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Serial Scope:

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26-32

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## Page 2

FD-350 (Rev. 11-11-75)

3

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

-

Indicate page, name o

newspaper, city and state.

SECTION ONE

PAGE TWO

FBI Burglaries

WASHINGTON (AP);- FBI officials

across the nation have been ordered to

search their files for new information

about burglaries, wiretaps and othe

intelligence-gathering

tactics

against the Socialist Workers party,it

Invas disclosed Tuesday.

TIMES-PICAYUNE

NEW ORLEANS, LA.

Date: 6-23-76

Edition: MORNING

Author:

Editor: ED TUNSTALL

Title: FBI BURGLARIES

66-215d

Character:

3

or

Classification:

Submitting Office:

N. 0.

• Being Investigated

66-2832-32

Sundlalland..

101 2 61976

FBI - NEW ORLEANS

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## Page 3

FD-350 (Rev. 11-11-75)

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

FBI 'Burglaries'

Probed-Times

By ROBERT L. JACKSON

they say may be used against them.

and RONALD J. OSTROW

While a source close to the agents,

(C.r 1976, The Los Angeles Times)

maintained the investigation has been,

/ WASHINGTON - At least 20 FBI

agents are under federal investiga-

tion for alleged illegal burglaries

during the last five years - long

after the FBI said such so-called

black bag jobs ceased,

. The Los. An-

l geles Times learned Monday. Bur-

glaries were said to have been con-

ndividuals above the rank of special

gent could be prosecuted for their part

in authorizing break-ins.

The investigation is based on Recon-

struction era laws that bar law enforce-

ducted against

groups "and

individuals the FBI considered

"extremists," primarily in the New

Yorklarea:

The investigation, cloaked in more

than the traditional veil of Justice

Department secrecy, has been under

way for about two months. J. Stan-

ley Pottinger, assistant attorney

general for civil rights, is said to be

devoting his primary attention to

the investigation.

Inside the FBl, James B. Adams,

as-

sistant to FBI Director Clarence M. Kel-

ley, has prime responsibility for the in-

quiry. Adams' office said Monday he was

"in transit" and could not be reached:

Pottinger said: "I cannot comment in.

any direction about it."

Though it could not be established

whether the matter was already before a

federal grand jury, it was learned that

some agents had been read their Miran-

da rights - the right to remain silent, to

have legal counsel present during ques.

tioning and the warning that anything

10 years imprisonment.

isclosure that black baglobs wer

onducted by the FBI within the last fir

years is likely for two reasons to shake,

mo tale vitor thing rom, lie elations.

of improper FBI activities by the Senate:

Intelligence Committee.

One is the symbolic specter of FBI

officials being read their rights as.poten-

tial defendants and being subjected to!

other trappings of the criminal justice

process,

The other is that the burglaries took

place sometime within the last five

years, counter to congressional testi

mony that former FBI Director J. Edgar

Hoover called off black bag jobs in 1966.

The existence of much more recent ille-

gal operations by the FBI is likely to :

raise the question of whether all such' ac-

tions have been finally shut off.

Indicate page, name o

ewspaper, city and state.

—FRONT RAGE

_ TIMES- PICAYUNE

NEW ORLEANS, LA.

Date: 6-22-76

Edition: MORNING

AuthorJACKSON/OSTROW

EditorED TUNSTALL

Title: FBI 'BURGLARIES'

PROBED - TIMES

Characters i 3am

or

Classification:

Submitting Office:

N.0.

• Being Investigated

1060-2832-34

LEED CHOKED.

J0N 2 8 1976

FBI - NEW ORLEANS,

NW

55252

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3

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## Page 4

FD-350 (R.w. 11-11-75)

"Mount Clipoing in Space Below)

Report reveals FBI

break-ins

By ROBERT RAYLOR

said they fust notbe repeated.

WASHINGTON (UPI) - The:

The latest report said "black

FBI conducted more than 2024

bag"' entries against at least 15

illegal "black bag job" brea-

targets were apart from 1,000

kins against domestic groups

other breakins. made.to.install

between 1948 and 1966 without;

hidden microphones or wire-

telling the Justice Department,!

taps.

aSenatecommitteestaffreport

It said the FBI reported at

said today.

least 239 entries between 1942

The report, latest in a series

and 1966, more than 200 of them

released by the Senate Intelli-!

in the post-World War II years

gence Committee,said former

nd some of them involving :

F BL Director J. Edgar Hoover

repeated entries against the

outrawed the practice for use

same-targets.

againstdomestictargetsin1966.

Jespite Hoover's ban, the

for undisclosed reasons.

eport said mere was evidence

It quoted from a 1966 staff

one illegal breakin was made

memo by former assistantFBI

- againsta "domesticsubversive

director niam O. Sullivan,

target between 1966 and 1968.

saying

the technique as.

Targets included the Ku Klux,

"clearly illegal"

and - thaty

Klan, the Socialist Worl

authorization was not sought

Party and its affiliates, axe

outside the FBI because "it' unidentited

would be impossible to obtäin

any legal sanction for it."

group."

The reports aurist cases.

The committee said the FBI. the FBI,was able to obtain keys

continues today touse cranes

tine entry techniques without i

for the breakins from coopera-

warrants to gathergridence on

tivelandlords or neighbors, but

"foreign agents" with

the

if this was impossible agents

permission

of the Justice

specially trained in "lock

Department. It recommended

studies" were available to open

that warrants be required.

doors and safes."

One SWP affiliaté was sucha

Other committee reports is-

sued during the past week have

frequent target the FBl even

told of 40 years of FBI bugging

had writteh instructions to

and tapping of telephones in; burglarizits offices, theveided

noncriminal cases, and traced

said. The FBIcarefully avoided

' the development of domestic

" mention of breakins for any

spymg actives mat mendey

purpose to higher officials, the

the incitement of violence; reportsaid.

between rival

factions

off

Itquotedone?Bl official who

dissident groups

briefed

former

attorn

The reports prompted an

Robert F. Kennedy on bugging

unprecedented public apology

operations as saying he was

from FBI director Clarence J.

"purposely vague" and that

Kelley, who said in a speech-at?

Kennedy may not have been

Westminster College in Fulton,

aware breakins were usedito

Mo., Saturday, We are truly

plant the bugs.

sorry we were responsible for

instances which now

are

subject to such criticism." Hel

(Indicate page, name of

newspaper, city and state.)

_PAGE 7

THE DAILY

NEWS

JENNINGS, LA.

Date: 5/10/76

Edition:

Author:

EditorMAURICE PUJOL

Title REPORT REVEALS

FBI BREAK- INS

Character: 6-2433

Classification:

Submitting Office:

• Being Investigated

606-2838-30

SEARCHE...

_INDEXED.,

SERIALIZED.

FILED..

MAY 191976

FBI - NEW ORLEANS

NW 55252 DocId: 32989823

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## Page 5

threatening phone caus, according to her

husband.

Otherwise, Kelly's apology last week was

little more than meaningiess rhetoric.

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## Page 6

FD-350 (Rev. 11-11-75)

(Mount Clippina in Space Rolas -

IN THE NATION

Overseeing

CIA, FB

By TOM WICKER

(c) 1976 N. Y. Times News Service

NEW YORK - THE Senate has reached

agreement on an'independent committee to over-

see the budget and operations of the Central

Intelligence Agency, and to share such power

over the Federal Bureau of Investigation and

other security agencies. That's better than doing

nothing about the documented.abuses.of the CIA,

the FBI and others, but skepticism about the new

committee still is in.order.

For one thing, it's a compromise between

those who supported the Church committee's

recommendation for an independent committee

to oversee all the security agencies, and those

wno wanted oversight to remain essentially In

Committees.

the hands of the Judiciary and Armed Services

That such a compromise was necessary,

despite

he proven unwillingness of thes

omittees to exercise control in the past, shows

how little real determination there is in the

Sonate to prevent security and intelligence

abuses in the future.

THE LIKELY REASON is the decline in

public interest in such abuses — at least the

decline in congressional perception of public

interest — and the success of the administration,

the security agencies and their supporters in

shitting the burden of guilt.

Now it is not the agencies that are under fire

for abusing their powers,

but members of

Congress and the press for airing "secrets" and

supposedly endangering national security.

That climate does, not augur well for

congressional oversight, no matter by which

committee conducted; and in any case, the.

history of oversight suggests

that those

responsible for it have almost invariably been

•co-opted by those supposed to be overseen.

The compromise committee agreed upon by

the Senate, moreover, will have to share its

authority - save in the case of the CIA - with

Armed Forçes and Judiciary, those toothless

tigers who saw no evil, heard no evil and cer-

tainly snoke no evil while carrying out their

myopic "oversight" in the past.

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Page 6

ndicate page, name o

ewspaper, city and state

- PAGE FOUR

— LAKE CHARLES:

AMERICAN PRESS

LAKE CHARLES, LA

Date:

5-21-76

OVERSEEING

CIA, FBI

Character: 4 25

Classification:

Submitting Office:

N.0.

• Being Investigated

606-2837-29

"SEARCHED: INDEXED

SERIALIZED.

JUN 2 1976

FBI=NEW ORLEANS

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## Page 7

-.=---.-

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE new Committee

will fores the ádministration to submit an annual

intelligence budget for congressional review,

But it is doubtful.

• that any oversight

arrangement, no matter how diligently pursued,

could prevent all the myriad forms of abuse and

violations of rights recently documented. An

oversight committee, at best, is not much more

than a useful first step in controlling the opera-

fion at security and intelligence agencies.

Another needed step is passage of a ber

ected version of a bill. by Sens. Edward Ken

medy, Charles Mathias, Robert Byrd, Gaylord

Nelson and others, to require a federal court

order to authorize electronic surveillance for

purposes of obtaining foreign intelligence.

The bill would require also that such sur-

veillance be limited to "foreign powers," or to

those for whom there is "probable cause" to

believe that they are "agents of a foreign

power," This measure is aimed at closing the

last loophole by which security agencies.can

wiretap and bug American citizens on their own

authority under the guise of seeking foreign

intelligence."

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## Page 8

LS,

SECRET

SUPERCOVERNMEN ICA

"Black bag

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## Page 9

FD-350 (Rev. 11-11-75)

Spy Monitor

Is Approved

by Senate

• By DAVID C. MARTIN

• WASHINGTON (AP) - The Sen-

ate on Wednesday overwhelmingly

approved creation of a permanent

, committee designed to monitor and (

control the activities of the cia.

"Bl and other American spy agen.

cies.

A resolution creating the 15-mem-

ber Senate panel was approved by a

72 to 22 vote after an amendment

stripping many of its powers was

defeated by a two-to-one margin.

Passage of the resolution marked the

first legislation to result from the Senate

Select Intelligence "Conmittee's. 1'5-

month investigation of spy agencies.

Sen. Walter F. Mondale, D-Minn., call-

ed the Sénate vote,

, "historic," while Gov.

ernment Operations Chairman Abraham

Ribicoff, D-Conn., noted that the first

resolution to create an intelligence over

sight-committee was introduced 20 years.

àgo by Majority leader Mike Mansfield

Armed Services Committée Chairman

John C. Stennis, D-Miss., talled by a vote

of 63 to 31 to persuade the Senate to let

his.panel retain its exclusive jurisdiction.

over the National Security Agency, the

Defense Intelligence Agency and other

Defense Department spy agencies.

The Stennis amendment would have

stripped the new oversight committee of

any legislative or budgetary authority.

over Pentagon intelligence activities.

Stennis argued that mitary intelli-

gence agencies "just were not in on" the

abuses documented by the select .com-

mittee.

The senator acknowledged, however

that the Army "got a little over the line"

in its surveillance of antiwar groups in

the late 1960s.

A recently released committee statt

report said the Army amassed files on

an. estimated 100,000 citizens. Other re

oorts. have detailed NSA's massive Inter

ception of international communica

Sen, John Tower, R-Tex., another

member of the Armed Services panel

who opposes the new oversight commit-

tee, contended that the ahuses disclosed

by the select committee were "the

exception rather than the rule."

55252

D001d: 32389824

Pagers

(Indicate page, name o

newspaper, city and state.

FRONT PAGE

_ TIMES- PICAYUNE

_ NEW ORLEANS, LA.

Date: 5-20-76

Edition: MORNING

Author: DAVID C. MARTIN

Editor: ED TUNSTALL

Title: SPY MONITOR IS

APPROVED BY SENATE

Character: 64-32537

Classification:

Submitting Office: N.0.

_ Being Investigated

66-2832-28

SERIALIZED.

SERRIED C MEN SC

JUN 21976

EBI-NEW ORLEANS

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## Page 10

FD-350 (Rev. 11-11-75)

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

ART BUCHWALD REPORTS

Can FBI Agents

Be Rehabilitated?

WASHINGTON - The revelation that

the-FBI'has been.committing all-sorts of

crimes, including break-ins, forgery, ille-

gal bugging, violating civil liberties and

raises an important question.

Should the people responsible for break-

ing the law of the land be tried and sent

Roderick Wilcomb, of the "Society to

Rehabilitate Wayward G-Mer," says it

would be wrong to send FBI agents to

i prison for crimes committed in the name

of national security.

"Society will not be served by putting

these people away," he said. "Many of

them came from broken homes and

never had the breaks you or I had. If I

thought punishment was the answer, I

would be for it. But there has to be a

i better way to solve the FBI crime prob-

lem than locking the agents.up."

"What do you suggest?" I asked..

"We have to teach them a trade so

they can become responsible citizens

again and learn that there is.no future in

"What kind of a trade?"

"IVe could teach them how to catch

criminals - car thieves, kidnapers,

hijackers and members of the mob. We

could train them in law enforcement

methods without breaking the law them-

/ selves. Once they learned the trade, they

could go out and get jobs and not have to

resort to housebreaking, spying and dirty

about forging a letter?' everyone im-

mediately sat down and started writing

letters on unmarked paper. Maybe the

vere mischievous, but as Efrem Zimbal-

ist once said, "There is no such thing as a

"Wilcomb," I said, "I'm for rehabilita-

tion providing the person has learned his

lesson. But how can we be sure these

black bag operators and break-in artists

won't,go back to their old tricks once you

put them on the street again?"

"They won't if we teach them skills

such as fingerprinting, filing and typing

person reca use he one solated the law.

I know many of fhese people, and the

say they would like to make good if soci

ety would only give them a chance. But

we sent every FBlagent who committe

a crime to prison? Millions of dollars

Vhy can't we use the same money t

rain them to be honest law enforcemen

"I don't know," i said, "You're taking

an awful chance."

Wilcomb admitted, "Sure; we'll have

one or two backsliders, who would rath-

er commit crime than do an.honest day's

work. I'm not saying the program will be

100 per cent successiul. But if we can

save-even 60-per cent of these people, all

of us will profit from it."

"That sounds like the bleeding-heart

"I still think we should be tougher on

approach. to crime," I accused Wilcomb.

people who commit crimes. But I'll say

"Do you realize that many of these men

this for you, Wilcomb, your approach.is a

did not commit one crime, but went back

novel one, and while I can't support you

and back again?"

financially I hope it works."

Wilcomb replied, "That's because soci-

"Don't worry about the finances," he

ety nèver gave them a chance. A lot of

told me. "I'm hoping to get a grant from

them started hanging around with guys

the Ford Foundation for a pilot program.

like J. Edgar Hoover when they were

We're going to have a halfway house

young, and they never had an opportuni-

where the courts will'send us FBI agents

ty to learn right from wrong. Most of

who committed crimes. If we can suc-

them played "follow the leader,' If Hoov-

ceed with rehabilitating this group, we

er said; 'Let's break into a house,' they

may be able to persuade the Justice De-

al folored him. If he said; 'Let's stick a partment lo drop charges against all the

bug in'Martin Luther King's hotel room,

other G-men who went wrong.""

nabody questioned it. If he said, How

(G., 1976, the Los Angeles Times)

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10

Indicate page, name

ewspaper, city and state

SECTION ONE

PAGE SEVENTEEN

TIMES-PICAYUNE

NEW ORLEANS, It

Date:

5-20-76

Edition: MORNING

Author: ART BUCHWALD

Editor: ED TUNSTALL

Title:

CAN FBI AGENTS

BE REHABILITATED?

Character:

or

66-7837

Classification:

Submitting Office:

N.O.

• Being Investigated

1010-2838-2617

I SEARCHED

_INDEXEC

SERIALIZED.

FILEDE

• JUN 21976

FBI-NEW ORLEANS

---

## Page 11

FD-350 (Rev. 11-11-75)

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

The FBI and the Future

The Federal Bureau of Investi- their authority are the result of

gation, for so long a national squad, feedback from the consensus oper-

of Untouchables but lately a nation-

ating in the national community at

al whipping boy, has at least now

the time.

been rendered human by Director

Justice Department guidelines

Clarence Kelley's public apology for

and congressional watchfulness,

the agency's history of abuses.

Chief Kelley asserted, "will substan-

"We are truly sorry we were re-

tially assure the propriety of the

sponsible for instances which are

FBi's operations now and in the fu-

now subject to such criticism,"

ture." This, of course is as it should

Chief Kelley said of probers' revela-

have always been. It is a corner-

tions of FBI activities before he be-

Stone of the American .concept.of

came director in 1973. "Some of

these activities were clearly wrong.

letic that the lay can beat, a !

and quite reprehensible. We most

tively enforced without breaking it/

certainly must never allow them to

and that anyone's abusing the law

be repeated."

makes everyone less secure.

Yet some were "good faith" ef-

But as in current efforts to "clean

; forts to protect life and property, he

up the Central Intelligence Agency,

insisted, and he rightly noted that

legisiation to control the FBI and

not only the late Director J. Edgar

other domestic law enforcers must

Hoover was involved in building the

not only assure that the nation's po-

FBi's superhero image, but also the

licemen do not abuse their powers

news media, Congress and a "grate-

and the people's rights, but also take

ful public." This is a useful remind-

into realistic account the task en-

er that often the liberties public forcers face in protecting the law-

"officials and employes take with

abiding public's rights.

ndicate page, nand state

wspaper, cl

-SECTION ONE

PAGE EIGHT

TIMES-PICAYUNE

NEW ORLEANS, LA.

Date: 5-12-76

Edition: MORNING

AshorED TUNSTAlL

Title: THE FBI AND THE

FUTURE

Character: 66-7832

Classification:

Submitting Office:

N.O.

[ Being Investigated

00-3832 - 2b

SEARCHED

-INDEX

ERIALIZED S FLED ..

NAY 1 2 1976

FBI - NEW ORLEANS

NW 55252

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Page 11

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## Page 12

FD-448 (10-28-71)

Transmit attached by Facsimile - PLAINTEXT

Priority_ IMMEDIATE

DIRECTOR, FBI

To:

ATTN: ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR N. P.

Date:

CALLAHAN

From:

SAC, NEW ORLEANS

Subject: EDITORIAL, TIMES-PICAYUNE, NEW

ORLEANS, 5/12/76, ENTITLED 6-2632

"THE FBI AND THE FUTURE"

5/12/76

Time: Transmitted -

Received - MEB

• Fingerprint Photo

• Artists Conception

• (6 min)

• Fingerprint Record

Map

• Other

EX Newspaper clipping

• Photograph

• (4 min)

Special handling instructions:

66-2832-240

mediately deliver to Associate Director N. P. Callahan.

Searched.

Seralized Su

I. T. SYLVESTER, IRe, SAG

Aproves Bet

NN 55252

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## Page 13

186-10075

WW 55252

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## Page 14

FD-350 (Rev. 11-11-75)

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

The FBI and the Future

The Federal Bureau of Investi- their authority are the result of

gation, for so long a'national squad

feedback from the consensus oper-

of Untouchables but lately a nation-

ating in the national community ati

al whipping boy, has at least now

the time.

been rendered human by Director

Justice Department guidelines

Clarence Kelley's public apology for

and congressional watchfulness,

the agency's history of abuses.

Chief Kelley asserted, "will substan.

"We are truly sorry we were re- tially assure the propriety of the

sponsible for instances which are

FBI's operations now and in the fu-

now subject to such criticism,"

ture." This; of course is as it should

Chief Kelley said of probers' revela-

have always been. It is a corner-

tions of FBI activities before he be-

stone of the American concept of

came director in 1973. "Some of

those activities were clearly wrong

and quite reprehensible. We most

certainly must never allow them to

be repeated."

Yet some were "good faith" ef-

forts to protect life and property, he

insisted, and he rightly noted that

not only the late Director J. Edgar

Hoover was involved in building the

FBI's superhero image, but also the

news media, Congress and a "grate-

ful public." This is a useful reminds

er that urten the liberties public

officials and employes take with

and that anyone's abusing the law

makes everyone less secure.

But as in current efforts to "clean

up" the Central Intelligence Agency,

lepislation. to control the FBI and

other doméstic law enforcers must

not only assure that the nation's po-

licemen do not abuse their powers

and the people's rights, but also take!

into realistic account the task en-

forcers face in protecting the law-

abiding public's rights.

indicate i, i am state.)

SECTION ONE

PAGE EIGHT

TIMES-PICAYUNE

NEW ORLEANS, LA.

fife

Date: 5-12-76

Edition: MORNING

Editor: ED TUNSTALL

Title:

THE FBI AND THE

FUTURE

66-2832

Character:

or

Classification:

Submitting Office:

_ Being Investigated

N. 0.

6-2832-2

_ INDEXED_

SERIALIZED.

_FILED.

MAY IN 1976.

FBI-NEW ORLEANS

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## Page 15

FD-350 (Rev. 11-11-75)

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

FBL 'black bag' jobs

number over 1,000

-.

Jack Anderson

• agents as on actual data. Indeed, Hoover:

purposely destroyed many of the records,

WASHINGTON - The FBI, without

dealing with the break-ins, presumably

technically telling an untruth, has led the

o eliminate documentary evidence ol

public to believe its agents took part in

the FBI crimes.

- no more than 238 criminal housebreak-

From our internal sources, however,;

ings. The actual figure is well over 1,000

and may surpass 2;000.

we have ascertained that some top FBI

These "black bag" jobs; as the late

officials believe the 1,000-to-2,000 figure

is a "conservative estimate" of the total

FBI chief J: Edgar Hoover called them,

housebreakings.

were employed principally against sus:

hurstares to set information but treaty-,

* pected spies, organized crime figures,

foreign diplomats and a few dangerous

• revolutionaries.

One source said the housebreakings go

But Hoover also sent.his agents to bur-

back far beyond 1942 and never termi

glarize the premises of law-abiding U:S.

nated completely in 1968. Under FBI

citazens. whom the old FBI curmudgeon

chief Clarence Kelley, however, the bu-

simply disliked.

reau has scrupulously followed legal

procedures..

Confidential FBI memos, obtained by

the Senate Intelligence Committee, ac-

The Senate Intelligence Committee,

knowledge that the "black bag" jobs.vio

meanwhile, has pushed the FBI hard for

lated the criminal laws the FBI was

supposed to entorce. Yet we have learn committee will release a repört shortly

ed from FBI sources that Hoover,

although sworn to uphold the laws, per-

sonally sanctioned more than 1,000 of

the break-ins.

Not until 1967 did Hoover take steps;

putable FBI sources.

in a self-serving memo turned up by the

in defense of the past practice o

Senate probers, to end the break-ins.

reaking, and entering, the FBI said this.

Even then, we have learned, it wasn't his

technique was used only "to obtain se-'

own idea but pressure from then-Atty.

cret and closely guarded organizational

Gen. Ramsey Clark that brought the

and financial information" or to plant

change.

electronic equipment in the most "highly

The figure of 238 "surreptitious

selective" cases.

entries," as the burglaries were politely

called; first appeared in an FBI memo to

the Senate committee on Sept. 23, 1975.

Footnote: Those who believe in law

and order had better demand that it

begin with the government. A lawless

The memo accurately but cagily re:

government is far more dangerous than

ported that the 238 housebreakings were

any lawless individual. Yet in spite of

perpetrated

against 14 "domestic süb.

the clear evidence that the FBI, CIA and

versive targets" during the 1942-68 peri- other agencies engaged in illegal acts,

od. But a careful reading-shows the the Senate Rules Committee led by

bureau left a hedge. Almost in passing, Chairman Howard Cannon, D.-Nev.;

the meso indicates the figure is "incom-

voted against strong oversight of these

plete," based as much on the memory of agencies.

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(Indicate page, name of

newspaper, city and state.)

SECTION A

PAGE NINE

STATES- ITEM

NEW ORLEANS, LA.

Date: 5-12-76

Edition: FINAL

Author:JACK ANDERSON

Editor:WALTER G. COWAN

Title: FBI 'BLACK BAG'

JOBS NUMBER OVER

1,000

Character:

or

Classification:

Submitting Office:

N. 0.

Being Investigated

106-2832-93

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## Page 16

FD-350 (Rev. 11-11-75)

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

The FBI and the Future

The Federal Bureau of Investi- their authority are the result of 1

gation, for so long a national squad

• feedback from the consensus oper-

of Untouchables but lately a nation-

al whipping boy, has at least now

ating in the national community at /

the time.

been rendered human by Director

Justice Department guidelines

Clarence Kelley's public apology for

and congressional watchfulness,

the agency's history of abuses.

Chief Kelley asserted, "will substan-

"We are truly sorry we were re-

tially assure the propriety of the

sponsible for instances which are

FBI's operations now and in the fu-l

now subject to such criticism,"

- ture." This, of course is as it should,

! Chief Kelley said-of probers' revela-

have always been. It is a corner-

tions of FBI activities before he be-

stone of the American concept of

came director in 1973. "Some of

justice - in theory and ideal, at

those activities were clearly wrong

least - that the law can be effec

and quite reprehensible. We most

tively enforced without breaking it,

certainly must never allow them to

and that anyone's abusing the law

be repeated."

makes everyone less secure.

Yet some were "good faithi" ef-

But as in current efforts to "clean

forts to protect life and property, he

up" the Central Intelligence Agency,

insisted, and he rightly noted that

legislation to control the FBI and |

not only the late Director J. Edgar

other domestic law enforcers must

not only assure that the nation's po- i

FBI's superhero image, but also the

(Hoover was involved in building the licemen do not abuse their powers

news media, Congress and a "grate-

and the people's rights, but also take

ful public." This is a useful remind into realistic account the task en-

er that often the liberties public

forcers face in protepting the law.

officials and employes take with

abiding public's rights.

indicate racy name state.)

- SECTION ONE

PAGE EIGHT

TIMES-PICAYUNE

NEW ORLEANS, LA.

Date: 5-12-76

Edition: MORNING

Author: ED TUNSTALL

Title:

THE FBI AND THE

FUTURE

667856

Character:

or

Classification:

Submitting Office: N. 0.

[J Being Investigated

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FD-350 (Rev. 11-11-75)

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

/Intelligence

Oversight

Up to Senate

WASHINGTON (AP) - Ways in which

Congress can monitor the intelligence

-agencies will be debated in the Senate

this coming week.

" The Senate intelligence committee,

headed by Sen. Frank Church, D-dano,

F has recommended creation af a perma-

• nent committee to keep an eye on the

/ agencies and their budget.

The Senate Rules Committee has

recommended a bill that simply would

authorize another, study committee on

intelligence.

elis: Walter Mondale, D-Mini, and

Dick Clark, D-idaho, are expected t

lead the fight for a permanent commit

litoe when debate begins. Monday.

"Church's. schedule .called for him to be

F away on his campaign for president.

Four Sénate committees now have

* Some responsibility for keeping watch on

• the CIA and FBI.

Up tor House action. Monday is a billi

that would expand the boards of the

• Federal Reserve district banks and also."

require the Federal Reserve to make

sure its.hiring practices do not discrimi-

nate against women and minorities.

The House plans to vote Wednesday on

-*a $113.3 billion federal spending target,

• $1%.5 billion above President Fords!

budget, andisend it to the Senate for Con-

gress' final approval.

The federal spending target for the fis-

cal year starting Oct. 1 is part of Con-

"gress' new machinery fer determining!

-Its own federal budget rather than sim-

Ply acting on. the President's.

(Tewater, diy and state,)

SECTION ONE

— PAGE THREE

-

- TIMES-PICAYUNE

NEW ORLEANS, LA.

Date: 5-10-76

Edition: MORNING

Author:

EditorED TUNSTALL

Title: INTELLIGENCE

OVERSIGHT UP TO

SENATE

Character: 66-2837

Classification:

Submitting Office: N.0.

Being Investigated

6010-2837-26)i

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## Page 18

FD-350 (Rev. 11-11-75)

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

FBI "dirty tricks' summed up

-more than 2,300 of them

WASHINGTON (AP) - FBI head-

AS AN EXAMPLE, the report quoted

quarters approved more than 2,500 ac-

• FBI memos showing thất two students

tions in a "rough, tough and dirty" cam-

who participated in a free-speech

paign to

disrupt and discredit U.S.

demonstration were made Cointelpro

(Indicate page, name of

newspaper, city and state.)

organizations ranging from the Black

targets because of their "obvious disre-

•Panthers to Antioch College, according®

gard for decency and established moral-

to a new report on the bureau's Cointel-

ity,"

pro program:

according to the report, more than'

The report, released today by the Sen-

sale the Cointelpra operations aonroved

SECTION A

PAGE TWO

ate intelligence committee, said.many. of

during its 15-year history were directed:

the actions approved during a 15-year

at the Communist party. By the early

period ending in 1971 "may have violat-

1960s, Comtelpro operations had expand-

ed specific criminal statutes," while

ed to include the prevention of Commu-

others "involved risk of serious bodily

injury or death to the targets."

misting train the a to datical

Chairman Frank Church coupled re-

scout troop."

STATES- ITEM

lease of the report with a renewed call

The most limited of the Cointelpro

for creation of a congressional panel to

programs was directed at the Socialist

oversee intelligence operations and a

Workers party from 1961 to 1969, ac-

special prosecutor to investigate possi-

cording to the report.

ble criminal charges against officials in-

"The bureau has conceded that the

volved in intelligence abuses.

SWP has never been engaged in organ-

The 77-pagé report.outlined Cointelpro

izational violence, nor has it taken any

operations against "a staggering range

criminal steps toward overthrowing the

NEW ORLEANS, LA.

of targets," beginning in 1956 with the

country," the report said.

Communist Party U:S.A. and ending in

1971 with "students demonstrating

FBI OFFICIALS were quoted in the

against anything."

report as saying the most successful

"Cointelpro program was against the Ku

FBI USE OF "dangerous, degrading oF

Klux Klan. The report said Cointelpro

blatantly unconstitutional techniques ….

"used comparatively few techniques that

carried a risk of serious physical, emo-

appears to have become less restrained

with each subsequent program," the re-

"tional or economic damage to the tar-

gets" in dealing with the Klan.

port said.

Most Cointelpro tactics described in

But it added that the Cointelpro pro-

gram aimed at what the FBI considered

¡ the report, such as mailing anonymous

letters that accused spouses of infidelity

"Black Nationalist" groups, ranging

from the Black Panthers to the Southern

or encouraging warfare between rival

Christian Leadership Conference, "used

groups, have been previously reported.

such techniques extensively."

