FUTURE POLICY TOWARD CUBA
Agency: NARA
Originator: DOS
To: KENNEDY, JOHN F.
Document date: 12/3/62

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JFK Assassination System

Identification Form

Agency Information

Date:

5/5/2016

AGENCY :

RECORD NUMBER :

NARA

176-10010-10019

RECORD SERIES:

SORENSEN

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

4

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :

DOS

FROM:

TO :

KENNEDY, JOHN F.

TITLE:

FUTURE POLICY TOWARD CUBA

DATE: 12/03/1962

PAGES:

3

SUBJECTS :

ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION: Top Secret

RESTRICTIONS: 1C

CURRENT STATUS : Withhold

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 08/18/1993

OPENING CRITERIA: UPON AGENCY REVIEW

COMMENTS :

SORENSEN PAPERS:CLASSIFIED SUBJECT FILES 1961-1964:Cuba, Subjects, General and

Historical Information, 1026/62-11/1/62:Box 49

v9.1

HH 49061 DocId: 32205533

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#6

Bandy

7033

7022 220232.

DRAPI

MEMORANDUM ROR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Future Polloy towerd Cuba

BY AP, NARA, Date.

VOL. XI

DOC.#

PUBLISHED IN FRUS. 1961-1963

DECLASSIFIED

Policy

our ultimate objective with respect to Cuba remains

the overthrow of the Castro regime and its replacement by

one sharing the aims of the Free World, Our immediate

objectives are to weaken the regime; frustrate 1ts

subversive intentions; further reduce its influence in

the Hemisphere; and increase the cost to the Bloc of

sustaining the regime lor split the reglme off from the

.. Bloo) •

A policy of containing, undermining, discrediting

and isolating the Castro regime through the exercise of

all feasible diplomatic economie, psychological and other

pressures will achieve these immediate objectives and

could create propitious conditions in Cuba for further

advance toward our ultimate objective.

This annex will

Courses of Action

be circulated

to ExCom members at

The following overt" courses of action should be

the meeting called

undertaken:

to discuss the memo.

1, OAS action:

condemning the Castro regine for

1ts duplicity; extending the trade embargo to all items

exoept

for the program of covert actions, please see Annex A

HH 49061 DocId: 32205533 Page 2

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animum

v

TOP SECRET

-2=

excapt icedsturis, bedicines and medieal supplies; further

limiting air and sea communications between the Hemisphere

and Cuba; authorizing air and other surveillance, and

warning Cubs agairet continued pronotion of subversive

and sabotage activities.

Establishment of Caribbean security arrangements

through min isterial level meetings of the Carlobean

countries for the purposes of reaching agreement on increasing

the intensity of surveillance of coastal and international

waters; increased surveillance and control of land boundaries;

Increased control over subversive activities within national

boundaries; systematic exchange of intelligence information;

and, development of procedures for coordination of military

contingenoy planning for emergercies.

3o Applicationd the four-point shipping restrictions

re cube.

4o Inclusion by NATO of Cuba on the list of countriés

to which shipment of COCOM list (strategio) items is

prohibited.

5o Dissuasion of Free World industrial nations from

shipping cruciel spare parts and equipment to cuba, not

on

the cocoM list.

6. Persuasion of non-Bloc nations to limit their

airlines service to cuba and to withhold transit rights

to Soviet aircraft serving Cuba.

TOP SECBET

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and.

We sawes

=3=

7. Persuasion of Latin inericen nations to limit

the travel of. their nationals to Cuba and to intensify

measures to prevent agents and groups of international

communism fron carrying on their subversive aotivities.

8. Persuasion of appropriate lAs organs to study

urgently the transfer of fuads to the other American

Republics for subversive pruposes, the plan of subversive

propaganda and the utilization of Cuba as a base for

training in subversive techniques; and to nake recommendations

to

the member states regarding counter-neasures.

9. Maintenance of currently enhanced VOA medium wave

facilities beamed to Cuba and adoption by VOA of a more

aggressive line toward Cuba.

10. Encilitation of Cuban exiles' entry into the

United States Arued Forces for training, and formetion

of reserve units thereafter.

Timing

We should surface our program of isolating and weakening

• Cuba when it becones olear that our discussions on Cuba

with thesoviets are unlikely to be fruitful. Actions si th

respect to Cuba which may contribute substantially to

creating a situation calling for United Steles military

action should be withheld until the soviet combet units

have been removed

from Cuba or erforto te parnuade the

USse to remove them have failed.

12/3/62

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