970

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TOP SECRET

WILLIAM HARVEY

Short Chronology*

Biographical

1940-47

1947

1948

1952

1959

Counterespionage work as FBi agent

Joined CIA as head of Soviet Intelligence Branch

Deputy Assistant Director, Office of Special

Operations (which became DDP.)

Chief of Station, Berlin (Berlin Tunnel operation)

Became Chief of Foreign Intelligence staff Division

D (FI/D) which handles communications intelligence

and sensitive methods of obtaining it le.f.

surreptitious entries)

1960

August 16

DR. EDWARD GUNN (Office of Medical Services)

receives box of Cuban cigars to be treated with

lethal poison. (21)

1961

Late January

(approx.)

February

(approx.)

EDWARDS and O'CONNELL ask for development of

POISON PILLS. (24)

BISSELL (DDP) asks HARVEY to establish an EXECUTIVE

ACTION capability under project ZRRIFLE. Harvey's.

notes are

quoted as saying that Bissell said he

had been "twice urged by the White House" to

establish such a capability. (37) Harvey is

briefed, probably by both BISSELL and EDWARDS, On

the Phase I assassination plot run by Sheffield

EDWARDS and James O'CONNELL (Office of Security)

which involved criminal syndicate connections. (37)

HARVEY uses agent QWIN (recruited earlier by

ARNOLD SILVER for use in an assassination operation

against LUMUMBA) as the principle asset for ZRRIFLE.

( 38)

Edwards has the POISON PILLS tested. (25)

* Page references in parentheses are from the 1967 Report of the Inspector

General of the CIA.

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TOP SECRET

1961 (cont 'd)

Early Feb.

Late Feb.

March-Early April

Mid-April

November 15

According to Dr. GUNN, HARVEY asked about the

pills he tested. Gunn briefed Harvey, who told

him to brief SIDNEY GOTTLIEB about techniques

but not targets. (27)

Pills given to ROSELLI by O'CONNELL are passed

to TRAFFICANTE. (27) ROSELLI reports to O'CONNELI

that pills reached ORTA in Cuba. ORTA returns

pills in couple weeks. (27)

O'CONNELL... gives pills and money to ROSELLI who

passes them to VARONA. (32)

Bay of Pigs invasion fails; JFK appoints Taylor

Committee.

Beginning of PHASE II: BISSELL instructs HARVEY to

apply the ZRRIFLE assassination capability to

Castro. (39) Harvey takes over the criminal syndicate

contacts developed in Phase I. (39)

HARVEY is told

by HELMS that he is to take over the CIA Cuba

task force. (39)

MC CONE replaces Allen Dulles as DCI

November 29

1962

February

February 7

February 19

April 8-9

April 14

April 18-19

EDWARDS briefs HARVEY on Castro operation. (40)

EDWARDS meets with FBI to ask them not to prosecute

the Rowan wiretap case because of CIA concern. (60)

HELMS (DDP nominee) authorizes HARVEY to handle

ZRRIFLE project with unvouchered funds. (38)

HARVEY, ROSELLI, O'CONNELL, and perhaps MAHEU meet

in New York to plan Phase II. (43) (Farvey disputes

O'Connell's recollection that Maheu was there and

knowledgeable of Phase II. Both Edwards and

Harvey check with HELMS before the meeting is

arranged and HARVEY obtains Helm's approval not to

brief MC CONE (41). Harvey thereafter begins

regular reporting to Helms on Phase II. (41)

HARVEY, ROSELLI, and O'CONNELL meet in Miami. (46)

Pills are delivered to Harvey in Washington. (46)

086115

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TOP SECRET

1962 (cont'&)

April 21

Late April

Throughout May

May 7

May 14

June 21

August 10

August 13

HARVEY passes the pills to ROSELLI in Florida. (47)

Roselli was to give the pills to Varona, who had an

asset in Cuba with access to Castro's restaurant.

At this point Roselli is using Tony VARONA and

"MACEO" as contacts with Cuba rather than Irafficante.

(47-8)

HARVEY, with help of Ted SHACKLEY (Chief of JMWAVE

station in Miami, loaded arms and equipment in a

U-Haul truck which was left in a parking lot for

Roselli, who delivered it to a Cuban contact. (49-50)

Intense contact between HARVEY and ROSELLI. Roselli

reports that pills are in Cuba at the restaurant

frequented by Castro awaiting the opportunity to

use them. (50)

EDWARDS and HOUSTON brief ATTORNEY GENERAL ROBERT F.

KENNEDY on PHASE I of the assassination operation. (62a)*

Edwards tells HARVEY of the briefing of RFK. (65)

Harvey says that he briefed HELMS about this and

advised against briefing McCone (DCI) or Carter

(DDCI); Helms agreed. (65)

HARVEY is told by EDWARDS that the "tacit approval"

of the DCI should be obtained if Roselli was to be

used any further. (65) Harvey told Edwards that

Roselli

would not be used any more.

