MEMORANDUM: GOLITSYN'S COMMENTS ON THE NOSENKO CASE
Agency: CIA
Originator: CIA
From: CHIEF, CI STAFF
To: MURPHY, CHIEF, SR DIVISION
Document date: 8/5/64
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

## Page 1

Date:

02/13/01

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JEK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

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AGENCY INFORMATION

Released under the John F.

kennedy Assassination Records

Collection Act of 1992 144 USc

Case#: NT 53216

Date: 06-14-2017

AGENCY :

CIA

RECORD NUMBER

: 104-10534-10085

RECORD SERIES

: JFK

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

: NOSENKO RECORDS

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR

FROM

MURPHY. CHIEF, SR DIVISION

TO : CHIEF, CI STAFF

TITLE

: MEMORANDUM: GOLITSYN'S COMMENTS ON THE NOSENKO CASE

DATE

08/05/64

PAGES

: 15

SUBJECTS : NOSENKO

GOLITSYN

NBR

CLASSIFNCATION PACEE, TEXTUAL, DOCUMENT

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RHAL

I ONLY

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CONr!.

_NTIAL

SECRET

SUBJECT: (Optionol)

FROM:

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

Chief, SR Division

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and

building)

5 August 1954

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

FFICEI

TITIA

C/CI

# AUG 1961

SECRET

EYES ONLY - BY HAND

2.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

PREVIOUS

SECRET

DIE GE7!

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5 Mugust 1964

NEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT:

Chief, CI Staff

GOLITSYN's comments on the

NOSENKO Case

Introduction and General Assessment

1.

In reviewing the value and validity of GOLITSYN's

comments on the NOSENko case, it must be borne in mind

that

although his current comments do not provide much

that is new GOLITSYN himself has always been a key to our

understanding of the NOSENKO case. In 1962 NOSENKO's in-

formation was closely keyed to what we could presume to be

a KGB damage assessment of GOLITSYN's defection, a fact

which we only noticed on comparison of NOSENKO's informa-

tion with GOLITSYN'Sip" enabled

sinilarly, what SOLiTSIN had tol

us about Department

us to see how such a hich-

level provocation could be run.

Furthermore, his most

recent comments do in fact provide useful support to our

analysis which had already been completed.

We do need now

to assess how much GOLITSYN may be

in a position to help

in our assessment and future handling of NOSENKO and other

ramifications of this KGB provocation.

His value and future

contribution can be assessed on several levels:

a .

contribute?

How much new hard information can he

b.

How much new insight can he provide us

through his own knowledge of KGB procedures and

personnel applied to the materials of this case?

How much guidance can he provide in our

future manipulation of these operations and in

breaking

KROTKOV and NOSENKO?

2.

Point "a" is discussed in paragraph 5 below.

While

are several

useful

total of new hard facts

is not great.

on point "be his insight, as reflected in his

oral. comments and

analysis

, is disappointing as one would

expected him

a more penetrating analysis

than that which we completed carliei.

And in point "c"

he himself admits to having no idea about how to break

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NOSENKO and kRotkoV, other than to point out that it will

be most difficult, that we need to do some nore groundwork

and proparation before proceeding to an active attempt to

do so (including perhaps uncovering a penetration of the

U. S. Embassy, Moscow tirst), and that we should use well

qualified interrogators.

3.

We are faced at this point with

the eminently con-

plicated task of breaking NOSENKO.

(while preparing to do

so we are keeping him productive and

examining the ramifi-

cations of the operation.) Our great need now is for hard,

incontrovertible facts with which we can confront NOSENKO,

based on

something more than

now evidently thinks it is.

For this, our only immediate

asset is GOLITSYN, who looms so importantly as a factor in

this operation.

We therefore hope, despite GOLITSYN's

relative lack

of contribution thus

far, to exhaust all pos-

sibilities and get from him every possible detail.

Therefore,

there are many loose ends and unclear bits from his

29 June report, ve are preparing followup questions for

GOLITSYN which might assist our

task. Sone of these questions

are

attached hereto as Attachment A.

GOLITSYN's principal report on the NOSENKO case was

contained in the

oral presentation of 28 June 1964.

background

for his study of the case, GOLITSYN was given a

wide range of materials on NOSENKO including 113 pages of

responses to specific questions GOLITSYN wanted put to

(see attachment B for a listing of all materials

pertaining to NOSENKO which were shown to GOLITSYN).

addition, GOLITSYN was given the CHEREPANOV papers with

supporting documentation, as well as the KROTKOV case and

manuscript, the BELIISKIY, the UNACUTE and POPOV cases.

• this was nearly everything available to us in

our analysis of 25 March, li May and 8 July, with the ex-

ception of the SCOTCH case.

What GOLITSYN said

Statements of fact: What GOLITSYN could contribute

in the form of personal knowledge,

as against supposition,

summarized in the subparagraphs below.

Comments on each

point are

appended where appropriate.

