PROBABLE COMPROMISE OF INFORMATION FURNISHED TO THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
Originator: CIA
Document date: 09/29/1976
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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* 2023 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

ATT A.

29 SEP 1976

MENORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM

: Robert W. Gambino

Director of Security

VIA

:. Acting Deputy Director for Administration

SUBJECT

: Probable Compromise of Information Furnished

to the House Select Committee on Intelligence

1.

Action Requested: Your approval is requested to

assemble an Agency-wide task force to conduct an overall

damage assessment of the classificd documents

and/or information

previously furnished by the Agency to the now defunct House

Select Committee on Intelligence (HSC) •

2.

Basic Data: I have been

concerned

for some time with

respect to the improper manner in

which classified information

supplied to the MISC by the Executive Branch was handled from a

security standpoint and which culminated in the leak of the

HSC'5

draft report

to Daniel Schorr.

As you know, leaks of

classified information to the news modia by the HSC began

shortly after its creation and continued throughout the life

of that Committee.

In addition to the news leaks, there have been sevoral

allegations (both substantiated and unsubstantiated) concerning

classified Agency and Intelligence Community documents which

have found their way from the HISC into the hands of unauthorized

persons.

Two of these allegations have been referred to the

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and in at lcast one

instance (the classified Agency documents

found on the West

Coast by R&D Associates) the FBI is conducting an active investi-

gation.

The House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct

inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the loak of the

HSC's draft report to Daniel Schorr generated substantial

testimony by former members and staff of the HSC regarding the

GONNDENTIAL

E2 IMPDET

CL BY 063344

641274.

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degree of protection afforded to classified Executive Branch

information by the MISC Staff.

This testimony clearly demon-

strated that the HISC Staff failed to provide adequate storage

and control over classified documents, to include little or

no control over the copies made or access to classified

material.

Further, the magnitude of this

situation cannot be

determined through

an inventory of the sealed cartons stored

at the Agency attendant to the "missing documents" allegation,

since there is no way of knowing how many copies

have been

made of these documents nor to whom any such copies may have

been provided.

In view of the inadequate

security practices employed

by the HSC Staff, it would seem to be a fair assumption that

much, if not all, of the classified information provided to

them by the Executive Branch has been compromised.

The allega-

tions and disclosures related to the documents and information

provided ta

provided to the ISC continue to surface at regular intervals,

and with each such occurrence the Agency is required to react

and prepare a damage assessment on a case-by-case basis.

I feel strongly that the Agency, and perhaps the entire

Intelligence Community,

should initiate an overall review of

the classified information provided to the MSC with

a view

towards preparing a comprehensive damage assessment. Admittedly,

this is an overwhelming task.

It could, however, be reduced

somewhat by limiting our review to that

classified data supplied

to the HSC the disclosure of which would compromise sensitive

Agency sources and/or current Agency projects or operations.

The above review could best be accomplished

through

the creation of a task force comprised of representatives from

all Agency directorates

and preferably of those individuals who

were previously involved in preparing Agency information for

transmittal to the MISC. As the Review Staff Registry has been

kept intact, it would be possible to determine precisely what

classified

Agency information was provided to the HSC. From a

community standpoint, it is suggested that the Intelligence

Community Staff initiate a similar review by all other Executive

Branch agencies which provided sensitive and classified infor-

mation to the HSC.

The resulting study would be of value in terms of our

commitment to protect the identity and safety of Agency sources

and in our future assessments of various programs

and projects

2

COMMENTIAL

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with regard to their success and/or failure.

In short, the

information.

the creation of a

Recommendation: It is recommended that you approve

task force, chaired by the Office of Security,

comprised of representatives

from all Agency directorates to

conduct a

damage assessment of the classified information and/or

documents provided to the now defunct House Select Comnittee on

Intelligence.

Robert W. Gambino

APPROVED

Estewache

DISAPPROVED:

Distribution:

Orig - Return to OS via DDA

1

- DDCI

1

~ ER

- DDA

1

- Asst to the DDCI

3

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DAMAGE ASSESSMENT REPORT

TRANSMITTAL DOCUMENT

Review Staff Number:

Classification

DOCUMENT ASSESSED

Number

:

Subject:

Date:

Component Performing Assessment:

Analysts Name:

Date Assessment Completed:

Coordination with Other Components:

Date:

Classification:

GENERAL STATEMENT/SUMMARY OF DAMAGE:

DETAILS OF DAMAGE:

ACTION TAKEN OR PLANNED:

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NAMAGE: ASOESSMNI REPORT

SC8C7T

TRANSMITTAL DOCUMENT

Revicw Staff Number:

Classification

Date:

DOCUMENT ASSESSED.

Nunber

Date: 21.5.73

Subject: Potential Flap Activities

Component Performing Assessment: CI Staff

Analysts Name:

R.B. Holmes

Date Assessment Completed:

21.1.77

Coordination with Other Components: Vone

Classification: SECRET

GENERAL STATEMENT/SUMMARY OF DAMAGE:

In the IG's Memorandum to Mr. Colby of 21 May 1973, the IG

identifies those "activities that are or might be illegal or

that could cause the Agency embarrassment if they were exposed"

The information contained

attachment to the IG's memoran-

dum was summarized

from a longer listing of questionable activi-

ties known as the "Jewels

CI Staff no longer apply to active operations or presenti

staft officers, public knowledge could be detrimental to the

Agency.

DETAILS OF DAMAGE:

For specific comments see attached sheet.

