Document date: 00/00/0000

## Page 1

124-10271-10058

77

2022 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

Memoranduri

TO

Mr. Sullivan

'DATE: June 22,

1961

FROM

• Ro O. L'Allier

SUBJECT:

LIAISON WITH INBLIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, (IN3?

Liaison with INS has been handled for the past several

years by si Sam Papich,

who also handles liaison with the central

intelligence Agency. (CIA).

The purpose of this memorandun is

to reconriend that SA Papich be relieved of his assignment with

INS in order to devote full time to cla.

INFORMATION. RELATING TO INS

CIA continues to be one of the most '

important liaison assignments as well as one of the most time

consuiling.

Proper handling of this assignent now requires the

full time and @tention of & Liaison Supervisor and it is believed

that S' Papich should be rcliaca of his INS assignment in order

to devote his entire atteption to CIA.

INFORMATION RELATINE TO AGENT. TO RE

ASSIGNED TO HANDLE LIAISON WITH INS.'

ACTION:

If you approve,

Liaison responsibility for INs sall be

transierred fron SA Papich to

NAME

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi

ration outside your Committee.

Its use l? limited to officin! hinceedings by

•your committee una the content may nut be disclosed to unautnorized gerson

nel without the express approval of the aBl.

or litte

Thais

mate

62-1159411-58

---

## Page 2

F:) CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) [DOMESTIC CONTACT

SERICE. You previously have been informed regarding CIA's Contact JFK

Division which has had offices in various U. S. cities and which is openly

identified as being connected with CIA. This division has been responsible

• for the overt collection of positive intelligence gained through interviews of

aliens. travelers, büsinessmen, etc. The division has not been engaged

in any operational activity such as the development of double agents. For

your iniormation, ClA has reorganized this division and it is now called

the Comestic Contact Service.

JFK (1) (B) -

, An examination of CIA s activities in the area of overt collection

of positive intelligence has indicated that the Bureau can strengthen its

position by having our field offices establish direct contact with the local

oifices of the Domestic Contact Service. This particularly applies to those

(TB)

situations where the Bureau and CIA both have an interest in Soviet-bloc

and Yugoslav nationals, excluding those who are connected with embassies

or the United Nations. We recognize that CIA has a responsibility for

collection of positive intelligence (i. e. information regarding Soviet-bloc

capaoility in a particular research field) which might be acquired from

such risitors hnt we rannot condone any CIA actirity which might

interfere with Bureau operations. - You therefore are authorized to

establish liaison with local offices of the Domestic Contact Service.

JFK

(D(B)

9-28-65

• SAC LETTER NO. 65-54

- 5

This document is prepared in reaponse to your request and is not for dissent

nation outside your Cnmmittee.

Its use l limited to official proceedings or

vour Committee and the content may nut be risclosed to unaulhorized persar

Fel without the express approval of the FBI.

---

## Page 3

In each case when you initiate any inquiry or investigation of a visiting

soviet-ploc national, you should obtain from the local Domestic Contact

Serrice the nature and extent of CIA interest and all pertinent information

which CIA has gained or may acquire in the future relating to our internal

security responsibilities. If you feel that CIA activity conflicts with

Bureau objectives, you should so advise the Seatof Government, clearly

setting forth your reasons. In this connection; there may be instances

where continuing CIA pursuit of positive intelligence would conflict with

the Bureau s discharge of its internal security functions.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

JFK

(15(S)

9-28-65

SAC LETTER NO. 65-54

---

## Page 4

JFK.

TUTTED STATES COVERNMENT

JENORANDUM

TO

EOM

"SIESECT:

: Director,. FBI

SACs Philadelphia

LALRAL ITELLTGEICL AGENO

DATE:

10/25/6b

: JFK (i) (B)

DECRHATION CONCERNINE

Re Section (E), SAC Letter 65-54, 9/28/65.

NAME.

Thiladelsnia Office, Cen-

tral Intelligence Agency (CIA) Dezestle Contact Service, was.

contacted on 10/14/65 as directed in referenced SAC Letter:

NAME

advised he had just returned frem conferences at his

Agency Headquarters in Weshington, where he had been advised

ete a vas draces or tre Den Me Contact sEe Las

i JFK(i)(8)

offered his complete cooperatior with this office in nat

Tere ar muonal Interest.

Arrangements were perfected whersin Agents of this

sofice making Inquiries or investigatican of a Soviet-Blos Na-.

•onal- car contact

NAME

lana le will gläse then in contact

in ens emertir contest service represertitive renaling ine

JFK

(XE)

Le imsdietely reported to this cifice.

NAME

Trequested, 1a view ce his Agenci's regu-:

j-culors, that CiA not, be identified as the source in the event

•.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi-

nation outside your Committee.

Its use is limited to official proceedings by

your Committee and the content may nut be disclosed to unauthorized person

pel without the express approval of the fBI:

---

## Page 5

Incomiation received fron his sfrice should be includca

contunication going to anyone cutside the Bureau.

NAME

nes assured thet CIA's. Identity in this regara mould de iulia

¿cotected.

INFORMATION RELÄTING TO THE

TERRITORY COUFRED BY THE

PHLLADELPHIA

ORFILE CLA DOMESTIC CONTACT

SERVICE

INCLUDING MAHES OF CIA, PERSONNEL:

JFK

(I)(B)

PRQUEST OF DE FUREAU:

In the course of futura contarts with CIA In these

• ca35°; 1ù 1s anticloated that CIA representatives mey at tires

request information relating to Subjects: backgrou.d, habits,

and characteristics, as well as ary avallabie piotegraphs.

The Bureau is requested to auvise 1i 1t will be per-

rissible to orally furrish such baciground irformation

s to the

• EIn, representative and to furrish copies of shoucgraphs, 11

they. are avallable.

•The Bureau 1s also requested to advise if the establish-

ran o1 tizison en she field office level with CIA's Domestio JFK

contäce service envisages the ruznistang d Ieporis mù letto-

(XB)

head memes to this senvice aù the field office leve, mere voce

nave a legitimate interest in the suojeco.

-2 ..

---

## Page 6

'1."

BAC, Philadelphia

8156/5705, 838

10/29/65

JFK (1)(B)

FORTION COUCITHING

Reference 1s nado to your lotter dated 10/25/65.

JPK

1ÃO IRIOSH DAS DZED TOLICTIDE a POLICY C DOT CIISETIDALING

sTern Iniorantion to the losestic contact service at a 10cal leve3.

mis polisy till contiqua uniess you are savisod to tho contrary.

•n the event that the locel cla clice desires isicuatlo

ОГОВТДТРІ ГРУ ТИПІСЕІІ ВИСІ ЧЕРЦВЗІЗ БЙОЙО СО ПІДЕСТЕЙ ІЗ ГІЛ ЧЕ

Bareza icedquartera.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for diszene

nation outside your Committee.

sorio oile our committen l net disted to o a porce pes be.

Tel without the express approval of the BI .

---

## Page 7

OX CAN, BiG. H0. 75

UNITEDISTATES GUVY ENMENT

Memorandan

: 8T. Co D. Delioach

DATE: 6/25/70

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: LIAISON WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, AGENCY (CIA)

WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE

The Director has inquired regarding the nature of

any liaison existing between the Washington Field Office (WFO)

and CIA. Limited liaison does exist, being addressed to

specific operational cases and name checks.

