WILLIAM HARVEY
Originator: SSCIA
Document date: 00/00/1975
Document type: REPORT

## Page 1

157-10014-10102

2022 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK Assassination System

Identification Form

7/7/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : SSCIA

• RECORD NUMBER:

157-10014-10102

RECORD SERIES :

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE

07-M-08

Document Information

ORIGINATOR:

FROM:

TO :

TITLE:

SSCIA

WILLIAM HARVEY

DATE: 00/00/1975

PAGES: 37

SUBJECTS :

AMLASH

HARVEY, WILLIAM

CIA

ASSASSINATIONS

DOCUMENT TYPE: REPORT

CLASSIFICATION: Declassified

RESTRICTIONS: 1B; IC

CURRENT STATUS: Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 03/21/2000

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS: CCBOX 450

v9.1

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Date :

Page

08/06/95

• - 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA

RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10102

RECORDS SERIES

: MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTTEE

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M-08

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA

FROM

TO

TITLE : WILLIAM HARVEY

DATE

: 00/00/75

PAGES

: 37

SUBJECTS : HARVEY, WILLIAM

CIA

AMLASH

ASSASSINATIONS

DOCUMENT TYPE : REPORT

CLASSIFICATION

: TOP SECRET

RESTRICTIONS

REFERRED

CURRENT STATUS

: POSTPONED IN

FULL.

DATE OF LAST REVIEW

: 01/05/99

OPENING CRITERIA

COMMENTS : CCBOX

450

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

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Box 450

WILLIAM HARVEY

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0 P

SECRET

1940-47

1947

1948

1952

1959

WILLIAM HARVEY

Short Chronology*

Counterespionage work as FBI agent

Joined CIA as head of Soviet Intelligence Branch

Deputy Assistant Director, Office of Special Operations

•(which became DDP)

Chief of Station, Berlin (Berlin Tunnel operation)

Became Chief of Foreign Intelligence staff Division D

(FI/D) which handles communications intelligence and

sensitive methods of obtaining it (e.B., surreptitious

entries)

1961

February

(approx.)

Early Feb.

Mid-April

BISSELL (DDP) asks HARVEY to establish an EXECUTIVE

ACTION capability under project ZRRIFLE. Harvey claims

Bissell said he had been "twice urged by the White

House" to establish such a capability. Bissell and

Edwards separately brief Harvey on the Phase I assassina-

tion plot run by Sheffield EDWARDS and James O'CONNELI

(Office of Security) which involved criminal syndicate

connections.

(In early February Edwards had the POISON PILLS tested;

in late february early March, the pills were sent into

Cuba by O'Connell through Roselli.

HARVEY uses agent QWIN (recruited earlier by ARNOLD

SILVER for use in an assassination operation against

LUMUMBA) as the principle asset for ZRRIFLE.

According to Dr. GUNN (Office of Medical Services),

HARVEY asked about the pills he tested. Gunn briefed

Harvey, who told him to brief SIDNEY GOTTLIEB about

techniques but not targets.

Bay of Pigs invasion fails; JFK appoints Taylor

Committee. EDWARDS halts or suspends PHASE I.

* Most of the reference to Cuba or Executive Action came from the 1967

IG Report.

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2

TOP SECRET

1961 (cont'd)

November 15

November 29

Beginning of PHASE II: BISSELL instructs HARVEY to

apply the ZRRIFLE assassination capability to Castro.

Harvey takes over the criminal syndicate contacts

developed in Phase I. HARVEY is told by HELMS that he

is to take over the CIA Cuba task force.

MC CONE replaces Allen Dulles as DCI

1962

February 7

February 9

April 8-9

April 10-14

April 18-19

April 21

Late April

April

EDWARDS meets with FBI to ask them not to prosecute.

the Rowan wiretap case because of CIA concern

HELMS (DDP nominee) authorizes HARVEY to handle

ZRRIFLE project with unvouchered funds.

HARVEY, ROSELLI, O'CONNELL, and perhaps MAHEU meet

in New York to plan Phase II. (Harvey disputes

O'Connell's recollection that Maheu was there and

knowledgeable of Phase II.) Both Edwards and Harvey

check with HELMS before the meeting is arranged.

Harvey begins regular reporting to Helms on Phase II.

Harvey says he took over an "ongoing operation" from

O'Connell.

HARVEY, ROSELLI, and O'CONNELL meet in Miami. At

this point Roselli is using Tony VARONA and

"MACEO"

as contacts with

Cuba rather than Irafficante.

Pills are delivered to Harvey in Washington.

HARVEY passes the pills to ROSELLI in Florida.

Roselli was to give the pills to Varona, who had an

asset in Cuba with access to Castro's restaurant.

HARVEY, with help of Ted SHACKLEY (Chief of JMWAVE

station in Miami), loaded arms and equipment in a

U-Haul truck which was left in a parking lot for

Roselli, who delivered it to a Cuban contact.

HARVEY is told by EDWARDS that the "tacit approval"

of the DCI should be obtained if Roselli was to be

used any further. Harvey told Edwards that Roselli

would not be used any more. (According to Edwards'

memorandum of 5/14/75.)

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3

TOP SECRET

1962 (cont'a)

Throughout May

May 7

May 14

June

June 21

August 10

August 13

August 14

September

October

Intense contact between HARVEY and ROSELLI. Roselli

reports that pills are in Cuba at the restaurant

frequented by Castro awaiting the opportunity to use

them.

EDWARDS and HOUSTON brief ATTORNEY GENERAL ROBERT F.

KENNEDY on PHASE I of the assassination operation.

rawards tells HARVEY of the briefing of RFK. Harvey

says that he briefed HELMS about this and advised

against briefing McCone (DCI) or Carter (DDCI); Helms

agreed.

DONOVAN negotiates for return of Bay of Pigs prisoners.

ROSELLI tells

HARVEY that VARONA has sent three men to

Cuba to recruit others for the pill plot.

Special Group (Augmented) meets on OPERATION MONGOOSE.

HARVEY said that McNAMARA raised the subject of

assassinations at this meeting.

