A REVIEW OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE LITERATURE, 1975-1992.
Agency: CIA
Originator: CIA
Document date: 5/1/92
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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DRAFT

May 1992

A REVIEW OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE LITERATURE, 1975 - 1992

By Cleveland C. Cram

NOTE: Final version will have proper

page breaks, etc.

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REVIEW OF COUNTERINTELLICENCE LITERATURE, 1975 - 1992

Foreword

The review of counterintelligence literature, 1975 -

1992, which follows is not meant to include every book

published concerning espionage and/or counterintelligence

from the period 1975 until 1992. The object of this study

is to focus on a relatively small selection of books that

concentrate on the major counterintelligence issues of the

period and are highlightedly the views of James Angleton

and Anatole Solitayn, which Iron Mous 1962 were a

compelling force in Western counterintelligence services.

The scope of the study is largely limited to books about the

American, British, and Canadian intelligence and security

services although it in some instances touches on countries

of Western Europe such as France, West Germany, Norway, etc.

it epdates

Recent books such as Corson and Trento's Widows are esseluded

because they are not reputable by even the generally lOW leill

standards of most counterintelligence writing. Other works,

such as Ron Kessler's,

The Moscow station or David Wise's the

Hand Wise,

Spy Who Got Away,

are exetried because some parts of their

stories are factually doubtful and better surveys of these

• Plact C11

complicated and sensitive events reside in the CIA records.

4013.

On the other hand, no studies exist on Angleton's efforts in

retirement to spread this propaganda via such writers as

Epstein. Nor has her®(been any analysis)done of how many

indicatis

mativiat

really dif curch.

secrets

of the British

services became public knowledge,

ranging from the Blunt case to the secret inquiry into Sir

Roger Hollis as putative Soviet spy. As

there are

instructive lessons

In these events review of what exists

in the public domain and how it got there find be helpful to

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counterintelligence managers of the future who wish to avoid

some of the errors of the past.

A LIST OF BOOKS OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INTEREST

(chronological order)

1977 - Orchids for Mother by Aaron Latham.

A novel about

Angleton. NOT RECOMMENDED.

L1978 - Honorable Men by William Colby. Chapter on

Angleton's dismissal is RECOMMENDED.

1978 - Legend: The Secret world of Lee Harvey Oswald by

Edward Jay Epstein. NOT RECOMMENDED; A SUMMARY

appears in this study.

11979 - The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the

CIA by Thomas Powers. NOT RECOMMENDED as portions

that deal with counterintelligence are inaccurate.

X 1979 - The Climate of Treason: live tha Spied les Russia by

Andrew Boyle. A SUMMARY appears in this study.

1980 - Wilderness of Mirrore by David Martin. A classic

strongly RECOMMENDED; a SUMMARY appears in this

study.

1980 - The Spike by Arnaud de Borchgrave and Robert Moss.

novel about Angleton. NOT RECOMMENDED.

X1981 - Shadrin: the spy who Never Came Back by Henry Hurt.

Despite many errors it is RECOMMENDED.

A SUMMARY

appears in this study.

1981 - Their Trade is Treachery by Chapman Pincher.

RECOMMENDED and a SUMMARY appears in this study.

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1982 - For Services Rendered: James Leslie Bennett and the

RCMP Security Service by John Sawatsky. RECOMMENDED

and a SUMMARY appears in this study.

1982 - A Matter of Trust: MI-5, 1945-72 by Nigel West.

RECOMMENDED and a SUMMARY appears in this study.

X 1984 - New Wiles for Old by Anatole Goliteyn. RECOMMENDED

only to learn what Golitsyn thought; no SUMMARY

appears in this study.

/ 1986 - The FBI/KGB War: A Special Agent's Story by Robert

J. Lamphere and Tom Shachtman. STRONGLY RECOMMENDED

and a SUMMARY appears in this study.

1987 - Spycatcher: the Candid Biography of a senior

Intelligence Officer by Peter Wright with Paul

Greengrass. RECOMMENDED and a SUMMARY appears in this

study•

X 1988 - The Spycatcher Icial by Malcolm Turnbull.

RECOMMENDED and a SUMMARY appears in this study.

V 1988 - The Spycatcher Affair by Chapman Pincher.

RECOMMENDED and a SUMMARY appears in this study.

1988 - Deception: The Invisible War Between the KGB and the

CIA by Edward Jay Epstein. NOT RECOMMENDED but a

SUMMARY appears in this study.

1988 - The Storm Birds: Soviet Post-War Defectors by

Gordon Brook-Shepherd. STRONGLY RECOMMENDED, and a

SUMMARY appears in this study.

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X1989 - Molehunt: the full story of the sevlet shy inNIes

by Nigel West. RECOMMENDED and a SUMMARY appears in

this study.

1989 - Widows: Four American spies, the Wives They Left

Behind and the KGB's Crippling of American

Intelligence by Corson and Trento. Definitely NOT

RECOMMENDED and NOT SUMMARIZED in this study.

V 1991 - Sold Warrior:

James Jesus Angleton: The CIA's

Master Spy Hunter by Tom Mangold.

RECOMMENDED and a

SUMMARY appears in this study.

V 1992 - Molehunt: The Secret Search for Traitors That

Shattered the CIA by David Wise. RECOMMENDED and a

SUMMARY appears in this study.

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Introduction

The year 1974 was a watershed in literature about the

CIA. Prior to that time there had been ely few books

critical of the Agency and they had been by outsiders,

usually professional journalists such as Wise and Ross.

Most books had been that neutral or even positive,

especially those written by former Agency officials such as

Allen Dulles and Lyman Kirkpatrick. But in 1974 a

disgruntled former Agency employee, Philip Agee, published

his highly critical book, Inside the Company: CIA Diary.

He was followed by others in quick succession: J. B. Smith,

John Stockwell, Victor Marchetti (with J. D. Marks), and R.

W. McGehee-placing highly confidential information in the

public doma that in if thor usually made their disclosures

about subjectstof which they had special knowledge tr

intereet, but the cumulative effect was to breach the walls

of confidentiality flat had protected agency operations and

personnel. Although the net effect was damaging, especially

in the case of Agee where his efforts were directed at

revealing the identities of officers serving abroad under

cover, this general scatter shot approach, while

distressing, did not reveal information about the most

sensitive operations, namely, those directed against the

main target--the Soviet Union and its intelligence organs.

In the mid-seventies this changed with the publication

of a series of magazine articles authored mainly by Edward

J. Epstein, a New York writer, which culminated with the

publication of his book in 1978 called Legend. The

articles, but especially the book, publicized for the first

time a series of clashes within the Agency fboth the CI

staff and the soviet Division concerning the bona fides of

a defector from the KGB named Yuriy Nosenko. Epstein's

articles and his book contained so much detailed information

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about sensitive operations by the CIA and the FBI that it

was generally agreed Epstein had a willing and knowledgeable

source, either a serving officer (which was thought

doubtful) or a retired person otta sufficiently senior

position that he had wide knowledge of operations against

the soviet target both overseas and in the "u.s."

Although

from

abdat 1978 orward Epstein admittestat

, on occasion he spoke

with

Japes Anglaton, the ratired lorner chiel of the cI

Staff,

he never admitted Angleton was his source. In fact,

Epstein, wisely perhaps, never sourced his articles nor his

book, leaving the reader in the dark as to how he came upon

such rare nuggets of sensitive information. Then in 1988,

with Angleton dead, Epstein in a new book called Deception

admitted that from 1977 onward he had obtained large amounts

of highly classified information from Angleton, N.S. Miler,

Tennent H. Bagley and others who shared Angleton's beliefs.

Thi

When Angleton was dismissed by DCI William Colby in

late 1974, he had no thought of what he would do in his

retirement. For the following six months he spent part of

his time at Langley, assisting the new CI Staff by

introducing them to such persons as his defector friend,

Anatole Golitsyn. After a few months it became clear to

Angleton that he really had been dismissed and his future

with CIA was finished. The whole matter was a terrible

blow; he became embittered and

at first withdrew into

alcohol. But quite soon people began to seek him out and he

began to formulate some ideas about the future. As he got

more attention from media people, he began to cultivate a

method of playing them off one against another, planting an

idea here and there amongst them. He changed his luncheon

venue from a local restaurant to the more politically

congenial atmosphere of the Army-Navy Club. One idea

Angleton developed ta livelop a counterattack fel the

Agency and, in particular, the new CI Staff by which he

would prove

Endy wong sin their new approach and indict them

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for negligence of duty. This task was given to his loyal

aide, N.S. Miler. Miler took on the job but found he was

his own researcher as well as secretary.

Foreseeing a dim

future of virtual servitude, he took his family and withdrew

to remote New Mexico.

Angleton's activities in this period, while not

neglecting the idea of KGB penetration, focused more

immediately on his strong belief in the threat from the KGB

of deception and disinformation. To support this thesis he

continually raised the issue of Nosenko. It Jas an idea had

that caught fire amongst some of his supporters and led to a

sort of cottage industry in which many academics and think

tank specialists propagated the theory. oddly, however,

Angleton's allies in Great Britain took a different line.

There they concentrated on KGB penetration largely because

events threw up some exceptional examples, such as sir

Anthony Blunt. Because of the so-called Cambridge "Ring of

Five, " public attention was more easily caught by the idea

of moles in Her Majesty's government. This eventually led

to much embarrassment for the Thatcher government,

culminating in the "Spycatcher" trial in Australia in 1986.

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I ghan house.

worth

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The American (and Canadian) Scene

som

Notiong after his long suffering but devoted aide,

"Scotty" Miler, decamped to New Mexico, a young writer

interested in CIA contacted Angleton. Aaron Latham holds a

doctorate

in literature from Princeton and in 1975 was

editor of New York magazine. He was attracted to Angleton

because of the latter's association with Ezra Pound and

other

American poets.

A two-hour initial call to Angleton

resulted in luncheon and visits to Angleton's home and

orchid sheds. Lathan wanted to write about the CIA and

claims he took the fiction route on the advice of Victor

Marchetti. Whatever the case, the result was a novel called

orchids for Mother published in 1977. The novel is heavily

loaded with atrocious sex, but the main theme is about an

old ex-CIA officer fired by the Director over differences in

policy. The dismissed CIA man (Angleton) decides he must

rid the Agency of this DCI, obviously meant to be colby,

which he accomplishes by hiring an assassin to kill him (the

old veteran) and then adroitly places the blame on the

Director, thus assuring the latter will be accused of

murdering his antagonist. The novel portrays Mother (the

curious name Latham gives Angleton, which he lifted

from a

book by Miles Copeland) as a genius wasted by his dismissal

from service to suit the ambition of a grey bureaucrat whose

security as well as comnon sense is much in doubt. It is a

singularly vicious work. It did not sell well. Mrs.

Angleton called the book "garbage" and claimed her husband

never read it.

In the summer of 1977 Angleton developed a new forum

for his ideas when he and like-minded associates organized

the Security and Intelligence Fund (SIF) which was intended

to defend the US security and intelligence organizations and

incidentally raise money for the defense of two FBI officers

then under indictment by the Carter administration. In this

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endeavor, Angleton was on surer ground. For starters, he

had the support of the large number of FBI retirees as well

as many from CIA. This was the period when the Pike and

Church committees in the Congress were in full cry and a

number of ex-intelligence people who believed Congress had

gone too far were rallying a defense. (David Phillips was

also starting the Association of Former Intelligence

officers.)

The drive by Angleton was very successful; over

$600,000 was raised and six months after its founding SIF

was reported to have more than 17,000 members. Angleton was

made chairman with his friends in senior positions. But

Yours soon after, the US Attorney General decided not to

pursue the prosecution of the FBI men and the reason for SIF

LeveRtheLess

more or less evaporated.

towever, Angleton converted it

into a forum by which he spread information about what he

saw as various forms of soviet deception and it continued

into the next decade until, after Angelton's death and the

coming of glasnost, it withered away.

The publication of Legend in 1978 provided enormous

stimulus to the deception idea by suggesting the Soviet

defector, Yurly Nosenko, had been sent by the KGB to provide

a cover story for Oswald. Epstein had made a small

reputation with an earlier book on the Warren Commission

called Incuest, which was generally well received because it

pointed out some obvious inadequacies in the Warren

Commission report. In Legend, Epstein wrote what in effect

were two books: one focused on Oswald's Marine career in

Japan, his time in Russia and then his return to America,

while the second portrayed Nosenko as playing a key role in

a major KGB deception operation intended to provide cover

for Oswald (and the Soviet government) as well

as to negate

the effects of Golitsyn's revelations. As so much

classified information could only have come from a person or

persons with intimate knowledge of the Nosenko case, blame

for the leakage naturally focused on Angleton and his

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supporters. It came as no surprise when ten years later

(and after Angleton's death) Epstein admitted his sources to

have been Angleton, Bagley, Miler, and other supporters.

Despite sone negative reviews such as George Lardner's in

The Washington Post, which denounced the book as

"essentially dishonest," the book sold well and was very

important in spreading Angleton's ideas of a super KGB

manipulating American society and politics via its

sophisticated deception apparatus.

The theme of Legend is extended in a novel which

appeared in 1980 called The Spike by Arnaud de Borchgrave

and Robert Moss. De Borchgrave, soon to be editor of the

new Washington Times and Moss, then editor of "The Blue

Economist," were close friends and admirers of Angleton,

whose conspiracy theories largely jibed with their own.

Moss had been spreading bogus Angleton propaganda in his

sheet for some time, an example being his claim Golitsyn had

provided the lead to Philby. This caught the eye of then

DCI Turner, who inquired of the CI Staff. The latter

replied from solid knowledge that Golitsyn could only be

credited for an assist on Vassal and none on Philby of

Blunt.

The low quality and general crudeness of theme in The

Spike exceeds that even of the Latham novel. Briefly, it

told the story of a young liberal taken in by leftists who

came to realize his error thanks to timely guidance received

from an elderly former CIA counterintelligence officer who

had been fired by a Director obviously acting on the

Kremlin's directions.

Moscow's secret designs are revealed

by a KGB high level defector whose escape is managed by MI-6

because the CIA is so penetrated it could not be trusted

with the mission. The KGB defector then uncovers the Soviet

agents in the White House, CIA and elsewhere and the wise

old counterintelligence chief, obviously meant to be

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Angleton, saves America. Although hard to believe, the book

was an alternate Book-of-the-Month Club selection.

Noventheloss

However, 1980/

was not entirely a year of wine and roses

por the angletonians; kok aft was that year it

Wilderness of

Mirrors appeared, authored by David Martin. Now considered

a classic of intelligence literature, Martin spent over two

years interviewing CIA retirees, including Angleton himself

who at first favored Martin with many secrets but later cut

him off when he learned Martin was consorting with some CIA

people who were critical of the ex-CI Staff chief. One of

these was Clare E. Petty who had worked on Angleton's staff

and had concluded he was either a giant fraud or a KGB

agent. Martin originally intended to publicize this view

via an article in Newsweek, but it was dropped when Angleton

threatened legal action. However, Martin did publish his

book that exposed Golitsyn as a not important defector who

made more trouble than he was worth, suggested Nosenko was

genuine and punched many holes in the Angleton myth. It

?

provided a lengthy and denunclatory raviaw by Ipstein In The

New York Times as well as a long public statement by

Angelton claiming Martin had robbed him of his phrase

"wilderness of mirrors" when in fact Angleton had himself

lifted it from a poem by I.S. Eliot.

However, events were weakening Epstein's faith in his

master.

In 1981 Mrs. Thatcher was forced by the publication

of a book called Their Trade is Treachery to admit that Sir

Roger Hollis, the former Director General of MI-5, had been

investigated after allegations were received he was a Soviet

agent. Mrs. Thatcher stoutly asserted that a high-level

investigation of these charges found them

false.

Some

months later, Epstein managed to obtain

an

interview with

the defector, Michel Goleniewski, who had become convinced

he was the last of the Romanovs, but

otherwise remained

quite a sensible person. In the interview Epstein asked if

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the defector thought Hollis was a KGB mole, an idea much

supported by Angleton. The defector replied negatively,

then listed precisely all the Soviet agents MI-5 had

apprehended due to the Intormation he had provided. "Is they"

KGB had had a mole at the head of MI-5, you can be sure ally

these men would somehow have escaped," he commented dryly.

ст 6220

ethics.

A further confusion of the issues occurred in 1979-80

period with the publication of a series of articles written

by one Joe trento, then a reporter for a daily in

Wilmington, Delaware. Trento, probably from Petty, learned

Cleveland Cram was writing a history of the Angleton years

in counterintelligence and from that slight fact launched a

number of charges against Angleton including some which

included largely erroneous information about the Nosenko and

Loginov cases. As Cram had several times interviewed

Angleton in connection with the history, Cram contacted him

to assure him the leak to Trento had come from others.

Angleton's response to the Trento articles was to attack

Admiral Turner. The Trento articles continued for some time

and were an embarrassment to the Agency, but they did not

affect the writing of the history. At any rate, Cram's

interviews of Angleton by this time were at an end mostly

because it had become increasingly evident Angleton's

judgment and veracity could no longer be relied upon.

The next book of conseguence to appear, which was

associated with Angleton, was Henry Hurt's Shadrin in 1981.

Hurt had worked on Legend as an assistant to Epstein.

During this stint Hurt became aware of the Shadrin case and

began interviewing Mrs. Ewe Shadrin

and her lawyer, Richard

Copaken. Hurt quickly sensed a rich story

and the Reader's

Digest agreed to provide financial support for the project,

which began as a magazine article but quickly grew into a

book. The chief

editor at this time for "Reader's Digest"

was Fulton Oursler, a man of strong right-wing views and

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much influenced by the Angleton-Epstein theories, which he

saw could be promoted by the Shadrin story while at the same

time condemning the new CI Staff for what he believed were

serious errors in their handling of the case. The inability

of the US authorities to provide an answer to the mystery of

Shadrin's disappearance had also provoked wide criticism.

The story not only revived the old Golitsyn-Nosenko

controversy but made it current by telling the story of the

appearance of a mysterious KGB man named "Igor" (codenamed

Kitty Hawk by the FBI) •

There is little doubt but that Angleton contributed

information to Hurt but so did a number of FBI people who

broke their oaths, talking more than their share. In sum,

much classified information was put in the public domain

that could not but have endangered the safety of the Soviet

named "Igor," assuming he was genuine, a matter on which

again Agency people divided, Angleton believing he was not,

while others thought his valuable information assured his

bona fides. The Hurt book, an interesting story, was

however, essentially a propaganda piece intended to benefit

Mrs. Shadrin, but its shrill attack on the Agency, the FBI,

and the new CI Staff was not helpful and the book's many

inaccuracies distorted an already confused situation.

