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2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 sinist.

1 October 1968

CONCLUSIONS AND COMMENTS

IN THE CASE OF

YURIY IVANOVICH NOSENKO

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SECHET

1 Ociober 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Directo, of Securisy

FRON

: Deputy Chiel, Socurity Rescarch Staft

SUBJECT

: NOSENIO, Yuzig Ivanovica

In accordance with the requesi of the Depuiy Dircctor

of Central Intelligenco, aitachod is a summary with conclusions

concerning the bona fides o Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENiO. Sub-

conclusions aro contained in thc summary concersiag several

major areas which were givón pritcazy corsideration in the master

of 8ão bODa fiCOS DE NOSENTO.

2. Included in thia summary are comments concerning

conclusione in tho previous surmury and an annex containing io-

marks on three separate subjecto tulaied to the NOSENKO caJe.

3. In brici, the conclusion of this aummary is that NOSENKO

is the person ho claims to be, that he hold his claimeo positions la

the KGB during 1953 - Jazuary 19u%, toat NOSENKO was sot dis-.

patched by the KGB, and that his previous lies and exaggerations

are not actually of material signuleance ai ibis tiere.

Biues li Solie

Aitaciment:

summary

3IS:X0

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

: 1.

Introduction

II.

Summary of Developments in NOSENKO Case Since

30 October 1967

=1. Analytical Comments Concerning the Bona Fides of Yuriy

Ivanovich NOSENKO

A. Is NOSENKO Identical to the Person Whom He Claims

to be?

B. Is the Claimed KGB Career of NOSENKO Plausible?

C, Has NOSENKO Given an Acceptable Explanation of

His Motivation in Contacting CIA in 1962 and For

His Defection in 1964?

D. Is the Information Furnished by NOSENKO to CIA

Concerning KGB Operations, Personalities, and

Organization Reasonably Commensurate With His

Claimed KGB Career?

E. Can the Information Furnished by NOSENKO be

Considered in Toto as Having Resulted in Material

•Damage to the KGB and/or Has the Information

Furnished by NOSENKO Been of Significant Benefit

to Western Intelligence?

F. Is There Evidence of KGB Deception or "Give-Away"

in Information Furnisked by NOSENKO Which Would

Warrant a Conclusion that NOSENKO was Dispatched

by the KGB?

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G. Is There Evidence of a Political or Any Other Type

Objective Which Could Justify a Dispatch of NOSENKO

by the KGB With Permission to Speak Freely to CIA

Concerning His Knowledge of the KGB and Without

NOSENKO Being Given a Specific Mission or Missions?

H. Is There Any Evidence That the Contacts of NOSENKO in

1962 or in 1964 With CIA Were Known to the KGB Prior

to His Defection or That NOSENKO Was Ever Briefed

by the KGB Relative to His Behavior or KGB Objectives

During These Contacts or After His Defection?

IV. Comments Concerning Previous Conclusions in Regard to NOSENKO

A. NOSENKO Did Not Serve in the Naval RU in Any of the

Capacities or at the Places and Times He Claimed

B. NOSENKO Did Not Enter the KGB in the Manner or at the

Time He Claimed

C.' NOSENKO Did Not Scrve in the American Embassy Scution

Throughout the 1953 - 1955 Period as He Claimed

D. During the Period 1955 - 1960, He Was Neither a Senior

Case Officer in, nor Deputy Chief of, the Seventh

Department American-British Commonwealth Sectior

E. NOSENKO Was Neither Deputy Chieí of the American Embassy

Section nor a Senior Officer or Supervisor in the Section

During the Period 1961 - 1902 (sic)

F. NOSENKO's Claims, That in 1962 He was Chief of the

American-British Commonwealth Section and Was

Thereafter a

Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department,

Are Not Credible

G. NOSENKO Has no Valid Cluim to Certainty That the KGB

Recruited No American Embassy Personnel Between

1953 and His Defection in 1964

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Annex

Annex A - Statements of Soviet Officials About NOSENKO

Annex 3 - Summaries of Cases Not Examined in Text

Annex C. - The Cherepanov Papers

6001005

SEGRET

'st dis

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'SECKEI

INTRODUCTION

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INTRODUCTION

The following summary and analysis is not intended to be

all inclusive, that is to contain a specific comment on all organi-

zational, operational, personality and case type information furnished

by Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO. To attempt to do so would be repetitious

and confusing to the reader and would not be of material benefit in the

formation of logical conclusions concerning the rather limited areas of

primary concern.

This summary will not contain a detailed psychological

assessment of NOSENKO nor will it contain a recitation of the numerous

theories which have been promulgated in the past concerning varying

.raspects

of the NOSENKO case. This summary will be primarily

directed toward the question of whether NOSENKO was or was not

dispatched by the KGB, whether his claimed KGB career is relatively

plausible and whether he has since late October 1967 been cooperative in

a reassessment of the entire case for or against NOSENKO. NOSENKO

has admitted certain lies and exaggerations in the past but claims that

these were of a personal nature, intended to enhance his own importance

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but not to mislead this Agency in any material matters of an operational

or policy nature.

In order to avoid any misunderstanding of the phrase "bona.

fides" as considered in this summary, NOSENKO will be judged primarily

on whether he voluntarily defected to this Agency without KGB knowledge,

and whether his 1962 and early 1964 contacts with representatives of this

Agency were known to the KGB. Motivation and certain other pertinent

aspects will be considered, but his admitted previous errors, lies and

exaggerations will not per se warrant a conclusion that NOSENKO is not a

"bona fide" defector.

There is not an accurate standard or scale of measurement

*gainst which information concerning NOSENKO can be balanced of

correlated to determine if he is or is not a dispatched KGB officer. For

purposes of this analysis and summary, an arbitrary list of areas

considered pertinent has been compiled. Readers may differ in regard to

wheiher this arbitrary standard is a completely accurate standard, but it

is felt that the information from NOSENKO and information from other

sources derived through independent investigation will permit the reader.

to assess the information in toto against any standard he considers

appropriate.

The previous summary on NOSENKO entitled, "The Exami-

nation of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector, " has been considered in

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ba preparaiton of this sunmary. I will be commented on is pari

and this samraary will include conclusions corselatod with the seven

primary conclusions dot forth on page 358 of the above sumizasy.

Remarks concerniag certain BITOES, inconsistencies, omiastons and

ansupported conclusions in tha previous suramary la ragard to specific

CaNOS O8 SAD -45028 Mill be included la this summary. Homever, this

samaaTy will not inclade a polns-by-polai comparison of all areas al

agrooment os disagroement with izlorration contained la the previous

огкатаху.

A positive decision in ragard to NOSENKO based on all

available 11105179510a should be made in tbe immediate futara. Thare

aIs no known sources currently avallable to provide nem positing

1a8ormnatlon CODEOrDing NOSINKO and his bona fidas. it la recognised

that there da alMaya a possibilily lI lSA futATe a LeV dOUTCO Os sOUrCOs

will be able to tarniah addidonal informaion in regard to NOSeNKO.

Homover, this possibility in exceedingly tenuous and la la leit thoro

lo sufficions informados avallable on waich to base a conclusion in

¿to NOSENKO matter.

3

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II

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SUMMARY OF DEVELOPVENTS IN NOSENKO CASE

SINCE 30 OCTOBER 1957

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SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENTS IN NOSENKO CASE

SINCE 30 OCTOBER 1967

Since 30 October 1967, interviews with Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO

have been conducted by one individual not previously known personally to

NOSENKO but who has been aware of the NOSENKO case since June 1962.

Interviews have been detailed and very extensive in scope, have

been recorded and transcribed, and have covered the entire life and career

of NOSENKO without regard to whether a particular aspect had been

covered during previous interview or interviews.

NOSENKO, although naturally apprehensive during the first few

interviews, has been cooperative, has developed a relaxed attitude, and

the interviewer has noted no significant reluctance to discuss any aspect

of his life, career, or activities. On occasion NOSENKO has indicated a

reluctance to make positive statements in certain areas previously

considered at a minimum extremely controversial. This reluctance

was understandable and when it became apparent to NOSENKO that the

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interviewer would not dispute or disparage his statements without adequate

reason, this reluctance on the part of NOSENKO, in the opinion of the

interviewer, totally disappeared.

During the interviewing period, particularly in the first six months,

NOSENKO materially assisted the interviewer by preparing approximately

sixty memoranda on such diverse subjects as his life, motivation for de-

fection, individual cases, notes which he furnished to CIA in 1964, KGB

organization, and KGB officer and agent personalities. As an example

of the scope of this work by NOSENKO, four of the memoranda included

remarks concerning approximately 875) KGB officers, 100) KGB agents,

35 GRU officers, and 400 other Soviet nationals. These lists were alpha-

betically arranged and the above indicated cooperation of NOSENKO has

materially assisted in the organization and evaluation of information

furnished by him during current interviews.

Copies of transcripts of interviews with NOSENKO and related

memoranda have been disseminated to the FBI and the CI Staff. Special

Agent Elbert Turner and Special Agent James Wooten of the Washington

Field Office/FBI in particular have given great assistance in research

and compilation of new or additional information and the FBI has inter-

viewed or reinterviewed a number of United States citizens concerning

whom NOSENKO has furnished pertinent information.

2

E TET

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la additos, thrse professionada from the S8 Diviaton have

rariomed the current information and assistad in the retrioval of

PrATIONS IRiOIMAtIOn ITOM NOSENKO and collation of current

¡aionzaation with provious Informatios. The latter is a tremendous

issi becanno ol the voluran ol material; tas sumber of individual

casus involved; and the extenalva infosmation la segard to KGB

personalities, procedares, organisational structars and activitias.

The SE Divistos 2180 protided tha servicas al as axpart..

tIanaiat05 to 1ran81ate tan tapes af the 1965 interrogation of NOSENKO

by Pots DERYABIN and one al tha pravloualy montioned three pro-

fessionals comploted a son tranalatios of the 1962 interriowa wits

NOSENKO. In additos, transcriptions of certain other particularly

partloeat previous intertlems al NOSENKO have been completed by

the Olfice of Security.

Approximately 7000 pagos of transcripis and related material

bana been complled and dinseminated maco late Ocsober 1957. Com-

monts concarning the valua aí the lalormation containod in the abovo

matesial ase contained la anothes section of this nutrary. An of thes

progent inso, a complate analydia ls not possibla since a conalderablo

portion al the material has not been fully processod, In thr pruparation

›i tals summary all arcas o major significance have baza examined.

Bacause of the voluminous information, all analysical asd collatios work

say not been complaiad; built la not considored that, bused on sil

3

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arailable information, the remaining work will materially aifect

the conclusions drawn in this summary.

The polygraph latervien of NOSENKO was initiatod on

2 Angunt and conciuded on 6 Auguat 1968, Approximately sixty

greastons al a pertinent natara vera included la the polygrapt lataz-

tier.. No problema vero encountarad durtag the polygrapa latervien

and no additloral testlag ol NOSINKO lo anticipated, Altechod la &

copy al the sell-explanatory report on the resalis of the polygrapa

Interviems wita NOSENKO save continued since ibe polygrapa

istarstem on a temporarily reduced acalo in order to permit a reviem

of previons iaformation and proparation ol this dummary. There la

10 doubt tant future intestions with NOSENKO will rarsal information

of intuiligenco value, but iniormation devaloped taun far will pormit

a decialos is the cass of Yurty Ivanovich NOSENKO.

Attachment:

12 Aug S8 Polygraph Rpt

0001014

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•

FROM

SUBJECT

: Chief, Security Research Staff

: Interrogation Research Division

Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO

12 August 1968

IRD # 67491

IDENTIFYING DATA

Subject is a 40 year old former KGB Staffer who defected

U.S. in 1964 1n Geneva..

to the

BACKGROUND

Mr. Bruce L. Solie of the Security Research Staff has been de-

brieting and interrogating Subject since October 1967 in order to

resolve the issue whether Suoject was a dispatched agent of the KGB.

He has conducted a vast amount of research and checking with sources

in an effort to establish the veracity of Subject's statements.

PURPOSE

The primary. purpose of the polygraph test was to determine:

I. Whether Subject was a dispatched Agent of the KGB;

2. Whether Subject had Intentionally given Mr. Solle

any false information.

PROCEDURE

Subject was given a polygraph examination on 2 August 1968 at

a saiesite in the vicinity of Washington, D.C. The examination was

conducted in the English language. Subject's comprehension and the

ability to express himself in English was completely adequate for

purposes of polygraph testing. Subject was completely cooperative

1n all respects. Subject displayed no evasiveness and appeared to

be completely frank whenever he was questioned or gave information

as a topic.

The following relevant questions were asked during the first test:

Is your true name Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO? Yes.

were you born in the year 1927? Yes.

Besides the Americans, did you tell anyone else about your

intention to defect?

0001015

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IRO # 6742

Page 2

Did you ever tell anyone in the KGB about your contact with

American Intelligence? No..

Were you given instructions by the KGB to get in contact with

American Intelligence? No.

Were you told by the KGB to defect in order to carry out an

Intelligence mission? No.

The following relevant questions were asked during the second test:

Did the KGB actually send a communication for your recall to

the USSR on the day of your defection? No.

Were you acquainted with CHEREPANOV? Yes.

Did you actually travel to Gorkly in November 1963 to hunt for

CHEREPANOV? Yes.

'Are you deliberately withholding from us any information about

the KGB recruitment of Americans? No.

Does the KGB have METKA and NEPTUNE 80? Yes.

Vere you the responsible Case Officer for John Abidian in 1960-61?

Ye6.

Do you know the true name of ANDREY or SASHA? No.

Did you ever have tuberculosis?

Yes.

The following relevant questions were asked on test three:

Did you serve in Navy Intelligence from 1951 to 1953? Yes.

Was (SHUBIN in the USSR during the period 1957 to 1959? Yes.

Io the best of your knowledge, were you in the Seventh

Department at this time? Yes.

Did you telephone the GRU about SHUBIN at this time? Yes.

•To the best of your knowledge, was POPOV compromised because

of the letter Mr. Winters mailed? Yes.

0001016

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Page

67491

3

To the best of your knowledge, was PINKOVSKIY exposed to the

KGB because of the mass surveillance on the British Embassy?

Yes.

Was there any misleading information in the notes you brought

out from the Soviet Union? No.

Did you intentionally exaggerate your personal association with

GRIBANOV? No.

Are you hiding any adverse information about your background? No.

Subject's polygraph test reflected no significant responses indicative

eception regarding the relevant questions asked. No further polygraph

s were administered on this date because the examiner did not want to

tne risk of fatigue setting in and thus possibly causing adrenalin.

astion.

Polygraph testing was resumed on 6 August 1968. The following

ant questions were asked on test four:

bu join the KGB in March 1953? Yes.

ere you a KGB officer from 1953 to 1964? Yes.

re you & Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department? Yes.

re you only a Captain at this time?

Yes.

re you an officer in the U.S. Imbassy Section fron March

3 to May 1955? Yes.

1958 and 1959 were you the Deputy Chief of the American-

tish-Canadian Section in the Seventh Department? Yes.

January 1960 to December 1961 vere you the Deputy to the

of the First Section of the First Department?

Yes.

January to July 1962 were you the Chief of the First Section

le Seventh Department? Yes.

you an officer in the First Section, First Department,

SCD,

time of the Stalingrad operation against (Benson, Mule and

-?. Xes.

0001012

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IRD # 67491

Page

The following relevant questions were asked on test five:

Since 1953 do you know of any other KGB recruitments in the

American Embassy besides ANDREY and HOWARD? No.

Did the KGB know about the notes you brought out? No.

Have you told us the complete truth about your KGB career?

Yes.

Dia you intentionally exagterate your personal involvement in

cases in 1962 ana 1964 in order to mislead us? No.

Did you intentionally give us any false operational

information? No.

Did GRIBANOV offer you the position of Deputy Chief of the

First Department?

Yes.

Was an order actually prepared promoting you to Deputy to the

Chief of the First Department? Yes.

In early 1960 did GRIBANOV tell you that your primary responsibility

was to work against American Code Clerks? Yes.

Other than you mentioned, are you hiding any other reasons for

your defection? No.

Are you deliberately withholding any information on any foreigners

recruited by the KGB? No.

The following relevant questions were asked on test six:

Did you enter the KGB through the influence of General BOGDAN

KOBULOV?

Yes.

Did you succeed BAKHVALOV as Deputy Chief of the First Section?

Yes.

Did GRYAZNOV succeed you as Deputy Chief of the First Section?

Yes.

Were the CHERMPANOV papers passed to the Americans with KGB

knowledge?

No.

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IRD # 67421

Page. 5

Io your knowledge was there any misleading information in the

CHIEREPANOV papers? No.

Dia you ever personally meet GOLITSIN? No.

Was there a cable sent to Geneva for you to assist ARIFMEV

in the BELITSKIY case?

Yes.

Did you personally make an approach to KEYSERS

at the Moscow

Airport? Yes.

The following relevant questions were asked on test seven::

Did you actually review the KGB file on OSWALD? Yes.

DId LEE HARVEY OSWALD reCeive

any KGB training or assigments?

Were there any microphones installed in the North Wing of the

U.S. Embassy in Moscow?

No.

Was the review of microphone reports one of your duties in

1960-613 Yes.

Are you withholding any information known to you conceming

KGB microphones or electronic activity against the U.S.

Embassy?

NO.

Before your official transfer to the Seventh Department did

you read the surveillance report on the visit of ABIDIAN

to PUSHKIN street? Yes.

Dia you personally conduct a certain investigation of SHAKOV

in 1962 in Geneva? Yes.

Was the rank of Lieutenant Colonel on your travel document

tO GORKTY only & mistake by KASHPIROV?

Yes.

The following relevant questions were asked on test eight:

'While in the U.S. Embassy Section dia you obtain a typewriter

for BORODIN for the preparation of a letter to Edward Ellis

SMITH? Yes.

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Did you read the official repori of KOSOTArOV on his contact

with JENNER on a train fron llelsinii to Moscow? Yes.

Are you intentionally withholding ony inforation conceming

KGB Knowledge of CIA personnel in Moscow? No.

Is there any pocsibility that the ich would dispatch an officer

to defect to the Americans? No.

Subject's polygraph test of 6 August Likevise refleötea no

indications of deception.

CONCLUSION

Baseà solely on the overall analysis of Subject's polygraph

tests, it is the opinion of the undersigned that the subject has

been substantially truthul in answering the relevant questions.

asksed.

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III. ANALYTICAL COMMENTS CONCERNING THE BONA FIDES

OF YURIY IVANOVICH NOSENKO

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ANALYTICAL COMMENTS CONCERNING THE BONA FIDES OF

YURIY IVANOVICH NOSENKO

As indicated in the introduction to this summary, information in

regard to Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO will be considered against an arbi-

trary but realistic list of areas considered pertinent to the question of

whether NOSENKO voluntarily defected to this Agency without KGB

knowledge, and whether his 1962 and early 1964 contacts with represent-

atives of this Agency were known to the KGB.

It was noted that motivation and certain other pertinent aspects

would also be considered but that his admitted previous lies and exag-

gerations would not per se warrant a conclusion that NOSENKO is not a

"bona fide defector."

The following is a list of the areas considered pertinent and which

are being given specific consideration. Attached is a separate section

containing remarks in regard to the designated areas of A - H.

A. Is NOSENKO identical to the person whom he claims

to be?

B. Is the claimed KGB career of NOSENKO plausible?

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C. Has NOSENKO given an acceptable explanation of

his motivation in contacting CIA in 1962 and for his

defection in 1964?

D. Is the information furnished by NOSENKO to CIA

concerning KGB operations, personalities, and organi-

zation reasonably commensurate with his claimed KGB

career?

E. Can the information furnished by NOSENKO be con-

sidered in toto as having resulted in material damage

to the KGB and/or has the information furnished by

NOSENKO been of significant benefit to Western Intelli-

gence?

F. Is there evidence of KGB deception or "give away" in

information furnished by NOSENKO which would warrant

a conclusion that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB?

G. Is there evidence of a political or any other type objective

which could justify a dispatch of NOSENKO by the KGB

with permission to speak freely to CIA concerning his

knowledge of the KGB and without NOSENKO being given

a specific mission or missions?

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H. Is there any evidence that the contacts of NOSENKO

in 1962 or in 1964 with CIA were known to the KGB

prior to his defection or that NOSENKO was ever briefed

by the KGB relative to his behavior or KGB objectives

during these contacts or after his defection?

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A. IS NOSENKO IDENTICAL IO THE PERSON

WHOM HE CLAIMS TO BE?

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A. Is NOSENKO identical to the person whom he claims to be?

During interviews

NOSENKO has furnished detailed information in regard

to his family, his activities as a youth, the schools he attended, assoc-

iates of his father and mother, and his own associates. The period

under consideration in this section is the period preceding his entry

into the First Department, Second Chief Directorate, MVD, in mid-

March 1953.

Information furnished by NOSENKO concerning his father and

mother and his early life, together with other information such as a

comparison of photographs of NOSENKO and a photograph of his father

and confirmed travel of his mother to Western Europe in 1956 with

Madame KOSYGINA, conclusively establish that he is Yuriy Ivanovich

NOSENKO, the son of Ivan Isidorovich NOSENKO, the Minister of Ship-

building in the USSR prior to his death in 1956. This is also satisfactorily

supported by personal-type information furnished by NOSENKO concern-

ing other associates of his father and mother.

Since, as indicated above, there is considered to be no doubt

that Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO is the son of the former Minister of

Shipbuilding, a detailed study of his life prior to 1945 (age 18) is of

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little or no value in assessing the bona fides or non-bona fides of

NOSENKO. An expose of his youthful indiscretions, of which he has

admitted a number, is of no import in a discussion of whether NOSENKO

was or was not dispatched by the KGB. Obtaining any collateral first-

hand information in regard to NOSENKO before 1945 would be of

negligible value, but there actually is supporting information from

Nikolay ARTAMONOV, a defector from the Soviet Navy, concerning

the claimed attendance by NOSENKO at a military-naval preparatory

school in Leningrad.

NOSENKO, during current interviews, has stated that he grad-

uated from the Institute of International Relations in 1950 and had

attended the Institute since 1945. He has explained that he should have

graduated in 1949 since it was a four-year course, but failed the final

examination in Marxism and therefore was required to attend the Institute

for a longer period of time and again take his final examinations.

Based on information furnished by NOSENKO concerning co-

students and the Institute, there is no reason to doubt that he actually

attended and graduated from the Institute of International Relations in

1950. The previous controversy in this matter was complicated by

NOSENKO who, in 1964 after his defection, stated in a biography that

he had graduated from the Institute in 1949. Actually this statement

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by NOSENKO in 1964 resulted in conflicting information since NOSENKO

on 9 June 1962 during his first contact with CIA had stated that he

"completed the Institute of International Relations in 1950. " NOSENKO

has given the explanation that he changed the date of his graduation to

1949 because he did not wish to admit that he had failed to graduate in

1949. NOSENKO explained that this change in his date of graduation

caused him to pre-date his actual entry into Navy Intelligence to 1950

instead of 1951 and his actual entry into the KGB from 1953 to 1952.

The above action by NOSENKO is included in what NOSENKO has

characterized as his "stupid blunders." The latter is a rather apt

characterization of his now admitted lies and exaggerations but is not

evidence that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB. It is evidence of

a certain personality trait of NOSENKO who has in the past by his own

admission tended to enhance his importance and astuteness by graphically

portraying his personal participation in KGB activities concerning which

he had knowledge but did not personally participate.

The claimed service of NOSENKO in Navy Intelligence during

March 1951 to early 1953 in the Far East and the Baltic areas has been

seriously questioned in the past. Specific comments on this period of

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time are contained in a separate section of this summary, but it is

considered that the recent interviews of NOSENKO satisfactorily sub-

stantiate his claimed service in Navy Intelligence during March 1951

to early 1953.

Attached is a typed copy of a handwritten memorandum completed

by NOSENKO on 31. October 1967. This is a biographical statement con-

cerning his life and KGB career. No effort has been made to correct

grammatical errors or spelling since to do so would be in conflict with

the manner in which current interviews were conducted; namely, to give

NOSENKO an opportunity to recount his life and activities to permit a re-

examination of the entire case. The comprehension and fluency of

NOSENKO in the English language was adequate for interview purposes

in October 1967 and both have materially improved since that time.

Interviews of and memoranda prepared by NOSENKO since

31 October 1967 have not indicated any material discrepancies with the

statements of NOSENKO in the attached memorandum. One change that

has been made by NOSENKO is that he now dates his transfer from the

First Department, Second Chief Directorate (SCD), KGB, to the Seventh

Department, SCD, as occurring in the latter part of May 1955 rather

than June - July 1955 as indicated in the attached statement. NOSENKO

also now dates the period in which an unsatisfactory "characterization"

0001029

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(personnel evaluation) was prepared on NOSENKO in March - April

1955 rather than May - June 1955. Since the unsatisfactory personnel

report was directly related to his transfer to the Seventh Department,

neither of the above changes are considered to be of a significant nature.

An effort has been made during current interviews to differentiate between

errors due to faulty memory and discrepancies indicative of deception by

NOSENKO.

Attachment:

31 Oct 67 Memo

5

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SEChEl

Operational Memo # N-2

SUBJECT: NOSENKO, Yuri Ivanovich

. The following is a typed copy of a handwritten memorandum

furnished by Subject on 31 October 1967, following a request on

30 October 1967:

I, NOSENKO, George, was born 30 October 1927 in the city

Nicolaev, Ukraine.

My family: the father - NOSENKO, Ivan, b. 1902, was working

at the shipbuilding plant and studied at the shipbuilding institute, which

he finished in 1928; the mother - NOSENKO, Tamara (nee MARKOVSKI),

b. 1908, a housewife; the brother - NOSENKO, Vladimir; b. 1944, a

student.

In September 1934 I began to study in the school (0 class) but

studied a short period of time because in October with the mother went

in Leningrad where the father was working at the shipbuilding plant,

"Sudsmech" from summer 1934. In Nicolaev I was living at the Street

Nicolski 7. All relatives of my family were living also in Nicolaev.

In Leningrad I was living with parents in three places till 1938:

at the Street Stachek (1934 - summer 1935), St. Canal of Griboedov,

154 (1935-1938), St. M. Gorky (short period in 1938). From 1935 till

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Exchuled Iran andomalie

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1938 I studied at the schools, which were close to my places of living.

In 1938 the father began to work in Moscow and soon I with the mother

went to live in Moscow in the end of this year.

i :

In Moscow we were living at the St. Serafimovich, 2.

Here

I was continuing to study at the school 585 (St. B. Polianka). In 1941

I finished 6th class and went with parents to rest to the south (Sochi)

but soon began the war and we returned in Moscow.

In October 1941 I with my mother went in the evacuation in

Cheliabinsk (Ural), where I finished 7th class in spring 1942. In

Cheliabinsk I lived in the poselok ChTZ, being there i tried to run to

the front with my playfellow BUSKO, but we were caught and returned

home. In 1942 (summer) I went with the mother in city Gorki and in

July-August we returned in Moscow.

In August I entered in the Moscowite military-navy special

school, which was evacuated in Kuibyshev, where I finished 8th class

in summer. 1943 and after that I arrived on a leave in Moscow. This

school must be evacuated from Kuibyshev in Achinsk (Siberia) and I

did not want to go there. With the help of father I was accepted in the

Baku's military-navy preparatory school and in August went in Baku,

where I was studying at the second course (9th class). In this school

I twice tried to be sent as a volunteer to the front but failed. Soon

2

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ULVIAR

after that I run with a friend (RADCHENKO) home in Moscow (January

1944). : In Moscow I studied at the courses (Russian word), finished

9th class and was accepted again in the military-navy preparatory

school, which was located in Leningrad. In August of 1944 I went in

Leningrad.

All cadets of this school were sent to forest (about 200 km.

from Leningrad) to prepare wood for winter, where we have been two

months. In November I wounded by chance the left hand and was put

in the navy hospital. When I was in the hospital I decided not to return

in the school but to finish 10th class in Leningrad about what I have

written a letter to my father asking his help and agreement with such

my decision. With the help of the father's friends I quited with the school

and entered in the shipbuilding college on the second course in January

1945 and studied there till the end of May. The WWIl finished and I

decided to return to Moscow. The director of the shipbuilding college

had given me a document that I studied in this college at the second

course and finished this course (though I was not passing exams). In

Leningrad I was living in the hostel of thie college (St. Tolmachev)..

In May 1945 I arrived in Moscow and was living with parente

(St. Granovaki, 3).

3

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In summer 1945 there was created the institute of the inter~

national relations in Moscow and in July I entered in this institute.

In July my father went in Germany with the group of engineers

and he took me (I received a temporary rank of a senior lieutenant,

documents and a uniform).

In 1945-1950 I studied at the institute. In 1946 I acquainted!

with a girl - Shishkoy FLAVIA, student of the medicine institute. I

was in close relations with this girl, because of the pregnancy I married

her and she made an abort. My parents were against the marriage and

we did not live together and we soon divorced. In the end of 1946 I was

acquai nted with Telegin AUGUSTINE and was going to marry her, re-

ceived a flat in 1947 (St. Mira - former Ist Uecyehckad, 162/174). In

November her father, General TELEGIN, was arrested, but I married

i" her. The marriage was not successful. I foundout about her close

relations with the brother, and the child girl was born with pathological

changes. I was not the father of this child. After that I broke with her

and we were living separately (end of 1948 - beginning 1949).

In spring 1950 before state exams in the institute was working

the commission, which was deal ing with future works of the students of

my 5th course. I expressed a wish to work in any military organization

0001034

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and soon I was invited to visit personnel department of MGB (Ministry

of State Security). But MGB did not accept me. After that with the

help of the father I began to deal with the personnel department of the

intelligence of the ministry of military navy concerning my future work.

Passing state exams I failed Marxism-Leninism and with a

group of fails I was passing state exams once more. In October 1950

I finished the institute and received a diploma.

I was accepted in the navy intelligence in the 13 of March 1951

and in March 17 went by a train to Soviet Harbour (intelligence of 7th

Fleet, as an interpreter of the information department). Before going

to the Far East I began my divorce with the former wife.

At the end of April 1952 I went on a leave in Moscow. Immediately

after returning in Moscow I had a blood cough out. In the middle of May

I went to a tuberculous sanatorium not far from Moscow. In July I

finished my treatment and returned in Moscow. Because of the health

I could not return back to the Far East and the personnel department of

the navy intelligence 'sent me to Baltic Sea (as a senior interpreter of

the navy intelligence point of the intelligence of 4th Fleet - in Sovietsk,

Kaliningrad's dietrict).

When I studied at the institute I as all the students received a

rank of junior lieutenant of administrative service after finishing the

0001035

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second course in 1947. In 1951 the ministry of navy had given me also

the rank of junior lieutenant when I was accepted in the navy intelligence.

In September-October 1952 I received a rank of lieutenant.

In Sovietsk the work was not interested and for me it was nothing .

to do.

Besides this the climate was not good for my health and I decided

to change the job. With thie purpose before new year at the end of 1952

I took a leave and went to Moscow. January 1 I was with my parents

at the evening party at the cottage of General MGB KOBULOV; whom I

did not know before, but I knew his son-in-law Vahrushev Vasili - a

former student and my friend. I told him about my job and that now I

was thinking about change of the job. KOBULOV was speaking with me

on this theme and propose we work and his help in MGB, but nothing

more definite was said about my work. This month I reported to the

head of the personnel department of the navy intelligence KALOSHIN

about my decision and that I will be working in MGB.

In the end of January I went again in the tuberculous sanatorium,

where I was in 1952. In the days of funeral of STALIN I has come to

Moscow and visited the ministry where my father was working. There

I have seen General KOBULOV who has come to the father and he said

that he would settle my question concerning my job. After several days

in the middle of March I have received a telephone call from MVD to

0001036

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come to KOBULOV. There I have spent about two hours in the re-

ception room of KOBULOV, but he was too busy and his assistant

SAVITSKI sent me to the Deputy of the Chief of the Second Directory

SHUBNIAKOV, who told me that there was signed an order and I was

accepted in the 1 department of 2 chief directory as a case officer.