Several of these

points are of real assistance,

but certain aspects of their

content or presentation weakens their impact or opens them

and

the source's accuracy to some question.

..*•

.:.

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This man is the person he says he is,

Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO, the son of

former Minister

NoseNko, and he really was a KOB officer.

Connents:

(1) COLITSYN knows this because he says

he knew NOSENKO personally, having met him two

or three times in II/1/1 in

1953 when GOLITSYN

was there on other business.

GOLITSYN also met

NOSENKO occasionally at work in 1958-1959.

In

1959, GOLITSYN asked NOSENKO where he worked,

and

NOSENKO said in the Tourist Department.

GOLITSYN asked him about CHURANOV.

in addition,

NOSENKO and GOLITSYN know one another indirectly

through their coinmon friends CHURANOV, GUK,

KASHEYEV, etc.

(2) NOSENKO, however, could not identify

the photo of GOLITSYN and, when told who it was,

repeated his earlier statements that he had

never met GOLITSYN and would of course remember

it he had.

He had once been shown a group photo

of him.

(It is difficult to see why NOSENKO

vould lie about this, since we clearly could

check through GOLITSYN and a contrary statement

would throw immediate doubt on NOSENKO's bona

fides, and there would apparently be nothing

him to lose merely admitting it.

for

This raises the

question

of why GOLITSYN might lie about this

point, similarly not very easy to answer.)

b.

NOSENKO served in II/1/1 from 1953 until 1957

or

1958, and was specitically responsible during the

period 1953-54 for American military personnel in the

Embassy

In 1955-57-58 he may have had the same

responsibilities, or may have been working against

other Embassy personnel or correspondents, but was

definitely in II/1/1.

Comments:

(1)

NOSENKO says he was in I1/1/1, working

first against correspondents and then against

military personnel, froil March 1953 until nid-1955,

and claims then to

have transferred to the 7th

SAd 090

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(Tourist) Departinent of the Second Chief

Directorate (II/7).

(2)

In our own

analysis of NOSENKO's

story (11 May report) we had expressed doubts

that NOSENKO actually even served in the Ameri-

can bepartment at all, since he was so vague

about details he should have known, since he

was suspiciously self-contradictory about when

a complete fabrication.

NOSENKO served from 1957 or 1958 in the

Tourist Department (I1/1), where in 1959 he was a

senior case officer.

Comments:

(1)

As noted above, this contradicts

NOSENKO's story of having made this transfer

In mid-1955, thus creating a period of two to

three years which NOSENKO's legend is trying

to cover up.

This suggests to GOLITSYN that

there was some success in the Embassy during

this period, which is supported by other ob-

servations (see below).

(2)

There is reason to doubt the validity

Of GOLITSYN's statement, since NOSENKO iS in-

dependently known to have been involved in at

least one, and perhaps two, strictly tourist-

type operations involving U. S. citizens in the

period 1956-1958.

One was Richard BURGI, whom

NOSENKO recruited in June 1956 in the company of

Anatoliy KOZLOV, Chiet of 11/?, who has contirmec

NOSENKO's story

and identified his picture.

There was possibly one other American, Gisella

in 1957 (she tentatively but uncertainly

identified his photo) and he claims to have worked

on three foreigners, one of whom, Sir Alan Lane,

vostlso, has confirned the story and recognized

The two others (Hans GERKENS,

a German

and fnu SUENDER, a Norwegian) have not

yet been

icentified.

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5

(3)

however,

Supporting GOLITSYN's statement,

the following points:

(a) DERIABIN considers it quite

possible that an American Department man

might be used in a Tourist Department opera-

tion,

if he had qualifications needed and

others were not available at the time.

There is an outside chance that this is

what happened here.

(b) In the 1962 meetings with CIA,

NOSENKO claimed to have personally par-

ticipated in the recruitment operation in

1956 against U. S. Embassy security officer,

Edward Smith.

Then confronted in 1964 with

this carlier statement, NOSENKO vigorously

denied it. His earlier claim could thus

or perhaps merely a gratui-

tous boast (paralleling his 1962 claim

to

have been involved in the October 1959

attempt against Russ Langelle).

(c) NOSENKO has reported personal par-

ticipation in only a few checkable tourist-

line activities during

lthough his year 1959 is replete with them.

almost all confirmed independently.

(d) The only other independently known

activity of NOSENKO during this period was

two trips to

England in August 1957 and

October 1958. These, he claims, were merely

to serve as watchdog for two soviet sporting

groups (and to give him some flavor of the

West).

They could presunably have taken him

from II/1 just as well as from II/7.

NOSENKO did not work in II/l at any time in

1960,

and therefore it is unthinkable that he was there

for the one year 1901 either.

