MFR - ANATOLE RE NOSENKO (PART OF CIA STUDY 'CONCLUSIONS AND COMMENTS IN THE CASE OF YURIY IVANOVICH NOSENKO').
Originator: CIA
Document date: 04/07/1969
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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104-10210-1031-2, 2023 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 192 / 0/.n

Soner

7. Apr1l 2069

W: MM9010

MEMORANDUM FOR THE KECO.O

SUBJECT: Anatole RE NOSENKO

1.

i 31 March and 1 and 2 April 1969, Anatole Was

consuliod about the NOSENKO case as a fcllo-up to the late

January 1969 neetings. He gave recommendations concerning

the procedures and topics to be covered during the begin-

ning phases of additional elicitation fron NOSENKO which is

to bagin scon.

?. To provide a basis for discussion certain papers

had been prepared for Anatole's revier. (See Attachment A

for list.) These papers were basically questionnaires about

some of the unresolved or questionable aspects of the

NOSENKO case based jaigely on the conidi themes Anatole

hed highlighted or 17 January 1969 when he corsented after

reviewing the October 1957-December 1968 interviers of

NOSENKO. (See transcripts KY 1, 2, 3 and 4.) Other papers

concerned topics related to the NOSENTO case, senoranda

NOSENKO had written, sumnaries and questionnaires prepared

fron both collateral infornation and NOSENKO's intormation

«set, duen dead dotrass"...

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and sunnaries and questionnaires prepared exclusively on

the basis of information obtained from NOSENKO during the

1967-68 interview period. Each of these papers was read by

Anatole. Anatole's comment, our discussion, or any comment

is detailed in Attachment B, which sets forth crucial ques-

tions in the NOSENKO case.

3. Anatole was told The Director had decided that the

question of NOSENKO's bona fides had not been resolved and

had directed that additional elicitation and questioning of

NOSENKO would be undertaken innediately and expeditiously

pursued. It was understood, of course, as Anatole knew,

that he was to make a major contribution to the questioning

of NOSENKO and that information to this end would be made

available to him: there will be the closest coordination

with hin, including a timely review of future transcripts

based on the new elicitation phase.

It was understood his

views, comments and recommendations will be transmitted and

seriously considered if not explicitly implemented. Anatole

emphasized the need for him to review in advance all topics,

if not in all cases the specific questions, to be discussed

with NOSENKO after the new elicitation phase begins. He

understands the new elicitation phase will begin with Attach-

ment C and that there will be no additional topics discussed

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with NOSENKO until after Anatole has an opportunity to

review them and comment.

4. The following summary points energed during the

course of our discussions as things which nust be considered

in the NOSENKO case information and as papers or question-

naires are outlined and topics selected for further elicita-

tion from NOSENKO:

a. NOSENKO, as I understand the situation, has

had full access to newspapers, magazines, radio and TV since

approximately August 1968. Anatole was told I have no

knowledge of the periodicals or cooks he has read.

b. NOSENKO has recently been afforded a controlled

break from isolation and an opportunity to have feminine

companionship.

c. Since December 1968 the FBI has been inter-

viewing NOSENKO about topics previously discussed as well as

other matters of interest to the FBI which do not originate

with NOSENXO. Anatole noted that FBI access to NOSENKO must

be controlled according to the new elicitation procedures.

d. That it is my opinion only that NOSENKO may

think he is entering into or close to entering into a new

relationship with the Agency on the basis that he has

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satisfactorily answered all questions during the period

1967-68.

e. That it has not been possible and it may never

be possible to isolate or pinpoint either the exact informa-

tion or the point in time when NOSENKO was given new infor-

nation or additional information which might be relevant

upon analysis to the question of his bona fides or his mission.

f. To date there has been a concentration on pre-

paring elicitation questions on the basis of information

obtained during 1967-68 period because (a) this is the infor-

mation Anatole has reviewed, and (b) this information has been

considered to be the standard for assessing NOSENKO and his

information and arriving at conclusions, since these inter-

views were designed to elicit information which would help

resolve discrepancies apparent in his previous statements,

and (c) at this time this information is better organized

and in contrast to infornation from 1962, 1964, etc., is

retrievable as an accurate or literal NOSENKO statement.

8. That the sumnaries and questionnaires, prepared

to date may not include every conment or statement NOSENKO

has made during the 1967-68 period because it has not yet

been possible to isolate, by indexing and extraction, every

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riference to a person or a topic. Anatole was told that

the sorting or isolation process has been completed only

through Memorandun N-188, from a total of approximately 260

memoranda.

It was emphasized that most topics and persons

were discussed with NOSENKO several times

at varying intervals,

and that the majority of topics were not covered to completion

in one or two interviews. NOSENKO also wrote memoranda on

topics which may not have been covered during interview or

which may relate to interview topics but which have not yet

been correlated with the interviews.

h. That research and analysis on most topics is

incomplete, both with respect to collateral information and

previous statements from NOSENKO.

i. That, as Anatole knows, there is certain collateral

or related information such as information from the FBI con-

cerning NOSENKO which has not been made available to him.

Anatole realizes this type of information may be vital to any

consideration of the NOSENKO case and he also points out the

possible if not probable relationship between FBI infornation

and sources and the problem of penetration of American intel-

ligence and Soviet disinformation. He hopes the FBI will

agree to release pertinent information to him and discuss

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sources in the ncar future. He realizes any analysis or

assessment of the NOSENKO case will suffer to the extent

infornation

is withheld from hin. Anatole understands the

problem even though he obviously does not accept it as

logical or helpful. He stresses the need for us to press

the FBI to make appropriate information available to him.

j. M

That infornation we are dealing with in the

transcripts of the 1967-68 NOSENKO interviews is not neces-

sarily information previously known to or discussed with

NOSENKO and that, for instance, the body of informaticn ro-

sulting from the 1967-68 information has been expanded con-

siderably by NOSENKO's review of hundreds of names and

photographs provided him. It was also noted that it has not

yet been possible to isolate topics new to NOSENKO about

which he was asked to comment during this period. Neither

have we been able to isclate or determine when in the past

new, topics or questions of possible significance were intro-

duced to NOSENKO.

4. We discussed in detail Anatole's recommendations

and evolved an iritial selection of Crucial Questions (Attach-

ment B) and from these the first topics and/or questions to

begin in the new elicitation phase with NOSENKO (Attachment C).

manet

• ió is be dare me to .

disa

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Anatole expects to review

and comnent and to frame additional

questions after he reviews the transcripts of the first

elicitations. He has requested and expecis, as this can be

accomplished, to review and comment about a summary of each

Crucial Question.. The summary is to set forth both collateral

and NOSENKO information and detail, with attachments if neces-

sary, exactly what NOSENKO has said. Also, pertinent photo-

graphs and appropriate other documentation is to be attached

for comment or verification of identity by Anatole. Anatola

insists that he review and assist in the framing of all ques-

tions to be assed of NOSENKO and he states that he will

stipulate the order of questioning by both topic and specific

question where appropriate. He will specify or indicate areas

as set forth in Attachment C where questioning may proceed

without his detailed guidance but he expects to be consulted

about each topic. He pians to carefully tailor the elicitation

approach and, more importantly, to

set down detailed guidelines

to follow when the elicitation or questioning becomes nore

direct and concerned with those subjects considered, now or

later as revised, Crucial Questions. Anatole foresees a period

of relatively bland elicitation which will be followed by a

gradual sharpening of questions to the point where there will

be a confrontation or hostile interrogation. He also foresees

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another polygraph oxanination either before or after the

period of confrontation. The

method or approach to the

elicitation from NOSENKO is elaborated in Attachment C.

Anatole's recommendations about confrontation tactics will

follow after the results of the elicitation phase have been

analyzed. During the period NOSENKO is being asked to com-

ment initially, work on additional elicitation topics will

continue.

5. Anatole continues to express his concern about the

problem of an Agency penetration and his absolute belief

that there is a continuing need to strictly compartment as

many aspects of our research as possible and to restrict

knowledge about our continuing efforts and particularly the

details to get to the bottom of the NOSENKO case. He

emphasizes the need to severely limit dissemination of the

results of the elicitation from NOSENKO although he under-

stands it will be necessary to provide the results to the

FBI. He is concerned

about the dissemination of his KY tapes

and the possible implications since he now believes he may

have erred in outlining too many areas of concern in the

context of considering NOSENKO's bona fides. Anatole was

told the KY tapes have not yet been made available to the

SECHAT

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FBI but that, of course, he would be advised about any

proposal or decision to disseninate then.

6. In relation to the point about Anatole's concern

about knowledge of his infornation I told Anatole that it

would be necessary for him to comment in detail in the

future as he had recently on certain items. He was told

that, as he knew, we are at a stage in the NOSENKO case

where details such as the organizational assignments of

individuals and identifications and the number of leads

provided were tending to obscure the Crucial Questions

and divert our attention from the central problen oi why

NOSENKO would have been dispatched. I told Anatole quite

frankly there was a feeling he had not been fully cooperative

on the NOSENKO case. There was a belief that he should

furnish the details of his knowledge about individuals,

operations, the KGB, etc., so that others can try to judge

the accuracy or inaccuracy of NOSENKO's information.

Anatole was told that it would come as no surprise, to him to

learn that the fact he has not told everything he knows is

still a problem and that there may be some misunderstandings

since it is obvious his detailed knowledge has had and will

have a direct bearing on the NOSENKO case. Anatole firaly

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but amicably reaffirmed his position concerning cooperation

on the NOSENKO case. He said (a) it was obvious that

research to daze and collateral information supports his

position that NOSENKO is a dispatched agent; (b) that he

will continue to cooperate fully as he has when there has

been an exchange of informacion; (c) that he would not give

details now because to do so would result in a situation

where it is "Anatole against NOSENKO" and it is obvious that

more evidence than this is required for an objective conclusion

about NOSENKO; (d) that details will follow after research is

analyzed or during the process of analysis as we examine

information and the details are pertinent; (e) that it is

unnecessary for him at

this time to give additional details

atcut personnel or the KGB organization except when these

details reflect on major items -- overall these details are

not crucial and there is nothing to gain by considering snall

items and details. If, however, snall details becone a major

point such as in connection with KOVSHUK', CHURANOV, GUK'

GRYAZNOV then duging the review he will pinpoint the specific

and detailed contradictions. He reiterated his previous con-

ments pointed to the waste of time and diversion involved in

pursuing details and leads to recruitnents or persons of

interest to the KGB when there is nothing crucial or significant

involved.

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7. It was agreed I would neet with Anatole when the

first elicitation results are ready of when additional

pertinent research has been completed and there are papers

or ideas to discuss.

N. SCOTT MILER

DC/CI/SIG

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toe: 92) 94596657

DELHEI

., ATTACINENT B

NATOLE RO HOSENKO

CRUCIAL GULSTIONS

A. ANATOLE was consulted 31 March and 1 and 2 April 1909

concerning his

rocomendations on hor to proceed to clicit

additional

information Iron NOSENKO. ANATOLE offered specific.

topics and questions about which NOSENSO is to be questioned

after setting forth itens or topics which M'ATOLE considers

the CRUCIAL QUESTIONS which need explanation or resolution.

These CRUCIAL QUESTIOYS arc set forth below with conment or

notations which emerged during our discussions.

B. ANATOLE understands that the inmediate period of

clicitation fron NOSENKO is part of the program to attempt to

resolva the bona fides of NOSENKO. le understands that his

participation and contribution is actually the implenentation

of the progran he originally believed was to be followed

bofore thero were any conclusions about NOSENKO's bona fides.

ANATOLE had been reviewing his filo matorial and the transcripts

of his conments in January 1959 (The KY transcripts) so he

was prepared to discuss aspects of the CRUCIAL QUESTIONS as

well as spocific ciicitation topics. As our contribution to

the discussion with ANATOLE we had prepared 26 papers relating

specifically to NOSENKO and I had notes concerning other points

or topics to be discussed. Each paper vas read by ANAtoLe, he

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- Zi-

rctained

certain of thy

papers aud, as set forth below, he

conmented about certain of the papers or related natters.

After outlining the CRUCIAL QUESTICS we worked out an elici-

tation guido to be followed with NOSENSD as tho beginning of

the progran. The clicitation guido is detailed separately.

C. ANATOLE submits the following as his recommendation

about how to procoed wich NOSENKO:

1. Isolate the CRUCIAL QUESTIONS fOr Our guidance

and consideration. (He basically accomplished this 31 March

and 1 and 2 April although obviously these nay be revised)

2: Devise questions for elicitation. The questioning

of NOSENKO is to begin innediately and is to follow the pro-

ceduros set forth separately. (Tho initial phase of this was

• accomplished. Additional or revised clicitation topics or

questions will be considered when the results of the first

elicitation phase are revieved witi ANATOLE).

3. A polygraph exanination. (ANATOLE believes anothor

polygraph based on questions he will help frane will be ossential:

It is his opinion that it will be possible to nako the polygraph

neaningful if questions are based on a careful revier of the

results of the clicitation and specifically on the basis of

his inowleuge. ANATOLE believes it should be possible to uso

the polygraph effectively and to eliminate or explain nore

adequately tha qualifications concerning NOSENKO's veracity

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Lechr

such as "substantially truthful" by pinpointing questions

and areas where there remains downt. ANATOLE agreed there

night be a question of when a polygraph examination should

be adsinistered sinco it nighe be nore effectivo after tho

confrontation or hostile interrogation of NOSENKO.)

4. A hostilo/confrontation interrogation phase at

which time NOSENKO would be faced with the errors, incon-

•sistencies, falsehoods, otc. in his story and advised that

his nission failed. This phase of the approach to NOSENKO

would only be undertaken upon conclusion of tie clicitation

phase or if or when NOSENKO's attitude changes during the

elicitation phase. The confrontation would be undertaken

only when full research on cvery aspect of each CRUCIAL

QUESTION has been completed and specific questions are

framed with ANATOLE on the bagis of NOSENKO's information oI

answers and all collateral information. In this connection

ANATOLE expects continuing research on eack crucial question

so that each can be examined on the basis of a sunnary of all

inforsation about the question, the dotails of what NOSENKO

has said and related or collateral information such as

photographs or documents, etc. The hostile interrogation phase

ANATOLE anticipates will be undertaken only afier full consid-

eration of all possible problems. For examplo ANATOLE stresses

he will need to reviow the Bagley letter of November 1966 to "

MOSENKO since this will bo a key closent in considoring how to

proceed with the confrontation as sell as to attempt to determine

-Hat urs-90111

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satisfactorily answered all questions during the period

1967-68.

e. That it has not been possible and it may never

be possible to isolate or pinpoint either the exact inforna-

tion or the point in tine when NOSENKO was given new infor-

nation or additional inforsation which night be relevant

upon analysis to the question of his bona fides or his mission.

£. To date there has been a concentration on pre-

paring elicitation questions on the basis of infornation

obtained during 1967-68 period because (a) this is the infor-

nation Anatole has reviewed, and (b) this information has been

considered to be the standard for assessing NOSENKO and his

information and arriving at conclusions, since these inter-

views were designed to elicit information which would help

resolve discrepancies apparent in his previous statements,

and (c) at this time this information is better organized

. and in contrast to irfornation fron 1962, 1964, etc., is

retrievable as an accurate or literal NOSENKO statement.

g. That the sunaries and questionnaires prepared

to date nay not include every conment of statenent NOSENKO

has made during the 1967-68 period because it has not yet

been possible to isolate, by indexing and extraction, every

wen Preen dead at -11

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reference to a person or a topic. Anatole was told that

the sorting or isolation process has been completed only

through Nazorandum N-188, from a total of approxinately 260

memoranda. It was emphasized that nost topics and persons

were discussed with NOSENKO several tines at varying intervals,

and that the majority of topics were not covered to completion

in one or two interviews. NOSENXO also wrote memoranda on

topics which nay not have been covered during interview or

which may relate to interview topics but which have not yet

been correlated with the interviews.

h. That research and analysis on most topics is

incomplete, both with respect to collateral infornation and

previous statements from NOSENKO.

1. That, as Anatole knows, there is certain collateral

or related information such as information from the FBI con-

corning NOSENKO which has not been made available to him.

