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Document date: 03/24/1976
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Vol: 2: OF 3.

Ohe Unitr» Statre Sruate

NATIONAL: SECURITY INFORMATIONS

Unauthorized Disclosure: Subjects

to Criminal Sanctions

R2862

Report of Proceedings:

Hearing held before

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental

Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities:

Wednesday:

March: 24, 19.76

Washington, D. C. -

(Stenotype. Tape and Waste turned over

to, the Counittee for destruction):

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WARD & PAUL

410 FIRST STREET, S! B

WASHINGTON, D: C. 20003%

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COMMITTEE MEETING

Wednesday,

March 24, 1976

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United States Senate,

Select Committee to Study Governmental

Operations with Respect to

• Intelligence Activities,

Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:23 o'clock

p.m., in Room S-407, the Capitol, the Honorable John Tower

(Vice Chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Tower (presiding), Huddleston, Mondale,

Baker, Mathias and

Schweiker.

Also present: William G. Miller, Staff Director; and

William Bader, Charles Kirbow, Joseph diGenova, Elizabeth.

Culbreath, Elliot Maxwell, Charles Lombard, Rick Inderfurth,

Michael Madigan, Al Quanbeck, Ted Rolston, David Aaron and

Robert Kelley, Professional Staff Members:

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Senator Tower. Why

don't we go ahead and proceed without

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a quorum.

If anybody wants

to raise a point of order later, let

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them do that.

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Mr. Aaron. All right:

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Page 110, Section VIII is the section on oversight and the

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intelligence budget. It contains both an analysis of some of

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the constitutional questions involved in disclosure of intelli-

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gence expenditures, as well as the Committee's analysis or

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the staff's analysis of the particular issue of disclosure

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and its relationship to our national security concerns.

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Two numbers appear in the text that the Committee should

direct its attention to

The most important functioning number

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is the $4.7 billion which the Committee's analysis would

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attribute to the direct costs of national intelligence. That

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is the number which the

findings and recommendations propose

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be made public and be made public annually.

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The second number is a $10 billion figure, which is the

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overall global costs of all intelligence, based upon the

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analysis of the Committee staff, essentially Mr. Quanbeck. This

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includes not only the $4.7 billion of national intelligence, but

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it includes tactical intelligence and it includes what I think

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you have to call indirect costs of the intelligence establishment.

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For example, the fact that intelligence officers in the military

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go through certain training programs and have certain medical

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facilities

and so forth and so on, these costs are not costs

in the sense that they

are exclusively devoted to intelligence.

I mean, if we were, for example, to have no intelligence, that

doesn't mean you would

save that entire $10 billion. These

are

in effect, I think those who worked on the defense budget

before

are aware of what indirect costs are and how one calculates

them.

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Those essentially are the two numbers.

There is, of course,

a dispute

about whether it is necessary or desirable to reveal

the numbers, and I might just say in that connection, the

primary reason for giving the global figure is in part to

settle a lot of public

debate about these enormous costs of

intelligence in a manner which will make it clear what it is

one has been talking about, and that in fact a lot of these

are indirect costs, a lot of these are tactical and integral

to the normal functioning of military commands.

The recommendations start on page 114, and there are only

three of them. I think the decision of the Committee has to

go to the question of

the numbers to begin with; whether they

should be indicated in

the text, and then the recommendations,

the first of which being that there be a national intelligence

budget, that it be made public, that the figure, the global

figure for the national intelligence budget, which would be

the $4.7 billion, be made, public, and that the Committee-

recommend further that the oversight committee consider whether

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it is necessary, given

the requirement of the Constitution and

so forth, to publish more details.

I must say the latter point raises a textual question which

we have to look at, and that is the way one describes what

revealing the national

intelligence number would do in terms

of the constitutional requirements.

What we have suggested here is on page 112 there are, I

think, some points of view which say that revealing that

number is not sufficient to satisfy the Constitution. There is.

another point of view which says that the national security

is overriding and that

this number should not be disclosed at

all, and therefore even

not disclosing any numbers still

satisfies the Constitution

What we have attempted

to capture in the first sentence

of the full paragraph

believe, felt was just

on page 112 is what the Subcommittee, I

about the right balance between the

requirements of national security and the requirements of the

Constitution.