The report quoted internal Justice De-

At least four assaults - two of them

partment documents as stating that

against women - and one broken mar-

Cointelpro activities may have violated

riage were reported to have resulted

the civil rights statute as well as federal

from Cointelpro tactics aimed at black

laws against mail fraud and extortion. •

groups, the réport said.

Although FBI witnesses testified that

According to the report, the least suc-

Cointelpro was intended to protect the

cessful Cointelpro program was one di-

national security and prevent violence,

rected against the New Left after stu-

the report said that "the unexpressed

dent riots in 1968.

major premise of much of Cointelpro is

The lack of success was due in part to

that the bureau has a role in maintaining

the fact that the FBI was unable to de-

the existing, social order and combat-

que exactly what organizations belonged

Date: 5-5-76

Edition: FINAL

Author: WALTER G. COWAN

Title:

FBI 'DIRTY'

TRICKS'

SUMMED UP -

MORE THAN 2,300 OF

Character:

THEM

80-0

Classification: 46-2832

Submitting Office:

N.0.

_ Being Investigated

16-a832-2.

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FBI-NEW ORLEANS®

ing those who threaten that order.

in the New Left.

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THE RESULT WAS that audent

groups ranging from Students for a

The report said there was documen-

tary evidence that "various attorneys

s, mem- .

committee, and . the Cabinet" were told

about Cointelpro operations against the

officials outside the FBI had been told

about the other Cointelpro-programs, the

report said.

The report.added, however; that "there

is no record that any of these officials !

asked to know more, and none of them

appears to have expressed disapproval:

based on the information they were !

Cointelpro was terminated in 19712

after documents stolen from an FBI of-

fice in Meata, Pa., began appearing in

the press.

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## Page 20

FD-350 (Rev. 11-11-75)

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

i

More FBI transgressions

The Senate Intelligence Com-

Intelligence, Committee's staff re-

mittee continues to unravel and

ported that those who knew of the

publicize the past and present trans-

campaign against Dr. King included

gressions of the Federal Bureau of

Investigation. The picture is alarm-

President Johnson, Atty. Gens. Rob-

ert F. Kennedy and Nicholas DeB.

ing, and supports those who argue

Katzenbach, Asst. Atty. Gen. Burke

for a congressional oversight com-

Marshall and former Johnson aides

mittee to monitor the activities of

Bill Moyers and Walter Jenkins.

the police agency.

Former Director J. Edgar Hoov-

The committe's report that the

gy's relentless campaign to discredit

FBI spends some $7 million a year

the late Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.

to support paid informants who ra-

is a sordid chapter in the history of

port on lawful political activities

law enforcement in this country. It

and details of the personal lives of

has demonstrated

the absolute

private citizens suggests a need for

necessity of preventing one individ-

congressional or court guidelines on

ual ever again from dominating the

such activities. The problem is not

nation's top police agency.

the network of informants but how

Revelations that top officials in

they are used.

the administrations of Presidents

The nation will be better served if

Lyndon B, Johnson and John f, the FBI spends more time and re-

Kennedy knew about the FBI's cam-

sources pursuing criminals and

paign against Dr. King, but took no

meddles less in legitimate political

action to stop it tarnishes their repu-

activities and the persorat lives of

tations as civil libertarians. Phs awful citizens.

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newspaper, ci, and of

y and state.

- SECTION A

PAGE SIX

STATES- ITEM

NEW ORLEANS, LA.

Date: 5-10-76

Edition: FINAL

sator: WALTER G. COWAR

Title: MORE FBI

TRANSCRESSIONS

Character: 1-26.-

or

Classification:

Submitting Office:

N.0.

• Being Investigated

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## Page 21

FD-350 (Rev. 11-11-75)

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

FBl 'black bag' jobs

unveiled by probers

WASHINGTON (AP) - The FBI has

between 1942 and 1968 and that since

conducted hundreds of break-ins,

"de-

1960 the FBI conducted more than 500

spite the questionable legalty of the

- break-ins to install bugs.

technique and its deep intrusion into the

"Almost as many surreptitious entries

privacy of targeted individuals," a Sen-

vere conducted in the same period

*ate Intelligence Committee staff repart

gainst targets of criminal investiga

tions," the report said.

The break-ins, officially known as

The report named the Ku Klux Klan

"surreptitious entries;" were conducted

and the Socialist Workers party as two.of

for the purpose of photographing or seiz-

the targets of FBI black bag jobs.

ing documents. and installing bugs, ac-

S described by the report, agents wh

cording to the report released today.

erformed break-ins would sometime

The report is one of a series prepared

request the cooperation of a landlord in

by the intelligence panel's staff to back

entering the premises. In other cases; the

up recommendations in the.committee's

agents simply would enter through un

final report.

ocked doors or pick the lock, the report

THE JUSTICE Department still per-

One break-in specialist said "only in a

, mits the bureau to conduct break-ins to

small proportion of the cases to which he

install bugs and refuses to rule out the

poisibility of using unauthorized entries

was assigned was it necessary to pick a

lock."

or 'black bag" jobs to obtain documents

from foreign intelligence targets, the 17-

page report noted.

"Although several attorneys general

A PARTIAL LIST of material obtain-

ed from break-ins against the Socialist)

Workers party included correspondence

were aware of the FBI practice of

break-ins to install electronic listening.

devices, there is no indication that the

FBI informed any attorney general

about its use of black bag jobs," the re-

port said.

An FBI memo cited in the report

stated that "we do not obtain authoriza-

tion for black bag jobs from outside the

bureau: Such a technique inyolves tres-

passing and is clearly illegal."

The FBI was unable to provide the

committee with a complete accounting

of the total number of break-ins because

most records were destroyed soon after

an entry was accomplished, the report

said.

FIGURES PROVIDED by the FBI

showed there were at least 242 break-jns

against suspected domestic subversives

Eisenhower, a list of party members ac

tive in trade unions, photographs ol

party members and letters relating te

the health of the national party chair

«The number of documents photo!

graphed during,a single operation reach:

ed as high as 220 and regularly was

above 100;" the report.said.

FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover banned

black bag jobs in 1966, although the Jus- i

tice Department has not ruled out their

future use in foreign intelligence cases,

the report added.

the committee has recommended that

- the FBI be required to cutama judicial

warrant before conducting future break-

NW 55252

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(Indicate page, name of

newspaper, city and state.)

— SECTION A

PAGE NINE

STATES- ITEM

NEW ORLEANS, LA.

Date: 5-10-76

Edition: FINAL

Author:

EditorWALTER G. COWAN

Title: FBI 'BLACK BAG'

JOBS UNVEILED BY

PROBERS

Character:

or

16.25300

Classification:

Submitting Office: N.0.

-Being Investigated

06-2832-18

SEALED CHEN CE

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## Page 22

April 28, 1976

The Honorable Russell B. Long

Room 217

Senate Office Building

Washington, D. C.

Dear Senator Long:

I have just completed reading the Washington (AP) release dated

4/27/76, in reference to the summation of the Senates Report on

Intelligence Operations.

I am 38 years old and a graduate of the American University School

of Government and Public Administration in Washington, D. C.

I spent fourteen years with the Federal Government (F.B.I. U.S.

Army Security Agency) prior to entering private industry approxi-

mately five years ago.

To say the least, I am appalled at the Senates apparent disregard

for

security operations.

I can assure you, a trained intelligence analyst could have all

kinds of data just by reading this report that was published in

the Times - Picayune.

Doubtless, intelligence operations develop problems by their mere

nature and no program is free from

errors.

I just don't like the idea of my grandchildren, should I have any,

marching down Pennsylvania Avenue with Chairman Mao's book in their

hands.

I am a student of American Government and am very familiar with the

workings on the "Hill'.

In this our BiCentenial Year, our founding fathers would roll over

in their graves if they were aware of the irresponsible disclosures

and revelations coming from. some of our elected bodies that are

responsible for this Great Nations security.

09.232-1182

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## Page 23

!

1

April 28, 1976

(2)

I heartily suggest the Senate Intelligence Committee have their

releases reviewed by trained intelligence analysts before they

completely disregard this Nations Security posture.

I am writing this letter as a concerned citizen from the State

of Louisiana.

I hope you will make every effort to insure our intelligence community

is not totally compromised.

Sincerely,

Metairie, Louisiana

70001

1**

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## Page 24

Routing Slip

0-7 (Rov. i2-17-77

TO: SAC:

Albany

Albaquerque

Nexandria

Anchorage

Atlanta

Baltimore

Binningham

Boston

Buffalo

Butte

Charlotte

Chicago

Cincinnati

Cleveland

COU

Columbia

Dallis

Denver

Detroit

El Paso

] Honolulu

(Cuties to difices

icked)

Houston

Indianapolis

0) 90k40

Jack-onville

Liansas Cily

Knoxville

Las Vegas

Lillle Rock

Los Angeles

Louisvilie

Memphis

Niiami

Mil rankee

Minneapolis

] Mobile

Newark

New Haven

New Orleans

New York City

Norfoik

→ Oklahoma City

- Grantia

_ Pilladelphia

1 Phoenix

1] Piltshurgh

Portland

Richmond

Sacramento

She Louis

Salt Lake City

Sau; Antonio

San Diego

San Fracisco

San Juan

Savannah

Seattle

J Springfield

Tamp a

Washington Field

Quantico

TO LEGAT:

B Bein

• Beirut

Bonn

Brasilia

Buros Aires

Caravas

Hong Kong

j London

Madrid

¡ Manila

Mexico Citi

Ottawa

3 Paris

Rome

Singapore

1 Tel aviv

• tokyo

RE:

Dose 12/30/75

DIRECTORS APPEARANCE BEFORE SENATE SELECT

COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES,

DECEMBER 10, 1975

66-2832

Retention

For infomation optional O actiappropriate.

_] Surep, by

The enclosed is for your information. If used in a future report,

sources, [ paraphrase contents.

Enclosed are corrected pages from report of SA

daled

Remarks:

I conceal all

ReButel to all SACs and Legats, 12/10/75.

Enclosed for each Office and Legat is

one copy of the transcript of questions which

were asked Mr. Kelley during captioned appearance,

along with Mr. Kelley's answers to those questions.

J. EARCHED

INDEXED.

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FBI-NEW ORLEA

Enc. (1)

Bufile

Urfile

pel

NW 55252 DocId: 32989823 Page 24010-283a44

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## Page 25

Vol. 20

Ohe Quite Staten Srnate

Copy5

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations

With Respect to Incelligence Activities

IVIELLIGENCE INVESTIGATION

Wednesday, December 10, 1975

Washington, D. C.

AFAO

SurT.

WARD & PAUL

410 FIRST STREET, S. E.

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003

(202) 544-6000

12. 35252

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Phone (Aroa 202) 544-6000

1

STATEMENT OF:

PAGE

3

4

5

6

The Honorable Clarence M. Kelley,

Direcotor, Federal Bureau of Inve-

stigation

2451

----=

WARD & PAUL

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AW 55252

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AHW/ smnl

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

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INTELIIGENCE INVESTIGATION

Wednesday, December 10, 1975

-.

United States Senate,

Select Committee to Study Governmental

Operations with Respect to

Intelligence Activities,

Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10

o'clock a.., in Room 318, Russell Senate Office Building,

the honorable Frank Church (Chairman of the Committee)

presiding.

Present: Senators Church (presiding), Hart of Michigan,

Mondale, Huddleston, Hart of Colorado, Baker, Goldwater and

Mathias.

Also present: William G. Miller, Staff Director; Frederick

A. 0. Schwarz, Jr., Chief Counsel; Curtis R. Smothers, Minority

Counsel; Paul Michel, Joseph diGenova, Barbara Banoff, Frederick

Baron, Mark Gitenstein, Loch Johnson, David Bushong, Charles

Lombard, John Bayly, Charles Kirbow, Michael Madigan, Bob

Kelley, John Elliff, Elliot Maxwell, Andy Postal, Pat Shea,

Michael Epstein and Burt Wides, Professional Staff Members.

The Chairman. The Committee's witness this morning is

NW 55252 DocId: 32989823 Page 27

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smn4,2

Phona (Area 202) 544.6000

2448

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the Honorable Clarence M. Kelley, the Director of the Federal

Bureau of Investigation.

Mr. Kelley was appointed Director in July of 1973 in a

troubled time for the FBI. His experience as an innovative

law enforcement administrator in charge of the Kansas City

Police Department for over ten years, and his previous work as

a Special Agent of the FBI have made him uniquely qualified

to lead the Bureau.

The Select Committee is grateful for the cooperation

extended by Director Kelley in the course of its inquiry over

the past months. The Committee is also impressed by the

openness of the FBI's witnesses before this Committee, and

their willingness to consider the need for legislation to

clarify the Bureau's intelligence responsibility.

It is important to remember from the outset that this

Committee is examining only a small portion of the FBI's

activities. Our hearings have concentrated on FBI domestic

intelligence operations. We have consistently expressed our

admiration and support for the Bureau's criminal investigative

and law enforcement work, and we recognize the vital importance

of counterespionage in the modern world. But domestic

intelligence has raised many difficult questions.

The Committee has also concentrated on the past rather

than on present FBI activities. The abuses brought to light

in our hearings occurred years and even decades before Director

WW 55252 DocId: 32989823

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Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

1

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• Washington, D.C. 20003

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Kelley took charge.

The Staff has advised the Committee that under Director

Kelley the FBI has taken significant steps to rethink previous

policies and to establish new safeguards against abuse. The

FBI is now placing greater emphasis on foreign related intelli-

gence operations, and less on purely domestic surveillance.

The FBI is working more closely with the Justice Department in

developing policies and standards for intelligence. These

are welcome developments.

Nevertheless, many important issues remain unresolved.

Therefore, we have invited Director Kelley to share with the

Committee his views on some of the considerations the Congress

should take into account in thinking about the future of

FBI intelligence. Among these issues are!whether FBI surveil-

lance should extend beyond the investigation of persons

likely to commit specific crimes;,whether there should be

outside supervision or approval before the FBI conducts certain

types of investigations or uses certain surveillance techniques;

3,whether foreign related intelligence activities should be

strictly separated from the FBI's domestic law enforcement

functions, and what should be done to the information already

in the FBI files and that which may go into those files in

the future.

The Committee looks forward to a constructive exchange

of views with Director Kelley this morning, with Attorney:

NW 55252 DocId:32989823 Page 29

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smn

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2450 -

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

1

2

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General Levi tomorrow, and with both the FBI and the Justice

Department in the next months as the Committee considers

recommendations that will strengthen the American people's

confidence in the Federal Bureau of Investigation. That

confidence is vital for the effective enforcement of Federal

law and for the security of the nation against foreign

espionage.

Director Kelley, we are pleased to welcome you, and if

you would have a prepared statement you would like to lead off

with, please proceed.

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

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NW 55252

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: smn '5

2451

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STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CLARENCE M. KELLEY,

DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

MI. Kelley. Thank you very much, Senator Church and

gentlemen.

I welcome the interest which this Committee has shown in

the FBI and most particularly in our operations in the intelli-

gence and internal security fields.

I share your high regard for the rights guaranteed by the

Constitution and laws of the United States. Throughout my

35 year career in law enforcement you will find the same insis-

tence, as has been expressed by this Committee, upon programs

of law enforcement that are themselves fully consistent with

law.

8

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I also have strongly supported the concept of legislative

oversight. In fact, at the time my appointment as Director of

the FBI and was being considered by the Senate Judiciary

Committee two and one half years ago, I told the members of

that Committee of my firm belief in Congressional oversight.

This Committee has completed the most exhaustive study

of our intelligence and security operations that has ever been

undertaken by anyone outside the FBI other than the present

Attorney General. At the outset, we pledged our fullest

cooperation and promised to be as candid and forthright as

possible in responding to your questions and complying with your

requests.

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I believe we have lived up to those promises.

The members and staff of this Committee have had unprece-

dented access to FBI information.

You have talked to the personnel who conduct security-type

investigations and who are personally involved in every facet

of our day-to-day intelligence operations.

You have attended numerous briefings by FBI officials who

have sought to familiarize the Comnittee and its staff with

all major areas of our activities and operations in the national

security and intelligence fields.

In brief, you have had firsthand examination of these

matters that is unmatched at any time in the history of the

Congress.

As this Committee has stated, these hearings have, of

necessity, forcused largely on certain errors and abuses. I

credit this Committee for its forthright recognition that the

hearings do not give a full or balanced account of the FBI's

record of performance.

It is perhaps in the nature of such hearings to focus

on abuses to the exclusion of positive accomplishments of the

organization.

The Counterintelligence Programs which have received the

lion's share of public attention and critical comment constituted

an infinitesimal portion of our overall work.

A Justice Department Committee which was formed last year

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to conduct a thorough study of the FBI's Counterintelligence

Programs has reported that in the five basic ones it. found

3,247 Counterintelligence Programs were submitted to FBI

Headquarters from 1956 to 1971. Of this total, 2,370,

less than three fourths, were approved.

I repeat, the vast majority of those 3,247 proposals were

being devised, considered, and many were rejected, in an era

when the FBI was handling an average of 700,000 investigative

matters per year.

Nonetheless, the criticism which has been expressed

regarding the Counterintelligence Programs is most legitimate

and understandable.

The question might well be asked what I had in mind when

I stated last year that for the FBI to have done less than it

did under the circumstances then existing would have been an

abdication of its responsibilities to the American people..

What I said then, in 1974, and what I believe today, is

that the FBI employees involved in these programs did what they

felt was expected of them by the President, the Attorney General,

the Congress, and the people of the United States.

Bomb explosions rocked public and private offices and

buildings; rioters led by revolutionary extremists laid seige

to military, industrial, and educational facilities; and

killings, maimings, and other atrocities accompanied such

acts of violence from New England to California.

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The victims of these acts were human beings, men, women,

and children. As is the case in time of peril, whether real or

perceived, they looked to their Government, their elected and

appointed leadership, and to the FBI and other law enforcement

agencies to protect their lives, their property, and their

rights.

There were many calls for action from Members of Congress

and others, but few guidelines were furnished. The FBI and other

law enforcement agencies were besieged by demands, impatient

demands, for immediate action.

FBI employees recognized the danger; felt they had a

responsibility to respond; and in good faith initiated actions

designed to counter conspiratorial efforts of self-proclaimed

revolutionary groups, and to neutralize violent activities.

In the development and execution of these programs,

mistakes of judgment admittedly were made.

Our concern over whatever abuses occurred in the Counter-

intelligence Programs,

and there were some substantial ones,

should not obscure the underlying purpose of those programs.

We must recognize that situations have occurred in the

past and will arise in the future where the Government may well

be expected to depart from its traditional role, in the FBI's

case, as an investigative

and intelligence-gathering

agency, and take affirmative steps which are needed to meet

an imminent threat to human life or property.

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In short, if we learn a murder or bombing is to be carried

out now, can we truly meet our responsibilities by investigating

only after the crime has occurred, or should we have the

ability to prevent? I refer to those instances where there is

a strong sense of urgency because of an imminent threat to

human life.

Where there exists the potential to penetrate and disrupt,

the Congress must consider the question of whether or not such

preventive action should be available to the FBI.

These matters are currently being addressed by a task

force in the Justice Department, including the FBI,

and I am confident that Departmental guidelines and controls

can

be developed in cooperation with pertinent Committees of Congress

to insure

that such measures are used in an entirely responsible

manner.

Probably the most important. question here today is what

assurances I can give that the errors and abuses which arose

under the Counterintelligence Programs will not occur again?

First, let me assure the Committee that some very sub-

stantial changes have been made in key areas of the FBI's

methods of operations since I took the oath of office as

Director on July 9, 1973.

Today we place a high premium on openness, openness

both within and without the service.

I have instituted a program of open, frank discussion

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in the decision-making process which insures that no future

program or major policy decision will ever be adopted without a

full and critical review of its propriety.

Participatory management has become a fact in the FBI.

I have made it known throughout our Headquarters and

Field Divisions that I welcome all employees, regardless of

position or degree of experience, to contribute their thoughts

and suggestions, and to voice whatever criticisms of

reservations they may have concerning any area of our operations.

The ultimate decisions in the Bureau are mine, and I take

full responsibility for them. My goal is to achieve maximum

critical analysis among our personnel without in any manner

weakening or undermining our basic command structure.

The results of this program have been most beneficial, to

me personally, to the FBI's disciplined performance, and to

the morale of our employees.

In addition, since

some of the mistakes of the past

were occasioned by direct orders from higher authorities outside

the FBI, we have welcomed Attorney General Edward Levi!s

guidance, counsel, and his continuous availability, in his

own words, "as a 'lightning rod' to deflect improper requests."

Within days after taking office, Attorney General Levi

instructed that I immediately report to him any requests

or practices which, in my judgment, were improper or which,

considering the context of the request, I believed presented

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the appearances of impropriety.

I am pleased to report to this Committee as I have to the

Attorney General that during my nearly two and one half years as

Director under two Presidents and three Attorneys General, no

one has approached me or made overtures, directly or otherwise,

to use the FBI for partisan political or other improper

purposes.

I can assure you that I would not for a moment consider

honoring any such request.

I can assure you, too, in my administration of the FBI

I routinely bring to the attention of the Attorney General and

the Deputy Attorney General major policy questions, including

those which arise in my continuing review of our operations and

practices: These are discussed openly and candidly in order

that the Attorney General can exercise his responsibilities

over the FBI.

I am convinced that the basic structure of the FBI today

is sound. But it would be a mistake to think that integrity

can be assured only through institutional means..

Integrity is a human quality. It depends upon the

character of the person who occupies the office of the

Director and every member of the FBI under him.

I am proud of the 19,000 men and women with whom it is

my honor to serve today. Their dedication, their professionalism,

their standards, and the self-discipline which they personally

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demand of themselves and expect of their associates are the

nation's ultimate assurance of proper and responsible conduct

at all times by the FBI.

The Congress and the members of this Committee in

particular have gained a great insight into the problems

confronting the FBI in the security and intelligence fields,

problems which all too often we have left to resolve without

sufficient guidance from the Executive Branch or the Congress

itself.

As in all human endeavors, errors of judgment have been

made. But no one who is looking for the cause of our

failures should confine his search solely to the FBI, or even

to the Executive Branch.

The Congress itself has long possessed the mechanism for

FBI oversight; yet, seldom has it been exercised.

An initial step was taken in the Senate in 1973 when the

Committee on the Judiciary established a Subcommittee on FBI

Oversight. Hearings had been commenced, and we were fully

committed to maximum participation with the members of that

Subcommittee.

I laud their efforts.

However, those efforts are of very

recent origin in terms of the FBI's history.

One of the greatest benefits of the study this Committee

has made is the expert knowledge you have gained of the complex

problems confronting the FBI. But I respectfully submit that

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those benefits are wasted if they do not lead to the next step,

a step that I believe is absolutely essential, a legislative

charter, expressing Congressional determination of intelligence

jurisdiction for the FBI.

Action to resolve the problems confronting us in the

security, and intelligence fields is urgently needed; and it

must be undertaken in a forthright manner. Neither the Cangress

nor the public can afford to look the other way, leaving it to

the FBI to do what must be done, as too often has occurred in

the past.

This means too that Congress must assume a continuing role

not in the initial decision-making process but in the review of

our performance.

I would caution against a too-ready reliance upon the

courts to do our tough thinking for us. Some proposals that

have been advanced during these hearings would extend the role

of the courts into the early stages of the investigative

process and, thereby, would take over what historically have

been Executive Branch decisions.

I frankly feel that such a trend, if unchecked, would

seriously undermine the independence of the Judiciary and cast

them in a role not contemplated by the authors of our

Constitution. Judicial review cannot be a substitute for Con-

gressional oversight or Executive decision.

The FBI urgently needs a clear and workable determination

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of our jurisdiction in the intelligence field, à jurisdictional

statement that the Congress finds to be responsive to both

the will and the needs of the American people.

Senators, first and foremost, I am a police officer, a

career police officer. In my police experience, the must

frustrating of all problems that I have discovered facing

law enforcement in this country, Federal, state, and local, is

when demands are made of them to perform their traditional

role as protector of life and property without clear and

understandable legal bases to do so.

I recognize that the formulation of such a legislative

charter will be a most precise and demanding task.

It must be sufficiently flexible that it does not stifle

the FBI's effectiveness

in combating the growing incidence

of crime and violence across the United States. That charter

must clearly address the demonstrated problems of the past;

yet, it must amply recognize the fact that times change and

so also do the nature and thrust of our criminal and subversive

challenges.

The fact that the Department of Justice has commenced

the formulation of operational guidelines governing our

intelligence activities does not in any manner diminish the need

for legislation. The responsibility for conferring juris-

diction resides with the Congress.

In this regard, I am troubled by some proposals which

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question the need for intelligence gathering, suggesting that

information needed for the prevention of violence can be

acquired in the normal course of criminal investigations.

As a practical matter, the line between intelligence

work and regular criminal investigations is often difficult

to describe. What begins as an intelligence investigation may

well end in arrest and prosecution of the subject.

But there

are some fundamental differences between these investigations

that should be recognized, differences in scope, in objective

and in the time of initiation. •In the usual criminal case, a

crime has occurred and it remains only for the Government to

identify the perpetrator and to collect sufficient evidence

for prosecution. Since the investigation normally follows

the elements of the crime, the scope of the inquiry is

limited and fairly well defined.

By contrast, intelligence work involves the gathering of

information, not necessarily evidence. The purpose may well be

not to prosecute, but to thwart crime or to insure that the

Government has enough information to meet any future crisis

or emergency. The inquiry is necessarily broad because it

must tell us not only the nature of the threat, but also whether

the threat is imminent, the persons involved, and the

means by which the threat will be carried out. The ability

of the Government to prevent criminal acts is dependent on

our anticipation of those criminal acts. Anticipation,

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in turn, is dependent on advance information, that is, intelli-

gence.

Certainly, reasonable people can differ on these issues.

Given the opportunity, I am confident that the continuing need

for intelligence work can be documented to the full satisfaction

of the Congress. We recognize that what is at stake here is not

the interests of the FBI, but rather the interests of every

citizen of this country. We recognize also that the resolution

of these matters will demand extensive and thoughtful

deliberation by the Congress. To this end, I pledge the

complete cooperation of the Bureau with this Committee of

its successors in this

important task.

In any event, you have my unqualified assurance as

Director that we will carry out both the letter and the spirit

of such legislation as the Congress may enact.

That is the substance of my prepared statement.

I would also like to say extemporaneously that I note

that on this panel are some gentlemen who were on the Judiciary

Committee which heard my testimony at the time I was presented

to them for candidacy as Director of the FBI. At that time

I took very seriously the charge which may possibly result

in the deliberation of this Committee and of the full Senate.

I have been well aware of the problems of the FBI since that

time. I have also been well aware of the capabilities of

the FBI to discharge those responsibilities. I don't take

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them lightly. I am of sufficient experience and age that I

have pledged myself to do what is good and proper. I say this

not as a self-serving statement but in order that we might

place in context my position within the FBI. I could seek

sanctuary and perhaps a safe sanctuary by saying during the

period these things occurred I was with the local police

department in Kansas City, Missouri. Prior to that time,

however, I was in the FBI.

During the time I was with the FBI, during the time I

was with the police department, I continued throughout that

period a close acquaintance with and a strong affection for

the FBI.

I only want to point out that based on those years, based

on those observations, we have here a very fine and very

sensitive and a very capable organization. I feel that there

is much that can still be done. I know that we are not without

fault. I know that from those experiences I have had.. We

will not be completely without fault in the future. But I

assure you that we look upon this inquiry, we look upon any

mandate which you may feel you have, that you should look at -

this is good and proper, and we do not intend -- I only want

to place in your thinking the fact that you have here a

matchless organization, one which I continue to say was

not motivated in some of these instances, and in most of

them, and I cannot justify some, that the motivation was of the

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best. I am not pleading, as does a defense attorney. I am

only putting in your thinking my objective observations as

a citizen who is somewhat concerned about the future of this

organization. It is too precious for us to have it in

a condition of jeopardy.

Thank you very much.

The Chairman. Thank you, Director Kelley.

I want to turn first to Senator Hart who won't be able

to remain through the whole morning. I think he has one

question he would like to ask.

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Senator Hart of Michigan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Mathias and I have Judiciary Committee hearings at 10:30.

Iahve several questions, and I'm sure they'll be

covered by others, but the ones that I have is a result of

reading your testimony and listening to it this morning, and

it relates to your comment at the foot of page 10 and at the

top of 11.

There you are indicating that you caution us about

extending the court's role in the early stages of investigations

suggesting that this might take us beyound the role comtemplated

for the courts under the Constutution.

Now as you have said, aside from the so-called national

security wiretap problem, the main focus of our discussions

and concern has been on the possibility requiring court

approval for the use of informants, informants directed to

penetrate and report on some group.

-

And one of the witnesses yesterday, Professor Dorsen,

pointed our that really those informants are the most pervasive

type of an eavesdropping device. It is a human device. It's

really, an informant is really more intrusive on my privacy

than a bug or a tap because he can follow me anywhere. He

can ask me questions to get information the government would

like to have.

Now we certainly involve the courts in approval of the

wiretaps for physical searches with the intent of the drafters

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of the Constitution to have a neutral third party magistrate

screen use of certain investigative techniques. And the

informant is such a technique. He functions sort of like a

general warrant, and I don't see why requiring court approval

would violate the role envisaged for the courts.

And as I leave, I would like to get your reactions to

my feelings.

Mr. Kelley. I do not feel that there is any use of the

informant in intrusion, which is to this extent objectionable.

It has of course been approved, the concept of the informant,

by numerous court decisions.

Let us go down not to the moral connotation of the use

of the informant.

I think, as in many cases, that is a matter of balance.

You have only very few ways of solving crimes. You have

basically in the use of the informant, I think, the protection

of the right of the victim to be victimized. You have within

the Constitution certain grants that are under ordinary

circumstances abrogation of rights. The right of search and

seizure, which, of course, can't be unreasonable, but none-

theless, you have the right.

I think that were we to lose the right of the informant,

we would lose to a great measure our capability of doing our

job.

Now I'm not arguing with you, senator, that it is not an

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unusual procedure. I'm not even going to say that it is not

an intrusion, because it is. But it has to be one I think

that is by virtue of the benefits must be counted.

We don't like to use it. We don't like the problems that

are attendant. We take great care.

Now you say about the court having possibility taking

jurisdiction over them and guiding. I think that possibly we

could present the matter to the court but what are they going

to do insofar as monitoring their effort? Are they going to

have to follow it all the way through?

Also, there is, of course, urgency in the other contacts.

Must the court be contacted for each and approval of the court

given for each contact?

There are a great many problems insofar as administration

of it.

I frankly feel, and again, all I can do is give you my

idea - I frankly feel that there is a satisfactory control over

the informants as we now exercise it today. Yes, there are

going to be some who will get beyond our control, but this

is going to happen no matter what you do.

Senator Hart of Michigan. Well, I appreciate your

reaction.

I was not suggesting that there is consideration here to

prohibit informants.

