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1104-10306-10010.

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

18 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: 303 Committee Meeting - 18 June 1964

1. Item I: Autonomous Operations

This was raised in view of Manuel Ray's request for

$25, 000 and indications that he is attempting to make a new expedition to

Cuba in a chartered ship. Various courses of possible action with Ray

were discussed, ranging from cutting him off altogether to giving him

the money. It developed that Ray is acting inconsistently with the agreement

with him which was that he would operate outside the United States. Therefore

it was decided that we would tell him that he must abide by the agreement,

that he must find a base of operations outside the United States and if he does

we will endeavor to secure the release of his ship which is now in Puerto Rico,

and that we will give him financial support.

2. With respect to Artime,

it was pointed out that Artime's

operations are very costly. CIA has put $4. 6 million into this operation

this year - the future bill will be large, but not as great. FitzGerald

reported that Artime planned one hit and run operation a month, but he noted

he would be lucky if he could pull off one every 3 months. Bundy seemed to

feel Artime was more of a threat than an operator and should be maintained

for that purpose and operations discouraged. FitzGerald pointed out this is

not practical. It was agreed to proceed with Artime recognizing that U.S.

or CIA support of him would probably be "blown". Furthermore it was.

suggested that he be cautioned to be careful and not follow unduly reckless

courses of action.

3. There was a long discussion on the implications of the CLA

Jun e l0th memorandum reporting plans of Cuban exiles to assassinate leading

Cuban government leaders. This report was taken most seriously by the group.

It was felt that the purpose of advising us through CLA of these plans was to

put us on notice and therefore we should not fail to take appropriate precautionary

actions to see that no assassination attempt of which we had knowledge was

carried out. It was decided that appropriate authorities, i.e. Department of

Justice and the FBI, should be notified and urged to take appropriate action

against the individuals involved.

I took the position that we are overly exercised, that I was

inclined to write the whole thing off as Miami cocktail party talk rather than

definite plans. Had I seen the Memo before it was distributed, I would have

investigated the sources and the credibility of the whole thing before taking

action. However the group were more concerned than I and the refore planning to

discuss the subject with the Attorney General and possibly Mr. Hoover.

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I pointed out that copies of the Memorandum had been sent

to the Attorney General and the Department of Justice but there had been

no conversation on the subject.

ACTION: Discuss with General Carter and Mr. Helms

steps we should take to establish the

credibility of the report; also communicate

with the FBI through Mr. Papich. Also I

should call the Attorney General personally.

4. Prior to the meeting Mr. Vance asked my opinion of using

the 22 million psyops leaflets which inadvertently had been printed on

U.S. manufactured white sulphite paper, all as reported in MACV

cable MAC SOG 5050 dated 18 June 1964 (IN 09143). I told Vance that I felt

we should go ahead. It was too bad it had been done this way, but it is one of

those things that a person not thoroughly acquainted with this type of operation

might overlook. He was in agreement and presumably will instruct the release

of the leaflets.

am/mfb

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TEIFB34

00 RUEPIA

SCOUT

NON-CIA TELETYPED MESSAGE 09143

ACTION: FE 18

10 Jm01 G9 10=

183

DE RUMSMA 1647F 18/8641Z

0 1806272

FM

'COMUSMACU

TO RUEPCR /WHITE HOUSE

RUEPDA / SECSTATE

RUEPDA /0 SD

RUEPIA/CIA

15941

a- DEI

10-DDCI

11- DDP

12-ADDP

13-500

14-F,LE

15-VR

16-RF

INFO RUHPA/CINÇPAC

ZEN/AMEMB SAIGON

RUHPA/CAS HONO

8T

TOP SECRET MAC SOG 5058

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION SPECIAL HANDLING SPECAT

EXCLUSIVE STATE FOR SULLIVAN, OSD FOR MCNAMARA

AND ANTHIS

WHITEHOUSE FOR MCGEORGE BUNDY, CIA FOR MCCONE, CARTER AND

HELMS, JOS FOR GEN TAYLOR, INFO AMEMB SAIGON FOR AMB LODGE

AND. NES, CINCPAC FOR ADM FELT.

