ITEM PREPARED FOR THE WARREN COMMISSION BY SR/CI/RESEARCH ENTITLED 'SOVIET USE OF ASSASSINATION AND KIDNAPPING.'
Originator: CIA
Document date: 02/28/1964
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

## Page 1

1104-10021-10115

.. 2022 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

XAAZ: 22414

28. Fob 64

ITEM PREPARED FOR THE WARREN. COMMISSION

BY SR/CI/RESEARCH entitled

"SOVIET USE OF ASSASSINATION AND KIDHAPPING".

See XAAZ-22406 for chronological listing.

This item was included in the 10 January memo from C/SR/CI/R,

over the signature of C/SR, to C/CI outlining the proposed outline for

the OSWALD project. A completed draft of this item was given to

DC/SR/CI for C/SR/CI, and another copy to C/CI/RAG for revient on 18 Feb 1964.

DC/SR/CI returned his copy on 24 February and approved transmittal.

CI/RAG called it its approval on 25 Feb. Copies of this item were

on an on c

forwarded to the Warren Commission under a memorandum dated 28 February

19640

For further information on this item, see:

Lee H. Wigren

Virginia Valpey

ANTWEAR

ABSTRACT

INDEX

2 ATTS,

CS COPY

201-289248

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Launis

This is the Circlines Versinf the fluk, in

5-263 died

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I UNCLASSISIED

SUBJECT: (Opional!.

Request - J. Seelmaecker

INTERNAL

USE BILI

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

HANDING FOLA REQUEST

RENUEST

NURSES

75-2105

FROM:

EXTENSION

E. Mendoza

Chief, CI/PA

2C29

R-1659

TO: (Officer dosignalion, room number, and

building)

DATE

RECEIVED

OFFICER'S

INITIALS

FORIVARDED

CI/EXO

•-==

DATE

SENT

29 December 1975

SUSPENSE DATE

COMMENTS (Number eoch comment to show tram whom

is whom. Drow a line across column after each comment.)

29 December 1975

DDO/PIC:

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

có

CI/PA (Graves)

2906

Please see attached comments.

DDO/PIC

IC.

12.

Distribution:

1 - FOIA file

# -X-ref: Warren Commission

1- Response chrono

copy an hide

exista in archive ives

forwarded on 121/351

DECi

ASSIFIED iN 1971 ly

C, A. CD. 1552.

COLA REQUEST

TITERNAT

111:631-697979

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:.

29 December 1975

DDO/PIC

Re: Request - J. Seelmaecker

(IRS 75-2105)

and kidnapping Copy of the study entitled: "Soviet Use of Assassination

Requestor states he is a German national).

There is attached a sanitized version of the study, which was

apparently prepared in or prior to February 1964, and transmitted to

the Warren Commission at that time.

However, the report as trans-

mitted was classified SECRET. There is some indication that the

document has since been declassified, and National Archives may have

a declassified version.

Would it be appropriate at this point to initiate inquiry with

Natinal Archives to determine. if, in fact, Archives does have this

declassified version, and to provide us a copy of the study and details

relating to the declassification, so that CI may amend its record for

FOIA requests relating to this subject matter.

A copy of the sanitized version (with deletions on pages

25 and

26) is attached, and we will await your advice before we consider this

study as actually released. It would apprear appropriate that this

study should be routed through SE/CI (J. Flaherty) for coordination

prior to release. A copy of the transmittal letter to the Warren

Commission is also attached for your assistance.

E. Mendoza®

Chief, CI/PA

Attachments:

Sanitized Version

w/transmittal letter

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LOCKKOPPEL 18

TELEFON 5362288.

Jure 11, 1yls

S/E

Loc

Central Intelligence Agency

(CIA)

Washington 25, D.C.

U.S.A.

J. Seelmaecker

IRS 75-2105

DDO/CI/RE

Working Copy

Subject: Your documentation "Soviet Use of Assassination

and Kidnapping"

Ref.:

German Daily DIE WELT (June 11, 1975)

Gentlemen,

Especially in these days of world-wide anti-

US-Propaganda from radical left media people some of

my friends and the undersigned feel the necessity of

correcting their lies. (x)

Therefore, please, let me have two copies

of the a/m documentation, including an invoice.

Yours sincerely,

27 A4

(x) All of us of German nationality.

JUN

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DIE WELT, 11 JUNE 1975, P. 5

-DIE 13. ABTEILUNG IST.

ZUSTANDIG FUR DEN TOD" SAHE

ARTICLE SIGNED BY WERNER KAHL:

HOW THE SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE HAD ITS ENEMIES

IN A DABEHER "DOSSIER" OF THE CIA WHICH WAS RECENTLY

DECLASSIFIED, RICHARD HELMS, EX-CIA DIRECTOR, HAD THE

• RESEARCH DONE BY ORDER OF THE ADMINISTRATION. TITLE

OF THE STUDY: "SOVPET USE OF ASSASSINATION AND

KIDNAPPING".

