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А насік

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE COMMITTEE

OiL

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

Staff Interview

Wednesday, November 5, 1975

Washington, D. C.

HH 55301

Official Reporters to Committees

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AXECULIVE GUNSTON

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STAFF INTERVIEW

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Wednesday, November 5, 1975

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House of Representatives

Select Committee on Intelligence,

Washington, D. C.

The staff interview began at 2:00 o'clock p.m.; in Room

B-316, Raykurn House Office Building,

Present: James Oliphant, John Atkisson, and Richard

Vermeire, Committee Counsel.

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Mr. Field.

Do you solemnly swear the testimony you

are about to give to the House Select Committee on Intelligence

will be the truth, the whole truth, so help you God?

Mr. Wannall. Yes.

Mr. Ryan.

Yes.

MT.

Shackelford. Yes.

TESTIMONY

W.. RAYMOND WANNALI, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR,

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, FBI; DAVID RYAN, SUPERVISOR,

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, FBI, AND ROBERT I. SHACKELFORD,

SECTION CHIEF, INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, FBI

Mr. Field. Will you please state your names?

Mr. Wannall. W. Raymond Wannall, Assistant Director,

Intelligence Division, FBI.

Mr. Ryan. David Ryan, Supervisor, Intelligence

Division, FBI.

Mr. Shackel ford,

Robert I. Shackelford, Section

Chief, Intelligence Division, FBI.

Mr. Wannall. May I ask if this will be a classified

hearing?

Mr. Oliphant. The information will be classified and

will not be released publicly without a vote of the

committee.

The Bureau will have a chance to take a look at the

testimony that comes in. If there is something that you

feel should be classified, not released, certainly you

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HN 55301

will be given an opportunity to make your feelings known.

There is a procedure worked out where if there is

severe breakdown in communications or at least on getting

together on what is or what is not classified, that will be

submitted all the way up to the President.

Mr. Wannall

Thank you. I appreciate that.

Mr. Vermeire. I will start the questioning off.

I will iddress my first questions to Mr. Wannall

Mr. Wannall, is there now or has there ever been any elec-

tronic surveillance of Congressmen?

Mr. Wannall. There has never, to my knowledge, been in

the national security area, and that is the area in which I

do have knowledge, a wiretap of any Members of Congress.

Mr. Vermeire. More specifically, do you know of any time

there was any wiretap or microphonic surveillance or any

electronic. surveillance in general ever targeted at a

Congressman Cooley?

Mr. Wannall, I am aware of the fact that several years

ago there was a microphone surveillance in a hotel room

in New York City which was occupied, as I recall, by officials

of a foreign government, or at least persons connected

with a foreign government. Congressman Cooley called at

that room and was overheard as a result of that microphone

surveillance.

Mr. Vermeire. Was this fact ever made known to

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the Directoi, who I believe was Mr. Hoover at the time?

Mr. Wannall. Yes, it was.

Mr. Vermeire. : It was made known to him?

Mr. Wannall. Yes.

Mr. Vermeire. By whom?

Mr. Wannall. Not by myself. I was not in a position

to do it. I recall seeing

memoranda indicating Mr. Hoover

was aware of it. I would only be speculating as to who

might have sent the memorandum to him. I assume it would have

gone through channels, through the Assistant Director, through

the Assistant to the Director, the Associate Director,

and Mr. Hoover.

• Mr. Vermeire. Did you have any conversations at any

time with respect to this matter with Mr. William Sullivan,

formerly with the FBI?

Mr. Wannall. Mr. Sullivan was the Assistant Director

at the time I think because this had to be sometime in the

early '60s.

He became Assistant Director, as

recall,

about early 1961, so I would certainly have had conversations

with him about it.

Mr. Vermeire. Do you recall any of the specifics

of those conversations?

Mr. Wannall. It is difficult to recall specifics.

I am certain that discussion was had as to the advisability

of putting a microphone coverage on. I cannot recall whether

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this was in the nature of conversations or memoranda

which were submitted by the section with which I was connected

at the time.

Mr. Vermeire. Do you recall a conversation more

specirically to the effect that--to Mr. Sullivan--that you had

advised Mr. Hoover incorrectly that no electronic surveillance

was done on any Congressman and the name of Congressman

Cooley came to your mind and you were concerned about Mr.

Hoover not having correct information at his command?

Do you recall any conversation to that effect?

Mx. Wannall. Yes, I not only recall the conversation,

if I'm not mistaken, sometime in the late '60s a memorandum

was prepared, or

perhaps two, in connection with that.

At the time there were charges, I think, being made by a

Member of Congress regarding wire taps made extensively

of members of Congress. Mr. Hoover made a statement to the

effect there had never been any electronic surveillances,

which is a broader term than wiretap. I recalled not having

called it to Mr. Hoover's attention. I didn't personally

do that. I think I probably called it to Mr. Sullivan's

attention at the time.

MI. Vermeire. Did you at any time ever call it to

Mr. Hoover's attention after talking to Mr. Sullivan?

Mr. Wannall. Personally? io, sir..

Mr. Vermeire.

You say there was a memorandum. Did

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the memorandum you are speaking of refer specifically

to your conversations with Mr. Sullivan in this respect

or is the memorandum referring to electronic surveillance

of Congressmen in general?

Mr. Wannall. The memorandum I am referring to, and

I think there were two, I think I perhaps participated in

preparing one and another was prepared by someone working under

me.

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It related to the fact that there has been an overhearing

of Congressman Cooley as a result of a microphone surveillance.

Just what triggered that, I cannot recall. I probably

could if I could review my files and refresh my recollection

about it.

Mr. Vermeire. That is all I have in that area.

DO

you want to ask any questions with regard to that?

can continue on another line of questioning unless you

have something you want to ask him.

• Mr. Oliphant. Not with regard to that specific area,

no.

Mr. Vermeire. This will again be directed to Mr.

Wannall. Mr._ Wannall is there now within the FBI any

procedure for describing or delineating subversive organiza-

tions or what organizations may be termed subversive or

is there any expertise, if you will, within the

FBI at this time for determining what particular organizations

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or persons might be considered subversive?

Mr. Wannall. We have guidelines in the form of manual

sections. I think the sections have been made available to the

committee staff, Section 87 of our Manual of Instructions,

Section 122 of our Manual of Instructions. I think those

guidelines are the basis on which determinations are made.

If determinations are originated in the field with

respect to an organization, for example, the field will

submit what is called a characertization writeup. That must

come into Headquarters. It must be approved for utilization

in documenting an organization if it is referred to in

a subsequent investigative report.

Mr. Vermeire. With what frequency are these evaluations

updated?

Mr. Wannall.

They must be reviewed once a year.

The instructions are:

If the structure and/or

character, of the organization undergoes any significant

changes in the interim, they must be updated at that time.

Mr. Vermeire. What persons within the FBI would have

charge of updating this?

Whose responsibility would this be?

Mr. Wannallthe responsibility originally rests

on the field. However, each of the characterizations is

reviewed at Headquarters and a tickler is maintained at

Headquarters to assure that at least once every year

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HH 55301

all characterizations are approved and approval granted

at Headquarters.

Mr. Vermeire.

What I was driving at is not the characteriza-

tions of whether X organization meets the criteria for a

subversive organization; what I was aiming at is who at

Headquarters, if anyone, reviews more or less the principles

or the ideology behind various theories of whether an

organization is subversive or not. In other words, do you

still follow

principles or theories as to whether an organiza-

tion is a subversive one which, say, were propounded back

in 1940 or are you continually revising your own information

in this area, your own education, if you will?

Mr. Wannall. Well, our characterizations are not

based on any ideology or philosophy. Itris based on' the nature

of the activities in which the members are engaged.

Our characterizations, therefore, are based upon

investigative results as opposed to ideologies.

• Mr. Vermeire. What kind of activities, for

example,

would fit that criteria?

Mr. Wannall. You always have a judgment situation.

I can give you some theoretical ideas. If we should be

investigating an organization and determine that it is

stockpiling weapons and at the same aime it is advocating

overthrow by violence of the government, the advocacy would

only be relative insofar as bearing upon the activities.

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Stockpiling weapons is indicative in my mind of an

activity on the part of a group leading toward attaining a

pronounced objective.

Mr. Alkisson. May I interject a question? Are you

saying that advocacy alone of anything is not sufficient

grounds for classifying a group as subversive?

Mr. Wannall. I am saying that without reservation.

Mr. Ryan. Could I add to Mr. Wannall's comment?

A very important consideration is evidence of foreign

influence or control or funding.

Mr. Vermeire. The committee is very concerned with the

FBI's classification of various things having to do with

national security. What would your definition of a national

security interest be?

Mr. Wannall. The definition of national security to

my knowledge has never been put down anywhere so I can only

give you my concept within the framework you are speaking

of, our domestic operations.

Mr. Vermeire. Yes.

Mr. Wannall. Activities which, if uninterrupted, could

lead to the overthrow of the government or violation of

statutes relating to that type of activity.

For example, our principal statutory basis, and we

do have all of our investigations

based on statutes, would be

under the Criminal Code, Title XVIII, Section 2383, which

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relates to rebellion and insurrection; 2384, which

relates to seditious conspiracy; and 2385, the Smith Act,

which relates to advocating the overthrow of the government

by unlawful means.

However, case law has certainly affected the terms used

in the Smith Act, and we must, of course, take into account

such decisions as in Brandenburg versus Ohio, where the

state law on criminal syndicalism was declared to be

unconstitutional because it related only to advocacy. But

we are basing it on the statutes and take cognizance of

the statutes.

Mr. Vermeire. What command and control within the FBI makes

the determination that something is in the interest.of

national security?

Who would make that determination presently?

Mr. Wannall. We are getting into the area of classifying

information. Is this what you mean by that?

I am trying to fix on the question.

Mr. Vermeire. In the respect that something is

classified in the national security interests, obviously, yes,

I'm dealing with classifications.

I don't want to go beyond that particular aspect of it,

though.

Mr. Wannall. We, of course, are guided by the

Executive Order on classification. We have a certain number

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HH 55301

. Of individuals who are authorized to classify. If a

document is classified for national security purposes, a

classification officer must pass upon it.

Mr. Vermeire.

How many such classification officers

are there now within the FBI?

Mr. Wannull. I can get you the precise figure.

Perhaps I can more readily describe who might be a classifying

officer.

Within our division I would have classification

authority. My deputy assistant directors would have classifi-

cation authority and the section chiefs in the operational

sections would have classification authority.

Bob, are there any others?

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Mr. Shackelford. Yes, the unit chiefs in certain

sections where they handle a lot of classified work have

some classification authority, only in certain sections,

though.

Mr.Vermeire. I know this next question is a little

beyond your bailiwick, but would that same principle hold

for sections and units within the other divisions?

Mr. Shackelford. No.

Mr. Vermeire. That is just within the Intelligence

Division?

Mr. Shack@lford. As far as I am aware, because we

handle the bulk of the classified information.

It is based on a need. The general criminal division,

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for example, handles little, if any, classified information.

I don't know for sure. They may have maybe one man who can

classify documents.

I can't say positively, I'm not

sure.

Mr. Vermeire.

Is the judgment as to classification

made by anyone other than yourself reviewed by anyone else?

Mr. Wannall. Every classified document that goes out

of the Bureau in the form of a piece of signature mail has to

go through channels above the level of the Assistant Director.

His initialing a letter would certainly indicate that he

also agrees with the classification assigned to it.

Not every document goes through such channels.

Mr. Vermeire. Does the occasion ever arise that

a determination or decision by someone that, anyone

who has the power to make a decision obviously, that something

is classified as national security, is that ever refuted

by anybody?

Mr. Wannall. Frequently, yes, because the classification

authority must rest also. in some of our field offices.

The material that is reviewed at Headquarters is reviewed

not only from the standpoint of its substance,. but also

from the standpoint of its classification. There are many

occasions where the classification is overruled. We do not

consider, really; a document classified until it is to be

disseminated, the ultimate classification.

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document is disseminated, the person who makes that

dissemination makes the ultimate final determination on

any classification.:

Mr. Vermeire. So there is authority within the field

offico level for classification?

Mr. Wannall. That is right.

Mr. Vermeire. Who does that rest with in each particular

field office?

Mr. Wannall. I would anticipate that each SAC would have

authority, but I'm not certain. For the most part it is

with the supervisors of those squads handling work related

to it:

By the way, I might add that we are reguired to furnish

a complete list of our classification officers, and

keep it updated, to the Department of Justice which has

a Classification Review Committee. The function of that

committee principally is to make the ultimate determination

on. classification if a document is to be released in

connection with an FOIA request, in connection with pending

litigation. So there is an ultimate authority vested in a

committee that functions directly under the Attorney General

within the Department of Justice.

The FBI has one member on that committee and his title

is

Document Classification Officer of the FBI. He functions

within our Inspection Division.

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Mr -

vermeire. My next question is really a definitional

one because many times we get into semantical problems

with the Bureau and what you mean and what we think you mean.

Do you equate internal security with national

secu. ity?

Mr. Wannall. No, I don't. I think there are phases

of internal security which have a bearing on national

security. But I don't call domestic intelligence the same

as foreign counterintelligence.

Mr. Vermeire. Many of these questions I know you may

have covered in briefings with us or may have been answered

in documents you sent to us. But obviously now we are on

the record and I want to put it on the record. So excuse

it if you feel it is repetitious. It may be, but I am

sure you understand the reasons for it.

Mr. Oliphant. Let me ask you this: Within the

Internal Security Division, or the Internal Security

Investigations certain groups are designated as subversive,

is that correct?

Shall I say classified, or designated? What would

be your terminology?

Mr. Wannall. Well, I hesitate because I don't think we

ever attach labels as such.

Mr. Oliphant. What criteria are exercised before

an investigation of a group is undertaken?

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MI -

wannail The criteria are in the manual. If the

activities of the group fit within that criteria,

that is a

basis for an active investigation.

Mr. Oliphant. Understanding that you are referring

to the manual, could you just on the record give us a

synopsis of what that criteria would be?

Mr. hackelford. Do you mean a synopsis of 87?

Mr. Oliphant. A synopsis of the criteria you would need

before you opened an internal security investigation on a

group.

Mr. Wannall. 87 is a long thing. Let's see if I can

satisfy your question.

Our manual sets forth that the FBI investigations violateous

certain statutes and conducts

investigations under orders

of the Attorney General. It then cites the principal statutes

which relate to our internal security operations. I have

referred to three of them before. There are others.

The Internal Security Act of 1950 could come into play,

sabotage, espionage, protection of foreign officials.

We could furnish a listing of statutes if you would like

to have that.

Mr. Oliphant. I understana.

Mr. Wannall-We do then cite statutes as a predication

for any investigation in our internal security field.

The manual then instructs that if information is received

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or developed indicating a group is engaging in activities

which, if uninterrupted, could lead to a violation of that

statute, that is a basis for investigating the group.

Mr. Oliphant. All right, Mr. Wannall.

My question to you is: Who within the FBI is tasked with

designating which groups fit that criteria?

Who is designated with looking at the allegations,

looking at the substance of the intelligence developed,

to see whether these groups merit a continuing investigation?

Mr. Wannall. In the field, if an allegation is received

indicating the group may be subject to investigation, pro-

vision is made in the manual for a preliminary inquiry. which

is limited to checks of indices, checks with established

sources, informants; in other words, a gathering of information

available through already establishd sources or records.

It precludes any active investigation in the sense

that you go out and ask questions, in the sense that you

try to target an informant against the group, in the

sense that it would be considered for any active investigative

technique. Within a 90-day period, if the field determines

through preliminary checks that there is no basis to the

allegation, the authority not to investigate rests with the

field. It makes the determination. It closes the matter and

there is not necessarily any record at Headquarters.

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If a determination is made that it is felt that there

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is a basis

for an on-going investigation, the entire results

must be furnished to Headquarters with a recommendation

that an on going or active investigation be instituted.

A determination is then made at the headquarters level

as tu whether an investigation should be pursued.

In other

words, the

field has the right to say no,

but not to say yes. That rests with headquarters.

At headquarters we have supervisors assigned to specify

areas of our work, each of whom operates under a supervisor

in charge. It may be a group of from three to five or six

or seven men.

The determination is made within that group unless

there is some question as to whether the guidelines are

being followed, in which case it would go to the séction

chief for determination. He has the opportunity, if he does

not feel he should make the determination, to go to a branch

chief which is a deputy assistant director. We have two,

one of whom concentrates in the internal

security area.

The determination is then made at that level.

If there is any question that it should go higher, normally

the facts are reduced to a memorandum for consideration

on higher levels. There have been occasions, and I can think

of several during the last couple of years, where we have

gone to the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice

and the decision is made by the Chief of the Internal Security

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Section there.

Mr. Oliphant. Is this in fact followed with regard

to all groups on which investigations of internal security

are conducted?

Mr. Wannall. It is followed. It can be cut off at the

various levels I have explained but there is no determination •

made on the field level for an on-going investigation of

a group.

Mr. Oliphant. Are you familiar with the Institute for Policy

Studies?

Mr. Wannall. Yes, sir.

Mr. Oliphant. Was such a procedure as you have just

outlined followed with regard to that group?

Mr. Wannall. When was the investigation on IPS opened,

Bob, can you say approximately?

Mr. Schackelford. That is an older investigation.

It would go back probably into the late '60s, at least.

• Mr. Wannall. I would say there are manual provisions

which are available to you. The manual is frequently revised.

It was rather extensively revised in August of 1973.

The procedures in the manual prior to that time would

still require review at a headquarters level.

Mr. Oliphant. Would this review that you have

laid out be memorialized in writing? Would there be a

record of all the steps of this?

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Mr. Wannall. In our case files, yes, I think so.

Mr. Oliphant. There would be a review of this with

regard to the Institute for Policy Studies, correct?

Mr. Wannall. That is right.

Mr. Oliphant. Do you know, or are any of you gentlemen

familiar with IPS?

Mr.

Wannall. I have never handled it. It was

handled in a branch of which I was chief a couple of years

ago. I have some general knowledge with respect to it.

But I do not have detailed knowledge.

Do you have anything that will help you in replying

to questions on this, Bob?

Mr. Shackelford. I can talk in general terms about

it. I did not handle the case personally but I have a

fairly good working knowledge concerning the time it was

head: handled,

Mi. Wannall.Is it still an on-going investigation?

Mr. :Shackelford. No, it is not.

Mr. Oliphant. When was it terminated, if you know?

Mr.

Shackelford. I cannot give you a termination date.

I don't know.

Mr. Wannall. I can give you an estimate because

the case came to my knowledge shortly after I moved into

the domestic area of our operations.

It-was prior to May 9,

1972

MY"

entire career had been spent in counterintelligence.

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Within a matter of three, four, or five months after

May 9, the IPS case

came to my attention. I discussed it

with the Supervisor, and issued instructions to him to have

the entire case reviewed on a field level to determine .

whether the bases that existed at the outset of the investiga-

tion

still existed. This was done and within a year

the investigation was terminated.

So I would guess it was terminated within the past year.

Mr. Oliphant. Why was the investigation begun?

Mr. Wannall.I would have to refer to the file to tell

you that.

Mr. Oliphant. Can anyone else answer the question in

general terms?

Mr.

Shackelford. I cannot give you a specific answer.

THE ANGOR IN

I would prefer to give you the files.

Mr. Oliphant. Was it

fair to indicate that the case

was closed because it was found there was no further

investigative merit pursuant to the investigation which

you began after you assumed duties?

Mr: Wannall. I would say it was fair to say that

the investigative steps which were logical had been completed

and the investigation had been terminated by a decision

that there was no further basis for investigation.

Mr. Oliphant. To your knowledge, did any indictments

proceed from the investigation?

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Mx. Wannall. No, and I think this can be said for a

large percentage of the investigations in the domestic

area like this.

Mr. Oliphant. Were any indictments referred to the

Depa:tment of Justice and I mean any appropriate U.

S.

Attorney also for prosecution?

Mr. Wannall. Every single report in every one of our

cases is furnished to the Department of Justice.

Mr. Oliphant. I understand, but were any of them

ever brought to any attorney with a request for serious

consideration of prosecution and then prosecution was declined?

Mr.

Shackelford. They are presented to the

Department periodically.

Some cases come to mind immediately, the Gainesville

Case, the Berrigan Case, these were conspiracy cases that

arose-

Mr. Oliphant. - out of the IPS study?