A number of other books appeared during the early

bus

1980's such as William Colent Honorable Men in which he

explains why he dismissed Angleton, Tom Powers' The Man Who

Kept the Secrets, which highly praised Angleton (a position

from which Powers has retreated), and a book by a Canadian,

John Sawatsky, on the Bennett case in Canada. The latter,

called For Services Rendered appeared in 1982. Bennett, a

long-time civilian employee of the RCMP Security Service,

was falsely impugned by Clare Petty, a major conspiracy

theorist, on Angleton's staff. It immediately ignited an

investigation, which could have been stopped by Angleton,

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but instead he lend it impetus by suggesting the Mounties

consult Golitsyn. That sealed Bennett's doom and brought

his dismissal from the service although no substantial

evidence existed against him and he passed his polygraph

tests. The case tore the Mounties apart and furthermore

gave ammunition to those who arguad he security service

should be removed from the RCMP. Within a few years Canada

had a civilian security service. Sawatsky's book drew

considerable attention in Canada but little in America.

In 1988, one year after Angleton's death, Epstein

produced his book called Deception. In the years between

Legend and Deception Epstein had become something of a

specialist on the subject of Soviet disinformation and

deception. These twin subjects, along with "active

measures" (to which they are related), truth occupied a

number of scholars and writers during the 1980s.

In this

they were assisted by the testimony of several Soviet

defectors, including the indefatigable Golitsyn who added

his own volume to the field called New Lies for old, whose

turgid prose had to be endlessly rewritten before it was

rendered readable.

Epstein's book Deception, like its predecessor, is

really in two parts. The second part in which he describes

various deceptions practiced through the centuries can be

ignored as it says nothing new. It/ is the first 105 pages

that are of interest, wherein he repeats the old theories

about Nosenko, and then in the section "Acknowledgments"

names all his sources for the years past: Angleton, Bagley,

Miler, Sullivan, etc. He also indicates in this part that

his informants understood clearly they were providing him

with classified information. It is an astonishing set of

revelations.

It

is difficult to avoid the feeling that this

book is Epstein's last hurrah, at least in the world of

intelligence.

He senses with glasnost the days of the

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conspiracists are numbered.

and run.

It/is time to take the money

In 1991 an English writer, Tol Mangold, published his

biography of Angleton called Cold Warrior to which he

devoted three years of intensive work and $300,000 of Simon

and Schuster's money.

Mangold has carefully sourced his

book, the research is impressive and Affay impeccable, and

the writing is good if a bit overwrought at times. But it

is far more a history of the CI Staff for the last ten years

under Angleton's command than it is a story about the man

himself. As history it is largely accurate and fair

although the absence of a chapter on Israeli liaison

(chopped out by the editor) is unfortunate. The book was

the occasion of considerable commentary because Mangold

stated he had interviewed 208 CIA retirees, until it was

then noted that John Ranelagh, another English author, in

his book on the CIA had interviewed

over 350 CIA retirees.

Mangold's conclusions that counterintelligence suffered

badly at Angleton's hands at the very time in the cold war

when the Agency needed common sense and honesty most is well

made and backed by numerous examples.

Finally, it should be noted that a second book about

Angleton and the old cI Staff followed only ten months after

Sold Warrior. This book called Molehunt by the veteran

intelligence writer, David Wise, is also a well-researched

and smooth-reading volume concentrating largely on the hunt

for "Sasha," a Soviet agent Golitsyn claimed had played a

major role providing the Russians valuable information. It

was mainly from this search for the supposed mole within CIA

that a very few CIA officers had their careers damaged.

Because his sources did not possess complete knowledge of

the "Sasha" story, Wise has presented a partially distorted

story. The complete story of the "Sasha" case resides in

the CIC archives re Gerald Sidney Ross at Langley; for

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various reasons, it remains a highly restricted issue.

Despite this minor misconception, for which the author

cannot be blamed, the Wise book is otherwise factually

correct and is another cautionary tale management should

bear in mind.

Legend: The Secret World of lee Harvey Oswald by Edward

Jay Epstein; The Reader's Digest Press/McGraw-Hill Book

Company (New York, N.Y.), 1978--382 pages

Epstein is a fatt bright and able writer who took his

MA at Cornell and his doctorate in government at Harvard

(1972). He had made a name for himself with his book

Inquest: The Warren Commission and the Establishment of

Iruth, done as his master's thesis at Cornell. As one of

the first serious works to expose the shortcomings of the

Commission, it sold well and made Epstein momentarily well

known. Epstein became aware of the Nosenko case through the

Reader's Digest, from which he became acquainted with James

Angleton. Their association flourished and Angleton became

Epstein's major source on Nosenko and the issues

surrounding

him. Eventually The Reader's Digest sponsored Epstein's

research to the tune of $500,000. The book was a best

seller, projecting Epstein into the forefront of those who

were popular exponents of the ideas of Angleton.

Following

the publication of Legend, Epstein wrote numerous articles

for New York magazine, Commentary, and other publications,

mostly--though not always--supportive of the Angleton

theories.

Legend is in fact two books: the first is about

Nosenko and the Angleton belief that he was part of a KGB

deception operation while the second is about Oswald's

service in the Marine Corps in Japan where it is suggested

he acquired information about the U-a flights flown from the

airfield on which he was stationed as well as his later

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sojourn in the Soviet Union. In brief, Epstein accepted

Angleton's conclusion that "Nosenko was

a Soviet

intelligence agent dispatched by the KGB expressly for the

purpose of delivering disinformation to the CIA, FBI and

Warren Commission." In this scheme of things, Oswald, the

supposed lone assassin of President Kennedy, likely was

working

for the KGB; Nosenko said this was not true, but,

therefore, by the logic in Legend--it is. Oswald the ex-

Marine who defected to the USSR in 1959 and returned three

years later, had been living a "legend," a false biography

concocted for him by the KGB. Amongst these two stories is

a central theme, carefully stated but always present, which

is that the highest level of the intelligence community, and

certainly the CIA, is penetrated by a "mole" working for the

KGB. Although by 1978 this "nole" had not been found, the

best proof that he existed rested in the assertion of

Nosenko that he knew of no penetration, which contradicted

statements made to the contrary by a "Mr. Stone," who proves

to be Anatole Golitsyn. Epstein thus promoted the Angleton

twin beliefs of deception and penetration by the KGB which

was enshrined in his concept which came to be derisively

called "The Monster Plot.") For CIA officers who wish to

learn the full story of the Nosenko case, it is recommended

they read the Fieldhouse/Snowdon study on Nosenko

commissioned by then DCI Casey in 1981.

i here

trenchede

covetasion

In his source notes, Epstein is quite frank in stating

that his work is based on interviews with Nosenko and

retired CIA officers. He then lists a number including

Gordon Stewart, Admiral Turner, Richard Helms, James

Angleton and members of his CI Staff, William Sullivan and

Sam Papich of the FBI, and others connected with the

Golitsyn and Nosenko cases. Although Epstein is careful to

camouflage his sources by never quoting them verbatim or

directly,

clear that a number of CIA officers had

provided

an

immense amount of classified information to

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Epstein. This was leakage about hitherto most sensitive

Soviet cases on a scale the CIA had not before experienced.

However, because Epstein so cleverly refrained from pin

point sourcing, At was impossible to say exactly which CIA

and/or FBI officers had leaked what. In 1989 the mystery

was resolved with the publication of a second book by

Epstein called Deception which dealt with the contentious

old cases, including Nosenko and Golitsyn again. But now

with his major source, Angleton, dead, Epstein revealed in

detail who his informants had been. This will be reviewed

in detail in the summary on Deception. Although the

presentation of these hitherto highly classified cases

shocked most observers, within a year the entire Nosenko

case was to be revealed to the public in detail via the U.s.

House Select Committee on Assassinations.

Legend sold better than might have been expected, and

the conspiracy buffs found it a welcome addition to the

growing

literature on the Kennedy assassination. Many,

however, found the book confusing and its claims extravagant

and unsupported by factual evidence. One of the chief

critics was George Lardner of The Washington Post who wrote,

"What Epstein has written...is a fascinating, important, and

essentially dishonest book. Fascinating because it offers

new information

about oswald, about the KGB, and about the

CIA. Dishonest because

it pretends to be objective, because

it is saddled with demonstrative errors and inexcusable

omissions, because it assumes the KGB always knows what it

is doing while the CIA does not. It is paranoid. It is

naive."

However,

there is no question but that Legend set the

tone for the debate which was to ensue in the media about

the Nosenko affair. It gave the Angleton and Bagley forces

an advantage by putting their argument adroitly if

dishonestly before the public.

It was not until David

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Martin responded with Wilderness of Mirrors that any

opposing view was to be presented in a coherent fashion.

Wilderness of Mirrors by David C. Martin; Harper and Row

(New York, N.Y.), 1980--228 pages

The best written and most informed book about CIA

operations against the Soviet target in the 1950's and

1960's with a penetrating and critical analysis of two of

the most prominent CIA officers involved, william K. Harvey

and James Angleton. Based upon countless interviews with

retired CIA officers, material acquired under FOIA, and from

open sources, including evidence derived from the House

Committee Hearings on Assassination, Martin crowds into 228

pages an exciting and generally accurate story.

Martin began his research with Angleton as his main

source in the late 1970s, but then transferred his interest

to Harvey, However, as he progressed, Martin became

convinced that while Harvey was an important figure, it was

that he had done severe

damage to CIA (especially to counterintelligence) and that

his forced resignation by CIA Director William Colby had

been a necessary and long overdue action.

There was the

additional problem for Martin that Harvey was dead and his

wife refused to grant interviews nor would she give Martin

access to his official or private papers.

Also, Harvey's

career had ended in 1967 and only a few years later he left

Washington for good. Angleton, on the other hand, had

remained in full throttle until December 1974 when Colby

abruptly ended his career, but even after that Angleton

continued a guerrilla action against the Agency, the new CI

Staff, his old antagonist, Colby, and launched a minor

propaganda campaign which he fueled with calculated leakage

playing one journalist off against another. One of those to

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whom he leaked in the early days was Martin until Angleton

discovered Martin was listening to other ex-Agency people

who did not swallow all of Angleton's theories, whereupon he

abruptly cut Martin off. Thus the last half of the book is

largely devoted to Golitsyn and the subsequent controversy

over Nosenko as well as such side diversions as the mole

hunt, KGB disinformation and other staples of Angleton's

diverse activities.

Martin did not name his sources nor did he footnote the

book, provide a bibliography or other academic

paraphernalia. In his forward he explained the purpose and

scope of the book and then was careful to note that one of

his principal sources was Angleton, "who was

marvelous

education in the ways of the CIA. Over time, he explained

to me its organization, its personnel, its modus operandi,

and its internal rivalries." It was from Angleton, Martin

continues, that he first heard some of the more colorful

stories about Bill Harvey. On the other hand, when Martin

called Harvey, the latter always hung up. Of course, after

Angleton heard that Martin was in touch with Clare Edward

Petty, who when working for Angleton had become suspicious

of his motives and began to speculate perhaps Angelton was

the mole they were searching for, Angleton refused to

continue this cooperation. Certainly Petty was one of the

generous contributors of information to Martin about

Angleton and the mole hunt, the Golitsyn-Nosenko

controversy, and many other subjects covered in the book.

Aside from Angleton, Martin identifies few other ex-CIA

sources although he admits they were legion.

The book was largely well received by the reviewers

mainly becauso it is a well written intelligence yarn which

is also chock full of mostly accurate factual material. It

sold out quickly and went into a paperback edition by

Ballantine. Even that edition has long since sold out and

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the book is now a collector's item. Most readers found it a

good story, but many found it especially interesting because

it focused on the enigmatic Angleton who by 1980 had become

a notorious figure thanks to Epstein's best-seller Legend,

which had lavished attention on Angleton as a

counterintelligence genius whorhad bled/ wrongly dismissed at

the height of the Cold War, an act many hinted was close to

treasonable. Martin's book took a fall different tack,

revealing Angleton as"self-centered, ambitious, and

paranoid character with little regard for his Agency

colleagues or for simple common sense. That view prompted

the lone critic of the book, Epstein, to write a long reveiw

for the New York Times Book Review filled with vituperative

comments, loose charges and character assassination.

Angleton himself entered the fray with a three page public

statement denouncing Martin and accusing him of having

stolen his phrase Wilderness of Mirrors, which Angleton had

actually lifted from a poem by T.S. Eliot without

attribution. Martin had heard Angleton use it ad nauseam in

the midnight sessions and as he could discern no copyright

he appropriated the term as a compelling title for his book.

The book remains a classic on Angleton and the period.

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SHADRIN: The Spy Who Never Came Back by Henry Hurt; The

Reader's Digest Press/McGraw Hill (New York, N.Y.), 1981--

301 pages

Henry Hurt was a free lance writer and researcher for

Reader's Digest when he met Edward J. Epstein. He assisted

Epstein on the research for Legend and was heavily

influenced by Epstein's ideas on recent intelligence

matters, which the latter had absorbed from Angleton.

In

1979 Hurt met Ewe Shadrin, the wife of the Soviet naval

defector who disappeared in Vienna in December 1975 while

on

a mission for the FBI and CIA. Soon after, Hurt met Ewe's

aggressive young lawyer, Richard Copaken,

and from this

association a plan developed for Hurt to write

an article

for Reader's Digest about Ewe's missing husband. The

article rapidly grew into a book for Reader's Digest under

the direction of fulton Oursler, a right-wing editor with

strong enthusiasm for Angleton.

Copaken immediately took Hurt in hand and introduced

him to a number of key persons associated

with the Shadrin

case, including several FBI officers while Epstein

introduced Hurt to Angleton. The latter seems to have been

responsible for facilitating a surprise visit by Hurt to

Golitsyn at his hideaway in upstate New York, an event which

shook Golitsyn and also necessitated for

security reasons

soon moving the defector frol that place to a new location

in the southland.

In 1981 Shadrin's mysterious

disappearance on his ill-fated visit to Vienna remained

unsolved. Copaken and Mrs. Shadrin were increasingly

frustrated and confused by seeming

US Government

indifference to their case, although in fact the agencies

concerned were doing all possible to extract any iota of

information from the Soviets while the latter remained

largely uncommunicative. In 1985 a Soviet defector, Vitali

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Yurchenko, had come over to the CIA, albeit briefly, and in

his debriefing provided the answer: Shadrin had been killed

accidentally by the KGB during his meeting with them in

Vienna.

Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov was born in 1922 in the

USSR and chose the Soviet Navy for a career.

He proved an

exceptional officer, a man of high intellect, great charn

and wide interests. With advanced training in nuclear

missiles, he was at age 27 the youngest destroyer captain in

the Red Navy; he was obviously destined for top command. In

1959 his ship was stationed in Gdynia, Poland, supporting a

training program for Indonesian naval officers. There

Artamonov met and fell in love with Ewe Gora, a young dental

graduate from a wealthy Polish family. Marriage seemed

impossible given Ewe's parent's antipathy for all Soviets

and the Red Navy's own restrictions, so he proposed

defection, she accepted, and in a daring and dangerous

escape they crossed the Baltic to Sweden in a commandeered

naval launch.

stalen

He was brought to America under CIA auspices, and, being

fully cooperative, he proved a veritable gold mine to the

Office of Naval Intelligence. Under the new identity of

Shadrin, Nick and Ewe made remarkable progress.

He took an

MA and a PhD in engineering; she opened

a successful dental

practice. They made many new friends, mostly drawn from

high-ranking intelligence officials. But then problems

developed. As his debriefing drew to a close, he should by

any measure have been continued as a naval analyst or

consultant to ONI, but because of his background a general

security clearance was refused. He was finally assigned to

a unit of former defectors serving as translators in

the new

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). The job and the people

who worked with him were below his level;

Shadrin was

understandably distressed but he stayed the course.

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This situation was radically altered in 1966 with the

arrival in Washington of a KGB officer named in the book as

Igor (code named Kitty Hawk by FBI and CIA). The full story

of Igor and Shadrin's association with the operation which

ensued is told in one or more Agency studies which, although

several were written in ignorance of the final developments

in the case, are more factually accurate and detailed than

Hurt's account, which is muthl degraded by the fact he had to

build his case wholly on word-of-nouth accounts. (However, /

Hurt must be credited with, thanks to considerable pressure

applied by "Reader's Digest" at high levels, having

collected considerable information; he also had help from

Copaken's own aggressive investigation. Finally, it appears

that several FBI officers confided more to Ewe Shadrin and

her lawyer than they should have. The Angleton/Epstein role

emerges in the portion dealing with Igor's background and

his bona fides.

Throughout the book, Hurt flays the Agency and FBI for

having allowed Shadrin to proceed with his hazardous

mission

in a city where the KGB could control the situation, but (it/

is difficult to perceive what other course could have been

taken if the operation were to remain viable. It was

an

admitted gamble, it had been done successfully before,

Shadrin was willing to proceed, and so the die was cast.

But then Hurt introduces the issue of Igor's credibility.

should the operation have been undertaken when

many questions about Isor? hurt estee e 190evere,

SO

credentials rested to some degree on two defectors whom Hurt

regards

as false, Fedora (the KGB agent who had worked for

the FBI) and Nosenko. The fact that by 1981 the Agency had

long accepted Nosenko as bona fide is swept aside as

irrelevant. Instead Hurt cites Epstein's Legend as his

source for questioning Nosenko's authenticity, but Hurt also

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cites an FBI study done in 1980 which he claims concluded

FEDORA was a false defector.

Readers of Shadsin should bear in mind Hurt was acting

throughout for Ewe Shadrin by attempting to generate maximum

publicity for her case and thus improve her leverage with

officialdom. Thus, throughout the book the issue of Igor's

security is totally disregarded. If Igor were genuine,

which Hurt doubts by following the judgment of Epstein (in

turn based on Angelton's views), then obviously his security

should have been paramount. Logically, he should never have

been mentioned at all. Hurt apparently never understood or

refused to believe Igor had been a valuable source of

counterintelligence information, one of his leads having led

to the apprehension of a long term KGB

spy who had done

enormous damage to American interests. Many other cases had

derived from Igor's information and were being played out.

While it is true that Igor had been mentioned in American

press articles)as early as 1978, the source of While leakage

has not been identified, the cases derived from Igor were

still being developed and, more importantly, if Igor were

genuine, all the Hurt publicity was likely to put his life

at serious risk. Hurt's book propelled the Shadrin case and

the mysterious Igor into the public knowledge in a major

way.

What action the soviets took, if any, subsequently

towards Igor is unknown to this writer, but if Igor suffered

imprisonment or death at the hands of the KGB, then Hurt and

his erstwhile allies bear a heavy responsibility.

this mere

Purse Tet.

Hurt also midl exaggerates what he terms Agency

incompetence and bungling in the Shadrin case, assigning

guilt to Colby, Kalaris and McCoy, roughly in that order.

He cites lack of surveillance in Vienna and the failure to

notify Washington immediately when Shadrin's absence was

discovered. Much of the blame he puts on the

uncommunicative Cynthia Hausmann. She is accused of being

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N

distant/and insensitive to Ewe Shadrin when Nick was found

to be missing. Although Hausmann was not a very outgoing

person under the best of circumstances, she was a Mety

competent and conscientious officer. Mostr experts agree in

that full surveillance was of doubtful utility in this case

and an immediate cable to Washington would have been of

little help. Under the circumstances, Hausmann's cautious

and restrained conduct seems laudable. Hurt's outrage on

these points is both naive and absurd.

oph

The Hurt book reflects throughout the influence of

Angleton, but it plays a secondary role. But this seriously

flaws the book, which is now overcome by events except for

our ignorance of the disposition of Igor. This persists but

perhaps in the new dispensation we may one day receive the

answer.

