## Page 1

Date

Page

: 06/25/98

JEK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY

RECORD NUMBER

RECORDS SERIES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

NSC

145-10001-10171

263

Released under the John

f. • Kennedy

Masasgihation

Records

Collection Act of

1992

144 USC 2107 Notel.

Case#:NIT. 54214 Date:

10-10-2017

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR

FROM

TO

TITLE :

DATE: 03/00/62

PAGES : 15

SUBJECTS : OPERATION MONGOOSE-- PHASE ONE (CIA)

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION :

RESTRICTIONS : 1C, 4

CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 02/10/98

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :

NO JOINT STAFF OBJECTION

TO DECLASSIFICATION

PELES CONCURRENOE OF

DATE:

MAR

2006

IR] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

1N 54214

Doc1d: 32977051

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DocId: 32977051

54214

MH

OPERATION MONGOOSE

PHASE I (CLA)

ACTIVITY

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

1. * Dispatch one intelligence

agent operation to key area

selected by CLA.

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

1 - 15 March 1962

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

Collect and report intelligence on anti-

regime attitudes, on potential resist-

ance, and on vulnerabilities and

strengths of Communist security

system.

There is a risk that this action will disclose this U.S.

intelligence activity within Cuba. Selected personnel

are being intensively trained. This first team has 2

agents.

An area in which resistance has been reported

has been selected. Agent operations must stay alive,

Physical risk to personnel is substantial, due to lack

of intelligence. First reports from firet team are

expected by the end of March, while reporte from the

second and third teams, dispatched in March, are ex-

pected to start in April.

Many of the agents infiltrated into Cuba will be trained

for paramilitary skille as well as intelligence collection,

with the thought that they will be in place inside Cuba

and ready to act whenever paramilitary operatione are

decided upon. However, CLA has noted that, once the

agents are inside Cuba, they cannot be controlled

effectively from outside Cuba, although every effort

will be made to attempt such control.

These staff intelligence officers may also be used in the

future for communications or agent handling, if future

developments warrant.

2. 3 third-country intelligence

staff officers in place in

Havana.

3. 2 third-country trained intel-

ligence officers, readied to

travel in Cuba for temporary

periods.

To collect intelligence.

To collect intelligence.

* Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962.

DE

2E0 BRACKE

racketa

689.

2/84

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Page

ACTIVITY

4. * Caribbean Admiesion Center,

Opa-Locka, Florida, fully

activated by 15 March 1962.

TOP SECRETSANDLIVE

L - 15 March 1962 (cont)

PURPOSE

To collect intelligence required for the

operations, to identify and earmark in-

telligence assets as refugees arrive,

and to provide security against Com-

munist agent operations.

5. * Periodic intelligence esti-

mates, as required by progress

of operations.

To up-date NIE 85-62, so that current

estimates can be considered at national

policy levels.

CONSIDERATIONS

This operation, in response to early recommendati on

as essential by the Chief of Operations, is moving at

utmost speed to become fully active by 15 March, with

a new building completed and occupied, and with a

staff of 43 at work. Operations commenced 15 February

and, as of 9 March, 33 people were active at the Center.

(CIA responsibility, with support by Defense, Justice,

State, USIA.)

As the operations develop, there will be both increased

intelligence collection and a need for as current an In -

telligence Estimate as the U.S. can produce meaningfully.

It is likely that a more informal method of producing an

Intelligence Estimate for use at the national level (than

now governing the issuance of NIE's) may have to be

followed. CLA is now publishing daily intelligence sum -

maries on Cuba and is planning a bi-monthly or weekly

report summing up intelligence for this purpose. (CLA

responsibility, with support of othere as required.)

OTHER OPERATIONS

Contint

age of Cu

DOCe

ce le required to

Lenamotives

contaminant

contaminating

at 3 months

6(1)(c)

+(4)

16, 16,16

16 - 31 March 1962

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

teams of agents dis-

patched to Cuba.

To collect intelligence.

* Iteme marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962

agents. Both teams include

personnel who have had resistance training and some past

experience.

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CONSIDERATIONS

Possible future use in communications and support.

To ready agent operations.

Pare

TOP gECRET SENSITIVE

16 - 31 March 1962 (cont.)

PURPOSE

To collect intelligence.

ACTIVITY

8. Establish 2 additional third-

country resident agents in

Cuba.

9. By 31 March, have 105 agents

selected and 50 agents trained.

