Originator: HSCA
From: CIA
Document date: 00/00/0000
Document type: REPORT

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180-10142-10018

2022 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

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from CIA - controlled documents.)

THIS COPY IS NOT

FOR RELEASE.

JFKBOX 22

Polder 19

Cover Sheet

ins attached package of paper is the property of

the Horse Select-Committee on Assassinations,

and is

On 10an to Cin under an agreement whereby CIA is not

to reproduce of copy the diaft or any portion thereof.

Notes may be taken on materials in this

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and rough notes may be prepared as a basis for infornal

and oral

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These

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These papers have been numbered for accountability

and receipted accordingly.

They are to be handled. on

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though constituting sensitive papers

io% basis.

pePpOnICTION

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$3

Berk-writelassification:

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from CIA -controlled documents.)..

(1)

Purpose and

Scope of Study

The Central Intelligence Agency's performance

in its role of support to the Warren Commission

public concern dur

nas been a source of controversy since) the pasT

neef then year sissien commission. Critics

have repeatedly charged that the CIA participated

in a conspiracy designed to suppress information

relevant

to the assassination of President Kennedy.

During 1976 the critic's

assertions were the subject of official inguiry

by the Senate Select Committee to Study

Governmental Operations testim

-er soC). The

SSC, in its report regarding. "The Investigation

of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy:

Performance of the Intelligence Agencies" reached

Findine

he following conclusion

The Committee emphasizes that it has

not uncovered any evidence sufficient

to justify a conclusion that there was

a conspiracy to assassinate President

Kennedy•

The Committee has, however, developed

evidence which impeaches the process

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SEC

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gence agencie

arrived at their own conclusions.

about the assassination, and by

which they provided information

to the Warren Commission.

This

evidence indicates that the

investigation of the assassina-

tion was deficient and that facts

which might have substantially

affected™

the course of the inves-

tigation were not provided

the

Warren Commission or those

individuals within the EBIana

withinvestigating the assassina-

tion.

(2)

Thi

'ommittee-has sought to examine in

greater detail the general findings of the SSC.

The Committee has particularly focused its attention

on the specific issue of whether the CIA or any

employee or former employee of the CIA misinformed,

or withheld information relevant to the assassina-

tion of President Kennedy from the Warren

Commission. In addition, the Committee has

attempted to determine whether, if the Warren

Commission was misinformed or not made privy to

information relevant to its investigation,

the misinforming or withholding of

evidence from the Warren Commission was the

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result of a conscious intent to do so by the

Agency or its employees.

(3)

The Committee has sought to examine the

issue detailed above in both an objective

and disciplined manner.. In order to accomplish

this goal the Committee has utilized a 1977 TasS lie

(19.77 TER).

Report by the CIA's Inspeste

terrerall

is Report was highly critical of

pertaining tothe AMLASHoperation*

the SSC findings and asserted that the SSC

the mistic

Final Report conveyed(an) impression of limited

effort by the CIA to

assist the Warren Commission

TER

In its work. The 77 IeR was in fundamental

disagreement with this characterization of the

SSC findings and noted that "CIA did seek and

collect information in support of the warren

Commission. Additionally, it conducted studies

and submitted specjal analyses

ane,

reports. "3

(4)

In order to

demonstrate further the scope

of support provided by the CIA to the Warren

TER

Commission, the

77

IER contained a comprehensive

listing of CIA generated material made available

*

The AM-LASH

one . of fine

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assistinatio. plots

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See

RET

(5)

(6)

(7)

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to both the U.S. Intelligence Community and

the Warren Commission regarding the assassina-

tion of President Kennedy. In this respect,

the committee agrees with the for wherein

it is stated that "This compiliation (of

CIA generated material) is appropriate to

consideration of the extent of the CIA effort,

to the extent that it reveals something of

the results of that effort."

177 IGR, Introduction

to Tab E)

"In examining the Agency's comprehensive

listing of CIA generated material referenced above,

the Committee has paralled its review to the

TFR

structure given to these materialsby the

17 FGR.

In this regard the ?? feR details four inter-

related compilations of Kennedy assassination

material: (These four compilations are:

1) Agency dissemination of information

to the Intelligence Community (Formal

and Informal Disseminations)

2)

Dissemination of material to the

Warren Commission

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from CIA —controlled documents.) •

3) Agency dissemination to the FBI et al

9)

regarding rumors and allegations

regarding President Kennedy's

assassination

4) Memorandum submitted by CIA to the

Warren Commission on Rumors

and

Allegations Relating to the President's

Assassinati

S77 FaR, Introduction

(10)

to Tab f

In reviewina these compilations,

the Committee

focused upon those

TER

CIA materials which the ?? ten documented as having

bein

^ made available in written form to the Warren

Commission.

(11)

During the course of this study, additional

Agency files have been reviewed. These files have

been examined in an effort to resolve certain

issues created by the review of the Agency's

compilations discussed in this report.

Where

apparent gaps existed in the written record,

files have been requested and reviewed in an effort

to resolve these gaps.

Where significant substantive

ET.

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issues have arisen related to the kind and

quality of information provided the Warren

Commission, files have

also been requested

and

reviewed in an effort to resolve these issues.

As a result, approximately thirty files, comprising

an approximate total of ninety volumes of

material have been examined and analyzed

in preparation of this report.

qualifica?

The findings set forth herein are subject

to modification due to the following considera

tions.

During the course. of the past fifteen

years; the CIA has generated massive amounts of

information related to the assassination of

President Kennedy. In spite of the Agency"s

sophisticated document retrieval system, Certain

documents requested by this Committee for study

and analysis have not been located. Whether these

documents merely have been filed incorrectly or

destroyed, gaps in the written record still

do

000005

exist.

( 13)

Secondly, due to dissimlar standards of Investigative

fies)

Eg :

ClA JFKassas, materials prouded the Racketeller

Commission,

Are were conmiss in berderin

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relevancy adopted by the CIA and this Committee,

certain files requested by the Committee for

review : :

have been made available to

the. Committee in a santized fashion.

Therefore,

to the degree reflected by the Agency's denial

of access and/or santization of certain materials,

this study's conclusions are based upon the

best evidence available to the Committee though

this may not be all relevant evidence to which

( 14)

the Agency has access.

One must, moreover, give due consideration

to the role that oral discussions, oral briefings,

and meetings of Warren Commission and CIA

representatives may have played in the supply of

assassination-related information by the CIA to

the Warren Commission. The subject and substance

of these discussions, briefings, and meetings

may not always be reflected by the written

record made the

subject of this study.

Therefore, the Committee has conducted interviews,

depositions and executive session hearings with

000006

ElA files pertaining to AMiMUS-1, Maria Teresa Prenza,

parsonal 5a42 nodings dere mide

a velabi classification attec soger to Aginay

Sanitizition sf the n

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Thiss form is to

ysed for material

extracted

-8-

key Warren Commission staff and members and

former or present CIA representatives in an

effort to resolve questions that are not

addressed by the written record.

The results

of the Committee's efforts to chronicle this

(15)

aspect of the working relationship between the

Warren Commission and the CIA will be a subject

for discussion herein.

In addition

this report will examine the

following subjects generated by the Committee's

study (as outlined aboves in the following general

order of discussion:

(18)

(11)

(18)

1) the organization of the CIA's investigation

of President Kennedy's assassination;

2)

the working relationship of the Warren

Commission staff and those CIA répresentatives

concerned with the Warren Commission inquiry;

3)

the standards of investigative cooperation

timel

which the Warren Commission staff believed

to govern the quality and quantity of

information supplied by the CIA to the

Warren Commission;

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(19)

4)

(20)

5)

the CIA's concern for protection of its

sensitive sources and methods and the

consequent effects of this. concern

upon the Warren Commission investigation;

and

the substance and quality of information

concerning Luisa Calderon passed to the

Warren Commission and the results of this

Committee's investigation of Calderon

and her significance to the events of

November 22, 1963.

II. Select Commitice Stung si

Information Made Available by CIA to Warren

Commission

See ClA page 2000517 infra

for beginning of this section

I It invatigation a the cit involued an extensive

andlysis of some fits. sentine rounds and method

Become the rounds and method and busted hon

disclosure, portion to this report have been

000008

written in a gomer lassificatisfis

Mined 122 refining exerit, te such deute

→ concludony manne

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To ba insated prior to section II

I. Organization of CIA Investigation

of President Kennedy's Assassination

(21)

In his Executive Session testimony before the Select

Committee, Richard Helms, the CIA's Deputy Director for

Plans during 1963, described the CIA's role in the

investigation of President Kennedy's assassination as

follows:

(12)

This crime was committed on United

States soil. Therefore, as far as the

Federal government was concerned, the pri-

mary investigating agency would have been

the Federal Bureau of Investigation without

any question. The role

of the CIA would

have been entirely supportive in the sense

of what material we are (sic) able to

acquire outside the limits of the United

States with reference to the investigation.

For investigative purposes, the Agency

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had no investigative role inside the United

States at all. So when I used here the

word "supportive," I meant that in the

literal sense of the term. We are (sic)

trying to support the FBI and support the.

Warren Commission and be responsive to

their requests, but we were not initiating

any investigations of our own or, tommy

recollection, were we ever asked to

(Executive Session Testimony of Richard

Helms, 8/9/78, PP: 17-18

(23)

On November 23, 1963 Helms called a meeting of senio!

level CIA officials to outline the Agency's investiga

tive responsibility vis a vis the assassination

SCadesk office

(carquati BOOk V, p. 25.)

At that time, helms placed John scelso, Hairpie

Division are

Miex1e0

Branch Chief for eIA operations in Mexico, central

Amera

enana, in charge of the Agency's tRitial

investigative-efforts. (HSCA Class. Deposition of John

Scelso, 5/16/78, PP- 111-112/-ExecSession Testimony

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of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, p. 10.)