Anatole realizes this type of information may be vital to any

consideration of the NOSENKO case and he also points out the

possible if not probable relationship between FBI infornation

and sources and the problem of penetration of American intel-

ligence and Soviet disinformation. He hopes the FBI will

agree to release pertinent information to him and discuss

SECRET

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sources in the near future. He realizes any analysis or

assessment of the NOSENKO case will suffer to the extent

infornation is withheld fron hin. Anatole understands the

problem even though he obviously does not accept it as

logical or helpful. He stresses the need for us to press

the FBI to make appropriate information available to hin.

j. That information we are dealing with in the

transcripts of the 1967-68 NOSENKO interviews is not neces-

sarily information previously known to or discussed with

NOSENKO and that, for instance, the body of information re-

sulting from the 1967-68 information has been

expanded con-

siderably by NOSENKO's review of hundreds of names and

photographs provided him. It was also noted that it has not

yet been

possible to isolate topics new

tO NOSENKO about

which he was asked to comment during this period. Neither

have we been able to isolate or determine when in the past

new topics or questions of possible significance were intro-

duced to NOSENKO.

4. We discussed in detail Anatole's recommendations

and evolved an initial selection of Crucial Questions. (Attach-

ment B) and from these the first topics and/or questions to

begin in the new elicitation phase with NOSENKO (Attachment C).

:

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SECRET

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Anatole expects to review and comment and to frame additional

questions after he reviews the transcripts of the first

elicitations. He has requested and expects, is this can be

accomplished, to review and comnent about a summary of each

Crucial Question. The summary is to set forth both collateral

and NOSENKO information and detail, with attachments if neces-

sary, exactly what NOSENKO has said. Also, pertinent photo-

graphs and appropriate other documentation is to be attached

for comment or verification of identity by Anatole. Anatola

insists that he review and assist in the framing of all ques-

tions to be asked of NOSENKO and he states that he will

stipulate

the order of questioning by both topic and specific

question where appropriate. He will specify or indicate areas

as set forth in Attachment C where questioning may proceed

without his detailed guidance but he expects to be consulted

about each topic. He pians to carefully tailor the elicitation

approach and, more importantly, to set down detailed guidelines

to follow when the elicitation or questioning becomes more

direct and concerned with those subjects considered, now or

later as revised, Crucial Questions. Anatole foresees a period

of relatively bland elicitation which will be followed by a

gradual sharpening of questions to the point where there will

be a confrontation or hostile interrogation. He also foresees

SECRST

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another polygraph exanination either before or after the

period of confrontation.

The method or approach to the

clicitation from NOSENKO is elaborated in Attachment C.

Anatole's recomnendations about confrontation tactics will

follow after the results of the clicitation phase have been

analyzed. During the period NOSENKO is being asked to com-

nent initially, work on additional elicitation topics will

continue.

5. Anatole continues to express his concern about the

problem of an Agency penetration and his absolute belief

that there is a continuing need to strictly compartment as

many aspects of our research as possible and to restrict

knowledge about our continuing efforts and particularly the

details to get to the bottom of the NOSENKO case. He

emphasizes the need to severely limit dissemination of the

results öf the elicitation from NOSENKO although he under-

stands it will be necessary to provide the results to the

FBI. He is concerned about the dissemination of his XY tapes

and the possible implications since he now believes he nay

have erred in outlining too many areas of concern in the

context of considering NOSENKO's bona fides. Anatole was

told the KY tapes have not yet been made available to the

SECRET

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FBI but that, of course, he would be advised about any

proposal or decision to disseminate them.

6. In relation to the point about Anatole's concern

about knowledge of his infornation I told Anatole that it

would be necessary for him to conment in detail in the

future as he had recently on certain items. He was told

:

that, as he knew, we are at a stage in the NOSENKO case

where

details such as the organizational assignments of

individuals and identifications and the number of leads

provided were tending to obscure the Crucial Questions

and divert our attention from the central problen of why

NOSENKO would have been dispatched. I told Anatole quite

frankly there was a feeling he had not been fully cooperative

on the NOSENKO case. There was a belief that he should

furnish the details of his knowledge about individuals,.

operations, the KGB,. etc., so that others can try to judge

the accuracy or inaccuracy of NOSENKO's information.

Anatole was told that it would come as no surprise to him to

learn that the fact he has not told. everything he knows is

still a problen and that there nay be some misunderstandings

since it is obvious his detailed knowledge has had and will

have a direct bearing on the NOSENKO case. Anatole firnly

SECRET

dalzasi talanistadrãl de dr doeo natácde egtrgicroden md eao

..

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but amicably reaffirmed his position concerning cooperation

on the NOSENKO case.

He said (a) it was obvious that

research to daie and collateral information supports his

position that NOSENKO is a dispatched agent; (b) that he

will continue to cooperate fully as he has when there has

been an exchange of infornation; (c) that he would not give

details now because to do so would result in a situation

where it is "Anatole against NOSENKO" and it is obvious that

more evidence than this is required for an objective conclusion

about NOSENKO; (d) that details will follow after research is

analyzed or during the process of analysis as we examine

information and the details äre pertinent; (e) that it is

unnecessary for him at this time to give additional details

atcut personnel or the KGB organization except when these

details reflect on major items -- overall these details are

not crucial and there is nothing to gain by considering snall

items and detsils. If, however, small details become a major

paint such as in connection with KOVSHuX, CHURANOV, Guk and.

GRYAZNOV" then during the review he will pinpoint the specific

and detailed contradictions. He reiterated his previous com-

ments pointed to the waste of time and diversion involved in

pursuing details and leads to recruitments of persons of

interest to the XGB when there is nothing crucial or significant

involved.

MOAIRRT

Zariaaão dãe dieroriao d dedaara mie eaud oatia

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SEORLi

jineg

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7. It was agreed I would neet with Anatole when the

first elicitation results are ready or when additional

pertinent research has been completed and there are papers

or ideas to discuss.

N. SCOTT MILER

DC/CI/SIG

dedarcésmiado draca gis en trado eo ezire dcreio

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DELMEI

,ciie

.., ATTACHMENT B

MAYOLE Re ROSENKO

CRUCIAL QUESTIONS

Л.

ANTOLE was consulted 31 Murch and 1 and 2 April 1969

concerning his recomnendations on hor to proceed to clicit

additional information fron MOSENKU. ANATOLE offered specific.

topics

and questions about which NOSENKO is to bo questioned

after setting forth items or topics which NiATOLE considers

the CRUCIAL DUESTIONS which need explanation or resolution.

These CRUCIAL QUESTIONS are set forth below with conment or

notations which emerged during our discusgions.

. ;

B. MATOLE understands that the inmediate period of

clicitation from NOSENKO is part of the program to attempt to

resolve the bona fides of NOSENKO. He understands that his

participation and contribution is actually the iuplementation

of the program he originally believed was to be followed

bofore there were any conclusions about NOSENKO's bona fides.

ANATOLE had been reviewing his filo natorial and the transcripts

of his consents in January 1959 (The KY transcripts) so he

was prepared to discuss aspects of the CRUCIAL QUESTIONS aS

well as specific clicitation topics. As our contribution to

the discussion with ANATOLE we had prepared 26 papars relating

specifically to NOSENKO and I had notes concerning other points

or topics to be discussed. Each paper vas read by ANATole, he

•.:.

Tawdr:210atrarttedtrge tngeite. nludips taécoia

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reinined certain of the papors aud, as set forth below, he

commented about certain of the papers or rolated sattars.

MIrcr outlining the CRUCIAL QUESTIONS we vorked out an elici-

tation quide so be followed wich MOSENKO as tho beginning of

the progran. The clicitation guide is dotailed separately.

C. ANATOLI subnits the following as his iccommendation

about how to proceed with MOSENKO:

1. Isolato the CRUCIAL QUESTIO'S fOr our guidance

and consideration. (He basically accomplished this 31 March

and l and 2 April although obriously these nay be revised)

2. Devise questions for elicitation. The questioning

Of HOSENKO is to begin inaediately and is to follow the pro-

ceduros set forth separatoly. (Tho initial phase of this was

accomplished. Additional or rovised clicitation topics or

questions will be considered when the results of the first

elicitation phase are reviered wich ANATOLE).

3. A polygraph exanination. (ANATOLE believes another

polygraph based on questions he will help frane will be ossential.

It is his opinion that is will be possible to nake tho polygrapa

neaningful if questions are based on a careful revier of the

results of the clicitation and specifically on the basis of

his knowleuge. MiATOLE believes it should be possible to uso

the polygraph effectively and to eliminate or explain nore

adequately the qualifications concorning NOSENTO's veracity

---

## Page 25

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such as "substantially truthful" by pinpointing quastions

and areas

where

there remains doubt. NATOlE igreed thore

night be a question of when i polygraph examination should

be adainistered sinco it nighe be vore effoctivo after tha

confrontation of hostile intorrogation of lOSENKO.)

4. A hostilo/confrontation intorrogation phase at

which tine NOSENXO would be faced with the errors, incon.

sistencios, falsehoods, otc. in his story and advised that

his nission failed. This phase of the approach to NOSENKO

would only bo undertaken upon conclusion of tie clicitation

phase of if or when NOSENKO's attitude changes during the

elicitation phase. The confrontation would be undertaken

only khen full research on cvery aspect of each CRUCIAL

QUESTION has been completed and specific questions are

framed with ANATOLE on the basis of NOSENKO's information or

answers and all collateral infornation. In this connection

ANATOLE expects continuing rosearch on each crucial question

so that each can be exanined on the basis of a summary of all

inforsation about the question, the details of what NOSENKO

has said and related or collateral information such as

photographs or

documents, etc. The hostile interrogation phase

ANATOLE anticipates will be undertaken only after full consid-

eration of all rossible problems.

For examplo ANNTOLE stresses

he will nood to revier the Ragley letter of November 1966 to

NOSENKO since this will be a ley eleceit in considering how to

proceed ith the confrontation

as vell as to atterpt to determine

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what influence that lotter has had on lüSEnko during tho 67-68

interrious.

D. It was necessary to caphusize io AÑATOLE the fact

that at this tino it is not pussiblo sor e to assire hii that

averything rOSENKo nas salu

on any topic has been recoverod

ur is retrievabla even for the intorvier period of 1967-1969

(and 09). joting the papors ue had proparei MiATOLE hai to

bo told thero ras no assuranco that everytzing MOSENKO has

said was includod or considorod when attenpting to extract

or sunnarize his statements about a person or event. Specif-

Ically it was noted that with a fow exceptions no topic or

iten is: fully covered during one or two interviows. Even

though NATOLE recognized tha problen based on his rovier of

tho transcripts of tho 1967-69 interviews it was necessary

to euphasize the fact that the validity of any given question

we had franod might bo challenged, roversed or modified es tho

process of indering the transcripts continued. ANATOLI was

told that as of 31 Karch 1909 we had been ablo to indox and

extract the transcripts and monoranda of the 1967-68 interviews.

only through t-188 of approxinately 260 M-menoranda. ANATOLE

also ras told it 1s not possiblo to be certain thai all previous

infornation fron NOSENKO can be accuratcly and fully recovered.

For this rcason it is difficult if not inpossible to isolate

what ho night havo saiù in 1964 anu/or 1905 and couparc that

....

---

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•statenent with mat ho said in 1008. AarolE also acknowledged

noting the possible significance of the intorvion schniques

as these lave varied over the years. Contrast in tho technique

and tho approach to joselio thero, for example, ho is provided

inforsation or

asiod oniy to confira a loading question has

tended to diluto if not obscura what MoSEliO actually has

had to say about many suojects; at this stage it nay be

viitually inpossiblo to distinguish HOSENKO's original infor-

nation fron subsaquent statenants modified as a result of

questioning. This probien is an inportant consideration

bocauso the approach to the olicitation phase was developed

with this in pind. Essentially it was agrood wich MintolE

that despito previous statenonts or information fron NOSENiO

the alicitazion phaso would be managed to attempt to obtain

frOM NOSENKO overything he has to offer or say about each

CRUCIAL QUESTION at this tino without referenco to any previous

statenent. It is ANATOLE's opinion that if NOSENKO provides

a'full statenent without prompting that further questioning

can bo meaningful aftor analysis of his statement despite

the possivility NOSENTO has nodifiod or revised his infornation

as he has learned of apparently learned what he thinks is

wanted of he should say. MATOLE Delicres the fundamental

problen renains and that despite HOSENKO's twists and turns

it will be possible to sort through the various stories to

focus on the reason for NOSEND's disgutch and dotermine the

---

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wwsemarwastsa@sossrienegeritenidtrenppiishoin9tahtXtport5.topaseoniat.itr9/Greresttydosi492dr3towe.6u

• !

SECRET

-6-

Key itcas of diversion.

E. In roply tO ANATOLE's question le vas told that the

FBl continued to

intorview NUSENKD usually with Mr. Solie

present but that I did not know in advance anything about the

topics of any interviows:

I told LüTOLE it was ny opinion

that once clicitation éroa iOSLNiO began on the basis of his

reconnendations that other interviors would stop. le

recognized and agread that there nigit be a tactical and/or

psychological problon with NOSENKO by shifting tho interviow

techrique to clicitation rather than consultation and a

response to questionirg. AlATOLE could not eaphasizo too

stronglg- the need to let NOSENKO respond fully with nininal

prodding or stizulation and nithout scireshing his neaory:

ANATOLE was told it was ny understanding the elicitation

phass would be conducted by Mr. Solie without FBI partici

pation alchough i did tell ANATOLE

that tho clicitazion trars-

cript results would undoudtedly be siven to the FBI just as

have the results of all the 1967-69 intervians.,

F. N'ATULE expects and recomends that the period of

elicitation will be followed by tha period of intorrogation

or confrontation to be conducted by a tean of threo persons -

Tho security expert, lir. Solic; a counterintelligence spacialist

ino knows relaioù cases and CI problcas, and a Soviet specialist.

---

## Page 29

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ANATOLE says this team approach will be recessary to inplement

a fast moving interrogation, based on the script he will help

icvise, which will not permit sOSE:k0 tino to reflect or

think about his ansvers. The tactic will be to insisi on

innediate and full ansivers and LATOLE insists that once the

new elicitation phase begins lOSENKO not be normitted to

write ay answers: He is not to be given any written assiga-

ments: every response and reply is to be ural and transcribed

and NOSENiO nust be encouraged and permitted to respond fully:.

he is not to be asted to confira or dony any staionent nor is

ho to be assisted in replying to any question with suzgestions

or reminders.

G. AiATOLE recognizes the problen of infornation fron

FbI sources and the release of this infornation to hin. lic

respecis the FBI need to protect its sources and undersiands

the rsI attitude even though he quite obviously disagrees. He

believes that our failure to nake rclevant infornation available

to hin is shortsighted and lessens both his effectiveness and.

our ability to decipher the NOSENiO puzzle faster. MATOLE

recalls that at the time NOSENO defected in 1964 and there

was discussion with the FRI about the SASHA lead and related

matters he asked for FBI file and source infornation pertinert

to the probleas. ANATOLE continues to believe there probably

---

## Page 30

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&-

is a serious question about the possible significance of

POSENKO to penetrat' ir of the FBl and the bona fides of FBI

sourcos in terms of misinfornation (disintoriation) in

rclation to both MOStKO and othei infornation. lic is of

tie opinion that a FBI source(s) probably cane to tuc PDI

aftor his dofection and porhaps after

"OSBUnd's contact if

not dispatch in 1961. He suggests the possibility there nay

be a false arrest and show trial of a Fil source in order to

further bolster WOSENKO's story. Although it has not been

possible to discuss this aspect of the MOStlkO story with

ANATOLE it scems clear that if we are to gain full nossure

STOM ANATOLE it will be necessary for the FBI to approve

or conduct a briefing of ANATOlE appropriate to puting a

porspective on the FBI sources so he can assess what they

have said about NOSENKO and COLITZY!!.

1. The following are the CRUCIAL CUFSTIONS which

are to;

forn the basis for elicitation fron NOSENKO. They are set

forth in the order discussed.

