Document date: 00/00/0000
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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Released under the John

F. Kennedy

Assassination Records

Collection Act of 1992

144 USC 2107 Notel •

Case#: NW 55261 Date:

04-10-2018

File #:

80-JN-662

Serial Scope:

1-26

11H

34085870 Page 1-

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## Page 2

FD-36 (Rev. 8-29-85)

TRANSMIT VIA:

X Teletype

• Facsimile

FBI

PRECEDENCE:

• Immediate

I Priority

§ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

• TOP SECRET

• SECRET

• CONFIDENTIAL

• UNCLAS EFT O

T UNCLAS

Date

12-24486

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FM JACKSON (80-662) ROUTINE

TO DIRECTOR, FBI ROUTINE

(ATTENTION: DENNIS MILLER, ROOM 5129)

BI

UNCLAS

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

RE BUREAU TELETYPE

TO ALL OFFICES DECEMBER 17, 1986.

AN IMMEDIATE REVIEW OF JACKSON'S GENERAL, ELSUR AND

CONFIDENTIAL INDICES FAILED TO REVEAL ANY REFERENCE TO ALBERT

HAKIM OR RICHARD V. SECORD.

GENERAL INDICES WERE CHECKED BY ELIZABETH A. QUARLES,

ELSUR INDICES BY VERNA A. LEE AND CONFIDENTIAL INDICES BY

PEGGY D. BRUMFIELD.

B'T

358/0002

D- Jackson

WEW/ kbn

80-6662-26

(1)

searched A

Serializeo

заехе

NNNN

Approved:

Transmitted

Vumbe

(Time)

DO NOT DESTROY E

See 199-0-92

NH 55275 DocId: 32989840 Page 2

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FORMS, TEXT HAS 1 DOCUMENT

OUTBOX, 1 (#58)

TEXT:

JNO 0002 3590200Z

RR HQ

DE JN

R 242330Z DEC 56

FM JACKSON (80-662) ROUTINE

TO DIRECTOR, FSI ROUTINE

(ATTENTION: DENNIS MILLER, ROOM 5129)

"BT

UNCLAS

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALL OFFICES DECEMBER 17, 1986.

AN IMMEDIATE REVIEW OF JACKSON'S GENERAI, ELSUR AND

CONFIDENTIAL INDICES FAILED TO REVEAL ANY REFERENCE TO ALBERT

HAKIM OR RICHARD V. SECORD.

GENERAL INDICES WERE CHECKED BY ELIZABETH A. QUARLES

ELSUR INDICES BY VERNA A, LEE AND CONFIDENTIAL INDICES BY

PEGGY D. BRUMEIELD.

ST

358/0002

NNNN

===

80-167-26

Searched

Serialized

CXU0

Indexed

Filed

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DooId: 32989840 Page 3

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Indices Search Slip

FD-160 (Rev. 7-21-83)

TO: OFFICE SERVICES MANAGER

. Subject

ALBERT

Aliases

HAKIMO

Address

• Exact Spelling

I All References

• Main Security Case Files Only

Security References Only

File & Serial Number

Birth Date

Date

12/18/86

Social Security Account #

Birthplace

Race

• Main Criminal Case Files Only

• Criminal References Only

• Main Security (if no Main, list all Security References)

Main Criminal (If no Main, list all Criminal References)

• Restrict Locality of

Remarks

File & Serial Number

Remarks

Sex

• Male

• Female

S

CECI

FBI/DOJ

DO NOT DESTROY ERN

See 199-0-92

Requested by

SAC Wielan de Nhala

M General Indices:

ales

12-18-848

Squad

2

• ISIS:

• Confidential Indices:

Searched by

• OCIS:

Searched by

VV ELSUR Indicos

Searched by

legative the

Searched by

• IIS:

12/19/86

Searched by

Consolidated by

Date

Reviewed by

Date

Extension

File No.

80-662-25

Date

Date

Date

File Review Symbols

I - Identical

NI - Not identical

? - Not identifiable

U - Unavailable reference

HH 55275 DocId:32989840 Page 4

SLANCHE CO

SERIALIZED.

ANCEACA

4014180

2000

#U.S. 'GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE': 1985-491-510342001

EI-MAISON

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## Page 5

Indices Search Slip

FD-160 (Rev. 7-21-83)

TO: OFFICE SERVICES MANAGER

Subject

RICHARD V. SECORD

Aliases

Address

• Exact Spelling

All References

• Main Security Case Files Only

Security References Only

File & Serial Number

Birth Date

Date

12/18/86

Social Security Accbunt #™

Birthplace

• Main Criminal Case Files Only

• Criminal References Only

• Main Security (if no Main, list all Security References)

• Main Criminal (if no Main, list all Criminai References)

Remarks

File & Serial Number

Race

[ Restrict Locality of

Remarks

Sex

• Male

• Female

S

EGIAL

FBI/DOJ

ĐÔ NƠT DESTROY E

See 199-0-92

Requested by

ASAC Willian JardWhale

* Goneral Indices:

12-18-86

Searched by

A conten no le te 1785

Searched by

AL ELSUR Indices:

Searched by

Legatue

te 13/17/86

Consolidated by

Reviewed by

Squad

2

• ISIS:

Searched by

• OCIS:

Searched by

•IS:

Searched by

Date

Date

Extension

File No.

Date

Date

Date

80-662-24

CEC 18 1986

FOI - JACKSON

* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1985-491-510:42001

1 - Identical

NI - Not identical

File Review Symbols

? - Not identifiable

U - Unavailable reference

HH 55275 DocId: 32989840 Page 5

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## Page 6

FORMS, TEXT HAS 1 DOCUMENT

INBOX.: ($380)

TEXT:

VZCZCHQ0052

00 ASO

ĐE HQ $0052

3510053

ZNR WUUUU

0 172325Z DEC 86

FM DIRECTOR, FBI

TO ALL FBI FIELD OFFICES

ALL LEGAI ATTACHES

• UNCLAS

9ü 662

*SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE. V 6L LET

THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE SENT A LETTER

TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL WHICH READS IN PERTINENT PART AS

FOLLOWS: "TO ASSIST IT IN ITS CURRENT INVESTIGATION, THE

COMMITTEE REQUIRES THE DOCUMENTS DESCRIBED BELOW:

"-- ANY AND ALL MATERIAL WHICH ARE IN POSSESSION OF THE

DEPARTMENT, AS A RESUZI OF PREVIOUS INVESTIGATIONS OR OTHER

ACTIVITIES, WHICH RELATE TO FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS INVOLVING

ALBERT HAKIM WHICH INCLUDE USE OF BANK ACCOUNTS IN

SWITHERLAND;

"-- ANY AND ALL MATERIALS WHICH ARE IN POSSESSION OF THE

DO NOT DESTROY ETEL

See 199-0-92

80-662-23

SEARCHED_

INDEXED SW

SERIALIZED ACK

_ FILED N

DEC 1 8 1986

-BI-JACKSON

pes kaidle

2

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PAGI INO 28 My 0052 130-4

DEPARUMENT, AS À RESOLE DE PREVIOUS INVESTIGATIONE 0S OTHES

ACEIVITISE, KRICE RELATI TO TRAXSACTIONE INVOLVING RICHARD V.

SECORD IN WHICH IT IS BELIEVED THAT INGEGAL PROFITE LIGRE HAVE

BEEN MADE DEE IC THE SAGE DE DELIVER CELESS,

MUNITIONS, OR MILITARY CA DIAL-JEE ENUEEMENT OR SERVICES TO

FOREIG NATIONS, GROUPS, DEGAN ZARTUNEES

INDIVIDUALE,"

ALL OFFICIE AND LEGATS

IMMEZ-ATILY REVIEX THOROUGELI AT-

FILES AXO THEREAFTER MAKE PHOTOCOPIES OF AUL JODIMENTS

RISPONSIVE TO THE COMMITTEE'S REQUEST, SEND THESE PHOTOCORIES

TO FIND, ATION DENNIS MINDER, MOOW S129, THIS MIEST

SHOULD RECEIVE TIP PRIORITY, A FROMPT AND

THOROUGH RESPONSE

IS ANTICIPATED.

3.

#0852

3300X

HIT

55275

DocId: 32989840

Page

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## Page 8

FORMS, TEXT HAS 1 DOCUMENT

INBOX, (+330)

TEXT:

VZCZCHQ0052

00 ASO

DE HQ 40052 3510053

ZNR UUUUU

0 1723252 DEC 86

EM DIRECTOR, FBI

TO ALI FBI FIELD OFFICES

ALL LEGAL ATTACHES

BT

UNCLAS

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE.

THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE SENT À LETTER

TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL WHICH READS IN PERTINENT PART AS

FOLLOWS: "TO ASSIST IT IN ITS CURRENT INVESTIGATION, THE

COMMITTEE REQUIRES THE DOCUMENTS DESCRIBED BELOW:

"_- ANY AND ALL MATERIAL WHICH ARE IN POSSESSION OF THE

DEPARTMENT, AS A RESULI OF PREVIOUS INVESTIGATIONS OR OTHER

ACTIVITIES, WHICH RELATE TO FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS INVOLVING

ALBERT HAKIM WHICH INCLUDE USE OF BANK ACCOUNTS IN

miNg 19.41

"151

SWITZERLAND:

"-- ANY AND ALL MATERIALS WHICH ARE IN POSSESSION OF THE

19149-0-72

80-662-23

SEARCHED.

SERIALIZEBAY

INDEXED

_ PILED_S

HUTT

DEC 18 1986

mant

1H4: 55275

DocId: 32989840 Page 8

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## Page 9

TWO DE HQ 005Z UNCL

DEPARTMENT, AS A RESULT OF PREVIOUS INVESTIGATIONS OR OTHER

ACTIVITIES, WHICH RELATE TO TRANSACTIONS INVOLVING RICHARD V.

EXCORD IN WHICH IT IS BELIEYED THAT SLINGAL PROFITE MIGHT HAVE

BEEN MADE DUE TO THE SALE OR DELIVERY OF U, S. ARMS,

MUNITIONS, OR MILITARY OR DUAL-USE EQUIPMENT OR SERVICES TO

FOREIGN NATIONS, GROUPS, ORGANIZZETONS-OR INDIVIDUALS. "

ALL OFFICES AND LEGATS/ IMMEDIATELY REVIEW THOROUGHLY ALL

FILES AND THEREAFTER MAKE PHOTOCORIES OF ALL DOCLMENTS

RESPONSIVE TO THE COMMITTEE'S REQUEST, SEND THESE PHOTOCOPIES

TO FBIHO, ATTENTION DENNIS MILLER, ROOM 5129, THIS REQUEST

SHOULD RECEIVE TOP PRIORITY, A PROMPT ÄND THOROUGH RESPONSE

3 ANTICIPATED.

BT

40052

34

NNNN

30-664-23

104

55275

DooId: 32989840

Page

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Post Office Box 1450

Jackson, Mississippi 39205

December 22, 1977

Senator Carroll Ingram

30th District

307 West Pine Street

Hattiesburg, Mississippi 39401

Dear Senator Ingram:

In regard to your letter of December 16, 1977,

wherein you invited me to testify before your Committee

in order to discuss the operation of the FBI within this

this office is generally defined many weeks in advance

of those dates.

do he a ten and do to i to the te verte a date

Federal enforcement area within the State of Mississippi.

Sincerely,

Patrick W. Murray

Acting Special

Agent in Charge

1- Addressee

Jackson

PWM/cmb

(2)

SeriaHead

Lamed --

80-662-27

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statins

thic

NORI

press

COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENTS:

Judiciary En Bane, Chairman

Judiciary "A", Chairman

Banks

Executive Contingent Fund

Finance

Interstate and Federal Cooperation

Labor

Publle Utilities

JACKSON

SENATOR CARROLL INGRAM

30th District

Forrest - Lamar - Stone Counties

307 W. Pine St., Hattiesburg 39401

December 16, 1977

0ff. 545-2211

Res. 544-3319

Mr. Pat Murray

Acting Special Agent in Charge

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Post Office Box 1450

Jackson, Mississippi 39205

Dear Mr. Murray:

The Judiciary Committee of the Mississippi State Senate will conduct

hearings on the criminal law enforcement agencies and the courts in the state

of Mississippi during the 1978 Regular Session. Generally, the committee

would like to undertake a comprehensive review of theofficials and agencies

within the criminal justice system.

The committee realizes that the role played by the various criminal law

enforcement agencies of the federal government in the state of Mississippi is

a significant one.

The committee would appreciate you or your representative

appearing before the committee and disucssing the operation of your agency

within the state. The committee would be particularly interested in the ways

in which Mississippi courts and law enforcement agencies may better cooperate

with your office.

These hearings are not being directed toward the enactment of any parti-

cualr legislation; rather, they are being conducted for the committee's infor-

mation. However,

the hearings may result in future criminal justice legislation.

The committee hopes that these hearings can begin during the second week

of the session, January 9-13. Due to the hectic and variable legislative

schedules, we cannot, at this time, give you an exact date and time when we

would like for you to appear. However, we will telephone you as soon as we

have an opening for the scheduling of hearings. Unfortunately, we maye

to give you only two days' notice, but we will make every safort to arcangel€ 6 2-21

your interview with the committee at a time that is convenie

DEC 2 2 1977

FBI-JACKSON

ww 55275

DocId: 32989840 Page 11

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Mr. Murray

Page Two

December 16, 1977

The committee respectfully requests your participation on these important

hearings. If you have any questions, please contace either Ken Raigins of

the Senate Legislative Services Office in Jackson (354-7128) or me.

Sincerely,

(

Carroll Ingram, Chairman

Judiciary En Banc Committee

CI/gb

HH 55275

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0

0

0

(B) FBI PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY INSURANCE PLAN - The first

anniversary of the implementation of the SAll Professional Liability

insurance Plan will occur on April 1, 1966

This insurance provides

protection for Agents and other Bureau personnel in the event their

official actions result in a law suit for actual damages which are not

covered by the Federal Tort Claims Act or punitive damages. Payment

of legal fees is also included among the provisions of the plan.

Renewal notices will be mailed to current subscribers during

the first week of March, 1977. This advance reminder should allow

members ample time to make certain this important coverage does not

lapse between payment of premiums.

The plan itself is unique in the insurance industry and was

created specifically for personnel of the FBI. It is to be noted that in

view of the highly successful claim experience during the first year of

operation, the underwriters of the program have agreed to increase the

limit of liability for all participants from the current $50, 000 to $60, 000

effective April 1, 1977, and at no additional premium charge. This is

realistic and worthwhile protection and in view of the trend to sue

individuals engaged in law enforcement activities I encourage all

employees and more particularly investigative personnel to thoroughly

examine the provisions of the policy for possible application to them-

selves and their official responsibilities.

Employees having this coverage are reminded that it is their

personal responsibility to directly notify the carrier as to the receipt of

process in a suit directed against them for an act taking place after

the effective date of coverage. A supply of applications and specimen

policies will be furnished, under separate cover, to all FBI Field Offices

and Headquarters Divisions.

3-1-77

MEMORANDUM 9-77

80-662-80

SEARCHED.

MAR 3 - 1977

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FD-36 (Rev. 2-14-74)

004

57%:

Transmit the following in

Via -

TELETYPE

FBI

Date:

CLEAR

(Type in plaintext or code)

(Precedence)

9/3/76

ROUTINE

EM JACKSON (80-662)

TO DIRECTOR ROUTINE 0503Z

BT

CLEAR

TESTIMONY BEFORE THE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS,

SENATE GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE.

RE BUREAU TELETYPE AUGUST 31, 1976.

REVIEW OF JACKSON FILE REFLECTS NO FUGITIVES IN

CATEGORIES DESCRIBED IN REFERENCED TELETYPE.

BT

A- JACKSON

80-662-19

Searched

Serialized D KM

Indexed -

Died -

SHEPPARAS

Approved:

HH 55275 DocId:32989840 Page 14

Sent

12°3/AM Per.

141

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## Page 15

#4 Desh- No.

#2 Dele-No

H00 7736 2442029

RR AFD

DE HO •

R 312300 AUG 76

FM DIRECTOR

TO ALL SAC'S ROUTINE

BT

CLEAR

TESTIMONY BEFORE THE PERMANENT SURCOMMITIEE ON INVESTIGATIONS,

SENATE GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS SUBCOMPIITEE •

TO AID FBIHO IN RESPONPING TO QUESTIONS RAISED BY

CAPTIONED SUBCOMMITTEE, SITEL BY SEPTEMBER

7, 1975, ATTENTIO!

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION THE FOLLOWING: THE TOTAL

NUNGER OF INDIVIDUALS BEING SOUGHT CURRENTLY AS FUCITIVES

RECAUSE OF THEIP FAILURE TO APPEAF OF TIHO OTHERWISE DEFAULTED

ON THE TERNS OF THEIR PRETRIAL RELEASE IN THOSE CRIMES OVER.

WHICH THE FBI HAS PIMEY INVESTICATIVE JURISPICTIn%

Corail

fribuded

HH

55275

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Page 15

80-662-181

SEARCHED.

_ILEXED

SERIALIZED KAFILED OFT

AUG 3 1 1975

Coline

Hauble

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OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

ERSONAL ATTENTION

MEMORANDUM 36-76

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

August 24, 1976

MEMORANDUM TO ALL SPECIAL AGENTS IN CHARGE:

employees, as well as the United States Government, are defendants in

numerous civil suits, and a number of FBI employees have expressed concern

regarding the extent to which courts are requiring us to produce documents in

these suits. Questions have been raised regarding the scope of discovery in

civil litigation, the means by which discovery can be resisted, and the extent

to which executive privilege can be invoked.

For your information, Rule 26 (b) (1), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, provides as follows regarding the scope of discovery:

Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter,

not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter

involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the

claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the

claim or defense of any other party, including the exist-

ence, description, nature, custody, condition and location

of books, documents, or other tangible things and the

identity and location of persons having knowledge of any

discoverable matter. It is not ground for objection that

the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if

the information sought appears reasonably calculated to

lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

This rule "apparently envisions generally unrestrictive access to

sources of information, and the courts have so interpreted it. " Horizons

Titanium Corp. v. Norton Co., 290 F. 2d 421, 425; Harris v. Nelson, 394

U. S. 286, 297.

To understand the reason for the wide scope of discovery permitted

by the Federal rules, it should be kept in mind that a clear distinction is made

between the right to obtain information by discovery and the right to use it at

the trial. Rule 26 (b) allows great freedom in discovery. Rules 32 (a), 33 (b),

and the rules of evidence generally limit what may be used at the trial.

80-662-11

SEARCHED_

_INDEXED._

8-24-76

MEMORANDUM 36-76

SERIALIZED.

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FBI-JACKSON

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The Supreme Court spoke of the proper scope of the discovery

rules in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U. S. 495:

We agree, of course, that the deposition-

discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and

liberal treatment. No longer can the time-

honored cry of "fishing expedition" serve to

preclude a party from inquiring into the facts

inderlying his opponent's case. Mutual knowledg

f all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is

essential to proper litigation. To that end, either

party may compel the other to disgorge whatever

facts he has in his possession. The deposition-

discovery procedure simply advances the stage at

which the disclosure can be compelled from the

time of trial to the period preceding it, thus reducing

the possibility of surprise.

Id. at 507-508.

The discovery rules apply to the United States just as fully as

they apply to any other person. U. S. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U. S.

677, 681. It is also true that, like other litigants and witnesses, the United

States--and other Governmental units--frequently resists discovery. There

are more grounds on which to do so than when discovery is sought against

private persons. The United States has, or has claimed, among others:

(1) a privilege not to disclose the identity of informers; (2) a privilege for

military or state secrets; and (3) a qualified constitutional privilege to

refuse to disclose whatever the executive chooses to keep secret. Privilege

may be invoked only by the head of the Executive agency, i.e., the Attorney

General.

What is usually referred to as the informer's privilege is in

reality the Government's privilege to withhold from disclosure the identity

of persons who furnish information of violations of law to officers charged

With entorcement of that law. Roviaro v. U. S., 353 U. s. 53, 59. Such

a privilege is well recognized.

"'The privilege for communications by

informers to the Government is well established and its soundness cannot

be questioned. " Mitchell v. Roma, 265 F. 2d 633, 635. Indeed, it has been

extended beyond those who give information to law enforcement officers to

include others who render assistance that is necessary to effective law

enforcement. Black v. Sheraton Corp. of America, 47 F.R. D. 263, 265.

8-24-76

MEMORANDUM 36-76

- 2-

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The privilege is a qualified one, however, and requires balancing the public

interest in protecting the flow of information and assistance to the enforce-

ment authorities against a party's right to prepare his case. Roviaro v. U. S.,

353 U. S. at 62.

It is only the identity of the informer that is protected. The

contents of his communication are not privileged (Roviaro v. U. S., 353 U. S.

at 50; Foltz v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 189 F. 2d 537,

539-540,

certiorari denied 342 U. S. 871) unless they would tend to reveal his identity.

Wirtz v. Robinson and Stephens, Inc., 368 F. 2d 114; Black v. Sheraton Corp.

of America, 47 F. R. D. at 269. The privilege belongs to the Government,

but it is waived if either the informer or the Government has disclosed his

identity (emphasis added). Mitchell v. Bass, 252 F. 2d 513.

There is also a privilege for state secrets that protects

information not officially disclosed to the public concerning the national

defense or the international relations of the United States.

McCormick,

Evidence, 1954, Section 144. U. S. v. Reynolds, 345 U. S. 1. The

Supreme Court in Reynolds, supra, rejected contentions that the decision

of the Executive is final as to the existence of this privilege. A court itself

must determine whether the circumstances are appropriate for the claim.

