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2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SECRET

ESG 95-02

14 July 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

Chief, Historical Review Group

Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.

DO, Focal Point for ARRB

Position on Release of Information Pertaining to

Mexico City Station and the JEK Assassination

Records

1. At its monthly meeting on 17 July the ARRB will be

addressing the issue of the Mexico City Station and its operation

in light of any deletions made by the Agency to protect sources

and methods.

The issues of greatest concern are those

surrounding the joint teltap operations run by the Agency(and the

Mexican Services, official acknowledgment of which could have an

impact on liaison and foreign relations. We therefore, wish to

maintain protection of this information.

2.

We are willing to release information which indicates

the existence of operational teltaps against the Soviet and Cuban

Embassies fas long as they appear unilateral and we can continue

to protect the existence of any participation of the Mexican

(Services. We are willing to release documents which indicate the

existence of Mexico City Station during times outside the window

which we have acknowledged when they contribute significantly to

the historical record.

These steps will be useful to the

historic record and reveal the extent of coverage employed

We

would

the information which identifies coverage of other countries

individuals other than Lee Harvey Oswald.

3. We also agree to release of the following:

A.

Pseudonyms of employees, aliases of employees,

and file numbers.

CL BY (524343 3

DECL OADR

DRV COV 2-87

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SUBJECT:

Position on Release of Information Pertaining to Mexico

City Station and the JFK Assassination

Records

B.

C.

Cryptonyms, such as those in the lI

series.

unless they appear in the context of liaison:

operational equities; (such as LITENSOR and

LITEMPO) •

We need

to continue the protection of the cryptonym

LIENVOY.

This cryptonym is used extensively throughout the

collect to describe the joint activity from

different perspectives.

Individual occurrences may

not seem to reveal anything significant but, when

looking at the cryptonym in context over the entire

collection it reveals the joint activity which we

are trying to protect.

4.

Regarding the revelation of names of employees who

retired under cover, we request the Board to table its final

determination until

the individuals have been contacted and

informed that their name is being considered for release. This

will allow the individual to consider the impact it will have and

convey relevant information. The Directorate database is not set

up to track individuals who were involved in specific operations.

We need the assistance of the employees to know their operational

involvement's.

Office of Central Cover has prepared and is

coordinating a letter to be sent to the employees which will both

inform them and solicit their assistance/comments.

2

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September 11, 1995

WORKING PAPER

Notes from meeting w/ ARRB staff Sept. 11, 1995

ARRB Attendees: Marwell, Gunn, Mary + one

CIA Attendees : Barry, Ellie

Issue:

Inconsistency between Mexico City Chrono item

#132 and ARRB document #31

junn proposed that the Agency release the information ii

locument 31 that was released by mistake in the Mexico Cits

Chrono.

Otherwise, the staff would have to take the

document back to the ARRB for reconsideration which they

felt would undercut the credibility of the CIA and the

staff.

The Board will not uphold a postponement in a

specific document if that information is released by mistake

in another copy of the same document.

Ellie's response - because the information deals with Mex.

liaison, she will have to take their proposal to a higher

level. [response needed by 16 September]

They also requested a "new" highlighted version of the

Mexico City Chrono which reflects all information released

to NARA in the multiple copies of the Chrono and in the

documents referenced in the Chrono.

Issue:

The three documents of concern.

GIBSON - Ellje reviewed the Gibson issues--the fact that he

had denied in court his affiliation with the CIA, etc.

noted that since the document would not be included in the

determination list would the Board be willing to reconsider. "

Marwell said that we could make an addition pitch to the

Board to reconsider, but he did not think it would have any

effect on their decision.

PROENZA - Ellie explained that out goal here was to protect

the "asset" not the method and that the deletions could be

reduced to those words that could result in the

identification of the agent.

Marwell said

that the Board may reconsider based on the need

to protect a source.

Mary ask who was the asset? Was it LIRING?

Ellie said she did not know (it could have been some "AM"

source.

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Mary ask for more information on LIRING.

considered the issue of the

paragraph dealt with Oswald, voted to release. Mary said is

was hard to defend the individual released since she did not

have any information on the person.

We pointed out that the this release impacted on other

nothing to do with Oswald.

Marwell said the Board may re-look at the document as part

of looking at similar documents.

The issue of the taps on other Bloc embassies came up. Mary

said the Board was inclined to release given the end of the

Cold War.

