Agency: SSCIA
Originator: SSCIA
From: MCMANUS, GEORGE B.
Document date: 07/22/1975
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

## Page 1

157-10014-10072

Date

Page

08/06/95

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY :

SSCIA

RECORD NUMBER

157-1001410072

RECORDS SERIES

: HEARINGS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 10-H-04

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR :

SSCIA

FROM

MCMANUS, GEORGE B.

TO

TITLE

:

DATE

PAGES

SUBJECTS

07/22/75

53

: OPERATION MONGOOSE

ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES

CIA

DOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPT

CLASSIFICATION

UNCLASSIFIED

RESTRICIIONS : 1C

CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/21/98

OPENING CRITERIA

COMMENTS

:Box 3

[R]

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The Initri Statra Brnate

R599

Report of Proceeding ZTMl22

Hearing held before

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental

paration Nith Respoot to Intelligence Aotivities

Tuesday, July 22, 1975

Washington, D. C

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over

to the Committee for destruction)

WARD & PAUL

110 FIRST STREET. &. E.

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003

(202) 544-0000

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R SECI

TORS (ANDs 202) 944800

SONIENTS

TESTIMONY OF

George B. McManus

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EXHIBITS

EXHIBIT

No. 1

No. 2

No.

FOR IDENTIFICATION

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AMIARD : amt

Phone fAres 292) 540-400

EXECUTIVE SESSION

c..

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0. = ca

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Tuesday, July 22, 1975

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:::=

United States Senate,

Select Committee to Study Governmental

Operations With Respect to

Intelligence Activities,

Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:15 o'clock

a.m., Room 224, Russell Senate Office Building, the Honorable

John Tower (Vice Chairman of the Cuumittee) presiding.

Present: Senators liart of Colorado, Tower (presiding)

and: Schweiker.

Also present: Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Chief Counsel:

Curtis R. Smothers, Minority Counsel; Charles Kirbow, Paul

Wallach, Joseph diSenova, Patrick Shea, Charles Lombard, Rhett

Dawson, John Bayly and Michael Madigan, Professional Staff

110510:95:-991. 5.E. MasAnGIOn, D.C 20001

::

2:

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queen

Senator Hart of Colorado. Mi. McManus, we will swear you

In, and the testimony will begin, and we may be joined by

other membars of the Committee.

Would you raise your hand?

Do you swear that the testimony you are about to give will

Do the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so

help you God?

Mr. McManus. I do.

Sanator Hart of Colorado. You may be seated.

Mr. Schwarz, our Counsel, will begin the questioning.

C.

r.

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410 First Sirpet. S.E.. Washingion, D.C. 20003

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Phone lAras 2021 548-8006

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4106us1 S1r9e1. 5E, Washington, Washengion, D.C.20001

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TESTIMONY OF GEORGE B. MC MANUS

Mr. Schwarz. Would you give your full name and address

to the Reporter? ..

М. McManus. My name 18 George B. McManus, my address 13

P.O. Box 161, 'Barnstable,. Massachusetts, 02630.

Mr. Schwarz. •As I told you, we always go through a

procedural matter with the witnesses at the outset, and ask you

If you know you have the sight to counsel?

MI. McManus. Yes, I do know.

Mr Schwarz. And if you want to ston and obtain counsel

you have that right.

Mx. McManus. Thank you.

Mr.. Schwarz. And you have your Constitutional rights.

Mr. Mclanus. That's right. Thank you.

Mr. Schwarz.

Now, Mr. McManus, you were flist employed

by the CIA when?

MI. McManus: In May of 1946 by Cantral Intelligence

Group, the predecessor organization.

Mr. Schwarz. And you stayed with the Agency until when?

20 !..

Mr. McManus: Until May 30th, 1970. That is, the

2:

" predecessor organization after it was organized.

2:1. MI. Schwarz. Now, prior to 1962, would you just give a

brief, a very brief summary of the things you did for the ci

24

Group and the Cantral Intelligence Agency?

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MI. McManus. I entered tha Agency as a Naval Officer. !

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and (AeRs 202) 3981000

...

pan.

r.

2105.08t 591901.5.8

. Washergion, D.C 20003

had been Naval attache in Capetom and was ordered to the Centrall

Intalligence Group where I began organizing the thing that 1s

known now as the Contact Division. It is an organization to

4

develop intelligence from the American business community, set

5

up & natwork so that we could see business people, univeralty

6

people, travellers and so forth, and I was engaged in that

7

operation until 1951.

8

In 1951, I went to Germany and organized the Defector

9

10

Reception Canter, the idea being that we would process people

who were defectiny from the Soviet Union and satellite

- -

1:

countries. And I then organized a group called the Returnes

12

axploitation Group dealing with German scientists who had been

1' " taken by the Soviots to the Soviet Union after World War It.

!: la would induce these people back from Fast Germany, Interrogatu

it ! then for information on soviet scientific and technical devel-

1i " opments.

1:

I left Germany in September of 1955, Saptember or October,

and I was sent to

as the Chief of Station and I remainel

2: there until October of 1960.

I returned to leadquarters and was assigned to duty in

7 :

Headquarters until - yes, I was on duty ir Yeadquarters until --

2r

wall, for a long time, but in December of 1961 --

Mr. Schwarz. Then

you got into cuba matters?

Mr. McManus. This was when I was asked to make a surve!.

MI. Schwarz. I want to come back to that, but after you

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finished working on those Cuban matters and working generally

2

for MI. Helms, can you recount just briefly what you did in

3

your ramaining tour of the Agency?

4

Wall, let me see if I can summarize lt for you.

5

You became the Executive Assistant to Admiral Rayburn

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who was the DCI?

Mr. McManus. Right.

8

After I finished the Cuban show, I want over and took over

9

the cover staff, and then I went on to Rayburn's office.

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Mr. Schwarz. As his Executive Assistant?

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Mr. McManus. Right.

12.

Mr. Schwarz. And after he left, what did you do betore yru

17.

retired?

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Mr. McManus. Vice-Admiral Rufus Taylor came in as the

new Deputy, because Helms moved up to Rayburn's position, and

16

" I broke him in and loft for Germany, and retired in May, 1971

1:

in Germany.

1&

Mr. Schwarz. Now, for questioning on the Cuban period.

1:

You first

camt into that in Decembar, 1961?

Mr. McManus. Right.

Mr. Schwarz. And you lastad in that until after the

*:. ¡ MONGOOSE program terminatad sonetime in the fall of

.1962.

i: is that right?

Mr. McManus. Right.

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==

Mr. Schwarz. All right.

?!

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Pore (Ares 202) 998600l

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4107 101 59r999, 5.8, Massingenn, DC.20001

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'What, vare you anked to do in December, 1961?

2

MI. McManus. I was asked to make a survay of what was

3

4

going on in the intelligence collection field in Cuba, and I

spent the Christmas week in Miami where we had our Cuban

5

station, and I looked into all of our clandestine activities,

6

the number of reports we raceived, and how many agents were

7

dispatched, what was being done about the flow of refugees

8

from lavana to Miami. I wrote this report and submitted lt to

9

the authorities when I returned.

10

As a result of this report, I had recommended a very

11

Intensiva effort in the interrogation of this flow of refugees

1: " because I felt there were a very great number of intellectuals.

12.

well-informed people who were coming in.

14

Mr. Schwarz. And somathing called the noa-Lacka Center

15

was ultimately set up?

1€

Mr. McManus.