In each case, the showing of necessity which

is made will determine how far the court should

probe in satisfying itself that the occasion for

invoking the privilege is appropriate. Where there

is a strong showing of necessity, the claim of

privilege should not be lightly accepted, but even the

most compelling necessity cannot overcome the claim

of privilege if the court is ultimately satisfied that

military secrets are at stake. A fortiori, where

necessity is dubious, a formal claim of privilege,

made under the circumstances of this case, will have

to prevail. Id. at 11.

There was also the contention, until United States v. Nixon,

418 U. S. 683 (1974) was decided, that by virtue of the separation of powers

in the Federal Government the Executive has an absolute privilege to with-

hold from Congress or the courts any information that the executive branch

8-24-76

MEMORANDUM 36-76

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MY 55275 DocId: 32989840 Page 18

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## Page 19

deems confidential. This contention goes back as far as Marbury V. Madison,

1803, 1 Cranch (5 U. S.) 137, 144, and the trial of Aaron Burr. U.s. v. Burr,

25 Fed. Cas. 187, 190, No. 14, 694.

Recent lower court cases, as well as the Nixon case, recognized

a qualified executive privilege, well-described in the following passage:

In asserting the privilege, the Government

cites no authority to establish the privilege as an

absolute one. In fact, the cases make it clear that

the privilege is a discretionary one that depends

upon ad hoc considerations of competing policy

claims, the policy of free and open discovery

juxtaposed to the need for secrecy to insure candid

expression of opinions by Government employees in

the formulation of Government policy. * * * Thus,

when the privilege is claimed, it is necessary to

balance interests to determine whether disclosure

would be more injurious to the consultative functions

of Government than non-disclosure would be to the

private litigant's defense. U. S. v. 30 Jars, More

Applying a process of this kind, courts in many cases have

sustained claims of executive privilege. In cases in which the litigant's

need for the information has seemed to outweigh the Government's interest

in secrecy, however, the claim of privilege has been overruled, and

disclosure has been ordered.

A discovery order, not being a "final" order, is not appealable,

but a party may attempt to obtain relief by applying to the court of appeals

for a writ of mandamus. To obtain such a writ, however, the petitioner

must show that the trial court has substantially abused its discretion. Be-

cause Rule 26 (b) (1) envisions generally unrestrictive access to information

and because a trial court has extremely broad discretion in this area, such

a writ is extremely difficult to obtain.

8-24-76

MEMORANDUM 36-76

- 4 -

WW 55275 DocId:32989840 Page 19

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Refusal of a Government officer to comply with a court order

overruling a claim of executive privilege and ordering disclosure could

lead to conviction for contempt. If the Government is a party, the court

may penalize it for its failure to comply with a discovery order by

invoking any of the sanctions set forth in Rule 37 (b) (2), Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure.

The court may, for example, prohibit the disobedient

party from introducing designated matters in evidence, or it may enter a

judgment by default against the disobedient party.

(Security pages attached)

8-24-76

MEMORANDUM 36-76

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## Page 21

Routing Slip

0-7 (Rev. 12-17-

TO: SAC:

Albany

Albuquerque

Alexandria

Anchorage

Allanta

Baltimore

Birmingham

Boston

Buffalo

Butte

Charlotte

Chicago

Cincinnati

Cleveland

Colunibia

Dallas

Denver

Detroit

El Paso

La Honolulu

(Copie

as to Offices Checked)

Houston

Indianapolis

Jackson

Jacksonville

Kansas City

Knoxville

Las Vegas

Little Rock

Los Angeles

Louisville

Memphis

Miami

Milwaukee

Minneapolis

Mobile

Newark

New Haven

New Orleans

Now York Cily

Norfolk

[J Okiahoma City

Omaha

Philadelphia

Phoenix

Pittsburgh

Portland

Richmond

Sacramento

St. Louis

Salt Lake City

San Antonio

San Diego

Sin Francisco

San Juan

Savannah

Seattle

Springfield

Tamp a

Washington Field

Quantico

TO LEGAT:

Beicut

13+171

1 Bonn

Prasilia

Buenos Aires

Caracas

Hong Kong

London

Madrid '

Manila

Mexico City

Ottawa

Paris

Rome

Singapore

Tel Aviv

Tokyo

RE:

Date 12/30175

DIRECTORS APPEARANCE BEFORE SENATE SELECT

COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES,

DECEMBER 10, 1975

Retention

For appropriate

• For information =J optional

Lay action

→ Surep, by

The enclosed is for your infonnation. If used in a future report,

conceal all

sources, C. paraphrase contents.

¡ Enclosed are corrected pages from report of SA -

dated

Remarks:

80-668-16

ReButel to all SACs and Legats, 12/10/75.

Enclosed for each Office and Legat is

one copy of the transcript of questions which

were asked Mr. Kelley during captioned appearance,

along with Mr. Kelley's answers to those questions.

JAM : 975

Enc. (1)

Bufile

Urfile

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Routing Slip

0-7 (Rev. 12-17-73

TO: S.4C:

Albany

ilbe querque

Alexandria

Anchorage

Atlanta

Baltimore

Binningham

Boston

Buttalo

Butle

Charlotte

Chicago

Cincinnati

Cleveland

Columbia

Dailas

Denver

Detroit

El Paso

Honolulu

(Copies to Offices Checked)

L Houston

Seth anapolis

" Jack son

Jacksonville

Kansas City

Knoxville

Las Vegas

Little Rock

Los Angeles

Louisville

Memphis

Miami

Mil waukee

Minncapolis

Mobile

Newark

New Haven

New Orl cans

New York City

C3 Norfolk

[.] Oklahoma City

Oraha

Philadelphia

Phoenix

Pittsburgh

Portland

Richmond

Sacramento

St. Louis

Salt Lake City

San Antonio

San Diego

San Francisco

San •Juan

Savannah

Seattle

springfield

Tamp a

Washington

Field

Quantico

TO LEGAT:

Bcirut

Bern

Bonn

Brasilia

Buenos Aires

Caracas

Hong Kong

London

Madrid

Manila

Mexico City

Ottawa

Paris

Rome

Singapore.

Tel Aviv

Tokyo

RE: DIRECTOR'S APPEARANCE

Date

BEFORE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

DECEMBER 10, 1975

AS ACrion

appropriat

For intonrat

TOPLOTE

ng: Surep,, by

1/5/76

sced -all

sources,

L Enclosed are corrected pages from report or

riated

Remarks: By routing slip dated 12/30/75 and'

CLAS

captioned as above, all SAC's and Legats were

furnished

a copy of the transcript of Mr.

Kelley's 12/10/75 appearance before the

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

Activities. Although the data contained in

the transcript may be made available to news

media representatives, used in answering

questions received from citizens, and other-

wise treated as

being of a public-source nature,

the transcript itself should not be reproduced

For, or given to, anyone outside the FBI.

Dic.

Bufile

Urnile

HH 55275 DocId: 32989840 Page 22

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Vol. 20

Ohe Muiten Staten Sruate

copy 5

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations

• With Respect to Intelligence Activities

INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATION

Wednesday, December 10, 1975

Washington, D. C.

WARD & PAUL

410 FIRST STREET, S. E.

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003

(202) 544-6000

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Phone (Aroa 202) 544-6000

CONTENT

STATEMENT OF :

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The Honorable Clarence M. Kelley,

Direcotor, Federal Bureau of Inve-

stigation

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WARD & PAUL

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410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

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INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATION

Wednesday, December 10, 1975

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--

United States Senate,

Select Committee to Study Governmental

Operations with Respect to

Intelligence Activities,

Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10

o'clock a.m., in Room 318, Russell Senate Office Building,

the honorable Frank Church (Chairman of the Committee)

presiding.

Present: Senators Church (presiding), Hart of Michigan,

Mondale, Huddleston, Hart of Colorado, Baker, Goldwater and

Mathias.

Also present: William G. Miller, Staff Director; Frederick

A. 0. Schwarz, Jr., Chief Counsel; Curtis R. Smothers, Minority

Counsel; Paul Michel, Joseph diGenova, Barbara Banoff, Frederiok

Baron, Mark Gitenstein, Loch Johnson, David Bushong, Charles

Lombard, John Bayly, Charles Kirbow, Michael Madigan, Bob

Kelley, John Elliff, Elliot Maxwell, Andy Postal, Pat Shea,

Michael Epstein and Burt Wides, Professional Staff Members.

-.

The Chairman. The Committee's witness this morning is

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the Honorable Clarence M.. Kelley, the Director of the Federal

Bureau of Investigation.

Mr. Kelley was appointed Director in July of 1973 in a

troubled time for the FBI. His experience as an innovative

law enforcement administrator in charge of the Kansas City

Police Department for over ten years, and his previous work as

a Special Agent of the FBI have made him uniquely qualified

to lead the Bureau.

The Select Committee is grateful for the cooperation

extended by Director Kelley in the course of its inquiry over

the past months. The Committee is also impressed by the

openness of the FBI's witnesses before this Committee, and

their willingness to consider the need for legislation to

clarify the Bureau's intelligence responsibility.

It is important to remember from the outset that this

Committee is examining only a small portion of the FBI's

activities. Our hearings have concentrated on FBI domestic

intelligence operations.

We have consistently expressed our

admiration and support for the Bureau's criminal investigative

and law enforcement work, and we recognize the vital importance

of counterespionage in the modern world. But domestic

intelligence has raised many difficult questions.

The Committee has also concentrated on the past rather

than on present FBI activities.

The abuses brought to light

in our hearings occurred years and even decades before Director

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Kelley took charge.

The Staff has advised the Committee that under Director

Kelley the FBI has taken significant steps to rethink previous

policies and to establish new safeguards against abuse.. The

FBI is now placing greater emphasis on foreign related intelli-

gence operations, and less on purely domestic surveillance.

The FBI is working more closely with the Justice Department in

developing policies and standards for intelligence. These

are welcome developments.

Nevertheless, many important issues remain unresolved.

Therefore, we have invited Director Kelley to share with the

Committee his views on some of the considerations the Congress

should take into account in thinking about the future of

FBI intelligence. Among these issues are whether FBI surveil-

lance should extend beyond the investigation of persons

likely to commit specific crimes; whether there should be

outside supervision or approval before the FBI conducts certain

types of investigations or uses certain surveillance techniques;

whether foreign related intelligence activities should be

strictly separated from the FBI's domestic law enforcement

functions, and what should be done to the information already

in the FBI files and that which may go into those files in

the future.

The Committee looks forward to a constructive exchange

of views with Director Kelley this morning, with Attorney •

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General Levi tomorrow, and with both the FBI and the Justice

Department in the next months as the Committee considers

recommendations that will strengthen the American people's

confidence in the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

That

confidence is vital for the effective enforcement of Federal

law and for the security of the nation against foreign

espionage.

Director Kelley, we are pleased to welcome you, and if

you would have a prepared statement you would like to lead off

with, please proceed.

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STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CLARENCE M. KELLEY,

DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Mr. Kelley. Thank you very much, Senator Church and

gentlemen.

I welcome the interest which this Committee has shown in

the FBI and most particularly in our operations in the intelli-

gence and internal security fields.

I share your high regard for the rights guaranteed by the

Constitution and laws of the United States. Throughout my

35 year career in law enforcement you will find the same insis-

tence, as has been expressed by this Committee, upon programs

of law enforcement that are themselves fully consistent with

law.

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I also have strongly supported the concept of legislative

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oversight. In fact, at the time my appointment as Director of

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the FBI and was being considered by the Senate Judiciary

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Committee two and one half years ago, I told the members of

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that Committee of my firm belief in Congressional oversight.

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This Committee has completed the most exhaustive study

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of our intelligence and security operations that has ever been

undertaken by anyone outside the FBI other than the present

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Attorney General. At the outset, we pledged our fullest

cooperation and promised to be as candid and forthright as

possible in responding to your questions and complying with your

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requests.

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I believe we have lived up to those promises.

The members and staff of this Committee have had unprece-

dented access to FBI information.

You have talked to the personnel who conduct security-type

investigations and who are personally involved in every facet

of our day-to-day intelligence operations.

You have attended numerous briefings by FBI officials who

have sought to familiarize the Committee and its staff with

all major areas of our activities and operations in the national

security and intelligence fields.

In brief, you have had firsthand examination of these

matters that is unmatched at any time in the history of the

congress.

As this Committee has stated, these hearings have, of

necessity, forcused largely on certain errors and abuses. I

credit this Committee for its forthright recognition that the

hearings do not give a full or balanced account of the FBI's

record of performance.

It is perhaps in the nature of such hearings to focus

on abuses to the exclusion of positive accomplishments of the

organization.

The Counterintelligence Programs which have received the

lion's share of public attention and critical comment constituted

an infinitesimal portion of our overall work.

A Justice Department Committee which was formed last year

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to conduct a thorough study of the FBI's Counterintelligençe

Programs has reported that in the five basic ones it- found

3,247 Counterintelligence Programs were submitted to FBI

Headquarters from 1956 to 1971. Of this total, 2,370,

less than three fourths, were approved.

I repeat, the vast majority of those 3,247 proposals were

being devised, considered, and many were rejected, in an era

when the FBI was handling an average of 700,000 investigative

matters per year.

Nonetheless, the criticism which has been expressed

regarding the Counterintelligence Programs is most legitimate

and understandable.

The question might well be asked what I had in mind when

I stated last year that for the FBI to have done less than it

did under the circumstances then existing would have been an

abdication of its responsibilities to the American people..

What I said then, in 1974, and what I believe today, is

that the FBI employees involved in these programs did what they

felt was expected of them by the President, the Attorney General,

the Congress, and the people of the United States.

Bomb explosions rocked public and private offices and

buildings; rioters led by revolutionary extremists laid seige

to military, industrial, and educational facilities; and

killings, maimings, and other atrocities accompanied such

acts of violence from New England to California.

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The victims of these acts were human beings, men, women,

and children. As is the case in time of peril, whether real or

perceived, they looked to their Government, their elected and

appointed leadership, and to the FBI and other law enforcement

agencies to protect their lives, their property, and their

rights.

There were many calls for action from Members of Congress

and others, but few guidelines were furnished. The FBI and other

law enforcement agencies were besieged by demands, impatient

demands, for immediate action.

FBI employees recognized the danger; felt they had a

responsibility to respond; and in good faith initiated actions

designed to counter conspiratorial efforts of self-proclaimed

revolutionary groups, and to neutralize violent activities.

In the development and execution of these programs,

mistakes of judgment admittedly were made.

Our concern over whatever abuses occurred in the Counter-

intelligence Programs, and there were some substantial ones,

should not obscure the underlying purpose of those programs.

We must recognize that situations have occurred in the

past and will arise in the future where the Government may well

be expected to depart from its traditional role, in the FBI's

case, as an investigative

and intelligence-gathering

agency, and take affirmative steps which are needed to meet

an imminent threat to human life or property.

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In short, if we learn a murder or bombing is to be carried

out now, can we truly meet our responsibilities by investigating

only after the crime has occurred, or should we have the

ability to prevent? I refer to those instances where there is

a strong sense of urgency because of an imminent threat to

human life.

Where there exists the potential to penetrate and disrupt,

the Congress must consider the question of whether or not such

preventive action should be available to the FBI.

These matters are currently being addressed by a task

force in the Justice Department, including the FBI,

and I am confident that Departmental guidelines and controls can

be developed in cooperation with pertinent Committees of Congress

to insure that such measures are used in an entirely responsible

manner.

Probably the most important question here today is what

assurances I can give that the errors and abuses which arose

under the Counterintelligence Programs will not occur again?

First, let me assure the Committee that some very sub-

stantial changes have been made in key areas of the FBI's

methods of operations since I took the oath of office as

Director on July 9, 1973.

Today we place a high premium on openness, openness

both within and without the service.

I have instituted a program of open, frank discussion

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in the decision-making process which insures that no future

program or major policy decision will ever be adopted without a

full and critical review of its propriety.

Participatory management has become a fact in the FBI.

I have made it known throughout our Headquarters and

Field Divisions that I welcome all employees, regardless of

position or degree of experience, to contribute their thoughts

and suggestions, and to voice whatever criticisms or

reservations they may have concerning any area of our operations.

The ultimate decisions in the Bureau are mine, and I take

full responsibility for them. My goal is to achieve maximum

critical analysis among our personnel without in any manner

weakening or undermining our basic command structure.

The results of this program have been most beneficial, to

me personally, to the FBI's disciplined performance, and to

the morale of our employees.

In addition, since some of the mistakes of the past

were occasioned by direct orders from higher authorities outside

the FBI, we have welcomed Attorney General Edward Levi!s

guidance, counsel, and his continuous availability, in his

own words, "as a 'lightning rod' to deflect improper requests."

Within days after taking office, Attorney General Levi

instructed that I immediately report to him any requests

of practices which, in my judgment, were improper or which,

considering the context of the request, I believed presented

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the appearances of impropriety.

I am pleased to report to this Committee as I have to the

Attorney General that during my nearly two and one half years

as

Director under two Presidents and three Attorneys General, no

one has approached me or made overtures, directly or otherwise,

to use the FBI for partisan political or other improper

purposes.

I can assure you that I would not for a moment consider

honoring any such request.

I can assure you, too, in my administration of the FBI

I routinely bring to the attention of the Attorney General and

the Deputy Attorney General major policy questions, including

those which arise in my continuing review of our operations

and

practices. These are discussed openly and candidly in order

that the Attorney General can exercise his responsibilities

over the FBI.

I am convinced that the basic structure of the FBI today

is sound. But it would be a mistake to think that integrity

can be assured only through institutional means..

Integrity is a human quality. It depends upon the

character of the person who occupies the office of the

Director and every member of the FBI under him.

I am proud of the 19,000 men and women with whom it is

my honor to serve today. Their dedication, their professionalism,

their standards, and the self-discipline which they personally

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demand of themselves and expect of their associates are the

nation's ultimate assurance of proper and responsible conduct

at all times by the FBI.

The Congress and the members of this Committee in

particular have gained a great insight into the problems

confronting the FBI in the security and intelligence fields,

problems which all too often we have left to resolve without

sufficient guidance from the Executive Branch or the Congress

itself.

As in all human endeavors, errors of judgment have been

made. But no one who is looking for the cause of our

failures should confine his search solely to the FBI, or even

to the Executive Branch.

The Congress itself has long possessed the mechanism for

FBI oversight; yet, seldom has it been exercised.

An initial step was taken in the Senate in 1973 when the

Committee on the Judiciary established a Subcommittee on FBI

Oversight. Hearings had been commenced, and we were fully

committed to maximum participation with the members of that

Subcommittee.

I laud their efforts. However, those efforts are of very

recent origin in terms of the FBI's history.

One of the greatest benefits of the study this Committee

has made is the expert knowledge you have gained of the complex

problems confronting the FBI. But I respectfully submit that

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those benefits are wasted if they do not lead to the next step,

a step that I believe is absolutely essential, a legislative

charter, expressing Congressional determination of intelligence

jurisdiction for the FBI.

Action to resolve the problems confronting us in the

security and intelligence fields is urgently needed; and it

must be undertaken in a forthright manner. Neither the Congress

nor the public can afford to look the other way, leaving it to

the FBI to do what must be done, as too often has occurred in

the past.

This means too that Congress must assume a continuing role

not in the initial decision-making process but in the review of

our performance.

I would caution against a too-ready reliance upon the

courts to do our tough thinking for us. Some proposals that

have been advanced during these hearings would extend the role

of the courts into the early stages of the investigative

process and, thereby, would take over what historically have

been Executive Branch decisions.

I frankly feel that such a trend, if unchecked, would

seriously undermine the independence of the Judiciary and cast

them in a role not contemplated by the authors of our

Constitution. Judicial review cannot be a substitute for Con-

gressional oversight or Executive decision.

The FBI urgently needs a clear and workable determination

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of our jurisdiction in the intelligence field, a jurisdictional

statement that the Congress finds

to be responsive to both

the will and the needs of the American people.

Senators, first and foremost, I am a police officer, a

career police officer. In my police experience, the must

frustrating of all problems that I have discovered facing

law enforcement in this country, Federal, state, and local, is

when demands are made of them to perform their traditional

role as protector of life and property without clear and

understandable legal bases to do so.

I recognize that the formulation of such a legislative

charter will be a most precise and demanding task.

It must be sufficiently flexible that it does not stifle

the FBI's effectiveness in combating the growing incidence

of crime and violence across the United States. That charter

must clearly address the demonstrated problems of the past;

yet, it must amply recognize the fact that times change and

so also do the nature and thrust of our criminal and subversive

challenges.

The fact that the Department of Justice has commenced

the formulation of operational guidelines governing our

intelligence activities does not in any manner diminish the need

for legislation. The responsibility for conferring juris-

diction resides with the Congress.

In this regard, I am troubled by some proposals which

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question the need for intelligence gathering, suggesting that

information needed for the prevention of violence can be

acquired in the normal course of criminal investigations.

As a practical matter, the line between intelligence

work and regular criminal investigations is often difficult

to describe. What begins as an intelligence investigation may

well end in arrest and prosecution of the subject. But there

are some fundamental differences between these investigations

that should be recognized, differences in scope, in objective

and in the time of initiation. In the usual criminal case,

crime has occurred and it remains only for the Government to

identify the perpetrator and to collect sufficient evidence

for prosecution. Since the investigation normally follows

the elements of the crime, the scope of the inquiry is

limited and fairly well defined.