WFO, of necessity, is in contact with CIA concerning

specific cases in the espionage field. for example,..

•SPECIFIC EXAMPLE GIVEN..

In addition; CIA has a domestic operations office

in the District' which makes name checks with WFO and secures

background information concerning foreign diplomatic personnel.

No liaison is conducted with respect to policy matters and the

objective of all contacts is the handling of immediate opera-.

tional matters.

ACTION:

For the Director's information.

.d8:9d

.:.

1189970.49.

'•.

c'ers document is prepared in response to your request and is int for dissemi

nation. outside your ronmittee.

Its use is limited to offirin! " nceedings by

your Committee and the content may nut be disclosed to unauthorized person

nel without the express approval of the FBl.

---

## Page 8

і ОРІОНА! ТОВИ МО, 10

MAY AND EDITION

OSA GIM, PIG. NO, 81

UNITED STATES GOV:

Memorandum

2010-808

'MENT

TO

: Mr. C. D. DeLoach

FROM

:W. C. Sullivan

DATE:.

6/26/70

SUBJECT:

LIAISON WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

WASHINGTON FIOLD OFFICE

•Hy attached memorandun, 9/25/70, discussed the

operational contacts between the Washington Field Office

JFK

(YFO) and CIA's local domestic operations office. No. Tolson

(i)(3)

noted "I thought all such contacts vore to be hanaled by

letter"

and the Director said "I most, certainly intended

the same."

We are instructing WO accordingly.

It is possible that other field offices have working-

level contact with the CIA offices in their territories. If

tho Dircetor desires, similar instructions will be issued to

Ithem.

ACTION:

(1) Attached for approval is a letter to VIO

instructing that all future contacts with CIA are to be

handled by letter.

10s

(2) IL the Director desires, an SAC Letter will be

prepared containing sinilar instructions, applicable to a11

offices.

No

!"'.

"'his docriment is prepared in response to your request and is not for distur

ration outside your Committee.

Its use is limited to official piocecdings by

your Cormittee and the content may nut be disclosed to unauthorized perzon

rel without the express approval of the FBl.

---

## Page 9

-2.

Inuelligence Bonrd and

mib-comi! tes thit cover

itars such is

handling of reloctors,

volonient of connier proprails, lenks of clossi

fied inforinion and rodiction of intellitence studies.

baches have rcason to contact chi on a regular besis, jand illhout 10 res

Tha daily busincss with Chi relates to hundreds o1 cases portining to

activities of n1l, Commist-sloc services, the le: laü, Black Mit_oraL-

ists, the Comuist Farty ma relatea ormnimationg, and politichl crises

•in areas silch as victnar, the ciddle lost, ond Intin serica.

Theorce: c-

'ally, all business could 'be henaled by mail, but from a practic it-ra-

point such a crocedure sall led, do unbelievnale chaos.

There will re

almost insurcuntrole oust-cles if we e to discharge our mities

resconsible rinner nd if'e -re to countor a relentless eroy in tie

interest of natinal secuity.

Becausc interests of.other agencies ..re

Ircoucntly inbert.incd ith cases involving the bureau and Cla, ™C Je

lin ¡BI-CIA liaison vill' aiversely nifect our liaison with such agercies.

I thin's you will shore my alarm over the consequences once tie

nord is received by the "troops" in all U,S. agincies that il ord I

no longer have any liaison.

Unfortunately,

there mill be individuals no

will unliciously distort and risinternet the true facts,

"ithin a srant

period, here will be stories in the gress, an vost of ill the Cors-

nist-ilos corvices will pick un a choice entree for the prortion of sic-

milliul. and extrenely harmiul disruntion.

I am absolutely convinced

that the intelligence services of Great Briüzin, Irance, west Germany -a

others are well penctrated by the soviets. I can't belioue that the Fail-

bys, the Blakes, the Alger fisses were the lasi of the penctrations.

mention this bec-use if such poneti tions exist, the break in rel-tions

between the FBI and CIl will provide a-basis for pronoting further ritus.

This is the first tire in our history that such an event has occurred, ins

it is difficult to believe thrt the enemy will not make every effort to

reap the greatest profit possible, Bricity, ir. Hoover, I lnve too muci

respect for you and our FBI to expose us to a potentially disastrous sit

lation.

Although the Denver incident is a blight on the rol-tions be-

tween the ISI and CIA, it would be most unfair o1 me not to conncnt co

the dedicayed and sellless erforts of numerous individuals in cr. ino

strived

for honest and harmonious relations. As a result of their er-

dervors there have been many services performed in behalf of the Eure?:

including notable and outstanding accomplishments.

We have been furnistes

• sources, informants, solid productive cases, technical advice and equip

teal, and there have been instances of cooperation mich led to substin-

saving of Bureau funds.. There also have been exarples of alertress

on the part of CIl emyloyes which prevented Bureau conmission of errors

and avorted embarrassrent. Anong some of the more significant exarnles

of cooperation. I cite the excellent and braly needed assistince of Cli

in the Rudolal duel case. I also refer to the Agency's providing us wiin

one of the better criminal informnts we have had in recent years in the

person of NAME

I only refer to the foregoing to emphasize

that, if at all possible, ve should preserve the good friends and the

supporters of the Bureau.

SECRET

It is recornized thit me cin also present a bill of mrtic-

ulars relating to camples of peer cooperntion and deliberite slulder

I lintil no brior for those in CIA who disrupted relations betiren

---

## Page 10

100. 110 Monies 18.

•alime in

ntive ico, in live

mo Me do cost to

A?16-1C646 100305

the circan of lio dediente

Pire in tie-

OLe.

G01.6N 261T0714301

alonely, Go also bilieves Lar 1a 106

"e sais char-

acterined as being dovin; ind there ins i dreinod moashere of victrast.

Inpoili, toat is no lie siarcion coded. I on confident tit gou er o

into my surrent c bli, pore end'abroad, end dou vil? jing tot relity,

Bravery, mo Intograly are sinemely relatri to the lisI,

The probleas in

past jers 11nr1ly. 1r0sc 1201 Moclievably poer cormichuo mong in-

tcrestod: rties.

we elicies of iny cociorted poople.

dovertheless, thore is roni lor

isrovcint.

In oil on Bureal tiere are mucrons officials and cinlojes

who have little or no inculcuge of the background and the principles oi

the National securior ded of 1947 and of the Rational security Coucil

Directives.

in addition, these sure people have a vague conception 01

the objeculies and lanculens or on inichligence offaniantion.

Siil-rily,

within Cla there ne very mony mose concendic of dic BI, its juvis

tiries.

Tromandous progress has been made, bit it is not easy 40 inr..01-

jously conrainate the onestions oi an duganisatin deciqned to operie

in a clindestine ranic with an agency wich is basic-lly a la: eniorce-

ment boàt.

do Manal do tumes Chined Michand Our Called

is still comosed of a fragile isuric. Me incident potentially can de-

stroy jears of constructive offort.

ix, Hoover, I roscectaully recuest that you rcconsider the

decision to sever liaison with the Centril Intrlligence Agency,

I appeal

to you to lenre the doer ooon for furtner reliberation bacause I am con-

fident this conitiou can be satisfactorily resolved.

I believe that my

renoval fro: the scue provides the coporimily to anoint anctier arent

who will scasure un to your desirei cobabilities and who will be able to

rauidly resolve the proolch ith a new and fresh appronch. It is a rood

time to rearmine our relations win CLi and to make adjustments satis-

factory to :ou.