1. Misinfornation in the Second Chief Hirectorate (SCi)

(This is an inmediato topic for elicitation as set forth separately)

2. Leadorship of the KGB

3:

Leadership of tlie First Chief Directorate (FCi))

1. Loadership of thie SCh

5. SHELEPIN'S 1959 Rejort

(This topic will be discussed

=ST

•

---

## Page 31

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nore thoroughly with MiNTOli beforo the question is raisod

with HOSENKO again. MINTOLE vas emphatic in stating that it

had been a mistake to raiso the subject of the XGb policy and

1959 icorganization with NOSLiKO. He road the pager with

attachrents but deforred comment except to note that HOSENKO

had said very little of significance. It was at this tine

that ANATOLi first notod it was a nistake to pernit YOSENKO

to write menoranda. ANATOLE obviously considers this aspect

of the HOSENKO case most important and a topic which requires

his study particularly in view of the fact lo now has extracts

from the GOLENIENSKI letters which relate to the 1959 KGB

reorganization and disinformation. ANATOLE also did not recall

tho book so it will be necessary to make cortain he has a

copy.)

G. Penetration of the American Embassy Moscow

(ANATOLE considers this a most important topic which requires

additional study and elicitation lator after research will

pernit us to assess NOSENKO's statements rapidly. ANATOLE

reiterates his concern that it is exactly and specifically

in this area that NOSENKO's reassurance of no KGB successes

is nost likely diversion. MATOLE expressed his concern that

in January ho may have commenteil too extensively

and theoret-

ically about this problen. lic noir wants to re-exanine this

probler and refocus everyone back wore preciscly to NOSENNO

and his story)

---

## Page 32

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--.

SEGRET

-lU-

lenetration ut ClA (This is a topic for later

elicitation fron MosEuko.)

8. VASSALL Case CUMIDLE believes HOSEiKO should

be asial to reconstruct completoly in detail everything he

knows about the VASSALl case: tines, sources, officers, ctc.,

at on?

taped

session. Siuultaneously ANATOLE says ve should

construct a complote chronology of everything dOSEiKo

has said about the VASSAll case since June 1962, including

the questions of conments put to HOSENKO about VASSALL. An

analysis comparison of these two papers will follow.

ANATOLE proposes

it may be possible to denonstrate

ho:: a possible penetration of CIA could have precluded NOSENXO's

safety fron 1962 to 1964. This nay assist us to solve our

problem and also be ultinately useful in confronting HOSENKO

•on the point of his dispatch and apparent innunity.

9. Doris BELITSKIY Caso (ANATOLE approved elicitation

:. and questioning on the basis of the sumnary and questionnaire.

• ANATOLE stresses the need to confine the questioning to the

questionnaire and tho fact that KOSEND is not to bo given

additional infornation about the case, its origins, ctc.,

cither as we knew it of now know it from ANATOLE. There will

be sone tie-in to the elicitation about Vladinir Luovich ARTEMOV

and Aleksandr Konstantinovich KISLOY but other than the questions

as set forth in the papers NiTOlE revicued there should be so

questions asted which brief OSBi? or relate the three or

any other persons.

---

## Page 33

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мамуий ло унтс вишиних мінсисно

.ore

-11-

NATOLE needs a photograph of ARTENOY to nake certain

of identification and he needs photos others in tho dolegation

with BELITSKIY to try to dotermine if there were other KGB

officors in the delagation who night have been in on: the case

or the disinfornation aspect)

10. The 1960 period Of NOSENKO's carcer.

This is to be an elicitation topic later after ve

have suanarized what we can about NOSENKO's story of this

period. In reply to ANATOLE's question based on his review

of the paper HOSENKO Timetable and Associates I told ANATOLE

the researcher had found it impossible to date to sort out

and isolate NOSENKO'S 1967-63 statenents about his career

during the period 1960 to 1962. ANATOLE was told this was

obviously a priority job but that it just had been an in-

possible task without additional rosearch and analysis. We

•. will discuss this fully when the isolation is completed and

• in conjunction with other topics.

11. Vadin Viktorovich KOSOLAPOV 's lovenber 1960 trip.

This iten is for later elicitation after nore

rescarch is completed about the code cleris, perhaps a reinves-

tigation to sake positive identifications, etc. ANATOLE asked

if KoSOLIPOV's trip to Copenhagen was confired (N-167 pg. 16)

and I told hin I thought it was under a differant name.

ANATOLE would like details.

TRET

---

## Page 34

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12.

The robert lee Joursch case.

MATOLE considerS

this an

irportant aspect

of

NOSEUKO's throw-away material. He again quostions my tho

SCD would lend technicians to the FCJ and wants ROSENKO to

caplaii this in detail as oll as to sully detail again ho,

fros shoi, cic. NOSEiKO learned of this casc. MINTOLE is

of the opinion now questions can lo aslied but agreed to defer

clicitation on

this case prinarily because I pointed out

that in 1965 a paper was written setting forth apparont

inherent security seainesses in the dohnson case some of which

at least suggosted strongly that, in addition to Johnson's

lack of access at one tine, the kCe could have anticipated

a blow at any monent. I outlinod sone of the points I recall

about the weaknesses of tho principals and quite frankly I

told NATOLE that I doubted that anyone currently of the opinion

NOSENKO is bona fide would be any nore inclined to crodit the

1965 paper today than he has in the past. I agreed that it

mighü be usoful to again atteapt to got NOSENKO's story about

the JOHNSON case when this story would be exclusively NOSEYKO's.

13. Aleksey Mikhaylovich GORBATENKO.

ANATOLE wants NOSENKO to toll in detril cverything

he linows about GORBATENKO. MATOLE notes the 1955 pronotion is

a key elcrent but stresses so sention of this is to be nade

tO HOSENÃO. Despite previous sentions of GORBATENKO, which

should be collated, NOSENiO is to restate overything completely.

J2ST

slanage xüte.5z

20. ...,

-

3,2

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## Page 35

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14. Serafin Likalayevich LYALID

Elicitation about LYlli is to follon lator.

111 reforences to LYMIN DY MOSENIO should be collated with

collateral infornation about hin. If there 1s a potograph

Of LYALIN, ANATOLE Wants to

see it to verify any MOSENKO

identification.

15.. Vladislav Hikhaylovich KOVSHUK. ANATO!.!:

considers NOSENKO's infornation about XOVSHUK nost important

as a lator clicitation point. He does not want NOSENKO asked

any questions about KOVSHUk which nay relate to KOVSHUK's

tzip to tho U.S.A. or KOVSHUK's association with KISLOV. If

NOSENKo in cranection with detailing the biographios of his

friends includos any of this about KOVSHUk he is NOT to be

questioned on this watter of about the vonan troublo previously

mentioned.

ANATOLE needs exact datos KOVSHUK was in the u.s.

and any details of activities he can be given fron FBI reporting.

In connuction with our discussion about KOVSHUK possibly working

with and associating with journalists MiATOLE said he recalled

an incident which he thinks took place in 1959 whon he net

KOVSHUK on the street not far from the KGB offices when KOVSUK

signalled him not to speak. ANATOLE did not and observed

KOVStuk meet a Soviet journalist in an apparent agent type necting.

SECRET

• :

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## Page 36

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MiATOLE said ho had forgotten this incident and he never spoke

to KOVSHUK about it. ANATOLE cannot recall the name of the

journalist bit said he recalls inoring hin slightly. No will

try to recall the nane.

(Hote for Sil checl:: did KOVSiUk per

NOSENKO work vs. Anericans with journalists and specifically

Ed Stevens?)

16. Eugene Peter SEREBRENNIKOV.

MiTOLE says what NOSENKO has said is clear

but that this needs full research and analysis - what he said

contrasted with what NOSENKO said and what SERESRENNIKOV said -

before asking NOSENKO about this again.

17. Alaz BROCHES Case

ANATOLE was told this lead information was being

roviered in dotail. That thore was some apparent confusion

and possibly nisinterpretation of nisunderstanding about his

lead information.

ANATOLE reiterated his point that the KGB wanted

to scestablish relations which had been broken after BROCHES

left France. ANATOLE knows about this fron reading ZARUBIN

paper and he knows that the KGB wanted to talk to ZARUBIN

about this.

ANATOLE said that iie would leave the decision

about when NOSENKO would be asked about BROCHES again to Si -

it could ic innediately when the revicw was completed of later.

The review is in process and we will have to sec what FBI

nay have asked roceatly.

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## Page 37

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18. Vilitor KOPLYKIN. A later topic.

19.

The CHENPANGS Papers

MATOLE stressos the importanco of this case

but says this nust be a later topic for lOSiNKO probably in

Intercogation although it say be useful to have NOSENKO

revion his knowlouge azain in detail bofore confrontation.

ANATOLE referred to the neod to analyze

the results of the BONDEN investigation before procoeding too

far with lOSiNKO.

In this connection MATOLE was told Stato

Security was securely organizing this investigation and that

• it was currently planned that interviers would commenco with

BONDEN first including mention to BOWDEN about his nention

in the CHEREPANOV papers. In response to ANATOLE's question

ho was told that to my knowledge the fbI did not yot know

about the BOWDEN investigation since to dato it vas a State

Departnent inquiry based on a need to clarify certain possible

problens. ANATOLE said that he saw CHERGPANOV aftor CHEREPANOY

had transferred to the Anerican Embassy Section vearing a

Li. Col, military uniform. MiNTOLE said this was unusual and

it suggests to hin that CHEREPANOV was ongaged in an operation,

perhaps a contact posing as a nilitary beginning in 1959.

He said CHEREPANOY had is

a constant companion a young san in

the Anerican Department but AINTOLE Cannot recall the young

man's nans. (ATOLE suggests later HOSENKO be asked if

GENERADY MOre a S mifora unionho was his companion.

---

## Page 38

-

warne bone

Sachel.

- 16-

probably in operations.) I told intole I did not inow if

NOSEi0 had named any friends of CHEREPLOV but would check

for naneS. ANATOLE said he recaile also thors was a big

change in CHEREPANOV's attitudo and denaanor boareen carly

1950 to nid - 1960 o5, sore probably, Dec. 1ó0 whea

ANATOLE ser therepanov again. MATOLE said he can only

interprat that CiEREPAYOV was in a better sood, nore confident

in personality because he nay have had sone operational

SUCCOSS. NATOLE is Of the opinion that ClEREPAidy's chango

in duneanor and nood could only rclate to Anerican Embassy

operations.

20. The

Case

ANATOLE says this is not Ically a crucial

question although an important case winich needs resolution

eventually along lines sea forth in the paper loSEro -

Homosecual Asuects but noz on the basis of the ionosexual

angle (see separate ciscussion re honosexual aspects).

21. The TOPOV and PERKOVSKlY Cases

MAIGLE Juys both of these cases should be delayed

until later. They raquire special consideration and more

research and discussion. Ve are not ready now to delve into

those and it is his opinion he may have tonica to obscure sose

of the points about doSENto by daving parallels hith PENROVS.IY

in January, lo bolicies there ar parallels and a relationshi?

...

""?.

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## Page 39

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and ve should continuo to exanine all aspects of the cases

but he concedes a better baso of understanding should be laid

before it vill he possiblo to male a neaningful tie to

• NOSINNO.

?.

SSOPET

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22. KOSSKO's Friendship with GUk: CHURIOK, KOVSHuKe etc:

MATOLE cronasized the need to get fron lOSENKO complete

details about his friends or clained friends. ANATOLE agreed

with the line of inquiry outlined in the paper "Knowledge Because

of Association with other KGB Officers' and said elicitation

should include infornation sufficient to give lis in one place

a, perspective on NOSENKD's associates and friends. This topic

can be covered immediately. ANATOLE stresses real inportance

of fusi, Kovshur and Churanov to NOSENKO. le notes Guk's wife

was the daughter of a minister and asks if NOSENKO could hare

introduced them. He also points out'chiPA'V in school with

NOSENKO.

23g

Lead.

• ANATOLE agreed elicitation on this topic should megin

immediately and was most interested in the possihle significance

of this case vis a vis disinfornation. lie noted, of course, the

different perspective on the case and that apparently when this

case was considered in the context of support to NOSENKO's bona

fides analysis had not taken into account the actual origins

and development of the case. ANATOLE innediately connected the

SLAVACHENSKIYA angle to the PENKOVSKIY case and speculated that

the KGБ na, have been attempting to establish a separate

ostensibly confirratory source to the FRI to holster PENKOVSKIY

SEBIST

1

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## Page 41

rapin magistrate 37h49356774-9

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who was in contact with the british and Cli. AVATOLE conhasized

his view that Nosevin should not be given a hint about the actual

beginnings of the case to prevent MOSENKO from nodifying his story

or being led to explanations. NOSEYkO should rotell his account

of ther

case and then be asked the questions listed

without confrontation or explanation.

24.

(Ses:-29 - This a later tonic) MATOLE requests

everything available about GINSRiRG and specifically ererything

NOSEIKO has ever sald. After the research AVATOLE thinks he

can spot sonething in connection with GINSPUr which is significant

but which he says eludes hin at this cime.

25. The Military Attache Incident. (s

бекі ми кліти йо ові но ільни

ANATOLE stresses importance again as he did in XY

transcripts. le persists in thinking there may be more here

than we

have covered - that one of the MA's may have been re-

cruited or soreone else was recruited and advised about the trio.

lie refers to d-32,

and maintains this incident needs reexamination

and that probably after research the Attaches should be questioned

again. ANATOLE says it his recollection that the Koß knew

exactly the device they vere looking for: that the ke? did not

have a detection device which could have heon effective and that

the use of a lor wich lookod lite a detection machine vas staged

some area sor

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## Page 42

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-20-

to cover up fnct 163 ineir exactly vere to find the devica and

want it sas. He says his recolisction is that tnß lnew where

to 100l: and there was no search or runitorin?. They just vent

to the risto place. This ecals to d'aTOLE a lunan sot a nachlne

source. He says questioning inseiko about this can only follow

rescarch.

'::

+ -085 75 anadens

(A'ATOLE asked if the rofomation about the Iapanese

Colonel in intelligence had been reported to the Japanese and

what was the outcone. AlATOlE las told I did not krow - would

check.)

26.

ANATOLE wns interested in this fut we did not dwell

isigosa

•aeioa

on this subject. A'ATOLE helieva it a give may diversion

although probably true. Decision re aidizional elicitation to

be nade bj sil on basis tine and framing questions.

27. Microphones in American Enhassy

ANATOLE still suggests revier this information from

NOSENKO and requestioning particularly to establish exactly

what SOSENK0 said when and if he said anything about so?:!??

riing. Dacisior: re timing of questioning by sil.

2ô. MATKIYS - Canadina Mbnosador Case.

MATOLE thinks it necossary dosauin retell in detail

cverythina de knovs ahout vATiliS in sano uny le to be astod

anut vassall. Tren it will bo recessar: line rut and compare

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## Page 43

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internatings par-tre

-127

- 21-

exactly what AYATOll said and mat dosevkn said. ATATOlE points

out importance of carly information from (oS5º5) hefore he was

Piren

background

inforation or leading questions. ANATOLE

thinks this

can begin carly in clicitation or he done later.

Decision re tining by sil.

(AVATOLE thinks it might he helpful for hin to revier

Miat COSEYKO has said about Svetiana STALTIA ALETLUEVA-

This is speculative hut ANATOLE recalls or was told YOSENKO

should or did inox something aud he thin's there may be sone

clue here about NOSENin's associates, friends, etc., possihly

of importance.)

29. Code Clerks = 59-62

ANATOLE again emphasizes his need to see a full review

of results of investigation of all the code clerk cases.

He is

convinced there may be a case here and that the clues have been

missed or overlooked. lie says he cannot recall the necessary

detail and that it is only when he can be stimulated with names,

dates, etc., that he nay be able to pinpoint sone angle of

sigrificance. ANATOIE was told we were also bothered about these

cases - that nuch work had been done but that, quite frankly, I

could! not

estinate how long it would tale to assemble the information

for orderly revier. A'NTOLE was told this is on the agenda - it

is a matter or tino and pepple. Any questioning of loSENko about

these cases can only he done liter.

-seT

---

## Page 44

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NATOlE said it would le nerossary to research and

collate all tie information about clA officers and operations

in coscow including visiines, i.c.. Thiors, to get a picture

of their activitios, associates, Kh? officers they met and

operationnl activities which night have made then vulnerable.

NATOLE opines NoSEyin should tror more specifics about this and

that later it will be accossar: to question him with specifics

during the confrontation stage after comparing late elicitation

results with collateral details.

