## Page 1

Date

Page

09/24/98:

1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY

RECORD NUMBER

RECORDS: SERIES:

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

PFIAB

206-10001-10002

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE. ADVISORY BOARD

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

DOCUMENT TYPE

CLASSIFICATION

RESTRICTIONS

CURRENT STATUS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW

OPENING CRITERIA

COMMENTS

ORIGINATOR

PFIAB

FROM

TO

TITLE

MINUTES OF MEETING OF JANUARY 30, 1964

DATE

01/30/64

PAGES: 67

SUBJECTS:

SUMMARY OF JANUARY 30, 1964 MEETING

AGENDA FOR JANUARY 30, 1964 MEETING

PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

TOP SECRET

1B, 1C

RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

08206/98 08/01/2024

guza Release under the

President John F. Kennedy

issassination Records

Collection Act of 1992

[R]

ITEM IS RESTRICTED

NW 88132

Docld:34671877 Page 1

---

## Page 2

206-10001-10002

2025 Release under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of

1992

MINUTES

• F:

MEETING:

•OF.

JANU A R Y 30,

19641

NWEERg32I

Docld:34671877 Page 2

---

## Page 3

-SECRET

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

AGENDA FOR MEETING OF JANUARY 30, 1964

ITEM

TIME

SUBJECT

1.

2.

3.

4.

9:00 - 10:00

10:00 - 11:00

11:00 - 11:30

11:30 - 12:30

5.

7.

83.

9.

12:30 - 1:45

1:45 - 2:30

2:30 - 4:00

4: 00: - 5:00

5:00

End

Day

of

Chairman's Time

Acting Director of Central Inteïligerce

Lt. General Marshall Carter

Executive Session

Director; National Reconnaissance Office

Under Secretary Brockway McMillan, USAF

Executive Session

Lunch--White

House Mess

ünsideration of Report to the President

Meeting, wish the President

Executive Session

and Discussion of

Future Board Business.

SECRET

NW 185\

Docid: 2492

Docld:34671877

Page 3

---

## Page 4

PRESIDAVTUS PORSION LITUULGENGS NOVISORE BOARD

January 20, 150/

MEMORANDUM FOR MR WALTER JONKINS

Folzowine lip on me moonu conversation whach you

had with Me, Olark curriony chasinan of the Pronident s

Foreign Intelligenco Aduluory Bound, thore are listed

below the hance of the parsonnel of the Board who aro

soheduled to neet with the treatient on Jamunry 30 ab

clark cliftord

→ Washington, D

. C.

N111200 0 Salter

Gon veroners Do 116610

Redondo Bocoh, Calif.

Gordon Grays

Washington, D. C.

Edwin M, Lank

Cobrldga, naus.

WillanT conger

Canbridge, Moss.

Robertip Maphy

New York, No Yo

New York,

N.

J. Pausiols Coyno

Wachington, D. C,

Copies of this manorindun are boing provided to

Kennet O!Donnoll und to rome Salingor for troir

information.

Exocutive Soureosty

is kennath a bonnoi

Ploro Saltras

NW 88192%

Docld:34671877 Page 4

---

## Page 5

Attached memoranda (Tabs A through H)

were used

by the Chairman as the basis for an oral briefing

on the origin of the Board at the PFIAB meeting

with President Johnson on January 30, 196it.

NW 88132

Docld:34671877 Page 5

---

## Page 6

This

No.

THE WHITE HOUSE

•WASHINGTON

2-01 16 0u

TOP SECRET

December 1, 1263

8.C. 1114:12/63

(3)

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

Origin of the Board:

i one total as To her enterence tova.

From 1946 to 1954 a variety of ad hoc groups

were constituted at the Presidential level to review selected aspects

In 1955 the Hoover Commission on Organization of the Executive

Branch of the Government recommended a permanent bi-partisan "Watch

Dog Committee". (to

be composed of members of both Houses. of Congress

and of public-spirited. citizens) to make periodic surveys of the

organization, functions, policies and effectiveness of the foreign

intelligence

activities of the several Government agencies concerned,

reporting thereon 'both to the Congress and the President. President

Eisenhower rejected this proposal.

In February 1956, as à tactic to forestall creation of a Watch

Dog Committee, President Eisenhower 1ssued an Executive Order (Tab A)

establishing his own Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence

to maintain a continuing,

Independent review of all U.S.

foreign intelligence activities.

President Eisenhower's Board

functioned continuously from February 1956 to January 1961. (The

-membership of the Eisenhower Board 1s listed under Tab B.)

In January 1961, President Kennedy decided that there was à

continuing need for

a Presidential advisory board on foreign Intell1-

gence, but deferred temporarily the appointment of new members.

the interim he requested that the Executive Secretary of the prior

Buard remain in office and that he continue to review and report

to the President on the conduct of our foreign intelligence effort.

Mission of the Board:

On May 4, 1961 following the disaster suffered

at Cuba's Bay of Pigs, the President, by Executive Order

No. 10938 (Tab.C), established the President's Foreign Intelligence

Advisory Board.

This Order directs the Board la to conduct a.con-

tinuing, Independent review and assessment of all functions of the

departments and agencies having

responsibilities in

intelligence and related fields" and (b) to advise the President with

respect

are required in the interest of foreign policy, national

ured in the interest foreten these, national aerence

and security.

The phrase:

"related fields"

sensitive covert operations relating to political action, propaganda,

economic warfare, sabotage, escape and evasion, subversion against

hostile states or groups and support of indigenous and anti-communist

elements in threatened countries of the free worla.

cherations are to be conducted in such manner that, if uncovered,

the U.S. Government can plausibly disclaim responsibility for them.

Membership of the Board:

provides that members of the Board shall be

President Kennedy!s Executive Order

appointed from among

qualified persons outside the Government,..

All appointments to

HANDLEMA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY FOr STORERS

Handle via BIEMAN

Control System

NW 88192

Docld:34671877 Page 6

---

## Page 7

the Board have been made on that basis:

The Board's menbership 1s

l1sted under Tab D.)

The Board was chaired initially by Dr.

KIlllan, Jr.

In April 1963 when De. Killlan resignea,

President

Kennedy appointed Mr. Clark Clifford as Chairman.

In appolnting

Mr. Clifford, the President directed that the Board

"continue to

perform the highly Important function of maintaining an Independent

revfew and assessment of the objectives and conduct of the foregn

Intelligence and related activities of the departments and agencies

having responsibilitles in this flela."

(Tab E)

Coincident with Mr. Clifford's appointment, the President

made a public announcement emphasizing that he would

"continue. to

100k to the Board for non-partisan, objective appraisals of they

activities of our intelligence agencies in order to assure

their

efficient lianagement and maximum effectiveness.

(Tab F)

Review Procedures of the Board:

The Board maintains lis continuing,

independent review and assessment of U.s, foreign intelligence

activities and covert action operations

through the following means:

• Panels comoosed of. designated Board. Members and th

¡ecutive secretary which are responsible lor keeping the rui

Board informed with respect to significant actions, problems, gaps,

overlays, and deficiencies In specified areas of the overall.

foreign

Intelligence. effort.

(2) On-the-scene reviews, both in the U.S. and abroad, of

These reviews (made by designated

Members and/or the Executive Secretary) encompass pertinent activ-

1ties of the CIA, the Departments of State and Defense, the Unified

and Specified Commands; the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the

National Security Agency and the

Service Cryptologic Agencies. Such

reviews have been made at the Seat of Government, elsewhere in the

Continental U.S., In Latin America, Scandânavia,

Europe, Africa,

the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and the Far East:

Review of periodic progress reports and special reports;

submitted

to the Board by the military and civilian intelligence.

agencies.

(4) Reviev of major Intelligence publications, produced on a

daily, weekly, monthly,

ord"spot"

basis by the Central Intelligence

by the U.S. intelligence community collectively.

the Defense intelonine deathe Deement ou sacations

Include current Intelligence reports and appraisals of significant

day-to-day developments, National Intelligence Estimates,

Special

Intelligence Estimates, and the Intelligence results of satellite

arid alrcraft reconnaissance missions.

(5) Briefings on selected Intelligence topics from

agency.

heads and other officials associated with the several U.S.

intelligence agencies?

6) * Discussionso

with the Secretaries of

State and Defense,

the Chairportes, the president sespectai

Handlo via BEM

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

NW B8g2F

Docld:34671877 Page 7

---

## Page 8

SEC

Assistant fur National Security Affairs,

the Director of Central

Intellizence, and

the Heads of the several intelligence agencies

(7) Frequent meetings of the full Board. i

Meetings of the Board: (From May 1961 through November 1963,

President Kennedy's Board held 25 separate meetings covering a

total of 39 days..

These meetings included sessions with the

President, which

provided opportunities for discussion of topics uf

major significance.

: (President Eisenhower's Board held 18 meetings

covering a total of 39 days during Its five-year tenure.)

Recommendations of the Board:

During the past 2a years the Board

submitüed to the President a total of 170 recommendations, summar-

Ized under Tab G.

(During Its fIve year tenure the Eisenhower

Board made 42 recommendations; these are sunmarized under Tab f.)

A large percentage of the recommendations made by president Kennedy's

Board Involved activities Internal to the Department of Defense;

lesser proportion Involved activities Internal to the Central

Intelligence Agency and the Department of Stale; a number of them

related to activities of joint Interest to two or more member

agencies of the intelligence Community.

Of the 170 recommendations,

remaining Presidentially-approved recommendations deal with

substantive Intelligence matterswarranting continued Board attention

and, possibly, the submission of further Board recommendations to

President.

206лI46CG

Intelligence Areas of Major Concern: These Include:

The ever-increasing cost, size and complexity of the

overall Intelligence effort. This fiscal year the effort will

cost 53.7 billion.

Its personnel strength 1s In excess of 149,000

Of this number, over 131,000 are In, the Deparoment of Defense and

17,000. 1n CIA.

The effort is diffused throughout a number of

Government agencies including the Departments

of State, Defense,

Army, Navy,

Air Force; the Defense Intelligence Agency, the

National Security Agency, the Service Cryptologic Agencies; the

Unifiel, Specified and Component Commands; and the Central

Intelllgence Agency:

(2) The acquisition on a priority basis of cricially-needed

inteiligence on

the long-range missile capability of the Sino-Soviet

(3) The National Reconnaissance Program for the collection of

photographic

and signals intelligence through surveillance sateilites,

manned aircraft and drones (eus. CORONA, LANYARD, GAMBIT, ARGON, U-2,

ORCART, PAGBOARD).

(4) The Signals Intelligence Program for the interception and

analysis of the governmental.and military communications

of foreign

governments.and.orselectronics emanatIons-assöclated.with thefr

missile anarspace venicreractivities

Manti

B WATCRA

SX3 HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS CINLY

NW 88192

Docld:34671877 Page 8

---

## Page 9

(recede The and gron analy the at 201 age

The handling and analysis of Intelligence information

as the basis for (a) the preparation

of appraisals of current intelligence inalcators and carly warn-

Ing data for time.y consideration by the president and other

officials, and (b) the formulation of longer-range natlonal

intelligence estimates for use in the policy-making process.

s, clandestine espionage effort for the collection

of vitally-needed Intelligence concerning the plans, actions and

capabilities of the Sino-Soviet bloc In areas significantly affect-

ing our national defense and security.

The safeguarding of sensitive U.S, information (including

Intelligence and Intelligence sources and

techniques) by means. of

(a) positive counterespionage penetration of Soviet bloc Intell1-

gence operations targeted against our Goverrment on a worla-wide

basis,

(b) the security screening and security supervision of:

personnel engaged in sensitive U.S. Government activities, ard

(c) physical security measures: for

the protection of sensitive.

U.s, material, installations and operations.

(8) The covert operations conducted by the CI! In poiltical

action, propaganda and related fields with the objective. of

Iniuencing the complexion and orientation of selected forelen

governments.

The budgeting and management, particularly in the

Department of Defense, of the complex programs which make up our

total foreign Intelligence effort.

Over 85, of ou foreign

intelligence dollar expenditures falls within the management and

control. responsibility.of

the Secretary of Derense.)

(10) The coordination and guidance of all significant aspects

of our entire foreign intelligence effort as a means of achieving

maximum effectiveness in meeting critical Intelligence needs of

our Goverrment.

St00

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHIA

TOR SECRET

INELS ONLY

oc d

NW Sage

Docld:34671877 Page 9

---

## Page 10

Rec. #1:

(1)

12)

(3)

(4)

(5)

=3$

His.

16.

TOP SECRET S.C. 114112/63

(i)

December 1, 1963

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS SUBMITTED TO

THE PRESIDENT BY THE PRESIDENT'S

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

May 1961.

-

November 22. 1963

Board Reports of July 2, July 18,

October 4. and October 17, 1961.

The Board made a series of 17 recommendations

calling for (1) a redefinition of the role of

the Director of Central Intelligénce (DCI),

and (2) a reorganization and redirection of

the activities of the Central Intelligence

Agency: (CIA).