THE REMAINDER OF THE & ARTICLE GIVES DETAILS

OF AHH SOME OF THE ASSASSINATIONS AND KIDNAPPINGS.

THE LATEST CASE CITED IN THE ARTICLE OCCURED IN 1961.

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•XẠA?

22414

XA4248245

Aira J. Ice Razzin

General Counsei

Presidenis Commission on tae

Assassination of Erosident lenzedy

200 Liaryland Avenua, N.

E.

Hashington. D.C., 20002

Dear MI. Raakin:

F'artarded herevish are the originals and tho carbor.

copies each of two papera preyared by this agency for the

Coratijssias.

Tho first paper is entitled "Soviet Use af Assassination

and kidrapping." It seis forch inforrsalion froma variety se

OUTCOS On IGg employmea of assassination and kidipplig

techráques to eliminate enercies of khe USSR abroad.

The second japer is entitied "Soviet Fress Reactos to

the Assassination ll Fresident liornedy." it la an acalysis

Di the coverage aí the assassination and ita aftermain in the

major Soviet neuspapers during the period 23 Moreruber - 31

December 1953.

Vie hope that these papers vill assist the couriasion

in completing its work.

Sincercly,

2856564

michard Fiolar

Deputy Liroctor ior i lies

Incloures: dis stated aüure.

Carlition: God 1-9115e

2- is:

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ACTION

ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP

70 Name, olfice symbol or location)

INITIALS

DATE

CIRCULATE

COORDIMATION

INITIALS

DATE

PILE

INPORMATION

INITIALS

DATE

NOTE

HOT ANO

INITIALS

PER CON

VERSATION

SEE ME

DATE

SIGNATURE

REMARKS

raise tat

hessorin tion and Kidnapping you

requested.

Do NOT use chis form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences,

disapprovals, clearances, and similar netions.

FROM (Namo, office symbol or location)

Nations

Marion: 981-21062

OPTIONAL FORM 41

•AUGUST 1867

DATE

121/13"

PHONE

523-3460

c49-16-81584-1

552-103

5041-101

GSA FPMR ( 41CFR) 100-11.206

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MASSIFICATION CANCELAD

lis anthoris of :

Namo and title of porson making a

Introduction

Dada

It has long been known that the Soviet state security service

(currently the KGB) resorts to abduction and murder to combat what.

are considcred to be actual or potential threats to the Soviet regime.

These techniques, frequently designated as "executive action

and known

within the KGB as "liquid affairs" (Mokryyc Dela), can be and are employed

abroad as well as within the borders of the USSR. They have been used

against Soviet citizens, Soviet emigres and even foreign nationals. A list

of those who have fallen victim to such action over the years would be a very

long one and would include even the co-founder of the Soviet state, Leon

TROTSKY. Several well known Soviet assassination operations which have

occurred since the rise of KHRUSHCHEV attest to the fact that the present

leadership of the USSR still employs this method of dealing with its enemies.

The sudden disappearance or unexpected death of a person known to

possess anti-Soviet convictions immediately raises the suspicion of Soviet

involvement.. Because it is often impossible to prove who is responsible

1. Strictly speaking, the term "executive action" encompasses

diversionary activitics (such as sabotage) as well as terroristic activitics.

This paper, however, discusses only the terroristic aspect of Sovict

executive action, namcly kidnapping and assassination.

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for such incidents, Sovict intelligence is frequently blamed and is

undoubtedly credited with successes it actually has not achicved. On the

other hand, even in cases where the Soviet hand is obvious, investigation

often produces only fragmentary information, due to the KGB ability lo

camouflage its trail. In addition, Soviet intelligence is doubtless involved

in incidents that never become officially recognized as executive action,

such as assassinations which are recorded as accidents, suicide, of

natural deaths.

All of the factors cited above have helped to obscure Soviet practices

in regard to assassinations and abductions outside the USSR. Certain

observations can be made, however, which will help to put these practices

into their proper perspective. These observations are set forth in the

following paragraphs and are based on information produced by the investigatioi

of known or suspected Soviet operations which have occurred since World

War II, as well as from information supplied by defectors during this period.

Targets

The large numbers of former citizens of the USSR (and of imperial

Russia) living abroad in protest against the Soviet regime have been a

continuing cause for concern to the Soviets since the carly twenties.

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Reducing and kceping to a minimum the polential threat to the regime

represchted by these emigres is one of the functions of the state security

service. Soviet intelligence secks to neutralizo, discredit and destroy

anti-Soviet groups by luring emigres back to the USSR, by penetrating

emigre organizations, and by kidnapping or murdering individual emigres

considered to be particularly dangerous.

