TAPE OF MR. WILLIAM K. HARVEY'S INTERVIEW, 4/10/75
Originator: ROCK
Document date: 04/10/1975
Document type: SOUND RECORDING

## Page 1

Date: 03/21/96

Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : ROCKCOM

RECORD

NUMBER

178-10002-10324

RECORDS SERIES

ASSASSINATION FILES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : A-I (I) INTERVIEWS RE ASSASSINATIONS

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION

FROM

BELIN, DAVID

FINER

PAGES : 11

SUBJECTS : HARVEY, WILLIAM K.

CIA

ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES

ASSASSINATIONS, FOREIGN LEADERS

EXECUTIVE ACTION CAPABILITY

BISSELL, RICHARD

EDWARDS, SHEFFIELD

ROSELLI, JOHNNY

MC CONE, JOHN

DOCUMENT TYPE : MEMORANDUM

CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED

RESTRICTIONS

: 1C, REFERRED, MANDATORY REVIEW MATERIAL

CURRENT STATUS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW

: 05/24/95

OPENING CRITERIA

: CIA APPROVAL

COMMENTS

: Unmarked, but may include classified information.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

---

## Page 2

Date: 05/24/95

Page: 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : ROCKCOM

RECORD NUMBER : 178-10002-10324

RECORDS SERIES :

ASSASSINATION FILES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : A-I(I) INTERVIEWS RE ASSASSINATIONS

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION

FROM : BELIN, DAVID

TO : FILE

TITLE:

INTERVIEW WITH MR. WILLIAM K. HARVEY

ATE : 04/10/7

AGES : 1

SUBJECTS :

HARVEY, WILLIAM K.

CIA

ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES

ASSASSINATIONS, FOREIGN LEADERS

EXECUTIVE ACTION CAPABILITY

BISSELL, RICHARD

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

---

## Page 3

Date: 05/24/95

Page: 2

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

EDWARDS, SHEFFIELD

ROSELLI, JOHNNY

MC CONE, JOHN

DOCUMENT TYPE : MEMORANDUM

CLASSIFICATION : U

RESTRICTIONS: 119

• REFERRED, MANDATORY REVIEW MATERIAL

CURRENT STATUS : X

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 05/24/95

OPENING CRITERIA :

CIA APPROVAL

COMMENTS :

Unmarked, but may include classified information.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

---

## Page 4

Date: 07/09/93

Page: 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : ROCKCOM AY42

RECORD

NUMBER: 1781000210324

RECORDS SERIES :

SSASSINATION FILES

GENCY FILE NUMBER..: A-I(I) INTERVIEWS RE ASSASSINATIONS

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION

FROM : BELIN, DAVID •

TO : FILE

TITLE :

NTERVIEW WITH MR. WILLIAM K. HARVEY

DATE : 04/10/75

PAGES : 11

SUBJECTS :

ARVEY, WILLIAM K.

NTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES

SSASSINATIONS, FOREIGN LEADERS

KECUTIVE ACTION CAPABILITY

ISSELL, RICHARD

WARDS, SHEFFIELD

SELLI, JOHNNY

¿ CONE, JOHN

DOCUMENT TYPE : MEMORANDUM

CLASSIFICATION

:U

RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED OPEN IN FULL

CURRENT STATUS : P

LE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/09/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

APPRO

CIA FICT

2552331a2

By

KBH

FOR RET

GORLARI

S24195

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

HELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

kp.20 may97

COMMENTS :

marked, but may include classified information.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

---

## Page 5

•

COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES

Washington, DC 20500

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

Nelson A. Rockefeller,

Chairman

John T. Connor

C. Douglas Dillon

Erwin N. Griswold

Lane Kirkland

yman L. Lemnitze

Ronald Reagan

Edgar F. Shannon, Jr.

David W. Belin,

Executive Director

April 10, 1975

DECLASSIFIED - E.O. 12355, Sea 3.4

With FORTIONS ELEMPTED

E.O. 12653, Sec. 1.3 (0) 44)

MEMORANDUM

MR 94-141,73 CIA Review/ gEK

TO

: The File

BY KAH, NARA, Dais _5/24/95

FROM

: David W. Belin

SUBJECT: Interview with Mr. William R. Harvey,

Mr. Belin: This is an interview that I've had with

Mr. William K. Harvey, 1611 Northwood Drive,

Indianapolis, Indiana 46240.