FOR SERVICES RENDERED; Leslie James Bennett and the

RCMP Security Service by John Sawatsky; Doubleday and

Company (New York and Toronto), 1982--239 pages

Sawatsky's book might well have been titled James

Bennett; A Counterintelligence Tragedy, because that is what

it was.

(It is a cautionary tale and should be read

carefully by every senior officer dealing with security and

counterintelligence. Sawatsky's book is also one of the

best on the Angleton era, although it deals with but one

slice of it. Although Golitsyn plays a role in the book,

Sawatsky does not otherwise touch upon the major

controversies that plagued the counterintelligence scene at

the time. Sawatsky did interview some CIA retired officers,

but the bulk of his evidence was collected from RCMP

personnel who were actually involved in the Bennett case.

Is focus" entirely on the Canadian scene ah there are

few distractions fron the central story, highlis a vivia

and truthful account of the destruction of an excellent

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out.

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Aper

civilian officer of the RCMP Security service.

Thete are

also Several accounts in the official

Cro 8/200. then way

be consulted to verify Sawatsky's story.

Sawatsky, ly a Canadian journalist, tilt cut his teeth on

intelligence and security affairs with an earlier book

called Men In The Shadows, a general account of the RCMP

Security Service. Shortly after the publication of

Sawatsky's book, a novel appeared by a Canadian named Ian

Adams. This was a thinly disguised story of the alleged

role of Leslie James Bennett as a Soviet spy. Bennett, who

had been a senior civilian official in the RCMP for many

years, all in counterintelligence work against the Soviets,

had been forced out of the service in 1972 supposedly on

health grounds. After a brief period in South Africa,

Bennett settled in Australia. When the Adams book appeared,

he struck back at its innuendo with a libel suit. In the

ensuing trial, much about the previously highly secret

Bennett case became public knowledge. Armed with these

details, Sawatsky went after the rest of the story.

It is

probably safe proposition that Bennett told Sawatsky his

side of the story and provided the names of friends who

could fill in additional detail as well as color. It also

seens likely that as Sawatsky pursued his investigation

those who believed Bennett guilty were ready to tell their

story while those who preferred to believe him innocent,

were equally ready to strike back with more argument. This

kind or argument and counterargument, stimulating each side

to blurt out more that it had originally intended, is

perfect for the investigative journalist.

Sawatsky had a

field day. Former RCMP personnel obviously talked freely

and in great detail. The result is an astonishing book that

reads like security service files, except that it is

livelier and better written.

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Readers of the Martin, Pincher, and other books about

counterintelligence in this period will find a common thread

running through them and Sawatsky's book. It was, the better

Arresteely held by la small group of westerantin hilies

counter intelligence officers in the 1960s and 1970s that

their services were penetrated by the Soviets.

The

penetration was thought to explain why things had gone

wrong, to show cause for many otherwise inexplicable

anomalies, and to account for the failures of their services

in the struggle against Soviet Bloc intelligence. These

fears came somewhat later to the Mounties than to the

British, who had contracted a very severe case of mole fever

during the late 1960s.

But when the Mounties got the

disease, they got it the worst of all. When people wondered

why cases had collapsed, spies slipped away without trace,

or double agents who had gone to Moscow were never heard

from again, the almost overwhelming judgment was that it

must have been the work of a mole.

On pages 265-266, Sawatsky tells how suspicion fell on

Bennett because Clare E. Petty, one of Angleton's

counterintelligence officers, told some stories out of

school. They constituted the kind of airy theorizing in

which Petty specialized, what might be termed extreme

speculation unsupported by any fact, but it was

enough to

set off a conflagration. When Angleton learned of Petty's

indiscretion, he was furious, but he did not then go to the

Mounties and advise caution. Instead, when he saw how

rapidly the case was developing, he poured kerosene on the

fire by suggesting the RCMP consult Golitsyn,

It was to be

Golitsyn's last big case, and he took full advantage of it.

Although only a year earlier he had visited Ottawa and

stayed at the Bennett home discussing cases for hours, an

event which Bennett thought led to their becoming

close

friends, the defector now declared Bennett to be a KGB mole.

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outd

prs.,

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This was all that was needed and the RCMP hurtled off to

disaster.

Bennett was an outsider (i.e., a civilian employee, a

rarity in the RCMP); he had been in the counterintelligence

branch for two decades; he had had access to everything; and

he was not the most popular of men. Bennett, a Welshman who

entered the RCMP in the early 1950s, had raised several

generations of commissioned and noncommissioned Mounties,

trying to instill in them the kind of discipline,

perseverance, objectivity, and dedication that

counterintelligence work requires. In the course of his

career it is safe to say he made some enemies. A dry,

dyspeptic man with a fierce dedication to his work, he was

known to arrive regularly at the office at seven in the

morning and not leave until seven at night; this addiction

to duty was later to be cited against him. He had a biting

tongue. He could be acidly critical of young, raw recruits

from the Canadian prairies who came to him with nothing more

than a high school education and whom he was trying to

hammer into an effective counterintelligence service. In

the long run, although he was widely respected (and nowhere

more than with the foreign services with whom the RCMP had

liaison), many of those who passed through B Branch (the

counterintelligence section of the security service) hated

him.

It was a likely, if unspoken, factor in the

accusations against him.

The story of the investigation, the confrontation, the

interrogation, and the ultimate decision that Bennett had to

leave is well tola be

Sawatsky despite its enormous

complexities.

It was a terrible, wrenching hour for the

distinguished Director General (its first)

of the security

service, John K. Starnes, when he finally had to decide

Bennett must go. Bennett, never in good health, was put out

of the RCMP on a medical discharge. Starnes himself left

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the security service not long after and within a few years

the whole organization was closed down, to be replaced in

due course by a civilian service.

fo The destruction of James Bennett and the ultimate

demise of the RCMP Security Service are events for mich

Angleton must be held at least partially responsible.

Angleton had been a malign influence upon the service for

many years, an example of which is the Olga Farmakovskaya

case detailed in the Canadian Section of the CI Staff

History and also covered in Mangold's Sold Warrior. on

pages 257-258, Sawatsky gives an example of Angleton gulling

the Canadians with a fanciful story he had also used on the

British. Angleton in the greatest secrecy told the RCMP of

a mysterious source he had behind the Iron Curtain which

reported only sporadically but whose product was of the

highest guality. Angleton went on to indicate that, with a

reference to the cultivation of orchids, he was slowly and

patiently developing this source which provided evidence of

Soviet disruption and disinformation but also positive

intelligence as well.

The source served up only partial

information and tended to refer to ancient Soviet history.

It could not be interrogated and its product came out to the

West erratically. Although good, this source had not yet

penetrated to the inner circle of soviet power, but Angleton

had high hopes. This fanciful source (the writer heard this

himself with a small group of RCMP officers at La Nicoise at

midnight and was appalled) existed, of course, only as a

figment of Angleton's imagination, but over long alcoholic

meals Angleton would bit by bit unveil the story of his mole

in Moscow. The Mounties were sworn to deepest secrecy, but

they should have checked with their British friends, as

Angleton had used this ploy on them at an earlier stage.

When Maurice Oldfield became Chief of MI-6 in 1973 and

Michael Hanley Director General of MI-5 in 1972, they turned

a deaf ear to such palpable nonsense. (Angleton had hinted

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ther

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at querying the source regarding Harold Wilson's alleged

Soviet connections, but the source never responded.) The

new management was determined not to be victimized further.

Only after the Bennett and other disasters did the Canadians

and British compare notes, thus discovering they had been

gulled separately over the years.

After Bennett's libel case against Adams brought this

scandal into public view, the Canadian Government made its

own inquiry and in 1980 the Solicitor General of Canada, Mr.

Francis Fox, told the House of Connons Committee on Justice

and Legal Affairs that "there was no evidence whatsoever

that Mr. Bennett was anything but a loyal Canadian citizen"

although there was no mention of any financial compensation

for his obvious loss of income plus his personal

humiliation. The incubus of Angleton still seemed to hover

over the case. Bennett lives in exile in Australia

surviving on a miserable medical pension. | Nothing seems to

be able to shake Canadian Government resolve to forget as

completely as possible the Bennett case.

Sunch

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DECEPTION: The Invisible War Between the KGB and the CIA by

Edward J.

Epstein; Simon and Schuster (New York, N.X.),

1989-335 pages

It is iconic that Edward J. Epstein should have

published his book called Deception in mid-1989 just as the

Soviet Union was undergoing massive changes, which would by

autumn 1991 result in its total demise. So also has its

major intelligence arm, the KGB, vanished, which according

to Epstein and his principal source, James Angleton, was

responsible for many mind-boggling feats of deception.

A

little heralded result of these events has been the

disappearance almost overnight of what once was

a burgeoning

cottage industry employing hundreds of academics and self-

appointed experts around in the country in universities and

think tanks devoted to the study of Soviet deception,

disinformation, active measures and subversion. This

already antique field of academic endeavor now has, like

Epstein's book, the smell of attic dust.

was

This book, rather like its predecessor Legend, is

really two books; the first book in 105 pages explains

Angleton's theories developed largely from the defector,

Anatole Golitsyn. The second part-the remainder

of the

bookis devoted to various forms of deception.

subject has been better covered in other works

As this

it is

of no

concern here except to note that one chapter is

devoted

to

the Soviet defector, Vitali Yurchenko, designated by Epstein

as an obvious KGB provocation similar

to Nosenko.

Epstein

concludes the book with a long chapter on glasnost, which he

dismisses

as simply another massive KGB deception.

The most arresting

information imparted in Deception is

Epstein's confession regarding his sources for both Legend

and this book. With Angleton now dead, Epstein apparently

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feels free to admit the former chief of CIA

counterintelligence was his major source since 1976 when

they first met. It was Angleton who pasped lastein on to

his assistants, Miler and Rocca, as well as provialing

Introductions to William Hood fus FBI officers William

Sullivan and San Papich. Angleton sent Epstein to Europe to

see Stephen de Mowbray, the former MI-6 officer and a

devoted disciple of Golitsyn, in England and to Tennent

("Pete") Bagley in Belgium. That the latter understood he

was passing on classified information is revealed by

Epstein's anusing description of the clandestine

circumstances under which they met. All down the years,

Angleton remained a constant and prolific source for

Epstein; the latter showed his appreciation by taking

Angleton with him to Israel when he went there in 1982 to de

research an his book about the diamond trade (later

published as The Rise and Fall of Diamonds). Although it

was obvious to most astute observers that Angleton was

leaking classified information to Epstein and others,

nothing was done to caution him. On the other hand, when it

was agreed Clare E. Petty had been leaking classified

material to the press, he was sent an official warning

eldercinit

letter by CIA. Thus, in retirement, as when he was a CIA lil

nah this.

In Part One Epstein recites again, as in Legend, the

Angleton belief in the KGB program of deception and

penetration, which over the years he had absorbed from the

defector Golitsyn and had then embellished further with

special embroidery of his own. These theories came to be

described by Angleton's critics as "The Monster Plot." As

Epstein never seems to have grasped the real meaning of how

the theory was supposed to have operated, the reader is

advised to read the appropriate section in the CI Staff

official history or the special chapter in the CI Staff

study done by Fieldhouse on the Nosenko case.

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One of Golitsyn's major claims, made almost immediately

after his defection, was that another defector would soon be

sent by the KGB, as Angleton invariably put it, to

"mutilate" Golitsyn's leads (which in another oddity of

terminology, Angleton always called "serials"). In 1964

Nosenko defected to the CIA. Angleton, who by now had

complete control of Golitsyn, instantly viewed Nosenko as

the predicted plant thereby ensuring that Golitsyn would

maintain his primacy as the CI Staff's resident expert.

When Nosenko did not confess to his role as a false

defector, he was incarcerated for three years under severe

conditions. Epstein blames this action entirely on Soviet

Division management, while portraying the powerful Angelton

as agonizing helplessly on the sidelines. This rendition is

not only wrong, but patently absurd. Angleton knew all the

legal inquiries concerning such action, was kept informed of

the construction of the prison quarters, and never once

raised an objection. If he had, as Epstein claims,

genuinely opposed Nosenko's imprisonment, one word from him

to Helms would have been sufficient to stop the program

instantly.

The foregoing is but one of many errors of fact and/or

misinterpretation in this book. Like Legend it is

propaganda for Angleton and is essentially dishonest. The

errors are too many to document here, but one more example

will give the flavor of this work. This error tends to

confirm what an exasperated senior FBI officer wrote to

Director J. Edgar Hoover: "Golitsyn is not above

fabricating to support his theories." On page 85, Epstein

cites Golitsyn's assertion that, to support the KGB

deception program, it was necessary to divide Soviet

intelligence into an outer and an inner KGB. Epstein then

explains what Golitsyn allegedly reported about this, but

nothing remotely resembling this can be found in any of

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Golitsyn's debriefings. It seems likely this fiction was

developed by Golitsyn after his visit to England, when there

is much evidence he began to embroider and fabricate. The

idea of the two KGBs has never been reported by any other

Soviet source or defector, including the most senior

defector of modern times, Oleg Gordievsky. Thus it is

suggested this statement should be treated with great

reserve. It also suggests that Epstein, who makes

considerable pretensions to scholarship, should have been

more conscientious in checking such stories with more

responsible sources before labeling them as fact.

minions

In summary, this is one of many bad books that appeared

during the period after Angleton's dismissal which were

inspired by him and mostly have no factual basis. Just as

Angleton gulled the British and Canadians with fake stories

about an alleged highly secret source of his in Moscow who

on occasion produced startling, if mostly historic,

information, so for over fifteen years Angleton and his

cohorte gulled the public via such writers as Epstein with

books like Legend and Deception. It is difficult to believe

that a writer as obviously intelligent as Epstein could

believe the stuff he wrote.

An interview with Epstein in the magazine Vanity Fair

in May 1989 suggests Epstein is having second thoughts about

Angleton and even about his pet defector, Golitsyn. In the

interview, Epstein admits Angleton's views were shaped by

Golitsyn--but how reliable was he?

"Possibly Golitsyn was a

liar," admits Epstein, "but Golitsyn is very interesting

because he is a museum of Angleton's mind.

What I

believe

happened is that Golitsyn listened to

stories Angleton told

him and then repeated them to British intelligence and vice

versa." This suggests that the great confidence writers

like Epstein put in Golitsyn is being eroded (witness the

article William Safire wrote in The New York Times after his

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visit with Golitsyn). And as a result, has Epstein's

confidence in Angleton's veracity been equally eroded?

It

appears this may be the case as Epstein concluded the

interview noted above with the remark: "Actually, I don't

know whether to believe Angleton at all!"

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COLD WARRIOR: James Jesus Angleton: The CIA's Master Spy

Hunter, by Tom Mangold; Simon and Schuster (New York, N.Y.),

1991--403 pages

The only book that focuses solely on James Angleton as

the central subject is Tom Mangold's Cold Warrior. All

previous books have dealt with Angleton in a peripheral

manner with the former CIA chief of counterintelligence as a

secondary subject although he often was a primary source.

The idea of a biography on Angleton had been around for some

time. William Hood, a competent writer of spy stories,

expressed an interest but was dissuaded when he became

convinced the readers on the Publications Review Staff at

Langley would hack his work to pieces, a la Admiral Turner's

book. Paul Greengrass, who ghosted Peter Wright's

Spycatcher also toyed with the idea, but was unable to find

proper financing. In the summer of 1987, Mangold got the

bug and began hunting for a publisher. He soon had two

possibilities, Random House and Simon and Schuster.

He

chose the latter because they offered the largest advance

($300,000), which attracted Mangold because he knew

he would

be off pay from his regular employer, the BBC, for two

years, he had a large family to support, the job would

require considerable travel, and he would have to employ a

competent research

analyst. But in accepting Simon and

Schuster's offer, he also got Alice Mayhew as his editor--

but more about that later.

Mangold made a scouting trip to America in late 1987 to

find a research assistant and settled upon a Washington free

lancer named Jeffrey Goldberg, a spectacularly successful

choice. Goldberg proved to be the kind of relentless

researcher for factual detail and truth rarely found in

modern journalism. He also was a good interviewer, although

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Mangold handled personally the most important targets.

Together they made a formidable team.

One of their earliest successes was an interview with

David Martin, the author of Wilderness of Mirrors. Martin

welcomed Mangold's enterprise and gave him his list of

retired CIA, FBI and other knowledgeable persons on the

Agency and particularly on the Angleton debate. Shortly

after, Goldberg went to New Haven to see Professor Robin

Winks, author of Cloak and Gown, a successful book on

espionage figures hailing from Yale University during World

War II and a minor authority on Angleton. Winks wanted

$2000 for a two hour interview, but Goldberg got him for

$600, which

proved a good buy as Winks had material left

over from his book which in effect he turned over to

Goldberg. Among this material was the name of Max Corvo, a

successful Connecticut lawyer, who had served in oSS in

Italy with Angleton and had concluded he was a fraud. They

had become bitter enemies, a condition which

passed into

post-war life. Corvo, in particular, knew the details of

the "Vessel" operation, a supposed penetration by Angleton

of the Vatican (later codenamed "ZYGOMA") which Corvo claims

was a disaster in which Angleton was swindled by a Soviet

émigré and a Jesuit priest. Angleton's henchman in this

operation was a Counterintelligence Center officer named

Mario Brod, who continued to work for Angleton in New York

after the war. Corvo told Goldberg to follow up this lead.

Goldberg did and it yielded eventually the story of

Angleton's connection with Jay Lovestone, although they also

got corroborating information on this affair from Tom

Braden, a former CIA officer.

Mangold is a professional writer who, quite

understandably, wishes to realize a maximum financial reward

for his labor, but he was also anxious that his book be an

honest and accurate story fully sourced. However, he

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realized that some of his sources (he was warned on this by

Martin) would likely wish to remain anonymous (as Epstein's

source had in Legend), but he insisted that otherwise every

fact in the book be carefully sourced. When he explained

this to his editor at Simon and Schuster, she exploded in

disgust. It was the occasion of their first falling out, of

which there would be many; she shouted at Mangold that what

she wanted was a book full of sensational exposes of the

CIA, she didn't care where they came from or how well

documented, if at all! Her rule was, she admonished

Mangold, "to produce a book that grabs a guy and he can read

on the hour flight from L.A. to Vegas." It was clear

Mangold and his editor were not on the same wave length.

Additionally, Ms. Mayhew was at this time shepherding three

other books toward publication: Kitty Kelly's book on Nancy

Reagan, Robert Woodward's on General Powell, and Lou

Cannon's work on President Reagan. It is little wonder in a

field like this, Mangold's book about a little known and now

dead CIA officer could hardly claim his editor's attention

for long.

