## Page 1

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2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SUMMARY OF AUGUST 1996 REVIEW BOARD ACTIONS ON

SECURITY CLASSIFIED HSCA TESTIMONY OF

JOHN SCELSO

(180-10131-10330)

Action

19; 9, 11, 22

52; 5-6

P.

M

R (see release on

p.141)

R&R

Protect first four

words of line 5;

release rest of line.

tb lang

Review 05/1997, "CIA

Employee."

10/2017, "Operational

Details."

52;11

52; 21 & 23

53;6

55; 25

56; 4-7

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56; 19-23

Release line 4;

protect all of line 5;

release lines 6 & 7

postpone from 4th

word in line 19

through the third

word in line 21;

release rest of lines

21-23

10/2017 "Describes

technical operation."

10/2017, "Describes

intelligence operation in

Mexico City."

10/2017, "Describes

intelligence operation in

Mexico City."

56; 25

57:2

57;47.

P

P

10/2017 "Describes

technical operation."

10/2017 "Describes

individuals."

10/2017 "Describes

technical operation."

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age, line

57; 10-11

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58; 2-3

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83; 14-15

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83; 22-23

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84; 1-2

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Kioditica don

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postpone 1st, 2nd,

and 4th - 6th words

on line 11.

protect last three

words on line 20;

release lines 21-23.

2

Cite/subslan

10/2017, "Describes

intelligence operations "

"Describes a group of

people."

10/2017 "Describes

technical operation."

10/2017, "Describes

intelligence operation"

10/2017, "Describes

intelligence operation"

Release 2017,

"Describes intelligence

operation."

Scelso language and

identifier.

10/2017 "Describes

individual."

Release date 08/2006;

"Сrypt."

10/2017 "Describes

meeting."

Release 2017, "No

suitable substitute

language"

Release 2017, "No

suitable substitute

language"

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84; 7-11

84; 13-14

84; 17

84; 19

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IE

140; 20

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141; 5-6

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168; 24

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date sub lin

Release 2017, "No

suitable substitute

language"

10/2017 "No suitable

substitute language."

10/2017 "Describes

technical operation."

Release date 08/2006.

"crypt"

"crypt"

Release date 08/2006.

"crypt"

10/2017. "describes

personnel

Scelso language and

date.

Release date 08/2006.

"description."

Release date 08/2006.

"crypt"

Release date 08/2006,

"Operational Detail"

Release 2017, "CIA

Installation in Western

Hemisphere 17"

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parestine

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185; 22-24

notes/ index:

p. 1

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R

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CIA team disk 81 sceL act.wpd

Moditication detail

date/sub lang

Scelso date. Sub.lang.

"location".

Review 05/1997 "CIA

Employee."

4

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## Page 5

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SECRET

27 September 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

Executive Director

Assassination Records Review Board

John F. Pereira

Central Intelligençe Agency

Reconsideration of Releases in Scelso

Testimony and Lopez Report

(We request that this memorandum be returned to CIA

once the Board has completed its deliberations on the issues

discussed below.)

1 e-

(S) Issue. This memo is to request that the JEK

Board reconsider its decision to release certain information

contained in the HSCA testimony of John Scelso and in the

Lopez Report.

Specifically CIA requests that the phrases

"political action program"

pg. 64 Scelso Testimony, pg.

177, 178 Lopez Report) ; "Mexican police" (pg. 85 Scelso

Testimony); and "is exposed by Agee in his book" (pg. 141.

Scelso Testimony (be postponed from release.

We also offer

some suggestions

"for substitute language which we believe

will not detract from the JFK assassination story, yet still

protect the information at issue.

I. Mexican Political Action Program

"We were running, at that time, a vast political action

program in Mexico City to try to swing Mexico around from

its Leftist direction to a middle of the road direction and

it succeeded. I don't know whether you informed yourself

about the magnitude of our political action program there at

the time -- absolutely enormous"

(Scelso, 64; Lopez, PP. 177, 178)

2.

(S) From the early 1950's to the mid-1960's,

Mexico City Station conducted a political action campaign to

minimize leftist influence on and within the Mexican

Government. The campaign utilized student groups, a front

group of progressive businessmen, and Catholic lay group

writers and operatives in political action and media

placement efforts.

The Station currently does not have a

political action program designed to influence Mexican

CL BY 2224130$

CL REASON 1.5 (C)

DECL ON X1

DRV FM LOC 3-82

LIA 3-82, HUM 4-82

SECRET

---

## Page 6

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SECRET

SUBJECT: Reconsideration of Releases in Scelso

Testimony and Lopez Report

politics, nor has it undertaken such activity anytime in the

recent past. Nevertheless, any public confirmation by the

U.S. Government of those activities would risk an adverse

reaction.

Such adverse reaction would impact on current

Mexico City Station operations and be harmful to U.S.

interests.

3. (S) As has been described to the Board in previous

briefings by the temierVeranch chief, Mexicans guard their

sovereignty carefully.

Nothing will infuriate them more

than allegations of CIA meddling in their internal politics.

In fact, earlier this year,

the Mexican Government postponed

a visit to Mexico by the DCI for fear that it might be

perceived (and exploited) by the Mexican media and political

opposition as the CIA being called in to assist with

handling the problem of the Peoples' Revolutionary Army.

4 .

(S) The fact that the CIA activity to which the

Mexicans would object occurred more than 30 years ago will

not lessen the reaction. Release of the Scelso comments

would risk an adverse reaction from the Mexicans, which

would likely include calls for an examination by the Mexican

Government of current CIA activities.

This could lead to

increased scrutiny of Station operations and personnel and

could jeopardize our unilateral activities.

It could also

have a chilling effect on activities conducted jointly with

the Mexican services, who will be reluctant to engage in

programs that could become subject to public scrutiny and

political debate.

(S) Furthermore, the fact that these statements

were made by scelso

amounts to an official confirmation of

the underlying facts, making it very difficult for ClA to

protect the same or similar information from further release

in the future. Speculation in books, articles, and other

publications, or disclosures by Congress are often perceived

by the public as evidence that that information is in the

public domain and therefore is no longer classified.

The

CIA has nevertheless been able to legally protect the

information from unauthorized disclosure.

The courts have

held that because there has been no official confirmation,

chopped

dropped

лежиео

do

FOIN

the information at issue even when there has been widespread

public discussion on the issue in question.

(S) In this case, should there by

as to the classification status of documents on the

question raised

political program referred to by Scelso, it would be

difficult to convince a court that such information had not

been declassified because of the release by the Board.

Scelso was a long-time CIA employee who was in charge

of the

investigation by the Agency into the assassination of the

2

(chaures

Inbl Comn

SECRET

---

## Page 7

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SECRET

SUBJECT: Reconsideration of Releases in Scelso

Testimony and Lopez Report

President, and his testimony was taken under oath, with the

knowledge-of the Agency, and in a classified setting.

Furthermore, the attached letter to Louis Stokes, Chairman

of the Select Committee on Assassination from former Acting

DCI Frank Carlucci also indicates that Scelso was acting as

an official of the CIA. The DCI states that any classified

testimony made by Agency staff before the Committees would

be considered "authorized provision" of the information.

This was to ensure that "all persons respond fully and

truthfully" to the Committee.

Carlucci's letter,

especially

taken together with the first few pages of Scelso's

testimony, make it clear

that Scelso was speaking as an

official of the CIA.

scelso's statemento were not

A court would, therefore, probably find that

just merely speculation by a

former Agency employee, but in fact, were official

confirmation of the political action program.

Anything

suggesting official confirmation of classified information

would lead a judge to the conclusion that the information at

issue had been declassified by the CIA.

This would make it

very difficult for CIA to continue to protect this

information from unauthorized disclosure.

When confusion

arises as to the classification status of information, it

could lead to complicated legal proceedings and protracted

and unnecessary litigation at great expense to all parties.

II. Liaison with Mexico

"We did not have any source of Cuban employees. We only had

Mexican police"

...We had a whole reporting set up there with

that, two of them, who watched things like that. (Scelso pg.

185).

8.

(S) Release by the Board of Scelso's comments about

the Mexican police in conjunction with surveillance coverage

of the Mexico City airport could similarly have a chilling

effect on our current liaison relationship with the Mexicans.

The Station has worked, and continues to work, with liaison

against compatible targets, including tracking the arrival

and departure at the Mexico City airport of targets of

interest.

Although the targets have obviously changed since

the time that Scelso is speaking of, these surveillance

operations are ongoing.

The success of these current joint

operations could be threatened by any revelation today of

Mexican cooperation with the CIA in the past.

9.

(S) CIA objects to this release on similar grounds

as stated in the prior section - disclosure of the: Scelso

comments would constitute official acknowledgment by CIA of

the assistance provided by Mexican liaison to the Agency.

Such acknowledgment could affect not only current operations

3

SECRET

New

i.":

---

## Page 8

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SECRET

SUBJECT:

Reconsideration of Releases in Scelso

Testimony and Lopez Report

described above,

but also result in reluctance by Mexican

liaison to provide similar assistance in the future.

The

Mexican Government would likely be subject to criticism by

groups and individuals opposed on nationalism and

sovereignty grounds to such close cooperation with the U.s.

Government and, even more so, with the CIA. The continued

success of CIA cooperation with the Mexicans, whether it be auy ulter

with the Brasident, the intelligence service, or tire pottee,

depends on the fact that those relationships

are, and

continue to be, secret.

marien

goverm

10.

(S) CIA requests that the Board continue to

withhold this phrase from release and substitute in "other

cutty

sources" or something similar to this.

Omitting the fact

that the airport information was obtained from Mexican

counterparts would probably leave the impression that the

information was obtained unilaterally.

Although this still

presents some risk to national security, it does achieve

some level of protection to the Station's equities with

liaison.

III. Phillip Agee

(S)

"That is, the variety and number of telephone

taps, surveillance teams, photo operations and other

technical operations is exposed by Agee in his book. That

exceeds anyplace else that we had in the world by a

lot..."

(Scelso, pg. 141)

11. (S) CIA objects to the release of the highlighted

phrase because, for reasons described in Section 1, it

amounts to official CIA confirmation of the existence of a

teltap operation conducted jointly with the Mexicans and

with close collaboration with the President of Mexico.

this Board is well aware, CIA has consistently requested,

the protection of liaison involvement in this teltap

operation. As the Board has agreed with CIA's position on

this matter, the only issue is whether this statement

reveals what we have agreed meets the criteria for continued

protection under the JFK Act.

12.

(S) For the Board's convenience, several relevant

pages from Agee's book (Inside the Company: CIA Diary) are

attached.

These pages explain in great detail the teltap

operation and the fact that it was conducted jointly between

the CIA and the Mexicans.

former employees are disturbing, they do not amount to

official confirmation of the underlying information.

Standing by itself, Agee's book can be dismissed by the

Agency as speculation, and do not compromise CIA's ability

to keep the information classified.

Scelso's testimony,

however, amounts to official confirmation of Agee's book,

4

SECRET

---

## Page 9

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SECRET

SUBJECT:

Reconsideration of Releases in Scelso

Testimony and Lopez Report

and does effect the Agency's ability to protect the

information from-further release.

Equally troubling is the

fact that Scelso's testimony could be read to confirm not

only what is accurate in Agee's book, but also what is

inaccurate.

12. (S) Furthermore, the language used by Scelso is

clear.

does

The use of the phrase "exposed by Agee in his book"

not allow for any other interpretation except that

Agee's description of the teltap is accurate.

If Scelso had

used other language, such as

"has been written about

elsewhere", the existence of the joint teltap operation

would be protected.

We request that the Board protect the

phrase as it is and use the above substitute language.

Such

substitute language would not alter the story of the JEK

Assassination, yet would still allow for the protection of

the joint operation.

13. (S) While the connection between Agee's book and

Scelso's testimony may at first seem attenuated, anyone

involved in the review process conducted by this Board will

know that it is not.

Many individuals follow the decisions

of this Board closely, and Agee's writings about the CIA are

also well known.

It is to be expected that those who read

the Scelso report would then turn to Agee's book.