Conments:

(1)

in

11 May report.

This confirms our finding, as reported

(2)

GOLITSY elains to know this because he tias

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aware in detail of who served in II/1/1 until

his departure for Helsinki in

July 1960, and

because

he visited Moscow and I1/1 in December

1960 and talked with the then head of 11/1/1,

He would have known tt nostnko were

section then at all, much less as deputy

However:

- NOSENKO was away in Cuba until 13

December 1960 and thus may not have

been there at the time. Nonetheless,

the fact that he had become Deputy

would presumably have come out of

COLITSYN's talks with KOVSiuk, anyway.

- GOLITSYN had earlier said that PETROV

was chief of 1I/1/1, GRYAZNOV the deputy.

Insofar as SR records show, GOLITSYN had

never named KOVSHUK

in this position, as

far as we know, until he saw the NOSENKO

materials.

KOVSHUK was, of course, named

by GOLITSYN many times

as an active case

officer in II/1/1.

e .

Contrary to NOSENKO's statement that GORBATENKO

remained

as chief of II/1 until 1959,

GOLITSYN knew that

GORBATENKO was sent as senior KGB advisor to Hungary

shortly after

the Hungarian Revolution, probably about

January

1957.

Comments:

(1) Since this is a high-powered job and

well have been given

represented a promotion, ORBATENKO hinks it may

a result of

success in operations against the American Embassy,

specifically a recruitment.

GOLITSYN thinks NOSENKC

may be covering

this up by changing the dates of

GORBATENKO's transfer,

and associates this with

KOVSHUK's trip to the

U. S. in carly 1957, pre-

sumably to follow up or complete a lioscow Embassy

recruitnent (about which trip NOSENKO alSO "ANDREY"

linking it to the

apparent can on so is laely, especially

"ANDREY" left Moscow in the spring of 1954).

..:

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Since the period involved here is the same

one GOLITSYN thinks NOSENKO is covering up in

his

be

own biography (1955-57), this might indeed

clue

to an important penetration.

from

(2) We are examining U. S. Embassy departees

Moscow during 1956, and

are preparine a paper

presentine the circumstances of one possible

theory.

have the woman trouble

"recalls" that this took place

Department to the Tourist Department.

arred ourist Depare sensitive American

Comment:

GOLITSYN also said that the events

"must have happened" after NOSENKO became a. CP

nember (In 1956-57), suggesting GOLITSYN is

stating a fact

but making a supposition.

It is not clear, in fact,

whether GOLITSYN

knows or supposes that this caused NOSENKO'S

transfer out of 11/1 into 11/7.

g.

The post of Assistant Section Chief -- which

GOLITSYN says NOSENKO claimed to occupy in 1960-62

was abolished in 1959, those holding this title being

made senior case officers.

Note:

GOLITSYN is apparently confusing

POMNACI (Assistant to the Chief)

with ZAMNACH (Deputy Chief).

NOSENKO also reported that Ponnaches

were abolished and made senior case

officers, while Zamnaches continue to

this day. GOLITSYN must also believe

this, since he has reported GRYAZNOV

as Zannach I1/1/1.

Statements of opinion:

In addition to the opinions

aspects of this case. by and large, these merely

provide

additional support for opinions already presented

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in our earlier reports on this operation. GOLITSYN concluded

without doubt that NOSENKO is a KGB provocateur, that the

operation could only have been run with KHRUSHCHEV's personal

approval, and that it is designed

anong other things to hide

various penetrations, one perhaps related to the POPOV con-

promise

and some of them

threatened by leads provided by

GOLITSYN

He considered that the NOSENKO operation is being

run in close coordination with the KROTkOV and CHEREPANOV

provocations, and that in order to carry out his mission

properly NOSENKO must know many of the significant truths

the KGB

is trying to hide or protect.

no reprodethe do betieves that nuch

to Western

Since all of this has already been

dealt with in detail in our earlier analysis, it is not re-

peated in the body of this memorandun.

David E

Chief, SR Division

Attachments

and B

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Questions for GOLITSYN based on 29 June Interview

What is your opinion of the general accuracy of what NOSENKO

has reported on KGB organization and personnel assignments?

(Aside fron ops and special incidents connected with provocation)

Any contradictions between your present knowledge and the

information

he provided re who was where when? (Aside from

GORBATENKO's departure date)

In your opinion, would the KGB give NOSENKO carte blanche to

tell the truth

re organization, personnel (including photo

idens) and procedures? Would it feel safe enough to permit

him to make major lies on this, especially general organization

(such as Sluzhba, Directorate of II, etc.)?

What are the specific points you think NOSENKO is lying about

re personnel?

You reported earlier that PETROV was chief of the Ist (Embassy)

Section of the American Department,

and GRIALNOV the deputy,

as of 1960.

•NOSENKO reports KOVSHUk had long been the chicf,

PETROV never had been, and GRYAZNOV only became deputy after

NOSENKO left in January 1962. How do you explain NOSENKO's

statement?