Well, this happened. Then I was told to

1:

implement that, so I set up the thina called Opa-Lacka, yes.

In the interrogation conter.

it. Schwarz. All right.

Now, did you attend, in January, on January 19, a meetin

:

with a number of people, including the Attorney General of the

2: " United States concerning Cuha?

Mr. McManus.

Yes, I did. In his office, in the Attornev

cionaral's offico.

2:

Mr. Schwarz. Would you put in front of the witness, an

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prone (Ares 202) 9466006

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roudd you mark as MoManus Exhibit 1, a memorandum dated

January 19, 1962 for the DCI, Subject: Meeting with the

Attornay General of the United States Concerning Cuba, and

mnsisting of three tuned pages and then a roup of five

handwrittan pages attached.

' 5

6

7

(The documents referred

to ware marked McManus

Exhibits No. 1 and '2

respectively for

1dentification.)

HARD A PAUL

749

A10 8 10s1 S11991,57

Mashirgins. 08.0000d

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Mona (Arns 202) 342

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Mr. Schwarz. First, 1a that your handwriting, Mr. McManus?

MI. McManus. It 1s Indeed, Yes.

MI. Schwarz. And the typescript i8 a typewritten version

o!

your handwritten notes?

Mr. McManus. With some mistakes in it.

Mr. Schwarz. Some typographical mistakes.

MI. McManus. For axample, "not" instead of "now" chanqes

the paragraph 2 in the beginning, changes the meaning complete- :

1y.

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410 4 0011 S9.009. 58-Washington, D.C. 80001

Mr. Schwarz. Which word is that?

Mr. McManus. Paragraph 2 of the typed memo, third line

12:

2, "would not attack the Cuban problem," "would now" --

MI. Schwarz. Okay, yes.

14

In addition to the attendees who are shown or page 1.

15

MI. Helms attended, is that right?

16

MI. McManus. Yes.

Actually, I wrote this memoranda for Helms' signature.

Apparently the original is not here with his signature, so the

19. 1 there

is Richard Helms.

"r. Schwarz. Now on the second page of the typed varsion:

::at subparagraph a, there is a paragraph which reads as follows:

2e: "Accordingly, a solution to the Cuban problem today carrier"

and then you indent certain words, and you put them in

quotations, "'The top priority in the us cov't -- all else is

24

secondary -- no time, money affort or manpower is to be spared.""

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Now, who is that quoting? whose words are those that you

r.

quoted?

MI. McManus. Those are the words of Robert Kennedy, the

4

Attorney Ganeral.

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MI. Schwarz.

Did you understand those words to include

6

permission to assassinate Fidel Castro or have anything to do

7

with assassination?

8

Mr. McManus. I did' not. It never occurred to me.

Mr. Schwarz.

Would you characterize Mr. Kennedy, lf you

10

were taking a sporta analogy, would

you characterize t

1?

what his demeanor was like in that meatina?

MI. McManus. Well, there was not any question that he

had called this group together and he really wanted action.

l4 In other words, there was no question. He was very vehement in:

1: " his speech. He said, we're going to got moving here, he said

16,

we have got to be underway. And he was really patting the ,

i pressure and heat on.

And that came through to me very clearly

¿i: and I am sure to everyone else in the room, and there was't

:: any question that if there was any problem, all you had to do

was tive him aring and he would see that you got results.

I think that is somewhere in the notes here that I did

is not put in the finished material, you know.

:.:

Mr. Schwarz. All right.

Now, apart from the particular words that I quoted to vou

:: ' In focusing on the

spirit of the meeting as a whole, did you

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Washington, D & 2000)

understand the spirit of the menting as a whole to contemplate

2

or authorizo assassination?

Mr. McManus.

Absolutely not. I never thought of that.

4

5

I had no idea that that was contemplated.

Mr. Schwarz. Okay.

6

Now, following this meeting, did Me. Helms ask you to play

7

a role with respact to monitoring or following the progress of

8

the task force 'and Mr. Harvey?

9

Mr. McManus. I was an assistant and dealt solely with

Cuban matters.

11

Mr. Schwarz. Assistant to whom?

Mr. McManus. To llelms.

17

Mr. Schwarz.

To Helms.

;..

1÷

15

Mr. McManus. But I was primarily interested in intelli-

sance. After we had the flow of Information boginning to come

•In from the refugees, it became clear to me that there was a

1:

great Soviet threat, and I followed that very carefully. I could

see the build-up developing in Cuba, and I thought that was the

heart of the matter. That interested me more than any other

aspect of the show.

::.

I did write a weekly report --

2:.

Mr. Schwarz.

For Mr. Helms?

:::

MI. McManus. For Mr. lalms.

It was printed up, perhaps the DCI signed it. I don't

an' know what the name of it was, but it was a special report, it

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pono (Ares 202) 36416000

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was sent to sevaral people in government. It was sent to the

White House, SECDEF, State, Attorney General, the Bureau, 'I

guess, in which I would summarize the highlights of Intalligence

gathared during the past weak, and 1' then I had an operational :

summary of what had been done operationally during that week.

Mr. Schwarz. And that you obtained from Mr. Harvey, did

4

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Mr. McManus. The operational?

MI. Schwarz. Yes.

Mr. McManus. I would ask Harvey to supply that information

to me. Harvey would give me the information, I would adit it

and out it would go.

Mr. Schwarz. So was Mi. Helms looking to you as his

principal staff assistant on Cuha to keep generally on top of

What was going on in the Cuban operationg for him?

Mr. McManus. Partially, Yes. I would say I was assistin::

him, particularly

in the intelligence field and keaping the

community aware of what progress. wa were making in Intelligenc=

gathering and operations, and I followed

all of the traffic er

Cuba.

MI. Schwarz: You were gpending, in a sense, your full

time on Cuba, weren't you?

MI. McManus. I was indead, yer.

Mr. Schwar?..

And Mr. Harvey was spending his full time .:

24

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Cuba?

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410 Firal 5te991, 56, Mashingion, D.C. 2000)

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MI. McManus. He was the operational head of the task

2

force who was responsible to General Lanadale.

3

4

Mr. Schwarz. Your understanding was that Harvey's boss,

Harvey's raporting channel, was to Lansdale to get tasks from

5

Lansdale?

6

MI. McManus. Yes, Lansdale gave him tasks, yes.

Mr. Schwarz. And ha: gave him constantly changing and

now and different and confusing tasks?

9

Mr. McManus. Ye.

10

Mr. Schwarz. You are smiling. The record ought to show

1]

what your smile is intended to convey.

MI. MCManus. Well, Ed Lansdale had been picked by the

=..

Attorney General as the man in charge, you see.

I am sure

14

20 M

Lansdale assumed as soon as a task force had been

set up in th

Contral Intelligence Ayency that

this was his private sort of

Army, that he could task his battalion commander to do this,

and he would sand

him another task, and he'd retreat, advance,

go sideways, and as time went on, there were fantastic thinas

li that came in, do this, do that, wilte a paper on this, what

2:: about the posgibility of balloons, and all

sorts of proporan!.:

x: Ideas, papers would have to be written, just dozens of Deol=

ex i working'flat out to mast these requirements.

%: And so therafors, you see, these tagks were comina from i:

¿i individual outside diractly into a small task force withir. thu

2.6

Contral Intelligence Agency.

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one (Ante 202)

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Mr. Schwars. By the individual, you mean Lansdale?

