MEMO: STUDY ENTITLED 'THE HAVANA CP CONFERENCE OF NOVEMBER 1964' (CIA-319-00004-65
Originator: CIA
From: WITHHELD
To: SPECIAL GROUP (CI) ASSISTANTS
Document date: 03/25/1965
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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2023 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

file-CI

SEERATYNOFORN

TO:

FROM:

Special Group (CI) Assistants

23 March 1965

Paul Eckel

• SUBJECT: Study entitled "The Havana CP Conference of November 1964'

(GLA - 319/00004-65)

Please correct a typographical error an page 7 of subject

study which was sent to you on 19 March 1965. The error is

found in the seventh line from the bottom of the page, which when

corrected should read, "... with the ouster of Anibal Escalante

in early 1962, and--outside..."

snade.om

study

1 Paul E. Eckela

Special Group Officer

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SEERICA GEORN

The Special Group (CI) Assistants

19 March 1965

Paul Eckel;-

The Havana Conference of Communist Parties, November 1964

There is enclosed for your information and use a CLA

Working Paper analyzing and commenting upon subject conference.

I think you will find the contents of this document pertinent and

timely particularly Section Ill dealing with conference decisions.

The dissemination of this document seems particularly

appropriate at this time in view of the discussion at the Group's

18 March meeting concerning USIA's efforts to publicize communist

support for and participation in subversive operations. Use of this

material is governed by the

stipulations contained on the inside

cover page in the paragraph entitled, "Limitations."

Paul E. Eckel

Special Group Officer

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

CIA - 319/00004-65

WORKING PAPER

The Havana CP Conference of November 1964

3 March 1965

This is not an officially approved publication of CIA. It is circulated

for information subject to the enclosed statement of limitations.

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CIA-319/00004-65

SCOPE

The Havana CP Conference of November 1964, 36 pages,

dated 3 March I965, describes the background, purposes, and

circumstances of the Conference of Latin American Communist

Parties held in Havana 22-29 November 1964, and discusses

the issues Involved and the decisions taken. It also identifies

the programs and courses of action decided

upon at the confer-

ence, certain of which have already been placed in operation,

and discusses

the tactics to be used in carrying

them out.

LIMITATIONS

There are a number of instances in this paper in which

the language employed has been adopted for the specific

purpose of source protection. It is essential, therefore,

that any proposed use of the paper or of material drawn from

it be cleared in advance with the originator.

The circulation

of the paper should be kept on a strict need-to-know basis.

Hence, any questions with respect to the use of this document

or the material therein in a manner contrary to the dissem-

ination controls must be addressed to the Document Division,

OCR.

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THE HAVANA CP CONFERENCE OF NOVEMBER 1964

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

1

1. Summary

II. Background, Genesis, and Circumstances of the

Conference

A. The Precedents

B. Problems Requiring Coordinated Solutions

1. The Brazilian Party Protest

2. The Argentine Party Protest

3. The Peruvian Party Protest

4. The Bolivian Party Protest

C. The Havana Conference--an Expression of

Loyalty to Moscow

D. The Conference Convenes

III. The Conference Decisions

A. The Regional "Solidarity" Projects for 1965

B. First Organizational Moves in the Solidarity

Campaigns

C. The Conference Treatment of the Role of,

and Support for, Armed Struggle

1. The Soviet Commitment

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C. (continued)

Post-Conference Developments in the

Field of Violence

a. Guatemala

b. Honduras

c.

Panama

d.

Venezuela

IV. The Conference and International Communist Unity

A. Cuba, the Orthodox CP's, and the Other

Liberation Elements

B. The National CP's and Internal Factionalism

V. Conclusions

Appendix

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THE HAVANA CP CONFERENCE OF NOVEMBER 1964

I. Summary:

The 22-29 November conference in Havana was the first

publicly acknowledged regional congress of Latin American CP's

since 1929, although it has been the practice since at least 1956

to hold such conferences regularly, if secretly, in Moscow. As

with other such conferences, it was called to coordinate regional

Communist activity with Soviet policy, and represents an effort

by the Soviets to establish orthodox CP control and coordination

over the revolutionary tactics to be employed in each country and

to prevent unilateral support by Cuba to extremist groups of its

own choosing.

Problems resulting from Soviet-Cuban differences over

the conduct of subversive operations in Latin America emerged

again after the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962, and were

intensified by the failure of the USSR and the Latin American

CP's to give Castro the support he desired. During 1963 Soviet

pressure on Castro and complaints by various CP's over Cuban

"interference" in the revolution in their respective countries

resulted in a number of discussions which, in turn, set the stage

for the Havana conference. The careful coordination between

Moscow and Havana and the publicity given by Moscow to the

final conference communique testify to the importance given by

the Soviets to this display of unity. The endorsement of the

. Moscow declarations of 1957 and 1960 can be interpreted by the

CPSU as a declaration of loyalty to Moscow by the Latin American

parties, including--for the first time--the new PURS of Cuba.

The unwritten.but.basic.premise.of the communique_lies

in an agreement by Castro to limit Cuban support to those

revolutionary groups approved by the CP of the country concerned

and, conversely, a pledge by the Soviet Bloc to support armed

action in countries where such action is approved-by the local CP.

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Soviet and Cuban statements, and covert intelligence sources,

suggest that the Venezuelan, Guatemalan, and perhaps Celembian

revolutionary forces may be the chief beneficiaries of this

support, although the communique itself promises "active aid"

to "freedom fighters" in other countries as well.

Preparations for the conference were made in Moscow

in early November by various leaders and representatives of

Latin American parties. The meeting was then held in Havana,

attended by a Soviet observer, and subsequently a group returned

to Moscow where they worked out the final editing of the documents

approved in Havana. Before the communique was issued, a

delegation of some ten Latin American leaders traveled to China

in an unsuccessful attempt to gain Chinese cooperation with the

conference agreements.

The overt conference decisions, as revaled in the

communique, involve four region-wide solidarity projects:

solidarity with Cuba; solidarity with all Latin American anti-

imperialist struggles; solidarity for the release of political

prisoners; and solidarity in support of the "combative" struggle

of the Venezuelan people. Implementation of these campaigns

began promptly with the scheduling of a Cuban solidarity congress in

Montevideo in April and the initiation of an amnesty drive and

other international campaigns. The Montevideo meeting will

probably represent a major effort--comparable to the Mexico

City liberation congress of March 1961--to demonstrate orthodox

Communist willingness and capabilities to support Cuba.

Argentine and Chilean parties have already met to pledge their

utmost efforts to assure the success of the conference.

With respect to the general anti-imperialist campaign,

the communique stresses the need for organization on a

permanent basis to give "active" (but unspecified) aid to freedom

fighters in some countries, to "intensify solidarity" with the

people of Panama, and to give "resolute" aid to independence

struggles in Puerto Rico and European dependencies. The

wording suggests that some regional coordinating body may be

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formed.

Both Che Guevara of Cuba and Salvador Allende of

Chile have suggested some such coordination, and there is

some evidence that sub-regional efforts have already begun.

The call for solidarity with Venezuela is not new. In

1963 the Cuban Institute of Friendship with Peoples (ICAP)

made such a call, and a special effort to promote solidarity

was made shortly before the unsuccessful FALN effort to

disrupt the Venezuelan presidential elections. The attention

given to Venezuela: in the conference communique is significant,

however, as it commits the Latin American CP's to support

a liberation movement in which the main line has been the

armed struggle. As failure of this line in Venezuela would

undermine the line elsewhere, it is possible that the initiative

was as much Cuban as Venezuelan. In any event, the Cubans

began devoting increased attention to Venezuelan solidarity

shortly before the conference and organized a Cuban-Venezuelan

solidarity week during which an FALN öffice was opened in

Havana.

