MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:PRELIMINARY DEBRIEFING REPORT ON ACTIVITIES IN CUBA.
Originator: CIA
From: WITHHELD
Document date: 11/26/1960
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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104-10103-10125

• 2023 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

26 November 1960

MEVIORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Preliminary Debriefing Report on A PANIC-7

Activities in Cuba .

RETURN TO CIA

Background Use Only

Do Not Reproduce

1. The substance of this preliminary report covers debriefing sessions

held vith AMPÁNIC-7 fron 7 through 15 Noverber 1960. Both lir. Pelich and the

undersigned participated in these debriefing periods. The pertinent aspects

of these debriefing sessions are summarized into four specific categories:

AMPANIC-7's operational activities in Cuba from his initial

arrival in Cuba 5 August until his departure 5 Hovember 1960.

b. Internal assets developed in Cuba for future operational

use.

c. Problems encountered by A-? while operating in Cuba.

a. Projected

future assignment in Cuba.

2. Mr. James Pekich, who was AMPANIC-7's case officer during his initial

training in Washington, was contacted by phone from Miami by subject on

Subject reported that he had arrived in the U. S. by boat 5 Nov.

and was planning to leave that afternoon by plane for lashingion.

A room was

booked at the Washington Hotel in anticipation of A-T's arrival thet evening.

At approximately 1800 hours, A-T called Mi. Pekich on the agent phone from the

Washington airport to announce his arrival and was directed to go to the hotel,

there subject was subsequently contacted by tir. Pekich and the undersigned.

diel

sore se

wire

assign

to our cormitments to support his activities in Cuba; that he didn't like the

idea of considering himseli as being expendable; that he vas not sure why we

sent him to Cuba in the first place if we had no intentions to support his

peter end that de vo dotate a daping it do g to down con-

Aiter Mr. Pekick succeeded in quieting down A-T following this initial

outburst, A-T was first asked to describe how he managed to get out of Cuba

without utilizing our channels to effect this exfiltration.

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Escape story

A-7 stated thai on 18 October he had sent an urgent nessage

to his Hava contact (AIiRE-1) informing him that his situation was

precarious and that he must get out of Cuba es soon as possible.

cording to A-7 his Agency contact vas unable to provide any definite

assurance that his departure from Cuba could be expedited. He then

attempted to lay on unilateral arrangements to this end with first

his operational contact, Benito FERNANDEZ, and later his nother-in-

surgeon who operates histore clinic in lavana..

On I Hovember a negro

by the name of (Lazaro RODRIGUEZ Arozarena, drovesto A-7's salehouse

and took him to his own house located on 64th Street 23-25)in liarianao.

On the morning of 2 November at 1100 hours, Dr. PRADO arrived at the

Negro's house and told A-? that he pianned to leavebfor Key West

Florida 5 November and would arrange to smuggle A-T out of Cuba by.

hiding him in the motor room of his yacht. Arrangements were made

between the principals for A-7 to visit the yacht 4 November to in-

spect his proposed hiding place on the yacht. In the interim period,

A-T stated that he began to suspect that he may have fallen into a

trap and told the Negro that he was returning to the U.S. to bring

dian't like the idea of hiding in the motor room and suggested that

he swim out to the boat, there he could be picked. up at sea. That

night (4 Novenber) A-T stayed at the home of Guido BRITO, who had a

house close to the beach at Santa Meria del liar located about

25 Kilometers from Havana. On 5 Rovember at 0530 hours, A-7 began

his long swim in rough, choppy vaters and was finally sighted by

vessel).

06

(Dr. Prado's) Yacht ("SORTIA"

I piloted by Eduardo OLIVA)reached

Key West, Florida 5 Hovember at 1445 hours.

A-Y managed to slip avay

during the refueling of the yacht before the custom officials arrived

and immediately took ofi for liani. Upon reaching Miami, A-T vent

lirectly to his wife t home. for a reunion with his lamily.

In query-

ing A-T further on how Dr. (Prado managed to leave. Cuba without any

06 (Dr. Prado told him that he received official approval for this trig-.

a stolen vessel from his yacht club, (Casino Espanol))

Havana, wich was being held for hin by American authorities iR&

Key West. Moreover,

Dr. Prado told A-T that he plened to leave the

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chat all such vessels as his would subsequently be nationalized by the Castr

Pradol planned to stay at the West

Drive Harbor Island, Miami - Tel: (fL I-5310.)

