## Page 1

14-00000

104-10210-10021

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992-

TOP SECRET

1. Attached is Annex A of the Top Secret study

entitled, The Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB

Defector - Yuriy 1. JOSESKO dated February 1968 (copy 10).

Copy 10 of this study had been forwarded to you earlier

for your revier.

2. Certain portions of Annex A of this study are

deleted since it contains information which bears on the

security of ongoing, viable CIA operations, or is related

thereto.

3. He request return of the study (copy 10) and Annex A

when your revier has been completed.

Attachment: As Stated Above

WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS

INVOLVED

E2 IMPDET CL BY 011340

...i..

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 2

14-00000

Top Secret

Annex A

Statunente of Soviet Dificials dUouG MOSENKO

1 February 1964

NOSENKO defected in Geneva.

& February 1964

The Chief of the sovlet Disarmament Delegation notified

the Soviet Ambassador

in Bern shortly before noon that

NOSENKO had disappeared, correctly placing the date as

4 Pebruary.

They

speculated privately between

that he night have been "poisoned"

themselves

or injured in an auto-

mobile accident.

& February 1964

An official spokesnan of the Sovier Mission In Geneva

reported to the

swiss police that

NOSEYKO, an

"axpert

temporarily assigned to Geneva", had been aissing for four

days.

2 Pebruary 1964

Evening

news broadcasts in Geneva carried reports

attributed

to

both Sovlet and Swiss sources that NOSENRO

had disappeared.

10 February 1964

The Swiss press quoted

unidentified Soviet sources

as saying it was presumed that NOSENKO had defected.

361

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

copy

10

---

## Page 3

Top Secret

(Annex A)

10 Eebruary 1964 Montlaued)

A U.S. Department of State press

identifying

NOSENKU 3S

KGs officer

request for political asylum

1 11

the

release

was

issued

and

acinowledging

h18

United

States.

According

to i

sensitive

source,

Me 2-1ert Matabate, 300

76518

44552214

h5938p.

Because of his

10ng

tenure

in

the

Important

NGH.

NOSINKo would have a great deal of

informaTiOn

which he could lapart to Intelligence

agencies of other countries.

Certainly.

he would be

acquainted with

many

KCB employees and

could identify then.

He also would

be

intimately acquainted

wich a large number

of Sovlet

agents

working

and

Inside the USSR against American

British

nationals.

According to

a sensitive

Grant ge

source,

Ile bulk of NOSENKO's inowledge concerning

KGB

activitles. would revolve around the intelligence

operations of the iCH In Moscow and also KGB personalitles

working in Headquarters.

NOSENKO waS also undoubtedly

familiar with all NCB personalltles in

Geneva and certainly

kneu some KGB personalities in other courtles.

Comnent:

NOSENKD identifled a number of KGB officers in

Geneva;

he

asserlid chat sone othera..koown

by CIA

be

connected with the KGB, were not.

362

Top Secret

TS. No. 197124

Copy.

---

## Page 4

Top Secret

(Annex A)

10

February 1964

(continued)

Accordinz to a

sensitive source

NOSENIO was affiliated with the KGB for

approxiancely

sixteen years,

since about

1947, end was

an

employee

of

che Second Chlef Directorate

in Moscow. His

father,

dead, was a Deputy to the Prise Minister of the

Soviet

Union and

also

Minister of the

shipbuilding Industry.

There

is a

shipyard naged

after NOSENKO's father in che

Ukraine.

Comment:

NOSCAiU claims to have served in the GRU

until

1953, when he entered the lGß.

According to a sensitive source,

#several KGg

It appeared quite certain to 4811310s45

officers that NOSENKD had the rank of lieutenant colonel 1n

tie KG3.

Commen.t.:

JoStrio was at the time claiming to have been.

a Kid ileutenant colonel.

According to a sensitive source,

Enous from ECB officers orienez

The

photograph

in l'.s. newspapers

not that of

NOSENKO OnE

Listene

worked with

NOSENKO for several years

in KGB

Heaiquarters; he described NOSENKO aS

a person

who

11kes to be fashlonably dressed at all times

and is fond

of women, by nature a friendly individual and generally

well-liked by his fellow workers.

NOSENKO worked in the

Second Chief Directorate.

363

Tos Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy.

10

---

## Page 5

Top Secret

(Annex A)

10 Februery 1964 (continued)

Comment:

824454

ssa,.:The photograph accompanying Americen

and Swiss press accounts of NOSENKO's defection

wus by cronr not chat of NOSENdo but'of

a sensitiye source Vladimir THUSID "clean" soviet diplomat at the

1denrifiud as a

Geneva Disarmament Conference.

the publicity accompanying che defection

of KG9

officer NOSENKO in Switzerland,

GORITSYN recalled that

NOSENKO had been a Second Chlef Directorate officer working

agaluat American citizens.

Comment:

Routinely, GOLITSYN had reviewed In March 1962

(before NOSENKO contacted CIA) a list of

Soviet delegates to the Disarmament Conference.

NOSENHO'S name, which was on the l1st, did not

at that time prompt any conment iron golilsyN.

11 February 1964

Ambassador DOBRYNIN informally notified the Departoent

that a Soviet note would be delivered later to

how NOSENKO had left Switzerland, to request his release,

and to denand an Inmediate Intervlew with him.

12 February 1964

S.K. ISARAPKIN, the head of the Soviet Delegation to the

Disarmasent Conference,

press conference

in which he strongly condemned the sules authorities for

permitting NOSENKO's "kidnapping" and for hindering efforts

to locate him.

TSARAPKIN demanded that immediate arepo be

taken to return NOSENKO to Soviet custody..

•364

Top Secret

simplicitit

TS No. 197124

Copy -

---

## Page 6

Top Secret

(Annex A)

12 February 196% luntinued!

AL

simultaneou: press

conferences in

sein and Geneva,

the

Swing rejecied these

arcusations. of non-cooparacion and

noted

the souler delay In 311191.e the police of doSEstos disappea-

rance did soviet

¡allure to cooperate wiih Swias authoriiles

in locating NOSENiA.