Mr. Shackélford. I didn't understand the restriction

to the question.

Mr. Oliphant. I'm referring to the IPs.

Mr.

Shackelford. No.

Mr. Ryan.

The Intelligence Division does not refer

its

security type investigations to local U. S. Attorneys.

These are furnished to the Internal Security Section

of the Criminal Division of the Department and in every

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instance reports are furnished and a decision regarding

prosecution is made by the Department.

Mr. Oliphant. : I understand, but as a result of these

files being furnished, were any prosecutions ever suggested

or ever specifically declined?

Mr. Ryan. As Mr. Wannall suggested, the overwhelming

percentage of our investigations are not those that

would develop prosecution. We are looking for evidence.

Mr. Oliphant. Was any evidence revealed during the

IPS investigations ever used for any criminal trial?

Mr.

Shackelford. Not to my recollection.

Mr. Atkisson.. Was anything developed in the investigation

of IPS which led the Bureau to classify or designate

that organization as subversive or any other like name?

Mr. Wannall. I think I probably have addressed myself

to that, that we don't try to classify an organization as

subversive.

Mr. Atkisson. You laid out certain criteria for

justifying continuing investigation of an organization.

I thought I understood that justification to be

tantamount to the same thing, that the justification for

continuing an investigation would be that the organization

was

potentially subversive.

Am I wrong in my impression?

Mr. Wannall. My answers

have been based on

a manual

revision. I referred to it earlier, an extensive one made

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and implemented in August of 1973.

Mr. Atkisson. Let me ask you this: The investigation

Of IPS lasted, evidently, some

five years or more.

Can you recall any specific information gathered which

justified that long an investigation? Did leads develop?

Was there anything that was developed which would lead any

reasonable person to believe that organization was dangerous

in any way to the security of the United States?

Mr. Wannall. I think you are getting into an area of

jurisdiction. In other words, should we have opened on

the IPs or should we not have opened or should we have

-

continued to pursue the investigation or should we have not?

I will be very glad to trace our jurisdiction in that

area from the time that Mr. Hoover took over. I can do it

in a relatively short time if you would be interested in

hearing it.

In other words, we are structured and have been since

August, 1973, on a statutory basis. Prior to that

time we were carrying out

our authority under certain

Presidential directives, the directive of the National

Security Council and subsequently the directive of the Attorney

General in 1964.

• Mr. Oliphant. Mr. Wannall, with regard to these

organizations on which you collect information after

the review which you laid

out before, what sort of material

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do you look for?

What sort of intelligence are you trying

to collect?

Mr. Wannall.At the present time, or are you talking

about

the entire time?

Mr. Oliphant. Let's say since 1971.

Mr. Wannall. In 1971 we were certainly structured

and operating on the basis of the Presidential directives.

I will be glad to read to you if you would like to have

it in the record --

Mr. Oliphant. Not so much the directives. I am interested

in what sort of intelligence you were looking for to get

into your files.

Mr. Wannall. May I place the categories in the record?

Mr. Oliphant. Sure.

Mr. Wannall-We are going back to the first time that

the FBI entered into the field of intelligence gathering.

From 1924, when MI. Hoover became Director, until 1934,

we have in our files much evidence to show that he consistently

repealed any efforts on the part of anybody to place the

FBI in the role of an intelligence gatherer.

As a matter of fact, the fish Committee, which goes

back to about 1930, made efforts to place the FBI in an

intelligence-gathering role at that time.

if: this

Mr. Hoover consistently reproved and said we investigate

violations of law, period. In 1934, Mr. Roosevelt called

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together MI. Hoover and several officials of other

agencies expressing concern regarding the activities

in this country of Nazis and pro-Nazis and urdered an

intelligence investigation to be conducted relating to such

activities. The Department of Labor, at that time, had

jurisdiction over deportation statutes and that was the

agency which had the basic statutory jurisdiction. But the

FBI was ordered to gather intelligence.

In 1936 there was another meeting. I think perhaps

you have been furnished this material.

• Mr. Oliphant. Yes. The historical perspective

is interesting. Assuming you have the authority, be it

statutory or by directive, to engage in intelligence-gathering

activities, I don't think anyone is disputing that, the

question is, and let's put it in a current perspective:

Since 1971, more specifically since COINTELPRO endea,

what sort of intelligence are you looking for?

Mr. Wannall. We are looking for intelligence relating

to matters which would be of interest to the Executive

Branch of the Government, more specifically the Attorney

General and through him the President, to permit him to

discharge his responsibilities in carrying out the functions

of the Executive.

Mr. Oliphant. In collecting this intelligence

do you incorporate into your files everything which is

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told to the Bureau?

Mr.

Wannall We have no recourse other than to

incorporate into the files everything that is told to

the Bureau.

Mr. Oliphant. So there is no selection of some things

put in and some things not put in.

Mr. Wannall. Everything is reported.

Mx. Oliphant. Do you put something in regarding

somebody's sex life?

Mx. Wannall. If that is part of a complaint, yes..

If somebody reports about somebody's sex life and it

has no relevance, the agent receiving that would not record

it.

Mr. Oliphant. What about materials that you collected

from somebody's garbage?

Mr. Wannall. You are talking about trash covers, which :

we have not engaged in since July, 1966, so that doesn't

cover the area of 1971.

Mr. Oliphant. Are you saying you have not collected

any information from garbage collections since 1966?

Mr. Wannall.

I'm saying we have not instituted trash

covers. Relating your question specifically to the

IPS, I'm fully aware of some allegations that have been made

by an indivdiual who claims to have performed certain

functions at the instructions of the FBI as an informant.

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Our review of his allegations has indicated that on one

occasion he carried from an office, presumably of the IPs,

an envelope of material which was turned over to

an agent. The agent reviewed the material, turned it back to

him and has made statements to the effect, under oath, that

it appeared to be information that had been gathered from

a trash basket.

Mr. Oliphant. Isn't it true that other information

regarding the IPS was gleaned from trash collection from

some material which the IPS was throwing away?

Mr. Wannall. This is the only incident in which I

can even relate to information received from material being

thrown away. We had no trash covers on the IPS.

Mr. Atkisson.. Was there ever an incident, do you

recall, of information being reconstructed from a typewriter

ribbon that had been thrown away by IPS?

MI. Wannall.I will have to say I have no knowledge.

If either of the other two men do, I'm sure they, will address

themselves to it.

Mr. shackelford. I don't have any specific recollection

about that. I have a vague recollection, but it is too vague

to discuss. If there was, I presume it

came out of the package

that Ray referred to and has to do with the informant who

made these allegations. You are aware, aren't you, that this

matter is under civil litigation?

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Mr. Atkisson.

Yes,

I am.

Mr. Vermeire. The area of material gathered in the

course of investigation, now, I would imagine an agent

would

weed out fxom any investigative report the irrelevant

material.

I mean he knows the difference between relevant

and irrelevant material, I suppose.

Mr. Wannall. Our instructions in the manual specifically

provide for that.

Mr. Vermeire. Therefore, I would think in the course

of an investigation which specifically involves some criminal

offense or even in the course of intelligence gathering,

material pertaining to one's personal life and one's sex life,

et cetera, to my mina would be considered irrelevant. So

I cannot see any situation where that would, and if you can

I would be happy to hear your views on it, where that

should be considered in a report.

Mr. Wanna 11. I can assure you since our restructuring

in August, 1973, there is no question in anybody's mina

that such material would be irrelevant.

Mr. Vermeire. There would be no question that it would

be irrelevant.

Mr. Wannall. There is no question that it would not be

relevant to the investigation.

Mr. Vermeire. And therefore would not be placed in

HM 55301

the file.

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Mr. Wannall. It would not be recorded and reported.

Mi. Vermeire. But prior to '73 such information might

have been recorded?

Mr. Wannall.I think it is quite possible. We do engage

in electronic surveillances. It we should have a surveillance

on an establishment, it is for a given purpose and

with very stringent guidelines. During the course of that

information could be secured which is completely irrelevant

to the reason for our surveillance. If it were recorded, as

It must be, and the tapes retained for ten years under instruc-

tions that material somewhere would be lodging in Bureau records

but it would not be removed, recorded and reported as signifi-

cant to the investigation.

Mr. Vermeire. Why was there such a significant break in

investigative techniques in 1973?

Mr. Wannall. Principally because an analysis was made

on a predecessor and a determination't think, that we should

be aware, I think as we always have been, of the climate of

the times and restructure on a

strict statutory basis.

I think the history of the Bureau, and I would not

bore you with details, has been one of responsiveness,

an awareness of the climate of the times, and restructuring..

•Mr. Vermeire. Who decides the awareness?

How do you glean from the times this mood?

Mr. Karnall. When Mr. Hoover was there, and I should

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not denigrate Mr. Kelley's ability, he has the same ability,

he was quite sensitive to this. Perhaps you have been

furnished documentation that in July, 1966, he discontinued

numerous investigative techniques. I have no other reason

to believe that he discontinued them than he felt that times

had changed and

we were getting into areas which had been

acceptable before and would not be acceptable in the future

and he cut them off.

Mr. Vermeire. Times may change, Mr. Wannall, but the law

doesn't change. Are you saying that Mr. Hoover would gear

his operating procedures or his general philosophy of the

Bureau based upon what he considered to be the changing times

or would he follow the mandate of the law?

Mr. Wannall. I would say from the aime I worked under

Mr. Hoover that he was quite aware of the mandate of

the law. -I

am aware of the fact that there were certain

procedures followed of which he was aware that have been

described as outside the law. I cannot address myself

to why he did that.

Mr. Ryan. There have been changes in the law, too, which

are very important. The Keith decision, for example.

Mr. Vermeire. But I thought you were dealing with

the question of the mood of the country. My only

question is that the Federal Bureau of Investigation is

HY

55301

a law enforcement agency. It is not a sociological one.

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$5301

I was wondering how the mood relates to the law.

If the law is not always responsive to the mood of

the country, the law may not change. That seems to me

a legislative question.

Mr. Ryan.

Erthink Mc. Wannal was not indicating we

make social judgments. When the tenor of the times is such

that campuses are being burned or civil rights workers are

being murdered, it is important that the FBI adjust

and adapt its resources to handle these violations.

Mr. Wannall. Yes, I would like to explain my answer.

I think I am entitled to do that.

Mr. Vermeire. If we are going to get into some of the

COINTELPRO type activities, we are going to go into that

later and if your answer attaches to that, I would ask you to

hold that until later on.

What I'm saying is that I want to give you full benefit

of explaining anything you might have said. If you want to sayi

it now, go ahead.

Mr. Wannall. I would like to make a couplé of remarks.

We got into the area of investigating Communism imnediately

after the war and Congress itself recognized the threat

of Communism in 1950 by the Internal Security Act of 1950

and also by the Communist Control Act of 1954.

We were in the area of investigating civil rights

conspiracies. Congress has addressed itself to that by

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various statutes

like in 1964 which comes ta mind..

We were in the area of campus riots and the bombing

statutes were passed in 1968. Interstate movement to engage

in riot activities was addressed by Congress by the anti-

riot laws.

This is what I meant when I said I think Mr. Hoover was

quite conscious of the tenor of the times. Frequently our

activities in intelligence gathering preceded the statutes

because I think we acted more quickly than Congress would be

able to act. This is what I had in mina.

Mr. Ryan. May I add to that?

Mr. Vermeire. Certainly.

Mr. Ryan.

We don't make social decisions in the

FBI, as Mr. Wannal stated. But during the first five months

of '67 there was racial violence in cities resulting in 32

deaths, injuries to 200 people, and property damage of over

$100 million. This is when the FBI readjusted its resources

to handle this product of the times.

This is the type of basis.

Mr. Vermeire. We will get back to that because I

think that is the basis I brought into the fore before.

Was there a change in procedures in '73 which would dictate

the FBI change its procedures with respect to relevant

and irrelevant investigations? What happened in 1973 or

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thereabouts that would necessitate this, to me, quite significat

HH

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change in investigative procedures?

Mr. Wansall, I think probably the gearing down of the

Vietnam war at the time had some bearing on it.

Mr. . Shackelford. Ray, could I answer that?

Fox one thing, I think you have to take a historical?

perspective. During the period that Dave described, there

was

really extraordinary violence out in the streets,

on the campuses, bombings,

arson,. ROIC facilities under

attack and riots of massive proportions.

The Bureau, I think, was heavily engaged in intelligence

gathering and also gathering of information pertaining to

certain specific statutes intermingled and intertwined

during that period.

Because of the massive scale of the violence, it was

very difficult to attempt to assess the threat.

This was the real problem at the time.

Now we had

considerable communications from the Department, from

the White House.

Everyone was looking at this. Congress

was

making inquiries and the like. So we had gone over probably

heavier into the intelligence-gathering role than we had

prior to that perioa.

I think 1973, with the termination of the Vietnam War,

with the termination of the unrest on the streets and the

like, 1973, in a loose sense of the word, represented somewhat

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of a return back to what we had done to a certain extent,

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now generally speaking, prior to that period. It was to

refocus again on potential violations and to, if you will,

de-emphasize, I think, the intelligence-gathering function.

Mr. Vermeire. Yes, but how does the mood and the actions

that were occurring at that time relate to putting relevant

information in files? It seems to me that relevant versus

irrelevant information--

Mr. Shackelford. What do you describe as irrelevant?

Mi. Vermeire. I'm not sure. Maybe I am mistaken. Were

you specifically referring to personal items of a person's

life?

Mx. Wannall. That is what you referred to.

Mr.

Shackelford. You brought that question up.

Mr. Vermeire. I wanted to know if it went into other

breakdowns of relevant and irrelevant.

MI.

Shack elford. What you are talking about such as

sex lives, I would describe as unusual circumstances,

certainly not normal operating procedures where something

like that would creep into a file. Bear in mind when the

Bureau

has an investigation the reason we write a report

is to segregate information and put it into report form.

When an agent receives information, he has an individual

value judgment at the time whether to report what someone

told him and whether it is in fact relevant.

HH

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whatever, I do not put much stock in that.

I think you are talking about relatively isolated

situations when something like that may have come about.

•

Mr. Vermeire. I want to pin down exactly what we are

talking about. I think there is some confusion here.

In 1973 there was a change. Exactly what was that change

so we are sure, the change in investigative procedures?

What is that with respect to?

Mr. Wannall. At that time a study was made: In May

of 1972 former Acting Director Gray called upon each

assistant director to present a position paper. A position

paper was prepared in line with the type of activities

that we had been engaging in for years and it was rejected

by the Assistant Director of the Intelligence Division.

He caused a study to be made by the Research Section within

the Intelligence Division and through some rather faulty

research a determination was made that the FBI should

investigate, based only on statutes and disregard any Presi

dential directors.

We have completed the study, which will

be delivered to your committee today tracing the development

of authority through Presidential, National Security

Council, AG directives, which I think are as valid today

as they were when they were first issued. I think it was

faulty research. I learned of this in February of this year,

but made a determination to continue on the basis that we were

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Page 38

structured in August, because I felt that it was a secure

basis. There were many questions being raised by Congressional

committees and others as to our intelligence gathering

activities. I consulted with others regarding this, including

the GAO auditors. They were in accord with my decision not

to change the restructuring that was done in August of 1973.

The questions that I have answered at the outset of this

interview have been based on our current structure.

If we are going back into what we were doing back in the

'60s, '50s, early '70s, I would, of course, give you the

basis on which we were doing them. Now, "responsive to the

times", I had prepared some time ago statements that were

made by responsible officials relating to this era of the late

'60s such as a television address by President Johnson

on July 24, 1967, in describing events that led to

sending troops to Detroit during the city's riots, he said:

"We will not tolerate lawlessness. We will not endure violence.

It matters not to whom it is done or under what slogan or

banner. It will not be tolerated."

In a second address in July of 1967, the President

said that this country had endured a week such as no nation

should live through, a time of violence and tragedy. "The

looting and arson and plunder and pillage which have occurred

are

not part of a civil rights protest."

These are two of several.

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Mr. Oliphant. Do you regard a television broadcast

as a directive to the FBI?

Mx. Wannall.I do not. We had directives before that.

•I mentioned that for an illustration of the times.

Mr. Oliphant. Your duties were to carry out the

President's directives?

Mr. Wannall. Yes, under which we were operating. He

was saying, here is a target which has a grave bearing

on the interests of the country. I think under the directives

we previously had this would indicate to us it was

a priority target. All of our intelligence gathering

has to do with isolating areas of priority on which our

investigations are based.

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Mr. Vermeire. Tying up the last thing on the position

papers, you say it was based upon a faulty research; by whom?

Mr. Wannall. It was conducted principally by the Assistant

Director and the head of our research section at that time.

I

am not trying to. fault them. It took us from February until

October 28 to complete this research. Their research was done

between the middle of May and July 31, 1972. They were not

able to retrieve from the files the necessary documents.

Retrieval is a problem with us, as you probably have

noted in our responding to your requests. We don't have any-

thing computerized. We have to start with a subject and try

to trace it to various files.

I cannot fault them for that. It is just that they did not

have available the material we have been able to gather in

eight months.

Mr. Vermeire. Is this the same position paper forwarded

to this Committee, the May of 1972 position paper?

Mr.. Shackelford. My recollection is that it was.

I

think you have that paper, and. I think a subsequent one back

in February.

Mr. Vermeire. I wanted to make sure we are talking about

the same paper.

Would it be a fair characterization, then, in sum, this

position paper was that the FBI was limiting its jurisdiction

to a

statutory one?

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Mr. Wannall. That was the result.

Mr. Vermeire. Is the intelligence division operating under

this limitation at the present time?

Mr. Wannall. We have not changed the restructuring. We

are operating on the statutory basis at this time and have

been since August of 1973.

The reason for the delay, the position paper was pro-

duced on July 31, 1972. It was forwarded to then Acting

Director Gray. He did not act upon it.

Mr. Kelley took over July 9, 1973. As soon as we had an

opportunity to get to him, the position paper was discussed

and within the first two weeks of August, 1973, it was sent to

the Attorney General.

It was August, 1973, then, that we went to a statutory

basis and we have remained on a statutory basis since that

time.

Mr. Vermeire. You say a statutory basis; does that mean

you are not considering the Presidential directives of

President Roosevelt and President Truman?

Mr. Wannall. We have not been operating within the scope

of those directives since August of 1973.

Mr. Vermeire. The FBI's reasons for its entire domestic

intelligence program, it seems

to me, was rooted essentially

in these directives.

Mr. Wannall. It was. I think it still is, but we are

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awaiting decisions by the Attorney General, by the President,

and certainly by the Congress, as to what the FBI should do and

the parameters within which it should operate.

Without making a speech, I would like to say that that

is precisely what we would like to do.

Mr. Vermeire. Then would it be fair to say that the

FBI -- I know this sounds

simplistic -- is not engaging pres-

ently in domestic intelligence?

Mr. Wannall. We have trouble with definition of terms.

We are investigating domestic organizations. We are gathering

information on those organizations. But our investigations of

them are predicated on a statute.

Mr. Vermeire. All right; let me phrase my question another

way. What were you doing, or could you do, with respect to

statutory and Executive Orders, and so forth, directives,

authority that you can't do under pure statutory authority?

Mr. Wannall. I perhaps can give you an illustration.

Under a very broad authority based upon the Presidential direc-

tives and the subsequent documents which the FBI looked at,

the entire scope of activities within the United States as to

what was going on in the nature of activities that might have

wer....:1;

an impact on the internal security of the countryA many of

these activities were of relative unimportance. With the man-

power we have, we could not possibly investigate everybody who

advocates, and we do not investigate people who advocate, the

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overthrow of the government. However, at the time the smith

Act was passed, it specifically provided for that. It was the.

case law, the court: decisions that narrowed the scope.

In this overall area of accumulating information on what

was going on in the country by various groups - and here we

have difficulties with definitions, but accept the term sub-

versive activities, groups that might be engaged in activities

that were or could be detrimental to the internal security --

gathering information, some of it was of no value. That which

was of value was made available to the officials who had respon-

sibilities in particular areas.

For example, if we should receive information regarding

an alien that would be of interest to INs, the information

would go to INs.

• The Presidential directive of September 6, 1939 called

upon the law enforcement agencies to turn over to the FBI

information relating to espionage, counter-espionage,

subversive activities, and such matters.