[Note: we will locate as many of the "private line tap"

documents we can for special review]

Issue:

Removing the Proenza and Private line tap

documents form the formal notification list

Marwell clearly prefers not to do it at this time (said they

would discuss).

Has no problem with asking the Board to

reconsider or giving us the opportunity to presence

additional

evidence since their next meeting was within the

30 days set by the law, but felt that the Board was not

inclined to keep tabling documents that they had reached a

decision on.

Marwell asked if the Agency plans to "appeal"; he would like

a heads-up.

Later, in private. Marwell said that he wanted to build into

the process a loop that would handle these types of

situations.

Issue:

Presentation to Board at Sept. 20/21 meeting

It was agreed that "STATIONS" would be the focus of the

presentation -- 10:00 am, 20 Sept., one hour.

Marwell recommended providing evidence of bilateral

agreements as well as identifying current harm. Said that

the Board was

leaning strongly toward releasing stations.

Mary pointed out that there were still issues on the Mexico

City station window. There

are documents from the 50s,

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references in summaries to the founding of the station and,

most important, the visit by the HSCA

¡ to Mexico City.

Ellie said there was the possibility of opening windows of

stations when Oswald was present, however, this was a key

issue for the Agency and a senior Directorate/Agency

decision.

She indicated that the Do would oppose expanding

the Mexico City window into the 70s.

As for the older documents, we pointed out that we had

already agreed to the release of those documents.

Marwell suggest that the 20 Sept. presentation would be a

good opportunity to address the Private uine and other tel

Taps issue rather than requesting a separate meeting.

After

• the meeting Marwell elaborated on the presentation.

He said to try a avoid going over old ground (US-Mexico

relationship; when possible provide specific/hard evidence

(bilateral agreements carry weight); war-stories did not go

over well and neither did Bill McNair. He emphasized the

importance of using

the language of the law.

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September 12, 1995

WORKING PAPER

Notes from meeting w/ ARRB staff Sept. 11, 1995

Issue:

Presentation to Board at Sept. 20/21 meeting

It was agreed that "STATIONS" would be the focus of the

presentation -- 10:00 am, 20 Sept., one hour.

Marwell recommended providing evidence of bilateral

agreements as well

as identifying current harm. Said that

the Board was leaning strongly toward releasing stations,

particularly those in Europe.

Mary pointed out that there were still issues on the Mexico

City station window.

There are documents from the 50s,

references in summaries to the founding of the station and,

most important, the visit by the HSCA to Mexico City.

Ellie said there was the possibility of opening windows of

stations when Oswald was present, however, this was a key

issue for the Agency and a senior Directorate/ Agency

decision. She indicated that the Do would oppose expanding

the Mexico City window (into the 70s

As for the older documents, we pointed out that we had

already agreed to the release of those documents.

Marwell suggest that the 20 Sept. presentation would be a

good opportunity to address the Private Line and other Tel

Taps issue rather than requesting a separate meeting.

After the meeting Marwell elaborated on the presentation.

He said to try to avoid going over old ground (US-Mexico

relationship); when possible provide specific/hard evidence

(bilateral agreements carry weight); war-stories do not go

over well. He emphasized the importance of using the

language of the law especially when citing harm.

He

specifically mentioned Sec. 6. (B) {copy attached) which sets

a standard of "interfere with the conduct of intelligence

activities"

[Note: In a previous meeting with Gunn, he stressed similar

themes including avoiding

what he called "chicken little"

arguments.

He also raised the question on sensitivity oi

acknowledging we had a station in Moscow during the 60s.

"It would have been logical to have one during the Cold

War.

"}

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Central Intelligence Agency

i.i

Washington, D.C. 20505

FEB 0 2 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT:

Director, Intelligence Coordination,

Intelligence and Research, Department of State

Appeal of Unfavorable

• Determination by the JEK

Assassination Records

Review Board (AIUO)

The JEK Assassination Records Review Board (Board) recently

released documents revealing the existence of CIA stations in

Helsinki, Bern, Geneva, and The Hague, a (joint tel-tapoperation

with (Mexican liaison, and the identity of a unilateral

penetration of a liaison service. It is the CIA's assessment

that such releases could seriously damage intelligence operations

as well as adversely affect the foreign relations of the United

States.

