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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA

RECORD NUMBER

: 176-10036-10282

RECORD SERIES : National Security Files: William H. Brubeck

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : NLJFK

FROM :

TO :

TITLE : John F. Kennedy document Control Record

DATE : 9/1/1963

PAGES: 28903473

SUBJECTS :

DOCUMENT TYPE :

CLASSIFICATION

RESTRICTIONS :

CURRENT STATUS :

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 383: Congo 8/63-11/63. Box 4.

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13

COPY NO

POLICY RESEARCH STUDY

THE CONGO:

A STUDY IN POLITICAL DYNAMICS

(Political Dynamics Study No. 3)

by

M. CRAWFORD YOUNG

Harvard University

and

EDWARD J. STREATOR, JR.

Office of Research and Analysis

for Africa

Bureau of Intelligence and Research

SEP 24

15 PM'63

RECEIVED

External Research. Staff

Bureau of Intelligence and Research

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

GROUP ONE EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC

DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

After three turbulent

years, the Congo is entering a new period of

political construction. The eventual departure of UN military forces will

terminate on-the-spot responsibility for the maintenance of order. Au-

thority over the entire Congo is now exercised by a government of un-

questionable legality. But serious problems remain in the organization

of the emerging polity.

To investigate the socio-political hurdles facing the Congo, an INR

team, comprising M. Crawford Young, a consultant from Harvard Uni-

versity, and Edward J. Streator, Jr. of INR, visited 14 of the Congo's

21 provincial capitals in June-July 1963. Commenting on this initiative,

Ambassador Gullion wrote recently that "...the idea of a Departmental

officer working in tandem with an academic area specialist seems to me

a good one. This kind of thing has been done by the French very ef-

fectively. I judge from the work of the Streator-Young team that it can be

equally useful to us.!!

This Policy Research Study is the product of this collaboration be-

tween a Departmental officer and a member of the academic community.

An abstract of the study accompanies this memorandum.

Thomes L. Экриа

Thomas L. Hug

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ABSTRACT

THE CONGO: A STUDY IN POLITICAL

DYNAMICS

1. A modern and virulent form of tribalism

will continue to dominate Congolese politics.

Tribalism lies squarely athwart every dimen-

sion of political behavior. But ethnicity in the

Congo is not a phenomenon of the primeval

forest. In the cities, tribal origin provided a

focus for social organization. The elites of the

cities extended this renewed sense of ethnic

identity to their tribal homelands, where it

served to rally support for emerging political

each other and have been mutually reinforcing

first years of independence.

arguments played the paramount role in provin-

cial fragmentation. In 1960 only four political

movements of any

significance were not pri-

marily ethnic. Since independence all political

parties have

been subject to

serious ethnic

2. The new constitution now under discussion

will perpetuate unwieldy institutions that ham-

per effective government. A

commission is considering a draft constitution

prepared by UN experts, together with pro-

submitted by Katanga and a conference

of presidents of provincial assemblies. The

UN draft preserves the essential features of the

Loi Fondamentale, the Congo's present con-

stitution which ranks with the most unsuitable

organic. laws in existence. Most other African

states which followed classical forms

parliamentary government at

independence

have abandoned them

favor of presi-

dentialism and single parties, which appear to

permit more energetic development policies.

Congo, however, will probably adopt by

mid-1964 the UN draft perpetuating a parlia-

mentary framework.

concessions to provincial demands for greater

auconomy, but does not by any means realistic-

ally reflect the present and likely distribution

of power between the center and the provinces.

It preserves the principle of strong central

government

institutional

framework which will obstruct

central power. The result will doubtless be to

sharp hostility among local leaders

government which will have

serious difficulty in supplying needed national

leadership.

3. The new provinces are likely to persist

as

the basis

of internal organization.

The

creation of 21 new provinces has transformed

the character of the Congolese polity. Although

ethnic factors are

important, only seven of

the new provinces are ethnically homogeneous;

and four have one predominant group. In 15 of

the 21 provinces

there is a single dominant

political party,

and in many the party has a

strong ethnic identity. Traditional tribal struc-

are significant in 11 provinces.

Secessionism, a spectre haunting many Afri-

can presidential palaces, is endemic in several

regions of the Congo. Although Katanga has

been returned to the fold, latent secessionism

persists there and in other areas on the coun-

try's periphery.

The phenomenon of fragmentation is more

recent than the impulse to secessionism, al-

though it derives

from

common

roots.

The

emergence after independence ofthree de facto

the general breakdown of

authority reinforced the movement to create

The paternity of the new

provinces usually lay with elites in the urban

centers whose aspirations for leadership in

areas of origin were frustrated within

the framework of the six provinces inherited

from the colonial period. They accordingly in-

voked ethnic-regionalist arguments to

popular support for the

formation of new

provinces. After Parliament established cri-

teria for new provinces in April 1962, a rash

of new entities were approved.

4. The new provincial institutions are func-

tioning with varying success. Four can be con-

sidered to function very well. Five have reason-

ably operative governments.

Three function

very poorly, and seven

are unstable. The

festering problem of territories disputed be-

tween two or more provinces remains to be

solved, and several of the provinces show signs

of further fragmentation.

The budgetary cost of creating the new

provinces has been high. About 150 new minis-

ters and their parasitic entourages are lined

up at the pay window each month. And yet,

welcome the new

provinces. Before emergence of the new units,

five of the six former provinces had ceased

functioning. The new entities are more repre-

sentative of local opinion. They frequently have

governments of experienced technicians, re-

gional pride to defend, more limited area,

and imperfect, yet better,

ethnic cohesion.

Very real benefits in acquisition of political

and administrative skills are accruing in the

provinces. In many areas the institutions fun-

i

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with virtually no European

technical assistance.

5. The Congolese bureaucracy will continue

to be handicapped by the lack of experienced

and technically qualified personnel; but in the

provinces it provides a strong backbone of

local administrative continuity. In the colonial

period, the bureaucracy,

untrammeled in the

exercise of power, penetrated and

Congolese society. Though the

golese elite was shaped in the subaltern ranks

of the administration, it was excluded from

all top echelons of the civil service until 19.59.

In the context of terror in July 1960, all but

a handful of European functionaries departed.

Thus, Africa's most radical decolonization.was

compounded

by the revolutionary. Africani-

zation of the civil service. The result was

administrative chaos. The Lumumba govern-

never really functioned. However, the

clerks promoted to fill the shoes

of departed Belgians gradually came to terms

responsibilities as adminis-

trators both in the central government and in

the provinces.

The Congolese civil service today is much

better than

generally

believed--not

that its

performance

is outstanding

in

any absolute

sense,

but it probably is not sharply below

the

norm

elsewhere

in

Africa.

The

civil

servants

as a group

are far

superior to the

members-.of

political

parties

and

repre-

sentative assemblies,

though

this

is

faint

praise. Many have reasonable norms of recti-

tude

and discipline.

The performance of the

territorial administrators, the middle echelon

of the provincial hierarchy, is superior to that

at the provincial and central government levels.

Nearly everywhere the

territorial adminis-

trators are

career. civil servants

who

have

been the backbone. of the Congo's internal ad-

ministration since independence. In sharp con-

trast to the breakdown of government at the

upper: levels during the dark days of 1960-61,

the basic administrative units below the terri-

torial

administrative level; the

circons-

criptions indigenes, also have largely remained

intact.

Their stability has been

a significant

buffer against widespread chaos in the country-

side.

An explanation of the lack of revolutionary

social credo accompanying the revolutionary

power

transfer may lie in the bureaucratic

origins of

most of the Congolese elite. The

administrator

Although the

conscription indègene and territorial levels.

functions fairly well, the superior courts were

stripped of trained legal personnel by the Bel-

exodus: The UN provided some judges,

but far fewer than needed to assure minimal

effectiveness. Some relief will be provided as

Congolese law students complete their studies.

A better formula is needed for absorbing

emergent university graduates into the system.

Rapidly increasing in number, they are dis-

affected by their inability to obtain civil serv-

ice positions commensurate with their com-

6. The absence of national political parties

and the new polarization of power between

Leopoldville and the provinces will pose seri-

ous problems in elections under consideration

for 1964. Political power. in the Congo today

provinces. Parliament and the central govern-

ment, like Spanish moss, have their roots in

the air, not in the hinterland. Power at the

from access to influence,

position, and money. The weakening of links

Leopoldville and the provinces since

1960 means that, until elections are held; the

exercise of power at the center remains un-

related to the provinces.

Leopoldville's alienation has left the provin-

cial leaders relatively free to consolidate local

authority, creating separate power structures

collectively capable of challenging Leopoldville

leaders in an election.

of power has serious

implications for the moderates around Prime

Minister Adoula who seek to establish a na-

tional party. They must deal with provincial

leaders who stand astride the lines of political

communication with the electorate. Although

government may apply certain

pressures on the provinces to obtain support

for a party under Adoula, the provinces re-

tain most of the trump cards. Under these cir-

cumstances, an emerging national party would

at the summit be, in effect, a loose coalition

of Leopoldville and provincial leaders.

It is likely that a moderate national party

of this sort would emerge with a narrow ma-

in Parliament. However, an

electoral campaign would run the risk ofcrea-

ting a serious security problem in many areas

at a time when tranquility is returning to much

of the country. Further, a moderate party

of national scope might labor under the onus

of identification with the American Embassy.

Conceivably,

a radical opposition movement

might be built around an anti-American theme,

offering opportunities for Soviet involvement.

These risks

would be much diminished if

elections were to be postponed until 1965,

allowing time for provincial and central

government institutions to shake down further,

the hard political bargaining neces-

sary to launch á moderate national party. If the

tide of opinion

continues to favor elections in

1964, even a mediocre moderate national party

would at least enhance the electoral prospects

of moderate candidates.

•7. The Congolese National Army (ANC) has

developed into a reasonably effective arm of

central government authority in many areas of

the country. Though the ANC committed bloody

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atrocities in the first two years of independ-

ence, the growing authority of ANC Commander

Mobutu has increased control by the central

government over the ANC. Recent incidents in-

volving the ANC do not constitute evidence of

generalized

indiscipline. Rather, the ANC,

except in

ex-Kasai

and southern Katanga, has

proved to be a positive element in the political

system. It has developed a nucleus of officers

of real ability. It has retained the principle of

ethnic scrambline,

which

operates

to

im-

munize it against local political influences and

to give it a commitment to the nation as a whole.

In many areas it is capable of acting as an ade-

quate constabulary. The ANC retraining pro-

gram

now being

launched under

Western

auspices may consolidate recent advances to-

ward providing the central government with a

reliable constabulary capable of maintaining

lomestic order and preserving the supremacy

of central power.

8. The Congo will continue to need substan-

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tial external technical and economic assist-

ance.

The United States, the UN, and other

donors, including Belgium, have contributed

massive technical and economic support to the

Congo

since

independence.

The shortage of

Congolese technical personnel and capital re-

sources will persist for the foreseeable future.

For a number of reasons

the

UN seeks to

reduce its role. The United States to date has

paid the lion's share, but wants to cut back

its

contribution.

Belgium,

the most

likely

candidate to increase aid to its former colony,

is

reluctant to shoulder more. Though an in-

formal UN-US-Belgian consortium of assist-

ance

appears the most desirable formula for

sharing

responsibility, the

Belgians to date

have been

reluctant to discuss forthrightly

us the extent of further aid they might

outlook

iii

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THE CONGO: A STUDY

IN POLITICAL DYNAMICS

(Political Dynamics Study No. 3)

by

M. Crawford Young

Harvard University

and

Edward J. Streator, Jr.

Office of Research and Analysis for Africo

Bureau of Intelligence and Research

September 1963

External Research Staff

Bureau of Intelligence and Research

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

I. THE NATURE OF CONGOLESE POLITICAL SOCIETY

The Colonial Legacy ..

Traditional Authority

Education ....

Economic Opportunities

Urbanization

... .

The Influence

of. Independence

II. ETHNICITY

The Modern Brand of Tribalism

Urban Influences

' . . . .

Ethnic "Nationalism"

Examples of the Successful Assertion of Ethnic Solidarity

Belgian "Tribalism"'

Ethnicity as a Political Expedient

111. THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORD: THE LOI FONDAMENTALE AND

LIKELY SUCCESSORS

The Loi Fondamentale •

Principal Defects in the Loi Fondamentale

The UN Draft Constitution

Proposed Organization of the Central Government.

Proposed Central-Provincial Division of Powers

Proposed Concurrent Powers

Recent Collective Provincial Initiatives to Amend

the Draft Constitution.

Conclusions..

VI. FRAGMENTATION AND SECCESSIONISM: THE 21 NEW PROVINCES

Secessionism

Fragmentation...............

Legal Basis of the New Provinces.

Characteristics of the New Provinces

Provincial Administration.

Possibilities for Further

Fragmentation

A Mixed Blessing?

V. THE BUREAUCRACY

African Exclusion from the Colonial Civil Service

The Statut Unique.....•

The Effects of Independence

Inflation of the Civil Service

Pay Scale..

Disaffection of the University Graduates..

The Organization and Effectiveness of the Civil Service

The Circonscriptions Indigenes

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Belgian Personnel

The Judiciary..

Conclusions..

VI. POLITICS AND PARTIES: THE POSSIBILITIES AND

RISKS OF ELECTIONS IN 1964

The

Fragile Roots of Nationalism

The Messianic Sects....

Associational Experience.:

Parties Prior to Independence

Parties Since Independence..

The Alienation of the Politicians from the People

The Failure of Lumumbism..

Political Power Clusters in Leopoldville..

Provincial Political Consolidation..•

The. Role of Labor Unions, Students, and Youth.

Political Communication.

Incentives to. Elections.

Provincial Electoral Experience since 1960.

Prospects for a Moderate National Party..

Recent Efforts to Create a Moderate National Party.

The Bargaining Power of the Provinces...

Possible Coercive Instruments of the Central

Government Leaders...

The Electoral Law.

Conclusions.

VII.THE POLITICS OF FORCE:

(AIC), POLICT, AND SURIOSE MATIOVE AN

The ANC and Its Antecedent.

The Shock of Independence..

Mobutu's Emergence......

Reunification of the ANC.

ANC Gendarmerie Function.

The Security Problem....

The ANC as a Force Promoting Stability

ANC Retraining.......•

The ANC Officer Corps..

The Surete.

The Police

VIII. EXTERNAL FACTORS..

The United Nations..

Belgium...

The United States.

The Soviet. Bloc

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ÍNTRODUCTION

After three turbulent years, Congolese independence is slowly ceasing

to be a world crisis. With the end of the Katanga secession in January

1963, the Congo was removed as a major cold war issue. The eventual

departure of UN military forces will terminate international responsi-

bility for the maintenance of order. Authority over the entire Congo is

now exercised by a government of unquestionable legality.

There is no African state where the US commitment is greater, both

in prestige and money, than in the Congo. The re-establishment of the

unity of the young republic, albeit fragile, was accomplished only through

a successful diplomatic effort of great magnitude.

Unity and legality are necessary, but not sufficient, requisites for the

future political viability of the Congo. This study examines the emerging

political system in the Congo, with a view toward clarifying possible

alternatives in the pursuit of political stability. This would permit the

harnessing of the Congo's substantial

ecönomic resources to the ends

of development and, in the process, vindicate the massive US engagement

in the 1960 rescue operation.

The essential elements in the post-independence political equilibrium

have now emerged with sufficient clarity to bear analysis. We ex-

amine the sociological coordinates, institutional framework, bureau-

cracy, political parties, and coercive instruments. We have found it diffi-

cult to

strike a balance between generalization useful to policy-making

and a reasonable accurate rendering of the complexities of the situation.

If

we

have

erred

on

the

side of simplification, we have done so de-

liberately in the interest of readability.

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I. THE NATURE OF CONGOLESE POLITICAL SOCIETY

The Colonial Legacy

Congolese political society is the result of

three-quarters of a century of acculturative

the Belgian colonizer

the plethora

of traditional

Basin. Belgium

constructed in Africa

a colonial state distinguished by the thorough-

ness of its organization, articulated in an in-

terlocking alliance of state, church, and capital.

The colony's ambitious economic and social

programs were pursued through an admin-

istrative organization heavily bureaucratic in

norms and oriented toward increased economic

productivity.

state resolutely

assisted the companies through extensive land

concessions and aid in labor recruitment, and

the religious missions through administrative

support. In

the words of former Governor-

General Pierre Ryckmans, the aims of colonial

rule were not to govern but to transform: "It

and east-central Kasai (Bakuba tribe). (See

Map D in the appendix).

2) Non-centralized. segmentary systems:

These cover the vast equatorial forest zone of

the central Congo Basin, where

traditional

systems never functioned beyond the village

level, and social differentiation was frequently

relatively slight.

The traditional element in leadership is of

little importance in urban centers whose popu-

lations are recruited from areas of segmentary

or decadent systems. In the urban centers of

provincial areas where centralized systems

persist, as in Katanga, it remains of con-

siderable relevance.

providing new techniques; it

education of an entire people, modifying pro.

foundly its mentality-giving it a new soul."!

Congolese elite

very largely an

"administrative

bourgeoisie."

society, access to high status for the African

was almost exclusively through subaltern posi-

vast public and private bureau-

cracies.

Of the 27

of Lumumba's

1960 government, 25

were clerks before in-

dependence. Commercially

unlike their

Grethren in West Africa. It was virtually im-

possible for a Congolese to acquire land title

in the colonial period. This placed the elite

in a situation of peculiar dependence upon the

The civil service post continues to

represent the individual's precarious niche

modern world, and the stakes in re-

taining it are high.

Traditional Authority

Traditional authority systems have not pro-

modern political leadership, although in cer-

tain areas hereditary chiefs remain important.

traditional systems are roughly of two

1) Centralized systems: Well-structured

traditional societies persist in Kwango (Bayaka

tribe),

Uélé (Azande tribe), Kivu lake region

tribe), a good part of Katanga (Baluba

Shankadi, Lunda, and some

smaller groups),

1. Etapes et jalons, 1946, pp. 137-138.

Education

At least a feigned interest in the priesthood

was for a long period the only path to post-

primary education. Consequently the Roman

Catholic Church in the Congo has developed

about 500 African priests and 10 Congolese

bishops, the most numerous indigenous

in

Vele P

African

country. The President of

Province, Pierre Mambaya, is a former

priest; the Vice-President of Sankuru,

Abbé

Athanase Djadi, has played an active political

role since

1960 with

the permission of the

hierarchy.

Many others, including President

Joseph Kasavubu, received secondary educa-

tions in the seminaries.

Except

for

religious training,

secondary

and higher

education

became available .only

after World War II. The first non-theological

university student,

Thomas Kanza,

was en-

rolled in 1952.

The Catholic

University

of

Lovanium opened its doors in 1954, the State

University of Elisabethville in 1956; and the

Ford Foundation sponsored the Ecole Nationale

de Droit et d'Administration (ENDA) beginning

1961. Belgian policy produced a broadly

sased but truncated educational pyramid.

Cnormous numbers have had some rudimentary

primary instruction, and very few advanced

training. By 1959 there were approximately

1,500,000 students in primary schools, and only

30,000 in secondary, technical, and higher in-

stitutions. Those with post-secondary training

in 1960 included 30 university graduates, 500

priests, 130 medical assistants, 250 agricul-

tural technicians, 30 administrative special-

20 social workers, and 15 veterinary

assistants.

A significant portion of the modern elite was

employed in the educational system. There

were in 1960 about 44,000 primary

teachers. Although many of these had no more

than a primary education, they, enjoyed con-

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living standard of the mass of the population.

By contrast, the "politicians" became con-

spicuously affluent, thereby producing a sharp

sense

of alienation by the mass from the

political elite.

Paradoxically, a popular

nostalgia

for colonialism developed--not, of

course, for a return to the myriad vexations

of European rule, but for the order and rela-

tive economic prosperity of "le temps des

belges." Thus, the norms and values of both

ruler and ruled in the Congo vary import-

antly from most post-colonial African politi-

•cal systems. The absence of an articulated

nationalist ideology

to

supplant the

values

, of the colonial system resulted in a retreat

to the bureaucratic norms which characterized

the Belgian administration, and in a lack of

political structure.

3

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II. ETHNICITY

No analysis of the emerging political sys-

tem in the Congo can escape the elusive problem

of "tribalism," or ethnicity, which lies squarely

athwart every dimension of political behavior.

A transcendent issue for the Congolese

since the "steel grid of colonialism" was re-

moved, ethnicity threatens the nation's con-

tinued existence. Symptomatic of

ordial importance are the

litical movements, with ethnic names: Abako-

Alliance des Bakongo; Unimo-Union des Mon-

go; Unerga-Union des Warega. No reader of

any Congolese newspaper can

fail to be 'im-

pressed by the extent to which political dis-

course has adopted an ethnic lexicon, contrary

to most experience elsewhere in Africa.

National integration tops the agenda

all tropical African

states. Almost all contain the germs of conflict

porated within their artificial boundaries. How-

ever, all other new African states so far have

contained the problem within tolerable limits.

In many cases, independence was

under the tutelage of a single party. In others,

as Nigeria and Uganda, ingenious con-

were devised to en-

sure a balance between major ethnic compo-

state. In most, a liberal dose of

authoritarianism

Kenya comes close to the Congo in the extent

to which ethnic conflicts have dominated the

political process. The Congo, however, lacks

all three solutions: viable political organiza-

tions, a workable constitution, or a government

enough to impose authoritarian meas-

The Modern Brand of Tribalism

It is initially tempting

to approach the

ethnic problem by establishing an analytical

equated respectively with

progress. The very term 'tribalism" is tainted

by an implication of retrogression. But ethni-

city in the Congo is not

a phenomenon of

the primeval forest. The bloody conflict be-

Lulua and Baluba at Luluabourg was in

no sense a throwback to the misty, pre-colon-

ing. Colonial rule not only

nat rule sonia perty, the potion

imposed a

new

state, but also profoundly affected African

society. Modernization wrought changes in

individuals and ethnic groups. The increas-

ing

ferment of colonial acculturation

ac-

celerated the pace of change, and further

altered but did not eliminate the contours of

ethnic reference units.2.

because the Copperbelt towns of

Rhodesia have

much in common with most

Congo urban centers, especially the nearby

southern Katanga cities, hypotheses related to

useful. Tribalism, in

scholars in

this field, has

and social needs,

in a working political system and

domestic life with kinfolk. In the

towns, a new

form of ethnicity develops. It

does not involve a group bound in a patterned

structure, but

rather a solidarity

defined in

ethnic terms. The towndwellers

display their

ethnic origin in the language

use and in their way of life. This en-

ables others "immediately to fit their neigh-

bors and acquaintances into categories which

determine the mode of behavior towards them."

According to Mitchell,

"for Africans in the

Copperbelt,

'tribe' is the primary category of

social interaction, i.e., the first significant

characteristic to

which any African reacts in

[person]. Frequently:

beyond this, and tribes ap-

to one another to be undifferentiated

Despite the emergence in the urban

vironment of new, non-ethnic prestige

status strata, Mitchell argues,

"there is a

constant flow of newcomers

from the various rural districts from which

the Copperbelt draws its labor supplies. They

are not immediately absorbed into the pres-

system which could possibly supply an

alternative principle of social interaction. In-

stead their own ethnic distinctiveness which

for granted in the rural areas is

into relief by

plicity of tribes with whom they are cast into

association. Its

importance to them is

exaggerated, and it becomes the basis on which

they interact with all strangers. '3.

There are other bases for group solidarity

in the urban environment. The African máy

2. Among a number of American scholarly contributions on this sub-

ject,

the most notable are Immanuel Wallerstein,

"Ethnicity and

National Integration,"' Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines, October,

1860;

and A. R. Zolberg,

"Effets de la structure d'un parti politique sur

l'integration nationale," ibid. October, 1960. The most systematic

study has been conducted by scholars of the Rodes-Livingstone

Institute

in Northern Rhodesia, especially J. Clyde Mitchell,

A. L. Esptein, and Max Gluckman (See especially Mitchell's

The Kalela Dance, 1956; Epstein's Politics in an Urban African

Community, 1958; and Gluckman's "Tribalism in Modern British

Central Africa," Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines, January, 1960.

3. The Kalela Dance, ibid, pp. 28-32.

4

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see himself as an African vis-a-vis the Eu-

ropean

ruler

or

employer. He may react

a worker confronted with the company in

certain situations. Nascent social stratification

within the African

community is yet another

basis

for social identification. In the Congo,

termination of the colonial regime re-

largest single progenitor of unity

among the African population.

Urban Influences

As elsewhere in Africa, the focal points of

the modern political

process

in the Congo

are the urban

centers,

where two ethnic

phenomena have been

observed: 1) "super-

tribalism," a reductive process fusing vaguely

related groups into

a single solidarity

net-

work; and 2)

virulent ethnic "nationalism,"

spawned by the

tensions of urban competi-

tion and subsequently transmitted to the coun-

"Super-tribalism" has been widely remarked

throughout Africa. In Nigerian coastal towns,

all immigrants

from the Northern Region are

"Hausa," whether or not the label is

accurate. In

the Copperbelt, those from the

"Benba"; those from the

west, "'Lozi." In Brazzaville, all from up river

"M'bochi"; in

Leopoldville,

"Bangala."

In Katanga, all from

the north tend to be classed as "Baluba." The

reductive process is completed when the in-

dividual himself accepts, at least in terms of

his relations with other groups, the new label

which others have assigned to him. The im-

migrant from Equateur eventually becomes,

for purposes

his Leopoldville existence,

a "Bangala." With other "'Bangala" he shares

vehicular language, Lingala, and a

of resentment at the

nation of the rival Bakongo tribe.

the "super-tribe" is

an artificial entity like the Leopoldville ''Ban-

Bala" There is no "Bangala" tribe anywhere

the. Congo.

Yet several decades

solidation of the legend in Leopoldville have

entrenched it to the point where Jean Bolikango

"grande ethnie bangala"

a basis for a political movement (the Puna

A more typical case is that of the "Baluba"

of the Katanga cities. The Luba empires of

traditional lore never gave political unity to

the

peoples. now subsumed under the Baluba

heading.

Three

of the world's four major

descent systems are to be found among the

Baluba, and the whole gamut of traditional

political

structures-from

the

segmentary,

stateless systems of the Lualaba Valley Baluba,

through the petty state systems of the Baluba

Hemba (northeast Katanga), to the centralized

chieftaincies

of the Baluba Shankadi (north-

west Katanga). The unifying thread lay not in

coherence of traditional culture, but in com-

mon urban experiences, mainly in

southern

Katanga.