(24)

Scelso testified before the (Select Committee

that he was given charge of the Agency's investigation

on the basis of two considerations: 1) his prior

experience in conducting major CIA security investi-

reparted

toCIA

gations and 2) the observance of Oswald by elA L

headquarter's

surveillance in Mexico, (Scelso's operational concern)

less than two months prior to the assassinatio

(SSC

Book V, p. 25, HSCA Class. Deposition of John Scelso,

170500:34:37-mia-You ariorse

5/16/70, pp. 111-112. 7)

Scelso also noted that

"during the course of his investigative efforts, Helms

citient

did not pressure him to adopt specific investigative

theories nor reach conclusions within a set

period of

8/9/78

* Raymond Rocca, Chief of Research and Analysis for

CIA's Counterintelligence Staff characterized Scelso's

responsibility not as a mandate to investigate but

rather to "coordinate traffic (code facilitation,

telegram or telegraphic consideration) for working

with the DDP with respect to what was being done over

the whole world..."

→ Raymon

the GPFLOOR, phaser (Ibia.)

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(25)

tion:

Scelso described in detail to the Committee the

manner in which he conducted the Agency's investiga-

•.•practically my whole Branch participated

in the thing.

We dropped almost everything

else and I put a lot of my officers to work

in tracing names, analyzing files.

We were flooded with cable traffic, with

reports, suggestions, allegations from all

over the world, and

these things had to be

checked out.

le were checking out just dozen:

no.dozens-of-peopre-atthe time, (HSCA Classifie

Deposition of John Scelso, 5/16/70, p. 131)*

*. During the course of the Agency's invetigation, Liaison

with the FBI was handled for the CIA by Bireiro veal.

(Ibia. p. 80.)

CAt the time of the assassination Mr. Oveal,

a former FBI agent was Chief of the Special Investigations :

Group of the CIA's Counterintelligence Staff. (HSCA Classifled

Deposition of tom on 620/18. 1 22 2 1 7,

He

A characterized his functions with respect to the Agency

as follows:

(This footnote - Footnote

- continues

on bottom of page 5)

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(26)

Scelso stated during his testimony that CIA

field stations worldwide were alerted to the Agency's

investigation "and the key stations were receiving

tips on the case, most of which were phony. We did not

send out instructions saying-everybody participate in

the investigation.

• (Tbid. p. 135.01

It was his

• recollection, however,

that throughout his tenure as

coordinator of the Agency's investigation, the Mexieo

City Station was the only CIA

field station directly

unit

Footnote

continued from bottom of page 4.

I knew that we fat CIAl did not have the

basic responsibility for investigating the

assassination of the President.

If there was

a crime commited in the course

of this activity,

tsic) it belonged to the FBI. I recognized that

it was our responsibility to give the fullest

cooperation to the FBI to protect the Agency

with regard to any aspects of our operations,

you understand, and at the same time giving them

cooperation,

and Iwas in close contact with Mr.

Sam Papich (of the FBI), and always fully co-

operated,

and he always fully cooperated with me.

This office

(Ibia. p. 52.)

O'Neal)noted that his office (CI/SIG) at the direction of

the Chief of Counterintelligence, James Angleton, was

designated the central point for collection of assassination-

related information made available to the FBI. (Ibid. pp. 52-53.

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13

Адену,

subsequently,

involved in investigatory activities

related to President

Kennedy's assassination

(Tbia? / 34

(27) During the tatter halt of December, scelso

that

issued a summary report which described Oswald's

activities in Mexico City from September 26, 1963 -

Accarding

October 3, 1963.

Scelso characterized the summary report

as incomplete by comparison to assassination-related

the

want

ther

investigative

information

then available to the FBI but not provided

to CIA until late Dec. 1963.

(Ibia. P. 11A has.)

(CIA

Document Report by John Scelso to C/CI.,

this

with

immediately

pursue

(28)

Following issuance of this report, Helms shifted

responsibility for the CIA's investigation of President

assassination-to-the-Counterintelligence

15

Kennedy's

Staff.

HSCA Classified Deposition of John Scelso

agree

terked

5/16/78, p. 136, gf. HSCA Classified Deposition of

Raymond Rocca, 7/17/78, P. 15 wherein Rocca states that

* StA the CIA "dies not

wee

responsibility shifted from Scelso to CI Staff on

January 12, 1964.)

Helms testified that this shift in

all of its branche

ten of it's station

** Approximately two days after President Kennedy's

assassination, Scelso prepared a summary report,

provided to President Johnson by Helms.

This report

adopted the position that Oswald probably was a lone

assassin who had no visible ties to Soviet or Cuban

intelligence though such ties could not be excluded

House So (-Get Con

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responsibility was a logical development because the

investigation had begun to take on broader tones.

(Executive Session Testimony of Richard Helms, 8/9/78,

p. 14, see also HSCA Classified Deposition of John

Scelso, 5/16/78, p. 138.)

(29)

Helms reasoning was expanded upon by Raymond

Rocca

who testified before the Committee that the

shift in responsibility described by Helms was caused

in part by the establishment of the Warren Commission

in bip wed

полико пли оптимомлни, ожи

7/17/78

(HSCA Classified Deposition of Raymond Rocca, pp. 12-13.)

Rocca

added:

130

It was entirely appropriate in the

piece

GPFLOOR phase that he (Scelso) would

have that (responsibility for the Agency

investigation.) But the minute you had

a commission set up outside the line

obviously had to be the Director, and from

the Director to his Chief of Operations

overseas, because the spread involved

then all

of the divisions. Here you had

Mr. (Scelso) being asked to sign off on

cables that had to do with the Netherlands,

with U.K., with Australia, and it would

have seemed to me utterly administratively

simply-a-hybrid monster JHSCA Classified

Deposition of R. Rocca, 7/17/78, p. 12.)

(31)

spread

James Angleton supported Rocca's belief that "the

(of investigative

responsibility) involved..

chief of the counterintelligence staff,

SECRE

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with

thee semitive youre and methods

CIA MAS NO OBJECTION TO

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all of the [CIA, divisions." Angleton testifed

to this Committee that the Agency's efforts to

gather and coordinate information related to

the assassination underwent a metamorphic

transition. Initially, Angleton noted, the

Director, Deputy Director, Division Chiefs and

Case Officers approached Warren Commission.

requirements in a piecemeal fashion. However,

Angleton

testified the Agency was eventually

able to focus its resources to avoid duplication

of effort and provide a system for the central

referencing of assassination related information

as such information was developed.

(HSCA

Classified Deposition of James Angleton,

10/5/78, pp. 76-77, see also HSCA Classified

Deposition of Raymond Rocca, 8/17/18,

p. 23.)

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(34

The record reveals that during this second phase

of CIA information collection efforts in support of

the Warren Commission investigation the concentration

of Agency resources shifted in emphasis from exploration

of Oswald's activities in Mexico City to his residency

in the Soviet Union during 1959-1962 and possible

association with the Soviet intelligence apparatus. @ segetaff)

(Ibia., pp. 32-33,44, Executive Session of Testimony

Richard Helms, 8/9/78, p. 23.

Acording 3, Rocca commented

that during this phase

primary interest in support of the

argue

Warren Commission was to

follow-up on Soviet leads g

on the assumption that a person who spends

four years*fin the Soviet Union, under his

circumstances, had to be of specific interest

to Soviet State security and their collateral

authorities. Masca Classified Deposition of

Raymond Rocca, PP. 32-33.1 (seep 9Efor #*)

(33)

Therefore, Rocca concluded, the areas the CIA tended

to concentrate on concerned the Soviets:

Go topi-/ofe continuation of text

*In fac, dwill wrent the years, eight months!

in the Soviet Quion.

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FOR ElA- centrelled de cuments.)

*The following exchange between Mr. Rocca and Committee

by the Agency related to its investigation of possible

further light on the eitficulties encountered

Cuban involvement in the assassination:

Mr. Goldsmith. Earlier, when I asked you which

areas of the case received emphasis, I believe that you

indicated that on balance the primary area of emphasis

was the Soviet connection.

Mr. Rocca.

That was certainly the one that I would

say dominated -- looking at it from my point of view.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, had you known about the anti-

Castro

assassination plots

you have given more priority, more emphasis, to the

• on the pure or abouthe

possibility of a Castro conspiracy to kill the President?

Mr. Rocca.

to it, not particularly by the staff. I had no capabilities

on the Cuban side.

organization of their service and their

operation in Mexico was something entirely entirely (sic)

within -- it was an enigma at the time.

They were just

getting started.

This was Wi's area.

This was tin LAgniy sapie

seotels area of

proficiency.)

So the defectors had only

begun to come out and they came out later, the Cuban

defectors.

So, I can't -- I really can't say that-(a)

the

Cuban connection was ignored, because it wasn't. The

press was filled with it at the time.

The Harker interview should have been undoubtedly

given greater attention in a generalized sense; but it

was given specific attention, I was told at the time of

the Rockefeller thing.

Mr. Goldsmith. In what way was the Cuban connection

investigated?

Mr. Rocca. I don't know.

I don't know this.

That side of the report strikes me as being inadequate.

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was the Cuban connection investigated, I don't mean by

the Warren Commission. I mean to what extent did the

karen commoton,

Mr. Goldsmith. Well, when I said to what extent

Agency provide --

Mr. Rocca. That I can't answer. I certainly

didn't, do it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Pardon me?

MI. Rocca. We certainly didn't, in R& A.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, CI/R & A did not --

Mr. Rocca. Go into the Cuban side of it at all.

This was something left to the people who were concerned

specifically with Cuban intelligence and security operation.

Mr. Goldsmith. But I believe earlier we

established that Mr. Helms gave orders that information

pertinent to the assassination was to go through your

office, correct?

Mr. Rocca. .

Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. And once information pertinent

to the assassination went through your office, I take (it)

you or Mr. Helms would decide what information would

be relevant for the Warren Commission to see.

Is that correct?

Mr. Rocca. Well =

Mr. Goldsmith. Based upon what you knew?

Mr. Rocca. Well, everything would go, yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Therefore, you were in the

position, it would seem, to know what information was

being generated in the

field that was going to the

Warren Commission.

Earlier I asked you which area received emphasis

and I believe you indicated that the

Soviet area (did).

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Mr. Rocca. Primarily, primarily.

But I didn't

mean by that that it excluded the Cuban, because there

was a lot of material that came through and went to the

Commission that concerned the Cubans.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let's go off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

MI. Goldsmith. Let's continue.

Mr. Rocca.

My recollection is that at the time

the great press

manifestation was that Cuban exiles who

were in touch with CIA had been somehow involved in this.

This was the great concern.

Mr. Goldsmith. That's another possibility.

