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anann

1704-10400-10311

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

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BY

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NEES ONLY"

PAGE 01

TOR:151902Z. JAN 76

IN 795558

LOND

68796

SECRET 151705Z JAN 76 STAFF

CITE LONDON 68796

D:/e0

TO: DIRECTUR:

RYBAT PLAMBALL

4096

DI/L/19

ACKIEL

NELSON FRUM MEYER

REFI ROGER CHANNEL 09548

Did a con, the

REFERENCE FROM DEPARTMENT INFORMS EMBASSY THAT SENATOR

HART OF SENATE SELECI COMMITTEE WILL BE ATTENDING CONFERENCE AT ?

DITCHLEY 30 JANUARY TU 1 FEBRUARY, HE HAS REQUESTED THAT EMBASSY

ARRANGE WITH DEREK TONKIN FOR BRIEFINGS ON SERIES OF SUBJECTS OF

INTEREST TO MIM AND SELECT COMMITTEE: THEY ARE THE DIVISION

OF.

LABOR BETWEEN A SECURITY AND THE SECRET SERVICE AND B. INTEL-

LIGENCE AND COUNTERI NIEL LI GENCE, HE GOES ON TO REQUEST BRIEFINGS

ON THE ORGANIZATIONÁL ARRANGEMENTS FOR COVERT OPERATIONS AND POLIT-

ICAL CONTROL OF POLITICAL OPERATIONS WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE. IN

ADDITION HE WANTS BRIEFINGS ON INTELLIGENCE BUDGET ALLOCATION AND

COORDINATION AND SYSTEM FOR APPROVAL OF MAJOR INTELLIGENCE PROJECTS.

SENATOR HART ALSO WANTS A BRIEFING ON THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT

AND HOW IT WORKS;

2, TONKIN HAS BEEN CONTACTED BY EMBASSY OFFICER AND TONKIN HAS

SECRET

+Not herewed.

.P.... Lan.

ust airs.

it Hat?

---

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EIA836

PAGE D2-D2

TOR: 151902Z JAN 76

IN 795558

LOND 68796

ADVISED THAT BRITS WILL DO THEIR BEST TO PROVIDE INFORMATION SENATOR

HART WANTS GUT THAT SOME OF THE INFORMATION COULD NOT BE MADE

AVAILABLE, HE iS PROPOSING A JOINT MEETING WITH SIR LEONARD

HÖOPER AND RICHARD SYKES FOR GENERAL DISCUSSIONS ON THE INTELLIGENCE

COMMUNITY AND WITH MR, ROBERT ARMSTRONG AT THE HOME OFFICE ON THE

WORKINGS OF THE OFFICIAL SECRETS. ACT. THERE WILL BE CHANGES IN

THE SCHEDULE AND EMBASSY WILL BE ADVISED BY MR.. TONKIN AT A LATER

DATE.

3, THERE IS NO INDICATION IN THE DEPARTMENT TRAFFIC THAT CIA

HAS BEEN INFORMED BUT WE PRESUME THAT OFFICIALS OF THE AGENCY HAVE

OR WILL BE CONTACTED BY SENATOR HART OF HIS STAFF ON THE MATTER.

4.

NO FILE: E2. IMPDET.

SECRET

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IS OTTON TO PROFES

RECEDENCE

VR SCI REVIEW STAFE, ISRE

PAGE 01

TOR11500522 JAN 76

IN 794546

CNBR 21033

SECRET 1423027 JAN 70 STAFF

CITÉ CANBERRA 21033

TOY DIRECTORI

RYUAT TAPPER PLMNCONGA CODEL ADDABBO

1. UPON ARRIVAL

OF THE CODEL ON THE EVENING OF THE

12TH GEORGE CARY CONTACTED COS AND ARRANDED FOR STATION

BRIEFING AT 0830/13TH THE CONTRY TEAM BRIEFING HAS SCHEDULED

FOR DOUB).

CARY MENTIONED THAT THE INTEL BRIEFS HAD BEEN

QIVEN "TAIL END" TREATMENT AT PREVIOUS STOPS, AND CONGRESSMAN

JORABBO HAD INDIRATED THAT JE MANTED TO BE SURE AND REMEDY

THAT ON THE CANBERRA STOPOVER,

2, CONGRESSMEN ADDABBO, ROBINSON AND EDWARDS, ACCOMPANIED

BY STAFFERS SNODBRASS, PRESTON AND GEORGE CARY ARRIVED: AT THE

EMBASSY AT DBJ0,

WITH CUNNEELY PRESENT, COS GAVE THEM DETAILED

BRIEFING AS OUTLINED BY HEADQUARTERS, DISCUSSION COVERED THE

MAKE-UP OF THE STATION AND BASES, OUR PRIMARY OBJECTIVES IN

AUSTRALIAS: THE OVERALL MANAGEMENT SCHEME USED BY HOS IN MANAGE-

MENT OF STATION AND ITS ACTIVITIES, OUR USE OF LIAISON,

STRESSING OUR USE OF THEM TO SUPPLEMENT OUR LIMITED RESOURCES.

OUR INTELLIGENCE CYCLE FROM VALIDATION OF REQUIREMENTS TO

SECRET

---

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CANTLA SHE DIRTHIM BEK

RETR

TRIAL SORITE

SECRET

RYN 9Y

REPROPUCTION

SUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE

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ACTION UNIT

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aY

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EIA422

PAGE D2

IN 794546

TOR1150052Z JAN 76

CNBR

21033

PRODUCTION OF INTELLIGENGE, SPECIFIC DETALES OF HOW WE ACCOMP-

LISH OUR OPS TASKING - SPOTTING, ASSESSMENT, DIRECT CONTACT

WITH TARGETS AND USE OF LIAISON - STATION BUDGET, ETC. • ACTUAL

EXAMPLES WERE USED WHENEVER POSSIBLE TO MAKE THE POINT.

FOR EXAMPLE, THE POWHIZ CASE WAS USED TO SHOW HOW THE STATION

FOCUSES ON AN INDIVIDUAL, PRIMARY TARGET, IT WAS A LIVELY.

•SESSION, WITH CONGRESSMAN ROBINSON AND SNODGRASSI THE "LIVE

WIRES" OF THE GROUP. QUESTIONS WERE OF A ROUTINE NATURE

PRIMARILY RELATED TO INCIDENTAL OPS DETAILS. FOR EXAMPLE.

CONGRESSMAN ROBINSON NOTED THAT HE FELT IT RATHER EASY TO IDENTIFY

THE SENIOR AGENCY OFFICERS OF A MISSION BECAUSE OF THE WAY THEY

HAPPEN TO BE INTERFACED ADMINISTRATIVELY WITHIN AN EMBASSY

COS RESPONSE WAS THAT SUCH IS OFTEN TRUE, BUT THAT STATIONS AND

H@S MANAGEMENT ARE FOCUSING ON THAT SPECIFIC PROBLEM, AND THAT THE

WELCH INCIDENT HAS CERTAINLY ACCELERATED OUR EFFORTS IN THAT

RE GA RD :

3. ALL BUT A FEW MINUTES OF THE ENTIRE HOUR WAS

SPENT IN DISCUSSING SIATION OPS, GEORGE CARY CERTIFIED

THAT THE GROUP WAS "WITTING" AND A FEW QUESTIONS AND

ISSUES WERE ADDRESSED ON THE SPECIALS AND T SUBJECT.

SECRET

---

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VR.

PAGE B3

TOR1150052Z JAN 76

SNODGRASS WAS THE FOCAL POINT OF THAT EXCHANGE, WND LT

IS REPORTED IN SEPARATE CABLE CANBERRA 21827, (IN 793209)

SNODGRASS REQUEST STATION HAD ARRANDED A SPECIAL MEETING

WITH A SELECT GROUP OF GOA OFFICIALSI

THE DETAIcE OF THAT

MEETING AND AN ADDITIONAL ONE EARLIER IN THE AFTERNOON OF

THE 13TH WITH DEFENSE ARE ALSO DETAILED IN CANBERRA 21029.ON

BECAUSE OF SOME RATHER UNUSUAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THOSE

MEGTINGS, SUQGEST A AND C/EA/PMI REVIEW REFERENCED

CABLE. THE CABLE WAS GIVEN RESTRICTED MANDLING BY STATION

BECAUSE OF THE SENSITIVITY OF ITS CONTENT.

4, THE MEETING LASTED THE FULL HOUR AND THE CONGRENS-

MEN INDIÇATED THAT THEY WERE WELL-SATISFIED WITH WHAT HAD

BEEN CONVERED, COS STRESSED THAT WE WERE AVAILABLE TO

CONTINUE ON THE SUBJECT AFTER THE FORMAL AGENDA OF THE DAY

WAS COMPLETED, BUT THEY INDICATED THE SUBJECT HAD BEEN

ADEQUATELY COVERED. THERE WAS NO FURTHER STATION CONTACT

WITH THE CONGRESSMEN DURING THEIR VISIT. THE STAFFERS

DEPARTED ON THEIR VISITY IN THE EMBASSY CONVAIR ON SCHEDULE,

AND WILL RETURN DIRECT TO SYDNEY BY CONVAIR ON THE 14TH.

ARRIVING AT ABOUT 2300:

E2. IMPDET.

SECRET

IN 794546

ON BR: 21033

---

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CTION #

т 595025

EI A412

aY

VR: DEIREVIEW STAFF,

DDD

occ,

CPÁGE 01-01

TOR: 122154Z JAN 76

CS/RF,

IN 791659

CNER

21007.

SECRET 1ZZUADZ JAN 75 STAFF

CITE CANBERRA 21007.

TO: JAKARTA INFO DIRECTOR..

RYBAT PLMHCONGA CODEL RANDALL AND ADDABBO

REFS: A. JAKARTA 35686 (1W787635)

B. JAKARTA 35661 (1w790 579)

CANBERRA STATION MUCH APPRECIATES ADVANCED REPORTING

ON CODELS, WAS HELPFUL WITH THE RANDALL GROUP, AND AM SURE

WILL BE VALUABLE WITH ADDABBO GROUP AS WELL. REGARDS. EZ IMPDET.

S

C

RET

---

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DCI REVEW STATE

DDO,

CS/RF,

0/OLE

3

5

6

T 093616

ELAN24

FAGE 01

IN 791004

TOR:1&1111Z JAN 76

JKRT

35674

SECKET 120939Z

UẠN

76 STAFF

CITE JAKARTA

35674

TO: DIRECTUN.

RYBAT PLMMCUNGA CODEL ADDABBO

REF: JAKANTA 55661 (790579)

1. AT RECEPTION AT HOME OF CHARGE NIGHT OF 11 JANUARY,

REPRESENTATIVE ADDABBO MADE POINT OF TELLING COS THAT STATION

BRIEFING AS PER REF WAS "DAMN. GUOD" AND THAT HE APPRECIATED THE

FRANK ANSWERS TU THE DELEGATION'S QUESTIONS.

•2, MR. SNODGRASS ALSO VOLUNTERRED THAT THE BRIEFING HAD

IMPACTED FAVORABLY ON THE DELEGATION AND THAT THEY WERE SURPRISED

AND PLEASED TO GET SUCH STRAIGHTFORWARD ANSWERS TO THEIR QUESTIONS.

LE ADDEU THAT WHAT OFTEN GAVE HIM TROUBLE WAS STATEMENTS BY

AGENCY UFFICERS THAT THEY HAD BEEN PURSUING SOVIET OFFICIALS FOR

TEN YEARS OR MORE AND HAD NOT YET RECRUITED ONE, HE ALLUDED TO

THIS AS THE BUREAUCRAT'S DREAM, BEING PERPETUALLY PAID FOR SEEKING

THE HOLY HAIL WITHOUT EVER FINDING IT.. COS

POINTED. OUT TO MR.

SNUDGRASS THAT SOVIETS WERE BEING RECRUITED AND THAT THE WORK

OF UNE STATIUN WHICH MIGHT NOT RESULT IN RECRUITMENT WOULD BE

THE VEMY BASIS ON WHICH ANOTHER STATION IS ABLE TO MAKE A SUCCESSFUL

SECRET

---

## Page 8

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BY

AT

STAFF.

VR

ACTION #

7 593616

ELARZA

FAGE D2

TOR:121111Z JAN 76

IN 791004

JK.RT: 35674

RECRUITMENT APPROACH, IN COST EFFECTIVENESS TERMS, ALSO POINTED

OUT THAT THE RECRUITMENT OF A SINGLE SOVIET. COULD AND DOES RESULT

IN

A MORE ACCURATE APPRAISAL OF THE SOVIET THREAT AND THUS A MORE

REL 1ST IC ALLOCATION OF FUNDS TO MEET IT. MR. SNODGRASS ÄDMITTED

THAT THIS WAS SO BUT ADDED HIS UPINION THAT MORE RATHER THAN LESS

CONGRESSIONAL CONTACT WITH CIA FIELD PERSONNEL AS IN JAKARTA

WOULD BE A PLUS FOR THE AGENCY AND GIVE THE CONGRESS A BETTER

FEEL FOR OUR ENDEA VORS AND PROBLEMS.

S, MR. CAREY ALSO SAID THAT ON THE BASIS OF HIS TALKS WITH

MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION IT AFPEARED THAT THE BRIEFING HAD GONE

DOWN WELL AND THAT THEY FELT THEY WERE BEING GIVEN AN ACCURATE

AND INTERESTING INSIGHT.

*, THUS IT SEEMS THAT STATIÜN DID GET THROUGH TO THE DELEGATION

DESPITE THE INITIAL IMPRESSION THAT THEY WERE GENERALLY LETHARGIC

ABOUT IT.':

5. NEW SUBJECT: DOES HEADQUARTERS HAVE ANY SPECIFIC

INSTRUCTIONS FUR HANDLING

OF COLEL DIGGS? EZ.. IMPDET

SECRET

---

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трокс

T 592728

ETA152

PAGE VI

TOR:112233Z JAN 76

RUN.BY

tracis

File

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER TH

BBUING OFVICE IS PROMIDITE

STAFF

4

IN 790651

CNOR 21008

SECRET 112220Z JAN 76 STAFF

CITE CANBERRA 2100D

TO: IMMEDIATE WELLINGTON INFO DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PLMHCONGA CONGRESSMAN MILFORD

REF: WELLINGTON 15837(14 787572)

CONGRESSMAN MILFORD DESIRES REFERENCED MEETING AT Q80D

AND WILL EXPECT CONTACT FOR DETAILS UPON HIS ARRIVAL:

2= HE IS VERY EASY TO TALK TO AND AM SURE YOU WILL ENJOY

THE MEETING. HE MET HERE WITH HEADS OF LIAISON SERVICES, ABOUT

45 MINUTES WITH EACH. HIS PRINCIPAL QUESTIONS ARE WHAT THEY

THINK OF THE CURRENT INVESTIGATIONS, WHAT IMPACT HAVE THEY HAD

ON FOREIGN INTEL RELATIONS, ETC:

HE HAS A: MINOR HEARING PROBLEM: SO SHOULD ARRANGE TO

HAVE HIM SEATED AS CLOSE AS POSSIBLE TO BRIGADIER GILBERT.

4.

BEST REGARDS.

E2, IMPDET.

SECRET

---

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"PAGE OI

TOR:1123137 JAN 76

RUN BY

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BBER

ENCE

THRE

TN 790652

CNBR: 21001

SECRET 1123057 JAN 75 STAFF

CITE CANBERRA 21001

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PLMHCONGA RTBUSHEL (DUCKETT)

SUBJECT: MILFORD VISIT

1: COS SPENT ABOUT EIGHT HOURS WITH CONGRESSMAN MILFORD

ON 10 JANUARY, AND BELIEVE HE WENT AWAY TOTALLY SATISFIED THAT

HE HAD ACCOMPLISHED HIS OBJECTIVES HERE: HE MET. WITH

SQUASH DIRECTOR GENERAL, DIJIO AND SOTERN/44, EACH FOR ABOUT 45

MINUTES AND ALL MEETINGS WENT WELL: ALSO WORKED THE MEETING IN

WITH THE NASA REP AND THAT ALSO APPEARED TO GO WELL, AS DID THE

MEETING ON THE SPECIAL S AND T SUBJECT.

2. INCIDENTAL CONVERSATIONS HELD WITH WILSON AND DICKINSON,

DEALING WITH TERRORISM QUESTION. ENTIRE DELEGATION WAS VERY

FRIENDLY AND A PLEASURE TO DEAL WITH.

JACK. MAURY'S PRESENCE

WAS AN ASSET...

3. DETAILED SUMMARY OF DAY'S ACTIVITY BEING FORWARDED

THIS DATE. EZ IMPDET.

SECRET

---

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JEA3

ACTION #

592369

FILE

VR DCI REVIEW STAFE)

DDO CORE SADDO OLC

EIA799

PAGE 01

2

3

6

IN 790579

• TOR: 1112137 JAN 76

JKRT 35661

SECRET 110937Z JAN 76 STAFF

CITE JAKARTA 35661.

TO: DIRECTOR INFO IMMEDIATE CANBERRA, SYDNEY.

• NIACT CANBERRA

RYBAT PLMHCONGA CODEL ADDABBO

1, COS BRIEFED REPS ADDABBO, EDWARDS AND ROBINSON AND

MESSERS PRESTON, SNODGRASS AND CARY ON 11 JAN IN COS OFFICE,

ONE HOUR SESSION WAS BASICALLY QUESTION AND ANSWER PERIOD

CONCERNING TARGETS, OVERALL BUDGET, FIELD PORTION OF BUDGET,

ALLOCATION OF COSTS TO COMMUNIST TARGETS US INTERNAL TARGETS,

RELATIONSHIP WITH LIAISON, ASSESSMENT OF GOVT, STABILITY AND

INSURGENCY POTENTIAL, MEANS OF ACQUISITION OF SECRET INFORMARION.

MOST IMPORTANT REPORTING OVER PAST YEAR, AMOUNT OF COVER WORK

PERFORMED BY OFFICIALLY COVERED OFFICERS, MALAYSIAN INSURGENCY,

INDONESIAN REASONS FOR NOT PROVIDING BASES, DIA ROLE iN INDONESIA,

AND CONSTRAINTS OF COS SPENDING.

2. QUESTIONS WERE NOT PERSUED WITH MUCH VIGOR AND GROUP

SEEMED NOT TOO DIFFICULT TO SATISFY, EXCEPTION WAS SNODGRASS,

A YOUNG AGGRESSIVE STAFFER WHO OBVIOUSLY WANTED TO DELVE

IN MORE DETAIL BUT WAS

RESTRAINED BY TIME LIMITATIONS ITHE

SECRET

---

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2

PAGE 02-02

TOR: 111013Z JAN 76

6

TN 790579

JKRT 35661

• CONGRESSMEN WERE HUNGRY AND WANTED TO GET OFF TO LUNCHI.

3• THE DELEGATION IS QUITE DIFFERENT FROM CODEL RANDALL.

NONE HAD THE INTENSITY OR INTEREST OF REP MILFORD OR THE TOUGH

POLITICAL FERCENTION OF REPS WILSON/DICKENSON. MR. CARY WAS QUITE

HELPFUL IN ORGANIZING THE GROUP AND PROVIDING CLUES TO THEER

OUTLOOK.

4, OVERALL, BELIEVE DELEGATION WAS SATISFIED THOUGH THEY.

PROBABLY DO NOT CONSIDER THIS AN IMPORTANT PART. OF THEIR TRIP.

E2, IMPDET.

SECRET

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EIA313

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BY

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• DCT/Review STASS, CSRF,

AlDO, 102C

PAGE 01 - 01

TOR: @912297 JAN 76

STAFF

2

6

IN 789314

CNBR

20992

SECRET D9RE33Z. JAN 76 STAFF

CITE CANBERRA 20992

TO: WELLINGTON INFO DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PLMHCÜNGA CONGRESSMAN MILFORD

REF:

KELGINGTON 15857 787512)

1.

COS. WILL TAKE MATTER UP WITH CONGRESSMAN MILFORD

ASAP

ARRIVAL CANBERRA AND ADVISE.

2. REGARDS:

E2. IMPDET.

R

E T

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## Page 14

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OUTGOING

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

COI

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15-2

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CLASSIFICATION

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MESSAGE HANDLINO INDICATON

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITe

STAFF

062335Z DIRECTOR

CONE: C/EA 8 iNFO: FILE

D01 Review-Staff, CS/RF,

DDO, spAt

DDO, D/OLC,

TO: PRIORITY JAKARTA INFO CANBERRA, WELLINGTON Y

RYBAT PLMHCONGA Y

REF:

0

INDEX

NO INDEX

RETURN TO

IP FILES

789926

DISSEM BY: 22

PER SOP

112

Mh.Wailes.coom

JAKARTA 35600 IN 787573*4

J. STATION APPEARS TO HAVE HANDLED VISIT OF CONGRESSMAN

MILFORD IN FINE FASHION. REF WILL BE HELPFUL IN FOLLOW-UP

DISCUSSIONS HERE Y

2. PARAGRAPH NINE, REFERENCE GIVES US SOME PROBLEMS.

OBVIOUSLY, EVEN FRACT THAT HE WAS BRIEFED BY CIA STATION CHIEF

IFPUBLISHED

IN JAKARTA SENSITIVE SINCE THAT FACT,

WILL CAUSE US EMBARRASSMENT

WITH INDONESIAN LIAISON AND WITH INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT PLUS

CALLING UNWANTED ATTENTION TO STATION. FURTHER: STATION ACTIVITIES

IN INTERNAL OPS FIELD AND FOCUS ON ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

IN INDONESIA WILL, IF PUBLISHED, CAUSE US DAMAGE IN INDONESIA.

ANOTHER PROBLEM IS THAT WE HAVE PLEDGED TO LIAISON THAT WE WILL

PROTECT OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THEM. MEETING WITH YOGA, IF

PUBLISHED, WILL BE INTERPRETED BY YOGA AS A BREACH OF FAITH.Y

3. THEREFORE REQUEST STATION FORWARD "NON-CLASSIFIED"

VERSION OF BRIEFING AND YOGA MEETING BY CABLE. HEADQUARTERS

DATE:

ORIG:

UNIT:

EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATINO OFFICERS

SENATOR E FOR AEPFODUETION BrOTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE I5 PROHIBITED

ENTICATINS prEMeN

E 2

IMPDET

CL BY: 058913

---

## Page 15

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UUIGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE

ONLY

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гра

0

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OMF. :

CLASS

SIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGEN

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RAOE

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INCT HUMORR

DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO:

FILE

789926

INDEX

NO INDEX

RETURN TO

DISSEM BY:

PER •

0

IP FILES

#

WILL HANDLE HERE WITH CONGRESSMAN MILFORD SO THAT STATION

OPERATIONS INCLUDING LIAISON EQUITIES ARE PROTECTED-Y

4. FOR CANBERRA: WELLINGTON: IF CONGRESSMAN MILFORD MAKES

REQUEST FOR UNCLASSIFIED VERSIONS OF MEETING AND BRIEFINGS WITHI

BY STATION AND LIAISON STATION SHOULD AGREE FORWARD TO HEADQUARTERS

AND WE WILL HANDLE IN SIMILAR FASHION AS JAKARTA MATERIAL: EZ. IMPDET.

OLG

MR. WHITE [DRAFTE

SAIDDO.

MR• WALLER ETELECOORDI

CEA/PMI UNEOS RIP ALL

DATE:

ORIG:

& JAN 76

B. J. HOUSTON

UNIT:

EXT:

9373

William

athable

DILLIAM E•

ELEASING OFFIC

NELSON DDO

COORDIMATINO OFFICERS

THEODORE F. SHACKIE CANCEA

CLASSIFICATION

CC IREPRODUCTiON.,

STHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBIT.

E: 2

IMPDET

SECRET

CL BY: 058913

---

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2.

O/OLE DCI P/DOL

584782

EL A351

PAGE 01

IN 787635

TOR: 0805597 JAN 76

JKRT.

35606

SECRET. @80352Z JAN 76 STAFF

CITE JAKARTA 35606

TO8

DIRECTOR INFO IMMEDIATE CANBERRA ROUTINE WELLINGTON.

RYBAT PLMHCONGA

REFI JAKARTA 035680 (0 787593)*

1, CONGRESSMEN WILSON AND DICKINSON BRIEFED AT COS RESIDENCE

NIGHT Y JANUARY FOLLOWING A RECEPTION AT CHARGE'S RESIDENCE. THEIR

INTERESTS LAY PRIMARILY IN GENERAL INTELLIGENCE APPRECIATION OF SITUA

TION IN INDONESIA, PARTICULARLY STABILITY OF GOVERNMENT. AND ROLE OF

INDONESIAN MILITARY. THEY ASKED NO QUESTIONS CONCERNING ORGANI-

ZATION, TARGETS, PERSONNEL OR BUDGET OF STATION. THEY WERE OPENLY

CRITICAL UF YOGA BRIEFING, WHICH THEY HAD ATTENDED EARLIER IN

THE DAY AS PER REF,

AND FELT THAT YOGA HAD BEEN EVASIVE AND

GENERALLY UNRESPONSIVE: THEY ASKED COS TO SUM UP WHAT YOGA HAD

SAID, COS!S ANSWER WAS THAT YOGA HAD APPEALED FOR

MILITARY

ASSISTANCE BUT HAD STRESSED THAT THIS WAS ONLY ONE ELEMENT. OF

THE TOTAL INDONESIAN "NATIONAL RESILIENCE" PLAN, WHICH INCLUDED

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AS A DEFENSE AGAINST. COMMUNIST

ENCROACHMENT, THE CUNGRESSMEN AGREED THAT THIS WAS THE BASIC

MESSAGE, SAID THAT IT COULD HAVE BEEN CONVEYED IN FIVE MINUTES

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RATHER THAN ONE HOUR PLUS.

2. THE TWO WERE ALSO INTERESTED IN TERRORIST ACTIVITY AND

WHAT WAS BEING DONE ABOUT IT IN INDONESIA, THEY APPEARED HIGHLY

INTERESTED WHEN COS REPORTED THAT THE STATION HAD PENETRATED WHAT

APPEARED TU BE AN ACTIVE TERRORIST GROUP WHICH APPARENTLY HAD

CONNECTIONS WITH THE JAPANESE RED ARMY, NEITHER HAD EVER HEARD

OF THE JRA AND WERE INTERESTED IN A SHORT BRIEFING ON IT. BOTH

MADE MENTION OF INDONESIA'S CO-SPONSORSHIP OF THE U.N. RESOLUTION

CONDEMNING U.S, MILITARY BASES IN GUAM. ONE OF THE MEMBERS OF THE

DELEGATION IS REPRESENTATIVE ANTONIO WONPAT, WHO IS THE REPRESEN-

TATIVE FROM GUAM, THEY SAID MR. WONPAT HAD AGREED FOR THE SAKE

OF DIPLUMACY NOT TO BRING UP THIS MATTER DURING THE VISIT, BUT

"THAT HE HAD CONFESSED TO SOME DIFFICULTY IN CONTAINING HIMSELF.

IN THIS MATTER, COS REPLIED THAT AS A PERSONAL OPINION HE SOMEWHAT

REGRETTED

THAT MR, WONPAT. DID NOT EXPRESS HIMSELF ON THIS ISSUE

SINCE WE HAD TAKEN SOME PAINS TU LET OUR INDONESIAN COUNTERPARTS

KNOW THAT WE WERE NOT HAPPY AT THIS GRATUITOUS REBUFF. IT WAS

ALSO PUINTED OUT THAT STATION HAD MADE SURE THIS ISSUE WAS BROUGHT

TO THE ATTENTION OF PRESIDENT SUHARTO, WHO HAD REACTED BY INSTRUCTING

THE INDONESIAN UAN. DELEGATION TO SEEK INSTRUCTIONS FROM JAKARTA

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BEFORE ACTING ON ANY SUCH ISSUE AGAIN. WE ALSO NOTED THAT

PRESIDENT SUHARTO HAD BEEN DEEPLY UPSET AT THE INDONESIAN UN

DELEGATION VUTE ON THIS ISSUE AND HAD MADE HIS DISPLEASURE KNOWN

TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE.

3, DURING THE COURSE OF THE YOGA BRIEFING, SEVERAL OF THE

CONGRESSMEN HAD RAISED THE ISSUE OF PUBLIC STUTEMENTS OF PRESIDENT

MARCOS AND "THE KING OF THAILAND" DEMANDING THE REMOVAL OF U.S.

MILITARY BASES FROM THEIR COUNTRIES. YOGA HAD RESPONDED THAT

THESE STATEMENTS

WERE FOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONSUMPTION AND DID

NOT REPRESENT THE TRUE POLITICAL BELIEFS OF THE THAI AND PHILIPPINE

LEADERSHIP, AS YOGA PUT IT, THESE WERE POLITICAL STATEMENTS AND

NOT STATEMENTS OF POLICY, BOTH CONGRESSMEN FELT THAT THIS ANSWER

REPRESENTED HIGH DEGREE OF POLITICAL NAIVETE SINCE SUCH PUBLIC

STATEMENTS WERE HEADLINED IN THE U.S, AND NATURALLY AFFECTED

CONGRESS, CONGRESSMAN WILSON COMMENTED THAT IT WAS EXTREMELY

DIFFICULT TU FIGHT FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR THESE COUNTRIES

WHEN THEY WERE TELLING THE WORLD THAT THEY DIDN'T WANT IT. HE

ADDED THAT THAT GOES FOR THE GUAM RESOLUTION ALSO, HE ASKED FOR

COS'S RECOMMENDATIONS ON WHETHER TO KEEP QUIET ON THIS OR LET

HIS FEELINGS BE KNOWN.. COS SUGGESTED THAT HE MIGHT WISH TO.

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DISCUSS THIS WITH THE CHARGE, BUT OFFERED AS A PERSONAL OPINION

THAT IT WOULD DO NO HARM AND MIGHT DO SOME VERY REAL GOOD FOR

CONGRESSMEN TO LET THEIR FEELINGS BE KNOWN ON THIS SUBJECT.

COS ADDED THAT HE HAD FREQUENTLY TOLD HIS INDONESIAN COUNTERPARTS

THAT IT DID NO GOOD FOR ASIAN LEADERS TO SAY PRIVATELY: THAT THEY

DIDN'T REALLY MEAN WHAT THEY DID SAY PUBLICLY SINCE THE PUBLIC

STATEMENTS WERE ON THE RECORD AND THE PRIVATE ONES WERE NOT.

4, THESE GENTLEMEN ARE HARD BITTEN, PROFESSIONAL POLITICIANS.

GENERALLY THEY APPEARED TO FAVOR A CONTINUING ROLE FUR THE U.S.

IN ASIAN AFFAIRS, INCLUDING CONTINUING MILITARY ASSISTANCE • THEY

ARE, HOWEVER, DEEPLY SUSPICIOUS OF ASIAN LEADERS, THEIR WILL AND

ABILITY TO SURVIVE AGAINST DETERMINED COMMUNIST SUBVERSION, AND

THEIR PERSONAL INTEGRITY, CONGRESSMAN WILSON RECOUNTED THAT HE

HAD BEEN PRESENT WHEN SUKARNO ADDRESSED A JOINT SESSION OF THE

CONGRESS AND WAS HAILED AS A GREAT NATIONALIST LEADER. HE ADDED.

"LOOK AT WHAT THAT (EXPLETIVE DELETED) DID TO USI". THEY EXPRESSED

VERY LITTLE UF THEIR UPINIONS CUNCERNING THE AGENCY, ALTHOUGH

BOTH SEEMED TO ATTEMPT TO ELICIT STATEMENTS FROM COS CRITICAL

OF MR. HELMS, IN THIS, OF COURSE, THEY WERE UNSUCCESSFUL.

EXPRESSED AUMIRATION FOR THE CONDOR OF MR. COLBY,

ECRET

BOTH

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5, GENERALLY IT APPEARED THEY WERE SATISFIED WITH THEIR

CONVERSATION WITH COS • ALTHOUGH GENERALLY DISAPPOINTED WITH THE

RESULTS OF THEIR VISIT UP TO THAT TIME, SINCE THEY SAID THEY HAD.

NOT FOUND OUT MUCH FROM THE INDONESIANS THAT THEY DIDN'T KNOW

BEFORE• STRONGLY ENDORSE HEADQUARTERS ADVICE TO TREAT WITH THESE

GENTLEMEN SEPARATLEY FROM CONGRESSMAN MILFORD, WHOSE INTERESTS

SEEM

QUITE DIFFERENT FROM THEIRS', EZ, IMPDET.

*Advised of contact with Congressmen Milford, Wilson and Dickinson to arrange

briefings, and forwarded a report of the separate 3 hour briefing of Milford on

? January.

E

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PAGE 01

TÜR:080007Z JAN 76

IN 787573

JKRT 35600

SECRET 070944Z JAN 76 STAFF

CITE JAKARTA 35600

TO: DIRECTOR INFO CANBERRA, WELLINGTON.

RYBAT PLMNCONGA

REFA. A. DIRECTOR 788143

B. DIRECTOR 788139

C. DIRECTOR 788398

D. DIRECTOR 785722

1. MADE CONTACT WITH CONGRESSMAN

MILFORD SHORTLY AFTER HIS

ARRIVAL AND ARRANGED TO BRIEF HIM ON MORNING 7 JANUARY, ALSO

CONTACTED HONGRESSMEN WILSON AND DIRKINSON AND LATER MR. TED

LUNGER, AND WILL BRIEF WILSON AND DICKINSON NIGHT Y JANUARY.

2. MILFORD BRIEFING COMPRISED THREE FULL HOURS AND GENERALLY

FOLLOWED FORMAT OUTLINED REFO. THIS WAS LIBERALLY INTERSPERSED

WITH THEORETICAL EXAMPLES WHICH WEREVER CLOSE TO ACTUAL CASES:

3. MILFORD WAS SERIURS, ATTENTIVE AND INTERESTED LISTENER,

HE WAS PARTICULARLY. INTERESTED IN CHECKS AND BALANCES. COMMAND

AND CONTROL, FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY, AND SECURITY ANÜ MORALE OF

STATION PERSONNEL, HE DID NOT ASK NUMBERS OF STATION PERSONNEL,

OVERALL BUDGET, OR OTHER SENSITIVE DETAIL, HE WAS VERY INTERESTED

SECRET

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IN STATION'S LIAISON PROGRAM AND AN EVALUATION OF THE STABILITY

AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE INDONERIAN GOVERNMENT. HIS ATTITUDE

WAS POSITIVE THROUGHOUT AND HE INDICATED THAT HE HAD HIGH.

ADMIRATION FOR THE AGENCY AND BELIVED THAT NEGATIVE CONGRESSIONAL

ATTITUDES WERE LARGELY BASED ON IGNORANCE. HE SAID ALSO THAT THE

CONGRESS SO FAR HAD BEEN LUOKING AT THE AGENCY'S "OLD CATS" AND

THAT EVEN SOME OF THE "RAVING LIBERALS" WOULD TAKE ANOTHER VIEW

OF THE AGENCY IF THEY TOOK THE TIME TO INFORM THEMSELVES OF THE

MANY POSITIVE CONTRIBUTIONS MADE BY THE AGENCY, AND PARTICULARLY

BY THE DDO, HE ALSO EVIDENCED CONSIDERABLE INTEREST IN ECONOMIC

INTELLIGENCE, SAYING THAT HE FELT THIS TO BE AN IMPORTANT MISSION

OF THE AGENCY AND NEEDED TO BE EMPHASIZED MORE, COS OUTLINED A

FEW STATION ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN THIS FIELD THAT SEEMED TO PLEASE

HIM.

PAGNSE SAKARTASSGRRSTRRE

OFF THE RECORD. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD SAID HE HAD IN MIND

PREPARING A MINORITY REPORT AND SPONSORING A BILL WHEREBY A

SINGLE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON AGENCY OVERSIGHT WOULD BE FORMED. THIS

COMMITTEE WOULD HAVE MEMBERSHIP FROM THE ARMED SERVICES, FOREIGN

RELATIONS, APPROPRIATIONS, TREASURY, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOR,

AND

SECRET

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PAGE 03

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TOR1080007Z JAN 76

JKRT

35600

THE PRESENT SELECT COMMITTEE, UNLIKE OTHER COMMITTEES OF

CONGRESSY ITS MEETINGS WOULD ALWAYS BE CLOSED AND ONLY OPEN AS

A SPECIFIC VARIATION FROMTHE NORM AND WITH THE APPRUVAL OF THE

SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE, ALSO, UNLIKE OTHBS COMMITTEES, COMMITTEE

DOCUMENTS WOULD NOT BE ACCESSIBLE EXCEPT ON A STRICT BIGOTED

COULD NOT BE

BASIS AND MOWD NANYE DECLASSIFIED WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE

MAJORITY OF THE COMMITTEE, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE AND OH?

SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE, HESADMITTED THAT THIS BILL MIGHT HAVE

RE

SOME ROUGH GOING IN THE PRESENT CONGRESS. HE POOH-POOHED THE IDEA

NO

OF A JOINT COMMITTEE SAEENG THAT IT WOULD HAVEMBO LEGISLATION

40

AUTFGRITY AND WOULD THUS SIMPLY BE ANOTHER DOG BITING AT OUR HEELS.

5.. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD ASKED FOR COS, VIEWS ON THIS

LEGISLATION AS WELL AS ANY RECOMMENDATIONS WHICH GOS WOULD CARE

TO MAKE ON OR OFF THE RECORD, COS MERELY COMMENTED THAT

CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S PLANNED LEGISLATION SEEMED EXCELLENT AND

NOTED THAT THE AGENCY WAS NOT ATTEMPTING TO AVOID RESPONSIBLE

S

OVERSIGHT BY THE CONGRES, BUT ADDED THAT A SECRET SERVICE MUST

somE

HAVE SVE SECRETS, AND WITHOUT THIS ESSENTIAL ELEMENT WE WOULD

ATI

BE OUT OF BUSINESS, COS OFFERED NO RECOMMENDOFRONS ON THE BASIS

THAT THE REQUEST WAS UNEXPECTED AND DID NOT GIVE HIM SUFFICIENT

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TIME TO THINK THROUGH A RESPONSIBLE RECOMMENDATION.

• 6. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD ALSO INQUIRED ABOUT THE EFFECT OF

THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT ON STATON ACTIVITIES, COS

POINTED OUT CERTAIN OBVIOUS SECURITY AND BUREAUCRATIC DIFFICULTIES:

BUT DID NOT ELABORATE.

7. FOLLOWING STATION BRIEFING, COS ACCOMPANIED CONGRESSMAN

MILDORD, TOGETHER WITH CFARGE RIVES AND THE ENTIREDELEGATION, TO

À MEETING WITH GENERAL YOGA IN THE LATTERIS OFFICE. IN THE COURSE

OF THIS MEETING CONGRESSMAN MILFORD ASKED GENEMAL YOGA IFMYOGA

FELT HE WAS

RECEIVING ADEQUATE INTELLIGENCE ASSISTANCE FROM

U.S, INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES AND IF HE HAD ANY CRITICISM OF U.S:

INTELLIGENCE INTERFERENCE IN INDONESIAN AFFAIRS, GENERAL YOGA

REPLIED THAT ALTHOUGH HE FELT THE NEED TO DEVELOP BAKIN SOMEWHAT

FURTHER, THE PRESENT ORGANIZATION AND CAPABILITIES OF BAKIN ARE

CLOSE TO SUFFICIENT. IN CERTAIN CASES IT IS POSSIBLE TO COOPERATE

WITH FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES, BUT THIS WAS ALWAYS DONE WITHOUT

INVOLVEMENT IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS IN EITHER SIDE. YOGA CONTINUED

THAT BAKIN AND CIA COOPERATIE IN CASES UF MUTUAL INTEREST. SUCH

AS THE SOVIETS.. THIS IS A LIMITED COOPERATION DIRECTED TO

A SPECIFIG GOAL, YOGA ADMITTED ALSO THAT HE HAD OTHER LIAISON

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RELATIONSHIPS ITH THE BRITISH, THE AUSTRALIANS, THE JAKANESE:

WEST GERMANS, AND ALL OF THE ASEAN NATIONS, HE SAID SPECIFICALLY

THAT HIS RELATIONSHIPS WITH RIA WERE EXCELLENT, ME DID NOT ADDRESS

HIMSELF TO ANY INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

8. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD HAS AN ACTIVE, VIVACIOUS WIFE NAMED

MARY WHO WASNELL TAPEN CARE OF BY EMBASSY ESCORT FSO EMILY PERREAULT.

SHE EVIDENCED INTEREST IN THE CASINOS, SAILING SHIPS AND SHOPPING

FOR NATIVE HANDICRAFTS, CONGRESSMAN MILFORD IS AN AVID PHOTOGRAPHER

AND ASKED TO BE TAKEN ON A MINI-TOUR OF THE CITY FOR THIS PURPOSE.

WEARS A HEARING AID AND IS SLIGHTLY HARD OF HEARING, AND IT

IS HELLTO SPEAK DISTINGTLY AND DIRECTLY AT HIM.

9, MILFORD ASKD FOR A NON-CLASSIFIED VERSION OF STATION

BRIEFING AND OF MEETING WITH MOGH TO BE SENT TRAGENCY AND

A

PSSED

ON TO HIM: THIS WILL

BE A LITTLE DIFFICULT BUT HE INSISTED IT

HAVE NO CLASSIFICATION SINCE IT WOULD GO INTO THE OFFICIAL RECORD..

WILL PREPARE AND FORWARD SOONEST.