It reads, "The Cormittee believes that disclosure of an

aggregate figure for national intelligence is as far as it is

prudent to go at this

stage in reconciling the nation's

constitutional and national security requirements.

Senator Tower. All right.

Shall we take this page by page now and see what --

Senator Huddleston. I would suggest that we go on the

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three recommendations,

Mr. Chairman.

Senator Tower. Take the recommendations?

All right.

First, let me just

ask if there is any substantial disagree-

ment with anything in the text here. I think it has got

probably as good

a balance as you can on this figure, given

the aggregate figure.

Well, you don't have line' items on the

figure in that anyway.

Senator Huddleston.

Probably not. We hassled over it

pretty much, and I will

say this: the staff that did the work

on the budget did an outstanding job, so I think we had a better

look at the budget of intelligence than anybody has had.

Senator Tower. Well,

I'll bet there is nobody around here

that can challenge the

figures.

Senator Huddleston.

That is right, even the Administration.

I think it is reasonable. Of course, we will have a

question on the numbers that we have included maybe in the

text, as far as

the Agency' is concerned in sanitization, but I

think our recommendation to include an aggregate figure is

sound, plus further consideration be given to the constitutional

requirements.

Senator Tower.

Any objection, then, to the text, pages 110

through 113.

Senator Baker. I have

no objection, MI. Chairman.

Senator Tower. All right.

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Dee, do you want to address yourself to the recommenda-

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tions?

Senator Huddleston.

think David explained them pretty

well. The main thing

is that we recommend that an aggregate

total which would correspond to that $4.7 billion figure be

included in the budget that is presented to Congress, and

thereby it would be made, of course, public, and that the

oversight committee consider further whether it would be neces-

sary in order to fulfill

the requirements of the Constitution to

go further than that:

There is a question of additional study

there.

The monitoring, that is

just an oversight responsibility,

it seems to me, No. 2 there.

And then the GAO

report, which is essentially available any-

time anyway•

Senator Tower. Well,

let me ask you this.

Is inherent in this No. I the suggestion that when OMB

makes its recommendations, 'they come in with a national figure?

Mr. Miller. This committee?

Senator Tower. No

OMB, when they present the annual

budget, they present a

national -

Senator Huddleston.

Under our plan, the DCI would do

that.

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Mr. Miller. The DCI would do that.

In the presentation that the people from the CIA gave to

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this Committee, they have the capacity to array it in a way

that would be useful to

oversight committee, so the figure

$4.7 billion corresponds

really to their perception of what

national intelligence

is.

The larger figure,

the

$9.7 billion is based on further

work done by this Committee.

They dispute some of the items

but not the basic approach

• Mr. Aaron. As you

know, the new executive order, the

Director of Central Intelligence will be presenting to the

President a consolidated

national intelligence budget, and he

will in fact be preparing

that budget. In effect we are

recommending that it be

presented to the Congress.,

Earlier

there are recommendations

along those lines, that that budget

be presented to the Congress.

This would say, in

effect, that that global figure, not

the breakdown, be made

public.

Mr. Quanbeck. I think it would be important that the

Congress, together with the executive branch, define exactly

what goes in that national intelligence budget.. There really

is no agreement at this

time.

Senator Tower. Any further comment on the recommendations?

Senator Schweiker!

One question. When we talk about

releasing a figure publicly, which of these figures are we

talking about?

MI. Aaron. .

It would be the $4.7 billion, down to the first

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subtotal, national intelligence effort.

Mr. Quanbeck. We also propose to release the $9.7

billion to show some relationship to what the House has already

released.

They released a figure of $10.5 billion.

Mr. Kirbow.. I think the Senator's question went to in the

future, annually.

Mr. Quanbeck. Yes, that would be the $4.7 billion.

Senator Huddleston. I don't know whether we ought to

change that figure from $10 billion to $9.7 billion.

Mr. Aaron. I think we ought to use the same figure all

the way through.

MI. Kirbow. I think if you say $10 billion and jump back

to $9.7 billion - if you just say approximately $10 billion.