(According to

Edwards' memorandum of 5/14/62.) (42)

ROSELLI tells HARVEY that VARONA has sent three men

to Cuba to recruit others for the pill plot. (51)

Special Group (Augmented) meets on OPERATION MONGOOSE.

HARVEY and MC CONE said that McNAMARA raised the

subject of assassinations at this meeting in regard

to new plans.

General LANSDALE'S memorandum assigns to HARVEY the

drafting of an outline of intelligence, political,

economic, and paramilitary activities for the

implementation of MONGOOSE. The task includes

planning for "splitting the regime, including liquida-

tion of leaders"

* RFK asks to be told before the CIA works with the Mafia again. (62a)

19403

.?91

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OP SECRET

1962 (cont'a)

August 14

September

HARVEY writes a memorandum to DDP HELMS saying

that he advised Lansdale's aide FRANK HAND to

excise the words "including liquidation of leaders"

from the LANSDALE memo because of "the inadmissibility

and stupidity of putting this type of comment in

writing in such a document". Harvey also tells Helms

that he has "careful notes"

on MC NAMARA'S discussion

of assassination at the Special Group meeting of

August 10.

Pills still in place; HARVEY learns that VARONA is

ready to send another team to Cuba. (51)

CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

October

1963

February

June

August 16

HARVEY and ROSELLI agree in Los Angeles to call off

the operation, although not to break precipitously

with VARONA. (52)

HARVEY and ROSELLI have last dinner in Washington

and are observed by SAM PAPICH of the FBI, who has

ROSELLI under intensive surveillance. Harvey asks

Papich to let him know if HOOVER is going to call

MC CONE. (53-4) Harvey briefs Helms and Helms

agrees not to brief McCone unless it appears that

McCone will receive a call from Hoover. (54)

Spurred by a Chicago newspaper story of the same

day; HELMS sends MC CONE the Edwards memo of 5/14/62

of the RFK briefing. (69)

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SEGRET

BYES COLY

14 May 1962

EdWARDS FXI

5/30175

То Долото 8:100,11

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT: John Rosselli

INVENTORIED:

ON MAR E

EY.

1977

1. In early April Mr. William Harvey asked me to arrange

a contact with Subject. The meeting in New York City was arranged

for 9 April. I explained to Mr. Harvey that the undersigned would

take no part in future operations proposed for Subject.

2. In the interim I have kept Mr. Harvey fully informed

reference to my briefing of The Attorney General on the former

project and cautioned him that I felt that any future projects of

this nature should have the tacit approval of the Director of Central

Intelligence.

On this date Mr. Harvey called me and indicated that

he was dropping any plans for the use of Subject for the future.

Shef

ala Edvards

Director of Sccurity

SECRET

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Ri le and i inad

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON 25. D.C.

indian so

13 August 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM HARVEY, CLA

ROBERT HURWITCH, STATE

CEN. BENJAMIN HARRIS, DEFENSE *

ION WILSON, USIA

From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale Ed

Lex 21 1917

MAR

Subject: Alternate Course B

In compliance with the desires and guidance expressed in the

10 August policy meeting on Operation Mongoose, we will produce

an outline of an alternate Course B for submission. The ClA paper

"Operational Plan (Reduced Effort)" will be used as the starting

basia.

Since this is to be a bare outline, to pernit further policy

guidance to be developed, I belicve the paper need contain only

a statement of objectives aud a list o' implementing activities.

The list of activities will be undo, the headings of: Intelligence,

Political, Economic, Psyclological, Paramilitary, and Military.

We will hold an Operutional Represchintives work soscion in

my office, at 1400 hours,

le August, to complete the

outline paper

for submission. Tic. il you is to bring 5 copies of

comploied assignod work to tis sure session, to pezrait cach ot

us to work from a full se. of cruis.

Papers reguired fion each of you for the Tuesday meeting:

Mr. Harvey: Intelli euse delical (splitting the regime,

Camomic (cabotage, limited

deception), and Paramilia: Mleo, any suggestions for inclusioa

in other sections of the.=.

Mr. Hurwitch: Stride Succtves, Folitical, and

Economic. Also, any 3::

muns iss inclusion in other sections

of the paper.

SEC DER CONER NO. 1-153 RIGIUDED FION 855

for Sro

REGRADING: DOR BET

1200.10

DOES NOT AL24

it 3

IDLING

0S hey No. 1

This

document

cort sing

Gopa

01

_co-

D.4:410

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HELM'S EXZ..

411317.5

SEORET

SENSITIVE

14 August 1962

miamiaiso:

DAR 31

MEMORANDUM EOR: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT

: Operation MONGOOSE

1. Action. None. This memorandum is for your information.

2. Reference is made to our conversation on 13 August 1962,

concerning the memorandum of that date from General Lansdale.