There is some evidence that the CP's in other

countries are beginning to organize in support of Venezuela.

Behind the language of the conference communique lies

an explicit though secret Soviet commitment to support the

armed struggle in Latin America. A CPSU functionary has

recently stated, in a closed meeting with non-Bloc Communists,

that armed struggle is "likely to be necessary in some

situations in Latin America," and a Pravda editorial clearly

spells out the Soviet obligation to support the just struggle of

armed patriots in Venezuela, Guatemala, and " a number of

•other countries." However, the Soviets apparently look to the

local CP's to protect them from over-commitment and involve-

ment in rash adventurism, and only in the case of parties which

have clearly committed themselves to the support of specific

revolutionary groups does there seem to be an obligation on

the part of the Soviets. This is the case with Venezuela, where

the CP has clearly identified itself with the policies and

objectives of the FALN. It is less clear in Guatemala, where

the CP recognizes the FAR (a nominal unified guerrilla command)

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but admits only a "certain degree of maturity" of conditions

for revolution. In Colombia, the CP admits conditions are

"mature, " but admits that unity of action does not exist. In

other countries, theoretical considerations may also qualify

Soviet support.

The Soviet obligation to honor its commitment to aid

an armed struggle may also be limited by unwillingness of

Castro and pro-Castro groups to collaborate with the local

CP's. In Guatemala, despite CP approval of the FAR,

difficulty has existed between the CP and extremists in the

13th of November Movement which may delay the realization

of the unity sought.

Despite the theoretical considerations which may limit

Soviet support, there have been significant signs of stepped-up

plans for sabotage, terrorism, and guerrilla activity in several

Central American countries, under the direction of the local

Communist party. In Guatemala, the party has formed a

committee to consolidate information on professional men,

landowners, and military officials who should be "liquidated"

in 1965. In Honduras, Cuban-trained leaders of the Francisco

Morazon Liberation Movement have agreed to submit to CP

direction, and the CP military command has planned militant

action for the post-election period. In El Salvador, the military

command of the FUAR has been reactivated, and the CP Panama

presented its military plan to Raul Castro at the time of the

conference, asking for Cuban training and arms at the same

time. In Venezuela also, there have been some developments

• of significance: the chief of the FALN, at the time of the

conference, obtained promises of financial aid from Cuba and

promises of arms from the Bloc; subsequently, he traveled to

the USSR to seek additional support for the revolution.

Reportedly, Cuban leaders agreed to give support only to

those revolutionary groups approved by the local Communist

party. It Castro abides by this agreement, it would resolve

the complaints by various CP's over unilateral Cuban action

and strengthen the hand of mature, orthodox, Communists

over the young extremists. However, the record suggests

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that in 1963 and 1964 Castro responded only nominally to Soviet

pressure, and this may be the case now, despite some evidence

of Cuban sincerity. Without Chinese endorsement, whichethe

Latin American CP's fruitlessly tried to enlist in December, the

Havana agreement may not promote effective unity or bring about

the cessation of polemics and elimination of factionalism for

which it calls.

The Latin American parties, however, appear happy

with the communique so far: the Uruguayan leaders see it as

softening the differences between hard-line and soft-line

elements; the Bolivian first secretary feels that it will reduce

the influence of the anti-party (pro-Chinese) faction; and a

Brazilian, CP functionary. in:Prague)spoke of the virtues of

such efforts toward unity and complete understanding in the

socialist camp, though without commenting on the disunity

which exists in Brazil.

In conclusion, events in December and January indicate

that efforts have been made to carry out the decisions of the

Havana Conference, and these efforts may contribute to giving

greater unity, common purpose, and momentum to Communist

subversive activity throughout the region. But it is equally

obvious that, if the CPSU seeks greater unity among its

adherents, and if there is a renewal of the confrontation with

the Chinese in the wake of Moscow's 1 March CP meeting, the

Havana agreements may be subject to serious strain. The pro-

Chinese Albanians have charged that the Havana meeting was a

Soviet-inspired maneuver to trap the Cuban Communists and to

restore Soviet control over Communism in the area. They

demand that the CPSU not be given respite nor allowed to

• consolidate its "shaky position."

The orthodox Latin American CP's face a series of

tests, both regional and national. Unimpressive showings in

the various solidarity campaigns may easily lead to increased

antagonism and recriminations. In Venezuela, the party must

defend the FALN against increasingly effective government

action and also regain political influence. In Cuba, in particular,

the old-line Communists face Fidel Castro's efforts to resist

~ Soviet orthodoxy through his influence over the development of

the PURS. Every failure in these tests will put new strains on

the Havana agreements.

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II. Background, Genesis, and Circumstances of the Conference.

A. The Precedents.

The 22-29 November conference in Havana was the first

publicly acknowledged regional congress of Latin American CP's

since 1929. However,

it in fact has been the practice since at

least 1956 to hold such conferences regularly, if secretly, in

Moscow. They usually have followed major world CP conferences

and are used for discussing, planning, and coordinating actions

to be taken in carrying out the Soviet line endorsed at the world

meeting concerned. Thus, following the 20th CPSU Congress in

February 1956, a secret meeting of Latin American CP's was

held to plan regional and sub-regional coordination. After the

40th Anniversary celebration in November 1957, a Latin American

CP conference was held, under Soviet guidance, to organize a

long-term action program to begin in 1958, a program which

included coordinated support for the anti-dictatorial struggles

in Venezuela and Cuba, improved sub-regional coordination, and

hemispheric consolidation of anti-US action and propaganda.

This program was implemented through support to the Cuban

26th of July Movement, through a conference of northern Latin

American CP's in Mexico in March 1958, and a hemispheric

peace conference in Buenos Aires in May 1958. These, in turn,

allowed coordination at lower levels.

Following the 21st CPSU Congress in January 1959, a

similar secret Latin American Conference was held, again with

a Soviet "observer" present. Emphasis was put on a continuation

of the 1958 action program and on more effective concealment of

the Communist initiative and influence in the organization of

popular movements.

After the 81-party conference in Moscow in November

1960, another secret LA CP conference was held, at which time

emphasis was placed on support of Cuba against US-sponsored

invasion threats and on the regional development of the national

liberation movement after the Cuban model. Implementation of

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these objectives was furthered through the "national liberation"

conference in Mexico (March 1961) and through a secret meeting

of Latin American CP leaders in Havana (May 1961), at which the

role of Cuba as the primary external training and coordinating

base for subversion was established. From this came further

sub-regional planning, such as the: August 1961 conference of

Central American CP's to discuss the armed struggle. Paralleling

the coordinated CP action, there was a similar regional

coordination of the Cuban-supported Castroist revolutionary

movements.

B. Problems Requiring Coordinated Solutions.

Russo-Cuban conduct of Communist subversive operations

in Latin America since 1959 has been marked by disputes and

mutual concessions relating to the role of Cuba and Cuban

revolutionary tactics. Initial differences between Castro and the

Communists were apparently reconciled in late 1960, and as

Castro subsequently dedicated himself to intensive study of

Marxism-Leninism, the Soviets and the orthodox parties permitted

Cuban-oriented national liberation movements to assume leader-

ship in the revolutionary struggle. The WPC-organized national

liberation conference in Mexico in March 1961 symbolized this

collaboration, and during 1961 a number of guerrilla liberation

fronts were founded in various countries. In December of the

same year, Castro announced that he had become a "mature'!

