DDO REACTION TO HSCA SUGGESTION CONCERNING PUBLIC TESTIMONY ON CIA FILES
Agency: CIA
Originator: CIA
From: SHEPANEK, NORBERT
To: BRECKINRIDGE, S.D.
Document date: 08/31/1978
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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31 August 1978

OLC #78-2598 11

12890:

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Scott D. Breckinridge

Principal Coordinator,

House Select Committee on Assassinations

Office of Legislative Counsel

FROM

: Norbert A. Shepanek

Policy and Coordination Staff

Liaison and Oversight Control

SUBJECT

:

Referenced Request for DDO Reaction to

HSCA Suggestion Concerning Public

Testimony on CIA Files

REFERENCE

: OLC 78-2598, 25 August 1978

The injunction against trusting Greeks bearing

gifts might find suitable application in evaluating the

motivation of prosecuting attorneys trying to bolster a

publicity-hungry, bankrupt congressional Committee or

the eve of elections by offering alleged PR benefits to

the CIA.

The only advantage from public exposure of our

filing system and procedures, which we can envision,

would

accrue to hostile intelligence services and

terrorist organizations. It would provide them with an

insight into our records system and

methodology and the

inherent limitations of the system.

Obviously, any

records system will have inherent weaknesses and limita-

tions.

Knowledge of the

specific system used by the CIA

could

render us and.

security of the nation more vulnerable.

I have discussed reference offer with Chief

IMS and DC/PCS. Our collective and individual reaction

is that Mr. Cornwell's "kind" offer be firmly and flatly

rejected on the grounds that any meaningful discussion

of our records procedures and system would inevitably

lead to the revelation of classified intelligence methods

which the DCI must protect.

att

CONCUR :

John H. Steln

В. Р. улезу

Norbert A.

.: 1973

ADDO

CONFIDENTIAL

RETURN TO CIA

Background Use Only

Do Not Reproduce

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31 August 1978

Aide Memoire

SUBJECT : Issues in Pending HISCA Subpoenas

1. CIA has restricted access by HSCA representatives to

two sets of documents, which led to the Committee's voting a sub-

poena shortly prior to the recess by the House. Two other items

of information that were included in the subpoena had been reviewed

by HISCA representatives prior to voting the subpoena. So far

as we know no action has yet been taken to serve the subpoena

formally. Its reported date of return is 6 September.

2. The two files on which we have restricted access deal

with two separate subjects, as follows:

a. An operational file involving a sensitive Covert

Action program, in which a person of interest to the

HSCA was one of a number of targets. The HISCA has

reviewed the 201 file of the person in question for the period

January 1973 through May 1964, but the separate operational

file has not been shown. The nature of the operation has

been outlined to Mr. Blakey and his deputy, Mr. Cornwell.

The presentation emphasized the sensitivity of the operation

and its lack of relevance to the HSCA inquiry.

09 b. The history of the Mexico City Station for the period

1947-1969. It covers all activities of the Station over a period

of time almost entirely irrelevant to the purpose of the

HSCA investigation. Only a few references in the Mexico

City Station history can be considered relevant to the issue

of President Kennedy's assassination, and these have been

seen by HSCA representatives. Substantial sections of other.

portions of the history have been shown the HISCA Chief

Counsel and Staff Director, Mr. Blakey, and to his deputy,

Mr. Cornwell.

3. The grounds offered for withholding these documents

Are yet of the sensitivity elevance mattitiana basis for

giving special handling to materials shown external investigators,

right to judge relevance. There is something of an anomaly ii

hese positions, because the evolution of the working agree-

ments with HSCA has to a degree compromised the basic position

of both parties.

71993

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CORESEEM :

4. The original Memorandum of Understanding, executed in

August 197%

"'that bears " Commits the Agency to provide access to material

upon the study and investigation authorized by

Il. Res. 222,"

which we see as referring to relevance.

It

also recognized the limitations placed on access depending on

"the responsibility of the DCI to protect sensitive intelligence

sources and methods."

An amendment to the original agreement

was negotiated in January 1978, the language of which throws

into question the unqualified right of the DCI to withhold material

because of sources-and-methods considerations, but leaves in-

tact the original position on relevance.

5. Our practice, under these provisions, has been to agree

to requested access to material we feel probably irrelevant, if

it is not judged sensitive.

When considerations of relevance

and sensitivity combine we have opposed unqualified access. In

the face of the HSCA representatives' assertion of the need to

verity our statements about relevancy, etc., we have tried to

employ the original commitment to the DCI by Mr. Blakey to

not disclose anything shown him personally, when the matter

becomes an issue, letting him review the material personally.

This serves to demonstrate good faith, at the same time that

it has permitted verification by a selected fISCA person.

6. If the HSCA decides to force the present issue, for whatever

purposes, there would be some confusion in outlining just what

the Agency's position is. The agreements can be presented as

compromising the legislated responsibility of the DCI to protect

sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. This considera-

tion has led us to follow the practice of tying relevance (preserved

in the original agreement) to sensitivity, avoiding assertion of the

right to protect material on the grounds of sensitivity alone. As

an example we have given extensive access to intelligence sources

and methods as employed in Mexico City, where it was relevant

because it explained CIA coverage of the Oswald visit in September-

October 1963.

T. Discussions with Chairman Stokes, assuming there will

be an opportunity to have such an exchange, should be reasonable

rather than technical. While we believe our grounds sound (the

material at issue is not relevant to the inquiry, and is sensitive) the

arguments in support of it may prove confusing in public controversy.

2

CAPESSAL

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