General LANSDALE'S memorandum assigns to HARVEY the

drafting of an outline of intelligence, political,

economic, and paramilitary activities for the

implementation of MONGOOSE. The task includes

planning for "splitting the regime, including liquida-

tion of leaders"

HARVEY writes a memorandum to DDP HELMS saying that

he advised Lansdale's aide FRANK HAND. to excise the

words "including liquidation of leaders" from the

LANSDALE memo because of "the inadmissibility and

stupidity of putting this type of comment in writing

in such a document"

Harvey also tells Helms that

he has "careful notes" on MeNamara's discussion of

assassination at the Special Group meeting of August 10.

Pills still in place; HARVEY learns that VARONA is

ready to send another team to Cuba.

CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

1963

February

HARVEY and ROSELLI agree in Los Angeles to call off

the operation, although not to break precipitously

with VARONA.

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NECRET

1963 (cont'a)

June

August 16

October

HARVEY and ROSELLI have last dinner in Washington

and are observed by SAM PAPICH of the FBI, who has

ROSELLI under intensive surveillance. Harvey asks

Papich to let him know if HOOVER is going to call

McCONE.

Harvey briefs Helms and Helms agrees not

to brief McCone unless it appears that McCone will

receive a call

from Hoover

Spurred by & Chicago newspaper story of the same

day, HELMS sends McCONE the Edwards memo of 5/14/62

of the RIK briefing.

CIA coordination with AMLASH assassination plotting

begins.

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-OP SECREI

WILLIAM HARVEY

Short Chronology*

Biographical

1940-47

1947

1948

1952

1959

Counterespionage work as FBI agent

Joined CIA as head of Soviet Intelligence Branch

Deputy Assistant Director, Office of Special

Operations (which became DDP)

Chief of Station, Berlin (Berlin Tunnel operation)

Became Chief of Foreign Intelligence staff Division

D (FI/D) which handles communications intelligence

and sensitive methods of obtaining it (e.&,

surreptitious entries)

1960

August 16

DR. EDWARD GUNN (Office of Medical Services)

receives box of Cuban cigars to be treated with

lethal poison. (21)

1961

Late January

(approx.)

February

(approx.)

EDWARDS and O'CONNELL ask for development of

POISON PILLS. (24)

BISSELL (DDP) asks HARVEY to establish an EXECUTIVE

ACTION capability under project ZRRIFLE. Harvey's

notes are quoted as saying that Bissell said he

had been "twice urged by the White House" to

establish such a capability. (37) Harvey is

briefed, probably by both BISSELL and EDWARDS, on

the Phase I assassination plot run by Sheffield

EDWARDS and James O'CONNELL (Office of Security)

which involved criminal syndicate connections. (37)

HARVEY uses agent QWIN (recruited earlier by

ARNOLD SILVER for use in an assassination operation

against LUMUMBA) as the principle asset for ZRRIFLE.

(38)

Edwards has the POISON PILLS tested. (25)

* Page references in parentheses are from the 1967 Report of the Inspector

General of the CIA.

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2

TOP SECRET

1961 (cont 'a)

Early Feb.

Late Feb.

March-Early April

Mid-April

November 15

According to Dr. GUNN, HARVEY asked about the

pills he tested. Gunn briefed Harvey, who told

him to brief SIDNEY GOTTLIEB about techniques

but not targets. (27)

Pills given to ROSELLI by O'CONNELI are passec

to TRAFFICANTE. (27) ROSELLI reports to O'CONNELI

that pills reached ORTA in Cuba. ORIA returns

pills in couple weeks. (27)

O'CONNELI. gives pills and money to ROSELLI who

passes them to VARONA. (32)

Bay of Pigs invasion fails; JFK appoints Taylor

Committee.

Beginning of PHASE II: BISSELL instructs HARVEY to

apply the ZRRIFLE assassination capability to

Castro. (39) Harvey takes over the criminal syndicate

contacts developed in Phase I. (39) HARVEY is told

by HELMS that he is to take over the CIA Cuba

task force. (39)

MC CONE replaces Allen Dulles as DCI

November 29

1962

February

February 7

February 19

April 8-9

April 14

April 18-19

EDWARDS briefs HARVEY on Castro operation. (40)

EDWARDS meets with FBI to ask them not to prosecute

the Rowan wiretap case because of CIA concern. (60)

HELMS (DDP nominee) authorizes HARVEY to handle

ZRRIFLE project with unvouchered funds. (38)

HARVEY, ROSELLI, O'CONNELL, and perhaps MARIU meet

in New York to plan Phase II. (43) (Harvey disputes

O'Connell's recollection that Maheu was there and

knowledgeable of Phase II.) Both Edwards and

Harvey check with HELMS before the meeting is

arranged and HARVEY obtains Helm's approval not to

brief MO CONE (41). Harvey thereafter begins

regular reporting to Helms on Phase II. (41)

HARVEY, ROSELLI, and O'CONNELL meet in Miami. (46)

Pills are delivered to Harvey in Washington. (46)

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3

TOP SECRET

1962 (cont'a)

April 21

Late April

Throughout May

May 7

May 14

June 21

August 10

August 13

HARVEY passes the pills to ROSELLI in Florida. (47)

Roselli was to give the pills to Varona, who had an

asset in Cuba with access to Castro's restaurant.

At this point Roselli is using lony VARONA and

"MACEO"

as contacts with Cuba rather than Trafficante.

(47-8)

HARVEY, with help of Ted SHACKLEY (Chief of JMWAVE

station in Miami), loaded arms and equipment in a

U-Haul truck which was left in a parking lot for

Rosell, who delivered it to & Cuban contact. (49-50)

Intense contact between HARVEY and ROSELLI. Roselli

reports that pills are in Cuba at the restaurant

frequented by Castro awaiting the opportunity to

use them. (50)

EDWARDS and HOUSTON brief ATTORNEY GENERAL ROBERT F.

KENNEDY on PHASE I of the assassination operation. (62a)*

Edwards tells HARVEY of the briefing of RFK. (65)

Harvey says that he briefed HELMS about this and

advised against briefing McCone (DCI) or Carter

(DDCI); Helms agreed. (65)

HARVEY is told by EDWARDS that the "tacit approval"

of the DCI should be obtained if Roselli was to be

used any further. (65) Harvey told Edwards that

Roselli would not be used any more.

