MFR: AMWHIP/ MEETING THURSDAY, 14 NOVEMBER 1963
Originator: CIA
From: SAS/EOB, C/O
To: NONE
Document date: 11/20/1963
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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2022 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SECRET

20 November 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT

: AMMLIP/I Meeting, New York City

Thursday, 14 November 1963

Meoting Time/Place.

This meeting was laid on

by phone from Washington on 13 Noveuber.

scheduled

It took place as

using an office/work-room in A/l°s Jewelry taotory-

showroom at 31 W. 47th st., New York.

2. Purposes of Meeting.

This meeting was soheduled

in order to obtain information and identifications trou A/1

revelant to the AllASH Operation.

We were particularly

Interested in deteruining ALLASH's present attitude toward

the Operation and any details of or names of likely

confederates which he may have discussed with A/l after

ontrich's departure from the scene.

He were also interested

in using A/l as a oheck against the liat of likely AMLASH

confederates which had been couplled by the MIAPRON group.

GIVe AMWHIP/1

The undersigned was prepared to

tais

those of AMASH during the reoent three-weck sojourn in

Europe which A/l made at ou. request. Horever, A/l refused

to accept any remuneration whatsoever, stating that the

money we had given him for his round-trip tickot ($950,00)

wAs

enough.

This, for

the record, represenis an outlay

conservatively of some $1200 to $1500 by A/l from his oun

pocket on XUBARK bohalf, not to uention the lost time from

big own business.

He belleve this gesture should be

remembered in luture dealings: with A/l.

have come in at all were it not for our scheduled meeting.

i come all more no

General. A/l was feeling poorly as the result

Re stated that ho mould not

Nevertheloss, he spent willingly several hours with us,

going over the points in which we were interested. The

meeting terminated at 1530 with no incidents of a security

nature noted.

Detailg of Meeting.

Collecting Inforuation

for the AMLASh operation constituted the principal of

discusslons during this meeting, aud may be found as

attaohment A to this report. A

copy is filed also in the

AMLASH 201.

William E. Watnwright

SAS/BOB, C/O

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Chave 1

CUMDNNSELI8 511

201-1352234

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ATTACHMENT A TG: AMHIP NEMO ON MEETING OF 14 NOV 1963

The following Information and observations wore obtained

from A/l during the above meeting:

AMLASN Secretary: Ernestina ACOSTA Gonzalez

(nickname:

Ene) calle 25 - #526 Apt 8 (presumably cur 25th

St., No. 526.... Vedado - Tr lephone 303865.

(Note AMASHl has considerable confidance in his secretary,

and has suggosted that letters or packagos could be sent

there on a one or two-shot deal.

2. In responde to the question of whom AMLASH

aight turn to in order to carry out his plans, ANHIP

centioned the following persons:

Vose AÉEP Yara,

ca. 33 yrs old, who is functionary

In Havana municipal govs.

He 18

of moorish descent. Has wide

circle of: acquaintances in lavana.

MajOr AKMEJEIRAS

Ramon GUIN

Juan ALMLIDA

The NIEVES brotherat

Sue (Pepia) NAHANJO

of the above, A/1 felt that GUIN, ACEE, The NIEVES, NARANJO

and MENEIlAS ReTo the most dependable. The degree to

which Juan ALMEIDA could be trusted was questioned by M/1.

In addition

to the above games which all volunteered, he

asKed about Major DIAZ-ARGUELLES, MajOr TOny CASTEL and

Major Faure CHOMON. A/l stated that he felt (DIAZ-ARGUELLES

and his brother

we-

"Iin-Tin" could be used and were trustrorthy;

, on the other hand, rould not be utilized

n the initial efforts by AMASH, but, 1f his efforte were

himself

Buocessill, they could be counted on to support LASH in the

period which followed.

Coming tRee, ponte house.

They would never be taken into the

When asked about Majors Pedro

and enrique Booner Gonez, A/l

" Uner Catated that PLANAS could never he utilized ARONET MOMlA

fit into the CASTEL-CHOMON category, and MIRET, though

friendly with lAST, could not be trusted as his primary

loyalty was to FIDEL CASTRo.

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Pegs 2 01 Attach. A

Concerning Majors William GALVEZ Rodriguez,

(Viotor BORDON Machado,

Crescend lo PERiL (Nontana?), and

ANtOnIO LUSSON (LUZONT) BALLLO, A/1 stated that he did

not know these types well aud therefore had little to say

regarding then.

He did say that he did not cure for GALViL

personally and that he ras a little "psycho"; BORDON was

OK; PEREZ was an oider man, ca. 60 years, who was a

nonentity tho had his rank

because he had guided the GRANDA

group into the bills at the boginning of the fight against

Batista: (LUSSON was provably too loyal to laul CASTHO to be

considered for any initial aotion.

then questionod about the identitios of followere

was three years old and hence not very accurate. We did not

press the question, nor suggost names, as lt was evident

that he felt that his answore rould simply not glve a true,

current picture.

