MEMO: MEXICO STATION COVERAGE OF SOVIET AND CUBAN EMBASSIES (1963)
Originator: HSCA
Document date: 1963-01-01 00:00:00
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

# DOCID-32392425

## Page 1

Date: 02/27/05

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CIA

RECORD NUMBER: 104-10413-10269

RECORD SERIES

: JFK

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : RUSS HOLMES WORK FILE

DOCUMENT. INFORMATION

AGENCY ORIGINATOR :

CIA

FROM

TO

TITLE : MEMO: MEXICO STATION COVERAGE OF SOVIET AND CUBAN

EMBASSIES (1963)

DATE :

01/01/1963

PAGES :

6

SUBJECTS : JFK ASSASSINATION

LIFEAT

LIPSTICK

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER

CLASSIFICATION

: SECRET

RESTRICTIONS

CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED IN PART PUBLIC - RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

DATE

OF LAST REVIEW

: 07/07/04

COMMENTS : JFK-RH08 : F147: 20040324-1064332

Heleased under the John F. Kennedy

Assassination Records Collection Act of

1952 (44 USC 2107 Note]. Case#:Nw

65990 Date: 11-01-2021

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

104-10413-10269

NW 65990 Docld:32392425 Page 1

---

## Page 2

wmdetainer +97:4759999809595o wen

..

SECRET SENSITIVE

Mexico Station Coverage of Soviet and Cuban Embassies 1963)

1. Unilateral Coverage:

From the time the Mexico Station was opened in April 1947 until

the arrival of Mr. Win Scott as Chief of Station in 1955, the Station had

developed a support apparatus to exploit leads from the Soviet Embassy in.

Mexico City. This umbrella type project (LIPSTICK) consisted of multiline

phone taps, three photographie sites, a mobile surveillance team and a

mail intercept operation.

Telephone taps (LIFEAT) were placed by an employee of the local

telephone company who was handled by a Station case officer. The number

of lines tapped was limited only by the availability of a listening post

nearby and the availability of langauge (English, Spanish, Soviet, Polish,

Czech, etc.) transcribers. Generally, these were Mexican or Mexican-

American recruited agents.

Three photographic sites were handled by a Station case officer

assisted by technicians on TDY from Headquarters who advised the Station

on the best types of cameras, films, and concealment devices. These

operations had sub-crypts under project LIPSTICK (namely: LIMITED, LILYRIC

and LICALLA). LIMITED was a fixed site directly opposite the Soviet Em-

bassy (across the street) which had both a vehicle and a pedestrian en-

trance. The gate to the Soviet Embassy was on the northwest corner of the

SFCRFTIRTNSITNF

E2, IMPDET

CL BY 004645

#12356

NW 65990 Docld:32392425 Page 2

---

## Page 3

SAME IS

210911155

Soviet compound and the LIMITED site was diagonally across a double laned

street on the southeast corner of that block. (See attached diagram).

LIMITED was the first photo base and operated

strictly on an experimental

basis in the early stages. This base, however, was closed when the Sta-

tion received word that the photograph of the "unidentified man" was

being released by the Warren Commission. LILYRIC was an alternate photo-

graphic base. It was located in an upper story of an apartment building

on the same side of the street as the LIMITED site but in the middle of

the block south. It had a planted view of the front gate of the Soviet

Embassy. LICALLA, the third photographic site, was located

in one

of a

row of four houses on the south side of the Soviet Embassy compound.

This site overlooked

the back garden of the Soviet Embassy compound. The

purpose of this operation was to get good identification photographs of

Soviet personnel. The three photographic sites were managed by a re-

cruited agent who was a Mexican citizen, the son of an American mother

and Mexican father (deceased). This agent collected the film from the

LIMITED and LILYRIC sites three times a week. The film was then de-

veloped and printed into 8 x 10 contact. print strips. LICALLA film was

originally processed in the Station but in early 1959, due to the resig-

nation of

a technician, this film

like that of LIMITED and LILYRIC was

processed on the outside by a recruited agent.

2

SECRET SENSITINE

NW 65990 Docld:32392425 Page 3

---

## Page 4

197601

SONC1/0206M64

Mobile surveillance was conducted by two American staff officers.