I was reflecting a view that I felt and

hold that the use of an informant does require some balance, as

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you yourself said, and I would be more comfortable with a

third party making a judgment as to whether the intrusion is

warranted by the particular circumstance. But I do understand

your position.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Hart.

(Senator Hart leaves the hearing room.)

The Chairman. Senator Baker, do you have questions?

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Mr. Kelley, I have a great respect for you and your

organization and I personally regret that the organization is

in political distress, but we've both got to recognize that

it is, along with other agencies and departments of the

government.

I think you probably would agree with me that even though

that is extraordinarily unpleasant and in many respects

unfortunate, that it also has a plus side. That is, it gives

us an indication of our future direction and the opportunity,

at least, to improve the level of competency and service of

the government itself.

With that hopeful

note, would you be agreeable then to

volunteering for me any suggestions you have on how to improve

the responsiveness of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or

indeed, for any other law enforcement agencies of the government,

to the Congress, to the Attorney General, to the President, and

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beyond that, would you give me any suggestions you have on

how you would provide the methods! the access, the documents,

the records, the authority, for the Congress to perform its

essential, I believe, essential oversight responsibility to

see that these functions, these delicate functions are being

undertaken properly?

And before you answer,

let me tell you two or three things

I am concerned about.

It hasn't been long ago that the FBI Director was not

even confirmed by the Senate of the United States. I believe

you are the first one to be confirmed by the Senate of the

United States. I think that is a movement in the right

direction. I think the FBI has taken on a stature that, an

additional importance that requires it to have closer supervision

and scrutiny by us.

At the same time I rather doubt that we can become

involved in the daily relationship between you and the Attorney

General.

Therefore, I tend to believe that the Attorney General

needs to be more directly involved in the operations of the

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FBI.

I would appreciate any comments on that.

Second, I rather believe that major decisions of the

intelligence community and the FBI ought to be in writing, so

that the Congress can, if it needs to in the future, take a

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look at these decisions and the process by which they were

made to decide that you are or you are not performing your

services diligently.

I don't think you can have oversight unless you have

access to records, and in many cases records don't exist

and in some cases the people who made those decisions are now

departed and in other cases you have conflicts.

How would you suggest then that you improve the quality

of service of your agency? How would you propose that you

increase the opportunity for oversight of the Congress of the

United States? What other suggestions do you have for improving

the level of law enforcement in the essential activity that

is required?

Mx. Kelley. I would possibly be repetitious in answering

this Senator, but I get a great deal of pleasure from telling

what I think is necessary and what I hope that I have followed,

one which is beyond my control, but which I think is very

important is that the position of Director, the one to which

great attention should be paid in choosing the man who will

properly acquit himself.

I feel that the Judiciary Committee, at least in going

over me, did a pretty good job. I feel that it is most

necessary that care be taken that his philosophy, his means

of management, his facility to adapt to change, his tendency

toward consulting with other members of the official family,

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that he be willing to, for example, go through oversight with

no reticence, and that I think that he should be chosen very

carefully.

I think further that he

should be responsible for those

matters which indicate impropriety or illegality.

Senator Baker. Could you stop for just a second? Who

does he work for? Does the Director, in your view, work for

the President of the United States, for the Attorney General,

for the Justice Department, for the Executive Branch?

Who does the executive. of the FBI, the Director of the

FBI, be responsible to, who should he be responsible to?

Mr. Kelley. Jurisdictionally, to the Attorney General,

but I think this is such an important field of influence that

it is not at all unlikely that we can expand it to the

judiciary, the legislative, and of course, we are under the

Attorney General.

Senator Baker. Do you have any problems with the idea

of the President of the United States calling the Director of

the FBI and asking for performance of a particular task?

Does that give you any difficulty? Or do you think that

the relationship between the FBI Director and the President

is such that that is desirable, or should it be conduited

through the Attorney General?

Mr. Kelley. I think it should be in the great majority

of the cases conduited through the Attorney General. There

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has been traditionally some acceptance of the fact that if

the President wants to see and talk with the Director, he

may do so, call him directly.

It has been my practice in such an event to thereafter

report to the Attorney General, whoever it might be, that I

have been called over and I discussed and was told. And this

was revealed in full to them.

Senator Baker. I suppose we could pass a statute that

says the President has to go through the Attorney General,

although I rather suspect it would be a little presumptuous.

But to go the next step, do you think it is necessary

for the pursuit of effective oversight on the part of the

Congress, to have some sort of document written, or at least

some sort of account of a Presidential order or an order of

the Attorney General given to a Director of the FBI?

Do you think that these things need to be handled in

a more formal way?

Mr. Kelley. Personally, it would be my practice in

the event I receive such an order, to reguest that it be

documented. This is a protection as well as a clarification

as to whether or not it should be placed as part of legislation.

I frankly would like to reserve that for some more considera-

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Senator Baker. Mr. Kelley, Attorney General Levi, I

believe, has already established some sort of agency or

function within the Department that is serving as the equivalent,

I suppose, of an Inspector General of the Justice Department,

including the FBI.

Are you familiar with the steps that Mr. Levi has

taken in that respect? I think he calls it the Office of

Professional Responsibility.

Mr. Kelley. Yes, sir, I'm familiar with it.

Senator Baker. Do you have any comment on that? Will

you give us any observations

as to whether you think that

will be useful, helpful, or whether it will not be useful or

helpful, how it affects the FBI, how you visualize your

relationship to it in the future?

Mr. Kelley. I don't object to this, which is to some

extent an oversight within the Department of Justice under the

Attorney General.

Frankly, it just came out. I have not considered it

completely, but to the general concept, yes, I very definitely

subscribe.

Senator Baker. How would you feel about extending that

concept of government-wide operation, a national Inspector

General who is involved with an oversight of all of the

agencies of government as they interface with the Constitutionally

protected rights of the individual citizen? Would you care

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to comment on that, or would you rather save that for a while?

Mr. Kelley. I would like to reserve that one.

Senator Baker. I'm not surprised. Would you think about

it and let us know what you think about it?

Mr. Kelley. I will..

Senator Baker. All right.

Mr. Chairman, thank you very

much.

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The Chairman. Senator Huddleston.

Senator Huddleston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Kelley, you describe on page 4 the conditions that

existed when much of the abuse that we have talked about during

this inquiry occurred, indicating that the people within the

Bureau felt like they were doing what was expected of them

by the President, by the Attorney General, the Congress and

the people of the United States.

Does not this suggest that there has been a reaction

there to prevailing attitudes that might have existed in the

country because of certain circumstances rather than any

clear and specific direct instructions that might have been

received from proper authorities? And if that is the case,

is it possible in developing this charter, this guideline,

to provide for that kind of specific instruction?

Mr. Kelley. I think so, yes. I think that they can

logically be incorporated and that --

Senator Huddleston. You can see there would be a continuing

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danger if any agency is left to simply react to whatever the

attitudes may be.at a specific time in this country because -

Mr. Kelley.

Senator, I don't contemplate it might be

a continuing danger, but it certainly would be. a very acceptable

guidepost whereby we can, in the event such a need seems

to arise, know what we can do.

Senator Huddleston. Vell, in pursuing the area which

Senator Hart was discussing, that is whether of not we can

provide sufficient guidelines would replace a decision by the

court in determining what action might be proper and specific -

ally in protecting individual's rights, can't we also

provide the restrictions and guidelines and the various

techniques that might be used?

For instance, supposing we do establish the fact, as

has already been done, that informants are necessary and

desirable. Io: do we keep that informant operating within the

proper linits so that he in fact is not violating individual

rights?

Mx. Kelley. Well, of course, much of the reliance must

be placed on the agent and the supervision of the FBI to assure

that there is no infringement of rights.

Senator Huddleston. But

this is an aware we've gotten

into some difficulty in the past. We have assumed that the

particular action was necessary, that there was a present

threat that some intelligence programs should be initiated, but

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in many cases it has gone beyond what would appear to have been

necessary to have addressed the original threat.

How do we keep within the proper balance there?

Mr. Kelley. Well, actually, it's just about like any

other offense. It is an invasion of the other individual's

right and it is by an officer and an FBI agent is an officer.

There's the possibility of criminal prosecution against him.

This is one which I think might flow if he counsels

the informant.

Now insofar as his inability to control the informant,

I don't suppose that would warrant prosecution, but there is

still supervisory control over that agent and over that

informant by insisting that control is exercised on a continuing

basis.

Senator Huddleston. It brings up an interesting point

as to whether or not a law enforcenent agency ought to be

very alert to any law violations of its own members or anyone

else.

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Senator Huddleston. But that hasn't been the case in the

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Mr. Kelley. Well, I don't know what you're referring

to but I would think your statement is proper.

Senator Huddleston. Well, we certainly have evidence

of unlawful activity taking place in various projects that

have been undertaken, which certainly were not brought to

light willingly by the FBI or by other law enforcement agencies.

The question that I'm really concerned about is as

we attempt to draw a guideline and charters that would give

the Agency the best flexibility that they may need, a wide

range of threats, how do we control what happens within each

of those actions to keep them from going beyond what

was intended to begin with?

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Mr. Kelley. You're still speaking of informants.

Senator Huddleston. Not only informants but the agents

themselves as they go into surveillance, wiretaps, or whatever

intelligence gathering techniques.

The original thrust of my question was, even though we

may be able to provide guidelines of a broad nature, how do

we control the techniques that might be used, that int themselves

might be used, that in themselves might be a serious violation

of the rights.

Mr. Kelley. Well, first, I don't know whether it's

germane to your question but I do feel that it should be pointed

out that the association to, the relationship between the

informant and his agent handler is a very confidential one,

and I doubt very seriously whether we could have any guide-

lines, where there might be an extension of any monitors here

because thereby you do have a destruction of that relationship.

Insofar as thé activities of agents, informants of others

which may_be illegal, we have on many occasions learned of

violations of the law on the part of informants, and either

prosecuted ourselves, through the reporting of it to the

United States Attorney, or turned it over to the local authority.

We have done this on many a time, many occasions. Insofar

as our own personnel, we have an internal organization, the

Inspection Division, which reviews this type of activity, and

if there be any violation, yes, no question about it, we would

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pursue it to the point of prosecution.

Senator Huddleston. But it could be helped by periodic

review.

Mr. Kelley. We do, on an annual basis, review the

activities of our 59 offices through that same Inspection

Division, and they have a clear charge to go over this as well

as other matters.

Senator Huddleston. Mr. Kelley, you pointed. out the

difference in the approaches when gathering intelligence, in

gathering evidence after a crime has been committed.

Would there be any advantage, or would it be feasible to

attempt to separate these functions within the Agency, in the

departments, for instance, with not having a nixing of

gathering intelligence and gathering evidence? Are the techniques

definable and different?:

Mr. Kelley. Senator, I think they are compatible. I

see no objection to the way that they are now being handled

on a management basis. I think, as a matter of fatt, it is

a very fine association whereby the intelligence, stemming as

it does from a substantive violation, is a natural complement.

Senator Huddleston. Now, another area, the FBI furnishes

information to numerous government agencies.

Is this properly restricted and controlled at the present

time in your judgment as to just who can ask the FBI for

information, what kind of information they can ask for, and

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who might also be inclined to call the Director and ask him

to do specific things?

Could there be some clearcut understanding as to whether

or not the Director would be obligated to undertake any such

project, that just anybody at the White House might suggest?

Mr. Kelley. It's very clear to me that any request must

come. from Mr. Buchen's office, and that it be, in any case,

wherein it is a request for action, that it be followed with

a letter so requesting.

This has come up before during the Watergate hearings, as

I think it has been placed very vividly in our minds, in

take care that you just don't follow the request of some .

underling who does not truly reflect the desire of the President.

Senator Huddleston. Just one more question about

techniques, aside from the guidelines of authority on broad

projects undertaken.

Would it be feasible from time to time in a Congressional

oversight committee, would be able to discuss with the Department,

with the Bureau various techniques so that they could have

some input as to whether or not these actions are consistent.

with the overall guidelines, to start with, and consistent

with the very protections?

Mr. Kelley. Senator, I have already said.to.the

översight committee of the Senate that so far as I can now

see, the only thing that would be withheld is the identity of

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probably even more importantly, what restrictions can be put

on the use of that information once it has been supplied by

the FBI?

Mr. Kelley. I think so, Senator.

Senator Huddleston. You think there are proper restrictions

now?

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Mr. Kelley. I don't know that we can ourselves juäge

in all cases whether or not there is good and sufficient reason

for an Agency to inquiry. I think that there should be a

very close delineation by the agencies as to what they're

going to ask for, but I think that we do have sufficient rules

that at least to us we are satisfied.

Senator Huddleston. You're confident that the information

your agency supplies is not being misused, to the detriment

of the rights of any individuals.

Mr. Kelley. Senator, I'm only confident in what I

do myself. I would say that I am satisfied.

Senator Huddleston. I was wondering whether some

inclusion ought to be made in whatever charter is made as to

who specifically can request, what limits ought to be placed

on what the request, and what they can do with it after they

get it.

Mr. Kelley. Yes.

Senator Huddleston. I have some concern about the fact

that in intelligence gathering, you gather, you are just

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bound to gather a great deal of information about some

individual that is useless as far as the intent of the intelli-

gence gathering is concerned, but might be in some way embarras-

sing or harmful to the individual, whether or not there's any

effort to separate this kind of information out of a person's

file that is really initiated for a purpose, for a specific

purpose unrelated to this information.

Is there any effort, or could any direction be given to

doing that?

Mr. Kelley. We would be very happy to work under the

guidelines or rules or anything else to purge material which

is extraneous, irrelevant, or for any other reason objection-

able.

Senator Huddleston.

And how about the length of time

that these files are kept in the agency?

Mx. Kelley. We are willing to work within that framework,

too.

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Senator Huddleston. I think that might be done.

Now, I think in developing the chain of command, so to

speak, it certainly would be very difficult to prevent the

President of the United States from calling up the head of

the FBI or anyone else and discussing any law enforcement

problem he might so desire, and perhaps even give direction

to the agency.

But how about that? What about White House personnel

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informants.

We'll discuss techniques, we'll discuss our

present activities. I think this is the only way that we can

exchange our opinions and get accomplished what you want to

accomplish and what I want to accomplish.

Senator Huddleston. I feel that is an important aspect

of it because even though you have a charter which gives broad

direction for all the guidelines and to the types of projects

that enter into it, if we don't get down to specifics, such

things as how intelligence is to be collected, how evidence

is to be collected, what is done after it is collected, this

type of thing, it seems to me we are leaving a wide gap

again for the Bureau to assume that it has total instruction

and total permission to move in a certain direction and go

beyond what is intended or what was authorized.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Director.

The Chairman. Senator Goldwater?

Senator Goldwater. Mr. Kelley, as part of the FBI

electronic surveillance of Dr. King, several tapes of

specific conversations, and later a composite King tape were

produced.

Are these tapes still in the possession of the FBI?

Mr. Kelley. Yes, sir.

Senator Goldwater. Have they been reviewed by you?

Mr. Kelley. No, sir.

Senator Goldwater. Have they been reviewed by any of your

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staff, to your knowledge?

Mr. Kelley. Senator, I think that they have been reviewed.

I know that at least some have reviewed it within the area of

this particular section. There has been no review of them

since I came to the FBI, I can tell you that.

Senator Goldwater. Would these tapes be available to

the Committee if the Committee felt they would like to hear

them?

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Mr. Kelley. This, Senator Goldwater, is a matter which is

of, as I said before, some delicacy, and there would have to

be a discussion of this in an executive session.

The Chairman. I might say in that connection that the

Committee staff gave some consideration to this matter and •

decided that it would compound the original error for the

staff to review the tapes, because that would be a still

further invasion of privacy, and so the staff refrained from

insisting on obtaining the tapes, believing that it was

unnecessary, and quite possibly improper, in order to get at

what. we needed to know about the King case.

So the staff did refrain, and for that reason the issue

never came to a head. I just wanted to lay that information

before the Senator.

Senator Goldwater. I realize that's a prerogative of

the staff, but it's also the prerogative of the Committee if,

and I'm not advocating it, if we wanted to hear them to

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ourselves whether Mr. Hoover was off on a wild goose chase

or whether there was, in effect, some reason. Again, I am

not advocating it, I am merely asking à question. They would

be available if the Committee took a vote to hear them and

decided on it.

Mr. Kelley. I don't think it would be within my juris-

diction to respond to this, Senator. It would have to be the

Attorney General.

Senator Goldwater. I see.

Now, are these tapes and other products of surveillance

routinely retained even after an individual ceased to be a

target of inquiry?

Mr. Kelley. They are retained usually for ten years.

Senator Goldwater. Ten years.

Mr. Kelley. Yes, sir.

Senator Goldwater. What is the future value, if any,

to the Bureau of retaining such information?

Mr. Kelley. If there be guidelines that set out a

destruction or erasure, we will abide by it. We will, on those

occasions where we think that matters might come up within

that period of time which may need the retention of them, we

will express our opinion at that time, but other than that

we would be guided by guidelines.

Senator Goldwater. Is it your view that legitimate

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with respect to retention of such information, or do we need

the clear guidelines on the destruction of these materials

when the investigation purposes for which they were collected

have been served?

Mr. Kelley. We feel that there should be a good close

look at the retention of material, and we would of course like

to have an input. But we welcome consideration of this.

Senator Goldwater. That is all I have, MI. Chairman.

you very much.

The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Mondale?

Senator Mondale. Mr. Director, it seems

to me that the

most crucial question before the Congress is to accept the

invitation of the FBI to draw Congressionally imposed lines,

limits of authority so the FBI will know clearly what you can

and cannot do, so you will not be subject to later judgments,

and the question is, where should that line be drawn?

As you know, in 1924 when the FBI was created, and

Mr. Stone later became the Chief Justice, he drew the line at

criminal law enforcement. He said that never again will we

go beyond the authority imposed upon us to get into political

ideas. We will stay in the area of law enforcement.

Would you not think it makes a good deal of sense to

draw the guidelines in a way that your activities are

restricted to the enforcement of the law, investigations of

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crime, investigations of conspiracies to commit crime rather

than to leave this very difficult to define and control area

of political ideas?

Mr. Kelley. I don't know whether I understand your last

statement of involving the area of political ideas. I say that

I feel that certainly we should be vested and should continue

in the field of criminal investigations as an investigatory

objective. These are conclusions, of course, which are based

on statutes in the so-called security field, national or

foreign.

These are criminal violations. I feel that they should

be in tandem. I feel, having worked many years in this

atmosphere, that you have more ears and eyes and you have

more personnel working together, covering the same fields..

I do not think there should be a separation of the intelligence

matters, because it is a concomitant. It naturally flows

from the investigation of the security matters and the

criminal.

Senator Mondale. Mr. Kelley, what Mr: Stone said was

this, that the Bureau of investigation is not concerned

with political or other opinions of individuals. It is

concerned only with such conduct as is forbidden by the laws

of the United States. When the police system goes beyond

these limits, it is dangerous to proper administration of

justice and human liberty.

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Do you object to that definition?

MI. Kelley. I think that life has become much more

sophisticated and we have added to the so-called policeman's

area of concern some matters which were probably not as important

at that time. I think that the fact that the FBI has been in

touch with the security investigations and the gathering of

intelligence is something which has proved to be at times

troublesome and given us great concern, but it is a viable,

productive procedure.

I don't know what Mr. Stone was thinking of entirely

of this course, but I can tell you about the procedure today:

Senator Mondale. You see, I think you recognize, if

that further step is taken, as you're recommending here, that

at that point it becomes so difficult to guarantee, and in

fact, in my opinion, impossible to guarantee that we won't

see a recurrence of some of the abuses that we've seen in

the past, and I don't know how you establish any kind of

meaningful oversight on a function as nebulous as the one

you've just defined.

If the FBI possesses the authority. to investigate

ideas that they consider to be threats to this nation's

security, particularly in the light of the record that we have

seen how that definition can be stretched to include practi-

cally everybody, including moderate civil rights leaders,

war dissenters and so on, how on earth can standards be developed

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How can you, from among other things, be protected from

criticism later on that you exceeded your authority of didn't

do something that some politician tried to pressure you into

doing?

Mr. Kelley. It might well be, Senator, that ten years

from now a Director of the FBI will be seated here and will be

criticized for doing that which today is construed as very

acceptable.

Senator Mondale. Correct. And I have great sympathy

for the predicament the FBI finds itself in.

Mr. Kelley. And the Director.

Senator Mondale. And the Director especially, and that is

why I think it's in the interest of the FBI to get these lines

as sharply defined as possible, so that when you are pressured

to do things, or when, after the fact, people with good 20/20

hindsight can criticize you or the Bureau, that you can say

well, here are the standards that you gave us, and they specific-

ally say this, and that is your answer. We have to live by

the law. If we don't define it specifically, it seems to me

that these excesses could reoccur, because I don't think it's

possible to define them, and the FBI is inevitably going to

be kicked back and forth, depending on personal notions of what

you should have done.

Don't you fear that?

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MI. Kelley. Not too much, Senator. I think we learned a

great lesson by virtue of Watergate, the revelations that have

come up as a result of this Committee's inquiries, the fact

that I think that we have a different type of spirit today

in the Bureau, the fact that, as I said before, you came in,

that I think the Bureau is

a matchless organization, and they

are eager to do that which is vital and proper, and the fact

that we are getting a number of very fine young people in the

organization, people of the other ethnic backgrounds than we

had years ago. I think there is a greater understanding in

the Bureau today of what is the proper type of conduct.

We may not be able to project this on all occasions,

because we must equate this with the need and with our

experience, but if the precise guidelines be the goal, you're

going to have trouble. If, on the other hand, there be a

flexibility, I think that we can work very well within those

guidelines.

Senator Mondale. I think, as you know, I don't think

there is a better trained or higher professionally qualified

law enforcement organization in the world than the FBI. I

think we all agree it is superb. But the problem has been,

from time to time, that when you go beyond the area of

enforcing the law into the area of political ideas, that you

are subject to and in fact you leave the criminal field, you

get into politics. And that is where, it seems to me, that the

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great controversy exists, and where you are almost inevitably

going to be subjected to fierce criticism in the future, no

matter how you do it. Once you get into politics, you get

into trouble.

Mr. Kelley. I agree to that, and I point out that in almost

every branch of the government and in every part, as a matter

of fact, every segment of our society, there are some who deviate

from the normal course. I feel that within the Bureau there is

less likelihood of this to happen, and I think that working

with you we can at least make some achievements that will be

significant.

Now, whether it be lasting, I don't think so, but I

think we've made a good start.

Senator Mondale. In your speech in Montreal on August

9th, you said we must be willing to surrender a small measure

of our liberties to preserve the great bulk of them.

Which liberties did you have in mind?

Mr. Kelley. Well, of course, this speech has been mis-

understood many, many times.

Senator Mondale. Well, I want you to have a chance to

clear it up.

Mr. Kelley. All that was intended here was a restatement

of the approach which the courts historically have used in

resolving most issues of Constitutional importance, and its

recognition that rights are not susceptible to absolute

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protection. It's a matter of balance. Even in the Fourth

Amendment, for example, which protects the right of privacy, it

does not prohibit searches and seizures. I mention, it only

refers to those that are unreasonable.

I came from the police field. What is more restrictive

to more people than traffic regulation? But what would be

more chaotic is of you did not have traffic regulation. We

do have to , in order to love in the complexities and

intricacies of today's life, have to give up some of our

rights.

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Some may construe this as an extravagant statement. If it

is bs, I wish to say that I only was pointing out that there

has to be a balance.

Senator Mondale. So that when you say we have to give

up some liberties, or as you just said, some rights, what you

mean -- let me ask. Let me scratch. that and ask again, you

have to give up some tights. Which rights would you have us

give up?

Mr. Kelly. Well, under the Fourth Amendment you would

have the right for search and seizure.

Senator Mondale. "You wouldn't give up the Fourth Amend-

ment right.

Mr. Kelley. Oh, no not the right.

Senator Mondale.

What right do you have in mind?

MI. Kelley. The right to be free from search and seizure.

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Senator Mondale.

There's no such right in the Consti-

tution. You can have such seizures, but they must be reasonable,

under court warrant.

. Did you mean to go beyond that?

Mr. Kelley. That's right.

Senator Mondale. That you should be able to go beyond

that?

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MI. Kelley. No, no. I do not mean that we should ever

go beyond a Constitutional right guarantee.

Senator Mondale. Well, would you say, Mr. Kelley, that

that sentence might have been inartful in your speech?

Mr. Kelley. I said that if it was misunderstood, I

made a mistake, because I should never make a statement which

yes, it was inartful.

Senator Mondale. I think I know about your record in

law enforcement well enough to tell you that I think you were

saying something different, that it was taken to mean something

different than I think you intended:

What you are saying is that in the exercise of your law

enforcement powers, the rights of individuals is determined

by the laws and the courts, but the courts, in the handling

of those issues, have to balance rights and other values.

That's what you're essentially saying, is that correct?

Mr. Kelley. Senator, I ought to have you write my

speeches so that I don't have any misunderstandings. I didn't

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understand that to be at the time anything that was unusual.

I have to admit that maybe I made a mistake.

Senator Mondale.

What you are saying in effect is that

in effect, the rights: of the American people can be determined

not by the Director of the FBI but by the courts and by the

law.

end t. 3

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You meant that.

Mr. Kelley. Indeed, yes, sir.

Senator Mondale.

All right.

Thank you.

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The Chairman. Senator Hart.

Senator of Colorado. MI. Kelley, in response to

a question by Senaotr Mondale, one of his first questions about

laying down guidelines, it seems to me what you were saying was

we could work together. That is to say the Bureau and the

Congress, lay down guidelines that would not unreasonably

hamper you from investigations of crime control in the

country.

But I think implicit in his question was also an area

that you didn't respond to, and that is how do you, what kind

of guidelines do you lay down to protect you and the Bureau

from political pressure, the misuse of the Bureau by political

figures, particularly in the white House?

And we've had indications that at least two of your

predecessors, if not more, obviously were corrupted and Mr.

Gray was under great pressure from the White House to use

the facilities of the Bureau and their capabilities to accomplish

some plititcal end.

Well, it seems to me you were arguing in favor of fewer

restrictions so you could get on with your job, but that is

not what Senator Mondale and the rest of us are interested in.

What kindof restrictions can we lay down to protect you

from political pressures?

I'd be interested in that sign of the

coin, if you would.

Mr. Kelley. I would welcome any guidelines which would

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protect me or any successor from this type of thing. I think

that would be splendid. I have not reviewed the guidelines

as prepared to the present date by the Department. It might

be that they are well defined in there. But I welcome any

consideration of such directives.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Do you think this is a problem?

Mr. Kelley. No, sir, not with me.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Do you think that it has been

a problem for the people that preceded you?

Mr. Kelley. J. think so.

Senator Hart of Colorado. And that's a problem the

Congress ought to address?

Mr. Kelley. I think so.

Senator Hart of Colorado. The Committee received a

letter from the Department of Justice a couple of days, the

Assistant Attorney General asking our cooperation in carrying

out the investigation of their efforts to review the investi-

gation conducted by the FBI into the death of Martin Luther

King, JI., in order to determine whether that investigation

should be re-opened. They asked our cooperation, they asked

for our transcripts, the testimony before the Committee, all

material provided to the Cormittee by the FBI which relates

to DI. King and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

I guess my question is this: Why is the Justice Depart-

ment asking this Comnittee for FBI files?

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Mr. Kelley. I don't think they're asking for files.

I think they're asking for what testimony was given by

witnesses whose testimony has not been given up. I don't know.

Senator Hart of Colorado. I'll quote it. "And all

material provided to the Committee by the FBI which relates

to DI. King and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference."

I repeat the question. Why is the Justice Department

asking this Committee for material provided to us by the

FBI?

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Mr. Kelley.

Frankly, I don't know. Do you mind if I

just ask -

(Pause)

Mr. Kelley. I am informed, and I knew this one.

Everything that was sent to you was sent through them. Did

they have a copy also? Yes, they had a retained copy. I

don't know why.

Senator Hart of Colorado. So there's nothing you

provided us that's not available to the Justice Department?

Mr. Kelley. That's right.

Senator Hart of Colorado. And you can't account for why

an official of the Justice Department would ask this Committee

for your records?

Mr. Kelley. No, sir.

Senator Ilart of Colorado. You released a statement on

November the 18th of '74 regarding the FBI's. counter-intelligence

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program and you said you made a detailed study of COITELPRO

activities and reached the following conclusions, and I quote:

"The purpose of these counter-intelligence programs was

to prevent dangerously and potentially deadly acts against

individuals, organizations and institutions both public

and private across the United States."

Now we had an FBI informant in the other day before this

Committee and he stated he told the FBI on a number of.

occasions he planned violent acts against black people in

groups. And yet, he said few, if any, instances in which the

FBI actually prevented violence from taking place.

How does his testimony square with your statement that

I have quoted?

Mr. Kelley. It doesn't, and I don't know if any of

his statements contrary to what we have said is the truth.

We don't subscribe to what he said. We have checked into it

and we know of no instances where, for example, 15 minutes

and that type of thing has been substantiated.

Senator Hart of Colorado. You're saying the testimony

he gave us under oath was not accurate?

Mr. Kelley. Right.

Senator Hart of Colorado. You also said in that statement,

and I quote:

"I want to assure you that Director Hoover did

not conceal from superior authorities the fact that the FBI

was engaged in neutralizing and disruptive tactics against

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revolutionary and violence-prone groups.

Now the Committee has received testimony that the New

Left COINTELPRO programs was not in fact told to higher

authorities, the Attorney Gereral and Congress.

Do you have any information in this regard?

I know in that statement you cite onw or two instances,

but in terms of the bulk of COINTEL programs, the record

seems to date at least to be clear that there was not systematic

information flowing upward through the chain of command to

Director Hoover's superiors?

Mr. Kelley: May I ask that I be given the opportunity

to substantiate that with documentation?

Senator Hart of Colorado. Sure.

Mr. Kelley: Or respond to it.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Dorector Kelley, just in

passing, do you agree with the statement made by President

Ford that those responsible for harassing and trying to destroy

DI. King should be brought to justice.

Mr. Kelley. Those who directly responsible and upon whose orders

the activities were taken responsible. I don't know if he intended to say

that, but if he did not, I would say that it would be more proper. Insofar

as my own opinion is concerned, that it be centered on those who said

to do it and those who are responsible.

I: took the responsibility for any such program and I

don't expect that those under me would be not acting in

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accordance with what they think is proper and may even have

some reservation, but they do it on my orders. I accept that

responsibility.

I think that it should rest. on those who instructed that

that be done.

Senator Hart of Colorado. But you agree that the people

who give the orders should be brought to justice.

Mr. Kelley. I do.

The Chairman. Aren't they all dead?

Mr. Kelley. No.

The Chairman. Not quite?

Mr. Kelley. Not quite.

Senator Hart of Colorado.

That's all, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.

Director Kelley, in the Comnittee's review of the

COINTELPRO program and other political involvements of the

FBI, it seems to me that we have encountered two or three

basic questions.