(According to

Edwards' memorandum of 5/14/62.) (42)

ROSELLI tells HARVEY that VARONA has sent three men

to Cuba to recruit others for the pill plot. (51)

Special Group (Augmented) meets on OPERATION MONGOOSE.

HARVEY and MC CONE said that McNAMARA raised the

subject of assassinations at this meeting in regard

to new plans.

General LANSDALE'S memorandum assigns to HARVEY the

drafting of an outline of intelligence, political,

economic, and paramilitary activities for the

implementation of MONGOOSE. The task includes

planning for "splitting the regime, including liquida-

tion of leaders"

#RFK asks to be told before the CIA works with the Mafia again. (62a)

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4

TOP SECRET

1962 (cont'a)

August 14

September

HARVEY writes a memorandum to DDP HELMS saying

that he advised Lansdale's aide FRANK HAND to

excise the words "including liquidation of leaders"

from the LANSDALE memo because of "the inadmissibility

and stupidity of putting this type of comment in

of assassination at the Special Group meeting of

August 10.

Pills still in place; HARVEY learns that VARONA is

ready to send another team to Cuba. (51)

CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

October

1963

February

June

August 16

HARVEY and ROSELLI agree in Los Angeles to call off

the operation, although not to break precipitously

with VARONA. (52)

HARVEY and ROSELLI have last dinner in Washington

and are observed by SAM PAPICH of the FBI, who has

ROSELLI under intensive surveillance.

Harvey asks

Papich to let him know 11 HOOVER is going to call

MC CONE. (53-4) Harvey briefs Helms and Helms

agrees not to brief McCone unless it appears that

McCone will receive a call from Hoover. (54)

Spurred by a Chicago newspaper story of the same

day, HELMS sends MC CONE the Edwards memo of 5/14/62

of the RFK briefing. (69)

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JERVIEW AND MEETING SUICIARY

Page 2_

of

10P

S28R21

FILE:

In 1959 Harvey came back to head Division D of the

Foreign Intelligence Staff, which is the unit basically in

charge of obtaining COMINT intelligence and supporting

operations related to that field, particularly surreptitious

entries, interception of couriers and other sensitive methods

of obtaining cryptological information.

During all of this period he had many occasions to

work directly with Mr. Helms and had a close working rela-

tionship with him.

The beginning of 1961, he was asked by Mr. Bissell to

explore the possibilities of setting up a "executive action

capability" within CIA. In the Fall he was asked by Mr.

Bissell to turn his attention with regard to the general

area of

executive action to the specific target of Castro

and, particularly, to take over one ongoing operation from

the Office of Security. Shortly thereafter, but as a distinct

matter, Mr. Helms (who was clearly slated to take over DDP,

even while Mr. Bissell was still its nominal head) asked

Harvey to set up Task Force W, to be the new working group

on Cuban matters. These items are all

iscussed in more de-

tail later on. when Legin

Harvey stayed as head of Task Force W until the spring

of 1963, at which point he turned it over to Desmond Fitz-

gerald, served about a month on TDY in Rome, and then

in

June formally took over as Station Chief in Rome. He returned

to Langley in 1966, and then took a special assignment to

suivey

the vulnerability of CIA installations to "technical coverage

107

SECRET

Fallf

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-NERVIEW AND MERLING SUMMARY

Passe

3.

of

FILE:

In December 1967 he ceased his full

time relationship with

the Agency. He continued for a few months to wrap things up

and to consult. Since then, however, he has no connection

with the Agency and is presently in private life.

LAs an

aside for those who do not know, the reason his

appearance here has been so delayed is that when I first

called him several weeks ago, he indicated that his wife was

ill and might have to go into the hospital and that he had

other serious personal commitments. We had further conversa

•tions about his trying to arrange at some point to come in

when

he informed me that his mother was gravely ill. We had

scheduled a visit by myself out to Indianapolis last week,

but his mother passed away. Although he still had personal

commitments and obligations in Indianapolis this week as a

result, which prevented his coming to Washington, he consented

to my interviewing him out there as

a prelude to his testimony

before the Committee next Wednesday. J

LUMUMBA

I first explored the events related by Mr. O'Donnell in

1960, and Mr. Harvey's knowledge generally about the Congo

and the death of Lumumba. He emphasized that he had known

of no credible evidence of CIA involvement with the actual

death of Lumumba. I asked what he meant by credible evidence

Seen,

and what "looser"evidence he had and he indicated that he was

referring to various,

allegations and news stories he was

aware of.

TOP SECRET

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/ERVIEN AND MEETING SUNMARY

Page

4

of

He is not sure whether he might not have been in Ger-

many on a special assignment at the time O'Donnell actually

spoke to Bissell about going to the Congo. However, he is

quite certain that both O'Donnell and Bissell mentioned it

to him thereafter. He believes O'Donnell mentioned it to

him shortly thereafter and it might have been very close in

time to the conversation with Bissell. His best recollec-

tion is that, as O'Donnell recounted the meeting with Bisself

Bissell was clearly requesting him to go on a definite mis-

sion to try to assassinate Lumumba. O'Donnell told Harvey

how vigorously he had objected and also related that he had

gone to mention it to Mr. Helms. Harvey does not recall

whether O'Donnell said he had gone to see Gottlieb..

Thereafter, perhaps in the course of the initial request

to set up ZRRIFLE, or perhaps at a different time, Harvey

clearly recalls that Bissell also told him about the inci-

dent, and again his impression is that Bissell recounted

that he had requested O'Donnell to undertake a specific

mission.

At this point we talked, however, about the fact that

there would always be the possibility of a no/go fail-safe

type proposition, even if a specific mission was involved

as distinct from theoretical exploration. (DID WE EVER ASK

BISSELL IF HE HAD OBTAINED HIGHER AUTHORITY FROM ANYONE OR

DISCUSSED WITH ANYONE ABOVE HIM AT THE WHITE HOUSE LEVEL OR

THE DCI THE MISSION HE PROPOSED TO O'DONNELL?)