Marxist-Leninist. However, the failure of the Soviets and the

various Latin American CP's to defend Cuban sovereignty

effectively during the October 1962 missile crisis created a

of Cuba--the orthodox CP's began to criticize Cuban "interference"

an attempt to show that a new basis for unity and coordination has

been achieved.

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1.

The Brazilian Party Protest.

In February 1963, Luiz Carlos Prestes, Secretary

General of the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB), left for

Moscow and then Havana, to correct what he and other PCB

leaders considered to be affronts to the PCB by both the

Cubans and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The main

complaint was that the Chinese and Cubans had often by-passed

the PCB and had dealt with revolutionary groups in Brazil,

particularly the dissident Communist Party of Brazil (CPB)

and the Peasant Leagues of Francisco Juliao. Although while

in Cuba Prestes declared his party's adherence to the Second

Declaration of Havana and to the armed struggle line for

Latin America, he insisted that the time was not propitious

for violence or terrorism in Brazil, and apparently indicated

that he had approval of his position from Moscow. Prestes

was able to resolve some of the conflicts existing between

Cuba and the PCB, but several major differences remained

outstanding. Castro and other Cuban leaders refused to

entertain Prestes' protest against their giving aid to Juliao,

on the specious grounds that the question of PCB-Juliao

differences was an internal question of the Brazilian movement

on which it would not be proper for them to express an opinion.

Prestes, who interpreted this as proof of the Cuban intent to

continue support of Juliao, concluded that Cuban leaders were

committed to the view that the best way in which Communist

movements in Latin American countries could aid Cuba was

to launch their own national revolution promptly.

2. The Argentine Party Protest.

In March/April 1963, an official of the Communist

Party of Bolivia (PCB) visited Argentina, and, on instructions

from the CPSU, told PCA leaders that Cuba was preparing to

organize and support insurrectionary groups in Bolivia,

Argentina, Peru,

and Venezuela with the cooperation of the

PCB. On hearing the report, the Communist Party of

Argentina (PCA) sent the head of its international section to

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Bolivia

and Peru to argue that revolutionary planning such as

this--outside of Communist party lines and control--could

work against the Communist parties. The Argentine official

pointed out that precipitous action, without mass support or

psychological preparation, could compromise the regular

efforts of the parties to build for future battles. The PCB

leaders refused to accept the PCA's stand, and PCA President

Victorio Codovilla went to Moscow in May to confer with

Khrushchev and to come to an agreement with Castro, who

was then making his long visit to Moscow. After meeting

with Castro he notified the PCA Central Committee that Castro

had accepted the party's position and had promised to suspend

the revolutionary program on his return to Havana. He said

Castro admitted that he had not realized how much dissension

and bitterness Cuban support of non-party leftist groups was

causing in the Communist parties.

3. The Peruvian Party Protest.

In this same month (May 1963), a CP Bolivia

delegation was severely berated at a meeting in Moscow with

CPSU members for being involved in guerrilla operations

against Peru. It was told that a formal complaint submitted

by Jorge del Prado Chavez, First Secretary of the Communist

Party of Peru (PCP), against the PCB had, among other things,

accused the PCB of violating the international Communist

accords of 1957 and 1960 through interference in the internal

affairs of another Communist party. The delegation protested

fruitlessly that the PCP had full knowledge of the operation and

• had given its prior consent. They were bluntly asked not to

intervene in the future in the internal affairs of another Communist

party. On the other hand, the CPSU spokesman said that if the

PCB felt that conditions were ripe within Bolivia, and if the PCB

had sufficient strength to carry out a successful effort, it should

initiate guerrilla activities in its own country.

Thus not only Cuba, but the Bolivian party leadership

as well, was being attacked for intervention in the affairs of

- other parties.

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4. The Bolivian Party Protest •

In October 1963 it was the PCB's turn to protest.

It charged the Cuban Embassy in La Paz with using PCB

and Communist youth members in its organizing of terrorist

and sabotage groups for operations in La Paz. The PCB

thus turned against the Cubans the charge of meddling in

the internal affairs of the PCB and protested that this was

destroying the integrity of the party. Claiming that the

PCB could not take any direct action to stop the Cuban

activity because of the serious internal problems it would

create for the party, the PCB said it was thinking of

denouncing Cuban interference in the internal affairs of

the PCB at the next international gathering of Communist

parties, then expected to take place in Moscow in November.

5. In other

countries, also, the Communist parties

attacked Cuban interference, though such attacks were not

made public. In Panama, for example, the CP prepared

an internal document for party leaders only which enumerated

cases of Cuban "indifference" to the CP and encouragement

of the extremist VAN, which was attributed to "second

echelon officials and the petty bourgeois foundation of the

Cuban revolution." Both Cuban and Chinese attempts to

direct the Panamanian revolution were attacked privately

by party leaders, who were warned that pro-Chinese petty

bourgeois influence might cause the Cubans to assume an

anti-Soviet position at any moment.

C. The Havana Conference--an Expression of Loyalty to

Moscow.

One of the most interesting questions concerning the

relationship of the 1964 Havana meeting to the earlier Latin

American party conferences is raised by the publicity that it has

been given since mid-January 1965. Earlier, the secrecy

observed in connection with the meetings was paralleled by

Soviet cautioning of the parties not to identify themselves openly--

and particularly, the coordinated programs they were to develop--

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with the USSR. But in 1965 it was a TASS release in Moscow

that first focused international attention on the meeting. (A

•press interview given at home by a Bolivian CP leader in early

December was completely ignored by Communist media

elsewhere: ) In the light of evidence from other parts of the

world, such as the Middle East, it is likely that this change

in approach has been dictated at least in part, by a Soviet

desire to strengthen its control and manifest authority over

the Communist parties of the developing countries in the Free

World. If nothing else, the informal, "unanimous" endorsement

at the end of 1964 of the declarations of 1957 and 1960 can be

interpreted by the CPSU as a declaration of the loyalty of the

Latin American parties--including, for the first time, the

Cuban PURS--to Moscow.

While the November Havana Conference unques tionably

was sponsored by the CPSU, its initiation was technically left

to Latin American parties--CP Bolivia and CP Uruguay according

to some reports, and the CP's of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and

Bolivia, according to others. On precedent, it seems probable

that Bolivia, and Uruguay would have been the most interested

initiators of such a conference for the CPSU. It has in fact been

reported that some of the parties in the countries around Bolivia

were unenthusiastic and felt that such a conference would be

fruitless. Uruguay has often expressed its great concern about

unity in the international Communist movement, and the Bolivians,

after a period of collusion with the Cubans, subsequently

experienced Cuban interference in what they deem to be their

internal affairs.

D. The Conference Convenes:

In early November 1964 various leaders and representatives

of Latin American Communist parties who were in Moscow for the

November celebration began to prepare documents and an agenda

for a meeting of Latin American Communist parties to be held in

Havana later in the month. According to one source, the CPSU

wanted the Havana meeting held for the purpose of discussing the

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Sino-Soviet dispute as well as other problems of common

interest to the Latin American Communist parties. Travel

of the delegates, as well as the printing of the approved

documents after the meeting, were to be paid for by the CPSU.

In mid-November 1964, additional Latin American

Communist party leaders began to leave for Moscow, which

suggests that the first group was operating as a kind of

preparatory committee.

From Moscow the groups went to Havana, where the

Latin American meeting was held from 22 to 29 November 1964.

It is not known how many of the participants in the conference

went directly to Havana.

Following the Havana meeting, a groupi

i returned to Moscow, where

they worked with others on the final editing of the documents

approved in Havana.