We were a focal point to receive and sift information.

There is an historical background here which would take some time

It will be in the document you

to show why that was done.

will receive today.

Mr. Vermeire. Excuse me.

Is this a document that we

ordered, or a document you

are bringing with you?

Mr. Wannall. You had requested documents bearing on our

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jurisdictional authority. You have received previous documents.

This one was completed October 28. It was approved by

Mr. Kelley yesterday. So, responsive to your previous request

for information relating to our jurisdictional basis, the docu-

ment i: being furnished to you.

Mr. Vermeire.

What is inside that document you are tell

ing us now in substance, or somewhat abbreviated?

Mr. Wannall. I am interpolating; yes. You asked what we

conceive our jurisdiction.

The document will show various

areas in which the President expressed an interest. Those

areas changed.

Basically, when we started out, we were in a pre-war

period and a wartime period. Most of our activities were

foreign-related. However, there were activities in the

Longshoremen's Union on the West Coast, indications.of

Communism infiltration and control. Mr. Roosevelt was inter-

ested in knowing about that.

So where do you define domestic activity, and where do you

define foreign activity? However, the intention of President

Truman during whose term the National Security Act of 1947

was passed, was certainly expressed when a Puerto Rican

nationalist group endeavored to assassinate him the lst of

November, 1950.

Mr. Vermeire. At the Blair House?

Mr. Wannall. At the Blair House.

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He called upon two

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committees which were created under the Presidential direc-

tive, one of which was known as the Interdepartmentl Intelli-

gence Conference, the other of which was known as the ICIS,

Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security, to report to

him what happened, why didn't we know about this situation.

In effect, he was

saying a domestic terrorist group has

tried to kill me. What can be done to prevent this again? What

was the importance, or was there any information that you had

gathered beforehand to show that this might occur?

Which is intent certainly -- as we can interpret it only

through what the man says and what his writings indicate -- that

he anticipated that the ICts, which consisted of the FBI and

the three military intelligence agencies, should have an inter-

est in securing information relating to a domestic terrorist

group.

Mr. Hoover reported to the National Security Council in

1954 and in 1956 on the scope and extent of the activities

under Presidential directives, which showed investigations

certainly in the domestic field.

So we had the charter to try to establish in what

quarters the threat existed. In doing that, you gather a

rather large amount of information, and you try to define the

area of the threat and then focus on that area.

At the present time, we are

starting with an allegation

of a violation of a statute and during the course of

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HH 55301

investigations of organizations

we will certainly gather what

could be defined as intelligence information.

MI. Vermeire.: But there is no preventive, anticipatory,

long-range information-gathering at this particular time?

Mr. Wannall. With respect to civil disturbances there are

such activities under a specific directive from the Attorney

General.

Mr. Vermeire. What is that directive? Have we supplied

that yet?

Mr. Wannall. It is outlined at the end of Section 122

of the manual. There is a section headed "Civil Disturbances"

Mr. Vermeire. I have that here. Okay.

Aside from that, though, your answer to my question would

be no?

Mr. Shackelford. That would be correct, basically.

Mr. Vermeire. I must admit this is an astonishing bit of

information. I don't think anyone has had any --

Mr. Shackelford. We can sit here and get into a lot of

definitive terms as to what is intelligence-gathering. For

example, through your coverage of the structured subversive

organizations based on statutes, the way the manual is struc~

tured at the present time, a fairly comprehensive amount of

intelligence information concerning planned activities and the

like flows out of that investigation. You could call that

intelligence, advanced intelligence, for example, flowing out

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HH 55301

of the substantive, investigative case.

-

The pure intelligence-gathering that occurred before

had in its underpinnings,

statutes, because there even you were

concerned with activities which you thought might proceed

into, for example, anti-riot law violations and a lot of our

investigative or so-called intelligence activity at that

time -- I am talking late sixties - were geared toward this

possible violation.

Mr. Vermeire. Right. I understand that, but my question

again is, and I will try to use every phrase I can think of,

anticipatory, preventive, long-range --

Mr.

Shackelford. It scales it down. I think that is

our answer to that question.

Mr. Wannall. I perhaps can use an example. There was a

time a demonstration was going to occur, and we learned of it;

we would have agents present to observe to see what was going

on, to see if there were violations of the law, local or

Federal.

If there is a demonstration at the present time, we do

not cover a demonstration unless it is sponsored by or partici-

pated in by an organization or individuals on whom we have an

active investigation based on a statute.

• If we learn that an organization which is under our cur-

rent investigative attention is organizing a demonstration,

we would be interested in observing the demonstration to

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determine if the activities are such that would add to our

knowledge with regard to the overall activities of the group.

Does this help?

Mr. Vermeire. It helps. It is hard, because to get a

concrete example, you have to deal with a specific case.

=

It would all be based on a case-by-case basis, but, for

example, say you had X-number of informants who had infil-

trated or were supplying information as to various organiza-

tions, and so forth, that would be considered, say, subversive

prior to 1973.

You are saying now that these informants are being pulled

out; in essence, they are not still continually developing

intelligence information.

Mr.

Shackelford. Within the subversive groups under

investigation.

Mr. Vermeire. Investigation with respect to a particular

crime?

Mr. Shackelford. Potential crime.

Mx. Vermeire. Potential; is there a probable cause?

Mr. Shackelford. Of course not.

Mr. Vermeire. So then we are in the same situation, then?

Mr. Wannall. You brought up the informants. I would like

to address that by some specifics. Sadat is visiting the

United States today. He has been in the country for some time.

If an informant who is operating for us within a group that we

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55301)

have under investigation based on a statute, has information

indicating that anybody in the United States is going to try to

assassinate Sadat, we will accept that information from him

and give it appropriate dissemination. That would have no

bearing on the operations of that organization whatsoever.

At the time of the Cuban crisis, October 22, 1962, there

was a demand for information on the part of the Executive,

the President, to assist him in making rather grave decisions.

We sent out to our field offices

a teletype saying, "Please

have your informants endeavor actively to gather information

having a bearing on activities of groups in this country who

might be sympathetic to Castro or might be sympathetic to any

cause which could work to the detriment of the government."

I think there were several hundred sources; not just

informants electronic surveillances, individuals whom we con-

tacted regularly in connection with matters of law enforcement

nature, several hundred, perhaps nearly five hundred various

sources that provided information which went into the hands of

the White House situation room.

So we are operating informants, and if informants can

provide information, significant information of value, to the

government in discharging its responsibilities in the foreign

intelligence field, in the foreign relations field, in the

counter-intelligence field, we will accept the information.

And I am glad to have the opportunity to advise you of

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this becau

I

am aware of consideration of legislation which

perhaps would require the issuance of a judicial warrant before

we might utilize an informant. Whether or not probable cause

would be required for that warrant, we would be in the posi-

tion once the warrant was issued of utilizing an individual

in an intelligence and information-gathering capacity within

a specified group. If he endeavored to report in some area

other than the group's activities, we would have to decline to

accept information from him because it would be outside the

terms of the judicial warrant.

This is why I think, in giving consideration to matters

of this type, the overall effect not on the FBI solely and

exclusively, not on the United States intelligence community

solely and exclusively, but on every law enforcement agency in

this country should be considered.

MI. Vermeire. In any event, the document that you are

delivering to the Committee today outlines fairly particularly

this entire new, if I can use that word, procedure that is

being followed?

Mr. Wannall. No, sir.

Mr. Vermeire. It does not?

• Mr. Wannall. No. It outlines with great particularity

the development of our jurisdictional basis for gathering intel+

ligence, both in the domestic field and in the foreign counter

intelligence field. They are very interwoven in the development

HH 55301

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of the jurisdiction. This document will do that with supporting

papers. •

MI. Vermeire.

Is there any document you could deliver to

us that can, as best as possible, show the difference between

what you were doing prior to 1173 and the procedures which are

followed now?

It is hard to sit here and go through examples, and having

problems with the semantics as necessarily we will have.

Trying, at least in my own opinion, to get a clear idea of

what exactly the FBI is doing in the area of domestic intelli-

gence today, it would help if I could see what they are not

doing now that they were doing then.

I get the feeling if we even sit here for another half

hour, I won't get a clear picture. Is there any document that

sets that out with some particularity?

Mr. Wannall. No; the only thing I can suggest, and perhaps

you already have, are the manual sections as they were struc-

tured at any given point in history. If you wanted the manual

section as of 1965, if we can recover that, you would have our

guidelines as of 1965, and you could compare this with our

guidelines as they appear in the manual today.

• Mr. Vermeire. As I see it, the various statutes on the

book, for example, espionage, of course we are dealing with

matters of counter intelligence; is that correct?

25

Mr. Wannall. Usually.

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Mr. Vermeire. In any event, the theory would be, is there

a potential for this person or this individual or this organiza-

tion to violate the law and that potential can be based upon

prior acts, prior actions, or information from a reliable in-

formant?

You say it doesn't approach probable cause. There is

another legal definition called reasonable suspicion, which is

slightly less than probable cause. There is probably something

less than that which I am not aware of.

But is there any standard? What is the standard that is

to be followed?

Because if there is no set standard, then

there can be no review; there can be no evaluation on propriety

or not of the particular action.

I am looking for a standard, if there is one.

If it is

just the potential of violation of the law, to me that is

extremely vague. I don't get anything out of that.

Mr. Wannall. I have no document that would give you that.

In any area at some point a judgment must be exercised, and

the way we endeavor to control that is by having review of the

juägment at headquarters.

Mr. Oliphant. Addressing yourself specifically to the

Socialist Workers Party, what about a number of these people

who have been followed around for relatively long periods of

time, members, careful documentation, when they go to meetings,

when they come back, where they live, who they are employed by,

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everything, with absolutely no allegations of. criminal activi-

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ties.

When exactly does an executive decision get made; let's cut

this off; let's cut off the resource allocation on following

this guy around?

oveR

Mr. Ryan. I think you have simplified the investigation

of the Socialist workers Party. There is foreign involvement

with the Socialist Workers Party, Investigation. There is in

the past some evidence of terrorism within the group, support-

ing advocacy of terrorism. I think you cannot take something

and say as simple as why are we investigating the Socialist

Party?

Mr. Oliphant. I am not talking about investigating it as

a monolith, Mr. Ryan. I am talking about the investigation

of individuals within it, individuals where there had been no

allegation they had been involved in any terrorist activi-

ties, no allegations of them espousing any sort of terrorism,

no allegation of them in touch with any sort of foreign powers.

Mr. Ryan. I think you are wrong, on all counts. The

basic philosophy of the Irotskyite movement - of which the

Socialist Workers Party is the leading mavement - is only a

22

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all political groups other than their own are counter-revolution!

and must be destroyed.

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Fourth International. There are elements of that which is

based, I believe, now in Brussels, which support terrorist

activities, particularly in Argentina and other foreign coun-

tries.

We in the Bureau are much concerned these elements which

are within the socialist Workers Party within the United States

may reach a point of influence where they could present a

direct threat.

Mr. Atkisson. Let me understand this, Mr. Ryan. Are

you saying the involvement with terrorist activities from the

Bureau's point of view is that it is involved with the Inter-

national, and that the International in turn is involved with

terrorist activities in Argentina? Is that correct? : :

Mr. Ryan.

There is a group within the Socialist workers

Party in this country which is called the Internationalist

Tendency, which strongly supports elements of the Fourth

International, which endorses terrorism and terrorist acts.

. Mr. Atkisson. In investigating the SWP since 1947, has the

Bureau ever uncovered any single item of information which

would directly link any member of the SWP to any terrorist

activity?

Mr. Ryan. I think a point here is that the Smith Act of

1940 was first applied against the Socialist Workers Party in

this country.

Mr. Atkisson. Can you answer the question I just asked?

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60

Has the Bureau

uncovered

any information

since 1947 involving

any individual member of SWP to any terrorist activity?

Mr.

Shackelford. Directly involved in a terrorist

activity as such?

Mr. Atkisson.

Yes.

Mr. Shackelford. From my recollection I would say I do

not recall such

an incident.

Mr. Atkisson. A little earlier acknowledging that the

SWP has possibly some remote foreign involvement --

Mr. Shackelford. I wouldn't describe it as remote, but

go ahead.

Mx. Atkisson. I asked the question earlier about IPS, and

we got off in all the jurisdictional philosophy.

Any three of you, what, if any, information has the

Bureau ever uncovered about IPS, which prompted further inves-

tigation of the IPS over a five-year period - I am not asking

for type of information; what information?

Mr. Shackelford. I think the answer as far as IPS goes

back to those persons who control IPS and run it, and we

looked very close at the activity of those particular individuals

and then looked at IPS as a product of theirs.

Mr. Atkisson. You looked at them for about five years.

Did you find anything?

Mr. Shackelford.

That is exactly right.

Mr. Atkisson. Did you find anything during those five

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years?

Mr. Shackelford. Not for which they could be prosecuted.

Mr. Atkisson.

Forget prosecution. Did you find informa-

tion whatsoever of a specific nature which linked any of those

individuals

to acts which are detrimental to the interists: of

the United States?

MI. Shackelford. During the period of time of the

Bureau's primary interest in IPS, IPS was variously described

as the think-tank of the new left. They ran seminars, discus-

sion periods and training programs which related to disturbances,

riotist-type activity. That, along with the background of the

persons involved in leadership roles in IPS, was the basis

fox investigative interest in that group.

Mr. Atkisson. The seminars, were they not, were largely

philosophical in nature concerning the anti-war movement?

Mr. Shackelford. 'I didn't attend them and can't answer

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that.

Mr. Atkisson. You received reports on them, did you not?

Mr. Shackelford.

We received the available information we

could get.

But those seminars were by invitation, and I would

say our coverage of the actual seminar, and the first-hand

knowledge, second-hand through the source, was somewhat limited

in scope.

Mr. Oliphant. Mr. Wannall said advocacy is not enough.

Let me ask you about that. Was illegal activity ever advocated

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in IPS from the reports the Bureau got?

Mr. Shackelford. Illegal activity. What we are going

to have to throw open for discussion is what we are talking

about is conspiracy.

Mr. Oliphant. Fine; I am asking for any --

Mr. Shackelford.

We are getting into a far-ranging con-

versation.

Mr. Oliphant. Was there illegal activity advocated?

Mr. Ryan.

If I can interrupt, in speaking to Mr. Wannall

and Mr. Shackelford: on the IPS, they had no warning this was

going to be a

subject of this hearing, and they are speaking

from memory dating back a long time about just one of many

hundreds of investigative responsibilities.

I think if you are going to make specific questions of

this nature, in fairness to these gentlemen, that you give them

advance warning on it.

Mr. Oliphant. I think Mr. Shackelford qualified his

statements he was going to make on IPS earlier with the fact

he was dealing from memory and that this would be not a

specific answer.

Mr. Shackelford.

You are getting to specific questions.

Mr. Oliphant. We are asking specific questions, under-

standing on the record he is dealing from memory.

Mr. Vermeire. Anything that cannot be answered in

detail now, as far as notice is concerned, I would think you

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would be put

notice that the question may come up in the

course of a hearing.

Mr. Shackelford: In the hearings we will run into a

legal problem because of the civil litigation.

Mr. Vermeire. We can deal with that. We can always

consider going into Executive Session.

Mr. Atkisson. Let me say I think one of the more produc-

tive things to be accomplished in this interview is to indeed

put you on notice as to areas we are concerned with so that

we may properly assure that the people who do know about these

things can be present at that hearing, or that Mr. Wannall, if

he is the chief witness, can be backed up by appropriate per-

sonnel and records, and so on. You will have time for review.

Mr. Wannall. We appreciate that opportunity because we are

dealing in an area we have not looked at for a year or longer.

Mr. Oliphant.

What exactly is the Fourth International?

FOUR

Mr. Ryan. In the Communist movement there are three inter-

11 M9

nationals. The Third International is controlled from Moscow.

To distinguish the Stalinist Communists from the Trotskyite

Communists, the title Fourth International was utilized.

Mr. Oliphant. Who controls the Fourth International?

Mr. Ryan. I can give you a little rundown about the

Trotskyite movement in this country.

Mr. Oliphant.

No; the Fourth International.

MI. Ryan. That

is controlled by those individuals who

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support the philosophy of leon Trotsky. Leon Trotsky, in a

very simple way, basically believed in world revolution,

whereas Stalin felt the revolution should be consolidated in

the Soviet Union.

Mc. Oliphant. Do these people at Fourth International

have a power base? In other words, I take it the Third

International at least is backed by Soviet Russia; is that

correct?

MI. Ryan.

Yes.

Mr. Oliphant. All right. Is the Fourth International

backed by any major power?

Mr. Ryan. It is backed by Communist elements in almost

all the major countries and

some of the Third World countries.

Mr. Oliphant. Is it backed formally by the Communist

Party in any major country or minor country, by the Communist

Party?

Mr. Ryan.

That is a difficult question for me to answer

because you are dealing in the international area, and we are

primarily concerned about the United States.

Mr. Oliphant. I understand that, but certainly one of

the reasons --

Mr. Ryan.

There are Trotskyite elements in many countries

of the world in close liaison with the movement in the United

States.

Mr. Oliphant. Who runs the Fourth International?

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Mr. Shackelford. Participating Trotsky groups in the

various countries support the Fourth International as a

governing body of the Trotskyites.

Mr. Oliphant. Does it have a building?

Mr.

Shackelford. It is physically headquartered in .

Brussels. I don't know if they own the building, rent the

space, or what.

Mr. Oliphant. Do you know how many people are in the

Fourth International?

Mr. Shackelford. Not from memory; no.

Mr. Oliphant. Has there been any evidence that the Fourth

International has the backing of any recognized viable,

political force in any country as opposed to having elements

which could be anywhere from one to one hundred thousand

individuals backing it?

Mr. Shackelford. The answer to that would be no.

The

only way it could be yes is if the Trotskyite Communist Party

in a given nation took control of the nation.

Mr. Oliphant. But as of right now, is there any major

power within any country that can throw its support behind the

Fourth International?

Mx. Shackelford. My previous answer would stand. The

various Communist parties in the various nations support the

Fourth International.

Mr. Oliphant. Is there any country where the Trotskyite

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HH 55301

party is in a dominant position?

Mr. Ryan. I think the answer to that is no.

Mr.

Shackelford. Not in a dominant position; no.

.

Mr. Oliphant.

Where is the Trotskyite party in a power-

ful position?

Mr. Shackelford. Argentina, for one place, and several •

Latin American countries, the Trotsky parties have considerable

influence.

Mr. Vermeire. In what countries, if any, has any Irotskyite

organizatior had a significant effect in overthrowing the

government?

Mr. Ryan. If you would excuse me, we do have information

about foreign Irotskyite organizations, but you are primarily

within the bailiwick of another agency at this time.

Mr. Vermeire. Right; but I think it relates to the FBI

expertise in determining the threat that a particular organiza-

tion poses. If the SWP poses a threat because it has a rela-

tionship with the Fourth International, I

think it is imperative

to get a reading of how dangerous the Fourth International is.

Maybe if the reporter would repeat the question, or I can

give it again. Is there any evidence that any organization,

any Trotskyite organization that has ties with the Fourth

International, had any significant effect in any overthrow of

any existing. government in any other foreign country?

Mr. Ryan. I don't know of any such instance. There is

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Trotskyite influence in many governments.

Mr. Vermeire. Well, the Democratic Party has influence,

and the Republican Party has influence in our country. That is

nothing illegal.

Mr. Ryan. We had the Smith Act of 1940 in this country

and which prescribes against the advocacy of violent overthrow

of the government. The Trotsky organizations in this country,

and specifically the Socialist Workers Party, which is a lead-

ing group: advocate the violent overthrow of the United States

Government.

Mr. Oliphant. Where do you see the violent overthrow of

the government being advocated by the Socialist Workers Party?

Mx. Ryan.

They have never repudiated the writings of Leon

Trotsky, who specifically calls for world revolution. The only

difference with Stalin is that Stalin said the revolution

should be consolidated first in the Soviet Union.

Mr. Vermeire. Aren't we talking two different things? It

is one thing to have a certain theory that goes back thirty-five

years -

Mr. Ryan. I think you are interested in the FBI philosophy

in investigating the Trotskyite movement.