I am going to make a transcript

of this interview which has

taken place on April 10, 1975 in

Mr. Harvey's home, and I will send to MI. Harvey for his

review a copy of the transcript for his additions or correc-

tions or changes, and then what we'll do, we'll ask that the

transcript as corrected be attached in an affidavit form

for forming a part of the record of the Commission.

Mr. Harvey is a native of Indiana. He was born on September

13, 1915 in Danville, Indiana.

He graduated from High School inTe

Haute.

He is a graduate of the University of Indiana Law

School (1937).

He was Assediate Editor of the Law Review

and was a member of the order of the Coif

briefly practicing law in Maysville, Kentucky, he joined the

FBI in the Fall of 1940.

Ms. Harvey: - and forgive | the brownie points on the Order of

the Coif

i that has no business -

Bi

#:

All right. I want to put it in for my recards.

I merely noticed in your Martindale biography

that you were also a member.

B:

He basically was with the FBI during the War,

working for a substantial amount of that time in

Washington on German intelligence matters; eventually worked

on the Soviet Desk and then joined the CIA in 1947,

first being

in charge of the Soviet Branch.

He went to Berlin

in the Fall

of 1952 where he was stationed -

---

## Page 6

-..

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

-2-

interrupt make that please - Do you mind my

B:

Sure - go ahead.

H:

B:

Make that Soviet Intelligence Branch.

- and he was in charge of the Soviet Intelligence

Branch of the Agency --

H:

-which is a lesser position than the other reads

like.

B:

the ese went to Berlinin the lee

where he was

back to Washington in the Fall of 1959 where he stayed until

June of 1963, except for possible short periods of temporary

.

H:

- except for several periods of temporary duty.

-- except for several periods of temporary duty

abroad.

He went to Rome in June 1963 where he

was..•••••••

....until 1966. He came back to the Agency

in Washington in

• 1966 and he retired from the Agency in 1967.

on December 31. Now, Mr. Harvey, does that sumarize basically

part of your background, at least that we discussed?

That is correct. I would like to add one thing, if

may. During both the Berlin and Rome periods and for a considera

period of time in Washington after I returned from Berlin I

was on the rolls of the Foreign Service of State, which raises

a tittle question of propriety. But I want you to know that

B:

All right. I first asked you with regard to any

knowledge of any assassination plans or plots withir

the Agency concerning Patrice Lumumba and you might indicate

what your response was to that, Mr. Harvey.

s.".

H:

I have no personal knowledge of any such plan or

operation within or on the part of the Agency.

B:

I also asked you apart from the question of Fidel

Castro whether or not you had any knowledge of

any assassination plans or plots in the Agency that involved

any other foreign leader.

with

---

## Page 7

Library

Photocopy from Gerald

-3-

H:

Beyond the loose talk, "Would it be desirable"

or "Wouldn't it be fine if", I do not.

•B:

You know of no other plans except Castro. Is that

correct?

H:

No. Plans in the sense that a decision was made

to attain that objective and an actual plan or

operation started for that purpose, I do not:

B:

All right. One of the reasons that we're here is .

to discuss the question of what knowledge you had about

this whole area, and I believe you indicated that at one time

you had a conversation with someone in the Agency concerning

what that person called a request from the White House for

the Agency to develop what was called an "executive actior

capability". Did you have such a conversation with anyone

in the Agency?

H:

Yes, I dia.

B:

And who was that?

H:

B:

Richard Bissell.

And I believe you indicated that that took place.

in either 1961 or 1962. Is that correct?

H:

To the best of my recollection that particular

discussion probably took place in the latter part

of 1961.

B:

Do you remember what Richard Bissell --

could

--it just conceivably/have been very early '62.

B:

Do you remember what Richard Bissell told you and

what you told him?

H:

B:

Not precisely.

Do you remember that he in substance said that

the White House or someone in the White House had

raised the question of whether or not the Agency should develor

what was called an "executive action capability", a capability

of assassination or liquidation of leaders of foreign countries:

H:

To the best of my recollection that was stated.