Senator Schweiker. What is the reason of the Subcommittee

in releasing the $4.7 billion as opposed to the $9.7 billion?

Senator Huddleston. Well, $4.7 billion represents more

of the direct costs of our national intelligence.. You have

got three different figures there. As you go up to $6.9

billion you are picking up your tactical and military intelli

gence. Then when you pick up the next $2 billion or so there,

that is support costs that while they are necessary for intelli-

gence, they are not necessary just because of intelligence.

You could probably golion -- they would go on even if you

eliminated all of your intelligence.

Senator Tower I think the first paragraph on 113 deals

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with that. Thus, the entire amount could not be saved if there

were no intelligence activities funded by it through the

Defense Department.

Senator Schweiker.

Won't you conceal more from the other

side if you release the entire figure?

I don't have any strong argument, but it just seems to me

that one of your problems

is that if you give the indirect

figures you would confuse the enemy and you would still level

with the public to a greater extent.

Senator Tower. Well,!

I'm told the Agency would rather

have the $4.7 billion figure.

Senator Huddleston. I think they like the national figure

without getting into the tactical.

Senator Schweiker:

Okay, I

don't feel strongly about

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it.

Senator Baker. I think Dick has got a good point, but

I guess their preference in this respect -

Senator Huddleston. Well, they don't want it to look too

high, for one thing.

Senator Baker.. Well,

who knows what is too high?

Senator Tower. You know, the critics have been saying we

are going to be spending $l0 billion.

Senator Baker. Oh, that, they are going to stop and they're

going: to say we've been spending $4 billion in the same tone of

voice.

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Senator Tower. Well,

$10 billion is more powerful than

$4.7 billion because it is higher.

Senator Baker. I knew

that and I knew that would be the

answer.

Mr. Aaron. I might say that there is also the consideration

that the $4.7 billion number, under our proposed oversight

committee, it would be the

number that was authorized and

therefore presumably would have to be made public in the author

ization bill.

Senator Tower. Anything further on Section VIII?

All right, Section IX.

Mr. Aaron. The next

section deals with chemical and

biological agents and the

intelligence community, and I

might call on Elliot to describe it because he did most of the

work in this area, you recall. We had a hearing on the subject

of the toxins and what have

you. We also had even more I think

in-depth analysis of the whole problem of drug testing as

it existed in the CIA and

to

some extent in the military.

Elliot?

Mr. Maxwell. The section tries to deal with both the

testing and the shift from defensive to offensive concerns as

well as the problems involved in particularly the surreptitious

administration of drugs

unwitting, non-volunteer human

subjects.

All the Senators are

TO

knowledgeable about the Olsen case.

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In a related matter, another person was killed is a result of

a military intelligence testing program conducted in New York.

These were very highly sensitive programs that were begun in

response to a concern by the Agency and the military that

individuals in the American government or agents of the

American

government would be kidnapped or held by hostile

powers

and would have these

drugs used against them either for

interrogation purposes or to gain control.

They soon, however,

became used as testing programs for

our use of chemical

and biological agents. These included not

only the toxins, but also

testing of LSD, sodium pentathol among

others. The problems involved were not only the concern over

the human rights of individual subjects, but the procedures

within the CIA, in this case, in which internal CIA's concern

over the security of the program led to the waiving of

certain administrative controls so that in 1957, for instance,

the Inspector General, doing a survey of the whole program, had

no knowledge that there was this particular unwitting testing

program going on.

The Committee recommendations go to the question of waiver

of Agency regulations, a problem that we have had all the way

through whereby regulations are issued by the Director and

thus can be waived at any time, and the Committee, or the

Subconmittee recommendations would require that if there were

a waiver of such regulations, they be reported to the Committee

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end .1

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so that they would know how

the internal governance of the

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agency has changed.

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secondly, it deals with the establishment, of really, the

continuation of a body presently in existence, the President's

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Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical

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and Behavioral Research, which is drawing up standards for

testing on human subjects within the government.

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There is a piece of legislation, S. 2515, introduced which

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would continue the life of that commission and would provide

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the commission with jurisdiction over DOD and the CIA. The

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CIA and DOD have both expressed individually their agreement

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with having their experimentation governed by the standards of

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this Commission.