Effectiveness and numbers are dependent upon purpose

of recruitment, nature of training, and policy decisions

controlling these factora. If the recruitment and train

ing are for resistance activities, the task of recruit-

ment and training will be much less difficult than if

they are limited to intelligence-collection purposes

10.* Develop intelligence potential

of Cuban "colonies" in U.S.

To exploit the intelligence possi-

bilities of former residents of

Cuba (including U.S. citizens) now

in the United States.

There are "colonies" in Washington, D.C., and other

U.S. cities which are "little Cubas." Family, Church,

and business interests provoke unusual personal ties

inside Cuba for some of these residente; a real potential

existe for collection of intelligence not otherwise avail-

able. (FBI support and coordination is basic in this

11. * Develop additional interroga -

tion centers in other areas by

31 March 1962.

To collect intelligence in a Latin

atmosphere, at different levels than

now seem possible in the continental

U.S., to spot additional intelligence

assets and to provide security

against Communist agent operations.

As Opa-Locka becomes fully activated, CLA will activate

other interrogation centers as promptly as feasible.

enter 20 bein tael

Negotiations with

local authorities are being undertalien to activate centers,

if possible, An Mexico

A ruba.

Bantago,

Chile pare being sur

veyed for possible centere.

(CIA responsibility with sup-

port by others as necessary.)

= Iskete as in red ink lives

не 11

6(1)(C)

+(4)

11,12

OTHER OPERATIONS

None.

Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962.

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TOP SECRET SENSITIVE-

1 - 15 April 1962

ACTIVITY

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

12.* Two teams of agents dis -

patched to Cuba.

13.5 third-country agents, tem-

porarily travelling legally, in

Cuba.

OTHER OPERATIONS

None.

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

To collect intelligence.

Number of agenta undetermined as yet.

To collect intelligence.

16 - 30 April 1962

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

14. * Two teams of agents die-

patched to Cuba.

15.

One third-country legal

resident agent in Havana.

OTHER OPERATIONS

None.

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

16. * Two teams of agents dis -

• patched to Cuba.

17. 3 legal resident agente in

Cuba.

To collect intelligence.

To collect intelligence.

Teams of 2 to 5 agents each, depending on circum-

stances.

Possible use for communications and aupport.

1 - 15 May 1962

To collect intelligence.

Teams of 2 to 5 agents each, depending on circum-

stances.

To collect intelligence.

Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962.

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19.

epul

Pare

18.

TOP SEGIET SENSITIVE

1 - 15 May 1962 (cont)

PURPOSE

To collect intelligence.

ACTIVITY

One or possibly two trained

staff intelligence officers

(non-U. S.) resident in

Havana.

CONSIDERATIONS

Tods.

OTHER OPERATIONS

None.

16 - 31 May 1962

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS.

20. * Four teams of agents dis-

patched to Cuba.

To collect intelligence.

Teams of 2 to 5 agents each, depending on circum-

stances. CIA will be attempting to cover as much

of Cuba as it can.

Difficult

21. One possible singleton agent

operation, Isle of Pines.

22. Four additional resident agents To collect intelligence.

inside Cuba.

CLA will be attempting to cover as much of Cuba

as it can.

The main factor of determining location

of resident agents is to find a place where a trained

agent can stay viable.

23. Five "legal travel" agents

inside Cuba.

24. By 31 May, selection of 50

additional agente and train

35 additional agents.

To collect intelligence.

To ready agent operations.

Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962

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54211

Paue

16 - 31 May 1962 (cont)

PURPOSE

ACTIVITY

OTHER OPERATIONS

develop a

plan fợi

Being

which

woulT not be implemented antil

a decision was thade

во кровно

e econoray in: Cuba

CONSIDERATIONS

To debase the economy of Cuba.

A counterfeiting

are to ataft

decloton

tien plan

proposal

cted

being deve toped.

so zougaly

taff patra female duel

decición to impl

edlately.

Preces

1 June - 31 July 1962

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

26. * 10 to 15 teams of agents dis -

patched to Cuba.

To collect intelligence.

27. Reinforce and resupply agents

and teams previously placed or

activated inside Cuba.

To reinforce and resupply, as

possible.

Number of agents in each team and selection of areas

will be determined by developments of the previous

actions and by conditions.

Numbers, areas, and supplies are completely dependent

upon conditions at the time, and upon policy approval of

methode to be used (that is, if air delivery can be used,

or if this activity must depend upon maritime delivery).