SHUBNIAKOV invited the deputy of the chief of 1 department GORBATENKO

(who was acting as the chief of 1 Department because the chief of the

department KOSLOV, Anatoli, was appointed to the special department

of extraordinarily affairs (investigation) ). SHUBNIAKOV and

GORBATENKO said to me that I would be working in the l section of

the department. Then I with GORBATENKO went to the 1 department,

was acquainted with the chief of section KOSLOV, Veniamin. KOSLOV

told me that I will be working against the American correspondente,

showed me room, my desk and acquainted with the officers, who were

working in this room: KUTIREV, RACOVSKI, GROMOV and TORMOSOY.

The last officer must give files on the correspondents and agents. I

was said to come next day and began to work.

When I was resting in the tuberculous sanatoriim I acquainted

with KOJEVNIKOV, Ludmila, a student of the Moscowite University,

and in June 1953 we married. Before it I was living with my parents

at St. Gorky, 9, but after marriage was living with the wife at

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St. Serafimovich, 2 (the flat of her parents). In 1955 I received a flat.

at St:

Narodnya, 13, where was living with my family.

In 1954 I contracted a disease (gonorrhea) and on the advice

of the friend IVANOV went to medic point at St. Negliunya. Doctors

asked to show a document, I had with me only MVD certificate and an.

operative passport and showed them the passport.. Doctors had given

me a treatment, after that twice they made tests and asked to come once

more, but I did not come. They wanted to see once more and sént a

letter to the place of work, which was written in the passport. The

plant with MVD found out about it.. The deputy of the chief, SHUBNIAKOV,

was speaking with me. I had written my explanation, and punished by the

chief of the 2 directory, FEDOTOV - 15 days of arrest. The komsomol!s

organization also punished me. I received a strict reprimand and was

' freed of the head of komsomol's organization of the 2 chief director.

I was a member of komsomol's organizationfrom, October 1943.

In the end of 1954 before leaving komsomol (because of age) the komsomol

organization of KGB took off this strict reprimand.

In 1955 on all officers of the 2 chief directory were written

characterizations (May-June). In my characterization was written that

I did not appropriate to the 1 department 2 chief directory. In June-.

July I was appointed to the 7 départment 2 chief directory as a case

0001038

8

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## Page 43

invita

officer of 2 section. This section was new created (the work against

tourists). The chief of 7 department - PERFILIEV, the chief of the

2 section - GUSKOV.

In 1956 I was accepted as a candidate in the Communist Party,

soon received a rank of a senior lieutenant and got a promotion • a

senior case officer.

In 1957 I was accepted in the Party as a member.

In August 1956 my father died.

In 1957 or 1958 I was promoted a deputy chief of 2 section. In

7th department I was working till 1960 and in January 1960 was sent to

work as a deputy chief of the l section in the l department 2 chief

directory (chief of the l department, KLIPIN, Vlad,, chief of the

l section - KOVSHUK).

My family was consist of the wife and two daughters: Oksana,

born in 1954, and Tamara, born in 1958. Oksana was ill (bronchial

asthma) from 1957 and almost every year till 1963 2-3 months was in

hospitals. In 1960 I'was thinking about change (temporary) place of

living and there was a possibility to go to work in 2 departments KGB

in Lvov and Odessa. But there was another question if I go from Moscow

I would lose the flat in Moscow. At this time the chief of the section of

2 department, PIATROVSKI, proposed to me to go to work in Ethiopia

0001039

9

GEORET

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SECRET,

(counter-intelligence work among Soviet specialists in Ethiopia). The

chief of 2 chief directory agreed and the question was almost decided

•but in the last moment the personnel department of KGB did not agree.

The reasons were the case of 1954 (illness and use of the passport for

"cover) and a checking in the place of my living (some of agents report

that drink and on this base have quarrels with the wife).

I was working in the 1 department till 1962. In January 1962

I was appointed again in the 7 department as the chief of the 1 section

(work against tourista from the USA and Canada).

In December 1959 I got a rank of a captain.

When I began to work in the 7 department I knew that soon I

must be promoted a deputy chief of the department, when would free

a place - the deputy chief of department BALDIN was preparing to go

to work in eastern Germany.

In July 1962 I was appointed the deputy chief of 7 department

(the chief of the department was CHELNOKOV) and here I was working

till January 18, 1964.

During my work in MVD-KGB I did not study in any school,

only in 1953-1954 was visiting courses of foreign languages of MVD-

KGB at St. Kiselni.

10

0001040

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Five times I was sent abroad: In 1957 I was in England with a

sport delegation; in 1958 was again in England with a sport delegation;

in 1960 I was in Cuba with a delegation of specialists of nickel industryi

in 1961 I was sent in Bulgaria with the aim to help to 1 department 2

directory MVD; in 1962 I was in Switzerland - the conference of dis -

armament.

Working in MVD-KGB every year I had leaves for rest. In

1953 with the wife I was resting in the tuberculous sanatorium. In 1954

I was with the family at the cottage. In 1955 I was resting at the cottage.

In March 1956 I was resting with the wife in Karlovi Vary, Czechoslovakia

In 1957 I was in Leningrad two weeks with the wife and then rested at

the cottage.

In 1958 I was resting at the cottage.. In 1959 I with the wife

rested in Sochi. In January-February 1960 I rested with the wife in

Kislovodsk. In 1961 - August - I rested with the wife and daughters in

Nicolaev. In October 1962 I rested with the wife in Sochi. In July 1963

I rested with the wife and daughters in Anapa.

C001041

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B. IS THE CLAIMED KGB CAREER OF NOSENKO PLAUSIBLE?

SECRET

Cree:

Eislead ten cutomatic)

dowagradiar and

declassiticalian

0001042

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B. Is the claimed KGB career of NOSENKO plausible? In the

past the theory has been advanced that NOSENKO was never an officer

in the KGB. Information of a detailed nature from NOSENKO concern-

ing the KGB, particularly the Second Chief Directorate, has been so

extensive as to invalidate any contention that he was not a KGB officer.

It is considered that NOSENKO was a KGB officer in the claimed

Departments during the claimed periods of time and served in the claimed

positions in each Department. It is interesting to note that NOSENKO has

not materially varied in his statements in regard to the above since his

original contact in June 1962 (with the exception of his change to 1952 as

date of his entry into the KGB and then later reverting to the date given

in 1962). There have been some variations in dates of a minor nature,

as indicated elsewhere in this summary, but these are of month or day

of transfer from one Department to another and not considered critical

or evidence of deception, NOSENKO has admitted previously giving false

information in regard to rank and medals, but his basic story concerning

SECRET

GINUPT

dawagranite nil

dls-1.

0001043

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his KGB career today is not significantly different from the fragmentary

version he gave in June 1962.

Basically the following is now considered to have been the KGB

career of NOSENKO:

Mid-March 1953 - late May 1955, First Section,

First Department, SCD

Late May 1955 - December 1959 (1958 - December

1959 - Deputy Chief of Section) Seventh

Department, SCD

January 1960 - December 1961, Deputy Chief of

Section, First Section, First Department,

SCD

January 1962 - July 1962, Chief of First Section,

Seventh Department, SCD

July 1962 - January 1964, Deputy Chief of Seventh

Department, SCD

(NOTE: The term Deputy Chief is being used throughout this

summary, but the better terminology probably is "Deputy to Chief."

The position of "Deputy Chief" in United States Government parlance,

including CIA, is not synonymous with the term "Deputy Chief" as used

0001044

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in Soviet organizations and more specifically in the KGB. As an example,

a Chief of Department in the KGB or the Chief of a Residentura abroad

may have 2, 3 or even 4 deputies, one of whom is given the title of

First Deputy. This particular deputy acts in the absence of the Chief

of Department and in general has supervisory functions over all the

Department sections. The exception to the latter is when the Chief of.

Department retains direct supervision over what he may consider the

most important section. Other deputies have supervisory functions only

over designated sections or organizational components.)

During current interviews and in prepared memoranda, NOSENKO

has furnished detailed information which it is considered substantiates

his claimed positions in the KGB. Detailed remarks on these topics are

contained in separate sections of this summary.

It is realized that GOLITSYN, although confirming that NOSENKO

was a KGB officer in both the First Department and Seventh Department,

SCD, has stated that NOSENKO remained in the First Department until

circa 1958 and that NOSENKO was not Deputy Chief of the First Section,

First Department, in 1960. It is impossible to correlate this information

with the above indicated opinion that NOSENKO left the First Department

in late May 1955 and was Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Depart-

ment, in 1960, nor is an adequate explanation of these variances available

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at this time. On the other hand, it is not reasonable that NOSENKO

would lay claim to the title of Deputy Chief of the First Section, First

Department, if this were not true when he clearly knew of the visits of

GOLITSYN to the First Section in 1960 - 1961 and of his conferences

with officers closely associated with NOSENKO at that time.

NOSENKO has also mentioned a number of officers of the SCD

or former officers of the SCD who transferred to the FCD with whom

he was personally acquainted and who were also known to GOLITSYN.

A number of these officers were officers from whom GOLITSYN has

stated he obtained certain information or through whom he became aware

of certain activities including Vladislav M. KOVSHUK, Gennadiy I.

GRYAZNOV, Vladimir Ivanovich PETROV, Yuriy I. GUK, Vladimir

A. CHURANOV, Yevgeniy GROMAKOVSKIY and Vadim V. KOSOLAPOV.

The statement of NOSENKO that although he had heard of

GOLITSYN he had never personally met GOLITSYN, stands in conflict

with the statements of GOLITSYN that he, GOLITSYN, had met and

talked with NOSENKO in the SCD in the late 1950's. The description

of GOLITSYN of this meeting is that of a casual encounter in the halls

rather than a specific office visit. In light of this, the absence of any

reason why NOSENKO from his point of view should remember such

an encounter and the absence of any reason for NOSENKO to lie on this

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Scunal

issue, it is eminently reasonable to conclude that the encounter took

place but that NOSENKO simply has no recollection of it. There is

no reason to attach significance to this lapse of memory.

The previous opinion that NOSENKO did not hold the claimed

position of Deputy Chief, First Section, First Department, during 1960 -

1961 has had the most merit in the controversy over his statements

relative to his KGB career. This particular aspect will be covered in

detail in another section, but of note at this time is the controversy

over what duties the position of Deputy Chief of Section in the SCD, KGB,

entails or does not entail. It is a fruitless exercise to attempt to judge

whether NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the First Section in 1960 - 1961

on the basis of whether his knowledge of the total activities of the First

Section was commensurate with the knowledge of a Deputy Branch Chief

in CIA in regard to the activities of the entire Branch.

Whether NOSENKO was a Deputy Chief of Section in the SCD,

KGB, must be judged on the basis of what were the duties of a Deputy

Chief of Section in the SCD and in particular what were his duties in

the particular assignment. The organizational structure of the KGB

may or may not have some similarities to the organizational structure

of CIA, but any similarities are surely not such as to permit a judgment

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as to whether NOSENKO held a certain claimed position on the basis

of a comparison of his activities and responsibilities with that inherent

in a somewhat similar position in CIA.

One of the most important differences between United States

agencies

or organizations, including CIA, and the bureaucratic structure

of agencies of organizations in the USSR, including the KGB, is the

salary structure. Pay of a KGB officer is based on military rank and

on actual position held with an additional percentage increase for longevity

and language qualification. Actual position held is important from a

monetary viewpoint in addition to the prestige. As an example, the

difference in monthly salary between a captain and a major is twenty

rubles and the difference in salary between a Senior Case Officer and

a Deputy Chief of Section is also twenty rubles. An increase in military

rank alone has limited pay advantages, as for example a Lieutenant

Colonel who is only a Senior Case Officer receives less pay than a major

who holds the position of Chief of Section.

During current interviews, an effort has been made to obtain

from NOSENKO statements concerning his responsibilities in the various

claimed positions. The judgment on whether he held or did not hold

the various claimed positions, in view of the absence of any factual

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supporting or refuting information, has necessarily been based to a

considerable degree on the logic of the statements made by NOSENKO.

Admittedly this is not the most satisfactory way of resolving the

questions, but it is the only method possible at this time.

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C. HAS NOSENKO GIVEN AN ACCEPTABLE EXPLANATION OF

HIS MOTIVATION IN CONTACTING CIA IN 1962

AND FOR HIS DEFECTION IN 1964?

SECRET

CROUP 1

Excladed from automatici

deungrading aud

declassification

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C. Has NOSENKO given an acceptable explanation of his

motivation in contacting CIA in 1962 and for his defection in 1964? Of

the eight listed categories which are being given specific consideration

in the matter of the bona fides of NOSENKO, this category is probably

the most difficult in which to present a logical position with factual

support. There are too many intangible aspects involved and although

motivation is an important factor; full resolution of the motivation

problem is not a paramount factor in deciding whether NOSENKO is or

is not a dispatched agent. NOSENKO could have contacted this Agency in

1962 and defected in 1964 without KGB knowledge and yet even at this late

date have failed to disclose some important events of a personal nature.

which actually were important ingredients in his ultimate decision.

Defectors are humans and have at least the normal reluctance to admit

unfavorable information which they consider of a personal nature.

On 31 October 1967 NOSENKO, following a request, furnished a

handwritten memorandum on the topic of his motivation, a typed copy of

which is attached. The memorandum, although not grammatically correct,

is quite understandable and is worthy of review. The tenor of the memo -

randum is one of increasing disillusionment with the Soviet regime.

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NOSENKO and others of his generation have lived in a Soviet society

throughout their entire lives. The environment is an important factor

of influence in the life of an individual and true disillusionment is at

best usually a gradual process in which many factors, some recognized

and some not recognized by the individual, have played a role in varying

degrees.

NOSENKO, until 1955 and possibly until the death of his father

in August 1956, could be compared to the profligate son of wealthy

parents in the United States who finally graduates from college and obtains

employment perhaps in the firm of his father without actually earning any of

the luxuries he has enjoyed. The father of NOSENKO was not only wealthy

by Soviet standards but also held a high government position. The

influence of his father and the name of his father undoubtedly was an

important if not the most important factor in NOSENKO even being

permitted to enter the Naval RU and the KGB even though NOSENKO is

particularly reluctant to admit, perhaps even to himself, that this was

the primary reason.

The above should not be construed as any reflection on the

actual intelligence of NOSENKO, but rather as an explanation of how

NOSENKO could have even entered the Naval RU and KGB. His

2

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performance in both prior to 1956 by his own admission was such that

he probably would have been summarily terminated if he had not been

the son of the capable, respected Minister of Shipbuilding.

If a certain amount of speculation is permitted, the

disillusionment of NOSENKO, who lost many personal advantages

following the death of his father including a personal automobile, may

have actually started soon after the death of his father. That NOSENKO

is undisciplined is supported by his admissions relative to his life in

the USSR and his behavior both in 1962 in Geneva and for a period of time

atter his defection in 1964. NOSENKO was addicted to women, liquor, and

the material things which can be purchased with money or obtained through

influence.

A question has been previously raised regarding his motivation

in contacting CIA in 1962, particularly his statement that he needed money

and would sell "two pieces of information." NOSENKO has stated that he

wanted to make a contact with the Americans, that he was not emotionally

ready to defect, but that he subconsciously believed that if he made a

contact he would be making an ultimate commitment from which he could

no longer retreat.

3

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NOSENKO has stated that he gave considerable thought to the

best way to contact the Americans so that he would be believed and not

rejected and came to the conclusion that he would offer to sell some

information. NOSENKO stated that he thought if he approached the

Americans stating he was a "KGB counterintelligence officer who wanted

to give information, " he would not have been believed and would have

been peremptorily rejected. NOSENKO stated he had difficulty deciding

how much money to ask for and how to make the approach, but finally

decided to do it through David MARK; whom the KGB considered was with

American Intelligence.

The above

statements by NOSENKO are not in conflict with the

record. NOSENKO did offer to sell "two pieces of information, " almost

immediately gave more information, made no significant demands for

money, and in fact his price for "two pieces of information" was

ridiculously low by American standards. NOSENKO has during current

interviews stated, as he first stated in 1962, that he had spent excessive

amounts of money in one or two riotous evenings. However, NOSENKO

has during current interviews stated that he could have covered his

expenditures by other means without receiving any money from the

Americans.

4

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## Page 61

NOSENKO has stated that the sight before bls departure from

Gansta to the USSR ho gave serions shougai to defection but was not

emotionally sdapted to doloct at that tiro. Folloming his saturs to the

Sorte: Valos, NOSENKO, during a period of time, made bis fizal

decision to defect at the first opportanity, realising that it raeani

leaving bis wife, childres, and otbar members of his family in the

USBR.

Sase aspecte of the motivation of NOSENKO are abacure and

will probably so remals. I toald be proferable li an axeei dotailed

chronalogy of all the lactors involved could be prepared or 1i1 ever

certais obvions factora could be accurazaly delineated. These ars boti

impossible as this time and probably at say time in the futero. What

is important at this timo la a dacition an to whether tho motivation al

NOSENKO WAs based on personal ressons with no implications of KGB

dispascs, It lo considered that tha explanation of NOSINKO concerning

hia santivation 1s acceptable and thal his statement that no one excepi

1ÃB AMATICAAI WAS SWAJO OÍ DiA CONtREtS With ISe ALOTiCaNA in 1962

07 bis istont t0 dolaci in 1964 la supported by otbes iaformation of a

collateral asiara. (See Seeston III, H.)

Attackrrent:

Typed epy Memo from NOSENKO

5

CECRET

6001055

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## Page 62

14-00000

Operational Memo # N-4

SUBJECT: NOSENKO, Yuri Ivanovich

The following is a typed copy of a handwritten memorandum

furnished by Subject on 1 November 1967, following a request on

31 October 1967:

What were the motif and the reasons which have led me to

the decision to breake with the Soviet Russia? The only definite is an

understanding of the situation in the Soviet Russia, the knowledge of

the methods of the communist regime, the knowledge of the real foreign

and interior policies of the Soviet government and the faith in the right-

ness of the free world.

It was not a decision which was accepted or could be accepted

in a month or a year. This decision was slowly growing in me. I

think that the beginning was in the studentship.

Living with my parents and being in the circles of the parent's

and my acquaintances I knew more then there was written in newspapers

and periodica and that was propagandized by radio and TV. Working in

the Far East and later being in trips in different regions and cities of

Russia I found out much better the life and conditions of the life of the

people of the Soviet Russia.

SECRET

GROUP 1

Arcladed frenz aulomalle!

hi: +9901118 90rd

6001056

---

## Page 63

When I worked 11 years in MVD-KGB I understood and found

out very many things, details and the real deal of the existing regime,

about methods of the work of MGB-MVD-KGB and about their doings,

about hundreds of thousands of the people of Russia who were (and

still are) considered "politically" dangerous and around whom was

(and still is) going an active work of all organs KGB:

At the same time when I was several times abroad I have:

seen personally the so-called "decay" at the West. I have seen in

reality how is living people.

Several times when I was abroad I was thinking about staying*

at the West and not returning in Russia, but only one thing was keeping

me - my family.

In 1962 in Switzerland I made the acquaintance with the

Americans. From my part "the sell of the information" was a real

show. I was thinking that they would not believe me otherwise. In

that period of the time there was going a big struggle in me to stay

abroad or to return home till the last days of living in Geneva and even

when I was returning home in Vienna.

In 1962-1963 I decided definitely that I did not want and could

not live more in the Soviet Russia. In this period of time I have done

all my best to go as soon as possible abroad.

2

00U1657

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## Page 64

14-011100

"It was not easy to make this decision, it was very difficult

to leave the family for ever.

And now in spite of everything I do not regret.

0001058

3

SFPAST

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## Page 65

D

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## Page 66

14-00000

SECRET

D. IS THE INFORMATION FURNISHED BY NOSENKO TO CIA

CONCERNING KGB OPERATIONS, PERSONALITIES,

AND ORGANIZATION REASONABLY COMMENSURATE

WITH HIS CLAIMED KGB CAREER?

SECRET

Excutes

rainercong

0001059

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## Page 67

4-00000

SECRET

D. Is the information furnished by NOSENKO to CIA concerning

KGB operations, personalities, and organization reasonably commen-

surate with his claimed KGB career? The conclusion is that the infor-

mation furnished by NOSENKO concerning KGB operations, personalities,

and organization is more than reasonably commensurate with his claimed

career in the KGB from mid-March 1953 to his defection in early February

1964.

In reaching the above conclusion, consideration has been given

to his claimed departmental assignments and claimed positions in each

department.. Certain allowance has been made for faulty memory with

consideration being given to whether there is any indication of deception

or whether the failure to recall a particular item of interest can logically

be attributed to the vagaries of the human mind. There is, of course, ru

accurate standard of measurement which would permit a positive deter-

mination as to whether inability to recall certain details or events is

actually due to the fact that the human mind cannot recall all past events

or could be attributed to willful deception.

SECRET

GROUP 1

Excluded trom automadle

downgrading and

declassilication

0001C60

---

## Page 68

An effort has been made to determine if there are any particular

patterns or areas where NOSENKO has indicated he did not recall

specific matters or certain details, and no pattern or specific areas

have been noted. NOSENKO, in fact, has an unusually good memory

as evidenced by the extensive information furnished by NOSENKO purely

from recollection. In addition, there has been no material reluctance

on the part of NOSENKO to discuss his entire life, KGB officers he has

known, KGB organization and procedures, or other topica of interest.

NOSENKO has furnished considerable detail concerning KGB

officers whom he has known at various periods in his: entire KGB career.

He has been very consistent in information furnished and has frequently

added certain details which he recalled at a later date.

Certain remarks will be made in another section in regard to

the volume and scope of information furnished by NOSENKO. This in-

formation is not selective, but is an excellent indicator that NOSENKO

was assigned to the First Department and Seventh Department, SCD,

during the claimed periods of time and held the claimed positions. Con-

sideration has been given to his various claimed KGB assignments in

evaluating the information furnished in an effort to assess whether his

indicated knowledge was commensurate with his claimed position during

0001061

SECRET

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## Page 69

14-00000

Sinclad

a particular period of time or suggested the possibility that he did not

occupy the position which he claimed to have held.

It is considered that information furnished by NOSENKO supports

his claimed positions in the SCD. It has not been possible to substantially .

confirm through collateral sources that NOSENKO served in his claimed

positions. Neither has it been possible to obtain from other sources an

applicable description of the duties or responsibilities of an individual

holding any of the positions NOSENKO claimed to have held after 1958. It

is felt there can be no question that NOSENKO served in the capacities of

junior case officer, case officer, and senior case officer during 1953 - 1957.

As regards the duties and responsibilities of a Deputy Chief of Section,

Chief of Section, and Deputy Chief of Department, and whether NOSENKO

held these various claimed positions, a considerable amount of personal

judgment has been necessary. This personal judgment has been made in

as judicial a manner as possible, with full knowledge that any opinion in

regard to the above is largely dependent upon information from NOSENKO.

NOSENKO has compiled detailed diagrams of the actual offices

be claims to have occupied and surrounding offices during the four pri-

mary periods of time: 1953 - 1955, 1955 - 1959, 1960 - 1961, and 1962 -

1963. He has prepared specific memoranda concerning his co-officers

3

0001062

SECRET

---

## Page 70

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S20.41

and other personnel, and changes of personnel, as well as diagrams

of the offices of the Chief and Deputy Chiefs of the SCD during 1956 -

1964. This material is internally consistent. Furthermore NOSENKO

could not possibly have known that this detailed information could not

immediately be checked for accuracy, at least in part, with a source

or another officer who has defected since mid-1964. If these diagrams

and memoranda were not relatively correct, NOSENKO, who is quite

astute in matters of counterintelligence, would hardly have voluntarily

prepared the material in such detail. This type of information is

peculiarly adaptable for analysis by a knowledgeable source or by another

defector and could, if not relatively correct, permit a rather positive con-

clusion that NOSENKO was lying or fabricating information.

NOSENKO has furnished quite specific information on KGB

operations during the 1953 - 1955, 1955 - 1959, 1960 - 1961, and 1962 -

1963 periods of time. As might be expected, his specific knowledge is

Less for the 1953 - 1955 period; but his own personal situation and attitude

until 1955 - 1956, which are mentioned elsewhere, should be given

consideration. In any event, he has furnished adequate information so

that his claimed assignment during 1953 - 1955 is considered sufficiently

substantiated even though his actual job performance undoubtedly

deserved a low rating.

C001063

SECRET

---

## Page 71

14-00000

SEC

The knowledge of NOSENKO concerning cases, KGB operations,

and other officers can consistently be related to his claimed department

and position assignment during the 1953 to January 1964 period. The

scope of his knowledge of his own department when considered in toto

is broader after 1957 than before, which is compatible with his claim of

increased responsibilities. His knowledge of the work of other departments

of the SCD from the late 1950's on is also more extensive, which is also a

further indication that NOSENKO actually held the claimed positions

during this period of time.

5

SECRET

0061087

---

## Page 72

E

---

## Page 73

4-00000

SECRET

- E.

CAN THE INFORMATION FURNISHED BY NOSENKO BE

CONSIDERED IN TOTO AS HAVING RESULTED

IN MATERIAL DAMAGE TO THE KGB AND/OR HAS

THE INFORMATION FURNISHED BY NOSENKO BEEN OF

SIGNIFICANT BENEFIT TO WESTERN INTELLIGENCE?

6001065

SECRET

Excluded from automatic

downgrading and

deciaocillostion

---

## Page 74

SECRET

E. Can the information furnished by NOSENKO be considered

in toto as having resulted in material damage to the KGB and/or has

the information furnished by NOSENKO been of significant benefit to

Western Intelligence? The conclusion in regard to both of the above

questions is affirmative, even though it is realized that ultimate loss

to the KGB and ultimate benefit to Western Intelligence are both partly

of an intangible nature and not susceptible to accurate measurement.

NOSENKO has, as previously, indicateà, furnished voluminous

information during current and previous interviews. An accurate total

of syecific cases is not possible at this time and would at best be only

an interesting figure, the actual significance of waich would be marginal.

Practically every interview with NOSENKO, even at present, reveals

information of counterintelligence interest and it is expected tat this

production can continue for a considezable period of time. Tais should

not be construed as an incication thai NOSENKO is intentionally wit-

colding irformation, but rather that stimulaion of his memory through

normal questions and discussions has been and can continue to be

Productive.

SECRE

0001066

---

## Page 75

14-00000

NOSENSO has furnished information concerning perhaps! 2, 00u)

KGB officers and 300)KGB agents or operative contacts (here the terms

agents or operative contacts are used o refer to Soviet nationals),

mainly in the Second Chief Directorate or internal KGB organizations.

However, he has identified approximately (250 former or current First

Chief Directorate officers and there is a considerable exchange of

officers between the FCD and SCD. In addition, numerous officers

of the SCD and other internal iGB organizations travel abroad with

delegations, tourist groups, and as visitors to various major exhibitions

such as World's Fairs. It is impossible at this time to estimate the

number of KGB officers identified by NOSENKO who have been outside

the Soviet Bloc since his defection or who will be out sometime in the

future.

There has been very little attempted exploitation of information

furnished'by NOSENKO concerning other KGB officers and, therefore,

the possible value of this information to United States Intelligence

cannot be estimated nor can the potential damage to the KGB be esti-

mated.

Disclosure of information concerning certain KGB officers would

be a necessary part of any dispatch oi a KGB agent or officei to the

West either or purposes of contact with Western Intelligence for a

2

0001667

15951

---

## Page 76

4-00000

limited perior of time or for the placing of the individual in a defector

staîus. However, identification of KGB officers or agents to Western

Intelligence is necessarily a matter of concern to the KGB and the ex-

posure of the identities of approximately (2, 000) KGB officers and (several)

(hundred) KGB agents could not be considered of negligible importance.

Obtaining specific information in regard to KGB officers or

KGB assets is important to United States Intelligence and a consider-

able amount of manpower and money is spent on this activity. Even

acknowledging that it is much more difficult for CIA to obtain this type

of information about the KGB, which operates in a closed society, than

it is for the KGB to obtain the identity of CIA employees, it is believed

doubtful any reader of this summary would consider that the identifi-

cation of! 2, 000) CIA employees and(several hundred) agent assets to

the KGB would be any less than a very serious compromise of valuable

information,

Prior to the defection of NOSENKO, little was known of the

organization

of the SCD or other internal KGB organizations. The

information provided by NOSENKO concerning both has been detailed

and extensive. That this information is of vaiue to the United States

inielligence community is hardly subject io dispuie, althouga analysts

3

6001C68

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## Page 77

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SEGRET

can differ as to the weight which should be given to the value of this

type of information.

NOSENKO has furnished information concerning SCD, KGB,

recruitments of United States citizens and foreign nationals covering

the period of 1953 through 1963. This should not be interpreted as a

statement that NOSENKO has furnished information in regard to all

SCD recruitments, even of Americans, during this period.. His infor-

mation based on personal knowledge is in general limited to the First

Department and Seventh Department. He has furnished information

concerning cases of several other departments in the SCD and some

FCD cases, but this information was in general acquired indirectly

from social or business

conversations with other KGB officers.

NOSENKO has furnished information in regard to a number of

cases which were previously known to United States Intelligence. While

the value of such information cannot be considered high, the additional

details which NOSENKO has provided in a number of cases cannot be

dismissed

as being of no value to Western Intelligence, even if the

information cannot be regarded as damaging to the KGB. Furthermore,

inasmuch as there is no reason to question his sourcing of information

already known, there is no basis for suspicion of NOSENKO for his

having provided such information.

6001669

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## Page 78

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i tits..

NOSENKO has furnished information in regard to a number of

recruitments. by the KGB of non-Bloc nationals who were known by

Western Intelligence to be pro-Communist or even connected with

Communist organizations. The identification as a recruited KGB

agent of an individual previously known to be pro-Communist is of

considerable value to Western Intelligence and may be considered to

have resulted in some damage to the KGB. Admittedly, the potential

to the KGB of an agent who is known as pro-Communist is less than

that of a "politically clean" individual. However, "pro-Communist"

or even "Communist" are not synonymous with 'recruited KGB agent."

NOSENKO has furnished additional information on cases in

which there was some previous but limited information. In a number

of these instances the additional information from NOSENKO has per-

mitted identification of the individuals of interest and the closing of an

"Unknown Subject" case. In such instances the information from

NOSENKO must be considered valuable to Western Intelligence since

the incomplete information known previously would in many cases not

have permitted ultimate identification of the individual of interest.

This category of cases must be considered as having resulted in damage

to the KGB and in benefit to Western Intelligence.

5

0001070

SEPRET

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## Page 79

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NOSENKO has furnished information in regard to a number of

individuals, both American and non-3loc foreign, who were recruited

by the KCB and concerning whom Western Intelligence had no significant

information. It is recognized that certain of these cases mentioned by

NOSENKO, particularly in the tourist category, would probably never

kave actually materialized as productive KGB agents. This could be

for various reasons including later refusal to cooperate, later geo-

graphical inaccessibility to the KGB, or not being either at the time

of SCD recruitment or later in a position to furnish information of

interest to the KGB. In this regard, NOSENKO has stated that at least

until 1962 there was a definite tendency in the Seventh Department to

make a "recruitment" as a statistic for the end-of-year report even

though it was apparent the agent at the time had no potential and that

it was highly unlikely there would be a potential in the future.

NOSENKO has furnished information on or leads to a number of

cases, primarily third nationals but some American, in which he bas

beer unable to furnish sufficient details to permit identification at this

time. In certain instances it is believed that an identification will be

possible after additional research and investigation. Until an identi-

fication is made, the value of any particular lead to Western Intelli-

gence cannot be estimated, but thai there may be a potential value

0001071

SECRE

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## Page 80

14-00000

cannot be ignored. As an example of this category, NOSENKO has

furnished a lead, still under investigation, to an unidentified agent,

probably not an American, who in 1962 was in a position to remove

the "NATO Emergency Codes," deliver the codes to the KGB for

photographing, and then successfully replace the codes. Because the

agent is as yet unidentified, his current access to information affecting

the security of the United States cannot be gauged.