What is your opinion about the general information NOSENKO

gave on Tourist Department ops, i. e., the totals he reported

(about 34 tourist agency owners and employees, about 25 non-

American tourists recruited, and a few miscellaneous others),

plus about 19 American tourists - practically all already

identified, known or useless - and 5 American tourist company

personnel?

Do you know anything about the relative success in recruiting

tourists prior to 1961?

Any considered solid or important?

Did you have direct, earlier, knowledge of NOSENKO's career

and activity? Had you heard

about his trouble with women,

the flaple

reports

as having occurred in 1954?

(The trans-

cript leaves it unclear whether it was your belief that it

happened in 1957-58 or whether it was hard fact.)

Could you provide details of the approximate date, location,

circumstances under which you net NOSENKO cach time?

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Do you know for a fact (or did you hear from kGb personnel)

that NOSENKO entered the KGb in 1953?

Or 1s that merely

the first year you personally saw or heard about him?

Had

you ever heard of him before 1953?

Did you ever hear

anything about Nosenko's background other

neighbors?

as hard-cardboard covered, only about five inches wide by

eight high, and

about 20-25 pages long. Are all obzors

produced in this or other standard format?

You have reported that a

KGB officer named KOTOV, formerly

in Yugoslav ops in Austria, suspected POPOV

in 1958 to Germany on the POPOV investigation.

no KOTOV in Vienna in the period concerned. Did you mean

n the p

We know of

Mikhail ZHUKOV?

Another?

Could you give us more details

on KOTOV, such as full name, description, career?

Do you have any

knowledge of direct contact between NOSENKO

and PREISFREUND? NOSENKO claims not only to have been a

case officer for PREISFREUND, but to have been his close

friend,

even prior to the time you left Helsinki. Can you

comment?

What can you say about the selection of NOSENKO for the

trips to England in August 1957 and October 1958? Would

this be likely for

Tourist or American Departnent officer?

How about the Cuba trip, 1960, and Bulgaria 1961?

Why, in your opinion, might he have changed his "traveling"

name from Nikolayev, which he used in England trips, to

NOSENKO,. "Vich he used for Cuba trip

for application

earlier in

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Materials made available to GOLITSYN listed in chronological

order of passing

to COLITSYN, with dates passed.

Copies of first four substantive cables fron Geneva

relating circumstances of his contact with us in June

1962, including first meeting with mark and trist

BAGLEY. (2 March 1964)

2. Copies of transcripts of all neetings between CIA and

NOSENKO in 1962 (3 March 1964)

3. Copies of all transcripts of Geneva meetings, January-

February 1964. (All passed to GOLITSYN by 13 March 1964)

4.

Report of biographic information provided prior to hostile

interrogation. (17 April 1964)

5. Final chronology, with our notations, of NOSENKO's life

and KGB career, prepared after hostile interrogation.

(Attachment A to 11 May 1964 report) (Passed 11 May 1964)

6. Copy of NOSENKO's handwritten notes

and documents he

brought out with him

in

1964. (Passed in mid-April)

7. Resume of first week's hostile interrogation.

8. NOSENKO's comments on KROTKOV's manuscript "Fear".

(Passed in mid-April)

9. Complete collection of photo identifications made by

NOSENKO to date, with explanatory note re method of

notation.

10. Questions re NOSENKO for GOLITSYN (passed in mid-April).

Special questions passed on 15 June and 22 June.

11. CHEREPANOV papers. (22 April 1964)

12. Information on American personnel named in CHEREPANOV

papers and otherwise of interest re Moscow Embassy

security

' WINTERS, including his ops activity; BOWDEN;

LANGELLE; DIESERMAN; Edward SMITH; WASHENKO; Leonid GRAN).

4 May 1964.

13. List of questions KROTkOV suggested be put to NOSEKO

in order to confirn and clarity info given by KROTkov.

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1=-2

14.

Copies of two reports prepared on KGB audio technical

one prepared on basis of GOLITSYN infor-

matron in 1962, another based on NOSENKO information

1964.

15. KOZLOV case (AEFOSDICK) 4 May.

17. Transcripts and chronology with background sketch

on BELITSKIY.

18. File summary on FEDOROV aka RAZIN. (11 May and 12 June)

19. Charts re NOSENKO CI production (leaus). (11 May)

20. Chronologies on KOVSHUk, GUK, FOMIN and IVANOV.

21. Outline of information on KGB structure and personnel

assignments as reported by NOSENKO. (11 May)

22. ARTAMONOV case. (November 1963)

23. PENKOVSKIY case. (Noveinber 1963)

24. POPOV case. (November 1963)

25. Answers to special questions posed by GOLITSYN and asked

of NOSENKO in interrogations in May 1964.

Total 113

pages; all questions answered and passed by 12 June.

