From: DIRECTOR, FBI
Document date: 00/00/0000

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File #:

62-116395

Serial Scope:

1474-EBF

HH

55165

DocId: 32989586

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1474

KHS:

36

62-13630

Poe

Atborney

- 2011F

11.8CK

nure (sco)

c'SC jet 1/7/76 rogst ortain materials Enem

2DE:

Anolosed for ur aproval

E Forwarding to

SS.

Ls oriainal of mmo which constitntes Sil response

no nee

for material

not forth in pazzores tuo

memo is belug:

: Eurashe

for ur recordar

along wily

bet of materials

Gelivered to sso with mino-

Page "2

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62-126395-

The Attorney General

Tittenal: 2/3214

C. SO SAUCE SALECT. CONIE

DER ON INTAGICIICE ACCIVI-

IXES: (SSC)

Re SOC let 1/7/76 reget certain materials from

Enclosed for ur approval & fowarding to SS

Us oriainal of nemo which conscitutes Du rogponse

oral 2 of rend

nt for material sot forth an pacegrari tro

loc.

"copy of

this mono is being;

Lucasha

for ur records, along with

set of materials to bu

delivered to

SSC

with nemo,

tie!

55165 DocId: 929

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## Page 4

SSC request 1/7/76

re changing of

Section

87, MOI

Retain for file

14771

* 55165 DocId:32989586 Page 4

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## Page 5

OPTIONAL PORM NO, 10

MAY 19GZ BUITION

s0to-106

OSA GEN, RIG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVER

MENT

Memorandum

TO

FROM

Mr. C. D. Brennants

Ro D. Cotter Palme

DATE:

SUBJECT: DEPARTMENT OF

JUSTICE GUIDELINES

t.

ON INTELLIGENCE GATHERINE ACTIVITIES

3/18/71

dater

Tolson -e

Sullivan -

Mohr -

Bishop -

Brennan, C.D..

Callahan.

Casper -

•Conrad _

Dalbey -

Felt

• Gale

Rosen -

Lavel -

•Halters -

Soyars _

Tele. Room.

Holmes -

Gandy -

Article in the New York "Daily News," attached, reported

that a top Justice Department official had admitted that FBI Agents follow no

"specific, published, or regular guidelines when they spy on civilians they

suspect of being trouble makers." This refers to inquiries being conducted

by the Senate Constitutional Rights Subcommittee. The article further reports

that 'the gathering of intelligence on civilians" was turned over to the

Justice Department, particularly the FBI, following revelations that the

Army had "overstepped its bounds" in gathering intelligence on/ civilians.

It is further reported that Senator Ted Kennedy was told that the FBI did

not have any specific regular guidelines to follow, only "some internal

working papers." Kennedy then told a Justice representative that Justice

efforts fall short in protecting the rights and liberties of the American people.

The Director inquired "What about this? H."

In the first place, FBI Agents do follow specific published

guidelines in conducting investigations.; Our investigations are based on

Executive Orders issued by the President and on specific statutes passed

by Congress. We do not conduct random "spying" on civilians. As a

matter of fact, our investigations are controlled to insure we do not invade

the constitutional rights of citizens. For example, in the field of technical

surveillances no installation of technical devices can be made until approved

by the Attorney General. We neither investigate nor report on legitimate.

activities of any group..

Enclosure

REC-2I°

1-10741.

BAW:ekn

This document is prepared in response to your request ancis got for

dissemi-

nation artsin

your committee.

I's use is limited to offinal proceedings by

(13)

your Commi:

and the content may not be disclosed to unawAY petsbu

/- fires:

nel without the express approval of the FBl.

i - Mr.

W.

C. Sullivan

1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan

1 - Mr. J. P. Mohr

I - Mr. Shackelford

1 - Mr.

Bishop

• I - Mr. G. C. Moore

1 - Vir. Rosen

1 - Mr. Gray

1 - Mr. Gale

1 - Mr. R. D. Cotter

1 - Mr. Dalbey

da....uet

1 - Mr. Wells

59 MAY 2 4 1971 MAY 24 1971

CONTINUED - OVER

I Sios Dood: 32969566

•3/c

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## Page 6

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. Brennan

RE: DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE GUIDELINES •

ON INTELLIGENCE GATHERING ACTIVITIES

Concerning the allegation that the FBI assumed

Army's "function" of "spying on civilians," this is not true. You

will recall that the military received wide criticism for their activities

in investigating and compiling files on civilians. As a result, the

Defense Department sharply curtailed military intelligence gathering

activities. This did not increase the Bureau's responsibilities or

activities. We assumed no Army function. As set out above, our

I responsibilities are based on Executive Orders and statutes.

While it is true that the Department of Justice does not

furnish specific published general guidelines to the Bureau, it is also

true that the Department does review this Bureau's work. In all cases

information developed by our investigations is furnished to the Department

for its consideration as to violation of Federal statutes and possible

prosecution.

Senator Kennedy's statement shows his animosity to

the Bureau. It implies that the Bureau is "violating the civil rights of

the American people." This, of course, is utterly without foundation.

ACTION:

For information.

2

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## Page 7

FBR

s Can

1FT UNE VAN RIPER

Machington, darch 17 (NEWS

Buycan) — A top Justice Depart-

men. offcial admitted today that

agents solom no "specise,

publishei, or regalar guilclines

wher. ticy any on civiliars they

suspret of being troublenakers.

This disclosure from_ Robert

•Mare in, risistant attorney gen-

se Sur interna, security, brought

a series or angry charges from

Sens. Sam d. Ervin (D-a.C.) anc

Eirrari d. Kennedy (D-slass.).

Hardian apeared Lefore Ervin's

constitutional richis subcommit.

teo along with Wiliam H. Rehn-

guist, ass.stunt attorney general

fin the Justice Deartment's office

legal

counsc..

Jardian was

questioned sharply about the pro-

cedures sortowed

by the depart

ment to sather intelligence on

civilians. That function has been

anded over to the Justico De-

partrient-the FBI in particular

folloring revelations that the

sorernmeit's previous civlien

sroopers, Army intelligence, al-

legediy oristepping its bounds

in putting •ugether cossiers on

suspected tronblemakers.

ehnguist, wao during his last

appearence before

Darin's panel

maintained that ine government

has the right to spy on arsbody

It wants to whenever it svauts to,

conceded tit some

spyiag

by

by governa: int agcnts

was

prekensible" and

"illigitimate."

doBut I chen't think it violates

constitulion l rislali, Delunguist

Ervin Disagrees

generally acknowiedged

by his

Fis Serate colleases as a

expert

consticutional law,

cunt agrec.

«There isn't a syllable (in i

Constitution) that gives the go:-

cranen:

right to sny

civicans,"

" he said, procecding to

5o scarqust a lecture lu an.

parently

hah.

been saving since

the officia."'s

last appearance.

"It I undristand your position,

Cre Govern: ent could put a tail

on me,

me clerguhero 1

1.01,

8881r16y

114" 9916,

A DoId: 329095

con'", thirk the P

cutalica

tha power to use LEe

mitaty to

- perform the funution of a nationa:

police force," Ervii wont on, al-

luding to provicus testimory from

former Army intelligence agents

that they

spied

oi lundreds of

individuals includig pulic 115-

Ires

like

then schatonni candi-

date Adlai Steverso: 3.

Kennedy

Grestone Jiardiar

ion how the dustro bopartment

hoped to avoid the "abuses" at-

tributed to the Arniy now that it

has. tho resporsibility of leeping

tabs on civilians.

When

Kennedy rus told that

ithe N'BI did not have any "spe-

cific, published, regular

guide-

lines" to follow. — outy some in-

tanal working papers and

sithe

same judgmental inctors of any

reasonable: human being,"

;the

Senator dociared:

• "It appeara you are just wash-

ing your hands of'any responsi-

bility for the surycillance that has

taken place in the Justice Depart-

meet short

• your ciforis fall woe-

protecting. the

rights and liberties wrich

the

mercan people.

believe

are:

Sen. Sam!!

Erris 113

Question Iratie

- Sen. Edward

Kennedy:.

105 1

FATEN DAT!

REC,21

Tolson _

Sullivar

•Sohr -

Pinhop -1V4

allahan 1

Dalbey YET

Joyars

Tele. Roon.

Holmes

Gandy

What alout

this?

The Washingtun Post

Times Fiendid.

The Washinyaur Daily News -

The Evening Year (Washington)

The Sunday Avar (Wahington F2

Daily News isew York).

Sunday Ne:: (New York) _

New York Pust

The New Yor: Times.

The Daily Furd

The New Liceuer

The Wall Ferret Joumal.

The Nations. Observer

People's it is:d

Madir. 1 8 1971

Date

467:.

-1819

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## Page 8

OPTIONAL : DAM NO. 10

0-108

051 6N. 110.N0.37

*UNITED STATES GEVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mir. W. C. Sullivan

1 - Mr.

J.

.

Mohr

1 • Mr. 1. E. Bishop

Folger

Surlivar

None -

O Bighow

Bronsan. C.

Cullahan

Casper

Conrad <

TO

Nr. C. D. Brenna!

DATE:

March 20, 197k

I 2. D. Cotter p

1 - Mr. A: Rosen

1 - Mr. Gale

1

- Mr. Dalbey

SECT- GUIDELINES FOR FBI INVESTICATIONS

1 - Mr. Brennan

Walters

Soyars

Tele. Room -

Holmes -

Gandy

1 - Mr.

Shackelford

•==--- .

1 - Mr. G.C. Moore

My memorandum 3/18/71 stated that FBI Agents follow

specific published guidelines in conducting investigations.

Mr: Iolson inquired "What are they?"

Guidelines in conducting investigations are furnished

to the field in the "Manual of Instructions," the "F.B.I. Handbook, "

and in letters to All Special Agents in Charge. Inaddition,

guidance is also given the field in Bureau communications on

specific cases.

The "Vanual of Instructions" sets out specific guide-

lines for all matters investigated by the Bureau.

yor example,

Section 122 covers investigation of racial matters,

includine

the

investigation of Klan and white hate groups. Section 87

furnishes specific guidelines for the security investigation of

groups and incividuals. In accition to setting out desired

investigation on these matters, the "Manual of Instructions,"

also sets out restrictions on investigations.

for example, in

regard to white hate groups and Klan matters it is specifically

pointed out that extreme care must be exercised to insure that

no investigation is conducted of groups or individuals who merely

support unpopular causes and that no investigation must be

conducted which will infringe on the Constitutional freedons of

speech, press or assembly. Investigation is confined to

organizations and individuals actually or allegedly using force

or violence to deny others their Constitutional rights.

Security investigations contain many restrictions.

FOr

example, sources and informants connected with an institution of

learning cannot be contacted on campus. Bureau authority is

required prior to developing such sources.

Photographic

"surveillances in security matters must receive Bureau approval

1 - MI. A. W. Gray

REC-21

nation artside your Committer.

BAN:as f

our comm

ПРОМАРИ

109795862 Pae 8,4 1971

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## Page 9

Nemorandum to Mr. C. D. Brennan

RE: GUIDELINES FOR FBI INVESTIGATIONS

Bureau authority is necessary prior to investigating communist

infiltration of a political organization. In the case of the

investigation of communist infiltration of a labor union, the

instructions clearly point out that thé Bureau is not interested

jin legitimate union activities.

Our instructions also contain numerous other

restrictions to protect the rights of individuals. For example,

no technical surveillance can be instituted without Bureau

authority; Agents cannot engage in improper, illegal,.or

unethical tactics in developing information; Agents cannot

misuse their credentials; Agents cannot visit trials or other

court hearings merely for the purpose of satisfying personal

curiosity; when testifying as a witness, Agents are instructed

to testify clearly or without bias or exaggeration; critical

complaints concerning Bureau personnel must be thoroughly

investigated; and personnel cannot engage in any conduct

prejudicial to the Government.

ACTION:

For information.

glin

2

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-÷

MaNO, 10

SeN, RE:. 110. 2

UNITED STATES G

ERNMENT

Memorandum

1

- Mr.

W.C. Sullivan

1

- Mx.

Mohr

1

- MX.

Bishop

: Vr. C. D. Brennan

DATE:

3/25/71

FROM

:1..D. Cotter Medio

Tolson

Sullivan

Mohr -

Bishop

Brennan, C.D.

Callahan

Casper

Conrad

Dalies

Felt S

Gale -

Rosen

Tavel

Walters

Soyars

• Tele. Room.-

Holmes -

Gandy -

SUBJEC

'GUIDELINES FOR FBI

INVESTIGATIONS

1 - Mr.

Rosen

1.- Mr.

Gale

- Mr.

Mr:

Dalbey

C.D. Brennan

-

Mr.

Shackelford

1

Mr.

G.C. Moore

-

Mr.

Mr.

Branigan

Wannall

-

Mr.

Gray

- Mr.

Cotter

1 - Mr. Wells

not for dissemi-

proceedings by

This document is arerired in response to your request

is limited to official

be disclosed to unauthorized person

Committee.

and the content may not

approval of

nation outsile

your committee

nel without

The Director has requested a memorandum concerning guide-

lines for FBl investigations and, as noted on attached article from

"The Washington Post," has stated

we must get together all our

guidelines.

Guidelines in conducting investigations are furnished

„to

the field in a "Manual of Instructions,"

Of Instructionin chargonmunications

In addition,

• /

guidance is also given.to the field in Bureau communications

on-

specific cases.

The Bureau's jurisdiction to conduct investigations

arises from statutes and presidential directives.

There are attached memoranda from the Domestic Intellagence

Division, the Special Investigative Division and the General!

Investigative Division setting out specific guidelines under whach

investigations are conducted by those Divisions.

noted

that our guidelines on

addition to setting out the investigation desired in each matter

also contains restrictions to insure that we do not violate theg

constitucional rights of any individual ana to prevent investigagons

from becoming "fishing expeditions."

For examp"e,

in security investigations, no investigation

is conducted merely because an

"individual or group supports an

unpopular cause.

Bureau authority is required prior to conducting

a photographic surreillance, prior to investigating the communist

infiltration of a

•political

organization, and prior to developing

sources connected with an institution of

learning. Sources

connected with

an

institution of learring cannot be contacted on

the campus and

individuals under the age of 18 cannot be developed

as sources.

He not vestigate ambassadors or heads of permanent

Enclosures

REC 70 later.

1971

7-10110

28

5 APR 27 1971

61M/5: 92

At.

RINCLESURE

CONTINUED - OVER

Doent

-J2980586

Page

10

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## Page 11

02250

Memo to Mr. Brennan

RE: GUIDELINES FOR FBI INVESTIGATIONS

fissions to the United Nations. Department of State clearance and

i reau authority are necessary prior to the investigation of officials

, Lad diplomatic representatives of foreign countries. No surveillances

are conducted at the white house, the capitol, the supreme court,

or the House and Senate Office Buildings. Our investigation of

black nationalist groups and individuals is limited to those who take

an extremist anti-U.S. Government position and whose activities have

or may involve them in disturbances or subversive activities. We

do not investigate individuals on the basis of their membership in

organizations which do not advocate the use of force.

Concerning criminal intelligence and organized crime

I matters, investigations are conducted to develop and

maintain current

Intelligence on the activities of organized crime and the development

of substantive cases against individual racket figures.

These

investigations are highly selective and

are concentrated on the

leaders of organized crime and their associates.

is afforded.

Close supervision

The use.of court-approved electronic surveillances

requires the approval of the Director and the Attorney General (AG)

and the ultimate authorization by court order.

In the matter of applicant investigations, specific guide-

lines have been developed to protect the rights or individuals.

Favorable information concerning an individual must be obtained, as

well as unfavorable; investigation is limited to checks of pertinent

records and interviews of individuals in a position to furnish

relevant information; persons furnishing derogatory information are

requested to furnish a

signed

statement; we make no evaluation or

recommendation concerning the applicant.

Our investigative jurisdiction in criminal cases is based

on specific violations of Federal laws. Investigations are conducted

when information is roceived indicating a violation of a Federal law

within our investigative jurisdiction has occurred. The results of

our investigatios are submitted to the United States Attorneys or

the Department of Justice to determine whether prosecutive action

is justified. The course of prosecutive action is determined by the

United States Attorny or the Department of Justice. A decision may

be made to present te case to a Federal

grand jury or whether the

facts justify the arrest of the subject. When the subject is

arrested it is on the basis of authorized prosecution and the

issuance of a warrant.

When the subject is arrested he is brought

before the nearest Commissioner or Magistrate or Federal Judge in

accordance with established rules of Federal criminal procedure and

• the law.

- 2 -

CONTINUED - OVER

HH 55165 DocId:32989586 Page 11

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## Page 12

Me to to Mr. Brennan

RE: GUIDELINES FOR FBI INVESTIGATIONS

Requests for FBI investigation in selected civil matters also

a received from the Department and/or the United States Attorneys •

i' cases in which the United States is a party in interest and are handled

is accordance with guidelines furnished by the Department. Civil rights,

tIer. tion laws, and antiriot law investigations are handled in strict

conformity with detailed guidelines furnished by the Department.

In addition to these, our guidelines contain numerous other

restrictions which apply to all phases of our work. For example, no

technical' surveillance is instituted without Bureau and Departmental

authority; Agents cannot engage in improper or unethical tactics; Agents

must testify in court clearly and without bias and critical complaints

concerning Bureau personnel must be thoroughly investigated.

Authority to arrest fugitives is statutory. U. S. Code empowers

(Agents to make arrests and tarry firearms and the Bureau's policy is to

only use that force which is absolutely necessary to affect the arrest of

the person to be arrested and show due regard for the safety of the

arresting officers and bystanders. Our guidelines are that Agents are

not to soo any person except for the purpose of self defense.

ACTION:

For information.

Shes

WASS

= 3 -

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## Page 13

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1: Racial Matter

2. Development of Informants

• 3. Internal Security - Nationalistic

Tendency

4. Security Investigations

5. Espionage

6. Criminal Intelligence and

Organized Crime

7. Selective Service

8. Fugitive Investigations

9. Applicant Investigations

10. Criminal and Related Investigations

1

2

4

5

.6

8

19;

10

_ HH 55165 DocId: 32989586

Page 13

ENCLOSUAL

1:304787-1816

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## Page 14

RACIAL MATTERS

in Section 122 of the Manual of Instructions. This Section

sets out guidelines for investigation of klan

and white

hate groups and individuals, the developing of intelligence

concerning racial developments and disorders, and the investi-

gation of black nationalist organizations.

Concerning the investigation of klan and white

hate group matters, investigation is limited to groups and

individuals who have adopted the policy or have actually

or allegedly conspired

or committed acts of violence to

deny others their constitutional rights. We specifically

point out that investigation is not to be conducted merely

because a group or an individual supports unpopular causes.

Officials at or above the state level of these groups cannot

be interviewed without Bureau

authority. Individuals

employed in the news media, educational, or the radio or

television industry cannot be interviewed without Bureau

authority.

Our investigation of black nationalist groups and

Individuals

is limited to those individuals and organi-

zations that take an extremist anti-United States Government

position and whose activities have or may involve them in

disturbances and/or subversive activities.

Bureau authority

must be obtained prior to interviews of leaders of such

groups or of individuals who are connected with civil rights

organizations, educational institutions, news media, and

religious groups.

Bureau authority is also required prior

to interview with individuals affiliated with foreign powers.

Instructions in Section 87 of the Manual of Instructions

dealing with the investigation of subversive organizations

and individuals are also followed in these investigations.

Information 10s0 not pertain to faction 87, n0I,

HN 55165 DocId:32989586 Page 14.

-=

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## Page 15

DEVELOPMENT OF INFORMANTS

Development of informants in security matters is

handled under Section 107 of the Manual of Instructions.

Development of racial informants and sources is handled

under Section 130 of the Manual of Instructions.

A discreet background inquiry is made on

individuals being developed as informants. All informants

are advised that they are not Bureau employees and that

their assistance is strictly voluntary. It is also stressed

that the informant's relationship with

the Bureau is to be

kept confidential. If the informant is connected with a

labor union, it is stressed that the Bureau is not interested

in legitimate union activities and he is not to report on

them.

Informants who are connected with institutions of

learning,

as students, are not contacted on the

Individuals inder the uge of l& are not developed as security

informants. In addition, each informant must be approved by

the Bureau.

Information das not pertain to Section 87, nOI,

• 2 -

H# 55165 DooId:32989586 Page 15

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## Page 16

INTERNAL SECURITY - NATIONALISTIC TENDENCY

Guidelines for these investigations are set out in

Section 105 of the Manual of instructions. Basically, these

investigations concern foreign intelligence matters,

including

Soviets and Cubans. Investigations are initiated when infor-

mation is received indicating subversive or intelligence

activity in the United States on the part of an individual

or an organization having definite foreign interests or

connections.

heads of permanent missions to the United Nations are not to

are obey e that que seasons are noe

any individual who is employed in the news media, entertain

official; a labor leader; connected with a foreign government

establishment, has diplomatic status, or is employed by the

United Nations or other international organizations; or is

employed by an institution of learning.

In addition, Department of State clearance and

Bureau authority is necessary prior to interview of a

diplomatic courier or the active investigation of officials

and diplomatic representatives of foreign countries.

Inter-

view of students from communist countries is prohibited

without Bureau authority.

Investigation is not initiated concerning contacts

• with communist officials if the person doing the contacting

is a member of Congress or the Supreme Court, is an official

representative of other countries or is a student of the

high school or below level. No physical surveillances may

be conducted at the White House, the Capitol, the Supreme

Court, or the House and Senate Office Buildings without

specific authority from the Bureau.

Infarmation doss not pertain to Section 87, NOT.

-3-

HH 55165 DocId:32989586 Page 16

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## Page 17

SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS

Guidelines for these investigations are set out in

Section 87 of the Manual of Instructions. Basically, the

investigations are for the purpose of determining the

identity and activities. of groups and individuals who are a

threat to the internal security of the United States.

Guidelines specifically prohibit photographic

surveillances without Bureau authority; investigation of

political organizations without Bureau

authority; investi-

gation of organizations connected with institutions of

learning without Bureau authority; investigation of a

noncommunist organization which is communist infiltrated

without Bureau authority; investigations based on membership

in organizations which do not advocate the use of force;

the investigation of faculty members without Bureau

authority; and the interview of students, faculty members or

employees

of institutions of learning without Bureau

authority.

In addition to these prohibitions, sources who are

students or employees of institutions of learning cannot be

contacted on the campus and investigations are not to be

conducted with local law enforcement agencies without

Bureau authority.

• 400

HH 55165 DocId: 32989586 Page 17

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## Page 18

ESPIONAGE

Guidelines for espionage investigations are

contained in Section 36, Manual of Instructions.

Our

investigations include both the investigations of

violations of the espionage and related statutes for

prosecutive purposes

and the gathering of counterintelligence

novade adequate protection to da nate detecons as to

information.

Investigation of diplomatic or other foreign

official or personnel, including persons who are employees

of international organizations,

, cannot be instituted without

prior Bureau authority. Investigations must be complete,

thorough, and expeditiously handled and the Bureau kept aware of

all developments

As a general rule, espionage subjects

cannot be interviewed without prior Bureäu authority.

We make no investigation of the administrative

misplacement, misfiling, or a loss in transit of classified

documents.

Informations does sat agely to Jectar 87, nOI.

• 5 -

NG 55165 DocId: 32989586 Paye 18

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## Page 19

CRIMIÑAL INTELLIGENCE

• AND

ORGANIZED CRIME

These investigations are divided into two principal

categories:

(1) the development and maintenance of complete

...and current intelligence on the activities of organized crime

In this country, and (2) the development of substantive cases

against individual racket figures, making use of various

Federal statutes providing the FBI a jurisdictional basis

in this specialized area of criminal activity.

-. Of nécessity the Bureau's organized crime program

has been carried on with a considerable degree of selectivity,

in that there are literally tens of thousands of individuals

in this country whose daily pursuits involve the promotion of

some form of organized crime.

Therefore, we have concentrated

on the leaders of organized crime and their associates on

whom we have developed specific Federal violations. In

concentrating on the control elements in organized crime, such

cases receive close supervision, with continuing central

direction from Bureau Headquarters.

The more sensitive the

Investigative lunction, the

more attention is altorded, particularly in our use of

court-approved electronic surveillance:

In conformity

• with

Title III of the Omnibus Crine Control and Safe Streets Act of

1968, this technique is utilized only.

after the Director's

referral of individual requests to the Attorney General for

his approval, and ultimate authorization by court order.

- All of our substantive cases, including those under

Federal antigambling statutes, Extortionate Credit Transaction

violations and Racketeer Intluenced and Corrupt Organization

matters, are, as noted above, restricted. to the more important

criminal operations in these

categories, and receive strict

scrutiny both in the field and at Headquarters in conformity

with carefully prescribed standards for investigative procedures.

These cases are presented to United States Attorneys or

Departmental Strike Force Attorneys on

provide regular reports on the progress oi these investigative

matters both to United States. Attorneys and Strike Force

Attorneys in the field and to the Department.

matión does not pertain to fection 87, noI.

-6 -

HW 55165 DocId:32989586

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## Page 20

GUIDELINES

SELECTIVE SERVICE INVESTIGATIONS

At the request of United States Attorneys, the FBI

conducts investigations to determine the willful nature of

alleged violations of the Military

Selective Service Act.

Other reported criminal violations

coming within the scope

of the Act, Title 50 Appendix, United States Code, are

investigated for the purpose of promptly presenting the facts

to the United States Attorney in order that a determination

can be made as to whether the facts developed warrant Federal

prosecution.

- sore.

libratini des not pertain to farta: 83, 107,

-*-

HH 55165 DocId: 32989586

Page

20

---

## Page 21

GUIDELINES

FUGITIVE INVESTIGATIONS

Authority to arrest individuals is statutory. Title

18, United States Code (USC), Section 3052, empowers FBI Agents

to make arresta and to carry firearms. The policy of the FBI

is to only use that force which is absolutely necessary to effect

the arrest with due consideration for the safety of the person

to be arrested, the arresting officers, and bystanders. In spite

of the existence of facts which might justify the shooting of a

fleeing person, it is the FBI policy that Agents are not to shoot

any person except for purpose of self-defense.:

In addition to conducting investigations to locate

individuals who have violated laws within the jurisdiction of

the FBI, such as bank robbery, kidnaping, extortion, the FBI

Is empowered by statute, Title 18, USC, Section 1073, to locate

fugitives at the request of state and local authorities when such

fugitives have been charged in a felony warrant and there is some

evidence of interstate flight.

At the specific request of the various branches of the

military, the FBI conducts investigations to locate persons charged

with desertion from the armed forces. Authority to make arrests

of such persons is found in Title 10, USC, Section 808.

-..

Apormation dos not pertain to Section 87, 107,

HN 55165 DocId:32989586 Page 21

---

## Page 22

FURLOYIES SECURITY AND SPECIAL INQUIRY INVESTIGATIONS

FBI conducts employee security investigations of

applicants or employees of Federal Government and United States

citizens employed by United Nations pursuant to and in strict

conformance with specific United States laws (Atomic Energy

Act of 1954; Arms Control and Disarmament Act; Public Law 298)

or Executive Order (EO 10450 and EO 10422).

In addition to

guidelines stated in those laws and Executive Orders, opinions

have been solicited from the Department of Justice over the years

as to whether connection with particular organizations or other

allegations justify initiation of investigation.

By request or agreement, FBI also conducts applicant

investigations of Presidential appointees, White House staff

members, Departmental employees and at request of cabinet members

and certain Congressional Committees.

All of these investigations are governed by further

specific guidelines directed toward protecting the rights of

individuals.

Those primarily applicable are:

Favorable information must be obtained as well as

unfavorable.

'Investigation is limited to checks of appropriate and

pertinent records and to interviews of individuals in a position

to furnish relevant information.

Persons furnishing derogatory information are requested

to furnish a signed

statement; if they decline, report so states.

Identification of individuals must be established with

respect to any derogatory information concerning them.

If pertient derogatory information is received

regarding close relatives or associates of applicant/employee,

degree of association must be determined.

All persons interviewed are advised inquiry is of

personnel type to preclude misinterpretation that criminal

investigation is involved.

FBI mares no evaluation or recommendation regarding

applicant/employee.

Reports to employing agency contain all the

facts and only che

facts collected.

Information dos not pertain to fection 87, no I.

- 30-

НН 55165 Do0Id:32989586

Page 22

---

## Page 23

GUIDELINES

GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

in criminal cases

Our investigative jurisdiction/is based on specific violations

of Federal laws. Investigations are conducted when information is

received indicating a violation of a Federal law within our investigative

jurisdiction has occurred. The results of our investigations are sub-

mitted to the United States Attorneys or the Department of Justice to

determine whether prosecutive action is justified. The course of

prosecutive action is determined by the United States Attorney or the

Department of Justice. A decision may be made to present the case

to a Federal grand jury or whether the facts justify the arrest of the

subject. When the subject is arrested it is on the basis of authorized

prosecution and the issuance of a warrant.

When the subject is arrested

' he is brought before the nearest Commissioner or Magistrate or Federal :

Judge in accordance with established rules of Federal criminal procedure !

and the law.

Requests for FBI investigation in selected civil matters also

are received from the Department and/or the United States Attorneys in

cases in which the United States is a party in interest and are handled in ac-

cordance with guidelines furnished by the Department.

Civil rights, election laws, and antiriot law investigations are

handled in strict conformity with detailed guidelines furnished by the

Department.

Information dos not pertain to Section 87, moI,

- 10-

2989586

Bage 23

---

## Page 24

Sanators Task -

Seeking Standards

For i veillance

Al By Alan Barth

SENATOR Ervin's Constitutional Rights

Subcommittee - and

especially

Senator

Kennedy-gase Assistant Attorney General

Robert C. Mardian, the new head of the

Mustice Department's Internal Security Di-

vision, a hard time the other day. And vice

versa.

Senator Kennedy did some rather

rough hectoring of the witness in an effort

to find out from him what standards, if any,

line Justice Department applies in its sur-

veillance of persons it deems threatening

to internal security. Mr. Mardian gave a

kind of compound answer which seemed to

say that the department doesn't engage in

any surveillance,

that when it does engage

'in surveillance it doesn't do any more of it

than it should do and that it has no formal

standards for doing

doesn't _do.

What it does do or

There was a mildly amusing Freudian slip

# in one of MIr. Mardian's responses to Sena-

tor Kennedy. The exchange, quoting from

transcript, went like this.

MT.

Mardian: We do not engage in,

Senators,

as I said, surveillance our-

selves. The only information we have

available to us comes in the form of

FBI reports of actions, civil disorders.

Senator

Kennedy:

The

Justice De.

partment doesn't engage in any sur

veillance at

all.

Mr. Mardian: Well, Mr. Rehnquist -re-

minds me that the FBI is a part of-the

Justice Department

OF COURSE, that is a perfectly under.

standable lapse of memory on the part of

an Assistant Attorney General. Even At-

corneys General haye forgotten that the FRI

is a part of tlie Justice Department. The

FBI just growed like-well, not like Topsy,

but more like, say, Jack's beanstalk or Alad-

General Harlan

created the FBI and made J. Edgar Hoover

director of it in

1924, he declared in very

positive terms:

"The Bureau of Investiga-

tion is not concerned with political or other

opinions of individuals. It is concerned only

with their conduct and then only with such

as is forbidden by the laws of the Uniled

States. Ithen a police system passes bevond

those limits,

it is dangerous to the proper

administration of justice and to hume" lib-

i aich it should be our first concern

" cherish."

