Originator: THE WHITE HOUSE
From: PRESIDENT KENNEDY
Document date: 3/9/61
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

## Page 1

Date

: 04/29/98

Page : 1

JEK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS

RECORD NUMBER

: 202-10002-10129

RECORDS SERIES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : NND 941071

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : THE WHITE HOUSE

FROM

PRESIDENT KENNEDY

TO

TITLE

DATE: 03/09/61

PAGES

SUBJECTS : CONCEPT FOR THE RECAPTURE OF THE PLAINE DES JARRES

LAOS - POLITICAL/MILITARY SITUATION *

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION

*TOP SECRET

RESTRICTIONS : 1C, 4

CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 04/07/98

OPENING CRITERIA

COMMENTS : NARA RG 218, BOX 6 Of 8.

Memo from the President re:

authorization granted at 9 March 1961 meeting.

Report

on the concept for the recapture of the Plaine des

Jarres

EXEMPT PER E.O. 13526

SEC 3.3(b)_ 5QxS

DATE EXEMPTED: MAR

2016

-- JS RE-REVIEW DATE: 31 DEL 2934

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

OKAY TO TIELEASE AS RESTETED W/CIA CONCURRANCE

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## Page 2

10P SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 9, 1961

199YAR 1O AM S 14

OFFICE OF THE

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

At a meeting in the Cabinet Room on March 9, 1961, on the

general subject of Southeast Asia, the President authorized the

following actions:

1.

An increase in MEOs from 3000 to 4000 by April 1. (CIA)

2.

CLA for CAT use.

Defense Department to supply 16 H-34 helicopters to

6(D(C)

[A]

3.

16 helicopter pilots.

Defense Department to select and sheep dip, with CIA

4.

More maintenance and base support personnel for

helicopters (300) (with consent of Thai government).

5. Defense Department to make available to CAT, appropriately

marked, 4 C-130s. (On Okinawa or Taiwan)

6. CIA to supply 4 C-130 crews. (U.S. civilian plus ChiNat.)

7. CIA to make available 1 C-47 and 3 DC-4s, with crews.

8.:

In case of urgent supply requirements, USAF aircraft may

resume delivery direct to Vientiane (C-130)•

6(UCe) + (4)

9.

Negotiate with Sarit for immediate availability of up to

4 105mm batteries (Thai soldiers, equipment, and supplies).

10.

PEO personnel will be augmented by approximately 100

officers and men, and the JUSMAAG personnel in Thailand by

approximately 100.

11.

(at Okinawa):

Defense to make available 8 B-26s, plus necessary spares

12. Defense Department to supply 16 sanitized B-26 crews to CLA.

TOP SECRET

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TOP

SECRET

6(1)(c)+(4)

[A]

6(D(c)

[A]

TOP SECRET

b. CAS stocks on Okinawa can be increased to support

such a force.

3. Air Support and Interdiction Operations:

a. It will be necessary to sustain combat air opera-

tions designed to:

(1) Interdict Pathet Lao lines of communication

(2) Destroy rebel supply dumps and installations

(3) Fragment

Pathet Lao concentrations.

Aircraft in the numbers

and types needed to make effective

delivery

and

achieve shock effect should be employed. They

should be armed with guns, rockets, bombs and napalm, as

required by the targets to be attacked.

b. There are nine armed I-6s (2/30 cal guns, 4/5"

rockets, 2/100 lb bombs) in the Laos inventory. Five

combat-ready Laotian pilots are available for current

operations; four qualified Thai pilots are on hand.

The

I-6, though slow and lightly armed, has a psychological

effect considerably greater than its destructive power.

It has value as a supplement to more powerful aircraft.

c. (1) It is estimated that sixteen

Sterile B-26s and

20 pilots are required to accomplish the missions en-

visaged in the attack on the Plaine des Jarres (PDJ).

(2) CIA has eight of these planes in Taiwan and the

USAF can

supply the additional eight, plus necessary

spares support, available in a period of 2-3 weeks.