Mangold suffered another setback early in his work on

the book. He knew from Paul Greengrass and other British

sources that Angleton had enjoyed a close relation with

British intelligence that had sourded badly on the london

side toward the end of his career.

Mangold was hoping to

expand on this issue over what appeared in books like

Wright's Spycatcher. He therefore made a number of

preliminary soundings, but very soon he was given to

understand by a sendor Britiah offlotal, he knew was

connected with SIS (MI-6) that the British Government would

view yery negatively any exhaustive inquiry of Angleton's

association with either SIS or MI-5. At the time, Mangold

had been given a specially important documentary involving

the KGB defector Gordievsky to produce; the implication was

that if Mangold transgressed the rule laid down to leave

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British intelligence out of his book, this documentary and

others in future on which official help might be required

would be at hazard. Mangold had no recourse but to accept

this ultimatum, consequently there is little about

Angleton's influence on British intelligence, especially in

the 1960s, in the book.

When Cold Warrior appeared, some Agency officers

expressed shock that Mangold explained in his foreward he

had interviewed some 208 retired CIA offices (he did not--

curiously-mention he had also interviewed about 35 FBI

retirees), apparently in the belief that never before had so

many CIA retirees broken their secrecy oath. This is hardly

the case. In 1986 a book appeared called The Agency: The

Rise and Decline of the CIA by John Ranelagh, another

British writer.

Ranelagh admits to having interviewed

"several hundred" ("over 350" he told the writer) CIA

retirees, which makes Mangold a poor second. However,

Ranelagh had a kind of laissez-passer from the Agency; he

was guided and given dozens of introductions by the late

John Bross and praises the assistance he got from the likes

of R. Jack Smith, Larry Houston and others. The difference

in attitude about these two exercises is that Ranelagh's

book was largely regarded as a "benign" view of CIA, while

Mangold's book, though not anti-CIA, is very critical of

Angleton, his activities, and especially those superiors who

should have known what he was doing and did not, or knew and

quietly approved. None of this, of course, justifies a

retired CIA officer breaking his secrecy oath whether he be

R. Jack Smith or Leonard McCoy, and at any rate in neither

case is their proof they did.

A far more serious charge against Mangold's work has

been made concerning instances where CIA and/or FBI retirees

revealed information about a sensitive source who had taken

great risks to provide intelligence on the soviet Union, the

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obvious case in Cold Warrior being the Soviet codenamed Nick

Nack and later Morine. This instance parallels Epstein's

revelations about Fedora and Top Hat, two FBI sources of the

1960s about whom Epstein disclosed considerable data, for

which Mangold takes him to task. Epstein's revelations

about them beginning in the late 1970s could have

compromised them. Mangold argues that he understood the

last pass from Nick Nack was c. 1972 and he had not been

heard from since. At the time of writing that event was

nearly twenty years past and it might be assumed the man was

retired, but like Top Hat he was made vulnerable by Western

revelations. Mangold knew Top Hat suffered the death

penalty; both he and his informants should have been more

responsible in restricting knowledge of Nick Nack.

Retirees' revelations can be equally damaging to

liaison relationships, although on some potentially

explosive disclosures it seems Mangold's key sources were

neither CIA nor FBI. For example, the story about Golitsyn

and CAZAB in Australia came from retired General Sir Charles

Spry, former head of ASIO. The story about the Tango case

in Canada obviously came from Mangold's excellent

journalistic sources in Ottawa to whom Sawatsky had directed

him. The de Vosjoll story Mangold got partly from FBI

sources, some from Walter Elder, former aide to Director

John McCone (who asked Elder to speak for him), and from de

Vosjoll himself, whon Mangold caught up with in Geneva,

Switzerland. De Vosjoli threatened to sue Mangold's

publisher for millions if the true story were told about

him, thus the story in the book is considerably diluted to

satisfy Simon and Schuster's legal experts.

HIC

Some critics of Mangold's book complain that the work

is one long litany of Angleton's misjudgments and failures,

unrelieved by anything worthwhile professionally he might

have done. There is some merit in this charge.

Before the

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arrival of Golitsyn, Angleton and the CI Staff had done

approximately what the original CI Staff charter required.

That, however, was pretty unexciting stuff and would never

have survived Ms. Mayhew's knife. The one story, which

might have served to balance the rest slightly, would have

been an account of Angleton's handling of the Israeli

liaison. Accordingly, Mangold interviewed several Mossad

officers, had Goldberg do the necessary research, and they

produced a worthy account of the 26 years Angleton had

guided the Agency's relations with Israeli intelligence.

It

had nothing new or particularly startling to reveal,

although it presented a different version of how the famous

"secret speech" by Khruschev was obtained (there are several

variants). The Israeli chapter compared favorably (perhaps

even was better) than the official CIA history (read by this

writer) done by a professional Agency historian enjoying

access to official records and such experts as stephen

Millett, then alive who was for twenty years head of the

Israeli desk. It was the cause of much resentment on

Mangold's part when Ms. Mayhew cut out the Israeli chapter

entirely on the grounds it contained nothing new or

sensational.

one vigorous critic of the Mangold book declared that

it failed to note Angleton's singular great accomplishment,

namely, he had not allowed a penetration during his twenty-

year stewardship. This is palpable nonsense. Some people

both before Angleton became Chief of the CI Staff as well as

afterward, were put out of CIA on security grounds (though

not as discovered penetrations), but this was the work of

the Office of Security, not Angleton although he was aware

of such cases. When Golitsyn first arrived, he told Allen

Dulles there was no Soviet penetration of CIA, although he

later abruptly changed his story to say there was

penetration, an alteration obviously intended to preserve

his primacy as the CI Staff guru. Nosenko also told his

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debriefers he knew of no penetration, but as this

contradicted Golitsyn's claim, Nosenko was immediately

subjected to hostile interrogation and subsequently jailed

for three years.

Long after Angleton was fired, it was discovered there

were two penetrations of the Agency during the last period

of his command--a Czech agent, whose product was passed on

to the KGB, and a Chinese Communist agent who had entered on

active duty as a staff officer in 1970. However, Angleton

could hardly have been expected to uncover a Chinese

Communist agent as he had no section devoted to the study of

the Chinese Communist intelligence organs. Mangold's

critics also make much of the mole hunts, some suggesting

the doubtful proposition they prevented penetration.

The

mole hunt was actually a minor and for Angleton

disappointing part of his activities; in reality only a

handful of officers suffered career degradation although

some endured considerable humiliation. Any fair-minded

examination of the cases reveals there should have been

neither; the four cases which were shown to the FBI were

immediately dismissed as unworthy of further investigation.

In short, Angleton's mole hunt was not what prevented

penetration of CIA; partly it was due to the massive

incompetence of the KGB itself, but an even more powerful

reason was the faceless polygraph operators and their

machines.

In the end, the best thing that can be said for

Mangold's book is that it is honest and reasonably (about 95

percent) accurate. True, there are errors, e.g., the

official CI Staff history is 11 not 12 volumes in length,

and it presents No conclusions, although most observers

would not quarrel with the conclusions Mangold assigns to

the work. It is in fact surprising the book does not have

more errors given the fact the author worked from limited

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documentary material except for what was in the public

domain via the Congressional Hearings. Mangold's FOIA

requests to the Agency yielded virtually nothing. Much of

the overt literature about Angleton is wildly in error or

the author's interpretations have been tailored to fit

Angleton's thus rendering them of minimal value. Despite

this, Mangold uncovered as he progressed with his research

an embarrassment of riches including many misdemeanors and

egregious acts that would have been immensely humiliating to

Angleton's adherents had they been included. They should

cast a medal for Ms. Mayhew as her dictum the book could NOT

exceed 400 pages meant that masses of material had to be cut

out. Whether this emasculation improved the book's sales is

much open to question (20,000 were printed in the United

States and it has sold out; 10,000 printed in the United

Kingdoll but the book did not sell out there; there will be a

paperback edition).

But what Mangold was able to cram into the 400 pages is

devastating. Forget the mole hunt and its victims, if one

wishes, but look at the following cases: Nosenko, Loginov,

Lygren, Bennett, Farmakovskaya--the conclusion is

inescapable: something was seriously wrong. That Mangold

was able to mine such knowledgeable sources amongst the CIA

and FBI retirees is likely a once-in-a-century event for it

seems improbable that any single individual will ever stir

as many people so deeply again. Something in Angleton's

character, at once attractive but also repulsive, his

intellectual arrogance perhaps, drove people to distraction.

It was wrong" 6o many chose to ignore their oaths in speaking

to Mangold and Goldberg, but it is human nature for people

to wish to put the record straight.

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Molehunt: The secret search for traitors That Shattered the

SIA by David Wise; Random House (New York, N.Y.), 1992--325

pages

David Wise, sometimes referred to as the dean of

espionage reporters, has produced a very readable and quite

accurate account of the molehunt in the CIA under James

Angleton in the 1960s, but it is shameless hyperbole to

title it as an event that "shattered the CIA." He says that

at most there were fifty some cases and of those he

discusses eight and only three of those in

detail. They are

Peter Karlow, Richard Kovich, and Paul Garbler. He also

does a brief review of the Yankovskys and Edgar Snow, but

these cases preceded Golitsyn and the 1960s mania. He also

mentions briefly the attempts by Angleton to paint David

Murphy as a Soviet agent, but Murphy's refusal to talk to

Wise effectively limited the issue to a few paragraphs. He

fails to mention that 99 percent of CIA personnel never knew

of the mole hunt for the simple reason the investigations of

the few targeted were kept so completely secret. Only in

the decade after the 1960s did some DO officers learn that a

few of their colleagues had been under investigation,

although then the gossip spread rapidly. Even then, except

for a few Security officers, the vast majority of CIA people

have learned of these bizarre events only in the last decade

when the story was picked up by investigative journalists.

When Wise began research for his book in 1989, it

appeared he intended to write a biography of Angleton, but

he soon learned an English writer named Tom Mangold had beat

him off the mark by more than a year. Recognizing his

handicap, especially when he discovered Mangold had gagged

many of the best sources, Wise had to regroup. At this

point he decided to concentrate on the mole hunt as the

center piece of this book. He had more than his share of

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problems in putting his book together, but in Karlow and

Garbler he had two very voluble sources and their accounts,

perhaps a bit gilded, make up a good part of the book. But

Wise, as the consummate writer, has woven many other threads

into his tapestry and in the end the work is a useful

history and mostly accurate. He has, however, in the

process lifted material shamelessly from Mangold's much more

detailed story of Angleton and his time for which he gives

little credit.

on the whole, Wise has done his homework well and the

book is full of interesting stories even if many are already

known. There is, however, one major error which

emerges in

the part on Igor orlov. Because Wise has depended strongly

on his FBI sources and retired old CI Staff officers like

N.S. Miler, he has produced a garbled version of the Igor

Orlov and Sasha stories. If Wise's sources do not believe

Kitty Hawk was genuine, then he was unlikely to give much

importance to the American military person Kitty Hawk

identified as a major KGB source of valuable intelligence

(including volumes of CIA material). By contrast, this

tends to make Igor orlov seem not so unimportant, when in

fact he was a low-level CIA agent (and never a CIA staff

officer) in Germany whose career was finished by 1959.

Nonetheless, he was considered important and his product was

much valued in Moscow. Golitsyn, as he frequently did with

other matters, probably got these two individuals confused.

He likely thought Orlov, who Golitsyn claimed was in CIA,

was the source for the massive amounts of material from the

American who was for two separate periods stationed in

Germany®

Naturally, Miler does not wish to advertise the value

of the military officer, whose identity could have been

resolved had the CI Staff done a proper analysis of the

leads they had separately from Golitsyn and Nosenko. The

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case somewhat resembles that of Vassall in England. Each

defector made a valuable contribution, but in this case

Nosenko 's

lead was discounted as throwaway or deception, and

so nothing serious was done to identify the real Sasha.

It

is by far the worst example of the CI Staff's failure to do

a simple job of CI analysis. They could have been heroes

but with their mind set, they failed completely. Wise has

missed the significance of this point, but perhaps just as

well. Things are bad enough as they are.

The British Connection

The intelligence literature discussed below is by

British authors and deals almost

solely with British events.

None of the books are anti-CIA in the usual sense.

Several

express some respect for James Angleton though this attitude

is in retreat by the end of the 1980s. A few of the books

explore the Golitsyn-Nosenko controversy and some think

Golitsyn helped British intelligence. At least three

authors received help from Angleton

although the amount of

information he imparted is difficult to measure as the books

are poorly sourced. Most of the writing is critical

of

MI-5

in varying degrees with

less attention given

to SIS

(MI-6)

except where the Philby and Blake cases are discussed.

Despite what appears to be a low Angleton profile, he in

fact played an important role in igniting a series of events

that proved embarrassing to the Thatcher government. Had

she not enjoyed such strong majorities in the House of

Commons, one or more of these affairs conceivably might have

brought her government down.

Angleton always took a keen interest in British

intelligence affairs dating from his early experience with

Philby. Later, partly on Angleton's recommendation, the

defector Golitsyn spent nearly five months in Britain in

1963 and met with British

security and intelligence people

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Several times afterward. Golitsyn made a powerful

impression on two British officers in particular: Arthur

Martin, the senior counterespionage officer in MI-5, and

stephen de Mowbray, a junior officer in MI-6 who served as

second officer for MI-6 in Washington in the mid-1960s.

Both men uncritically accepted Golitsyn's ideas about

penetration and deception. Most of the earlier converts to

Golitsyn's ideas dropped out, especially Sir Maurice

Oldfield who became Chief of MI-6, as events began to cast

doubt on the defector's credibility.

Peter Wright, always

sensitive to what the powerful believed, was at first a

Golitsyn advocate, but later became a critic as the power

barons in MI-5 turned against the Soviet defector. However,

Martin and de Mowbray have remained faithful to Golitsyn and

de Mowbray in particular became a source for Epstein.

KOB

Angleton's influence in MI-5 and MI-6 also suffered a

decline during the early 1970s. Both Martin and de Mowbray

had retired, and Wright retired in 1976, leaving for

Tasmania shortly after. Although Wright was out of touch,

Martin and de Mowbray remained in contact with Angleton as

well as Golitsyn. In the early 1980s Martin and de Mowbray

assisted Golitsyn in the preparation of his book New Lies

for Old. Like wright, they were much frustrated by their

inability to get the authorities to consider their case

against Mitchell and, especially, against Hollis. De

Mowbray fervently believed the West was not sufficiently

alert to the threat of Soviet deception; and he was

especially annoyed when a paper he had prepared on Soviet

penetration with special reference to Hollis received no

response frow 10 Downing Street, where he had personally

delivered it to the Prime Minister's secretary.

In 1978 Andrew Boyle, an English writer, came to

Washirgton to do research at the National Archives on a book

he was preparing on the career of a notable Englishman

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rumored to have been a Soviet agent during World War II.

The subject in question was Sir Anthony Blunt, who had long

been the subject of malicious gossip revolving around his

homosexual life style as well as his known close association

with Guy Burgess and Kim Philby. Boyle had done lengthy

research on Blunt's background at public school and

university plus his well known role as Keeper of the Queen's

Pictures. Boyle's intention was to make the strongest

possible case his quarry was a Soviet agent without getting

himself in legal difficulty. He therefore codenamed the

subject of his book "Maurice" after a homosexual character

in an E.M. Forster novel. During his research in

Washington, Boyle met James Murphy, Angleton's wartime boss

as head of X-2 in oss, who in turn introduced him to

Angleton. As a result there are many references in his book

to Angleton, which are always respectful and usually heavily

laden with metaphoric allusions to patient angling or the

careful nurturing of orchids.

The Boyle book, called The Climate of Treason, appeared

on 5 November 1979 and within ten days forced Mrs. Thatcher

to admit to Parliament Blunt's confession in 1964 to having

been a Soviet agent while working for MI-5 and that to

obtain full disclosure of his treachery he had been given a

grant of immunity from prosecution. This agreement had been

kept a secret for fifteen

years during

which time he worked

for the Royal Household and had been given a knighthood by

the Queen. The shock of the disclosure about Blunt was only

the first and least damaging of several that were in store

for Mrs. Thatcher. This was ironic, for even from her

opposition years and unlike her predecessors, she had taken

a keen interest in the secret world. She made a point of

getting to know her chiefs of the secret services, and she

had a close and mutually admiring association with sir

Maurice Oldfield, Chief of SIS (MI-6) FrOM 1973-79.

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She also came to depend heavily upon Sir Robert

Armstrong who was not only Permanent Secretary to the

Cabinet but was also her principal security adviser.

Usually this secret world would have remained part of her

private work, but events beyond her control precipitated a

number of disasters.

After her long and revealing statement

about Blunt, it seemed to confirm her as an exponent of an

unusual candor, as

sell as intending to demystify as far as

possible the secret world.

The question of how much

penetration there had been of the foreign, secret and

security services in the 1940's and 1950's seemed to have

taken a large step toward closure.

With Mrs. Thatcher's disclosure, the Boyle book became

a best seller and earned its author a considerable

reputation as well as much money. However, for some

inexplicable reason, Boyle in chapter nine included a story

which brought him much trouble and caused his enhanced

reputation to take a serious tumble. In chapter nine,

titled "Enter the Fifth Man," Boyle introduces a figure

codenamed "Basil" who he suggests was a slightly homosexual

nuclear scientist serving in the British Embassy in

Washington with Donald Maclean. From this slender evidence

he suggests this person as a likely candidate for "The Fifth

Man." The press was immediately in hot pursuit, while Boyle

dodged and hedged. Very soon they located an elderly

British scientist in Washington named Wilfrid Basil Mann who

was now an American citizen working at the National Bureau

of Standards, but who in 1949-51 had served as a scientific

liaison officer to CIA with Philby in the MI-6 office.

Dr. Mann denied he was "The Fifth Man" and rather

belatedly the American authorities came to his rescue with

assurances he was not nor ever had been a Soviet agent.

Both Boyle and Angleton remained silent on the case of Dr.

Mann (Boyle had never interviewed Mann nor did he apologize

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after the affair was resolved) and it was left to Dr. Mann

later to write his own rebuttal in which he set the record

completely straight.

DI. Mann, who had a personal friendship with Angleton

in the Philby days, remains perplexed regarding the origins

of the affair and as both Boyle and Angleton are dead, it is

likely the issue may never be fully resolved. However, we

know that Angleton and Boyle had a close relationship during

Boyle's stay in Washington.

The likely result was that

Angleton confirmed Boyle's suspicions of Blunt; it further

seems likely that at some point Angleton, in his peculiarly

circular and obscure way of speaking, provided the Mann

story because Mann had worked as an intelligence officer

under Philby in Washington. For unexplained reasons, Boyle

got the story wrong and foolishly included it in his

otherwise quite admirable book. Dr. Allen Weinstein,

reviewing the affair later, called it a "case of blatant

McCarythism based on gossip from spook informants. " That

accurately sums it up, but it does not relieve the distress

and embarrassment Dr. and Mrs. Mann suffered at the hands of

the media during their brief moment of fame.