55165

DocId: 32989586

Page

21

Contady

Daley e

Felt _

Gale

Walters -

Soyars _

Tele. Room

Holmes -

Gandy -HHH0/021

at ones

liness.

ганы

ENCLOSURE

he Washington Post +-/

-Times Heratd..

The Washington Daily News -

The Evening Star (Washington)

The Sunday Star (Washington) .

Daily News (New York) _

Sunday News (New York) _

New York Post.

The New York Times

The Daily World

The New Leader

The Wall Street Joural

The National Observer -

People's

< World -

62-66727-101

LAR 2 4 1971

5 APR '27 1971

COPY MADE OP

D. TOLERAT

---

## Page 25

That limited view of the FBI's role did

not tast very long. In the Second usuar,

President Roosevelt gave the burcau respon-

sibility for safeguarding the country against

espionage and

sabotage,

which soon

led' It

• to look askance at everyone whose political

opinions veered from the true north of abso-

lute orthodoxy, And after the war, President

Truman made it responsible for investigat:

ing the loyalty or suitability of federal em-

plojees, which led it to amass vast numbers

of dossiers on citizens whose conduct was

not in any way forbidden by the laws of the

United States.

jAnd now the FBI appears to have. taken

over from the Army

the delicate

task of

averting uprisings and disorders and bomb

piots and schemes to kidnap public officials,

an enterprise in which the Attorney General

says it doesn't need lo stop at anything, not

even the constitulional command lo get a

warrant of some sort before tapping the tele.

phones or bugging the homes of persons

whose conduct has not been forbidden by .

the laws of the United Stales.

WELL,

that's quile a lot of police power?

In a counly which considers the idea of a

police state abhorrent-and especially al a*

time when technology has perfected auto-

mated memories called

computer's

which

es rent or wroana forget poling, waether

So thero's a good deal of rationality: be-

hind the Constitutional Rights Subcommit

tee's feeling that there ought to be a law

limiting the reach and range of official in.

vestigation.

Such a law is admittedly very

difficult to draw. Prevention.of injury to

the community being a vital aspect of po-

lice protection, it will hardly do to say that

investigation of suspected persons can begin

only after they have committed some crime

or only after there is probable cause to

believe them guilty of a crime.

"The Justice Department ought to be work-

ing hand in hand with

"the

Constitutional

Righls Subcommittee to

devise

standards

for official

surveillance

Clearly, there is

nade of fee citize s

citizens.,

Nicey collected information from falling into

unauthorized hands.

Clearly, there ought to.

be an

opportunity

for

individuals to

sce

derogatory information in their files and lo

rebut it or correct it if they can. Clearly,.

there ought to be avoidance of investigation

on purely political grounds. Clearly, the in-

vestigators ought to be required to con-

form faithfully to the law.

Drawing legislation

on

the basis of in

formation amassed at public hearings is the

essential business of

congressional

commit-

ices.

The Constitutional

Rights

subcom-

mittee is engaged in a task that goes to the

foundatiois of a iree society.

1L7T

Л0010:32989686

Pane: 25

What is the danger to human liberty that

Attorney General Stone warned agains,

when he prescribed his limits for the FBI?

Last week the Evening Star published on its

Ilont page a story by Miles Benson of the

Newhouse News Service reporting that Sen.

George S. McGovern, Sen. Harold E. Hughes,

Sen. Birch Bayh, Columnist Frank Mankie-

wicz,

NAACP

representative

Clarence

Mitchell, Attorney Joseph L. Rauh Jr. all

believe their telephones are tapped. A lot

of other people living in the Capital of the

United States have the same anxicty. 'They.

are not all paranoiacs.

"When people fear survelilance, whether

it exists or not, when they grow afraid to

speak their minds and hearts freely to their

government or to

anyone else," said Sena-

tor Sam Ervin.

a free suciety."

"then we shall cease to be

---

## Page 26

TO

FROM

SUBJECT

OPTIONLE IÓRM NG. 10

M949o

"MAY 1962 EDITION

ESSA GEN, REG, NO. 27

UNITED STATES GO

ARNMENT

Memorandum

Tol son

Sullivan

Mohr

Bishop

C.D

Calls

Casp

Dal bey

: Mr. Tolson

DATE:

3/31/71

Felt.

Gale

Rosen

Tavel

Walters

D. J. Dalbey

Soyars

S

-...: /

Tele. Room

Holmes -

GUIDELINES FOR FBI INVESTIGATIONS

Re memo 3/25/71, from Mr. Cotter to Mr. Brennan, same

caption, attaching a summary of the guidelines for FBI investigations.

The Director's attached routing slip asked "Shouldn't we have these all

I drawn together into a separate section of our manual? H. "

All these guidelines can be placed in one special section and

we recommend that this be done. The section on guidelines should be

the tirst in the manual, and all instructions to new Agents and others .

should take the position that the guidelines are foundation policy and

should be understood before moving into any type of investigation in

¡particular. These guidelines should appear in both the Manual of

*Instructions and the Handbook.

RECOMMENDATION:

That referenced memorandum on guidelines be referred to the

Training Division for printing and for insertion in the manuals as the

first chapter.

ДБ

1: Mr. Mohr

1 - Mr. Casper

Whos

2 ENCLOSURE

REC 70.

'ENCI FILED

OF

UNREC COPY AND COPY

EX-103

62-46-227-1817

DJD:mfd

(4) .

D APR 27 1971

MACINE KATEEN MATTERI

JERICAN

This daguest is prepared in response to your request, and is not for dressin

-roceedings

> by

nation outside yor Commitee.

ANBi

our Come e and the content may not

disclosed to win orized person

Without the express approval of the FBl .

IN 55155 1AM: 3248923

Paue 26

---

## Page 27

April 9, 1971

This document is prepared in response

to

your request and

is not for dissemi-

nation outside

your Committee.

Its use

is limited to official proceedings by

your Committse

and the content may not

nel without the

be disclosed to unauthorized person

express

approval of

the

FBI

Colson

sullivan

lohr

Bishop

Brennan,.C.D.

Callahan

Jasper

Conrad

Dalbey

Pelt

Gale

Rosen

'avel

alters

oyars -

cle. Room

olmes

andHH 55165

PROPOSED CHANGES FOR

THE MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS

The following should be inserted in the Table of Contents

oi Volume I above and with same margin as Section I.

PREFACE. GUIDELINES FOR FBI INVESTIGATIONS

The following should be inserted as a Preface section in

Volume I immediately after the Table of Contents and ahead of Section I.

PREFACE

GUIDELINES FOR FBI INVESTIGATIONS.

Fundamental to all investigations by the FBI is the need to protect the

constitutional rights of any individual while still thoroughly and

expeditiously discharging those responsibilities with which it is charged

by statutes and Directives of the President and the Attorney General.

The FBI is a fact-finding agency which seeks with equal vigor to gather

evidence which will aid in the successful prosecution, or establish the

innocence, of alleged violators of laws of the United States or of those

who are accused of seeking by force to subvert or overthrow the

Government of the United States.

The FBI makes no determination of

the guilt or innocence of any individual or group so accused.

To this end, guidelines have been established to be followed in the

investigation of cases falling within the jurisdiction of the FBI, to

prevent unwarranted investigations and invasions of the constitutional

rights of any person.

INTERNAT SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS

For example, in matters affecting the internal security of the United

States, no investigation is conducted merely because an individual or

group supports an unpopular cause, or petitions the Government for

redress of grievances, nor do we investigate individuals solely on the

-NOTE: Based on memorandum D.

J. Dal e

dated 3/31/71, re "Guidelines

SAME MATERIAL TO BE

ADDED TO FBI HANDBOOK '

i

- Tolson,

DJ

Investigatsons.

---

## Page 28

Proposed Change in

the Manual of Instructions

for Special Agents of the FBI

basis of their membership in organizations which do not seek the

overthrow of the United States Government by the use of force oi

violence. In addition, no electronic surveillance may be instituted

without the specific: authority of the Attorney General. Explicit

Bureau authority

must be obtained prior to conducting a photographic

surveillance and prior to investigating the communist infiltration

of a political organization. Bureau authority must be obtained

prior to conducting investigation at an institution of learning.

Bureau authority must also be obtained prior to the investigation

of faculty members or the interviewing of students,

faculty members,

of employees of institutions of learning. No investigations are

conducted of ambassadors or heads of permanent missions to the

United Nations.

Both Department of State clearances and Bureau

authoritylare necessary prior to the investigation of officials

and diplomatic representatives of foreign countries. Our investiga

tions of groups and individuals are limited to those who take an

extremist anti-United States Government position in that their

actions

indicate

involvement in assassinations, physical attacks

0n

persons or property, or other activitios endangering the rational

security.

Cilluluäl intelligence - Organized Crime

Where matters of a criminal intelligence nature or organized crine

are concerned, investigations are conducted to develop and maintain

current information; on

the activities of organized crime in general,

¡and to develop substantive cases against individual racket figures.

These investigations are highly selective and are concentratad

on the leaders of organized crime and their reported

Associates,

Any electronic surveillance used in these investigations requires

approval of the Bureau, the Attorney General, and authorization by/

a court order.

Doo not pertain to 5 87

-2 =

HH 55165 DocId:32989586 Page 28

---

## Page 29

Proposed Change in the Manual of Instructions

For Special Agents of the FBI

Applicant-type Matters

In the area of applicant investigations, specific standards have been

established to protect the rights of individuals. All relevant informa

tion, both favorable and unfavorable, obtained concerning an individual

must

be duly reported; investigation-is limited to checks of pertinent

records and interviews of persons in a position to furnish relevant

information; persons furnishing derogatory information are requested

to furnish a signed statement. The FBI makes no evaluation or

recommendation to the requesting agency concerning the applicant.

General Criminal and Civil Matters.

Our investigative jurisdiction in criminal cases is based on specific

violations of Federal laws.

Investigations are conducted when

information is received indicating a violation of a Federal law, over

which we have been given investigative jurisdiction, has occurred.

Results of our investigations are furnished to United States Attorneys

or the Dopartment of Justice for determination of the course of any

prosecutive action. The decision may be made to present the case to

a l'ederal Grand Jury or, it the tacts so justify, to arrest the subject.

in which latter instance the arrest is made on the basis of authorized

prosecution and the issuance of a warrant. Upon arrest, the subject

must be brought before the nearest United States Magistrate or Federal

Judge in accordance with established rules of Federal crininal

procedure.

Requests for FBI investigations in selected civil matters in which tre

United States is or may be a party in interest are received from the

United States Attorneys and/or the Department of. Justice. These are

hardled in strici conformity with guidelines furnished by. the Departzer

¿of Justice, as are also investigations of violations of the civil rigis

antiriot, election laws, and antitrust laws.

General Principles

Doss not pertainto 'S 87

In addition to these principles, numerous other restrictions apply to

all phases of our work. For example, our authority to arrest fugitives

is statutory. The United States Code empowers Special Agents to make

arrests and

carry firearms but FBI policy further requires that only

that force may be used which is necessary to effect arrest with due

regard being observed for the safety of the arresting officers and

others.

HN 55165 DooId:32989586

Page 29

---

## Page 30

Proposed Change in the Manual of Instructions

fos Special Agents of the IBI

Special Agents are not permitted to shoot anyone except in

self-defense.

No, surveillances are conducted in the White

House, the Capitol,

the supreme Court, or the House and

Senate Office Buildings.

No surveillance, clectronic or

otherwise;

may be instituted on any member of Congress, any

justice or Judge, or any principal functionary of the

Executive Branch.

C= Special Agents may not engage in

entrapment or any of'er improper, illegal, or unethical

tacties in procuring information or evidence; any critical

complaints concerning FBI personnel must be

thoroughly

investigated; any testimony by

• a Special Agent in court must

be given glearly and without bias or embellishment.

The foregoing is a general statement of guidelines for fRI

investigations.

Ali investigative personnel nust follov

those rules.

WW 55165 DocId: 32989586 Page

30

antiamson +n 957-95650

---

## Page 31

3010-100

OPTIONAL FORM NO, 10

¿MAY 19E2 EDITION

ROSA GEN. REG. NO. 27 '

UNITEL: STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolsom

I - MI. Rosen

1 - MI. Mohr

1 - HI. Bishop

Jolt -

TO

FROM

SUBJECT:

your request and is not for dissemi-

Its ase is limited to official proceedings rog

irepared in response to

Committee.

contert may not be disclosed to unauthorized persa

FBI.

approval of the

, the

and

express

This dormeri

ortsir?n

nation

your Commitire

nel without the

EM Callahan

Casper -

Conrad

Mr.

S. Miller

DATE: 10/28/71

Dalbey.

Cleveland

1 - Crime Records Divis towne

J. Smith

TIS

• (Attn: M. A. Jones)

Walters -

1 - Mr. Eas. Miller

Soyars.

-

Tele. Room -

1 - Mr. T.Jo

Smith

Holmes -

COMMITTEE FOR PUBLIC JUSTICE

1 - Mr. Recer

Gandy

1 - Mr.

J.M. Sizoo

Milet

рацііко

Reference memorandum M. A. Jones to Mro/Bishop, 10/27/71,

sane caption.

Set forth below is review of "The) Scope and. Basis

o1 1'31 Domestze Intelligence Data Collection" by

Massachusettse This paper is to be submitted to captioned

Committee's conference on the FBI to be held at Princeton, New

Jersey, 10/29-31/71.

Bufiles negative re Elliff who has written

a soon-to-be-published book entitled "Crime, Dissent, and the

Attorney General."

Purpose of Paper

1.50

While moderate in its tone and subdued in tis anti-FBI

stand, this 70-page scudy is aimed at encouraging a public inquiry

by. Congress into the FBI's domestic intelligence data collection

and thus, will serve only to add quel to the fires of vicious

and

self-serving criticism against the Bureau.

Elliff clains

that only a public inquiry can "obtain sufficient access to

relevant confidential materials! which would reveal FBI intelli-

(stolen 3/8/71 from the former Media Resident Agency, Appropriations

Testimony by the Dir ctor, "The FBI Story" by Don Whitehead,

annual reports of th. Attorney General, Justice Department memo-

randa and press reld ses, Presidential memoranda, court decisions,

and books and articlas on American justice.

Basis for FBI Domes ic Intelligence Coverage

Ellift crims that the Department of Justice belleves

domestic intellige: e coverage comes within the inherent powers

of the President,

eriving fron the Constitution and not fron

grant by Congressi.nal legislative authority, with the exception

of intelligence da a collected regarding protection of the

President.

[EX-122n

5-J.M

Brod

IMS

Jus :amt

(9) Ent

CONTINUED OVER ME

ELT

10 NO! 19 ."

• 5E4N0N151970

Page 31

---

## Page 32

Memorandum for Mr. Miller

Be:

Committee for Public Justice

Origin of Security Intelligence

As do most critics of the FBI, Elliff notes the Director

was head of the General Intelligence Division in the "Palmer Raid"

days. Elliff states that the Director later deplored tactics

used to round up Individuals at that time and was able to persuade

the American Civil Liberties Union and Attorney General Harlan F.

Stone of his sincerity in opposing excesses at the time of the

"Painer Faids."

Ellift notes President Roosevelt's 9/6/40 memo-

randur and President Truman's directive of 1950 as authority for

IBI intelligence collection activities. Elliff claims the FBI

magnified President Roosevelt's 9/6/40 statement which called. for

local officials to furnish the FBI information received on

espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, subversive activities, and

violations of the neutrality laws into a definitive order serving

what it

considered its mission in intelligence gathering.

Scope of Security Intelligence

Noting the risk of describing the FBI'S intelligence

scopo on the basis of uvailable material, Elliff-obviously with

tongue in cheek-denies trying to create

the impression that the

IBI has exceeded its Constitutional authority.

He calls for

I/lunanation o1 aspecte of the FBl nd lully appreciated before

"so we may make reasoned judgments and factual, constructive

the targets of FBI security intelligence

coverage through the years as communists, communist front groups,

Nazi-intluenced and Fiscist-type groups,

the extremist New Leit,

and

groups with interational contacts

subject to communist

lintiltration. He mansions existence of an index of persons

considered detrimente: to internal security during Horld War II

as well as the curren; Security Index which he claims is used

ito identify persons rio might threaten

the president, while 1t

previously existed tur apprehenszon of potential sabotage subjects

in future periods of national energency. Ellift notes the FBI

must exercise discrecion on whether or not there are sufficient

facts to report in itters involving internal security and on which

Federal officials

siould receive such reports. He adits that the

FBI seeks to elimini te subjectivity by reporting all available

Information, following prescribed procedures, and use of "by-the-

book" patterns and cerminology.

CONTINUED - OVER

- 2 =

HH. 55165 DocId: 32989586 Page 32

---

## Page 33

Lemorandum for hir. Miller

il: Committee for Public Justice

"cope of Racial Intelligence

Ellifi states that racial intelligence gathering is

now hal? of the FBI's domestic intelligence mission,

noting we

Eave Intormation oa racial excremist matters to local authorities

Mand the Department of Justice. From documents stolen at the

dormer Media Resident Agency,

he notes the FBI's ghetto informant

progran that seeks to uncover indicatiors of possible racial

¿disorders and he concludes that while wiretap coverage of extremist

groups produces much extraneous material, wiretaps are, in fact,

oiten the only way to obtain information

regarding possible

Iracial violence.

Elliff also discusses the BI's interest in

black student groups and Klan activities pointing to instructions

and recommendations from President Johnson and several study

commissions for intelligence coverage needed to alert Government

officials

to possible relal disorders.

EllifE's Conclusions

Ellili snidel:, concludes that "a little fresh air is

needed" in the form of periodic public scrutiny of the FBI. He

claims that if fault is to be found it would not be in the FBI

and the Director, but 22 the Attorneys General, Presidents and.

Congresses who gave power and responsibility to the FBI but

Halled to direct, guic:, and control it.

Nino recomme: Jations are presented by Elliif: (1) Estab-

Iish Constitutional bi. is for domestic inteligence gathering;

(2) consider separatle. of foreign counterespionage duties from

donestic intelligence: (3) review standards for preparation and

dissemination of done ic intelligence data; (4) establish

permanent domestic ir alligence advisory council; (5) scrutinize

Justice Department's ternal Security Division;

(6) make FBI

give recommendations

ind draw conclusions on basis of intelligence

data; (7) maintain =

•act aiscipLine, inspections, and IlIm pro-

cedures in FBI intel

igence work; (8) examine need for domestic

intelligence data; a 1 (9) insure that the Director's successor

maintain internal c. trol and morale, resist outside partisan

(pressures, and exen] ily a true professional.

RECOMMENDATION:

For info: ation.

ротт

HH 55165 DocId: 32989586 Page 33

-3 m

---

## Page 34

SECHNITY

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

5010-106

MAY 1982 EDITION

OSA GEN. REG. NO, 27

UNITED STATES G.:

'ERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

: Mr. E. S. Millefly

FROM : T. J. Smith

1 - Mr.

Rosen

- Mr. J. P. Mohr

DATE: 2/24/72

1 - Mr. Bishop

- Mr. Dalbey

1

- Mr. Cleveland

1 - Mr. E. S. Miller

1 - Mr. T.J. Smith

Tolson

Folt _

Rigger

*Alshop

Miller, W

Callahar

Casper

Conrad

Dalbey

Cleveland

Ponder

Bates

Haikart.

Waiters

Soyars -

Tele. Room

Holmes -

Gandy .

SUBJES-

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi-

Its use is limited to official proceedings by

to unauthorized person

and the content may not be disclosed

FBI

the

nation outside, your Committee.

express

your Commitre

nel without the

GUIDELINES FOR SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS

OF INDIVIDUALS AND ORGANIZATIONS

"Washington Post" article on 2/24/72 stated that

Deputy Attorney General Richard G. Kleindienst

testified 2/23/72

that he is "not sure" what

guidelines are used by the FBI

in

deciding to investigate an individual or organization. The

Director noted "Prepare succinct memo to him on our

guidelines."

The line of questioning which apparently gave rise to

Kleindienst's statement regarding guidelines revolved around our

security-type investigations.

Therefore, a memorandum has been

prepared along these

lines and is attached.

The essence of the attached memorandum is that the FBI

investigates all organizations which have as their basic objective

the violent overthrow or destruction of the United States.

Typical organizations, such as the Communist Party, USA; Socialist

Workers Party; Progressive Labor Party; Black Panther Party and

Students for

a Democratic Society, are

listed as examples.

The

obvious aims

and purposes of the international communist movement

are explained.

Responsibility and jurisdiction of the FBI under

statutes and Presidential Directives relative to the nationàl

security are set out.

Circumstances under which security investigations of

individuals are conducted are

enumerated.

These basically have

to do with the fact that investigations are instituted when an

individual has revolutionary, extremist or anarchistic beliefs,

giving reason to believe

the

individual might commit acts inimical

to the internal security in time of national emergency.

Also set forth are the fundamental principles that the

FBI scrupulously safeguards the individual's constitutional

rights and impartially gathers evidence not only to prosecute,

but to prove the innocence of the individual.

The fact is also

Enclosureshau

2-75=72

REC-51

5-757

TJS : gIw

(8)

160-5572254136

CONTINUED - OVER

3

FEB 28 1972

46 ZIMAR ta 194

89586

Page 34

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## Page 35

Memorandum to Mr. E. S. Miller

Re :

Guidelines for Security Investigations

of Individuals and Organizations

noted that the FBI does not investigate persons espousir?

unpopular causes or beiiefs or who hold membership in

organizations which do not advocate violent overthrow of the

U. S. Government.

The fact that investigations are carefully

supervised at all levels to

assure constitutional rights are

not jeopardized is also explained.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the attached letter with enclosed memorandu.i

to the Deputy Attorney General be approved and sent.

..

NH 55165 DocId: 32989586

Page

35

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## Page 36

2-19 Hey. 12-30-71)

(Kleindienst

Mo Er Sator J. Trie

Tashlnston Post Stall Wrlter

Deputy

Attorne:

General

Richard G.

Kleindiensi testi-

fied yesterday that he is "not

sure" what guidelines are used

Aby:

the

• FBI

in

deciding

whether to investigate an indi

Vidual or organization.

Kleindierst, whose nomina-

tion to become Attorney Gen-

eral is to be voted on today by

the Senate Judiciary Commit-

tee, toid the committee he has

"a very fine working relacion-

with FBI Director J.

Edgai Hoover, bui nas

too busy ever the past three

vears to pay detailed attention

to the büreau..

It confirmed as

Aitorney

General, Kieiadienst told Sen.

John V. Tunney (D-Calif.), "I

will know more about the FBI

than I do now."

He portrayed himself, how-

ever, as abundantiy satisfied

with

the work of the bureau

• and said he was

"confident"

that Hoover would not order

electronic

surveillance

of

"anybedy witbout the express'

written permission" of the At-

torney Gereral.

¿ Kleindienst answered ques-

tions, mostly hostile ones from

liberal

Democratic senators,

for four hours on the second

day of his confirmation hear-

ing:

At day's end,

Committee

chairman

James O. Eastland

(D-JIiss.), who called an execu-

tive session for this morning,

said, "I do not anticipate any

Ivotes

against" Kleindienst or

I. Patrick Gray III, President

Nixon's

nominee to become

the new Deputy Attorney Gen-

eral.

Despite the hostile question-

ing from others, the only com-

mittee member who appearca

to be wavering

on whether to

Ivote fur Kicindienst was ad-

ward M. Kennedy (D.Mass.).

Kennedy

and

Kleindienst

took

much of yesterday's?

session

with a dchate

Over:

whinet

cout

MAR

salled,

• And

over the

past three years an

little sear. to come."

ENCLOSURE

177t.

55165 DocId: 32989586. Rage 36

Backs FBI

Probes

is rolson.

Rosen

En witter, Bk

Callahan .

Casper

Conradi"

Dalbeym

cravelati

Ponder

Bates I

Waikart -

Walters -

Soyars -

Tele. Room

Holmes —

Gandy -

crime with speeches and press

Kennedy also ques-

Justice Depart-

ment's priorities in using in-

vestigative tools.

prosecute Daniel Ellsberg for:

disclosing the top secret Pen-

tagon Papers on the Vietnam

war, and to use "flocks of

agents and attorneys" in the

case involving a purported au-

tobiography

but not to convene a

grand jury investigation into

the shooting deaths

of four

Kent State University" stu-

dents in May, 1970.

Kleindienst insisted,

that. the Justice Depart-

(ment and FBI "thoroughly in-

. vestigatea"

the Kent Statel

shootings before deciding not

National

Guardsinen.

He also defended Attorney

(eneral John N. Mitchell's re-

fusal to permit congressional

Inspection of the FSI's report

on the Kent State shootings.

nominee argued

longest with kennersy over are

rest and detention procedures

during the Mayday antiwar:

demonstrations in Washington

last spring.

Kleindient said that the

Justice Department,

which,

had anticipated

about

4,000, demonstrators on Mon-

day,

was completcly

, súrprisen that. "so many peo.

• MAR

1972

guncan t

The Washington Post

Times Herald -

A-G

The Washington Daily News.

The Evening Star (Washington)

The Sunday Star (Washington)

Daily News (New York) -

Sunday News (New York .

New York Post

The New York Times

The Daily World

The New Leader

The Wall Street Journal

PEC 2-The National Observer.

Li, BoReople's World

1.92911

- 4738

FEB 2 4 1972

4

MAR 3 1972ate

5-T55

(COPY MADE FOR ME. TOLCON

125-4

UNRECOLUEN COPY FILED IN

---

## Page 37

ple — 20,000 to 25,000- would

attempt to do such a stupid

thing" as tie up Washington.

He testified that advance in-

telligence on the Mayday pro-

tests did not involve any wire-

tapping.

However, in court affidavits

filed in connection witi crimi-

nal

prosecutions

of

leader

Yippie

Abbie Hoffman

and

Bradford Lyttle, co-chairman

lof the People's Coalition for

¡Peace and Justice, the Justice

Department has acknowledged

they were overheard during

"national security" wiretaps.

The affidavit involving Hoff-

anan

WaS

signed

by

Klein-:

dienst last Juiy 15. He testi-

{fied yesterday that Mitchell

delegated supervi-

sion hereuch wiretaps to him

over the past three years.

The only negative testimony

about Kleindienst came from

Clarence Mitchell, Washington

representative of the NAACP,

who said the organization dis-

approved of his handling of a

judicial nomination and civil

rights enforcement.

As

the

NAACP

officer

stepped

forward to testify,

Kleindienst

greeted

him

warmly and said,

"Give 'emi

hell, Clarence."

Kennedy said yesterday that

it had been 400 days since At-

§torney General Mitchell had

held

a press

conference in

i Washington.

"I

suspect I'll

probably have more press con

¿ferences than Mr. Mitchell,"

Kleindienst said, "and I proba-

[bly will régret it." ent

By Bob Burchette-The Washinion Post

1: Sen. Charles Mathias, leit, and Richard Kleindieust chat at committee hearing

HH 55165 DocId: 32989586 , Page 37

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## Page 38

The Deputy Attorney General

DirectoI, FBI

1 -M

sen

1

1

1

- Mr.

P. Mohr

- MI. Bishop

- Mr. Dalbey

1 - Mr. Cleveland

February 25, 1972

1

- Mr.

1

E.

S. Miller

- Mr. T. J. Smith

GUIDELINES FOR SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS

OF INDIVIDUALS AND ORGANIZATIONS

The matter of guidelines for FBI security investigations

of organizations and individuals has been

the subject of recent

-Congressional interest.

I am enclosing for your information a succinct stata-

ment setting forth the essence of our guidelines for security

investigations of organizations and individuals.

i a

Enclosure

TJS: glw

(10)

NOTE:

2/24172, captioned as above, prepared by Tis:gIw.

memorandum T. J. Smith to Mr. E. S. Miller, dated

* 3

REQ 2Q

100-358086-443

antion outside your Committee.

Its use is limited to offarial procecdi

• MAR 3 1972.

wur Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unuuthorized person

nel without the express approval of the FBI.

WBS

Ret

MAILED. 2

Fao 15 1072

Nr- Tolson

Mr. Felt

-FBI

Mr. Rosen -

Sir. Mohr..

Sr. Bishoy

Mr. Miller. BYVer

Mr. Callahan.

Mr. Casper

Mr. Conrad

Mr.

Dalbey

S

ANGLOSURE

ir. Cleveland

Afa. Ponder -

Mir. Bntes

Sr. Snikart

Nir. Walters

Mr. Soyars

Tele. Room

Ell

==."

i?!:

MAR

1972

60 MAR 6

1972

MATE ON 9386 TEENEYES UNIT

---

## Page 39

1 - Mr.

len

1 ÷ MI.

• P. Mohr

1

-. Mr.

1

Bishop

- MI.

Dalbey

1 - Mr. Cleveland

1 - Mr. E. S. Miller

1 - Mr. T. J. Smith

February 24, 1972

/GUIDELINES FOR SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS

OF INDIVIDUALS AND ORGANIZATIONS

This document is prepared in response to your reguest and is not for dissemi-

nation pitside

your Committee.

Its use is limited to official proceedings by

your cormitre and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized person

nel without

express approval of

fa. Tolson -

k. Felt.

ir. Rosen -

15. Mohr

1r. Bishop -

Ir. Miller; E.S. -

Ir. Callahan -

Ir. Casper

Ir. Conrad

Ir. Dalbey

Ir. Clevelund -

Ir. Ponder

Ir. Bntes

ir. Haikart

ir. Walters

r. Soyars

ele. Room

iss Holmes

iss Gandly -

HY 75165

By statute and Presidential Directives, the FBI is

charged with

the responsibility of coordinating all information

regarding che internal security of the United Staces.

In addition to provisions of the Smith Act of 1940,

Title I of the internal Security AcE of 1950, the Communist

Control Act of 1954, and statutes relating to

espionage, sabotage,

rebellion and insurrection, sedition and seditious conspiracy,

FBI authority and responsibilities for investigation of subver-

sive matters are clearly stated in Presidential Direciives dated

June 26, 1939, and September 6, 1939, which have been reiterated

and broadened

by subsequent Directives.

Commission of crimes such as espionage and sabotage

clearly involves specific statutory provisions.

Other subver-

sive activity, however, such as plotting the viclent over-

throw of the United States Government, often does noi clearly

involve a specific section of a specific statute.

activity may often involve several sections of several statutes..

It is a nell-established fact thai the basic ain of

the international communist movement is to overthrow all existing

nonconmunise covernments and to see up in their stead a conmunist

system of government.

This is true whether the communist nove-

ment be directed from Moscow or from the headquarters of the

Fourth International, which guides the Socialist Workers Party

in the United States.

The Snith Act of 1940 was aimed at the international

communist movement.

However, statutes dealing with rebellion

and insurrection and seditious conspiracy could cover any attempt

at violent overchion or destruction of the Government.

Insofar

the

FBI is concerned, therefore, any organization whatsoever

which has as an objective the violent overthrow or destruction

of the United States Government, or which engages in such acts

as espionage, sabotage or other criminal activity detrimental

to the national defense, would be subject to a thorough in-

vestigation.