10, OVERALL BELIVE THIS WAS A PLUS, MILDORD EXPRESSED

COMPLETE SATISFACTION WITH HIS BRIEFING AND AGAIN REPEATED

THAT

IF OTHERS OF THE CONGRESS WOULD ONLY INFORM THEMSELVES THEY

TOO

WOALD BE IMPRESSED.

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TORID8DDD7Z JAN 76

11. WILL REBORTSEKARATELY ON WILSON/ DICKINSON BRIEFING

WHEN IT IS COMPLETED LATER TONIGHT.

E2, IMPDET,

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35600

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583912

EL A590

PAGE 01-01

TOR1072129Z JAN 76

IN 787506

CNBR 20980

SECRET OZ21DDZ JAN 76 STAFF

CITE CANBERRA 2D980

TOS DIREGTOR.

RYBAT PLMHCONGA CONGRESSMAN MILFORD

REF: DIRECTOR 7.87555

1, APPOINTMENTS WITH LIAISON HAVE BEEN TENTATIVELY

ARRÄNGED.: CONG. MILFORD WILL MEET WITH SATERN REP

(PROBABLY SOTERNIA4A DIJIO AND SQUASH/D-O•

• 2. COS AND BONHAM DISCUSSIONS TENTATIVELY SET FOR

0830-1000, ANTICIPATE APPROXIMATE 3O MINUTES MEETING WITH

EACH LIAISON OFFICER. SO SHOULD BE COMPLETED IN AMPLE TIME

FOR MILFORD TO REJOIN GROUP FOR AFTERNOON AQTIVITES. CAN

EXTEND DURATION OF MEETINGS IF HE DESIRES. E2, IMPDET:

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2

T. 584270

E1A882

PAGE

TORID80DU1Z JAN 76

IN 787572

WELL 15837

SECRET O7OZ4DZ JAN 76 STAFF

CITE WELLINGTON 15837

TOS CANBERRA INFO DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PLMNCONGA CONGRESSMAN MILFORD

REFS: A: DIRECTOR 787959

B, DIRECTOR 787555

PLS ADVISE CONGRESSMAN MILFORD THAT COS WELLINGTON CAN ARRANGE

15 JANUARY DODD HOURS BREAKFAST MEETING WITH NE SECURITY INTELLI

GENCE SERVICE DIRECTOR, BRIGADIER HO E. GILBERTO AT CONGRESSMAN

MILFORD'S HOTEL, ALTHOUGH EMBASSY WELLINGTON BRIEFINGS ON UPERATION

DEEPFREEZE SCHEDULED FOR MORNING OF 15.

JAN, CONGRESSMAN MILFORD MAY

PREFER TO MEET WITH COS AND BRIGADIER GILBERT. AMBASSADOR SELDEN

CONCURS WITH THIS ARRANGEMENT, TRANSPURTATION TO AIRPORT FOR

FLIGHT TO MT. COOK WILL BE AVAILABLE IMMEDIATELY AFTER MEETING WITH

GILBERT. PLS ADVISE GONGRESSMAN MILFORDIS PREFERENGE SO COS CAN

CONFIRM ABOVE ARRANGEMENT WITH BRIGADIER GILBERT.

EZIMPDET

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RYBAT PLMHCONGA CONGRESSMAN MILFORD Y

REF: DIRECTOR 787555 |*1

PAGE

: 04

IGN RUFURINCE NUNBER

787954

INOSK

NO INDEX

RETUAN TO

DISSEM BY:Z'/

PER 506

112

CONGRESSMAN MILFORD DOES DESIRE MEETINGS WITH SENIOR LIAISON

OFFICIALS. REQUEST STATION'S PROCEED TO SCHEDULE MEETINGS WITH

LIAISON. E2, IMPDET: N

*TRANSMITTED CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S SCHEDULE.

Reli

OLd-

DATE:

Z JAN 76

ORIG:

B.J. HOUSTON

UNIT:

DEEA

•EXT:

THEODORE G. SURE

RELEASING OFFICER

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BILL J•

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COORDINATING OFFICERS

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2:

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AUTUA ТО

TO: JAKARTA: CANBERRA; WELLINGTON INFO TOKYO. Y

RYBAT PLMHCONGAY

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 785722 (NOT NEEDED TOKYOF 1*1

B. DIRECTOR 787555 ENOT NEEDED TOKYOF I**Y

I BASED 3 JANUARY DISCUSSION WITH CONGRESSMAN MILFORD. HE

EXPECTS MEETINGS WITH ACTION ADDEES AS FOLLOWS:Y

ON HEFRAZACH NUE

788739

DISSEN BY: 22

PER SOP

112

JAKARTA - MORNING? JANUARY

CANBERRA - L0 JANUARY.

WELLINGTON - EVENING I4 JANUARY Y

2. AT 3 JANUARY MEETING, MILFORD REAFFIRMED HE, AS MEMBER HOUSE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE SPIKE COMMITTEES, HAS BEEN MOST

INTERESTED IN OUTCOME OF COMMITTEE'S INVESTIGATIONS AND IS. CONCERNED

ABOUT DIRECTION IN WHICH COMMITTEE HEARINGS HAVE GONE. FYI: ONLY

MILFORD PLANS FILE SEPARATE VIEWS OR MINORITY REPORT WHEN COMMITTEE

1..

DRAWS UP ITS RECOMMENDATIONS. HE HAS VISITED HQS ON A NUMBER OF

OCCASIONS AND HAS BEEN BRIEFED BY VARIOUS AGENCY OFFICIALS. HE

RECENTLY VISITED SEOUL WHERE HE SPENT DAY IN COS HOSPITAL ROOM JUST

TALKING. MILFORD ANXIOUS SOAK UP AS MUCH KNOWLEDGE AGENCY ACTIVITIES

DATE:

ORIG:

UNIT:

EXT:

RALIABINO OFFICER

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#

AS POSSIBLE: TO ASSIST HIM WRITE MINORITY REPORT. ACCORDINGLY, HE

WANTS MEET OUR FOREIGN LIAISON COUNTERPARTS TO GET FEEL FOR IMPORTANCE

THIS SOURCE AND NEED PROTECT IT FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURES. RECOGNIZE

SHORT NOTICE, BUT REQUEST ACTION ADDEES MAKE SPECIAL EFFORT ARRÄNGE

LIAISON CONTACTSY

3. FOR JAKARTA: PLS HANDLE MILFORD AND WILSON/DICKINSON CON-

TACTS SEPARATELY AND AVOID OBVIOUS SITUATION OF SINGLING MILFORD OUT

FOR SPECIAL TREATMENT Y

Mr. Lou BouHAM

(BONHAMISS CANBERRA: MILFORD DOES EXPEÇT MEETAND DISCUSS. HIS

ACTIVITY WITH MR.

SO BONHAM IN CANBERRA... HE WILL DEVOTE DAY OF

LO JANUARY TO STATION AND NASA.: REQUEST STATION COORDINATE WITH NASA

REP WHO PLANS TAKE MILFORD VISIT FACILITY AT TIPENBILO. IF SO,

SUGGEST STATION ARRANGE HAVE MRS: MILFORD TOUR NEARBY ZOO. IF ANY

CONFLICT SCHEDULING WITH NASA: MILFORD SAYS HE WANTS AGENCY TO TAKE

PRIORITY • Y

5. FOR WELLINGTON: MILFORD UNDERSTANDS HIS STAY WELLINGTON

SHORT AND WILLING DEVOTE EVENING TO STATION U

b..

FOR TOKYO: TOKYO IS RESTESTOP AND MILFORD EXPECTS NO

DATE:

ORIG:

UNIT:

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CONTACT. Y

?. REQUEST ACTION ADDEES COORDINATE STATION PLANS WITH EMBASSY

SCHEDULING FOR GROUP TO GIVE MILFORD OPPORTUNITY MEET SENIOR FOREIGN

GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IF CONFLICT CAN BE AVOIDED. MILFORD HAS STRESS-

ED, HOWEVER, AGENCY BUSINESS HAS PRIORITY.. HAS HAS PROVIDED MILFORD

NAMES COS'S IN JAKARTA, CANBERRA, AND WELLINGTON. REQUEST STATIONAS

CONTACT MILFORD AS SOON AFTER ARRIVAL AS POSSIBLE SO MILFORD CAN PLAN

NON-AGENCY: PART OF SCHEDULE. SUGGEST STÄTIONNOFFICER ASSIST MRS.

MILFORD SINCE SHE MAY NOT WISH TO TAG ALONG WITH LARGER GROUP WITHOUT

HER HUSBAND. E2 IMPDET•N

*GAVE DETAILS ON CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S TRIP:

**CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S REVISED SCHEDULE:

DEP. DIR/DDS&T - C. DUCKETT EDRAFT

OLC - R. CHIN EDRAFTY,

DATE:

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BY

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PAGE 01

IN 782959

TOR1020840Z JAN 76

JKRT

35549

SECRET 020756Z JAN 76 STAFF

CITE JAKARTA 35549 (SHIMA ACTING)

TO: DIREBTOR.

RYBAT PLMHCONGA CONGRESSMAN

REFS: A6 DIRECTOR 787555

B6 DIRECTOR 785722

1: CHARGE MIKE RIVES HAS BEEN ADVISED GONGRESSMAN MIL-

FORDIS REQUEST FOR STATION BRIEFING PER REF A. WILL ARRANGE

BRIEFING AFTER CONGRESSMANIS ARRIVAL,

2. ON 2 JANUARY HAFAWNA1 TELEPHONED STATION TO SAY

THAT CABLE HAS BEEN RECEIVED BY BAKIN FROM HACLAUSE/1. WE

PROPOSED MEETINGS WITH MINISTRY OF DEFENSE: MINISTRY OF

FOREIGN AFFAIRS, INDONESIAN PARLIAMENT AND CALL ON PRESIDENT

SUHARTO, HE ALSO PROPOSED THAT GENERAL MURDANI BRIEF THE

GROUP ON GENERAL SECURITY SITUATION, BAKIN HAS SENT CABLE

TO MURDANI. TO RETURN TO JAKARTA EARLY NEXT WEEK TO

PARTICIPATE IN BRIEFINGS. BRIEFING OF CONGRESSMEN AND

THEIR STAEF MEMBERS SCHEDULED TO BE HELD AT BAKIN HOS ON

7 JANUARYA CONGRESSMAN MILFORD WILL PARTICIPATE IN THIS

BRIEFING STATION ÄRRANGED BAKIN BRIEFINGS BASED ON INSTRUCTIONS

FROM CHARGE,

SECRET

€ 2 IMPDET.

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RYBAT PLIHCONGA CONGRESSMAN MILFORD Y

REF: DIRECTOR 785722 1*4

•I• CONGRESSMAN MILFORD REVISED SCHEDULE:Y

ETD JAKARTA

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15 JAN. Y

16

HE JAN FOR HAWAII Y

NOTE: THIS SEPARATE TRIP TO THAT OF SNODGRASS, PRESTON, CARY

MENTIONED DIRECTOR 778574.4.

2. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD HAD PREVIOUSLY REQUESTED MEETING WITH

COST JAKARTA LO JANUARY, COS, CANBERRA 13 JANUARY AND WITH COS,

WELLINGTON, 15 JANUARY. REVISED SCHEDULE WILL ALTER HIS DESIRES

THIS CASE: MEETING WITH HIM ON 3 JANUARY AND WILL FORWARD NEW

DATE:

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UNIT:

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787555

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SCHEDULE FOR MEETINGS WITH COS' AT THAT TIME Y

3• FOLLOWING ARE RESULTS CEA AND OL EMR. ROBERT CHING

BRIEFING OF CONGRESSMAN MILFORD 19 DECEMBER 1975:4

A:: NINETEEN DECEMBER MEETING LAID ON IN ORDER THAT.

REPRESENTATIVE MILFORD COULD BE GIVEN A BRIEFING IN OVERVIEW

TERMS ON WHAT THE CIA STATIONS IN AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND AND

INDONESIA WERE DOING IN TERMS OF OPERATIONAL PROGRAMS.Y

B. AUSTRALIA: THERE WAS CIA PRESENCE IN CANBERRA,

MELBOURNE AND SYDNEY. THIS REPRESENTATION CONSISTED OF ABOUT

SIX OFFICERS CHARGED WITH BASIC MISSION OF PURSUING SOVIET.

CHINESE AND EAST EUROPEAN TARGETS AVAILABLE IN AUSTRALIA. IT

WAS STRESSED THAT THESE DENIED AREA TARGETS WERE PURSUED BOTH

UNILATERALLY AND IN JOINT OPERATIONS WITH THE AUSTRALIAN

LIAISON SERVICE. THERE WERE 53 SOVIETS IN AUSTRALIA, bE CHINESE,

& HUNGARIANS, 22 CZECHS- 3 BULGARIANS, 59 YUGOSLAVS, 9 RUMANIANS

AND I? NORTH KOREAN STUDENTS. IT WAS STRESSED THROUGHOUT

BRIEFING THAT PRIMARY OBJECTIVE IN BOTH UNILATERAL AND JOINT

OPERATIONS WAS THE REGRUITMENT OF SOVIET: CHINESE OR EAST

DATE:

ORIG::

UNIT:

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SECRET

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EUROPEAN TARGETS AS IN-PLACE AGENTS WHO WOULD WORK FOR US NOT ONLY

IN AUSTRALIA BUT UPON THEIR RETURN TO THEIR COUNTRY OF ORIGIN: ALSO

STRESSED CIA'S MINTEREST IN OBTAINING NATIONAL LEVEL INTELLIGENCE FROM

RECRUITED PENETRATIONS OF THE SOVIET: CHINESE OR EAST EUROPEAN

PRESENCE IN AUSTRALIA• HE WAS INFORMED OF OUR DESIRE TO RUN

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS OR ARRANGE THE DEFECTION OF KNOWLEDGE-

ABLE SOURCES: OUR INTEREST IN BUILDING UP PERSONNEL INDICES ON

THOSE INDIVIDUALS FROM TARGET COUNTRIES WHO WERE IN AUSTRALIA BUT

WHO WERE NOT RECRUITABLE IN THE CURRENT CONTEXT OF THEIR RELATION-

SHIPS WITH THEIR OWN GOVERNMENT ALSO WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS UNDER-

SCORED THAT THE INDIVIDUAL WHO NOT RECRUITABLE TODAY MIGHT BE

RECRUITABLE IN FUTURE IF WE CAN LEARN TO UNDERSTAND WHAT MOTIVATES

THE TARGET AND WHAT MAKES THEM TICK AS HUMAN BEINGS. THE BRIEFING

OF REPRESENTATIVE MILFORD ON AUSTRALIA ALSO TOUCHED LIGHTLY ON THE

BROAD ASPECTS OF CIA'S LIAISON WITH ASIO; ASIS AND JIO:"

C. NEW ZEALAND: HE WAS ADVISED THAT CIA HAD THREE

PEOPLE IN WELLINGTON WHO WERE FOCUSED ON RUNNING JOINT OPERATIONS

WITH THE NEW ZEALAND INTELLIGENCE SERVICE AGAINST THE'SOVIET, PRC

DATE:

ORIG:

UNIT:

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AND EAST EUROPEAN PRESENCE IN NEW ZEALAND. HE WAS GIVEN RUNDOWN

ON NUMBERS OF SOVIETS, CHINESE AND EAST EUROPEAN WHO WERE CURRENTLY:

IN NEW ZEALAND. THE SCOPE OF OUR OPERATIONAL PROGRAMS WAS ALSO

DISCUSSED IN TERMS SIMILAR TO WHAT WAS OUTLINED IN PARA 3B ON

AUSTRALIA Y'

D... INDONESIA: CIA MAINTAINED A PRESENCE IN JAKARTA.

MEDAN AND SURABAYA.: CIA HAD APPROXIMATELY 28 PEOPLE IN INDONESIA.

THESE FIGURES WERF COMPARED AGAINST THE

SOVIET INTELLIGENCE PRESENCE

IN INDONESIA. A DISCUSSION OF THE PRE TÄRGET AS SEEN FROM PER-

SPECTIVE OF INDONESIA FOCUSED ON LEGAL TRAVEL OPERATIONS AGAINST

CHINA AS WELL AS SCREENING OF INTERCEPTED MAIL FROM CHINA TO

INDONESIA.: THERE WAS ALSO BRIEF DISCUSSION OF NORTH KOREAN AND

VIETNAMESE TARGETS IN INDONESIA: THE BRIEFING ALSO FOCUSED ON

INDONESIA AS AN INTELLIGENCE TARGET IN TERMS OF HOST COUNTRY

ACTIVITIES, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND

NARCOTICS TARAFFIC INTO AND OUT OF INDONESIA: A BRIEF COMMENT

WAS ALSO MADE ON TOPIC OF CIA LIAISON WITH BAKIN, THE INDONESIAN

INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE: THE TOTALITY OF

DATE:

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787555

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STATION'S EFFORTS IN INDONESIA WAS DESCRIBED IN BROAD MANAGEMENT

TERMS AND SOME EXAMPLES WERE CITED OF TYPES OF INTELLIGENCE OBTAINED

FROM CIA ACTIVITIES IN INDONESIA. CEA ALSO FOCUSED BRIEFLYE ON OUR

ABILITY TO USE AGENTS OF INFLUENCE TO PURSUE US. FOREIGN POLICY

INTERESTS IN INDONESIA-Y

E. : COMMENT: REPRESENTATIVE MILFORD TOOK NOTE OF ABOVE

GRIEFINGS, ASKED LIMITED NUMBER OF QUESTIONS ON THE TYPES OF

INTELLIGENCE THAT WAS PRODUCED BY THE VARIOUS STATIONS AND INDICATED.

THAT BRIEFINGS HAD COVERED ALL OF THE ISSUES THAT HE HAD WANTED TO

DISCUSS. j

F... REPRESENTATIVE MILFORD EXPRESSED GREAT DEAL OF

INTEREST IN THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS AND ASKED THAT IF AT ALL POSSI-

BLE, PARTICULARLY IN AUSTRALIA, HE WOULD LIKE TO MEET WITH MEMBERS

OF AUSTRALIAN LIAISON SERVICES. REPRESENTATIVE MILFORD MADE POINT

THAT SUCH MEETINGS WOULD BE USEFUL TO HIM IN CONTEXT OF HIS PIKE

COMMITTEE DUTIES BECAUSE HE COULD THEN COMMENT ON LIAISON SERVICES'

REACTIONS TO CURRENT CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES INTO CIA. REPRESENTATIVE

MILFORD WAS ADVISED THAT ATTEMPTS WOULD BE MADE TO ARRANGE MEETINGS.

DATE:

ORIG:

UNIT:

EXT:

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COORDINATINO ORFICERS

CLABSRICATION

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SECRET.

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PARTICULARLY IN AUSTRALIA: WITH ONE OR TWO SENIOR LIAISON PERSON-

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4. REGARDING REFERENCE PARA THREE F, SINCE CONGRESSMAN

MILFORD SPECIFICALLY WISHES DEAL WITH LIAISON SERVICES ATTITUDES

IN HIS MINORITY REPORT. HAVE NO OBJECTION GENERAL DESCRIPTION

OF OUR DEALINGS WITH LIAISON SERVICES• STATIONS CAN ALSO ARRANGE

¡CETING WITH SENIOR LIAISON OFFICIALS ON DISCREET BASIS IF

CONGRESSMAN MILFORD REQUESTS. E2. IMPDET A

* GAVE DETAILS ON CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S TRIP.

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TO: PRIORITY CANBERRA, JAKARTA, WELLINGTON: Y

RYBAT PLAHCONGA Y

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

255722

INDEX

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O IPFRES

1'2

REFS: A. CANBERRA 20866 lIN 774560*| ERELAYING

JAKARTA, WELLINGTONI

B. DIRECTOR 784159 |**| ERELAYING JAKARTA, WELLINGTONE. Y

Lo ARad

THIRTEEN MEMBERS OF HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE,

ACCOMPANIED BY WIVES, WILL BE MAKING TRIP TO JAKARTA, CANBERRA,

SYDNEY, AND WELLINGTON., GROUP WILL USE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.

AIRCRAFT. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE WILL BE MAKING ARRANGEMENTS FOR

TRIP. THEREFORE: NO NEED FOR STATION TO MAKE HOTEL OR RELATED

TRANSPORTATION ARRANGEMENTS. TWO REPRESENTATIVES, PRICE AND

WILSON,

ARE MEMBERS

OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCEW DOE

FARE GOINEAT

THIS TONE NONE

FRANK SLATHUSHES

OF ABOVE HAVE ASKED TO MEET WITH STATIONS. ISAFER REQUESTED

Chick counsel on Commilies bully diencednudgrivelling

3Y HEADQUARTERSOMEET.WITHEGRIUP CONTACTEAN BE MADE THROUGE

COMMITTEE STAFF ASSISTANT SLATINSHEK WHO TRAVELLING-WIFH GROUPS

INTERESY DGVEL0R3.

2. HOWEVER, CONGRESSMAN DALE MILFORD EDEMOCRAT, TEXAST WHO.

IS A MEMBER OF THE PIKE COMMITTEE CHOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON

INTELLIGENCES WILL ACCOMPANY. THIS GROUP AND DOES DESIRE BRIEFINGS.

CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S WIFE WILL TRAVEL WITH HIM. CONGRESSMAN

DATE: 24 DEC 75.

ORIG:

UNIT:

B.J. HOUSTON

EXT:

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MILFORD'S INTEREST AS STATED BY HIM WILL BE IN SEEING HOW THE

INTELLIGENCE PROCESS WORKS FROM THE GROUND UP. HE WANTS TO ACQUIRE

BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE ON THIS PROCESS SO THAT WHEN THE FINAL:

COMMITTEE REPORT IS MADE HE CAN USE HIS INFLUENCE TO SEE THAT IT

•IS A BALANCED. ONE: CONGRESSMAN MILFORD DOES NOT LIKE FORMAL:

BRIEFINGS AND DOES NOT WANT CHARTS. Y

3. SINCE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE IS VERY INTERESTED

IN COMMAND AND CONTROL ASPECTS OF HOW THE AGENCY FUNCTIONS, IT

IS. LIKELY THAT CONGRESSMAN MILFORD WILL FOCUS ON THIS ASPECT

OF STATION ACTIVITIES DURING HIS VISIT.

A• MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVES: STATIONS PROBABLY CAN

DEAL WITH THE CONGRESSMAN'S DESIRE TO UNDERSTAND THE INTELLIGENCE

PROCESS FROM THE GROUND UP BY BRIEFING HIM ON HOW MANAGEMENT BY

OBJECTIVES FUNCTIONS• STATION CAN OUTLINE OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE

PROCESS I.E•" HOW STATION RECEIVES OD FROM HEADQUARTERS AND COMMENTS

ON IT. ONCE AGREEMENT REACHED ON OD DIALOGUE FOLLOWS ON AG'S

WHICH RELATE TO SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES. THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL

TO FOCUS ON KEY OBJECTIVES IN GENERAL AND THEN NARROW'DISCUSSION

DATE:

ORIG:

UNIT:

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DOWN TO AG'S OF SPECIFIC INTEREST. " THIS PHASE OF BRIEFING SHOULD

INCLUDE COMMENTARY ON FUNDING OF FAN'S, ETC.Y

B: AGENT ACQUISITION: STÄTION COULD THEN OUTLINE HOW TÄRGET

STUDIES OF KEY INTELLIGENCE REPOSITORIES ARE CONDUCTED, POTENTIAL

• TARGETS FOR RECRUITMENT IDENTIFIED ÄND HOW SPOTTING, ASSESSMENT

AND RECRUITMENT PROCESS UNFOLDS:

IN DISCUSSION OF RECRUITMENT

PHASE OF OPERATIONS, THERE SHOULD BE EXAMINATION OF NAME TRACE:

AND POA PROCESS. Y

C.: AGENT AUTHENTICATION: DIALOGUE WITH CONGRESSMAN SHOULD

AUTHENTICATED

ALSO OUTLINE HOW AGENT AUTHORIZED ONCE RECRUITED. STRESS SHOULD

BE PLACED ON CONTINUING ASPECTS OF AUTHENTICATION: SECURITY OF

MEETINGS, ETC -Y

D. POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION: ACQUISITION OF

INTELLIGENCE FROM IN-PLACE AGENT, TURNING IT INTO INTEL DISSEM-

INATION, REQUIREMENTS SYSTEM, AND REPORTS EVALUATION CYCLE SHOULD

ALSO RE REVT.F.HIF.D.

RODRACOITESAGININTO SONS UNNECESS BEENERAEGASESSE,

DATE:

ORIG:

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FOR CANBERRA AND WELLINGTON: SHOULD MAKE POINT THAT COLLECTION

ON INTERNAL TARGET IS BY PRODUCT ACQUIRED THROUGH ELICITATION

FROM LIAISON, FOREIGNERS AND AMERICANS. (FYI: OBJECTIVE K

HAS BEEN DROPPED FROM CANBERRA OD AND THEREFORE SHOULD NOT BE

ADDRESSED IN THIS BRIEFING-S THRUST OF PROGRAM IS RECRUITMENT

OF SOVS AND CHINESE, USING LIAISON AS

DATE:

ORIG:

UNIT:

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MELRASINO ORFICER

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ACHi

таа.

TRE

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08

PArES

OMF

CLASNPCATYON

SECRET

MESSAGE +-ANDLING INDICATOR.

x5

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITa

DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

DISSEM BY:

CONF:

INFO: • FILE

785722

•0

INDEX

NO INDEX

RETURN TO

PER

IO FILES

#

EXTENSION OF CIA, FOR COLLECTION OF INFO ON PRE AND USSR. POINT

OUT DO NOT RECRUIT AUSTRALIANS OR NEW ZEALANDERS WITHOUT SPECIFIC

APPROVAL OF GOUTS CONCERNED .4:

E. OPERATIONAL REPORTING SYSTEM: STARTING WITH RECRUITMENT

•OF AGENT, STATION SHOULD OUTLINE TYPES OF REPORTING REQUIRED BY.

AGENCY FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL PURPOSES I.E., PRQ PART I AND 2O

CONTACT REPORTS, INTEL REPORTS; PERIODIC ASSET REPORTS PERIODIC

PROGRESS REPORTS, OPACTS AND FIELD PERFORMANCE REPORTS. ON LATTER

STRESS SHOULD BE PLACED ON FEED BACK FROM MID-YEAR AND FY REVIEWS

WITH DDO. FY BUDGET CYCLE SHOULD ALSO BE-TOUCHED ON. Y

F. CASE HISTORY: IT ESSENTIAL WE NOT IDENTIFY ANY ACTIVE.

SOURCES OR LIAISON SERVICES BY TRUE NAME TO CONGRESSMAN MILFORD:

IN VIEW OF THIS WISH POINT OUT HQS HAS FOUND IT USEFUL TO DRAW

ON CASE HISTORY SCENARIO TO UNDERSCORE ALL POINTS PREVIOUSLY

MADE IN BRIEFING. IN SUCH CASE HISTORY ONLY IDENTITY OF AGENT..

AND POSSIBLE TARGET HAS BEEN ALTERED FOR SOURCE PROTECTION.

THIS

APPROACH HAS WORKED EFFECTIVELY FOR HOS AND ASSUME IT WILL BE

USEFUL TECHNIQUE FOR STATIONS-Y

DATE:

•ORIG:

UNIT:

EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER

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785722

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0

PER

4. WHERE APPLICABLE ISUCH AS JAKARTAJ BRIEFING SHOULD ALSO

DEAL SPECIFICALLY WITH STATION COORDINATION ROLE UNDER DCIDS FOR

CLANDESTINE MILITARY AND INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION OPERATIONS. Y

5. FOR CANBERRA AND WELLINGTON: IT PROBABLY WOULD ALSO BE

USEFUL TO PROVIDE CONGRESSMAN MILFORD WITH ANALYSIS OF THE RECENT

ELECTION DEVELOPMENTS IN AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND. HE WOULD ALSO

BE INTERESTED IN STATION'S ESTIMATE OF HOW NEW GOVERNMENTS WILL

CONDUCT FOREIGN POLICIES: VIS-A-VIS UNITED STATES. Y

L. FOR JAKARTA: IN ADDITION TO STABILITY OF SUHARTO

REGIME THE CONGRESSMAN MIGHT APPRECIATE A REVIEW OF THE PORTUGUESE

TIMOR SITUATION AND HOW THAT WILL INFLUENCE THE STABILITY OF

THE

REGION.Y

?. THIS VISIT IS SEPARATE FROM TRIP OF PRESTON, SNODGRASS,

CALLOWAY AND CARY DISCUSSED IN PIRECTOR 778574.y

8.. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD IS NOT A MEMBER OF THE HOUSE ARMED

SERVICES COMMITTEE.Y

9.

SEPARATE CABLE FOLLOWS TO CANBERRA ON SENSITIVE ASPECTS

OF VISIT. ADD BUODANGA ITINERARY AS FOLLOWS: Y

DATE:

ORIG:

UNIT:

EXT:

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785722

JAKARTA 6 JANI ETD 9 JAN Y

CANBERRA 9 JAN • ETD LI JAN Y

*

SYDNEY II WANT ETD 14 JAN Y

WELLINGTON I4. JAN, ETD L6 JAN EZ, IMPDET-N

INQUIRY CONCERNING CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION.

** HQS CONTACT WITH D. MILFORD ON TRIP TO AUSTRALIA.

PAGE

*7

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

INDEX

NO INDEX

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18 FILES

#

SA/DDO

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24 DEC 75

B. J-HOUSTON

ACEA

9373

DAVID BLEET

CLASSIFICATION

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PRECEDENCI

3

PAGE 01

IN 754484

TOR 12805012 NOV 75

SEOU

25948

SECRET 280348Z NOV 75 STAFF

CITE SEOUL 259.48

TO: DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PLMHCONGA

REF: SEOUL 25761

(236899)

1, FOLLOWING LETTER WAS PREPARED BY GENERAL RICHARD G.

STILWELL, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, UNITED NATIONS COMMAND, AND

FORWARDED TO DOD CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON FOR REVIEW AND PASSAGE TO

CONGRESSMAN MILFORD, THE LETTER WAS PREPARED IN RESPONSE TO

CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S REQUEST TO BOTH GENERAL STILWELL AND LT.

GENERAL JAMES HOLLINGSWORTH, COMMANDER, I CORPS, CAMP RED CLOUD,

FOR LETTERS SIMILAR TO HIS REQUEST OF AMBASSADOR SNEIDER.

GENERAL HOLLINGSWORTH PREPARED A LETTER WHICH WAS REWORKED INTO

THE FOLLOWING LETTER WHICH WAS SENT BY GENERAL STILWELL AS

REFLECTING BOTH GENERAL HOLLINGSWORTH'S AND HIS OWN VIEWS. THE

LETTER WAS FORWARDED TO WASHINGTON AS AN SSO BACK CHANNEL.

MESSAGE

AND HAS SINCE BEEN CLEARED BY DOD FOR RELEASE TO CONGRESSMAN

MILFORD. THE TEXT OF THIS LETTER WAS GIVEN TO COS BY GENERAL

HOLLINGSWORTH.

2. QUOTE " DEAR MR. MILFORD:

SECRET

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6

PAGE D2

TOR: 2805017 NOV 75

IN 754484

SEOU 25.948

GENERAL HOLLINGSWORTH AND I WERE EXTREMELY PLEASED AT THE INTEREST

YOU SHOWED IN THE PROBLEMS WE FACE HERE IN KOREA, I AM ONLY SORRY

THAT OUR SCHEDULES DID NOT PERMIT US TO EXPLORE THE CHALLENGES WE

FACE HERE AND OUR CAPABILITIES TO DEAL WITH THEM IN GREATER DETAIL.

THIS LETTER INCORPORATES BOTH GENERAL HOLLINGSWORTH'S AND MY.

VIEWS.

AS FIELD COMMANDERS, WE ARE DEEPLY INVOLVED IN THE AREA OF

INTELLIGENCE - AND FOR GOOD REASONS. A COMMANDER HAS À FUNDAMENTAL

INTEREST. IN PROTECTING HIS COMMAND AND ASSURING THAT. SHOULD

HOSTILITIES OCCUR, HIS COMBAT RECOURSES ARE EMPLOYED IN THE MOST

EFFECTIVE MANNER POSSIBLE.

ORGANIZATIONALLY, THE US INTELLIGENCE SETUP IN KOREA IS VIABLE.

THE RESIDENT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES,

I.E. • CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIAS, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

IDIAS, AND NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY INSAS WORK EFFECTIVELY IN

CONCERT WITH OUR INTELLIGENCE STAFFS AND THOSE COLLECTION ELEMENTS

WHICH ARE UNDER OUR CONTROL TO PROVIDE AN INTEGRATED AND

EFFICIENT FLOW OF INTELLIGENCE, WE HAVE BEEN MOST IMPRESSED WITH THE.

DEDICATION AND PROFESSIONALISM. DF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS ASSIGNED

TO THOSE NATIONAL AGENCIES: AND WE HAVE EQUALLY HIGH RESPECT FOR OUR

SECRET

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IN 754484

TOR 280501Z NOV 75

SEOU: 25948

OWN PEOPLE, THIS TEAM IS RESPONSIVE AND GIVES US A GREAT DEAL

OF QUALITY INTELLIGENCE:

LIKE ALL COMMANDERS, HOWEVER, WE ARE NOT FULLY SATISFIED WITH ALL

ASPECTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE EFFORT. THE PRIMARY NEED IS FOR :

RELIABLE WARNING INTELLIGENCE, BECAUSE OF OUR PROXIMITY TO THE.

ENEMY'S AIRFIELDS, AND THE FACT THAT MANY OF OUR TROOPS LIVE WITHIN

THE RANGE FANS OF HIS EMPLACED WEAPONS SYSTEMS; WE MUST CONSTANTLY BE

ALERT FOR THOSE ANOMALIES IN HIS BEHAVIOR WHICH WOULD TIP US OFF

TO IMPENDING ATTACK. UNFORTUNATELY, RECAUSE OF HIS READINESS. AND

THE FORWARD DISPOSITION OF HIS FORCES, INCLUDING FORWARD POSITIONING

OF SUPPLIES, WE DO NOT HAVE A HIGH DEGREE OF ASSURANCE THAT WE

WILL HAVE MUCH WARNING. WHILE WE MIGHT HAVE DAYS OR WEEKS, IT IS

MORE PROBABLE THAT WE WOULD HAVE ONLY HOURS. TO PARTIALLY OFFSET THIS,

US AND ROK FORCES MAINTAIN A HIGH DEGREE OF ALERT, PREPARED TO

QUICKLY ENGAGE THE FORCES OF THE NORTH SHOULD THEY INITIATE

AN ATTACK, CONCURRENTLY, WE AND THE NATIONAL LEVEL INTELLIGENCE

COMMUNITY ARE SEEKING WAYS TO IMPROVE OUR SYSTEMS AND METHODOLOGIES

TO INCREASE OUR ASSURANCE OF TIMELY WARNING.

NATIONALLY MANAGED COLLECTION PROGRAMS GIVE US INVALUABLE.

INTELLIGENCE ON THE DISPOSITIONS OF THE POTENTIAL ENEMY, YET WE

SECRET

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IN: 754484

TOR:28D501Z NOV 75

SEOU

25948

STILL HAVE SIGNIFICANT GAPS IN OUR HOLDINGS ON THE ACTUAL

LOCATIONS AND IDENTITIES OF HIS UNITS, HIS COMMAND AND. CONTROL

STRUCTURE AND HIS WAR PLANS. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT WHILE THE

EXCELLENT TECHNICAL COLLECTION PROGRAMS IN PHOTOGRAPHY AND ELECTRONIC

INTELLIGEME COUPPLY A GREAT DEAL OF INFORMATION ON THE ENEMY'S

CAPABILITIES, WE ARE STILL LACKING INTELLIGENCE ON HIS INTENTIONS.

UNFORTUNATELY, INTELLIGENCE ON WHAT HE IS THINKING AND PLANNING

WOULD COME LARGELY FROM HUMAN SOURCES, AND GIVEN THE CLOSED

NATURE OF HIS SOCIETY AND HIS STRICT AND EFFECTIVE SECURITY

MEASURES, IT IS VERY DIFFICULT TO COLLECT THIS KIND OF

INFORMATION.

THE PREPONDERANCE OF REQUIREMENTS FOR HUMAN SOURCE CLANDESTINE

INTELLIGENCE FALL WITHIN THE PROPER PURVIEW OF THE CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE AGENCY: AND THAT AGENCY IS UNIQUELY QUALIFIED

TO PERFORM THIS VITAL FUNCTION. AT THE SAME TIME, THERE IS A NEED

FOR A CAREFULLY MANAGED. LIMITED MILITARY EFFORT TO FOCUS ON

STRICTLY MILITARY REQUIREMENTS. A PRIMARY MILITARY TARGET OF THIS

NATURE 1S THE TUNNEL NETWORK THAT THE NORTH HAS BEEN DETECTED

CONSTRUCTING UNDER THE DME. THIS IS A LABOR INTENSIVE EFFORT, AND

EXPLOITATION OF CLANDESTINE TECHNIQUES WOULD BE: A MEANS OF

SECRET

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TOR:2805017 NOV 75

IN 754484

SEOU

25948

DISCOVERING THE TUNNELS BEFORE THEY ARE USED AGAINST US.

IN THE AREA OF ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE WE HAVE REQUESTED A HIGH:

ALTITUDE PLATFORM TO BE OPERATED OVER THE SOUTH KOREAN LAND MASS

TO GIVE US A DEEPER AND MORE EFFECTIVE LOOK INTO THE ENEMY'S

ELECTRONIC ENVIRONMENT. THE REQUESTEN SYSTEM INCLUDES A DOWN LINK

CAPABILITY WHICH WOULD GIVE US A NEAR REAL TIME READ OUT OF DATA

COLLECTED. OUR PROPUSAL HAS RECEIVED STRONG SUPPORT FROM DIA AND

NSA. WE ALSO HAVE HIGH INTEREST IN INSURING THAT WE WILL HAVE DOWN

LINK ACCESS TO NATIONALLY MANAGED OVERHEAD PHOTOGRAPHY SYSTEMS,

WHICH ARE NOT YET OPERATIONAL.

WE ARE AWARE OF THE COSTS INVOLVED IN FIELDING MODERN COLLECTION

SYSTEMS AND THE UPGRADING OF CURRENT ONES, NONETHELESS, GENERAL

HOLLINGSWORTH AND I SHARE THE VIEW THAT, GIVEN OUR MISSION AND OUR

PROXIMITY TO POTENTIAL BELLIGERENT, WE MUST HAVE THE BEST

INTELLIGENCE AVAILABLE. I AM SURE THAT YOUR TRIP TO KOREA GAVE

YOU A FEEL FOR THE SENSE OF URGENCY THAT WE LIVE WITH HERE.

AND WE HOPE THAT YOU WILL BE ABLE TO PROVIDE YOUR COLLEAGUES.

IN THE CONGRESS WITH A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF OUR POSITION AND

HELP

TO INSURE THAT OUR FORCES CONTINUE TO GET THE KIND OF SUPPORT

NEEDED TO DO THE JOB TO WHICH WE ARE DEDICATED.

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TOR: 280501Z NOV 75

IN

1:754484

SEOU 25948

SINCERELY YOURS, "UNQUOTE

E2. IMPDET:

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• PAGE D1-01

TOR: 100349Z NOV 75

SECRET 10D3ZZZ NOV 75 STAFF

CITE SEOUL 25761

TO: DIRECTOR,

RYBAT PLMHCONGA

REF: SEOUL 25730 (N 732789)

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATE 264382 (ROGER CHANNELY

1R.. NOVEMBER 1975: QUOTE SUBJECT: LETTER TO CONGRESSMAN

*

MILFORD.: REF: SEOUL 8531. 1. LETTER HAS BEEN FORWARDED

TO MILFORD AS RECOMMENDED, ONLY CHANGE IN TEXT PROPOSED

PARA 5. REFTER WAS DELETION OF FINAL SENTENCE. OWING TO

SENSITIVITY OF REFERENCE TO "CLANDESTINE OPERATION! IN LETTER

LIKELY TO BECOME PART OF PUBLIC RECORD. UNQUOTE,

REPRODUCTION DŸ OTHER THAN

ISSUING OFFICE IS PROMIBITED

STAFF

3

5

IN 736898

SEOU

25761

* NO.

RECORD IN. CABLE

SEC

10Nou75 1348

SA/DDO

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5

Т 424247

EIA33Y

PAGE D1

IN 728294

TOR: 310345₴ 09T.

SEOL 25687

SECRET 3103147 OCT 75 STAFF

CITE SEOUL 25687

TO: DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PLMHCONGA

REF: SEOUL 25649

224551) •

1. REGRET DELAY

IN REPORTING FOLLOWUP DISCUSSION

340ст

WITH CONGRESSMAN MILFORD. HE MET WITH COS FOR APPROXIMATELY

ONE HOUR MORNING OF 28 OCTOBER PRIOR TO DEPARTURE, DOOS

BROUGHT THE CONGRESSMAN TO COS RESIDENCE AND THEN EXCUSEDLO

HIMSELF TO MEET WITH CONGRESSMAN LUCIEN NEDZI (SEOUL 25657).

2.. AS IT TURNED OUT NOTHING OF PARTICULAR SIGNIFICANCE

DEVELOPED AT THIS MEETING. R SPROVIDED BOTH AN OPPORTUNITY

TO REVIEW VARIOUS POINTS DISCUSSED IN THE PREVIOUS SESSION

WITH COS EMPHASIZING THE AEZFCY COMMAND AND CONTROL

PROCEDURES FOR FOREIGN OPERATIONS PLUS THE MANAGEMENT BY.