1 sincorol, regret that this situntion arose,

since I rerrii.ly

apureciate

you are burdene. mith ao any heavy responsibilities.

lecl thirt 1 had a firm oblization end anor to corminicnte with you co-

cause of the very nature of ny assiment these many yoars and because

of my involverent in this conurnversial case.

Iy years mith the Bure-u gave me more satisf ction then anyone

can imagine.

You rould have to noi ge better to apsreciate this.

Hant to assure you tirt therever I go or whatever I do 1 will be premared

to be of service in any cause nich involves the preservation of a strong

and respected iBI,

Sinceroly jours.

Anis Tapicl

Sam l'ayich

I SEGREI

---

## Page 11

TO

FROM

..

SUBJECT:

WHINENT

Memorani m

XI. C. D.

DeLoach

#. C. Sullivan

DATE: March 5, 1970

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

Attached is, a memorandum dictated by Special Agent

San J. Papich in response to the Director's request for the

identification of the instances Papich had. in mind when in

his retirement request he indicated that CIA "believes that

Alist identifying the cases and outlining the problee

involved has been prepared by Papich and is attached to the

memorandum.

A review of the 25-page cocument reveals that it

contains several instances in which CiA has registered its

dissatisfaction and could conceivably renew its complaints,

Erd athars i. which presumably. CIA had no knowledge of Bureau

action and has made no complaint.

For the Director's further information, I have

instituted in this Division an analysis of each situation cited

aid a nemorandun will' be prepared as to each, containing my

views and recommendations as a result'of that analysis.

This

1s being handled on an expedite basis and the memoranda will

be sent through as soon as possible

This document is prepared in response to vour request and is not for distme

nation oritside your Committee.

Its see l? limited to official proceedings by

your Committee and the content may nut be disclosed to unauthorized person

nel without the express approval of the fBl.

---

## Page 12

бото-

300

8. 50.88

"UNITED STATES G.

iNMENT

Memorandum

SEGRET

The Director

DATE: March 5, 1970

ROM

: Sam J. Papich

UBJECT: RELATIONS WITH CIA

Reference is made to my letter of 3/2/70. I made the

statement,

"Unfortunately, CIA also believes that in the past

we did not always act in a forthright manner, and the Agency

undoubtedly could present a list of grievances." It is my

understanding that you want such grievances identified.

There

1s enclosed herewith'a list of cases or situations which arose

over the years.

Based upon a review of files and my. personal recollectio=

this list would be representative of matters which CIA could use

for making charges such as: not being forthright, not playing

falrly and squarely, not cooperating, not being of assistance,

not recognizing the need for concrete FBI contributions to the

foreign intelligence effort.

What CIA may have compiled over the i

years is unknown.

What situations are known to CIA and have not

come to our attention cannot be answered at this time. I am

thinking of leaks including distorted information which may have

been passed to CIA from ex-Bureau employees and CIA informants®

and sources;

It should be clearly emphasized that there is no

indication whatsoever within CIA that the Agency has been seeking

any find of a showdowe or contentation tith the til. contrary,

to what some people may believe, the relationship between the

two agencies up to the recent crisis was never better despite

the problems which have arisen from time to time. I am confident

that a thorough and impartial examination will conclusively

In order that there may not'be any misunderstanding, 1t

Is important to emphasize that the Bureau can also produce an

extensive list of justified grievances.

We can also produce an'

excellent record of support which we have given CIA; presumably

CIA could do the same.

There are ingredients for continuing

conflict and there is also adequate machinery for maintaining

sound working relations and producing badly needed intolligence

Information.

Classified by 12

SENT NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disciasure®

Exempt from GDS, Category 28 3

Date of Declassification Indefinite

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

---

## Page 13

lenorandum to th

RS: RELATIONS k

Sirector dEGRET

A CIA

..

I believe that it would be most helpful to you and

Interested Bureau officials when evaluating and passing judgment

on the attached material if we analyzed very briefly the role

of the Bureau liaison Agent. A liaison Agent can be a simple

mail courier.or

he can be the true Bureau Agent ready to confrost

any problem or issue with anotherzgency, very often working with

very limited information..It is expected that the Bureau Agent

carry out his instructions forcefully and efficiently. He must

be prepared to handle all types of personalities under various

conditions.

He must be alert for pitfalls and express hinself

in a nost judicious and prudent manner but always making certain

that the Bureau position is well fortified.

In evaluating the attached and my encounters with CIA,

It should be noted that protests from the Bureau always were

easy to handle because the Agent had J. Edgar Hoover behind him.

However, when an Agent struck atian official on one day and

solicited his cooperation the next day, it did require some

resourceful action. It is believed that other liaison Agents

regularly encounter similar situations. On numerous occasions

I have bittorly feuded vith. CIA officials and this has ircludes

rough language. I have walked out on CIA officials when I felt

they were unreasonable. They took the initiative by asking the

Agent to return•;

I did try to play fairly and squarely with all

of them and never hesitated to accept a confrontation; this includ

the Director of the Agency. When'I lectured to CIA personnel

over the years I always made a point to challenge them to present

any grievances or raise any subject matter relating to the

• Bureau. I never left a discussion with any CIA official without

being positive that our position was absolutely understood.

The approaches utilized by me might be open to criticism.

can only refer, to the records of the Bureau and CIA and I believe

the Bureau's position is most favorable.

I don't think CIA has

ever transmitted a letter.of protest to the Bureau during the .

eighteen years during which the Agent handled the assignment.

ACTION:

For information.

---

## Page 14

SECRET

•CASES AND/OR SITUATIONS

INVOLVING CONFLICTS WITH THE

• CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

(1) MOCASE. (THE BORIS MORROS CASE) •

This was a sensitive Soviet-espionage case

which originated in 1943 and terminated for the most

part in 1957..

The case had many wide foreiga ramifi-

cations and historically has been, and undoubtedly

w111 be, one of the most important. and involved cases

of Soviet operations in this country and abroad.

He

did not disseminate any injormation of significance

In this case until 1954. On various occasions when

the Liaison Agent has become involved in heated argu

ments with CIA officials, they have seen fit to raise

this case as an outstanding example of FBI failure to

cooperate with the Agency.

The position taken by CIA

was that it should have been advised regarding the

soviet operational activity in Ioreign countries,

claiming that the Agency mould have had the opportunity

to develop nore information of significance, identify

Soviet agents, and possibly prepare conditions for

recruitment or doubling of Soviet operatives. He did

not disseminate our reports to CIA because of the

!

extreme sensitivity of the case.

Ne actually did not

permit CIA to handle any investigations relating to

the MOCASE until 1957.

In 1957, CIA complained that it certainly had

every right to have received the information earlier

because many aspects of the MOCASE pertained to CIA

employees and operations. CIA further argued that it

had been greatly handicapped in effectively carrying out

the leads in 1957 because the leads were given to the

Agency at the same time that the case was publicized.

The Agency argued that the failure of the Bureau to

coordinate with CIA those French aspects of the case

permitted the French, rather than the U. s., to play &

doninating role in Europe.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure.

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SECRET

---

## Page 15

in :

"ith regard to dealing with the French, we

took the position that we would cover the leads through

our Legal. Attaches wherever possible and to furnish

leads to CIA in those countries where we did not have

Legal Attaches. CIA maintained that since we were on

record that our Legal Attaches do not handle operations

abroad, the Bureau had an obligation to levy those French

leads on CIA or at. least coordinate with the Agency

before going to the French.