Luba was many things in its rural

cradles; it could become one

only when con-

fronted

with more

alien groups

in the new

towns.

Ethnic "Nationalism"

Related to the new ethnic solidarity systems

emerged in the urban environment was

the birth in

the cities of an aggressive ethnic

nationalism,

especially among

large groups

with a sense of their own history, such as

he Bakongo. The Bakongo were endowed with

a potent historic myth which embellished on

the ancient Bakongo kingdom at San Salvador (in

Angola). However, the kingdom

memory, and the Bakongo were rent by dis-

sensions. Reassertion of Bakongo unity was

initiated by intellectuals in Leopoldville in

reaction to grievances suffered in the capital.

Lingala was

gaining ground and had become

language

schools, to the

detriment of Kikongo, the Bakongo language.

The two Belgian-appointed heads of the Afri-

can quarters of Leopoldville since World War

Il had both been "Bangala," seemingly con-

of colonial ill-will toward the

Bakongo. From these grievances sprang the

Abako party, which gradually

transmitting from the city to the country its

militant appeal in defense of Bakongo pre-

The Mongo tribe is a particularly significant

example of highly developed ethnic conscious-

This vast group,

including nearly

2,000,000 people and covering a large part of

the central basin, was split among five of the

six former provinces. A remarkable sense of

cultural identity had been preserved over this

huge area. All were conscious of having

from the. common ancestor

and spoke similar languages. However, the

modern articulation of their latent sense of

"Mongohood" resulted from the

frustrations of Mongo migrants to the cities.

The leaders of the Leopoldville Mongo in-

cluded Antoine-Roger Bolamba (MNC/L par-

ty, now Information Minister), Paul Bolya

(Unimo party, former Minister of Civil Serv-

ice), and Joseph Ileo (now central government

Commissioner

in Elisabethville).

wrote in a 1956 article indignantly rejecting

the "Bangala" label by which the Mongo were

popularly known in Leopoldville: "If we defend

our name, 'it is not by egoism or mistrust,

but because it suits us .... For the Mongo

or Nkundo group occupies a vast stretch in

the central basin of the Congo..... We are

astonished to bear a name which is not ours

and has so significance told that this neigh

our ancestors, we are

our master, nearly all

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inferior to the Mongo. Therefore we

are discontented when people try to degrade

The Mongo movement then extended to

Coquilhatville,

a Mongo-dominated city be-

on Mongo ancestral

lands. During the urban elections of 1958 and

1959, Mongo disunity resulted in the election

of Coquilhatville

The essence of Mongo cultural

"nationalism"

is ably summed up by Father

missionary who was

attached to the Mongo. He wrote,

"Objectively speaking, the Mongo present all

the characteristics of a people.... It seems

to me evident that, in an ethnic community

an administrative entity

or state, national consciousness is natural,

but remains latent as long as it is not obliged

to externalize itself before

ternal dangers." Thus,

the seeds of renewed

ethnic self-consciousness were

on fertile terrain in the ethnic homelands.

Another fundamental aspect of

awakening

is the catalyzation of

hostility toward other urban

groups. A re-

current theme

an assertion

of hegemony

one group and

a violent reaction to this

of another.

superiority may arise from the geographical

what are considered

to be tribal lands, 4 a numerical majority of

urban population, for a clear advance in

economic status. 6 The

last factor has proven the most combustible.

Examples of the Successful Assertion

o1 Ethnic Solidarity

For the Congo as a whole, the three tribal

groups most successful in

collectively ad-

vancing their ambitions have been the Bakongo,

the Baluba, and the complex of riverain peo-

ples (Bobangi, Lokele, and others) who have

been labelled "Bangala" in Leopoldville. These

three groups, although they represent no more

20 per cent of the population, almost

definitely have furnished a majority of uni-

students. Since World

War II the

advantages of

entry into the modern sector

have become abundantly clear to virtually all

groups, and those which found them-

selves outstripped by others became intensely

frustrated. Groups with

an established elite

provided the schoolmasters and company per-

directors. Tribes with less influence

or less favored could find daily corrobora-

4. Bakongo in Leopoldville, Mongo In Coquilhatville, Bashi in Baka-

• vu, Basanga in Jadotville, Lulua in Luluabourg.

5. Bakongo in Leopoldville, Buluba in Luluabourg or the southern

Katanga towns.

6. Baluba in Luluabourg and southern Katanga.

tion of their inferiority in many petty ways:

expulsion of a child from school,

the promotion of a clerk.

the sequence of po-

developments in the Congo served to

enhance the importance of the ethnic element

in political behavior. Until 1959, political or-

ganization was not tolerated. A channel of

communication between the mass and the elite

operated only within the framework of the

tribal associations in the cities. The Congo

tribal association had little competition. Trade

unions were very weak, and all other types

organizations

surveillance and controls of the paternal ad-

ministration. Thus

the political

without political parties, was first introduced

large cities at the fulcrum of ethnic

The first elections in the Congo were held

in Leopoldville, Elisabethville, and Jadotville

1957, followed by others in Luluabourg,

Stanleyville,

Bukavu, and Coquilhatville

1958. In most cases the electoral campaigns

and/or the

exercise of municipal offices by

the victors served to heighten ethnic tensions.

A curious paradox placed in the vanguard

of militant nationalism an ethnic movement,

the Abako organization of the Bakongo tribe.

The first overt nationalist act occurred in

1954, when the Abako publicly nominated

Mukongo for the post of Chief of Leopoldville's

African quarter, based on an alleged authority

to speak for. "80 per cent of the Leopoldville

population."8 In 1956 the Abako issued the first

demand for immediate independence,

1959 was the first tolaunch a civil disobedience

appeal. Thus the Congolese nationalist move-

ment bore ethnic birthmarks because of the

exclusive tribal character of the Abako. Other

groups could not join Abako and were forced

to found other, opposing groups.

Belgian "Tribalism"

There is some relevance also in the fact that

Belgium

differs

other former major

colonial powers in

•being

culturally plural

itself. Colonial contact between Belgium

the

Congo

was

between

two

"countries,"

"'neither of which was a nation."9 Britain,

France, and Portugal possess a highly inte-

grated nationalism based upon centuries of his-

tory and common experience. Belgium as a

separate country was born in 1830, only half a

century before the Congo Free State. The Bel-

7. See also Chapter VI, "Politics and Parties."

8. A considerable exaggeration; the Bakongo element in the Leo-

poldville population, although by far the largest single component,

could hardly have exceeded 50 per cent.

9. J. Gerard-Libois and B. Verhaegen, Congo 1960.

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national image

is schizophrenic; tension

between Walloon and Fleming is highly visible

and was recognized in the Congo when an in-

to emerge that was

equipped to remark that Europeans were not

simply an undifferentiated

and distant ruling

class. Indeed, the movement for Flemish cul-

tural autonomy, which Congolese studied under

largely Flemish missionary teachers in the

secondary schools, could not fail to win the

sympathy of the Congolese students.

"Progress" through the Belgian prism stands

in sharp contrast to the unitarian message of

French Revolution-"la republique,

et indivisible"-which had been transmitted as

the meaning of history to the ex-French Afri-

The Abako, in one

for a federal system, invoked the Belgian ex-

"It suffices to observe the perpetual mis-

trust and misunderstandings between Flemings

and Walloons to convince oneself of the danger

there is to unite men of different grigins. We

don't want to meddle in the internal affairs of

our Belgian friends, but we can't help saying

that if the union between Flemings and Wal-

loons were conceived

almost interminable quarrels which have often

broken forth

have been avoided."

Ethnicity as a Political Expedient

The dangers of the ethnic appeal were less

well appreciated in the Congo than in other

countries, where nationalist political goals and

were more carefully elaborated. The

abrupt collapse of Belgian resistance and the

tumultuous

contest for

fragmented Congolese nationalist move-

ment were an inevitable incitement to follow

the shortest path to success, the ethnic appeal.

The atmosphere of crisis and insecurity

in which the 1960 elections

took place added

impetus to ethnic self-awareness. Times of

emergency and violence tend to shift frames of

reference to ethnic and raciallines. There was

in 1960 a crescendo of uncertainty in many

areas. A number of groups, both African and

European, began arming.

The future

for

all

posterity

seemed to be resolving

itself in a

cataclysmic contest; elections were to settle

whether Mongo or Ngombe ruled in Coquilhat-

ville, whether Baluba or Lulua dominated Kasai.

The ethnic pattern had thus been established,

and thereafter politics fitted the mold. Ethni-

city and politics fed upon each other and have

been mutually reinforcing in the first years of

independence. By early 1961, the debate on

the

formation of new provinces was in full

swing.

Although by no means all of the 21

provinces are ethnically homogeneous, ethnic

arguments, true or false, played a primordial

it was rhetorical. Now that the new provinces

role in provincial fragmentation. In most cases,

the demand for

fragmentation arose from the

political leadership rather than from the mass;

however, once the ethnic question was asked,

exist, the festering problems of the marginal,

disputed territories keep the ethnic issue alive.

In 1960 only four political movements of any

significance were not primarily ethnic: Par-

_Solidaire Africain (PSA), Mouvement Na-

tional Congolais/Lumumba (MNC/L), Centre

de Regroupement Africain (Cerea),

Parti National du Progres (PNP). The PNP

has disappeared,

ethnic tensions. In the

PSA, a split in Kwilu provincial leadership,

between Kamitatu and Gizenga, was per-

ceived at the base in ethnic terms. Gizenga's

support was derived from his own Bapende

tribe and from the Bambunda followers of his

lieutenants, Pierre Mulele and Gabriel Yumbu.

The Bambala,

Bangongo,

and most of the

smaller groups rallied to Kamitatu.

In the MNC/L party, even in 1960, the vot-

ing support in the areas of Maniema, Sankuru,

based on the ethnic soli-

darity of the Ankutshu-Anamongo group, of

which Lumumba's Batetela tribe was a part.

And in Stanleyville, where MNC/L support

in the first instance had been genuinely pan-

sectarian policies

Bernard Salumu, resulted in a sharp

split between Salumu's Lokele tribe, the larg-

est single group in the Stanleyville popula-

tion, and the rest. Another

breakaway of the

areas of Uele

Stanleyville, and the formation in

1962 in Stanleyville of a "Cartel des Cultiva-

teurs," whose purpose, we were told by one of

its founders, was to "anéantir l'orgeuil des Lo-

significance of party name

in the fact that the Lokele were a riverain

fishing people, whereas the rest of the Stan-

leyville population comes from farming com-

munities. In the case of Cerea, a party in

Kivu, the political evolution

resulted in a

polarization

which was

scribed, not entirely accurately, as a tribal

Bashi (Kivu Central)

the Bakusu (Maniema); MNC/L became

referred to there as MNC/Bakusu.

Thus the tensions born of competitive mod-

the urban centers created a new

form of ethnic identification in the Congo.

The insecurities and divisions of urban ex-

perience were catalyzed and deepened by the

nature of the political process

Ethnicity as a

central factor in Congolese

political behavior is far more profound than

a simple anachronism or retreat to

traditionalism; rather it is a dynamic element,

begotten by the forces of modernization. Just

how it will evolve in the coming years is

difficult to forecast. The one safe prediction

is that it will not simply disappear.

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1II. THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAME-WORK:

THE LOI FONDAMENTALE AND LIKELY SUCCESSORS

The Loi Fondamentale

of all parliamentary delegations, ex-

cept those of the Abako party and both wings

A scissors-and paste digest of the Belgian

constitution, the Loi Fondamentale ranks

the worst organic laws in existence. It was a

by product of the extraordinary haste of power

transfer in

Congo. The Brussels Round

Table Conference of January-February 1960,

which decided upon independence for June 30,

an intellectual tabula rasa on the

of government the Congọ

needed. The

Round Table provided some general mandates,

and turned over the task

Fondamentale to a group of young Congolese

and Belgians. After a cursory examination of

of the PSA party, renders the body incoherent

and essentially negative. The disappearance of

roots in the interior after

1960 made

Parliament irrelevant as

legitimation

of government decisions. The

potent single

Parliament has been the special privileges

of the body (e.g., salary

and parliamentary

immunity). Such a corporate guild provides

few innovating impulses.

the Council of Minis-

ters, there seems no way a secure majority can

assured for

Swiss, Nigerian, and Belgian the most suitable.

They prepared a document in six weeks which

maverick features as co-opted senators. 10With

apparently little serious thought by

Belgians or Congolese

problems of stable government for a complex

and underdeveloped polity such as the Congo,

they endowed the country with a bi-cameral

legislature, a parliamentary regime,

double executive comprising a chief of state

and a prime minister.

It would be naive to

suggest that an inade-

quate constitutional framework is at the heart

of the Congo's difficulties. But given the prob-

lems this political community must overcome

in governing itself, the added burden of a woe-

fully inadequate legal framework is a heavy

one.

The Belgian tradition is highly legalistic.

"Legality" remains a hallowed political value in

the Congo, no matter how frequently honored

in the breach. An attachment to legality is

surely an ideal to be fostered, yet it is diffi-

cult to sustain when careful observance leads

down blind alleys.

Principal Defects in the

Loi Fondamentale

The

present constitutional structure

has

several major defects:

1. Parliamentary power. A parliamentary

regime would make

sense in the Congo were

there meaningful political groups represented

in the legislature. But the utter disorgani-

level of parliamentary

corum and efficiency has risen substantially

1960, as shown by even a cursory ex-

amination of the debates. Yet placing the locus /

of power in Parliament, rather than in the

executive branch under a presidential regime,

really means

government often is

either paralyzed, or it acts in defiance of the

letter of the constitution. Either is excessively

high tribute to pay to literal application of

classical liberal democratic theory to the

Congo.

2. Dual executive authority. The very office

of chief of

state is an anomaly. It derived

from the Belgian hope, later shown hollow, of

reserving

Baudouin

particular associations

chief of state-prime minister confusion come

to

an early head September

President Kasavubu dismissed Prime Minister

Lumumba. This action was based on Article 22

of the Loi Fondamentale ("The President names

and

dismisses

Kasavubu's act, although defensible politically,

created a nearly insoluble constitutional im-

passe that lasted almost a year. Since the in-

vestiture of the Adoula government, Kasavubu

has been content with a quasi-monarchical role

of largely ceremonial dimensions. A more ac-

tive president, however, could find himself in

constant conflict with the prime minister. The

duality of authority has grave latent dangers.

3. Legislative review. No clear way is sug-

gested for obtaining a definitive interpretation

of the law. Article 51 provides that 'authori-

tative interpretation of laws belongs only

Parliament," but adds, "for the interpretation

of the Loi Fondamentale, the Parliament can

solicit the Belgian Parliament's interpre-

10. A provision under which the Senate itself elects a number of ad-

ditional members of the body.

8

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tation." This article arises from the Belgian

constitutional

that only the legislator

can know his intent in the formulation of a law,

therefore he alone can resolve a disputed

interpretation. However, the Congolese Parlia-

ment has taken

advantage of the ambiguity in

Article 51 to

assert its right to give authori-

tative interpretation to the Loi Fondamentale

and has used this clause to justify free-wheel-

ing

parliamentary

actions.

Though

the Loi

Fondamentale provided for the establishment of

a Constitutional Court, this requires a special

law, which has yet to be voted. Were the Con-

stitutional Court in existence, its powers likely

would be limited to judging whether new laws

conform to the Loi Fondamentale, arbitrating

central-provincial conflicts,

charges of administrative torts. Nowhere is it

suggested that the Court would be empowered

to interpret the Loi Fondamentale as

such.

4. "States of exception." Among other conse-

quences

of

ambiguity

has been

a highly

ir-

regular procedure under

which a chamber of

Parliament adopts

resolution

establishing

a "state of exception" in a province, in effect

seeking central government assistance to over-

throw the existing

provincial

government.

Should the executive branch fail to implement

the resolution, the weapon of interpellation and

censure

could be invoked against the

sponsible minister. Although the !state of ex-

ception" procedure has at times been justified,

in

other instances

it

and damaging.

5. Censure votes. Another example of am-

biguity may

be found in the Gizenga case. Al-

though Parliament stripped Gizenga of his im-

munities by an overwhelming vote in January

1962 and he was later imprisoned, there have

been several votes since December 1962 calling

for

his release.

in June 1963,

Parliament voted

to restore his immunity.

Justice Minister Justin Bomboko brilliantly de-

fended the government's argument that this was

a case sub judice, which only

awaited parliamentary creation of a tribunal

competent to try him. But nothing could have

stopped one chamber

from enforcing its own

interpretation by simply removing the minister

in a censure vote.

6. Amendments. Another crucial defect is a

loophole in the amendment process. Though a

complicated procedure was specified for fram-

ing a new constitution, provision was made for

amendment of the Loi Fondamentale itself by a

two-thirds vote of both houses.

There are

therefore no entrenched provisions beyond the

reach of amendment. A number of changes have

already been voted,

including a complete al-

of the ratification process for a new

constitution. The requirement that elections be

held in 1964 similarly could be removed by

parliamentary vote.

The UN Draft Constitution

The Loi Fondamentale was intended to be

only a provisional instrument. The Belgians and

Congolese believed in 1960 that only the Con-

golese could define their basic law, and that

its content should not be a subject of bargaining

assembled a group of experts in

early 1961 to initiate preparatory work on a

draft constitution. At the same time, the Con-

golese. College.

of Commissioners charged

Marcel Lihau, the first Congolese law graduate,

with initial drafting efforts on behalf of

government. In early 1962, another UN foU

of three constitutional experts, led by

Elias of Nigeria, was at work on the final form

of a draft constitution. Another Congo govern-

ment commission, again under Lihau,

January 1962 to draft a document embodying

the accords reached at Kitona between Adoula

and Tshombe. In the course of the "dance of

the cranes"

which constituted the Adoula-

Tshombe negotiations, there were extensive

suggestions from both

sides-as well as from

and other interested

observers-es-

on the provincial-central government

relationship. Finally,

presidents of the provincial assemblies met

in Coquilhatville and prepared an extensive

series of proposed amendments to the

Shortly thereafter a parliamentary com-

mission began to discuss the UN draft, pro-

methodically article by article. By

June 1963 they had completed consideratior

of about 40 of the 212 articles.. The com-

mission work is continuing

during the

parliamentary vacation of 1963, and Parlia-

ment is scheduled to reconvene as

assembly in September

Parliamentary sources maintain that a draft

will be complete by early 1964. It is likely

to conform largely to the UN draft.

Proposed Organization of the

Central Government

Much concern has been expressed over the

central

government-provincial

relationships

outlined in the UN draft constitution, but very

little over the structure of the centralgovern-

ment itself. Generally, the application of cer-.

tain European procedural concepts

of demo-

cracy to the

organization of the central gov-

ernment seems

excessive and insufficiently

adapted to Congolese needs. Specifically, the

parliamentary system provided in the UN draft

appears to disperse the authority of the central

government too greatly for effective direction

of the country.

It is ironic that much of the pressure for re-

taining the parliamentary system in the Congo

via the UN from other African states

9

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which, in the name: of progress, have

sup-

pressed opposition parties in their own coun-

tries. By the very nature of the. UN's own code

of public

values, it had to endorse the parlia-

mentary formula. The other major partner in

preparation of the definitive constitution, the

Congolese Parliament, also has an innate predi-

lection

for perpetuation of

the parliamentary

The Congölese elite

feels insecure and un-

certain of its own values and the legitimacy of

its rule. It therefore clings to the external

trappings of legitimacy deriving from a func-

tioning parliamentary regime. Present also are

the paradoxical phenomena of widespread anti-

indefectible

popular attachment to the principle of parlia-

mentarianism. These render almost inevitable

the perpetuation of the existing institutional

framework at the central level.

Proposed Central-Provincial

Division of Powers

The most publicized facet of the Congo's

quest lies in central-provincial

relationships. "Federalism" was a polarizing

political slogan in the

purely polemic debate

between the "'federalists" (especially the Abako

and Conakat parties) and the: "centralists"

(incarnated by the MNC/L party) during

final phases

of decolonization.

controversy, however, raged over such sym-

bolic issues

granted mining rights,

rather than the real problems of dividing the

distribution of the security

forces,

nature of the hierarchical

relationships between

provinces and the

"federalism" in

classical sense had two crucial limitations as

a relevant organizing theory for Congolese

1) Federalism implies that the building

blocks of the

federation are

herent and constitute units which can reason-

ably share power with the center. As subse-

quent experience has shown, the six former

were all subject to uncontrollable

fragmentary forces.

2) Federalism

also implies that the fed-

erating units seek to join together in order to

share benefits flowing from a larger political

community. There is probably no other con-

temporary example of a working federation

from the dismantling of as tightly

centralized a colonial regime as the Belgian

The events of the immediate post-independ-

ence crisis, however, were to transform the

situation. The whole machinery of centralized

government broke down, a result of the Katanga

and South Kasai secessions and the Leopold-

ville-Stanleyville split, and of the loss of ef-

fective capacity to implement central govern-

ment decisions.

The old provinces dissolved

series of new entities which, despite

their administrative

manageable

cost, are mainly more

and coherent entities, Moreover,

they have been created through a willing act of

community by elected representatives. Thus

of organization became not only

relevant but virtually inescapable.

The Loi Fondamentale itself

significant decentralization. The provinces for

the first time became organic entities, with

their own elected governments. The break-

down in the centralized budgeting and fiscal

system of the Congo also forced an innovation

of great importance. For the first time, in

March 1962, provinces were required to main-

tain separate accounts, rather than debit the

government: for their expenditures.

The provinces also were given lump-sum sub-

covering. ex-

penditures in the areas of their own .com-

The UN draft moves somewhat further in a

federal direction.

The most important con-

cessions to the provinces are:

1) Suppression of the office of Commissaire

This Loi Fondamentale provision was

in fact never applied in its original form, which

called for a representative of the central gov-

ernment in each provincial capital to represent

central authority and coordinate central serv-

ices. However, the central

government has

named "special" or "extraordinary" commis-

sioners to deal with real or fabricated crises

in the provinces. With some exceptions, the

remedy has been worse than the disease. The

commissioners have become involved in local

created additional tensions. The

argument for provincial coordinators of central

services is not convincing. The central "serv-

the provinces are the Congolese Na-

tional Army (ANC), Sûreté, judiciary, Conseil

Monétaire, postal

services, and communica-

The first four in any case would lie

beyond the control of a commissioner posted

the provincial capital, and the latter two

can be coordinated by other means.

of révenues. Certain explicit

provisions are

made for sharing the fiscal

domain. In particular, the provinces obtain

half the export duties, and the proceeds of

individual (but not corporate) income taxes.

Since this is far from an adequate tax base

the provinces, the presumption has been

that there would continue to be a supplemen-

tary, direct federal subsidy.

3). Decentralization of judiciary. Under the

proposed constitution,. control of all but the

highest level of the judiciary would be vested

in the provinces. At present, with the excep-

tion of local courts delivering

judgments

based on customary law, justice is a central

government function. This alteration is par-

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ticularly significant in view of the large num-

ber

of. corrupt provincial political

figures

whose bulging dossiers

ate in the hands

of

the central government magistrature. Pre-

sumably, the political decisions whether to

prosecute will devolve. on the provinces, re-

moving

a: potentially important central gov-

ernment lever.

4) Consultation with

provinces. The UN

draft provides for regular consultative con-

ferences of provincial presidents. This would

supply

an institutionalized mechanism for the

provinces to

vent their

collective grievances

against the central government.

Proposed Concurrent Powers

The UN draft maintains generally the broad

allocation of functions established by the Loi

Fondamentale. However, the listing of powers

more precise,

federal authority re-

mains paramount in the exercise of concur-

rent powers. Table A, appended to this

compares the enumerations of powers

Loi Fondamentale and the UN draft.

Defense and Internal Security

A key power accorded the central govern-

the UN draft is the assignment to

the Congolese National Army (ANC) of re-

sponsibility

for external defense but

the gendarmerie

function. This

the Force Publique was

in a series of large military

but also in garrisons throughout the country,

with a small detachment in each territory.

The deployment of the ANC is a vital brake

on

provincial autonomy, which would be un-

restrained

were

constabulary

function

entirely assigned to police

forces controlled

by the provinces.

Central government authority would befurther

strengthened through the proposed creation

of a federal police force. Its primary mis-

sion would be to maintain order in the Fed-

eral

District of Leopoldville, but it could

operate in a province on the orders of the

central

government or at the request

of

local authorities.

Recent Collective Provincial Initiatives

to Amend the Draft Constitution

important new dimension to the central-

provincial debate has been added by the com-

mon front of provincial

governments that

emerged after the end of the Katanga seces-

sion. The resolutions of the 1963 Coquilhat-

Conference

of Provincial Assembly

Presidents indicate a general, rising hostil-

ity to central

authority. Detailed amend-

ments were proposed by the conference for

of the 212 articles of the UN draft con-

stitution. If adopted, they would bolster pro-

vincial

autonomy.. The

most important de-

mands were. for:

1) Provincial authority to fix jointly with

the central government the levels of export

duties.

2) Retention by the provinces of 75 rather

than 50 per cent of export duties.

Elimination of the right of intervention

by federal police in provincial crises.

4) Control over the local personnel of the

postal, telecommunications, radio, and tele-

vision services.

fixing of income tax levels

for individuals and corporations.

6) Elimination of federal primacy in matters

•of concurrent jurisdiction.

7) Assignment to the provinces of all tax

except import duties and 25

cent of export duties.

Establishment of a statutory joint fed-

ministers to allocate available foreign

requirement that two-thirds of the

provincial assemblies as well

of Parliament ratify any constitutional amend-

Parliament has taken the position that the

Coquilhatville

proposals are not the product

of any legally

constituted body and hence are

consideration. Parlia-

ment also has amended the Loi Fondamentale

eliminate the requirement of ratification

new constitution by provincial as-

semblies. Consequently, as noted above, it

is likely that the constitution will hew closely

to the UN model. This could well provoke

a serious crisis in central-provincial

lations and will place the new

constitution

under heavy and probably concerted attack by

provincial authorities.

Table B, contained in

vides

summary

comparison

of

central-

provincial power

distribution

under the Loi

Eondamentale

and as proposed by the UN

and Katanga

draft constitutions and by

• the

Conference of Presidents of Provincial As-

semblies. The partition of the fiscal domain

proposed in the UN draft is summarized in

Table C, also in the appendix.

