Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

## Page 1

176-10036-10183]

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA

RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10183

RECORD SERIES : National Security Files

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

• .

ORIGINATOR :

FROM :

TO :

TITLE : Frontier Force, Vietnam

DATE:

PAGES : 6

SUBJECTS :

DOCUMENT TYPE :

CLASSIFICATION :

RESTRICTIONS :

CURRENT STATUS :

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000

OPENING CRITERIA

COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 203: Vietnam, Taylor Reports, Tabs H-J.

Box 1

---

## Page 2

or winch

NLK- 75-164

NIK 02-34b

Tere upletd

FRONTIER FORCE, VIETNAM

The Problem To establish a force in Vietnam which will deny

ving thy save one er bordey of at to Comme intonion, end

areas outside South Vietnam to disrupt Communist lines of commun

cation

•Considerations

a The strength, disposition, and intention of the Communist

enemy in the frontier area afe not known precisely.

Reports indicate

the 325th North Vietnam (NVN) Division is just north of the 17th

Parallel Demarcation Line and the 304th and 324th NVN Divisions are

in the vicinity of Route 9, having crossed the border from the Ichepone

Area. The VNA at Kontum believes there are three NVN regiments

west of Kontum, towards the border.

Since top Vietnamese officials,

including President Diem, believe the northwest frontier is a Commu

nist pipeline to the south and east, and there is some confirmation of

this belief, it is not known how much of the estimated 8400 Commus

mists in their interzone Vare in the northwest frontier, whether they

aten transit elsewhere or are disposed in the area for quick assembly

to mount an attack on Kontum

ba"It is known that Communist forces cross the Laös-Vietnam

border, Four such routes are known, including Routes 9 and 12:

is possible that other routes could be identified, since they are known

to the inhabitants given better intelligence collection methods in

Montagnard tribal areas.

One MAAG plan indicated 103 miles of

border as "hot, where crossings are most likely, the figure included

areas in the south.

•C.

Without the willing help of the Montagnards, initially in intel-

ligence and later in securing their own areas, any practical denial of

the northwest frontier to Communist infiltration becomes almost

impossible.

There are serious problems to be overcome in gaining

members in Montagnard villages, at least since 1954. Itis estimated

that 1700 Montagnards in the Il Corps area alone have been recruited

by the Viet Cönge The Vietnamese have looked upon the Montagnards:

SUCRED

---

## Page 3

06A01

4

as something almost sub-human,

and this is known to the Montagnards

On the other hand, the Viet Cong need for food and services apparently

ha's led to increased Communist use of terrorism to get these quickly

from the Montagnards. The Montagnards are now seeking weapons"

for self-protectionAmericans serving in the High Plateau and French

missionaries long resident there believe the Montagnards should be

armed for village self-defense and can be used far more extensively

for intelligence collection, CIA is currently planning to arm and train

up to 1000 Djarai in the Central and South Il Corps area for this pur

pose.

In addition to intelligence collection, these men will be available

as scouts for any force in the Il Corps area, and will have a potential

to assist any Special Force operations along the border. In that these

men will not act in organized units, they will best be controlled through?

CIA and Il Corps ARVN liaison.

d. General McGarr has expressed concern at the further depletion

of Vietnamese divisions to obtain manpower for special units, such as

ranger companies

Since special units are manned by volunteers, the

drain is in the best manpower, of quality as well as quantity. Divisel

sions

which have

personnel most familiar with the border terrain are

presently stationed in the High Plateau, have the mission of border

area defense now, and would be needed to back up any frontier force

which would operate as rangers on extended patrols.

The present range companies häve'a strength of 132. MAAG

ouncers consider that this should be upped to 142, with the additional

strength being used for communications and a mortar section.

General "Big" Minh is currently developing a plan to combine two

ranger companies into a Mobile Forest Groupement which would create

a base

area

with a landing strip of cleared area for air drops;

exten-

Sive patrols would be undertaken from the base area.

There is now a total of 86 ranger companies in the ARVN: Of

these,

26 have completed unit training. An additional ll will complete

unt trairing by January 1962 The remainder of the 49 ranger

companies, all formed early in 1960 and committed to operations with

little or no formal ranger training,

will have completed unit training

by the end of 1962. There are no current plans to form additional

ranger companies

There are four Vietnamese provinces bordering Laos. Quang

Tri,: Thua Thien, Quang Nam, and Kontum, The first three are in

2

---

## Page 4

SECRET

the I Corps military area, and Kontum in the Il Corps area? In the

MAÄG concept of border control, apart from the zone for the 17th

Parallel, there are five border patrol zones suggested

Concept:

a.The command will be known as the Northwest Frontier Force

It will be a component of Il Corps, but will operate in both I and II

Corps areas, as a special force,

with its own distinctive insignia.

It

will be a force of jungle rangers.

teamed with air elements and a

special civil section. There will be US encadrement, under a US

military chief, with US personnel acting as advisors-collaborators

(similar to Army Special Forces operations in Laos). The US en-

cadrement will/include both military and civilian personnel, and will

have its own communication net.

