The Nature of the Buddhist Conflict
Originator: CIA
Document date: 09/27/1963
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

## Page 1

176-10036-10153

2023 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA

RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10153

RECORD SERIES : National Security Files

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA

FROM :

TO :

TITLE : The Nature of the Buddhist Conflict

DATE: 9/27/1963

PAGES : $6

SUBJECTS :

DOCUMENT TYPE :

CLASSIFICATION :

RESTRICTIONS :

CURRENT STATUS :

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 200: Vietnam,9/22/63-10/6/63, CIA

Reports. Box 2

---

## Page 2

3

1005

06 29%

RE

GO EAGE

FO EVELA

) ( DON)

BONE 100

An ena

THE NATURE ONE BUDDHIST CONCUCT N SOUTEVIEN

# 1(51300

(AS) 6

TRAI

SE

---

## Page 3

THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-

ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES

WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,

TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-

SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO

AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

This document MUST NOT BE RELEASED TO FOREIGN

GOVERNMENTS. If marked with specific dissemination

controls in accordance with the provisions of DCID 1/7,

the document must be handled within the framework of

the limitation so imposed.

1043S20

394361

LITA

..??

•...

---

## Page 4

113

SECRET

27 September 1963

THE NATURE OF THE BUDDHIST CONFLICT IN SOUTH VIETNAM

The current Buddhist protest movement in Soutb

Vietnam has been highly political since its incep-

tion.

However, in the context of Buddhist tradition;

as well as of political life under the igo family

regime,

it is impossible entirely tó separate Bud-

dhist political aims from Buddhist religious mötivâ-

tion..

And in the course of their protest campaign,

many otherwisé apolitical Vietnamese Buddhists were

forced to the conclusion thät only through à change

in the regime could they win religious equality:

A majority of the South

from

the more passive Theravadà

Vietnamese population consider

themselves

Buddhists of Ceyion and the

Buddhists in one

rest of Southeast Asia, have es=

sense or another.

The Buddhist

tablished contacts with them

Sangha (the organized community

through. the world Buddhist Fel

Öf monks and nuns) does not share

lowship started in 1950:)

the Western concept of church

state separation and looks back

to ap

perlod in Vietnamese his

tory when Buddhurts served as

cultural, and spirit-

ual counselors to emperors. Al-

though this

role declined well

before the advent of French

we made tents ate colo

period, with its introduc

tion "of Catholicism and the

privileged status

corrupted their religion, Grow

ing out of this concern,

agrow

ing. Buddhist revival beginning

in the 1920s

led to the forma-

tion in 195l by the most impor

tant Vietnamese sect 'of a na

tional Sangha and' laity organize

tion, the General

Association

of. Vietnamese Buddhist's' (GAVB).

When Diem assumed power in South

Vietnam, Buddhists probably re

garded ais strong. Catholic ori

entation as unfavorable to their

aspirations. (Vietnam's predomi

nantly fahayama Buddhists, al-

though: of a different school

the

0f Feligion

or that it car-

ried out repressions against

Buddhists prior to the 8 May

outburst.

Nevertheless, the

government's open bias

Catholicism--evident In its of

ficial philosophy, in its of

ficial sanction of Catholic cele-

brations, in some of its laws

in schools, in the armed forces

(Catholic chaplains), and to

some extent in its choice of

more trusted officials--clearly

created the impression among

Buddhists of religious discrimi-

nation.

Lão organization,

iza on, borne around;

a nucleus of Catholics, became

the government's controlling

element in the civil service

and army; and many ambitious

Vietnamese have come to regard

conversion to Catholicism'as the

path to success. In a series

public ceremonies in the fall

of 1959, Diem offictally dedicated

SECRET

---

## Page 5

SECRET

the entire country to the

Virgin

Mary. The appointment in 1961

of Diem's brother Thuc as arch-

bishop of Hue-a Buddhist Strong:

hold--intensified the resent-

ment

engendered by Thuc's polit-

ical influence and activities.