In all, the information from NOSENKO in the category of cases

where Western Intelligence did not previously have significant infor-

mation must be considered on balance as having resúlted in material

damage to the KGB and of significant benefit to Western Intelligence.

Quantity alone of CI or FI information from a KGB defector is

not a standard on which to judge bona fides.. The question is whether

the amount of his information is reasonably commensurate with his

claimed positions in the KGB. This question as regards NOSENKO

has been examined, with affirmative findings, in another section of

this paper.

A few examples from the above cited categories of information

furnished by NOSENKO are listed below. These cases are given as

illustrations and are not necessarily listed in order of importance.

7

0001072

SEC.

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## Page 81

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Ine case oi Robert Lee JOHNSON and the related case of

James Allen VINTKENBAUGH have been covered in the previous

summary. It cai be considered that soth were exposed as a result

of a lead from NOSENKO which led to suspicions of JOHNSON.

Another American case is that of Herbert HOWARD, a USIA;

employee who spent considerable time in the USSR in 1962 - 1963.

NOSENKO identified Herbert HOWARD/as having been recruited by.

the First Section, First Department, SCD, in 1962 and was positive

that (HOWARD) furnished valuable information to the KGB. When

interviewed in 1964, HOWARD did not admit he had been recruited,

but suspicion of HOWARD was greai enough so that his contract with

USIA was not renewed.

I indeed HOWARD was recruited by the KGB, it is impossible

to determine how much information would have been compromised by

HOWARD; while in the USSR, he did have certain access to the United

States Embassy. There is good reason to believe that if HOWARD was

recruited, it was he who was responsible for the compromisa of a

potentially valuabie Soviet walk-in with whom CIA was attempting to

establish contact using HOWARD)as intermediary.

NOSENKO in 1964 furnished information in regard to a "ZHARI"

(apparentiy a KGB code name, although NOSENKO thought it was a true

8

0001073

SECRET

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## Page 82

Dano). He identifiod "ZHARI" (phosetto) as an American code cleri

#ão delocted to the USSR in 1961. As intornal assumptlon was made

annod on too origioal lead information fsom NOSENKO that "ZHARI"

waa Victor NoIris HAMILTON, SiA FOU?! Mitri HINDALY, & 108M8S

NSA esaployas who defocted to the USSR Is 1962, asd the information

ESOTa NOSINIO uns nover disseminatad or investigated.

Prior to the auriacing al John Diacoe SMITH by the Sorlota

da tha tail of 1967,

talormation conceraing KGB browledgo

of American codo clarks mas botag laventigated; and John Discoe

SMITH was a loadiag suspocs. After las ouriacing of SMITH by tho

Sorters, it becama apparent that SMITH, MatHOS tRI HAMILTON, WEE

Idlontical to "ZHARI," Intastigation dlacioned toas so dofiaire intosina-

ton could be satablished in ragard to the actual whereabouto ol 3MITH

aftas circa mid-1960. It cannot be positivaly statod that appropriato

lavestigation is 1964 of tho "ZHARI" load would baro lod to tro Identi-

fication of Jobs DiscOs SMITH AS "ZHARI." However, nuch identifi-

callon would bavo bees of considarable intaraai to the DepRitment al

Siste and CIA, and could vesy wall bave perraitted costals action thica

moold save al least lossenod the propaganda ellect af the surprise

Banouscamoa! by the soviola in laa fall of 1967.

NOSENKO, in Juse 1962, furalahed Information from walch

William VASSALL could ba quicily Identiflod. GOLITSYN, la lato

1960 - cazly 1961, had lurnished Islormation concerning a Soviet pena-

¿salon of la Britai Government on the badio outsit he Britab

9

SECRFT

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## Page 83

14-00100

Servicon had complled a llat al trenty suspecis, includiag VASSALL.

Iven though il may be prosumed thai investigation of tha tranty suapecta

mould ultimataly bave resulted in & desermination that VASSALL Nas

tho agent on whom GOLITSYN had furainbed certzin information, the

EsTormatiOn ÍTOOs NOSENKO in juno 1962 resultad in tho caxilas tarini-

nation by the British Servicos of a still valuable productivo KGB agent.

Althonga not the case of a KGB agent, the matter of the malcro-

phonas la the Unitad Sistas Imbassy should alsa be meitioned.

GOLITSYN, following ble defection in December 1961, furalabed

cortain information in regard to microphones in the Unitad States

Embaany (ChAsCeTy). Staco la fact the microphones were connected

to contral cables, location of one microphone moald logically bavo lod

to the exposure of the entiro sot of microphones. Howevas, appro-

pilate action was not taixon on this information and the KGB would bave

beon aware thai no action mas taten prior to june 1862 when NOSENKO

{139t contacted CIA.

Ll NOSINKO is a dispatebed KGS agost, 1t la sot clear way the

KG3 monid attraci speciflo atrantion to a syatem of microphones which

21ast bave atlll bad somo value an al Juna 1952. A presumpilon may

Da sURdo ¿BRI 11 NOSENKO was a diapatched agent, ite KGB bad, as oi

1962, an advanced system of monitoring devicoy walch renderad the

abora microphone systam obsoleta. Homover, no concrato evidence

of nuch an advanced systam is available and it should be notad ibai it

10

CEGRET

0001075

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## Page 84

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was not until circa April 1964 that any effective action was taken to

locate and remove the microphone system to which GOLITSYN had

given a lead in late December 1961 - early January 1962.

A few general comments in regard to the CI information fur-

nished by NOSENKO would be appropriate in this particular section.

As regards leads furnished by NOSENKO to American cases, most

of these leads have been mentioned in the previous summary. Current

interviews with NOSENKO have resulted in approximately seventeen

new American leads which are being examined by the FBI. The inter-

views have also resulted in more specific information in regard to a

number of cases previously mentioned by NOSENKO, thus permitting

additional development of these cases by the FBI.

NOSENKO has provided leads to over 100 third-country KGB

agents. Geographically these leads are wide in scope, including

nationals of such countries as Indonesia, Austria, Uruguay, the United

Kingdom, France, West Germany, Belgium, Sweden, Australia, Japan,

Mexico, Italy, and a number of other countries.

included in the more important of these agent or other leads

are leads to high levels of government and intelligence to code clerks,

to access agents fo: American targets, to actual or possible illegal

0001076

1 1

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## Page 85

14-01100

support assets. Also included are foreign correspondents,

repre-

sentatives of foreign tourist firms, and foreign tourists.

A summary of the foreign leads arbitrarily defined as of major

significance shows nineteen leads highly placed or formerly highly

placed in their own government, four code clerks, eight cases involving

definite American interest, and four access agents to Americans. It also

20d3e

1/0C8

shows nine instances of clandestine KGB activity against foreign missions

in Moscow, including actual KGB clandestine access into certain Western

Embassies (but not the British or American Embassies).

NOSENKO has also furnished leads to certain FCD foreign

national agents, his information on several being derived during his

three months in Geneva in 1962.

It is impossible to give an exact evaluation of the significance

of the foreign leads furnished by NOSENKO. That they are of signi-

ficant value to Western Intelligence and damaging to the KGB is hardly

subject to dispute. This evaluation must be given even though there

are numerous foreign leads which have not been adequately exploited

ai this time. '

As a final note, the implied conclusion in the previous summary

is accepted that the failure of NOSENKO to provide usable positive

12

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## Page 86

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PLUNLI

insulligenco iniormation ls sot s siguilleart inctor in a determiastios

of his bona ides. Tao qualificatios abould, homores, be added that

1813 10t lalt that NOSENKO has, as of this time, been fally debrielad

in many areas of positive incalligento laterest.

13

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## Page 87

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F. IS THERE EVIDENCE OF KGB DECEPTION OR "GIVE AWAY"

IN INFORMATION FURNISHED BY NOSENKO WHICH

WOULD WARRANT A CONCLUSION THAT NOSENKO

WAS DISPATCHED BY THE KGB ?

0001078

CROU? 1

Excluded trem cateratic

SECRET

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## Page 89

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SECRET

I. Is there evidence of KGB deception or "give away" in

information furnished by NOSENKO which would warrant a conclusion

that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB? The conclusion in this

summary is that NOSENKO was not dispatched by the KGB. In

reaching this conclusion, a full examination of the above question has

been both a necessary and integral part.

It is inherent that the volume of information furnished by

NOSENKO is only one of the factors which should be given consideration

in arriving at a conclusion that NOSENKO was or was not dispatched by

the KGB. If NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB, the KGB would have

surely been willing to sacrifice

certain information of value to the KGB

in order to support the bona fides of NOSENKO. However, if NOSENKO

was dispatched, it must have been to accomplish or further a KGB

purpose or mission, the nature of which has been and continues to be

unknown.

An examination of the circumstances under which NOSENKO first

contacted CIA in Geneva in 1962 and his behavior during these contacts is

particularly pertinent since during this period of time NOSENKO would

have surely been under direct KGB control if there are any implications

of KGB dispatch in the NOSENKO case.

dider 1

Hold ten thematic:

SECRET

0001079

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## Page 90

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SEGALT

NOSENKO has stated that his original approach to "sell two

pieces of information"' was his own idea as to what was most likely to

be successful. NOSENKO has stated that he wanted to make a contact

with the Americans, was not psychologically adapted to defect at the

time, and felt that if he merely stated that he was a "KGB counter-

intelligence officer who wanted to give information, " he very possibly

would be rejected. It should be noted that NOSENKO even during his

first contact did not limit his remarks to the "two pieces of information"

and began to talk quite freely on other matters.

If NOSENKO was dispatched, it is felt that he, during his 1962

contacts, would have been very carefully briefed and that his remarks

or statements would have not been of a nature which could cause any

suspicion in regard to the bona fides of NOSENKO. Instead, a current

review of his statements and remarks during his five contacts in 1962

indicate that his many errors, exaggerations, and actual lies were quite

likely typical of a braggadocio element in the personality of NOSENKO

and may also have been evidence supporting the statement by NOSENKO

that he usually had a few drinks of liquor before each contact in

Geneva.

z

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NOSENKO, during his five contacts in Geneva, made many

statements which in retrospect were impossible, and the investigation

of which could only have raised certain questions concerning NOSENKO.

The following is a list of the more obvious areas in which NOSENKO

made gross exaggerations or made incorrect or impossible statements.

(a) NOSENKO claimed he personally was with

Oleg M. GRIBANOV, Chief of the SCD, during the

recruitment pitch to James STORSBERG, (This was

a lie and an interview with STORSBERG)with display

of photograph would have disclosed that NOSENKO

did not participate.)

(b) NOSENKO was involved in the recruitment

approach to Russell LANGELLE. (This was a lie and

LANGELLE was available for interview.)

(c) NOSENKO said he recruited LUNT (Horace)

(LUNT) in Bulgaria. (Actually NOSENKO never met

(LUNT.)

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(d) NOSENKO claimed personal contact with (Edmund

STEVENS who, according to NOSENKO, had been recruited

by the KGB. (NOSENKO actually had never personally met

(STEVENS and only had seen (STEVENS) once at a distance.)

(e) NOSENKO dated the recruitment of "ANDREY"

in Moscow as 1949-1950. At the same time he furnished

information that "ANDREY" (who is considered identical to

. Dayle Wallis SMITH) was in Moscow during a part of the time

that Roy RHODES, also a recruited agent, was assigned to

Moscow, 1951-1953. "ANDREY" (SMITH) was actually in

Moscow 1952-1954.

(f) NOSENKO said be, GRIBANOV, and another officer

met Edward Ellis SMITH. (NOSENKO bas since stated he did

not meet SMITH and that his only role was obtaining a foreign

typewriter and paper for a KGB agent involved in the SMITH

operation.)

(g) NOSENKO in a number of instances spoke in the

first person,

saying "We did this," or "We did that, " in

reference to

a particular KGB activity in which he now admits

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(*

he was not involved but had some knowledge. (If

NOSENKO was under KGB control in 1962, both he

and the KGB should have known that these indicated

exaggerations would eventually lead to a question

concerning the bona fides of NOSENKO.)

In 1962-1963 a number of similarities were noted between

information furnished by NOSENKO and information which had been

furnished by GOLITSYN prior to June 1962. These similarities were

quite striking and gave riseto certain suspicions of NOSENKO because

he provided information which the KGB would presumably have considered

already compromised as a result of the defection of GOLITSYN. Certain

of the similarities at the time could only be explained in terms of

NOSENKO being a dispatched agent. The following are some examples of

the similarities noted.

(a) Both furnished information in regard to

(Johan PREISFREUND!

(b) Both furnished information in regard to a

military code clerk case (James STORSBERG).

(c) Both furnished information in regard to a

trip of Vladislav KOVSHUK, under an assumed name,

to the United States. (GOLITSYN was sure it was

connected with a reactivation of an agent formerly in

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Moscow, or a recruitment of an American formerly

with the United States Embassy in Moscow; and NOSENKO

related it directly to the "ANDREY" case, giving the

assumed name which KOVSHUK used. )

(d) Both furnished information in regard to

microphones in the United States Embassy in Moscow.

(e) Both furnished information in regard to

(Edmund STEVENS and Isaac Henry SHAPIRO!

The above list is not complete nor does it indicate the actual

differences in the amount of information furnished on any particular

topic by GOLITSYN and NOSENKO. To cite the above in detail in this

summary is believed unnecessary since the only point of real interest

is whether the fact that NOSENKO was aware of certain events, cases,

or situations of which GOLITSYN was also aware raises a legitimate

question concerning the bona fides of NOSENKO.

The above area of concern has been thoroughly examined and

it is considered that the fact that NOSENKO furnished some information

on certain cases or situations previously mentioned in lesser or

greater detail by GOLITSYN cannot logically be construed as evidence

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that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB. NOSENKO has during

current interviews satisfactorily sourced his information in almost

every instance. In a few instances he has said he did not recall

how be learned of a particular piece of information but these

apparent lapses of memory were not large in number and are

considered to be in no way suspicious.

The general area in which there was a similarity between

information furnished by GOLITSYN in late 1961 - early.1962 and

information furnished by NOSENKO in June 1962 and which would have

been the most significant insofar as the security of the United States

Government was or is concerned related to certain activities centering

around or in the First Department, SCD.

It is the conclusion of this summary that NOSENKO was an

officer of the First Section, First Department, SCD, during 1953-1955

and was Deputy Chief of the same section in 1960 - 1961. Therefore,

the fact that NOSENKO furnished information concerning certain cases

or situations in the First Department and the fact that GOLITSYN

furnished information concerning the same case or situation is not

unusual or necessarily suspicious. NOSENKO has stated that GOLITSYN

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knew and was in contact with other officers of the First Section and

GOLITSYN has attributed his knowledge of certain cases or activities

of the First Department, SCD, primarily to his association with

certain officers in the First Department, SCD.

It is recognized that there are certain conflicts in information

furnished by GOLITSYN and NOSENKO and at this time it is not

possible to satisfactorily correlate certain information from GOLITSYN

with information from NOSENKO. Pages 162 - 163 of the previous

summary refer to information from GOLITSYN which is characterized

as "Information about KGB Operations Agairst Embassy Code Clerks in

1960 - 1961. " The references are to information from GOLITSYN basea

on remarks by Gennadiy Ivanovich GRYAZNOV and Vadim Viktorovich

KOSOLAPOV of the First Section, First Department, SCD, and an

officer of the Second Section, First Department, SCD.

NOSENKO has stated that he was Deputy Chief of the First

Section, First Department, SCD, during 1960 - 1961, that his primary.

responsibility was work against code clerks at the United States Embassy

in Moscow, and that both KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZNOV were engaged in

the same work and under his supervision. The statement by GOLITSYN

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that NOSENKO was not Deputy Chief of the First Section in 1960 has

been noted and commented on in another section of this summary.

GOLITSYN has furnished certain information which he re-

ceived from officers of the First Section, First Department, SCD.

In each instance where this information, which was fragmentary, could

not be immediately correlated with information from NOSENKO, it was

previously considered to be evidential of deception or lying on the part

of, NOSENKO. This position, however, failed to allow for the possibility

that the discrepancies between the two sources were; at least in certain

instances, more apparent than real.

In certain instances it has now been possible to correlate frag-

mentary information from GOLITSYN with information from NOSENKO,

making it evident that in these instances the differences could not be

construed as in any way reflecting against NOSENKO. The four examples

cited below represent two probable correlations, (a) and (b); one possible

correlation, (c); and one instance where no correlation is possible at this

time, (d):

(a) GOLITSYN furnished information which he

received in April-May 1960 from Gennadiy GRYAZNOV

that an attempt had been made by the KGB to recruit an

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American female employee of the American Embassy

in Moscow tarough a male Soviet friend, but that the

attempt had failed. GOLITSYN also furnished information

that the woman had left Moscow by the time he learned of

the information but that the Soviets hoped she would return

to Moscow so that further work could be undertaken to

effect her recruitment. He did not recall the name of the

secretary, but did recall that it was a long and "German)

sounding"' name.

NOSENKO has furnished information in regard to a

recruitment attempt against Collette SCHWARZENBACH)

who it is considered is identical to the "American secretary"

referred to by GOLITSYN. However, (SCHWARZENBACH)

was not a female secretary in the American Embassy, but)

had been employed as a secretary to the wife of Ambassador)

BOHLEN during 1955 - 1956 and from 1958 - 1959 was employed)

las a correspondent by the United Press in Moscow.) The

recruitment attempt against|SCHWARZENBACH) according to

NOSENKO, occurred in 1959 and was an operation of the First

Section, First Department, SCD.

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(b) Page 163 of the previous summary contains infor-

mation that GOLITSYN also learned from GRYAZNOV in

the spring of 1960 that GRYAZNOV had developed an operation

against an American Embassy military code clerk in which the

KGB was "99 per cent sure" that the target would be recruited.

This is believed to undoubtedly be a reference to the case of

(James STORSBERG)who was actually the subject of a recruit-

ment approach in 1961.

There is considered to be a good possibility that

GOLITSYN actually learned of the above information from

GRYAZNOV in early January 1961 when he was again in Moscow

rather than during the spring of 1960 when GOLITSYN was

preparing for his assignment to Helsinki, Finland. This

theory is supported by information on page 163 of the previous

summary that GOLITSYN has stated he learned in January

1961 from Vladislav M. KOVSHUK (Chief of the First Section)

that Johan PREISFREUND had recently been used in the

successful recruitment of an American employee of the

Embassy. (Johan PREISFREUND was used in the(STORSBERG)

operation,

according to NOSENKO, and NOSENKO was also

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aware that GOLITSYN had a conversation with KOVSHUK about

(PREISFREUND since GOLITSYN wanted to use (PREISFREUND

in Helsinki, NOSENKO has stated he was not present during

the above conversation. It is very possible that KOVSHUK

exaggerated a little in his conversation with GOLITSYN in the

matter of why GOLITSYN could not use PREISFREUND as an

agent.

NOSENKO has furnished extensive information in regard

to the James STORSBERG case and with due consideration to

the accuracy and recollection of GOLITSYN, there does not

appear to be an adequate basis for questioning the bona fides of

NOSENKO on the basis of the differences between the report-

ing by GOLITSYN of information he received from GRYAZNOV

concerning what is considered to have been the James)

STORSBERG case and detailed information furnished by

NOSENKO concerning the James STORSBERG case.

The

exact date of the recruitment attempt against STORSBERG)

has not been positively established, but it is considered to

have occurred before

early May 1961 and probably in the

March-April 1961 period.

The statement by James/

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(STORSBERG that it occurred in October 1961 is com-

pletely unacceptable and is even contradicted by other

statements by STORSBERG himself.

(c) Page 163 of the previous summary contains

information from GOLITSYN which he had received from

GRYAZNOV in April or May 1960 that an American

employee of the Embassy in Moscow was either recruited

or prepared for recruitment on the basis of a homosexual

compromise beginning in 1959 and concluding in 1960.

The previous summary also states that according to

GOLITSYN, the KGB had photographed the American in

various homosexual acts, but SHELEPIN, who had just

become Chairman of the KGB, was at the time stressing

ideological rather than blackmail recruitments. SHELEPIN

did not exclude future use of the photographs which the KGB

would hold in reserve.

NOSENKO has furnished information concerning the

homosexual compromise of Robert BARRETT, who was a

guide

at the United States Exhibition in Moscow in 1959, and

with whom "SHMELEV" and "GRIGORIY", two homosexual

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agents of NOSENKO, became acquainted. Work against

the United States Exhibition was the responsibility of

the Ninth Department, SCD, but various Departments

were participating under the direction of the Ninth

Department.

One of the above homosexual agents succeeded in

involving BARRETT in homosexual activities which were

photographed by the KGB but, according to NOSENKO,

although the photographs were of a good quality, the KGB

was

unable to

use the photographs in 1959 because of a

general ban by the Central Committee on the recruitment

of the United States Exhibition guides due to the planned

visit of President EISENHOWER to the Soviet Union.

NOSENKO also stated that the compromising material

and information on BARRETI) was later given to the First

Department and that BARRETT was recruited by the Second

Section, First Department when he returned with another

Exhibition in 1961, and that he, NOSENKO, was not involved in

the recruitment operation. BARRETT, following his return

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to the United States in January 1962, confessed to the

FBI that he had been recruited in 1961 on the basis of

compromising photographs which had been taken

during his 1959 trip to Moscow.

Although it cannot be established at this

time, it is possible that the information furnished

by GOLITSYN which he had received from GRYAZNOV*

actually refers to the Robert BARRETT case. It should

be noted that Robert BARRETT) could not actually be

characterized as an "American employee of the Embassy

in Moscow."

(d) Page 162 of the previous summary contains infor-

mation from GOLITSYN that in the spring of 1960 when he

visited the First Section, First Department, SCD, he learned

from GRYAZNOV that GRYAZNOV had as an agent an Embassy

code clerk who was scheduled to be transferred to Helsinki.

GRYAZNOV indicated to GOLITSYN that the code clerk had

already furnished the KGB with some information, that he was

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considered by the KGB to be a "real" agent and that if

the transfer of the code clerk materialized, GOLITSYN

might have the code clerk as an agent in Helsinki.

NOSENKO has furnished no information which can be

correlated in any way with the above information from

GOLITSYN, but neither has the information from GOLITSYN

resulted in an identification despite the considerable investigation

which has been conducted in the matter. Although this is

considered to be a valid lead, it need not necessarily refer

to a code clerk who was in the United States Embassy in

Moscow during 1960 - 1961. It is also possible that the previous

remark by GOLITSYN concerning the above "code clerk" who

might be transferred to Helsinki as well as his cited remarke

in a-c could be clarified or at least additional information

obtained if a specific reinterview on these matters was possible.

The trip of Vadim V. KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki, Finland in

November 1960 should be mentioned in any comparison of information

from NOSENKO with information from GOLITSYN. This conflict is

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also mentioned in another section pertaining to the 1960-1961 career

of NOSENKO. GOLITSYN stated that KOSOLAPOV came to Helsinki

to accompany an American Embassy code clerk on the train to

Moscow and that KOSOLAPOV planned to strike up an acquaintance

with the code clerk which could be continued in Moscow.

The American Embassy code clerk referred to above was

undoubtedly (John GARLAND and the train manifest lists John GARLAND

and Viktor KOLOSOV (Vadim V. KOSOLAPOV) as passengers on the

same train from Helsinki to Moscow. NOSENKO is aware of the

identity of John GARLAND but claims no knowledge of the above trip

of KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki, although being well aware of a previous trip.

NOSENKO, as Deputy Chief of the First Section specifically

charged with work against code clerks, should have been aware of the

November 1960 trip of KOSOLAPOV to and from Helsinki. His lack of

knowledge may or may not be explainable in terms of his other activities

such as his trip to Cuba in November-December 1960 but it cannot be

interpreted as evidence NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB since, if

he had been, the KGB should have briefed NOSENKO on the trip of

KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki in November 1960, as this was an event the

KGB knew GOLITSYN was aware of.

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A theory which has previously been given consideration and

warranted full consideration was that if NOSENKO was dispatched,

his mission was to confuse leads furnished to American Intelligence

and/or to denigrate the value of information furnished by GOLITSYN.

In connection with this theory, it should be noted that NOSENKO during

current interviews has not made any remarks which could in any way

be construed as derogatory to GOLITSYN. In addition, NOSENKO does

not claim to have any detailed knowledge of the FCD and frequently,

when some topic peculiar to the FCD has been broached with NOSENKO,

his immediate reply has been to the effect that "I didn't work in the FCD, "

or "You should ask GOLITSYN about that. "

In connection with any consideration of whether the contact of

NOSENKO with CIA in Geneva in June 1962 could have been initiated by

the KGB as a result of the defection of GOLITSYN, the timing of certain

events should be noted. GOLITSYN defected on 15 December 1961.

NOSENKO departed from Moscow in March 1962 for Geneva, Switzerland,

where he remained until 15 June 1962.

It is felt that it would have been practically impossible if not

impossible for KGB officials to complete an assessment of the actual or

potential damage which could result from the defection of GOLITSYN,

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select NOSENKO as the individual who would be dispatched to counter-

act the possible damage, and appropriately brief NOSENKO prior to

his departure for Geneva in March 1962. Therefore, if NOSENKO

was dispatched by the KGB, it would appear that plans for this would

have predated the defection of GOLITSYN and that any GOLITSYN

aspect could only be a related aspect and not the basis for the original

plan to dispatch NOSENKO. In addition, if NOSENKO was dispatched,

it would hardly seem necessary for the KGB to send NOSENKO to

Geneva two and one-half months before his first contact with CIA.

The theory has also been considered that NOSENKO could have

been dispatched to confuse and divert American Intelligence and thus

to protect an important KGB penetration or penetrations of the United

States Government, particularly CIA. This is a theory which should

and has been given full consideration, but it is not possible to factually

substantiate of refute this theory in the absence of specific information

that high-level KGB penetrations do or do not exist.

Actually, as regards NOSENKO, the primary area which should

be given consideration in the above matter is if all the information from

NOSENKO is accepted, what effect would or could it have on the efforts

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of American counter-intelligence tó determine the identity of and

take appropriate action against KGB penetrations of the United

States Government. The only answer to this question seems to be

that there would be little consolation of assurance to American intelli

gence even if every statement by NOSENKO was accepted at face value.

The only specific area in which NOSENKO could be even con-

sidered to claim full knowledge is the United States Embassy in Moscow.

In this area his statements could be construed as assurance that there

were no recruitments of American personnel in the, United States Embassy

in Moscow from 1953-December 1963 with the exception of "ANDREY"

(Dayle Wallis SMITH) and Herbert HOWARD, The basis for this

expressed opinion of NOSENKO is considered elsewhere in this summary

and analysts may differ as to whether a recruitment could have occurred

of which NOSENKO did not have knowledge, assuming that his statements

are made in good faith. It should be noted, however, that at this time

there is no specific information which is in direct conflict with the

expressed opinion of NOSENKO.

NOSENKO, as previously mentioned, has never claimed any

particular knowledge of FCD activities. In addition, he does not claim

to be aware of all recruitments of Americans by the SCD. As an

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example, he has made it clear that his knowledge of SCD activities

against members of delegations, foreign businessmen, foreign students,

and individuals in the USSR on the invitation of a Soviet organization or

a component of the Soviet Government is extremely limited and at best

mainly of a collateral nature.

NOSENKO does not even claim any detailed knowledge of

activities of the Second Section (Active Line) of the First Department, SCD,

nor does be claim to know all of the cases of which the Chief of the Seventh

Department was aware. The latter is specifically supported by certain

notes brought out by NOSENKO which are short references to a number

of Seventh Department cases which are identified only by the KGB code

name. These notes, according to NOSENKO, were made when he had an

opportunity to review a notebook held by the Chief of the Seventh Department

and constitute the only knowledge NOSENKO had of these particular cases.

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G. IS THERE EVIDENCE OF A POLITICAL OR ANY

OTHER TYPE OBJECTIVE WHICH COULD JUSTIFY A DISPATCH

OF NOSENKO BY THE KCB WITH PERMISSION TO SPEAK

FREELY TO CIA CONCERNING HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE KGB

AND WITHOUT NOSENKO BEING GIVEN A SPECIFIC

MISSION OR MISSIONS?

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G. Is there evidence of a political or any other type objactive

waich could justify a dispatch of NOSENKO by the KGB with permission

to speak freely to CIA concerning his knowledge of the KCB and without

NOSENKO being given a specific mission or missions? The above possi-

bility has been given consideration even though the ultimate ramifications

are practically incalculable. The conclusion is that as regards NOSENKO,

with the single exception detailed below, there is no evidence of a

political or other type objective which could be considered of sufficient

importance by the KGB to warrant the dispaich of a KGB officer with

the knowledge of NOSENKO to speak freely with CIA without his being

given a specific mission or missions by the KGB.

It is accepted that the Soviet leadership would be entirely capable

of instructing the KGB to dispatch a staff officer for permanent defection

to United States authorities with no specific intelligence mission and no

limitations

on the KGB intelligence information he mige reveal providing

that such act would, in the estimate of the leadersaip,

result in a net

political gain for the USSR. For such a possibility to be seriously

entertained by the Soviets, however, it wouid have to involve an issua of

major importance to the Soviet leatership and pres-mably would bave to

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ne considered by them as the only or at least the best means of

achieving we desired end and of baving a very high probability

Of süccess.

The only area touched upon in any way by NOSENKO which

migat meet the above requirements is the assassination of President

Kennedy: the involvement of Lee Farvey Oswald in the assassination

and his association with the Soviet Union. 'Given (a) speculation

obtaining at the time that there was Soviet involvement in the

assassination, (b) the premise that in fact theze was'no Soviet

involvement, and (c) a hypothesis that the Soviet leadership was deeply

concerned lest erroneous conclusions be drawn which could lead to

irreversable actions, it is conceivable that the Soviet leadership migai

have been prepared to take extreme steps to convince United States

authorities of their non-involvement in the assassination. (The passage

to the United States Government of the aliegedly complete Soviet consuia:

file on OSWALD was, in itself, an unprecedented aci.)

The NOSENKO case warrants examination in the above regaid in

light of the fact that among the information NOSENKO provided was

"'inside" KGB information on OSWALD: information waich purpo ieay

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revealeá the substance of the content of the KGB files on OSWALD.

This information clearly indicated that there was no KGB relationship

with OSWALD, that the KGB had no operational interest in OSWALD,

and that as a matter of fact OSWALD had presented the KGB with a

continuing series of problems.

Upon examination, however, NOSENKO does not meet the

requirements premised above for serious Soviet consideration of a free

KGB defection.

The following reasons render this unacceptable:

a. The chronology, in itself, presents virtually impossible

problems for such a theses, viz. NOSENKO's initial approach to CIA

in June 1962, 17 months prior to the assassination of President Kennedy.

b. While the information from NOSENKO on OSWALD is

interesting and partinent, it is not,

in nature, scope, and content,

sufficiently convincing for United States

authorities

to reasonably be

expected to conclude that it represented unequivocal proof of Soviet

non-involvement.

c. It is implausible not to assume that the Soviets would

assume that United States autorities, in any examination of the

possibilüy oi a Soviet (KGB) hand in the assassination, wouid presume

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extrernely narrow Soviet compartmentation in such an operation -- a

compartmentation which would exclude knowledgeability by any KGB

oificer other than very senior persons and an individual of group of

action individuals specifically concerned with matters of this nature.

The KGB career of NOSENKO would not permit even serious

consideration that NOSENKO could have logically been fitted into the

above very limited category.

It is accordingly concluded that the possibility of a politically

motivated free dispatch can in the case of NOSENKO be satisfactorily

eliminated.