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Finally, it indicates

the Committee's hope that the

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Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense

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will continue the efforts' they are making to find those people

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who were subjects of the tests and to make sure that they

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have proper medical treatment available if it is requirea.

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Senator Schweiker. Ijjust wanted to say this recommendation

here coincides with what our health subcommittee is working on

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and also with what the Domestic Subcommittee is coming up with.

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So we do have a fairly unified and integrated -

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Senator Tower. Any

comment on this section?

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Mr. diGenova. The only thing I would say in regard to the

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first recommendation would be that one way of reading it is that

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it reads "the Director," and it should be also nrobably amended

to include not only the Director but anybody in the Department of

Defense.

Senator Tower. Yeah, (the stylistic has to be changed to

include everybody involved.

Mr. diGenova. It says "The Director shall be required to

provide immediately the

reasons for the waiver." And maybe he

should first be required to

identify that there is a waiver, and

then the reasons, because

then it could be possibly read that

he only have to give the reasons if asked. It could be construed

that he does not have to come up here and tell that they are in

fact in a waiver --

Senator Schweiker.

This doesn't give him a right to

violate the law, does it, Elliot? What do you mean by that

because I read it two ways.

Mr. Maxwell. There are certain regulations that we

are recommending CIA issuel! internal directives and the like,

if -- and this is a general recommendation that just was

placed here because it dealt with the waiver of regulations

in this particular case, but in cases where an internal

directive is promulgated, this would require the Director to

notify. committees of waivers that take place.. The Committee

could then ask him for the reasons for the waiver.

It is a general recommendation so that the Committee is

able to determine when there have been changes in the governing

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procedures which it will be familiar with because they will

have copies of the Agency regulations. It would not provide

any right to violate the law.

Senator Schweiker. That isn't clear. I would like to see

something said about it in Section 2 below. In other words,

when I first read it I thought that even though we have the

law, the Director can waive the law as long as he tells somebody

he is doing it. I would like to do something to the effect

that such waiver does not --

Mr. Maxwell. Well, I think the intention of the Subcommittee

was that this provision, if the Full Committee approves it,

would go to the back section on general recommendations

affecting CIA, DOD and the intelligence communities.

Mr. Kirbow. You mean a waiver of any regular internal

regulation would have to be reported to the oversight committee.

Then it is probably too broad, Mr. Chairman, because that

means that a simple waiver of a Department of Defense regulation

having to do with some reimbursement of travel or anything

like that would fall under this general -- if you are talking

about the drug program or just the CIA's programs like that,

I could see it. Otherwise,

this is a very broad mandate

reguiring extensive communication between the executive branch

on a daily basis.

Senator Schweiker.

We are in trouble here, Elliot, because

as

I read it, this is so poorly written that if I want to waive

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the fact that we don't, recruit clergymen, I can. as I read

this thing, recruit clergymen, and just be required to advise

people that I am doing

fit:

You have really got tỏ

narrow this.

• Mr. Maxwell. The problem it was geared to was if in fact

the Committee chooses

to

dợ

certain things by way of internal.

directives, by requiring Agency regulations to be amended, there

is at this point no, in particular circumstances, no requirement

that the Director who

1S

responsible for the issuance of those

regulations

notify the

oversight committee.

I think Charlie's

point

is very well take in the sense

that it is too broad

now; and

we can attempt to narrow it, but

it does govern a whole

series of questions directed toward

internal directives.

MI. Aaron. I think

the

first question, Mr. Chairman, is do

we want to include the

Depärtment of Defense in this

particular

Recommendation 1. If we

do want to include the Department of

Defense under this waiver,

we have a very large issue.

Is my understanding correct that that was a suggestion that

had

been made earlier?

Mr. Kirbow. The point

I was trying to make was that if

this was to be a general recommendation, we should take it

out of the drug section

and put it in the back.

Mr. diGenova. Is

there the general recommendation or is

it only in

the drug area?

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Mr. Maxwell. My personal opinion would be that because

we are making a number of recommendations in regard to the

amending of the internal directives of the CIA, that some pro-

vision should be made for a general recommendation insofar as

the oversight committee would be notified should there be a

waiver for a particular reason by the Director of the internal

directives that we are asking him to promulgate.