2

Mr. McManus. From Lansdale to a task force that was set

3

up under Bill Harvey, and Bill Harvey wain't really even part

of the clandestine service. In other words, hare wad'.Hrlms,

the Deputy Director of Plans, dandestine, and here is Mr. John

6

McCone up here as the Director. So all of this was going right

down into an organization, back and forth, courlers going,

8

meetings being held. It was odd organizationally.

9

10

MI. Schwarz. It was odd organizationally?

MI. McManus. Yes.

1)

MI. Schwarz. And perhaps odd from the point of view of

12

the personalities involved as well?

MI. McManus. Kather, yes, rather.

14

Mr. Schwarz.

We have

seen some of that.

15

Now you ware spending full time on Cuba and Mr. Harvey was

16

spending full time on Cuba. What proportion of Mr. Halms!

1'%

time want into Cuba?

Mr. McManus.

I would say very little, as a matter of

1'9

fact, excopt for responding to quastions

from around town ani

what the progress was, and what do you

think the future holy.

::. Otharwise, he was rather removed from it. I mean, he had the

2i Whole world to supervise from the clandestine point of view.

"ir. schwarz.

And you said something interesting that!

?:

hadn't understood before or huard before:

You said MI. Harle!'

was not really a part of the clandestine services. What did !

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mean by that?

MI. McManus. Well, organizationally, if you look at the

clandestine service, you have divisions and you have staffs,

and he was not in a division and he was not in a stati. A

special force, a task force, had been set up, so that organiza-

tionally he was the man nominally over them, and he was

receiving his orders, not from someone in the hierarchy, but

he was receiving them from a man outside of the organization

who had been picked by the Attorney General to be the commander

of this affort.

Mr. Schwarz. In other words, Langdale.

Mr. McManus. Ed Lansdale, General Lanadale.

MI. Schwarz. Okay.

Now, did you, after the Cuban Missile Crisis had been dadl

with and MONGOOSE was coming to an end, did you wIlte a

mamorandum about MONGOOSE, looking back over it and saying what

lessons we can learn, and so forth?

Mr. McManus. Yes, I did.

Ir. Schwarz. And who asked you to write that mamo?

Mr. MeManus. I don't think I was asked to writo this

pioco of paper. I was talking to llelms about problang that y

could foresee in the future, and we were discussing this, an

I said, you know, I ought to sit down and put this on a piere:

of paper. It would he much batter if I would put it on a pier:

of paper. So I just wrote a think piece. I didn't address it

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to anyone, I just wrote a piece of paper.

MI. Schwarz. Okay. Let's put in front of you as Malanus

Exhibit 3, a three-page

memorandum with your signature at the

end dated November 5, 1962, with some handwritina on the front

page, and stamped at the bottom 01110 to 01112.

Is that the memorandum ve were just talking about. Mr.

McManus?

Mr. McManus. Yes, that is the papar. That 1s the little

think ploce I wrote.

C:

MANO A PAUL

??

10

11

12

13

14

16

16

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(The document referrer!

to was marked McManug

Exhibit 110. 3 for

idantification.)

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Mr. Schwarz. And you gave that after you wrote it, and

you have recounted the conversation you had with Mr. Helms.

Did you give it to Mr. Helms?

MI. McManus. I gave it to him.. This 1a what I think.

yes.

r.

. Washinatan, D.C. 2000.1

6

Mr. Schwarz. And is it your understanding he then sant

It forth, sent it out to Mr. McCone, the DCI?

8

Mr. McManus. I think he either took it up to Marshall

9

Carter or perhaps he took it to John McCone. I think that is

10

what he intended to do after he read it.

11

Mr. Schwarz. But you don't know that one way or the

12

other, that is just your impression?

13

Mr. McManus. I don't think Mr. McCone was there on the

14

|1, 5th of November, and it is my recollection he gave it to

15

Marshall Carter.

16

Mr: Schwarz. All right.

17

Did Mr. Helms make any comments to you about the substance

10

of the memo?

MI. McManus. No, he did not.

He just thought I had som.

2. "

interosting ideas in here, and there aro some fairly sharp

?!

coinments, but I said that was my honest opinion, and I was

also making recommandationg here about organization, which i

felt was vary important.

2'4

1r. Schwarz. All right.

24

Now, part of the mamorandum deals with your understandin:

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of what happened, or what had been done during the MONGOOSE

2

program?

Mr. Melanus: Rlght..

4

MI. Schwarz. Lat me read to you the first sentence of

5

paragraph 4, "During the past yoar while one of the options of

6

the project was to create internal dissension and resistance

8

9

leading to eventual U.s. Intervention, a revlow shows that

policy makers not only shied away from the military Intervention

aspoct but ware generally apprehensive of sabotage proposals."

10

First question. Who did you mean by policy makers there?

11

Mr. McManus. I think when some aspects of MONGOOSP, began

12

to be ravlowed at a higher lovel, you know, all the war to

13

1÷

Dundy and across that level -

1r. Schwarz. Maxwell Taylor?

15

Mr. McManus. Yeah, that's rinht. .

16

MI. Schwarz. Robert Kannedy?

• 1%

MI. McManus. They felt that 10 GOOSF, vol know, the

Internal dissension and all is fine, hut we're not going to

!:

commit ary forces to invade cuba, and thy other aspect was

:: " that they didn't ever like the blea of a lot of sabotage.

because there were so many Cuhans, for examnla, even in flori:.

?, I and here wa had a big Strategle Air Command base dowa south o:

2!

Miami, I mean, there could hy all sorts of rataliation proble..

So guntially the feelina was, we ary goine to yo short of an:

21

sarious consideration of military intervention, and they were

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not very keen on sabotage operations.

Mr. Schwarz. I Interrupted your anuver to try to see who

you meant by the polley makers. You said persons on the level.

I think, of Bundy.

Mr. McManus. Well, I've got to be careful in saying, I'm

not - 1t is difficult for me to name, but I would say certainly

people who were concerned with these matters, the senior. people

in, government.

MI. Schwarz. The sendor people in government who were

concorned with these matters, who included Maxwell Taylor,

MCGeorge Bundy, Robert Kennedy, McNamara -

MI. McManus. Mil of thosa people, but I go on to say here.

it was only Taylor - if you could read the next sentence --

Mr. Schwarz. WYes. Will you read the next sentence into

the record and explain what you meant by that?

Mr. MCManus. Yes. I say, "The only sendor official

Involved outside of the Agency who thought in terms of militar!

action was Maxwell Taylor."

Mr.. Schwarz.: I quess

that speaks in terms sufficientlv

for itself.

Mi. McManus. That's right.

Mr. Schwarz. What did you mean by the sentance that

follows that? Maybe you could read that into the record and!

explain what you meant by it.

Mr. ichanus. It is difficult for me to put myself back a!."'

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many years, but I think at the time I had reached the conclusionl

you know, after the Missile Crisis was all over and I looked back

on it, I falt that a tremendous amount of the activity that har

bean carried on, intensive activity of all kinds, was really

almost game-playing, you know, it really wasn't that serious.

I mean, if you look back in the perlod, you will find that

• lot of people were criticizing the government for inaction in

Cuba, not doing something, not sending the Army in there, not

doing all these kinds of things. So Lansdale and his group

were active as hell in getting, you know, keeping a trothy

operation going all the time.

You know, there were things in

the paper about. Cuhans doing this, and we were trying to do that

about Cuba.. Actually, not very much was accomplished.