Since the investigation is over insofar as the Committee

is concerned, we're now turning our attention to remedies for

the future, what I would think would be our constructive

legislative work, it is very important that we focus on what

we learned in that investigation.

And one thing that we have learned is that Presidents of

the United States have fron time to time ordered the FBI to

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obtain for them certain kinds of information by exercising the

necessary surveillance to obtain. and to have a purely

political character, that they simply wanted to have for their

own personal purposes.

I think that you would agree that that is not a proper

function of the FBI,, and you agree.

Yet it's awfully difficult for anyone in the FBI,

including the Director, to turn down a President of the United

States if he receives a direct order from the President. It

is always possible, of course, to say no, and if you insist,

I will resign. Eut that puts a very hard burden on any man

serving in your position, particularly if the President puts

a good face on the request and makes it sound plausible or

even invents some excuse. It is alvays easy for him to say,

you know, I an considering Senator White for an important

position in my administration, and I need to know more about

his activities, particularly of late. I've had some cause

for concern and I want to be certain that there is nothing in

his record that would later embarrass me, and I just want you

to keep careful track of him and report to me on what he's

been doing lately.

It's difficult for you to say back to the President, ir.

President, that's a very questionable activity for the FSI,

and I frankly don't believe that you've given me the real

reason why you want this man followed. I think his opposition

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to your current policy is politically embarrassing to you and

you want to get something on him.:

I mean, you know,

the Director can hardly talk back that

way, and I'm wondering what we could do in the way of protecting

your office and the FBI from political exploitation in this

basic charter that we write.

Now, I want your suggestions, but let's begin with one

or two of mine. I would like your response.

If we were to write into the law that any order given you

either by the President or by the Attorney General should be

transmitted in vriting and should clearly state the objective

and purpose of the request and that the FBI would maintain

those written orders and that furthermore they would be

available to any oversight committee of the Congress. If the

joint cormittee on intelligence is established, that committee

would have access to such a file.

So that the committee itself would be satisfied that

orders were not being given to the FBI that were improper or

unlawful.

What would you think of writing a provision of that kind

into a charter for the FBI?

Hr. Kelley. I would say writing into the law any order

issued by. the President that is a request for action by the

Attorney General should be in writing, is certainly, in my

opinion, is a very plausible solution. I'm sure that in

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contemplation of this there would be some that will say yes

or some that will say no, but I think we could define an

area where you are trying to cure the abuses and we could

do that.

Now as to the availability to any oversight committee

of Congress, I would say generally that I certainly would have

no objection to this, but I again, there may be some request

for something of high confidentiality that the President might

put in writing such as some national or foreign security

matter.

I would like to have such a consideration be given a

great deal of thought and that the oversight committee review

be conditioned with that possibility. I don't think it would

present a problem.

I have said previously that I feel I can discuss every-.

thing except the identity of the informants to the oversight

committee. I welcome that.

The Chairman. Well, that has been of course the way we

proceeded with this Committee. It has worked pretty well,

I think.

Now Senator Goldwater brought up a question on the

Martin Luther King tapes. I would like to pursue that question.

If these tapes do not contain any evidence that needs

to be preserved for ongoing criminal investigations, and since

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why are they preserved? Why aren't they simply destroyed?

Is there a problem that we can help through new law to enable

the FBI to remove from its files so much of this information

that is has collected that it is no longer needed or may never

have connected the person with any criminal activity? And

yet, all of that information just stays there in the files

year after year.

What can we do? How can a law be changed? If that's

not the problem, then what is? Why are these tapes still down

there at the FBI?

Mr. Kelley. Mell, of course, we do have the rule that

they are maintained ten years. Now why the rule is your

question and why right now are they maintained? Since we

do maintain everything since the inquiry has started and until

that's lifted, ve can't

destroy anything.

I would say that this is a proper area for guidelines

or legislation and ayain, as I have said, there should be

some flexibility and I know that's a broad statement but there

might be some areas wherein that the subject of the investigation

hinself may want them retained because it shows his innocence.

I think you have to deliberate this very carefully, but

it can be done and we are willing to be guided by those

rules:

The Chairman. Let me ask you this. The FBI is conducting

thousands of investigations every year on possible appointees

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to Federal positions. As a matter of fact, the only time I

ever see an FBI agent is when he comes around and flashes his

badge and asks me a question or two about what I know of Mr.

so and so, who's being considered for an executive office.

And we have a very brief conversation in which I tell him that

as far as I know, he's a loyal and patriotic citizen, and that

is about the extent of it.

Then when this file is completed and the person involved

is either appointed or not appointed, what happens to that

file? I know it's full of all kinds of gossip because it is

in the nature of the investigation to go out to his old

neighborhoods and talk to everybody who might have known him.

What happens to the file? Is that just retained forever?

Mr. Kelley. We have some capability of destroying some

files and they are rather lengthy insofar as retention. We

have some archival rules which govern the retention of mateial

and is developed in cases

involving certain members of the

Executive Branch of the government.

I see no reason why this would not be a proper area

for consideration of legislation.

The Chairman. Can you

give me any idea of how much

do you have records that would tell us how much time

and money

is being spent by the FBI just in conducting these thousands

of routine investigations on possible Présidential appointments

to Federal offices?

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Mr. Kelley. I feel confident we can get it. I do not

have it now, but if you would like

to have the annual cost

for the investigation of lederal appointees --

The Chairman. Yes.

Plus, you know, plus any other

information that would indicate to us what proportion of the

time and effort of the FBI was absorbed in this kind of

activity.

Mr. Kelley. I can tell you it is relatively small, but

I can get you, I think, the exact amount of time and the

approximate expense.

The Chairman. I wish you would do that because this is

a matter we need riore infornation about. And when you supply

that data to the Committee, would you also supply the number

of such investigations each year?

You know, I don't

expect you to go back 20 or 25 years,

but give us a good idea of the last few years. For example,

enough to give us an idea of how much time and how broad the

reach of these investigations may be.

Mr. Kelley. Through '70?

The Chairman. That would be sufficient, I would think.

The other matter that is connected to this same subject

that I would like your best judgment on is whether these

investigations could not be linited to offices of sensitivity.

That is to say where legitimate national security interest might

be involved so that there is a reason to make a close check on

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past associations, attitudes and expressions of belief.

I have often wondered whether we couldn't eliminate

routine Federal offices

that are not particularly sensitive

in the national security sense from the reach of these FBI

checks.

And so when you respond to the series of questions, I

wish you would include the offices that are now covered by

such checks and give us an idea of how far down into the

Federal bureaucracy this extends.

Could you do that?

Mx. Kelley. Yes, sir.

The Chairnan. Fine.

Now there is a vote.

The vote always cones just at

the wrong time, but Mr. Schwarz wants to ask you some additional

questions for the record, and there may be other questions:

too that would be posed by the staff, after which I will as!:

Mr. Schwarz to adjourn the hearings. It looks like ve're going

to be tied up on the floor with votes.

But before I leave I want to thank you for your testimony,

iir. Kelley, and to express my appreciation to you for the

way you have cooperated with the Committee in the course of

its

investigation during the past months.

Mx. Kelley. Thank you.

The Chairman. And I hope, as you do, that as a result

of the work of the Committee we can write a generic law for

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the FBI that will help to remedy many of the problems we'll

encounter in the future.

Thank you.

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Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Kelley, I'll try to be very brief.

On page 5 of your statement -

Mr. Kelley. What?

Mr. Schwarz. On page 5 of your statement, the third

full paragraph, you said the following, and I would like then

to question about what you said.

"We must recognize that

situations have occurred in the past and will arise in the

future where the Government may well be expected to depart from

its traditional role, in the FBI's case, as an investigative

and intelligence-gathering agency, and take affirmative steps

which are needed to meet an imminent threat to human life or

property."

Now, by that you mean to take what kind of steps in what

kind of situation?

And can you give some concrete examples under your general

principles statement?

Mr. Kelley. I think that Mr. Adams addressed himself to

that the other day, where you have an extremist who is an

employee at the waterworks, and he makes a statement that he's

going to do something which is devastating to the city, and you

have no way to attack this under the ordinary procedures, and

so therefore you must take some steps to meet that imminent

threat to human life or property.

Mr. Schwarz. So let us take that case as a test of the

principle. You are saying the extremist has said he is going

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to do something to the waterworks, poison it or something, and

he is on the way down there with the poison in his car.

Is that the presumption?

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Mr. Kelley. We hadn't gone that far, but all right, you

can extent it.

Mr. Schwarz. All right, now, in that case you have the

traditional law enforcement tool, which is the power of arrest.

MI. Kelley. Not under probable cause where he has not

gone down there. The hypothetical we gave was one where he had

not taken any overt acts in perpetration of this.

Mr. Schwarz. Well, if he hasn't taken any overt acts,

are you then in what you would call in imminent threat of

human life or property?

Mr. Kelley. I think so.

Mr. Schwarz. How so? Unless he has taken an overt act

to buy the poison or to get in the car with the poison, there

is not by definition any threat to life or property.

Mr. Kelley. Mr. Schwarz, I've been around in this business.

a long time. I've heard a number of threats which were issued,

and they thereafter materialized into actions. I don't think

take these threats as being empty ones, because so many times

they have been acted upon.

I was criticized one time when there was a threat made to

kill me, and it was said later on, it's not rhetoric, it's

not rhetoric to me, because when they say they're going to

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kill me, that just means one thing.

Mr. Schwarz. But I'm not disagreeing with you.

Mr. Kelley. But you are disagreeing with me. You're saying

on the basis of experience that you cannot detect a possible

threat. That's the whole area of concern that we have here, where

we don't lose the capability of doing something. We don't

say we should initiate ourselves. We say that we should go to

the Attorney General. We do not subscribe to the idea that

we should act independently because maybe we don't have the

judicial review, the capability of determining, but we do

think that we should report it and thereafter see what can

be done.

Mr. Schwarz. Well, have you changed in the course of

our discussion the standard on page 5.

On page 5 you're talking about an imminent threat.

Mr. Kelley. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. And I hear you now as saying a possible

threat.

Mr. Kelley. An imminent possible threat.

Mr. Schwarz. An imminent possible threat. All right.

Now, would a fair standard for either action, other than

arrest, I don't know what you have in mind, but something to

prevent the person from carrying out his activities, other

than arrest, for instance, what is an example of what you have

in mind?

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Mr. Kelley. Removing him from his position or whatever

is necessary in order to make it impossible or at least as

impossible as possible to perpetuate this thing.

Mr. Schwarz. You mean have him lose his job or -

Mr. Kelley. I don't know what it would be.

Mr. Schwarz. Isolate him in some fashion.

Mr. Kelley. In some fashion perhaps.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, for such activity and for opening

an investigation into a domestic group, could you live with

a standard which said you would have to have an immediate

threat that someone was likely to commit a serious federal

crime involving violence?

Mr. Kelley. I think that this thing could be worked out

so that there could be an adequate basis for an evaluation.

Mr. Schwarz. So those words, without trying to commit

you entirely to them, do not seem to you to depart far from

what you think would be an acceptable standard.

Mr. Kelley. Well, an imminent, immediate threat might

be, by virtue of the word "immediate" that he's going to

do it the next minute. In that case it may be necessary for

you to, not with the presence of the possibility, not able

to do anything except put him under arrest or anything.

Mr. Schwarz. Of course, of course.

And nobody would at all disagree with that kind of action.

Mr. Kelley. I don't think they would either.

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MI. Schwarz. But on the question, let's take the opening

of an investigation into a domestic group.

Is it basically consistent with practicality to make the

test immediate threat of a serious Federal crime involving

violence?

Mr. Kelley. To open a domestic security case.

Mr. Schwarz. Yes.

MI. Kelley. It appears to me that this is a terrorist

activity, in effect. We certainly have terrorist activities

under our jurisdiction as a threat against the United States.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, are there other circumstances where

it is justifiable to open an investigation of the domestic

group where you do not have an immediate threat of serious

federal crime involving violence?

Mr. Kelley. Oh, I think there are other criteria, and

they have been well defined as to what is the possible

opening, the basis for a possible opening. We haven't been

discussing that, we have been discussing particular instances,

but there are other criteria that are used, yes.

Mr. Schwarz. What would the other criteria be?

Mr. Kelley. Well, the possible statutory violations

over which we have jurisdiction are, generally speaking, the

most used of thebasis, and then you have, of course, some

intelligence investigations which should, of course, be of

short duration. If there is no showing of this into action

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Mr. Schwarz. So that's what you're looking for in the

intelligence investigation?

Mr. Kelley.. By intelligence investigation, yes, you

are looking to prevent.

Mr. Schwarz. And what you are looking to prevent, and

what you're looking to find is a likelihood of action combined

with an intent to take an issue?

Mr. Kelley. And the capability.

Mr. Schwarz. And the capability.

All right. I just have two other lines, Mr. Kelley, and

I appreciate very much your time.

Mr. Kelley. That's all right.

Mr. Schwarz. Assuming a legitimate investigation has

been started into a domestic intelligence matter, is it legiti-

mate for the FBI, in addition to obtaining information that

relates to what we've just been talking about, the likelihood

of violent action, is it also legitimate for the FBI to

collect, A, retain, B, disseminate, C, information concerning

let's say the sex life of a person on the one hand, and the

political views of a person on the other?

Mr. Kelley. I think, Mr. Schwarz, that this is just what

many of our problems and perhaps the guidelines can define

this type of thing. I think probably you will agree that

within the determination of the deviations possibly of sex

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lives, there might be something that is relevant. I would say

ordinarily it's not. And so far as political views, yes, I

think that this could be, if he is espousing some cause or

some view that advocates violence of the overthrow of the

government.

Mr. Schwarz. Would those be the two limits on political

views?

Mr. Kelley. What?

Mr. Schwarz. Would those be the only limits on political

views that you think are okay to collect, advocants of violence

or advocants of overthrow?

Mr. Kelley. Well, I don't think because he's a Democrat

or a Republican it would be anything that would be damaging,

but it might on the other hand counter the report that he's

a member of some other organization.

Mr. Schwarz. Is the standard you used on collection of

sex life information, might be relevant? I suppose anything

might be relevant, but don't you think that as a function of

balance, it has to have a high degree of relevance before it's

justifiable to collect that kind of information on American

citizens who are not suspected of having committed crimes?

MI. Kelley. Insofar as doing it presently, it has been

included in some reports as a result of the requirement that

that is what is required by our rules, that when a person

reports something to us, we do a report of the complaint. Insofar

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as a determination by guidelines that might be prepared later,

I think that we can certainly deliberate on this to see whether

or not this is something we should retain, and we would not

object to anything reasonable in that regara.

Mr. Schwarz. I just have one final question.

Taking the current manual and trying to understand its

applicability laid against the facts in the Martin Luther King

case, under Section 87 there is a -- permission is granted to

open investigations of the infiltration of non-subversive

groups, and the first sentence reads: "When information is

received indicating that a subversive group is seeking to

systematically infiltrate and control a non-subversive group

or organization, an investigation can be opened."

Now, I take it that is the same standard that was used

in opening the investigation of the Southern Christian Leadership

Conference in the 1960s, so that invéstigation could still be

open today under the FBI manual, the current FBI manual.

Mr. Kelley. We are interested in the infiltration of

clearly subversive groups into non-subversive groups inasmuch

as this is a ploy that is used many times, and having infil-

trated, they then get control, and they have a self-laundered

organization which they can use, and not, certainly, to the

benefit of the country.

Mr. Schwarz. But is the answer to my question yes, that

under that standard, the SCIC investigation could still be

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opened today?

Mr. Kelley. I think so.

Mr. Schwarz. All right, then, just one final question. .

Do you agree that special care needs to be taken not only

of the standards for initially opening an investigation of a

group, but perhaps extra care needs to be taken when the investi-

gation goes beyond the initial target group to individuals

or people who come into contact with it?

Mr. Kelley. I don't know if I agree with that entirely.

If

you mean that we go into the

non-subversive group, that we

then investigate people in that non-subversive group, not the

infiltrators, but the non, that we conduct a lengthy investigation

of them without any basis for doing so other than that they

are in an infiltrated group, I would likely have said -- but

off the top of my head I would say probably that's not necessary.

Mr. Schwarz. Thank you very much.

Mr. Smothers. Just a couple of very brief lines of

inquiry, Mr. Kelley.

I think that the questions of the Chief Counsel was

raising is one that goes further into your statement, when you

talk about the difficulty of setting out the line between

intelligence gathering and law enforcement kinds of functions..

Nevertheless, though, I think that you have made an effort,

indeed, the Bureau's organizational scheme reflects i

to distinguish some of this has been made.

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Putting aside for one moment the counterespionage

effort, and looking strictly at what we have been calling the

Domestic Intelligence, is it your view that the retention of

this function in the Bureau is critical to the Bureau's

law enforcement position?

Mr. Kelley. My personal opinion is that the Bureau does

a splendid job in this area. I feel further that the background

of criminal investigatory activities and experiences which

all counterintelligence people have is very helpful. It is help-

ful not only in gathering knowledge and experience, it also

enters into this field, a person with a broad understanding

of the rights and privileges, and you don't have so much that

spy type, that cloak and dagger, that very, very secret type

of an operation.

I subscribe to the present system heartily.

Mr. Smothers. Would it be of assistance to your mission

if within the Bureau guidelines were established that

effectively limited access or controlled dissemination of

the intelligence product? In other words, if we had a

situation where the intelligence product is critical to assist

the law enforcement effort, I don't think there's any question

that there should be access to it.

Isn't our problem one of controlling the use of that

intelligence product and preventing the kind of murky crossing

of lines there with the information legitimately needed for

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law enforcement?

Mr. Kelley. There is always a problem when there is wide

dissemination, because that just numerically increases-the

possibility of misuse, abuse or slander, libel, or anything

of that matter, and I think that it would be well worthwhile

to review the dissemination rules to make them subject to

close guidance in the guidelines that we're speaking of.

Mr. Smothers. Let me just raise one final area with you.

We talked a little bit about, or a question was raised about

the investigation now being conducted by the Justice Department

regarding the improper actions on the COINTELPRO, and the

King case in particular.

As we look at allegations of impropriety by your personnel,

I think it would be helpful for our record here to have some

insight into the procedure the Bureau would normally follow.

What does the Bureau do when you get an allegation that

an agent or administrative official in the Bureau has behaved

improperly?

Is an investigation conducted internally, or is it

routinely referred to the Justice Department?

MI. Kelley. There may be a revision in this type of

procedure as a result of the establishment of the Council for

Professional Responsibility. At present it would be in the

great majority of the cases turned over to our Investigative

Division for investigation. There might, on some unusual

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occasion, be a designation of a special task force made up,

perhaps, of division heads. That is most unlikely, but it is

handled internally at present.

Mr. Smothers. Would these internal determinations be

reviewed by Justice, or do you think that is a necessary

step?

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I guess what we are searching for here is, first of all,

I think you answered that, well, to what extent does the

Bureau police itself; and then secondly, is the Department of

Justice involved in the police determinations?

For instance, what if the Attorney General disagreed with

the assertion that only the higher up officials who ordered

the action against King should be the subject of investigation

and maybe prosecution?

How does the interplay work there between you and Justice?

Mr. Kelley. We do report to the Attorney General those

activities which we construe as improper or possibly illegal.

There is a possibility that the Department, having been advised

of the situation, might take it on their own to do their own

investigating, and this is something that we feel is a

decision to be made only rather rarely, because we feel we

have within our own organization sufficient capability to

handle that. But we do not protest it. It is handled

independently of us.

MI. Smothers. Thank you.

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That is all I have.

Mr. Schwarz. Thank you.

(Whereupon, at 12:12 o'clock p.M., the Committee recessed

subject to the call of the Chair.)

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350 (Rev. 11-11-75)

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

1328002108861311808

Intelligence abuses

After 18 months of congression- cial told a reporter for The Wash-

i disclosure and exposes in the ington Post, "but I think we've won

press concerning the abuse of power

too much."

Dy u.s. intelligence agencies, the

chances for tighter supervision are

Just months ago, the reformers in

Congress set their sights on: legisla-

as remote as ever.

tion armed at preventing a

The months of shocking disclo-

recurrence of the unsavory acts

sures tell the American people

perpetrated by the various agencies.

clearly enough that tougher con-

There would be a new standing

gressional supervision (congression-

Senate oversight committee, and the

, al-oversight) of intelligence agen

timely sharing of secrets by the

cies is needed. Agency officials have

intelligence agencies with the new

sometimes operated like police

committee. The latter safeguard

move functionaries out of a g

was aimed at giving congressional

watchdogs a chance to confront

aarious facets of the U.s. intelli executive actions that might ulti

gence community. have inyolved

mately become unwise foreign poli-

themselves in clumsy foreign assas.

cy:

• sination plots, illegal surveillance of

Emerging, legislation apparently

American citizens, and domestic pot

will be much different: Unless there

litical espionage. Simple disagree:

is a remarkable turnabout in atti

ment with government policy has

tudes, it will hamper congressional

meant surveillance and clandestine

power to investigate, and will give

retaliation for some unfortunate the president veto power over pub-

individuals.

lic disclosure of congressional find

Yet, hope of placing the Central

ings.

(Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the

Congress has found that exposing

FBI on a shorter leash has all but. the abuses is a lot easier than build-

faded. The reformers are inflight.

ing the legislative machiery

"Thate to say this," a top CIA offi needed to stop them

ndicate page, name

ewspaper, city and state

SECTION A

PAGE EIGHT

STATES- ITEM

NEW ORLEANS, LA.

Date: 4-20-76

Edition: FINAL

Editor: WALTER G. COWAN

Title: INTELLIGENCE

ABUSES

Character:

or

Classification:

Submitting Office:

• Being Investigated

N.0.

SEARCHED. INDEXED.

SERIALIZED.....

SOFILED.

Mr 261975

FBI-NEW ORLEANS

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8:46 AM NITEL 3/22/76 MBT

TO ALL SACS

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

ASAC

SUPV.

SUPV.

SUPV.

4_

5_-

Mr, 6! =

NEWS ARTICLE. WASHINGION POST. MARCH 21, 1976.

AN ARTICLE APPEARED IN THE WASHINGION POST, SUNDAY,

MARCH 21, 1976, CAPTIONED "LEVI ORDERS PROBE OF THREE TOP FBI

AIDES. "

IN SUMMARY, THE ARTICLE ALLUDES THAT ATTORNEY GENERAL

LEVI ORDERED AN INVESTIGATION OF THE THREE TOP AIDES TO FBI

DIRECTOR KELLEY, NAMELY, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR CALLAHAN, DEPUTY

ASSOCIATE DIRECTORS ADAMS AND JENKINS, AND THAT MORE THAN

TWENTY OTHER PRESENT AND FORMER FBI OFFICIALS ARE BEING

INVESTIGATED IN A PROBE OF ALLEGED FINANCIAL CORRUPTION INSIDE

THE BUREAU, AND THAT THE ATTORNEY GENERAL WANIS ME TO REPLACE

MESSRS. ADAMS, CALLAHAN, AND JENKINS WITH APPOINTEES MORE

LOYAL TO ME. THIS STORY GREW OUT OF THE ONGOING INVESIIGATION

INTO THE BUREAU'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S. RECORDING 'COMPANY

AND HAS NO BASIS IN FACT. I HAVE NOT BEEN REQUESTED, NOR HAS

IT EVEN BEEN INFERRED, THAI I CONSIDER REPLACING

MESSRS. CALLAHAN, ADAMS, AND JENKINS AND THEY ARE NOT THE SA

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TARGETS OF THE INQUIRY PRESENTLY BEING CONDUCTED RELATING

TO

TO THE U.S. RECORDING COMPANY•

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL HAS INDICATED THAT THE ARTICLE DOES

NOT REFLECT HIS VIEWS AND ISSUED THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT

CONCERNING THE ARTICLE:

"IN SPITE OF MY FIRM VIEW THAT CURRENT INVESTIGATIONS

SHOULD NOT BE COMMENTED UPON BY THOSE IN CHARGE, BOTH AS A MATTER

OF ESSENTIAL FAIRNESS AND FOR THE SAKE OF THE INVESTIGATION

ITSELF, I HAVE TO SAY THAT THE WASHINGION POST STORY OF

MARCH 21 RELATING TO THE BUREAU'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE

U.S. RECORDING COMPANY DOES NOT SIATE MY VIEWS. IT DOES NOI

STATE THE VIEWS OF DIRECTOR

KELLEY OR OF MICHAEL A. SHAHEEN,

JRO, OR OF JOHN DOWD (SHAHEEN AND DOWD ARE DEPARIMENTAL

ATTORNEYS) •

IT IS CORRECT THAT THE INVESTIGATION WHICH IS GOING ON

HAS THE FULL AND WHOLEHEARTED COLLABERATION OF DIRECTOR KELLEY

AND OF THE OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND MYSELF.

THE INVESTIGATION WILL GO INTO EACH AND ALL OF THE MATTERS

WHICH ARE RELEVANT TO IT BUT IT IS NOT CORRECT TO SAY OR TO

GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE INVESTIGATION IS TARGETED AGAINST

THREE TOP AIDES OF DIRECTOR KELLEY. I HAVE FREQUENILY SAID,

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AND I REPEAT, THAI DIRECIOR KELLEY AND THE LEADERSHIP HAVE MY

FULL CONFIDENCE. THE DEPARTMENT OVER TIME INEVITABLY HAS

INVESTIGATIONS INVOLVING A WIDE VARIETY OF AREAS WITHIN THE

DEPARIMENT. THE VERY PROCESS OF ASSURING AND MAINTAINING THE

INTEGRITY OF THE DEPARTMENT NATURALLY REQUIRES THAT THESE

INVESTIGATIONS BE CONDUCTED AND THAT THE METHOD OF INVESTIGATING

EACH CASE REFLECTS WHAT IS REQUIRED TO MAKE IT THOROUGH,

IMPARTIAL, AND FAIR."

IN ADDITION, I HAVE RELEASED THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT TO THE

MEDIA CONCERNING THIS ARTICLE:

"I APPOINTED THE THREE OFFICIALS MENTIONED, NAMELY,

MESSRS. CALLAHAN, ADAMS, AND JENKINS. I HAVE NOT REGRETTED

THESE DESIGNATIONS. THEY HAVE SERVED THE FBI AND ME WITH

LOYALTY AND DEDICATION. I HAVE NO SUSPICIONS ABOUT THEM.

I HAVE NO RESERVATIONS CONCERNING THEM AND I COMPLETELY SUPPORT

THEM. I HAVE NOT BEEN ORDERED TO NOR HAVE I DIRECTED AN •

INVESIIGATION OF THEM, OR ANY OTHER CURRENT BUREAU OFFICIALS,

AS POSSIBLE SUSPECTS IN A CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION. THE

ATTORNEY GENERAL HAS NOT ORDERED ME NOR HAS IT BE INFERRED THAT

I SHOULD REPLACE THESE MEN AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL HAS ASSURED

ME THAT HE HAS FULL CONFIDENCE IN THESE MEN."

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• PAGE FOUR

THE ABOVE IS FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND ASSISTANCE IN

RESPONDING TO ANY PRESS INQUIRIES. YOUR RESPONSES TO ANY

PRESS INQUIRIES SHOULD BE CONFINED TO THE CONTENTS OF MY

STATEMENT AND THAT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL.

END

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NR303 WA PLAIN

8:46 AM NITEL 3/22/76 MBT

IO ALL SACS

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

NEWS ARTICLE. WASHINGION POST. MARCH 21, 1976e

AN ARTICLE APPEARED IN THE WASHINGION POST, SUNDAY;

MARCH 21, 1976, CAPTIONED "LEVI ORDERS PROBE OF THREE TOP FBI

AIDES."

IN SUMMARY, THE ARTICLE ALLUDES THAI ATTORNEY GENERAL

LEVI ORDERED AN INVESTIGATION OF THE THREE TOP AIDES TO FBI

DIRECIOR KELLEY, NAMELY, ASSOCIATE DIRECIOR CALLAHAN, DEPUTY

ASSOCIATE DIRECTORS ADAMS AND JENKINS, AND THAT MORE THAN

•TWENTY OTHER PRESENT AND FORMER FBI OFFICIALS ARE BEING

INVESTIGATED IN A PROBE OF ALLEGED FINANCIAL CORRUPTION INSIDE

THE BUREAU, AND THAT THE AITORNEY GENERAL VANIS ME TO REPLACE

MESSRS. ADANS, CALLAHAN, AND JENKINS WITH APPOINTEES MORE

LOYAL TO ME. THIS STORY GREW OUT OF THE ONGOING INVESTIGATION

INTO THE BUREAU'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S• RECORDING COMPANY

AND HAS NO BASIS IN FACI. I HAVE NOT BEEN REQUESTED, NOR HAS LaLo-9

IT EVEN BEEN INFERRED, THAI I CONSIDER REPLACING

MESSRS. CALLAHAN, ADAMS, AND JENKINS AND THEY ARE NOT THE

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TARGETS OF THE INQUIRY PRESENTLY BEING CONDUCTED RELATING TO

TO THE U.S• RECORDING COMPANY•

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL HAS INDICATED THAT THE ARTICLE DOES

NOT REFLECT HIS VIEWS AND ISSUED THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT

CONCERNING THE ARTICLE:

"IN SPITE OF MY FIRM VIEW THAT CURRENT INVESTIGATIONS

SHOULD NOT BE COMMENTED UPON BY THOSE IN CHARGE, BOTH AS A MATTER

OF ESSENTIAL FAIRNESS AND FOR THE SAKE OF THE INVESTIGATION

ITSELF, I HAVE TO SAY THAT THE WASHINGION POST STORY OF

MARCH 21 RELATING TO THE BUREAU'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE

U.S. RECORDING COMPANY DOES NOT STATE MY VIEWS. IT DOES NOI

STATE THE VIEWS OF DIRECIOR KELLEY OR OF MICHAEL A. SHAHEEN,

JR., OR OF JOHN DOWD (SHAHEEN AND DOWD ARE DEPARIMENTAL

ATTORNEYS) •

IT IS CORRECT THAT THE INVESTIGATION WHICH IS GOING ON

HAS THE FULL AND WHOLEHEARTED COLLABERATION OF DIRECTOR KELLEY

AND OF THE OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND MYSELF.

THE INVESTIGATION WILL GO INTO EACH AND ALL OF THE MATTERS

WHICH ARE RELEVANT TO IT BUT IT IS NOT CORRECT TO SAY OR TO

GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE INVESTIGATION IS TARGETED AGAINST

THREE TOP AIDES OF DIRECTOR KELLEY. I HAVE FREQUENTLY SAID,

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PAGE THREE

AND I REPEAT, THAI DIRECIOR KELLEY AND THE LEADERSHIP HAVE MY

FULL CONFIDENGE, THE DEPARTMENT OVER TIME INEVITABLY HAS

INVESTIGATIONS INVOLVING A WIDE VARIETY OF AREAS WITHIN THE

DEPARTMENI. THE VERY PROCESS OF ASSURING AND MAINTAINING THE

INTEGRITY OF THE DEPARIMENT NATURALLY REQUIRES THAT THESE

INVESTIGATIONS BE CONDUCIED AND THAT THE METHOD OF INVESTIGATING

EACH CASE REFLECTS WHAI IS REQUIRED TO MAKE IT THOROUGH,

IMPARTIALA AND FAIR."