B:

Was it stated just once or perhaps on more than

one occasion?

---

## Page 8

-....

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

-4-

H:

B:

'I can only be certain as to once.

All right. But it might have been on more than

one occasion?

H:

That's possible, but I have no real recollection

that -- the statement which is best I can recall

is that the White House has more than once raised the question

of whether we should have a capability for executive action.

B:

OK. I believe you indicated to me that you first

learned about the Castro operation from Bissell who

instructed; you to talk to Sheffield Edwards who had been

involved with

operation before you became involved. Is

that correct?

H:

To the best of my recollection I may have been told

of the operation before I was asked to discuss it

with Edwards and take it over.

I cannot be certain whether

there was one discussion of this or two. I think possibly I

may have known about it before I was asked to take it over.

B:

All right. And then after you were asked were you

briefed at all by Bissell or did you get your

initial briefing from Sheffield Edwards?

H:

I was only briefed by Bisseli that such an opera-

tion had been mounted, what the objective was,

and that it had been handled through Sheffield Edwards. I do e

not recall if he went into further detail or not, but in other

words whether or not he may have said that a contact was made

with this person or this type of person.

But in any event it

was not a briefing as such or in any detail. It would merely.

have been a summarizing of remarks.

.

B:

All right.

Then you did get a briefing in detail.

• though from Sheffield Edwards, is that correct?

H:

Yes.

B:

H:

And Edwards was in what capacity at that time?

At that time he was Chief of the Office of

Security.

B::

All right. Then did he put you in touch with the

case officer?

H:

• B:

H:

Yes.

Correct.

And that was Mr. O'Connell, is that correct?

:

---

## Page 9

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

-5-

3:

Now, I believe, that you said that prior to this

time you had had contact with Robert Maheu because

you had been both in the same FBI training class together but

that you didn't have any contact with Maheu during this period

of time to any degree:. Is that correct?

H:

The last time that I saw Maheu or talked with

Maheu of had any direct or indirect communication

with Maheu would have been about 1946, possibly '47.

B:

All right. I believe you said as you went through

the entire analysis of the plan you called it among -

other things a "damn fool idea to start with" -- I'm saying

..

you called it in our prior conversation today before we started

taping this interview, and you thought it had been handled in

an incredibly amateurish fashion. Is this accurate?

H:

I'd like to be sure that this is precise. This

was my tentative opinion of it.

Whether I expressed exactly those words either to Cölonel

Edwards or to Bissell, I am not sure. But I may very well have

I may have expressed them subsequent to that time.

B:

You also stated that you thought--you also stated

to me today that you thought we were dealing with

what you referred to as a huge hand grenade, that you could

Fus,

not afford to have go

is concerned.

Off, so far as outside knowledge of it

That is correct.

H:

: /It was not just

• a question of my not being able

to afford

that

it go off, but in the aftermath

of the Bay of Pigs failure, that was not the kind of an explosior

that the Government, the Agency, or anybody else could well

affor

B:

And one of the concerns you had, I believe, was

that so many people seemed to know about the plan.

Is that correct?

H:

That is correct.

B:

Do you have any opinion as to whether or not

Castro might or might not have known about it?

H:

Given the capabilities of Castro's security

lex.

apparata and the general sieve-like character

of the Cuban community in exile and the number of people who

knew: at least something about this particular incident or

operation, before I had any connection with it, or later as

a result of things that occurred before I had any connection

with it, I think and thought at the time that it was quite

conceivable that it had been penetrated.!

I cannot

honestly state that I had at that time any firm reason to

---

## Page 10

Photocopy from Gerald R.

Ford Library

• .

euth

EFFORTS

-6-

selieve that "Castro was aware of this operation".

B:

I believe that you discussed this with Edwards

and then O'Connell and then with Helms.

Is that

correct?

H:

B:

H:

B:

Yes.

And I think you also said that if you got involved

you felt you had to take over the contact with

John Roselli to have control of the situation: Is that correct?

And that

/I wanted everyone else cut out.

You met Roselli first in New York and when,

approximately?

H:

Of the best of my recollection about early April

B:

Roselli was working with Cuban exiles and with organi

gamblers, is that correct?

H:

That was my understanding.