What I was worried about, on the intelligence side, was

the Sovist build-up which was coming to me through intelliaence

which is clear as a ball that this build-up was gradually

getting more intense, the Soviet presence was increasing, and

this was what -- you see, it wasn't this

flaw. It was those

:: Ruskies who were coming in there and solidifying thair

: position while wa were carrying on all these balloon operatio...

:: and Lord knows what.

21

Mr, Schwarz. And the froth, as you dascribed, that is

:: your charactorizatior of the MONGOOSE proram?

Mr. McManus. I would say that is what I thought at the

time I wrote this. I think that was what was going through ?:

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hand. This was my honest opinion.

2

Mr. Schwarz. Based upon your review of the project over

3

the months you were associated with it?

4

Mr. McManus. That is right.

5

Mr. Schwarz. Thank you.

6

Sanator Tower. (presiding). Are you through?

7

MI. Schvarz. Yag.

8

Senator Tower: Mi. McManus, in this think piece that you

did that we have been referring to.--

10

Mr. McManus. Yes, Senator.

11

Senator Tower. On page 3, the top of the page, "practica!!:

1:

everyone at the operating level agrees that Lansdale has 10st

13

his value. Bundy and Taylor are not improssed with him. Bill

14

Quinn and company obviously have his number, as do wa."

1:,

What was General Quinn's job? This is the only document

16

I've seen or looked at closely in which Bill Quirn's name

1'7

surfaces.

Mr. McManus.

I believe General Quinn at the time, to te

I best of My recollection, was than

running the Defense Intell:

gence Mency, Bill Quinn had been ir oss and had been with

2: the cIG many years ano and ssU. I know Bill quinn quite wel!.

2e' and I think he was in the hafense Intelligence Agency, of in!.

I cannot remamber what the organisation was at that time, h*

hes was the boss,

Senator.

2!.

Senator Tower. I fue.

So he was not necessarily dira.

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Involved in this Lanadale operation?

MI. McManus. Oh, no, sir, not at all, no. But I felt

that over there in the Defense Department there were other

people who shared the view that we had, I mean there were some

other senior people in the Department of Defense, Bill Quinn

being a man I had graatly respected and had worked for at one

time when I was a younger man.

Senator Tower. So actually what was happening was that

Lansdale was, in effect, through back channels, tasking Harver

directly, Is that right, but no reference to this paper.

MI. McManus. What was that, sir? Excuse me?

Senator Tower. Was Lansdale, through back channels, or

at least without going through the normal chain of command,

was directly tasking Harvey, is that correct?

Mr. McManus. This was the way it was set up and it was.

authorized. I mean, he wasn't cutting through any hierarchy

that he wasn't supposed to. This was set up that way. It was

a most unusual organizational set up, but that was because the

Attorney General was

running

the thing, and this was the wa!

he wanted it. He wanted Lansdale as his man to be in charge. c

i. run hard over this group, and that is what he did. He ran her!

?il over the group.

Senator Tower.

well, that, of course, I dont think there's

:: anything terribly unusual about that. I deal directly with

subordinates in my office.

2:.

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PhOne (Arne 202) 56

1

3

4

I yield to counsel.

Mr. Smothers. Mr. McManus -

Senator Towar. Excuse me..

Saritor Hart?

Senator Hart of Colorado. I have some questions, but go

6

ahead.

8

9

10

1:

Sanator Tower. I'm sorry, Gary.

Senator lart of Colorado. Not at all.

How large was Task Force W?

Мг. МсМалив.

I can't give you the figures right offhand.

Senator liart of Colorado. Roughly?

Mr. McManus. My recollection is that there must have beer.

betwean four and five hundred men in it. That is my recollec-

tion.

A10 F0s: 81001. 38.Mas9engi0r. D.C.20001

17

14

15

Senator Hart of

‚Colorado. All under Harvey 'e direction,

16

immediate direction?

1:

MI. McManus. I can't remembar when Harvey left.

Senator lart of Colorado. But when he was there.

Huh?

= .

Senator llart of Colorado, When Harvey was there, were

¿: tho four or five hundred men under his direction?

i: 1!

Mr. schanus.

Yus, yes, suro thyy were.

Senator llart of Colorado. How many of those were in

shhington as opposed to South Florida?

Мт. Мемапия;

Well, you've got me there. This is only a

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guess, and I may be wrong. let's split it fifty-fifty, two

2

hundred and two hundred, mybe, or it might be a little higher

in the Miami area.

4

Senator liart of Colorado. Since you ware involved, at

5

least to some degree, on MI. Helms' behalf in this whole

Cuban operation --

7

Mr. McManus. Yes, sir.

8

Sanator Hart of Colorado. Were there ever Washington

9

meetings of Task Force W where these 200, roughly 200 people

10

would got together and Harvey would lecture them, or anything

like that?

Mr. McManus.

I know that Harvey would hold stall meetirin

17

of the senior people.

1÷

Senator Hart of Colorado. And that would be about how

1'l many people?

16

Mr. McManus.

I would say five or six, probably.

17

Senator Hart of Colorado. Did you attend any of those

meetings?

12:

Mr. McManus.

I never attended any of those meetings, no.

Sanator llart of Colorado. To your knowledge, did the

Attorney Genaral ever pick up the phone and call directly in:

?.r.

Mr. Harvey of any of the senior peonle in Task Force W?

Mr. Mclanus. I really have no knowledge as to whether te

24

did or not.

25

Sanator lart of Colorado. But you don't racollect llarve!

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193RА (Aл00 202) 344

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aver saying to you, I Just talked with the Attorney General,

or anything like that?

MI. McManus. No, I don't. No, I do not.

4

Senator Hart of Colorado. Would Me. Helms ever have

5

attended any of these sendor staff meetings?

6

Мг. МеМализ. No, по в1r.

7

senator Hart of Colorado. But to pursue Senator Tower's

8

question, the link between Ganeral Lansdale and Mr. Harvey was

9

an institutional one? It was established that way?.

1C

MI. MCManus. Correct, that's correct.

1:

Senator lart of Colorado. It was Taylor to Lansdale to

1:

Harvey?

17

Mr. McManus. That's right, that's right.

1÷1

Senator Hart of Colorado. In MONGOOSE.

16

And what role did MI. Helms play in that link?

MI. McManus. He really wasn't involved in that link

::: directly. He was much off to the side, because was really ar.

:: employee of Mr. Helms.

Mr. Helms was his senior officer, but

again, on the other hand, he was taking his direction from

i someone

outside the organization.

Now I think you spoke, Serator, about Taylor, Lansdale.

et catera, as I remember 1t, it was more the Attorney General.

Lansdals. I think Lansdale had a very sort of close relation.

2:

ship with the Attorney General, and I think --I sort of brin

that out somewhere here.

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M5.. Schwarz. At the bottom of page 2 -

MI. McManus. Yes, I 80e.

Some paople sort of thought he was a mystic, you know.

Senator liart of Colorado. How did you gather this relation-

ship between Lansdale and the Attorney General?

Jas this representations that Lanadale made to you?

MI. McManus. Well, my first impression I had in this

meeting in the Attorney General's office, you know, you just

sanse people, that there's sort of a relationship, you know,

thera's a special relationship of some kind.

And I could fael that, Jeez, almost in the air, as far

as the Attorney Genoral and Langdale, and I knew that lansdal:

aftar hours and all, I knew from him, he would spend quite a

bit of time with the Attorney General, so I knew thare was more

just a ralationship of a general officar in the Pentagon and

the Attorney General. There was a close personal relationshi?

in. which Lansdale had, I would gay, a lot of influence, some

sort of influence.