The early 1980s were marked by more trouble for Mrs.

Thatcher from the secret world. Aside from the union

trouble at GCHQ, following the conviction of Geoffrey Prime

for spying for the Soviets in 1982, the worst of the shocks

came with the publication of a Their Trade is Treachery by

the investigative journalist, Chapman Pincher, in 1981.

Within a brief time after its appearance, Mrs. Thatcher was

forced to make yet another admission to the House of

commons. The Pincher book, far more than the union and

espionage problems at GCHQ, was to prove a major political

difficulty because it triggered a series of events

culminating in the famous Spycatcher trial in Australia in

1986.

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The Pincher book and events surrounding it was to some

extent the result of a conversation between a Tory MP named

Jonathan Aitken

and James Angleton in Washington in December

of 1979 just a few days after Mrs. Thatcher had made her

admission regarding Blunt. For reasons best known to

himself, Angleton hinted darkly to Aitken that the Blunt

revelations were just the tip of a mammoth problem, which

might well lead to an investigation of penetrations of MI-5

and MI-6. Aitken, fascinated, asked for more data, but

Angleton demurred and said he would think how to proceed.

Upon his return to England, Aitken found a letter from

Angleton telling him to speak to Arthur Martin and

Christopher Phillpotts, both of whom had been deeply

involved in mole-hunting. Aitken contacted the two men and

they told him exactly what Angleton intended he should hear:

that in 1963 and after, there had been prolonged

investigations into Mitchell and Hollis as putative Soviet

agents. An idea of what they were told is reflected in the

letter Aitken subsequently sent Mrs. Thatcher, a copy of

which is attached to the summary of the Pincher book.

Angleton's revelations to Aitken, however, are minor

compared to what was to happen next. Aitken told Pincher

some or likely most of what he had learned from Martin and

Phillpotts, but then in the early autumn of 1980 events took

an even more bizarre turn. At that time Lord Rothschild

brought Peter Wright from Australia and introduced him to

Chapman Pincher. This led to a working partnership between

Wright and Pincher resulting in the eventual publication

of

Their Trade is Treachery, which revealed the investigations

within MI-5 of Hollis and Mitchell as possible Soviet agents

as well as many other MI-5 secrets. It was this book which

forced Mrs. Thatcher to confirm there had

been such

investigations but that subsequent reviews of the cases

demonstrated there was no evidence to support such charges.

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I course it

it wasn't

well!

publicized.

It was notiknown when Pincher's book became a best

seller that the major source for his sensational book was

Peter Wright, who was quietly tucked away in Australia on

his stud farm. Nor was there common knowledge of the role

Angleton had played in getting the project underway. There

was, however, much speculation about the source for so much

sensitive material, but in all the excitement about the

public charges against Hollis and Mitchell attention was

diverted from some basic issues.

In 1986 all the mystery was to be resolved because that

year it was learned Peter Wright had completed a book and

was moving to have it published. The book called Spycatcher

was to be published by Heinemann's branch in Australia.

• Upon learning this, the British government immediately got

an injunction to stop the book and the trial followed. It

was then that the disturbing fact emerged that not only had

Wright been the main source for Pincher's allegations

against Hollis and Mitchell, but knowing this and having the

opportunity to stop Pincher from publishing, a small group

within the British government (including MI-5) had decided

not to go to law. Pincher, in other words, had virtually

published with government approval. This revelation fatally

undermined the British government's position not only in

Australia but elsewhere as well. It led to wholesale

publications of Spycatcher in many countries so that when

the case finally wended its passage to a final hearing in

the House of Lords, the judges found themselves unable to

uphold the obligation of confidentiality on which the

government depended. As the affair unfolded, over a period

of years between 1985

and 1988, the government's efforts to

stop publication came to be seen as absurd as they were

desperate.

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As the problem developed, Mrs. Thatcher pushed a proxy

defender forward. Sir Robert Armstrong was assigned to

carry the British government's case in the Australian court.

In this forum he did not do well; he was a reluctant

witness, harried by a disrespectful young Australian lawyer,

Malcolm Turnbull, but he did what duty demanded and put

himself on the rack. He was as he ruefully admitted, the

government's "fall guy" in the desperate effort to exhaust

every remedy against wright's book. He will always be.

remembered for his memorable locution during the trial that

the truth. " a persession d

it una noses boat me in a 0o lose comed ME

Much Twan's trath

The book that ignited Mrs. Thatcher's futile effort was

the work of Peter Wright, but ghost written by Paul

Greengrass. Wright was a discontented former MI-5 officer

who had two major grievances against his former employer:

(1) their failure to give him his full pension to which by

any standard of decency he was entitled and for which under

secrecy regulations he possessed no redress; and (2) his

former service's determination that it could not be proved

Hollis had been a Soviet agent, a position much reinforced

by a year long study by Lord Trend, a former Cabinet

secretary. To this was added a whiff of the good life

resulting from money he had received for his share in Their

Trade is Treachery. Wright could have had no idea his own

book by an accident of fate would be propelled onto the best

seller lists and thus make him a fortune.

As regards the culminating event, the great Spycatcher

trial in Australia, there are three books worth reading,

each in its own way very different from the others. There

is also a chapter in David Hooper's Official Secrets:

called "The Wright Case: A Tale of Perversity," which is an

excellent summary by a British solicitor who participated in

the case as a member of Turnbull's team.

The most spirited

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book though a bit prejudiced is Turnbull's account of the

trial in Sydney titled The Spycatcher Trial. The second

book is by pincher and, is called The spycatcher Affair and

although self-exculpatory,) is a good account of what

transpired tron 1980 to the trial in Australla. The final

book is Molehunt by Nigel West and although only the last

part of the book covers the Spycatcher trial, it gives a

good summary of events leading up to it, albeit from a pro-

Thatcher point of view. In the end, a cartoon that appeared

in a London daily perhaps most accurately summed it all up;

it shows a group of bewigged barristers in the office of Her

Majesty's Attorney General and one is commenting: "So far

the legal fees come to approximately ten million pounds--

wouldn't it have been cheaper to have increased the old

codger's pension in the first place?" Just a bit of common

sense.

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The Climate of Ireason by Andrew Boyle; Hodder and stoughton

(New York, N.Y.), 1979; revised edition, 1980--574 pages

Andrew Boyle's book (published in England under the

title The Fourth Man) is recommended, despite its numerous

errors both of fact and interpretation, because on the whole

it is a good read on the Cambridge spies. It also has some

slight historical significance: its publication on 5

November 1979 forced Mrs. Thatcher, then Prime Minister of

Great Britain, only ten days later to confirm that sir

Anthony Blunt, a wartime officer with MI-5 and later Keeper

of the Queen's Pictures, had been a Soviet agent. In the

original edition, Boyle used the code name "Maurice" (taken

from an E.M. Forster novel about a homosexual) for sound

legal reasons to disguise the identity of Blunt. But there

had been hints and much pub gossip for years that there was

a senior British person usually described as homosexual who

was a member of the Cambridge group of spies who had yet to

be publicly identified. But it was impossible in the United

Kingdom to confirm these rumors absolutely because the

Official Secrets Act was a powerful force preventing

disclosure by intelligence officers, serving or retired, of

the true facts. However, the Official Secrets Act has no

force in the United States and it was there in 1978 Boyle

went to continue his research, where he spent much time with

James Angleton. However, neither in his book nor at any

time before his death from cancer in 1988 did Boyle ever

admit to having received classified information from

Angleton. Despite this, there are many indicators in the

book, especially in the chapters on Philby and "the Fifth

Man, " of Angleton's influence on Boyle and it seems likely

Angleton provided some conclusive evidence about Blunt to

Boyle. Angleton knew about Blunt's confession from his past

position as CIA Chief of Counterintelligence where he was

privy to much highly classified information passed to him by

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the British services. However, senior FBI

counterintelligence officers also held such knowledge, thus

it is possible Boyle may have received sensitive information

from more than one American source.

In addition to exposing Blunt the Boyle book is very

good social history and is packed with solid information on

the political climate of the times as well as providing a

detailed review of the Cambridge spies from Burgess through

Blunt and Philby. Despite its drawbacks noted above as well

as below, the book is the best account of this unusual

group. Only Cairncross, now positively identified as "the

Fifth Man," remains to be presented in a detailed biography

and that is almost certainly being worked on at this moment.

It is recommended over John Costello's long-winded Mask of

Treachery (William Morrow and Company; New York, N.Y.,

1988), which runs off the rails with its conclusion that

"the Fifth Man" was Guy Liddell, a distinguished MI-5

officer whose career extended from the early 1920's until

1958. This allegation has been denounced by authorities on

every hand and much degrades the credibility of Costello's

work overall.

The Boyle work, however, suffers form a grotesque and

inexplicable error, which may serve to validate Angelton's

close association with Boyle and his contribution to the

book in terms other than the revelation about Blunt.

Chapter Nine is titled "Enter The Fifth Man" and rambles on

for 40 pages describing in elliptical terms an atomic

scientist somehow controlled by James Angleton (invariably

referred to as "brilliant" and "penetrating") who was played

as a double agent informant. The scientist was British, had

been in the British Embassy around the time of Maclean's

tour in Washington, and was code-named "Basil," the second

codename Boyle employed in the book. In later editions,

while Boyle abandoned his code name for Blunt (there no

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longer being any need to continue the fiction), he

maintained the mysterious "Basil" but provided no further

elucidation.

Because of the fascinating implications, the

press searched frantically for "Basil's" identity while

Boyle refused to supply it, claiming it was the

responsibility of the Americans, who knew who he was.

Finally, it was determined there had been a Dr. Wilfrid

Basil Mann In the British Embassy, and more interestingly

during the period Philby and Burgess were there. Dr. Mann

had remained in America after that tour and became an

American citizen in 1959, being employed by the National

Bureau of Standards. The press quickly ran him down at his

home in Chevy Chase, Maryland, but Dr. Mann denied

emphatically that he was "Basil" and, rather tardily, the

American authorities allowed that Dr. Mann was a loyal

American citizen. But most reporters missed the essential

ingredient of the story, i.e., that James Angleton and Dr.

Mann had been friends for

some years, or at least from the

time of Philby's and Dr. Mann's arrival in Washington, which

nearly coincided. Grudgingly and puzzled, the press backed

down from the Dr. Mann issue. In 1982 Dr. Mann produced his

own brief book on the issue titled Was There a Fifth Man? in

which he details his career as a scientist and proves

convincingly that Boyle's allegations were careless

nonsense. We now know that The Fifth Man (if we can really

believe Golitsyn's assertion about a "Ring of Five") was

John Cairncross, who definitely was NOT an atomic scientist.

So where did Boyle get his idea for "Basil" as "the

Fifth Man"? As neither Boyle nor Angleton, perhaps

understandably, ever divulged anything further on the issue

and as both are now dead, At sunlikely the full truth will th

Never be known. If Dr. Mann has suspicions he has kept them

to himself.

Because Angleton was a family friend of some

standing, it is unlikely Dr. Mann will speculate in a

fashion that would lae degrading fp Angleton's memory.

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whatever the case, the bottom lime le the "Basil" story the

that dt unsubstantiated claims provided in a careless and

obscure manner, tend to downgrade the datal credibility

of Boyle's work by introducing an issue bathas proven

untrue and in any case tas peripheral to the main story.

As a footnote to the above, the writer in February 1992

interviewed Dr. Mann regarding the Boyle story. Dr. Mann

stated Boyle had never contacted him about the story nor had

he, after the story had been proven false, apologized to Dr.

Mann for the distress and embarrassment it had caused.

Dr.

Mann now has read Cold Warrior and other things about

Angleton and has formed a judgment of the man different from

that he held in 1980 when the trouble erupted. It is a

complex story too intricate to be analyzed here, but there

is strong evidence that Angleton for some unknown reason

likely told Boyle various stories about Dr. Mann never

completing the details and leaving a false impression on

this gullible journalist. Boyle should have checked his

facts further but did not. As a result a bogus story was

included in what otherwise was largely an accurate book

based on what DI. Allen Weinstein, the competent author of

PerjUrY: The Hiss-Chambers Case, calls dubious information

from "informant spooks," a reference obviously aimed at

James Angleton.

Their Trade is Treachery by Chapman Pincher; Sidgwick and

Jackson (London), 1981--240 pages

The importance of this book is now historical in the

sense that, like Boyle's disclosures about sir Anthony

Blunt, it was the instrument that forced Mrs. Thatcher to

admit to Parliament that Sir Roger Hollis, former Director

General of MI-5, had been under investigation some years

previous as a possible Soviet agent. The author of the

book, Chapman Pincher, had been a gadfly of the British

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government for years on intelligence and defense matters in

his position as a senior reporter for Lord Beaverbrook's

Daily Express. As for the book's very detailed exposition

of the case against Hollis and his deputy, Graham Mitchell,

while interesting as an example of how "mole mania" had

gripped senior persons in the American and British

intelligence and security services, it is fully accepted now

that the case against the two men was entirely

circumstantial and that they were innocent of the charges.

The west also now has the word of oleg Gordievsky, the

important KGB defector, for this. Other supporting data on

this matter may be forthcoming from now unemployed KGB

officers in Moscow, and even the KGB files.

At the time Pincher's book appeared there was some

reason to believe James Angleton was responsible for the

massive leakage to Pincher about the Hollis and Mitchell

cases (he had known about them in his capacity as Chief, CI

Staff)

although Pincher denied this. Pincher does, however,

lend credence to this theory on page 2 by noting a warning

had been given Mrs. Thatcher about the explosive nature of

the Hollis case by Jonathan Aitken, a Troy MP and son

of the

late Lord Beaverbrook. Aitken claimed to have learned about

Hollis from "former members of MI-5,

SIS and the CIA".

On

page 3 Pincher continues with the following (which sounds

very familiar to those acquainted with Angleton's practice

of calculated leakage): "The view of the loyal MI-5

officers who uncovered the evidence is that the Russians

penetrated both the Security and Intelligence Services so

deeply, and for so long, that they not only neutralized them

but effectively ran them. I have established that this is

also the view of senior officers of the CIA, who had been

alerted to the facts." All of the foregoing

is, of course,

wildly in error. No senior CIA officer (except Angleton)

had accepted the case against Hollis nor

waS

the CIA about

to press Mrs. Thatcher for an investigation of the matter as

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Pincher implies. On the contrary, the view of CIA

counterintelligence in 1980 was sturdily that the case

against Hollis was the work of a small group of British

officers, namely Arthur Martin, Peter Wright, and Stephen de

Mowbray, all of whom were retired from their services. The

CIA elements to whom Pincher refers were Angleton and a few

adherents all of whom had been in retirement since 1974 or

before and had ever since been leading a vendetta against

the new counterintelligence people at CIA. They regarded

the three British officers noted above as allies in their

battle to prove Golitsyn's charges of massive penetration of

the Western services.

For reasons best known to himself, Angleton alone

decided in late 1979 and likely in the euphoria inspired by

the revelations which Mrs. Thatcher had been forced to make

about Blunt, to thrust himself into the center of the Hollis

controversy by leaking information on the Hollis case to

Jonathan Aitken who was then visiting Washington. In 1981

Pincher was reluctant to reveal any close connection to

Angleton or anything about the Aitken matter more specific

than that noted above, but later in his book he makes clear

that he and Angleton were in frequent correspondence, the

nature of which he does not specify.

The truth about the extent of Angleton's contribution

to the Hollis problem was not revealed until the famous

"Spycatcher" trial in Australia in 1986 when a copy of

Aitken's letter was submitted to the court as evidence. It

emerged that Aitken had visited Washington

in December 1979

where he had a long talk with Angleton who declared he

believed there would be a major investigation of MI-5 and

MI-6. When a startled Aitken asked why, Angleton replied he

would think of some way of answering the question. When

Aitken returned to London he found a letter from Angleton

awaiting him at the house of Commons. The letter told

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Aitken to talk with Arthur Martin, formerly of MI-5, and

Christopher Phillpotts, formerly of MI-6 (he had been chief

of counterintelligence). It is now known that Angleton had

written Martin about his talk with Aitken and he likely

wrote Phillpotts as well. Aitken had known Martin well from

his days after leaving MI-6 (he had been transferred out of

MI-5 over to MI-f) when he worked for several years as a

clerk to the House of Commons. It now appears that Martin

told Aitken the entire story about the Hollis and Mitchell

investigations; Aitken in turn used this information in his

famous "warning" letter to Mrs. Thatcher. Later Aitken, who

was very close to Pincher, told him the story including the

fact he had sent a personal warning to Mrs. Thatcher via a

"confidential and personal" letter. Angleton's role, though

not mentioned to Mrs. Thatcher, was made clear to Pincher,

which is why Pincher makes frequent reference to him.

Thus Pincher knew a great deal but he did not have the

whole story. The massive amount of inside information in

his book came from another source. In September 1980

Pincher received a telephone message from Lord Rothschild to

come as soon as possible to his home in Cambridge.

When

Pincher noted it was a late Sunday afternoon with crowded

roads, Rothschild said he would send his Rolls with driver

from London to pick him up and bring him directly to

Rothschild's home. Pincher agreed and when he arrived,

Rothschild introduced him to a person he did

not know but

soon discovered was Peter Wright. Rothschild after dinner

withdrew and Pincher spent the evening debriefing Wright on

a number of intelligence issues, chief amongst them being

the Hollis and Mitchell cases. Later a financial agreement

was reached between the two parties, and to acquire further

details, Pincher with his wife flew

to Australia where he

could debrief Wright at his leisure. It was an

astonishing

lode. Pincher could hardly grasp his good fortune. In a

later book, Pincher exclaimed, "To someone as obsessively

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curious as I am about the secret services, it was like being

led into Aladdin's cave with nuggets and jewels sparkling

everywhere!"

This book sold well and eventually made him not only

the most famous journalist in Britain but also a very

wealthy man. However, its major claim to fame, as noted

earlier, is that its publication jolted the Thatcher

government into a forced admission that there has been an

investigation of Hollis, but that no evidence was found to

support the charge of his having been a soviet agent.

Pincher in the course of these developments became wholly

convinced that Hollis had been a spy and two years later

produced a second book on the subject called Ioo Secret Io0

Long which sold well (it added what Pincher called further

hard evidence), but whose premise was not proven. Then two

years later wright took center stage himself with the

publication of his own book Spycatcher. It was banned in

Britain but the incredible circus trial in Australia

prevented its being banned there. The result, however, was

to send sales of this otherwise ordinary book skyrocketing

to best-seller levels all around the world and overnight

made Wright an multi-millionaire.

It is clear that Angleton's role in supplying

information to Pincher was much less than was first thought

when it was unknown that wright was actually Pincher's

secret source. But he was certainly the instrument by which

Aitken became informed of the whole Hollis affair and

Pincher got that much information second hand from Aitken.