These recommendations were

submitted on the basis of a Board study re-

anticipation of

the appointment of a new bol which subsequently

took place on November 29, 1961. The Board

reconmended as follows:

That the President designate the DOI as the

Covernment's chief intelligence officer naving

primary responsibillty for lending coordination

andiguidance to the total U. S. foreign Intel-

ligence effort.

That the DOI consider establishing a small

staff to assist him in providing

coordination

and

guidance to che Intelligence effort.

That the DOI, although retaining over-all

President to assign to the Deputy DCI the

day-to-day operational direction of the CIA.

That the DCI be housed in the Executive Office

of the President,.

In order to emphasize his

role as chief intelligence officer of the

United States.

That the DCI consider taking with him to the

Executive Office those CIA personnel engaged

In the preparation of national Intelligence

estimates and evaluations.

HANDLE VIA COMINI CHANNELS ONLY

TOP SECRET

Conrol Oystem

Nº185

Docid 2

Nw Sage?

Docld:34671877 Page 10

---

## Page 11

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9.)

(10)

(11)

(12)

(1.3.)

(14)

-TOP SECRET

That the DCI participate with the Bureau of the

Budget In Its review of the intelligence budgets

of the various U.S. Intelligence agencies.

Inat the DOI be responsible for (1) oversacing

the preparation of national, Intelligence estimates

by the intelligence community, (2) assuring the

timely flow of intelligence to the inite House,

and (3) providing intelligence briefings to the

President and other Wnite House officials as

required.

That the DCI serve as Chairman of the U.S.

Intelligence Board

(USIB) and reprasent

the

President on intelligence policy matters at

the national level:

That CIA (1) place Increasing emphasis on the

acquisition of

"hard" intelligence,

and

(2) decrease the excessive emphasis being

placed upon covert action programs.

That CIA devise means

for identifying and

eliminating covert action programs of low

potential:.

That CIA consider the feasibility of trans-

ferring clandestine operations and covert

operations from CIA to some

other agency.

That, 1f feasible, the headquarters administra-

ton of all or portions of clandestine

activities be relocated to points outside

• of washington (e.g.,

to New York City, and

other appropriate points).

That deeper cover be achieved for all clandestine

activities and covert actions.

That efforts be made to reduce the visiollity

of our foreign intelligence activities

through (1) action by the DÇI to reduce to

a minimum the appearances of CIA officials

before Congressional Committees, and (2) action

by officials of all intelligence agencies to

refrain from public statements concerning

substantive Intelligence matters.

MIMINULE VIM GOING CHANNELS ONLI

2 -

- TOP SECRET

Lada va Bradl

Contre: Systero

NW 88132

Docld:34671877 Page 11

---

## Page 12

(15)

(16)

(17.)

ReC. 12

Rec • 13:

Rec. 1r4:

Rec. 15:

TO:

That Improvements be achieved in the quallty

of CIA personnel.

That consideration be given to a possible ra

change In the name

of the CIA.

Inat there be realignments in the organiza-s

tion and staffing of the CIA;

mith avied toa

Increasing its effectivoress.

That positive

action on the new leadershio

of CIA be taken as soon as possible.

19202149128

313

Board Report of July 2, 2962

That the Department of State. and the CIA conduct

à stay of the number of cis representaclves

serving overseas under official state Department

cover, with a view to an orderly neduction.of

cover positions in appropilate instances.

That the U. S. Intelligence Board creäte the:

means for assessing and reporting early warning

Indications of developing

"cöld war""crisisuoge

situations in any part of the world (such early

varning to be handled separately from "not war

indications dealt with In the National Indica-

tions Center of the j. S. Intelligence Board se

Watch Committee).

That there be a strengthening of the capabilitles

of the National Security Agency (NSA) In the

acquiring and processing of communications

intelligence and Electronics intelligence,

through the following means: (1)neu legistation

authorizing the Department of Defense to

summarily deny or revoke the employment at sa

any person unless such employment is round.

to be consistent with national security interests;

in neilerislation exemotini theinst from sa

statutes and regulations coveinine embicument

the U.S. cIvil service, as required to enable

NSA to accomplish its sensitive and vital mission;

(3) a requirement for full management and budgetary

control of NSA byithe Office of the Secretary of

Defense; (4) central supervision by NSA of all

TOP SECRET

- 3. -

19

NW 88192

Docld:34671877 Page 12

---

## Page 13

Pec. H6

Rec..

#7

Rec. IO

Rec.

Rec. #10:

Rec. 722:

TOD

collection and processing of Electronics

Intelligence (ELINT) done by military Intel-

ligence elements within the Department of

Defense; (5/a.real1sticre-examination.or

the system followed oy the U.S. Intelligence

Board In levying Intelligence collection re-:

quirements unon the NSA; and lo support o

the Defense Department to meet such

vital needs

of NSA as shis borne intercent stations, and

equipment for Intercept coverage of submaiines

and critical lano areas, in order to meet

national as distinct from purely milliary

requirements.

That the president support the secretary of

Defense In a reorganization of Defense Depart-

ment Intelligence activities through the establish-

ment of a Defense Intelligence Agency.

!This recommendation, on the subjecü of possibly:

changing the name

of the CIA, 1s dealt wiüh In

the sunmary of Rec. #1 (16), above).

That the President oppose: (1) the establishment

of a Joint congressional Committee on Foreign

Intelligence; and (2) Congressional Investigations

of the CIA.

That every effort be made to protect the Prest-

against public idencaricavion with specific

and programs Involving (1) clan-

rescine espionage activitles, and (2)

covert

political, propaganda, psychological, para-

military

and related activities.

That the President lend his influence In

persuading congress to reduce its demands for

testimony by officials of the cIa.

That the Departments of State

and Dafense,

and

the CIA,

be

requested to report semiannually

on the

status

of their respeciive

actions to

Implement the 43 recommendations made. on

December 15, 1901, by the Joint study Group

on Foreign Intelligence Activitles.

TOP SECRET

-4-

411851

Docid 2492

NW Bage "

Docld:34671877 Page 13

---

## Page 14

Ree.

#12:

Rec

1r13:

Rec. 1774 :

Ress t15:

Inat the president lend his prestige lin the

period of transition Involving the selection of

a new DCI, and reiated matters to support ano

enhance the morale of the intelligence com-

munity, and to restore public confidence in

the CIA, by: (1) a Presidential statement

commending the work of those serving in our

intelildence agencies; and (2) an Indication

oy the President of appreciation for the

long, distinguished and ploncering nork of a

Allen Dulles In the foreign intelligence field.

10"

Board Report of JulY 18, 2961

That CIA review Its plans for cocupancy of thei

newly-completed CIA Headquarters Building atza

Langley, and

consider the feasibility of housing

at some other place the administration of

CIA's clandestine activities:

That the mechanism of the Special NSC 5412/2

Group be employed In such a manner as to ensûre:

1) nol1tical

control of all covent actions beg

Includins paramilitary operations whetheror

not assigned to the Department of Defense with

opportunity for the Department of Staüe

to bring suggéstions and

judgmenis to bear on

covert action operations in the planning ano

execution stages; (2) the submission for resolü-

tion by the president of mattens Involving

disagreement by any member of uhe special

Group with respect to a proposed, covert action

operation; and

13) a current

reviow and evaluation

bi the special Group of all covert, action authort-

izations then in effert,

In order that the

Department of State might be rully informed of

all such authorizations.

Board Report of October 4, 2961

That: the U. S. Intelligence Board maice a thorough

assessment. with a view

to improving the collection,

courdination and analysis of Intelligence con-

cerning

and technical capao1l1tles

of the soviet b1oc.

POP

SECREI

- 5

18501

102249

NW 8813₴

12

Docld:34671877 Page 14

---

## Page 15

Rec. 110:

Rec. #>7:

118501

la

124

NW Sage 11

Docld:34671877 Page 15

-TOR SECRET

the need for intelligence. on

soviet nuclear and missile capabllitles 1s

more urgent than the current need for geodetic

and mapping information, urgent action be

as follows:

• (1) the scheduling ofas

many additional CORONA shots as possible

1n, the coming months,. w1th

postponement of

ARGON shots, If necessary; (2) the THOR-CORONA

system to be

relled upon as the photographic

reconnaissance

"work horse" while other systems

añe in the developmental stage; (3) a sufficlent

number of CORONA systems be made avallable to

neet basic neers, either by ordering long

lead-time 1tems beyond the present CORONI

system, or by ordering additional CORONA

sustems unt1l

advanced systems are Improved;

and. (4) steps be taken to ensure launch pao

avallability to permit future CORONA fl1ghts

for quast-tactical objectives.

(Subsequently, based on Information obtalned

In the

course of its continuing review of

the National Reconnaissance Program, the Boarc

sübmitted to the Special Assistant to the

President for National Security Affairs a report

dated July 5, 1963, In which the Board:

(1) rioted a sugnificant series of fallures

which had occurred In photographic reconnaissance

sateilite missions, because of malfunctions of

booster and other systems; and (2) suggested

that the President's office appropilately re

emphasize the urgent need for achieving and

maintaining a dependable and continuing photo-

graphic reconnaissance satellite capability --

lest our Government be denied vitally-needed

Intelligence essential to our Intelligence-

estimating. and pollcy-formulating.

relative to the sino-soviet bloc. processes

That the Special NSC 5412/2 Group re-evaluate

and make recommendations

desirability and feasibility of conducting

(under special security safeguards) U-2 photo-

graphic reconnaissance missions ovir selected

areas.

of the China mainland.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 16

Rec. 128:

Rec. if-2:

Rec. 1t20:

Rec: #21:

NW 88192

Docld:34671877®

. Page 16

TOP

That the DOI, as Chairman of the U. S. intel-

ligence Board, explore the feasibility of

expediting the operational readiness date

(April 1963) of the new National Photographic

"Inteipretation Center at the Naval Weapons

Plant,.

That (1) the Defense Department report on

the feasibillty and status

of two

technical

projects InItlated by the U.S: Alr force

to eliminate delays in the transmission of

critical Communications Intelligence and:

Electronics Intelligence data to StrategIc

A1r Command Headquarters; and (2) the

Department of Defense comment on the adequacy

of interim remedial measures which the Board

had proposed

as a tentative means of reducing

delays in the

transmission of such Intel-

ligence data to SAC headquarters.

That preparatory to a Board review

of the

security of l.

S, classifled Intelligence,

and intelligence sources and methods, the

DCI submit, a detalled report on the Imple-

mentation of the following:

(1) Section. 202-0-3

of the National Security Act of 1947 which

provides that the Dot shall be responsible

for protecting Intelligence sources and methods

from unauthorized disclosure; and (2) Section 3

of National Security Council Directive No. 1

which prescribes methods by which the DCI,

In consultation with the U.S. Intelligence Boaró,

shall ensure the development of polliles and

procedures for the protection of intelligence.

and intelligence sources and methoäs, from

unauthorized disclosure.

That at the earliest possible date action be

taken on the Board's

previous recommendations

for a redefinition of the role of the DoI

and so!' an Improved organization of CIA activitles.

(See Rec. #I, above.)

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 17

Rec. 1122:

Rec. #23-a:

Rec. 123-b:

Rec. H23-0:

NW 88192

Docld:34671877 Page 17

TOY SECRET

Board Report of October I7e 1261

The Board re-emphasized to the President Its

conviction's to the importance of outlining

to the newly-chosen DCI the objectives of

previous Board recommendations

concerning

the coordinating. role of the DCI. (See Rec. #1.)

With respect to the National Reconnaissance

Office. (NRO), the Board proposed that 1t

review, with

the Defense Department and the

CIA, the contemplated

organizational structure

of the NRO for purposes of clarlfjing lts

responsibillties and Increasing Its effective-

ness in the coordinated management and operation

of all sateijite and overhead reconnaissance

projects.

Board Report of June 26, 1962

With further reference to the National Recon-

naissance Office, tha Board noted

NRO agreement between the Secretary of Defense

and the DI was not adequate to support an

efficient NRO organization; and the Biard recom-

further study to achleve a better

derumentary basis for the NRO with particular

reference to National Securly Council directives

possibly in conflict with the NRO plan then

existiing..

Board Report of March 8, 1963

With further reference to the National Recon-

naissance Office (NRO) the Board recommended

that a recently-completed draft of a new NRC

agreement be adopted by the Secretary of Defense

and the DCI,

and that in the implementation of

the NRO plan there be:

(1) a clear channel of

guidance and authorization from the policy

decisions of the President to the Secretary of

Defense and to the DCI; (2) a clear and effective

connection between the advance technology and

planning of the National Reconnalssance Program

and the development of plans for reconnaissance

capabilities for the Department of Defense

and the military services; (3) plans for Improved

continuity of management of the NRO, particularly

TOP SECRET

8

---

## Page 18

Rec. Ht24:

Rec. 1t25:

Rec. 1126:

W 1851

Doold 2492

Docld:34671877 Page 18

TOP SECRET

with respect to the avallability of career

specialists heavily engaged in meeting schedules

for new satellites,

aircraft and other recon-

naissance Instruments; (4) accion to ensure

that Department of Defense directives which

guide the National Reconnalssance Program

are consistent with pertinent directives from

higher authority, such as National Security

Counc1l Intelligence Directives; and (5) within

the Defense Department a clarification of

present and planned re. utlonships as between

the NRO, the Defense Intelllgence Agency.

and the National Securlüy Agency.

board Report of October 17: 1261

That the Special NSC 5412/2 Group revlew the

paramilitary operations being carried out by

the CIA In Laos (and elsewhere) to determine

whether those operations, given their present

scale; are properly assigned to the CIA.

