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Date :

09/24/98

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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY

RECORD NUMBER

RECORDS SERIES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

PFIAB

206-10001-10016

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR

NSC

FROM

A.R. ASH

TO

THE FILE

TITLE

BOARD PANEL ON COVERT ACTION OPERATIONS

DATE

: 09/10/63

PAGES : 7

SUBJECTS

: COVERT ACTION

DOCUMENT TYPE

CLASSIFICATION

RESTRICTIONS

CURRENT STATUS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW

OPENING CRITERIA

COMMENTS

PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

TOP SECRET:

1B, 1C

RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

+8/06/98-08/01/2024

Box 10, Covert Operations, 1954-1967:

contained in 206-10001-10001.

Duplicate

2025 Release under the

President John F. Kennedy

Assassination Records Collection

Act of 1992

[R]

- ITEM IS RESTRICTED

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206-10001-10016

Box. 10

Covert Operations

1954-1967

2025 Release under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of

1992

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TOP SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 10, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Board Panel on Covert Action

Operations

The Board Panel met in the Board's offices on September 6,

Panel members present were Mr. Robert Murphy, Chairman;

Mr. Gordon Gray; and Dr. William Langer. Messrs. Coyne and

Ash also attended the meeting.

During the course of Its meeting the Panel was briefed

by Mr. Richard Helms (Deputy DCI/Plans, CIA) and his assistants,

Mr. Cord Meyer and Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald (head of CIA's head-

quarters staff dealing with Cuba). Highlights of the briefings

were as follows:

MESSRS: HELYS and MEYER

British Guiana

for a 79-day period ending in July, the anti-Jagan Trades

Union Congress maintained a general strike which was directed

against the Jagan regime, and had wide support among agrarian

and industrial workers in protest against an oppressive Labor

Bill proposed by Communist-oriented Jagan.

CIA worked out

with George Meany a program of CIA financial support ($435,000)

to the strike under the cover of "AFICIO contributions.

A CIA cover representative ran the strike program.

The

activity

was tricky because the United States and the British desired

to avoid violence; and the situation was complicated by the

fact that the British Governor-General opposed the strike.

CIA assesses the operation as a success because even though

Jagan was not unseated, the oppressive Labor Bill was withdrawn

and the TUC survived.

The strike activity took place against a background of

agreement between President Kennedy and MacMillan that the

British will not pull out of Guiana for an indefinite future

period, in the hope that a Communist government will not f1ll

the vacuum when the British do withdraw.

Cuban influence in the strike was in the form of a

$1 million advance from Cuba to the Guiana Import-Export

Corporation (an arm of Jagan's East Indian Peoples Progressive

Party) which In turn was borrowed by the Jagan regime.

Soviet help was indicated by a rumored transfer of over

$100,000 to Jagan's Party through banks.

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CIA at present 1s providing $5,000 to the PNC Party made

up of anti-Jagan Africans in Guiana,

and CIA 1s sending a Negro

cover representative from New York to aid the African Party.

(CIA considers that Mrs. Jagan, a known Communist from

Chicago, 1s the brains and guts of the Jagan operation.)

Haiti

CIA has surveyed the intentions and capabilities of

various Haitian exile groups and has supplied them with token

o test them

amounts of money to test them out.

Efforts of the groups to

form a united front have failed, and in the Dominican Republic

Juan Bosch has reversed his intention to help unseat Devalier

for the present.

Ten days ago CIA dropped 100 rifles and

ammunition to one Haitian exile group which has been given

sanctuary by a Dominican Republic commander stationed on the

border.

Dominican Republic

In this country there 1s a lack of democratic institutions,

political party structure, labor unions, or cooperatives of

an

effective nature.

Juan Bosch spends more time debating charges

by political opponents than in performing the administrative

job of running

the country.

Bosch is an extreme conservative, economically, and refuses

to spend moneys in excess of assured revenues.

A twenty per cent

unemployment figure is a major problem. Bosch has strengthened

his Cabinet at the urging of the U. S. Ambassador, and has made

peace with church elements (with CIA's help).

Opposition to Bosch 1s from the right and from parts of

the Army.

He has met individual Communist moves as they arise

(e.go, an attempted InfIltration of the Planning Commission),

but he Is not pursuing an over-all anti-Communist program or

crusade.

Although Bosch 1s considered by CIA to be anti-Castro

and anti-Soviet, he has not clamped down on returning trainees

from Cuba.