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11-

Date: 02/13/01

Page: 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CIA

RECORD NUMBER

: 104-10534-10085

RECORD SERIES

: JFK

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : NOSENKO RECORDS

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR :

FROM

:

TO :

TITLE

DATE

PAGES

:

:

SUBJECTS

DOCUMENT TYPE

CLASSIFICATION

RESTRICTIONS

CURRENT STATUS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW

OPENING CRITERIA

COMMENTS

:

:

:

:

CIA

MURPHY. CHIEF, SR DIVISION

CHIEF, CI STAFF

MEMORANDUM: GOLITSYN'S COMMENTS ON THE NOSENKO CASE

08/05/64

15

NOSENKO

GOLITSYN

NBR

PAPER,

TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

SECRET

POSTPONED IN FULL

02/02/01

JFK-M-24: F44 2001.02.02.11:12:30:820084: NOT BELIEVED

RELEVANT (NBR). EIGHT-PAGE MEMO PLUS ATTACHMENTS A AND B

PLUS ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET.

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ONCLAÏSIFIED

RNAL

ONLY

CONT

NTIAL

ROUTING. AND: RECORD SHEET

SECRET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

EXTENSION

FROM:

NO.

DATE

Chief, SR Division

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and

building)

1.

C/CI

2.

3.

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S

INITIALS

5 August 1964

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom

to whom.

Draw a line across column after each comment.)

$ AUE 1958

NO AUG 1964

SECRET EYES ONLY - DY HAND

7.

10

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

En t

IN 19216609C484175 SEGRETE

CONFIDENTIAL

INTERNAL

USE ONLY

UNCLASSIFIED

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5 August 1964

NEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT:

Chief, CI Staff

GOLITSYN's

NOSENKO Case

comments on the

Introduction and General Assessment

1.

In reviewing the value and validity of GOLITSYN's

comments on the NOSENKO case, it must be borne

in mind

that although his current comments do not provide much

that is new GOLITSYN himself has always been a key to our

understanding of the NOSENKO case. In 1962 NOSENKO's in-

formation was closely keyed to what we could

presume to be

a KGB damage assessment of GOLIISYN's defection, a fact

which we only noticed on comparison of NOSENKO's informa-

tion with GOLITSYN's.

Similarly, what GOLITSYN had told

us about Department "D" enabled

us to see how such a high-

level provocation could be run.

Furthermore, his most

comments do in fact provide useful support to our

analysis which had already been completed.

We do need now

to assess how much GOLITSYN may be

in a position to help

in our assessment and future handling of NOSENKO and other

ramifications of this KGB provocation.

His value and future

contribution can be assessed on several levels:

a.

contribute?

How much new hard information can he

How much new insight can he provide us

through his own knowledge at kEE procedures and

personnel applied to the materials of this case?

c. How much guidance can he provide in our

future manipulation of these

operations and in

breaking KROTKOV and NOSENKO?

2.

Point "a" is discussed in paragraph 5 below. While

there are several useful itens, the total of new hard tacts

is not great. On point "b", his insight, as reflected in his

oral comments and analysis, is disappointing as one would

have expected him to provide a more penetrating analysis

than

that which we completed carlier.

And in point

"c"

he himself admits to having no idea

about how to break

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NOSENKO and KROTKOV, other than to point out that it will

be most difficult, that we need to do some more groundwork

and preparation before proceeding to an active attempt to

do so (including perhaps uncovering a penetration of the

U. S. Embassy, Moscow first), and that we should use well

qualified interrogators.

We are faced at this point with the eminently con-

plicated task of breaking NOSENKO. (While preparing to do

so we are keeping him productive and examining the ramifi-

cations of

the operation.) Our great need now is for hard,

incontrovertible facts with which we can confront NoSENKO,

to prove to him that our conviction about his guilt is

based on something

more than analysis, which is what he

now evidently thinks it is.

For this, our only immediate

asset is GOLITSYN, who looms so importantly as a factor in

this operation.

We therefore hope, despite GOLITSYN's

•relative lack

of contribution thus far, to exhaust all pos-

sibilities and get from him every possible detail.

The refore,

since there are many loose ends and unclear bits

from his

29 June report, we

are preparing followup questions for

GOLITSYN

which might assist our task.

Some of these questions

are attached

hereto as Attachment A.

4.

GOLITSYN's principal report on the NOSENKO case was

contained in the oral presentation of 28 June 1964. As

background for his study of the case, GOLITSYN was given a

wide range of materials on NOSENKO including 113 pages of

responses to specific questions GOLITSYN wanted put to

NOSENKO (see attachment B for a listing of all materials

pertaining to NOSENKO which were shown to GOLITSYN).

addition, GOLlISIN was given the CHEREPANOV papers with

supporting documentation, as well as the KROTKOV case

July, with the ex-

ception of the scotch case.

What GOLITSYN said

5. Statements of fact: What GOLITSYN could contribute

in the form of personal knowledge, as against supposition,

is summarized in the subparagraphs below.

Comments on each

point are appended where appropriate.

Several of these

points are of real assistance, but certain aspects of their

content or presentation weakens their

impact or opens them

and the source's accuracy to some question.