5402221

John F. Pereira

5

SECRET

---

## Page 10

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SECRET

From the Desk of Linda C. Cipriani

NOTE FOR:

J. Barry Harreison

FROM:

Linda C. Cipriani

DATE:

09/26/96 12:22:04 PM

SUBJECT:

Agee Memo • New draft

Here it is... with Jeremy's improvements. Please read it carefully as I had to rush through this. Some of Jeremy's comments were slight

wording changes so as not to offend "the Board" so you may not notice much change. The biggest substantive change was on my FOlA

section (I have skillfully crafted this section to avoid the use of that four letter word!). Please note there is one more paragraph now

because I did add a bit about Scelso being an "official". And don't forget to attach to Stokes-DCI letter which I will fax back to you.

Have fun - and let me know if you need help.

AGEEMEMO.DOC

CC:

SECRET

---

## Page 11

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SECRET

23 August 1996

Note For:

FrOM:

Subject:

Fred Wickham,

DO

Eleanor Neiman, DO

Mike Luce, DO/Mexico

Valerie Patterson,? DO/EA

Christine Hegeman, DO/EA

Linda Cipriani, OGC

J. Barry Harrelson, CSI/HRG

Meeting with ARRB Staff

1.

Thursday afternoon I met with Dave Marwell,

Executive Director for the ARRB, and two of his staff,

I briefed them on the four

releases in the Lopez Report and Scelso Testimony that had

been identified as potential appeal items, and on the

Agency's concerns re the Australian documents?

I requested

that the Board reconsider the release of the

statements; on

Mexico City political action programs,

Scelso's comment on

Agee, the reference to the Mexican Police as a source and

Warrenton as site of the Agency's Record Center.

2. Marwell agreed to send a "staff recommendation" to

the Board recommending that they delay the release of these

four items to hear additional evidence from the Agency.

The

rest of the Lopez Report and Scelso Testimony would be

released on schedule.

If the Board accepts the staff's

recommendation, the four items will be addressed at

the next.

Washington

meeting

(27 September).

If the Board rejects the

staff's recommendation, then we have the option of appealing

to the President.

Marwell and Gunn seemed confident that

the Board would agree to delay the release.

3. Gunn requested that the Agency's additional

evidence on these four items (if provided in writing) be to

the ARRB staff by 23 September.

The Agency can also brief

the Board members at the

septemoer meeting.

As "I"""

• understand it, DO/Mexico-(Mike L.)-will be preparin

"political action programs" and "Mexican

police"

issues and OGC (Linda C.) will take the lead on

Agee. I will contact the DA/IRO (Don Hatch) on the[ Warrenton

issue.

4. Concerning the Australian documents, Marwell agreed

to delay Board action until the 16 October meeting.

The

Agency's proposal on these documents should be sent to the

ARRB staff as soon as possible.

CL By: (611637 / CL REASON: 1.5 (c)

DECL ON: X1 . DRV FM: MULTIPLE

SECRET

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## Page 12

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Testimony of then fetired Do officer

'SCELSO (pseudonym)

to the HSCA, Ib May 1978

political action program

largest teltap coverage; 30 lines

"is exposed by Ages) in his bock"

p. 141

The phrase, if released, could tie

together what weve been trying

to protect - primarily a joint teltap

with the Mexicans and close cal-

laboration with the President of

Mexico. It also qiues credence

To the many allegations of Agee,

couch the Arenay his neither

coverage of the äupert.

p: 18.5

in addition to Mexican Pelice

being a liaison relatonship, it

Shows our access to airport

control items

p. 64

pp. 52,53,56,57

Please review the attached pagers as determined

Dy the Assassinationa Records Preview Beard members

fellow highlighted passages are as crA submitted

information to the Board, redacted

Brecketed passages Fyl as Board iphot deletions

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## Page 13

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seiz

08)

WISH

?

3

5186-155

(202)

18006

=

'MORONUSIN

WHINNIN

15

13

vuE

=3

25

1-64

:..

been handled in any different manner?

'Mr. Scelso. It would have been in the case of dissimina-

tion of information about him, but I do not think that any

operational action would have been taken to apprehend him oI

to contact him or to try to force him back to the United

States.

MI. Goldsmith. What about in terms of -- how would the

dissemination have been treated differently?

MI. Scelso.

Well, it simply means that we would have

disseminated any additional information that we got.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did Headquarters ever criticize the

Mexico City station for failure to send this information?

Mr. Scelso. No. That was not because we were trying to:

• easy on them, it is simply because it is in the nature of

the business.

What you are trying to do is engage, as i used

to say, in important illegal manipulations of society,

secretly.

apper

We were running, at that time, a vast politicallact

program in Mexico City

tory to swing Mexito aroung tron

Leftist direction to a middle of the road direction and it

succeeded:

I'do not know whether you informed yourself

about the magnitude of our political action program there at

the time -- absolutely enormous.

we were trying to follow the Soviets and all the satel-

lites and the Cubans. At the same time, the main thrust of

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1-52

213)

558-29115

UNSUITHGION,

10:1.0.00.1.1

ITI STILT.

3

3

=0

21

24

Mr. Scelo.

Yes.

Now, why did they not report everything they found out?

MI. Goldsmith. Answer your own question.

Mr. Scelo. The telephone center envoy was manned by

principally Mexican supervision

san american, or Mexican- o

American.

These people were just inundated with information

and apparently did not extract this and transmit it back to

Washington.

The later contacts with the Cuban Embassy, and so on,

which only were divulged after the assassination. It is

an

enormous problem. Mexico had one of the biggest and most!

active telephone intercept operations in the whole worla

and the job of processing this material is just impossible.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let's go through this step by step,

although I was not going to do this at this time. I am going

to modify the line of inquiry somewhat.

Do you know how many telephone intercepts there were

in the Mexico City station?

Mr. Scelo. How many lines were being tapped?

MI. Goldsmith. Yes, at the Cuban and then at the soviet.

Mr. Scelo. I think there are about 80?lines being tapped

altogether. That is just the number that sticks in my mina.

MI. Goldsmith. Thirty meaning a total of thirty from du

both the Soviet and the Cuban?

MI. Scelo. And various security suspects.

1l 1 3:33

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collapolll 10'5

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# C: +1024 (202) 554-2345

3

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20

21

23

23

SECREI

1-53

MI. Goldsmith. Would the security suspects to related

to the Soviet or Cuban?

Mr. Scelo. Some of them were American Communists

living there whom we tapped at the specific request of J.

Edgar Hoover.

Mr. Goldsmith. Of those thirty lines now many, at your sle

best estimate, would have been for the Soviet and Cubans?

Mx. Scelo. However many outside telephone lines they

had.

MI. Goldsmith. You think just about every outside

phone?

MI. Scelo. I think they tapped all the outside lines.

Mr. Goldsmith. How certain of that are you?

Mr. Scelo. Well, this is just based on my recollection,

going back 15 years.

Mr. Golasmith. In any event, your ea-lier comment was

that the telephone surveillance operation in Mexico City

was one of the most extensive in the world?

Mr. Scelo. Yes. And of course, they taped a great

deal which they could not exploit. They could not later

listen to it; they did not have time. They used to listen

to it sort of spottily, you see, and attempt then to expioit

what was the most important.

MI. Goldsmith. Your answer to my earlier question as

to why the information on Oswald was not sent to the

SECRET

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i-56

2?3)

YOSH

3

20024 (2012)

:2

i 3

17

ITH

STATT,

5.11.

!3

20

21

23

(Pause)

Mr. Scelo. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. I have a

few questions to ask you on

that. This refers to the envoy operation thatswas. theali

joint operation conducted by the Mexicans and the Anericans

and I believe this indicates that there were

30 lines, inà

fact, connected at one time, so that your early testimony

was, in all likelihood, accurate.

I am going to have to ask you also torread the section

marked number 3, Oswald coverage.

MI. Scelo. What is that report, if I may ask?

MI. Goldsmith. This is taken from the 1977 Inspector

General Report.

Mr. Scelo. I see.

MI. Goldsmith. Please read the section marked Oswald

Coverage through to the end of the paragraph on page 162:

(Pause)

age.

On page 161, the section where it says:

"Oswald Cover-

In mid - 62

•[the Mexican officer in charge of the envoy,

operation

MasKedithe American officer attne

ole

envoy listening post for the telephone numbers of the soviet,

Cuban and satellite embassies in anticipation of possible

coverage."

The question I have for you is as follows. It would

seem, from the earlier paragraph, that the liaison operation

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Archives

HSCA

(RG

MASHINGTON,

20024

(202)

554-2315

1 :

:5

i?

ia

20

21

23

=1

2=

1-57

was already in effect, so why would it have been necessary

Fox fERe Mexican officer in chargel|to ask the American officer ]

for the telephone numbers?

MI. Scelo.

The Mexicans were probably tapping other /

things

at that time, not these targets. They were tapping

other Mexicans;

and so on.f We had our own "unilateral tap:

operations

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand that.

Mr. Scelo. - on those important targets.

Mr. Goldsmith.

So, are you saying that prior to 1962;:

[the Liaison operations with the Mexicang Jaid not cover the

Soviet, Cuban and satellite embassies?

MI. Scelo. That is what that says. I do not really

recall. That would have been in mid'6

That was just

about the time I was coming onboard in the Mexico desk.

And I do not recall what the previous status was.

I do recall that they certainly did ask --

they suddenly

disclosed the intent to tap certainstines

hich

Welwere

tapping un laterally.

Mr. Goldsmith. It indicates that

It indicates that/ the Ilaison operation.]

had taps on 30 lines. If it was. not the Soviet, Cuban and

satellite embassies, it makes us wonder what it could have

been.

Mr. Scelo. Mexican politicians and security suspects:

Mexican Communist Party people. There were three or four or

101838

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Keproducea

Irom

the

holdings

the National

Archives

HSCA

STREET,

s.11.

Kilotiiis

BUILDING, HASHTIGTON.

2002% (202)

554-2345

DEUME 1

1-141

!1

i2

!3

20

23

28

ME. Goldsmith. Is the Mexico City's station's operations

one of the most sensitive of all of the stations at the

Agency?

MI. Scelso. It was then. That is; the variety and

number of telephone taps, surveillance teams, photo operations

and other technical operations

is exposed by Agee inthis

book

That exceeds anyplace else that we had in the world

by a lot. There is no other station in the world that has

that good operations.

Then came Caracas.

That got to be real good. Nothing

like it in Europe.

Mr. Goldsmith. I would like to draw your attention to

cable which, unfortunately, I do not have with me.

The cable

is referred to in Book 5 of the Senate report, written by

Thomas Karamessinas to the Mexico City station in which he

indicate and said the arrest of sylvia Deran would jeepordize

U.S. freedom of action.

Do you remember that cable?

Mr. Scelso. Yes. *

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know why it was sent?

MI. Scelso. At that time, we were not sure that oswald

miget not have been a Cuban agent, and the arrest of a

foreign consular person was quite a serious matter under

international law.

Although Sylvia Duran was a Mexican citizen, I believe,

nevertheless, I did not think -- Karamessinas may not have

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## Page 19

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Appendix 1

Alphabetical and numerical listing of CIA employees,

agents and collaborators and organizations controlled,

financed and influenced by the CIA.

ACOSTA VELASCO, JORGE. Nephew of Ecuadorean President, Jose

Maria Velasco.

Minister of the

Treasury and Minister of

Government. Informant and political-action agent of the Quito

MORICIA ORBE LATINO MERICANO. Feature news service serving

most of Latin America. Financed and controlled by the cIA through

the Santiago, Chile, station.

AGRIBUSINESS DEVELOPMENT.INC. (LAAD). Provided cover for CIA

officer Bruce Berckmans, q.v.

AGUERRONDO, MARIO. Uruguayan Army colonel and former Monte

video Chief of Police. Close station liaison collaborator.

AIR AMERICA. CIA-owned airline for paramilitary operations, mainly

in the Far East.

ALARCON, ALBERTO. Guayaquil businessman and Liberal Party activ.

ist. Principal agent for CIA student operations in Ecuador. Crypto-

nym: ECLOSE.

ALBORNOZ, ALFREDO. Ecuadorean Minister of Government (internal

security). Close collaborator of the Quito station.

ALLEN, JOHN. CIA operations officer at Camp Peary training base,

formerly assigned in the Near East.

ALLIANCE FOR ANTI-TOTALITARIAN EDUCATION. Propaganda

mechanism of the Montevideo station.