It is to be noted that in any argument relating

to jurisdiction in this matter, CIA will fall back on the

responsibilities placed on the Agency under the provisions

of the National Security Act of 1947 and the implementation

of the foregoing through National Security Council Direc

tives. CIA will maintain that' it is incumbent upon the

Bureau to recognize the provisions of the National Security

Act of 1947 and the Directives. The Agency would argue

that in the BOCASE. these were

ignored by the Bureau.

(2)

SENSITIVE ONGOiNG OPERATION

•2

---

## Page 16

SECRET

SENSITIVE ONGOING OPERATION (continued fron page 2 and 3)

(3) THE ABEL CASE

Although CIA has not raised the point for

several years, the prevailing attitude was; and probably

still exists, that the FBI did not play it square with

ciA in the abel case by not making certain that the

Agency Has given the proper recognition for its contri-

CiA feels that' in the first place, there would

not have been any U. S. access or availability to the

NAME•

because CIA took

the full responsibility for moving NAME from PLACE

to the U. S. in 1957. CIA claims it took the risk and

responsibility of doing this after the Bureau declined

to become involved in any operation designed to transport

NAME

to the.U. S. It should be noted that NAMe

was an alcoholic and that his first contacts with CIA

In PLACE raISEd qUeStIONS COnCErning NAMe

mental

stability.

After NAME arrived in the U. S., we

irranged access to nim for a period, the purpose of

unich was to obtain a complete story of his intelli-.

gence activities in the U.S. and we were particularly

Interested in identifying all of his associates, es

pecially the man who later was identified as Rudolph

Abel.

After a short handling period in the U. So,-we

dropped NAME because he became a problem.

It was

an extremely critical situation because we had not yet

I#dentified Abel. CIA agreed to take the responsibillty

for the carrying and safeguarding of NAME but we

SECRET...

---

## Page 17

were given free access to this difficult source.' This

vas a most fortunate arrangement as far as 'CIA was con

cerned, because this adjustment.

gave us the time to work

WIth NAME

and subsequently develop the leads which

led tö the apprehension of Abel. The Agency has main

tained that it was largely responsible for making

absolutely certain that NAME

was mentally and

physically prepared for testimony at the Abel trial.

NAME

was a key witness.

CIA has- also referred to

Bureau never really thanked the Agency for its coopera-

tion and CIA has been particularly irked becaused the

Bureau did not see fit to inform the. Attorney General

lor the White House of the role played by CIA.

(4) NAME OF SUBJECT

• In July, 1953, Senator

NAME

sought

to subpoena

NAME

AND

OCCUPATION

to

testify before the Senator's Committee. NAME

claimed

that MAME

alleged communist activities were clearly

documented. The most serious allegation was that

IDENTIFFING

DATA

All of this ras publicized... The infornation set forth

in the newspapers emanated from a Bureau report. CIA

• CIA officials held numerous con-

terences

concerning the matter but charges were never

made against the Bureau.

What information CIA has on

this particular item is not known but the Agency did

know that we maintained liaison with NAME

Committee.

(5) BUREAU DISSEKINATION OF INFORMATION CONCERNING

in lay, 1954, Allen Dulles raised the question

concerning the propriety of FBI dissemination of information

concerning

This information had been fur-

unished to us by

NAME.

& former official of the

SECRET

---

## Page 18

SECRET

. Department of Labor.

Then interviewed by us, NAME

made several accusations against CIA. ' We disseminated

the information to the White House, the Attorney General,

and some data also went to the State Department. Dulles

took the position that by disseminating derogatory in-

formation

concerning his Agency, he had been placed on.

the spot because the

• NAME

data was not the

complete story, In the past, CIA informally referred

to this as an instance of very unfair conduct on the part

of the Bureau.

(6) BUREAU HANDLING OF CIA REQUESTS FOR TOURS

FOR FOREIGN OFFICIALS

CIA complained that

officials visiting the U. S. under CIA sponsorship were

given excellent treatment on the tour but, nevertheless,

many of the risitors left nost disappointed because they

had not had any contact with any Bureau officials. CIA

felt that contact with Bureau officials had very

significant

benefits and left lasting favorable impressions because of

the FBI's worldwide reputation.

CIA also pointed out that

when foreign visitors had no contact with Bureau officials,

they were left with the suspicion that there was some kind

of friction between the FBI and CIA. In 1956, we had a

clear-cut policy to the effect that tours for

such visi

tors would be of a restrictive nature in that such

visitors would view our facilities normally seen by the

public and nothing more. CIA was so laformed but

that our policy prevented the

Agency from truly enhancing U. S. interests abroad.

CIA never lodged an official complaint.

It should beemphasized that for the past several

years there would not be any basis for any forma complaint

• Igiven to such officials by

other officials and Supervisors in the Domestic Intelligence

Division has been outstanding and benefits have accrued to

'the Bureau. These visitors have gone back to their native

---

## Page 19

countries with far better impressions than in the

past.

In addition, we have learned more about these

countries, their services, and their security chiefs

by spending a

few minutes with them. Needless to say,

this kind of treatment has also immeasurably helped

our Legal Attaches.

(7) CIA - DUTCH INTEREST IN SOVIET ESPIONAGE ACTIVITY

In 1965, the. Dutch Internal Security Service

was in the process of investigating individuals in

Holland who allegedly had been engaged in Soviet-espionage

activity. The Dutch wanted to have certain individuals

in the U.S. Interviewed and approached CIA to make

Inquiry at the Bureau.

At that tine, our relations

with the Dutch had been practically nonexistent because

case ate hame file tests deal with.us in the

NAME FIND IDEUTIFYING DATA

who had been

clandestinely collecting intelligence at the National

Security Agency.

Then CIA approached us, re-told

the Agency that the Dutch could subnit their request

through-diplonatic channels. He subsequently told CIA

we would not handle the interviews for the Dutch. Ne

stuck to our position.

CIA surrendered but felt that

we were impairing their efforts to gather information

concerning Soviet-espionage activities in Europe.

(8) TWO NAMES

NAME

- IDENTIFYING

- ...

"DATA

•--.- -

, during Horld War It, established a

private intelligence netrork, operating throughout the

world but primarily in Europe:

His sources included

any number of European exiles who came to the U. S.

While he was in business, he was financed by the State

vepartment, then the Department of the AImy, and In the

later 1940's and into the 1950's Dy cIA. NAME

established contact with the Bureau through one of

his subordinates,

NAME

who periodically called

• SECRET

---

## Page 20

SEGRET.

on us and furrished information which NAMe felt

was of interest to us. This dissemination through

NAME

continued during the period of

relationship with CIA. We never informed CIA that we

were receiving such infornation which also was of

Interest to the Agency. It is possible that

had given the same data to CIA but we do not know.

CIA

and

_NAME

clashed and the relationship was severed

In an atmosphere of severe bitterness.

In the last

years of its dealings' with NAME • • the Agency had

successfully penetrated the latter's organization and

allegedly had identified many of the sources.

CIA

hinted to the Liaison Agent that it had become aware

of the relationship between NAME

organization

and the Bureau. How much CIA really learned about

this relationship is not known but 11 its penetrations

were significant, the Agency may have developed evidence

to justify a charge that the Bureau had withheld infor-

nation from CIA, particularly when we were receiving

the data from an organization which. was financed by

the agency.

