CLASSIFIED TITLE
Agency: JCS
Originator: OSD
Document date: 8/8/62
Document type: MEMORANDUM

## Page 1

Date,: 08/28/98

Page

: 1

JEK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY

INFORMATION

AGENCY

RECORD NUMBER

RECORDS SERIES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

: JCS

202-10001-10166

: FOIA SERIES

: DOC 167

Released under the John

F. Kennedy

Assassination Records

Collection Act of 1992

144 USC 2107 Notel.

Case#: NW

54214 Date:

09-13-2017

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR

OSD

FROM

TO

TITLE : CLASSIFIED TITLE

DATE: 08/08/62

PAGES : 5

SUBJECTS : MONGOOSE

DOCUMENT TYPE : MEMORANDUM

CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET

RESTRICTIONS : 1C

CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/30/98

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : Reviewed by JCS,

OSD, CIA and State.

NO JOINT STAFF OBJECTION

TO DECLASSIFICATION

MAR

2016

ĐAI E:.....

[R] -

ITEM IS RESTRICTED

HH 54214

DocId:32424897

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TOP SECRET

SPECIAL HANDLING

NOFORN

OASP(PA! DFOISR

OF SECRET CONTROL

capy No. Busine

case NO._

- FOI

-0336

T.S. No.

5-39

Dociment No.X

8 AUG 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

Subject:

Consequences of US Military Intervention

in Cuba (TS)

1. On 2 August 1962 the Chief of Operations, Operation

MONGOOSE, requested the DOD/JCS Representative, Operation

MONGOOSE, to prepare a paper for distribution to the Special

Group (Augmented) on 8 August 1962. The specific requirement

1s to set forth "Consequences of (US) Military Intervention

(In Cuba) to include cost. (personnel, units and, equipment),

effect on world-wide ability to react, possibility of a require-

ment for sustained occupation, the level of national mobili-

zation required, and Cuban counteraction." Pursuant to

this request, the requirement has been divided into its

separate parts.

2. Requirements (personnel, units and equipment)

a. In order to seize control of key strategic areas in

cuba within 1o-15 days with miniman casualties to both

aldes about /262,000 us mitary personnel would participate:

in the operation.

Do About 72,000 Army and 35,000 Marine forces Will be

engaged on the ground within Cuba. In addition, approx1-

mately 29,000 Army

troops will be available as on-call

forces.

c. Major units/involved in the initial assault include:

Iwa army azrborne alvisions, an Infantry brigade, and an

armored combat command; one and one-third Marine division/

wing teams; a Navy Striking and Covering force together

with an amphibious task force; and 17 USAF tactical fighter

IA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

squadrons and 53 troop carrier or transport squadrons.

ECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

d. Principal equipment includes:

ELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

SASHED 23 JUNE 48 nuble (1) Army -

Artillery units and armor (Including about

OSA; NO OBVECTION 275 tanks:)

Z5VUN98

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING

DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

(DOCIS)

NW 54214 DocId: 32727897 Page 2

(58

(438)

ne vecanment oi state nas no objection io the

elease or reciassification of this document in full

inder the pruvisions of the JFK Assassination Records

Collection Act of 1992 (PL102-526)

Reviewed on.

30/0

8,00

#

11.>

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## Page 3

IOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING - NOFORN

(2) Marines

Lartialery unsts and armor (including

about 85 tanks), plus sone 320 supporting airerarty

(3) Navy - Approximately 175-200 ships, including

two aircraft carriers with approximately 180 aircraft

embarked

(4) Air Force -

About 490 troop carriers and trans-

ports, 312 tactical fighters, and 65 reconnaissance

and refuelling aircraft.

3. Level of National Mobilization Required.

a dray - None. In leu of C1v22 Affa1rg Affairs:

units from the active reserve, tactical forces, though not

trained for this mission, will be employed to conduct Civil

Affairs/Military Government operations.

b. Navy - For troop and cargo sealift, no rise in

mobilization level would be required beyond the present

authority held by the Maritime Administration to charter

shipping.

c. Air Force - In order to land the maximum number of

airborne troops in the minimum time, fourteen Air Force

Reserve troop carrier squadrons (C-119)) were originally

Included in the airlift plan, however, CINCLANT and USAF

have been requested to prepare alternate plans not involving

any mobilization

prior to D-day.

d. Marines - None.

e. Further mobilization would be required if a concurrent

political or military situation exists which would make such

a precaution desirable in order to assure US military

responsiveness to additional demands.

4. Effect on World-Wide Ability to React - The present basic

contingency plan anticipates achieving control of key strategic

areas 1a Cuba with 0-15 paya, subsequent to satains such

control of the island there wilf

be a progressive withdrawal

of forces as the situation permits.

HH 54214

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3

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TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING-

a. When the assault forces have been committed to the

Cuban oper? tion,

the strategic Army forces in CONUS wouli

be short the supporting forces for the remaining five divi-

sions.

It 1s estimates that the ry Airborne tia isvision

force foulci be avallable for other operations 15-30 days af-

ter with:raal from Cuba.

Substantial Army forces

from the on-call echelon will relieve the assault forces

and remain on the islans to perform counterguerrilla opera-

tions and conjuct military government activities. This force

will be progressively ithdrawn as the new Cuban government

increases in effectiveness.

b. The Atlantic Fleet amphibious troop lift capability

(less that deployed with the Sixth Fleet) will be engaged

fully during the initial phase

of the operation. There may

be a requirement for amphibious lift. for rapis redeployment

and counterguerrilla activity until order has been restored.