A delegation of some ten Latin American Communist

leaders, who in all probability were with the group that returned

to Moscow, went on to Communist China, carrying out a decision

that had been taken at the conference itself. This group tried

to get the Chinese to agree to work more closely with the USSR

to lessen tension in the Communist world, particularly in Latin

America, and to accept the policy of not supporting groups that

did not have proper endorsement. No agreement was reached,

however, and the delegates received no satisfaction from the

Chinese, who treated them courteously but very coldly. The

Chinese allegedly reaffirmed their determination to recognize

and cooperate with "true Marxist-Leninists" who opposed Soviet

policies,

and made it clear that there was no chance that they

would yield to pressure, no matter how many parties opposed

them.

Most of the few known delegates to the Havana Conference

returned to their native countries during the latter part of

December 1964, or in early January 1965. (See Appendix::

"Identified Participants in the Conference and Related Events.")

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The Havana CP Conference of November 1964, if it

. has in fact resolved the problems that developed among Latin

American Communists over the past three to four years,

establishes new bases of Soviet-Cuban subversive collaboration.

Effective planning, coordination, and vigorous efforts to carry

out programs on a regional and sub-regional basis, after the

pattern of the years before 1960, may be expected in 1965--

though not without the possibility of disruptive or independent

action by recalcitrant pro-Castroist or pro-Chinese elements.

IlI. The Conference Decisions.

A. The Regional "Solidarity" Projects for 1965.

Four region-wide solidarity projects were approved

at Havana:

1.

A campaign of solidarity with Cuba.

2, A general campaign of solidarity with Latin

American anti-imperialist struggles.

3. A campaign for the release of political

prisoners in various Latin American countries.

4. A specific solidarity campaign in support of

the "combative struggle" of the Venezuelan

people.

The implementation of a number of the conference.

objectives in the field of solidarity activity began promptly.

Indeed, some preliminary steps were taken even before the

conference communique formalized the projects. Meetings

during the Cuban Week of Solidarity with Venezuela that

immediately preceded the party conference in Havana provided

an excellent opportunity for working out the specifics of projects

that would fit in the over-all program. Moreover, a Society of

Soviet-Cuban Friendship was officially created in Moscow on

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11 November 1964, in the presence of Giraldo Mazola and other

members of a Cuban delegation representing the Cuban Institute

of Peoples' Friendship (ICAP). This new body in the USSR may

well serve hereafter as a Soviet instrument for supporting and

promoting action in Latin America, after co

after coordination on the

policy level, through the channels.provided by.soviet otticials

working with other friendship societies in Latin America, since

the Soviet equivalents of the friendship societies abroad work.

under a single body in Moscow--the Union of Soviet Societies for

Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries=-with

which the Soviet intelligence services are deeply involved.

Moreover, this body has as one of its components an association

that deals only with countries of Latin America. A CPSU official,

M. F. Kudatchkin, long identified with the CPSU Foreign Section's

work in Latin America, arrived to join the new Soviet Embassy

in Santiago, Chile, as of the beginning of February, and may

well play a key role in guidance and coordination of regional

activity.

On 22 November, the day on which the conference

opened, the Secretary of the Cuban-Mexican Society for Cultural

Relations returned from a one-month visit to Mexico, during

which she visited the University of Morelia and contacted Mexican

intellectual and cultural figures. While the specifics of her

discussions are not known, it is likely that they involved planning

for 1965 activities.

While each of the four region-wide solidarity projects

may involve a separate organization effort, they are clearly

intended to be mutually supporting and to work toward a single

goal. The Cuban campaign is being built around two themes --

Cuban right of self-determination and demands that other Latin

American governments adopt a policy of non-intervention in

Cuban affairs. The general anti-imperialist solidarity campaign

will also advocate self-determination, but in addition will take

the offensive, exposing and attacking alleged acts of "imperialist

intervention." The amnesty campaign, by its defense of "patriots,"

will spearhead the attack against local anti-Communists and

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anti-Communist national governments. The Venezuelan

campaign, dealing as it does with the presently most significant

• test case of Communist subversion in Latin America, will

involve elements of all three general campaigns. Whatever

contribution it may make to supporting and encouraging the

liberation struggle in Venezuela, this campaign clearly will

also serve as a testing mechanism through whose operations

each of the Communist parties can assess which of the various

projects is most likely to produce results in its own national

environment.

B. First Organizational Moves in the Solidarity Campaigns.

1. On 8 January, an Uruguayan pro-Cuban front

(FIDEL) demonstrated in favor of renewal of Uruguayan-Cuban

diplomatic relations and at the same time announced the formation

of a "Latin American Congress of Solidarity with Cuba and for

the Self-Determination of Peoples, " to be held in Montevideo

2-4 April 1965. There is little doubt that many CP's--and the

Soviets as well--will make a major effort to mobilize the greatest

and most impressive participation possible for this event (which

is comparable to the 1961 National Liberation Congress held in

Mexico), if only to demonstrate to Cuba, China, and the world

the willingness and capabilities of the orthodox CP's in LA to

support Cuba and the liberation movement as long as agreements

on a common policy are observed. A number of similar

conferences in recent years have been postponed or subtly

sabotaged by local Communist foot-dragging in the face of Cuban

efforts to dominate policy. The local parties also stand to gain.

Uruguayan Communists are already reported to be optimistic

that the Havana agreement will reduce inner party friction and

permit greater local influence to be achieved by FIDEL, their

popular political front. External support for this Congress has:"

already been received. The representatives of the Argentine

and Chilean Communist parties met in Buenos Aires during

22-23 January in the first of a series of bilateral meetings as

envisaged in the Havana Conference and declared: "At the

present time it is vitally necessary to put forth the utmost

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effort to assure the success of the coming continental conference

in solidarity with Cuba and for the self-determination of peoples

and nations. Both parties pledge themselves once more to this. "

basis, to:

a. give active (but otherwise unspecified)

aid to freedom fighters in Venezuela, Colombia,

Guatemala, Honduras, Paraguay, and Haiti, and

also to intensify movements of solidarity with

the people of Panama;

b. give "resolute" aid to independence

struggles in Puerto Rico and British Guiana;

for the autonomy of Martinique, Guadaloupe,

and French Guiana; for the return to Argentina

of the Falkland Islands; and for rendering

support to the national aspirations of the British

and Dutch colonies in the Caribbean.

Should such a regional solidarity organization

emerge, it would have international significance as the Latin

American counterpart of the Cairo-based Afro-Asian Peoples

Solidarity Organization, many of whose national affiliates have

essentially the same character.

A three-continent conference

to bring together the Latin American and Afro-Asians has long

been projected, but the convening of the preparatory meeting

planned for Havana has been repeatedly postponed. In early

October, the Cubans suddenly informed the Cairo AAPSO

secretariat that the meeting could be scheduled and named

organizations in six Latin American countries which would be

represented--Mexico (MLN), Venezuela (FALN), Guatemala

(13 November Movement), Uruguay (FIDEL), Chile (FRAP),

and Cuba (PURS). There has been no recent news, but it is

possible that, as the Cubans suggested, a preparatory meeting

was held in Algiers at the AAPSO Economic Seminar scheduled

for five days beginning 22 February. The Montevideo Conference

scheduled for April may well bring the Afro-Asian to Latin America.

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3. The decision to conduct a hemispheric campaign

for the release of political prisoners was a logical sequel to,

and was probably inspired by, the Youth Conference of Solidarity

with Political Prisoners of Latin America, which was already in

the planning stage at the time of the Havana Conference.