CIA is presently preparing an appeal of these rulings by

the Board and requests

the support of the Department of State

should these appeals be brought before the President. (S)

Additionally, the Board has just released the existence of

stations in Rome, Madrid, Copenhagen, Os10, Brussels, and

Stockholm, and in March-April, it will be reviewing a document

that reveals the location of every CIA station in 1965. It is

anticipated that CIA will be preparing to appeal those releases

and requests State Department's assessment as to the damage to

foreign relations should the location of CIA stations be publicly

acknowledged. (S)

It remains essential that the U.S. Government stand by

assurances to persons and foreign governments that information

they provide

and activities they undertake based upon expected

confidentiality remain protected for as long as necessary. These

releases made by the Board seriously undermine the ability of CIA

to uphold secrecy obligations it took on in the past and to make

those assurances in the future. (C)

CL BY 2103140

REASON 1.5(c)

DECL X1: X5

DRV LOC 3-82

DRV LIS 3-82

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SUBJECT: Appeal of Unfavorable Determination by the JFK

Assassination Records Review Board (AIUO)

We have a critically short deadline in which to address

issues concerning the release of Helsinki, Bern, Geneva, and The

Hague stations, the identity of the asset, and Mexican liaison?

The release of the identities of the remaining stations must be

resolved over the next two weeks.

We request your comments and

expert opinions regarding the impact such releases would have on

the foreign relations of the United States, and hope to cite

State Department's support as we finalize our appeal. (S)

David N. Edger

David N. Edger

Acting Deputy Director for Operations

CIR-316/ 00293-96

2

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i...

SUBJECT:

Appeal of Unfavorable Determination by the JFK

Assassination Records Review Board (AIUO)

C/ IMS/ESG/F. Wickham/tdn/x44448/2Feb96

Distribution:

Original '- Addressee

1 - DDO/ Reg

1 - AC/DDO

1 - DCI/CSI/HRG

1

- OGC

1

- EUR/ LGL

1

LA/ LGL

1

C/IMS

1

IMS/ IRO

2

- ESG

3

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ADMINISTRATWE INTERNAL USE ONLY

From the Desk of Liñda C. Cipriani

NOTE FOR:

FROM:

DATE:

SUBJECT:

J. Barry Harrelson

Linda C. Ciprian

03/18/96 06:24:14 PM

JFK Meeting today

After speaking with you tonight about the results of the meeting today, Jeremy Gunn called me and relayed his concerns about the

Board's understandings (or misunderstandings) of CIA's position. (Bob Caudle and I discussed what happened at the JFK meeting and

the following is our impression of what resulted. Basically/Edger did not commit himself on any specifics on these issues, but expressed

his willingness to cooperate with the Board:

1.

Jerusalem-Station (Edger was more willing to negotiate this one, but does not agree to its release. CIA wants to present more

information. (Edger was not under the impression that this station was to be discussed today so he did not come prepared to present new

information on it. CIA should do this for the Board at the next possible opportunity.

2.

Open Period for Stations Edgenagreed that the staffs of the Board and HRG should work out the exact time period. He had

no problem with the Sept 63-64period and opening it up to Olgin the Oswald file. He did not make any firm commitment on the dates to

the Board, saying that the staffs should come to an agreement on this.

Substitutions for(Nordic stations - Although Edger suggested "Scandanavia Station" as a substitution, he clearly prefered

something less revealing like (Nörthern-European station 1, 2, etc.)". Using the former term has far less plausible deniability. The latter

option basically gives up what we want to protect.

Once HRG hears from Edger as to what his understandings are, then someone needs to speak with Jeremy Gunn ASAP on Tuesday

morning before the Board leaves. Jeremy said that unless we correct the Board on its mistaken impression about the above, they will

leave assuming we have come to an agreement and will refuse to revisit this at a latter date.

Let me know if you need me to help out in any way on this. FYl, I will be in meetings at 10AM and 2pm (Win Scott settlement

discussions!!!) tomorrow.

CC:

John F. Pereira

Eleanor Neiman @ DO

ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL LISE ONLY

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From the Desk of (Linda C. Cipriani)

NOTE FOR:

FROM:

DATE:

SUBJECT:

Fredrick Wickham @ DO

Johnny Going @ DO

Eleanor E. Neiman @ DO

(Linda C. Ciprian

03/29/96 11:52:57 AM

JFK release of Tokyo station(S)

I just spoke with EA legal and informed her about the latest release by the JFK Board of (Tokyo station and the fact that we have a letter

from the Ambassador objecting to the release. She indicated that Art Brown would be a good candidate to go down to speak with the

Board at their next meeting (what are the dates?) to request that they reconsider. It might also be more persuasive if we could arrange

for a State Department person (Japai desk) to come to the Board with us and present the Ambassador's letter. (S)

I would appreciate hearing your thoughts on this course of action. If we plan on doing this, we need to arrange it with Marwell and then

brief the appropriate people in the DO and State Department as soon as possible. (S)

CL BY &224130.3

CL REASON 1.5(c)

DECL ON X1

DRV FM LOC 3-83

CC:

Röbert D. Caudle

J. Barry Harrelson

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21 March 1997

JFK PROJECT WORKING PAPER

SUBJECT:

Policy Guidance--"Atsugi" and "U-?"