IN ADDITION, I HAVE RELEASED THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT TO THE

MEDIA CONCERNING THIS ARTICLE:

"I APPOINTED THE THREE OFFICIALS MENTIONED, NAMELY,

MESSRS CALLAHAN ADAMS, AND JENKINS- I HAVE NOT REGRETTED

THESE DESIGNATIONS, THEY HAVE SERVED THE FBI AND ME WITH

LOYALTY AND DEDICATIONO I HAVE NO SUSPICIONS ABOUT THEM.

I HAVE NO RESERVATIONS CONCERNING THEM AND I COMPLETELY SUPPORT

THEM. I HAVE NOT BEEN ORDERED TO NOR HAVE I DIRECTED AN

'INVESTIGATION OF THEN, OR ANY OTHER CURRENT BUREAU OFFICIALS,

AS POSSIBLE SUSPECTS IN A CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION. THE

ATTORNEY GENERAL HAS NOT ORDERED ME NOR, HAS IT BE INFERRED THAT

I SHOULD REPLACE THESE MEN AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL HAS ASSURED

ME THAT HE HAS FULL CONFIDENCE IN THESE NEN."

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PAGE FOUR

THE ABOVE IS FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND ASSISTANCE IN

RESPONDING TO ANY PRESS INQUIRIES. YOUR RESPONSES TO AWY

PRESS INQUIRIES SHOULD BE CONFINED TO THE CONTENTS OF MY

STATEMENT AND THAT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL-

END

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- FD-350 (Rev. 11-11-75)

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

Bush Against New Monitoring Plan

Indicate page, name o

lewspaper, city and state.

WASHUNGTON (AP) - CIA Director George Bush

joined two powerful Senate committee critmen

Wednesday in opposing plans to create a congressional

panel to monitor the U.S. intelligence agencies.

The proposal would give to the new panel some of the

jurisdiction the two committees now have in monitor-

ing intelligence activities.

Bush declined to comment on the jurisdictional dis

oute. Instead, he argued that the legislation to create a

ew committee did not provide sufficient safeguards

against the disclosure or intellgence secrets.

Asked specifically, if the administration could support,

the legislation in its present form, Bush said no.

The testimony came at a Senate Rules. Committee

hearing on a resolution. that would create an 11-mem-

ber. Senate panel to monitor the activities and cranding

of the Central Intelligence Agency, the FRI-National

Security Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency and

cther intelligence agencies.

Armed Services Committee Chairman John C. Sten-

nis, D-Miss, said that creation of an oversight panel:

would leave his own committee "stripped to the bone."

ven. Roman Hruska, R-Neb., testifying in.place of Ju-

diciary Committee Chairman James Bastland, D-MisS g

urged the Rules Committee not to give the proposed

oversight. panel jurisdiction.over the FBI.

The resolution, which would not be legally binding,

states that other Senate committees which have previ

ously exercised jurisdiction over the various

intelligence agencies would relinquish some of thei

"It just won't work," said Stennis, whose Armed Serv-

ices panel has traditionally monitored intelligence

operations.

SECTION ONE

PAGE IWENTY-FIVI

TIMES- PICAYUNE

NEW ORLEANS, LA.

Date: 4-1-76

Edition: MORNING

Author:

Editor: ED TUNSTALL

Title: BUSH AGAINST

NEW MONITORING PLAN

Character:

Classification (6+125ir

Submitting Office:

N. 0.

• Being Investigated

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FD-350 (Rev. 11-11-75)

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

[in contempt,

agents warned

VASHINGTON (AP) - A House panel recommended

day that five federal agents be held in contemot for

refusing to testify about government interception of

cables to and from American citizens. The agents said

the attorney general and a deputy defense secretary

ordered them to refuse.

At the same time, the Senate intelligence committee.*

voted to turn over to the;Justice Department.its fies.on

mail opening by the CIA and FBI and electronic eaves-

dropping by the National Security. Agency. The depart-

ment said it needs the files to decide whether to bring

criminal charges against those involved

CHAIRMAN BELLA S. Abzug, D-N.Y., of the govern-

ment information subcommittee warned the five

agents - three with the FBI, one retired from the FBI

and one with the National: Security Agency - that they

were in contempt and liable to jail terms and fines.

Contempt of Congress carriés a maximum penalty of

one year in jail and a $1,000 fine.

The three FBl agents and the retired FBI agent told

the subcommittee they were ordered by Atty. Gen: Ed-

ward H. Levi to refuse to testify. The three are John P.

Loomis of Washington, D.C. and Walter C: Zink and

David G. Jenkins of New York City. The retired agent

is Joe R, Craig. His hometown was not available:

The agent with the National Security Agency, Joseph

J. Tomba, told the subcommittee he was ordered by

Deputy Defense Secretary William P. Clements to:re:

• fuse to testify. Tomba's hometown was not available.

Contempt recommendations against the tive were ap-

proved-by yotes of 6-1, with Democratic members vot-

_ing for the recommendations and Rep: Paul McClosky,

*R-Calif., voting-against.them

THE SENATE Intelligence committee action came

"by voice vote and was announced by Chairman Frank

Church, D-Idaho,

The files which the committee is turning over to the

Justice Department are on the CIA's 20-year program

of opening mail between the United States and the Sovi-

*et Union and on a variety of mail opening programs by

* the FBI in a number of American cities.

The committee voted last month to give the Justice

•Department its files on CIA operations in Chile, a 1971

CIA break-in and an alleged plot involving former CIA

agent E, Howard Hunt in a scheme to kill columnist

_Jàck Ariderson,

The alleged plot against Anderson is the subject of a

Separate investigation by the Watergate special prose-

cutor's office. Hunt, serving a prison term for his part

In the Watergate break-in, has denied there was any

Splot to kill-the columnist.

Instead, Hunt has said he was involved in a plan to

embarrass Anderson by slipping him an LSD-type drug

before one of the columnist's, public appearances. Hunt

said nothing ever came of the plan.

President Ford has ordered the Justice Department

Indicate page, name o

ewspaper, city and state

PAGE A-3

STATES- IEEM

NEW ORLEANS, LA.

Date: 2/25/76

Edition: FINAL

Author:

Editor: WALTER G. COTAN

Title: IN CONTEMPT,

AGENTS WARNED

Character:

or

66.241-

Classification:

Submitting Office:

• Being Investigated

1010-2839-3

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SERIALIZED.

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ORLEADER

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automate Departea to else not the cate ]

interceptions.

pane preten or tea for miser a to ay the

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1109337" HITEL 2-11-75 Tis

TO ALL SACS

FROM DIRECTOR

TESTITOY DEFORE HOUSE CIVIL RIGYIS ANG CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

SUDCOMMITTSE

FEBRUARY 11, 1975°

THE AITORVEY GEVERAL AND I TISTIFISE BEFORE

66-2432

-CAPTIONED MUBCOMMITTEE TODAY CONCERNING LEGISLATIVE

POLICIES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE FBI. COPIES OF THE

STATEMTNIS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE BY THE ATTORNEY

GENEFAL AND MEGARE BEING MAILED TO ALL OFFICES TOO1Y F0?

YOU? IPOEMATION, THERE FOLLOWS A SYNOPSIZED ACCOUNT OF THE

MAJOR AREAS OF THE SUBCOMMITTES'S QUESTIONS TO ME, TOGETHER

VITY MY RESPONSEC:

(1)

IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS RESANDING IHE

PREVENIIVE ACIION PROVICION IN THE AITORNEY GENERAL'S

PROPOSED GLIDELINES FOR THE FOI WHICH ARE CITSE IN HIS

PREPARED STATEMENI, I STATEO IHAI THE PRIMARY MANUATE OF

LAW ENFORCEMENT IS PREVENTION; THAT VE CANYOT INVESTIGATE

SOLELY "AFTER THE FACT", THAT ACTION TO PREVENT LEFITTAATE

DISSENT UNDER OUR DEMOCRATIC FOR OF GOVER MINI WOULD BE

INTOLERABLE; THAT PRIOP TO TAKING PREVENTIVE ACTION IN A

SAC

106-2839-13

(59/25.75

ASAC

'SUPV

3-

SUPV .

4---

SUPV.

5

SUPV..:

171976

Dog Id: 32989828

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A0E T7

'CHIC SEOURILY CASE TODAY NO LOULS ASCERTAIN THE NATURD

AN: EXTENT OF THE THREAT INVOLVED, CONSULT WITH THE DEPARTY US,

MA: 1A0K A VORKABLE COLUTION AS TO ATY NECESSARY AND PROPE?

ACTIO! TO DO TAKERO

(E RECARDICE THE GUIDELINES, QUESTIONS VERS ASKED

SISTIC MY TIPUT COY RESPOUSE DAS TUAT THE FEI CAS A

POPSITATIVE OU THE CUIDELINES COMMITTEE, ANY IDECEIVE

COTT HON TIME TO TIME COUGETALIC SUE PHRUST OF CREST

CHINTUILD 660 KIC0002 TRE GUIDELINES IN PROSCAT FORM AC

ISO MIDT O: LOOSE CHY RESPONDE LAS THAT THE FOI IS ÍD:

WOOMORTABLE IN TID GUINGLIESS, THAL I CANNOT BROADLY

¿CODIZE IEG AS STRICT OR LOOSES THAT THEY ARE STILL

Li? COISIDERAIIO SUI AT THIS POINT ARE NOT TOO RESTRICTIVO.

(3) I: RESPONSE TO A QUESTION AS TO SHALIEN THE

_PAINT OF JUSTICE SUPERVISAS THE FEI, I CIATED INAT I

TOOGIZE THAT IT DOES AND THAT I CAN STATE UNEQUIVOCALLY THAT

I HAVE A VORY PLIASANT RELAZIOUGHIP WITH THE ATTORNOY ONTRAL

AND EAT WE GIT ALONG VERY TELLO

CINE ATTORUCY CENDRAL AGREED AND POINTED OUT THAT

TIC PITAS TO HAVE CONSIDERABLE AUCONOMY, THAT THE FBI

TROTONG RESPO GIZILITY IS CREAT, AND TUAT THE ATICUNTY GENETIL

KIN

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M: THINNL OUTOSIGHT GESPONSIBILITY CVER THO BUZZAU. H7 20:02

CE TIE ATIONLY GUNCRAL " IS NOT GUNNING THE FBI - DiNG:

GEE QUAO TOO GOTO HIMANE COM GUI. M10. 1010

ID WISH TO ANON" SSIEZA CHAATIORNEY CORREAL ANS THE FSI

(4) I! RESPOSE TO QUESTIONS CONCTPRILE CONTINUSO

MUSIOT DE THE F31 3Y CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTERS I CATHO

THOE ATTICS 1979, THE FOI TAS DENOTES 450G AGENT BUYS

'O COCA CLERICAL DAY TO PROVIDE COUGHESE HIT TUR INCOTATION

MANT TA HIS MCQUECTOO, TMAT SOME SOURCES 4US INFORMANTS.

!A!" 3HCUIT MILLINE TO FORMICH US HERMATION S-CAUSE 0.

ME HITSPORCO ICOLOURS ON THE MICETAL CE RAVE PROVIDES

SO'ONISCIDAL COMMITIOUS; THAT THE FBI COES NOT OSUSCT TO

OUERSICITE THAT HE CRE HILLING TO HAVE OVERSIONT DID

AIME: BUT THAT DO LANT TOLEVELOP COME BALANCE SO.

THE TOMY MARTINE OUE CAPADILITIES INTACT TO TULLY

1:CHAR9 001 AZSPONSISILITIES.

ALL LIGATE ADVISE: SEPARATELY.

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FD-350 (Rev. 7-16-63)

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

10-A

Мов, Jan.5, 1976

THE SHREVERORT IMM

Conflict Said Encouraged by FBI

SAN DIEGO (AP) - The FBI has

Panther Party against a group known

The Union said that throughout the

revealed to a congressional committee

as US Organization, the Union said.

summer of 1969, during which four per-

that during an eight month, period. in

sons were killed, and four wounded,-

1969 it had encouraged warfare between

The two organizations were classified:

rival black activist factions in three

in an

posters continued to appear on walls

counter-intelligence

major California cities, the San Diego

gram as militant "hate groups," the

and telephone poles.

Union reported in Sunday editions..

paper said:

It quoted an FBI memo sent to

The paper said that FBEinvolvement

Washington on Sylvester Bell,

one

A source connected: with the Senate

in provoking hostilities that led to four

Black Panther shot to death, as saying:

committee told the Union one technique

"In view of the recent death of Black

killings and the wounding.of four others

was revealed in a 1,200-page Bureau:

used by the FBI to cause friction bet

Panther Party member Sylvester Bell,

ween Panther and US members in San:

• report recently turned

over to the

a new:cartoor is being considered in the

Select

Diego was the drawing and distributing

Senate

Committee on in-

hopes it will assist in the continuance of

' of bogus cartoon posters attributed to

telligence.

the rift between the Panthers and US."

From January to August of that year,

US showing the Panthers as corrupt..

The-Union also quoted:a similar Sept.

FBI agents in San Diego, Los Angeles

The San Diego posters were approved,

18, 1969, three-page memo as stating:

and San Francisco, at the direction of

by Hoover's office and distributed by

"Shootings, beatings and a high degree

FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, were

FBI agents and informants, the paper

instructed to pit members of the Black

said.

of unrest continues to prevail in the

ghetto area of southeast San Diego.

=.)

Date: SHREUEPORT

Edition:

TIMES

Author:

Editor:

1-5-75

Title:

PAÇE

cô-1

10A

Character:

or

Classification: 66- zP3.2

Submitting Office:

• Being Investigated

106-2832-61

Searched.

Serialized.

Indexed-

Filed._

-=- tapera

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Fouting Stip

0-7 (Rov. 7-11-75)

TO: SAC:

Albany

Albuquerque

Alexandria

Anchorage

Atlanta

Baltimore

Bimingh am

Boston-

Buffalo

Bulle

Charlotte

Chicago

Cincinnati

Cleveland

Columbia

Dallas

Denver

Detroit

El Paso

Honoiulu

(Copies

Checked)

TO LEGAT:

,, Houston

Indianapolis

Jackson

Jacksonville

Kansas City

Knoxville

Las Vegas

Little Rock

Los Angeles

Louisville

Memphis

Miami

Mil wankee

Minneapolis

Mobile

Newark

New Haven

New Orleans

New York Cily

Norfolk

J Okiahoma City

J Onaha

| Philadelphia

Phoenix

1 Pittsburgh

Portland

Richmond

Sacramento

7

St. Louis

Salt Lake City

San Antonio

3

San Diego

San Francisco

San Juan

Savannah

Seattie

Bern

Bonn

Brasilia

Buenos Aires

Caraças

Hong Kong

London

Madrid

Manila

Mexico City

Oltawa

Paris

Rome

Tel Aviv.

Tokyo

j Springfield

]

Tampa

Wushington Field

Quantico

Date December 5, 1975

RE: TESTIMONY OF ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR--

DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR JAMES B. ADAMS

•BEFORE THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON

12/2/75

46.2832

' Retention

Por appropriate

I For information → optional.

action

• Surep, by -

/ The enclosed is for your information. If used in a future report, [ conceal all

sources, l

• paraphrase contents.

Enclosed are corrected pages from report of SA

dated

Renarks:

Re Bureau R/S of 12/4/75 which provided

excerpts of Mr. Adams' testimony.

• Attached for your information and

assistance, is the complete transcript of

above-referenced testimony. u:2932-10

Enc. (1)

Bufile

Urfile

NW 55252

unedited transcript

DocId: 32909823

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!

Vol. 15

Ohe Quited Statra Sruate

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Saleci Committea to Scudy Governmantal. Operations

Wich Respect to Intelligence Activities

INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATION

Tuesday, Dacember 2, 1975

• Washington, D. C.

:?::

WARD & PAUL

410 FIRST STREET, S. E.

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003.

(202) 544-6000

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Senator Tower.. The next witnesses to appear before the

Committee are Mi. James Adams, Assistant to the Director-

Deputy

• Associate Director, Investigation, responsible for all

investigative operations; Mr. W. Raymond Wannall, Assistant

Director, Intelligence Division, responsible for internal

security and foreign counterintelligence investigations; Mr.

John A. Mintz,

Assistant Director, Legal Counsel Division;

Joseph |G. Deegan, Section Chief, extremist investigations:

Mr. Robert L. Schackelford, Section Chief, subversive

investigations; Mi. Homer A. Newman, Jr., Assistant to Section

Chief, supervises extremist informants; Mr. Edward P. Grigal!.

Unit Chief, supervises subversive informants; Joseph G. Inli:!,

Assistant Section Chief, Civil Rights Section, Gener:: Int."li-

gative Division.

Gentimen, will you all rise and be sworn.

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Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give

before this Comnittee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing

but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Adams.

I do.

Mr. Wannall. I do.

Mr. Mintz. I do.

!

Mr. Deegan. I do.

Mx. Schackelford. I do.

Mr. Newman. I do.

Mr. Grigalus.

I do.

• Mr. Kelley.

I do.

Senator Tower. It is intended that MI. Wannall will be

the principal witness, and we will call on others as questioning

might require, and I would direct each of you when you do

respond, to identify yourselves, please, for the record.

I think that we will spend just a few more minutes to allow

tie membes of tine committer iu detai fron the foor.

(A brief recess was taken.)

Senator Tower. The Committee will come to order.

Mr. Wannall, according to data, informants provide 83

percent of your intelligence information.

Now, will you provide the Committee with some information

on the criteria for the selcction of informants?

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TESTIMONY OF W. RAYMOND WANNALI, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR,

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION •

ACCOMPANIED BY: JAMES B. ADAMS,. ASSISTANT TO THE

DIRECTOR-DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR (INVESTIGATION) :

JOIN A. MINTZ,

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, LEGAL COUNSEL

DIVISION; JOSEPH G. DEEGAN, SECTION CHIEF; ROBERT I.

SCHACKELFORD, SECTION CHIEF; HOMER A. NEWMAN, JR.,

ASSISTANT TO SECTION CHIEF; EDWARD P. GRIGALUS, UNIT

CHIEF: AND JOSEPH G. KELLEX, ASSISTANI SECTION CHIEF,

CIVIL RIGITS SECTION, GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

Mr. Wannall. Mr. Chairman, that is not FBI data that you

have quoted.

That was prepared by the General Accounting

Office.

Senator Tower. That is GAO.

MI. Wannall. Based on a sampling of about 93 cases.

Senator Iower. Would that appear to be a fairly accurate

figure.

Mr. Wannall. I have not seen any survey which the FBI

itself has conducted that would confirm that, but I think that

we do get the principal portion of our information from live

sources.

Senator Tower.

It would be a relatively high percert"

then?

24

25

Mr. Wannall. I would say yes. And your ques!'

criteria?

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Senator Tower.

What criteria do you use in the selection

of informants?

Mr. Wannall. Well, the criteria vary with the needs. In

our cases relating to extremist matters, surely in order to get

an informant who can meld into a group which is engaged in a

criminal type activity, you're going to have a different set

of criteria. If you're talking about our internal security

matters, I think we set rather high standards. We do reguire

that a preliminary inquiry be conducted which would consist

principally of checks of our headquarters indices, our field

office indices, checks with other informants who are operating

in the same area, and in various established sources such as

local police departments.

Following this, if it appears that the person is the type

who has credibility, can be depended upon to be reliable, we

would interview the individual in order to make a determination

as

to whether or not he will be willing to assist the FBI

in discharging its responsibilities in. that. field.

Following that, assuming that the answer is positive, we

would conduct a rather in depth investigation for the purpose

of. further attempting to establish credibility and reliability.

Senator Tower. How. does the. Bureau. distinguish between

the. use of informants for law enforcement as opposed to

intelligence collection?

Is the guidance different, or is it the same, or what?

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Mr. Wannall. Well, Mr. Adams can probably best address

the use of informants on criminal matters since he is over

the operational division on that.

Mr. Adams. You do have somewhat of a difference in the fact

that a criminal informant in a law enforcement function, you

are trying to develop evidence which will be admissible in

court for prosecution, whereas with intelligence, the informant

alone, your purpose could either be prosecution or it could be

just for purposes of pure intelligence.

The difficulty in both is retaining the confidentiality

of the individual and protecting the individual, and trying to,

through use of the informant, obtain evidence which could be

used independently of the testimony of the informant so that

he can continue operating as a criminal informant.

Senator Tower. Are these informants ever authorized to

function as provocateurs?

Mr. Adams! No, sir, they're not. We have strict regula-

tions against using informants as provocateurs. This gets

into that delicate area of entrapment which has been addresses

by the courts on many occasions and has been concluded by the

courts that providing an individual has a willingness to engage

in an activity, the government has the right to provide him the

opportunity. This does not mean, of course: that mistakes don't

occur in this area, but we take whatever steps we can to

avoid this. Even the law has recognized that informants can

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engage in criminal activity, and the courts have held that,

especially the Supreme Court in the Newark County Case, that

the very difficulty of penetrating an ongoing operation, that

an informant himself can engage in criminal activity, but

because there is lacking this criminal intent to violate a

law, we stay away from that. Our regulations fall short of that.

If we have a situation where we felt that an informant

has to become involved in some activity in order to protect

ox conceal his use as an informant, we go right to the United.

States Attorney or to the Attorney General to try to make sure

we are not stepping out of bounds insofar as the use of our

informants.

Senator Tower. But you do use these informants and do

instruct them to spread dissension among certain groups that

they are infolming on, do you not?

Mr. Adams. We did when we had the COINTELPRO programs,

which were discontinued in 1971, and I think the Klan is probably

one of the best examples of a situation where the law was

in effect at the time. We heard the term States Rights uses

much more then than we hear it today. We saw in the Little

Rock situation the President of the United States, in sending

in the troops, pointing out the necessity to use local law

enforcement. We must have local law enforcement, to use the

troops only as a last resort.

And then you have a situation like this where you do try

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to preserve the respective roles in law enforcement. You have

historical problems with the Klan coming along. We had

situations where the FBI and the Federal Government was almost

powerless to act. He had local law enforcement officers in

some areas participating in Klan violence.

The instances mentioned by Mr. Rowe, every one of those,

he saw them from the lowest level of the informant. He didn't

see what action was taken with that information, as he pointed

out in his testimony. Our files show that this information was

reported to the police departments in every instance. We

also knew that in certain instances the information, upon being

received, was not being acted upon. We also disseminated

simultaneously through letterhead memoranda to the Department

of Justice the problem, and here, here we were, the FBI, in a

position where we had no authority in the absence of instruction

from the Department of Justice, to make an arrest.

Sections 241 and 242 don't cover it because you don't have

evidence of a conspiracy, and it ultimately resulted in

a situation where the Department called in United States

Marshals who do have authority similar to local law enforcement

officials.

So, historically, in those days, we were just as frus-

trated as anyone else was, and when we got information from

someone like Mr. Rowe, good information, reliable information,

and it was passed on to those who had the responsibility to

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do something about it, it was' not always acted upon, as he

indicated.

Senator Tower. None of these cases, then, there was

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Mi: Adams. The Departmental rules at that time, and

still

require Departmental approval where you have a conspiracy.

Under 241, it takes two of more persons acting together.

YOU

can have a mob scene, and you can have blacks and whites

belting each other, but unless you can show that those that

initiated the action acted in concert in a conspiracy, you have.

no violation.

congress recognized this, and it wasn't until 1968

that they came along and added Section 245 to the civil rights

statüte, which added punitive measures against an individual

that didn't have to be a conspiracy. But this was a problem

that the whole country was grappling

with: the President of

the United States, Attorney General. We were in a situation

where we had rank lawlessness taking place, as you know from

memorandum we sent you that we sent to the Attorney General.

The accomplishments we were able to obtain in preventing

violence, and in neutralizing the Klan -- and that was one

of the reasons.

Senator Tower. What was the Bureau's purpose in con-

tinuing or urging the continued surveillance of the Vietnam

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Veterans Against the War?

Was there a legitimate law enforcement purpose, or was the

intent to halter political expression?

Mr. Adams. We had information on the Vietnam Veterans

Against the War that indicated that there were subversive

groups involved. They were going to North Vietnam and meeting

with the Communist forces.

They were going to paris, attencing

meetings paid for and sponsored by the Communist Party, the

International Communist Party. We feel that we had a very valid

basis to direct our attention to the VAw.

It started out, of course, with Gus Hall in 1967, who was

head of the Communist Party, USA, and the conments he made,

and what it finally boiled down to was a situation where it

split off into the Revolutionary Union, which was a Maost

group, and the hard-line Communist group, and at that point

factionalism developed in many of the chapters, and they closed

those chapters because there was no longer any intent to follow

the national organization.

But we had a valid basis for investigating it, and we

investigated chapters to determine if there was affiliation

and subservience to the national office.

Senator Tower. Mr. Hart?

Senator llart of Michigan. But in the process of chasing

after the Veterans Against the War, you got a lot of information

that clearly has no rclationship to any Federal criminal

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statute.

Mr. Adams. I agree, senator.

Senator Hart of Michigan. Why don't you try to shut that

stuff off by simply telling the agent, or your informant?

Mr. Adams. Here is the problem that you have with that.

When you're looking at an organization, do you report only the

violent statements made by the group or do you also show that

you may have one or two violent individuals, but you have

some of these church groups that were mentioned, and others,

that the whole intent of the group is not in violation of the

statutes. You have to report the good, the favorable along

with the unfavorable, and this is a problem. We wind up with

information in our files. He are accused of being vacuum

cleaners, and you are a vacuum cleaner. If you want to know the

real purpose of an organization, do you only report the

violent statements made and the fact that it is by, a small

minority, or do you also show the broad base of the organization

and what it really is?

And within that is where we have to have the guidelines

we have talked about before.

We have to narrow down, because

we recognize that we do wind up with too much information in

our files.

• Senator Hart of Michigan. But in that vacuuming process:

you are feeding into Departmental files the names of people

who are, who have been engaged in basic First Amendment

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exercises, and this is what hangs some of us up.

Mr. Adams.

It hangs me up. But in the same files I

imagine every one of you has been interviewed by the FBI, either

asking you about the qualifications of some other Senator

being considered for a Presidential appointment, being inter-

viewed concerning some friend who is applying for a job.

Were you embarrassed to have that in the files of the

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FBI?

Now, someone can say, as reported at our last session, that

this is an indication, the mere fact that we have a name in our

files has an onerous impression, a chilling effect. I agree.

It can have, if someone wants to distort what we have in our

files, but if they recognize that we interviewed you because

of considering a man for the Supreme Court of the United

States, and that isn't distorted or improperly used, I don't

see. where any harm is served by having that in our files.

Senator Hart. of Michigan. But if.I am Reverend. Smith

and. the vacuum cleaner picked up the fact that. I was helping

the veterans,. Vietnam Veterans Against. the War, and two years

later a name check. is. asked. on Reverend Smith and. all your

file shows. is that he was. associated two years ago with a group

that was sufficient enough, held sufficient doubtful patriotism

to justify turning loose

a lot of your energy in pursuit on

them --

Mi. Adams. This is a problem.

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Senator Hart of Michigan.

This is what should require

us to rethink this whole business.

Mr. Adams. Absolutely.

And this is what I hope the guidelines committees as well

as the Congressional input are going to address themselves to:

Senator Hart of Michigan. We've talked about a wide range

of groups which the Bureau can

and has had informant penetration

and report on. Your manual, the Bureau manual's definition

of when an extremist or security investigation may be under-

taken refers to groups whose activity either involves violation

of certain specified laws, or which may result in the violation

of such law, and when such an investigation is opened, then

informants may be used.

Another guideline says that domestic intelligence

investigations now must be predicated on criminal violations.

The agent need only cite a statute suggesting an investigation

relevant to a potential violation. Even now, with an improved,

upgraded effort to avoid some of these problems, we are back

again in a world of possible violations or activities which

may result in illegal acts.

Now, any constitutionally protected exercise of the

right to demonstrate, to assemble, to protest, to petition,

conceivably may rcsult in violence or disruption of a local

town meeting, when a controversial social issue might result

in disruption. It might be by hecklers rather than those holding

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the meeting.

Does this mean that the Bureau should investigate all

groups organizing or participating in such a meeting because

they may result in violence, disruption?

Mr. Adams. No, sir.

Senator llart of Michigan. Isn't that how you justify

spying on almost every aspect of the peace movement?

MI. Adams. No, sir. When we monitor demonstrations, we

monitor demonstrations where we have an indication that the

demonstration itself is sponsored by a group that we have an

investigative interest in, a valid investigative interest in,

or where members of one of these groups are participating where

there is a potential that they might change the peaceful

nature of the demonstration.

But this is our closest question of trying to draw

guidelines to avoid getting into an area of infringing on the

First Amendment rights of people, jet at the same time being

aware of groups such as we have had in greater numbers in the

past than we do at the present time,

But we have had periods

where the demonstrations have been rather severe, and the

courts have said that the FBI has a right, and indeed a duty,

to keep itself informed with respect to the possible commission

of crime. It is not obliged to wear blinders until it may be

too late for prevention.

And that's a good statement if applied in a clearcut

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case. Our problem is where we have a demonstration and we have

to make a judgment call

as to whether it is one that clearly

fits the criteria of enabling us to monitor the activities, and

that's where I think most of our disagreements: fall:

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Schator llart of Michigan. Let's assume that the rule

for opening an investigation on a group is narrowly drawn. The

Bureau

manual states that informants investigating a subversive

organization should not only report on what that group is

doing but should look at and report on activities in which

the group is participating.

There is a Section 97B3 dealing with reporting on

connections with other groups. That section says that the

field office shall "determine and report on any. significant

connection or cooperation with non-subversive groups." Any

significant connection or cooperation with non-subversive

groups.

Now let's look at this in practice. In the spring of

1969 there was a rather heated national debate over the

installation of the anti-ballistic missile system. Some of us

remember that. An FBI informant and two FBI confidential

sources reported on the plan's participants and activities

of the Washington Area Citizens Coalition Against the ABM,

particularly in open public debate in a high school auditorium,

which included speakers from the Defense Department for the

ABM and a scientist and defense analyst against the ABM.

The informants reported on the planning for the meeting,

the distribution of materials to churches and schools, :.

participation by local clergy, plans to seek resolution on

ABM from nearby town councils. There was also informa•

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plans for a

subsequent town meeting in Washington with the

names of local political leaders who rould attend.

Now the information, the informant information came as

part of an investigation of an allegedly subversive group

participating in that coalition. Yet the information dealt

with all aspects and all participants. The reports on the

plans for the meeting and on the meeting itself were disseminated

to the Statc Department, to military intelligence, and to the

White House.

Ilow do we get into all of that?