Conclusions

In sum, there can be no doubt that the pro-

spective constitution will be a considerable

advance over the Loi Fondamentale with two

important reservations.

The UN draft con-

stitution entrenches a parliamentary system

and hence weak, government at the center. It

is also unlikely to provide a federal solution

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acceptable

to the provinces,

especially in

view

of the unilateral, adoption

procedures

involved. The

latter

objection

is

somewhat

mitigated by

the

technical incapacity

of the

central government to

exercise a number of

its

enumerated

powers.

But, by the same

token,

it is too weak to impose a form of

government without the cooperation of pro-

vincial authorities. There is certainly wis-

based on federal experience elsewhere,

in making provision for the gradual expansion

of power exercised at the center as the capacity

for its responsible exercise in the interests

of the community as a whole increases. But

the survival of a federation will be hazardous

without the consent of the federated.

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IV. FRAGMENTATION AND SECESSIONISM: THE 21 NEW PROVINCES

The

redrawing of the Congo's internal

civil service positions. In addition, the Chief

boundaries,

and the criteria upon which

of State, Joseph Kasavubu, is of their tribe,

was based,

have transformed the character

have established a solid claim to

of the Congolese polity. For this reason we

the central government Finance, and Interior

examine briefly the twin phenomena of frag-

portfolios. Their ability to obtain satisfactory

mentation and

secessionism; and

the nature

under the existing national political

of the 21 new provinces.

structure is therefore substantial.

Secessionism

in Katanga

was first a Euro-

Secessionism

pean movement and hence was somewhat tainted

eyes. However, in

Secessionism is a spectre haunting many

African presidential palaces.

It derives from

the artificial character of nearly all African

boundaries, and the co-existence within them

of disparate cultural groups. There are two

frequent causes for secessionist movements:

1) among large ethnic groups,

such

as the

or Ewe (of Ghana-Togo),

sense of cultural

metamorphosis, the non- Baluba Africans fused

this European incentive with their own revolt

against Baluba hegemony

Katanga urban centers. The Conakat party, a

coalition of southern Katanga tribes, provided

the vehicle for the movement. Though Katanga's

1960 experiment in self-determination was

terminated

by . international

intervention,

temptations will almost certainly arise again,

less compromised by transparent

group between two or three states; 2) uneven

endowment in natural resources

development may

a region in getting the rest of the

country off its back, particularly if it is so

geopolitically that the rest of the

country does not have the compensating ad-

vantage of political domination.

Secessionism

most likely in areas

than the European-

backed secession of 1960.

Katanga is simply too far from Leopoldville

to obtain subjective satisfaction from partici-

pation

the central organs of government.

Moreover, the Congo government at the moment

is

too weak and inexperienced to render to

outlying

areas

functional

services in pro-

portion to the resources it reserves for its

This is not to argue that there

would be unthinkable,

example, in

or Lomami Province

(see Map D in appendix), whereas it looms

as a political alternative in the Bas-Congo,

fringe areas. For this

South Kasai, in the Congo heartland,

only briefly referred to its recalcitrant at-

titude as "secession"; thereafter it was termed

"autonomy."

Latent secessionist sentiments in the Congo

appear endemic in two primary

regions, the

own necessarily be a future secession, or

that the central government cannot and should

not act to prevent it. But Leopoldville-Elisa-

bethville relationships will continue for the

foreseeable future. to be unsatisfactory, and

secessionist spirit will remain near

surface in Katanga:

periphery of the Congo there

are other, less pronounced secessionist pos-

sibilities.

Three are discernible as possible

future trouble spots:

1) Ubangi Province. The Sudanic population

the two most. important

economic areas

of the country, the problem assumes agonizing

of this province has more in common cul-

turally with the peoples of the Central African

Republic (CAR) than with the Congo. A Ubangi

In the Bas-Congo the motivating factor is

the remarkable solidarity of

the Bakongo

tribe vis-a-vis. other tribes. Bakongo cherish

the hope of reuniting the fragments from Congo

(Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), and Angola

in a single political kingdom. Secession would

become

a much more immediate threat were

there

a serious possibility of achieving Bakongo

reunification,

at the moment is not

politically feasible. The key geographical loca-

tion of

capital, also mitigates the secessionist threat.

The Bakongo

well represented in the

Leopoldville population and hold many top

delegation is said to have visited Bangui in

mid-1961 to open negotiations for annexation

to its northern

CAR authorities were not at that time inter-

ested and apparently gave no encouragement.

2) Kibali-Ituri Province. Several of

major Nilotic ethnic groups of this province,

such as the Lugbare and Alur, straddle the

Uganda frontier. Traditional economic circuits

were entirely transformed during the period

of the Stanleyville-Leopoldville rupture, and

this region is now very closely linked with

Uganda by (mostly illicit) trading relation-

ships. Union with Uganda is not likely to be

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serious

issue

while the present Kibali-

Ituri provincial leader, John Foster Manzikala,

stays in power.

3) The Lunda and Ishokwe tribal zone's of

southwest. Katanga. There are large Lunda and

Tshokwe populations in both Angola and Rho-

desia.

The Lunda are most numerous

in

Rhodesia, and the Ishokwe

in Angola. In this

area latent

secessionism is complicated by

the

traditional hostility between these

two

ethnic

is food for thought in

the name of the Ishokwe party in the Congo,

Association des Tshokwe du Congo, de l'Angola,

et de la Rhodesie (ATCAR). In 1960 ATCAR

was actively seeking the incorporation of the

Buckle®

into

Congo. ll-Negotiations were reported between

the Conakat territorial administrator in Dilolo

and his Portuguese counterpart in July- August

1960, with a view to repatriation of 50,000

Tshokwe. to Angola. The potential for trouble,

though now diffuse, could become concrete,

depending

on political developments in the

three countries involved.

Fragmentation

The phenomenon of fragmentation is much

more recent than the impulse to secessionism,

although it derives

common

roots.

Fragmentation,

a lesser variant of secession,

has

entailed withdrawal to establish

a semi-

autonomous entity, while not renouncing par-

ticipation in the

state. No movement for

new.

province goes

back further than 1959

in the Congo, and these initiatives were really

only given a decisive fillip by the tensions of

the 1960 electoral campaign and the immediate

pre-independence period.

Two factors made inescapable the formation

of new provinces:

1) The emergence of three de

facto new

provinces in the immediate wake of independ-

ence: Kongo Central, South Kasai, and North

Katanga. The first was a result of the strong

desire of the Bakongo for their own political

entity;

the second

ensued from the calvary

of the Kasai Baluba and the forced regrouping

of some

250,000

refugees

in the

confines

of the Baluba

ethnic homeland; and

the third

riposte to the unilateral

Conakat act of secession.

2) The general breakdown of authority, which

gave autonomist movements

the opportunity

to establish

their claims at a time when

central authority

was powerless to resist

and incapable of exercising leadership.

With

Pandora's box opened by the three

initial de facto

new provinces, further frag-

mentation occurred. For example, in former

11. This small piece of land was traded by the Belgians to the Portu-

guese in 1926 in return for land near Matadi to permit railroad

construction.

Leopoldville Province,

once the Bas-Congo

withdrawal

was a certainty, both Lac Leopold

II and Kwango demanded separation from Kwilu.

When Cuvette Centrale pulled out of Equateur

the Ngbwaka-Ngbangi

refused to remain linked with

Ngombe of Moyen Congo. By eaily 1961 the

candidate provinces had been fairly well de-

Their claims to legitimacy

consolidated by the principle,

adopted at the

Tananarive and Coquilhatville Conferences in

March and April-May 1961, of admitting.

facto or de jure" leaders to

sit at the con-

ference table. Sixteen of the present 21 prov-

inces were represented at the Coquilhatville

Conference. By the time legitimate, constitu-

tional government was restored in Leopoldville

in August 1961, there was no turning back the

With the exception 'of the first three

provinces,

the fragmentation movement

not reflect any popular groundswell. The

paternity of the provinces

lay usually with

"out" groups whose aspirations were frustrated

within the framework of the old provinces.

from: a

given

region had little

difficulty in invoking ethnic-regionalist argu-

ments

to rally popular support to form

a

new province.

Legal Basis of the New Provinces

Parliament

writhed in eight months of

elephantine labors to give birth to a judicial

monstrosity, the law of April 27, 1962, which

established

criteria for the new provinces.

The Lumumbist bloc, then

a relatively

coherent group, fought hard against the law.

of defining criteria and pro-

cedures was complex. The ethnic

generally advanced as the guide to partition,

but it was immediately subject to debate. The

Bakongo group

was clearly identifiable, and

its will to constitute itself into a separate

political entity was manifest. However, where

the Mongo community,

and ends is a subject of endless dispute among

anthropologists; with

significant

between the Mongophiles and Mongophobes.

Further, in

many areas, such as Kwilu and

Kasai, precólonial migration patterns produced

a population mosaic of infinite intricacy, which

the techniques of gerrymander could not

unscramble.

Three prerequisites for provincial status

were finally adopted:

1) A population minimum of 700,000;

2) Economic "viability";

3) A petition submitted by two-thirds of the

provincial and national deputies. from the

putative provincial area.

There

however, an escape. clause

which rendered the minimum population cri-

terion meaningless; a population of less than

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700,000 was

acceptable "si les imperatifs

politiques et sociales l'exigent." Any group

could concoct "imperative reasons" for ignor-

ing the population minimum. Economic viability

was indefinable and hence

inapplicable. Thus

the

only real criterion

was a petition from

two-thirds of the deputies from the region.

Characteristics of the New Provinces :

Table D in the appendix to this report

provides summary profiles of the character-

of the new provinces. Map D, also in

• the appendix, shows

the provinces and ethnic

groups.

Although ethnic factors were important in

the establishment of

the new

provinces,

• it

is not really adequate to describe them

as

"tribal provinces," as Table D clearly shows.

Only seven can be considered really ethnically

homogeneous, and four

more have one group

which

tends to predominate. Again, the ambi-

güity of the concept of ethnic homogeneity

must be stressed. For example, though one

might argue that North Katanga was a Baluba

province

since most of the peoples inhabiting

the zone belong

at least peripherally to the

Luba culture cluster,

a subjective sense of

"Lubahood" is

shared

by only a portion

of

them. The province, therefore, cannot engender

loyalty

by

explicitly

stressing

a Baluba

character.

Some provinces classifiable as ethnically

homogeneous have experienced

some of the

most serious tribal disorders in recent months.

For example, Kwango is essentially a Bayaka

tribal province, but

grave disturbances have

dissidence of a Bayaka

more costly

has been the strife in Sankuru, where, viewed

externally, only Batetela are visible. However,

there are two kinds of Batetela: those who

experienced acculturative contacts

Zanzibar Arab

traders at the end of the

nineteenth century,

and those who did not.

The former, enlisted as marauding warrior

bands by the Arabs, were shrewd enough to

and joined

the Belgians in

war against the Arabs. As a reward,

were given land and posted in strong

points throughout the Sankuru region, where

subjugated their brethren. Provincial

Diamasumbu reopened the issue

recently by an appeal to the "downtrodden"

to rise against their "arabisé" oppressors,

led

by Abbe

Athanase

Ndjadi. The result

was tribal war, involving a large number of

deaths and the destruction of a sizeable part

of the capital city of Lodja:

seven of the new provinces seek to

invoke ethnic loyalty as a fundamental ethos!?

At the other extreme are Haut Congo, Kivu

Central, and Katanga Oriental, which became

provinces after being deserted by neighboring

areas and will have a difficult time developing

a sense of common purpose.

Another hypothesis occasionally advanced

to explain the new provinces is that they

are one-party provinces. It

15 of the 21 there is a single dominant party.

major qualification to this is that in four

of the new provinces (Haut Congo, Uélé, Kibali-

Ituri, and Sankuru) MNC/L is the single party.

one could argue that, rather

parties shaping the provinces, the provinces

consecrated the disintegration of a once

potent and supra-ethnic party. In Uélé, for

example, MNC/L is virtually excluded from

the government.

In four of the other "one-party provinces,"

the parties were poorly organized and had only

a fleeting existence (Kwango, Moyen Congo,

Unité Kasaienne,

and Lomami). In

expression of a strong sense

of ethnic identity (Kongo Central, Sud-Kasai,

Lomami). Ethnic and political

party criteria

overlap,

however, and it is difficult even

analytical terms to disentangle them.

Pre-existing administrative divisions helped

to shape the new provinces. In only one case

(Lomami) has a new province been established

which straddles the old provincial boundaries.

Although

provincial

major

revision in 1933, they had remained

stable since that time,

territories had been constantly in flux.13Intra-

provincial migration

provincial capital served as the primary pole

of attraction for the young, the educated, and

the ambitious. The former district boundaries

in 17

cases

establishing

the new provinces, although in

most cases with some adjustments. It may

be suggested that the former administrative

serve as starting points for the frag-

mentation process. If there were strong ethnic

or political reasons to redraw the lines, this

was done. Otherwise, inertia favored retention

of the familiar frame of reference.

instances

colonial

provincial boundaries coincided with ethnic

frontiers, in many others they did not. To

only the more important, the Mongo

people were divided among five provinces

12. Kongo Central, Bakongo tribe; Kwango, Bayaka tribe; Cuvett

"Bangala" -Ngombe tribe

13. The administrative hierarchy is structured as follows (in descend-

ing sende, i province, district, territory, sector (circonstiption

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(äll but Katanga). The closely related Batetela

and Bakusu were split between Kivu and Kasai.

The Bapende were divided between Kasai

Leopoldville.

The Basongye were split between

Kasai, Kivu,

and Katanga; only

they have

suceeded in regrouping

(Lomami).

a new province

Traditional structures are to some degree

In Kwango,

Kiamfu, a local tribal leader, is clearly

dominant political force. His 40 sons provide

settle the dispute by

awarding the territories to Kivu Central. How-

ever, this procedure has caused more prob-

lems than it solved.

The disputed territories are administered

directly by the

government.

administrative positions, and the weakness of

modern development in the region leaves him

little competition. In Uélé, 4

with President Mambaya,

belong to the Azande ruling clan, the Avungara.

The provincial government relies heavily on

authority of the Azande

One of them; the Minister of Agriculture,

has no fewer than

16 relatives in the Uéle

Assembly. In Kasai Central, 3 of 1l ministers

are members of the family of the scheming

and ambitious self-appointed Lulua paramount

chief, Sylvestre Mangole Kalamba. Provincial

President François Lwakabwanga was form-

erly Kalamba's

secretary.

Kivu Central; the key obstacle to the formation

government was the complex set of

hostilities deriving from the traditional hos-

tility between the two ruling

houses of the

Bashi (the Kabare and Ngweshi clans); com-

pounded by

a dispute

over the selection of

the Kabare Mwami (King).

perpetuation of this interregnum. On the

hand, since these are; by and large, marginal

with diverse populations, the

are likely

bitterly fought. Especially

when the issue is attachment to an ethnic

small groups that

they would be accorded subordinate status

are unfortunately justified. It may well be

that the best solution for some of the more

hopelessly divided transitional zones would be

indefinite prolongation of the present central

administration:

Some way

might be found to

formalize the arrangement, so that the wounds

of civil strife may heal.

some instances, provinces have simply

dispatched their police

disputed areas. This has happened in Bolobo,

now occupied by Maindombe police after a sharp

engagement with Moyen Congo forces,

in the Kasongo area,

the hands of

Lomami, to the great indignation of Maniema.

dimensions

of the problem can be seen

by the length of the list of disputed areas:

Provincial Administration

The new provinces have

begun operation

I with varied

The official installation

of the new institutions started

1962. Four (Uéle, Kongo Central, Kwilu, and

Cuvette Centrale) can be considered function-

ing very well. Ubangi, Kibali-Ituri, Nord-

Katanga, Sud-Kasai, and Lomami have rea-

governments.

unstable are Sud Congo (Lualaba), Lac Leo-

pold II, Kivu Central, Kasai.

Central; Haut

Katanga Oriental,

Maniema, Unité Kasaienne,

and Kwango

function very poorly.

Possibilities for Further Fragmentation

Zones Legally Subject to Referendum

Former Province

Regions contested

Leopoldville

Kinvula sector

(Popokabaka

territory)

Equateur

Orientale

Kivu

Banzyville

Hatsa

Faradje

Goma

Autahuru

Shabunda

Provinces clalming territory

Kongo Central-Kwango

Two critical problems remain for the new

provinces; the festering issue

of territories

disputed between two

or more provinces is

entirely unsolved, and several of the present

units

show signs

of further fragmentation

(see map). The problem of the territories was

to be settled by referendum. However, no

referendum has been organized to date, and

none is scheduled in the near future. In one

instance, Goma

and Ruthshuru territories

(disputed by Kivu Central and Nord-Kiva),

Ubang1-iuyen Congo

Uele--K1bal1-Itur1

Uéle--K1bal1-Itur1

Kivu Central--Nord-Kivu

Kivu Central --Nord-Kiva:

Kivu Central-Mainema

Kivu Central-Mainema--Nord

Katanga

Basongye regions

Lomani--Nord-Katanga

of Kongolo,

Kabalo,

Kabongo

(Kasal District

Dibaya

Central.

Mwene-Ditu

Kasal Central--Sud-Kasa1--

LuBanbo town

Nord-Katanga

Lomami -- Sankuru

Tshishilu sector

(Dibaya territory)

Kasad Central-Unité Kasalenne

Other areas subject to dispute:

Leopoldville

Leopoldrille subur-

Kongo Central-Leopoldville

ban Zone

Federal District

parts of Kutu,

Benningville ter-

Kuszu-Lec Leopold II

ritories Bolobo

Equateur

parts of Bongandanga,

Basankusu terri-

lar tie old Tee cono

Katanga

tories

Baudoinville

Nord-Katanga--Katange

Oriental

ubudi, Mitwab

Nord-Katanga --Ketange

erritorie

Oriental

Kasad

Dimbelenge

Lomam1-Kesed Central

parts of Mueka

territories

Unité Kasalenne-Kasal Central

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The following provinces appear far from

stable in

their present form

and may well

break up, or perhaps regroup with another

province:

1) Maindombe: Nearly half the provincial

councilors,

led by Jacques Massa, are

in

"exile" in Leopoldville. The split is primarily

regional,

with the

opposition

dominating

Mushie,

Kutu, and Inongo,

while provincial

President Victor Koumorico's bloc is strongest

in

the east and south, in Kiri and Oshwe

territories.

) Moyen Congo: The Budja-inhabited ter

itory of Bumba is thoroughly hostile to th

capital of Lisala. Bumba has demanded a new

possibility might

be a Budja union with Haut-Congo.

3) Uelé: The Babua

tribe in Aketi and Buta

territories are unrepresented in the provincial

government. A secession plot might be mounted

by such Babua leaders as Christophe Gbenye

or Egide Bocheley-Davidson, who are certain

to be frozen out if new elections are organized

under the aegis of the present Uélé government.

4) Kibali-Ituri: There is some disposition

to rally to Uélé. The incumbent president,

Manzikala, is strongly opposed to this, and

it is unlikely to happen as long as he retains

5) Nord-Kivu: This province is lacking any

it obtains Goma. There is some hope in Bukavu

that Nord-Kivu will eventually agree to re-

unification.

6) Kivu Central: The Warega areas in the

are still by no means committed to

this province.

7) Mainema: The present government is

highly uneasy coalition of the two dominant

ethnic groups, Bakusu and Warega. Presi-

is a Murega, and Vice Presi-

dent Bulakimuri a Mukusu. A break-up

Sankuru, and the Warega portions uniting with

Warega of Kivu Central to form a new

province, is a distinct possibility.

8) Nord-Katanga: In early 1963, immedi-

after the end of the Katanga secession,

there was some sentiment for a reunification

of the old Katanga province. Balubakatleaders

Leopoldville,

especially Jason

tended to support this. However, important

elements in Nord-Katanga vigorously oppose

the move, and the splitting of South Katanga

into two provinces would seem to complicate

future reunification efforts.

Unité Kasaienne: This province includes

a diverse collection of ethnic groups

only by their common hostility to both Baluba

and Lulua. The government is weak and cor-

rupt, but does not appear to face

mediate challenges.

10) Kwango: Although there is ethnic homo-

geneity and a strong.

traditional system, this

region is the poorest of the Congo. It is

observers feel that the province may collapse

eventually because of its poverty.

The pious hope is occasionally expressed

that the new provinces experiment is already

such a catastrophe that a move-

ment toward reconstitution of the old entities

will shortly emerge. It is also suggested that

this might be encouraged by grouping certain

services in the old provincial cap-

itals. This hope appears, on reflection, for-

absolutely

sentiment in

any of the provinces for

reunification,

the exceptions noted above. Such wishful think-

ing especially is encountered in the old prov-

incial capitals, which have seen their horizons

Nostalgia for the good

old days of the Austro-Hungarian Empire was

found in Vienna, not Budapest. The old prov-

incial services have already been dismantled

extent physically possible. In such

fields as communications, where

dependence

on the old capitals continues, a major objective

provinces

to terminate

existing arrangements at the earliest possible

A Mixed Blessing?

The cost of creating

new provinces has

been considerable. The procedures and records

the colonial administration

rendered largely worthless.

ministers and their parasitic entourages

friends and relatives in the "ministerial cab-

up at the pay window each

month. There is obviously no increased out-

to justify this outrageous charge upon

it appears that there are important

to welcome the change, which now

transpired,

ceased

with

Ngombe in Equateur. Kivu was at an impasse.

Katanga and Kasai had split apart with hos-

thousands of lives and the

relocation of several hundred thousand per-

sons. Therefore, the alternative of retaining

the old provinces was not really open.

We would endorse the conclusions of

Lovanium University delegation of economists

and political scientists which toured most of

provinces early in 1963. They cite

as common advantages of the new provinces:

1) a provincial assembly more representa-

tive of public opinion;

2) frequently, a government of technicians

which is better aware of the situation in

the province;

3) a regional pride to defend;

4) a more limited area;

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5) imperfect, yet better, ethnic cohesion.

stressing that in many areas

the new institutions function quite well indeed,

with virtually no European technical assist-

ance. Very real benefits

political and administrative skills are accruing

in

these regions. A great contribution could

be made to the Congo in providing technical

assistance to those

provinces which have

clearly passed the "takeoff" point.

18

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V. THE BUREAUCRACY

The colonial state is

the prototype of a

bureaucratic system. And Belgian adminis-

tration was perhaps

the most thoroughly bu-

reaucratic of all colonial systems.

almost untrammeled

of power by any consultative or

bodies, either

colony or in the metropole. In short, there

were no politics other than administration.

With system and purpose, the colonial bu-

reaucracy penetrated and organized Congolese

created an elite in its own image,

whose access to the modern world was through

administration.

In a profound way, it established the values,

the Congo's leadership.

In any political system, the technical capac-

ity to transmit and execute a decision is a

determinant of the efficacy of government.

For these reasons, we examine the nature of

the Congolese civil service.

African Exclusion from the

Colonial Civil Service

The Belgian colonial service differed from

and French counterparts

absolute exclusion of Congolese from all the

top echelons,

until the adoption January 13,

statut unique.

then there

were two official barriers to Congolese:

1) Entry into the civil service was limited

Luxemburg).

Congolese were held by

splitters to be "subjects," but not "citizens."

a university degree

prerequisite. Since the first Congolese

Thomas Kanza, who

graduated from Louvain in 1956 (and still was

not admitted to the civilservice), the exclusion

was complete. A specialauxiliary civilservice

was organized to staff the clerical ranks;

this was entirely African.

Friction with the Africans first developed

at the bottom grade of the European service,

which included non-university personnel. Be-

ginning in 1953 a certain number of Congolese

would

have qualified for this rank, but the

administration held that a complete

of the

civil service

continued to deny access to Africans. Entry

on equal terms

to the civil service

crucial importance to the Congolese

Through 1958 it was probably their greatest

single

grievance.

until after the

Significantly,

Leopoldville

that the statut unique made its appearance.

The Statut Unique

The provisions of the statut unique

the root cause of the present outrageous

salary

scales for the civil service.

familiar colonial conundrum was posed: to

attract able European talent, relatively high

pay scales were necessary. But African opinion

vehemently

differential

between European and African performing the

same

was made

write in

an "expatriation bonus" for European

civil

but this foundered on

problem of the few Europeans recruited in

the Congo itself, who considered themselves

permanent

residents of the Congo and thus

would not have qualified for the bonus. At this

time, Belgian policy postulated a Eurafrican

future for the Congo. It was assumed that for

a long period-even

after independence-Bel-

gians

would play

an important role both in

administrative and

all echelons.

Accordingly, even this limited

number of Europeans were an important.com-

cern for the colonial policy-maker.

The final solution, embodied in the statut

unique, involved simply pasting together the

two civil

service structures.

There

were

seven ranks.

The top three were to remain

virtually exclusively

European

for the

im-

mediate future; the fourth

category would be

the point of fusion between the two systems;

and the bottom three were the African grades.

The high European pay

scales

were

be

applied

to the

few Africans

who entered at

the

top.

The

traditional

scale

would

continue to apply at the bottom, as illustrated

by the following table:

COMPOSITION OF CIVIL SERVICE

AND PAY SCALE, 1960

Rank European African Pay scale (annual)

(Belgian Congo

francs

1

•2

3

4

5

6

7

106

1,004

3.559

0

)ver 440,00

1

800

11,000

325,000-440,000

225,000-325,000

20,000 - 225,00

3,250-90,00

45,000-73,250

Less than 45,000

The Effects of Independence

The months immediately before independ-

ence saw gane persions

service.

19

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decolonization formula

agreed upon at the

Brussels

Round Table. This,

vided

for a completely Africanized political

direction for the country, while the adminis-

tration was to remain almost entirely European

at the top

levels. A "revolt of the clerks"

was

brewing,

and

had the

ANC not

first

mutinied, a

been likely within the administration.

Insecurity

grew apace

the European

side.

There were demonstrations and strike

threats, which Belgium tried to allay in March

1960 by a law guaranteeing

integration into

the metropolitan

service for any agent unable

to continue his career in Africa. In the panic

days of July

Belgian Ambassador

announced a blanket extension of these pro-

visions to all Belgian civil servants

those in Katanga.

This, in the context of

terror,

ensured the massive departure of

nearly all the European functionaries. Africa's

most radical decolonization plan

compounded by revolutionary Africanization

of the civil service.

Initially the result was administrative chaos.

