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JEK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

RECORD NUMBER

RECORDS SERIES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

206-10001-10015

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR

FROM

• TO

TITLE

NSC

A. RUSSELL ASH

THE FILE

CUBA (REVIEW ON 1/10/63 OF RECORDS OF THE SPECIAL NSC

5412/2 GROUP

DATE :

01/11/63

PAGES

: 13

SUBJECTS : CUBA

SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

DOCUMENT TYPE

CLASSIFICATION

RESTRICTIONS

CURRENT STATUS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW

OPENING CRITERIA

COMMENTS

PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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1B; 1C

D0/1/50 08/01/2624 OPEN IN FULL

Box 10, Covert Operations, 1954-1967.

contained in 206-10001-10011.

Duplicate

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2025 Release under the President

John F. Kennedy Assassination

Records Collection Áct of 1992

[R]

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206-10001-10015

BOx 10

Covert Operations

1954-1967

2025 Release under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of

1992

206-10001-10015

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Box 10.

Covert Operations

1954-1967

206-10001-10015

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act.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 11, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: CUBA (Review on 1/10/63 of Records of the

Special NSC 5412/2 Group)

On 1-10-63 the writer reviewed in the offices of Mr. Tom

Parrott,

Executive Secretary, Special NSC 5412/2 Group, the

records

of the Special Group which Mr. Parrott identified as

relating to considerations given by the Special Group to recon-

naissance and covert action operations with regard to Cuba.

(Attached hereto is a copy, supplied by Mr. Parrott from his

records, of a

"Memorandum

for the Record"

dated 10/21/62 on

the subject "Reconnaissance of Cuba" which Mr. Parrott had

prepared for another purpose.)

There follows a detailed summary of the results of a

review made by the writer of the Cuba items referred to in

Mr. Parrott's summary memorandum, and of other items which

the writer reviewed in the Special Group records pertaining

to Cuba.

Minutes of Meetings of the Special Group

(Augmented) - "MONGOOSE"

Minutes of the July 12, 1962 Meeting

of the Special Group (Augmented)

Those present were the Attorney General, Mr. Johnson,

Mr. Gilpatric, Mr. McCone, General Carter, General Lemnitzer,

General Lansdale, and Dr. Cline (for part of the meeting).

The Group noted a paper presented by the State Department

member concerning "Guideline for a post-Castro Political

program.

General Lansdale briefed the Group on the number of agents

now in Cuba, including legal residents, plus infiltrated teams.

It was decided that a CIA proposal, for resupply of agent teams

and possibly of resistance groups, should be deferred pending

a broader review of the entire situation.

General Taylor

specified, however, that if an urgent need arose for air supply

at any time, the proposal could be made to the Special Group

(Augmented) •

Mr. McCone and General Lansdale stated that

a sizable

number of intelligence reports were coming out of Cuba,

largely on political and

economic matters. Mr. McCone emphasized

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that no high-level penetration of the Cuban Government had been

achieved.

In answer to a question from the Attorney General,

General Lansdale said that intelligence indicated that although

there was widespread dissatisfaction with Castro, there was

no rallying point for active opposition.

The Attorney General and Mr. Johnson emphasized the need

for an effort to obtain hard intelligence on subversive activi-

ties by the Castro regime in the Hemisphere, Mr. McCone noting

that

such efforts to date had been fruitless.

Dr. Cline showed the Group the extent of reconnaissance

coverage of Cuba.

Mr. McCone emphasized that this program has

developed complete information on deployments and facilities

for the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and he particularly noted

that these missions have verified

that there is sufficient

logistic support for a

75,000-man military force.

"No missile

sites have been found."

The Group agreed on a complete review of MONGOOSE toward

the

end of July, with participation by the Secretaries of State

and

Defense.

General Taylor emphasized that in the preparation

for such

review, there would be a need for summaries of results

obtained

to date, of intelligence developed, and of future

alternatives opened to the United States (including possible

activities in other parts of Latin America).

Mr. Johnson said that the State Department is investigating

the possibilities for subsidizing Japanese purchases of Dominican

sugar to divert purchases from Cuba and thereby deprive Cuba

of a source of dollars, and Mr. Johnson asked that MONGOOSE

operational representatives look into this further.

Mr. McCone

said

that the CIA could use unvouchered funds for this purpose,

but it would be illegal to use covert funds as a means of

evading the intent of Congress.