At the

Havana meeting, Orlando Millas Correa, Chilean representative,

offered Santiago as a meeting place and headquarters for the

political prisoners organization. The Youth Conference referred

to above actually took place in Santiago between 1l and 13 December

1964, and one of the decisions adopted called for the formation of

a permanent committee for the liberation of political prisoners.

The conference was organized, controlled, and attended almost

exclusively by Communists, although there were a few participants

of other political tendencies.

Only about twenty delegates arrived from outside

Chile. They included Argentines, Brazilians, Colombians,

Paraguayans, Uruguayans, and Panamanians. Most of those

attending the meeting were exiles and students from various

Latin American countries who were already living in Chile.

The Cuban delegates, who were expected to be the key personalities

at the meeting, failed to arrive.

Delegates given special recognition at the conference

were Hernando Garavito Munoz (Communist), Colombian deputy;

Paulo de Tarso, former Minister of Education in Brazil under

Goulart; and Elizabeth Tortosa Cuenco, wife of Jesus Faria,

Secretary General of the Communist Party of Venezuela, who is

now in jail.

4. The call for a Venezuelan solidarity effort is not new...

In 1963 the Cuban Institute of Friendship with the Peoples (ICAP)

• -

called on all Latin American countries which had not already :.:

done so to set up Committees of Solidarity with Venezuela. At

that time, however, the call evoked only lukewarm response.

The increased attention given by other Latin American

CP's to Venezuela at the present time is, however, significant.

For several years the Communist Party of Venezuela (PCV) has

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been engaged in an all-out, but thus far unsuccessful, struggle

to overthrow the government of Venezuela by force and violence,

primarily through its paramilitary arm, the Armed Forces of

National Liberation (FALN)•

The wisdom of continuing the armed struggle,

however, was increasingly questioned during 1964 by "soft-line"

members of the PCV. An ally of the PCV, the Movement of the

Revolutionary Left, has already split on this point. The "soft-

liners" have pointed out, with considerable truth, that the armed

struggle had not broughtthe party any closer to achieving political

power. On the contrary, the party had been seriously weakened.

Mass support had not been forthcoming, the peasantry and the

bulk of organized labor had remained loyal to the government,

and the party was virtually isolated politically. Moreover, the

loss of its representation in Congress deprived it of the

operationally useful immunity which its representatives had

enjoyed, and of their salaries, a portion of which was used to

finance party activities.

Principal party leaders are, or were

until recently, in jail; still others are in hiding or abroad, and

the party itself is outlawed.

The "soft-line" faction was beginning to gain

strength and in the last half of 1964 it became more assertive

in pressing for a change in party policy. There was an

increasing possibility just before the Havana Conference that

control of the party would pass from the "hard-line" to the

"soft-line" faction.

An obvious failure of the armed struggle in

Venezuela would be a serious blow to the Cuban leaders, who

have consistently advocated armed struggle as a solution to the

problems of Latin American countries. If the party finally

admitted that the armed struggle had failed in Venezuela it

would have a deleterious effect on armed struggles elsewhere

(Guatemala, Honduras, etc.), and would discourage or inhibit

other CP's in future efforts to apply this policy. It is thus

probable that the initiative for this solidarity campaign was

inspired as much by the Cubans as by the Venezuelans.

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Venezuela has long been a prime target for Cuban subversion;

the importance to Cuba of a victory of the revolutionary movement

there was underscored by Blas Roca in a speech on 24 January

1963 in Havana, on the occasion of the 5th Anniversary of the

ousting of the Perez Jimenez regime, when he stated: "The

victory of Venezuela will give Cuba a tremendous boost. We

will cease to be the solitary Caribbean island facing the Yankee

imperialists and we will have a nation on the continent to back us."

Just before the Havana meeting, Cuba began to

devote increasing attention to Venezuela. Havana radio on

5 October reported the establishment of a new organization

called the "Cuban Committee for Solidarity with Venezuela, "

although the prior existence of a "Cuban-Venezuelan Solidarity

Committee" had been indicated on a number of occasions. The

significance Cuba attached to the new organization, is suggested

by the prominence of its sponsors. So, too, is its character

as a venture in which the existing functional organization of

labor, youth, and women. should coordinate their effort with

that of the CP. The president of the new committee is Haydee

Santamaria, a member of the PURS governing council, wife of

Education Minister Hart, and a confidant of Fidel Castro. Others

participating in launching the organization included labor leader

Lazaro Pena, student leader Jose Rebellon, and women's

federation head Vilma Espin, the wife of Raul Castro.

The week of 14-21 November 1964 was designated

as the Week of Cuban Solidarity with the Struggle of Venezuela

for National Liberation. Coincidentally, during this same period,

an office of the FALN was officially established in Havana.

According to Prensa Latina, representatives of the USSR, ' •... "

The November 1964 pledges of hemispheric and

international support and aid for the liberation struggle in

Venezuela have undoubtedly resulted, at least temporarily, in

a strengthening of the control of the "hard-line" faction over the

PCV.

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The basis on which the Venezuelan campaign can be

linked by Communists elsewhere in Latin America to the regional

amnesty'and national liberation campaigns appears with particular

clarity in an August 1964 statement issued by the Politburo of the

PCV's Central Committee. In it the PCV, under the slogan "'We

are not cultivators of violence, " tortuously tries to put the blame

on the Venezuelan government for the original and continuing

armed struggle.

It charges that a "Fascist group" in the governing

party and which has influence in the government is systematically

committing acts of provocation, which they then attribute to the

"revolutionary organizations," in order to create a climate of

violence as

a pretext for repressive measures of an anti-

revolutionary character,, for holding political prisoners, and

for refusing to restore political liberties. It accuses the

Venezuelan government of responding to a national movement for

amnesty for political prisoners by increasing repression, and,

finally, declares that, while the PCV and its revolutionary allies

have showed their desire and willingness to work peacefully, they

are determined to continue to use violence ("the higher forms of

struggle'') as long as they are forced to do so.

5. Not all regional coordination will take place in the

organizational framework being built in connection with the

solidarity campaigns. The traditional front organizations, too,

will play a role. For example, coordination of women's activities

in support of the conference resolutions will be the subject of a

meeting now scheduled to be held in Havana in March.

This

will bring together women's representatives of the Latin American

Communist parties for the purpose of strengthening solidarity

and improving relations, especially with Cuban women, and

developing "common goals" towards which all will work.

Preparations for this meeting probably took place at the October

1964 meeting of the Executive Council of the Women's International

Democratic Federation in Sofia.

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C. The Conference Treatment of the Role of, and Support for,

Armed Struggle.

1. The Soviet Commitment.

Behind the language of the conference communique lies an

explicit though secret Soviet commitment to support the armed

struggle in Latin America; but what little is known of the commitment

indicates that the timing, nature, and extent of Soviet aid is by

agreement to be determined by the Soviet-oriented orthodox CP's in

line with Soviet interests. The preliminary meeting in Moscow, the

attendance of a Soviet observer at the conference itself, and the final

coordination of the communique in Moscow all point to careful efforts

by Moscow to insure that it can control the demands placed upon it,

even while it publicizes its willingness--in principle--to give support.

made it est such i oviet co

The existence of such a Soviet commitment is indicated by remarks

made by a CPSU Foreign Section functionary who, in a closed meeting

with leaders of a key European CP in e a r 1 y 1965, stated that

armed struggle, while not a possibility in Europe, was still likely

to be necessary

• in some situations in Latin America.