Emigre leaders who participate in anti-Soviet activities have been

primary targets of Soviet abduction or assassination operations. Such

operations are sometimes designed to demonstrate that the Soviet regime

can strike its enemies anywhere in the world. The Soviets hope thereby

to create fear, unrest, confusion and dissension within emigre organizations

and at the same time deter other emigres from joining their ranks. The

planned assassination of NTS leader Georgiy S. OKOLOVICH in February

1954 represented a particularly significant step toward achieving this goal,

but the act was not carried out because of the defection of state security

Captain Nikolay KHOKHLOV.

On the other hand, assassinations of some emigre leaders have been

carried out so skillfully as to leave the impression that the victims died

from natural causes. Details of somc of the techniques usod to achicve

this were brought to light in 1961 when proicssional KGB assassin Bogdan

STASHINSKIY defected to the West and revealed that he had successfully

• ISCITICATION CANCELASS

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performed two such missions. In 1957 he killed Ukrainian cmigre writer

Lov REBET in Munich iith a poison vapor gun which left the victim doad

of an apparent heart attack. In 1959, the same type of weapon was used on

Ukrainian emigre leader Stepan BANDERA, although BANDERA's death

was never fully accepted as having been from natural causes. These

cases are discussed in more detail later in this paper.

Executive action is also triggered by any signs of possible disloyalty

on the part of Soviet officials abroad. The Soviets have gone to great lengths

in the past to silence their intelligence officers who have defected, as

evidenced by the assassination of former state security officer Ignace

REISS in 1937 and the unexplained "suicide" of former Soviet military

intelligence officer Walter KRIVITSKY in 1941. In the post-war era, their

determination to prevent such defections was vividly demonstrated by the

unsuccessful attempt to force the wife of Vladimir PETROV to return to

the Soviet Union from Australia after his defection in April 1954.: The

practice of physical restraint applies with equal force to other Soviet

officials who attempt to defect or are suspected of being on the verge of

doing so. Examples were witnessed in Calcutta, India in January 1958

and Rangoon, Burma in May 1959. The respective victims, Aleksandr

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F. ZELENOVSKIY and Mikhail I. STRYGIN, were both portrayed ly the

Soviets as mental cases, were laken into custody by means of strong-arm

tactics, and were forcibly removed to the USSR in a matter of days.

Foreign nationals are somotimes victims of Soviet executive action.

The targets who fall into this category may be indigenous agents who have

become suspect or former citizens of Satellite countries who have turned

against the Soviet regime. In the latter case, actions against such individuals

are usually carried out through the corresponding Satellite intelligence

service, aided and abetted by soviet state security. The abductions of

DI. Walter LINSE and Bohumil LAUSMAN exemplify this type of operation.

LINSE had fled East Germany in 1947 and later became a leader of the

"Society of Free Jurists," an anti-Communist organization that the Soviets

considered particularly dangerous. He was kidnapped from West Berlin

in July 1952 by agents of the East German security service, with the full

knowledge and approval of sovict state security; he was later turned over

to Soviet authorities in Karlshorst, East Berlin and eventually sentenced

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to imprisonment in the USSR.

LAUSMAN, a prominent Cacch anti-Communist

who had fled to the West in 1949, disappeared from Vienna in 1953. It was

later learned that he had becn kidnapped by agunts of Czech intelligence, with

the official sanction of Moscow. The soviet state security rezidentura in

Vienna also had been directed to assist the operation by supplying a car

for transporting LAUSMAN to Prague and arranging for the vehicle to have.

free passage through the Soviet Zone of Austria.

Foreign political leaders are also potential targets of Soviet executive

action operations and, according to recent information, the KGB's executive

action component includes such persons among its targets. There is, however.

no evidence proving that any Western leader has been the victim of Soviet

executive action.

2. LINSE died in a Soviet prison camp 15 December 1953, according

to a statement issued by the Soviet Red Cross on 8 June 1960, a virtual

admission of Soviet responsibility for the kidnapping. The cited date of

his death is at variance, however, with information from fellow prisoners

of LINSE who reported having seen him in 1954 and 1955.

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Organization

The executive action component of the Soviet government is currently

designated the Thirteenth Department of the KGB intelligence directoratc

(First Chief Directorate). The earliest known predecessor of the Thirteenth

Department was the so-called "Directorate of Special Tasks" reportedly

established within the NKVD in Dccember 1936 for terror purposes. During

World War Il terror missions were performed by the NKGB Fourth Directorate

which was responsible for partisan activity behind German lines. In late 1945

or early 1946 this directorate was replaced by a unit of the MGB known as

Spets Byuro #1 which was organized to retain Fourth Directorate personnel

to support and direct partisan activities behind enemy lines in the event of

a future war.