There is no requirement at this point that if the

Director is asked to promulgate regulations in regard to the

recruitment of clergy, that they would have to notify the over-

sight committee that that was being done. You could simply

waive the regulation in this particular case.

Now, it might be argued that this would fall into the

fully and currently informed.

Senator Huddleston. Well, I think here first of all

we

ought to address ourselves to the drug problem. It seems to me

that No. 2 should have been No. I to start with. First establish

what

Senator Schweiker. I don't really think it belongs here.

I think you really get a can of worms, because I can read this

to have a waiver to assassinate Presidents, you know. We've

got a policy. There is no statute now, and our policy is to nọt

assassinate, so we can waive and say it is okay.

Senator Huddleston. Why don't

we just strike the waiver

paragraph.

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Senator Tower. You

can look at it anothe:: way, too.

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the extent that this procedure is required of any kind of regu-

lation, be it a minor regulation on staff travel policy or

some damned insignificant thing. like that.

Mr. Maxwell. I think that is correct. As it is now drawn,

it is overly broad, and I don't think it belongs here. I think

it probably belongs in the question of whether we make clear at

some point that fully and currently informed includes any

question of waiver of major regulations by the Director.

Another example would be

that where a regulation now

provides the Inspector General have access to all information,

that could be waived and has been waived in the past by the

Director in order not to allow the Inspector General to have

access, and in that condition you would want the oversight

committee's to know that such a waiver had been made. That

is why this is a general recommendation.

Senator Schweiker. But you are setting up a bypass route.

That troubles me because

it

seems to me you go into any area,

you can get around it by

alwaiver. I would rather not address

ourselves to the subject

and

make it clear he has to issue

new regulation.

After all,

he can still amend his own

regulations. If it is just

regulation; the way to do it is

amend the regulation.

Why

give them a cause to cheat?

Mr. Miller. Senator,

"I think this is addressed by two

provisions we have suggested. The first is in the oversight

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legislation which says

"fully and currently informed," of anything

beyond a nitpicking, minor, trivial things that the oversight

committee would not be worried about. The committee would be

informed it would be the obligation of the agencies to do

it.

Secondly, in the general provisions here, we have the

provision for a classified Federal Registry where regulations

are required to be deposited, and the oversight committee has

access to any changes in régulations, including such things as

waivers and so on.

So I think in those two ways, the kind of question that

Elliot is worried about really. is covered. So I don't think

it is necessary.

Senator Schweiker. So let's delete it then..

Mr. Aaron.

Well, before we do, may I make one comment?

First of all, I think it should be understood that the

Director of the Agency writes his own regulations. The Directof

of the Agency can amend his own regulations whenever he .

wishes, and the Director of the Agency can waive his own

regulations whenever he wishes. The regulations may be secret

or classified regulations. And he may waive them or amend

them in secret.

Now, there are a number of recommendations that we make

that go to the suggestion; that certain regulations be adopted

by the Agency.

For example, we have had an extensive discussion

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of the use of academics or certain categories of personnel.

They have a very important regulation called 50-10, which

regulates how they can use Americans or members of the Vatican

or members of the Red Cross

or numbers of different kinds of

people.

Some of these regulations say, you want to use somebody

you have to get a waiver, or sometimes -- well, there ae all

sorts of provisions like that.

Now, I think the point of this suggestion was to make it

clear that in these important policy cases, if there is to be a

waiver which can take place

on

a classified basis, it is

brought to the attention

. of

the oversight committee, for these

matters, not for the normai

personnel and such issues.

My personal view is

that this is not covered by our

recommendations governing

currently and fully informed, because

that recommendation goes

to

covert action.

Mr. Miller.

No, it

doesn't.

Mr. Aaron. As far as I am aware, that is what it goes

to.

Mr. Kirbow. Might I suggest that if the Committee desires

notice of changes in regulations on major policy questions, that

we simply have the staff rewrite this to say that and put it

back in the other section and consider it next time around.

Senator Tower. I think it is going to have to be rewritten

because everybody is unclear about it.

Senator Schweiker. It doesn't belong here.