Minutes of the October 4, 1962 Meeting

of the Special Group (Augmented)

Those present for this meeting with regard to Operation

MONGOOSE were the Attorney General, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric,

General Lansdale, Mr. McCone, General Carter, and Mr. Wilson.

The Attorney General informed the Group that higher authority

was concerned about progress on the MONGOOSE program and felt

that more priority should be given to trying to mount sabotage

operations. The Attorney General wondered if a new look were

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not

required in view of the meager results obtained, especially

in the sabotage field, and he urged

"massive activity" within

the entire MONGOOSE framework.

General Lansdale thought that another attempt should be

made against the major target which had been the subject of

three unsuccessful missions and he said that six new missions

were in the planning stage.

Mr. Johnson said that the "massive activity" would have

to come from within, and he hoped to be able to present soon

to the Group a plan for giving Cuban exiles more of a free hand,

fully realizing that this will give additional visibility to

their activities.

Mr. McCone reserved judgment on the feasi-

bility and desirability of such a program, and Mr. Johnson

agreed that he had reservations as

well.

Mr.

McCone said that he had received the impression

that although high levels of our Government wanted increased

activit incong dia not belleve

activity, they still want to keep it at a low noise level,

but Mr.

McCone did not believe this would be possible and

he

felt that any sabotage would be blamed on the United States.

Mr. McCone cited the enormous number of telephone calls

directed at CIA at the time the skin divers landed in east

cuba, and the time that the cuban exile students shot up the

apartment house.

Mr. McCone therefore urged that responsible

officials be prepared to accept a higher noise level if they

want to get on with operations.

The Attorney General, in partial rebuttal, said that the

reasons people had such concern were (a) the fact that the skin

divers were Americans, and (b) the fact that the student activity

was irresponsible and foolish -- and if either of these had

in fact been engineered by the United States it would have

been a great mistake.

The Attorney General also related the

possibility of attributability to the importance of the

particular undertaking, and he questioned whether we are going

down the right road or whether more "direct action

were not

indicated.

He urged that alternative and imaginative plans

be developed.

Mr. McCone said that internal restrictions are so rigid

that internal uprisings would surely be brutally suppressed.

(It was agreed that the current guidelines did not call for

inciting such an uprising.)

Mr. McCone and General Carter explained the tremendous

efforts

necessary to insure that operations such

as the sabotage

operation previously authorized cannot be pinned directly on

the United States.

After discussion, the Group agreed that

It was not necessary to go to such extreme lengths to insure

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nonattribution, and that short cuts were desirable.)

Mr. Gilpatric informed the Group that the Defense Depart-

ment was hard at work on establishing a Cuban brigade. Recruits.

would be trained from four to five months and then placed on

call for any future action.

General Taylor reported that the Joint Staff 1s refining

various contingency military plans based on a variety. of

possible situations, including Soviet action arainst Berlin:

"the presence of bloc offensive weapons in Cuba"; an attack

against Guantanamo; a popular uprising; armed Cuban subversion

in the Hemisphere; and

"the establishment of a direct threat

to the United States.

Dr. Scoville and Colonel Steakley were present at this

reconnaissance of Cuba.

Group meeting for an item regardine restricted to using its

It was pointed out that the CIA is

high-performance vehigle in the southeast quadrant of Cuba,

because of SAM sites.

It was questioned whether this was

reasonable restriction at that time, particularly when SAMs

were almost certainly not operational.

Colonel Steakley and Dr. Scoville described a spectrum

of reconnaissance activities which could be undertaken,

ranging from low-level, Navy fighters through drones, up to

the agency's capabilities, particularly equipped with new radar

countermeasures.

As a result of the discussion there was agree-

ment that the Department of Defense and the CIA should get

together on recommendations for targets within Cuba that require

coverage, and on recommendations as to how to achieve this

coverage.

A meeting was set for the following Tuesday when

Defense and CIA were to be prepared to discuss all possibilities,

including requirements, capabilities, vulnerabilities, etc.

There was some discussion of the desirability of mining

Cuban waters, using nonattributable mines appearing to be home-

made

and laid by small aircraft operated by Cubans.

It was

agreed that the Attorney General would act as

Chairman of the Special Group (Augmented) for the time being.

It was agreed that four major points which had emerged

from

this meeting

were: (1) we ought to go all-out for increased

ntelligence; (2) there should be considerably more sabotage:

(3) restrictions on attributability can be relaxed so that

training and preparations can be subject to short cuts; and

(4) all efforts should be made to develop new and imaginative

approaches to the possibility of getting rid of the Castro regime.