(Not a recommendation -- this was a report to

the President on the progress achieved by the

Defense Department In performance of Its share

of the responsibility for the efficiency of

the Critical Communications (CRITICOMM) Network

for the quick transmittal of vital early warn

1ng and other intelligence data from

posts to headquarters In Washington.)

Board Report of january l1, 1962

Based on a revier of advance Intelligence con-

cerning the Berlin Wall and Syrian Coup Incidents,

the Board recommended that: (il) a sense of urgency

be imparted at fiela and neadquarters revers oi

U.S. Intelligence agencies, with a view to

ensuring timely reporting, dissemination and

assessment of Intelligence Indicating the 1m-

minence of

crisis situations which are of potential

significance to the foreign pollcy

and nationa)

security Interests, of the United States;

(2) Without Imposing undue delay on the

trans-

mission of ran Intelligence to Washington,

TOP SECRET

9

---

## Page 19

Rec. #27:

!??

(2)

(3)

NW. 681

Docld:34671877 Page 19

TOP SECRET

State Department officlals at overseas poists:

prepare periodic appraisais of developing crisis

situations, ior use at the field level anc for

consideration at Washington in the preparation

of Intelligence analyses and estimates;

(3) procedures of the U.S. Intelligence Board,

and

its subsidiarles such as the Watch: Committee,

ensure that Intelligence appraisals reflect

significant differences of view which may develop

the timely flow of Intelligence to the white

House, the DoI be requested to review arrange-

ments

and procedures to ensure that (a) CIA's

Intelligence assessments and spot reports on

developing. criss situationg are made available

for timely consideratica by

the President

and other officlals, and (b) coples. of assess-

ments and spot reports to the white House from

other agencies are furnished to the DOI for

Information and for use in preparing Intelligence

estimates.

Board Report of January 20, 1962

Based on an on-the-scene review. (made by

representasives of the soard) or us latel-

ligence activities In Egypt,

Lebanon,

Turkey, Cyprus, Greece and Israel, the Board

recommended as

follows:

with respect to foreign countries to which

the Ambassadors are assigned.

That Political Sections and Ambassadors at

comment on all political Inüelligence at the

time 1t 1s being sent to headquarters, except

when this would unduly delay the reporting

process.

That U.S, Ambassadors be made aware of she

capability and security of emergency clandestine

radio stations installed in selected U.S.

Embassles.:

-TOP SECRET

10 -

---

## Page 20

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

(21)

(12)

185

cid:2492

NW Bage 10

Docld:34671877 Page 20

-FOr SEE

That U. S. Intelligence personnel be assigned

overseas posts

were best use can be m. de

of their language

abilitles.

That when Intelligence Infonation: 13 reported

that later proves

erroneous, appropilate

corrective notification be given

to recipients

of the erroneous reports.

of staff, ensure the validity oi intelligence

collection requirements levied upon the ciA

for support of the military In vartime.

That the Defense Department review the Attache

Systeins of the three Military services to

determine the advisability.of establishne

a single, Milltary Attache Syster.

That the Defense Department ensúre adequate

corefen lannuare. tralning of Malitary Attaches

orior to their assignment to overseas posus

That the Defense Department staif Miltary

Attache posts on the baris of specific intel-

lizence needs and on

the bagis of lInguistic

and other specialized talents.

redated purposes, ensure efficient allocation

of aircraft to Military Attaches at overseas

That the. Defense Department egulp field elements

of the Critical Communications (CRITICOMM) Net-

work with capability for rapid communication.of

critical messages among major and sub-

ordinate military commands in the fleld.

That the DCI review NSC 5412/2 and related National

Security Council Intelligence Directives,

and

recommend.

any necessary revisions to ensure

adequate: guidance toU. S. Ambassadors and CIA

Station Chiefs overseas, with regard to

(1) covert actions direcied at targets within

foreign countries,

and (2) covert actions

directed against third country targets.

TOP SECRET

- 11 =

---

## Page 21

(13)

(34)

(15)

(16)

(17):

(78)

AW 185

Docld:2492

NW 8818211

Docld:34671877

Page 21

-ФОГ

• SEURLT

That the Signals Intelllgence Panel of the

President's Board

President SaBional security arena cerations,

determine whether significant intelligence

gathered by NSA Intercept stations in the

Field 1s beins furnished to U.S. Intelligence

agency consumers (and to field. cunsumers) in

timely fashion.

That the U.S. Intelligence Board review

(1) the adequacy of criteria used for the

selection of a particular Military Crypto-

10g1c Service or the CIA for Communicationg

Intelligence and Electron.cs Intelligence

Intercept operations in a glyen country;

and (2)

the grounds for selecting targets

fur such operations In a given foreign country.

That improvements be made In the communica-

tions of the U. S. Embassy In Cairo,

which would not permit use of commercial

communications channels.

That the Defense Department consider changing

the Army Attache

"hardsht," to a

station pose to peronta

longer tours of duty and continuity of

experience.

That the DOI and the Assistant Chief of Staff

for Intelligence, Army, Improve the coordination

of clandestine espionage activities conducted

uy the emy and the CIA in Iran (as called

for

In National Securlty Council Intelligence

Directive No. 5).

That the National Security Agency make an

on-the-scene

technical review of CIA's covert

Communications/ Electronics Intelligence coi-

lection effort ir Behshahi, Iran,

to ensure

maximum technical use of this strategically-

positioned

activity against Soviet missile and

satellite operations.

TOP SECRET

12. -

---

## Page 22

( 19)

(20 )

(21)

(22)

(23)

(24)

NW 185*

Docld:2492.

NW 88132 2

Docld:34671877 Page 22

TOP SECRET

That the National Security Agency take steps

1n

Iran

to ensure

that: (i) the U.S. Emoassy

1s furnished significant Intelligence deveioped

by

the U. S. Army Security Agency Intercept

detachment which 1s housed on

the Embassy

grounds,

and (2) the National Security Agency

provides

to the Teheran CIA Station Chief any

data

developed by the Army security Agency

detachment, concerning (a) communtiations of

•the Iranian security and Intelligence forces,

and (b) 11l1c1t Soviet agent commurications

networkstargeted against. Iran from Odessa.

That the Staüe Department and CIA review the

situation in Iran with a view to: (1) Improving

th: coordination of U.S. Intelligence activitleg

In that country; (2) agreeing on procedures for

the handling by the U. S. Embassy oi political

Intelligence developed by the CIA In Iran;

and. (3)

maintaining an appropriate proportion

between the numbers of Foreign Service Officers

and CIA representatives assigned to the Political

of the Embassy in Iran.

That the DCI ensure that: ill in Cyprus Increasing

emphasis is placed on covert operations, particu-

the trade union and newspaper

fields;

and (2) the CIA Stations in Greece and Turkey

piovide support to the covert action operations

of the CIA Station in Cyprus:

That the DCI ensure that the CIA Station Chief

In Cyprus keeps the U. S. Ambassador Informed

of the nature of a clandestine intelligence

program in whici: the CIA Station Chief is engaged

with the Cypriot Minister of the Interior.

That the DCI ensure

that the U. S, Ambassador

in Athens is adequately informed

about the

substantive nature of the special relationship

between

the CIA Station Chief and the ruling

and policy-making officials of the Greek Govern-

ment.

That the DCI reassign CIA personnel who are in

excess of the requirements of the CIA Station

In Athens.

TOP SECREt

- 13 -

---

## Page 23

(25)

(216)

(27)

(28)

( 29)

N 185

locld: 2492

NW &4222:

Docld:34671877

Page 23

- TOP SECRET

That the DCI consider furnishing the U.S.

Ambassador in Tel Aviv with details of

CIA-Israell Intelligence undertakings

involving Africa.

That the DCI consider the proposal (made

to Board representatives by the Israeli

Intelligence and Security Service) calling

extended CIA-Israell coordination

of intelligence activities in Latin America,

Africa,

the Middle East and elsewhere; and

(2) a cooperative mechanism for the review,

discussion and assessment of intelligence

problems relating to the Middie East and

peripheral countries.

That the Air Force consider the assignment

to Tel. Aviv of an Air Force Attache having

jet fighter experience, because of the

Intelligence significance of jet aircraft

operating in this area of the Middle East.

That officials making up the Special NSC

5412/2 Group: (1) examine the Turkish

government's request for access to operational

and early warning data of the NSA-Service

ryptologic Intercept sites in Turkey;

2 consider assigning to the U. S. Ambassador

in Turkey the responsibility for negotiating

he Turkish request; and (3) assure co-

ordination of the efforts of the many U. S.

elements in and out of Turkey which are working

on various aspects of the strategically-placed

U.S. Signals Intelligence activity In Turkey.

That the National Security Agency take steps

to ensure that: (1) the U. S. Army Security

Agency Detachments at Ankara

pass significant

Intelligence to the U. S. Ambassador, the

Embassy Political Section, the CIA Station

and to CIA headquarters In Washington;

and (2) Improvement Is made In

the communications

capabilities of selected intercept sites 1n

Turkey, Including the Tropospheric Scatter

System.

TOP SECRET

- 14 -

---

## Page 24

(30)

Rec. 128:

Rec. H22:

Rec._ #30-a :

Rec. #30-b:

TOP SECRET

That the Special NSC 5412/2 Group review

the desirabillty and feasibllity of C-130

aircraft reconnaissarce flights over Iran

from

Turkish bases, with a view to covering

Soviet missile tests and related activitles..

That highest priority be placed on the ac-

quisition of cruclally-needed intelligence

on the Soviet ICBM capabillty, with spec1al

and intensive efforts to advance the photo-

graphic reconnaissance capabilities of the

OXCART and GAMBIT projects even earlier

programmed.

That, with regard to CORONA, OXCARI and

other advanced intelligence

collection pro-

jects: (1) prompt and stringent measures be

taken, within the Intelligence community

with outside contractors, to keep to

the absolute, practicable minimum the number

of persons cleared for access to information

concerning such sensitive projects, and

(2) there be periodic security indoctrinations

of al. persons cleared for access to such

information,

Including knowledge of the speclal

photographic capabilitles involved.

That there be brought to the urgent aütention

of the Secretary: of State the Intelligence

aspects of the U.S. space

satellite program,

for consideration in connection with a United

Nations requirement for the registration by

member nations of all satellite launchings.

Board Report of May 16, 1962

Subsequently, In a May 16, 1962 letter to the

President, the Briard: (1) pointed out the

Intelligence Implications to the United States

of International discussions of agreements to

provide information on U.S. satellite launchings

to the United Nations and Its Committee on

Peaceful Uses of Outer Space; (2) urged that

U.S. control of the development of space

capabillties for national defense and intel-

ligence purposes not be foreclosed, diminished

or compromised; and (3) noted that the United

States, unlike the USSR, would lose a

- TOP. SECRET

- 15 -

il it

NW. 185-

Pocld:2492

Nw Sage

Docld:34671877 Page 24

---

## Page 25

Rec..

#31:

Rec. it32:

Rec. #33:

-POP SECRE

cruc1ally-nceded intelligence, corabillü: 1f

Intemnational agrecments

cuter space should preclude

continueo

ar Government's highly effective'"

reconnaissance satellite intelligence activi-

Accordingly,

the Board recommended that:

the United States formulate a clear position

relationship of our reconnaissance

cateilite intelligence programs to International

discussion of peaceful uses

of outer space;

(2) the

President review and approve the

p0s1+10n

to be taken by the United States on this subjecü;

(3) 11. S. representatives: involved, in Un, Goneva

and other discussions be appropriately bricfed

on the sensitive U.S. intelligence collection

program involved; and (4) differing points of

view among U.S. Government officials on this

subject be resolved as soon as possible.

Board Report of January 20, 1962

That there be a re-examination of the scatus.

or the DeI, to determine mether nis relative

position and salary are in keeping with the

newly-defined role and responsiblity of the

DOI for coordinating and guiding the u. s.

foreign Intelligence effort,

as provided. in

the President's January 16, 1962 memorandum

to the Del.

That the DOI, In consultation with the U. S.

Intelligence

Board, revier the functions of

S. Intelligence Board's Watch Comnittee

and National Indicatiors Center, to determine

their effectiveness in carrying out their

mission of providing early warning.