References to "CIA base/Station/representatives at

Atsugi, Japan" in the U-2 context is releasable.

2. Information relating to the station, other bases

and Agency representatives elsewhere in Japan will continue

to be protected.

3. The issue was coordinated with the DS&T i (Teresa

Wilcox), DO (Lee Carle), the Air Force (Captain Thomas I

Rock) and the Department of State (Nina Noring) ; all of whon

had no objection to the declassification and/or release of:

"CIA Base at Atsugi, Japan" and "U-2" project / effort /

activities.

J. Barry Harrelson

File: G: \HRG\ JAPOL. DOC

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DD/0 25-3059

- 1 SON 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, JFK Assausination Recorde Review Board

FROM:

David Cohen

Daputy Diractor for Operations

SUBJECT:

Release of JFK Documents

1. I understand the JEK AARB is presently considering the

release of documenta which would identify CIA stations to the

public. I am opposed in general to ravealing the locations of

our stations and would prefer instead to substitute the station

name with a regional designation, e.g. European Station vica

Brussels. I would be willing, however, to open certain stations

during a specific window of time if they are substantively

relevant to the assassination investigation and provided that the

documents in question are sanitized to conceal the permanent

presence of the station? (s)

2.

In all but a handful of instances, public acknowlodgment

of a station would be a political embarrassment to the host

government and would threaten ongoing sensitive operations and

liaison relationships.

In a few instancas, the damage probably

would be minimal or not at all as long as the presence appears to

be temporary.

I have surveyed the involved components and

determined the damage to national security which would follow

such release. (8)

3. I strongly urge that you not allow the information

regarding the Congo and Senegal to be released. The Congo is now

Zaira and the station in the 60's would have been in

Leopoldville, now Kinshasa where we are currently located. Our

current alationship with the zaireang in not a full-blown

liaison type, but more of a limited relationship with cartain

individuals from the services. In the past, we have had close

CL BX50695930

CL REASON: 1.5

DECL ON: X1

DRV ERM LOC 3-82

(C)

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SUBJECT: Release of JEK Documents

ralationships with the zaireans because of our noed for their

cooperation in assisting with a Prasidentially-mandated program

and will need to improve our relationship over the next several

months to accomplish our goals in that part of the world. We

also continue to have a station in Dakar, Benegal. We have

liaison there and would not want to jeopardize it. In dealing

with developmental contacts, there have been racent instances

where potential assets have voiced concern about our Agency'8

ability to keep its relationships clandestina.

To expose our

station there would further hamper devalopmental relationships

and eventual recruitments. (8)

4. Within the context of our European presence, I have the

following comments:

Brussels - Public acknowledgment would force the

government and liaison service to pay closer attention to

Station operations and therafore present a threat to ongoing

sensitive operations. (g)

Helsinki - A neutral country. Public acknowledgment

of a CIA station would embarrass the government and liaison;

thereby inhibiting the close and productive liaison

calationships wa now enjoy as wall as presenting a threat to

ongoing sensitive operations. (8)

Paris - No additional damage. (8)

Bonn - No specific damage. (S)

Berlin - No specifio damage. (8)

Luxembourg - Public acknowledgmant would embarrass the

government and inhibit liaison cooperation; thus endangering

ongoing operations. (S)

The Hague - Public acknowledgment would draw questions

from the press and create political problems for the

government and liaison. This would endanger the

continuation of sensitive joint operations. (S)

2

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SUBJECT: Release of JFK Documents

Oslo - Public acknowledgment would draw questions from

the press and threaten vary productive and very sensitive

ongoing joint operations. (s)

Madrid ~ Publid acknowledgment would draw prose

attention and embarrabsing questions for the government and

liaison service. This would further damage an already

delicate liaison relationship which is vital to us for

counterterrorism operations. (8)

stockholm - A neutral country. Public acknowledgment

would be politically embarrassing for the government and

liaison services.