Mr. Vermeire. If I can

finish the question, it is one

thing to say they never repudiated Trotsky beliefs; there has

never been a formal repudiation, but I would think that one's

actions, an organization's actions over the course of thirty-five

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HH 55301

years, actions

that have been peaceable and complete compli

ance with the laws of the host country, might, in effect, be

kind of repudiation

of that thirty-five-year-old, forty-year-

old philosophy.

Mr. Ryan. This pertains to the degree of a threat.

Mr. Atkisson.

Do you see any distinction between advo-

cating violence and believing that it will occur?

Mr. Ryan. The Supreme Court has gone into this concept.

The Smith Act still remains in force.

Mr. Atkisson. I am asking if you see any distinction

between advocating violence -- by advocating violence, I mean

I, John Atkisson, say to you, Mr. Ryan, I want you to go out

and beat Mr. Wannal over the head.

DO YOU

see any distinction between that and my saying that

have a sincere belief that Mr. Wannallwill be beat over the

head sometime tomorrow? Do you see a distinction between

those

two concepts?

Mr. Ryan. The distinction has to be made, the end-product.

What action do you take to bring about the beating?

Mr. Atkisson.

That is precisely the question.

Mr. Shackelford. Here we get into a relative situation

comparing the Irotsky, CPUSA, Communist Party of the United

States of America, with groups such as the weathermen and the

like.

What we are dealing with is the broad spectrum of the

so-called subversive movement.

You get into difference in -

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you shake your

head, but hear me out.

Mr. Oliphant. You are linking the Weathermen

and SWP

in the answer.

Mr.

shackelford. I am talking about a spectrum, of

range.

Mr. Oliphant. I think Mr. Atkisson's question, which he .

would like answered, is, do you have any acts that the Socialist

Workers Party has done to bring this about? What are those

acts?

Mr. Shackelford. The Socialist Workers Party - at the

present time their philosophy would be to continue to build the

party to gain the strength to bring about the revolution. so

long as they engage in the party-building function for the

ultimate purpose of engaging in the revolution. As far as I

would be concerned, I would look at that as a continuing act

toward the violation.

MI. Atkisson. Let me ask you this: If the ERA amenament

is. passed by the 28th state next year, will that constitute in

your mind a revolution?

MI.

Shackelford. The equal rights amenament?

Mr. Atkisson. Yes.

Mr. Wannall. We are at a

disadvantage because while you

have been talking, I have been thinking back to the extent of

influence and/or control of some of the groups that were

engaging in confrontations during the demonstrations in the late

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sixties or early

seventies. I would not want this record to

show that we had no information indicating that not a single

member of the Socialist workers Party did engage in activities

of that nature. We would have to go back to our files and try

to respond to your question after a review.

MI. Vermeire. Mr. Wannall and you other two gentlemen,

you mentioned before how the FBI is sensitive to the moods of

the.country, and you have alluded on a number of occasions

to the smith Ack. How many convictions have there been of

persons under the Smith Act in the last ten years? Do you

know?

Mr. Wannall. None, to my knowledge.

Mi:. Ryan. There have been a number of convictions --

excuse me, since 1950.

Mr. Vermeire. I am talking about the moods of the coun

try in the last ten years.

Mc. Ryan. None.

Mx. Vermeire.

How many arrests have there been?

Mr. Ryan.

The Supreme Court has rendered the Smith Act

ineffective for prosecutable purposes. It remains a statute.

Mr. Wannall. The Department advised us on November 1, 1974,

that a basis for investigation was the Smith Act.

MI. Vermeire. I am trying to tie it in. We are dealing

with a group whose

only claim to fame or in-fame has been

convictions under the Smith Act. Those convictions go back, I

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believe, to the late forties or early fifties; I am not sure.

All I am saying to you, and I don't mean to argue, is do you

think the socialist Workers Party may be in for or should have

a reevaluation as a subversive organization?

Mr. Ryan. If I can answer you, in the FBI you are re~

quired to follow, groups who advocate violence, and experience

shows that these groups at different times have different

levels of propensity for violence..

As you say, the Socialist workers Party now may not be a

threat, and I agree compared to other organizations now they

are at a low level as far as propensity for violence goes.

Maybe some pro-Maoist groups, elements of that development, ine

SIA, maybeathey are more violence-prone.

We do feetive have a responsibility for these groups-who""

advocate violence, when the time is right, to be aware of these

FriDates

groups and furnish this to the proper agency of the Executive.

Mr. Vermeire. Earlier this week, Mr. Wannall a public

statement was made by a former Attorney General, and also a

high-ranking Justice Department official -- and this will give

it away - who is a chairwoman of the Justice Department

Committee on the FBI, and in the course of those statements the

former stated, number one, that the FBI should not even be

engaged

in the area of domestic intelligence. That was former

Attorney General Clark.

And, number two, he stated that he felt that an independent!

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outside organization or persons should be involved in reviewing

on a continual basis the programs and activities of the FBI.

Miss Lawton

stated that she felt the FBI did not have the

sufficient expertise in its domestic intelligence section to

make realistic and practical judgments as to whether various

organizations presented threats, a threat or threats, to the

United States.

Do you care to comment on any of those statements?

Mr. Wannall. I am not aware of the statements.

I have

heard them from you for the first time, so I have no observa-

tion to make.

Mr. Ryan. If I could comment briefly, in 1968, in discuss-

ing extremist activity to foment, as he said, "rebellion in

urban ghettoes"

, the then Attorney General Clark called this

"the most difficult intelligence problem" in the Justice

Department.

Mr. Vermeire. I am aware of that.

Mr. Ryan. Apparently his attitude has changed. Since

he was Attorney General, a lot of his public actionand state-

ments have changed.

Mr. Vermeire. The former

Assistant Director, William

Sullivan, feels that the intelligence-gathering aspectsof the

FBI and its criminal investigative aspects should be separated

and two distinct organizations should be set up. What are

your feelings on that?

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These are general questions. Obviously we will get into

more specific ones later.

Mx. Wannall. I am rather surprised, because former

Assistant Director Sullivan was certainly the one who

initiated and implemented many of our operations in this area.

Mr. Ryan.

I would like to comment on that a little just

briefly to say that there are elements within the FBI that may

feel this way, too, but we are working and operating within

our responsibilities,

and this is a matter outside the FBi.

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NS 55301

Mr. Shackelford. Let me pose a practical answer there,

if I may. That issue has been discussed numerous times. It

is not really anything new. Some of the disadvantages I think

you would have; the agent training that is received is primarily

along criminal lines. The cross-feeding of agent personnel,

for example, from criminal investigations over into security

investigations, I think certainly has merit.

It has an end-product, if you will, operating within the

same house to keep us closer aligned to basic violations of law

and activity aimed toward violations of law. I think that is

particularly important.

Another advantage is the manpower flexibility that we

have. If the intelligence-gathering function had been

separated off unto itself, say, during the period of the late

1960's, I don't know where the manpower would have come from

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to cope with the problems that existed in the street. It

was virtually an impossible situation.

• It becomes more complex when you get into the trying of

cases, the searching of indices, the checks that are made

in connection with prosecutions. I can remember a period

when Bureau indices were checked and no other agencies were

checked. That ultimately became a problem which was recti-

fied, but the Bureau, and even its intelligence-gathering role,

or its subversive investigations, I think, are best related

in a law enforcement sense as opposed to a pure intelligence

sense without a basis for a tie back to the basic statutory

violations in some way.

MI. Oliphant. Getting into resource allocation here,

in 1971, what percentage would you estimate of your agent

resource, basically man-hours, were dedicated to domestic inves-

tigations of, let's say, internal security investigations?

MI. Wannall. I am not in a position to estimate that

because we didn't keep any records of that sort. The best

that could be done would be to ask our administrative division

to endeavor to give you an estimate based on the allocation of

money •

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Mr. Oliphant. All right; has the allocation changed up-

ward or downward since 1971?

Mr. Wannall. In our domestic area?

Mr. Oliphant. Yes:

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95301

Mr. Wannall Downward.

Mr. Oliphant. When did the major change downward come?

Mr. Wannall. I would say between October of 1972 and the

present time.

Mr. Oliphant. Why is that?

Mr. Wannall, Because in September of 1971, the Title 2

of the Internal Security Act of 1950 was repealed by legisla-

tion. At that time, we undertook to look at all investigations

we had in that area which meant in some instances opening

for active attention cases which had been placed in a mora-

torium basis because there had not been enough manpower to take

care of them. And the cases were opened.

They were looked at

and since that time many investigations which we would have

conducted prior to that time were closed and similar investiga-

tions were unopened.

Mr. Ryan. If I could briefly add, I might point out

that the level of the threat, the degree of the threat in terms

of activity as far as the black extremists were concerned,

and I refer specifically to such groups as the Black Panther

Party, and, as far as the new left was concerned, and I refer

to those violent-prone elements of the SDS, and Weathermen, and

in terms of the white hate groups, I refer to flan-type groups,

had also phased down.

Mr. Oliphant. How would you classify the Viet Nam Veterans

Against the War? How would you have classified them?

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Mr. Shackelford. Viet Nam Veterans Against the War?

Mr. Oliphant. Yes, sir.

Mr. Shackelford. What time period?

Mr. Oliphant. Well, do you have ongoing investigations of

the Viet Nam Veterans Against the War at the present time?

Mr. Shackelford. Let me go back historically a little.

The VVAW began as

what appeared to be a legitimate veterans

rights organization. Our first investigation of VVAW came

about when there was

information received of attempts by the

CPUSA to infiltrate it.

It evolved into what would be essentially described as

a basic Marxist, Leninist revolutionary organization at a

national office level.

Mr. Oliphant. When did it become a Marxist-Leninist

operation?

Mr. Shackelford. I can't give you the exact date.

MI. Oliphant. Can you document that it is a Marxist-

Leninist operation?

Mr. Shackelford. On a national office level?

Mr. Oliphant. What do you mean by that?

Mr. Shackelford. The national office leaders were advo-

cating a Marxist-Leninist revolution line.

Mr. Oliphant. Would that include John Carey?

Mr. Shackelford.. No, it did not.

Mr. Vermeire. Was that a personal philosophy, or was that

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a.

philosophy of the organization?

Mr.

Shackelford. Any organizational philosophy is a

direct product of the leadership.

Mr. Oliphant. How did the leadership manifest this

Marxist-Leninist philosophy?

Mx .

Shackelford. In statements made, material pub-

lished, the position papers put forth in their conventions, and

the like.

Mr. Oliphant. What did they say, that we are Marxist-

Leninists?

Mr. Shackelford. I can't give you exact quotes off the

top of my head.

Mr. Oliphant. I am not trying to be smart. Did they

use the terms Marxist-Leninist, or did you infer from the pro-

gram they wanted --

Mr. Shackelford.

They used the term.

Mx. Ryan. If I can go into a little on that.

Mr. Oliphant. Sure.

Mr. Ryan. I think it was about two years ago that there

were elements among the leadership of the VAW who began

internally and sometimes externally advocating a Marxist-Leninist

line. About eighteen months ago, we became concerned that the

Revolutionary Union, which is a pro-Maoist organization, became

very interested in the VVAW and actually started a campaign

to take over the VVAW in its entirety.

And they have had

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some success.

There are many leaders and members of the VAW who have

secretly enrolled in the Revolutionary Union. We are following

the activity of the Revolutionary Union carefully and endeavor-

ing to determine what other inroads they make into the VAW.

Maybe you could tell how they stand at the present time

in that area?

Mr. Shackelford. What I was trying to point out is our

investigation of VVAW has changed with the direction VVAW has

taken.

We have never, for example, investigated all VAW

chapters because VVAW has been a very fluctuating type organiza-

tion over the years, and I don't think at any one point have

all VVAW chapters, for example, necessarily adhered to the

national office policy.

VVAW has been in almost a constant state of flux in power

struggles among the leadership the VAW has taken in particu-

lar, or in directions which reflect the thinking of the

individual leaders. There has been a constant power struggle

within VVAW.

They have not adhered to a hard line for any

extended period of time.

Mr. Oliphant. With the exception of the Gainesville

case have there been prosecutions against any VAW organiza-

tions or members?

Mr. Shackelford. I don't believe there have been any other

Federal prosecutions that I am aware of.

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55301

Mr. Oliphant. Have there been any state prosecutions?

Mr. Shackelford.

Of individuals? I couldn't really

answer that.

Mx. Oliphant.

Have there been any state prosecutions of

groups?

Mr. Shackelford. Not that I am aware of.

Mr. Oliphant. Have you recommended prosecution? When

I say recommended prosecution, I understand that the FBI

presents its reports to the Department of Justice. However,

I also understand that when there are 302's which go over to the

Department which report general information and then there are

other reports that go over. that basically outline what would be

a case.

All right; understanding that, have there been reports

going over to any prosecutive authority submitted by the FBI,

I suppose the Department of Justice, which are laid out in a

case-like fashion in which the prosecution has been declined?

Mr. Shackelford: I don't believe so.

Mr. Oliphant. Thank you.

Mr.

Shackelford. That is with the exception of the

Gainesville case.

Mr. Vermeire. Mr. Wannall sometime in the early sixties,

a series of programs were begun by the FBI that were known and

have become known as the COINTELPRO activities. The procedures

utilized in these various programs aimed at various subversive

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organizations were not in accordance with Section 87 of the

FBI manual on instructions. In fact, they were quite a depar-

ture from traditional FBI investigative and intelligence

practices as had been practiced by the FBI in the past.

I would like to know how COINTELPRO germinated, how it

began, why it began, on whose suggestion did it begin, how was

It formulated, how was it carried out, and why was it carried

out?

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Mr. Wannall. I have no personal knowledge, but I will en-

deavor to respond to your question.

Mr. Vermeire. I understand you were not an Assistant

Director at that time. Perhaps you could tell us at that

time where you were assigned throughout the period of the

sixties.

Mr. Wannall. I can pursue that if you would like, but we

were

aware that you were going to talk about COINTELPRO. We

were advised beforehand, and that was the reason Mr. Ryan

came along. If you have no objections, I would have him address

your questions.

• Mr. Vermeire. Fine. I have no objections.

Mx. Ryan. Well, you give a pretty wide area, and I would

like to know how much time you would like me to give to this.

Mr. Vermeire. You can start off. This is an important

area. We would like to devote some time to it.

NH 55301

Mr. Atkisson. First, let's take a short break.

(Short recess, and discussion off the record during it.)

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Mr. Oliphant. I think it was Mr. Wannall, but I might

be mistaken, who stated - and I want to be sure I'm not

misquoting her - that the Smith Act was the justification

for a great number of the investigations regarding groups

under investigation foi domesic subversion, specifically,

the sWP.

Then you stated that the Smith Act or perhaps it was

Dave who stated the Smith Act had been renderea nugatory

basically by a Supreme Court decision. However, you were

told that as of 1974, the Smith Act was to be used as

a justification by the Justice Department. Are we to under-

stand by that that what you mean is that you have no hopes

for any prosecutions under that but that that is the

reason that you are allowed to continue to investigate?

Mr. Wannall. I would like to tell you what the

Department. said specifically in response zo a request that we

submitted.

• Mr. Oliphant. All right.

Mx. Wannall. We asked, in view of the abolition of the

Attorney

General's list, which

occurred, I think, in about

the spring of 1974, what was required of the FBI to permit the

Attorney General to carry out his responsibilities under

Executive Order 10450, which relates to the security of

government employees.

The Department came back and said,

"You should conduct investigations based on such statutes as

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HH 55301

the Smith Act."

I interpret this to mean that the Department feels

that the Smith Act is still a viable basis for an .

investigation. It has not been wiped off the books.

Mr. Oliphant. But as a practical matter, is it possible

to bring prosecutions under the Smith Act?

Mr. Wannall. You are asking me a legal question.

Mr. Oliphant. I'm asking your opinion, understanding

you are with the FBI and not with the legal arm of Justice.

But as an investigator and as the mar in charge of the

agents that primarily investigate the Smith Act, do you

feel that your men can bring viable prosecutions underneath

the Smith Act?

Mr. Wannall. I still cannot answer your questions. We

don't bring prosecutions.

Mr. Oliphant. Have any prosecutions been considered

under the Smith Act? Let me rephrase that. When was the

last time a prosecution was considered under the Smith Act?

Mr. Wannall. I don't know. That should be directed to

the Criminal Division.

Mr. Ryan. May I add a comment there?

19 kis

¡During the period from approximately 1952 until

1960, at the requestof the Department of Justice, the FBI

devoted considerable energies to developing evidence to

prosecute the Communist Party under the Smith Act.

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We exposed over 100 informants in trials and hearings

relating to the Snith Act. Then the Supreme Court determined

that the Smith Act was not prosecutable.

4957

MI. Wannall. That was in 1969

Mr. Ryan. The Congress then had passed the Internal

Security Act of 1950 and the Justice Department placed all

the FBI available resources into prosecuting the Communist

Party under the provisions of the Internal Security Act.

Again, we exposed dozens of confidential informants operating

within the Communist Party in an effort to cause the

Communist Party to register under the Internal Security

Act of 1950 and to abide by the other sanctions and provisions

of the Act.

The Internal Security Act of 1950 then through supreme

Court decisions was rendered ineffective. Since that time

there have been many efforts by Congress to pass legislation

to help contain Communism. There has not been effective

legislation to make Communism a prosecutable violation of

the law.

Mr. Oliphant. So the bottom line is that right now

it is not possible to prosecute Communism?

Mr. Ryan. It is technically not possible to prosecute

Communists now.

Mr. Oliphant. Do you have a reasonable ballpark

figure on how many registered members there are of the

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American Communist Party in the United States?

Mr. Shackelford. None registered.

Mr. Oliphant. How many members registered with the

Communist Party, let's say?

Mr. Wannall. We had to research this figure about

a year and a half ago.

I cannot give you today's figure.

At that time taking into account the Party and its youth

affiliate, I think we estimated in the neighborhood of 4500.

Mr. Oliphant. How many of those would have been in the

youth affisiate?

Mr. Shack elford. From memory it is roughly a fifty-

fifty break, as I recall.

Mx. Wannall I didn't get that figure.

I will have to rely

on his recollection.

Mr. Ryan. Could we go off the record?

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Ryan. The FBI, fron 1956 to 1971, in what I

believe reasonably and within the parameters of existing law

utilized counterintelligence program activities for the

sole purpose of limiting the capability of those practicing

massive violence and subversion to the detriment of the

American people and our Constitutional form of government.

Before I begin briefing you a little bit on it, I would

like to state that it is my belief that these programs had an

impact on the crises of the time.

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They helped bring about

favorable change. The FBI

personnel involved with these programs acted with a reasonable

good faith belief they were doing what was necessary and

lawful. I would like to point out the Department of

Justice, after a thorough examination of these programs, has

concluded none of the actions taken constitute a prosecutable

violation of federal statutes and only a small minority pose

problems of civil liability.

Mr. Oljohant. Is it not true that the Department of

Justice did not review each one of these? Didn't they

review a selected sampling?

Mx. Ryan. That is not true. As a matter of fact, I

personally sat down with Assistant Attorney General Stanley

Pottinger and his two deputies who are representatives

of the Civil Rights Division of the Department and personally

made available all our COINTELPRO files.

Mr. Oliphant. I know they were made available. I'm

not inferring they were made available. Did they actually

review each one of the files?

Mr. Ryan. They spent several days reviewing these

files. I endeavored to the best of my ability to point

them out to specific areas where we thought there could be

problems and to indicate to them exactly where they might

find problems.

We tried to showthem the most hideous examples.

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trying to get an answer here. Did they review each file?

They may have seen the most hideous. I am not trying to

quibble. I am trying to put it in accurate perspective.

Did they review each file?

Mx. Ryan. I would like to point out that there are

probably over 64,000 pages

involved here. Some of these files

they reviewed page by page. Others they spot-checked.

Others, they sampled. Others, they naed specific areas

that they wanted to explore in detail. The FBI, with

900đ

faith and with complete cooperation, made available

to them everything we had.

Mr. Vermeire. Are you familiar with the specific

programs and the various files?

Mr. Ryan. Yes.

Mr. Vermeire. Are you familiar with the one involving the

SNCC and SNCC's application to IFCO in New York for a

Joan of money, funds to buy various farm equipment, I believe,

for a cooperative, farm project down in Tennessee? That was

one of the documents we received from you pursuant to

one of our requests. Are you familiar with that particular

one?

