ATTACHMENT B TO MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD: ANATOLE RE NOSENKO, CRUCIAL QUESTIONS.
Agency: CIA
Originator: CIA
From: NONE
To: WITHHELD
Document date: 4/7/69
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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Date: 02/13/01

Page: 1

JEK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CIA

RECORD NUMBER

:104-10534-10082

RECORD SERIES : JFK

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : NOSENKO RECORDS

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

Released under the John F.

Kennedy Assassination Records

Collection Act of 1992 144 USC

Case#:NU 53216

Date: 06-14-2017

ORIGINATOR

FROM

го :

TITLE :

CIA

ATTACHMENT B TO MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD: ANATOLE RE

NOSENKO, CRUCIAL QUESTIONS.

DATE :

04/07/69

PAGES

45

SUBJECTS:

NOSENKO

"ANATOLE"

NBR

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER,

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

RESTRICTIONS

CURRENT STATUS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :

TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

POSTPONED IN FULL

02/02/01

JFK-M-24:F44 2001.02.02.09:27:45:170084: DOCUMENT DATE

TAKEN FROM LAST TWO PAGES

- CORRECTION AND AMENDMENT.

NOT BELIEVED RELEVANT (NBR) .

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ATTACHMENT B -

ANATOLE Re NOSENKO

CRUCIAL QUESTIONS

A. ANATOLE waS

consulted 31 March and 1 and 2 April 1969

concerning his recommendations on how to proceed to elicit

additional information from NOSENKO. ANATOLE offered specific

topics and questions about which NOSENKO is to be questioned

after setting forth items or topics which ANATOLE considers

the CRUCIAL QUESTIONS which neeu explanation or resolution.

These

CRUCIAL QUESTIONS are set forth below with conment or

notations which emerged during our discussions.

•B. ANATOLE understands that the immediate period of

elicitation from NOSENKO is part of the program to attempt to

resolve the bona fides of NOSENKO. He understands that his

participation and contribution is actually the implementation

of the program he originally believed was to be followed

before there

were any conclusions about NOSENKO's bona fides.

ANATOLE had been reviewing his filo material and the transcripts

of his comments in January 1959 (The KY transcripts) so he

was prepared to discuss aspects of the CRUCIAL QUESTIONS as

well as specific elicitation topics. As our contribution to .

the discussion with ANATOLE we had prepared 26 papers relating

specifically to NOSENKO and I had notes concerning other points

or topics to be discussed. Bach paper was read by ANATOLE, he

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retained certain of the papers and, as sot forth below, he

commented about certain of the papers or related matters.

After outlining the CRUCIAL QUESTIONS we worked out an elici-

tation guide to be followed with NOSENKO as tho beginning of

the program. The clicitation guide is detailed separately.

C. ANATOLE submits the following as his reconmendation

about how to proceed with NOSENKO:

1. Isolate the CRUCIAL QUESTIONS for our guidance

and consideration. (We basically accomplished this 31 March

and 1 and 2 April although obviously these nay be revised)

2. Devise questions for elicitation. The questioning

OF NOSENKO is to begin innediately and is to follow the pro-

cedures set forth separately. (The initial phase of this was

accomplished. Additional or rovised elicitation topics or

questions will be considered when the results of the first

elicitation phase are reviewed with ANATOLE).

3. A polygraph exanination. (ANATOLE believes another

polygraph based on questions he will help frane will be essential.

It is his opinion that it will be possible to nake the polygraph

meaningful if questions are based on a careful review of the

results of the clicitation and specifically on the basis of

his knowledge. ANATOLE believes it should be possible to use

the polygraph effectively and to eliminate or explain more

adequatoly the qualifications concerning NOSENKO's veracity

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such as "substantially truthful" by pinpointing questions

and areas where there remains doubt. ANATOLE agreed there

night be a question of when a polygraph examination should

be administered sinco it might be more effective after the

confrontation or hostile interrogation of NOSENKO.)

4. A hostilo/confrontation interrogation phase at

which time NOSENKO would be faced with the errors, incon-

sistencies, falsehoods, etc. in his story and advised that

his mission failed. This phase of the approach to NOSENKO

would only be undertaken upon conclusion of the elicitation

phase or if or when NOSENKO's attitude changes during the

elicitation phase. The confrontation would be undertaken

only when full research on every aspect of each CRUCIAL

QUESTION has been completed and specific questions aro

framed with ANATOLE on the basis of NOSENKO', information or

answers and all collateral information. In this connection

ANATOLE expects continuing research on each crucial question

so that each can be examined on the basis of a summary of all

information about the question, the details of what NOSENKO

has said and related or collateral information such

as

photographs or documents, etc. The hostile interrogation phase

ANATOLE anticipates will be undertaken only after full consid-

eration of all possible problems. For examplo ANATOLE stresses

he will need to review the Bagley letter of November 1966 to

ROSENKO since this will be a key eleuent in considering how to

proceed iith the confrontation as well as to attempt to deternine

.

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what influence that letter has had on NOSENKO during the 67-68

interviers.

D. It was necessary to emphasize to ANATOLE the fact

that at this tine it is not possible for me to assure him that

everything NOSENKO has said on any topic has been recovered

ur is retrievabla even for the intervier period of 1967-1963

(and os). Noting the papers we had prepared ANATOLE had to

be told thero was no assurance that everything NOSENKO has

said was included or considored when attempting to extract

or summarize his statements about a person or event. Specif-

ically

It was noted that with a for exceptions no topic or

iten is fully covered during one or two intervions. Even

though ANATOLE recognized the problen based on his review of

the transcripts of the 1967-68 interviews it was necessary

to emphasize the fact that the validity of any given question

we had framed might bo challenged, reversed or modified as tho

process of indoxing the transcripts continued. ANATOLE was

told that as of 31 March 1969 we had been ablo to index and

extract the transcripts and menoranda of the 1967-68 interviews.

only through j-l8ß of approxinately 260 M-menoranda. ANATOLE

also was told it is not possiblo to be certain that all previous

infornation from NOSENKO con be accuratoly and fully recovered.

For this roason it is difficult if not inpossidle to isolate

what he night have said in 1964 and/or 1965 and comparc that

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statement with what he said in 1968, ANATOLE also acknowledged .

noting the possible significance of the interview techniques

as these have varied over the years. Contrast in the technique

and tho approach to NOSENKO whero, for example, ho is provided

information or askod only to confirn a loading question has

¿ended to dilute if not obscure what NOSENKO actually has

had to say about many subjects; at this stage it may be

virtually impossiblo to distinguish MOSENKO's original infor-

nation fron subsequent statenents modified as a result of.

questioning. This problen is in important consideration

because the approach to the elicitation phase was developed

with this in mind. Essentially it was agreed wich ANATOLE

that despite previous statenents or information from NOSENKO

the elicitation phase would be managed to attempt to obtain

FrOm NOSENKO everything he has to offor of say about each

CRUCIAL QUESTION at this time without referenco to any previous

statement. It is ANATOLE's opinion that if NOSENKO provides

a full statement without prompting that further questioning

can bo meaningful after analysis of his statenent despite

the possibility NOSENKO has modified or revised his information

as he has learned or apparently learned what he thinks is

wanted or he should say. ANATOLE believes the fundanental

problem renains and that despite NOSINKO's twists and turns

it will be possible to sort through the various stories to

focus on the reason for NOSENKO's dispatch and determine the

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key itens of diversion.