B:

And after that first meeting with Roselli at which

I believe you indicated to me earlier - and when I

say "earlier",

we had an extensive interview berore we started

taping here - is that correct?

H:

B:

That's correct.

After that first meeting, lyou feel that O'Connell from

that time forward was not involved in the situation.

Is that correct? So far as you were concerned?

•: far as I was concerned and I shortly thereafter

xpressed the conviction that

that should be the case

to which Colonel Eawards agreed, I do not remember the exact

date that O'Connell was instructed to stay completely out of

this operation -- instructed by Colonel Edwards, that is:

But

it would have been some time rather shortly after this.

And then as I understand it basically, you reported

to Helms that you were taking -- you had already:

do can ate on enter to loan 2 to 013.

Government.

---

## Page 11

• .

:

Ford Library

-7-

H:

-- or of any other individuals involved in this.

B:

If by that you use blackmail in the broader term

of not just payment of money for an individual

but doing a favor, even taking action that the government

might not otherwise want to take.

H:

That is correct. Or its being used in a vindictive.

sense, if you will if proposals of policies

or particular things these individuals and groups wanted.

were refused.

By what means

B:

were they going to try and assassinate cuba - or

a Cuban leader - Castro?

H:

I was told that there were two possibilities -

rifle fire and the use of poison.

B: .

On the rifle fire, did you participate with the

financing to enable one of these Cuban exile groups

that Roselli was involved with to acquire guns and ammunition?

H:

I did participate in one delivery of arms and

some related equipment.

B:

H:

B:

And where did that delivery take place?

• It took place in Miami.

And do you know approximately when that took place?

Might it have been in late '62 or early

• '63?

H:

B:

Well, it certainly was not in '63. I do not believe

it was as late as late '62.

To the best of my

recollection, it would have been about mid-'62.

H:

he asked, given the amount of his

funds he had expended in travel expenses ana. own personal

so forth, that he F

bably could have gotten money. As a matter of fact, I believe that

Roselli made it a point of pride to take absolutely nothing

- no with the u.s.

he

---

## Page 12

..

: •

-..

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

-8-

Now, Mr. Harvey,

3:

Ido you know how much money was paid in the

Summer of 1962 - mid-'62 - for these gun deliveries,

approximately?

premarch

• I don't remember the exact amount that the shipment

There was a not large cash

payment made to this Cuban group.

I believe it was in the low

four figures, but the exact amount I do not remember.

B:

H:

B:

Plus or minus $5,000?

Certainly not plus, and I would think minus.

Do you remember if it included both rifles and

handguns?

H:

B:

I believe that it did, yes.

And I believe you also told me drugs such as anti-

biotics.

H:

Yes, there were some medicinal drugs, anti-biotics,

and so forth, which as I recall was a fairly minor

B:

Were the poison pills invölved botulism pills?

H:

I don't know.

B:

They were pills which were to be used in - to

dissolve in food or something of that nature?

H:

My understanding that they were - whether they

were pills or what they were, I don't. know, but a sub

stance was ito be orally administered, I believe in food or

drink, but I'm not positive.

B:

Did you ever get a report from Roselli that the

people had gotten into Cuba with the guns and

with the pills?

H:

I did receive a report from Roselli that he had

received from his Cuban contact that the arms

had gotten in , the people had gotten in, and the material

had gotten in, and that they had high hopes of success for

B:

But the - of course - there was no ultimate success

so far as the killing of Castro was concerned.

---

## Page 13

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

-9-

H:

There was no ultimate success, and as far as I

personally know, there was never, even any credible !

attempt made.

B:

Do you have any opinion why?

H:

I don/t know that I have any valid opinion why.

There are a great many things that could have

happened.

It wasn't tried, it was choked off, it was pene-

trated from the start - at least on the Cuban end -- that is

the end in Cuba. When I say I had no personal knowledge of

this, I am aware that Castro has claimed there were a number

of attempts on his life.

I am aware that he has blamed those

on the U.S. in general and on CIA in particulai. But I have

no personal knowledge of facts which would prove that there

was ever actually if you will, a shot fired or any poison

administered, or any other attempt other than in the inchoate

stage.

B:

Mr. Harvey, didJohn McCone know at this time what

was going on?