In the summer of 1952, however, the long-range aspects of

Spets Byuro #l's mission were abandoned, and emphasis was shifted io

using all available agents for sabotage and other violent activities. Spots

Byuro #1 was given a new, and at present still unknown, designation sometime

in 1953 and assigned to carry out "special action tasks," such as sabotage,:

political murders and kidnappings. With the creation of the KGB in 1954, the

executive action component was redesignated as the Thirteenth Department.

Although the jurisdiction of the department is global, its main target arcas

are the United States and members of Western trcaty organizations.

There

CLASSTFICATION CANCELED

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is no evidence of the existenco of any unit within the Sovict military intelli-

gence component (the GRU) rcsponsible for the type of exccutive action

discussed in this paper, although the GRU reportedly can undertake such

operations under certain circumstances.

The Thirteenth Department is believed to be divided into sections

(otdeleniyc) or directions (napravleniye) by countries or groups of countries,

such as, for example, the United States ("the principal enemy"), England;

Latin America, etc. At Moscow headquarters the department has approxi-

mately 50-60 experienced employees, and was last known to be headed by

General (fnu) RODIN, who under the alias KOROVIN had previously been the

KGB resident in Great Britain. Secrecy about the work of this department

is maintained through the careful selection and training of its personnel;

the officers do not discuss their experience among others; department

documents are not circulated.

In addition to headquarters personnel, the 13th Department has its

own support officers in legal residencies in Western countries and in some

Satellite countries. Such support officers work under the instructions of

the legal resident and the 13th Department. One of the more active groups

is a unit in East Germany which numbers perhaps 20-30 persons. As of

1960 there was

a group in China, but it probably no longer exists. Prior

to 1955 there was also a group in Austria. In a country in which a support

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....'...

officer of the 13th Department is stationed, the legal resident and the

headquarters department for that country arc aware of the largets of

the 13th Department in that country, althuugh they are not awarc of

illegal agents who are in direct contact with the 13th Department.

Although the Thirteenth Department is the KGB's executive action

component, the Emigre (Ninth) Department directs all operations, including

assassination operations, against Soviet emigres. The Emigre Departinent's

assassination operations, however, are believed to be conducted jointly

with the Thirteenth Department and sometimes other KGB components;

for example, the counterintelligence directorate (Second Chief Directorate).

The 13th Department also supports the Disinformation (12th) Depart-

ment of the First Chief Directorate in the latter's covert propaganda

campaigns aimed at the creation of confusion and panic in Western countries.

An example is the campaign conducted, in 1959 and later, for the purpose of

creating adverse world opinion toward West Germany. This campaign

included setting fire to synagogues and painting swastika signs in public

places and attributing, these acts to West Germans. Other operations in

which both the Thirteenth Department and the Disinformation Department

are involved include attempts to remove the threat to Soviet interests posed

by certain members of Western governments. Sometimes this entils

arranging for the dismissal of such persons from public uffice, but, in

w1wcthygpoy.at.fyastrkksguld mean "eliminating" them physically.

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7038505197

Man and tille of person mukings ten peerness

NARENNA

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CLARSIPICATIOON CARTON

Installations

The defector, KHOKHLOV, described to laboratories associated with

the executive action department. One produced special weapons and explosive

devices, whereas the other developed poisons and drugs for "special tasks."

The explosives laboratory was located near Kuchino, outside Moscow, and

was responsible for the development and production of weapons, from

drawing up blueprints to melting and pouring bullets. In no case was assistance

obtained from military ordnance or other outside agencies.

The laboratory for poisons was supposedly a large and super-secret

installation. No agents were permitted access to it or even knew of its

location. KHOKHLOV could provide no first-hand information on it.

Other sources, however, have reported the existence of this type of laboratory

dating back to the purges in the late 1930's. A report from one source in

1954 described an experimental laboratory within Spets Byuro #1 known as

the "Chamber" (Kamera"). This laboratory conducted experiments on

prisoners and persons subject to execution to lest the effectiveness of

different powders, beverages and liquors and various types of injections, as

well as rescarch on the use of hypnotism to force prisoners to confess.

Besides its staff, only certain high-level persons wore permitted to enter

its premises. Although its existence officially was kopt a sccret, it was

generally suspected or known by many state security functionaries that a

unit of this sort was maintaincd. The Soviet government allegedly abolished

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the "Kamera" in Ocluber 1953, according to an announcement made lo

sclected statc sccurity and Party officials, altributing the establishment:

and operation of the laboratory solely to BERIYA and his cohorts. Whether

or not this step actually was taken does not rule out the possibility, however,

of the same type of unit continuing to exist in some other form.

Training for executive action operations was conducted at a basc in

Moscow by a staff of instructors who specialized in such subjects as the use

of small arms, jujitsu, code, wireless, driving, surveillance, and photography.