Furthermore, any individual who has nembership

EM

TJS: glwat

(10)

MAR

8_1972

MAIL ROOM

DggId; 32259586

TELETYPE UNIT

Fame 39

ENGLESURE SEE NOTE PAGE 4

105-35-8656-4137

33150191

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## Page 40

Guidelines for Security Investigations

of Individuals

and Organizations

in or who is affiliated with or adheres to the principles of

such organizations

would likewise be subject to thorough

investigation.

The fBi, therefore, has basic guideiines for con-

lucting security investigations of organizations and individ

uals, in connection with the national security.

Organizations

The FBI conducts investigations of the Connunist

Party, USA; Socialist Workers Party; othor Marxist revolutionary-

type organizations, such

as the Progressive Labor Party; front

grOUps; New Left and miscellaneous organizations, such

as the

Students for a Democratic Society, Black Panther Party and

miscellaneous other revolutionary

organizations which

are

dedicated to violent overthrow or destruction of the

United States Government.

The purposes of our investigations are to:

1. Obtain legally admissible evidence for prosecution

under existing Federal

statutes.

2. To

obtain sufficient pertinent data to determine

the organization's character and permit implementazion of

Executive Order 10450.

3.

To obtain intelligence data in order to have day-

to-day appraisal of strength, dangerousness, and activities of

the organization; and to keey the Department of justice and

other affected Government agencies advised.

Individuals

The FBI has the responsibility to conduct thorough

investigations into the background and activities of all per-

sons in the United States and Puerto Rico who are dangerous or

potentially dangerous to the internal security of the

United States.

Danger or potential danger of such individuals

may involve membership in or affiliation with basic revolution

ary

organizations, or other Marxist revolutionary organizations

including

splinter groups.

H# 55165 DocId:32989586 Page 40

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## Page 41

Guidelines for Socurity Investigations

of Individuals

and Organizations

Purposes of investigation include:

1. Determination of dangerousness.

2.

To fully establish identity, whereabouts and

activities of all individuals who have been or may be violating

laws of the United States relating to the national

security.

3.

To obtain admissible evidence to establish a

violation of laws of the United. States.

4. To be alert for indications of espionage, sabotage,

or sedition.

The activities of any individuals should be investigated

if they fall within one of more of the following categories:

1. Membership in a basic revolutionary organization.

2. Espousing the line of revolutionary movements.

Such espousal could encompass a wide variety and range of

activities.

Actual membership in a basic revolutionary organi-

zation is not a prerequisite.

Espousal may be expressed by

membership or active participation in subversive

front groups.

Mere membership in a front organization, however, is not con-

sidered sufficient grounds for investigation, unless there

has been past membership in a basic revolutionary organization

os other subversive activity.

3. Special training such as training in a subversive

movement abroad; or leadership training in a basic revolutionary

organization.

4. Individuals employed in or having access to a

Key facility who are alleged to have been at any time members

of a basic revolutionary organization.

5. Other individuals with anarchistic, revolutionary

or extremist beliefs who are likely to seize upon a national

emergency to endanger public safety and welfare. •In such cases,

membership or affiliation in basic revolutionary front groups

are not prerequisites.

In spito of the neod to keep constantly abroast of

situations affecting the national security, it is fundamental

to all FBI investigations thai tho constitutional rights of

- 3-

H# 55165 DocId:32989586 Page 41

4450514355

і маматіЕТа

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## Page 42

Guidelines for Security Investigations

of Individuals and Organizations

the individual must be protected. The FBI is a fact-finding

agency which impartially secks to gather evidence which

will either aid in the successful prosecution of, or establish

the innocence of, alleged violators of laws of the United States

or those who are

accused of seeking by

• force to subvert or

overthrow the Government of the United States.

The FBI makes

no determination of the guilt or innocence of any individual

or group so accused.

For example, in matters affecting the internal security

of the United States, no investigation is conducted merely be-

an individual or group supports an unpopular cause, ox

petitions che Government for redress of grievances, not do we

investigate individuals solely on the basis of their membershin

in organizations

which do not seek the overthrow of the

United States Government by the use of force or violence.

In

addition,

all of our investigations are carefully followed and

supervised at numerous levels of supervision, both in the

field and at FBI headquarters.

One of the primary purposes of

careful supervision of FBI investigations is to assure

that at

.no timo will the

constitutional rights of an individual be

placed in jeopardy.

NOTE:

See

memorandum T. J. Smith to MI. E. S. Miller, dated

2/24/72, captioned as above, prepared by TJS:glw.

1W 55165

DocId: 32989586

Page

12

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## Page 43

прі.1

OPTIÊRILL FORM NO, 10

3010-100

MAA 1002 EDITIÓN

OSA GEN, REG. NO. 27

Feli

UNITED STATES@OVERNMENT

Mobr

Rosen

Memorandum

Bates

1 - Mr. Bishop

Bishop

Callahan

1 - Mr. Miller

* Campbell

Casper

Mr. E. S. Miller

JIlt

DATE: 6/2/72

Cleveland

'Conrad

Dalbey

I - Mr. T.J. Smith

FROM

SUBJECT:

I. J. Smith poS Security JuRisDiction

EM TEE

Soyars

Waiters

Tele. Room —

Mr. Kinley -

Mr. Armstrong -

/THE SCOPE AND BASIS. OF. FBI DOMESTIC

Ms. Herwig -

Mrs. Neenan -

INTELLIGENCE DATA COLLECTION" - JOHN T. ELLIFE

your request and is not for

is limited to official proceediays

be disclosed to unauthorized pers

FBI

rise

not

the

ticured in response

Its

Committee.

yOUr

and the content may

approval. of

express

This document

nation outside

your. Committre

the

without

nel

M.A. Jones to Bishop memorandum concerned a letter from

John T. Elliff, Assistant Professor, Department of Politics, Brandeis

University, who requested an interview with Mr. Gray. The letter enclosed

two studies entitled "The Scope and Basis of FBI Domestic Intelligence Data>

Collection, " and. Aspects of Federal Civil Rights Entorcement: the dusticer:

Department and'the FBI, 1939-1964.", Mr. Gray requested that these papers--

be thoroughly analyzed and sound rebuttals prepared. The first paper

dealing with Domestic Intelligence data is analyzed herein. The second,

dealing with Civil Rights enforcement, is being handled separately by the

General Investigative Division.

SYNOPSIS:

• Mr. Elliff's study, which was presented at a two-day conference

last October at Princeton sponsored by the Committee for Public Justice,

consists of 70 pages of cetailed observations and conclusions based on a

study of 126 sources, including copies of numerous FBI documents stolen in •

the Media Resident Agency burglary. Mr Elliff's paper is a calm,

unemotional, scholarly study and for the most part is objective and is not

highly critical of the FEi. He has exhibited a lack of understanding (or else

has brushed off the significance) of the internal security threat posed by

the domestic subversive. His main thrust is, home ver, that certain

domestic intelligence investigation is necessary, but that any such activity

on the part of the FBI should be fully authorized and circumscribed by statute.

He strongly suggests, among other things, a separation of domestic and

toreign intelligence-c. llection functions and he believes that a permanent

dome stic intelligence advisory council, similar to the existing foreign

Intelligence Advisory Board, should be established. Ellift also calls for an

Eye ligation of the FBI by a select Senate committee.

2°

REC-30

79-

ACTION:

ST-104

HIM

113

1973

For the isformation of Mr. Gray.

File

HH 55165

Fedraga passee Page 13

18 AUG 9

1973

---

## Page 44

Ilemorandum for Mr. Miller

RE: "THE SCOPE AND BASIS OF FBI DOVESTIC"

INTELLIGENCE DATA COLLECTION" - JOHIN T. ELLIFE

DETAILS:

John T. Elliff presented a 70-page copyrighted study during a

two-day conference sponsored by the Comr-tee for Public Justice at

Princeton, October 29-31, 1971. The study isted 126 sources of information

for documentation. Included in the list of sirces were at least 30 FBI

documents stolen during the burglary of the BI Resident Agency at Media,

Pennsylvania. Elliff's study notes that revelations of the Media documents

resulted in emergence of a vague picture o FBI intelligence activities.

He acknowledged that fragmentary news stozies, second-hand accounts,

papers taken out of context, and unverified charges brought more confusion

than enlightenment about the FBI's operations. He stated that major changes

in the FBI's mission had not been readily perceived and that disclosures

like the Media documents are distorted beczuse they enter an analytical

vacuum.

OBSERVATION:

While this premise is apparently based on Elliff's review of a

great deal of material he attributes to historians, he does not take into

consideration that the operations of the FBI have constantly been open to

public scrutiny through Mr. Hoover's annual apperrance before the House

Appropriations Subcommitee and his numerous public statements in the

news media and publications produced by the FBI.

THE SUBVERSIVE THRAT:

Elliff went into quite some detail concerning the interpretation of

subversive danger to te country both as it related to the fascist threat of

the 1930's and World Var Il era, and the communist threat extending into the

present.

OBSERVATION:

Elliff exh sited a lack of understanding of the danger to the Nation

by the subversive elements including both the fasrists and communists. While

he referred to the ??I's first intelligence investitions as being directed

against "fifth colur ists" in 1934, he did not stru's in sufficient detail just

how dangerous this 'fifth column" of Nazi and fascist sympathizers really was.

DETAILS - CONTINUED OVER

117 55165 DocId:32989586 Page 14

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## Page 45

Memorandum for Mr. Miller

RE: "THE SCOPE AND BASIS OF FBI DOMESTIC

INTELLIGENCE DATA COLLECTION" - JOHN T. ELLIFF

He then said that the term "fifth column" has been out of fashion since the end

of World War II. This observation may be true insofar as the fashionable

use of the expression is concerned. But, factually the concept of the

"fifth column, " as it can be applied to international communism, was even

stronger following World War II.

Elliff fails to stress the fact that following World War II Soviet

Russia enslaved the peoples of Eastern Europe with its communist ideology,

using the concept of "fifth column" tactics to seize control of government

after government. Elliff speaks glibly at one point of a pilgrimage to

Washington of several thousand youths which was sponsored by the American:

Youth Congress, a communist front organization. While admitting the

communistic nature of the group, he implied, mainly through omission,

that the communist influence was insignificant. He noted, however, that the

President clearly desired this sort of information.

Elliff pointed out that at one point the FBI had estimated that almost

one million people had been drawn into communist-front activity, but he

failed to go into the tremendous significance of a million people being

involved in an activity which was manipulated by an ideology which preached

and preaches the violent overthrow of the United States Government.

He made the statement that the Communist Party, during the

period 1935-39 softened its revolutionary line, virtually endorsed the New Deal,

and adopted a policy of alliance with noncommunist groups and that because

of this the potential range of FBI intelligence extended to every left-liberal

organization that was an object of communist infiltration. Again, through omis-

sion he failed to take note of the fact that the communists have never really

softened their revolutionary line. The philosophy of "the end justifies the

means" has been the backbone of communist strategy and any "softening of

its revolutionary line" has only been for the purpose of duping the gullible

and the naive. A scholar such as Elliff should certainly be aware of the

philosophy of deceit which is a trademark of the Communist Party.

In discussing organizations included on the Attorney General's

list of subversive organizations, Elliff refers to the Trotskyist Socialist

Workers Party as being nearly defunct. Elliff, who is an Assistant Professor

in the Political Department of Brandeis University, displayed an amazing lack

of knowledge of the Socialist Workers Party. It is not only not nearly

defunct, it is today one of the most militant of the so-called old line revolutionary

organizations and its influence on the antiwar movement and youth organizations

NN 55165 DocId:32989586 Page 45

- 3 -

DETAILS - CONTINUED

SITIN

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## Page 46

Memorandum for-Mr. Miller

RE: "THE SCOPE AND BASIS OF FBI DOMESTIC

INTELLIGENCE DATA COLLECTION" - JOHN T. ELLIFE

is very strong. Its revolutionary stance has not diminished and the

treatment afforded in Elliff's study certainly would lead one to believe

that the Socialist Workers Party represents no danger to our national

security.

PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVES:

Elliff's study is largely concerned with the legal authority for

FBI intelligence-type investigations. He pointed out that from the time

Mr. Hoover was appointed Director until 1936 he had a policy of "closed-end

investigations" as described below, but that ultimately this policy gave way

to intelligence coverage which involves continuing investigative work within

a broad range of delegated authority. He points out that we have claimed to

have derived authorization or our responsibilities in the domestic intelligence

field from legislative enactments, Presidential directives, and instructions

of the Attorney General.

Concerning the authority derived from Presidential directives, Elliff

goes into some detail concerning the issuance of the Presidential directive

of September, 1939, which has been reiterated on three subsequent occasions.

Apparently based on a study of the Roosevelt papers and other material of

record, Elliff presents a picture of Mr. Hoover manipulating President

Roosevelt into issuing the September, 1939, directive, implying that

Roosevelt may not have realized that he was shifting the basis of FBI

authority from Congressional statute to Presidential directive. Elliff:

states at another point, iowever, that Roosevelt probably assumed he had

already granted this authority in 1936 when he requested intelligence

investigations of fifth columnists.

Elliff declares that Roosevelt's 1939 directive (or statement) had to

be an assertion of inhr rent executive power, but that the evidence suggests

that Roosevelt did not intend to grant such authority. He said that there is

now the impression that the White House was never clearly informed of the

legal situation and that the FBI later magnified a statement (the 1939 directive)

into a definitive ords:

DETAILS - CONTINUED OVER

MiT

---

## Page 47

Memorandum for Mr. Miller

RE: "THE SCOPE AND BASIS OF FBI DOMESTIC

INTELLIGENCE DATA COLLECTION' - JOHN T. ELLIFE

OBSERVATION:

It is true that we have cited the 1939 Presidential directive, and

the succeeding ones re-iterating it, as one of the bases for our authority to

carry out responsibilities in the domestic intelligence field. While the

full intent and purpose of the initial directive will be the subject of critical

analysis by legal minds, politicians and historians for years to come, we

now see in retrospect that there is a definite weakness to any actual

interpretation of the directive's conveying a legal authority not already

existing by Congressional statute. We are currently making an in-depth

study of the etfect these directives have on our intelligence investigations.

It is dangerous to make a hasty judgment on the legal basis of the

| 1939 et sequens directives, since much of our extremely important

investigative activities are at stake.

It would appear on the surface,

however, that existing statutes which were ignored by Elliff in his study

I cover most if not all of our investigations of subversive activities. Statutes

such as Title 18, USC 2383 (Inciting to Rebellion or Insurrection), Title 18,

USC 2384 (Seditious Conspiracy - Conspiracy to Overthrow or Destroy the

Government), Title 18, USC 2385 (Advocating Overthrow of the Government),

and several others appear to be sufficient basis for our security investigations,

whether the questioned directives exist or not.

We believe without doubt that the type of investigations we have

conducted over the years and are conducting now in the interest of national

security are very necessary. The question as to whether the so-called "closed-

end investigation" as would normally be conducted in an investigation of a

criminal violation should also be the only type investigation conducted

relative to investigations involving statutes relating to the national security

is absurd. A criminal-type investigation usually takes place after the crime

has been committed. We cannot allow a crime against the Government to

occur. Therefore, where conspiracies are afoot and where ideologies are

based on the destruction of the Government there must be continuing

intelligence investigations if for no other reason than to neutralize the threat.

A good example is the matter of the investigations which continue

on Communist Party functionaries such as Gus Hall. Gus Hall was investigated,

tried and convicted and served time in a Federal penitentiary (as did other

high-level officials of the Communist Party) for violation of the Smith Act.

These people, without exception, now out of prison, profess the same beliefs

as before, including the basic belief of overthrowing this Government.

14 016020010:32989386 Page 40

-5 -

DETAILS - CONTINUED - OVER

---

## Page 48

Memorandum for Mr. Miller

RE: "THE SCOPE AND BASIS OF FBI DOMESTIC

INTELLIGENCE DATA COLLECTION" - JOHN T. ELLIFF

We believe that it is not necessary to close an investigation

gimply because enough evidence has not been collected to support prosecution

of an individual whom we have reason to believe will attempt to overthrow

or destroy the United States Government. As long as the circumstances

indicate the danger to the Nation exists, we feel that a continuing investi-

gation is necessary. We believe also that statutes can in most every case

be cited as a legal basis for investigation of this sort.

There are, however, situations which are so vague as to defy a

statutory connection. Many of these situations involve instructions from the

White House to furnish information or intelligence on matters relating to

policy making and planning the national defense, or foreign relations. In

such cases we have relied on the so-called inherent executive power to

order an investigation required in connection with executive responsibilities.

In such cases the reliance on the 1939 et sequens directives has been, a

means whereby White House requirements could be handled.

CONSTITUTIONAL POWER OF THE PRESIDENT

Ellitf raises the question as to whether the so-called inherent

executive power gives him the broad authority to issue an executive order

or Presidential directive which could give authorization to the FBI for

conducting intelligence irestigations.

He acknowledges that the Department

of Justice maintains that done stic intelligence functions are within the.

inherent powers of the F.'esident, which are not dependent upon any grant of

legislative authority fro:: Congress, but derive from the Constitution itself.

Elliff belittles this Depa mental position.

He states tha: in connection with language in the 1968 Omnibus

Crime Bill (wiretappir ) which related to the President's constitutional

power, Senator McCle an, who introduced the Act, later remarked that

the Congress had not ‹ ren considered that question in 1968.

OBSERVATION:

It is questionable that Elliff, in spite of his scholarly approach to

this study, has the 1: ekground and legal credentials and knowledge to attack

the constitutional quastion of the scope of so-called inherent executive power.

We certainly believ. that the President does have the constitutional power to

DETAILS - CONTINUED - ÖVER

HH

55165

DocId: 32989586 Page 48

---

## Page 49

Memorandum for Mr Miller

• RE: "THE SCOPE AND BASIS OF FBI DOMESTIC

INTELLIGENCE DATA COLLECTION" - JOHN T. ELLIFF

direct the FBI to do whatever is necessary to protect the national security

and that a Presidential directive which does not abrogate the various constitu-

tional amendments or impinge on the statutory rights & the citizen would

have the full force of legislative authority.

There are questions before the Supreme Court at this moment,

however, dealing with the very issue raised by Elliff and in the present

political climate where established concepts of Government policy,

including our own investigative policies, are under attack by civil libertarians,

it is difficult to say how broad the Presidential power may be tomorrow.

ELLIFE'S CONCLUSIONS:

Elliff stated that appropriate legislation or administrative reforms

could be drafted and adopted only after a thorough scrutiny of FBI functions;

that first a firm constitutional foundation should be established for domestic

intelligence. He suggested that a legislative framework might adequately

authorize the most vital functions.

We agree that if it were possible to have a legislative framework

to adequately cover the myriad situations affecting the national security, this

would be the best possible situation. We certainly have no fear of our

investigative activity being circumscribed, so long as adequate provisions

are made for protection of the national security. It has long been the policy

of the FBI that the first consideration in our investigative activity is the

protection of individual rights of the citizen.

It is extremely doubtful that at this point in time with the political

climate existing as it is today that any meaningiul legislation could be drawn

in Congress which would give the FBI the legislative authority, beyond that

which we already have, that would respond to Elliff's suggestions.

CONCLUSIONS CONTINUED:

Elliff suggested that serious consideration should be given to

separating foreign counterespionage duties from dome stic intelligence.

He

notes that requirements for the two functions are substantially different

and that indeed the controversy over FBI "political surveillance may hinder

effective counterespionage contacts.

-7 -

DETAILS - CONTINUED - OVER

1H 55165 DooId:32989586 Page 49

---

## Page 50

Memorandum for Mr. Miller

RE: "THE SCOPE AND BASIS OF FBI DOMESTIC

INTELLIGENCE DATA COLLECTION" - JOHN T. ELLIFF

OBSERVATION:

There have been other suggestions of separating various functions

of the FBI. We feel that while there is some merit in the principle that

there is a difference in the way foreign intelligence matters are handled

and the way domestic intelligence and criminal cases are handled, it would

be impractical to have a complete separation of functions without an

enormous administrative problem. At present there is a flexibility of

use of Special Agents which means that under our present administrative

structure literally thousands of Agents are available to handle any given

case of importance whether it has to do with a Soviet illegal agent or a

kidnaping.

We already maintain, to the extent practical, a separation of all

our various functions so that we have specialists handling foreign intelligence

matters in most offices and other specialists handling domestic intelligence

and criminal cases. Where needed, however, such as in a surveillance

, across the Nation, large number of additional Agents can be pressed into

service. This would not be possible with the kind of separation suggested by

Ellitf. There are other reasons why such a separation would be impractical.

CONCLUSIONS CONTINUED:

Elliff suggests that a permanent domestic intelligence advisory

council, similar to the existing foreign intelligence advisory board, should

be established. He notes that the latter is a part-time group of outside

consultants which makes reports to the President, the reports not being

made public.

OBSERVATION:

Elliff does not go into enough detail asto what effect such a council

might have on the operations of the FBI. The FBI makes reports to the Presi

dent's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, and we can find nothing which

would indicate that this Board does not serve a useful function to the

Pain the establishine at of done tic int should ano disy vantage to the

opinion is, of course, predicated on the assumption that such a council

would not serve in y way in an overseer capacity and would not exercise.

any powers over any of our operations.

HH 55165 DocId:32989586 Page 50

ВТРИТ

---

## Page 51

Memorandum for Mr. Miller

RE: "THE SCOPE AND BASIS OF FBI DOME STIC

INTELLIGENCE DATA COLLECTION" - JOHN T. ELLIFE

CONCLUSIONS CONTINUED:

Elliff was not highly critical of the FBI's investigative policies or

activities. He advanced the suggestion that a public inquiry of the FBI is

in order, and that such an investigation could be undertaken by a select

Senate committee. He said, however, that such an inquiry would not seek

to discover illegality, but rather to evaluate for the first time the Bureau's

overall mandate against the norms of the Constitution. He said that if fault is

to be found, it would not be sought in the Bureau and its Director, but in

the long line of Attorneys General, Presidents and Congresses who

have given power and responsibility to the FBI.

OBSERVATION:

There have been numerous efforts over a long period of time to

have congressional committees or other outside agencies conduct a public

inquiry of the FBI. However, whatever noble purpose might be behind

Elliff's suggestion or those before him that a public inquiry into FBI

operations should be instituted, the whole idea is preposterous when

consideration is given to the confidential nature of our FBI files.

We have nothing to hide from the standpoint of our administrative

policies and operations.

3ut what committee would stop at administrative

policies? We have already seen what can happen when our investigative

files are opened to the curious ones. Our Media documents and material

leaked to such persons &3 Jack Anderson are taken out of context and used

for purposes wholly unir ended. Both in the case of the Media documents

and the Anderson documents, information was publicized that would have

never seen the light of ay; would never have damaged a reputation; would

never have violated a t ust had they not been exposed to public view.

We have been accused of maintaining "Secret files" or "dossiers"

with the implication tr.it we have two sets of files. Such is not the case.

All FBI files are confidential and with the exception of maintaining highly

classified material under more closely guarded conditions because of

regulations requiring it all FBI files are treated the same.

- 9 - DETAILS - CONTINUED- OVER

HH 55165 Do0Id:32989586 Page 51

---

## Page 52

•Memorandum for Mr. Miller

RE: "THE SCOPE AND BASIS OF FBI DOME STIC

INTELLIGENCE DATA COLLECTION" - JOHN I. ELLIFF

The lives of both criminal and security informants and other

individuals depend to a large measure in the FBI maintaining strict control

over its files and information. We frankly would not trust the lives of

others to members of an investigating committee who could not comprehend

the necessity for keeping our records from public scrutiny. We are

unalterably opposed to any investigating committee being given access to

our complete operations. We are confident that the American people share

this view.

SUMMARY:

As noted herein, Elliff's study is calm, unemotional and scholarly.

Whether the Presidential directives he refers to are valid remains to be

seen. We feel that the President does have the power to issue directives •

giving us authority to conduct intelligence investigations. We even feel

that a comprehensive directive from the President could sweep away many

doubts, even in our own minds, as to the actual scope of our authority in

conducting intelligence investigations. However, being realistic, we feel

that the political climate which would no doubt preclude any meaningful

additional legislation in this area, would also prevent the issuance of any

such directive during an election year. Meanwhile, we are endeavoring to do

the job which everyone, including Elliff, recognizes is necessary, and

to do this job using the statutes where possible as basis for authority as

we have always done, but following Presidential mandate in any event on the

basis that the President possesses the power to protect internal security.

XEROX.

A':. 11 1973

HH 55165 DooId:32989586 Pade 52

10

-

---

## Page 53

•IONAL FORM NO, 10

5010-106

Me " 1902 EDITION

"OS, GENt, REE, 1.0. 27

UNITED STATES C

ERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Vir. Ecst

I - Mir. Dalbey

TO : Vir. E. S. Miller

DATE: 8/1/72

1 - Mr. Miller

FROM

I. So Smith TIS

J. - Mr. D. M. Armstrong:

J. - Mr. Williamson

1 - Vir. Decker

SUBJECT:

/POSITION PAPER

1 - Mi. A. W. Gray

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

SCOPE OF FBI AUTHORITY, JURISDICTION

AND RESPONSIBILITY IN DOMESTIC

felt -

Batos

Bichop

Callahan

Campbell

Clevcland

Conrad,

Jenkins

_ Marshall

Ponder

Soyars

Walters

Tele. Room -

Mr. Kinley

Mr. Armstrong:/

Ms. Herwig

Mrs. Neenan

I - Mr. C. W. Thompson

1 - Mr. T. J. Smich

INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS

DEnis burstition

Referenco is made to memorandum from the Acting

Director to all Assistant Directors dated 5/11/72 instructing that

position papers be prepared as in-depth studies for presentation

during a two-day Executive Conference scheduled to begin on

5/23/7% Subject of Domestic Intelligence Division paper was

Subversion (to specifically include a detailed analysis and justifi

cation for our current policies with regard to the investigation of

individuals where there has been no specific violation of Federal

law. Is additional legislation needed?) .

A paper was prepared and submitted in advance of

the scheduled Executive Conference. However, during the Executive

Conference you demurred concerning the paper already submitted

and offered a different position. The essence of your second

position was that the FBI has relied on Presidential directives

dating back to 1939 for investigative authority to conduct investigations

where there were no specific violations of law; that these directives

do not appear to convey any authority which the FBI did not already

You pointed out the need for an in-depth study to

determine if we need additional statutory or Executive authority to

conduct intelligence-type investigations where no specific violation

of Federal law was involved. You recommended that such a study

be instituted, after which a position paper would be submitted

Enclosures

TJS:bjr let

XEROX

(10)

UNAICORDED SO2I FILED IN

%. 1

e and the content may not se disclosed to unauthorized person

nel without the express approval of the FBI:

14 55165 DoOId:32989586

Page 53

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## Page 54

Memorandum to Mr. E. S. Miller

Re: Position Paper

Domestic Intelligence Division

Scope of FBI Authority, Jurisdiction

and Responsibility in Domestic

Intelligence Investigations

containing results of the study. With Mr. Gray's concurrence a

study was instituted and a committee was formed consistis, of

SAs k. J. Decker, A. W.. Gray, C. W. Thompson and myself

from Domestic Intelligence Division, E4 John Hotis of Legal

Counsel's Office and Mr. D. M. Armstrong of the lcting Direcion's

Office. You designated me to act as chairman. The committee

was to conduct the in-depth study referred to above and to submit

a position paper.

Unfortunately for our project, SA Hois was

reassigned to another position part way through the study and

Sis J. I Williamson was designated to seplace him as a

representative of Juegal Counsel's Office.

The study has been

tedious and has necessarily required a great deal of time to date.

Material to study has been difficult to locate and a tremendous

amount of research was necessary to determine how much statutory

authority we actually have.

There is division of opinion among the committee

members as to whether Presidential directives issued during the

pre-World War Il period and afterward are legitimate sources of

current FBI investigative authority and whether statutes on the

bookscan be used as the basis for conducting intelligence-type

investigations where there is no specific violation of law involved.

Examples of cases where some dependence on the Presidential

directives is believed necessary, or some authority other than

statutory authority is required were submitted by the various

Sections supervising Domestic Intelligence Division cases. These

examples were incorporated into the study.

CONTINUED - OVER

-2-

IN 55165 DooId:32989586 Page 54

---

## Page 55

Memorandum to Mr. E. S. Miller

Re:

Position Paper

Domestic Intelligence Division

'Scope of FBI Authority, Jurisdiction

and Responsibility in Domestic

Intelligence Investigations

There is attached a drait of a position paper written

by me, based on research of all available records and documents

and of the examples furnished by individual Sections and on a

painstaking review of existing statutes covering some or all phases

of Domestic Intelligence Division work. To support this position

paper there is also submitted as an exhibit to the position paper

a compilation of statutes, together with recent court decisions

affecting some of them; copies of Presidential directives and

Executive orders relating to Domestic Intelligence Division work;

and copies of various memoranda and other documents used to

support the position taken in my paper.

It is recognized that the points of view taken in the

altached paper are in many instances based on opinion and con-

clusion which may be subject to question or rebuttal from a legal

standpoint. It is also recognized that in some instances it might

appear that the FBI's investigative policies, both past and future,

are being undermined by the conclusions reached in this study.

However, it is believed that with the pressure being applied to

dig into the FBI's investigative policies and guidelines, it is

imperative that if there are weaknesses in our policies or

procedures we must expose them, admit they exist, and eliminate

them without delay.

It is my firm conviction that intelligence-type

investigations conducted in the past and which certainly will be

ncessary in the future have been firmly based in lawful authority

derived from statutes and constitutional power of the President

as set forth in Executive Orders 9835 and 10450, but that we have

overstated our authority supposedly derived from Presidential

directives issued from 1939 through 1953. I strongly feel that upon

completion of our position paper we should then call upon the

CONTINUED - OVER

-3-

1H 55165

DocId:32989586

Page 55

---

## Page 56

Memorandum to Mr. E. S. Miller

Re:

Position Paper

Domestic Intelligence Division

Scope of FBI Authority, Jurisdiction

and Responsibility in Domestic

Intelligence Investigations

Attorney General to provide legal guidance and advice as to just

how much authority we have or need to conduct the investigations

necessary to protect the national security.

The arached position paper is submitted as a

Status report for the Acting Director and for the review oi each

member of the commitee designated to participate in the study.

This is a starting point. I sets forth the intormation which we

have been able to locate. It should now be read critically and

objectively by each member of the commitee and thereafter each

should submit his views in writing to voice dissent, rebuttal,

observations, additional evidence supporting their views or

additional evidence supporting this paper, and any recommendations

not covered in the paper.

It should be borne in mind in reviewing this paper

that there is at least one lawsuit pending against the FBI, et al,

(MUHAMMAD KENYATTA, et al versus J. EDGAR HOOVER, et al,

Civil Action No. 71-2595 in the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Pennsylvania) in which the very issue of the

FBI's legal basis for conducting intelligence-type investigations

may have to be shown in court. Therefore, our final position paper

must be realistic and factual and not be a whitewash or a perpetuation

of misconceptions of the past.

CONTINUED - OVER

-4-

H₩ 55165

DoeId: 32989586 Page 56

---

## Page 57

Nemorandum to Mr. E. S. Miller

Re: Position Paper

Domestic Intelligence Division

Scope of FBI Authority, Jurisdiction

and Responsibility in Domestic

Intelligence Investigations

ACTION:

That the committee referred to herein meet on

8/14/72 at a time and place to be agreed upon to present written

views and to resolve any differences which might exist in relation

to opinions expressed in the attached position paper, and that a

proposed draft of letter to the Department of Justice be framed

so that this matter can be considered by the Department.