E. In roply to ANATOLE's question he was told that the

FBI continued to intorview NOSENKO usually with Mr. Solie

present but that I did not know in advance anything about the

ropics of any interviews. I told ANATOLE it was my opinion

that once elicitation fron NOSENKO began on the basis of his

reconmendations that other interviews would stop. We

recognized and agreed that there night be a tactical and/or

psychological problem with NOSENKO by shifting the interview

technique to elicitation rather than consultation and a

response to questioning. ANATOLE could not emphasize too

strongly the need to let NOSENKO respond fully with minimal

prodding or stimulation and without refreshing his menory.

ANATOLE was told it was my understanding the elicitation

phase would be conducted by Mr. Solie without FBI partici-

pation although

I did tell ANATOLE that the elicitation trans-

cript results would undoubtedly be given to the FBI just as

have the results of all the 1967-69 interviews.

F. ANATOLE expects and recommends that the period of

elicitation will be followed by the period of interrogation

or confroutation to be conducted by a tean of threo persons -

The security expert, li. Solic; a counterintelligence specialist

ho knows related cases and Cl problens, and a Soviet specialist.

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ANATOLE says this tean approach will he necessary to implement

a fast noving interrogation, based on the script he will help

devise, which will not permit NOSENHO time to reflect or

think about his answers. The tactic will be to insist on

immediate and full answers and ANATOLE insists that onco the

new elicitation phase begins NOSENKO not be pernitted to

write any answers: He is not to be given any written assign-

ments: every response and reply is to be oral and transcribed

• and NOSENKO must be encouraged and permitted to respond fully:

he is not to be asked to confirm or deny any statement nor is

he to be assisted in replying to any question with suggestions

or reminders.

G. ANATOLE recognizes the problen of information from

FBI sources and the release of this information to him. He

respects the FBI need to protect its sources and understands

the FBI attitude even though he quite obviously disagrees. He

believes that our failure to nake relevant information available

to him is shortsighted and lessens both his effectiveness and.

our ability to decipher the NOSENKO puzzle faster. ANATOLE

recalls that at the time NOSENKO defected in 1964 and there

was discussion with the FBI about the SASHA lead and related

matters he asked for FBI file and source infornation pertinent

to the problems. ANATOLE continues to believe there probably

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is a serious question about the possible significance of

NOSENKO to penetration of the FDI and the bona fides of FBI

sources in terms of misinformation (disinfornation) in

relation to both NOSINKO and othei information. He is of

the opinion that a FBI source(s) probably cane to the FBI

after his dofection and perhaps after NOSENKO's contact if

not dispatch in 1964. He suggests the possibility there nay

be a false arrest and show trial of a FBI source in order to

further holster NOSENKO's story. Although it has not been

possible

to discuss this aspect of the NOSENKO story with

ANATOLE it seems clear that if we are to gain full measure

from ANATOLE it will be necessary for the FBI to approve

or conduct a briefing of ANATOLE appropriate to puting a

porspective on the FBI sourcos so he can assess what they

have said about NOSENKO and GOLITZYN.

H. The following are the CRUCIAL QUESTIONS which

are to

form the basis for elicitation fron NOSENKO. They are set

forth in the order discussed.

1. Misinformation in the Second Chief Dircctorate (SCD)

(This is an innediate topic for elicitation as set forth separately)

2. Leadership of the KGB

3. Leadership of the First Chief Directorate (FCi)

4. Leadership of the SCD

5.

SHELEPIN's 1959 Report (This topic will be discussed

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nore thoroughly with ANATOLE beforo the question is raised

with NOSENKO again. NATOLE was emphatic in stazing that it

had been a nistake to raise the subject of the KGB policy and

1959 corganization with NOSENKO. He read the paper with

attachments but deferred comment except to note that NOSENKO

had said very little of significance. It was at this time

that ANATOLE first notod it was a mistake to permit NOSENKO

to write memoranda. ANATOLE obviously considers this aspect

of the NOSSNKO case most important and a topic which requires

his study particularly in view of the fact he now has extracts

from the GOLENIEWSKI letters which relate to the 1959 KGB

reorganization and disinformation. ANATOLE also did not recall

the book so it will be necessary to make certain he has a

copy.)

6. Penetration of the American Embassy Moscow

(ANATOLE considers this a most important topic which requires

additional study and elicitation later after research will

permit us to assess NOSENKO's statements rapidly. ANATOLE

reiterates his concern that it is exactly and specifically

in this area that NOSENKO's reassurance of no KGB successes

is most likely diversion. ANATOLE expressed his concern that

in January he may have conmented too extensively and theoret-

ically about this problen. le now wants to re-exanine this

problem and refocus everyone back more preciscly to NOSENKO

and his story)

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7. Penetration of CIA (This is a topic for later

elicitation from NOSENKO.)

8. VASSALL Case (ANATOLE believes NOSENKO should

be asked to reconstruct completely in detail everything he

knows about the VASSALL case: times, sources, officers, otc.,

at one taped session. Simultaneously ANATOLE says we should

construct a complete chronology of everything NOSENKO

has said about the VASSALL case since June 1962, including

the questions of comments put to NOSENKO about VASSALL. An

analysis comparison of these two papers will follow.

ANATOLE proposes it may be possible to demonstrate

how a possible penetration of CIA could have precluded NOSENKO's

safety from 1962 to 1964. This may assist us to solve our

problem and also be ultimately useful in confronting NOSENKO

on the point of his dispatch and apparent immunity.

9. Boris BELITSKIY Case (ANATOLE approved elicitation

and questioning on the basis of the sunmary and questionnaire.

ANATOLE stresses the need to confine the questioning to the .

questionnaire and the fact that NOSENKO is not to be given

additional infornation about the case, its origins, otc.,

cither as we knew it or now know it from ANATOLE. There will

be some tie-in to the elicitation about Vladimir Luovich ARTENOV

and Acksandr Konstantinovich KISLOY but other than the questions

as set forth in the papers ANATOLE reviewed there should be no

questions asked which brief NOSENKO or relate the three or

any other persons.