ALMEIDA, WILSON. Publisher and editor of Voz Universitaria, q.v., a

university student newspaper. Propaganda agent for the Quito

station.

ALONZO OLIVE, RAUL. Cuban engineer in sugar industry. Member of

commercial delegation to Brazil and Uruguay. Recruited by the CIA

in Montevideo before return to Cuba.

AMADOR MARQUEZ, ENRIQUE. Labour and political-action agent of

Guayaquil base. Minister of Economy.

1 AMAYA QUINTANA, ENRIQUE. Leader of the Peruvian Movement of

the Revolutionary Left (MIR), recruited in Guayaquil as a penetra-

tion agent. Resettled by the CIA in Mexico.

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL

EMPLOYEES. The US member of the Public Service International

599

---

## Page 20

13-

INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION. OF PETROLEUM AND CHEMICAL

WORKERS (LEPCIS). The ris for this industry set up originally by

the ClA trough die US Oil Werkers International Union.

INTERNATIONAL FEDERATIONOF PLANTATION, AGRICULTURAL

AND ALLIED WOREERS (OFE HAW). The international trado secret-

ariat for rusal woches. Used ta the ClA for labour operations.

INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF WOMEN LAWYERS. Organization

used by tue cIn for propaganda operations.

INTERNATIONAL TOKICE ACADEMY. CIA controlled police training

school under ats cover ix Washington DC. Formerly the Inter-

American Polic Acadouy: löunded in Panama by the Panama

station

INTERNATTONALTOLICESER YICES SCHOOL, CIA training school for

police in Washigion usder commercial cover.

INTERNATIONAL STUDENI CONFERENCE (ISC). See COORDINAT-

ING SECRETARIST OF NATIONAL UNIONS OF STUDENTS (COSEC).

INTERNATIONAL IRADE SECRETARIATS. A generic description of

the interrations trade-amion organizations having as members the

national unoes of roders. in a particular industry. There are 15-20

ITs's most of which have keen used by the ClA for labour operations.

Some have bezaquarters in: Europe, others in the US but close rela-

tions maintained wich toe IC F TU in Brussels.

INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORI WORKERS FEDERATION (ITF). The

international tade secrewiat for transport industries. Used by the

CIA for labor operatioas. See JOAQUIN (JACK) OTERO.

JACOME, ERASICINE. Anzerican married to Ecuadorean. Quito agent

wha wrote orver letters sar Luis Toroella, q.V., and served as tran-

scriber zue couricE fir telephone-tap operation. Cryptonym:

ECDOXY

JARAMILIO; JAEKE, Verquista leader and Quito station penetration

JAUREGUL, ARTURO. Sucretary-General of the Inter-American

Regiocal Lañor Orgaization (ORIT), q.V., in Mexico City. CIA

ageat

collabote

KARAMESSIAS; TENISi. Assistant Deputy Director for Plans and

ater Dexat: Distctes for Plans.

612

KAUFMAN, WALTER J. Chief of Mexico branch of Western Hemi-

sphere Division.

KINDSCHL, JACK. CIA operations officer in Stockholm using non-

official cover of Washington DC public relations firm Robert Mullen

Co. Assigned to Mexico City with same cover.

KING, COLONEL, J. C. Chief of the Westen Hemisphere Division of the

KLADENSKY, OTTO. Quito Oldsmobile dealer and station agent for

intelligence on the Czech diplomatic mission. Also the cutout to

Reinaldo Varea Donoso, Ecuadorean Vice-President, q.v. Crypta

• Dym: ECTOSOME Later DICTOSOME.

LABOR COMMITTEE FOR DEMOCRATIC ACTION. Propaganda moch-

anism of tbe Montevideo station.

LADD, RAYMOND. Quito station administrative officer also in charge

of certain operations.

LADENBURG, ARTHUR, CIA operations officer in Mexico City under

• non-official cover. Later assigned to Santiago, Chile.

LIBIDINAL Mexico City station postal interoept operation. True

cryptonym and true names of agents unknown.

IICALLA One of three observation posts overlooking the Soviet

Embassy in Mexico City. Names of agents forgotten.

LICOBRA. Cryptonym for operations targeted by Mexico City station

against the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) and the

Mexican Foreign Ministry and Ministry of Government.

LICOWL-1. Owner of small grocery store near Soviet Embassy, Mexico

City. CIA agent. True name forgotten.

LICOZY-1. Double-agent of Mexico City station against the KGB. True

name forgolten.

LICOZY-3. Double-agent of Mexico City station against the RGB. True

name forgotten.

LICOZY-5. Double-agent of the Mexico City station against the KGB.

True name forgoliii.

LIDENY. Mexico City station unilateral telephone-tapping operation.

True cryptonym and true names of agents unknown.

LIEMBRACE. Mexico City station surveillance team. Names of team

members unknown.

LIENVOY. Joint telephone-tapping operation between Mexico City

station and Mexican security service. Names of agents un-

known. p

LIFIRE Mexico City station travel control and general investigations

team. True names unknown.

LILINR. An operation in Mexico City to provide non-official cover for

613

---

## Page 21

13-00000

nym: LISAMPAN) is still in the 'interference-complaint-te

stage.

Another important operation directed against the Cubans fi

sophisticated provocation that won the CIA Intelligence Men

for Stan Archenhold,f the case officer who conceived it h

operation consisted of a series of letters sent to the Cuban intell,

gence service in their Mexico City Embassy from a person v

purported to be a CIA officer trying to help them. The letter

purport to implicate Joaquin Ordoqui, a respected, old-gus.

leader, of the Cuban Communist Party and a high-ranking mit

tary leader, as a CIA agent. The letters are based on informatio

irom Carlos Manuel Pellecer, the Guatemalan exile and penetr

tion agent, who was closely associated with Ordoqui and Marcos

Rodriguez when all three lived in Mexico City during the late

1950s. The letters continue to be sent to Cuban intelligenoe al

though Ordoqui was arrested in 1964, and the desired contro

versy and dissension in the Cuban revolutionary leadership

followed.

As the cover of Sherry, the chief of the Cuban operations sea

tion, is in the Embassy consular section, he has been able to mod

several of the Cuban consular officers directly. However, his main

agent for direct assessment of the Cubans is Leander Vourvoulias,

Consul of Greece and President of the Consular Corps.

Support Operations

The support operations must also be detailed. The joint opera

tion for telephone tapping, LIENVOY, is effected in cooperation

With the Mexican authorttes aud has a capacity for about fort

lines. The station provides the equipment, the technical assistance,

couriers and transcribers, while the Mexicans make the conne

tions in the exchanges and maintain the listening posts. In add

tion to monitoring the lines of the communist diplomatic mission

and those of Mexican revolutionary groups, LIEN VOY also cove

special cases. For years the telephones of ex-President Cárdena

and his daughter have been tapped, and recently tapping ba

started on that of Luis Quintanilla, a Mexican intellectual whos

planning a trip to Hanoi with the publisher of the Miami Ne

and with a fellow of the Center for the Study of Democrati

532

institutions in Santa Barbara. Reports on plans for this trip are

tent immediately to the White House.

¿ The station also has its own unilateral telephone tapping

operation which is limited to special cases where the involvement

of the Mexicans is thought to be undesirable. Connections for this

coperation are made outside the exchanges by telephone company

engineers who work as station agents, as in the case of the bugging

of the Cuban Embassy (LISAMPAN). However this is restricted as

far as possible in order to avoid damaging relations with the

Mexicans in the event of discovery.

Travel control, general investigations and occasional surveil-

lance are the duties of a six-man team called LIFIRE. They obtain

fight-travel lists from the airport, which are passed daily to the

station and take photographs of passengers to and from com-

munist countries and of their passports as they pass through

immigration.

Another eight-man surveillance team, known as LIEMBRACE,

has vehicles (including a Volkswagen photo-van) and radio-

communications equipment and is mainly concerned with Soviet/

satellite and Cuban targets. It is administered by Jim Anderson, #

who also controls another eight-man team (LIRICE), similarly

equipped, which deals with the Mexican revolutionaries and other

miscellaneous targets.

Postal interception is mainly directed towards the mail from

communist countries, but can occasionally be used to get corres-

pondence from selected Mexican addresses.

As in every station, a variety of agents assists in support tasks

which they perform in the course of their ordinary jobs. For

processing the immigration papers for station non-official cover

personnel, for example, Judd Austin, I one of the US lawyers in

Goodrich, Dalton, Little and Riquelme (the principal law firm

serving American subsidiaries) is used. The Executive Vice

President of the American Chamber of Commerce in Mexico

City, Al Wichtrich, I channels political information to the station

that he picks up in his normal work with American and Mexican

businessmen. For technical support the station has an officer of

IS under Embassy cover with a workshop and qualification:

in audio, flaps and seals, and photography.

533

---

## Page 22

13-20000

that they were engaged in political activities. The Chinese had t

lact, been using the NCNA ofice for propaganda and support t

pro-Chinese revolutionary organizations in Mexico and Centr

Amacrica.

Central American Exiles

Mexico has traditionally been a haven for political exiles from

Central American countries including communists and other

extreme leftists. Several Central American parties, including the

Guatemalans, maintain liaison sections in Mexico City in order

to keep lines open to the Soviets, Cubans and others. They

operate semi-clandestinely for the most part in order to avoid

repression from the Mexican government.

Washington DC

20 December 1966

Because of the strategic importance of Mexico to the US, its size

and proximity, and the abundance of enemy activities, the

Mexico City station is the largest in the hemisphere. Altogether

the station has some fifteen operations officers under State

Department cover in the Embassy political section, plus about

twelve more officers under assorted non-official covers outside the

: Embassy. In addition, a sizeable support staff of communications

officers, technical services, intelligence assistants, records clerks

and secretaries bring the overall station personnel total to around

fifty.

Liaison Operations

Dominating the station operational programme is the LITEMPO!

project which is administered by Winston Scott, I the Chief of

Station in Mexico City since 1956, with the assistance of Annie

Goodpasture,‡ a case officer who has also been at the station for

some years. This project embraces a complicated series of opera-

tional support programmes to the various Mexican civilian

security forces for the purpose of intelligence exchange, joint

524

operations and constant upgrading of Mexican internal intelli-

fence collection and public security functions.

At the top of the LITEMPo operation is the Mexican President,

Gustavo Diaz Ordaz, $ who has worked extremely closely with the

station since he became Minister of Government in the previous

edministration of Adolfo Lopez Matcos$ (1958-64). Scott had

aso developed a very close working relationship with Lopez

Matcos, and, since Diaz Ordaz became President two years ago,

Scott has been working closely with the current Minister of

Government, Luis Echeverria. Thus the LITEMPO project

focuses at the top on the President and the current Minister of

Government who will be the second consecutive choice of PRI

kaders to pass from internal security to the presidency.

Scott's chummy relationship with Diaz Ordaz none the less has

its problems. In 1964 Fulton Freeman went to Mexico City as

Ambassador to crown a Foreign Service career that had started

in the same Embassy in the 1930s. He is expected to retire after

the 1968 Olympic Games. At the time of his assignment to Mexico

City Freeman's expectations of meaningful diplomatic relations

with Diaz Ordaz collided with the President's preference for deal-

ing with Scott, and Freeman was relegated to protocol contacts

with the President while his diplomatic talents focused on the

Foreign Minister. The problem of who would deal with the Presi-

dent was confused somewhat by the Ambassador's insistence, not

long after arrival, on a detailed briefing about the station opera-

tional programme, which Scott refused. Eventually both Scott

and the Ambassador visited the White House, where President

Johnson settled matters according to the wishes of the Agency

and of his friend Diaz Ordaz. Scott continued, of course, to work

with the President and the Ambassador never got the full briefing

he had demanded. Since then the relations between Scott and the

Ambassador have warmed, but the Ambassador forbids any

station operations directed against the Mexican Foreign Ministry.