The

soviet nott

earller promised by DOBRININ was delivere!

to,the

State Deparinine.

A nonccamittal reply

was given

Soviet

querles concerning the requested

interview and

the

neans of NoSEYko's

jeparture fron Switzerland.

The Swis; Embassy asked

for a

meeting with wOSEiKo

order

to obtain assurance that the

defection

had

been:

voluntary.

Arrangements

were made to

have

NOSENKO

Silss and Soviet representatives

in

äashington

as

900n

possible.

nect with

as

NOSENKO arrivid

in Washington at 2130 hours.

22-13 February L9t4

14 February 1964

"In Moscow, Sovlet Foreiga Minister GROMYKO read to

Ambassador KOHLER

statement deploring the "evasive"

reply

of the State Departuent to Soviet inquirles in Washingion

and terming the whole event of NOSENKO's disappearance a

365

Top Secrat

TS No. 197124

copy 10

---

## Page 7

Top Secret

(Annex A)

14 February 1964 (continued)

"¡ross provocation by derrican lacelligence organs".

СКОЧіКО

repeniod the demand for NOSENKO's arsediate release

fron American cuitody.

Tie Counselor of lle Swiss

Enhassy

interviewel YOSENKO at

thie washingion offices of

che

U.s.

Inmigration

and Naturall-

zation Service.

Thie

soilet confrontatio?

Inrediately after-

wards was handled by

Minister counselor G.4. KORNIENKO, and

Third Secretary.V.F.

IrAdOV, a recent

arrival in washington.

JOSEND told boch the sigs

and the soviets that he had

defected of his own irre will after careful consideration

and that he ind

no desire to retura to the soviet inion.

I n

response to MORalENtO's questions, he spacificaliy renounced

his status and

righis

as a soviet

citizen.

18 February 1964

FEllks NOVALEV, a Soriet

diplomat in Buenos Alres, told

a CIA

agent that

he had

artended

the

Institute

of

Inter-

national

Relations

with

VOSESKO.

Accordiag io

KOVALEV.

NOSENKO

had

twice

married, had

good fanily backg-ound,

was

che

son

of a

Minister

in the

Government,

was notorious

for

his

"adventurous"

nature,

and

"famous

for his character".

158872RERESSTRY

366

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Сору -

To z.

---

## Page 8

Tag Segret

(fanta

A.)

367

TS No: 197124:

---

## Page 9

Top Secret

REFERESS

SEHNERAR SIAR SEIEN DESIEN

EN FANN ANE34527230

attent

ЙЕТЕІНИХ

15728199

1895041

8/336x30.

2316 7377

SUITTALLES

BESSERES

20074745

17111154534

445 10XF0

57771

NTACH3

NEBTERINES

NUES MEEN

147P57

E1528

31113

MISTESSI

CLAN

2368:

Top Secrot

TS No. 197124

Сору

---

## Page 10

Top Secret

According to a sensitive

source

MINESE

for

about id

year:

employees

oi

this

of

the

KGB

and

Directurate.

had

been

the

cond

Chief Directorate

3 1

as

almo

all

of

the

nirectorate.

He was

aware of the structure

many

personnel

o! the

Firet Chief

NOSENKO.

Deputy

to the Chief

oftlie

rerenth

Depariment; had

1 n

his

possession a telephone

directory which

iisted

the

names

of

sose. 10,000 KGB employees

1a MUsCUN.

Only

Chiefs

and

Deputy

Chiefs

these phone books.

of Departuents, had officer

opinion

that

"NOSESKO

expressed

1 s

much

more

CIA

vaivable to the fBl and

than

N38

01eg

PENKOVSKIY becauge

of che fact

that he

knows

80

auch

about

che

methods

of

work of the first and

Second

Directorates

of the KGS and is familiar with so many

indivijuals

1n

the

KGB

both

in Moscow. and abroad. @alesala KGB officer

Sunna sald

at

PLNKOVSKIY

was able so furnish American and

British

In

gence

with a

lot of infornation concerning

defense

se

ets

of

the

more

Soviet Union, but NOSENKO 18 much

knowledgeable

intelligence and counterintelligence

operations

of

the

KGB.

Comment:

NOSENKO has never commented on the KGB

telephone book referred de

i to above.

369

Top Secret

TS No.. 1.97124

Copy 10

et o

---

## Page 11

Tep 290re8

BASIONDE

370

Tan Sacrat

1303291 5 8

TS No. 187124

Pam!

---

## Page 12

According to a sensitive source,

in a resporse do a question

shether inSul'O actually celected or whether z

as the defection night be a

493 "trick", tho source replied that fron his om krowledge of this ratter,

he was convinced that i SEidO's defection was not a "trick" ly the KGB.

22 Fabruary 1964

According to a sensitive source fron conversations with verdous unnamed. KOB

officers: NOBIXO worked arainst perso:nel

stalloned arch.

Madridad

fabasty in tired, and with his

help agents vere diel ped

asyuned by the

ÄGa that he is

familiar

with

the:

I!

is

number and

locatior of micr0....nrs

- 11

clie rabassy.

Comment:

Alchrugh sOSElk" inew

chat there were micro-

phole: in three seneral

locations

in the

Embaisro his specufle information regarding

the number and location

of

microphones was

1l=iced to that contained in a written list

brought to Gereva l1 1964, a l1st which he

clained

no one in

the kGB kara he had.

24 February 1964

Women clalaing in he she wife and

nother of HOSENKO

visited the

ime=iian

imbassy lu loscow for the first tine,

expressing disbellei chat he had

volunta-ily betrayed his

family and count:: und requesting a pessural meeting with

him.