But the real informant we know was Wright who provided his

information to Pincher for monetary reward. What was the

reason for Lord Rothschild's bizarre action in bringing

Wright to England to meet Pincher? That he kept to himself

and it is unlikely the truth will ever be fully known.

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I. A Matter of Trust: MI-5, 1945-72 by Nigel West;

Weidenfeld and Nicholson (London), 1982--196 pages

II. Molehunt; The full story of the Soviet Spy in MI-5 by

Nigel West; Weidenfeld and Nicholson (London), 1987--208

pages

Nigel West (true name Rupert Alason, a Conservative

Member of Parliament) is the pseudonym of a writer of spy

books, of which two are considered here. The first book to

be considered A Matter Of Trust published in 1982 is a

history of MI-5 in the post-World war II period. It

contains a good deal of largely accurate information on MI-

5, also called the Security Service more commonly in recent

times, and is a good overview of operations against the

soviet intelligence offensive in Britain. It contains,

therefore, some information about CIA sources, especially

defectors such as Golitsyn and Goleniewski. It is well

written and researched and, despite the official Secrets

Act, it is the most reliable story about MI-5 after World

War II that has appeared in print. At the time of writing,

West had the advantage of the revelations that had appeared

just a year earlier in Pincher's book Their Trade is

Treachery with its allegations that sir Roger Hollis, former

Director General of MI-5 and his deputy, Graham Mitchell,

had been investigated as possible Soviet agents; and just

two years earlier Mrs. Thatcher had confirmed that sir

Anthony Blunt had been a Soviet spy, but because of his

confession and agreement to tell what he knew about the

Soviet spy activities in Britain, he had been secretly

granted immunity.

However, in writing A Matter of Trust Nigel West had a

secret advantage, which he has never divulged. West knew

that the key figure in the investigation of the Philby case

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as well as other spy cases of major importance had been

Arthur Martin. Martin had been the eminent counterespionage

expert in MI-5 as a result of his investigation of Philby

after 1951. He had been sent abroad on assignment in

Malaysia for a time, but upon his return in 1960 to the MI-5

Head Office he was put in command of the Soviet section in D

Branch (counterespionage). In 1963 he had made such a

strong case Philby was a Soviet agent that Philby was

finally confronted in Beirut and fearing the net was closing

in, fled to safety in Moscow. But that same summer, the

defector Golitsyn visited England and was under Martin's

control during his debriefing. Martin had even before the

defector's arrival concluded there had been or still was a

Soviet penetration of his service. This eventually led to

his deduction that it was at a high level, i.e., possibly

the Director General or his deputy. The result was an

investigation of Graham Mitchell but no case could be proved

against him and it was dropped. Then Martin challenged the

Director General himself. Sir Roger Hollis was about to

retire but in the face of what amounted to almost persistent

insubordination by Martin in his pursuit of the ephemeral

spy in the service, Hollis as one of his last acts before

leaving at the end of 1965 had Martin transferred to MI-6.

Martin remained there for the remainder of his career.

After he retired, MI-6 got him a position as clerk of the

House of Commons for several years. When he left his

Commons job, he retired into the Cotswolds where he lives

today.

The Boyle book which exposed Blunt as a spy, led to

several writers investigating security matters about which

there were rumors but little hard fact. One of these was

Nigel West and his research led him eventually to Martin.

Although fully aware of the restrictions of the Official

Secrets Act, Martin was taken by the engaging personality of

the young writer who pledged he would use Martin's

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information for background only. Martin admits he told West

much more than his secrecy oath or common sense allowed.

Sometime later, Martin learned his former service had

obtained a copy of West's manuscript and were shocked at the

voluminous detail that could only have come from someone who

had been in the service. At about the same time, Martin

feeling nervous about West's calls to check some facts, went

to his former employers and told them of his conversation

with West. Martin was let off on this occasion, but was

given a warning there would be severe retribution if it

happened again.

Martin's information probably assisted West in only

about a fifth of the book, mainly on the FLUENCY

investigations (as the mole hunt in MI-5 and MI-6 was

known), the Hollis and Mitchell cases, the Philby case, and

such matters. Much of the remainder of the book is drawn

from overt sources or a small number of people once

associated with MI-5 but retired yet willing to give out

bits and pieces of information. Taken together, West had

enough to make an impressive book, mostly accurate and it

stands as

sound

account of the MI-5 organization and

activities in post-war Britain. MI-5 at first considered

legal action against the west book, but in the end did

nothing.

The second of west's books considered here is Molehunt,

which appeared in 1987 and, as its name implies, covers the

investigations by MI-5 into the Hollis and Mitchell cases as

well as the work of the FLUENCY committee (on which Angleton

fashioned his HONETOL). The work of the FLUENCY committee,

like its CIA imitator, covered much ground but with few

results-certainly no penetration was found although several

MI-6 officers were forced to resign their service on grounds

of having concealed certain data on their applications

and/or vetting forms.

As West does not know the true facts

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about FLUENCY he much exaggerates its effectiveness. The

book also, in addition to examining at great length the

cases against Hollis and Mitchell, looks at the career of

Guy Liddell, a distinguished MI-5 officer who retired in

1953. Unlike John Costello (The Climate of Treason), west

concludes Liddell could not have been "the Fifth Man," this

being written before the Andrew-Gordievsky book correctly

identified John Cairncross as the Englishman on whom that

dubious title should be bestowed.

The most interesting part of Molehunt is the latter

portion which west devotes to his commentary on the

spycatcher trial in sydney. Is Obvious" west took great

delight in observing the miserable situation in which his

competitor, Chapman Pincher, found himself as bit by bit the

embarrassing story emerged of Wright's collusion with

Pincher. All the clever devices Pincher had created to

protect the identity of his true source for the vast amount

of beans spilled in Their Trade is Treachery, all his false

stories and cover-ups, were suddenly exposed to the delight

not just of the public but especially to all the journalists

who had suffered Pincher's scoops and inside stories.

Now

he was revealed as having concocted a sordid deal to pay the

old spycatcher a paltry sum for his information which,

converted into a book, had paid off for Pincher in the

amount of several hundred thousand pounds. In terms of

ignominy and embarrassment, Pincher ran second only to sir

Robert Armstrong.

Two of the most informative chapters in this book

(chapters 6 and 7) cover the background to Pincher's

relations with Wright and Lord Rothschild and provide vital

information not revealed in either Pincher's or Turnbull's

books. In particular, West Demonstrates the degree of

knowledge senior officials, particularly MI-5 and the

Cabinet Secretary, possessed regarding Pincher's manuscript

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of Their Trade is Treachery. He also demonstrates that

because of the illegal means by which they had acquired the

manuscript their hands were tied legally as regards bringing

action to prevent publication. It was this conundrum that

allowed Pincher's book to appear even though the top people

in the British government know its contents violated the

official Secrets Act. Beyond this, West also reports that

soon after the book's appearance the British intelligence

authorities had by analyzing the book's contents line by

line deduced the source had to be wright (they interviewed

Martin and de Mowbray, both of who denied honestly they had

(contact with Pincher on the book). They further

confirmed this by discovering Pincher's air tickets for his

trip to Tasmania. All this information was grudgingly

revealed during the Sydney trial, which much degraded the

British government's case in trying to force

an injunction

against wright's book when Pincher's earlier work had been

allowed to go into print with no objection. These two

chapters are among the best in this well-researched and l ell'-

written book.

In his last chapter West again considers the issue of

Soviet penetration of MI-5, emphasizing the belief

(strongly

held by Martin and Wright) that there had been a mole in MI-

5 from the wartime period up to perhaps the early or mid

1960's. After a cursory examination of the most prominent

suspects, West finally settles on Mitchell as the most

likely candidate. He makes a general case, but his major

effort is to emphasize the paper Mitchell wrote for Prime

Minister Macmillan that in effect cleared Philby.

Admittedly the paper is replete with errors and slanted

toward a/downplaying/ d philby's role in the case of the

"missing diplomats" (Burgess and Maclean), but this alone

hardly makes the case against Mitchell. Surely on such a

momentous issue, Mitchell's paper must have been reviewed by

other superiors before being signed off by Sir Dick White.

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Most agree the paper is an abomination, but how do the

others explain how it got through the screening process

before it went to Downing Street for the Prime Minister.

West passes over this lightly and goes on to note other

minimal points about Mitchell such as his alleged dislike of

defectors. But taken together, West's efforts do not make a

strong case against Mitchell-especially it does not explain

how Blake was allowed by the KGB to return to London, nor

does it explain the wrapping up of the entire Molody-Gee-

Houghton-Kroger network, not does it provide any answer how

Penkovskiy was allowed to return to London on his second

visit if a spy had told the KGB about him. These points do

not make Mitchell innocent of the charge against him, but

they much weaken West's case. Gordievsky cleared Hollis;

did he not at the same time clear Mitchell? And if not, why

not? Perhaps someday the KGB archives will yield the truth.

Meantime Mitchell was spared this last indignity from West:

he had died in 1985.

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Spycatcher: The Candid Autobiography of a Senior

Intelligence Officer by Peter Wright; Viking Penguin, Inc.

(New York, N.Y.), 1987--390 pages

Although filled with error, exaggeration, bogus ideas,

and much self inflation, Peter Wright's book Spycatcher is

one of the outstanding works in the field of intelligence

literature to appear in the last three decades. It covers

matters that have been explored before and repeats much that

is known to the well informed intelligence officer, but it

is nevertheless so full of bombast, the joy of the hunt,

English eccentricities, and factual data that it must be

accounted as required reading. Its publication also drove

the British government to such a degree of irrational

distraction that it embarked upon a series of foolhardy and

disastrously hopeless measures that resulted in (a) it not

stopping the book's publication, (b) ensured their own

embarrassment, and (c) made the author, whom they hoped to

punish, a wealthy man.

Tom Mangold reports that wright told

him the book in 1989 had brought him

some two million

dollars Australian (about three million in US dollars) •

Recently to add insult to injury, the European Community

High Court ordered the British government to pay damages to

two London newspapers whose editions carrying excerpts of

the book had been prevented from publishing the material.

BY any standard, Peter Wright is a genuine character

who could only have flourished in England. In its now non-

imperial status, integrated into Europe and without the

menace of the Nazis or Bolsheviks, it seems unlikely these

kind of eccentrics will flourish again. But anyone who ever

heard Wright in full flight delivering a lecture on the pre-

World War II Comintern apparat in the United Kingdom or

dilating on his interrogation of Blunt and his

comintern/Communist friends will never forget the

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experience. His appearance alone with his patriarchal

countenance, his bald pate with its crown of wispy white

hair, the curious defect of speech between a lisp and

stammer, and his astonishing memory for arcane fact was

impressive to the most jaded observer.

There are two parts to the wright story, both of equal

importance in understanding what transpired from peddling

his information to Pincher through the infamous Granada

television show in which he first spilled his secrets to

millions of viewers to finally writing, with the help of

Paul Greengrass, his book Spycatcher. The first is wright's

obsession, which began with Golitsyn's 1963 visit to

England, that the British services, and in particular MI-5,

were penetrated by the RIS. In this belief he was supported

and encouraged within his own service by his mentor, Arthur

Martin, who at that time was held in the utmost respect.

Later in the sixties he began an association with Angleton,

who also encouraged him in his obsessive ideas of

penetration. After Martin's removal in 1965, the leadership

of the mole hunters fell upon wright, a mantle he willingly

accepted. The role he played in CAZAB heightened his view

of himself as the chosen voice to sound the warning. But

then other views began to be heard; the Mitchell case

sputtered out, Hollis retired and with his departure the

immediacy of action tended to decline, Golitsyn's stock

within the British

services began to fall, mole hunt fever

began to recede, and Wright suddenly found himself alone

with his convictions. He tried everything to make the new

leadership listen, but they turned a deaf ear. The old man

and his obsession became an embarrassment. The problem now

was to ease him out of

the service.

The second aspect of Wright's story is the man himself.

He was never a popular figure in MI-5, especially with

senior management. He was a scientist (actually he had

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studied agriculture at Oxford) whose application of his

special discipline to intelligence work did not always win

acceptance by his colleagues. When he became allied with

Martin, another non-establishment outsider, and the two

began pressing for a more aggressive approach against Soviet

intelligence in the United Kingdom, they were hailed by the

young junior officers as heroes and the two were held in the

highest regard, but in the process they antagonized many of

the conservative old-timers, and especially the top

management, Hollis and Mitchell. After Golitsyn's visit and

the investigation of Mitchell began, the division between

the followers of Martin and Wright and those who questioned

the penetration idea became more pronounced. Wright was

even more isolated after Martin's departure, but the new

Director General, Furnival Jones, continued to allow Wright

considerable leeway. But toward the time of wright's

retirement, he was virtually isolated. Many felt Wright's

obsessive mole hunt was distracting the service from its

primary tasks as well as threatening the cohesion and morale

of the service. All this had shaken Wright's confidence and

he began to feel an outcast. A prudent observer, noting so

many skeletons in the closet (Blunt, Mitchell, Hollis, etc.)

and a retiree of such mercurial temperament and precarious

financial status, would have advised some effort to assure

so far as possible that Wright left the service in a

favorable state of mind. Instead the old man was denied a

sizable portion of his retirement annuity to which he was

clearly entitled, thus making certain Wright left with a

burning grievance.* His foolhardy attempt to establish a

stud farm further endangered his already precarious

*Before entering MI-5, Wright had worked some dozen

years as a research scientist for the Royal Navy.

agreed that this service would count as time in

establishing

the amount of his pension.

his final pension sum and when he complained this was a

violation of trust

he was waved off. The actual sum he

ceceived was unbelieveably small.

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financial situation. In desperation, he finally was forced

to move to Tasmania where he hoped his stud-farm endeavors

might prosper and conditions were better for his health,

which had been worsening. Now he was beyond the reach of

the Official Secrets Act. At about this time, when his

financial condition had become truly serious, the call came

from Lord Rothschild precipitating events that were to wound

him, wright, and the British government.

It will be argued, on the one hand, that the rigid rule

is that an officer does not break an oath to which he has

solemnly given his word and that therefore what Wright did

was both morally repugnant and a criminal action. on the

other hand, the British government and his service by

denying him his legitimate pension rights had done wright a

wrong, for which under the secrecy arrangements obtaining in

Britain there was no recourse. In this whole matter, it

should also be borne in mind that wright was no left-wing

agitator nor fuzzy liberal; on the contrary he was a far

right, rock-hard Tory. That his own kind and his service

would so mutilate him was a shock to wright spiritually from

which he never recovered. His actions from that time

forward are out of character. They are probably best

summarized by his remark at the conclusion of his testimony

at the Australian trial; as he descended from the witness

box, wright was heard to mutter "That will fix the

bastards. "

It does not take a mighty imagination to visualize how

the MI-5 management could have prevented the disaster into

which they had carelessly maneuvered themselves. First,

they should have given wright his full pension; second,

maintained contact with him seeking his "advice" from time

to time, thus keeping him in a mood where he felt he was

still a part of the service even if retired; and finally

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tried to deflect any attempt to publicize his beliefs.

Not

every retiree wants or needs such attention, but wright

should have been seen as a special case on the grounds of

his pension denial if no other. True, the MI-5 minder would

have had to suffer a lot of hot air about penetration and

the guilt of Hollis, but as time went on this would have

wound down. As Wright concedes on the penultimate page of

Spycatcher: "One man's view, as I now realize, is in the

end worthless. Only facts will ever clear up the eternal

mystery. "

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The Spycatcher Trial by Malcolm Turnbull; William Heinemann

Australia (Richmond, Victoria), 1988--227 pages

This book is a useful antidote to Chapman Pincher's The

Spycatcher Affair and while not required reading is

recommended as an entertaining and reasonably truthful

account of how a brash young Australian barrister destroyed

the British government's case, which in truth was never very

strong. The author, Malcolm Turnbull, was thirty-two years

old at the time of the trial, a legal circus that attracted

worldwide attention. Turnbull was educated in Australia and

afterward won a Rhodes scholarship to Oxford for two years

during which time he was employed by the "London Times." He

married well socially in Australia and had excellent

political connections, which proved of immense help during

the case. A shrewd observer of human foibles and the

fickleness of the media, Turnbull employed a number of

stratagems to outwith the British legal team, even to the

outfitting of Peter Wright with a drover's hat in order to

give him an Australian character (he also prudently got him

Australian citizenship before the trial began).

Additionally he employed a shrewd English solicitor from

Heinemann's London staff to give him special insight into

the British legal thicket.

He also took on Paul Greengrass,

Wright's ghost writer, so that he would possess

an inside

view of what had propelled Wright to his activities of the

past few years. Greengrass's role was especially important

because Wright's memory was failing and he was also inclined

to change his story or embroider on occasion.

Peter Wright's Spycatcher received more legal attention

than almost any other book of its kind in history. The

trial involving

its author in Sydney, Australia, in the

winter of 1986 represented an extraordinary nexus between

the secret security and intelligence services, the law, and

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the media. What began as an attempt by MI-5 to muzzle one

of their former officers ended up with the British

government on trial in Australia. In 1985, frustrated by

his failure to persuade the British government to act

against what he considered continued Soviet penetration of

the British intelligence and security services, Wright

signed a contract with Heinemann's (publishers) of Australia

to publish his dossier of "facts." He was motivated largely

by a desire for vengeance against his former employers for

what he considered their malicious refusal to give him his

proper pension, but he was also hopeful of making enough

money to keep his stud farm afloat. (Wright had sampled the

largess that came as his share of Pincher's book Their Trade

is Treachery and he likely found it good.)

However, his

incapacity to write anything but the worst beauracratic

style led to his hiring Greengrass, whom he had met during

the filming of the related Granada television show, to be

his ghost writer.

Within weeks, news of the book leaked out and the legal

battle was begun. The British Prime Minister, Mrs.

Thatcher, presumably on the advice of MI-5, pursued Wright

through the courts in Australia, Britain, and other parts of

the world. Wright, equally dogged, with the support of his

publisher, remained determined that his book should appear

in print. When Turnbull took up the case in early 1986 the

betting odds were he had

a 1 percent chance of winning. The

ensuing

three-week trial

in Sydney and, in particular,

Turnbull's brilliant cross-examination of British cabinet

Secretary, Sir Robert Armstrong, is the centerpiece of the

book. The trial turned the case in favor Wright and the

attendant publicity made Spycatcher an international best

seller. It is known to have made Wright into a millionaire

several times over.

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For intelligence officers there is an especially

compelling story told (pages 53-55) concerning the use of

the "old boy" network in a backdoor attempt to make the

injunction watertight. Turnbull learned from an English

friend of the British government's intention to request the

help of the Australian government to stop publication of

Wright's book. This was to be done via intelligence links

between the two countries. Turnbull immediately through his

excellent political connections determined that this story

(which originated from a conversation between two senior

British officials overheard in the pissoir of the Garrick

Club in London) was true. Furthermore, it appeared that

ASIO and the Department of Defense were very keen to

demonstrate their loyalty to Britain and the Western

intelligence "club." Turnbull immediately fired off a

letter to the Prime Minister, then Bob Hawke, and the

Minister for External Affairs, Bill Hayden, and others

emphasizing that "Australia should not run to Mrs.