There are different --

LAyering ding dont

Mr. Rocca. Questions went down to WHen do you

have anybody who could possibly have gotten involved in

this kind of thing.

There was extraordinary diligence, I thought,

exercised to try to clarify that side.

Mr. Goldsmith.

Do you think that the possibility

of an assassination plot by Castro against the President

was adequately investigated?

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. With the advantages of 20-20 hind-

sight, I could say probably not.

But at the time it seems

that they gave due attention to it -- within the

information that I had at my disposal.

**In fact,

(October

Dinda

Ho spent 2 years, 8 months in the Soviet Union

1959 - June 1962)

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ff8m ElA= EgAtfalled d8eumeRts:)

Oswald.. (Angleton, p.

86) estated for the record

with regard to-the Warren Commission's investigation

(with the CIA's support) of possible Cuban involvement imply

in the-assassination:

(38)

inadequate.

I personally believe that the United

States intelligence services did not

have the capabilities to ever come to

an adjudication (of the Cuban aspect) •

27

I don't think the capabilities were there.

(HSCA Classified Deposition of James Angleton,,

10/5/78

p. 93)

Chock- two page

confusin

000022

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11 -

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(39)

As noted above, the CI Staff assumed responsibility

in late December 1963 - early January 1964 for the

coordination of CIA efforts to assist the Warren

Commission in its investigation. At that time, Raymond

Rocca,

Chief of Research and Analysis for CI Staff,

was designated point of contact with the Warren

Commission.

(sch chase sied deposition un james

Angleton, 10/5/98, D. 77.1

Rocca's Research and

Analysis component was concerned with:

(40)

"analytical intelligence, analytical

brainpower, which meant all source, all

overt source comprehension; a study of

cases

that had ceased to occupy opera-

tional significance, that is, closed cases,

to maintain the ongoing record of overall

quality and quantity of counterintelligence

being performed by the entire DDP operational

component; the Deputy Director foF plan!

7/17/18 assified Deposition of R.

Rocca,

See also HSCA Classified Deposition

of James Angleton, 10/5/78, p. 77.):

(41)

Mr. Rocca testified that assassination-related

information generated by CIA components was directed

to his staff (as designated point of contact with the

Warren Commission) in the normal flow of day to day

000023

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extracted

dA controlled

•cument

•cuments

work

(toid., pp. 16-17.) This information was then

reviewed by Rocca or his assistants who included LAger engie

Baomas Hath, (Soviet Expert), Saut 7 Eman

Emperizer

(general

research and search man for the U.S. Intelligence

Community and its resources)', and Arthur Dooley

Cagency Enritage who

had transferred to the CIA from the FBI a number of

years prior to the assassination) (Ibid. p. 17.)

During the course of the Warren Commission investi-

amb.arsup

gation, Hadd, Haremar and Dooley worked with those

that.were

CIA divisions producing substantive information

related to the assassination.

(Ibia.)

(42)

Mr. Rocca testified that even though

CI/R&A was the Agency's point of reference with regard

to the Warren Commission, neither his staff nor the

CI staff in general displaced the direct relations of

Mr. Helms or any other concerned Agency official with

the Warren Commission

(Ibid.; Rocca testified that neither

CI Staff nor his staff displaced the CIA's Soviet

Division (represented by Dewind turpay, Chief of the

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13

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148m ElA- controlled documents:)

33

SR division and his assistant, TennastBagley) in

Its contact with the Commission; nor did CI/R&A

displace John Scelso in his contact with the Warren

Commission.

Rocca testified that in some instances

indicated

J. Lee Rankin of the Warren Commission would go directly

to Helms with requests, and in other instances David

Slawson, a Commission Staff counsel, conferred directly

with Tom falr of Rocca's staff.

(Ibia. p. 36.)

(43)

The record reveals that on certain issues of

particular sensitivity Rocca was not permitted to act

as the Agency's point of contact with the Warren Commission.

He testified that "compartmentalization was observed

notwithstanding the fact that I was the working level

point of contact.

(HSCA Classified Deposition of Raymond

34

* Although James Angleton functioned as Rocca's direct

superior during the course of the Warren Commission

investigation, he did not participate on a regular

basis in the Agency's efforts to supply substantive

(ITi Classie ad information to the Warren Conmission nor did he dealous alan

on a direct basis with Warren Commission representa

tives. (excepting Allen Dulles on an unofficial basis;

p. 17-181 HSCA Classified Deposition of James

10/5/78, P. 784) However, Angleton testified to this

Hey classified Deposition of Raymond Rocca, Angletot?, tongseler.com

(5814.0E

011720)

Committee that he did attempt to keep apprised of

developments as the investigation progressed through

consultation with Rocca. (HSCA Classified Deposition of

James Angreton, 1075/78, p. 81)

(I bia

57

classification:

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F8m ElA -cantrelled document.+

35

Rocca, 2/17/78, p. 18)

Tocca cited by way of example

the case of the Soviet defector Nosenko. Rocca

testified that he did not attend any of the Agency.

discussions pertaining to Nosenkó's case

Tbid.)

inS

Rather,

(as it affected the Warren Commission investi-

• *r..+.

gation) responsibility for the Nosenko caselwas

assigned to david mary,

Chiefor

SR Division, in

addition to Richard Helms. (Ibid)

37

(44)

Rocca described the CI staff mail intercept program,

HTLINGUAL, as a second example of an Agency matter

about which he had no knowledge nor input.vis-a-vis

•38

the Agency's support rate to the warren Commission.

LAger Gaspire

(Ibia., pp. 19-20. Rather, James Angleton and Bireh

31

Weat handled the disposition of this particular,

material (HSCA Classified Deposition of J. Scelso,

5/16/78, p. 113, wherein Scelso states that CI Staff

including oWeat, was repository of HTLINGUAL intercepts;

but see iSCA Chass Dep. of Binat Obneal, 7/20/78

herein Otrent states that he did not kra 1828-2r

to provide

#TAIrSUAn programy

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(This farm is 18 be used dor material

extrasted

In sunmary, it was Rocca's testimony that an internally

decentralized information reporting function best

40

characterized the organization of this second phase

of the Agency's investigative efforts to assist

the Warren Commission

(Foid., p. 10; HSCA Classilled

Deposition of James Angleton, 10/5/78, p. 75, 80.

See

also CIA Doc. Rocca Memo for Record, I April 1975,

Subject: Conversation with David W. Belin, April 1,

of 197p,

wherein it is stated that Helms remained senior

official in charge of the overall investigation,

with CI staff acting as a coordinator and repository

of information collected.)

SEAT.

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CrassifisgtigA:

see

ret

This form is to be

used for materia extracted

from

-controlled document

trom

documents:

Il The Warren Com Sion EliA Working Relatingst

A. Opinions of Warren Commission and CIA Representatives

Regarding Warren Commission-CIA Relationship

(46)

The Committee has contacted both representatives of

the Warren Commission staff and those representatives of

the CIA who played significant roles in providing CIA-

generated information to the Warren Commission. The

general consensus of these representatives is that the

41

Warren Commission and the CIA enjoyed a successful

working relationship during the course of the Commission's

investigation. (HSCA Class. Depo. of R. Rocca 7/17/78,

p. 18) (See also Exec. Sess. Test. of Richard Helms,

8/9/78, 1p9,24.) William Coleman, a senior staff counsel

for the Warren Commission who worked closely with Warren

Commission staff counsel W. David Slawson on matters

which utilized the CIA's resources, characterized

the CIA representatives with whom he dealt as

highly competent, cooperative, and intelligent.

(See HSCA staff interview of William Coleman,

8/2/78

Mr. Slawson expressed a similar opinion

regarding the Agency's cooperation and quality

000028

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sassicallon

lassitication

Secr

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tros cram controlled used ehtsaterial

extracted

from ClA-controlled documents.

-10-

43

of work.

(Executive Session Testimony of W.

David Slawson, 11/15/77, P. 17,see also JFK

Exhibit 23.)

(47)J. Lee Rankin, General Counsel for the

Warren Comnission, testified that the Warren

Conmission and its staff were assured by the CIA

that the Agency would cooperate in the Comniss.

work

(HSCA Class. Depo. of J. Lee Rankin,

8/7/78, p.4; HSCA Class. Depo. of John McCone,

8/17/78, p. 9)

John McCone, Director of Central Intelligence

at the time of President Kennedy's assassination

and during the Warren Commission investigation,

supported Mr. Rankin's testimony in this regard

by characterizing the CIA's work vis-a-vis

the Warren Commission-as both responsive and...

comprehensive

(ESCA Class. Depo. of John

McCone, 8/17/78, p. 5)

MI. McCone was responsible

for ensuring that all relevant matters were

see yellows pad changes

.44

000023

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2C60513

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Jasstication

asstrication

S

Aret

(This form is to be used for material

extracted

tolf cram controlled yocuments. aterial

extracted

from ClA- controlled documents.)

-10a-

conveyed by the

CIA

the Warren Commission.

(Ibid., pp. 5=6))

In this regard, Mr. McCone

testified that:

(48)

The policy of the CIA was to give the Warren

Commission everything that we had. I

personally asked Chief Justice Warren to

come to my office and took him down to the

vault of our building where our information

is

microfilmed and stored and showed him the

procedures that we were following and the

extent to which we were giving him -- giving

his staff everything that we lad, and thank

(50)

he was quite satisfied.

(Ibia., p.g)-

However, as will subsequently.

in the arenan dart

Materials Be Made Promptly Available By

CIA TO Warren Commission

47

(51)

MI. Raymond Rocca, • fis anningler dininenter of ClA

jolng.arhetcr.con

the Warren Commission

investigation,

characterized the Agency's role as one/of

full support to the Warren Commission. Mr.

Rocca, who served as the Chief of the Research and

009030

@tessifliction: -

Se

let

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trots dipke controlted etodurentsaterial extracted

from CIA - controlled documents.)

-10b-

Analysis Divison for the Counter-Intelligence

Staff of the CIA, stated under oath that

Richard Helms had given the following

directive:

ananythin

52 All material bearing in any way tha

could be of assistance to the

Warren Connission should be seen by cIf

staff and Rant A and marked for us.

He

issued very, very strictly worded

lastru atins indications

-- they were verbal in so

far as I know - that we were to leave no

stone unturned.