OBJECTIVE AND COST EFFECTIVENESS REVIEW PROCEDURES•

•3. COS PERMITTED THE CONGRESSMAN TO READ A STERILIZED

COPY OF SEOUL 25388 LESS THE FINAL PARAGRAPH AND THEN

DISCUSSED HIS PROPOSAL TO TRY TO DEVELOP A MINORITY

REPORT AROUND THIS TYPE: I-83

MiTOE OR

WE D1.

4

23 78B REVIEW

SECRET

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• 424247.

EIA337

PAGE D2-02

TOR: 310345200975

IN 728294

SEDU

25687

STUDY AND EXPLAINED WHY DID NOT BELIEVE THIS WAS FEASIBLE.

THE CONGRESSMAN CONCURRED BUT RESTATED HIS DESIRE TO NOW

FOLLOW UP HIS KOREA INQUIRIES AT THE WASHINGTON LEVEL AND

SOMEHOW INCORPORATE VARIOUS ASPECTS INTO HIS REPORT. HE

T*7

REINTERATED HIS STRONG DESIRE TO MEET WITH GENERAL WALTERS.

COMMENDED MR. SHACKLEY TO THE CONGRESSMAN FOR SPECIFIC

DISCUSSIONS ON THIS AREA•

4. THE CONGRESSMAN WAS QUITE PLEASED AND APPRECIATIVE.

OF THE DISCUSSIONS HERE AND WOULD LIKE TO BE HELPFUL.

HIS PROBLEM REMAINS ONE OF FOCUS AND STAFF ASSISTANCE.

EZ. IMPDET.

CS COMMENT:*COS forwards a resume of points covered during more than

six hours of off the record discussions with Congressman Dale Milford (D, Texas)

on 25 October 1975.

* Bors Ste'D

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WE FILE. VR. DEL/REVIeW STAFE,

D/DaL DDO, D/OIC, CSR5

5A/DDO

EL A827

PAGE 01

TOR1280440Z OCT 75

SECRET 280300Z OCT 75 STAFF

CITE SEOUL 256:49 SECTION 1 OF 4

he 1-4y.4

TOI DIRECTOR,

RYBAT PLMHCONGA

REFI A, SEOUL 29646

(23138)

B. DIRECTOR 759641

FOLLOWING IS A RESUME OF POINTS COVERED DURING

MORE THAN SIX HOURS OF OFF THE RECORD DISCUSSIONS

WITH CONGRESSMAN DALE MILFORD ID-TEXASS ON 25 OCTOBER 1975.

BECAUSE OF FEVER COS HAD NOT BEEN RELEASED FROM HOSPITAL AND

DISCUSSIONS WERE THEREFORE HELD AT THE HOSPITAL SITTING

ROOM,

1, CONGRESSMAN MILFORD OPENED THE DISCUSSION

BY REITERATING CONCERNS SURFACED THE PREVIOUS AFTERNOON.

IN ADDITION TO HIS REFERENT À ASSESSMENT, HE STATED

THAT HE BELIEVED THAT THE FIRST PHASE OF THE COMMITTEE

REPORT WILL STATE THAT:

A, DUPLICATION OF INTEL MISSIONS RESULTED IN

MULTICHANNEL FORWARDING OF INFORMATION.

B: BUREAUCRATIC INEFFICIENCY RESULTED IN DELAYS

SECRET

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SEOU

25649

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TOR: 28D440Z OCT 75

IN FORWARDING OF INTELLIGENCE,

CO. NEW LEGISLATION AND NEW PERMANENT, PREFERABLE

JOINT OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE ARE REQUIRED.

2, THE CONGRESSMAN STATED THAT THE COMMITTEE

INQUIRIES ARE POLITICAL IN NATURE AND IN HIS OPINION

THERE IS NO PRETENSE OF OBJECTIVITY, TIME FACTORS

DID NOT PERMIT HIM OR OTHER MEMBERS TO PERSONALLY

OR SERIOUSLY ADDRESS THE QUESTIONS INVOLVED SO

THAT FOR PRACTICAL PURPOSES, MOST MEMBERS WERE "PRISONERS

OF THE COMMITTEE STAFF", HE HAS NOT BEEN HAPPY WITH

THIS SITUATION AND HAD INITIALLY PROPOSED THAT EACH

COMMITTEE MEMBER BE PERMITTED TO PERSONALLY SELECT

ONE STAFF MEMBER FOR ASSIGNMENT TO THE COMMITTEE,

HE HAD LINED UP A TOTAL OF SIX MEMBERS TO BACK THIS

APPROACH, WHEN THE CHAIRMAN AGREED TO LET HIM SELECT

ONE STAFF MEMBER IF HE IN TURN WOULD DROP HIS SPONSORSHIP

OF THIS PROPOSAL, HE AGREED, BUT SAID THAT HE HAD AS

YET BEEN UNABLE TO IDENTIFY AN APPROPRIATE CANDIDATE.

HE DISMISSED THE CURRENT COMMITTEE STAFF AS STARRY-EYED.

LIBERALS OUT TO MAKE A NAME FOR THEMSELVES, HE IS

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TORI2804407

OCT 75

ACTIVELY SEEKING A CANDIDATE FOR EMPLOYMENT

AS HIS

STAFF ASSISTANT ON THE COMMITTEE, BUT DID NOT APPEAR

SANGUINE THAT HE WOULD COME UP WITH THE RIGHT MAN;

3. CUS NOTED THAT DIRECTOR COLBY WOULD BE

THOROUGHLY DELIGHTED WITH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A

JOINT CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE SINCE HE

WAS NOW OBLIGED TO REPORT TO SIX SEPARATE COMMITTEES.

COS EVIDENCED SOME SKEPTICISM THAT A JOINT OVERSIGHT

COMMITTEE WOULD BE ESTABLISHED, THE CONGRESSMAN WAS

NOT OPTIMISTIC IN THE SHORT TERM BUT BELIEVED THAT

A JOINT COMMITTEE WILL EVENTUALLY BE ESTABLISHED:

HE SAID THAT RIGHT NOW THE AGENCY IS ESSENTIALLY IN

AN UNDERDOG POSITION AND IS GOOD COPY, HOWEVER.

OVER THE LONGER TERM, INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP

SCORES NO POINTS WITH THE FOLKS BACK IN HOMETOWN USA SO

THAT IN TIME CONGRESSMEN WILL NAMEUVER TO AVOID THE

ASSIGNMENT.

4, THE REAL PROBLEM AS HE SEES IT IS TO FORM A

COMMITTEE THAT WOULD HAVE CREDIBILITY IN THE EYES OF

THE HOUSE AND HAVE PROCEDURES THAT WOULD PERMIT EFFECTIVE

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OVERSIGHT FUNCTION TO BE EXERCISED AND IN A SECURE

MANNER, THE CONGRESSMAN IS PUSHING A PROPOSAL THAT

THE HOUSE COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP BE COMPOSED OF ONE

MEMBER NOMINATED FROM THE ARMED FORCES COMMITTEE,

ONE FROM THE FUREiGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, ONE APPOINTED

BY THE SPEAKER, WITH THE REMAINDER OF THE COMMITTEE

TO BE NOMINATED BY THE SPEAKER WITH CONCURRENCE BY

THE HOUSE MEMBERS,

5, THE PRESENT HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE (HSCI IS

TO BE PHASED OUT AS OF 31 JANUARY, THE CONGRESSMAN

WAS OF TWO MINDS AS TO WETHER THE COMMITTEE'S LIFE

SHOULD BE EXTENDED. IF TERMINATED ON SCHEDULE, THE

SPOTLIGHT WOULD FADE AWAY BUT THE RESULT WOULD BE

VARIOUS RECOMMENDATIONS FOR "BAD" LEGISLATION, IF

CONTINUED, THE POLITICALLY INSPIRED MANIPULATION OF

THE COMMITTEE WILL CONTINUE SEEKING SENSATIONAL

HEADLINES, HE SAID THAT HE FRANKLY DID NOT KNOW

WHICH WAS WORSE,

6, THE CONGRESSMAN'S STATED INTENT, WHICH HE

SHARES WITH CONGRESSMAN DAVID C. TREEN IS TO FILE

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TOR:280440Z OCT 75

A DISSENTING MINORITY REPORT FOCUSING IN A POSITIVE

MANNER ON THE CONTEMPORARY SITUATION RATHER THAN

THE HISTORICAL ISSUES THAT THE COMMITTEE HAS FOCUSED

IN A NON-OBJECTIVE MANNER, HOWEVER, SINCE DECEMBER

IS FOR PRACTICAL PURPOSES NOT. A WORKING MONTH, THIS

• GIVES HIM ONLY THIRTY DAYS TO PUT TOGETHER A REPORT.

SINCE HE IS A MEMBER UF THREE HOUSE COMMITTEES AND

CHAIRMAN OF UNE SUB-COMMITTEE WITH NOT EVEN ONE STAFF

ASSISTANT ON THE SELECT COMMITTEE HE IS FINDING IT

ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO DEVELOP A MINORITY REPORT.

HE TURNED ASIDE THE SUGGESTION THAT FAVORABLE WITNESSES

BE CALLED AS IMPRACTICAL. HE SAID, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT

IF HE ASKED GENERAL WALTERS OR PRESTIGIOUS AND

KNOWLEDGEABLE PERSONALITIES WITH INTELLIGENCE BACKGROUNDS

TO APPEAR, THEY WOULD NOT BE PERMITTED TO MAKE AN OBJECTIVE

AND BALANCED PRESENTATION, THE COMMITTEE'S LINE OF

QUESTIONING WOULD BE CONFINED TO THEIR KNOWLEDGE OF THE

"DEAD CATS" OF TEN TO FIFTEEN YEARS AGO.. HE ALSO FORESAW

NO POSSIBILITY OF MODIFYING THE MAJORITY VIEWS OR THE

MAJORITY REPORT, HE WAS CLEARLY CONCERNED THAT SAM ADAMS'

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ALLEGATIONS ARE BEING ACCEPTED AS FACT WITHOUT REBUTTAL

PERMITTED, HE WAS PUSHING FOR REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF ALL

INDIVIDUALS CITED BY ADAMS BUT WAS UNCERTAIN WHETHER HE

COULD OBTAIN COMMITTEE AGREEMENT, IF NOT, HE INTENDED TO

EMPHASIZE THIS POINT IN THE PROPOSED MINORITY REPORT.

7, THE CONGRESSMAN IS TENTATIVELY CONSIDERING A

MINORITY REPORT THE THRUST OF WHICH WOULD BE THAT HE

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SECRET 2803QDZ UCT 75 STAFF

CITE SEOUL 25649 SECTION 2 OF 4

TOI DIRECTOR,

RYBAT PLMHCONGA

HAD TAKEN A CURRENT LOOK AT THE INTEL COMMUNITY IN A

CRITICAL AREA (KOREAD AND FOUND IT ALIVE AND WELLI

AND HAD FOLLOWED THE INTEL FLOW THROUGH THE CYCLE

"ALL THE WAY TO THE FURTY COMMITTEE", HE STATED

THAT WHAT HE NEEDED WAS SOME "VEHICLE" TO TIE THIS

ALL TOGETHER FOR PURPOSES OF HIS REPORT. COS NOTED

THAT USIB IN WASHINGTON HAS RECENTLY COMPLETED A.

COMPREHENSIVE ALBEIT HIGHLY CLASSIFIED REVIEW AND

ASSESSMENT OF THE KOREAN TARGET IN A EFFORT TO

IDENTIFY ANY PROBLEM AREAS AND TO TAKE PROPER

REMEDIAL ACTIONS, COS NOTED THAT HAVING ONLY

RECENTLY ARRIVED HERE HE HAD OF COURSE UNDERTAKEN

3

A THOROUGH IN COUNTRY REVIEW IN ORDER TO ASSURE

HIMSELF OF THE ADEQUACY OF OUR IN-COUNTRY PROGRAMS.

THE CONGRESSMAN SEIZED ON THESE REVIEWS AS THE POSSIBLE

BASIS OF HIS REPORT, HOWEVER, HE WANTED TO DEAL

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WITH "UNCLASSIFIED ASPECTS" OF THE REVIEW. CHOW

ONE RECONCILES THIS CANNOT BE SUGGESTED FROM THIS

VANTAGE POINT, IT MERELY EMPHASIZES THE LACK OF

FOCUS

AND THE CONGRESSMANIS DESIRE TO DO SOMETHING

CONSTRUCTIVE, BUT HIS INABILITY TO FIND A "HANDLE".)

8, THE CONGRESSMAN COMMENTED THAT THE SECURITY OF

CLASSIFIED MATERIAL IN THE COMMITTEE'S HANDS IS A

MAJOR PROBLEM, THE HSC RULES STATE GLASSIFIED

MATERIAL MUST NUT BE RELEASED BUT THESE RESTRICTIONS

DIRECTLY CONTRAVENE HOUSE REGULATIONS ON THIS POINT

AND WOULD NOT BE SUSTAINED IF CHALLENGED, HOWEVER,

SINCE THE HARRINGTON EPISODE HE DOUBTED THAT THE

HSO'S SPECIAL RULE WOULD BE CHALLGNGED (ACCORDING TO

THE CURRENT HOUSE RULES ANY MEMBER CAN ASK FOR A

COMPLETE TRANSCRIPT OF ANY CLOSED COMMITTEE HEARING

AND USE IT ALMOST WITH IMPUNITYS,

9, COS WAS PREPARED TO PROCEED ON THE BASIS OF

REFERENT & GUIDANCE IF WE SENSED THAT THE CONGRESSMAN

WOULD BE RECTIVE TO THIS LINE OF PRESENTATION.

GIVEN THE UNORTHODOX MANNER IN WHICH THIS HAD

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DEVELOPED, AND UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES IT WAS BELIEVED

BEST TO GIVE THE CONGRESSMAN THE OPPORTUNITY TO CHART

THE COURSE, IN SO DOING IT BECAME ABUNDANTLY CLEAR

THAT HIS INTEREST LAY IN THE AGENCY'S ROLE VIS-A-VIS THE

INTEL COMMUNITY IN THE FIELD, HE WANTED TO KNOW HOW

COORDINATION AND CONTROL WAS EXERCISED IN THE FIELD.

COS EXPLAINED THE CHIEF OF STATION'S RESPONSIBILITY

AND AUTHORITY IN THE COORDINATION OF CLANDESTINE

COLLECTION PORGRAMS, IN DISCUSSING COORDINATION OF

MILITARY COLLECTION AGENCIES COS IN DUE COURSE

SUGGESTED THAT MILITARY REPRESENTATIONS MIGHT

PROFITABLY BE INVITED TO JOIN IN THE DISCUSSION.

TELEPHONE CALLS BROUGHT THE 8TH ARMY J-2, CAPTAIN ALBERT

M. HUNT, THE DEPUTY JO2 COLONEL ARTHUR W. LONG AND

THE SENIOR NSA REPRESENTATIVE MR, DELMAR C. LANG INTO

THE DISCUSSION. THE COMMAND AND COORDINATION CHANELS

WERE OUTLINED, AND THE STATION'S ROLE

WAS ENDORSED BY

THE MILITARY REPS TO ALMOST AN EMBARRASSING DEGREE.

COS EXPLAINED THE DOID'S, AND IN THIS INSTANCE

DOID 5/1, EXPLAINED HOW THE FIELD CLEARANCE,

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REGISTRATION, APPROVAL AND IF NECESSARY, RECLAIMOR

PROCESS WORKS AND SUGGESTED THAT THE CONGRESSMAN

OBTAIN COPIES OF THE DCIDIS UPON HIS RETURN TO

WASHINGTON. NOT SURPRISING, THE CONGRESSMAN HAD

NEVER HEARD OF THE DOID'S, HE NOTED THE SUGGESTION

AND WILL IN ALL PROBABILITY FOLLOW UP UPON HIS

RETURN.

1D, THE CONGRESSMAN WAS CONCERNED THAT THERE

WAS A DUPLICATION OF EFFORT AND INTENTLY QUESTIONED

THE MULTICHANNEL NATURE OF REPORTING WHEN ONLY ONE

DICISION COULD BE TAKEN. COL, LONG, THE DEPUTY

JaZ, WAS PARTICULARLY ELOQUENT IN DEFENSE OF

MULTIPLE REPORTING CHANNELS, POINTING OUT THE

SPEED AND ASSURANCE OF COVERAGE WHEN SUCH WERE

EMPLOYED. HE ADDED THAT PLACING A UNIFYING LAYER

OF BUREAUCRACY ON TOP WOULD TEND: TO DELAY THE

MORE RAPID TRANSMISSIUN OF INTELLIGENCES TO STIFLE

DISSENTING. VIEWSS AND TO CREATE A MONSTROUS SIZED

SUPER-AGENCY WHICH MIGHT PROVE LESS SUSCEPTIBLE

TO CONTROL AND REVIEW, THE CONGRESSMAN WAS PARTICULARLY

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STRUCK WITH THIS LATER POINT WHICH HE CONSIDERED

A PARTICULARLY PERSUASIVE ARGUMENT FOR MULTICHANNEL

REPORTING. HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE EVEN MORE PERSUASIVE

ON HIS "WILD-EYED" LIBERAL PEERS,

11, COS REVIEWED IN DETAIL AND ESTABLISHMENT OF.

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER SYSTEM AS A DEVELOPMENT

WITHIN THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS AND DEVELOPED BY THE

DOI TO FURTHER REFINE: THE COMMUNITY EVALUATION

SYSTEM AS WELL AS TO ENSURE EVEN MORE EFFECTIVE

COORDINATION AND UNDERSTANDING WITHIN THE COMMUNITY.

IT WAS NOTED THAT THE NIO FOR NORTH ASIA AND THE

PACIFIC, MRS, EVELYN COLBERT, IS A SENIOR CAREER

STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICER, WHILE COL. LONG'S PREVIOUS

ASSIGNMENT HAD BEEN AS THE DEPUTY NIO FOR LATIN

AMERICA, IT WAS EXPLAINED THAT THE SYSTEM PERMITS

THE DO! TO ESTABLISH AN ORDER OF NATIONAL PRIORITIES

AND TO EXAMINE THE PRODUCT OF AN ENTIRE MISSION, AN

INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, OR A SERVICE COMPONENT TO SEE

HOW WELL IT IS ADDRESSING THE KEY INTELLIGENCE

QUESTIONS, THE EVALUATIONS OF THE NIO SYSTEM REPRESENTS

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TORI 280502Z OCT 75

A MAJOR ADDITIONAL STEP IN MANAGEMENT OF THE COMMUNITY.

COS ALSO NOTED THAT PERHAPS AN EVEN MORE IMPORTANT

STEP TAKEN BY THE DO! IN EFFECTING COMMUNITY CONTROL

WAS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF INTER-AGENCY RESOURCES

ALLOCATION COMMITTEE PIRACY WHICH PERMITS THE DEI

TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE BUDGETS OF THE

RESPECTIVE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES, THE CONGRESSMAN

WAS QUICK TO PERCEIVE THE USEFULNESS OF IRAC.

12. COS REVIEWED THE AGENCY SYSTEM OF

MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVE AND THE FIELD INTEL

PROCESS IN SOME DETAIL NOTING THE AUTOMATIC

SIMULTANEOUS RELEASE TO CUSTOMERS IN WASHINGTON.

AS WELL AS THE FIELD, LOCAL COORDINATION WAS

EXPLAINED AND THE ABSOLUTE INTEGRITY OF STATION'S

REPORTING WAS STRESSED, COS STATED THAT HE WAS

UNAWARE OF A SINGLE INCIDENT DURING HIS CAREER

IN WHICH AN AMBASSADOR OR GENERAL OR ANY OFFICER

HAD PREVENTED THE DISSEMINATION OF A SINGLE REPORT

FOR POLITICAL OR OTHER REASONS. LOCALLY, COS

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TOR 2804237 OCT 75

SECRET 280300Z OCT 75 STAFF

CITE SEOUL 25649 SECTION 3 OF 4

TOS DIRECTOR,

RYBAT PLMHCONGA

NOTED THAT WE DO NOT PRECLUDE REQUESTING THE

AMBASSADOR'S OR THE CINCUNC'S OR ANY OTHER SPECIALIST

OPINION OR COMMENTS IN THOSE INSTANCES WHERE THE SUBJECT

MATTER IS OF A NATURE THAT THEIR COMMENTS WOULD PLACE

THE INFORMATION IN CONTEXT AND THEREBY MATERIALLY

ADD TO THE VALUE OF THE REPORT, IT WAS NOTED THAT

SUCH COMMENTS ARE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED AS SUCH IN THE

REPORT AND SUCH REVIEW IS NOT PERMITTED TO DELAY

ITS TIMELY DISSEMINATION, E. GO, THE OFFICE OF THE

CINCUNC IS PERMITTED 24 HOURS IN WHICH TO

COMMENT ON CERTAIN MILITARY REPORTS IF THE SUBJECT

MATTER IS OF A MILITARY NATURE AND THE TIMELINESS

OF THE INFORMATION IS NOT AFFECTED BY A 24-HOUR DELAY.

COS EMPHASIZED THAT NO ONE REPEAT NO ONE IN THE FIELD

CAN PRECLUDE A CHIEF OF STATION FROM EXERCISING HIS

RESPONSIBILITY AND PREROGATIVE TO DISSEMINATE SUCH

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INTELLIGENCE AS HE, IN HIS CONSIDERED JUDGMENT,

CONSIDERS WORTHY OF DISSEMINATION INTO THE NATIONAL

LEVEL SYSTEM,

13, THE CUS'S RESPONSIBILITY AND AUTHORITY FOR

COORDINATION OF MILITARY GLANDESTINE OPERATIONS WERE

ALSO REVIEWED IN DETAIL IN THE PRESENCE OF THE DEPUTY

JO2, COLONEL LONG, WHILE DEFENDING THE SERVICES

SEPARATE NEED FOR A COLLECTION CAPABILITY, STRONGLY

ENDORSED THE NEED FOR THE COORDINATION PROCESS UNDER

DC ID 5/1,

14, THE CONGRESSMAN NOTED THAT ONE PROBLEM THAT

HAD BEEN BROUGHT TO THE COMMITTEE'S ATTENTION AND

WHICH HAD SURFACED DURING THE TET OFFENSIVE WAS THAT

FOUR DIFFERENT INTEL URGANIZATIONS HAD BEEN USING THE

SAME SOURCE IN VIETNAM. COS NOTED THAT IF TRUE

THE INCIDENT WAS THE EXCEPTION NOT THE RULE AND

EXPLAINED THE ROLE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE INTER AGENCY

SOURCE REGISTRY AND HOW IT SERVES THE NEEDS OF THE

ENTIRE COMMUNITY, THE PROBLEM OF FABRICATION WAS

DISCUSSED AND THE COMMUNITY'S USE OF BURN NOTICES

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TOR82884237 OCT 75

TO IDENTIFY AND NEUTRALIZE SUCH PEOPLE WAS EXPLAINED.

•15, ALTHOUGH COS HAD PREVIOUSLY BRIEFED THE

CONGRESSMAN PRIOR TO HIS ARRIVAL, SUSLAK DELMAR LANG

BRIEFED THE CONGRESSMAN ON THE STATUS OF COMINT

COVERAGE OF THE NORTH KOREAN TARGET, HE ALSO

STRESSED THE DESIRABILITY AND COST EFFECTIVENESS

OF THE PROPOSED UO2R DEPLOYMENT, PROPOSED MARKHAM

AND SWAMP COVERAGE AND ADDING A DF CAPABILITY TO THE

AUTOMATED VHF/HF ADVENTURER COLLECTION SITES, LANG

ALSO MADE A STRONG PITCH FOR THE COST EFFECTIVENESS

OF THE THIRD PARTY PROGRAM, AND THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL

FUNDING OF DSA, THE KOREAN COUNTERPART ORGANIZATION.

THE CONGRESSMAN AT THIS POINT INTERJECTED THAT HE

SAW NO REASON FOR THE SEPARATION OF NSA AND CIA. COS

ADDRESSED TO THIS AND THE NSA REPRESENTATIVE LATER

STATED HIS VIEWS WHICH WERE GENERALLY IN ACCORD.

COS EXPLAINED NSA TASKING RESPONSIBI!

ITY AND

FIRST AND THIRD PARTY PROGRAMS NOTING THAT ON THE

SURFACE HE COULD NOT PERCEIVE ANY ADVANTAGES THAT

WOULD ACCRUE TO THE GOVERNMENT IN TERMS OF GREATER.

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EFFICIENCY OF COST EFFECTIVENESS BY COMBINING THE

TWO ORGANIZATIONS, INDEED THE UNIQUE NATURE OF NSA

RESPONSIBILITIES WHICH ARE HIGHLY TECHNICAL AND SOMEWHAT

ESOTERIC ARGUED AGAINST FUNCTIONAL MERGER OF THE TWO

ORGANIZATIONS, IT WAS NOTED THAT THE RESULTANT SPAN

OF MANAGEMENT CONTROL COULD IN FACT RESULT IN A LESS

COST EFFECTIVE OPERATION, BOTH COS AND MR. LANG NOTED

THAT PRESENT PROCEDURES PRECLUDE UNDESIRED DUPLICATIVE

TASKING AND ENSURED MAXIMUM EFFECTIVE COMMUNITY EXPLOITATION

IRRESPECTIVE OF WHICH AGENCY HAD THE LOCAL COMINT

RESPONSIBILITY, MR. LANG COMMENTED THAT HE HAD WORKED

CLOSELY WITH CIA IN SEVERAL COUNTRIES. AND SAW NEITHER

MAJOR PROBLEMS NOR ANY ADVANTAGES THAT WOULD NECESSARILY

ACCRUE IF THE AGENCIES WERE COMBINED.

16, DCOS BRIEFED THE AMBASSADOR ON THE EVENING

OF 25 OCTOBER ON THE NATURE OF THE CONGRESS MAN'S

INTERESTS AND THE SUBSTANCE OF THE DAY'S

DISCUSSIONS, THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT HE WOULD BE

HAPPY TO DISCUSS THESE CONCERNS WITH THE CONGRESSMAN

ON SUNDAY OR MONDAY: THE AMBASSADOR SAW CONGRESSMAN

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MILFORD THAT NIGHT AT DINNER AND INVITED HIM TO THE

RESIDENCE AT 1100 HOURS ON THE 26TH.. THE CONGRESSMAN

LATER STATED THAT THE DISCUSSIONS WERE QUITE HELPFUL

AND THE AMBASSADOR AGREED TO FORWARD A LETTER ON THE

EFFECTIVENESS OF LOCAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT WHICH

WOULD BE OF ASSISTANCE TO HIS PROPOSED MINORITY REPORT.

17, IN A STATION-ARRANGED ONE HOUR MEETING WITH

LT. GEN. HOLLINGSWORTH ON 26 OCTOBER IN WHICH DOOS

PARTICIPATED, THE CONGRESSMAN RESTATED THE NATURE OF

HIS CONCERNS IN SEEKING POSITIVE CONTRIBUTIONS TO

A MINORITY REPORT, HE THEN ASKED GEN. HOLLINGSWORTH

WHAT INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT HE NEEDED AS A FIELD ARMY

COMMANDER AND HOW HE WOULD CHARACTERIZE THE SUPPORT

HE WAS CURRENTLY OBTAINING FROM THE INTELLIGENCE

COMMUNITY, HOLLINGSWORTH RESPONDED WITH A CRUSTY

BUT IMPASSIONED LECTURE ON THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL

CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT TO CIA AND NSA

HOLLINGSWORTH

TOLD THE CONGRESSMAN. THAT HE NEEDED MORE TACTICAL

INTELLIGENCE AND HE NEEDED IT IN A TIMELY FASHION,

WHICH WAS EXACTLY WHAT HE HAD RECENTLY TOLD SECRETARY

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TORI 288423Z OCT 75

SCHLESINGER WHO HAD POSED THE SAME QUESTION. THE

GENERAL STATED THAT HE WANTED MORE NORTH KOREAN TACTICAL.

PHOTO, AND EVEN ECONOMIC COVERAGE AND HE DEPENDED ON

NSA AND CIA TO GET IT FOR HIMA HE COMPLETELY

DISCOUNTED U,S, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE EFFORTS SAYING

THE ARMY DID NOT PUT HIGH CALIBER MEN INTO INTELLIGENCE

AND DID NOT DEVELOP INTELLIGENCE PROFESSIONALS.

HE NOTED THAT HIS SPECIAL FORCES COMMANDER HAD JUST

BEEN TRANSFERRED TO DIA IN AN INTELLIGENCE ASSIGNMENT.

HE SAID HE WAS A GOOD SPECIAL FORCES COMMANDER BUT.

NO INTEL OFFICER, WHEREAS HIS FORMER GO2 HAD BEEN

REASSIGNED TO HONOLULU IN A PERSONNEL SLOT, AND THEN

THE ARMY HAD BEEN UNABLE TO PROVIDE A QUALIFIED

CULONEL AS A REPLACEMENT, HE SAID THAT IN CONTRAST

CIA AND NSA HAVE CAREER PROFESSIONALS WITH WHOM THE

FIELD COMMANDER CAN WORK, AS HE FORMERLY DID IN

VIETNAM AND AS HE IS NOW DOING IN KOREA, HOLLINGSWORTH

ALSO ADDED KUDOS FOR STATION MILITARY REPORTING.

NOTING THAT KOREA IS A MILITARY-ORIENTED SOCIETY

AEPRODUOTION DY OTHER THA

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TOR1280427Z OCT 75

SECRET 280300Z UCT 75 STAFF

CITE SEOUL 25649 FINAL SECTION OF 4

TO! DIRECTOR,

RYBAT PLMACONGA

AND THAT HE HAD FOUND OUR MILITARY/POLITICAL

REPORTING QUITE HELPFUL, THE GENERAL DECLINED

TO BE SPECIFIC AS TO THE NATURE OF ADDITIONAL

TECHNICAL SUPPORT HE REQUIRED BECAUSE OF

UNCERTAINTY REGARDING ITS SECURITY CLASSIFICATION,

BUT HE VOLUNTEERED TO PUT HIS REQUIREMENTS AND

COMMENTS IN A LETTER TO THE CONGRESSMAN WHICH HE

WOULD FORWARD VIA STATION CHANNELS AND "THEN LET

THE PEOPLE BACK HOME WORK OUT THE CLASSIFICATION

PROBLEM"', CONGRESSMAN SAID THAT WOULD BE MOST

HELPFUL AND WOULD REPRESENT A REAL CONTRIBUTION

TO HIS REPORT,

18, IN A SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION WITH DOOS.

THE CONGRESSMAN REQUESTED THE ASSISTANCE OF THE

DDC! BY NAME IN DRAFTING HIS MINORITY REPORT AS

WELL AS IN REVIEWING THE USIB STUDY ON KOREA

SECRET

RUN DY

REPRODUQTION DY OTHER THAI

IBBUING OFFICE IS PROMIBITRC

STAFF

2

3

IN 724585

SE OU

25649

---

## Page 75

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20

PAGE DZ

TOR1280427Z OCT 75

IN 724583

SEOU 25649

REQUIREMENTS, HE STATED THAT HE PROPOSED TO BASE

HIS REPORT ON THE USIB AND COS REVIEWS OF THE KOREAN

PROBLEM AND TO INCLUDE EXTRACTS OF THE LETTERS FROM

THE AMBASSADOR AND GENERAL HOLLINGSWORTH. ALTHOUGH

STILL UNCERTAIN AS TO METHODOLOGY, HIS INTENT IS

TO DEVELOP A PUSITIVE REPORT REFLECTING THE HIGH.

DEGREE OF LOCAL COOPERATION THAT HE HAS PERSONALLY

OBSERVED BUT STRESSED THAT THE REPORT MUST BE

UNCLASSIFIED BECAUSE THE REPORT MUST BE DESIGNED

FOR PRESENTATION ON THE HOUSE FLOOR, HE BELIEVED

THE DOCI WOULD BE OF PARTICULAR ASSISTANCE IN PULLING

TOGETHER A REPORT OF THIS NATURE.

19, THE CONGRESSMAN STATED THAT HE AND REPRESENTATIVE

DAVID C. TREEN WERE IN THE VANGUARD ON THE NEED FOR A

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE EFFORT AND THEY HAVE THE SUPPORT

OF REPRESENTATIVES MCCLARY AND JOHNSON ON THE COMMITTEE..

HE SAID THE BIPARTISAN NATURE OF THIS

MINORITY, ALBEIT

THREE REPUBLICANS TO ONE DEMOCRAT, WOULD ASSIST ITS

ACCEPTANCE, HE ALSO STATED THAT HE MUST NOW MOVE

RAPIDLY TO RECRUIT HIS OWN STAFF ASSISTANT ON THE

SECRET

---

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21 - 21

PAGE DB-BEL

TOR82804277 OCT 75

IN 124508

SEOU

25649

COMMITTEE STAFF,

20. ADDITION DISCUSSION IS SCHEDULED WITH

CONGRESSMAN MILFORD FOR.

28 OCTOBER, WILL ADVISE,

E2, IMPDET,

S

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C

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## Page 77

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#112

TO: PANAMA CITY.Y

RYBAT PLMHCONGA Y

REF: PANAMA CITY 34339 lIN 72313514

L• HQS AWARE OF AND HANDLING REF CASE. NO NEED FORWARD

WALKER LETTER AND OTHER THAN POUCHING COPIES OF MEMOS, NO FURTHER

STATION ACTION NECESSARY AT THIS TIME. PLS ADVISE BY CABLE IF ANY

FURTHER INFO THIS MATTER COMES TO STATION ATTENTION. Y

2. FILE: DEFER. EZ IMPDET. M

Cri

LA COMMENT: REQUEST HQS GUIDANCE ON 19Z2 CASE OF MAIL INTEACEPTS

INADVERTENTLY SENT TO PANAMA•

SAIDDO - NORM SHEPANEK (TELECOORDI

28 OCT 75

DATE:

ORIG:

BARBARA GRAHAM: EMER

C/LA/CAM/PA

UNIT:

4805

Mitterly

CLASSIFICATION

COORDIMATING OFFICERS

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

..

CILA/CAM

AUTHFRTICATING

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E 2

IMPDET

CL BY:054524

---

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MEDAN: MELBOURNE, SURABAYA!

SYDNEY? TAKHLI, UDORN. Y

RYBAT ADMIN PLMHCONGA Y

REF: DIRECTOR 759843 y

L. EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY ALL CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO IDENTITY

MUST BEAR THE SENSITIVITY INDICATOR RYBAT AND THE CRYPTONYM UNDERUDAH

PLMHCONGA. Y

2. FOR UNUSUALLY SENSITIVE CASES, CHIEFS OF STATION MAY AT.

THEIR DISCRETION USE THE DIVISIONS PLMPTACTI PRIVACY CHANNEL.

3. ALL INFORMATION RELATING TO IDENTITY MUST REPEAT MUST BE

SENT TO HAS VIA CABLE REPEAT CABLE... EZ, IMPDET •N

CEA/OEM:

• EA/DDO:

R-E: RUSSELL CIN DRAFTE

MR. PECHOUS

{TELECOORD}

DATE: 24 OCTOBER 1975

ORIG: CEA/ESEC

UNIT: S.M. LABAR

EXT:

1709

d

THEODORE G.

Curio

SHACKLEY,

CEA

RELEASING OFFICER

CLASS

ICATION

COOROINATINO OFFICERS

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

SECRET

AUTHENTICATINE OFFICER

E 2

IMPDET

CL BY: 005088

---

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MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMDEN

759843

INFO: FILE DCI RENEW SHARE CS/RF,

INDEX

NO INDEX

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SAI DD

PER

Sop.

1/Z

TO: PRIORITY EASS, CHIANG MAI

• KOBE: MEDAN, MELBOURNE, SURABAYA,

SYDNEY, TAKHLI, UDORN. W

•RYBAT ADMEN. PLMHCONGA W

REF: DIRECTOR 7598424

EL. IDENTITY IS: CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION OF THE AGENCY.

2.

NO FILE.

" E2, IMPDET.

CEA/OEM:: R-E. RUSSELL CIN DRAFTE

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DATE: 24 OCTOBER 1975

ORIG: CEA/ESEC

UNIT:

EXT:

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1709

THEODORE MO OFFICER

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COORDINATING OFFICERS

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---

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IMMEDTATE SEOUL. Y

RYBAT PLMHCONGA Y

REF:

•A.'

SEOUL 25645 IN 7228031

B. SEOUL 25646 lIN 7231381 4

1. IN VIEW OF CONGRESSMAN.

MILFORD'S INTENTION AS EXPRESSED IN

REF A TO SPEND ONE IF NOT SEVERAL DAYS IN DISCUSSION OF FIELD STATION

ACTIVITIES, BELIEVE SEOUL STATION SHOULD APPROACH THIS TASK WITH

FOLLOWING DATA IN MIND: Y

A. BACKGROUND... HOUSE COMMITTEE IN ITS ENTIRETY IS

KEENLY INTERESTED IN COMMAND AND CONTROL ASPECTS OF HOW CIA

FUNCTIONS. IT MOST LIKELY CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S WILL BE

FOCUSED PRIMARILY ON COMMAND AND CONTROL ASPECTS OF FIELD

STATION ACTIVITIES DURING HIS VISIT TO SEOUL. Y

B. MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVE. BELIEVE MUCH OF WHAT

CONGRESSMAN MILFORD CALLS "START OF THE INTELLIGENCE

COLLECTION PROCESS IN THE FIELD" CAN BE DEALT WITH IF

STATION STARTS ITS BRIEFING WITH PRESENTATION ON HOW

MANAGEMENT, BY OBJECTIVE FUNCTIONS.. SUGGEST STATION OUTLINE

DATE: 24 OCT 75

ORIG: TGSHACKLEY: DCM

•UNIT: C/EA

EXT: 1428

RELEASING.OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

COORQINATING OFFICERS

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

AUTHENTICATINO OFFICER

E 2

IMPDET

CL BY: 061491

---

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DATE-TIME GROUR

CITe

DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

759641

INDEX

NO INDEX

RETURN TO

DISSEM BY:

CONF:

INFO: FILE

0

PER

OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE PROCESS I.E., STATION RECEIVES OD

FROM HAS AND COMMENTS ON IT.. ONCE AGREEMENT REACHED ON OD

DIALOGUE FOLLOWS ON AG'S WHICH RELATE TO SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES.

THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL. IN KOREAN CONTEXT, TO FOCUS ON

KE.

OBJECTIVE IN GENERAL AND THEN NARROW DISCUSSION DOWN

TO AG-4 OR AG-?. THIS PHASE OF BRIEFING SHOULD INCLUDE

COMMENTARY ON FUNDING BY FAN'SO ETC. Y

C. AGENT ACQUISITION.. WITH FOCUS OF BRIEFING BEING

ON AG-4. OR AG-?, STATION COULD THEN OUTLINE HOW TARGET

ARE

STUDIES OF KEY INTELLIGENCE REPOSITORIES IS CONDUCTED,

POTENTIAL TARGETS FOR RECRUITMENT IDENTIFIED AND HOW SPOTTING

ASSESSMENT AND RECRUITMENT PROCESS UNFOLDS. IN DISCUSSION

OF RECRUITMENT PHASE OF OPERATIONS; THERE SHOULD BE EXAMI-

NATION OF NAME TRACE AND POA PROCESS. Y

D. AGENT AUTHENTICATION.: DIALOGUE WITH CONGRESSMAN

SHOULD ALSO OUTLINE HOW AGENT AUTHENTICATED ONCE RECRUITED.

STRESS SHOULD BE PLACED ON CONTINUING ASPECTS OF AUTHENTI-

CATION, SECURITY OF MEETINGS, ETC. 4

DATE:•

ORIG:

UNIT:

EXT:

"RELEASING. OFFICER

• ILASSIFICATION

COORDINATING OFFICERS

REPROL, MION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS

SHIBITED

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E. 2

IMPDET

CL BY: 061991

---

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•CONF:;

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759641

0

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NO INDEX

RETURN TO

PAGE

3

RENCE NUMBER

DISSEM BY:

PER

PAGES

E.

POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION. ACQUISITION OF

INTELLIGENCE FROM IN-PLACE AGENT, TURNING IT. INTO INTEL

DISSEMINATION, REQUIREMENTS SYSTEM. AND REPORTS EVALUATION

CYCLE SHOULD ALSO BE REVIEWED. Y

F: OPERATIONAL REPORTING SYSTEM. STARTING. WITH RE-

CRUITMENT OF AGENT, STATION SHOULD OUTLINE TYPES OF REPORTING

REQUIRED BY AGENCY FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL PURPOSES I.E..

PRA PART I AND 2, CONTACT REPORTS, INTEL REPORTS, PERIODIC

ASSET REPORTS, PERIODIC PROGRESS REPORTST OPACTS AND FIELD

PERFORMANCE REPORTS. ON LATTER, STRESS SHOULD BE PLACED

FEED BACK

ON FRALIA

• FROM MID-YEAR AND FY REVIEWS WITH DDO. FY

BUDGET CYCLE SHOULD ALSO BE TOUCHED ON. Y

G. CASE HISTORY• IT ESSENTIAL WE NOT IDENTIFY ANY

ACTIVE SOURCES BY TRUE NAME TO CONGRESSMAN MILFORD. IN VIEW

OF THIS WISH POINT OUT HQS HAS FOUND IT USEFUL TO DRAW

ON CASE HISTORY SCENARIO TO UNDERSCORE ALL POINTS PREVIOUSLY

MADE IN BRIEFING. IN SUCH CASE HISTORY ONLY IDENTITY OF

AGENT AND POSSIBLE TARGET HAS BEEN ALTERED FOR SOURCE

DATE:

ORIG:

UNIT:

EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

COORDINATING OFFICERS

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

E 2

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CL BY: 051991

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MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF:

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759641

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DISSEM BY:

PER

PROTECTION. THIS APPROACH HAS WORKED EFFECTIVELY FOR HQS

AND ASSUME IT WILL BE USEFUL TECHNIQUE FOR SEOUL. Y

2: BRIEFING SHOULD ALSO ZERO IN ON STATION'S COORDINATION ROLE

UNDER DCID'S FOR CLANDESTINE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION OPS.

