MEMO RE SITUATION IN CUBA.
Originator: CIA
From: WITHHELD
Document date: 01/01/0000
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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104-10162-10222

2022 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

DATE 10/8/93

LOST/MISSING MATERIAL

THE DOCUMENT OR PAGE(S) LISTED BELOW WAS/WERE MISSING

DURING THE DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW BY THE HISTORICAL

REVIEW GROUP, CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF INTELLIGENCE.

DOCUMENT NO.

DATED :.

1963

PAGE(S) - 1

Of CIA 6 PAGE MEMO

FROM:

CIA JOB NO. MICROFILA-ARTIME

BOX NO. -

FOLDER NO. XI

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that 18,

they would be close enough for him to "reach

for them."

c.

to surnish the advice, Chief SAS stated that he

rould sake avallable an experienced, mature, able case

olficer and a small tean to support our representation

in contact with AlBIDDY/1's group.

Specifically, Chief

SAS mentioned a younger case officer to help our

representative, a man-of-allvork, a translator, and two

radio operators.

AMBIDDY/l assured that he had a man for

the job of translator.

D. No Contrar t Yet:

Chief SAS emphasized at this

time, as he did on

several other occasions during the

conversatior, that he was not empowered to "sign a contract".

with AMBIDDY/l and he emphasized in equally strong terns

that this assistance does not include any commitments of

U.S. troops under any circumstances; except that, as

Secretary of Defense IcHanara had previously stated, tho

U.S. would not stand idly by if the Soviet Union shoul

commit its troops to surpress a popular uprising of the

Cuban people.

Any victory won would be a Cuban vict ry.

Chief SAS stipulated the above four points to be the

ground rules for the exploratory and actual work relation-

ship between ANBIDDY/1

and the Agency.

I. At this point, Chief SAs turned to the questions

which must be answered before the next step can be taken

1n this plan.

It would be necessary for AlBIddy/l to

furnish the following:

..l.. A base fros nich to operate.

2.

Individuals dedicated and stout-hearted enough

to return to the fight of freeing Cuba.

•A general plan as to what can be done and

hot to go about it.

At this point, Chief SAS emphasized again that this is to

a "Cuban shou" and an atteupt to prove that Fidel can

be destroyed by the efforts of the Cuban people.

Chief SAS reminded AMBIDDY/l that the first order

of business was to be the procurement of a base and that

AXBIDDY/1 should proceed after a waiting period of approxinately

three days to survey the Caribbean area.

Specifically

mentioned by Chief SAS vere Guatenala, Honduras, Nicaragua,

and Colombia.

At this tize AMBIDDY/l

mentioned that he had

been told by NAVE representatives to scratch Nicaragua as a

possible base for the reason that this is a "dictatorship'."

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Goddad

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ANBIDDY/1 was told, and he pointed out himself, that the

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use of a piece of property in Nicaragua should

not be

Interpreted as the acceptance of the Nicaraguan government's

philosophy.

The possibility of a Nicaraguan base was

accepted.

Chief SAS nade it perfectly clear that 1f

AKBIDDY/l's negotiations with these governments should be

leaked or 1f the U.S. Governent were officially asked if

It has a part to play, the U.S. Government would deny

any part in the activity. On the other hand it was

suggested that AXBIDDY/1

might possibly find 1t easier to

procure & base if he were to say that the U.S. Government

night assist hin if he had a base from which to operate.

Again Chief SAS indicated that whereas the U.S. Government

rould not be willing to formally admit any participation.

1t could conccicadly inne known its sympathy with AHBIDDY/1's

plans and activity and give its "unofficial" nod.

In

general, AMBIDDY/l was made t, understand that the hand

of the U.S. Government cannot and will not be revealed,

but at the same time we would be willing to unofficially

and intornally assist, however possible.

G.

Chief SAS told AMBIDDY/1 that once he had pr, zured

& base and prepared a plan, it would be possible for Chief

SAs to take the operation one step further and

seek

approval in washington. Chief SAS observed th't word

will get around that AMBIDDY/l has the support of the u.s.

Government,

which, of course, we will deny. AMBIDDY/1

inforned Chief SAS that he had already begun building

the story of support by certain Central American countries

and even Buropean aid, specifically fron General DeGaulle

Chief SAS stated that

he raised this particular poirt

regarding probably leaks of U.S. support to AHBIDDY/1 with

the thought that this would result in a great number of

Cubans, who really want to fight Castro and Connunist,

rallying to AMBIDDY/l. This would mean that AKBIDDY/1

rould find it necessary to be selective in his choice of

collaborators.

A BIDDY/1 agreed that "quality" should be

the criteria.

Chief SAS observed that the number of collaborators

rould deternine how sany people would be needed to support

the operation, as would the size of the base. The conversa-

tion duelt for some time on the equipnent that would be

needed and AMBIDDY/1 inforned Chief SAS that he had & PC

Boat with two General Motor's engines.. Chief SAS. stated

that he would like to have a representative of his in the

HAVE arEa SeE AMBIDDY/l's boat, in order to assess its

general

seaworthiness.