In the territories the general tendency was

for the senior clerk to fill the shoes of the

departing Belgian; provided he was not ethni-

cally or politically incompatible. But in the

central and provincial ministries the dis-

organization was massive. The Lumumba gov-

ernment

never really functioned. There

a large-scale influx of persons into the civil

service

on the basis of ethnic and political

criteria.

It

is

difficult

not to underestimate the

enormous pressures

placed upon the newly

installed ministers. Each of them

fronted with a virtual army of political and

ethnic clients camped on his doorstep, who

expected, a concrete reward for their support.

The minister was unprotected by any estab-

lished, operative administrative regulations

to

escape these claims.

party

existed at that time to provide a dis-

cipline permitting rational solutions. Violence

and intimidation were in the air, and it took

minister to avoid

substantial

in those cases where he

understood that these were wrong. It was not

of the College of Com-

missioners in September 1960 that administra-

tive disorder began to come under control.

In legal terms,

the new promotions

initially on the basis of "encommissionment"

rather than formal "nomination." This was to

an employee permanent

above the civil service grade he previously

held, pending a complete overhaul of the regu-

lations. The spectacular promotions therefore

did not immediately yield financial benefits.

It was not until the enactment of Ordinance 33

of April 21, 1961, that concessions were made

to confirm the material advantages expected

by the civil

servants. Under international

pressures

even

this

was

not immediately

applied. Moreover, the central government was

sparing in the

number of permanent nomi-

nations made to the top two grades.

Inflation of the Civil Service Pay Scale.

A new civil service law was finally promul-

gated in July 1963. The distorted salary scale

has been definitively corrected by

the bottom with the top.

received emoluments higher than those paid

to Belgian functionaries before independence,

injustices within the public pay scale

were reduced by giving enormous boosts.

In mid-1962 there were

approximately

functionaries

statut'' (not including Katanga). In addition

there were: 2,000 "political personnel" (par-

ministerial cabinets), approx-

imately 45,000 teachers, about 35,000 soldiers,

10,000 police, and the mass of

ployed by the government in various menial

capacities (100,000-300,000).

All government salaries in the last analysis

have been scaled upon the excessively high

civil service salaries. The result is a situation

where public receipts cover perhaps one-third

salaries account

nearly 90 per cent of all government expendi-

tures. Unfortunately this

exorbitant privilege

who have significant power

system--politicans,

functionaries, teachers, soldiers, and police-

men. An austerity program in

a matter of imposing sacrifice upon

a whole; the ruling group

must penalize itself.

Disaffection of the University Graduates

Another major area of difficulty in

the

structure of the civil service is the failure

to provide adequate opportunities for absorbing

the new generation

shortly to emerge in relatively large numbers.

category and the upper

rank is open only to those who had received

an efficiency rating of "very

successive years prior to 1960. This was un-

mistakably

directed against the university

graduates, who were thus disqualified entirely.

An older group, which had no higher edu-

cational facilities

1n

and which

experience,

albeit in subaltern

posts, and the wisdom of age, conflicts with

younger generation

emerging from

universities of Europe and Africa. This tension

is found in most new African states, and the

Congo's problem differs only in degree. The

of history and Belgian policy have

made the contrast between generations par-

20

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Only Minister of Justice

Justin Bomboko and Foreign Minister Auguste

Mabita-Kalanda, among the present top leader-

ship, hold university degrees.

The flavor of the mutualantagonisms between

the clerks and students is captured in the two

statements briefly quoted below; the former

from an Abako journal, and the latter from a

universitaires

congolaises

(written by Mabita-Kalanda) published in 1961:

Even in the Abako, we have no know-

edge of a single university student

has accepted to serve even as secretary

for the movement. They belittle our work

and consider us as primitive.... We have

done everything ourselves, and therefore,

forgotten.... We have

independence

bit of French, we will govern the country

with this same

little bit of French...

We have learned by experience,

the university students are incapable

and we will make good

use of our experience.

said that the Congo

lacks trained persons. Yet we see none-

theless that the Congolese university

are kept away from political

responsibilities. If one or the other has

some responsibility, it was

tribe, in function of a short-sighted policy:

It has often been said: university grad-

are theoreticians,

experience. One thing, however, is clear,

that is that in the matter of experi-

ence, at least

concerning the problem of

the modern world, no Congolese has very

much in the political, administrative, or

experience

majority of the present leaders is limited

don't know any Congolese

who has had a long experience in the art

of commanding, of conceiving or of super-

vising a task of great scope.

university graduates obviously tend to

overrate their own immediate value

society. James Coleman has perceptively ob-

the "uncritical equating of education

with special rights and legitimacy" by

African elite, which views Western education

grace.-giving process.

"Politics," he

"have been permeated with the

incontestable assumption

educated have a divine right to rule." 14

graduates makes

The relatively modest post

14. Gabriel Almond and James S. Coleman, Politics of the Develop-

ing Areas, 1960, pp. 282-283.

of assistant bureau chief is not satisfactory

to the graduate; only a handful bave in fact

entered

the civil

service.

It is

ironic

that

nearly all members of the Congo's oversized

ambassadorial corps

are university grad-

uates, hardly.a

rational employment of an

extremely scarce resource. 15 There is a sharp

sense of grievance on the part of the growing

group of

university

graduates,

which can

become dangerous for the existing order.

The Organization and Effectiveness of the

Civil Service

The civil service may be examined at two

and provincial ministries,

and 2) the territorial service.

The central and provincial ministries. To

begin with positive aspects, the Congolese civil

service is much better than generally believed.

Not that its performance

is outstanding in

absolute sense. Most readers, however,

are likely to presume chaotic incompetence.

For this reason, it is important to emphasize

that the general level of administrative ability

in the Congo is not sharply below the African

norm. This is faint but necessary praise.

Moreover, the caliber of members of the

central administration in the Congo stands

out in relation to other elements in

governmental process. They are far superior

to members

of political parties or repre-

Although the top civil

functions far beyond

which they were trained, they gen-

erally have behind them long years of service

in the Belgian administration.

reasonable norms of bureaucratic rectitude and

discipline, and know what constitute reasonable

criteria of satisfactory performance, if they

do not always have

the capacity to achieve

bureaucracy

transitional society invaluable experience in

exercise of responsibility in

where rational (in a Western sense) standards

of behavior exist. It is precisely these norms

of conduct which are lacking in the Congo's

There are, of course, many

of the civil

service. The most significant

are examined below:

1) The exigencies of ministeriai inflation

have created serious duplication and juris-

dictional conflict, especially

level. The workings of Parliament are such

that apparently no government can win a vote

confidence

without having a

numbering,

at a minimum,. 20

ministers.

Under the colonial administration there were

15. For example, Mario Cardoso in Washington, Theodore Idzumbuir at

the UN, Thomas Kanza in. London, Andre Mandi in Rome, Paul

Mushiete in Paris, and Joseph Mbeka at the Common Market are

all among the small group of university graduates.

21

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11 major departments. These have been broken

into a maximum of 25 ministries. At the present

time, there are

20. In the field of economic

affairs a continuing jurisdictional dispute is

the overlapping Ministers

a) Finance, b) National Economy, andc) Plan-

and Industrial Development. There is, in

addition, a Vice Premier for Economic Co-

ordination, an important organ attached to the

Prime Minister's office. In the field of social

policy, a Vice Premier operates alongside

Ministers of a) Labor and Social Welfare,

b) Social Affairs,

and c) Youth and Sport.

Overlapping is less

serious at the provincial

level, where the Loi Fondamentale restricts

the number of ministers to 10.

imported the harmful

"political cabinets"

for ministers. Provincial and central

ernment ministers are entitled to a personal

cabinet of 13 persons. These cabinets are

supposed to offer "political" advice, as op-

posed to the administrative recommendations

emanating from the civil service. The auth-

orized annual salary total for one ministerial

cabinet (there are approximately 250 minis-

is 2,705,600 Congo francs

(about US$43,000 at the official rate of

change). The Congo would no doubt profit if

hungry horde

of camp followers simply

drew salaries and never came to the office.

As there are no legal minimum requirements

for employment in

this capacity, the quality

of most is particularly low, and their nuisance

value to the regular civil service high.

3) Related to (2) is the fact that relations

between the ministers and the civil service

are often poor. Venerable functionaries have

inherited the "apolitical", mores of the colonial

¡administration and tend to resent the "upstart"

elections to a command position.

4) Even the most highly educated ministers

tend to pad the civil service rosters of their

with ethnic followers. A striking

example is the Foreign Ministry, which from

the outset has been headed by a university

graduate. Former Foreign Minister Bomboko,

whatever his political merits, systematically

created for himself a solidly Mongo tribal

ambiance for his working environment.

were told by a young Muluba subaltern, freshly

installed at the ministry under the new min-

ister, Mabita-Kalanda,

tribesmen have descended like locusts, while

the unhappy Mongo are out on the

"C'est comme ga dans la démocratie," he

observed with a philosophic chuckle.

5) Good will and long clerical experience

are not enough in the more highly technical

functions. Air traffic control is a case in

Visitors travelling by air would do well

to arrive via Brazzaville should the UN with-

draw. its personnel from the Leopoldville air-

port control towers in

the near future. The

whole area of public finance is another example.

Foreign technicians are indispensable inthese

departments.

The whole judicial

similarly cannot operate without a minimum

number of trained magistrates.

6) Areas of administration involving large

sums of private or public money are particu-

larly prone to corrupting influences. The im-

port licensing system, for example, is vulner-

able. Anything which touches the diamond trade

from near or far is likewise susceptible.

7). The inability of the Congolese Government

to assure regular payment to its functionaries,

especially at provincial and local levels, is

invitation to corrupt behavior.

the Congo as elsewhere, those with adminis-

trative power usually can find a way to assure

themselves of what they feel to be their due--

and corruption has a narcotic effect.

8) Finally, central

effectively communicating

information to subordinates in the field.

The territorial service. The territorial

service differs importantly from the central

administration.

These local echelons are in

much more intimate contact with the popula-

tion,

especially in the

he is face-to-face with

the people, the ter-

ritorial administrator, unlike most other civil

servants, is under close scrutiny. Possibilities

for corruption are accordingly fewer.

roughly 7,000

square miles and 100,000 inhabitants,

lowest echelon of European administration in

the colonial period. Below approximately 125

territories lay approximately 1,000 circon-

scriptions indigènes (native authorities) headed

by traditional (or appointed) Congolese chiefs.

Thus the territory was and remains a crucial

administrative level. Many of the major deci-

population are taken or, at least, implemented

based on observation of

large number of these local seats of gov-

ernment, the administrative performance in

the territories is superior to that at provincial

and central levels. The territorial seat today

is usually

a small, dusty town of perhaps

5,000 inhabitants, lacking the amenities found

in Leopoldville or Elisabethville. In a real

sense, the local administrators share the life

the population at large, even if they do

occupy the large, pleasant houses left behind

by their European predecessors.

In the immediate wake of independence a

tendency appeared in several parts of the

country toward political appointments to ter-

ritorial administrative posts. Well-organizec

such as MNC/L, PSA, and Abako

recognized the critical importance of the

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territorial administrator in the local power

structure. However, the bureaucrats progres-

sively have had their revenge. Now, nearly

everywhere,

are filled by

career civil servants. Like their colleagues in

the central administration, they are

politician" and view their task,

gians before them, as one of maintaining peace

and order, and supporting the local economy.

be cherished in the

period immediately ahead, especially where

'politics" in the countryside has meant civil

disobedience, ethnic hostility, and non-payment

The method of nominating territorial admin-

istrators has had important implications for

the balance of power

between the center and

the provinces.

The colonial practice was

to

assign a functionary from the central govern-

ment to a province, which would post him in

turn to a district, whence he would be assigned

to a territory. The province, however, had the

final authority in naming the territorialadmin-

istrators. This procedure after independence

took on entirely new meaning. The provinces

assumed the right to name the African re-

placements for

the departed European civil

servants.

Thus the key to

in the countryside, the territorial adminis-

trator, was

beholden to the province, and not

to the

central government.

nized

this, and in some

areas

the nomination

process.

But he was unable to impose

own choices.

an ethnic unscrambling of

territorial

every incentive to

install local persons

the top slots.

Where there was some ethnic

integration, it was always within the confines

For example, MNC/ L-dominated

Orientale Province prided itself on its refusal

to follow tribal criteria. But the nature of

parties in that area meant that political criteria

similar result. Thus all the MNC/L-

administrators

came from

MNC/L zone of Orientale, and the Batetela-

Bakusu areas. The PSA

also ruled that no

territorial administrator could serve in his

home territory in Kwilu. But the other

was that the candidate had to

come from within the Kwilu District.

The Circonscriptions Indigenes.

A profile of the structure of the Congolese

polity would be incomplete without reference to

the very local administrative structures, the

circonscriptions indigenes (CI's,

called "sectors"). The surprising solicity

of

these institutions stood in sharp contract to

the breakdown of government at the top levels

days of 1960-1961. Their

stability provided a significant buffer against

widespread chaos in the countryside.

"Build-from-the-ground-up" was a Belgian

policy axiom. The

commune is the hero of

Belgian history. Medieval townsmen asserted

the people against the foreign

feudal overlords.

Thus there is a veritable

innate virtue of local

institutions. In the. Congo this value was

in complete harmony with colonial convenience:

let there be local institutions; let our wards

learn first to handle the humdrum problems

streets and sewers before they are per-

mitted to taste the delights of policy-making

grand scale. For this reason, the first

meaningful institutional reforms with a view

decolonization

providing for

elected councils in both urban

In the cities the reform has been of less

lasting value because of

particular urban

circumstances.

Structurally, the town com-

munes were established on a Eurafrican basis,

with paritary European representation. Pari-

tarism ceased to

be relevant in July 1960,

but

the legal structure

remains unchanged.

More importantly, the initial municipal elec-

tions attracted a larger number of the African

political elite. However, new opportunities sub-

sequently arose at much higher levels, and

able individuals deserted the municipal organs

of government.

But such was not the case in the country-

The indirectly elected councils were

grafted on to the administrative circonscription

structures which had been developed over a

long period. The chiefs selected by the councils

rural in orientation. Very few were

tempted by the electoral campaign of 1960.

there was a substantial continuity in

personnel at this level. Further, the functions

were not new, and a considerable

The CI's have been the

capillaries of modern government.

The territorial centers are equipped with the

external symbols of administration: a respect-

permanent

functionaries,

typewriters,

books, and a treasury. They have auxiliary

agricultural

who work under the

supervision of the more highly trained agri-

cultural officer

in the territories.

a tribunal, and usually

marketplace.

As any officer in the terri-

territories

and the CI's function, the whole

country can function." Only in the Bas-Congo

was there a systematic political purge at the

Cl level; elsewhere the continuity was re-

markable. What Belgium really sought to do

thoroughly in the way of political construction

was done with competence. The local institu-

tions remain a credit to the colonizer.

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Belgian Personnel

A handful of Belgian functionaries

throughout the crisis

ginning in the fall of 1960, a certain number.

responded to appeals

by central and prov-

return. At the moment

of independence there were 10,000 Belgian

civil servants, not counting Belgians with the

vast parastatal organizations or the 8,000

lay teachers. In January 1961 the Congo em-

ployed only

2,268 Belgian civil servants (in-

1,168 in Katanga). By early 1963 the

total was 1,590. None of the Belgians occupies

in the command hierarchy

administration. They

are attached as "tech-

nicians" or "advisers," mainly with the central

government, former Equateur Province, and

Their

role has a thousand variations, de-

pending upon the personalities of the Europeans

and Congolese involved

and their

working

relationships. In a number of ministries the

Belgian technicians visibly perform

great

deal

of

the important work; in others, they

are.

assigned to

tedious tasks.

The

feeling

is

wide spread

among them that they are not

being used effectively.

The Judiciary

A non-political organ of government, the

was extremely hard hit by the 1960

large. parts

of the Congo the

administration of justice simply stopped.

judicial system has

traditional.

The latter, which

operates at the circonscription indigène level

and judges by customary

law, generally con-

However, the maximum

penalty which could be imposed by a tradi-

tional court was one month imprisonment, or

a fine of 1,000 francs. Serious offenses and

infractions

of written law had to be judged

by the modern courts.

The modern judiciary began at the ter-

ritorial echelon. There the territorial admin-

as judge (and prosecutor) in

involving penalties not exceeding two

The lowest echelon

with professional magistrates was the District

Court, which could sentence to five years and

judge civil

up

to

a value

of 50,000

francs.. The old provincial capitals

Tribunal of First Instance, with general penal

and civil competence. Finally, Appeals Courts

operated at Leopoldville and Elisabethville.

In 1959 the modern jurisdictions had a total

of 168 magistrates and were considered seri-

ously understaffed. Following

the continental

model, the magistrates were in part assigned

to the bench (magistrats assis) and partly

to the office of the public prosecutor (magis-

trats débouts). These departed almost to a man

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

in July 1960 (except from Katanga).

Curiously, the judiciary was one field where

there was

no pressure for Africanization.

The Belgian magistrature had a tradition of

independence

Congolese na-

no desire to purge the

did the civil service, nor

did the Congolese court clerks demand im-

mediate promotions. They knew all too well

that a bench without an executive to protect

its independence and

carry out its sentences

unrewarding hot seat. Gradually the

Congolese employees of the judicial system

were named auxiliary judges. In some cases

they hear

cases; in

others, they maintain

the records

of the public prosecutor's of-

A few Belgian magistrates returned

Beginning in

UN-recruited magistrates from Greece, Haiti,

the UAR, Syria,

and Lebanon began arriving.

The target

50 qualified magistrates has

never been reached, however, and the whole

structure operates by fits and starts. There

solution until at least

when the Ford Foundation-sponsored

École Nationale de Droit et d'Administration

begins graduating 60 Congolese magistrates

Conclusions

In sum, the heavily bureaucratic tradition

of the Belgian colonial system

has

left an

indelible mark on the Congolese state. For

all its

shortcomings, the bureaucracy

is a

crucial element in the political system. Es-

pecially in the countryside, the position of the

territorial service is paramount. To be sure,

the administrators are handicapped by com-

munications problems and by their own limi-

tations in training and policy-making experi-

ence. But there are no effective challengers

to the power they hold. The limits of their

authority are the limits of effective organi-

zation of the political society.

At the center, decision-making and initia-

tion of policy are not really in the hands of

the bureaucracy. But the limits of the capacity

of the civil service to carry out

policy are the boundaries of the effectiveness

of government. Political ideologies never took

root in the Congo, and there is accordingly

no alternative offered for the Belgian-instilled

administrative criteria

of good government:

public order and increased production.

At the same time, the bureaucracy poses

some vexing problems. It has won for itself

a level of remuneration beyond the capacity

of the country to pay. The Congo cannot be

viable until some adjustment takes place in

the pay scale, perhaps through a depreciation

in the Congolese franc. As one observer has

wryly commented, the once -militant civil serv-

24

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ice union, APIC, will no doubt undergo "pro-

found modifications" in outlook, as "for the

first time since its creation, its objectives

seem to be fully realized." Alsó a' better'

formula must be

found for absorbing

the

emergent university generation into the civil

service.

But this should not obscure the real merits

of the bureaucracy. The failure of thetransfer

of power left the clerks with the sudden re-

sponsibility of managing a vast, complex coun-

try.. What is remarkable is

that

so many

of the routine administrative functions were

continued in

the central administration, and

that in many

territories

the new

adminis -

trator maintained a reasonable degree of

public order.

Perhaps

the explanation for the lack of

revolutionary social credo to accompany

the

revolutionary power transfer. lies in the bu-

reaucratic origins of the Congolese elite. The

administrator is not by nature a revolutionary.

His rationale is

the

governance,

not the

transformation, of society. The political pro-

gram of the bureaucratic

elite in the Congo

was the Africanization.of the administration,

not a root-and-branch remaking of colonial

society.

25.

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VI. POLITICS AND PARTIES:

THE PROSPECTS AND RISKS OF ELECTIONS IN 1964

. The Fragile Roots of Nationalism

The most fundamental characteristic of the

lateness of its emergence. Throughout British

and French colonial Africa national political

parties were beginning to function by the end

of World War II. In the Congo overt political

movements began only in 1957 and were not

launched in earnest until 1959. Lack of ex-

perience is a trait common to all Congolese

political parties.

This difference between the Congo and other

parts of independent Africa is largely explained

by the character of the Belgian administration,

was highly authoritarian compared with

its British and French counterparts. For ex-

ample, a vigorous and colorful African press

back to 1858 in Ghana. In the Ivory

Coast, L'Eclaireur de la Côte d'Ivoire was

launched in 1935. On the other hand, the first

independent Congolese papers, Quinze and Con-

go, began only in 1957 and were quickly sup-

political action was

and French colonies,

recognized

War Il as legitimate in a broadening area. In

the Congo, African (or even European) politi-

cal movements were prohibited, as indeed was

any kind of political activity. The low level

political sophistication

absence of an awakening sense of nationalism

among the mass made it possible for the Belgian

authorities to forestall any African nationalist

movement.

The complete isolation from external in-

the Congolese elite was another

key factor. For decades the emerging

British and French Africa had been educated

in the universities of

Britain, and

another, at least

within the confines of the

English and French linguistic barriers.

had years of working together

Assembly, one

the world's toughest political schools. In the

was stark.. Before the

Brussels Exposition in

literally only

a handful of Congolese had travelled abroad.

At that time there were only 15 Congolese

mostly at

versity. Rigid censorship was maintained on

events did not begin really influencing

Congo until

the independence of Ghana

1957. The Bandung Conference, for example,

had passed unnoticed.

The year 1958 was a turning point. In that

year, Patrice Lumumba and Joseph Ngalula

Sud-Kasai President) attended the All-

African People's Conference in Ghana. General

speech in Brazzaville in August

1958, announcing that independence was avail-

for the asking, had sharp repercussions

across the river in Leopoldville. The Brussels

Exposition provided an opportunity for large

numbers of educated Congolese to visit Europe.

In the first decade following World War II,

however, both the Belgians and the Congolese

considered that the most important issue con-

fronting the colony was the status satisfaction

of the new elite. Colonial debate focused on

the "immatriculation" card (a device to grant

Africans limited access to certain privileges

reserved to Europeans), equal status in the

discrimination. Mrs.

Robeson, after a session with Leopoldville's

elite during her 1947 African tour

commented, "The evolues did not seem visibly

interested in independence, nor emancipation.

They were

the world." Unaware of what was going on in

There was no explicitly nationalist statement

of a

comprehensive character until the Con-

science Africaine Manifesto of August 1956, a

document of Catholic antecedents.

This pro-

voked an almost immediate riposte by the Al-

liance des Bakongos (Abako)

of the Bas-

Congo, which for the first time used the slogan

of "immediate independence." The next major

statement was Joseph Kasavubu's inaugural

speech as burgomaster of Dendale commune

in Leopoldville in April 1958. The word "in-

dependence" was not publicly uttered beyond

the confines of Leopoldville until after the riots

there in January 1959.

The Messianic Sects

Symptomatic of the high degree of frustra-

tion with the colonial situation and the lack of

a nationalist outlet for these feelings was the

prevalence of radical messianic sects. These

are a synthesis of pre-nationalist expressions

of social discontent

traditional ritual

symbols, both animistic

and Christian. Al-

though syncretistic sects are found throughout

tropical Africa, their activity has been most

intense in the southern third of the continent.

There, conflict with the European settler

colonial complex has been greatest, and a

16. A.A.J. Van Bilsen, !'Indépendance du Conco, 1961, p. 47.

26

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secular solution

seemed most remote.

There have been

dozens of these sects in the

Congo, all having in common

a radical re-

jection of

European

domination.

responded through the escapism of the apo-

calyptic dream rather than the development of

nationalist programs.

Associational Experience

Related to the late emergence of nationalism

the mediocre level of pre-nationalist as-

sociational experience. Group activity involv-

ing Africans prior to the emergence of parties

took at least five different forms:

1) Unions. These suffered under legal

re-

strictions on their operation

of the Belgian trade unions to organize

control their activity. The only really African

union prior to 1959 was the Association de

Personnel Indigène de la Colonie (APIC), the

2) European political groups. After 1954 the

metropolitan parties began establishing po-

litical clubs in the major centers and sought

clienteles.

Belgian Liberals and Socialists were parti-

cularly active; in contrast, the

Parti Social

Chretien (PSC) tended to

duction of metropolitan parties into the Congo.

subordinate,

and although a number of leaders went through

a phase of

association with one or another of

these clubs, they did not consider them a very

useful training ground in political organization.

Attempts by these groups to circulate informal

the 1957 urban elections

an abject failure and ended European

illusions of being able to enlist the African

elite as foot soldiers for their own battles.

3) Cercles des évolues. These were set up

by the administration immediately after the

war, often with attractive club houses, as social

centers and controlled forums

grievances of the

elite. The cercles probably

did fulfill the limited purposes for which they

again were not very

helpful for political training.

4) Alumni associations. These were more

important than the preceding groups. Sponsored

by the Catholic missions,

gether in an African-led organization many of

The federation of alumni

associations, Union des Intérêts Sociaux Con-

(UNISCO), was the closest thing to a

African movement. It

immediately after World War II.

Kasavubu got his start when he was elected

president of UNISCO in 1946. Some political

grievanses were channeled through these

They were, however, by definition

elite groups and tended to articulate the spe-

cific complaints of the elite.

5) Tribal associations. These were by far

the most important of the pre-political as-

sociations.

wholly African organizations, formed to help

adjust to the colonial situation, both

humble functions of mutual aid and in the

comprehensive

political pro-

They can be traced back to about

1925 both in Leopoldville and Elisabethville.

However, there was a fundamental change in

their character after the war. In the early

days, leadership was in the hands of tra-

ditional elders; after 1945, young, educated

elements took

Only in the

sociation did the mass and elite establish a

working relationship.

associations, the Abako and

Frères, stand far above all others in

effectiveness. Both played a determining role

in shaping the fragmented, ethnic nature of

the eventual nationalist response. The Abako

was the real founder

of militant Congolese

nationalism,

but it never sought to become a

comprehensive organization.

Lulua Freres was

a tightly disciplined, ethnically organized, and

terrorist body whose cohesiveness was based

on acute resentment of the Baluba, especially

in the Luluabourg area.

Parties Prior to Independence

the Congo lacked the exotic flowering

characterized so much of West Africa; valu-

able leadership training ground accordingly

was not available. And the tribal associa-

tions, although found in every African city,

had an unchallenged position in the Congo as

the most important group activity.

first elections took place in the urban centers:

Leopoldville,

Elisabethville

in December 1957; and Coquilhatville, Stanley-

ville, Bukavu, Luluabourg, and Matete-Ndjili

(Leopoldville)

in December 1958.

were not permitted to contest these

elections, and accordingly the ethnic associa-

logical organizational

for candidates to utilize. Many of the present

in fact lineal descendents of the

ethnic associations called into electoral duty

during the urban elections.