ALSO THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE PART OF BRIEFING CONCENTRATE

ON IMMINENCE OF HOSTILITIES INDICATORS WHICH NOW BEING WORKED ON BY

AMERICAN INTEL COMMUNITY IN CONSULTATION WITH ROK'S. THIS MIGHT

WELL SHOW COMPLEXITY OF ISSUES INVOLVED IN MEASURING INTEL SUCCESS

OR FAILURES..Y

•3.: HAS HAS HAD LIMITED EXPOSURE TO CONGRESSMAN MILFORD, THUS

UNABLE TO SHED ANY LIGHT ON QUESTION POSED IN REF B PARA Z. BASIC

GUIDELINE FOR THIS BRIEFING MUST BE FULL CANDOR WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY

PROTECTING SOURCES AND METHODS. Y

•4:: PLEASE USE ABOVE INDICATORS ON FUTURE TRAFFIC DEALING WITH

BRIEFINGS OR TRAVELS OF CONGRESSIONAL MEMBERS WHO INVOLVED IN INVESTI-

GATION OF INTEL COMMUNITY... E-2: IMPDET.M

Malian

AC/EA/ JK.

DC/EA

C/EA/COPS-

DATE: 24 OCT 75

A/DDO

ORIG:

TGSHACKLEY:DCM

UNIT: C/EA

C/REVIEW STAGE

C/OLC-

EXT:

4428

DDO

RELEASiNG OFFICER

LATON

COORDINATING OFFICERS

REPROL: TION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE I:

SECRET

Istriley

THEODORE AGMENTICAHG ORACEE

SHACKLEY, C/EA

JHIBITED

E 2

IMPDET

CL BY:

061991

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GUN VINII NOTIFIRE.

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LAS

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408492

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VR

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TOTAL COPIES_

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SECRET

Sivator's Tranil File

RAPRODUCTION DY OTTEN INAN

IQUINO OFFICE IS PRONIBITIS

OCI (REVIENSTART, CSRF,

DoLe

PAGE D1

TO R8 2406507

• 009 75

IN. 722803

SEOU

25645

SECRET 240620Z OCT 75 STAFF

CITE SEOUL 25645

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR:

NIACT DIRECTOR

RYBAY CODEL

REF: A. DIRECTOR 758492

B, DIRECTOR 758427

1. CODEL MURPHY ARRIVED SEOUL EVENING 23. OCTOBER

AT ROKG INVITATION. DUE HOSPITALIZATION DE COS, DOOS

CONTACTED CONGRESSMAN MILFORD AND OFFERED SEPARATE

BRIEFING IF DESIRED. IN BRIEF CONVERSATION AFTER

COUNTRY TEAM BRIEFING ON MORNING OF 24 OCTOBER IN

WHICH DOOS PARTICIPATED, REPRESENTATIVE MILFORD REITERATED

POINTS COVERED

' IN REFERENT A MESSAGE AND STATED HE HAD

BEEN CHARGED BY HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN TO MAKE A

DETAILED STUDY OF THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS IN THE FIELD.

HE ADDED THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO BREAK OFF FROM DELEGATION

SCHEDULE AS OF DODO OCTOBER 25 TO COMMENCE DISCUSSIONS.

WHILE PARAMETERS OF HIFMINTERESTS NOT FULLY COVERED IN

INITIAL CONVERSATIONO HE ANTICIPATES DEVOTING ONES/E NOT.

SECRET

---

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488492

E1A951

PAGE 02-02

TOR: 2406507 OCT 75

IN 722803

SEOU 25645

SEVERAL DAYS TO DISCUSSION OF FIELD STATION ACTIVITIES.

2. REP. LUCIEN NEDZI WAS ALSO CONTACTED WITH OFFER

OF STATION BRIEFING WHICH WAS REBEIVED IN FRIENDLY FASHION.

REP. NEDZI EXPRESSED APPRECIATION AND. SAID THAT HE WOULD BE IN TOUCH

LATER

DURING THEIK FIVE DAY STAY.

3. COS MAY BE RELEASED FROM HOSPITAL MORNING OF 25 OCTOBER.

WHETHER HE IS OR NOT, COS PREPARED TO TALK WITH REP. MILFORD EITHER

AT HOSPITAL OR AT RESIDENCE WHERE HE WILL NEED.

BE CONFINED FOR

ONE WEEK RECUPERATION, THIS OFFER BEING CONVEYED TO CONGRESSMAN,

AND IF AGREEABLE TO HIM, ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE MADE FOR

HIM TO MEET DIRECTLY WITH COS.

4. WOULD APPRECIATE SPECIFIC GUIDANCE BY 8880 LOCAL 25

OCTOBER AS REP, MILFORD'S INTERESTS OBVIOUSLY EXTEND TO

DETAILED

PROCEDURES AND REQUIREMENTS BEYOND NORMAL SCOPE OF FIELD BRIEFINGS.

EZ IMPDET

SECRET

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2317417

CITE

DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER.

758926

DISSEM BY: C

co/Rf,

INDEX

NO INDEX

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TO:

DDO,

200/00,.

TEHRANT BEIRUT, AMMANT CAIRON

PERS

poo

IP FILES

#

ISLAMABAD, NEW DELHI..JIDDA.U

112

ADMIN Y

I. ALL SIGNIFICANT CABLE TRAFFIC RELATING TO THE CURRENT

• CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION OF CIA SHOULD CARRY IDEN SLUG.Y

2. IN CASES OF UNUSUAL SENSITIVITY ADDRESSEES MAY USE

PLARGYLE RATHER THAN IDEN SLUG. IN SUCH INSTANCES, NE DIVISION

WILL ASSURE THAT APPROPRIATE HOS COMPONENTS ARE APPRISED OF

PERTINENT PORTIONS OF THOSE MESSAGES.

E2 IMPDET.N

DATE: 23 OCTOBER 1975

ORIG: SAMUEL H. RICKARD

UNIT: NE/COPS

EXT:

R-1562

C/NE

RELEASING OFFICER

COONDINATING OFFICERS

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

GLASGICATION

SECRE

action.

NE/COPS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICEH

E 2

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CL BY :056382

---

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DATE -TIME GROUP

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231741Z

DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER.

758927

DISSEM BY C

CONF :

INE - B

INFO, FILE DE/RETIEW ST

is/RE

INDEX

NO INDEX

RETURN TO

200, soo/so;

PER -

112

TO: TEHRAN, BEIRUT, AMMAN. CAIRO, ISLAMABAD, NEW DELHI, JIDDA-Y

ADMIN Y.

REF: DIRECTOR

1758926

IDEN: PLMHCONGA* E2 IMPDET •*

DATE: 23 OCTOBER 1975

ORIG: SAMUEL H. RICKARD

UNIT: NE/COPS

EXT:

R- 1562

HULEASING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

"COORDINATING OFFICERS

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROMIBITED

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E 2

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---

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CONF: C/EUR 3 INTO: FILE DEL REVIEW STAFF,

D0D. 000/00

SA/DDD

FAIR

A ..

CS/RF o

MESSAGE REFEHENCE NUMHER

758109

DISSEM BY:

PER SOP

#

I'Z

TO: ROME.Y

RYBAT PLMACONGA Y.

FOR ACOS AND OZGA Y

1. HOUSE SELECT COMMITIEE PLANS HOLD HEARINGS ON DESTRY

PROJECT 27 OCTOBER. REQUEST. MR. OZGA PLAN. REVIEW PLDEFINE MATERIAL

UTTI CHIEF EUROPE ON 27 OCTOBER AND ARRANGE BE HEADQUARTERS NOT

LATER. THAN AFTERNOON 26 OCTOBER. Y

2= PLEASE USE ABOVE SLUG FOR FUTURE SIGNIFICANT TRAFFIC

RELATED TO THE CURRENT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS. IN CASES

OF UNUSUAL SENSITIVITY, YOU MAY USE PLIMBALL SLUG FOR SUCH TRAFFIC

AT. YOUR DISCRETION. EZ, IMPDET N

CATE:

ORIG:

EXT:

C/CoR

21 OCTOBER 1975

PHILIP F. FENDIG

DC/CUR

1233

Saile

REFRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROMISITEO

DC/EUR FTANBBAFTI

2

HAPDET

C... BY:

---

## Page 89

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MBADAGS HAMOLIMS INONATOR

STAFF

CONF: C) EUR

0 :

DATE-THAN ONOUP

2117457

INFO: FILE DE, (R

CS/RF, DDO.

DIRECTOR

STAFF),

TO: LONDON, BONN.4

RYBAT PLMHCONGA Y

MANY THANKS FOR YOUR REPORTING ON VISIT MR. DAVID AARON:

PLEASE USE ABOVE SLUG FOR FUTURE SIGNIFICANT TRAFFIC RELATED

TO THE CURRENT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS. IN CASES OF

UNUSUAL SENSITIVITY, YOU MAY USE PLKMBALL SLUG FOR SUCH TRAFFIC

AT YOUR DISCRETION. E2 IMPDET •N

PINCH MUMUSA

757742

DISSEM EY: 28.

INDEX

NO INORE

nATUAN TO.. PER

#

DDO

memo

DATE: 21 OCTOBER 75

ORIG:

PHILIP F. FENDIG

UNIT:

DC/EUR

1283

a C/EUR.

CLASSIFICATION

MELBABING OFFICER

COONOINATING OFFICERS

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

SECRET

AUTHENTICATINO OPPICER

E 2

IMPDET

CL BY: 012860

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## Page 90

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UNCLASSLFIED

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DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS

ROUTING SHEET

TO:

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DOO

ADDO

3

C/PLANS

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C/ CCS'

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• 9

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11

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15

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".10 NOV 1975

SUSPENSE DATE

file

Senator Civich?

SIGNATURE

FORM 3671

SA/ ADDU

USE

4÷75

REVIOUS

EDITIONS

SECRET

DATE

INITIALS

17 OCT 1975

(40)

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## Page 91

13-00000

18 OCT 1975

75-5703

MEMORANDUM FOR: DDO Division and Staff Chiefs

SUBJECT

: The Director's Greeting Card List

l. It is requested that you provide recommendations as to whom

the Director should send holiday greetings. Please submit vour list

to the SA/ADDO in Room 7E22 by the close of business 1Ü November 1975.

2. Your list should be prepared on a very selected basis. You

may include the names of chiefs of foreign security and intelligence

services and the names of non-intelligence personnel abroad who are

of special interest or significance to the Agency mission. In most

cases, these names should be those of persons whom the Director has

met here or abroad.

3. After the Director has reviewed the lists of recommended

names, the greeting cards will be prepared and sent to the appropriate

Division or Staff for pouching or mailing.

Peter V. Rauderbush®

SA/ADDO

Distribution:

C/AF

C/EA

C/EUR

C/DCD

C/DIVD

C/FR

C/LA/

C/NE

C/SE

C/CCS

C/CI

C/OPS

C/PS

C/SS

SA/DDO

SPG/DDO

E2 IMPDET

CL BY 037796

CIA INTERNAL USE ON!Y

---

## Page 92

13-00000

17 OCT 1975

1:0760

MEMORANDUM FOR: DDO Division and Staff Chiefs

SUBJECT

: DDCI's Greeting Card List

Addressees are requested to prepare a Christmas card list

for the DDCI. It should include, where security permits, all

significant contacts hosted by him at Headquarters or visited in

the field. Please submit your list to the SA/ADDO by close of

business 10 November 1975.

red Race a

Peter V. Raudenbush

SA/ADDO

Distribution:

C/AF

C/EA

C/EUR

C/DCD

C/DIVD

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CL BY 037796

CIA INTERNAL LISE ONLY

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## Page 93

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UNCLASSAFIED

"TERNAL

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FROM:

EXTENSION®

Philip F. Fendig

DC/BUR

TO: (Officer designatión, room number, and

building)

1.

2.

RECEIVED

DATE

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---

## Page 94

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3

IN 716119

TOR: 1619317 OCT 75

LOND 66194

C/EUR_

SECRET 101650Z OCT 75 STAFF

CITE LONDON 66194

TOS DIRECTOR.

RYBAT. PLKMBALL

I sand CAISA/D00.

REF A. DIRECTOR 752556

B. DIRECTOR 754586

1, AT DAVID AARON'S REQUEST, COS BRIEFED HIM FOR AN HOUR AND

FIFTEEN MINUTES ON THE AFTERNOON OF 16 OCT. IN RESPONSE TO

HIS QUESTIONS, COS BRIEFED HIM IN GENERAL TERMS ON THE STRUCTURE

OF THE BRITISH INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND THE FUNCTIONING OF

THE JIC. COS ALSO DESCRIBED, WITHOUT OPERATIONAL DETAIL, THE

INTERFACE WITH THE BRITISH AND THE FUNCTIONS OF THE STATION

AND OUR RELATIONSSHIPS WIH THE VARIOUS COMPONENTS OF THE

EMBASSY, AARON DID NOT ASK FOR FINANCIAL DETAILS OR PERSONNEL

FIGURES.

2. IN A WIDE RANGING DISCUSSION AFTER THIS BRIEFING.

AARON PURSUED THE FOLLOWING MAIN LINES OF QUESTIONINGI

A, HE ASKED IF A RECRUITMENT ATTEMPT COORDINATED

WITH THE BRITISH WOULD BE CLEARED WITH THE AMBASSADOR, COS

REPLIED THAT THIS COULD BE A MATTER OF JUDGMENT, BUT CERTAINLY

SECRET

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PAGE D2

TOR11619317 OCT 75

IN 71611

LOND

661

IF THERE WAS ANY POLITICAL RISK OR SENSITIVITY HE WOULD

PROBABLY ALERT THE AMBASSADOR, COS POINTED OUT THE FAGT OF

COORDINATION WITH THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES REDUCED THE RISK

CONSIDERABLY,

B, HE ASKED: IF A LARGE SCALE ACTION TYPE PROGRAM COORDINATED

WITH THE BRITISH SUCH AS MIGHT BE INVOLVED IN PORTUGAL WOULD BE

CLEARED WITH THE AMBASSADOR, AFTER HE HAD REPHRASED THE QUESTION

TO LEAVE OUT ANY MENTION OF PORTUGAL, COS STATED THAT HE WOULD

SEEK AUTHORITY FROM WASHINGTON TO INFORM THE AMBASSADOR OF ANY SUCH

SITUATION.

C. HE ASKED IF COS WOULD APPROACH THE FOREIGN OFFICE

DIRECTLY OR THROUGH GNGRAPH IN ORDER TO COORDINATE SUCH A

PROGRAM. COS REPLED THAT NORMALLY HE WOULD GO DIRECTLY TO

GNGRAPH AND THAT THEY WOULD INSURE COORDINATION WITH THE FOREIGN

OFFICE...

D. HE ASKED IF GNGRAPH HAD TO CLEAR BOTH INTELLIGENCE

COLLECTION AND ACTION OPERATIONS WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE AND THE

U.K.: AMBASSADOR IN THE FIELD • COS REPLIED THAT ACTION

OPERATIONS HAD TO BE CLEARED WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE, BUP THAT

HE IS NOT SURE AS TO HOW MUCH COORDINATION WAS REQUIRED ON

SECRET

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## Page 96

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• ABLE ARC DIADEM aY

HER ...

MERSON UNIT NOTIFIED

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ACTION UNIT

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389706

EIA62D

PAGE D3

TOR11619317 OCT 75

COLLECTION OPERATION,

AARON WILL UNDOUBTEDLY PURSUE THIS

POINT IN HIS MEETING THIS AFTERNOON WITH SYKES AND HOOPER

AND WE WILL REPORT ANY PLAYBACK WE GET. HE ASKED WHETHER

IN COS'S JUDGMENT IT WOULD DE AN IMPROVEMENT ON PRESENT

PROCEDURES FOR THE STATE DEPARTMENT TO REQUIRE PRIOR CLEARANCE

WITH OUR AMBASSADORS OF ALL INTELLIGENCE AND ACTION OPERATIONS.

COS REPLIED THAT IF ALL THE AMBASSADORS WERE AS ABLE AND AS

INFORMED AS THIS ONE AND SOME OTHERS HE HAD KNOWN. THAT THIS

MIGHT WORK. THE PROBLEM WAS THAT MANY AMBASSADORS HAD NO

KNOWLEDGE OR ACQUAINTANCE WIIH THE INTELLIGENCE FIELD AND NO

BASIS FOR MAKING INFORMED JUDGMENTS, AND THE RESULT, THEREFORE.

OF SUCH A RULE MIGHT BE TO SERIOUSLY INHIBIT AND PREVENT MANY

OPERATIONS THAT SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN.

E, IN ANSWER TO ANOTHER QUESTION, COS CONFIRMED THAT BOTH

THE AMBASSADOR AND THE BRITISH WERE PERIODICALLY BRIEFED ON

THE STATUS OF ANY COVERT ACTION OPERATIONS TAKING. PLACE IN

THE U.K.

3. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE DISCUSSIONS, COS TRIED TO MAKE

THE FOLLOWING POINTSY

A, THE BRITISH WERE SERIOUSLY CONCERNED BY THE LEAKS AND

SECRET

REPRODUCTION DY OTHEN

THAN

INQUINO OFPICE IS PHON

IN 716119

LOND: 66184

---

## Page 97

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EIA620

PAGE. DA

TOR:1619317 OCT 75

•IN 716119

LOND

6615

CONTINUING PUBLICITY IN WASHINGTON. THE PAD BEEN REASSURED

BY US THAT WE WOULD PROTECT THE LIAISON RELATIONSHIP AND THE

PRODUCT, AND TO DATE THERE HAD BEEN NO DIMINUTION

OF THHE INTELLIGENCE THEY WERE PRPARED TO GIVE US, AARON SAID

HE WOULD ALSO REASSURE SYKES AND HOOPER ON THIS POINT AS FAR AS

THE SENATE COMMITTEE: IS CONCERNED.

B, COS POINTED OUT BRITISH INTELLIGENCE ENJOYED AN ENVIABLE

DEGREE OF PROTECTION AS A RESULT OF THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT.

THE ABSENCE OF PARLIAMENTARY INVESTIGATIONS AND THE VERY

EFFECTIVE COVER PROVIDED BY THE FOREIGN OFFICE FOR GNGRAPH

REPRESENTATIVES SERVING OVERSEAS. COS TOLD AARON THAT ONE

*OF THE USEFUL THINGS THE SENATE COMMITTEE MIGHT DO WOULD

BE TO CALL FOR NEW LEGISLATION THAT MIGHT OFFER SOME

PROTECTION SIMILAR TO THE KIND THAT THE BRITISH ENJOY,

AARON SAID THAT THE COMMITTEE WAS IN FACT LOOKING INTO THIS

PROBLEM.

C. COS REVIEWED THE PUBLIC EVIDENCE AVAILABLE AS TO I

WHAT PHIL AGEE HAS BEEN UP TO AND POINTED OUT THE KIND OF

DAMAGE THAT CAN BE DONE IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY EFFECTIVE

SANCTIONS, COS DUCKED A QUESTION FROM AARON AS TO HOW MUG.

SECRET

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389706

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PAGE 05-05

IN 716119

TOR 11619317 00T 75=

LOND 60194

COVERAGE ON AGEE JAGUAR WAS

PROVIDING FOR US.

4, IN CONCLUSION, COS STATED THAT WE HAD EVIDENCE THAT

THE CONTINUING PUBLICITY IN WASHINGTON IS BEGINNING TO AFFECT

OUR ABILITY TO RECRUIT AND MAINTAIN OUR AGENTS. AARON REPLIED

THAT IF SECSTATE KISSINGER HAD BEEN WILLING TO PROVIDE THE

CHURCH COMMITTEE WITH THE INFORMATION THEY REQUESTED THE

HEARINGS WOULD HAVE BEEN OVER IN SEPTEMBER.: HE SPECULATED

THAT THE WAY THINGS WERE NOW GOING, THE CHURCH COMMITTEE

WOULD FINISH

UP NEXT. FEBRUARY. THE ENTIRE MEETING WAS CARRIED

OUT IN A COURTEOUS. TONE AND NO

CONFRONTATIONS OCCURRED, EZ IMPDET

SECRET

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## Page 99

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UNCLASSIFIED

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DEPUTY DIRECTOR

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---

## Page 100

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UNCLASSIFIED

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17.0ст 75

16:16

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---

## Page 101

13-00000

SECRET 1617262 OCT 75 STAFF.

CITE BONN 43387

/N= 716059

TO:. PRIORITY HIRECTOR.

RYBAT

REF: DIRÉCTOP: 752556

1 .

DAWID RAPON DE SENATE, SELECT COMMITTEE BRIEFED BY

STIGGINSS HIFFERT AND DEUTINGER FOR TWO HOURS MORNING 15. OCTOBER.

ARRON. HAD LUNCH WITH HIBERT AND NEWLY ARRIVED ARMY ATTACHE:

COLONEL OLIVER RAY.

HE MET, FOR OVER HOUR WITH AMERSSADOR

HILLENERAND AFTERNOON 15 OCTOBER BEFORE DEPARTING FOR LONDON.

"LARGE PART OF MORNING BRIEFING DEVOTED TO MILITARY,

INTELLIGENCE REFAIRS: IN GERMANY RAPON ASKED FOR DEFINITION OF HOW

AND TO WHAT ENTENT COS/SUPERVISED MILITARY INTELLIGENCE EFFORT

WHICH EXPLAINED TO HIM IN SOME DETRIL. RARON ASKED NUMBER

QUESTIONS AEOUT GOORDINATION FROCESS AND HOW THIS IMPLEMENTED.

HÈ WANTED KNOW IF THE COORDINATION PROCESS EXTENDED TO A REVIEN

REQUIREMENTS AND OF THE NALUE OF MILITARY COLLECTION ACTIVITIES

AS REFLECTED IN ITS PRODUCTCAND TOLD THAT OUR COORDINATION OF

MILITARY ACTIVITIESAGENERALEY. CONFINEDDTO INSURING THAT MILITARY

TRADECRRFT MET OUR STANDARDS» AND THAT POLITICAL RISKS ACCEPT-

ABLE: IN PRACTICE, WE DID NOT REVIEW PRODUCTION OF MILITARY

OPERATIONS. WE MENTIONED THAT MILITARY COLLECTION IN RECENT YEARS

IWAS ON FELATIVELY MODEST SCALE AND THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO: FLAPS

IN RECENT YEARS*

AIRPON SHID THAT THE SENATORS ON HIS COMMITTEE HAD BEEN

SURPRISED, TO FIND THAT MILITARY WAS ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN COLL-

ECTION ACTIVITY SINCE THIS NOT COVERED IN ANY LEGISLATIONS BUT

(ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SUCH ACTIVITY AUTHORIZED IM MONSKIDS:

STIGGÍNS

MADE POINT THAT MILITARY IN GERMANY STRUCTURED ALONG COMBAT#

INTELLIGENCE LINES AND IN EFFECT ENGAGED IN MILITARY COLLECTIOM OF

TACTICAL: NATURE AS TRAINING EXERCISE APPROPRIATE TO THEIRS

POTENTIAL WARTIME MISSION.

MEY HHRON BEVERAL TIMES SUGGESTED

MILITART ORS AND PERSONNEL: COULD BE ASSIGNED TO CIA OPERATIONAL

---

## Page 102

13-00000

FSGESS BO&N. 43397 SE CR. ET

CONTROL IN FIELD.

WE-OPINED THIS IS TO SOME EXTENT DIRECTION IN

WHICH COORDINATION HAS TRENDED OVER THE. YERRS BUT LOCAL COMMANDERS

PROBAELY FEEL. HIS CONTROL UNDERMINED THEREBY

TURNING TO EHERALD OPOS ME. FARON SHID HE RECALLED

FROM WASHINGTON ERIEFING THAT. GERMAN STATION HAD SIZEABLE ALLOT-

MENT FOR OFFICER ENGAGED IN POLITICAL COVERT ACTION ON REGIONAL

•WE EXPLAINED THAT MONIES IN THIS FROJECT ALMOST EX-

CLUSIVELY FOR SALARY AND EXTENSIVE TRAVEL OF, OFFICERE CHERZFANZ

NOT MENTIONED EX NAME AND NOT USED FOR AGENT PRYMENT DP OTHER

PURPOSES, THIS SEEMED TO SATISFY AMRON.

5. HE ASKED NUMBER QUESTIONS ABOUT "FANGY" POLITICAL SOURCES .

ALONG: LINE THAT THESE COULD PERHAPS BE HANDLED AS NORMAL

DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS AND ASKED WHETHER THESE CONTACTS DID NOT

REPRESENT HIGH RISK IF EXPOSED. : STIGGINS EXPLAIND AT SOME LENGTH

TAHL THERE SOLEEEE VER FEW-IN AUMEERE AND WERE, FEODUCT OF BEVERAL

FACTORS! INCLUDING MANY YEARS/ CONTACT WITH SPECIFIC CIN

OFFICERS, MAKING POINT

THAT AGENTS

CONFIDENCES IN CIA BASED: ON

MeNS WEeRS POSOCIATTON WE ESTIMATED FLAPS POTENTIAL SLIGHT

: THESE LONG-STANDING: CONTACTS: WHICH COULD BE EXPLAINED AS OLD

FRIENDSHIPS! FOP RERSON THAT. THEY WERE IN FACT SUCH, THESE

FELATIONSHIPS COULD NOT. BE TRANSFERRED TO STATE DEPARTMENT

OFFICERS:

WE MENTIONED THAT SOME OF THE LOWER-LEVEL DEVELOPMENTAL -

OPERATIONS ACTUALLY FEPRESENTED HIGHER RISK AND CITED GENERAL

DUTLINE OF "HILTONSAFFAIR" COITHOUT NAMESE AS EXAMPLE HOW

DEVELOPMENTAL CASE COULD BE TROUBLESOME.

EMPHASIZED" THERE HAD

'BEEN FEW OF THESE OWER: VERRS:

BAFON ASKED SOME QUESTIONS MEDUT FEDREP: REACTION IN:

EVENT DUF INCOMPATIBLE SOURCES EXPOSEDE WE RESPONDED THAT IN

GENERAL GERMANS WERE NOT INTERESTED IN EMBARRASSING US AND THAT THIS

KEY ELEMENT: PLUS FACTOP THAT WE HANDLẾD ALL INCOMPATIBLE ROTIVITY

VERY CAREFULLY! LED US/TO/CONCLUSION THAT LE WERE NOT FUNNING

RISK MAJOR EMBARRASSMENT BY CONDUCTING LIMITED NUMBER OF THESE

DEERATIONS: EDINTED DUT THRA & CERTOLA MUNBER DES THESE OFERATIONS:

ESSENTIAL TO PROVIDE COVERAGE THOSE ARERS IN ERST-WEST RELATIONS

AND SOME ECONOMIC FIELDS WHERE GERMANS NOT COMPLETELY CANDID

WITH UE EMERSSY RE THEIR ACTIVITIEST

---

## Page 103

13-00000

PASE 3

*BONN 43387/S E

E T

MR@ RARON ASKED REOUT EXTENT WE KEPT AMERSSADOR INFORMED

ON DUF ACTIVITIES IN WEST GERMAM FIELD.

WE REPLIED THAT AMERSSADOE

SAW VIRTUALLY ALL REPORTING AND THEREFORE KNEW WHERE-SOURCES:

LOCATED BUT THAT AS RULE WE DID NOT CLEAR WITH HIM ON INDIVIDUAL

CONTACTS. MAKING REFERENCE TO "SOURCES AND METHORS" PROVISION OF

OUR REGULATION AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS.

POINTED OUT THAT EACH

CASE TREATED SEPARATELY BUT THAT AMBRSSADOR AND EMBASSY/CON-

SULATES HAVE NOT HAD INTEREST. IN DEVELOPMENTAL CONTACT WITH

YOUNGER POLITICAL FIGURES OUTSIDE BONN AREA. ON OTHER HAND HE

CLEARLY QUITE CONCERNED WITH FOREIGN MINISTRY WITH RESULT THAT WE

GENERALLY ASSUMED HANDS-OFF ATTITUDE ON FONMIN.:

8.

MR. ARON INQUIRED RE STATION CASE OFFICER- STRENGTH AND

GIVEN FIGURES CITED IN POSITION REFORT DATED OCTOBER 74 (FORWARDED

HOS BY TM DRTED 2S SEPT 74.239 E

EXPLAINED THAT BREAK DOWNS SOMEWHAT

ARBITRARY.

AND SAID THAT FOP NUMPER OFFICERS THOSE ENGAGED IN

( LIAISON SUPPORT, ANALISIS: FOR INSTANCES IT NOT ALWAYS EAST TO.

¡CATEGORIZE THEIF EFFORTS-

HE PROBED IN SOME DETRIL ON OUF NOC

STRENGTH AND WE

RNSWERED CANDIDLY. MA FARON SEEMED SURPRISED AT SMALL NUMBERS

INOC OFFICERS IN STATION AND SRID HAD HEARD ORINION FROM SOME GIA

OFFICERS THAT NOC FREFEFHELE TO OFFICIAL COVERS WE SRIDEFELT

THIS DEFENDENT OM LOCATION AND CIRCUMSTANCES AND THAT HERE, IN

GERMANY ARMY COVER READILY RVRILABLE, GENERALLY QUITE SATISFACTORY

AND: COST CONSIDERABLY LESS THAN NOC COVER

AARON ASKED SEVERAL

QUESTIONS RE REASONS WE WOULD PUT OFFICER IN GERMANY UNDER NOC.

WE EXPLINED NOC PRIMARILY USED. FOR. PERSONNEL: WE PLANNED KEEP

ASSIGNED GERMANY SEVERAL YEARS AND WHERE NOG PROBABLIAMORE SECURE

AND FOR INSTANCES WHERE IT. PROVIDED BETTER ACCESS. " WHEN HE PUSHED

FORS FURTHER EXAMPLES WE MENTIONED HAD RECENTEY CONSIDERED PUTTING

OFFICER UNDER STUDENT COVER IN HEIDELBERG WHERE OFFICIAL CHINESE-

STUDENTE STENIE IGANT THRGET FEFRESENTED EUT THAT THIS PLEN DROPPED

FOR ADMINISTRATIVE FERSONS WE MADE NO MENTION USE JOUPNALIST

COVER ANDE DID NOT IDENTIFY ANY COVER FIRMS EY HAME.

• 10.

AMPON ASKED STIGGINS WHICH OF WHAT BARONG ENVISAGED AS THREE

PRINCIPAL DUTIES TOOK MOST TIME.

ARPON OUTLINED COS DUTIES HS

IMANAGEMENT OF STATION; EMBRSSY. RESPONSIBILITIES AND COOFDINATION:

OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. STIGGINS SRID MANAGEMENT OF

---

## Page 104

13-00000

SAGE 4 BONN 43387 SECRET

SINTION CLEARLY REGUIRED MOST TIME AND FURTHER THAT WITHIN STATION:

THE EFFORT AGAINST THE HARD TARGETS CONSUMED THE MAJOR PART OF HIS

TIME AND EFFORT •

AS EMERSSHDOE BRIEFED ON QUENDISCUSIONS WITH REPON PRIOR•

TO HIS: SESSION WITH HIM SHER IMPDETO

SE OF ET

;: f

---

## Page 105

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_ABLE SEC DISCREE

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ADVANSE COPY ISSUEDISLOTEN CL

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"TION BY OTHER TH

.: / "FICE IS PROMIDIT

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5

PAGE 01

TOR: 1619377 OCT 75

IN 716124

BONN

43389

WENS

DHES

Pot

SECRET 16I855Z OCT 75 STAFF

CITE BONN 43388.

TOS PRIORITY DIBECTOR.

RYBAT

REF BONN 4536(1W716059)

1, AMBASSADOR BRIEFED COS AFTERNOON 16 OCT ON HIS HOUR AND

ONE-HALF SESSION WITH MR, AARON ON 15 OCT, DISCUSSION COVERED

THREE MAIN TOPICSI SAY RISKS AND NEED FOR "FANCY POLITICAL

SOURCES" IN BONNI (BY COVERT ACTION OPERATIONSI AND (C) DEGREE

TO WHICH AMBASSADOR COGNIZANT OF STATION ACTIVITIES.

R: 2. ON POINT AMA, AMBASSADOR STATED THAT MOST STATION

POLITICAL SOURCES WERE OF LONG-STANDING AND COMMENCED IN THE

EARLY POSTWAR OCCUPATION ERA, THEY WERE BASED ON PERSONAL

FRIENDSHIS AND UNIQUE CHARACTER OF THE EARLY POSTWAR YEARS

AND WERE IN HIS BELIEF LIKELY TO PROVE IRREPLACEABLE..

• THAT IS, AMBASSADOR OPINED THAT SIMILAR CLOSE ASSOCIATIONS

COULD NOT BE ESTABLISHED BY STATION IN TODAYIS POLITICAL

CLIMATE AND IMPLIED THAT HE EXPECTED COVERAGE TO GRADUALLY

WITHER AWAY, BECAUSE OF THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE RELATION-

SHIPS, AMBASSADOR BELIEVED RISK WAS VERY LOW AND STATED THAT.

SECRET

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## Page 106

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== MFG. 2.175

4BLE BEC DISBEM E'

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FERBON/UNIT NOTIFIES

15:r- 6291:

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*DYANCE GOLY COFY SLOTTED

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9: 389723

E1A645

PAGE D2

TOR: 1619377 OCT 75

in a pite in in.

THE COVERAGE PROVIDED BY THESE SOURCES WAS OF DEFINITE VALUE

SINCENTHE INFORMATION WAS NOT OBTAINED BY OFFICIAL EMBASSY

CONTACTS.

SE REGARDING PARA 1.B,0 AMBASSADOR CONFIRMED TO AARON

THAT:IT WAS HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT STATION WAS NO LONGER

INVOLVED IN LARGE-SCALE COVERT ACTION OPERATIONS AND THAT HE

ASSUMED EXPLANATION PER PARA 4 REF WAS IN ACCORD WITH FACTS.

COS 'EMPHATICALLY ASSURED THE AMBASSADOR THAT THERE WERE NO

COVERT ACTION FUNDING OPERATIONS BEING UNDERTAKEN BY THE

STATION. AND THAT WE HAD BEEN MYSTIFIED BY MR. AARON'S

REFERENCE TO THE LARGE BUDGET FOR SUCH ACTIVITIES BUT HAD

CONCLUDED THAT IT MUSI APPLY TO SALARY AND EXPENSES OF

HERZFANZ WITH WHICH AARON SEEMED TO AGREE.

4. WITH RESPECT TO THE AMBASSADOR'S KNOWLEDGE OF SPECIFICS

OF STATION ACTIVITY, THE AMBASSADOR STATED FIRST THAT HE OF

COURSE "HAD A PRETTY GOOD IDEA" ABOUT THE IDENTITY OF SOME

OF OUR SOURCES BUT HAD NOT BEEN SPECIFICALLY ADVISED OF THE

IDENTITIES OF ANY OF THEM, HE FOUND THE SITUATION ACCEPTABLE

HOWEVER, FIRST BECAUSE HE HAD BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH COS PER-

SONALLY FOR THE LAST TWENTY YEARS AND HAD CONFIDENCE THAT

$5..

SECRET

IN 716124

BONN

43389

---

## Page 107

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т 389723

EL A6 45

PAGE 03

IN 716124

TOR: 1619377 00T 75

BONN 43389

COS WOULD ADVISE HIM OF ANYTHING HE OUGHT TO KNOW: LOOKING

BACK ON THE RECORD OF THE PAST TWENTY-FIVE YEARS, THE

AMBASSADOR SAID HE CONCLUDES THAT IN FACT THE AMBASSADORS IN

BONN HAD BEEN KEPT APPROPRIATELY ADVISED AND THE ABSENCE OF

FLAPS WOULD SUBSTANTIATE THE JUDGMENT EXERCISED BY THE RE-

SPECTIVE STATION CHIEFS OVER THE YEARS.

5, MR, AARON DISCUSSED AT SOME LENGTH WITH THE AMBASSADOR

THE FEASIBILITY OF CHARGING THE AMBASSADOR WITH GREATER DIRECT

RESPONSIBILITY FOR SUPERVISION OF THE CLANDESTINE EFFORT.

AMBASSADOR STATED THAT IF IT WERE ASSIGNED TO HIM AS A

A MISSION

HE WOULD MANIFESTLY HAVE TO DISCHARGE IT AND WOULD AS HE SAW IT.

@ROBABLY NESO A STAFF OF AT LEAST TWO COMPETENT OFFICERS TO.

HARRY OUT THE PRACTICAL STAFF WORK ON HIS BEHALF. MR. AARON THEN

RAISED THE QUESTION OF THE BRITISH SYSTEM ABOUT WHICH THE AMBASSA-

SOR MADE THE PERTINENT OSSERVATION THAT IT WAS A QUESTION FOR THE

JOVERNMENT TO DECIDE, IF iT WAS DECIDED TO SUBORDINATE GLAN-

:ISTINE TELLIGENCE OPERATIONE TH "HE FIELD'DIRECTLY TO THE

• BEG REEL ARSEOPRIA"E : HGEMENT COULD AND WOULD BE MADE.

THE METER WE GET PRESSION BY MR. AARON THAT. AT

LEAST A NUMBER OF T: " = SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ARE

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PAGE D4-D4

TOR: 1619377 OCT 75

BONN

IN 716124

43389

1nd so..

GIVING SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO THE BRITISH SYSTEM AS A MEANS OF

INVESTING AMBASSADORS WITH DIRECT AUTHORITY OVER CLANDESTINE

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. EROIMPDET.

Ernates

1 612

E

RET

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:i 710701

TOR:1615147 OCT 75

50MM 6Ü366

•E=P= : 1613222 OCT 75 STAFF

SITE BONt

43369

*Reconnend dissemination

TO: DIRECTORA

RYBAT PLKMBALL

AARON MADE FOLLÖWING COMMENTS AT LUNCHEON IS OCTOBER.

SAID ME WAS STAFF EMPLOYEE UF SENATOR MONSDALE AND WAS HEAD OF

HELECT COMMITTEE TASK FORCE FORMERLY CALLED WHITE HOUSE TASK

•ORGE BUT RENAMED COMMAND AND CONTROL TASK FORGE. MRO AARON SAID

-E FELT COMMITTEE WOULD CONCLUDE ITS WORK IN FEBRUARY AS CURRENTLY

SCHEDULED.

2.

AARON SAID IT HIS OPINION THAT AS CONCERNED WRONGDOINGS

CIA'S RECORD WAS PROBABLY BETTER THAN SOME OF THE OTHER INDEPENDENT

GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, HE MENTIONED THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE

COMMISSION IN THIS CONTEXT, HE SAID IF WE FELT THAT CIA HAVING

DIFFICULT TIME WITH CHURCH COMMITTEE WE SHOULD WAIT AND SEE WHAT

KAPPENS TO FBI WHO WERE "GOING TO HAVE THEIR CLOCKS CLEANED. ".

SAID FBI HAD GONE 50 YEARS WITHOUT REVISION AND VAST AMOUNT OF

WRONGDOING HAD RESULTED FROM THIS SITUATION.

3. ALSO OF INTEREST, COLONEL SMITH, DEPUTY TO DOSI USAREUR

GENERAL DILLARD, WHO WAS PRESENT DURING AARON'S SESSIONS WITH ARMY

SEGRET

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TOR:1615147 OCT 75

IN

715761

BONN 43369

COMPONENTS, INFORMED US 15 OCTOBER THAT HIS IMPRESSION BASED ON

TALKS WITH MR. AARON, LATTER WOULD LIKE SEE CIA TAKE OVER POSITIVE

COLLECTION ELEMENT OF THE GOTH MIG, MR. AARON MADE SIMILAR

COMMENTS TO US, AS WE REPORTING SEPARATELY, EZ IMPDET.

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PAGE D1

IN 716119

TOR: 1619317 OCT 75

LOND 66:94

SECRET 161650Z OCT 75 STAFF

CITE LONDON 66194

Coopy to la!'

TO DIRECTOR:

RYBAT PLIMBALL

WEt

REF A, DIRECTOR 752556

B. DIRECTOR 754586

1. AT DAVID AARONES REQUEST, COS BRIEFED HIM FOR AN HOUR AND

FIFTEEN MINUTES ON THE AFTERNOON OF 16 OCT. IN RESPONSE TO

HIS QUESTIONS, COS BRIEFED HIM IN GENERAL TERMS ON THE STRUCTURE

OF THE BRITISH INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND THE FUNCTIONING OF

THE JIC. COS ALSO DESCRIBED, WITHOUT OPERATIONAL DETAIL. THE

INTERFACE WITH THE BRITISH AND THE FUNCTIONS OF THE STATION

AND OUR RELATIÖNSSHIPS WIH THE VARIOUS COMPONENTS OF THE

EMBASSY• AARON DID NOT ASK FOR FINANCIAL DETAILS OR PERSONNEL

FIGURES.