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ANATOLE needs a photograph of ARTEMOV to make certain

of identification and he needs photos others in the delegation

with BELITSKIY to try to dotermine if there were other KGB

officers in the delegation who night have been in on the case

or the disinformation aspect)

10. The 1960 period of NOSENKO's career.

This is to be an elicitation topic later after we

have sumnarized what we can about NOSENKO's story of this

period. In reply to ANATOLE's question based on his review

of the paper NOSENKO Timetable and Associates I told ANATOLE

the researcher had found it impossible to date to sort out

and isolate NOSENKO's 1967-68 statements about his career

during the period 1960 to 1962. ANATOLE was told this was

obviously a priority job but that it just had been an im:

possible task without additional research and analysis. We

will discuss this fully when the isolation is completed and

in conjunction with other topics.

11. Vadim Viktorovich KOSOLAPOV 's November 1960 trip.

This item is for later elicitation after more

research is completed about the code clerks, perhaps a reinves-

tigation to nake positive identifications, etc. ANATOLE asked

if ROSOLAPOV's trip to Copenhagen was confirmed (N-167 Pg. 16)

and I told hin I thought it was under a different name.

ANATOLE would like details.

TOONET

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12. Tho Robert Lee JoiNsor case.

ANATOLE considers this an important aspect of

NOSENKO's throw-away naterial.. He again questions why the

SCD would lend technicians to the FCD and wants NOSENKO to

explain

this in detail as well as to fully detail again how,

from whom, etc. NOSENKO learned of this case. ANATOLE iS

of the opinion new questions can be asked but agreed to defer

elicitation on this case prinarily because I pointed out

that in 1965 a paper was written setting forth apparent

inherent security weaknesses in the johnson case some of which

at least

suggested strongly that, in addition to Johnson's

lack of access at one time, the KGB could have anticipated

a blow at any moment. I outlined sone of the points I recall

about the weaknesses of the principals and quite frankly I

told ANATOLE that I doubted that anyone currently of the opinion

NOSENKO is bona fide would be any moro inclined to credit"

the

1965 paper today than he has in the past. I agreed that it

night be useful to again attempt to get NOSENKO's story about

the JOHNSON case when this story would be exclusively NOSENKO's.

13. Aleksey Mikhaylovich GORBATENKO.

ANATOLE wants NOSENKO to tell in detail everything

he knows about CORBATENKO. ANATOLE notes the 1955 promotion is

a key elcment but stresses no mention of this is to be made

to NOSENKO. Despite previous mentions of GORBATENKO, which

should be collated, NOSENKO is to restate everything completely.

siam

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14.

Scrafin Nikalayevich LYALIN

Elicitation about LYALIN is to follow later.

All references to LYALIN by NOSENKO should be collated with

collateral infornation about him. If there is a photograph

Of LYALIN, ANATOLE wants to see it to verify any NOSENKO

identification.

15. Vladislav Mikhaylovich KOVSHUK. ANATOLE

considers NOSENKO's information about KOVSHUK most important

as a later elicitation point. He does not want NOSENKO asked

any questions about KOVSHUK which may relate to KOVSHUK's

trip to the U.S.A. or KOVSHUK's association with KISLOV. If

. NOSENKO in connection with detailing the biographios of his

friends includos any of this about KOVSHUK he is NOT to be

questioned on this matter of about the wonan trouble previously

mentioned.

ANATOLE needs exact dates KOVSHUK was in the u.s.

and any details of activities he can be given fron FBI reporting.

In connection with our discussion about KOVSHUK possibly working

with and associating with journalists ANATOLE said he recalled

an incident which he thinks took place in 1959 whon he net

KOVSHUK on the street not far from the KGB offices when KOVSHUK

signalled him not to speak. ANATOLI did not and observed

KOVSHUK neet a Soviet journalist in an apparent agent type neeting.

2201

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ANATOLE said he had forgotten this incident and he never spoke

to KOVSHUK about it. ANATOLE cannot recall the nano of the

journalist but said he recalls knowing him slightly. He will

try to recall the name. (Note for SM check: did KOVSHUK per

NOSENKO work vs. Americans with journalists and specifically

Ed Stevens?)

10. Eugene Peter SEREBRENNIKOV.

ANATOLE says what NOSENKO has said is clear

but that this needs full research and analysis - what he said

contrasted with what NOSENKO said and what SEREBRENNIKOV said

before asking NOSENKO about this again.

17. Adam BROCHES Case

ANATOLE was told this lead information was heing

roviewed in detail. That there was some apparent confusion

and possibly misinterpretation of misunderstanding about his

lead information.

ANATOLE reiterated his point that the KGB wanted

to reestablish relations which had been broken after BROCHES

left France. ANATOLE knows about this from reading ZARUBIN

paper and he knows that the KGB wanted to talk to ZARUBIN

about this.

ANATOLE said that he would leave the decision

about when NOSENKO would be asked about BROCHES again to S™ -

it could be immediately when the review was completed or later.

The review is in process and we will have to see what FBI

nay have askod rocently.

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18. Viktor KOPEYKIN. A later topic.

19. The CHEREPANOV Papers

ANATOLE stresses the importance of this case

but says this must be a later topic for NOSENKO probably in

interrogation although it nay be useful to have NOSENKO

roviow his Inowledge again in detail before confrontation.

ANATOLE referred to the need to analyze

the results of the BOWDEN investigation before proceeding too

far with NOSENKO. In this connection ANATOLE was told State

Security was securely organizing this investigation and that

it was currently planned that interviews would commence with

BOWDEN first including mention to BOWDEN about his mention

in the CHEREPANOV papers. In response to ANATOLE's question

ho was told that to my knowledge the FBI did not yet know

about the BONDEN investigation since to date it was a State.

Department inquiry based on a need to clarify certain possible

problens. ANATOLE said that he saw CHERPANOV after CHEREPANOV

had transferred to the American Embassy Section wearing a

Lt. Col. military uniform. ANATOLE said this was unusual and

it suggests to him that CHEREPANOV was engaged in an operation,

perhaps a contact posing as a military beginning in 1959.

He said CHEREPANOV had as a constant companion a young man in

the American Department but ANATOLE cannot recall the young

man's nane. (ANATOLE suggests later NOSENKO be asked if

CEREPANOV wore a military miform and who was his companion,

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probably in operations.) I told ANATOLE I did not know if

ROSENKO had named any friends of CHEREPANOV but would check

for names. ANATOLE said he recalled also there was a big

change in CHEREPANOV'5 attitudo and demeanor between carly

1959 to mid - 1960 or, nore probably. Dec. 1900 when

ANATOLE sew Cherepanov again. ANATOLE said he can only

interpret that CHEREPANOV was in a better mood, more confident

in personality because he nay have haú sone operational

succoss. ANATOLE is of the opinion that CHEREPANOV's chango

in doneanor and mood could only relate to American Enbassy

operations.