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BIES

•-3-

This man is the person he says he is,

Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO, the son of former Minister

NOSENKO, and he really was a KGB officer.

Comments:

(1) COLITSYN knows this because he says

he knew

NOSENKO personally, having met him two

or three times in II/1/1 in 1953 when GOLITSYN

was there on other business.

GOLITSYN also met

NOSENKO occasionally at work in 1958-1959.

In

1959, GOLITSYN asked NOSENKO where he worked,

and NOSENKO said in the Tourist Department.

GOLITSYN asked him about CHURANOV.

In addition,

NOSENKO and GOLITSYN know one another indirectly

through their common friends CHURANOV, GUK,

KASHEYEV, etc.

(2) NOSENKO, however, could not identify

the photo of GOLITSYN and, when told who it was,

repeated his earlier statements that he had

never met GOLITSYN and would of course remember

if he had.

He had once been shown a group photo

of him.

(It is difficult to see why NOSENKO

would lie about this, since we clearly could

check

through GOLITSYN and a contrary statement

would throw immediate doubt on NOSENKO's bona

fides, and there would apparently be nothing for

him to lose merely admitting it.

This raises the

question of why GOLITSYN might lie about this

point, sinilarly not very easy to answer.)

NOSENKO served in II/1/1 from 1953 until 1957

or 1958, and was specifically responsible during the

period 1953-54 for American military personnel in the

In 1955-57-58 he may have had the same

insanstoilities, or may have been working against

other Embassy personnel or correspondents, but was

definitely in

II/1/1.

Comments:

(1)

NOSENKO says he was in II/1/1, working

first

against correspondents and then against

military personnel, from March 1953 until mid-1955,

and claims then to

have transferred to the 7th

3E7 •

BES ANY

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(Tourist) Department of the Second Chief

Directorate (II/7).

(2) In our own analysis of NOSENKO's

story (11 May report) we had expressed doubts

that NOSENKO actually even served in the Ameri-

can Department at all, since he was so vague

about details he should have known, since he

was suspiciously self-contradictory about. when

and since his later

periode in that department 196d since late

a complete fabrication.

c. NOSENKO served from 1957 or 1958 in the

Tourist Department (II/7), where in 1959 he was a

senior case officer.

Comments:

(1)

As noted above, this contradicts

NOSENKO's story of having made this transfer

in mid-1955, thus creating a period of two to

three

years

which NOSENKO's legend is trying

to cover up.

This suggests to GOLITSYN that

there was some success in the Embassy during

this period, which is supported by other ob-

servations (see below).

There is reason to doubt the validity

dependently known

least one, and perhaps two, strictly tourist-

type operations involving U. S. citizens in the

period 1956-1958.

One was Richard BURGI, whom

NOSENKO recruited in June 1956 in the company of

his picture.

Harris

in 1957 (she tentatively but uncertainly

identified his photo) and he claims to have worked

on three foreigners, one of whom, Sir Alan Lane,

British

VOSENKo? has confirmed the story and recognized

s photo.

The two others (Hans GERKENS,

a German and fnu SUENDER, a Norwegian) have not

vet been

identified.

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(3)

Supporting GOLITSYN's statement,

however, are the following points:

(a) DERIABIN considers it quite

possible

that an American Department man

might be used in a Tourist Department opera-

tion, if he had qualifications needed

and

others were not available at the time.

There is an outside chance that this is

what happened here.

(b) In the 1962 meetings with CIA,

NOSENKO claimed to have personally par-

ticipated in

the recruitment operation in

1956 against U. S. Embassy security officer,

Edward Smith.

When confronted in 1964 with

this carlier

statement, NOSENKO vigorously

denied it. His earlier claim could thus

have

been

a silp, or

perhaps merely a gratui-

tous boast

(paralleling his 1962 claim

to

have been involved in

the October 1959

attempt against Russ Langelle).

(c) NOSENKO has reported personal par-

ticipation in only a few checkable tourist-

line activities during the years 1955-58

although his year 1959 is replete with them,

almost all confirmed independently.

activity 5 arch 305

(d) The only other independently known

activity of NOSENKO during this period

was

two trips to England in August 1957 and

October 1958. These, he claims, were merely

West).

They could presumably have taken him

from

Il/1 just as well as from 1I/7.

d.

NOSENKO did not work in II/1 at any time in

1960,

for

106 and thorato too, at?

and therefore it is unthinkable that he was there

Comments:

(1)

in 11 Nay

This confirms our finding, as reported

report.

(2)

GOLITSYN claims to know this because he was

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aware in detail of who served in II/1/1 until

his departure for Helsinki in

July 1960, and

because he visited Moscow and II/1 in December

KOVSHUK.

in the

section then at all, much less as deputy

chief.

However:

- NOSENKO was away in Cuba until 13

December 1960 and thus may not have

been there at the time.

so cho

Nonetheless,

the fact that he had become Deputy

would presumably have come out of

GOLITSYN's talks with KOVSHUK, anyway.