4: 45P

= 5-

HH 55165 DocId:32989586 Page 57

---

## Page 58

OPTIONAL F'RM NO. 10

5010-106

MAY "902 IDITION

G5A GEN. REG. 110.27

Felt

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Baker

Bates

Memorandum

Bishop

1 - Mr. Bishop

Callahan

1 - Mr.

E.so Miller

Cleveland

Conrad

TO

. Mr. E. So Miller

Dalbey

DATE: 8/17/72

Jenkins

Marshall

1 - Mr. Shackelford

Miller, E.S.

FROM

To J. Smith

1 - Mx. To J. Smith

Ponder

Soyars

I - Mr. J. M. Sizoo

Walters

Tele. Room —

Mr. Kinley

-

SUBJECT: JACK ANDERSON'S COLUMN IN

Mr. Armstrong -

"PIER WASHINGION POST"

Ms. Herwig —

Mrs. Neena

trie

=475.6241

Cutiessos

8/12/72

730077

Captioned column (copy attached) which was headlined

"Blockade fails to Halt Hanos Supplies" contains a section titled

"Finuncial Secrets" comprised of information on the financial

dealings of antivar activists Dr. Benjamin Spock and Jane Fonda,

as well as on floyd Mckissick, Negro civil rights activist.

The information was taken, sometimes verbatim, from

the ollowing FBI documents:

(1) a 4/15/68 New York Office

report on Spock classified "Confidential"; (2) a 2/23/68

New York Office repost on McKissick classified "Top Secret";

= 4/30/71 Los Angeles Office report on Jane Fonda classified

"Top

Secret, No Foreign Dissemination, No Dissemination Abroad";

and (1) a 1/20/72 Los Angeles Office report on Fonda classified

"Secret, No Foreign Dissemination, No Dissemination Abroad."

Concerning Spock, Anderson notes that an FBI inquiry

at the Amalganated Bank of New York revealed that Spock had

recalved a check dated 12/12/67 for $500 from the Fifth Avenue

Viet:on Peace Parade Committee. This information was set forth

in tire New York report (Anderson calls it an FBI meno) dated

4/15/68 on Spock which was disseminated to Secret service,

Assistant Chief of Siaff for Intelligence (U. S. Army), and the

Department of Justice.

Investigation on Spock was initiated in

in deterine ul ather of not his speeches vere seditious

and his activities

Fibversive.

Anderson" column also states that the same FBI document

included

Linancial

information obtained from the Chemical Bank

New York Trust Com:

iny concerning a Doctor Edward Barsky Dinner

Committee.

This i

formation was taken from the characterization

of that committee ..et lorth in the 4/15/68 report's appendix.

roL

The information concerns the opening of the group's account as

an affiliate account of the "National Guardian," which was

characterized

by the House Committee on Un-American Activities

12 1961 as 2 "vi?". ual propaganda arm of Soviet Russia."

19.

Enclosure

ST-10

REC-28 6J-74492 375120

JMS: gI

I'has document is prepared in rescense to yur request and is notifor dissemi

(6)

ENCLOSUREr Comm:

nation nitsin your Committee.

Its reorrrindte over proceedings br

''e and the content mau not be disclosed to unauthonzed person

nel without the express approval of the fi

57805652 01874: 32989586

Page 58

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## Page 59

demorandum to Mr. Is S. Miller

Re:

Jack Anderson's Column in

"The Washington Post"

8/12/72

addition, information in the characterization contained the names

If three officers of the group who have been identified by sources

the past as Conmunist Party, USA, (CPUSA) members or former

members. Barsky was identified as a CPUSA member in 1953. The

1/15/68 report on Spock notes that Spock's name appeared on the

program as a sponsor of a testimonial dinner given Barsky on the

30th anniversary of the Spanish Civil War in New York City in

2/67.

Information is set forth in Anderson's 8/12/72 column

regarding a check made out in Floyd Mckissick's name for $2, 500

and drawn on the account of the Louis M. Rabinowitz Foundation.

This information comes from a 2/23/68 New York Office report on

McKissick. which was disseminated to Secret Service, Internal

Revenue Service, the Department of Labor, the Department of

Commerce, the U. S. Information Agency,

and the Department of

Justice.

The information was also featured in a previous

Anderson column on 5/13/72.

McKissick vas investigated beginning

In 1967 Recause of hilitancy, revolut oney state dave eation

advocacy of support for the Black Panther Party.

Has closed in 1/70.

Concerning the Rabinowitz Foundation,

money to a "left faction" which included expelled CPUSA menbers.

Anderson's ü/12/72 column also refers to financial

Information obtained by the FBI on jane Fonda, noting that a

4/30/71 memo (actually a 334-page report on Fonda) lists five

Council of Churches.

This is a repeat of

information Anderson

included in his 5/12/72 column,

Anderson's B/12/72 column also refers to "another memo

dated this past Jantry" (actually a 1/20/72 Los Angeles report

on fonda) containins: information on ten checks written on Fonda's

bank accounts and oi:

18 checks written by one Ellen Lustbader,

Fonda's personal se:

Fonda were dissemin

retary.

The 4/30/71 and 1/20/72 reports on

ted to the Internal Revenue Service, secret

Service, Defense In 'elligence Agency.

and the Depariment of

Justice. Fonda has been investigated to determine whether or

not hex speeches or activities indicate a violation or the

sedition statute.

CONTINUED - OVER

H# 55165 DooId:32989586 Page 59

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## Page 60

Memorandum to Mr. E. So Miller

Re:

Jack Anderson's Column in

"The Washington Post"

8/12/72

On 8/14/72 Anderson testified before a subcommittee

of the Senate Banking Committee in favor of legislation which

would require subpoenas or customer consent for authorities

to examine customer account records.

At that time Anderson

reportedly furnished the subcommittee with copies of what he

called FBI memos on Spock, McKissick, and Fonda.

Analysis of this column and other recent columns

indicates that Anderson is repeating some information from his

earlier 5/72 columns regarding FBI documents.

Anderson seems to be going into more detail utilizing the FBI

documents which he claims to possess.

on 8/14/72 that informants in the FBI had told him of FBI inquiries

into the checking accounts of individuals under investigation, it

is believed that Anderson is actually obtaining his information

concerning these matters from the copies of documents which he

apparently possesses, We are, of course, continuing our analysis

of items appearing in Anderson's columns from FBI documents,

and

the

Washington Field Office is currently conducting an investigation

centering on Gary Keht Rubens, who participated in a program to

transfer Secret service records to a new computerized form from

8/71 through 5/72 when Rubens was employed by the contractor

company, Computer Sciunces Corporation, F'alls Church, Virginia.

RECOMMENDATION:

If approvec this memorandum will be included in the

book maintained on AlJerson in the Research Section, Domestic

Intelligence Divisior,

WRW/AG

Aggress.

11: 142#

- 3

НН 55165 Do0Id:32989586

Page 60

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## Page 61

0-19 (Re::

• -29-72)

Felt

Bates

Bishop

Callahan -

Campbell -

Cleveland

Conrad

Dalbey

The K

nington Merry-Go-Rend

THE WASHINGTON POST

Saturday, 1ug. 12,1972

D31

Blockade Fails to Halt Hanoi Supplies

By Jack anderson • Icial

intormation to govern-|Dr. Spock discloses that the book to the G-men. A "Top Se-

ment gumshoes without a sub

FBI was provided financial in-

The bloczade of Haiphong

poena. Dozens of FBI files in formation by the Chemical 30, 1971, for example, lists five

harbor, according io the satest

our possession, however, tell a Bank New York Trust Com- checks written by Miss Fonda

intelligence reports, has failed

to

stop the steady flow of sup-

different story.

pany concerning an organiza- to various groups, including

plies into North Vietnam. •

An FBI memo about baby tion called the "Doctor' Ed- the National Council ef

Aerial photos show

that

¡doctor Benjamin Spock, for

ward Barsky Dinner Commit- Churches.

heavy shipments are rolling

example, states that on

Dec.

tee." The person to serve with

across China without any ap-

| 12,

1967, he received a

$500

Another memo doted this

a subpoena in this case, the

preciable backup at the hor- check from the "Fifth Avenue

memo said,

was "Irwin

H.

past January listed 10 checks

der. This means the sup, lies

Vietnam

Peace Parade Com-

written on Miss Fonda's ac-

are pouring into North Viet-

mittee."•

Sklar, Manager."

counts. The federal sleuths

nam through the existing net-

work of roads, trails and

rail

subsequent

oration

Sklar was on vacation and

also visited the City National

yarns that "the abo. e check

unavailable for comment,

Bank, Los Angeles, Calif., and

lines.

intormation cannot be nade

The FBI file on black leader

copied down the details of 18

Oil from China is also being

Ipublic except in the us:.l pro-

Floyd McKissick reveals that checks written by Ellen Lust-

pumped through a nev, jun-iceedings following th: issu-

in 1967 he

"received Check bader,

who is identified as

gle hidden pipeline into

the lance

of a subpoena

duces Number 2666 made out in his Miss Fonda's "personal secre-

Hanoi area. Enough oil is com-

name and drawn against the tary."

ing through, apparents, to en-

"The person to be abpoe-

account of the Louis M. Rabi-

According to the FBI, Miss

able Hanoi to get along with-

naed

in this matter i Miss

nowitz

Foundation,

Incorpo- Fonda

keeps her

personal

out fuel rationing

Sara 'I. Malloy, sel. vice

rated,

checking accounts at the Mor-

Captured docuinents also in-

president, Amalgamat: Bank

$2,500."

in

the amount

of

gan Guaranty

Trust Com-

dicate that Norti: Vietramnese

of

New

York,

11-10

Union

"The

above information," pany, New York.

The infor-

troops at the front have an

Square,

New

New

the memo warns, "is not to be mation they

ample stockpile of arms. am-

collected,

York."

made public without the issu-

the

memo warns,

"is not to be

munition, food ano suel. 'these.

supplies

had

all ady

been

Miss Malloy refuse to dis-

ance of

subpoena duces made public" without a sub-

moved into positin, report-

cuss the matter with us, but

tecum, directed to Mi. Henry

poena directed to

"Arthur TV.

edly, before Haipl ing harbor

the bank's executive i ce pres-

Skelton,

vice president,

Herbert, Assistant Secretary."

was mined.

ident,

Nicholas

"ta,

in-

Manufacturers Hanover Trust

Herbert told us he didn't re-,

sisted

it was Amal.' mated's

Company,

40 East 42d Street, flease the information and sug-

Financial Secris

"policy to get a sub

Jena be-

New York, New York."

gested it may have been given

releasing suci informa-

Banks are supp: "ed to pro-

fore

tion."

Skelton has subsequently re-"to the FBI "by our counsel."

tired, but the man who tooky

Note: Several senators have

ect the financial secrets or

heir customers.

•i the FBI

An

attorney for

he bank,

his place, Frederick E. Lyon, expressed concern that federal

wants to

snoop i: to the ac-

Alan Blumberg,

nitted to

told us "it is the bank's strict law doesn't adequately protect

counts of a suspc.

, however

my

associate,

Tos h

Spear,

policy to require whatever the privacy of bank recoras.

he bankers usualy fall all

that bank official;

requently

legal documentation is neces-

Senator

William Proxmire,

over themselves

is their ea-

cooperate with fer

-al investi-

sary before we release any in-

(D-Wis.), in fact, is currently

jerness to cooperate.

gators,

usually ag:

nst the ad-

formation."

holding hearings in an effort

For the record, the bankers vice of their couns !.

Movie actress Jane Fonda's

to close loopholes in the law.

say they don't rolease finan. The same mem vandum on checking accounts are an open

© 1972, United Feature Sandicate

-

-

-

ENCLOSURE

6574190-37

НН 55165 Do0Id:32989586

Page 61

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## Page 62

DOOM OFFICE OF ACTING DIRECTOR

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

MR. MOHR

MR. ROSEN

MR. BATES

MR.

MR.

CALLAHAN

MR. CAMPBELL

MR.

CASPER -

MR. CLEVELAND

Ion saed of these

MR. CONRAD -

MR. DALBEY -

Cases, i central issin

MR. PONDER -

is our authority, our

MR. SOYARS

MR. WAIKART

MR. WALTERS

TELE. ROOM

jurisdictional authority, ' po

•tomisestegat".

Therfore, in the future, indicats

this authority bey citing the pretenin

provision of This U.5 Code, on other

Authority. Alas incieats cohether on

not an einstegation was direted

by if, on we opened it without any

reques; com? f. Son the lates

instancis, cits our reasons.

9.. 8/27

PAN CALME

11:4SA

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi-

nation origion your Committer.

I's use is limited to official proceedings by

your Comm."' e and the contert ma, not be disclosed to unauthorized person

nel without the express approval of the FBI.

ENCLOSURE 1. 116.""

37

HH 55165 DocId:32989586 Page 62

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## Page 63

LOM

¡BJECT

BESTORM NO. 10

TRAS EDITION

- 5510. 31

UNITED STATES C

VERNMENT

Memorandum

Mr. E. S. Miller

T. J. Smith 7

SCOPE OF FBI JURISDICTION

AND AUTHORITY IN DOMESTIC

INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS

Felt.

Baker .

Bates

1 ~ Mr. Dalbey

1 - Mr. E. S. Miller

Bishop -

Callahan _

Cleveland

Conrad -

Dalbey -

DATE: 9/13/72

Jenkins -

Marshall

Miller, E.S.

1 - Mr. D. M. Armstrorgponder -

1 - Mr. Decker

Soyars -

Walters -

1 - Mr. A. W. Gray

Tele. Room —

1 - Mr. Thompson

Mr. Kinley -

Mr. Armstrong -

1 - Mr. J. L. Williamson

Ms. Herwig -

1 - Mr. T. J. Smith

Mrs. Neenan -

3

Smith to Miller memo dated 8/1/72, captioned "Position

Paper, Domestic Intelligence Division, Scope of FBI Authority, Juris-

diction, and Responsibility in Domestic Intelligence Investigations, "

enclosed a 43-page position paper containing results of a detailed study

concerning captioned matter.

Conclusions set forth in the 43-page study were that

we must sweep away the myth that the FBI now has any investigative

authority based on Presidential directives dating from 1939 and that

any responsibility we derived from those directives is so outdated as

to be very questionable if not entirely void.

Also concluded was that the FBI has valid reason to

conduct intelligence-type investigations based on Federal statutes

relating to various types of subversion affecting the national security.

It was also concluded, however, that while it would be ideal to have

definitive legislative enactment spelling out our jurisdiction and

authority to conduct intelligence investigations the political climate

today is such to stifle any attempt to formulate needed legislation.

For this reason it was recommended in the study that

• we request the Department to seek a comprehensive executive order

which would cover any jossible gaps between statutory authority and

Executive necessity in protection of the national security: 1 1 97-1822

ST-101 REC-30//..,

A meeting was held on 8/14/72 of the committee formed

conduct a study of the captioned matter. Present were SAs I. J.

Sint, 4. J. Decker, J. I. Wiliamson, C. W. Thompson, A. W. Gray,

(ENCLOSINE

• Enclosure

18 AUG 9 1973

TJS:bir

CONTINUED - OVER

(9) 0 criedocument is Depared in response to your request and is not for dissema

nel withow the elopress approval of the FBl.

DucTit: 32909506

---

## Page 64

Memorandum to Mr. E. S. Miller

Re:

Scope of FBI Jurisdiction

and Authority in Domestic

Intelligence Investigations

Mr: D. M. Armstrong, and Miss Catherine Doohan. The 43-page

position paper was discussed at length and there was general agree-

ment that the 1939 and subsequent directives give the FBI little

if any current authority to conduct intelligence investigations. There

was some disagreement as to whether intelligence-type investigations

could be conducted on the basis of existing Federal statutes. How-

ever, this issue was not resolved since there does not appear to be

any legal precedent relating to the matter.

The committee was unanimous in the conclusion that

the FBI badly needs an updated executive order which clearly

delineates FBI authority and responsibility to conduct intelligence

investigations. It was agreed that we should prepare a proposed

executive order and submit it in a letter to the Attorney General

for consideration by the Acting Director. After careful study a

proposed executive order has been drawn up and is included in a

letter to the Attorney Geueral which outlines the necessity for such

an executive order. This letter is attached.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the ettached letter to the Attorney General

requesting the issuance of an executive order be approved.

case is tyrry serian

EN X

D

=2=

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## Page 65

TO

:

FROM

SUBJECT:

OPTIONAL FORM NO, 10

5010-106

BLY 1962 EDITION

SA GEN. REG. NO. 22

UNITED STATES G

NMENT

Memorandum

Mr. W. M. Felt

ir. E. s. Miner

PROFESSOR JOHN T. ELLIFE

BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY

REQUEST TO INTERVIEW THE

ACTING DIRECTOR AND STAFF

DATE: 9/20/72

1 - Mr. Felt

1 - Mr. Bishop

1 - Mr. E. S. Miller

1 - Mr. T. J. Smith

Felt -

Baker

Bates.

Bishop

Callahan

Cleveland

Conrad

Dalbey

Jenkins

Marshall

Miller, E.S.

Ponder

Soyars

Walters

Tele. Room _

Mr. Kinley

Mr. Armstrong -

Ms. Herwig -

Mrs. Neenan -

3-!

This document

is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi-

nation

artside

your Committee., Its use

is limited to official proceedings by

your Commi

anil the

content may not be disclosed to unauthorized person

nel

without

the

express

approval of the FBI.

By letter dated 9/15/72 Professor John T. Elliff,

Brandeis University, referred to a previous letter from the Acting

Director, 5/30/72, concerning an interview with the Acting Director

and members of his staff relating to the FBI's domestic intelligence

system. The 5/30/72 letter indicated a meeting would be arranged

after the Acting Director had an opportunity to conduct his own

studies. Professos Elliff renewed his request for interview and

suggested late November be considered as an appropriate time.

T. J. Smith to E. S. Miller memorandum 6/2/72;

captioned "The Scope and Basis of FBI Domestic Intelligence Data

Collection - John T. Elliff," reported a detailed analysis of a

study submitted by Professor John T. Elliff during the two-day

conference in October, 1971, at Princeton University spors ored by

the Committee for Public Justice. In essence Professor Elliff's

study was a calm, unemotional, scholarly study relating to our

domestic intelligence-type investigations. The study for the most

part, was objective and not highly critical of the FBI.

Major thrust of the study revolved around authority

and jurisdiction of the FBI in the domestic intelligence field, and

he argued that our authority in this area is questionable 115358-

ST-112

_ REC-61 6-I-

As a part of a reexamination of our position in the

domestic intelligence field of operations, we began an in-depth

study of the scope of our jurisdiction and authority in this area. wa

A 43-page position paper was submitted 8/1/72 and by memorandum

'16 OCT 6 1972

Enclosure

TJS:bjr

(5)

CONTINUED - OVER

посій бектурких

143

58 0CT 1 9 1972

5-755

W.55165

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3305

TRES

*892777474

17159

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## Page 66

Memorandum to Mr. W. M. Felt

Re: Professor John T. Elliff

Brandeis University

Request to Interview the

Acting Director and Staff

dated 9/13/72 a letter to the Attorney General was submitted for

the Acting Director's consideration. The position paper concluded

that certain Presidential directives cited by the FBI as one of the

bases of our authority to conduct intelligence-type investigations

vested little, if any, authority in the FBI to conduct such investi-

gations. Professor Elliff reached the same conclusion. Our

position paper, however, and our letter to the Attorney General

asserted that our intelligence-type investigations are conducted

under an umbrella of legislative enactments. Our letter to the

Attorney General requested that an Executive order be sought

which would clearly delineate FBI authority and responsibility to

collect intelligence information for the President in the interest

of natinal security.

Professor Elliff undoubtedly wants to explore further

into questions already raised about our jurisdiction and authority.

Domestic Intelligence Division stands ready to assist in any dis-

cussions Professor Elliff desires to have with the Acting Director.

However, for various reasons, it is believed that any such dis-

cussions should be postponed until the results could not be used

as a political issue during and immeliately following the national

elections. Also, since we are awaiting important response to our

request for an updated Executive order, which could also be delayed

until after the elections, it would be more propitious to wait until

our request has been handled by the Attorney General.

The Acting Director has publicly announced intention

of offering his resignation to the President after the election. There

is no question in our mind that this wouldie accepted by the President

and we can, therefore, expect confirmation procedures by the Senate

CONTINUED - OVER

-2-

WW 55165 DocId:32989586 Page 66

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## Page 67

Memorandum to Mr. W. M. Felt

Re: Professor John T. Elliff

Brandeis University

Request to Interview the

Acting Director and Staff

to begin shortly after the election. We think that issues which are

likely to be raised by Protessor Elliff in the domestic intelligence

field should not be exposed to public view prior to a confirmation

hearing.

Therefore, we propose that the attached letter be

sent to Professor Elliff suggesting that due to heavy commitments

through the next several weeks it is not possible to set a date for

an interview with him until at least the latter part of November.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the attached letter to Professor Elliff be sent.

TIS

= 3-

NH 55165 DocId:32989586 Page 67

---

## Page 68

8261-98

OPtIO

рокні но. 10

MAY 2 POON

3010-106

1. 210. N5. 37

UNITED STATES '

RNMENT

Memorandum

TO

Vir. Felt

DATE:

5/22/73

FROM

I. S. Miller

SUPER FISCA:

sorrid, matter.

SUBJECT:

SECTION 87

MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS

Mr. Felt

Mr. Baker

Mr. Callahan

Mr. Cleveland

Mr. Conrad

Mr. Gebhardt

Mr. Jenkins

Me. Marshall, A.

Mr. Miller, E.S

Mr. Soyars -

Mr. Thompson

Mr. Walters

Tele. Room

Mr. Baise

Mir. Barnes -

•Mr. Bowers

Mr. Herington -

Mr. Conmy -

Mr. Mintz -

Mi. Eardley -

Mrs. Hogan

onto rein

6501-81

. Attached for approval is complete revision of Section 87

of the Manual of Instructions which governs our basic policies

and procedures in handling domestic security matters. This

rewrite represents a major step in the evolution of our policies

in this area from heavy reliance upon various Presidential Directives

dated back to the 1930s to a jurisdictional approach based on existing

Federal statutes. As indicated in prior communications, including

a detailed "Position Paper" submitted by this Division 7/31/72, we

have for some time recognized the need to more closely relate our

work in this field to its underlying statutory authority.

nation outsire your

Actually, FBI's authority to conduct investigations of

subversive elements has not been seriously challenged until recently.

There was little, if any, demand that we specify our investigative

jurisdiction in terms of statutes. Not only the general public but even

our own personnel came to accept the FBI's right to handle internal

security matters and to investigate subversive activities without

approval of

reference to specific statutes. We operated on the basis of custom

the

and precedent supplemenied by references to various Presidential .

Directives issued in the sast, notably a September, 1939, Directive

of President Roosevelt hich charged the FBI with the responsibility •

to coordinate matters relating to internal security.

committee.

Its use is limited

ed

to

This rationale has proved adequate for a number of years.

Moreover, we have ha:! tight controls on the handling of these cases

This document is prepared in response to your request and is

Enclosure

1-Mr. Felt

1-Mr. Miller

1- Administrative Division (Attn: Reilly)

1-Mr. Mintz (Attn: Williamson)

1-Mr. '

T. J. Smith

S7-102

1-Mr. Shackelford

REG-19

shitter. Cottex

JUL 17

1779

AUG 6

RDC:nlb (8)

55165

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(CONTINUED - OVER)

delete

unazunorized

roceerings

Thy

for glasscina-

ti.

11 JUN 29 1973

8151

100-00-1531

aRT 1000

TENN

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## Page 69

Memorandum to Mr. Felt

Re: SECTION 87

;

MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS

to preclude any unwarranted or excessive inquiries. Our investigations

have been soundly based even though we did not spell out the statutory

basis on which they rested.

The need to emphasize our statutory authority more clearly

became evident in the Spring of 1971 when Senator Ervin initiated efforts

to obtain from the Justice Department the specific guidelines governing

the FBI's operation in this area. Later in 1971, Professor John Elliff

presented his detailed study of FBI domestic intelligence operations at

the Princeton University conference held under the auspices of the

Committee for Public Justice. Elliff's study was concerned to a major

degree with questioning the validity of the Presidential Directives as a

firm basis for our security investigations.

Based on our detailed consideration of this matter, we believe

the answer to this matter is relatively simple although it will require

some adjustment on our part. We should base our investigations

of domestic subversion squarely on statutory basis and make it clear in

our communications and reports that this is the case. This is the

principal objective of the attached rewrite of Section 87 which includes

the following major changes:

(1) Title of Section has been changed from "Security Investigations"

to "Investigations of Subversive Organizations and Individuals. " We

believe the term "security investigations" is too broad and indefinite

whereas the new title conreys the idea that investigations covered

under this Section (namely, investigations of persons or groups seeking

to overthrow or subvert the Government) are directed at a particular

type of activity.

(2) We have revamped the basts and criteria for investigations

to make it clear throughout that our investigations are based on existing

laws, the chief of which are the statutes dealing with rebellion or

insurrection (Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 2583), seditious conspiracy

(Title 18, U. S. Code,

Section 2584), and advocating the overthrow of

the Government (Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 2585).

(3) Rules cov ring Administrative Index (ADEX) have been

updated in line with changes approved last Fall. At the same time, the

1W 55165 DocId:32989586

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2

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## Page 70

Memorandum to Mr. Felt

Re: SECTION 87

MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS

intluence of the ADEX program as a controlling factor in investigations

has been eliminated. Revised chapter stresses that ADEX is strictly

an administrative device and should not play a part in investigative

decisions or policies.

(4) We have eliminated overemphasis on Communist Party (CP)

which has characterized this Section in the past. CP is no longer singled

out as the prime subversive organization as this is no longer the case.

(5) Instructions regarding FBI responsibilities and agreements

with Defense Department agencies regarding individuals employed at key

facilities and with private contractors holding defense contracts are

being eliminated from Section 87. They will be incorporated in Section 102

(Coordination with Other Government Agencies) where they are believed

to more properly belong. This will be handled separately.

(6) Current rule requires that FBIHQ approval be secured

for members of other law enforcement agencies to accompany FBI Agents

in handling these investigations. This is being revised to provide for

'SAC approval: Actually, necessity to use officers from other agencies

rarely occurs. Where the need does arise, it is believed the SAC should

be able to make the decision.

(7) Entire chapter has been streamlined and made more

readable and better organized. It is about one third the size of existing

Section.

The new concept advanced in the revised Section 87 with its

stress on a statutory approach will no doubt prove to be a difficult

adjustment for many of our Agents who have become accustomed to

handling these cases under the existing procedures, format, etc., for

many years. In addition, there may be some "bugs" in the new system

which we have overlooked.

Accordingly, it is felt that we should allow a certain amount of

time for the field Agents and Supervisors to review the new procedures

3

HH 55165 DocId: 32989586

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## Page 71

Memorandum to Mr. Felt

Re: SECTION 87

MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS

and policies prior to their actual implementation. In this regard, we will

arrange so that when the new chapter has been printed and is being

distributed to the field, we will instruct the field by SAC Memorandum

that they are not to be put into effect for a certain period of time, for

example, "30 days.

During this interval, field will have an opportunity to carefully

study the new format and to raise any questions which arise with FBIHQ.

In addition, it is believed we should hold several regional-type conterences

with key Supervisory personnel of the major security offices to iron out

any problems which may exist in connection with converting to the revised

format. Such conferences could be led by several knowledgeable supervisors

from FBIHQ staff. Such conferences would be invaluable in eliminating

misunderstandings or confusion and insuring that we make a smooth

adjustment to the new policies.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the attached revision Section 87 be approved. Additional

recommendations will be submitted relative to the distribution of this

Section when printing is completed and for the holding of regional field

conterences.

It is requested that, upon approval, the printing of revised

Section 87 be expedited so that we can distribute it to the field as soon

as possible. As indicated, there will be some delay involved to allow fe

thelfield to assimilate the new procedures and we want to keep the over

all delay in implementing them to a minimum.

EM

gfus

(See Addendum page 5)

4

NN 55165 DocId:32989586 Page 71

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## Page 72

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION ADDENDUM, 5/30/73, RDC:nlb:

In order to expedite this matter and also allow for possible

changes in Section 87 which may be suggested by the field, we will

defer the preparation of Section 87 in final form. Instead, we will

provide the field with Xerox copies of the attached version for the

field's review during the interim period before the new procedures

actually take effect. At the conclusion of this period, we will prepare

Section 87 in final form for printing and distribution.

HH 55165 DocId: 32989586 Page 72

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## Page 73

SECTION 87..

INVISTIGATIONS OF SUSVERSIVE

ORCANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS

TABLE OF CONTENTS'

This document is prepared in response to your request and is

not for dissemi

nation outside your Committee.

I's use is limited to offimial moceediugs by

your Committe ail the contert may not be disclosed to unautoriced person-

nel without the express approval of the FBI

A. General Guidelines

1: Investigative jurisdiction

Rebellion or insurrection

b. Seditious conspiracy

c. Advocating the overthrow of the

Government.

d.. Internal Security Act of 1950

and

Communist Control. Act of 1954

2

Prosecutive determination

3. Related statutes •

4.

Definitions

5.

Predication for investigation

6.

Accuracy of characterizations

7.

Investigations and contacts with

individuals connected with institutions

of learning

8.

Use of officers from other agencies

B.

Investigation of Organizations •

1.

Purpose

2. Responsibility to initiate investigations

3. Scope of invastigation

4.

Infiltration of nonsubversive groups

•a." General

b. Caption and preface

c. Limitations on investigation

d. Conversion to full scale investigation

5.

Subversive publications

6.

Investigative steps

7.

Administrative ana reporting procedures

a.

Reporting sequirements and status

10.

Informant coverage

c.

Topical headings

d.

Character

e.

Classification

Copies .

9 .•

Closing of case

•

Page

1

1

1.

1

3

5

6

. 7

7

9

9

1.0

3.0

10

1.0

10

10

10

10

1373

(3)

MH 55165

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3-6924l7-3

5672/73

, ROC: 1766

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## Page 74

C. Investigation of Individuals

1.

General policy:

Purpose

b. Individuals to be investigated

c. Limitations on investigations

&. Investigations requiring FBIHO

approval . ..

e.

2:01

Members of ü.'s armed forces

Investigative procedures.

a.

Scope of investigation

b. • Investigative steps

c. Interviews of subjects

(1) Policy :

(2) Purpose .

(3) Approval to interview

(4)

Letter requesting FBIHO approval

(5)

It interview not conducted

within D0 days

(6) Conduct of interview

(7) Direction of subject's

activities

(8) Reporting results of interview

3. Reporting procedures .

..

General

o. Sunmarizing information

Administrative or cover pages

Office of origin

Title of communications

f. Classification

9. Character

h. Copies of reports or LAMS

i. Status . . .

j. Closing and reopening of cases

k.

Subjects traveling abroad

1. Submission of information on members

of

subversive groups

m. Control

files on former members

of subversive organizations

n. Channeling information to

case files ..

0.

Movement of

subjects between offices

11

11

11

11

11

11

12

12

12

13

14

14

14

14

1:5

15

16

16

16

17

17

17

18

18

18

18

19

19

19

19

19

21

21

21

22

ii

HH 55165 DooId:32989586 Page 74

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## Page 75

E.