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MI. Ryan. I am familiar generally with the files.

When you get into particular incidents, I would like to

point out for you that there were a total of 3208 incidents

23.40

proposed and of these some I388 were approved according

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to Justice Department figures resulting from a survey

of these programs.

Mr. Vermeire.

I believe this was not only approved

but carried out. This was where a letter was sent, an anonymous

letter was sent to the lending company, the lending

organization, and the letter -

Mr.

Shackelford. Was this a bank?

Mx. Vermeire. No, it was a philanthropic organization

which -

MI.

Shackelford. I think the record will show the

type of organization.

Mr. Vermeire. It was a philanthopic organization.

It was not a chartered bank.

A letter was sent fraudulently

stating that the person, being the alleged sender of the

letter, was a seller of farm equipment, and that the deal

was that the person applying for the loan was going to

buy used equipment. Whereas he would tell the lending

institutions he was buying new equipment, he was: going to

buy used equipment at the price he was stating to the lending

institution, at the price he was stating to them.

The difference between the money he was getting

from them for new equipment and the actual value of the

used equipment, the difference in that was going to be

split by the person sending the letter and the person applying

• for the loan.

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They were going to cut the difference between them.

AS a

result of this letter, IFCO decided not to lend this.

particular organization the money. Are you telling me the

Justice Department attorneys told you there is no violation

of law there, for example, interference of interstate trade

or anything of that type?

Mr. Ryan. I'm unable to comment about this specific

item. All I can say is that I have a broad knowledge of

the programs and there were very few instances where

fraudulent information was furnished. Most of the techniques

were based upon factual information in this program.

I do not know whether the Department of Justice specifically

saw. that technique. I don't know what the intent was.

I don't know what the damages were. I don't know if the anony-

mous mailing or fictitious name mailing was effective.

I cannot discuss that.

Mr. Vermeire. You are not aware of this particular

case?

MI. Ryan. No.

Mr. Shackleford. I assume that is from the information

we furnished you.

Mr. Vermeire. I understand from the documents, and it is

my recollection that the inter-departmental memorandum

indicated that this was not the case.

In the request for

the approval of sending such a letter, there was an indication

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that this was not the case, that it was fraudulent.

There was no such person.

The person who sent the letter

was an FBI agent.

Mr. Shackelford. I do not argue that point, but with

the satement as related about buying used equipment

and representing it as new, was that based on fact of was

that fiction?

Mr. Vermeire. It was fiction. Would you check out

that particular document and be prepared to comment on it at

the hearing?

Mr. Ryan. I would appreciate it if you would give

me a copy of it.

I understand

somebody from your staff would want to be

briefed further on that particular document.

Mr. Vermeire. All right, fine.

Mr. Ryan. On any particular technique we are willing

to do that.

• Mr. Vermeire. All right.

Mr. Ryan. To continue about the overall rationale

for our counterintelligence program, as you know, the

first program was effected in 1956 and it was directed

against the Communist Party, USA. I again point out that

we are dealing in some areas of sensitivity now. In 1956

there was evidence indicating that the Soviets were using

the Communist Party as a front for political and intelligence

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purposes. We in the FBI were very conscious of this

because we knew that many of our espionage cases of the '30s

and '40s grew out of individuals who were Communist

Party Members. Also, in the early 1950s, the Communist

Party had actually put hundreds of members into an underground

status, individuals who changed their names, changed their

employments, changed their localities, submitted false

income taxes

and

were operating in a complete submerged

underground status under the direction of the Party leadership.

The

Smith Act as we have indicated was unproductive and

because of legal technicalities made prosecution impossible.

we knew, also, that the Communist Party since the 1940s

• had

been used as a vehicle by the Soviets for intelligence

purposes. Since the Party was founded in 1919, I should point

out it has always been a puppet of soviet policy and remains

so today. At that time there were many in this country,

including prominent Members of Congress, who felt the

INTENDED

legislation which had been enacted expected the FBI to contain

Communism. There was a philosophy of "Leave Communism to the

FBI." Based on this, there were investigators that felt

the FBI should do more to curtail communism. The philosophy

of the field agents was reflected at headquarters and the

Bureau officials which conceived farming an organized,

carefully supervised program in an effort to neutralize

communist subversion.

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Mr. Vermeile. Who were these officials?

Mr. Ryan. This was a collective decision made I

believe at that time the Assistant Director was Allan Belmont.

I think he had some input into it. There was a section

chief named William Sullivan who had input into it. There

were other individuals on a lesser level.

During

that period there were a series of regional field

conferences where the possibilities of establishing

such a program was discussed. These officials, when

they came back to headquarters, pursued this further.

On August 28, 1956, a memorandum was forwarded through

the Bureau chain of command--it was subsequently approved

by MI. Hoover-which authorized consideration of a program to

counter communist subversion. The second memorandum, was

prepared in September, 1956. Instructions were thereafter

sent out on 9/6/56, authorizing 12 officers to effect a counter-

intelligence program against the Communist Party.

Mr. Vermeire. Who was the Attorney General at the time?

Mr. Ryan. I believe Rogers, but I would have to check on

that.

Mr. Vermeire. Was he consulted with respect to that

program.

Mx. Wannall. I have no information he was consulted,

but Mr. Hoover, in an appearance before the National

Security Council during the year 1956, did point out

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HH 55301

that the FBI had a program involving the neutralization of

the Communist Party.

Mr. Oliphant.

Did he go into detail?

Mr. Wannall. That document I think is available to you

in a position paper which has previously been turned over

to you.

Mr. Vermeire.

Aside from that generalized statement,

did MI. Hoover go into any detail on the program?

Mr. Ryan. Mr. Hoover directed a letter to Attorney

General Rogers dated May 8, 1958, where he specifically

advised a program had been instituted in August, 1956, to

neutralize the activities of the Communist Party and he

set forth examples of techniques that were utilized in this

program.

Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President, was

also advised by a copy of this letter.

Mr. Vermeire. What kind of examples were given at that

time?

Mr. Ryan. I did not bring the documentation for you.

It is available.

Mr. Vermeire. Do you recall of your own knowledge?

Mx. Ryan. I would suggest the fact that we were utilizing

informants to raise controversial issues within

the Party, to question the philosophy of the Pary, would be

one. We exposed the fact the Communist Party was trying

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to reinstitute a united front effort against a Left wing

group which was not a communist control group, basically

these were the techniques utilized. We were also raising

within the Communist Party some questions relating to

communist philosophy which had been raised by Trotskyites.

Mr. Vermeire. Aside fxom the disruptive activities,

the proposed disruptive activities which may be carried

on by informants within the Party, were any other techniques

at least considered at that time and made known to the

Attorney General or the people in the White House?

Mr. Ryan. We have considerable information about

notice given to the white House, the Secretary of State,

tovarious Attorney Generals, to the House Subcommittee

on Appropriations relating to these programs. We can detail

this for you now oxican dosit in chronological order.

Mr. Vermeire. This is subsequent to 1956, then?

Mr. Ryan. Yes.

Mr. Vermeire. Could you detail that at this point?

Mr. Ryan. All right.

On November 6, 1958, Director Hoover presented

a briefing relating to matters of internal security,

counterintelligence, to the President; and selected members

of the National Scourity-Countl. We have located in our

files his notes for this briefing which indicate at that time

he indicated to these individuals the existence of a formal

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intelligence program effort against the communists.

Mr. Vermeire. Was there any detail of the kind of

techniques?

Mr. Ryan. As I can recall, and I can document this,

several techniques were mentioned. To continue, there was

• letter to Attorney General Rogers which I briefly

mentioned, dated 5/8/58, regarding Communist Party activities

which specifically advised we had instituted a counterintelligehce

program in August of '56.

A copy of this letter was directed to Robert Cutler,

Special Assistant to the President.

There was a letter to Attorney General Kennedy dated

January 10, 1961, which attached a comprehensive memorandum

which set forth sensitive information regarding the.

Bureau's investigation of the Communist Party.

There are examples of counterintelligence program activity

set out in this letter.

A.copy of this letter was sent to the Secretary

of State, whom I believe at that time was Dean Rusk. There

was a letter to Attorney General Katzenbach dated

September 2, 1965, which outlined in some detail our

investigation of the Ku Klux Klan and other hate groups.

This letter pointed out that the Bureau was

seeking

to disrupt and neutralize theactivities of the Klan.

A Copy of this letter was

sent to Marvin Watson at

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the White House.

It is interesting to note that "by date of 9/3/65

Attorney General Katzenbach directed a response to this letter

to Director Hoover where he expressed the hope that at

MICHA

some time it may be possible to place these activities on

the public record so the FBI could receive its due recognition.

Mr. Oliphant. I think that is going to happen, Dave.

Mx. Ryan. On December 19, 1967, Director Hoover sent

a letter to Attorney General Ramsay Clark regarding

our activities to neutralize the violence-prone activities

of the Ku Klux Klan. He enclosed with this letter a compre-

hensive memorandum regarding our Klan investigations where it

was clearly set forth that we were using counterintelligence

type techniques to neutralize the Klan.

A letter was sent to Attorney General Mitchell by

the Director, dated September 17, 1969, outlining our counter-

intelligence program directed against the Klan and assuring the

Attorney General that we would continue our efforts to neutralize

the violence presented by this group.

Mr. Oliphant. Did any of these letters show that any

of the programs were being conducted against the other

groups besides the Kan and the Communist Party?

Mr. i

Ryan.

Black Extremist, the New Left, and SWP?

ONLY

These are the letters we have located.

Mr. Vermeire. So at the present time you have no

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HH 55301

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evidence that letders were sent regarding the Black

Extremist, the New Left or the SWP?

Mr. Ryan. Yes. I will continue with this.

I do not have the date with me, but by accident

one time a teletype captioned "Cunterintelligence Program,

Black Extremists, Black Nationalists," was sent to the

Department of Justice by routing slip. It outlined in some

detail a successful counterintelligence technique effected,

I believe, against the Black Panther Party.

Mr. Oliphant. What was the response from the Department?

Mr. Ryan. There was no response.

Mr. Oliphant. Who got that at the Department?

Mr. Ryan. I believe it was sent to the Internal Security

Division. It was the special litigation section.

Mr. Oliphant. Is there any record of the fact of who

received it or what if anything was done with it? You know.

let's be practical, the fact that a letter went over

to the Department might mean something significant if it was

routed to the appropriate person, or it might mean

it got buried in an avalanche of mail that went over

there and ended up in somebody's desk drawer.

Mr. Vermeire. Aside from the response of Attorney

General Katzenbach that you referred to, were any of these

letters ever responded to?

Mr. Ryan.

No. If I may continue, during the period

HH 55301

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1958 to 1966, on six occasions detailed information was

prepared for off-the-record testimony of the Director

before the subcommittee on Appropriations of the U.s.

House of Representatives relating to our counterintelligence

progiams. We have the information that was prepared and

may be presumed

1 to have been

used by the Dixector.

As you know, he often went off the record before

this committee to advise them of sensitive areas of our

operations.

Mr. Oliphant. Is there anyone who was with him at

that time who can testify?

Mr. Ryan. Yes. On November 1974, Mr. Wannal! I believe,

contacted former Assistant to the Director Cartha De Loach

and he advised Mr. Wannall, and Mr. Wannall duly recorded this,

that he recalled briefing Attorney General @ark regarding

our counterintelligence activities, President Johnson, and

he was also sure that Mr. Sullivan or Mr. Belmont had

briefed Attorney General Katzenbach.

Mr. Wannall, I believe, also contacted John Mohr, a

former Assistant to the Director, in November of 1974.

Mr. Moore recalled on several occasions the Director had

furnished details to the House Subcommittee on Appropriations

relating to our counterintelligence program activities.

Mr. Oliphant. To the House as a whole or selected

members of the House?

HH 55301

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MI. Ryan. Selected members.

Mr. Oliphant. The House Subcommittee as a whole of

let's say to Mr. Rooney?

Mr. Ryan. The House Subcommittee on Appropriations

was chaired by Congressman Rooney.

Mr. Oliphant. I understand that.

When they say they were advised, and let's say it was

off the record, does that mean during the hearing?

Mr. Ryan. During the hearing, yes.

Mr. Callahan, who is presently Associate Director

of the FBI, also recalled in November, 1974, basically

the same information furnished by a former Assistant to the

Director,

John Mohr: that is, that the Director had

on several occasions furnished details to the House Subcommittee

on Appropriations relating to our counterintelligence

investigations.

I can personally tell you that during the period 1963

to approximately 1967, there were numerous cumors occasioned

ASKED

when I was harangued mima manner of-speaking, to prepare backup

material for the Director's use, relating to successful

PROGRAM

counterintelligence type activity. This was prepared in

an informal manner. It was often prepared immediately

prior to the Director's briefing of an important dignitary

of government, including the President. It was my

understanding that this was going to be furnished to the

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Director for his use in briefing these individuals:

Mr. Vermeire. What President?

MI. Ryan. You

would have to go back to the period

1963 through 1967. That constitutes basically the notice

that we have given to appropriate and important government

officials regarding our COINTELPRO type activities.

Are there any questions on that?

Mr. Oliphant. Is there any documentation?

I appreciate the documentation you have given and I can

see it represents a lot of work, getting that together.

Is there any way that can be pinned down as to how much

of this was actually passed

on?

You have the stuff that went over to the Department.

Is there anyone who was advised of any feedback?

In other words, did these letters cause any stir?

Were they appreciated by the Attorney General or anyone

who got them? Did they understand the import?

Mr. Ryan. Mr. Katzenbach sent what might be referred

toas a memorandum fol commendation on it. We have that

documentation.

Mr. Katzenbach has since been interviewed

about that. _He has indicated he cannot recall doing it.

He has also stated that it was his habit sometimes to flatter

people.

Mr. Oliphant. What about any other of the Attorney

Generals?

HH 55301

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Mr. Wannall. I would suggest you might want to talk

to Mr. Deloach who by telephone advised me he had briefed

the Attorney General on not just this program, but the

programs in general that the Bureau was carrying out during

the period.

He might be able to furnish information based on his

knowledge because he indicated there were oral briefings.

Mr. Oliphant. Who accompanied the Director when he

went before the House Appropriations Committee?

Mr. Ryan. Mr. Mohr and Mr. Callahan generally.

Mr. Oliphant. Have you talked with Mr. Mohr or Mr.

Callahan as to whether in fact Mr. Hoover did brief

the committee as a whole?

Mr. Ryan. Mr. Wannal has talked to them and has

recorded his comments in memorandum form which were made

available to me.

Mr. Oliphant. What did he say?

• Mr. Ryan.

I talked with Mr. Mohr.. He said, yes,

the off-the-record testimony that we had prepared

for the Director had been given before the House Appropriations

Subcommittee by Mr. Hoover. In reviewing the record zestimony,

there were indications of off-the-record discussions

at particular points at which the information would have been

disclosed.

Mr. Vermeire. Did the Congressmen have any questions

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with respect to the program or was it more in the form of a

briefing by Mt. Hoover to them?

. Mr. Byan. I can only relate to what Mr. Mohr said.

He indicated that they expressed interest in them. He

indicated they did not express any disfavor over them..

was calling on recollection. We do have compiled off-the-

record testimony that was prepared for that purpose.

If you do not have it, we are certainly in a position

to make it available to you.

Mr. Vermeise. That off-the-record testimony would not

be contemporaneous. It is a recollection of what that was?

Mr. Ryan. This was what was prepared for Mr. Hoover's

use for his off-the-record discussion.

Mr. Vermeire. It was prepared but as far as the actual

dialogue, that was based upon MI. DeLoach's recollection?

Mr. Wannall. Mr. Mohr.

Mr. Vermeire. What year was this?

Mr. Wannall. There were five or six years.

Mr. Ryan. There were six occasions between 1958 and

1966 which was basically the period of strong activity

in these programs.

Mr.. Oliphant. Why was the program discontinued?

Mr. Ryan.

The program

was discontinued in April of

1971 by instructions that were relayed to me from the

then Assistant Director, Charles Brennan. It was my understanding

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that the program was discontinued at this time based on

the fact that it had been primarily phased out. There was

a depreciation of the threat and there had been a security

breach in that in March, 1971, our resident agency in

Media, Pennsylvania, was burglarized.

Mr. Oliphant. How soon after the burglary was it dis-

continued?

Mr. Ryan. In March, 1971, the burglary took place

and stamas discontinued effective April 28, 1971, all counter-

intelligence programs.

Mr. Vermeire.

Before the break-in, was there any memo-

randa to the effect that the program would be discontinued?

Mr. Ryan. No, I would point out to my own knowledge

that the programs

had been literally phased out. In 'some areas

thay

it had been completely discontinued formally.

MI. Oliphant. Which areas were those?

Mr. Ryan. Socialist Workers Party was discontinued

in 1969, although I understand that that one technique

did not actually phase out until January of the following

year.

Mr. Oiphant. Which technique was that?

Mr. Ryan. I'm not sure. Another program, one that has

been described as Hoodwink, had long since been

discontued.

Mr. Vermeire. Hoodwink was a short-term program?

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Mr. Ryan. There were four anonymous letters prepared

under Hoodwink. There were other programs discontinued

and some in a classified area.

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HM 55301

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Shackelford. I think a point that needs to be made

is that these programs were responses to problems, and as the

problem was diminished, the need for the program was diminished

essentially. I don't know if Dave would agree with this, but

the compromise that came out of the Media burglary probably

brought everything into very sharp focus and tipped the balance

as far as a determination whether it should be continued.

Mr. Ryan. In 1971, the programs, as I indicated, were

phased down. At that time, the reason I became involved is

that I had put through a recommendation for a counter-

intelligence program type action. I don't remember what it

was

and at that time Charles

Brennan, the Assistant Director.

My 5369rt312

turned that down, and at that time questioned the feasibility

of continuing the programs.

I would not doubt that he had consulted with other

Bureau officials at the time.

There was some feeling that some portions of these pro-

grams should have been continued, but the threat in most areas

had phased down to the extent where most of the programs were

inactive.

Mr. Vermeire. It seems

to me in any of those off-the-

- record discussions of the programs by Mr. Hoover with Congress,

he could not have gone into much detail, and the reason I say

that is because if he did, I don't know how secure that

particular hearing room was.

I don't know whether it was just

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the Congressmen, or whatever. •But it seems to me that just

that, itself, would somewhat compromise the programs.

I mean once it gets out that the FBI might be sending a

certain letter to somebody and saying it is from somebody, you

know, once that kind of thing starts getting out, it seems to

me you might apprise the people that activity is going on, and

it seems to me then the program loses much of its effective-

ness.

• •

Mr. Wannall. I would say, Mr. Vermeire, that Me. Hoover dis-

cussed the most sensitive operations that we had not just in

the domestic field but in our counter-intelligence areas with

the Committee, and I have no knowledge that there was any

breach of security.

I am inclined to think probably the room was swept prior

to the testimony.

Mr. Ryan. During the years of this testimony before the

House Subcommittee on Appropriations, the public record will

show that Mr. Hoover was highly complimented on his presenta-

tion and great confidence was expressed in him. I think this

confidence was justified.

neat

Ms. Miller. Let me ask you

abut the tactics that were

considered to be disruptive that were used in the COINTELPRO

program. Would you outline

what some of those were?

Mr. Ryan. The techniques that were utilized were calculated

to curb subversion or violence. There was no rulebook of what

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to use.

When I was involved with the counter-intelligence program.

my philosophy was that we should primarily endeavor under this

program -- and it was the Communist Party program - to

develop new long-range intelligence or counter-intelligence

techniques.

And I would like to comment on the Communist Party

program, we did develop such techniques which were unique in

the area of intelligence and which have evolved into foreign

intelligence techniques which I think have become some of the

more important operations or techniques used in our foreign

counter-intelligence area in the FBI, and I think that high

ine.

government officials, including, Kissinger, have commended the

FBI for the information developed as a result of techniques

that evolved out of the counter-intelligence program.

Ms. Miller. What were some of the techniques?

Mr.. Ryan. They are highly classified.

Ms. Miller. What were the techniques under the

COINTELPRO?

Mr. Ryan. There were a variety of techniques.

There was

no rulebook of what could be used.

We would consider any

technique which would neutralize violence-prone or subversive

organizations.

Mr. Atkisson. Can you give us some examples, Mr. Ryan?

