MEXICO STATION COVERAGE OF SOVIET AND CUBAN EMBASSIES (1963).
Originator: CIA
Document date: 1963-01-01 00:00:00
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

# DOCID-32364038

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Date: 02/16/05

JEK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CIA

RECORD NUMBER

: 104-10125-10003

RECORD SERIES

: JFK

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

80T01357A

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

AGENCY ORIGINATOR : CIA

FROM

TO

TITLE

DATE

PAGES

MEXICO STATION COVERAGE OE SOVIET AND CUBAN EMBASSIES

(1963) .

: 01/01/1963

6

SUBJECTS : MEXICO CITY

USSR EMBASSY

JFK ASSASSINATION

CUBA EMBASSY

DOCUMENT TYPE

PAPER

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

RESTRICTIONS

CURRENT STATUS RELEASED IN PART PUBLIC - RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

DATE

OF LAST REVIEW

: 05/26/04

COMMENTS

: JFK56: F8 : 20040225-1049117

Heleased under the John F. Kennedy

Assassination Records Collection Act of

1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW

65924 Date: 10-26-2021

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

104-10125-10003

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CHET/SENSITIVE

Mexico Station Coverage of Soviet and Cuban Embassies (1963)

1. Unilateral Coverage:

From the time the Mexico Station was opened in April 1947 until

the arrival of Mr. Win Scott as Chief of Station in 1955, the Station had

developed a support apparatus to exploit leads from the Soviet Embassy in

Mexico City. This umbrella type project (LIPSTICK) consisted of multiline

phone taps, three photographic sites, a mobile surveillance. team and a

mail intercept operation.

Telephone taps (LIFEAT) were placed by an employee of the local

telephone company who was handled by a Station case officer. The number

of lines tapped was limited only by the availability of a listening post

nearby and the availability of langauge (English, Spanish, Soviet, Polish,

Czech, etc.) transcribers. Generally, these were Mexican or Mexican-

American recruited agents.

Three photographic sites were handled by a Station case officer

: assisted by technicians on TDY from Headquarters who advised the Station

on the best

types of cameras, films, and concealment devices. These

operations had sub-crypts under project LIPSTICK (namely: LIMITED, LILYRIC

and LICALLA). LIMITED was a fixed site directly opposite the Soviet Em-

bassy (across the street) which had both a vehicle and a pedestrian en-

trance. The gate to the Soviet Embassy was on the northwest corner of the

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SECRET SENSITIVE

Soviet compound and the LIMITED site was diagonally across a double laned

street on the southeast corner of that block. (See attached diagram).

LIMITED was the first photo base and operated strictly on an experimental

basis in the early stages. This base, however, was closed when the Sta-

tion received word that the photograph of the "unidentified man" was

being released by the Warren Commission. LILYRIC was an alternate photo-

graphic base. It was located in an upper story of an apartment building

on the same side of the street as the LIMITED site but in the middle of

the block south. It had a planted view of the front gate of the Soviet

Embassy. LICALLA, the third photographic site, was located in one of a

row of four houses on the south side of the Soviet Embassy compound.

This site overlooked the back garden of the Soviet Embassy compound. The

purpose of this operation was to get good identification photographs of

Soviet personnel. The three photographic sites were managed by a re-

cruited agent who was a Mexican citizen, the son of an American mother

and Mexican father (deceased). This agent collected the film from the

LIMITED and LILYRIC sites three times a week. The film was then de-

veloped and printed into 8 x 10 contact print strips. LICALLA film was

originally processed in the Station but in early 1959, due to the resig-

nation of a technician, this film like that of LIMITED and LILYRIC was

processed on the outside by a recruited agent.

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Mobile surveillance was conducted by two American staff officers.

These two officers organized a surveillance team of six recruited agents

which used late nodel cars and a panel truck for surveillance. The team

could be activated by radio from the LIMITED site whenever someone of

interest left the gate of the Soviet Embassy. These agents were aware of

the LIMITED site since they had been issued LIMITED photographs for

identification purposes.

The Station also conducted a unilateral mail intercept operation,

LIBIGHT, which was handled by an American case officer. A recruited

Mexican agent, who had a semiofficial status, obtained selected letters

from a subagent employed by the Mexican postal system.

2. Liaison Coverage:

Liaison coverage was unreliable and insecure as characterized by

the nature of the Mexican services at that time. The Mexican Direction

of Federal Security (DFS), with which we conducted liaison, was a hip-:

pocket group run out of the Mexican Ministry of Government. This Ministry

was principally occupied with political investigations and control of

foreigners. Their agents were win restedlt, and corrupt. A station

officer trained a number of them in name tracing and travel control. In

1958, at the instigation of a Mexican official, a joint telephone tap

operation came into existence. The operation, which became known as

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Debitc1/9610111k

LIENVOY, was run by a Mexican officer. The listening post had 30 lines

connected at one time.

The transcription room was staffed by Mexican

Army officers. In 1961, because of mismanagement by the Mexican prin-

cipals, the Station chief, himself, became the project case officer. A

Station officer assisted him in the daily supervision of the listening

post, and in picking up the transcripts and the tapes. There was also

an American technician inside the listening post.

3. Oswald Coverage:

In mid-1962, the Mexican officer in charge of LIENVOY (the

joint tap operation) asked the American officer at the LIENVOY listening

post for the telephone numbers of the Soviet, Cuban and Satellite Em-

bassies in anticipation of possible coverage. The Station inmediately

disconnected all of the unilateral telephone taps on these Embassies so

that they would not be discovered when the Mexicans hooked up their

taps. The Mexicans soon thereafter connected five Cuban lines, five

Soviet lines, three Czech lines, two Polish lines, and one Yugoslav

line. At the listening post, a live monitor made short summaries of

conversations of interest which were then included in a daily resume

for the Chief of Station. Later, when a reel was completely recorded,

full transcripts were typed and passed to the Station; however, there

was usually a time lag of a day or two. Reels which contained Russian

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r a language other than Spanish or English were taken to another location

for translation and typing. Mr. Boris Tarasoff did the Russian transla-

tions but because of the volume of Russian conversations, the translations

usually ran about a weak behind the date of the conversation.

As soon as the Station learned that an American identifying him-

self as Lee Oswald phoned the Soviet Embassy, Miss Ann Goodpasture of the

Station started screening all photographs. However, here again, there .

was a backlog because the photographs were picked up three times a weak

but those picked up were usually for dates a few days before since the

technician who was processing the film, did so on a night-time basis.

Further, photographs were not made initially until a complete roll of

film was used. Later this was changed and the operator cleared the camera

at the end of each day regardless of amount of unused film remaining.

The instructions were to cover the entire work day (office hours) and to

photograph all Soviets, their families, all foreigners, and cars with

foreign license plates. Human error did occur but generally the agents

were conscientious. The Cuban Embassy coverage had more sophisticated

equipment using a pulse camera which frequently developed mechanical dif-

ficulties.

Oswald came to the attention of the listening post operators

from a tap of the Soviet line... It was picked up and taken to Mir. Boris

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Tarasoff for translation because the caller was trying to speak in Russian.

There was some delay because Station personnel waited to compare the

photographs with the typed transcript. All transcripts were made in

either Spanish or English since the Chief of Station could read only

these two languages and because he personally screened the transcripts

for operational leads.

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