Mx. Adams. Well --

Senator llart of Michigan. Or if you were to rerun it,

would you do it again?

MI. Adams.

Well, not in 1975, compared to what 1969

was.

The problem we had at the time was where we had an

informant who had reported that this group, this meeting was

going to take place and it was going to bethe daily worla,

which was the east coast communist newspaper that made conments

about it. They formed an organizational meeting.

we took

a quick look at it. The case apparently was opened in May 28,

1969 and closed June 5 saying there was no problem with this

organization.

Now the problem we get into is if we take a quick: 100k

and get out, fine. We've had cases, though, where we have

stayed in too long. When you're dealing with security "' i li:

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Soviet espionage where they can put one person in this country

and they supported him with total resources of the soviet

Union, false identification, all the money he needs, comnuni-

cations networks, satellite assistance, and everything, and

you're working with a paucity of information.

The same problem exists to a certain extent in domestic

security. You. don't have a lot of black and white situations.

So someone reports something to you which you feel, you take

a quick look at and there's nothing to it, and I think that's

what they did.

Senator llart of Michigan. You said that was '69. Let

me bring you up to date, closer to current, a current place

on the calendar.

This one is the fall of last year, 1975. President •

Ford announced his new program with respect to amnesty, as

he described it, for draft resistors. Following that there

were several national conferences involving all the groups

and individuals interested in unconditional amnesty.

wow parenthetically, while unconditional amnesty is

not against -- while unconditional amnesty is not yet the law,

we agreed that advocating it is not against the law either.

Mr. Adams. That's right.

Sonator ilari of Michigan. Some of the sponsors wr

umbrella organizations involving about 50 diverse r rup:

• it: i

the country. FBI informants provided advance ii .wi...i

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plans for the meeting and apparently attended and reported on

the conference. The Bureau's own reports described the

participants as having represented diverse perspectives on

the issue of amnesty, including civil libertics and human

rights groups, G.I. rights spokesmen, parents of men killed

in Vietnam, wives of ex-patriates in Canada, experts on draft

counselling, religious groups interested in peace issues,

delegates

; from student organizations, and aides of ilouse and

Senate members, drafting legislation on amnesty.

The informant apparently was attending in his role as

a member of a group under investigation as allegedly subversive

and it described the topics of the workshop.

Ironically, the Bureau office report before them noted

that in view of the location of the conference at a theological

seminary, the fBI would use restraint and limit its coverage

to informant reports.

Now this isn't five or ten years ago. This is last

fall. And this is a conference of people who have the point

of view that I share, that the sooner we have unconditional

amnesty, the better for the soul of the country.

Now what reason is it for a vacuum cleaner approach on

a thing like that? Don't these instances illustrate how broad

informant intelligence really is, that wouid cause these groups

in that setting having contact with other groups, all and

everybody is drawn into the vacuum and many names so into the

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Bureau filcs.

Is this what we want?

Ar. Adams.

I'll let Mr. Wannall address himself to this.

Ile is particular knowledgeable as to this operation.

Mr. Wannall. Senator llart, that was a case that was

opened on Novenber 14 and closed November 20, and the information

which caused us to be interested in it were really two particular

items. One was that a member of the steering committee there,

was a three man steering committee, and one of those members

of the national conference was in fact a national officer

of the VVA in whom we had suggested before we did have a

legitimate investigative

interest.

Senator Hart of Michigan. Hell, I would almost say so

what

at that point.

Mi. Hannall. The second report ie had was that the

WAW would actively participate in an attempt to pack the

conference to take it over. And the third report ve had -

Senator. Hart of Michigan. And incidentally, all of the

information that your Buffalo informant had given you with

respect to the goals and alis of the VVAW gave you a list of

goals which were completely within Constitutionally protectes

objectives.

There wasn't a sinfle item out of that vAl that

jeopardizes the security of this country at all.

Mr. Wannall. Well, of course, we did not rely entirel:

on the Buffalo informant, but even there we did

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from that informant information which I considerod to be

significant.

The Buffalo chapter of the WAW was the regional office

covering New York and northern New Jersey. It was one of the

five most active VVAl chapters in the country and at a

national conforence, or at the regional conference, this

informant reported information back to us that an attendee

at the conference announced that he had run guns into cuba

prior to the Castro take-over. He himself said that he duriig

the Cuban crisis had been under 24 hour suveillance. There

was also discussion at the conference of subjugating the

VAll to the revolutionary union. There vere some indiviauals

in the chapter or the regional conference who were not in

agreenent with us, but Mr. Adams has addressed himself to the

interest of the revolutionary union.

So all of the infornation that we had on the VAN did

not come from that source but even that particular source die

give us information which we considered to be of some

significance in our appraisal of the need for continuing the

investigation of that particular chapter of the VAW.

Senator llart of Michigan. But does it give you the

right or does it create the need to go to a conference, even

if it is a conference that might be taken over by the WAW

when the subject matter is how and by what means shall we

seck to achieve unconditional amnesty? What threat?

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Mr. Mannall. Our interest, of course, was the VAll

influence on a particular meeting, if you cver happened to be

holding a necting, or whatever subject it was.

Senator llart of Michigan. What if it was a meeting to

seek to make more effective the food stamp system in this

country?

Mr. Mannall.

well, of course there had been some

organizations.

Senator llart of Michigan. Hould the same logic follow?

Mr. Mannall. I think that if we found that if the

Connunist Party USA was going to take over the mecting and

use it as a front for its own purposes, there would be a logic

in doing that. You have a whole scope here and it's a matter

of where you do and where you don't, and hopefully, as we've

said before, we will have

some guidance, not only from this

committee but from the guidelines that are being developed.

But within the rationale of what we're doing today, I was

explaining to you our interest not in going to this thing and

not gathering everything there was about it.

In fact, only one individual attended and reported to us,

and that was the person who had, who was not developed for

this reason; an informant who had been reporting on other

matters for some period of time.

And as soon as we got the report of the outr..r

mceting

and the fact that in the period of some.

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discontinued any further interest.

Senator Hart of Michigan. Well, my time has expired

but even this brief exchange, I think, indicates that if we

really want to control the dangers to our society of using

informants to gather domestic political intelligence, we have

to restrict sharply domestic intelligence investigations. And

that gets us into what I would like to raise with you when

my turn comes around again, and that's the use of warrants,

obliging the Bureau to obtain a warrant before a full-fleaged

informant can be directed by the Bureau against a group or

individuals.

I know you have objections to that and I would like to

review that with you:

Senator Mondale, pursue that question.

Senator Hart of Michigan. I am talking now about an

obligation to obtain a warrant before you turn joose a full-

fledged informant. I'm not talking about tipsters that run

into you or you run into, or who walk in as information sources

The Bureau has raised some objections in this memorandum to the

Committee.

The Bureau argues that such a varrant requirement

might be unconstitutional because it would violate the First

Amendment rights of FBI informants to communicate with their

government.

ought to

Now that's a concern for First Amendment rights that

• hearten all the civil libertarians.

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But why would that vary, why would a warrant requirement

raise a serious

constitutional question?

Mr.

Adams. Well, for one thing it's the practicability

of it or the impacticability of getting a warrant which.

ordinarily involves probable cause to show that a crime has

been or is about to be committed.

In the intelligence field we are not dealing necessarily

with an imminent criminal, action. We're dealing with activities

such as with the socialist Horkers Party, which we have

discussed before, where they say publicly we're not to engage

in any violent activity today, but we guarantee you we still

subscribe to the tenets of communism and that when the time

is ripe, we're going to rise up and help overthrow the Unitea

States.

Well, now, you can't show probable cause if they're about

to do it because they're telling you they're not going to do it

and you know they're not going to do it at this particular

moment.

It's just the mixture sonewhat of trying to mix in a

criminal procedure with an intelligence gathering function, =73

we can't find any practical way of doing it. We have a particular

örganization. We may have an informant that not only belongs

to the Communist Party, but belongs to several other organization:

and as part of his function he may be sent out by the Communist

Party to try to infiltrate one of these clean organizations.

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We don't have probable cause for him to target againsi

that organization, but yet we should be able to receive informa-

tion from him that he as a Communist Party member, even

though in an informant status, is going to that organization

and don't worry about it. We're making no headway on it.

It's just from our standpoint the possibility of informants,

the Supreme Court has held that informants per se do not

violate the First, Fourth, or Fifth Amendments. They have

recognized the necessity that the government has to have

individuals who will assist them in carrying out their

governmental duties.

Senator llart of Michigan. I'm not sure I've heard anything

yet in response to the constitutional question, the very

practical question that you addressed.

Quickly, you are right that the court has said that the

use of the informant per se is not a violation of constitutional

rights of the subject under investigation. But Congress

can prescribe sone

safeguards, some rules and some standards,

just as we have with respect to your use of electronic

surveillance, and could do it with respect to informants.

That's quite different from saying that the warrant

procedure itself would be unconstitutional.

But with respect to the fact that you couldn't show

probable cause, and therefore; you couldn't get a warrant,

therefore you oppose the proposal to require you to get a

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warrant. It seems to beg the question.

Assuming that you say that since we use informants and

investigate groups which may only engage in lawful activities

but which might engage in activities that can result in

violence or illegal acts, and you can't use

the warrant,

but

Congress could say that the use of informants is subject to

such abuse and poses such a threat to legitimate activity,

including the willingness of people to assemble and discuss

the anti-ballistic missilé system, and we don't want you to

use them unless you have indication of criminal activity or

unless you present your request to a magistrate in the same.

fashion as you are required to do with respect to, in most

cases, to wiretap.

This is an option available to Congress.

Senator Tower. Senator Schweiker.

Senator Schweiker. Thank you very much.

Mr. Wannall, what's the difference between a potential

security informant and a security informant?

Mr. Wannall. I mentioned earlier, Senator Schweiker,

that in developing an informant we do a preliminary check on

him before talking with him and then we do a further in-depth

background check.

A potential security informant is someone who is under

consideration before

he is approved by headquarters for use as

an informant. He is someone who is under current consideration.

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On some occasions that person will have been developed to a

point where he is in fact furnishing information and we are

engaged in checking upon his reliability.

In some instances he may be paid for information furnished,

but it has not gotten to the point yet where we have satisfied

ourselves that he meets all of our criteria. When he does,

the field must submit its recommendations to headquarters, and

headquarters will pass upon whether that individual is an

approved FBI informant.

Senator Schweiker.

So it's really the first step of

being an informant, I guess.

MI. Wannall. It is a preliminary step, one of the

preliminary steps.

, Senator Schweiker. In the Rowe case, in :the Rowe

testimony that we just heard, what was the rationale again

for not intervening when violence was known?

I know we asked you several times but I'm still having

trouble understanding what the rationale, Mr. Wannall, was

in not intervening in the Rowe situation when violence was

known.

Mr. Wannall. Senator Schiveiker, Mr. Adams did address

himself to that. If you have no objection, I'll ask him to

answer that.

Sonator Schweiker.

111. right.

Mr. Adams.

The problem we had at the time, and it's the

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problem today, we are an investigative agency. We do not

have police powers like the United States marshalls do.

About 1795, I guess, or some period like that, marshalls have

had the authority that almost borders on what a sheriff, has.

We are the investigative agency of the Department of Justice

and during these times the Department of Justice had us maintain

the role of an investigative agency. We were to report on

activities to furnish the information to the local police,

who had an obligation to act. We furnished it to the Departnent

of Justice.

In those areas where the local police did not act, it

resulted finally in the Attorney General sending 500 United

States marshalls down to guarantee the safety of people who

were trying to march in protest

of their civil rights.

This was an extraordinary

measure because it came at a

time of civil righs versus federal rights, and yet there was

breakdown in law enforcement in certain areas of the country.

This doesn't mean to indict all law enforcement agencies

in itself at the time either because many of them did act

upon the information that was furnished to them. But we

have no authority to make an arrest on the spot 'because we

would not have had evidence that there was a.conspiracy

available. We can do absolutely nothing in that regard.

In Little Rock, the decision was made, for instance, that

if any arrests need to be made, the Army should make them and

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next to the Army, the United States marshalls should make them,

not the FBI, even though we developed the violations.

And over the years, as you know, at the time there were many

questions raised. Why doesn't the FBI stop this? why don't

you do something about it?

Well, we took the other route and effectively destroyed

the Klan as far as committing acts of violence, and of course

we exceeded statutory guidelines in that area.

•Senator Schweiker. What would be wrong, just following

up your point there, lix. Adams, with setting up a program

since it's obvious to me that a lot of informers are going to

have pre-knowledge of violence of using U.S. marshalls on some

kinà of a long-range basis to prevent violence?

Mr. Adams. We do. We have them in Boston in connection

with the busing incident. We are investigating the violations

under the Civil Rights Act. But the marshalls are in Boston,

they are in Louisville, I believe at the same time, and this

is the approach, that the federal government finally recognized,

was the solution to the problem where you had to have added

Federal import.

Senator Schweiker. But instead of waiting until it

gets

to a Boston state, which is obviously a pretty advanced

confrontation, shouldn't we have som

ere a coordinated program

that when you go up the ladder of crand in the FBI, that

on an imnediate'and fairly contemporary basis, that kind of

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help can be sought instantly as opposed to waiting until it

gets to a Boston state?

I realize it's a departture from the past. I'm not

saying it isn't. But it seems. to me we need a better remedy

than we have.

MI. Adams. Well, fortunately, we're at a time where

conditions have subsided in the country, even from the '60s

and the '70s and periods -- or '50s and '60s. We report to the

Departient of Justice on potential troublespots around the

country as we learn of them

so that the Department will be

aware of them. The planning for Boston, for instance, took

place a year in advance with state officials, city officials,

the Department of Justice and the FBI sitting down together

saying, how are we going to protect the situation in Boston?

'I think we've learned a lot from the days back in the

early '60s. But the government had no mechanics which protected

people at that time.

Senator Schweiker. I'd like to go, if I may, to the

Robert Hardy case. I know he is not a witness but he

was a witness before the llouse. But since this affects my

state, I'd like to ask MI. Wannall. Mr. Hardy, of course, was

the FBI informer who ultimately led and planned and organized

a raid on the Camden draft board. An: according to Mr. Hardy's

testimony before our Committee, he s.:.: that in advance of the

raid someone in the Department had. even acknowledged the fact

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that they had all the information they needed to clamp down

on the conspiracy and could arrest people at that point in time,

and yet no arrests were

nade.

Why, Mr. Wannall, was this true?

Mr. Wannall. Well, I can answer that based oniy on.

the

material that I have reviewed, Senator Schweiker. It was not

a case handled in my division but I think I can answer your

question.

There was, in fact, a representative of the Department

of Justice on the spot counselling and advising continuously

as that case progressed as to what

point the arrest should be

made and we were being guided by those to our mentors, the

ones who are responsible for making decisions of that sort.

So I: think that Mr. Hardy's statement to the effect that

there was someone in the Department there is perfectly true.

Senator Schweiker. That responsibility rests with who

under your procedures?

Mr. Hannall. We investigate decisions on making arrests,

when they should be made, and accisions with regard to

prosecutions are made either by the United States attorneys

or by Federals in the Department.

Mr. Adams. At this time that particular case did have

departmental attorney on the scene #ause there are questions

conspiracy.

conspiracy is a toug! riolation to prove and

sometimes a question of do you have the added value of catching

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someone in the commission of the crime as further proof,

rather than relying on one informant and some circumstantial

evidence to prove the violation.

Senator Schweiker. Well, in this case, though, they

even had a dry run. • They could have arrested them on the

dry run.

That's getting pretty close to conspiracy, it seems to

me. They had a dry run and they could have arrested them on

the dry run.

I'd like to know why they didn't arrest them on the dry

run, Who was this Department of Justice official who made

that decision?

Mx. Adams. Guy Goodwin was the Department official.

Senator Schweiker. Next I'd like to ask back in 1965,

during the height of the effort to destroy the Klan, as you

put it a few moments ago, I believe the FBI has released

figures that we had something like 2,000 informers of some

kind or another infiltrating the klan out of roughly 10,000

estimated membership.

I believe these are either FBI figures or estimates.

That would nean that one out of every five members of the klan

at that point was

an informant paid by the government.

And I believe the figure goes or io indicate that 70

percent of the new members of the Kla: that year were FBI

informants.

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Isn't this an awfully overwhelming quantity. of people

to put in an effort such as that? I'm not criticizing that

you shouldn't have informants in the Klan and know what's

going on for violence, but it seems to me that this is the

tail wagging the dog.

For example, today we supposedly have only 1594 totali

informants for

both donestic informants and potential informants

and that here we had 2,000

just in the Klan alone.

MX. Adams.

Well, this number 2,000 did include all

facial matters, informants at that particular time, and I

think the figures we tried to reconstruct as to the actual

number of klan informants in relation to klan members was around

percent, I think, after we had read some of the testimony.

Now the problem we had on the klan is the Klan had a

group called the Action Group.. This was the group that you

yemember from Mr. Rowe's testimony, that he was left af-

ter the meeting.

He attended the open meetings and heard

all of the hurrahs and this type of thing from information,

but he never knew what was going on because each one had an

action group that went out and considered themselves in the

missionary field.

Theirs was the violence.

In order to penetrate those, it takes, you have to direct

as many informants as you possibly can against it.

Bear in

mind that I think the newspapers, the President and Congress

and

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1932

everyone is concerned about the murder of the civil rights

workers, the Linió Kent sase, the Viola Liuzzo case, the

bombings of the church in Birmingham. We were faced with one

tremendous problem at that time.

Senator Schweiker.

I acknowledge that.

Mr.. Adams.

Our only approach was through informants

and through the use of informants we solved these cases, the

ones that were solved. Some of the bombing cases we have

never solved. They are extremely difficult.

These informants, as we told the Attorney General, and

as we told the President, that we had moved informants like

Mr. Rowe up to the top leadership. He was the bodyguard to the

head man. He was in a position where he

could forewarn us

of violence, could help us on cases that had transpired, and

yet we knew and conceived that this could continue forever

unless we can create enough disruption that these members will

realize that if I go out and murder three civil rights workers,

even though the sheriff and other law enforcement officers are

in on it, if that were the case and with some of them it was

the case, that I would be caught. And that's what we did and

that's why violence stopped, was because the Klan was insecure

and just like you say, 20 percent, they thought 50 percent of

their members ultimately were Klan members and they didn't

dare engage in these acts of violence because they knew they

couldn't control the conspiracy any longer. •

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Senator Schweiker.

My time is expired.

I just have

che quick question.

Is it correct that in 1971 we're using around 6500

informers for black ghetto situations?

• .

Hr. Adams. I'm not sure if that's the year.

We did

have one year where we had a number like that which probably

had been around 6000; and that was the time when the cities

were being burned, Detroit, Washington, areas like this.. We.

were given a mandate to know what the situation is, where is

violence going to break out, what next?

They weren't informants like an individual penctrating

an organization. They were

listening posts in the community

that would help tell us that we have a group here that's getting

ready, to start another fire-fight of something.

Senator Tower. At this point, there are three more

Senators remaining for questioning. If we can try to get

everything in in the first round, we will not have a second

round and I think we can finish around 1:00, and we can go

on and terminate the proceedings.

However, If anyone feels that they have another question

that they want to return to, we can come back here by 2:00.

Senator Mondale?

Senator Mondale. Mr. Adams, it seems to me that the

24

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25

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organization of its kind in the world. And when the FBI acts

in the field of political ideas, it has bungled its job, it

has interfered with the civil liberties, and finally, in the

last month or two, through its public disclosures, heaped

shame upon itself and really led toward an undermining of

the crucial public confidence in an essential law enforcement

agency of this country.

In a real sense, history has repeated itself because it

was precisely that problem that led to the creation of the FBI

in 1924.

In World war I, the Bureau of Investigation strayed

• from

its law enforcement functions and became an arbiter and

protector of political ideas. And through the interference

of civil liberties and Palmer Raids and the rest, the public

became so offended that later through Mr. Justice Stone and •

Mr. Hoover, the FBI was created. And the first statement

by Mr. Stone was that never again will this Justice Department

get involved in political ideas.

And yet here we are again looking at a record where with

Martin Luther King, with anti-war resistors, with -- we even

had testimony this morning of meetings with the Council of

Churches. Secretly we are investigating this vague, ill-defined,

impossible to define idea of investigating dangerous ideas.

It seems to be the basis of the strategy that people

can't protect themselves, that you sonchow need to use the

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tools of law enforcement to protect people from subversive

or dangerous: ideas, which I find strange and quite profoundly

at odds with the philosophy of American government.

I started

in politics years ago and the first thing we

had to do was to get the communists out of our parts and out.

of the union. He did a very fine job. As far as I know, and

I'm beginning to wonder, but as far as I know, we had no help

from the FBI or the CIA. We just ramned them out of the meetings

on the grounds that they weren't Democrats and they weren't

good union leaders when

we didn't want anything to do with them.

And yet, we see time and time again that we're going to

protect the blacks from Martin Luther King because he's

dangerous, that we've going to protect veterans from whatever

it is, and we're going to protect the Council of Churches

from the veterans, and so on, and it just gets so yummy and

confused and ill-defined and dangerous, that don't you agree

with me that we have to control this, to restrain it, so that

precisely what is expected of the FBI is known by you, by the

public, and that you can justify your actions when we ask

you?

Mr. Adams.

I agree with that, Senator, and I would like

to point out that when the Attorney General made his statement

Mr. Hoover subscribes to it, we foll...ed that policy for about

ten years until the President of the …ited States said that

we should investigate the ivazi Parti.

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1936

I for one feel that we should investigate the Nazi Party.

I feel that our investigation of the Nazi Party resulteû in

the fact that in World War II, as contrasted with World War I,

there wasn't one single incident of foreign directed sabotage

which took place in the United States.

Senator Mondale. And under the criminal law you could

have investigated these issues of sabotage.

Isn't sabotage a crime?

Mr. Adams.

Sabotage is a crime.

Senator Mondale. Could you have investigated that?

Mr. Adams.

After it happened.

Senator Mondale. You see, every time we get involved

in political ideas, you defend yourself on the basis of

crimes that could have been comnitted. It's very interesting.

In my opinion, you have to stand here if you're going to

continue what you're now doing and as I understand it, you

still insist that you did the right thing with the Vietnam

Veterans Against the War, and investigating the Council of

Churches, and this can still go on: This can still go on under

your interpretation of your present powers, what you try to

justify on the grounds of your law enforcement activitics

In terms of criminal matters.

Mr. Adams.

The law does not say we have to vait. until

we have been murdered before we can --

Senator Mondale. Absolutely, but that's the field of

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1937

law again. You're trying to defend apples with oranges.

That's

the law. You can do that.

Ms. Adams. That's right, but how do you find out which

of the 20,000 Bund members might have been a saboteur. You

don't have probable cause to investigate anyone, but you can

direct an intelligence operation against the German-Anerican

Bund, the same thing we did after Congress said --

Senator Mondale. Couldn't you get a warrant for that?

Why did you object to going to court for authority for that?.

Mr. Adams.

Because we don't have probable cause to

go against an individual and the law doesn't provide for

probable cause to investigate an organization.

There were activities which did take place, like one time

they outlined the Conmunist Party -

Senator Mondale. What I don't understand is why it

wouldn't be better for the FBI for us to define authority

that you could use in the kind of Bonn situation where under

court authority you can investigate where there is probable

cause or reasonable cause to suspect sabotage and the rest.

Wouldn't that make a lot more sense than just making these

decisions on your own?

Mr. Adams. We have expressed cciplete concurrence in

that. We feel that we're going to grilipeat to death in the

next 100 years, you're damned if you 's, and damned if you

don't

if wa don't have a delineation of our responsibility

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in this area. But I won't agree with you, senator, that we

have bungled the intelligence operations in the United States.

I agree with you that we have made some mistakes. Mr. Kelley

has set a pattern of being as forthright as any Director of the

FBI in acknowledging mistakes that. had been made, but I think

that as you said, and I believe Senator Tower said, and

Senator Church, that we have to watch these hearings because

of the necessity that ve must concentrate on these areas of

abuse. We must not lose sight of the

overall law enforcement and intelligence community, and I

still fcel that this is the freest country in the world.

I've travelled much, as I'm sure you have, and I know we have

made some mistakes, but I feel that the people in the United

States are less chilled by the mistakes we have made than they

are by the fact that there are 20,000 murders a year in the

uhited states and they can't walk out of their houses at night

and

feel safe.

Senator Mondale. That's correct, and isn't that an

argument then, Mr. Adams, for strengthening our powers to go

after those who commit crimes rather than strengthening or

continuing a policy which we now see undermines the public

confidence you need to do your job.

MI. Adams. Absolutely. The mistakes we have made

are

what have brought on this embarrassment to us.

I'm not blaming the Committee. I'm saying we made some

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mistakes and in doing so this is what has hurt the FBI. But

at the same time I don't feel that a balanced picture comes

out, as you have

of zercing in on abuses.

said yourselves, because of the necessity

I think that we have done one trcmendous job. I think

the accomplishments in the klan was the finest hour of the

FBI and yet, I'm. sure in dealing with the klan that we made

some mistakes. But I just don't agree with bungling.

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Senator Mondale. I don't want to argue over terms, but

I think I sense an agreement that the FBI has gotten into trouble

over it in the political idea

trouble, and that that's where we

need to have new legal standards.

Mr. Adams. Yes, I agree with that.

Senator Tower. Senator Huddleston.

Senator Huddleston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Adams, these two instances we have studied at some

length seems to have been an

inclination on the part of

the Bureau to establish, a notion about an individual or a group

which seems to be very hard to ever change of dislodge. In

the case of DI. King, where the supposition was that he was

being influenced by Communist individuals, extensive investi-

gation was made, surveillance, reports came back indicating that

this in fact was untrue, and directions continued to go out

to intensify the investigation. There never seemed to be a

willingness on the part of the Bureau to accept its own facts.

Ms. Cook testified this morning that something similar

to that happened with the Vietnam Veterans Against the War,

that

every piece of information that she supplied to the Bureau

seemed to indicate that the Bureau was not correct in its

assumption that this organization planned to commit violence,

or that it was being manipulated, and yet you seemed to insis:

that this investigation go on, and t:..s information was used

against the individuals.

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Now, are there instances where the Bureau has admitted that

its first assumptions were wrong and they have changed their

course?

Mr. Adams. We have admitted that. We have also shown

from one of the cases that Sénator Hart brought up, that after

five days we closed the case. We were told something by an !

individual that there was a concern of an adverse influence

in it, and we looked into it. On the Martin Luther King

situation there was no testimony to the effect that we just

dragged on and on, or admitted that we dragged on and on and

on, ad infinitum. The wiretaps on Martin Luther King were

all approved by the Attorney General. Microphones on Martin

Luther King were approved by another Attorney General: This

wasn't the FBI, and the reason they were approved was that

there was a basis to continue the investigation up to a point.

What I testified to was that we were improper in discreditir

DI.

King, but it's just like --

Senator Huddleston. The Committee has before it memoranda

written by high officials of the Bureau indicating that the

information they were receiving from the field, from these

surveillance methods, did not confirm what their supposition

was.

MI. Adams.

That memorandum was not on Dr. King. That

was on another individual that I thi:. somehow got mixed up

in the discussion, one where the iss'' was can we make people

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prove they aren't a Communist before we will agree not to

investigate them.

But the young lady, appearing this morning making the

comment that she never knew of anything she told us that

she considers herself a true member of the VAW-WSO inasmuch

as she feels in general agreement of the principles of it, and

agreed to cooperate with the FBI in providing information regard-

ing the organization to aid in preventing violent individuals

from associating themselves with the VAW-wSO. She is most

concerned about efforts.by the Revolutionary Union to take over

the VVAW-WSO, and she is working actively to prevent this..

I think that we have a basis for investigating the VAW-

WSO in certain areas today. In other areas we have stopped

the investigation. They don't agree with these principles

laid down by the --

:

Senator Huddleston. That report was the basis of your

continuing to pay informants and continuing to utilize that

information against members who certainly had not been involved

in violence, and apparently to get them fired from their job

or whatever?

Mr. Adams. It all gets back to the fact that even in the

criminal law field, you have to detect crime, and you have to

prevent crime, and you can't wait until something happens.

The

Attorney General has clearly spoken : that area, and even our

statutory jurisdiction provides thur ve don't --

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Senator Huddleston.

Well, of course we've had considerable

evidence this morning where no attempt was made to prevent

crime, when you had information that it was going to occur.

But I'm sure there are instances where you have.

MI. Adams. He disseminated every single item which he

reported to us.

Senator Huddleston. To a police department which you

knew was an accomplice to the crime.

Mr. Adams. Not necessarily.

Senator Huddleston. Your informant had told you that,

hadn't he?

Mr. Adams. Well, the informant is on one level. We have

other informants, and we have other information.

Senator Huadleston. Yes, but you were aware that he

had worked with certain members of the Birmingham police in

order to -

Mr. Adams.

Yes.

He furnished many other instances

also.

Senator Huddleston. So you weren't really doing a whole

Lot to prevent that incident by telling the people who were

already part of it.

MI. Adams. We were doing everything we could lawfully

do at the time, and finally the situation was corrected, so that

when the department, agreeing that we had no further. juris-

diction, could sent the United States Marshal down to perform

certain law enforcement functions.

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Senator Huddleston. Now, the Committee has received

documents which indicated that in one situation the FBI assisted

an informant who had been established in a white hate group

to establish a rival white hate group, and that the Bureau paid

his expenses in setting up this rival organization.

Now, does this not put the Bureau in a position of being

responsible for what actions the rival white hate group might

have undertaken?

Mr. Adams. I'd like to see if one of the other gentlemen

knows that specific case.

because I don't think we set up a

specific group.

This is Joe Deegan.

Mr. Deegan. Senator, it's my understanding that the

informant we're talking about decided to break off from the

group he was with. He was with the Macon Klan group of

the United klans of anerica, and he decided to break off.

This

was in compliance with our regulations. His breaking off,

we did not pay him to set up the organization. He did it

on his own.. We paid him

for the information he furnished

us concerning the operation.

We did not sponsor the organiza-

tion.

Senator Huddleston. Concerning the new organization that

he set up, he continued to advise you of the activities of that

organization?

Mr. Deegan.

He continued to advi:: us of that organization

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and other organizations.

He would advise us of planned

activities.

Senator Huddleston. The new organization that he formed,

did it operate in a very similar manner to the previous one?

Mr. Deegan. No, it did not, and it did not last that

long.

Senator Huddleston. There's also evidence of an FBI

informant in the Black Panther Party who had a position of

responsibility within the Party with the knowledge of his

FBI contact of supplying members with weapons and instructing

them in how to use those weapons. Presumably this was in the

knowledge of the Bureau, and he later became - came in contact

with the group that was contracting for murder, and he partici-

pated in this group with the knowledge of the FBI agent, and

this group did in fact stalk a victim who was. later killed with

the weapon supplied by this individual, presumably all in the

knowledge of the FBI.

How does this square with your enforcement and crime

prevention responsibilities.

Mr. Deegan.. Senator, I'm not familiar with that particular

case.