Attached is a copy of this memorandum, excised from which are

four woids in the second line of the penultimate paragraph on

page 1. These four words were "including liquidation of leaders."

3. The question of assassination, particularly of Fidel Castro,

was brought up by Secretary McNamara at the meeting of the

Special Group (Augmented) in Secretary Rusk's oifice on 10 August.

It was the obvious consensus at that meeting, in answer to a

comment by Mr. Ed Murrow, that this is not a subject which

has been made a matter of official record. I took careful notes on

the comments at this meeting on this point, and the Special Group

(Augmented) is not expecting any written comments or study on

this point.

4.. Upon receipt of the attached memorandum, I called

Lansdale's office and, in his absence, pointed out to Frank Hand

the inadmissibility and stupidity of putting this type of comment in

writing in such a document. I advised Frank Hand that, as far

as CIA was concerned, we would write no document pertaining to

this and would participate in no open meeting discussing it.

I strongly urged Hand to recommend to Lansdale that he excise

the phrase in question fiom all copies of this memorandum, in-

cluding those disseminated to State, Defense, and USIA. Shortly

thereafter, Lansdale called back and left the message that

he agrced and that he had done so.

STONET

SENSITIVE

EVIS UNY

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SEROIRIE

HES MAY

5.

For your information also, in your absence and since

the attached memorandum already had been distributed and in

view of the possibility that this might come to the Director's

attention, I informally briefed Walt Elder on the above.

WILLIAM K. HARVEY

Chief, Task Force W

Attachment

Memo fr Gen Lansdale dtd 13 Aug 62

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SECRET

Project ZRRIFLE

K371

1

1977

1. Identification: The purpose of Project ZRRIFLE is to spot,

develop, and use agent assets for Division D operations. Agents will be

spotted in

several areas, including the United States, but for operational

security reasons will probably not be used in their countries of residence.

Present developmental activity is being conducted in the WE and EE areas,

but it is anticipated that this will be extended to other division areas. The

project will be operated against third-country installations and personnel.

2. Objectives: The objective of this project is the procurement of

code and cipher materials, and information concerning such materials,

in accordance with requirements levied on the Clandestine Services,

primarily by the National Security Agency. Since these requirements are

subject to frequent revision, no listing. of targets would be valid for the

duration of the project. Specific operations will be mounted on the basis of

need

and opportunity. The project will be conducted by Division D with

assistance from area divisions and stations

as needed.

3. Background: In response to the increasing requirements for the

operational procurement of foreign code and cipher materials, Division D

in 1960 began the spotting of agent assets as a developmental activity.

During the same period requirements from NSA became more refined and in

many respects more sensitive. Because most

stations are not equipped to

conduct this type of operation and because of the desirability of completely

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure Subject io

Criminal Sanctions.

SECRET

RECEIVED FROM

Classified by

007789

JUN 2A 1973

Exempt from general

declassification schedula ci E.O. 11252

exemptien schedule 53 (1), (2), (3)

CIA

Automaticaily

decisesiliad on

Date Impossibio lo Deiermino

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control over this entire effort, it was determined that Division D, which is

in closest touch with NSA on procurement requirements, could best conduct the :

activity.

The spotting activity has now advanced far enough to justify

removing from the OOA category.

4. Operational Assets:

(1) Personnel: QJWIN is under written contract as a principal

agent, with the primary task of spotting agent candidates. QJWIN was first

contacted in 1958 through the Chief of the Luxembourg I.S. by the Chief of

Station, Luxembourg, in connection with an illegal narcotics operation into

the United States. For a

period of a year and a half he was contacted

sporadically by COS, Luxembourg, in behalf of the Bureau of Marcotics.

Files

of this Bureau reflect an excellent performance by QJWIN. In

October 1960,

SECRET

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SEGRET

3

QJWIN annual salary:

Travel & ops

expenses for QJWIN &

other agents & agent condidates:

Fees for services by and standby of agents

and agent candidates:

Travel of staff employees engaged in

ARRIFLE activity:

Hire of

safehouses, automobiles

and other

operational expenses:

$7,200

2, 000

2, 000

2, 500

1, 000

$14, 700

Pay for agents on completion of jobs?

1) Legal, ethical-morale, operational problems; political: non-attributability.

2) Our own experience (Bangkok) (and effect on DDP) and experiences with

KGB (Grossup, Bandera groups, Khokhlov) - require most professional,

proven operationally competent, ruthless, stable, CE-experienced ops

officers (few available), able to conduct patient search and with guts to

pull back if instinct or knowledge tells him he should, and w/known high

regard for operational security. Assessments

are all-important.

3) Maximum security:

a.