Although executive action operations outside the USSR are planned,

directed, and sometimes carried out by state security staff personnel, a

mission may also be performed by one or morc agents recruited specifically:

for this purpose. KHOKHLOV himself, for instance, was categorically

forbidden to assassinate OKOLOVICH personally. Two German agents,

Hans KUKOWITSCH and Kurt WEBER, were to carry out the deed under

KHOKHLOV's supervision. This reflected Soviet theory that indigenous

personnel would have better access to the target, and also had the advantago

of avoiding direct Soviet attribution. It appears from the STASHINSKIY casc,

however, that security considerations ruled out the involvement of non-Soviets

in more recent opcrations.

Even though some sources have made statements

to the contrary, it

appears that the agents (as opposed to staff employees like STASHINSKIY)

who perform executive action for the Soviots may be used for more than one

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mission of this nature.' KHOKHLOV spoke of special exccutive action

units known as "boyevaya gruppa" (literally, combat groups) which

consisted of indigenous agents and/or Soviet illegal staff officers situated

outside the borders of the USSR on the territory of hostile governmehts or in

close proximity thereto. Such groups were armed and prepared to perform

executive actions when required to do so, either in time of peace or war.

A group of this type under the direction of the executive action department

base at Karlshorst ostensibly was involved in the kidnapping of Dr. Alexander

TRUSHNOVICH, an NTS leader in West Berlin, in April 1954. KHOKHLOV

believed the abductors

to have been recruited and organized by the East

German security service at the request of the KGB chief at Karlshorst.

The same type of group was mentioned in connection with the abduction of

DI. LINSE; the actual abduction was reportedly performed by four German

members of a "boyevaya gruppa" from East German. It is probable that

such teams arc a modern variation of the "mobile groups" described by a

pre-war source as units dispatched from Moscow to foreign countries to

assassinate Trotskyites and state

security officers who refused to return

to the USSR, as in the case of REISS and possibly KRIVITSKY.

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CD1552

Icchniques

Many known oi suspected exccutive action cases in the post-war

period have involved the use of poison rather than guns or explosives.

It is conceivable that the Soviets tend to favor poisons because murders

can be accomplished more surreptitiously in this manner and in some

instances without leaving easily recognizable traces of foul play. Drugs

are also used to incapacitate a person temporarily for abduction purposes,

as reportedly happened in the TRUSHNOVICH case and in the kidnapping of

another NTS member, Valeri P. TREMMEL, from Linz, Austria in June

1954. There are, however, many unknown, uncontrollable factors in the use

of poisons and drugs which limit and often preclude their usage. Probably

the most important is the narrow span between a dose that will cause disability

and one that will cause death. ' Dosages vary from one individual to another

depending upon the person's weight, state of health, and the way the poison

enters the body. The type used obviously is determined by the result desired.

It is no problem to cause death, but often difficult to control dosage success-

fully when the objective is to incapacitate an individual only temporarily.

There appears to be no consistency in the use of poisons by Sovict

intelligence to cause disability or death, or in the repetitious usc of any

one drug. Chemicals which have been used in cases known or suspected

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12. 17

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Irist

to be Soviet instigaled include arsenic, potassium cyanido, scopolamino,

and thallium. Other likely substances are atropino, barbiturates, chlo-

ral hydrate, paraldchyde and Warfarin. Combinations of iwo or more

substances may also be used, which further complicates diagnosis and

tracing.

One well publicized poisoning case involved the defector Nikolay

KHOKHLOV. KHOKHLOV suffered a sudden and severe illness while

attending an anti-Communist meeting in Frankfurt, Germany in September

1957. A positive diagnosis was precluded by the initial treatment given

him at a German hospital, but there was evidence of his having been

poisoned by a thallium derivative of arsenic and/or other chemical agents,

and a strong possibility that the poison had been administered at RIS

instigation. KHOKHLOV himself believed, and allegedly had supporting

medical opinion, that he had been poisoned by radio-activated thallium.

He believed that the poison was of Russain origin because it was such a

complicated substance that it was difficutl to analyze and had been carefully

prepared to leave virtually no trace. A unique mechanism for administering

poison was

described by a knowledgeable source as a pneumatically operated

poison ice "atomizer" which leaves no wound or other evidence of the cause

of death. The equipment and techniques used in the poisoning of REBET and

BANDERA are treated below in some detail as examples

of the most recent

and sophisticated methods in use by the KGB.