Board Report of June 26. 1962

That the Speclal NSC 5412/2 Group ensure that:

(1) adequate cover stories are approved

ready for release by responsible parties, if

required, with respect

to the Ü-2, OXCART and

satellite reconnaissance programo; (2) adequate

TOP SECRES

- 16 -

NW 185

Hold: 2492

Docld:34671877 Page 25

---

## Page 26

rec. 134:

TO? SECRET

procedures are in readiness for malingastich

rcleases; and (3) that U-d and CXCARt prlots

are instructed

as to appropriate actión to

be taken in case of mission rallures....o

Based on further continued studles of waysi

and means to strengthen the national Communica

Intelligence and

Electronics intelligence

effort, under authoritative control and manage-

ment of the National security Agency, the Board

recommended: (1) strong control and management

Dy Nsa evor these intelligence activitles;....o.

(2) concentration ba NSA on Intelligence objec-

tives

of greatest national Importance, in response

to U.S. Intelligence Board guidance which must

be refined; (3) NSA supervision of all Signals

Intelligence collection and processing, so that

national needs will be met without undue cost

and effort; (4) the completion of lon-pendine

plans for improved collection and processine

of Electronics Intelligence; (5) Increased

Department of Defense leadership now that.i.ra

responsib1l1ty for NSA autivities has been

asulgned to an Assistant secretary of Defenge;

and. (6) within NSA Itself, the exercise of

strong leadership competent to meet national

Intelligence

needs rising beyond specirac

military Intelligence Interests.

That the Defense Intelligence Agency and the

CIA joIntly: (1) make an operational

analys1s

of present and potential use of audiosurveillance

as an Intelligence collection technique;

(2) work up a pian for developing audiosurvell-

lance devices to meet operational clandestine

Int-lligence requirements;

(3) estimate the costs

and results of a major research and development

effort to produce practicable audio systems

use in clandestine collection and counterintel.

ligence activities; and (4) on the counter-audio

anstadi secure rooms electronically an

acoustically shielded in sergitive U.S. posts

overseas:

TOP SECRET

- 17 -

₩ 185

Rocld: 2492

NW 381821"

Docld:34671877

Page 26

---

## Page 27

Bec. 136:

Rec. 37:

TOP SECRET

That

the U. S. Intolligence Board evaluate

the intelligonce potential of the Bir

Dish"

moun-reflector project, and that there-

after the secretary of Defense reach an early

decision as to the iuture of this projert.

Board Report of August l, 1962

Bascor on a review of Intelligence disclösures

In a New York Times article by Hanson Baldwin;

the Board recommended that: (1) the President

emphasize to Government officlals his cöncern

about such disclosures.and hls intention. in. th1s

case to Ideritify and take action agalnst the.:

source of Governnent leaks to the newspaper.

writer; (2) the President take drastic action

against the offender 1f Identifled by the FBI,

or against the heads of. offices.from. which the

icak emanated; (3) the Departments of State i

and Defense. and the cin require

their personnel

to male memoranda of recora on talks with the

press, and to cicar

such contacts In advance

with

departmental Public Relations Officers;

(4) those responsible for protecting intel-

ligence data

ard

techniques identify selected

areas of sensitive data ruguiring spectal handing;

(5) ways be sought to reduce the number of persons

involved in preparing highly sensitive Intel-

Ligence estimates; (6) the DCI

and the Director of

the

Defense Intelligence Agency be ornvided vitn

the Investigative capability to run down leaks

of sensitive intelligence data; (7) a confidential

polIcy be established within the ¿recutive Branch.

as to the degree of disclosure of Intelligence

data to be made to congressional Committees;

(8) a re-study be made of possible proposals

for lerislation to protect official secrets;

and

'(0) a revier be made of Government 0011cy

and

procedures with a view to declassifying non

sensitive Information and thereby strengthening

programs for the safeguarding of sensitive data.

- 18 -

185

o cid: 2492

NW 88182 7^

Docld:34671877 Page 27

---

## Page 28

Rec. #38:

Rec. #32:

Rec. 140:

Rec. #41:

Rec. #42:

TOP SECRET

Board Report of Octoner &, 1952

(Based on an

on-Che-scene review 57

Board

representatives of U.S. foreign intelligence

and reiated

activitles in Southeast 1312

and the Far East)

thai the Defense Department, the Joint Chiefs

or Staff and the Defense Intelligence Agency

strengthen the intelligence elements of the

Defense Intelligence Agency and

Commands (arawing on resources of the miiitary

Intelligence services in the process.)

That the flow of Intelligence guidance from

the Defense Intelligence Agency to Unified/Specified

component commands be oriented toward a con-

trolled, Integrated effort on the part of the

numerous U.S. military Intelligence organiza-

tions overseas (e.B., In South Vietnam,

and Japan),

to make the most effective

use of their substantial resources.

That the Defense Intelligence Agency take action

regarding the military Speclal Security Offices

(SSO) Communications System for transmitting

sensitive Information with a view to: (1) con-

solidating parallel SSO networks running between

Pacific military commands

and Washington

civilian officials, and (2) reorienting the

SSO system to make

It a primary service and

support to Commands in the field and command

(as distinguished from Service) elements in

washington.

Thât the National Security Agency accelerate

spectrum searches in Thalland In order that the

U.S. Intelligence Board may give guidance to

the U.S. Ambassador in negotiating a permanent

U. S. Intercept site in Thalland (which 1s a

most favorable location for U. S. Signals Intel-

lIgence operations against targets in

the soviet

North Vietnam, Laos, Burma, Tibet and

Communist China.)

That the Special NSC 5412/2 Group consider

authorizing selective, airborne defoliation

operations against the Viet Cong In South Vietnam.

TOP SECRET

- 19 -

185

nocid: 2492

NW 481322

Docld:34671877 Page 28

---

## Page 29

Rec.1143:

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4.)

(5)

(6)

NIN 185

Bocld: 2492

NW B81829

Docld:34671877

Page 29

TOP SECRET

Board Report oi October 192 1962

Based on an on-the-scene review of U. S. Intel-

ligence activitles in Southeast Asia and the :

Far Fast, the Board made the following sib-

sidiary recommendations:

12008:

That the National Security Agency revlew the

Office of the NSA Pacific Representative with

a view to clarifying 1ts mission, and ItT

relationship to the Pacific Commano structure...

to other

NSA personnel deployed In the

Pacifi: area.

That the Defense Department consider staggering

the rotation schedules of U.S. Army Intelligence

Advisers to the South Vietnam Government, and

that such advisers be given more extensive

training in the French and Vietnamese languages:

That the DCI and Director of the Defense Intel-

lIgence Agency emphasize efforts of U. S. c1v1llan

mIlltary Intelligence elements In South Viet-

nam to Improve the capabilities of south vietnámese

That the DCI and the Defense Intelligence Agency.

In their respective areas of responsibility ensure

adequate aud

timely lateral exchange of Intel-

_I1gence reporting of the varlous U. S. Intelligence

untts In South Vietnam (particularly the intelligence

elements of the Military Assistance Command in

Vietnam, the U.S. Milltary Attaches In

That the Defense Intelligence Agency, consulting

w1th the three U. S. Milltary Intelligence Services,

consider the advisability of (1) extending from

two to three years the tours of Service Attaches

in Thalland; and (2) provide Thai language train-

Ing for Military Attaches selected for future

assignment to Thailand.

That the Defense Intelligence Agency arrange for

U. S.'A1r Force photo interpretation personnel, on

Taiwan and at Yokota, Japan, to receive all reports

produced by the Chinat Air Force Photo Interpreta-

tion Center concerning U-2 and other reconnaissance

flights over the China Mainland.

TOP SECRET

- 20 -

---

## Page 30

ReC.

NW 185•

Docld:2492

NW B8g2 ^

Docld:34671877 Page 30

(7)

(8)

{9)

(10)

(1).

(2)

POP SECR

Thatrthe Defense Intelligence Agency

in con-

sultation with Army Intelligence: (1) assess

the organization, management and effectiveness

of clandestine espionage operations conducted

In the Pacific area by Arny's 500th. Intelligence

assure early coordination

with appropriate CIA Station Chiefs of the few

Army Intelligence clandestine operations not

yet coordinated.

That the Defense Intelligence Agency, consulting

with U.S. milltary Intelligence agencies,

assure that (under guidance by lihe Joirt Chiefs

of Staff to the Unified Commands) maximum use

1s made of the substantial Intelligence potential

of U.S. MilItary Assistance Groups deployed

In foreign countries.

That the Defense Intelligence Agency make

maximum Intelligence use of Service Attaches

In foreign countries, particularly where Intel-

ligence 1s also being produced

by i. S. MilItary

Assistance Groups and other U.S. milltary

organizations;

That the Defense Intelligence Agency,

consulting

with the National Security Agency and U.S.

milltary Intelligence agencies, reduce the

time

for security clearances of personnel

assigned to sensitive U.S. Installations overseas.

The Board also made the following additional recom-

mendations based on Its Southeast Asia and Far

East review:

That the State Department explore with the U.s.

Intelligence Board the practicabillty. of a

nechanism to furnish U.S. Ambassadors In

Southeast. Asla with current, regional Intelligence

evaluations

(of a politival,

economic and military

nature ) concerning

the Southeast Asla area --

as proposed by the U. S. Ambassador to Thailand.

That the State Department review the manning

table of the Polltical Section of the U. S. Embassy

at Bangkok,

to determine whether an additional

officer should be assigned

(as recommended by the

Chief of the Political Section of the Embassy).

-TOR SECRET

•. 21.-

---

## Page 31

(3)

Rec. #45:

Rec. 114E:

(1)

(2)

(3)

N 185

docid: 2492

NW F88₫323

Docld:34671877

Page 31

POP SECRET

That the CIA renew efforts. to convince the

Thai Government of the need for an effective

central intelligence organization in ene

Government of Thailand

tine State Department

to decide whether the U. S. Ambassador should

make specific overtures

to Marshal Sarit In

this regard).

That the CIA explore the feasibillty of

Intensifying covert.

actions against the size-

able and effective Influence of Communists

among Japanese Intellectuals, educators

and students.

Board Report of December 28, 1962

Based on its revlew of intelligence coverage,

assessment and reporting by U.S. agencies with

respect to the soviet military buildup in Cuba

during the months preceding October 22, 1962,

the Board

submitted to the President an interim

report containing the following recommendations:

That the U. S. Government: (1) maintain an

aggressive intelligence effort to equip our policy

makers with timely and adequate intelligence

Information to meet the possibillty of continuing

Soviet con rontations in Cuba; and (2) resist

any tendency toward a

1n Intelligence

coverage of Cuba in the wake of U.S. Intel-

ligence successes through U.S. milltary aircraft

reconnaissance of Cuba.

That the United States make Intensified, hard-

hitting efforts to obtain significant Intelligence

on Cuba through clandestine espionage operations,

Intelligence agencies

Including efforts by U. s'"deep cover" espionage

to lay the groundwork for

operations In Latin American and other foreign

countries (without dependence on official State

Department cover which would not be avarlable in

the event of a break in diplomatic relations).

That (1) high-level and low-level reconnaissance

of cuba be continued as a means of acquiring

photographic and Signals

Intelligence concerning

Soviet military Installations, forces, weapons,

TOP SECRE

- 22 -

---

## Page 32

(4)

(5)

Rec. 1747:

Rec. #48:

NW 185

WJocld:2492

NWS88J323

Docld:34671877 Page 32

TOP SECRST

and highly-sophisticated communications equip-

ment In Cuba;

(2) planning be made foi substitute

intelligence

techniques in the event that our

reconnaissance of Cuba Is denica us by

Sovilet air defense systems on

the Island;

(3) that the United States launch a clandestine

agent program to provide on-the-ground photography

of Intelligence targets in Cuba,

to but aerian recomats ance photographie coverage

adjunct to signals Intelligence cover-

ape of Cuba: (1) a major clandestine agent effort

be drected toward obtaining vitally-neeced

Signals Intelligence from soviet encoding machines

through the use of clandestine intercept equip-

ment carried by on-the-ground U. s. espionage

agents in Cuba; and (2) plans be readied for

commando-type

or covert actions to pre-emot

soviet communications equipments in the event

of internal revolt or invasion of Cuba.

That in Instances where exceptional intelligence

collection techniques are suggested to meet,

priority U.S. intelligence objectives, but are

opposed because of political of other risks in-

volved, the issues be submitted for resolution at

the Presidential level.

That, In view of Soviet camouflage of missile

installations in Cuba, the DIrector of the

National Reconnaissance Office assign high

priority to experime.is to determine the

effectiveness of short and long-range photography

of concealed

ground targets; Including the use

of new sensing and illuminating methods.

Board Report of January 12: 1963

That, with regard to the Secretary of Defense/DCI

for surfacing military versions of OXCART,

Intelilgence considerations require that:

(1) no statements or programs

should be undertaken

which would result in public (and Soviet) knowledge

of OXCART or military versions thereof; (2) although

leaks concerning OXCANT wili eventually occur,

such leaks should be

avos.jed as long as possible

TOP SECRET

•- 23. -

---

## Page 33

Rec. 1742:

(1)

185•

xeld: 2492

NW SAgE 33

Docld:34671877

Page 33

TOP SECRET

In order to nostpone soviet, develoument of

against CXCART; and (3): Instead

of an OXCART cover story to the effecü that

produced s interceptor aligran

1s. being

the cover story should be that a

variety of U.