2, IN A WIDE RANGING DISCUSSION AFTER THIS BRIEFING,

AARON PURSUED THE FOLLOWING MAIN LINES OF QUESTIONINGI

A, HE ASKED IF A RECRUITMENT ATTEMPT COORDINATED

WITH THE BRITISH WOULD BE CLEARED WITH THE AMBASSADOR, COS

REPLIED THAT THIS COULD BE A MATTER OF JUDGMENT, BUT CERTAINLY

SEGRET

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IN 716119

LOND

66184

42422

•= THERE WAS ANY POLITICAL RISK OR SENSITIVITY HE WOULD

PROBABLY ALERT THE AMBASSADOR, COS POINTED OUT THE FACT OF

COORDINATION WITH THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES REDUCED THE RISK

CONSIDERABLY

B. HE ASKED IF A LARGE SCALE ACTION TYPE PROGRAM COORDINAATED

WITH THE BRITISH SÜCH AS MIGHT BE INVOLVED IN PORTUGAL WOULD BE

CLEARED WITH THE AMELSSADOR. AFTER HE HAD REPHRASED THE QUESTION

TO LEAVE OUT ANY MENTION OF PORTUGAL, COS STATED THAT HE WOULD

SEEK AUTHORITY FROM WASHINGTON TO INFORM THE AMBASSADOR OF ANY SUCL

SITUATION.

CO HE ASKED IF COS WOULD APFROACH THE FOREIGN OFFICE

DIRECTLY OR THROUGH GNGRAPH IN ORDER TO COORDINATE SUCH A

PROGRAM. COS REPLED THAT NORMALLY HE WOULD GO DIRECTLY TO

GNGRAPH AND THAT THEY WOULD INSURE COORDINATION WITH THE FOREIGN

OFFICE.

D. HE ASKED IF GNGRAPH HAD TO CLEAR BOTH INTELLIGENCE

COLLECTION AND ACTION OPERATIONS WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE AND THE

VIK. AMBASSADOR IN THE FIELD • COS REPLIED THAT ACTION.

OPERATIONS HAD TO BE CLEARED WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE, BUT THAT

HE IS NOT SURE AS TO HOW MUCH COORDINATION WAS REQUIRED ON

SECRET

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PAGE D3

TOR: 1619317 OCT 75

COLLECTION OPERATION, AARON WILL UNDOUBTEDLY PURSUE THIS

POINT IN HIS MEETING THIS AFTERNOON WITH SYKES AND HOOPER

AND WE WILL REPORT ANY PLAYBACK WE GET. HE ASKED WHETHER

IN COS'S JUDGMENT IT WOULD BE AN IMPROVEMENT ON PRESENT

PROCEDURES FOR THE STATE DEPARTMENT TO REQUIRE PRIOR CLEARANCE

WITH OUR AMBASSADORS OF ALL INTELLIGENCE AND ACTION OPERATIONS.

COS REPLIED THAT IF ALL THE AMBASSADORS WERE AS ABLE AND AS

INFORMED AS THIS ONE AND SOME OTHERS HE HAD KNOWN, THAT THIS

MIGHT WORK. THE PROBLEM WAS THAT MANY AMBASSADORS HAD NO

KNOWLEDGE OR ACQUAINTANCE WIIN THE INTELLIGENCE FIELD AND NO

BASIS FOR MAKING INFORMED JUDGMENTS, AND THE RESULT, THEREFORE,

OF SUCH A RULE MIGHT BE TO SERIOUSLY INHIBIT AND PREVENT. MANY

OPERATIONS THAT SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN.

E, IN ANSWER TO ANOTHER QUESTION, COS CONFIRMED THAT BOTH

THE AMBASSADOR AND THE BRITISH WERE PERIODICALLY BRIEFED ON

THE STATUS OF ANY COVERT ACTION OPERATIONS. TAKING PLAGE IN

- u.4.

3,

: THE CONCLUSTON DE "S DISCUSSIONS, COS TRIED TO MAKE

TONING PRINTSI

THE HERE 1111114 CONCERNED BY THE LEAKS AND

IN 716119

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PAGE 04

MEr:

TOR8161931Z OCT 75

IN 716417

LOND

6617

CONTINUING PUBLICITY IN WASHINGTON. THE PAD BEEN REASSURED

BY US THAT WE WOULD PROTECT THE-LIAISON RELATIONSHIP

'AND THE

PRODUCT, AND TO DATE THERE HADBEEN NO DIMINUTION

OF TEHE INTELLIGENCE THEY WERE ORPARED TO GIVE US, AARON SAID

HE WOULD ALSO REASSURE SYKES AND HOOPER ON THIS POINT AS FAR AS

THE SENATE COMMITTEE IS CONCERNED.

B, COS POINTED OUT BRITISH INTELLIGENCE ENJOYED AN ENVIABLE

DEGREE OF PROTECTION AS A RESULT OF THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT,

THE ASSENCE OF PARLIAMENTARY INVESTIGATIONS AND THE VERY

EFFECTIVE COVER PROVIDED BY THE FOREIGN OFFICE FOR GNGRAPH

REPRESENTATIVES SERVING OVERSEAS, COS TOLD AARON THAT ONE

OF THE USEFUL THINGS THE SENATE COMMITTEE MIGHT DO WOULD

BE TO CALL FOR NEW LEGISLATION THAT MIGHT OFFER SOME

PROTECTION SIMILAR TO THE KIND THAT THE BRITISH ENJOY,

AARON SAID THAT THE COMMITTEE WAS IN FÄCT LOOKING INTO THIS

PROBLEM.

C. COS REVIEWED THE PUBLIC EVIDENCE AVAILABLE AS TO

WHAT PHIL AGEE HAS BEEN UP TO AND POINTED OUT THE KIND OF

DAMAGE THAT CAN BE DONE IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY EFFEÇTIVE

SANCTIONE, COS DUCKED A QUESTION FROM AARON. AS TO HOW MUCH

ANTSECRET

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66184

COVERAGE ON AGEE JAGUAR WAS PROVIDING FOR US.

4, IN CONCLUSION, COS STATED THAT WE HAD EVIDENCE THAT

THE CONTINUING PUBLICITY IN WASHINGTON IS BEGINNING TO AFFECT

OUR ABILITY TO RECRUIT AND MAINTAIN OUR AGENTS. AARON REPLIED

THAT IF SECSTATE KISSINGER HAD BEEN WILLING TO PROVIDE THE

CHURCH COMMITTEE WITH THE INFORMATION THEY REQUESTED THE

HEARINGS WOULD HAVE BEEN OVER IN SEPTEMBER, HE SPECULATED

THAT THE WAY THINGS WERE NOW GOING, THE CHURCH COMMITTEE

WOULD FINISH UP NEXT FEBRUARY, THE ENTIRE MEETING WAS CARRIED

OUT IN A COURTEOUS TONE AND NO CONFRONTATIONS OCCURRED. EZ IMPDET

---

## Page 116

13-00000

6.04875

1658•

Review Staff:

Date 6. October 1975

75/3149/a

Mange: File

TO

: CIA Task Force

FROM

: The Review Staff,

SUBJECT : SSC/HSC Request

RECEIVED: Date 3 October

Walter Elder

Time 1905

The attached letter requests an orientation briefing

for David Aaron who is travelling again, this time

Switzerland, West Germany, and the United Kingdom.

omments: /

, at meten 175 teet only

2nd Treping -10 0275 by tindig

SC/DCI

A/DDA

A/DDI

-A/DDO

A/DDS&T

OGC

OLC

IG

B. Evans

SA

Action

Info

X.

---

## Page 117

13-00000

FRANA CHURCH, IDAMO, CHALAMAN

JOHN Q, TOWER, TELAS, VICE CHAIANA.

PHILP A, HAHT, MIC.

HOWANO H. HAKER, JR., TENOd,

WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.

BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ

WILTER D. HUDOLESTON, MY.

CHAPLES MCC. MATHIAS, JA-MD.

POSERT MONSAN, N.C.

RICHARDS. SCHWEIKER,PA

ORRY HART, COLO

WILLLAM G, MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR

FREDERICK A, O. SCHWARTZ, IN., CHIEF COUNSEL,

CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

REVIEW STAFF

76-3149

Writes States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO

STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH

RESPEGT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(PURSUANT TO I. RES, II, SITH CONGRENS)

WASHINGTON, D.G 20510

October 5, 1975

Mr. Seymour Bolten

Assistant to the Director

Room 6D0120

Central Intelligence Agency

Langley, Virginia

Dear Mr. Bolten:

This letter is to request an orientation briefing for

a visit to the Federal Republic of Germany which a member of

the Select Committee staff, David Aaron, has been asked to

make this month.

Although plans are not yet precise, it is expected that

he will be in Geneva Sunday, October 12; in the Federal

Republic of Germany October 13-15; and in London October 16

and 17:

The primary purpose of this travel is to discuss State-

CIA and military intelligence relations in the field with

the Ambassadors, Embassy Station officers and military com-

manders.. As appropriate, past Agency programs may also be

reviewed.

In Geneva, Mr. Aaron plans to interview Ambassador

U. Alexis Johnson on the broad issue of the role of the

Department of State in the control of intelligence activities.

Sincerely,

Bitt

William G. Miller

copy to Mr. Hyland, State Department

SLAHASO L E 190

---

## Page 118

13-00000

FRANX I

JOHN G. 76

наят, MiH.

WALTER F. MONDALE. M

WALTERD. HUDOLESTON,

KY.

ROJIAT MORGAN, MI.C.

iM, IDAHO, CI IAN

TEXAS, VICH

HMAN

HOWARD H, DAKER, 1R., TENN.

BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.

CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, IA.,MO.

NICHARD S. SCHIVEIKER, PA.

tINY HART, COLO.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR

' FREDERICK A: O, SCHIVARZ, JR.. CHIEF COUNSEL.

CURTIS FI, SMOTHIAS, MINORITY COUNSEL

Whites States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO

STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH

RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(PURSUANT TO 5. RES. 11, SITH CONGRESS)

M'ASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

October 3, 1975

REVIEW STAFF

75-3150

Mr. William G. Hyland

Director

Bureau of Intelligence and Research

Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Hyland:

This letter is to request an orientation briefing

for a visit to the Federal Republic of Germany which a

member of the Select Committee staff, David Aaron, has

"been asked to make this month.

Although the plans are not yet precise, it is expected

that he will be in Geneva Sunday, October 12; in the Federal

Republic of Germany October 13-15; and in London October

16 and 17.

The primary purpose of this travel is to discuss State-

CIA and military intelligence relations in the field with

the Ambassadors, Embassy Station officers and military com-

manders. As appropriate, past Agency programs may also be

reviewed.. In Geneva, Mr. Aaron plans to interview Ambassador

U. Alexis Johnson on the broad issue of the role of the

Department of State in the control of intelligence activities.

Sincerely,

William G. Miller

copy to Mr. Bolten, CIA

SLAHA SO L & 100

---

## Page 119

13-00000

UNCLASSIIED

SUBJECT: (Optional).

FROM:

John Waller

2B-1415

TO:

(Officer designation, room number, and

building)

INTERNAL

ONLY

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

CONF "ENTIAL

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EXTENSION

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DATE

OFFICER'S

INITIALS:

FORWARDED

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1olo

Jolen Walle

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NO.

DATE

26 septembers 1975

OMMENTS (Number each. comment to show from whior

to whom.

raw a line across column after each comment.

NAtali®

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worth reading

Caron and Bill

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---

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PAGE D1

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TO R1 242029Z SEP 75

MONT 21483

SECRET 241945Z SEP 75 STAFF

EITE MONTEVIDEO 21405 SECTION OF 2

TO& IMMEDIATE BUENOS AIRES INFO DIRECTOR.

NACT BUENOS AIRES

# /

AYBAT PLUWCADET

1, COS HAD TWO HOUR SESSION WITH TRUEHART AND AARON LATE.

MORNING 24 SEPTEMBER, GENERAL IMPRESSION IS THAT BOTH WERE

BUSINESS-LIKED QUESTIONS WERE INCISIVE AND DESIGNED TO ASCERTAIN

HOW A STATION FUNCTIONS IN AN EMBASSY, PARTICULARLY VIS-A-VIS

THE AMBASSADOR, RATHER THAN HOW MONTEVIDEO STATION IS FUNCTIONING

IN URUGUAY, HENCE MANY QUESTIONS WERE HIGHLY HYPOTHETICAL, MOST

IMPORTANT IMPRESSION WAS THAT FORMER AMBASSADOR TRUEHART (WHOM S

COS HAD MET IN NIGERIA YEARS AGOD FEELS THAT AN AMBASSADOR

SHOULD BE FAR MORE KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT ALL REPEAT ALL STATION

OPERATIONS IN ORDER TO JUDGE POSSIBLE "FLAP POTENTIAL".

ZO CUS DID NOT SHOW OD TO VISITORS SINCE THEY DID NOT ASK

TO READ IT BUT INSTEAD READ PORTIONS OF IT TO THEM AND DISCUSSED

IT WITH THEMA

3, THEY ASKED INITIALLY WHAT THE AMBASSADORS INJUNCTIONS

WERE WITH RESPECT TO PROHIBITED OPERATIONS, COS SAID

SECRET

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PAGE D2

TOR12420297 SEP 75

IN 695658

MONT 21403

AMBASSADOR DOES NOT WANT COVERT OPERATIONS OF A POLICTICAL NATURE

IN URUGUAY WITHOUT HIS PRIOR APPROVAL NOR DOES HE WANT US TO

MOUNT "ELECTRONIC" OPERATIONS. WITHOUT APPROVAL. COS OPINED THIS

LATTER INJUNCTION MEANT UNILATERAL EFFORTS, AARON ASKED IF WE

HAD ON-GOING PRESS PLACEMENT MEDIA OPERATIONS, COS SAID WE.

DID HAVE SOME BUT THESE WERE OF ROUTINE NATURE. AARON PURSUED

MATTER, ASKED IF AMBASSADOR WAS FULL Y AWARE OF THIS TO WHICH

COS RESPONDED THAT HE PRESUMED SO, COS ADDED HE HAD NOT

SPECIFICALLY COVERED THIS POINT WITH THE AMBASSADOR SINCE

COS ARRIVAL HERE LESS THAN ONE MONTH AGO.

4:

BOTH AARON AND TRUEHART QUESTIONED AT LENGTH WHAT KIND

OF THINGS WE COORDINATE WITH THE AMBASSADOR AND IN WHAT DEPTH

PRIOR TO INITIATION OS AN OPERATION. WHAT KIND OF AGENTS

WOULD WE IDENTIFY BY NAME TO THE AMBASSADOR? COS SAID HE

WOULD BE INCLINED TO REVEAL TO THE AMBASSADOR THE NAME OF

ANY. SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL WITH WHOM THE AMBASSADOR WAS

DEALING OFFICIALLY AND INTIMATELY, BUT THIS WOULD IN LARGE

PART DEPEND ON THE AMBASSADORS WISHES HIMSELF. WOULD WE

INFORM THEMROLITICAL SECTION CHIEF OF THE IDENTITY OF ONE OF

OUR AGENTS WHOM THE POLITICAL OFFICER WAS TRYING TO DEVELOP?

SECRET

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TORI 242029Z SEP 75

IN 695650

MONT 21483

COS ANSWERED WE WOULD FIRST INSTRUCT THE AGENT. HOW TO HANDLE

HIS OVERT CONTACT BUTO DEPENDING UPON RELATIONS, MIGHT ALSO

DISCUSS THE MATTER FRANKLY WITH POLITICAL OFFICER. WHAT ABOUT

DEFENSE ATTACHE? ANSWER! THE SAME,

5, THIS LED TO DISCUSSION OF INTER-AGENCY SOURCE REGISTER.

HAVING JUST FINISHED WITH DEFENSE ATTACHE, AMBASSADOR TRUEHART

SAID DEFATT INDICATED HE HAD MANY SOURCES REGISTERED AND •

THEREFORE WE WERE PROSCRIBED FROM RECUITING THEM: COS POINTED

OUT SOURCE REGISTER IS FOR COVERT AGENTS ONLY AND SINCE DEFATT

HERE IS PROCSCRIBED FROM RUNNING COVERT AGENTS, NONE OF HIS

SOURCES ARE IN INTER-AGENCY SURCE REGISTER, COS ADDED THAT

MANY DEFENSE ATTACHES MISCONSTRUE THEIR REGISTERING OF THEIR

AGENTS IN PENTAGON SERIES AS SYNONOMOUS WITH REGISTRATION IN

THE INTER-AGENCY SOURCE REGISTER.

6, TRUEHART ASKED IF WE EXERTED "REAL CONTROL" OVER DEA'S

OPERATIONS AS REQUIRED BY DOID. COS SAID THAT ON THE CONTRARY

WE EXERTED NO CONTROL OVER DEA NOR ARE WE UNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO

TRY TO DO SO, WE DO COORDINATE CLOSELY, REGISTER THEIR SOURCES.

PROVIDE TRACES AND ASSITANCE, ENCOURAGE LIAISON TO COOPERATE FULLY

WITH THEM, ETC. IN ADDITION, WHEN A DEA OPERATIN IS

SECRET

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PAGE D4

TOR1242029Z SEP 75

IN 695658

MONT 21483

BEING MOUNTED TO UNDERTAKE A DRUG BUY WE ARE REQUIRED TO KNOW

ENOUGH ABOUT THE CASE IN ADVANCE TO ADVISE THE AMBASSADOR

ÁS. TO THE POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS INVOLVED, IF THERE ARE ANY.

• 7, TRUEHART ASKED TO WHAT EXTENT WE WORK WITH LIAISON ON

THE OSOVIET TARGET AND WHETHER WE HAVE TELTAPS. HE WAS ADVISED

LIAISON SHARES WITH US THE PRODUCT OF THEIR TELTAPS AND THAT

LIAISON IS PREPARED TO MOUNT JOINT OPERATIONS WITH US AGAINST

SOVIET TARGET, THAT WE ARE NOW INTENDING TO APPROACH THIS

MATTER WITH LIAISON IN A MORE PLANNED WAY, AARON ASKED

HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION WOULD WE ADVISE AMBASSADOR IN ADVANCE

OF MOUNTING JOINT OPERATION WITH LIAISON TO BUG RESIDENGEE OF

A SOVIET OFFICIAL, WE SAID PROBALBLY NOT SINCE THERE WOULD BE

• NO FLAP POTENTIAL, AARON WANTED TO PURSUE THIS BUT STRANGELY

ENOUGH TRUEHART AGREED FULLY AND EXPLAINED THAT IF SOME ELEMENT

WENT AWRY THE LIAISON SERVICE WOULD BE THERE TO SET IT RIGHT,

8 AARON. AND TRUEHART SPENT CONSIDERABLE TIME ANALYZING OD

NON-COMMUNIST WORLD COVERT ACTION OBJECTIVE K-2 INVOLVING AGENTS

OF INFLUENCEM, THIS PARAGRAPH WAS READ SEVERAL TIMES TO THEM ON

THEIR REQUEXT, THEY. WANTED TO KNOW HOW LONG THE AGENT OF INFLUENCE

PROGRAM HAD BEEN IN EXISTENCE, IN LATIN AMERICA CANSWER: TWO OR

SECRET

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TORI242029Z SEP 75

MONT - 21403

THREE YEARS IN ITS PRESENT FORM THOUGH WE HAVE BEEN DOING THIS

ENOu

KIND OF THING FOR YEARS:? HE STRESSED THAT THIS PARAGRAPH IN.

TWO PLACES CONTAINED THE PHRASE "SUBJECT TO POLICY APPROVAL"

WHICH MEANT THE AMBASSADOR AND WASHINGTON, WHILE THEY UNDERSOTOOD

THIS. POINT THEY WANTED TO KNOW IF WE WOULD COORDINATE IN ADVANCE

WITH THE AMBASSADOR OR THE DEFENSE ATTACHE ON THE RECRUITMENT OF

A SENIOR URUGUAYAN GENERAL AS A POSSIBLE AGENT OF INFLUENCE:

ANSWER: NO, DO WE HAVE ANY RECRUITED AGENTS OF INFLUENCE IN

URUGUAY: ANSWER! NO: ARE WE WORKING ON THIS? ANSWER: YES.

THEN AARON ASKED IF IT WAS TRUE THAT AT THE PRESENT TIME

WE DID NOT HAVE THE CAPABILITY THROUGH COVERT AGENTS OF

INFLUENCE TO COUNTER SOVIET INITIATIVE WHICH PRESUMABLY

COULD THREATEN PRIORITY U,S, INTERESTS IN URUGUAY, ANSWER:

TRUE AT THE PRESENT TIMES WE PROBABLY WOULD HAVE TO RURN TO

OTHER AGENTS POSSIBLY INCLUDING LIAISON SHOULD IT BE NECESSARY

IN THE NEAR FUTURE, PRIOR TO OUR ACQUISITION OF AGENTS OF

INFLUENCE, AARON ASKED WHY THAT PARAGRAPH IN OD SPOKE OF

MAINTAINING THE CAPABILITY TO COUNTER SOVIET INITIATIVES THAT

THREATEN THE STABILITY DE URUGUAY SINCE THERE IS LITTLE UAS.

COMMERCIAL INTEREST IN URUGUAY, WE ANSEWEREED THAT URUGUAY IS

SECRET

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IN 695650

MONT 21403

CLEARLY IN THE WESTERN CAMP, VOETES ANTI-COMMUNIST IN

INTERNATIONAL FORUM AND IS CONSIDERED A FIRIEND OF THE U.S.

ÀARON ASKED IF SIMILAR PRÖVISIONS WERE WRITTEN INTO THE OD'S OF

OTHER STATIONS IN LATIN AMERICA, I.E, TO COUNTER SOVIET

INSTIATIVES THAT THREATEN INTERNAL STABILITY, WE SAID WE DID NOT

KNOR, CONTINUING DISCUSSIONS ON THE MILITARY, TRUEHART

POSED HYPOTHETICAL CASE ABOUT RECRÜITMENT FOR FI PURPOSES OF

A PRIVATE SECRETARY TO A MINISTER, WOULD WE COORDINATE THIS

R

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SECRET 241945Z SEPT 75 STAFF

CITE MONTEVIDEO 21403 FINAL SECTION OF 2

TOS IMMEDIATE BUENOS AIRES INFO DIRECTOR.

NIACT BUENOS AIRES.

RECRUITMENT IN ADVANCE WITH THE AMBASSADOR, ANSWER: NO.

TRUEHART THEN POSTULATED CASE WHERE RECRUITED SECRETARY

CONFESSES TO MINISTER THAT SHE HAD BEEN FURNISHING US WITH

COPIES OF THE MINISTERS CLASSIFIED CORRESPONDENCE. WOULD

THIS NOT HAVE FLAP POTENTIAL HE ASKED? ANSWER: YES:

TRUEHART THEN MUSED THAT AMBASSADOR SHOULD HAVE THE RIGHT

TO KNOW PRIOR TO OUR RECRUITMENT OF THE SECRETARY. HE DID

NOT SEEM SATISFIED WITH THE EXPLANATION THAT WE ARE THE

OPERATIONAL PROFESSIONALS WHO WOULD JUDGE THE RISK PRIOR TO

RECRUITMENT AND WOULD BE MONITORING THE CASE THROUGHOUT. WE

PRESUME, THEREFURE, BY EXTRAPOLATION TRUEHART WOULD WANT THE

AMBASSADOR TO

BE THE SUPER-CASE OFFICER MONITORING ALL OUR

OPERATIONS FOR POSSIBLE FLAP POTENTIAL.

9, SOME OF THE EASIER QUESTIONS WERE ALLOCATION OF MAN

POWER CABQLL TWO OFFICERS NOW ON SOVIET/BLOC TARGET, HOPE

PUSH THIS TO THREE WHILE REMAINING OFFICERS COVER OTHER

SECRET

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OBJECTIVES, HOW IS GUER ALL BURGET ARRIVED AT IDIALOGUE

WITH HEADQUARTERS, SYSTEM STILL IN FLUXS AND IS BUDGET

BOVIDED BY OBJECTIVES (YES) WITH SUBORDINATE LINE ITEMS CALLED

WHAT (PROJECT ACTIVITIESS, WAS THERE ANY FLEXIBILITY DURING

THE COURSE OF THE FISCAL YEAR? ANSWER: SOME WITHIN PROJECT

ACTIVITIES AND OBJECTIVES BUT NOT BETWEEN OBJECTIVES WITHOUT

HEADQUARTERS APPROVAL, DO WE HAVE A REGULAR PROGRAM OF

BRIEFING REGULAR EMBASSY OFFICERS ON OUR ACTIVITIES SO THEY

UNDERSTAND BETTER? ANSWERS NOT IN ANY FORMAL SENSE, AARON

IMPLIED THIS MIGHT BE DONE BETTER AT THE WASHINGTON LEVEL.

1D, IN DISCUSSIONS ON TERRORISM AND NARCOTICS, WE POINTED

OUR MOST OF OUR TARGETS ARE IN BUENOS AIRES. COULD WE

RUN AGENTS FROM HERE AGAINST THOSE TARGETS IN ARGENTINA?

ANSWER: YES, BUT ONLY IF COORDINATED WITH AND APPROVED BY

HOS AND BUENOS AIRES STATION, CONCERNING MANPOWER, WE SAID

WE ARE AT PRESENT UNDERTAKING A REVIEW OF BOTH TE FRORIST AND

NARCOTICS TARGET TO DECIDE THE EXTENT OF THE PROBLEM AND THEN

THE MANPOWER REQUIRED SO THESE EFFORTS ARE IN A STATE OF FLUX.

WE SAID WE WERE UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT BUENOS AIRES MAY NOT

HAVE NARCOTICS IN ITS OD BUT THAT THEY HAVE A VERY FULL PLATE

SECRET

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SO

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OF OTHER THINGS TO DO.

11.

IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION ON NOCS WE ADVISED WEH

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IN 694147

BRIL 24723

SAIDDO

SECRET 2314897 SEP 75 STAFF Y

CITE BRASILIA 24723. SECTION 1 OF 2

J. WALLER

TOS. IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, MONTEVIDEO ROUTINE BUENOS AIRES.

RYBAT PLUWCADET

1, HAD TWO HOUR SESSION WITH AARON AND TRUEHEART

AFTERNOON 22 SEPT, TRUEHEART AWAY PART OF TIME TO TALK TO

OTHERS IN EMBASSY AS AARON WAS CONCENTRATING ON STATION'S

ACTIVITIES.

2, QUESTIONS RAN ALONG LINES OF THOSE INDICATED IN

DIRECTOR 744266, PLUS QUITE A FEW EXTRAS, FOL IS HIGHLIGHT

OF FIVE AND ONE-HALF HOURS OF DISCUSSIONS HELD STAURDAY AND MONDAY,

3. AARON MOST INTERESTED IN HOW STATION RAN ITS

OPERATIONS--E,G, LINE OF COMMAND FROM HOS AND STATIONIS

RELATIONSHIP WITH BASES, HE WENT OVER OD MINUTELY, THEN

PERUSED EXAMPLES OF TELENOTE REQUIREMENTS SENT FROM

STATION TO BASES INCLUDING SUCH AS HBBS 933. A NUMBER OF

QUESTIONS WERE RAISED ON HOW CONTROL WAS EXERCISED OVER

OUR OPERATIONS, BASICALLY, HE WAS TOLD THAT ALL

ACTIVITIES ENTERED AROUND THE OD, OUR PROJECTS,

FUNDS, AND MANPOWER ALLOCATION WERE DESIGNED TO MEET

SECRET

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BRIL

24723

THE PRIORITY REQUIREMENTS AS ENUNCUIATED IN THE OD.

PERIODIC

REPORTS WERE SUBMITTED TO HOS TO APPRISE THEM OF WHAT WE

HOPED TO DO WITH REFERENCE TO OUR OD PRIORITIES, AND THIS WAS

FOLLOWED BY REPORTS ON WHAT HAD ACTUALLY BEEN ACCOMPLISED AGAINS!

THESE PRIORITIES, A "REPORT CARD" SYSTEM EXISTED WHEREIN

r..

WE WERE GRADED ON THE WORK DONE, AARON WAS INTERESTED IN

HOW A CASE OFFICER (THIS IS THE TERM HE USEDS WORKING ON

THE HARD TARGETS WAS GRADED RELATIVE TO ONE WHOSE

TARGETS WERE LESS HARD, AND WHETHER LACK OF ULTIMATE SUCCESS

PRECRUITMENT OF A SOV, FOR EXAMPLES WAS HELD AGAINST THE C/O.

THE EXPLANATION WAS THAT THE RECRUITMENT OF SOMEONE IN THE

HARD TARGET AREAS WAS THE ULTIMATE TEST, AND FAILURE TO RECRUIT

RECEIVED A ZERO SCORE, HOWEVER, IF THE C/O WORKING ON THE

HARD TARGET HAD BEEN IMAGINATIVE, HAD GOTTEN A NUMBER OF

ACCESS AGENTS, HAD MANAGED TO HAVE DIRECT CONTACT WITH ONE

OR MORE TARGET PERSONALITIES, AND ALL IN ALL DID HIS

HOMEWORK, WORKED HARD, WAS AGGRESSIVE, BUT WAS NOT

SUCCESSFUL BECAUSE THE TARGET WAS IN FACT NOT RECRUITABLE,

HE WAS GIVEN A GOOD. GRADE, AARON MUSED WHETHER LACK OF

•SUCCESS IN RECRUITING A HARD TARET INDIVIDUAL EVER HELD

SECRET

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BRIL 24723

UP A C/O'S PROMOTION. AND HE WAS TOLD THAT IN OUR EXPERIENCE

THIS WAS NOT SO, SO LONG AS THE OTHER ELEMENTS THAT

EARMARK A GOOD C/O WERE PRESENT.

A, THE NOC PROGRAM HAD A CERTAIN FASCINATION FOR BOTH

AARON AND TUREHEART, THEY WERE NOT INQUISITIVE ABOUT NAMES

OR COVER COMPANIES, BUT DID WANT TO KNOW THE REASON FOR NOCS

SECURITY FOR HIGHLY SENSITIVE AGENTS, STAYBEHIND IN CASE

THE STATION HAD TO BE ABANDONEDS, WHETHER CUTOUTS WERE USED IN

CONTACTING NOES INO, DIRECT INSIDE C/O CONTACT UNDER

SCRUPULOURS SECURITY CONDITIONS, WHETHER THEY WERE WORTH

THE MONEY OUTLAY YES, IF PRODUCTIVE AGENTS WERE GIVEN

THEM AND NOCS WERE SUFFICIENTLY EXPERIENCED AND ADEPT IN

GETTING THE MAXIMUM FROM THE

AGENTS BEING HANDLED).

5. AARON WAS MOST SPECIFIC IN QUERYING ABOUT THE

PERCENTAGE OF TIME SPENT BY STATION IN ACCOMPLISHMENT OF

INDIVIDUAL OBJECTIVES, HE WANTED TO KNOW HOW A CO/O SPENT HIS DAY,

THE PROCESS HE WENT THROUGH IN CONTAGTING AN AGENT, HOW DID.:

WE ENSURE THAT CAOS DID NOT TRY TO RECRUIT THE SAME

INDIVIDUAL CONTACT REPORTS) AND TRACE REQUESTS ALLOWED ADEQUATE

CONTROLS, WITH REFERENCE TO CI, HOW MUCH TIME WAS

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DEVOTED TO THIS AND HOW DID WE MANGAGE IT (PENETRATION OF

LIAISON AND JOINT EFFORT WITH LIAISON-TELET APS,

¡SURVEILLANCE, ETC, --AGAINST HARD TARGETS), DISCUSSIONS ON

COVERT ACTION TOOK UP CONSIDERABLE TIME. DESPITE HOS

BRIEFING ON THIS SUBJECT, AARON WANTED TO KNOW THE

'DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A MEDIA OP AND A COVERT POL ACTION OP,

MUGH STRESS WAS PLACED ON WHETHER WE HAD ANY PLUMBING FOR

"POLÍTICAL ACTION OPS SHOULD WE BE REQUESTED TO GET INTO

CHÄF ACTIVITY, IT WAS. EXPLAINED THAT WE HAVE NOT BEEN IN

•POL ACTION IN BRAZIL FOR YEARS, THAT WE HAD NO PLUMBING AS

SUCH, AND THAT IF A REQUEST WAS TO BE MADE FOR SUCH ACTION.

THE STATION WOULD LIKELY NEED TO START FROM POINT ZERO

REPRODUCTION DY OTHER THAI

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IN 694147

BRIL

24723

UNLESS SOME OF THE AGENTS NOW AVAILABLE WERE USABLE. IT WAS :

EXPLAINED THAT WE DID HAVE A SMALL MEDIA CAPABILITY AS WELL AS

AN AGENT OF INFLUENCE PROGRAM BUT THAT THESE IN NO WAY

RESEMBLED THE KIND OF COVERT POLITICAL ACTION OF THE

CHILEAN VARIETY.

6, AARON HAD A FASCINATION FOR TRADESCRAFT, WANTED:

KNOW HOW LONG COS HAD BEEN IN THE BUSINESS AND APPROXIMATELY

SECRET

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HOW MUCH TIME IN TOTAL COS SPENT IN TRAINING (COULDN'T

HAZARD A GUESS AS TO HOW MUCH TIME SPENT IN TRAINING BUT

SAID THAT THERE WAS A LONG COURSE ON ENTERING AGENCY. THAT

OVER THE YARS THERE WAS TRAINING COVERING A VARIETY OF

SUBJECTS INGLUDING SECRET WRITING, CLANDESTINE PHOTOGRAPHY,

COMMUNISM, MANAGEMENT INCLUDING THE STUDY OF GRIDS, REPORTS

WRITING, ETC, MENTION WAS MADE OF MID-CAREER COURSE,

PLUS SENIOUR SEMINARS AVAILABLE TO OFFIERS, PLUS ATTENDANCE

AT SAFF COLLEGES SUCH AS THAT PROVIDED BY STATE, ARMY, ETC:,

PAARON WAS FASCINATED WITH THE REPORTS WRITING COURSE AND

ASKED FOR PARTICULARS, I

7. ON INTERAGENCY RELATIONSHIPS, BOTH AARON AND

TUREHAEART WERE INTERESTED IN HOW INTEL REPORTS WERE

DISTRIBUTED WITHIN THE EMBASSY, WHETHER COB HAD AUTHORITY

TO SEND AN INTEL REPORT DIRECTLY TO HOS WITH INFO TO

STATION PYES; ON MATTERS WHICH WERE PECULIAR TO THE LOCAL

SCENE BUT THOSE IMPINGING ON BROADER GOB MATTERS WERE FIRST

SENT TO BRASILIA FOR ADDITIONS, MODIFICATIONS, ETC. PRIOR TO

ONWARD TRAASMISSION.I THEY WERE TOLD THAT THE AMBASSADOR

SEES ALL REPORTS, THAT OTHER SECTIONS OF THE EMBASSY DID SEE

SECRET

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THOSE REPORTS WHICH WERE PERTINENT TO THEM, INTEL ON MAJOR

ITEMS-SUCH. AS THOSE WHICH HAD A BEARING ON GOB POLICIES

VISA-VIS THE U,S,-WAS SHOWN TO THE AMBASSADOR PRIOR TO

SUBMISSION, STATION MADE IT A PRACTIVE TO CHECK INTEL.

OUT. WITH CONCERNED SECTIONS WITHIN THE EMBASSY PRIOR TO

TRANSMISSION IF THIS WAS CONSIDERED NECESSARY AND BENEFICIAL

BY: THE STATION, THERE ARE OCCASIONS WHEREIN THE STATION IS

REQUIRED TO LIMIT A REPORT TO THE AMBASSADOR ONLY WHEN

SENSITVE: INFO: AND/OR A SENSITIVE SOURCE IS INVOLVED.

THIS HAD NOT HAPPED IN THE COS'S SHORT TENURE IN

•IN 694147

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TOR: 231508Z

SEP 75

SE OR E T 231409Z SEPT. 75 STAFF

CITE BRASILIA 24723 FINAL SECTION OF TWO

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, MONTEVIDEO ROUTINE BUENOS AIRES.

RYBAT PLUWCADET

BRÄSILIA, BUT IN PANAMA FOR EXAMPLE, CERTAIN REPORTS

CONSIDERED HIGHLY SENSITIVE WERE OFTEN LIMITED TO THE

AMBASSADOR, THE CINSCO, AND THE GOVERNOR OF THE CANAL

ZONE, OR TO THE AMBASSADOR ONLY, SECURITY WAS THE

CARDINAL FACTOR IN SUCH LIMITING OF DISTRIBUTION,

8.: AARON WANTED TO KNOW WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF ONE OF

THE STATION'S AGENTS WAS BEING SEEN BY A MEMBER

OF THE

POLITICAL SECTION--WOULD WE DISCUSS IT WITH THE POLITICAL

OFFICER? (FIRST STEP WOULD BE TO TALK TO THE AGENT ON THE

PROBLEMS THAT WOULD BE ENCOUNTERED BY SUCH ACTION ON HIS

PART, THAT THIS NORMALLY DID SUFFICE IF IN FACT HE WAS A

CONTROLLED AGENT. IF HIS ACCESS WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY

SENSITIVE, HE WOULD BE ALLOWED TO SEE THE POLITICAL OFFICER

SO LONG AS HE REMEMBERED WHO HE WORKED FOR AND ACTED

ACCORDINGETI.

9, AS TO KEEPING THE AMBASSADOR APPRISED ON POSITIVE

SECRET

HEPRODUCTION BY OTHER

ISHUING OFFICE

THAN

ITED

STAFF PARE OMNICE

IN 694101

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TOR: 231508Z SEP 75

BRIL 24723

COLLECTION OPERATIONS, THIS WAS DONE AS A MATTER OF COURSE

BUT WITHOUT SPECIFIC DETAILS UNLESS THE AMBASSADOR WAS IN

FACT. SEEING AN AGENT OF OURS REGULARLY AS PART OF HIS AMBASSADORO

LAL -DUTIES.

*110. THE LIAISON SERVICES WITH WHOM WE WERE IN TOUCH WERE

NAMED. INCLUDING OUR JOINT EFFORTS AT TELTAPS, PLUS OUR

UNILATERAL PENETRATION EFFORTS FOR CI AND POSITIVE INTEL! •

11. BOTH AARON AND TRUEHEART WERE SHOWN THE KIQS AND THE

CIRLS AND TAILORED REQUIREMENTS THAT WERE SENT PERIODICALLY.

THEY BOTH REMARKED THAT THE AGENCY HAS A MORE

SOPHISTICATED SYSTEM FOR GETTING REQUIREMENTS TO THE FIELD THAN

SAY.A. STATE.

12, VERY LITTLE WAS ASKED ABOUT SPORLON ACTIVITIES IN RIO

EXCEPT THAT THEY BOTH WERE UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT NSA

WAS RUNNING THE SHOW. THEY DID ASK ABOUT CUSTOMER REACTION

TO THE SPORLON PRODUCTS CAMBASSADOR CRIMMINS IS AN AVID

CUSTOMER AND WE WERE OF THE OPINION THAT AGENCIES IN

WASHINGTON CONCERNED WITH THE INTERCEPT PROGRAM WERE

HAPPY

WITH THE RESULTS.Y

13. ON HEARING THAT COS HAD BEEN IN PANAMA, QUESTIONS

SEGRET

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WERE RAISED ON AGREED ACTIVITIES. THEY WERE BOTH

SURPRISED TO FIND OUT THAT THE STATION IN PANAMA HAD TO

AUTHORIZE ALL CLANDESTINE COLLECTION ACTIVITIES ENGAGED IN BY

U.S, ELEMENTS IN THE AREA, INCLUDING GETTING PROJECT INFO

MUCH LIKE THAT REQUIRED IN THE AGENCY WHICH GAVE NAMES OF

AGENTS TO BE RECRUITED, RATE OF PAY, METHOD OF CONTACT,

ETC.

14, AARON

EVINCED GREAT INTEREST IN THE COVER

PROVIDED BY THE EMBASSY, HE WAS TOLD THAT COVER COULD

BE IMPROVED UPON, THAT WE DID HAVE A SMALL NUMBER OF

OFFICERS WHO WERE ACTUALLY ASSIGNED TO OTHER SECTIONS.

THAT THEY GAVE ALMOST SOPERCENT OF THEIR TIME ON THE ACTUAL

WORK OF THAT SECTION, THEN SPENT THE REST OF THE WORK

DAY PLUS A LARGE DOSE ON NIGHTWORK ON OUR WORK FOR WHICH

THEY RECEIVED NO OVERTIME BUT DID THIS OUT OF HIGH MOTIVATION

"AND THE DESIRE TO GET AT OUR OBJECTIVES.

15: AARON KNEW OF THE OLD OPC AND OSO SEPARATIONS OF THE

PAST AND PROBED ABOUT HOW THE FINAL AMALGAMATION AFFECTED

MOST PEOPLE• (NOTHING TRAUMATIC, OPE AND OSO OFFICERS HAD

A COMMON DENOMINATOR IN BASIC TRADECRAFT AND OTHER

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TRAINING. A GOOD OPC TYPE COULD DO EQUALLY GOOD WORK IN

THE OSO FIELD, AND VICE VERSA. D

16, ABOVE ARE ONLY THE HIGHLIGHTS OF THE DISCUSSION.

AARON IS IN CHARGE, HE ASKED MOST OF THE QUESTIONS, AND

TOOK COPIOUS NOTES. BOTH AARON AND TRUEHEART WERE

ESSENTIALLY LOW-KEY BUT THE QUESTIONS WERE SHARP, PROBING,

AND AARON ESPECIALLY HAS A QUIETLY INCISIVE WAY OF GETTING

AT THINGS. IT'S DIFFICULT TO TELL WHETHER THE TWO ARE.