A. OPLAN 34A

1: IN ORDER TO MEET OPERATIONAL SCHEDULES FOR JUNE AND

JULY PSYOPS LEAFLET DROPS, TWENTY _TWO

MILLION LEAFLETS

10P

18 JUM 68 IN 0 9 1 43

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2063

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOP SECRET

IN-

: PAGE.

WERE PRINTED ON SIXTEEN POUND US GRADE WHITE SULPHITE

PAPER. THIS WAS NECESSITATED DUE TO UNAVAILABILITY OF

OTHER PAPER

SUITABLE FOR IHIGHSPEED LEAFLET PRESS.

2.. UNLESS THESE PRINTED LEAFLETS ARE AUTHORIZED FOR

DISSEMINATION OVER NORTH VIETNAM UNDER SCHEDULED OPLAN

34A: OPERATIONS NUMEROUS PSYOPS OPPORTUNITIES EXPLOITABLE

UNDER PRESENT LIGHT OF THE MOON PERIOD WILL BE MISSED AND

TIMELINESS OF SEVERAL OF THESE LEAFLETS WILL BE LOST.

3. REALIZE SUBJECT OF PLAUSIBLE DENIAL BECOMES INVOLVED

FERE BUT FEEL IN THIS CASE PROBLEM OF POSSIBLE ATTRIBUTION

TO UNITED STATESTBUST BE JUDGED IN LIGHT OF FOLLOWING CIR-

CUMSTANCES:

A. PAPER STOCK USED IS STANDARD US MANUFACTURE OB-

TAINED THROUGH US ARMY QUARTERMASTER SOURCES AND IS

ASSUMED TO BE AVAILABLE ON WORLD MARKET FOR SALE TO ANY

CONSUMER.. MAP SUPPORTED FORCES SUCH AS ARVN OR OTHERS

COULD HAVE ACCESS TO SAME TYPE PAPER.

B. ANY DESIRE TO ATTRIBUTE OPLAN 34A ACTIONS TO US

COULD BE MORE READILY SUBSTANTIATED BY DRV PRODUCING AGENT

PERSONNEL OR MORE CRITICAL ITEMS LOST IN SOME PREVIOUS

TEAM OPERATIONS.

C. PAPER STOCK. ITSELF IS NOT ONLY ATTRIBUTABLE ITEM,

BUT ALSO OFFSET PRINTING PROCESS EMPLOYED WITH OTHER TYPE

PRINTED MATTER.

D. IN ESSENCE ALL OPLAN 34A ACTIONS ARE DESIGNED TO

IMPRESS DRV THAT PRESSURE IS BEING APPLIED BY MAJOR POWER.

USE OF US PAPER AND

Jon IRECT INDICATION OF US INUOLVEMENT

TOP SFORFT

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IN 09143 PAGE

3063

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOP SECRET

TEND CONTRIBUTE TO THAT BASIC OBJECTIVE.

E. ONLY CHEMICAL ANALYSIS COULD ASCERTAIN THAT PAPER

USED IS U.S: MANUFACTURED STOCK.

F. IN ANY EVENT, U.S. BLAMED BY DRV FOR ALL OPLAN 34A

ACTIONS THEY CHOOSE TO PUBLICISE AND U.S. IN EACH CASE

COULD CHOOSE TO DENY OR IGNORE ACCUSATIONS.

4. REQUEST APPROVAL TO PROCEED WITH DISSEMINATION OF PRE-

PARED LEAFLETS AT THIS TIME AND UNTIL SUITABLE FOREIGN

SOURCE PAPER STOCK CAN BE OBTAINED WHICH SHOULD BE WITHIN TWO WEEKS.

5. IN ORDER TO MEET. CURRENT JUNE SCHEDULE REQUEST REPLY

WITHIN 48 HOURS.

GP- 1

TOP SECRET

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3 April

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

4/14.

SUBJECT: Special Group Meeting (5412) - 2 April 1964

1. Briefly reviewed the status of North Viet Nam operations 34A.

All concluded that the results have been negative and disappointing.

I took the position this was to be expected but that now the period of

organization had past, we might get some better results.

95

The CIA IDEALIST-TACKLE program was approved except

for the North Korean flight. Defense interposed an objection to this

flight on the grounds that they were nearing agreement for the release

of helicopter crews which have been held in North Korean custody.