Dissemination of Data Developed

...

2 c

General policy

Specific requirenents

a. =

Members of armed forces

b. Aliens and paturalined citizens

C.

Individuals employed in or having

access

to Key Facilitios or employees of

private contracters of the Arned Forces

d.

e.

Employees of public utilities

Members of military reserve branches

or National Guard •

f.

Seanen and subjects employed in

maritine industry.

9.

hi.

Enployeos of rederal Government

Individuals who own property or reside

in immediate vicinity of premises

under armed forces

jurisdiction .

1. Airmen licersed by Federal

Aviation Adrinistration •

1. Disseminat...n

to Secret. Service .

3. Restrictions o: field dissemination

Ianinistrative Inde: (ADEX)

I..

Purpose and getural policy

2. Criteria

3.

Recommendation or preparation of

ADEX card

1,

: 5.

Format of ADE cara

Arrangement o. IDux

a.

At Headqu: ters

b.

In?

fiold: ' fice

(1) Alph etical

section

(2) Geogiaphical section

(3) Unav ilable section

6.

Special intes st subjects

7. Changes

in residence and empioyment

Of ADEX subj. its

8. Changes in c nes background

data

9. Movement of DE% subjects between offices

10. Subject entr ing U.S. armed forces

11.

Removal of ids from ADEX

12. Reevaluatio: Of ADEX status

iii

HH 55165 DocId:32989586 Page 75

23

23

23

2.3

24

24

24

24

24

2,4

24

2,4

2.5

26

27

27

27

*32

32

32

32

33

33

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## Page 76

SECTION 87: INVESTIGATIONS OF SUBVERSIVE

ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS

A. GENERAL GUIDELINES

1. Investigative juridiction.

FBI investigations under this soction are based on specific

statutory jurisdiction and Departmentel instructions.

Investigations conducted under this section are to be

directed to the gathering of material portinent to a

determination whether or not the subject has violated,

or is engaged in activities which may result in a violation

of, one or more of the statutos enumerated belovi or in

fulfillment of Departnental instructions

There are three principal statutes which provide a basis

for these investigations; as follows:

Rebellion or insurrection (18 USC 2383).

"Whoever incites, sets on 100t, arsises, oi engages

or insurrection against the author

ity of the United States or the lars thereos, or

gives aid or comfort thereto, shall be fined not

more than $10, 000 or imprisoned not more

than ten

years, or both; and shall be incapable of holding

any office under the United States."

b.

Seditious conspiracy (18 usC|2384).

"If two or more persons in ahy Stale or Territory,

or in any place subject to the jurisdiction of the

United states, conspire to overthror put down, or to

destroy by force the Governnent of the United States:

or to levy

war against thom, ior to oppose by force

the authority thereof, or by force to prevent, hinder.

or delay the execution of any law of the United States:

or by force to seize, take, or possess any property

of the United States contrary to the authority

there

of, they shall each be fined not more than $20,000

of imprisoned not more than twenty years, or boch."

Advocating the orerthrow of the Governnent (18 USC 2385) .

"Whoever knowingly or willfully advocates, abets,

advises, or teaches the duty, necessity, desirability

or propriety of overchrowing or destroying the

government of the United States or the government of

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi-

nation outside vorr Committee.

Its use as himited to official proceedings bu

your Commit-e aid the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized person-

nel without the express approval of the FBI .

HH 55165 Do0Id:32989586 Page 76

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## Page 77

any State, Territory, District or Possession there-

of, or the goveriment of any political subdivision

therein, by force oi violence, or by the assassina

tion of any officer

of any such goveinment; or

"Whoever, with intent to cause the overthrow on

destruction of any such government, prints, publishes,

edits, issues, circulates; sells, distributes, or

publicly displays any written or printed matter

advocating, advisingh or teaching the duty, necessity,

desiravility, or propriety of overthrowing or

destroying any goveriment in the United States by

force or violence,

attempts to do so; or

"Whoever organizes or helps or attempts to organize

any society, group, or assembly of persons who teach,

advocate, or encourage the overthrow or destruction

of any such government by force or violence; or

becomes or is a member of, or affiliates with, any

such society, group, or assembly of persons; knowing

the purposes thereof

"Shail be. fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned

not more than trenty vears, or both, and shall be

neligible for employment. by the United States or

any department or agency thereof, for the five years

next following his conviction.

"If two or nore persons conspire to comnit. any offense.

named in this section,

each shall be fined noi more

than $20,000 or inprisioned not more than twenty

rears, or both, and shall be ineligible for employ-

ment by the United States or any department or

agency thereor, for the five yeais next following

his conviction.

"As used in this, section, the terms 'organizes' and

'organize,' with respect to any society, group, or

asserblyor persons, includes the recruiting of new

members, the forming of new units, and the regroup-

ing or expansion of existing clubs, classes, und

other units of such society, group, or assembly of

persons."

...

The courts have interpreted this statute to rcquire

advocacy to action, i.e., advocacy to do sonething,

now or in the future, rather than merely to believe

in something.

2

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In addition to the three principal

statutes outlined above,

there are two other statutes which might provide a statutory

foundation for an investigation under this section.

These are:

d. The Internal Security Act of 1950 and the Communist

Control Act of 1954 (50 USC 781-810).

In summary: these statutes make it unlawful to

knowingly

contribute to the establishment of a

totalitarian dictatorship within the United States

•which is controlled by a foreign government, organi-

zation, or individual. The statutes also impose

various restrictions on the activities of members

of organizations cited by the Subversive Activities

Control Board, (SACB). as "communist action,"

"communist front," or "conmunist infiltrated"

groups.

The restrictions apply principally to

employment by the Federal government or by a asfense

facility.

The former SACB cited only one organization, the

Comnunist Party, USA, which was named as a "communist

action" group.

2.

Prosecutive determination.

All discussions pectaining to the prosecutive potential

of investigations initiated under this section will be

conducted by FBIHQ with Departmental officials. these

cases should not be discussed with local U. S. Attorney's

office without FBIHl approval.

3.

Related statutes.

There are a number of other statutes under the FBI.'s

investigative jurisdiction which should be borne in

mind in handling these investigations. Information

concerning possible violations of such statutes is.

frequently developed during these investigations.

Where this occurs the field should consider the desir-

ability of conducting investigation in line with the

policies and procedures governing the statute in question.

A list of other Federal statutes which may arise during

these investigations is outlined in an appendix to this

manual, setter

- 3-

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4.

5.

Definitions.

The term "subversive activities" as used in this section

denotes activities which are aimed at overthrowing,

destroying or undermining the Governnent of the

United" States or any of its political subdivisions by

the illegal means prohibited by statutes enumerated

in A. 1. above.

The term "subversive organization" or

"subversive movement" denotes a group or movement which

is known to engage in or advocate subversive activities,

as defined above.

Predication for investigation.

In all cases handled under the provisions of this section,

the

first communication prepared which indicates

an

investigation is being initiated

(intra-office memorandum,

letter, airtel, teletype or report) shoula show specifi-

cally the

statute

upon which the investigation is based

together with all the supporting facts.

Such a

predication must be included in the first communica-

tion to FBIHQ and the first report or IHM pre-

pared in each case.

Where investigation has been specifi

cally requested by Department, this should be indicated

in predicatio.. The following examples are illustrative;

however, the predication for each individual case must be

tailosed to the circumstances of such case.

that/

"This investigation is based on information the

sub-

ject's activities may be in violation of 18 USC 2383

¿(Rebellion or insurrection), and 2384 (Seditious

conspiray). A source whose

reliability has not

been det. rmined has informed

that the

subject is

planning, along with others, to travel to Washington,

D. C., 01 April 30, 1971, to participate in planned

violent lemonstrations during the first week in

May, 19"1, to 'shut down the Government.'

Demonstra

tion plins include the blocking of streets. and

highwas':, destruction of personal and Government

properi?, and physical obstruction to prevent

Governi ant employees from reporting to work."

that/

"This

nvestigation is based on information the

subjec='s activities may be in violation of 18 USC

2385 (lavocating the overthrow of the Government).

The subject is an admitted member (or has been

-4-

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## Page 80

identified

as a member by a confidential

source who

has provided reliable information in the past) of

(name of group).

The (name of group) in its public

statements and publications advocates the desir-

ability and necessity of overthrowing the U.S.

Government by force or violence, and the assassina-

tion of U.

S. Government officers.

The same souice

has reported that the subject actively supports

these

positions."

• If the statutory basis for an investigation should change

or be expanded to include an additional statute or statutes,

the first communication prepared subsequent to such change

or expansion should specifically show such changes.

larly, this information should be included in the next report

Or LHM prepared in the case.

6.

Accuracy of characterizations.

Assure that statements

relating to characterizations of

an individual or organization, or relating to affilia

tions with or membersnip in any organization, are

founded on a firm basis.

Identify sources for such

characterizations or statements

of affiliation of member

ship li such characterizations, affiliations or member-

ships are not.commonly and publicly known.

7.

Investigations and contacts with individuals connected

with institutions of learning.

(a) Prior EBIHQ

: approval is required to:

(1) Institute investigation of a faculty member or

an organization connected with an aducational

institution.

(2)

Interview any

student or faculty member who is

not an established source.

Requests to conduct

interviews must include individual's name,

position, and an assessment of his reliability

and discretion.)

(b) Contacts with established sources in an administra-

tive capacity may be made on

campus.

Contacts with

other established sources, e.g., students and non~

academic employees, should be made off campus:

- 5 -

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8.

Use of officers from other agencies.

Members of other law enforcement or intelligence agencies

are not to accompany Agents handling these investiga-

tions without specific approval by the SAC.

6

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B. INVESTIGATION OF ORCANIZATIONS

1.

Purpose

To develop evidence of any violations of statutes

enumerated in A. I above and to keep the Department

and other agencies and officials of the Exccutive

Branch apprised of infornation developed which

pertains

2.

to their areas of interest and responsibility.

Responsibility to initiate investigations

When information is reccived indicating an organization

may be engaged in subversive activities. or may be a front

group for snoversive organizarion, field otrice should

iniciate preliminary investigation confined to established.

sources.

Notify

undertaken.

that investigation has been

within I5 days submit results by letter with

recommendation as to whether or not further investigation

is warranted.

3.

Scope of investigation

Pertinent data concerning following items should be obtained

reported:

Origin and scope

Date and circumstances of founding including any

incorporation data.

Identities of organizers. Location

b.

Of Headquarters ano chapters or affiliates, if any.

Stated aims and purposes, especially any information

showing advocacy of violence or illegal activity.

c .

Officers

Principal officers and/or leaders with succinct

resume of subvecsive backgrounds, if any:

a. * Membership

Tocal active membership, including logical brealdowns

by organizational scructure

and geographical ared, if

applicable.

Il exact membership figures are not

availabic and estinates aze given, be certain they are

plainly shown as

estimates.

in

cover pages or cover

communications, include evaluation of reliability

of membership figures cited, as well as comments

concerning any significant factors involving membership,

e.g., increases of decreases, notable shift in

composition of group by age, sex, nationality, etc.

Be certain to secure accurate description of all Lists

referred to so as

to avoia confusion as to exaci identit

or significance of such listo.

e.

Publications

All publications of group with emphasis on any which

clearly depict subversive character of organization.

-7=

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Furnish FEINO wich copy of publications which

portray subversive

character of group or which

advocate

violence.

Ascertain sources of funds for publications

When it is operated as distinct

entity, a

separate

investigation should be initiated concerning the

publication.

£.

Finances

Sources of funds and nature of expenditures, in

particular whether any income is received from os

contributions made to foreign elements.

9 •

Connections with other groups

Develop pertinent information

concerning ties with other

subversive elements including material and/or moral

support givon or received.

Be especially alert to

detect connections with foreign subversive elements

or indications of foreign allegiance or control. Also

determine and report any significant connections or

cooperation with nonsubversive groups.

h..

Activities

Describe activities of group. Afford special emphasis

to any underground operations or activities involving

violence or threatened violence. Include any pertinent

data showin success or failure

of organization in

achieving jus stated goals.

4. Infiltration of nonsubversive groups

a..

General

When infocation is received indicating that subversive

is seeking to

systematically infiltrate and

control

a ronsubversive orgainzotion, available data

should be'ubmitted by letter with recommendations as

to initiai ng active

investigation.

Recommendation to

undertake investigation should be supported by

available lackground

information concerning

target

organizat: on (including name and locations, estimated

• membershi, principal officers,

of activities.

and resu: of extent of subversive infiltration efforts

(includi: ; identities of known subversives who have

brief st tement as to investigation planned.

ed by FbiHl conduct discreet investiga

tion li: ted to determining and reporting activities

which a:: related to or in furtherance of subversive

infiltr zion.

These instructions apply to local

chapter

oi affiliates as well as national organization.

b.

Captior and preface

Captic: of communications should show that subversive

infil:

ation of target organization is objective of

investigation, not organization itself, a.gy

"Infi' ration of (Name of target organization) by (Name

WH 55165 DocId: 32989586 Page 83

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5.

6.

of subversive organization)."

All communications

prepared foi dissemination should carry prefatory

statement which clearly conveys this point, e,g•,

"This

nvestication 1s directed solely towards establishinc

the extent of infiltcation, domination, or control of

the (Name of nonsubversive organization) by the (Name

of subversive organization), It is not concerned with

the normal activities of the (Name of nonsubversive

organization). "

In addition preface should succinctly

show the predication for our investigation of che sub-

versive group involved.

C.

Limitations on investigation

(1) Other than with established sources, no interviews

should be initiated with members, leaders, of

officers of infiltrated organization without

PriOs FBINO approval. (except where they

can be handled by suitable pretext). However,

this does not preclude accepting infornation

volunteered to FBI.

(2)

Informants and sources should not be direcied

by FBI to join or participate in activities of

target organization.

However, if subversive

group requests informant to do so, latter may

comply:

(3) Be certain all persons interviewed, including

informants, are aware that FBI is not interested

in normal activities of target organization but

solely in efforts to influence or control the

organization by subversive elements.

d. Conversion

to

full scale investigation

If target organization becomes completely dominated and

i controlled by subversive elements, advise FBiC

on UNCE basis that full investigation being initiated

as subversive organization.

Drop infiltration

designation from title of case.

Subversive publications

Each office should review such publications produced in its

territory to determine whether any advocate subversion,

violence, or violations within FBI jurisdiction.

If 50, •

submit available information by IHM to FBINQ with

copy Of pertinent material and make recommendations as to

further action.

Insure that FBIHO is'aware of all

subversive publications with brief identifying data.

Investigative steps

Efforts should be made to develop reliable informants at

all levels and in all segments of subversive organization.

Live informant coverage should be supplemented by othei

logical investigation

including review of appropriate

public records and publications,

_9-•

H₩ 55165 DocId: 32989586 Page 84

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7.

interviews with former members of group and, on selective

basis,

through such techniques as physical and photographic

surveillance.

Administrative and

reporting procedures

a .

Reporting requirements and status

When necessory data has been developed concerning

•Orgonization's activities (Sce B. 2. above),

submit

report.

After initial report, reports should be

submitted semiannually (unless BIHO has instructed

otherwise in individual cases).

IHM may be used to

provide FBiHO or other interested agencies with

significant data of immediate interest on an interim

b.

basis between reports.

Informant coverage

Cover pages of reports should include a brief summary

of informant coverage available with respect to the

organization, identifying informants who report on the

group's activities by symbol number and showing

specifically which informants are members of the group.

C.

Topical headings

Both reports and INMs should be organized under logical

headings.

d.

Character

All cases should use character "Internal Security,"

e.g., "Communist Party, USA; Internal Security."

In case of subsidiary or front group, character shoula

show name or abbreviation of the parent organization,

e. g., "Young Workers Liberation League, Intechal

Security • CPUSA"; "Young Socialist Alliance,

• Internal Security • SWP."

infiltration cases should include name of

group and target organization, e.g., "Infiltration

of (Name of target organization)

Party, Internal Security - SWP."

e. Classification - 100

f. Copies

Furnish 5 copies of reports and LHMs except where

instructed otherwise in individual cases.

9.

Closing ot case

If it is determined subject organization is. not

currently engaged in subversive activities,

submit

pertinent facts in closing report.

- 10

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...

C. INVESTIGATION OF INDIVIDUAIS

1. General policy

a.

Purpose

To develop evidence of any violations of

the statutes enumerated in A. l. above and

keep the Department

and other agencies and

officials of Executive Branch advised of infor

mation developed which pertains to their areas

of responsibility and interest.

•b..

Individuals to be investigated

Investigations should be conducted to fully identify

and determine the activities and affiliations of

persons who:

Are reported to be engaged in activites which

may result in a violation of statutes enumerated

in A. I. above. This includes individuals who

are current active members of subversive organiza-

tion or movement.

Where formal membership in a

subversive movement does not exist, it includes

individuals who are actively supporting the

subversive goals of

the movenent.

:

Priority investigative attention should be given to

individuals who are

known or suspected of being

involved

in subversive activities which are of

clandestine, underground, or violent nature.

C.

Limitations

on investigations

All investigations conducted should avoid nebulous

or sweeping inquiries which are not relevant to

objectives.

Under no circumstances

should an

investigation be conducted of any individual merely

on the basis that such individual supports unpopular

¿causes or opposes Government policies.

d.

(1) U. S. Government employee

(2) Officials or

employees of United Nations or other

public international organizations of a

governmental or quasi-governmental nature:

(3)

Officials or employees of foreign diplomatic

establishments or governments.

(4)

of student or nonacademic employees of institutions

of learning in the absence of unusual circumstances

If during a pending investigation it is discovered

that the subject fits one of above categories,

suspend active investigation and advise rBINQ

with recommendation as to further action.

- Il -

1# 55165 * DOCT: 32989386- Pate 66.019-941

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## Page 87

i,

2.

e.

Menbers of United States armed forces.

No investigation should be conducted of active or

retired members of United States military

forces. IL

it is detemined that a subject fits in this category,

terminate investigation and promptly furnish pertinent

data to appropriate counterintelligence

branch of

United States armed forces. Advise FBIHQ' in form

suitable for dissemination.

Investigative procedures

a.

Scope of investigation.

Data concerning the following items

shoula be developed and reported, if pertinent:

(1) Background information, including

(a) True name and aliases.

(13)

Date and place of birth.

(c)

(d)

Residences, past and present:

Occupations

and employments, past and present.

(e)

Citizenship status; where applicabie,

naturalization data.

(f)

Family background.

If available, include

identities of immediate family and any

information indicating they are employed

in sensitive positions or by u.s.

Government.

If member of immediate family

is known to be engaged in subversive

activities, include succinct resume.

(g)

(r)

(i)

(5)

(k) .

Military records, including any service in

foreign forces.

Educational backgroud.

Arrest record and disposition of charges.

Physical description.

Make reasonable

effort to secure photograph.

Hanäwriting and/or handprinting specimens

should be obtained, if readily available,

had rating

• and kept in case file. Special efforts

should be made to secure such specimens

with regard to leaders of subversive groups

and they should be furnished to FBIll

by letter for attention of fBI laboratory

• to be included in National Security File.

- 12-

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(2)

subversive activities and affiliations, including

(a)

Information concerning membershiy in

subversive novements, organizations or front

groups, date and circumstances of admission.

positions held, and participation in

activities of organization

(e.g. attendancc

at meetings or other functions, fundraising

oi recruitment efforts on behalf of organiza

tion, contributions, etc.)

•(b)

Statements made or other

factors which

inci cate

awareness of the subversive

nature of group, including involvement

in underground operations, and/or in

any other illegal.

or violent actions

promoted by organization or movement.

(c)

Information

tending to show subject's

importance in subversive movement or

organization, e.g., degree of Influence

and leadership exercised, close association

with national or local leaders, participation

in policy

decisions.

b. Investigative steps

The following steps should be considered, but are

not all inclusive.

(1)

File reviews.

office indices should be checked.

Any pertinent infomation developed should be

included in initial report.

Where logical, check files

of other field

offices and/or FBINQ.

(2)

Public sousce material.

Make full use of

public records

and public sources

of infor-

mation, including hearings of congressional

or other Government committees both state and

Federal, and publications, including those

issued by subversive groups.

(3)

Check of files of other government agencies,

both Federal and local, which could logically

be expocted to have pertinent intormation.

(4)

Records Of

firms. Obtain pertinent

available infomation from records of private

firms such as past or present employers.

Checks

of credit agencios should be linited to

securing identifying information only.

• HH 55165 DocId:32989586 Page 88

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...

C.

(5). Contacts with neighbors and fellow employees.

Such inquiries should be made only where there

is expectation they will develop pertinent

infornation not otherwise available.

(6)

Canvass of established sources and informants.

Contact informants and sources in position to

be knowleageable coucering subversive groups

with which subject is affiliated.

(7)

Physical and photographir surveillances.

These should be considered on selective •

basis when circumstances indicate they may

be procuctive.

Interviews of sujects

Policy

Subjects of investigation should be

interviewed in the absence of exceptional

circumstances.

Generally, interviews

shoulä be considered after background inquiries

have len completed and a good picture of

subjece's activities developed.

If a cacision not to interview a subject is

made, chis should be fully explained

file and FBIHD aävised whenever FBIHQ

is cognizant of investigation.

(2)

Purpose

To derelop information regarding subversive

actirties

in which the suject is engaged.

•(3)

Apprial to interview

All. interviews of subjects may be

appri red by SAC except folloving instances

whic: require FBMO approval:

(a)

When subject holds leadership position

in subversive organization.

(1)

When subject is nationally prominent or

where circunstances otherwise indicate

the interview coula be widely publicized,

such as labor leaders, educators, religious

• leaders or journalists.

(c:

When interview is to be conducted in

presence of subject's attorney and/or aide.

-14 =

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(4)

(d)

When subject is connected with institution

of learning.

Letter requesting FBIll approval to .

interview subject.

(a)

Letter shoula concisely set our available

data concerning following items.

I.

Residence address, emnloyment, race,

date and place of birth, citizenship

and any health factors which could

affect conduct of interview.

II.

Marital status: employment and

citizenship of

spouse.

III.

succinct summary of subject's

subversive

,activities, membership ou affiliation

with subversive groups positions helia.

IV.

Similar sumary regarding soouse's

affiliation with subversive activities.

v.

Similar sunmary concerning subversive

VI.

activities on part of close relatives.

Resume of subject's current sympathies

and status in subversive movement or

organization and any indication of

disaffection.

VII.

subject's arrest

recoId

and disposition

of charges; any information indicating

propensity for violence.

VIII.

What is expected to be gained by intervier

List above items by number but headings

necä not be restated. If no pertinent

data is available concoming a particular

item, so indicate.

(b) Submit one copy of letter and additional

copy of fiist page only which can be

returned by FBINO stamped

"Apsroved."

(5)

If interview not conducted within 50 days,

submit letter advising FBIHQ:

(a)

Reason intervier not conducted.

(b) Any ner information pertinent to

desirability of

interview.

(c) Whether efforts to interview subject

will be pursued.

Thereafter, keep

FBIHQ advised at least each 60

days

as to progress of matter.

~15 ~

1N 55165 DocId:32989586 Page 90

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(6)

Conduct of interview.

(a)

Interviews of subjects entitled to the warning

and waiver shall be conducted in accordance with

the requirements set forth in Volume I, Manual of

Instructions, Section 2B, page 15. If the inter-

view is being conducted for intelligence informa-

tion rather than an admission or confession of

guilt, no warning

is required. Moreover, if the

investigation has

failed to develop information

indicating a possible violation of Federal law

by the subject, it would be permissible to inter-

view the subject without a warning as he does not

fit the criteria of those entitled to a warning

of rights. Carefully plan interview so there

will be no compromise of sources, sensitive tech-

niques or interviewing personnel. An overriding

consideration to always bear in mind is that

interview should elicit from, not provide infor

mation to the subject.

(b)

Interview at subject's place of employment should

be avoided if possible.

If attorney or aide is

present during

interview, interview must be con

ducted li? two Agents.

(c)

If, during conduct of interview subject desires

that his attorney or aide be present, the inter

view should be tactfully terminated, and FBIHQ

his attor a tenay

should be informed with recommendation whether

or not to resume interview.

(a) In all other instances, SAC has responsibility

and option of deciding when two Agents should

handle

nterview.

Safety of Agents is first

priorí. to consider.

17) Direction is subject's activities.

Prior FBIll: approval is required before taking any

steps to d'rect the subject's activities even though

he may apfar to be cooperative during the interview.

(8)

Reporting esults of interview.

(a) Recori results of interview on FD-302.

(o) Perti ent results of interview should be included

in neit report or LIM unless circumstance's indicate

need

for more expeditious reporting.

In cover

letti: or administrative pages, include observa-

tion

of intervieving Agents as to subject's

coop rativeness, any relevant information concerning

subjict's appearance or characteristics,

and assess

ment.

• of information developed by interview in light

of other data known to your office.

- 16 -

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..:

?.

Reporting Procedures

a.

General

(1)

Pertinent information developed during

investigation may be reported either by

report or LiM.

Reports should be subnitted:

(a)

When setting out results of extenged

inquiries such as summary of subject's

(1)

activities.

When subject is being recommended for

inclusion in ADEX.

JEM should ba used to report timely or

significant information regarding subject's

current activities.

(2)

All communications should be limited to:

(a) Infornation

regarding subject's

subversive

• activities, sympathies and affiliations.

(b)

artinent background data concerning

subversive individuals or groups with which

cubject is connected.

(c) issential backgrouna

data regarding subject.

They should

not include information regarding

subject's social or personal affairs or other

back, ound data not relevant to subject's

sub-

vers:

e activities or atfiliations.

(3)

Info: ration in both reports and IlMs should be

orge. ized under topical headings.

Main headings

and wheadings shoule be enployed to make the

con: nication as readable as possible.

1. Summaria: ig information.

curuler ting information of repetitious or

e nature, such as attendance at regular

meetings of subversive group, use summary narrative

stateme: :.

Exact dates are not ncedea, but time

period

Ivolved should be indicated.

Summaty

statene

ss must be statements of faots

and not

conclusions. Information fron different

- 17-

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sourcesshould be reported separately and any

significant items must be set forth in detail.

Administrative or Cover Pages

(1)

Material to be included

Pertinent information concerning following

should be included in administrative pages

cover communication of InM:

References to other reports or correspondence,

ADEX status, reference to security flash

notice (FD-165) or transfer of origin (FD-128) ,

reason for. classification, if any, documentation

of dant centain

of data contained in report or LiM, identities

of confidential sources, leads, and other

administrative or noninvestigative material.

Use FOIm (FD-305) .FOr ADEX cases.

If used,

nonsymbol source page

should be

last page.

(2)

Documentation

(a)

In documenting information originating with

another field office,

file number of

original

document need not be shown

provided

source, daic information seceived,

and receiving Agont are identified.

(D)

Do not conduct extensive inquiries

to

(c)

document: background information.

In characterizing

persons who associate

with subject, identify source but

further documentation not required.

•Office of Origin

Orrace covering place where

subject's principal

subversive activities

or originate shoulà be

In unusual circumstances where there is

doubt as to which office should be origin, request

FBIHO to designate office of origin.

e.

Title of communications

Nosmally, only one subject should be carried in

title of each report or LuM and separate reports

should be submitted for each subject regardless of

relationship.

However, when reporting virtually

identical inforation concerning two related

individuals (e. g. travel data concerning

a husband

and wife an exception can be made and single LAM Or

report submitted.

In such cases dual captions should

be used and

an extra copy of communication provided.

f. Classification - 100

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HH 55165 DooId:32989586 Page 93

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g. Character

(1)

Designation "Suoversive' Matter" (or abbreviation SM)

should be used in all cases.

Add organizational

affiliation when chief group with which subject

is connected is under current investigation or

has approved thumbnail sketch.

-

Example: Subversive Natter - CPUSA '

Subversive Matter - SWP

(2) Where meaningful organization affiliation cannot

.n.

be shown, use caption "Subversive Matter."

Copies of reports or LHMs.

In all instances furnish four copies to FBIHQ to

cover dissemination to Department (2) and

secret service

(1). Where it appears dissemination will be made to

other agencies.at FBIHQ

additional copy for each such agency involved.

i..

Status

Carry cases as pending until logical inquiries aimed

at resolving purpose of investigation have been

completed.

As minimum, case should be kept pending

until essential background data regarding subject has

been secured and sufficient infocation developed to

present good picture of nature and extent of subversive

activities engaged in by subject.

j.

Closing and reopening of cases.

If it is determined that subject's current activities

not involve an actual or potential violation of

one or more of the statutes

enumerated in A. 1.

above, case should be closed.

Case may be reopened

at a later date if additional

information is received which indicates subject's

subsequent activities involve or may

result

in a

K.

violation of the statutes cited in A. 1.

subject traveling abroad (Also see section 105G

Volume IV, of this manual).

Take following action when information is received

that subject of current investigation intends

to travel abroad or has departed on, foreign travel

(except where travel is of brief duration and is

known

to be for innocuous purpose, such as vacation):

-19 -

: 1H7--55165DeCId:32989586--Page94om000999

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## Page 95

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Immediately notify FBIHQ of available details

concerning travel, including places

and dates of

departure and intended return, destination,

itinerary out

itinerary, purpose of trip, and percinent passport

data.

include full description of subject,

including aliases. Set out concise resune ot

available subversive data regarding subject.

DO

not delay advising FBIll while devaloping

details if time is of essence.

If necessary, set out lead for Wro to check records

sI Passport Office, Department of State.

Pertinent information is furnished Department of

State, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) , and

interested Legal Attaches.

Furnish EBIHO

six copies of LIM (2-Department, 1-Secret

service, 1-State, 1-CIA) plus an additional fouI

Legal Attache Office which covers

subject's itinerary (1-tegat, 3-Legat's

sources) .

Also, furnish one copy of subject's

photograph, 1.i

available, for each. Legat Office

involved.

services

If stop should be placed with security

abroad,

so indicate in cover letter.

Set out requests

for investigation abroad on

separate numbered page captioned "Leads"

at end

Of LHM.

Request should not refer to legal Attache

or request investigation by any

particular service.

AdViSe FBIHO DrOmOtlY bY LEM Of

subject's

return. If subject has traveled to a communist

country, furnish reconmendation as to interview

and advise rather additional

investigation boing

conducted.

lake following

action when information is receivea

has organization or anovidual engaged ii

subversive activicies is forming tour group foi

foreign travel:

(a)

Advise appropriate oifices, uider caption oi

tour group or organization, as to, identities

of individuals participating in tour and

furnish LAM tO FEIND For dissemination

.

to State Department, CIA, and interested Legal

Attaches .

Include readily available informa

tion partaining to tour, such as itinerary,

dates, names, and addresses of parcicipants,

and thumbnail sketch of organization or

individual sponsoring tour.

- 20 -

HH 55165

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1.

m.

(b)

Other offices should imediately identify

participants residing within their respective

territories

and submit LiMs on those of

security interest.

Refer to INM previously

prepared under caption of tour group oi

organization. in

cover letter, list

participante

on whom there is no subversive

information.

submission of information on rembers of subversive

groups.

(1)

Offices covering national headquarters or local

units of subversive groups should promptly

furnish FBIHQ names and identifying data

regarding persons affiliated with such groups.

Furnish information by letter, and indicate list

is being furnished for indexing purposes.

sand, cape list

(2)

subversive affiliation of

individuals residing in territory of other offices

should be furnished to latter.