The possibility has also been considered that the KGB might

have theorized that by dispatching an agent, in this case an officer,

with numerous leads to non-valuable or non-current KGB agents or

cases, the facilities of the United States Intelligence community would

be practically neutralized for an extended period of time. This could

only be based on an assumption that the United States Intelligence

community would involve a majos portion of its personnel and efforts

in the investigation and resolution of cases waich had little or no current

or potential value to the KGB. The above possibility cannot be

arbitrarily eliminated witzout full consideration. It is noi believed tau

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NOSENKO in the absence of any evidence that he had any KGB mission

or missions

to fulfill comes within the above category, particularly since ân

overall assessment of his information leads to the conclusion that full

exploitation of his information would be quite damaging to the KGB.

Consideration of the above possibility must also include an

evaluation of the deterrent effect on the prospects of future recruitments

by the KGB caused by legal action taken against individuals exposed by

information from the dispatched agent or officer. The deterrent effect

on others of the conviction and sentercing of persons who have committad

a crime or crimes has long been a part of the legal theory of way persons

who commit a crime should be imprisoned or punished.

The detecrent effect on others of the trials and convictions of

William VASSALL, Robert Lee JOHNSON and James Allen MINTKEN-

BAUGH should not be underestimated. The KGB also could not have

known that information furnished by NOSENKO would not result in the

trial and conviction of other KGB agents or recruitments concerning

whom NOSENKO had some knowledge.

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н.

IS THERE ANY EVIDENCE THAT THE CONTACTS OF

NOSENKO IN 1962 OR IN 1964 WITH CIA WERE KNOWN TO THE

KGB PRIOR TO HIS DEFECTION OR THAT NOSENKO

WAS EVER BRIEFED BY THE KGB RELATIVE TO HIS BEHAVIOR

OR KGB OBJECTIVES DURING THESE CONTACTS OR

AFTER HIS DEFECTION?

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Excluded tram automatic

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H. Is there any evidence that the contacts of NOSENKO in 1962

or in 1964 with CIA were known to the KGB prior to his defection or

that NOSENKO was ever briefed by the KGB relative to his behavior

or KGB objectives during these contacts or after his defection? The

conclusion is that there is no evidence that the contacts of NOSENKO

in 1962 or in 1964 with CIA were known to the KGB prior to his

defection and that NOSENKO was never briefed in any manner by the KGB.

The basis for the above conclusion is substantially contained in

previous sections. It is being treated here as a separate area of interest

since it is a sufficiently important area as to warrant individual consideration.

It is recognized that since positive factual confirmation such as

the KGB file on NOSENKO is not available, any conclusion concerning

whether NOSENKO was or was not dispatched by the KGB can only be

based on the full review of available information from NOSENKO,

collateral sources, independent investigation and the opinion of the

individual analyst concerning the significance or non-significance of

each item of available information.

The conclusion that the contacts of NOSENKO with CIA in 1962

and 1964 prior to his defection were not known to the KGB is

0001107

SECRETI

Excited iron asidiatie

dinarading and

1.07.000

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SECHE!

necessarily based in part on a judgment as to whether any of his

activities or information logically warrant a substantial suspicion

that they were or could be in any part the result of KGB direction

or control. One of the particular areas considered was his apparent

behavior during his contacts with CIA in June 1962 and the conclusion

was that it was incomprehensible that he could have been under KGB

control at that time.

Consideration has been given to the possibility that his 1962

contacts with CIA were not known to the KGB, but became known to

the KGB later and NOSENKO was doubled by the KGB. It was con-

cluded that there was no basis for or information which would warrant

serious consideration of the above possibility aside from the separate

conclusion that the KGB would be very unlikely to reward a traitor in

KGB eyes by sending him again to Geneva where he would be quite free

to defect.

Worthy of comment in this section is the fact that NOSENKO,

during his 1962 contacts, expressed considerable concern over his

personal security, requesting that knowledge concerning his identity be

kept to an absolute minimum, that no communications be sent to the

2.

0001108

SECRET

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United States Embassy in Moscow concerning his contact with CiA and

shat he did not wish io be contacied and wouid not recognize any attempted

contact within the Soviet Union. NOSENKO also furnisked information as

to ine reason for his concern thai no information regarcing ils contact

with CiA become known in the United States Embassy in Moscow and the

dangers to NOSENKO in any contact oz attempted contact with NOSENKO

in the USSR.

It is recognized that the above indicated concern of NOSENKO

about bis personal security is nos substantial evidence that NOSENKO

was not under KGB control; however, it is evidence that NOSENKO was

not in any way encouraging clandestine contact of NOSENKO within the

USSR, which very likely would have been an aim of tee KGB if NOSENKO

was under KGB control.

The material which NOSENKO furnished to CIA in 1964 bas been

carefully reviewed to determine if there is any evidence that the KCB

participated in any way in the assembling of this rather unique collection

oi material. None of the material appears to have been of an accountable

type and, on the contrary, it appears that NOSENKO could hava furnissed

all of the material to CIA and returned to the Soviet Urion witzout the KGB

ever at a later date becoming aware that the materiai was actually missing.

The latter statement even includes te travel dogument which audiorized

te trip o NOSENKO to Gorkiy in December 1963.

00011C9

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The trip in December 1963, according to NOSENKO, was to

participaie in the search for Aleksand. CHEREPANOV. According to

NOSENKO, this particuiar documen: was not accountable in that it was

only necessary to turn it in when requesting reimbursement for travel

expenses.

NOSENKO stated taat ie had not claimed te rather small

amount of money to which he was entitled and has also admitted that he

really brought the document along because it gave bim the indicated rank

of Lieutenan: Colonel.

NOSENKO has compietely retracted his claim io having had the

rank of Lieutenant Coionel, stating that ever as a Deputy Chiaf of Dapart

ment be was only a Captain althoug, he was entitled to and expected to

receive the rank of Major in early 1964. NOSENKO has stated that

giving him the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in the above document was

the error Of KASHPEROV, the officer on duty in the SCD on Sunday, and.

that practically all Deputy Chiefs of Depariment in the SCD had at least

the rank of Lieutenant Colonel.

The above explanation by NOSENKO may weil se considered by

readers with at least a degree of skepticism. However, if NOSENKO

was dispatched by the KGB, it would seem that he could have been pro-

vided with something a liitle more substantial to document his claim oi

the rank of Lieutenani Colonei, in acidition, it would seem that the KCB

0001110

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couid have provided NOSENKO with some type of documeni waica

would support at least one of his claimed positions in the SCD, KG3.

Even tae Cherepanov Papers do not in any way support the claim oi

NOSENKO that he was Deputy Chief of the First Section, First

Depariment, SCD, in 1960 - 1961, nox do they even support the claim

of NOSENKO that there was such à position in the First Section in

1960 - 1961 or even in 1958 or 1959.

0001111

5

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IV

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SECRET

IV.

COMMENTS CONCERNING PREVIOUS CONCLUSIONS

IN REGARD TO NOSENKO

0001112

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Exceed tom camatio

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SECRET

COMMENTS CONCERNING PREVIOUS CONCLUSIONS

IN REGARD TO NOSENKO

Attached is a verbatim copy of pages 357 - 360 of the "Examina-

tion of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector" which contains seven (A - G)

primary conclusions concerning the claimed Naval RU (Navy Intelligence)

and KGB career of NOSENKO. These conclusions or findings are

independently treated in separate attachments.

With the exception of "G," the conclusions in this summary are

in direct conflict with the above conclusions and are basically that

NOSENKO served in the Naval RU from March 1951 to early 1953, was

a KGB officer from March 1953 until his defection in February 1964,

and held his claimed positions in the *KGB during the March 1953 -

February 1964 period.

* For purposes of clarity, the term KGB is used to refer to the

Committee for State Security and predecessor organizations

unless otherwise indicated.

Attachment:

Cpy Pgs 357-360 of "Examination

of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector"

0001113

SFCRFT

Excluced tan avitmalic)

downgrading and

daclassificalion

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SECRET

PREVIOUS CONCLUSIONS RE NOSENKO

AS CONTAINED ON PAGES 357 - 360 OF

"THE EXAMINATION OF THE BONA FIDES OF A KGB DEFECTOR"'

The following is a quote of the previous conclusions in the case of Yuriy

Ivanovich NOSENKO. (The specific conclusions have been given the designation

of A - G for purposes of easier correlation with other sections of this summary.)

"SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

CONCERNING NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES"

"NOSENKO claims that he served for a decade in the KGB in

successively senior positions of auhority from which he derived

extensive knowledge of the scope, character, and results of KGB

operations against Americans in the Soviet Union in the period

1953-1963. To substantiate his claim, he provides an impressive

array of information about KGB personnel, organization and opera-

tions which, to the extent that it has been confirmed, is presumptive

evidence of his bona fides. Various Soviet officials, including

intelligence officers, have generally corroborated NOSENKO's

claims.

According to some of these

sources, NOSENKO was a

senior KGB officer who occupied a

series

of sensitive positions, who

0001114

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SECKLI

enjoyed considerable authority and trust despite personal short..

comings, and whose defection, 'the greatest loss ever suffered

by Soviet Intelligence', paralyzed the work of ata KGBe

• Legal Residency, and justified the formulation of plans to assas -

sinate him."

"The examination has compared each element of NOSENKO's

biography relevant to his claimed KGB service with known

facts and reasonable surmise. The examination reflects

the

test to which his accounts were put: whether his accounts are

internally coherent and consistent with known fact, and whether

he actually gained the information he has from occupying the

KGB positions he claims to have held. In short, is he what he

says he is, according to his own accounts?"

"This examination had led to the following findings, arrived

at independently:

A. NOSENKO did not serve in the Naval RU

in any of the capacities or at the places and times he

claimed.

B. NOSENKO did not enter the KGB in the

manner or ai the time he claimed.

C. NOSENIO did not serve in the American

Embassy Section throughout the 1953-1955 period as

he claimed.

0001115

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D. During the period 1955-1960, he was neither

a senior case officer in, nor Deputy Chief of, the Seventh

Department American-British Commonwealth Section

E. NOSENKO was neither Deputy Chief of the

American Embassy Section nor a senior officer or

supervisor in the Section during the period 1961-1962.. (sic)

F. NOSENKO's claims, that in 1962 he was Chief

of the American-British Commonwealth Section and was

thereafter a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, are

not credible.

G. NOSENKO has no valid claim to certainty

that the KGB recruited no American Embassy personnel

between 1953 and his defection in 1964.

These findings differ somewhat with respect to degree of probability.

or certitude, but they reflect the preponderance of available evidence

in each instance. "

"The above judgments, if correct, rebut presumptive evidence

Of NOSENKO's bona fides. The contradictions in NOSENKO's accounts

of his life and KGB service are so extensive as to make his claims

as a whole unacceptable.. While truth and fact in this case frequently

0001116

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cannot be established with certainty, it is evident that truth and

fact are not what NOSENKO relates. By almost any test, virtually

any of NOSENKO's above claims are impugned by fact or probability,

or contradicted or retracted in his own statements. NOSENKO is

not what he claims to be, and thus he is not a bona fide defector."

"Given the conclusion that NOSENKO is not a bona fide

defector, it is necessary to attempt to determine his true motives

for contacting American Intelligence and for providing the information

he has given. Here, it must be recognized that the evidence, largely

consisting of NOSENKO's own assertions, does not permit unequivocal

conclusions.

Neverbeless, the question cannot be ignored.: The

character of the information NOSENKO has conveyed, the fact that

some of his false claims have been corroborated by Soviet officials,

and the necessity to make decisions about NOSENKO's future all

require that at least a provisional judgment be made. "

"Of the reasonable explanations advanced for NOSENKO's

misrepresentations, the chief ones are that he is a swindler posing

as a former KGB officer for reasons of personal advantage; that he

suffers from a deranged personality or unbalanced mind; that he has

greatly exaggerated his actual rank, status and access in the KGB, for

simply personal reasons; or, finally, that he is a dispatched KGB

agent. "

0001117

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SEÜNEI

"The first two possibilities are easily dismissed. That

NOSENKO is not simply a swindler who falsely claims for personal

advantage to have been a KGB officer is evident, we believe, from

the confirmed details of KGB organization, personnel and operations

which he has provided and which could only derive from within the

KGB itself. "

"Second, as noted in the text, extensive psychiatric and

psychological examination by qualified specialists rule out the

possibility that NOSENKO's actions and testimony are the product

of a deranged personality or unbalanced mind."

"It is somewhat more plausible that NOSENKO is a KGB

officer who served in at least some of the components for some

or all of the time periods that he claims, but who greatly exag-

gerated his positions, rank and access to intormation, and

invented some matters outright, to achieve greater status with

American Intelligence.

This explanation, however, fails to

accommodate the fact that several KGB officers have

asserted

that NOSENKO did in fact hold senior positions in the KGB. Also,

NOSENKO's assertions with respect to his rank, GRIBANOV's

patronage, the recall telegram, and the like, cannot be just a

product of his own invention, since these were the subject of

comment by other sources."

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"Because none of the above explanations is consistent with

the data developed in interrogations and investigations, we are

left with the hypothesis that NOSENKO was dispatched by the

KGB. While this explanation does not reconcile all the anomalies,

none of them renders it untenable. "

"In the absence of further revelations by NOSENKO, or

other persuasive evidence to the contrary, CIA finds that the

evidence establishes a presumption that NOSENKO was dispatched

by the KGB, and believes that prudence requires that he be

regarded as still responsive to KGB control, and that his infor-

mation should be assessed accordingly. "

6001119

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## Page 133



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SECRET

A.

NOSENKO DID NOT SERVE IN THE NAVAL RU

IN ANY OF THE CAPACITIES OR AT THE PLACES AND

TIMES HE CLAIMED

= .

0001120

SECRET

CAGUP1

excluded from automatica

ceungrading and

deshassificallan

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SECRET

A. NOSENKO did not serve in the Naval RU in any of the capacities

or at the places and times he claimed. (Previous conclusion)

The above is conclusion "A" in the previous summary in regard

to NOSENKO. The current conclusion is that the claimed service of

NOSENKO in Navy Intelligence (Naval RU) during March 1951 to early

1953 in the Far East and the Baltic areas is adequately substantiated

and should be accepted.

The interrogations of NOSENKO prior to 1967 were complicated

by NOSENKO changing the date of his graduation from the Institute of

International Relations from 1950 to 1949 because he did not wish to

admit that he had failed to graduate in 1949 with the majority of his class.

However, previous efforts of NOSENKO to revert to his original 1962

statement that he graduated in 1950 were not accepted and an unwarranted

significance was given to the 1949 - early 1953 period of time.

It is considered that NOSENKO has adequately explained his

"stupid blunders" as they relate to the above and to certain other personal

matters and that his claimed service in Navy Intelligence from March

SECRET

0001121

dawagrading and

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(

1951 to early 1953 both in the Far East and the Baltic area is fully

acceptable. It is not considered necessary to comment concerning all

of the remarks in the previous summary regarding the claimed Naval

RU service of NOSENKO as reflected on pages 49-59 and remarks will,

for purposes of brevity, be limited in scope.

The statement is made in the previous summary that "The sole

Headquarters RU officer NOSENKO identified was the Personnel Chief,

Colonel KALOSHIN. He identified no ranking officers in either'the Baltic

or Far East Intelligence Staffs. Some 30 GRU officers he did identify,

by his own admission, NOSENKO knew not from his Naval RU service,

but through social acquaintance, later, in Moscow, or through his visits

to Geneva. ":

Attached is a copy of a handwritten memorandum voluntarily

prepared by NOSENKO in late 1967 containing the names of a number

of GRU personnel of whom he had some knowledge. The attached was

not prepared as the result of any inquiry concerning his claimed Naval

RU service, but was only a small part of the material prepared by

NOSENKO at this time.

The entire material included remarks by

NOSENKO regarding approximately (875)KGB officers, (100) KGB agents,

35 GRU officers and 400 other Soviet nationals.

0001122

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## Page 137

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It is interesting to note that the attached list contains the names

of approximately 20 GRU officers whom NOSENKO relates to the early

1950's period. In addition, NOSENKO has, during current interviews

and in other memoranda, furnished the names of additional Navy Intelli-

gence personnel whom he knew in the 1951 - early 1953 period.

Page 52 of the above summary and other related pages question

whether NOSENKO ever served in the Baltic area with Naval Intelligence

and even question his geographical knowledge of the area. Attached is a

copy of a handwritten memorandum with certain diagrams prepared by

NOSENKO on 21 February 1968 concerning his assignment with Navy

Intelligence in the Far East and the Baltic area. The memorandum was

completed by NOSENKO without any reference material and a review of

his diagrams indicates they are quite accurate.

NOSENKO had previously stated that his service in the Baltic

area was at Sovetsk Primorskiy and during current interviews recalled

that the former name of the place, an almost deserted fishermen's

village, was Fishausen. The previous designation given by NOSENKO

for this place as having the mail address of Sovetsk Primorskiy had

caused the conclusion that his alleged place of assignment was non-

existent. A further check in the matter would have disclosed that the

place was not nonexistent, that it is currently known as Primorsk and

that the former German name of the fishing village was Fischhausen.

3

6001123

PEPOrT

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The previous summary also stated that despite his claimed

active commissioned service in the Navy, NOSENKO knew nothing of

Soviet Navy tradition, doctrines, or organization of procedures. It

should be noted that there is a considerable difference between being

a member of the Naval RU and being an actual member of the Soviet.

Navy. The situation could be compared to a career civilian employee

of the Office of Naval Intelligence and a line officer in the United States

Navy•

Attachments:

List of GRU Personnel as Prepared by NOSENKO

Diagrams and comments

as Prepared by NOSENKO

6001124

4

SECRET

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## Page 139

sekrener Leonid - till 145 or lists a deputy of chief f navy

inte liegene, they a chinf of mary iilligeure, later he was a deputy of dief.

f ga (Sezor Juch and Joashutin), I leard he was a navy attache in the lst.

or Maltaines

2. Gespalor - a major, code cesk of the very intelligence of 7 ficet

in Soviet Harbow's region in 1957-1962

1.."

3. Bogdanonsky - a depaty of chief of the navy intelle zeue of 7

Fleet (on agents) in 1951-192.

4. Bulakh - au officer of the rauy intelligence print of intelligenc

of le 4 Fleet in Sovietsk, Kaliningrad's district in 1852.

5. Chikin - in 1ss0t a colorel, vorbad in Ki department if foreiga

ins of the ministry of defence.

6. Churil'skiy - a colonel, in 1850 wooked in the de pastment of

forrign, uffrins of the misistry of dofence.

7. Demchents an officer if nary intelligence point of intelligence of 4TBet

in Sovietsk, kaliningrad's district.

8. Denisento - in 1962-1954 a military attache of soviet embissy in Bern.

1. Bollshakor Yuri - au officer f JK6l (colonel), was is the USA,.

marks wntor. cons of press-agency Necss"

o. Bulganin der 1'f in 13507 worted in gRU.

//. Soliger - su ffices if JAU i 1150F. (or Syerler)

12. Kaloshin - a colonel, in 1150-1sã8 a chief of personnel departient

the hasy intelligence

0001125

13. Kononyuk - in 1950 finished the instaite of internatisual relations,

i. 1917 Inten in the hause intelliernee and cant taenant in Bondt dunain

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## Page 140

1 Kipalkin- a genezel, in 1590 nos adepty of chief the military.

diptimetic acadesy. He his tire sons: Kipalkia Sergey -finishin this academy

in 4950, orks in gRU, worked in Haly and in Frame, his no fee daughter if

Mishal Tinoshenko - Olya (fishit the institute f fozzign trade; Kepalkintic

Tor

in 1840s studed as a student in the USt, alse works in gRU.

15: Kabalinor Vadimir - a major, a serion officer of the hay intellizeuce

387 Fleet in 1950-52.

16. Khaberes - in 1250-52 a diprily of chief of nery zadio detachment

I the rivy intelligence of 7 Ficet.

17. Khaytor S.S. - a deputig of chief (on information) of nasy intelli -

f 7 Fleet in 1980-52.

18: Kon'kox - a deput of chiff of hacy intelligeuse of 7 Fleet in 1951-52

15. Rezlooskiy - in lisso an officer of deportacut of forciga affairs of the

ministry of defence.

20. Molchunor - an ifficer of gAH (in 4s50-)

2. Orchor Jensadi - in lssi-52 un achnimistentive officer of the way in -

Telligence if 7 Fliet

22. Pegodiu Boris - a chiof off the seizibrriate of my intellizeuce if 7 Fleet

in 1850-19352, kis a japane language.

23. Kezantser-a cemmander of hung intelligeuce point of the inteGligence

4 Fleet in Sovietsk, kaliningrad's distriot in 1152.

•24. Shalin - a geveral, in ls405 nes a chief of the bilitery diplomatica. -

dimy, later was a chief of gru.

25. Shaneshiher ducil magul works in SR4: his fatter bara distallse:

---

## Page 141

21 Mel'niker Sergay - a chüf of my intelligence of 7 Ilet i 190-32

27. Nasugaladze -ayenol, a chief of havy itillignce at Blacki ser, 1050-52

28. зегдеусь - an cujiner-biscolivel, a senior officer of the waty.

intelligence if7 Fleet in 1557-5a (carlier hi worked in Turkey).'

21. Suslobick - in 1160-52 a commisdes of rasynadio dotachment if the

mary intellizeme if 7 Feet:

30: Stishlunov - au officer of jul, cooried in the USA lest yers in hur

din, from shere was recalled.

31. Tishkin - a ver -adueira?, in 4550-58 a deputy chief of the narry inte

(02-0v)

Mi pence of the ministry of military wary.

32. Vasilevsky Yuri works in TRU, son of a marshal of WIth

33. Torouker Allert un officer of the waty intilligente f7 Ileet in 1950

3r. Torantser Michel a vice admiral, a fosner chief of hay inteligues,

my he haste ta doctor tid fent modes in post denigned,

as alives art fatas

35. Yersher - an offier if personal of the haoy intelligence of 7 Tirt.

in 2150-58, Roos a chinize Carrjuays.

6001127

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## Page 142

SE0

M.il

The tô of Marok, 1151 was sighiel an order about my p-

postment es on interpreten of the mary ütellizence of 7Tit

in Soviet herfan, Primorskiy district, arkere 1 hase goe.

by a trass und arrived in the place of iny appris tuant enthe

end of March. (I scit from laser to khabareusk whee.

changen a train to Komsowolsk-on tuer ther crassed the

zver and from station Pirand seit te Soriet harbour (station

Pyatisotka).

вкуванін

nist zhilderbat.

sity Soviet

herbar

fisland Sultalis.

The istelligence of 7 Fleit wal lorsited in lay Costrayy, here

vere also Political directory of I Fleci, submarins und distrycas lises.

He conraudes in chief of 7 Flict was admizal Baykor trant.,

chief of staff - rice admiral satinro.

40001128

He chief of masy iteligence of I Fleet was cptain f lennh

Wie Eriker Sergen K. dis demitis - initiin if 2 zach Goghancoskep

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## Page 143

i grutis department), contace of 1zant khaitoo Semen S. (information

dipstunt, captain of trik Konkor (naoy intelligent), colount

Burchenko (a commissar).

I was working in the infirmition digustrecut: tfficers Kebalin,

§fion were working in this digertunit. Oller officers of the intelligen.

ore keitenant colonel Seryayer, hintest Doranton Albert, jer

Sishor, cantains Orekhor, Rodicuor, Poyodia, Besprulou and 3-4 more

freers, here sere also siergenits aul privates.

Li the end of April, 1752 l fleur in Mosters stagping for 12

digs in Khabarisk) for a liare.

In fuse -July It a personil department of thirmary intelli

jusse (a chief -coloual kaloshin) was devilicg a pestion about-

tunsferee breast of illuss, Mud I was a ted in the way

intelligence poisit of nasy intellingsues of H Fleet in Sovietsk (lo-

calid bifere a peninsula ti Baltügsk-forties Pillau), rohese 1

errived in August, 1952. (Kaliningrad's district-fornic fusin)

Soviet is a little sity-vilizje, a fornce german village of fish

ernes, it seems had a name Fishhausen.

Sovietsk

Baltiyse

Switsk-a demolished little town, here thiri

size i laby istelüginne pruit and 1-1

Alters military detachments (fullin;

'battalion):"

6001129

Bittiyst was a buse and headquinters of 4 Flect.

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## Page 144

SHe commander in chif of 4l Firet bas airal golovket. y

The chif of my very intellizou prist was arpitain of 2 wink Kyszantico.

Here mere fficers: Tungrator, bulakh, Denchenko and others will serged;

and privates

bufore my errind (d deg) this nacy intelligace point as tansfe-

ed from eest gerainy in Smist. If in germany the work of the

pacet was sonnested with agrit's work, now thee was thather

tash - a preparation of agent of territion post in a ensc of nose

(544 persous reak poet). - an alsolidly monkey bussness

In the end of Decembis I took a leans zensining it will my illicss,

his herring in mind a transferene in unither plase

In mid of March, 4153 I begen ti work in 2 chief diretey fkgr

(fare 1102)

0001130

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SECRET

B. NOSENKO DID NOT ENTER THE KGB IN THE

MANNER OR AT THE TIME HE CLAIMED

SECRET

tannerading and

declared toret

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## Page 147

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SECRET

B. NOSENKO did not enter the KGB in the manner or at the time

claimed. (Previous conclusion)

The above is conclusion "B" in the previous summary in regard

to NOSENKO. The conclusion in this summary is that NOSENKO entered

the then Second Chief Directorate, MVD, in mid-March 1953 and that his

entry was not only facilitated by but due to the influence of General

Bogdan Zakharovich KOBULOV.

Previous

statements by NOSENKO and changes relative to date of

entry into the KGB have been mentioned in another section of the summary

and will not be repeated here. His statements during current interviews

that he entered on duty in mid-March 1953 as a case officer in the First

Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate, MVD, are con-

sidered adequately substantiated and should be accepted.

The conclusion of the previous summary (pages 61-74) that

NOSENKO did not enter the KGB in the manner or at the time claimed

was primarily based on conflicting statements by NOSENKO as to when

he entered the KGB (MVD). In 1962 NOSENKO said March 1953 and in

1965 NOSENKO again said March 1953, soon after the death of STALIN.

SECRET

0001132

GROUP 1

Excluded liom automatic?

corngrading and

declassification

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SECRET

In 1964, NOSENKO had given two dates in 1952 as his time of entry into

the KGB in an effort not to admit that he had failed to graduate from the

Institute of International Relations in 1949.

The previous summary gave considerable weight to the statements

of NOSENKO indicating that he did not enter the KGB (MVD) under what

are considered normal KGB procedures. Proper allowances were not

given for position of the father of NOSENKO, the Minister of Shipbuilding,

and the influence of General KOBULOV. An analyst can either accept or

reject the statement of NOSENKO that he entered the KGB (MVD) through

the influence of General KOBULOV; but, if the statement is accepted, then

the failure of NOSENKO to be required to follow normal KGB procedures

should also be accepted. A Communist society or a Soviet Intelligence

organization is not and could not be immune to influence by a high official.

General KOBULOV as of mid-March 1953 was First Deputy to BERIYA,

the Minister of the then MVD.

The previous

summary raises several points concerning the

eligibility of NOSENKO for the KGB (MVD). It points out on page 67

that other than his undistinguished period of service with the Naval RU,

he was no more eligible for a KGB appointment in 1953 than he was at

the time of his previous rejection in 1950. This statement is not contro-

vertible and is fully accepted with the qualification that in 1950 NOSENKO

0001133

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90055I

was not sponsored by any person of influence as was the case in 1953

with General KOBULOV who in mid-March 1953 was the First Deputy

to BERIYA.

The previous summary also states that according to KGB

defectors familiar with the standards in force at the time, no candidate

was accepted who had ever had tuberculosis. This is a flat statement

which it is doubtful any defector or series of defectors could fully

substantiate; namely, that it never happened. Until and unless it is

medically proven that NOSENKO did not have tuberculosis, it is accepted

that he did have tuberculosis in 1952 and was at a sanitarium - rest

place in Kubinka. It is also accepted that he was an officer in the KGB

after mid-March 1953. The influence of KOBULOV could undoubtedly

have permitted NOSENKO to enter the KGB even though he previously

had tuberculosis, but the flat statement that no candidate was accepted who

had ever had tuberculosis is not and cannot be sufficiently substantiated.

The previous summary contained a number of additional remarks

and conclusions intended to show that NOSENKO was not eligible for and

therefore could not have entered the KGB (MVD). Comments concerning

these will be brief since there is considered to be no adequate basis at

this time on which to contend that NOSENKO did not enter the KGB

(MVD) as an officer in mid-March 1953. A comment was made that

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NOSENKO did not take a physical examination in connection with his

processing for KGB entry, and that such a medical examination was

routine and mandatory part of the processing of a KGB candidate.

This statement makes no allowance for the influence of General

KOBULOV; but, in addition, does not consider the fact that the Naval

RU dossier on NOSENKO was available to the KGB (MVD).

The previous summary also failed to note that the MVD would

have had independent information in regard to NOSENKO since the MVD

would have conducted any necessary inquiry in connection with the entry

of NOSENKO into the Naval RU. As of 1953, the MVD undoubtedly also

had a dossier on the father of NOSENKO since this was still the STALIN

era.

The summary also states that NOSENKO did not complete the

necessary lengthy Anketa before entry into the KGB (MVD) and did not

speak to any personnel officers or visit the personnel office.

It would

seem that the influence of General KOBULOV could have permitted the

elimination of most if not all of the necessity of complying with normal

procedures,

but NOSENKO has during interviews stated that he com-

pleted the Anketa while sitting at his desk after entry into the KGB (MVD).

Page 70 of the previous summary states that NOSENKO did not

know the designation of his own Directorate either at the time he allegedly

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entered on duty or during his first year of KGB service. While

NOSENKO bas claimed that the designation of his Directorate at the

time he entered the KGB (MVD) in mid-March 1953 was the Second

Chief Directorate and that it subsequently was redesignated the

First Chief Directorate, DERYABIN has stated this reversal of

designations occurred in March 1953.

STALIN died in early March 1953 and that same month the

MVD and the MGB were merged under the name MVD with BERIYA

as Minister. BERIYA held this position until his arrest in early June

1953. BERIYA was succeeded by KRUGLOV, who held office for less

than a year.

Yuriy RASTVOROV was recently queried concerning the

date of the reversal of the designation of the FCD and SCD and places

it as the end of April or early May 1953. GOLITSYN has indicated that

the change occurred "soon after the advent of BERIYA as head of the

MVD in April 1953. " In the light of our inability to fix the effective date

of the reversal of the designations of the SCD and the FCD, it is

unreasonable to impugn NOSENKO on his statement as to the designation

of his Directorate at the time of his entry into the KGB (MVD).

There

is a disagreement between NOSENKO and others as to who

was

responsible for the reversal of designations of the FCD and the SCD.

NOSENKO is of the opinion that it occurred under KRUGLOV, which is

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in conflict with the statements of DERYABIN, RASTVOROV and

GOLITSYN, all of whom maintain that BERIYA was responsible for

the changes. As for the issue of who was responsible for the reversal

of designations, it would appear that NOSENKO is in error.. However,

the fact that he was a new junior officer and that this was a period of

upheaval in the KGB (MVD) effectively eliminates any significance in

this issue.

NOSENKO is criticized in the previous summary for not knowing

the location of the Chief Directorate of the Militia or the history of the

KI (Committee of Information). NOSENKO has stated that he had no

contacts with either office during 1953-1955 and there is no adequate reason

to disbelieve this statement. He is not aware of when the KI ceased to

exist (1951 given in the summary, but other information indicates the KI

continued to exist in a nominal capacity until the mid-1950's), but care

should be used in stating what NOSENKO should know if he held a certain

position. Readers of this summary may wish to reflect on their own

memory concerning the location and their knowledge of Agency facilities at

any given period of time or when Agency components or related organizations

were organized or ceased to exist.