That's why I say when sone of these ? that's why I sar

when some of these people thought he was a mystic, perhaps !

:::

don't got my point over to you, you know, but that is what I

2: il

thought. That

is why I put it in there. I, just wrote down wis

I thought, as I was writing it up for my organization, and !

124

wouldn't put anything down but what I thought was the truth.

21

Serator Hart of Colorado. Did you aver hear of the

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1

Special Group (Augmented)?

2

Mr. McManus. Sure, yes, sir.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Did you ever attend any of

those mestings?

5

MI. McManus. No, I never attended any of those, senator.

Senator. Hart of Colorado. Did you ever hear any discussions

whatsoever concerning the asgassination of Fidel Castro?

8

MI. McManus. Senator, I never heard any discussion of

9

20

1t at all, never. I never heard any discussion of assassina-

tion, at any

time, any plans, discussion or thinking of

assagsinatien. Never.

Senator

Hart of colorado.

Based upon your exparience in

1'! the CIA, could such planning or discussions have been conduc: el

at the Harvey level without your knowledge?

'Ir. Melanus, I'm not quite sure I understand that question.

1 6:

"Senator:

Could he have discussal it?

Senator liart of Colorado.

Could he and his sonior Tast

:: Force l people have been

plannina this or discussing it withs::

:: you finding out? .

:::

"I. McManus. Oh, I think that was -- yes, he could, i!

" that. was what he wished to do, but knowing Harvey. I don't

:.:

think he would have discussed it with verv many people. I

mean, he's not.

an articulate

individual as far as ryver! ini

* 1.

what he has in the tack of his mind.

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ROME (ASBE 202) 368

1

2

3

(General laughter)

MI. McManus. I do not think 'he would discuss 1t.

Senator Hart. of Colorado. You sald five or six people.

MI. McManus. I don't think he would discuss it with one

of them. No, I don't think he would

discuss it with them.

This is what I would call a need to know, a one man neod to

по.

...

410 4 1rs1 StaRes, 56, Warrenator. D C 2000.1

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

1:

li:

1.

::

Senator llart of Colorado.. Are you saying it's impossible

for five or six people in the Agency to plan assassinations

without it getting out?

MI. McManus. No, what I'm driving at, Senator, is that l

don't think that if he was planning assassinatnion, he would

not have that many people involved in his staff. lle minht

have a special little inside group who probably wouldn't know

wily they were doing scartain things. You know, he could give

then orders to do something, and they would carry out the

order. They wouldn't know what the end rasuit would be.

Senator Hart of Colorado.

And that could be done among

those few special people without others finding it out?

MI. Mclanus. •I suppose so. I'm just thinking in my

ordinary life, I ask people to do things without their

2:!!

knowing why or what my motive is, you know?

You could utilize individuals.

Serator Tower. Let me pursue Senator

Hart's question

just a step further.

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Was It standard operating procedure within the Agency to

compartmentalize to the extent that vary often people did not

specifically why they ware doing certain things? Perhaps one

person knew or four different people were doing something, but

those four had no knowledge of how it all fit together?

MI. McManus. I think that could be said on a need to know

basis, Senator Tower, that very often that something very

sensitive was going on, that people would have to carry out

certain orders without really knowing the honest reason for

it, you see, what the objective was.

Senator tower. During the course of your career in the ri

ward you aver tasked to do things without fully understandira

why you were doing it?

MI. McManus. Personally I don't

think that I over wag.

happened to enter the Agency in a fairly senior position

as a young man, and stayed there.

Senator Tower. Mr: Smothers?

Mr. Smothars. If we might, Mr. McManus, can we go back.

for

a minuty to General Lansdald and your characterization o!

him as a mystic along with a discusgion of the organizational

anomaly here of lansdalo's diract tasking of the Arency.

iould it be a fair statement of the situatlon to say ane.

apparently, based on a close relationship that lanadale har

Either with the Attorney General or the Attorney Goneral

President, that he had been nut in charge of a working arous.

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working group which Mr. Harvey represented CIA, and that it

was the vlow of the Agency that Lansdale's charter allowed him

to task. Harvay direct?

- .

Mr. McManus. Wall, there wasn't any question in my mine.

that Lansdale was able to charge the task force with whatever

ho wanted them to do. In other words, Lanadala was a General

without an Army, if you took Task. Force l away. When you but

1n Task Force W, that was his Army, and Harvey happened to be.

1f you call him a battalion commander or whatever he was, ther

was it. And Lansdale gave the orders.

Mr. Smothers.

Okay.

In the normal

Mr. McManus. Excuse me. I must -- excapt Insofar as the

organization and the task, force would be running in a normal

way a lot of clandestine operations, putting people ashore 1r.

boats and so forth, you

know, a continuina standard.clandesti..g

infiltration.

Mr. Smothers. Then in order to task. Marvey, it would roo

heve bean necessary

for Lansdale to qo through the DCI or

through lelms?

Mr. McManus. No. He -- as

I ramenher it, sir, there we:

, 24

?:couriers running back and forth batween Lansdals's office al!

Harvey's office continuously. I think the corraspondence?..

seen, you have correspondence in the file which shows the wi::

writing to one another back. and forth.

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59r041.

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Mr. Smothers. Let me then draw on your general experience,

2

Years of experience with the Agency and your familiarity with

3

both the method of operation of lialms, DCI and the other

principals at this time, to raise a few hypothetical questions

5

with you, if I might.

One, lot us assume that Mr. Harvey had, in fact, been

7

tasked by General Lansdale to develop assassination plans.

8

Is it your opinion that this. Information would have been shared i

with 11r. Helms by Harvey, and he would have gone to Helms and

10

said, this 1s what they've asked me to do, should I do 1t?

11

Mr. McManus. Wall, I really cannot answer that.

Mr. Smothers. Based on the operatiny procedure at this

1?.

time, as you knew it?

14

Mr. McManus. That would be difficult for me to answer

that question, really. I roally don't think I can answer thar

1c

or give you a reasonable answer.

1i:

Mr. Smothers. Lot's trv it this way, then.

1ё

Do you bellave that. Mr. Harvey would take stang to carry

i: out an assassination without informing Mr. Helms?

Mr. Hchanus. I really cannot answer for larvey, but !

i: think he would be a damned fool if ho didn't.

Mr. Smothers. Okay.

2:

Let me focus, then, on the relationshin between Mr. lul''.

and the Director, Mr. McCone, as you krew it.

Is it your opinion that Mr. Helms kyot. Mr. McCone full:

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Informed of the DDP activities?

2

MI. McManus. I always assumed so when I was -

MI. Smothors. Well, you noted here that your presance at

4

5

the January 19th meeting was for the purpose of making notes

so that the Director could be kept informed by Mi. Helma.

Wag that the normal course of activiey?

7

Mr. McManus. The reason I went along with llaime was that

8

I had already written a report about our current activities.

9

what had to be done. to improve the Intelligence gathering, and

10

-=

the Attorney Goreral apparently was aware that this was done.

1!

80 I went alona to represent this new idea of intelligence

1::

gathering. On the way over, Helms said, you'd better take

l some notes. I sald, fine, I'll take the notes. So I wrote l

this memo of the meating, and as soon as we got back, I had

it drawn Up -

15

16

Mr. Smothers. You wrote the memo for Helms' signature.

didn't you?

Mr. McManus. That's right, so he could take it to Mr.

:: ¡cone immediatel%.

Mr. Smothers. Has this connistant with llelms' normal

method of operation?