FILE:

CF

TweEly

interviers

up ly Fred. t

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108 121

STERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY

Paire 5. 0f

Harvey is not sure how much he knew of QJWIN's mission

to the Congo for O'Donnell, although he thinks that he may

well have signed some of the cables to Leopoldville, since

Silver was in Staff Dand therefore both were working under

Harvey at the time that Silver was lending QJWIN to O'Donnell

for the Congo mission.) In any event, Silver briefed Harvey

about it later when they were discussion WIN as a possible

ZRRIFLE asset. Harvey does not recall anything about the

WIROGUE; does not recall anything about ROGUE asking WIN

to participate in an executiion squad, nor does he recall

ever having been told by

'Donnell

r anyone about viruses

getting to the Congo.

FILE:

- (ty)

ZRRIFLE

To summarize at the outset, the following is the thrust

of what Harvey would testify to regarding QWIN/ZRRIFLE:

Harvey regarded ZRRIFLE as the overall project crypt under

which QJWIN as an asset operation was going forward. He. had

discussed with Silver the general assignment of exploring

executive action capability, and the possibility that either

QJWIN or that other criminals. whom WIN helped to spot might

be assets. He never did more than review some of them as

possibilities in the course of his taking an inventory:

However, he did not use WIN or anyone WIN spotted in con-

nection with any assassination operations against Castro

or otherwise, nor did he even discuss the concept with any.

of them. He did not stockpile any materials or discuss pre

liminary targets or make plans or evaluations premised on

particular tentative targets. Essentially,

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INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMARY

ve Page

the technological, human asset, and organizational poten-

tials in being,or which might be organized, under the cland-

estine services, and

I came up with a pessimistic report to

Helms and Bissell that the possibilities of effective dis-

creet action were slim. He also concluded that it was

"ridiculous" to try and set up a general reserve capability

in being, and counselled that the one sure way to do it, or

at least the only one close to having. a chance at secure

success, was to simply appoint a single senior officer to do

everything: to run the operation, kill the person, bury the

body, and tell no one. In regard to Castro, he had used the

ZRRIFLE project as the administrative hook for his billing

and so forth, and said that at some times there were mix-

ups in terms of the financing offices, so that QJWIN/ ZRRIFLE

might be used. He did not completely explain why on some

of his own bills

seems to have indicated QJWIN/

ZRRIFLE, but we did not have time to pursue this at greater

length,

Whether he would regard this as his own slip or

indicate that to some extent they were written up by others,

the bottom line. is that he would swear that QJWIN was never

involved in any way in the castro operation _ nor, for

example, ever in the United States, although there is a

plane trip ticket from Miami to Chicago which is charged

to "QJWIN/ZRRIFLE" (Harvey says it was a plane trip of

Roselli's, which was the only thing he ever paid for of

Roselli's.)

FILE:

TU

SEGMET

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Pare 1 Of -

In early 1961 Bissell asked Harvey to explore an

executive action capability. Harvey confirmed and said he

firmly recalls that Bissell on at least two occasions indi-

cated to Harvey that he, Bissell, had been repeatedly im-

portuned by the White House to explore such a capability.

The first time Bissell spoke to him, Harvey thinks, was

early on ,and at least one other time occurred which was whe

Bissell asked him in the fall to turn the RIFLE approach

to Castro and pick up the Roselli operation. The first time

-Bisseli

Bissell spoke to him about it, / definitely said he had

been urged by the White House, but Harvey does not recall

whether he mentioned anyone at the White House.

Harvey

thinks that if Bissell had said that he had been directly

asked by the President, then Harvey wuld have remembered

it even today.

His impression is that the implication in

Bissell's conversation with Harvey was that the White House

had initiated it; but he said that he couldn't be sure

whether Bissell had said the White House wanted it set up

to be ready. in being or whether the White House wanted the

possibility explored. Harvey elaborated that the White House

might sa "create such a capability"

,.or might say "deter-

mine

whether it would be a good idea to set up such a

capability" or might say "see if it would be possible to

set up such a capability."

Harvey is fairly certain that Bissell did not indicate

whether dulles knew about this White House request, nor could

Harvey be sure whether Bissell had indicated whether it was

someone in the Kennedy White House or the Eisenhower

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## Page 18

I. -ENVIEN AND MESHING SUN IARY

TOP SEAted

White House who had made the request. Again, he has the

impression, although he can remember nothing express, that

at the time he received the distinct impression Bissell's

conversation at the White House had only been

a short time

prior to his conversation with Harvey. When pressed, he

said he was not sure and he might even have spoken to Bissell

a short time before the Kennedy inauguration which would

have meant that Bissell was more likely to have been referring

to the Eisenhower White House as having pressured Bissell

to set up an executive action capability. On the other

hand, he has the strong impression that the second time he

was told by Bissell, i.e., in the fall, Bissell again implied

that the renewed pressures had been recent, thereby strongly

suggesting that, at least at that point, it was the Kennedy

White House which was involved.

Bissell asked him to explore the current clandestine

services capability to make recommendations on how such

an

operation should be set up. He does not recall Bissell men

tioning Castro, Lumumba or Trujillo, although it is possible

that it was at that time that Bissell told Harvey about his

approach to O'Donnell (and as noted

above, Harvey definitely

remembers that, at some point, Bissell did do that). But

Harvey does not preclude the possibility that there was a

general discussion of the kinds of situations when that

capability might be useful to have, and that this could have

TOP

SERRET

Page 3. of _

FILE:

fill

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LARVIN AND MEETING SO MARY

Page 9

of

10

included discussions of Trujillo, Castro and Lumumba. He

simply does not remember and does not think they discussed

the project in terms of likely specific targets.

Either at that first meeting with Bissell or shortly

thereafter, Harvey learned that Arnold Silver and Sidney

Gottlieb had been "cut in" by Bissell on Bissell's interest

in executive action capability. Harvey thought this was

unfortunate, but it was done. Harvey also thought Bissell

should have known better than to discuss Lumumba with

O'Donnell, although Harvey understands and fully respects

O'Donnell's moral scruples against being involved.

Also, shortly after being asked to set up executive

action capability, Harvey learned about the Cuban operation

involving the Office of Security and understood that both

J.C. King and J. Esterline were witting, as well as O'Connell

and Edwards. Harvey is not sure why Bissell would have told

Silver about the executive action project. But he has a

vague recollection that at some point Bissell indicated to

him that Silver had an asset who might be useful. (So pre-

sumably Bissell knew about QJWIN, perhaps from O'Donnell's

use of him in the Congo.)