In the "Memorandum for the Record," October 21, 1962, on the subject

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(Continuation of footnote from previous page)

"Reconnaissance of Cuba" it is stated:

"The DCI pointed out that the

Agency is now restricted to using the U-2 in the southeastern quadrant

of Cuba, because of SAM sites.

It was questioned whether this

was a

reasonable restriction at this

time, particularly since the sAMs were

almost certainly not operational.

Beside this item in the summary

memorandum, there appears the penciled notation "Also agreed should

go all out for intel."

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Minutes of the October 9, 1962 Meeting

of the Special Group (Augmented)

Present

for this meeting were the Attorney General,

Mr. Bunay, Mr. connson, Mr. Gilpatric, General Taylor, Mr. Mc-

Cone, Mr.

Wilson, Dr.

Charyk, Dr. Scoville, Colonel Steakley,

and Colonel Ledford, CIA.

The Group discussed various possibilities of accomplish-

ing reconnaissance of Cuba, ranging from low-level coverage

by tactical aircraft to high-performance aircraft and drones.

Overflights and peripheral flights were discussed. It was

agreed that the first priority is one high-performance mission

in the western part of the island, to be accomplished by all-

out ELINT support, and depending on the results of this, a

number of similar

sorties might be mounted.

was later approved by higher authority, with the decision on

the second proposition left open.

be discussed at the USIB and by the Chiefs on Wednesday,

October 10.)

Along with the minutes of this October 9 Meeting there

was in file a memorandum from Mr. Parrott to Mr. Bundy, dated

October 11, 1962.

It was reflected

in Mr. Parrott's memorandum

that Mr. Gilpatric had called at 2:15 P.M. to say he and Mr.

McCone had finally agreed that the one high-performance flight

would be flown as a military flight with a SAC pilot.

CIA had

wanted to stick to the existing system for the first flight,

simply to avoid any delay. The SAC pilot would require some

additional training because the equipment in the improved

vehicle was new to him, but Mr. Gilpatric and Mr. McCone

apparently felt that this was an acceptable delay and it was

hoped to get the flight off over the weekend. It was further

stated in Mr. Parrott's memorandum that it seemed agreed that

within the terms of the authorization given by higher authority

It would be necessary to go back for approval of the next

phase: contemplating two or three more high-performance missions,,

and Mr. Gilpatric seemed to feel that the discussion which had

taken place with higher authority was explicit enough to get

Mr. Parrott further in-

formed Mr. Bundy that the Cover Committee (Messrs. Charyk,

"et al") had met that

morning and

had agreed on a new cover story for a military pilot and a

revised cover story for civilian pilots, and with the necessary

changes it was thought that the cover story would be ready

that afternoon.

Mr. Parrott pointed out to Mr. Bundy that, on

the military side, the flight is characterized

as military

reconnaissance of

the periphery of the target area, with parti-

cular reference to the Secretary of State's recent

comments to

the OAS Ministers to the effect that we are increasing surveil-

lance activities. (A penciled note on the file copy of this

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memorandum read:

"Later was delayed due to disagreement on

account of training required."

There was also an October 12, 1962 addendum to the above-

mentioned October

stating:

"Later. ""I memorandum from Mr. Parrott to Mr. Bundy,

The memorandum related that, according to

Knocke, Mr.

McCone had decided the day before (October 11)

that these

flights must be either entirely overt or entirely

covert, and he didn't particularly care which so long as they

were accomplished as soon as possible.

In Mr. McCone's absence,

General Carter had come to an agreement with General McKee,

Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, along those lines on

October 11; later,

however, Mr. Gilpatric said that this was

not his understanding of the terms of authorization from higher

authority.

Mr. Gilpatric felt that the idea was that a uniformed

pilot should operate the Agency's vehicle.

On October 12 at 12:45, General Carter had

a meeting with

Mr. Bundy and at that time General Carter stated that the Agency

operation was ready to go except for weather, and that this

would hold it up until at least Sunday, and meantime the SAC

pilot would have received the necessary training. It was agreed

that if the pilot was

sufficiently trained by the earliest time

the mission could be mounted, the flight would go, with all

other arrangements within the Agency framework. If the pilot

were not ready by the time the vehicle was ready, the mission

be mounted

as a completely Agency operation, i.e., with

a civilian pilot.

According to Mr. Lay, the USIB had taken

the following actions at its October 10, 1962 meeting with

respect to the targets listed in the COMOR paper of October 6:

The Group I targets were not discussed by USIB, the impli-

cation being that there was no problem from the point of view

of USIB's jurisdiction.