By contrast, intelligence work involves the gathering of

information, not necessarily evidence. The purpose may well be

not to prosecute, but to thwart crime or to insure that the

Government- has enough information to meet any future crisis

or emergency. The inquiry is necessarily broad because it

must tell us not only the nature of the threat, but also whether

the threat is imminent, the persons involved, and the

means by which the threat will be carried out. The ability

of the Government to prevent criminal acts is dependent on

our anticipation of those criminal acts. Anticipation,

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in turn, is dependent on advance information, that is, intelli-

gence.

Certainly, reasonable people can differ on these issues.

Given the opportunity, I am confident that the continuing need

for intelligence work can be documented to the full satisfaction

of the Congress. We recognize that what is at stake here is not

the interests of the FBI, but rather the interests of every

citizen of this country. We recognize also that the resolution

of these matters will demand extensive and thoughtful.

deliberation by the Congress. To this end, I pledge the

complete cooperation of the Bureau with this Committee or

its successors in this important task.

In any event, you have my unqualified assurance as

Director that we will carry out both the letter and the spirit

of such legislation as the Congress may enact.

That is the substance of my prepared statement.

I would also like to say extemporaneously that I note

that on this panel are some gentlemen who were on the Judiciary

Committee which heard my testimony at the time I was presented

to them for candidacy as Director of the FBI. At that time

I took very seriously the charge which may possibly result

in the deliberation of this Committee and of the full Senate.

I have been well aware of the problems of the FBI since that

time. I have also been well aware of the capabilities of

the FBI to discharge those responsibilities. I don't take

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them lightly. I am of sufficient experience and age that I

have pledged myself to do what is good and proper. I say this

not as a self-serving statement but in order that we might

place in context my position within the FBI. I could seek

sanctuary and perhaps a safe sanctuary by saying during the

period these things occurred I was with the local police

department in Kansas City, Missouri. Prior to that time,

however, I was in the FBI.

During the time I was with the FBI, during the time I

was with the police department, I continued throughout that

period a close acquaintance with and a strong affection for

the FBI.

I only want to point out that based on those years, based

on those observations, we have here a very fine and very

sensitive and a very capable organization. I feel that there

is much that can still be done. I know that we are not without

fault. I know that from those experiences I have had..We

will not be completely without fault in the future. But I

assure you that we look upon this inguiry, we look upon any

mandate which you may feel you have, that you should look at

this is good and proper, and we do not intend -- I only want

to place in your thinking the fact that you have here a

matchless organization, one which I continue to say was

not motivated in some of these instances, and in most of

them, and I cannot justify some, that the motivation was of the

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best. I am not pleading, as does a defense attorney. I am

only putting in your thinking my objective observations as

a citizen who is somewhat concerned about the future of this

organization. It is too precious for us to have it in

a condition of jeopardy.

Thank you very much.

The Chairman. Thank you, Director Kelley.

I want to turn first to Senator Hart who won't be able

to remain through the whole morning. I think he has one

question he would like to ask.

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Senator Hart of Michigan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Mathias and I have Judiciary Committee hearings at 10:30.

Iahve several questions, and I'm sure they'll be

covered by others, but the ones that I have is a result of

reading your testimony and listening to it this morning, and

it relates to your comment at the foot of page 10 and at the

top of 11.

There you are indicating that you caution us about

extending the court's role in the early stages of investigations

suggesting that this might take us beyound the role comtemplated

for the courts under the Constutution.

Now as you have said, aside from the so-called national

security wiretap problem, the main focus of our discussions

and concern has been on the possibility requiring court

approval for the use of informants, informants directed to

penetrate and report on some group.

And one of the witnesses yesterday, Professor Dorsen,

pointed our that really those informants are the most pervasive

type of an eavesdropping device. It is a human device.

It's

really, an informant is really more intrusive on my privacy

than a bug or a tap because he can follow me anywhere. He

can ask me questions to get information the government would

like to have.

Now we certainly involve the courts in approval of the

wiretaps for physical searches with the intent of the drafters

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of the Constitution to have a neutral third party magistrate

screen use of certain investigative techniques. And the

informant is such a technique. He functions sort of like a

general warrant, and I don't see why requiring court approval

would violate the role envisaged for the courts.

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And as I leave, I would like to get your reactions to

my feelings.

Mr. Kelley. I do not feel that there is any use of the

informant in intrusion, which is to this extent objectionable.

It has of course been approved, the concept of the informant,

by numerous court decisions.

Let us go down not to the moral connotation of the use

of the informant.

I think, as in many cases, that is a matter of balance.

You have only very few ways of solving crines.

You have

basically in the use of the informant, I think, the protectian

of the right of the victim to be victimized. You have within

the Constitution certain grants that are under ordinary

circumstances abrogation of rights. The right of search and

seizure, which, of course, can't be unreasohable, but none-

theless, you have the right.

I think that were we to lose the right of the informant,

we would lose to a great measure our capability of doing our

job.

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unusual procedure. I'n not even going to say that it is not

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an intrusion, because it is. But it has to be one. I think

that is by virtue of the benefits must be counted.

We don't like to use it. We don't like the problems that

are attendant. We take great care.

Now you say about the court having possibility taking

jurisdiction over them and guiding. I think that possibly we

could present the matter to the court but what are they going

to do insofar as monitoring their effort? Are they going to

have to follow it all the way through?

Also, there is, of course, urgency in the other contacts.

Must the court be contacted for each and approval of the court

given for each contact?

There are a great many problems insofar as administration

of it.

I frankly feel, and again, all I can do is give you my

idea -- I frankly feel that there is a satisfactory control over

the informants as we now exercise it today. Yes, there are

going to be some who will get beyond our control, but this

is going to happen no matter what you do.

Senator Hart of Michigan. Well, I appreciate your

reaction.

I was not suggesting that there is consideration here to

prohibit informants. I was reflecting a view that I felt and

hold that the use of an informant does require some balance, as

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you yourself said, and I would be more comfortable with a

third party making a judgment as to whether the intrusion is

warranted by the particular circumstance.

But I do understand

your position.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Hart.

(Senator Hart leaves the hearing room.)

The Chairman. Senator Baker, do you have questions?

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Mr. Kelley, I have a great respect for you and your

organization and I personally regret that the organization is

in political distress, but we've both got to recognize that

it is, along with other agencies and departments of the

government.

I think you probably would agree with me that even though

that is extraordinarily unpleasant and in many respects

unfortunate, that it also has a plus side. That is, it gives

us an indication of our future direction and the opportunity,

at least, to improve the level of competency and service of

the government itself.

With that hopeful

note, would you be agreeable then to

volunteering for me any suggestions you have on how to improve

the responsiveness of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or

indeed, for any other law enforcement agencies of the government,

to the Congress, to the Attorney General, to the President, and

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beyond that, would you give me any suggestions you have on

how you would provide the methods! the access, the documents,

the records, the authority, for the Congress to perform its

essential, I believe, essential oversight responsibility to

see that these functions, these delicate functions are being

undertaken properly?

And before you answer, let me tell you two or three things

I am concerned about.

It hasn't been long ago that the FBI Director was not

even confirmed by the Senate of the United States. I believe

you are the first one to be confirmed by the Senate of the

United States. I think that is a movement in the right

direction. I think the FBI has taken on a stature that, an

additional importance that requires it to have closer supervision

and scrutiny by us.

At the same time I rather doubt that we can become

involved in the daily relationship between you and the Attorney!

General.

Therefore, I tend to believe that the Attorney General

needs to be more directly involved in the operations of the

FBI.

I would appreciate any comments on that.

Second, I rather believe that major decisions of the

intelligence community and the FBI ought to be in writing, so

that the Congress can, if it needs to in the future, take a

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look at these decisions and the process by which they were

made to decide that you are of you are not performing your

services diligently.

I don't think you can have oversight unless you have

access to records, and in many cases records don't exist

and in some cases the people who made those decisions are now

departed and in other cases you have conflicts.

How would you suggest then that you improve the quality

of service of your agency? How would you propose that you

increase the opportunity for oversight of the Congress of the

United States? What other suggestions do you have for improving

the level of law enforcement in the essential activity that

is required?

Mr. Kelley. I would possibly be repetitious in answering

this Senator, but I get a great deal of pleasure from telling

what I think is necessary and what I hope that I have followed,

one which is beyond my control, but which I think is very

important is that the position of Director, the one to which

great attention should be paid in choosing the man who will

properly acquit himself.

I feel that the Judiciary Committee, at least in going

over me, did a pretty good job. I feel that it is most

necessary that care be taken that his philosophy, his means

of ranagement, his facility to adapt to change, his tendency

toward consulting with other members of the official family,

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that he be willing to, for example, go through oversight with

no reticence, and that I think that he should be chosen very

carefully.

I think further that he should be responsible for those

matters which indicate impropriety or illegality.

Senator Baker. Could you stop for just a second? Who

does he work for? Does the Director, in your view, work for

the President of the United States, for the Attorney General,

for the Justice Department, for the Executive Branch?

Who does the executive. of the FBI, the Director of the

FBI, be responsible to, who should he be responsible to?

Mr. Kelley. Jurisdictionally, to the Attorney General,

but I think this is such an important field of influence that

it is not at all unlikely that we can expand it to the

judiciary, the legislative, and of course, we are under the

Attorney General.

Senator Baker. Do you have any problems with the idea

of the President of the United States calling the Director of

the FBI and asking for performance of a particular task?

Does that give you any difficulty? Or do you think that

the relationship between the FBI Director and the President

is such that that is desirable, or should it he conduited

through the Attorney General?

Mr. Kelley. I think it should be in the great majority

of the cases conduited through the Attorney General. There

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has been traditionally some acceptance of the fact that if

the President wants to see and talk with the Director, he

may do so, call him directly.

It has been my practice in such an event to thereafter

report to the Attorney General, whoever it might be, that I

have been called over and I discussed and was told. And this

was revealed in full to them.

Senator Baker. I suppose we could pass a statute that

says the President has to go

through the Attorney General,

although I rather suspect it would be a little presumptuous.

But to go the next step, do you think it is necessary

for the pursuit of effective oversight on the part of the

Congress, to have some sort of document written, or at least

some sort of account of a Presidential order or an order of

the Attorney General given to a Director of the FBI?

Do you think that these things need to be handled in

a more formal way?

Mr. Kelley. Personally, it would be my practice in

the event I receive such an order, to request that it be

documented: This is a protection as well as a clarification

as to whether or not it should be placed as part of legislation.

I frankly would like to reserve that for some more considera-

tion.

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I don't know whether it would be, but I think that it

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Senator Baker. It. Kelley, Attorney General Levi, I

believe, has already established some sort of agency or

function within the Department that is serving as the equivalent,

I suppose, of an Inspector General of the Justice Department,

including the FBI.

Are you familiar with the steps that Mr. Levi has

taken in that respect? I think he calls it the Office of

Professional Responsibility.

Mx. Kelley. Yes, sir, I'm familiar with it.

Senator Baker. Do you have any comment on that? Will

you give us any observations

as to whether you think that

will be useful, helpful, or whether it will not be useful or

helpful, how it affects the FBI, how you visualize your

relationship to it in the future?

Mr. Kelley. I don't object to this, which is to some

extent an oversight within the Department of Justice under the

Attorney General.

Frankly, it just came out. I have not considered it

completely, but to the general concept, yes, I very definitely

subscribe.

Senator Baker.

How would you feel about extending that

concept of government-wide operation, a national Inspector

General who is involved with an oversight of all of the

agencies of government as they interface with the Constitutionally

protected rights of the individual citizen?

would you care

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to comment on that, or would you rather save that for a while?

Mr. Kelley. I would like to reserve that one.

Senator Baker. I'm not surprised. Would you think about

it and let us know what you think about it?

Mr. Kelley. I will..

Senator Baker. All right. Mr. Chairman, thank you very

much.

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The Chairman. Senator Huddleston.

Senator Huddleston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MI. Kelley, you describe on page 4 the conditions that

existed when much of the abuse that we have talked about during

this inquiry occurred, indicating that the people within the

Bureau felt like they were doing what was expected of them

by the President, by the Attorney General, the Congress and

the people of the United States.

Does not this suggest that there has been a reaction

there to prevailing attitudes that might have existed in the

country because of certain circumstances rather than any

clear and specific direct instructions that might have been

received from proper authorities? And if that is the case,

is it possible in developing this charter, this guideline,

to provide for that kind of specific instruction?

Mr. Kelley. I think so, yes. I think that they can

logically be incorporated and that -

Senator Huddleston. You can see there would be a continuing

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danger if any agency is left to simply react to whatever the

attitudes may be.at a specific time in this country because --

Mr. Kelley. Senator; I don't contemplate it might be

a continuing danger, but it certainly would be. a very acceptable

guidepost whereby we can, in the event such a need seems

to arise, know what we can do.

Senator Huddleston. Well, in pursuing the area which

Senator Hart was discussing, that is whether of not we can

provide sufficient guidelines would replace a decision by the

court in determining what action might be proper and specific -

ally in

protecting individual's rights, can't we also

provide the restrictions and guidelines and the various

techniques that might be used?

For instance, supposing we do establish the fact, as

has already been done, that informants are necessary and

desirable. How do we keep that informant operating within the

proper limits so that he in fact is not violating individual

rights?

Mr. Kelley. Well, of course, much of the reliance must

be placed on the agent and the supervision of the FBI to assure

that there is no infringement of rights.

Senator Huddleston. But

this is an aware we've gotten

into some difficulty in the past. We have assumed that the

particular action was necessary, that there was a present

threat that some intelligence programs should be initiated, but

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in many cases it has gone beyond what would appear to have been

necessary to have addressed the original threat.

How do we keep within the proper balance there?

Mr. Kelley. Well, actually, it's just about like any

other offense. It is an invasion of the other individual's

right and it is by an officer and an FBI agent is an officer.

There's the possibility of criminal prosecution against him.

This is one which I think might flow if he counsels

the informant.

Now insofar as his inability to control the informant,

I don't suppose that would warrant prosecution, but there is

still supervisory control over that agent and over that

informant by insisting that control is exercised on a continuing

basis.

Senator Huddleston. It brings up an interesting point

as to whether or not a law enforcenent agency ought to be

very alert to any law violations of its own members or anyone

else.

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If a White House official asks the FBI or someone to do

something unlawful, the question seems to me to occur as to

whether or not that is not a violation that should be reported

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Mr. Kelley. I think that any violation which comes to

our attention should either be handled by us or the proper

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Senator Huddleston. But that hasn't been the case in the

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Mr. Kelley. Well, I don't know what you're referring

to but I would think your statement is proper.

Senator Huddleston. Well, we certainly have evidence

of unlawful activity taking place in various projects that

have been undertaken, which certainly were not brought to

light willingly by the FBI or by other law enforcement agencies.

The question that I'm really concerned about is as

we attempt to draw a guideline and charters that would give

the Agency the best flexibility that they may need, a wide

range of threats, how do we control what happens within each

of those actions to keep them from going beyond what

was intended to begin with?

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MI. Kelley. You're still speaking of informants.

Senator Huddleston. Not only informants but the agents

themselves as they go into surveillance, wiretaps, or whatever

intelligence gathering techniques.

The original thrust of my question was, even though we

may be able to provide guidelines of a broad nature, how do

we control the techniques that might be used, that int themselves

might be used, that in themselves might be a serious violation

of the rights.

Mr. Kelley. Well, first, I don't know whether it's

germane to your question but I do feel that it should be pointed

out that the association to, the relationship between the

informant and his agent handler is a very confidential one,

and I doubt very seriously whether we could have any guide-

lines, where there might be an extension of any monitors here

because thereby you do have a destruction of that relationship.

Insofar as the activities of agents, informants or others

which may be illegal, we have on many occasions learned of

violations of the law on the part of informants, and either

prosecuted ourselves, through the reporting of it to the

United States Attorney, or turned it over to the local authority.

We have done this on many a time, many occasions. Insofar

as our own personnel, we have an internal organization, the

Inspection Division, which reviews this type of activity, and

if there be any violation, yes, no question about it, we would

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pursue it to the point of prosecution.

Senator Huddleston. But it could be helped by periodic

review.

MI. Kelley. We do, on an annual basis, review the

activities of our 59 offices through that same Inspection

Division, and they have a clear charge to go over this as well

as other matters.

Senator Huddleston. Mr. Kelley, you pointed. out the

difference in the approaches when gathering intelligence, in

gathering evidence after a crime has been committed.

Would there be any advantage, or would it be feasible to

attempt to separate these functions within the Agency, in the

departments, for instance, with not having a nixing of

gathering intelligence and gathering evidence? Are the techniques

definable and different? :

Mr. Kelley. Senator, I think they are compatible. I

see no objection to the way that they are now being handled

on a management basis. I think, as a matter of fatt, it is

a very fine association whereby the intelligence, stemming as

it does from a substantive violation, is a natural complement.

Senator Huddleston. Now, another area, the FBI furnishes

information to numerous government agencies.

Is this properly restricted and controlled at the present

time in your judgment as to just who can ask the FBI for

information, what kind of information they can ask for, and

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who might also be inclined to call the Director and ask him

to do specific things?

Could there be some clearcut understanding as to whether

or not the Director would be obligated to undertake any such

project, that just anybody at the White House might suggest?

Mr. Kelley. It's very clear to me that any request must

come, from Mr. Buchen's office, and that it be, in any case,

wherein it is a request for action, that it be followed with

a letter so requesting.

This has come up before during the Watergate hearings, as

I think it has been placed very vivialy in our minds, in

take care that you just don't follow the request of some .

underling who does not truly reflect the desire of the President.

Senator Huddleston. Just one more question about

techniques, aside from the guidelines of authority on broad

projects undertaken.

Would it be feasible from time to time in a Congressional

oversight committee, would be able to discuss with the Department,

with the Bureau various techniques so that they could have

some input as to whether or not these actions are consistent.

with the overall guidelines, to start with, and consistent

with the very protections?

Mr. Kelley. Senator, I have already said.to.the

översight committee of the Senate that so far as I can now

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probably even more importantly, what restrictions can be put

on the use of that information once it has been supplied by

the FBI?

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Mr. Kelley. I think so, Senator.

Senator Huddleston. You think there are proper restrictions

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Mr. Kelley. I don't know that we can ourselves judge

in all cases whether of not there is good and sufficient reason

for an Agency to inquiry. I think that there should be a

very close delineation by the agencies as to what they're

going to ask for, but I think that we do have sufficient rules

that at least to us we are satisfied.

Senator Huddleston. You're confident that the information

your agency supplies is not being misused, to the detriment

of the rights of any individuals.

Mr. Kelley. Senator, I'm only confident in what I

do myself. I would say that I am satisfied.

Senator Huddleston. I was wondering whether some

inclusion ought to be made in whatever charter is made as to

who specifically can request, what limits ought to be placed

on what the request, and what they can do with it after they

get it.

Mr. Kelley. Yes.

Senator Huddleston. I have some concern about the fact

that in intelligence gathering, you gather, you are just

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bound to gather a great deal of information about some

individual that is useless as far as the intent of the intelli-

gence gathering is concerned, but might be in some way embarras-

sing or harmful to the individual, whether or not there's any

effort to separate this kind of information out of a person's

file that is really initiated for a purpose, for a specific

purpose unrelated to this information.

Is there any effort, or could any direction be given to

doing that?

Mr. Kelley. We would be very happy to work under the

guidelines or rules or anything else to purge material which

is extraneous, irrelevant, or for any other reason objection-

able.

Senator Huddleston. And how about the length of time

that these files are kept in the agency?

Mr. Kelley. We are willing to work within that framework,

too.

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Senator Huddleston. I think that might be done:

Now, I think in developing the chain of command, so to

speak, it certainly would be very difficult to prevent the

President of the United States from calling up the head of

the FBI or anyone else and discussing any law enforcement

problem he might so desire, and perhaps even give direction

to the agency.

But how about that? What about white House personnel

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informants. We'll discuss techniques, we'll discuss our

present activities. I think this is the only way that we can

exchange our opinions and get accomplished what you want to

accomplish and what I want to accomplish.

Senator Huddleston. I feel that is an important aspect

of it because even though you have a charter which gives broad

direction for all the guidelines and to the types of projects

that enter into it, if we don't get down to specifics, such

things as how intelligence is to be collected, how evidence

is to be collected, what is done after it is collected, this

type of thing, it seems to me we are leaving a wide gap

again for the Bureau to assume that it has total instruction

and total permission to move in a certain direction and go

beyond what is intended or what was authorized.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Director.

The Chairman. Senator Goldwater?

Senator Goldwater. Mr. Kelley, as part of the FBI

electronic surveillance of DI. King, several tapes of

specific conversations, and later a composite King tape were

produced.

Are these tapes still in the possession of the FBI?

Mr. Kelley. Yes, sir.

Senator Goldwater. Have they been reviewed by you?

Mr. Kelley. No, sir.

Senator Goldwater. Have they been reviewed by any of your

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staff, to your knowledge?

MI. Kelley. Senator, I think that they have been reviewed.

I know that at least some have reviewed it within the area of

this particular section. There has been no review of them

since I came to the FBI, I can tell you that.

Senator Goldwater. Would these tapes be available to

the Committee if the Committee felt they would like to hear

them?

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Mr. Kelley. This, Senator Goldwater, is a matter which is

of, as I said before, some delicacy, and there would have to

be a discussion of this in an executive session.

The Chairman. I might say in that connection that the

Committee staff gave some consideration to this matter and

decided that it would compound the original error for the

staff to review the tapes, because that would be a still

further invasion of privacy, and so the staff refrained from

insisting on obtaining the tapes, believing that it was

unnecessary, and quite possibly improper, in order to get at

what we needed to know about the king case.