While Scott frequently meets the President and the Minister of

Government, two non-official cover case officers handle the day-

lo-day contact with the chiefs of the security services subordinate

lo Echeverria. One of these officers is a former FBI agent who

worked in the legal attaché's office in the Mexico City Embassy

- the legal attaché is usually the FBi office in an American

525

---

## Page 23

13-00900

embassy. The pal officer had left the FBI to come with the statlo!

but pains have been taken to conceal his CIA employment i

order to avoid the bad blood that would result from the city

"stealing' of an FBI officer. The two non-official cover officers are

the equivalent of an AID Public Safety mission but in Mexico tha

function is performed secretly by the station in deference to Mexi

can nationalist sensitivities - as is the case in Argentina. Through

the LITEMPO project we are currently providing advice and equip.

ment for a new secret communications network to function be?"

tween Diaz Ordaz's office and principal cities in the rest of the

country. Other joint operations with the Mexican security ser

vices include travel control, telephone tapping and repressive

action.

The station also prepares a daily intelligence summary for Diaz

Ordaz with a section on activities of Mexican revolutionary orga-

nizations and communist diplomatic missions and a section on

international developments based on information from head.

quarters. Other reports, often relating to a single subject, are

passed to Diaz Ordaz, Echeverria and top security officials. Thes

reports, like the daily round-up, include information from station

unilateral penetration agents with due camouflaging to protect the

identity of the sources. The station is much better than are the

Mexican services, and is thus of great assistance to the authorities

in planning for raids, arrests and other repressive action.

....

Liaison between Scott and the Mexican military intelligence

services consists mainly of exchange of information, in order lo

keep a foot in the door for future eventualities. The US military

attachés, moreover, are in constant contact with their Mexican

military intelligence counterparts and their reports are received

regularly by the station.

Stan Watson, the Mexico City Deputy Chief of Station, has

been meeting with a South Korean CIA officer who was recently

sent under diplomatic cover to monitor North Korean soundings

for establishment of missions in Mexico and Central America

Communist Party Operations

The station CP section consists of two case officers, Wack

Thomast and Ben Ramirez, I both under Embassy cover, plus

526

i two case officers outside the station under non-official cover: Bob

Driscoll, i a retired operations officer now working under con-

¿ tract, and Julian Zambianco who was transferred from Guayaquil

10 Mexico City about a year ago. These officers are in charge of

agent and technical penetrations against the revolutionary organi-

rations of importance. The quality of this intelligence is high,

although not as high as it was before 1963. In late 1962 Carlos

Manuel Pellecer, I the station's most important communist party

penetration-agent, broke openly with communism by publishing

a book. He was a leader of the Guatemalan Communist Party

(PGT) and had been Minister of Labor in the Arbenz government

during the 1950s. However, after the Agency-sponsored over-

throw of the Arbenz government Pellecer made his way to Mexico

City where for years he was the station's best source (cryptonym

LINLUCK) on all the revolutionary organizations in Mexico, not

just the Guatemalan exiles. His book, of course, was financed by

the station and distributed by the Agency all over Latin America.

Pellecer is still being used by the Mexico City station as a propa-

ganda agent, as with other former penetration agents who form-

ally break with communism without revealing their years of work

as spies - Eudocio Ravines, f the well-known Peruvian defector

from communism is a parallel case. Another book by Pellecer,

aiso financed by the station, has just appeared. This book is a

continuation of CIA exploitation of the Marcos Rodriguez and

Joaquin Ordoqui cases in Cuba, and is aimed at denigration of the

Cuban revolution.

The station also collects information about communists from

the US living in Mexico. Many of them arrived during the Mc-

Carthy period and some have subsequently become Mexican

citizens. Information about them is mainly of interest to the FBI,

which calls them the American Communist Group in Mexico

City (ACGMC). Information collected about them includes that

obtained through the LIENvOY telephone tapping operation des-

cribed below.

The station also receives copies of reports from FBI penetration

operations against Mexican revolutionary organizations. Mexico

is the only country in Latin America, except Puerto Rico, where

the fBi continued operations against the local left when the CIA

look over in 1947. The fBI intelligence is of high quality.

527

---

## Page 24

13=

Soviel/Satellite Operations

The largest section in the station is that covering Soviet/satelins

operations. It has four case officers, three intelligence assistant

and a secretary, all under Embassy cover, and four case offioe:

under non-official cover. It is headed by Paul Dillont and th

other official cover case officers are Donald Vogel, Cynthi

Hausman and Robert Steele. # A number of sensitive operation

are underway.

The station has two observation posts in front of the Soviet

Embassy, which cover the entrances, plus a third observation post

in the back of the Embassy to provide coverage of the gardens?

The LICALLA observation post in the back is the closest of five

houses bordering the Embassy property - all five are owned by

the station. Several years ago films were made of Soviets con-

versing in the garden, but attempts by Russian lip-readers to dis-

cover their conversations were unsuccessful. From one of the

front of's, radio contact is maintained with the LIEMBRACE

surveillance team for signalling when a particular Soviet surveil

lance target leaves the Embassy, his route and other data. Photos

are regularly taken from all the Op's of Soviets and their families

and all visitors to the Embassy. When visitors use vehicles, photo-

graphs are taken of their licence plates for tracing. Occasionally

the LICALLA OP is used for electronic monitoring, since it is

close to the Embassy, but so far attempts to pick up radiations

from Soviet cryptographic equipment have been unsuccess.

ful.

In addition to the LIEMBRACE surveillance team, several other

support operations include coverage of the Soviets. Through the

CIENVOY operation, Soviet telephones are constantly monitored,

and through the LIFIRE travel-control operation photographs of

travel documents are obtained along with data on arrivals and

departures. Monitoring of Mexican diplomatic communications

reveals requests for Mexican visas by Soviet officials, including

the diplomatic couriers. In addition, NSA is also monitoring

several communications systems involving 'burst' transmissions

from the ussr to as yet unidentified agents believed to be in

Mexico - possibly Soviet intelligence officers assigned abroad as

"illegals', with false identity and non-official cover.

528

The station runs between fifteen and twenty access agents

rainst the Soviets with varying degrees of effectiveness and

Miability. Several of these agents are suspected of having been

Ficruited by the Soviets for use as double agents against the

dation. Two of the most important of the current access-agents

are Katherine Manjarrez, I Secretary of the Foreign Press Associa-

tion, and her husband - both of whom are targeted against the

Soviet press attache and the Tass correspondent. Others are

LCowL-lIand LIOVAL-1.$

LICOWL-l is the owner of a tiny grocery store situated in front

of the Soviet Embassy where the Soviets buy odds and ends in-

duding their soft drinks - TSD is studying ways of bugging a

wooden soft-drink case or the bottles themselves. More import-

ant, LICOWL-1 is involved at the moment in an operation against

the Embassy zavhoz (administrative officer), who spends consider-

able time chatting with the agent. Because Silnikov, the zavhoz,

has been on the prowl for a lover - or so he said to LICOWI-1 -

the station decided to recruit a young Mexican girl as bait: An

appropriate girl was obtained through BESABER,‡ an agent who

is normally targeled against Polish intelligence officers and who

runs a ceramics business specializing in souvenirs. By loitering at

LICOWL-I's store the girl attracted Silnikov's attention, and a

hot necking session in a back room at the store led to several

serious afternoon sessions at the girl's apartment nearby -

obtained especially for this operation. Silnikov's virility is as-

tonishing both the girl and the station, which is recording and

photographing the sessions without the knowledge of the girl.

Although promiscuity among Soviets is not abnormal, relation-

ships with local girls are forbidden. Eventually it will be decided

whether to try blackmail against Silnikov or to provoke disrup-

lion by sending tapes and photos to the Embassy if the blackmail

is refused.

LIOVAL-II is not as interesting a case but is more important.

The agent is an American who teaches English in Mexico City

and is an ardent fisherman. Through fishing he became acquain-

led with Pavel Yatskov, the Soviet Consul and a known senior

KGB officer - possibly the Mexico City rezident (KG B chief). Yats-

kov and the agent spend one or two week-ends per month off in

the mountains fishing and have developed a very close friendship.

529

---

## Page 25

13-00000

When Yatskov is transferred back to Moscow - he has alre

been in Mexico for some years - we shall decide whether to try la

defect him through LIOVAL-1. Recently Peter Deriabin, I thi

well-known KG B defector from the 1950s who is now a US citize,

and full-time CIA employee, went to Mexico City to study the

voluminous reports on Yatskov written by LIOVAL-1. He con

cluded that there is a strong possibility that LIOVAL-1 has been

recruited by Yatskov and is reporting on Paul Dillon, the station

officer in charge of this case. Nevertheless, the operation con!

tinues while the counter-intelligence aspects are studied further

The station double-agent cases against the Soviets, LICOZY-1;y

LICOZY-3I and LICOZY-S,I are all being wound up for lack,

of productivity or problems of control. One of these agents,.

LICOZY-3, is an American living in Philadelphia who was ro

cruited by the Soviets while a student in Mexico, but who reported

the recruitment and worked for the Mexico City station. Hé

worked for the fBI after returning to the US - the Soviet case

officer was a UN official at one time - but recently Soviet interest

in him has fallen off and the FBI turned the case back over to the

Agency for termination.

Against the Czechs and the Poles many of the same types of

operation are targeted. Acoess agents, observation posts, tela

phone tapping, surveillanoe and travel control are continuous

although with somewhat less intensity than against the Soviets.

In the Yugoslav Embassy the code clerk has been recruited by the

CIA as has one of the Embassy's secretaries.

Until the New China News Agency (NCNA) office was closed

last month by the Mexican government, the Soviet/satellite sec.

tion of the station was responsible for following the movements

of the Chinese communists. Telephone intercepts through

LIENVOY and occasional surveillance by the LIRIcE team were

directed against them, but the most important intelligence col-

lected against them was from the bugging of their offices. The

audio operation was supported by the Far East Division in head-

quarters, who sent an operations officer and transcribers to

Mexico City. Now that the NCNA offices are closed, the audio

equipment will be removed and the station will continue to

follow up the many leads coming from the bugging operation.

530

than Operations

She Cubân operations section consists of two case officers,

rancis Sherry and Joe Piccolo, and a secretary under Embassy

över and one case officer under non-official cover. An observa-

cion post for photographic coverage and radio contact with the

LEMBRACE surveillance team is functioning, as well as LIENVOY

telephone monitoring and LIFIRE airport travel control. Through

he LIFIRE team the station obtains regular clandestine access

to the Prensa Latina pouch from Havana, and copies of corres-

pondence between PL headquarters in Havana and its correspon-

dents throughout the hemisphere are forwarded to the stations

concerned.

Through the LITEMPO liaison operation the Mexican immi-

gration service provides special coverage of all travellers to and

from Havana on the frequent Cubana flights. Each traveller is

photographed and his passport is stamped with arrival or depar-

ture cachets indicating Havana travel. The purpose is to frustrate

she Cuban practice of issuing visas on separate slips of paper in-

sead of in the passport so as to obscure travel. Prior to each

Cubana departure the station is notified of all passengers so that

name checks can be made. In the case of US citizens, the Mexican

service obliges by preventing departure when requested by the

station.

The most important current operation targeted against the

Cuban mission is an attempted audio penetration using the tele

phone system. Telephone company engineers working in the

LIDENY tapping operation will eventually install new wall-boxes

for the Embassy telephones in which sub-miniature transmitters

with switches will have been cast by ISD. At the moment,

however, the engineers are causing deliberate interference in

Embassy telephones by technical means in the exchange. Each

time the Embassy calls the telephone company to complain of

interference on the lines, the engineers report back that every-

hing in the exchange is in order. Eventually, as the interference

continues, the engineers will check street connections and finally

arrive to check the instruments in the Embassy. They will find the

wall-boxes "defective' and will replace them with the bugged

boxes cast by ISD. Right now, however, this operation (crypto-

531

---

## Page 26

Reproduced

from

the holdings

the

National

Archives

HSCA

(RG

233)

13-00000

NIONTIN:

11118.001N5.

WASHINGTON,

• 20024

(202)

5511-2345

$

:$

id

20

23

23

0 in 891.12891

1-185

MI. Goldsmith. What do you mean, things like this

happened all the time?

MI. Scelso. Planes were held for travellers who rould

otherwise miss them, for Cuban officials, and so on.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did the Agency ever actually investigate:

this particular matter?

Mr. Scelso. It investigated to the extent that there

was nothing left to investigate. The plane was gone. The

man was on it. He had not identified himself before he left.

We had very complete coverage of the Mexico City Airport Ole

and watched the Cuban flights closely, but where it sometimes

happened that an important Cuban official would come late,

he would go directly to the plane without going through

travel controls:

At that time, the man was gone. There was no picture

of him.