Thatcher's whistle; it should not protect Britain from the

consequences of its past crimes; and so forth." It had the

desired effect. Although Australia externally appeared to

side with Britain in its policy of trying to stop the

publication of wright's book, its intervention was to be as

innocuous as possible.

Turnbull's book provides a full and often amusing

account of this celebrated legal event. He explains

wright's motives in publishing and those of the British

government in relentlessly pursuing the case. Turnbull's

story could easily be the plot for a successful thriller

film as he recreates the drama of the trial that caught the

imagination of the world.

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The Spycatcher Affair by Chapman Pincher; St. Martin's Press

(New York, N.Y.), 1988--305 pages

This book was first published in England under the

title The Web of Deception in 1987, and is one of three

major works dealing with the famous "Spycatcher" trial, the

other two being Molehunt by Nigel West and The Spycatcher

Trial by Malcolm Turnbull. All three are of considerable

interest, but only the Pincher book is required reading for

understanding the whole hodgepodge of events that began with

James Angleton's leakage to the Tory MP Jonathan Aitken in

December 1979. As Pincher was intimately involved with

Wright in an earlier book called Their Trade is Treachery,

he was obviously a major figure in the Australian trial,

particularly when Turnbull, the Australian lawyer, attempted

to prove that Pincher had corrupted Wright with money to

obtain the first bits of information on the Hollis case and

then allegedly cheated Wright of his monetary rewards.

on

both of these points, good as Turnbull was, he failed to

make a watertight case; yet the charges were vastly

embarrassing to Pincher.

The real issue, however, in the Australian trial was

the legitimacy of the British government's case together

with the veracity of its major representative, the Cabinet

Secretary, Sir Robert Armstrong, who had been sent from

London to speak to the court, or--as Sir Robert himself

admitted in an unguarded moment--"to be the fall guy." In

the end both suffered much embarrassment and, worse still,

they ended up losing

the case. Meantime, the trial had

generated unprecedented international interest, so much in

fact that

an American publisher decided to produce Wright's

book in the United States, which ensured it a spectacular

financial success thus making wright a rich man.

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To understand this very complicated story, it is

necessary to start at the beginning, which is with James

Angleton. In December 1979 Jonathan Aitken, a Tory MP and

son of Lord Beaverbrook, was in Washington on a private

visit during which he saw Angleton. The Blunt affair had

just broken with Mrs. Thatcher's confirmation of his role as

a Soviet agent. In a conversation with Angleton, the

retired CIA veteran warned Aitken there was more to come and

he believed there must be a full inquiry into both MI-5 and

MI-6.

Aitken was astonished and asked why. According to

his story, Angleton said he would think of a way of

answering the question and that perhaps Mrs. Thatcher should

be warned. When Aitken returned to London he found a letter

to him in which Angleton provided the names of Arthur Martin

and Christopher Phillpotts, retired from MI-5 and MI-6,

respectively. Aitken asked them to the House of Commons for

a drink and learned from them about the Hollis and Mitchell

cases. On the basis of this information, Aitken then

delivered a warning letter marked "confidential and

personal" to the Prime Minister at Downing Street.

Aitken later contacted Pincher, whom he had known for

years, and revealed what he had learned of the Hollis and

Mitchell cases, even going so far as to show Pincher the

confidential letter he had delivered to Mrs. Thatcher.

Pincher states that the letter was detailed and included the

charge "that our Security Services were penetrated by Soviet

agents.at a far more secret level than at which Philby,

Burges, Maclean, and Blunt were operating." Last it went on

to name as the principal secret agents, Sir Roger Hollis and

Mr. Graham Mitchell. (A copy of this letter is attached to

this Summary • J

Pincher was deeply involved in the basics of the

Spycatcher trial from the start because of his association

with Peter Wright, which began with a meeting at Lord

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Rothschild's home in Cambridge on 4 September 1980. Lord

Rothschild had invited Pincher to come to his home in order

to meet Peter Wright, although at the time Pincher had no

idea who wright was. Wright at this meeting explained to

Pincher his past employment with MI-5, his move to Tasmania,

his precarious financial position, and his raging belief MI-

5 had been and still was penetrated by Soviet agents. He

noted Andrew Boyle's success with his book on Blunt, which

had flushed out the old spy. Wright said he wanted to do

the same thing and was writing a book on Soviet penetration

of MI-5, but his bad health and lack of financial resources

endangered its completion. To get Pincher's attention,

Wright spilled some of his secrets before him. Pincher

quickly agreed, after digesting these initial nuggets of

information, he would assist wright on his book. A

financial agreement was made and Pincher went to Tasmania

where over three weeks he debriefed Wright thoroughly. He

then returned to England where he did further research and,

writing furiously, had a completed manuscript in hand by the

end of 1980.

The role of the late Lord Rothschild, who paid for

Wright's air ticket from Australia to England and return,

remains clouded to this day. Lord Rothschild was in 1980 a

pillar of respectability in English life. He had served in

MI-5 through World War II and earned the George Cross for

herois, had headed one of the largest merchant banks in the

United Kingdom, and had served as the head of a brain trust

for Prime Minister Heath. What then had prompted him to

bring Wright to England and pass him along to Pincher?

Several explanations have been made, which need not be

examined here, but none offer a sensible answer. Whatever

the case, these bizarre events tarnished the reputation of

Lord Rothschild in his last years.

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But if the Rothschild role appears peculiar, the

developments that followed Pincher's selection of a

publisher and their subsequent actions are genuinely mind-

boggling. The publisher selected by Pincher was Sidgwick

and Jackson. After reading the synopsis provided them, they

immediately said the book would breach the Official Secrets

Act and the risk of publishing such material was very high.

Because of the sensitive content of the manuscript, every

precaution had to be taken so that MI-5 would not learn of

Pincher's text for fear of immediate retributive action by

the authorities. Eventually, the publisher sought advice

from a distinguished person who occasionally served in

confidence as an arbiter of taste and prudence concerning

new book projects.

The publisher and Pincher agreed to

accept this person's advice and abide by his decision.

Pincher keeps the identity of this person, whom he titles

the "Arbiter," a secret.

Within a few days the "Arbiter" called for more

information on the book from Pincher, which he provided.

Throughout these negotiations, Pincher kept wright's role

secret and very complicated arrangements were made to pay

Wright his share of money from the book via an offshore bank

in the Netherlands Antilles. The "Arbiter" was never

informed of Wright's role in the book and Lord Rothschild

distanced himself from the entire project.

A further curious development occurred when the

"Arbiter" introduced a friend upon whose advice he much

relied, namely, Sir Arthur ("Dickie") Franks, then Chief of

MI-6. The role of Franks in this affair is equally in

mysterious to that of the "Arbiter" but his identity became

known at the Sydney trial. In the trial, evidence was

produced that Franks told MI-5 that Pincher was producing a

book about the Security Service in March 1981. About this

time, Sir Robert Armstrong was advised (probably by MI-5) of

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the book's contents. Meantime, Pincher was pushing things

forward as rapidly as possible: the book was being edited

and arrangements were being made to sell portions to the

daily press. So Pincher was vastly relieved when it

appeared in the book shops in late spring 1981.

It was an immediate sensation, particularly because

within days it forced Mrs. Thatcher to again admit, as in

the case of Blunt, a very sensitive matter of great security

importance had been kept secret.

She announced that both

the Director General of MI-5 and his deputy had been

investigated as possible Soviet agents, but in neither case

had proof been found as possible Soviet agents, but in

neither case had proof been found to substantiate these

charges. Sir Roger Hollis was dead, but Graham Mitchell was

alive living in retirement in surrey. While the

announcement was embarrassing to the British government, it

was devastating to Mitchell and his family. These

repercussions are brushed aside by Pincher who claims that

such personal tragedies are merely the inevitable result of

investigative journalism and part of the price people must

pay for freedom of the press.

Much of this book is devoted to assailing his erstwhile

colleague, Peter Wright, for what he contends were wright's

false statements to the court. He also denounces the

Australian legal system, Justice Powell (the judge in the

case), and especially Malcolm Turnbull, the brash,

aggressive young Australian lawyer who handled the case for

Heinemann's. This is entirely understandable because the

evidence Turnbull brought forward was damaging to Pincher's

already suspect reputation. Pincher is also offended by the

manner in which the main British government representative,

Sir Robert Armstrong, was treated, but he also has to admit

that Armstrong's performance, which largely resulted from a

weak British government case, left something to be desired,

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especially after his famous admission to the judge, on one

occasion, that "perhaps I was being economical with the

truth." Despite the wounds Pincher claims to have suffered,

the pain is much reduced by the considerable bounty he

enjoyed from a huge revival in sales of his original book on

Hollis--Their Trade is Treachery--which as a result of the

trial publicity went into five editions. Wright was not the

only person to profit vastly from the Spycatcher trial; it

also made Pincher a very rich man.

Meantime MI-5 was hauled over the coals by the media,

left and right, for being incompetent, allegedly penetrated

by hordes of Soviet agents, for numerous illegal activities,

and for a lack of responsibility to the Prime Minister.

Although the whole affair

embarrassed the Thatcher

government, it did not damage her politically, especially

since she had a very safe majority in the Commons. Her

position was also improved when it was found the Labor Party

leader, Neil Kinnock, had covertly tried to make political

profit through his contacts with Turnbull in Australia,

which exposed by the press left Kinnock very red-faced. As

noted earlier one whose reputation suffered considerably was

Lord Rothschild, who emerged from the affair with his

prestige much lowered.

However, the public person who

suffered most was clearly Sir Robert Armstrong whose long

career ended on this inglorious note. Before the trial, he

was considered a sure bet upon retirement to become Provost

of Eton College, one of England's most prestigious posts.

The trial in Australia demolished that possibility. Mrs.

Thatcher tried to ease the pain by making him a life peer

the following year, but the public image of him will always

be one of the supercilious "Pom" trussed up and being

barbecued over a hot fire under the direction of a sneering

Malcolm Turnbull.

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Pincher's book is a transparent attempt to put himself

and his various literary activities in the best light and

exonerate himself from any association with illegal or shady

dealings. In this he hardly succeeds, particularly as he

fails to cast a critical eye upon the machinations of

Whitehall, which in the end permitted his book Their Trade

is Treachery to be published while Wright's later effort

brought down the weight of the entire British government

against publishing Spycatcher. Pincher offers no

explanation for Lord Rothschild's crucial role nor does he

explain how and why Sir Arthur Franks became involved. He

does not identify the "Arbiter" who clearly foresaw storm

clouds on the horizon, but did not reconmend killing the

book. All these mysteries and many more remain unanswered.

Although not intended, perhaps the Australian trial was

a fitting conclusion to this mess. All in all, it is a

cautionary tale.

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Postscript

Two books concerned with counterintelligence history

have been added to the group reviewed here. They are Robert

Lamphere's The FBI/KGB War: A Special Agent's Story,

published in 1986, and Gordon Brook-Shepherd's The Storm

Birds: Soviet Post-War Defectore, published in 1988.

Although they appeared in the period when many books dealing

with CIA and British counterintelligence issues focused on

the Golitsyn-Nosenko controversy, these two works concern

themselves entirely with providing an historical account of

the counterintelligence benefits flowing from defectors and

from such other exceptional events as a break into the KGB

cyphers achieved at the end of World War II.

Lamphere's book concentrates on the FBI's work against

the soviet intelligence services' operations in the United

States, which although suspected for some time was proven

beyond doubt with the defection in Canada of Igor Gouzenko

and in America of Elizabeth Bentley and others who had been

Involved in the soviet spy apparatus. Their astounding

revelations were in turn supplemented by an unusual

accomplishment in the cryptographic field. Lamphere arrived

in the Washington field office around the time the

cryptographic wizard, Meredith Gardner, had achieved

a break into the KGB cypher system and had the good fortune

to be assigned to the National Security Agency (NSA) as

Gardner's principal FBI liaison. Using the fragmentary but

very valuable information from this breakthrough, Lamphere

participated in uncovering some of the major Soviet

espionage rings then in operation. His

work included

dealing with Philby, the ace spy for the Soviets,

as well 'N

interrogating the atomic scientist Klaus Fuchs, pursuing

Harry Gold, assisting

in the Judith Coplon trial, and many

other memorable cases of the immediate post-war period. A

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series of conflicts with J. Edgar Hoover led to Lamphere's

early resignation from the Bureau. His excellent memory was

supplemented by access to FBI records, and NSA, after

considerable pressure was brought to bear, gave Lamphere

permission to describe in elementary detail Gardner's

magnificent achievement against the KGB cypher system. It

is altogether a gripping story well and accurately told.

Brook-Shepherd's excellent history of the post-war

Soviet defectors also benefited from assistance given the

author by the British intelligence and security services and

the CIA. As a result, he has produced a highly accurate and

complete story about most of the major Soviet defectors all

of whom but one (Shevchenko) had served with either the KGB

or GRU. He has eschewed the controversial issues upon which

many of the other books in this collection are concerned,

although he devotes a chapter each to Anatole Golitsyn and

Yuri Nosenko. Each of these men is given objective and fair

consideration. Brook-Shephard's two summaries are probably

the most accurate evaluation available to the public and go

far to make the two men and the issues connected with them

comprehensible.

* **

These two histories are largely accurate and together

constitute a mine of important information on the early

defectors, both American and Soviet, as well as detail on

later defectors such as Gordievsky, who provided inside

information at critical periods in history. The two books

also illustrate how important the defectors were not only in

helping the western intelligence and security services but

also in alerting the public to the Soviet threat. Both

books deserve reading by counterintelligence officers.

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The FBI/KGB War: A Special Agent's Story by Robert J.

Lamphere and Tom Shachtman; Random House (New York, N.Y.),

1986--320 pages

Reading Robert Lamphere's book one gains the impression

he is a stubborn and determined man who fights to win. This

trait is amply demonstrated by his battle with the National

Security Agency (NSA) to obtain permission to tell part of

the story about the American break into the KGB cyphers

during World War II and the consequences which flowed from

this event in the fight against Soviet espionage and

subversion. Lamphere obviously has an excellent memory

(supplemented perhaps by his diaries and notes) : but to

describe some events in this story of his work for the FBI

he required the permission of NSA. Although the break into

the KGB cyphers for a brief period in wartime had been

described in some detail in Chapman Pincher's Their Trade is

Treachery (1981), which was based upon the detailed

knowledge of the event possessed by Peter Wright, who was

Pincher's informant, NSA with strong support of its British

counterpart, GCHQ, steadfastly refused permission for

Lamphere to reveal from his personal experience how

effective the material derived from the break had been.

In retrospect it seems foolish for NSA and GCHQ to have

refused Lamphere's initial request for permission to

chronicle the events flowing from the cypher break,

especially as it was essential to the rest of his story

about FBI operations, but the whole story had been so

closely held that it was difficult to alter an attitude

strongly held over four decades. Lamphere understood this

and in his narrative reveals only the barest details, being

so circumspect he does not even mention the codenames by

which the project was known (BRIDE, DRUG and VENONA in that

order over the years). It seems probable the FBI played a

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role in pressuring NSA to yield on the issue as it is clear

the FBI gave Lamphere assistance themselves by allowing him

access to some of his memoranda, special reports, and so

forth. Lamphere is to be commended for his having persisted

in his effort to include the VENONA story as it is central

to much of the book.

The author entered the FBI fresh from law school in

1941 and was in due course assigned to the New York field

office where he was put to work on the Soviet espionage

sguad. It was in the New York field office that Lamphere,

obviously a disciplined, intelligent, and hard working FBI

officer, got his baptism into the intricacies of Soviet

espionage and subversion in the United States. Here he

experienced at first hand the results flowing from the

information obtained from the first two defectors, Igor

Gouzenko in Canada and Elizabeth Bentley in America. From

the older, more experienced hands he learned how to conduct

an investigation, do surveillance, consider the legal

aspects, and all the many details of a special agent's

responsibilities. By the end of the war, Lamphere was fully

occupied with Soviet cases and well on his way to becoming

an expert in that field. Especially interesting are his

accounts of meetings with such old time Communist luminaries

as Ruth Fischer and Hede Massing, both of whom provided

vital background information on Gerhard Eisler in whose

trial Lamphere played an important role as assistant to

William Hitz, the prosecuting attorney. Lamphere's

autobiography is such

good history one wishes for more

detail on many of the cases he describes, although it can

usually be obtained from other accounts that have been

published.

In the fall of 1947 at the special request of William

K. Harvey, then a major figure in the Soviet section of the

Washington field office, Lamphere transferred from New York

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to the nation's capital, only to find that Harvey in the

meantime had been pushed out of the FBI and gone to work for

CIA.

What Lamphere does not say, but is important in the

VENONA story, is that it was this development which gave the

CIA its first knowledge of the NSA break into the Soviet

cyphers. Prior to this time, the FBI had carefully

restricted knowledge of the BRIDE material (as VENONA was

known in those days) to their British counterpart, MI-5, who

had been brought into the closed group by GCHQ after having

gotten agreement from NSA. Not long after, MI-6 was brought

in largely because of the ongoing investigation into an

espionage lead relating to someone in the Foreign office.

As coordination was required on occasion in Washington, it

was necessary to consult with Peter Dwyer then the MI-6

representative who was acting for both MI-5 and MI-6 in the

British Embassy as no MI-5 officer had yet been assigned.

This is how it happened that Dwyer's successor, H.A.R. "Kin"

Philby, was indoctrinated into the system although by the

time Philby got to Washington, an MI-5 officer was en poste.

Lamphere states that Philby immediately gave the precious

secret to his Soviet masters (which is true) but then goes

on to say it had been given much earlier by Sir Roger Hollis

(which is not proven). This is the one egregious error in

Lamphere's book as he uncritically accepts the judgment of

Chapman Pincher in his book Their Trade is Treachery, whose

message is that Hollis was a Soviet agent but provides no

substantial proof. He apparently did not when writing the

book have the benefit of Gordievsky's knowledge on the

subject, but he ought to have given some value to the word

of Prime Minister Thatcher who stated to the British

Parliament that the official investigation had found no

evidence to support the spy allegation against Hollis. He

even gets wrong the period when Hollis was Director General,

giving it as 1952-56 when it actually was 1953-65. As

Lamphere gives credit to James Angleton for having

critically read the book, it is astonishing that this major

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error went uncorrected. In fact, although Lamphere cannot

be blamed for being ignorant of the event, knowledge of

BRIDE reached the Soviets in 1948 from an ASA officer named

William Weisband, about two years before they had this

information confirmed by Philby.

One of the most fascinating parts of this excellent

history is Lamphere's story of how BRIDE was developed.

Without going into detail here, the person who made the

breakthrough was a brilliant American named Meredith

Gardner, then working at Arlington Hall, the headquarters of

the Army Security Agency (ASA), the forerunner of NSA. When

Lamphere arrived from New York, the breakouts were few and

not well understood. However, Lamphere asked permission to

work on them and in this way met Gardner, whose genius was

imnediately apparent to the FBI officer. They began working

together and became a formidable team. From this beginning

flowed information that was of the utmost help to the FBI in

its effort to understand and run to ground the myriad of

Soviet agent networks then in existence in America.