So the staff did refrain, and for that reason the issue

never came to a head. I just wanted to lay that information

before the Senator.

Senator Goldwater. I realize that's a prerogative of

the staff, but it's also the prerogative of the Committee if,

and I'm not advocating it, if we wanted to hear them to

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ourselves whether Mr. Hoover was off on a wild goose chase

or whether there was, in effect, some reason. Again, I am

not advocating it, I am merely asking à question. They would

be available if the Committee took a vote to hear them and

decided on it.

Mr. Kelley. I don't think it would be within my juris-

diction to respond to this, Senator. It would have to be the

Attorney General®

Senator Goldwater. I see.

Now, are these tapes and other products of surveillance

routinely retained even after an individual ceased to be a

target of inquiry?

Mr. Kelley. They are retained usually for ten years.

Senator Goldwater. Ten years.

Mr. Kelley. Yes, sir.

Senator Goldwater.

What is the future value, if any,

to the Bureau of retaining such information?

Mr. Kelley. If there be guidelines that set out a

destruction or erasure, we will abide by it. We will, on those

occasions where we think that matters might come up within

that period of time which may need the retention of them, we

will express our opinion at that time, but other than that

we would be guided by guidelines.

Senator Goldwater. Is it your view that legitimate

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with respect to retention of such information, or do we need

the clear guidelines on the destruction of these materials

when the investigation purposes for which they were collected

have been served?

Mr. Kelley. We feel that there should be a good close

look at the retention of material, and we would of course like

to have an input. But we welcome consideration of this.

Senator Goldwater. That is all I have, MI. Chairman. Thank

you very much.

The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Mondale?

Senator Mondale. MI. Director, it seems to me that the

most crucial question before the Congress is to accept the

invitation of the FBI to draw Congressionally imposed lines,

limits of authority so the FBI will know clearly what you can

and cannot do, so you will not be subject to later judgments,

and the question is, where should that line be drawn?

As you know, in 1924 when the FBI was created, and

Mr. Stone later became the Chief Justice, he drew the line at

criminal law enforcement. He said that never again will we

go beyond the authority imposed upon us to get into political

ideas. We will stay in the area of law enforcement.

Would you not think it makes a good deal of sense to

draw the guidelines in a way that your activities are

restricted to the enforcement of the law, investigations of

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crime, investigations

of conspiracies to commit crime rather

than to leave this very difficult to define and control area

of political ideas?

Mr. Kelley. I don't know whether I understand your last

statement of involving the area of political ideas. I say that

I feel that certainly we should be vested and should continue

in the field of criminal investigations as an investigatory

objective. These are conclusions, of course, which are based

on statutes in the so-called security field, national ox

foreign.

These are criminal violations. I feel that they should

be in tandem. I feel, having worked many years in this

atmosphere, that you have more ears and eyes and you have

more personnel working together, covering the same fields..

I do not think there should be a separation of the intelligence

matters, because it is a concomitant. It naturally flows

from the investigation of the security matters and the

criminal.

Senator Mondale. Mr. Kelley, what Mr: Stone said was

this, that the Bureau of investigation is not concerned

with political or other opinions of individuals. It is

concerned only with such conduct as is forbidden by the laws

of the United States. When the police system goes beyona

these limits, it is dangerous to proper administration of

justice and human liberty.

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Do you object to that definition?

Mr. Kelley. I think that life has become much more

sophisticated and we have added to the so-called policeman's

area of concern some matters which were probably not as important

at that time. I think that the fact that the FBI has been in

touch with the security investigations and the gathering of

intelligence is something which has proved to be at times

troublesome and given us great concern, but it is a viable,

productive procedure.

I don't know what Mr. Stone was thinking of entirely

of this course, but I can tell you about the procedure today:

Senator Mondale. You see, I think you recognize, if

that further step is taken, as you're recommending here, that

at that point it becomes so difficult to guarantee, and in

fact, in my opinion, impossible to guarantee that we won't

see a recurrence of some of the abuses that we've seen in

the past, and I don't know how you establish any kind of

meaningful oversight.on a function as nebulous as the one

you've just defined.

If the FBI possesses the authority to investigate

ideas that they consider to be threats to this nation's

security, particularly in the light of the record that we have

seen how that definition can be stretched to include practi-

cally everybody, including moderate civil rights leaders,

war dissenters and so on, how on earth can standards be developed

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that would provide any basis

for oversight?

How can you, from

among other things, be protected from

criticism later on that you exceeded your authority of didn't

do something that some politician tried to pressure you into

doing?

Mr. Kelley. It might well be, Senator, that ten years

from now a Director of the FBI will be seated here and will be

criticized for doing that which today is construed as very

acceptable.

Senator Mondale.

Correct. And I have great sympathy

for the predicament the FBI finds itself in.

Mr. Kelley. And the Director.

Senator Mondale. And the Director especially, and that is

why I think it's in the interest of the FBI to get these lines

as sharply defined as possible, so that when you are pressured

to do things, or when, after the fact, people with good 20/20

hindsight can criticize you or the Bureau, that you can say

well, here are the standards that you gave us, and they specific-

ally say this, and that is your answer. We have to live by

the law. If we don't define it specifically, it seems to me

that these excesses could reoccur, because I don't think it's

possible to define them, and the FBI is inevitably going to

be kicked back and forth, depending on personal notions of what

you should have done.

Don't you fear that?

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Mr. Kelley. Not too much, Senator. I think we learned a

great lesson by virtue of Watergate, the revelations that have

come up as a result of this Committee's inquiries, the fact

that I think that we have a different type of spirit today

in the Bureau, the fact that, as I said before, you came in,

that I think the Bureau is a matchless organization, and they

are eager to do that which is vital and proper, and the fact

that we are getting a number of very fine young people in the

organization, people of the other ethnic backgrounds than we

had years ago. I think there is a greater understanding in

the Bureau today of what is the proper type of conduct.

We may not be able to project this on all occasions,

because we must equate this with the need and with our

experience, but if the precise guidelines be the goal, you're

going to have trouble. If, on the other hand, there be a

flexibility, I think that we can work very well within those

guidelines.

Senator Mondale.

I think, as you know, I don't think

there is a better trained or higher professionally qualified

law enforcement organization in the world than the FBI. I

think we all agree it is superb. But the problem has been,

from time to time, that when you go beyond the area of

enforcing the law into the area of political ideas, that you

are subject to and in fact you leave the criminal field, you

get into politics. And that is where, it seems to me, that the

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great controversy exists, and where you are almost inevitably

going to be subjected to fierce criticism in the future, no

matter how you do it. Once you get into politics, you get

into trouble.

Mr. Kelley. I agree to that, and I point out that in almost

every branch of the government and in every part, as a matter

of fact, every segment of our society, there are some who deviate

from the normal course. I feel that within the Bureau there is

less likelihood of this to happen, and I think that working

with you we can at least make some achievements that will be

significant.

Now, whether it be lasting, I don't think so, but I

think we've made a good start.

Senator Mondale. In your speech in Montreal on August

9th, you said we must be willing to surrender a small measure

of our liberties to preserve the great bulk of them.

Which liberties did you have in mind?

Mx. Kelley. Well, of course, this speech has been mis~

understood many, many times.

Senator Mondale. Well, I want you to have a chance to

clear it up.

...

Mr. Kelley. All that was intended here was a restatement

of the approach which the courts historically have used in

resolving most issues of Constitutional importance, and its

recognition that rights are not susceptible to absolute

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protection. It's a matter of balance. Even in the Fourth

Amendment, for example, which protects the right of privacy, it

does not prohibit searches and

seizures. I mention, it only

refers to those that are unreasonable.

I came from the police fieda. What is more restrictive

to more people than traffic regulation? But what would be

more chaotic is of you did not have traffic regulation. We

do have to , in order to love in the complexities and

intricacies of today's life, have to give up some of our

rights.

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Some may construe this as an extravagant statement. If it

is os, I wish to say that I only was pointing out that there

has to be a balance.

Senator Mondale. So that when you say we have to give

up some liberties, or as you just said, some rights, what you

mean -- let me ask. Let me scratch: that and ask again, you

have to give up some tights.

Which rights would you have us

give up?

Mr. Kelly. Well, under the Fourth Amendment you would

have the right for search and seizure.

Senator Mondale. You wouldn't give up the Fourth Amend-

ment right.

Mr. Kelley. Oh, no not the right.

Senator Mondale. What right do you have in mind?

MI.

Kelley. The right to be free from search and seizure.

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Senator Mondale. There's no such right in the Consti-

tution. You can have such seizures, but they must be reasonable,

under court warrant.

• Did you mean to go beyond that?

Mr. Kelley. That's right.

Senator Mondale. That you should be able to go beyond

that?

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Mr. Kelley. No, no. I do not mean that we should ever

go beyond a Constitutional right guarantee.

Senator Mondale. Well, would you say, MI. Kelley, that

that sentence might have been inartful in your speech?

Mr. Kelley. I said that if it was misunderstood, I

made a mistake, because I should never make a statement which

yes, it was inartful.

Senator Mondale. I think I know about your record in

law enforcement well enough to tell you that I think you were

saying something different, that it was taken to mean something

different than I think you intended:

What you are saying is that in the exercise of your law

enforcement powers, the rights of individuals is determined

by the laws and the courts, but the courts, in the handling

of those issues, have to balance rights and other values.

That's what you're essentially saying, is that correct?

Mr. Kelley. Senator, I ought to have you write my

speeches so that I don't have any misunderstandings. I didn't

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understand that to be at the time anything that was unusual.

I have to admit that maybe I made a mistake.

Senator Mondale. What you are saying in effect is that

in effect, the rights: of the American people can be determined

not by the director of the FBI but by the courts and by the

law.

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Mr. Kelley. Indeed, yes, sir.

Senator Mondale.

All right.

Thank you.

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The Chairman. Senator Hart.

Senator of Colorado. Mr. Kelley, in response to

a question by Senaotr Mondale, one of his first questions

about

laying down guidelines, it seems to me what you were saying was

we could work together. That is to say the Bureau and the

Congress, lay down guidelines that would not unreasonably

hamper you from investigations of crime control in the

country.

But I think implicit in his question was also an area

that you didn't respond to, and that is how do you, what kind

of guidelines do you lay down to protect you and the Bureau

from political pressure, the misuse of the Bureau by political

figures, particularly in the White House?

And we've had indications that at least two of your

predecessors, if not more, obviously were corrupted and Mr.

Gray was under great pressure

from the White House to use

the facilities of the Bureau

and their capabilities to accomplish

some plititcal end.

Well, it seems to me you were arguing in favor of fewer

restrictions so you could get on with your job, but that is

not what Senator Mondale and the rest of us are interested in.

What kindof restrictions can we lay down to protect you

from political pressures?

I'd be interested in that sign of the

coin, if you would.

Mr. Kelley. I would welcome any guidelines which would

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protect me of any successor from this type of thing. I think

that would be splendid. I have not reviewed the guidelines

as prepared to the present date by the Department. It might

be that they are well defined in there. But I welcome any

consideration of such directives.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Do you think this is a problem?

Mr. Kelley. No, sir, not with me.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Do you think that it has been

a problem for the people that preceded you?

Mr. Kelley. I think so.

Senator Hart of Colorado. And that's a problem the

Congress ought to address?

Mr. Kelley. I think so.

Senator Hart of Colorado. The Committee received a

letter from the Department of Justice a couple of days, the

Assistant Attorney General asking our cooperation in carrying

out the investigation or their efforts to review the investi-

gation conducted by the FBI into the death of Martin Luther

King, JI., in order to determine whether that investigation

should be re-opened. They asked our cooperation, they asked

for our transcripts, the testimony before the Committee, all

material provided to the Committee by the FBI which relates

to Dr. King and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

I guess my question is this: Why is the Justice Depart-

ment asking this Comnittee for FBI files?

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Mr. Kelley. I don't think they're asking for files.

I think they're asking for what testimony was given by

witnesses whose testimony has not been given up. I don't know.

Senator Hart of Colorado. I'll quote it. "And all

material provided to the Committee by the FBI which relates

to DI. King and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference."

I repeat the question. Why is the Justice Department

asking this Committee for material provided to us by the

FBI?

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Mr. Kelley.

Frankly, I don't know. Do you mind if I

just ask --

(Pause).

Mr. Kelley. I am informed, and I knew this one.

Everything that was sent to you was sent through them. Did

they have a copy also? Yes, they had a retained copy. I

don't know why.

Senator Hart of Colorado. So there's nothing you

provided us that's not available to the Justice Department?

Mr. Kelley. That's right.

Senator Hart of Colorado. And you can't account for why

an official of the Justice Department would ask this Committee

for your records?

Mr. Kelley. No, sir.

Senator Ilart of Colorado. You released a statement on

November the 18th of '74 regarding the FBI's. counter-intelligence

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program and you said you made a detailed study' of COINTELPRO

activities and reached the following conclusions, and I quote:

"The purpose of these counter-intelligence programs was

to prevent dangerously and potentially deadly acts against

individuals, organizations and institutions both public

and private

across the United States."

Now we had an FBI informant in the other day before this

Committee and he stated he told the FBI on a number of .

occasions he planned violent acts against black people in

groups. And yet, he said few, if any, instances in which the

FBI actually prevented violence from taking place.

How does his testimony square with your statement that

I have quoted?

Mr. Kelley. It doesn't, and I don't know if any of

his statements contrary to what we have said is the truth.

We don't subscribe to what he said. We have checked into it

and we know of no instances where, for example, 15 minutes

and that type of thing has been substantiated.

Senator Hart of Colorado. You're saying the testimony

he gave us under oath was not accurate?

Mr. Kelley. Right.

Senator Hart of Colorado. You also said in that statement,

and I quote:

"I want to assure you that Director Hoover did

not conceal from superior authorities the fact that the FBI

was engaged in neutralizing and disruptive tactics against

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revolutionary and violence-prone groups.

Now the Committee has received testimony that the New

Left COINTELPRO programs was not in fact told to higher

authorities, the Attorney Gereral and Congress.

Do you have any information in this regard?

I know in that statement you cite onw or two instances,

but in terms of the bulk of COINTEL programs, the record

seems to date at least to be clear that there was not systematic

information flowing upward through the chain of command to

Director Hoover's superiors:

Mr. Kelley. May I ask that I be given the opportunity

to substantiate that with documentation?

Senator Hart of Colorado. Sure.

Mr.. Kelley: Or respond to it.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Dorector Kelley, just in

passing, do you agree with the statement made by President

Ford that those responsible for harassing and trying to destroy

DI. King should be brought to justice.

Mr. Kelley. Those who directly responsible and upon whose orders

the activities were taken responsible. I don't know if he intended to say

that, but if he did not, I would say that it would be more proper. Insofar

as my own opinion is concerned, that it be centered on those who said

to do it and those who are responsible.

I: took the responsibility for any such program and I

don't expect that those under me would be not acting in

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accordance with what they think is proper and may even have

some reservation, but they do it on my orders. I accept that

responsibility.

I think that it should rest.on those who instructed that

that be done.

Senator Hart of Colorado. But you agree that the people

who give the orders should be

brought to justice.

Mr.. Kelley. I do.

The Chairman. Aren't they all dead?

Mr. Kelley. No.

The Chairman. Not quite?

Mr. Kelley. Not quite.

Senator Hart of Colorado. That's all, Mir. Chairman.

The Chairnan. Thank you, Senator.

Director Kelley, in the Committee's review of the

COINTELPRO program and other political involvements of the

FBI, it seems to me that we have encountered two or three

basic questions.

Since the investigation is over insofar as the Conmittee

is concerned, we're now turning our attention to remedies for

the future, what I would think would be our constructive

legislative work, it is very inportant that we focus on what

we learned in that investigation.

And one thing that we have learned is that Presidents of

the United States have fron time to time ordered the FBI to

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obtain for them certain kinds of information by exercising the

necessary surveillance to obtain. and to have a purely

political character, that they simply wanted to have for their

own personal purposes.

I think that you would agree that that is not a proper

function of the FBI, and you agree.

Yet it's awfully difficult for anyone in the FBI,

including the Director, to turn down a President of the United

States if he receives a direct order from the President. It

is always possible, of course, to say no, and if you insist,

I will resign. But that puts a

very hard burden on any man

serving in your position, particularly if the President puts

a good face on the request and makes it sound plausible or

even invents some excuse. It is always easy for him to say,

you know, I an considering Senator White for an important

position in my administration, and I need to know more about

his activities, particularly of late. I've had some cause

for concern and I want to be certain that there is nothing in

his record that would later embarrass me, and I just want you

to keep careful track of him and report to me on what he's

been doing lately.

It's difficult for you to say back to the President, Mr.

President, that's a very questionable activity for the FSI,

and I frankly don't believe that you've given me the real

reason why you want this man followed. I think his opposition

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to your current policy is politically embarrassing to you and

you want to get something on him.:

I mean, you know, the Director can hardly talk back that

way, and I'm wondering

what we could do in the way of protecting

your office and the FBI from political exploitation in this

basic charter that we write.

Now, I want your suggestions, but let's begin with one

or two of mine. I would like your response.

If we were to write into the law that any order given you

either by the President or by the Attorney General should be

transmitted in vriting and should clearly state the objective

and purpose of the request and that the FBI would maintain

those written orders and that furthermore they would be

available to any oversight committee of the Congress. If the

joint cormittee on intelligence is established, that committee

would have access to such a file.

So that the committee itself would be satisfied that

orders were not being given to the FBI that were improper or

unlawful.

What would you think of writing a provision of that kind

into a charter for the FBI?

Mr. Kelley. I would say writing into the law any order

issued by the President that is a request for action by the

Attorney General should be in writing, is certainly, in my

opinion, is a very plausible solution. I'm sure that in

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contemplation of this there would be some that will say yes

or some that will say no, but I think we could define an

area where you are trying to cure the abuses and we could

do that.

Now as to the availability to any oversight committee

of Congress, I would say generally that I certainly would have

no objection to this, but I again, there may be some request

for something of high confidentiality that the President might

put in writing such as some national or foreign security

matter.

I would like to have such a consideration be given a

great deal of thought and that the oversight committee review

be conditioned with that possibility. I don't think it would

present a problem.

I have said previously that I feel I can discuss every-.

thing except the identity of the informants to the oversight

committee. I welcome that.

The Chairman. Well, that has been of course the way we

proceeded with this Cormittee. It has worked pretty well,

I think.

Now Senator Goldwater brought up a question on the

Martin Luther King tapes.

I would like to pursue that question.

If these tapes do not contain any evidence that needs

to be preserved for ongoing criminal investigations, and since

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why are they preserved?

Why aren't they simply destroyed?

Is there a problem that we can help through new law to enable

the FBI to remove from its files so much of this information

that is has collected that it is no longer needed or may never

have connected the person with any criminal activity?' And

yet, all of that information just stays there in the files

year after year.

What can we do? How can a law be changed? If that's

not the problem, then what is? Why are these tapes still down

there at the FBI?

Mr. Kelley. Hell, of course, we do have the rule that

they are maintained ten years. Now why the rule is your

question and why right now are they maintained? Since we

do maintain everything

since the inquiry has started and until

that's lifted, we can't destroy anything.

I would say that this is a proper area for guidelines

or legislation and ayain, as I have said, there should be

some flexibility and I know that's a broad statement but there

might be some areas wherein that the subject of the investigation

himself may want them retained because it shows his innocence.

I think you have to deliberate this very carefully, but

it can he done and we are willing to be guided by those

rules.

The Chairman. Let me ask you this. The FBI is conducting

thousands of investigations every year on possible appointees

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to Federal positions. As a natter of fact, the only time I

ever see an FBI agent is when he comes around and flashes his

badge and asks me a question or two about what I know of Mr.

so and so, who's being considered for an executive office.

And we have a very brief conversation in which I tell him that

as far as I know, he's a loyal and patriotic citizen, and that

is about the extent of it.

Then when this file is completed and the person involved

is either appointed or not appointed, what happens to that

file? I know it's full of all kinds of gossip because it is

in the nature of the investigation to go out to his old

neighborhoods and talk to everybody who might have known him.

What happens to the file? Is that just retained forever?

Mr. Kelley. We have some capability of destroying some

files and they are rather lengthy insofar as retention. Ve

have some archival rules which govern the retention of mateial

and is developed in cases involving certain members of the

Executive Branch of the government.

I see no reason why this would not be a proper area

for consideration of legislation.

The Chairman. Can you give me any idea of how much --

do you have records that would tell us how much time and money

is being spent by the FBI just in conducting these thousands

of routine investigations on possible Presidential appointments

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Mr. Kelley. I feel confident we can get it. Ião not

have it now, but if you would like to have the annual cost

for the investigation of rederal appointees --

The Chairman. Yes. Plus, you know, plus any other

information that would indicate to us what proportion of the

time and effort of the FBI was absorbed in this kind of

activity.

Mr. Kelley. I can tell you it is relatively small, but

I can get you, I think, the exact amount of time and the

approximate expense.

The Chairman. I wish you would do that because this is

a matter we need more information about. And when you supply

that data to the Committee, would you also supply the number

of such investigations each year?

You know, I don't expect you to go back 20 or 25 years,

but give us a good idea of the last few years. For example,

enough to give us an idea of how much time and how broad the

reach of these investigations may be.

Mr. Kelley. Through '70?

The Chairman. That would be sufficient, I would think.

The other matter that is connected to this same subject

that I would like your best judgment on is whether these

investigations could not be limited to offices of sensitivity.

That is to say where legitimate national security interest might

be involved so that there is a reason to make a close check on

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past associations, attitudes and expressions of belief.

I have often wondered whether we couldn't eliminate

routine Federal offices that are not particularly sensitive

in the national security sense

from the reach of these FBI

checks.