ACTION TAKEN OR PLANNED:

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-DET

SUPPORT

----

Page 6: Police Departments - CI Staff's former Police

more detaile

was given in the Village Voice of 16 February 1970.

Damage:

Although this operation has been terminated

detafled knowledge of CIA's involvement in the training

(in the United States) of foreign police services under

the auspices of Public Safety, AID, could, even now, be

danaging to the Agency's present and future relations

with police services

ot trendly countrles to the poini

that the U.S. Government might lose their support in

maintaining

i united front

against the common enemy.

DETAILED PERSONNEL

Page 15: John HART - was detailed to the Secretary of

the Treasury, along with four other Agency employees.

Damage:

Probably little - HART is now retired

as a

CIA employee.

03

об

Byron. ENGLE - for over (ten)years was Director

' of AID.

ment that the Director of OPS (the Agency for Interna-

ional Development'

IPS' CIA status.

Who was the Director of OPS, was in actual fact a (CIA) 24

employee, he could find himself the object of attack.

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HIGHLY SENSITIVE ACTIVITIES

Page 11: Project. SIESTA - not a C6 Staff operation..

Project PARAGON - Thelma King, a Latin American

revolutionary, and her assocrates were under surveillance

by the Office of Security from May to September 1971 at

the request of cl stati.

Damage: King identified as the objective in an illegal

surveillance operation set up by Security in the United

States,

thus providing more evidence to the "enemy" that

CIA operated in the U.S.

Page 13: PrOjeCt BUTANE) OL

• not a CI Staff operation.

Project SRPOINTER - mail intercept program; became

HTLINGUAL under CI Staff. Well documented in overt publica-

tions.

Project AELADLE - "based on false documentation,

the Office of Security obtained passports for Golitsyn, his

wife, and daughter by documenting them as U.S. citizens."

Damage:

CIA use of false documentation to obtain an American

passport, a violation of the law.

Page 14: Project REDFACE I - does not appear to be a CI Staff

operation, although the Staff may have had an interest in the

defector.

Damage:

Surreptitious entry into

an office in Silver Spring,

Md., by Agency employees.

Another example of illegal

activity

carried out by the Agency in the United States.

Page 16: Project ANTLERS - movement of defector out of a

European country and into U.S. without leaving any trace of

his

true identity.

Used false passport of another country.

Damage: Although defector not identified the fact he brought

into U.S. under false identification a violation of American law.

Page 19: Audio-surveillance - not sponsored by the CI Staff,

although the Staff may have been aware of it.

Page 20:

Project MHDOZEN - Technical surveillance of new

Soviet Embassy. Although this operation may not be active -

the new Soviet Embassy has not yet been built - the fact that

CIA and the FBI were cooperating in planning a surveillance

operation against the new Embassy, could cause the soviets

to increase their own attacks against the American Embassy ir

Moscow.

3/00

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DAMAGE ASSLOSMENI KEIUKI

CRAT

TRANSMITTAL DOCUMENT

Kevicw

• Start Number:

Classification

Date:

DOCUMENT ASSESSED

Number

:

Date:

?

Classification:

SECRET?

Subject:

"List of liSt [sie - CIA] material reviewed at Has"

Component Performing Assessment: CI Staff

Analysts Name:

R.B.Holmes

Date Assessment Completed:

21.1.77

Coordination with Other Components: None

GENERAL STATEMENT/SUMMARY OF DAMAGE:

This document is

a list of material reviewed by HISC representa-

tives at headquarters.

The only set of files pertaining to a

Cl operation is (ENDOMORTH/ENGAGE)O| The Village Voice of 16.2.76

gives a

general description of this operation on page 89.

DETAILS OF DAMAGE:

Although this operation has been terminated, detailed knowledge

of CIA's involvement in the training of foreign police services

under the auspices of public Safety, AID, could, even now, be

damaring to the Agency's present

future relations with

police services of friendly countries to the point that the U.s

Government might lose their support in maintaining a united

front

against the common enemy.

According

to the Village Voice (citing the"Pike Report"') "As many

as 5,000 foreign police officers from over 100 countries, many of

whom

have become high officials, unwittingly received training fror

ACTION TAKEN OR PLANNED OF theSe

foreign police officers may have

• been damaged when, in 1973,

IPS (Internatio-

nal Police Services)

Rate to wore tered to a lie of esentatives

No CIA officer was present to supervise

the situation.

The Agency has no idea what notes were taken

by HSC staff menbers.

ACTION TAKEN OR PLANNED: None

3INV

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TRANSMITTAL DOCUMENT

Revier Staft Number:

Classification

Datc:

DOCUMENT ASSESSED

Number

Date: 22.9.75

Classification: SECRET

Subject: 0IG Survey of OS, Annex II SGLATERAL/HGLINGUAL

Component Performing

Assessment: CI Staff

Analysts Name:

R.

B. Holmes

Date Assessment Completed:

21.1.77

Coordination with Other Components: none

GENERAL STATEMENT/ SUMMARY OF DAMAGE:

Project SGLATERAL/HGLINGUAL, was a sensitive mail intercept pro-

which, until 22 December 1974, was highly compartmented

within the

Agency.

The operation was first described in the

New York Times of 22.12.74.

It was covered by the Rockefeller

Commission in its report of June 1975 and by the Senate Select

Committee in volume III of its final report (April 1976),

pages 559-677.

DETAILS OF DAMAGE: None

ACTION TAKEN OR PLANNED:

None

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