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AASSIFICATION CANCELED

Specific Cases

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In November 1961 a Sovict intelligence officer, Bogdan STASHINSKIY.

surrendered to the West German police, stating that he had, acting under

official orders, assassinated livo individuals during the previous few

years: Lev REBET, a Ukrainian emigre writer; and Stepan BANDERA, a

leader of the Ukrainian Nationalist movement. In both cases, a similar

type of weapon had been used: a gun which fired vaporized poison which

killed almost instantly upon being inhaled. The properties of the killing

agent were such that, until the defection of the assassin, both victims

were officially believed to have died from hcart attacks. In the case of

BANDERA, however, there was some unconfirmed suspicion of potassium

cyanide poisoning although there was insufficient evidence to prove it.

The Weapon

The weapon used to assassinate REBET was a light-weight aluminum

cylinder, 15-18 cm. long and approximately 3 cm. in diameter, and

weighing about 200 grams. The cylinder was divided into three separaic

chambers,

one of which contained liquid poison scaled hcrmetically into

a plastic-typc ampule container under low pressure. (At normal temperatures

the poison would evaporate, disappearing without trace in about two minutcs.)

The three components could be assembled by means of a thread which allowed

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one part to screw into the other. The first component was the poison

ampule portion, the front end of which had a fine metallic scroon. The

poison ampulc fitted solidly against the walls of the metal cylinder. The

center component contained a piston and a piston arm which extended inlo

the third or activating component. The latter contained a spring-mounted

activating arin which, when drawn back, armed the weapon. A releasing

arm was appended to the third component at an angle and was attached to

the activating arm by means of a releasing catch. A small safety arm

permitted the weapon to be placed in the

safety position. The third component

also contained a few grains of powder.

The maximum effective range of the weapon was about one-half

meter; at one and one-half meters the effect of the vapors would be

questionable; and at two and one-half meters, the vapors would be totally

ineffective. (The assassin was instructed to fire the weapon only inches

from the face.)

The weapon was activated as follows: The activating arm was pulled

back and the safety released. The weapon was then activated. It was

held in the palm of the hand in such a fashion that it fired when the user

pressed the releasing arm towards the activating arm. The relcasing

arin, when pressed, acted upon the relcasing catch, permitting the spring-held

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activating arm to fly forward against the small charge of powder. The

exploding powder (which made a noise approximating the sound of a loud

handclap with the hands cupped) drove the piston arm forward, causing thc

piston to strike against the poison ampule. The poison was thus driven out

through the fine screen in the form of a liquid spray.

The weapon used for the second assassination was similar, except

that it was double-barrelled. Each barrel contained à charge of poison

similar to that contained in the single-barrelled weapon; however, the

two barrels could be discharged separately or together as a unit. Thus;

in the event the first charge did not kill the victim, a second attempt could

be made. The two barrels were welded together and the weapon had iwo

releasing arms, two releasing catches, two safeties, and two activating arms.

The effect of the poison was the same.

Utilization of the Weapon

For maximum effective results it is recommended that the liquid

poison be shot directly into the face of the victim, in order to introduce

the vapors most quickly into the respiratory system. Since the vapors

rise upwards very rapidly, the poison is still effective when aimed at the

chest; conceivably, this would be sufficient timc to allow the victim timc

to screans.

SSIFICATION CANCIl D

By authority of: Sik hit, Jan i, oile

Namo and till a

el coll minding ties rites

27.

Daisy

1/15/

?!

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Effects of the Poison

The effect of the poisonous vapors is such that the arteries which

feed blood to the brain become paralyzed almost immediatcly. Absence

of blood in the brain precipitates a normal paralysis of the brain or a

heart attack, as a result of which the victim dies. The victim is

clinically dead within one and one-half minutes after inhaling these

poisonous vapors. After about five minutes the effect of the poison

wears off entirely, permitting the arteries to return to their normal

condition, leaving no trace of the killing agent which precipitated the

paralysis or the heart attack.

Allegedly, no foreign matter can be discovered in the body or on

the clothes of the victim, no matter how thorough an autopsy or examination.

The liquid spray can be seen as it leaves the nose of the weapon, however,

and droplets can also be seen on the face of the victim.

STASHINSKIY claimed that, before using the weapon on his first victim,

he tested it on a dog. He fired the gun directly into the dog's face, holding

his hand approximately one and one-half feet from its nose. Almost

immediately after the liquid spray had hit its face the dog rolled over,

without making any sound whatever. It continued to writhe for almost three

minutes, howevcr. STASHINSKIY was told that the poison affected a human

much sooner, causing death within one and one-half minutes.

"FICATION CANCELED

1. anchority of: Lilice tate en. 8,1831

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Da'n _ 1/15/2

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Safcty Precautions fur the User

STASHINSKIY was told that neither the poisonous liquid nor the fatal

fumes affected any portion of the body other than the respiratory system,

and that, since it could not enter the body through the skin or the pores,

one could safely place his hands into a pail of the poison. Inasmuch as

the weapon was held at arm's length when fired and the liquid spray ejected

forward in a conical pattern, the user, under normal conditions, is safe

from the effects of the poisonous vapors. Nevertheless, as an extra

precaution, STASHINSKIY was provided with counteractive agents to

use if he so desired.