Efforts to debrief A-7 on his operational activities in Cuba were

sonewhat futile in this initial meeting in view of his unsettled emotional

state. His primary concern appeared to be his wife and his rather strained

relationship with bis in-laws; who were now residing in Miami.. In this con-

nection, it should be pointed out that this emotional state appeared to stem,

In part, from his inherent suspicions that his wife (21 years of age and rel-

atively attractive) was being unfaithful to him. All indications are, however;

that A-T has no real basis for these suspicions; other than those conjured up

in his owe mina.

In any case, ke requested 11 It might not be possible to wire-

tap his wife's house in Miani, so that be could have daily reports on her activi-

ties. While no promises were made, A-T was assured we would attempt to l00k

into this possibility, once we had more definite Information that there were

some grounds for his suspicions.

(Note: Subsequent discussions with Security

Office revealed that a wire-tap of A-T's house was a major project in itself

and impossible to accomplish at this time without tieing up considerable

personnel.) A-T was later told this alter we assured him that his suspicions

were groundless where his wife. was concerned.

5. Following this initial meeting with A-T, it was apparent to both

Mr. Pekich and the undersigned that: time would be needed to restore agent's

confidence in our capability to support his efforts in any future projected

assigment in the field. Moreover, A-T's emotional state, which appears to

stem from his problems with his in-laws and his concern about leaving his wife

alone, must be fully resolved before attempting to dispatch him again.

6.. In later debriefing session held from 8 to 15 November with A-7,

considerable more light was thrown on the nature and scope of his operational

activities in Cuba.

As previously indicated in paragraph 1 of this report,

A-7's activities are sumarized as follows:

2.o

AMPANIC-Y Operational Activities in Cuba:

In line with his projected mission to organize, resistance groups

in Havana and Pinar del Rio for mounting sabotage operations against

key carget installations and assasination of prominent Cuban Communist

members in the Castro entourage, A-? appears to have made some progress

in this direction from the time he arrived in Cuba in early August 1960

to his subsequent exfiltration 5 November. Upon arrival in Havena,

A-7 began a series of meetings with leaders of the OA, Triple-A and MDC

with a view to establishing some degree of rapport in the furtherance

of his own personal objéctives. It is significant to note that. ir

a period of approximately 5 weeks, A-7 made contact with over 42 indi-

viduals, who represented various anti-Castro groups operating in the

Havana and Pinar del Rio areas.

A-7. frankly admitted that he had spread

himself out too thin in this respect and that in many cases he should

SEGRET

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SECHET

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have employed cut-outs instead of attempting to contact certain

naivine miserved meetings were also. held by A-T wit

AMPANIC -5, Dr. Iino

ernandez and ARUrG-1 with a view to establishin

some degree of rapport and coordination of activities in the area.

In this connection, A-7 claims he turned over a number of his assets

over to AMPANIC-5, prior to his movement to the ESCAMBRAY, where he

tas subsequently picked up by G-2.

Internal Assets Developed in Cuba for Future Operational Use:

In attempting to sift out specific assets developed by A-T during

his activities in Havana, three of the more prominent individuals with

whom A-T was in direct contact should be listed.

selection of suitable IZ's and DZ's in both Pinar del Rio

and Oriente provinces, location of safehouses in Havana and

use of his garages for storage of arms and military equipment

which A-T anticipated would be dispatched to him.

a lawyer by profession, who has unlimite

also selected to handle the propaganda for the "Cuba Libre" group

being organized by A-7 inside Cuba.

(3) (TrancIsco ROBAYNAS DorInguez: a Cuban national who had served

in the U.S. Army and who also fought in the Escambrays against Bati:

forces (ROBAYNA) claimed he had a force of 150 men at his disposaj

and was planning to use them in a guerrilla action against Castro

forces in the Pinar del Rio area. 'Moreover, once proper materiel

support in the form of arms and other nilitary equipment was made

available to him by A-7, he felt he could marshal over a thousand

men in this area.

(4) In addition to the ?