It does not square with our policy in all respects, and

I would have to look at that particular case you're talking

about to give you an answer.

Senator Huddleston: I don't have the documentation on that

particular case, but it brings up the point as to what kind of

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control you exercised over this kind of informant in this kind

of an organization and to what extent an effort is made to

prevent these informants from engaging in the kind of thing

that you are supposedly trying to prevent.

MI. Adams. A good example of this was MI. Rowe, who became

active in an action group, and we told him to get out or

we would no longer use him as an informant, in spite of the

information he had furnished in the past.

We have had cases, Senator, where we have had --

Senator Huddleston. But you also told him to participaté

in violent activities.

Mr. Adams. We did not tell him to participate in violent

activities.

Senator Huddleston. That's what he said.

Mr. Adams. I know that's what he said. But. that's what

lawsuits are. all about, is that there. are. two sides to the

issue, and our agents. handling. this have advised. us, and I

believe have advised. your staff, that at no time did they

advise him to engage. in violence..

Senator. Huddleston. Just to do what was necessary to

get the information, I believe maybe might have been his .

instructions.

Mr. Adams. I don't think they made any such statement

to him along that line, and we have informants, we have

informants who have gotten involved in the violation of the law,

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and we have immediately converted their status from an informant

to the subject, and have prosecuted I would say, offhand, I

can think of around 20 informants that we have prosecuted for

violating the laws, once it came to our attention, and even

to show you our policy of disseminating information on violence

in this case, during the review of the matter, the agents told

me that they found one case where their agent had been working

24 hours a day, and he was a little late in disseminating the

information to the police department. No violence occurred,.

but it showed up in a file review, and he was censured for

his delay in properly notifying local authorities.

So we not only have a policy, I feel that we do follow

reasonable safeguards. in order to carry it out, including periodic

review of all informant files. .

Senator Huddleston. Well, Mr. Rowe's statement is

substantiated to some extent with the acknowledgement by the

agent in charge that if you're going to be a Klansman and you

happen to be with someone and they decide to do something, that

he couldn't be an angel. These were the words of the agent,.

and be a good informant. He wouldn't take the lead, but the

implication is that he would have to go along and would have

to be involved if he was going to maintain his credibility.

Mr. Adams. There's no question but that an informant at

times. will have to be present during demonstrations, riots,

fistfights that take place, but I belicve his statement was

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to the effect that - and I was sitting in the back of the

room and I don't recall it exactly, but some of them were

beat with chains, and I didn't hear whether he said he beat

someone with a chain or not, but I rather doubt that he did

because it's one thing being present, and it's another thing

taking an active part in criminal actions.

Senator Huddleston..

He was close enough to get his

throat cut.

How does the gathering of information -

Senator Tower. Senator Mathias is here, and I think that

we probably should recess a few minutes.

Could we have Senator Mathias' questions and then should

we convene this afternoon?

Senator Huddleston.

I'm finished. I just had one more

question.

Senator Tower. Go ahead.

Senator Huddleston. I wanted to ask how the selection of

information about an individual's personal life, social, sex

life and becoming involved in that sex life or social life

is a requirement for law enforcement or crime prevention.

Mr. Adams. Our agent handlers have advised us on Mr.

Rowe, that they gave him no such instriction, they had no

such knowledge concerning it, and I can'= see where it would

be.of any value whatsoever.

Senator Huddleston.

You aren't a:re of any case where

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these instructions were given to. an agent or an informant?

Mr. Adams.

To get involved in sexual activity? No, sir.

Senator Huddleston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Tower.

Senator Mathias.

Senator Mathias. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to come back very briefly to the Fourth

Amendment considerations in connection with the use of informants

and in posing these questions we're not thinking of the one

time volunteer who walks in to an FBI office and says I have

a story I want to tell you and that's the only time that you

may see him. I'm thinking of the kind of situations in which

there is a more extended relationship which could be of varying

degrees. It might be in one case that the same individual

will have some usefulness in a number of situations. But when

the FBI orders a regular agent to engage in a search, the first

test is a judicial marzant, and what I would lie to explore

with you is the difference between a one time search which

requires a warrant, and which you get when you make that

search, and a continuous search which uses an informant, or

the case of a continuous search which uses a regular undercover

agent, someone who is totally under your control, and is in

slightly different category than an informant.

Mr. Adams. Well, we

get, there. into the fact that the

Supreme Court has still held that the use of informants does

not invade any of these constitutionally protected areas, and

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if a person wants to tell an informant something that isn't

protected by the Supreme Court.

An actual search for legal evidence, that is a protected

item,. but information and the use of informants have been

consistently held as not posing any constitutional problens.

Senator Mathias. I would agree, if you're talking about

the fellow who walks in off the street, as I said earlier,

but is it true that under existing procedures informants are

given background checks?

MI. Adams. Yes, sir.

Senator Mathias. And they are subject to a testing period

Mr. Adams. That's right, to verify and make sure they

are providing to us reliable information.

Senator Mathias. And during the period that the relation-

ship continues, they are rather closely controlled by the

handling agents.

• Mr. Adams. That's true.

Senator Mathias.

So in effect they can come in a very

practical way agents themselves to the FBI.

MI. Adams.. They can do nothing --

Senator Mathias. Certainly agents in the common law use

of the word.

Mr. Adams. That's right, they can do nothing, and we

instruct our agents that an informant can do nothing that the

agent himself cannot do, and if the agent can work himself into

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:

an organization in an undercover capacity, he can sit there and

glean all the information that he wants, and that is not in the

Constitution as a protected area. But we do have this problem.

Senator Mathias. But if a regular agent who is a nember

of the FBI attempted to enter these premises, he would require

a warrant?

Mr. Adams. No, sir, if a regular - it depends on the

purpose for which he is entering. If a regular agent by

concealing his identity, by - was admitted as a member of the

Communist Party, he can attend Communist Party meetings, and he

can enter the premises, he can enter the building, and there's

no constitutionally invaded area there.

Senator Mathias. And so you feel, that anyone who has

a less formal relationship with the Bureau than a. regular

agent, who can undertake a continuous surveillance operation

as an undercover.agent.or as an informant --

Mr. Adams. As long as he commits no illegal acts.

Senator Mathias. Let me ask you why you feel that it is

impractical to.reguire.a

warrant since,.as I understand it,

headguarters must approve the use of an informant.

degree of formal action required?

Is that

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Mr. Adams. The main difficulty is the particularity

which has to be shown in obtaining a search warrant. You

have to go after particular evidence. You have to specify

what you're going after, and an informant operates in an

area that you just cannot specify. He doesn't know what's

going. to be discussed at that meeting. It may be a plot to

blow up the Capitol again or it may be a plot to blow up the

State Department building.

Senator Mathias. If it were a crininal investigation,

you would have little difficulty with probable cause, wouldn't

you?

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Mr. Adams. We would have difficulty in a warrant to

use someone as an informant in that area because the same

difficulty of particularity exists. We can't specify.

Senator Mathias. I understand the problem because it's

very similar to one that we discussed earlier in connection

say wiretaps on a national

security problem.

Mx. Adams. That's it, and there we face the problem of

where the Soviet,

an individual identified

as a Soviet spy

in a friendly country and they tell us he's been a Soviet spy

there and now he's coming to the United States, and if we can't

show under a probable cause warrant, if we couldn't show that

he was actually engaging in espionage in the United States,

we couldn't get a wiretap under the probable cause requirements

which have been discussed. If the good fairy didn't drop the

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evidence in our hands that this individual is here conducting

espionage, we again would fall short of this, and that's

why we're still groping with it.

Senator Mathias.

When you say fall short, you really,

you would be falling short of the requirements of the Fourth

Amendment.

Mr. Adams. That's right, except for the fact that the

• President, under this Constitutional powers, to protect this

nation and make sure that it survives first, first of all

national survival, and these are the areas that not only the

President but the Attorney General are concerned in and we're

all hoping that somehow we can reach a legislative middle

ground in here.

Senator Mathias.

Which we discussed in the other national

security area as to curtallling a warrant to that particular

need.

Mr. Adams. And if you could get away from probable

cause and get some degree of reasonable cause and get some

method of sealing indefinitely your interest, say, in an

ongoing espionage case and can work out those difficulties,

we may get their yet.

Senator Mathias. And you don't despair of finding that

middle ground?

Mr. Adams. I don't becausc I think that today there's

more of an open mind between Congress and the Executive Branch

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and the FBI and everyone concerning the need to get these

areas resolved.

Senator Mathias.

And you believe that the Department,

if we could come together, would support, would agree to that

kind of a warrant requirement if we could agree on the language?

Mr. Adams. If we can work out problems and the Attorney

General is personally interested in that also.

Senator Mathias. Do you think that this agreement night

extend to some of those other areas. that we talked about?

Mr. Adams. I think

that that would be a nuch greater

difficulty in an area of domestic intelligence informant who

reports on many different operations and different types of

activities that might come up rather than say in a Soviet

espionage or a foreign espionage case where you do have a little

more degree of specificity to deal with.

Senator Mathias. I suggest that we arrange to get

together and try out some drafts with each other, but in the

meantime, of course, there's another alternative and that

would be the use of wiretap procedure by which the Attorney

General must approve a wiretap before it is placed, and the

same general process could be used for informants, since

you come to headquarters any way.

Mr. Adams. That could be an alte tive. I think it

would be a very burdensome alternative d I think at some

point after we attack the major abuses, or what are considered

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major abuses of Congress and get over this hurdle, I think

we're

still going to have to recognize that heads of agencies

have to accept the responsibility for managing that agency

and we can't just keep pushing every operational problem up

to the top because there just aren't enough hours in the day.

Senator Mathias. But the reason that parallel suggests

itself is of course the fact that the wiretap deals generally

with one level of information in one sense of gathering

information. You hear what you hear from the tap.

Mr. Adams. But you're dealing in a much smaller number

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Senator Mathias. Smaller nunber, but that's all the

more reason. When an informant goes in, he has all of his

senses. He's gathering all of the information a human being

can acquire from a situation and has access to more information

than the average wiretap.

And it would seen to me that for that reason a parallel

process might be useful and in order.

Mr. Adams. Mr. Mintz pointed out one other main

distinction. to me which I had overlooked fron our prior

discussions, which is the fact that with an informant he is

more in the position of being a concentral monitor in that one

of the two parties to the conversation agrees, such as like

concentral monitoring of telephones and microphones and

anything else versus the wiretap itself. where the individual

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whose telephone is being tapped is not aware and there is,

and neither of the two parties talking had agreed

that their

conversation could be monitored.

Senator Mathias. I find that one difficult to accept.

If I'm the third party overhearing a conversation that is taking

place in a room where I am, and my true character isn't perceived

by the two people who are talking, in effect they haven't

consented to my overhearing my conversation. Then they consent

if they believe that I am their friend or their, a partisan

of theirs.

But if they knew in fact that I was an informant for

someone else, they wouldn't be consenting.

Mr. Adams. Well, that's like I believe Senator llart

raised earlier, that the courts thus far have made this

distinction with no difficulty, but that doesn't mean that

there may not be some legislative compromise which might be

addressed.

Senator Mathias. Well, I particularly appreciate your

attitude in being willing to work on these problems because

I think that's the most important thing that can evolve from

these hearings, so that we can actually look at the Fourth

Anendment as the standard that we have t: achieve.

But the

way we get there is obviously going to : "', lot casier if we

can work toward them together.

I just have one final question, is. Chairman, and that

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deals with whether we shouldn't impose a standard of probable

cause that a crime has been committed as a means of controlling

the use of informants and the kind of information that they

collect.

Do you feel that this would be too restrictive?

Mr. Adams. Yes, sir, I do.

When I look at informants and I see that each year

informants provide us, locate 5000 dangerous fugitives, they

provide subjects in 2000 more cases, they recover $86 million

in stolen property and contraband, and that's irrespective

of what we give the local law enforcement and other Federal

agencies, which is almost a comparable figurc, we have almost

reached a point in the criminal law where we don't have much

left. And in the intelligence field we still, I think when

we carve all of the problems away, we still have

to make sure

that we have the means to gather information which will permit

us to be aware of the identity of individuals and organizations

that are

acting to overthrow the government of the United

States. And I think we still have some areas to look hard

at as we have discussed, but I think informants are here to

stay. They are absolutely essential to law enforcement.

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informants, you have individuals in your connunity that

you rely on, not for ultarior purposes, but to let you know

what's the feel of the people, am I serving them properly,

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am I carrying out this?

It's here to say. It's been here throughout history

and there will always be informants. And the thing we want to

avoid is abuses like provocateurs, criminal activities, and

to ensure that we have safeguards that will prevent that.

But we do need informants.

Senator tower. Senator Hart, do you have any further

questions?

-

Senator llart of Michigan.

Yes. I ask unaninous request

perhaps with a view to giving balance to the record, the

groups that we have discussed this morning into which the

Burcau has put informants, in popular language, our liberal

groups - I would ask unanimous consent that be printed in

the record, the summary of the opening of the headguarters

file by the Bureau of Dr. Carl McIntyre when he announced

that he was organizing a group to counter the American Civil

Liberties Union and other "liberal and communist groups,"

is not a left only pre-occupation. •

Senator lover. Without objection, so ordered..

(The material referied to follows:)

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phone (Ares 2081 544-6000

8

2

3

4

5

WARO

PAUL

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

51252

1959

Senator Tower. Any more questions?

Then the Committee will have an Executive Session this

afternoon in Room 3110 in the Dirksen Building at 3:00, and

I hope everyone will be in attendance.

Tomorrow morning we will hear from Courtney Evans,

Cartha DeLoach.

Tomorrow afternoon, former Attorneys General

Ramsey Clark and Edward Katzenbach.

The Committee, the hearings are recessed until 10:00

a.m. tomorIoN morning.

(ihereupon, at 1:10 o'clock p.m., the hearing in the

above mentioned matter was concluded, to reconvene on Wednesday

December 3rd, 1975, at 10:00 c'clock a.nn.)

-n1 8-1

---

## Page 182

(Copies

to

(cos Checked)

CA fliev. 7-11-75)

TOS SAC:

L]

Albany

albuquerque,

Al exondria

Anchorage

Allant.a

Baltimore

Birmingham

Boston

Buffalo

Bulte

Charlotte

Chicago

Cincinnati

Cleveland

Columbia

Dallas

Denver

Detroit:

El Paso

] Honolulu

Houston

Indianapolis

Jackson

Jacksonville

Kansas City

Knoxville

Las Vegas

Llttle Rock

Los Angeles

Louisville

Memphis

Miami

Milwaukee

Minneapolis

Mobile

Newark

New Haven

•New Orleans

New Yorks City

Norfolk

J Oklahoma City

l Omaha

• Phriadciphia

Phoenix

Pittsburgh

Porti and

Richmond

Sacramento

St. Louis

Salt Lake Cily

San Antonio

San Diego

San Francisco

San Juan

Savannah

j Seattle

J Springfield

Washington Field

j Quantico

TO LEGAT:

Bein

BOND

Brasilia

Buenos Aires

Caracas

Hong Kong

London

Madrid

Manila

Mexico City

Ottawa

Paris

Rome

Tel Aviv

Tokyo

RE:

Date December 4, 1975

HEARINGS BEFORE THE SENATE

SELECT COMMITTEE

Retention

For appropriate

[a) For information ma optional

a action

[ Surep, by

I The enclosed is for your information. If used in a future report, [ conceal all

sources, L paraphrase contents.

L Enclosed are corrected pages fron report. of SA

daled

-

Remarks:

For your assistance in responding to

local press inquiries, attached is a copy of

unedited excerpted remarks by Assistant to the

Director--Deputy Associate Director James B

Adams while testifying before the Senate Select

Committee on 12/2/75, concerning anti-FBI

allegations made by Gary Rowe, former EB.

informant.

66-2832.°

Eric. (1)

Bufile

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NW 55252

DocId: 32989823 Page 182

---

## Page 183

EXCERPTS OF REMARKS MADE BY

ASSISTANT

TO THE DIRECTOR --

DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR JAMES B. ADAMS

TESTIFYING BEFORE THE

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

PERTAINING TO THE KU KLUX KLAN,

GARY ROWE,

FORMER FBI INFORMANT, AND

PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS OF THE FBI

TO PREVENT VIOLENCE

DECEMEER 2, 1975

NW 55252 DocId: 32989823 Page 183

---

## Page 184

QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

....You do use informants and do instruct them to

spread dissention among certain groups that they are

informing on, do you not?

We did when we had the COINTEL programs which were

discontinued in 1971, and I think the Klan is probably one

of the best examples of a situation where the law was

ineffective at the time. We heard the term, State's Rights

used much more than we hear today. We saw with the

Little Rock situation the President of the United States

sending in the troops pointing out the necessity to use

local law enforcement. We must have local law enforcement

use the troops only as a last resort. When you have a

situation like this where you do try to preserve the

respective roles in law enforcement, you have historical

problems.

With the Klan coming along, we had situations where

the FBI and the Federal Government was almost powerless

to act. We had local law enforcement officers in some

areas participating in Klan violence. The incidents

mentioned by Mr. Rowe--everyone of those he saw them from the

lowest level--the informant.

He didn't see what action

was taken with that information as he pointed out during

his testimony. Our files show that this information was

reported to the police departments in every instance.

We also know that in certain instances the infor-

mation upon being received was not being acted upon.

We

also disseminated simultaneously through letterhead

NW 55252 DocId: 32989823

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## Page 185

QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

memorandum to the Department of Justice the problem.

And here we were--the FBI--in a position where we had no

authority in the absence of an instruction from the

Department of Justice to make an arrest. Section 241

and 242 don't cover it because you don't have evidence

of a conspiracy. It ultimately resulted in a situation

where the Department called in U. S. Marshals who do have

authority similar to local law enforcement officials.

So historically, in those days, we were just as

frustrated as anyone else was, that when we got information

from someone like Mr. Rowe--good information, reliable

information--and it was passed on to those who had the

responsibility to do something about it, it was not always

acted upon as he indicated.

In none of these cases, then, there was adequate

evidence of conspiracy to give you jurisdiction to act.

The Departmental rules at that time, and still do,

require Departmental approval where you have a conspiracy.

Under 241, it takes two or more persons acting together.

You can have a mob scene and you can have blacks and whites

belting each other, but unless you can show that those that

initiated the action acted in concert, in a conspiracy, you

have no violation.

Congress recognized this and it wasn't until 1968

that they came along and added Section 245 to the Civil

Rights Statute which added punitive measures against an

-2 -

NW 55252 DocId: 32989823 Page 185

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## Page 186

QUESTION:

MR ADAMS:

QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

individual. There didn't have to be a conspiracy. This

was a problem that the whole country was grappling with--

the President of the United States, Attorneys General--we

were in a situation where we had rank lawlessness taking

place.

As you know from the memorandum we sent you that

we sent to the Attorney General the accomplishments we were

able to obtain in preventing violence and in neutralizing

the Klan and that was one of the reasons.

....A local town meeting on a controversial social

issue might result in disruption. It might be by hecklers

rather than by those holding the meeting. Does this

mean that the Bureau should investigate all groups

organizing or participating in such meetings because

they may result in violent government disruption?

No sir, and we don't....

Isn't that how you justify spying on almost every

aspect of the peace movement?

No sir. When we monitor demonstrations, we monitor

demonstrations where we have an indication that the

demonstration itself is sponsored by a group that we have

an investigative interest in, a valid investigative

interest in, or where members of one of these groups are

participating where there is a potential that they might

change the peaceful nature of the demonstration.

This is our closest question of trying to draw

guidelines to avoid getting into an area of infringing

on the lst Amendment right, yet at the same time, being

=3-

NW 55252 DocId: 32989823 Page 186

---

## Page 187

aware of groups such as we have had in greater numbers

in the past than we do at the present time. We have had

periods where the demonstrations have been rather severe

and the courts have said that the FBI has the right,

and indeed the duty, to keep itself informed with respect

to the possible commission of crime. It is not obliged

to wear blinders until it may be too late for prevention.

Now that's a good statement if applied in a clear-cut

case.

QUESTION:

MR. WANNALL:

MR. ADAMS:

Our problem is where we have a demonstration and

we have to make a judgment call as to whether it is one

that clearly fits the criteria of enabling us to monitor

the activities. That's where I think most of our disagree-

ments fall.

In the Rowe Case, in the Rowe testimony that we just

heard, what was the rationale again for not intervening when

violence was known about. I know we have asked this several

times--I'm still having trouble understanding what the

rationale, Mr. Wannall, was in not intervening in the Rowe

situation when violence was known.

Senator Schweiker, Mr. Adams did address himself to

that and if you have no objections, I'll ask that he be

the one to answer the question.

The problem we had at the time, and it is the problem

today, we are an investigative agency; we do not have

police powers even like the U. S. Marshals do. The Marshals

- 4 -

NW 55252 DocId: 32989823 Page 187

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## Page 188

since about 1795 I guess, or some period like that, had

authorities that almost border on what a sheriff has. We

are the investigative agency of the Department of Justice,

and during these times the Department of Justice had us

maintain the role of an investigative agency.

We were to report on activities. We furnished the

information to the local police who had an obligation to

act. We furnished it to the Department of Justice in those

areas where the local police did not act. It resulted

finally in the Attorney General sending 500 U. S. Marshals

down to guarantee the safety of people who were trying to

march in protest of their civil rights.

This was an extraordinary measure because it came at

a time of Civil Rights versus Federal Rights and yet there

was a breakdown in law enforcement in certain areas of the

country. This doesn't mean to indict all law enforcement

agencies in the South at the time either, because many of

them did act upon the information that was furnished to

them. But we have no authority to make an arrest on the

spot because we would not have had evidence that was a

conspiracy available. We could do absolutely nothing in

that regard. In Little Rock the decision was made, for

instance, that if any arrests need to be made, the Army

should make them. And next to the Army, the U. S. Marshals

should make them--not the FBI, even though we developed

the violations.

We have over the years as you know at the

-5-

NW 55252 DocId:32989823 Page 188

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## Page 189

QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

QUESTION:

MR ADAMS:

Time there were many questions raised. Why doesn't the

FBI stop this? Why don't you do something about it? well,

we took the other route and effectively destroyed the Klan

as far as committing acts of violence and, of course, we

exceeded statutory guidelines in that area.

What would be wrong, just following up on your point

there, Mx. Adams, with setting up a program since it is

obvious to me that a lot of our informers are going to

have preknowledge of violence of using U. S. Marshals on

some kind of long-range basis to prevent violence?

We do. We have them in Boston in connection with

the busing incident. We are investigating the violations

under the Civil Rights Act, but the Marshals are in

Boston. They are in Louisville, I believe, at the same

time and this is the approach that the Federal Government

finally recognized.

On an immediate and fairly contemporary basis that

kind of help can be sought instantly as opposed to waiting

till it gets to a Boston state. I realize a departure from

the past and not saying it isn't, but it seems to me we need

a better remedy than we have.

Well, fortunately we are at a time where conditions have

subsided in the country even from the 60's and the 70's, or

50 's and 60's.

We report to the Department of Justice on

potential trouble spots around the country as we learn of them

so that the Department will be aware of them. The planning

-6-

NW 55252 DocId: 32989823

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## Page 190

QUESTION:

for Boston, for instance, took place a year in advance, with

state officials, city officials, the Department of Justice

and the FBI sitting down together saying "How are we going to

protect the situation in Boston"? I think we have learned a

lot from the days back in the early 60's. But, the Government

had no mechanics which protected people at that time.

Next I would like to ask, back in 1965, I guess during

the height of the effort to destroy the Klans as you put it

a few moments ago, I believe the FBI has released figures that

we had something like 2,000 informers of some kind or another

infiltrating the Klan out of roughly 10,000 estimated member-

ship.

MR. ADAMS:

QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

That's right.

I believe these are FBI figures or estimates. That would

mean that I out of every 5 members of the Klan at that point

was an informant paid by the Government and I believe the

figure goes on to indicate that 70 percent of the new members

in the Klan that year were FBI informants. Isn't that an

awful overwhelming quantity of people to put in an effort such

as that? I'm not criticizing that we shouldn't have informants

in the Klan and know what is going on to revert violence but it

just seems to me that the tail is sort of wagging the dog. For

example today we supposedly have only 1594 total informants,

both domestic informants and potential informants. Yet, here

we have 2,000 in just the Klan alone.

Well, this number of 2,000 did include all racial matters

and informants at that particular time and I think the figures

NW 55252 DocId:32989823 Page 190

-7-

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## Page 191

QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

we tried to reconstruct as to the actual number of Klan

informants in relaton to Klan members was around 6 percent, I

think after we had read some of the testimony on it. Isn't that

right, Bill? Now the problem we had on the Klan is the Klan

had a group called the Action Group. This was the group if you

remember

from Mr. Rowe's testimony that he was left out of in

the beginning. He attended the open meetings and heard all the

hoorahs and this type of information but he never knew what was

going on because each one had an Action Group that went out and

considered themselves in the missionary field. Theirs was the

violence. In order to penetrate those you have to direct as

many informants as you possibly can against it. Bear in mind

that I think the newspapers, the President, Congress, everyone,

was concerned about the murder of the three civil rights

workers, the Lemul Penn case, the Violet Liuzzo case, the

bombings of the church in Birmingham. We were faced with one

tremendous problem at that time.

I acknowledge that.

Our only approach was through informants. Through the

use of informants we solved these cases. The ones that were

solved. There were some of the bombing cases we never solved.

They're extremely difficult, but, these informants as we told

the Attorney General and as we told the President, we moved

informants like Mr. Rowe up to the top leadership. He was the

bodyguard to the head man. He was in a position where he

could see that this could continue forever unless we could

NW 55252 DocId:32989823 Page 191

-8-

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## Page 192

QUESTION:

MR ADAMS:

QUESTION:

create enough disruption that these members will realize that

if I go out and murder three civil rights, even though the

Sheriff and other law enforcement officers are in on it, if

that were the case, and in some of that was the case, that I

will be caught, and that's what we did, and that's why violence

stopped because the Klan was insecure and just like you say

20 percent, they thought 50 percent of their members ultimately

were Klan members, and they didn't dare engage in these acts of

violence because they knew they couldn't control the conspiracy

any longer.

I just have one quick question. Is it correct that in

1971 we were using around 6500 informers for a black ghetto

situation?

I'm not sure if that's the year. We did have a year

where we had a number like that of around 6000 and that was

the time when the cities were being burned. Detroit, Washington,

areas like this, we were given a mandate to know what the

situation is, where is violence going to break out next. They

weren't informants like an individual that is penetrating an

organization. They were listening posts in the community that

would help tell us that we have another group here that is

getting ready to start another fire fight or something.

... Without going into that subject further of course we

have had considerable evidence this morning where no attempt

was made to prevent crime when you had information that it

was going to occur. I am sure there were instances where

you have.

NW 55252

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-9-

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## Page 193

MR. ADAMS:

QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

QUESTION:

We disseminated every single item which he reported to us.

To a police department which you knew was an accomplice to

the crime.

Not necessarily knew.

Your informant told you that, hadn't he?

The informant is on one level. We have other informants

and we have other information.

You were aware that he had worked with certain members of

the Birmingham Police in order...

That's right. He furnished many other instances also.

So you really weren't doing a whole lot to prevent that

incident by telling the people who were already a part of it.

We were doing everything we could lawfully do at the

time and finally the situation was corrected when the Department

agreeing that we had no further jurisdiction, sent the U.s.

Marshals down to perform certain law enforcement functions.

...This brings up the point as to what kind of control

you can exercise over this kind of informant and to this

kind of organization and to what extent an effort is made to

prevent these informants from engaging in the kind of thing

that you were supposedly trying to prevent.

A good example of this was Mr. Rowe who became active in

an Action Group and we told him to get out or we were no longer

using him as an informant in spite of the information he had

furnished in the past. We have cases, Senator where we have had

But you also told him to participate in violent activities

NW 55252 DocId: 32989823 Page 193

-10-

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## Page 194

MR. ADAMS:

QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

QUESTION:

We did not tell him to participate in violent activities.

That's what he said.

I know that's what he says, but that's what lawsuits

are all about is that there are two sides to issues and our

Agent handlers have advised us, and I believe have advised your

staff members, that at no time did they advise him to engage

in violence.

Just to do what was necessary to get the information.

I do not think they made any such statement to him

along that line either and we have informants who have gotten

involved in the violation of a law and we have immediately

converted their status from an informant to the subject and

have prosecuted I would say off hand, I can think of around

20 informants that we have prosecuted for violating the laws

once it came to our attention and even to show you our policy

of disseminating information on violence in this case during

the review of the matter the Agents have told me that they

found one case where an Agent had been working 24 hours a

day and he was a little late in disseminating the information

to the police department. No violence occurred but it showed

up in a file review and he was censured for his delay in

properly notifying local authorities. So we not only

have a policy, I feel that we do follow reasonable safeguards

in order to carry it out, including periodic review of all

informant files.

Mr. Rowe's statement is substantiated to some extent with

an acknowledgment by the Agent in Charge that if he were going

NW 55252 DocId:32989823 Page 194

-11-

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## Page 195

-

MR. ADAMS:

QUESTION:

QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

to be a Klansman and he happened to be with someone and they

decided to do something, he couldn't be an angel. These are

words of the Agent. And be a good informant. He wouldn't

take the lead but the implication is that he would have

to go along or would have to be involved if he was going

to maintain his liability as a ---

There is no question that an informant at times will

have to be present during demonstrations, riots, fistfights

that take place but I believe his statement was to the

effect that, and I was sitting in the back of the room and I do

not recall it exactly, but that some of them were beat with

chains and I did not hear whether he said he beat someone with

a chain or not but I rather doubt that he did, because it is

one thing being present, it is another thing taking an

active part in a criminal action.

It's true. He was close enought to get his throat cut

apparently.

How does the collection of information about an

individual's personal life, social, sex life and becoming

involved in that sex life or social life is a requirement for

law enforcement or crime prevention.

Our Agent handlers have advised us on Mr. Rowe that

they gave him no such instruction, they had

' no such knowledge

concerning it and I can't see where it would be of any

value whatsoever.

NW 55252 DocId: 32989823 Page 195

-12-

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## Page 196

QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

You don't know of any such case where these instructions

were given to an Agent or an informant?

To get involved in sexual activity? No Sir.

!

-13-

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## Page 197

Routing Slip

0-7 (Rov. 12-17-73)

TO: SAC:

L. Albany

Albuquerque

..?