371

Top Secret

z'r.;

TS No. 197124

• " Copy.

10

---

## Page 13

- Sacri

(Annex A)

24 February 196: (continued)

Corrent:

Hostiko conflined their identities as his wife

ind nothi:

the basis

of

physical descrip-

ttons.

on only one previoua uccasion

have

mcabets ui il defector's

family

called

on a

sorelgn cabassy in Moseya.

Following

the

defectiun o: Yurly

Vastlyevich

KROTKOV In

England

1n 1963, his ü1fe

appeared

at

the

Br!lish Erlassy to make Inquirles about him.

According to a sensitive source

824442402344

UNTENTER IDEA TUNTS EATENE MURIANNERE

KUROCHKIN (EnU),

a KGB sui officer schoculed for assizonent to Washington,

will not be sent us he is "well-known" to NOSENKO.

In the

course of-his duties in Moscow, KUROCHKIN had very often

visited the department where NOSENiO worked and, as a

result, HOSENKO 1s "nore than casually acquainted wich his".

comment:

NOSENKO has never 1dentifled KUROCHKIN nOI

referred to the name.

Y

372

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy.

іня ста: нее."

---

## Page 14

Top Secret

(Annex A)

February 1964

Nikolay

AKIAMONOV, who defected from the Soviet Navy in

the late

1950's, noted the pubilelty accompanying NOSENKO a

defection.

He volunteered

to ClA that he attended a naval

preparatory school with the son of Miniscer NOSENKO in

1944-1946.

Coament:

ARTAMONOV's description of the school and of

the dates involved differs from those chaindd

by NOSENKO.

KGB officer Vladimir TULAYEV mentioned NOSENKO to a

CIA double agent la Vienna. IULAYEV said that NOSENKO,

whos he knew-well, came from a wonderful family, loved

wife and children, ind earned a good salary.

(TULAYEV

later said on another occasion that he had friends who

knew NOSENKO well.)

his

Comment:

NOSENKO rever identified TULAYEV by nage or

photograph.

When

asked, NOSENKO denied

knowing him.

373

Top. Secret

T3 No. 197124

Copy 10-

cos rein.

---

## Page 15

Ton Beerst

February-March 1960

LINTELE

According to a sensitive source:

A KG3 conmiasion

was in

ine proces!

of

by lUSENkO's

siudjing

the

scale

0:

109g

{caused

defection)

the

USSR.

The

commlision

very

The

jarge, forked

fron

different

of

the

(s1:)

"because

departeents

KGB.

study

Wag

made

supPosed

that

NOSEirO had

досецв

папу

rocket

cat

to

tan y

nuclear

matters, to

cany

strategical

obtecta

che

cuuntry. many

details

about

11 fe

ot

the

leaders

of

the

country,

1 n

the

governnent...that

he knew

very

much

-bout internal

relations

between

the people working

in the

KGB .

chat

t.c

had

Дапу

close friends among them and (spent)

days

and

nighta

together

with

then.

The whole

hisdory.of

b1s

life was

studied

step by step

very carefully."

KEyS

TS. Ma, 197124

---

## Page 16

Tora Sest

12:1i

According

to a

source,

with various unnamed. KGB

officers disasti

NOSENKO knows many

of the chiefs ind

departnents

copulles

uf

the Ko? directorates

and

at KGb

ieadquarte:

in Mosccu.

In KGB

Head-

quarters

four

separate dining rooms for

personnel

"lio

work

there;

onú.

such

dining

reon is reserved

for

chiefs

and

deputies

o.f

dipartients.

Because of this

fict,

NOSEYKO

has

vast

knowledge

the hierarchy of

the KGB.

ConTent: MUSEliD never referred to

the dining rooms

until the

January-March

1965

interrogations,

when

he

volunteared

hat

he

had

eaten

occasionally

i n

the

"chiefs'

dining

room

375

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy 10

---

## Page 17

Top Secret

(Annex. A)

STACE JAP

SEATNEY

ATETELT: 1012355443522NE2199SDTNETST9TSS11SEC

SENT ANDELSE TIMINGHATION

side twitt

ANNE FEAST SEEIN

EINEIRENNADIDNITE 211221111

52094563

"ЗУСТУТ

1515074549

N111Y4394

23. March 1964

The tso women

claiming to be the wife and nother of

NOSESKO made

the

last

of

five visits

co the Embassy

in

MOScOW.

NOSENKO's wife

had explained that she reguired

some definite stateuent in writing fron her husband so that

she could plar for her own

fulure and

that of the NOSENKO

children.

-376

do top Secret

:TS No.. 197124

сору .

---

## Page 18

Top Secret

(AnnEX A)

27

March

1964

According to a

sensitive source

various unnamed

KGB officerse

330 :

There soons

to be unaniaous

opinion among arian KGB

culets

= that NOSENKO...could

do the KCB a tre-

trendous

amourt of harn.

NOSENKO in his position as a de-

puty

chief is one of the departients of the Second

Chief

Directorate could

have

been entitled

to have one

personnel

directory

of approximately 30 pages setting for the iden-

titles us all of the supervisory officials

in KGB Head-

quarters.

BoSEYKU would

also have had a 100-page directory

11sting by

nate and telephone number all the rank-and-file

employees corting in

The opinion was expressed by

some chay iü3 "chiefs"

were merely able lo make these tio directories

available

to American

Incelligence, the KGB would be severely damaged

for the present and

for several years to come.

certain-

Comment:

JOSENKO has never

referred to the KGB direc-

tories described.

31 March 1964

KGB officers I.l. PETUKHOV nad P.P.. BORISOV in Canada

told their agent George Herman SPRECHER to cease all intel-

Ilgence activity for a year, to destroy any incrioinating

materials in his possession

as well as to

supply the Soviets

witi passport photographs so that "escape" docuscats could

be prepared for himself and his family.