Nobody looked at his passport. Period.

MI. Goldsmith. You did not bother to ask any Cuban

employees in the Airport about the man?

MI. Scelso.

- We did not have any source of cuban

Elraiser

employees.

We only had

Mexican police

Mr. Goldsmith. vere any of them questioned about him?

Mr. Scelso. Yes, this was a routine thing. We had a

whole reporting set up there with that, two of them, who

watched things like this. But the report from them was that

the man had just gone on the plane and they did not know vino

SECRE

ALIEREON REPORTING CONFAYY

101967

---

## Page 27

13-00000

The Lopez Report

HSCA Summary of Oswald and the ClA.

in

Mexico City

Warrenton site.

metallation, under Anny cover,

Archives for lit pollin

• •Ist is the

teltap coverage of 30 lines

identification of Sauiet officials

targeted

Identification of Cuben offreials

targetted

palitical action program

p.44

P. 54 and others ile

p. 566, 71 ok

ok

p. 58

p. 177,178

---

## Page 28

13-00000

Classification:.

y.:

g wa

(This form is to be used for material extracted

from CIA -controlled documents.)

= 44-

was in operation on only four of those days. This

Committee has not been able to establish or disprove

the possible inference that LILYRIC covered those

days when there was no coverage from LIMITED because

the production and logs from the LILYRIC base were

not made available for review. That material was

requested but has not been made available.14l/ An

explanation of why this material is missing was

requested on 7/25/78.142/ The CIA's explanation stated

that the photographs and logs "may have been destroyed

in a purge of Mexico City Station files and that the

folders for the destroyed material were reused to

forward more recent photographic material to

Headquarters

for retention. "143/ The folders which

once contained the production were located at the

National Archives' Warrenton Records Center but,

SCIE

according to the CIA's explanation, the folders

contained production material from 1967.144/ Because

the CIA has not provided the photographic production

and logs from the LILYRIC for examination, no

precise determination detailing the effectiveness of

the coverage of the Soviet compound can be made.

Classification:

2600/23

160

---

## Page 29

13-00000

Classification: 4 U

(This form is to be used for material extracted

from ClA controlled documents.)

=54-

16.

(lease of

le niemes

ho retired

inder cover

parent fir

please

day 1997

2010"1

surveillance project. 189/ • Even though Mr. Scott was

the nominal case officer, the "routine case officer

functions" were performed by Ms. Ann Goodpasture. 190/

An American technician was stationed in the listening

post to maintain the equipment and to protect the

Station's interests there.191/ Ms. Goodpasture's

duties in this operation ranged from meeting with

the technician/officer inside the base for the purposes.

of daily supervision of the operation to handling the

collection and distribution of the tapes and transcripts.192/

Ms. Goodpasture worked in this capacity until 1968.193/

With the exception of the technician, the listening:

0/

post and the transcription.room.of.this.base/were.

staffed by Mexican Army officers 194/ This listening

post covered up to thirty lines at one time. 195/

b. Analysis and Reporting of Information

Obtained

Mr. "Herbert Manellwas responsible for the

analysis, processing, and daily review of the soviet

transcripts.196/ The transcripts were reviewed on a

daily basis by Barbara

a Manell?

Mrs. Manel? would

Classification:

varsian

170

---

## Page 30

13-00000 sno.

0555279

моке

Classification: 1

05H03

(This formi is to be used for material extracted

from ClA-controlled documents.)

=56-

2000/22

It should be noted, though, that an examination of

the project files shows that Americans in contact

with communist diplomatic institutions were routinely

reported to Headquarters for name traces and dissemination

to the intelligence community. 203/

3. Telephone Lines Covered

This Committee has made an attempt to determine

which telephone lines at the Soviet and Cuban

diplomatic compounds were subject to this electronic

intercept operation in September and October of 1963.

The monthly operational report of this project for

the month of september lists the following phones

as targets of the operation: 204/

14-42-37

14-92-14

Cuban Embassy

. Cuban

Embassy

25-07-95

Cuban Embassy

14-13-26

Cuban

• Embassy

15-60-55

Soviet Embassy (Chancery)

15-61-55

15-69-87

soviet Embassy

(Chancery)

Soviet

Embassy (Military Attache)

75-61-07

Soviet Embassy (Commercial Office)

15-12-64

Soviet Embassy (Film

Representative)

The report notes that lines 14-92-14 and 25-07-95 at

the Cuban Embassy were disconnected on 23 September

1963.205/

The monthly report for october says that

Classification:

702

0F209T

172

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## Page 31

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Classification:

RARN

Viti

(This form is to be used for material extracted

from ClA controlled documents.)

571-

in

a chronological file.292/ One copy of the

Cuban

transcripts was routinely sent to Headquarters on

weekly basis.293/

(9) Format of Transcripts

The format of the transcripts that Mr. Tarasoff

produced was much the same as those of the Spanish

language transcripts described above.294/ Mr.

Tarasoff's transcripts were from Russian into English. 295/

Many of Mr. Tarasoff's transcriptions bear the notation

"(previously transcribed)" after the meter

• number

referring to the reel footage location of a

conversation.297/ Mr. Tarasoff indicated that this

notation meant that the conversation had already been

transcribed from a tap on another embassy phone:

"Previously transcribed"

means, for instance,

I went to the embassy first and the embassy

number was 605055.

Now this number 501264

belonged to the

film's office.

So consequently

if that particular call went out of the main

building to the films office and it had been

transcribed

that is

exactly what l

would do, put down

before.previously transcribed.

So there was no question of doing it twice. 298/

Classification: Ul

2000010?

18%

Citatied ty derivoric::

---

## Page 32

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Classification: or Cruncl

(This form is to be used for material extracted

from ClA-controlled documents.)

- 58-

subject to the intercept operation. It should be

noted, though, that there were five lines tapped in

the Cuban compound in 1964.212/ They were:

14-42-37

25-07-95

14-13-26

25-09-14

11-28-47

The Ambassador's private telephone

The Chancery

The Chancery

The Commercial Office

The Consulate

One CIA employee who was involved in Cuban

operations in Mexico City remembered that there were

taps on the telephone of the Cuban Consulate. 213/ It is

possible that the employee, Mr. Phillips, who was stationed

in Mexico City from 1961 to 1966, was incorrect, after

a fifteen-year hiatus, in placing this tap in 1963.214/

As the above notes, an examination of the project

files fails to support: Mr. Phillips' memory,

although those files do show that the Consulate

telephone was tapped in 1964.

4.

Production from Operation

The intercept listening post operated from

approximately 7:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m. every day. 215/.

Classification:

20000/21

174

Cossied by derivation: -

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## Page 33

13-00000•

"Tr

Classification:

& ts

(This form is to be used for material extracted

from ClA-controlled documents.)

-177 -

Q: Had the information concerning Oswald's visit

to the Cuban Embassy in addition to the Soviet

• one, that Oswald had been requesting a visa,

if it had been

sent to CIA headquarters, would

his case prior

to

the assassination have been

handled in any different manner?

A: It would have been in the case of dissemina-.

tion of information about him,

but I do not

think that any operational action would have

taken to apprehend him or to contact him or

to try to force him back to the United States.

Q: ... how would the dissemination have been

treated

differently?

A: Well, it simply means that we would have dis-

seminated any

additional

information that we

got. 657/

It cannot be determined with exactitude whether or

not this additional information about Oswald was reported

to Headquarters. In all likelihood it was not. The Chief

of the Mexico Desk was asked whether or not the Station

was ever criticized for this failure to report in the

face of a specific request to do so by CIA Headquarters.

He said:

No. That was not because we were trying to go

easy on them, it is simply because it is in the

nature of the

business.

What you are trying to

do is engage, as 1 used to say, in important il-

legal

manipulations of society, secretly.

we were running, at that time, a vast poli-

tical action program in Mexico City to try to

sHing Mexico

around from

its leftist direction

to a middle of the road direction and it succeeded.

Classification:

afte

zy 3

100.

---

## Page 34

13-00000.

Classification:

(This form is to be used for material extracted

from CIA - cortrolled documents.)

-.178 -

I do not know whether you intormed yourself about

the magnitude of ourlpolitical action program at

the time--absolutely enormous.

We were trying to follow the soviets and

all the satellites and the cubans:

At the same

time, the main thrust of the Station's effort

was to attempt to recruit Russians; Cubans and

satellite people. 658/

Perhaps the nature of the CIA Mexico City Station's

handling of the Oswald case prior to the assassination

can best be summed up in Dave Phillips' response when

he was asked how he

would characterize that handling:

"At the very best, it is not professional, at the best." 659/

V. Mexico City Station Reporting of Information Concerning

Oswald After the Assassination

A. Reporting of information concerning the photograph

of the Mexico Mystery Man

Even though some people in the station clearly dis-

associated the photograph that was.

i described in MEXI 6453

from Oswald after receiving the 10/11 cable, - 656/ it is

clear that some people still considered it possible for .

some reason that the photograph was of Oswald. In Octo-

ber, Ann Goodpasture had argued this very point with win-

ston

Scott. 657/ On the day of the assassination, the

Mexico City Station cabled Headquarters that it was sending

Classification:.

as

soon as possible

4596L

"copies of only visitor to

29

Classified by derivation:

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## Page 35

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SECRET

Whitters

From the Desk offLinda C. Cipriani>

NOTE FOR:

John F. Pereira

J. Barry Harrelson

Eleanor E. Neiman @ DO

Fredrick C. Wickham @ DO

Johnny L Goins @ DO

> Fred Crawford @ DO

{ Linda C. Cipriani

04/24/96 12:15:25 PM

Interview with John W. (S)

FROM:

DATE:

SUBJECT:

CL By 2224130/

CL Reason 1.5(c)

DECL On X1

DRV FM Hum 4-82

Attached is an MFR summarizing my meeting with Mr. Whitten. On a more personal note, Mr. Whitten is an extremely

charming and interesting gentleman. The meeting with him went much better than I had hoped, but it was also rather emotionally

distressing for both Jeremy and I. Mr. Whitten broke down several times during the meeting and was obviously feeling very scared.

Although Jeremy is sure that the Board will do the right thing here, we both agreed that Mr. Whitten is withoüt doubt someone who

should be protected even if it means going to the President.

WHITTMFR.DOC

CC:

SECRET

---

## Page 36

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SECRET

17 May 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with John Whitten (S)

onducted the interview by showing Whitten various documents and

is prior testimony before the HSCA.

help the Board in any way he could and even offered to come to

the US if need be. Gunn concluded that it would probably not be

useful to take Whitten's deposition at a later date.

Although

Whitten had in general a good memory, Gunn felt he did not add

anything of significance to his prior testimony before the HSCA.

After the interview, Mr. Whitten took us to his apartment and

then later to a restaurant with his wife. We left Mr. Whitten

about 1900. (S)

Mr. Whitten was extremely worried and upset about the

release of his name and on several occasions in the interview was

with CIA and the Board, instead, he clearly tent hurt and

Although I was expecting him to be angry

His obvious physical problems add to this feeling of

Physically he is not well; he is paralyzed on

his left side and has great difficulty walking. On a map, he

pointed out his apartment and indicated what he believed

to be

serious threats to his safety should his affiliation with CIA

become known. Within a block of his apartment, he pointed out

the headquarters of the PKK, the Anarchist party and a bar where 7

many Middle Easterners would congregate He then pointed out

these places to us when we went to his apartment.

He made it

clear that there was no way he could defend himself from any

attack. (S)

3.

Mr. Whitten also stated that he has been retired for

almost

and that he has

and his wife have

Lived in Vienna, approximately 25 years.

He is a member of

various musical

and art societies.

He sings in a prominent

Vienna, Men's Choir.

He has published various articles on music

(his specialty is Johann Strauss).

He has received many medals

for his work

his apartment. (S)

in the arts In Vienna which we saw when we went to

Mr. Whitten is also greatly worried about the fact that

he committed perjury when applying for Austrian residency by

stating he worked for the State Department. He believes this

CL BY: 2224130

CL REASON: 1.5(CT

DECL ON: X1

DRV FM: HUM 4 - 82

SECRET

---

## Page 37

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SECRET

SUBJECT: Interview with John Whitten (S)

could subject him to criminal penalties in Austria. He stated on

several occasions, should his affiliation become known,.

he would

have to leave Austria.

stated that he

would turn himself in to the Viennese authorities and offer his

services as a consultant to the police or intelligence service.