These two officers organized a surveillance team of six recruited

agents

which used late model cars and

a panel truck for surveillance. The team

could be activated by radio from the LIMITED

site whenever

someone of

interest left the gate of the Soviet Embassy. These agents were aware of

the LIMITED site since they had been issued LIMITED photographs for

identification purposes.

The Station also conducted a unilateral mail intercept operation,

LIBIGHT, which was handled by an American case officer. A recruited

Mexican agent, who had a semiofficial status, obtained selected letters

from a subagent employed by the Mexican postal system.

2. Liaison Coverage:

Liaison coverage was unreliable and insecure as characterized by

the nature of the Mexican services at that time. The Mexican Direction

of Federal Security (DFS), with which we conducted liaison, was a hip-

pocket group run out of the Mexican Ministry of Government.

This Ministry

was principally occupied with political investigations and control of

foreigners. Their agents were winders Tailt, and corrupt.

A Station

officer trained a number of them in name tracing and travel control.

In

1958, at the instigation of a Mexican official, a joint telephone tap

operation came into existence. The operation, which became known as

3

SECRET /SAISITIVE

NW 65990 Docld:32392425 Page 4

---

## Page 5

LIENVOY, was run by a Mexican officer. The listening post had 30 lines

connected at one time. The transcription room was staffed by Mexican

Army officers. In 1961, because of mismanagement by the Mexican prin-

cipals, the Station chief, himself, became the project case officer. A

Station officer assisted him in the daily supervision of the listening

post, and in picking up the transcripts and the tapes. There was also

an American technician inside the listening post.

3. Oswald Coverage:

In mid-1962, the Mexican officer in charge of LIENVOY (the

joint tap operation) asked the American officer at the LIENVOY listening

post for the telephone numbers of the Soviet, Cuban and Satellite Em-

bassies in anticipation of possible coverage. The Station immediately

disconnected all of the unilateral telephone taps on these Embassies so

that they would not be discovered when the Mexicans hooked up their

taps. The Mexicans soon thereafter connected five Cuban lines, five

Soviet lines, three Czech lines, two Polish lines, and one Yugoslav

line. At the listening post, a live monitor made short summaries of

conversations of interest which were then included in a daily resume

for the Chief of Station. Later, when a reel was completely recorded,

full transcripts were typed and passed to the Station; however, there

was usually a time lag of a day or two. Reels which contained Russian

4

SECRET / SENSITIVE

NW 65990 Docld:32392425 Page 5

---

## Page 6

SECRET SEASIVE

* a language other than Spanish or English were taken to another location

for translation and typing.

Mr. Boris Tarasoff did the Russian transta-

tions but because of

the volume of

Russian conversations, the translations

usually ran about a week behind the date of the conversation.

As soon as the Station learned that an American identifying him-

self as Lee Oswald phoned the Soviet Embassy, Miss Ann Goodpasture of the

Station started screening all photographs. However, here again, there.

was a backlog because the photographs were picked up three times a week

• but those picked up were usually for dates a few days before since the

technician who was processing the film, did so on a night-time basis.

Further, photographs were not made initially until a complete roll of

film was used.

Later this was changed and

the operator cleared the camera

at the end of each day regardless of amount of unused film remaining.

The instructions were to cover the entire work day (office hours) and to

photograph all Soviets, their families, all foreigners, and cars with

foreign license plates. Human error did occur but generally the agents

were conscientious. The Cuban Embassy coverage had more sophisticated

equipment using a pulse camera which frequently developed mechanical dif-

ficulties.

Oswald came to the attention of the listening post operators

from a tap of the Soviet line. It was picked up and taken to Mr. Boris

5

SECRET SENSITINE

NW 65990 Docld:32392425 Page 6

---

## Page 7

SIGNET SENSITIVE

Tarasoff for translation because the caller was trying to speak in Russian.

There was

some delay because Station personnel waited to compare the

photographs with the typed transcript. All transcripts were made in

either Spanish or English since the Chief of Station could read only

these two languages and because he personally screened the transcripts

for operational leads.

--*-

6

SECRET SENSITNE

, NW 65990 Docld:32392425 Page 7

---