FAVORABLY DISPOSED TOWARD THE AGENCY OR NOT. CERTAINLY

NO ANIMOSITY WAS SHOWN, BUT NEITHER WAS THERE ANY SHOW OF

GREAT LOVE FOR THE AGENCY, AN OBJECTIVE APPROACH OU THE

MATTER AT HAND APPEARS TO BE AN APT DESCRIPTION OF HOW THEY

WORKED.

17. AARON AND TRUEHEART WERE CARED FOR BY. THE

EMBASSY

WHILE IN BRASILIA BUT ON SATURDAY IN RIO AARON SEEMED TO

HAVE BEEN LEFT ALONE BY THE CONGEN. COB AND COS TOOK

AARON OUT TO DINNER AFTER THE BRIEFING SESSION AND HE

SEEMED TO ENJOY AND APPRECIATE THE CHURRASCO, MONTEVIDEO

AND BUENOS AIRES MIGHT WISH TO KEEP IN MIND THAT AARON

IS INTERESTED IN TRYING THE BETTER KNOWN LOCAL FOODS, IS

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A WINE LOVER AND WANTS TO SAMPLE THE BEST OF THE LOCAL

PRODUCT.

18. AT DINNER ON SATURDAY NIGHT. AARON WAS ASKED BY

THE COS WHAT HE THOUGHT MIGHT HAPPEN TO THE AGENCY, HE

OPINED THAT THE DDO MIGHT BE SPLIT OFF FROM THE MAIN BODY OF

THE AGENCY, AND PUT UNDER AN EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MADE UP OF

MEMBERS FROM STATE AND OTHER AGENCIES IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH

MORE CONTROL OVER ITS ACTIVITIES. EZ, IMPDET.

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IN 698994

BUEN 34519

SECRET 291547Z SEP

CITE BUENOS AIRES 34519

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO MONTEVIDEO, BRASILIA, RIO DE JANEIRO,

RYBAT PLUWCADET

REF: BUENOS AIRES 34511

(2 648265)*

1. VISITORS MET WITH AMBASSADOR HILL FOR ONE HOUR AND A HALF

EVENING 27 SEP AT HIS RESIDENCE AND THEN WENT DIRECTLY TO AIRPORT.

AFTER INTRODUCING VISITORS TO AMB, COS WITHDREW AND WAITED IN ANOTHER

ROOM, CUPON DEPARTING COS HEARD AMB ASK VISITORS FOR THEIR

CREDENTIALS. AMB LATER TOLD COS HE SUGGESTED TO VISITORS THAT COS

BE PRESENT DURING DISCUSSION BUT THEY PREFERRED TO TALK WITH HIM

PRIVATELY, COS WAS CALLED IN HOWEVER, TO PARTICIPATE IN LAST FEW

MINUTES OF DISCUSSION, IN COS PRESENCE, MR. AARON ASKED AMB

WHETHER HE THOUGH HE SHOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO SEE ALL INFORMATION

PRODUCED WITHIN HIS MISSION, TO WHICH AMB REPLIED AFFIRMATIVELY.

AARON THEN ASKED AMB WHETHER HE IN FACT SAW ALL INFO. AMB REPLIED

HE DID NOT KNOW, BUT HAD CONFIDENCE IN COS IN THIS REGARD, AARON

THEN ASKED COS WHETHER HE WAS AUTHORIZED TO SHOW AMB ALL STATION

REPORTING, ANSWER: OPERATIONAL REPORTING IDENTIFYING AGENTS OR

CLANDESTINE METHODS OF OPERATION COULD NOT BE SHOWN TO AMB WITHOUT

SECRET

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BUEN 34519

HOS APPROVAL: OTHER INFO COULD BE SHOWN AT DESCRETION OF COS.

SUBJ OF ROGERS LETTER RE SHOWING INTEL REPORTS TO AMB PRIOR TO

DISSEMINATION WAS THEN RAISED BY AMB, AMB SAID HE TOOK POSITION THIS

WAS POLICY MATTER WHICH HAD TO BE SOLVED IN WASHINGTON AND HAD SO

INFORMED ROGERS. (COS SAW DRAFT OF LETTER TO ROGERS TO THIS EFFECT. Y

AT CONCLUSION OF MEETING AMB HANDED COS A NEWS ITEM (HAVANA

MERIDIANO 80 IN SPANISH 1-15 JUL 75 PP 5-6. ARTICLE BY CARLOS MARIA

GUTIERREZ ENTITLED AMERICAN AMBASSADOR HILL SEEN AS CIA AGENT IN

ARGENTINAD AND ASKED THAT ARTICLE BE SHOWN TO VISITORS IN CAR, AMB

TRUEHEART READ ARTICLE AND COMMENTED SOMETHING TO EFFECT THAT

ARTICLE DID NOT SEEM TO HIM TO BE ANYTHING TO BE VERY CONCERNED

ABOUT, MR. AARON DID NOT READ IT, POUCHING COPY LAMB SUBSE-

QUENTLY TOLD COS ARTICLE HAD BEEN GIVEN TO HIM IN WASHINGTON BY

DEPUTY ASSISTANT RYAN. D

2..

ON WAY TO AIRPORT AFTER MEETING WITH AMB, TRUEHEART

MENTIONED AMBIS REQUEST TO SEE THEIR CREDENTIALS, SINCE THEY HAD

NONE, THEY SHOWED THEIR PASSPORTS. CAMB LATER TOLD COS HE HAD

ASKED TO SEE CREDENTIALS SINCE HE WANTED TO SEE FOR HIMSELF EXACTLY.

WHAT THE LIMITS OF THEIR AUTHORITY WERE.D COS INFERRED THAT

VISITORS WERE TAKEN ABACK BY AMB'S REQUEST BUT MEETING WITH AMB

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34519

WAS NONETHELESS HARMONIOUS. SAMB LATER CONFIRMED THIS IMPRESSION.)

3. AMB TELEPHONED COS MORNING 28 SEP AND GAVE HIGHLIGHTS OF

DISCUSSION WITH VISITORS: FULLER ACCOUNT GIVEN IN HIS OFFICE EARLY

MORNING 29 SEP. AMB CHARACTERIZED VISITORS AS INTELLIGENT AND

BUSINESSLIKE. AMB HAD IMPRESSION THEY SATISFIED WITH VISIT TO BUENOS

AIRES AND WITH COOPERATION THEY RECEIVED FROM EVERYONE.: HE

SPECULATED THAT THEIR REPORT WOULD BE WRITTEN IN MANNER WHICH SERVES

INTERESTS OF CHURCH COMMITTEE. AMB SAID HE TOLD VISITORS HE SATISFIED

1.

WITH BKHERALD OPERATION IN ARGENTINA. ONLY AREA WHERE HE HAD A

QUARREL WITH BKHERALD IS THAT OF COMMUNICATIONS: AMB BELIEVES STATE

DEPT SHOULD CONTROL ITS OWN COMMUNICATIONS: HE HAS NO OBJECTION TO

BKHERALD HAVING ITS OWN COMMO, ALSO, REGARDING HIS KNOWLEDGE OF

EKHERALD ACTIVITY, AMB SAID HE TOLD VISITORS THAT BECAUSE OF

TERRORIST PROBLEM HE DID NOT WANT TO KNOW ABOUT BKHERALD ACTIVITIES

IN DETAIL AND TRUSTS COS TO TELL HIM WHATEVER HE NEEDS TO KNOW.

VISITORS SHOWED GREAT INTEREST IN THIS VIEWPOINT. AMB SAID HE HAD

HAD A PROBLEM WITH ONLY ONE STATION CHIEF WHO NOW DECEASED, WIN

SCOTT, AND WITH ONE FORMER DIRECTOR, RICHARD HELMS. AMB EXPLAINED

THAT BEFORE HE WENT TO SPAIN AS AMB, DIRECTOR HELMS HAD TOLD HIM

SIXTY PERCENT OF MADRID STATION'S EFFORTS WERE DIRECTED AGAINST

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CUBANS:

ONLY LATER DID AMB FIND OUT BY CHANCE ABOUT SPORLON

EFFORT. DIRECTED AGAINST NORTH AFRICA, AMB SAID MR. HELMS AWARE OF

HIS SENTIMENTS AS IS GENERAL WALTERS, EVIDENTLY ON BASIS OF COMMENT

BY VISITORS, AMB TOLD COS THAT AMB CRIMMINS HAD BEEN CRITICAL OF

BKHERALD, BUT DID NOT ELABORATE.

4. CURIOUSLY, AARON ASKED DOOS' SECRETARY FOR DATE EVENING

26 SEP: ALTHOUGH IT TURNED OUT BE PRIMARILY SOCIAL EVENT AND HE

DID NOT ATTEMPT ELICIT INFORMATION FROM SECRETARY, AARON DID MAKE

FOLLOWING COMMENTS OF INTEREST:

SAD HE SAID HE HAD BEGUN TRIP WITH CERTAIN AMOUNT ANTI-

BKHERALD BIAS BUT THIS HAD BEEN MUTED SOMEWHAT BY FAVORABLE

IMPRESSIONS HE HAD OBTAINED OF VARIOUS BKHERALD OFFICERS. IN THE

FIELD WITH WHOM HE HAD SPOKEN.

(B) HE SAID HE THOUGH BUENOS AIRES' EMBASSY

POLITICAL

SECTION WAS "JEALOUS" OF BKHERALD.

(C) HE IMPLIED HIS EGO HAD BEEN BRUISED ON TRIP BECAUSE

PEOPLE FREQUENTLY ASSUMED AMBASSADOR TRUEHEART, NOT HE, WAS SENIOR

OFFICER, HE SAID HE NEXT PLANS TRIPS TO EUROPE AND ELSEWHERE,

HEADQUARTERS, THEREFORE, MIGHT WISH ALERT. FUTURE STATIONS HE WILL

VISIT OF PECKING ORDER.

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TOR: 291627Z SEP 75

VISITORS DEPARTED BUENOS AIRES 27 SEP AT 2130 HOURS ON

IN 699594

BUEN 34519

5.

SCHEDULE:

6: : AMB SAID HE HAD A GOOD TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH MR. RICHARD

SAMPSON IN WASHINGTON, MENTIONING ESSENTIALLY SAME POINTS REPORTED

DIRECTOR 744995.

7, NO FILE. EZ IMPDET.

CS Comment: *Aaron and Trueheart's 26 September conversations with COS

and DCOS.

S

RET

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PAGE 01

TOR1252337Z SEP 75

IN 697014

BUEN. 34503

SECRET 252234Z SEP 75 STAFF

CITE BUENOS AIRES 34585 SECTION 10F 2

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO MONTEVIDEO. BRASILIA, RIO DE JANEIRO.

RYBAT. PLVWCADET

REF DIRECTOR 745626

1, COS AND DOOS HELD TWO-HOUR DISCUSSION WITH AMBASSADOR

WILLIAM

TRUEHEART AND MR. DAVID AARON MORNING 25 SEP AND THEN

ATTENDED LUNCHEON AT WHICH CHARGE D'AFFAIRES JOSEPH MONTULOR,

EMBASSY POLITICAL COUNSELOR WAYNE SMITH, AND FBI REP ROBERT

SCHERRER ALSO PRESENT, EARLIER IN MORNING THE TWO VISITORS MET

PRIVATELY WITH CHARGE MONTLLOR AND IN AFTERNOON TRUEHEART TALKED

PRIVATELY WITH SMITH, CAARON BEÇAME ILL AND REMAINED IN HOTEL.)

COS AND DCOS ALSO HAD DINNER ALONE WITH VISITORS EVENING 24 SEP.

2, AARON CLEARLY IN CHARGE, MAT LUNCHEON TRUEHEART

EXPLAINED THAT AARON IS HEAD OF THE COORDINATION AND CONTROL

WORKING GROUPS ONE OF FOUR WORKING GROUPS OF CHURCH COMMITTEE,

AND TRUEHEART IS SERVING AS CONSULTANTOS. AARON ASKED MOST OF

QUESTIONS, BY NATURE AND TONE OF SOME OF AARON'S QUESTIONS AND

COMMENTS, WE SUSPECT THAT HE HAD PREFORMED NOTIONS WHICH ANTI-

BKHERALD, PE.G., ATTITUDE TOWARD SOVIET PROGRAM DISCUSSED BELOW Y

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BUEN. 34503

3. IN DISCUSSING BKHEARALD APPROACH TO SOVIET TARGET, AARON

ASKED IF IT REALLY MADE SENSE. TRY RECRUIT SOVIET IN "OUT OF WAY

PLACES" WHERE SOVIET, EVEN IF RECRUITED, WOULD NOT LIKELY HAVE ACCESS

TO INFORMATION OF VALUE TO USG. WE EXPLAINED THAT

OUR INTERESTS NOT

PRIMARILY IN LOCAL SOVIET ACTIVITIES BUT IN INTERNAL SOVIET MATTERS,

POINTED OUT ACCESS SOVIETS HAVE TO THIS INFO EVEN WHILE ABROAD, SAID

SOME SOVIETS RECRUITED ABROAD SELECTED FOR INTERNAL HANDLING. ALSO

POINTED OUT CI VALUE OF CERTAIN TYPES INFO PROVIDED BY RECRUITED RIS

OFFICERS, NONE OF THIS SEEMED IMPRESS AARON, WHO CONTINUED QUESTION

VALUE OF BKHERALD SOVIET OPS IN MANY (BUT UNDEFINED) AREAS, SAID HE

HAD WORKED IN WHITE HOUSE WHERE HE SAW ALL INTEL, FOUND IT HARD

JUSTIFY BHERALD SOVIET PROGRAM INPUT ON BASIS INTEL PRODUCTION. WE

ARGUED THIS IS ONE PROGRAM WHERE LARGE AMOUNT CASE OFFICER TIME

REQUIRED ON WORLD-WIDE BASIS IN ORDER ACQUIRE THE FEW GOOD SOURCES

WHO CAN BE PICKED UP AND WHO ARE PICKED UP. TRUEHEART ASKED FOR

EXAMPLES, AND WE REFERRED THEM TO HOS FOR DETAILS; TRUEHEART SAID

IT HIS IMPRESSION THAT BKHERALD NOW IN A §SOVIET PHASE", WHEREAS IN

EARLIER YEARS IT HAD BEEN IN COVERT ACTION OR OTHER PHASES. WE SAID

SOVIETS HAVE ALWAYS BEEN MAJOR TARGET, AND OUR APPROACH TO THEM HAS

BEEN REFINED OVER THE YEARS.

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4. KEEN INTEREST WAS SHOWN IN STATION RELATIONS WITH

AMBASSADOR AND DEGREE TO WHICH STATION ALLOWED AMBASSADOR EXERCISE

CONTROL OVER OR AT LEAST HAVE KNOWLEDGE OF, ITS OPERATIONS.

SPECIFICALLY, DEGREE TO WHICH WE WOULD COORDINATE RECRUITMENT

PROPOSAL OF GOVT OFFICIAL PRIOR TO MAKING PITCH. ANSWERS AMB

WOULD BE INFORMED IF UNUSUAL SENSITIVITY OR HIGH RISK INVOLVED,

WHICH HAS NOT BEEN THE CASE HERE THUS FAR, ASKED WHO DETERMINES

IF AMB SHOULD BE INFORMED, ANSWER: COS. ASKED WHETHER AMB HAD

PLACED CERTAIN POTENTIAL RECRUITMENT TARGETS OFF LIMITS. ANSWER&.

HE HAD NOT. THEN ASKED WHETHER, IF SUCH INJUCTION EXISTED, WE

WOULD ADHERE TO IT OR TRY TO CIRCUMVENT IT. ANSWER: WE WOULD

ADHERE TO IT. ASKED WHETHER AMB SATISFIED WITH WORK OF STATION

AND ITS MISSION, ANSWER: WE BELIEVE SO, BUT DEFER TO AMB (WHO:

WILL RETURN BUENOS AIRES MORNING 26 SEP AND WILL TALK WITH TRUE-

HEART,)

5. BOTH WANTED KNOW HOW STATIONS'S REPORTING REQUIREMENTS ON

LOCAL POLITICAL SCENE WERE GENERATED SI.E.. PRIMARILY BY HOS OR

THROUGH DISCUSSION WITH AMB AND OTHER EMBASSY OFFICERS, IT CLEAR

THAT THRUST OF QUESTION WAS TO DETERMINE DEGREE TO WHICH STATION

COOPERATED/COORDINATED WITH AMB AND OTHER SENIOR EMBASSY OFFICERS.

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ANSWER: WE RECEIVED REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FROM HOS ON CONTINUING

BASIS, AND THESE FORM GOOD DEAL BUT. NOT ALL OF GUIDANCE WE FOLLOW

ON INTERNAL TARGET, WE ASSURED VISITORS WE TAKE INTO ACCOUNT REPORT-

ING FROM OTHER EMBASSY COMPONENTS AND THEIR NEEDS, VISITORS PROBED

DEEPLY INTO MANNER IN WHICH STATION COORDINATES ITS REPORTING AND

FORUMS THROUGH WHICH IT RECEIVES THIS GUIDANCE. WE MENTIONED TWICE

WEEKLY POLITICAL MEETING PLUS COUNTRY TEAM MEETING AND FREQUENT

INFORMAL CHATS WITH AMB AND OTHER OFFICERS. WE ALSO POINTED TO OUR

PROCESS OF SHOWING REPORTS PRIOR TO DISSEMINATION TO POL SECTION

AND OTHER INTERESTED COMPONENTS. REGARDING VOLUME OF REPORTS, WE

SAID AVERAGE IS OVER 20 PER MONTH. REGARDING DISTRIBUTION OF HOS

DISSEMINATED REPORTS, WE SAID AMB RECEIVES ALL REPORTS AND, EXCEPT

FOR EXTREMELY SENSITIVE ITEMS (WHICH ARE RARES, OTHER INTERESTED

OFFICERS DO ALSO.

6, IN RESPONSE THEIR QUERIES, WE ACKNOWLEDGED PRODUCTIVE

LIAISON RELATIONSHIP WITH LOCAL INTEL SERVICE (WHICH NOT IDENTIFIED

BY NAMES BUT DID NOT GO INTO DETAIL, SAID COS AND DCOS ONLY STATION

OFFICERS DEGEARED TO LIAISON. ASKED WHETHER WE IN TOUCH WITH

BRITISH INTEL REP, ANSWER: YEST, BUT

THIS NOT SUBSTANTIVE RELATION-

SHIP, THEY WANTED KNOW HOW WE HAD MET HIM, AND WE SAID RELATION-

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BUEN 34503

SHIP HAS EXISTED FOR YEARS, AND CONTACT IS PASSED FROM ONE PERSON

TO ANOTHER: ASKED WHETHER THERE SDECE REP IN BUENOS AIRES. ANSWER:

WE NOT AWARE OF ANY, NO MENTION MADE OF ANY OTHER LIAISON CONTACTS

AND SUBJECT. OF LOCAL POLICE NOT RAISED.

7..

SUBJECT OF NOCS NOT. RAISED.

8, ASKED WHETHER WE HAD ANY COVERT ACTION PROGRAMS. ANSWER:

NONE OTHER THAN A FEW CONTACTS UNDER AGENT OF INFLUENCE PROGRAM. WE

STRESSED INFO COLLECTION ROLE OF THESE AGENTS AND CONJINGENCY NATURE

OF CONTACT IN COVERT ACTION CONTEST. ASKED WHETHER WE RECRUITING

NEW AGENTS, ANSWER: WE CONSTANTLY STRICE TO UPGRADE CALIBER OF

OUR REPORTING SOURCES AND THEREFORE ARE RECRUITING NEW ONES AND AT

SAME TIME WEEDING OUR LESS PRODUCTIVE ONES. WE EXPLAINED HOW ACCESS

OF GIVEN AGENT CAN CHANGE FROM ONE TIME• TO ANOTHER DUE TO CHANGES

IN POLITICAL SCENE.

9, FEW QUESTIONS ASKED REGARDING STATION STAFFING, WE

EXPLÄINED IN RESPONSE QUESTING WHETHER STAFFING ADEQUATE THAT STATION

CUT BY OVER 38 PERCENT OVER LAST 18 MONTHS OR SO, INCLUDING CASE

OFFICERS& WE ADMITTED THIS RESULTED IN CUTTING OF SOME LESS

IMPORTANT CONTACTS BUT NO LET UP IN EFFORTS AGAINST HARD TARGETS.

WE EXPLAINED FUNCTIONS OF EACH CASE OFFICER AND STRESSED TEAM

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CONCEPT IN WORKING AGAINST HARD TARGETS. OD OBJECTIVES AND

PRIORITIES WERE IDENTIFIED BY OD INSELF NOT PROVIDED.

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EIA660

PAGE-DI

IN 697087

TOR:252301Z SEP 75

BUEN

34503

SECRET 252234Z SEP 74 STAFF

CITE BUENOS AIRES 34503 FINAL SECTION OF 2

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO MONTEVIDEO, BRASILIA, RIO DE JANEIRO.

RYBAT PLUWCADET

10.

CONSIDERABLE INTEREST SHOWN IN SUBJECT OF TERRORISM. WE

DESCRIBED TWO PRINCIPAL TERRORIST GROUPS (MONTONEROS AND ERP AND

STRESSED DIFFICULTIES OF PENETRATING THESE GROUPS; AARON SAID THAT

CHARGE D'AFFAIRES HAD MENTIONED TO HIM THE GASE OF SOURCE FROM

ANOTHER AREA WHO HAD PROVIDED COVERAGE IN THIS AREA. CAMB AWARE

OF COVERAGE BY PUTENNIS-3 FROM TIME OF HIS FIRST VISIT AND HAD

MENTIONED IT TO MONTLLOR.Y WE EXPLAINED HOW SOURCE SUCH AS THIS

CAN ESTABLISH GOOD CONTACTS AT HIGHER LEVEL AND PROVIDE GOOD INFO.

WE STRESSED THAT OUR INTEREST WAS IN COLLECTING INFO BEARING ON

SECURITY OF U.S. PERSONNEL AND PROPERTY, AARON ASKED WHETHER WE

WOULD PROVIDE TO LIAISON INFO FROM OUR AGENT WHICH WOULD ENABLE

THEM TO CAPTURE TERRORISTS

DURING MEETING WITH OUR AGENT, ANSWER:

NO, FOR SEVERSL (OBVIOUS REASONS, WHICH WE SPELLED OUT.

11, EVENING 25 SEP AARON APPEARED TO HAVE RECOVERED FROM

ILLNESS, WENT SHOPPING WITH TRUEHEART, BECAUSE BUENOS AIRES

STORES WILL BE CLOSED 26 SEPT AND BECAUSE AARON NOT LEAVING

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TOR:252301Z SEP 75

14

IN 697003

BUEN 34503

UNTIL NIGHT 26 SEP AND TRUEHEART NIGHT 27 SEP, WE ANTICIPATE WE

WILL HAVE FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH THEM, THESE WILL BE COVERED

IN NEXT CABLE.

12, WISH THANK INFO ADDEES FOR THEIR PROMPT AND USEFUL WRAP-UPS.

E2 IMPDET

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PAGE 81-01

TOR: 2919577 SEP 75

SECRET 2919257 SEPT 75 STAFF

CITE BRASILIA 24777

TO I BUENOS AIRES INFO DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PLUWCADET.

REFI BUENOS AIRES 34519(10699594)

REF PARA 3 SENTENCE "EVIDENTLY ON BASIS OF COMMENT

BY VISITORSI AMBASSADOR TOLD COS THAT AMBASSADOR GRIMMINS

HAD BEEN CRITICAL OF BKHERALD, BUT DID NOT ELABORATE. "

FYI, AMBASSADOR CRIMMINS ON HOME LEAVE AND RICHARD JOHNSON.

DEMO WAS CHARGE AT TIME OF AARON'S AND TRUEHEARTIS VISIT TO

BRASILIA.. IN THE SHORT TIME COS HAS BEEN IN BRASILIA,

CRIMMINS HAS BEEN MORE THAN COOPERATIVE AND APPEARED TO

BE MORE APPRECIATIVE OF BKHERALD'S EFFORTS THAN MOST STATE

OFFICERS. WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF YOU COULD GET

ELABORATION ON HILL'S REMARKS ON LOW KEY BASIS, EZ, IMPDET.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN !:

ISCUINO OFPICI LE PRONIDITRO

IN 699882

BRIL 24777:

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TOR 2315237 SEP 75

IN 694147

BRIL

24723

SECRET 231409Z

SEP 75 STARS 2

CITE BRASILIA 24723 SECTION 1 OF 2

TOI.

IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, MONTEVIDEO ROUTINE BUENOS AIRES

RYBAT PLUWCADET.

1, HAD TWO HOUR SESSION WITH AARON AND TRUEHEART

AFTERNOON 22 SEPT, TRUEHEART AWAY PART OF TIME TO TALK TO

OTHERS IN EMBASSY AS AARON WAS CONCENTRATING ON STATIONIS

ACTIVITIES.

2. QUESTIONS RAN ALONG LINES OF THOSE INDICATED IN

DIRECTOR 744266, PLUS QUITE A FEW EXTRAS. FOL IS HIGHLIGHT

OF FIVE AND ONE-HALF HOURS OF DISCUSSIONS HELD STAURDAY AND MONDAY.

3. AARON MOST INTERESTED IN HOW STATION RAN ITS

OPERATIONS--E.G, LINE OF COMMAND FROM HOS AND STATIONIS

RELATIONSHIP WITH BASES, HE WENT OVER OD MINUTELY, THEN

PERUSED EXAMPLES OF TELENOTE REQUIREMENTS SENT FROM

STATION TO BASES INCLUDING SUCH AS HBBS 933. A NUMBER OF

QUESTIONS WERE RAISED ON HOW CONTROL WAS EXERCISED OVER

OUR OPERATIONS, BASICALLY, HE WAS TOLD THAT ALL

ACTIVITIES CENTERED.

AROUND THE OD, OUR PROJECTS,

FUNDS, AND MANPOWER ALLOCATION WERE DESIGNED TO MEET.

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THE PRIORITY REQUIREMENTS AS ENUNCUIATED IN THE OD: PERIODIC

REPORTS WERE SUBMITTED TO MOS TO APPRISE THEM OF WHAT WE

HOPED TO DO WITH REFERENCE TO OUR OD PRIORITIES, AND THIS WAS

FOLLOWED BY REPORTS ON WHAT HAD ACTUALLY BEEN ACCOMPLISED AGAINST

THESE PRIORITIES, A "REPORT CARD" SYSTEM EXISTED WHEREIN

WE WERE GRADED ON THE WORK DONE. AARON WAS INTERESTED IN

HOW A CASE OFFICER (THIS IS THE TERM HE USED WORKING ON

THE HARD TARGETS WAS GRÄDED RELATIVE TO ONE WHOSE

TARGETS WERE LESS HARD, AND WHETHER LACK OF ULTIMATE SUCCESS

PRECRUITMENT OF A SOV, FOR EXAMPLE? WAS HELD AGAINST THE C/O.

THE EXPLANATION WAS THAT THE RECRUITMENT OF SOMEONE IN THE

HARD TARGET AREAS WAS THE ULTIMATE TEST, AND FAILURE TO RECRUIT

RECEIVED A ZERO SCÖRE,: HOWEVER, IF THE C/O WORKING ON THE

HARD TARGET HAD BEEN IMAGINATIVE, HAD GOTTEN A NUMBER OF

ACCESS AGENTS, HAD MANAGED TO HAVE DIRECT CONTACT WITH ONE

OR MORE TARGET PERSONALITIES. AND ALL IN ALL DID HIS

HOMEWORK. WORKED HARD, WAS AGGRESSIVE, BUT WAS NOT

SUCCESSFUL BECAUSE THE TARGET WAS IN FACT NOT RECRUITABLED

HE WAS QIVEN A GOOD GRADE, AARON MUSED WHETHER LACK OF

SUCCESS IN. RECRUITING A HARD TARET INDIVIDUAL EVER

HEEP

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BRIL 24723

UP A C/O'S PROMOTION, AND HE WAS TOLD THAT IN OUR EXPERIENCE

THIS WAS NOT SO, SO LONG AS THE OTHER ELEMENTS THAT

EARMARK A GOOD C/O WERE PRESENT.

A; THE NOC PROGRAM HAD A CERTAIN FASCINATION FOR BOTH

AARON AND TUREHEART, THEY WERE NOT INQUISITIVE ABOUT NAMES

OR COVER COMPANIES, BUT DID WANT TO KNOW THE REASON FOR NOCS

SECURITY FOR HIGHLY SENSITIVE AGENTS, STAYBEHIND IN CASE

THE STATION HAD TO BE ABANDONED, WHETHER CUTOUTS WERE USED IN

CONTACTING NOCS INO, DIRECT INSIDE C/O CONTÄCT UNDER

SCRUPULOURS SECURITY CONDITIONS, WHETHER THEY WERE WORTH

THE MONEY OUTLAY (YES, IF PRODUCTIVE AGENTS. WERE GIVEN

THEM AND NOCS WERE SUFFICIENTLY EXPERIENCED AND ADEPT IN

GETTING THE MAXIMUM FROM THE AGENTS BEING HANDLED,.

5: AARON WAS MOST SPECIFIC IN QUERYING ABOUT THE

PERCENTAGE OF TIME SPENT BY STATION IN ACCOMPLISHMENT OF

INDIVIDUAL OBJECTIVES, HE WANTED TO KNOW HOW A CO/O SPENT HIS DAY,

THE PROCESS HE WENT THROUGH IN CONTACTING AN AGENT, HOW DID.:

WE ENSURE THAT CIOS DID NOT TRY TO RECRUIT THE SAME

INDIVIDUAL (CONTACT REPORTS) AND TRACE REQUESTS ALLOWED ADEQUATE

CONTROLL: WITH REFERENCE TO CI, HOW MUCH TIME WAS

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DEVOTED TO THIS AND HOW DID WE MANGAGE IT ¡PENETRATION OF

LIAISON AND JOINT EFFORT WITH LIAISON-OTEL ETAPS,

SURVEILLANCE, ETC, -- AGAINST HARD TARGETS), DISCUSSIONS

ON

COVERT ACTION TOOK UP CONSIDERABLE TIME, DESPITE HOS

BRIEFING ON THIS SUBJECT, AARON WANTED TO KNOW THE

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A MEDIA OP AND A COVERT POL ACTION OP.

MUCH STRESS WAS PLACED ON WHETHER. WE HAD ANY PLUMBING FOR.

POLITICAL ACTION OPS SHOULD WE BE REQUESTED TO GET INTO

THAT ACTIVITY, IT WAS EXPLAINED THAT WE HAVE NOT BEEN IN

POL ACTION IN BRAZIL FOR YEARS, THAT WE HAD NO PLUMBING AS

•SUCH, AND THAT IF A REQUEST WAS TO BE MADE F N SUCH ACTION.

THE STATION WOULD LIKELY NEED TO START FROM POINT ZERO

PAGE J BRAGITHA GAZZIGERE

UNLESS SOME OF THE AGENTS NOW AVAILABLE WERE USABLE... IT WAS .

EXPLAINED THAT WE DID HAVE A SMALL MEDIA CAPABILITY AS WELL AS

AN AGENT OF INFLUENCE PROGRAM BUT THAT THESE IN NO WAY

RESEMBLED THE KIND OF COVERT POLITICAL ACTION OF THE

CHILEAN VARIETY,

AARON HAD A FASCINATION FOR. TRADESCRAFT, WANTED te

KNOW HOW LONG COS HAD BEEN IN THE BUSINESS AND APPROXIMATELY

SECRET

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HOW MUCH TIME IN TOTAL COS SPENT IN TRAINING (COULDN'T

HAZARD A GUESS AS TO HOW MUCH TIME SPENT IN TRAINING BUT

SAID THAT THERE WAS A LONG COURSE ON ENTERING AGENCY, THAT

OVER THE YARS THERE WAS TRAINING COVERING A VARIETY OF

SUBJECTS INCLUDING SECRET WRITING, CLANDESTINE: PHOTOGRAPHY,

COMMUNISM, MANAGEMENT: INCLUDING THE STUDY OF GRIDS, REPORTS

WRITING, ETC, MENTION WAS MADE OF MID-CAREER COURSE,

PLUS SENIOUR SEMINARS. AVAILABLE TO OFFIERS, PLUS ATTENDANCE

AT SAFF COLLEGES SUCH AS THAT PROVIDED BY STATE, ARMY, ETC.I

SAARON WAS FASCINÄTED WITH THE REPORTS WRITING COURSE AND

ASKED FOR PARTICULARS,

7i ON INTERAGENCY RELATIONSHIPS, BOTH AARON AND

TUREHAEART WERE INTERESTED IN HOW INTEL REPORTS WERE

DISTRIBUTED

WITHIN THE EMBASSY, WHETHER COB HAD AUTHORITY

TO SEND AN INTEL REPORT DIRECTLY TO HOS WITH INFO TO

STATION (YES; ON MATTERS WHICH WERE PECULIAR TO THE LOCAL

SCENE BUT THOSE IMPINGING ON BROADER GOB MATTERS WERE, FIRST

SENT TO BRASILIA FOR ADDITIONS, MODIFICATIONS, ETC, PRIOR TO

ONWARD TRANSMISSION. I THEY WERE TOLD THAT THE AMBASSADOR

SEES ALL REPORTS, THAT OTHER SECTIONS OF THE EMBASSY DID SEE

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THOSE REPORTS WHICH WERE PERTINENT TO THEM, INTEL ON MAJOR

ITEMS- SUCH AS THOSE WHICH HAD A BEARING ON GOB POLICIES

VIS-A-VIS THE U,S, -WAS SHOWN TO THE AMBASSADOR PRIOR TO

SUBMISSION, STATION MADE IT A PRACTIVE TO CHECK INTEL

OUT WITH CONCERNED SECTIONS WITHIN THE EMBASSY PRIOR TO

PRANSMISSION IF THIS WAS CONSIDERED NECESSARY AND BENEFICIAL

BY THE STATION, THERE ARE OCCASIONS WHEREIN THE STATION IS

REQUIRED TO LIMIT A REPORT TO THE AMBASSADOR ONLY WHEN

SENSITVE INFO AND/OR A SENSITIVE SOURCE IS INVOLVED.

THIS HAD NOT HAPPED IN THE COS'S SHORT TENURE IN

SECRE

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TOR:231508Z SEP 75

SECRET 231409Z SEPT. 75 STAFF

CITE BRASILIA 24723 FINAL SECTION OF TWO

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, MONTEVIDEO ROUTINE BUENOS AIRES:

RYBAT PLUWCADET

BRASILIA, BUT IN PANAMA FOR EXAMPLE, CERTAIN REPORTS

CONSIDERED HIGHLY SENSITIVE WERE OFTEN LIMITED TO THE

AMBASSADOR, THE CINSCO, AND THE GOVERNOR OF THE CANAL

ZONE, OR TO THE AMBASSADOR ONLY SECURITY WAS THE

CARDINAL FACTOR IN SUCH LIMITING OF DISTRIBUTION,

8.. AARON WANTED TO KNOW WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF ONE OF

THE STATION'S AGENTS WAS BEING SEEN BY A MEMBER OF THE

POLITICAL SECTION--WOULD WE DISCUSS IT WITH THE POLITICAL

OFFICER? (FIRST STEP WOULD BE TO TALK TO THE AGENT ON THE

PROBLEMS THAT WOULD BE ENCOUNTERED BY SUCH ACTION ON HIS

PART, THAT THIS NORMALLY DID SUFFICE IF IN FACT HE WAS A

CONTROLLED AGENT. IF HIS ACCESS WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY

SENSITIVE• HE WOULD BE ALLOWED TO SEE THE POLITICAL OFFICER

SO LONG AS HE REMEMBERED WHO HE WORKED FOR AND ACTED

ACCORDINGLY).

9, AS TO KEEPING THE AMBASSADOR APPRISED ON POSITIVE

SECRET

REPrODUETION

NEBUING OFFICE

OTHER THAN

ROHIBITED

STAFF MEG OUNCE

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COLLECTION OPERATIONS, THIS WAS DONE AS A MATTER OF COURSE

BUT WITHOUT SPECIFIC DETAILS UNLESS THE AMBASSADOR WAS IN

FACT SEEING AN AGENT OF OURS REGULARLY AS PART OF HIS AMBASSADOR

IAL DUTIES.

1D. THE LIAISON SERVICES WITH WHOM WE WERE IN TOUCH WERE

NAMED, INCLUDING OUR JOINT EFFORTS AT TELTÄPS. PLUS OUR

UNILATERAL PENETRATION EFFORTS FOR CI AND POSITIVE INTELE

11: BOTH AARON AND TRUEHEART WERE SHOWN THE KIQS AND THE

CIRLS AND TAILORED REQUIREMENTS THAT WERE SENT PERIODICALLY.

THEY BOTH REMARKED THAT THE AGENCY HAS A MORE

SOPHISTICATED SYSTEM FOR GETTING REQUIREMENTS TO THE FIELD THAN

SAY, STATE.

12: VERY LITTLE WAS ASKED ABOUT SPORLON ACTIVITIES IN RIO

EXCEPT THAT THEY BOTH WERE UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT NSA

WAS RUNNING THE SHOW. THEY DID ASK ABOUT CUSTOMER REACTION

TO THE SPORLON PRODUCTS (AMBASSADOR CRIMMINS IS AN AVID

CUSTOMER AND WE WERE OF THE OPINION THAT AGENCIES IN

WASHINGTON CONCERNED WITH THE INTERCEPT PROGRAM WERE

HAPPY WITH THE RESULTS.)

13.: ON HEARING THAT COS HAD BEEN IN PANAMA, QUESTIONS

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WERE RAISED ON AGREED ACTIVITIES. THEY WERE BOTH

SURPRISED TO FIND OUT THAT THE STATION IN PANAMA HẠD TO

AUTHORIZE ALL CLANDESTINE COLLECTION ACTIVITIES ENGAGED IN BY

U.S. ELEMENTS IN THE AREA: INCLUDING GETTING PROJECT INFO

MUCH LIKE THAT REQUIRED IN THE AGENCY WHICH GAVE NAMES. OF

AGENTS TO BE RECRUITED, RATE OF PAY, METHOD OF CONTÄCT.

ETC.

AARO

14.

EVINCED GREAT INTEREST IN THE COVER

PROVIDED BY THE EMBASSY. HE WAS TOLD THAT COVER COULD

BE IMPROVED UPON, THAT WE DID HAVE A SMALL NUMBER OF.

OFFICERS WHO WERE ACTUALLY ASSIGNED TO OTHER SECTIONS.

THAT THEY GAVE ALMOST SOPERCENT OF THEIR TIME ON THE ACTUAL

WORK OF THAT SECTION, THEN SPENT THE REST OF THE WORK

DAY PLUS A LARGE DOSE ON NIGHTWORK ON OUR WORK FOR WHICH

THEY RECEIVED NO OVERTIME BUT DID THIS OUT OF HIGH MOTIVATION

AND THE DESIRE TO GET AT OUR OBJECTIVES.

15. AARON KNEW OF THE OLD OPC AND OSO SEPARATIONS OF THE

PAST AND PROBED ABOUT HOW THE FINAL AMALGAMATION AFFECTED

MOST PEOPLE.: (NOTHING TRAUMATIC, OPE AND OSO OFFICERS HAD

A COMMON DENOMINATOR IN BASIC TRADECRAFT AND. OTHER

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TRAINING. A GOOD OPC TYPE COULD DO EQUALLY GOOD WORK IN

THE OSO FIELD, AND VICE VERSA. Y

16, ABOVE ARE ONLY THE HIGHLIGHTS OF THE DISCUSSION.

AARON IS IN CHARGE, HE ASKED MOST OF THE QUESTIONS, AND

TOOK COPIOUS NOTES. BOTH AARON AND TRUEHEART WERE

ESSENTIALLY LOW-KEY BUT THE QUESTIONS WERE SHARP, PROBING.

AND AARON ESPECIALLY HAS A QUIETLY INCISIVE WAY OF GETTING

AT THINGS. IT'S DIFFICULT TO TELL WHETHER THE TWO ARE

FAVORABLY DISPOSED TOWARD THE AGENCY OR NOT. CERTAINLY

NO ANIMOSITY WAS SHOWN, BUT NEITHER WAS THERE ANY SHOW OF

GREAT LOVE FOR THE AGENCY.. AN OBJECTIVE APPROACH (QU THE

MATTER AT HAND APPEARS TO BE AN APT DESCRIPTION OF HOW THEY

WORKED.

17. AARON AND TRUEHEART WERE CARED FOR BY THE EMBASSY

•WHILE IN BRASILIA BUT ON SATURDAY IN RIO AARON SEEMED TO

HAVE BEEN LEFT ALONE BY THE CONGEN. COB AND COS TOOK

AARON OUT TO DINNER AFTER THE BRIEFING SESSION AND HE

SEEMED TO ENJOY AND APPRECIATE THE CHURRASCO, MONTEVIDEO

AND BUENOS AIRES MIGHT WISH TO KEEP IN MIND THAT AARON

.IS INTERESTED IN TRYING THE BETTER KNOWN LOCAL FOODS, IS

SECRET

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EBUINO OLFIER T

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A WINE LOVER AND WANTS TO SAMPLE THE BEST OF THE LOCAL

PRODUCT.

18. AT DINNER ON SATURDAY NIGHT, AARON WAS ASKED BY:

THE COS WHAT HE THOUGHT MIGHT HAPPEN TO THE AGENCY. HE

OPINED THAT THE DDO MIGHT BE SPLIT OFF FROM THE MAIN BODY OF

THE AGENCY, AND PUT UNDER AN EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MADE UP OF

MEMBERS FROM STATE AND OTHER AGENCIES IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH

MORE CONTROL OVER ITS ACTIVITIES•

E2, IMPDET.

