Agency: FBI
Originator: FBI
From: SULLIVAN, W. C.
To: DELOACH, C. D.
Document date: 3/7/70
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

## Page 1

124-10185-10098

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY: FBI '

RECORD NUMBER:

124-10185-10098

RECORD SERIES:

HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER: 62-116395-386

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR: FBI

FROM:

SULLIVAN, W. C.

'TO: DELOACH, C. D.

TITLE:

DATE: 03/07/1970

PAGES: 15

SUBJECT:

CC, CIA ACT, CP, LHO, TRA, WIRETAPPING, CASTRO, ACT

DOCUMENT TYPE:

ORIGINAL-

CLASSIFICATION:

PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

Secret

NEW

CLASSIFICATION:

REVIEW DATE:

STATUS

10/30/1998

Redact

UPDATE DATE:

02/12/2001

COMMENTS:

RESTRICTIONS:

JFK Act 6 (1)(B)

JFK Act 6 (1)(C)

INC 3 MEMO, LIST, 329 OF 344 PAGES NAR

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## Page 2

The Attorney General

1

1

Director 31

Mintz

(J: B. Hotis)

July 10, 1975

Wanna 11

Mr o

- Mr5R. 1.

Moore

UNITED STATES

SENATE SELECI COMMITTEE

ONCINTELLICENCE ACTIVIJTES SSC)

By letter dated May 14,

1975, with attached appendices

the SSC requested certain information and documents from the

FBI

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the

Comnittee are the original of a memorandum and enclosures which

serve as a response to two of the SSC requests.

A copy of this memorandum with enclosures is being

furnished for your records.

Enclosures (40)

62-116395

I - The Deputy Attorney General

Attention: K. Witten ® connor

Special Counsel Tor

Intelligence Coordination

RLM-mam

ALAN

16212345386

3- JUL 21 1975

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LIS

75ROOM V

# 179

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TELETYPE UNIT E7

SECRET MATERIAL TRACHED

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Э9T8.

ee org. 10

OsA Sir: D00-N91. 37

UNITED STATES GOVEIWMENT

Memorandum

I SECRET

TO

The Director

DATE: 3/13/70

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

FROM

SA Sam Papich

SECRET

DECLASSIFIOAS

ND/OR,

RELEASE OF CIA IN URMATION

IN THIS DOCUMENT.

SUBJECT RELATIONS WITH CIA

AS SANTZED

GMA 6: 29-94

Reference is made to my letters dated March &

March 5, 1970. In my letter of March 5, 1970, I stated "it

is Important to emphasize that the Bureau can

also produce

an extensive listrot justified axlevances.

It is my underg

standing that the Director desired that this list be identified.

Enclosed herewith is a list of approximately 75 items.

This list should not

be considered absolutely complete,

Preparation was predicated on my personal recollection and a

review. of Bureau records. To make this list more complete and

specifically accurate would necessitate the review of thousands.

of 111eso

who, enclosed 12st can be stenorted hy Burenu records.

What CIA records reflect on the same items is unknown.

This

also must be kept in mind in connection with our evaluation

of the alleged CIA grievances which I previously listed.

•I realize

that it is presumptuous on my part, but

1f the Director feels that our Bureau work can benefit by a

personal discussion between the Director and myself, I am

available until April 3, 1970. I plan to leave the area

Immediately thereafter for an extended period.

ACTION:

For Information.

6-24-94

Classified by SpruCKse

Decassly on DADA(JFK)

Enclosure

ALL INFORMATICN CONTAIN

CLASSIFTER

ST WHENE SHOWE

OTHEAWISE

Clas

lechay 6

mpt fro

CDS

Dấn

of Declagilic

Category 263

on Indefinite

SEGRET

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SECRET

possible hostage situation in his native country. The Bureau

was following this potential defection and pursuant to estab-

lished procedures was keeping interested agencies apprised of

developments.

res was keepings.

On September 15, 1958, we received information

indicating that another Government agency was conducting an

investigation of the subject.

CIA was

the

other agency: (Rel

It was later established

that

| Bureau file

S

(105-64024)

39.