?:

Mr. McManus. As I remember it, yes. I always thoughe

that he informed the Director. I always tried to keep the

Diractor informed.

21;

Mr. Smothers. Realizing again that wa are in a hypotherienl

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$00

32

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5

6

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8

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10

11

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16

1i:

situation, and assume that there is, as there has been some

testimony to indicate, a conversation batween Mi. Harvey and

Mr. Helms regarding the question of assassination, and the

implamentation of assassination schames, would it be your

opinion that after determining an assassination scheme should

bo implemented, that Mr. Harvey and Mr. Helms would agree not

to inform Mr. McCone?

Mr. McManus. As I said, I always assumed that Mr. Helms

would kasp the Director fully informed of any activity that

he thought was sensitive or should be brought to his attention.

you know, any sensitive activity, any Information that was

developed that was important, as you would in any good

tion, disciplined urganization. I mean, I lust assumed that

any man in that position would keep the Director, who has

the Issponsibilities that he doss in this government, fully

informed. I mean, I would just assume that.

Thare is only one reason that I think he minht not that i

can think of, and that would be if someone told him not to tel!

him.

::

21 4

i.:

21

Mr. smothers.. If somyone told him not to toll the

Director?

• Mr. Melanus. If someone toll him, now l00k, I don't. wai!

you to bring John lecond into that. Who that somoone is, !

don't know, but it occurred to ma that this could happen.

Mr. Smothers.

In your opinion, is that the only cireunst.m.:

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#10 F0r11 59r091, S.E.. Washonaten, D.C. 2000.1

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In which MI. Helma would not inform the Director?

Mr. McManus. In my opinion, yes. Yes, sir, that is my

opinion.

Mr. Smotherg.

Ald right.

5

As you knew the Operation MONGOOSE. Cuba situation, who

would be in a position to advise Mr. Helms not to inform Mr.

McCone?

8

•MI. MeManus. I don't know. I really honestly don't know.

but -

10

"Mr. Schwarz. I thought he was going to finish his

1:

answer.

P5. McManus. I was searching my mind for why he wouldn'

1?

Inform Mr. Mecond. I can't think of any reason for not infor".

14

irg MI. McCone unless someone whom he thought was higher

15

authority told him not to.

Now, Mr. McCone

is one of the

1€

finest Directors I ever knew. He was a broad-gauged, sincere.

1:

morally strong individual, and I think that if a matter of

that kind had been brought to his attantior, he

would have

reacted violently immedia:aly, and Mr. Mccono had a areat

i Love for the Prasident o' the United Stitas, and ho sort of

looked at him in a way as an older son or a brother, a very

protective serse he had about the Presidert, President Kenne!:

and Mecone would have immediately said, lesus, this is a nur:

ballgame, number 1. Secordly, as ar individual, he would hu:..

2!.

found it morally reprahensible, see.

So I think that that.

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Pons (Aros P07) 344

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about summarizes my thinking on this.

2

Mr. Smothers. Lat me understand this, then.

3

Under most circumstances, and indead, under all circum-

s!under jou can imagine, lalma would have told verone, with

5

the excaption of a situation in which Helms had been told by

6

higher authority not to tell him.

Are we correct that far? Is that a correct statement, or

8

a correct summary of what you have said?

9

MI. Mollanus. Let me Just repeat, 1f I may, what I sald.

1C

I said the only reason I could think of that he would not

11

Inform him la that someone instructed him not to. Obviously.

it would be someone more senior in govarument, someone whom he

13.

i felt he ought to obey his orders, and who that is, I don't

14

know.

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Hasmoratiars, 098.20001

910+n4t41e

Mr. Snothars. Well, understanding Caneral Lansdale's

position now as coordinator, his ability to task the ClA, end!

undarstand Mr. Harvey's positior and his relationship to yr.

Helms, is it your opinior, even if lls. Helms had recolved a

I's " very clear directivy with regard to assasgiration from renora:

:. Lansdale or anyone on that lovel, anyone on the level balcw

i higher authority, or below the Cabinat lavel, that Mr. Helms

would have considared that sufficiant hasis to proceed with th:

.:: execution of an assasgination scheme?

Mr. Mallanus.

I really can't answer that, sir.

Tred!!"

don't -

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MI. Smothers. Hell, didn't MI. Helms have access, reqular

access, substantially higher than General Lansdale?

Mr. McManus. Well, I mean, MI. Helms used to go over to

all the time, you know. He was always in and around the white

5

HOUSe.

Mr. Smothers.. Nell, do you think he would have taken

7

Ganera! Lansdale's ordar to assassinate Pidel Castro without

6

checking 1t out, without seeing if Lansdale was correct?

9

Mr. McManus. Do I think that he would take Lansdale's

order? No, I don't think he would take Lansdale's ordor to

assassirate Castro, no. That's my opinion. No, I definitelv

:: dun't thirk he would have.

Mr. Smothers. Understand now, we are going on your

; understarding of the way things operated at this time, as well

as the operation of the Agency.

All right, lat's look at 'ir. Helms' contacts, then.

Did he meat regularly with the President?

• Mr. Mclanus.

Did he meet with the President? Yes, ho

met with the President a lot.

I've been

ir the office

• :.

when the President would call him on the phone and say.

Dick, what the hell's the story on this, I'm datting some

boilerplate from some other Devartments.

Ard

we would look

into it and renort to him preciselv, immadiataly.

Mr. Sinothurs. Those raportinas to the Presidert, did thi

sometimes occur on Mr. Holms' initiative, or did ho wait for

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the President to call him?

Mr. McManus. I think he usually walted for the President

to call him. I ramember one amusing incident when we rad

picked up some machine guns and I think it was the coast of

Venezuela, when Castro had landed there, when he was Interested

in stirring up trouble in the southern Hemisphere, and someone

sant one of these guns up to Headquarters and Helma was goina

ovar to see the Attorney General that day and he put the gun

in a little box he had there and took it over and showed

the

Attorney General, and I think the Attorney General called the

President and said I'm going to take Helma over to see you.

he's got a piece of equipment he wants to show you. I think.

you'd like to see it.

So they all know Halms there, the Secret Service and all.

you know, and, Christ, he walks right into the white House witt

this thing and into the President's office, and the President

took him and put it up, you krow, aimed around in the office

and said, losus, he said, Dick, you know, it's a good thing

you're a loyal subjoct.

So, this is the relationshin. I'm just trying to give

¿: "you the relationship there.

2r ! betweer. the President ard Richard Helms.

It was a close ralationship

:..

1r. Smotharg.

would vou describe the Islationshio betwe.:.

ii: Mr. ilelms and kobert Kennedu?

i :

¡r. cManus, I ryally can't. I tell ycu, l really ilor.':

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that much about it. I was never present at any other meetings.

I don't know what the relationship was.

Mr. Smothers. All right.

Let'a raise a question regarding some other actors

Involved here.

You have indicated in your memo that the opinion of Ceneral:

Lanadale was not terribly high in the Agency, and you seem to

Infer that he was simply tolerated by other persons based on the

fact that the President, or the President and the Attorney

General, had laid the mantle on General Lansdale for the

purposy of heading up the working group on Cuba operations.

Mr: McManus. Yes.

Mr. Smotherg.

You mentioned as one of the persons who

was trying going along, MI. Gilpatric who was then the Deputy

Secretary of Defense.

What wag

your understanding of MI.

Gilpatric's Involvement in the Cuha opgationg?