31. 1 code Cler, in Anerican Inbassy with Spanish Languare

or Spanish Background.

MiATnLE noted the reference in the paper re Vladimir

Lovich ARTSOV to NOSENIO's information that ARTENDY knew Spanish

and said there might he a connection to sonethin, he vaguely

recalled alinut

an interest in or a case against an American code

¡clert of Spanish backgrcund or who spole Spanish.

ANATOLE

said the period was 1957-60. He could not recall dotails. Ha

sald this should he considered a special case for him to lori on

now for later questioning of NOSEND if research Indicated this

necessary. AiATOLE requested for revier any information availahle

se codo cloris, civilian or military, in ioscow 57-60 with Sparish.

language or bacterone.

SURET

оВал, оспостй, ані йс

---

## Page 45

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1-.

1....

-23

AvATole agrood that the questions to VARiousleY should

le ashod of costin during tire

first elicitation stores.

ANATOLE

was concerned that tsEYko not be given any inlication me oir

current special interest in VARUSHeV. (S" HOTE: Guestion

• I

adeleted fron paragranh 11 by Si! on basis

unnecessary

en reviewing paget vith diathlr. ie, of course,

asked about

band was tolder

Dias til sane shin once with

wAkRUSIE and researcher had included quostion becaused

had high Us lovernment contacts including sone carly 1950 vorl:

on l.S. intelligence connunity reviers.)

A specific question d'ATOLE asted las about any collateral

or documentary infomation thai VANIPUSlEY attended the Institute

• of Foreign Relations. He also asked if there vere photographs

of VARRUSHE's wifc(s) availahle and if dosen lad identified

then. He would like to, see them too. (SM HOTE: See 12 August

1954 interview).

ANATOlE thinks there nay be a significant asnect about .

NoSEito's schooling and VANiRuStiAV's schooling which nesds checking.

M'ATOLE is speculating on possibility N5ail0 was in Milltary

Institute of Foreign Languages. I had to answer ANATOLE thai I

did not know if there was ary collateral proof that tasteiD was

a cindert at the Institute of Foreiga Interrational Pelations

tut soul ciece. AlATOli projoets this noint on the locical

---

## Page 46

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- 2.1-

progression u costito's schooling in tie military and probability

that higher education would have been under military unless sore

special fanily or riner influence permittri change. Me also notes

insPiko's continuation in Neval Service and confirms he saw

voseiko in cary uniform in larch 1953 in KGB lidas.

AVATOLE suggests this aspect be reexamined after

elicatinda light of Nostrio's answers

and

information about

VATHPUS:IEV and sUSLor, who was in Institute of Forcien relations.

ANATOLE SayS CURY vas in Foreia Felations Institute and that

Cui was in ''llltary Institute. ANATOLE speculates this may bo

arca where NOSENKo is hiding his close relationship with ful: -

that he night have first known duk in the Milltary Institute although

GUk a couple of years older than NoSENED. Suk worked in GRIl

will

but ANATOLE does not remember if Navy. AlATOLE says he/consider :

futher clicitation later and also a surnrise question on new

polygraph about NOSENKO's attendance at the Military Institute.

A. The paper NOSEYiO's Defection

was read by A'ATOLE

with interest. I did not have 2 copies of this paper. AlATOLE

was told a copy would be furnished hin at next reeting. Certain

conments which follow are based on infornation from this paper

but a specifie comment hy INATOLE was (see para 2 page 2 of paper):

It is true ISYMPAl, was a

forner renber of department.

It is illorical that ISY'PAL vas transferred to the Illegal

nirectorate and more illogical he would travel with the delegation

if lie were bead of the Illegals Directorate. As head of the 1th

FORET

---

## Page 47

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...:::

- 2.5

repartnent le bould ne with the delegatina bit norantiv and

logically tire inuld le no pixiao of local aad 1lleral clements.

The kon lould not permit any publicity oo identification of

TSYCAL 1E be were hond of the Illegals. d'ATOlE can only conclude

this information

is to create tie impressin of renreamlantion.

after his defection.

B. ANATOLE also points ont the illoric aspect of a

Tourist Dapartsent officer as security officer to such a delegation.

lie also notes that when sening officials such as partyko travel

there are specially assigned expert security officers with their

delcantions it anv are sent at all. lie notes that for the nost

part the senior officials travel without security officers except.

assimned such as would be the situation MoStlo

protective experts

describes.

AVITOLE says a basic question for confrontation will

be abous the inclusion of a "speclal security officer" in a

delegation such as one hoaded by the foreign "inister. He says

the inclusion of a porson such as NOSpiRo is very unusual. The

Foreign Minister and his aldes, etc., are trusted nen who go

- abroad regularly. These are always experienced ko? officers

on the operations in support of the delegations and the planning

is kell in advance. These officers can handle anything. At a

later date AlATOLE says we can confront MosFy with this

oposite position from ANATOLi:.

ARET

---

## Page 48

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-26-

C. MAlola sald the story about casuit's role with

Saw just gives a reason to us ahout vy NOSENtO was in

Geista.

There would he no reason for asy specinl interest by

10s5:50. The residentura could and sould handle any technical

devices and operations such as NOSElin describes.

ANATOLE found this connection and final drinking hout Interesting

and said bot! Gui and KREPtOGaRSilY ould troy ihat SOSFAt)'s

mission was in 1962. I coulu provide so infomation shout

KOLPROGORSKIY and ANATOLE asked to see photo of kREpOcopSklY.

nothing he could not rocall name.

E.

ANATOLE asked for Information aboute

(SY TOTE: S!! needs

check significance - where in "YOSTYSO - Defection" paper.y What

HOSENKO Say, ctc.).

F. ANATOLE SayS a later question SOSENTO should be

arkedpuny in 1902 he rejected the idea of using his position

in the Tourist Department as the lorical position from which he

could keep in contact with MIS, i.e., a tourist sent to be

recruited by NOSENKO, eic.

33. Personnel

of lat section, Ist

Deat: 1950 - 61

ANATOLE believes this vill be inportant area for lazer

clicitation and, perhaps, confrontation after se lars mportunity

to analyse crarythin 1nsei% says vs the collateral and aNATOlE's

trporation.

It will be recossary in research this.

---

## Page 49

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ATTOLE suggests de doiie carch tie dobricfing of

alout Mostro's aapronel and reexarine get background

and what he has been doing to see if there is anything which

looks significant now, i.c., anything inportant given hindsight

and more inforration.

34.

The Maurice Do

Jean Case

AviTOle said it was inporiant to line out in quotes

by date everything that INSENKO said ahout De Jean and do the same

for the information fron Yurly. Vasilyevich...

KAOTKOV. These

should then be lined out and chronclogically compared with what

AN'TOLE said. On the basis of these conclusions and the time

sequence we should rem cramine the problen of the leakage of lead

information to iry to got indicationant least of hoi, shy and

Where ANATOLE's infornation leaked. AMATOLE said we should also

consider the possible problem of Icalage in connaction with the

KATRIN's Case and the RCHP in this. le also notes that

GRIFAHOV'S

role and visit to Paris may be important so wica MoSEvka responds

to questions about GRIBANDY we should exanine this aspect also.

Specifically, NOSENKO should comment about why GRIMANOV went to

Paris.

35. DESHK BAG GPIRINON

In connection viti discussions about GetRisor and bis

trip in 106l, we discussed the wishier case ard Althll was told

ti: follerira

re chroaclery.

Try-

---

## Page 50

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15 January MOOriKe In Genera from Paris:

1 Feb (Oll belloves) GRIPinY arrives paris fron Vienna -

+sa4+9+94574-172370

rapinio defects.

7 Fel, MoIBAiCY coparts Paris for Vienna (CRIMINO! uses

none CORiNaY in Vienna and wich BUSllK.)

12 Feb Soviets in Switzerland strongly protest to swiss

about MoSENko's defection.

11. Feh (mayhe 13 Feh.) GRINAVOV, according to PUSHrk,

relaxed about "SENio defection when

pusink raised question.

AÏATOLE suggests questions re MiSHEk come later.

36. Hecall Telegran

It is apparent to AiATOLE there is significant in-

formation about this aspect of the MosE:in case fron the FRI.

This goes to the basic question of cooperation with the FRI and

his knowlerge which he concedes is a basic FPI decision about

-what he sees of the rocall telegram information. ANATOLE has

seen only NOSEUKO's information (transcripts, otc.). The

significance of this may bear on the question of rank discussed

soparatoly but even without being ahle to discuss all aspects

of the recall telegran with ANATOLE he suggests we should examine

if we have not done this the details of doSE:ko's admissions he

lied about his rank and the recall telearan. ANATOLE says it is

recessary in detamine: the exact date inceit broke on each

santy: 1h0 ras

involved: who ther he vas being pressured; was there

coilination with tie FRI about the messure on the recall telezran;

i done.

---

## Page 51

143079

-??-

wint and son lod lis to conclude the starios more false: what

vete die dates involvod hetraca tostada's itory of tie telearan

and the inforantion fron

mantier soure:(s) was thore tire for

instin to confirn his use of the rocall telegran story: could

the message Eron Vosbik0 have gotter to mochor solice or rould!

¡t appear the telegram story had to bo alanned in advanee and

not trigaered by confirmation fron inSENio: after 10sri50 brote

sins the otber

source (s) confronted; was tiere aay change in tie

relations with tho othar source(s); las there heer any collateral

infornation reflecting k6B knowledge he has broien on rank or tha

telegras stories. AvATOLE surgests this aspect of the question

of hons fides cone later in confrontaiion and he assumes S" vill

be covering this fully even though he hones there will he

permission

for him to be fully read into this. lie was told, for the record

since de obviously understrod tie implications, I could pronise

nothing sirce any discussion about the rocall telegran and any

other source would mean opening to him full information about any

isource since evoryone, including the FRI, lnew he would never he

satisfied with partial limited inforration. le laughingly agreed

he rould press for full information but did concede he night

(temporarily?) sottle for less than the full scurce information

15 the context of the information about vostlid vas complete and

he cruld unierstand the sianificance of the scurce's position, etc.

---

## Page 52

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-

- 301.

said He would think dout what could lie done but that antinien

was not in ordor.

5. E0SEE2 Statement Condemnint Soviet Pegine

AVATOLE nutlined the steps In be talen to abtain fron

Nasusso a statement which in its ultinate iritten forn may serve

lots as a control and a propaganda instrument. ANATOL! believes

that leading lOSErkO to a final alsolute vritten and documented

statenent against the Soviets will not caly permit us to judge

HOStko more accurately by observing his reactions but also

provide additional psychological pressure useful in the final

stages of dealing with NOSEstn when we confront hin with the

evidence ve linoy he was on a mission. A'ATOLE helieves the

final-denunciatory statement nay help tip the balance in gaining

YOSENKO's CoOperation/confession.

• The steps to be taken are as folios:

A. Elicit from

vosasko statements as detailed and

specific as possible condeming the Sovict regime, the KGB, the

party, individuals, etc. Tols sbould he at a fast tempo. (This,

can bogin inmediately.)

B. After reviewing these statenents elicit from

NOSEND Increasingly detailed condernatory statements by having

him idd details about persons and activities.

C. Concurrent sit: 37A above NoSeNin should he asked

In chunerate in detail each example of those things be did, saw

or heard about which brought hir to tie point of defection. If

he ines not

mention the 163 tien at later stage in tha

elicitation process no Stillie nressed for ransona se dicallas

---

## Page 53

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-31-

t'e tos. lie should be led to mate stateneats sicut restorant

on techniques such as ilachnail, hetero-seraal and lomosexual

chiragments rainst diplonats, tourists preinent lostern

sciontists, etc.

te should he led to express his disgust at

croty. stage put the intimidation practiced and should include

Pussian youth

and the spying on intellectuals.

D. After NOSENKO has enumerated and elatorated his

denunciation and conderating of the soviets, orally and at

lonath he should be asked to write in his cir lords a statenent

which he will agree can be published. He should be asled at

this point, although it nay he necessary to ast hin carlier, if

ne is prepared to make an official statement condemning the

Soviet regine and specific people. He will he told that with

his cooperation we vant to expose the soviet regine on the basis

of real inosledge. This first statement will be revised by us

to include specifies and which will include statenents such as

"I condenn SHELEPIN, GRIBANDY, etc. for - D---": "I condemn

GRIBIVOU for forcing me to engage in reprehensible homosexual

entrapnents - - ": "I condenn a systen which deals in misinfornation

and confusion sucr as that led ly AGAYAYIS - -".

E. At a later stage after review of his other

statenents abnut personnel, the kob organization, ete: as follow-

up he should in interview onl

detail what steps were taken to

counteract the danage fros GOLitay!'s defection and the KAR

rearranizition.

le srould list all personrel structural aid

: LOMET

---

## Page 54

a...sira!.

- 32-

particularly the functional cannes in the koa. lie should be

asted the speelfie question of when was a conforence hold to

consider the impact of COlITZYA's inpuleigo arout tourists an!

the loss of docunents.

tie should relte this to the 1061 Tourist

Conference he says was

scheduled.

F. The final written condenator; statement will he

considered for publication with or without sosENth's noproval or

agreenent. The statenent should be a koy elcent in assessing

his reaction at the point where his confession/ cooperation 1s

solicited and he ls told it will be published.

35. ROSENKO'S "SASIA:

_Case

There was little discussion of this excent to consider

need to revier more and consider this a topic for later questionins.

39. PREISEREUND

A''ATOLE considers this a topic worth more study and

review on the basis that something may have been overlooked

which relates to aisinfornation about the American Enbassy ot

American personnel, We should not consider this case, closed and

more research is needed.

CAMATOLE sees no relevancy to the questions re GOLITZYM.

If we have sone operationally significant angle he can approve

questions but he sees none - he finds this unnecessary and question

15 especially unnecessary.

ANATOLE

SOMET

-3 The

- 53:

---

## Page 55

-33-

AVATOLE

pointed out the !. sic and only question with espect to dOSESXO

is misinfornation

and he sees no advantage or assistance

resulting fron question about GOLITZYM, Hoirever, he said this

was not his decision.

lie was told the paper about the GOLITZYN

question

was prepared by a researcher who works exclusively

at this tine on the 1967-1968 naterials and the researcher

responded to a general requirement to extract information and

frane questions to be asked of NOSENKO which could be tested

against known infornation. The researcher obviously believes

that if NOSENXO were to nake a false or mislcading statement

which GOLITZYN has of could deny or prove wrong NOSENKO would

be in a bind. ANATOLE was also told he must understand that

compartnentation in research and on NOSENKO as well as on

"larger, issues neans that we will revier a few papers which are

useless in the larger context eventhough to the researcher who

has a narrow view the concern is real.)

40. Gennadly Ivanovich GRYAZNOV-

ANATOLE's reaction to the questions and paper was that they

.will not accomplish nuch of significance re GRYAZNOV since he

thinks there is a GRYAZNOV relationship to the code clork cases

which can only be ictermined after that research and analysis

of infornation about GRYAZNOV. He agreed the questions could

be used later

• during elicitation

as tine fillers and prelininary

to hard questions but not nuch will come because the questions

are not to the point, which he did not explain fully.

---

## Page 56

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- 3.4 -

ANTOLE did specifically challenge ncetao's story of his

cinse relationship with GaYAZUNV as a lIe. ANITOLE notes the

possibility there ias leinge of his identification to the FPI

and ClA OF GRYAZAny as a source. Particularly A'ATOLE says

POSed's story of a close relationship with GRYAZY in 1962

is probably false because there was mo

previous reintionship

leading to this. ANATOLE said definitely that GIACSOV would

have been punished if the k6ß knew he vas identified as a source

to GOLITZY:?.

ANATOLE says there is a contradiction with HOSENKo trying

to build up his relationship with GRYALS and don-play or,

more accurately minimize, the extent of his relations with

CHURNOV and GUK. ANATOLE believes it was a deliberate part

Of NOSENKO's legend to set him close to CRYAZNOY since GRYAZNOY

was an ackrowledged source of some of rolltzy's infornation.