H:

B:

To my knowledge, he did not.

You were at a meeting of the Special Group (Augmented'

in the Department of State in August of 1962 when

someone brought up the possibility of liquidation of Castro,

is that correct?

H:

That is correct.

B:

Do you remember what Mr. McCone did at the time?

H:

ies. He got rather

red in the face and made a

comment "Well, that's not something that should

be discussed!'

Now, please don't hold me to these

EXACT words.

with

B:

H:

That's to the best of your recollection?

The best of my recollection is I was at that "

meeting with John McCone.

To the best of my

recollection the remark that he made was a clear effort to

stop any such proposals, suggestion or any discussion thereof

at that meeting within that forum immediately.

B:

Earlier, before that meeting, had you had any dis-

cussiors with Richard Helms about whether or not

McCone should be advised of what was going on after McCone

became DCI?

H:

Yes, I had.

---

## Page 14

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

-10-

B:

And what was the substance of your conversation

with Richard Helms?

H:

I do not recall how the question came up as to

whether the new DCI should be briefed or not. I

may have raised it.

But I did recommend to Mr. Helms that

since this particular "operation" and the possible repercussions

from it all stemmed from actions which had taken place long

before either Helms or myself had had any personal connection

with it, and before John McCone had had any connection whatever

with the Agency, and since the decision had been made at that .

time that this should be sanitized, tied off and terminated

as soon as practically feasible, I

saw no reason why the new

ocI should be briefed on it, and I strongly recommended that

he not be.

B:

Ultimately you decided that the planshad litte

chance of success and you decided to wind down

the plans. Is that correct?

H:

I would object to the word "ultimately".

• That

is substantially correct if you put it within the

time frame that I reached a tentative conclusion to that effect

very shortly after I was able to fully debrief Roselli and

assess what had gone on in the past, the people that we could fin

out that were involved in it who I checked out file-wise and so fr

as against what we then knew of the general capability of

effective action within Cuba.

B:

And then in order to not have an explosion from

a too-abrupt termination, you determined to

gradually tie it down and wind it up, is that correct?

H:

That is correct.

Remembering, Mr. Belin, that

in the initial phases of this it was quite

obvious that there was an explosion potential here--an explosion

not in the technical sense -- a flap potential, if you will,

and how 20k

but it took some time to find out just what could'be done

and how it could be done, to try to sanitize the possible

repercussions of this.

B:

Any other thing that you wish to add for the

record here?

H:

Only that I assume you will write up your notes

of this.

from our considerably more detailed discussion

If you do I would appreciate

a copy .

---

## Page 15

-11-

.:

......

Photocopy from Gerald

Ford Library

5:

You will get a copy of whatever I write in that

regard.

H:

The only other comment that I would like to make

for this tape is that to the extent it is possible

I would request that actual identities be sanitized from this

insofar as it is possible to do so.

B:

And that's for purposes of protecting rights of

privacy to people including yourself?

H:

Exactly It is not as I said earlier in our

informal conversation that this is net an oblique

pleading of the Fifth Amendment.

B:

whit

I believe you then indicated to me that you went

to Rome in approximately June of 1963.

H:

B:

That is correct. It was June 1963.

H:

And had no further contact with this Cuban operation

from that time forward. Is that correct?

That is correct.

B:

Anything else you wish to add on the record?

POINTS

H:

One please.

One catchi

There have, as you know,

been some unfortunate and in my opinion distorted

allegations about that that have surfaced publicly sin then,

but I have had no official connection with any Cuban operatior

of any kind since June--probably May would be more accurate--at

the very latest--of May of 1963. And from the time that I left

the Cuban task force in the early months of 1963--to the best

of my recollection around March--I have in no sense attempted

to keep current or involve myself in it in any sense whatever.

B:

Anything else you'd wish to add?

H:

You want this for the record--or off the recörd?

B:

Either way.

H:

I have nothing to add to the tape unless you have

further questions.

B:

-

No sir, I just want to thank you very much for your

cooperation and I'll get a transcript to you on this.

H:

What I'd like to say--and this has no business in the

tape--but you've been most courteous and most considerate

and again, take it for what it's worth, I have tried very hard to

Thank you very much.

(END OF TAPE)

Wuhan tari

---