"Silver, in any event, knew: (1) that Bissell was

interested in setting up an executive action capability,

and (2) that

Bissell had spoken to Harvey about it. There-

after he and Silver spoke about it (see discussion of notes

FILE:

TOP

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## Page 20

INKVIEN AND METING SUMAANY

Page

10.0f

TU

in the file, infra.) Silver's relationship to the entire

project was really threefold: (1) he was actively running

QJVIN the asset, (2) QJWIN was spotting people whom Harvey

assumes Arnold was considering both for normal Division D

type surreptitious entry and code-stealing, and executive

action capability, and (3) Silver did explore the general

concept involved. for setting up such capability with Harvey.

We next spoke about the portion of the report suggest-

ing that Harvey had been briefed about the technical de=

velopments. of capabilities under the Roselli plot.

Harvey

said that he does not recall the name and is fairly certain

he never met or dealt with Dr. Treichler, the person who

actually made the pills in the ISD. He did know both sid

¡Gottlieb and "Manny" Gunn fairly well. He said that in

terms of his general professional duties as a Station Chief

and counterespionage expert against the Soviets, he had

made it a point of keeping fairly current in background

knowledge on the enemy's capabilities for assassination.

He had therefore discussed the latest state of the art with

the Office of Medical Services (where Gunn was) and TSD

(where Gottlieb was). He said he had also discussed with

those offices medical and other scientific aspects of

interrogation techniques (e.g. truth serum) and control

techniques (e.g. post-hypnotic suggestion for controlling

agents). He had had general discussions, therefore, with

both Gunn and Gottlieb. However, he does seem to recall

a discussion of specific techniques with Gunn at one point,

although he is not positive this was after he had been

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assigned the ZRRIFLE task by. Bissell. In any event, he canbofile:

remember asking Gunn to brief Gottlieb, as is suggested in

the IG Report.

We next discussed the notes in the ZRRIFLE file. (The

xerox of those notes sent us by CIA is in part illegible.

I returned and took down completely that set of notes which

specifically discusses the executive action capability and.

which is the set Harvey identified as his: Appended here-

to :

ere my notes, but if Harvey is going

to be questioned about them we would really have to ask ClA

for the file copy before next Wednesday.)

The reference to Notes hereafter refers to a package

of three sets of notes which we had xeroxed by the Agency.

The first two or three pages which are not in Harvey's

handwriting appear to be a draft of what would be the basic

project outline used as a cover for the RRIfLE project.

It does discuss QJWIN as the asset and does indicate that

he will be used to spot other criminals for sensitive pro-

jects. But unlike the subsequent notes, it does not discuss

issues regarding the setting up of an assassination capa-

bility. The next set of notes which are in large writing

on pages covered with various doodles are those identifiedt

Harvey as his. From looking at

them, he judged that they were

notes based on two successive conversations. First, with.

Sidney Gottlieb on the 25th

of January, 1961 and then on

the 26th of January with Arnold Silver.

Harvey concluded

that the first conversation with Gottlieb ranged across a

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variety of activities which fell within the framework of

Gottlieb's position at TSD. (Harvey speculated Gottlieb

had just become Acting Director or taken over some other

high post in TSD.) His conclusion in this regard is based

in part on references in

that first section of his notes

to items which he recalls and which hewould swear have

nothing to do with ZRRIFLE. For example, there is a dis-

cussion of "GE Basic Sounds Project""translation machine"

"phenomena"' and "(r with C.B. [then something illegible])".

Below that appears "commint gear"' and under that is "Anes-

thesia." Harvey said that there was a project to develop

a new kind of translating machine and also one to translate

from the printed word and his parenthetical checkmark is

his way of signifying that he wanted to check with "C.B."

who was someone he brought into the Agency and whom he

regarded as the best man in the intelligence community on

COMINI intelligence, Frank Rowlett, whom he said had ab-

solutely nothing to do with ZRRIFLE.

Above the remarks just noted in the Notes was the phrase

"Framework of Sid's job," and under that "ELINT RED--memo

Ledford. Again, Harvey identified this as Dick Ledford,

•who was an ELINT specialist. with

the Agency.

The first part of the Notes of the 25th/1 meeting with

Sidney Gottlieb is headed "Executive Action." Harvey could

not recall what he meant by the phrase "the magic button"

but said that he assumed this was a euphemism either he or

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NIERVIEN AND MEETING SUMMARY

Gottliub used. for whatever mechanism was eventually chosen.

Ile could not understand the reference to the narcotics

bureau, except that if Gottlieb

or he at that point knew

about QJWIN they might have been aware of his initial in-

volvement with American intelligence agencies in a narcotics

enforcement operation.

The reference

• to "RIS 201 cover

caution" meant that if there was an attempt to get a fake

201 file as cover involving the person allegedly in some

operation relevant to the Russian intelligence service, this

had to be done with great caution. Harvey speculated that

the word "bankruptcy" referred to the same considerations

discussed below -- that there was a bankruptcy of policy on

the part of the CIA or USA if there had to be a resort to

assassination. (This might frame an interesting general

policy question for Harvey.)

Harvey did not know what "no star" meant. I asked him

if that might refer to the star file system, and he said that

when he was in the Agency he didn't know about one or does

not recall one now. He thinks the reference to "eyes ..

Jim A. -- contradistinct from U-2". may have meant that the

check of any assets to be used through the CI Division, a

normal operating technique, in this case should be done on

an "eyes only" basis. through Angleton. He also thought the

reference to the U-2 might mean that unlike that operation,

this project should not be run on such a compartmented basis,

that any assets to be used were not checked with cIso that.

the counterespionage protective resources of the Agency

were utilized.) Harvey thinks that the phrase.

"not a TSD

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problem" probably meant that he was saying that ISD as a

unit should not be involved in this project, even if some-

one like Gottlieb and

one or two trusted people were work-

ing on it for him.

Harvey said the phrase "apply brakes" meant that one

should be able to have a fail-safe mechanism if the situa-

tion changed or that it might have referred to the fact that

one shouldn't jump into this kind of thing too precipitously.