(Sort to hit on to the Rode us one dead tan tenter o

rendered him considerable assistance in moving securely about havane

in the course of his operational contacts. In the case of AMIRE+1,º|

1- highly praised his abilities as a highly capable case Officer.

nd he feared for his personal safety. He suggested that AMIRE-1o

pire

(5) Finally, ANPUG-I who was trained in sabotage techniques in the

U.S. and was later assigned to A-T, was listed by A-7 as an asset,

who could be channeled into möre specific operations, once available

materiel was forthconing. He felt, however, that he and AMPUGI

were at considerable odds on certain aspects of conducting operatioi

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F/P/

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in Havana, but lelt he could resolve these differences upon

his own return.

Problems Encountered by A-7 while Operating in Cuba:

Some of the more significant problems encountered by A-7

during the course of his operations in Havana are as follows:

(1) Security: In this cornection, A-T stated that despite

the disguise given him, he had to be constantly on the alert

from the danger of being picked up by G-2 or Castro police

during the course of his numerous operational contacts.

sited several examples where he believed he was under sur-

veillance by the opposition and subsequently succeeded in allud-

ing this surveillance.

He complained that his disguise, (hair-

piece and mustache) rapialy deteriorated in the Havana climate

and as a consequence he was forced to abandon this disguise towa

the latter part of his stay in Havana. Similarl}; be was forced

to change his quarters continually, by moving from one safehouse

to another as a security precaution, since he felt that it was

generally known in Cuban circles that he was operating in the

Havana area, and that he was probably already under the sur-

veillance of Castro. security forces.

¿.. Materiel support: In the course o1 these debrielli

essions, one of A-l's chief complaints was the

despite his

urgent messages sent through his cut-out (AYTRE-1)) to the Statio

that arms and other military equipment were sorely needed by'

his groups in Havana and Pinar del Rio, no action was taken to

implement his requests. As a result, A-T felt he was losing fac

with his followers and this was one of the primary factors for

returning to the States to discuss this aspect with Headquarters

(3) Need for Direct Commication: A-T stated that without the

services of a W/I operator who could be in direct communication

with us, he is fully convinced that any subsequent return to Cuc

in an operational capacity would be ineffectual. Hence, this

would be one of the conditions laid on us that when he returned,

a W/I operator would be assigned to him personally.

tion that Aj will me went back to be in the relatively neat toure, ass

Predicated on the assu

Mssrs. Pekich and Petore feel that his nost significant contribution can be

made in the Pinar del Rio area, where he appears to have known assets in the

hills. This, however, does not preclude A-T from also operating in Favana in

developing sabatoge operations with AMPUG-1, whom we assume will cooperate

with A-T despite their differences in how these operations should be conducte

Moreover, should the AMYu complex decide to move into other provinces of

Cuba where nilitary action is to take place, A-T vould appear to be the logic

SENDET

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choice in taking over the operations in this area against Castro targets.

In any case, a decision has been reached that A-T should not be dispatched

without a trained W/I operator who can be relied on to nork closely on

operations with A-T inside the country.

Case Officer Comments: Despite A-f's tendencies to operate on

a grandiose scale, his disappointment in the lack of support received on his

initial mission to Cuba; and his display of enotional instability at times,

it is believed that his efforts can be properly channeled to work effectively

for us in Cuba..

His motivation appears to stem from his personal ambitions.

to make his mark on this counter-revolution against Castro, where he can

assure himself of a priminent position in the luture government to be formed

in Cuba after the overthrow of the Castro regime. A-? has imagination and

the will to succeed. His weakness is his inability to hide his personal

ambitions from others who may work with him and who may have altogether dil-

ferent motivations and sense of values. Hence, it is believed that A-T

will encounter problems in handling pedle recruited or assigned to him in

the course of his activities inside the country.

AMPUG-1 can be sited as

a good example, where a clash of personalities has apparently already taken

place.

In view of this; A-T will have to be dealt with firmly and must be

convinced that the success or failure of his projected mission will depend

on his ability to develop confidence and loyalty among his followers once hè

is inside the country again.

Similarly, A-T must resolve his personal proble

dealing with his wife and In-laws, which has had an adverse effect on him

personally since his return, and may affect his operations inside Cuba. The

next several weeks will, therefore, need be devoted to re-establish A-T's

confidence in our ability to support his efforts in Cuba, once he is sent

back, and working out his family problems to obviate any adverse psycholo-

gical effect which may be detrimental to his operations in Cuba..

JOHN.

PETER

WH/4/PM/oes

SECRET

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