This would likely endanger any

continuation of joint operations. (s)

Geneva - A neutral country. Public acknowladgment

would create political problems for the government and

liaison service and force greater attention to our

operations.

This would create an intensive

counterintelligence atmosphere for our operations; likely to

cause a decreasa in our operations. (8)

London - No specific damage. (S)

Ottawa - No specific damage. (8)

5. Our Eastern European stations pose a unique problem when

we considar public exposure.

Prague Station is recovering from

operating for almost fifty years in an undeclared status. During

the last three years we have managed, with much effort, to begin

the establishment of good working relations with the host

government and internal/extarnal servicas.

As a result, the

station has recently begun some very sensitive and high-leval

bilateral oparations. Thase obviously depend upon the good will

of the host service.

The Czech citizenry came of age in an

atmosphere in which distrust of intelligence services in general,

and the CIA in particular, was thoroughly ingrained.

That

distrust lingers in the public's mind even today. Exposure of

oux station's previously undisclosed presence and operational

activities during the Cold War will necessarily raise quastions

about our activities then, and almost certainly lead to further

3

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SUBJECT: Release of JFK Documents

inquiry about our present relationship. It is doubtful that our

relationship, and certainly our very sensitive operations, could

withstand the resulting public debate.

The existence of Prague

station, past and present, cannot be surfaced at this tima

without serious damage to national security. (5)

6.

Public acknowladgment of our stations in Managus,

san dose, Panama City, San Salvador, Santo Domingo, Buenos Aires,

Lima, Santlago, and Montevideo would not further damage our

operational capabilities in a specific sense. Overall, any

release of information about a clandestine service breeds

distrust in professionalism and will put future operations at

risk. (S)

7. We receive significant national colleation systems

support from Australia which affects national system collection

efforts against Tier IA targets throughout Asia. We would

jeopardize this by raleasing the presence of our station to the

public. Tokyo is a special case in that there is continuing

disagreement regarding our station.

We should not complicate the

current "Spy Mania" atnosphere in

Tokyo. There have been two

incidents regarding our presence in Japan during the present

year. Any further disclosure' would axacerbate the tension and

create an untenable operational atmosphere for our station and

parsonnal. (8)

8. Public acknowledgment of a station in India would be a

problem for the U.s. Government. U.s. and India foreign

relations are always delicate; the Indian Government is very

sensitive to parceived slights to its national sovereignty, and

public acknowledgment of a station would prove embarrassing to

the Indian Government which in turn could ask that the station be

closed.

If the station were closed or significantly downsized,

it would affect a large number of important intelligenca

collection operations. (8)

9. Public acknowledgment of a station in Tunisia would be

a problem for Tunisia vis-à-vis its Libyan naighbor. Libya and

Tunisia share a border which means the Tunisian Government must

act with some prudence regarding its relations with Libya.

The

Libyan

Government would almost certainly respond very negatively.

4

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SUBJECT: Release of JFK Documanto

to a public acknowledgment of a station in Tunisia and might well

engage in harassment/sabotage/terrorist actions in Tunisia to

show its displeasure. If the Tunisian Government should ask that

our station ba closed, the U.S. Government would lose a

capability to collect on Libya, north African stability, and

Islamic extremiam. (8)

10. Public acknowledgment of a station in Morocco would be a

problem for Morocco vis-à-vis its Islamic fundamentalist

population.

Morocco, like so many countrios with a majority

Muslim population, has a growing Islamic fundamentalist problem,

and Islamic fundamentalists are frequently opposed to the U.8. in

general and the Agency in particular.

Public acknowledgment of a

station in Morocco could cause its Islamic fundamentalist

population to react negatively and demand that our station be

closed. If the station were closed, the U.8. Government would

lose intelligence on the western Bahara conflict, north African

stability and Islamic extremism. (S)

In those instances where I have indicated damage to

operational capability and national security, I would feel

compelled to seek a reversal of any decision to make a publio

acknowledgment. In those cases where I indicate "no specific or

additional damage", I am prepared to accept your decision yet I

must call your attention to the general damage done to us by any

disclosure of operational presenco.

Our operational capabilities

are in direct proportion to the confidence placed in our ability

to protact sourca identities and operational methods. Disclosura

to the public of our presence weakens this confidence. (S)

janel sign

David Cohan

5

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