He said that the phrase "last resort. : . beyond last re-

sort and a confession of weakness" meant just what it said

- that this was a last resort and a profession of weakness

or bankruptcy of U.S. policy. He was not sure why there

was a reference to "ElBenefactor" but said that this might

nean they had discussed situations where such a capability

might be used. (It

should be noted at this point, however,

that later on Harvey said he would swear that he never had

anything to do with Trujillo, did not particularly examine

the possibilities of peculiar needs of such an operation,

and has no first hand knowledge of any involvement we may

have had

in that area.) Finally, he said the phrase

"assumptions.

• examples of three single 'wrong',"

would

seem to suggest that several examples were discussed

(possibly including Trujillo as one) and that Harvey though:

that assumptions made in regard to each case by Gottlieb

or someone

else were erroneous.

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By the way, I asked Harvey if "ZRACORN" and "ZRRAG-

TIME"' were crypts for projects or were sensitivity indicatoes,

routing labels, or other control indicators. He said he

could not recall the projects, but thought they would have

been projects and not indicators. He said, however, they

might have been generic labels for a category of projects

and not referring to a specific project. This possibly

contrasts with what the IG's office told David Aaron and

myself, namely, that they were some sort of sensitivity and

control indicators.

We can pursue this.

The second part of the two sheets of Harvey's notes

which he said were from a conversation with Silver are fair

ly self explanatory. The notes on the right hand side

"Max 2/3 ... B-WKH-AS-Sid-resev-substitute- [illegible]"

we did not discuss, but I strongly presume this means

a maximum of two or three persons with Bissell, Harvey and

Silver already involved, the possibility of Gottlieb being

included, but with some reservations as a member of the

group:

Harvey and I did discuss item

8, which refers to a

principal agent, the possibility of using QJWIN, and then

says "AF proj. draft -= LCH -- tested 1500 from NB -- mask

spotispat?] ramstill AF project [name illegiblel." Harvey

said the initials probably did refer to Lester Houck, but

since he had never discussed ZRRIFLE with Houck at that time

or later, he assumes that this referred to the fact that

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Huck night have been familiar with QJWIN's role in Africa

FILE:

We also discussed item 12 which refers to a cover file

created to prove RIS (illegiblel and point 13 which notes

that there was a danger of RIS counteraction if we tried

to put the blame on the Russians.

I did not discuss with larvey all of the considerations

listed on the two pages of notes which appear immediately

after his in the file. His best guess was that they were .

notes prepared by Arnold Silver, either as a result of the

conversation between Silver and Harvey or simply based. on

Silver's preparing a paper at Harvey's request after they

had talked. Harvey said, however, he thought he recognized

some of the concepts expressed as his own. I did ask him

about the reference to "our own experience (Bangkok and

effect on DDP).. After some thought, he said it might have

referred to some incident in Thailand, but he could not

remember it. I asked him if he remembered the Killim case;

it refreshed his recollection. He said he had heard about

it; he did not know any of the details but thought that's

probably what the reference was to. I also asked him what

he thought the first sentence of point number

three in this

TOP

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IENVIEW AND MEGLING SUICIARY

Liege

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set of notes meant: "Maximum'

security, KUBARK only

(e.g: what does Siragusa now know?)" He said that since

the first part means it obviously should be handled within

CIA, the question was what Siragusa, a leading BNDD man

who often worked with the CIA, knew, possibly about QJWIN

if he were to be an asset(because of WIN's earlier work on

narcotics cases, supra.) We then discussed the last sentence

of point three which is a question: "DI officially advised?"

Harvey said this would have been a legitimate policy

point;at least to raise for consideration. In effect, it

was extending the notion of plausible deniability down one

level to protect the DCI in case there was a flap. He does

not recall any decisions on this point, but simply that it

was a policy issue. to be laid on the table.. (Compare his

arguments in regard to why McCone might not have been

apprised of the Phase II operation.)

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At this point Harvey reviowed the rest of the file

memos I had brought,

With regard to the accounting against

QUWIN/ ZRRIFLE for some of the

activities he engaged in with

Roselli, he suggested that he always thought of ZRRIFLE as

the overarching crypt within which were the QJWIN operation

and the ZRRIFLE '

expleration of executive action

He said that he used QJWIN/ZRRIFLE sometimes in connection

with the Roselli activities, but only after there had been

some initial mixup by the finance section which resulted in

his general ZRRIFLE activities and QJWIN operation being

slugged the same combined crypt of QJWIN/ ZRRIFLE. With

regard to a note that refened to Henry Manfreddi, Haivey

did not know why his name was on notes in the QWIN

file, except that he was a highly talented narcotics expert

who worked both in the Justice

Department and the CIA and

who might have been involved in the evaluating of or check-

ing on potential assets whom QJWIN had spotted in Italy.

(The file does reveal that QJWIN spotted assets in Italy.)

With regard to the small note in the file that simply

says "John Ralston - John Roselli -- William Walker."

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Harvey said that that was a note he left for Helms when he

went to Rome so that Helms would be alert if anything came

in either for himself (he was William Walker) or for Roselli

or relating to Roselli (who was "Ralston").

Harvey again summarized ZRRIFLE as follows:

(1) A search for what assets and capabilities might

be available; (2) No recruitment of anyone in general or

for specific targets; (3) no preliminary targetting of any

victims, even in a general way; (4) no stockpiling of

lethal equipment or "merchandise".

He said that he kept both Helms and Bissell generally

informed of his progress. He had briefed Helms on the

assignment shortly after being given

it by Bissell

because

Helms, &S

number 2 in DDP, was too likely to see something

something coming in or to be working on an independent pro-

ject

in the same area or related with someone else, and he

thought it was important that Helms knew

generally what

Harvey was working on and that he had an assignment to do

it from Bissell.

Bissell. did not talk too much

about why Edwards was in

charge of Phase I of the mob opcration. Harvey thinks that

Bissell may have indicated

• some

question about whether they should have gotten into it with

Edwards and O'Connell.

Before describing Bissell's instructions to Harvey in

November to turn ZRRIFLE to Castro, Harvey jumped ahead and

we discussed the setup of Task Force. W. He made clear that

he was instructed to do this by llelns, not Bissell. It was

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SAM:

clear Bissell was on his way out. Helms asked Harvey to

do it. As his condition, Haivey got a promise that he could

put in totally fresh people and not take anyone from the

o1d Latin American division, which did not please them.

this setup of Task Force W was something that he

undertook in December. Farlier, probably in November, Bissell

had suggested he direct his attention regarding executive

action capability to Castro, and specifically asked him to

take over the Office of Security operation.