Mr. Ryan. A copy of the report of the Department of

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Justice study, Committee on FBI COINTELPRO'S, -the Petersen

Committee Report has been made available to you which endeavored

to put in categories the type techniques used under this pro-

gram.

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Mr. Atkisson. The program was discontinued in 1971: It

had been largely phased out, you say, before that, 1970, and

with respect to SWP largely discontinued as early as 1969.

Are there any of the techniques outlined in the report

already forwarded to us, any of the techniques that you now

have in mind which were continued for any reason whatever after

any of those dates -- well, after

1971, with respect to any-

body; after 1970, with respect to SWP?

Mr. Ryan. I would like to point out that there have been

some efforts by irresponsible elements of the press, by

individuals who for personal reasons are endeavoring to capitalize

on their past association with the FBI, and by individuals who

I would classify por as subversives to try to leave the impres-

COINTEREO

sion that we are still using counterintelligence-type activi-

ties.

Now, in the Petersen report a technique is mentioned, and

that is interviewing members.

These were interviews that were

authorized for disruptive purposes. Now we still interview

members of subversive groups. We don't interview for disrup-

tive purposes.

Mr. Oliphant. What about interviewing families or

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employees?

Mi. Ryan. I do not know of any instance where this would.

be done for disruptive purposes. It is possible that the inter-

views would be conducted to develop necessary background to

establish identity or to determine the extent of involvement

with a subversive group.

Mr. Vermeire. Is disruption a motive, or is it a result?

Mr. Shackelford.

Past or current?

Mr. Vermeire.

Current. I mean, it seems to me --

Mr .

Shackelford. In other words, if we interview a

person now, what is the motivation of the interview?

Mr. Vermeire. I am not sure that is important. Because

of the kind of interview and the kind of statements made so

clearly lend themselves to a disruption of some activity or

some - it seems

to me the motive may not be so important.

Mr. shackelford. I think what we are talking about,

we are interviewing a person about their current activities

which are under investigation. They of all people are

certainly aware of their own activities.

Mr. Vermeire. What about people other than the target?

Mr. Shackelfora. Like who?

Mr. Vermeire. Employers, family, landlords.

Mr. Oliphant. Co-workers.

Shackelford. I believe you will find those interviews

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aren't normally conducted. You are talking about exceptions.

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HH 55301

Mr. Atkisson. Would it be legitimate post-1971, to

indicate to a third party interviewee, i.e., an employer, let

us say, that the reason the interview was being conducted was

that the subject of the interview was Communist, or subversive,

or was in any way dangerous to the United States?

Shackelford.

I would say normally it would not be.

If the employer was engaged in highly sensitive classified

government contract work, certainly it could be.

Mr. Atkisson.

But if not?

Mr. Shackelford. If not under normal circumstances, no.

Mr. Oliphant. Pursuant to that, what would be the purpose

of furnishing to the Civil Service Commission the results of

interviews of the results of information developed that a

person was living with someone no longer her husband or going

into their sex life in any way, shape,. or form?

ro/ shackelford. You are raising the same old question.

Mr. Ryan. I don't know where this is being done.

Mr. Shackelford. You keep resurrecting the sex life.

don't know what the problem is. Talk specifics, and we will

try to give you an answer.

Mr. Atkisson. Specifically, Kathryn Sledge Zaharie, I

guess was the maiden name or marriage name. There is a letter

sent to the Civil Service Commission. She got a job in a vA hospi-

tal in Seattle - I don't have the file in front of me --

certainly a non-sensitive job, name check, reported back a lot

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of information about SWP activities, and then the fact that.

she is married to a certain person, but living with someone

else.

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MI. Ryan.

Tim, what I would like to suggest you do, if

you have documentation -

Mx. Atkisson. This is documentation.

Mr. Ryan.

-- let us have the benefit of it, and we will

be glad to brief you completely on the circumstances.

Mx. Atkisson. We want to ask philosophically, if you are

going into that.

The other thing is we have people --

Mr. Shackelford. Let me answer the first question first.

Mr. Atkisson. Go ahead.

Mx.| shackelfora.

The problem that arises in a situation

like that, in the normal investigation of the individual engaged

in subversive activities, you would get a degree of back-

ground information concerning them, they are married, single,

U.S. citizen, alien, and the like.

If the individual, for example, is married or in the case

that you described, I believe, is living with someone other than

a spouse, legal spouse, that would appear in the normal back-

ground of the investigation, of the person.

When a namecheck comes in, if that appears in the report,

which is prepared in connection with the subversive investiga-

tion, it would be sent probably in toto. We do not go through

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normally and excise. That is how it would come about.

Mr. Atkisson. Let me ask you this: Would people, when

they were going around, let's say, investigating specifically

the SWP, speaking with third parties, would it be acceptable

procedure to say, (a) that they were conducting a subversive

investigation and that the person belonged to an organization

which was on the Attorney General's subversive list? This is

in 1972, let's say, of post-1971, at any rate, when the

Attorney General's list for all practical purposes has not been

alive and

well since 1956?

Mr.

Shackelford.

Well, that is your definition of alive

and well.

Mr. Ryan. I would like to get back to a factual situation.

Mx. Atkisson. Those are allegations. If those allegations

are true, would that be an acceptable technique?

Mr. Ryan. I would like to deal with facts and avoid

allegations, if we could.

Mr. Atkisson. Would that be acceptable?

Mr. Ryan. We will resolve individually any allegation

you want to present to us.

The facts are that the Petersen

Committee Report, which thoroughly studied these programs,

found, and I think you will find under Category 12 of the

Report, that the FBI as a COINTELPRO action during the period

1956 to 1971 in only thirty instances informed others of

immoral activity on the part of a member of a subversive group

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or 'extremist.

To emphasize how little this was done and how this is

being distorted, I would point out there were only two

instances of such activities in the Communist Party program out

of 1,388. So you

are talking about a very minute area which

think is distracting you from what your charter is, to find

areas of possible abuse. This is so minute.

Mr. Atkisson.

we are talking about post-1971. I am ask-

ing is that acceptable? As a basic thing, is it acceptable to

interview third parties now regarding, let's say, people

specifically within the SWP, to ask them about their where-

abouts, do they live here, landlords, and that sort of thing?

Mr. Shackelford. The answer to that is yes. But you do

not furnish information. You solicit information. You must

qualify it in that regard.

Mr. Atkisson. In the course of that investigation is it

acceptable to reveal why you are investigating the person?

-----

Mr. Shackelford. Not normally. Again, I have to qualify

it, because I don't know the specific incident or the specific

• third party, or what the circumstances are.

Mr. Atkisson.

That is reasonable, but not normal --

Mr. Shackelford. Again, the basic guidelines of the agent

is he obtained information; he does not give information.

Mx. Atkisson. That is what one would think.

Mr. Ryan. Some of these allegations you mention that are

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MW 55301

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coming out now are raised for one basic reason, and it is quite

obvious, to curtail our investigative responsibilities. There

are some people obviously who do not want to be investigated.

Mr. Vermeire. I don't want to be investigated. I don't

know anybody that does.

Mr. Wannall; I don't know what the Privacy Act, how that

will impact on our conducting interviews very frankly. We

have not yet received all of the guidelines that are neces-

sary. You mentioned

someone employed in the government and

mention was made in the late sixties of the Attorney

General's list. Under 10450, the Executive Order having to do

with

security of government employees,

we do have responsibili-

ties to furnish information to other agencies. While there

is no updating of that list from about the mid-50's, the list

was in existence until about a year and a half ago, and I can

well understand our furnishing information to the Civil

Service Commission, where mention is made of the Attorney

General's list.

That would have been a normal procedure.

I don't know if this ties in with the facts that you have

of not, but there is no question in my mind that we would have

furnished Civil Service information, information if a person

was employed by Civil Service, or Agriculture, if he was

employed by Agriculture, and normally Civil Service would

conduct the investigation unless it got into an area of rather

extensive activities, and it would be referred to us for

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security government employees' investigation..

Mr. Vermeire. If I can go on, Mr. Wannald, this is

gotten from an FBI document. COINTELPRO document labeled

Black Extremists, and I direct this question to Mr. Wannall.

In 1969, Ralph Abernathy, at the time he just succeeded

Martin Luther King as head of the SCIC, was preparing to give

an informative speech at a church in Pittsburgh regarding the

upcoming elections -- I believe it was 1968 and not 1969.

A letter was

sent, an anonymous letter, to the pastor

of that church, which contained certain allegations that Mr.

Abernathy had been involved in certain sexual molestations of

a fifteen-year-old girl.

In God's name, how does this apply to your justification

for COINTELPRO activities? Here is a man giving a political

informative speech to people at a church and here is the FBI,

and this procedure was approved by headquarters, approved a

procedure whereby such kind of information is sent to that

church.

How can you justify that kind of an action?

Mx. Wannall, I am sitting here today trying to justify

something that occurred under a policy which was established

and approved by Mr. Hoover -

Mr. Vermeire. I am not putting any individual blame on

this, but I would like your viewpoint on that kind of pro-

cedure. Would you have approved this kind of procedure had you

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been in that position to do so in 1968? Would you have

approved that kind of a technique?

MI. Wannall. Well, I am getting into theory, naturally.

You are asking me what I would have done. I don't know.

I don't

Know.

I certainly would not approve it today. I can answer

that question.

Mr. Oliphant.

What would be different between now and

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then?

Mr. Wannal I don't know all the circumstances surround-

ing the investigation of Abernathy. I wasn't involved; I have

no background on him. I don't know what the files show.

Mr. Vermeire.. We had received information at a briefing

that Ralph Abernathy was not under investigation by the FBI.

We know his predecessor was. We won't get into that.

MI. Ryan, do you care to comment on that? Are you familia?

with the document in question?

Mr. Ryan. Just generally. I don't question the document

was approved. I would like to point out another technique

that I reviewed --

Mr. Vermeire. No, but I am interested in this one.

Mr. Ryan. - which is basic to this one, I believe.

There was an individual who was a member of a Black

Extremist group who obtained a job as a schoolteacher.

This

individual had been convicted for molesting children. He was

a schoolteacher. The FBI furnished this information to a

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local police department, and this individual was discharged

from his position.

Mr. Vermeire.

Do you think that is analogous?

Mr. Ryan.

I do.

Mr. Vermeire. SCIC is not an extremist organization.'

Mr. Ryan.

Well, you are reaching an area of great sensi-

tivity based on our interest in Abernathy's predecessor, and it

is an area where I think if you want to approach into it, you

should do so with some caution out of respect to dead people.

Mx. Vermeire. I certainly am not bringing out any of the

material vis-a-vis Martin Luther King, if that is what you are

getting at.

Mr. Ryan. I don't care to bring that out --

Mr. Vermeire. I don't either.

Mes Ryanne myselfe

Mr. Vermeire. I wasn't asking for that.

Mr. Ryan. But this is an individual who was the number

one associate of Martin Luther King in this time frame.

Mr. Vermeire. I understand the FBI, and am familiar with

the FBI interest in Martin Luther King and SCLC, but here is

a time when he was dead; the SCIC at that particular time was

not considered an extremist organization, as I understand it,

and that kind of information was disseminated, and I just don't

think it is analogous to the

case you gave me.

Mr. Ryan. I won't comment whether or not we should do it.

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I don't know.

I will comment, if you were the minister and you

had a daughter, you might have been interested in that informa-

tion.

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HH 55301

Mr. Vermeire. The point is the man was there to speak on

educating people in the church with respect to elections.

there were Black populace in the church. It was an upcoming

election. I won't dwell on it.

Are you familiar with the case of Father Taylor in Ohio?

Mr. Ryan.

These are areas - there were 3,208 proposals

254.0

in this program, some 17300 approved. We would be glad to

discuss the specific ones if we had a chance to review the

circumstances.

MI. Atkisson.

That is one of the purposes of bringing

it up now.

Mr. Wannall We will go over the record thoroughly.

Mx. Vermeire. And also look into Father Taylor, that comes

under the Black Extremist COINTELPRO; okay?

• Ms. Miller. Probably Mr. Wannalf can answer this: The

memo which announced the fact that COINTELPRO would be dis-

continued said that certain actions would be authorized on a

selective basis.

Mr. Shackelford. No; it didn't: It said any proposed

action should be submitted under the individual case captions.

It didn't say would be approved, as I recall that document.

Ms. Miller. Okay; but it gave instructions to the field

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NH 55301

office, if they felt the case was warranted, that disruptive

actions could he undertaken.

Mr. Shackelford. It said to submit the recommendations

under the individual case captions.

Ms: Miller. My question is, have there been any disrup-

tive activities approved since 1971?

MI. Ryan.

If I may respond to that, at the instructions

of Mr. Wannall, I surveyed the entire Intelligence division

earlier this year to determine if anybody in the Intelligence

division had any knowledge of any COINTELPRO-type activity

that had been authorized after April 28, 1971, and this survey

was negative with one exception; that one agent spoke about

a misinformation technique in the foreign counter-intelligence

area, and he thought that maybe somebody might consider this

as a COINTELPRO-type activity.

I reviewed this technique and found that it was exclusively

in the foreign intelligence area and was not of a COINTELPRO

nature in this context we are discussing.

However, in connection with various reviews which we have

conducted and are continuing to conduct, we have discovered that

there were two recommendations submitted for counter-

intelligence action in February of 1972. One of these related

to the Black Extremist field

and involved the furnishing of a

newspaper clipping from an extremist newspaper anonymously to

the headquarters of an extremist group.

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The other, I believe, was in what could be called the

White-hate field and involved furnishing information to an

individual affiliated with a news media organization of a

factual nature.

These two instances we have reported to the Attorney:

General. These were approved

after the 1971 concluding date of

the programs.

Mr. Wannall. May I add one more thing to that, please?

The communication to which you refer, indicating that if there

should be any further recommendations for COINTELPRO-type

actions, they should be submitted under the case file, I was

not involved in the communication. I have given consideration

to this.

Some of the COINTELPRO actions were in the counter-

intelligence area, and I would specifically refer to some that

were conducted against the Communist Party•

I want it to be very clearly understood that in our

foreign counter-intelligence activities, we engage in activi-

ties that you might classify as a COINTELPRO-type activity.

AS

an example, if through an anonymous mailing we could surface

an intelligence officer of a hostile foreign intelligence ser-

vice, we would do it.

So when we are talking about COINTELPRO, I want to be

sure we are talking about the activities in our domestic field

which are under criticism, and there are certainly valia

questions that have to be asked and responded to to the best

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NW 55301

of our ability.

Mr. Vermeire. Mr. Wannall, the justification that we were

given by the Bureau! for example, for the Bureau's not

divulging the identity of informants, why those names are

excised in various documents, is, and I think it is a valid

justification, that if we compromise informants, their identity

and so forth, that we are putting informants, because of the

very nature of being an informant, we are putting an informant

in an extremely untenable and dangerous position, i.e, he is

subject to possibly physical harm or even death at the hands

of the people he has been informing on.

Is that a fair characterization of one of the justifica-

tions for not turning over informants, aside from the other

theory of the Bureau not breaching its confidentiality?

Mr. Wannall. That is part of it. It does go further.

We

have had persons who have cooperated with us in the past in our

foreign counter intelligence areas who have come to us and

said, "I am discontinuing my cooperation because in two

weeks, two years, or three years, I will read my name in the

newspaper."

There has been a measurable effect on our ability to carry

out responsibilities in our counter-intelligence field as a

result of the revelation of informants.

Mr. Vermeire. I understand that. I wasn't questioning

the justification.

That was a preface to my next question.

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Given the reason for not giving us the names of the

informants, how do you square it with some of the COINTELPRO

activities, whereby you actively subjected people to this kind

of threat, this kind of potential for harm? In other words, were

you told X, who was in a position of importance or power in

a Black extremist group, for example, the Black Panther policy,

you told X that y was an informant and Y, being also a member

of the party., telling other members of these groups falsely

that people within the group were informants?

Wasn't this really subjecting these people to the likeli-

hood or risk that they would face severe chance of physical

harm?

Mr. Ryan. The Bureau was very much aware of this possi

bility. I think what you are talking about was a proposal

which was specifically turned down on the basis that it could

jeopardize an individual's life. If this one was not turned down,

there were others that were turned down.

•I would also like to point out to you that this Bureau,

in the case of an extremist organization on the West Coast,

where a second extremist organization in competition had a

contract out to kill the leaders of the first group, this Bureau

alerted these extremists to the fact that their life was in

jeopardy, duffrouity.

Mr.. Oliphant. Mr. Ryan; there are COINTELPRO things

approved, Bureau documents, not allegations, where exactly the

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tactic which Mr. Vermeire was

referring to was used, and then

under the section which dealt with results, it said, "Subject

fled the area."

Mr. Ryan. Without going into specifics, I can say that in

my survey of these programs - and I have been involved for

some period in surveying - I have uncovered no instance where

physical harm resulted to any individual --

Mr. Oliphant. We are talking about the risk. How do you

justify the risk on that?

Mr. Shackelford. Let me answer that, if I may. You are

trying to compare subjects engaged in extremist activity, high

level of violence, and our responsibilities, if you will, to

that person and comparing it specifically with our responsi

bilities to a person who is willing to engage in a relationship

with these people at great risk to himself, considerable hard-

ship for the

Bureau and the government, and I propose that there

is a considerable difference in the FBI's responsibility to those

two different people.

Mr. Oliphant. You are saying subjecting these people to

violence and they deserve this and yet --

Mr. Shackelfora. I didn't say that.

Mr. Oliphant. That is the implication.

Mr. Shackellord. I said you are comparing those two as

being like circumstances. I propose they are not like

circumstances as far as the Bureau's responsibilities to them.

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Mr. wannall. I would have to say that sitting here now and

looking back on some of the activities that were carried out,

they could be classified as improprieties. I don't think

there was any effort from anything that I have been told or

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anything that I have seen myself on the part of the Bureau to

subject individuals to violence.

I don't know the specific cases or case that you have in

mind, and if you have a case in mind, and we can review the

circumstances, we will be more than glad to give you as much

information as is available with regard to it.

Mr. Vermeire. Mr. Wannall,about three weeks ago, you

recall Congressman McClory and a few of us had a briefing with

you involving national security wiretaps and some break-

ins, and I would just like to put on the record some questions.

with respect to that hearing.

Why don't we take a few minutes' break while I

collect my

thoughts?

• (Brief recess)

Mr. Vermeire. Mr. Wannall, on October 10, as I referred

to before, there was a briefing with Congressman McClOry,

yourself, and other members of the FBI, members of this staff,

and I am not going to go through my records of that entire

briefing, but I am going to touch on a few of the things

brought up there.

At the time of the District Court for the Eastern District

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of Michigan decision that is referred to by a lot of names,

Mckees! decision for one, I believe in the Spring of 1972 you

said - I am sure most people are familiar with the decision,

but in the decision of Justice Powell, one of the things. he

said, in trying to lay down suma kind of standard or criteria

for what is a domestic organization as opposed to a foreign

organization - of course the strictures and the decision by

that court said that no electronic surveillance could be done

on a domestic organization even in

the interest of national

security.

A lot of questions, of course, by that decision were not

answered.

But I want to cite one particular quote from

Justice Powell, and then ask you a question on it.

It says, "Although we attempt no precise definition, we

use the term 'domestic organization' in this opinion to mean

a group or organization whether formally or informally

constituted, composed of citizens of the United States which

has no significant connection with a foreign power, its agents

or agencies.

"No doubt there are cases where it will be difficult to

distinguish between domestic and foreign unlawful activity

directed against the government of the United States where

there is collaboration of varying degrees between domestic

roots' organization and agents or agencies of foreign powers,

but this is not such

a case."

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In your opinion, then, does this leave it up to you on a

case-by-case basis and based on the facts of each case, to

determine what is a domestic organization and what isn't?.

In other words, that allows a lot of flexibility, and how. is

the FBI attempting to meet the mandate of this decision?

Obviously Congress has a mandate from this decision, also,

and that is that Congress should enact positive legislation

whereby these standards are set out. Hopefully that will be

the result of these committees, but presently how is the FBI

implementing this decision?

Mr. Wanal]. Every electronic surveillance in the national

security area, aside from Title 3, has to be personally

approved by the Attorney Ageneral, and he is the ultimate

judge as to whether there is a significant foreign connection,

We furnish him factual information, and if we feel that there

is such a connection, we will recommend to him that he

authorize it. He makes the determination.