- GOLITSYN had earlier said that PETROV

was chief of II/1/1, GRYAZNOV the deputy.

Insofar as SR records show, GOLITSYN had

never named KOVSHUK in this position, as

far as we know, until he saw the NOSENKO

materials.

KOVSHUK was, of course, named

by GOLITSYN many times as an active case .

officer in II /1/1.

e.

Contrary to NOSENKO's statement that GORBATENKO

remained as chief of II/1 until 1959, GOLITSYN knew that

GORBATENKO was sent as senior KGB advisor to Hungary

shortly after the Hungarian Revolution, probably about

January 1957.

Comments:

(1)

since this is a high-powered job and

represented a

promotion, GOLITSYN thinks it may

well have been given to GORBATENKO. as

a result of

success in operations against the American Embassy,

specifically a recruitment.

GOLITSYN

thinks NOSENKO

may be covering this up by changing the dates of

GORBATENKO's

transfer,

and associates this with

KOVSHUK's trip to the

U. S. in early 1957, pre-

sumably to follow up or complete a Moscow Embassy

recruitment (about which trio NOSENkO also

apparent disinformation, linking it to the

"ANDREY!

which we all agree is likely, especially

since

"aappey" left Moscow in the spring ot 1954).

?::"

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- 7-

Since the period involved here is the same

one GOLITSYN thinks NOSENKO is covering up in

his own

biography (1955-57), this might indeed

be a clue to an important penetration:

(2) We are examining U. S. Embassy departees

From Moscow during 1956, anc

are preparing a paper

presenting the circumstances of one possible

theory.

NOSENKO dia, in fact,

have the woman trouble

he claims, but GOLITSYN "recalls" that this took place

in 1957 or 1958, not in 1954, and this was the reasor

he

was transterred out of the more sensitive Americar

Department to the Tourist Department.

Comment:

(1)

GOLITSYN also said that the events

"must have happened" after NOSENKO became a CP

nember (In 1956-57), suggesting GOLlISIN IS

not stating a fact but making a

supposition.

It is not clear, in fact,

whether GOLITSYN

knows or supposes that this caused NOSENKO's

transfer out of II/1 into II/7.

The post of Assistant Section Chief -- which

GOLITSYN says NOSENKO claimed to occupy in 1960-62 --

was abolished in 1959, those

holding this title being

made senior case officers.

Note:

GOLITSYN is apparently confusing

POMNACH (Assistant to the Chief)

with ZAMNACH (Deputy Chief).

NOSENKO also

reported that Pomnaches

were abolished and made senior case

officers, while Zamnaches continue to

this day.

GOLITSYN must also believe

this, since he has reported GRYAZNOV

as Zannach I1/1/1.

Statements of opinion:

In addition to the opinions

connected with the facts summarized above, GuLlisin provide

I number of opinions, theories and suppositions on variou:

detailed

aspects of this case. By and large, these merely

provide additional support for opinions already presented

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- 8-

in our earlier reports on this operation. GOLITSYN concluded

without doubt that NOSENKO is a KGB provocateur, that the

operation could only have been run with KHRUSHCHEV's personal

approval, and that it is designed among other things to hide

various penetrations, one perhaps iclated to the popov

con-

promise, and

them threatened by leads provided by

GOLITSYN.

He considered that the NOSENKO operation is being

close coordination with the KROTKOV and CHEREPANOV

provocations, and that in order to carry out his mission

property

NOSENKO must know many of the significant truths

the KGB

is trying to hide or protect.

He believes that much

of what NOSENKO has said is keyed to KGB knowledge, rather

than supposition, about what GOLITSYN had reported

to Western

intelligence authorities.

Since all of this has already been

dealt with in

detail in our earlier analysis, it is not re-

peated in the body of this memorandun.

Attachments A and B

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20025У

Questions for GOLITSYN based on 29 June Interview

What is your opinion of the general accuracy of what NOSENKO

has reported on KGB organization and personnel assignments?

(Aside fron ops and special incidents connected with provocation)

Any contradictions between your present knowledge and the

information he provided re who was where when? (Aside from

GORBATENKO's departure date)

In your opinion, would the KGB give NOSENKO carte

• blanche to

tell the truth re organizould it ersonnel (including photo

idens) and procedures?

safe enough to permit

hin to make major lies on this, especially general organization

(such as Sluzhba, Directorate

of II,. etc.)?

What are the specific points you think NOSENKO is lying about

re personnel?

You reported earlier that PETROV was chief of the Ist (Embassy)

Section of

the American Department, and GRYAZNOV the deputy,

as of 1960. NOSENKO reports KOVSHUk had long been the chief,

PETROV never had been, and GRYAZNOV only became deputy after

NOSENKO left in January 1962. How do you explain NOSENKO's

statement?