Groups II and. III should be

as rapidly as possible initially, and after that the

frequency of coverage would be further examined.

(3) COMOR

was to re-do the section of the October 6 paper dealing with

Group IV, with targets to be broken out in categories of priorty,

would consider this new paper on October 17.

dia not consider any operational aspects, but confined them-

selves to the importance of the targets and the frequency

of coverage.

Minutes of the Special NSC 5412/2 Group

The following summarizes the minutes of the Special Group

Meetings which were identified by Mr. Parrott as including

consideration of the subject of Cuba.

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Minutes of February 1, 1962 Meeting of the Special Group

This meeting was attended by General Taylor, Mr. Johnson,

Mr. Gilpatric,

and Mr. Helms.

On the subject of cuba, the Chairman read his memorandum

to higher authority dated January 26, summarizing progress up

to that time. The memorandum from General Lansdale suggesting

a different approach to the content of the minutes of the

meeting of the preceding week on Cuba was discussed, and it

was agreed that the minutes would stand as prepared.

Lansdale's report of February I on popular support for the

meeting was

distributed.

Mr. Parrott's summary states

that the cuba missions were stepped up from one per month

to two per month.

Minutes of June 14, 1962 Meeting of the Special Group

This meeting was attended by General Taylor, Mr. Johnson,

Mr. Gilpatric, and General Carter.

On the subject of "Request for Special Cuban Missions,"

It was stated that the COMOR proposal dated June 13, 1962 was

approved.

(A handwritten notation on the file copy of these

stated that "Higher authority informed June 15 about

possibility of uprising,

and there was also a notation that

the June 13 memorandum regarding the COMOR request had been

"rewritten for book.")

Minutes of the July 12, 1962 Meeting of the Special Group

The Group agreed to recommend approval of various requests

for authorizations. In the case of Cuba, the minutes reflect

agreement to continue with the presently authorized schedule

purpose of discussing this matter with higher authority, CIA

should prepare a paper on Cuba, setting forth a summary of

information which had been obtained to date, the number of

missions mounted, what is proposed to be looked at in

the

future, and the

frequency of further coverage desired.

Memorandum for the President from the Special Group,

July 20, 1962

The Special Group records contain a memorandum for the

President from General Taylor dated July 20, 1962, bearing a

handwritten notation by General Taylor,

(presumably "ither authority" do July noberoved by kende

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the memorandum to the President was as follows:

In the Special Group we are aware that we have been

proceeding on a day-by-day basis in requesting authority

for overflight reconnaissance.

At our meeting yesterday,

we took a long look ahead at the estimated requirements

for the next few months and agreed that the following

program is the minimum which meets military require-

ments . . . • Cuba:

Two flights monthly . ... all U-2

flights with CIA civilian pilots..•

We would like

to get your approval in principle of the foregoing

program with the understanding that on the first of each

month you will be presented

with the specific flights

recommended for that month.

Minutes of August 2, 1962 Meeting of the Special Group

Those present were General Taylor, Mr. McCone, Mr. Hilsman,

and Mr. William Bundy.

On the subject of "Cuba Reconnaissance" it was stated

that the Group agreed that the second mission authorized for

August should be flown whenever the DCI decides that the im-

mediate situation with respect to Soviet materiel justifies

It was noted that this would use up existing authority

for August, and if a third mission should become necessary

later in the month, it should be considered on its merits at

that time.

MInutes of August 30, 1962 Meeting of the Special Group

Those present were General Taylor, Mr. Johnson, Mr. G11-

patric, General Lemnitzer and Mr. Bundy.

The minutes reflect that in connection with the Agency's

monthly forecast, General Carter mentioned that there might be

"Memorandum for the Record,

"Reconnaissance of Cuba,"

the item dealing with

this meeting the penciled notation

"primarily low-level.'

Minutes of September 10, 1262 Meetinz of the Special Group

Those present at this meeting, which took place in Mr.

Bundy's office, were the Secretary

of state, the Attorney

the Acting Director of Central Intelligence,

"and others. "General,

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The Secretary of State expressed concern at the Agency's

planned coverage of cuba, involving extensive peripheral

coverage as well

as two legs directly over cuban air space,

all in one flight. He said he had no objection to the

peripheral parts

and, in fact, thought it useful to continue

to establish our right to fly over international waters.

the other hand, he recognized the necessity of obtaining vertical

coverage of the Isle of Pines and the eastern portion of Cuba

at this time.