29. The

Case

ANATOLE says this is not really a crucial

question although an important case which needs resolution

eventually along lines set forth in the paper NOSENKO -

Homosexual Aspects but not on the basis of the homosexual

angle (see separate discussion to honosexual aspects).

21. The TOROV and PENKOVSKIY Cases

ANATGLE Guys both of these cases should be delayed

until later. They require special consideration and more

research and discussion.. We are not ready now to delve into

these and it is his opinion he may have tonded to obscure some

of the points about noseNKo by drawing parallels with PeNtOVSKIY

in January, le bolieves thore aro parallels and a relationship

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and we should continue to examine all aspects of the cases

but he concedes a better base of understanding should be laid

before it will be possible to make a meaningful tie to

NOSENKO.

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22. NOSENKO's Friendship with GUK. CHURANOV,.

_KOVSHUK, etc.

ANATOLE emphasized the need to get from NOSENKO complete

details about his friends or claimed friends. ANATOLE agreed

with the line of inquiry outlined in the paper "Knowledge Because

•of Association with other KGB Officers' and said elicitation

should include information sufficient to give us in one place

a perspective on NOSENKO's associates and friends. This topic

can be covered immediately. ANATOLE stresses real importance

of Guk, Kovshuk and Churanov to NOSENKO. He notes Guk's wife

was the daughter of a minister and asks if NOSENKO could have

introduced them. He also points outCHURANOV in school

with.

NOSENKO.

23 ₫

Lead.

ANATOLE agreed elicitation

on this topic should thegin

immediately and was most interested in the possible significance

of this case vis a vis disinformation.

He noted, of course, the

different perspective on the case and that apparently when this

case was considered in the context of support to NOSENKO's bona

fides analysis had not taken into account the actual origins

and development of the case. ANATOLE immediately connected the

SLAVACHENSKAYA angle to the PENKOVSKIY case and speculated that

the KGB may have been attompting to establish a separate

ostensibly confirmatory source to the FRI to holster PENKOVSKIY

SLUM

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who was in contact with the British and CIA. ANATOLE emphasized

his view that NOSENko should not be given a hint about the actual

beginnings of the case to prevent NOSENKO fron modifying his story

or being led to explanations. NOSENKO should retell his account

of the

case and then be asked the questions listed

without confrontation or explanation.

24.

(See N-21 - This a later topic) ANATOLE requests

everything available about GINSBURG and specifically everything

NOSENKO has ever said. After the research ANATOLE thinks he

can spot sonething in connection

with GINSBurG which is significant

but which he says eludes him at this time.

25. The Military Attache Incident. (s

.. ANATOLE stresses importance again as he did in KY

transcripts. He persists in thinking there may be more here

than we have covered - that one of the MA's may have been re-

cruited or

someone else

was recruited and advised about the trip.

'Ho refers to N-32, and maintains this incident needs reexamination

and that probably after research the Attaches should be questioned

again. ANATOLE says it his recollection that the KOR knew

exactly the device they were looking for; that the KGB did not

have a datection device which could have beon effective and that

the use of a box wich looked like a detoction machine was staged

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to cover up fact KGB Inew exactly wiere to find the device and

what it was. He says his recoliaction is that KoR knew where

to 100l and there was no search or monitoring. They just went

the right place. This means to ANATOLE a human not a machine

source. He says questioning NOSENKO about this can only follow

research.

(ANATOLE asked if the information about the Japanese

Colonel in intelligence had been reported to the lapanese and

what was the outcome. ANATOLE was told i did not know - would

check.)

26.

ANATOLE was interested in this but we did not dwell

on this subject. ANATOLE believe it a give away diversion

although probably true. Decision re additional elicitation to

be nade by SM on basis time and framing questions.

27. Microphones in American

Embassy

ANATOLE still suggests review this information from

• NOSENKO and requestioning particularly to establish exactly

What NOSENKO said whon and if he said anything about NOr?: !??

Wing. Decision re timing of questioning by SM.

28.

KATKINS - Canadian Anbassador Case.

MATOLE thinks it necessary NOSENkO retell in detail

everything he knows

ahout WATKINS in same way he to be asked

whout Yassall.

Then it will he sacoscary line

out and compare

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exactly what ANATOLE said and what NOSENKO said. ANATOLE points

out importance of early information from NOSENKO before he was

given background information or leading questions. ANATOLE

thinks this can begin early in elicitation or be done later.

Decision re timing by Si.

CANATOLE thinks it might be helpful for hin to review

what NOSENKO has said about Svetlana STALINA ALEILUEVA

This is speculative but ANATOLE recalls or was told NOSENKO

should or did know something and he thinks there may be some

clue here about NOSENiO's associates, friends, etc., possibly

of importance.)

29. Code Clerks - 59-62

ANATOLE again emphasizes his need to see a full review

of results of investigation of all the code clerk cases. He is.

convinced there may be a case here and that the clues have heen

missed or overlooked. le says he cannot recall the necessary ..

detall and that it is only when he can be stimulated with names.

dates, etc., that he may be able to pinpoint some angle of

significance. ANATOIE was told we were also bothered about these

cases - that much work had been done but that, quite frankly, I

could not estimate how long it would take to assemble the information

for orderly revier. ANATOLE was told this is on the agenda - it

is a natter of time and peoplo. Any questioning of NOSENkO about

these casos can only he done later.

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30. CLA Complex MOsCOW

ANATOLE said it would be necessary to research and

collate all the information about CIA officers and operations

in Moscow including visitors, i.e., Thiers, to get a picture

of their activities, ussociates, KGB officers they met and

operational activities which might have made them vulnerable.

ANATOLE opines NOSFNKO should know more specifics about this and

that later it will be nocessary to question him with specifics

during the confrontation stage after comparing late clicitation

results with collateral details.

31: A code Clerk in American Embassy with Spanish Language

or Spanish Background.

ANATOLE noted the reforence in the paper re Vladimir

Ivovich ARTEMOV to NOSENKO's information that ARTEMOV knew Spanish

and said there might he a connection to something he vaguely

recalled about an interest in or a case against an American code

clerk of Spanish

background or who spole spanish. ANATOLE

said the period was 1957-60. He could not recall dotalls. He

sald this should be considered a special case for him to work on

now for later questioning of NOSENKO if research indicated this .

necossary. ANATOLE requested afor review any information availahle

re code clorks, civilian or military, in Moscow 57-60 with Sparish

lauguage or background.

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32. Vladimir SUSTOV and Vasily Ve VAKURISHEY

AXATOLE agreod that the questions re VAkirusHeY should

be asked of sosenko durina the first elicitation stares. ANATOLE

was concerned that NOSENKO not be given auy indication of cir

current special interest in VAKHRUSHEV. (SM NOTE: Question

• IC

madeleted from paragranh 11 by Sil on basis

unnecessary,

ien reviewing paper with ANATOLE, ile, of course,

asked about

and was tolde

swas on samo shin once with

VAKHRUSHEV and researcher had included question hecause

had high US fovernment contacts including some carly 1950 worl:

on U.5. intelligence community raviers.)