Mlexandria

Anchorage

Atlanta

Baltimore

Binningham

Boston

Buffalo

Butte

Charlotte

Chicago

Cincinnati

Cleveland

Columbia

Dallas

Denver

Detroit

El Paso

Honolulu

€ 160p

Offices Checked)

Houston

Indianapolis

Jack son

Jacksonville

Kansas City

Knoxville

Las Vegas

Little Rock

Los Angeles

Louisville

Memphis

Miami

Milwaukce

Minneapolis

Mobile

Newark

New Haven

New Orleans

New York City

Norfolk

2 Oklahoma City

Omaha

Piniladelphia

Phoonis

Pittsburgh

Portland

Richmond

Sacramento

St. Louis

Salt Laise City

i San Diego

] San Francisco

3 San -Juan

Savannah

3 Springi

1 Springlield

, Tampa

) Washington Field

J Quantico

TO LEGAT:

[.] Beirut

• Bem

Brasilia

Buenns Aires

Caravns

Hong Kong

London

7 Madrid

Manila

] Mexico City

¡ Ottara

Paris

Rome

1 Singapore

I Tel Aviv

Tokyo

11/21/75

RE: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

Date

ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES 66 - 2132

Retention

For appmpriate

= For information m optional C action

[] Surep, by

•I The enclosed is for your information. If used in a luture report, My conceal all

sources, ] paraphrase contents.

Enclosed are corrected pages trom report of SA -

dated

Remarks:

_

Enclosed for your information is a copy of

an article by Mr. William Safire entitled

"Mr.

Church's Cover-Up" that appeared in the

November 20, 1975, issue of "The New York rimes."

66-2832-88

}

DIC.

(1)

Bufile

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## Page 198

Mr. Church's Cover Up

By William Safire

The committee is not asking embar-

rassing questions even when answers

are readily avatiable. A couple of

WASHINGON. Nov. 19--On Oct. 10,

wecks ago, at an open hearing, an

1963, thie then Attorney General of the

P.B.I man inadvertently started

to

United States put his personal signa-

blurt out an episode about newsmen

ture on a document that launched and

who, were weritapping in 1962 with

legitimatized one of the most horren-

- the apparent knowledge of Attorney

dous abuses of Federal police power in

General Kennedy. The too-willing with

this century.

ness was promptly shooshed into sis

In. Senator Frank Church's subcom-

lence, and told that such information

mittee hearing room this week;

the

would be developed only in executive

authorized

Viretapping and

quent unauthorized huzing and at-

session. Nobody raised"

,an

eyebrow.

That pattern of containment by the

tempted blackmailing of Martin Luther

Church committce is vividly shown by

ding uf. is being gingerly examincd..

the handling of the buggings at the

with the "investigation" conducted in

1964 Republican and Democratic con-

such & way as not to unduly em

barrass officials of the Kennedy or

ESSAY

Johnson Administrations:;

With great care, the committee has

focused on the F.B.L. Yesterday, When*

ventions: which were ordered by Lyn,

the committee counsel first set forth

don Johnson. Such invasions of politi:

the resuit of shuffling through press

cal headguarters were worse than the

clips, it seemed as if no Justice De-:

crime committed at Watergate, since

partment had existed in 1062, today:

they involved the use of the F.B.I..

an E.B.l. witness pointed out that it

but the Church investigators seem to

was Robert Kennedy who authörized

be determined not to probe too deeply.

the wiretap of Dr. King, and that the

If F.B.I decuments say that reports

President of the United States and the

were made to specific Johnson aides,

Attorney General specifically discussed

Why are those men not given the

their concern of Communist influence

same opportunity to publicly tell their

with Dr. King."

stcry so avidly given the next Presi-

But the Church committee showed

derit's men? If Lyndon Johnson com-

no rest for getting further te the Kon-

mitted this impeachable high crime of

nedy root of this precedent to Water-

using

fate eavesdroppings It Senator Church

the FBI. to spy on political,

opponents, who can be brought. for-

were willing to let the chips fall where

ward, to tell us all about it?

they may, he would call some know.

"-But that would cause embarrass

edgeable witnesses into the glare of

ment to Democrats,

and Senator

the camera lights and ask them some

Church wants to embarrass profes.

questons that have gone unasked for

sional employees of

investigatory

thirteen years:

agencies only. A new sense of Con-

For chample, he could call Nicholas:

gressional decorum exists, far from

Katzenbach, Atterney Goreral Ken-

the sense of outrage expressed in the

nedy's deputy and successor, and ask

Senate Watergate committees hear-

what he knows of the Kennedy de-

ing room. When it is revealed that the

cision to witetap Di. King, Who a?

management. of NBC News gave press

Justice concurred in the recommendas

credentials to L.B.J.'s; spies at the 1964

tion? How does the F.&.l. know the i

convention, everybody blushes demurey

President was consulied or informed?

ly-and nobody demands to know

After Wir. Katzenbach assumed. of.

which network executive made what:

fice, and the wiretapping conunued.

decision under what pressure.

he was told by angry newsmen that

I have been haranguing

patient

the F.B.l. was leaking scurrilous me

readers for years about the döuble

formation about Dr. King. Why did ha

standard applied to Democratic and

walt. for foug months; and for a thou-

Republican political crimes, and. had

sand telephonie interozations, in dise i

continue the officiaily approved tap?:

hoped the day would come when the

hardcall precedents set hy the Ken-

Of

course, this sort of'testimony

nedy and Johnson men wond be laid

would erode Senator 'Church's political

before the public in damning detail.

base. That is why we do notises for.

Obvisusts, Democrat Frank , Church

met Assistant Flat. director Cartha

is noi lie man to do it His jow-

(Deke)

Deloach, Ivadon

Joanson's

shakiag indignation is

all too. selec-

personal contact with the F.B.J. in the

live: the trap of hignesel resnonsis

char

Whac did President

bility fur the crimes commitied, against

Johnson tinow anor the chareter-

Di. King and others is evidently going

aisassination pint and. when did he

to be allowed to cool.

know f9 Wens purgersatons

You'd think that cher ail she

plus a bariween Dus Datusch and Fre-

antion ne beon through in the past

deat dohagon in to. ring ni fies

Sow joars, our politicai leador: would.

have trauned thai the one thing that

say other intrusions into the lives of

piage you down is the act of cover-

ing ifs.

aND 55252

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Page 198

•F+27=--7

THE NEW YORK NINES

THURSDN, NOVEMBER 20th, 2975

PAGS 0-41

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## Page 199

8/13/75

TO: SAC, NEW CRLEANS (66-2832)

(C)

FROM: SA STEPHEN M. CALLENDER

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

This is to advise that a review of this file

Therefor it is recommended that this case be

closed on this memorandum.

66-2832-7

SEARCHED _ FILED-

_ INDEXED S

SERIALIZED_

MA 1

1975

NW 55252

DOCId: 32989823

Page 199

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## Page 200

July 1, 1975

AIRTEL

AIRLIATI

TO:

DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM:

SAG, NEW ORLEANS

FORMER NO 1850-S

BUFTLES 134-19380

NO filed

134-1050 (C)

FORMER NO 1308-5

BUF140E

134-19690

NO file: 134-1073 (C)

Re lew Orleans teletype to Burezu dated 6/11/75.

Attached are one copy each of two letters to

captioned sources fron Senator JOIl G TOTER and CHARLES

KIRBON, both dated 6/20/75.

The documents enclosed in KIRBOW's letter were

COpIeS Of JOIN CREADSON's original "New York Times"

atticle

of 2/16/75 and the 3/6/75 article of WhY magazine.

The

sure 1s in possession of doci of these articles.

Both SChAfers felt reassured by the expressions and

tone of the atrached letters, enough to be willing to again

travel to washington, D.C. On 5/28/150

2-BUTEBU

1 • 134019500)

51+134079699

LoNew Orleans

- 134010503

134010737

134-1274)

66-2832)

66-2832-6

Searched

Series Eu

Filed

NW 55252

DocId: 32989823

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## Page 201

NO 134-1050

CHA/pd/pr:b

On 7/1/75, the SCHAFERS advised that they had

both staff members of the Senate Select Conmittee to Study

Govermental Operations with Respect to Intelligence

Activities.

It was a short

interview wherein RIRBOt solicited

the general unsworn statements of the SCHAFERS regarding the

allegations against the FBI of JOE BURTON.

KIRBON stated that

he believed bukion was a too. and was probably motivated by

self interest in his allegations. After hearing the SCHAFERS'

general statements contradictory to BURION's allegations,

Kinsod said that they confirm his indression of bunior.

SCHAFERS were important to the Committee's inquiries in

or relationship with the FBI.

KIRBON said the SCHAFERS' statements would remain

confidential and would not be leaked to the press.

KIRBOW

said he did not expect the SCHAFERS to be asked or subpoenaed

• to testity openly before the full connittee.

NW 55252

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## Page 202

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR.. TENN.

BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ

WALTER D.

ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.

GARY HART, COLO.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Benate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO

STUDY GOVERNMENTAL ORERATIONS WITH

RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, ITH CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

June 20, 1975

Mr. and Mrs. larry Schaffer

Stattood, Texas 77477

Dear Mr. and Irs. Schaffer:

It has been brought to my attention that the Committee

desires to have certain testimony relating

to your relation-

ship to the fbI for purposes of its investigation currently

underway.

This letter is to assure that Mr. Charles Kirbow, my

official designee on the Committee Minority Staff, has

been

appointed to conduct this part of the inquiry and

any interview or questioning before the Committee in con-

nection with this

matter.

The conduct of the interview,

testimony, and any other matters will be handled hy dr.

Kirbow in

accorance with the Rules which he has furnished

you. Mr. Kirbow has my complete confidence in this matter..

Sincerely,

John tower

John Tower

Vice Chairman

3

* NW 55252 DocId: 32989823

Page 202

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## Page 203

RANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMA

OHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAI

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN

WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.

BARRY COLDWATER, ARIZ.

JALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY. CHARLES MCG. MATHIAS, JR., MO

ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.

RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA

GARY HART, COLO.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR

@nited States Benate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO

STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH

RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(PURSUANT TO S. RES, 21, ISTH CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

June 20, 1975

Mr. Harry Schaffer

Stafford, Texis 77477

Dear Mr. Schaffer:

I enjoyed

our nnone conversation of last week in

connection with the Conmittee's interest in your

former

relationshin with the id.

I am enclosing certain docu-

ments that I discussed with you at the time.

Additionally,.

the letter

from Senator lover to you is enclosed.

connection with your former

association with the rbl.

If either Saturday, June 23, 1 moulú appreciate

or Saturday, July 12,

1975, 1s conveniont to you,

your cal-

ling

me at my office to confirm

the date, time, and place.

I believe that vour presence will be required for ay-

proximately two hours.

However, I would apprcciate your

appearing

30-45 minutes belore in order to allow us to dis

cuss

preliminary information that the Committee desires.

I understand the problems that such an appearance may

create for you or your

wife in relation with your present

emyloynent and in

accordance with the Rules of the

Committee,

(your

appcarance will not be made known to anyone without

your permission

nor will any publicity in connection with

your appearance

Do allowed. is you will also note from the

Rules you may not, without

Your

vermission, be photographed

or in any way interviewed by the press in connection with

your appearance before the Committee.

4

NW

55252 DooId: 32989823 Page 203

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## Page 204

2

In this instance, it is expected that the Rules allowing

for sworn testinony before one or more Senators will be

the procedure adopted and your testimony wiil not be re-

quired before the full Conmittee.

Please feel free to call me if you have any questions

concerning this natter or anything else in connection with:

your appearance before the Committee.

thanks Rebow

Charles Kirbow

Enclosures

5%

NW 55252 DocId: 32989823

Page 204

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## Page 205

FD-35 (Rev, 5-22-64)

Transmit the following in

Via

TELETYPE

FBI

Date: JUNE I1, 1975

CODE

(Type in plaintext or code)

NITEL

(Priority)

TO :

DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM:

SAC, NEW ORLEANS

FORMER NO 1850-S; BUFILE 134-19380; NO FILE 134-1050 (C).

FORMER NO 1868-S; BUFILE 134-19699; NO FILE 134-1073 (C).

RE NEW ORLEANS AIRTEL TO BUREAU MAY 21, 1975.

AS PER TELEPHONIC ARRANGEMENTS WITH MICHAEL EPSTEIN, WHO

INITIATED CONTACT BY LETTER, ABOVE CAPTIONED SOURCES ARRIVED IN

WASHINGTON, D. C., AT EPSTEIN'S INVITATION AND OFFER: TO

REIMBURSE THE SCHAFERS' EXPENSES. AT 11:30 AM ON SATURDAY,

JUNE 7, 1975, THE SCHAFERS WENT TO THEIR APPOINTMENT WITH

EPSTEIN IN ROOM G308 IN THE BUILDING ACROSS FROM THE SENATE

OFFICE BUILDING (FORMERLY THE CARROLL ARMS HOTEL) EXPECTING TO

MEET EPSTEIN. INSTEAD THE SCHAFERS WERE TOLD BY AN UNKNOWN

FEMALE THAT SHE WOULD GO GET EPSTEIN WHO WAS LOUNGING IN A

NEARBY PARK WITH A GUITAR. EPSTEIN APPEARED SHORTLY AND

INTRODUCED HIMSELF AND TWO COLLEAGUES, A WHITE MALE NAMED

MARSHALL ELLIOTT (A REPRESENTATIVE OF SENATOR SCHWEIKER, WHO

GAVE THE APPEARANCE OF A BEARDED HIPPIE) AND MARY DIOREO

(PHONETIC, A WHITE FEMALE RESEARCHER) .

66-7832-5

Searched

D - NEW ORLEANS

(1 - 134-1050)

134-1274) Seristized

(1

-134-1073)

66-2832>

Indexed

CHA: pd

Filed

Approved: -

Special Agent in Charge

NW 55252 DocId: 32969823 Page 205

Sent

_ M

Per.

#U. S. GOVERNHENI PRINTING OFFICE: 1303 Q -336-090 (11)

---

## Page 206

FD-36 iRer, 5-22-64)

Transmit the following in

Via

FBI

Date:

(Type in plaintext or code)

(Priorizz;)

PAGE TWO

NO 134-1050

NO 134-1073

EPSTEIN BEGAN BY STATING THE PURPOSES OF THE SENATE

SUBCOMMITTEE AND OF EPSTEIN AND HIS STAFF, AND WHY: THEY HAD

ASKED THE SCHAFERS TO COME TO WASHINGTON. EPSTEIN SAID THAT

THEY WERE TRYING TO DEVELOP INFORMATION ON WHAT UNITED STATES

INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES HAVE BEEN DOING AND ARE DOING GENERALLY,

WHAT CHANGES IN THOSE AGENCIES ARE NEEDED; AND "WHERE MISTAKES

MIGHT HAVE HAPPENED." THE SCHAFERS ASKED EPSTEIN TO ASK

SPECIFIC QUESTIONS. EPSTEIN ASKED WHAT WAS THE ENTIRE PERIOD

OF TIME OF THE SCHAFERS' RELATIONSHIP WITH THE FBI, AND IF

THEY ARE STILL NOW ASSOCIATED WITH THE BUREAU. GI SCHAFER SAID

THAT HE WAS NOT GOING TO ADMIT ANY ASSOCIATION WITH THE FBI AT

THIS POINT. THIS SEEMED TO GREATLY UPSET EPSTEIN. EPSTEIN

ASKED WHY THEN HAD THE SCHAFERS COME TO WASHINGTON, TO WHICH

THE SCHAFERS REPLIED, BECAUSE THEY WANTED TO ESTABLISH SOME

GROUNDWORK FOR ANY RELATIONSHIP THEY MIGHT HAVE WITH THE

SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE, TO UNDERSTAND WHAT TYPES OF QUESTIONS

EPSTEIN WANTED TO ASK, TO UNDERSTAND THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF

THE COMMITTEE INQUIRY REGARDING.

THEM, AND WHETHER THE SCHAFERS

Approved:

Special Agent in Charge

NW 55252 DocId:32989823 Page 206

•Sent

_ M

Per

*U. & GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1969 0 - 346-090 (12)

---

## Page 207

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

Transmit the following in

Via

FBI

Date:

(Type in plaintext or code)

(Priority)

PAGE THREE

NO 134-1050

NO 134-1073

WOULD BE SUBPOENAED; GENERALLY WHAT THE SCHAFERS COULD EXPECT

FROM THE SUBCOMMITTEE. EPSTEIN TRIED TO HAVE THE SCHAFERS

START AT THE BEGINNING AND TELL THEM' ALL ABOUT THEIR ACTIVITIES

IN BEHALF OF THE FBI. GI SCHAFER SAID THEY WOULD NOT SAY ANY-

THING SINCE EPSTEIN'S MANNER AND PRESENTATION, LACKING ANY

EXPLANATIONS OR REASSURANCES, MADE THEM FEEL UNEASY. THE

SCHAFERS GOT THE DEFINITE IMPRESSION THAT EPSTEIN AND HIS CASUAL

AND UNPROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES EXPECTED TO HEAR AN AFTERNOON OF

INTERESTING STORIES AND ANECDOTES.

THE SCHAFERS ASKED EPSTEIN HOW HE GOT THEIR NAMES, AND

EPSTEIN SAID ORIGINALLY FROM JOHN CREWDSON'S "NEW YORK TIMES"

ARTICLE. JILL SCHAFER THEN SAID THAT CREWDSON HAD GOTTEN THEIR

NAMES THROUGH AN INDISCRETION BY JOE BURTON IN TAMPA. CREWDSON

APPARENTLY BELIEVED THAT THE SCHAFERS WOULD HAVE BACKED UP

BURTON AND HIS ALLEGATIONS AGAINST THE FBI. JILL TOLD EPSTEIN

THEY WOULD DEFINITELY NOT BACK BURTON'S ALLEGATIONS, AND WERE

NOT "MEDIA FREAKS," AS BURTON APPARENTLY WAS, AND THAT THEY DID

NOT WANT THEIR ACTIVITIES LEAKED TO THE PRESS, AS HAD BURTON.

Approved: -

-

Sent

Special Agent in Charge

NW 55252 DocId: 32989823 Page 207

_M Per

U.S. GOVERNIENT PRINTING OFFICE: 2968 0 - 346-090 (21)

---

## Page 208

FD-35 (Rev. 5-22-64)

Transmit the following in

Via

FBI

Date:

(Type in plaintext or code)

(Priority)

PAGE FOUR

NO 134-1050

NO 134-1073

JILL SCHAFER THEN TOLD EPSTEIN THAT THEY HAD DONE NOTHING WRONG,

ILLEGAL, IMMORAL, OR UNETHICAL IN THEIR MOVEMENT ACTIVITIES,

THEY WERE PROUD OF THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO THE NATION'S INTERNAL

SECURITY, THEY HAD ENJOYED A HAPPY RELATIONSHIP WITH THE FBI, AND

THEY KNEW OF NOTHING QUESTIONABLE OR UNPROFESSIONAL REGARDING

THE BUREAU'S HANDLING OF THEIR INFORMATION. THEY MADE IT

CLEAR THAT THEY WOULD BE VERY HAPPY TO TELL THE SUBCOMMITTEE

THESE THINGS. HOWEVER, SINCE THEY WERE NOT REASSURED BY EPSTEIN,

AND IN FACT WERE PUT OFF BY HIS MANNER AND HIS COLLEAGUES'

BRUSQUE REACTIONS, THEY WOULD NOT FURNISH ANYTHING FURTHER TO

EPSTEIN. SHORI OF APPEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE, THE SCHAFERS

SAID THEY WANTED TO BE LEFT ALONE.

EPSTEIN AND HIS COLLEAGUES GAVE THE CLEAR IMPRESSION THAT

THEY WERE DISAPPOINTED AND ANNOYED WITH THE SCHAFERS

RELUCTANCE TO TELL THEM EVERYTHING. EPSTEIN ASKED IF SCHAFER

WANTED TO TALK TO ANY OF THE SENATORS, AND THE SCHAFERS SAID

THAT THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO SPEAK TO SENATOR GOLDWATER, BUT

Approved:

-

Special Agent in Charge

NW 55252 DocId: 32989823 Page 208

Sent —

Per -

# U.S. GOVERNIESI PRINTING OFFICE: 1969 0 - 345-090 (12)

---

## Page 209

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

Transmit the following in

Via

FBI

Date:

(Type in plaintext or code)

(Priority)

PAGE FIVE

NO 134-1050

NO 134-1073

EPSTEIN MADE NO SPECIFIC ARRANGEMENTS OTHER THAN TO CHECK WITH

CHARLIE LOMBARD, GOLDWATER'S REPRESENTATIVE. EPSTEIN DID NOT

SAY IF THE SCHAFERS WOULD BE SUBPOENAED, NOR WERE ANY FIRM

ARRANGEMENTS MADE ABOUT REIMBURSING THEM FOR THEIR EXPENSES.

THE MEETING BROKE UP RATHER ABRUPTLY AND EPSTEIN'S COLLEAGUES

LEFT WITHOUT SAYING GOOD-BY. •

THE SCHAFERS SAID THEY MADE AN EFFORT TO BE FRIENDLY,

COOPERATIVE AND AMENABLE. THEY FEEL THEY MADE A GOOD FAITH

GESTURE IN APPEARING BEFORE EPSTEIN IN WASHINGTON.

• •

Approved:

Special Agent in Charge

NW 55252 DocId: 32989823 Page 209

_ • Sent

_M

Per -

# U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: OFFICE: 0 - 346-090 (11)

---

## Page 210

5/21/75

AIRIDI

TO:

DINICIOR, FDI

FROSI:

SAC, HIT OPICANS

FOREIER 10 1850-5

Bufile 134-19380

110 file 134-1050 (C)

FORIER N0 1868-5

Eufile 134-10699

TO Filc 134-1073 (C)

Enclosed in one copy of a letter from lICHADI I.

EPSTEILI dated 5/14/75.

On Lionday, 5/19/75, the captioned sources reccived

the enclosod lctter.

EPSTIll is not known to the sourcos. Thoy have in

the past recoived other written inguiries from individualo

whon tho sourcos believe were in fact newsrien Eishing for

additional stories on the sources' activities.

The sources have not yet contacced IPSTDIll, but are

villing to do co voluntarily if the curcau sees no objection

and assuning EPSTIIN is who he represents himself to be, and

LE IDSTIILI can assure then of discrction in not revealing their

curicht addross and location. They are anxious to do what choy

can to speal: vell for the IBI and to sct the rccord straight

Iogarding past nows stories derogatory to thonselvos and to

FDI infornant opcrations•

The sources presume the Church

Cormitico vill emplore arcas of FDI infomant infiltration

into legal defense carps, informant provocateurisn, and

intornant opcration outside the united states and 131

jurisdiction.

2 • Burcau (Lnc 1)

(3)- 17ery Orleans (1 - 134-1050) (1-134-1073)

(5)

nife

66-2832)

66-7832-

H

BIW

55252 DocId: 32989823

Page

210

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## Page 211

....-.

NO 134-1050

The following lew Orleans co-munications in these

tro informant cases and in other cases have been addressed

to those issues as they have arisen involving these informants:

Eufiles 134-19330 and 134-19699

Her Orleans airtel to the Lureau, 3/3/75.

Bufile 100-472191

New Orleans nitel to the Bureau, 2/20/75.

New Orleans nitel to the Bureau, 2/7/75.

Hew Orleans teletype to the Bureau, 2/3/75.

lew Orleans teletype to the Bureau, 1/29/75.

RUSSELL CHARLES MEANS; DENNIS JAMES BANKS; WOUNDED INTEE -

RELATED; CIR - BURGLARY

New Orleans LEI, 1/11/75.

FOUNDED INCE NON-LEADERSHIP TRIALS, LINCOLM, NEDRASKA; CIT

Minneapolis nitel to the Burcau, 5/16/75.

2%

NW 55252 DooId: 32989823

Page

211

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## Page 212

JOHAN TO HER HE DANVI CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.

WALTER D. HUDDLEST MARY. CARL ENCE MATHS, JP, MD.

ROBERT MORGAN, N.C

RICHARO S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

DARY HART, COLO.

WILLIAM G, MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR

FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL

CURTIS A, SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OFERATIONS WITH

RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, MITH CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

May 14, 1975

Mr. and Mrs. Harry Schafer

Post Office Box 638

Stafford, Texas

Dear Mr. and Mrs. Schafer:

Some matters have come up during

I would appreciate it if you would

call me collect at 202/224-1700.

Sincerely,

Michael I. Epstein

Counsel

NW 55252 DocId: 32989823

Page 212

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## Page 213

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

Transmit the following in

TELETYPE

Via

FBI

Date: MARCH 26, 1975

CODE

(Type in plaintext or code)

URGENT

(Priority)

TO:

DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM:

SAC, NEW ORLEANS (66-2832)

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE BUREAU NITEL MARCH 24, 1975.

NUMBER OF SUPERVISORS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY (IS)

MATTERS, ONE; NUMBER OF AGENTS ASSIGNED TO IS MATTERS, IWELVE;

PERCENTAGE OF AGENT TIME SPENT ON IS MATTERS, 60 PERCENT;

PERCENTAGE OF SUPERVISORY TIME SPENT ON IS MATTERS, 60 PERCENT;

NEW ORLEANS HAS NO AGENTS OR SUPERVISORS ASSIGNED TO

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

D - NEW ORLEANS

SMC: pd

Searched

Saricia: 11

Indexed

Filed

66-2832-3

Sent 24%

_M

Per da

Approved:

pecial Agent g

NW 55252 DacId: 32989823

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## Page 214

NROOI NO CODE

2:49PM URGENT MARCH 26, 1975 DCB

TO:

DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM:

SAC, NEW ORLEANS (66-2832)

ATTENTION: BUGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE BUREAU NITEL MARCH 24, 1975.

NUMBER OF SUPERVISORS ASSIGNED IQ INTERNAL SECURITY (IS)

MATTERS, ONE; NUMBER OF AGENIS ASSIGNED TO IS MATTERS, TWELVE;

PERCENTAGE OF AGENT TIME SPENT ON IS MATTERS, 60 PERCENT;

PERCENTAGE OF SUPERVISORY TIME SPENT ON IS MATTERS, 60 PERCENT;

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

END MESSAGE...

MAH FBIHQ ACK FOR ONE

WA CLR

.....

NW 55252 DocId: 32989823 Page 214

66-2832-3

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## Page 215

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

19

FBI

Date: MARCH

COD, (Type in plaintext or codel

URGENT

27, 1975

Transmit the following in

Via

TELETYPE

70130

(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, NEW ORLEANS (66-2832)

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND XX ACOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE BUREAU NITEL MARCH 24, 1975 ;NEW ORLEANS TELETYPE

MARCH 26 LAST; BUTEL CALL MARCH 27 INSTANT.

THE FOLLOWING ARE CORRECTIONS TO REFERENCED NEW ORE ANS

TELETYPE. NUMBER OF SUPERVISORS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY

(IS) AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS, ONE; NUMBER OF AGENTS ASS%

ASSIGNED TO IS MATTERS, TWELVE, OF WHICH SEVEN ARE ALSO

ASSIGNED TO UNXX COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. PERCENTAGE

OF AGENT TIME SPENT ON IS MATTERS, 25 PERCENT AND PERCENTAGE

OF AGENT TIME SPENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS 35

PERCENT. PERCENTAGE OF SUPERVISORY TIME SPENT ON IS MATTERS

25 PERCENT, AND 35 PERCENT SPENI ON COUNTERINTELIIGENCE

MATTERS.

66-7832-2

SMC

Searched

• Serialized

Indexed

Filed

Approved:

Sent

Per

---

## Page 216

NROIS NO CODE

7:15PM URGENT MARCH 27, 1975 JMF

_IO DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM SAC, NEW ORLEANS (66-2832)

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU NITEL MARCH 24,1975; NEW ORLEANS TELETYPE

MARCH 26,1975; BUTEL CALL MARCH 27,1975.

THE FOLLOWING ARE CORRECIIONS TO REFERENCED NEW ORLEANS

TELETYPE. NUMBER OF SUPERVISORS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY

(IS) AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS, • ONE; NUMBER OF AGENTS

ASSIGNED 10 IS MAITERS, TWELVE, OF WHICH SEVEN ARE ALSO

ASSIGNED TO COUNTERINIELLIGENCE MATTERS. PERCENTAGE OF AGENT

TIME SPENI ON IS MATTERS, 25 PERCENT AND PERCENTAGE OF AGENT

• TIME SPENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS 35 PERCENI. PERCENIAGE

OF SUPERVISORY TIME SPENI ON IS MATTERS 25 PERCENI, AND 35.

PERCENT SPENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

END MESSAGE.

DBS FBIHQ CLR

ballendis

66-2832-2

NW 55252 DocId: 32989823 Page 216

!:.:

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## Page 217

NRO46 WA CODE

7:33PM NITEL 3-24-75 DEB

TO ALL SACS

FROM DIRECTOR

• SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

7

SENATOR FRANK CHURCH,

CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE SELECT

COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES HAS MADE AN INITIAL REQUEST FOR INFORMATION

FROM THE FBI. AMONG THE ITEMS REQUESTED IS A BREAKDOWN OF

FIELD AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

ACCORDINGLY, WITHIN FOUR EIGHT HOURS EACH SAC SHOULD SUTEL

TO FBIHQ, ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION, SETTING FORTH

SEPARATELY THE NUMBER OF SACS, ASACS, SUPERVISORS AND AGENTS ASSIGNED

TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. PERCENIAGES

OF AN AGENIS TIME, WHEN NOT ASSIGNED FULL-TIME TO THESE ACTIVITIES,

SHOULD BE USED IF APPROPRIATE, PARTICULARLY IN THE SUPERVISORY

CATEGORIES. THIS INFORMATION SHOULD BE BROKEN DOWN SEPARATELY

BETWEEN INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. YOUR RESPONSE

SHOU

D

BE LIMITED TO AGENT PERSONNEL ONLY.

END

66-2832-

SEARCHED

E INDEXER

SERIALIZED

→= FILED -

MAR 2 - 1975

EW ORLEANS

NW 55252 DocId: 32989823 Page 217

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## Page 218

NRO46 WA CODE

7:33PM MITEL 3-24-75 DEB

TO ALL SACS

FROM DIRECIOR

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

SEMATOR FRANK CHURCH, CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE SELECT

COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO

INTELLIGENCE ACIIVITIES HAS MADE AN INITIAL REQUESI FOR INFORMATION

FROM THE FBIS. AMONG THE ITEMS REQUESTED IS A BREAKDOUN OF

FIELD AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

ACCORDINGLY, WITHIN FOUR EIGHT HOURS EACH SAC SHOULD SUTEL

TO FBIKQ, ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION, SETTING FORTH

SEPARATELY THE BURBER OF SAGS, ASACS, SUPERVISORS AND AGENTS ASSIGNED

TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINIELLIGENCE MATTERS. PERCENTAGES

OF AN AGENTS TIME, WHEN NOT ASSIGNED FULL-TIME TO THESE ACTIVITIES,

SHOULD BE USED IF APPROPRIATE, PARTICULARLY IN THE SUPERVISORY

CATEGORIES• THIS INFORMATION SHOULD BE BROKEN DOWN SEPARATELY

BETVEEN INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, YOUR RESPONSE

SHOU

D

BE LIMITED TO AGENT PERSONNEL ONLY.

END

66-2832-1

SEARCHED.

SERIALIZED

MAR : 1975

FBI - NEW ORLEANS

NW 55252 DocId:32989823 Page 218

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