(9) COMMISSION ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE

EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT

(Herbert Hoover Conmission. - 1954)

In October, 1954, a task force of the captioned

Commission initiated a survey of CIA's operations under

the leadership c

NAME.

ID MONTH, 1955,

ve were advised by a representative of the task force

that Senator. NAME

had furnished the group &

list of CIA employees who were considered subversive.

CIA became cognizant of this development and there was

talk within the Agency that the Bureau had furnished

the names to the Senator.

When the Liaison Agent was

Informally approached on this, he flatly told the Agency

!to officially submit its charges. The Agency never did.

What information CIA may have had on this matter as it

¡pertained to the Bureau is not known. It is possible that

the Agency's attitude was strictly predicated on a knowledge

•I that we naintained liaison with the Senator's Conmittee.

SECRET

---

## Page 21

SECRET

(10) INTERNAL SECURITY LEADS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES

During the 1950's, we gave our Legal Attaches

numerous leads stemming from internal security cases in

the U. Si.

In many instances we did not see fit to

notify CIA although the Agency always maintained that

you could not separate

"internal Security" from "counter-

intelligence,": namely a lead in France pertaining to a

communist in

the u. S. warranted advising CIA, if not,

at least asking the Agency to handle the.dead. In the

last several years, it is not believed that there is

any basis for complaint since we have regularly been

notifying CIA concerning subjects of cases who travel

notified in order to avoid duplicate efforts.

have been exceptions where we have taken the position

that CIA should not be notified because of the sensitivity

of the matter. How many such exceptions are known to

cla cannot be established Irom.our Illes; however, we

should boax ia mind that when nut legal attaches inves.

tigate, they contact many of the same foreign officials:

normally contacted by CIA. How many of these foreign

officials are CIA informants, or on the Agency payroll,

Is unknOwn.

(1]) BUREAU OPERATIONS IN CUBA

: He operated informants in Cuba when we had a

Logal Attache's Office in Havana. Informants reported

on activities of communists and other subversives in

that country. During the period we operated these

Informants, we did not coordinate our operations with

ciA. We did not advise the agency that we had such

sources.

However, in 1960, after Castro'. came on the

scene, it became infeasible to handle certain informants

In a secure manner: Approval was granted to turn certain

informants over to CIA!'

What these informants may have

subsequently told CIA about past Bureau operations is

unknown. This item is being cited in the event CIA bad

evidence

to establish that we had been operational in

Cuba and had not coordinated with the Agency pursuant

to Directives.

SIGHTI

---

## Page 22

(12) BUREAU OPERATIONS IN BRAZIL -

In YEAR the U. S. Ambassador in Brazil accused

our Legal Attache of engaging in uncoordinated covert

intelligence activity "of a nature which I believe

exceeds his terms of reference."

The Ambassador further

Indicated that. CIA was unhappy over the Legal Attache's

activities and the Agency allegedly had told the Ambassador

that the Legal Attache had disseminated information from

& source who mas a fabricator or a provocator.

This

situation arose as a result of the Legal Attaches

operation of an informant in Brazil. Some of the

Information that he received from the informant was

of a derogatory nature and related to a Brazilian who

was being touted as a Presidential, candidate. CIA

asked for the identity of the informant and we told

the Agency that the person could not be identified

because he did not wish that his identity be disclosed.

This case is being cited because.CIA may have evidence

that we had been operational in Brazil, had not coordi-

nated pursuant to Directives, and that the matter ras

further aggravated because of the alleged unreliability

of the information.

(13) BORDER COVERAGE

INVOLVES SENSITIVE METHODS AND TECHNIQUES

"grad: '=3o

SEGRET

10

•. i

---

## Page 23

SECRET

SENSITIVE METHODS AND TECHNIQUES

(Continued from page 10)

(14) CODE NAME

In Hay, YEAR the Bureau

"s. double Agent in the

captioned case was advised by his Soviet contact that he

yas to have a neeting in PLACE

during the period

DATE

A question arose as to whether CIA

should be informed concerning the double Agent's cravei

to PLACE

it was reconnended and approved that we

not advise CIA.

What is important here is that CIA established

contact with our double agent at ore point. The Agency

may have had further contact vithout our knowledge. The

Agency may have also picked up the contact with the Soviet

• IN PLACE

The case is being highlighted since me

cannot exclude the possibility that the Agency has evidence

to demonstrate that me were operational in PLACE and we

did not coordinate with the Agency.

(25) CIA REQUESTS FOR BUREAU LECTURE ON COMMUNISM IN THE U. S.

could give a lecture on the communist movement

On September 25, 1958, CIA inquired 1I NAME

In the u.S.

It was recommended that NAME

give the

lecture.

Such lectures were being afforded in other parts

of the Government. The Director made the notation "ye

саДоЇ make NAME

available to this outiit." The

agency accepted this as an affront and a blatant refusal

.. -SECRET-

---

## Page 24

SECRET.

to cooperate on a most important subject of interest

tó both agencies.

(16) CASE OF

NAME

On July 9,

"tain, an official of the state

Department confidentially advised the Bureau that

NAME

a CIA employee in pLace, bad been

involved in an affair nith a fordeN girl.

According

NAME

allegedly had furnished information

to the ForEIcN girl. He. checked with the State Departnent

and CIA and we confirmed

involved in.

an affair and that he had been recailed. According to

Cla and State Department, there was no indication that

NAME

involved in any espionage against the

U. S. CIA gave consideration to requesting the Bureau

to ideniily iis suurce and then changed iis mind.

Khether CIA has docunented this as an instance where

the Bureau failed to cooperate by not voluntéering the

source is a matter of conjecture but, it is a case that

should be kept in mind.

(27): NAME OF CASE

In April, 1963, we became involved with CIA in

that Agency's efforts to collect sensitive information

relating to foReIGN Government intentions to conduct

espionage against the U.S. CIA bad access to a sensitive

source,

•NAME

, Who was in a position to make

available highly important FoREIGN docents. On April 11,

1963, CIA informed us that our Legal ittache in Place had

locally contacted CIA concerhing this natter: CIA Head-

quarters was highly disturbed because its office in pLAcE

had not been cut in on this operation and the Agency wanted

to be informed regarding the rature and the extent of our

dissemination óf CIA Information to our Legal Attache. He

SECRET:

.. 12-

---

## Page 25

SECRET

(18) LEAKS TO THE '"NATIONAL REVIEH" - 1959

•In April, 1959, CIA became concerned over the

appearance of certain items in issues of the "National

Review.". The publication carried a column authored by.

an unidentified individual who was making derogatory

references to CIA. CIA subsequently identified the

author as NAME

a former CIA employee.

CIA

Investigation indicated that

NaME was obtaining.his

Information frön former CIA Agents. In checking on

NAME CIA identified some of his friends who were

listed as

NAME

former member of the Senate

Internal Security Subcommittee; and NAME

former

Assistant to the Director.

The Liaison Agent was unable

to develop any additional information.as it night have

pertained to NAME

in this. particular matter. CIA

may have additional data not revealed.

(19). TRAVEL OF BUREAU INTORMANTS TO CUBA

In September, 1965, we received information

indicating that oneaf our informants on the Mexican border

was in a position to travel. to Cuba. A question was raised

concerning CIA interest in this matter, if the informant

made the trip.