A specific question MATOLE asked was ahout any collateral

or documentary infornation that VAKINUSHEY attended the Institute

of Foreign Relations. He also asked if there were photographs

Of VAKHRUSKEV's wifo(s) availahle and if HOSENKO had identified

them. He would like to

see them too. (SM NOTF: See 12 August

1951 interview).

ANATOLE thinks there nay be a significant aspect about

NOSENKO's schooling and VAKIRUSTEV's schooling which needs checking.

ANATOLE is speculating on possibility NOSENKO was

in Military

Insultute of Fereign Laaguages. I liad to answer ANATOLE that I

did not know if there was any collateral proof that wOShko was

• irndent at the Institute of Forcion/International Relations

but would check. AYATOLE projects this point on the logical

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progression of NOSENKO's schooling in the military and probability

that higher education would have been under military unless some

special family or other influence permitted change. He also notes

NOSENKO's continuation in Naval Service and confirms he saw

NOSENKO. in Navy uniform in March 1953 in KGB Fidgs.

ANATOLE suggests this aspect be reexamined after

elicitation innight of NOSENiO's ansivers and information about

VAKHPUSHEV and SUSLOV, who was in Institute of Forcien Pelations.

ANATOLE SayS CHURANOV was in Foreign Relations Institute and that

Gul was in Nilitary Instituto, ANATOLE speculates this maybe

area where NOSENKO is hiding his close relationship with Gul -

that he might have first known Gul in the Military Institute although

GUk a couple of years older than NOSENKO, fuk worked in GRU

will

but ANATOLE does not remember if Navy. ANATOLE says he/ considersd

futher elicitation later and also a surprise question on new

polygraph about NOSENKO's attendance at the Military Institute.

A. The paper NOSENKO's Defection was read by ANATOLE

with interest. I did not have 2 copies of this paper. ANATOLE

was told a copy would be furnished him at next meeting.. Certain

comments which follow are based on information from this paper

but a specific comment hy ANATOLE was (see para ? page ? of paper):

It is true TSYMNAl, was a former member of Department 4.

It is illogical that SYMPAl was transferrod to the Illegal

Directorite and more illogical he would travel with the delegation

if lie wore head of the Illegals Directorate. As lead of the 1th

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Department he would go with the delegation but normally and

logically there would be no nixing of legal and illegal elements.

The KGB would not permit any publicity or identification of

TSYMBAL if he were head of the Illegals. ANATOLF can only conclude

this infornation is to create the imeression of reorganization

after his defection.

B. ANATOLE also points out the illogic aspect of a

Tourist Departnent officer as security officer to such a delegation.

Tie also notes that when senior officials such as GROMYKO travel

there are specially assigned expert security officors with their

delegations if any are sent at all. He notes that for the most

part the senior officials travel without security officers except

protective

experts assigned such as would be the situation NOSENKO.

describes.

ANATOLE says a basic question for confrontation will

be about the inclusion of a "speclal security officer" in a

dolegation such as one headed by the Foreign Minister. He says

the inclusion of a person such as NOSENKO is very unusual. The

Foreign Minister and his aldes, etc., ars trusted men who go

• abroad regularly. These are always experienced KGR officors.

on the operations in support of the delegations and the planning.

is well in advance. These officers can handle anything. At a

later date ANATOLE says we can confront NOSENKO with this

opposite pesition From ANATOLI

MET

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C. ANATOlE said the story about ROSENkO's role with

SHAKuoV just rives a reason to us ahout why NOSENKO was in

Conova. There would he no reason for any special interest by

NOSENKO. The residenturs could and would handle any technical

devices and operations such as NOSENKO describes.

ANATOLE found this connection and final drinking hout Interesting

and said both Guk and KREPKOGOPSXIY would know idat NOSENKO'S

mission was in 1062. I could provide no information shout

KREPKOGORSKIY and ANATOLE asiod to see photo of KREPROGORSKIY..

nothing he could not recall name.

E.

ANATOLE asked for information aboute

(SM NOTE: SM needs

check significance - where in "NOSENKO - Defection" paper.

, What

NOSENKO

say, etc.).

F.. ANATOLE says a later question NOSENKO should be

asked,hy in 1062 he rejected the idea of using his position

in the Tourist Department as the logical position from which he

could keep in contact with AIS, i.e., a tourist sent to he

recruited by NOSENKO, etc.

33. Personnel

or lat section, Ist

Dept: 1252 - 61

AATOlE belioves this will be important area for later

elicitation and, perhaps, confrontation after we have opportunity

so analyze everythine dosauko says vs the collateral and aNAtOla's

inferation.

It will be necessary to research this.

Fit, i

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ANATOLE suggests ie doubie chech the dobricfing of

ahout NOSEND's approach and reexamine

background

aid what he has been doing to see if there is anything which

100ks significant now, i.e., anything inportant given hindsight

and more information.

34. The Maurice De Jean Case

AVATOLE said it was important to line out in quotes

by date everything that NOSENKO said about De Jean and do the same

for the information from Yurly Vasilyevich... KROTKOV. These.

should then be lined out and chronologically compared with what

ANATOLE said. On the basis of these conclusions and the tima

sequence we shouldsten examine the problem of the leakage of lead

information to try to got indicationgsat least of ho, why and

where ANATOLE's information leaked. ANATOLE said we should also

consider the possible problem of leakage in connection with the

WATKIN's Case and the RCMP in this. He also notes that GRIBANOV's

role and visit to Paris may be important so when NOSENKO responds

to questions about GRIBANOV we should examine this aspect also.

Specifically, NOSENKO should comment ahout why GRIBAYOV went to

Paris.

35. BESUEX and GRIBANOV

In connection with discussions ahout GRIPANoV and his

¿rip in 1001, we

discussed

the BuSiek case and ANATOLE was

• told

tie following re chronology:

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15 January NOSENKO to Geneva from Paris.

4 Feb (SM believos) GRIBANOV arrives Paris from Vienna

-

NOSENKO defects.

7 Feh. GRIBANOV departs Paris for Vienna (GRIBANOV uses

name CORBINOY in Vienna and with BUSHEK.)

12 Feb Soviets in Switzerland strongly protest to Swiss

about NOSENKO's defection.

14. Feh (naybe 13 Feh.) GRIBANOV, according to BUSHEK,

relaxed about NOSENKO defection when BUSHEk raised question.

ANATOLE suggests questions re BUStER come later.

36. Recall Telegram

It is apparent to ANATOLE there is significant in-

formation about this aspect of the NOSENKO case from the FBI.