He obviously was extremely distraught and was voicing

what he

believed were his options should his name be released by the

Board, although he had not decided on a particular course of

action.

In the other hand,

Mr. Whitten was adamant that no

natter what happens he would never betray the CIA by telling

anyone about his work as an intelligence officer. (S)

Felt much better about eate of even white sevented tcasion

events. On several occasions,

I had assured him that CIA was doing everything to protect him

and Gunn had stated he would argue for his protection to the

He clearly looked upon Gunn and I as his

allies in this

process and even

stated that he had a

"wonderful"

day talking to

us. We left him,

I believe, feeling happy and confident all would

turn out well: (S)

about how this issue would be handled by

our meeting with Whitten, I spoke with Gunn

the Board.

believed that it was more than likely that the Board would agree

o protect him and that he would make the strongest argument he

could to them.

The Board will make its decision in it's next

meeting in mid-May. Gunn did not think it would be necessary

anyone from CIA to come down to that meeting.

We agreed that

should the Board make the reprehensible decision of

releasing

Whitten's name, that we

could not imagine a

stronger case on

which to bring an appeal to the President. (S)

Linda C.

Cipriani

SCI/OGC/L

2

SECRET

---

## Page 38

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SECRET

SUBJECT:

Interview

with John Whitten

(S)

DCI /OGC/LD/[Cipriani:/76124

Distribution:

Original

- Original

1

- Registry

1 - Lit

File

(17 May 96)

SECRET

---

## Page 39

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SECRET

24 April 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with John Whitten (S)

conducted the interview by showing Whitten various documents and

his prior testimony before the HSCA.

Mr. Whitten was eager to

help the Board in any way he could and even offered to come to

the Us if need be Gunn concluded that it would probablythoughe

useful to take Whitten's deposition at a later date.

Whitten had in general a good memory,

Gunn felt he did not add

anything of significance to his prior testimony before the HSCA.

After the interview, Mr. Whitten took us to his apartment and

then later to

a restaurant with his wife.

We left Mr. Whitten

about 1900. (S)

Mr. Whitten was extremely worried and upset about the

release of his name and on several occasions in the interview was

on the verge of tears.

Although I was expecting him to be angry

with CIA and the Board, instead, he clearly felt hurt and

betrayed.

His obvious physical

problems add to this feeling of

Physically he is not well; he is

his left side and has great difticulty elking. On a papa yee o

paralyzed on

pointed out his apartment

and indicated what he believed to be

serious threats to his safety should his affiliation with CIA

become known.

Within a block of his apartment, he pointed out

the headquarters of the PKK,

the Anarchist party and a bar where,

many Middle Easterners would congregate. He then pointed out

these places to us when we went to his apartment.

He made it

clear that there was no way he could defend himself from any

attack. (S)

Mr. Whitten also stated that he has been retired for

almost as long as he worked for the cIA, and that he hag:

completely different life now inVienna? He and his wife have

lived in Vienna) approximately 25 years.

He is a member of

various musical and art societies. He sings in a prominent

Vienna, Men's Choir.

He has published various articles on music

(his specialty is Johann Strauss).

He has received many medals

for his work

in the arts? in Vienna which we saw when we went to

his apartment. (S)

Mr. Whitten is also greatly worried about the fact that

ne committed perjury when applying Ior austrian residency Dy

stating

he worked for the State Department, He believes this

CL BY: (2224130%

CL REASON: 1.5 (c)

DECL ON:

DRV FM: HUM 4-82

SECRET

---

## Page 40

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SECRET

SUBJECT: Interview with John Whitten (S)

could subject him to criminal penalties in Austria, He stated on

several occasions, should his affiliation become known, he would

have to leave Austria

On other occagions, he stated that he

would turn himself in to the Viennese authorities and offer his

services as a consultant to the police or intelligence service.

He obviously was extremely distraught and was voicing what he

believed were his options should his name be released by the

Board, although he had not decided on a particular course of

anyone about his work as an intelligence officer. (S)

f he mastured him hat the was doing eat ining ev protect hims,

and Gunn had stated he would argue for his protection to the

Board. He clearly looked upon Gunn and Jas his

allies in this

process and even stated that he had a "wonderful" day talking to

us. We left hims

I believe, feeling happy and confident all would

turn out well.

After our meeting with Whitten, I spoke with Gunn

about how this issue would be handled by

' the Board.

delieved that it was more than likely that the Boara would agree

to protect him and that he would make the strongest argument he

could to them.

The Board will make its decision

in (it's) next

meeting in mid-May.

Gunn did not think it would be necessary for

anyone from CIA to

come down to that meeting.

We agreed that

should the Board make the reprehensible decision of releasing:

Whitten's name, that we could not imagine a stronger case on

which to bring

an appeal to the President. (S)

Linda C. Ciprian.

DCIZOGC/LD

SECRET

---

## Page 41

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SECRET

24 April 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with John Whitten (S)

On 22 April 1996, from approximately 1000 to 1600;

Jeremy Gunn, General Counsel of the Jfk review Board, and I spoke

with Mr.

. John Whitten at the u.s. embassy in vienna.

conducted the interview by showing Whitten various documents and

his prior testimony before the HSCA.

Mr. Whitten was eager to

help the Board in any way he could

and even offered to come to

the us if need be. Gunn concluded that it would probably though

useful to take Whitten's deposition at a later date.

Whitten had in general a good

Gunn felt he

did not add

anything of signiticance to his prior testimony before the HSCA.

After the interview, Mr. Whitten took us to his apartment and

then later to a

restaurant with his wife. We left Mr. Whitten

about 1900. (S) :

Mr. Whitten was extremely worried and upset about the

release of his name and on several occasions in the interview was

on the verge of tears.

Although I was expecting him to be angry

with CIA and the Board, instead, he clearly felt hurt and

betrayed.

His obvious physical problems add to this feeling of

Physically he is not well; he is paralyzed or

is left side and has great difficulty walking..On a map; he..

pointed out his apartment and indicated what he believed to be

serious threats to his safety should his affiliation with CIA

become known.

Within a block of his apartment, he pointed out

the headquarters of the PKK, the Anarchist party and a bar where)

many Middle Easterners would congregate, He then pointed out

these places to us

when we went to his apartment.

He made it

clear that there was no way he could defend himself from any

attack. (S)

3.

Mr. Whitten also stated that he has been retired for

almost as long as he worked for the CIA, and that he has a

completely different life now in Vienna!

Lived in Vienna approximately 25 years.

various musical and art societies. He sings in a prominent

32022

and his wife have

He is a member of

He has published various articles on music

(his specialty is Johann Strauss). He has received many medals

for his work in the arts) in Vienna which we saw when we went to

his apartment. (S)

4.

Mr. Whitten is also greatly worried about the fact that

ne committed perjury when applying for austrian residency by

stating he worked for the State Department). He believes this

CL BY:

2224130)

CL REASON: 1.5 (c)

DECL ON:

DRV FM: HUM 4-82

SECRET

---

## Page 42

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SECRET

SUBJECT: Interview with John Whitten (S)

could subject him to criminal penalties in lustriano he stated on

several occasions, should his affiliation become

he would

have to leave Austria.

On other occasions, he stated that he

would turn himself in to the Viennese, authorities and offer his

services as a consultant to the police or intelligence service.

He obviously was extremely distraught and was voicing what he

believed were his options should his name be released by the

Board, although he had not decided on a particular course of

action.

On the other hand, Mr. Whitten was adamant that no

matter

what happens he would never betray the CIA by telling

anyone about his work as an intelligence officer. (S)

felt much bette and teen cente see te at be

On several occasions,

I had assured him that CIA was doing everything to protect him

and Gunn had stated he would argue for his protection to the

Board.

He clearly looked upon Gunn and Jas his allies in this

process and even stated that he had a "wonderful" day talking to

us. We left him,

I believe, feeling happy and confident all would

turn out well. (S)

24323

6.

After our meeting with Whitten, I spoke with Gunn

about how this issue would be handled by the Board.

Gunn

believed that it was more than likely that the Board would agree

o protect him and that he would make the strongest argument he

could to them.

The Board will make its decision in it's next

meeting in mid-May.

Gunn did not think it would be necessary for

anyone from CIA to come down to that meeting.

We agreed that

should the Board make the reprehensible decision of releasing

Whitten's name, that we could not imagine a stronger case on

which to bring an appeal to the President. (S)

Linda C. Cipriani

DCI/OGC/LD

2

SECRET

---

## Page 43

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SECRET

20 November 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM:

Eleanor Neiman

Sue A. Burggraf

SUBJECT:

REFERENCE:

Edit cable

Per our telecon, here is a copy of the cable that came in on Friday

from Vienna,

Document displayed with Header, Body, and Footer zones

Categorize cable

Print this cable

CATEGORIES:

ROUTE SUBJECT: RESPONSE FOR JFK ASSASSINATION RECORDS COLLECTION ACT

ROUTE COMMENTS:

SECRET 171648Z NOV 95 STAFF

CITE VIENNA 28456

TO: DIRECTOR.

FOR:

LIMIT CHIEF/OCC INFO OCC/OSG, CHIEF/PCS, C/EUR/SA, EUR/LGL,

OGC/OSD, OGC/OFLD

SLUGS: WNINTEL

SUBJECT: RESPONSE FOR JFK ASSASSINATION RECORDS COLLECTION ACT

REF: {A.

DIRECTOR 493642

95 2040015

B. DIRECTOR 493658 95 2040060

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: NONE, FYI.

2. 3 ON 14 NOVEMBER 1995, C/O NOBLEHORSE DELIVERED REF TEAR LINE

INFORMATION AS REQUESTED.

REF IDEN THEN ASKED FOR TIME TO FORMULATE

HIS THOUGHTS AND SUBMIT THEM ON PAPER.

ALTHOUGH NOBLEHORSE

EXPLAINED THAT WE WOULD PREFER HE PASS THE RESPONSE DIRECTLY TO C/O,

HE WAS APPARENTLY SO ANGERED OVER THE CONTENTS OF REF, THAT HE LATER

TRIED TO CONTACT BERT MILLS DIRECTLY AND WITHOUT SUCCESS.

ON 15

NOVEMBER, REF IDEN PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING RESPONSE IN WRITING, WHICH

IS BEING POUCHED TO HQS VIA TM 902-825:

NOV 14, 1995

TO BERT MILLS,

SECRET

---

## Page 44

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SECRET

I OBJECT VIOLENTLY TO THE REVELATION OF MY NAME REGARDLESS OF

THE LAW.

HERE ARE SOME REASONS:

I EMIGRATED TO AUSTRIA IWICE, FIRST IN 1971 AND AGAIN IN 1983.

BOTH TIMES/I HAD TO FILL QUI AND SWEAR TO LENGTHY FORMS ABOUT MY

BACKGROUND. 3I USED MY RETIRED STATE COVER BOTH TIMES, THEREBY>

COMMITTING

PERJURY TWICE UNDER AUSTRIAN LAW. MY OLD FRIENDS IN HIGH

PLACES WHO MIGHT HAVE BEEN ABLE TO PROTECT ME HAVE ALL RETIRED OR,

EVEN MORE, DIED. / AUSTRIAN JUSTICE IS NOTORIOUSLY IMMUTABLE. DO YOU

LIVING SINCE RETIREMENT IN AUSTRIA FROM 1971 TO 1980 AND FROM

1983 TO THE PRESENT, I HAVE ACHIEVED HIGH POSITIONS IN VIENNA'S

MUSICAL BODIES, BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE JOHANN STRAUSS SOCIETY AND

VICE PRESIDENT OF THE VIENNA MEN'S SINGING SOCIETY, AND/I AI

PERSONALLY KNOWN TO SEVERAL RECENT AUSTRIAN PRESIDENTS, MANS

REPORTERS AND RADIO FIGURES. I SUFFERED A DISABLING STROKE IN

DECEMBER 1993 AND MY WIFE AND I, BOTH 75, CAN CONTINUE TO EXIST HERE

BECAUSE OUR 2000 SQ. FT. APARTMENT IS WITHIN WALKING DISTANCE OF 2

POST OFFICES, SEVERAL SMALL SUPER MARKETS, MY FAMILY PHYSICIAN, OUR

DENTIST, MY UROLOGIST, AND AN EYE DOCTOR AND OPTICIAN.