The NOSENKO-GRYAZNOV relationship will be a key element in

future questioning:

A. "Cosment on NOSEYKO Family Felations" was a paper in

• which A'ATOLE found little of importance or significance as a

crucial point except that as the discussions progressed he de-

veloped the idea that the 1945-50 period may be crucial after

all. SATOLE sees little nuestion about most of his life and

secifically ANATOLE says the horoserial question is not "ir.

line vita avallable cridence". ANATOLE thought these questions

would rive MosENn the impression to are "unprofessional" but

SLORET

ма Еоо ....ол. ліалю рокі. кі..

i sini. 2.

---

## Page 57

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. - 35-

innediately conceded this is renlly not a problen since NOSENXO

has not been handled very professionally in the past.

B. "NOSENKO - Homosexual Aspects"

MATOLE questions any assunption that OSENKO had any

"expertise" on homo

operations. He just does not think NOSENKO

was an "expert" or a

"specialist" and points out he can run

then at level he has described with very little knowledge.

ANATOLE Says he knows NOSENKO was not a homosexual before and

doubts ho would have been consulted ly anyone as a "specialist".

In view basic doubts if any question:

in be used should be

woven into other topics and not treniel as separate subject.

• 41. RUNYANTSEV

After reading the paper ANATOLE said there is nothing

to ask NOSENKO at this time. ANATOLE naintains this will be a

special question later. ANATOLE directly relates the RUMYANTSEV

case to what he considers was the serious mistake of asking

..NOSENKO about the May 1959 conforence. (See N-223) Ile also

thinks further questions on the conference should only come

later. ANATOLE saw cicarly why no questions should have been

asked about RUNYANTSEV and May 59 Conference but after nistake

made it may be we will want to adjust and consider what we might

gain by sone questions during elicitation or if touching on this

SECRET

....

---

## Page 58

point will upset the phasing of questions to NOSE:KO. This

natter will be discussed further after idiATOLE reads the papers

carefully. AYATOLE was told it will be clear to him that the

May 59 neeting was known through GOLIENE/SKI and there was

some indication from this source also of wide scale nisinfor-

nation prograns. It was also noted that in my opinion the

questions for NOSENKO, even with hindsight and my knowledge of -

how seriously GOLITZYN's infornation about this conference has

been viewed, were normal intelligence officer questions which

NOSENKO could expect based on the overt infornation nade available.

Certainly the questions were not unusual except for the fact

"that they indeed were different fron other questions asked of

NOSENKO because they zouched on political matters. To the extent

that 11-228 showed NOSENKO soneone at a lato dato was interested

in political natters NOSENKO nay have been alerted. Certainly it

would seen those questions were completely out of context :

out of the blue so to speak - and since there was no follow-up

NOSENKO way feel there is to real interest because there has

"been no real interest in natters political with him.

A. "HOSENKO - US Of Alias by KGB Officers"

ANATOLE connented these were very good questions. They

could be asked during elicitation or later during the crucial

or hard questioning phase when we were assured of fast follow-up

questioning.

B. "NOSENKO - Knowledge because of Association with other

KBS Officers".

AVATOLE thought this was excellent approach. le

.3027

---

## Page 59

- 37-

commentod in connection with paras o and 1l and using this paper

stressed need to elicit all possiblo fron iOSENKO orally during

intervier and no written nenorandun. MiATOLE outlined need for

NOSENKO to list exact dates of all his service assignments;

when he first met each officer; detailed biography of each

officer, etc. He retained without connent the 28 March 1969

addendus to RAOVSKIY, ¡UTYREV, and SUROV.

42. Nikolay S. SKVORTSOV and Vladinir Vasilyevich KRIVOSHEY

MINTOLE, as with these officers, separately lists KGB

officors of special significance as part of the enumeration of

CRUCIAL QUESTIONS because they are not only proninent in

*OSENKO's story but also of major concern to us since they work

against Anericans. They aro important even without NOSENKO.

In most instances also there will be the initial new elicitation

about then from NOSENKO. Then NOSENKO's previous information

will be collated and compared with collateral infornation,

including previous information from GOLITZYN, after which ANAtoLE

will review, conment with now information, if any, and frame

pertinent questions for NOSENKO. Specifically ANATOLE says

that NOSENKO's statement he consulted SKVORTSOV about tourist

operations 1955-59 is nonsense. SAVORISOV was in Gernany until

1959. NOSENKO should be asked what kind of tourist operations,

etc.

•

c.1sm

---

## Page 60

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43. Nikolay Grisorycvich BAGRICIEV

44. GRIBANOV (GORDUNOV)

ANATOLE stresses the inportance of collating all

information about the activitios of GRIBANOV and separate the

sourcing.

45. NOSENKO-ASen GEORGIEV Case

ANATOLE believes these questions useful now in

elicitation phase. He wants to review everything NOSENKO has

said about Anatoliy S. KOZLOV and view any photos. I could

nọt confirm that KOZLOV had participated in the can case.

ANATOLE asks if we can confirn KOZLOY was Chief of the American

Section when NOSENKU left the Section in 1955 and what NOSENKO

said about early relations including precise dates when NOSENKO

says KOZLOV was his boss. In this connection it is noted that

NOSENKO says KOZLOV was Chief of Dept I (Page l of paper) then

Doputy Chief of Dept 7 (page 4). ANATOLE says as clicitation

question NOSENKO should be asked why the denotion and also shat

happened to GORBATENKO.

Not unexpectedly, MATOLE said he would eventually

want to see tha file on the GEORGIEV case to

see what the

tie-in

to the Soviets may have been.

46.

vladinir Lvovich ARTENOV

ANATOLE would like photograph and travel record for

_.....

- 33-

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## Page 61

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- 39-

47. Mikhail Stepanovich BANNIKOV

ANATOLE wants background info and photo.

48.

Fedor Alckseyevici SUCHERBAK

Sce 47

19.

FNU GOLOVKOV.

1. Nikolay Daitrievich ARKHIPOY

ANATOLE wants background and photograph. ANATOLE

thinks questions re Egil SUNDAR needed and that NOSENKO should

fully explain how and why ho became involved with a journalist

and what kind of an agent was SUNDAR and his background, etc.

" SUNDAR's targets should be described fully and NostrO should

explain the relevancy of this to tourist operations.

B. ANATOLE asked about the Arsene FRIPPEL Case but I

could not answer with complete assurance the details of his

recruitment, admissions, identifications, etc. NATOLE was told,

however, overyone satisfied about this apparently but would check.

C. ANATOLE suggests full exploration with NOSENKO to

get his explanation for the use of the technicians IVANOV, SERGEY,

and LEBEDEV, Lev A, in the recruitment of the British tourist

Eric LUKIS? Is there a relationship to the Johnson case.

50. Ivan Alekseyevich YEROFEYEV

ANATOLE wants photo and travel record.

1. In connection with this also, ANATOLE requested

a list of all CIA personnel in contact with Soviets in Berlin.

(Page 2) lie said he had originally or carlier asked for this

SEGRET

-----

---

## Page 62

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-40-

several tines and he related this request to the larger question.

of his analysis which le raisod with tr. Solio and which has

sone unanswered - he asked for and wants a list of all CIA

people in overt contact wich Soviets world-wide. Hy only comment

was to the point that compilation of such lists was difficult

if not inpossible.

51. Ivan Abramovich PANASENKO

See 50.

52.

PIVNEV

ANATOLE says this topic is definitoy a confrontation

-topic. Specifically he noted para 7 in this connection.

N'ATOLE says he needs the substance of the follow-up

and results of the f

case to frane questions to PIVNEV

but he also makes the point he considers the

• case

important separately from considerations of NOSENKO, le recalled

MT. O'NEAL was to review the file with him and arrange interview

abut ho has heard nothing. On the basis of short

•discussion ANATOLE believes there aro unexplored aspects to this

case and parallels with the RUMYANTSEV case as far

as NOSENKO

is concorned which nay go to penetration in the M'i ENB, Moscow

or even to Germany. The tining is important.

1. Meksandr Konstantinovich KISLOV

ANATOLE relates interest in KISLOV to KOVSliUK as well

as to tlie BELITSKIY case to begin in overall elicitation about

Kos officars. die manes "lilden tie Fal infornation abour

le den torer.

---

## Page 63

4-00000

.i:.

-41-

KISLOV's U.S. activities and surveillance reports of his

association with KOVSHUK. All the questions re KISLOV should

be used in elicitation.

B. In connection with NOSENKO's stories about his status

and cover in Geneva in 1962 and 1964, ANATOLE would like to

review all verified info against NOSENKO's statenents. For

example was his diplomatic passport verified, etc.

C. MATOLE would like to review the lists of other nenbers

of the delegations of which he was a member as well as the

lists of other dolegations there at the sane time.

(531 NOTE: Check N-127, page 7 - he could take orders of

Chairnan on POPOV case. Compare with other info re POPOV case

fron NOSENKO. Ihy would ba have orders on POPOV case in his

safa in 1964? The order was put out in 1959 (57-682. NOSENKO

would knor this in 1962 - Immediately after Auerican Section duty.

He would have it or access to it but why as late as 1964 in

Dept.)

D. Atter considerable reflection ANATOLE thinks it is quito

possible that NOSENKO hold the rank of Lt. Col. but that when he

saw he was suspect on the rank issue because his actual history

and his assignnents as he described then did not warrant the

Lot. Col, rank attrass flies to cover his dispatch/mission

and the reward he received he decided to agree and downplay his

---

## Page 64

14-0000

SACT

-42-

importanco. Ho had to accede to his interviewers to avoid moro

questions about why and how he becane a lt. Col. ANATOLE

thinks ho may have been revarded (pronoted) quictly with only

a very few persons knowledgable. (S!! NOTE: Check all roports.)

NATOLE suggests this question for polygraph: "Did the

travel document you brought reflect your true rank on the basis

of your success and achievements of your game with AIS which

began in June 1962 in Geneva?

In this connection also ANATOLE points to two promotions

in one ycar (1962) (See N-181 pg 27): Chief of Section then

•Deputy Chiof of Department. How has NOSENKO explained this

when he was not in his first job even three months and he had

no major successes in Geneva (except contact with CIA?) - What

; were the cases he handled and the recruitnents he made in 1962?

53. Aserican Ambassadors

ANATOLE believes at a later date NOSENKO should be

asked or confronted about operations against American Ambassadors.

However, as an olicitation question ANATOLE thinks ho

should be asked if he knew of any Anerican Ambassador who was

recruited at any time by SCD?

Later, under the hostile interrogation he would be

asted if he knew about an important high level SCD American

agent who was recontacted and reactivated when he visited floscow

in 1959. Other questions to follow fron the tean of interrogators

such as who did or would have handled this agent, etc.

3.005T

---

## Page 65

14-000000

54. Yurly GUK's Agent in Wasnington

ANATOLE thinks this case needs attention again even

though it may not bear on the HOSENKO case. He says it needs

analysis and future research on tho basis of what action the

FBI took. If there is sonething pertinent to NOSENKO wo can

considor for later use.

55. Yuriy Vasilyevich KROTKOV

ANATOLE says we should extract and review what

NOSENKO has said about KROTKOV and line out the parallels

in the info. ANATOLE notes KROTKOV - Oct 1963; Cherepanov -

Nor 1963 and NOSENKO - Jan 1964, and he thinks we need to frame

questions to includo KROTKOV in our considarations. He recalls

KROTXOV promised an expose of the KGB and this never canee

about.

---

## Page 66

14-00000

'**

CORRECTION AND AMENDMENT TO PARA 35/PAGE 28 of

ATTACINENT B TO MENO FOR THE RECORD DATED 7 APRIL 1969.

SUBTECI: ANATOLE RE NOSENKO:

2 - 11 Jan 64

18 Jan

19 Jan

24 - 25 Jan

25 - *28 Jan

28 Jan

GRIDAiOV applied for Austrian, French,

(8 Jan) and Swiss visas.

NOSENXO arrives in Geneva from Paris.

Nikhail S. ROGOV arrives Switzerland.

ROGOV registered Hotel Regina, Bern

ROGOV registered Ilotel Krebs, Bern

ROGOY to Rome

3 Jan - 3 Feb

GRIBANOV, FEDORENKO, KURISHEV and NOVIK at

Winter Olympics, Innsbruck.

GRiBANOr in Vianna.

NOSENÃO defects

4 Feb

4 Feb

6 Feb

Soviet Ambassador advises Chief, Soviet Delegation

Disarnanent Conference NOSENKO disappeared 4 Feb.

---

## Page 67

4-00000

7 Feb

8 Feb

8 Feb

9 Feb

10. Feb

12 Feb

14 Feb

:14 Feb

18 Fal

-/...

SECRET

-2-÷

GRIBANDY arrives, Paris. KOVSIlUk was in Paris.

Soviet official in Geneva reports to Swiss

police NOSENKO nissing.

ROGOV returned to Bern

Radio news in Switzerland attributed Swiss

and Soviet sources said NOSENKO presumably had

defected.

GRIBANOV Left Paris for Vienna, BUSCHEK clairs

to have seen him 10 Feb.

TSARAPKIN, not Soviet Ambassador to Switzerland,

holds conference condemning Swiss for permitting

NOSFNKO's kidnapping: Swiss called Soviet

Ambassador Bern and strongly protested

TSARAPUIN action.

GRIBANOV dinner party with BUSCHEK at which

GRIBANOV not unduly disturbed about NOSENKO.

ROGOV departed Switzerland via Austria.

KonsHok left Parig as mamber

Of the RUDNEY DelEgation.

65030

---

## Page 68

4-00000

ATTACINENT C

AMATALE RO :A5FN5?

Elicitation

A. As a result of consultations sith adoll 5l "arch

and 1 ad 2 49r11 1062, it vas coacludes the inllovine tonics

or itons vere to be used to bozin the ner clicitation phase

with toseuro. The followin? outline notes of the tonic, are

arranged in the order thoy are to he discussed with castlin

although it 1s important only to begi: sith the topics listed

1 and 2. Additional elicitation trpics to le added ly 51 in

consonance with discussion set fortr in Crucinl Questions.

B. AVATOLE omphasizes that it is accessary that dOSENIO

le pernitted to respond fully and completely nhout each topic

with all possible detalls. Mostita should sot be reminded

of air previous statorents of cornerts nor should he be corrected

about dates, places or persons. lie is not to le rivon any

tritton assionents and cach topic is to le covered as completely

as possible in one irtorier without digression into other topies

except, of course, where insENtO may tale the initintive in the

digression. le sloulu, rousver. he hroigit back to the main

topie as soon as possible sithout losing value of digression.

C. Torics:

1. Refection Motivation -

tost serire. to spe stare protrossive clicitation.

SEGRET

---

## Page 69

4-00000

-? -

Л.

petall lorivation.

(1) this de hates sorine.

(3) Can ho pive particulars and spocifics -

conciete

eximples ile se lates regine.

(3)

concreto exanples of actions, pocrations

of XAG (socurity), ohy le develoned

nogativo attitude vs for anu regine.

(4) Conerete exnales of this to Party.

(5) Coicrete examples of actions, attitudlos.

etc.. of party lcaders, the clite, the

hierarchy which caused hin to take

negative attitude.

Tho ahove must be sreclal session - then to

be reviened for further consideration re

statenert.

2. Detail career

-A11 assignments, nonch, yoa, maning heed of

denartments

and sections 1053 - highlighting

major assignnents accooplishments.

3. reneral question to have linSENkO describe ard

sciail with examples hor misinfornation handled in SCh - givo

cisos - name personnel - what tind of paros - relations with

SCo - cutiro K6B - everytling he Suous iritiout suggesting

arything to lis.

SIET

---

## Page 70

4-00000

- 3-

1. Lendershin of tar.

Chairman, Muputies, and their collaacies - yearly

basis 1953 (do not coniine years) to 1061 vit: detailed bioaraphy

o! caci.

5. Leadershl! of FCi.

Chrirnan, leputics, and their colleales - yearly

basis 1953 (20 not coaline years) to 1061 with detalled blography

of cach.

6. Leadershin of SCD.

Chalrnan, Deputles, and thair colleaques - yearly

basis 1953 (do not coabine years) to 195d with detalled biography

of each. (do not go to Heads of Departnents)

7. Vassall

8. SELITSKIY - so ahead os basis questionaire.

9. All heads of American Departrent and deputles 1953,

on jearly hasis, mith complete detalis re biography ast quostions

on cach - oral.

10. GUX, CHIRANOV, etc. • explore in detail as with

nuestions.