It was recommended and approved that we

not advise CIA concerning the identity of the informant

or his trip to cuba.

It is not known if CIA acquired any knowledge

but, if the Agency did, we potentially are vulnerable.

The Agency could charge that we were operating outside

of the U. S. and we failed to coordinate with the Agency.

(20) DISSEMINATION OF CIA INFORMATION IN A BUREAU MONOGRAPH

By letter. dated May 5, 1965, we disseminated to

Interested agencies, Including CIA, a copy of a monograph

entitled "Communism in the Dominican Republic."

The mono-

graph contained considerable information which had emanated

« ціо ол

SE

∞ 14

---

## Page 26

Iron. CIA.. He did not obtain clearance from CIA for

tbe inclusion ofthis information in our monograph.

Clearance approval was not obtained because of the

urgency of the document.

CIA was irritated because

It considered our action a distinct violation of the

third agency rule. The Agency never made any protest.

(27) BUREAU INFORMANTS IN PLACE

In 1966, and 1967, we were operating Informants

• At

the inception of our operational ac-

tivity, ClA was not informed.

In one case, ve finally

were able to efiect the necessary arrangements with cIa

whereby the Bureau would be pernitted to run the informant

In PLACE

In the second instance, we established an

agreement with CIA in October,' 1967, that we could con-

tinue handling an informant in

phace: with the under

standing that the bureau Agent, on the occasion of each

visit, would confer with the local CIA office on political

Information collected from the intormant.

These two cases

had all the makings of a conflict. CIA was under the

definite impression that we had been running these

informants before we had finally coordinated with them.

It is true that the CIA Chief in PLACE

was much

incensed but no issue was made at CIA Headquarters and

thematter was put to rest.

CIA may have developed concrete evidence that

we were operating in PLACE

bearing in mind that in

& place such as

PLACE

., It would not be difficult

for a CIA intelligence officer to spot an FBI Agent in

contact with FOrEIGNers • our potential vulnerability is

that we were operating in pLacE

without coordinating

with CIA.

(22) CODE NAMÉ

CURRENT SENSITIVE

OPEPATION

SECRET

---

## Page 27

SLURLI

CURRENT SENSITIVE OPERATION. -

Continued from page 15

(23) HARRASSHENT OF CIA

By letter dated November I5, 1967, CIA Inquired

if the Bureau would check the toll calls on

the home

telephone of one NAME

who was harrassing

CIA in the Miami area. NAME allegedly was seeking

Information corcerzing the Agency's covert operations.

•He told CIA that we would not check the toll-calls.

We

explained that on the basis of the information received,

there was not sufficient information to justify investigation

falling within theBureau's

jurisdiction.

CIa accepted

our response but there is no doubt that the agency

characterized our position as a concrete example of

refusal to help a sister agency with a problem relating

•to the security of U. S. intelligence operations.

(24)

SENSITIVE DOCUMENT

CIA became very irked when ve restricted

dissenination of our SENSITIVE DACUMENT

to

tro copies for the Agency. CIA took the position with

• the Liaison Agent: that CIA always has been most liberal

In providing the Bureau with as many copies as we needed

When it involved various types of CIA material. The

agency never made an official issue of this matter.

The.

Liaison Agent is confident that CIA always considered this

an uncooperative gesture on our part.

SEGRET.

• 16 .

---

## Page 28

SEGRET

•(25) ESTABLISHIENT OF BURBAU LIAISON WITH

DUTCH INTERNAL SECURITY SERVICE - 1960

. In January, 1960, our Legal Attache,

traveled to Holland for the purpose of exploring arrange-

ments for liaison with appropriate Dutch authorities.

NAME

raised questions, pointing out that over

the years, all relations with the Dutch authorities bad

been handled through CIA: He indicated that before there

was any change in procedure, it yould be necessary for

CIA and FBI to cone to some

form of an agreement.

Allen

Dulles subsequently expressed disappointment tu that his

Agency had not been contacted by the Bureau prior to

exploring the liaison arrangement.

We eventually conferred

with CIA and came to an agreement satisfactory to all

parties concerned.

Again, CIA could cite

Le failed to coordinato late teased an instance where

National Security Council Directives.

In the latter part of 1959 we gave consideration to

establishing a Legal Attache in Copenhagen, Denmark.

The

purpose of the assigment was to follow Bureau leads in

Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Rolland. He did got inform

CIA of our intentions.

(26) BUREAU DISSEUINATION OF COUNTERINTELLIGINCE

INFORKLATION TO FOREIGN SERVICES - DATE

By letter dated

DATE

, CIA raised

questions concerning the propriety of Bureau dissemination

of counterintelligence information to foreign intelligence

services.

CIA, at that time, had particular reference to

Information which our Legal Attache had transmitted to the •

FoREi Intelligence Service concernine KGB operations.

CIA

Itook the position that pursuant to the coordinating

SEBEGI

• 0170

---

## Page 29

SEGMET

Directive, the Bureau was obligated to coordinate with

CIA prior to such dissemination. The particular data

had emanated from one of our sensitive FOrbIGN sources

CODENAME Me responded to CIA by stating that the

information was the product of an internal security

operation and did not relate to any operational activity

abroad,

Cla again surrendered.

The Agency could argue

that it was responsible for following Soviet matters

with the FoREld Intelligence Service and that we had an

obligation of coordinating with the Agency.

(27) TITLE OF 8O0K

AUTHOR

BOOK AUTHORED BY,

In August,

1963, we received information indi-

cating that

AUTHOR

In the process of gathering

material for a book pertaining to activities of U. S.

Intelligence activities:. AUTHOR

contacted

the Bureau. It was recommended that liaison orally advise

CIA that

AUTHOR

preparing a book con-

cerning U.S. intelligence agencies. The Director. noted

"I see no reason doing so."

It is not known if CIA was aware of the contact

with the Bureau. AuTHer

subsequently published the

book which contained extremely derogatory information

concerning CIA.

(28) COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES - AFRICA

In April, 1960, CIA inquired if the Bureau would

give any consideration to assisting the Agency toward

developing coverage in Africa. CIA was looking for the

services of any Negro informant who might be available.

The Agency also inquired about placing a Negro in the

Communist Party, USA, under a plan which would have as

an eventual objective, the sending of the informant to

∞ 18 -

---

## Page 30

SECRET

•Africa under an appropriate cover and for an extended

period. He told CIA we had no informants available

because they were necessary for our own operations. He

took the position that we saw no benefit to be gained by

Loaning an informant on a short of long term basis.

This item is. being mentioned because Airica

has become vitally important to U. S.. interest, bearing

In mind that both the Soviets and Chinese Comnunists have

made significant inroads into the area.

CIA could argue

that as early as 1960, it had the foresight to recognize

the need for additional coverage, that it appealed to the

Bureau for assistance, and that we did not

cooperate.

(29) ADVISING TRE WHITE HOUSE REGARDING CRITICISM

OF INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS - SUROPE

By letter dated October 23, 1964, we furnished

the White House information received

by our legal Attache

from the

SOUPGE

He was critical

of intelligence operations in Europe and made particular

reference to the overstaffing of personnel.

He do not know if CIA became cognizant of the

existence of the Bureau letter bearing in mind that the

•Agency undoubtedly would have considered the document as

relating to its operations. He do know that for several years,.

.CIA personnel have been assigned to the White House and had

access to considerable information.