Concealment Methods

For transportation, the weapon was transported hermetically

sealed in a container, and inserted between sausages in a can which

was itself hermetically sealed. It was suggested to STASHINSKIY that

he should carry the weapon to the site of the planned assassination

wrapped in a light newspaper, in which he had torn a small hole to

enable him to reach the safety quickly just before using the weapon.

Method of Attack

In the first assignment, STASHINSKIY observed REBET debarking

from a streetcar at about 0930 hours. Observing that the victim was heading

for his office, the assassin preceded him into the building and climbed the

• ClASSIFICATION CANCELEU

Nine nad title uf

NAKI-NNA

ba8-1/85/21

"71."7

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circular staircase to the first floor. On hearing REBET's footsteps on

the staircase, STASHINSKIY turned and started walking down, keeping to the

left, and carrying the weapon, wrapped in newspaper, in his right hand.. The

two met about halfway between the two floors. Firing directly into REBET's

face from a distance of approximately one-half meter, STASHINSKIY continued

walking downstairs without even breaking his pacc. The victim lurched

silently forward and fell on the staircase. While still in the building,

STASHINSKIX shook off the liquid drops from the weapon and put it in the

breast pocket of his suit. (A laboratory examination of the suit later revealed

nothing of significance.) Although he had no reason to believe that he had in-

haled the poisonous fumes, he used the counteractive measures provided.

He later disposed of the murder weapon in a shallow canal in the city.

In carrying out his second mission, STASHINSKIY used a

similar

approach. Having previously abandoned an attempt to corner BANDERA

in the latter's garage, the assassin gained entry into the victim's apartment

house by reproducing a key which he had observed being used in the front

door lock. On the day of the assassination, having seen BANDERA drive

into his driveway, STASHINSKIY let himself into the apartment building

and waited. BANDERA, carrying soveral packages of fruit and vogctables

in his right hand, entered the front door with the aid of a key which was un

a key ring together with other keys. As he was attempting to disengage the

CLASSIFICATION CANCE! ED

1: muthority of: Cited-tin, may, Fill

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Manu and tille of pret muting tois seas

NARS- WAN

Dir'ar -

765/01

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key from the lock, STASHINSKIY moved away from the clevalor, where

he had been standing, toward the front door. The weapon was in his hand

with the safety released. As he walked past the victim, who was still

trying to extracate the key from the lock, the assassin took the door

handle with his left hand, as if to assist BANDERA, asking him "Doesn't

it work?" By this time, BANDERA had succeeded in pulling the key out

of the lock. Almost at the instant he replied "Yes, it works, " STASHINSKIY

fired both barrels simultaneously into his face at almost point-blank

range.

Seeing the victim lurch backwards and to the side, the assassin

walked out of the apartment building and closed the front door.

Although

he did not wait to see BANDERA drop to the ground, STASHINSKIY is certain

that, contrary to press reports, the man did not scream or otherwise call

for help. STASHINSKIY later threw the murder weapon into the same canal

in which he had discarded the first weapon.

Although the press reported that BANDERA had been attacked physically

before he was poisoned, STASHINSKIY insisted that he had used no force,

since it had not been necessary to do so. Some newspapers also reported

that BANDERA had died of potassium cyanide poisoning. STASHINSKIX claims

that he was told, and believes, that the chemical was not potassium cyanido,

sincc (1) he thinks that substance could not have been introduced into the body

by the method employed, and (2) he believes the RIS would have no reason to

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deceive him on this natter, especially since he had to be provided with

countcractive piccautions. STASHINSKIY claimed thai one of his Soviet

contacts was pleased to learn that the police suspected potassium cyanide,

since this allegedly indicated that the true cause of the victim's death

was not evident.

II. RADIO FREE EUROPE

The New York Times reported on an attempt to poison the staff

of RFE on November 21, 1959, by placing atropine in the salt shakers

of the cafeteria used by RFE personnel. Atropine is a derivative from the

deadly nightshade plant; it can cause paralysis or death if taken in sufficient

quantity. The amount of poison in each salt shaker was said to be 2.36% by

weight of the contents. White crystalline alkaloid is indistinguishable from

salt. (Unclassified, from NYT, 17 December 1959.)