Tri Quang,

the Buddhist

bonze, who sparked the eruption

of the Buddhist protest movement

on 8: May.,

has admitted

since taking refuge in the Ameri-

can. Embassy on 1 September that

he had long been planning such

a campaign. He has

denied, how-

ever, deliberately.

instigating

the violence of 8 May,which

culminated in the death of eight

persons during efforts of secu

rity: forces to disperse a crowd.

- Tri Quang claims he

seized on

the issue for a

showdown, having

let earlier opportunities go by,

and that even for some time sub-

sequent to 8 May,

the Buddhists

would. have.settled: for an.end

to religious discrimination.

His statements cannot be refuted

on the basis of

hard information

now available.

Tri Quang and other Bud-

dhist leaders are known to have

had at least two days' notice

prior to the 8 May celebration

of Buddha's birthday in which

to plan open protests over a

government effort to apply a

directive--long standing but

not previously. enforced--con-

cerning the display.of the Bud-

dhist. flag. The government's

charge, however, that the en-

suing deaths were caused by a

Viet Cong grenade rather than

by: government troops is not

borne out by eyewitness reports

or the findings of Us military

personnei in the area.

?.."

The five demands: drafted

by Buddhist leaders in Hue on

10. May were in effect a petition

for both religious and political

concessions, including the elimi-

nation of legal restrictions not

applicable to Catholics and resti-

tution for the 8 May victims.

Whether

or not, the: demands were

politically motivated, prompt

and adroit government handling

of the issue probably. could, have

averted the formation of a na-

tional Buddhist campaign. Under

GAVE leadership, this campaign

not only served

to foster greatel

cohesion among:.the country.s. dif-

fuse Buddhist following, but was

supported. by 13 sects represented

by a recently: created. Inter-sect

Committee. Two other, nonpartici-

pating sects are reportedly, gov-

ernment-subsidized. By, the time

that the government reached a

compromise agreement on 16 June,

however, the Buddhists had de.

veloped sufficient momentum and

evidence of new repressions to

challenge the regime's promise

of good faith.

There is strong evidence.

that

the government, through

its authoritarian inclinations

and its concern over Viet Cong

instigation or exploitation. of

the Buddhist issue, was disposed

from the beginning to regard the

Buddhist leadership as subversive

and to deal. with it forcefully.

When it refrained fron doing so,

under US pressure, while stall-

•ing on concessions, the. Bud-

dhists were able to arouse pub-

lic sympathy by organizing

2

SECRET

---

## Page 6

SECRET

demonstrations and, ultimately,

by self-immolations which, what-

ever their political effects,

represent a sacrificial gesture

compatible with the traditions

of Vietnamese (Mahayana) Bud-

dhism.

Although by early Au-

gust the fervor of the Buddhist

movement may have been partly

out of control, as claimed by

the Buddhist leaders, the lat-

ter were already expanding their

demands in late June; in mid-

July moderate Buddhist clergy

were expressing alarm over the

political aims of extremists in

the movement.

There is almost

no question that Tri Quang and

others were actively organizing,

whether from the outset or as

a: result of frustrations en-

countered during the campaign,

a"vehicle to bring about the

government's overthrow, though

they do not appear to have co-

operated with Diem's traditional

political opponents:

The government has claimed

it has proof of Communist di-

rection of the Buddhist campaign,

but officials privately admit

there is little hard evidence

of this, other than Viet Cong

directives to exploit the is-

sue. Charges concerning the Com-

munist ties of Tri Quang and

other Budhist leaders apparently

derive from French intelligence

files alleging their participa-

tion in the early stages.of the

Viet Minh resistance.

Quang him-

self claims that, despite per-

sonal antipathy to Diem, he ini-

tially accepted the President

as a strong anti-Communist leader;

it was only later that he con-

cluded that Diem could not win

the war and that the Buddhists

were caught between the evils

of the regime and of the Viet

Cong.

Quang, however, is polit-

ically sophisticated and.some-

what devious in his approach.

A Vietnamese source, one who

regards most Buddhist leaders

as sincerely motivated, has

expressed distrust of Quang

and his denials of Communist

sympathies.

(SECRET)

SECRET

C4:192

---

## Page 7

SECRET

C

".?

-....!:."

e' o, inis inond viize

..?.

SECRET

---