And so when you respond

to the series of questions, I

wish you would include the offices that are now covered by

such checks and give us an idea of how far down into the

Federal bureaucracy this extends.

Could you do that?

Mr. Kelley. Yes, sir.

The Chairnan. Fine.

Now there is a vote.

The vote always cones just at

the wrong time, but Mr. Schwarz wants to ask you some additional

questions for the record, and there may be other questions:

too that would be posed by the staff, after which I will as!:

Mr. Schwarz to adjourn the hearings. It looks like we're going

to be tied up on the floor with votes.

But before I leave I want to thank you for your testimony,

iir. Kelley, and to express my appreciation to you for the

way you have cooperated with the Committee in the course of

its investigation during the past months.

Mr. Kelley. Thank you.

The Chairman. And I hope, as you do, that as a result

of the work of the Committee we can write a generic law for

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the FBI that will help to remedy many of the problems we'll

encounter in the future.

Thank you.

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Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Kelley, I'll try to be very brief.

On page 5 of your statement --

MI. Kelley. What?

Mx. Schwarz. On page 5 of your statement, the third

full paragraph, you said the following, and I would like then

to question about what you said. "We must recognize that

situations have occurred in the past and will arise in the

future where the Government may well be expected to depart from

its traditional role, in the FBI's case, as an investigative

and intelligence-gathering agency, and take affirmative steps

which are needed to meet an imminent threat to human life or

property."

Now, by that you mean to take what kind of steps in what

kind of situation?

And can you give some concrete examples under your general

principles statement?

MI. Kelley. I think that Mr. Adams addressed himself to

that the other day, where you have an extremist who is an

employee at the waterworks, and he makes a statement that he's

going to do something which is devastating to the city, and you

have no way to attack this under the ordinary procedures, and

so therefore you must take some steps to meet that imminent

threat to human life or property.

Mr. Schwarz. So let us take that case as a test of the

principle. You are saying the extremist has said he is going

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to do something to the waterworks, poison it or something, and

he is on the way down there with the poison in his car.

Is that the presumption?

Mr. Kelley. We hadn't gone that far, but all right, you

can extent it.

Mr. Schwarz. All right, now, in that case you have the

traditional law enforcement tool, which is the power of arrest.

Mr. Kelley. Not under probable cause where he has not

gone down there. The hypothetical we gave was one where he had

not taken any overt acts in perpetration of this.

Mr. Schwarz. Well, if he hasn't taken any overt acts,

are you then in what you would call in imminent threat of

human life or property?

MI. Kelley. I think so.

Mr. Schwarz. How so? Unless he has taken an overt act

to buy the poison or to get in the car with the poison, there

is not by definition any threat to life or property.

Mr. Kelley. Mr. Schwarz, I've been around in this business.

a long time. I've heard a number of threats which were issued,

and they thereafter materialized into actions. I don't think

take these threats as being empty ones, because so many times

they have been acted upon.

I was criticized one time when there was a threat made to

kill me, and it was said later on, it's not rhetoric, it's

not rhetoric to me, because when they say they're going to

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kill me, that just means one thing.

Mr. Schwarz. But I'm not disagreeing with you.

Mr. Kelley. But you are disagreeing with me. You're saying

on the basis of experience that you cannot detect a possible

threat. That's the whole area of concern that we have here, where

we don't lose the capability of doing something.

We don't

say we should initiate ourselves. We say that we should go to

the Attorney General. We do not subscribe to the idea that

we should act independently because maybe we don't have the

judicial review, the capability of determining, but we do

think that we should report it and thereafter see what can

be done.

MI. Schwarz. Well, have you changed in the course of

our discussion the standard on page 5.

On page 5 you're talking about an imminent threat..

Mr. Kelley. Yes.

• Mr. Schwarz. And I hear you now as saying a possible

threat.

MI. Kelley. An imminent possible threat.

Mr. Schwarz. An imminent possible threat. All right.

Now, would a fair standard for either action, other than

arrest, I don't know what you have in mind, but something to

prevent the person from carrying out his activities, other

than arrest, for instance, what is an example of what you have

in mind?

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Mr. Kelley. Removing him from his position or whatever

is necessary in order to make it impossible or at least as

impossible as possible to perpetuate this thing.

Mr. Schwarz. You mean have him lose his job or --

Mr. Kelley. I don't know what it would be.

Mr. Schwarz. Isolate him in some fashion.

Mr. Kelley. In some fashion perhaps.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, for such activity and for opening

an investigation into a domestic group, could you live with

a standard which said you would have to have an immediate

threat that someone was likely to commit a serious federal

crime involving violence?

Mr. Kelley. I think that this thing could be worked out

so that there could be an adequate basis for an evaluation.

Mr. Schwarz. So those words, without trying to commit

you entirely to them, do not seem to you to depart far from

what you think would be an acceptable standard.

Mr. Kelley. Well, an imminent, immediate threat might

be, by virtue of the word "immediate" that he's going to

do it the next minute. In that case it may be necessary for

you to, not with the presence of the possibility, not able

to do anything except put him under arrest or anything.

Mr. Schwarz. Of course, of course.

And nobody would at all disagree with that kind of action.

Mr. Kelley. I don't think they would either.

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Mr. Schwarz. But on the question, let's take the opening

of an investigation into a domestic group.

Is it basically consistent with practicality to make the

test immediate threat of a serious Federal crime involving

violence?

Mr. Kelley. To open a domestic security case.

Mr. Schwarz. Yes.

Mr. Kelley. It appears to me that this is a terrorist

activity, in effect. We certainly have terrorist activities

under our jurisdiction as a threat against the United States.

MI. Schwarz. Now, are there other circumstances where

it is justifiable to open an investigation of the domestic

group where you do not have an immediate threat of serious

federal crime involving violence?

Mr. Kelley. Oh, I think there are other criteria, and

they have been well defined as to what is the possible

opening, the basis for a possible opening. We haven't been

discussing that, we have been discussing particular instances,

but there are other criteria that are used, yes.

MI. Schwarz. What would the other criteria be?

Mr. Kelley. Well, the possible statutory violations

over which we have jurisdiction are, generally speaking, the

most used of thebasis, and then you have, of course, some

intelligence investigations which should, of course, be of

short duration. If there is no showing of this into action

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or a viable intent.

Mr. Schwarz. So that's what you're looking for in the

intelligence investigation?

Mr. Kelley.. By intelligence investigation, yes, you

are looking to prevent.

Mr. Schwarz. And what you are looking to prevent, and

what you're looking to find is a likelihood of action combined

with an intent to take an issue?

Mr. Kelley. And the capability.

Mr. Schwarz. And the capability.

All right. I just have two other lines, Mr. Kelley, and

I appreciate very much your time.

Mr. Kelley. That's all right.

Mr. Schwarz. Assuming a legitimate investigation has •

been started into a domestic intelligence matter, is it legiti-

mate for the FBI, in addition to obtaining information that

relates to what we've just been talking about, the likelihood

of violent action, is it also legitimate for the FBI to

collect, A, retain, B, disseminate, C, information concerning

let's say the sex life of a person on the one hand, and the

political views of a person on the other?

Mr. Kelley. I think, Mr. Schwarz, that this is just what

many of our problems and perhaps the guidelines can define

this type of thing. I think probably you will agree that

within the determination of the deviations possibly of sex

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lives, there might be something that is relevant. I would say

ordinarily it's not. And so far as political views, yes, I

think that this could be, if he is espousing some cause or

some view that advocates violence of the overthrow of the

government.

Mr. Schwarz. Would those be the two limits on political

views?

Mr. Kelley. What?

Mr. Schwarz. Would those be the only limits on political

views that you think are okay to collect, advocants of violence

or advocants of overthrow?

Mr. Kelley. Well, I don't think because he's a

Democrat

or a Republican it would be anything that would be damaging,

but it might on the other hand counter the report that he's

a member of some other organization.

MI. Schwarz. Is the standard you used on collection of

sex life information, might be relevant? I suppose anything

might be relevant, but don't you think that as a function of

balance, it has to have a high degree of relevance before it's

justifiable to collect that kind of information on American

citizens who are not suspected of having committed crimes?

Mr. Kelley. Insofar as doing it presently, it has been

included in some reports as a result of the requirement that

that is what is required by our rules, that when a person

reports something to us, we do a report of the complaint. Insofar

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as a determination by guidelines that might be prepared later,

I think that we can certainly deliberate on this to see whether

or not this is something we should retain, and we would not

object to anything reasonable in that regard.

Mr. Schwarz. I just have one final question.

Taking the current manual and trying to understand its

applicability laid against the facts in the Martin Luther King

case, under Section 87 there is a -- permission is granted to

open investigations of the infiltration of non-subversive

groups, and the first sentence reads: "When information is

received indicating that a subversive group is seeking to

systematically infiltrate and control a non-subversive group

or organization, an investigation can be opened."

Now, I take it that is the same standard that was used

in opening the investigation of the Southern Christian Leadership

Conference in the 1960s, so that invéstigation could still be

open today under the FBI manual, the current FBI manual.

Mr. Kelley. We are interested in the infiltration of

clearly subversive groups into non-subversive groups inasmuch

as this is a ploy that is used many times, and having infil-

trated, they then get control, and they have a self-laundered

organization which they can use, and not, certainly, to the

benefit of the country.

Mr. Schwarz. But is the answer to my question yes, that

under that standard, the SCIC investigation could still be

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opened today?

Mr. Kelley. I think so.

Mr. Schwarz. All right, then, just one final question. .

Do you agree that special care needs to be taken not only

of the standards for initially opening an investigation of a

group, but perhaps extra care needs to be taken when the investi-

gation goes beyond the initial target group to individuals

of people who come into contact with it?

Mr. Kelley. I don't know if I agree with that entirely.

If

you mean that we go into the non-subversive group, that we

then investigate people in that non-subversive group, not the

infiltrators, but the non, that we conduct a lengthy investigation

of them without any basis for doing so other than that they

are in an infiltrated group, I would likely have said -- but

off the top of my head I would say probably that's not necessary.

Mr. Schwarz. Thank you very much.

Mr. Smothers. Just a couple of very brief lines of

inquiry, Mr. Kelley.

I think that the questions of the Chief Counsel was

raising is one that goes further into your statement, when you

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to distinguish some of this has been made.

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Putting aside for one moment the counterespionage

effort, and looking strictly at what we have been calling the

Domestic Intelligence, is it your view that the retention of

this function in the Bureau is critical to the Bureau's

law enforcement position?

Mr. Kelley. My personal opinion is that the Bureau does

a splendid job in this area. I feel further that the background

of criminal investigatory activities and experiences which

all counterintelligence people have is very helpful. It is help-

ful not only in gathering knowledge and experience, it also

enters into this field, a person with a broad understanding

of the rights and privileges,

and you don't have so much that

spy type, that cloak and dagger, that very, very secret type

of an operation.

I subscribe to the present system heartily.

Mr. Smothers. Would it be of assistance to your mission

if within the Bureau guidelines were established that

effectively limited access or controlled dissemination of

the intelligence product? In other words, if we had a

situation where the intelligence product is critical to assist

the law enforcement effort, I don't think there's any question

that there should be access to it.

Isn't our problem one of controlling the use of that

intelligence product and preventing the kind of murky crossing

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law enforcement?

Mr. Kelley. There is always a problem when there is wide

dissemination, because that just numerically increases the

possibility of misuse, abuse or slander, libel, or anything

of that matter, and I think that it would be well worthwhile

to review the dissemination rules to make them subject to

close guidance in the guidelines that we're speaking of.

MI. Smothers. Let me just raise one final area with you.

We talked a little bit about, or a question was raised about

the investigation now being conducted by the Justice Department

regarding the improper actions on the COINTELPRO, and the

King case in particular.

As we look at allegations of impropriety by your personnel,

I think it would be helpful for our record here to have some

insight into the procedure the Bureau would normally follow.

What does the Bureau do when you get an allegation that

an agent or administrative official in the Bureau has behaved

improperly?

Is an investigation conducted internally, or is it

routinely referred to the Justice Department?

Mr. Kelley. There may be a revision in this type of

procedure as a result of the establishment of the Council for

Professional Responsibility. At present it would be in the

great majority of the cases turned over to our Investigative

Division for investigation. There might, on some unusual

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occasion, be a designation of a special task force made up,

perhaps, of division heads.

That is most unlikely, but it is

handled internally at present.

Mr. Smothers. Would these internal determinations be

reviewed by Justice, or do you think that is a necessary

step?

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I guess what we are searching for here is, first of all,

I think you answered that, well, to what extent does the

Bureau police itself; and then secondly, is the Department of

Justice involved in the police determinations?

For instance, what if the Attorney General disagreed with

the assertion that only the higher up officials who ordered

the action against King should be the subject of investigation

and maybe prosecution?

How does the interplay work there between you and Justice?

Mr. Kelley. We do report to the Attorney General those

activities which we construe as improper or possibly illegal.

There is a possibility that the Department, having been advised

of the situation, might take it on their own to do their own

investigating, and this is something that we feel is a

decision to be made only rather rarely, because we feel we

have within our own organization sufficient capability to

handle that. But we do not protest it. It is handled

independently of us.

Mr. Smothers. Thank you.

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That is all I have.

Mr. Schwarz. Thank you.

(Whereupon, at 12:12 o'clock p.m., the Committee recessed

subject to the call of the Chair.)

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MIR 050 WA PLAIN

8:23PM NITEL 12/19/75 GHS

TO ALL SACS

FROM DIRECTOR

DIRECTOR'S APPEARANCE BEFORE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, DECEMBER 1D, 1975

A COPY OF THE STATEMENT I DELIVERED BEFORE THE SENATE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES TODAY HAS BEEN

SEIT ALL OFFICES. FOR YOUR INFORMATION, THERE FOLLOWS A

SYNOPSIZED ACCOUNT OF THE MAJOR AREAS OF THE COMMITIEE 'S

QUESTIONS IO ME, TOGETHER WITH MY RESPONSES:

(1) REGARDING FBI INFORMANTS, QUESTIONS WERE ASKED

WHETHER COURT APPROVAL SHOULD BE REQUIRED FOR FBI USE OF

INFORMANIS IN INVESTIGATIONS OF ORGANIZATIONS MY RESPONSE

WAS THAT THE CONTROLS WHICH EXIST TODAY OVER USE OF INFORMANIS

ARE SATISFACIORY); HOW CAN FBI KEEP INFORMANIS OPERATING

WITHIN PROPER LIMITS SO THEY DO NOT INVADE RIGHTS OF OTHER

PERSONS MY RESPONSE WAS

THAI RELIANCE MUST BE PLACED ON THE

INDIVIDUAL AGENTS HANDLING INFORMANTS AND THOSE SUPERVISING

THE AGENTS' WORK, THAT INFORMANIS WHO VIOLATE THE LAW CAN BE

88-662-15

ste tots

HH 55275 DocId:32989840 Page 100

---

## Page 101

PAGE TWO

PROSECUTED -- AS CAN ANY AGENT WHO COUNSELS AN INFORMANT TO •

COMMIT VIOLATIONS); AND DID FORMER KLAN INFORMANT GARY ROWE

TESTIFY ACCURATELY WHEN HE TOLD THE COMMITTEE ON DECEMBER 2

THAT HE INFORMED FBI OF PLANNED ACIS OF VIOLENCE BUT FBI

DID NOT ACT TO PREVENT THEM MY RESPONSE WAS THAT ROWE'S

TESTIMONY WAS NOT ACCURATE) •

(2) IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS REGARDING IMPROPER

CONDUCI BY FBI EMPLOYEES, I STATED THAT ALLEGED. VIOLATIONS OF

LAW BY FBI PERSONNEL SHOULD BE INVESTIGATED BY THE FBI OR

OTHER APPROPRIATE AGENCY; THAT THE INSPECTION DIVISION HAS

CONDUCTED INQUIRIES REGARDING ALLEGATIONS OF MISCONDUCT ;.

THAT AN OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY HAS JUST

BEEN ESTABLISHED IN THE JUSTICE DEPARIMENT, AND WE WILL ADVISE

THAI OFFICE OF OUR MAJOR INVESTIGATIONS OF DEPARIMENTAL PERSONNEL,

INCLUDING FBI EMPLOYEES, FOR ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF LAW, REGULATIONS,

OR STANDARDS OF CONDUCT; THAT I WOULD RESERVE COMMENT

REGARDING POSSIBLE CREATION OF A NATIONAL INSPECTOR GENERAL

TO CONSIDER MATTERS OF MISCONDUCI BY EMPLOYEES OF ANY FEDERAL

AGENCY •

HH 55275

DocId: 32989840 Page 101

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## Page 102

PAGE THREE

(3)

• 1I RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS CONCERNING HARASSMENT OF

MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., I STATED THAI THE PERSONS WHO ISSUED

THE ORDERS WHICH RESULTED IN SUCH HARASSMENT SHOULD FACE THE

RESPONSIBILITY FOR IT, RATHER THAN THOSE UNDER THEM WHO CARRIED

OUT SUCH ORDERS IN GOOD FAITH; THAT THE FBI SIILL HAS RECORDINGS

RESULTING FROM ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCES OF KING ; THAT WE RETAIN

RECORDINGS FOR TEN YEARS BUT WE ALSO HAVE AGREED TO A REQUEST

FROM THE SENATE NOT TO DESTROY INFORMATION IN OUR FILES WHILE

CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES ARE BEING CONDUCTED; THAT I HAVE NOT

REVIEWED THE KING TAPES; THAT IF THE COMMITTEE REQUESTED TO

REVIEW THE KING TAPES, THE REQUEST WOULD BE REFERRED TO THE

ATTORNEY GENERAL.

(4) IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS REGARDING WHETHER IT WOULD

BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO SEPARATE THE FBI CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE

RESPONSIBILITIES AND OUR INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS, I STATED

THAI WE HAVE FOUND THE TWO AREAS IO BE COMPATIBLE, AND I

FEEL THE FBI IS DOING A SPLENDID JOB IN BOTH AREAS.

(5) IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE ADEQUACY

OF CONTROLS ON REQUESTS FROM THE WHITE HOUSE AND FROM OTHER

GOVERNMENT AGENCIES FOR FBI INVESTIGATIONS OR FOR INFORMATION

IN 55275 DocId:32989840 Page 102

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## Page 103

PAGE FOUR

FROM OUR FILES, I STATED THAI WHEN SUCH REQUESTS ARE MADE

ORALLY, THEY SHOULD BE CONFIRMED IN WRITING; THAT WE WOULD

WELCOME ANY LEGISLATIVE GUIDELINES THE CONGRESS FEELS WOULD

PROTECT THE FBI FROM THE POSSIBILITY OF PARTISAN MISUSE •

A FULL TRANSCRIPT OF THE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS WILL BE

FURNISHED TO EACH OFFICE AS SOON AS I! IS AVAILABLE.