6

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CEC

matin ar

The point has also been made that any career of NOSENKO

in the KGB should have ended or he should have at least encountered

difficulty when bis benefactor General KOBULOV, together with the

brother of General KOBULOV, was arrested with the BERIYA group in

early June 1953. NOSENKO has during current interviews stated that he

encountered no difficulties but is aware that the KOBULOV connection

was discussed by an officer from the Personnel Directory with an

official of the First Department. Under other circumstances NOSENKO

would very possibly have encountered difficulty; but, it should be noted

that the father of NOSENKO retained his position, that NOSENKO only

met General KOBULOV through his father, and that NOSENKO has stated

that although his father knew General KOBULOV, his father could in no

way be considered a member of the BERIYA group.

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C. NOSENKO DID NOT SERVE IN THE AMERICAN EMBASSY

SECTION THROUGHOUT THE. 1953 - 1955 PERIOD

AS HE CLAIMED

0001139

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SLORE!

C. NOSENKO did not serve in the American Embassy Section

throughout the 1953 - 1955 period as he claimed. (Previous conclusion)

The above is conclusion "C" in the previous summary. The

conclusion in this summary is that NOSENKO was an officer of the First

Section (American Embassy Section), First Department, from mid-March

1953 to late May 1955 when he was transferred to the Seventh Department,

SCD.

This period of time has been covered in detail with NOSENKO

during current interviews. The conclusion is that NOSENKO was an

officer in the First Section but was not a very effective officer and that

both his work and behavior were decidedly influenced by the fact that he

was the son of the Minister of Shipbuilding. NOSENKO is reluctant to

admit that he was other than slightly lackadaisical in his work during

this period of time, but is not hesitant to admit that his personal be-

havior was such as to cause him to be removed as Secretary to the

Komsomol unit in 1954 and to cause an unsatisfactory "characterization"

SECRET

racludad from aulenatich

duregrading and

Gecrassification

0001140

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to be prepared in early 1955 which necessitated a decision as to whether

he would be fired from the KGB or transferred to some other component.

The influence of his family is quite apparent in the above since

his father was advised of his difficulties in 1954 by an official of the

KGB and his mother interceded on his behalf in 1955 with the Chief of

SCD. The result in 1955 was that NOSENKO was transferred to the

Seventh Department and not fired from the KGB.

The question has been raised as to how NOSENKO could remain

in the KGB when after 1954 he was not a member of the Komsomol and

was not eligible to become a candidate for the Communist Party. This

is a valid question but a plausible explanation is again the fact that he was

the son of the then Minister of Shipbuilding.

NOSENKO has stated during previous and current interviews that

following his entry into the KGB and until circa mid-1954 he was respon-

sible for work against American correspondents in Moscow. He has not

claimed that he had any successes and has stated that the work with news -

paper correspondents already recruited was being handled by other officers.

NOSENKO has explained that during this time he was a "new officer, "

indicating he could hardly have been expected to act as an experienced

officer. His knowledge of correspondents in Moscow during this period

of time, together with his knowledge of other KGB officers and his

2

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information concerning his own agents is believed of sufficient weight

to accept the statement of NOSENKO that work against American cor -

respondents was his assignment from mid-March 1953 to mid-1954.

From circa mid-1954 until his transfer to the Seventh Depart-

ment in late May 1955, NOSENKO claims and has claimed he was an

officer of the First Section with the responsibility of work against the

Military Attaches (Army) at the United States Embassy in Moscow. It

is considered, based on his knowledge of the various Military Attache

personnel and other collateral information furnished by NOSENKO, that

NOSENKO was an officer of the First Section during the mid-1954 - late

May 1955 period of time, that his primary work was against members

of the Office of the Military Attache, but that the quality of his work

undoubtedly left much to be desired.

In circa mid-1954, NOSENKO was removed as Secretary of the

Komsomol unit and by early 1955 his performance was such that at least

certain officials in the First Department desired his removal from the

First Department, if not the KGB. Under these circumstances,

NOSENKO could be criticized as having been a very poor if not

undesirable KGB officer, but his knowledge of the First Section during

this period of time and his knowledge of the members of the Office of

3

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the Military Attache supports the claim of NOSENKO that he was an

officer of the First Section with the indicated assignment as related

by him.

NOSENKO has stated that the work against the Military

Attaches was not primarily directed toward development of recruitment

possibilities, but was directed toward control of the Military Attaches

on trips in order to prevent observation of sensitive areas, sensitive

sites or sensitive activities in the USSR. This attitude by the KGB

would appear to be completely plausible and NOSENKO noted as

exceptional in this regard the recruitment attempt against Captain Walter

MULE. NOSENKO explained this exception as retaliation for approaches

to Soviets in the United States in that period.

NOSENKO has been criticized because he did not know all the

details concerning the Military Attaches which it was considered he

should have known if he had the specific responsibility for work against

the Military Attaches during the indicated period of time. It is submitted

that this may be evidence of his failure to satisfactorily fulfill his

0001143

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insigned unctions, mi maires io amowance for the uncertain persoi

staius u NOSENKO whose actua, inture in the KGB was in jeoparuy

NOSENKO LaS

previously

indicated and still indicates à definite

lach of inowledge concerning his assigned targets during approximately

March - May 1955. This, according to NOSENKO, was when an un-

satisfactory "characterization" was being prepared on NOSENKO, a

decision was being made on his case, and a period of time in waica he

eri on a "big drunk" which culminated in his spending about 40 days

andes auspial care secause of the possibility of recurrence if his previous

riberculosis.

Pages 84 - 87 of the previous summary suggeat thai NOSENNO

had not furished siuficient details about his alleged agent netwo. fur

we ajalast the Military Attaches. It is considered that NOSENIC in

current inerviews has furnishei adequa. acceptable detais, and as

an example furnisaed specific mormation concerning "VOLODiNA

cal DARtin" (ig 85). "Wed appear that here was 20 tuat by

NOSanno i withaoi information conceraing wese individuals, but

0001144

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SCREA

The effectiveness or non-effectiveness of NOSENKO during his

assignment to the First Section, First Department, from mid-March

1953 to late May 1955 can have little pertinency in the question of the

bona fides of NOSENKO if it is accepted that he actually was an officer

in the First Section during this period of time. It is felt that information

furnished by NOSENKO in current interviews and in previous interviews

is of sufficient scope and detail that his claimed service as an officer

in the First Section during this period of time is completely acceptable.

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D. DURING THE PERIOD 1955 - 1960, HE WAS NEITHER A

SENIOR CASE OFFICER IN, NOR DEPUTY CHIEF OF,

THE SEVENTH DEPARTMENT AMERICAN-BRITISH

COMMONWEALTH SECTION

0001147

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CROS? 1

Exclud»: trom autamatic

dswagrading and

Macross: 108t131

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SECRET

D. During the period of 1955 - 1960, NOSENKO was neither a

senior case officer in, nor Deputy Chief of, the Seventh Department,

American-British Commonwealth Section. (Previous conclusion)

The above is conclusion "D" in the previous summary.

The

current conclusion is that NOSENKO was an officer in the Seventh

Department, SCD, from late May 1955 to December 1959 and was

Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section, Seventh

Department from 1958 to December 1959.

During current interviews, NOSENKO has furnished extensive

information concerning his own activities in the Seventh Department

during the 1955-1959 period. Interviews of persons who were the subject.

of KGB interest collaterally confirm that NOSENKO was personally in-

volved in certain claimed activities during 1955 to December 1959.

These

activities include among others the recruitment of Richard BURGI.

in June 1956, contact with Sir Allen LANE)and Arthur BIRSE)in the

summer

of 1957, the recruitment of Gisella HARRIS) in 1958, the re-

cruitment of George DREW) in the spring of 1959, the recruitment of

0001148

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William Stanley WILBY in June 1959, the recruitment of David TAYLOR

in the summer of 1959, the recruitment of Gerard MERTENS in July -

August 1959, and the recruitment of Arsene FRIPPEL in 1959. The

foregoing is not a complete list of all cases in which NOSENKO claims

personal involvement, but is representative of cases in which his alleged

participation has been confirmed by interviews with the individual who

was the KGB target.

Sir Allen LANE, Arthur BIRSE, William Stanley WILBY) and

David TAYLOR) were British citizens and the other above-named indi-

viduals were United States citizens. This would seem to substantiate

the claim of NOSENKO that during 1955 - December 1959 he was an

officer engaged in KGB operations against American-British Common-

wealth tourists in the USSR.

In addition, NOSENKO has furnished specific information about

an operation against Martin MALIA; an American tourist who was in

the Soviet Union from approximately September 1955 to December 1955.

MALIAjhas not been interviewed and will not be interviewed, so at this

time no particular 1955 case in which NOSENKO claims involvement

or personal knowledge has been substantiated by interview of the

individual involved.

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SCOREI

NOSENKO has furnished information on the travel of certain

United States Government officials, including Congressional represent-

atives to the USSR in 1955 - 1956; and the trip of Supreme Court Justice

William O. DOUGLAS in 1955 which, when considered with the previously

mentioned specifics, adequately substantiate his claimed service in the

Seventh Department and work against American-British Commonwealth

tourists during the late May 1955 - December 1959 period.

NOSENKO has stressed that when he transferred to the Seventh

Department, the Tourist Section had just been established and an agent

network was not available for operations against American and British

tourists. This seems quite logical since the influx of tourists into the

USSR was just in, a formative stage.

NOSENKO has spoken in detail about an agent network he de-

veloped after 1955 which primarily consisted of Intourist personnel

and two homosexual agents, "SHMELEV" and "GRIGORIY" (KGB code

names), whose extensive use in KGB operations has been confirmed by

interviews with individuals who were the subject of homosexual com-

promise operations.

The previous summary contained remarks on pages 101 - 150

in regard to the claimed 1955 - 1959 Seventh Department

service of

0001150

NOSENKO. To comment on all the aspects mentioned in those fifty

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pages would be repetitious and in many instances superfluous. It is

considered that even if the statements were accepted in toto, there

would still not be an adequate basis for a conclusion that NOSENKO

was not an officer

in the claimed positions in the Seventh Department

during the period of late May 1955 - December 1959. Nor is it con-

ceded that, if all the sub-conclusions and the interpretations of various

areas of information were accepted without qualification, there is any

evidence that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB.

However, there

are certain assumptions and interpretations which appeared in the

previous summary which are particularly worthy of comment and which

are considered erroneous or require additional clarification.

On page 1,45 it is stated that the evidence suggests that NOSENKO

was an English-speaking specialist in sexual entrapment, not a counter-

intelligence officer responsible for the identification of foreign agents

among tourists or for the development, recruitment, and exploitation

of agents for the KGB. The Second Chief Directorate, KGB, and the

MVD have used homosexual and heterosexual compromise in numerous

known (and presumably unknown) successful recruitments and recruit-

ment attempts.

This activity has not been limited to the Seventh Depart-

ment, SCD; and the innuendo that NOSENKO was "only an English-

speaking specialist in sexual entrapment" and not a KGB offilthen

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considered with the detailed information NOSENKO has provided on

Seventh Department personnel, activities, procedures, and topics of

a similar nature is not considered to have any foundation in fact.

Page 145 of the above summary lists eleven operations which

were Seventh Department cases priot to 1960 and which were included

in the notes furnished to CIA in 1964 by NOSENKO. The named operations

were those against Bernard PECHTER, Patrick PRESSMAN, John RUFE,/

Gerald SEVERN, Sofia SHATIAUER, (fnu) KARLOV, Norman FISK,;

Ralph MAILAW, Marvin KANTOR, Michael GINSBURG, and William

¡TARASKA. The criticism made in regard to the above eleven cases

was that NOSENKO could not describe the individual operations other

than to say that he had recorded the name of the target and such details

as he could acquire when he reviewed the activities of the Seventh Depart-

ment in 1962 following his return from the First Department.

The notes brought out by NOSENKO are considered in another

section of this summary, but it should be noted here that a full review

of all of the notes of NOSENKO currently available indicates that his

statements as to how and why he obtained the information in the notes

are completely plausible. A detailed explanation of the notes furnished

by NOSENKO would almost necessitate a separate listing of the approxi-

mately 150 cases

or names mentioned in the notes.

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• :

During current interviews, NOSENKO furnished specific

information on certain of the above eleven cases, including William;

(TARASKA, Bernard PECHTER, Michael GINSBURG and John RUFE,

It should also be noted that certain of the cases such as Marvin KANTOR

and William TARASKA were cases in which the tourist was visiting

relatives in the Soviet Union and that NOSENKO has given a satisfactory

explanation of how he learned of the KANTOR case. NOSENKO has, in

discussing his duties as Deputy Chief of the American-British Common-

wealth Section, also explained that if a tourist indicated that he intended

to visit relatives in the USSR, the case automatically was assigned to a

group of officers in the Section who reported directly to the Chief of

Section and were, not under the supervision of NOSENKO.

NOSENKO has stated that he noted the names of three of the

individuals when retiring the files of "GRIGORIY" and "SHMELEV, "

two homosexual agents of NOSENKO previously mentioned. NOSENKO

has explained that "SHMELEV" and "GRIGORIY" had the assignment of

identifying American travelers with homosexual tendencies, that they

had contact with numerous Americans, and that they had homosexual

activity with individuals on whom they reported but on whom no overt

action was taken by the Seventh Department.

In some cases the individual

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was not considered a worthwhile target and in others the information

was just maintained for possible use at a later date if the individual

returned to the USSR.

NOSENKO has also explained how he learned of the Patrick

PRESSMAN and Gerald SEVERN cases; and, the listing of the (Sofia

SHATTAUER case in connection with the 1955 - 1959 period is in com-

plete error since page 427 of the previous summary contains information

from NOSENKO on her recruitment in 1962. During current interviews

the notes which NOSENKO brought out in 1964 have been discussed in

detail with NOSENKO. He has given a detailed explanation of the material

which he brought out and his explanation of all aspects is very convincing.

The previous summary (page 144) suggested that the involvement

of NOSENKO in certain cases being handled by other Sections in the

Seventh Department of by the KGB Directorate of Moscow was unusual.

An examination of the cited cases does not indicate that his participation

was unusual, but rather that his explanation of why he was involved is

logical and normal. No consideration was previously given to the English

language capability of NOSENKO or the fact that his own homosexual agents

were used in two of the four cited cases.

The summary also noted that there was a question concerning

whether Gisella HARRIS)was necessarily a Seventh Department case.

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• This question seems quite superfluous since HARRIS was in the USSR

on a tourist visa and "real" tourists are the responsibility of the Seventh

Department.

Departmental responsibility within the SCD for an indi-

vidual traveling in the USSR is decided on the basis of how the individual

is traveling; i. e., whether on a tourist visa, as a member of a delegation,

as the invitee of an organization in the USSR, as a former diplomat

stationed in Moscow, as a diplomat not previously stationed in Moscow,

as a member of the Cultural Exchange program, as a student attending

a university in the USSR, etc. There are also various other factors

which affect the determination of which Department or organizational

component of the SCD has the responsibility for a tourist case. These

factors include whether the individual is already suspected of foreign

intelligence connections and whether the individual is a businessman.

In addition, certain actual tourists in the USSR may never become the

responsibility of the SCD if the individual is of specific interest to the

FCD.

On pages 148 - 149, NOSENKO is criticized for not knowing at

least some of the substance of the information furnished by George

BLAKE in regard to the CIA-MI-6 program of utilizing tourist agents

in the USSR. This criticism completely ignored the fact that NOSENKO

made several references in 1962 to the KGB having such information

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although he did then and still suspects that William VASSALL was the

source. The references by NOSENKO to the KGB having such infor-

mation were not developed in 1962 or later interrogations, and it was

not until current interviews that it was established that NOSENKO had

actually seen excerpts of information passed by George BLAKE.

According to NOSENKO, the information which was obviously only

partial was furnished to the FCD by the SCD and could only have come

from an agent.

The previous summary (page 149) also notes that in 1961 CIA

acquired a lengthy Top Secret study on the subject of the use of tourists

by American Intelligence for espionage and operational support in the

Soviet Union (document was furnished by GOLITSYN following his de-

fection in December 1961). It was noted that the summary contained

references to certain 1958 - 1959 tourists whom the KGB counter-

intelligence identified as American agents and noted that NOSENKO

claimed he was Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth

Section in this period of time and that he claimed the KGB identified

no American Intelligence agents during this period of time. What later

is described as a claim by NOSENKO is neither an accurate reflection

of what NOSENKO said prior to 1967 or has said since 1967.

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SEGREA

NOSENKO has never claimed to know all activities against

American travelers in the Soviet Union during 1958 - 1959. Many

of these travelers would have been the responsibility of a section in

the Seventh Department, other than the American-British Common-

wealth Section, or another Department in the SCD. NOSENKO was

quite aware that certain of the American tourists in 1958 - 1959 were

acting suspiciously from a KGB point of view.

NOSENKO has stated he was aware that a document which the

Seventh Department had prepared and furnished to the FCD in an effort

to obtain further assistance from the FCD in the work against tourists

had been compromised by GOLITSYN. NOSENKO stated he was not in

the Seventh Department when the document was prepared and did not

review the document until after the defection of GOLITSYN and follow-

ing advice from the FCD to the Seventh Department, SCD, that the

document had been compromised. The document furnished by GOLITSYN

has never been reviewed with NOSENKO to determine if it contained

additional information not in the document which he was aware had

been prepared by the Seventh Department for the ECD.

NOSENKO has been impugned on his apparent unfamiliarity with

a number of cases cited as examples in the document furnished by

GOLIISYN. In current interviews, however, the descriptiout NOSENKO

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conceining the distribution di responsibilities within she SCD io:

various categories of forciga visicors

to taü USSR provides a logical

exquisition for his marinarity.

Previous picklems in this regard

üz2eai

to have

stermed iron a misconceptich oi te meaning of tae

term "tourist"' as used by the KC3. luis generai terin has a specific

meaning in te Second Cuel Directorate; namely, a "tourist" is a

foreigner travelling io the USSR on a tourist visa. Such a parson

was the responsibiity oi the ourist Section di the Seveath Depazi-

ment. A large number of travelers to the usSi, inciuding busiess-

men, persoas travelling on invitation of a Soviut organization, stidents

artending a university, eic., ura nus tourists in tae küs concept and

would not be tue responsibility of the Tourist Section of the Seventic

Department.

The oily unresoived Fiobiem considered ci any significance

¡a regaiu to the 1955 - 1959 pariod is the account oy NOSENKO u ica

presence oí American citizen JOan SHUSIN in tue USS? as a tourist

in the late 1950's. Tae previous summary pointed oui that,

since

üoan SHUBal did not have a valid Unitad States passport betweia 1940

and June 19ú1, ii was impossible for him to have been & tourist under

true name in the USSR and, therefore, a target of the Seventa Depari-

¡one, as NOSENKO diains.

Alaouge several avenues oi possibly

0001158

Suitil investigation have noù yet baen iully explored, there is to

11

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assurance that this anomaly will ever be explained. All that

justifiably can be said at the preseri sime is that, even if the story

Oí NOSENKO is inaccurate, there is no evidential reason why such

inaccuracy should be interpreted as indicative of deception or dispatca,

or for that matter as indicative that he was not Deputy Chief of the

American-British Commonwealth :Section of we Seventc Department

in 1958 - 1959; neither would such an inaccuracy reflect on his claimed

service in 1962 - 1963 in the Seventh Department.

G001159

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E.. NOSENKO WAS NEITHER DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE AMERICAN

EMBASSY SECTION NOR A SENIOR OFFICER OR

SUPERVISOR IN THE SECTION DURING THE

PERIOD 1961 - 1962 (sic)

0001160

SECRET

GROUPI

Exaluded trom artomaile

sever raing and

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SECRET

E: NOSENKO was neithor Deputy Chief of the American

Embassy Section nor a senior officer or supervisor in the Section

during the period of 1961 - 1962 (sic). (Previous conclusion)

It is the conclusion of this summary that NOSENKO held the

position of Deputy Chief, First Section (American Embassy Section),

SCD, from January 1960 - December 1961.

The claim of NOSENKO that he held the above position ir 1960

- 1961 has been the most difficult claimed position of NOSENKO to

satisfactorily resolve and accept. Acceptance or nonacceptanca of

his claim to have beld this particular position is a critical factor in

a decision as to whether the remainder of his claimed KGB career

is valid. It is believed zeasonable to presume that if NOSENKO was

Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section, Sevenua

Department, prior to December 1959 in the absence of any indication

that he was demoted, he should have been at least a Deputy Chief of

Section during 1960 - 1961.

Position in the SCD, KG3, and throughout the KGB is important

from a monetary point of view as well as a prestige point of view. ii

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NOSENKO was only in the First Section as a Senior Case Officer, in

1960 - 1961, this would have been a demotion in position with resultant

loss of both money and prestige. For this reason alone, his failure to

have held the position of Deputy Chies in 1950 - 1961 would raise con-

siderable doubt as to whether he held his claimed position prior to 1960,

as well as whether he held his claimed positions in 1962 - 1963.

It is apparent that the knowledge of NOSENKO concerning all

aspects of activity in the First Section, First Department, during 1960 -

1961 is incomplete when judged by whai are considered the normai

responsibilities of a Deputy Chiei in CIA. During current interviews,

an effort was made to determine what the responsibilities of NCS ENKO

actually were in 1960 - 1961 and whether his statements in this area

were impossible or could be accepted as not negating his claim to have

been Deputy Chief, First Sectioz.

According to NOSENKO, in the early 1960's there were only

approximately fifteen Deputy Chiefs of Section in the entire SCD and

in certain departments none of the sections had a Deputy Chief of Section.

in addition,

transfer of a Deputy Chiel of Section was

not always followed

by a repiacement in kind,

according to NOSENKO who stated that he was

not replaced by another

• Deputy Chief when he transferred to the First

Section, First Department.

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According to NOSENKO, inere was not a job description for a

Deputy Chief of Section and the cuties of the particular Deputy Chief

were in actuality what the Chie oi Department and Caief of Section

decided would be his assigned duties.

The previous summary drew atiention io an apparent conflict

between early statements of NOSINKO that he replaced no one when he

entered on duty in the First Section, First Department, and his subseguent

claim that he replaced Mikhail BAKIVALOV as Deputy Chief in the First

Section. Along with this he had first credited KOVSHUK and various

other officers in the Section with previous responsibility for certain

matters which were assigned to him upon his arrival there, then later

stated that BAKHVALOV had been responsible for these maiters. The

previous summary noted that interrogation had never resolved these

contradictions.

In the light of the present clearer picture of the nature of a

Deputy Chief of Section, the statements of NOSENKO on BAKHVALOV

and on the issue of who he, NOSENKO, did or did not replace are not

contradictory. There is no reason to question that BAKHVALOV, with

whom NOSENKO, incidentally, did not overlay, was a Deputy Chiei of

Section in the First Section before NOSINKO, and that he was respon-

sible for certain areas which later iell to NOSENKO. On the oiner

0001163

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hand, according to NOSENKO, the principal reason for his being assigned

to the First Section was to concentrate on a new area of emphasis (code

clerks). There could di course have been no specific predecessor for

a substantively new area. Therefore, in one sense BAKHIVALOV was

the predecessor

of NOSENKO and in another sense he was not. The

interpretation of the various statements of NOSENKO on this issue as

being in conflict appears to be the result of coniusion on this point by

all concerned.

According to NOSENKO, at the time of his transier to the First

Section, First Department, in early 1960, he had not been told and for

a short period thereafter was not told what his actual duties would be.

KOVSHUK, Chief of the First Section, wanted to assign NCSENKO to

supervise the work against Service Attaches at the United States Embassy.

NOSENKO felt that the proposed assignment by KOVSHUK was intended

to keep NOSENKO occupied with nonproductive work since KGB policy

for work against the Service Attaches was primarily one of control on

trips and not active work towards possible recruitment.

After a short period of time, NOSENKO was informed by

GRIBANOV that he, NOSENKO, had been transferred to supervise the

work agains: code cleris (also code machina mechanics) ai the United

States Embassy. GRIBANOV defined this work as being o the greatest

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SECLEA

importance, and the recruitment of code clerks as a priority aim of

the KGB. KLYPIN, who was Chief of the First Department, later re-

peated the above and a group consisting of NOSENKO, Gennadiy I.

GRYAZNOV and Vadim V. ROSOLAPOV was formed with NOSENKO

responsible for supervision of the work. GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV

were not new KGB officers, but instead were experienced officers

although both as Senior Case Officers were of lesser rank than NOSENKO.

NOSENKO does not claim that he had to train either officer or to minutely

scrutinize every action or proposed action of GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV.

NOSENKO does claim he was responsible for supervision over their

work.

According to NOSENKO, GRIBANOV emphasized that work

against code clerks was to be his primary work in the First Section

and that it would take precedence over any other activity. Other than

work against code clerks, NOSENKO has generally defined his resyon-

sibilities as follows:

(a) Responsibility for file of (work against) John

ABIDIAN, Security Officer at United States

Embassy.

(b) Responsibility for preliminary review of ra-

ports irom OTU (KGB technical unit) of "take" from

microphones in the United States Embassy.

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(c) Responsibility for maintenance of the physical

security file on the United States Embassy.

(d) Acting in place of Vladislav KOVSHUK, Chief,

First Section, when KOVSHUK was absent.

As can be seen from the above, the responsibilities of NOSENKO;

by his definition, which are borne out by specific information furnished

by NOSENKO, would not coincide with the normal responsibilities of a

Deputy Chief of Branch or Section in CIA.. An analyst can either accept

or reject the theory that there is necessarily an equation between the

responsibilities of a Deputy Chief in CIA and the KGB, but if the analyst

accepts the theory, he must offer some supporting evidence on this point.

Pages 151 - 261 of the previous summary contained comments

and conclusions and sub-conclusions in regard to the claimed service .

of NOSENKO as Deputy Chief of Firsi Section, First Department, 1960 -

1961. The previous primary conclusion was that he was neither Deputy

Chief of the First (American Embassy) Section nor a supervisor in that

section. The conclusion of this summary is that he was Deputy Chief

and had supervisory responsibilities for work against code clerks. The

matter of the responsibility of NOSENKO foi work against code clerks

will be considered later. Comments will first be made on the respon-

sibilities listed in (a) - (d) above.

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.:.

Pages 205 - 222 of the previous summary contain a detailed

basis for the previous conclusion that NOSENKO was not the KGB case

officer for john ABIDIAN. The current conclusion is that he was the

responsible case office for ABIDIAN. Whether or not his work against

ABIDIAN compared favorably with what is considered to be the MO of

a responsible CIA case officer is immaterial; what is material is

whether NOSENKO reasonably fulfilled the requirements of the KGB

for work against the particular target, John ABIDIAN. It is felt that

the answer to this is that NOSENKO did.

According to NOSENKO, the work against ABIDIAN was in the

direction of determining if ABIDIAN would lead the KGB to "another

POPOV, " and no consideration was given to active agent work against

ABIDIAN for possible recruitment. This explanation by NOSENKO

appears reasonable and logical and his knowledge of ABIDIAN and his

description of his work against ABIDIAN should be considered only

within that framework.

Admittedly NOSENKO was unaware of a considerable amount

of details regarding the background of ABIDIAN, but on the other hand

il the statements of NOSENKO are accepted that the only aim of the

KGB was to see if coverage of ABIDIAN would lead io "another POPOV,"

it follows that such personalia information on ABIDIAN would have had

0001167

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little material value for the SCD. The FCD had advised the SCD prior

to the arrival of ABIDIAN in the USSR that ABIDIAN was corsidered to

be "American Intelligence, " and in addition ABIDIAN assumed the

Security Officer position formerly held by Russell A. LANGILLI,

who was known by the KGB to be CIA. No investigation by the SCD

was necessary to determine if ABIDIAN was "American Intelligence"

or not.

The previous summary, pages 213 - 216, contains som e quite

specific statements relative to ABIDIAN and a Soviet maid, a KGB

operational contact according to NOSENKO, which are erroneous.

This invalidates one of the bases for the previous conclusion that

NOSENKO was not the responsible case officer for ABIDIAN.

NOSENKO had previously stated that in circa October 1960 he

prepared an operational plan on ABIDIAN which included continuation

of the placing of Metka on the clothing and eifects of ABIDIAN by his

maid who is mentioned above, Tatyana FEDOROVICH. The statement

is made in the summary that this could not be true because FEDOROVICH

did not work part time for ABIDIAN until at least July 1961. ABIDIAN.

has recently been reinterviewed concerning the above and the results.

invalidate the previous conciusion that FEDOROVICH could not rave

treated the clothing and effecis of ABIDIAN with Metka prior to July 196i.

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ABIDIAN has now stated that he arrived in Moscow in March

1960 with the intention thai he would not employ a Soviet maid. Approxi-

mately three months later his close association began with Myra

KEVIVER, a Department of State employee; this association continued

until she left Moscow in mid-1961. KEMMER had Tatyana FEDOROVICH

as a maid and through mutual agreement with KEMMER, FEDOROVICH

became the pari-time maid for ABIDIAN beginning sometime in the fall

of 1960. From that time on FEDOROVICH, according to ABIDIAN, had

uncontrolled access to his living quarters since she had a key to permit

entry for cleaning purposes.

ABIDIAN did not mail any operational letters within the Soviet

Union until after March 1961 and therefore in view of the above, there

is no reason to contradict the statement of NOSENIO that the three mical ?

operational letters intercepted by the KGB and mailed by ABIDIAN all

showed evidence of Metka. It is interesting to note that NOSENKO in

June 1962 warned CIA about the KGB use of Vetka for spotting internal

letter mailings by United States Embassy personnel.

ABIDIAN, according to NOSENKO, was the subject of a 24-hour

surveillance with the Seventh Directorate assigning a specific surveillance

brigade to cover ABIDIAN. The actual surveillance of ABIDIAN was the

responsibility of the Seventh Directorate which submitted reports to the

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First Section, First Department. NOSENKO, as the responsible case

officer for ABIDIAN, was expected io review these reports and give

any appropriate guidance or direction to the Seventh Directorate, but

under the KGB organization he would not participate in the surveillance

activities of the Seventa Directorate. NOSENKO stated that had sur-

veillance or agent information disclosed any personal weaknesses of

ABIDIAN, the KGB would have attempted to exploit them. No personal

weaknesses were disclosed, according to NOSENKO, and the pattern

of coverage to see if ABIDIAN would lead the KGB to "another POPOV"

remained unchanged.

Pages 210 - 212 of the previous summary notes that NOSENKO

was unaware of countries visited by ABIDIAN during trips outside the

USSR and that no effort was made by NOSENKO through the FCD to find

out such information. According to the previous summary, NOSENKO

stated that the FCD "would not accept"' such a request for "operational

action against an American diplomat coming from Moscow. " The

surveillance which would have been required on the part of the ECD

to achieve any sort of reasonable coverage of ABIDIAN abroad would

certainly have placed a severe burden on the FCD. Further, NOSENKO

contends that the results which might reasonably be expected woüld be

of little or no practical value to te SCD.

0001170

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is time!

Pages 216 - 221 of the previous summary contain a summary

on the matter of the Pushiin Street deaddrop site which John ABIDIAN

visited on 30 December 1961. It should be noted that a current review

of the 1964 - 196ó interrogations of NOSENKO on this matter indicates

they were unable to clarily the matter and dia much to confuse the issue.

Current interviews, as indicated above, have not fully resolved

the problems, but have assisted in at least minimizing the areas of

conflict or confusion. It is apparent that NOSENKO was not in the First

Section, First Department, for any material period of time after

30 December 1961. It is also clear that he either read the surveillance

report on the visit of ABIDIAN to the Pushkin Street deaddrop site or

was fully briefed on the details of the visit. NOSENKO insists that he

read the surveillance report at the time or shortly after the event.

There is no reason to question his assertion that he read the report

...since his accurate knowledge of the route of ABIDIAN and his actions

in connection with the visit support this claim. However, his consistent

inability on his own to approximate the date of the visit or relateit to

his change of assignments raises a question regarding when he actually

read the

report.

NOSENKO claims that the visit of ABIDIAN to the Pushkin Street

¿eaddrop area led to the KGB setting up a stationary surveillance posi

0001171

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Scienti

near the siie which was maintained for three months and that he was

informed on a daily basis of the results of this stake out (always

negative). To take this statement literally would raisea further problem

since, in addition to his transfer from the First Department to the

Seventh Department as of early January 1962, NOSENKO. went to

Geneva in mid-March 1962..