This goes to the basic question of cooperation with the FBI and

his

knowledge which he concedes is a basic FRI decision about

what he sees of the recall telegram information. ANATOLE has

seen only NOSENKO's information (transcripts, etc.). The

significance of this may bear on the question of rank discussed

separately but even without being ahle to discuss all aspects

of the recall telegran with ANATOLE he suggests we should examine

if we have not done this the details of NOSENKO's admissions he

lied about his rank and the recall telegram. ANATOLE says it is

necessary to determine:

the exact Jate NOSBNKO broke on reach

story: who was involved: who knew he was being pressured; was there

coordination with the FRI about the pressure on the recall telegran;

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what and to led us to conclude the storios were false; what

were the dates involved hetween NOSENKO's story of the telegram

and the

information from

another source(s); was there time for

NOSENKO to confirm his use of the recall telegran story: could

the message from NOSENKO have gotten to another source or would

it appear the telegram story had to be planned in advance and

not triggered hy confirnation from

NOSENKO; after NOSENKO broke

was the other sourcels) confronted; was there any change in the

relations with the other source (s); has there been any collateral

information reflecting KGB knowledge he has broken on rank or the

telegram stories. ANATOLS suggests this aspect of the question

of bons fides come later in confrontation and he assumes SM will

he covering this fully even though

he hopes there will be permission

for him to be fully read into this. He was told, for the record

since he obviously understood the implications, I could promise

nothing since any discussion about the rocall telegram and any

other source would mean opening to hin full information about any

souice since evoryone, including the FBI, knew he would never he

satisfied with partial limited information. He laughingly agreed

he would press for full information but did concode he night

(temporarily?) sottle for less than the full source information

if the context of the information about NOSENKO was complete and

he could understand the significance of the source's position, ete.

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I said we would think shout what could he done but that optimism

was not in order.

57. NOSENKO Statement Condemnine Soviet Regime

ANATOLE outlined the steps to be taken to obtain from

NOSENKO a

statement which in its ultimate written form may serve

both as a control and a propaganda instrument. ANATOLY believes

that leading NOSENKO to a final absolute written and documented

statement against the Soviets will not only permit us to judge

NOSENKO more accurately by observing his reactions but also

provide additional psychological pressure useful in the final

stages of dealing with NOSENKO when we confront him with the

evidence we know he was on a mission. ANATOLE believes the

final denunciatory statement may help tip the balance in gaining

NOSENKO's cooperation/ confession.

The steps to be taken are as follows:

A. Elicit from NOSENKO statoments as detailed and

specific as possible condemning the Soviet regime, the KGB, the

party, individuals, etc. This should be at a fast tempo. (This

can begin innediately.)

B. After reviewing these statements elicit from

NOSENKO incroasingly detailed condemnatory statements by having

him add details about persons and activities.

C. Concurrent with 37A above NOSENKO should be asked

to enumerate in detail each example of those things he did, saw

or heard about which brought him to the point of defection. If

he ones not mention the

4rp then at later

stage in the

elicitation procoss he

erie presses for reasona he dislikes

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the KoB. He should he lod to make statements about repugnant

KGB techniques such as blacknail, botero-sexual and homosexual

ontrapments against diplonats, tourists, preminent Western

scientists, etc. He should he led to express his disgust at

every stage about the intimidation practiced and should include

Russian youth and the spying on Intcllectuals.

D. After NOSENKO has enumerated and elaborated his

denunciation and condemnation of the soviets, orally and at

length he should be asked to write in his ewn words a statement

which he will agree can be published. He should be asked at

this point, although it nay he necessary to ask him carlier, if

he is prepared to

make an official statement condemning the

Soviet regine and specific people. He will he told that with

his cooperation we want to expose the soviet regine on the basis

of real knowlodge. This first statement will be revised by us

to include specifics and which will include statements such as

"I condemn SHELEPIN, GRIBANOV, etc. for - D - --"; "I condemn

, GRIBANOV for forcing me to engage in reprehensible homosexual

entrapments - - "; "I condemn a systen which deals in misinformation

and confusion such as that led by AGAYANTS - - ".

E.

At a later stage after review of his other

statenents about personnel, the kob organization, etc; as follow-

up he should in interview only detail what steps were taken to

counteract the damoge from MOLITZYN's defection and the KeR

reorganization. He should list all personnel structural and

720MC1

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particularly the functional changes

in the KGB. He should be

asked the speclfic question of when was a conference hold to

consider the

impact of GOLITZYN's knowledge about tourists and

the loss of documents. He should relate this to the 1961 Tourist

Conference he says was scheduled.

F. The final written condematory statement will he

considered for publication with or without NOSENKO's approval or

agreement. The statement should he a key elment in assessing

his reaction at the point where his confession/cooperation is

solicited and he is told it will be published.

38. NOSENKO'S."

"SAStIA. Case

There was little discussion of this excent to consider

need to review more and consider this a topic for later questioning.

30. PREISFREUND

ANATOLE considers this a topic worth more study and

review on the basis that something may have been overlooked

which relates to misinformation ahout the American Enbassy.or

American personnel. We should not consider this case closed and

more research is needed.

(ANATOLE sees no relevancy to the questions re GOLITZYN

If we have some operationally significant angle he can approve

questions but he sees none - he finds this unnecessary and question

15 especially unnecessary. ANATOLE

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ANATOLE

pointed out the

ic and only question with

espect to NOSENKO

is misinfornation

and he sees no advantage or assistance

resulting from questions about GOLITZY!. However, he said this

was not his decision. He was told the paper about the GOLITZYN

question was prepared by a researcher who works exclusively

at this time on the 1967-1968 materials and the researcher

responded to a general requirement to extract information and

frame questions to be asked of NOSENKO which could be tested

against known information. The researcher obviously believes

that if NOSENKO were to make a false or misleading statement

which GOLITZYN has or could deny or prove wrong NOSENKO would

be in a bind. ANATOLE was also told he must understand that

• compartmentation in research and on NOSENKO as well as on

larger issues

means that we will review a few papers which are

useless in the larger context eventhough to the researcher who

has a narrow view the concern is real.)

40.

Gennadiy Ivanovich GRYAZNOV.

ANATOLE's reaction to the questions and paper was that they

will not accomplish much of significance re GRYAZNOV since he

thinks there is a GRYAZNOV relationship to the code clerk cases

which can only be astermined after that research and analysis

of infornation about GRYAZNOV. He agreed the questions could

be used later during elicitation as time fillers and preliminary

to hard questions but not much will come because the questions

are not to the point, which he did not explain fully.