(HSCA Class. Depo. of Raymond Rocca,

1/17/78, p.

24)

008031

GRESHREAT

Ct.-

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119

(53)

Mr. RoCHAis abrads thater usea misncher leaffeed Mr. Helms'.

ders were fotlova to tolle detersby all cIA employees.

the

Ibid. p. 24

• Mr. Rocca concluded that on this basis:

he GI

was to turn over and to develop any information

bearing on the assassination that could be of assistance

to the Warren Commission."

Ibid., p. 26.

(sx)

A different view of the CIA's role regarding the

supply of CIA's information to the Warren Commission was

propounded by Richard Helms. Mr. Helms, who served as

the CIA's Deputy Director for Plans during the Warren

Commission investigation, was directly responsible for the

CIA's investigation of President Kennedy's assassination and the

ablishmen of soily visa ris the warren Commission.

(Ibid., p. 23

He testified to the Committee that th

CIA made every effort to be as responsive as possible to

Warren Commission requests

(Exec. Sess- Text. of Richard

Helms, 8/9/78, p. 10.0

• Helms added further testimony

regarding the manner in which the CIA provided its infor-

mation to the Warren Commission. He stated:

(55)

(56)

An inguiry would come over (from the Warren Com-

mission).

We would attempt to respond to it.

But these inquiries came in individual bits and

pieces or as individual items...Each individual

item that came along we to@t care of as best we

could. (Ibid., pp. 10-11~

However, it was Mr. Helms' recollection that the CIA

53

provided information to the Warren Commission primarily

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on the basis hither dite sies sos paterial extraddests. Under

from CIA -controlled documents.)

oath he supported this proposition:

MI.

Goldsmith:

In summary, is it your position that

the Agency gave the Warren Commission

information only in response to speci-

fic requests by the Warren Commission?

Mr. Helms:

That is correct.

I want to modify that by saying that

memory is fallable.

There may have been

times or circumstances under which some-

thing different might have occured, but

my recollection is that we were attempting

to be-responsive and supportive to the

FBI and the Warren Commission.

When

they asked for something we gave it to

• them.

As far as our volunteering information

is concerned, I have no recollection of

whether we velunteered it of not

=4

(Ibia., p. 34

(57)

Mr. Helms' characterization of fulfilling Warren

Commission requests on a caselbasis rather than uniformly

volunteering relevant information to the Warren Commission

stands in direct opposition to J. Lee Rankin's perception

of the CIA's investigative responsibility. Mr. Rankin was

asked by Committee Counsel whether he worked under the

impression that the Agency's responsibility was simply to

respond to questions that were addressed to CIA by the

Warren Commission. In response, Mr. Rankin testified as

follows:

(58)

Not at all and if anybody had told me that I

would have

insisted that the Commission com-

municate with the President and get a different

arrangeclassificatisme might not ask the right

SECRET

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lassification:

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Nots Cram donPoned useumehts. aterial extracted

trom ClA- controlled documents.)

-13-

55

(59)

B

questions and then we would not have the

information and that would be absurd.

(ESCA Class. Depo. of J. Lee Rankin,

8/17/78, p. 4)

MI. Slawson added support to Rankin's position

testifying that Warren Commission requests to the CIA

were rarely specific. "The request was made initially

that they give us all information pertinent to the

assassination investigation.

(Exec. Sess. Test. of

W. David Slawson, 11/15/77, p. 29)

CIA's failurE to Discles: 14 inti-

Eutro Assinatina Pinine to Narcen

Commissio

56

(60)

in unfortunate consequence of barren donnissio reliance o

treciA to provide tue

Lommislion.coctg.all reiaran

CIA mfürial isreflecribiis

the subsequent exposure of the CIA's anti-Castro

7

assassination plots (SSC Book V) see also (Alleged

Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, Interim

152000

Report, SSC, 11/20/75)/.

aratosieetly, even if the

Wa

ston had requested im

tior on such

The record reveals that the

tot.

be CIA's point of contact with the warre

Commission

outd not have bee

"able to provide the

stops

2030521

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C. Berk

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lassitication:

(This form is to be used for material extracted

fratis team dontRolled useeurtentsaterial extracted

from ClA controlled documents.)

Commit

informatio

knowledge at the time of the Warren Commission

investigation of Agency efforts to assassinate

Fidel Cástro.

CESCA class, Depo. of Raymond

Rocca,

7/17/78,

p. 501

geep. 34

Calangili

20.0522

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SECRE

(This form is to be used for material extracted

from CIA -controlled documents.)

Had Roget, as the CIA's working level representative

to the warren commission, been requested by the

Cormission to research and report on-any and all

CIA anti-Castro assassination operation's,

Rocca 's

athis war lin lent

efforts would have produçed no substantive informa-

tion. (Ibid., p. 497"

The record digd reveals that the CIA desk

officer who was initially given the responsibility

by MI. Helms to investigate

Lee Harvey

Oswald, and the assassination of President Kennedy

had no knowledge of such plots during his investi-

Spuricely, gation. (4ScA ta Peo de to 5c0180. 5/15/78.

pp. 73, 111-112)y Mr. Scelso testified that had he

own of such assassination plots the following

action would have been taken:

662)

(63)

"We would have gone at that hot and heavy.

We would have queried the agent (AMLASH)

about it in great detail. I would have

had him polygraphed by the best operative

security had to see if he had (sic) been

a double-agent, informing Castro about

our poison pen things, and so on.

would have had all

our cuban sources

queried about it."

(Ibid., p. 166%

шил014.4101.94

As the record reflects,

these

plots were known

000031

by few within the CIA.

Mr. Helms' testimony regarding

1 Rouce testified he us notin a positin to answer questions reluted torIAa

Classification:

SECKET

Hanse Seleet Corint

014720

*See also HSCA Classraked

Deposition

1 Of James Angleton, 10/5/78,

p.so, wherein Angleton states rur dedid dastied by

fearst sitor

toassusine Fidei Gistro until

after menarcen conn ission ne

ain

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## Page 39

remove

explaid

Classification:

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: 1.

(This form is to be used for material extracted

from ClA - controlled documents.)

these plots reveals that the Agency compromised the policy of

its pirector

Les promise to supply all relevant information to

(sEx statementot son Mutant, ploaherzin)

the Warren Commission.

The following exchange

between

Committee Counsel and Mr. Helms illustrates

the

extent

Mr. Goldsmith:

¡of the Agency's compromise:

Mr. Helms, I take it from your

testimony

• that your position is

that the anti-Castro plots, in

fact, were relevant to the

Warren Commission's work; and,

in light of that, the Committee

would like to be

informed as to

why the Warren Commission was

not told by you of the anti-

Castro assassination plots.

Mr. Helms:

I have never been asked to testify

before the Warren Commission about

our operations.

Mr. Goldsmith:

If the Warren Commission did not

know of the operation, it certainly

was not in a position to ask you

about it.

Is that not true?

Mr. Helms:

Yes, but how do you know they did

not know about it? How do you

know MI. Dulles had not told them?

How was I to know that? And besides,

I was not the Director of the Agency

and in

I the CIA, you did not go

traipsing around to the Warren Com-

mission or to Congressional Committees

or to anyplace else without the

Director's permission.

Mr. Goldsmith:

Did you ever discuss with the Director

whether the

Warren Commission

should be informed of the anti-Castro

assassination

Classification: 53

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## Page 40

16

Classification: -

(This form is to be used for material extracted

from CIA -controlled documents.)

Mr. Helms:

I did note as far as I recall

*HSCA Exec.

Sess.

Test of Richard

heims,

8/9/78, pp. 30-31-4, emphasis

Added.

Mr. McCone testifed that he first became aware

of the CIA's anti-Castro assassination plots

involving CIA-Mafia ties during August 1963. He

stated that upon learning of these plots he directed

that the. Agency cease all such activities.

(HSCA

Glass. Depc. of John McCone, 8/17/78, p. 13)

When

asked whether the CIA desired to withold informa-

tion from the Warren Commission about the Agency anti-

Castro assassination plots to avoid embarrassing the

Agency or causing an international crises he gave

the following response:

"I cannot answer that since they (CIA

employees knowledgeable of the

continuance of such plots) withheld

the information from. me.

I cannot

answer that question. I have never

been satisfied as to why they with

held the information-from me-lIbid.

p. 16)

Regarding the relevancy of such plots to the

Warren Commission's work, Warren Commission counsels

Rankin, Slawson and spector were in agreement that

such information should have been reported to the

60

677

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SESSKETI

Classification:-

(This form

from CIA-contrpledadlocersents.)

Warren Commission. (Exec. Sess. Test. of W.

David Slawson, 11/15/77, P. 27; Exec. Sess. Test.

of Arlen Spector 11/8/77, pp. 45-46; CF, Exec.

Sess. Test. of Wesley Liebeler, 11/15/77, p. 71

where he states that possible witholding of

information by CIA about Agency attempts to

assassinate Castro did not significantly affect

Warren Commission- investigation)

From the CIA's-perspective, MI. Rocca

testified that had he known of. the anti-Castro

assassination plots his efforts to explore the

possibility of a retaliatory assassination against

President Kennedy by Castro would have been intensi-

fied. He stated that: " a completely different

procedural approach probably would and should have

been taken. "_JHSCA Class. Depo. of Raymond Rocca

7/17/78, p. 45).

John Scelso, the above-cited CIA desk officer

who ran the CIA's initial investigation of President

Kennedy's assassination until that responsibility

was given to the CIA's counterintelligence staff,

offered a highly critical appraisal of Helms'

non-disclosure to the Warren Commission:

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(This form is to be used for material extracted

from ClA -controlled documents.)

Mr. Goldsmith:

Do you think Mr. Helms was

acting properly when he failed

to tell the Warren Commission

about the assassination plots?

Mr. Scelso:

No, I think that was a morally

highly reprehensible act, which

he cannot possibly justify under

his oath of office, or any

other standard of professional

public

service.

(HSCA Class:

Depo. of John Scelso, 5/16/78

10

II. D.

Agency Coneern/for the Sanctity

of Sensitive Sources and Methods - Factors Affecting

CIA Resporse to Warren Commission Requests

The length of time required by the CIA to

respond to the Warren Commission's requests for

information was dependent upon 1) the availability

of information;...