(3)

Subscription lists of publications of subversive

organizations should be indexed in fiela office

covering address

shown for subscriber but should

not be forwarded to WBTHQ.

Control files on former members of subversive

organizations.

(1). Offices having sufficient volume should maintain

control files

on former members of subversive

organizations.

Such filles will wreclude necessity

for extensive

file reviews

to identify persons wis

are in position

to furnish information of value in

(2)

particular cases.

where appropriate, make

copies of communications

for these

files.

In lar as practical these files

shoula contain following information regarding

ex-members of subversive groups:

background, sype

of information possessed, time period covered,

availability for interview and for testimony.

Channeling information to case files

(1)

Menoranda regarding membership. or activity in

subversive organizations, including sumacies

of

informant reports, should be channeled to case

files of individuals involved.

When information

from informants or surveillances is channeled to

individual case files, it should be documented.

HH 55165

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Page 96

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.. ..

0.

(2)

When preparing lengthy 'channeling memoranda

reporting material of interest to other offices,

limit number of copies prepared to two for each

other office. Clearly indicate next to namesof

other offices the page number containing

information of interest and note on cover

• page

that distribution of material to individual case

files should be handled by recipient offices.

Movement of subjects between offices.

If office of origin receives information that

subject of current or past investigation changes

residence to territory of another division, office

of origin request verification within 30 days.

new residence

confirmed, office of origin submit

'D128 to transfer orlain.

- 22

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## Page 98

D| DISSEMINATION OF DALA DEVELOPED

1. General. Policy

Information developed during these investigations

should be furnished to other agencies in Executive

Branch which have a legitimate interest.

See MAR,

part II, section 5, pertaining to Bureau's overall

responsibilities and policies

in dissemination.

Do not disseminate earlier reports without reviewing

them to insure they meet current reporting standaras.

If they are unsuitable for dissemination, prepare IHM

containing pertinent infomation.

2. Specific requirements

Following instructions coves representative situations

which occur frer: antly.

a.

Members of ned forces

Delimitation: Agreement between FBI and armed Forces

intelligenci agencies (sse section 102B, volume IV,

of this manial.) requires free exchange of all

information of mutual interest between subscribing

agencies.

mediately refer any derogatory or

possibly sir rificant information developed concerning

members of litary services, including contacts with

individuals or groups of security interest, to military

service hat og primary responsibility.

If it is desermined subject of FBI investigation is

member. of, med services, discontinue imediately,

advise

FBI. 1Q

aná disseminate pertinent informa-

tion local

y to appropriate intelligence agency.

If it is i -termined subject has close relatives

armed

for: as, promptly advise appropriate military

intellige

se

service, and furnish peftinent information,

Including reports

on subject involved.

Evaluation of

such assc iation lies entirely within province of

military intelligence service.

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W 55165 DocId: 32989586 Page 98°

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## Page 99

b.

c.

d.

h.

i.

in all instances, advise IBind concerning any

possible subversive contacts or derogatory infor-

mation developed concerning military personnel.

including local dissemination made.

Enclose four

copies of IHN or report setting out pertinent data.

Aliéns-and naturalized citizens

Furnish any information which might have bearing on

their deportation os denaturalization to Immigration

and Naturalization Service, (INS) locally.

Individuals employed in or having access to Key

Facilities, or employees of private contractors of

Undar Delimitations Agreements, FBI is responsible

to disseminate pertinent data to the counter-

intelligence agencies of the Armed Forces.

See

section 102, volume IV, of this manual for details.

Employees of public utilities (including state and

municipal facili: ies).

Disseminate pertinent data locally to Army and any

other Federal ageacy whose interest is apparent.

Members of military reserve branches or National Guard.

Disseminate pertinent security data locally to

appropriate mililary intelligence service.

and subjits employed in maritime industry,

including longshoremen and waterfront employees.

Disseninate per nent. security data locally to

Coast Guard and, when circumstances dictate, to other interested

Employees of Fe"-ral Government. intelligence agencies, includin.

Any subversive formation received concerning an NISO.

employee of an: gency of the Executive Branch

should

be promptly for arãed to FBIHQ for dissemination

to interested: encies.

No dissemination of reports.

in Security of Fovernment Employee cases

should be

made in field.

Instructions regarding all phases.of

FBI responsib:.ities under BO 10450

volume II, of

this manual.

are in section 19,

Individuals wis own property or reside in immediate

vicinity of i stallation or other premises under

jurisdiction if branch of armed services.

Disseminate Firtinent data locally to appropriate

military inte ligence service.

Airmen licens:a by Federal

Aviation Aôministration (FAA).

FAR issueS

•. rtificates

airmen (pilot, mechanic,

or member o crew); to individuals directly in

- 24 -

HH 55165 Do0Id:32989586 Page 99

---

## Page 100

charge of inspection, maintenance, overhauling, or

repair of aircratc; and to aircraft dispatchers or

air-traffic control towes operators.

Furnish pertinent data concerning such persons to FBIHO

by report or LAM. In cover conmunication, recomend

dissemination to FAA.

J.°

Dissemination to Secret Service.

Under agreement between FBI and

Secret Service

conceming protective responsibilities dated 11/26/71

(set out in

section 102, vOlume

• IV, of this manual),

reports and IMMs are disseminated to Secret Service

both locally and at FBIHO in all cases which

meet standaras set forth.

This includes virtually

all cases on individuals

where any substantial

information exists as to subversive activities

sympathies of subject.

When photographs are available

send copies to Secret Service locally

and to FBIHQ fOr

dissemination at headquarters level.

Secret Service should be

advised of reason for

referrali 1.e., statement of class or classes of

agreement which applies to subject. FD-375

serves

as ietter

of transmittal for both local and

FBIHQ dissemination.

Forward original and

one copy to BIll and maintain copy in case

file.

(2)

After initial dissemination, as changes occur in

residence and

employment; advise Secret Service

Ipcally by Fi-356

and furnish two copies to retHQ.

FD-366

must be submitted even though changes in

residence

and/or employment are noted in report

or LHM being submitted:

(3) - For instructions governing dissemination to

Secret Service in matters involving threats against

President, refer to section 134B, volume IV, of •

this manual.

subject's new

residence and business

address by

LHM OF FD- 366.

Provide copies to FBIHO and

new office of origin fos dissemination to Secret

Service headquarters and branch office covering new

residence, respectively.

=25 -

HH 55165

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## Page 101

3.

(5)

As an administrative aid to insure proper

dissemination, the file covers of cases in which

dissemination

is being made to Secret Service may

by stamped "Ss

Restrictions on field dissemination.

If security measures are known to be inadequate

at local office of another. Government agency, do not

disseminate locally, but bring matter to attention of

FBIHQ for headquarters dissemination.

- 26 -

HW 55165 DocId: 32989586 Page 101

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## Page 102

1%.

ADMINISTRATIVE INDEX (ADEX)

Purpose and general policy

a.. To have a readily available and up-to date listing

oI individuals deemed currantly dangerous to the

national security.

objective is to identify

individuals who should be afforded priority

investigative coverage in the event of a national

emergency.

b.

Under no circumstance should individuals be included

in ADEX merely because of their opposition to

Government policies or because of the exercise of

their constitutional rights of protest and dissent.

c. ADEX is strictly an administrative device. It should

not be treated as a factor in determining basic in-

vestigative decisions, i.e., whether an investigation

should be opened or closed, the extent of investiga-

tion to be corducted

in

a particular case, etc.

2 .

Criteria

a.

ADEX should include individuals whose

actions or

statements have established that they represent

current treat to the national security, i.e.:

Indivi uals whether affiliated with organized

groups or not who have shown a willingness

and cipability of engaging in treason, rebellion

•or insurrection, sedition, sabotage,

espionage,

terrorism, guerrilla warfare, assassination of

gover tent officials, or other such acts which

would result in interference with or a threat

to th.: survival and effective operation of

national, state or local government.

b. Ihis wou. include leaders of organizations whose

aims inch de the overthrow or destruction of the

Governme: : Oi the United States or the government

of any £ ate, territory, district, or possession

thereo, or the government of any

political sub-

division therein, by unlavful means.

"leader

'denotes

The term

those individuals, irrespective

of titl

, who are in a position to significantly

influen a the policies or direct the activities

of the

coup.

Mere membership in an organization,

without the element of leadership or without a

demonsi rated willingness and capability described

in par-graph a, is not sufficient for inclusion in

ADEX.

C .

Indivi: uals should be considered

a "current threat"

to th

national security when reliable information

has b:on developed that they have engaged in activity

- 27-.

HH 55165 DocId:32989586 Page 102

---

## Page 103

or exhibited the requisite willingness and capability

falling within the above-described criteria during

prior two years and there is no indication they

have ceased such activity. Howevei, there may be

instances where retention of an individual in ADEX

is available during the prior two years. For example,

such retention might be warranted in the case of

individuals who have

gone into hiding, temporarily

left the country, or been imprisoned.

a.

• ADEX should not include individuals

who may be ideologically committed to a philosophy

which calls for the downfall of our form of government

or which favors another forn of society but who

have not shown a current willingness or capability of

engaging in meaningful action to promote their

beliefs.

This might apply, for example, to rank-and-file

members of the Socialist Workers Party or the Communist

Party, USA, or other

old-line revolutionary groups

which have

avocated

an overthrow.of

our present

form of government but where subject's activity

is primarily ideological in nature and not oriented

toward action.

Each case should be reviewed on an

individual basis in the light of the criteria

enumerated

above.

3. Recommendation for preparation of ADEX card.

a.

when dangerousness

of subject has been

established,

oftice oi origin should prepare secommencation on

FD-1aL, in triplicate. Forwaro original

and copy

to FBINQ, and place copy in subject's tile.

b.

Attach additional page or pages to FD-122 setting

out succinct summary of facts, on which recommendation

based.

C.

Non-piosecutive summary report should be submitted

when

subject is

racommended for ADEX unless one was

previously furnished to FBIHQ. In latter instance

submit up-to-date report.

d.

Do not delay recommendation for ADEX because of

absence of complete background or descriptive data.

e. Do not defer recommendation for ADEX because subject

is missing, temporarily out of the country, or in

prison.

It FBIHQ approves recommendation, ADEX cards

will be prepared including two copies for field.

Copy Of FD-122 will be returned stamped "ADEX card

approved, copies attached." Check cards for accuracy.

- 28-

• HH 55165.

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9786Fage,

e103

Cast dong

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## Page 104

Place one in alphabetical section of field office

DEx and other in either geographical section oc

unavailable section.

9 ..

When subject is aproved for ADeX, submit Security

Flash Noticg (FD-165) to check records of.

Identification Division and post flash notice is

fingerprints of subject are

on file.

FD-165 will

be returned if positive identification cannot

be made.

In latter event, FD-165 should be submitted

every two years as long as

subject remains on ADEX

and no fingerprint

record has been locatco.

these

submissions should be timed to concide with biennial

review of case.

- Format of ADEX card

Data to appear on face of card

Itemized below are descriptive categories in which

subject may be, classifica

and.corresponding abbrevia-

trons jor use on ID-all and abax cara.

(..)

Pull name and aka's

(2) Date ind place of birth

(3) Race

White

Black

Other

(4)

Sex

• Nale

Femal':

(5) Citiunship

U.S. Cicizen

Alic:

C.2

ANds

(6)

(7)

Resirance address

Emplyment. (occupati02 and

address)

(8) Type of activity

Black Extremist

Com unist (pro-Chinese)

Col: unist (pro-soviet)

Col

munist (trotskyist)

Io sign Nationality

Pu rto Rican Nationalist

Revolutionory

Mi ¡cellaneous

BEX

CMC

CMS

CMT

FRN

I RN

REV

MSC

-29 -

HH 55165 DocId:32989586 Page 101

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## Page 105

Activities connected with "New Left" or anarchistic

elements should be shown as "Revolutionary."

The

term "Foreign Nationality" covers foreign-directed

subversión, e. g., Soviet or Chicom espionage,

Arab terrorism.

The abbreviation ERN should be

followed by nationality involved e.g. FRN-Arab,

FRN-Cuban.

(9)

Special Interest

Espionage Subjects

ESP

Foreign government employees

FGE

U. S. Goverment employees

GOV

(10)

Unavailable section

Missing.

MI

Out of country

OC

Imprisoned

PR

(23) /

Key

facility geographical reference number

(obtained from Department of Defense Key

Facilities List, if applicable,.

and. agency

(12)

having security

responsibility, which is Army.

Field office and rBIHO file numbers

b.

Data

to appear on separate card attached to ADEX

card

in geographical or unavailable section.

(1)

Physical description

•(2)

Photograph, with

date taken.

It should be

most current or best likeness of subject

available.

(3)

Dangerous

characteristics of subject, e.g,

notation if subject carries firearms.

(4)

Any special information needed to locate

subject.

(5)

Notation that security flash notice (FD-165)

has been posted with Identification Division

(6) FBI number and fingerprint classification,

when available.

Case should normally be kept pending to secure all pertinent

identifying data enumerated in paragraphs a. and b. above.

However, if it appears a considerable amount of effort would be

required to obtain a particular item, use judgment in

deciding whether to continue in pending status solely for this

purpose.

Use FD-186 to report above information. File

in case

file.

5. Arrangement of ADEX

a.

At EBIHO.

Index is

printed on IBM cards, two copies of which

are sent to field. An alphabetical breakdown of true

- 30 -

HH 55165 DooId:32989586 Page 105

---

## Page 106

names and all aliases of subjects is maintained at

FBIHQ

b:

In field office

Index is maintained in three sections:

(1) .

Alphabetical section

This section includes one complete set of

current ADEX cards.

(2)

Geographical section

This section includes ADaX cards of all. subjects

except those who are missing, temporarily out

of the country, or in prison.

Geographical

section is broken down by residence address in

accord with needs of each office, e.g., by

state, county, city, or if needed, into boroughs

or suburbs.

Cards are filed alphabetically

under each such breakdown.

(3)

Unavailable section

This section includes cards of individuals who

are missing, out of the country for an indefinite

period: or imprisoned, broken down into three

corres; onding subsections.

(a)

Missing subjects

(0)

Subjects out of country for indefinite perioa

Include foreign residence and employment

addresses on FD-122, if Known. Place stops

with INs to be advised of subject's return.

Verify foreign residence annually.

(c)

subjects imprisoned.

identify institution in which subject is

incarcerated on FD-122. Request prison

cuthorities to notify us of subject's release

and set tickler to verify.

6.

Special inter it subjects

Following cla: ses of individuals could be of special

interest

in nitional emergency:

(1)

Espiona: : subjects

Any act. un taken in these cases should be handled,

If poss

ble, in such manner as to pot destroy the

opporti ity

to penetrate an active espionage network.

(2)

Foreigi

government employees

Any ac ion taken in these cases must be handled so

as to : inimize the possibilities of diplomatic

repercissions.

(3)

U. S. Covernment employees

ubjects are of special interest to Department

of Ji tice.

Cards on

"Special Interest" subjects should be filed in

regular seque: a with other ADEX cards.

- 31-

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Page 106

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## Page 107

7. Changes in residence and employment of ADEX subjects.

a.

Develop sources to insure that any such changes

are

promptly brought to our attention.

b. Submit FD-122 whenever changes occur. Also submit

FD-366. to TBIHQ and Secret Service locally.

8. Changes in

other background data.

a.

submit any changes, additions, or deletions in

data

required by FD-122 in an updated FD-122. If

item being deleted, specity "Delete."

b.. Make notations concerning change on existing ADEX

card pending receipt of revised card fron FBIHQ.

9.

Movement Of ADEX subjects between offices

Requests fron other offices to verify addresses

of subjects should be handled within thirty days.

b. Upon

verification of new address, office of origin

submit FD-128 transferring origin. Furnish original

C.

covering new address enclosing copies of previous

reports, other pertinent serials, photograph if

available, and ADEX cards.

If flash notice (FD-165) has been placed with Identi

d..

O1d office of origin submit current report or LHM

whenever there is pertinent information to report.

Do not delay submission of FD-128 solely for

preparation of report of IHM, but note on FD-128

Latter being prepared.

old office of origin

furnish Secret Service locallywith subject's

residence

and business addresses by FD-366

and provide copies to new office of origin for

dissemination to Secret Service there.

e. If new office of origin plans no further investigation,

advise FBIHQ by letter that case is being closed.

the be ovat gation,

10. Subject entering U. S. armed forces

Submit ED-122 to cancel ADEX and FD-366 to advise

Secret Service, furnishing copy of latter to local

Secret Service office.

Be certain interested military agency

has been forwarded all pertinent subversive data regarding

subject and is aware of subject's entry into armed forces.

Where appropriate,

prepare up-to-date IHM or report for

dissemination to military agency and to Secret service

both at FBIHQ and field level.

While subject is

serving in armed forces, appropriate military agency has

- 32 -

HH 55165 DooId:32989586 Page 107

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## Page 108

p209

11.

12.

complete jurisdication over his activities and no active

investigation should be conducted by FBI.

Geographical

card for subject should be filed in case file marked

"canceled," and

alphabetical card destroyed.

When

subject returns

to civilian status, determine if activities

warrant inclusion in ADEX. If so, submit FD-122 so

recommending as

well as current report. If not, advise

FBIHQ by letter.

Removal of cards from ADEX

Subject should be

removed from ADEX for any of the

following reasons:

a.

Death

b. Permanent departure from U. S. or Puerto Rico

C. Designation as security informant

d. Subject no longer falls within ADEX criteria

In all of the above: cases recommend removal from ADEX.

by FD-122 with attached succinct summary of facts.

In all instances except c.; submit current LHM OI

report for dissc tination to Secret Service at FBIHQ.

and also furnisi report or LIM to Secret Service locally.

Reevaluation of DEX status.

Prepare administsative tickler concerning each ADEX

subject to come up at two-year intervals.

This tickler,

which is independent of any assignment card, should promot

careful assessrent of case to insure subject still falls

within 'ADEX criteria.

= 33

14 55165 : DocId:32989586 Paite 108

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## Page 109

Casant to

iSH.

Pak"

Instei shituated

3010-106

TO

•OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

MAY 1002 EDIIDIN

"OSA GEN. REG. NO, 37

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memoraridum

Mr. E. S. Miller aMle,

1 - Me. E. S. Miller

1 - Mr. R. D. Cotter

DATE:

6/8/73

FROM

T. J. Smith

TJS

SUBJECT: REVISION SECTION 87

MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS

1 - Mr. Mintz (Office of

Legal Counsel)

1 - Mr. T. J. Smith

1 - Mr. J. F. Miller?

1 - Manuals Desk

Mr. Felt

Mr. Baker

Mr. Callahan

Mr. Cleveland

Mr. Conrad

Mr. Gebhardt

Mr. Jenkins

Mr. Marshall

Mr. Miller, E.S.

Mr. Soyars

Mr. Thompson

Mr. Walters

Tele. Room

Mr. Baise

Mir. Barnes

Mr. Bowers

Mr. Herington -

Mr. Conmy

Mr. Mintz

Mr. Eardley

Mrs. Hogan

A recent proposed revision of Section 87 of the Manual of

Instructions (MOI) has been approved and is in the process of being

printed.

This revision makes reference to an MOI appendix enumera-

ting statutes, evidence of violations of which may be developed during

investigations of domestic subversive organizations and individuals and

foreign counterintelligence investigations.

All personnel conducting these types of investigations should

be aware of these statutes and alert for evidence of such violations.

Attached is proposed appendix.

ACTION:

IES COPT

Attached be approved and prepared for Manual of Instructions

along with approved Section 87 revision.

Enclosure

REG-31

16.14:

8159

JIM:rIC,*

iST. 113

16 JUN 26 1973

(7)

Er."

This document is prepared in response to your request and is noam

dissemi-

nation outsie, your Committee.

Its use is limited to officia).?

vour Commite and the content may not be disclosed to unpu a tiers b

nel without the express approval of the FBI.

1?1?

XEROX

Clair

BUG 13 1973

.

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This seems to dudicate mater'al

in the madneals but if it will

pravide.matevial@ssistonetii

Should be incladed, With

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APPENDIX

Evidence of violations of the

following

statutes may be developed during

investigations of domestic subversive

organizations and individuals and foreign

counterintelligence investigations.

All

personnel engaged in such investigations

should be

aware of these statutes.

Refer

to the United States Code Annotated for

full presentation of the statute and its

judicial case history.

This document is prepared in response to

nation arisine your Committee.

nel without the express approval of the FBI.

66-1934-8129

WW 55165 DocId: 32989586 Page 110

FENCOSURE

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- Is, mania

TABLE OF CONTENTS

•Activities Against Foreign Governments

Conspiracy to Injure Property of

Foreign Governments

Commission to Serve Against A

Friendly Nation

Enlistment in Foreign Service

Expedition Against Friendly Nation

Strengthening Armed Vessel of Foreign

Nation

Arming Vessel Against Friendly Nation

Advocating the Overthrow or Destruction df the

Government; Opposing by Force the Authority of

the Government; Related Activities

Treason

Misprision of Treason

Rebellion or Insurrection

Seditious Conspiracy

Advocating Overthrow of the Government

Anti-Riot Laws

Riots

Civil Disorders

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Page

i

1

1

2

2

3

3

3

4

5 .

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Flatte::

Atomic Energy Act of 1954

Unauthorized Dealing in Special Nuclear

Material

Prohibitions Governing Atomic Weapons

Production Facility

- Suspension of Licenses During War or

National Emergency

Security Investigations

Cormunication, Receipt, Tampering,

Disclosure of Restricted Data

Trespass Upon Commission Installation;

Issuance and Posting of Regulations

Photographing, etc., of Commission

Installations

Bomb Threats - Bombings - Interstate Iransportation

of Explosives

Prohibited Acts Under FBI

Jurisdiction

Civil Rights

Federally Protected Activities

Crimes on 'Government Reservations

Laws of States Adopted for Areas within

Federal Jurisdiction

Arson within Special Maritime and

Territorial Jurisdiction

Desecration of the Flag of the United States

Destruction of Government Property

Government Property or Contracts

HH 55165 DocId:32989586 Page 112

Page

6

6

6

7

7

7

8

8

9

9

10

10

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352:

. Rs

Listen

Page

Espionage

Harboring or Concealing Persons

Gathering, Transmitting, or Losing

Defense Information

Gathering or Delivering Defense Infor-

mation to Aid Foreign Government

Photographing and Sketching Defense

Installations

Use of Aircraft for Photographing

Defense Installations

Publication and Sale of Photographs

of Defense Installations

Disclosure of Classified Information

Violation of Regulations of National

Aeronautics and Space Administration

Conspiracy, or Attempt to Establish

Totalitarian Dictatorship

Firearms Acts

i.=

National Firearms Act

Transfers

Making Firearms

Identification of Firearms,

Destructive Devices

Definitions of Various Fire-

arms and Destructive Devices

Prohibited Acts

'10

10

11

12

12

12

12

12

13

13

14

14

14

14

HH 55165 DocId: 32989586

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MT.

122

State Firearms Control Assistance

Definitions

Unlawful

General Prohibition on

Receipt, Possession, Transpor-

tation of Firearms by Felons,

One Dishonorably Discharged from

Military, Mental

Incompetents,

One who Renounced U. S. Citizen-

ship, and Illegal Aliens

Fraud Against the Government

Statements or Entries Generally

Interstate Travel in Aid of Racketeering

Joss of United States Nationality

Loss of Nationality by Native-born or

Naturalized Citizen; Voluntary Action,

Burden of Proof; Presumptions

Dual Nationals; Divestiture of Nationality

Neutrality Matters

Munitions Control

Illegal Exportation of War Materials -

Seizure and Forfeiture of Materials

and Carriers

Private Correspondence with Foreign Governments

(The Logan Act)

IN 55165 DocId:32989586 Page 111

-.

Page

15

15

19

19

20

21

23

23

23 •

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MIE

Protection of Foreign Officials and Official

Guests of the United States

Murder or Manslaughter of Foreign

Officials or Official Guests

-. Kidnaping

Protection of Foreign Officials

and Official Guests

Protection of Property Occupied by

Foreign Governments and International

• Organizations

Protection of United States Officials and Employees

Assaulting, Resisting or Impeding Certain

Officers and Employees

Protection of Officers and Employees of

the United States

Assault or Resistance

Congressional Assassination, Kidnaping and

Assault

Presidential Assassinations, Kidnaping and

Assault

Registration Acts

Agents of Foreign Governments

Foreign Agents Registration Act as

Amended (The McCormack Act)

Registration Act - Individuals with

Knowledge of Espionage or Sabotage

by Foreign Country

Registration of Certain Organizations

NH 55165 DocId: 32989586

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Page

24

24

24

25

25.

25

26

26

27

27

27

27

28

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Page

Sabotage

Fortifications, Harbor Defenses, or

Defensive Sea Areas

Destruction of War Material, War Premises

or War Utilities

Production of Defective War Material, War

Premises or War Utilities

Strategic Facilities

28

29

29

29

Sedition

Activities Affecting Armed Forces Generally

Activities Affecting Armed Forces During

War

Recruiting for Service Against, the

United States

Enlistment to Serve Against the United States

30

31

31

31

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1836t

this.

a Mats.

1208Ta

ACTIVITIES AGAINST FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS

18 U.S.C. 956.

Conspiracy to Injure Property of Foreign

Governments

Prohibits conspiracies of two or more persons within

the jurisdiction of the United States to injure or destroy

any railroad, canal, bridge, or other public utility of specific

property situated in a foreign country and belonging to a

foreign government or political subdivision thereof with which

the United States is at peace.

Commission of an act within

the jurisdiction of the United States by one or more of the

conspirators to effect the object of the conspiracy penalizes

each of the parties to the conspiricy.

18 U.S.C. 958. Commission to Serve Against a Friendly Nation

Prohibits any United States citizen within the

jurisdiction of the United States from accepting and exercising

a commission to serve a foreign prince, state, colony,

district or people, in war against any prince, state, colony,

district or people

with whom the Unitea States is at peace.

18 U.S.C. 959. Enlistment in Foreign Service

Prohibits anyone in the United States enlisting or

entering himself or hiring another to enlist or enter, or

leaving the jurisdiction of the United States with intent to

enter or enlist

in the military service of any foreign power.

18 U.S.C. 960. Expedition Against Friendly Nation

Prohibits anyone in the United States from knowingly

taking part in or supporting any military or naval expedition or

enterprise against the territory or dominion of any foreign

power with whom the United States is at peace.

18 U.S.C. 961. Strengthening Armed Vessel of Foreign Nation

Penalizes anyone in the United States who strength-

ens any armed vessel in the service of any foreign power

which is at war against any foreign power with whom the

United States is at peace.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi-

nation outside your Committee.

Its use is limited to official proceedings bu

your Commitre and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized person

nel without the express approval of the FBI.

.-1-

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Jah.

BEZA

Mints

18 U.S.C.

962. Arming Vessel Against Friendly Nation

Penalizes:

(1) Anyone within the United States who attempts

to or does arm any vessel, with the intention that the

vessel shall be employed by a foreign power, to commit hos-

tilities against any foreign power with whom the United States

.is at peace, or

(2) anyone who commissions any vessel with the

above intent.

Bureau Classification 2

Manual of Instructions

Volume III, Section 75

ADVOCATING THE OVERTHROW

OR DESTRUCTION OF THE GOVERNMENT;

OPPOSING BY FORCE THE AUTHORITY OF THE

GOVERNMENT; RELATED ACTIVITIES

18 U.s.C.

2381. Treason

Penalizes anyone who, owing allegiance to the

United States,

levies war against the United States or

adheres to their enemies giving them aid and comfort within

the United States or elsewhere.

Note that this codifies the crime of treason as

defined in the Constitution. It does not extend or restrict

or provide a new definition for the crime of treason.

Bureau Classification 61

Manual of Instructions

Volume IV, Section 95

18 U.S.C. 2382

Misprision of Treason

Penalizes anyone who owing allegiance to the

United States and having knowledge of the commission of

treasonable acts conceals and does not disclose such infor-

mation to an appropriate official.

Bureau Classification 61

Manual of Instructions

Volume IV, Section 95

IH 55165 DocId: 32989586 Page 118

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BUIL

AVE:

18 U.S.C. 2383. Rebellion or Insurrection

Penalizes anyone who incites, sets on foot, assists,

or engages in any rebellion or insurrection against the

authorisy of the United States or the laws thereof, or gives

aid or comfort thereto.

Bureau Classification 100

Manual of Instructions

Volume III, Section 87

18 U.S.C. 2384. Seditious Conspiracy

Penalizes each member of a conspiracy involving two

or more persons in any State or Territory, or in any place sub-

ject to their jurisdiction, who conspires to overthrow the

Government of the United States, levy war against them, oppose

by force the authority thereof, or by force prevent, hinder,

or delay the execution of

any law of the United States or by

force seize, take or possess any property of the United States

contrary to the authority thereof.

Bureau Classification 100

Manual of Instructians

Volume III, Section 87

18 U.S.C. 2385. Advocating Overthrow of Government •

(The Smith Act)

Penalizes (1) anyone who knowingly and willftyly

advocates, abets, advises, or teaches the duty, necessity,

desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying

the

Government of the United States, any State, Territory, District

or Possession of the United States, by force or violence or by

assassination of any officer of such government; (2) anyone who

with intent to cause the overthrow or destruction of any such

government, prints, publishes, edits, issues, circulates, sells,

distributes, or publicly displays any written or printed matter,

advocating, advising or teaching the duty, necessity, desir-

ability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying any govern-

ment in the United States by force or violence, or attempts

to do so; (3) anyone who organizes, helps or attempts to

organize any society, group or assembly to engage in above-

- 3-

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Later

22==

listed activities or

becomes a member of, or affiliates with

a group knowing its purpose to be overthrow of the govern-

ment by force or violence; (4) anyone participating in a

conspiracy to commit any above-named activities.

Bureau Classification 100

Manual of Instructions

Volume III,

Section 87

ANTIRIOT LAWS

18 U.S.C. 2101. Riots

Prohibits travel in or use of interstate or foreign

commerce with intent to incite a riot or organize, promote,

encourage, participate in or carry on a riot, or commit any

act of violence in furtherance of a riot, or aid or abet any

person in inciting or participating in a riot, or perform or

attempt to perform any overt act to incite or

participate in

a riot.

18 U.S.C. 2102. Definitions

(a) "Riot" herein means a public disturbance involving

(1) an act or acts of violence by one or more persons part of

an assemblage of three of more persons which act or acts

constitute a clear and present danger of or shall result in

damage or injury to the property of any other person or to

the person of any other individual or (2) a threat or threats

of the commission of an act or acts of violence by one or more

persons part of an assemblage of three or more persons having

individually or collectively, the ability of immediate

execution of such threat or threats, where the performance of

the threatened act or acts of violence would constitute a

clear and present danger of or would result in damage or

injury to the property of any other person or to the person

of any other individual.

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(b) The term "to incite to riot" or "to organize, pro-

mote, encourage, participate in, or carry on a riot" includes

but is not limited to urging or instigating others to riot.

It is not deemed to mean the mere oral or written advocacy of

ideas or expression of belief.