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Mr. diGenova. There has to be a caveat in there that even

though you are talking

about a waiver, you are still not talking

about anything that is

"inconsistent with the laws

and the

Constitution of the United States, because we say that all

the

way through, and the waiver cannot encompass a violation of

a

law that the Congress has passed.

Senator Huddleston. That ought to be added to the general

recommendations.

Mr. Maxwell. I think that is where it belongs

Senator Schweiker. And redrafted back to the Committee

Senator Tower. All right. If everybody is agreed,

that will be redrafted and made a part of the general recommen-

dations.

Mr. Maxwell.

It would deal with both waiver and promulgating

new regulations.

Mr. Aaron. Right.

Senator Tower. Yes.

Mr. Bader.

And Elliot, I assume amend the current

regulations.

Mr. Aaron. May I suggest in doing this we take the

point made by MI. Miller and start out by simply saying, in

accordance with the policy of being currently and fully.

informed on all signficant Agency activities, because the only

place we have that phrase now is in the covert action case.

Senator Huddleston.

That ought to be established.

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Mr. diGenova. It is

now on all intelligence activity.

Senator Tower. All right.

2 and 3 no objection.

All right, let's move to Section x.

Mr. Aaron. All right, now, we are on to the General

Recommendations. We have five of them.

I might just say at the outset, these I think fall into the

category of what the staff would say or put forward as good

ideas, in other words, that we haven't had a hearing on each

one of these subjects; our total experience on some of them

leads us to feel that some!

of these steps would be very useful;

some of them fall into the category I think of helpful sugges-

tions as to how we might proceed in some of these general areas.

The first one on secufity clearances, I think perhaps Mr.

Miller would want to talk to it.. He had

a great deal of

experience with the security clearance problem

as this

committee was established, and I think it. flows from his

experience.

Mr. Miller. Well, this very simply is based on our own

Committee's experience on security clearances, and also based

on the GAO study that was made of security clearances.

There are on the civilian side vast inconsistencies in

procedure and practice and degree of thoroughness in the

security clearance process.

The suggestion here is that for

the civilian intelligence community, and possibly for the

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Congressional Committees,

that there be a single applicable

standard, that it be done by one agency, that what would flow

from this are economies. and a consistency of purpose and a

consistency of standard.

This is something that I think would profit well in the

future.

Senator Tower® Okay.

Anything more on that?

All right, personnel practices.

Mr. Aaron. All right. I think the purpose of this is

we have found as we have talked to a number of people in inter-

views and what have you that to ensure in these areas where

there is a potential for people straying across the line of

constitutional rights of others, that there be a conscious

effort made by the Federal

Government to inculcate its employees

with the proper idea of what the law and the Constitution

require. That is the basic

thrust of Recommendation B.

Senator Tower.. Any comment on that?

All right, Section C, security functions of the intelligence

agencies.

Mr. Aaron.

Now, I think this makes a general observation

concerning what the security function of intelligence agencies

not involved in law enforcement, what

in effect the policy

should be. This is not a

recommendation as to precisely how

one might implement that policy, and I take it perhaps you

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could inform us, Bob and Mike, as to the Domestic Group I

believe is doing a considerable amount of work on dealing with

the specifics of this

This would really simply be the policy statement.

Elliot?

Mr. Maxwell. There is

a problem in that in that the last

sentence of that,

security functions of the intelligence

agencies may be in conflict with the detailed recommendations

of the Domestic Subcommittee, and then a number of activities

which were undertaken under Operation CHAOS and Operation

MERRIMAC were designed in a larger

sense and interpreted in

the larger sense to be based on the authority to protect the

Agency's personnel and facilities and to ensure that intelligence

personnel follow proper security practices.

MI. Miller. But they were abuses of those missions..

There was no problem with the missions, per se.

Mr. Kelley. The problem is they didn't think it was an

abuse at the time. They just interpreted it broad enough.

I think we can flag this to be coordinated.

Mr. Kirbow. I do have some serious reservation about the

detail which the Domestic report goes on this, and that is a

general statement of policy. I think this Committee or the

subcommittee should adopt kind of a general policy that they

do have the requirement and that we think they should be

authorized to do this in each individual agency. Otherwise

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we wind up leaving not only personnel facilities but putting

a

man's record in the record, and for the most part it is

pretty naked.