(3) CIA has four currently qualified American pilots,

and it would require 3-4 weeks of training to provide

more civilian American pilots. Sixteen sanitized USAF

crews could be provided in 2-3 weeks. Volunteers from

the Chinese Nationalist Air Force (CNAF), Philippine Air

Force (PAF), and RTAF could not be trained in time: The

former

require 4-6 weeks

and the latter two, 6-8 weeks.

TOP SECRET

3

5

6

8

10

11

12

2: 3

-144.

15

16

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26

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TOP SECRET

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[A]

NOP

SECRE

TOP SECRET

ГА]

JES

6(1)(C)

Volunteers could be processed through

"Sheepdip" (sant-

tized and proper arrangements made in event of capture

or death). Sanitized USAP crews to man the four unmanned

CIA aircraft can be provided in about 10 days.

(4) CIA can support approximately four sorties per

day with 2-4 B-26s based at Takhli. Additional sorties

will require augmentation of the CIA task force with

operational planning, intelligence, maintenance, armament

and ordnance personnel.

4. Helicopter Operations: Additional helicopter support is

fundamental to the success of the proposed operation.

a. A total of 20 H-34 helicopters are required to provide

airlift and pickup in the forward areas which lack landing

fields

for fixed-wing aircraft.

b. At present, CAT has four engaged in operations. An

additional sixteen can be furnished by the Department of

Defense within a week. Suitable aircraft are not available

on the commercial market. Ostensibly they will be owned

and operated by CAT.

c. CAT has four qualified pilots flying these H-34s and

1s experiencing great difficulty in locating more as they

are In short supply outside the armed services. The Depart-

ment of Defense can supply sixteen additional pilots within

about 10 days. They will be processed through "Sheepaip"

and ostensibly be employed by CAT.

6(1)(c)

d. Their present hourly rate of up to 100 hours of

flying per month is exceptional.. It is difficult to

estimate the sorties avallable because their mission times

vary so drastically:

2

3

5.

6

7

8

9

10

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

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TOP SECRET

TOP CECRET

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TOP SECRET

6(1)(c)+ (4):

ÇA7

TOP SECRET

6. Artillery Support. During the final assault phase on

Pláine des Jarres it is anticipated FAL will need up to four

105 mm artillery batteries in addition to present capabilities.

Because of the time frame involved, these units with equipment

will be obtained from Thai volunteer forces.

7. Augmentation of PEO and JUSMAAG Personnel. In order to

provide Chief, PEO, and Chief, JUSMAAG, increased advisory,

logistical, interpreter, and technical

assistance, necessary

personnel augmentation will be furnished on a priority basis.

2

4

5

6

7

8

9

Personnel requisitions for this augmentation will be forwarded

10

by these organizations as soon as requirements are determined. 11

TOP SECRET

6

TOP SECRET

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Print Date: 11/24/2014

Standard View:

User:

JFK

JMATHIS

SYSTEM

DOCID

32425007.

RECORD

NUMBER

202-10002-10129

TITLE

TO

FROM

PRESIDENT

KENNEDY

v9.1

CREATED

DATE

03/09/1961

NUMBER

OF PAGES

17.

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## Page 7

THE WHITE FOUSE

WASHINCTON

TOP SEGRET

March 9, 1961

1901 MAR 10 AN 0 14

OFFICE OF THE

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

At a meeting in the Cabinet Room on March 9, 1961, on the

general subject of Southeast Asia, the President authorized the

following actions:

An increase in MEOs from 3000 to 4000 by Aprill. (CLA)

2. 1

Defense Department to supply 16 H-34 helicopters to

CLA for CAT use.

3.

Defense Department to select and sheep dip, with CIA,

16 helicopter pilots:

4. More maintenance and base support personnel for

helicopters (300) (with consent of Thai government).

5.

Defense Départment to make available to CAT, appropriately

marked, 4 C-130s. (On Okinawa or Taiwan)

6. CIA to supply 4 C-130 crews. (U.S. civilian plus ChiNat.)

7. CIA to make available 1 C-47 and 3 DC-4s, with crews.

In case of urgent supply requirements, USAF aircraft may

resume delivery direct to Vientiane (C-130)•

Negotiate with Sarit for immediate availability of up to

4 105mm batteries (Thai soldiers, equipment, and supplies):

10. PEO personnel will be augmented by approximately 100

officers and men, and the JUSMAAG personnel in Thailand by

approximately 100.