11. VAKHRISHEV

Ist years in Instituto Forcian Policy.

and question list of friends, classates with

binaraghy men/if sentions Viiinustal nd susley - then ask

mastions outlined.

trer

---

## Page 71

i .

- 4-

12. ARISANOV TriP.

13. SEVORTSOV (with friends).

14. BAGRICHEN (with friends).

15. KOZLOY.

16. ARTENOV.

17. YEROFEYEV.

18. PAVASENKO.

19.

FISLOV.

20.

documentation-

Explain again hor, wien received documentation,

why discrenancies, how can you travel

- Identity card one

rank order another rank.

21. Travel abroad, cover, etc.

22. Use of allas, questionnaire.

23. Yurly V. KROTKOV -

(probably nothing yet)

--

VICHEL

"Histinoia

arians

-.i.:

---

## Page 72

CA7104

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

UBI:CT

ANATOLE HE NOSSUKO

MRO E-

FILE NUMBER

14 may 169

eles was given a copy of the

jolourg for delivery to Quatole

today :

A Memo for Director Securit

"sticitation Tojies for luri Noseno"

( a cop of the Drop was quen

D C CI

ou which I

I auotated

firal was dated 22 Ggril.)

B. A cartou of the Therno for

Re Record dated I april 69,

Subjech: Cuatole Re NoseuRo

with atts A BIC.

OFFICE AND TITLE

1.62 |954

Ma Scouthieler

SECRET

---

## Page 73

MEMORANBUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT

ANiTeLE RE Pile lusculic Paper

16 JANARE 09

FILE NUMBER.

A Gurvirus if he statiá in re

his Dec bo tack enth Köister

Het it was a rites

cade cecil which usas

recruited - more disce

lee statie important

ricritient code clerte

el Salet teren - Thi

Cheet nb4-54 bite fio

merelatientes caro

in Die 10).

GETICE

RiD TITLE

e!e!

SIGNATURE

FOPA

7-62

1954

GROUP 1

(40)

CLASSISICATION

1, do ista

"Ira

---

## Page 74

GOECKETE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

160-61 Nosentos posilice.

16 динарої

"is in fonuation"

from Noscutio

I He was not in american

Section, 60-61. and he couc

2. There were no recruitiucut?

IN is estRacisted an un

American Siction Free porcr

2. 1c, Noscuko's clan

Til This 11661e 0110

Le PETRiUR .

Doc: b0- as 61 - in 09 fines

pElLEnCE te could not find.

il

OTFICE

SIGRATURE

1080 18

SECRET

---

## Page 75

SEGUST

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

(2) 60-61 1105611120-

1.27 €

CILF ALMAFO

reficcia.

acication N Wiilial hove Mo

LLCACI

Sucician - revarde

witt aud!.

rewardi la citas ancl

tarifait.

OTTICE dOS TITLE

SICHATIRE

•LEIRA: 200R.200IT

• 0: 110101

SEGRET

---

## Page 76

(HA930012A1100

SECRET

MEMBRANBUM FOR THE RECORB

Nasculte tip to El-No-See No-Aee60

15 Ганнану 67

1115 suggeR

ivilisbacon, did Travel there.

Austerdam - BR to Berlie =,

some aire in therella, ou

juaniferte, trauel contiet, ete

Back subitaulistice

do Request fe her Stronicate

OFFICE AND TITLE

SIGRATURE

41. Salluici

GRO:P I

-SEORST.

1a41e1

180)

---

## Page 77

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

ї5 Пи3

69

Anatoli suggesti cose cente aboul

altatines

bubeined under

Leis dianc

, such un politiser cipo,

sud sel what de unite sey aleur

Sel stage ser what mide de donc-

Solis ofinire e, wores aqsee.

4 had ashed and beth tild ly

OFFICE AND TITLE

SIGNATURE

144. S-fluie:

GROUP !

TOP 1951

(40)

---

## Page 78

14-00000

CLASSIFICATION

SEC..

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

15/ си 609

THE RUMAN

Tage - britners acteres =

Rudice sens burns fact.

Macaos ti

ê stress diet rigile.

Did not understaud forech!

OFFICE ANC TITLE

SIGNATURE

1. 67 1954

CoPERET.

---

## Page 79

SUUJECE

we99y"g4s

SECCAT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

15 January 57

FILF AUMBER

NvozSuño NitE

Guetréi caceemintu stater in uruié

feiei beile diniposuelec

for N to traunfer

Aiupennti d paféis Witle tiene Whel

teu ferin→ 1t0 anorece Lefiertnanh.

inrate ou Salct dud meleneie énnetonch,

it saus aif he trad lasle. told N Rept

dirtinea ileis apartonent A cicele

sey "unduessl " hiet helierabce,

Émucah acceit trauesósi mitermitte N.

A Queitioa Naurtadeauna

FresClhure, Heur woliche liave.

A Jays tlatis nuititare uiit unier

KousHtuk, PPasube Pitror iu

Scetras (suf) seynsati pon Korsttuk.

Giorai Zúkor.? Limotion 55 A agrces

/ (zHuñor) churenanor pafens show Chiefeerion.

Iueu to clicele'

'"С papci" re

KIVSItuk Staiter.

OFFICE RNS TITLE

7-62 1954

413ile

SIGNATURE

SEGIET

GRUÜP 1

CLASSIFICATIO%

(40)

---

## Page 80

19126

SHORET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT

15 Cura: 69

Tre мартя

CHEREPANCO WRitE-Ul trait bertisti

Kir Acar.

JA NICEL

Quatole

3.

OFFICE AND TITLE

SIGNATUFE

FORM

8-821

1954

1408

→ y-to onesia.

---

## Page 81

SUBJIC:

SIGHET

JATE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

15. Caee

%9

Kovsitick-in W.S, -dlenictiee.

FILE AUMUER

Meatols sau: Thak loushui get

is trcunce witi tie wios sire The 1S

a nuiichiae,

Kle vias accaltia aud

elcmetci, do lia a SCD ifricce

Mr FCD. de piai oeid lu Us 1onieele

ientete ilhcs mob neuchh razukes

ENRERaTiTa of Necos tor KOiStuA

dénstiza.

Aratile Siupe, Nehlning to soles,

ho atiS vas s, /Shi saidte

t'd iioeeu

mecatia ude intilued gues ee ls

Howvever, Auatöle Sapa secacl

eui in prmatun

- tut did iidesate

unestic atiru, Relatta to

¿sses he steseuie

OFEIRE RAO TITLE

P.:8 1954

SIGYATURE

ta. 3.

lles.Cie.

CET

•ICATIDS

(40)

- 47.4

---

## Page 82

---.

CLASSIT

CATION

SEGRET

HEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT

DATE

15 Jaù 69

FILE AUUBER

TAMARA

MAGEDOVA

Pia de enne que le dia de

But wich when death. A interie

not case inevicie mentiones once

miles saidi he innas might la case

to be reviewed.

OFFICE ASO TITLE

595. 82.

2.68

1954

SIGRATURE

41.B. Hice:

SECRET

GRULPI

1403

5=2an940 406.187

---

## Page 83

!

ILVi

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBSICT

iicóriillo- eimsencou-Guía

JATE

15 Jinseererey

69

FILC BUMBEP

HILTC SAem is-C- E Eteaet

A tiencte, Dlucnont Kurai acE C=€

i s aqaiti eud vice verin.

(Rosuete :

N esued idiutify ventret

lere cdce; ssorid kuow c's ágeuts.

1 A atis omuncited thact Grets ine

Saiie wouis baue beeu targettee i's.

Атесан. мов солоній міти

fiui t iroies suine polica.

A in aurennr 70 JA QuESTTiN!

sitid ii ssuce foi fack that 1-eG

clasant pindi pate, sud i dediel

tLA ILtouY NomEN

had sc picheut wheu N=C

tilking doont oberiious using

Lauanaga, i.e, donliitara, so

te, A, dlid mot know whict they

ваши мата атась ник лилиани

to A They intiurte se abemticnet

OFFICE AND. TITLE

F024

7.52 1 954

SIGNATURE

v4S. iula:

SEGRET

CLASSIFICATION

{ 40}

---

## Page 84

!

CAAS

FICATIDR

SEGRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

BATE

15 Сui23,

FILF.".

juare

69

4. Nezarrio Burtice GuciicanSatta

Curatote schennid to boict thiar di sece,

no ietetanetiation vou eviécee tireli d

nias artuaie enitlrei aue dioknng

abiues arferisous. in tus qosis

t2 cncurà haue decn in "lo cescs" as

particisat . Mhitanh- Weril nih

Itaternte " "lamnica" in pail of eppesicuced

dise ety wuvrlutd - in contarh. Asrotes

Korsiteeks,

rseazauii dec un BuiN lauquage,

KOSALOpor aud N SAtWA LiaMe

worled ausa pertiripa ch rogeticiseo -

110 corer,

i la ieletable he coil st sicet

Ise restonse to Stlie wits de. N.

altieille isi pendoie at arritat, uilcle

ISALie MNITIT PONN ECitiN Nt COUMS

A Fiyin senr emuperuatira - crucu.

4.12 1954

SteHal

GROt'F1

IREZPDELITMNTRNATA

CLATNKAIS

(a0)

---

## Page 85

SECRET

SATE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT

(2) 1J'à Distei: Anericien Sitteen

FILE MLUBER

A very insinie werte brut in Ni

stong is (Omisican Sentica dute -

interi sole ais tinc.

OFTICE ALD TITLE

SIGNATURE

F0R1

1-87 1 954

CASERNES.

GROLP

120)

2

---

## Page 86

SEGRET

SUSSECT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

4: NOSENKO

15 Tau 6?

FILE ALASER

testers inposined parch That

good lauguage, expericuce, ete,

Tear N should have followed America

OFFICE ANO TITLE

SIGARTURE

ГОР*

7-62

1954

"SEGZET.

$401

---

## Page 87

SEGRET

sars

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FILE MUMGER

simelied. Tas repey to d'e

confisetations N lad ein

tritten dias in halheure

hach mot idcuts/id N.

Sais Faid i had attesed.

OFFISE RIO TITIE

SIGRATLPE

CROLP I

7-52 1 954

(408

CLASSIFICATION

---

## Page 88

!

CLASSIFICATION

SERAT T0

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

!

SUOJECT

DATE

15 January 69

FILE NUMBER

No douht, not eres ile dicelly thick

il ads is unt a fisavacatzur(is):

è statemal luntolo reiteratid

to. J.augietre, E. Solie aud SiMiles,

Aiatala circene is to poich

tut the esitiadictires, major areas,

notect reer sicutele,

OFFICE RIO DITLE

SIGNATURE

7. 42 1954

SECHE!

SCATION

GHOtP 1

1402

---

## Page 89

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT

ACATOLE RE MESENHO

DATE

17 Dau'69

FILE

MIER

TAPE - 1

temisenos of Polie intereses esta

in musan and Solas papee Me

ties encurrite:

si te circer but

New paper acrent wade it elidi to

A sanú saci as crecien cit

Barrice 1961.

went to fie tore

Diureet i analist

aurenis of while Gase but bute,

12311001 1129-100d to leame ace

if her memed ferreel fin leel

OFFICE AND TITLE

FORM

-8.62

1954

CLASSIFIIATION

ACH DENTA TOMATIC

(408

---

## Page 90

SECURI

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

DATE

SUBJECT

по клен сол 15- пі

duchet seconderer en

Would needed amitinal au?

Sole did asid jot -did which st

Leil to di fich maughieh: -

Frises to docuss

Bre a desset

Eau state Corciesita: 8-9 vols of upe

Soria dicitia divis (geod) for

Anal val archsion - dudies.

if evidence - mitalianace -

muslin a Concurien mis supportat

OFFICE AND TITLE

SIGnATURE

GROUP 1

7. 62 1 954

1161

CLASSIFILATION

---

## Page 91

SECRET

SUBJECT

LATE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FILE NUMBER

Nosuki пря сс преʼт pen '€

Mics-to amess turn audiented

huge 12: Housic Sight Pegat

parallel - up-dater kus. lock är tentersli

рози 13 т і

my to lutes man tas to Metere

стиль I8/2 1073

Penis cos to Rochel Schook 159- Cive tere bacis

Sadar to Massier Lite lefore

Golitzyn saur. Dice - wis 1e KGB

mine, canticis,

about Sinua

FED I SANG SCA. !

do rediscord

OFFICE AID TITLE

7.62 1934

SEUMET

CLASSIFIEETICT

GROUP I

КОНТРІМЕНАНТИ

140)

---

## Page 92

14-00000

MEMORANDU:, FOR THE RECORD

1:EEo-2oct8

autes cin , Caserna

le question

contretien not critia to decin

220 ie 1i1t demie!

Ча шля хов своролів аіС вімʼє

De Merin Conictes t une seslicel

Le ne ve doto mot ses de minis

Guesu ci s'et - diffeuse in actaie.

Niscuta

OFFICE ANO PITLE

SIGSATURE

.62 1954

1801

CLASSIFIC

---

## Page 93

SEGTET

NEMURANDUM FOR THE RECOND

(A11

Filr RuariR

I Bic , 210. Kifl w diie uap lieel dureté eon ties

ecnifeees

cl els cir Cipiiei

eiscwills es delabricti beel cize iiereiieg tod

J8 dcidieaho sitere do coietid-

BiIS 1Sp* t IfCiA neepiin decene

whise A led mids Feck N.ionl- slestls

des éfeteceituetest délglligseienfo

II Pernal êbouets - diecul épreres

11011I AUCut- tu Setci- anki

il stuls amdfinnnn tncu inti dileseille -

pfine Gusitica -i

TII

Serezee u KCH - itéene

ReTacCa a Sacrei Redrer ea Clre Lo élal

OFFICE AND TITLE

SIGNATURE

1.82 1951

SEGTET

CLASS

(401

---

## Page 94

MEMOKANDUM FOR THE RECORD

ra:r

FILE R9N160

nei precisi tres ilie

Lean liri dee

A seys)

G-tele

N. bich Said fish unn lecruse E Bucr

Based on fach - net tries destroale

OFFICE ANO TITLE

SIGMATURE

7.65 1954

SEGRET

CLASTIFICATIGS

CHOUP 1

1401

---

## Page 95

SECRLI

NEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SuagrC:

1.62 1954

JATE

Fllr diuare

A'innian t lentnesiendeel ise äees:

Lelt te aesr aulicistaéne

Ccciad

sarain alnt

Eire Eenrde de tisie

iB Siidinde detuce AL

IEIS A SperuinTe LuG'N G TZ!

te det ill di deniee dat étle di dlieseen Tl

Ses trs!

acsielita. - clente cteet

inctetine. É d'á dii dinei da Tiie

suLgill hhle riphenteá, Cién Serd leneice

aucicune eslerti - eeá ire cnpelelé

lusierdsceetzones

Mect in delve slnel liedesneud

inthiel les lesotices initl rndt lec leile)

хочетеіл Дери, -

neGid ai jach -

54 pesition alilinira , cte GO lieli TUGHD

auti der N -

G-RYAZNET WaG Lclute I 1

e 59 - lidien eichonter abadislerd

Ne necins seeind cese Kelini - eil

Thee vere cchurtio cerssdi les

dctdehor in äämieiee intr uil lericeuee

OFFICE A4O TITLE

SIGMATERE IS. NT.

SebneT

CLASSIEIEATIDS

(80)

---

## Page 96

4-00000

SECRRT

L'ENORANDUM FOR THE RECORO

l.9.1

118 RUWiCA

eesueut of ige th quein dincnitie-

tozerén prerhecese

adiclitieai fgeluf.eoméslere

-1G9 i ('s) 59 Icécin -eref-ete

Ha bhes peceed Viluganti iiteneC,

Uacurte

taicleticn - ioied sipupsenuce

:815 i6i oficcin (sols Leich -

Irtotey L00i ) 2000 + 300 ageets

250 CU.cul FCS = SeS Afisces

953-5i• 1952r

tape off - Zêu11es

likhae

eri acte ileetee

Bresechi- conneetiin Bclitsleuj

not Yuri - lectims Mée eelurai)

Aietrineeel N inpi - sepral ideutitece ke1?

Laekristeng Rici Tell .