Harvey

emphasized that the destruction of Castro was the top priority

item for the Kennedy administration in foreign affairs at

that time. They wanted him overthrown at all costs, on the

one hand, but on the other hand, insisted that it be done

by clandestine means.. Harvey said he told his superior that

he could produce a provisional government for a few days on

the island which could ask for help, but that was really

all that he could guarantee and that then the U.s. would

have to send in assistance -- which the Kennedys were un-

willing to do. As a result, he says, there was a great

sense of frustration and an effort to try to comply with

Kennedy's wishes

to topple the regime clandestinely. He

says that Bissel reiterated. at that time the statement that

he was being prodded by the White House to explore the

questions of executive action capability. (It is not clear

from my notes whether Harvey was saying that this time

Bissell said the push from the White House was for executive

action capability against Castro, or still in a general

sense. Obviously, this should be nailed down.)

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When I asked Harvey whether it was

possible that

all Bissell had said in the fall was that the Kennedys wanted

to topple Castro's government, Harvey said, "No." Bissell

clearly said that the White House had reiterated its interest

in executive action (i.e. assassination), capability. We

discussed whether it was not inconsistent or at least

incongruous for the White House to ask for a general capa-

bility to be explored, if the President in fact knew of the

ongoing Maheu-Roselli plot. Harvey said that if the White

House had authorized the go-ahead for Phase I initially it

would not have been good form for Dulles to have told them

of the actual specifics of the plot, or the day by day

account of its going

forward. Therefore, he said, it was

possible the White House merely knew they had approved CIA's

pursuing executive action against Castro, but not knowing

how it was coming, and, therefore, in the fall: asking the

people to pursue generally the possibility of using assassina-

tion against Castro.

Harvey said shortly after Bissell had asked him to turn

his attention to Castro, Bissell authorized and Harvey re-

ceived a briefing from Edwards on the Phase I project. Shortly

after, Harvey in turn briefed. Helms in general on the project.

Later

Harvey said that he recalls Edwards briefing him on Edwards'

and Houston's conversations

with Kennedy (RFK), but he does

not remember what Edwards said, or whether Edwards said

that Kennedy had been upset in regard to the Mafia use with-

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out his knowledge or the assassination effort without his

knowledge. Harvey does remember Kennedy was angry. Nor

does he recall whether Edwards. indicated they had told RFK

it was a finished operation or not.

Harvey indicated that he had spoken with Helms prior

to having Edwards introduce

him to Roselli. He did not

know if it was then or at a later time that he and Helms

discussed not briefing. McCone, but he agrees that

definitely did take place. He gave a variety of reasons.

The first, again, was that it did not "happen on McCone's .

watch," so why tell him about a potentially messy situation

or involve him in it? The second argument was that he,

in fact, did not think much of the operation, was skeptical

from the outset as to whether anything was really going

forward in Cuba, or was just a lot of third and fourth hand

ha

allegations of accomplishment, In general,, thought the

whole setup stank. He was taking time to sort it out and

see what it really looked like before abandoning it and in

the meanwhile it was going forward but did not seem worth

discussing with McCone. He also mentioned the question of

plausible deniability for the DCI as a possible, why he migh

have urged on Helms that McCone not be briefed. In any

event, he says it was definitely Helms' decision.

Harvey does recall being told that the pills were passed

into Cuba in the late spring, although he again emphasized

that all of the information on this project was third and

fourth hand.

He recalled the van of equipment given to Verona

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as his price for involvement and that some firearms were

involved, including possibly sniper-scope rifles.

He also

recalls a report that three men were going into Cuba later

in the early summer but did not associate this in his mind

with the possibility of using the pills, as distinct from

the possibility of using firearms

against Castro. He

also

reemphasized that it was taking

him a while to sort out the project, get a feel for the

people, the credibility, the security problems, and so

forth, which is one reason why he kept on, even though he

had low hopes for it from the outset.

With the missile crisis imminent

-- and we did have

advanced knowledge of at least a general military buildup

Harvey said he was unwilling to toss away any assets that

might be useful against Castro, and the plan was generally

kept in operation through that time. But he said that as

soon as the crisis was over, he indicated to. Roselli he

wanted the project to be cut off, albeit gradually so is

not to engender hard feelings or other side effects.

Shortly thereafter the plans to end the project were cut,

although the relationship continued on and was only gradually.

ended over

the first part of 1963. (There are expense sheets

for Miami as late as April 1963.)

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+2%

Next ne discussed the MONGOOSE matorials and purtic -

ularly the August 10, 1962 Special Group Augmented meeting

Harvey remembers McNamara tossing on the table the possi -

bility of killing Castro -- not by way of simply underlin-

ing the futility of paramilitary plans -- but, it appeared

to Harvey, as a real suggestion. McCone immediately re-

sponded in the negative and Murray then picked up the

question that it shouldn't be discussed at the meeting.

A day or so later -- but in any event prior to Lansdale's

memo-McCone was chatting with Harvey and said that he had

felt so strongly against McNamara's idea that he had called

the Secretary of Defense

after the meeting to reiterate

Harvey then confirmed the story in the IG Report, apparentl

from himself, about McCone's concern that he might be excom-

municated. As for Lansdale, Harvey indicated

that he often suggested he was expressing Bobby Kennedy's

views or speaking for him and that there was always some

question there. (I don't know how strongly Harvey would

testify along these lines, however. He is generally very

hesitant to poor-mouth anyone.) Harvey said that he knew

of no basis for Lansdale

to have originally put the refer-

ence to liquidating leaders as a study item in the memorandum

which upset him so. He said that whenever Lansdale thereafter

tried to raise the subject with him he did, as the 1967 study

indicates, simply turn off the discussion as he turned aside

some suggestions for assassinations as a possibility by

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members of Task Force W. (that is lower level staff).

FILE:

With regard to Phase II, and the actual operations,

Harvey said that all the stories about Roselli being involved

in boat trips to Cuba and other heroics were a lot of "crap"--

although he is quick to defend Roselli's patriotism and

his contribution as the middle man in this operation. He

also disclaimed any knowledge of other plots against Castro.

e...