-b:

The mission of the Force will be to secure the frontier zone

by pacification of the territory on the Vietnamese side of the border

and by disrupting the enemy's lines of communication outside the

border, through long-range combat patrols. Pacification will employ

techniques of attracting the support of the inhabitants in a limited

area, as employed successfully before in Vietnam:

Pacification

ncludes security screening, establishment of intelligence collection,

initiating governmental services and control, then training and arming

the villages for self-detense. When an area is secure, the Force will

move into the next area for pacification operations, and continue doing

so until all Vietnamese territory in the Frontier zone is secure.

Each Sector of Vietnam in the Frontier zone will be divided

into defined areas for pacification, depending upon terrain and in

habitants Two ranger companies will move into the pacification

are a

while the third company moves into the next area beyond, as

a security screen. As the two companies establish physical security,

a civic action civilian unit will move in behind them, establishing

working relations with the village council, a dispensary, a school,

an information center with a radio receiver, and the unit will then be

under the self-help publid projects (the first being the construction

of a landing strip for eight aircraft, and then feeder roads as required):

Public welfare, such as salt and blankets, W

will be distributed. As the

support of the population is won over, they will be readied for self-

defense,

for intelligence reporting, and enlisted as scouts for patrols.

---

## Page 5

a Patrols will enter an area to wir over the tribal inhabitants,

obtain information of the location of enemy elements in the area, and

then seek out the enemy to destroy him. Initial contact with the enemy

will be to gain information about him, which will be promptly reported

by radio.

The patrol commander will make the decision on whether to

attack, using hunter-killer tactics, to call up an air strike and follow

it by attack, or to call up additional forces for the ättack

e. The Northwest Frontier Force operation calls for close military;

civilian teamwork, to enlist the support of the overwhelming majority

of the Montagnards and to make the entire frontier zone a hostile area

to Communist incursions

This will require a definite change in

Vieinamese attitude towards and relations with the Montagnards:

The

Civic Action Civilian unit will have a Vietnamese. cadie, but be come

posed of two-thirds Montagnards as rapidly as they can be screened

and trained

In Kontum province, operations will be assisted by the Djarai

(Montagnard) scouts now being recruited. This will be accomplished

by the D Corps Commander.

Force:

Vietnamese Military

Headquarters/Operations Center at Kontüm®

Reserve strike force, of five ranger companies, strengthened

to 142', 'ät Kontum

Air force composite squadron at Kontum, under Frontier

Force Operational control.

Special Weapons Unit, for field use of CDTC equipment, at

Kontum

Three long-range patrol ranger companies, based at Kontum.

Five Sector Headquarters/Operations Centers, one for each t

pacification sector.

---

## Page 6

ba:

BEGRET

4

Fifteen ranger companies, strengthened to 142, for pacifi.

cation of the Vietnamese side of the Frontier zone (divided

into five sectors, with three companies per sector).

The 23 ranger companies will be withdrawn from the 59 com-

pantes now assigned to the Iu Corps area.

Other military

personnel will be provided from throughout the RVNAF, to be

replaced as the 30, 000 force increase is implemented.

Vietnamese Civilian (Civic Action)

Headquarters/Operations Center at Kontum, with the Chief

of the Civic Action Unit being Deputy to the Frontier Force

Commander

Five Civic Action units, one for each pacification sector, con-

sisting of public health, welfare, information radio; motion

pictures, education, and public works (an engineer element

for helping build air strips).

Four small Civic Action Units, one stationed with each

province chief, for coordination of all civil operations.

U.S. Personnel

At Kontum, Chief of the U.S. element, who also will act as

collaborator advisor to the Commander of the Frontier Force.

He will have a team of specialists who will act as collaborator-

advisors to the Vietnamese in running the intelligence/operations

center, in logistical support, and for training of Montagnards

in self-defense. A small U.S, element for administrative

support of U.S. operations in the Frontier Zone will be under

his command, since base facilities will be needed to support

temporarily assigned specialists from the CDIC, MAAG,

CAS, USOM, and USIS:

Small U.S. liaison elements, for advice and collaboration on

Frontier Force operations, will be established at Il Corps and

Field Command.

---

## Page 7

One "cell" of the 4400th CCTS will be stationed with the

Vietnamese Air Force squadron in the Kontum area.

One split FA team (six men, USA Special Forces) will be

stationed with each ranger company.

One FB team:

wil be

stationed with each pacification sector and with the long

range patrol unit.

One U.S:

Foreign Service Officer will be the Political Deputy

to the Chief, U.S. Element; at Kontum, to run the civilian

portion of the U.S. team,

and to act as advisor-collaborator

with the Regional delegate and the four Province Chiefs. He

will have a small staff of CAS, USIS, and USOM personnel

who will be field workers, visiting their Vietnamese oppositel

numbers in the pacification sectors and in the provincial?

capitals, where they will act as advisors collaborators with

the Vietnamese. Chief MAAG will have over-all responsibility.

for direction of the U.S. effort.

---