SPRECHER asked

whether the action had any connection with NOSENKO's recent-

ly publicized defection, but che

KGB officers denied it;

asserting NOSENKO "was just a secretary".

..., D..

377

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy 10

---

## Page 19

Top Secret

(Annex A)

31 March 1944

(continued)

CosTent:

Khen PETUNHOV recontacted SPRICHER 1n February

1965, PETUKHOV acknowledged that NOSENRO had

in fact been the

causa of KGB Cincern, that lie

had had sume connection ulch NOSENEO, and

DOSENKO may have

in Jwn

something of what the

iGB was doing In Carada.

HOSENKO described a KGB Illegal, whose name.

sids untanwa to hia, who apperently 18-ideotical

SPRECHER.

Morc: 1954

According to a sensitive source "ha

bricEed

1n his office in KGB Headquarters

Directurate

officer of the American

of that

Deparchent,

1 n

WhIch NOSENKO

defection, were io

shocked

at the

event

mention 1t at all.

F7000,

by

a Second Chief

Departuent:

Personnel

ad

served until

h10

that they would not

a sensitive

source

Conment:

Inthis

and other contex

amans has

stated

or implied chat NOSENKO

served

in the American

Department 1n 1963-1964:

•BOSENKO aBBErIO be

left the American

DePATERADE

January

1962

and

served

in

the

Seventh:Department until blo

defection.

378

Top Secret

TS No.: 197124

---

## Page 20

Top Secret

379

Top Secret

TS. No. 197124

Copy

10

---

## Page 21

Top Secret

(Annex A)

KGB offIcer G.i. VLAMIY, CaRe

officer of Robert

Lee

JOHNSON

1 n

Paris,

began

meet

JOKESCY

n

the

atreet rather

than

in various

restaurantg

8 8

had been their

habit.

AL OnE

of their itral

meetings

before

JOHNSON returned to the United

States, MASON told

had

defected

that a Soviet Intelligence officer

the

Americans

in Geneva,

and

unat extreme

câution muse cherefore be exercised

1a JOHSSON's contacte

with

the KGB.

VLASOV

said

that

the defector. could

not identify

JohNSoN but that Jollison should dispode of everyching he had

which

Soviet.

espionage activities. (see

24 fur

cage.)

SHAYNE

May 1964: According to

sensitive source

unidentified

sources,

presumably

fIOn

officers

been.

TWO

commissions

KGB

have

tablished

by

the

C?S!

for the purpoges:

(8)

to

§determine why KGB employees such as DERYABIN, GOLIISYN,

and NOSENKO defected while serving abroad, and (b) to attempt.

to ellainate the

"weak" employees and improve the efficlency

of the KGB.

380

Top Socret.

TS No. 197124

Capy.

---

## Page 22

Top Secret

(annex

)

20

Ma: lyos

According to a sensitive source from a KGB officer

SENTS CANNETT LEGEND TEARIKE

The

KCB

iucky

that

the

Azericang

microphones

1n

che

U.S.

found

only

Enbagsy

Moscow.

Actually,

about 200

nicrophores

were

concealed by

the

Sovicto 1n

the

was

respcrolbla for furnianiag inforsailon

to the Anerleans intch resulted in the microphones being

found.

BOSENKO know

only-the general

locatten

of the 40

microphones which. were fourd and

does

not

neve

any knowledge

of the renaining

ones.

27N277

12 June 1964

Professor John M. THOMPSON reported

at

the

American

Embassy in Moscow that an unnamed

Soviet official with whos

he was acquainted cold hia that NoSeNdo wag a

Wich two wives and many debts

profligate

and 18 considered In

to be someone they are wall std

of.

22

June 1964

According to a sensitive source

Sha (iron varlous unnamed XGB. officers

he consensus amongakGB employeey

1 g

that

in the

future' the KGB will be

feellng sharply the

effects

of NOSENIO's escape to

American

Intelligence.

NOSENKO 1s considered to be vastly.

more laportant

than either

GOLITSYN or DERYABIN.

This

opinion

appears to be based

several factors:

NOSENKO worked

against personnel

stationed

at the American

Embassy In

Moscow and with

his help

agents

were

developed

these

Americans.

Second,

•1.€

18

aBBumed by KGB personnel

that

because

of his closenous to

381.

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

10:

---

## Page 23

Tog

Secret

22 June 1964 (continues)

the -American

Eirbassy in che

past, NOSENKO bould

also be

familiar

with

the

nurber of

installed

@Icrophones uhich

had

been

in she Embassy by the KGB

and the locationa

of

these

microphones.

Third, as a Deputy Chlot of a

depart-

ment,

NOSENYO

would normally

have had access to

telephone

directory

11sding

a11

KGB

personnel in all

dir

ectorates

of

the

111

MOSCUN.

another

factor.

which 18 a

formidable one

1n

the

minds i other iCB exployees, la that NOSENKO

trivelled in a rather influential circle of friends in

Moscow who were high in the Soviet Governnent.

All these

commento

were

cited as reasons

for ROSENKO being an

"Irportant

catch" for Acerican Intelligence, but no one in

the keB

really knows exactly how such information NOSENKO

- had concerning the KGB.

39 June 196i

• GOLITSIN (fron personal

acquaintance): NOSENKO, the son

of the former Minister of Shipbuilding,

wag a KGB

officer

who had worked in the American

Department and the Seventh

Departuent of the second Chief

Directorate.

GOLITSYN, while

on his own Flrst Chief Directorate Duelness, set NOSenko euo

of three times in the American

Embassy Section in 1953.

and lad seen hin occasionally at work during 1958 and 1959.

When GOLIISYN asked him where he was working in 1959, NOSENKO

replied that he was assigned to che Seventh Departuent.

NOSENKO served in the American Embagay Section

fron 1953

until 1957 or 1958, and was

specifically responsihle for

KGB coverage of American ailitary personnel In Moscow during

1953.