The twenty per cent unemployment situation provides the

basis for a coup in the months ahead.

Meanwhile the Army

strong-man Embert (one of Irujillo's

assassins) waits in the

wings.

Vietnam

two-fold:

CIA's role in Vietnam during the past two years has been.

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(1) Total support of the war against the Viet Cong, In-

to ding the training of some 43,000 Irregulars (now turned over

Special Forces); support to

the mountain people in

operations against the Viet Cong; and CIA training of U.S.

Special Forces in South Vietnam.

(2)

CIA support of infiltration operations in North

Vietnam.

(Not a great success. High losses of teams.)

In response to/question based on recent U. S. press allega-

tions that CIA 1s attempting to overthrow the Diem government:

to/ meetin

"CIA has never engaged in any such operations whatsoever --

no instigation of the Buddhists -- nothing.

CIA considers

that anti-CIA expressions of this kind originate with Madame

Nhu.!

The Viet Cong has been working on the Buddhists, but the

Buddhist leader who took sanctuary in the U. S. Embassy has

Indicated that the Buddhist activity is motivated by a desire

to unify what 1s a loosely-joined, Individual-Pagoda-type religious

movement.

August 20 saw the temple

raids, martial law, and then the

arrests of students.

One U.S. reaction was an August 24 cable-

gram from the State Department (presumably hastily prepared)

which, in nice diplomatic language to State Department representa-

tives In Saigon, gave the word to "unload the Nhus"

--1.e.,

indicate to the

anti-Diem plotters among the Generals that

they should get moving.

However, the Generals proved to be lack-

Ing in any intentio to pursue their previously-professed anti-Diem

sentiments.

CIA considers that the August 24 State Department

cablegram was the result of a miscalculation of the General's

the postle or a

true capabilities and intentions.

CIA understands that subsequently

the Executive Committee of the NSC has met frequently on the sub-

ject, and more recent State Department cables have reflected

a revision of the earlier "unload the Nhus" message.

As yet the political situation in South Vietnam has not

had an adverse effect on the military effort, nor any increased

Viet Cong moves to capitalize on the situation. (Mr. Helms

departed at this point.)

Italy

With approval by the Special NSC 5412/2 Group, the Christian

Democratic Party was supported by CIA to the tune of $1 million

In the campaign leading to the June elections (plus $600,000

to other political elements in Italy). CIA!s rationale for the

loss of CDP strength in the elections

1s that (1) there was a

loss of votes

among the workers from the south who were given

the Communist treatment when they moved to the northern cities;

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(2) Fanfant, and (3) the Papal audience given to Khrushchev's

son-in-law had an effect on anti-Communist religious Italians,

including wives of the workers who had previously been able to

persuade their husbands to vote against the Communist candidates.

Meanwhile the Special Group has authorized CIA to spend $125,000

to support the CDP in current developments looking toward the

establishment of a center-left government coalition.

Bolivia

The Special Group has authorized a unique effort by CIA

in support of Paz Estancero's program to "rationalize" the

tin mines -- 1.e., a project calling for the firing of surplus

tin miners and resettling them in new Jobs. This will take

some time, but may result in breaking the leftist influence among

the Bolivian miners.

Brazil

Goulart is engaged in coordinated efforts to (1) discredit

the legislature, (2) obtain backing of the Army, and (3) make

a demagogic appeal to the Brazilizn people as the only leader

who can serve their Interests.

CIA 1s carrying out covert action in the labór movement

and CIA believes that Communist control can be weakened.

In student groups, a number of CIA operations are going

and

assets are in place (e.g.

the Students! Federationj, In the top executive committee of

However, there is no large-scale

CIA political operation in Brazil now.

MR. FITZGERALD

(On the subject of Cuba)

In June the NSC Special Group approved a CIA proposal for

a package of covert actions against Cuba.

The covert program

assumes

, that means short of military action are to be attempted

on the premise that at the present rate of progress, the Castro

regime will be even

more firmly entrenched because

the passage

of time runs in Castro's favor.

Mr. Fitzgerald turned to a listing of the approved CIA

covert actions, remarking that if they seemed familiar proposals

which were previously under consideration interdependent"

it should be kept in

mind that they have now been approved as

actions.