11. Defense to make available 8 B-26s, plus necessary spares

(at Okinawa).

12. Défense Department to supply 16 sanitized B-26 crews to CIA:

TOP SECRET

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TOP SECRET

2

13. CIA is authorized to recruit non-U.S., non-ChiNat crews

for B-26 and transport aircraft.

14. The Department of State will draft for the President's

approval a message to Ambassador Brown giving the sense and

meaning of the present steps.

15. General Boyle will go to work on Phoumi to lift the

quality of FAL military leadership.

16. CIA is authorized to commit additional helicopters as

obtained.

17: CIA is authorized to commit additional transport aircraft

as obtained.

Muk hum

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## Page 9

COP SECRE

TOP SECRET

COrY NO. - 20

9 March 1961--1300

CONCEPT FOR THE RECAPTURE

OF THE PLAINE DES JARRES

Distribution:

Secretary of Defense

Deputy

Secretary

of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)

Chaizman, ICS

CSA

CNO

CSAY

CMC

CINCPAC

PEO

Director,

Joint Staff

Secretary, JCS

2

1

2

copies

copy

copy

copies

copies

copies

coples

copies

copies

coPy

copies

copies

TOP SECRET

TOP GAORRY

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## Page 10

TOP SECRET

NOR SECRET

1300 - 9 March 1961

CONCEPT FOR THE RECAPTURE OF THE PLAINE DES JARRES

1. Purpose. This concept outlines a plan for the seizure

of the Plaine des Jarres (PDJ) Base Complex of Laos utilizing

forces avallable. The concept envisages maximum utilization

3

of Laos Arny (FAL) forces and resources; and a timely, selec-

tive and flexible employment of US transport aircraft and

"volunteer" forced,

4

5

6

2. Situation.

7

a. On 1 March 1961 the Commander in Chief, Pacific, stated 8

that the Pathet Lao "has become strong enough in the Plaine

9

des Jarres to block the FAL offensive and could take offen

10

sive on their oin at time of their choosing." In addition,

"it is likely that the Conmunists will attempt soon to seize 12

Luang

Prabang in order to consolidate their position in

13

Northern Laos,"

The Joint Chiefs

or Staff concur with this 14

evaluation and believe that, if aeceleracea action is not

taken to recapture the Plaine des Jarres and reverse this

15

16

trend, the balance of power will continue to favor the

Pathet Lao. Moreover, the enemy will continue to improve

his advantageous position for further military action and

17

18

19

political negotiations.

20

b. Military action at present is characterized by small

21

units carrying out probes and adjusting

their positions in

22

consonance with assigned roles--the Pi consölidating and

defending terrain in the PDJ area taken from Royal Army

23

24

Forces during the datter perfol January while awaiting a

political settlement, and the FAi attempting to contain

and

25

25

compress these forces

prior to initiating a full-scale

attack designed to recover the PDJ area.

Although the

27

28

terrain Lavors guerrilla tactios, the enemy has abandoned

his enter demonstrated preference for these tactics in!

29

30

31

favor of more conventional techniques, thus projecting his

operations into a new, more sophisticated dimension of war-

32

fare.

SOP SECRET

TOP SECRIT

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8101N

TOP SECRET

1

2

3

c. Pro-Communiet forces occupy the key centers of

Xieng Khouang and the Plaine des Jarres, most of Sam Neua

and Phong Saly provincés, and a number of pockets in the

central and southern provinces. Pathet Lao forces through-

out Laos number an estimated 10,000. Those in north central

and northeastern Laos number 4-5,000 and control all popula-

t1010

centers

and communications routes in Sam Neua

and Xieng

Khouang provinces. soviet airlift to the Plaine des Jarres

is supplemented by truck convoys using

the road from North

Vietnam which runs through Nong Het and Ban Ban. 09 7-8

March, Government forces witharew from positions east of

the road junction of Route 7 and 13, in the face of Pathet

Lao probing action, and established new positions on Route

13 just north and south of the road junction. The Pathet

Lao have at least temporary control of this strategic inter

section on the road connecting the Royal Capital at Luang

Prabang with Vientiane, the Aûministrative center of the

country. On the southern axis to the Plaine des Jarres,

enemy forces located 20 miles south of Xieng Khouang are

withdrawing

slowly as part of a controlled withdrawal to

Improve their positions.