"2) the complexity of the issues

presented by the request and 3) the extent to which

the relevant information touched upon sensitive CIA

sources and methods. On

the first two points, Mr.

Helms testified that when CIA(had been) able to

1 want

satisfy a Commission request, the CIA would then send

a reply back:

"and some of these inquiries obviously

took longer than others.

For example, some might

A21

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delete

Unter

AY

114

10y

Classification: -

(This form is to be used for material extracted

from CIA -controlled documents.)

checking a file which was in Washington.

Other inquiries might involve trying to

see if we could locate somebody in some

overseas country:

Obviously, one takes longer to per=

form than the other. TExec. Sess. Test

of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, p.

25) on;

At

Ines ther

Tals concern for protecting its

sensitive sources and methods caused the Warren

Commission to expérience greater difficulty in

getting relevant information than when the protec-

tion of such sources and methods was not at issue.

J.

Lee rankin expressed the opinion that the Agency's

effort to protest it sengere sources and methods partiest

Offect the quality of the information to which

the Warren Commission and its staff were given

access.

22-

p.

23)

(ASCA Class. Depo. of J. Lee Rankin 8/17/78

"howeve.

AS

a result of

the Ca-s Concern, In

some instances

the Agency made

tire

nadeource

initially

limit accesspto CIA materials by the commission

(ASGA Class. De

Depo. Of John Scelso, 5/16/78, P. 158)™

ТТЗ

concern in which the Agency's desire to protect'Its

sensitive sources and methods elicite faren

Commission's investigation. These are:

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Initially

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(This form is to be used for material extracted

from CIA -controlled documents.).

carsoner materals

1)

witholding information from the Warren

Commission

Oswald's trip

pertaining to the phote

and telephonie surveillance

operatiens of the CIA's Mexico City Station

2) As a related consideration, the Agency's relucter

reticence to reveal the origin of the photograph

Hey 145t

TEET

tatter tits Merrestle plots -

alas Initial Concern for Revealini

sensitive sources intmethods

The CIA's concern for revealing the existence

soure and method;

of sensitive technieal operations

as outlined above»

evident from the inception of the Warren Commission.

Mr •

Scelso commented that "we

were

not authorized

[remitive]

at first to reveal all our

technica) operations."

(Ibid., p. 158)

But Scelso did testify that:

We were going

to give them intelligence

reports which derived from all our sources,

including technieel sources, including the

telephone intercept and the information

gotten from the interrogation of Silvia

Duran, for example, which corresponded

75

almost exactly with the information from

the telephone intercepts. bid)e

Mr. Scelsco's characterization is supported by

examination of the background to the first major CIA

report furnished the Warren Commission regarding

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(This. form is to be used for material extracted

from ClA-controlled documents.)

Lee Harvey Oswald's trip to Mexico City.

TCIA

DOC. FOIA #509-803, 1/31/64, Memorandum for J.

Lee Pankin from Richard Helms) Much of the

information provided to the Warren Commission

in this report was based upon sensitive sources

and methods, identification of which had

been

deleted completely from the report.

The CIA policy limiting Warren Commission

knowledge of CIA sources and methods was articu-

lated as early as December 20, 1963, at which

time a cable was sent from CIA headquarters to

sensite douche

and method!

the Mexico City Station which stated:

Our present plan in passing information

to the Warren Commission is to eliminate

mention ontelephone taps, in order to

protect your continuing ops.

Will rely

instead on statements of Silvia Duran

and on

contents of

Thich Soviets gave LODACID

#420-757-12/20163 Dir 90466) 1

The basic policy articulated in the December

20, 1963 cablenis also set forth! in a CIA memorandum

of December 10, 1963(as it specifically concerned

the CIA's relations with the FBI.

an CIA Memorandum

for File, 12/20/63, Birch d'dead; included in with Soft

file materials) In that memorandum, Bret aldeal [clA emplyer]

of the CIA Counterintelligence/special Investigations

Group ste classification: st

wrote that he had been advised by sam

RE H

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## Page 46

ole

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SECRET

(This form is to be used for material extracted

Papich, FBfohiCaAs@onttledbecuests.) that the FBI was

anticipating a request from the Warren Commission

for copies of the FBI's materials which supported

or complimented the FBI's five volume report of

December 9, 1963 that had been submitted to the

Can employee!

Warren Comnission. Papich provided o"Neal with

this report which indicated that some United

de-dinnedd

States Agency was left tetepfores in Mexico

and asked him whether the FBI could supply the

this operetton.

Warren Commission with the source of the telephone

taps near's memorandum shows that he discussed

this matter with Scelso. After a discussion

with Helms, Scelso was directed by Helms to prepare

CIA material to be passed to the Warren Commission.

-"Neal wrote

made..

the fallowing it-latio

regarding

SECRAL

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SECRET

*

Took

ok

-ok

Classification:

(This form is to be used for material extracted

from ClA-controlled documents.)

He (Scelso) was quite sure it was not

Grensitive

source

the Agency's desire to make available

to the Commission at least in this

manner--via the FBI-sensitive informa-

tion which could relate to telephone

78

taps. (CIA Memo for File, 12/20/63, by

Bircho Neal, included in Soft File

materials)*

maplacent miner

so wit regard

The opinion expressed by Scelso as of December

20, 1963 was set forth on January 14, 1964 in

formalized fashion, when Helms expressed his

concern regarding exposure by the FBI of Agency

sources to the Warren Commission.

Helms wrote

that the CIA had become aware that the FBI had

already:

called to the attention of the

Commission, through its attorney,

that we have information [as deter-.

mined from Agency sources) coinciding

with the dates when Oswald™

was in Mexico

City and which may have some bearing

on his activities while in that area.

(CIA de seemine

CIA # CSEI. 377797

so: 10174-191

- Mr. Helms further indicated that the CIA might

be called upon to provide additional information

acquired from checks of CIA records and agency

sources. He suggested that certain policies be

employed to enable CIA to work cooperatively

with the Commission in a manner which would

protect CIA information, sources and methods.

Among the policies articulated were two which

Helms claimed would enable the Agency to control

the flow of Agency originated information.

In

this way the CIA could check the possibility of

revealing its sources and methods inadvertantly.

The policies articulated were:

SECRET

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46/24-

Classification:

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

(This form is to be used for material extracted

RELEASE OF THIS DOGUMENT

from ClA-controlled docuiments.)

The CIA policy of eliminating reference

to Agency

sensitive sources and methods is further revealed

by examination of an Agency cable, dated January 29,

1964, sent from CIA Headquarters to the CIA Mexieo

citystation: fICIA DOC. FOIA 4398-204, 1/29/641

DIR 97829)

This cable indicated that knowledge of

Agency sources "and techniques was still being with-

held from the Warren Commission, and stated that. on

Saturday, February 1, 1964, the CIA was to present

a report on Oswald's Mexico City activities to the

80

Warren Commission which would be in a form

protective of the CIA's Mexico-City Station's

sources and techniques,

(Ibid.)

0778%

ok

(Footnote cont'd from pg. 23.)

1) Your Bureau not disseminate information re-

ceived from this Agency without prior concur-

rence

2) In instances in which this Agency has provided

information to your Bureau and you consider

that information is pertinent to the Commission's

interest, and/or compliments (sich or otherwise

is pertinent to information developed or

ok

In

such cases it will be appreciated if you will

advise us of such referral in order that we may

anticipate. the

possible denture interest of the luc

prasaratory steps to

meeting its needs. (Ibid.jac

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(This form is to be used for materia! extracted

from ClA=-controlled documents.)

Telephone Taps

Mr. Helms offered testimony regarding the CIA's

reticence to inform the Warren Commission, at least

during. the initial stage of the Commission's work,

of the CIA's telephonic and photo surveittance

operations in Mexico City.

The reason for the sensitivity of these

telephone-taps.and surveillance-was not

only becuase it was sensitive from the

Agency's standpoint, but the telephone

taps were cunning. conjunction with

the Mexican authorities and therefore,

if this had become public knowledge,

it would have caused very bad feelings

between Mexico and the unitedstates

and that was the reason (Exec. Sess.

Test. of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, pp. 51-52-

The CIA's unwillingness to inform the Warren

julete composion in the carly states of ito investigation

of the above-described surveillánce operations is

a source of concern to this Committee. It is

indicative-of an Agency policy designed to skew

In its favor the form and substance of information

the CIA felt uncomfortable providing the warren

Commission. (HSCA Class. Depo. of John Scelso,

5/6/78, p. 158) This process might well have

hampered the Commission's ability to proceed in

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## Page 50

8

ol.

- 26

SECKZT

Classification:

its invest one you on

material extracted

racts

before it.

As noted previously, on January 31, 1964,

the CIA provided the Warren Commission with a

83

7971

memorandum that chronicled Lee Harvey Oswaldes

Mexico City visit during September 26,11963

October 3, 1963.

That memorandan did not mentionandold ray

is coin!?

that Oswald's various conversations with the. Cuban

in MeXico,

and Soviet Embassy/Consulates had been tapped and

by the Agency's Mexico City Station

subsequently transcribed?

Furthermore, that memo-

randum did not mention that the CIA had tapped

and transcribed conversations between Cuban Embassy

employee Sylvia Duran and Soviet officials at the

Soviet Embassy/Consulate (

nor was mention made of

the conversations between cuban president Dorticos

and Cuban Ambassador to Mexico Armas which the CIA

had also tapped and transcribed.

On February 1, 1964, Helms appeared before the

Commission and Pitely discussed che memorandum of

January 31, 1964, SiCIa DOC. FOIA +198-204, 1/25/64,

DIR 97829)

On

February 10, 1964y Lee-Rankin wrote

Helms in regard to the CIA memorandum of January 31.

(JFK DOC. No. 3872

A review of Rankin's letter

delete

8Y

SECRET

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senditive

Sauna

ra.d

fined,

-

Classification: -

SECRET

(This form is to be used for material extracted

from ClA-controlled documents.)

indicates that as of his writing, the Warren

informatic perc

commission had no substantive knowledgeof th

sensitive

are meters that had fithe

telephonie suvert lance operation or the production

the formand Onscripts from that operation.