MI. McManus. I cannot answer that, but I just - at the

tima - it is hard for me to recollect, but somehow or other

I gathered a lot of this information ir. the Pantaron

and ov=r

at the whitt lousy and around, and I had a pretto good idea o

what people, how people had sized un Lansdale, and if I put i

in is phrase I would say they thought he was a wild man, you

say, dudl they her to 70 alone with him because the Attorney

Gonoral over there was pressuring them, you see? you damn wal!

have to cooperate with lansdale.

So he was tolarated. It was:':

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C.

Just within the Agancy. Excuse me. You see, it wasn't just

within the Agency, and the: reason I was making these recommenda-

tiong is that I wanted to protect our own organization.

MI. Smothers. How wall did you come to know the wild man.

General Lansdale?

Mr. McManus. Well, I met him on the day I went over to that

meeting, and I used to see him from time to time, and people

from the task force would come up to me and say we have this

paper from Lansdale. I don't know what the hell to do. And

I'll say, well, I'll give you a hand, I'll help you write it..

write a report for him.

Mr. Smothers. In your oninion, was General Lanadale doin':

things inconsistent with the desires of the Attorney General?

Mr. McManus. I cannot answer that question. I do not

12

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MI. Smothers. Well, you mentioned your observation of

the relationship between them, and you mentioned the fact that

the Attorney General was apparently pleased with General lans-

910 8 n0 510001.66. 0019-009000d.0000.s

:: dale.

It. MeManus. I don't know how pleased he was latar or..

but I think he was enamored of him in the sense that he trow...

2! he was a man capable of a lot of terrific activity that 1

suppost ambarrassed Castro. I raally don' know what he tho::.

at the and of ONGOOSE, I really don't know. But lansdale

certainly had his backing. As I say, Bobby kennedy was firho:.i

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his battle. Then I say in here, as recently as two weeks ago.

MI. Smothers. To the best of your knowledge, were any

of Lansdale's wild schemes or pokey schemes, as you described

them, over spacifically callad off and pulled back by the

Attornay General?

Mr. McManus. You see, I would not know about that.

Mr. Smothers. Well, you apparently formed some opinion.

though, about the amount of backing Lanadale enjoyed at the

time of this memo, at the time of your think piece, and if we

could go back to that time, is it your recollection at the

time of this think pisce that General lansdale still enjoyed

the confidence of the Attorney General?

Mr. McManus.

weld, I think I say in paragraph 9 on the

bottom of page 2, "Absolutaly no attempt on our part should lu

made to unseat Lansdals..

Remember that the Attorney General has

fighting Lansdale's battle as recantly as two weeks ayo."

So that, I mean, obviously I felt that there wasn't a thing

we could do about Lansdale, but organizationally, we could

protect a lot of our people from his depredations.

Mr. Smothers. Now this think piece is in November. You

2: first exposure to Lansdale is ir January of 1aia.

2:: . ir. McManus.

That's right, yes, sir

i!

Mr. Smothers, Based on your recollectior of the times.

and the state of minl or the conclusions that you apparant?"

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drew at the time of the November memorandum, would it be you:

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opinion that in August of 1962, General Lanadale did, In fact,

enjoy the confidence of the Attornay Ganeral?

Mr. McManus. Well, I would assure so. You see, I really

can't tell you that. I don't know. I would assume so, yes.

He was fighting his battles in November.

Mr. Smothers. Thank you. Nothing further.

Senator TOwer. Do you have any more, Fritz?

Mr. Schwarz. I do not.

Senator Tower. Thank you vary much, Mr. McManus. We

appreciate your appearance.

(Wharoupon, at 11:18 o'clock a.m., the hearina recesser. ).

WARD A

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January 19, 1962

- MEMORANDUM FOR: The DC 1

SUBJECT

: Mecting with the Attorney General of

the United States concerning Cuba

1. I attended a meeting at 11 AM today in the Office of the

Attorney Gencral which was chaired by him. Others present

• Brigadier Gen. E. S. Lansdale (OSD)

Major Patchell (OSD).

Brig. Gencral Craig (JCS)

Mr. D. Wilson (USIB

Mr. Frank Hand (CIA) and,

Mr. George McManus CIA.

(The Dept of State was not reprosented although invited)

2. The Attorney Gencral outlined to us "How it all started",

findings as they developed and the general framework in which the

U.S. Government would net attack the Cuban problem.

Bricly, these were the main points

(a) After failure of invasion, the U.S. Govt

relaxed and became less active on the basig "be

the to lay low".

(b) However drI the months the complexion

of the refugee flow changed (ie upper classes out

first then middle classes dropping to lower middle

class ate which, he stated, indicated a strong

focling of opposition to Castro within Cuba.

(c) Progress in Cuba toward a police state and

Conmunist state was more rapid during this period

than thist made by any country in Eastern Europe in

01.S.19

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radiations

an cquivalent period of time.

Hence, because of

the rapidity of advance, immediato action was

necessary.

(d) With these factors in mind Attorney General

had discussion at White House with President, SECDEF

(Taylor?) and Lansdale. SECDEF assigned Lansdalo

to survey problem and he' Lansdale reportod to Pres,

SECDEF and Attorncy General in latc November

concluding

I Overthrow of Castro regime was possible

Il• Sugar crop should be attacked at once

Ill Action to be taken to keep Castro so busy

with internal problems (economic, political

and social) that he would have no time for

meddling abroad (in Lalin America

detail

U.S. Covt was procluded from destroying the

current sugar crop (1) we were late and

overly optimistic and (b) "the assets of U.S.

Government were not as great as we were

led tó believe".

(e) Ascordingly a solutión to the Cuban problem

today carried

"The top priority in the US Gov't

-- all else is secondary --

no time, money efiori or manpower is to be spared"

(5) Yesterday (January 18, 1962) the President had

indicated to hiin "that the final chapter on Cuba had not

beenwritten" -- its got to be done and will be done.

(g) Thierciore the Atorey Gonoral directed those in

attendance à: the mecting in address themselvos to the

"'32 T'asis" (Sco progiam review

The Cuba Project

dated 18 Jan 1962) unallingly le said "It is not only

General Lansdalo's job 10 put the lasts bur your's to

carry ou with every resource at your command.

2

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3. The Attorney General inquired about the progress in establishing

& refugee interrogation conter at Miam! and was informed that this would

bo ready to start functioning initially by 15 Fob 1962 - the target date.

With respect to intorrogating the back log of Cubans we agreed that.

we would attack this problem by getting at the more rocent arrivals

first and work toward those who have been here longer. It was made

clear to the Attorney General that one could not rclate in time the

establishment of an interrogation facility with placing agents to live

in Cuba - in other words a body of information would have to be

developed over a period of intensive interrogation of many sources.

4. It was General Lansdales view that there were several tasks

amongst the #32 outlined upon which action could be taken without

awaiting this dotailed intelligence information. He noted for example--

the defection of top Cubans as being within the capabilities of the CIA.

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Gurner, 19 1962

the United Slates coneni

10.:

Prelim ES Landia lose

priz Ginsid Craig (JES)

Mr. s. Wilson

He Frank Hand (C/A) and

in Gurge MEManus_ 614.

Not pasmi

merristed

FAster The Atones, Geratel

intined to us

"How it all steits,

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state was more braid durem

this pens then that me l

-(<)

Sc Đét

series

in hate Noventin concludini

I Dinticer in Gastro burne

01.526

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detail

C

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dached at once

III action to be then to keep

Castro so busy with interned

_problems ectronic

lime for meddle

' US. Gourmat were hist

as greet as we were lei To.