CIA ACTIVITIES IN

T(5)

The Legal Attache, Tokyo, reported by letter dated

september 22, 1a5o, that

I was a paid, highly regarded, and very sensitive source

of CIA.* This information was given to the Legal Attache by

G2 Head in Japan. According to L

CIA did

particularly the FBI.

not want this The Darictor's notation was, "Some more

to be known to other agencies,

of CIA double dealing. H."

(Letter from Legat, Tokyo, dated

September 22, 1958, "Investigations in Hong Kong and Manila,

Philippines")

40. ALLEGED CIA INCOMPETENCE

During the period October 20-25, 1958, Bureau

representatives attended a seminar at Orlando, Florida, which

was given by the y.S. Air Force. Among the activities was a

lecture given byl

7] Subsequent to the S

briefing, General Millard Young of the Air Force confided to

Bureau representatives and expressed his displeasure with the

briefing given by

] He was particularly critical of (S

reluctance to furnish certain information, using the (S

excuse that the matter was of a "Top Secret" nature.

General

Young stated that the position taken byl

excuse for incompetence on the part of cIA.

jas only an(5)

This item is being cited in the event we desire to

use the foregoing as evidence to support a position that we were

obliged to be circumspect in dealing

with CIA.

(Memorandum

October 28, 1958, Roach to Belmont,

"Joint Strategic Planning

Seminar, Orlando Air Force Base, Orlando, Florida, October 20-25,

1958"')

41. .CIA COVERAGE IN CUBA PRIOR TO OVERTEROW OF BATISTA GOVERNHENT

The overthrow of the Batista Government on January 1,

1959, and the subsequent assumption of power by Castro raised

questions concerning the efficiency and competence of U.S. intel

ligence. Allen Dulles indicated that future

deyelopments would

- 14-

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zation than the U.S. Government had realized.

Information

coming to our attention suggested the possibility that both

State and CIA had failed to assess developments in Cuba properly.

The foregoing is cited in the event that we found

reason to question the competency of CIA in Cuba. This coulds

be useful if we wanted to justify the

existence of a Legal

Attache office in Havana.

One could also comment that poor

coverage in Cuba had an

indirect and adverse effect on our

operations in the United States.

42.

him as a double agent.

The individual involved was

a well-known expert in the field of

(5)

medical research as It

applied to (space flying.

also a contract agent of CIA and had occasion to handle sensitive

matters for that Agency XInApril, 1959,

Twas preparing

(5)

a trip to Moscow.

CIA briefed him on matters as they

applied to his trip..

The Agency also interviewed him concerning

his relationship with the subject in Washington, D. C., and,

furthermore, gave him guidance concerning the relationship.

We objected to CIA giving any guidance tol

concernings

ais contacts with the subject without first consuring with us.

Bureau file

I(5)

43.

ALLEGED BELITTLING OF COMMUNISM BY ALLEN DULLES

In July, 1959, Allen Dulles of CIA spoke at the

National Strategy Seminar of the National War College. One

of the professors handling the Seminar was critical of Dulles.

He claimed that Dulles had belittled the importance of the

communist problem.

The above is being cited in the event we desire to

utilize the information in justifying a position that it was

necessary to be circumspect with CIA. (Memorandum W. C. Sullivan

to Belmönt, August 14, 1969, "National Strategy Seminar, National

War College, July, 1959")

44.

"'TRUE" MAGAZINE ARTICLE - SEPTEMBER, 1959

In September, 1959, "True" magazine carried an

article captioned "Allen Dulles:

America's Global Sherlock,"

which included information of a

derogatory nature. concerning

the Director and the Bureau. The article precipitated & crisis

- 15-

SECRET

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STERE

On february 7, 1962; Colonel Sheffield Edwards,

Director of Security, CIA, informed the Liaison Agent that

CIA was preparing a report containing extremely sensitive

Information.

He stated that this information came from a

sensitive source and he was not certain as to how it should

be handled.

As a result of a discussion with Edwards on

February 26, 1962,

it was ascertained that CIA had maintained

a technical

surveillance onl

lover an extended period. S

Edwards explained

that he had been reluctant to identify this

•source at an earlier date because he feared that prosecution

could have been jeopardized and, furthermore, he did not want

his Agency embarrassed in the event the Bureau objected to

CIA maintaining a capability such as technical surveillances.

existence of the coverage.