Substance

Hewr meum turuis ClA or Olleia Serieees

Suebrtacte tuis peree Ne figures -

Fatel mimus riteiscs -

tracleus -

2INeT Ofe "IReE MMaLeiG-

OTEICE ANO TITLE

SIGAATURE

1-82 1954

«SEURE.

6401

---

## Page 97

(

MENORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

MATE

FILE ALOURER

Sitifeau o

G Sera oney 5% torrist copertie per KERjolice

on many nas agie dich fc illusify?

ence paiticeion CANEL

Operation - taluc & signifiamune

ruraus Chussican -

OFFICE RID TITLE

SIGNATURE

1-e3 1954

(101

---

## Page 98

SECHET

-

-A11

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FILE ALMBIA

sie aucunelais tut 116

SISICi + YAKRISNEN MARStE

sieuten maines

Concide stirns campic sans tusie

Valsusticen actrans seppeted miáit,

Nes stiltilinte

OFFICE AND TOTLE

SIGNE: LRE

FORU

7.68 1 954

SEGmET

CLASSIFICATICA

GROLP I

140)

---

## Page 99

14.00000.

HENORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

CLAUIET

ALNatE

atf qeumus dif tin nim : noni sienc lesite sp.

alieui c ce prlicies - bleeese lecéleis, =

she ir bavi e l vieny sere nep 2e.

taste Kirê-

RIRLANTSEV - SiT s'5i fae

coetoet iit trneicani-

trises tri asio saiel acfeil l Tistebia

окол перт мештя май. - SCD

didu " Cipétn. hoi Pumsníser apfirsed

11-hs seaul ehc exfised :

Sonerinki

Ilitetrns- ersos, inceusitcacies -osiseie

lncemenre iitt

61 - 64

oue fact helis pon SR, lici ifo

se

Man 59: Shaleiiee

to see ef

defcetir wired disclose - impürtsuk

ueCini - Klézu mor eeuilelled aetsy

Es syplirinsé-

OFFIGE RES TITLE

SIGMATUDE

7.82 1954

SEURET

CLASSIBIÇATION

(83)

---

## Page 100

SEanr*

•ATE

HEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FILT AUUBIR

Tresee mnce desntarecee-aet

3c nule Ollinnden äleidlicnd

reidi faet hmernct. aftos

7- ünduoen- enipeeeni dis uit bomntiico

Litnatr beh donl Tiinidi aeeitiée

1ST- 7uenta1:7U01i M0iOE MES Bep Dui

мін- ніза Піс - бава -

SpERsÓ AsICIiTiL - ciMécaRlEE Penre.

zud Diseuiation Gictio- dau le ue

brrad dissemiatio

imistale hi icreá

all Nos ifo ti 731 73Rá Coultics -

nelre spizng aes teis Miiz Sleocé le

nio quiestcn

viecid - ouly didtindual caser

311 - quiitin of efracy of pelyçiaia

au cruciar-

OTFICE AND TITLE

SIGnATURE

h561 2921

CuAss SESRaT

(80)

---

## Page 101

NEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Karen faut. wie.

52-1-16 -

Kiward -

10s220e

Fis trisa totalla -

Casano, Gule, lousse!

2, Factuai laus dingres no succist

laic chuplctis. no defails → neus info

NoT Audic - (dismised).

GEFICE

SICSATURE

1.82 1954

SEGMET

CLASSIFICAPISS

(10)

---

## Page 102

,8: 1

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PECORO

sanitá 5i-370 - esa liría )dréano es

совий 2-2610 S-pORTH

canutices

07930-

Venereal (verichre) disare

LAPIHON (8)

OFFICE ASS TATLE

SIGMATURE

1954

SECRET

CLASSIFICATIRS

---

## Page 103

SECRET

...i

MEMORANDUY FOR THE RECORD

AMARC CENT BUT La

adiance c is linte one

JA

24K 2a was mutant field -

селів: нив .

5,58-54 — in portent Accructincet

austering topor case.

areas

Berlie Pasis Eric! Suins) 1102c05

re CIA

- a

read cherpan papers

BOLUDEN

LiNTERS 2

Dubachi 3

Pater at copies? Win this

OFFICE AND TITLE

SIGMATERE

1-82 1 954

SEGRET..

140)

---

## Page 104

SEGRET

MEMORANDLM FOR THE RECORD

decane

sétre riferire di deise:

se testerel to

Barlia in 35

High cenci cauc tratice GiA not selved

paper Gs rad .

pi ta info

Tevi teati de scuittera

OFFICE

ANO TUTLE

SICHATUPE

9. 67

1954

"SEGRET

(801

---

## Page 105

sunders

SECRET

PATI

MEMÖRANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FILE MUMMER

Koschaged tr to license -

driendent cope Milnerzus nose

0. Mucine nitis pace ices in sorter leer

• ratio.

Ne i terence is eat diation

onsetely marcinee he winked

Be INSESTE

Absolute Stairwant he was uit

and Nachouty - a taer.

9. Code Cuits case

meie to he reexamied.

Nos que 62 I fieces

Pressle

OFFICE DAD TITLE

10EУ 1954

...SECRET

SIGNATURE

GRIMP 1

140)

---

## Page 106

xis:L

nukser T

Eiulal

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

PIL1 AIMOIS

Priveli et ance a oliegs :

iepuiite-

5e lir

Ciso CTuiti lo ECCeet

eripeitic of Mis ausuei-

duim to cIt -

JA

ro nlecei cema ileuicien 15 te

te ciareses urk to 92 oul withe

Bultite Genf Leceise Cb

deustinien BIS - dousli to

Cl't aboet iscunits of Biet

basis E lcacis

Cacuier accapr 6 moiths too sterl

Socie swg1'

uor 6 oucy 3

Metrei Kunt Cin dize destrnK

in i.ontcult when costacr made

It- cartan an inul e dtivitare...

less deucer - lue fest nidetisge

OFFICE

SIGMATURE

ORu

7.82 | 954

"SEGRAT

100)

---

## Page 107

14-00000

-OSEL

• e.t

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECO?D .

BILE AUODIR

..

as-i

Réitinn cere ench

"tIEuid ouu

Imiae62afie

1e0anse cide (conetreneed

oer зепч: a.

dis i'äucé ie'sa k62 iFfieie

1ero loeng fare ne -

ii i snehee.

ZENKiN - afüa Buisele lerters

KGB aolicsc 59 - A'savaluris

B ale conduied this winss Z sud-

New injo in Nos (soris) papou-:

Pielitstiiy cafo snecó lee les to Bloie.

LAVINIA - GolieNeLSTicee → A couCudEd

N0T3- UB 61 • Iohase mc0 ld tt PEahe -

iuh toge tice lote fchetstug nter kuninuk6e-

evidcuce KGz suypating necialilit,

i Erlicnnishi -

SIGMATURE

4.42 1 954

LtHE

CLASSICICATIUN

1101

---

## Page 108

SLu.at

-

HEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

•UNJECT

A1d

• ILE MUMALA

intirécineeis

i Relzeti p/zzi ia el Esiisg Ebuieeste

E decsintaiin

UAt - litiloi a licide tüides

S.ioe:

мянвая 111-5 воінс вСаве

ape ageu whe idtilegieilly

pusa li aret aurue-

iscruitrcut, ut 5pitting -

lir anian tenne, mnikies, cfa

eul/losed bres zicer whese in

prison = fiseepe Chauged 1II-5

contielen fa

Pilalee in Kirci - DF Gelrur

aquer adeeiti - n1 355 liaisau

iis NSC . DE Critile: Prilty-

OFFICE RAD TITLE

SIGHATERE

GROCF

FORM

1-62

1954

„Skhus.

(40)

---

## Page 109

14-00000

LAIIUA

→-...

PET

MENORANDUM FCR THE RECORD

TILE AUMDrA

Id- tane aimen -actarlicd

Ghiclecn by dcccn 2i2.2.01e

2aR2aten

Leatt en Paes

Ieva SiALE-ON - COiTO

Pisne aids io woeee cantaar

TiLi sich to S6

- serti Brit

WÁLE tRUi ARmi cuae SecitrisS

in c/A.

Iitai evac nlo iezie telieig feers

Suberrci ie Reidtis a ecaá to

Blake - SeniiThma Kuson orcin to

Siueii qrorp -(Stitutisn transela -)

NOS ito Not auneezeraie

Ctaiuul

he wia postilon 100-61

Dolinson Cue - lan -

Iprtaeet ir Give-awizy.

Palelies

FCD Wils nit uled helpfiru Ses to

opaes pEadiaãi - Tliii Sticeida

Crúdli GRil acuest.

OFFICE ANO TIILE

SIGNATURE

7.62 1 954

SEUNS..

1008

---

## Page 110

(

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

aurich to unpech.

PETROV -ATT

Aides:" "

Ses

Ires les N'35 se Stélifie pager vital

OFFICE &

SIGAATURE

1.89 1 354

•SECRET.

GROUP I

ANCITRONI

1001

---

## Page 111

LEBRET

MEMORANDUM TOR THE RECORD

. 16

111: 1A11110

Con 12 REt Paris :

Kendente - Conda Cate = ==

Posile Consul Gei 53-95 c 16.5.

40%0 -

Beney in Stes -

sae's Did Gis tack dbae assentit - yes

one Cunicon Est nett tate ho

menti-tut

OFFICE

SICMATERE

CROLPI

7.62 1954

Silit

ICA: 100

1801

---

## Page 112

40.10

(

LYALIN -

MENDRANDU FOR THE RECORD

pou 45 in Loudiere.

Parkersia invitieaiic-

" illaurice de Trau -

Diastev - Valiseshar

SASHA accek - cüd uit reperk

56-59- 60 Ans PecK112

OFTIEL ANS TITLE

SIERATURE

9.67 8 954

(801

---

## Page 113

SECRET

HEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD .

FILE ALMIEN

Sist - Milane

Pictones tande Gassaur Kender-Neerles

VictoR Koster love-

ticing - sof

overcap smilesta, NOS Giuto-

lice cite man altiple s

OFFICE RNO TITLE

SICHATURE

7.69 1 959

120)

---

## Page 114

SZOMET

MEMORANDU FOR THE RECORD

•КСЕ ДУМДЕЙ

See: in Soren dines

22emuI 1.6

- Intester

Moone (siren

Alland -

impo in 10599 -

то лосін

45 Prent, - Keen out

- I

PAPARA

OFFICE AID TITLE

SIGNATUDE

T.89 1954

1408

---

## Page 115

MEMORANOUM FOR THE RECORD

N05

Durate cri spest - sce hine.

MINICO - GIROLAR

TAPE 3

E HORBALLY (140n341y)

Popor case indicatica Mel K6B

entel. Clem up- puctration CLA-

KousHuK arrival-conuretid

sana - canne -

Allini Laurelli

SERICE ANO TITLE

Le disin.

dicialente weree & work

SIGNATURI

7.68

1954

1401

---

## Page 116

L'EMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FILE ELUDER

Fede le di l-e

e est auringe Cipres

itucif

Reso sullent Misante -

cher passor leads of Stetire .

Harenstue pate, ca lead f

Section ZuRtE i 53 - aug-

inconsistate - aerinch

OFFICE ANO TITLE

SIGNITURE

= 62

1954

SECAEI...

1808

---

## Page 117

SET

MENORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

ATT

FILE RUMBIR

esares -

Riverti a me

ation supertires

CIA - codeMian 60-61

escala - mottura to state

French Mada - vic

suid

7-881

1954

CUS SECAST

(401

---

## Page 118

CLASSIDICI

COTT

MEMORASOUIA FOR THE RECORD

FILE AUMSER

205228

Viaduch - Friendents

aires.

Mitivatier acts apacent

Basshona - case bicursi

attion to come to deu

Doncuatia Commitee

condin atang Secter cittur

ECD - 1002 Divetrati

maicycon-hunting milligence

inttligence -

not to helene foreiating

FCD a S0D inflectine

but -

OFFICE ASS TITLE

SIGMATURE

7-62 1954

SECRETion.

140)

---

## Page 119

SUBJECT

-

SCARET

-AT.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FILE AIMGEN

i tie save up was who Bren

Di Jelle

Wu anteratin Compene

De Jean I said he Miher deGeet

A que some into to Gritrinor

éuse

Giving avaus of de scan -

DST says no recruitinct

agreed duo au accut

Pocksotan-Causdicu. Beut.-

M'as eradi fit flip Cros -

OFFICE ADO TITLE

SIGNATURE

1.6Y 1954

140)

---

## Page 120

RISECRETS

MEMORANDU:A FOR THE RECORD

dinal Missendie is posities

le He was not in Guirecu

Met he Debat, Cist -0 50492620 62.

2. There were dió recriutucus

This polite.

InU is established to un

Surrecan Section Then peril

2ie, Nescute's clain, Fillai

bek This dis 111-16 case,

Dir. 60-90461 - in jolice

/. Perica Sectin, Petiti tols

ADO TITLE

SIGNATURE

7-68

1954

(ec)

CLASSIPICATIOS

...

---

## Page 121

SUEDICT

CTASSITICATION

UATT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORO

Coi-l1 diiütelie

TILL NUNGIK

E 3tn yo cufne ie le

mwwin acloin tasaian

"ini'sc

A Everieciad dliee ssin pir

rejirte.

A verus M0 li Seeit tuele Reere kei

sectim N uirerei hove .uo

nolehu earung atmel

recruitmauts auid asceitites,

etmtantr innizeucitl

SICAELIDN - MUTrEL

Meisuii in pur dana - tlea

1121127024

Peres a Malcs i

Teard N weled ter- be

ETuCe CucenTC Uno, ahrna

ztirte audi lice ogetije

urta amimianncn

sccriarelt

tê daien ancl

Taresit

OTFICE AND TITLE

. 62 1994

CLASSIFICATION

SIGNATURE

aritrr s

ixcasi

180)

-imges Mriarigi a.

---

## Page 122

14-000014

--an.-.

URJECT

GLA-OPOILAIIIN

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PECORD

A TA

15 кон маʼям

FI08 AIG.TR

SKESriEEN - Stepsferg Casr

Cincs.e.2.de

Iteuis

A NUNe MEeeS TCh SEVENSIN

cii й peer as tunch banucsenenn.

Aiers hedareni Saece2it bure

eurta fcclen pirneinie - dec!s

Elcoiesi Porean

trl diéidiceta

Gupfatis

susiigidupeatrus ausea

aud tioore icentiticiien aui 1

MuaN Sicrier usid Múiia eun

scsii to limênica Pereré cite

fimich perte e tei, coner

In Vecuune Stliostürs ded uik

PULTT FeCuEn - A CouCel lu coCTi.

-meaphe Sivotri Ftastd liarei)

eis omcaus tE55r

OFFICE AND TITLE

ORI

1954

SIGNATURE

Lii.silücien

CROUTi

aTUon.1G

CLASSITICA:ION

(a0)

---

## Page 123

14-0490d 4-7

INAL

: ONLY

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

cour?

_NTIAL

I SECRET

SUB.ECT

FROM:

(Optonal)

ISTRICA

TNO

DATE

Chief, SR Vivision

"jiveer designcion, room numbor, and

buttong)

1.

C/CI

2.

3.

sle,

SAugust 1954

CoMes do aer oct as cour do a tea team

DECEIVED

DATE

" !-i

SECRET - EYES ONLY - BY LAND

hi Trenkit

7.

8.

10.

11.

12.

13.

15.

610 v1

formous

SECRET

22247

CONFIDEMTIAL

NTER.YA

ISE ONL

UNCLASSIFIED

i. rises

---

## Page 124

14-00000

• saras pause.

".

5 Migust 1961

SUBJECT:

chici, C! Staff

GOLITS. conTents

on the

Introduction and General issessent

1.

connents

Lorene wise the val and said bore inmit's

must be borne in mir

that

alicugh his

current coments do not provice mu.

that is ei GOLITSY, hinsel: has alays been a joy to our

understanjing of the doSEii case... In 1902 HOSENKO's in-

'ormation las closely reyes to what lie could presune to be

a KGu dazare asses..unl of üOLlISY.i's defection, a

fact

which se only

notic'. un co-parison of NOSEiio's inforna-

tion with GOLITSY,'s.