Other influences inhibited the development

of a unified politicallife: the regionalcharacter

of Belgian colonial organization;

restraints

on population mobility;

and lack of African

social

and political communications between

the main urban centers. As a result, not one

elite but six provincial elites emerged

with

virtually no contacts among them until 1958.

To enhance their claims to political leader-

ship, the provincial elites

traded

tribal

themes, strengthening ethnic self-awareness on

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the part of the mass, and widening cleavages

the eve of independence. This contributed in

between ethnic groups. National politics were

large measure

to the irresponsiblity

subsequently dominated by this development

electoral campaign. An

each of the Congo's component parts.

establish an

"Executive College" to share

Especially in the face of the rapid dis-

of the colonial power

1959-1960, removing any externally compelling

reason for national unity, there was virtually

no possibility of forming

a coherent national

party. Lumumba had many of the charismatic

qualities of other single-party state leaders

in Africa, but in seeking to extend his party,

the Mouvement National Congolais/ Lumumba

its Stanleyville womb, he

was faced in virtually every

in March 1960, and subse-

the administrative hierarchy at

provincial, district, and territorial levels.

this idea came too late to prove

effective. The situation was at complete vari-

ance with all other African experiences of

decolonization, with the exception of Algeria;

and even there,

a structured revolutionary

movement existed which could

supplant the

colonial administration. Elsewhere in Africa,

the insurmountable task of working with po-

litical leadership in the provinces that was

sharply divided,

on ethnic grounds.

In most cases, he had to choose one faction,

and in the process earned the bitter enmity

of the others.

prospective. African leaders

restrain their attacks on government because

they shared in its operation.

their brief life prior to the electoral

campaign in the spring of 1960, the Congolese

Parties, when they finally did emerge, had

in sorting out leader-

the short time available before elec-

independence.

internal tensions. Abako

Kanza formed a dissident wing

Relations between Parti Solidaire

Africain (PSA) groups in Leopoldville (under

and Kikwit (under Kamitatu) were

subject to periodic crises. The MNC split into

Lumumba, Kalonji, and Nendaka wings,

the second becoming a Baluba party and the

third having little following. The Centre de

Regroupment Africain (Cerea) party

organizational functions: the sale of member-

cards, and

the preparation of electoral

lists. The second task did require a certain

sophistication. In

a system

multi-member districts with proportional

representation, a great deal was at stake in

the ordering of an electoral list.

But in general, parties were built upon

sand despite some

impressive feats of high-

speed organization, such as MNC/L's rapid

growth from

a party limited to Stanleyville

in January 1960 to one sweeping all Orientale

other districts in May of that

developed

Kashamura,

Bisukiro wings. There is little realideological

divergence underlying these splits.

At the time of the December 1959 elections

for territorial councils and municipal offices,

only the Abako and PSA had

organizations

extending into the countryside, as demon-

strated by their successful electoral boycott.

These elections were suspected of being part

of a. Belgian maneuver to install, with the

an electoral process, a govern-

immediate, short-term objectives of the elec-

tions. Even without the 1960 breakdown of law

and order, all parties would have experienced

major crises after

independence, when or-

ganizers in the provinces attempted to collect

debts of patronage.

The characteristics of the ten major par-

ties emerging from the

1960 elections

summarized

in the appendix in Table E

cording to five differentiating criteria: mass-

ment subservient to Brussels. Thus the par-

electoral campaign. It

only in the

period from February to May 1960, after the

terms and timetable for independence, that

political organization got underway through-

out the country on a grand scale. The parties

were thus working under enormous time pres-

sure, and every available shortcut was taken.

some areas, there was

in most, unbridled demagoguery,

extravagant promises, and appeals for ethnic

The parties and the political leadership

were not placed in a position of bearing

responsibility for, public order or the

tenance of good government until literally

unitary-federal; radical-moderate. A "mar-

included where a party

does not fall clearly into

polar type. Where the classification might be

debatable, a justification is in-

the appendix,

of the May 1960 elections.17

results, by party,

Parties since Independence

The bewildering sequence of political events

17. A glossary of the principal Congolese parties may be found in

Table G in the appendix. Map C in the appendix shows the geo-

graphical distribution of major party strength in 1960..

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since 1960 almost defies coherent summary. 18

The

circumstances

independence

duced simultaneously a spectacular promotion

in social and economic status for much of the

elite

and an abrupt drop in the

living

of the mass. This inevitably ruptured

the briefly established mass-elite relation-

ship and resulted in what might be termed

a "social demobilization." The mass, failing

to comprehend what had happened and lack-

ing an

easily identifiable scapegoat to blame

for the disappointments of independence, could

only react by an apathetic withdrawal from the

system, politically and economically. Politi-

this was expressed by

the betrayal by "politicians"; economically,

by a tendency to secede from

economy.. Symbolic of this

strike called in March 1962 by the Union

des Travailleurs Congolais (UTC) to protest

inflated salaries for politicians.

in the countryside shrivelled

as fast as they had been implanted

By 1961 no party cards were being sold any-

where in the Congo. Local sections had ceased

to function; political meetings were outlawed;

returned

stituencies.

true of MNC/L,

achieved high

levels of organization.

revolt of the army in July 1960 was

followed by the collapse of the constitutional

framework, the dismissal of Lumumba, and

the subsequent

establishment in Stanleyville

of a competing "legal government" with some

international

recognition.

The Loi Fonda-

situatiog provided

means by

could be resolved. Thus force and

negotiation between de

leaders became

the only means

of re-establishing the legi-

the central government. Only the

presence of the UN, the strong international

commitment to preservation of a single Congo,

and the vigor of US policy prevented the per-

manent disintegration of the country during

1960-1961. The UN provided a framework of

while sporadic negotiations

took place between the two competing

governments, and the two seceded fragments,

Katanga and

South Kasai

The armies rarely

fought one another, but all became involved

in bloody conflicts

with civilian

populations.

in January-February

civilian-ANC clashes resulted in massacres of

18. It is beyond the scope of this paper to record this history. Summary

chronologies of major events since independence may be found in

RAF

Research Memoranda Nos. 16 of December 22, 1961; 20 of

January 29, 1962; and 5 of February. 5, 1963 (UNCLASSIFIED).

For highly detailed materials, the reader is referred to the series

of volumes published by CRISP in Brussels (Jules Gerard-Libois

lent monthly, Etudes Congolaises, published by the Institut Na

ional d'Etudes Politiques in Leopoldvill

civilians.

at Elisabethville, Bakwanga,

Stanleyville.

The Alienation of the Politicians from the

People

With the attrition of the parties

and the

establishment under

international tutelage

rudimentary

authority, the primary source

of power now. lies in access to the organs. of

influence, force, and money at Leopoldville.

What the outlying areas feel is no longer

relevant--unless and until new elections are

The political system at the center re-

sembles Spanish moss; its roots are in the

air, rather than in the ground.

symptom of Leopoldville's isolation from

the mass is the contrast in leadership

between Lumumba and

Adoula. The former

had remarkable talents in mass mobilization.

At a time when political power depended upon

this, Lumumba

was a well-nigh irrestible

force. His prestige derived from his eloquence

French, Swahili, Lingala, and Tshiluba.

Almost anywhere in the Congo, he could pro-

ject a compelling image of himself in

Nkrumah-Toüré-Nyerere fashion. Adoula en-

tirely lacks these characteristics. He was in

eclipse in the heady days of 1960. But with the

transformation of the nature of politics, his

talents suddenly became relevant. He is a mani-

mastered the art of making himself indispen-

sable, of balancing competing demands of

shifting constellation of caucus groups. And he

has made able use of the diverse types of inter-

national support most useful in the present

situation: US, UN, and Belgian.

The Failure of Lumumbism

• Another symptom of alienation between the

politicians

and the mass has been the failure

of efforts after Lumumba's death to construct

a "Lumumbist bloc," a mass nationalist move-

ment akin to the radical African nationalist

model. Lumumba's

strategy at the outset had

been to weld a national coalition of parties--

MNC/L, PSA, Cerea, Balubakat, and at times

Puna-alleged to

share his three-point pro-

gram of nationalism, anti-tribalism, and cen-

tralism.

This

was

only

briefly successful.

The Lumumbist bloc did vote with discipline

for the election

of officers of the Chamber of

Deputies and Senate. in June 1960, but barely

mustered enough votes to confirm their lead-

er as Prime Minister. Again there was a brief

moment

of

united

action at the

Lovanium

Parliament in July-August 1961, but this failed

to elect Gizenga as Premier. Despite periodic

proposals in 1961 and 1962 for the establish-

ment of some form of Lumumbist national

29

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party, Lumumbism as a politicalforce steadily

adduced for the failure of the effort to build

a mass movement around the martyr image

1) The inefficacy of a corpse. The departed

hero may be mourned, but he cannot lead.

2) The divisive aspect of the Lumumba

memory. Although Lumumba was adulated in

large areas of the Congo, he was despised in

There was no possibility of achieving

unity about this symbol.

3) The Gizenga obstacle. Gizenga, an inept

individual lacking the essential prerequisite

of audacity and personal magnetism, was able

to pre-empt the top position. He could not be

ousted without fatally

dividing the movement,

nor could he supply the necessary leadership

4) The incompetence of other leaders. None of

Lumumba possessed the necessary leadership

Only an exceptionally gifted

could have had any chance, and politi-

like Christophe Gbenye and Antoine

Kiwewa are the incarnation of mediocrity.

5) The irrelevance of radical nationalism.

Lumumbist

of national

against the Belgian

colonists became irrele-

vant in the post-independence situation. The

"enemy" symbol which might have

elsewhere in Africa, to rally a nationalist

To some extent the Congolese "poli-

ticians" serve as scapegoats today, but ani-

mosity toward them remains diffuse.

6) The lack of access to effective means of

support. MNC/L was anathema to major do-

mestic forces-the Catholic Church, the large

corporations, and the Western governments

represented in the Congo. The assistance of

the Soviet bloc and Casablanca group of Afri-

insufficient to

sustain the

Political Power Clusters in Leopoldville

Politics in Leopoldville

has become

es -

sentially a bargaining process between clusters

of leaders; ideology plays only a small role.

most important political cluster to

emerge is the "Binza group." This group in-

a cross-section

of leadership which

collectively forms an interlocking directorate

of influential persons, who between them con-

trol or have access to a broad spectrum of

and power. Although membership

there have never been

more than ten in the inner caucus. This coali-

tion began to

emerge in 1961 and

did

not

really become a major importance until 1962.

The key members are described below:

1) Victor Nendaka, head of the Sûret since

September 1960, is an intelligent man of will

and courage. He took over this key agency at

a moment of total

disorganization from

Christophe Muzungu,

who

was personally

loyal to Lumumba.

The Sûreté's national or-

ganization,

power

of arrest,

and files of

compromising information on many political

figures make it a potent instrument.

2) General Joseph Mobutu had by 1961 firm

control

ANC units close enough

to Leo-

poldville to be ableto exert political pressures.

His involvement guarantees the support of at

least a good part of the ANC.

3) Justin Bomboko was

Foreign Minister

in all governments until the most recent

Adoula cabinet shakeup in April 1963. Despite

some character defects, he has become a

skilled politician and able operator in the

Leopoldville environment. In addition, he has

constructed a

solid popular base at Coquil-

batville. He has excellent access to both Bel-

gian and US sources.

4) Albert Ndele since 1960 has headed the

Monetary Council, shortly to become a Na-

tional Bank.

5) Damien Kandolo began as a member of

Lumumba's

supervision of the

Surete. He

the Lumumbist bloc, was for a time

Adoula's Chef de Cabinet, and

quently Permanent Secretary in the Ministry

Adoula himself is not a member of the

"Binza group," but is very close to it. There

is no ethnic element to the group; Nendaka is

a Mubua, Mobutu an Ngbandi, Bomboko a Mongo,

Ndele a Mukongo, and Kandolo an Otetela. The

success of the group lies in the nature of the

Congolese political process; there is no need

for formal organization, or a structure capable

of developing a web of political communication

There are a number of other caucus groups,

based in large part upon the activity of Parlia-

ment. The most effective

Although there is

the Abako group, its representatives in Parlia-

ment maintain remarkable discipline.

has never been an occasion when Abako mem-

bers have taken opposing positions in debates

or votes. This cohesion has been used in the

systematic pursuit of the objectives of the

Bakongo peoples, in the furtherance of which

the Abako has been extremely successful.

PSA Kamitatu and PSA Gizenga are both

effective caucus groups. Part of

the Cerea-Reko party delegation from Kivu,

under the leadership of Joseph Midiburo and

Edmond Rudahindwa, also has shown capa-

bility for group action.

Parliament has become a major focal point

for political maneuvering, especially in the

last year. It had very few meetings in the

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summer of 1960, then was put on vacation

by Mobutu in

reconvene until July 1961. From that time

most of the time. As the techniques of parlia-

have become

strength as a branch of government has in-

creased. The powers vested in Parliament by

the Loi Fondamentale are vast;

ties have learned how to make use of them,

Parliament increasingly has been an obstacle

to effective executive action.

Provincial Political Consolidation

A development of major significance in recent

months is the rapid consolidation of a series

of local power clusters centered on the new

provincial institutions.

Where a homogeneous

leadership

has

emerged, it

is

challengeable

from

virtually

un-

inside or outside.

The

provinces have three major trumpcards:

1) Control of the police forces.

These are

frequently overt political instruments.

2) Control of the local administration. Ter-

ritorial

administrators

are

named

by the

provinces; the territorial administrator is the

unchallenged authority in his zone.

3) Monopoly of direct contact with

the

population at large.

This is not significant in

the normal process of decision-making in

Leopoldville. However, if

and

when

national

elections are held, it would be a critically

important asset.

The ability of the central government to

intervene in the provinces grows in situa-

where provincial leadership is split.

It has proved to date virtually impossible

to dislodge an incumbent provincial govern-

Dissident provincial political

to Leopoldville, trying to secure

a vote (by a procedure of dubious

of one house of Parliament to request central

intervention and arbitration. But once sub-

stantial accord has been achieved within a

there is very

little the central

government can do to influence the situation.

The Role of Labor Unions, Students,

and Youth

Like most under-developed countries, the

Congo does not possess many

functional

terest groups. Labor unions and

student

and

youth groups, however, are worthy of brief

mention.

The Congolese unions are not

proletarian

organizations;

the most effective

ones

are

collar groups (i.e., civil

servants and

teachers).

society

as the Congo,

the bargaining power

of the relatively scarce

skilled, educated person is by nature vastly

superior to that of the unskilled laborer, who

lives in the

shadow of a "reserve

unemployed" willing and eager to take his

organized, white collar groups have

through union structures been quite success-

their grievances. Unions

relatively little concrete to

unskilled laborer for his dues. Union leaders

are accepted on consultative bodies of an of-

ficial character, but do not participate in real

collective bargaining, except in the govern-

ment-level negotiations establishing the legal

minimum wage (which is the salary in fact

received by the majority of workers).

The major unions are:

1) Union des Travailleurs Congolais, (UTC).

This union has the largest membership and

probably must be rated the most important. It

is of Catholic inspiration and

was initially

organized under the patronage of the Belgian

Catholic union. Its leader, Andre Bo-Boliko,

is a keenly intelligent and able person.

2) Confédération des Syndicats Libres Con-

golais (CSLC). This is a very close second

to the UTC in importance. It is accused by

its opponents of being remote-controlled by

the American Embassy. Its leader, Alphonse

Kithima, is

Adoula's brother-in-law

had the informal support of the Prime Min-

ister. CSLC is an ICFTU member.

3) Fédération

Travailleurs

Kongolais (FGTK). Formerly head by Adoula,

this is the stepchild of the largest Belgian

union, the EGTB, associated with the Socialist

Party. There have been periodic hopes that

it would rally to the CSLC, but to date it re-

mains separate. It suffers from the absence

of a single national secretariat. At the top,

there are merely two regional offices.

Though union leadership has been effective

in articulating the widespread resentment of

the privileges of the politician class, unions

probably do not have the capability of mo-

bilizing widespread

positive support for

political movement.

On the student level, the Union Générale

des Etudiants Congolais (UGEC), dominated

by the Lovanium University section, unites

loosely the farflung

munity. Thus

great capacity for action. It participates both

in the literation Side Cantee nos

ordinating Secretariat (ISC-COSEC). The uni-

are at present an alienated

group. They feel that access to opportunities

with their intellectual talents

is blocked by the former clerks now holding

government positions. UGEC is far

reing an extremist,

Marxist-Leninist bod

like the Union Generale des

l'Afrique, Occidentale (UGEAO) in Dakar or

the Fédération

des Etudiants de l'Afrique

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Noire en France (FEANF) in Paris. However,

Second Congress of UGEC, held

August 1963, it was

evident from the anti-

American resolutions that the Soviets have

some headway in infiltrating

ganization. There is also an ineffectual youth

federation which is a member of the World

Assembly of Youth (WAY), but it has little

significance in the Congo.

Political youth groups attached to various

parties were a volatile force in the 1960-1961

They were originally

paramilitary

organized as

weapons of intimidation and violence. Political

leaders have become disillusioned with these

organizations, however, as they have proved

difficult to control and a great public

are less ideological groups

than bands of disoriented, unemployed persons

seeking a violent outlet for their frustrations.

Political Communication

Means of

political communications are very

limited. Thus, the Leopoldville government is

handicapped

in projecting a favorable image

in the interior. As a result, Adoula is largely

of the population.

anonymity

could prove a drawback in possible

elections in 1964.

One can hardly speak of any "mass media."

Press and radio now reach

only a restricted

audience. Only in Leopoldville and Elisabeth-

ville is

there a widely circulated daily press.

The largest newspaper in the country, Courrier

d'Afrique (Couraf), has a circulation

of no

more than 15,000, mostly in Leopoldville. The

Couraf staff

is

mostly

Bakongo,

and

of a

The Adoula

organ, Le

Progres, circulates less than 10,000 copies.

There are printed newspapers-in nearly all

cases organs of the provincial governments--

in the following cities: Coquilhatville, Bukavu,

Kindu, and Kikwit. Although circulation figures

are not available for these, it is doubtful any

prints more than 1,000 copies.

are radio

stations in each of the six

former provincial capitals. The most powerful

is that of Elisabethville. There is at present

no political content to the programming; news

broadcasts are controlled by the central gov-

number of radio

Congo is considerable. Estimates vary

600,000, although the latter figure

much too high. Many. of the radios

are battery-operated and are now not func-

tioning because batteries are in short supply.

By far the most important means of com-

munications

is by word of mouth, through

the marketplaces and along the transport axes.

News spreads with amazing rapidity from city

to country by the "bush telegraph"; however,

the reverse is much less true.

In

a number of cases, provincial officials

travel widely within their provinces. However,

this is rarely done by central leaders. Adoula

has failed to use this means of making him-

self known to the country at large. Travel in

the interior by deputies and persons in op-

position to the provincial governments has

seen closely controlled.

Political

are prohibited in most sections of the country.

Incentives to Elections

The Loi Fondamentale stipulates that elec-

must be held by

30, 1964, to re-

place the present Parliament and the provincial

assemblies. However, the

sacrosanct,. since

two-thirds

vote of both

houses of Parliament suffices to amend this

other clause of the Lo1 Fondamentale

Moreover,

Article 67 and 76 of the Lo

Fondamentale and the debates at the Brussels

completion of the new constitution is

requisite to the holding

of new elections.

predict adoption of the

constitution by late 1963 or early 1964. While

possible, we hold this unlikely. However, by

mid-1964, work on the new constitution could

well be completed.

After it has been

mulgated, pressures for new elections will be

longer exist.

The contentious issue of the disputed ter-

also have to be settled prior

are at least 15

claimed by two or more of the new provinces.

government had planned

to hold referenda

to determine the future

the territories, it has avoided to date opening

any of these Pandora's boxes.

The leaders of the new provincial govern-

ments share a sense of isolation from the

sources of power at Leopoldville. Although

some provinces have surrogates in Leopold-

ville, including several with

Adoula's Cabinet, most feel their represen-

tation in Parliament inadequate, largely as a

result of the failure of the parliamentarians

elected in 1960 to maintain contacts at the pro-

vincial level. Thus, the provincial govern-

ments anticipate elections as a means of re-

representatives owing

allegiance to the new

provincial regimes. With this new blood, the

provinces hope to increase their leverage in

Leopoldville and their share of central govern-

ment patronage. The impulse to elections at

the provincial level is virtually unanimous.

There is as well surprising depth of attach-

ment by the Congolese elite to precepts of

Western democratic theory. The Congolese are

aware that their country has been the

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object of world ridicule. For this reason,

elections become

all the more important as a

redemptive process.

Postponement of the elections will become

increasingly difficult, and there

seems no pos-

sibility

of

introducing a

formula

of indirect

elections which

would pose less of a security

problem. Despite the excellent access which

the United States enjoys to many top leaders,

and their willingness to receive political advice

on many issues, we doubt that the Congo gov-

ernment could be dissuaded from holding elec-

tions

in the next two years, short of

a total

breakdown of law and

order on a scale which

made them physically

impossible. To

seek

a different formula for legitimating the organs

of government

would be to confess inability

to enter the civilized world on equal terms

The broad alternative of centralizedauthori-

tarianism appears to be unavailable,

the weakness of the central government

the limited administrative and security capa-

bility of the ANC. Also, the ANC leadership

no disposition at present to assume the

the Congo. Finally,

the Congo creates unusual requirements

for democratic legitimacy,

pected to persist for some time despite any

reductions in the UN presence.

Provincial Electoral Experience since 1960

There have been since independence local

elections

in the city

of

Kikwit

(Kwilu) and

the

province of Cuvette Centrale.

Two fea-

tures of these elections are important:

1) In both cases, the elections were carried

out peacefully. In Kikwit calm was maintained

in the face of a heated political contest.

suggests that elections may not be a serious

public order in areas where

vincial institutions are functioning reasonably

of the best-organized

and Cuvette Centrale ably ad-

ministered provinces in the Congo.

both cases, the elections resulted

in strengthening control of the

administrations. This suggests that, in prov-

inces with functioning governments, elections

will operate to consolidate the position of the

Prospects for a Moderate National Party

In light

of possible national elections

1964, there has been considerable recent dis-

cussion on

the

desirability. of

national party of moderate persuasion.

principle arguments advanced in favor of such

a movement may be summarizedas follows:

1) Stability in most African states has been

achieved through the mechanism of a single

dominant national party, which performs the

key functions of national integration and con-

tainment of disparate local and ethnic loyalities.

2) The Adoula government has the desirable

characteristics

of. moderation

and respon-

sibility. However, it lacks any structure cap-

able of engendering popular support for its

policies; there is no linkage between the rulers

and ruled, except through the administrative

structures of the state.

This could be supplied

the organization of a national party

committed to the same principles of govern-

ment as the Adoula regime..

3) The Adoula government is

subject to

continual harassment and is frequently para-

by a fragmented

irresponsible

Parliament. It is argued that the creation of a

solid national party

could assure the govern-

ment a firm and

parliamentary

majority, while permitting the kind of energetic

leadership necessary to

public finances and to "get the country moving

Careful analysis of these arguments

quires first an understanding

of efforts now

to establish a national party, a

look at its possible organization, and a survey

of the risks involved.

of a national moderate party is

not new. The Belgian administration sought

a similar movement in

1959-1960,

National du Progres (PNP). Indeed,

decision to accede to the demands

independence was partly based on the cal-

culation that universal suffrage would operate

in favor of a moderate, administration-backed

party, rolling up overwhelming majorities in

to compensate for the loss

the cities to more militant groups. The cir-

cumstances now are vastly

different, but a

brief review

of the major

humiliating failure of the PNP

still provides

material for reflection:

1) The movement was immediately identified

administration, and

loadora rare to get to the using and

determined

to contend with the more radical movements

on their own terms.

3) As the campaign proceeded, the PNP's

prospects began to look so unpromising that

major interest

groups,

such

companies, sought

to

as the large

by

reinsure themselves

making

substantial contributions

to the

radical movements. Ironically, despite clear

Belgian sympathy and support for the PNF

a party

such as

MNC/L enjoyed greatl

superior resources by the end of the campaign.

4)

"Moderation" does

not constitute

dynamic political program in an electoral

campaign.

5) The

PNP was not a coherent national

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movement, but a weak coalition of numerous

local movements. It was not capable of ef-

fective, united action.

Recent Efforts to Create a Moderate

National Party

The need for a national party is felt by

a large segment of the present Congolese

leadership. Several efforts are underway:

1) Defense Minister Jerome Anany has been

travelling extensively in recent weeks, es-

tablishing contacts with local leaders. Anany

was born in Lisala (Moyen Congo), but his

parents were from Kivu. He was elected

Senator from Kivu in 1960, on a non-party

list. He considers Moyen Congo his bastion,

but there is reason to doubt how much genuine

support he has in that area, or whether he is

accepted as

"native son." His choice of

electoral constituency in 1960

would suggest the contrary. Anany's prospec-

tive party is the Parti Démocratique Congo-

lais (PDC)--already dubbed by its enemies

des Députes Corrompus."

position as Defense Minister is a key one. It

is not yet clear whether he considers

PDC "his" party,

or whether his efforts are

on behalf of the Prime Minister.

not yet firmly committed

himself to the national party project,

as one he would

lead. For all his fine qualities, Adoula

seem to have the magnetism necessary

to make his personality the central feature

of the party's image. It seems unlikely that

he would lend his active support to the effort

to develop a national

party unless he were

the acknowledged leader.

Chief Nendaka has also been

and seeking to mold

force into an

weapon for the political campaign. Nendaka

wants to be elected as

Aketi home district in Uélé Province, and

then move to the Ministry of the Interior. It

is not clear to what extent Nendaka's efforts

are coordinated with those of Anany.

4) The "Binza group" feels that it, or its

members,

the organizing com-

mittee for a national party. The strength of

this caucus derives, however, from its power

in Leopoldville, and not from its

support. It is not clear whether Nen-

on behalf of the "Binza

group" or himself; Anany is not a member

5) Kamitatu, leader of the Parti Solidaire

Africain/Kamitatu (PSA/K), and his top par-

liamentary lieutenant, Felicien Kimvay,

very interested in the national party project.