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No winder

sse travel

SECRET

20 August 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, LA Division

SUBJECT

:

Transmittal of SSC Memo Announcing

the Intention of SSC Staffers to

Visit Latin America

1.

Attached is a xerox of a letter from the

SSC Staff Director (Review Staff 75-2399) describing

travel plans to Latin America on the

part of SSC

Staffers.

This is for your information.

You will

be alerted when this becomes firm and an itinerary

is

established.

2. Also attached is an agreed upon memo giving

guidelines of such trips.

Supplementing this

should

be a briefing of the travelling of sst staffers

before they go and a notification of the stations

involved as to what the guidelines are.

John H. Waller

SA/DDO

Attachment

As stated above

Distribution:

Orig

-

2

Addressee

w/att

- SA/DDO

E2 IMPDET

CL BY 055636

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SUBJECT: Guidelines for Members of the Select Committee and

Their Staffs While Traveling Abroad

There have been already and there will continue to be members

of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who wish to travel abroad and

talk to U.S. embassy and intelligence personnel. It is essential

that we agree on guidelines to avoid serious diplomatic and security

problems. The following specific guidelines are applicable.

I. : MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC SHOULD NOT PUBLICLY APPEAR TO BE

ABROAD. FOR THE PURPOSE OF INVESTIGATING U.S. INTELLIGENCE

INSTALLATIONS•

Most of these installations, including all CIA stations abroad,

for example, are under some form of cover, or are maintaining a low

profile. Certainly all have and need varying degrees of protection

from exposure. At one extreme are U.S. intelligence activities

behind the iron curtain. These clearly need maximum protection.

•The mere visit of SSC representatives could be noted as evidence

of U.S, intelligence presence within the country. Even in those

countries where U.S. intelligence efforts enjoy the shielding and

other benefits flowing from close liaison with the host government,

care is required to avoid the potentially grave political repercussions

4/25/95

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2

that could result to U.S. and host country activities from exposure

of such liaison. Many countries that wish to cooperate with the

United States in intelligence endeavors simply cannot afford public:

exposure of such relationships. To help maintain the discreet

nature of the visit, it would be preferable if some reason

other

than SSC business could be given to explain any visits by SSC members

and staff. No deliberate contact should be made with the local press,

nor should comments on SSC matters be supplied if Investigating

officers are contacted by the press. Local press publicity pertaining

to an SSC investigation abroad would in almost all cases

be

distasteful to the host government.

In sum, except in the case of especially sensitive areas, discreet

arrangements can be made for SSC visits to certain U-S. intelligence

activitiès overseas on a case by case basis, and with senior officers

within the covering embassies. Such visits are contingent upon the

SSC member not publicly declaring himself to be on SSC business

at the time of the visit or upon his return, and his proceeding

on a basis satisfactory to the Ambassador.

II. THE AMBASSADOR AT THE EMBASSY VISITED WILL BE IN CHARGE OF THE

VISIT.

All arrangenents. and contacts will be made by hiw, and because of his

knowledge of local situations, his advice will be binding.

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III. FIELD DISCUSSIONS WITH U.S. INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL SHOULD BE

CONDUCTED ONLY IN GENERAL TERMS.

It is more fitting that Washington be the place where operational

details are conveyed to the SSC. Field intelligence elements will

only discuss operations in general terms--operational priorities,

the kinds of operations conducted, the operational environment,

relationships with the Embassy and defense attaches, etc. In all

cases, such discussions will only be conducted in physical

surroundings which meet appropriate security standards.

Members and staff of the SSC should refrain from asking to

see texts of or general notes on intelligence agreements between

the U.S. and the host government. These are usually considered

by the host government as extremely sensitive, politically and

operationally,. and cannot be divulged without the consent of the

host government.

IV:

MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC WILL NOT INTERVIEW AGENT

• PERSONNEL.

Foreign agent personnel frequently are under hostile or local service

scrutiny. For them to be placed in touch with SSC members would be

to run an unacceptable risk. Moreover, serious damage would be

done to agent morale and motivation if their identity were to be .

revealed to Members or staff of the SSC.

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V.

MEMBERS OF HOST COUNTRY INTELLIGENCE OR SECURITY SERVICES

WILL: BE CONTACTED ONLY IN EXCEPTIONAL CASES.

Many foreign intelligence services will find contact with the SSC

politically difficult and will avoid it. They further regard that

their relationships with U.S. intelligence activities, the

Information they pass, and the cooperation extended are all most

sensitive matters. Regardless what assurances are given them,

they would find it difficult and awkward to discuss these matters

with menbers or staff of the SSC. The very fact that such matters

were under investigation could well cause the host service to

reassess the desirability of a relationship with U.S. Intelligence

activities.

VI. MEMBERS AND STAFE OF THE SSC SHOULD NOT VISIT FOREIGN

TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE INSTALLATIONS.

In those countries in which we operate joint technical collection

sites, the host would be firmly opposed to access by U.S.

Congressional representatives, especially where there is public

knowledge of the Congressional Investigating interests. 'If such

a visit is considered essential, a special request must be

negotiated with the host country in advance.

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VII. AN ORIENTATION BRIEFING WILL BE PROVIDED ALL MEMBERS AND

STAFF, PRIOR TO DEPARTURE.

This briefing will be conducted. by the DCI and other representatives

of the Intelligence Community (CIA, NSA, DIA, State, etc.), as

appropriate. The purpose of this briefing is to familiarize the

visitor with the types of activities conducted at each location,

the restraints which are imposed upon U.S. activities in each case

and the considerations which preclude the discussion of

operational details, names and terms in an overseas environment;

Members and staff of the SSC should bear in mind at all times that

they and their activities are matters of great interest to opposition

Intelligence services, as well as to the press. Comnittee and staff

members, particularly those who are publicly prominent, can hardly

travel inconspiciously and will be easily recognized.

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## Page 171

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LI, MINN.

LESTON, KY.

ACH, ¡DAHO, CHAIRMAN

¿A, TECAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

HOWANO H. BAKER, JR., TENN.

BARRY GOLDWATER, ARTZ.

CHARLES MCG. MATHIAS, JR., MD.

RICHARD S, SCHWEIKER, PA,

caLa

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STANY DIRECTOR

FREDERICK A. D. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL

CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

file

@nited States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO

STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH

RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, MITH CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON. D.C. 20510

August 12, 1975

air a mierre rin

ARGUES STARF

275-23?9

Mr. Seymour Bolten

Assistant to the Director

Room 6D0120

Central Intelligence Agency

Langley, Virginia

2 Septern

Dear Mr. Bolten:

This letter is to confirm an oral request by Comnittee staff

for an orientation briefing for a visit to South America which two

members of the staff, David Aaron and William Trueheart, have been

asked to make next month.

Although plans are not yet firn, it is expected that they will

be free to travel during the second and third weeks of September.

It is proposed that they visit Brasilia, Rio de Janeiro, and

Montevideo. If time permits; they might also visit another con-

sular post in Brazil and/or Buenos Aires.

The primary purpose of this travel is to discuss State-CIA

relations in the field with Embassy and Station officers. As ap-.

propriate, past Agency programs may also be reviewed.

Messrs. Aaron and Trueheart are not expected to consult with

officials of the host government and, so far as the Committee is

concerned, the latter need not be informed of the visit.

Sincerely yours,

Bell

William G. Miller

copy to Mr. Hyland, State Department

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AGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

col

ACE

TOO

TPE

DCi

OMF

CLASSIPICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HAMOLINO INDICATON

STAFF

0

DATE-TIME

0220492

CONF: FUR 8 INFO:

FILE IRANDDO

ICS PS/PG

PAGU

PAORS

GIRECTOR

744410

DISSEM BY S

INDEX

NO INDEX

RETURN TO .. PER

IP PRES.

TO: PRIORITY LONDON.4

REF: STATE 137637, 30 JUNE 1975 4

1. SHENATOR TOWER, MEMBER OF SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

CASCE AND VICE CHAIRMAN OF SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ISSCI INVESTIGAT-

ING CIA: IS TRAVELING IN EUROPE IN HIS ASC CAPACITY BY U.S. AIRI

ITH

FORCE JET AND WIT

AIR FORCE ESCORT. STATE HAS ADVISED THAT SENATOR

TOWER WILL BE IN LONDON 3-7. JULY WHERE HE WILL CALL ON MINISTER!

HEALEY ON 4 JULY AND CINCUSNAVEUREA ON 1 JULY, W

2. ALTHOUGH TRAVELING ON ASC BUSINESS, SENATOR TOWER MAY TAKE

THE OPPORTUNITY TO LOOK INTO CIA AND BOTHER U-S: INTEL SERVICE!.

ACTIVITY IN U.K. IF HE REQUESTS A GENERAL BRIEFING, STATION !.

SHOULD BE COOPERATIVE AND FORTHCOMING. IN PROVIDING HIM WITH ONE.

YOU MAY COVER THRUST OF OUR GENERAL INTEL EXCHANGE WITH THE BRITISH

BUT SEE NO NEED TO TOUCH ON ANY JOINT OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY. STATIONA

SHOULD NOT OFFER. ARRANGE CONTACT BETWEEN SENATOR TOWER AND BRITISH

. SERVICE CONTACTS."

J. FOR BACKGROUND GUIDANCE, IN THE. EVENT SSE BUSINESS ARISES:

HQS IS CURRENTLY WORKING WITH THE SSC TO ESTABLISH GUIDLINES FOR

DATE:

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#

ITS DEALINGS WITH ITS MEMBERS AND THEIR STAFFS. ALTHOUGH NOT

FINAL HQS BELIEVES IT IS MORE APPROPRIATE THAT WASHINGTON BE.

THE PLACE WHERE OPERATIONAL DETAILS OF CIA ACTIVITY BE CONVEYED.

TO THE SSC. FIELD ELEMENTS SHOULD ONLY DISCUSS THEIR OPS AND I

ACTIVITIES IN GENERAL TERMS, I.E., OPERATIONAL PRIORITIES, TYPES

OF OPERATIONS, PARTICULAR PROBLEMS AS EVOLVE FROM THE LOCAL OPERA-

TIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE EMBASSY AND LOCALI•

MILITARY SERVICES•: IN ALL CASES DISCLSSIONS WILL MEET APPROPRIATE

SECURITY STANDARDS IN TERMS OF PHYSICAL SURROUNDINGS.. HQS IS I

ASKING THE SSC TO REFRAIN FROM ASKING TO SEE THE TEXTS OF OR 1

GENERAL NOTES ON INTELLIGENCE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND HOST

GOVERNMENTS SINCE THESE ARE CONSIDERED BY THE HOST GOVERNMENTS i

AS EXTREMELY SENSITZE, POLITICALLY AND OPERATIONALLY, AND CANNOT

BE DIVULGED WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE HOST GOVERNMENT. EZ IMPDET-M

DATE:

2 JULY 1975

ORIG:

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713701

DISSEM BY: /

INDEX

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REF: MUNICH 30382 IN 6215671 Y

I. AS YOU AWARE, IN ADDITION TO BEING A MEMBER OF THE SENATE

ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE CASCE SENATOR TOWER IS VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ISSCI INVESTIGATING CIA. SENATOR TOWER IS

TRAVELLING TO EUROPE IN HIS ASC CAPACITY BY U.S. AIR FORCE JET AND

WITH AIR FORCE ESCORT. WE HAVE NOT DETERMINED HIS DETAILED ITINERARY

BUT WILL ADVISE YOU AS APPROPRIATE WHEN WE DO. Y

2. ALTHOUGH TRAVELLING ON ASC BUSINESS SENATOR TOWER MAY WELL

TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY TO LOOK INTO CIA AND OTHER U.S. INTEL SERVICE

ACTIVITY IN THE FRE. SHOULD HE DO SO, THIS ASPECT OF HIS VISIT

SHOULD NOT BE PUBLICIZED. BUT. IF HE REQUESTS A GENERAL BRIEFING.

THE STATION SHOULD BE COOPERATIVE AND FORTHCOMING IN PROVIDING HIM

WITH ONE. YOU MAY COVER THRUST OF OUR GENERAL LIAISON EXCHANGE

WITH THE BND. OMITTING THE DETAILS INVOLVED WITH OUR INTEL EXCHANGE

AND JOINT OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY: THE STATION SHOULD NOT OFFER TO

ARRANGE CONTACT BETWEEN SENATOR TOWER AND ITS FRG LIAISON CONTACTS.

DATE:

ORIG:

UNIT:

EXT:

HELLASING OFFICEN

COORDINATINO OFFICANS

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## Page 175

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713701

THE COS WILL PROBABLY WISH TO MAKE HIMSELF AVAILABLE TO PARTICIPATE

IN ANY BRIEFING SENATOR TOWER MAY REQUEST. Y

INTHE

3. FOR BACKGROUND GUIDANCE EVENT SSC BUSINESS ARISES: HOS IS

CURRENTLY WORKING WITH THE SSO TO ESTABLISH GUIDELINES FOR ITS

DEALINGS WITH ITS MEMBERS AND THEIR STAFFS. ALTHOUGH NOT FINAL HQS

BELIEVES IT IS MORE APPROPRIATE THAT WASHINGTON BE THE PLACE WHERE

OPERATIONAL DETAILS OF CIA ACTIVITY BE CONVEYED TO THE SSC. FIELD

ELEMENTS SHOULD ONLY DISCUSS THEIR OPS AND ACTIVITIES: IN GENERAL

TERMS, I.E., OPERATIONAL PRIORITIES, TYPES OF OPERATIONS, PARTICULAR

PROBLEMS AS EVOLVE FROM THE LOCAL OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND

RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE EMBASSY ECONSULATES AND LOCAL MILITARY

SERVICES. IN ALL CASES DISCUSSIONS WILL MEET APPROPRIATE SECURITY.

STANDARDS IN TERMS OF PHYSICAL SURROUNDINGS. HAS IS ASKING THE SSC

TO REFRAIN FROM ASKING TO SEE THE TEXTS OF OR GENERAL NOTES ON

INTELLIGENCE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND HOST GOVERNMENTS SINCE

THESE ARE CONSIDERED BY THE HOST GOVERNMENTS AS EXTREMELY SENSITIVE.

POLITICALLY AND OPERATIONALLY AND CANNOT BE DIVULGED WITHOUT THE

CONSENT OF THE HOST GOVERNMENT. E2 IMPDET•N

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UNIT:

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## Page 176

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UNCLASSIFIED

INULKMAL

USE ONLY

'ROUTING AND RECORD SHEL

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM.

C/SS/ CAG

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and

building)

3D0004

EXTENSION

R9125

OFFICER'S

INITIALS

". Mr. John Waller

SA/DDO

2B1415

2.

3. Mr. Seymour Bolten

Review Staff

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

29 JUL 1975

NO.

DATE

28 July 1975

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom

to whom.

Draw a lina across column ofter each comment.)

Origazin

I RECTOR

intries on

6 D 0120

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

FORM

3-02

670 USE REYNOUS

EDITIONS

SECRET

O CONFIDENTIAL

INTERIAL

USE ONLY

_ UNGLASSIFIED

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SEGRET

SENSITIVE

28 July 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Mr. Seymour Bolten

Review Staff

VIA:

SUBJECT:

Mr. John Waller

Special Assistant to the DDO

Summary of Covert Action Operations Targeted at

Right-Wing Governments

1. Pursuant to your request, forwarded as attachment A 1s a paper

providing examples of covert action operations targeted at right-wing

governments, which is responsive to a question from the Senate Select

Committee.

2. All of the cases in the attached sunmary are considered sensitive

by the area divisions and some are considered extremely sensitive up to

today. In many ways public disclosure of some of these operations could

impact more severely on our foreign policy interest than the other dis-

closures on our foreign involvements.

For example, a disclosure of our

past operations in Spain could possibly adversely affect the military

base negotiations now underway.

With this problem in mind, we have

broken the operations into two categories:

Category I are those oper-

ations about which full committee could be briefed, if necessary, and

Category Il are those operations considered extremely sensitive about

which the committee Chairman and Co-Chairman might be briefed, if abso-

lutely necessary.

3. In addition to the attachment A summary, we also approve the use

(with the full committee) of the case summary on our operations to assist

operations

the survival of the Betancourt government in Venezuela, which was pro-

vided to you directly by LA Division.

4. Obviously, we would prefer to forego providing this information

to the committee.

However, should it be necessary to do so, we would

appreciate being advised promptly regarding the time and circumstances

of any use of this material outside of the Agency.

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We are also providing you as attachments B, C and D copies

of memoranda from EUR, AF and EA Divisions which provides additional

background on division attitudes and caveats concerning the provision

of this material to the Select Committee.

Donald J. Purcell

Chief, Covert Action Group

Services Staff

Attachments, a/s

SECHET

2

SEASICKE

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SCUNL1

SENSITIVE

28 July 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:

VIA:

SUBJECT:

Mr. Seymour Bolten

Review Staff

Mr. John Waller

Special Assistant to the DDO

Summary of Covert Action Operations Targeted at

Right-Wing Governments

L. Pursuant to your request, forwarded as attachment A is a paper

providing examples of covert action operations targeted at right-wing

governments, which is responsive to a question from the Senate Select

Committee.

2. All of the cases in the attached summary are considered sensitive

by the area divisions and some are considered extremely sensitive up to

today. In many ways public disclosure of some of these operations could

impact more severely on our foreign policy interest than the other dis-

closures on our foreign involvements..

past operations in Spain could possibly adversely affect the military.

base negotiations now underway. With this problem in mind, we have

1 nov underay.

For example, a disclosure of our

broken the operations into two categories: Category I are those oper-

ations about which full conmittee could be briefed, if necessary, and

Category II are those operations considered extremely sensitive about

which the committee Chairman and Co-Chairnan might be briefed, if abso-

lutely necessary.

In addition to the attachment A summary, we also approve the use

(with the full committee) of the case summary on our operations to assist

the survival of the Betancourt government in Venezuela, which was pro-

vided to you directly by LA Division.

4. Obviously, we would prefer to forego providing this information

to the committee.

However, should it be necessary to do so, we would

appreciate being advised promptly regarding the time and circumstances

of any use of this material outside of the Agency.

E2 IMPDET

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232694

5.

We are also providing you as attachments B, C and D copies

of memoranda from EUR, AF and EA Divisions which provides additional

background on division attitudes and caveats concerning the provision

of this material to the Select Committee.

/s/ Donald J. Purcell

Donald J. Purcell

Chief, Covert Action Group

Services Staff

Attachments, a/s

SECRET

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Covert Action Operations Concerning Right-Wing Regimes

CATEGORY I

ETHIOPIA: A project for covert support of the Ethiopian labor

movement was first approved for FY 1965. The purpose of the support

was to encourage the development of the labor movement as a democratic

force and as one of the few mass representative organizations in Ethiopia.

The project was terminated at the end of FY 1973.

The total approved

budget for this project from its inception in CY 1964 to its termination

in CY 1973 was $291,006.

Covert support to the Ethiopian labor movement

was approved by the Special Group on 22 August 1967, on 25 March 1970,

on 26 May 1971, and on 8 May 1972.

cratic labor movement through the provision of guidance and funds to

facilitate its growth among the workers and rural village peasants and

tenant farmers.

3. GUATEMALA: In 1972-73, the Guatemala City Station with access

to the government succeeded in dissuading the President from military

action against Belize.

HAITI: As early as 1963, the Special Group discussed ways and

means of influencing the Duvalier dictatorship. In 1967, a modest pro-

ject was approved for the support of Haitian exile radio broadcasts for

the purpose of offsetting "the inflammatory propaganda broadcasts to

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: In 1963, CIA was directly involved in the

successful efforts to prevent the return to the Dominican Republic of

General Elias Wessin y Wessin and forestall his leadership of a right-

wing coup designed to prevent the holding of free elections.

6. GERMANY: From 1948 to 1960, CIA exploited an asset in a neo-

Nazi political movement both as a source of intelligence concerning its

plans and actions and as a means of covertly sabotaging the movement

and its European counterparts.

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CATEGORY II

1. SOUTH AFRICA: In 1959, after consultation with the Special

Group, the DCI approved an overall expenditure of $165,000 to a leading

South African political figure designed to encourage the creation of a

new political party. This party was established in 1960. The objective

was to influence the liberalization of the South African Government by

having a legally constituted party in opposition to apartheid. The

activity was terminated in 1962.

2. SOUTH AFRICA: A project was initiated in 1962 to encourage

the development of a multiracial trade union organization which opposed

apartheid. It was funded through a European philanthropic organization.

State Department approval was received in June 1963. A total of $311,705

was spent on this activity. The project was terminated in 1968.

3. KOREA: In 1963, the Special Group approved a covert action

project designed to encourage "emerging civilian government"' vis-a-vis

the military leadership following President Rhee's resignation and in

anticipation of forthcoming elections; it proposed to support a group.

of National Assembly members.

• 4. KOREA: The Special Group approved in 1967 a project designed

to support a private, rural self-help organization to encourage more

participation by rural farmers in local and national politics to increase

their influence on the Government of the Republic of Korea; it involved

the creation of agricultural training centers in rural villages, a news-

letter and student rural services. It was terminated in 1970 as a project,

but the movement has been continued under the auspices of the government.

5. ARGENTINA: Between 1950 and 1955, efforts of the CIA were

directed at countering Peron's program to obtain wide support in Latin

America for his Movement of Latin American Trade Unionists (ATLAS) which

was designed as one element of his campaign to expand his influence in

the area. Partially as the result of CIA's efforts, the movement never

caught on and it was abandoned with Peron's ouster from power.

6. BRAZIL: From the early 1960's through the ouster of Goulart

and the assumption of power by the conservative Brazilian military, to

1972, ClA supported a rural cooperative movement in the impoverished

Northeast.

This support was provided in spite of strong opposition to

the movement first by the Goulart government and then by Brazilian.

military authorities in that area and in spite of the effect particularly

after 1974 on liaison and diplomatic relations if this support by the USG

were discovered. The project was terminated in 1972.

2

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7. NICARAGUA: During the period 1962 to 1966, CIA participated

in efforts to interdict moves by General Somoza to purchase arms for

military actions against his neighbors.

8.

SPAIN: In 1963, the Special Group approved a program to train

15-20 Spanish democratic labor leaders a year outside of Spain to build

an effective cadre of Spanish labor leadership. In 1966, the Special

Group approved a modest program designed to strengthen the Christian

Democratic movement in Spain through supportive efforts with youth,

political and labor elements.

3

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## Page 184

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22 JUL

1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Mr: John Wallor

Special Assistant to DDO

SUBJECT:

Summary of Covert Action Operations

Against Right-Wing Governments

REFERENCE:

SS/CAG Memorandum of 18 July 1975,

Same Subject

We have reviewed referent memorandum and have the

following comments on those paragraphs which concern

Buropean Division.

13.

GERMANY. While this case is somewhat

bizarre and does not

represent a productive operation,

we pose no objection to its being presented to the

Senato Select Conmittee.

14. SPAIN. We have no objection to the

presentation of these programs to the Senate Select

Conmittee for review although we share concern expressed

by SS/CAG that a leak of this information would be detri-

mental to the base negotiations.

sigeta/Milliam W. Welle

William W. Wells

• Chief, European Division

DDO/DC/E/NW:MFBue11:tj (22 July 75)

Distribution:

Orig. & 1 - Addressee

1 - SS/CAG

1

1

C/EUR

DC/E/NW

1

- E/G

1

- E/IB

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SECRET/SENSITIVE

25 JUL 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Covert Action Group, Services Staff

SUBJECT

: Covert Action Operations Against Right

Wing Regimes

1. Attached are revisions of the descriptions of the

three covert action operations in Africa, cited in your

memorandum to Mr. John Waller dated 18 July 1975.

has cut 0 it not on out an ue chat the brotect

will request that discussion of it be limited to the Chairman

and Vice-Chairman only of the Senate Select Committee.

Director should be informed of the potentially embarrassing

procedural errors in the presentation and review of this

project before the 303 Committee, and the risks of exposure

to two former assets who have been jailed by the new Ethiopian

regime.

3.

The Ethiopian labor program was undertaken

without 303 Committee knowledge or approval.

Subsequently,

196 Project was presented to the 303 Committee on 22 August

and Mr. Walt Rostow, then Chairman of the Security Council,

asked why it had not been brought before the Committee before.

le was told that for projects costing $20,000 or less, it had

been the DCI's discretion to determine if a given project was

sufficiently politically sensitive to warrant bringing it

before the committee.

Mr. Rostow directed

that the 303

Committee should examine all political action projects.

Nevertheless, the project was not submitted to the Committee

for review in 1968, 1969 or 1973.

4.

In addition to these procedural errors, the arrest

in 1974 and continued detention of two Ethiopian labor leaders

who are former assets under this project, and

accusations in

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the Ethiopian press that the trade union organization received

support from the U.S. Government, make any disclosure of CIA

interest in the labor organization potentially dangerous to

our former assets.

Neither of the former assets was arrested

Neither of ton,

because of his CIA connections, and neither of the two assets

nor the labor organization have been accused of CIA involvement.

An admission now of CIA support to Ethiopian labor or to the

two Ethiopian labor leaders in jail could be a sentence of

death for them.

In the case of South Africa, CIA support to a leading

South African political figure to encourage the creation of a

new political party remains a very sensitive matter.

The

principal agent is still a leading and respected spokesman

for the opposition party in south Africa and is a leading member

of the South African parliament..

Exposure of the operation

could lead to his identification which would be extremely.

damaging to him, to the opposition party and to our govern-

ment's relations

For these reasons, we believe I.

it would be desirable for the DCI to limit discussion of this

operation to the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Select.

Committee only.

6.

The European philanthropic organization which was

used

to fund the development of a multiracial trade union organiza-

tion in. South Africa was the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES),

located in Germany.

The South African labor officials and

organizations which received funds from FES were not aware

that the actual origin of the funds was the United States

Government and presumably do not now know of U.S. Government

or CIA involvement.

Aside from exposing a U.S. Government

involvement where none is known to have existed, FES was used

to support a number of other covert action operations in Africa

and elsewhere and exposure of the foundation would have

ramifications other than in south Africa.

The Director should

be briefed on FES and its range of activities on behalf of CIA

if he has not already been

informed.

Clip Retrother

Deputy Chief, Africa Division

Attachments:

As Stated Above

2

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SECRET

21 JUL 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR : Mr. John Waller

Special Assistant to the DDO

SUBJECT

REFERENCE

: Covert Action Operations Against

Right Wing Governments

: Chief, SS/CAG Memorandum, dated

18 July 1975

Subject: "Summary of Covert Action

Operations Against Right Wing Governments"

1. DA Division is concerned about Reference and its possible

use in briefing the Senate Select Committee. Specifically, our concern

centers on describing the EA operations contained in the attachment to

Reference as "were mounted against" "right wing governments"..

None of the EA operations -- DNSCOOP, DNSPROUT (both of which

took place in Korea) and TUMIX (which took place in Vietnam) -:

were or should be so described as being mounted against the government

then in power. In fact, just the opposite is true.

All of these

operations, while covert in the sense that the U.S. Government hand

was never disclosed, were primarily designed to broaden the base of

the governments in power and enhance its stayability by providing

advice and support to "grass root elements" in an attempt to get these

elements to function as a more cohesive organization in seeking

participation in the governmental process.

2. While all of the operations have been terminated, the

INSCOOP operation is perhaps the most sensitive of the three, in that

it represented an initial effort by the Agency to establish contact with

opposition elements in South Korea. As noted above, the purpose of

this contact was not to overthrow the ruling government but rather to

assist the opposition in establishing itself as a more viable force in its

effort to establish a two-party system in South Korea. The Agency today

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maintains contact with the major opposition leaders in South Korea

and this contact is well known to and approved by the U.S. Ambassador

in Korea as well as the Assistant Secretary for East Asia and Pacific

Affairs, Department of State.

3. We see no real value to be gained if any of these operations

were to be raised with the Senate Select Committee.

Robert'D. Brown, jr!

Acting Chief, East Asia Division

cc:

DC/Operations Staff

C/SS/CAG

SECRET

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SEGRET

Jemy 26.

SUBJECT:

Guidelines for Members of the Select

Committee and Their Staffs While

Traveling Abroad

There have been already and there will continue to

be members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who

wish to travel abroad and be in conversation with our

Stations.

It is important that we agree on guidelines

to avoid serious security problems from arising.

The

following specific guidelines are considered important:

Members of the SSC and members of its staff

should not publicly appear to be abroad for

purposes of investigating ClA installations.

CIA Stations abroad,

all of which are under

one extreme are Stations behind the iron

curtain or in other particularly sensitive

areas which need maximum protection. At

the other extreme are Stations which enjoy

close liaison with the host government and

are thus less sensitive.

In the first case,

strict cover conditions

in sensitive environments, the very presence of

SSC members could be highly provocative by

flaunting the fact of CIA's presence. But

even in countries in which we enjoy a good

liaison with the host country's security

service, there remains a need to be discreet.

Many countries whose services want to be

cooperative with CIA cannot afford public or

parliamentary exposure of the relationship.

Local press publicity pertaining to an SSC

investigation abroad would in almost all

cases be distastefull to a host government.

SECRET:

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- 2 -

In sum, except in the case of very sensitive

areas,

discreet arrangements can be arranged

for SSC visits

to CIA's overseas stations and

with senior officers within the covering Embassy

provided the SSC member does not publicly declare

himself to be on SSC business and maintains his

Station

contacts on a discreet basis.

Members of the SSC and their staff should not

question Station personnel on specaste operational

It is more fitting that Washington be the

place where operational details are conveyed to

the SSC.

It is at Headquarters where the guide-

lines are best understood, where the most complete

and authentic records are

kept (many Stations

finding themselves in dangerous crisis situations,

have periodically destroyed their files).

There

is no reason, however, that Station Chiefs should

not discuss

operations in general terms -- opera-

tional

priorities, the kinds of operations, the

operational environment, relationships with the

Embassy, the service attaches, etc.

Members of the SSC and their staff should not

interview agent personnel.

Foreign agent

personnel frequently are under hostile or

local service scrutiny.

For them to be placed

in touch with SSC members would be to run an

unacceptable risk.

Moreover, serious damage

could be done to agent morale and motivation

if they were to think their role had been

revealed to members of Congress.

Members of the SSC and their staff should not

in most cases be in contact with members of

lost country's intelligence or security services

Many services will find contact with the SSC

politically difficult and will avoid it.

They

further regard that their relationships with ClA,

the information they pass us and the sort of

cooperation extended as a most sensitive matter.

SECRET

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--.

SEGRET

- 3 -

No matter what

assurances are given them,

they would find it difficult and awkward

to

discuss these matters with the SSC or its

staft, and the very tact that such matters

were under investigation could well cause

them

to reassess the desirability of a

relationship with CIA or other U.S.

intelligence agencies.

Exceptions

can

perhaps be made in special cases.

Members of the SSC and their staff should

not visit foreign technical intelligence

installations.

Again there may be exceptions

to this which can be arranged, but in most

countries in which we operate joint technical

opposed to access

the host service would be

opposed to access by Congressional representatives.

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LABLI

S:: 1156EM 15

TOTAL COPIRE REAC

SECRET

RUN E!

REPRODUCTION BY OTIE:

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED_

ARVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED

ACTION UNIT

C/EURG

N

F

ACTION #

STAFF

T 126085

FILE .

IS, c/oPS, c/PS/E

CY-SA :000

E1A165

PAGE 01

D/OLC

, C/PS/PL

3

4

5

6

IN 628738

TOR1301301Z JUN 75

LOND

628897

SECRET 301128Z JUN 75 STAFF

CITE LONDON 628897

WENT

TO: DIRECTOR.

RYBAT

KEF WIRECTOR 712872

1, IN MEETING WITH COS ON JO JUNE• AMBASSADOR TOLD COS -

THAT HE HAD LUNCH WITH SENATOR MONDALE ON 28 JUNE AND ENGAGED.

IN BRIEF GENERAL DISCUSSION OF INVESTIGATION OF BKHERALD BY

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE: AMBASSADOR FOUND SENATOR MONDALE

ENTIRELY REASONABLE IN HIS APPRUACH AND FULLY AWARE OF DIFFICULTY

OF JUDGING EVENTS AND DECISIONS OF EARLY 196D'S BY STANDARDS

NOF 1975.

2, AMBASSADOR REPORTED THAT SENATOR MONDALE STATED THAT

HE HAD MADE SOME EFFURT TO CONTACT BRITISH ON JUNE 28 WITHOUT

SUCCESS, IN LIGHT OF REF, COS DID NOT ATTEMPT TO CONTACT

SENATOR MONDALE ON 28 JUNE, IN CONVERSATION WITH COS ON SO JUNE,

RICHARD SYKES, CHAIRMAN, JIC, REPORTED THAT BRITISH EMBASSY

IN WASHINGTON LAST WEEK FORWARDED REQUEST FROM SENATOR MONDALE

TO MEET WITH BRITISH ON 38 JUNE. SINCE SYKES HAD TO BE IN

PARIS ON 28 JUNE AND HOOPER HAD NOT YET RETURNED FROM HIS ASIAN

"SECRET

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SQUING OFFICE IS PRONIBI

STAFF

3

5

PAGE 02-02

TOR1301301Z JUN 75

IN 620738

LOND

628897

TRIP, U.K: EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON WAS ASKED TO INFORM MONDALE

THAT THEY WOULD NOT BE AVAILABLE AT THAT TIME, THIS IS FOR

YOUR BACKGROUND IN EVENT SENATOR RAISES THE POINT WITH HOS.

E2 IMPDET.

SEC

R

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## Page 194

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.?.

CALLE

he Distant

PE.H

PENSON. UNIT NOTIFIEL-

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED'SLOTTED

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TOTAL COPIE:

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2

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ACTION

dalip 3.

T 121509

EXA815

PAGE D1

TOR1271651t JUN 75

IN 619528

BONN

41001

SECRET 271217Z JUN 75 STAFF

CITE BONN 41001

TO: DIRECTOR.

RYBAT

FROM GRAVER

REF DIRECTOR 708791

1, IT WILL GREATLY FACILITATE PLANNING SCHEDULE FOR SENATOR

MONDALE IF A MORE SPECIFIC ITINERARY CAN BE OBTAINED TOGETHER

WITH SOME INDICATION UF HOW MUCH TIME THE SENATOR PLANS TO MAKE

AVAILABLE TO US DURING HIS BONN VISIT, IN VIEW OF THE UNUSUAL

CIRCUMSTANCE IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC THAT GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES ARE

NOT CENTRALLY LOCATED IN ONE PLACE, PLUS THE SPECIAL NATURE OF

BERLINO I AM GIVING THOUGHT TO HAVING CHIEFS OF BASE BERLIN AND

MUNICH PARTICIPATE BUT AS OF PRESENT TIME WE UNCERTAIN EVEN WHAT

DAY SENATOR WILL ACTUALLY BE IN BONNA

2, WE ALSO PERPLEXEU BY PARA 6 REF RE "SIMILAR INDEPENDENT

CONTACT WITH THE BND" SINCE, AS HOS AWARE, THE BND IS LOCATED

IN MUNICH, WE ARE EQUALLY PUZZLED BY THE COMMENT IN PARA 7

ABOUT 'SEEING THE WESTPORT FACILITY WHICH SEEMS TO SUGGEST

RESURGENCE OF LONG-STANDING MISCONCEPTION THAT WESTPORT IS A

SECRET

---

## Page 195

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TOTAL COPIES

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RUN EY

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STAFF

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ACTION UNIT

RF. FILE

BY

AT

VR

N

2

3

5

ACTION #

T 121509

E1A815

PAGE D2-D2

IN 619528

TOR 2716514 JUN 75

BONN 41001

PHYSICAL FACILITY HOUSING AND PROCESSING DEFECTORS, THERE

IS NO WESTPORT FACILITY AS SUCH, JUST A FEW SAFE APARTMENTS

IN FRANKFURT, AND 1 PLAN TO BRIEF THE SENATOR ON WESTPORT

ACTIVITIES AS PART OF THE BONN FRESENTATION, IF THE SENATOR

PLANS TO VISIT ANY OTHER LUCATION IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC IN

ADDITION TU BONN WE URGENTLY REQUEST EARLY ADVICE THEREDF.

3, ASSUME SENATOR HAS BEEN BRIEFED IN GENERAL TERMS AT LEAST

ON AGENCY PROCEDURES FOR TRACING AND CLEARING OPERATIONAL SOURGES,

REPORTING ON THEIR ACTIVITIES, AND AGENCY FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING

PROCEDURES, BUT WOULD PLAN USE THESE PROCEDURES AS FRAMEWORK

IN DESCRIBING EXERCISE OF CONTROL AND SUPERVISION IN THE FIELD,

IN AUDITION TO PROVIDING GENERALIZED DESCRIPTION OF MAJOR AREAS

OF STATION OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY.

4, WILL GREATLY APPRECIATE ETA UF SENATOR AND PARTY BONN

AS SOON AS THIS CAN POSSIBLY BE PROCURED, EZ IMPDET.

S E. C

R'Et

---

## Page 196

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ACTION UNIT

RF.

GEUR6

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F

FILE.

ACTION •

12 05 65

E1A892

TOTAL COPIES 9 - 1

SECRET

RUN B•

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER 1

ISBUING OFFICE IS PROHIBI

STAFF PRECEDENC

VR GUAN, DDO, OLE, IS,

PAGE 01

TOR82711197 JUN 75

IN 619109

LOND 62823

SECRET 271112Z JUN 75 STAFF

CITE LONDON 62823

TOS IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR.

11t13.

RYBAT

REF A, DIRECTOR 708791

8, STATE 146723 DTD 21 JUNE

C. STATE 150884 DTD 26 JUNE

кс *

1, WE NOTE CHANGES IN SENATOR MONDALE TRIP.

2, REFS B 8 C INDICATE MONDALE ARRIVING #BONDONE 28 JUNE

DEPARTING 29TH, TRAVELLING NORWAY THEN RETURNING TO WASHINGTON

VIA LONDON ON 7 JULY, NO MENTION OF OTHER MEMBERS OF PARTY

EXCEPT MRS, MONDALE, REALIZE INFO MAY BE COVER FOR TRIP, BUT

WOULD LIKE CLARIFICATION, DOES SENATOR EXPECT BRIEFINGS

LONDON ON 28TH VICE 30 JUNE AND.. I JULY? .

3.

PLS ADVISE, EZ IMPDET

* NO RECORD IN CASLE SECRETABIAT

SECRET

---

## Page 197

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OUTGOING

MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

col

ACP

106

TPE

MRO

OMF

CLASSITICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE MANDLING INDICATOR

STAFF

0

252225Z

DCI

DIRECTOR

oLc, c/ss 3; c/Ps/eGZ.

PALE

OF

PAGES

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMDEN

711716

DISSEM BY: 272

INDEX

NO INDEX

RETURN TO

PER

IP FILES

TO:

LONDON. Y

RYBAT Y

REFS: A. LONDON 62701 IN 616087

B. LONDON 62615 TIN 6L35901 Y

DHB

sent

AS YET WE HAVE NOT HEARD FURTHER ON THE MONDALE VISIT

NOR HAS EUR DIVISION HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO BRIEF ANY OF THE

A MEMBERS OF THE CODEL. IN ANSWER TO YOUR SPECIFIC QUESTIONS,

WE HAVE ALREADY FORWARDED TO LONDON BY SEPARATE CHANNEL THE CLEAR-

ANCE STATUS OF THE PARTY. WE HAVE QUERIED ABOUT THE SENATOR'S

KNOWLEDGE OF THE AGEE CASE? BUT KNOW OF NO SPECIAL BRIEFING GIVEN

HIM. WE PRESUME HE HAS READ THE NEWSPAPERS. SHOULD THE SUBJECT

ARISE, WE ARE PREPARED TO ANSWER HIS QUESTIONS FORTHRIGHTLY.

RATHER THAN DISCUSSING SPECIFIC COVERT ACTION PROJECTS AND DIVULGING

SOURCE NAMES, YOU SHOULD COVER THE GENERAL IDEAS BEHIND COVERT

ACTION ACTIVITIES, THE PURPOSES FOR WHICH THEY WERE DEVELOPED

AND WHY THEY WERE TERMINATED. E2, IMPDET N

DATE:

ORIG:

UNIT:

EXT:

25 JUNE 1975

WILLIAM

W. WELLS

C/EUR

I hell

WILLIAM W. WELLS, CTEUR

RELEASING OFFICER

LASSIFICATION

COOADINATING OFFICENS

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

the tele,

JOHN WALLER, SAIDDO

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

E 2

IMPDET

CL. BY:

---

## Page 198

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ACTION UNIT

0077.

EUR

ACTION A

FILE

DOLC

112809

EIA332

TOTAL COPIES /2-/

SECRET

RUN

RODUCTION BY OTHER THAN

SUING OFFICE IS PROMIBITED

BY

STAFF

VR.

14/00-3. 1

c/1s 17-2

2

3

PAGE D1

TORI 2416227 JUN 75

SECRET. 2414517 JUN 75 STAFF

CITE LONDON 62781

TOI DIRECTOR.

RYBAT

REF A, DIRECTOR 708791

8, LONDON 62615 f 613590)

WEN

DHB

JW

1, RE PARA 5 REF A, RICHARD SYKES, CHAIRMANO JIC.