Kubark only (e.g., what does Siragusa now know?); no approach

to other Government agencies.

b. Within Kubark, one focal point for control, search, training

case officering, etc. DDP authority in this focal point manda RECEIVED FROM

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SECRET

DCI officially advised?

c. Max. security cable commo for innocuous cables only; no

restrictions on travel; possibility of one-man overseas (Europe) control

base with own (non-Station) commo. Word of mouth and no bashfulness

re trips.

d. No PA's (except for search) or intermediaries; rigid

case-

officering, from start to finish.

e. No approach to officials of foreign governments.

f. No use of any agent who ever worked for a U.S. Government agency.

Training by opposition would

g. Use of already tested assets (e. g., Manuel in the search.

h. Stand-by list of Rubarkers who can pass as foreigners.

i. Pretext:

Kutube/D search; this established (e.g, Rome).

j. No discussions in Stations.

k. No "team" until ready to go,.

if

at all.

4) Blackmail:

a.

No American citizens or residents or people who ever obtained

U.S. visa.

b. No chain of connections: strictly person to person; singleton ops.

c. No meeting any candidate in house territory.

d. Exclude organization criminals (e.g., Sicilians) those with record

of arrests, those with instability of purpose

as criminals.

SECRET

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:.

SECREI

e.

Staffers

-selection.

5) Cover: planning should include provision for blaming Sovs or Czechs

in case of blow.

6) Should have phoney 201 in RI to backstop this, all documents therein

forged and backdated.

Should look like a CE file.

7) Testing of moninees essential: re following directions, security,

blackmail.

8) Former resistance personnel a possibility.

9) Use fishady nobody who has ever dealt with criminals;

otherwise will not be aware of pitfalls or consider factors such

as freedom

to travel, wanted lists, etc.

10) Possible use of staffers for the action.

1l) Silverthorne.

Keeping of files.

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SECRET

6

Freedom to travel

Khokhlov case.

Legal, operational & ethical-morale problems.

1) Maximum security & within Kubark only (e.g., how much does Siragusa

now know?).

Limitation on number code clerks for enciphering &

deciphering. Guise of Louvide objection. Siglen not secure enough.

2) One focal point for search, control, training, case-officer & PA

sedection. Complete DDP authority in this focalpoint mandatory. Overseas

one-man control base with own (non-Station) commo.

3) Every operation to be rigidly case-öfficered; no silk-shirt PA's.

4) Non-attributability: No American

ditizens or American residents for

direct action; possibly for approach

to foreign elements. No criminal who

tainted by use by another American agency.

Use of case officers who can

pass as foreigners -- and limited official reference.

5) No chain of connections permitting blackmail.

6) Don't meet any selecter in house territofy.

7) Avoid discussion w/foreign officials until

all

possibility of search

through private citizens (e.g., @JWIN) has been

examined.

8) Planning should include provision for blaming Soviets (or Czechs)

in case of blow.

4 above essential.

9) Exclude organization criminals, those with record of arrests, those

who have engaged in several types of crime.

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SECRET

10) Corsicans recommended. Sicilians could lead to/Mafia..

1l) Former resistance personnel offer possibilitied.

12) Period of testing, surveillance, etc. for each selectee.

(OSS archives.)

13) All Kubark personnel involved should have some CE experience.

14) Silverthorne & stable in

Paris.

15) What are limits on team or individuals selected? No "team" until

ready to go.

16) Danger of Standbys.

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8

SECRET

Scd G - 251

Exec Actions

"The Magic Button"

Narcotics Bureau

"for a living"

RIS 201 cover

caution - Bankruptcy -- No star

eyes

- Jim A. Contradestinct from U-2

Not a TSD problem

Apply brakes

Last resort beyond last resort &

a confession of weakness.

--El Benefactor -- assumptions

Examples of 3 "wrong"

Framework of Sid's job.

Ehut R&D - memo.

Ledford

"Translating machines"

- of E basic sounds project.

pherious - (V with CB)

comment - Gear

Anathesia --

261 -- AS -- Fanforn - DCI Matter

No file

1. Select proper oern to run --

2. Place a cover

3. Security Rules

4.

Guide leves

5.

Last Resort - Brakes -

6.

No other agencies

7.

No projects or papers except per cover.

8.

Principal agent - (Mankel) ?

AF - Project draft LCH tested 1500 - from NB.

Mask spat Igm. stall AF project - cler Dbieke

SECRET

Never mentions word assassination.

Max as 3

B - WKH - AS-

Sid - Reserv.

Substitute - What next

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.. i

SEGRET

9

9. Disposal

10. Targets who & where -- Must know before we can spot --

11.

Case officering

12.

Cover file - create to provide RIS or akbatobel it. - non sov

13.

Note dangers of RIS counter action and monitor if they are

blamed

Fd J list - Remember

RECEIVED FROM

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SECRET

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