Б.

A/l provided the full name of a possible lead

shich he had discussed earlier with Ontrich:

le 5 * 453. Apt 6, Vedado, lavana.

Raudol RUIZ,

(RUIZ) 18 an assistant to

"Direotor of Sporta")for the National Gort

in Havana.

6.

In addition to the above information, the

undersigned

discussed

various aspects of the AMLASli case,

and in particular, questioned A/l about AMLASH's frame of

mInd and luture plans which he may have revealed to all

aftor Ontrich departed the scene. A/l nade several points,

which basically boiled down to the fact that AMLASIl was

st1ll not pleased with the support he was getting from the

USG side.

The vistt with DAINOLD, who acted in the capaolty

of a reprosontative of high levels of the Gout concerned

with the Cuban problen, satisfied AMLASH as far as polloyy

was concerned, but he was not at all happy with the fact

that he still ras not given the technical

assistance for

the operational plan as he san 1t.

A/l said that AMLASH

dwelt constantly on this point.

He could not understand

why he was denied certain small pieces of equipment which

promised a final solution to the problem, while, on the

other hand, the USG gave mich equipment and money to exile

groups for their inoffective excursions against

Cuban

coastal targots.

According to A/1, AMLASH feols strongly

on this polut, and 11 he does not get advice and

materials

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Page 3 of Attach. A

Irom USG technician, he will probubly becono fed-up again,

and we mill lose whateror progress me have made to date.

A/l stated that AMLASM now has hla feet net vis-a-via

cooperating with USt and has accepted the Inct that he ill

work profitably and securely with it.

It is this that

stand to lose with our procrastination.

AHILASH also

talked about going to the french terrorist group, the dAs,

in order to got the materiale and guidance ho needs.

1& bollaved. that he was talked out of this idea, after the

dangers involved mere discussed with AlasH.

1. With regard to the radio gear, AMLASH stated

that he did not feel that he wanted to take one in with

him, particularly in vlew of the recent arrests in Cuba

of agenta carrying concealed radios.

He was not opposed,

however, at this time to ha:dug a radio cached for him,

to be recovered by him later.

8.

According to MNIP, If there is any interest

In having AMASIl link up with other trusted assets in

Cuba, these names would have to be given to him berore he

returned; othernise he would not trust any other means

used later insido to get his to initiato or respond to such

contacts.

9.

All stated that AMLASHl talked about getting

ald from,

or at least discussing his position, with

ManOlO RAY.

However, he stated that he questioned whether

this was tho best idea, since 1I RAY came to Paris while

he (LASH) was there, people would conclude that there fras

something botroen the two, Another spot nouid be better,

thought AHLASH.

10. At the time of A/l's departure, AMASH

said that he would contact "Jack" (Red Stent, Paris

staffer) upon his return to Paris.

(This he subsequently

did on the l5th of November, according to info recelved

•from Paris-somewhat belatedly).

11. When AMLASI, A/1, and VENEGAS were together

In Rome and Italy, VENEGAS

AMLASH that people were

betting that LASh

would not return to Cuba.

Some had also

questioned his mother on this point. AMASH reportedly

told VENEGAS to cover all the hete he could as he would

be a rich nan.

(It tas at this time, according to A/1,

that AHLASH secided that he had better roturn to llavana

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Pago 1 of Altaoh. A

a littlo sooner than he intelled, in taot almost as soon

as posBibla.)

12.

AMLASH talked about the two possibilitios

of re-taking Cuba - eithor thiru invaalon by US troops, or

his way.

He also realizod, lowever,

that Invagion as

not to be considered

seriougly at this tino. Also, AlASH

talked about his ability to take soue men into the hills

of Las Villas Provinco and taking the small towns of

Trinidad and Topes de Collantes.

Ils satd that he and hid

men could last no more than 1s days in the hills as the

anti-guerrilla fighters now employed by the Regime were

ex-guerillas themselves and knew the way to fight and

wittin the hills.

Also the Soviet equipment made the govt

forces nuch moro formidable than in Batista's timo.

MALASHI

apparently was diacussing these ideas with the lapression

that this was the way to sot up a provisional robel govt

and thereby invite and gain US support,

By the way A/1

tolked, It is lairly certain that AMASH realized that

this was not the kind of a plan which could even remotely

be expected to receive US ald.

It 18 hoped that he

does realize that lavana must first be taken... or falling

that, a truely sizablo piece r. land (say, almost an

entire province) which could be a true rallying point and

staging ground linder complece Rebel control, from which

the rest of the island could be wrested from the Fidelistas

and the Communists.

In sunnary, the talks mith a/l led the

underaigned to bellere that sMASHl is again entering

one of his skeptical woods, one which our actions have

done little to dispel. Too little and too late.......

End of Report

W1111an E. Walsoright

SAS/EOB

C/o

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