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Mr. Vermeire. Do you feel that it would be workable

that a selected magistrate, a federal judge in a selected

area, perhaps the District Court in Washington,.

should have

some powers somewhat commensurate to the omnibus crime

provisions under Title III wher: at some future time all

future security wire taps should be viewed in camera by a

nember of the Judiciary, in other words, by someone outside

the Executive Branch of the Government?

Mr. Wannall. I think this is one of several

solutions

that can be considered. You are talking in terms of having

one specific judge.

That is one of the alternatives, The

reason I say one judge is that you are cutting down the risk

of disclosure, not that anyone imputes any member of the

Judiciary of those kind of actions.

WRASS HI

Mr. Vermeire.

No, I wouldn't impute that either and I

would not raise the question based on that. The basis for

my question was one individual who would become sufficiently

Knowledgeable with regard to counterintelligence or foreign

intelligence needs. That expertise does exist within the

Executive Branch. It terminates with the Attorney General

who has the power and authority and exercises it, to call

on various officials in the Executive Branch, at the

Presidential appointee level for input and approval

I think the procedures he has established, and I'm not

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at all sure they are final because he still has them under

consideration, probably have controls built in that might

be more secure than having one individual with that

authorithin

Mr. Vermeire.

Mr. Wannail you stated that on the date

of the Keith decision, there were ten electronic surveillances

operating in the domestic intelligence area.

Mr. Wannall. I think I said less than ten.

Mx. Vermeire. Excuse me, I misread. One of the

criticism, and I'm not saying that I espouse to that in any

way, but one of the criticisms, and whether it was valid or

not, I don't know, of the late Director was that before he

would go into a particular Congressional hearing he would cut

X number of wiretaps or X number of microphonic surveillances

and then testify, truthfully, of course, the next day or week,

that there were only X number of wiretaps operating at that

time.

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My question is, was this number drastically reduced .

before the keith decision, or was this number less than

ten somewhat consistent for a long period of time preceding

the Keith decision?

Mr. Wannall. I have not conducted a study on that

specific question, but I have conducted a study with regard

to the statements made that prior to his testimony Mr. Hoover

would order a cutback on wiretaps.

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I will be very happy to furnish the results of that

study to you which I think tends to refute the allegation.

Mr. Vermeire. . But you have no knowledge with respect

to the electronic surveillance, domestic electronic surveillances

at the time of the keith decision. You have no knowledge how

long that figure existed?

Mr. Wannall. No, I don't. I have no reason to believe

that there was a cutback because of the impending decision

of the Supreme Court.

I think possibly we have records which might be relevant

with respect to that. I would be more than happy to have such

• -

records reviewed because we, I think, can reconstruct ati..

number of electronic surveillances we had at a given date.

Would you consider it relevant to figure how many we had as

of June 19 as opposed to what date prior to that?.

Mr. Oliphant. I don't mean to interrupt, but on that

specific point I understand that the Senate made a request

where they tried to find every time the Director was going

to speak on this subject of electronic surveillances and

they asked for a list, I think ten days before and ten

days afterwards. Maybe I am mistaken, but I heard this

information from someone.

Do you know as a result of that if that showed any

significant variance?

Mr. Wannall. I have said before that the study did not,

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to; my recollection, show any significant variance.

Mr. Vermeire. You also said in 1974 there were 140

national security wiretap targets in the United States,

Is that correct?

Mr. Wannall. That figure I was using came from information

which had been compiled in a letter by the Attorney General

and addressed to Senator Kennedy. I think the letter was

dated June 24, 1975. That did in fact reveal the total

number of wiretaps conducted during the year 1974. I will

have to amend a bit. I don't recall whether the 148 were

the number of targets of the number of wiretaps.

I think 148 represented the number of targets. There

would be variation because if we had a wiretap on an

individual and he moved that would be one target, but we

would count it as two wiretaps. So there would be a variance

between 148 and some figure above that.

Mr. Vermeire. You used the term "trespass." What

do, you mean by trespass?. Do you consider a trespass a break-in?

Mr. Wannall.I think there are varying degrees of trespass.

Tree

They are really legal determinations involved. I consider

a breaking and entering a trespass if that is the question

you are propounding.

•

Mr. Oliphant. What would you consider an entrance

that was not a break-in, but was an entrance in which

a tradesman or some third party friendly to the Bureau made

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an entrance for one reason or another or someone disguised

as a tradesman who was involved in the Bureau which would

not be a break-in,

but they got in under false pretenses,

let's say.

Mr. Wannall. I really am not qualified because you do

have legal questions involved in that. I think a lot would

depend upon the degree of relationship between the person

making the entry and the person requesting an entry be made;

was there an agency relationship?

Mr. Oliphant. Were there instances made where third

parties, not bureau personnel, entered premises to

install electronic surveillance equipment or facilitate the

installation of the same?

Mx. Wannall. I have no personal knowledge with regard

to this at all. I would anticipate that there were

some.

I don't know. You say were there a number.

Mr. Oliphant.

Were there any?

Mr. Wannall. I would say there probably were some where the

individual making the entry

was

completely unwitting. I

have in mind, for example, the placement of a listening

device in a telephone. The employee of the telephone

company who installed the instrument would not even be

aware of the fact there was a listening device on the

telephone.

Mr. Oliphant. In other words, the listening device

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had been installed before installation in a telephone

and he was given that telephone to install. Is that correct?.

Mr. Wannall. I suggest this is a possibility.

Mr. Oliphant. Have there been instances where Bureau

personnel have entered under the guise of being something

other than Bureau personnel to wit, tradesmen or whatever,

to make an installation?

• Mr. Wannall. I don't know.

Mr. Oliphant. Have you read in your review of the files

or have you been told in the course of your business that

this took place?

Mr. Wannall. Where an agent disguised as a tradesman would

go into the area for the purpose of installing a microphone?

Mr. Oliphant. Or facilitating the installation, yes.

Mr. Wannall. For example, looking over the premises to

determine if an installation might be made.

Mr. Oliphant. I suppose so, yes.

MI. Wannall. I have heard of instances of that sort. I

cannot recall specifics but I think this technique has been

utilized.

'MI. Vermeire. Also brought out at that briefing was

the question of break-ins. I believe you stated at that time

that there were break-ins that did occur from 1965 to 1974.

I think that is the period of time. We set down a ten-year

period of time. I think you said the beeak-in of the offices

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of

an Al-Fatah contact. You went into some detail, how

the entry was made and the hardware used at the same time

to see if it could

be operable and the authority was obtained

by the Attorney General to utilize microphonic surveillance

in that situation. I think the other situation you said

is that there were a number of break-ins that did occur

with respect to illegal Soviet agents in the United States.

Now, considering that one instance of the Al Fatah and

the instances of break-ins involving Soviet agents, illegal

Svoiet agents in the United States, were there any other

break-ins aside from them conducted by the FBI?

Mr. Wannall. During the period of '65 to '75?

Mr. Vermeire. Yes, the ten-year period.

Mr. Wannall. Mr. Hoover ordered no further surreptitious

entries in July, 1966. There is an overlap of a year-there.

I don't have personal knowledge, but there is a possibility

there were because the technique was utilized until it was

discontinued by Mr. Hoover, the technique of surreptitious

entry.

Mr. Vermeire. In other words, post-1966 under no conditions

would there be any break-ins, not even of illegal Soviet

agents?

Mr. Wannall. Yes. In our counterintelligence area

there were. We determined as a result of a field-wide

DOMiSTIE

survey that there was

one after July 1966 when Mr. Hoover

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said the technique should be discontinued.

Mr. Vermeire. Which one was that?

Mr. Wannall. I would have to refresh my memory. It

involved, as I recall, the Communist Party, USA. It was

probably in about 1967 or 1968. There was no record of it

In our headquarters, but our New York office did have a

notation on a serial in the file that a telephone call had

been placed to headquarters and approval granted to make

the entry for the purpose not of taking something away

but for the purpose of photographing material on the

premises.

Mr. Oliphant. Were there any surreptitious entries against

the Socialist Workers

Party?

Mr. Wannall. There have been, yes.

Mr. Oliphant. Up until what date?

Mr. Wannall. I don't know the date. Do you?

Mr. Shackelford. I cannot speak factually but I

would generally say up to the '66 date. They could have

terminated before that. I have no first hand knowledge..

Mr. Oliphant. After that date, Mr. Shackelford, were

there any surreptitious entries performed, not by Bureau

personnel, but at the behest of the Bureau; in other words,

through the use of informants or through the use of people

who were friendly to the Bureau?

Mr. Wannall. After 1966?

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Mr. Oliphant. That is right.

Mr. Wannall. Our study has revealed none.

Mr. Oliphant.

What is the policy of the Bureau,

if the Bureau is conducting an investigation regarding, let's

say, a subversive organization and let's say not a foreign"

organization, not a Soviet organization, and the Bureau

is presented with information which would appear to be

the result of something which was taken from an organization.

I.

refer specifically, let's say, to internal documents and

that sort of thing, which are not for public consumption,

not pamphlets and things like that, and the Bureau is in

receipt of that.

What is the position of the Bureau with that?

Mr. Wannall. I think if the documents clearly

indicated they came from such a source, our policy would be

not to accept Item.

I cannot say, with some 8,000 men out in the field,

that they would not be accepted. But I can tell you this,

if they were accepted and we learned about it, the agent

would be subjected to severe disciplinary action. He would

put himself in a position of having something he could not

use because he would know good and well he was in possession

of something that would do him no good and he dare not report

to headquarters.

Mr. Vermeire. Do you have any estimation of the total

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number of break-ins conducted by the FBI prior to 1966?

Mr. Wannall. Prior to 1966 there has been a figure of

248. I think that is the precise figure. I do not know

where that figure came from. I would have to go back to

the man that I have assigned tr. this particular area to

verify if we in fact can say we made 248.

Mr. Vermeire. Out of those 248, how many of those break-

ins were conducted on American citizens?

Mr. liannall. I don't know. I do know that we had either

14 or 17 targets of domestic organizations.

There were numerous surreptitious entries in the

case of some of those organizations which runs the figure

up much higher than the total number of targets.

Records were not maintained. The system was devised.

I think perhaps we had talked about this before, that if

the recommendation was made it was made a record in our

field office file after authorization. It was maintained

for a year because we have an inspection of each of our

offices each year and the inspector has access to everything.

If he found in the files information that was unaccounted

for, the special agent in charge could say "Here is my

authorization." After that process, the record was

destroyed.

Mr. Ryan. If I could add to Mr. Wannall's comment,

you mentioned domestic break-ins on U. S. citizens.

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In the overwhelming majority, in my estimation of so

called surreptitious entries of U. S. citizens or

domestic groups there was evidence of foreign influence

of control.

Mr. Atkisson. What in any of your views were the attributes

an individual citizen had to have to qualify for ADEX.

in the course of its existence?

Mr. Wannall.

AEX exists today.

Mr. Atkisson. I am asking if it has changed. Let's

ask today. What attributes would I have to have to be

listed on ADEX?

Mr. Wannall. You would have to represent what we

considered to be a curient threat to the security of the

country.

Mr. Atkisson. Is association alone with any group,

no matter how dangerous, association alone enough to

qualify me for that elite group of people?

Mr. Wannall. No.

Mr. Atkisson. Has that been the case throughout the

existence of ADEX?

Mr. Wannall. Throughout the existence of ADEX.

Mr. Atkisson. I know the difference between the

security list and the other.

Mr. Wannali. There was the custodial list and the

security list and ADEX. The ADEX was established on the

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authority of the Department. We had about 15,000 people

who were on the discontinued security index which was set up

under Title II of the Internal Security Act of 1950.

I

mentioned earlier that we took a look at everybody on

that list with criteria which ould have included membership

in certain organizations in order to determine the extent

of what had been considered before the potential threat.

Once we had gone through that, we said there was no basis

for maintaining a list as such. We are interested in on-going

continuous investigations of individuals who we feel represent

a current threat to the security of the country. So we have

cases, something around 1238 on-going investigations, which

are reviewed every 90 days to determine if the person's

activities have changed. If they have changed, we close the

case, if that is arranted, or we discontinue an intensified

investigation.

The ADEX has nothing to do with whether or not we end

•the investigation of an individual.

Mr. Atkisson. I understand that. Let me ask you with

specific reference to SWP, is membership in SWP enough

to qualify somebody to be listed?

Mr. Wannall. No.

MI. Atkisson.

Is active membership enough to qualify one

to be listed on ADEX?

Mr.

Wannall.

No...?

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MI. Oliphant. The 90-day check, has that-been

lIved

up to since the inception of ADEX?

• Mr. Wannall. Yes:

Mr. Oliphant. Off the record.

(Liscussion off the record.)

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saying I believe

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Mr. Oliphant. With the caveat of not

this

at all, this allegation was made.

Mr. Wannall,

There was an allegation made that as recently

as the early 1970's' there were in the possession of someone

in the Bureau warrants that were signed but were not filled

in, so that in the case of national emergency or something

people could be apprehended summarily. Is there any truth

at all to that allegation?

Mr. Wannall. Yes.

Mr. Oliphant. Could you explain?

Mx. Wannall. Yes. Under the Internal Security Act of

1950, Title II, Congress decreed that there should be an

emergency detention program whing would be invoked by the

President in the event of a national emergency or hostilities.

The Attorney General had a portfolio with directions as to

what should be done, even to the extent of arranging for

detention sites, transportation of individuals, certain

criteria applicable to aliens, other criteria applicable to

citizens because there would have to be a suspension of the

writ of habeas corpus in order for such a program to be

invoked. As a result of that, we were called upon to compile

lists of individuals who actually could be grabbed off the

street and detained in the event of an emergency. I might

add that this was an impetus for surreptitious entries to gain

knowledge with regard to members of organizations, principally

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the Communist

Party.

The criteria for placing a person on

this list, which was called a security index, was submitted

to the Department of Justice and the Attorney General, either

said "I agree with it", "I disagree with it", or "I disagree

Shari

and here's how you change it."

Three categories were devised. The first category was

those individuals who would be considered as the principal

threat in the event of a national emergency or hostilities.

A second category was a lesser threat. The third category

was persons who, after the first two categories had been dis-

posed of, would be looked at more closely and a determination

made as to whether there should be detention. There were

Presidential warrants prepositioned for the purpose of serving

them on aliens. I do not have all the details. I was not

involved in the program but it was my recollection that there

were warrants issued that could be executed and served upon

citizens upon the declaration of an emergency and a suspension

of the writ of habeas corpus by the President under wartime

or extreme national emergency conditions.

These lists were maintained. Criteria were reviewed

regularly.

There were changes made with changing times.

EvEry

person who was recommended to be placed on the security index

was the subject of an investigation, a full investigation, the

results of which were furnished to the Department and except

for a very short period in 1955 when funding was not available,

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continually through that time judgments were made and decisions

made by departmuntal attorneys that either the person should

be included on the list or should not be included on the list.

Even during the time of the suspension because of budgetary

problems I think the people whose names came up there were

subsequently reviewed

so there was a special unit in the

Department which

made a judgment as to whether an individual

should be included on the index and if so what category.

I think it was the 15th day of September, 1971, that the

legislation was approved repealing Title II of the Internal

Security Act of 1950. On that very day we wrote to the

Attorney General. If you don't mind I will quote a single

paragraph of the letter.

The Chairman. Certainly.

Mc. Wannall. I was hopeful that I would have a communi-

cation that went to the Attorney General. I don't have it

with me. It is available if you would like to have it.. The

letter referred to the fact that the Act had repealed the

emergency detention program and then acknowledged in the

second

paragraph that the Bureau has no basis for maintaining

security index and accordingly it has been discontinued.

The question was posed to the Attorney. General as to whether

the legislation in September of 1971 had any effect, (1), on

our investigative

jurisdiction and (2), whether it would

preclude our maintaining an index for the purpose of retrieval

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of, information relating to persons who were under investigation

in our security area. The reply was, (1), there was no

bearing or impact upon our jurisdictional authority; and (2),

there was no reason why for administrative purposes, in-house

use, the FBI could not maintain a list. That is when va took

a look at everybody including cases which had been in a

moratorium status because of an inability to assign manpower

to investigate them, individuals concerning whom we had no

information on their activities for perhaps a two-year period.

Every case was looked at. By October of 1972 we had a little

over 15,500 people.

Mr. Oliphant.

What number of those would have been subject

to emergency detention?

Mr. Wannall. None at that time.

Mr. Oliphant. I understand that but when the legislation

came first in September 15, 1971.

Mr. Wannall. I would have to try, and I don't know if.

it is available, to find out who were in category 1 and 2.

Mr. Oliphant. Could you give us a ballpark figure

understanding that it is not conclusive?

Mr. Shackelford. I couldn't.

Mr. Ryan.. I would say we are talking in terms of between

15,000 and 5,000 at that time to be discontinued. The list

WAX

willisbe considerably reduced.

Mr. Wannall. I am not in a position to give you a ballpark

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figure.

Mr. Oliphant. I think it is important from your point of

view because you don't want to give the impression that all

15,000 were on it.

Mr. Ryan.

The list had been

considerably reduced at the

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Mr. Wannall.

You are talking about September 1, 1971,

while this list was still supported by legislation?

Mr. Dliphant. Yes.

Mr. Wannall. We took a look at everybody. We opened

cases. There must have been less than 15,000 on the old

security Index at that time. I should not say that because

they sidl were listed on the Index. There must have been

15,500, a percentage of whom would not have been scheduled

for detention without further investigative attention. So in

October 1972, the 15,500, at that time on our own we said we

were not interested in all these

people; we are interested

in persors who represent a clear, current threat to the security

of the country. We had the field go through the entire number

of cases and it was drastically reduced in a very short time

because the first thing we did was cut off the lowest category.

I think that reduced the list by 8,000 or something of that

sort. It immediately cut the list. We didn't even pay any

more attention, to them. But I have maintained a very close

watch on it to see the progress downward.

The latest figure

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thật I have is 1,238 people as of October 15. Now that means

that we have currently active investigations on 1,238 people

whose activities indicate a current threat. I am talking

about persons

who represent a threat to assassinate the

President, as an example, or isdividuals who have taken action

or are engaged in violence for the purpose of attaining a goal

which in their minds is the destruction of the United States

Government.

Mr. Oliphant. That is the ADEX list?

Mr. Wannall. That is the ADEX. I would like to point

out one thing more. The reason we maintain the list is we are

able on the list to put these

people into a specific category.

For example, if this country should by any stretch of the

imagination go to war with Communist China, there are persons

on that list who are pro-Soviet in their sympathies. Certainly

we would not go out and intensify coverage on the pro-soviets

because I am inclined to think that Russia would be most

delighted to have the United States go to war with China.

So we have the capability through a list of segmenting persons

pro-Soviet, pro-Chinese in categories so that if we should

be called upon at any time to intensify efforts we can target

in the efforts to a category as opposed to the entire 1,238

individuals.

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Mr. Wannall. The list represents nothing more than an

index to us, a usable administrative tool, and there is

nothing sinister about it, because each person whose name is

included on the list is a subject of an active investigation

based or a statute, whose file is reviewed evezy ninety days

for determination as to whether he is the type of person that

we should continue to investigate.

One more point, and I hesitate to make it, because it. is

not a completely accurate figure. I had a test-run made last

week to determine if everybody on the ADEX had previously been

on the security index which would be a normal question, per-

haps a continuation of something which had existed at the time

of the legislation. This survey was made on the basis as of

october I, 1971, what file number was being assigned in our

one hundred classification or our 157 classification --

Mr. Oliphant. Could you explain what that means?

Mr. Wannall. It is covered by Section 87 and 122 of the

manual.

What file number at headquarters was being assigned as of

October 1, 1971, which would indicate we did not previously

have a 100 or 157 classification case on that individual..

Just above twenty-one percent of the individuals who are on

the ADEX now had files opened on them at headquarters after

October 1, 1971. Unless we went through and meticulously

reviewed each case, we could not say that that figure is

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infallible.

it should go in any direction, it would probably

be.up.

. It is just to illustrate that at least one out of every

five individuals that we now have indexed on our ADEX was not

on the previous list.

Mr. Atkisson. Let me establish one thing for the record.