What is your opinion about the general information NOSENKO

gave on Tourist Department ops, i. e., the totals he reported

(about 34 tourist agency owners and employees, about 25 non-

American tourists recruited, and

a few miscellaneous others),

olus about 19 American tourists - practically all already

identified, known of useless - and 5 American tourist company

personnel?

Do you know anything about the relative success in recruiting

tourists prior to 1961?

Any considered solid or important?

Did you have direct, earlier, knowledge of NOSENKO's career

and

activity? Had

you heard

about his trouble with women,

the flaple reports as having occurred in 1954?

(The trans-

cript leaves it unclear whether it was your belief that it

happened in 1957-58 or whether it was hard fact.)

Could you provide details of the approximate date, location,

circumstances under which you met NOSENKO each time?

-'

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Do you know for a fact (or did you hear from kGs personnel)

that NOSENKO entered the KGB in 1953?

Or is that merely

the first year you personally saw or heard about him?

Had

you ever heard of him before 1953?

Did you ever hear anything about Nosenko's background other

his father, 1. e.,

his GRU service, schooling (especially

Institute of Foreign Relations), residences (including dacha),

neighbors?

as hard-cardboard covered, only about five inches wide by

eight high, and about 20-25 pages long.) Are all obzors

produced in this or other standard format?

You have reported that a KGß officer named KOTOV, formerly

in Yugoslav ops in Austria, suspected POPOV and

was sent

in 1958 to Germany on the

POPOV investigation.

We know of

KOTOV in Vienna in the period concerned. Did you mean

Mikhail ZHUKOV? Another?

Could you give us more

details

on

KOTOV, such as full name, description, career.

Do you have any knowledge of direct contact between NOSENKO

and PREISFREUND? NOSENKO claims not only to have been a

case officer for PREISFREUND, but to have been his close

friend,

even prior to the time you left Helsinki. Can you

comment?

What can you say about the selection of NOSENKO for the

trips to England in August 1957 and October 1958? Would

this be likely for Tourist or American Departnent officer?

How about the Cuba trip, 1960, and Bulgaria 1961?

Why, in your opinion, might he have changed his "traveling"

name from Nikolayev, which he

used in England trips, to

NOSENKO, which

he used for Cuba trip and for application

earlier in 1960?

fac.."

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Materials made available to GOLITSYN listed in chronological

order of passing to COLITSYN, with dates passed.

1. Copies of first four substantive cables from Geneva

relating circumstances of his contact with us in June

1962, including first meeting with MARk and first

meeting with BAGLEY. (2 March 1964)

2. Copies of transcripts of all meetings between CIA and

NOSENKO in 1962 (3 March 1964)

3. Copies of all transcripts of Geneva meetings, January-

February 1964. (A11 passed to GOLITSYN by 13 March 1964)

4.

Report of biographic information provided prior to hostile

interrogation. (17 April 1964)

• 5. Final chronology, with our notations, of NOSENKO's life

and KGB career,

prepared after hostile interrogation.

(Attachment A to 11 May 1964 report) (Passed 11 May 1964)

6. Copy of NOSENKO's handwritten notes and documents he

brought out with him in 1964. (Passed in mid-April)

7. Resume of first week's hostile interrogation.

8. NOSENKO's comments

on KROTKOV's manuscript "Fear".

(Passed in mid-April)

9. Complete collection of photo identifications made by

NOSENKO to date, with explanatory note re method of

notation.

10. Questions re NOSENKO for GOLITSYN (passed in mid-April).

Special questions passed on 15 June and 22 June.

11. CHEREPANOV papers. (22 April 1964)

12.

Information on American personnel named in CHEREPANOV

papers and otherwise of interest re Moscow Embassy

security (WINTERS, including his ops activity; BOWDEN;

LANGELLE; LIEBERMAN; Edward SMITH; WASHENKO; Leonid GRAN) .

4 May 1964.

13. List of questions KROTKOV suggested be put to NOSENKO

in order to confirm and clarify info given by KROTKOV.

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14. Copies of two reports prepared on KGB audio technical

operations, one prepared on basis of GOLITSYN infor-

mation in 1962, another based on NOSENKO information

1964.

15. KOZLOV case (ALFOSDICK) 4 May.

17. Transcripts and chronology with background sketch

on BELITSKIY.

18. File summary on FEDOROV aka RAZIN. (11 May and 12 June)

19. Charts re NOSENKO CI production (leads). (11 May)

20. Chronologies on KOVSHUK, GUK, FOMIN and IVANOV.

21. Outline of information on KGB structure and personnel

assignments as reported by NOSENKO. (11 May)

22. ARTAMONOV case. (November 1963)

23. PENKOVSKIY case. (November 1963)

24. POPOV case. (November 1963)

25. Answers to special questions posed by GOLITSYN and asked

of NOSENKO in interrogations in May 1964.

Total 113

pages; all questions answered and passed by 12 June.

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