Kamitatu is a highly ambitious and very able.

leader. He conditions his participation on

satisfactory place near the center of the po-

litical constellation. He recognizes, however,

that his source of political strength is regional

(Kwilu), and he probably has no illusions that

he himself could organize a national party.

The recent PSA/K Congress in Kikwit (June

1963) was explicitly designed to renovate the

to recreate its rural apparatus,

looking toward the electoral campaign.

6 Alphonse Kithima, leader of one of the

major labor unions, Confederation des Syn-

dicats Libres Congolais (CSLC), has initiated

the Mouvement pour la Defense des Intérets

du Peuple, based upon his union organization.

This structure probably does not have enorm-

ous potential, but reflects the tendency of the

diverse elements in Adoula's entourage to

anticipate the formation of a national party

by launching their own movements as quickly

possible.

Adoula's approval of the project,

likely to become a link in any national party

under Adoula.

Numerous other lesser organizations need

not be catalogued. Individually, they are of very

little significance; collectively, they are im-

portant symptoms of the strong potential for

fragmentation inherent in the Congolese polity.

These scattered efforts to achieve a national

party may indicate that Adoula has given his

tacit assent to the simultaneous pursuit of

several initiatives. If so,

this may place

once again in the position of the in-

broker between these

indicating

nature of the leader-

ship which the

"party" is likely to have. It is

not the manner in which dynamic and success-

ful

national parties have been created else-

where in Africa.

The Bargaining Power of the Provinces

In organizing a national movement from

Leopoldville, one comes hard

against the in-

controvertible fact that, in most areas, access

to the electorate must pass through the groups

level. It would be unthinkable to seek to or-

ganize a party in competition with the Abako

Central; an

organizer

authorization of President

Mambaya would be summarily dealt with.

Therefore, the only possible procedure is to

negotiations with provincial, au-

thorities and

solicit their cooperation. Col-

laboration would come at a price. Provincial

authorities will certainly demand substantial

concessions to their list of provincial needs.

Further, the cooperation probably would be

in

the form of an electoral alliance, rather

than absorption into a national movement,

which would then be able to communicate di-

rectly with the masses. The kind of national

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party likely to emerge bears many resem-

blances

to an American political

party.

It

would be a loose coalition at the summit level

of a series of provincially based power centers.

Possible Coercive Instruments

of the Central Government Leaders

The central government possesses certain

potential instruments of coercion in the prov-

inces which might be of some use to national

party organizers. These include:

1) The ANC. The ANC has

sufficient level

of discipline and effectiveness

as a consta-

bulary in most areas for it to be a potentially

decisive force. Mobutu's concept of the ANC's

role in the elections is not clear. He has tried

hard to preserve the "apolitical" tradition of

the ANC, and this approach is shared by most

officers. Accordingly, he will

resist requests for overt commit-

ANC to one side or the other.

However, the army probably would prevent or

limit the use of intimidation and violence by

opposition

groups in the campaign. In some

areas, these techniques played an important

role for parties like MNC/L. The ANC could be

provinces where political

exists, depending upon how it chose

to intervene to halt likely disorders.

2) Sureté. In Nendaka's hands, this is an

overtly political instrument. The Sûreté has

the power of arrest and clandestine means

of intervening

in local situations. It is

under central control. The caliber

stantially from very good to mediocre.

3) Subsidy. The major part of the pro-

vincial budget comes from the central gov-

ernment, although this will change somewhat

under the new constitution. Theoretically, the

threat of a subsidy reduction should be a potent

weapon. However, an agreed, automatic formula

for calculating the subsidy level exists, and

there is not much room for central government

manipulation. In general, experience to date

rather than

leverage upon the provinces, the central.gov-

ernment permits those provinces which levy

the most effective demands or make the most

fearsome threats to extract the largest shares.

4) Import quotas. At the moment, these are

centrally determined. There is more room for

arbitrary decision and manipulation, but the

above remarks apply as well to import quotas

as to subsidies in general.

5) Patronage. The central government theo-

retically could reward well-behaved provinces

attractive public

works projects. The

situation limits the potential of this

approach, unless large

new infusions of for-

eign aid were

received.

possibilities, the central government can offer

jobs in Leopoldville to meritorious political

workers, but in fact controls very few appoint-

ments in the provinces. The central Civil Serv-

ice Ministry

still controls the promotion and

ranking of civil servants, on which basis pay

are calculated. There is, however, no

way of stopping the provinces from making

their own promotions and paying the persons

concerned from their own resources.

o) Judiciar

7. Pending adoption of the new

constitution,

the judicial system is still con-

trolled by the central government. In many

provinces, highly incriminating dossiers on a

number of political figures

(Bomboko)

could decide to pursue some of

cases. The judiciary values its neu-

trality, however, and would resist becoming

conscious political instrument. Further,

there are a good many moonlight entrepre-

neurs within the Leopoldville establishment.

The corruption issue is a two-edged sword.

of emergency. The central govern-

ment can declare a state of emergency in a

province and install a provincial government

A prerequisite for this

procedure is access to a faction in the pro-

vincial assembly. Where there is near unity

behind provincial leadership, this ploy is ex-

cluded. Unusual opportunities for intervention

at the time of the creation of new

provinces.

The central government appointed

commissioners

the new institutions. In Stanleyville and Bukavu,

for example,

power has been used

fectively. However, all but a few

central govern-

ment leverage will probably correspondingly

8) Disputed territories. It may be possible

to play one province against another in reach-

ing a decision

concerning the fate of the

numerous territories disputed between two or

three provinces. This, however, is a danger-

ous

game. In rewarding

one

province

gaining support from its

leaders,

one incurs

corresponding losses in the other..

The Electoral Law

The 1960 elections were organized under

the electoral law of March 23, 1960. The

law established the administrative districts

electoral units for the Chamber of Repre-

sentatives,

with the number of seats in a

district ranging from 4 to 12. For the pro-

vincial assemblies,

the territory served as

the

electoral

district,

with

an

average of

3 or 4 deputies elected per territory. The

choice of a proportional representation sys-

tem of voting for several seats for each elec-

toral unit was dictated in part by the ex-

perience of the 1957 urban elections. They had

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been based on single-member districts. In

Leopoldville and Elisabethville, a cohesive

and disciplined group of the population pro-

great discontent

by winning repre-

sentation far exceeding its numericalstrength.

Parties or individuals were permitted to

enter lists. The party had the responsibility

its candidates in order, perhaps

the most difficult task

parties. However, an unusual provision of the

voter to cast his ballot

either for a list or merely for one candidate

on the list. There was extensive solicitaton of

these "preferential votes" by individual candi-

dates on the party lists, a factor which under-

of party leadership.

Another feature of the law permitted the com-

bination of two or more districts in a prov-

ince into a single electoral. constituency. If

retained in a new electoral law,

would permit a winner-take -all

election, from

single dominant party

could emerge in control of a province..

supervision

were organized under

of the Congolese Executive

Colleges, which had been designated at the

Brussels Round Table.. Control

was exercised by special

missions, named by the King and headed by.

magistrates from Belgium. One commission

was created for

each administrative district.

on the basis of the 1960

the pre-inde-

that a new electoral law is neces-

for the organization of national elec-

to replace the initial Parliament, unless

will almost certainly not be the

number of serious difficulties will be

encountered

preparation

law. The creation of new

istrative subdivisions invalidate the 1960 elec-

toral districts. There have

population movements, especially in Kasai and

Katanga. Thus, the pre-1960 census figures

can no longer be utilized for establishing the

number of seats to which each province will

be entitled. The census machinery rests upon

the local authorities. Accordingly, the prov-

inces will

the collection

mation. The temptation to pad census results

will be almost irresistible; one

cite the inflated population

figures claimed

by the new provinces in their petitions

recognition

1962. All urban centers also

have experienced a tremendous influx of popu-

lation. There voting status will pose vexing

dilemmas. In addition,

with the removal of

administrative

controls on population move-

ments, cities like Leopoldville will experience

agonizing problems if contending parties bring

in battalions of voters from the countryside.

In the final analysis, control of the elections

probably will lie with provincial and local

authorities. The stake which the political elite

of the country has in the elections cannot

be over-emphasized. Because of its impact

on the outcome of elections, the electoral law

certainly

will be a major concern for all po-

litical leaders.

Conclusions

A new electoral campaign would run the

risk of creating

in many areas

of the country at a time when

tranquility is at last returning to almost the

nation. Disorder is not likely where

effective provincial administrations are op-

erating. However, there is sufficient political

confusion or latent local hostility to create

a real threat to security in the following

provinces: Lac Leopold

I1, Moyen Congo,

Hant Congo, Maniema, Kivu Central, Katanga

Oriental, Nord-Katanga, Sud-Congo (Lualaba);

Sankuru, Sud-Kasai,

Luluabourg (Kasai Cen-

tral), and Unité Kasaienne. In addition, nearly

disputed territories would be powder

kegs during an electoral campaign.

It is not likely that there would be eruptions

at all these points. However,

even a few of them would severely strain the

ANC. Especially dangerous, in our view, is

productive area

southern Katanga. The threat there is a latent

problem stemming from the complete political

vacuum in both Katanga Oriental (East Katanga)

and Sud-Congo (Lualaba). It is not at all certain

that this danger will have been removed by

The organizers of a national party will be

not commanders, of the support of

provincial leaders. The advantages which the

latter enjoy sitting athwart the lines of com-

munication to the electorate would not be

compensated

for in an electoral campaign

by any corresponding weapon of intimidation

the hands of the present leaders of the

government. Thus, if it comes into

existence, the national party will be a loose

between Leopoldville leaders and

leaders of provincial governments.

A moderate national party

would probably

labor under the onus of identification with

the American Embassy-even if there were

active US encouragement and support for

such a party. Conceivably a united opposition

group might be built around an anti-Ameri-

can theme, offering the Soviets opportunities

for electoral involvement.

If, however,

a loosely organized, radical,

national opposition

party

emerged

in

re-

action to the national moderate

movement,

it would be hampered by a) pressures which

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provincial leaders aligned

with the nation-

al moderate party could apply, and b) the likely

use of

the ANC in many areas to suppress

disorderly radical political activity. Sections

of a radically oriented party

are most likely

to emerge in provinces

where effective

gov-

ernment does not yet

such

exist. In those areas

a party could

candidates

pose a

serious threat to

of the

moderate

national

party

who

are likely to be exposed to physical

dangers.

Because it would be, in fact, a loose coali-

tion between

central and provincial govern-

ment

leaders, a

moderate

national

party

would likely dissolve into its component units

shortly after the elections and

would thus

lack the power to promote national integra-

tion or the capacity to link the central

gov-

ernment and the population at large. Manage-

ment of Parliament would continue to be

an

exasperating process; the

new

party would

not give Adoula (or

a successor) the

dis-

ciplined majority

Parliament necessary

for dynamic executive leadership under

Rough Estimate of Possible Popular Yote Favoring Moderate

National Political Party in 1964 Elections a (as of June 1963)

Former District New Province

Population of

Former District

Number of

Deputies

Kwilu

Kwango

3as Congo l

Cataractes

Ubangi

Mongala

Equater

Tshuapa

Ituri

Bas-Uélés (

Haut-Ueles 1

Tanganika

Kabinda

Kwilu

Kwango

Kongo Central

Ubangi

Moyen Congo

Cuvette Centrale

Kibali-Ituri

North Katanga

Lomami and Sud-Kasai

1, 148

466

1412

1439

517

€ 520

1312

$652

46c

582

397

480

90

4(A

4

4(A)

parliamentary regime.

However,

moderate

national party under

present.: Leopoldville

leaders

and with the

backing of

core group of provincial lead-

ers from stable areas who

enjoy relatively

firm control over their local electorate prob-

ably would

emerge

with

a narrow majority

of seats in Parliament, obviating the danger,

at least for the time being, of a more extreme

replacement for Adoula. In the accompanying

table, we propose a very rough approximation

of the votes a moderate national party might

obtain in 1964 elections on the basis of present

trends. There are a number of areas; like

Kongo

Central, where the results are pre-

ordained.

There are others,

like South Ka-

tanga, where prediction is

virtually impos-

sible. The disputed territories and the failure

of the new

provinces to coincide with the

old

districts make

it impossible to know

exactly how many representatives each prov-

ince will have.

Thus, no mathematical pre-

cision is claimed for this table; we are adrift

on a sea of approximation:

6 (P)

4 LA

6

4

8d

66(4 4)=70€

a. Based on population figures for former districts of the ex-Belgiar

Congo, tables 1 and 2, pp. 133, 134, Tableau Géneral de la Démo

graphie Congolaise, Ministry of Plan and Economic Coordination

Statistical Services, Leopoldville, July 1961.

double the size of the lower house.

• Because PSA/Gizenga continues to have popular support among

egment of the Kwilu Province population, the estimated number c

deputies has been reduced by 2.

• Migration since 1960 of Baluba populations from Katanga, Unit

asalenne and Kasai Central (Luluabourg) to Sud-Kasai has re

sulted in an important increase in the population of that area. The

estimated number of deputies accordingly has been increased by 3.

e. There are nominally 137 seats in the lower house; hence 70 seats

would provide a narrow majority for the national party.

37

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VII. THE POLITICS OF FORCE:

CONGOLESE NATIONAL ARMY (ANG), POLICE, AND SURETÉ

The role of force necessarily looms large

quest. Nor could the Congo Free State long

in a political community like the Congo, which

bear the cost of recruiting

"auxiliaries" along

lacks a consensus, a sense of nationalidentity,

the West Coast of Africa or in Zanzibar. The

adequate legitimation for its political

Congo had to be quickly organized "to con-

structures. Indeed, the military throughout the

quer itself." Although the Force Publique was

underdeveloped world until recently had been

formally founded in 1888, by 1897 it numbered

greatly underestimated. As Lucien Pye ob-

14,000 men of whom 12,000 were Congolese.

Throughout most of its existence, its strength

over 20,000. The European

Only a few years ago it was generally

future of the

would be determined

largely by the activities of their West-

ernized intellectuals, their socialistically

inclined bureaucrats, their nationalist rul-

ing parties, and possibly their menacing

Communist parties.

students of

the underdeveloped regions

that the military might become the critical

group in the course of national-building. 19

complement of officers and non-commissioned

officers was small. During the most difficult

part of the conquest, the Arab Wars of 1892-

1894, there were

only 120 Europeans

with

the army in all of the Congo. In 1960, about

1,100 European officers and non-coms

charge of 24,000 African non-coms

, In the stages of political development, there

are of positive

indicates that the army is ubiquitous, recruits

from all parts of the country, and, most im-

portant of all, is national in its symbolism 20 Pye

adds that armies as rationalized structures

are capable of relating means to ends. 21

The experience of military service provides

a mechanism for an intensive acculturative

experience for the recruit,

and a shift from

The good

soldier, in short, becomes a modernized man.

The structure of discipline in the army pro-

vides a relatively high degree of psychological

security. Acculturation in the army proceeds

in a very different environment from that of

urban center with

its anxieties and ten-

The ANC and Its Anteçedent

The nature of the Force Publique, the pred-

ecessor of the ANC, was sharply different from

that of other armies in tropical Africa. Unlike

Britain, France, and Portugal, Belgium

no metropolitan troops for the colonial

19. "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization," in John

Johnson (ed.), The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped_Ceu-

tries, 1962.

20. "The Military in the Political Development of the New States,"

ibid, p. 32.

21. Ibid, p. 74.

scrambling. The Belgians endured

a searing experience when in 1895 the "Bate-

tela" tribesmen

of the Luluabourg garrison

commanding of-

"Batetela" in the Dhanis column

the Nile revolted in 1897.

Boma in 1900 was again

"Batetela".

from these experiences was that. the army

had to be ethnically integrated very carefully

to prevent domination by any single ethnic

group at any unit level, even the squad. The

army with its very small corps of expatriate

officers could be a secure instrument only if

it were so scrambled that no group resistance

could emerge. Discipline could then operate

on the individual, who by himself posed little

Belgians could bank

postulate that being Congolese or even Afri-

can would be an insufficient factor of solidarity

for the Negro troop tò unite against the white

The impetus for ethnic integration received

renewed life

Luluabourg garrison

again mutinied in 1944. The inquiries on this

disaster showed there had been dereliction in

the application of the scrambling principle.

Instructions

four tribes had to be represented in each

In the early days, the Free State tended to

concentrate its recruiting

soldiers among

so-called "martial races," the "Bangala,"

Batetela-Bakusu, and Azande tribes. The great

mutinies showed the dangers of this policy to

the colonial system, and later levies were

distributed throughout the Congo. Thus

1960, the composition of the army, probably

more than any other institution, including the

civil service, reflected the ethnic composi-

38

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tion of the population as a whole.

Loyalty

the

nation. There was consid-

erable effort to instill in the Force Publique

loyalty

to itself and to the symbols

of the

colony, such

as the

Belgian crown. "Congo

ni, pays fort" was the

slogan of the army

indoctrination was carried

out through an active

troop information pro-

gram, newspapers, and veterans' associations.

Much of this esprit was assimilated by the

troops, and it. is very visible in the attitudes

of the officer

corps today. The army is not

partial to the pan-African brand of national-

ism, but it has a loyalty to the whole Con-

golese political community exceeding that of

"another sectors of Congolese society.

French had an entirely

field. Africa

garded as a vast manpower reservoir for the

French Army. In War War I France mobilized

181,000 tropical. African troops. Even during

peacetime,

in the military. However, the military organi-

zation was

not related

to the. territorial

which later became

separately inde-

The bulk of the

soldiers came from

the interior, rather than the coastal regions.

In areas formerly under British rule, only

an army of its own. However, re-

cruitment in West and East Africa provided

at least the embryos of national armies. In

West Africa, enlisted ranks were recruited

mainly in the northern regions, especially of

Ghana and Nigeria. The small African ele-

ment in the officer

corps came mostly from

regions, where education

the Congo army

much more

military forces. The careful ethnic integra-

tion and sense of national mission enhanced

its potential role in the nation-building pro-

The failure of political parties

representative institutions to develop in the

Congo set the stage for a de facto abdication

civil service and the army. In the rest

of independent tropical Africa,

far tipped in the other direction.

political sector has

substantially

better organized, and the armies much less

The Shock of Independence

The events of independence shook the Congo-

lese National Army (ANC) to its very founda-

tions. Overnight the Belgian exodus removed the

whole of its officer corps. Soon thereafter,

the emergence of four separate armies re-

flected the political fragmentation of the Congo.

In 1960-1961 leaderless bands of mutineers

committed atrocities

without number.

The

new Congolese officers had a daily battle to

restore discipline. Nothing is more destructive

a successful mutiny; the

of the entire Congolese army against

officer corps

is a virtually unique phe-

immediate cause for the breakdown in

the obstinacy of its last Eu-

ropean commander, General

refused. any real acceleration in the

canization program he had devised. At the

end of 1958, when Belgian policy-makers were

counting on

independence in five years, a

scheme was announced that would have pro-

duced 14 second lieutenants in ten years. Prep-

aration was literally from the cradle up. The

candidates, in the initial

chosen in primary school. Some meager ad-

ditional concessions were made in the months

before independence, in the face of a growing

malaise in the army. However, these were

hopelessly out of touch with the psychological

requirements of power transfer. The new of-

ficers were to be newly recruited, not selected

from the

non-coms. Under

this

plan

there

would have been no Congolese officers before

Against this background the troops grimly

were available in civilian sectors and which

did not share. The disintegration of

the colonial order had

almost constant action for

also had been the object of intensive

solicitation by political leaders, who feared

that in the hands of European officers it would

be a neo-colonial instrument.

On July 5 the ANC mutiny began. On July

8 General Janssens was relieved of his com-

mand. Two days later the Congo government

to Africanize the entire

Victor Lundula was named Com-

of general,

and Joseph-Désire Mobutu was named a colonel

and. Chief-of-Staff. This formula reversed the

Belgian plan through a massive promotion of

the non-commissioned grades. Apparently the

authorities: hoped

only to exercise

some control over the nomination of field

grade officers. Company grade officers were

chosen by the

themselves, ap-

parently by elections where there was more

one non-com who was a logical candi-

date. On July 9 government delegations were

sent to different parts of the Congo to superin-

tend the installation of the new officers.

During the following months the ANC was

for the most part a

"disorderly rabble." The

new officers had little authority over their

troops. Political figures tried to make use of

bands of soldiers

from their regional or

ethnic groups. A result of this disintegration

was. Mobutu's.coup d'etat of September, which

was made possible by his firm control over

a very small number of men. The bulk of the

39

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army

was capable of united action only in

support

regular pay and in resistance

UN moves to disarm

the ANC. In the

chaos

reigning in Leopoldville at that time, Mobutu's

ability to position

a few hundred disciplined,

armed men

proved

sufficient to seize power.

Lundula was

dismissed by

Kasavubu at the

same

time

as Lumumba. Lundula did not. im-

mediately resist

the move, enabling Mobutu

to move into

the top spot and ten days later

to proclaim his coup.

Mobutu's Emergence

Mobutu energetically set to work providing

officer corps

could depend and which had some rudimentary

training. Only a minimum of Belgian assistance

was available.

After the mutiny, only seven

Belgian officers, three of whom

were chap-

remained with the troops.

able to exercise some in-

fluence over

the designation of officers in the

Leopoldville, Equateur, and Luluabourg gar-

risons, which gave him relatively secure con-

trol over a portion of the army. In Stanley-

ville, the struggle for the 3rd groupement was

crucial to the power contest between Limumb-

ist elements,

seeking to regroup at Stanley-

ville, and those elements disposed to accept

the authority of the College of Commissioners

at Leopoldville. The contest lasted from Sep-

tember to November 1960, with the Lumumbists

finally winning.

On November 26, 1960, General

Lundula arrived in Stanleyville and took com-

mand. Shortly thereafter, the Gizenga govern-

ment announced its claim to be the

sole legal

authority, with Lundula and the 3rd groupement

under its orders. Thus, by the end

of 1960, the

ANC had broken into two groups, one at Stanley -

ville under Lundula, and one at Leopoldville

under Mobutu.

Meanwhile, South Kasai and

Katanga had created new armies from scratch.

No less than four armies roamed the land.

fragments of the

Leopoldville group by

somewhat better led and disciplined.

The heart of Mobutu's

man paracommando battalion stationed at Leo-

poldville. The other detachments at Leopold-

ville and Thysville were also under reasonable

control. By

1961 the troops in Equateur had

ceased to be a serious menace.

Lundula's army. Lundula himself is an offi-

cer of considerable wisdom and integrity. His

allegiance to Stanleyville undoubtedly grew

from a sincere conviction that legality lay with

the Stanleyville government. In Stanleyville he

faced several handicaps:

1) Although Leopoldville continued paying

this insurrectionary group, wages often did

not reach outlying units, especially in Kivu,

North Katanga, and northeast Kasai.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

2) Lundula's control over much of his

army was

tenuous. He never

was

able to

check the units in

Kivu, Kasai,

and North

Katanga. Even among those in Orientale, he

faced

the

problem

of

"political

officers,"

who were

susceptible to direct influence by

Gizenga and

other MNC/L leaders. He op-

posed politicization of the 3rd groupement,

but could not prevent it.

• 3) Lundula lacked access to external ma-

terial support. Beginning in 1961 the benefits

of the

overseas

training

of the new ANC

loyal to Leopoldville began to be

ceived some foreign assistance in the form of

military equipment.

The Katanga gendarmerie. In Katanga, the

first act of the

Tshombe government was to

call in Belgian troops to disarm and expel

detachments.

Crèvecoeur,

created at top speed; starting from a nucleus of

only 300 former Force Publiqué troops ethni-

cally compatible with

the Conakat regime.

substantial Belgian technical as-

sistance. All of the 25 small aircraft of the

Force Publique were flown to Katanga and

placed at Tshombe's disposal. By early Sep-

tember 1960 the Katanga gendarmerie had

received 100 tons of arms and munitions, 89

officers from the Force Publique, 326 junior

officers and non-coms from the Belgian army

who volunteered for detached service in Ka-

70 agents of the Belgian gendar-

merie. Beginning

in late 1960 European mer-

were recruited for a special

ternational company"; by mid-1961 there was

said to be nearly 500 of these. The exact total

strength of the Katanga gendarmerie is not

known. Estimates range from 11,000 to 19,000.

South Kasai army. The kingdom of

South Kasai also organized its own gendar-

In 1961 it had some 3,000 men and

assisted by nine European

"general"

youth, Floribert Dinanga.

Reunification of the ANC

One of the most difficult problems in

re-

unifying the Congo has been knitting together

the military fragments. In the case of the two

wings of the ANC, a major obstacle was the

question

of who

was

the "legal" Com-

mander, Lundula or Mobutu. The government

of reconcilation emerging from the Lovanium

parliament did not immediately resolve the

problem. It was not until November 1961 that

Lundula agreed to

come to Leopoldville to

accept Mobutu's authority as Commander.

When he did, however; the end was in sight

for Gizenga's campaign to re-establish a dis-

sident power center at Stanleyville. In De-

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cember 1961 Lundula cooperated with

central government in dismantling the

of Gizengist officers in Bukavu that was a

constant threat to public order. It was Lun-

dula who finally arrested Gizenga in

uary 1962. Thus the last major center of

ANC dissidence was eliminated. Slowly, dur-

course of 1962, "political officers"

3rd groupement were transferred. The

accelerated in late 1962 when

replaced by

energetic Col. Leonard Mulamba.

Absorption

of the South Kasai gendarmes

insuperable

mid-1963 the majority were integrated

remainder

apparently

join the ANC if they so desire.

Mobutu has opposed complete integration

gendarmes.

numerous that the ethnic regional balance of

the ANC would be upset. Approximately 1,300

have been brought into the ANC. The rest

are presumably now "technologically unem-

ANC Gendarmerie Function

Of great political importance is the fact

contrast to

the general practice

former French Africa, the ANC is responsible

not only for external security, but also serves

as a national gendarmerie. This means that

in addition to being stationed in approximately

12 major military camps, ANC detachments

are posted on gendarme

in each of

125 territories. Ironically, during the

1954-1959 period there was a prolonged de-

within the colonial

administration on

whether the gendarmerie role should be re-

assigned to the territorial police, under pro-

this debate. Had the decision been other-

would be little real power left

to the central government. Since to

date the external security mission is largely

theoretical, the key function of the army re-

mains its constabulary role.