Rankin inquired in the February 10, 1964 letter

whether Oswald's direct communication with employees

of the Soviet Embassy (as stated in Paragraph 1

of January 31 memorandum) had been facilitated by Mill ar

telephone

sterview. Manifestly, had the Warren

Commission

been informed of the télephonic

suveillance operation and its suecess in tapping

aswald, this inquiry by Rankin would not have been

made.

Raymond Rocca's testimony tends to support

this conclusion. It was Rocca's recollection that

between the time period of January 1964 - April 1964,

Warren Commission's representatives had visited the

CIA's headquarters in Langley, Virginia and had

been shown various Miserapes resulting from the

Lientitie dovice.

CIA telophonic surveiltance-operations in Mexico

CitY -

(ESCA Class. Depo. of Raymond Rocca,

• 7/17

00,

p. 39)

However, Mr. Rocca did not personally make

86

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28

Classification: _

SEGRET

(This form is to be used for material extracted

from ClA-controlled documents.)

this material available to Commission representa-

tives and was not able to state under oath

precisely the point in time at which the Warren

Commission first learned of these operations. (Ibid.

87

83

On February 19, 1964 the CIA responded to

(C D 384, FOLA NO: 553-80814

Rankin's inquiry of February

10. The Agency

response did indicate that Oswald had phoned the

Soviet Consulate and was also interviewed at the

still did

not reveal

Consulate. However, the Agency

neither revealed

the source of this information, inits-response to

the Commission nor indicated that this source

would be revealed-by other-means-te.g. by oral

briefing)

(Ibia

188

densitive Optiotising

Warren Commission Knowledge of CIA Teleptroric Surveilance

During the period of March - April 1964,

David Slawson drafted a series of memoranda which

among other issues concerned Warren Commission know-

ledge of and access to the production material

sensitive

operations

derived from the CIA telephonie surveillance operations

• in Mexico City. A review of these memoranda tends

to support the Committee's belief that the Warren

Commission, through Mssrs. Slawson, Coleman, and

.31

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Contcch..

Classification:

SECRET

or

isinalsorte

and willen hisalem toobedie decesterial restedelephonic

source

from ClA-controlled documents.)

surveillance materials until April 9, 1964. On

that date, Coleman,

Slawson and Willens met with

vin Scott, the CIA's Chief of station in Mexic

raw data

"ity, who provided them with various transcripts

sens. tive.

and transtations derived from A tetephenetaps

af the Cuban and Soviet-Embassy/Consulates AIslawson

Memorandum of April 22, 1964, Subject: Trip to

Mexico City p22)

panas

-PriOrito April 9, it appears doubtful that

the Commission had been given even irel

access,

to thel referenced material. Nevertheless, by March

12, 1964, the record indicates that the Warren

of

commission had at least become aware that the CIA.

9

did maintain telephonic surveillance of the cuban

Diain20.

Embassy/Consulate. (Slawson merorandum, March 12,

(1964, Subj: meeting with CIA representatives) .

Slawson's memorandum of March 12 reveals that the Warren

departe

Commission had learned that the CIA possessed tan- inform

scripts of conversations between the Cuban Ambassadoi

al to Mexico, Armas, and the Cuban President Dorticos

The

91

Dorticos-Armas conversations, requested by the

marrer

whiskihadbeen summarized inthe

whilein

Classification:

# Slawson

this Committee

stated that me be came aware of the l xi classified by derivation;

000051

in Mexicactaprobab

offer to-

Apr

1 0%

City

andis

dur

mister

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SECRET.

Classification:

(This form is to be used for material extracted

A MAS NO OSJECTION TO

DEGLASSIFICATION AND/OR

from ClA-controlled documents Marant

RELEASE OF THIS DOCUME

Commission representatives at nutting; with

CIA officials, including Richard Helms, concerned

Silvia Duran's arrest and interrogation by the

9z

Mexican Federal Police.

_(Slawson Memorandan

April 22, 1964, pp. 3, 19, 45-46)S Helms responded

to the Commission's request for access, stating

that he would attempt to arrange for the Warren

conmission's representatives to review this material. 93

(Slawson Memorandum of March 12, 1964, p. 6)*

Another Slawson memorandum, dated March 25,

1964 concerned Oswald's trip to Mexico. In that memo

Slawson wrote that the tentative conclusions

he had reached concerning Oswald's Mexico trip,

were derived from CIA memoranda of January 31, 1964

and. February 19, 1964/ (Slawson Memorandum of March

25, 1964, p. 20) and, in addition, a Mexican federal

police summary of interrogations conducted

Shortly-

after the assassination with

Soul Durant teet

calteracio, an handle of

Slawson wrote:

A large part of it (the summary report)

is simply a summation of what the Mexican

police learned when they interrogated Mrs.

Silvia Duran, an employee of the Cuban

Consulate in Mexico City, and is there-

fore only as accurate as

MeS. Duran's

testimony to the police.

Ibid.fi

95

SECRET

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31

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SECRET

(This form is to be used for material extracted

from ClA- controlled documents.)

These comments indicate that Slawson placed

qualified reliance upon the Mexican police summary.

Moreover, there is no indication that Slawson had

raw data

been provided the duran telephone intereept

cran*

obtaired by means of

scripts.

In fact, by virtue of Slawson's comments

sensitie

concerning the Mexican police report, it would

CIA

fuurce.

appear that the Warren Commission, as of March 25,

and

methics.

had been provided little substantive information

pertaining to Silvia Duran. As Slawson reveals,

the Commission had been forced to rely upon the two

semitive

memoranda that did not make reference to the surveil-

lance operations and a sunnary report issued by

the Mexican Federal Police. Thus, the Agency had

for over three months Prelude exposing

He survertlance operations to the review of thi

concerned Warren Commission staff members.

As was

3

3 ok

stated in the CIA cable of December 20, 196f to its

Mexico City Station:

Our present plan in passing information

Esensitie

to the Warren Commission is

operating mention ofteephone on, to emito

to eliminate

protect your continuing operations.

Will

State Deposies

rely instead on statements of Silvia

Duran and on contents of soviet consular

file which soviets gave DACID here.

TCIA DOC. FOIA #420-75T, Déc: 20, 1964.3

State Deft

SECRET

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(This form is to be used for material extracted

rain data

from CIA -controlled documents.)

parteing

Qurain

The Committee's belief that Slawson had

that

Lect

not been given access to the Duran transcripts is

further supported by reference to his memorandum

geinear ite

Delect

of March 27, 1964 (ED>ggZ) wherein he states his

conclusion that Oswald had visited the Cuban

o Embassy on three occasions.

(Ibid, pr2)

This

again

conclusion, he wrote, was based upon an analysis of

Silvia Duran's testimony before the Mexican police.

This memorandum bears

no indication that he had

petrimin

idjne.s..

reviewed any of the Duran transtlipts. Furthermore,

had lawson been given access to these transcripts,

certainly their substance would have been incorporated

into Kis analysis and accordingly noted for this

purpose.

His analysis would have reflected the fact

of his review aither by its corroboratión or

criticism of the above cited Mexican police summary report.

Logicallt, access to the ChAt telepheric

delet surveittance productat would have claritiga some

ambiguities.

For example, on September 27, at 4:05 p..

(Slawsof Memorándam of April 21, 1964, Subj: Intereepts

from Soviet and Cuban Embássies in Mexico, p. 2) if t sentence

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SECRAT

stated that a/Amertoln dou stesently at the

Cuban embass

y requesting an

in-transit visit to

Cuba. Thas American was later determined by CIA analysts

to be Oswald.

/Again on september 2%,

at 11:52 a.m.

Duran telepkoned the

Soviet Consulate stating that

an American, subseqdently identified by CIA analysts

as oswald was at the Cuban Embassy.

corol sting sia visite are Can Embassy

Had this information been made available to slawson,

his calculatións of Oswald's activities in Mexico

City would have been

more

firmly established than

refleukdinhis.mendr.ir.com

they were as of March 27, 1964.

The record supports the Committee's finding

that as of April 2, 1964 the Warren Commission had

till not been given access to the above-rererence

• originalsourimaterials.

, i † memorandum of

that date by Coleman and Slawson,

posed one.

question to the CIA and made two requestsfor information

from the Agency (Slawson - Coleman Memorand F

April 2, 1964, Subj: Questions Raised by the Ambassador

Mann File)

Coleman and Slawson wrote:

1) What is the information source referred

to in the November 28 telegram that

SECRET

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sensitive

Öswaara intendedect dors enteriel astwastein

from CIA -controlled documents.)

Odessa;

2) We would like to see copies of the

raw catal

transeriots of the intercepts, translated

if possible, in all cases where the

Law data!

Intercepes refer to the assassination

Sensitive

sensitive

or related subjects;

3 We would especially like to see the

raw data

intereept in which the allegation tha

money was passed at the Cuban Embassy

is discussed

(Ibid.)

The question initially posed by (Item I) in

the above-referenced memorandum of April 2 concerns

a seniore

sparatio..

then CIA telephort intercept of September 27, 1963-

at 10:37.a.m= (Slawson Memorandum of April 21

1964, p. 1)

Obviously, if Slawson found it necessary

to request the source of the information, he had

not as yet been provided access to the original

material by the CIA.

100

Item Number Two of the above listing tends to show

that the Conmission had

not been giving access

the intercept

concerning the assassination.

Certain

sensitive

data

SECRET

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_ SECRET

(This form is to be used for material extracted

from CIA -controlled documents.)

Item number three of the above listing

sensitive

Nave data pattering tie

reveals that the intercept of the Dorticos-Armas

conversation of November 22, 1964, in which the

passing of monies was discussed had not as of April

2 been provided to the Commission. The Commission

information

had specifically requested the Dorticos Armas convergatio

transcripts at a March 12, 1964 meeting between

Commission representatives and. Agency representatives.

101

(Slawson memorandum, March 12, 1964, Subj: Conference

with CIA on March 12, 1964)

On April 3, 1964, Coleman and Slawson expressed

their concern for receiving complete access to all

materials relevant to Oswald's Mexico City trip:

The most probable final result of the

entire investigation of Oswald's activities

in Mexico is a conclusion that he went

there for the purpose of trying to reach

Cuba and that no bribes, conspiracies,

etc. took place.