(80) THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY

BOARD And JOHN lC CONE

In Hay, 1963, we became embroiled with CIA 1n a

rather critical conflict as a result of communication the

Bureau sent to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory

Board. The matter dealt with consideration that might be

given to increasing wire taps on diplomatic establishments.

SECRET

-19

---

## Page 31

=

SECRET.

In a portion of our communication, ve attributed cer-

• tain Information to licCone, then Director of Cla. de

charged that the information attributed to him was not

so because he, had never made any such statement and he

could prove it. The actual fact was that the information

relating to icCone had been given. to us by öne of his

subordinates who had indicated that the information.

originated with icCone. UcCone maintained that we

should have checked with him before we went on record

that any information had. originated with him. The

record at the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory

Board was subsequently corrected.

(31) ALLEGED PANETRATIONS OF CIA

In February, 1965, Bureau representatives met

with CIA officials and with

NAME

to discuss

allegations made by NAME

= Sovict deicator, relative

to alleged Soviet penetrations of CIA. NAMÉ

HaS

interviewed in detail concerning these allegations.

By

letter dated February 26, 1965, we officially advised CIA

that there appeared to be no basis at this time for a

full investigation of the individuals involved.

There are off cials in CIA who continue to be

seriously concerned about possible penetrations of the

•Agency and have not discarded NAME'S

allegations.

He do not have any reason to believe that CIA

necessary investigation in 1965.

(32) VICE PRESIDENT NIXON'S TRIP TO SOUTH AMERICA - 1958

In 1958; Vice President Bichard M. Nison traveled

to Latin America during which time there were numerous riots

and attacks which were directed against the Vice President

jand his party. By letter dated May 16, 1958, we provided

the Vice President with a summary of information which we

had received concerning the events in Latin America relating

SECRET

• 20 -

---

## Page 32

SECRET

to the trip.

Host of this information came from CIA.

Our letter could be interpreted as raising, the question

concerning the quality of CIA's coverage in Latin America.

•It is not known if CIA ever became krowledgeable

of the referenced communication.

As already indicated,

We do know that CIA personnel have been assigned to the

White House. Ne also know that

МДМЕ

AND

TITLE

CIA, was attached to Vice

President sixon's staff.

IL CIA is cognizant of the communication, the

Agency technically could raise a question concerning a

to CIA's coverage in Latin America..

(33) . NAME Of SUBJECT.

The captioned individual is a criminal infor-

mani whom we have been utilizing to very significant advan-

tage in New York City. He has been the source of valuable

criminal intelligence and has been a key witness in

prosecutions of cases being handled by the Bureau. He

acquired access to NAME through CIA. A covert CIA

operator in New York City had become

acquainted with

saw his potential as a source of criminal intelligence,

and then conferred with

contacted the Bureau Liaison Agent

CIA.

'NAME

and asked if the Bureau

was interested.

Negotiations were initiated and we

subseguently, acquired the services of NAHE although

the Agency has never officially made any statement to us,

It has been bitterly disappointed that the Bureau never

acknowledged CIA's assistauce which the Agency considered

extremely valuable.

(34) EXCHANGE OF TECHNICAL INFORMATION

for many years, ve maintained tight restrictions

with regard to the exchange of technical information with

Cis, particularly as it related to the technical surveillance

field. CIA exhibited its equipment to us but, for many years,

ve declined to show any of our devices, with some exceptions.

SEGRET

---

## Page 33

CIA never made

any official protest but informally

Indicated fron time to time that the lack of exchange

in this highly important field was prejudicial to over-

all intelligence and internal security interests.

The

Agency implied that we actually were more open with the

British in this general area than we were with

. CIA.

It should be noted that the foregoing situation

does not exist today. There is good exchange between the

Bureau and CIA..

(35) CIA LECTURERS AT BUREAU TRAINING SCHOOLS

CIA has never been able to understand why the

Bureau will not permit CIA personnel to lecture at Bureau

schools or training courses.

CIA has felt that through

& careful selection of lecturers, the Agency could make

a very valuable contribution both to the Bureau and to

CIA.

The Agency has indicated that its participation in

some of our courses mould give the Agency the opportunity

to describo cIA's erganization, objestires, and operational

problems. Furthernore, it has been expressed that Bureau

personnel could be given the opportunity to pose questions

and there would be a far better over-all orientation ou

the part of our people..

The Liaison Agent has always resisted CIA's

request.

It has been a delicate matter to handle because

Bureau personnel have lectured to hundreds of CIA employees.

(36) EXCHANGE IN THE TRAINING FIELD

Although CIA has never officially made an issue

of the matter, the Agency has not been happy about our

attitude concerning exchange of information in the training

field.

When the natter has been broughtup for any discussion

by CIA, the Agency has been discouraged..

CIA informally has

expressed the feeling that an exchange along certain guide-

lines could be most useful to the U. S. intelligence and

Internal security effort.

SECRET

∞ 22 =

---

## Page 34

SECRET:

(37) POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE

•This 1s an area where discussion with CIA

officials can rapidly generate criticisn of the Bureau

for failure to cooperate and offer the necessary assis-

tance.

Positive intelligence, briefly, is that information

which might assist the U. S. Government in formulating

foreiga policy.. Much' of it is of a political nature and

& vital portion pertains to scientific developments, military

capabilities of foreign countries, and intentions of foreign

countries.

Positive intelligence

is cot only important

as it concerns the communist-bloc countries but also

the nor-bloc nations.

There never has been, any'lay, Directive, or

Executive Order which has fixed the responsibilities for

the clandestine collection of positive intelligence in

the U.S. The Bureau does have a responsibility which

we refer

to as internal security and shich falls into the

accepted area of counterintelligence. He do investigate

subversives spys, and we develop penetrations of foreign

Intelligence services.

Our work in the positive intelli-

gence field, for the most part, has been restricted to

the compliance of requests imposed upon us by the state

Department, usually when a political crisis occurs in

some country.

• CIA has maintained that there is a tremendous

unexplored

field for expanded acquirement of positive

Interligence in the U.S. This would nean vastly increasec

technical surveillance coverage, development of informants,

and collection of cryptographic material. CIA does not

feel that we have aggressively moved on this particular

subject and that over the years, the agency has been

thwarted in its attempts to do much about the problem.

In DATE:

, CIA requested the Bureau to

Install technical surveillances at the offices and temporary

residences of two FOREIEN Government officials visiting the

U.S.

Pursuant to instructions, CIA was told to seek the

authority of the Attorney General. The Director stated

that he did not want CIA utilizing FBI as a channel.

= 23 ∞

---

## Page 35

SECRET,

In the same month, CIA inquired 11 the Bureau

: would reestablish technical surveillance coverage on

NAME

who CIA felt was a key figure in the

transmittal of scientific intelligence data to the

FOREIGN. Intelligence Service.

We declined to reinstitute

the coverage: CIA considered the matter important because

of its relationship to the PLACE

On October 21, 1969, we told CIA that future

requests from. CIA for technical surveillance coverage

should be transmitted by the Agency directly to the

attorney General.

CIA has never made any official. comment or

protest but it has considered the afore-mentioned action

by the Bureau as unfriendly and'uncooperative. The Agency

has looked to the Bureau as the logical point of contact and

as the only organization baving the resources and capabilities

of adequately determining if such coverage is even feasible.

(38) MISCELLANEOUS ITINS

The Llaison Agent recalls fragments of other

situations or conflicts which occured over the years and

which resulted in the voicingo

CIa displeasure or criticiso.

