Originator: HSCA
Document date: 00/00/0000
Document type: TRANSCRIPT

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180-10142-10154

2022 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

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the holdings

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the National

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ASCA

(RG. 2?3)

HensaTell lo. C 20024 (2021 554-2945

KILOMETE: 1UMDИИО,

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telling Headquarters,

Ior some reason, of the 9/27 contact.

I do not mean to suggest that the reason is sinister or

innocent, but according to cable traffic, the Mexico City

station, anyway, is not telling you about it.

MI: Scelso. Yes.

---

Mr. Goldsmith. Let us look at CIA number 211.

MI. Scelso. What was the nature of that 9/27 contact?

MI. Goldsmith. If you would like, you can review the

transcript again. Essentially, it was a conversation between

„Solet Duran and soviet Embassy, or consulate officials

in respect to Oswald's obtaining a visa and the problem of

obtaining a visa.

Reading through CIA number 211, can you identify that?

Mr. Scelso. I suppose this was the President of

I Mexico?

..-

Mr. Goldsmith. Correct.

why do you think that, in paragraph 3, the person send-:

ing the cable considered the fact that bitensor was aware of

Oswald's contact to be important? The fact that he was aware

29

of it, and passing the information along would be important?

2!

=2

2?

MI. Scelso. You get into a psychological question.

Chief of Station is called in to speak to the President of

Mexico.

There had been a big fight when the new Ambassador

Tre

21

igot there -- no, it wasn't that. It was a very peculia

situ-

DO NOT REPRODUCE

whereby

the Mexican President's primary contac

RETURN TO CIA

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with

the

u?s? government was through our Chief of Station

rather than through the Ambassadors. This caused no great

problem with the then-Ambassador whose name I have forgotten.

MI. Goldsmith. Thomas Mann?

Mr. Scelso. Yes. He was a very fine guy and recognized

the usefulness of this arrangement. The next Ambassador,

MI. Friedman, tried to cut Winn Scott out of contact with the

'President" of Mexico,] waereupon the President of Mexico dellea

in Winn Scott and

said, I want you to send a cable to the white

House telling them I am not going to deal with this jackass,

I want to deal only with you.

So, the result was, eventually, Winston Scott and

Ambassador Friedman went to the White House and talked to

President Johnson and straightened the whole thing out in

favor of Winston Scott.

So Scott is just remarking that it is interesting that

the president of Mexico/is aware of our (telephone operation.

MI. Goldsmith. He should have been since it was a

Liaison Operation?

Mr. Scelso. Yes. But you do not always know whether

he was informed. I think we always knew he was informed.

It is just significant that the person calls you in and says,

here is some intelligence about the Kennedy thing.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let us take a look at CIA 210. Would

you please reäd that?

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PRET

MOERSON REFORTING EOMPET

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inn

STKITT,

5.1. lllorries

111.01Mii,

w:1110101, 01.6.

+11021(2112) 5941-2145

3

5

7

:C

15

id

20

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=3

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(Pause)

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you identify this document?

Mr. Scelso. This is a cover sheet for the cable from

the Mexico station.

Mr. Goldsmith.

The cover sheet to the cable we just

referred to?

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Winn Scott here indicates, due memo

of ray meeting with bitensor.

Mr. Scelso. It is addressed to this person who is

supposed to write a memo on it.

MI. Goldsmith. Scott? That is Scott's signature.

Mr. Scelso. Yes, he writes it back to himself and

reminds himself to write a memo on it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever see the memo?

Mr: Scelso. I do not think so.

MI. Goldsmith. Did you ever talk to scott about his

meeting with Litensor?

Mi. Scelso. I do not recall having done so.

Mr. Goldsmith. In any event, by this time, the Mexico

City station still had not informed Headquarters of the 9-27

contact?

Mr. Scelso. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let's look at CIA 213.

skim

ALDERSON FEFORTING EDiNG"I

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OnO OTH STARES, 5.1. MONTERS MURDERO, MISHTACTON,

1. c.

+0024 (202) 551-2115

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20

2!

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2=

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(Pause)

Mr. Scelso. This was all on the same day.

Mr. Goldsmith. The cable traffic was pretty neavy on

that day, I would imagine.

Mr. Scelso. Right.

Mr. Goldsmith. This cable is the first time that the

Mexico City station informs Headquarters about Oswald's

9/27 contacts.

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you think that there is any connec-

tion between the fact that this contact was recorded after

the Mexico City station became aware of the fact that Litenso=

knew about Oswald's contacts?

Mr. Scelso. I would imagine that there were probably

many - several Mexicans/transcribing reelstranscribing

things and some got finished before others.

MI. Goldsmith. This was months ago. The conversations

have been transcribed and reviewed months earlier.

Mr. Scelso. What are the numbers of the various cables?

They were all going out in a series.

They may have had

several analysts in the Mexico Station working on them.

One

said you take this one and write a cable and the other said

you take that one and write a cable, and so on, and they went

out and went into the COMM Center and the COMM Center sent

them out in some order. Here.

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