MI. Kelley. Charlie,

II think that is true, and I think

we have to make these match and fit. I don't think we can

take any action on this not knowing what the other side has

reference to.

Senator Tower. The Chairman requested that we carry over

D until his return, so to accede to his request, we will postpone

consideration of D.

E deals with Federal Register for Classified Executive

Orders.

Mr. Miller. This is a provision that was introduced some

years ago by Senator Mathias and Senator Ervin dealing with the

problem of -- it was discovered during the investigation of

emergency powers that there

were a great many orders of the

President which because they were not called executive orders

were not put into

the Federal Register. The intention was to

bring all lawful orders of the President in the Register.

we

also found that there was provision for some classified material

in the Federal Register, although it was very seldom used.

The purpose for this is to have a place where the lawful

orders of the President

and

executive orders, by whatever

name

called, are put in a place for purposes of official record.

Senator Tower.

This would be a separate Federal

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Register, in effect, for classified regulations and orders.

MI. Miller. That's right.

Senator Tower. And would have, of course, very limited

circulation. It would not be a public record.

Mr. Miller. That is right.

Senator Tower.

And do we say anything about access or

provision?

Mr. Miller. Only by the oversight committee.

Senator Tower. By

appropriate Congressional oversight

committee would mean not necessarily the oversight committee,

but it could mean Appropriations or Armed Services.

Mr. Miller.

That's right, in their area of jurisdiction.

Senator Tower. Anything further on that?

Mr. Kirbow. There is

an escape valve. There is a

provision where he can

do something immediately and then

file it in an emergency situation.

Senator Tower. All right.

With the instructions to redraft Item 1 on page 118; and

put it in the General Recommendations, with the reservation that

the Chairman will want to take up Section D on page 120, and.

we will consider it adopted. Of course, in that we operated

without a quorum, a motion to reconsider on anybody's part is

in order.

All right.

Senator Mathias. An eventuality which is horrible to

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contemplate.

Senator Tower. Senator Huddleston here has some redrafted

language.

Senator Huddleston.

Well, we have two very difficult

subjects to

resolve which I think will complete our findings

and recommendations. One, of course, is the covert action which

the Chairman has incorporated in some of his suggestions and

wants to be here when we consider it, tomorrow I take it.

Also

yesterday at the suggestion

of Senator Mondale, we rewrote some

provisions relating to the

use of academics, and I would

suggest that

we hold that over also to give us a chance to

look at this, to reconsider

the whole matter of academics and

be prepared to move on it

forthwith, tomorrow, if

that is the

day the Chairman is going

to

be here.

MI. Miller. Yes, he is.

Senator Huddleston.

And

see if

we

can't resolve these

two things tomorrow, and we

Chairman.

will have it wrapped up, Mr.

Ms. Culbreath. Mr. Chairman, in connection with the

attempted rewrite that we worked on, there are a couple of

typos in here that might help you if anybody really has time to

look at them.

On page 77, on these inserts, about six lines down the

second word is typed "for confirmation," and the word that was

intended there was "for continuation." This is under

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Recommendation 43.

Senator Tower.

for "confirmation."

The ninth line, substitute "continuation"

Ms. Culbreath.

That is the main one. There may be a

few others, but that was

the

main one that really had a

very different meaning.

Senator Tower. Any more

on that?

Then this will be carried over until the Chairman

returns.

Senator Huddleston.

• I understand he will be here

tomorrow?

Senator Tower.

He will be.

Mr. Miller. Yes,

he will be tomorrow morning.

He called and asked to

meet tomorrow at 10:00 and

2:00 and

Friday at 10:00.

Senator Tower. All right.

Does that complete our business now?

MI. Miller. I believe so, sir.

Senator Tower. All right, we will reassemble again at

10:00 o'clock tomorrow morning, and then at 2:00 o'clock

tomorrow afternoon. So until that time the Committee is in

recess.

(Whereupon, at 3:02.5 o'clock p.m., the Committe recessed

to

reconvene at 10:00 o'clock a.m., Thursday, March 25, 1976.)

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