ACTION: This particular flight should be withheld. USIB

and most particularly DIA should be informed in the meeting

On Wednesday, the 8th.]

Discussed the problem of captains and crews for the SWIFT

and NASTY craft and the necessity of withdrawing the German mercenaries

and the Swedish captains. This was recognized as a must.

It was agreed

that substitution of Chinese Nationalist captains was acceptable on an

interim basis.

ACTION: DDP to arrange with Secretary Vance for appro-

priate actions by the Department of Defense through their

representatives in Taiwan for the recruitment, movement,

compensation and care of these captains.]

_3. [Reviewed DoD peripheral reconnaissance which was approved

after extended discussion of capabilities of the new radar in Cambodia.

It was agreed that the field would be instruded to carefully observe

operation of this radar to determine whether the U-2s were being picked

up by it. If this turned out to be a regular practice by the Cambodians,

the matter should be resubmitted for, reconsideration.

ACTION: The field should follow this carefully with MACV.

4. Review of ground rules for U-2 in North. Viet Nam as outlined.

Secretary Vance's paper was approved.]

Ч/жc

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98

The recommendation to overfly Laos was held in suspension.

DoD was asked to bring in specific details of the particular 34A operations

which required such overflights and the probable advantages of continuing

the operations by means of overflying Laos. State held very positive view

against Laotian overflights.

6. The proposed infiltration and exfiltration operations in Cuba

were approved. Mr. FitzGerald was warned not to cache arms with

agents felt to be under Castro control. He stated that this particular

Cache involved money and other things, but no arms. The caching of

small quantities of arms elsewhere in Cuba was approved.

Memorandum on the operation of autonomous exile groups was noted and no

instructions were given to restrain these operations. The overall' question

of future sabotage operations was discussed. Mr. Bundy agreed to bring

the matter before the President and senior Cabinet officers promptly.

April lst was approved. It was pointed out that since the paper was

drafted, COS and Ambassador in Santiago had reached an agreement about i

the handling of funds.

8.Proposed political action in Zanzibar was approved. Mr. Waller

gave a brief account of the results of the favorable negotiations with the

British. Understood that implementation of this paper was to be

coordinated with the British in accordance with agreement reached in

London]

OTHER MATTERS:

on February men implicate being cha tre was paipta vic rady os

Phnom Penh.

ACTION: I would like to know the facts on this.

2. Question was.

intrusion into Cambod "aised about need for continuing the 30 mile

and Laos. Indications were that the photography

had produced no useful information for MAC.

ACTION: This question should be studied and brought

up for discussion at meeting on April 9th. I should cable

Carter to investigate fully.]

- 2 -

JAM/ mfb

5/ж

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27 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting of 5412 Group

98

1.

The question of the extent of the SAC planes operations in South

Vietnam was discussed against the background of Dr. McMillan's

letter of February 26th.

1. Overflights of South Vietnam - - O.K.

2. Overfly that part of North Vietnam which is within 30 miles

of South Vietnam or of the coast line.

3. That part of Laos which is within 30 miles of the South

Vietnamese border.

4. That part of Cambodia which is not more than 30 miles

from South Vietnam.

With respect to 4.,

instructions were to be given that the primary

purpose of the flights was to survey border activity and the 30 mile shot

is provided to give range and operational flexibility. I felt in reviewing

McMillan's proposal that if the SAC planes were to go as far north as the

Zist parallel, then they should go all the way to the China border and the

proposed CLA operation out of Takhli should be abandoned. This raised the

question of whether civilian or military planes and pilots should be over

North Vietnam to the extent which could not be explained as being "off

course". All agreed that the SAC Air Force operations should be either

limited as outlined above or should cover the entire country. It was

decided to refer the matter to higher authority for decision.

I interposed

no objection to SAC's overflight of North Vietnam but merely took the

position that if they went as far north as proposed by McMillan, they

should cover the entire country.

2. The program of infiltration and exfiltration of Cuba was approved

with the exception of one operation -- operation #434 -- about which

Mr. Cheever explained that he thought the agents we were resupplying were

under Cuban control and the resupply operation was for the purpose of

deception. It was agreed that the resupply should be confined to money and

Imc

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medicine and that the small amount of arms involved should not be cached.

Otherwise the operation was approved.

