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Than 082010020. 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT ON KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECOROS 07 OF 18323059

- 1 NOr 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, JFK Assassination Records Review Board

FROM:

David Cohen

Daputy Diractor for Operations

SUBJECT:

Release of JFK Documents

1. I understand the JEK AARB is presently congidering the

release of documents which would identify CIA stations to the

public.

I am opposed in general to revealing the locations of

our stations and would prefer instead to substitute the station

name with a regional designation, e.g. European Station vice

Brussels.

I would be willing, however, to open certain stations

during a specific window of time if they are substantively

relevant to the assassination investigation and provided that the

documents in question are sanitized to conceal the permanent

i presence of the station? (s)

In all but a handful of instances, public acknowledgment

of a station would be a political embarrassment to the host

government and would threaten ongoing sensitive operations and

liaison relationships. In a few instances, the damage probably

would be minimal or not at all as long as the presence appears to

be temporary. I have surveyed the involved components and

determined the damage to national security which would follow

such release. (S)

3. I strongly urge that you not allow the information

regarding the Congo and Sanagal to be released. The Congo is now

Zaire and the station in the 60'g would have been in

Leopoldville, now Kinshasa where we are currently located. Our

current relationship with

the zaireang is not a full-blown

liaison type, but more of a limited relationship with certain

individuals from the services. In the past, we have had close

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ralationships with the zaireans because of our need for their

cooperation in assisting with a Presidentially-mandated program

and will need to improve our relationship over the next several

months to accomplish our goals in that part of the world. We

also continue to have a Station in Dakar, Senegal. We have

liaison there and would not want to jeopardize it.

In dealing

with developmental contacts, there have been recent instances

where potential assets have voiced concern about our Agency's

ability to keep its relationships clandestina.

To expose our

station there would further hamper developmental relationships

and eventual recruitments. (8)

4. Within the context of our European presence, I have the

following comments:

Brussels - Public acknowledgment would force the

government and liaison service to pay closer attention to

Station operations and therafore present a threat to ongoing

sensitive oparations. (s)

Helsinki - A neutral country. Public acknowledgment

of a CIA station would embarrass the government and liaison;

thereby inhibiting the close and productive liaison

ralationships we now enjoy as well as presenting a threat to

ongoing sensitive operations. (8)

Paris - No additional damage. (8)

Bonn - No specific damage. (S)

Berlin - No specifio damage. (8)

Luxembourg - Public acknowledgment would embarrass the

government and inhibit liaison cooperation; thus endangering

ongoing operations. (S)

The Hague - Public acknowledgment would draw questiong

from the press and create political problams for the

government and liaison.

This would endanger the

continuation of sensitive joint operations. (S)

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Oslo - Public acknowledgment would draw questions from

the press and threaten vary productive and very sensitive

ongoing joint operations. (s)

Madrid - Publio acknowledgment would draw press

attention and embarrassing questions for the government and

liaison service. This would further damage an already

dalicate liaison relationship which is vital to ua for

counterterrorism operations. (8)

Stockholm - A neutral country. Public acknowledgment

would be politically embarrassing

for the government and

liaison services.

This would likely endanger any

continuation of joint operations. (S)

Geneva - A neutral country. Public acknowledgment

would create political problems for the government and

liaison service and force greater attention to our

operations.

This would create an intensive

counterintelligence atmosphere for our operations; likaly to

cause a decrease in our operations. (8)

London - No specific damage. (S)

Ottawa - No specific damago. (8)

5. Our Eastern European stations pose a unique problem when

we congidar public exposure. Prague Station is recovering from

operating for almost fifty years in an undeclared status. During

the last three years we have managed, with much effort, to begin

the establishment of good working relations with the host

government and internal/extarnal servicas. As a result, the

station has recently begun some very sensitive and high-leval

bilateral oparations. These obviously depend upon the good will

of the host service.

The Czech citizenry came of age in an

atmosphere in which distrust of intelligence services in general,

and the CIA in particular, was thoroughly ingrained. That

distrust lingers in the public's mind even today. Exposure of

our station's previously undisclosed presence and operational

activitias during the Cold War will necessarily raise quastiong

about our activities then, and almost certainly lead to further

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inquiry about our present ralationship. It is doubtful that our

relationship, and certainly our very sensitive operations, could

withstand the resulting public debato. The existence of Prague

station, past and present, cannot be surfaced at this tima

without serious damage to national

security. (s)

6.

Public acknowladgment of our stations in Managua,

San Jose, Panama City, San Salvador, Santo Domingo, Buenos Aires,

Lima, Santlago, and Montevideo would not further damage our

operational capabilities in a specific sense. Overall, any

release of information about a clandestine service breeds

distrust in professionalism and will put future operationg at

risk. (S)

7. We receive significant national collation systems

support from Australia which affects national systan collection

efforto against Tier IA targets throughout Asia. We would

jeopardize this by raleasing the presence of our station to the

public.

Tokyo is a special case in that there is continuing

disagreement regarding our station. We should not complicate the

current "Spy Mania" atnosphere in Tokyo. There have been two

incidents regarding our presence in Japan during the present

year. Any further disclosure would exacerbate the tension and

create an untenable operational atmosphare for our station and

parsonnal. (8)

8. Public acknowlodgment of a station in India would be a

problam for the U.S. Government. U.s. and India foreign

relations are always delicate; the Indian Government is very

sensitive to parceived slights to its national sovereignty, and

public acknowledgment of a station would prove embarrassing to

the Indian Government which in turn could ask that the station be

closed. If the station were closed or significantly downsized,

it would affect a large number of important intelligence

collection operations. (8)

9.

Public acknowledgment of a station in Tunisia would be

a problem for Tunisia vis-à-vis its Libyan neighbor. Libya and

Tunigia share a bordar which means the Tunisian Governmant must

act with some prudence regarding its relations with Libya. The

Libyan Government would almost certainly respond vary negatively.

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to a public acknowledgment of a station in Tunisia and might well

engage in harassment/sabotage/terrorist actions in Tunisia to

show its displeasure. If the Tunisian Government should ask that

our station be closed, the U.S. Government would lose a

capability to collect on Libya, north African stability, and

Islamic extremiam. (8)

10. Public acknowledgment of a station in Morocco would be a

problem for Morocco vis-à-vis its Islamic fundamentalist

population. Morocco, like so many countrios with a majority

Muslim population, has a growing Islamic fundamentalist problem,

and Islamic fundamentalists are fraquently opposed to the U.8. in

general and the Agency in particular. Public acknowledgment of a

station in Morocco could cause its Islamic fundamentalist

population to react negatively and demand that our station be

closed.

If the station were closed, the U.8. Government would

lose intelligence on the western Sahara conflict, north African

stability and Islamic extremism. (S)

11. In those instances whara I have indicated damage to

operational capability and national security, I would fael

compelled to seek a reversal of any decision to make a publio

acknowledgment.

In those cases where I indicate "no specific or

additional damage", I am prepared to accept your decision yet I

must call your attention to the general damage done to us by any

disclosure of operational presenca.

our operational capabilities

are in direct proportion to the confidence placed in our ability

to protact source identities and operational methods. Disclosure

to the public of our presence weakens this confidence. (S)

niel Wign

David Cohen

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