... In order to make such a judgment (that

all reasonable lines of investigation that

might have uncovered other motivations or

SECRET

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CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION ANDIOR

RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

Classification:

SES AI

(This form is to be used for material extracted

from CIA -controlled documents.)

possible conspiracies have been followed

through with negative results), we must

become familiar with the details of what

both the American and Mexican investi-

gatory agencies there have done. This

means reading their reports, after trans-

lation, if necessary, and in some cases

talking with the investigators themselves.

10.2

(Slawson and Coleman Memorandum, Aprid

oK

13, 1964, Subj: Additional lines

Investigation in Mexico Which May Prove

i emprasis uniled

Worthwhile p. 11.)

However, as the rand tends to show

Manifestly, Coleman's and Slawson's desire

rampedlack

for a thorough investigation had bean

Imposed the cIA's.

concern test

sources and methods,

however relevant to the Commission's investigation,

bo esposed. Considering the gravity and signi-

ficance of the warren Commission's investigation; the

the

initial

original sourer

Agency'switholding of material from the

Commission staff may have peters ability to reach

a curately reasoned conclusions with perpent to Grudald!

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009058

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37

Classification: -

(This form is to be used for material extracted

from ClA-contrelled documents.)

On April 8, David Slawson, Howard Willens,

and William Coleman flew to Mexico City, Mexico

to meet with the representatives of the State

Department,

FBI, CIA, and the Government of Mexico.

(Slawson Menorandum, April 22, 1964, Subj: Trip

Mexico City, p. 1) Prior to their departure.

who to see

they met with Thomas Mann, Eke U.S. Ambassador to.

Mexico

during Oswald's visit to Mexico City and at

the time of President Kennedy's assassination. Ibid.)

3

104

Ambassador Mann told the Warren Commission representa-

tives

that the CIA's Mexieo City»Station-was-actively

engaged i?photosurveillance-operations against the

Soviet and Cuban Embassy/Consulates (Ibid., p.

•Upon the group's arrival in Mexico City, they

were met by U.S. Ambassador Freeman, Claire Boonstra

of the State Department, Clarke Anderson of the FBI,

Lein afree tinted

11060

and winston scott EthereIA

(Ibia. pp. 9-10)"

That same day during a meeting between the

janion depresentative and wisent, seest nade

the raw dete

available to the group actuat transcripts of the -CIA's

Johat had beet.

donning telepati undone operations accompanted jero l

English translations-of the transe

In addition,

senitie

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38

GIA HAS NO CEJECTION TO

/DECLASSIFICATION ANDIOR

RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

Classification: -

he provided the group

CiA geomole documen materia steeraphs photogra

for the time period covered by Oswald's visit.

that had resulted from photosur

Impranc

108

Cuban and soviet Embassy entratces. David slawson

wrote:

D

Mcafoott stated at the beginning

of his narrative that he intended to make

a complete disclosure of all facts,

including the sources of his information,

and that he understood that all three of

us had been cleared for TOP SECRET and

that we would not disclose beyond the

confines of the Commission and its

immediate staff the information we obtain-

ed through him without first clearing it

10

with his superiors in Washington.

agreed to this."

(Ibia.)

The CIA plungies line:

stall

Miscott described to the Commission

repre- Meter

directly

sentatives the CIA's course of action :

following the assassination, indicating that his

staff immediately began to compile dossiers on

Oswald, Duran, and everyone else throughout Mexico

whom

the CIA knew had had some contact with Oswald

(Ibid.)

seott revealed that all known Cuban and Russian

intelligence agents had quickly . been put under

surveillance following the assassination. Slawson

concluded :

[CIA Representative'/

"Scotts narrative plus the material we

were shown disclosed immediately how

incorrect our previous information had

and men an east state the soutet

and Mexicar

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39

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SECRET

"CIA

(This form is to be used for material extracted

distant tippsorarollerhicsadans to which our

information had been subjected had

entered some place in Washington,

[CIA

because the CIA information that we

vere snown by scott was unambiguou:

almost all the crucial points

We had

previously planned to show sootty Slawson's

reconstruction of Oswald's probable

activities at the embassies to get Scott's

opinion, but once we saw how badly distorted

our information was we realized that this

would be useless.

Therefore,

instead,

we

decided to take as close notes as possible

Irom the original source materials at some

later time during our visit." (Ibidas Paries"

A separate Slawson memorandum of April 21, 1964 records

the results of the notetaking from original source

materials that he did following Scott's disclosures.

Esensitive now datal

These notes dealt exclusively with the telephonic

intercepts pertaining to the duran and Oswald -conver-

sations for the period sept. 27

warve

Cmain moral At 240964 Subjee

CS

4/21/64

from the Soviet and Cuban Embassies in Mexico City.

It is evident from Slawson's record that the

Agency's den

s'at of original source materials, in this

note

case the telephonic surveillance intercepts,

enroasty

affecte

imperin

the Commission's ability to draw accurately

reasoned conclusighs regarding/Oswald's sodourn in

Menaco city.

It/ meant that as of April 10, 1964,

Soto pollan

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CIA HAS NO OSJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

de

+ad

othe

com

40

Classification: -

(This form is to be used for material extracted

from ClA-controlled documents.)

nearing the halfway point of the warren Commission

investigation,

the Commission

Tort eito retrace

the factual path by which it had structured Oswald's

activities in Mexico City.

It

• further revealed that

the Agency had provided ambiguous information to

the Commission when, in fact "on almost all the

crucial points" significantly more precise materials

could haye been made available for analysis by the

Commission. (Ibid.)

Thus, the Agency's early policy

ginaliourc

of not/providing the commission with vitally relevant

intonet on derived from assain sensitive sources

hampered

and methods had seroubly undernined the investigation

and/ possibly foreclosed lines of investigation e g.,

Cuban involvement, that might have been more seriously

considered had this material been expeditiously

providea.

Mexico tutationhotoser titance and the

Meteo Ci

On November 23, 1963, FBI Special Agent Odüm

showed Marguerite Oswald a photograph of a man

bearing no physical resemblance to her son

(Warren

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## Page 65

noneed

pases

some.

Agency

cocoa.

Classification:

SECRET,

-118

commission repa's toes us thes mate togetst had beer

rem clA controited documents.

supplied to the FBI on November 22 by the CIA S

117

Mexico City station after Agency representatives

had searched their files in an effort to locate

gok

Ibid.

17

information on Oswalda (CIA DOC. DDP4-1555, 3/2$/64

@ •Kwarren Commission Doc. 6Fthis photograph, which was one

in a series outing Exon the CIA photosurveillance

K operations against the Soviet and Cuban Embassy/enoutat

Prior to the assassination,

- a.

had been linked by

the Mexico City Station to Lee Harvey Oswald.

(Ibid.)

Richard Helms, in a

sworn affidavit before the Warren

Commission, stated that the photograph shown to

outside of the contion

eat stated been take doctobe eti 1963

cal United

medurin theperiod

July'

in Mexico City and mistakenly-linked-at-that-time-to

1963 to November 23, 963

5119

Oswala.

/(Warren Commission Affidavit of Richard Helms

8/?/64, Vol. XI, PP. 469-470)

On February 101964, Marguerite Oswald testified

before the Warren Commission and recounted the cir-

cumstances under which she was shown the photographs

Warren Conmission Report Vol I,p153JMrs. Oswald testified

that she

believed this photograph to have been of Jack

Ruby. (Ibia.))

12

000063

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Replainie

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42-

SECRET

(This form is to be used for material extracted

from ClA - controlled documents.)

Thereafter, on February 12, 1964, J. Lee

Rankin wrote to Thomas Karramesines, Assistant DDP

requesting both the identity of the individual

depicted in the photograph and an explanation of

the circumstances by which this photograph was

obtained by the Central Intelligence Agency.

6122

(Letter of J. Lee Rankin, Feb. 12, 1964, JFK DOC.

#3872) FO1A 543-233A

On that same day, in a separate letter,

Rankin wrote to DCI McCone regarding materials

that the CIA had disseminated since November 22,

1963 to the Secret Service but not to the Warren

Commission. Rankin requested copies of these

materials which included three CIA cables.: The

that his 3661

cables concerned the photograph/subsequently shown in. fr

by the FBI to Oswald's mother of the individual

originally identntied by the not to to

123,.

as Ice Harvey Oswala! (letter of J. Lee Rankin

Feb.

12, 1964, JFK DOC.

#3872)

541-23%A

Among the materiats disseminated by the CIA

to then secret /service was a November 26 dissemination.

dK (CIA RoEnaT3177, 11/26/64) That cable concerned

FOIR,

76-7276164)

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43

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turing

(This form is to be used for material extracted

and

disclosed the

existence of CIA tetaphone surveinfande operations

i/ed

information

in Mexico-City at the time of the assassination

andjoswald's earlier visiteAs

a result the CIA was

reluctant to make the material disseminated to

the Secret Service available to the Warren Commission

for in so doing the Agency would have necessarily exposed its

sensitive splatios

tesephonic sureillance operationsto the Commission.

John Scelso testified

regarding the circumstances

surrounding the eventual explanation given to the

Commission recounting the origion of the photograph in

question.

Scelso stated:

"We did not initially disclose to the

Warren Commission all of our technical lensinu

operations.

In other words, we did not

initially disclose. to them that we had

Gauch

operators

photosurveillance because the November

photo we hady (of MMM) was not of Oswald.

Therefore it did not mean anything,

see?"{HE CA C/ass Depo of John".

Scetso, 5/166

780158

Mr. Goldsmith:

...So the Agency was making a unilateral

decision that this was

not relevant to the Warren

commission EIbid a

Scelso:

Right, we were not authorized, at first,

tHe end all que testicopera ioad/18.

sensitive)

pi: 1507

aT bid

In sumary the records shows that

By February 12, 1964 the Warren Commission had

(inadvertantly) requested access to telephonic surveillance

atson, a cause for concern within the figenty

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## Page 68

assification:

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frot cram controlled yiecurentsnaterial extracted

from ClA-controlled documents.)

-44-

ok.

due to the sensitivity of Agency sources and methods.

similarly, the possible disclosure/of the phot survenance

operations to the Warren Commissionkhad also begun to cause

concern within the Agency.