Alexis Johnson and Mr. Bundy raised questions of the consequences

of finding an arms cache or knocking over an infiltration at the time of the

OAS debate on the Venezuelan problem. Arguments were persuasive that

we should go slowly during this period. I read from the February 25th

Cuban checklist of the deterioration of the spirit of the people of Cuba, the

feeling that we were about to recognize the Castro government and the apathy

toward further resistance as evidence of the price we are paying for

slow-downs and deferments of action against Cuba. I said that I thought our

Cuban program was in complete disarray. We had no policy or covert

operations. We now are hesitating on infiltration and exfiltration, our

economic denial program was failing, while Castro is making significant

progress.

3. (The forcast of NRO activities for March was approved.

4. [The status report on political action in Kenya was approved.

JAM/mfb

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•3, 8.

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON 25, D.G.

file

February 10, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY

Attached is a paper which I would like to table for.

discussion at the next meeting of the 5412 group

Cie

Cyrus R.

Vance

auce

Attachment

Am Hers

lous you

acculate

a fian. Gienin talk chief will hin

TOP SEORET

SENSTIVE

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TO

P. SONS EYES ONLY

February 10, 1964

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Clandestine and Covert Activities Against Cuba

The objective of the U. S. Government is to overthrow

the Castro/Communist regime in Cuba. In accomplishing it's

objective, the U. S. is not willing to risk nuclear war or, at

this time, substantial deterioration in its relations with its

Allies, or significant escalation in tensions between this

country and the Soviets. Thus, any covert U. S. program

should be set at a level that is not likely to incur such risks.

Such a program would appear to be a low-risk, clandestine

program of harassment and sabotage directed against Cuba.

In addition, a program of higher risks seems justified when

it is directed against Cuban subversion of Latin America.

Actions Against Cuba

1. Sabotage. A low level campaign of sabotage and

harassment against Cuba might include such targets as the

Canete Saw Mill, smaller POL storage plants (such as the

one at Pilon), the Nazabal warehouse and pier, and ships

(such as barges or Cuban patrol boats). Where possible,

it would seem desirable to make the raids appear to have

come from within Cuba. Cuban ships outside Cuba can be sabotaged

by discreet means (such as placing sand in gears or sugar in fuel).

2. Harassment of Free World Shipping to Cuba.

a) Initiate a more comprehensive program of

overt and covert pressure against Free World firms trading

with Cuba. In this connection, develop a comprehensive list

of firms doing business with Cuba, check them against known

DOD off-shore and foreign purchase suppliers so that

appropriate retaliation can be applied against those suppliers.

b) Place unactivated incendiary and explosive

devices in cargoes and on ships bound for Cuba and subse~

quently "tip off" port or shipping officials so that they will

search and discover the devices with the attendant publicity.

GRET

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3.

Covert Economic Activities.

a) Intensify covert activities directed against

critical commodities destined for Cuba with resort, if

necessary, to carefully considered and controlled preclu-

sive buying.

b) Make it known discreetly through the press

that we maintain careful records of the companies dealing

with Cuba, suggesting without saying so that these records

constitute a potential "blacklist."

c) Form a group of responsible and qualified

Cuban exile businessmen to maintain pressure on firms

trading with Cuba by indicating that such firms will have

no future in a post-Castro Cuba.

4. To the extent possible, encourage dissidence

among different factions in Cuba - Peking, Moscow,

Nationalist -- by spreading rumors, internal and

external sabotage designed to accomplish this purpose

(such

as actions against homes of leaders, etc).

Actions Against Cuban Subversion in Latin America

lo Develop a list of vulnerable Cuban agents in Latin

America

against whom a concentrated program of bribery,

blackmail and coercion can be instituted.

2. Carefully select key Latin American members of

the Havana-Peking school and institute a program of kidnapping,

and personal and physical harassment, while attempting to

attribute these acts to rivals who support Moscow. Institute

the reverse process as a retaliatory program against Moscow

supporters.

Any of the foregoing activities would be conducted against

a background of U. S. propaganda (black, white and gray) and

political activity designed to increase internal dissension within

Cuba, to support economic isolation of Cuba, to avoid splitting

with our allies over the Cuban issue and to reduce, and perhaps

eliminate, Castro subversion of Latin America. In addition,

surveillance activities should be significantly stepped up.

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