Similarly, what GOLITSY: had told

us about Department "y" ensoled us to see hoi such a high-

Furthernore, his most

recent consents do in fact provide useful support to our

analysis nhich had

to assess how much GOLITSi:: may be

in a position to hel

in our assessment and future handling of Nosetto and other

ramifications of this KGb

provoca.ion.

His value and future

contribution can be assessed on several levels:

How much new hard infornation can he

contribute?

How nuch new insight can he provide us

through his olin knowleije of KGB procedures and

personnel applied to tha naterials of this case?

c.

How much guidance can he provide in our

future nanipulation of these operations and in

breaking KROTKOV and NOSEWD?

Point "a" is discussed in pararraph 5 below.

aro several

the total of neir hard facts

is not great.

expected hin

that which we completed

And in point

he hiself adits to having no idea aboit hor to break

...:

---

## Page 125

4-00000

.......

- 2 .

inserto and sollo!, other than to point out that it will

•e most dificult, that lo uced to

do

and proparation before prococuing to an

active

attenpt ti

do so (including perines uncovering a penetration of the

U. S.

tabassy,

osco: first), and that ve should use well

qualified interrogators.

is are faced at this point with the eminently con-

plicated tasi of breaking roseano.

(chile proparing to do

so we are keeping hin productive and exanining the ranifi-

cations of the opcration.)

Our great reed now is for hard,

incontrovertible

facis with wich lie can confront dosENko,

to prove to hin that our conviction about his guilt is

based on sorething nore than analysis, which is what he

cvidently thinks it is.

For this,

our only innediate

asset is GOLITSYY, who locms so importantly as a factor in

this operation.

lie therefore hope,

despite GOLITSYN'S

relative lack

of contribution thus far

to exhaust all pos-

sibilities and get froz him every possible detail.

Therefore,

since there are many loose ends and unclear bits fron his

29 June report, we are preparing followup questions for

Some of these questions

arc attached hercto as Attachaent A.

GOLITSYN's principal report on the NOSENNO case

contained in the oral presentation of 28 June 1964.

background for his study of the case, GOLITSYN was

wide range of materials on "OSENKO including 113 pages of

responses to specific questions GOLITSY.i wanted put to

NOSENKO (see attachnent B for a listing of all materials

pertaining

to NOSENKO wnich were

to GOLITSYN).

addition, GOLITSYN was given the CHEREPANOV papers with

supporting documentation, as hell as the KROTKOV case and

manuscript, the

BELITSilY, the UNACUTE and POPOV cases.

In general, this was nearly everything available to us in

our analysis of 25 March, ll lay and 8 July, with the ex-

ception oi the SCOTCH case.

That GOLITSYN said

Statements of fact: What GoLlisty could contribute

in the for of personal inculedge,

as against supposition,

is sunnarized in the subparagraphs below.

Connents on each

point are appended there

appropriate.

Several of these

points are

assistance, but

certain aspects of their

content or presentation

leakers their impact or opens then

and the source's accuracy to sone question.

"."

?

---

## Page 126

14-00000

-3 -

a. This mon is the person he

says he is,

Yuriy Ivanovich dosiio,

the son of forier :linister

NosENio, and he

really was a XGs officer.

Coments:

(1) COLITSY: Arous this bacause he says

he knew doobie personally, havin net hia tic

or three times in II/ll in

1953 when GOLITSYN

was there on

other business.

NOSENKO occasionally at work in 1953-1959.

1955-195950 met

GOLITSYS asked NOSENKO where he worked,

and sa sadle de tour we be actorie

joLlisyd asked hir about CilUka..ov.

In addition,

•NOSENIO and GOLITSYN "know one another indirectly

their comon friends CHURANOV, GUX,

KASTIEYEV, etc.

the photo of GoLfistv end,

however, could not identify

when told wio it was,

repeated his carlier statements that he had

never net GOLITSY and would of course remerber

if he had.

He had once been shown a group phot

It is difficult to sce why NOSEiKi

about this,

since le clearly could

check through GOLITSYN and a contrary statesent

would throw

innediate doubt on SOSENKO's bona

fides, and there would apparently be nothing for

him to lose merely admitting it.

This raises the

of why GOLITSYN might lie about this

point, sinilarly not very casy to answer.)

?

b. NOSENKO served in II/1/1 from 1953 until 1957

and was specifically responsible during the

period 1953-54 for Anerican military personnel in the

In 1955-57-58 he may have had the same

responsibilities, or may have been working against

other Embassy personnel or correspondents, but was

definitely in II/1/1.

Connents:

(1) NOSEVKO says he was in II/1/1, working

Milt ay personate on last 1953 until nsa-195s,

military personnel,

and clains then to have transferred to the 7th

S42 093

mantuit

---

## Page 127

14-00000 4200П000"

(Tourist) Departont of the Second Chief

Directorate (11/7).

(2) In our mun analysis of tSENkO's

story

(11 "lay report) die had expressed doubts

that

"UsE"*D actually even served in the Areri-

can

Department at ill

since ho was so vague

about

dotails he should have linoun,

since le

vas suspiciousl; self-cuntradictory dout shon

hẹ

entorou and what ho did,

and since his later

period ii laat Departront (1900-62 is clcarly

a complete fabrication.

POSENKO served fron 1957 or 1953 in the

Tourist Department (II/7), where in 1959 he was a

senior case officer.

Connents:

As noted above, this contradicts

NOSENKO's story of having nade this transfer

in mid-1955,

three years thus coating legend is trying

to cover up.

This suggests to GOLITSYN that

there was

some success

in the Enbassy during

his period

which is supported by other ob-

¡crvations (see below).

12 There is reason to doubt the validity

of GOLITSYN's statement, since NOSENKO is in-

dependently known to have been involved in at

least one, and perhaps two, strictly tourist-

type operations involving U. S. citizens in the

period 1956-195s.

One was Richard BURGI, whom

NOSENiO recruited in June 1956 in the company of

Inatoliy KOZLOV, Chici of 11/7, who has confirmed

NOSEiKO's story and identified his picture.

There was possibly one other American, Gisella

Haentified his photo end he claims

in 1957 (she tentatively but uncertainly

whom, Sir Alan Lane,

(lans GERKEN'S,

a German and fu SUENDER, a Norwegian) have not

yet been identific.

---

## Page 128

1400009 +t.---,f--0--........

-5.

(3)

Supporting GULITSY.''s statenent,

holiever, are

the

following poinis:

(a) DERIABLY considors it cuite

possible that an dericon bepartient man

night ba used in a Tourist Depariient opera-

tion, if

had qualifications needed and

others vere not availabla at the tina.

There is an

outsiie chance that this

what happened here.

In the 1962 meetings with CIA,.

NOSE to clained to hara personai

Licipated in the reco. feat operation in

1956 against U. S. Lonssy security officer,

Edward Smith.

then caronted in 196f with

this carlier statere

Ose:k0 vigorously

His carlier clain cosld thus

have been a slip,

or perhaps nerely a gratui-

tous boast (paralleling his 1962 clain to

have been involved in the October 1959

attempt against Russ Langelle).

(c) NOSENKO has reported personal par-

ticipation in only a fen checkable tourist-

line activities during the years 1955-58

although his year 1959 is replete with then,

alnost all confirned independently.

(d) The only other indepercently known

activity of XOSENKO during this period was

two trips to England in August 1957 and

October 1950.

these, he clains, vere merely

to serve as watchdog

for trio Soviet sportinn

groups (and to sive hin sone flavor of the

They could presiably hare taken hi

fron 1l1 just as well as trom 11/7.

d. NOSENKC did not work in 11/l at any time in

1960, and therefore it is unthinkable that he was there

for the one year 1961 either.

Corments:

(1) This confirus our finding, as reported

in 11

ilay report.

(2) GOLITSts cliiis to laor this because he vias

....-

:

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## Page 129

14-00000977

-6.

axare in dotail of who served in 11/1/1 until

les die he referscow and till la December

1950 and tallied with the then head of 11/1/1,

in

would have known

the section

tien at all, nuch less

as deputy

chier.

However:

- NOSENKO

las away in Cuba until 13

December 1960

and thus nay not have

there at the tine. Nonetheless,

the fact that he lad beco.c Deputy

would presumably have come out of

GOLITSY"'s talks with koUSiluk, anyway.

- GOLITSYS had earlier said that PETROV

was chief of I1/1/1, GRYAZIOV the

materials.

KOVSHU! was, of course, named

by GOLITSYY many times as an active case

officer in II/1/1.

Contrary to NOSENKO's statenent that GORBATENKO

remained as chief of Il/1 until 1959, GOLITSYN knew that

GORBATENKO was sent as senior KGB advisor to Hungary

shortly after the llungarian Revolution, probably about

January 1957.

Cornents:

(1) Since this is a high-powered job and

represented a promotion, GOLITSYN thinks it may

well have been given to

GORBATEiNO as a result of

success in operations against the American Embassy,

specifically a recruitaent.

GOLITSYN thinks NOSES*

nay be covering this up by changing the dates of

GORSATEVKO's transfer,

and associates this with

KOl'S:lUK's trip to the

sumably to follow up or complete a loscow

1957, pre-

recruitment about whici triy

YOSEKO also gav

apparent disiniormation,

it to the

lic all agree

is unlikely,

espccially

since "AReY" left loscol in the spring of 1954).

....i

178279459

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## Page 130

14-00000

49+0+++27799-999967

=7 -

Since the

perind involi. mure is the sa::e

one

GOLETSY:

thin's to.

• is covering up

his

in

on biography (1955-1, this night indeed

be a clue to an important ponceration.

(2) te are examining U.S. Enhassy departees

froT 110500w during 1956,

and

are arcoarin

presenting

the

circuastances

of one possible paper

theory.

NOSENKO diu,

in 1957 or 1958, not in 1951, and this was the reason

he was transferred out of the nore sansitive imerican

Departuent to the Tourist Department.

Conment:

(1) GOLITSY! also said that the events

It is not clear, in fact, whether GOLITSYN

knows or supposes that this caused cOSEVO's

transfer out of Il/1 into I1/7.

The post of Assistant Section Chief -- which

GOLITSYY Says MOSEsKO claimed to occupy

in 1960-62--

in 1959, those holding this title being

made senior case officers.

Note:

GOLITSYN is apparently confusing

POM"ACH! (Assistant to the Chief

Not bolts do an a that or aches

officers, while Zannaches continue to

GOLITSYY nust also believe

since he has reported GRYAZ.OV

as Zannach Il/1/1.

6. Statements of opinion:

In addition to the opinions

GoLitsyy provided

ictailed

u! and large, these nerely

provile additional support

for opinions alreaily presented

....

...-

---

## Page 131

in our earlier reports on this operation.

GOLITST: concluded

without joubt that dustilo is a kos provocateur,

that the

operation could only have been run nich lUScio!'s personal

approval, and that i is desired asons other things to hidc

various penetrations, one perhaps ralated to the POPOl co:!-

protise,

and sone of

then throatened by loads provided

by

COLITSY:

tie

considered that

the

rosesko operation

is

being

run in close coordination "ith

the tratiot and CHEREPAXOV

provocations,

and that in order to carry out his mission

properly doSENKO nust kao: many of the significant truths

the l'0ò is trying to hide or protect.

Ile belicves that nuch

since ail of this lias

dealt with in detail in our earlier analysis, it is zady heen

peated in the body of this enorandus.

David

Chief,

Attachaents A and B

..is

---

## Page 132

покераторо

Questions 1or GOLlTiX: based on 29 lee Intervies

That is your

opinion of the concral accuracy of that NOSENiO

has reported

iris organization

and personnel assignients?

(Aside fron ops and

speciai incidents canacted with provocation)

Any contradictions totreen your present knoiledge and the

information he provided

re who was were when? (iside fron

GORBATE ND's departure date)

In your opinion, rould the KG3 give MOSENKO carte blanche to

tell. the truth

personnel (including photo

idens) and procedures?

to make najor lies

¿such as Stuzisa, restorate be To eddy enafia organization

What are tha

re personnel specific points you think Nosesko is lying about

You reported earlier that PETROV was chief of the lst (Embassy)

section of the Aneriran Departnent, anc GRinzid, the deputy,

NOSEYKO reports KOVSsilk had Ion been the chief,

PETROV never had been, and GRYAZNOV only becane deputy after

NOSENKO left in January 1962. ilow do jou explain NOSENiO's

statement?

That is your opinion about the general intoration NoSe.yxo

the totals he reported

identified, knoun of useless - and 5 A-erican tourist company

personnel?

Do you know anything about the relative success in recruiting

tourists prior to 1961?

Any considered solid or important?

Did you have direct, earlier, knowleage of NOSENKO's career

and activity? liad you heard about his trouble with women,

the flagle reports as having occurred in 1954?

(The trans-

cript leaves it unclear wether it was your belief that it

happened in 1957-53 or whether it was hard fact.)

Could you provide details of the

approrisate date, location,

circusstances under which you net NoStiko cach tine?

---

## Page 133

.?.

Do you hun for a fact (or did you hear fres die personnel)

the Most ye eyer tety or cores out cap

is that merelys

you cver leare of hin bofore 1053?

vid you ever hear anything about losenko's background other

than his

father, i. c.

nig GiJ service,

schooling

Institute

(especially

of foreign Rélations), residences (incluling dacha),

neighbors?

Can you describe the Obzor you sal: on

the loPoV case, par-

produced in this or other standari fornue re all ozors

You have reported that a iGB officer named KOTOV, formerly

in Yugoslav ops

suspected POPOl and was sent

no kolov an on in the period concerned on a you near

ie know of

Mikhail ZHUKOV?

•ould you give us more details

on KOTOV, such as full name, description, career?

and you have any knowledge of direct contact between NOSENKO

NOSESTO clains not only to have been a

comment even prior to the time you left helsinki. Can you

What can you say about the selection of NOSENKO for the

gland in August 1957 and Octoder 1958

rips to fkely for Tourist or inerican Departuent officer'

How about the Cuba trip, 1960, and Bulgaria 1961?

thy, in your opinion, might he have changed his "traveling"

---

## Page 134

14-0904 400г140

order si passing to CoLTiete, titi

1. Cogies of first four substuntive cables fro: Geneva

reistin; circunstances of

contact with us in June

including first neeting with turk and first

Copies of transcripts of all nectings between CIA and

NOEENNO in 1963 (3 March 1901)

3.

Copies of all transcripts of Geneva

nicetings, January.

ebruary 1064. (A11 passed to GOLITSYi by 15 March 1964

4. Report of biographic infornation provided prior to hostile

interrogation.

(17 April 196+)

• Copy of «OSENkO's handwritten notes and documents hi

brought out with hin in 1964.

(Passed in mid-April)

Resune of first week's hostile interrogation.

8. NOSENKO's connents on KROTIOV's manuscript "Fear".

(Passed in mid-April)

9. Cozalete collect onto explan tory ific reone hode by

Yosaiko to date,

notation.

10. Questions re NOSENKD for GOLITSYN (passed in mid-April).

Special questions passed

on 15 June and 22 June.

11. CHEREPANOV papers. (22 April 1964)

security (WINTERS,

including his

ops activity; BOWDEN;

LINGELLE; LIEBERIAN; Eiward SIT; MAS:ENKO; Leonid GRAV).

3. List of questions KHOlklY suggested be put to doSen

order to

confir

and clarify info given by KROTKOV.

---

## Page 135

14-00090 -м.. -

...

i canar-.

•2÷°

• .

14. Copies of two i porps arupared on tos audio technical

of GOLITSi: infor-

1a on On door, another based on sustaro inforaation

1961.

15. KOBLOV CaSC (ACFOSDICK) 110y.

IZABOLDLY

17. Transcripts and chronology with background siotch

on SELITSilY.

18. File sunaary on FEDOROY aka RAZIs. (11 May and 12 June)

19. Charts Ie YOSENÃO CI production (leaus). (1l May)

20. Chronologies on koslluk, GUk, FOll. and IVAsoV.

21. Outline of infornation on KiB structure and personne:

assignments as reported by rOSENKO. (11 May)

22. ARTA:IONOV casc. (Novender 1963)

(November 1963)

23. PENKOVSKIY case.

24. POPOV case. (November 1963)

25. Ansliers ta special questions posed by GOLITSYN and asked

of NOSENKO in interrogations in !lay 1964.

Total 113

pages; all questions

answered and passed

by 12 June.

---