The Agent cannot recall the names of the cases which is

necessary to acquire the required data.

There was one

Instance early in the 1950's which involved information

received from a source of unknown reliability charging

in Europe.. He disseminated the information to several

The Agent also has recollection of instances when

CiA alleged that its source or informant

was compromised by

Bureau revelation ot cls iniormation during the course of

Interviews conducted by 1s.

Technically, this would be a

violation of the third agency rule and, if CIA had hard

core facts, ve mould be vulnerable, particularly if an

Important informant was lost. CIA never made any official

Issue or protest.

SECRET

c 24 =

---

## Page 36

SECRET

There

also have been instances, but cases

cannot be recalled, where we included CIA information

in Bureau reports but CIA had requested that the information

not be passed outside of the Bureau. CIA never protested.

SECRET

25

---

## Page 37

O La GIM, 810. NO, 21

UNITED STATES GOVE

MENT

Memorando

n

: Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: March 11

1970.

ROM : W. C. Sullivan

UBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissen

nation outside your Cnmmittee.

Ils use i lanted to official prureedings b

nel without the express approval of the FBI.

your Committee and the content may nut be cisclosed to unauthorized person

Reference my memorandum 3/9/70 recommending that a

letter be directed to CIA outlining the elements of intelligence

and counterintelligence work affecting the United States.

Purpose of this letter is to protect Bureau by giving CIA a

chance to make any comments it may have concerning current

use..of sources and facilities affecting both Bureau and ClA.

Director instructed "Prepare same and let me see it."

We have prepared letter to CIA Director Helms in

line with the foregoing. Letter cites agreement or so-called

"ground rules" ine in hotween Bureau and ClA in January, 1966,

with regard to coordination of FBI-CIA efforts in collection

of positive intelligence in the United States. At that time

Vice Admiral Raborn was head of CIA and we are enclosinga

copy of the 1966 agreement for Mr. Helms' attention.

In letter we have also pointed out the Bureau's

primary responsibility concerning internal security of the

United States and for conducting counterintelligence operations

here. We have noted that while the Bureau has no statutory

responsibilities concerning collection of foreign intelligence,

we have made a concerted effort to obtain positive intelligence

of value to other U.S. agencies and policy-making officials

and have regularly furnished the product to CIA and other

Interested agencies. Letter invites any observations Mr. Helms

may desire to make after reviewing this matter, including the

1966 agreement.

Information.

If the Director approves, the attached letter

• Io. Hetes

should go forward.

---

## Page 38

J&D

19, 1966

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCS ACENCY

OPERATIONS IN THS UNITED STATES

(1) CIA will not initiate an investigation of ab!

foreign official in the United States without the concurreace

and coordination of the F3I.

In this context, the cera

"investigation" neans systematic and direct inquiries or

procedures (such as physical or technical surveillances

or neighborhood inquiries) aining at developing information

concerning an individual's activities or background;

"investigation" does not include the acceptance or the

development of inforration through social contacts or

contacts norrally made by CIA agents in discharging their

cover functions.

г....... '

(2) CIA will see's concurrence and coordication

of the FBI before approaching for recruitment any foreigo.

Official or communist-bloc visitor in the United States?

The FBI vill concur aud cocrdinate if the proposed action

does not conflict with any uperation,

current.or planned.

Including active investigation of the FBI.

(3) CIA will advise the FBI prior to any planned

meeting between a Cla asset and a foreign official or

conmunist-bloc visitor of known or presumed interest to

•the FBI (this woulá include all communist-bloc officials

and visitors) for purposes of assessment and social

development.

(1) Clandestine CIA staff operatives, domestic

American agents of CIA, and foreign agents of CIA recruited

abroad who coma to the United States will be identified to

the FBI by nere or expropriate descristion depending on

the national security interest involved.

(5) Pursuant to paragraph 4 above, when a CIA

agent arrives in the United States for a visit or for an

assignuent, the Eurcau sill be advised and the two agencies

will confer regarding the handling of the agent in the lalied

IStates.

It is recognized that each case will have its

¡individual peculiarities. The governing principle ill

be positive intelligence interest as weighed against interra?

Thi ronant is prime in response to your request and is not for dissim

natiin difside your Conmittic.

Its use is limited to officin succedings ou

yoz Committee and the content man nut be disclosed to unauthorized persis

not without the expreys approval of the FBl.

---

## Page 39

jFK (1) (B)

CENTRAL IXTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OPEFATIONS IN TIE UNITED STATES

security factors. CIA will continue its contractual

rela-

tionship for the purpose of handling the training,

procurerent of cositive foreign intellifence, the

fulfiller:

of CIA commitnerts to the agent, and the preparation of the

agent for his next assignent abroad.

(6) In those cases where CIA will be handling

Its agent in the United States, CIA will service FBI securii? :

or counterintelligence requirements and will provide the FEi

•all agent information bearing or counterintelligence or

Internal security matters, including the scope and nature.

of the agent's access to information and the identities of

the agent's significant contacts, particularly in the

comnunist-bloc field. In such cases where CIA servicing

has been inadequate to F3I internal security interests,

the FBI will have direct access to the agent.

.....

---

## Page 40

=*

, SECRET

March 11, 1970

Honorable Richard Helms .

Director

Central Intelligence Agency

Hashington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Helms:*

As I am gure you will agree, the need for close

coordination of theKintelligence-gathering ansfounter.

Intelligence

efforts of the FBI and the Central Intelligence

Agency (CIA) is self-evident. This matter, is one which

requires a continuing analysis to assure that both agencies

have established working agreements whereby we can most

• effectively reálize positive results with a minimum of

duplication, misplaced effort, and jurisdictional problems.

During January, 1966, representatives of this

Bureau met with officials of the CIA to consider coordina-

•tion of our. mutual efforts in the collection of positive

intelligence in the United States. Ag a result of these

conferences, a set of ground rules was drawn.up and agreed

to by both agencies. A copy of this agreement was transmitted

in my letter of February 7, 1966, to then CIA Director

Vice Admiral William F. Reborn, JI. A copy of the agreeirent

is enclosed for your information. ' This agreement has proven

generally effective and no major problems have been

encountered since

Its adoption in the areas it covers.

•.. The FBI has primary responsibility with regard to

matters involving the internal security of the United States

as well as for conducting counterintelligance operations in

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Discinsure

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SECRET

---

## Page 41

0.00

(SECRET

this country. While this Bureau does not have any statutory

responsibilities with regard to the collection of foreign

Intelligence, I have always recognized that the potential

for the development of such intelligence in this country 1s

congiderable.

The FBI has, in fact, made a concerted effort

to obtain positive intelligence of value to other U. S.

:: Intelligence agencies, including the CIA, and policy-making

officials of the Government. While these efforts have,

of course, been incidental to our main internal security

and counterintelligence responsibilities, we have on a

selective basis developed sources, both live and technical,

providing coverage at key foreign establishments in the

United States. The product of this coverage has been furnished

on a regular basis to the CIA and other interested agencies

and officials uf the Guverimeni.

I know that you will share my bellef that this

matter requires a periodic reexamination to assure that the

national security interests continue,to be served in the

most effective and complete manner possible. After reviewing

this matter, including the attached 1966 agreement, I would

velcome any observations you may desire to make.

Sincerely yours,

*. Edgar Hoover

SEGMET

---