Although for years the Soviets have distinguished between

"just" and "unjust" wars, and have promised support to "just wars"

of liberation, the CPSU commitment to aid armed struggle in Latin

America has never been spelled out as clearly as in the Pravda

editorial of 14 January, which coincided with the publication of the

conference communique. The Pravda editorial notes that (underlining

supplied): "Communists in Latin America, guided by the general

line worked out by the international Communist movement, come out

for the use of all forms of struggle, both peaceful and non-peaceful. "

It specifically praises the "just struggle of patriots, arms in hand, in

Venezuela, Guatemala, and a number of other countries. " Most

importantly, the editorial concludes that the Soviet people consider

it their sacred duty to provide support to such "patriots."

Under the new policy, the Soviets appear to be looking to the

local orthodox CP's to protect them from over-commitment and

involvement in rash adventurism, as these CP's assume the authority

and burden of distinguishing between wise and unwise revolutionary

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efforts in their countries. The Soviets have been preparing the

parties for two years to assume this responsibility. Under the

earlier modus vivendi with Castro, which obtained during 1961 and

1962, the Soviets apparently were willing to permit Castro, with

the aid of the Cuban CP, to assume the role of sponsor of armed

liberation movements which were penetrated and unofficially aided

by orthodox CP elements, despite overt policy differences. This led

to the formation of guerrilla groups such as the 13th of November

Movement (MI3N) in Guatemala, the National Liberation Front (FLN)

in Nicaragua, and the "Francisco Morazon Liberation Front" in

Honduras.

With the notable exception of the Venezuelan CP, however,

the orthodox parties, with their limited penetrations, were generally

unable to control the guerrilla movements, particularly where serious

differences developed after the Cuban missile crisis.

Therefore,

beginning in 1963, Castro was pressured by the Soviets to withdraw

support from extremist leaders, and some orthodox CP's initiated

purges of extremist and "pro-Chinese" elements while establishing

their own paramilitary apparats.

The Guatemalan CP, for example,

established a systematic military programunder Rafael Tischler in Jạn. 1963,

although PGT members had been active since 1961 within the MI3N.

Other parties also developed military apparats, while an accelerated

training program for CP leaders was initiated in the USSR to strengthen the

will and ability of the CP's to resist and deal with the extremist and pro-

Chinese views. In some countries this gave the parties greater contact

with guerrillas and greater influence over paramilitary activities.

The Soviet commitment to armed struggle is thus fairly well

controlled and delimited where it has puppet parties in Latin America,

although the statement of this commitment is purposely obscure. A

number of parties--such as the Colombian CP--admit armed violence

as "one of the forms" of struggle, and many argue that peasant revolts,.......

demonstrations, and spontaneous violence are inevitable and justifiable

responses to repressive conditions. The general line, however, does

not necessarily involve more immediate or deeper Soviet commitment

than at present in any specific case. On the other hand, the fact that

certain parties have clearly committed themselves to support of

specific revolutionary movements places an obligation upon the

Soviets as well. The Venezuelan CP, when it resumed publication of

its theoretical organ, Principios, in September-October 1964, began by

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printing a collection of policy documents which clearly identify

the party line with the support of the FLN and with continuation

of the armed struggle by the FALN. Of all the Latin American

Cp's, no party can advance a better claim to Soviet support, under

the new commitment, than the Venezuelan party.

The Guatemalan CP (PGT) has also emphasized its

commitment to armed struggle, which it calls "inevitable." It,

too, explicity mentions--but without clear and full approval--

the policies of the Armed Revolutionary Forces (FAR), a nominal unified

guerrilla command of which the MI3N is a part. It has noted that

the "maturing conditions" must be given "thorough, scientific,

analysis" and cautiously goes no further than stating that a "certain

degree of maturity of the conditions for revolution and the objective

trend making for their further ripening exist in Guatemala." But

the PGT also states that the masses must be organized and activated,

and that "the unity of all the democratic and anti-imperialistic forces

is the cardinal condition for victory" (World Marxist Review, June 1964).

That such proper unity (or, now, simply assurance of the orthodox CP's

control of fighting "patriots") has been the immediate problem is seen

in the recent "open letter" from the Guatemalan CP to the extremists

of the MI3N guerrilla faction, whose organ, Revolucion Socialista, has

followed a Trotskyist line which leans toward both Chinese and

Castroist concepts. The Colombian CP view is similar to the

Guatemalan. In January 1965, Gilberto Vieira White stated, even

less ambiguously than the PGT, that the armed struggle has now

become "absolutely inevitable as one of the forms of struggle, " and

that conditions for revolution are mature.

But, on the other key

question--unity of action among revolutionary forces--he frankly

admitted that it did not exist.

Vieira, moreover, does not mention by

name any armed revolutionary front similar to the FAR in Guatemala

or the FALN in Venezuela, both of which have the explicit recognition

of the orthodox local CP. Such recognition and approval would, under

the terms of the Havana Conference understanding, seem to be necessary

prerequisites to the Soviets becoming fully committed to support of a

particular armed struggle.

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The Soviet obligation to honor their commitment may also

be limited by the willingness of Castro and the pro-Castro groups

to collaborate with the local CP's. Although there is already some

evidence that Cuban support to armed groups will be channeled

hereafter through the CP's, there is as yet no compelling reason

to assume that Castro will exert himself to force non-orthodox

groups to abandon their Castroist faith in "instant socialism" through

the creation, by violence and terrorism, of the conditions for

victory. Castro himself has been reported to have virtually ignored

the Havana Conference, and during December Che Guevara intentionally

re-emphasized Cuban support of violence. It is possible, therefore,

that some "patriotic" revolutionary groups--particularly if they see

clear possibilities of Chinese support--will reject the Communist

party appeal for unity. Only the eventual response of the M13N

in Guatemala to the PGT letter, and similar exchanges between

CP's and non-party revolutionary groups elsewhere, are likely to

give some clue as to whether Castro and the Cubans are willing to

pressure their followers to abandon polemics with the local CP and

join in the unified liberation struggle asked for in the Havana

communique. It is interesting in this context to note that just such

an appeal to abandon polemics and to recognize the value of PGT .

support and collaboration was made to Guatemalan guerrilla leaders

in October 1964 by Victor Rico Galan, a Mexican leftist journalist

with both orthodox CP and Castroist contacts, who had also discussed

the problem of unity with Alfredo Guerra Borges, author of the PGT

"open letter." In a subsequent propaganda article, published in

Siempre (4 November), Rico Galan emphasized unity and quoted

FAR guerrilla leader Yon Sosa as stating that "unity... is the basis

of victory," that "we count on international solidarity, " and that

"this armed struggle is no one's property: the revolution has no

master.... We are neither prejudiced nor sectarian.... " .....

..•

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2. Post-Conference Developments in the Field of Violence.

The Cuban-Soviet agreement to support armed revolution

and any action in close coordination with the CP's provides for a

more efficient, unified, and centralized direction of the armed

struggle in selected countries. Since the conference, there have

been significant signs of stepped-up plans for sabotage, terrorism,

and guerrilla activity in several Central American countries, under

the direction of the local Communist party. There has also been

evidence that some Castroist revolutionary organizations or indi-

vidual Castroists have acquiesed to orthodox CP direction.

a. In Guatemala, the Communist party (PGT) has formed

a new committee to organize and coordinate terrorist activity by

youth and students, and this committee has called for information

concerning professional men, military officers, and landowners who

should be "liquidated" during 1965. On 10 January, the PGT and its

labor front (FASGUA) made plans to create sabotage groups of ten

men each to carry out terrorist activity in factories. The FASGUA

had already sent one of its leaders to the Pacific banana zone on

3 January to inform the peasants that the "armed revolution had

begun" and to call on them to denounce unpopular landlords, who

would subsequently be "liquidated." The provocative character of

this kind of agitation is obvious. In neighboring El Salvador, the

military command of the United revolutionary action front (FUAR)

has been reactivated.

b. In Honduras

Lid Odde

that military training would be completed by the

16 February elections, after which a call would be issued in the name

of the Popular Action Front for revolution, to be followed by assas-

sinations, kidnappings and sabotage. He claimed excellent infor -

mation concerning the government order of battle.

parentdentity chabones

costart on tabr

warned that informers would be liquidated immediately: Withou s

party hearing or expulsion. In early January also, an alignment was

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reached between the "Francisco Morazon Liberation Movement' (MLFM),

led by Cuban-trained elements, and the PCH, under which MLFM

leaders will take orders in the future "directly from the PCH."