For the remainder. of his gervice in the Embagay Section

unt11 1957 or 1958, NOSENKO may have had the same respons1-

billtles or may have been working againat other Embassy

personnel or correspondente, but he was defiaitely in che

American Department during the entire period.

In 1957 01

1958 NOSENKO was transferred

to

the

Seventh Department, and

was a sentor case officer there as of 1959.

NOSENKO did not

work in the Arerican Departuent

of the second Chief Directorate

American Department at any time duriag 1960; GOLIISYN vialted

the Embassy Section

on at leagt, three occagions

1960 to early 1961,

from'early

and would have kaown if NOSENKO had been

In the Section, pariicularly 1f NOSENKO had been Deputy

c.I.

Chief.

GRYAZNOV

was acting as assistant of the Chief of the

Section during this period.

382

Top Secret

TS No.: 197124

---

## Page 24

Top Secret

(AnneX A)

29 June l'ns (continued)

Comment:

NOSENKO clalma he left the Enbassy Section 1n

1955 and

was assigned

to the Seventh

until

DepaItnent

1960, when

he returned

to the Embassy

Section as

Deputy

chief.

NOSENKO did not

Identify COLITSYN's photograph and

had denied

since defection that he has

ever net or even

seen him.

ire 195L

According to a sensitive source

Just

after"

HOSENKO'&.

defection

V.S. MFDVEDEV from the

Exit&

CORmiBBLON

of

the

CPSU

Central Commitler travelled

to

Geneva

to

Bpeak

the

Soviets

stationed there and to

Soviet

delegates

the

azent Conference.

MEDVEDEV underscored

the

BerlOUgDERS

• f

the defection and urged greater vigilance

BUCH

The defection caused

the recall

of

Nina Ivanovna

a KCB secretary in Geneva.

It

FEREMEYErA,

WAB

runored that some.sdxty

Soviet officials statloned abroad would

be

transferred from

their assigiment as a consequence of the NOSENKO affalo.

V.A. POCHANKIN, a KGB OffICer

ith the permanent Soviet

Mission In Geneva, speculated

that

he had been completely

exposed by NOSENKO and would therefore have to retura to

MoscoW.

Yu. I. GUK who was known mats to the disasource

had been discharged from the KGb becausa he had: recommended

NOSENKO's travel to Geneva.

•According to one rumor.

the

chief of the Department in which NOSENKO had been employed,

would also lose his job.

by a sensitive souice

Comment: HEDVEDEV, a KGB officer formerl

y/stationed In

New Yord Clty, was sald by. est

e to

of those from

the CPSU Central Committee sho

conducted intervieus with KGB personneli going

abroad.

Another sensitive source

Top Secret

T5 No. 197124

Cooy

10

---

## Page 25

Top Secret

(Annex A)

June 1964 (continued)

Comment:

(Continued)

mass Counselor of the soulet Mission

at the

l'ilted tationa,

the Cornuniot Party

OrganIzeT

and

possibly a

member of the KGB, but aald that

MEDVEDEV's role 19

not important and

that ho

worked

mainly with the Minfairy of Foredgn Affairs.

POCHANKIN, whO NOSENKO had Identifled as e"

KGis officer, was still 1n

Geneva in Décember 1966.

29 Jul: 1964

According to a sensitive

source

innaned

sources, presumably KCR officerg

N2DS) :

An investigating commission

of

the

CPSU

Central

Commitree checking

into

the

circumstances

surrounding

rosinko's defection

has thug

far been

responsible

for the

expulsion from che KGB

of 15 Second Chief Directorate

employees.

Theisu

from

the

CPSU

ind

Include GRIBANOV, who

was also expelled

was

stripped

of his rank of lleutenant

gene.r.el.

GRIBANOV has been: given a very anall pension.

11ke

an

ordinary Soviet citizen.

This drastic action

was taken

since

the

primary

responsibility for the defection was placed

on

CRIBANOV.

It

was realized that, in addition to belng Chlef

of

the

Second. Chief

Directorate

at

the

time

of the defection,

GRIBANOV

Was

a persunal

frlend

legg

of NOSENKO and

had

ог.

treated

NOSENKO

as

a prolege and had taken many stepa

to

further

NOSENKO'S

career

that

GRIBANOV

within the KGB.

It was

felt

should

have

been

avare of NOSENKO's plana co

defect.

Three

of

CRIBANOV'

dei

puties vere

8130

expelled

from

the

KGB,

one

of

of

Major

[BANNIKOV!.

whom

WAB

General BANNIK

the l1

other

Second Chiet Directorate employees

expelled, some were

found

hava been parsonal frlenda of

NOSENKO and some of

them

were

found to have confided to NOSENKO

details of operations in which

they were working.

S.M.

GOLUBEY.

a KGB officer stationed in Washington, would be

leaving

for

Moscow because the Investigating compission

had determined

that fu.!. Con, a mutual friend of NOSENKO

and

GOLUBEY told

NOSENKO that GOLUBEV had been

assigned

to the Washington

Legal

Residency.

COLUBEV had

himself worked with NOSENKO In XGB

384

Top Secret

IS No. 197124

Сорy.:

---

## Page 26

Top Secret

(Annex A)

22 2u1x 1964 (continued)

Headquarters sometime in the past, but subsequently NOSESKO

and COlUßIV were given

different

a8s1gnnents wichin the KGB

and thereafter did not associate with

one another in the

course uf

chelo dally accivat.es.

Gorient:

NOSESNO ratracted 1n 1965 his earller clales

that GRIbANOV had been Instrumental in his

advancemeat and asgignments.

NOSEYKO Ident1-

fled by name and photograph COLUBEV, uhos he

mad hnous personally since 1959, but Nosedro

said he had nover

worked

w1th him at KGB Head-

quartera since COLUBEV had.always been. in

the

First

Chief jirectorate.

GOLUBEV left for che

USSR

0n 28 hugust 1964.