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ANATOLE did specifically challenge NOSENKD's story of his

close relationship with GRYAZNOV as a lie. ANATOLE notes the

possibility there was leakage of his identification to the FBI

and CIA of GRYAZNOV as a source. Particularly ANATOLE SayS

NOSENKO's story of a close rolationship with GRYAZNOV in 1962

is probably false because there was no previous relationship

Icading to this. ANATOLE said definitely that GRYAZNOV would

have been punished if the KGR knew he was identified as a source

to GOLITZYN.

ANATOLE says there is a contradiction with NOSENKO trying.

to build up his relationshin with GRYAZNOV and down-play or,

more accurately minimize, the extent of his relations with

CHURANOV and GUK. ANATOLE believes it was a deliberate part

of NOSENKO's legend to set him close to GRYAZNOV since GRYAZNOV

was an acknowledged source of some of COLITZYN's information.

The NOSENKO-GRYAZNOV relationship will be a key element in

future questioning.

A. "Comment on NOSENKO Family Relations" was a paper in

which ANATOLE found little of importance or significance as a

crucial point except that as the discussions progressed he de-

veloped the idea that the 1945-50 period may be crucial after

211. AYATOLE sees little question about most of his life and

specifically ANATOLE says the homosexual question is not. "ir.

line with availahle cvidence"

• ANATOLE thought these questions

would give NOSENSO the impression we are 'unprofessional" but

ALONE

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immediately conceded this is really not à problem since NOSENKO

has not been handled very professionally in the past.

...

B. .

"NOSENKO - Homosexual Aspects"

ANATOLE questions any assumption that NOSENKO had any

"expertise" on homo operations. He just does not think NOSENKO

was an "expert" or a

"specialist" and points out he can run

them at level he has described with very little knowledge.

ANATOLE says he knows NOSENKO was not a homosexual before and

doubts he would have been consulted by anyone as a "specialist".

In view basic doubts if any questions to be used should be

woven into other topics and not treated as separate subject.

41. RUMYANTSEV

After reading the paper ANATOLE said there is nothing

to ask NOSENKO at this time. ANATOLE naintains this will be a

special question later. ANATOLE directly relates the RUMYANTSEV

case to what he considers was the serious mistake of asking

NOSENKO about the May 1959 conference. (See N-228) He also

thinks further questions on the conference should only come •

later.

ANATOLE saw clearly why no questions should have been

asked about RUMYANTSEV and May 59 Conference but after mistake

made it may be we will want to adjust and consider what we might

gain by sone questions during elicitation or if touching on this

SEOn

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point will upset the phasing of questions to NOSENKO. This

matter will be discussed further after ANATOLE reads the papers

carefully. ANATOLE was told it will be clear to him that the

May 59 meeting was known through GOLIENEWSKI and there was

some indication

from this source also of wide scale misinfor-

mation programs. It was also noted that in my opinion the

questions for NOSENKO, even with hindsight and my knowledge of

how seriously GOLITZYN's information about this conference has

been viewed, were normal intelligence officer questions which

NOSENKO could expect based on the overt information made available.

Certainly the questions were not unusual except for the fact

that they indeed were different from other questions asked of

NOSENKO because they touched on political matters. To the extent

that N-228 showed NOSENKO someone at a late date was interested

• in political matters NOSENKO may have been alerted. Certainly it

would seen those questions were completely out of context :

out of the blue so to speak - and since there was no follow-up

NOSENKO may feel there

is no real interest because there

has

been no real interest in matters political with him.

A. "NOSENKO - Use of Alias by KGB Officers"

ANATOLE commented these were very good questions. They

could be asked during elicitation or later during the crucial

or hard questioning phase when we were assured of fast follow-up

questioning.

B. "NOSENKO - Knowledge Because of Association with other

KBS Officers".

ANATOLE thought this was excellent approach.

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comnented in connection with paras 9 and ll and using this paper

stressed need to elicit all possible from NOSENKO orally during

interview and no written memorandum.. ANATOLE outlined need for

NOSENKO to list exact dates of all his service assignments;

when he first met each officer; detailed biography of each

officer, etc. He retained without comment the 28 March 1969

addendun te RAKOVSKIY, KUTYREV, and SUROV.

42. Nikolay S. SKVORTSOV and Vladimir Vasilyevich KRIVOSHEY

ANATOLE, as with these officers, separately lists KGB

officers of special significance as part of the enumeration of

CRUCIAL QUESTIONS because they are not only prominent in

NOSENKO's story but also of major concern to us since they work

against Americans.

They are important even without NOSENKO.

In most instances also there will be the initial new elicitation

about them from NOSENKO. Then NOSENKO's previous information

will be collated and compared with collateral infornation,

including previous information from GOLITZYN, after which ANATOLE

will review, comment with new information, if any, and frane

pertinent questions for NOSENKO. Specifically ANATOLE says

that NOSENKO's statement he consulted SKVORTSOV about tourist

operations 1955-59 is nonsense. SKVORISOV was in Germany until

1959.

NOSENKO should be asked what kind of tourist operations,

etc.

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43.

Nikolay Grigoryevich BAGRICHEV

44. GRIBANOV (GORBUNOV)

ANATOLE stresses the importance of collating all

information about the activitios of GRIBANOV and separate the

sourcing.

45. NOSENKO-Asen GEORGIEV Case

ANATOLE believes these questions useful now in

elicitation phase. He wants to review everything NOSENKO has

said about Anatoliy S. KOZLOV and view any photos. I could

not confirm that KOZLOV had participated in the

case.:

ANATOLE asks if we can confirm KOZLOV was Chief of the American

Section when NOSENKO left the Section in 1955 and what NOSENKO

said about

early relations including precise dates when NOSENKO

says KOZLOV was his boss. In this connection it is noted that

NOSENKO says KOZLOV was Chief of Dept I (Page 1 of paper) then

Deputy Chief of Dept 7. (page 4). ANATOLE says as elicitation

question NOSENKO should be asked why the demotion and also what

happened to GORBATENKO.

Not unexpectedly, ANATOLE said he would eventually

want to see the file on the GEORGIEV case to see what the

tio-in to the Soviets may have been.

16. Vladinir Lovich ARTEMOV

ANATOLE would like photograph and travel record for

ARTEMOV.

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47. Mikhail Stepanovich BANNIKOV

ANATOLE wants background info and photo.

48. Fedor Alekseyevich SHCHERBAK

See 47

19. ENU GOLOVKOV.

A. Nikolay Dmitrievich ARKHIPOV

ANATOLE wants background and photograph. ANATOLE

thinks questions re Egil SUNDAR needed and that NOSENKO should

fully explain how and why he became involved with a journalist

and what kind of an agent was SUNDAR and his background, etc.

SUNDAR's targets should be described fully and NOStRO should

explain the relevancy of this to tourist operations.

B. ANATOLE asked about the Arsene FRIPPEL Case but I

could not answer with complete assurance the details of his

recruitment, admissions, identifications, etc. ANATOLE was told,

however, everyone satisfied about this apparently but would check.