S. millItary aircruft are beirg

developed.. In nakire these

recommendations

the Board

confined 1tself to the intelligence-

related aspects

of the subject, noting the

Board's avareness that the problem Involved

milltary and congressional consideration's

(the B-70 Issue,

for example) apart from Intel-

lIgence concerns.)

Board Report of rebruary 4, 1263

As a follow-un to the board's Interim Cuba

report and recommendations of December 28

the Board foriarded to the President on

3e 1902,

February 4, 1963, the results of the Board's

assessrient of the performance of the u.S.

Intelligence community Ir Its coverage and

reporting of the soviet milltary buildup

In Cuba during 1962.

Board Report of March 8, 1963

On March 8, 1963, the Board submitted to the

President its final report on Cuba (taking Into

account vlows and comments which had been received

from the Director of entral Intelligence

concerning Intelligence aspects of the Cuba

The Board made a lumber of specific

recommendations for strengthening U. S. Intel-

and for increasing

the capabiJitles.of the

ligence coverage of Cubatotal foreign. Intelllgence

program of our covernment, as

follows:

That U. S. Intelligence planning include attention

to possible Scviet inte clon ti create and main-

In Cuba a Soviet base for vommunications

survelliance and military command-and-control

In the Western Hemisphere (with unprecedented

opportunity to use electronic and öther means

to obtain intelligence on U.S. military ano

space capabilltles).

TOP SEC:

- 24. -

---

## Page 34

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

{7)

TOP SECRET

Intelligenc: agencies make It a

oal to discover the terms of soviet/

Cuban

agreements and

the programs to carry

out such agreements.

That Intensifled efforts be made for sub-

stantial Improvement in U. S.

clandestine

espionage, coverage of Cuba - vecause human-

resource espionage ope ations continue to

be important in spite uf noteworthy results.

obtained by the United States In using

scientific and technical intelligence

techni.ques

That (1) there be a resumption of efforts to

develop a long-focal-length

camera for use

In U-2 coverage of Cuba,.

using color and stereo

photographic methods; (2) that there be a re-

appraisal of the decision to suspend low-level

photographic reconnaissance aircraft missions

over Cuba; and (3) that a vigurous clandestine

agent program be Instituted with a vier to

obtaining on-the-ground photography of Intel-

ligence targets in Cuba, as an essential

supplement to aerial photographic reconnalssance

of tine Island.

•That the current, Intensive aerial survelllance

of cuba be.accompanled by priority planning for

adequate substitutes in the event that our aerial

reconnaissance program is cut off by the

advanced

Soviet air defenses being Installed In Cuba:

as recommencied earlier,

a major clandestine

agent effort be mounted against Cuba, with a

view to intercepting emanaiions from sopristicated

Soviet.code machines through the use of Intercept

equipment capable of concealment on un agent's

as previousts proposed, the President be

to resolve the issue when exceptional

Intelligence techniques are opposed at lesser

levels because of theelement of risk.

TOP SEGRET

- 15 -

185

io cld:2492

NW B81g2

Docld:34671877

Page 34

---

## Page 35

18!

(9)

(10)

(11)

(12)

Docld.2492

NW 88192?

Docld:34671877 Page 35

TOP SECRE

That (1) U.S. Intelligence officials be less

reluctant to propose to higher authority the

of extraordinary means (such as the U-2)

to acquire vital intelligence not otherwise

12) that there be a mechanism

whereby policy officials will be informed or

uperational delays or other factors wrich

call for top-level authorization of new or.

revised intelligence missions.

That,, in order to meet intelligence neeo.

in simultaneous emergencies; pre-arrangec

plans be made for: (1) the rapid: assignment

of personnel,

equipment and other Intelligence

resources; (2) the designation. of various

processing centers for the handling of

photographic Intelligence; 13) the processing

and communication of

vital intelligence to major

users in Government; and (4) planning for such

related Intelligence activitles to meet the

extra burden 1f

two or more crises should occur

concurrently:

shot darte evautreat entractions on the s

arise requiring restrictions on the

normal publication and distribution of intel-

lIgence data, the U.S. intelligence conmunity

should monitor the application of such restrictions

to ensure that (1) they are carried through,

and (2) they are nöt applied in such a way as

to deny critical Intelligence to policy-making

and command officials who need such intelligence

That concerted efforts be made to ('1) devise

an effective mechanism for the integrateu

assessment (and cumulative periodic

opraisals)

of early-warning and indicator-type intelligence

and prompt reporting thereof to policy-making

and command officials; and' (2) conduct Intensfiled

research concerning automatic data processing

techniques to facilitate the revieir and assess-

ment of the great volume of material dealt withi

In the United States Intelligence commuity.

That there be a re-examination of present methods

of arriving at national intelligence estimates,

with a vier to ensuring that

all indicators

TOP SECRET

- 26 -

---

## Page 36

(13)

Rec. 1t50:

Rec. 151:

NW 185)

Mocld: 2492

WW 88192÷

Docld:34671877

Page 36

TOP SECRET

other avallable intelligence Incormation

are considered; (2) the views: of

Inschligeiice

community members are fully. taien Into account;

(3) recognlton 1s Given to the posalbility.

of widely-varying interpretations or a given

'evidence; (4) consideration ls given

to the advisability of preparing: tuo or more

estimate; when evidence 1s susceptioe of more.

than one Interpretation -- even though under

current practice dissents are noted. in foot-

notes to estimates;

and (5) that every precanüion

be taken to avoid adherence to isolated opinions

or preconceived notions.

That the effectiveness of the National Recon-

nalssance Office be strengthened through

specific measures separately summarized in

Rec. i123.

That there be a reorganization and recrientation

the CIA's sclertific and technological act1-

vities in the intelligence field.

Specifically

the Board reconmended: (1) a research and develop-

ment effort located outside the intelligence

community but coupled with development and engineer-

ung conducted within ClA and other Intelligence

agencies; (2) an administrative arrangement. In

CIA to oring scionce and technology into contact

with major intelligence programs and projeçis

of the CIA; (3) the vesting of sclentific and

technological intelligence.responsibliltles in

a top-level official of the CIA; (4) the forma-

tIon in CIA of special research

and development

groups concerned with natural sciences and

behavioral research in studies of such matters

as camouflage and concealment; and (5) actions

within the Defense Department to emphasize

research on advanced sensing, photographic and

advanced research In the

signals Intelligence field over the next ten years.

Board Proposal of July 11, 1963

That the Chairman of the U. S. Intelligence Board

give continued attention

to and report periodically

on measures taken by the U. S. Intelligence agencies

TOP SECRE

- 27 -

---

## Page 37

-TOP SECRET

tò'

strengthen our Government's counterintelligence

posture.

endorsement

(Here the Board reiterated 1ts previous

of a recommendation that:

"The

Director of Centrai Intelligence should focus

community attention

on the Important area of

counterintelligence and the security of over-

seas personnel, and assign responsibliity for

perlodic reports thereon to the United States

Intelligence Bcard.")

TU SECRET

-.

28 -

188

Doold 2492

Docld:34671877

Page 37

---

## Page 38

IOR SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

26

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT:

January 30, 1964, Menting of the

President's

Foreign Intelligence Advisory Puard

The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board convened in regular

meeting at: 9:00 a.m. on January 30, 1964, at the Board's offices, Room 297

Executive Office Building. Present were Chairman Clifford and Board members

Gray, Langer, Murphy, Doolittle, Pace, and Land (Dr. Baker was unavoidably

detained in new Jersey and joined the meeting later in the morning); and

2356

Messis: Coyne and Ash.

In executive

session, Chairman Clifford gave Board members a fill-in

on the brief talk he had with President Johnson a few days after the Prestdent

took office on November 22. Chairman Clifford had taken the occasion to relate

to the President some of the highlights of the function performed by the Board

for President Kennedy, and the composition of the Board. Although Presidenc

Johnson gave no indication that he had previously known of the work of the Board

he expressed appreciation for the effort which the Board had made on behalf of

President Kennedy. The President sald that he was comfurted to know that this

group uf -utstanding citizens 1s giving attention to the important subject of

intelligence, and he asked Mr. Clisford to Inform the Board members that he wished

them to continue with this important task.

Chairman flifford referred to the one-hour meeting which the Board would have

with the President later in the day Mr. Clifford spoke of the heavy work schedule

which the President has under taken and the many, demanding matters to which the

CORONA /OXCARTY SACBOARD/CAVO T

Mandis via BEMAEl

HANDIE MA CO

ANNELS ONLY

tonio anom

HOP SECRE

oxelo

Docld:34671877 Page 38

---

## Page 39

TOP SECALE

President is glving personal attention. Mr. Clifford expressed the opinion

that prior to succeeding to office President Johnson hes probahly had few

occasions on which to obtain more than brief glimpses of Intelligence problems.

With that assumption in mind, Mr. Clifford thought that the Board's major

purpose at today's meeting with the President should be one of education

with respect to the foreign intelligence effort and the Board's role in 1t.

Mr. Clifford proposed that he begin with a background statement to the

President. concerning the circumstances under which President Kennedy estab-

lished the Board (the Bay of Pigs incident), and its responsibilities and

method of performing ita assigned functions. Then, in order that the President

might become better acquainted with the Board membership and some of the more

significant intelligence areas reviewed by the Board, Mr. Clifford said he

would like to call on various members

to speak briefly about those areas.

Particularly, the Chairman asked that Dr. Land be prepared to inform the

President about the National Reconnaissance Program; that General Doolittle

be ready to discuss the U-2 OXCART,

and TAGBOARD programs; Di. Baker the

Signals. Intelligence Program; and Mr. Gray the Dunlap espionage case..

(The Board agreed with. Mr. Coyne's proposal that in the Board's reporting

on the Dunlap case there be only an oral statement to the President, but

nothing in writing, with respect to the closely-held and highly sensitive

source about which the Board has been informed. In this conneciion, the

Chairman said that in the course of a recent conversation with former

Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric, the latter seemed unaware of the

sensitive source.)

Dr. Land suggested thac during the Board meeting with the President the

point be made that the Board p pelicipal function le to determine what the

foregn intelligence

m should be andito recommend how to achieve it.

AGONINT CHANNELS ONLY

HOP SECRET

Control Systems

11.8

NW 88192

Docld:34671877

Page 39

---

## Page 40

TOP SECREF

Mr. Pace chought that It would also be well to indicate to the President

the value of the role played by MeGeorge Bundy In tha staffing of Board

subject matters

for the President, and mertion should also be made of tbe

Board's use of Panels in its review of intelligence matters. De, Langer

thought that brlef remarks from selected Board members concerning intelligence

subjects, coming within their spectal Panel assignments, would be more

approprlate and helpful to the President than for all Board members to be

called upon. Mr. Clifford thanked the members for these suggestions and said

that he would be guided accordingly, in making his presentation to the President.

Chairman Clifford then made reference to the recently-discovered Soviet

espionage case involving Army Sergeant Howell, a case which Mr. Clifford

thought might prove to be more damaging than the Dunlap case, and one which

dramatizes the

recommendations which the Board has formulated in its report

to the President on the basis of the Dunlap matter. Mr. Clifford recalled

that when he recently discussed the Dunlap case with former Deputy Secretary

of Defense Gilpatric, the latter said that lf any progress is made by the

Government in the area of counterintelligence, the impetus will have.

to come

from the Board, and remedial action cannot be left up to the Defense Department.

The Chairman

asked Mr. Coyne to be prepared to brief the Board on the Howell

case later on in

the meeting,

Next, Chairman Clifford directed attention of the members to the list

of topics which he had asked the Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. McCone;

to cover at today's meeting - Mr Clifford noting that because the DCI 1s

out of the country he had des gnated hia peputy, Ceneral Carter, to cover

these matters with the Board.

HANDIA MA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

Handle deb

Control System

LOP SECRET

NW B8192

Docld:34671877 Page 40

---

## Page 41

JOP SECRET

Chairman Clifford then turned to the January l', 1964, letter which

he had received from the DCI, volunteering information concerning the events

which had led to the recent ClA release of information on the estimate of

the Soviet economy, with resulting critical editorial reaction in the .

United States press. Me. Clifford asked that Board members study the DCI's

letter as the basis for later discussion. Mr.. Clifford said that he had

found the letter to be curiously defensive, and he expressed concern over the

danger inhèrent

In what appeared to be an almost obsessive interest on the

part of the

DCI In regard

to the CIA's "Image". The Chalrman also observed

that

according to newspaper accounts the DCI was at that moment in Europe

visiting

several heads of state, presumably on intelligence and other matters.