ALL LEGATS ADVISED SEPARATELY •

END

BIH FBI JN CLR

MH 55275 DocId:32989840 Page 103

---

## Page 104

AR OSO WA PLAIN

8:23PM NITEL 12/10/75 GHS

TO ALL SACS

FROM DIRECTOR

DIRECTOR*S APPEARANCE BEFORE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, DECEMBER 10, 1975

A COPY OF THE STATEMENT I DELIVERED BEFORE THE SENATE

SELECI COMNITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES TODAY HAS BEEN

SENT ALL OFFICES• FOR YOUR INFORMATION, THERE FOLLOWS A

SYNOPSIZED ACCOUNT OF THE MAJOR AREAS OF THE COMMITTEE *S

QUESTIONS TO ME, TOGETHER WITH MY RESPONSES:

(1) REGARDING FBI INFORMANTS, QUESTIONS WERE ASKED

WHETHER COURT APPROVAL-SHOULD BE REQUIRED FOR FBI USE OF

INFORMANIS IN INVESTIGATIONS OF ORGANIZATIONS MY RESPONSE

WAS THAT THE CONTROLS WHICH EXIST TODAY OVER USE OF INFORMANTS

ARE SATISFACIORY); HOW CAN FBI KEEP INFORMANTS OPERATING

WITHIN PROPER LIMITS SO THEY DO NOT INVADE RIGHTS OF OTHER

PERSONS (MY RESPONSE WAS THAT RELIANCE MUST BE PLACED ON THE

INDIVIDUAL AGENTS HANDLING INFORMANTS AND THOSE SUPERVISING

THE AGENTS' WORK, THAI INFORMANIS WHO VIOLATE THE LAW CAN BE

80-662-15

•1Н 55275 D00Id:32989840

Page 104

---

## Page 105

PAGE TWO

PROSECUTED • AS CAN ANY AGENT WHO COUNSELS AN INFORMANT TO

COMMIT VIOLATIONS); AND DID FORMER KLAN INFORMANT GARY ROWE

TESTIFY ACCURATELY WHEN HE TOLD

THE COMMITTEE ON DECEMBER 2

THAT HE INFORMED FBI OF PLANNED ACTS OF VIOLENCE BUT FBI

DID NOT ACT- TO PREVENT THEM (MY RESPONSE WAS THAT ROVE'S

TESTIMONY WAS NOT

ACCURATE) *

(2) IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS REGARDING IMPROPER

CONDUCT BY FBI EMPLOYEES, I SIATED THAI ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF

LAW BY FBI PERSONNEL SHOULD BE INVESTIGAIED BY THE FBI OR

OTHER APPROPRIATE AGENCY; THAT THE INSPECTION DIVISION HAS

CONDUCTED INQUIRIES REGARDING ALLEGATIONS OF MISCONDUCI;

THAT AN OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY HAS JUST

BEEN ESTABLISHED IN THE JUSTICE DEPARIMENT, AND VE WILL ADVISE

THAT OFFICE OF OUR MAJOR INVESTIGATIONS OF DEPARTMENTAL PERSONNEL,

INCLUDING FBI EMPLOYEES, FOR ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF LAW, REGULATIONS,

OR STANDARDS OF CONDUCT; THAT I WOULD RESERVE COMMENT

i REGARDING POSSIBLE CREATION OF A NATIONAL INSPECTOR GENERAL

• TO CONSIDER MATTERS OF MISCONDUCT BY EMPLOYEES OF ANY FEDERAL

AGENCY,

HH 55275 DocId: 32989840

Page 105

---

## Page 106

PAGE THREE

' (3) IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS CONCERNING HARASSDENT OF

MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., I SIATED THAT THE PERSONS WHO ISSUED

THE ORDERS WHICH RESULTED IN SUCH HARASSMENT SHOULD FACE THE

RESPONSIBILITY FOR IT, RATHER THAN THOSE UNDER THEM WHO CARRIED

OUT SUCH ORDERS IN GOOD FAITH; THAT THE FBI STILL HAS RECORDINGS

RESULTING FROM ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCES OF KING ; THAT WE RETAIN

RECORDINGS FOR TEN YEARS BUT WE ALSO HAVE AGREED TO A REQUEST

FROM THE SENATE NOT TO

DESTROY INFORMATION IN OUR FILES WHILE

CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES ARE BEING CONDUCTED; THAT I HAVE NOT

REVIEWED THE KING TAPES; THAT IF THE COMMITTEE REQUESTED TO

REVIEW THE KING TAPES, THE REQUEST WOULD BE REFERRED TO THE

ATTORNEY GENERAL

(4) IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS REGARDING WHETHER IT WOULD

BE ADVANTAGEDUS TO SEPARATE THE FBI CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE

RESPONSIBILITIES AND. OUR INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS, I STATED

THAT WE HAVE FOUND THE TWO AREAS TO BE COMPATIBLE AND I

" FEEL THE FBI IS DOING A SPLENDID JOB IN BOTH AREAS

(5) IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE ADEQUACY

. OF CONTROLS ON REQUESTS FROM THE WHITE HOUSE AND FROM OTHER

GOVERNMENT AGENCIES FOR FBI INVESTIGATIONS OR FOR INFORMATION

HH 55275 DocId: 32989840 Page 106

---

## Page 107

PAGE FOUR

FROM OUR FILES, I STATED THAT WHEN SUCH REQUESTS ARE MADE

ORALLY & THEY SHOULD BE CONFIRMED IN WRITING; THAT WE WOULD

WELCOME ANY LEGISLATIVE GUIDELINES THE CONGRESS FEELS WOULD

PROTECT THE FBI FROM THE POSSIBILITY OF PARTISAN MISUSE.

A FULL TRANSCRIPT OF THE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS WILL BE

FURNISHED TO EACH OFFICE AS SOON AS IT IS AVAILABLE*

ALL LEGAIS ADVISED SEPARATELY •

END

BIN FBI JN CLR

HH 55275. DooId:32989840 Page 107

---

## Page 108

Pouting Slip

"0-7 (Rev. 12-17-73)

• TO: SAC:

Albany

Albuquerque

Nexandria

Anchorage

Atianta

Baltimore

Birmingham

Boston

Buffalo

Butte

Charlotte

Chicago

Cincinnati

Clevel and

Columbia

Dallas

Denver

Detroit

El Paso

-.Honolulu

(Copies to

s Checked)

Houston

Indianapolis

Jack son

Jacksonville

Kansas City

Knoxville

Las Vegas

Little Rock

Los Angeles

Louisville

Memphis

Miami

Milwaukee

Minneapolis

Mobile

Newark

New Haven

New Orleans

New York City

Norfolk

Oklahoma City

Omaha

Philadelphia

Phoenix

Pittsburgh

Portland

Richmond

Sacramento

St. Louis

Salt Lake City

San Antonio

San Diego

San Francisco

San Juan

Savannah

Seattle

Springfiel

ramp a

Washington Fiel

Quantic

RE: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Date

TO LEGAT:

I Beirul

Bern

Bonn

Brasilia

Buenos Aires

Caracas

Hong Kong

London

Madrid

Manila

Mexico City

Ottawa

Paris

Rome

Singapore

Tel Aviv

Tokyo

11/21/75

Retention

For appropriate

[ For information

to optional

action

→ Surep, by

C. The enclosed is for your information. If used in a future report,

_ conceal all

sources, [ paraphrase contents.

[ Enclosed are corrected pages from report of SA

dated

Remarks:

Enclosed for your information is a copy of

an article by Mr. William Safire entitled "Mr.

Church's Cover-Up" that appeared in the

November 20, 1975, issue of "The New York Times."

enc.

(1)

Bufile

Urfile

1H 55275

DooId: 32989840

Page 108

---

## Page 109

Mr. Church's over-Up

* The committee is not asking embar-

By William Safire

rassing questions even when answers

are readily available. A couple of

WASHINGON, Nov. 19-On Oct. 10,

weeks ago, at an open hearing, an

1963, the then-Attorney General of the

F.B.I. •man inadvertently starled to

United States put his personal signa-

blurt out an episode about newsmen

ture on a document that launched and

who were weritapping in 1962 with

legitimatized one of the most horren-

the apparent knowledge of Attorney!

dous abuses of Federal police power in

General Kennedy. The too-willing with

this century.

less was promptly shoosnea into s.

In Senator Frank Church's subcom-

ence, and told that such informatior

mittee hearing room this week,

the

would be developed only in executive

authorized

Wiretapping

and

subse-

session. Nobody raised an eyebrow.

quent unauthorized

bugging and at-

That pattern of containment by the

tempted blackmailing of Martin Luther

King Jr. is being gingerly examined,

the handling of the buggings at the

with the "investigation" conducted in

1964 Republican and Democratic con-

such a way as not to unduly em-

barrass officials of the Kennedy or

ESSAY

Johnson Administrations.

• With great care, the committee has

focused on the F.B.I. Yesterday, when:

the committee counsel first set forth

the result of shuffling through press

clips, it seemed as if no Justice De-!

partment had existed in 1962; today,

an F.B.I. witness pointed out that it

was Robert Kennedy who authorized

the wiretap of Dr. King, and that "the

President of the United States and the

Attorney General specifically discussed

their concern of Communist influence

with Dr. King."

But the Church committee showed

"no zest for getting further to the Ken-

nedy root of this precedent to Water-

gate eavesdropping. If Senator Church

were willing to let the chips fall where

they may, he would call some know!-

edgeable

witnesses into the glare of

the camera lights and ask them some

questions that have gone unasked for

• thirteen years.

For example, he could call Nicholas

Katzenbach, Attorney General Ken-

nedy's deputy and successor, and ask

what he knows of the Kennedy de-

cision to wiretap Dr. King. Who at

Justice concurred in the recommenda-

tion? How does the F.B.I. know the ?

President was consulted or informed?

After Mr. Katzenbach assumed of-

fice, and the wiretapping continued,

he was told by angry newsmen that

the F.B.I. was leaking scurrilous in-

formation about Dr. King. Why did he

wait for four months, and for a thou-

sand telephonic interceptions, to dis-

continue the officially approved tap?

Of course, this sort of testimony

would erode Senator Church's political.

base. That is why we do not see for

mer Assistant F.B.I. director Cartha

(Deke)

Deloach,

Lyndon

Johnson's

personal contact with the F.B.I. in the

witness chair.

What did President

Johnson know about the charactei-

assassination plot and when did he

know

it? What conversations took

place between Mr. Deloach and Presi-

dent Johnson on the tapping of Dr.

King, or about the use of the F.B.I. in

aly other intrusions into the lives of

552 Are DocId: 32989840

ventions which were ordered by Lyn-

don Johnson. Such invasions of politi-

cal headquarters were worse than the

crime committed at Watergate, since

they involved the use of

the 'F.B.I.,

but the Church investigators seem to

be determineti not to probe too deeply.

If F.B.I. decuments say that reports

were made to specific Johnson aides,

why are those men not given

the

same opportunity to publicly tell their

story so avidly given the next Presi-

dent's men? If Lyndon Johnson

com-

mitted this impeachable high crime of

using the F.B.I. to spy on political

opponents, who can be brought for-

ward to tell us all about it?

But that would cause embarrass-

ment to

Democrats,

and Senator $

Church wants to embarrass profes-

sional employees

of

investigatory

agencies only. A new

sense of Con-

gressional. decorum exists, far from

the sense of outrage expressed in the

Senate Watergate committee's hear-

ing room. When it is revealed that the

management of NBC News gave press

credentials to L.B.J.'s spies at the 1964

convention, everybody blushes demure-

ly-and nobody demands

to

which network executive made what;

decision under what pressure.

I have been haranguing patien

readers for years about the double

standard applied to Democratic and

Republican political crimes, and

had

hoped the day would come when the

hardball precedents set by

the Ken-

nedy and Johnson men would be laid

before the public in damning detail.

Obviously, Democrat Frank Church

is not the man lo do it. His. jow!-

shaking indignation is all too selec-

tive: the trail of high-level responsi-

bility for the crimes committed against

Dr. King and others is evidently going

to he allowed to cool.

Pity. You'd think that after ail the

nation has been through in

the past

few years, our political iraders would

have learned that the oe thing that

brings you down is the act di cover-

page

80-111

SEARCHED_

NOV 2 4 1975

THE NEW YORK TIMES

THURSDAY,

NOVEMBER 20th, 1975.

PAGE C-41

---

## Page 110

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

18:6

Transmit the following in

TELETYPE

Via

FBI

Date:

11/12/75

CODE (Type in plaintext or codel

NITEL

(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR

ATTENTION: INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

FROM: JACKSON (80-662)

SENSTUDY SEVENTYFIVE.

RE BUREAU TELCALL TO JACKSON NOVEMBER ELEVEN, SEVENTYFIVE.

FORMER SAC ROY K. MOORE WAS CONTACTED BY SAC ON NOVEMBER

ELEVEN AND ADVISED OF THE DESIRES OF THE SENATE SELECT

COMMITTEE TO INTERVIEW HIM CONCERNING THE CAMDEN ACTION CASE

AND SPECIFICALLY THE HANDLING OF INFORMANT HARDY.

MR. MOORE ADVISED THAT HE RECALLS SUCH AN INFORMANT

BUT HAS NO INDEPENDENT RECOLLECTION OF DETAILS CONCERNING

THIS INDIVIDUAL'S HANDLING AND CANNOT RECALL THE NAMES OF

THE HANDLING AGENTS. WHILE HE PERSONALLY THINKS THE

COMMITTEE MEMBERS WOULD BE WASTING THEIR TIME TRAVELLING

ALI THE WAY FROM WASHINGTON TO CONTACI HIM, HE WOULD, OF COURSE,

BE COURTEOUS AND COOPERATIVE IF CONTACTED. HE WAS ADVISED

THAT HE COULD AVAIL HIMSELF OF THE BUREAU'S OFFICE OF LEGAL

COUNSEL BY CALLING THE BUREAU COLLECT AFTER BEING CONTACTED.

HE APPRECIATED THIS AND ADVISED HE WOULD CONSIDER USING THIS

80-622-13

ASSISTANCE.

Searcheil

Saraised

Jackson

Indexed

Filed

Approved:

A NH 55275 DocId: 32989800

-

Sent 3145f'15

-M Per -

U.S. Government Printing Office: 1972 - 455-574

Agent in Charge

Page 1N

---

## Page 111

FD-36 (Rev, 5-22-64)

3

Transmit the following in

Via

TELETYPE

CODE

NITEL

FBI

Date:

9/18/75

(Type in plaintext or code)

(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: JACKSON

SENSTUDY 75

(80-662)

REBUNITEL SEPTEMBER 17, 1975.

ON SEPTEMBER 18, 1975, FORMER SAC, JACKSON, ROY K. MOORE

WAS CONTACTED BY SAC SULLIVAN IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE

INSTRUCTIONS IN RE NITEL. MR. MOORE APPRECIATED THE

CONTAST. HE ADVISED THAT DUE TO THE MANY SPECIAL ASSIGNMENTS

HE SERVED ON DURING THE PERTINENT PERIOD AND HIS MANY

TRANSFERS HE HAS AT THE PRESENT TIME NO RECOLLECTION WITHOUT

BENEFIT OF THE FILE AND WOULD CERTAINLY NOT WISH TO

REFRESH HIS RECOLLECTION THROUGH REVIEW OF PERTINENT FILES

FOR PURPOSE OF ANSWERING THE INQUIRY. IF, HOWEVER, THE

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE REPRESENTATIVE HAD PERTINENT

DOCUMENTS AUTHORED AND SIGNED OR INITIALED BY MOORE AND

UTILIZED THIS MATERIAL TO REFRESH MOORE'S RECOLLECTION, HE

WOULD, OF COURSE, COOPERATE FULLY. HE POINTED OUT HE

WOULD IN NO WAY BE UNCOOPERATIVE BUT SIMPLY HAS NO

INDEPENDENT RECOLLECTION AT THE PRESENT TIME.

80-682-12

Approved:

HW 55275 Do0Id:32989840 Paue

Per -

U.S. Government Printing Office: 1972-455-574

---

## Page 112

IR 863, WA CODE

1105 PM NITEL 9/17/75 MEB

TO ALEXANDRIA

JACKSONVILLE

NEW YORK

ATLANTA

KNOXVILLE

RICHMOND

BOSTON

DETROIT

LOS ANGELES

MENPHIS

ST . LOUIS

SAN DIEGO

JACKSON

NEWARK

SEATTLE

FROM DIRECTOR (62-116395)

LENTOR

PERSONAL AITENTION

SENSTUDY 75

Klan.

REBUTELS MAY 29, 1975, AND SEPTEMBER 4, 1975, TO

ALL OFFICES AND BUTELS SEPTEMBER 3, 1975, TO SELECTED OFFICES

INFÖRMING LATTER THAT SENATE SELECI COMMITTEE, (SSC> HAD

REQUESTED: IDENTITIES OF ALL SUPERVISORS AND COORDINATORS FOR

COINTELPROS IN SELECTED OFFICES FOR (1)

NEW LEFT AND BLACK

EXTREMIST, 1967 THROUGH 1971, AND 12) FOR WHITE HATE, 1964

THROUGH 1971•

SSC ALSO REQUESTED LOCATIONS OF PERSONS NAMED IN FIELD

RESPONSES TO REFERENCED SEPTEMBER 3, 1975, TELETYPES, AND

LATEST INFORMATION IN FBIHQ FILES HAS-BEEN FURNISHED TO SSC.

80-622-11

SEARCHED_

SERIALIZED7

FILED

SEP 171975

FBI-JACKSON

55275 DocId: 32989840 Page 112

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## Page 113

PAGE TWO

SSC STAFF MAY CONTACI CURRENT AND OR FORMER EMPLOYEES NAMED,

TO INTERVIEW THEM CONCERNING THEIR KNOWLEDGE OF COINPELPROS

IN WHICH THEY HAD SUPERVISORY OR COORDINATING RESPONSIBILITIES.

EACH OF THE FOLLOWING FORMER EMPLOYEES EXCEPT MESSRS •

CROKE AND. MCMANUS IS TO BE CONTACTED IMMEDIATELY AND ALERTED

THAT HE MIGHT BE APPROACHED BY THE SSC STAFF FOR INTERVIEW.

THE FORMER EMPLOYEE MAY, AFTER BEING CONTACTED BY SSC STAFF,

CONTACT BUREAU'S LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION BY COLLECT CALL FOR

• FULL INFORMATION TO 'ASSIST HIM INCLUDING OBLIGATIONS AS TO

CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION ACQUIRED AS FBI EMPLOYEE. IT'

IS EMPHASIZED THAT BUREAU'S OFFER OF ASSISTANCE IS NOT

INTENDED 10, IMPEDE SSC WORK, BUT IS DONE AS COOPERATIVE

GESTURE AND TO SAFEGUARD SENSITIVE BUREAU INFORMATION.

CONTACTS WITH THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES TO BE HANDLED.

PERSONALLY BY SAC OR ASAC. IN EVENT THIS IS NOT FEASIBLE

FOR JUST CAUSE, IO BE HANDLED BY A SENIOR SUPERVISOR.

• REGARDING FORMER SAS CROKE AND MCMANUS, SSC HAS BEEN

INFORMED OF IHEIR POOR PHYSICAL CONDITION AND REQUESTED TO

TÀKE THIS INTO CONSIDERATION IN ANY ACTION COMTEMPLATED BY

SSC CONCERNING THEM: WE DO NOT, HOWEVER, KNOW THAT SSC WILL

WW 55275 , DocId:32989840 Page 113

---

## Page 114

Miracles to "i

PAGE THREE

NOT CONTACI THEM. NEW, YORK OFFICE, IM COORDINATION WITH

NEWARK SHOULD ARRANGE TO HAVE CONTACT MADE WITH CROKE AND

MCMANUS BY A FORMER ASSOCIATE IO MAKE FRIENDLY INQUIRY AS TO

THEIR CURRENT CONDITION. IT IS BEING LEFT TO DISCRETION OF

SAS NEW YORK AND NEWARK, BASED ON RESULIS OF SUCH INQUIRY,

WHETHER CROKE AND MCMANUS SHOULD BE INFORMED REGARDING

POSSIBLE CONTACT OF THEM BY SSC. FBING DOES NOT DESIRE

THAI THEY BE UNDULY ALARMED, BUT WOULD NOT WANT THEM SURPRISED

BY CONTACI OF SSC STAFF IF THIS COULD IMPAIR THEIR HEALTH.

IMMEDIATELY AFTER CONTACI, RESULIS SHOULD, BE FURNISHED

BUREAU BY NITEL IN ABOVE CAPTION, AITENTION INID, W. O • CREGAR,

BRIEFLY INCLUDING REACTION OF FORMER EMPLOYEES CONTACTED. IF

A FORMER EMPLOYEE NO LONGER IN YOUR TERRITORY OR TEMPORARILY

AWAY, SET OUT. LEAD TO OTHER. OFFICE IMMEDIATELY WITH COPY TO

FBIHQ •

ALEXAWDRIA:

SETH F. EIKENBERRY, 5367 SUMMIT DRIVE, FAIRFAX, VIRGINIA

JESSE C. HALL, UR.=,

4535 EATEN PLACE, ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA

ATLANTA:

CARL E. CLAIBORNE, 1866 MARY LOU LANE, S.E., ATLANIA,

HY 55275 DocId: 32989840 Page 114

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## Page 115

PAGE FOUR

GEORGIA

RICHARD H. DAVIS, 1147 WILD GREEK TRAIL, ATLANIA, GEORGIA

CHARLES S. HARDING, 2243 PINECLIFF DRIVE, N. E., AILANIA,.

GEORGIA

BOSTON:

RICHARD H. BLASSER: 129 ACADEMY AVENUE, WEYMOUTH,

MASSACHUSETTS

FREDERICK M. CONNORS, 15 LONGFELLOW ROAD, MELROSE,

MASSACHUSETTS

MICHAEL J. MCDONAGH, 28 SPRINGVALE ROAD, NORWOOD,

MASSACHUSETTS

JOHN F • NOONAN, 122

VERNON ROAD, SCITUATE, MASSACHUSETTS

DETROIT :

ROBERI F. O NEILL, 2551 IROQUOIS, DETROII,, MICHIGAN

JACKSON :

JACKSONVILLE:

FLORIDA

ROY K. MOORE, 107 SWALLOW DRIVE, BRANDON, MISSISSIPPI

W. HERSHEL CAVER, 3714 NORTHWEST 4DTH STREET, GAINESVILLE,

KNOXVILLE:

WW 55275' DocId: 32989810 Page 115

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## Page 116

PAGE FIVE

LOS ANGELES:

CALIFORNIA

CALIFORNIA

MEMPHIS :.

TENNESSEE

• IRVING R. ANDERSON, 1029 PERCH DRIVE, CONCORD, TENNESSEE

JOHN KEARNEY, 4142 MAYFIELD STREET, NEWBURY PARK,

RICHARD J. STILLING, 11648 AMESTOY STREET, GRANADA HILLS,

JOHN S. TEMPLE, 2145 GRENADIER, SAN PEDRO, CALIFORNIA

PHILIP-S. ENDRES, 22 SOUTH SECOND. STREET, MEMPHIS,

NEWARK :

NEW YORK :

NEW YORK

BENJAMIN P. MOMANUS, 25 MICHAEL STREET, FORDS, NEW JERSEY

THOMAS J. CROKE, JR, 15 HOFSTRA DRIVE, GREENLAWN, NEW YORK

JOHN d. DUNLEAVY, LO SOUTHVIEW CT., CARLE PLACE, NEW YORK

JOSEPH H. GAMBLE, 24 GREYSTONE ROAD, ROCKVILLE CENTRE,

RICHMOND :

CHARLES F. HEINER, 25 TWIN LAKE LANE, RICHMOND, VIRGINIA

RANDOLPH E. TROW, 1702 RANCH DRIVE, RICHMOND, VIRGINIA

1H 55275

DocId: 32989840 Page 116

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## Page 117

PAGE SIX

JOHN H. WAGNER, 8220 BARNINGHAM ROAD, RICHMOND, VIRGINIA

SAINT LOUIS:

MISSOURI

JOHN J. BUCKLEY, 9469 HARALD DRIVE, WOODSON TERRACE,

EDMUND C. WELION, 825 DEANDELL COURT, FERGUSON, MISSOURI

SAN DIEGO :

SEATTLE:

ROBERT S. BAKER, 4268 HORTENSIA, SAN DIEGO; CALIFORNIA

LEROY W. SHEETS, 5725. 72ND STREET, N. E., MARYSVILLE,

WASHINGTON

'END

JWD FBI JN CLR

HH 55275

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## Page 118

ORIG

I

NA L

OFFICE

COPY

NR 009 JN CODE

PM NITEL SEPTEMBER

5, 1975 SRV

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395) JAC

FILE: SERIPPI

Date.