• C. ANATOLE suggests full exploration with NOSENKO to

get his explanation for the use of the technicians IVANOV, SERGEY,

and LEBEDEV, Lev A, in the recruitment of the British tourist

Eric LUKIS? Is there a relationship to the Johnson case.

50. Ivan Alekseyevich YEROFEYEV

ANATOLE wants photo and travel record.

1. In connection with this also, ANATOLE requested

a list of all CIA personnel in contact with Soviets in Berlin.

(Page 2) He said he had originally or carlier asked for this

SOROST

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several times and he rclated this request to the larger question

of his analysis which he raised with Mr. Solie and which has

gone unanswered - he asked for and wants a list of all CIA

people in overt contact with Soviets world-wide. My only comment

was to the point that compilation of such lists was difficult

if not impossible.

51. Ivan Abramovich PANASENKO

See 50.

52. PIVNEV

ANATOLE says this topic is definitely a confrontation

topic:

Specifically he noted para 7 in this connection.

ANATOLE says he needs the substance of the follow-up

and results of the

case to frame questions re PIVNEV

but he also makes the point he considers the e

case

important separately from considerations of NOSENKO. He recalled:

Mr. O'NEAL was to review the file with him and arrange interview

of

but he has heard nothing. On the basis of short

discussion ANATOLE believes there are unexplored aspects to this

case and parallels with the RUMYANTSEV case as far as NOSENKO

is concerned which may go to penetration in the AM ENB, Moscow

or even to Germany. The timing is important.

A. Aleksandr Konstantinovich KISLOV

ANATOLE relates interest in KISLOV to KOVSHUK as well

as to-the BELITSKIY case to begin in overall elicitation about

Kos officers. lie wants to lovien

the FBI information about

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KISLOV's U.S. activities and surveillance reports of his

association with KOVSHUK. All the questions re KISLOV should

be used in elicitation.

B. In connection with NOSENKO's stories about his status

and cover in Geneva in 1962 and 1964, ANATOLE would like to

review all verified info against NOSENKO's statements. for

example was his diplomatic passport verified, etc.

C. ANATOLE would like to review the lists of other members

of the delegations of which he was a member as well as the

lists of other delegations there at the same time.

(SM NOTE: Check N-127, page 7 - he could take orders of

Chairman on POPOV case. Compare with other info re POPOV case

from NOSENKO, Why would behave orders on POPOV case in his

safe in 1964? The order was put out in 1959 (585602 NOSENKO

would know this in 1962 - immediately after American Section duty.:

He would have it of access to it but why as late as 1964 in

ourist.bepta

D. After considerable reflection ANATOLE thinks it is quito

possible that NOSENKO hold the rank of It. Col. but that when he

saw he was suspect on the rank issue because his actual history

and his assignments as he described them did not warrant the

Lt. Col. rank wiesenssed

mas to cover his dispatch/mission

and the reward he received he decided to agree and downplay his

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importance. He had to accede to his interviewers to avoid more

questions about why and how he became a It. Col. ANATOLE

thinks he may have been rewarded (promoted) quietly with only

a very few persons knowledgable. (SM NOTE: Check all reports.)

ANATOLE suggests this question for polygraph: "Did the

travel document you brought reflect your true rank on the basis

of your success and achievements of your game with AIS which

began in June 1962 in Geneva?

In this connection also ANATOLE points to two promotions

in one year (1962) (See N-181 pg 27): Chief of Section then

Deputy Chief of Department. How has NOSENKO explained this

when he was not in his first job even three nonths and he had

no major successes in Geneva (except contact with CIA?) - What

wore the cases he handled and the recruitments he made in 1962?

53. American Ambassadors

ANATOLE believes at a later date NOSENKO should be

asked or confronted about operations against American Ambassadors.

However, as an olicitation question ANATOLE thinks he

should be asked if he knew of any Anerican Ambassador who was

recruited at any time by SCD?

Later, under the hostile interrogation he would be

asked if he knew about an important high level SCD American

agent who was rocontacted and reactivated when he visited Moscow

in 1959. Other questions to follow fron the team of interrogators

such as who did or would have handled this agent, etc.

SECRET

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SaTE

54.

Yuriy GUK's Agent in Washington

ANATOLE thinks this case needs attention again even

though it may not bear on the NOSENKO case. He says it needs

analysis and future research on the basis of what action the

FBI took. If there is something pertinent to NOSENKO we can

consider for later use.

55. Yuriy Vasilyevich KROTKOV

ANATOLE says we should extract and review what

NOSENKO has said about KROTKOV and line out the parallels

in the info. ANATOLE notes KROTKOV - Oct 1963; Cherepanov -

Nov 1963 and NOSENKO - Jan 1964, and he thinks we need to frame

questions to include KROTKOV in our considerations. He recalls

KROTKOV promised an expose of the KGB and this never canèe

about.

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CORRECTION AND AMENDMENT TO PARA 35/PAGE 28 of

ATTACHMENT B TO MEMO FOR THE RECORD DATED 7 APRIL 1969,

SUBJECT: ANATOLE RE NOSENKO:

2

- 11 Jan 64

GRIBANOV applied for Austrian, French,

(8 Jan) and Swiss visas.

18 Jan

NOSENKO arrives in Geneva from Paris.

19 Jan

Mikhail S. ROGOV arrives Switzerland.

24

25 Jan

ROGOV registered Hotel Regina, Bern

25 -

28 Jan

ROGOV registered Hotel Krebs, Bern

28 Jan

ROGOV to Rome

5 Jan - 3 Feb

4 Feb

4 Feb

GRIBANOV, FEDORENKO, KURISHEV and NOVIK at

Winter Olympics, Innsbruck.

GRIBANOr in Vienna

NOSENKO defects

6 Feb

Soviet Ambassador advises Chief, Soviet Delegation

Disarmanent Conference NOSENKO disappeared 4 Feb.

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7 Feb

GRIBANOV arrives Paris. KOVSHUK was in Paris.

8 Feb

Soviet official in Geneva reports to Swiss

police NOSENKO missing.

8 Feb

ROGOV returned to Bern

9 Feb

Radio news in Switzerland attributed Swiss

and Soviet sources said NOSENKO presumably had

defected.

10

Feb

GRIBANOV left Paris for Vienna, BUSCHEK claims

to have seen him 10 Feb.

12 Feb

TSARAPKIN, not Soviet Ambassador to Switzerland,

holds conference condemning Swiss for permitting

NOSENKO's kidnapping. Swiss called Soviet

Ambassador Bern and strongly protested

TSARAPUIN action.

14 Feb

GRIBANOV dinner party with BUSCHEK at which

GRIBANOV not unduly disturbed about NOSENKO.

14 Feb

18 Fal

ROGOV departed Switzerland via Austria.

Konsick Left Paris as membion

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