The Security Problem

Evaluating the role of the ANC in the po-

system entails examination of the Con-

The Congo alone of

states has experienced bloodshed on

scale since independence. There

is no way to estimate the violent deaths since

1960. No one will

ever know, for example,

died in North Katanga. A reason-

able guess would

be about 100,000 for the

as. a whole, including perhaps 100

Europeans.

examine the categories

and proceed

analysis of the

present dimensions of the disorder threat.

Post-independence violence can be usefully

divided into several categories:

1) Anti-European Acts

a) Violence associated with the July 1960

the most part, the civilian

population did not participate in these atro-

cities, except in the Bas-Congo and the Ishuapa

District of Equateur. Actual deaths were few;

less than two dozen Europeans lost their lives.

Men were forced to walk barefoot and were

spat upon. Women were violated in the presence

and children. Priests and

and wanton cruelty

of mob behavior, but their symbolic humilia-

European colonial society is also

b) Abuses and intimidation of various sorts

the Kashamura regime in

Kivu, January-March 1961. There were few

casualties,

but the entire European popula-

tion crossed the border into Ruanda.

c) A narrowly averted St. Bartholomew's

Day massacre in Stanleyville when the news

of Lumumba's assassination became known.

European popula-

tion of Stanleyville (about 1,500) on that

February night.

d) Acts of savagery in Luluabourg, Kindu,

and Kongolo, November 1961-January 1962.

These are all directly linked with the abortive

ANC invasion of Katanga. In Luluabourg

search for a radio set which had been trans-

mitting to Katanga information on ANC troop

movements degenerated into a drunken orgy

of rape and looting. In Kindu 13 Italian avia-

tors, suspected of being Belgian parachutists,

were slaughtered, cut into small pieces, and

eaten (the present Minister of Finance in the

government reportedly

partook of the feast). In Kongolo 16 Catholic

were massacred, purportedly

for their Conakat sympathies. These incidents

demonstrated the danger constituted by ANC

units when under the tensions of combat. They

had a pervasive fear of "'Belgian paratroopers"

and European mercenaries.

e) Southern Katanga. Since the arrival in the

area of the ANC

following

Katanga in January 1963, there has been a

series of incidents,

and several Europeans

have been killed. Individual acts, the killings

have not involved collective rampages as did

earlier ANC incidents. The ANC retains a

deep-seated fear and hostility toward Ka-

tanga's European population. ANC troops re-

call that European troops earlier threw the

ANC out of Katanga. European officers and

mercenaries were

the backbone of the Ka-

tanga gendarmerie, which inflicted a series

of humiliating defeats on the ANC, notably at

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2) Anti-civilian Acts

a) The ANC invasion of Sud Kasai in August

1960 degenerated into a massacre of several

thousand Baluba.

gendarmes

against Baluba irregulars in North Katanga in

September 1960. After a brief, UN-imposed

lull in December-March,

sumed until it was again halted by the UN in

late April 1961. Apparently

20,000 civilians were slaughtered.

c) Serious hostilities broke out between

the ANC and irregulars of the Ngweshi (Bashi

tribe) dynasty (Kivu) in March and May 1961.

The number of deaths was reported as 800.

The South Kasai gendarmerie caused

during incursions in the

Dimbelegne-Lake Mukamba area of Kasai in

e) ANC patrols acted similarly in the

area shortly thereafter.

f) In April 1962 approximately 70 casual-

ensued from ANC operations in

a local insurrection by a religious

sect, mpeve, near Mangai, Kwilu.

3) Recent ANC Incidents.

In 1963 there have been three major incidents

the ANC: at Kakenge (near Mweka)

in Unité Kasaienne, in the area west of the

Bushimaya River in

Sud-Kasai, and in Boma,

Kongo Central.

a) Kakenge. There were a reported 400

death, including those of the two Europeans,

in these incidents. The blame for this violence

Lulua Chief Kalamba

and the present Lulua-

bourg government. Kalamba, in a radio speech

September 17, called for the Lulua to press

outward in several directions to expand the

Luluabourg provincial boundaries. Two Euro-

murdered by Kalamba's thugs.

The UN magistrate in Luluabourg has in his

a letter from Luluabourg Presi-

an ocolyte of Kalamba,

ordering the assassination. When armed bands

youth pressed toward the Mweka

area, which had been awarded to Unité Kasai-

enne province, the ANC intervened. A patrol

ambushed, and several

killed. At this point,

the ANC intervention

became brutal. But the brutality

voked, and the action was clearly in preserva-

tion of law and order and to put down an

insurrectionary act.

b) Sud-Kasai. In January 1963 ANC patrols

dispatched to deal with armed bands

of youthful supporters of former South Kasai

Albert Kalonji

that were roaming

the

countryside. (Their arms reportedly had been

provided by Luluabourg Minister Mukenge, a

close relative of Chief Kalamba of Lulua-

bourg.) The ANC was attacked and went on a

rampage. Casualty estimates range trom su

indisputable

that villages

a large area were burned and that the

entire population fled into the bush. In this

instance the ANC was acting on behalf of

constituted government of Sud-

Kasai, but its brutality seemed out of pro-

portion to the seriousness of the provocation.

c) Boma. In March

1963 a riot occurred

between ANC troops and

were a number of in-

but no deaths. Triggered by a banal

incident involving a parrot and some women

based on latent

hostility that had

been developing for some

The intensely self-conscious Bakongo

tribesmen at Boma regarded the ANC as

"Bangala go home" slogans were scrawled on

walls. Local hotels, the

ANC alleged, refused

lodging to officers. Soldiers

recreational activity to which

accustomed. At the

same time,

administrative demotion

a district to a territory, which followed the

creation of the new provinces, resulted in a

claim by the ANC commander that he out-

ranked the territoral administrator. Mutual

smoldering grievances ignited. The transfer

of the local ANC

commander and the

of joint local police-ANC patrols

seem to have considerably reduced the tension.

These recent incidents do not constitute evi-

of generalized indiscipline in the army.

There is a sharp contrast between the inci-

dents in Kasai, where the ANC was guilty of

an excess of brutality in defense of legally

constituted government, and the anarchic acts

of 1960-1961, where the ANC was a threat

to legal government.

4) Political Assassination.

There was a wave of murders in Elisabeth-

ville, Bakwanga,

and Stanleyville in February

1961. Although

there had been

a number of

crimes of this nature in late 1960, the virtually

simultaneous execution of 26 leading figures

in early 1961 represented the real low point

of the Congo crisis. Since then, this technique

has generally ceased to be used, except for

two members of Tshombe's cabinet who died

under mysterious circumstances. A symptom

of the total impasse of the political system at

that time, the situation has now clearly changed.

5) Ethnic Clashes

Tribal disorders on a massive and serious

scale have been restricted mainly to ex-Kasai

42

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Province.

There,

conflict was triggered by

Lulua- Baluba

animosity, with peripheral

groups drawn into the maelstrom. The bulk of

the disorders have been on the fringes of the

homelands of these two large, aggressive

groups.

The most recent example of disorder in this

category occurred in Sankuru Province in May

1963. The hostilities there involved two sub-

groups of the Batetela ethnic

cluster, whose

principal differentiating element (see chapter

II)

seems

to be

whether or not they were

subjected

to acculturative

contact with the

Zanzibar

Arabs in

the late 19th century.

Trouble of this sort may reoccur in many

areas

an effort is not made

to settle the

question of the disputed territories.

6) Present Security Threats

Southern Katanga is the only area

of the

Congo where security remains a matter of im-

mediate concern. Hostility between the ANC

and

the Katanga Europeans remains sharp,

and there is a threat of serious incidents,

possibly leading to a European exodus when

the UN troop buffer is removed.

The whole of ex-Kasai province remains

an area for concern, but

disorder there is

less of a threat to the fundamental stability

of the country. Security of the main rail line

will become

copper again is exported on this route. How-

the UN forces have never been able to

the sort of disorder which occurred

in Kasai. Accordingly, UN troop withdrawal

from Kasai may not make an important dif-

The ANC as a Force Promoting Stability

Although the exact figures are unknown at

the present time, the ANC has about 35,000

men. On the whole, and excluding troops in

southern Katanga, the ANC has been a posi-

tive element in

the political system. It has

developed a nucleus of officers of real ability.

It retains

the vital principle of ethnic inte-

at all levels, which operates

munize it against local and political influences

and gives

it. a commitment to the nation that

is shared by

few elements of Congolese so-

ciety. In most areas, sufficient discipline has

been restored so that it is

not a real threat

to the expatriate population or to the govern-

ment. It is capable in many áreas of

acting

as an adequate constabulary in the interests

central government. It would be of little

use in protecting

the Congo from external

-- but there is no pressing immediate

to be more than a constabulary

force.

ANC Retraining

Plans for retraining the ANC are finally

crystallizing. A retraining program was drawn

up by a US

Special Military Advisory Team

headed by Col. Michael Greene. 22 Although the

program has gone through several'subsequent

metamorphoses, many of its salient features

report concluded that key em-

should be placed upon the training of

the officer corps:

In the final analysis, the ANC can ac-

complish its own basic individual and unit

raining provided that it receives

sistance in training

increased number of foreign military ad-

specific positions, in-

creased school quotas in foreign officer

.and specialist schools, observer/orien-

in foreign countries,

some material and equipment support

to fill known gaps and to effect modern-

Following abortive efforts to obtain from the

UN a commitment to coordinate ANC retrain-

ing, an ad hos consortium was devised to carry

out the program. Belgium agreed to provide

over 100 officers to train the ANC; Israel

undertook to provide paratroop instruction in

Israel; and the

United States will furnish

equipment and other material support. Several

other

countries, including Italy, interested

in aiding in ANC and other military training,

subsequently may make firm commitments.

Because under current plans the bulk of the

training personnel will be supplied by Belgium,

the program

presumably will bear a strong

Belgian stamp. As a result of prolonged un-

extent of international

cooperation in the scheme, the precise details

have remained vague. However, there appar-

ently has been considerable divergence of views

among interested parties as to how the retrain-

ing would operate. On one hand, a simple rein-

forcement of technical, consultative personnel

in headquarters positions was recommended.

On the other; the placement of Belgian officers

in the regular command structure of the ANC,

even down to the small unit level, has been

proposed. Until very recently, the Belgian

while the ANC leaders preferred to

use Belgian personnel as advisers.

If real value is to be derived from the re-

training program, the

foreign role must

beyond a mere presence behind headquarters

22. Report of Social NiTE Advisor Team, Republic of the Canes,

July 23, 1962. (CONFIDENTIAL)

43

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desks. However, there is no possibility that

tions without engendering very serious tensions

among both the officers and the troops.

Congolese officers are insecure in their new

status and are keenly opposed to any infringe-

ment of their prerogatives. Therefore, a care-

ful delineation of the Belgian officers' relation-

ships with the ANC officer corps is crucial.

A model of effective operation is provided by

Col. Dekoster in Stanleyville. He never left in

1960, and he has

worked unobtrusively

Col. Mulamba, the Stanleyville commander. It

is generally recognized that he made a major

contribution to the re-establishment of disci-

in the 3rd groupement, without ever

seeking to intervene directly.

The notion of retraining, we believe, should

be viewed in perspective. At times "retraining"

seems to have ben discussed as a redemptive

process to produce a profound metamorphosis

in the ANC. It is probably a mistake, however,

the program in terms of a "before"

and "after" caricature. Without the program

the army has already made considerable pro-

gress: toward restoring its discipline

developing a command structure. The more

intensive dose of technical assistance, which

the retraining program essentially entails, will

probably make a real contribution to the accele-

ration of this regenerative process. However,

the ANC will not become

effective army. The ANC will continue

brutal-as it

was under the Belgian admin-

istration. Its interventions will result in un-

necessarily high casualties among the civilian

population. Retraining's chief accomplishment

is likely to be consolidation of the gains al-

ready made in placing in the hands of the central

government

reliable

constabulary

force

capable of maintaining domestic order and pre-

serving the supremacy of central power.

The ANC Officer Corps

The ANC officer corps is a relatively un-

known. elite group of considerable potential

political importance. The officers constitute

a very special sociological group. Both before

and after independence they have been very

far removed from the administrative

geoisie which rules in the political spheres.

In the, Force Publique, the career noncoms

lived with their families

in military camps.

They were seldom posted to their home areas

and generally were transferred too frequently

of relationships

their garrision areas. Soldiers frequently took

wives from outside their own tribes. With the

exceptions of Generals Mobutu and Lundula,

virtually the only top officers who were brought

back from civilian

officers of the

ANC have not been involved in the social-po-

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

litical circuits of Leopoldville.or the provincial

capitals. Lundula was in the Force Publique

for only 30 months during World War II, and

Mobutu left in 1956, after seven years' service.

As a whole; the officer corps is apolitical.

political elements present in the 3rd

groupement during the

Gizenga regime

Stanleyville have been removed or neutralized.

evidence. of the militant,

nationalism advocated by the officer

corps in the Middle East and in some other

areas, although this may emerge among the

new generation of officers, and it was pres-

ent in elementary form among those purged

rom the sra groupement. However, the arm

pentality today is that of the technocrat, no

the political organizer.

For analytical purposes, the officer corps

may be divided into four categories:

1) A small group of former sergeants per-

sonally loyal to Mobutu, and with long serv-

ice in the Force Publique. These number no

They are typified by Col.

Louis Bobozo, who was designated ANC com-

mander in reintegrated Katanga. Bobozo has

more than 30 years of military service and

entered the army at a time when little educa-

tion was available. He has an imposing mili-

tary presence. However, he lacks the educa-

and imagination to exercise effectively

a top-level command responsibility.

better-edu-

These are exemplified by such dynamic and

capable officers as Maj. Joseph ("The Ter-

rible"') Ishatshi,

who organized the famous

paracommando

battalion; Col. Leonard Mu-

lamba, commander of the 3rd groupement in

Stanleyville;

23 year-old Chief-of-Staff. This group seems

the old sergeants, who played

1960-1962 period.

very little experience

the Congo, since Mobutu has never

able to spare its members for pro-

longed periods. Yet they clearly have suf-

icient education to benefit greatly from ad-

vanced officer courses abroad.

3) There are more than

300 very young

officers, with little military. service but with

substantially

more formal

education, who,

since 1960, have received several

of training in Belgium or elsewhere. Seven-

teen have completed the Belgian military aca-

demy program.

Clear signs are visible of a coming con-

flict between these men and the older, former

non-coms. The elders point to the.

lack. of

practical field experience of the new officers

and

insist that they can achieve responsible.

positions

only after a prolonged apprentice-

ship. The new officers are equally convinced

44

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of their superior endowments in education

and training and are frustrated to find access

to high rank blocked by former non-coms.

4) A. substantial group of mediocre officers

into none of the above categories. They

most nearly

comparable

category 2 above, but lack leadership abili-

The Sûreté

personnel

varies

from excellent to very

poor, the Sûreté

has

emerged

a potent

instrument under effective

central govern-

• ment

control.

possesses

own

com-

munications

It

its

network

and. has

come to

work

increasingly closely with the ANC. The Sûrete

has the power of arrest and the capability for

involvement in a broad range of sub rosa

activities. Its excellent files on the dubious

financial transactions of many political figures

provide another element of leverage. A main

arbiter

in

Leopoldville, the Stirete

is also

a crucila instrument of the central govern-

ment in limiting the extent of provincial au-

tonomy.

instrument available to

central government

the Sûreté. In

this omnipresent, clandestine

force had the mission of preserving internal

security and overseeing immigration and the

movements of persons. It had 81 European

agents and an enormous network of occasional

"informers.".

The official

actual role has altered vastly.

The potential of the Sûreté was early recog-

nized by Lumumba, who put one of his trusted

lieutenants in charge. The Sûreté was ordered

to report directly to the Prime Minister's

rather than to the Ministry of the

Interior. Since no Congolese had access: to

the inner circle of Sûreté operations be-

fore 1960, the

independent government had

mumba was not in power long enough to ad-

very far in this task, although in the

operated under the

September: 1960 the College of Com-

missioners

entrusted .the

direction of the

Sûreté to Victor Nendaka. From the outset,

Nendaka, a resolute

man who has

good. use the Belgian

and US support

he has received, established the special branch

autonomous agency. He first consoli-

structure in Leopoldville. By late

1961 the Sûreté began to operate effectively

in the provinces.

A major crisis arose when MNC/L leader

Christophe Gbenye became Minister of the

Interior in the first Adoula government. He

made a determined effort to bring the Surete

under his control. In December 1961 he an-

nounced that Nendaka had been relieved. How-

ever, Nendaka responded by surrounding the

Interior Ministry

with his agents, and Gbenye

defeat. Since then, there has

been no real challenge to the autonomous posi-

tion of the Sûreté and its direct relationshipto

At present, the Sûreté has

estimated

168 persons

inner network.

detachments are present in

every provincial

capital. In all cases but one, the chief provin-

cial Sûreté agent is not a native of the prov-

• ince in which he serves. Although the calibre

The Police

The other important instrument of coercion

available in the Congo is the provincial police.

The one element of force in the hands of

provincial authorities, the police are a major

factor in the evolving relationship between

the provinces and the central government.

The present provincial police

outgrowth of the pre-independence Territorial

Police. Organized in 1926 as a corps distinct

from the Force Publique, and specially trained

for the responsibilities normally vested in a

police force,

it reflected the growing com-

plexity of colonial society after the pacifica-

tion phase. With the emergence of provincial

urban centers, the necessity arose for a force

trained in

the enforcement of criminal law

and in policing the rapidly expanding African

quarters surrounding

the European outposts.

Two important procedures were adopted that

have decisively affected the role of the police

in the independent Congo:

1) The police forces were placed under the

direct authority of the provincial

rather than the Governor-General, thus es-

tablishing the tradition of a provincial, rather

than a national, role.

2) Recruitment has been local rather than

national. Unlike the ANC, the police forces

are directly related to the populations which

they serve.

During the colonial period, a detachment of

commissioner and under the authority of the

Territorial Administrator, was posted at each

territorial seat. Unarmed local police als

were recruited and commanded by the chiefs o1

the Circonscriptions Indigènes (CI). These de-

tachments were in addition to the Force Pub-

lique platoons, and the exact delineation of the

respective jurisdictions of the territorial and

CI police was always somewhat blurred.

usually remained near a figure of

6,000. In the year 'before independence there

was a sharp increase. By early 1960 the force

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included 8,927 Congolese police and 272 Bel-

gian commissioners. There were no Congolese

police

commissioners. before

independence,

and no

serious plan was elaborated for

ac-

celerated training.

Although in 1960 there

the police comparable to that of the ANC, the

disorders of independence hit the police harder

than it did the army. Nearly all the police

commissioners-except those in Katanga-left.

Thus the force was as leaderless as the ANC,

although not as a result of its own insub-

ordination. Belgian sources who have worked

with the

police estimate that half the 1960

force was absorbed into the ANC during

the

large-scale army recruitment in 1960-1962.

The army offered better and more regular

pay. African police commissioners were desig-

nated by the provincial Ministers of the

In-

terior, frequently on a political basis. In this

respect the police stand in sharp contrast to

the ANC, where political criteria played very

little role in the massive promotions of 1960.

The present status and possible reorganiza-

tion of the police form the subject of a recent

1963 in the Congo. Although re-

figures on present strength are un-

available, the AID team estimates there are

about 22,000 police. Most of the police, unlike

the army, have been recruited since 1960 and

have never known the training or discipline

of the old Territorial Police. Dressed in

shabby uniforms

frequently under in-

competent or

venal leadership, the police are

a sorry force.

In many areas

provincial authorities have

used police forces

as an avowedly political

instrument. One

example is the

recent in-

occupation

of disputed territories

Lac Leopold

Il and Lomami provincial

been forced to supplant the police

because of the political orientation and in-

eptness of the latter. In Leopoldville the PSA

Minister of the Interior of former Leopold-

ville Province had inflated the police forces

with recruits from Kwilu in a transparent

to solidify PSA predominance

provincial level. An

objective

central government Interior Minister Maboti

(a Mukongo) in dismissing the entire Leopold-

force following a brief mutiny in

May 1963 was to rid the capital of the Kwilu

policemen. In Luluabourg the police force is a

potent

instrument of the vicious Kalamba-

Lwakabwanga clique. Its commissioner

is

notorious

for

the magnitude of his illicit

gains from the diamond traffic.

There is growing recognition of the threat

which the police constitute to Congolese re-

covery. For some time the UN has worked

with the police, using mainly Nigerian per-

sonnel. A few Belgian police specialists

as well. The AID report urges a

vigorous program of retraining and assistance

by Belgium and the. United States in an effort

to strengthen the police force. However, any

reorganization plan will encounter the

difficulty of provincial supremacy in the police

apparently

would be willing and eager to have help with

the police. However, agreement centrally ne-

gotiated cannot always be carried out at the

provincial level.

Two other solutions to the police problem

recently have been proposed: 1) dissolution

of the police and delegation of all law en-

forcement to the ANC; and 2) federalization

of the police force. Both these solutions ap-

pear unrealistic in the present political con-

text. The provinces

abandoning

their control over the police, and

the central government would need to be far

stronger than it is at present to enjoin the

to surrender their police forces.

The ANC is not capable at present of handling

routine police work,

as the collection

of evidence and accident reporting. Further,

effective police work requires a more intimate

contact with the local

detachments are likely to achieve. The AID

which concludes that no basic structural

alteration is now possible, strongly recom-

that a central inspectorate be es-

tablished to place limits on police venality

and political activity. Just how an inspec-

torate general would enforce its will is not

The police are likely to continue to pose

serious problem. Probably in the more

efficiently governed provinces, technical as-

could enhance police effectiveness.

In the unstable provinces, the police will con-

tinue to be key weapons

of factions contend-

ing for power.

46

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VIII. EXTERNAL FACTORS

to independence the

of Congolese university

Congo-as a result of its colonial inheritance

quire the maintenance of UN or other foreign

disorders which have plagued its

personnel in many

of these jobs

three years of self-government-has been re-

foreseeable future. It is likely that bilateral

liant upon and subject to greater external

assistance programs could provide qualified

influences than any other newly independent

French-speaking

personnel

African state.

Invoked to thwart an

technicians, • but at the

West confrontation in Central

Africa, the

location to

administrative

relationships al-

UN has played an unprecedented civilian and

ready existing between UN

personnel and the

role in the Congo. By virtue of its

Congo Government.

commercial and financial

stake Belgium re-

Because of the massive

assistance rendered

by the United States to the Congo and to the

UN Congo operations, the United States prob-

ably has greater political leverage

than has any other foreign state. Finally, the

Soviet Bloc, although discredited in the Congo,

source of

external in-

historical roots of the

fluence of foreign interests

are of signifi-

discussion is limited. We

the most important elements of non-

influence only as

current situation. Excluded from this dis-

the impact on the Congo of de-

velopments

in Angola and other neighbor-

The implications of the Congo's

relations with its neighbors are of such po-

importance as to warrant

The United Nations

The dual military and civil character of UN

Congo operations has been obscured by the

news value of UN military successes. How-

ever, the civil operations program has furn-

ished important technical assistance to sagging

central government and provincial institutions.

specialized

of the UN have

financed almost 700 experts in fields rang-

from medicine to meteorology, under the

supervision of the UN Civil Operations repre-

sentative in the Congo. 23.

The UN civil presence. At the

level of the

government,

technicians

served in many instances as replacements for

Belgians who left the Congo in 1960. Although

about 1,590 Belgians are employed in the

Congo Government and parastatal enterprises,

civil operations

personnel continue to

fill many advisory

and functional

requiring advanced

technical skills. The lack

much more limited scale, to

vincial governments. Most striking, however,

are the UN civilian representatives who fill

the ad hoc role of "district commissioner" in

several unstable provinces. At Kindu, capital

of Maniema Province, a single UN represen-

tative of UAR nationality, assisted by only a

handful of Nigerian police, has gained the

confidence of the provincial government, the

local ANC, commander,

the representative of

Sareté, and the judiciary. In his role of

23. There are, in addition, about

550 teachers provided by the UN.

latent hostilities from erupting into serious

disturbances.

Similarly, in the confused and

uncertain political climate of Luluabourg, the

UN civilian representative has marshalled the

representatives

of central

government au-

thority-the ANC Commander, Surete Chief,

and District Attorney--into a peace-keeping

team which has had to contend mainly with

the Luluabourg government, probably the most

corrupt provincial administration in the Congo.

Although the effectiveness of the UN civilian

presence varies, it appears generally good.

Insofar as the UN civil representatives serve

as buffers between competing elements of the

population, their presence aids greatly in the

maintenance of order. If possible, their serv-

ices should be retained, particularly in Lulua-

bourg, Kindu, Albertville, and Elisabethville.

Consideration might also be given to placing

resident UN representatives in troubled San-

kuru and Unité Kasaienne Provinces.

The UN military presence. Since the end

of Katanga's secession, UN troop strength has

been reduced to 7,475, including

1,983 ad-

support troops (June 24, 1963).

All but a few

are positioned in southern

Katanga. Apart from Kasai, where about 700

troops act

as a damper on

possible disorders,

the only area appearing

to warrant a continued major UN troop pres-

ence is

southern Katanga.

The absence of

local political leadership

in southern Ka-

tanga, and the hostility between the ANC, on the

hand,

and the Belgian and African popu-

lations

and former Katanga gendarmes,

the other, present a latent threat of blood-

47

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shed. If possible, UN or other international

forces

should be retained in Katanga well into

1964. By that time, it is possible that po-

litical leadership

will have emerged, the ANC

will have improved its

effectiveness, and all

elements of the population will be acclimated

to the new situation. Also enhancing the need

for a foreign military presence in southern

Katanga until well into 1964 is the prospect

of national

companied by serious disorders.

Belgium

Since the Congo's independence, the Bel-

gian Government has restricted its aid

tribution to servicing

the Congo's external.

debt and to technical assistance involving about

1,200 teachers for the Congo and scholarships

for Congolese in Belgium. Total Belgian Gov-

expenditures

for Congo aid were

about $53,000,000

1962 and

may reach

$72,000,000 in 1963. Belgian assistance be-

yond this amount apparently is

sideration in the wake of the recent settle-

ment of the contentieux, outstanding financial

the Congo and Belgian Gov-

ernments that date from independence.