3. Concept for Execution. D-day is the day air interdiction

operations begin.

a. Mission. Utilizing IAL Forces to the maximum, conduet

Immediate military operations to seize the PDJ base complex

for FAl use and to deny its use to the enemy. It is visual-

ized that the whole operation will require 6-8 weeks.

b. Interdiction Phase.

The objective is to disrupt and

fragment the enemy effort and thus enable FAL forces

to

resume the offensive. This will be accomplished by:

TOP SECRET

2

5

6

7

8

9

10

12

13

141

15

16

17

18

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20

21

22

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24

25

26

27

23

29

30

31

32

TOP 660

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KOP

TOP SECRET

(1) Conducting offensive air operations utilizing

suitable combat aircraft armed with machine guns,

rockets, high explosive bombs and napalm, to attack

1

2

3

enemy

air transport aircraft in Laos, supply routes,

troop concentrations, and supply dumps.

(2) Conducting guerrilla operations, using MEO tribes:

244.

men, against enemy command posts, troop and supply con

voys and supply points.

(3) FAL will regroup for later operations and exert

8

maximum pressure on the PL.

c. Attack Phose..

_Seo Annex A (Mep)

(1) The objective of this phase is to seize assault

positions on the perimeter of the PDJ area by means of

10

11

12

13

a coordinated ground attack. This operation would be

14

supported by combat air support and air and ground

interdiction operations.

15

16

(2) On D-day, Task Force West, consisting of FAL Group

Mobile (GM) 11 (4 infantry battalions, 4 artillery bat-

17

18

teries, 1 tank company, 1 reconnaissance company, 1 engi- 19

neer company

and available MEO) from present positions

20

in the vicinity of the road junction of

Routes 7 and 13,

21

will attack east

and seize objectives on the west side

22

of the PDJ.

(3) On D-day, Task Force

South, consisting of GM A, B

23

24

and C, (6 infantry battalion equivalents, 2 artillery

25

batteries

and available MBO) from present positions

along 26

the Paksane-PDJ road in the vicinity of Ban Ta Viang,

will attack north then northwest along the Paksane-PDJ

27

28

road seizing objectives on the southeast and south

side

29

of the PDJ.

(4) On D+5 days, Task Force Northeast, consisting of 31

available MEO tribesmen and FAL troops to be airlanded by 32

helicopter in the area west and north of Xieng Khouang-: 33

30

34

Moung Phan, will conduct guerrilla harassing and inter-

diction attacks against enemy lines of communication,

35

command posts and supply units along the Xieng Khouang-

PDJ road and along Route 7 northeast of the PDJ/S (219 137

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TOP SECRET

d. Final Assault Phase. Seo Annex A (Map)

(1) The objective of this phase is to seize the IDJ

Base Complex area for FAl use and to deny it to the enemy. 3

This operation would be supported by combat air support: 4

and air and ground interdiction operations, both inside

5

and outside the PDJ area.

6

(2) An Airborne Task Force (1 full strength airborne

7

battalion equivalent and 2 infantry battalions) will

conduct

an airborne

assault in the PDJ area. The air

8

9

borne battalion will seize an available airfield to

10

permit the airlanding of the two battalion follow-on

11

infantry force.

(3) Task Forces West, South and Northeast will

Jarnch a coordinated attack to effect early link lp

12

13

14

with the Airborne Task Force, to destroy the enemy

in the PDJ Base Complex, and to seize and hold that

15

16

area.

e. Special Operations. During all phases, operations

will be conducted to:

17

18

19

(1) Jam

and otherwise interfere with enemy air

20

navigation

aids in the PDJ area.

21

(2) Disrupt enemy communications.