He said that he knew nothing

about plots to assassinate Castro coming out of Guantanamo

any involvement of Barker, Sturgis, or any first-hand know-

ledge of the Cubella plot, although he later learned of it.

Our final reprise was on the question of the general

policy of the period.. he said he wanted to emphasize.

that given the Kennedys' strong commitment to getting rid

of Castro and their contemplation of violent overthrow or

attack, he thinks the entire situation could be summarized

that (implicitly, even if they had not specifically auth-

orized Phase I and Phase II) the shooting of one Cuban,

even Fidel, by another Cuban, was not a major change or

new departure in U.S. policy that would have required

additional approval.

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BIXS ONLY

14 May 1962

5/30175

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT: John Rosselli

1. In early April Mr. William Harvey asked me to arrange

a contact with Subject.. The meeting in New York City was arranged

for 9 April. I explained to Mr. Harvey that the undersigned would

take no part in future operations proposed for Subject.

2. In the interim I have kept Mr. Harvey fully informed

reference to my briefing of The Attorney General on the former

project and cautioned him that I felt that any future projects of

this nature should have the tacit approval of the Director of Central

Intelligence.

3 On this date Mr. Harvey called me and indicated that

he was dropping any plans for the use of Subject for the future.

shet a Edwards

Director of Security

SECRET

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NERVIEW AND MEETING SUGARY

Pige 10f

William Harvey

Indianapolis,

June 19,

1975

Interviewer - Burt Wides.

I flew out to Indianapolis on the evening of the 18th

and interviewed Mr. Harvey

from 7:30 until approximately

12:30 on the morning of the 19th.

We first reviewed Mr. Harvey's career outline. He was

with the FBI from 1940 until 1947 and worked on German and

Soviet counterespionage cases, including the Elizabeth

Bentley case and several of the major cases involving our use

of Nazi agents as double agents during WWII. In 1947 he worked

briefly for' the Central Intelligence Group and then its suc-

cessor, the CIA.

His first position with the CIA was as head of the Soviet

Intelligence Branch in the

Soviet Union Division. This was

the unit in charge of counterintelligence against Soviet

intelligence services at

the inception of the CIA. Harvey was

shortly thereafter given an additional hat while retaining

the first position. The additional job was the coordinator

for the clandestine services on

communications intelligence.

In the summer of 1948 he became the Deputy Assistant Director

of the Office of Special Operations (predecessor of DDP) in

charge of counterespionage. From the fall of 1952 until 1959

he was Station Chief in Berlin. During the early to mid-50's

he was in charge of the famous Berlin Tunnel operation,, which

tunneled under the East German telephone junction points from

West Berlin.

FILE:

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Schivere

Review Staff:

1 July 1975

K405

- lage

75/1024

MI. Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, JI.

Room G-308

Dirksen Senate Office Building

Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Fritz:

In response to your telephone call of 27 June 1975,

I offer you the following based on my memory of certain

events and the atmosphere of the times:

(Please note

that my records on this era are not all that precise.

My memory is vivid and may be biased.

However, as a

close observer, here is what I recall, for what it is

worth.)

You should be aware that this Agency felt itself

to be under very strong pressure in the early 1960s to

bring about change in the Cuban regime.

This pressure

was strongest after the Bay of Pigs incident in April

1961 and although it dissipated somewhat after the Cuban

Missile Crisis in October 1962, it has never really

completely disappeared. In any event, when My. Robert F.

Kennedy accepted

the proposals by General Lansdale which

led to the formation of the MONGOOSE Project, it was

clear to the DCI, Mr. John A. McCone, that the major tasks

in. this broad covert

action program would fall on CIA.

McCone in turn made it clear to Agency officials that

this task was very much a direct charge on the Agency.

It should also be noted that from the beginning, there

was little hope that the program as conceived would

actually achieve its purpose which was to bring about

the removal of the Castro government. and to replace it

with one whose interests would be more compatible with

American interests and the interests of other governments

in the Western Hemisphere.

William K. Harvey, who was placed in charge of the

Agency's Cuban Task Force, has, as you know, a very

special type of personality. Both his manner and his

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to

Criminal Sanctions.

RECEIVED FROM

M 1 1975

SECRET/ EYES ONLY

ClA

Classifled by_007789

Exempt frein goneral

declassification schedula of E.O, 11652

exemption schedule 58 (1), (2), (3)

Automatically

deciassified on

Date Impossibla lo Determine.

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method, in my opinion, tend to be thorough, comprehensive,

and time-consuming.

Because of the nature of his assign-

ment and because of his personality traits, his personal

relations, particularly with General Lansdale and with

the Attorney General, were never very pleasant to begin

with, and tended to deteriorate steadily.

A climax of sorts occurred at a meeting of the

Special Group Augmented during which the Chairman asked

a specific question, noting that he had ten minutes in

which to hear the reply and wanted a crisp answer within

that period.

Harvey was not forthcoming, and the

Chairman left the meeting after ten minutes expressing

strong dissatisfaction with things in general and Harvey

in particular.

After this meeting it was clear to McCone that

Harvey had broken his lance and would have to be replaced.

In due course, he was replaced.

During the Cuban Missile Crisis, when it was

virtually impossible to get access to top officials in the

government and get their guidance on day-to-day affairs;

Harvey, who did indeed try to get such guidance, on his

own concluded that United States policy was headed toward

a full-scale invasion of Cuba.

He ordered a number of

agent teams to be dispatched to the island for intelligence

collection and to be in place as assets to support a con-

ventional military operation.

General Lansdale claimed

this was done without his knowledge and authorization and

there was a confrontation in McCone's office. McCone

concluded that unless these teams were being

sent to

satisfy specific requirements by the Secretary of State

and the Secretary of Defense that they should be recalled.

Since there was no such requirement, they were recalled.

In a separate meeting, McCone reassured Lansdale that

he was in fact Chief of Operations.

As a result of this,

Harvey earned another black mark as not being fully under

control.

I trust the foregoing will be of some value to you.

Sincerely,

Wast

WaLter ERECEIVED FROM

- 2 -

SECRET/EYES ONLY

ML 1 1975

CIA

NW 50955

DocId 32423490 Page

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