The Director made the notation,

"I only wish we would eventually realize CIA can never be

depended upon to deal forthrightly with us.

Certainly my

skepticism isn't based on prejudice nor suspicion, but on

specific instances of all too many in number.' Yet, there

exists

wistful belief that the 'leopard has changed his

(Memorandum Branigan to Sullivan February

1062, unknown subject; nos Abent inor as "Saabel

27,

56.

In February, 1962,

the Liaison Agent was requested

to discuss with CIA a

case which, in our opinion, clearly

indicated CIA had failed to keep us appropriately informed

of developments.

The Bureau's original interest was initiated

in Miami as a result of a discussion with CIA personnel in

that

city.

Attempts to get CIA replies via correspondence were

negative. On February 13, 1962,

the Liaison Agent discussed

the matter with CIA and received a reply which did not adequately

satisfy the Bureau's request. (Memorandum Donahoe to Sullivan,

February 27, 1962, and Brennan to Sullivan, March 2, 1962; Bureau

57 °

CIA WIRE TAPPING IN THE UNITED STATES

Sometime prior to the Bay of Pigs fiasco, CIA had

become involved in a weird plan designed to bring about the

assassination of Fidel Castro:

One of the principal ingredients

of this plan was to be the utilization of U.S, hoodlums.

CIA

established contact with Robert Maheu, former Bureau Agent, who

served as the intermediary

in dealings with the notorious

hoodlum, Sam Giancana.

SECRET

21 - 1*

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SECRET

The entire operation fell apart when we developed

Information indicating that Mabeu was behind a wire tapping

operation in Nevada.

Potentially, there were elements for

possible violation of unauthorized publication or use of

communications.

However, prosecution was out of the question

because of the

tainted involvement of CIA.

(Arthur James Balletti,

"Unauthorized Publication or Use of Communications" and memo

randum from the Director to Mr. Tolson, dated May 10, 1962)

58.

In October, 1962, we lodged a protest with CIA

because the Agency initiated operation of Cuban agents in the

Miami area and in so doing violated Bureau jurisdiction.

Arrangements were subsequently effected where the source in

the matter was turned over to the Bureau for

randum Brennan to Sullivan, October 29, 1962

handling. (Memo-

59.

On April 23: 1963. CIA requested that the Bureau

establish coverage on

a visiting (Panamanian national. "es

Immediately instituted investigation and then determined that

CIA actually had been instrumental in supporting the subject's

trip to the United States. CIA had been endeavoring to recruit

the subject.. On April 29, 1963, a strong protest was lodged

w1th General Carter, Deputy Director of CIA.

(Memorandum

Brennan to Sullivan, April 26, 1963, l

60• ALLEGED ATTACK ON BUREAU BY JOHN MCCONE

We received information in December, 1963, indicating

that John McCone, Director of CIA, allegedly was attacking the

Bureau in what would appear to be a vicious and underhanded

manner. McCone allegedly informed Congressman Jerry Ford and

Drew Pearson that CIA had uncovered a plot in Mexico City

Indicating that Lee Harvey Oswald had received $6,500 to

assassinate President Kennedy. The story attributed to McCone

appeared to be related to information which had come from one

Interrogation of

Alvarado, including a polygraph, disclosed that he had fabricated

his story.. This had been made known to CIA and to McCone.

There

fore, if McCone had made the above statements to Ford and

Pearson,

it would appear that it would have been an obvious attempt to

ridicule the Bureau:

The Liaison Agent contacted McCone on

December 23, 1963. McCone vehemently denied the allegations.

(Memorandum

Brennan to Sullivan, December 23, 1963, "Relations

With CIA")

site

22 -

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OPTIONAL PORA NO. 10

MAT ITAR ADITION

CHA GIM. 800.00.88

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SECRET

TO :Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE:

FROM :#. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

AGENCY (CIA)

BUREAU OPERATIONS IN CUBA

3/7/70

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

DECLASRIFICATION AND/OR,

RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION .

IN THIS DOCUMENT, AS SANITIZED

GMB 5-31-94 1508 mAC GEL

3-2.01

Item number eleven in the material submitted to the

• Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 states that

we operated informants in Cuba during the period we had a

Logat Office in Havana and did not

coordilate our operations

with CIA or advise it we had sources there. It was noted that

after Castro Came on the scene, approval was granted to turn

certain informants over to CIA. Papich also refers to a

memorandum NAME

NAME

2/5/60, regarding the

Communist Party of Cuba (CPC) which dealt

with the problem

of whether a Havana sourcelused in an intercept operation

between the

turned over to CIA to obtain complete coverage. We"

co and the CPO]should be (5)

had no coverage of

of course,

Bureau had not advised other

agencies of this source since we did not want Castro to uncover

any operational activities which might embarrass the Bureau. Ie

The entire operation was later turned over to CIA.

CIA began its operations in Havana in 4/47 and in a

letter to the Bureau, 4/28/53, [regarding Havana informants 7e

NAMe noted

CIA was not overly cooperative and that,

in fact, it was not developing pertinent information. At that

time NAMe met with the CIA representative in Havana who

We instructed NAME to ascertain from the Hatana CIA

representative information available to him concerning matters

of interest to the Bureau; however, he was to continue through

Informant sources to obtain needed information regarding security

matters which could not be supplied by CIA.

Subsequently, our

relations vith CIA improved to the point of being described as

excellent in 1958. Ne think our overall position to be sound 6-2-94

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

Classified by 5P&, mrt / GCL

Declassify on: DADR / (JFK

None. Ne do not believe, in light) of the facts set forth,

that CIA will make an issue of this matAtiONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

Unauthorized Disclosure

Subject to Criminal Sanctione

NH 50953 DocId: 32176432 Page 8

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OPTIONAL FORM NO 10.

5010-100

MAY IDOL EDITION

GSA. GEN. REQ.-NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Wallets

Mohr

1 - Mr. DeLoach

Binhop .

Casper

1 - Mr. Sullivan

Callahen

Conted

TO :Mr. C. D. DeLoach

Felt

DATE:

3/7/70

Gole

Rosen -

FROM

:W. C. Sullivan

SECRET

1 - Liaison

Sullivan -

1 - Mr. Flemister

Tavel an

Soyars.

Tele. Room

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO -

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

AGENCY (CIA)

[BUREAU OPERATIONS IN CUBATES

DECLASSIFIGATION AND/OR,

AGI TAFORMATION CONTAINED

HERISEN TS UNOGASSIFTED

RELEA

P GIA INFORIATION

JUUSNENIAS SANITIZEL

IN B 531194 (SP8 mAC (CL -66/94-561)

Item number eleven in the material submitted to the

(irector by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 states that

we operated informants in Cuba during the period we had a

Legat Office in Havana and did not coordinate our operations

with CIA or advise it we had sources there. It was noted that

alter Castro came on the scene, approval was granted to turn

certain informants over to CIA.

Papich also refers to a

memorandum Donahoe to Mr. Belmont, 2/5/60, regarding the

Communist Party of Cuba

(CPC) which dealt

with the problem

of whether a Havana sourcellused in an intercept operation

between the

turned over to CIA to obtain complete coverage. We,

had no coverage of

•S Bureau had not advised other

agencies of this source since

we did not want Castro to uncover

any operational activities which might embarrass the Bureau. (e)

The entire operation was later turned over to CIA.

CIA began its operations in Havana in 4/47 and in a

letter to the Bureau, 4/28/53, [regarding Havana informants, 07)

the Legat noted that CIA was not overly cooperative and that,

in fact, it was not developing pertinent information. At that

time Legat met with the ClA representative In havana who

admitted he was not getting any information (concerning the CpCop

6/2/9e

Classified by SPemAl

ON• DADR JER

Peclassify

and had no plans for any aggressive action in that field. For

this reason it was necessary for us to develop our own coverage J

We instructed the Legat to ascertain from the HaVana CIA

representative information available to him concerning matters

interest to

informant sourcesh

the Bureau; however, he was to continue through

no obtain needed

matters which could

information regarding security

not be supplied by CIA.

subsequently, our

relations with CIA improved to the point of being described as

excellent in 1958. We think our overall position to be sound.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None.

We do not believe,

in light

that CIA will

make an issue of this

matter

of the facts set forth,

HCF : bsf/mst

(5) not

SECRET

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