I. STEIN

In March 1955, Lisa STEIN, an interviewer with RIAS, the American

propaganda radio station in West Germany ("Radio in American Sector"), was

fed candy containing the highly dangerous poison scopolamine. (scopolaminc

is used in the so-called "twilight sleep." Given in small doses it induces a

kind of euphoria; in larger doses it is supposed to be a deadly poison. )

It was intended that Frau STEIN would become ill and would be abducted. The

plan was that the agent - somconc whom Frau STEIN trusted and with whom

CLASSIFICATION CANCET.ED

I thority of Seetitifan4,rn1

tride of pron!!

into 1l:8 659095181

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she was mecting in a West Berlin cafe - would offer the poisoned candy

toward the end of the mocting. The lady was expected to become ill while

walking frum the cafe to her nearby residence. On becoming unconscious,

she was to be picked up by a waiting car which would appear to be passing

by chance.

The plot was not carried to fruition, however, because Frau

STEIN did not become ill until she was near her apartment, at which point

neighbors came to her aid and she was moved to a hospital. She was

severly ill for 48 hours, after which an antidote was found. (Unclassified,

from the testimony of Theodor HANS, formerly with US Military Intelligence,

Germany, September 21, 1960, before a Congressional investigating committee.

IV. OTHER

Another weapon used is described as a noiseless gas pistol, powered

by a 300 volt battery, which fires a lethal, odorless unidentified gas.. The

gas acts in two or three seconds, and is effective up to 15 or 20 meters.

The pistol has three buttons: one for arming, one for firing, and the third

for recharging the battery. (After 50 firings the battery may be recharged

by plugging a transformer into normal house power source.) The pistol is

normally fired 20 times, very rapidly and automatically - "Bzzzd." Although

one squirt could kill, 20 squirts are emitted in order to saturate the arca,

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since the gun is fired at a silhouctic, rather than at a point.) The gas shot by

the pistol would penctrato the victim's clothing and entcr the skin. There

is allegedly no danger to the user.

Trends

Since World War Il, and especially in the years since Stalin's death,

assassination attempts abroad have become increasingly rare. Currently

the emphasis in the executive action field is placed on sabotage and sabotage

planning rather than terrorism against individuals. The Soviets now apparently

resort to murder only in the case of persons considered especially dangerous

to the regime and who, for one reason or another, cannot be kidnapped. A

kidnapped person is obviously more valuable inasmuch as the Soviets may

be able to extract from him information of interest, as well as use him for

propaganda purposes by making it appear that he defected to the Soviet side of

his own free will. This course was followed in the case of DI. TRUSHNOVICH.

It is also likely that the Soviets find it increasingly difficult to find persons

willing to undertake murder assignments, while the same may not be true

of abduction operations. It can further be conjectured that the Soviets are

now more concerned about the adverse publicity generated by Soviet assassina-

tions in gencral than they were in previous years.

"ASSIFICATION CANCELAY

by authorits of: C+0115,640/?1

Nano and title of pciran

mating 70+1890-99989

fl! fre.

NARS-IND

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In this connection, comments made by statc security defectors Petr

DERYABIN and Yury RASTVOROV in 1954 about what the Soviets would or

would not do are still of intcrest. Both believed that the Soviets would

murder one of their officials on the verge of defecting if that were the only

way of preventing the act. The same would apply to a Sovict official who had

just defected if thereby state secrets could be preserved and if they believed

that killing him would not bring about a more adverse situation in terms of

politics and propaganda than already existed. DERYABIN and RASTVOROV

doubted, however, that the Soviets would murder an official who had been in

non-Communist hands long enough to have been exploited for intelligence and

propaganda purposes. While both granted that in particular cases the Soviets

might go to any extreme, they both believed, generally speaking, that the

adverse propaganda resulting from such an act would negate its original purpose

On the other hand, KHOKHLOV, who might have been in a better position to

know, has stated without qualification that the Soviets would continue to

assassinate defectors in the future. The threat of Soviet executive action

against defectors is also considered a real one by Reino HAYHANEN, who

defected from the KGB in 1957. A still more recent Soviet intolligence sourc

also bclieves that standard Sovict practice is to mount a kidnapping or

assassination operation "through all intelligence opportunitics" against

defectors from the Soviet intelligence services.

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113.15:

DERYABIN and RASTVOROV further agreed that the Soviets, without

hesitation, would forcibly return to the USSR someune on the verge of

defecting at a mission abroad. This was borne out by the aforementioned

STRYGI! and ZELENOVSKIY cases. DERYABIN and RASIVOROV also

believed that the same palicy would apply to a Soviet official who had just

defected, or one who had been in non-Communist hands long enough to have

been exploited for intelligence and propaganda purposes, if the capability

existed for returning him physically to the USSR.

Lastly, DERYABIN believed that the assassination of an Allied official

would be highly unlikely and probably unprofitable. He also doubted that

the Sovicts would attempt to kidnap any U.S. officials unless they were

particulasly knovledgeable. Such an incident would nut be worth the trouble

for an average official, but an important person conccivably would have

sufficient information to make it vorthshile.

922,23

ILET

is 201307

T:;.

letter da tan.

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