It is conceivable that, as he himself now maintains, he was kept

advised of developments or sondevelopments following the visit of

ABIDIAN to the Pushkin Street building by Veniamin KOZLOV, a Chief

of Department in the Seventh Directorate who had been known to

NOSENKO since 1953, or Vladislav KOVSHUK or Gennadiy GRYAZNOV,

Chief and Deputy Chief respectively of the First Section, First Depart-

ment.. Even so, however, his failure to call our attention to this matier

in June 1962 would seem to require explanation, especially in view of

the fact that he did warn us about the danger of operational letter mail-

ings by ABIDIAN -- a warning which would aypear clearly to have been

derived from KGB coverage of the activities of ABIDIAN in the spring-

summer of 1961.

It is to be noted that during the June 1962 meetings NOSENKO

was not specifically asked for any additional information regarding

any known or suspected intelligence activities of ABIDIAN. Beyond

12.

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this, NOSENKO himself has stated thai it did not occur to him to tell

us because the stake out had long since been dropped,

it had revealed

nothing suspicious on the part of ABIDIAN or anyone else, and therefore

he had regarded it as insignificant.

This is not implausible.

Another possible explanation, however,

derived from the already noted inability of NOSENKO to pin down a date

for the visit, is that he learned of the stationary surveillance post if not

of the visit itself after his meetings with us in June 1962. It should be

noted in this context that with the public exposure of the PENKOVSKIY

case in the fall of 1962, the Pushkin Strect deaddrop undoubtedly became

the subject of widespread interest within the KGB.

That NOSENKO is at a minimum still confused about the visit

OÍ ABIDIAN to the Pushkin Street deaddrop and its consequences is clear

from the record. While it is entirely possible that NOSENKO has con-

sciously exaggerated his involvement with the visit and its aftermats,

it is also possible that the evident distortions of his accounts of the

affair derive from honest confusion.

Current interviews and a check of the tapes of previous inter-

views leave no doubt that NOSENKO was aware of the visits of ABIDiAN

to the upper Gorkiy Sireei area circa Varch 1961. These visits by

ABIDIAN were for cover purposes and preceded his start of operational

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SEUREA

letter mailing. NOSENKO consistently relates, and has furnished

drawings which substantiate, thai visits of ABIDIAN to a commission

shop, a next-door art shop, and a local post office in the area were

known to and considered suspicious by the KGB. The entrance to the

art shop, according to NOSENKO, was so situated as to be an ideal

place for picking up or placing a deaddrop, and a mobile surveillance

was placed on the art shop for a period of time following the visit of

ABIDIAN. Official records confirm the visits of ABIDIAN at the time

and to the buildings described by NOSENKO.

Pages 216 - 220 of the previous summary contain no reference

to the specific statements of NOSENKO relative to KGB interest in the

visits of ABIDIAN to the upper Gorkiy Street area. It is also clear

from a review of certain transcripts of previous interrogations that

20 differentiation was made concerning his statements relative to KGB

coverage of the activities of ABIDIAN in the upper Gorkiy Street area

circa March 1961 and his statements concerning his knowledge of the

Pushkin Street deaddrop site after the visit of ABIDIAN to that site

(30 December 1961).

It is impossible at this time to staïe that a detailed debriefing

O NOSENKO concerning ABIDIAN prior to hostile interrogation wouid

have permitted the clarification of all issues including ihe above, bit

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there is no doubt that the hostile interrogation has confused matters to

the point where compiete clarification appears impossible. In any event,

one thing is clear -- since he may well have transíerred out of the First

Section, First Department, by 31 December 1961 and most certainly had

transferred by early January 1962, the fact that NOSENKO has supplied

confused information regarding the Pushkin Street affair cannot ve used

to impugn his claim to having been case office for ABIDIAN from early

1960 until late 1961. Furthermore, the fact trat NOSENKO is not able io

properly date the visit of ABIDIAN to Pushkin Street, is in no way indicative

of KGB dispatch. If dispatched, NOSENKO presumably would have had the

date right.

In regard to (b), the responsibility of NOSENKO for preliminary re-

view of reports from OTU (Technical Unit of KGBj of "take" from micro-

phones in the United States Embassy, the previous conclusion was that his

claim that he personally reviewed the KGB monitoring reports was not

sustained.

It is not felt that the previous conclusion made sufficient allow-

ance for the explanation of NOSENKO of what the responsibility actually

• entailed. Information from microphones in the United States Embassy,

according to NOSENKO, was handled very specially. Telephone inter-

cepts were given to a designated office: io. distribution to the appropriaie

case officer, but microphone reports, io prevent wide dissemination even

0001175

within the first Section, were brought daily to the Deputy Chiel or in his

absence to the Chief and then were distributed to the individual responsible

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SEVERA

case officer.

In this way, according to NOSENKO, no one below the

rank of Deputy Chiei was aware of the total microphone "take" from

the United States Embassy as received by the

section.

As regards political type information, and according to NOSENKO

this was considered the most important by the KGB and OTU, NOSENKO

had no responsibility for review or ultimate dissemination of the infor-

mation to the Chief, SCD, the Chairman, KGB, or the Central Committee

since this was the responsibility of a unit in the office of the Chief, SCD.

NOSENKO has also stated that the output from certain of the

working microphones was "dying" and that OTU in addition to having

reception difficulties was also having difficulty obtaining a sufficient

number of qualified monitor-translators. As a result, according to

NOSENKO, OTU was not providing complete verbatim transcripts from

most microphones, but actually was reporting only those portions which

OIU considered pertinent. Despite the fact that full transcripts of all

conversations in areas covered by active microphones would have been

Of interest to responsible officers

of the First Section, OTU, according

tO NOSENKO, did not provide full transcripts and when asked to provide

more gave the routine answer of, "we could do so if we had more

personnel." According to NOSENKO, the tapes were maintained at

OTU and could not be furnished io the first Section.

An officer oi ma

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Sivine

First Section could listen io a particulai tape but he had to go to OTU

to do so and as a result this was done very infrequently.

It is believed that any presumption that the KGB recovered or

transcribed all conversations

even in the thirteen

areas listed by

NOSENKO as having active microphones is noi reasonable or even

realistic. It is also unrealistic to presume that any conversation con-

ducted within reasonable distance of an active microphone was not

compromised to the KGB. The latter is a factor to be considered in

any damage assessment; it is not an appropriate basis for a presumption

that NOSENKO had to have been aware of this or this just because some-

one had a conversation in one of the rooms in which there was an active.

microphone and NOSENKO has claimed he reviewed the "take" from

microphones in the United States Embassy.

It is apparent that there are a number of imponderable factors

to be considered such as whether the conversation could be picked up

by the microphone, whether the monitor could recover sufficient portions

of the conversation to understand the gist of what was being said, and

even if he did, whether he would consider it of suificient importance oi

interest io include in his report in verbatim or in summary form.

In regard to (c), the claim of NOSENKO thai he was responsible

for maintenance of the physical security file on the United States Embassy,

1?

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it is not considered that there is an adequate basis for questioning

this claim.

The previous summary contained a conclusion thai the claim

of NOSENKO that he was custodian of the Embassy security file was

an invention. The basis for this conclusion was not then adeguate and

current interviews with NOSENKO have further indicatad that his claim

on this point should be accepted.

In regard to (a), the claim of NOSENKO that he acted in place

of KOVSHUK, the Chief of First Section, when KOVSHUK was absent,

it is considered that this claim is acceptable providing it is not con-

verted into a presumption that therefore NOSINKO knew everything

that KOVSHUK knew.

NOSENKO claims that he was not responsible for the direct

supervision of approximately two-thirds of the officers in the First

Section. These officers normally reported directly to KOVSHUK and

would only report to NOSENKO when KOVSHUK was absent. As an

example of this, NOSENKO has shown a lack of detailed knowledge of

the work against diplomatic personnel in the United Staïas Embassy.

He has stated he is sure he would have iown of anything "important"

such as a recruitment or attempied recruitment, but he does noi claim

to have reviewed all the reports of the various officers of the First

1S

SECRET

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Section.

His recognition oi the races of individuals at the United

States Embassy in 1960 - 1961 and even their assignments seems

adequate.

The previous criticism that NOSENKO knew only the names

of most agents or operative contacts who were part of the KGB network

among the indigenous employees of the American Embassy, did not

recognize their photographs, and did not give sufficient details coz-

cerning their specific activities is considered to be an unwarranted

criticism. NOSENKO indicates that in general the handling of agents

in the First Section was the responsibility of individual case officers.

It is also apparent that the philosophy in the KGB was to maintain

a single handler-agent relationship as much as possible, and that respon-

sibility for an agent would not be transferred merely because the agent

had access to a taïget who was the responsibility of a case officer othei

than the handler of the agent. This apparent philosophy is of particular

interest in connection with NOSENKO, who even though ke was the case

officer responsible for ABIDIAN and together with KOSOLAPOV and

GRYAZNOV worked actively against code clerks, did not have an agent

network which he specifically handled. Mere use of an agent fo: report-

ing on oi a specific activity againsi a particular target was normally

19

SERDET

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not an adequate reason to transier responsibility for the agert and it

appears the KGB considers that the continuation of an established

handler-agent relationship has considerable merit.

NOSENKO, as previously indicated, has stated that he had the

responsioility for work against code clerks at the United States Embassy

during 1960 - 1961. Except for the period of time that he claims respon-

sibility for supervision of work against te Service Attaches in early

1960, he was, according to NOSENKO, responsible for supervision of

the work of Vadim A, KÖSOLAPOV, Gernadiy I. GRYAZNOV, Vladimir

DEMKIN and Yevgeniy GROMAKOVSKIY.

GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV worked only against code clerks

and therefore were supervised

solely by NOSENKO, whereas DIMKIN

and GROMAKOVSKIY, who handled indigenous agents in American

House, came under the supervision of NOSENKO only in those cases

where these agents were directed against code clerks.

It is quite clear that the knowledge of NOSENKO concerning the

code clerks, code machine mechanics and pouch clerks who, according

to NOSENKO, were included in his targeis in 1960 - 1961, was müch

greater than his knowledge of any other category of American employees

at ine United States Embassy during this jeriud excepi for AbIDiAN.

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..!

The foliowing comments are concerned with several specific

cases in which, according i NOSENKO, there was an approach by the

KG3, interesting information was developed, or in which at least a

considerable amouni of specific work was carried out by NOSENKO,

KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZNOV.

The first case, (James STORSBERG) is covered on pages 100 -

177 of the previous summary. Little additional comment is considered

necessary on this case since there does noi agear to be any adequate

reason to question the general story of NOSENKO in regard to the KGB

effort against|STORSBERG.

It is

recognized and mentioned elsewhere that NOSZNKO in 1962

exaggerated his personal involvement in the case, particularly in placing

himself as present with GRIANOV when the recruitment pitch was made

to SIORSBERG. NOSENKO has retracted this particular claira, but

there is no reason to doubt that he was engaged for approximately a year

in the planning and activities which preceded the unsuccessiul approach

to STORSBERG.

An issue was previously made over the timing of the approach

to SIORSBERG since SICRSBIRGdated this as October 1961, NOSENKO

has indicated about June 1961, and information from GOLITSYN, based

on remarks by KOVSHUK to him, had been interpieted as indicating the

21

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(

approach occurred at the "end of 1960."

NOSENKO, during current interviews, has given an acceptable

account of the SIORSBERG) case. He has stated that he canso precisely

date the approach to STORSBIRG, but lnai it occurred before the

approach at the iVoscow airport to James KEYSERS (June 16, 1961)

because otherwise no action would have been taken against KEYSERS!

When recently reinterviewed, (STORSBERG)continued to maintain

that the approach occurred in October 1961, but the iniernal evidence in

his description of coliateral events makes it clear that the approach had

to have taken place considerably earlier.

(Joseph MORONE, another code cierk at the United States Embassy,

who will be the subject of further discussion below, has been interviewed

on the basis

of statements by (STORSBERG) that MORONE)was present in

American House the night of the aporoach. Analysis of the statements

of MORONE) clearly indicates that the eveats STORSBERG describes

could not have taken place later than the period February to early May

1961.

The best estimate possible ai this time is thai the approach to

(STORSBERG) occurred in March - April 1961, waich is quite compatibie

with the approximate dating of the approach by NOSENKO. In the face

of this approximation of the date of the approaca to SIORSBERG, it is

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, too on?

balieved reasonable io assume that te remarks of KOVSHUK to

GORITSYN in January 1901, as relaied oy GOLITSYN concerning

a successful operation againsi a military code cleri in Moscow at the

end of 1960, referred to STORSBIRG, and thai KOVSHUK either was

referring to a compromise phase of the opèration rather than the actual

approach, or was prematurely claiming anticipated success.

Pages 178 - 181 oí the previous sumraary contain information

in regard to the attempied defection operation against James XYSERS.

As of this time, it is considered that tere are no discrepancies between

record information and information from NOSENKO which in any way

refiect against NOSENKO. KEYSERS did not recognize a photograph

of NOSENKO as the Soviet who made a fast approach to him at the air-

port, but this does not provide a valid reason to disbelieve the statement

Of NOSENKO that it was he who tried to talk to KEYSERS).

There are certain statements relative to the KEYSERS case as

set forth in the previous summary which require specific comment.

(a) The statement is made that no KGB utficer

directly connected with the case could regard KEYSERS)

as the replacement for STORSBERG. In fact, KEYSERS,

actually was being trained by STORSBERGlas

a substiüute,

not a replacement, even thoug. sis primary assignment

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was not thât of a code cierk.

NOSENKO has during

current interviews reiated now he received the impression

from the OTU reports oi conversations picked up by the

microphone in the Vilitary code room at the United States

Embassy that KEYSERS either was not a code clerk or

had been away from code work for a considerable period

of time.

In any event, the impression of NOSENKO was

that STORSBERG was having a difficui time expiaining

the particular work to KEYSERS. The observations of

NOSINKO are of interest since KEYSERS actually had

not been a code clerk but, as noted, was being trained

by STORSBERG so that he could act as a substitute. Under

the circumstances, it is considered quite logical that the

KGB would assume at the time that XEYSERS was to be the

eventual replacement of STORSBERG.

(b) The previous summary stated that, "prior to his

departure from Moscow, KEYSERS acknowledged io his

supervisors /Colonel URBAN/ his homosexual tendencies

and he admitted involvement in three homosexual incidents,

all at the American House" (page 179).

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Contrary to this assertion, a review oi the

official memorandur, dated 16 June 1961, of Coionel,

(URBAN reflects that KEYSERS was not informed by

URBAN of the "allegations of homosexuality in order

not to aggravate the possibility of a rash act by him

while within the Soviet Union. "

(c) On page 23ó of the previous summary, the

statement is made that, "In ihe single case in wich he.

ÑOSENKO/ asserted that he reiied on information pro-

cured from microphones (KEYSERS) failure to report

receipt of the defection invitation) he was in error."

While the official record shows that KEYSERS)

did indeed report receipt of the defection letter to Colonel)

(URBAN in the office of Coionel URBAN, it scould be noted

that this occurred less than one hour before (KEYSERS) left

the Embassy for the airport. NOSENKO has stated that in

the absence of information to the contrary from microphone

and telephone taps, the KGB had concluded that KEYSERS)

had not reported receipi of the

: defection letter and there-

fore had decided to approach KEYSERS) at the airport.

view

of the shori lime betwaen KEySERS report of receipt

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of ühe letter and ais departure iron Moscow, it would

have been remarkable if the *CS ad learned this in-

formation in time to cali off ine airport appioach.

The

account Of NOSENKO in te(KEYSERS matter therefore

is considered completely credible.

Pages 181 - 184 of the previous summary contain information

in regard to Matthew ZUJUS, who succaaded James STORSBERG,

having arrived in Moscow in September 1961. GRYAZNOV was the

responsible case officer for ZUJUS, according to NOSENKO.

The previous summary states (page 183) that ZUJUS, during a

routine debriefing, confirmed an Embassy report that in the summer of

1962 he had been intimate with an Austrian woman, "LILLIAN, " who.

visited the American House with someone from the United Arao Republic.

"LILLIAN" was interviewed by the American House manager and she

claimed to be from Vienna but traveling with her employer, a Czeco.

Further inquiry revealed that no Austrian passport had been issued to

"LILLIAN," and she was later asked for her passport.

"LILLIAN"

replied that she had forgotten it, then leit, and did not return.

The previous summary stated that the above incident had beer

described by NOSENKO but in connection with attempis to entray Joseph

¡VORONE in 1960, not ZUJUS) in 1962.

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did in inas no i

(

Page 194 of the previous summary relates information from

NOSENKO Snaï GRYAZNOV went to Dast Berlin in early 1960 to obtain

two German women who could be used against the residents of American

House.

Düring current interviews, this matier has been again covered

with NOSENKO. According to NOSENKO, GRYAZNOV arranged for.

these two women, agents of the Berlin KGB Residentura, to visit Moscow

under false documentation, one as a West German and the other as an

Austrian. NOSENKO further identified the "West German" agent,

"HANNA," as having the cover of a journalist, and stated he believed

"HANNA" had met MOROND at American House. In a recent interview,

MORONE confirmed that in early 1961 he had met a West German girl

at American House who claimed to be a journalist. The staïements of

MORONE therefore appear to substantiate the report of NOSENKO.

Concerning the agent documented as an Austrian, NOSENKO ze-

ported that she was queried about her passport at American House and

as a result the KGB returned her to East Germany without further

attempts to use her at American House. NOSENKO places this incident

in the same time period as the "HANNA" case; i.e., 1960 - 1961. He

has never suggested any connection with ZUJUS, nor is there reason

to assume that he couid be reierring to the experience of ZUJUS) since

this iook place in the sumner of 1962,

after NOSENKO had leit the

American Embassy Section.

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it was the conclusion of the previous summary that NOSENKO

dia noi know enough about 'ZUJUS or his background to have exercised

any supervision in the development of ZUJUS. Granted that NOSENKO

did not know many details regarding ZUJUS, the fact is that NOSENKO

leît ine First Section, First Department, at the end of 1961 at wich

time any supervisory functions of NOSENKO terminated. ZUJUS, who

did not arrive in Moscow until September 1961, remained in Moscow

until January i963.

NOSENKO could hardly be held responsible for

knowing anything about! ZUJUS after 1 January 1952.

Pages 185 - 189 o the previous summary contain a synopsis of

previous information from NOSENKO in regard to (Paul JENNER)

Basically, NOSENKO had reported that when the KGB learned that

(Paul JENNER, who was thought to be a code clerk, was coming to

Moscow through Helsinki, a plan was made to send Vadim V. KOSOLAPOV

to Helsinki to travel on the same train as (JENNER) to Moscow. A female

agent of GRYAZNOV was to be placed on this train at Vyborg after the

train entered the USSR. The female agent was to become acquainted

with JENNER as a part of a future operation against JENNER) in Moscow,

and KOSOLAPOV was also to become acquainted with JENNER.

NOSENKO has stated that the operation was successful, that both

KOSOLAPOV and the ¿emale agent made the acquaintance of jENNER,

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and that he, NOSENKO, read the report submitted by KOSOLAPOV on

te trip from helsinici to Moscow.

JENNER, after arriving in Voscow, reported that he was

approached on the train from Helsinki by two young Russiars, "a boy.

and a giri, probably university students," who struck up a conversation.

According to JENNER, they both said that they might see JENNER in

Voscow. About three months later JENNER) reported being approached

again by the same girl, this time at the Moscow airport where he had

gone on courier business. There was a short conversation and she gave

JENNER a phone number, insisting that he cail her. The woman also

advised JENNER not to mention the conversation to anyone. NOSENKO

has stated that in an effort to follow up the initial train acquaintance,

the KGB had arranged for the female agent to encounter JENNER) at

the Moscow railroad station or airport when he went alone to meet

couriers.

Insofar as is known, JENNER has never been shown a photograph

Of KOSOLAPOV. Although KOSOLAPOV was ayproximately 34 years of

age in 1960, his photograph and remarks by NOSENKO indicaie thât in

appearance he was much younger and that he couid have passed as a

university student.

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During current interviews, NOSINKO nas repeated the same

general story as regards Paul JENNER. He still insists that KOSOLAPOV

was on the same trair with JENNER from Heisiaki. Coilateral infor-

mation raises difficulties here, however: Finnish irain manifests

indicate that JENNER was the only Moscow-bound passenger on the

31) March 1960 train from Finland to Moscow, and that one Viktor

KOLOSSOV (a name NOSENKO has identified as an alias used by

KOSOLAPOV) was on the 2 April 1960 train io Voscow.

The above obvious discrepancy has no beer and cannot be clâri-

fied with available information. KOSOLAPOV (KOLOSSOV) was either

on the same train as JENNER or he was not. Irain manifests indicate

that KOSOLAPOV was not. Nevertheiess, the "boy and girl, probably

university students" who, according to JENNER, struck up a conver-

sation with him on the train would appear clearly to be part of the

operational effort described by NOSENKO, particularly in view of the

later approach of this same girl to JENNER at the airport.

There is

no reason io question that this girl was the female agent of GRYAZNOV.

In view of the conflict between the train manifest and statements by

NOSENKO, however, it is not ciear who the "boy student" was: whether

this somehow was KOSOLAPOV, or whether it may have been some

other person entirely.

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...

..... i

It is not accepted that the train manifests are incontrovertible

evicence thai KOSOLAPOV could not have been on ine same train as

JENNER. Neither is it accepted thai the train manifests are in error.

There is just not a satisfactory answer for the indicated discrepancy

between the train manifests and the statement of NOSENKO that

KOSOLAPOV and JENNER were on the same train. If indeed KOSOLAPOV

did not travel with JENNER, this does no establish anything moze than

that NOSENKO is wrong; it is evidence that he does not low something

he, as the supervisor of ROSOLAPOV, should have inown according to

his own statements.

Pages 190 - 192 contain a summary of previous information in

regard to the John GARLAND case. GARLAND)was identified by

NOSENKO as a code clerk whom the KGB was studying, but on whom

no derogatory information was developed. NOSENKO provided practicaily

no details in regard to GARLAND' other than to identify him as a code

clerk.

GOLIISYN has reported on an incident which it is considered

relates to the trip of GARLAND from Heisinki to Moscow on ló November

1960. GOLITSYN reported that in Novemoer 1960 the Helsinki KGB

Residency received a cable from Moscow advising that an American

code clerk would be arriving in Helsinki en route to voscow and that

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the responsible SCD case officei, KOSOLAPOV, would be sent to Helsinki

under alias to sirike up an acquaintance with the code cierk which te

SCD hoped to continue in Moscow. GOLITSYN talked to KOSOLAPOV

in Helsinki at that time, and the Residency procured for KOSOLAPOV

a place in the compartment of the American on the train from Helsinki

to Moscow.

The previous summary also stated GOLITSYN had advised that

later in Helsinki he inquired of another SCD officer "from the Embassy

Section" (First Section, SCD) about the case on which he had delped

KOSOLAPOV. According to GOLITSYN,

the officer refused to discuss

the case and he, GOLITSYN, concluded from this reaction that it must

have resulted in a successful recruitment.

It has been determined that GOLITSYN, in an interview with the

FBI on 20 March 1962, referred to the above "SCD officer from the

Enibassy Section"' as (nu) ZENKIN of the American Department.

GOLITSYN also stated that the officer was in Helsinki under the alias

Of SERGEEV (SERGEYEV), but was unable to furnish a first name and

patronymic for SERGEYEV. GOLITSYN referred to (inu) ZENKiN as

being from the American Department, SCD.

It is considered that there is no doubt that the (inu) ZENKIN

referred io by GOLITSYN is the individual of the same last name

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concerning whom NOSINKO has furnished information. NOSENKO

has identified ZENKIN (whose firsi name he does not recall but

possibly is Yuriy) as an officer of the Second Section, First Depart-

ment, SCD. According to NOSENKO, one group of the Second Section

both before and after 1960 - 1961 was engaged in "operative games"

against American Intelligence and that ZENKIN was a member of this

group. NOSENKO has advised that ZENKIN traveled abroad in connection

with activities of the Second Section, bui that he had no specific knowledge

regarding the activities oi ZENKIN on these trips. NOSENKO has fur-

nished some fragmentary information which he learned in regard to

ZENKIN and when the full name of SERGEYEV (ZENKIN) iogether with

his photograph is obtained, this fragmentary information from NOSENKO

may prove quite useful.

As regards the KOSOLAPOV GARLAND matter and the opirion

expressed by GOLITSYN based on the refusal of ZENKIN to discuss the

case (GARLAND) that it must have resuited in a successiul recruitment,

there appears to be an inadequate basis for this presumption. According

to NOSENKO, and there is no reason to disbelieve NOSENKO on this

point, ZENKIN was in the Second Section, not the First Section, in

1950 - 1961. He was not Chief of the Section, but only a Senior Case

33

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Officer.

Since KOSOLADOV. was an officer of the First Section and

the work against GARLAND was the responsibility of the First Section,

it does noi appear that ZINKIN would secessarily have knowof any

developments in the KOSOLAPOV-GARLAND) matter.

The Finnish train manifest of 16 November 1960 for the Helsinki

to Moscow train lists John GARLAND' and Viktor KOLOSSOV (alias of

KOSOLAPOV) as passengers. GARLAND, when interviewed in 1962

following the lead from GOLITSYN, deried having met any Soviet with

the physical description of KOSOLAPOV on the Heisinki-to-Moscow.

trip, and denied ever being approached by Soviet Intelligence. Later

interviews by the FBI and a polygraph interview did not indicate that he

hãd ever met KOSOLAPOV or that he had ever knowingly been contacted

by any foreign intelligence agent.

It is accepted that KOSOLAPOV went from Moscow to Helsinki

in November 1960, that he talked with GOLITSYN there, and that he

was on the same train as GARLAND from Helsinki to Moscow. It is

also accepted that NOSENKO is unaware that KOSOLAPOV made a trip

to Helsinki in November 1960.

Travel for an SCD officer outside the USSR or Bloc countries

requires high-level approval, according to NOSENKO. It does nos

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(

SORRES

(

matter that the individual has previously traveied on a similar mission,

each trip must have

specific high-lovel approval.

The red tape which

thus must inevitably have been involved in preparation for such a trip

further supports the assumption that NOSENKO should have known about

the KOSOLAPOV-GARLAND trip.

The position taken by NOSENKO on this point is that he accepts

the statement by the interviewer that KOSOLAPOV made süch a trip,

but he says that he, NOSENKO, simply does not know anything about

it. He adds only that had anything significant developed in the study

Of GARLAND, he would have been aware of it.

NOSENKO, as supervisor of the group working against code

clerks, should have known of any trip of KOSOLAPOV to Finland in

1960 or 1961. NOSENKO himself was out of Moscow on a trip to Cuba

from 15 November 1960 to circa 17 December 1960. The possibility

exists that this could have accounted for his lack of knowledge of the

trip of KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki and return to Moscow on 16 November

1960. However, NOSENKO has not attempted to use his Cuban trip as

a possible explanation for not knowing of the November KOSOLAPOV

trip.

As with the JENNER-KOSOLAPOV case, it is noi possible at

this time to

resolve the discrepancies pertairing to the GARLAND+

KOSOLAPOV trip.

the lact that MOSaNko denies any knowled

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this operational activity of KOSOLAPOV is another apparent instance,

as in the JENNER:

case, of his not knowing something he, by his own

statements,

should have known.

Viewed in the context of the total knowledge of NOSENKO of

operations against code clerks, however, neither the problems in the

'JENNER case nor those in the GARLAND' case, singly or combined,

in any way represent conclusive eviderce that NOSENKO was not super-

visor

Of KOSOLAPOV or that he was not responsible for the code clerk

operations described by NOSENKO. This statement, however, was not

substantiated in the previous summary.

Pages 193 - 199 of the previous summary contain an account of

KGB activity against code clerk Joseph MORONE from various sources,

including NOSENKO. NOSENKO first mentioned the case in 1962.

According to NOSENKO, the responsible case officer for work

against MORONE was KOSOLAPOV. When it was learned that MORONE

and an Embassy colleague, a Marine guard by the name of BEGGS, were

piarning a vacation trip to Warsaw, arrangements were made with the

UB (the Polish Security Service) for a female Polish agent to come to

Moscow and travel from there to Warsaw on the same train as MORONE)

and BEGGS. The intent was for the agent, either on the train or sub-

sequently in Warsaw, to meet and compromise MORONE) sexually. She

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vinceite

successfully accompiished this, but due to certain problems in KGB-UB

liaison relations, it was noi possible for the KGB io expioit this directly.

The previous summary stated that with respeci to the female

UB agent, there was persuasive evidence that neither NOSENKO nor

KOSOLAPOV played the roies in the MORONE case described by

NOSENKO. That summary cited the travel of NOSENKO to Cuba and

Of KOSOLAPOV to Finiand at approximately the same tirae as the MORONE

trip to Warsaw as evidence of the impossibility of NOSENKO ana

KOSOLAPOY being invoived personally ir this part of the VORONI

case.

NOSENKO has stated that KOSOLAPOV met the Polish female

agent and made the arrangements to place her on the train to Warsaw.

(MORONE and BEGGS) departed Moscow on 12 November 1960. It is not

known when KOSOLAPOV left Moscow for Helsinki, but he was on the

16 November 1960 train manifest as departing Helsinki for ivioscow.

NOSENKO departed Moscow on 15 November 1960 for Cuba. Ihe

activities described by NOSENKO are therefore possibie within the

known time frame.

It is clear that NOSENKO in 1962 exaggerated his personal role

in the MORONE) case, particularly when he stated thai he, NOSENKO,

placed the female agent on the train. NOSENKO now clearly states that

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-.

KOSOLAPOV was the only KGB officer in contaci with the Polish agent.

NOSENKO previously stated that a KGB technician who was on the train

from Moscow to Warsaw reported back to NOSENKO the day after the

train arrived in Warsaw. Later NOSENKO said that instead of talking

to the technician personally, he may have read the report of the technician

after he returned from Cuba.

The activities described by NOSENKO with regard to this matter

are accordingly possible within the known time frame. It is not con-

sidered that the retractions NCS ENKO has made from his original

statements on this operation are of sufficient significance to materially

discredit him.

Page 198 of the previous summary contains the statement that

MORONE, when interviewed, denied having been intimate with Svetlana

IVANOVA, a KGB agent employed at the American House. NOSENKO

had stated that IVANOVA was instructed to report everything she saw

or heard concerning MORONE (page 194). The summary, however,

cited a number of reports that MORONE had been intimate with IVANOVA

and with Ella UMANETS, also a KGB agent employed at the American

House, and commented that NOSENKO therefore was apparently unaware

of the sexual involvement of MORONE with "IVANOVA's friends."

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(

NOSENKO, during Current interviews, has indicated awareness

ofat least some involvement of IVANOVA with VORONE. He has fur-

nished information on a developing operation against Viarine guara

GARCIA (Anthony A. GARCIA) based on the involvement of GARCIA

with IVANOVA. He has also stated that the possibility was considered

of using IVANOVA against MORONE to obtain compromising photographs.

This plan was seriously affected when it was learnea from the

militiaman/KGB guard at the United States Embassy that IVANOVA,

her girl friend, MORONZland a Marine guard, possibly GARCiA, had

been in the city," then returned to the "flat" of one of the Marines

where the girls spent the night. This apparently placed the reliability

Of IVANOVA in question in the eyes of the First Section.

According to the previous summary, NOSENKO stated that Pietro

CECCHI, Italian cook at the American Embassy and agent of KOSOLAPOV,

reported on Americans at the Embassy, but NOSENKO recalled nothing

specific that CECCHI had reported about MORONE. The summary also

states that MORONE was said by other American Embassy employees

to be a close friend of CECCHI and that MORONE)had admitted black

market money exchanges with CECCHI.