в сочі!

• Die Cuben problen

is secondare

No time, mone

-

inel chapter on Cis, had it kin

written

= Vigot to be done

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. and will be done.

•(g)

sy àm nt ths i trnh ca

Etre met z vei taen

See prozsan sevieno.. The Cube

Projut ieted 18 gan 1562) unfllingtn

S hrat your cormand

abott tu plto pripne in

Gireres ininirex

a refuges saterinicin cnite e

lifrmeed tct this world

afetla g 15 0e 1907 z the

inlessos. Wrink

We oin e becllos Ci

A Cutisi

Whis pribtons las

the siote recant artivals

beon deie Koress. Otwao

Gerinei lice!"

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A mermitin wores

lure to be acmeloped ves a period

Aintercine estessogation Annery sour en

D It wis Geniest Lansdiles

view that there were severed

Tasks amongst the"

myon.which.actin. coull be

It ken without detes os auritin

in is:

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, 80., pes do!,.

: ) 600886608

Di. s oug

Whea the Presideat, le his lotter to Khruahchev of 27 001068

gave "assurascos against invasion di Cubal la consideration of tiay

Soviut ramoval of olicnsive weapoa, in Cuba undar UN suparvision,

Operation iongooso was on its death bod. When the Prosidunt starid

in his lotier of 23 Octosar to Karushchev, "I conaidar my letier to

you of 27 Ociober a1d your reply of ioday as a firra undertaidag.on

the pars of bolh our governaeata which abouid ba promptly carried

ou:" Cperation Hongoune died.

2. Il tbego agreoments ará carziod ous li soemo clear i2a:

Cusa wili de deals wich as another deniad arca lo a maaner duleran3

20: g=eady from shat ia which Cllhandles oler dezied Jr8ag. II

1jo agieemesia aro not carriad out, miliiary action cannos long be

d=layed. Ia nicher event she siongoose yiruchure ad ll has u cxisied

In Covernzent is sbrougà.

1.5

3. Lo0kiag bacio to tho origina o1 Mosgooso ono findo lbe

• Miornoy General and Nº. Mcivarara doekiag primarily to =emove

lhe political auais lui: on the Uresident by tos Bay ol Pigs failuca.

Bolb the A.G. 20d Ibe Secrelary of Defense iul: li necessasy for

pulitical rsascas tbat some actica dalti be tason svila rsspeci to

Cuba to ingure lao Prenidest's luiurs. In a nuiinell, lauy wero out

1o. duna CaglIo 0= 10 mile him cocceraie.

isoy

Sieeoi

Vles

1. Duriag ine pase year, waile one dí the obiiona ci ihe project

was to ciead interaal diayonsion and renighaca leiding io ivestal

U. S. intervention, a review snows that policymaicors noi cnly sried

away from lio milicary intarvention aspect sut were geaurally aapre-

hengive of saborago proposala.

Tho only sezior olicial iavolved,

ou:sido the Agency, who laought in terme oi roilisary iczos waa

Naxwell Taylor.

Orhero llce loo Attoracy Geseral, MlcNanara,

Gilpatic, ichayon aad laic: Buady viewed the project in a arrichly

poiizical ligc:. Hindsiget musi cow revoal :o ochars, as well as it

hau :ouo, tbas a Caisi al Operaziona (i. 6. Lazudalo) was seve:

acrinlly neeced.

5. ist presen: uo genio: U.S. Guveranist officialiicuad 20wn

jo intamaysud in d éuture "Cubia difairo Speciai Groug." Lundy has

ilicady dubjosiad ina crsalios in Saio of i "Citico ci Cusin Eaio

Aiiaiay" or"Fre:

Cugin Aidtag" which in itocli id a move ouisida

¿l iho ilciçoude strucruroe dli clandestiae ascorities di ind porc.od

ze ü,

0!1:0

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TTI: continue ar a orald down?

ficant drops have bees taxes

the Agency togeiber with the military for contingency planing MUSLA

bag mored into the propaganda flaid under State guidasce without

relation to she Mongoosa atzucture. Mongoose cas only live agala

through "resurrection. "

6. Given these circumstances and in the ligàt of great pressures

elsewoore in the world CLA, interaally, should move with great

rapidity to distaace Tass Forca W from any criernal accoss. This

would iavolve regularizing or institutionalling TEW in order that

this uniquo group whica bas been available to Lanadalo ay a "whippiag

boy" becomas a normal pari oí our monolitaic Agency structure. By

such a movo, nuilha, Laasdale nor anyone else could got at these

rosources wichou: golog through regular chasiola. Vichia CLA we

would retura Cuba to the Weutara Hemisphere and treil Cuba ag a

deniod irea and relaio in to over-all WH problame. ('Ihroughout

Projec: Mongoose, this is precisoly tao manner in wnich Stata bas

handled the problem. As a result Langdale never felt that he had

troops la Stato as de did is CLA.)

7. La accomplishing this, the only analosy I can thins of is a

We should not go through buzkruptcy which would

have to be announced, bu: rather paay TEW through an inpublicizud

recelversaip sad raorganization.

Tho naud to realiga mangowod dua

asseto lor demaada in olier areas would be mufticient reason in itsei.

Ihe current stand down in a pericci suiting for such a chauge in

r.

8. Concurrently, ida DOI should endorse Bundy's suggestion

and be sould encourage the immediate establishmen: of an Oilice of

Cubas Exile Affairs in State. This would relieve ClA oi one of the

mos! annoyiag and issolidle problemy we have laced. Tais would

place problaras of proposed Cuban Govaramca: structures, provisional

goveramests, platoras, exile polises, and ine like rigai whore they

balcaz - in le Departmeat o1 State.

•..-9. Absolutely no attempt on dur pure should be tride to undeat

Lansdio. Homerser taat the anomy Goreral wis Hirring Langdaio'

ba:do so recently no poo weeks ago. Secondly, Mediamara dad

Gilpatrio mill look upon canadale ad something di i mayotic and are

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€81:182

Gooral: practically varyone it the sporadag toval astras

Chat

Lansdals has lost his value. Buady and Taylor aro not impressed

with hia.

Bill Quirs and company obviously have his numoor as do

With a pollaical soludon to the Cubas problera la hand reflocting

grea: credit on the part of the President, the A. C. will drop Laaudalo

Ilke a hot brick. Therefors, while awalring the outcome of the Cuban

talks, we munt ai dacs desy Langdalo dEscLaccess to TEl.

Lassdalo can bave accasa as to all other ClA componesia ibrougà

the DCl during tha stand dowa period.

10. Lasadale's reaction io any reassigament is ast to be a

violen: ono.

Ho undoubiadly realizes tha: be never again will do

In toe position os a special advisor to tha two most poweríul men in

the country.

Therefore, if wa don't closo ranks within ClA and put

TEW boynad aig reach without delay (except tarouga the DCI) he

• saigài be ablo to icílict serious dazago to CLA's standiag boiora bis

eventual demigo.

11. To sumarize, the following action 13 required:

D. Interaally, lastdoaalice IFlY. Grate it la2o WH.

(Defense ill then loos lo DIA lor intelligaaco and DIA tO U9.)

3. Dash (torougà ise Dil and Lundy) for the immodiaio

ciablonnent of to Olice vi Cuban Sailo Aiiai=s 1n 29c

Departnest of Sia:a.

Guis HElle

180051962

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