28. By 31 July, select 100 additional To ready agent operations.

agents and train 70 additional

agents.

29. * Collection of psychological

material.

30. * Survey airfields, military

installations, and communica -

tion centers.

31. * By the end of July, have

operations to penetrate the

regime.

To provide documentary and photo -

graphic evidence of the tyranny of

the Communist regime.

To provide current intelligence on

key security resources of the

regime.

To provide current intelligence on the

actions and intentions of the regime.

* Items marked by astorick were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962

This evidence will be used by CIA and USIA to neutralize

the influence of Castro and the Communists in the West-

ern Hemisphere.

This is conceived of as ground surveys, and the possible

recruitment of military and other official personnel as

intelligence agents.

This requires attempte to place trained agents inside

government organizations, or to defect officials "in place."

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TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

1 June - 31 July 1962 (cont)

PURPOSE

ACTIVITY

OTHER OPERATIONS

None.

CONSIDERATIONS

32. * Comprehensive and

definitive intelligence

report on attitudes and

abilities of the popula -

tion inside Cuba.

End of July 1962

To provide the Special Group (ISC 5412

augmented) with a hard estimate of the

Cuban situation.

The intelligence estimate will provide a vital basis for

a Special Group recommendation on whether or not the

U.S. should undertake actions to make maximum use

of Cuban resources as a justification for decisive U.S.

military intervention.

Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962

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OPERATION MONGOOSE

PHASE II (State)

ACTIVITY

Make political decision to

intervene with U.S. mili-

tary forces in Cuba.

2. U.S. officiale and news

releases on policy decision.

Latin American leaders,

government and public, in

support.

TOP SEC

RET SENSITIVE

PURPOSE

To overtly engage the U.S. prestige in sup-

port of a Cuban revolt to an extent that would

require the U.S. to become involved in assur-

ing the ultimate victory of a Cuban revolution;

this involvement must include the commitment

of U.S. military forces as necessary to achieve

such victory.

Indicate policy and commit prestige of U.S.

government to appropriate support of the

Cuban people vs. Communist dictatorship.

Commit national prestige and power of Latin

political, intellectual, labor, youth, religious,

military leaders to cause of Cuban people

against Communist regime. For local public

impact, international support, and morale of

resistance within Cuba.

CONSIDERATIONS

This political decision will require considera-

tion of the legal and moral factors, assessed

in the perspective of world opinion and U. S.

security interests.

Top officiale of Executive and Legislative

branches to make timely statements. This

should encourage similar attitude by leaders

of other nations and help spirit of Cubans.

Development of sympathy leading to favorable

opinion about outside support for Cuban people

is a goal.

Timely and strong public statements will be

encouraged. Maximum publicity at country of

origin, other key countries and into Cuba by

CLA assets. Support of State action by CLA and

USIA is involved.

289

- 161

s/87n 20p

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OPERATION MONGOOSE

PHASE II (Defense)

ACTIVITY

After political decision,

provide maximum U.S.

support to resistance fight-

ers in Cuba who have been

spotted in Phase I.

After political decision,

commit U.S. military forces

in accordance with contingency

plane.

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

PURPOSE

To assure that Cuban "freedom-fighters"

are fully equipped to attack the Commun-

ist regime's military and police forces;

as part of the assurance, the U.S. support

must include the immediate commitment

of U.S. leadership personnel in combat

operations.

To intervene as required to achieve victory

for the revolutionary forces.

CONSIDERATIONS

DOD support planning, stock piling, readying of

equipment and personnel for commitment must

be developed with maximum lead time. Close

coordination with CIA is required to insure maxi-

mum readiness to meet the immediate needs of

the revolutionary forces. The hazard of visibility

in preparing for these support activities makes

security a paramount consideration.

Consistent with security aspect, U.S. military

forces are placed in a state of readiness to

accomplish the assigned mission. The military

forces must be prepared to assist in the mainte -

nance of order until the revolutionary government

is in control.

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54214

OPERATION MONGOOSE

PHASE II' (CLA)

ACTIVITY

Support U.S. military

actions in Cuba.

Page

11

TOP SECRE

PURPOSE

To provide intelligence, guerrilla action, and

Cuban political-psychological support of U.S.

military operations.

CONSIDERATIONS

CIA capabilities must be continuously assessed

and considered in the development of military

planning. Executive responsibility for direct-

ing the use of covert assets must be clearly

understood as resting in the U.S. military

commander of the U.S. intervention, as in

agreed-upon wartime operations.