Mr. Murphy recalled that previously the Board had urged closer relations

between the President and the DCI on intelligence matters and he wondered 1f

the DCI's current trip abroad 1s an indication that this close relationship

exists. between the DCI. and President Johnson, Mr. Clifford said that it

could only be speculated

that sometimes

a new President is susceptible to

suggestions offered by experienced Presidential advisers, and in this instance

the President may possibly have received a uggestion from the DCI that the

European trip be made and perhaps the President acquiesced in rellance upon

the DCI's judgment.

MI. Clifford left the Board meeting to take a telephone call from

Secretary of Defense McNamara. Upon his return to the meeting Mr. Clifford

said that the Secretary of Defense had called to emphasize the importance

which he placed on the NRO problem which would be related to the Board later

Kore

in the day by NRO Director McMillan; and Secretary McNamara had indicated

that he personally was disturbed about the competition and back-knifing which

had become evidenton

the

HANDIE VIA

Clifford noted that General Carter

CONNE CHANNELS ONLY

Handle, VA

Controlse Cien

TOP SECRET

NIX 1180

1o0014

Docld:34671877 Page 41

---

## Page 42

192000

TOP. SiERLI

of CIA was about to join the Board meeting, and that it would be well for

the Board to defer bringing up the NRO subject at this time. In this

conncution, Mr. Cliffurd stated that he had recently been visited by NRO

Director Meltilan who had expressed his views

as to the NRO problem and would

repeat them to the Board when he joined the meeting later in the day.

At 10:20 a.m. the Board meeling was joined by the Deputy DCI, General

Carter (substituting for Mt. McCone), General Carter was accompanied by

Mr. Knocke (who was introduced as

substituting for Mr. Kirkpatrick who was

in the Far East), and by Mr. Fitzgerald (referred to by General Carter as

the CIA's expert on Cuba).

Mr. Clifford thanked the ClA officials for their attendance:

He pointed

out that today the Board

was having its Elrst meeting with President Jolinson,

therefore the Board would appreciate being brought up to date; would like to

hear "from General Carter on the topics which had been listed in Mr. Clifford's

note to Mr. McCone;

and would be glad to hear from General Carter on any

matters which he might also wish to cover.

General Carter said that Mr. McCone's absence from the country prevented

his meeting wich the Board, but that he would endeavor to cover for Mr. MaCone

the various matters

in which the Board had expressed an interest as set forth.

in Mr. Clifford's note to My. McCone dated January 16, 1964.

Iurning. first to the subject of Cuba, Genèral Carter said that all

sabotage afforts have been stood down; that the President and Secretaries

Rusk

and McNamara have some serious doubts about our policy toward Cuba;

and that the question had

been raised as to whether it is not hypocritical

for the United States Government to talk peace while at the same time

"waging war" against Cuba. General Carüer added that when MI. Bundy gets

back from leave and

Handle via Disad

MAN OLE NO ONE from Abroad the following Sacurday,

COND 0 0088

• =5 =

-IOP. SECRET

NW B81g21

Docld:34671877 Page 42

---

## Page 43

TOP SECRET

there will be a meeting to discuss a new policy toward Cuba.

In answer to an inquiry from De. Land, General Carter said that

Mr. Bundy has no deputy to act in his absence; chat the DCI brlefs the

President on intelligence

matters and Me. Bundy briefs him on foreign policy

matters; and that the White House staff has not seemed to have settled into

any new mechanism since November 22. General Carter said that the President

gets

the CIA daily intelligence check list which is handed to the President

by one of a other member of the White House staff, not necessarily the same

one each time.. Also, ClA has added a weekly check list revlew, und it 1s

understood that the President reads them.

Mr. McCone sees the President at

least twice

a week and

attends all policy

meetings except on

occasions when

the DCI has to be absent, In which case General Carter attends in his

stead.

General Doolittle asked whether there has also been a stand-down in

clandestine intelligence collection efforts with respect to Cuba, and

General Carter answered in the negative. Mr. Fitzgerald stated that

the

volativity of the Cuban people is a factor, and over the long run the capability

of CIA LO infiltrate Intelligence agents into Cuba 1s affected by the morale

of the Cuban people which in turn is affected by

the success of sabotage acts

directed

against Cuba.

i me time

In answer to a question from Chairman Clifford, Mr. Fitzgerald

said

that no hard facts had been obtained concerning the purpose and subject

matter of Castro's recent talks with Khrushchev in Moscow, although the

Panama and Cuban

economic situations may have been discussed -- Mr. Fitzgerald

agreeing with Murphy that this is all speciation on ClA's part.

'General Carter said that our Government's economic denial program

Liar si

against Cuba is also

falling by the wayside, as reflected by the actions of

Britain and Spain in trading with Cuba.

Handle Via Brail

85

food 2,3100

There is a view, General. Carter

TOP. SECRETS:

NW 88182

Docld:34671877 Page 43

---

## Page 44

LOP. SLÜNLI

added, that it 1s difficult for our Governmene to equate its policy of

wheat sales to Russla with a policy of economic denial agninst Cuba;

however

the President has said that he wants to push the economic denial:

program. Mr. Fitzgerald remarked In this connection that the volatsfity

of the Cuban people

transmits itself to Washington.

Mr. Murphy then asked if someone could say what 1s going on in cuba.

Mr. Fltzgerald replied that the most important development is the serles of

"victories" which Castro has enjoyed: Castro found at ear's end that

was an unanticipated hard currency balance of $100 million from the sugar

стор,

thus giving Castro a basis for obtaining extensions of credits: for

such transactions as the purchase of British buses, the

French are

about to

extend

Castro credits over a 5-year period; In Panama, although Castro didn't

provoke the anti-U.S. Incidents he gets credit for it; and Castro

also gets

credit for the Zanzibar

coup even though he did not instigate chat incident,

either.

So, Mr. Fitzgerald noted, 'Castro is stronger and his arm is longer".

DI, Langer asked i¡ CIA 1s getting intelligence agents into: Cuba, and

information out. Mr. Fitzgerald exhibited a chart depicting the deployment

of agents

in Cuba, pointing out that there was a concentration of

agents in

the lavana area.

He said, however, that the "figures vere off because CIA

had sloughed off the poor agents, and because

two agent nets had been lost

in the Havana area (although a key agent fron each net had been successfully

pulled out). Mr. Fitzgerald said that CIA has 64 singleton agents; 83 agents

legally resident in Cuba; and 55"black subagents" in one net,

In reply to Dr. Langer's question, Mr. Fitzgerald said that about 1200

Latin American and African nationals a year are receiving training in Cuba

and are returning to their respective countries.

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

Handle via BYEMAN

-7÷

Control System

HOP SECRET

NW 88182

Docld:34671877 Page 44

---

## Page 45

JOP, SECRET

Mr. Pace asked what are the prlority intelligence objectives which

are assigned

•for coverage by CIA agents sent into Cuba. Mr. Fitzgerald

said that the agents are targeted against the strategic military situation.

In answer to a query about the question of the use of Cuban caves, Mr.

Fitzgerald

said that this question had been pretty well resolved but ClA

1s keeping

at it.

General Carter stated that CIA presently estimates there are from

4,000 to 7,000 Soviet military personnel in Cuba who are operating the SAM

sites and providing military training to Cubans, plus about 1, 000 non-

military Soviet personnel. He added that by April the Cubans will pro-

bably be ready to take over the air defense systems 1f the

Sovicts

choose

to turn them over to the Cubans. Mr. Fitzgerald added that a flash had been

received this morning of the first evidence of a Chinese pilot taking part in

air operations

in

Cuba (this from a COMINT source). 1

Mr. Murphy inquired as to whether CIA had

succeeded in planting agents

in Castro's Immediate entourage. Mr. Fitzgerald said that this is another

priority intelligence, objective being pursued by CIA, including the objective

of obtaining

Intelligence on the inter-relationship of factions within the.

Castro regime;

on the extent of Cuban counter-insurgency programs (in which

Cuba has a good capability); and on the Soviet bloc training of Cubans in

counterintelligence: activities (Cuba hrs a

fairly wide intelligence system

with "plenty in the United States").

Mr. Fitzgerald departed the meeting at this point, upon conclusion

of the discussion of the subject of Cuba.

General Carter next turned to the Panama situation. He noted that CLA

has regularly reported on the subject of Communist activities in Panama since

1956. General Carter Stated that there i8 no evidence that Communists

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

Handle via BIZAN

Control System

FOR SECRET

Docld:34671877 Page 45

---

## Page 46

OP, SEER

instigated

the recent incidents in Panama, although the Communists were

quick to exploit the situation once it arosc. CIA succeeded in photographing

13 Castro-ltes who were engaged in fomenting the incident after

It started.

Of a total of 45 Comnunist Castro-ltes Involved, 13 had been trained In Cuba,

and they distributed leaflets and disseminated propaganda over the radio.

CIA also learned that one Thelma King personally led a mob of Panamanians

• In the streets. Do. Langer wondered If Panamanians and the world at large

are aware that radio stations in Panama were in the hands of the Communists.

General Carter replied that one rould not say that precisely, but

It can be

said that 30 minutes after the incident began there were Inflamatory broad-.

casis.on

the ait. As for the sniper activity, General Carter said that one

sniper had been

identified as a known Communist:

With regard to Vietnam, General Carter said that the blöodless coup

which began yesterday afternoon was accomplished by a group of young generals

who

are

pro-Amcrican and anti-neutralist. General Khanli is the leader.

General Khin, 3+d Corps Commander, will be chief of staff. The coup group.

had been plugging for more counter-insurgency effort against the Viet Cong,

and

the new leaders will take stronger action. General Khanh has said that

he will look to U.S. Ambassador

Lodge for guidance on political matters in:

the immediate Saigon area.

General Carter said that CIA had received advance information from

General Khanh that he was worried about French noves with respect to

Vietnam.

(In answer to Mr. Coyne's question as to whether CIA had been

back of yesterday's coup, General Carter replied that it is well known that

the CIA does not instigate coups.) Mr. Murphy, noting the conspiratorial

MANGLE VIA LOREANIELO UINLY

-9 -

Handle via DYEMAN

Contrel System

IOD SECRET.

Docld:34671877 Page 46

---

## Page 47

CRET

aspects Involving France in the Vietnam

situation, asked whether ClA had

recelved advance intelligence from French sources concerning involvement

of the French Government in Vietnam.

General Carter

said that none had

been received, despite good CIA penetrations in Paris. Sir. Murphy found 1t

difficult to understand why there had been no hard intelligence on this matter,

particularly when there had been

public statements by the French concerning

France's neutralist ubjectives in Southeast Asia.

Goneral Carter

said that

effort

there had been no evidence of a covert French/aguinst the Vietnam regime.

rad

Chairman Clifford asked whether there had been an improvement in the

Vietnam situatio. following the previat coup which overthrew

the Diem

regime.

General Carter said that social reforms have been made but their timing and

acceleration have been disappointing. He thought it too early to say whether

the new regime will have the will and ability to intensify the fight against

the Viet Cong. General Khanh has indicate! to Ambassador Lodge a desire to

retain General Minh in the new government. General Khanh also said that

he saw

no malfeasance on

the part of the generals. In the Minh regime although

they were known to have cooperate with French intelligence in the past.

In answer

to a question by Mr. Murphy, General Carter said there vas no

evidence that the murders of Diem and Nhu in the previous coup were motivating.

factors in the recent coup. General Carter answered Di. Langer's question

by saying that there is no hard evidence of an increased flow of supplies,

arms and men into North Vietnam.(from Coumunist China).

Turning to the next item which had been Indicated as of interest to

the Board, General Carter referred to the question as to

the desirability

to separate the coordinating function of the DCI from the post of head of the

CIA. Chairman Clifford interposed the comment that from

its inception this

Board had been concerned with achieving greater coordination and control

over the total U.S. foreign intelligence effort, the Board still urges it,

Handle via STEMAN

10 -

Paolael Boaten

LOR SECRET

NW 8813241

Docld:34671877 Page 47

---

## Page 48

-TOP. SECRE

cases whether involving U.

S. military personnel or civilians; and

another

recommendation dealing with the criteria for selection of the heads

of sensitive agencies such

as the NSA. The Chairman stated that these

proposed recommendations would be taken up at the next Board meeting.

Chairman Clifford directed Board members' attention to the report and

recommendations which had been completed by the Board Panel on Signals

Intelligence. There was agreement with Mr. Clifford's suggestion that the

report and its recommendations be forwarded to Mi. Bundy for consideration

and action with the agencies involved, rather than presenting this complex

subject to

the President today.

Mr. Clifford mentioned to the Board the recently copyrighted newspaper

article by former President Truman who took the CIA to task for engaging in

activities which were not within the function of ClA as originally created.

Mr. Clifford reminded

the Board that while Mr. Truman was President the CIA

was authorized and d'rected to engage in covert actions (e.g. in Italy) which

had much to do with stemming the Communist tide in post-world War II in

Europe.

Chairman Clifford brought up another matter, which he felt could

become more serious, namely, the aggressive campaign being waged by CIA to

improve its "public image".