WITHIN WHEEL CHAIR DISTANCE OF THE CONCERT HALLS AND THE OPERA.

WHERE CAN YOU DUPLICATE THIS FOR ME?

DURING MY ACTIVE CAREER

IN VIENNA AROUND 1959 I INTERROGATED AND

BROKE AN INTELLIGENCE SWINDLER WHO HAD BEEN A NAZI ASSASSIN.

PROMISED HIM SECRECY IF HE CONFESSED, BUT THE US ARMY PUT OUT A

"BURN NOTICE" ON HIM, FORCING HIM TO MOVE TO GERMANY. I AM SURE HE

WOULD LOVE TO FIND ME AND SHOOT ME...

¿VIENNA IS FULL OF ISLAMIC TERRORISTS.

THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL

ASSASSINATIONS, EVEN OF A CITY COUNCILMAN, BY THEM IN RECENT YEARS.

UNDER AUSTRIAN LAW, I, AS A FOREIGNER, CANNOT EVEN GET A PISTOL

LICENSE.

KNOW ABOUT THE KIDNAPPING AND KILLING OF OUR

COLLEAGUES AROUND THE WORLD.

I HAVE TWICE TESTIFIED BEFORE HOUSE AND SENATE COMMITTEES ABOUT

THE KENNEDY ASSASSINATION.

THEIR FULL REPORTS SIMPLY CALLED ME THE

"DESK OFFICER" AND THAT HAS SEEMED TO SATISFY EVERYONE.

SAY, IF YOU DO EXPOSE MY NAME, I WILL NOT EVER TALK TO ANY

JOURNALISTS OR SO-CALLED HISTORIANS.

IF MY NAME IS EXPOSED, I WILL OBVIOUSLY HAVE TO LEAVE VIENNA,

NITH THE WHOLE HOUSE FULL OF FURNITURE, PICTURES, LIBRARY, CLOTHING,

CTC. WHICH I PACKED AND PAID TO HAVE MOVED OVER HERE IN 1983.

BECAUSE OF MY STROKE, I WILL BE UNABLE TO DO ANY PACKING AND THE

MOVE WILL BE VERY EXPENSIVE.

WHERE CAN I RESETTLE IN A 2000 SQ FT.

APT. SO CONVENIENTLY LOCATED.

MY WIFE AND I LOVE LIVING HERE FOR MANY REASONS, AND LEAVING

WOULD BE A CRUEL AND NEEDLESS FATE.

7. I REGARD THIS LAW AS DISHONORABLE AND UNWORTHY OF THE UNITED

STATES OF AMERICA.

IF YOU DECIDE AGAINST ME,

I WANT TO APPEAR

BEFORE THE BOARD AND EVEN THE PRESIDENT, WHOM I HAPPEN TO ADMIRE. I

WILL PAY MY OWN WAY BACK TO DO SO. I SERVED IN WWII AND NEVER

SPARED MYSELF; IN THE OUTFIT I WORKED HARD, WAS FEARLESS IN DEALING

WITH MY SUPERIORS (CORD MEYER AND DICK HELMS CAN TESTIFY TO THAT)

AND MY ADVERSARIES.

I WOULDN'T EVEN THINK OF THREATENING TO EXPOSE

THINGS TO PRESSURE YOU.

I WILL BE EMPLOYING AN ATTORNEY OR TWO,

FAMILIAR WITH OUR AFFAIRS, TO REPRESENT ME.

I WILL NOT DENY, THAT I

CONSIDER YOU AND EVERYONE ELSE IMPLEMENTING THIS LAW TO BE ENGAGING

IN DISHONORABLE CONDUCT, UNWORTHY OF OUR GOVERNMENT SERVICE.

SECRET

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## Page 45

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SECRET

RIN THE LATE 1960'S WHILE SERVING IN VIENNA UNDER TOM

KARAMISSINIS, I WAS ORDERED BY HQ TO REVEAL TO AUSTRIAN MILITARY

-INTELLIGENCE THAT A LOW-RANKING AUSTRIAN DIPLOMAT SERVING AS THEIR

INFORMANT IN BUDAPEST HAD ALSO BEEN RECRUITED BY US AND WAS REPORTI

NG TO US.

I REFUSED TO CARRY OUT THIS ORDER AND OFFERED MY

RESIGNATION.

TO ME, IT WAS DISHONORABLE TO BETRAY A YOUNG AGENT WHO

HAD ACCEPTED OUR RECRUITMENT AND PUT FAITH IN OUR PROMISE OF

TO MY MIND AN AGENCY WITHOUT PRINCIPLES CANNOT SURVIVE AND

INDEED SHOULD NOT SURVIVE.

TOM KARAMISSINIS, PERHAPS ONE OF THE

LAST HONORABLE MEN TO SERVE WITH US IN HIGH POSITION, FIRED A STRONG

CABLE BACK AND THE SHAMEFUL ORDER WAS RETRACTED.

I HAVE INVESTED ABOUT $50,000 IN MY APARTMENT, IN KEY MONEY AND

I WILL LOSE ALL OR MOST OF THIS.

LAST MOVE TO VIENNA COST ME ABOUT $15,000 IN SEA FREICHT AND

INSURANCE.

I WILL NEVER GET ON MY KNEES AND ASK TO BE MADE WHOLE IF

YOU EXPOSE ME, BUT I MAY REPORT TO THE COURTS.

I AM A RETIRED

MEMBER OF THE VIRGINIA BAR.

10. LET ME REGALE YOU WITH AN EXAMPLE OF HOW THE HISTORIANS

MINDLESS DRIVE TO KNOW EVERYTHING CAN LEAD TO A PROUD COUNTRY'S

DISGRACING ITSELF. DURING WWII WHEN WE WERE INTERROGATING GERMAN

POW'S, WE PROMISED THEM NO ONE-WOULD EVER LEARN THEY HAD "SPILLED

THEIR GUTS," AND WE ALL BELIEVED WE WERE BEING HONEST.

25 YEARS AFTER WWII THE BRITISH DECLASSIFIED ALL THE ADI(K) REPORTS

(THAT'S WHAT THEY WERE CALLED, AND EVEN THE "ROOM CONVERSATIONS,"

TRANSCRIPTS OF THE CONVERSATIONS POWS HAD IN THEIR ROOMS, EVEN

INCLUDING THE EXTREMELY VALUABLE SPEECHES MADE BY HIGH-RANKING

LUFTWAFFE OFFICERS TO THEIR HIGH-RANKING FELLOW POW'S AT

"COCKFOSTERS" MANSION.

NEWCOMERS WERE VISITED BY THE OLD HANDS FOR

A MONTH TO MAKE SURE THEY WEREN'T STOOL PIGEONS, BEFORE THEY WERE

GIVEN THE PRIVILEGE OF ADDRESSING THEIR FELLOW OFFICERS ON SOME

IMPORTANT ASPECT OF THE WAR. THE EXCELLENT BRITISH MIKES PICKED IT

ALL UP.

IN RECENT YEARS, AT LEAST ONE LUFTWAFFE VETERAN ASSOCIATION,

THAT OF J.G.2, THE RICHTHOFEN GESCHWADER,

SENT PEOPLE TO LONDON TO

GET COPIES OF

THE INTERROGATION REPORTS OF THEIR PILOTS. THEY DID

IT CHRONOLOGICALLY AND WERE SO SHOCKED AT THE VAST AMOUNT OF VITAL

DATA REVEALED BY THEIR BUDDIES THAT,

IN ACUTE REVULSION,

STOPPED LOOKING. I ASSUMED THEN THAT "EVERYONE" HAD "TALKED, " WHICH

IS TRUE.

11. I AM 75 YEARS OLD PARTLY PARALYZED ON MY LEFT SIDE FROM A

STROKE IN DEC. 1993..

I WAS NEARLY FULLY REHABILITATED WHEN, IN MAY

1994, I WAS HIT BY CONSTANT MUSCLE SPASMS ALL UP AND DOWN MY LEFT

THIS RATHER RARE CONDITION, BASICALLY A SUDDEN SUPER-HUMAN

TIGHTENING OF ALL THE MUSCLES, WITH AFTER EFFECTS LASTING UNTIL THE

NEXT SPASM, HAVE MADE IT INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT FOR ME TO STAND UP,

WALK, OR EVEN SIT UP FOR VERY LONG.

IN A FEW DAYS, WHEN ALL THE

MANY MEDICINES ARE HERE, WILI BEGIN A 20-WEEK HOMEOPATHIC CURE FOR

THE SPASMS UNDER DR. SCHRAMM, A LEADING SPECIALIST HERE. I CAN'T

VERY WELL LEAVE FOR

20 WEEKS.

YOU WILL BE CONTACTED MOMENTARILY BY ONE. OF MY ATTORNEYS. I

WILL ALSO BE IN TOUCH WITH MY CONGRESSMAN AND SENATORS.

WITH BITTER RESOLVE,

(SIGNED - REF B IDEN)

REF IDEN HAD ALSO ATTEMPTED TO PUT THE ABOVE INTO

"CABALESE, " BUT BECAME TOO TIRED TO FINISH IT.

NONETHELESS, REF

IDEN ALSO REQUESTED THAT THE CONTENTS OF THIS MESSAGE ALSO BE PASSED:

SECRET

---

## Page 46

13-00000 .

SECRET

1. SAW SUBJ IN HIS APT NOV 14. CORDIAL

REASONS:

AND 1983,

USING RETIRED STATE COVER ON SWORN AUSTRIAN FORMS

SUBJ HAS EMIGRATED PRIVATELY TO AUSTRIA FORMS THUS

COMMITTING PERJURY TWICE BY AUSTRIAN LAW. - HIGH OFFICIAL HERE WHO

COVERED FOR HIM NOW DEAD. WOULD FACE SCANDAL TRIAL, JAIL, AND

DEPORTATION.

3.

SUBJ PROMINENT IN LOCAL MUSIC CIRCLES, RADIO, TV, AND POLITICS

AND MILITARY, GREAT SCANDAL POTENTIAL.

SUBJ INVESTED 50 THOUSAND DOLLARS IN APT AND WOULD LOSE IT IN

HURRIED DEPARTURE, PLUS EXPENSE OF MOVING EFFECTS TO 21, AND OWN

FARES.

SUBJ NOW 75 HAD CRIPPLING STROKE DEC 93. WIFE ALSO 75 ABLE TO

CARRY ON BECAUSE STORES, DENTIST, DOCTOR, UROLOGIST OF SUBJ, POST

OFFICE ALL IN WALKING DISTANCE OF APT.

CANNOT DUPLICATE THIS IN Z1.

SUBJ WOULD BE ENDANGERED BY ISLAMIC GROUPS HERE WHO HAVE

EMBASSY GETS

THREATENING PHONE CALIS. AS FOREIGNER SUBU DENIED AUSTRIAN PISTOL

THREATENING PRONE CALLS.

SUBJ ALSO ENDANGERED BY FORMER NAZI ASSASSIN AND INTEL SWI

NDLER HE INTERROGATED AND BROKE 25 YEARS AGO, PROMISING HIM SECRECY;

BUT US ARMY PUT OUT BURN NOTICE, FORCING NAZI TO MOVE TO GERMANY.

SUBJ HAS TESTIFIED FULLY BEFORE HOUSE AND SENATE COMMITTEES,

TERMED "DESK OFFICER," OWN ROLE MINOR.

ALTHO PUT IN CHARGE OF

AGENCY INVESTIGATION BY HELMS THEN DDO, HIS WORK WAS SABOTAGED BY

ANGLETON WHO WITHHELD HUNDREDS OF BEST FBI REPORTS AND CONFERRED

DAILY WITH FBI WITHOUT PRESENCE OF SUBJ, ALL IN FLAGRANT VIOLATION

OF HELMS ORDERS.

SUBJ AVERS HE WILL NEVER THREATEN TO EXPOSE AGENCY. EVEN IF

SURFACED WILL DENY EVERYTHING.

4 5

FILE:

CL BY :

{ 618711

CL REASON: 1.5(C)

785-120-034.