Lamphere had the intelligence to see the potential of this

product and developed it in a manner by which it could be

used without endangering the source, although the Soviets by

this time were aware their communications had been

compromised for a certain period. His superiors had the

good sense to comprehend this development and even Hoover

seems to have allowed this section to operate without his

making the usual unhelpful intrusions.

At the same time that Gardner and Lamphere were trying

to make the BRIDE breakthrough a viable tool against the

Soviet networks, the CIA was just getting established.

Lamphere pulls no punches in describing how Hoover did his

best to hamper its development, even to the point of playing

up to the British services against the Agency.

Lamphere's

whole approach to Hoover is refreshing. He is, on the one

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hand, frank in describing Hoover's faults of playing

politics endlessly as well,as his tyrannical and often

irrational administrative practices. On the other hand, he

respects the manner in which Hoover guarded the Bureau's

rights and managed to keep it on an even keel despite fire

from many quarters. But Lamphere recognized the need for an

intelligence service that must operate abroad and saw that

the Bureau and the Agency were working toward the same goal.

High on Lamphere's list of Hoover's vengeful actions was the

manner in which he directed the liaison with CIA. He put it

entirely in the hands of a devoted sycophant, Zeke de Loach,

with the objective to obstruct the Agency wherever possible.

De Loach from the start tried to make everything as

witho

difficult as

he could, which created many problems--

particularly as his Agency opposite number was a young

woman.

Eventually de Loach was replaced by the widely

respected and revered Sam Papich, but de Loach continued to

create difficulties for the liaison. Lamphere makes no

secret of his feeling that this was one of the most shameful

and damaging of Hoover's many transgressions, particularly

because it was perpetuated at a time when the closest

counterintelligence cooperation was required to meet the

increasing demands placed on both FBI and CIA by the

burgeoning cold war.

Reading Lamphere's stories about how the Bureau

operated, one wonders if the men in it were really mature

adults or were slightly psychotic.

An example is Hoover's

handling of relations with MI-5 on the Fuchs

case.

MI-5's

William Skardon had broken Fuchs and obtained his confession

of having worked for the Soviets, but many aspects of his

American communist associations remained unanswered. Hoover

wanted Fuchs questioned by one of his officers, but MI-5

replied the Attorney General of Great Britain could not

permit this while Fuchs' appeal was being considered. At

word of this, Hoover flew into a rage but he could not budge

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London.

Eventually, Fuchs' appeal was denied and MI-5

indicated the way was clear. Lamphere's superior selected

him to do the debriefing, but Hoover intervened at the last

moment with instructions that Hugh Clegg, a Bureau officer

who had done liaison with MI-5 during the war, should

accompany Lamphere to be watchdog over the British,

Lamphere, and the London FBI representative, John Cimperman.

This was an unhappy situation as the British disliked Clegg

from their wartime experience with the man and Lamphere

resented this watchdog tagging along. In the end, cool

heads carried the day, Skardon and Cimperman letting

Lamphere do the questioning and keeping Clegg in the

background. It was during this debriefing that Lamphere got

Fuchs to identify Harry Gold as his major contact in the

atom spy ring. But Hoover's intervention had produced a

great deal of needless acrimony. It is a testimony to

Lamphere's skill that he brought the trip to a successful

conclusion.

Lamphere continued to manage the exploitation of the

VENONA material, including the clues that led to the

eventual arrest of Ethel and Julius Rosenberg. The cypher

material was supplemented by immensely valuable information

which was coming from defector sources such as Gouzenko

and

especially former American communists Bentley, Budenz,

Chambers, and so on. It is gratifying to note that during

this time, Lamphere was allowed on occasion to lecture to

CIA training courses (perhaps without Hoover's knowledge).

This must have been of immense help to the young CIA, then

only beginning to learn the arcane art of

counterintelligence. Another example of what was likely a

behind-the-scenes cooperative effort was

Lamphere's plan

formulated with James Angleton to kidnap Joseph Katz, a much

vaunted Soviet spy, from Israel. The plan was discovered by

Hoover who put an immediate end to it. Later the CIA and

FBI cooperated in London, when Katz came to reside in

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Britain, on a scheme to debrief him (with MI-5 knowledge and

help) but Katz remained uncooperative and took his secrets

with him to the grave.

Although this book has a few errors and the story has

perhaps been gilded a bit by Lamphere, it nevertheless

remains one of the best histories of counterintelligence in

America. It is especially valuable because it covers a

period when there was intense activity flowing from the

VENONA breakthrough and the defectors' information that

revealed to the American authorities rock-hard evidence that

their wartime ally had been spying on them for two decades

and had in fact accelerated this activity during the war

when the Soviet Union and America were allies. Despite the

excitement and satisfaction deriving from such important

work, Lamphere eventually became fed up with Hoover's

irrational management and in 1955 left the Bureau for a

successful career with the Veterans Administration. Later

he retired to have yet another successful business career

with a major insurance company. A man of many parts and

obvious ability, Lamphere's book should be required reading

for counterintelligence officers.

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The Storm Birds: Soviet Post-War Defectors by Gordon Brook-

Shepherd; Weidenfeld and Nicolson (London), 1988--303 pages

Gordon Brook-Shepherd, a British foreign correspondent

turned historian, has with publication of this book done the

best work of his long career. As intelligence history

dealing with soviet post-war defectors, it is not only an

exciting read but is factually accurate in almost every

respect. Compressed within its 303 pages is the story of

how the Western intelligence services, largely denied the

possibility of obtaining information from within the Soviet

Union, came to realize the enormous intelligence value of

those Soviets who risked their lives to make the leap to

freedon. More importantly, the author has immersed himself

thoroughly in the voluminous detail about the defectors so

that he comprehends the events which influenced the secret

world of intelligence, with the result his judgments are

objective and fair. The author likely achieved this kind of

professional knowledge partly from work on his earlier book,

The Storm Petrels, which recounted the story of pre-war

defectors from the Soviet Union. With this experience plus

generous help from CIA and the British intelligence

services, Brook-Shepherd has written a fascinating account

of how and why so many senior Soviet intelligence officials

defected and their impact on the West.

The author deals with his complex subject in

chronological fashion starting with the first post-war

defector, Igor Gouzenko, in Canada. It is difficult today

to comprehend how little knowledge the West, governments as

well as people, possessed about Soviet espionage and

subversive activity prior to Gouzenko's defection in

September 1945. This event and the revelations that flowed

from it stunned both statesmen and the public. It had an

enormous effect in America where it was coupled with

defections of Americans such as Elizabeth Bentley, Louis

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Budenz, Whittaker Chambers, etc. from communism, all of whom

made a contribution to the,growing mass of evidence about

Soviet illegal activities. In Canada where Prime Minister

Mackenzie King seemed almost unable to grasp the enormity of

Soviet transgressions, it had the salutary effect of

establishing the groundwork for a security service in the

Royal Canadian Mounted Police. In Britain the Gouzenko

information also had an electric affect, but agents such as

Philby were often able behind the scenes to blunt its force.

(For example, it is known that Philby managed single-

handedly, without drawing attention to himself, to prevent a

major position paper urging stronger action against the

Soviets from reaching the Prime Minister.)

Although Gouzenko was the first Soviet intelligence

officer to defect post-war and the impact of his disclosures

are almost beyond measure, the author does not include him

amongst the post-war defectors he describes as "giants." He

defines a giant as one who dominated the scene in the sense

that his contribution went far beyond his normal

professional assets to play a certain strategic role in

post-war history. The three he places in this category are

Penkovsky, "Farewell", and Gordievsky. All the defectors he

examines were intelligence officers of either the KGB or GRU

with but one exception: Arkady Shevchenko, the one-time

Under Secretary-General at the United Nations. He was

included because of his personal and political significance.

Brook-Shepherd also examines the reasons for Soviet

defections and, as might be expected, he concludes there

were several, some of which are repeated many times. A

primary and nearly constant reason was fear--often sheer

terror at what fate awaited them upon their return to

MOscOW.

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They also shared a common reaction to their experience

when they visited the outside world: shock at the grey

misery of the soviet Union in contrast to the freedom and

affluence of the West (even in the old days, the Soviet-

occupied zone of Austria seemed like Heaven compared to what

they left behind in the USSR). This contrast with the

Soviet homeland shook the faith of many in the Soviet system

despite the fact they belonged to a very privileged class

that enjoyed lavish privileges denied the ordinary Soviet

citizen.

Thus the seed was often planted early for

defection, but it often took some other more immediate event

to trigger the act itself. These sometimes were marital

problems, petty disputes or jealousies within the soviet

community (always a very isolated group), or simply the hope

for a better life in the free world.

Whatever the case, all

the reasons taken together reveal at bottom a disgust with

and hatred for the oppressive regime, which boils down to

the fact the basic reason for defection was ideological.

Gouzenko's difficulty in finding any person or agency

who would listen to his story spotlighted a gaping

deficiency in Western governments, especially in the

intelligence and security services. During the war when the

Soviet Union was adulated as an heroic ally, there were very

few defectors. One who attempted defection, Victor

Kravchenko (not an intelligence officer), had a difficult

time escaping from the Soviet Purchasing Mission in

Washington in

1944 and was lucky to have

survived. His

defection was little publicized and only after the war when

attitudes changed toward the USSR was his story published.

other attempted defections had a less happy ending.

The most famous of these, of course, is that of

Konstantin Volkov, which

is described in some detail. It

was

almost certainly Philby's most desperate and successful

coup. Volkov had approached the British consulate in

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Istanbul shortly after the cessation of hostilities with an

offer of information which.. had he not been neutralized by

Philby's quick action, undoubtedly would have lead to the

exposure of all the Soviet agents in Britain. Another case

in which Philby succeeded in derailing the information if

not the informant was that of Ishmael Akhmedov, a GRU

officer who defected to the Turks during war-time. Philby

later during his tour as MI-6 chief in Istanbul prevented

Akhmedov's information from reaching the West except in very

truncated form. The episode highlights a much neglected

aspect of the damage Philby inflicted on the West. CIA

eventually got access to Akhmedov, but it was not until ten

years after his defection!

The last example of Philby's murderous activity on the

KGB's behalf concerns a young English speaking GRU officer

named Vladimir Skripkin. This little known case began in

Tokyo in early 1946 when the young

officer made overtures to

both the English and the Americans. For

some reason he

received

no encouragement from the American

side, and as he

was soon to be posted back to Moscow, he made

another pass

at the British

leaving with them

an address in Moscow where

he asked

to be contacted. Upon his return, he was seized by

the KGB and never heard of again. Two KGB defectors

(Rastvorov and Deriabin) told CIA later that Skripkin had

been given away by a British intelligence source, who almost

certainly was Philby.

The book then turns to a series of defections in 1954

touched off in part by the news of the execution of Lavrenti

Beriya (who had been head of Stalin's secret police). By

this time, the western

services--CIA in particular-were on

keen alert

for defectors

and had improved the system for

receiving and expeditiously handling them. The first in

this wave of defectors was Yuri Rastvorov, a KGB officer who

first made overtures to the British but changed his mind and

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chose CIA. This event was followed by the defection of KGB

officer Peter Deriabin in Vienna in which his escape from

the Soviets was skillfully managed by CIA. The author

provides a detailed account of Deriabin's KGB background

that demonstrates how valuable his information was to the

West. This is followed by the account of Nikolai Kokhlov's

defection. Kokhlov had been dispatched by the KGB to West

Germany for the purpose of assassinating the leader of the

NTS, an anti-Soviet organization. Kokhlov instead turned

himself over to the CIA, which then launched a series of

operations too complicated to be recounted here, some of

which worked and some failed. The CIA made no secret of the

defector's assassination mission, developing much anti-

Soviet propaganda from it. Kokhlov wrote a book about the

affair after which he was resettled in America where he made

a successful career in academe. Finally, there

is the

harrowing story of Vladimir and Evdokia Petrov, the KGB

husband and wife team

in the Soviet Embassy in Canberra,

Australia, who with the assistance of the Australian

security service (ASIO) managed to escape to freedom

although the wife was nearly kidnapped back to the USSR.

The clumsy intervention of the KGB security goons

was

captured by photographers and the picture of Mrs. Petrov

being dragged shoeless across the airport tarmac to a

waiting plane gave the Soviets a very black eye. From their

long service, mostly as cypher clerks, they were able to

provide the West with valuable information including the

first knowledge the "missing diplomats" Burgess and Maclean

were in Moscow. Like Gouzenko in Canada, they

also revealed

a number of KGB agents in the Australian government and

trade unions. The successful management of the defection,

though a close thing, gave the fledgling ASIO a special

boost and put it in the league of major security services.

There then follow two chapters devoted to the Penkovsky

case. This

is a well done summary but is now overtaken by

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the recently published (1992) and more exhaustive study

called The Spy Who Saved the World by Jerrold Schecter and

Peter Deriabin. Next follow the stories of the two most

controversial defectors in history: Anatole Golitsyn and

Yuri Nosenko. This is a true test of the author's ability

to analyze a vast amount of information and testimony.

Despite the complexity of this affair, he has done a good

job of sorting out the facts and arriving at fair judgments.

He obviously had help on the Golitsyn chapter from MI-5 and

MI-6 and perhaps some guidance from CIA. He puts Golitsyn

in proper perspective both as to the value of his product

and his later career as troublemaker, especially for the

Agency. He does the same with Nosenko, dealing fairly with

the false charges made by Edward J. Epstein and others about

the Oswald part of Nosenko's testimony. It would have been

helpful perhaps had someone in the Agency told the author

that Admiral Turner in 1978 had given Nosenko

a completely

clean bill of health and every Director since has accepted

that conclusion including William Casey. However, Brook-

Shepherd's account of the Nosenko case, brief

and to the

point, should leave no doubt but that the defector was and

is genuine.

Under a chapter titled "Pluses and Minuses" the case of

Oleg Lyalin in Britain takes first place, particularly as

this KGB officer's defection triggered the famous

deportation of 105 Soviet diplomats from the United Kingdom.

The Minuses are the several Soviet intelligence officers who

within a time frame of one year (1971-72) defected to the

Americans and then in varying periods redefected to Russia.

The cases are not worthy of detailed consideration except

for one,

a young KGB lieutenant named Artush Oganesyan, who

brought with him when he defected by crossing the Soviet

border into Turkey the latest issue of the KGB's "Watch

List". This was the annually revised catalogue of soviet

citizens of all sorts--ballet dancers, opera singers,

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scientists, athletes, as well as officials and intelligence

personnel--who had failed to return from visits to the West.

Additionally, Oganesyan had much other valuable information

which he provided, but in the eyes of James Angelton it was

the "Watch List" which subjected him to suspicion because

there in the "Watch List" was the name of Yuri Nosenko.

Angleton thought his suspicions confirmed when Oganesyan

with his young wife suddenly re-defected to the Soviets, but

this view is not held by other Agency officials nor by

Brook-Shepherd.

A special case of interest is Arkady Shevchenko, who

held an exalted position at the United Nations in New York.

When his interest in defecting became known, the CIA managed

to convince him to work for it in place as long as possible.

This turned out to be something over two years, but in 1978

the order came for his return to Moscow.

He then put the

re-arranged plan into effect; his defection went smoothly,

he wrote a bestseller about his experiences as a senior

Soviet diplomat, married an American woman, and quietly

settled into American life.

The final cases summarized are all of special interest.

They are all of rather recent vintage, falling within a time

frame of the decade roughly 1975-1985. The first of these

cases concerns a GRU officer, Vladimir Rezun, who defected

to the British in Switzerland in 1978. He brought with him

considerable valuable information, the most alarming of

which was specifics about the Red Army's Spetnatz units or

"Special Purpose Forces". These special units were present

in every part of the Soviet military and employed

sabotage,

terror, and other extreme action in the event of war. Rezun

under British direction, and using the pseudonym "Victor

Suvorov", wrote several

books relating his experiences in

the Soviet military and emphasizing the role of Spetnatz

units. As CIA made several of their defectors available to

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Brook-Shepherd for interviews, so the British also turned

Rezun over to the author for consultation.

Victor Levchenko, a KGB officer stationed in Tokyo and

engaged in active measures, defected to the CIA in 1979. He

had been active with the Soviet Mission there since 1975 and

was able to reveal not only the order of battle of soviet

intelligence in Japan but also much about the extent of

Soviet penetration and collaboration within the Japanese

government and the media. His defection provided much

inside information on KGB active measures worldwide as well

as its place in the KGB. As there was mounting

interest in

the subject at this time, Levchenko's defection

was

specially valuable. He subsequently wrote

a book about his

experiences and lectured widely about Soviet Special

Measures.

The penultimate defector case is that of Vladimir I.

Vetrov, known as "Farewell", a case which began in France

but ended in Moscow, with his execution in the early 1980s.

The case, even aside from

its lurid

aspects (which involved

a murder

and a mistress), is of special interest because it

revealed in excruciating detail the highly sophisticated

efforts of the Soviet government to obtain every possible

bit of scientific and technical information from the West.

Even more alarming, Farewell's reporting disclosed how

successful this massive endeavor, spearheaded by the KGB,

had been. Farewell early in his career had been

stationed

in Paris where he had made many contacts. After Farewell

returned to Moscow from a successive overseas assignment in

Ottawa, he signalled he wished to contact the French, and

arragements were made for meetings

in the Soviet capital.

The case because of its origins in Paris had been under the

jurisdiction of the DST (Direction de la Surveillance

Territoire) and it was continued by the internal service

even though the operation was being conducted abroad. It

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may be surmised that security considerations were prominent

in this decision.

The Farewell product was of such enormous significance,

particularly because so much of the Soviet operational

effort was directed at American industry, that President

Mitterand instructed the French intelligence service to

share this vital material with the United States. Although

the operation was of relatively short duration--less than

two years--the voluminous product and the insight it

provided into the intricate and highly secret soviet system

for collecting and utilizing the scientific

and technical

intelligence was of inestimable value to the US

Intelligence

Community. Within the constraints of the limited amount of

information released by the French about the case, the

author has done a remarkable job in presenting

this

important story, which without question places Farewell as

one of the most important agents ever to work for the West.

Meantime, Farewell had moved steadily upward in the KGB's

Department I, which was concerned with technical and

scientific espionage abroad and occupied

a key position from

which he could monitor the Soviet efforts and their

requirements in this area.

Brook-Shepherd concludes his book with a brief chapter

on Oleg Gordievsky, who needs no introduction to

counterintelligence officers. His story in general terms is

well known and recounted in this book. However, now that

Gordievsky's family has been allowed to join him in England,

the defector is busy writing his own autobiography, with--of

course--careful British guidance. Undoubtedly for this

reason as well as because his family in 1987 was still held

in Moscow, Brook-Shepherd got only the minimum amount of

information sufficient to make a good ending for this

remarkable book.

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