This was fine with AMBIDDY/l.

In

this connection AMBIDDY/1 stated that he can provide a

crew fox. this boat, the mechanics necessary to keep 1t in

operation, as well as nen fantliar with wéapons and logistics.

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AMBIDDY/1 obviously was not too sure of his strength in

the logistical field.

Chief SAS noted that he night be

sble. to lend a log officer to help in this regard.

So

ar. as radio operators are concerned, AlBIDDY/l informed

hief SAS that he has these but that he does not nave the

necessary equipsent. To close his part of the conversation,

chief SAS referred again to the fact that his representative

would be present to advise the group, that it would not be

necessary to completely agree with the advice, and that if

n fact the adviser sent to AMBIDDY/1 proved unacceptable,

another could be substituted for him.

Typically, AMBIDDY/1

hastened to assure Chief SAS that they rould certainly be

ablo to get along with his representative, and that he

fOTESaU DO ULIIICULLY OI JELLINg UN WiLL LUE MIUiTE GI

finding a base and presenting a plan.

Chief SAS enphasized

that he did not want a minutely detailed plan, but the

concrete outline of AHBIDDY/1's ideas. At this point Chief

SAS asted AYBIDDY/1 to take up whatever points he had 1n

mind.

These follow:

1.

AMBIDDI/1's Statenent:

AXP" DDY/1 has had

some prob.ems along the following llues:

An inability to work out satisfactorily

a radio program to be beamed to Cuba.

According

to AMBIDDY/1, a plan has been worked out for a

ten-: "nute progran, three times weekly on a station

which beans largely to the exile community and is

able to reach only a very linited part of Cuba.

This 1s not a satisfactory solution to their (MRR)

probles.

b.

Problens surrounding publication of issue

nuaber two of his newspaper.

Apparently the

station wants another memo fron AMBIDDY/1 regarding

Issue number two.

(Chief SAS took up with HAVE

оп 2 Мaу.)

c..

AMBIDDY/i states. that approximately one

month ago he had raised the question of the

architect convention to be held in Cuba, and that

he had provided wAVE a contact with an exile

architect but that nothing concrete had come of

this to date.

Note:

At this point Chief sas

reninded AKBIDDY/1 that 1t has been difficult to

arrive at a solution of certain problems during

this period when so much attention has been diverted

to the problens of the hit-and-run raids and the

crisis within the CRC.)

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• d.

AMBIDDY/I stated that with a dissolution

of the CRC, his organization would be cut off

fron its support of

some $4,000 monthly.

Apparent'y

the MRR was pald $4,000 for April but has not

received anything for hay.

This was resolved"

a telephone call by Chief SAS to WAVE on 2 May:

MRR to continue receiving this fund.

ANBINDY/1 also indicated a need for' funds

to pay the rent of the office used by the urr.

(Iden phone call on 2 May.)

1.

AmIDDY,1 stated that he had heen asted

by HAVE to furnish personnel for infiltration into

Cuba: He stated that he is ready and able to do

so and all he needs to know is how many and when.

He did

ask, however,

that these nen not be asked

to give up

their nembership in the ARR and become

"solely agents."

When asked if he had experiences

of this type of handling in the past, AMBIDDY/1

stated that there had been cases when members of

his organization had been told to gorget their

ARR membership, that now "they were working for

KUBARE. "

Chief SAS said that this problem could

be resolved and added that he foresaw that under

certain circumstances.our Miami office could help

AMBIDDY/1 to

"Independent, out his people into Cuba for the

operations, especially in case of

North Coast opg.

AKBIDDY/1 advised he was presently training

воле

of his personnel in intelligence and counter-

Intelligence work.

He wondered if it would be

possible to have KUBARK assist the BRAC officer

he is using to do this.

Chief SAS told hin that

but that our

it would be difficult to say when this could be

done.

At this point Chief SAS stated that he

would from time to time send experts to assist

ANBIDDY/1 but that these men would not be part of

the permanent. group

supporting and advising AYBIDDY/l.

2." The meeting erded with assurances on the part of AMBIDDY/1

that he was willing. to go all out. to

work with KUBARR; that. the

MRR had the longest list of martyrs in the Cuban cause; that 1t

had been his

organization that hed put in the greatest number

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-waT

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of aras into Cuba during the Bay

of Pigs Invasion and finally

that the MR and AlBIDDY/l could be counted upon.

assured AHBIDDY/1 of his high esteem of AKBIDDY/l and his

Chief, SAS

organization, of which he had heard and read nuch. Chief, sas

net with AMBIDDY/1 as Don Archer.

03

Cation denges

Distribution:

1 - AC/SAS

1 - SAS/SO/AR - Chrono

1 - Sabject File (with extra copies)

MO

•SECRET

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