128/75

Eir Da.

FROM JACKSON (80-490)

SENSTUDY 75

REBUTEL TO ALEXANDRIA, ET AL, SEPTEMBER 5, 1975.

FORMER SAC WILLIAMS WEBB BURKE, 1847 AZTEC DRIVE, JACKSON,

MISSISSIPPI, PERSONALLY CONTACIED BY ASAC JACKSON EVENING

SEPTEMBER: 5, 1975, AND PERTINENTLY INFORMED AS INSTRUCTED

RETEL• BURKE WAS MOST APPRECIATIVE AND CORDIAL BUT OFFERED

NO FURTHER REACTION OR COMMENT.

END

Indexed

RBK /SRW

satenals

80-162-10.

APPROVED

126) ARK.

••SENT. 10: 00P

•OPER

• 0 .

HN 55275

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## Page 119

NR D3D WA CODE

8:42 PM NITEL 9/5/75 PMJ

TO ALEXANDRIA

BALTIMORE

BOSTON

CHICAGO

DALLAS

EL PASO

JACKSON

JACKSONVILLE

LOS ANGELES

MEMPHIS

NEW YORK

OKLAHOMA CITY

PHILADELPHIA

PHOENIX

SAN FRANCISCO

BIRMINGHAM

CINCINNATI

INDIANAPOLIS

LOUISVILLE

MIAMI

SI. LOUIS

SAVANNAH

SAN DIEGO

SEATTLE

FROM DIRECTOR (62- 116395)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

SENSTUDY 75

REBUTELS MAY ?, 1975, AND SEPTEMBER 4, 1975.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) HAS REQUESTED WHEREABOUTS

• OF A NUMBER OF FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES INDICATING THEY MAY BE

INTERVIEWED BY THE SSC STAFF. LISTED BELOW, BY FIELD OFFICE:

TERRITORY, ARE THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES AND THEIR LAST KNOWN

ADDRESSES AS CONTAINED IN BUREAU FILES.

handled

Personal agen

anto Bras

If sent

ASAC

HH 55275

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Tou

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80-662-9

490

SEARCHED

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1975

FBI-JACKSON

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PAGE TWO

INFORMATION FROM SSC INDICATES NAMES OF FORMER SA'S

LITRENTO AND STEWARI DEVELOPED AS HAVING BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR

SUPERVISING COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE FBI AND CIA CONCERNING

MAIL OPENING ACIIVITIES. ALL OTHERS IN LIST BELOW WERE EITHER

SAC, ASAC, OR BOTH, DURING PERIOD 1959 - 1966 IN ONE OR MORE

OF THE FOLLOWING OFFICES: BOSION, DETROIT, LOS ANGELES, MIAMI,

NEW YORK, SAN FRANCISCO, SEATTLE, AND WASHINGION FIELD • THEY

PRESUMABLY ARE ALSO KNOWLEDGEABLE CONCERNING MAIL OPENINGS •

EACH OF THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES IS TO BE IMMEDIATELY

CONTACTED AND ALERTED THAT HE MIGHT BE APPROACHED BY THE SSC

STAFF FOR INTERVIEW. THE FORMER EMPLOYEE MAY, AFTER BEING

CONTACTED BY SSC STAFE, CONTACI BUREAU'S LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION

BY COLLECT CALL FOR FULL INFORMATION TO ASSIST HIM INCLUDING

OBLIGATIONS AS IO CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION ACQUIRED AS

FBI EMPLOYEE. IT IS EMPHASIZED THAI BUREAU'S OFFER OF

ASSISTANCE IS NOI INTENDED IO IMPEDE SSC WORK, BUT IS DONE

AS COOPERATIVE GESTURE AND TO SAFEGUARD SENSITIVE BUREAU

INFORMATION•

HH 55275 DocId:32989840 Page 120

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## Page 121

PAGE THREE

CONTACIS WITH THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES TO BE HANDLED

PERSONALLY BY SAC OR ASAC. IN EVENT THIS IS NOI FEASIBLE

FOR JUST CAUSE, TO BE HANDLED BY A SENIOR SUPERVISOR.

IMMEDIATELY AFTER CONTACI, RESULTS SHOULD BE FURNISHED

BUREAU BY NITEL IN ABOVE CAPTION, BRIEFLY INCLUDING REACTION

OF FORMER EMPLOYEES CONTACTED. IF A FORMER EMPLOYEE NO

LONGER IN YOUR TERRITORY OR TEMPORARILY AWAY, SET OUT LEAD TO

OTHER OFFICE IMMEDIATELY WITH COPY IO FBIHQ.

ALEXANDRIA :

W. DONALD STEWARI, CRYSTAL HOUSE I, APARTMENT 202, ARLINGION,

VIRGINIA.

JAMES H. GALE, 3397 ROCKY MOUNT ROAD, FAIRFAX, VIRGINIA

THOMAS E BISHOP, 8820 STARK ROAD, ANNANDALE, VIRGINIA

BALTIMORE :

ANTHONY P. LITRENTO, 2810 STONYBROOK DRIVE, BOWIE, MARYLAND

PAUL O'CONNELL, JR., 2417 STRATION DRIVE, POTOMAC, MARYLAND

DONALD E. RONEY, 131 CAMBRIDGE DRIVE, WINDSOR HILLS,

WILMINGTON, DELAVARE

VICTOR TURYN, •2645 TURF VALLEY ROAD, ELLICOTT CITY,

MARYLAND

DONALD W. MORLEY, BOX 222, NEW MARKET, MARYLAND

HH 55275

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## Page 122

PAGE FOUR

BIRMINGHAM:

BOSTON :

CHICAGO :

MART, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

CINCINNATI :

DALLAS:

EL PASO :

INDIANAPOLIS:

INDIANA

JACKSÓN :

MISSISSIPPI

JOHN DAVID POPE, JR., 221 REMINGION ROAD, BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA

LEO L. LAUGHLIN, 9 EVERETT AVENUE, WINCHESTER, MASSACHUSETTS

EDWARD J. POWERS, IS COLONIAL DRIVE, BEDFORD, NEW HAMPSHIRE

JoF • DESMOND, 185 FRANKLIN STREET, BOSTON, MASSACHUSETIS

MARLIN W. JOHNSON, CANTEEN CORPORATION, THE MERCHANDISE

HARVEY G. FOSTER, 1012 SOUTH HAMLIN, PARK RIDGE, ILLINOIS

PAUL FIELDS, 2677 CYCLORAMA DRIVE; CINCINNATI, OHIO

HARRY J. MORGAN, 5314 ELMCREST LANE, CINCINNATI, OHIO

PAUL H. STODDARD, 3014 CHATTERTON DRIVE, SAN ANGELO, TEXAS

KENNETH E. COMMONS, 2458 DOUGLAS DRIVE, SAN ANGELO, TEXAS

KARL M. DISSLY, POST OFFICE BOX 9762, EL PASO, TEXAS

DILLARD W. HOWELL, 6413 CARDINAL LANE, INDIANAPOLIS,

ALLAN GILLIES, 8228 HOOVER LANE, INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA

WILLIAMS W. BURKE, JR., 1847 AZTEC DRIVE, JACKSON,

Webt Burke

NW 55275 DocId: 32989840 Page 122

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## Page 123

PAGE FIVE

JACKSONVILLE:

FLORIDA

DONALD K. BROWN, 826 BROOKMONT AVENUE, EASI JACKSONVILLE,

WILLIAM M. ALEXANDER, 4857 WATER OAK LANE, JACKSONVILLE,

FLORIDA

LOUISVILLE:

BERNARD C. BROWN, 2301 NEWMARKET DRIVE, N.E., LOUISVILLE,

KENTUCKY

LOS ANGELES:

WILLIAM G. SIMON, 2075 LOMBARDY ROAD, SAN MARINO,

CALIFORNIA

WESLEY G. GRAPP, 4249 BON HOMME ROAD, WOODLAND HILLS,

CALIFORNIA

ARNOLD C. LARSON, 4232 ABBINGTON COURT, WESTLAKE VILLAGE,

CALIFORNIA

JOSEPH K. PONDER, 3719 CARRIAGE. HOUSE COURI, ALEXANDRIA,

VIRGINIA. BUSINESS ADDRESS: 3030 SOUTH RED HILL AVENUE,

SANTA ANA, CALIFORNIA

MEMPHIS :

E. HUGO WINTERROWD, 155 & NORTH PARKWAY, MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE

MIAMI :

THOMAS MC ANDREUS, 324 NEAPOLITAN WAY, NAPLES, FLORIDA

FREDERICK F. FOX, 1145Q W. BISCAYNE CANAL ROAD, MIAMI,

FLORIDA

NW 55275 DocId: 32989840 Page 123

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## Page 124

PAGE SIX

NEW YORK :

JOSEPH L. SCHMIT, 656 HUNT LANE, MANHASSET, NEW YORK

HENRY A. FITZGIBBON, 76 EASTON ROAD, BRONXVILLE, NEW YORK

OKLAHOMA CITY :

JAMES T. MORELAND, 108 FERN DRIVE, POTEAU, OKLAHOMA

LEE O• TEAGUE, 2501 N.W. 12IST STREET, OKLAHOMA CITY,

OKLAHOMA

OMAHA :

JOHN F. CALLAGHAN, IOWA LAW ENFORCEMENT ACADEMY,

CAMP DODGE, POSI OFFICE BOX 139, JOHNSTON, IOWA

PHILADELPHIA:

RICHARD J. BAKER, 219 JEFFREY LANE, NEWTON SQUARE,

PENNSYLVANIA

JOHN F. MALONE, 25 GARFIELD AVENUE, CARBONDALE, PENNSYLVANIA

PHOENIX:

PALMER M. BAKEN, JR., 3832 EAST YUCCA STREET, PHOENIX,

ARIZONA

ST • LOUIS:

THOMAS J. GEARTY,

6630 CLAYTON ROAD NR. 105, RICHMOND HEIGHIS,

MISSOURI

WESLEY I . WHALEY, 286 GREEN TRAILS DRIVE, CHESTERFIELD,

MISSOURI

HH 55275 DocId: 32989840

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## Page 125

PAGE SEVEN

SAN DIEGO:

SAIN FRANCISCO :

CALIFORNIA

CALIFORNIA

SAVANNAH :

GEORGIA

SEATILE :

FRANK L. PRICE, 2795 TOKALON STREET, SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA

CURTIS O. LYNUM, 644 EAST HILLSDALE BOULEVARD, SAN MATEO,

HAROLD E. WELBORN, 13867 LA VISTA COURI, SARATOGA,

TROY COLEMAN, 36 CROMWELL ROAD, WILMINGTON PARK, SAVANNAH,

JOSEPH D. PURVIS, 721 DANCY AVENUE, SAVANNAH, GEORGIA

LELAND V. BOARDMAN, ROUTE 3, BOX 268, SEQUIM, WASHINGTON

RICHARD D. AUERBACH, P.O. BOX 1768, SEATTLE, WASHINGION

JAMES E. MILNES, 4317 - 50IH AVENUE, N.E., SEATTLE,

WASHINGTON

VASHINGION

END

PAUL R. BIBLER, 15134 -

38TH AVENUE, N.E., SEATTLE,

HOLD PLS

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## Page 126

NR 033 WA CODE

5: 09PM 9/4/75 NITEL AUN

TO ALL SACS

FROM DIRECTOR

(62-116395)

PERSON TELENTION

SENSTUDY 75

REBUTEL MAY 2, 1975.

PURPOSES OF INSTANT TELETYPE ARE TO (1) REITERATE THAT

FBI HAS PLEDGED FULL COOPERATION WITH THE SENATE SELECT

COMMITTEE (SSC) AND WISHES TO ASSIST AND FACILITATE ANY

INVESTIGATIONS UNDERTAKEN BY THE SSC WITH RESPECI TO THE FBI;

AND (2) SET FORTH NEW PROCEDURE RELATING TO SSC STAFF

INTERVIEWS OF CURRENT AND FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES.

FOR INFORMATION OF THOSE OFFICES WHICH HAVE NOI PREVIOUSLY

HAD CURRENT OR FORMER EMPLOYEES IN ITS TERRITOY INTERVIEWED

BY THE SSC, THE BUREAU FREQUENTLY LEARNS FROM THE SSC OR

OTHERWISE THAT FORMER EMPLOYEES ARE BEING CONSIDERED FOR

INTERVIEW BY THE SSC STAFF • INSTRUCTIONS ARE ISSUED FOR THE

FIELD OFFICE TO CONTACT THE FORMER EMPLOYEE TO ALERT HIM AS TO

POSSIBLE INTERVIEW, REMIND HIM OF HIS CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT

WITH THE BUREAU AND SUGGEST THAT IF HE IS. CONTACIED FOR

80-662-8

CIRCL

AS BUMEMO

SEARCHED.

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SEP

A 1975

FBI-JACKSON

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PAGE TWO

INTERVIEW, HE MAY CONTACI THE LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION BY

COLLECT CALL FOR FURTHER INFORMATION. IN THE USUAL CASE,

CIRCUMSTANCES UNFOLD, THE FORMER EMPLOYEE IS TOLD (1)

THAT HE HAS A RIGHT TO LEGAL COUNSEL, BUT THAT THE BUREAU

CANNOT PROVIDE SAME; (2) THAT THE BUREAU HAS WAIVED THE •

CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT FOR THE INTERVIEW WITHIN SPECIFIED

PARAMETERS; AND (3) THAT THERE ARE FOUR PRIVILEGED AREAS IN

WHICH HE IS NOT REQUIRED TO ANSWER QUESTION. THESE AREAS

ARE RELATING TO INFORMATION WHICH MAY (A) IDENTIFY BUREAU

SOURCES; 6) REVEAL SENSITIVE METHODS /TECHNIQUES; (C) REVEAL

IDENTITIES OF THIRD AGENCIES, INCLUDING FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE

AGENCIES, OR INFORMATION FROM SUCH AGENCIES; AND O> ADVERSELY

AFFECT ONGOING BUREAU INVESTIGATIONS •

HERETOFORE, BUREAU HAS OFFERED INTERVIEVEES CONSULIAIION .

PRIVILEGES WHEREBY A BUREAU SUPERVISOR WOULD BE AVAILABLE

NEARBY, ALTHOUGH NOT ACTUALLY AT INTERVIEW, SO INTERVIEWEE

MIGHT CONSULT WITH HIM SHOULD QUESTIONS ARISE AS TO PARAMETERS

OF INTERVIEW OR PRIVILEGED AREAS. THE CONSULTANI DID NOT ACT

AS A LEGAL ADVISOR. •

EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY, BUREAU WILL NO LONGER PROVIDE

HH 55275 DocId:32989840

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## Page 128

PAGE

THREE

ON-THE-SCENE PERSONNEL FOR CONSULTATION PURPOSES TO ASSIST

EITHER CURRENT OF FORMER EMPLOYEES. PROSPECIIVE INTERVIEWEES

SHOULD BE TOLD THAT, IF THEY DESIRE ASSISTANCE OF THIS NATURE

DURING AN INTERVIEW, THEY MAY CONTACI EITHER PERSONALLY CIF

INTERVIEV IS IN WASHINGION, D. C.) OR BY COLLECI CALL, THE

ASSISTANI DIRECTOR OF THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, MR. W. R.

WANNALL, OR , IN HIS ABSENCE, SECTION CHIEF V. O. CREGAR.

THIS CHANGE IN PROCEDURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED AS

LESSENING THE ASSISTANCE WE ARE FURNISHING TO CURRENT AND

FORMER EMPLOYEES•

FOR YOUR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION, I AM WORKING WITH THE

DEPARIMENT IN EXPLORING AVENUES TO ARRANGE LEGAL REPRESENTATION,

WHEN NECESSARY, FOR CURRENT AND FORMER EMPLOYEES WITHOUT

EXPENSE TO THEM. YOU WILL BE KEPT ADVISED OF DEVELOPMENIS

IN THIS REGARD •

END

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## Page 129

NRO22 #A CODE

2:16PM VLIEL 6-13-75 VLJ

TO ALL SACS

FROM DIRECIOR (62-116464)

PERSOLAL ATTERI.ON

HOUSTUDY 75.

REBUTELS MAY 2, 20, 1975, "SENSTUDY 75. "

BUFILE 62-116464 AND CODE NAME "HOUSTUDY 75" DESIGNATED

FOR ALL MATTERS RELATING TO HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY

GOVER MENTAL UPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

AND BUREAU'S HANDLING OF MATTERS PERTAINING THERETO. USE

THIS FILE NUMBER AND CAPTION FOR MATTERS RELATING TO HOUSE

COMMITTEE AS SEPARATE FRU SENSTUDY 75 FOR MATTERS RELATING

TO SENATE COMMITTEE.

END

o86238-47431

Trans

(dast)

80-662-7

90-190

SEARCHED.

SERIALIZEDCCL

-INDEXEDCOR

FILED

JUN 1 3 1975

FBI JACKSON

5775

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## Page 130

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

ERSONAL ATTENTION

EMORANDUM 35-75

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

August 12, 1975

190-189

MEMORANDUM TO ALL SPECIAL AGENTS IN CHARGE:

(A) INTERVIEWS OF EBI EMPLOYEES BY/CONGRESSIONAL STAFF

MEMBERS -- In accordance with a recently adopted suggestion, you

are to insure that all new employees who enter on duty in your field

office are fully apprised of the contents of the Memorandum to All

Employees, dated May 28, 1975, dealing with captioned matter. This

should be done at the time they execute the FBI Employment Agreement,

FD-291, regarding the unauthorized disclosure of information.

This practice can, of course, be discontinued upon the

completion of the inquiry that Congress has instituted.

8-12-75

MEMORANDUM

35-75

(B) "ALL SAC" TELETYPES, AIRTELS, OR LETTERS ORIGINATED

BY FIELD OFFICES - Effective/immediately, field offices may

initiate an "ALL SAC" teletype, airtel, or letter, provided SAC

personally approves the communication. A copy of such communica-

tion must be furnished to FBIHQ for subsequent review by the sub-

stantive division.

Appropriate manual revisions to follow.

Clarence M. Kelley

Director

80-662-6

80-490-189A

SEARCHED.

8-12-75

MEMORANDUM 35-75

AUG 14 1975

FEI-JACKSON AT

HH

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OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

1-75

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGION, D.C. 20535

May 28, 1975

MEMORANDUM TO ALL EMPLOYEES

RE: INTERVIEWS OF FBI EMPLOYEES

All employees are advised that Congress is conducting

an inquiry into activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Congressional stati members are conducting interviews of former

and current FBI employees. This Bureau has pledged its cooperation

with the Congress.

You are reminded of the FBI Employment Agreement

(copy attached) with which you agreed to comply during your employment

in the FBI and following termination of such employment.

Also, you are reminded of Title 28, Code of Federal

Regulations, Section 16.22 (copy attached), which reads as follows:

"No employee or former employee of the Department of

Justice shall, in response to a demand of a court or other authority,

produce any material contained in the files of the Department or disclose

any information relating to material contained in the files of the Department,

or disclose any information or produce any material acquired as part of

the performance of his official duties or because of his official status

without prior approval of the appropriate Department official or the

Attorney General in accordance with Section 16.24. "

Also, you are reminded of Department of Justice Order

Number 116-56, dated May 15, 1956, (copy attached) which, among

other things, requires an employee upon the completion of his testimony

to prepare a memorandum outlining his testimony.

Our cooperative efforts, of course, must be consistent

with the above cited authority. Therefore, if you are contacted for

purpose of interview or testimony you are to request approval as

required by the Employment Agreement and await authorization before

furnishing intormation, testimony, or record material. 80-662-5

70410-89

Enclosures (3)

INDEXED..

SERIALIZED

Clarence M. Kelley

Director

SUN L 1 1975

woo sooetad:02309080

Page 131

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## Page 132

FD-291 (Rev. 11-1-73)

1

EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT

As consideration for employment in the Federal Bureau of Investigation (F'BI), United

States Department of Justice, and as a condition for continued employment, I hereby declare

that I intend to be governed by and I will comply with the following provisions:

(1) That I am hereby advised and I understand that Federal law such as

Title 18, United States Code, Sections 793, 794, and 798; Order of the

President of the United States (Executive Order 11652); and regulations

issued by the Attorney General of the United States (28 Code of Federal

Regulations, Sections 16.21 through 16.26) prohibit loss, misuse, or un-

authorized disclosure or production of national security information, other

classified information and other nonclassified information in the files of

the FBI;

(2) I understand that unauthorized disclosure of information in the files

of the FBI or information I may acquire as an employee of the FBl could

result in impairment of national security, place human life in jeopardy, or

result in the denial of due process to a person or persons who are subjects

of an FBI investigation, or prevent the FBI from effectively discharging its

responsibilities. I understand the need for this secrecy agreement; there-

fore, as consideration for employment I agree that I will never divulge,

publish, or reveal either by word or conduct, or by other means disclose to

any unauthorized recipient without official written authorization by the

Director of the FBI or his delegate, any information from the investigatory

files of the FBI or any information relating to material contained in the files,

or disclose any information or produce any material acquired as a part of the

performance of my official duties or because of my official status. The burden

is on me to determine, prior to disclosure, whether information may be disclosed

and in this regard I agree to request approval of the Director of the FBI in each

such instance by presenting the full text of my proposed disclosure in writing to

the Director of the FBI at least thirty (30) days prior to disclosure. I understand

that this agreement is not intended to apply to information which has been placed

in the public domain or to prevent me from writing or speaking about the FBI but

it is intended to prevent disclosure of information where disclosure would be

contrary to law, regulation or public policy. I agree the Director of the FBI is

in a better position than I to make that determination;

duties wine that all nd all officia mated by a nich hate on weiss me afficial

the property of the United States of America, and I will surrender upon demand

by the Director of the FBI or his delegate, or upon separation from the FBI, any

material relating to such information or property in my possession;

(4) That I understand unauthorized disclosure may be a violation of Federal

law and prosecuted as a criminal offense and in addition to this agreement may

be enforced by means of an injunction or other civil remedy.