22

(3) Deceive the enemy as

to FAL capabilities and

23

24

intentions.

4. Logistic support

a. Concept. United States transport aircraft will be

used to airlift supplies and equipment into Vientiane.

25

26

27

28

Supply of the Task Forces will be accomplished by air

delivery from Vientlane. This will be supplemented by

29

surface lines of communication for Task Force West

subject

to the vehicle transportation capability and highway con-

ditions. Enabling administrative action will be taken to

31

32

make funds readily available to cover the cost of the

operation.

33

34

TOP SECRET

4

TOP CEORYT

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TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

b. Operations Sufficient stocks of materiel will be

made avallable in Laos and Thailand including weapons,

petroleum, ammunition, communications equipment, cargo

parachutes, airdrop. containers, and other critical items

to replace combat attrition. Maintenance and supply

support will be available for the helicopters employed.

Sanitized US personnel on temporary duty in Laos and

JUSMAAG Thailand will maintain the impetus of the logistics

effort.

3

4

5

8

9

TOP SECRET

5

TOP SECRET

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TOP SECRET

PHONG SALY

I ET

NA

ABN TASK FORCE

1 ABN BN

TÄSK FORCE NORTHEAS""

500 MEO

$ 500 FAL

IOU KHOUN

# MOUNG PHAN

XEING KHOUANG

I TK CO

¡ ENGR CO

MEO

PHASE 2

BAN SA

SAN TA VIANG

PHASE 1

& INF BN

2 ARTY ETRY

MEO

i PAR SANE

CA DINA

DeVIENTIANE

2Í THA HA1L1

ANNEX A (MAP)

wist is ANNER NATIONAL BOUNDARY

• DATE

9 MARCH 1961

PROVINCE BOUNDARY

ROAD

ROUTE NUMBER

PHASE LINE

FINAL OBJECTIVE

MILES

TOP SECRET

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TO SARIS 9

TOP SECREE

REZUIREMENTS TO IMPLEMENT THE CONCEPT OF

OPERATIONS FOR THE CAPTURE OF THE PLAINE DES JARRES

Additional psychological moves, fire support and logistic 1

effort are required to implement successiully the Plaine des

Jarres operation,

All or these measures should be undertaken

2

3

urgently in order to complete this operation before the onset

of the rainy season about the first of May..

.Most of the pro

4

5

posed measures can be undertaken with little fear of compensa

6

tory or retaliatory action by the Communist Bloo:

These

additional requirements include:

1. Appraisal and Problems of Leadership:

a. Phoumi is running a one-man show, giving little

freedom of decision to commanders or to staff officers..

He is now devoting most of his time to coping with

governmental problems, instead of fighting the war.

These problems stem largely from efforts by the United

States, the United Kingdom and France to persuade Phoumi

to broaden his government base and "win the support of

the lao people," and the numerous concepts for the inter-

vention of cóntrol commissions.

b. Phoumi feels insecure due to the internal situation

In Laos, the conflicting pressures

of diverse family

interests

and distrust of his subordinate leaders.

His

refusal to retain battle-tested, successful leaders in

crucial command positions is one result of his distrust.

He also feels insecure because he does not have confidence

In complete US support. During his Revolutionary Period,

he developed the conviction that the US favorea Souvanna

Instead of himself... Based on this experience, he is

uncertain of US support; and conversely, the US Ambassador

1s uncertain of Phoumi's capabilities and trustworthiness.

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

TOP, SECRET

1

TOR FECRET

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MOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

c. Solutions:

1

(1) The US mission i Laos should be directed to

2

accept as a matter of overriding priority the military

3

mission of recapturing PDJ and should support Phoumi

accordingly.

4

5

(2) Present efforts to broaden the base of the RIG

6

and to seek a political solution should be given secondary

priority to enable Phoumi to concentrate on

the PDJ

military operation,

7

8

9

(3) US inflüence with other governments should support 10

these priorities. Other governments should be informed

that it 1s our judgment that a satisfactory political

12

settlement is not attainable until there is an improve-

13

ment in the military situation.