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54214

OPERATION MONGOOSE

PHASE II (USLA)

ACTIVITY

Increase news emphasis

on Cuban revolt and inter-

vention from the outside

to help the Cuban move -

ment.

ROP SECRET SENSITIVE

PURPOSE

To neutralize opposition to U.S. policy and,

if possible, gain support for U.S. policy in

the Western Hemisphere.

CONSIDERATIONS

Optimum exploitation of news material avail-

able to CLA and Defense is essential.

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OPERATION MONGOOSE

PHASE I (State)

ACTIVITY

Political and economic

operations to isolate Castro

regime and neutralize its

influence in the Western

Hemisphere.

TOP SEC

• SENSITIVE

March - July 1962

PURPOSE

Activities in consonance with U.S. policy

established after the April 196l failure in Cuba.

CONSIDERATIONS

These activities will have some negative impact

on the Cuban people, who are part of the target, but

are consistent with an overt policy of isolating Castro

and neutralizing his influence in the Western Hemis -

phere. They are noted here, for the sake of com

pleteness, as actions now being carried out by the

Department of State under other existing programs

and projects.

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## Page 14

OPERATION MONGOOSE

PHASE I (Defense)

ACTIVITY

Expand special intelligence and

other sensitive intelligence cover-

age of Cuba as required.

Develop the means of the Inter-

American Defense Board to pro-

vide substantive intelligence on

Cuban activities.

3. Provide logistic and personnel

support for CLA intelligence

operations into Cuba.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will con-

tinue the planning and essential

preliminary actions to assure a

decisive U.S. military capability

for intervention.

TOP DE

March - July 1962

PURPOSE

To develop increased "hard" intelligence.

To add to the U.S. intelligence coverage

on Cuba and possibly to strengthen the

concern of Latin American states for

security.

To ensure optimum implementation of the

intelligence plan.

To overthrow the Communist government

of Cuba.

CONSIDERATIONS

Use of cays near Cuba entail unacceptable security

risks when vulnerable to Cuban landing parties.

(Defense, in collaboration with CIA.)

Sensitivity of using this multi-national organiza -

tion clearly restricte potential use by USA. Visi

bility of operational interest is an acceptable risk

here.

The intelligence plan requires support by U.S.

military manpower and equipment.

The U.S. military intervention must be conducted

as quickly as possible and with sufficient force

so that the Communist Bloc's ability to take

effective counter-measures is reduced to a

minimum.

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OPERATION MONGOOSE

PHASE I (USIA)

ACTIVITY

Propaganda programs to isolate

Castro regime and neutralize its

influence in the Western Hemis-

phere.

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

March - July 1962

PURPOSE

Activities in consonance with U.S.

policy established after the April

1961 failure in Cuba.

CONSIDERATIONS

These activities will have some general impact

upon Castro support and influence in the Western

Hemisphere.

There will be some new material

for use as the Phase I intelligence operations

produce but essentially the program is a continua-

tion of that already in effect.

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T-O-P

D-N-C-A-L-T

*Teams = 2 to 5 bodies

TEAMS*

INFILTRATED

31 May 1962

13.

31 July 1962

30 Sept. 1962

30 Now. 1962

28 Feb. 1963

23 to 28

28 to 33

33 to 38

48 to 53

3RD COUNTRY

RES. AGENTS

3RD COUNTRY

STAFF IO'S

LEGAL

TRAVELERS

10+5 temp.Leg. Sin/ready . 30-5 temp.

Travlrs.

15

25

20

35

20

40

30

50

AGENTS

SELECTED

155

AGENTS

TRAINED

85

255

255

255

255

155

155

155

155

sky

S-E-E-R-I-T

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*Teams = 2 to 5 bodies

TEAMS*

INFILTRATED

31 May 1962

13,

31 July 1962

30 Sept. 1962

30 Nov. 1962

28 Feb. 1963

23 to 28

28 to 33

33 to 38

48 to 53

3RD COUNTRY

RES. AGENTS

3RD COUNTRY

STAFF

IO'S

10+5 temp. Leg. 51n/ready

Travirs.

15

20

20

30

LEGAL

TRAVELERS

30-5 temp.

AGENTS

SELECTED

155

AGENTS

TRAINED

85

25

35

40

50

255

255

255

255

155

155

155

155

Blue

sky

T-O_P

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