18 U.S.C. 231. Civil Disorders

Prohibits:

(1) reaching or demonstrating to any other person

the use, application or making of any firearm, explosive or

incendiary device, or technique capable of causing death or

injury with knowledge or intention that they will be used in

a civil disorder affecting commerce or a federally protected

function;

(2)

Transportation or manufacture for. transport

in commerce any such firearm, explosive or incendiary

device, with knowledge or intention that the same will be

used unlawfully in furtherance of a civil disorder;

(3)

Interference or attempts to interfere with

any fireman or law enforcement officer engaged in the performance

of his duties during a civil disorder which affects commerce

or any federally protected function.

18 U.S.C. 232. Definitions of "Civil Disorder," "Commerce,"

"Federally Protected Function," "Firearm,"

"Explosive or Incendiary Device," "Fireman,"

and

"Law Enforcement Officer."

18 U.S.C. 233. Preemption

Congress did not preempt this field to the exclusion

of State or local laws and no provision of this statute is to

be construed to invalidate any State law unless the State law

is inconsistent with the purpose of this statute.

Bureau Classification 176

Manual of Instructions

Volume IV, Section 136

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26. --

Fails, .

3374. LitTle 210251620

8

ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954

Unless authorized by the U. S. Atomic Energy

Commission or under international agreement, the Act pro-

hibits the activities enumerated in 42 U.S.C. 2077, 212ü,

2131 below:

42 U.S.C. 2077. Unauthorized Dealings in Special Nuclear

Material

(a) Transferring or receiving in interstate commerce

or transferring, delivering,

acquiring, owning, possessing, or

receiving possession of or title to, or importing into or

exporting from the United States any special nuclear material;

(b)

Engaging in the production of any special

nuclear material outside the United States;

42 U.S.C. 2122. Prohibitions Governing Atomic Weapons

Transferring

or receiving in interstate or foreign

commerce or manufacturing, producing. transferring, acquiring,

possessing, importing or exporting any atomic weapon.

42 U.S.C. 2131. Production Facility

Transierring or receiving in interstate commerce,

manufacturing, producing, transferring, acquiring, possessing,

using, importing or exporting any utilization or production

facility.

42 U.S.C. 2138. Suspension of Licenses During War or

National Emergency

The Atomic Energy Commission, whenever Congress

• declares that a state of war or national emergency exists is

authorized to suspend any license, to recapture special

nuclear material and to order the operation of any licensed

facility.

42 U.S.C. 2165. Security Restrictions

(a) Investigations by the FBI

If a personnel investigation of an Atomic Energy

employee develops any information that such individual is

of questionable loyalty, the matter must be referred to the

FBI for a full field investigation.

=6=

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te sardi.

113t

RANT

no 3l:.

Lisas

-2IRKY

(e)

FBI investigation of any individual to be

employed or licensed by the Atomic Energy Commission may

be required by the President.

(f) The FBI is required to investigate individuals

to be named to positions with a high degree of importance or

sensitivity with the Atomic Energy Commission.

RESTRICTED DATA

"Restricted Data" means all data concerning (1)

design, manufaccure, or utilization of atomic weapons; (2)

the production of special nuclear material; or (3) the use

of special nuclear material in the production of energy.

Anyone with the intent or reason

to believe that the U. s.

will be injured or a foreign nation be given an advantage

is prohibited from:

42 U.S.C. 2274,5,6,7. Communicating, Transmitting or

Disclosing Restricted Data to

Any Person; Acquiring Restricted

Data; Tampering with Restricted

Data; or Disclosing Restricted

Data to One Known or Believed Not

to Be Authorized to Receive It

42 U.S.C. 2278a. Trespass Upon Commission Installations;

Issuance and Posting of Regulations

Prohibits willful violations of entry and other

regulations of Atomic Energy Commission facilities.

42 U.S.C. 22780.

Photographing, etc., of Commission

Installations

Prohibits photographing, sketching, etc., of Atomic

_Energy Commission installations or facilities, information

about which is protected against general dissemination.

Bureau Classification 117

Manual of Instructions

Volume II,

Section 20

- 7-

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iNEd

Lister

BOMB THREATS - BOMBINGS -

INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF EXPLOSIVES

The FBI and the Treasury Department have concurrent

Jurisdiction by

subsections

Treasury will handle subsections

and (i), and subsection (h) will be handled by the agency

having jurisdiction over the underlying felony.

Violations

directed against diplomatic functions will be handled by the

Each agency handles violations directed at its own

functions, and postal authorities handle violations directed

against that agency's functions as well as matters involving

18 U.S.C.

844. Prohibits:

(d) Interstate transportation of explosives or

incendiary devices with intent to injure or

intimidate a person or damage property.

(e) Use of telephone, mail of other instrument of

commerce to transmit a bomb threat.

(t) Use of explosives or incendiary devices to

sation cong teeta francia a stande.

(g)

Unauthorized possession of explosives or

incendiary devices in a building owned or used

by the U. S. Government.

(h) Carrying or using explosives or incendiary

devices during the commission of any Federal

felony.

(i) Use of explosives or incendiary devices to

damage any property used in an activity affect-

ing interstate commerce.

Bureau Classification 174

Manual of Instructions

Volume II, Section 23

CIVIL RIGHTS

18 U.S.C. 245. Federally Protected Activities

Prohibits willful injury or interference with

(1) persons in the exercise of certain enumerated rights

by force or threat of force, whether or not the offenders

-8.

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1. 18

KIK:

Nate

it 1s

- WORS

are acting under color of law; (2) persons voting in any

election, participating in beneilts of lederal programs

or facilities, applying for or enjoying Federal employme t

or serving as Federal jurors;

(3) persons on account of

and enjoy

private or State employment, serve as State jurors, use the

facilities of interstate commerce, or patronize enumerated

places.of public accommodation; (4) persons who afford others

opportunity to participate in the activities listed above;

(5) persons not participating, for the purpose of intimi-

dating those who are participating, in the above-mentioned

activities; and (6) persons participating in a speech or

peaceful assembly opposing denial of opportunity to partici

pate in these activities.

Bureau Classification 44

Manual of Instructions

Volume II, Section 27

CRIMES ON GOVERNMENT RESERVATIONS

•18 U.S.C. 13. Laws of States Adopted for Areas within

Federal Jurisdiction

Makes the criminal law on a government reservation

conform to local law except when a particular act has beer

defined as a federal offense.

18 U.S.C. 81. Arson within Special Maritime and Territorial

Jurisdiction

Penalizes anyone who, within the special maritime and

territorial jurisdiction of the United States, willfully and

maliciously attempts to, or

sets fire to or burns any building,

structure or vessel, any machinery or building materials or

supplies, military or naval stores, munitions of

war,

or any

structural aids or appliances for navigation or shipping.

Penalty is increased if the building is a dwelling or

if the life of any person is placed in jeopardy.

Bureau Classification 70

Manual of Instructions

Volume II, Section 33

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DESECRATION OF U. S. FLAG

18 U.S.C. 700. Desecration of The Flag of the United States

Prohibits anyone from knowingly casting contempt

upon the United States flag, standard, colors, ensign, or any

picture or representation of either by publicly mutilating,

defacing, defiling, burning, or trampling upon it.

Bureau Classification 180

Manual of Instructions

Volume IV, Section 138

DESTRUCTION OF GOVERNMENT PROPERTY

18 U.S.C. 1361. Government Property or Contracts

Penalizes anyone who willfully injures or commits

any depredation against any property of the United States, or

of any department or agency thereoi, or any property which

has been or is being manufactured or constructed for the

United States, or any department or agency thereof.

Bureau Classification 52

Manual of Instructions

Volume II, Section 50

ESPIONAGE

18 U.S.C. 792. Harboring or Concealing Persons

Penalizes anyone who harbors or conceals any person

who he knows, has reasonable grounds to believe or suspect,

has committed, or is about to commit a violation of the

Espionage statute.

18 U.S.C.

793. Gathering, Transmitting, or Losing Defense

Information

Prohibits anyone with intent or reason to believe

that the U. S. will be injured or a foreign nation will be

given an advantage thereby from:

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MM.

LS: 2108

(a)

Obtaining information concerning facilities,

equipment, etc., related to the national

defense;

(b)

Obtaining enumerated items, e.g, copies,

sketches, photographs, etc., of anything

connected with the national defense.

(c) Receiving, obtaining, or agreeing to obtain

enumerated items, e.g., documents, code books,

etc., related to the national defense.

(d)

Willfully making available items related to

the national defense by one lawfully entitled

to have access to them to one not authorized

to receive them, or to willfully keep such

items from one entitled to receive them.

(e)

Willfully making available items related to

the national defense by one whose access ic

such items is unauthorized to one not autho-

rized to receive them, or to willfully keep

such items from one entitled to receive them.

(E)

Allowing items related to the national defense

in his lawful custody to be removed, lost,

destroyed, etc., or fails to report

such

occurrence.

(g)

Conspiring to violate the above provisions.

18 U.S.C.. 794. Gathering or Delivering Defense Information

to Aid Foreign Government

Penalizes anyone who with intent or reason to believe

that it is to be used to the injury of the United States or

advantage of a foreign nation attempts to or transmits to any

foreign power any of the enumerated items including any docu~

ment, writing, note or information relating to the national

defense.

Penalizes anyone, who in time of war, with intent

that it shall be communicated to the enemy, collects, records,

publishes or communicates or attempts to gather any information

, regarding the Armed Forces, or information relating to the

national defense which might be useful to the enemy.

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18 U.S.C. 795.

Photographing

and Sketching Defense

Installations

Prohibits the making of any photograph, sketch,

picture, drawing, map, or graphical representation of military

and naval installations and equipment designated by the

President as reguiring protection from general dissemination.

18 U.S.C. 796. Use of Aircraft for Photographing Defense

Installations

Penalizes the use of aircraft for the activities

enumerated in 18 U.s.C. 795.

18 U.S.C. 797. Publication and Sale of Photographs of

Defense Installations

Prohibits the reproduction, publication, sale or

giving away of any photograph, sketch, or other graphical

representation of any military or naval installation or

equipment defined by the President as requiring protection

against general dissemination of information.

18 U.S.C. 798. Disclosure of Classified Information

Penalizes anyone who knowingly and willfully communi-

cates, furnishes, transmits or otherwise makes available to

an unauthorized person, or publishes, or uses in any manner

prejudicial to the United States' interest or safety or, uses

for the benefit of a foreign government any classified infor-

mation concerning communication systems or intelligence.

• 18 U.S.C. 799. Violation of Regulations of National

Aeronautics and Space Administration

Penalizes any conspiracy to violate or any violation

of any regulations or orders of the National Aeronautics and

Space Administration for the protection or security of any

laboratory, station, base or facility or part of any of these,

• or any aircraft, missile, spacecraft or similar vehicle or

part of any of these or any property or equipment of this

agency or any real or personal property, or equipment held by

a contractor under a contract with the National Aeronautics

and Space Administration.

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WaiT

50 U.S.C.

783.

Conspiracy or Attempt to Establish Totalitarian

Dictatorship

Prohibits:

•(a) Any act which would substantially contribute

to the establishment within the United States of a totalitar-

ian dictatorship which would be unãer the direction, control,

or domination of any foreign government, organization of

individual.

(b) Any United States employee from communicating

any classified information affecting the security of the

United States to a person who is known to be a representa-

tive of foreign government or an officer or member of a

Communist organization.

(c)

Any agent or representative of a foreign gov-

ernment or member or officer of a Communist organization from

knowingly attempting to or obtaining or receiving any classi-

fied information affecting the security of the United States

from any United

States government employee.

Bureau Classification 65

Manual of Instructions

Volume II, Section 36

FIREARMS ACTS

.. '

National Firearms Act

26 U.S.C. 5812. Transfers

The transfer of a firearm requires a written appli-

cation to the Secretary of the Treasury for the transfer and

registration to the transferee.

The application must contain

identification of the transferor, transferee, and firearm

involved.

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Leaks

alber

Lists:

26 U.S.C. 5822. Making Firearms

Reguires that any prospective maker of a firearm

must file with the Secretary of the Treasury a written

application indicating his intent to make a firearm.

The

application must contain the identification of the fireaim,

the identity of the prospective maker including his photograph

and fingerprints, the proper stamp showing that the tax imposed

by this provision has been paid.

26 U.S.C. 5842. Identification of Firearms, other than

Destructive Devices

Manufacturers and importers of firearms other than

destructive devices are required to identify such items by

serial number or as

otherwise prescribed.

26 U.S.C. 5845. Definitionsof Various Firearms and

Destructive Devices

26 U.S.C. 5861. Prohibited Acts

(a) to engage in business as a manufacturer or

importer of, or dealer in firearms without having paid the

required tax or having registered as required by this

chapter;

(1) to receive or possess a firearm transferred

in violation of requirements of this chapter;

(c) to receive or possess a firearm made in vio-

lation of this chapter;

(a) to receive or possess an unregistered firearm;

(e) to transfer a firearm without complying with

requirements of this chapter

regarding transfer;

(f) to make a firearm without complying with the

requirements of this chapter;

(g) to obliterate, remove, change, or alter the

serial number or other identification of a firearm required

by this chapter;

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u13là

1224

BEWA

Kita

(h) to receive or possess a firearm having the

serial number or other identification required under this

chapter obliterated, removed, changed, or altered;

(i) to receive or possess a firearm not identified

by a serial number as required;

(j) to transport, deliver, or receive any firearm

in interstate commerce which has not been registered accord-

ing to regulations of this chapter;

(k) to receive or possess a firearm which has been

imported or brought into the United States for the use of the

United States or any United States department, independent

establishment, or agency of the United States, or any State

or possession

or political subdivision of such State or

possession; or for scientific or research purposes; or solely

for testing or use as

a model by a registered manufacturer or

solely for use as a sample by a registered importer or dealer.

Exception: The Secretary of the Treasury may permit the con-

ditional importation or bringing in of a firearm for examina-

tion and testing in connection with classifying the firearm;

(1)

to make any false entry on any application,

return or required record, knowing such entry to be false.

State Firearms Control Assistance Act

This act deals primarily with the interstate trans-

portation of firearms.

18 U.S.C.

921. Definitions of Act Terms

18 U.S.C.

922.

(a) Unlawful Acts

(1) Engaging in the business of importing,

manulacturing or dealing in firearms or ammunition without

a license; shipping, transporting or receipt of any firearm

or ammunition in interstate or foreign commerce by an

unlicensed person.

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WIRE SERENE

(2) Interstate shipment of any firearms ór

ammunition by a licensee to anyone other than another

licensee, with certain exceptions.

(3) Transporting or receiving by a non-

licensee in the State of his residence any firearm purchased

or obtained by him outside his state.

(4) Transporting destructive devices and

National tirearms Act weapons by other than a licensed

importer, licensed manufacturer, licensed dealer or licensec

collector in interstate or foreign commerce, except as

authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury.

(5)

Transferring, selling, trading, giving,

transporting or delivering a firearm by an unlicensed

person to another unlicensed person who resides in another

state.

(6) Knowingly making any material false•

statement or use of any deceitful practice to attempt to or

to acquire a

firearm or ammunition.

(b) Prohibitions Applicable Only to Licensees

(1) Sale or delivery by a licensee of any

firearm, other than a shotgun or a rifle, or ammunition for

a firearm other than a shotgun or rifle to anyone less than

twenty-one years old.

Sale or delivery by a licensee of any

firearm, or ammunition to anyone less than 18 years of age.

(2) Selling or delivering any firearm or

ammunition to an unlicensed person if the licensee has

reasonable cause to believe the purchase or the possession

of the firearm or ammunition would be in violation of

State or local law.

(3) Selling a firearm to an out-of-State

unlicensed resident except that this section does allow a

licensee to sell or deliver a shotgun or rifle to a resi-

dent of a State contiguous to the State of

the licensee's

place of business if the purchaser's State.of residence

permits such sale or delivery by law and if the sale con-

forms to the laws of the both States.

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Kit:

S. 3024

TRAN

(4) Delivering or selling a destructive

device or a National Firearms Act weapon to any person un-

less authorized.

(5) Delivering or selling any firearm of

ammunition without making a record of the name, age and resi-

dence of the purchaser.

(d) Prohibits a licensee from selling or otherwise

disposing of any firearm or ammunition to any person who:

(1) is under indictment for, or has been

convicted of a felony, or;

(2) is a fugitive from justice; or

(3) is an unlawful user of or addicted to

marihuana or any depressant of stimulant drug or narcotic

drug;

(4) has been adjudicated as a mental defec-

tive or has been

i committed to any mental institution.

(e)

Is anyone from knowingly delivering

to a common carrier for transportation of shipment in inter-

state or foreign commerce to other than licensees any container

in which there is any firearm or ammunition without furnishing

to the carrier written notice that such is being transported

or shipped.

such steng

This section provides that any passenger who owns

or legally possesses a firearm or ammunition transporting

such items aboard a

common carrier for movement with the

passenger in interstate or foreign commerce may deliver such

items to the pilot, captain, conductor or operator of the

common carrier for the duration of the trip and will thus

not be in violation of this section.

Forbida

(f) Prohibits any common or contract carrier to

transport or deliver in interstate or foreign commerce any

firearm or ammunition with knowledge or reasonable cause

to believe that its transportation or receipt would be in

violation of this statute.

(g), (h) Prohibits the shipping, transporting, or

receipt of any firearm or ammunition in interstate or foreign

commerce by anyone who;

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" на 1.

Atl.

- (1) is under indictment, or is a felon, or;

=.

(2) is a fugitive from justice or;

(3) is an unlawful user of or addicted to

marihuana or any depressant or stimulant drug or narcotic

drug; or

(4) has been adjudicated as a mental defec-

tive, of who has been committed to a mental institution.

(i) Prohibits anyone from transporting à stolen

firearm or ammunition in interstate or foreign commerce

knowing or having reasonable cause to believe it was stolen.

(j) Prohibits any person from receiving, con-

cealing, storing, bartering, selling or disposing of any

stolen firearm or stolen ammunition or from pledging or

accepting as security for a loan any stolen firearm or

stolen ammunition, which is moving as or is a part of inter-

state or foreign commerce, having reasonable cause to believe

or knowledge that the firearm or ammunition was stolen.

(k) Prohibits anyone knowingly from transporting,

shipping or receiving, in interstate or foreign commerce, any

firearm from which the manufacturer's or importer's serial

number has been removed, obliterated, or altered.

(1) Prohibits anyone knowingly from importing or

bringing into the United Scates or its possessions any firearms

or ammunition in violation of provisions of this chapter, or

from knowingly receiving any such firearm or ammunition so

imported.

(m) Penalizes any licensee who knowingly makes

• a false entry in, or fails to make an appropriate entry in,

or fails to maintain properly any record he is required to

keep under this statute.

18 U.S.C.

924.

Contains the Penalty and Forfeiture

Provisions of Chapter

- 18 -

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Shh

Liter.

Lister, a

18 U.S.C. Appendix 1202 Receipt, Possession, Transportation

3202 Roars tox

of Firearms; Persons Liable;

Penalties for Violations

Prohibits receipt, possession or transportation in

commerce or affecting comnerce, of any firearm by anyone who

• from the Armed Forces, or has been adjudged by a United States

or State or local court of being mentally incompetent, or has

renounced his United States citizenship or is an alien illey-

ally or unlawfully in the United States.

Bureau Classification 4

Manual of Instructions

volune III, Section 74

FRAUD AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT

18 U.S.C. 1001. Statements or Entries Generally

Provides criminal punishment for anyone who knowingly

and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick

scheme or device a material fact or makes any false, fictitious

or fraudulent statements or sepresentations, or makes or uses

any false writing or document knowing it to contain any false,

fictitions or fraudulent statement or entry in any matter within

the jurisdiction of the United States Government.

Bureau Classification 46

Manual of Instructions

Volume II, Section 47

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INSURETT

stasinin, a state

2153.

:

INTERSTATE TRAVEL IN AID OF RACKETEERING

18 U.S.C. 1952.

Interstate and Foreign Travel or

Transportation in. Aid of Racketeering

Enterprises

Penalizes anyone who travels in interstate or foreign

commerce or uses any facility in interstate or foreign commerce

with intent to (1) distribute the proceeds of any unlawful

activity or (2) commit any crime of violence to further any

unlawful activity or (3) otherwise promote, manage, establish,

carry on, or facilitate the promotion, management, establishment

or carrying on of any unlawful activity and performs or attempts

to perform any of the above-listed activities.

"Unlawful

‚activity" is defined as (1) any business

enterprise involving gambling, liquor on which the Federal

excise tax has not been paid, narcotics or prostitution offenses

in violation of the laws of the State in which they are committed

or of the United States or (2) extortion, bribery or arson in

violation of the laws of the State in which committed of of the

United States.

Bureau Classification 166•

Manual of Instructions

Volume IV, Section 125

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702530-

:

.

LOSS OF UNITED STATES NATIONALITY

8 U.S.C.

1481. Loss of Nationality by Native-born or

Naturalized Citizen; Voluntary Action;

Burden of Proos; Presumptions

Overt acts which when performed by an American

citizen may cause termination of his citizenship:

(1) obtaining naturalization in a foreign state;

(2) taking an oath or making a declaration of

allegiance to a foreign state;

(3) serving in the

armed forces of a foreign

state without specific authorization;

(4)

accepting, serving in, or performing duties

a foreign state if he has or acquires the nationality of

allegiance is required;

(5)

voting in a political election in a foreign

state, participating in an election or plebiscite to deter-

mine

sovereignty over foreign territory or making a formal

renunciation of nationality before a diplomatic or consular

officer of the United States in a foreign country;

(6) making, in the United States, a formal written

renunciation of nationality when the United

States is in a

state of war;

(7) deserting the armed forces of the United States

in time of war, if and when convicted by court martial and

dismissed by reason of the conviction or dishonorably discharged;

(8) committing any act of treason against,

attempting

by force to overthrow, or bearing arms against the United States,

violating or conspiring to violate 18 U.s.C. 2383 (Rebellion

or Insurrection), willfully performing any act in violation of 18

(Advocating Overthrow of the Government) violating

18 U.S.C. 2384 (Seditious Conspiracy) by engaging in a con-

spiracy to overthrow, put down or to destroy by force the

Government of the United States, levy war against them, if

convicted by a court martial or court or competent jurisdiction.

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wishe

WHO MAN -BAN

4124.

REt.

(9) departing from or remaining outside the

jurisdiction of the United States in time of war or national

emergeniy to evade U.S. military service.

8 U.S.C. 1482. Dual Nationals; Divestiture of Nationality

Provides that persons who at birth acquired dual

nationality of the United States and of a toreign state,

having claimed benefits of foreign nationality and having

continuous residence of three years in the foreign state

after he becomes twenty-two years of age ioses U. S. citizen-

ship unless during that three-year period of residence he

takes oath of allegiance to the United States.

8 U.S.C. 1483. Restrictions on Expatriation

Provides that any

national who within six months of

his eighteenth birthday claims United States nationality in

the appropriate manner even though he may have committed any

of the acts outlined above which expatriate a national prior

to his eighteenth birthday shall not be deemed to have expat-

riated himself.

8 U.S.C. 1485,6. Inapplicability of Section 1484 to

Certain Persons

-

Sets forth those situations wherein a United States

national does not lose his nationality although he has had

extended residence abroad.

such situations include e.g,

residence abroad because of employment by the United States

Government; residence abroad representing a bona fide American

organization; ill health, etc.

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so. a Beat

72k8

X2442

•Stalin Testaras

singledul

NEUTRALITY MATTERS

22 U.S.C. 1934. Munitions Control

This act, commonly known as Munitions Control iot,

State and secure a license from State Department to import or

export these items.

22 U.S.C.

401.. Illegal Exportation of War Materials -

Seizure and Forfeiture of Materials and

Carriers

Provides for the seizure of war materials or any

there is probable cause to bellege there is an attempt to

export such items or they are intended to be or have been

exported in violation of law.

Such materials seized under

this provision shall

be forfeited.

Bureau Classification 2

Manual of Instructions

Volume III, Section 75

18 u.s.c.

PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE WITH FOREIGN

GOVERNMENTS (THE LOGAN ACT)

953.

Private Correspondence with Foreign

Governments (The Logan Act)

•Penalizes any citizen of the United States who di-

conduct of any foreign government or its officers or agents

regarding any disputes or controversies with the United States

PROTECTION OF FOREIGN OFFICIALS AND OFFICIAL

GUESTS OF THE UNITED STATES

This legislation provides the United States with

concurrent jurisdiction with that of the States when certain

prohibited acts are committed.

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"RAREN"

aMerication

----÷

18 U.s.C.

1116. Murder or Manslaughter of Foreign Officials

or Official Guests

Makes murder or manslaughter of a foreign official,

a member of his family, or an

official guest a

Federal

offense.

18 U.S.C. 1201. Kidnaping.

Makes the kidnaping of and conspiracy to kidnap a

foreign official, a member of his family, or an official

guest, a Federal felony.

Note: Federal jurisdiction arises immediately

in the kidnapina of a toreian official or official quest.

The victim need not be transported in interstate or foreian

commerce.

18 U.S.C. 112.

Protection of Foreign Officials and Official

Guests

(a)

Penalizes anyone who assaults, strikes, wounds,

imprisons, makes an offer of violence to any

foreign official,

or official guest.

(b) Penalizes anyone who willfully intimidates,

coerces, threatens,

or. harasses a foreign official or an

official guest or willfully obstructs a foreign official in

the performance of his duties.

(c) Outside the District of Columbia, prohibits

anyone from, within 100 feet of a foreign or international

establishment or the residence of a foreign official, parading,

picketing, displaying any flag, banner, sign, placard, or

device, uttering any word, phrase, sound or noise for

"purpose of intimidating; coercing; threatening; or harassing

any foreign official or obstructing a foreign official in the

performance of his duties.

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18 U.S.C.

970.

Protection of Property Occupied by Foreign

Governments and

International Organizations

3=-

Prohibits anyone from injuring, damaging, destroy-.

ing, or attempting to injure, damage or destroy any real or

personal property belonging to, utilized by, or occupied by

a foreign government, international organization, foreigr

official or official guest.

Bureau Classification 185

Manual of Instructions

Volume IV, Section 146

PROTECIION OF UNITED STATES OFFICIALS

AND EMPLOYEES

18 U.s.c. 111.

Assaulting, Resisting or Impeding Certain

Officers and Employees

Penalizes anyone who forcibly assaults, resists,

opposes, impedes, intimidates or interferes with specified

dato agora vegan in cho in an on an any st cho

Use of a

above acts increases the penalty.

'18 U.S.C. 1114.

Protection of Officers and Employees of the

United States

This statute makes the killing of various enumerated

Federal officers and employees a federal offense.

Generally

officers or employees covered are those engaged in the per-

formance of investigative, inspection or law enforcement func-

tions and includes

United States judges, United States

Attorneys, Assistant United States Attorneys, United States

Marshals and Deputy Marshals, Federal Bureau of Investigation

officers or employees.

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-LUISTORA LUNARETING

The provisions of this law require that the

attack occur while the victim is engaged in, or be on

account of, the performance of his official duties. How-

ever, the official status of the victim is merely the

basis on which Federal jurisdiction is asserted.

Know-

ledge of the official status of the victim is not an

element of the offense itself.

18 U.S.C. 2231. Assault or Resistance

Makes it a federal offense to forcibly assault,

resist, oppose, prevent, impede, intimidate or interfere

with any person authorized to serve or execute search

warrants or to make searches and

seizures while engaged

in the performance of his duties of on account of his

performance of such duties.

Use of any deadly or danger-

ous weapon increases the penalty of fine and imprisonment.

18 U.S.C. 351. Congressional Assassination, Kidnaping,

and Assault

Penalizes the killing, kidnaping or assaulting

of a Member of Congress or Member-of-Congress-Elect and

attempts to or conspiracies to commit above offenses.

Does not require that the offense occur while

the victim is engaged in or be on account of the perfor

• mance of his official duties.

Bureau Classification 89

Manual of Instructions

Volume II, Section 18

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====_

======-=

Tanne.

18 U.S.C. 1751.

Presidential Assassination, Kidnaping, and

Assault

Makes it a federal offense to attempt or to con-

spire to assault, or to kill or kidnap the President of

the United States, the President-elect, the Vice President,

the officer next in order of succession to the office of

President, the Vice President-elect, or any individual who is

acting as President under the Constitution and laws of the

United States.

Bureau Classification 175

Manual of Instructions

Volume IV, Section 134

REGISTRATION ACTS

18 U.S.C. 951. Agents of Foreign Governments

Requires anyone, other than a diplomatice or con-

sular officer or attache, who acts in the United States as an

agent of a foreign government to notify the United States

Secretary of State.

22 U.S.C. 611 - 621. Foreign Agents Registration Act as

• Amended (The McCormack Act)

Provides that no person shall act as an

agent of a

foreign principal unless he has filed with the Attorney General

a registration statement and supplements as required unless

he is exempt from registration.

50 u.s.c.

851 - 858. Registration Act - Individuals with

Knowledge of Espionage or Sabotage by

Requires that any person (with certain specified

exemptions) who has knowledge of, received instruction or

assignment in the espionage, counterespionage, of sabotage

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124

BSEN

Lisa AME

service or tactics of a government of a foreign country or of

a foreign political party, shall register with the Attorney

General a registration statement containing information which

the Attorney General may prescribe.

Bureau Classification 97

Manual of Instructions

Volume III, Section 84

18 U.S.C. 2386. Registration of Certain Organizations

++**

The following organizations shall be required to

register with the U. S. Attorney General:

Every organization subject to foreign control which

engages in political activity;

Every organization which engages both in civilian

military activity and in political activity;

Every organization subject to foreign control which

engages in civilian military activity; and

Every organization, the purpose or aim of which, or

one of the purposes or aims of which, is the establishment,

control, conduct, seizure, or overthrow of a government or

subdivision thereof by use of force, violence, military

meausres, or threats of any one of more of the foregoing.

SABOTAGE

18 U.S.C.. 2152.

Fortifications, Harbor Defenses, or

Defensive Sea Areas

(a) Penalizes anyone who willfully trespasses upon,

injures, or destroys any of the works, property or material

of any submarine mine, torpedo, fortification or harbor-

defense system of the

United States;

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(b) Penalizes willful interference with the opera-

tion or use of any such submarine mine, torpedo, fortification

or harbor-defense system;

(c) Penalizes anyone who knowingly, willfully or

wantonly violates any Presidential order or regulation gov-

erning persons or vessels within defensive sea areas designated

by the President.

forbid

The following statutes prohibit anyone, who during

time of war or national

emergency, with intent to or reason

to believe his act may. injure, interfere with or obstruct,

the United States or an associate nation:

18 U.S.C. 2153.

Destruction of War Material, War Premises, or

War Utilities

Attempts to or willfully injures, destroys, con-

taminates, infects any war material,. war premises or war

utilities.

18 U.S.C. 2154. Production of Defective War Material, War

Premises, or War Utilities

Attempts to or willfully makes, constructs, or causes to be made or con-

utilities,

structed in a defective manner machine, utensil, war premises or war

or tool, implement,

or receptacle used in

the production oFFendio see seems de a vELecere manies.

An act by any conspirator to effect the object of

a conspiracy to commit the above violations subjects all con-

spirators to liability.

Strategic Facilities

The following statutes prohibit anyone, with

intent to injure, interfere with or obstruct the national

defense of the United States, from doing any of the actions

cited:

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18 U.S.C. 2155. Destruction of National-Defense Materials,

National-Defense Premises, or National-

Defense Utilities

Attempts to or willfully injures, destroys, con-

taminates or infects any national-defense material, national-

defense premises or national-defense utilities.