14

(4) All US personnel, including the Ambassador and

the United States Mission, should impress upon Phoumi

15

16

the importance of putting his best commanders in the field 17

and relleving inept officers who are losing battles

18

for hin.

19

(5) Above all; the additional air and artillery

support and logistic means needed to capture the Plaine

20

21

des Jarres should be provided. The Chief, PEO, should be

authorized to inform Phoumi of support to be provided;

operations to be undertaken and results expected.

2. Maximum Utilization of ME Guerrillas:

a. By a maximum effort, including full cooperation by

the FAL, the present effective strength of 3, 000 MEO

Irregulars will bé increased as rapidly as possible by

I April. The NEO guerrillas can be most effectively

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

employed in harassing actions behind enemy lines, cutting

supply routes and making hit-and run attacks on enemy

30

31

formations. They would be supplemental, therefore, to an

attack mounted by FAlL regular forces.

32

33

TOP SECRET

2

TOP

SECRET

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TOP SECRET

LOP SECRET

b. CAS stocks on Okinawa can be increased to support

such a förce.

3. Air Support and. Interdiction Operations:

a. It will be necessary to sustain combat air opera

tions designed to:

(1) Interdict Pathet Lao lines of communication

(2) Destroy rebel supply dumps and installations

(3) Fragment

Pathet Lao concentrations.

Aircraft in the numbers and types needed to make effective

delivery and achieve shock effect should be employed. They

should be armed with

guns, rockets, bombs and napalm, as

required by the targets to be attacked.

b. There are nine armed I-6s (2/30 cal guns, 4/5"

rockets, 2/100 1b bombs) in the Laos inventory. Five

combat-ready Laotian pilots are available for current

operations; four qualified Thai pilots are on hand. The

I-6, though slow and lightly armed, has a psychological

effect considerably greater than its destructive power.

It has value as a supplement to more powerful aircraft.

c. (1) It is estimated that sixteen Sterile B-26s and

20 pilots are required to accomplish the missions en-

visaged in

the attack on the Plaine des Jarres (PDJ).

(2) CIA has eight of these planes in Taiwan and the

USAE can supply the additional eight, plus necessary

spares support, available in a period of 2-3 weeks.

(3) CIA has four currently qualified American pilots,

and it would require 3-4 weeks

of training to provide

more civilian American pilots. Sixteen sanitized USAF

1

2.

3

4

5.

6

7

8

9.

10

-11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

crews could be provided in 2-3 weeks.

Volunteers from

the Chinese Nationalist Air Force (CNAF), Philippine Air 30

Force (PAF), and RIAI could not be trained in time: The

:31

former require 4-6 weeks and the latter two, 6-8 weeks.

...32

TOP SECRET

3

TOP SECRET

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10719

5. 66618165

TOP SECRET

Volunteers could be processed through "Sheepdip" (sani-

tized and proper arrangements made in event of capture

or death. Sanitized USAF crews to man the four unmanned

CIA aircraft can be provided in about 10 days.

(4) CIA can support approximately four sorties per

day with 2-4 B-26s baced at Takhli. Additional sorties

will require augmentation of the CIA task force with

operational planning, intelligence, maintenance,

armament

and ordnance personnel.

4. Helicopter Operations: Additional helicopter support is

fundamental to the success of the proposed operation.

a. A total of 20 H-34 helicopters are required to provide

airlift and piclip

In the forward

areas which lack landing

felds for fixed-wing aircraft.

b. At present, CAT has four engaged in operations. An

additional sixteen can be furnished by the Department of

Defense within a weck. Suitable aircraft are not available

on the commercial market. Ostensibly they will be owned

and operated by CAT.

c. CAT has four qualified pilots flying these H-34s and

1s experiencing great difficulty in locating more as they

are in short supply outside the armed services, The Depart

ment of Defense can supply sixteen additional pilots within

about 10 days. They will be processed through "Sheepdip"

and ostensibly be employed by CAT.

d. Their present hourly rate of up to 100 hours

of

flying per month is exceptional. It is difficult to

estimate the sorties

available becäuse their mission times

vary so drastically.