I accept the above provisions as conditions for my employment and continued employment

in the FBI. I agree to comply with these provisions both during my employment in the FBI and

following termination of such employment.

(Signature)

(Type or print name)

Witnessed and accepted in behalf of the Director, FBI, on

HW 55275

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(Signature)

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## Page 133

HH 55275

Office of the Attarmey General

Washington, Đ. 0. 20530

January 18, 1973

ORDER NO.501-73

RULES AND REGULATIONS

Title 28— JUDICIAL

ADMINISTRATION

Chapter I-Department of Justice

(Order 501-73]

PART 16- PRODUCTION OR DISCLO-

SURE OF MATERIAL OR INFORMA-

TION

Subpart B-Production or Disclosure

in Response to Subpenas or De-

mands of Courts or Other Authori-

This order delegates to certain De

partment of Justice oficials the author-

ity to approve the production or dis-

closure of material or information con-

tained in Department files, or informa-

tion or material acquired by a person

while employed by the Department. It

applies where a subpena, order or other

demand of a court or other authority,

such as an administrative agency, is is-

sued for the production or disclosure of

such information.

By virtue of the authority vested in me

by 28 U.S.C. 509, 510, and 5 U.S.C. 301,

Subpart B of Part 16 of Chapter I of

Title 28, Code of Federal Regulations, is

revised, and its provisions renumbered,

to read as follows:

Subpart B-Production or Disclosure in Response

to Subpenas or Demands of Courts or Other

Authorities

16.21 Purpose and scope.

16.22 Production or disclosure prohibited

unless approved by appropriate De-

partment official.

Procedure in the event of a deman

for production or disclosure

action by the appropriate De-

partment official or

the Attorney

General.

Procedure where a Department decl

sion concerning & demand is not

made prior to the time a response

to the demand is required.

6.26 Procedure in the event of an adverse

ruling.

AUTHORITY: 28 U.S.C. 509, 510 and 5 U.S.C.

101.

jubpart B-Production or Disclosure

in Response to Subpenas or De-

mands of Courts or Other Authori-

§ 16.21

Purpose and scope.

(a) This subpart sets forth the pro-

sedures to be followed when a subpena,

order, or other demand (hereinafter re-

ferred to as a "demand") of a court or

DocId: 32989840

Page 133

For purposes of this subpart, the

term "employee of the Department" in-

cludes all officers and employees of the

United States appointed by, or subject

to the supervision, jurisdiction, or control

of, the Attorney General of the United

States,

including U.s. attorneys,

marsals, and members of ore stas.oe

those offcials.

§ 16.22 Production or disclosure prohib-

ited unless approved by appropriate

Department official.

No employee or former employee of the

Department of Justice shall, in response

to a demand of a court or other au-

thority, produce any material contained

in the files of the Department or disclose

any iniormation relating to material con-

tained in the files of the Department, or

disclose any information or produce any

material acquired as part of the per-

formance of his official duties or because

of his official status without prior ap-

proval of the appropriate Department of-

ficial or the Attorney General in accord-

ance with § 16.24.

§ 16.23 Procedure in the event of a de-

mand for production or disclosure.

(a) Whenever a demand is made upon

an employee or former employee of the

Department for the production of ma-

terial or the disclosure of information

described

in

$ 16.21(a),

he shall im-

mediately notify the U.S. attorney for

the district where the issuing authority

is located. The U.S. attorney shall im-

mediately request instructions from the

appropriate Department official, as desig-

nated in paragraph (b) of this section.

(b) The Department officials author-

ized to approve production or disclosure

under this subpart are:

(1) In the event that the case or other

matter which gave rise to the demanded

material or information is or, if closed,

was within the cognizance of a division

of the Department,

the Assistant At-

torney General in charge of that divi-

sion. This authority may be redelegated

to Deputy Assistant Attorneys General.

(2) In instances of demands that are

not covered by paragraph (b) (1) of this

section:

---

## Page 134

§ 16.26 Procedure in the event of an ad-

If the court or other authority declines

ployee of that Bureau for information

to stay the effect of the demand in re-

or if the demand calls for the production

of material from the files of that Bu-

sponse to a request made in accordance

with § 16.25 pending receipt of instruc-

rules that the demand must be com-

plied with irrespective of instructions

not to produce the material or disclose

the information sought, in accordance

with § 16.24, the employee or former em-

ployee upon whom the demand has been

the Deputy Attorney

(c) If oral testimony is sought by the

demand, an afidavit, or, if that is not

feasible, a statement by the party seek-

te, must he ta hand or somason

Dated: January 11, 1973.

LICHARD G. KLEINDIENS

ttorney Genera

[FR Doc.78-1071 Filled 1-17-73;8:45 am]

by the U.S. attorney to the appropriate

Department official.

16.24 Final action by the appropriat

lepariment official or the Attorne

General.

(a) If the appropriate Department of-

icial, as designated in § 16.23(b), ap

material or disclosure of

he shall so notify the U.S. attorney and

such other persons as circumstances may

warrant.

(b) If the appropriate Department

official,

as

§ 16.23 (b),

decides not to approve & demand for the

production of material or disclosure of

information, he shall immediately refer

che demand to the Attorney General for

decision. Upon such referral, the Attor-

ney General shall make the final decision

and give notice thereof to the U.S. attor

ney and such other persons as circum-

§ 16.25

'rocedure where a Departmen

ecision concerning a demand is no

made prior to the time a response lo

the demand is required.

It response to the demand is required

etore the instructions from the appro

mate Department official or the Attor-

ney General are received, the U.S. attor-

ney or other Department attorney des-

ignated for the purpose shall appear with

the employee or former employee of the

Department upon whom the demand has

or other authority with mise cott

or other authority with

regwations contained in this subpart and

inform the court or other authority that

referred for

prompt consideration of the appropriate

Department official and shall respect-

cully request the court or authority to

stay the demand pending receipt of the

requested instructions.

55275 DooId:32989840 Page 134

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## Page 135

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

WASHINGION, D. C.

May 15, 1956

ORDER NO. 116-56

It is the policy of the Department of Justice to extend the fullest

possible cooperation to congressional committees requesting information from

departmental files, interviews with department employees, testimony of depart-

ment personnel, or testimony of Federal prisoners. The following procedures

re prescribed in order to effectuate this policy on a basis which will be

utually satisfactor to the congressional committees and to the Department

(Ints order supersedes the Deputy Attorney General's Memorandum No. 5, dated

March 23, 1953, and his Memorandum No. 97, dated August 5, 1954 It formal-

Izes the Attorney General's press release of November 5, 1953, establishing

procedures to permit committees of the Congress and their authorized repre-

sentatives to Interview and to take sworn testimony from Federal prisoners.

It supplements Order No. 3229 (Revised) dated January 13, 1953, and Order

No. 3464, Supplement No. 4 (Revised) dated January 13, 1953 (with Memorandum

of "Authorization Under Order No. 3464 Supplement No. 4 (Revised)" dated

January 13, 1953), Insofar as said orders have reference to procedures to be

followed in the Department's relations with congressional committees. In

support of this order, reference should be had to the President's letter

dated May 17, 1954, addressed to the Secretary of Defense, and to the Attorney

General's Memorandun which accompanied it.]

A. REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION FROM DEPARIMENT FILES

I. Congressional committee requests for the examination of files

or other confidential information should be reduced to writing, signed by

the chairman of the committee, and addressed to the Deputy Attorney General,

who is responsible for the coordination of our liaison with Congress and

congressional committees. The request shall state the specific information

sought as well as the specific objective for which it is sought. The Deputy

Attorney General will forward the request to the appropriate division where a

reply will be prepared and returned for the Deputy Attorey General's signa-

ture and dispatch to the chairman of the committee.

2. If the request concerns a closed case, 1. e., one in which

there is no litigation or administrative action pending or contemplated,

the file may be made available for review in the Department, in the presence

of the official or employee having custody thereof. The following procedure

shall be followed in such cases:

a. The reply letter will advise the committee that the

file is available for examination and set forth the

name, telephone extension number, and room number of

the person who will have custody of the file to be

reviewed;

HH 55275

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!

• 2 .

D. Before making the file available to the committee

representative all reports and memoranda from the iBi

as well as investigative reports from any other agency,

will be removed from the file and not be made available

for examination; provided however that if the committee

representative states that it is essential that information

Irom the fbl reports and memoranda be made available,

he will be advised that the request will be considered

by the Department. Thereafter a summary of the contents

of the FBI reports and memoranda involved vill be

prepared which will not disclose investigative tech-

niques, the identity of confidential informants, or

other matters which might jeopardize the investigative

operations of the FBI. This summary will be forwarded

by the civision to the fBl with a request for advice as

to whether the ist has any objection to examination of

such summary by the cormittee representative. The file

the Department. If the cormittee representative desires

to examine investigative reports from other government

agencies, contained in the files of the Department, he

will be advised to direct his request to the agency whose

reports are concerned.

3. If the request concerns an open case, 1. e., one which liti-

gation or administrative action 1s pending or contemplated, the file may

not be made available for examination by the committee's representative.

The following procedure shall be followed:

3.0

the reply letter should advise the committee that

Its request concerns a case in which litigation or

administrative action is pending or contemplatea, and

state that the file cannot be made available until the

case is completed; and

b. Should briefly set forth the status of the case in

as much detail as is practicable and prudent vithout

jeopardizing the pending contemplated litigation or

administrative action.

B. REQUESIS FOR INTARVIEUS WITH DEPARIMENTAL PERSONNEL

I. Requests for interviews with departmental personnel regarding

any official matters within the Department should be reduced to writing,

signed by the chairman of the committee, and addressed to the Deputy Attorney

General. When the approval of the Deputy Attorney General is given, the

employee is expected to discuss such matters freely and cooperatively with

the representative, subject to the limitations prescribed in A respecting

open cases and data in investigative reports;

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!

2. Upon the completion of the interview with the committee repre-

sentative the employee will prepare a summary of it for the file, with a

copy routed to his division head and a copy routed to the Deputy Attorney

General.

C. EMPLOYEES TESTIPYING BEFORE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES

1. Then an employee is requested to testify before a congressional

committee regarding official matters within the Department the Deputy Attorney

General shall be promptly informed.

When the Deputy Attorney General's approv-

al is given the employee is expected to testify freely subject to limitations

prescribed in A respecting open cases and data in investigative reports;

2. An employee subpoenaed to testify before a congressional committee

on official matters within the Department shall promptly notify the Deputy

Attorney General. In general he shall be guided in testifying by Order 3229

(Revised) and the President's letter of May I7, 1954, cited at the beginning

of this Order.

3. Upon the completion of his testimony the employee will prepare

a memorandum outlining his testimony with a copy routed to his division head

and a copy routed to the Deputy Attorney General.

D. REQUESTS OF CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES FOR THE TESTIMONY OF FEDERAL PRISONERS

Because of the custodial hazards involved and the extent to which

their public testimony may alfect the discipline and vell-being of the institu-

tion, it is the policy of the Department not to deliver Federal prisoners out-

the penal institution In which they are Incarcerated for the purpose of

being intervieved or examined under oath by congressional committees. However,

when it appears that no pending investigation or legal proceeding will be

adversely arfected thereby and that the public interest will not be otherwise

adversely affected, Federal prisoners may be interviewed or examined under oath

by congressional committees in the institution in which they are incarcerated

under the following procedures, and with the specific advance approval of the

Deputy Attorney General.

I. Arrangements for intervieving and taking of sworn testimony

from a federal prisoner by a committee of the Congress or the authorized

representatives of such a committee shall be made in the form of a written

request by the chairman of the committee to the Deputy Attorney General.

2. Such written request shall be made at least ten (10) days

prior to the requested date for the interview and the taking of testimony

and shall be accompanied by written evidence that authorization for the

interview or the taking of sworn testimony was approved by vote of the com-

mittee. Such request shall contain a statement of the purpose and the sub-

jects upon which the prisoner will be interrogated as well as the names of

all persons other than the representatives of the Department of Justice who

will be present.

3.

A member of the interested committee of the Congress shall be

present during the entire time of the interrogation.

HH 55275 DocId:32989840 Page 137

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## Page 138

= 4-

4. The warden of the penal institution in which the Federal

prisoner is incarcerated shall, at least forty-eight (48) hours prior to the

time at which the interview takes place, advise the Federal prisoner concerned

of the proposed interview or taking of sworn testimony; and shall further

advise that he is under the same, but no greater obligation to answer than any

other witness who is not a prisoner.

5. The warden of the penal institution shall have complete

authority in conformity with the requirements of security and the mainte-

nance of discipline to limit the number of persons who will be present at

the interview and taking of testimony.

The warden or his authorized representative shall be present

at the interview and at the taking of testimony and the Department of Justice

shall have the right to have one of its representatives present throughout

the interview and taking of testimony.

T: The committee shall arrange to have a stenographic transcript

made of the entire proceedings at committee expense and shall furnish a copy

of the transcript to the Department of Justice.

E. OBSERVIRS IN ATTENDANCE AT COMMIITYEE HEARINGS

In order that the Department may be kept currently advised in

matters within its responsibility, and in order that the Deputy Attorney

General may properly coordinate the Department's liaison with Congress and

Its committees, each division that has an observer in attendance at a

congrssional hearing, will have the observer prepare a written summary of

the proceeding which

should be sent to the division head and a copy routed

to the Deputy Attorney General.

/s/ Herbert Brownell, Jr.

Attorney General

HH 55275

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Page

138

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## Page 139

NR636 WA CODE

5: 10PM NITEL 5-20-75 PAW

10 ALL SACS

FROM DIRECTOR

(623116395)

PERSOVA RETENTION

SENSTUDY

REBUTEL MAY 2, 1975.

IN CONNECTION WITH WORK OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE SELECT

COMMITTEES, ITS REPRESENTATIVES MAY CONTACI YOUR OFFICE FOR

INFORMATION.

IN ONE RECENT INSTANCE, A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SENATE

SELECT COMMITTEE TELEPHONICALLY INQUIRED AS TO IDENTITY OF SAC

IN A PARTICULAR OFFICE DURING 1970.

IN HANDLING SUCH INQUIRIES INSURE ESTABLISHING BONA FIDES

OF REPRESENTATIVE BY SHOW OF CREDENTIALS ON PERSONAL CONTACT OR;

IF TELEPHONIC CONTACI, BY TELEPHONING BACK TO COMMITTEE.

UNLESS INFORMATION IS OF A PUBLIC NATURE, AS IN THE INSTANCE

CITED ABOVE, OBTAIN FBIHQ CLEARANCE PRIOR TO SUPPLYING ANY

INFORMATION. FBIHQ MUST BE EXPEDITIOUSLY ADVISED OF ALL

INFORMATION FURNISHED.

80-662-4

END

SSSS/ 04,5 11.

Nead an sA, cont

41111

SEARCHED,

INDEXED.

SERIALIZED.

FILED

5/3b73

MAY F: 01975

FBI-JACKSON

436322

2/on 3.

(ast) SAC 3E

1HH 55275 DooId:32989840 Page 139

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## Page 140

1AD7- TA CODE

952PA MILL 5-2-75 r5E

IU ALL SACS

FRUr DaECIOR (63-116395)

PERSONAL ATTENT-OU

dex

SENSCUbY

75

¿ANI-ONED MATTER PRIALS fO BUREAU'S HAUDLIIG OF REQUESIS

FROM SEMATE AND HOUSE SELECT COMMITTRES TO STUDY GOVERIME.TAL

UPERAILONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGINCE ACTIVITIES. IN CONNEC-

ILON aTH MONK OF THESE CONSTIELS, SIAFF MEMBERS MAY SEEK

TO INTERVIEU CURRENT AND FORMER FBI EMPLOYELS.

RECENILY, THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) SIAFE HAS

INTERVIEUED SEVERAL FORMEÀ EMPLOYEES AND IT IS ANTICIPATED

THAI MANY MORE SUCH PERSONNEL TILL BE CONTACTED.

THE FBI LiAS PLEDGED FULL COOPERATION WITH THE CUPMITTEE

AND WE WISH TO ASSIST AND FACILITAIE ANY INVESTIGATIOS UNDER-

TAKE DY INE COMMITTEE VITH ROSPECI TO THE FBI. HOWEVER, VE

DÙ HAVE AN OBLIGATION IÜ INSUNG THAT SENSITIVE SOURCES AND

METHODS ALL ONGOING SEISITIVE -NVESTIGATIONS ARE FULLY

/ccm

62-0

80-662-36

1190-

1075

785

AS BUMEMO

NN 55275 DocId:32989840 Page 140

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## Page 141

PAGE IJU

PROTECIED. SHOULE AUX FORE EMPLOYEE CONTACI YOUR OFFICE AUD

HAVE ANY QUESTION REGARDING FLS OBLIGATION NOI TO DIVULGE INFOR-

JiAT.O. USIALURE BI VIRTUE OF MIS PASI FBI EMPLOYMENI, HE SHOULD

DE -SINUCTED TO CONTACT LEGAL COUNSEL, FBIQ, BY COLLECI CALL.

YOUR CONVERSATIONS TH FORMER IMPLOYEES MUST BE 14 KEEPING WITH

ÜUR PLELGE. LI S BELIEVED SUCH A PROCELURE MOULD ILSURE PROPER

PROTECION AND ALSO FACILEIATE THE WORK OF THE SSE.

This ABOvE

• PROCEDURE ALSO APPLIES IO CURRENT EMPLOYELS

UF YUN UNFICE. NOTEVEN, COLIACI WITH THE LEGAL COUNSEL SHOULD

BE HANDLED IMROUGH THE SAC.

END

RETUR TO IALK ON THE CONFERENCE:,

9EHJDNZR

HH 55275 DocId: 32989840

Page 141

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## Page 142

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

Transmit the following in

Via

TELETYPE

CODED

NITEL.

FBI

Date:

3/26/75

(Type in plaintext or code)

(Priority)

003

TO:

FROM:

DIRECTOR, ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

JACKSON (100-0)

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU NITEL MARCH 24, 1975.

SAC AND ASAG, JACKSON OFFICE, HAVE NO CASES ASSIGNED IN

INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FIELD. TWO

SUPERVISORS HAVE CASES ASSIGNED AND THE PERCENTAGE OF TIME IS

EQUIVALENT TO FORTY PERCENT OF ONE SUPERVISOR IN INTERNAL

SECURITY AND FIFTEEN PERCENT OF ONE SUPERVISOR IN COUNTER-

INTELLIGENCE MATTERS. THERE ARE FIFTY FIVE SPECIAL AGENTS WHO

CONDUCT INVESTIGATIONS IN THE INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTER-

INTELLIGENCE FIELD. THE PERCENTAGE OF TIME IS EQUIVALENT

TO THREE POINT SIX TENTHS AGENTS ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO

INTERNAL SECURITY AND ONE POINT ONE TENTH AGENTS ASSIGNED

FULL TIME TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

END.

80-662-2

100-0-108

- Jackson

•MG/

Approved:

Special Agell in Change

NH 55275 DocId: 32989840 Page 142

Sent

40lb

_M

Per

GPO: 1970 0 - 402-735

---

## Page 143

NRO46 WA CODE

7:25PM NITEL 3-24-75 DEB

TO ALL SACS

FROM DIRECTOR

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLiGENCE ACTIVITES

SENATOR FRANK CHURCH, CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE SELECT

COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENIAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT IO

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES HAS MADE AN INITIAL REQUEST FOR INFORMATION

FROM THE FBI. AMONG IHE ITEMS REQUESTED IS A BREAKDOWN OF

FIELD AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

ACCORDINGLY, WITHIN FOUR EIGHT HOURS EACH SAC SHOULD SUTEL

TO FBIHQ, ATTENIION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION, SETTING FORTH

SEPARATELY THE NUMBER OF SAGS, ASAGS, SUPERVISORS AND AGENIS ASSIGNED

TO INTERNAL SECURLTY AND COUNTERINIELLIGENCE MAITERS. PERCENIAGES

OF AN AGENT'S TIME, WHEN NOT ASSIGNED FULL-TIME TO THESE ACTIVITIES,

SHOULD

BE USED IF APPROPRiATE, PARTIQULARLY IN THE SUPÉRVISORY

CATEGORIES. THIS INFORMATION SHOULD BE BROKEN DOWN. SEPARATELY

BETWEEN INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. YOUR RESPONSE SHOULD

BE LIMITED IO AGENT PERSONNEL ONLY •

END

• REC ONE FBI JN TWM CLR

310475

80-662-1

t00 0-11

ERATO THE

INDEXI

MAR 2 4 1975

Handl

HH 55275• DocId: 32989840 Page 143

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