It is anticipated that most of these ships will be available

for other commitments within approximately 30-45 days. About

40 to 50 per cent of the Pacific amphibious troop lift capa-

bility will be employed in the landings in the eastern end of

Cuba. These ships would be available for other operations in

the Pacifid about 15 days after the withdrawal of the Pacifle

Marines from' Cuba

"In addition to the amphibious troop lift

capability the initial requirements for sealift will include

MSTS ships obtained through the Maritime Administration.

Over-all requirements for shipping will diminish after the

initial 10-20 days of the operation.

c. It Is estimated that combat-ready status of the Atlantic

Command Marine division/wing team will be restored within 15

days of withdrawal; combat-readiness of the Pacific Command

Marine expeditionary brigade/within 30 days of ithdrawal?

a. For approximately ten days, CONUS MATS airlift

would be fully committed.

NW 54214 DocId:3242I807 pâfe^1~=

...

o......

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## Page 5

TOP SECRET

SPEGIAL HANDLING NOFORN

OASP!PA! DFOISR

TOE SECRET CONTROL

8 AUG 1962

¡case NO.

iT.s. No.

EIR 0. 25 5 - 39

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

Subject:

consequences of US Military Interventior

1n Cuba (TS)

1. On 2 August 1962 the Chief of Operations, Operation

MONGOOSE, requested the DOD/JCS Representative, Operation

MONGOOSE, to prepare a paper for distribution to the Special

Group (Augmented) on 8 August 1962. The specific requirement

1s to set forth "Consequences of (US) Military Intervention

(1n Cuba) to include cost (personnel, units and equipment),

effect on world-wide, ability to react, possibility of a require-

ment for sustained occupation, the level of national mob1l1-

zation required, and Cuban counteraction." Pursuant to

this request, the requirement has been divided into its

separate parts.

• Reguirements (personnel, units and equipment)

a. In order tonseize control of key strategic areas in

Cuba withi

days with mistmum casualties to both

sides about,

personnel would participate

in the operation.

b. Abou

i111 be

engagedion

the ground wattagn Cuba. In additions approx1-

matel

111 be available as on-call

forces.

c. Major units/involved in the initial

assault include:

(58

(438)

ne decanment or state has no objection to the

elease or reclassification of this document in full

inder the pruvisions of the JFK Assassination Records®

Collection Act of 1992 (PL102-526)

Reviewed on -

30/98/гр

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

d. Principal

RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMEN

ASsAMNED 23 JUne98 mhw (1) Army

OSA:

NO OBVECTION

25VUN98

HH 54214 DocId: 32724897 Page 5

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING

DOD. DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

DOC15)

#

Duc

167

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## Page 6

TOP SECRET SPECIAt

HANDLING HOFORNE

a Army - None. In Ileu of mobilizing Civil Affalrs

units from the active reserve, tactical forces, though not

trained for this mission, will be employed to conduct Civil

Affairs/Military Government operations.

b. Navy - For troop and

cargo sealift, no rise in

mobilization level would

be required beyond the present

authority held by the Maritime Administration to charter

shipping.

C. Air Force

"were originally

Included in the atrlift plan, howevery INCLANI and USAF

have been frequested to prepare alternate plans not involving

any mobilization prior to D-day.

d.: Marines - None.

e. Further mobilization

would be required if a concurrent

political or military situation exists which would make such

¿ a precaution desirable in order to assure US military

rosponsiness to aditional demands.

4. Effect on World-Wide Abillty to React - The present basic

contingency plan antunipates achieving control of key strategic

areas in Cuba withi

lays.

/Subsequent to gaining such

control of the island there

wilf

be a

progressive withdrawal

of forces as the situation permits

NW 54214 DocId: 3242489/ Pagê 60ne+

a0000... a

.......

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## Page 7

TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING

NOFORN

When the assault forces have been committed to the

Cuban operetion, the strategic Arny forces In CONUS would

be short the supporting forces for the remaining five divi-

It is estimates that the

pulli be available, for other operations 15-30 days 3f-

ter ilth: ra al from Cuba.

Substantial Army forces

from the on-call schelon will relieve the assault forces

and remain on the islans to perform counterguerrilla opera-

tions and conjuct military government activities. This force

will be progressively itharawn as the new Cuban government

increases in effectiveness.

b. The Atlantic Fleet amphibious troop lift capability

(less that deployed with the Sixth Fleet) will be engaged

fully during the Initial phase of the operation. There may

be a requirement for amphibious lift for rapis redeployment

and counterguerrilla activity until order has been restored.

It is anticipated that most of these ships will be available

for other commitments within approximately 30-45 days

these ships would be available for other sperations,

bout 15 days after the withdrawal,

In addition to the amphibious troop lift

capability the initial requirements for sealift will include

MSTS ships obtained through the Maritime Administration.

Over-all requirements for shipping will diminish after the

Initial 10-20 days of the operation.

c. It is estimated that combat-ready status of the Atlantic

Command Marine division/wing team will

be restored within 15

days of withdrawal; combat-readiness oi

1thin 30 days of withdrawal

3. For approximately ten days, CONUS MATS airlift

would be fully committed.

WW 51214 DocId: 3242485₽ Page Port.

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