According

1964

LO&

sensitive source:

The

first

infurration

about

NOSENKO

was

from

KGB

Hea

Iterg

which

the

reported

conclusions

of

the

commission

had

been

appointed

prepare

the

damage

report on

NOSENKO'S

defection.

The

letter,

which

was very

brtef.

said

that

"the

1088

was very

great

and some new foras of

efficient in

the future.

wOrk

shou

ld. be

created to be.

The

before

received

any

"8

Lega

Residency häd.not

reports

conzentailes on NOSENXO's

escape.

383.

Top Secret

TS. No. 1197124

COFY

÷ 10

---

## Page 27

Tep Secret

(Annex A)

November 1964

Asked while visiting the United

S

eg

If the Russian

people

had

been

tuld

of

the ABEL-PO

ERS

exchange.

Soviet

mathematician

K.V. GAMKRELIDZE reP

a d

an

American

acquaintance

that

they knew

Iney

had not been

told

officially but

about

it since there

was

qui

grapevine"

MoscoW.

It was

in

this way;, GAMKRELIDZE

stated;

that he

learned

of

the HOSENKO defection

and

of

1t8

81

gnificance.

According to the

"graperine"

the defection

was

very

damaging

to

soviet Intelligence in that NOSENKO

was

the

Chief of

the American Section,

and

he

knew

the identities

of all Soviet agents in the United

States.

386

Top Secreti

TS No. 197124

Copy -

1..

---

## Page 28

Top Secret

(Anner. A)

Novenber. 1964 (cuntinued)

Corment:

GAMKRFLIDZE is suspected of having connections

with soviet Intelligence because

of hig

statimenta, actions, and unusual

freedon

of

solllary movement while on

visita to the

United

States.

GAMKKELIDZE rebufied a CIA recruitment

attempt in 1964, but

added

chat he

"welcomed

che opportunity to meet with

an American

Inteiligence officer...to compare the Soviet

Intelligence

officers he had

mat with

their

Acerican counterparts.

During

that 1964

meeting GAMKRELIDZE again

raised the subject

OÍ NOSENKO, describing his as

"obviously &

traitor to

his country"

December 1964

a

source

NIkolzy RESHETNYAK, NOSENKO's/roormate in Geneva at

the

time of

his defection,

told sterilias

that he bad been

Interrogated by

the

KGB

In connection alch NOSENKO's defection,

and

that

he

had

later

attended the Moscou trial in

which

NOSENKO

was

sentenced

to

death in absentia. RESHETNYAX

source reported

sp the dismissal. of large

numbers of

KGB officers, including GRIBANOV and GUK.

From what

PESHENYAK sald, earle thought the KGB might go so far

source

387

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy _10

12E2

---

## Page 29

Top Secret

(Annex A)

December 1964 (continued)

as to bend

SOREUDE

NOSENKO.

officer.)

source

the United States to locate and

k111

later Idencified RESHETHYAK aB A KGB

Comment:

NOSENKO 1Jentified RESHEINYAK As a liralnian

M1nistry of FOreIgn Affairo officer on the

staff of the Disarmament Delegation.

29

January 1305

According to a sensitive source

Ifroin conversations with unrecalled KGB officers

It 1s conson

knowledge

among

employees

that GRIBANOV was expelled fron

the KGB and

CPSU

and

1s now on pension, partlal ratier than full.

ад д

result of the NUDENKO defection.

When HOSENKO was being

considered for assiganent to Geneva (1n 1964), a summary

statement of his activitles was prepared in the Second Chlef

Directorate and sent to GRIBANOV.

Thia summary contained

considerable. "comprontsing information"

concerning NOSENKO;

1f acted upon properly, 1t would

have recoved

h1m

fron

consideration

for this trip. GRIBANOY read

the summary

material, ran a line through all of 1t, and. added che note-

tion:

"Send hin to Geneva."

The general. feeling 1o that

GRIBAÑOV was w11ling to overlook a lot of NOSENKO's

deficiencles because of GRIBANOV's long-else friendship

WIth NOSENKO's father.

Comment:

inst maran

NOSENKO orIginally asserted that GRIBANOV

was responsible for sending'hin to Geneva

1964, but after retracting' his claim

that

GRIBANOV had played

any: special

role In his

•assignnents,, he asserted that BANNIKOV. approved

the 1964

trip.

NOSENKO dentes that hia father

and GRIBANOV vere acquainted.

388

Top Secret

TS No:: 897124

Copy -

---

## Page 30

Top Secret

(Annex A)

February 1965

According

to a sensitive source from a KGB officer

defection

he

bias

second

deputy

to the Chief of a department in the

Chiuf

Directorate.

(Surveillance)

whtle working in the Seventh the KGß officer:!

Directorate in

three

separate occasions

participated

in

conferences between

"Isportant prople"

of the second Chief Directnrate and

she

Seveath Directorate. NOSESKO

was present

at all of these.

Although MOStNID ons a Deputy

chief he held only the rank

of captain 1n the ida. Camonasateributed tris (che

the KGB officer

jisparily setween job and

rank)

to the Influence which

GRIBASOV exerted un the behalf of doseiro.

Canaest:

the KGB officer

NOSEtKO has never Identified dema

NOSENKO

always

claimed

that he had been a lieutenant

colonel

1 n

the KGB until Ocrober 1966,

when he

retracted that claim and asserted chat he had

been

ouly a captain.

According to

a sensitive

source from a KGB officer

CEMENTERHEARTS: "GRIBANOV has been disalssed from

the iGS, expelled iron the CPSl, and 18 presently llving on

a suall

pension.

His dismissal occurred lunediately after

NOSESKO's defection.

In

addition, not less than 50 other

people dere disalsird, many of whon were close friends of

GRIBASOV.

Most of chase were from the first and Second

Chief Directorates, with the majority iron the second Chief

Directorate.