The actions call for (1) covert collection of intelligence,

(2) propaganda action to stimulate "low-key sabotage"

, (3)

stimulate

disaffection among the Cuban military, (4) an economic denial

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program aimed at precluding acquisition of spare parts for

Industrial machinery, and other products needed by Cuba,

(5) a sabotage program of a general nature, and (6) support

of anti-Castro autonomous

groups, by giving them money and

the means to act, but under an arrangement which insures against

attribution to the United States, and which precludes operations

from U.S. or British soil.

(The CIA philosophy is to back only

the potentially powerful and effective anti-Castro groups, and

the military is felt to be the best bet.)

The CIA effort represents a shift from external raids to

Internal sabotage actions.

CIA mounts about 10 "black"

operations a month, and Castro security forces have taken their

toll among the CIA

teams. Three operations were conducted on

August 17 and 18, and among other things the objective 1s to

give encouragement to dissident Cuban elements such as military

officers who see no professional future under Castro who is

unloading military elements which aided him in his initial

seizure of the government. (The Special Group, Mr. Bundy and

other White House staff note the successful mounting of CIA's

sabotage operations and have asked for more to be conducted.

CIA has found it necessary to resist any such pressures for

these operations to be increased beyond the present effective

capacity which CIA has at this time.)

referring to the Cuban economy, It is hurting badly.

The United States has a monopoly on the spare parts for industrial

machinery needed by Cuba, and the USSR cannot supply them.

The Cuban electrical industry is particularly hard hit in

respect.

Castro's re-emphasis on an agricultural step-up means

Increased efforts to produce sugar, a crop which presents a good

sabotage target. Finally, the soviet aid at a rate of st million

a day (military and economic) is not enough to keep the Cuban

economy going.

Cubans are not starving but they do not eat

"comfortably

even in the larger cities. CIA finds that a major

problem for their "black" teams is food re-supply in areas where

the Cubans are hard put to feed themselves.

CIA assets being used against Cuba:

Staff: 384 (Washington and Miami)

U. S. contractor personnel: 83

Foreign nationals: 525 (mostly Cubans)

Personnel at overseas posts: 45

DD/I staff: 12

NPIC: a big effort on. U-2 photography of Cuba.

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CIA considers that of all nationalities, the Cubans are

the most unreliable (prone to exaggerate). The best informa-

tion comes from non-Cuban agents.

There are 108 agents In Cuba, Including friendly diplomatic

personnel.

There are two illegal teams working, one of which

has 200 sub-agents.

There are

44 legal travelers working;

60 agents in Cuban

shipping; and there are 31 penetrations of

Cuban installations abroad.

As to Soviet shipping into Cuba, CIA has an agent in

every port, but observers cannot say what 1s in the crates

they see being off-loaded.

, Since January CIA has disseminated 150 photographs taken

by agents on-the-ground in Cuba.

Also CIA has furnished its

agents in Cuba more and better radio equipment.

CIA!s estimate of bloc personnel in Cuba: 12,000 Soviet

troops; 150 Chinese (mostly diplomatic personnel an unknown

number of Soviet civilian technicians: and "

of Czech and

other bloc technicians working with the Cuban milltary forces.

CIA considers that in the past 9 months progress has

been

made in (1) intelligence collection with respect to Cuba,

and (2) effectiveness of the economic denial program.

CIA

feels that the

"X" factor is the volatility of the Cuban people

whose resignation to their lot under Castro would change over-

night if they see evidence of successful sabotage operations

against the Cuban government.

CIA penetration of the Cuban military got under way in

April.

An agent brought out a Cuban Army major and he is being

sent back into Cuba next week.

The major says that there is

a medium level acceptance among the military of the idea of

overthrowing Castro,

It to others within Cuba.

a to cube, the wire

but although this view is held by

Individual members of the military they are fearful of communicating

The wife of the chief of training of

the Cuban Army is a CIA source. Defectors are naming military

personnel to be contacted. There 1s, however, a fear of the

Castro security system.

The subject of specific kinds and amounts of Soviet military

equipment in Cuba is an area of the worst exaggeration and reporting

by nonprofessional observers.

However, there is no evidence of

offensive missiles. There are 47 MIG-2l's operated by. Cuban pilots.

Cubans are at the SA-2 sites and are being trained to operate them.

We don't know what is in the caves, exactly.

Neither CIA agents

nor Cubans (nor even Castro) has access to the Soviet armored camps.

A. R. Ash

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