He felt, however, that, it was unwise to combine.

extensive overflying of international waters with actual over-

flights.

He pointed out that the long peripheral flights

would draw undue attention to the mission and, further, should

the aircraft fall into enemy hands after an overflight had

occurred, this would put the United States in a very poor position

for standing on its rights to overfly international waters.

Taking these views into account, the Agency's plans to

break this proposed coverage into four parts:

the Isle of Pines;

the area roughly east of longitude 77 west; and two legs along

the coast, one north and one south.

Within this framework, higher authority gave approval this

morning for two additional missions to be added to the one for

which authority is currently outstanding. Priority will be

given to the two overflights. (A notation on the file copy

of these Special Group minutes states that as of this morning

it appears that weather will not permit a flight until at least

Friday, and longer range weather prospects are not very good,

consequently it will be some little time before these

authorizations are used up.)

three

In connection with the minutes of this meeting, the Special

Group records contain a note for the file dated October 25,

1962, stating that COMOR later recommended that the Bay of

area should be looked at since it had not been seen since

June. ... • time over mainland would be 12a minutes for a total

of 75 miles

•.. depth of penetration, 13 miles . . . • nearest

Known SAM site,

The file note further stated

that arter considerable negotiation with the Department of

State it was agreed that this additional coverage would be

accomplished.

(In quoting

the minutes of this September 10 meeting in a

memorandum from

Mr. Tom Parrott to Deputy Secretary of Defense

Gilpatric dated

November 30, 1962, there was an addendun which

"N.B.

Mr. Bundy said on 13. September 1962 that he

thought the intent of higher authority's approval was such that

the entire

number of four missions would be considered as being

approved.

This thus

extends the outstanding authorizations

from three to four.

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• Minutes of September 14, 1962 Meeting of the Special Group

Those present were Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Nitze,

General Lemnitzer, and General Carter.

The minutes of this meeting reflect that a JOS representa-

tive (Colonel Steakley) outlined the capabilities for low-level

coverage of certain targets in Cuba.

It was noted that the

Secretary of Defense did not wish this operation considered

further until the results of Agency rèconnaissance in the same

area became

available.

General Carter said that special

efforts will be requirea to identify certain installations,

the nature of which is not clear at present. Colonel Steakley

aistributed charts for the monthly book, on supplementing

ELINt coverage of Cuba which was begun today.

The Group

had no objection to these missions.

agreed 'that the

Joint Reconnaissance Center should

keep an eye on all military

reconnaissance or surveillance flights in the Cuban

(The Special Group record of these minutes is contained in

a memorandum dated November 30, 1902, from Mr. Tom Parroti

to Deputy Secretary of Defense

G] patric.,

Minutes of September 27, 1962 Meeting of the Special Group

Those present were General Taylor, Mr. Johnson, Mr. GIlpatric,

General Lemnitzer, and General Carter.

CIA's October forecast of reconnaissance activities was

noted.

The special mission request for Cuba was approved.

This brings the number of

authorizations for this area back to

four, i.e., four had been previously authorized and one has

successfully completed, leaving authority for three out-

standing.

Minutes of October 15, 1962 Meeting of the Special Group

A memorandum prepared for the Special Group records by

Mr. Parrott reflected that at a special meeting on this date

two U-2 missions, designed to cover all of Cuba, were approved,

and that these were concurred in by higher authority. It is

reflected that after the 15th of October additicnal coverage

was agreed on at other meetings, but the Special Group was not

convened for this purpose.

Memorandum from Mr. Parrott to Deputy Secretary Gilpatric,

November 30, 1962

The Special Group records contain a copy of a memorandum

(previously referred to) from Mr. Thomas A. Parrott to Deputy

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Secretary of Defense Gilpatric dated November 30, 1962.

The

memorandum began with the statement that it had been prepared

in answer to Deputy Secretary Gilpatric's request on

the

preceding day for minutes of the special meetings of the

Special Group which bore on Cuban reconnaissance, in order

that Mr. Gilpatric and General Taylor might be informed.

It was

stated in the memorandum that Mr.. Gilpatric and General

Taylor had been present on August 30 and had then returned

to the Group on September 27.

It was'further stated that at

the meetings of the oth and 20th of September the subject of

Cuba reconnaissance did not arise.

The memorandum then pointed

out that the meeting of September

10 was not a regular meeting

of the Special Group but had nevertheless resulted in particu-

larly significant decisions.

The memorandum then went on to

set forth the minutes of the meetings of September 10, 14

and

27.

A. Russell Ash

Attachment

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