During current interviews, NOSENKO has stated that CECCHI

furnished "pieces" of information concerning VORONE, but he, NOSENiO,

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knew of no black market involvement of MORONE with CECCHI.

NOSENKO has aiso indicated that the KGB sometimes suspected,

and on occasion actually became aware that various agents did not

fully report everything of interest to the KGB. The KGB of course

was aware that CECCII was involved in the biack market. However,

whether he reported to the KGB everything he did and with whom is

open to question; viz., the Maurice ZWANG) case below.

The comment was made in the previous summary that NOSENKO

was unaware that MORONE met some Soviet females in the spring of

1961 at the apartment of Saiwat el SHAZLY, an Egyptian-national KGB

agent of the Sixth Department who was also reporting on Americans,

and was intimate with one in this apartment.

A review of oificial records indicates that MORONE) did repost

having met some Soviet girls at the apartment of Sarwat, but there is

no indication that he admitted or that anyone else has reported that he

was intimate with any of them. The conclusion of the previous summary

in this regard was based on a misinterpretation. Accordingly, since

there is no reason to believe that any compromise incident took place

in the Sarwat apartment, the story of NOSENKO on this matter is con-

sidered completely acceptable.

(

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SE02:

navidin

A few comments are appropriate concerning remarks in the

previous summary on pages 199 - 204. Comments were made there

concerning five code clerks, Maurice ZWANG, John TAYLOR, Frank)

DAY, Robert DWELLY and Joseph GAFFEY, and although it is not

specifically stated, the suggestion is apparent that the reporting of

NOSENKO on these cases was considered evidence that NOSENKO was

• not supervisor of all KGB operations against code clerks. The follow-

ing observations may assist in placing these cases in their proper

perspective:

(a) | Maurice ZWANG - ZWANG was identified by

NOSENKO as

a code clerk who was actively "worked on"

during 1960 - 1961. The previous summary suggested

that the knowledge of NOSENKO regarding KGB activity

against ZWANG was inadequate. First, reporting of

NOSENKO on ZWANG contained no reference to the

relationship of ZWANG with his maid, whom NOSENKO

in another case has identifiea as a KGB agent. Although

ZWANG) denied sexual relations with his maid, he did

admit to some intimacies with her in her apartment.

During polygraph examination ZWANG reacted when he

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SaW.

responded in the negative to a question regarding sexual.

relations with nis maid.

The lailure of NOSENKO to re-

port on this relationship can be ascribed to ignorance,

but also can be piausibly explained by faulty memory on

his part or failure on the part oi the maid to report details

of this relationship to the KGB.

Second, NOSENKO had not reported that ZWANG)

was involved in the currency operations of Pietro CECCHI.

(A fact that previous summary implied he should have

known from KGB agent CECCHI.) From the record, cow-

ever, it appears that the dealings of ZWANG were not

directly with CECCHI, but rather through other Embassy

employees, making it plausible that CECCHI was either

unaware of the involvement of'ZWANG or, as NOSENKO

himself stated he suspected, CECCHI did not report all

details of his currency operations to his XGB handier.

(b) John TAYLOR - NOSENKO identified TAYLOR

as a State Department code clerkand target of KOSOLAPOV.

The KGB was aware of the involvement of TAYLOR with

his Soviet maid, but no attempt was made to recruit (TAYLOR)

before his depaiture in early 1961 since to do so migai

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endanger the pians for a recruitment approach to James:

STORSBERG, who had been under development for almost

a year and was considered more valuable.

The implication of the previous summary that

the explanation given by NOSENKO was subject to question

failed to take into account the fact that although STORSBERG

was not approached until aiter the departure of TAYLOR,

the operation against STORSBERG was underway before

(TAYLOR became involved with his maid. Further,

it is

apparent that the KGB did not abandon interest in TAYLOR,

since he was approached at a later date outside the USSR

on the basis of his previous affair with his maid in Moscow.

(c) Frank DAY - NOSENKO identified Frank DAY'as

a State Department code clerk who was the target of either

ROSOLAPOV OF GRYAZNOV. According to NOSENKO,

nothing "interesting" was learned about DAY and no oper-

ational measures were taken against DAY. The previous

summary noted that in July 1961, (DAY) traveled to the

Caucasus with his friend and former overt CIA employee,

Agricultural Attache G. Stanlay BROWN.' It was also

stated that the two were under surveiliance by five persons

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SEGRETI

at all times on the above trip, that they found a "repairman"

in their hotel room when wey unexpectedly returned, and

that on another

occasion an "attractive and available Soviet

female" was believed to have been planted in their train

compartment.

According to NOSENKO, surveillance and any other

local coverage of any employee ai the United States Embassy

who travels in the USSR is the resyonsibility of the locál

KGB organization, not the SCD. It would appear that the

local organization was trying to do a thorough job on DAY!

and BROWN, but it apparently was nonproductive. It does

not seem justifiable to expect that NOSENKO should have

recalled a trip which produced no results.

(d) Robert DWELLY - NOSENKO has related in con-

siderable detail the efforts of NOSENKO, GRYAZNOV and

KOSOLAPOV to involve| Robert DWELLY, a code clerks) in

Moscow from April 1959 - July 1960, in a homosexual com-

promise operation. According to NOSENKO, a homosexual

agent of GRYAZNOV was of the opinion DWELLY was a

homosexual.

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(

• in..

There is no reason to doubt the statement of

NOSENKO concerning KGB efioits to determine when

and where DWELLY was going "into the city" (Moscow)

so that a homosexual compromise situation could be

arranged.

There were no specific developments from

their efforts, according to NOSENKO.

(DWELLY has categorically denied being a homo-

sexual; NOSENKO has not said he was, but only that the

homosexual agent of GRYAZNOV assessed DWELLY) as.

a homosexual. There does not appear to be any reason

consider the statements of NOSENKO about DWELLY)

as reflecting adversely on NOSENKO.

(e) Joseph GAFFEY - NOSENKO has identified

Joseph GAFF EX, as a code clerk. The previous summary

noted that NOSENKO had stated the KGB had tried to lure

GAFFEY into downtown Moscow, using Svetlana IVANOVA,

an agent of DEMKIN in the American House.

By way of comment, the previous summary stated

that GAFFEY arrived in Moscow in September 196i and

that! Fred KADERA had reported that GAFF EY had told him

he had been intimate with a Russian girl at the Ament 2C5

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House. It was further noted that GAFFEY was recalled:

from Moscow in the summer oi 1962 because of drunken-

ness and during interview had admitted being intimate

with IVANOVA at the American House and at her apart-

ment and that she had claimed pregnancy.

As to whether the above information raises a

question concerning NOSENKO; the following faciors

should be considered:

(1) NOSENKO has stated that during the

latter part of December 1961 he was part time

in the First Department and part time in the

Seventh Department,

and that he reported full

time to the Seventh Department after New

Years Day 1962.

(2) In addition to the information previously

mentioned as furnished by GAFFEY, during inter-

view, GAFFEY also stated that he was first

intimate with IVANOVA in his room on 27 December

1951 and was also intimate with her later on three

occasions at her apartment. According to GAFFEY,

IVANOVA told him of her pregnancy about i May

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- di

1962, which is approximately four months after

NOSENKO has stated he transierred to the Seventh

Department.

The matter of review by NOSENKO of OTU reports from micro-

phone coverage on the United States Embassy has previously been

mentioned in this summary. Pages 226 - 236 of the previous summary

contained a detailed account of information from NOSENKO on the matter

of microphones, countermeasures taken by the Americans in 1964, and

damage estimates prepared by the Americans. The previous conclusion

was that his information did not sustain his claim to have been Deputy

Chief, First Section, or his claim that he personally reviewed the KGB

microphone monitoring reports. Comments have been made in this

summary in regard to this previous conclusion.

A few remarks, it is believed, will assist in a fuller understanding

of the microphone matter. In the material brought out by NOSENKO ii

1964, there was a single sheet of paper containing on one side hand-

written notes which NOSENKO identified as a list of the active micro-

phones (those which were being monitored) in the United States Embassy.

This list is given on page 227 of the previous summary and need not be

repeated here. The acquisition of this list by NOSENXO was character-

ized in the previous summary as singular and it was stated thai NOSENKO

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has

never plausibly explained the circumstances which prompted his

retention of the list until 1964, when he produced it for CIA in Geneva.

During current interviews, the matter of the above list has been

covered in considerably greater detail with NOSENKO than had been

done before.

His expianation, both of the circumstances which led to

his acquiring the list as well as of his still having it in his possession

at the time of his defection, is considered plausible, contrary to the

judgment of the previous summary.

NOSENKO has stated that in 1960 - 1961 Vladimir I. PETROV,

Chief of the Second Section, First Department, desired some "points"

for use against targets of his section. NOSENKO uses the term "point"

not as meaning just a microphone, but as referring to an OTU sub-unit

which includes microphones as well as the necessary monitors and

translators to cover the microphone and translate the "take." The

targets of PETROV were primarily Americans and, therefore, there

was a transcription-translation problem.

According to NOSENKO, most of the available "points" were

assigned to the First Section to cover microphones in the United States

Embassy.

The Chief of the First Department, Viadimir A. KLYPIN,

held a meeting attended by KLYPIN, Chief of the First Section Viadislav

KOVSHUK, Vladimir I. PETROV, änd NOSENKO, the purpose of which

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was to discuss the possibility of temporarily discontinuing certain

Embassy "poinis" controlied by the First Section, and permitting

PETROV to use these "points" against targets of his section.

According to NOSENKO, PETROV brought to the meeting a list

of names of certain targets to which he wished to give technical cover-

age. During the meeting, KOVSHUK apparently took a piece of paper

which PETROV had and wrote on it a list of active microphones in the

United States Embassy and residences. When the meeting ended,

NOSENKO had this paper and he took it back to his office.

Contained on the reverse side of the paper were the following

names in Russian: (LUBIN, SMITH, Will BURTIN, and Sipe BURIIN.

The name A. A. MIKHAYLOV was listed next to the name of LUBIN,

and the name of Y. E. CHERNETSEV was listed next to the name of

¡SMITH. NOSENKO has explained that LUBIN, SMITH, Will BURTIN,

and Sipe BURIIN were among the targets of PETROV; and MIKHAYLOV

and CHERNETSEV were officers of the Second Section.

NOSENKO stated he knew nothing more about the four non-Soviet

names except that they were targets of PETROV. NOSENKO stated that

he could not be positive of the date of the meeting other than that it

occurred while KLYPIN was Chief of the First Department. (According

tO NOSENKO, KLYPIN was succeeded by Sergey Mi. FEDOSEYEV as

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Chief of the First Department in circa mid-1961.) Research in regard

to the four non-Soviet names leaves no doubt that|LUBIN is George)

(LUBIN; and that Will SURTIN and Sipe BURTIN)are correct names,

with Sipe being the wife of Will BURTIN) All three are American

citizens who were in the USSR circa June 1961. SMITH) at this time,

has still not been identified.

In view of the above, it has been possible to deduce the date

of the meeting called by KLYPIN as circa June 1961.

According to NOSENKO, the piece of paper described above

was

placed by NOSENKO with other notes he kept between the pages

of a bound volume which NOSENKO calls a "working copy." This,

according to NOSENKO, was an accountable, registered notebook

issued to all officers in which they were supposed to write all their

notes,

destroying any other notes.

According to NOSENKO, he, like many other officers; did not

completely follow regulations and the tendency was to frequently put

loose notes in the notebook so that the notebook often acted as a file

rather than being used in the way required by regulations. NOSENKO

has stated that when he left the First Section he took various notes

with him to the Seventh Department; these included notes he had drafted

concerning certain First Section activities for use in briefing FEDOSEYEV

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when FEDOSEYEV succeeded KLYPIN, and notes he had prepared for

lectures to the Seventh Directorate. According to NOSENKO, he did

not intentionally take the particular paper pertaining to microphones;

it was just in the group of notes he took along when he went to the Seventh

Department.

In consideration of the above explanation by NOSENKO, it should

be noted that he also brought with him in 1964 his notes for the briefing

of FEDOSEYEV and certain notes he obviously had also prepared while

in the First Section; e. g., his notes for a lecture to the Seventh

Directorate in regard to a "mass surveillance" on the American

Embassy.

By including a section (pages 236 - 239) on the knowledge of

NOSENKO of the KGB cryptologic attack on United States Embassy

communications, the previous summary implies that there is some

reason to question his information on this subject.

NOSENKO has asserted that the KGB had never succeeded in

reading enciphered communications of the Service Attaches; however,

he said that the Eighth Directorate (the unit of the KGB responsible for

communications intercept and cryptologic analysis) was reading some

United States Embassy traffic. While it is open to question to what

extent knowledge of successes of the Eighth Directorate would be known

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to anyone in the First Section of the First Department, within the

scope plausibly availabie to NOSENKO in his claimed position, there

is no reason to question his statement.

In the previous summary (pages 240 - 248), the failures or

successes of NOSENKO in identifying CIA officers are noted. With

the exception of ABIDIAN, NOSENKO does not claim to have been the

responsible case officer for any of the listed CIA officers. According

to his claim, NOSENKO should have been aware that William N. MORELL.

was. CIA, but he hasnever identified MORELL as CIA. Surely KOVSHUK

knew MORELL was CIA but why NOSENKO is not aware MORELL was

CIA is not known. It has already been established, however, that

NOSENKO, as Deputy Chief, was not aware of all of the activities of

KOVSHUK.

are appropriate.

As regards some of the other listed individuals, a few remarks

(a) NOSENKO has never indicated any knowledge

Paul GARBLER was CIA, and yet GARBLER was surely

known to the ECD as a CIA employee before going to

Moscow. It is presumed that the ECD furnished the SCD

at least basic iniormation that Paul GARBLER was

"American Intelligence." GARBLER, however, did not

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arrive in Voscow until Noveraber 1961, only a month

before NOSENKO left the First Section for the Seventh

Department.

(b) The previous summary stated that according

to NOSENKO the KGB did not suspect that Eugene)

(MAHONEY, was a CIA officer, yet he was a CIA officer.

It was also stated that ViAHONEY reported the presence

of intensive KGB surveillance while in Moscow irom

October 1960 to September 1961. The "intensive KGB

surveillance" is based on statements of VAHONEY) and

may possibly be more a reflection of his personal concern

over surveillance rather than what was actually happening.

(c.) Steve WASHENKO was correctly identified by

NOSENKO as CIA. William HORBALY was CIA and

identified by NOSENKO as suspected of being a CIA officer

or cooptee.

(d) Lewis BOWDEN, who was not CIA, was, according

to NOSENKO, suspected of being a CIA officer.

George Payne WINTERS, JI., has stated that

ROVSHUK warned WINTERS that BOWDEN was the "FBI

officer" in the Embassy. The Cherepanov Papers indicate

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that too KGB bad rossons to considor the activities of

BOWDEN with suspicion.

It is not bellered that the liated fallures of NOSENKO to identlly

CIA officera aro of partlediar significanco is establishing that be vas

08 was not Dopety Chial of the First Saction. There ars too masy sun-

10207 factors which would send to be considered. Despita our assump-

fiono an to mass tha KGB kaors, lI 1s possiblo that (a) the KGB did sot

JuRor of the ClA alfillaldon of thaso people, (1) le Laformation Jonoma

t0 EDo KGB Was not avaliable at tho firal Sectios, Tiras Departmeat,

lorel, or (c) information avallable to lee Chiel ol Eha Firai Section or

tO a sportle cans ollicar was of no ofticial concesa to NOSINKO and

was 20i mado availablo so him. The last of those poszibilities la

suggested in spite of clales by NOSINKO that be had to have inoma

whatavar taa known in tha Section regarding CIA identifications; a

propensity on she part of NOSINKO to ariggerate the area of lala own

knowlodgeability has been sees elsewhere lo this caso.

Pages 252 - 258 ol tha previous summary contals a report ol

the 1960 izip of NOSENKO to Cuba and his 1961 trip to Balgaria. Wich

Regard to the Caba trip, there la collateral evidence of bia travel za

described by NOSENXO, and there la so aubetastive season to doube

his accous of lis activides on inla trip. The stateraent was saja la

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•"""

the previous summary thai the travel of NOSENKO to Cuba in 1960

damaged his claim thai he was supervising operations against Embassy

code clerks at the time. To accepi the validity of this judgment is to

say that no supervisor in the SCD would be permitted to make a trip

abroad unrelated to his supervisory function, a judgment for which

there is no supporting evidence.

As regards the trip of NOSENKO to Bulgaria in 1961, for which

there is no collateral information, the previous summary concluded

that his account of the trip was untrue and argued that such a trip to

Bulgaria, if it did take place, at a time when he claimed the operation

against |STORSBERG was reaching a climax and his subordinates were

"apparently planning to exploit KEYSERS' newly-discovered vulnerability, "

it would indicate thai the presence of NOSENKO in Moscow was dis-

pensable. There was, however, no evidence that NOSENKO did not

travel to Bulgaria and only highly speculative reasoning as to why his

account of the purpose of the trip was untrue.

As to the (STORSBERG) case, while it cannot at present be proved

that the recruitment pitch took place before NOSENKO left for Bulgaria,

it can be stated, on the basis of reporting from MORONE, that it had to

nave taken place before the time NOSENKO returned from Bulgaria.

Since no serious question has over been raised concerning listence

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of NOSENKO in Moscow at the time this pitch was made, it would appear

that NOSENKO was comparatively free to go to Bulgaria because this

phase of the (STORSBERG operation had been completed.

As to the KEYSERS case, there is no apparent probier since

it is clear that the approach to KEYSERS took place after NOSENKO

returned from Bulgaria, and furthermore that the KGB probably did

not become aware that KZYSERS was a homosexual, and therefore

potentially vulnerable, until just before the pitch was made.

In short, there is no reason to believe that the accounts by

NOSENKO of his trips to Cuba and to Bulgaria are noi essentially true,

or that if they are true they necessarily reflect on his claim to having

been supervisor of code clerk operations..

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F.

NOSENKO'S CLAIMS, THAI IN 1962 HE WAS CHIDE

OF THE AMERICAN-BRITISH COMMONWEALTH SECTION AND

WAS THEREAFTER A DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE SEVENTH

DEPARTMENT; ARE NOT CREDIBLE

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F• NOSENKO's claims, that in 1962 he was Chief of the

American-British Commonwealth Section and was thereafter a

Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, are not credible. (Previous

conclusion)

The conclusion of this summary is that NOSENKO was Chief

of the American-British Commonwealth Section (First Section) from

January 1962 to July 1962 and that he was a Deputy Chief of the Seventh

Department thereafter.

NOSENKO has stated that, although he was offered the position

of a Deputy Chief of the First Department, SCD, by Oleg M. GRIBANOV,

Chief, SCD, and although an order had been prepared and was in the

Personnel Directorate, he declined the proffered position.

According to NOSENKO, he knew that Sergey Mikhaylovich

FEDOSEYEV, the Chief of the First Department, did not want NOSENKO

as a Deputy Chief, but instead wanted to promote Vladislav KOVSHUK,

then Chief of the First Section, to the position. FEDOSEYEV was

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willing to promote NOSENKO to the position of Chief, First Section.

However, GRIBANOV did not wish to promote KOVSHUK and NOSENKO

considered that under the circumstances it would be better for him to

return to the Seventh Department rather than to become a Deputy to

FEDOSEY EV who wanted KOVSHUKas a Deputy.

Vladimir Dmitriyevich CHELNOKOV had offered NOS ENKO the

position of Chief of the First Section, Seventh Department, pending the

reassignment of BALDIN to Germany at which time NOSENKO would

become a Deputy Chief, Seventh Department, replacing BALDIN. The

above explanation of NOSENKO seems plausible and credible and indi-

cates that GRIBANOV, the Chief of the SCD, for reasons best known tò

GRIBANOV, was assisting NOSENKO in his career in the KGB.

This section actually covers two periods in the claimed career

of NOSENKO; namely, January - July 1962 as Chief of the First Section,

and July 1962 - January 1964 as a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Depart-

ment. Since NOSENKO was in Geneva, Switzerland, from March to

June 1962, he actually cannot be seriously faulted for not having de-

tailed knowledge of the activities of the First Section during January -

July 1962. The previous

summary (pages 268 - 291) contains remarks

in regard to the January - July 1962 period, including the period of

March - June 1962 when he was in Geneva..

Four specific tourist cases

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are discussed in the previous summary: the cases of Wallace Everett

JOHNSON, William Carroll JONES, Natalie BIENSTOCK, and Horst

BRAUNS. Apparent conflicts between information from NOSENKO and

information derived from subsequent interviews with these individuals

were cited as evidence impugning NOSENKO. It is not believed that the

previous

comments concerning these cases constitute any substantial

evidence that NOSENKO did not hold the claimed position of Chief of the

First Section, Seventh Department, during January - July 1962. That

there were KGB operations against JOHNSON, JONES, BIENSTOCK and)

BRAUNS has been confirmed through interviews by the FBI of all four

individuals.

A few additional remarks in regard to the above four cases are

warranted, not because it is considered that there are any substantial

discrepancies between what NOSENKO has said and what each individual

stated when interviewed, but because they may provide additional clari-

fication.

In the Wallace Everett JOHNSON case, it was previously noted

that JOHNSON arrived in Moscow on 31 December 1961 and that the KGB

operation against him occurred on 5 January 1962. The summary sug-

gested that the short lapse of time indicated that the homosexual tend-

encies of (JOHNSON were known to the KGB prior to his arrival, contrary

to the statements of NOSENKO. NOSENKO during cure in views

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has stated that the KGB learned of the homosexual tendencies of (JOHNSON'

"by chance" soon after his arrival. "SHMELEV" and "GRIGORIY, " two

homosexual agents of NOSENKO, were at the time operating out of a room

at the Metropol Hotel where JOHNSON stayed. They met JOHNSON there

and reported his apparent homosexual tendencies.

"In regard to the William Carroll JONES case, NOSENKO during

current interviews has furnished additional information on the KGB operation

against (JONES, including the woman Ludmila BUGAYEVA who was recruited

as an agent to work against JONES and was used in another case. The other

details furnished by NOSENKO concerning the JONES case are compatible

with his claim to having been Chief of the First Section, Seventh Department.

In regard to the Natalie BIENSTOCK case, NOSENKO did not claim

to have been the responsible case officer but was able to provide enough

specific information concerning the case to bring about a confession when

she was interviewed by the FBI. That he did not know all the details con-

cerning the BIENSTOCK case could be explained by his claim to have been

Chief of Section and not the case officer directly involved with the case.

In regard to the Horst BRAUNS) case, in the previous summary

the criticism was levied that NOSENKO did not know why BRAUNS visited

the USSR and was not able to identify any Soviet citizens whom BRAUNS)

met in the USSR. It was also stated that NOSENKO had explained that

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the Seventh Department was not concerned with foreigners visiting

relatives in the USSR nor with Soviet expatriates.. NOSENKO, accord-

ing to the previous summary, was aware that BRAUNS was a former

Soviet citizen and the summary stated that his plan to visit relatives

was information available to the KGB through his visa application.

In regard to the statement that the Seventh Department was not

concerned with foreigners visiting relatives in the USSR nor with Soviet

expatriates, this is not in agreement with current information from

NOSENKO. * Cases of "true" tourists, which were normally, the respon-

sibility of the Seventh Department, could become the responsibility of

another department or KGB component where Soviét relatives were

involved. However, if the case was not taken over or assigned by higher

authority to another department or

component, it was and remained the

responsibility of the Seventh Department. The fact that(BRAUNS) was a

former Soviet citizen could very well have made (BRAUNS) of interest to

the Second Section, First Department, or a direction in the Service of

the SCD. However, in the absence of an actual reassignment by higher

authority, the case would remain the responsibility of the Seventh Depart

ment since (BRAUNS) was visiting the Soviet Union on a tourist visa. The

previous summary also indicated that BRAUNS listed on his visa appli-

cation that he planned to visit relatives in Leningrad. BRAUNS had a

* By 1962 there had been a large reorganization in the SCD and in the

Seventh Department.

The

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relative or relatives in Leningrad. Although, BRAUNS, when interviewed by

the FBI, mentioned a number' of items of which the KGB was aware concern-

ing his background and occupation from his visa application, there is no

specific reference in these interviews indicating his statement of purpose

in visiting the USSR.

Pages 282 - 286 of the previous summary reviews remarks by

NOSENKO on the Boris BELITSKIY case and states that his claimed role

in the case was not plausible. There are several specific points made in

the summary which imply that NOSENKO was lying about his knowledge of

the case.

There is adequate reason to believe that NOSENKO exaggerated

his own 1962 role in that NOSENKO now states he was to give assistance

to Vladimir Lvovich ARTEMOV in the handling of BELITSKIY in Geneva

in 1962 and not to supervise ARTEMOV.

The more important aspect and the primary one is the difference in

what NOSENKO specifically reported about the BELITSKIY case and infor-

mation from the actual CIA record of the case. There are major differ-

ences and without going into all the details of the case which is very involved,

an effort has been made toward determining whether these apparent differ-

ences necessarily indicate that NOSENKO was or is lying or whether there

is a possibility he is relating the actual KGB version of the case.

NOSENKO has stated that BELITSKIY was a KGB agent whom

American Intelligence recruited in London in 1960 or 1961 and that the

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KGB purpose in running the operation was to lure American Intelligence

into meeting BELITSKIY inside the USSR. The previous summary stated

that NOSENKO did not know when the BELITSKIY operation started

(Brussels, Belgium, 1958), did not know the nature of the British

involvement, did not know the operational details and contact arrange -

ments BELITSKIY bad with CIA, and did not know BELITSKIY's pattern

of activity in Moscow or Geneva.

NOSENKO during current interviews has indicated an awareness

that the KGB (Second Section, First Department) had been trying to use

BELITSKIY against the British. However, he still has dated the recruit-

ment of BELITSKIY as 1960-1961 in London and still states that the

primary purpose of the KGB was to involve American Intelligence in

contacts with BELITSKIY within the USSR. The latter was considered

completely inconsistent with the fact that BELITSKIY was recruited in

Brussels, Belgium, in 1958; that three letters had been mailed to

BELITSKIY in the USSR in 1959 and early 1960; and that BELITSKIY

had an accommodation address for contact outside the USSR.

There are at this time sufficient unresolved questions in the

BELITSKIY case to preclude any conclusion that the apparent dis-

crepancies between the statements by NOSENKO on the BELITSKIY

case and the actual record are a reflection against NOSENKO

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the other hand, there is some reason to believe NOSENKO has

furnished the actual KGB version of the BELITSKIY case and that the

KGB, at least as of 1962, did not know the true story of the relation-

ship of BELITSKIY with CIA. There is a distinct possibility the

KGB believed the BELITSKIY recruitment occurred in 1961 in London

and BELITSKIY did not then nor ba's he since admitted to the KGB

his association with CIA actually started in 1958 in Brussels, Belgium.

As a possible reason why BELITSKIY would have told the KGB in

1961 a partial story of his contact with American Intelligence, some

at present unknown event may have occurred in 1961 which caused

BELITSKIY to believe his security was endangered and as a result

Le told the KGB of certain events in London in 1961, relating these.

events as being the original approach to BELITSKIY by CIA.

The following are certain of the points which suggest the KGB

actually considered that BELITSKIY was recruited by CIA in London

in 1961 and that BELITSKIY may have never told the KGB of the

developments in his case prior to 1961:

(a) BELITSKIY was in London in April 1960 at which

time he was in contact with a British citizen who was also

reporting to MI-5. This individual reported information

received from BELITSKIY which may have been a lead to

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George BLAKE. (It seems highly unlikely the KGB would

ever have directed BELITSKIY to furnish information which

may have been a lead to George BLAKE, or at least could

have caused the employees of the unit in which BLAKE was

employed from June 1959 to August 1960 to come under

suspicion as having passed information to Soviet Intelligence.)

(b) NOSENKO has stated that BELITSKIY, after he went

to Geneva in 1962, managed to reinitiate contact with CIA

rather quickly because he met a girl he had previously known

whom he was sure was an American Intelligence agent and

that she must have reported his presence in Geneva to American

Intelligence. (I the BELITSKIY case had been controlled by the

KGB from its inception in 1958, the KGB would have known of

the internal mailings to BELITSKIY and the fact that BELITSKIY

had a cover address outside the Soviet Union through which to

initiate contact. However, if BELITSKIY did not tell the KGB

anything about his contacts with CIA prior to 1961 and then

gave only a partial story of what happened in London in 1961,

BELITSKIY would not have told the KGB of the internal mail-

ings to BELITSKIY in the USSR or the fact that he long had

a cover address

outside the USSR. BELITSKIY therefore

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would not have told the KG3 how he actually made contact

with American Intelligence in Geneva in 1962, but very well

could have toid the KGB le had

seen a particular woman

whom he had previously kaow., he was sure she worked

for American Intelligence and it was through this woman

American Intelligence became aware BELITSKIY was in

Geneva. )

(c) BELITSKIY in 1962 in Geneva agreea to meei

within the USSR an individual representing CIA.' However,

bis agreement was only under certain stipulated conditions,

the most interesting of whick was that the individual must

be unwitting of the true nature of the relationship of

BELITSKIY with CIA. In addition, any message to

BELITSKIY or any individual who met BELITSKIY must

make no reference to any previous meeting of BELITSKIY

with CIA.

The above conditions are quite explainabie if

BELITSKIY had not been under KGB control between 1958

and 1961 and in 1961 gave the KGB only a partial story of

the 1961 events in Lordon.

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As previously indicated, the conclusion is there are a sufficient

number of unresolved questions in the BELITSKIY case so that discrep-

ancies between information from NOSENKO and the actual record in the

BELITSKIY case cannot at present be considered as a reflection against

NOSENKO, and there is a distinct possibility the KGB actually did not

know the true facts of the BELITSKIY case.

The previous summary noted on page 106 that Nataliya SHULGINA

was an Intourist interpreter recruited by NOSENKO in 1955. It also

noted that NOSENKO had stated Boris BELITSKIY "reported to the KGB

that CIA had warned BELIISKIY against SHULGINA. "'The previous

summary stated BELITSKIY reported to CIA that SHULGINA was a KGB

agent and "CIA did not warn BELITSKIY. "

There appears to be no doubt at this time that the statement: by

NOSENKO that BELITSKIY reported the "CIA had warned BELITSKIY

against SHULGINA, " is a reasonably accurate description of what actually

happened in May 1962 during Agency contacts with BELITSKIY in Geneva.

The record reflects that BELITSKIY stated SHULGINA had confidentially

told him of her status as a KGB agent, stating she had been doubled by

the KGB after having been forcibly recruited by American Intelligence

while previously in Paris, France.

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invitin

It was determined there was no collateral information which

would indicate that the statement by SHULGINA had any factual basis

and BELITSKIY was warned SHULGINA may have been acting on behalf

of the KGB in stating to BELITSKIY she had been "forcibly recruited by

American Intelligence" at a previous date. It was also suggested to

BELITSKIY that he should go to the KGB as a loyal Soviet citizen and

report the apparent indiscretion of SHULGINA.

Pages 282 - 286 of the previous summary, in connection with

the BELITSKIY case, made reference to Vladimir Lvovich ARTEMOV.

It was stated that ARTEMOV had been involved with a series of American

tourist agents in the Soviet Union and although NOSENKO was allegedly

familiar with ARTEMOV, he was unaware of the involvement of ARTEMOV

with American tourist agents in 1958 - 1959. The summary noted this

was during a period when NOSENKO claimed to have been Deputy Chief

of the American-British Commonwealth Section of the Seventh Depart-

ment. Although not specifically stated, the above suggested ARTEMOV

was

actually in the Seventh Department in 1958 - 1959 and that NOSENKO

was not even aware ARTEMOV was in the Seventh Department. NOSENKO

has consistently stated that ARTEMOV was assigned to the First Section,

First Department, from the time he entered into the KGB in approxi-

mately 1957.