The present Acting Chlef of the Second Chief

Directorare is a Major General BANNIK, those

appointment

has not yet been approved by the Centrel Commistee

CPSU.

of the

One

of his deputies is a Major General (E.A.)

SHCHERBAK.

1.2. 111e

389

TS. No. 197124

---

## Page 31

14-00000

Top. Secret

(Аппех А)

& February 1965 (continued)

Corrent:

CAIDANOY was reported in opera donal

corract

wich a sendor Western diplonat

until

late

aurunn life lalmost a year

after dOSENKO'&

defection', when

He turred

over that contact

lu änother

KGB officor.

2 February. 1243

•According to a sensitive source from a KGB officer

The

detectior

і 3

"unpredlitable"

of danage

caused

NOSENKO

knew

feW

empicyces

ine First Chiet Directorate

working

abroad,

but

many

such

enployces

serving

in

KGB

Headquarters

virtue

stein?

then

the

dining

IOOM

which

by

1 5

reserved

for

chiefs

and

deputy chiefs

of KGB

departments.

Eariy June 1965

Iccording

to

sensitive source

conversations

with

officers grantane

Major

General

BASNIKOV

is curcently

temporary

Chief

of the

Second

Chief

Directorate, having

replaced

GRIDANDY who was expelled fron the KGS because he

supported NOSENKO in his career.

GRIBAYOV is working

1n &.

small city outside Moscow as the chlei of security at an

unlaportant willtary plant and la now a "nothing".

390

" 34

Tep Secret

1S No: 197124

---

## Page 32

Top Secret

(Annex ?)

15 Juli

1365

According to a sensitive source froz a KGB officer

SENATE

attended

the

Ковсок нее

1A3

described):

Beeting

of

all

Float Chief

Directorate pe

onnel

a KGB

W38

held

on

15

July 1965.

Headquarters

meeriag

devoted

to che

circumatances

The

Wag

the expulsion

of.

Chief

of

the

Second

(8118185)

Departsent of

the

First

Chief

TARABRIN,

about

three

and

tralf

Directorate, Ye.

A.

Jcaths

earlier.

I.A. BELOV

and othe: officers also

attended

the

meeting.

According

officia!

to

stalenents

made

at

Of NOSESKO the KGB

conducted

8.

after

the

defection

an

exteralve

investigation

to

jeternine which employees

knew

h 1a

end

tre

nature

of

their

relationship.

CiTINg thIS TARABRIN vaS questioned; he sald

he

knew lostiko, but ouly castally and

only because of linited

contacos wichla the joB.

The investigation

deteruined, how-

ever.

¿no: lANdBRI: attended several parties at which NOSENKO

das

PIEBERE.

Girls Invited by NOSEiKO were

a

also there.

SED- (

mas described one such party.

nsitive

nereatter.

TARABRIN

afforded

a hearing and was accusséd of villfully concealin:

•Source

vital inforciation.

As a resull he vas expelled fron the KGB

and the CPSU

and was deprived of all pension rights.

Comment:

NOSENKO had Dost recently asserted chai he net

GRIBAOV socially only

three

times

during his

KGB service, and on each occasior. IARABRIN was

present.

NOSENKO sald be cuice provided girls

fOr GRIBANOV aNd TARABRIN, once in October

November 1963 in circusatances

sinflar to those

referred to.

NOSENKO said that TARABRIY was

Chief of the British Department fron 1958 to

1963, when he became Deputy Chief of "Service

ilo. 2",

the reorganized Counterintelligence

Department of the First Chlef Directorate.

391

Top Secret

1S No. 197124

Copy: 10

3=051

---

## Page 33

Top Secret

(Annex A)

Summer 1955

According tu a sensitive

source

regula of losErko's

55=

axgaiiti

F==I

a==%.

::.=

!..:

*÷st

CaB1:zë2

and secs..:

Chief

Directorate CHAI GRIBATOY had

been expelled

from

the

Party

and fron

the kit.

GRIBAVOY had been especially

friendly with cOSENio, had siven him

many privileges, and

they were "buddles it's

night buddles"

Connent:

SEMICHASTIYY, not

SEROV, was KGB Chairwan In

1965. SEKDY

became head of the GRU in 1958.

Winter

1965-1966

Source,

Hi self-professed former. KGB Second

Chief Directorate agent (fron KGS officer V.G. SVIRIN, &

colleague of her husband at the State Coruittee for Sclence

and Technology (GKKNR) In 1960-1962. 1508AN0131205 sald

Source

that SVIRIN was later head of a KGB unit conducting operations

aga1n8t the American Embassy 1n Moscow):

NOSENKO's father was a Minister

or General and his nother

was

Jewish and

"always Involved in some blacknarketeering".

NOSENKO

was not a KGB officer out a "civilian" connected

somehow with the KGB.

lihen NOSENKO defected, everyone sald

he was detestable.

NUSENKO cold the Americano about the

microphones and things (s1c) in the Embassy.

392

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Сарї.

Snea

---

## Page 34

Source

Top Secret

(Annex A)

Winter 1965-1964 (continued).

COnTerE:

Source

fror.

No allegation

а:1;

source describina.

officer..

is

the single

report

NUSENKO 49

other than

March

1926

According

to a sensitive source,

aver (iron unidentified sources

in Moscow):

NOSE RO.

who

nol personally

known to

sad,

wag

817

Important Source

bos.g.10.8.h0

KCB.. When: HOSENKO bag

young

the GRU

Mill:ary Acadeny and was

then

man,

he was in

gent

to

the

GRU

Information Department for a short

Elme;

1n

all,

perhapa

for a jeat.

NOSENKO had been

while

very

undisciplined

person

In the GRU

and

"not very

good

He

was to have

-been

discharged fron the GRU; however, his father,

who vag

influential person

in the Miniatry

of

able to Bet NOSeNKO

Shipbuilding,

vas

ITAN

the KGB.