Mr. Clifford asked that the Board members think

about this subject, which would be placed on the agenda of the next Board

meeting. At that

time the Board should hear from the DCI regarding this

matter, and consider it in the light of previous Board recommendations that

the DCI and other CIA officials refrain from making public speeches, with a

view to reducing the visibility of Intelligence activities. Mr. Clifford

INS

said that he had learned that one of the subjects which the DOI is now

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

Handlo via BYEMAN

Control System

8 25 0

-IOP SECRET.

NW 88182

Docld:34671877 Page 48

---

## Page 49

TOP, SEO

discussing.i.n

the course of his visit with heads of atate overseas.

18

the advisability of their countrles engaging in economic reprisals against

Cuba. Dr: Baker confirmed this, stating that today he had learned that

CIA 1s taking specifie covert

steps to influence cessations of trade with

Cuba, particularly in the case of Spain. Mr. Clifford could only speculate

that the DCI had suggested that the fostering of economic reprisals 1s

properly a task for the CIA, and the President may have agreed in the absence

of any other advice or consultation. Mr. Clifford thought that the DCI's

meetings with heads. of state is the course least likely to succeed in

CIA's

efforts to contradict its growing image as becoming a pollcy-making

organization in the Government. Mr. Clifford repeated that the Board should

hear from the DCI on this at its next meeting and consider making a recommenda

tion to the President.

At 4:00 p.m., until 5:30 pom., the Board met with the President in the

Cabinet Room of the White House (a pertinent memorandum on the meeting 1s

filed elsewhere in the Board's records).

When

the Board members returned to the Board's offices, Chalrman Clifford

remained at the White House at the President's request to confer on other

matters of

a non-intelligence nature.

April 2 an1 3, 1964, were

selected as the dates of the next meeting

of the Board, a two-day session.

Manile via Dictan

Centrol Systrm

A.. R. Ash

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHAÏNIVELS ONLY

0 26.

TOP SECRET

WW S819

Docld:34671877 Page 49

---

## Page 50

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET

February 4, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Board Meeting with the President, January 30, 1964

Controk systems

At 4:00 p.m. On January 30, 1964, ine Board members and

the writer met with the president in the Cabinet Room of the

White House. The meeting terminated at 5:30 p.m. The

highlights of this meeting rollow.

At the outset, Mr. Clifford made reference to his meeting

with the président in early December reporting that Immediately

following the meeting he conveyed to the Board personnel the

President's desires that the Board continue

to perform 1ts

mission and that each Board member continue to serve with this

advisory body. Mr. Clifford then went on to state that he

conaldered the Board to be an extraordinary group composed, of

Individuals whose diverse backgrounds and experience were of

Inestimable value in caravins out the mission of the Board.

By way of example he oited tremendous contributions made 1n

the fields of communication signals intelligence and missiles

systems by Dr. Willlam Od Baker, the Head of Research at Bell

Laboratories. He next mentioned the outstanding military career

of Jimmy Doolittle, noting that he has served three Presidents

In reviewing:

3 yardous aspect of intelligence and noting also

the ramifled contributions which he has made to the overhead

intelligence reconne sea,ce prostene next mentioned Mr.

cordon drey not us thet no an ee-en roryed as Secretary of

• HANDLE W

NELS ONLY TOP SECRET

NW 88192

Docld:34671877

Page 50

---

## Page 51

macho corderr

the Army, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Director of Defense

MobIlIzation and Presidential Arsistant for National Security

Affairs.

He noted, too, that with coyne on behalf of the Board, .

Mr. Gray has made on-the-scene reviews of intelligence activities

1n

practically every

country

In the Near East, Middle East,

Southeast Asia and the Far East,. The Chairman next mentioned

Dr. Laru, his presidency of Polarold and his outstanding

contributions to photographic reconnaissence techniques having

special application to intelligence. He next mentioned

Di. WIlliam Langer: his distinguished academic career and his

long association with the Intelligence estimating process. He

next mentioned Mr. Robert Murphy and his decades of service as

a career diplomat, roviro ambassador and Under Secretary of

State.

He next mentioned Mr. Frank Pace, noting that his

experience as Director of the Budget Bureau and is Secretary

of the Army, as well as his experience as President of General

Dynamics,..

expecially equips him to keep abreast of management

and organization problems in the intelligence commanity and of.

the intelligence budgeting process. Finally Mr. Clifford

mentioned Mr. Coyne, the Executive Secretary of the Board, as

a Presidential appointee and member of the White House staff

who has had some 24 years of experience in the Intelligence

sleld, Irst as Assistant Director of the fBI and In more

recent years with the staff of the National Security Council

and of the President

Whe observed that prior to President

Jonson's assuming or ico, corne had served Prestients Truman,

HANDE S

UNELS ONLY

TOP SECRET

Dole 24

Docld:34671877 Page 51

---

## Page 52

Eisenhower and Kennedy In various intelligence

capacities.

Mr. ClIfford then went Into some detall with respect to

the history of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory

Board and predecessor organizations of the Boara. He pointed

out

that following the close of world War II, a varlety of

ad hoc groups were formed at the Presidential level to review

selected aspects of the Government's foreign intelligence

effort. Studies were made from time to time, recommendations

were submitted; and then In most cases the particular study

Eroup disband. with little or no follow-up action on Its

recommendations.

Mr. Clifford noted that In 1955 the loover

Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch' recommended

the creation of a permanent, bipartisan "Watch Dog Committee"

(to be made up of House and Senate members and private citizens)

to make periodic surveys of the foreign intelligence activities

of our Government agencies, and to report to the Congress and

to the President.

President Eisenhower opposed the idea of

Congressional Watch Dog Committee on Intelligence (as did

President Kennedy after he took office). Mr. Clifford want on

to state that in February 1956, President Eisenhower formed his v

own Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence, made up of 21

private citizens, responsible for reviewing on his behalf all

foreign intelligence activities of the United States; that

President Eisenhowerklooked on the Consultants group not only

as a means of obtaining independent appraisals and advice

concerning.our foreign intelllgence.erfort, but also asa

HANDLE

AT CANNELS ONLY

TOP SECRET

NIA 186

NW 88192

Docld:34671877 Page 52

---

## Page 53

tactic to forestall the creation of a "Watch Dog Committee".

in the Congress. The Board of Consultants served for some

Iive years until the members submitted their resignations

at the close of President Eisenhower's term of office.

Mr. Cllfford then pointed out that In January 1961.

President Kennedy decided that there was a continuing need

for a Presidential Advisory Board on foreign Intelligence,

but deferred temporarily the appointment of new members; that

on May 4, 1961, following the disaster experienced by the

Central Intelligence Agency at Cuba's Bay of Pigs, the President

issued an Frecutive Order establishing this Board. (Mr. Clifford

noted that at that time and on several subsequent occasions;

President Kennedy remarked to him that he could not stand

another intel gence fallure like the Bay of pigs flasco; that,

as President he must have the assurance of adequate Intelligence

on which to make Important decisions; and that he would depend

heavily on this Board to continually monitor the activities

of all oi the Intelligence agencies, providing him w1th

Independent, objective assessments and recommendations concerning

those activities. Mr. Clifford stated that President Kennedy

had informed him that CIA had proviuad him with "bad" Information

on Cuba and that this had resulted in

"bad" decisions. Based

on this experience President Kennedy had emphasized to

Mr. ClIfford that

he was activating the Board to perform a

continuing mission for the President; that the Board was to

- 4. =

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

-TOP SECRET

Docld:34671877 Page 53

---

## Page 54

have three functions (1) Investigation (2) recommendation and

(3) 5011011-üp.

Mr. ClIfford noted that Dr. Killian served as Chairman

of the Board unt1l April 1963; that he resigned at that time

because of reverses in his health; and thereupon Mi. Clifford

was moved up from member to Chalrman.

Mr. Clifford then proceeded to describe In some deta1l

the work, meetings, review procedures, reporting procedures

and general modus operandl of the Roard..

He noted that from

May 1961 until the time of President Kennedy's death, the

Board held 25 separate meetings covering a total of 40 days.

He emphasized that the intelligence community 1s made up of

a great many departments and agencies and that efforts to

coordinate and control them have thus far barely gotten off

the ground. Some progress has been made but much more remains

to be accomplished.

M. ClIfford then went on to discuss in some detall the

Panels and Task Forces of the Board citing a few examples.

The Chairman next went Into some detall with respect

to the recommendations which the Board made to President

Kennedy noting that during the past 2a years the Board suomitted

to the President a total of 170 recommendations. A large

percentage of the recommendations made by. President Kennedy's

Board Involved activities Internal to the Department of Defense;

a lesser proportion Involved activities Internal to the central

Intelligence Agency and the Department of State; a number of

them related to activitles of joint interest to two or more

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

_TOP SECRET

Docld:34671877 Page 54

---

## Page 55

member agencies of the Intelligence Community. Of the 170

recommendations, the President approved 125, disapproved 2,

and temporarily deferred final action on the remainder.

Of

the 125 approved recommendations, implementing actions on 85

have been substantially completed.. The remaining Presidentially-

approved I commendations deal with substantive Intelligence

matters warranting continued Board attention and, possibly,

the submission of further Board recommendations to the

President.

Next Mr. Clifford cited several examples of Intelligence

areas of major and continuing concern to the Board. These

Included the rollowing:

1. The vast size and cost of the over-all Intelligence

effort which Involves some 149,000 individuals, 131,000 of whom

are in Defense and 17,000 of whom are in CIA. Mr. Clifford

reported that the eftort this year will cost slightly less

than four billion dollars.

2. The National Reconnaissance Program (at this

point Mr. Clifford asked Dr. Land to brief"the President for

three or four minutes, which he did, on the highlights of

the satellite reconnaissance programs.) In the course of the

briefing Dr. Land exhibited to the President examples of the

recent Ganbit photography taken over Montana.

The U-?, Oxcart", Tagboard, programs. At this

point, pursuant to Mr. Clifford's request, General Doolittle

briefed the President for several minutes on the highlights

of these three programs

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLE

TOP SECRET

NWS881325

Jocld:346/10// Page 55

---

## Page 56

I. The Signals Intelligence program.

Here,

Dr. Baker, at the request of Mr. Clifford, briefed the

President on the highlights of the signals Intelligence

effort and on the major contribution which 13 nade to the

over-all Intelligence effort by elements of the COMINT-ELINT

cominunity.

5. The Counterintelligence Program. At this point

Mr. Clifüord advised the President that, following a serious

espionage penetration at the National Security Agency,

President Kennedy requested the Board to make a thorough

exanination of thé entire situation. Happily ir. Gray was.

able to free himself in order to devote full time, along with

Mr. Coyne, to such a study. Mr. Clifford requested Mr. Gray

to brief the President on the highlights of the Dunlap case

which he did. Thereafter Mr. Gray mentioned briefly the

highlights

of the Howell penetration. Following the Gray

briefing Mr. Clifford presented to the President the repört

on the Dunlap case which had been prepared by the Board,

noting that 1t was dated as of November 22, 1963. (Ihe

President retained the report and later sent 1t to Mr. Bundy's

office for appropriate staffing and it 1s nów in the process

of being staffed by us.

In the course of the Board's discussion. with the

President, the following major points were made:

With respect to the recent developments in Panama,

the President was not happy with the way in which CIA

acquitted Itself. The President indicated that after the

fact "they told us they had been reporting disturbing

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

-.7.-

TOP SECRET

NW 88182*

Docld:34671877 Page 56

---

## Page 57

developments in Zanama for months on end and that perhaps this

was so" but from the president's vantage point there was no

specifio information pinpointing development's until after

difriculties had occurred:

In the case of the coup which had occurred in South

Vietnam on the night preceeding our meeting with the president,

he sald that he "received no intelligence at all on that

development." In fact it appeared to the President that

General Khanh had advised our Intelligence people of a

suspected coup which would be actempted by someone else in

Saigon for the purpose of "pulling us off the track."

Next the President Inquired as to the Board's view on

a request that he had recently received from the Pentagon.

Reading from a communication which he had before him, it

appeared that

the President was being Informed by the Pentagon

that a proposal had been made to reduce the military membership

on the U. S. Intelligence Board by dropping from the USID the

Directors of G-2, 'A-2 and ONI, retaining on USIB the DCI,

the Deputy Director of CIA, DIA, NSA, State, AEC and FBI.

Mr. Clifford observed that in our bureaucracy no one having

representation on a committee llkes to be removed therefrom

but that it was his personal view that USIß would probably

function as well if not better with reduced membership. The

President Indicated that the Chiefs of Staff: ald not agree.

They were, In fact,

asking the President to permit their

кріни

respective G-2's to

continuer as regular members of USIB.

Mr. Clifford advised that herand the other Board members

did not agree that thin wen decessaryaparticularly now

HANDLE VIA COMINE CHANTEE. ONL8

TOP SECRET

NIM!

Nordo

NW 88192~

Docld:34671877 Page 57

---

## Page 58

that milftary intelligence activitles are being centralized

In the Defense Intelligence Agency along the lines earller

recommended to the president by the Board. Presid nt Johnson

expressed appreciation for the Board's views on this matter

Indleating that 1t would be helpful to him in responding to

the request of the joint chiefs of staff.