2

3

5

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e. Maintenance personnel are in short supply, and it will 1

be necessary to move a military maintenance unit in to main- 2

tain the 20 aircraft. CHPEO has a site near Nong Khai,

Thailand, in mind for a maintenance base. Bangkok is tóo

3

4

far away, and the airfield at Vientiane too vulnerable to

5

rebel action.: A Marine maintenance unit can be moved into: 6

Thailand from PACOM in 2-3 days. Personnel would comprise:..

225 Operations and Maintenance personnel and 75 base support. 8

5. Airlift Operations:

a. Using Vientiane, there is a

requirement for sixteen

10

operational 046 equivalents plus 4 0130's during the peak

..11

phase of the attack.

An estimated ten C46's daily are

-12

required prior to the troop drop and thirteen C46's daily': 13

after the troop drop.

3. CAT can supply 4 0130 crews, and the Defense Depart- 15

ment can supply the aircraft.

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c. CAT has eleven C45's and four C47's assigned to South- 17

east Asian operations. It can make available one more C47. 18

and three DO4's which are presently used on other

commit

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ments. The FAL has seven C47's.

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d. CAT has adequate personnel to operate their aircraft, 21

and the FAI can count on using five C47's with FAl pilots.

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e. It is urgent to shorten the turn-around time of the

046 and 047 aircraft being used to supply the FAL. This

can be most effectively accomplished by airlifting supplies

by USAF aircraft directly into Vientiane. If this is not

permitted and the present Shuttle between Banglok and

Vientiane is continued, there will not be sufficient

operational C45 equivalents available during the most

crucial phases of the battle.

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6. Artillery Support. During

the final assault phase on

Plaine des Jarres it is anticipated

FAL will need up to four 2

105mm artillery batteries in addition to present capabilities. 3

Because of the time frame involved, these units with equipment 4

will be obtained from Thai volunteer forces.

5

6

7. Augmentation of PEO and JUSMAAG Personnel. In order to

provide Chief, PEO, and Chief, JUSMAA, increased advisory,

logistical, interpreter, and technical assistance, necessary

8

personnel augmentation will be furnished on a priority basis.

9

Personnel requisitions for this augmentation will be forwarded 10

by these organizations as soon as requirements are determined. 11

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ASSESSMENT OF RISKS

1. It must be recognized that the planned operation will

present the opposition with a decision as to its response.

2. We consider it nost likely that the enemy will seek

soft

spots, particularly in southern Laos, to create counter-

pressure. If the planned PDJ operation

1s

successful, it

should be possible for the FAl to meet this threat.

3. SNIE 58-61, dated 21 February

1961, provides an

estimate of Communist

Bloc

response to the use of "volunteer"

combat aircraft by the FAl in Laos. This estimate is:

"The comnitment of "volunteer' combat aircraft to

ground support operations in Laos. The Bloc would probably

seek to increase PL AAA capebilities, possibly covertly

introducing DRV AAA units. Soviet threats would be made

against the (Thei, Vietnamese, or other) bases supporting

the air operations. The chances are about even that

"volunteer! Communist ground attack aircraft would be

committed in Laos. However, the chances

of such commit

ment would rise sharply if the non-Communist aircraft had

attacked and destroyed soviet

airlift aircraft. We believe

it less likely that Communist air

strikes would be attempted

against the supporting non-Communist

air bases."

It is considered

possible to meet this threat without further

escalation on our part.

4, should this not be possible, overt US air support from

outside Laos may be necessary.

5. We consider it important to leave the enemy uncertain

as to our reaction should the other side then further

escalate.

6. The reported recent arguments between the Soviets and

the CHICOMs indicate that the Soviets are sensitive to the

dangers of escalation, Failure on our part to present them

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with this risk would tend to support the CHICOM position

that acgressive Communist action presents less

rick

to the

Communist side then the more careful operations implied by

the soviet "peaceful coexistence" program.

7. An essential complement to the military actions proposed

is the requirement

for concomitant political action to insure

that our limited military objectives are clearly understood

by the Communist Bloc. On this basis, the advantages to be

gained

far outweigh the risks involved.

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