Here, too, other current information indicates that violence

and preparation for violence are being tied in with political action.

CP groups have been instructed to take additional security measures

and to agitate after mid-February for a general strike to protest the

elections. At the end of January, the National Civic Movement was

formed, with Communist youth elements providing direction, to bring

together as many groups as possible in a militant campaign osten-

sibly to prevent the election of a conservative military man to the

Presidency. In this movement Communist elements, including domi-

nated student and youth groups, trade unions, women's organization,

and professional associations, are ostentatiously supporting a non-

Communist progressive political party, whose left-oriented youth

group is particularly vocal in calling on all liberals to be prepared

to fight, if necessary, to defeat so-called enemies of democracy.

The real Communist effort, however, was clearly being planned for

the post-election period, presumably on the assumption that much

of the non-Communist opposition will be more easily exploitable

after the electoral defeat which the Communists expected them to suffer.

c. In Panama, the Panamanian CP (PDP), which has been

developing a military apparatus since late 1962, drew up a plan for

armed action in Panama "in the near future" which it presented to

the Havana Conference. The plan was received with interest by

Raul Castro, and the Panamanian representative made a request for

Cuban support, including guerrilla training and arms.

That Cuba

is now disposed to work within the context of the Havana agreement

is suggested by Raul Castro's request for copies of the conclusions

of the PDP plenums, including that of 1962 which established a staged

plan for the seizing of power and preparation for armed violence

against imperialism "in accordance with the correlation of forces

for a world-wide basis. " At this time the PDP was preparing a

$50,000 budget for military action--a sum which was promised to

the party in Moscow in mid-1963 and delivered in late 1963, and which

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may have contributed to the development of the military apparatus

in the Chiriqui banana zone which was uncovered in September 1964.

d. In Venezuela, the operational policy of the PCV since

the end of 1964 still involves violent struggle as an essential part

of its subversive effort. However, it now is trying to:

(l) exploit, as part of a political action program

intended to create a solid base for mass organizations

and new support, demonstrations and strikes over

such "grass roots" issues as rises in the cost of

living (rally held in January to commemorate the

fall of Perez Jimenez regime was to be exploited to

this same end);

(2) relate and synchronize military action with

political programs;

(3) de-emphasize urban terrorism, shifting the

emphasis to the guerrilla effort in the countryside.

Since the emphasis is now being placed on operations

that will build the Party's strength and following,

guerrilla operations and violence are likely to be

tactical or provocative sorties for local political

impact and for discrediting the government, rather

than part of a systematic buildup to achieve a

revolutionary takeover in the immediate future.

The Soviet contribution to these aspects of the Venezuelan

struggle is now new.

fis the secon dif

a small group of Venezuelan"

Communists received guerrilla warfare training in the Soviet Union.

Oaewembentortherg.ouplatsoresswedmtensgencettraining. This

training had been negotiated by the CP of Venezuela with the Soviets

and was apparently designed to balance Chinese influence on

guerrilla warfare trainees going to Communist China.

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In June 1964, the Soviet Union turned over to the PCV an

initial sum of $400,000 to purchase arms and also finance a study

to determine suitable locations on the Venezuelan seacoast where

arms and other supplies can be smuggled into the country.

Alberto Loverarra member.of the Political- Bureau of they

(CP"Venezuela and chief of the FALN, was in Cuba at the time of

the Havana Conference and presumably was one of the Venezuelan

CP representatives. While in Cuba, Lovera attended conferences.

with top Cuban leaders and Soviet, Chinese, and Czech represent-

atives. He also held bilateral talks with representatives of the

other Latin American Communist Parties.

In his private talks with Cuban leaders, Lovera obtaïned a

promise of financial help during 1965, which he estimated to be

valued at three million dollars. Also discussed was the training

abroad of up to 1, 000 Venezuelan youths in different types of

courses and the selection of several men to send to Cuba for a

special training course.

During Loverals talks with the Czechs, the latter offered

to provide arms. Lovera agreed with the Czechs to send a

representative to examine the different types of arms available for

the needs of the FALN.

After leaving Cuba, Lovera proceeded to the USSR' to

request moral and financial support for the revolution.

The results

are not known. He also wished to visit Communist China, but the

time factor prevented him from doing so.

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IV. The Conference and International Communist Unity.

A. Cuba, the Orthodox CP's, and Other National Liberation

Elements.

Reportedly, the Cuban leaders (Fidel Castro, Guevara and

others) have agreed to support only those revolutionary groups

approved by the local CP.

This, in effect, gives a national CP

the authority to define for the country concerned the "stage of

revolutionary development" and the "unique national conditions"

which determine the appropriate combination of the various

forms of struggle (peaceful: or non-peaceful). It thus could

resolve the basic complaints by various CP's over Cuban uni-

lateral intervention and strengthen the hand of the "mäture"

Communists over the young and immature Communists who lack

ideological training.

Will Castro abide by this agreement, which represents the

culmination of two year's increasing effort by the orthodox

Communists and the Soviets to reduce Castroist influence?

The record shows that under Soviet pressure Castro's

support

was withdrawn from the VAN in Panama in mid-1963, and that

other Central American Castroist leaders and organizations

suffered a decline in influence while increased Soviet funds were

funneled directly to the CP's. Nevertheless, Panamanian and

other extremists continued to receive training in Cuba, and it

is probable that in 1963 and 1964 Castro was only nominally

responding to Soviet pressure. This may be the case now,

although it has recently been reported that Cuban support to

Colombian leftist groups has been stopped and will be channeled

henceforth through the orthodox CP.

There is some evidence that the Chinese have taken over

the financing of a number of groups formerly supported by

Castro, a development that may have Castro's tacit approval

and support. In any event, without Chinese endorsement the

Havana agreement may do little to develop unity in the national

liberation movements, particularly in those which have a

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guerrilla component. The original wording of the communique,

however, is sufficiently broad and flexible to permit concessions

to the Chinese and thus to bring them into partnership if the

Chinese should become convinced that their confrontation with

the CPSU and its allies among the CP's of the world would. be

indefinitely postponed. While the Havana conference delegation

to Peiping received no encouragement, it is possible that the

high-level Cuban visits to Peiping in January and early February,

as well as the Kosygin conferences, might have some relation

to this question. Specifically, a new postponement of the inter-

party preparatory meeting now scheduled for 1 March would be

a necessary precursor to such a change. Sensitive reports state,

in fact, that the attitude of the Latin American CP's, including

that of the Cuban PURS, is likely to be of decisive importance

in connection with

the March plans.

One immediate result of the Havana Conference has been

the posing of financial problems for certain Cuban-supported

revolutionary groups which are not endorsed by the recognized

CP. This has already occurred in Colombia. A leader of the

(pro-Cuban Youth of the Liberal Revolutionary Movement stated

that his organization was now in a bad financial situation as a

result of the agreements reached in Havana and is no longer

receiving funds from Cuba.