I was asking before about the qualification to get on the

ADEX list. You indicated that active membership alone was not

enough.

The only question I have, and I would reiterate for the

record that Mr. Shackelford. I gave you a list of some five or

six names during a break when we were off the record, all SWP

people.

Have we received or been given access to everything in the

Bureau files concerning those individuals?

Mr. Shackelford. Have you received it?

Mx. Atkisson. We have requested it. Have we received it?

We have materials on these individuals, or we have had

access to them, and we have since asked for production of those

documents. Have we gotten everything on those individuals?

Mr. Shackelford.

I wouldn't have any idea. I don't

prepare the material.

Mr. Atkisson. I would assume that would be the understand-

ing, if we asked for material on the individual, we would get

everything.

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Mr. Atkisson.

We asked for everything.

Mr. Wannall. To the best of our ability, we will send to

the Department, transmittal to yuu on everything.

Mr. Atkisson. Can you give me any idea with respect to

your knowledge of the SWP individuals listed there, or any SWe

people that you know of, what, in addition to active member-

ship in SWP, qualified some of those individuals.-- and some

of them listed there are on the ADEX list -- what, in addition

to active membership, would qualify those people for being

listed on ADEX?

Mr. Wannall. We would be glad to furnish to you, if you

would like, the criteria as it existed in connection with the

security index when membership was one of the bases for putting

them on.

Mr. Atkisson. I am talking about ADEX now. I understand

the distinction and some of those people are or were on ADEX.

I would just like to know what it is in addition to

active membership that got them there.

Mr. Wannall. We will give you the criteria with which we

started our survey of ADEX and the criteria now is include

only those individuals who pose a realistic direct and current

danger to the national security. The various categories are

no longer utilized. It would have to be in the nature of a

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55301

willingness and capability and action. Willingness and capa

bility to engage in these things.

Mr. Atkisson. Let me ask you this:. If somebody is

active in the SWP and consequently falls under the watchful

eye of the Bureau and then that person leaves the swe, is "

there any way -

what would a person have to do to convince

the Bureau that he or she was no longer pursuing the terrorist

policies and objectives of the SWP?

Mr. Wannall. Your choice of words "convince us"; he

doesn't have to do anything to convince us. We are interested

in activities of individuals. If the activities cease, we

have no further interest in the person.

The. "convince" is

what hangs me up a bit.

We are trying to conduct our investigations based on

a threat that is represented by a person's activities..

Mr. Atkisson. I would point out to you for your review --

and it is a question I think we would like an answer to later --

that Norma Jean Ladiko vociferously and visibly withdrew from

SWP long before she was taken off the list.

Mr. Wannall. Can you tell me the time frame?

Mr. Atkisson. I don't know the specific dates. She

withdrew in 1971, a long time ago.

And a review of the

documents that the Bureau has

supplied to us show no activities

whatsoever, even participation in any SWP activities or related

activities.

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Mr. Wannall. And you are sure she is on the ADEX.

Mr. Atkisson. According to the documents in the file.

Mr. Wannall. She is currently on the ADEX?

Mr. Atkisson. No; I think just about everybody there

was recommended for being dropped from ADEX at some point.

Ms. Miller.

Not everyone.

Mr. Zimmerman is still on.

Mr. Atkisson. I do recall in reviewing the Mark Rich

file thai there was a specific memo recommending that he no

longer be a candidate for ADEX, and I think it was in 1973.

Mr. Wannall, You understand, September, 1971, up until

October, 1972, when we had this

15,000

1y005 figure, we had four

standards for reviewing files and at that time persons were put

under four categories. I don't know the precise date -- I

think it was probably in January of 1973, or perhaps before

that -- we said, "Okay, we will look at everybody we haven't

taken a look at for some time. Now whittle it down."

She probably was dropped during the course of that.

Mr. Atkisson. I do recall that Mark Rich was dropped from

ADEX after the SWP filed its lawsuit, if that gives you any

time frame.

Mr. Wannall. Well, if you would like to request it, there

are channels set up for requests. If you will submit a request

to

us as to the precise criteria

we used after September 1,

September, 1971, and when we established the new criteria.

Mr. Oliphant. We have asked for a listing of all persons

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this is not only our request; these are the requests specifi-

cally asked for by Congressman McClory, a listing of all per-

sons who have been on the ADEX list since its inception, a

copy of the current ADEX list. I don't believe that has been

provided.

Mr. Vermeire. We have had access to the ADEX list.

Mr. Shackelford. You were given access to a current

list, as I recall, and I think the discussion went on that we

cannot retrieve a list as of a given date, if I am not mis-

taken.

Mr. Vermeire. I understand, but we haven't had a current

list delivered to the Committee. I thought that was in the

process.

Mr. Oliphant. We made a request.

Mr. Shackelford. You made a request; whether it was

delivered, I don't know.

Mr. Ryan. It seems to me there would be a privacy con-

sideration.

Mr. Vermeire. That had been arranged. Paul Daley

told us that had been approved.

Mr. Wannall. You are getting into areas where this has to

be negotiated in the Department with our legal counsel. If

Paul said this was approved, it is on its way.

Mr. Vermeire. Mr. Wannall, how many arrests have there

been in the last fifteen years, from sixty to seventy-five

Doodle Ratibal lor espionage or sabotade?

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Mr. Wannall. I would have to research that. I recall

two arrests made within the last six months. I recall an

arrest - foreign nations,

did you specify specifically?

Mr. Vermeire. Yes.

Mr. Wannall. Very few.

The last one I recall, as a mat-

ter of fact - and there may have been a more recent one -

was the Ivanoff case. When you are talking about foreign

nations, you are talking about our targets who had diplomatic

immunities. They are not subject to arrest.

Mr. Vermeire.

Not all of them have diplomatic immunity.

Mr. Wannall. Many of them.

:

Mr. Vermeire.

Only a high-ranking one, I would think.

Mr. Wannall. No; everybody except those connected with

the United Nations

Secretariat. The only ones in the United

States in an official capacity without diplonatic immunity are

those connected with U.N. Secretariat. Every member of a

U.N. Mission, consulate --

Mr. Vermeire. What about domestics? How many domestics

have been arrested for espionage or sabotage?

Mr. Wannall. This is what I started to answer before.

recall two last summer. I recall one in the Summer of 1973, and

beyond that, I would have to go to records to give you a pre-

cise answer..

Mr. Vermeire. Could you check those records out between

now and November 18?

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Mr. Ryan. I might add during that period there were

number of hostile representatives of foreign countries who

were declared persona non grata; in other words; asked to.

leave the country.

Mr. Vermeire. They lost their visa, from State?

Mr. Wannall, This is something you would have to go to

the State Department on. There have been numerous cases - I

say numerous, it is a relative

term - where an official f a

foreign government has been determined to have been engaged

in activities of an espionage nature and rather than a public

declaration of persona non grata action, the State Department

would be in touch with the soviets and say, "we will do our

best to keep this off the public recora because you have one

of our people over there and you do the same thing with him."

There are negotiations of this type.

Even trying to compile for you something that was usable

in a public forum, of PNG actions or requests that the

person be removed

from the country or that he leave the country

in a certain length of time - there have been instances of

this sort.

But we are bound quite closely by State Department

considerations of their relationships with the particular

foreign country involved. It all has to do with the period of

detente and foreign relations.

Mr. Vermeire. Mr. Wannall, I just have one more question.

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We understand that the security index has been destroyed.

There is no way to retrieve it. There is no way to put it

together in any way, to get an idea of the 13,000 or 15, 000 or

so names that were on it.

Ihat presents obvious problems. There is no way histori-

cally now for us

to go back and see, aside from whether the

Iist, itself -- the idea of that kind of list was wrong.

Assuming it was right, there is no way to see whether the

names on there were the kind of names you wanted subjected to

this kind of condition in case of national emergency.

My question is that I was always under the impression

that under the retention plan that documents that might have

historical value or sometime in the future there may be some

question as to that material, that that kind of material woula

be retained somewhere in an archival situation.

There obviously is now no way to go back, according to

the Bureau, to retrieve that kind of information. I can

understand why a list of that type, if those conditions

applied, should a national emergency arise, why that list and

the conditions attached to it should be destroyed, but the

Jist, itself, the list of the pure names, it seems to me

should have had some kind of retention just in case the situa-

tion èver did come up, as it has come up now, of a committee

or anyone else checking into the list.

Do you know any kind of decision that went into

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destroying this list?

Mr. Wannall. I don't know the decision, but I can tell you

what the procedures are, which might explain it.

The type of information which the Bureau must retain

because of its possible or actial historical value is clearly

defined by the Archivist of the United States, and rules were

laid down as to what should be retained and what should be

destroyed.

The list was an administrative device to. use in the event

of an emergency. At headquarters, when a person was removed

from the list, it was a card that was kept in a cabinet.

That card was placed in a separate file drawer and retained

for three years.

We have a relocation site from which we would operate in

the event of an emergency.

Mr. Vermeire. Is that in Quantico?

Mr. Ryan. I think that is classified.

Mr. Wannall. Here it is Quantico. On the record, we

don't respond to that if we should get into a public session.

At Quantico, we would have to operate with whatever was

there. There were times when people felt that washington

would be one of the principal targets of the first atomic

bomb if there should be a war, so there was at Quantico a

duplication of this list; and it was retained for five years.

When, I guess it was Senator Mansfield indicated no

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agency should destroy records, we ceased destroying cards on a

three-year basis here and on a five-year basis at Quantico!

but the list, itself, was run off the middle of each month.

A copy of that list went to Quantico until it was replaced,

so it would be there if during the ensuing months we would have

to relocate.

Once a new list was prepared, there was no reason to

retain the old list because during the intervening days

names would have been added, names would have been deleted,

and we would certainly have no interests in continuing inves

tigations from our relocation site of persons whose names had

been deleted from the list:

So it had, in the opinion of the Achivist, no historical

value. I say "it had". I am telling what the procedures were,

and I assume the determination was made.

Mr. Vermeire.

Wasn't it on any kind of computer or print-

out of this material that could have been easily stored?

Mr. Wannall. The names, when a computer capability was

developed, were put on the computer, and that was the printout.

. That was the monthly list the 15th of each month.

Mr. Vermeire. I am not an expert of computers, but isn't

there a way. you can reconstruct a computer entry?

Mr. Wannall. I am not, either. But I think it depends

on a particular reel you have at a time, and if you have

transferred to a new reel and added to it, the information has

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to be added and deleted from it, and the reel is wiped out.

I do know that there is no way of reconstructing it through

our computers, because we made very searching inquiries.

We have a drawer, and I think you have had access to it,

of these old cards that were retained for three to five years.

Mr. Vermeire. The problem with the old cards - and I

have been through this with your people - is that there is no

indication that those old cards -- most of those old cards I

believe are from the third stage, is it? As I understana it,

those cards - there were three stages; right?

Mr. Wannall. There were three categories.

Mr. Vermeire, As far as the security index was concerned,

there were three stages or categories, one and two being the

most serious. I understand those cards only deal with the

third category.

Mr. Wannall. I am not aware of that. That is quite pos-

sible.

Mr. Vermeire. Coild you just check --

MI. Shackelford. I don't think so. There is no

procedure differentiating between categories -- I don't think

that is right. I think what you are running into is a numerical

probability, because, as the categories get more restrictive,

numerically there are less people. So if you were to flip

through the cards, you would see more in Category 3 than in

Category 2 than in Category 1. Category I would undoubtedly

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be few in number relative

to all the others..

Mr. Vermeire: In essence, would all those cards contain

people that were on the security index at some time, not any

one time, but at some time?

Mr. Shackelford. No; only up to the retention perioa.

Mc. Wannall. I think it was in January, this year, we were

told not to destroy any more records, so I would say at head-

quarters we probably, as opposed to having three years of

records, we have four.

Mr. Atkisson.

Was the content of the list ever transmitted

to military intelligence?

Mr. Wannall. No.

Mr. Vermeire. Would those cards you have -- I think they

are orange cards.

Would those cards you have give us a fair

sampling of the kinds of people who are on the security index?

Mr. Wannall. You mean over the entire lifetime of the

security index? Because criteria did change from time to

time.

Mr. Vermeire. That would be just the most recent

names, then?

Mr. Wannall. They would be ones that have been removed

within the past four years, I would say.

Mr. Shackelford. Right. Anyone in the card file you

are referring to would be those taken off that would fall into

the three to five-year category and the retention at the

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instruction of Senator Mansfield, where we ceased to destroy.

That is all you would have.

Mx. Vermeire.

These were people taken off the security

index?

Mr. Shackelford.

• yes.

Mr. Vermeire. The people on it remained on it until the •

termination would not be in the card catalog?

Mr. Shackelford.

Yes, because ultimately they would be

taken off.

Mr. Vermeire. Ultimately, you mean the list was

destroyed?

Mr. Shackelford, We are talking about two different

things. When the security index ceased to function, there was

reevaluation, as Ray said, for inclusion on the ADEX. Those

who were taken off the S:I. would go into that arawer.

It would be a very difficult thing to reconstruct because on a

given card, if you could establish a different period on the

S.I. from the card -- you can't. You would have to also look

at the manual for that period, too.

Mr. Vermeire. Looking at it from this point of view, if

I found a person's name on one of those cards, that person at

one time would have been on the security index?

Mr. Wannall. Would have been on the ADEX. The security

index was discontinued September, 1971.

Mr. Shackelford. Only security index persons would be

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inithe dead file, If you will.

Mr. Vermeire. That is what I mean.

Mr. . Shackelford. I mean ADEX, because of the time lapse,

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Mir. Vermeire. Would you check into that? It is my under

standing now - and I think you would agree -- that security

index in no way can be retrieved; is that correct?

Mr. Shackelford. I know that is correct. It cannot be.

Mr. Oliphant. I just have one question, maybe semantics.

When we started this session, Mr. Wannall stated that to

his knowledge there were no Congressmen that had been the sub-

jèct of electronic surveillance or, let's say, even figured

in walk-ins on electronic surveillance in the national security

field. Is that correct?

Mr. Wannall. What do you mean by walk-ins?

Mr. Oliphant. Someone that came on one. In other

words, you have a tap on or electronic surveillance on X and

· inadvertently speaks with X.

Mr. Wannall. I didn't say that. You were talking there

it

about microphones. When you say electronic surveillance, means

wiretaps, also.

Mr. Oliphant. All right; then let me ask you this ques-

tion: To your knowledge have there been any Congressmen who

have been picked up on any electronic surveillance conducted

by the Bureau while they were Congressmen?

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Mr. Wannall. Yes.

Mr. Oliphant. And do you know how many?

Mr. Wannall. No.

Mr. Oliphant. DO

You

know when the most recent time was?

Mr. Wannall. I would imagine there is a possibility it

is going on today.

We do have electronic surveillances in our

foreign counter-intelligence field. If you visualize a particu-

lar establishment, and if a Senatur or Congressman should make

a call to that establishment, he would commit what you call a

walk-in.

Mr. Oliphant. All right. Have there been any Congressmen

who have been, while they were Congressmen, the subject of an

electronic surveillance by the FBI?

Mx. Wannall. I am qualifying in the national security field.

I do not know whether there have been any Congressmen subject

to electronic surveillance under Title 3, because they were

being investigated under some criminal statute.

Now, in the national security field, I have no information

or knowledge that a Congressman, either at his house or at his

office, has been the subject of a wiretap.

I have Information to the effect that on one occasion when

we were conducting a microphone surveillance in a hotel room in

New York, there was an overhearing of a Congressman.

Mr. Oliphant. And this was what you referred to previously?

Mr. Wannall. Yes.

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HN 55301

Mr. Vermeire.

In that case, the microphone was placed in

the hotel room of a foreign national?..

Mr. Wannall. There were two individuals in

the hotel.

think they may have been in the same room; they may have been

in different rooms, but it was in the room occupied by uné of

those two individuals.

I described them as foreign nationals.

I think I am

correct. They were officials of a foreign government, to the

best of my recollection.

Mr. Oliphant. In that case, Congressman Cooley walked

into the room and was overheard?

Mr. Wannall. Congressman Cooley was overheard on the

wiretap in that room.

Mr. Oliphant. I thought you said microphone. *

Mr. Wannall. I mean microphone.

Mr. Oliphant. Was it anticipated he would be overheard?

Mr. Wannall. There was indication that "a friend" would be

visiting those individuals, and the way I recall it, it was

anticipated it would be Congressman Cooley.

Mr. Oliphant. When was this?

Mr. Wannall. Well, let's see, it was during the time that

MI. Kennedy was Attorney General, so I would put it in the early

sixties, probably not later than 1963.

Mr. Vermeire. Was the anticipation that Congressman

Cooley was going to be in the room; was it that anticipation

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which led. to the microphone being placed in the room, or was it

there already and the anticipation arose after the microphone

was placed?

Mr. Wannall. I think it was the anticipation he would be

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there.

Mr. Vermeire. Led to the microphone being placed in the

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HH 55301

LOOM?

Mr. Wannall. Yes.

Mr. Vermeire. So, in essence, he was the target?

Mr. Wannall. In essence, he was a target.

Mx. Oliphant. Are there any warrantless electronic sur-

veillances taking place presently with regard to any domestic

organization?

Mx. Wannall. No.

Mr. Vermeire. Are there any such arrangements similar to

the one involving Congressman Cooley, where it is anticipated

that a Congressman will be in a certain spot at a certain time

and the electronic surveillance is made with that anticipation

although it is ostensibly directed against another party,

other than a Congressman?

Mr. Wannall. No, and I will clarify the situation with

respect to Congressman Cooley. We were conducting an investiga-

tion at the request of the Attorney General. It had to do

with sugar lobbying in the United States, and the Attorney

General requested an investigation to determine, as I recall, if

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there were undue pressures being placed upon the President in

parceling out sugar quotas to the varions sugar-producing

countries, and it was the individuals from the sugar-producing

countries who were occupying the rooms in the hotel in New

York and the investigation did show contacts between those,

Individuals and Congressman Cooley, who, as I recall at the

time, was heading a committee that related to sugar matters,

the Agriculture committee, as I recall, or a subcommittee

dealing with agriculture matters.

It was an investigation that was undertaken at the specific

request of the Attorney General, and I don't know if the

request originated higher or not. I don't know that.

HIH

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Mr. Vermeire. When MI. Hoover was told there

was no electronic surveillance going on of any Congressman

that technically might have been correct. But do you think

in substance it was not a full picture of what was happening?

Technically it was not his room, but substantially he

was the person targeted.

Mr. Wannall. Mr. Hoover was replying to charges that

Members of

Congress were being wiretapped. When I learned

Mr. Hoover was going to make a statement that no Congressman

had ever been subject to an electronic surveillance, which

is broader than a wiretap, I called that to the attention

of the Assistant Director.

Mx. Vermeire. We were under the impression from that

Assistant Director that for some reason you had informed

Mr. Hoover of the situation, that there were no electronic

surveillances going on and that you went to Mr. Sullivan

after that, realizing that perhaps this was not entirely

accurate and you stated to Mr. Sullivan that you were

concerned that Mr. Hoover would go on the record and say

there were not electronic surveillances when in fact there

was

this microphonic surveillance involving Congressman

Cooley. What you tell us today is quite different from

the interpretation given to us from Mr. Sullivan.

Mr. Wannall. As I understand your interpretation,

it is entirely different.

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' IN

In fact, for nearly 25 years work, directly at headquarters,

ili peRsoN DR

I would say I talked with him on the

telephone while he

was in the office not over a half dozen times. I was

were

a section chief. Over me was

a branch chief and then

WERE AN PISSISTANt tO dUe DIRAGTUSAUD

an assistant director and over him was an association director

to Mr. Hoover. I would not have thought of going to Mr. Hoover

on a matter of this type. I called it to Mr. Sullivan's

attention.

Mr. Ryan. I have worked directly under MI. Wannall

for 13 years and he would be the last person I would ever

expect in the FBI to engage in any kind of a coverup.

If this implication has been put forth, it is a great

injustice to him.

Mr. Vermeire. This certainly did not originate

with us. In fact, out of deference to him, I was not playing

games. I came out and told you what the story is.

Mr. Wannall. I appreciate that. I want my story on the

record. I'm telling you what the facts are.

Mr. Vermeire. I have no further questions.

Thank you.

(Whereupon, at 6:40 o'clock p.m., the interview

was concluded.)

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