The Belgian Government also has agreed

to furnish military personnel for retraining

the ANC. The importance of ANC retraining

is crucial, particularly in view of the eventual

withdrawal of UN forces, and should have the

priority among

foreign assistance

respect to increased Belgian public

responsibility in the Congo, the Belgian Gov-

ernment apparently has an ambivalent attitude,

compounded by the

failure to plan ahead in

terms of contingencies. Although the Belgian

private stake in the Congo is vast, the Bel-

gian Government is reluctant

to take steps

to

increase

its technical and financial

as-

sistance as long as the United States or other

nations are willing to bear the principal burden.

In the

absence of any other effective lever to

obtain an increase in the Belgian aid contribu-

tion, a reduction in the US contribution might

serve to heighten Belgian private and official

interest in covering the shortfall. A risk in

this essentially negative approach is that the

Belgians may react too late to meet Congo-

lese needs. If the United States then failed to

recover the situation, the way might be opened

to renewed Soviet involvement. It is clear that

the Belgians, at least for the moment, are being

less than frank with the United States about their

intentions in the Congo, and the possibility of a

really close Belgian-US aid consortium may

consequently be somewhat limited.

The role of Union Miniere in the Katanga

secession diverted attention from the

sub-

stantial constructive contributions of Bel-

gian private individuals and concerns to emerg-

stability in other areas of the Congo. All

but a few of the major Belgian-financed agri-

cultural, industrial, and mining enterprises

are in operation, some at levels of produc-

tion approaching or above the pre-independ-

ence period. Although handicapped by short-

ages of spare parts, vehicles, and imported

for sale to

enterprises and their managements

have provided surprising economic continuity.

In most areas, plantation and plant managers

and local governments are cooperating closely

to increase productivity. Relations between

the indigenous population and Belgian man-

cordial; outside of southern

Katanga there are few

reports of significant

Belgo-Congolese animosities. Particularly in

the provinces enjoying relatively stable gov-

stated their desire

for additional Belgian investment. Where Bel-

farmers and

small businessmen have

failed to resume their enterprises since 1960,

provincial leaders especially have

renewed Belgian activity. Un-

employment stemming from the closing down of

some Belgian operations has created serious

for Congolese political leaders.

Nearly 50,000 Belgians are estimated to

be in the Congo. Some observers have ex-

pressed the belief that this number would not

increase significantly in the future, since most

who left in 1960 had either returned or found

satisfactory employment in

where. Were conditions more settled, and were

special inducements offered, it might be pos-

sible to attract more Belgian nationals to the

Congo for employment in both the private and

public sectors.

The United States

The pivotal role played in the Congo by the

United States has paid off handsomely interms

of American prestige, not only in the Congo,

but also in the rest of Africa. As long as Con-

golese attention centered on the Katanga seces-

sion, the US image was positive. However, in

the wake of the Katanga victory, the American

presence in the Congo is receiving new scru-

tiny, through an optic untinted by the rosy

aura of the Katanga success.

At Leopoldville the US presence is linked

closely with the Adoula

government.,

Radical Congolese sniping at Adoula has de-

veloped with considerable effect the theme that

Adoula is an American "stooge." Belgian far-

left circles

recently issued

venomous pamphlet attacking the United States

alleged neo-colonialism in the Congo. Ir-

responsible Belgian nationals and interests in

the Congo also appear to be actively under-

cutting the United States by spreading anti-

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American rumors.

audience among

the Congolese elites of the

Thus American

"prestige" is on the firing line for the first

time since the demise of Lumumba.

At the same time, provincial leaders often

equate the American presence with the failure

of the Adoula government. Where there have

been inadequate central government responses

to real or imagined provincial problems, the

government

that often includes an indictment of the United

States. In particular, the impressive and use-

ful AID truck import program has backfired

on the United States. Provincial leaders

aware that over 1,000 trucks were imported

US Government

also believe that, with the connivance of the

US Embassy, the trucks were deliberately

denied to the provincial governments.

provincial leaders' misunderstanding of the

import program is complete; but more serious

is their belief

that the United States has

conspired with "politicians" at Leopoldville

to deny the provinces their due.

In the context of possible national elections

in 1964, developing anti-American sentiment

is ominous. Since the Belgians no longer are

scapegoats in any area, except possibly south-

Katanga, a radical national party-if it

emerged in

reaction to a moderate national

coalition under Adoula-could be expected to

build into its platform a plank of demagogic

anti-Americanism. Such a backlash could harm

an emerging moderate national coalition.

The Soviet Bloc

Badly burned by its past experience in the

~ Congo,

hesitated to make

major new bid for influence. either in Leo-

poldville or the provincial capitals. The ab-

of cohesive political groupings in the

Leopoldville parliament-other than the loose

coalition of moderate

leaders backing

Adoula government,

and the generally con-

servative Abako and PSA/K

parties-has re-

duced the

field for potential Soviet activity

at the center to a lunatic fringe

of disaf-

fected deputies. At the same time, the weak-

ness of the central government, reflected in

the polarization of

effective political power

between

Leopoldville and the provincial capi-

tals, has raised the ante for the Soviets should

they wish to develop influence at the prov-

incial level. That the Soviets have concentrated

their activity since 1962 in Leopoldville and in

the Stanleyville area of ex-Orientale Province,

despite the emergence

of other

strong prov-

incial power centers, is indicative of their

current reticence.

glan reluctance to provide higher education

for Congolese, few were offered an opportunity

to imbibe Marxist doctrine at European uni-

versity centers. Unlike Africans from former

British and French territories, there is no

significantly large group

of Congolese

of the Marxist vocabulary. Consequently,

such ideological discourse

level. Even the so-called radical nationalist

Congolese leaders who

accepted Soviet mili-

1960 were ideologically

motivated only to the extent that they sought

Katanga or to salvage personal

Most vulnerable at present to Soviet bland-

are disaffected

national parliamen-

tarians

and some labor leaders and

students.

The

Soviets

at times have

bought with

the

traditional bribes of women, money, and the

promise of power a fringe group of deputies

as Anicet Kashamura.

lowever, the

profits from this commerce in venality have

yet to be reaped. Most of the extremist fringe

is discredited

at Leopoldville and in the

constituencies.

students at Leopoldville, the Roman

have inhibited much pro-communist activity.

the radical Congolese students do not

generally conceptualize their opposition to

the status quo in Marxist terms.

labor unions, only the Confédéra-

tion Générale des Travailleurs

(CGTC) and the Union Nationale des Travail-

leurs Congolais (UNTC) have a pro-communist

tinge. Their range of activities appears limited.

The Congo's massive budgetary deficit and

foreign exchange shortage offer new opportuni-

ties for Soviet bloc involvement. Even the pro-

Western Adoula regime might look with in-

on Soviet offers of assistance if the

financial and monetary crisis worsens. For

example, a recent alleged Soviet offer of

would be hard for

Adoula to refuse, particularly if the offer

were made known to provincial leaders, whose

transport needs verge on the desperate. The

Soviets may be expected to seek to exploit

these and other rifts in the Congo's economic

Additional significant

opportunities

likely to open for the Soviets in the political

pot now beginning to boil in preparation for

national elections. in 1964. A moderate na-

Adoula, whose opponents may be expected to

form, in reaction, a national party

of a radical stamp. The Soviets might reap

a rich harvest from investment in such

radical opposition.

49

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APPENDIX

TABLES:

A. Enumeration of Powers Under Draft Constitution Compared to

Loi Fondamentale

B. Comparison of Proposed Central-Provincial Power Distribution

on Three Key Issues:

UN, Katanga, Coquilhatville Provincial Assembly Presidents'

Conference,

and Loi Fondamentale Positions.

C. Proposed Partition of Fiscal Domain, UN Draft Constitution

D. Profile of New Provinces

E. Typology of Congolese

Parties

F. Seats Won, by Party, May 1960 Elections

G. Glossary of Principal Congolese Political Parties

H. Congolese Provincial Governments since 1960

I. Congolese Central Governments since 1960 (and Secessions)

MAPS:

A. Republic of the Congo - Provinces

B. Republic of the Congo - Political Stability

C. Republic of the Congo - Major Political Parties, May 1960

Elections

D. Republic of the Congo - Provinces and Ethnic Groups

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necurity

Central Powers

foreign aidandtrado

Nationacurly

Generalone

TABLE A

ENUMERATIONE ARE TO UN TENSEN CONSTITUTION

Concurrent Powers

UN Draft

Lol Fondamentale

Ishing, veterinary serv-

cartoRraphy.

hydro-

Satell and Intered reserch

Provincial Powers

UN Drall

Provincial political and administrative institu

provincial stadio tes

at a crime reprovincial lane

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

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Issues

Security

Forces

Finance

• Admin-

istration and

judiciary

UN

Katanga

AN ud poetral an A unite under vince

darmere mission.

Federal postore for prendarme has own

tervention in prov-

Sûrete exclusively cen-

tral function.

Central limit placed on

numbers, equipment

Coquilhatville

Loi Fondamentale

AN under central com- ANC, same as UN draft,

Provinces control po-

rovet of police tones no to seting

No federal police.

or

Streté is central fune-

Import duties to central Provinces fix and levy Central

government No provision made

government.

all taxes.

fixes and collects all

statutory allocation of

Export duties 50-50 be-

Provinces

center

% encer bation of their

import duties.

tax receipts.

Concurrent fixing ofex- Centralized budget,

province of orgin.

total

receipts equal

port duties, provinces

treasury

to be

re-

Income tax on corpora-

for all states.

retain 75%.

tained; all taxes col-

tions to central gov-

Guarantee of sufficient

Provinces fix royalities

lected by central gov-

ernment, on indivi-

foreign exchange for

on mine concessions,

ernment, provincial

duals to provinces.

all needs of Katanga;

Concurrent tax rights

derivation princi-

All ve a taxes tet and

budgets covered by

central subsidy.

in excise, consump-

ple for allocating ex-

change.

cial

commission to

allocate foreign

ex-

change.

With minor variations,

same as UN draft.

Larger provincial role

naming supreme

court.

Civil service statute,

nominations, and sal-

ary centrally con-

trolled.

Federal services man-

All administration

federal civil

in provinces, whether

performing federal or

provincial

services,

vincial civil service.

under authority of

Only top two echelons of

provincial president.

judiciary under. fed-

Provinces control judi-

eral control.

ciary, except su-

No state commissioner

preme court.

in provincial capital;

No state commissioner.

provincial

govern-

ment represents au-

of state in

POSITIONS

COMPARISON OF PROPOSED CENTRAL-PROVINCIAL POWER DISTRIBUTION

ON THREE KEY ISSUES: UN, KATANGA, COQUILHATVILLE PROVINCIAI

ASSEMBLY PRESIDENTS' CONFERENCE, AND LOI FONDAMENTALE

TABLE B

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TABLE C

PROPOSED PARTITION OF FISCAL DOMAIN, UN DRAFT CONSTITUTION

(millions of francs)

Tax category

1/

1961

receipts

Export duty

1960 budget

2,188

344

Allocation

Federal

Provincial

50%

50%

Import duty

1,982

529

Excise and consumption

1,532

2, 006

875

Administrative and

judicial receipts

21

N.A.

Income

5,033

940

• corporate individual

Portfolio

1,180

0

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

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63

• Kongo

Central

o Kwango

d Kwilu

Lac Leopold II

E Cuvette

q Centrale

u Ubangi

t Moyen Congo

SECRET/ NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Province

Key:

1 indicates that the stated characteristic is strongly of clearly present.

2 indicates that the stated characteristic is present in diluted form.

3 indicates that the stated characteristic is absent, or exists in very weak form.

Ethnic

homogeneity

Party

homogeneity

III

Administrative

continuity

IV

Strong traditional Pre-independence Urban conflict

structures

autonomy demands

in origin

VII

Economic

viability

VIII

Incipient

fragmention

Operating in-

stitutions,

June 1963

O VElE

i Kibali-

Ituri

n Haut-Congo

PROFILE OF NEW PROVINCES

(June 1963)

K Maniema

v Kivu Central

u Nord-Kivu

a Nord-Katanga

a Katanga-Orien-

tale

g Sud-Congo

a (Lualaba)

K Sud-Kasai

s Kasai Central

a (Luluabourg)

¿ Unite Kasaienne

Sankuru

Lomami

+ m

m.

---

-N-

mn m

TABLE D

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TABLE E

TYPOLOGY OF CONGOLESE PARTIES

Mass

MNC/L, PSA, Cerea, .

Abako, MNC/K

Marginal

Balubakat; Puna,

Unimo

National

MNC/L, PNP

Elite

PNP, Conakat

Regional

PSA, Cerea,

Balubakat, Abako,

Puna, Unimo, MNC/K,

Conakat

Pan-tribal 1/ PSA

MNC/L,

PNP; Conakat2/ Cerea, Puna

31

Ethnic

Balubakat 4/, Abako,

Unimo, MNC/K=,

Unitary

MNC/L, PSA, Cerea

Balubakat], Puna, PNP

Unimo

Federalist

Abako, MNC/K,

Conakat

Radical

MNC/L, PSA, Cerea,

Abako

Moderate

Balubakat, Unimo, Puna, PNP, Conakat

MNC/K8/

1. Pan-tribal in its official ideology, although in fact ethnic in its campaign in the Batetela-Bakusu-Bankutshu

zone in Maniema, Kivu, Sankuru, and Kasai; starting from this base, it began to penetrate rapidly into the

related Mongo areas in Equateur.

2. Some might argue that the Conakat belong in the marginal column. It is classified as pan-tribal because its

official ideology, if not its actual performance, is a claim to represent all the peoples of Katanga; it is in

any case not ethnic in the sense of representing any single tribe, although there is an important difference

between the Conakat, which is a federation linked at the level of the tribal association, and the PSA,

where membership is individual..

3. Puna claims to cover all of northern Equateur (now Moyen Congo). In the terms of its leader, Bolikango,

this is a reunification of the "grande ethnie bangala," but in fact it covers a number of different ethnic

groups, especially the Ngombe.

4. This overlooks the alliance with a smalles ethnic party, Association des Tsbokwe du Congo, de l'Angola,

et de la Rhodésie (ATCAR).

5. The MNC/K was not at first ethnic when the original MNC split into Lumumba and Kalonji wings in July

1959. However, it became increasingly a Kasai Baluba party, although some of its original intellectual

members, such as Iléo andAdoula, are not Baluba.

6. Listed as unitary despite its flirtation with federalism at the Kisantu Congress in December 1959.

7. Despite its initial link with the Conakat and early sympathy with some of the latter's views on the need

to ensure Katanga a larger share in the use of its own wealth.

8. MNC/K until early 1960 would have fallen into the radical category; as independence neared, the Kasai.

Baluba became increasingly preoccupied with the threat to their security in Luluabourg.

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TABLE F

SEATS WON, BY PARTY, MAY 1960 ELECTIONS

Party

MNC/L

National

Chamber of

Deputies

1/

41

Provincial Assemblies

Senate/Leopoldville /Equateur/Orientale/Kivu/Katanga/Kasai

19

10

58

17

25

•PSA

13

4

35

Cerea

10

6

31

30

Balubakat

7

3

233'

Abako

12

4

33

Puna

7

11

Unimo

1

2

8

MNC/K

8

3

1

21

PNP

15

3

5

6

4

Conakat

6

25

Other

15

27

20

26.

6

18

10

20

Total

137

84

90

60

70

70

60

70

1. Including direct alliances.

2. Indirectly elected by provincial assemblies.

3. Including all three wings.

4. Including five from alliances--two Atcar and three MNC/L

5. Including two from alliance.

TABLE G

GLOSSARY OF PRINCIPAL CONGOLESE

POLITICAL PARTIES

Mouvement National Congolais / Lumumba

(MNC/L

Parti de l!Unité Nationale (PUNA)

Union Mongo (Unimo)

Parti Solidaire Africain (PSA)

Centre de Regroupement Africain (Cerea)e)

Association des Baluba du Katanga (Balubakat)

Alliance des Bakongos (Abako)

Parti National du Progres (PNP)

Confédération des Associations Tribales du

Katanga (Conakat)

Mouvement National Congolais/Kalonji

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1960

July

1961

October

April

July

October

1962

January

April

July

Kongo Central

.......--

Moanda (Abako)

Leopoldville

Kamitatu (PSA)

Diomi (Abako)

Equateur

Eketebi (PUNA)

(Central Gov't Intervention

Eketebi (PUNA)

Orientale.

Finant

(MNC/ L)

Badjoko

(MNC/ L)

Manzikala

(MNC/ L)

Losala

( MNC/L)

Manzikala/LoBala

*disputed

Kivu C

Miruho (Cerea)

ashamura

(Cerea)

Miruho (Cerea)

ILLEGAL

Central Gov't Inter-

vention

(Mayamba, Anany.

Weregemere)

Nord-Katanga

.. ----------

Mwamba-Ilunga (Balubakat,

Katanga

T'shombe (Conakat)

Thombe Jailed

(Ministerial Triumvirate Tahombe

South Kasal

Kalonji (MNC/K)

TKazadi (MNC/K5

Каваі

Mukenge (UNC)

Lubaya (UNC)

Central Gov't

intervention

(Mukenge

1/ Sometimes spelled Zondomia.

October

1963

January

April

July

Kwilu

Leta (PSA)

Kwango

Delvaux (Luka) |

Lac Leopold II

Koumorico (PNP)

Mayamba (Luka)

Cuvette Centrale

Engulu (UNIMO)

Mayan Commo

Ubangi

Nzondonyo 1/ (PNP)

Bolya Incidents

Eketebi (PUNA)

UATE

Mambaya (no party)'

Manzikala (MNC/L)

Haut Congo

No Government

Kivu Central

No Government

Nord-Kivu

Moley (Cerea)

_Maniema

Kieanga (MNC/L).

(Grentell| Isombuma(?)

T Malago (Reko)

Mwamba-Ilunga

HH4!HH | Katanga Orientala

resigned

Bulundwe

( Central Gov't)

Lualaba

No Government

Мапопо (MUB)

Luluabourg (Kasai Central)

Lwakabwanga (MNC/L)

Unite Kasaienne

Kamanga (UNIKAS)

Sankuru

Diamasumbu

(MNC/L)

Lubaya disputes

Ndjadi

live love

at Lusambo•

Diamasumbu arrested

and released

CONGOLESE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS SINCE 1960

(Party affiliations shown in parentheses are as of 1960)

TABLE H

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

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## Page 67

CONGOLESE CENTRAL GOVERNABNTS SINCE 1960 (AND SECESSIONS)

Independence.

South Kasai

autonomy

Kalonji

Katango

secession

Government

Tshombe

Participation at

Coquilhatville

Participation

at Lovanium

Kalonji

arrest.

Ngalula

Government

Kalonji

escape and rearrest

Tananarive

Tshombe

under

arrest

Ist Round

UN

2nd Round

UN

Kitona

Accords•

Adoula-

Tshombe

tolks

3rd Round

UN

Secession

liquidated

Commissioners

Ileo

Government

Gizenga Government

Stanleyville

Gizenga

Dissidence

Gizenga

arrest

Government

Government

July

- Mobarubu dismissal of Lumumba

Jan.

April

July

July

Oct.

Jan.

April

Oct.

April

Tananarive Conference

. Lovanium Parliament

Jan.

Kamitatu replaces Gbenye

Ist Reshuffle

2nd Reshuffle

Lumumba

College of

2nd lleo

Ist Adoula Government

2nd Adoula

3rd Adoula

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1960

1961

1962

• 1963

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## Page 68

REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO-PROVINCES

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

CAMEROON

UBANGI,

*

Gemena

MOYEN- *Lisala

CONGO

UELE

HAUT-CONGO

*Stanleyville

CONGO

Coquilhatville

GABON

CUVETTE

CENTRALE

*Inongo

LAC LEOPOLD II

Leopoldville

SANKURU

*Lodia

Kindu

{MANIEMA

BinzaT Kenge

KONGO CENTRAL "

KWILU

*Kikwit

KWANGO

Ishikapa! KASAI

CENTRAL

KASAIENNE

LOMAMI

Kabind

SUD-KASAI

NORD-KATANGA

LUALABA

(Capitol not yet

selected)

SUDAN

Paulis

KABAL Bunia

ITURI

UGANDA

NORD

KIVU

Kirotshe

(tentative)

RWANDA

BURUNDI

TANGANYIKA

Albertille,

ATLANTIC

OCEAN

ANGOLA

Province boundary

Province capital

Area in dispute

(arrows indicate

claimants)

1 August 1963

100

200

KATANGA

ORIENTAL

Elisabethville

# (de

facto)

FED. OF RHODESIA

AND

NYASALAND

MOZAMBIQUE

HH 49061 DocId: 32626338 Page

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CONFIDENTIAL

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

SUDAN

CAMEROON

UGANDA

CONGO

GABON

RWANDA

BURUNDI

Léopolduille

TANGANYIKA

ANGOLA

Atlantic:

=Ocean

REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

POLITICAL STABILITY*

Provincial area with functioning institutions

under fairly strong emergent leadership

likely to support a moderate national coalition

(as of June 15, 1963)

Provincial area under leadership likely to support a

moderate national coalition (as of June 15, 1963)

*With respect to possible 1964 national elections

100

MILES

200

CONFIDENTIAL

FED. OF RHODESIA

AND

NYASALAND

BOUNDARY

REPRESENTATION I

NOT NECISSARILY AUTHORITATIVE:

CONFIDENTIAL

MOZAMBIQUE

GROUP 1

NN 49061 DocId:32626338 Page 69

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## Page 70

REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

SUDAN

CAMEROON

PNP

PUNA

CONGO

GABON

MNC/L

Atlantic

Ocean

MNC/L

éopoldville:

ABAKO

PNP/LUKA

ANGOLA

MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES

MAY 1960 ELECTIONS

Local lists, individuals

Areas of political parties

are approximate.

100

MILES

200

UNIMO

PNP

PNP

PSA

MNC/K

UGANDA

CEREA

RWANDA

BURUNDI

CEREA

MNC/L

TANGANYIKA

MNC/K

CONAKAT

BALUBAKAT

CONAKAT

FED. OF RHODESIA

AND

NYASALAND

MOZAMBIQUE:

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CAMEROON

CENTRAL

REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

PROVINCES

AND ETHNIC GROUPS

Ethnic group boundary

Province boundary

Area in dispute

Province capital

(arrows indicate

claimants)

BANGUI G

AFRICAN. REPUBLIC

TOGBO

BANZIRI

GOBU

NZAKAR,

GOMBE

UBANGI

BWAKA

Gemena*

BONGO:

BANZA

1. Kimvula region

2.

Banzyville territory

3. Faradje territory

Walsa territory

Rutshuru and Goma territones

6. Shabunda lerritory

7. Fizi termilery

8.

Basonge sector

50

AREAS IN DISPUTE

(Submitted to referendum)

9. Munga-Kisuka group-

10.

Musule-Lumba group

11. Mwene-Ditu territory

12.

Tshishily sector and Kamiji region

13.

Lusambo (that area ethnically different

from the native center)

14.

Misumba group

100

150

50

100

150

200 MILES

200 KILOMETERS

MABALE

LOBALA

GOMBE

BANGALA

MO

/ BUDJA

DOKO

Lisalar

рокаі

BOMBE

GOt

GOMBE

BALOI

MONGO

BALOLO

CUVETTE CENTRAL

Coquilhatville

LALIAR;

ELINGA

GABON

GOMBE

BAYANZI

Кна

BOLIA

KUNDU

BASENGELE

TUMBA

Lac Leopold

BAKUTI

Elnongo

LAC

LOOPOLD II

BABOMA

BADIA

BABAIE,

BASAKATA

MBOLE

AKEI

BATITU

BAMFUMUNGU

BAYANZI

BALESA

Кечаї

BANGOLI

DENGESE

BOKALA/

YAELIMA

BOOLI.

3A80N40.4210

Sankuru

BASUNDI

BRAZZAVILLE

Djelo-

XELEOAOLDVILLE

BAWUMBU

BADINGA

BASHILELE

*Kenge /

<

BAYOMBE

MONG

KAKONGO

CEXTRA

BAHUANA /

Kikwit

)BABUNDA

Ah u

BA W.ONG O

BAKUBA",

BAK/ETE

BAYAKA

BAMBATA

BASUKU

Kwang"

BAKWESE

BALUA

BAPENDE

W

BASONDE

LULjU'A

KASA!

CRATIAL

ZAPO A

tuluabourg

Tshikap

BASHILANGE

UNITE

not, on.

BABINDJI

KASJENNG

ALAMPASU

TSHOKWE

(BATSHIOKO)

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## Page 72

AKARE

SUDAN

BoiLu

ABANDJA

AZANDE

MANGBETE

AMADI

AZANDE

BENGE

MOBATI

BAKANGO-

AZANDE

AbARAMA

KAKWA

MANGBETU

AZANDE

MABINZA

' ABABUA

MAKERE

• NIAPU

AZANDE

Paulis( MAYOGO

MEDJE

LUGWARE

MOBATI

PORDIE

MABUDU

MOBANGA

BANIARI

BANGELIMA

3 BANDAKA

BAMANGA

WALESE

KABALI

ITURI

Lake

Albert

TURUMAU

CONCO

BABALI

BARỪM BI

Stanleyvill

BABIRA

TOPOKE

L@ANGANDU

BAPERE

• UGANDA

BAMBOLE

WALENGOLA

i.r

•BAKUMUT

BABUGOMBE

WANANDE

BOYELA

NORC

KIVU

WANIANGA

-Kirotshe

(anlativa)

Lake

Edward

MITUKU

WASONGOLA

Tohuapa

ENIARUANDA

KIGALI

RWANDA

BAH

BAHAVU

-Bukavy

BANIA

JUNG

RIVU

*Lodja

ANKUTSHU

Kindun

MANIEMA

BAKUSU

-@USUMBURA

BURUNDI

WAZIME

? BATETELA

TANGANYIKA

LOMAMI

BASONGE

BANGO

Albertville

* Kabinda

‹wanga

37D

Lake

Tanganyika

WARUWA

NORD-KATANGA

BALUBA

BASHILA

HH

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BATABWA

BABEMBA

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## Page 73

HH 49061

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73

IDA

Mweru

BAYEKE

ALABA

lot yat selected)

MITEMBA

BAYEKE

KATANGA

ORIENTAL

BASANGA

BAUSHI

Lake

Elisabethville

(do facio)

DERATION

OF RHODESIA AND

24

.(U.K.)

BALAMBA

NYASALAND

28

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## Page 74

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Rio Cuanzo

(Portugal)

ATLANTIC

OCEAN.

TOUNDARY

38118 7-63

Rio Cassai

20

BALUN

LUI

Capital r.

TSHOKWE ((BATSHIOKC

---