12

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A closer

examination of the cases described in the previous

summary as "CIA American tourist agents, " reveals there is no con-

flict in the involvement of ARTEMOV in these cases and the statement

by NOSENKO that ARTEMOV was with the First Section, First Depart-

ment. As an example, one of the cases is the case of Edward McGOWAN.

NOSENKO has furnished information concerning this case, stating it was

originally a Seventh Department case and that after the mailing of a letter

by the individual in Minsk, the case was immediately taken over by the

First Department. There is adequate reason to believe ARTEMOV only

became involved after the case was transferred to the First Department.

Another of the cases involved the contact of ARTEMOV witha CIA

officer who was under Department of State cover in Helsinki, Finland,

and visited the USSR on a tourist visa. Such an individual would under

no circumstances be considered a true tourist or the responsibility of

the Seventh Department, particularly since apparently the individual was

even traveling under a diplomatic passport.

It is assumed the individual

was of interest to the First Chief Directorate and if the First Chief

Directorate required or desired support from the SCD, it would normally

request the First Department for such assistance and it is extremely un-

likely that the FCD would request the Seventh Department for assistance

in a case involving

an American diplomat.

0001230

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. 75.

Pages 332 - 333 of the previous summary contain the basis

for the previous conclusion that the claim of NOSENKO that he was a

Deputy Chief of the Seventa Department from July 1962 to January

1963 was not credible. It is considered that a detailed rebuttal is

not necessary since this conclusion was apparently based on inadequate

information. During current interviews, NOSENKO bas furnished

details concerning his duties and other aspects of his claimed position

which substantiate his claim to having been a Deputy Chief of the

Seventh Department from July 1962 to January 1964.

An example in support of the statement that the previous conclu-

sion was based on inadequate information is the matter of the written

notes which NOSENKO brought out and furnished to CIA in early 1964.

The description of these notes on page 319 of the previous summary is

inadequate, inaccurate, and misleading. Prior to current interviews,

an offort had not been made to obtain from NOSENKO a detailer explan -

ation of his notes or of how be obtained the information in the notes.

During current interviews, NOSENKO has given detailed informa-

tion concerning all aspects of his notes. This information supports his

claimed position of Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department and includes

collateral support to his claim of being Deputy Chief of the First Section,

First Department, in 1960 - 1961.

C001231

14

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¿cunzi

Primarily the notes of NOSENKO can be categorized as

follows:

(a). Short case summaries by the Chiefs of the

First Section, Second Section and Sixth Section, Seventh

Department. NOSENKO has stated that he was in 1962 -

1963 responsible for supervision over these Sections and

that Filip Denisovich BOBKOV, Deputy Chief, SCD, who

supervised the Seventh Department, requested a list of all

recruited agents of the Seventh Department. According to

NOSENKO, the order from BOBKOV was to only retain the

files (cases) of agents in tourist firms and that the files of

other recruited agents should be sent to the FCD or Archives.

NOSENKO has

stated that he in turn levied on the Chiefs of

the three Sections the requirement of BOBKOV, but also ex-

panded the request to include all 1960 - 1962 cases, not

excluding previous cases or cases which had already been

given to the FCD. The notes of NOSENKO included hand-

written reports from the Chief or Acting Chief of each Section

on recruited agents, with information varying from agent to

agent and even including some human errors.

Many of the above cases had previously been trans-

ferred to the ECD, but the remarks of NOSENKO about theif001232

15

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## Page 251

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inclusion support his statement that he had expanded

the original request from BOBKOV so that he would have

some "pieces of information to give CIA. "

(b) Notes by NOSENKO on other cases which he learned

of during the 1962 - 1963 period. Certain of the notes were

made from a review of a notebook kept by the Chief, Seventh

Department, to which NOSENKO had access on at least two

occasions. Most of his notes were not detailed but were

sufficient to refresh the memory of NOSENKO at a later

date and yet were somewhat innocuous to maintain before

his defection.

(c) Notes for lectures to officers of the Seventh Directorate

prepared while with the First Department, 1960 - 1961, and

the Seventh Department, 1962 - 1963.

(a) Draft report for the briefing of the new Chief, First

Department, in the latter part of 1961.

(e) One of three copies of an unregistered report pre-

pared by the Chief, Seventh Department, and two Deputy Chiefs,

including NOSENKO. This was a briefing paper for use by the

Chief (CHELNOKOV) in an appearance before the Collegium

of the KGB which was reviewing the activities of the Seventh

16

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Department. According to NOSENKO, the prepared

report was never typed as a formal document.

The view has been set forth that NOSENKO took undue risk in

carrying written notes with him out of the Soviet Union. An examination

of this material suggests that NOSENKO was using extreme care in

collecting material and was not attempting to obtain documents, the

possession of which might be incriminating or which if he had brought

out would have been immediately missed. Instead, he collected a con-

siderable amount of valuable information which he could bring out with

little or no fear that a search of his effects in the KGB after his depart-

ure for Geneva would disclose that certain material was missing. None

of the material was registered and all could have previously been des-

troyed by NOSENKO.

The previous summary stated that NOSENKO brought three KGB

documents to Geneva. These were typed papers but none was registered

or actually accountable. The reference to three documents was to:

(a) The draft report for the briefing of the Collegium

which has been mentioned previously.

(b) A typed two-page report on several cases. Actually

a Chief of Section had typed his notes on cases instead of

submitting in handwriting as the others did.

17

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(c) A second copy of a summary on a KGB agent.

NOSENKO stated that there were two copies in the file

kept by the Chief which he reviewed and that he kept one.

Of interest is the fact that the copy was not a registered

document and did not contain the usual information as to

number of copies typed.

0001235

18

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G. NOSENKO HAS NO VALID CLAIM TO CERTAINTY THAT

THE KGB RECRUITED NO AMERICAN EMBASSY

PERSONNEL BETWEEN 1953 AND HIS DEFECTION IN 1964

0001236

SECRET

DROUP 1

Encleded don culematic,

Mailissities lon

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## Page 256

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(

G. NOSENKO has no valid claim to certainty that the KGB

recruited no American Embassy personnel between 1953 and his

defection in 1964. (Previous conclusion)

The conclusion in this summary is that NOSENKO is of the

opinion that there were no KGB recruitments of United States Embassy

personnel in Moscow between 1953 and December 1963 with the exception

of "ANDREY" (Dayle Wallis SMITH) and Herbert'HOWARD, who actually

was a 'USIA) employee but did work part of the time in the Embassy.

The question here is whether or not the expressed opinion of

NOSENKO is sufficiently based on actual knowledge so that this opinion

can be accepted as absolute evidence that there were no other KGB

recruitments of Embassy personnel during this period of time. The

only logical conclusion is that the opinion of NOSENKO cannot be

accepted as absolute fact and, therefore, there is a possibility that

a recruitment could have occurred and NOSENKO not be aware in any

way of the recruitment. This should in no way be interpreted as a

suggestion that NOSENKO could be lying, but rather that an unbiased

observer without personal knowledge could and should be hesitant to

accept the expressed opinion of NOSENKO in this particular area.

The

actual basis for the stated opinion of NOSENKO

Cool ould be

examined and can be cited as follows.

SECRET

GROUP 1

1 Excluded from talomatic

Congrading and

dgelescification

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## Page 257

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(a) During March 1953-late May 1955 NOSENKO

was a case officer in the First Section, First Department,

SCD. NOSENKO does not claim that he would have known

the details concerning any recruitments (other than

"ANDREY") in this period, but states if there had been

he would have heard "something."

(b). During late May 1955 to December 1959 NOSENKO

was in the Seventh Department, not the First Department,

but continued to have contact with certain officers in the

First Section, First Department. NOSENKO is of the

opinion that if there had been a recruitment in the United

States Embassy during this period be would have heard

"something" even though he would probably have learned

few details.

(c) During the January 1960-December 1961 period

NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the First Section, First

Department, and be has made the categorical statement

that there were no recruitments by the KGB of United

States Embassy personnel during this period of time.

He has also stated that if there had been any recruitments

during the 1953-1959 period he is sure he would, during

1960-1961, have heard or learned some details of ty0)01238

case

or cases. There is merit to this contention by

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'and to ta do some de

NOSENKO since the Chief of Section was Vladislav

KOVSHUK who had been an officer of the First Depart-

ment since 1953, actually working in the First Section

except for the periods of time that he was in the United

States to reactivate "ANDREY" in 1957-1958 and a

period of time that he was Deputy Chief of the First

Department.

(d) During 1962-1963 NOSENKO was again in the

Seventh Department.

However, he continued to maintain

contact with certain officers of the First Section, First

Department; in particular, Gennadiy I. GRYAZNOV,

who succeeded NOSENKO as Deputy Chief of the First.

Sectión, then became Chief of Section, and in the latter

part of 1963 became a Deputy Chief of the First Department.

According to NOSENKO his relationship with

GRYAZNOV was sufficiently close during 1962-1963 that

he is sure GRYAZNOV would have furnished NOSENKO

some information in regard to any successful recruitments

of United States Embassy personnel. NOSENKO pointed

out that he learned of the existence of the Herbert HOWARD;

case from GRYAZNOV in 1962, although it was not until

1963 that NOSENKO heard the name. NOSENKO actually

0001239

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## Page 259

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learned of the name when the Flrst Section, First

Department, needed the services of the Seventh

Department (Third Section) in obtaining a room in a

certais hotal for the Soviet girl friend of HOWARD.

In general the above constitates the basis for the stated opinion

Of NOSENKO that "ANDREY" and Herbert HOWARD were the only

succescial KGB recraltmente during 1953 - December 1963. It should

Do noted that there are no other identifled KGB recrultments during

this period of tise which would spectically refate the opinion of

NOSENKO. However, ta viow of the cited actual basia for the opinion

Of NOSENKO, acceptance of the opindon of NOSENKO as being an

honest opinion should not be converted into a statement that it in

absolute proof that another recraltment could not have occurred.

NOSENKO say be completely correct in his opiaion, but since

NOSENKO was only in the Fisst Departmost 1953 - 1955 and 1960 - 1961

his opinion that he would have heard "something" about a recrultment

1= 1955 - 1959 or 1962 - 1963 cannot be accepted as infallible.

0001240

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v.

ANNEX

0001241

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Excluded frem automati

down raring 20d

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i-CRET

ANNEX

The previous summary contained an Annex "A" and an Arsex

"B" covering pages 316 - 435. Limited comments concerning Annex

"A, " Statements of Soviet Officials About NOSENKO, and Annex "B, "

Summaries of Cases Not Examined in Text, are attached. In addition,

there is an Annex "C" to this summary which is entitled, "The

Cherepanov Papers. "

Attachments:

Annex A

Annex B

Annex C

SEGRET

0001242

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## Page 263



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ANNEX B - SUMMARIES OF CASES NOT

EXAMINED IN TEXT

6001243

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Exclude i

237 50J

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ANNEX B

SUMMARIES OF CASES NOT EXAMINED IN TEXT

Pages 399 - 435 of the previous

i summary contain summaries

on the cases

of 49 Americans who, according to information from

NOSENKO, were of KGB interest, were approached by the KGB, or

were actually recruited by the KGB. It was stated that these cases

did not clearly relate to the specific KGB positions held at particular

times by NOSENKO and thus could not be usefully employed in examining

his claimed KGB service. The sourcing of these cases has been explored

in detail during the current interviews with NOSENXO, and it is now

possible to establish a certain relationship between these cases and

certain claimed positions of NOSENKO in the KGB.

It is the conclusion of this summary that any group of 49) cases,

as well as all other cases concerning which NOSENKO has furnished

information, must be fully considered, not necessarily for the impostance

or unimportance of the information, but to determine how NOSENKO

claimed to have learned of the case and whetuer his statemenis con-

cerning each identified case are supported by collateral information.

These factors are important in assessing the overall validity of info:-

mation from NOSENKO as well as being supporting evlalidathis

claimed positions in the KGB.

shas free matic

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!

Un-...

To comment specifically on eaca of the 49' cases would require

a very lengthy paper. Current interviews have developed pertinent

additional information from NOSENKO in approximately 40 of the 49

cases. Of even more significance is the fact that NOSENKO has

logically sourced his irformation in all except perhaps four cases.

The indicated inability of NOSENKO to completely source all' 49 of

the cases is not considered significant, particularly since his having

knowledge of all the cases is quite compatible with his claimad positions

in the KGB. In addition, criticism of NOSENKO for not being able to

source all of his information would be unreasonable since it makes

no allowance for normal lapses of memory or failure to recali some-

thing which was insignificant at the time it occurred.

Without citing in detail any of the 49) cases, the ways in which

NOSENKO learned of a number of the cases are considered important

since there is a direct relationship to his claimed positions in the KGB

during 1960 - January 1964, specifically the position of Deputy Chief,

First Section, First Department, 1960 - 1961; Chief, First Section,

Seventh Department, January - July 1962; and as Deputy Chief, Seventh

Department, July 1962 - January 1964. Certain examples of the above

are as follows:

2

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(a) NOSENKO learned of a number of the Seventa

Department cases which had occurred in 1960 - 1961, as

well as several 1958 - 1959 cases from notes prepared by

the Chief or Acting Chief of the First Section, Second

Section and Sixth Section in 1963. These notes were pre-

pared at the request of NOSENKO who as a Deputy Chief,

Seventh Department, was responsible for supervision of

these three sections; and the request was actually an ex-

pansion of the original request from BOBKOV, Deputy Chief

of the SCD, for information on recruitments of the Seventh

Department. NOSENKO brought with him in 1964 the notes

prepared by the Chief or Acting Chief of the First Section,

Second Section and Sixth Section and his knowledge of many

of the cases which had occurred prior to 1962, particularly

1960 - 1961, was limited to information contained in the

notes. From these notes, NOSENKO had prepared his re-

port to BOBKOV eliminating those which were not applicable

to the request.

(D) NOSENKO learned of several 1962 - 1963 cases of

the First Section, First Department, from Gennadiy I.

GRYAZNOV who succeeded NOSENKO as Deputy Chief,

3

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wwiil.

(

First Section, First Department. This information was

furnished to NOSENKO primarily because of his friendship

with GRYAZNOV and not as the result of mutual operations.

However, NOSENKO learned of certain of the cases or

was furnished additional details as a result of a request

from the

Seventh Department to the First Section, First

Department, for assistance or vice versa.

Certain of the 49 cases listed were cases of the Seventh Depart-

ment prior to 1960 or in 1962 - 1963 waen NOSENKO was in the Seventh

Department. Certain of the cases were cases in which the First Section,

First Department, was involved prior to 1960 or 1960 - 1961. The

knowledge of NOSENKO concerning these two groups of cases does not

materially support his claimed positions in the First Department and

Seventh Department, but does support his claimed assignment to te

Seventh Department prior to 1960 and in 1962 - 1963, and his claimed

assignment to the First Department in 1960 - 1961.

It is difficult to specifically comment concerning these 49) cases

since they do not fall into one or two specific categories. Instead, they

constitute a rather motley group of cases remaining after completion of

the detailed sections of the previous summary. Included are Fiist

Department and Seventh Department cases covering a pariod of approxi-

mately five and one-half years.

It should be noted, no?tE? it the

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## Page 269

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.. .

(

explanation of NOSENKO concerning ais knowiedge oi tel 49) cases

is both plausible and compatible with his claimed positions in tee

First Departnent and Seventh Department during 1960 - Januasy 1964.

0001248

5

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SECRET

ANNEX C - THE CHEREPANOV PAPERS

0001249

SECRET

one-

Excluded true carmat

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## Page 272

SECRET

ANNEX C

THE CHEREPANOV PAPERS

Pages

309 - 316 of the previous summary contain a description

of the Cherepanov Papers,

and how Aleksandr Nikolayevich CHEREPANOV

passed a package of documents to an American tourist in Moscow in early

November 1963. The conclusion, however, was that the assertions of

NOSENKO with respect to the CHEREPANOV case were not material to

the claim of NOSENKO that he was Deputy Chief, Seventh Department,

in late 1963.

The definite relationship of the Cherepanov Papers to the bona

fides of NOSENKO cannot be ignored and must be given specific consiù-

eration. I CHEREPANOV was under KGB control when he passed the

papers to the American tourist, or if the papers contain "deception

information, " the bona fides of NOSENKO are subject to very serious

question.

NOSENKO had personal knowledge of CHEREPANOV who was,

according to NOSENKO, an officer in the First Section, First Depaitment,

SEGRET

6001250

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during 1960 - mid-1961 when he was forced into retirement from the

KGB. During the above period of time, NOSENKO claims to have

been Deputy Chief, First Section,

although he does not claim to bave

had a direct supervisory responsibility over CHEREPANOV except

in the absence of the Chief of Section, Vladislav KOVSHUK. NOSENKO

also claims to have participated in the hunt for CHEREPANOV in

December 1963.

Consideration has previously been given to the theory that the

Cherepanov Papers were passed to Americans by the KGB through

CHEREPANOV to support the bona fides of NOSENKO. This ibeory

seems to have little credibility since the papers contain no information

which would even support the claim of NCSENKO that he was in the

First Section, First Department, 1960 - 1961. The papers also contain

no information which would indicate there was even a Deputy Chief of

the First Section during 1958 - 1960.

Statements by NOSENKO are emphatic that CHEREPANOV was

not under KGB control, that he passed the papers which it later developed

be bad taken from the First Section prior to his retirement because be

was disgruntled with his treatment by the KGB, and that the action by

CHEREPANOV caused consternation in the KGB.

There is no collateral evidence which contradicts any oi

the statements by NOSENKO about CHEREPANOV. Further, tere is

0001251

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noting in either the form or substance of the papers which provides

a basis for suspicion as to their aubenticity. In addition, the form

and substance of the papers aie in keeping with the description by

NOSENKO of the day-to-day operation of the First Section, First

Department.

During current interviews, the CHEREPANOV case has been

covered in detail with NOSENKO.. The Cherepanov Papers, which

were originally shown to NOSENKO in 1964 after his defection, have

also been covered in detail on a separate item-by-item basis. Although

NOSENKO does not claim to have specifically seen any particular item

prior to 1964, his statements in regard to the various handwritings,

types of notes, and drait memoranda leave no doubt that NOSENKO

was very familiar with personnel in the First Section, First Depart-

ment, and with First Department procedures.

Certain additional research bas been conducted in regard to the

papers and a detailed

analysis will be prepared at a later date. It

should be noted that a considerable amount of personal judgment ras

been necessary in making an assessment of the Cherepanov Papers

since there are no exemplars with which to compare any of the material.

However, based on information developed thus fai, and bare is no

reason to believe additional work will alter the conclusion, there is

not an adequaie basis for an opinion that CHEREPANOV was under KGB

conizol, thai the Cherepanov Papeis contain "deceptive ingrit 232"

3

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• .

or that the papers were other than the collection of material by a

disgruntled employee which he very carefully selected or accumulated,

toe removal of which would only bave constitutea a minimal risk to

CHEREPANOV.

The entire Cherepanov Papers have been reviewed to determine

if there is any information which could be considered "deceptive infor-

mation" either by direct statement or implication. Two possible areas

have been noted and given full considerati

(a) There is no specific infd

1253

coded of, stauld

were any recruitments by the KCB

sonnel in the United States Embas;

nor is there any information sugge

P.ratect

American source 0x American age

during that period of time.

(b) PetI S. POPOV, a GRU

got ok

an extremely valuable CIA source from 1953 on, was,

according to the papers, exposed to the KGB in January

1959 as a result of a letter mailing by George Payne

WINTERS, JI. WINTERS was a CIA employee under

Department of State cover)assigned to the Embassy in

Moscow. The lettei, waica was io POPOV, was obiained

by the KGB after mailing by WINTERS and was a direct

result of KGB surveillance of WINTERS.

0001253

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## Page 276

In regard to (a), the papers are only a rather minute part of

the total papers prepared in the First Section during 1958 - 1960.

The lack of any information in these papers which directly or indirectly

indicates that the KGB made a recruitment of an American in the

Embassy or had an American source in the Embassy during the 1958 -

1960 period is only a matter for consideration. It is not conclusive

proof that a recruitment was not made or that an American source

did not exist.

The papers do not contain a positive statement on

either matter.

In regard io (b), the quite specific information in the papers

that Petr S. POPOV was uncovered by the KGB as a resuit of KGB

surveillance on George Payne WINTERS, JI., who mailed a letter to

POPOV. in January 1959, this information should be considered as

possibly information of a deceptive nature unless an adequate explanation

can be made for its presence in the papers. POPOV was recalled to

Moscow from East Germany in November 1958 ostensibly for TDY.

The circumstances under which he was recalled and collateral infor-

mation have given adequate grounds for a belief that by November

1958 POPOV was suspected by the KGB of cooperating with Western

Intelligence or that the KGB may even have been sure POPOV had

been cooperating with United States Intelligence.

It may be presumed that any lead to the KGB in regard io

POPOV of tae fact inat United Sates Latelligence, more spe0001*54

5

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CIA, bad a source in the GRU would have come from an agent or

source of the FCD, KGB, not the SCD. It can also be presumed that

à source or agent of the FCD in a position to furnish a lead to a

penetration of the GRU by Western Intelligence would be carefully

proiected even within the KGB. The possibility of course exists that

a lead from George BLAKE, an FCD agent, resulted in the exposure

of POPOV to the KGB, but it is not established that it did nor is there

any reason to believe the FCD could not or did not have another agent

or agents who furnished information to the KGB pertinent to develop-

ment of the case against POPOV.

The primary question, however, as regards the Cherepanov

Papers is whether, even if it is presumed the KGB obtained information

from an FCD source or agent which led to suspicion of POPOV or

identification of POPOV, this would be incompatible with information

in the papers and could only lead to the conclusion that the papers contain

"deceptive information."

The conclusion in regard to the above is that the faci the papers

attribute the exposure of POPOV to the KGB to surveillance on WINTERS

when he mailed the letter to POPOV in January 1959 is not incompatible

with the distinct possibility that the KGB had previously obtained infor -

mation from an ECD agent oi agents which actually led to suspicion in

regard to POPOV or actual identification of POPOV.

0001255

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If information was received from an important ECD agent

such as George BLAKE or through another valuable ICD agent which

led to KGB suspicion of POPOV priot to his return to Moscow in

November 1958, it is bighly unlikely such information would receive

wide distribution within the KGB, either in the FCD or the SCD. It

is also possible the limited group within the KGB who would be aware

that the KGB had received information leading to suspicion of POPOV

from a valuable agent would be very interested in attributing the

exposure of POPOV to the fortuitous mailing of the letter to POPOV

by WINTERS. The possibility should be considered that prior to the

retrieval by the KGB of the letter to POPOV there was only a deep

suspicion of POPOV but that the letter completely solidified the case

against POPOV.

Consideration has been given to the possibility that CHERZPANOV

was under KGB control when be passed the papers to the American

tourist and that it was done by the KGB with the hope of involving CIA

in a KGB-controlled operation within the USSR. In that event, the

papers passed by CHEREPANOV would most likely be genuine since

this would have been the initial step in what the KGB hoped would become

a

successful operation.,

The above theory has been rejected since there

are a number

of factors which militate against it. These factors include the fact that

0001256

1..

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## Page 279

¿ne latest irformation in the papers was at least three years old,

which woüd indicate CHEREPANOV nad no current access and there

was no indication CHEREPANCV Was interested in a future contact.

8

6001257

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INDEX

ABIDIAN, John - IV, E, 5, 7-15,19,20, 52.

"ANDREY" (Dayle Wallis SMITH) - IV, G,1-4

ARTAMONOV, Nikolay - III, A, 2

ARTEMOV, Vladimir Ivovich - IV, F, 6,12, 13

BAKHVALOV, Mikbail - IV, E, 3, 4

BALDIN, Boris Andreyevich - IV, F, 2

BARRETT, Robert - IJ, F, 14, 15

BEGGS, Frank) - IV, E, 36,37

BELITSKIY, Boris - IV, F, 6-12

BERIYA, Lavrentiy Ivanovich - IV, B, 2,3,5-7

BIENSTOCK, Natalie) - IV, F, 3, 4

(BIRSE, Arthuy - IV, D, 1,2

BLAKE, George - IV, D, 9; IV, F, 9; V, C,6,7

BOBKOV, Filip Denisovich - IV, F, 15,16; V, B, 3

BOHLEN, Ambassador - III, F, 10

BOWDEN, Lewis - IV, E, 53, 54

BRAUNS, Horst) - IV, E, 3-6

BROWN, G. Stanley, - IV, E, 43

6001259

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Ercluded teid attamalie)

Jaer rating a.1d

duc ritecia

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BUGAYEVA, Ludmila - IV, F, 1

BURGI, Richard - IV, D, 1

BURTIN, Sipe - IV, E, 49,50

BURTIN, Will) - IV, E, 49, 50

CECCHI, Pietro - IV, E, 39, 40,42

CHELNOKOV, Vladimir Dmitriyevich - IV, F, 2,16

CHEREPANOV, Aleksandr N. - III, H, 4; V, C, 1-4, 6-8

CHERNETSEV, Y. E. - IV, E, 49

CHURANOV, Vladimir A. - III, B, 4

DAY, Frank - IV, E, 11, 43

DEMKIN, Vladimir - IV, E, 20, 45

DERYABIN, Petr Sergeyevich - IV, B, 5, 6

DOUGLAS, William O. - IV, D, 3

DREW, George - IV, D, 1

DWELLY, Robert - IV, E, 41, 44, 45

FARMAKOVSKAYA, Olga A. - V, A, 1

FEDOROVICH, Tatyana - IV, E, 8,9

FEDOSEYEV, Sergey M. - IV, E, 49-51; IV, F, 1

(FISK, Norman - IV, D, 5

FRIPPEL, Arsene) - IV, D, 2

(GAFFEY, Joseph) - IV, E, 41, 45, 46

2

0001259

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GARBLER, Paul - IV, E, 52

GARCIA, Anthony A. - IV, E, 39

GARLAND, John' - III, F, 17; IV, E, 31, 33-36

(GINSBURG, Michael - IV, D, 5,6

GOLITSYN, Anatoliy Mikhaylovich - III, B, 3,4; II, E, 9-11; III, F, 5-13, 15-19;

IV, B,5,6; IV, D,9,10; IV, E, 21,23,31-34;

V, A, 1

GRBANOV, Oleg M. - II, F, 3,4; IV, 6; IV, 6; IV, E, 4,5,21; IV, F, 1,2

"GRIGORIY" - II, F, 13; IV, D,3,6; IV, F, 4

GROMAKOVSKIY, Yevgeniy - III, B, 4; IV, E, 20

GRYAZNOV, Gennadiy I. - Ш, В, 4;

I1, F, 8-13,15; IV, E, 5,12,19-21, 26-28,

30,43-45; IV, G,3; V, B, 3,4

GUK, Yuriy I. - II, B, 4

HAMILTON, Victor Norris - III, E, 9

(aka: HINDAL, Fouzi Mitri)

"HANNA"' - IV, E, 27

HARRIS, Gisella - IV, D, 1, 7, 8

HORBALY, William - IV, E, 53

HOWARD, Herbert) - III, E, 8; III, F, 20; IV, G, 1,3, 4

IVANOVA, Svetlana - IV, E, 38, 39, 45, 46

JENNER, Paul) - IV, E, 28-31, 35-36

JOHNSON, Robert Lee - III, E, 8; III, G, 5

(JOHNSON, Wallace Everett)- IV, F, 3,4

JONES, William Carroll'-IV, F, 3,4

0001280

3

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KADERA, Fred - IV, E, 45

KANTOR, Marvin - IV, D, 5, 6

(KARLOV, fnu' - IV, D,5

KASHPEROV, Mikhail - Ш, H, 4

KEMMER, Myra - IV, E, 9

KEYSERS, James - IV, E, 22-26, 55, 56:

KLYPIN, Vladimir Alekseyevich - IV, E, 5, 48-51

KOBULOV, Bogdan Zakharovich (General) - IV, B, 1-4,7

KOLOSSOV, Viktor - IV, E, 30, 34

(Alias used by KOSOLAPOV)

KOSOLAPOV, Vadim V. - III, B, 4; II, F, 8, 16, 17; IV, E, 5, 19-21, 28-32,

34-39,42-44

KOSYGINA, Madame - III, A, 1

KOVSHUK, Vladislav M. - I,B, 4; Ш,F,5, 11, 12; IV, E, 3, 4, 6, 12, 18, 21,

23,49,52,53; IV, F, 1,2; IV, G, 3; V, C,2

KOZLOV, Veniamin - IV, E, 12

KRUGLOV, Sergey Nikiforovich - IV, B, 5

LANE, Allen) - IV, D, 1, 2

LANGELLE, Russell - II, F, 3; IV, E, 8

"LILLIAN" - IV, E, 26

(LUBIN, George) - IV, E, 49, 50

LUNI, Horace) - III, E, 3

MAHONEY, Eugene - IV, E, 53

MALIA, Martin) - IV, D, 2

0001261

4

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MARK, David - III, C, 4

MATLAW, Ralph - IV, D, 5

MERTENS, Gerard - IV, D, 2

MIKHAYLOV, A. A. - IV, E, 49

MINTKENBAUGH, James Allen - II, E, 8; W, G, 5

MORELL, William N. - IV, E, 52

MORONE, Joseph - IV, E, 22, 27, 36, 37, 39, 40, 55

MULE, Walter (Capt.) - IV, C, 4

(MC GOWAN, Edward - IV, F, 13

(PECHTER, Bernard

- IV, D, 5, 6

PENKOVSKIY, Oleg Vasilyevich - IV, E, 13

PETROV, Vladimir Ivanovich - III, B, 4; IV, E, 48, 49

POPOV, Petr S. - IV, E, 7, 10; V, C/4-7

PREISFREUND, Johan) - I, F, 5, 11, 12

PRESSMAN, Patrick - IV, D, 5,7

"RAKETA" - IV, C, 5

RASIVOROV, Yuriy - IV, B, 5, 6

RHODES, Roy - II, E, 4

RUFE, John - IV, D, 5, 6

SCHWARZENBACH, Collette - III, F, 10

5

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0001262

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SERGEYEV (SERGEEV), FNU - IV, E, 32,33

(Very possibly Igor Alekseyevich ZENKIN, but is now considered also

identical to Igor Alekseyevich SERGEYEV, Igor Alekseyevich SUKHOV

and very possibly Igor A. SMIRNOV.)

(SHAPIRO, Isaac Henry - II, F, 6

SHATTAUER, Sofia - IV, D, 5,7

SHAZLY, Sarwat el - IV, E, 40

SHELEPIN, Aleksandr Nikolayevich - I, F, 13

"SHMELEY" - II, F, 13; IV, D, 3, 6; IV, F, 4

SHUBIN, Jobn - IV, D, 11 =-

SHULGINA, Nataliya - IV, F, 11, 12

SMITH, Dayle Wallis - II, F, 4, 20; IV, G, 1

SMITH, Edward Ellis - III, F, 4

SMITH, John Discoe' - ILI, E, 9; IV, E, 49, 50

STALIN - IV, B, 5

STEVENS, Edmund - I, F, 4, 6

STORSBERG, James - ILI, E, 3, 5, 11-13; IV, E, 21-24, 26, 43, 55, 56

TARASKA, William - IV, D, 5, 6

TAYLOR, David - IV, D, 2

TAYLOR, John - IV, E, 42, 43

UMANETS, Ella - IV, E, 38

6001263

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(URBAN, (Colonel); - IV, E, 24, 25

VASSALL, William - III, E, 9; IL, G, 5; IV, D, 9

WASHENKO, Steve - IV, Ei, 53

WILBY, William Stanley - IV, D, 2

WINTERS, George Payne, Jr. - IV, E,, 53; V, C, 4-7

ZENKIN, FNU - IV, E, 32-34

(Very possibly Igor Alekseyevich ZENKIN, but is now considered also

identical to Igor Alekseyevich SERGEYEV, Igor Alekseyevich SUKHOV

and very possibly Igor A. SMIRNOV. )

(ZUJUS, Matthew) - IV, E, 26-28

ZWANÇ,, Maurice - IV, E, 40-42

7

0001284

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