DECL ON:

X1

DRV FROM: HUM 4-82.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

CC

SECRET

---

## Page 47

13-00000

EYES ONLY

CIA

INTERNAL USE ONLY

SECRET

9202=14,19945

CL BY:

618211

CL REASON: -

whis

DECL ON:.

DRV FROM:

To Bert Mille?

I obet violent.

It the revel at can of very name

regardless of the lair, Here are some recoous:

forms abnet my bakgroundo used may retired all coe?

ball time, thul commit pagin it me deni

all retired os, eir more, die

Twing suice retirinet in Quistra from 1971 81980

and fon 19838 the preet, Thave acread ligh

positins n varsis Musical Lodes, board of Directions

Wthe Joham Stroes Socild and Sue Presidenty

, Socil, and?? an person dly.

brown 'sereral recent Austrain Presidents, Man

reparter and radio frigina,

in Alecenter 1993

contric to exist her leans"

our 2000 sg. 1- apartment

is withing, ching distana f2 post offic, several small

super tribeta, my family physica, our dentet, my

urologat, and an eye isthoce of the concert hall and

the apers. If here can you,

duplicite this for me?

Auring my.

acture career in Gene arrant $959

O interrogald and broke in intellignce smiles who

had been a Nazi assason. Ironised his soaring if he

confessed, dot the us A t out a ban Potie"

I am seve

---

## Page 48

13-00000

CIAS

ten several ass

SECRET

2

INTERNAL USE ONLY

if counclemen, big

Chas su recent years Under Austra, law, 2,

forazier, can not ern get a pistol licise. You must here

bout ta bidnappig and billig oir collagne

4. I have tire testifil before Souse and Sanat

do expose my have,

formalit an oo cacal historans.

name is exposed, I will aberous hav

prechear

6. My wife and I love liziy hive for manny reason,

and leaning could, be a cruel and needles fate.

boch to do so, I send in WWIt

and never spied myself; hi ts out fut I worked hard,

was fearles in desting with ry sparines (Card Mayer

and ih Helm can testify to that) and my adversaris.

I wont even think if threatening t expose things

I will not dany, that I concil you and

every one ele inplimentey this dam. ts he

conduct, unward,

---

## Page 49

13-00000

3

SECRET.

CIA

NTERNAL USE ONLY

the late 1960's white seming in renne und

Com Kerasmusines, I care andered big 4Q t

Evereal to Clustrian Militay Dittezine that a lo-

ranbring Austran

diplomat serving on their inform

has and

lots +87618226

or and offered by poigration, To

dishonorable I betray a young agent who had

acapted our rantmet and put faith in aw

promise of story. To my mind son dog witho

prinaple.cam.not survie and wideed should

the last honorable men

Tom 1 masser in four i bigh

position, pril a stroy cald lad and thi shamefed,

I have investid atront.

50, o0d in may

money and in proven out: I

Please, 7 cret

apartment; in 1ose as add on sat there, C

last move billiena

east me about $ 15,000 in

sen freight and insurane. I will neve get on my

Bnees and ash to be wide whole if you expose me y

manter sti Virgin Bar.

the tit me sit you vich an excupa & hi

dried know every this.

lead D a prond country?

pronius thers no are would ever

pe we woe intense ten the hi

spilled thei git, and we all belind in mr bin

bout 25 year after WWH. The british.

"H. ADILK) remort (that' that the

---

## Page 50

13-00000

4

SECRET

CIAS

INTERNAL USE ONLY

of to concentrain POla hal in their storma,

even includig to extrand valuable speecher

makk by bigh wanting polis

hish-ranting fellow

COCKFASTEPS

at

mansion. Newsmer were veded by the old

Smake sur They werent stool

given the pirateze a

therers their fellar officer in some inferti

repet it war. The excellent britis siter pisted.

it all up,

2 recent year,

i, at least me Luftwaffe

vetera association, that 1 J.G. 2, The Richthafa

Geschrader, sent people & London & get

benchis that, in onto main, es end

Lached.

1994 7 cras

ip and down My?

condition, basicily a sudden super hum tights

hare made it in crising

walk; a even pil

for very long. In a four damp, when ald

Za man

relicin are her, will beguin

20-eeck hincopathic cure, for the spasm

an, Dr.

Schramma. a leadin

---

## Page 51

13-00000

SECRET

CIA

INTERNAL USE ONLY

You will the contacted mon

Horners.

Twill des be in touch witts my

Confess

an and Sonasten.

With bitter resolve,

John De. Which

---

## Page 52

13-00000

SECRET

CIA

INTERNAL USE ONLY

SAW SUBI IN HIS APT NOV14, CORDIAL.$

SUB HAS PREWRITTEN PLEA TO REMAIN UNDER COVER,

PRIVATELY

Z.

REASONS: SUBU HAS EMIGRATED, TO AUSTRIA TWICE,

1971 AND 1983, USING RETIRED STATE COVER ON

SWORN AUSTRIAN FORMS THUS COMMITTING PERJURY

TWICE BY AUSTRIAN LAW, MIGH OFFICIAL HERE WHO

COVERED FOR HIM NOWDEAD, WOULD FACE SCANDAL

TRIAL, DAIL, AND DEPORTATION:

3. SUBS PROMINENT IN LOCAL MUSIC CIRCLES,

RADIO, TV, NOD POLITICS

SCANDAL POTENTIAL.

B4 AND MILITARY, GREAT

4, SUBJ INVESTED 50 THOUSAND DOLLARS IN APT AND

WOULD LOSE IT IN HURRIED DEPARTURE, PLUS

EXPENSE OF MOVING EFFECTS TO ZI, AND OWN FARES,

5. SUBU NOW 75 HAD CRIPPLING STROKE DEL 93,

WIFE ALSO 75 ABLE TO CARRY ON BECAUSE STORES,

DENTIST, DOCTOR, UROLOGIST OF SUBU, POST OFFICE

ALL IN WALKING DISTANCE OF APT, CANNOT

DUPLICATE THIS IN Z6,

6. SUBS WOULD BE ENDANGERED BY ISLAMK

GROUPS HERE WHO HAVE ASSASSINATED

SEVERAL INCL ONE CITY COUNCILMAN, EMBASSY

Di GETS TGEEATENING PHONE CALLS, LAS FOREIGNER

SUBS REFUSED AUSTRIAN PISTOL PERMIT SUBS

ALSO & ENDANGERED BY FORMER NAZI

ASSASSIN AND INTEL SWINDLER HE INTERRO-

GATED AND BROKE 25 YEARS AGO, PROMISING

HIM SECRECY; BUT ARMY PU US ARMY PUT

OUT BURN NOTICE, FORING NAZI TO MOVE TO

GERMANY

7. SUBJ HAS TESTIFIED FULLY BEEORE HOUSE

AND SENATE COMMITTEES, TERMED "DESK

OFFICER: OWN ROLE MINOR. ALTHO PUT IN

CHARGE OF AGENCY INVESTIGATION BY HELMS

THEN DO HIS WAR

---

## Page 53

13-00000

WITH FBI WITHOUT PESENCE OF SUBS, ALL IN

FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF HELMS ORDERS,

8. SUBJ AVERS HE WILL NEVER THREATEN

TO EXPOSE AGENCY EVEN IF SURFACED WILL

DENY EVERYTHING

---

## Page 54

13-00000

Subj: On Scelso testimony

Date: Oct12 TueSun 19961995 18:46 EDT

From: 74030.3022@CompuServe.com

X-From: 74030.3022@CompuServe.CoM (ed dolan)

To: dickkovar@aol.com (Dick Kovar)

Dick, this is what Chuck Briggs requested

Date: 06-0ct-96 02:36 EDT

From: (The name of this person is unimportant)

Subj: EX-CIA Agent Adds Fuel to Kennedy Assassination Fire

EX-CIA Agent Adds Fuel to Kennedy Assassination Fire

By Michael Dorman

(c) 1996, Newsday

The chief CIA investigator of President John F. Kennedy's assassination has

testified that another high ClA official - noted for seeking conspiracies -

disobeyed orders in repeatedly conferring with the Warren Commission shortly

after the murder. The witness also sald a colleague once told him that the CIA

official, the late

James Angleton, "has ties to the Mafia"

Almost 33 years after the assassination, the identity of the witness, who held

various top-secret ClA jobs, is considered so sensitive that federal authorities

insist on withholding his true name. He is known only by the alias "John

Scelso."

While Scelso testifled before the House Select Committee on Assassinations in

1978, his 192-page testimony was kept secret until now. It has just been sent to

the National Archives by the Assassination Records Review Board, a federal .

agency that screens assassination documents and makes public those that do not

endanger national security.

Sceiso's testimony, which criticized operations of the CIA, FBi, Secret Service

and other agencies, likely will renew debates, especially among conspiracy

theorists, on the assassination and how it was investigated

When Kennedy was assassinated on Nov. 22, 1963, Scelso was chier or a CIA

---

## Page 55

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10/8/1996

America Online: Dick Kovar

Page 1

branch

responsible for operations in Mexico and Central America. Richard Helms, the ClA

chier of clandestine services and later the agency's director, placed Scelso in

charge of the assassination investigation. Angleton, a counterintelligence

official with close ties to FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, "immediately went

Into action to do all the Investigating," Scelso testified, criticizing the

move sharply.

"Helms called a meeting at which Angleton and a lot of others were present and

told everybody that I was in charge and that no one should have any

conversations with anyone about the Kennedy case without my being present -

which was violated from the word go by Angleton, who dealt with the FBI and

the Warren Commission and (Warren Commission member and former CIA Director

Allen) Dulies himself.... Angleton ignored Helms' orders. I tried to get Helms

to make him obey and Heims said, "You go tell him.'"

Angleton, who died in 1987, spent much of his career searching for conspiracies

- belteving that there was a Communist mole in the CIA - and was presumed by

other ClA officers to have tried to press a conspiracy theory on the warren

Commission. The commission found no evidence of a conspiracy. Angleton. was

fired

in 1975. Years later, a mole was found - Aldrich Ames - but he had entered the

CIA after Angleton's dismissal.

At one point in the 1978 House testimony, committee attorney Michael Goldsmith

asked, "Do you have any reason to belteve that Angleton might have had ties to

organized crime?"

"Yes," replied Scelso, who is now retired and lives abroad, government sources

sald. He said the Justice Department once asked the ClA to determine the true

names of people holding numbered bank accounts in Panama because the Mafia was

hiding Las Vegas "skim" money there. "We were in an excellent position to do

this and told them so - whereupon Angleton vetoed it and said, 'That is the

bureau's (FBI's) business.' " Scelso said he discussed the situation with

another CiA officer. "And he smiled a foxy smile and said, 'Well, that's

Angieton's excuse. The real reason is that Angleton himselr has ties to the

Maria and he would not

want to doubie-cross them.'"

On another subject, Sceiso gave Kennedy conspiracy theorists a slight plece of

---

## Page 56

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10/8/1996

America Online: Dick Kovar

Page 2

ammunition. A Soviet defector, Yuri Nosenko, was known to have told

investigators that Lee Harvey Oswald - Identifted by the Warren Commission as

Kennedy's assassin - was not a Soviet agent. But Scelso sald: "! later heard

that Nosenko was discovered to have been dissembling, not being on the level.

That Information was imparted to me by ClA officers."

Based on the information ClA headquarters had on Oswald before the assassination

- chiefiy that he had been in the Marine Corps and defected to the Soviet Union,

then returned - Scelso said he saw no reason to pay him special heed. "Oswald

just seemed to me to be a small-potatoes defector," he said. But he conceded

that significant information about Oswald - known to CIA agents in Mexico City,

for example - had not reached headquarters before the assassination.

It dealt chiefly with Oswald's visits to the Soviet and Cuban embassies In

Mexico City and his attempts to obtain a Cuban visa two months before the

assassination. Scelso said the information failed to reach Washington because of

simple overwork and bureaucratic delays in the Mexico CIty office. He revealed

that all the outside telephone lines at the Soviet and Cuban embassies were

tapped by American agents and that calls Oswald made to them were recorded

After Oswald was arrested, Scelso revealed, agents compared audiotapes made

while he was in custody with the wiretaps and determined that he was the same

man who had visited the embassies.

Distribution:

To: j. dolan > 174030,30221

Dickford Cohn > (76226, 1572]

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