He stated that this was also true

of other leftist groups which had received money from Cuba in

the past.

These revolutionary groups, in Colombia and elsewhere,

are thus faced with grave financial problems which could affect

their very existence. It is doubtful that any of these groups could

remain active for long on the contributions of its members and

sympathizers alone. Therefore, other sources of funds and

support must be found. Several alternatives are available:

1. To obtain the money by violent means, such as the

robberies which have recently taken place in Ecuador and

Venezuela: those who advocate these operations have justified

them by quoting Mao's advice, that a guerrilla supports him-

self by taking from the enemy;

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2. To reach an agreement with the orthodox Communist

party: this would be unpalatable to most groups, as it would lead

inevitably to control by the CP;

3. To ally with pro-Chinese groups whö are receiving support

from Communist China;

4. To appeal directly to the Chinese Communists for support.

Of the above choices, the latter will be the most appealing

o these revolutionary groups, as each is anxious to maintain its

separate image. The Chinese, however, are likely to insist on close

coordination with the groups they already support and

on an eventual

formation of a revolutionary front.

B. The National CP's and Internal Factionalism .

In a bilateral meeting during 22-23 January, the Argentine and

Chilean Communist parties declared their full, enthusiastic support

for the declaration adopted in Havana condemning factionalism and

actively defending the unity of each Communist party. Neither party

appears, however, to have intensified its actions against dissidents,

which in fact had been pursued vigorously earlier in 1964. A leading

Chilean CP member has, however, publicly broken with the party

and is now militantly adopting a pro-Chinese line criticizing the CP's

policies concerning the critically important parliamentary elections

which are imminent. In Uruguay, the Uruguayan Party functionaries

have suggested that one immediate benefit of the Havana conference

will be to soften differences between hard-line and soft-line advocates

within the party, thereby permitting leaders to formulate a sound

tactical position with a minimum of difficulty and dissension. In

Bolivia, P.CB"First Secretary"Mario Monje has stated that the Havana

conference is a great achievement, since it will reduce the influence

of the anti-party (pro-Chinese) group of the PCB who are trying to

establish

contacts outside of Bolivia.

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Concerning Brazil, Pedro Motta Lima, Brazilian Communist

Party representative on the staff of the international Communist

journal Problems of Peace and Socialism, in Prague, commented

publicly in January on the Havana communique, stressing the efforts

for unity within each party and the categorical repudiation. of-all

divisive activities as called for in the communique. He said: "It

would be most gratifying to Latin American revolutionaries if all

of our parties merged into a single Marxist-Leninist group in unity

and complete understanding within the socialist camp. We would

thereby avoid the factors of division and maintain a fraternal

dialogue."

The dissident CPB has maintained that it is the legitmate

CP and that it is the only "revolutionary" force left in Brazil. It

has been saying that the 31 March 1964 military coup has demon-

strated the futility of the orthodox Prestes-led PCB's line of right

revisionism, with its traditional emphasis on non-violence.

There

have been indications that some militants within the orthodox PCB

agree with the hard revolutionary dissident line. In an effort to

attract new followers, the CPB is reported to be drawing away

from its extremism and to have relegated violent action, such as

sabotage and terrorism, to a secondary plane, at least temporarily.

It should be noted, however, that even while emphasizing its pro-

Chinese orientation, the CPB is now willing to adopt, as an expe-

dient, participation in a Communist united-front, if only to harass

the present government. In view of this and the unanimous

criticism to which the orthodox PCB was allegedly subjected by

the other Communist parties at the Havana meeting for "being too

peaceful and relying too much on the bourgeoise and not enough

on the proletariat," it appears that the area for rapprochement

between the two parties has broadened significantly. If any

factional tensions remain important, they now are likely to affect

the orthodox party's right wing, against which charges of past

opportunist errors are now most likely to be directed.

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V. Conclusions.

Events in Latin America during December and January

indicate that an effort has been made to carry out the decision

of the Havana Conference, and that the effort could contribute

substantially to giving unity, common purpose, and new momen-

tum to Communist subversive activity throughout the region.

But it is equally apparent that some of the problems that the

conference tried to deal with can easily become serious again:

on short notice.

The first problem likely to arise concerns the next

Soviet steps in their effort, through the l March meeting or

some alternative device, to restore unity throughout the

Communist movement.

If the CPSU opts for tighter unity with

their knovn supporters.

and an open renewal of the confrontation

with the Chinese, the Havana agreements may be subjected to

serious strain. The CPSU's opponents are not likely to let such

a Soviet move go unchallenged; in fact, they are likely to try to

exploit it.

major anti-CPSU attack on the 1 March meeting plans which

In mid sebruary.

In mid-February, the pro-Chinese Albanians issued a

explicitly charged that the Havana Conference was a Soviet-

inspired maneuver to trap the Cuban Communists and exploit

Cuba's popularity with other Latin American revolutionaries in

order to restore Soviet control over the Communists of the area.

After spelling out analogous Soviet moves in other areas, they

demand that the CPSU not be given the respite it is seeking, nor

allowed to consolidate its "shaky positions".

The next tests are likely to involve the mobilization

campaigns, in which unimpressive efforts at display of strength,

or otherwise poor performances by one or more CP's, may

easily lead to recriminations and loss of enthusiasm. But, during

confrom period, the in Chi, the forth mine ela, ameraba will

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elections are of great importance;

in Venezuela, it is the party's

ability to disrupt or withstand the repressive operations against

the FALN and to make a good showing in its renewal of political

activity that is crucial. In Cuba the old-line Communists face

Fidel Castro's efforts to resist Soviet orthodoxy through die

tribution of key governmental posts and through directing the

development of the PURS--the single party which has yet to

hold its first congress. Again, since "it is results that count, "

each success is likely to reinforce the trend that began with the

Havana Conference. However, with more Latin American

governments and leaders showing that they understand at least

the main implication of the tactics which the Communists are

employing, the chances for major gains seem limited if appro-

priate countermeasures are vigorously carried out.

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APPENDIX

IDENTIFIED PARTICIPANTS IN THE CONFERENCE

AND RELATED EVENTS

..•

..

Prep.

Moscow

Comm.

Before After

Havana

Meeting

Representatives

Codovilla, Victorio

Monje Molina, Mario

Kolle Cueto, Jorge

Melgar Justiniano,

Hern an

Ziller, Armando

Luchesi, Ramiro,

Millas Correa,

----

Orlando

Donaire Cortes,

Uldarico

aka

Cortes, Rafael

Vieira White,

Gilberto

Mora Valverde,

Manuel

Country

Argentina

Bolivia

Bolivia

Bolivia

China

X

Brazil

Brazil

Chile

Chile

X

Colombia

x

Costa Rica

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Final

Editing

Comm

(Mosco

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APPENDIX

(CONTINUED)

"raise-yes

Representatives

Mora Valverde,

Eduardo

Rodriguez, Carlos

Rafael

Guevara, Ernesto

("'Che")

Olivares Sanchez,

Carlos

Echeverria, Rafael

Rodriguez, Carlos

*Del Prado Chavez

Jorge

Arismendi, Rodney

Lovera, Alberto

Prep.

Moscow

Havana

Country

Comm. Before After Meeting

China

Costa Rica

Cuba

x

x

Cuba

Cuba

Ecuador

Ecuador

Peru

Uruguay

Venezuela

NOTE: Absence of an 'X" merely shows that no explicit report of participation at

specific event has been received.

* Planned to leave 10 November for Moscow.

traveled clandestinely.

Departure not confirmed: may have

Final

Editing

Comm.

(Moscow)

wires: Sa+

i=:

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