It was

the opinion;

of persona to whom

talked that NOSENKO had given

very, very.good infornation

to the U.S. after his defection

and that NOSENKO had

had

which included all means

great

to KGB Inforsation

KGB coverage

of people in

Мовсой,

nicroptione systems in che

embassies, etc.

Based

NOSENKO's Infornation

the American

Embassy found many

of

on

the

mIcrophones.

.393

Top Secret

: TS No. 197124

: Copy

10

---

## Page 35

Top Secret

10:E1i0 has clalded that herrejected an offer

attend tire

Military Diplomatic Academ.

he,. like beatin.

called

the

Milliary

Acadeny),

choice accepting as81gn-

ment

.r.?.

the

Far

Fast

entry to

the

GRU

1 п

1951

At Ene

on

time,

the Military

Diplonatic

Academy

wäs

four-year course;

If NOSENKO

i1d

attend. the

school,

he could not have

setic!

clained

1n. che GRU.

the

sole.

source

(Lesides NOSENKO) who

alleged

•USE

iKO

sarved

in

the

GRU.

-Source

Source

394

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

---

## Page 36

Top sacret

22312 126

AB101

395

Top Secret

TS No... 197124

Copy 10

---

## Page 37

Top Secret

(Annex A)

M1d - 1966

Yurly Deltriyevic! HOROLEV,

a Soviet

journalist,

visited

Paris and spoke with representatives

of

the

Fresch

magazine

Parta Match.

KÜROLEV indicated that he would like to serve

as a striager for the French journal

and

proposed that he

.. begin with a story on

the lile of the family

of a "soviet

secret agent".

As KOROLEV apoke only broken French and

Engliah, the ragazine staff did not seriously pursue che

matter at thai tine.

Conment:

KOROLEV 18 belleved Identical with furly KOROLEV

who, as of 1964, was employed part-time for

the United Press

International Moscos corres-

pondent, Henry SHAPIRO, whom buch NOSENKO and

GOLITSYN have Identified da an agent of the KGB

second Chief Directorate.

KOROLES has travelled

previously to brussels

as a correspondeut for

che soviet publication Sputnik, sad to Japas

and the Untted States ao a correspondent for

Novosti, the Soviet news Agency.

The offer. by

an official soviet presa representative. of

Information on a "Sovlat secret ageat", which

turned

out to refer to NOSENKO, 1s uithout

precedent.

October 1956

Soviet Journalist Yu. D. KOROLEV returned to Paris with

an interpreter

renew

his offer to Paris Match editore to

provide a story

the

life of the faully of a

"Soviet secret

agent".

The story das

to concern NOSENKO's faully and their

•396

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

---

## Page 38

Top Secret

(Annex 1)

October luif (continued)

11fe In Magerio eluce NOSENKO's defection.

A short background

statement KOlOllY provided Yaris March editors stated:

"HOSENED, about 3i-35,

an officer of

the Soviet Secret Police

organizatiin, defected to the USA without his fanily abou:

two years

1 and

asied for political asylum in the u.S.:

le was granted to

him.

This was

the mest serious defeat of

the soulet cururily organs as NOSENKO occupied Importani

positions

In ripionage and counterespionare departments

and

also was clonely icquainted with the country's leading

familles and lones. - NOSENKO's family consists of a wife,

35, two daughlurs, 10 and 12, a nother and a younger brother.

The family 1u not prosecuted (sic) but

feel very badly about

the incident lehe

defection).

Very soon the wife will apply

to the International Lawyers Crganization fur a divorce and

compensation.

It is possible that this case will be glyen

rich

publicity.

His wife has not heard from him since he

defected,

but

1l is abulous that he is still in

the USA. "

KUPOLEV displayel a photo spread showinz NOSENKO's wife and

amlly g01ne nboul sheir daily affairs in Moscow, ano

indicated chat additional photographs of NOSENKO's family

could be obtalned and that intrrviews with then and with

others knowlne NOStNiO could be arranged for a Parla Match

correspondene.

Comment: A divorce from a defector from the Soviet Union,

who 1s legally considered

to be an enemy of the

atate, is

granted automatically upon the uife's:

request.

28 January 10!1

According to a sensitive source

Cures (from personal knowledge) :

knowledge of til organization,

his explanation, he would call

knew these

matters better than

at KGB Headquarters longer.

Referring to his own

• said If NOSENKO heard

a child, since NOSENKO

because he had served

Source

397

Top Secret

15 No. 19124

10

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## Page 39

Top Secret

February 1961

According to a sensitive source

As (from unidentified GRU sources

In Moscow):

NOSENKO worked only In kU Information Departuent

of the GRU,

and only for about five or alx montha, after which he veat

to the NGB.

May 1961

According to a sensitive source

The ÁCH assumes that NOSENKO divulged

the whole

of surveillance of Americans.

He worked

on 18, KnEW

all about it and exposed the whole systen of work.

He knew

& 11

the poses, the sources (feu words unclear) he knew all

the

surveillance groups and knew surveillants by sight.

According to a sensitive source

When

NOSEYKO

worked

in the

GiU Infornation Department he worked

only th the Center (Huadquarters) ln Moscow.

lle worked badly

there, and

received bad efficiency

reports.

as a reault

of

which

he had arguients. Then with his father's help he went

to the KCB.

≤ June 1967.

According to a sensitive source

There had been some

: "KGB

suspicions of

Pavel

Fedorovich SHAKHOV while he vas

1n

Geneva, because he had allegedly had many American contacts

which he had nos reported, and NOSENKO vas sent to Geneva to

Investigate lin. Rezident KULEBYAKIN 18 8t1ll suspiclous of

SHAKHOV.

Comment:

NOSENKO claius he was sent to Geneva in 1962

to investigate SHAKHOV.

inst one gended attit i

398

Top Secret

TS No: 197124

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