Turning to another matter, the President asked whether

the Board belleves that Congress 1s being provided with

enough information on our intelligence activities. Mr. Clifford

respunded in the affirmative then brought up the fact that

there are Increasing pressures for the establishment of a

Congressional Watch, Dog Committee on Intelligence.

Mr. clifford

emphasized to the President the view of the Board that the

creation of such a Watch. Dog Committee would be dilatorius

to the national

security and national Interests because 1t

would be most difficult to keep our secrets secret under such

a committee.

The meeting with the President terminated with an

expression on the President's

223

Part of deep appreclation to

the Board for the continuing patriotic and substantive contri

bution which It 1s making to the national security in

Important areas Involving foreign intelligence.

CAt the suggestion of the President the discussion of

Board business was momentarily suspended In order to let the

Press

take pictures of the President In session with his

Foreign Intelligence, Advisory Board

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNE

destrick, Cone

#TOP SECRET

(clo

Docld:34671877 Page 58

---

## Page 59

ree tile.

PRESIDENT'S FORETON INILLIMORNCS NVISORY BOARD

January 16, 1964

Dear John!

would neat with us

the morning of that any.

proferably from 10:00 to 11:00 a. 1.

At the time of your moating with us, it

would be helpiul 1f you mould be preparad

discuss the subjocta outlined in the attachment.

sincerely,

clark M. Clifford

Chairman

cr.

Attachmant

DIRACLOS

of Contral Intelligence

langloy, Virginia

УРС SHX

SEGRET.

Nw lage Fa

Docld:34671877 Page 59

---

## Page 60

PRISIDSITIS PORTINA IUNTLIDENCE ADVISORY BOARD

subfoots su

envad by Board Hondery for

Disoussion by tho Dirootor of Contral

Intelligenso at tho Doard Mostino of

11 3011900

d.

pube

(otatus and ortotivonesa of olandestino callaation and

sovert notion prosta cumbers and misadona of soviet

Lauth Vietnen

organizations. )

3.

Fonase

(Avs11ab111ty os procoriass intelligando indiancosa anó

5270117088

of aurrent roporting therson, entent of Castro

Iniluen0e.)

Separation of the OrfAce 2S 8ho Digastor of Contral

Intollsrenge from the Contral Intellitence Anongy

(Views as to desirabllity and roas1b1s1ty.)

5a Ve 3. Counto

sture

rasoument of denssa do U. Se intolligazza nourcas an

pareciong rusuline tron vindao, mni Foreli ceBed

tatus of ois luchan di peaceston or miradigence

6.

: 7a.

Joint C

na?. Comiteos on Posater Intelzireyoo

Ino polva aparalia es aistos euah a camittes sirango

want would nave on un

effootivenase and brourity of

foraiga interliganon

meted aotivitloo.)

CRA MAT

BOC

SECRET

Dos lo

Docld:34671877 Page 60

---

## Page 61

TUT.

¡THE DIRECIOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASKINOTON 25, D.C.

к 1.

14 Tanuary 1964

Dear Clark:

As you probably know, I am leaving for Europe on Saturday and

sence will miss an opportunity to visit with you in the immediate future.

However I wish you to know the hackground of the press incident which

unfortunately has been

"'blown up" and hence the theme of a great

number.of editorials.

Therefore I am attaching a memorandum prepared for my file

to review the series of events which led up to the rolease of irformation

on the Soviet economy with CLA attribution: Also attached is a copy of

a letter frum Senator Stennis and my reply. Finally, there is a copy

of the directive whicht am issuing today in order to prevent an inadver-

Teutrocurrence of the situation:

Frankly I am surprised at the publicity and furthermore I cannot

be overly critical of the attribution because of the long history of CLA's

rcleases on Soviet economy. We have for 10 years been issuing

volumes on this subject in unclassified form carrying the Central

Intelligence Agency name and these are in universities, libraries, and

in the hands of virtually all economists and newspapermen interested

in the subject.

Furihermore, Allen Dulles has testified in open

hearing and on the record on this subject. It was a favorite topic for

speeches by Allen, General Cabell and Bob Amory in the days when

CIA officials were making speeches. Hence the denial of the privilege

of attribution would have, in my opinion, not been respected iy

anyone in the gress.

Two additional points which might have something to do with

this -- first, we recently lost Co!. Grogan, who has handled press

relations for CIA for years, because of retirement after a heart

His replacement, a capable officer in the field of public

relations was in the process of getting acquainted with the press and

hence was not as sensitive to the tricky problem of press relationship

as a more experienced press ofticer might have been., Secondly,

-20-64

SEGHLI

WW SIS

Docld:34671877

Page 61

---

## Page 62

SEORLA

I have known for some time, as I told you, that there are people in

this Government, most particularly in the State Department, who

enjoy harassing CLA in the press.

I think, although I cannot prove

it; that they have not been inclined to pass up this opportunity.

Sincer

aly,

Jahr

A.

McCone

Jirector

Attachments as

statud

The Honorable Clark Clifford .

Chairman, President's Foreign

Intelligence Advisory Board

Washingion, D. C.

SEE

NW S8ig2

Docld:34671877 Page 62

---

## Page 63

UNITED STATES SENATE

January 13, 1964

Honorable John A. McCone

Director, Central Intelligence Agency

Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. McCone:

Recently I riad an article stating that the CLA had held a press

conference during which the Soviet economy was discussed.

My impression is that the holding of press conferences is a

distinct departure from CIA's past practice.

I would appreciate it

if you would advise me of the significance of this occurrence and

whether it represents a change of policy which will be a precedent

for the future.

Sincerely,

/S/

John Stennis

United States Senator

*

:1.695

14118

Doold

NW B8182

Docld:34671877 Page 63

---

## Page 64

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

11 January 1901

Ine Horuraulo John Stennis.

Tho Unitod States Senate

Mashington, D. C.

Daar sonator Stennis:

This is in roply to your letter of Janunry 13tl. As I told you

when I saw you at my mooting with your Cormnittoe on triday

afternoon, tho prese report of a "ClA prosa conferenco" was

somothing of an ovor-statement of fact, although cricuinatances

wore such that I can understand the roauon for the itatement.

What happenod was that sevoral reporters decaived unclassi-

ded intormation on the Soviet econoiny frons us and one of thena

¡eatured the ClA attribution. Thia brought an avalanche oi icquesta

iron other reporters who folt that one had been favored with some

'inside iniormation." Thoreforo our people prepared a brict

memorandur of just what had been told and invited the inquirers

to come out and pick it up. All who inquired wore asied to come at

a particular bour.

The fact that they wore met and talked to by

a Cli officor during the conse of distribution of the monioranium

jave rise to the roport that it had beon a "Cila press conference, "

which, I think, overstates what happened.

I havo been concerned over the fact that the ClA attribution

has been given such wide-sprond publicity and franly don't

understand why because in this area, nancily soviet economics, CLA

has boon a recognized authority and has for lho prot l0 years issued

volumes of unclassificd reporte of one sort vi anothcr which have

been distributed to libraries and universitics.

was a lavorite subject of my predeceason who lodice upon it as one

the subject

area which he could troat froely and publicly in open forum. You may

recall thero was an open hearing by the Joint Economic Committee on

13 Novernber 1959 at which the Director of Central Intelligence

testified.

P. B. #1695

Docld:34671877

Page 64

---

## Page 65

In viow of all this, I cannot criticizo the anchoricod atribution.

Tho abovo background of ClA intorest li, and continued

siudy of,

the Sovict economy la so wall known to tho pross that a roqueat isr

non-aliribution would most cortainly not have boon recroctoi. Novor-

choleso I have rostated our rules so that on such clicumsta:co will

again occur sithout my consont and appioval; and this, 1 ascuro you,

would bo given only astor consultation with all intoreated partios.

I havo tried to anawer your quastions by slo abovo oxplanations

but I assuro you that thoro le no chango of policy which will bo a

procodent for tho futures

Sincerely,

1S/

Jobn A. McCono

Diractor

Docld:34671877

Page 65

---

## Page 66

P

Y

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Recent ClA Publicity

13 January 1964

Two recent developments within ClA should be noted:

Following the briefings of the NSC and

Corgressional leadership, I projosed that CLA

findings on Soviet economy be released to the public

in the United States and Europe in order to (1) influence

curtailment of long-range credits and (2) influence a

number of uncommitted leaders of nations in Africa;

Southeast Asia and Latin America. This plan was

discussed and agreed with the President, Secretaries

Rusk, Harriman, Alexis Johnson and sthers. My

proposed plan per Memoranda and Notes of Conversation

,was to handle the subject through cut-ouis, on an

unattributable basis, and largely through the foreign

press on a carefully timed schedule to avoid the impact

of "sudden propaganda": DDP organized to implement

this program.

Additionally, information was to be

furnished (presumably on an unatiributable basis) to

Stewart Alsop (SATURDAY EVENING POST) and Charles

Murphy (FORTUNE) who were said to be studying the

subject.

b.

I have felt, and expressed myself to the late

President Kennedy, to President Johnson, to Secretary

Rusk and others, that the DCI, and GIA irnage must be

Changed. Its basic and primary responsibilities by law

are to assemble all intelligence, analyze, evaluate,

estimate and report such intelligence for the benefit

of policy makers. This function has been submerged

and Cla has been consistently referred to as a "cloak

and dagger" outfit whose activities involve (almost

exclusively) operations designed to överthrow

governments, assassinate Heads of State, involve

itself in political affairs of foreign states, and none

of these activities are either controlled or coordinated

with the White House of the State Department. This is

Y

Lakel

Docld:34671877

Page 66

---

## Page 67

entirely wrong, both with respect to the activity

and the coordination and control, and I wish to

attempt to change this image. (NOTE: Hundreds

of editorials, and dozens of speeches on the Hill

have dealt with this thesis in one form or another,

and there has been no rebuttal at any time to my

knowledge).

No authorization was given by me for the briefing of press

or other

columnists (other than Alsop and Murphy) or for attribution

or for

statements or references to ClA's unique capabilities in Soviet

economy or the purpose of lue releases.

What has happened is that the two stated purposes "rnerged"

and journalists, including TIME, NEWSWEEK, HERALD TRIBUNE,

Charles Bartlett and Mr. Dale of the NEW YORK TIMES were briefed

during late December and early Januetly.

In the case of Charles Bartlett and Mr. Dale, permission was

given to attribute the information to ClA by DD/l and PR and apparently

additional information on the depth of ClA's work in studying Soviet

economy was discussed.

As a result the CIA role, the attribution and the fact that it

had finally "spoken out"' was of far greater significance than the facts.

When the NEW YORK TIMES featured this side of the story in a front-page

article, there was a clamour for like information for others and, as a

result; ClA invited inquiring press men to come down and receive identical

information which was then prepared in a written nemorandum.

memorandum was discussed with them and this was interpreted to be a

"forrnal press conference" which is only partially true.

In defense of DDI and PR's activities, it is to be noted that ClA

has for 10 years issued unclassified publications on the Soviet economy

and the method usad in analyzing it. Mr. Allen Dulles used this subject

as a favorite topic for his speeches, which were numerous - in fact,

Mi. Elder, my assistant, states he has written at least 12 speeches

this subject for Mr. Dulles. However the timing and manner of release

has given special notice by the press in this instance.

Attribution to President Johnson for authority to do all of the

above is completely wrong, except to the extent that Fresident Johnson

knew of, and agreed to, a and b. above which were entirely separate

courses. It was not anticipated that they "marge" as they have.

Docld:34671877

Page 67

---

## Page 68

The consequences are as follows:

1. The White House, and more particularly the

State Department, are sightfully disturbed because

they do not know the effect this pubiicity might have on

their responsibilities.

2: CIA's methodology and findings have been

questioned because a vast amount of information upon

which our conclusions are based was not disclosed

(and much of it cannot be disclosed), and hence the

1 legitimacy of our conclusions is doubted by some experts

and in the public mind.

Congressional leaders. Senators Russell,

Saltonstall, Stenpis,

freeChairmen Vinson and Cannon)

are rish. ully disturbed and have so expressed themselves.

4. All of this will be used to emphasize the

"need for,a "Watchdog Committed"' and icgislation on

this is more probable,now than at any time in the

5. A carefully planned DDP operation for covert

release of information; and developed at my direction, has

been destroyed.

The purpose of DCI's trip to brief Heads

of-State in Britain, -France,..West Germany and Italy has

been impaired if not destroyed.

6. Activities have been contrary to my specific

written and oral orders and warnings'of DDCI at staff

meetings when the subject was discussed.

As a result it is my intention to issue instructions for the

conduct of all public relations activities in the fúture, their careful

coordination at the level of the White House and the State Department,

and until these orders are issued I wish absolutely no contact whatsoever;

no comments, no discussions with the press except with my personal

authorization.

NW B8182

Docld:34671877 Page 68

---