Document date: 04/17/2018
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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA

RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10215

RECORD SERIES : National Security Files:William H. Brubeck

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

ORIGINATOR :

FROM :

TO :

DATE :

PAGES : #3

SUBJECTS :

DOCUMENT TYPE :

CLASSIFICATION :

RESTRICTIONS :

CURRENT STATUS :

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000

OPENING CRITERIA :

TITLE : John F. Kennedy document Control Record

COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 383: Disarmament, 7/63-10/63. Box 4.

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Exempt N1K-01-383-3-2-3,1%b.

5534.

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON 20301

Honorable William C. Foster

Director

U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Department of State

Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Bill:

I am enclosing copies of JCSM-685-63, 3 Septeuber 1963,

and JCS!-773-63,

4 October 1963.

These two papers present the views of the Joint Chiefs

of staft on a militarily acceptable l. S. position on the exchange

of observation posts to reduce the risks of wai by surprise attack or

I believe that these to papers provide an excellent

basis for the development of

a U. S. position.

In observation system,

such as reconcended below, would be advantageous

to the United States.

While such a systen sould not provide a guarantee

against surprise attack,

it could,

in properly designed, provide a measure

of advance warning that would make it more difficult for a State or

groun of states to initiate a major suprise conventional offensive

operution.

Such a system could increase confidence, reduce tensions,

Soviet intentions, and begin the process of opening up the Bloc.

¿ siccessiul policy on such an observation sysiem can only emerge from

fuil and open discussion in the Nort: Atlantic Council.

These discussions

may ie difficult but they are essenu.

Successful negotiation of such

an agreement with the Soviet Union Irsbably vill increase existing

pressures within the United States and abroad for reductions of defense

expenditures.

In addition, observation posts located in the U. S. would

of soviet knowledge of our response to crisis

situations on a world-wide basis. Therefore, such posts would limit

our flexibility to some extent.

on balance it appears that

negotiation of an agreement as outlined herein would be advantageous

to the U.S.

-An agreement on observation posts is acceptable within the guidelines out-

the preferred position,

as outlined in the follow-

ing subpa agraphs includes provisions for a reduction of forces in Europe

after implementation of the observation system.

The preferred position

includes:

Ground observation posts in the larsaw Pact area established

on the basis of reciprocity in righis anâ privileges and an equitable

balance in numbers. Posts would cover ports, rail centers, motor high-

wey junctions and air bases aad would have adequate surface and air

1250 AN

1"01

DOn DiR

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mobility to be able to observe movements or the local transporation

complex (see TAB A to Annex A to Appendis: to JOSM-773-63).

requirements for access to military facilitics,

transportation facilities

• and vehicles and for communications till have to be developed.

Proposed

restrictions

on the location of Warsaw Pact Josts on NATO territory are

as indicated in Annex B to Appendi: to JCSM-173-63.

(2) Mobile observation teans assigned on an area basis to observe .

military activities within that area (see TAB A to Annex A to Appendix

to JCS1-773-63.)

Again details of requirements for access to various

facilities and vehicles will have to be developed.

provisiuns for advance notification of major land suals movements

(brigade/regiment or higher) of forces through or within areas of

responsibility of observation posts/teans (see Appendix to JCSM-T73-63,

B :

(3) Aerial surveillance on e 4-hoiê, all-weather basis,

restriction on sensing equipment,

to encompass at least the area covered

by the observation posts/teams (sce Appendix to JCSM-773-63, p. 5.)

Aerial inspection of those portions of ti: USSR bordering Turkey and

Iran would be included if the USSR insist, on acrial inspection in those

countries.

(4) . Overlapping radar coverage as indicated in the Norstad Plan.

(5) Reduction of all foreign troops in Eucope to five divisions

on each side contingent upon agreement on and implementation of the preceding

four points.

We should develop a U.s. position on the composition of the

I¡ve NATO divisions.

This must be aune prior to bringing up the subject

in the North Atlantic Council. We may want the five NATO divisions to

Do all U. S. or some combination (say, 2 U.S., IU.K., I French, 1 Benelux-

Canadian) of NATO forces with U.S.

Soviet negotiating initiative on the observation question (or their

response to a U.S. proposal) would probably take one of the following

three general lines of approach:

til at military rement one cal other minor measure

perhaps coupled to an advanc

A non-aggression pact, perhaps in return for some kind of

observation agreement.

An observation system agrousent, perhaps coupled to a with-

draval of weapons of mass destructic: and/or their delivery vehicles

from Germany or Lurope.

TiTC

shoula formulate our position io malic possible negotiations on the

basis of either the first or

second possibility. However, an agreement

within NAIlO to withdraw or reducc nuclear weapons and/or their delivery

vehicles appears impossible at this time.

It is also clear that a NATO

consensus on a non-aggression pact would be very difficult to obtain.

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Without a fundamental change in Gerna- attitudes and a considerable

alteration of the viens of othes Nado envois, we could only discuss a

ron-aggression pact as a part of a brosder Europcan settlement. However,

the HAC might be tilling to agree to the development of a declaration

against aggression, in which case,

the u. s. could support it in returr

foi an agreement on an observation system.

It is recommended that the U. S. Goveriment prepare two negotiating

proposals:

A complete observation sysic. consisting of the five elements

listea above.

b. An observation system consisting us uhe sane dements, except

Icauction of forces, a number of which could be separated from the ne-

gotiating package as detailed below.

Elimination of overlapping radar

coverage and serial surveillance from

the agreement would not mare it unaccontaoie, however, it would eliminate

considcration of a reduction of forces since surveillance capabilities

would be materially reduced.

Elinination of nobile observation ion., ou ring radar coverage and

aerial surveillance would not make i grunt unacceptable.

It

would elininate our willingness to so. pt a coduction in forces, and

would increase the importance of the ocation;

amber and mobility of

the fixed posts and of the other accociatai amungeuents wich would

optimize saîeguards against surprise ariaci.

I think that

it is necessary for me to emplosize the problen of gaining

a consensus in Nato.

There already

seas to dc a consensus in the NAC

on the five principles enumerated by - Du cia: representative that an

agrecrent on observation posts (1) mu. no: copromise alliance security,

(2) must not alter the East-West mili. truce, (3) must not prejudice

the reunification of Germany, (4) must 1oü .: anything towards recognition

Of Last Germany, and (5) must not nice the islir situation more difficult.

If we cannot achieve a genuine consuno is viliout subjecting the alliance

to major stresses and strains, then I thin: what the Committee of Principals

would went to be exceedingly cautious in recomonding to the President

that we pursue such an agreement.

In vIew of the foregoing, I recommend

that when the proposed position has been fornulated and discussed by our

representatives, it be the subjeci of an early meeting of the Committee

of Principals.

Sincerely,

2 Inclosures

JCSM-685-63,

JCS11-773-63,

3 Sept. 1%63

Oct.

1963

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