INFORMED COS AT LUNCH 24 JUNE THAT AS RESULT OF REQUEST FROM

SENATOR MONDALE VIA MURRAY SIMONS, SYKES AND SIR LEONARD

HOOPER ARE TENTATIVELY PLÄNNING TO MEET WITH SENATOR MONDALE

ON 1 JULY TO DISCUSS BOTH HOW POLICY CONTROL

IS EXERCISED OVER

BRITISH INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND HOW BRITISH OFFICIAL

SECRETS ACT WORKS,

2, SYKES MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE AND HOOPER WERE THE

ONLY ONES AUTHORIZED TO DEAL WITH SENATOR MONDALE AND THAT

SENATOR MONDALE WILL NOT BE MEETING WITH GNGRAPH OR JAGUAR

REPS.

EZ. IMPDET

3, WOULD APPRECIATE REPLY TO GUIDANCE REQUEST IN REF B.

IN 616087

LOND

62701

SECRET

---

## Page 199

13-00000

SECRET

. )

Review Staff:

24 June 1975

75/1009

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT

Director of Central Intelligence

Senator Gary Hart's Request to Talk

to QJWIN While Traveling in Europe

This is for your information concerning Senator Gary

Hart's request to talk to a former agent while the senator

is traveling in Europe..

The agent is QJWIN.. He was first approached in 1958

through the head of the Luxembourg intelligence service.

At first he was used mainly to spot potential agents in

various European countries.

Later he became the major

asset under ZRRIFLE:

In this capacity he made a brief

visit to the Congo, but took no actions.

On the weekend of 7 June 1975, members of the Senate

Select Committee staff spent many hours at Headquarters

reading files, including QJWIN and ZRRIFLE, among others.

QJWIN's true name contract is in the file which they read.

So is a street and post office address as of 1964, the

time when we ended our contract with this agent.

We have

not contacted him since.

We have heard that David Aaron of the Senate Select

Committee staff telephoned QJWIN.

This report remains

unconfirmed.

We have protested to Bill Miller.

It is difficult to imagine how a U.S. senator could

talk to a former agent without arousing the interest of

the local intelligence service (probably Luxembourg) and

of the host government who might wonder about the propriety

of investigations being conducted on their territory and

involving one of their citizens.

In any event, an approach of this nature would be

of interest to the Department of State, and the senator

might wish to consult with the Department before proceeding.

Weet Eler

Walter Elder

CB:

007789

E2 IMPDET

SECRET

---

## Page 200

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SECRET

Talking Points For Use With Senator Gary Hart On His Proposed

Contact With QJWYN

1..

Senatorial contact with a former CIA agent would run the

risk of his exposure to his local government and the press.

Because of his former activities and relationships he

might be subjected to reprisals from abroad, possible

prosecution for espionage at home from his local govern-

ment and harassment from the media.

2.

Active as well as former CIA agents abroad would have

further cause to believe that the American intelligence

service is incapable of protecting its informants from dis-

closure. Contacting an agent under the insecure conditions

involved would violate the Agency's promise to this former

informant to protect the confidentiality of the relationship.

3.

Foreign intelligence services with which the CIA is in

liaison would find this approach highly unprofessional

and risky. It is bound to raise further questions about

the dangers of continued confidential cooperation with

the CIA.

4.

It is possible that the local government involved might

lodge a formal protest to the US mission protesting the

unusual procedure of a Senate investigating committee

interrogating its nationals in violation of its sovereignty

without requesting formal permission.

6/24/75

014359

-Tood thatter C! E.O. 11952

::. 133, (3).

faienatocky costars

Daid Aapocable do Deteriatio

SECRET

---

## Page 201

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SECRET

Exei tra Ragistry

75-6905

Review Staff:

20 June 1975

75/868

HEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

This is for your information concerning Senator Gary

Hart's request to talk to a former agent of ours while

traveling in Europe.

You should know that we have been told that tha

Senate Select Committee staff has airsady been in touch

with this agent by telaphone.

We do not know hon they

learned his true name or his whereabouts.

We have already

advised Davia Aaron of the Senate Select Cormittee staff

of a potential problen area in connection with such a

proposed neeting.

The agent in question is, of course,

a subject of interast to the local intelligence service

and we doubt that the host government or the intelligence

service would agree that a United States senator, especially

a member of the Senate Select Committee, may appropriately

conduct such investigations within its territory without

clearance to do so.

In any event, an approach of this nature would ba

of interest and indeed of concern to the Department of

State and the senator might be well advised to consult

with them before proceeding.

For your information, the agant referred to is

QJwIN and we have not been in touch with hin since about

1951.

Walter Elder

oldertondcaried.

crig to DeI:

E8

CB: 007789

82 IMPDET

SECRET

---

## Page 202

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6/25 D00

MEMORANDUM FOR: DC/ ADU

50/000

More facts, per your

request, on the OrWiN

matter.

Tacking pant you your

use with

Sen. Gary Hart

are included.

#. Knache-

6-27-25

(DATE)

FORM NO.

! AUG 54

101

REPLACES FORM 10-101

WHICH MAY

BE USEd.

---

## Page 203

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PROPOSED DOD

CHANGES SHAWN

HERE, PA 2 and 5

WITHIN

BENCKETS,

THE HEAV

SUBJECT:

GUIDELINES FOR MEMBERS OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE AND

THEIR STAFFS WHILE TRAVELING ABROAD

There have been already and there will continue to be members

of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who wish to travel abroad and

talk to U.S. embassy and intelligence personnel. It is essential

that we agree on guidelines to avoid serious diplomatic and security

problems. The following specific guidelines are applicable.

I. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC SHOULD NOT PUBLICLY APPEAR TO BE

ABROAD FOR THE PURPOSE OF INVESTIGATING U.S. INTELLIGENCE

INSTALLATIONS.

Most of these installations, including all CIA stations

abroad,

for example, are under some form of cover, or are maintaining

a low profile. Certainly all have and need varying degrees of

protection from exposure. At one extreme are U.S. intelligence

activities behind the iron curtain. These clearly need maximum

protection. Ther mere visit of SSC representatives could be

noted as evidence of U.S. intelligence presence within the

country. Even in those countries where U.S. intelligence

efforts enjoy the shielding and other benefits flowing from

close liaison with the host government, care is required to

avoid the potentially grave political repercussions that

25. June- latest version, incorporating

proposed changes by DoD.

---

## Page 204

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2

could result to U.S. and host country activities from exposure

of such liaison.

Several foreign governments or entities thereof

now willing to cooperate privately with the U.S. in intelligence

agreements-exchanges maintain strong neutral or anti-U.S. foreign

policies; continuation of such agreements-exchanges is therefore

dependent upon avoidance of their public disclosure. In many

cases termination of such agreements would result in the loss

of unique strategic intelligence, and alternate collection

methods are either not available or are prohibitively expensive.

To help maintain the discreet nature of the visit, it would be

preferable if some reason other than SSC business could be

given to explain any visits by SSC members and staff. No

deliberate contact should be made with the local press, nor

should comments on SSC matters be supplied if investigating

officers are contacted by the press. Local press publicity

pertaining to an SSC investigation abroad would in almost all

cases be distasteful to the host government.

In sum, except in the case of especially sensitive areas,.

discreet arrangements

; can be made for SSC visits to certain U.S.

intelligence activities overseas on a case by case basis, and with

senior officers within the covering embassies. Such visits are

contingent upon the SSC member not publicly declaring himself

to be on SSC business at the time of the visit or upon his

return, and his proceeding on a basis satisfactory to the Ambassador.

---

## Page 205

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3

II.

THE AMBASSADOR AT THE EMBASSY VISITED WILL BE IN CHARGE

OF THE VISIT.

All arrangements and contacts will be made by him, and because

of his knowledge of local situations, his advice will be binding.

TA 22.

HII. FIELD DISCUSSIONS WITH U.S. INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL SHOULD BE

CONDUCTED ONLY IN GENERAL TERMS.

It is more fitting that Washington be the place where operational

details are conveyed to the SSC. Field intelligence elements

will only discuss operations in general terms--operational

priorities, the kinds of operations conducted, the operational

enviromment, relationships with the Embassy and defense attaches,

etc. In all cases, such discussions will only be conducted in

physical surroundings which meet appropriate security standards.

Members and staff of the SSC should refrain from asking to

see texts of or general notes on intelligence agreements between

the U.S. and the host government. These are usually considered

by the host government as extremely sensitive, politically and

operationally, and cannot be divulged without the consent of

the host government.

IV.

MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC WILL NOT INTERVIEW AGENT PERSONNEL.

Foreign agent personnel frequently are under hostile or local

service scrutiny. For them to be placed in touch with SSC members

---

## Page 206

13-00000

v.

VI.

would be to run an unacceptable risk. Moreover, serious

damage would be done to agent morale and motivation if their

identity were to be revealed to Members or staff of the SSC.

MEMBERS OF HOST COUNTRY INTELLIGENCE OR SECURITY SERVICES

WILL, BE CONTACTED ONLY IN EXCEPTIONAL. CASES.

Many foreign intelligence services will find contact with the

SSC politically difficult and will avoid it. They further regard

that their relationships with U.S. intelligence activities, the

information they pass, and

the cooperation extended are all most

sensitive matters. Regardless what assurances are given them,

they would find it difficult and awkward to discuss these matters

with members or staff of the SSC. The very fact that such matters

were under investigation could well cause the host service to

reassess the desirability of a relationship with U.S. intelligence

activities.

MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC SHOULD NOT VISIT FOREIGN TECHNICAL

INTELLIGENCE INSTALLATIONS.

In those countries in which we operate joint technical collection

sites, the host would be firmly opposed to access by U.S.

Congressional representatives, especially where there is public

knowledge of the Congressional investigating interests. If such

---

## Page 207

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5

a visit is considered essential, a special request must be

negotiated with the host country in advance.

Senate Select. Committee principals and staff should

understand the distinction between U.S. intelligence

installations abroad and joint U.S.-foreign intelligence

installations or foreign intelligence installations supported

by the U.S. intelligence community. Access to the former

is at the discretion of the U.S. Ambassador; access to the

latter two

is at the discretion of the foreign government

involved.

VII. AN ORIENTATION BRIEFING WILL BE PROVIDED ALL MEMBERS AND STAFF,

PRIOR TO DEPARTURE.

This briefing will be conducted by the DCI and other representa..

tives of the Intelligence Comnunity (CIA, NSA, DIA, State, etc.),

as appropriate.

The purpose of this briefing is to familiarize

the visitor with the types of activities conducted at each

location, the restraints which are imposed upon U.s. activities

in each case and the considerations which preclude the discussion

of

operational details, names and terms in an overseas environment.

- Members

and staff of the SSC should bear in mind at all times that

they and their activities are matters of great interest to öpposition

intelligence services, as well as to the press. Committee and staff

members, particularly those who are publicly prominent, can hardly

travel inconspiciously and will be easily recognized.

---

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N

TOTAL COPIES 11722

SECRET

RUN DY

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA

IBBUINO OFFICE IS PRONIDITENI

STAFF

_AI

chées

ACTION M

T 105747

EI A405

PAGE DI

TORI201921Z JUN 75

IN 613598

LOND

62615

SECRET 201745Z JUN 75 STAFF

CITE LONDON 62615

TOI DIRECTOR,

RYBAT

REF A, DIRECTOR 707518

B, DIRECTOR 708791

1: THANK YOU FOR ADVICE REGARDING SENATOR MONDALE'S

PROPOSED VISIT, AND AMBASSADOR ÄND MINISTER HAVE BOTH BEEN

ALERTED.

2, IN RESPONSE TO PARA 6 REF A, COS PLANS TO BRIEF SENATOR

MONDALE ON STRUCTURE OF THE BRITISH INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

AND THE NATURE OF OUR INTERFACE WITH IT WITH PARTICULAR STRESS

ON THE GROUND RULES. GOVERNING OUR RELATIONSHIP. COS WILL ALSO

COVER THE STATION'S ORGANIZATION, PRIORITIES, AND THE GENERAL

KINDS OF OPERATIONS BEING RUN.

IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO HAVE

ANSWERS TO A NUMBER OF SPECIFIC QUESTIONS THAT OCCUR TO US!

A. WHAT: CLEARANCES DO SENATOR MONDALE AND HIS TWO STAFF.

ASSISTANTS

BO: TO WHAT EXTENT HAS THE SENATOR BEEN INFORMED

ABOUT AGEE CASE, AND IN WHAT DETAIL SHOULD THIS CASE BE COVERED

WITH HIM AND HIS TWO

ASSISTANCTS?

C. TO WHAT EXTENT SHOULD

SECRET

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BY OTHER

ISBUING OFFICE I8 PROMIS

BY

AT

STAFF

VR.

ACTION #

7: 105747

E1A4 05

PAGE 02-02

•TOR:201921Z JUN

75

IN 613590

LOND

62615

SPECIFIC CA PROJECTS BE DESCRIBED, ASSUME THERE IS. NOT OBJECTIONS

TO POINTING OUT THE DAMAGE DONE BY LEAKAGE IN WASHINGTON TO

TOHAWKBIT, AS A WAY OF DRAMATIZING THE NEED FOR SECURITY IN THE

COURSE OF THE SENATE INVESTIGATION. D.

IF THE STATION

IS TO BE RESPONSBIBLE FOR THE SENATOR!S HOTEL AND TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS.

WE WOULD APPRECIATE BEING SO INFORMED. E2 IMPDET

-47395

SECRET

12072205

---

## Page 210

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r..

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTEH USE ONLY

AGE

cor

-rod

TRE

MRO

17-86

PAGE

oF

OMF 0

D

CIASSITICATION

SCRE

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE-TIME GROUP

cre

STAFF

1017337

DIRECTOR

CONF: C EURCO INFO: FILE ClIPIAN,

o, osalso,

c/polEGa, plore, plies

clerlor 3,

TO: LONDON. VIENNA, BONN, PARIS INFO OSLO, HELSINKI. Y

MESSAGÈ REFERENCE NUMBER

708771

DISSEM BY:

INDEX

NO INDEX

RETURN TO

PER

D

IA FRES

WEN

REF: DIRECTOR 707518 ENOT NEEDED OSLO, HELSINKIE A P

1. CREF CONCERNED VISIT OF SENATOR MONDALE TO EUROPE IN EARLY

JULY ON SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTIGATION ACTIVITIES.} Y

2. SENATOR MONDALE'S ITINERARY IS NOT YET FIRM. NOW APPEARS

HE WILL ARRIVE LONDON ON 30 JUNE FOR TWO-DAY STAY THEN PROCEED

OSLO AND HELSINKI FOR VISITS NOT CONNECTED WITH SENATE SELECT

COMMITTEE ACTIVITIES. CURRENT PLANS BRING HIM TO VIENNA ? JULY FOR

TWO-DAY STÄY THEN TO PARIS EL DAYI AND BONN (2 DAYSI. NO DECISION

DIRECTLY FROM

YET AS TO WHICH CITY WILL BE VISITED ENSE VIENNA -Y

3. MR. DAVID AARON ADVISES THAT SENATOR WISHES THE DISCUSSIONS

TO BE GENERIC IN NATURE. HE WANTS TO KNOW THE STATIONS' PRIORITIES

AND THE GENERAL KINDS OF OPERATIONS BEING RUN, BUT HE IS NOT SEEKING

SPECIFICS. Y

4.. MR. AARON STATES THERE WILL BE NO PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT

OF SELECT COMMITTEE CONNECTIONS, AND IT IS NOT YET CLEAR WHETHER

THE SENATOR'S PARTY WILL BE TRAVELING BY AIR FORCE OR COMMERCIAL

DATE:

ORIG:

UNIT:

EXT:

CLASSIFICATION

PELTASING OFFICER

COOROINATINO OFFICERS

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

AUTMENTICATINO DRAICEN

E 2

IMPDET

CL BY:

N12444

---

## Page 211

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SIGNAL CENTER USE ONL

col

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: roa

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OMF O0

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

STAFF

TPA

PAGE

2

or

PADES

DATE-TiME GROUP

MESSA

RENCE NUMBER

DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO: FILE

708798

INDEX

NO INOEX

RETURN TO

DISSEM BY:

PER

IP FILES

#

AIRCRAFT.Y

5. FOR LONDON. MR. AARON HAS BEEN IN TOUCH WITH MURRAY

SYMONDS BUT NOT THROUGH CIA ARRANGEMENT.- SENATOR MONDALE HAS

ASKED FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE CAND PROBABLY MI-6}

ON THE BRITISH OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT AND HOW THE BRITISH COMMAND

AND CONTROL AUTHORITIES RUN WITHIN THE BRITISH SERVICE. WE ARE

NOT ASKED FOR ANY ASSISTANCE IN THIS AFFAIR. Y

6. FOR BONN. SENATOR MONDALE PLANS A SIMILAR INDEPENDENT

GERMAN EMBASSY AND THE BMD XI

CONTACT WITH THE 200 X

?. IN A GENERAL REVIEW OF THE TRIP, MR. AARON SAID THAT IN

VIENNA THE SENATOR WOULD WISH TO DISCUSS EAST/WEST RELATIONS AND

HOW THESE AFFECT THE OPERATIONAL PICTURE IN THAT CITY. IN BONN

THE SENATOR WILL WISH TO LOOK INTO COUNTRY TEAM RELATIONS AND

MAY ALSO BE INTERESTED IN SEEING THE WESTPORT FACILITY. IN PARIS

THE SENATOR WILL EXPECT TO REVIEW THE STATION'S VARIED PROGRAM. 4

8. WE NOTED THE SENATOR'S INVESTIGATION MAY STILL BE SUBJECT.

TO HIGHER LEVEL EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT DIRECTION OF WHICH WE HAVE NOT

YET BEEN INFORMED. EZ, IMPDET •N

DATE:

17 JUNE 1975

ORIG:

WILLIAM W. WELLS E.H. KNOCHE

Eitkeache

UNIT:

C/EUR

EXT:

UTITAN

.M. Will

U. WELLS, C/EUR

RELEASING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

COORDINATING OFFICERS

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

JOHN'

WALLER, SAIDDO

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

IMPDET

CL BY:

---

## Page 212

13-00000

SECRET

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE AND PLACE:

17 June 1975 1000 - 1100

Room 2E-45

SUBJECT:

Conversation by Mr. John waller, SA/Do with

Mr. David Aaron, member of Senator Mondale's

staff, with Regard to the Senator's Proposed

Trip to Europe

1.

According to Mr. Aaron the Senator and Mr. Aaron's itinerary,

while not yet fixed, will be along the following lines:

a. 30 June - 1 July: London

b. Monday, 7 June: Vienna, for one day

c. Paris and Bonn. Although the order has not yet been

determined, the Bonn stop would be two days and the

Paris stop, one day.

In the period between London and Vienna, the party intends to visit

Oslo and Helsinki. The purpose of this part of the trip, however,

has nothing to do

with the SSC and the party does not want or need

Station contact.

2. Mr. Aaron agrees that in discussions with Stations, the

party should not get into specific operational cases.

They want to

discuss "more generic" subjects: operational priorities, relations

with the imbassy robest scene dated is commend and controions,

command and control"

It had occurred to Aaron that Vienna would be a good example of a

Station which concentrates on "East - West" operations (read third

country, Sov and Sov Bloc operations).

He recognized London was a

liaison

station.

Mondale, however, was anxious to talk to Cord Meyer..

SECRET

E2 IMPDET

CL BY 055636

---

## Page 213

13-00000

SECRET

- 2 -

Paris, he felt, would provide some understanding of "third world"

operations.

Bonn, he felt, would be a good example of the inter-

relations of a CIA Station with the Military and the Foreign Service.

3.

Mr. Aaron stated that he had already sought out Mr. Simon

of the British Embassy, requesting that contacts be arranged in

London with the appropriate Foreign Office or Intelligence Offices

in order to discuss the British experiences in "command and control".

Aaron is also interested in how the British Official Secrets Act

works.

He had heard that it was proving inadequate.

Mr. Aaron

stated that Simon had not been enthusiastic about the idea but

promised to look into it. Aaron felt that it had been better to

work directly with Simon, whom he claimed to know, than to involve

the Agency's go-between.

4. Mr. Aaron intended to make a similar approach to the German

Embassy.

S. Mr. waller commented that such approaches to foreigr

governments would make our liaison services uneasy and could

adversely affect their willingness to cooperate.

To this reason,

we did not favor involving foreign governments -- at whatever

level or wherever in the bureaucracy.

Moreover, contacts with

foreign governments increased the likelihood that the true purpose

of the Senator's trip could leak to the press.

Mr. Waller mentioned

that he would want to bring this to the attention of others.

6. Mr. Aaron agreed that the Senator, through press conferences

or otherwise, would not make public the fact that his trip was

connected with Select Committee investigations.

7. Mr. Aaron said that he and the Senator were in touch with

Mr. Hyland of the State Department with regard to this trip.

He

also suggested that they might get in touch with military intelligence

He made specific reference

to "Naval Intelligence"

8.

Mr. Aaron stressed the fact that the itinerary was still

tentative and subject to change.

SEGRET

---

## Page 214

13-00000

-

SECRET

- 3 -

9. At one point, Mr. Aaron asked if CIA had any aircraft

in Europe which

could be put at Senator Mondale's disposal.

Mr. Waller replied negatively.

10.

Mr. Aaron felt that it was unlikely that Mr. Bader

would be a member of the Senator's party.

Distribution:

1 - Mr. Knoche

1

- Мт.

Wells

1

1

Miss Page

Mr. Leader

SECRET

---

## Page 215

13-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY S

PER

TOTAL COPIE 6 - 1

SECRET

RUN BY

ISSUING ON

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED_

STAFF

ADVANCE COPY ISFUED SLOTTIED

ACTION UNIT

N

F

ACTON A

AF. FILE..

96llop3, TOPS, 9PSlEG2

T 892461

EJA462

PAGE 81

TOR81689217 JUN. 75

IN 688574

VIEN 26877

SECRET 165853Z JUN 75 STAFF

CITE VIENNA 26877

TO: DIRECTOR.

RYBAT

REF& DIRECTOR 797518

JW

1. ALTHOUGH WE WOULD GENERALLY PLAN BRIEF SENATOR MONDALE

ON STATIONIS POSITION WITHIN EMBASSY, PRIMARY TARGETS..

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND DEPLOYMENT FOR OPERATIONS, CAN OF

COURSE ADJUST TO SUIT HIS REQUIREMENTS, WHICH HOPEFULLY WILL

COME INTO CLEARER FOCUS AFTER MOS BRIEFING MENTIONED PARA 8 REF.

2. IF POSSIBLE, WOULD APPRECIATE CONFIRMATION THAT STAFF

AIDE, MR. WILLIAM BADER (PARA 2 REFY IS IDENTICAL WITH PERSON OF .

SAEM NAME WHO HAS FORD FOUNDATION REPRESENTATIVE IN PARIS LATE

SIXTIES AND AT THAT TIME HAS NAVAL RESERVE LIEUTENNANT COMMANDER.

3O NO FILE, EZ IMPDET.

SHEUN

..

SECRET

---

## Page 216

13-00000

VUINUIIYT

SIONAL CANTER US& ONLY

сон

ACH

900

MESSHUC

ТРН

COI

OF 0

ОЛЬСАТОР

SECRET

АМОЧІНА КИСТАТОМ

OCI

21-9

PAGE:

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE

STAFF

1416517

DIRECTOR

CONF: C/EUR 6 INFO: FILE DCI, D/ACI,

ДДО.

ClIP/AM, DDOlDO, e/CIlOPs, c/ops, c/LsNhA,

c/PS/EG2,

TO: PRIORITY LONDON, VIENNA, BONN, PARIS. Y

D

SU HUPEREACE MUMBER

707518

DISSEM BY: 38.

шокх

NO ІОНІ ""

MATUANTO. PER

RYBAT Y

SUBJECT: THE VISIT OF SENATOR MONDALE OF MINNESOTA TO EUROPE

AT THE END OF THE MONTH. Y

I. THE SENATORIAL PARTY. WISHES TO VISIT CIA FIELD STATIONS

TO EXAMINE AGENCY COMMAND AND CONTROL. IN THE FIELD. SENATOR

MONDALE WILL WISH TO TALK TO YOU ABOUT HOW STATIONS OPERATE AND

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE STATION AND THE EMBASSY. PRESUMABLY

THE SENATOR WILL ALSO WISH TO EXAMINE OUR MN COUNTRY TEAM RELATIONS. Y

2. SENATOR MONDALE WILL BE TRAVELING WITH HIS PERSONAL

AIDE, MR. DAVID AARON, WHO IS THE DIRECTOR OF THE TASK FORCE

ON COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTI-

GATING CIA ACTIVITIES. MR. WILLIAM BADERT A SECOND STAFF MEMBER.

MAY ALSO ACCOMPANY THE SENATOR. Y

REQUEST OF

3. HEADQUARTERS WILL SUGGEST DO SENATOR MONDALE THAT HE USE

OTHER REASONS THAN THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTIGATION FOR

VET

HIS TRAVEL IN HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PRESS: WE DO NOT KNOW,

HOWEVER. IF HE WILL AGREE.Y

DATE:

ORIO:

UNIT:

EXT:

MULBADINO DUFICHA

CLANMARATION

SECRET

COOADIMATINO OFFICURS

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROMIBITED

AUTHINTICATHO OFFICHR

E 2

IMPDET

CL BY:

012866

---

## Page 217

13-00000

BIONAL CENTER USE ONLY

col.

ACF

TOO

AGE

OMF •

BLASBIPICATION

Sue Fara FantanEntaron

STAFF

CONF:

TP8

DATE- TIME GROUP

PAGE

INFO: FILE

CITE

DIRECTOR

707578

INORK

NO INDEX

RETURN TO

DISSEM BY:

PER

IP POLE

#

4. YOU SHOULD ADVISE THE AMBASSADOR OF THE SENATOR'S

INTENTIONS TO VISIT HIS MISSION AND THE PURPOSE OF THE VISIT•

PLEASE ASK THE AMBASSADOR TO RESTRICT HIS CORRESPONDENCE TO WASHINGTON

ABOUT THIS TRIP TO EITHER CIA CHANNELS OR THE ROGER CHANNEL.

LATER RESTRICTIONS MAY DE FORTHCOMING: DEPENDING ON HOW SENATOR

MONDALE DECIDES TO HANDLE HIS PUBLIC STATEMENTS. Y

5. THE CODEL'S TENTATIVE ITINERARY IS AS FOLLOWS: DEPART

30 JUNE VIA CUMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT: ARRIVING LONDON I JULY; 2 JULY -

VIENNA: 3-4 JULY - BONN: 5-6 JULY - PARIS; 7-& JULY - LONDON:

•9 JULY - RETURN TO THE U.S...Y

L.. REQUEST EACH COS ADVISE HEADQUARTERS OF HIS PLANS FOR

BRIEFING THE SENATOR.

?.: FOR BONN: SUGGEST YOU CONSIDER A VISIT TO WESTPORT: Y

&. HEADQUARTERS. WILL OFFER A BRIEFING TO SENATOR MONDALE

AND HIS PARTY AT HEADQUARTERS PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE. EZ, IMPDETH

% MORE SpecitiC quiDANcE on opecAtional discussions to

follow.

E.H. KNOCHE-

Exfilucche

Kost elen

SAIDDO

DATE: 13 JUNE

ORIG: WILLIAM

UNIT: C/EUR

EXT:

elt

CLABNFICATION

1975

W. WELLED

COORDIMATINA OFFICERS

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

DDO.

AUTHENTICATINO

E 2

CL BY:

IMPDET

01.2866

---

## Page 218

13-00000

SECRET

SUBJECT:

Guidelines for Members of the Select

Committee and Their Staffs While

Traveling Abroad

There have been already and there will continue to

be members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who

wish

to travel

Stations.

abroad and be in conversation with our

It is important that we agree on guidelines

to avoid serious

security problems from arising.

The

following specific guidelines are considered important:

--

Members of the SSC and members of its staff

should not publicly appear to be abroad for

purposes of investigating CIA installations.

CIA Stations abroad, all of which are under

some form of cover, have and need varying

degrees of protection from exposure.

At

one extreme

are Stations behind the

iron

curtain or in other particularly sensitive

areas which need maximum protection.

At

the other extreme are Stations which enjoy

close liaison with the host government and

are thus less sensitive..

In the Ilrst case,

stations existing under strict cover conditions

in sensitive environments, the very presence of

SSC members could be highly provocative by

flaunting the fact of CIA's presence. But

even in countries in which we

liaison with the host country's security

service, there remains a need to be discreet.

Many countries whose services want to be

cooperative with CIA cannot afford public or

parliamentary exposure of the relationship.

Local press publicity pertaining to an SSC

investigation abroad would in almost all

cases be distastefull to a host government.

SECRET

---

## Page 219

13-00000

SECRET

- 2 -

--

In sum, except in the case of very sensitive

areas,

discreet arrangements can be arranged

for SSC visits to CIA's overseas stations and

with senior officers within the covering Embassy

provided the SSC member does not publicly declare

himself to be on SSC business and maintains his

Station

contacts on a discreet basis.

Members of the SSC and their staff should not

question Station personnel on specific operational

detail. It is more fitting that Washington be the

place where operational details are conveyed to

the SSC.

It is at Headquarters where the guide-

lines are best understood, where the most complete

and authentic records are

kept (many Stations

finding themselves in dangerous crisis situations,

have periodically destroyed their files).

There

is no reason, however, that Station Chiefs should

not discuss

operations in general terms -- opera-

tional priorities, the kinds of operations, the

operational environment, relationships with the

Embassy, the service attaches, etc.

Members of the SSC and their staff should not

interview agent personnel.

Foreign agent

personnel frequently are under hostile or

local service scrutiny. For them to be placed

in touch with SSC members would be to run an

unacceptable risk.

Moreover, serious

damage

could be done to

agent morale and motivation

if they were to think their role had been

their

revealed to members of Congress.

Members of the SSC and their staff should not

in most cases be in contact with members of

ost country's intelligence or security services

Many services will find contact with the SSC

politically difficult and will avoid it. They

further regard that their relationships with CIA,

the information they pass us and the sort of

cooperation extended as a most sensitive matter.

SECRET

---

## Page 220

13-00000

SCURCH

- 3 -

No matter what

assurances are given them,

they would find it difficult and awkward to

discuss these matters with the SSC or its

staff, and the very fact that such matters

were under investigation could well cause

them

to reassess the desirability of a

relationship with CIA or other U.S.

intelligence agencies.

Exceptions can

perhaps be made in special cases.

Members of the SSC and their staff should

not visit foreign technical intelligence

installations. Again there may be exceptions

to this which can be arranged, but in most

countries in which we operate joint technical

collection sites, the host service would be

opposed to access by Congressional representatives.

SEOMET

---

## Page 221

13-00000

-

SUBJECT:

Guidelines for Members of the Select

Committee

and Their Staffs While

Traveling Abroad

There have been already and there will continue to

be members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who

wish to travel abroad and be in conversation with our

Stations.

It is important that we agree on guidelines

to avoid

serious security problems from arising.

The

following specific guidelines are considered important:

Members of the SSC and members of its staff

CIA Stations abroad,

all of which are under

some form of cover, have and need varying

degrees of protection from exposure.

At

one extreme

are Stations behind the iron

curtain or in other particularly sensitive

areas which need maximum protection. At

the other extreme are Stations which enjoy

close liaison with the host government and

are thus less sensitive.

In the first case,

Stations existing under strict cover conditions

in sensitive environments, the very presence oI

SoC members could be highly provocative by

flaunting the fact of CIA's presence. But

even in countries in which we enjoy a good

liaison with the host country's security

service, there remains a need to be discreet.

Many countries whose services want to be

cooperative with ClA cannot afford public or

parliamentary exposure of the relationship.

Local press publicity pertaining to an SSC

investigation abroad would in almost all

cases be distastefull to a host government.

---

## Page 222

13-00000

-.

In sum, except in the case of very sensitive

areas, discreet arrangements can be arranged

for SSC visits to CIA's overseas stations and

with senior officers within the covering Embassy

provided the sol member does not publicly declare

nimself to be on SSC business and maintains his

Station

contacts on a discreet basis.

Members of the SSC and their staff should not.

detailon Station personnel on specific operational

It is more fitting that Washington be the

place where operational details are conveyed to

the sSC.

It is at Headquarters where the guide-

lines are best understood, where the most complete

and authentic records are

kept (many Stations

finding themselves in dangerous crisis situations,

have periodically destroyed their files). There

is no reason, however, that Station Chiefs should

not discuss operations in general terms -- opera-

tional priorities, the kinds of operations, the

operational environment, relationships with the

Embassy, the service attaches, etc.

Members of the SSC and their staff should not

interview agent personnel.

Foreign agent

personnel frequently are under hostile or

local service scrutiny.

For them to be placed

in touch with SSC members would be to run an

unacceptable risk.

Moreover, serious damage

could be done to agent morale and motivation

if they were to think their role had been

revealed to members of Congress.

Members of the SSC and their staff should not

in most cases be in contact with members of

host convers at tige one security services.

politically difficult and will avoid it. They

further regard that their relationships with CIA,

the information they pass us and the sort of

cooperation extended as a most sensitive matter.

---

## Page 223

13-00000

--

- 3 -

No matter what

assurances are given them,

they would find it difficult and awkward to

discuss these matters with the SSC or its

staff, and the very fact that such matters

were under investigation could well cause

them

to reassess the desirability of a

relationship with CIA or other U.s.

intelligence agencies.

Exceptions can

perhaps be made in special cases.

Members of the SSC and their staff should

not visit foreign technical intelligence

installations.

Again there may be exceptions

to this which can be arranged, but in most

countries in which we operate joint technical

collection sites, the host service would be

opposed. to access by Congressional representatives.

---

## Page 224

13-00000

6/18/15

SUBJECT:

Guidelines for Members of the Select Committee and

Their Staffs While Traveling Abroad

There have been already and there will continue to be members

of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who wish to travel abroad and

talk to U.S. embassy and intelligence personnel. It is essential that

we agree on guidelines to avoid serious diplomatic and security problems.

The following specific guidelines are applicable.

I.

MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC SHOULD PUBLICLY APPEAR

TO BE ABROAD FOR SOME PURPOSE OTHER THAN THE

INVESTIGATION OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE INSTALLATIONS.

Most of these installations, including all CIA stations abroad, for

example; are under some form of cover, or are maintaining a low

profile. Certainly all have and need varying degrees of protection

from exposure. At one extreme are U.S. intelligence activities

behind the iron curtain.

These clearly need maximum protection.

The mere visit of SSC representatives could be noted as evidence

, of U.S. intelligence presence within the country.

Even in those

countries where U.S. intelligence efforts enjoy the shielding and

other benefits flowing from close liaison with the host government,

care is required to avoid the potentially grave political repercussions

---

## Page 225

13-00000

that could result to U.S. and host country activities from exposure

of such liaison. Many countries that wish to cooperate with the

United States in intelligence endeavors simply cannot afford pablic

exposure of such relationships. Some reason other than SSC business

should be given to explain any visits by SSC members and staff to

help maintain the discreet nature of the visit. No deliberate contact

should be made with the local press, nor should comments on SSC

matters be supplied if investigating officers are contacted by the

press. Local press publicity pertaining to an SSC investigation abroad

would in almost all cases be distasteful to the host government.

In sum, except in the case of especially sensitive areas, discreet

arrangements can be made for SSC visits to certain U.S. intelligence

activities overseas on a case by case basis, and with senior officers

within the covering embassies. Such visits are contingent upon the

SSC member not publicly declaring himself to be on SSC business.

at the time of the visit or upon his return, and his proceeding on a

basis satisfactory to the Ambassador.

II. THE AMBASSADOR AT THE EMBASSY VISITED WILL BE IN CHARGE

OF THE VISIT.

All arrangements and contacts will be made by him, and because

• of his

knowledge of local situations, his advice will be binding.

---

## Page 226

13-00000

3

I. FIELD DISCUSSIONS WITH U.S. INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL

SHOULD BE CONDUCTED ONLY IN GENERAL TERMS.

It is more fitting that Washington be the place where operational

details are conveyed to the SSC. Field intelligence elements will

only discuss operations in general terms -- operational priorities;

the kinds of operations conducted, the operational environment,

relationships with the Embassy and defense attaches, etc. In all

cases, such discussions will only be conducted in physical surroundings

which meet appropriate security standards.

Members and staff of the SSC should refrain from asking to

see texts of, or general notes on intelligence agreements between the

U.S. and the host government. These are usually considered by the

host government as extremely sensitive, politically and operationally,

and cannot be divulged without the consent of the host government.

::=..

IV. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC WILL NOT INTERVIEW AGENT

PERSONNEL.

Foreign agent personnel frequently are under hostile or local service

scrutiny. For them to be placed in touch with SSC members would be

---

## Page 227

13-00000

4

to run an unacceptable risk. Moreover,

serious damage would be

done to agent morale and motivation if their identity were to be

revealed to Members or staff of the SSC.

V .

MEMBERS OF HOST COUNTRY INTELLIGENCE OR SECURITY

SERVICES WILL BE CONTACIED ONLY IN EXCEPTIONAI CASES.

Many foreign intelligence services will find contact with the SSC

politically difficult and will avoid it. They further regard that their

relationships with U.S. intelligence activities, the information they

pass, and the cooperation extended are all most sensitive matters.

Regardless what assurances are given them, they would find it

difficult and awkward to discuss these matters with members or

staff of the SSC. The very fact that such matters were under investigation

*.*.

could well cause the host service to reassess the desirability of a

relationship with U.S. intelligence activities.

VI, MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC SHOULD NOT VISIT FOREIGN

TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE INSTALLATIONS.

In those countries in which we operate joint technical collection sites,

the host would be firmly opposed to access by U.S. Congressional

representatives, especially where there is public knowledge of the

Congressional investigating interests. If such a visit is considered

---

## Page 228

13-00000

essential, a special request must be negotiated with the host country

in advance.

VII. AN ORIENTATION BRIEFING WILL BE PROVIDED ALL MEMBERS

AND STAFE, PRIOR TO DEPARTURE.

This briefing will be conducted by the DCI and other representatives

of the Intelligence Community (CIA, NSA, DIA, State, etc.), as

appropriate. The purpose of this briefing is to familiarize the

visitor with the types of activities conducted at each location, the

restraints which are imposed upon U.S. activities in each case and

the considerations which preclude the discussion of operational details,

names and terms in an overseas environment.

Members and staff of the SSC should bear in mind at all times that

they and their activities are matters of great interest to opposition

intelligence services, as well as to the press. Committee and staff

members, particularly those who are publicly prominent, can hardly

travel inconspiciously and will be easily recognized.

---

## Page 229

13-00000

MEMBET

SECRET

SUBJECT: Guidelines for Members of the Select

Committee and Their Staffs While

Traveling Abroad

There have been already and there will continue to

be members of the Senate Select Committee

(SSC) who

wish

to travel abroad and be in conversation with our

Stations.

It is important that we agree on guidelines

to avoid serious security problems from arising.

The

following specific guidelines are considered important:

Members of the SSC and members of its staff

hould not publicly appear to be abroad fol

urposes of investigating CIA installations

CIA Stations abroad, all of which are under

some form of cover, have and need varying

degrees of protection trom exposure.

one extreme are Stations behind the iron

curtain or in other particularly sensitive

areas which need maximum protection. At

the other extreme are Stations which enjoy

close liaison with

the host government and

are thus less sensitive. In the first case,

Stations

existing under

strict cover conditions

in sensitive environments, the very presence of

SSC members could be highly provocative by

flaunting the fact of CIA's presence. But

i on thir

even in countries in which we enjoy a

good

liaison with the host country's security

service, there remains a need to be discreet.

Many countries whose services want to be

cooperative with CIA cannot afford public or

parliamentary exposure of the relationship.

Local press publicity pertaining to an ssl

investigation abroad would in almost all

cases be distastefull to a host government.

SECHET

---

## Page 230

13-00000

SECRET

- 2 -

In sum, except in the case of very sensitive

areas, discreet arrangements can be arranged

for SSC visits

to CIA's overseas stations and

with

senior officers within the covering Embassy

provided the SSC member does not publicly declare

himself to be on SSC business and maintains his

Station

contacts on a discreet basis.

Members of the SSC and their staff should not

question Station personnel on specific operational

de tail.

It is more fitting that Washington be the

place where operational details are conveyed to

the SSC.

It is at Headquarters where the guide-

lines are best understood, where the most complete

and authentic records are

kept (many Stations

finding themselves in dangerous crisis situations,

have periodically destroyed their files). There

is no

reason, however, that Station Chiefs should

not discuss operations in general terms - opera-

tional

priorities, the kinds of operations, the

operational environment, relationships with the

Embassy, the service attaches, etc.

Members of the SSC and their staff should not

interview agent personnel.

Foreign

personnel frequently are under hostile or

local service scrutiny. For them to be placed

in touch

with SSC members would be to run an

unacceptable risk.

Moreover, serious damage

could be done to agent morale

and motivation

if they were to think their role had been

revealed to members of Congress.

Members of the SSC and their staff should not

in most cases be in contact with members of

host country's intelligence or security services.

Many services will find contact with the SSC

politically difficult and will avoid it. They

further regard that their relationships with CIA,

the information they pass

us and the sort of

cooperation extended

as a most sensitive matter.

SECRET

---

## Page 231

13-00000

--

- 3 -

No matter what

assurances are given them,

they would find it difficult and awkward to

discuss these matters with the SSC or its

staff, and the very fact that such matters

were under investigation could well cause

them

to reassess the desirability of a

relationship with CIA or other U.S.

intelligence agencies.

Exceptions can

perhaps be made in special cases.

Members of the SSC and their staff should

not visit foreign technical intelligence

installations. Again there may be exceptions

to this which can be arranged, but in most

countries in which we operate joint technical

collection sites, the host service would be

opposed to access by Congressional representatives.

SEGRET

---