18 U.S.C. 2156.

Production of Defective National-Defense

Material, National-Defense Premises or

National-Defense Utilities

Attempts to or willfully makes or constructs, in

a defective manner, any national-defense material, national-

defense premises or national-defense utilities or any tool,

implement, machine, utensil, or receptacle used in the

production of such items.

An act by any conspirator to effect the object of

a conspiracy to commit the above violations subjects all

conspirators to liability.

50 U.S.C. 797. Security Regulations and Orders

Prohibits willful violation of regulation or order

promulgated or approved by Secretary of Defense or military

commander designated by him for protection of property and

places subject to jurisdiction of Department of Defense, its

subagencies, or officer or employee of that Department.

Bureau Classification 98

Manual of Instructions

Volume III, Section 86

SEDITION

18 U.S.C. 2387. Activities Affecting Armed Forces Generally

Penalizes anyone who with intent to interfere with

the armed forces of the United States advises, counsels, urges

or causes or attempts to cause insubordination, disloyalty,

mutiny, or refusal of duty by any member of the armed forces

or distributes or attempts to distribute any written or printed

matter which counsels insubordination or refusal of duty..

HH 55165 DocId:32989586 Page 146

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N4

18 U.S.C. 2388. Activities Affecting Armed Forces During War

Penalizes anyone who when the United States is at

war willfully makes or conveys false reports or statements

with intention of interfering with successful operation of the

armed forces of the United Statis or promoting the success of

its enemies or willfully causes or attempts to cause insub-

ordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty in the

armed forces of the United States or willfully obstructs or

attempts to obstruct the recruiting or enlistment service of

the United States or harbors or conceals any person who he

knows or has reasonable grounds to believe has violated or is

about to violate any provision of this subsection.

Penalizes each of the pa-ties to a conspiracy if

two or more persons conspire to violate this subsection and

one or more such persons act to effect the object of the

conspiracy.

Bureau Classification 14

Manual of Instructions

•Volume III, Section 88

18 U.s.c.

2389. Recruiting for Service Against the

United States

Penalizes anyone who recruits soldiers or sailors

within the United States or areas within its jurisdiction to

engage in armed hostility against the United States or opens

a recruiting station for enlistment of soldiers and sailors

to serve in any manner in armed hostility against the

United States.

Bureau Classification 61

Manual of Instructions

Volume IV, Section 95

18 U.S.C. 2390. Enlistment to Serve Against the United States

Penalizes anyone who enlists or is engaged within

the United States or in any place subject to the jurisdiction

of the United States with the intent to serve in armed hostility

• against the United States.

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thats

• lis.

LIF

1 - MI. W. M. Felt

Mr. I•

W. Conrad

Mr.

R.

J. Baker

Mr.

R.

E. Gebharat

P. Callalia.

12 MX. W. V. Clevelan

J. Jenkins

10 - Mx. J. W. Marshals

Mr.

Mr.

• Mr.

Mr.

W.

B.

Soyars

F.

D.

Thompson

Is.

M. Walters

J.

E. Reilly

CODE

TELETYPE

URGENT

TO: ALL SACS

FROM: ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI

SECTION

87,

6/7/73

-

MI..

E. S. Miller

Its Mr.

H. A. Newmann

1 - Mr.

R. D. Cotter

MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS.

BY SEPARATE COVER EACH OFFICE IS BEING FURNISHED COMPLETE .

REVISION OF SECTION 87. REVISED VERSION INCLUDES FOLLOWING PRINCIPAL

CHANGES:

(1) TITLE OF SECTION HAS BEEN CHANGED TO "INVESTIGATIONS OF

SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZETIONS AND INDIVIDUALS." TERM "SECURITY INVESTIGA-

TIONS" IS INDEFINITE WHEREAS NEW TITLE BETTER CONVEYS PURPOSE - THAT

INVESTIGATIONS COVERED UNDER THIS SECTION ARE DIRECTED AT PARTICULAR

TYPE OF ACTIVITY (OVERTHROW OR SUBVERSION OF GOVERNMENT) .

(2) CRITERIA HAVE BEEN REVAMPED TO MAKE,IT CLEAR OUR INVESTIGA~

TIONS ARE BASED ON EXISTING LAWS, CHIEF OF WHICH ARE STATUTES DEALING

WITH REBELLION OR INSURRICTION (TITLE 18, U. S. CODE, SECTION 2583) .

SEDITIOUS CONSPIRACE (TITLE 18, U. RECOA, SECTI

ADVOCATING OVERTHROW OF THE GOVERNMENT (TITLE 18, U. S. CODE,

SECTION 2585).

EX-103,

(3) RULES COVERING ADMINISTRATIVE INDEX HAVE BEEN UÉDATED IN

/ LINE WITH CHANGES APPROVED IN SEPTEMBER, 1972. INFLUENCE OF ADEX

PROGRAM AS CONTROLLING FACTOR IN INVESTIGATIONS HAS BEEN ELIMINATED.

#. Felt

.. Baker

c Callahan

... Cleveland

r. Conrad

-_ Gebharit

~ Jenkins

* Marshall

- Miller, E.S. -

• Soyars

- Thompson

a Walters

dic. Room

a Buise.

- Bumes

" Bowers

_Herington -

Conmy -

a slinte.

19EN 51-65

tailorses

RDC: was

(17)

SEE NOTE PAGE THREE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

22e

am i need response do yu repent on i oe or agen

Its use is limited to official proceeds

you Can

0, 06033)

the contert may not be disclosed to unauthorized verson-

thou the ex

neil

DaL

---

## Page 149

TELETYPE TO ALL SACS

RE:

SECTION 87

MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS

REVISED CHAPTER STRESSES THAT ADEX IS STRICTLY ADMINISTRATIVE ESVICE

AND SHOULD NOT PLAY PART IN INVESTIGATIVE DECISIONS OR POLICIES.

(4) OVEREMPHASIS ON COMMUNIST PARTY WHICH HAS CHARACTERIZED THIS

SECTION IN THE PAST HAS BEEN ELIMINATED.

(5) INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING FBI RESPONSIBILITIES AND AGREEMENTS

• WITH DEFENSE DEPARTMENT AGENCIES REGARDING INDIVIDUALS EMPLOYED AT

KEY FACILITIES AND WITH PRIVATE CONTRACTORS HOLDING DEFENSE CONTRACIS

ARE BEING INCORPORATED IN SECTION 102 (COORDINATION WITH OTHER

GOVERNMENT AGENCIES) • THIS WILL BE HANDLED SEPARATELY.

(6) RULE REQUIRING FEINQ APPROVAL FOR MEMBERS OF OTHER LAW

ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES TO ACCOMPANY AGENTS IN HANDLING THESE INVESTIGA-

• TIONS IS BEING REVISED TO'

PROVIDE FOR SAC APPROVAL.

(7) ENTIRE CHAPTER HAS BEEN STREAMLINED AND REORGANIZED AND IS

ABOUT ONE THIRD SIZE OF EXISTING SECTION.

• CONVERSION TO NEW PROCEDURES WILL INVOLVE MAJOR ADJUSIMENT ON

PART OF ALI CONCERNED. ACCORDINGLY, WE ARE ALLOWING INTERIM PERIOD

PRIOR, TO IMPLEMENTATION OF NEW PROCEDURES DURING WHICH ALL OFFICES

WILI HAVE OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW REVISED SECTION, DISCUSS IT AMONG

INTERESTED PERSONNEL, AND RAISE ANY QUESTIONS WHICH NEED TO BE

RESOLVED WITH FBIHQ. FIELD SHOULD SUBMIT TO FBIHO BY 6/15/73 ANY

OBSERVATIONS THEY HAVE CONCERNING REVISED SECTION 87. SPECIFIC

ATTENTION SHOULD BE CALLED TO ANY OUTSTANDING INSTRUCTIONS WHICH

- 2.

65'

86°

• Rager: 149

---

## Page 150

TELETYPE TO ALL SACS

RE :

SECTION 87

MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS

APPEAR INCONSISTENT WITH REVISED SECTION. NEW PROCEDURES ARE TO BE

FULLY IMPLEMENTED THROUGHOUT FBI AS OF 7/1/73.

IF INVESTIGATIONS NOW PENDING ARE JUDGED, ON REVIEW, NOT TO MEET

CRITERIA OUTLINED IN REVISED SECTION, FIELD SHOULD TAKE LOGICAL ACTION

TO CLOSE INVESTICATION. WHERE FBIHQ IS COGNIZANT OF CASE, CLOSING

COMMUNICATION SHOULD BE SUBMITTED ON UACB BASIS AND AUXILIARY OFFICES

NOTIFIED. ANY SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION WHICH HAS BEEN DEVELOPED WHICH

HAS NOT YET BEEN REPORTED SHOULD BE INCORPORATED IN LIM OR REPORT FOR

DISSEMINATION.

IT IS NOT DESIRED THAT MASSIVE REVIEW ON CRASH BASIS BE UNDER-

TAKEN OF ALL SECURITY CASES TO DETERMINE WHETHER THEY MEET NEW

CRITERIA. CASES SHOULD BE REVIEWED ON SYSTEMATIC BASIS IN LINE WITH

EXISTING ADMINISTRATIVE TICKLERS.

ADDITIONAL COPIES TO MEET OFFICE NEEDS MAY BE MADE OF ADVANCE

• COPY OF SECTION 87 BEING SENT SEPARATELY. HOWEVER, ALL COPIES SHOULD

BE AFFORDED SAME SECURITY AS PROVIDED REGULAR BUREAU MANUALS AND UPON

RECEIPT OF FINISHED MANUAL PAGES, THESE COPIES SHOULD BE DESTROYED.

NOTE:

Approval for revised Section 87 was obtained pursuant to

memorandum Miller to Felt, 5/22/73.

Training Division is expediting

preparation of revised manual pages but in the meantime we are pro-

viding field with typed copies for review and study.

- 3 =

25165-DpcId: DpcId: 33989586 Pate 150g

---

## Page 151

I-Mr. Baker

I-Mr. Callahan

Airtel

1-Mr. Cleveland

I-Mr. Conrad

TO: SAC, Albany

1-Mr. Gebhardt

1-Mr. Jenkins

6/21/73

PERSONAL ATTENTION

From: acting Director, FBI

SECTION 87

SECTION 122

MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS

I-Mr.

Marshall

1-Mr.

Soyars

i-Mr.

Thompson

1-Mr. Walters

1-Mr. Miller

1-Mr. Reilly

ReButels 6/7/73.

1EN.

1-Mr. Newmann

1-Mr.

Cotter

FBIHQ appreciates responses to reButels made by various field offices,

including pinpointing of areas of possible misunderstanding. Any additional

observations regarding the pending changes in our procedures will be welcomed.

It is suggested, however, that comments be focused on regulations which have

been revised in the rew manual chapters rather than on those which have been

in effect for a number of years.

In some instances, field offices have misinterpreted certain portions

of the new manual chapters. In addition, a number of specific questions have

been raised regarding manual provisions. Accordingly, and in order to insure

a smooth transition to the new rules, implementation of these revised

procedures is being deferred. Additional instructional material is currently

being prepared at F 317Q to provide field with necessary background information

-as to underlying basis for these changes and also in response to the particular

_ questions raised. This additional data should be in your hands in early July

jang implementation of new regulations is postponed until 8/1/13

EX- 106 REG-34

¡In addition, FBIHQ is planning to hold a series of regional conferences

z at which field supervisory personnel can disuuss the revised manual sections

=with FBIHQ representatives. Further information regarding these conferences

willbe provided at a later date.

2 - All Field Offices

7 JUN 22 1973

MEFE9E KIT

NOTE: We originally planned to place new procedures in effect concerning

ієт

- Sections 87 and 122 on 7/1/73. However, responses from some field offices have

lahan -

veland -

- indicated a misunderstanding of new approach and, in addition, a number of

rude

hafdl

specitic questions have been raised by the field (many dealing with procedures

sinà

which have not been changed). We are deferring implementation of new

shalt

er. E.S. A

regulations until after we have resolved questions raised by field and held

us.

mpsion -

regional conferences to insure full understanding on part of field. Specific

ers.

30m

recommendations regarding regional conferences (attendees, sites, dates, etc.)

28

will be submitted in separate memo.

hi? document is prepared in response to your requestrand is not for dissemi-

* RDC: 12b (155) M

pation pitside nor Committee.

Its use is limites do offimal proceedings oy.

le'sy

MAIL, ROOM I

'l the content may not inflosed to unauthorized senti

HH

55165

DocId: 32989586 Page 151

---

## Page 152

TO

OPTIONAL FORM NO, 10

5010-106

MAY 1962 EDITION

GLA GEN. RiS. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GUVERNMENT

Memorandum

Mr. Do so Millenda

1 - Mr. N. P. Callahan

1 - Mr.

E. S. Miller

1. - Mr. T. J. Smith

DATE: 7/2/73

1 - Mr. E. I. Schroeder

FROM

05, D. Cotter - s.M.

1 - Mr.

H.

A. Newman, Jr.

1 - Mr. R. D. Cotter

SUBJECT: SUBVERSIVE

AND EXTREMIST INVESTIGATIONS

SECTIONS 87

AND 122, MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS

brittan Sadanicined dice!

Prior memoranda have outlined substantial

changes being made in our procedures

governing the nyesti

rations of subversive and extremist organizations and.

individuals. This includes a complete revamping of Sections

87 and 122 of the Manual of Instructions which relate to these

types of cases.

The new procedures will take effect 8/1/73

throughout the

field.

As indicated in prior communications,

we plan to hold

a series of regional conferences so

• that all.

concerned fully understand the new policies and to insure a

smooth transition to the new system.

Mr. Felt

Mr. Baker

Mr. Callahan

Mr. Cleveland

Mr. Conrad

Mr. Gebhardt

Mr. Jenkins

Mr. Marshall

Mr. Miller, E.S.

Mr. Soyars

Mr. Thompson

Mr. Walters

Tele. Room

Mr. Baise

Mr. Barnes

Mr. Bowers

Mr. Herington

Mr. Conmy

Mr. Mintz

Mr. Eardley

Mrs. Hogan

your request and is not for dissemi-

is limited to official proceedings by

in response to

Its use

is prepared

your committee.

and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized person

approval of the FBI.

express

This document

nation ortsi",

your Comm: ' e

the

nel without

We have worked up a schedule of six regional confer-

ences to be held in Washington Field Office, New York,

San Irancisco, Chicago, Dallas, and Atlanta during the period

July 6 through July 18, 1973.

attend from all field offices with the exception of Anchorage

and Honolulu.

Attendance will be limited to Special Agents in

Charge, Assistant Special Agents in Charge, or full-time

Security Supervisors.* Smaller offices will be limited to one

representative but larger offices will be allowed to send two.

Of course, the host office will be able to have all interested

Supervisors attend.

Four representatives of Intelligence Division will

handle these conferences,

as follows: Section Chief T. J. Smith

and SA Emil Shroeder will handle conferences in San Francisco

on July 16 and in Dallas on July 18, whereas SAs R. D. Cotter

and Homer J. Newman, Ji. will handle conferences in Chicago

and

Atlanta on the same

dates. All four men will take part in

the

first two conferences in Washington Field Office on July 5

and

New

York Office on July 10.

*

Or in absence of full-time supervisor, an approved

Roch ilc

relief supervisor

EX-109

REC-621 CL

1539

/ ENCLOSURE

XEROX

CONTINUED - OVER

59 JUL 271973

JUL 20 1973

9

JUL I2 1973

UNRECORDED

COPY FLLEL

HH 55165 Do0Id:32989586

Page

152

---

## Page 153

Memorandum to Mr. E. S. Miller

Re:

Subversive and Extremist Investigations

Sections 87 and 122, Manual of Instructions

A detailed schedule is attached showing the locations

and dates of the six conferences along with the offices assigned

to each.

ACTION

Attached is airtel to all offices furnishing pertinent

information concerning the forthcoming conferences.

Offices

scheduled to attend the July 5 conference at Washington Field

Office will be telephonically advised in order to insure they

have sufficient notice.

CONTINUED - OVER

- 2-

HH 55165 DocId: 32989586 Page 153

---

## Page 154

-1=

SCHEDULE FOR FIELD CONFERENCES

Thursday, July 5

Kashangton Field office

Baltimore

Norfolk

Richmond

Tuesday, July 10

New York

Albany

Boston

Buffalo

New Haven

Newark

Philadelphia

Pittsburgh

Monday, July 16

San Francisco

Butte

Las Vegas

Los Angeles

Phoenix

Portland

Sacramento

Salt Lake City

San Diego

Seattle

Chicago

Cincinnati

Cleveland

Detroit

Indianapolis

Milwaukee

Minneapolis

maha

st. Louis

Springfield

HH 55165

Wednesday, July 18

Atlanta

Birmingham

Charlotte

Columbia

Jacksonville

Knoxville

Louisville

Memphis

Mobile

Miami

Savannah

Dallas

Albuquerque

Denver

El Paso

Houston

Jackson

Kansas City

Little Rock

New Orleans

Oklahoma City

San Antonio

Tampa

San Is document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi-

nation pitside your Committee.

Its use is limited to official proceedings by

"your Comm!" e and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized person-

mel without th

express approval of the FBI.

MIL/ 20 1973

DocId: 32989586

Page 154

100-00-

1539

---

## Page 155

Alrtel

To: SAC, Albany

Dom: Acting Director, FBI

XSUBVERSIVE AND EXTREMIST INVESIIGATIONS

SECTIONS

87 AND 122, MANUAL OF

E INSTRUCTIONS

S:1/.

....

5,00.

• 7/3/13

PERSONAL ATTENTION

Attached for each office are

two copies

of schedule showing

dates, locations, and oifices scheduled to attend a series of

regional conferences at Washington Field Office, New Yorks,

San Francisco, Chicago, Atlanta, and Dallas.

With exceptions noted below regarding larger offices, each

office should designate one representative to attend.

Preterably,

ches should be a lull-time supervisor handling work Involved, or in

his absence, an approved relief supervisor.

Offices which do not

have full-time security supervisors may, however, designate an SACOr ASAC

if desired.

The following offices should designate two representa

raves:

Baltimore, Boston, Newark, Philadelphia, Los Angeles, Seattle,

and Detroit.

In addition, host offices may designate as many repre-

sentatives as they deem desirable.

Attendees should be prepared to frankly discuss implementa-

tion of revised policies and procedures covering Sections 87 and 122,

particularly any problems which are anticipated. Conferences will

begin at 9:30 a.m. on the datos indicated and will be limited to one

day.

Enclosures (2)

2 - All I'leid Offices - Enclosures (2)

(125)

MAILED 10

NOTE: See memodUl ~ 5 1973

captioned as

Mr. Felt -

Mr. Baker

Mr. Callahan

NI. Cleveland -

AIr, Conrad

Mr. Gebhardt

Nir. Jenkins

Mr. Sarshall

Mr. Miller, E.S..

Mr. Soyars

Air. Thompson -

Mr. Walters

Tele. Fixom.

Nir. Baise -

Mr. Bames

Mr. Bowers

Mr. Herington -

Nir. Conmy -

Mr. Stintz

nEC

Cotter to Mr. Miller dated 7/2/73

ST-105

50-00-1532

indexusnes

BO JUL 6

Its use is limited to offmat proceedens on

ENRECO

COPY FILED IN

..:15 your Comm

Committee.

nel without the express

TENEYPENT

---

## Page 156

1- Mr. Thompson

Airtel

1-Mr. Jenkins

1-Mr. Walsh

F2L.

AC, Albany

" Director, FBI

• 115/1

SE & 'IONS 87 AND 122

M. NJAL DE INSTRUCTIONS

SUBVERSIVE AND EXTREMIST INVESTIGATIONS

1-Mr. Marshall

1-Mr. Miller

1-Mr. Gebhardt

1-Mr. White

1-Mr. Cotter

1-Mr. Shackelford:

(Attn: Mr. Schroeder)

8/3/73

1-Mr. Cregar

1-Mr. George Moore

(Attn: Mr. Newman)

1-Mr. Cleveland

1-Mr. Jacobson

1-Mr. Campbell

1-Mr. Baker

In connection with the various letters being directed by FBIH@ to all offices

under individual organization captions which set out the suggested predications

to be used in the future, the following instructions apply.

The field may reproduce these letters as required to facilitate distribution

within their offices and notification to all interested personnel. They should,

of course, be treated as sensitive material in any distribution to Resident Agencies

Based upon results of reccht regional field conferences and further

consideration by FBIHQ, it ha; been decided that a predication for investigation

need not be included in materla prepared for dissemination (letterhead

memorandt or report) with re ect to on-going investigations which were pending

before 8/1/ 73 and concerning

lich information has already been reported in

a form suitable for dissemina : n. However,

in such cases an appropriate

predication must be shown in e first intraoffice communication prepared

after 8/1/73 and in the first ir aBureau communication prepared after 8/1/73

which is dizected to FBIHQ.": is would include the administrative pages of

reports or communications c: " ering letterhead memoranda.

For example, if pending ase exista 6

REC-63/

14-15460

on a subject as o 8/1/73 and information

P, conce: ning such subject has: ready been disseminated either by report or LHiM,

subse; sent LHMs or reports repared after 8/1/73 need not include a statutory

predication. However, if a ‹ se is pending as of 8/1/73 and no prior outside

disse: ination has been mac by LHM or report, the first such LHM or report

11e!

prepared alter 8/1/73 shoul include a statutory basis. In either event, the

ss. Dir. first: traoifice communica ion prepared aiter 8/1/73 should show the statutorx.

sst. Dir.:

Admin. -

Comp. Sys?- All Field Offices

Files & Com. _

Gen. Inv. _

111:

Ident. -

Inspection

RDC: n1b (138)

AUG 4 1973

SEE NOTE PAGE E

Intell. -

Laboratory

Plan. & Eval.

Spec. Inv.

Training

-egal Coun.

Jong. Serv.

Corr. & Crm.

Roscarch

Press Off. -

Telephone Rm.

Director sit 65

MAILED 22

AUGO 3 1973

"FEL

astdocument is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi

ration outsin your committee

Its use is limited to official proceeaings oy

Con"

3 ail the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized person

ng.

express approval o the FBI.

189586

whel

---

## Page 157

i----9-

Airtel to Albany

SECTIONS 87 AND 122

MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS

SUSVERSIVE AND EXTREMIST INVESTIGATIONS

basis as should the first intraBureau communication, copies of which are being

directed to FBIg.

Advise FBILQ i you have any questions concerning the foregoing instructions.

NOTE: We recently conducted a series of regional field conferences concerning

the revised policies and procedures governing our investigations of

subversives and extremists covered by Sections 87 and 122 of Manual

of Instructions. During these conferences the field pointed

to the

necessity for reproduction of copies of the all-office letters being sent

out from FBIQ concerning various organizations. In addition, it was

agreed that the rules on predications with respect to existing cases

should be applied as is indicated herein.

NH 55165 DocId: 32989586

Page 157

---

## Page 158

'IN-TIONAI FORM VO, 10

5010-106

a Garr.

2IG. N- 27

INTED STATES! - VERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

Mr. Miller

DATE: 8/3/73

FROM

D. Cotter

SUBJECT SECTION 87

MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS

SUPERVISIIN

SECURITY MATTE

Assoc- Dira de

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

Comp. Syst._

Files & Com. _

Gon. Inv. -

Ident.

Inspectio

Intell.

Laboraton

Plan, & Eval

Spec, lege

Training

Legal Count

Cong, Serv.

Corr. & Crm.

Research

Press Off.

Telephone Rm. -

Director Sec'y -

During recent regional conferences with supervisory

personnel from field offices, we discussed new procedures governing

investigations of subversive and extremist elements and a number of

suggestions were made for minor modifications. After careful consideration,

it is believed the following modifications should be made:

your request and is not for dissemi.

Its use is limited to official proceedings by

prepared in respouse to

Committec.

and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized person

express approval of the FBl.

This document is

nation o'isian

your Commi''e

nel without the

I - Requirement that a statutory predication for each

investigation be shown on the first communication

prepared (intraoftice memorandum, letter, airtel,

etc. should be modified since there will be occasions

where preliminary inquiries will have to be undertaken

before it is known whether a statutory basis for

investigation exists. This is particularly true with

regard to indivittuals identified as being in contact with

known subversive groups or subjects, where the purpose

of the contact is not initially known. Accordingly, we

should modify the regulation to require that a statutory

basis be shown in the first communication prepared for

outside dissemination (letterhead memorandum or report

but that it need not be shown in strictly internal

communications for a period not to exceed 90. days.

This will allow time for preliminary inquiries to be

conducted thregh established sources to determine

whether or not a statutory basis tor a full investiation

exists.

RE 68/0-15-

2 - With respect to developing background. information concerning

a subversive subject, it is believed we should include a

sentence indicating that where practicable, the field should

endeavor to verify the subject's date and place of birth

through appropriate bureau of vital statistics or birth registra.

15%.00

55165

Enclosure

I-Vir. Miller

CB Mr. Callahan

1-Jraining Division (Attn: Mr. Reilly)

5 Mx. T. J. Smith

1-Mr. George Moore (Attn: Mr. Newman)

1-Mr. Shackelford (Attn: Mr. Schroeder)

1-Mr. Cregar

PAGE 458 RDC:nlb (Y)

20 AUG 1 7 1973

(CONTINUED - OVER)

do are prepos

---

## Page 159

Memorandum to Mr. Miller

Re: SECTION 87

MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS

3 - Regarding interviews of subversive subjects,

the Manual now instructs that they should be

interviewed in the absence of "exceptional

circumstances." Field supervisors made a

strong case for relaxing this requirement,

especially since there are many subjects who

are known to be hostile towards all Government

authority where no purpose would be served in

seeking to conduct an interview. Accordingly,

we are recommending that the instruction be

changed so that subjects should be interviewed

"unless there is a sound basis for not doing so."

4 - Manual now requires FBIHQ approval for

interviews of subjects who hold "leadership

positions" in a subversive group. The consensus

of our recent conferences was this should be

eliminated and that the SACs should be allowed

to approve such interviews. It was pointed out

that the term "leadership position' is vague

and unclear and further that, in any case, FBIHQ

approval is required whenever subjects are

"nationally prominent."

5 - Concerning dissemination of information developed

it was the consensus of our conferences that

mention be made of our responsibility to disseminate

pertinent information regarding persons holding

clearance with the Armed Forces to the Defense

Industrial Security Clearance Office (DISCO).

2

HH 55165 DocId: 32989586

Page 159

---

## Page 160

Memorandum to Mr. Miller

Re: SECTION 87

MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS

6 - In order to deal with the problem of field office files

building up an accumulation of channelling memoranda

and creating space problems, it was decided that we

should include some provision for the destruction of

such memoranda by the field at the option of the

appropriate supervisor. This can be done through the

preparation of an "investigative insert'' for later possible

inclusion in a letterhead memorandum or report.

7 - It was suggested and agreed upon that the Manual should

include brief additional instructions regarding reporting

procedures for ADEX (currently dangerous subversives)

subjects. This includes the necessity for a summary

type report at the time the subject is recommended

for inclusion in ADEX and the need to keep FBIHQ

periodically advised of investigation of ADEX subjects.

These requirements were initially established in September,

1972, at the time our current ADEX policy was initiated.

8 - It was agreed that the period for a preliminary investigation

of subversive organizations should be expanded from 45 to

90 days.

ACTION:

Attached is an airtel to all offices dealing with these

modifications and instructing that they be put into effect

immediately. Manual revisions will be separately submitted.

HH 55165 DocId:32989586 Page 160

---

## Page 161

Airtel

To: SAC, Albany

rom: Director, F3l

I-Mr. Thompson

1-Mr. Jenkins

1-Mr. Walsh

1~Mr. Marshall

1-Mr. Miller

I-Mr. Gebhardt

1-Mr. White

1-Mr. Cotter

1-Mr. Shackelford

(Attn: Mr. Schroeder)

8/8/73

I-Mr. Cregar

1-Mr. George Moore

(Attn: Mr. Newman)

1-Mr. Jacobson

MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS

I Mr. Campbel

your request and is not for dissemi-

Its use is limited to official proceedings by

¿SUBVERSIVE INVESTIGATIONS

1-Mr. Baker

Based on recent regional field conferences, following modifications are

being made in policies and procedures set forth in Section 87:

prepared in response

your Committee.

express approval of the FBI.

'his dociment

outside

the

without

Afage.

nation

Jour

I - Requirement that statutory predication for each investigation be

shown on the first communication prepared is being rescinded. Instead

it will be required that a statutory basis be shown in the first

communication prepared for outside dissemination (LHM or report);

however, it need not be shown in strictly internal communications

for a period not to exceed: days. This will allow time for

preliminary inquiries to be conducted through established sources

to determine whether or not a statutory basis for a full investigation

exists. This will apply particularly with respect to individuals

identified as being in contact with known subversive elements, where the

purpose of the contact is not initially known. In the event preliminary

inquiries fail to establish a sound basis for investigation, the case

should of course be promptly closed and there is no need to advise

FBIHQ in such instances. Nor is there any need to prepare an LHM

or report in such cases where no pertinent subversive derogatory

information has been developed.

REC5 / 00-00-1518

2 - Where practicable, eitorts should be made to verity a subject's date

and place of birth through the apparate bureau of vital statistics

or birth registrar.

MAILED

piti

ZAUG * 9 1973

3- Regarding interviews oi subver

conducted unless there is a 20,1

Asst. Dir.:

they should bed Alid 1973

for not doing so.

Admin.

/ Comp. Syst. -

Fon. IaCo2-All Field Offices

Gon. Inv..

Ident. -

inspection BeTw

Intell. -

RDC: rilb (138)

NOTE: See cover memo R. D.

Cotter to Mr. Miller

oated 8//79 saptioned "S ction 87, Manual

Laboratory.

Plan. & Eval..

Spec, Inv,

Troining L

Legal Cour.

Cong. Serv.

04C

Corr. & Cim.

Resoarch _

22,1973

Press Off..

Hf -55165 Doe

It: 329805

Raye

---

## Page 162

Airtel to Albany

SECTION 87

MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS

SUBVERSIVE INVESTIGATIONS

1 - The requirement that FBIHQ approval be obtained

for interviews of subjects who hold "leadership

positions" in a subversive group is being deleted.

5 - The Bureau's responsibility to disseminate information

concerning persons holding clearances with the

Armed Forces to the Defense Industrial Security

Clearance Oifice (DISCO) is being added to the Manual.

6 - In order to deal with the problem of field office files

building up an excessive accumulation of channelling

memoranda on subversive subjects, provisions are

being made for the destruction of such memoranda

following preparation of an "Investigative insert"' which

can be used later, i needed, in preparing reports or

LHMs or in transferring the office of origin.

7- The period for a preliminary inquiry concerning a newly

formed subversive organization is being expanded from

45 to 90 days.

8 - A separate paragraph is being added to that portion of

Section 87 which covers the administrative index

outlining proper reporting procedures for ADEX cases

including the need for a summary type report at the

time an individual is recommended for inclusion in ADEX.

Appropriate changes are being made in the Manual with respect

to the foregoing modirications. However, these changes should be

placed into effect immediately throughout the field. Any questions

regarding their implementation should be promptly directed to FBIHQ.

2

HH 55165

DocId: 32989586

Page

162

---