On March 5, 1967, Raymond Rocca wrote in an

internal memorandum to Richard Helms that "we have

a problem here for your determination." Rocca

outlined Angleton's desire not to respond directly

to Rankin's request of February 12 regarding the CIA

material forwarded to the secret servi

since

November 23, 1964.P0

Rocca then stated:

"Unless you feel otherwise, Jim would

prefer to wait out the Commission on the

matter covered by paragraph 2 (of the

above-referenced February 12 letter to McCone

requesting access to CIA reports provided

367 the Secret Service after November 22, 1963,

(JFK DOC: 3982) .

If they come back on this

point he feels that you, or someone from

here, should be prepared to go over to show

then to them in copy:

Commission the material rather than pass

Incidentally, none

of these items are of new substantive

interest.

We have either passed the material

in substance to the Commission in response to

earlier levies or the items refer to aborted

leads, for example, the tamous six photographs

which are not of aswaldo CTA DoC.

= FOLA

#579-250, 3/5/64; see also HSCA Tassified

Deposition of lames Angleton, 10/5/78e PP• 31ti3

lassification: -

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-44a-

127

wherein he states that the only reason

for not providing the Warren Commission with

access to CIA surveiltance materials (tiel muts, eat

was due to the Agency's concern for

protection of its sources and methods)

000057

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SECTATI

(This form is to be used for material extracted

from CIA - controlled documents.)

On March 12, 1964, representatives of the

Warren Commission and the CIA confered regarding

the February 12 request for the materials forwarded

ok to the Secret Se

Service by the Ageney.

(Letter of

FOIA 60041-256017

J. Lee Rankin March 16, 1964, JFK Doc. # 3872, Slawson**

Memorandum, March 12, 1964)

The record indicates that the Commission at

the March I2 meeting pressed for access to the

com. parch. 1219144

Secret Service materials. Rankin wrote to Helms

on March 16. that it was his understanding that the

CIA would supply the Commission with a paraphrase of

each report or communication pertaining to the Secret

Service materials "with all indications of your

confidential communications techniques and confidential

sources deleted. VYou will also afford members of.

our staff working in this area an opportunity to

review the actual file so that they may give assurance

that the paraphrases are complete."

(letter of j. Lee?

TO1A 607-256011

Rankin, March 16, 1964, paragraph 2, JFK DoC. No. 3872)-

Rankin further indicated that the same

procedure was to be followed regarding any material

in the possession of the CIA prior to November 22,

130

13/

132

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1963 which had not as yet been furnished because

it concerned sensitive sources and methods.

(Ibid.,

par.

3)

133

Helms responded to Rankin's March 16 letter

ali on March 24 (FOIA 7 622-258) by two separate

-134.

FUH65-958

communications! (CIA Doc. DDP4-1554, hereinafter CD 631,

Furt 621-259

ula

3/24/64, CIA Doc., DDP4:-1555, 3/24/64, CD 674 hereinafter)

/ CD 631 provided the Commission with a copy of the

text live! HOctober 10, 1963 CIA dissemination to FBI, State Dept.

INS and Navy Dept. (and to the Secret Service on

22 Nov.) regarding Lee Harvey Oswald and his presence

at the Soviet Consulate in Mexico City.

The response

3

I further revealed that on October 23, 1964, CIA had

Tom the Navy

requested two copies of the most recent photograph

of oswald in order to check the identity o

of the person

considen

IDi

believed to be Oswald in Mexico City

Furthermore,

cank

the CIA stated, though it did not indicate when, that

it had determined that-the photograph shown to Marguerite

Oswald on Movember 2, 1963 aid not refer to lee

Harvey Oswald!-"The Agency explained that it had checked the

photograp

against the press photographs of Oswald generally

available on November 23, 1963,

CD 674 reveals that on Nov. 22, 1963 immediately follow

Exclair

is 0511 Classification:

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0!:.

47

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extracted

the assasstom tian confolled documenper 23,

1963, three

cabled reports were received at CIA headquarters

from the CIA Mexico City-Station regarding photographs

of an unidentified man who had visited the Cuban and

Soviet Embassies during October and November 1963

0D674

Paraphrases of these cables, not revealing sensitive

Iloi

sources and methods, were attached to CD(674

The

Agency wrote

that the subject of the photo referenced

in these cables was not Oswald. It was further

stated that:

your end to mastern and, willens anc

your memo of 16 Marchwi

to at these as emine on the se copies

of these 3

Service and the cables

phot which they were

based, as well as the photos of the unidenti-

fied man.

(CIA DOC.- DDP4-1555 ED634,24

MarCh 1964)

Thatarein ourtila

Ibis

140

On March 26, William Coleman wrote in a memorandum

for the record:

"The CIA directed a memorandum to J. Lee Rankin

On March 24, 1964 (Commission Document No. 631)

in which it set forth the dissemination of

the information on Lee Harvey Oswald. I realize

that this memorandum is only a partial answer

to our inquiry to the CIA dated March 16, 1964

and I hope that the complete answers will give

us the additional information we reguested."

(Memorandum of William Coleman, March 24, 196AT1

Coleman went on to state:

"As you know, we are still trying to get an

explanation of the photograph which the FBI.

showed darquerite out after the

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NO

iL)

- 48:552221

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assassination.

hope that paragraph

4

of the memorandum of March 24, 1964

[CD 631) sent Mr. Rankin by the CIA

147

is not the answer which the CIA intends

to give us as to this inquiry " (Ibid.

Mart. 27

The following day, as agreed by Warren Commission

and Agency representatives, Samuel Stern of the

Commission visited CIA headquarters in Langley,

Muset.

IginIa

sterns' memorandum of his visit reveals that

he reviewed Oswald's file with Raymond Rocca.

_Stern

indicated that Oswald's file contained those materials

jiy4

oll

furnished previously to the Warren Commission bY, 4 5

Al "the file also contained:

fron

"Cable reports^of November 22 and-November

1903

23, from the CIA's Mexico City Station

per ton

relating to the photograph of the unidenti-

the Cuter n.

octoberds 6.60

fied individual mistakenty believed to-be

19÷4

Lee ilarvey oswald'and the reports on these

cables furnished on November 13. Foe For.

(Tomorand um

the segret service by the et the ...

of samtel stern, March 27, 1964)

Stern noted that these messages were accurately

paraphrased in the attachments to CD 674 provided the

# Paragraph 4 of CD 631 stated that CIA soncludiettle

-146

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Warren Comfreestion Catrelles cacuments.)964.1

He/also

reviewed the october lo, 1963 cable iron"eIAn field sti

148.

Mexico

Station to

• CIA headquarters

reporting Oswald's contact with the Soviet Embassy

in Mexico City.-

addition, Stern examined the

October 10, 1963 cable from CIA headquarters to

the Mexico City Station' reporting background infor-

mation on Oswald." (Ibid.))

stern recorded / 4 9.

that these messages

were

repriet

Jok. paraphrased accurately as set forth in the CIA's January

31 memo to the Warren Commission reporting Oswald's

Mexico City trip.Fbid

• 150

Lastly, Stern noted that Rocca provided him

for his review a computer printout of the references

to oswald related documents jocated in the Agenous / 5 1

electronic data storage system.

stated "there is

ok no item listed on the printout which the warren con-.

mission has not been given either in full text or.

paraphrased."

(Ibid.)

Thus, by the 27th of March, a Warren Commission

representative had been apprised of the circumstances

surrounding the mysterious photograph.

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from ClA-controlled documents.)

Luisa Calderon

Approximately five hours after President

Kennedy's assassination a Cuban government employee

in Mexico City named "Luisa" received a telephone

(91 to 2, dent sod man-speaking Spanish. p

173-615, attachment

This call had been intercepted and recorded by the

CIA's-Mexico City Station as the result of its

IIENVOted tap operation

(Ibid.

The Mexico

City Station as subsequently reported to CIA

headquarters, identified the Luisa of the conversa-

tion as Luisa Calderon, who was then employed in

the Commercial Attache's office at the Cuban Consu-

late

(Ibid.)

S/55

During the course of the conversation, the

unidentified caller asked Luisa if she had heard

(of the assassination)

the latest news. Luisa replied in a joking tone:

"Yes, of course, I knew almost before Kennedy."

(Ibid.)

0/56

CIA'S

Paraphrasing the telephone intercept transcript,

it states that the caller told Luisa

the person

#Paraphrade on tradators intopretito.

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ANTS

DSCLASS FIOATION ANDOR

RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENE

158

54

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from CIA -controlled documents.)

apprehended for Kennedy's slaying was the

-15>

"President of one of the committees of the Fair

Play

for Cuba. "

Luisa replied that she also knew

159

Th:

this

Idisa inquired whether the person being

held for the killing was a

"gringo.

The unidenti-160

fied caller replied, "yes!

Idisa told her caller

that she had learned nothing else about the assassina-

161

tion and that she had learned about the assassination

only a little while ago.

The unidentified caller

commented:

We think that if it had been or had

seemed... public or had been one of

the segregationists or against

intergration who had killed Kennedy,

then

there was, let's say, the

possibility that a sort of civil

war would arise in the United States;

who knows

that contradictions would be sharpened...

8162

Luisa responded:

Imagine, one, two, three and now, that

makes three.' (She laughs.) (Ibid, p.27

Raymond Rocca, in response

to a 1975 Rocke-

feller Commission request for information on a

possible Cuban conspiracy to assassinate President

Kennedy wrote regarding Calderon's comments:

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tom the le demen material extrase

ea documents.

¿ocuments.}

-55-

Latin hyperbole? Boastful ex post facto

suggestion of foreknowledge.

This is the

only item in the intercept coverage of

the Cubans and Soviets after the assassina-

tion that contains the suggestion of fore-

knowlege of expectation. (CIA DOC-.

Memorandum of Raymond Rocca for DC/OPS,

5/23/75, p. 15) * fsee p, 55a for k

Standing by itself, Luisa Calderon's cryptic

comments do not merit serious attention. Her words

164

may indeed indicate foreknowledge of the assassina-

tion but may equally be interpreted without such a

sinister implication. Nevertheless, the Committee

has determined that Luisa Calderon's case should

have merited serious attention in the months following

the assassination.

In connection with the assassination, Luisa

" Calderon's name first surfaced on November 27, 196%/

in a cable sent by then Ambassador Mann to the State

6'65

- l' Department (CIA DOC. DIR-85573, 11/27/63).

In that cable Mann stated:

18

•..Washington should urgently consider

feasibility of requesting Mexican authorities

to arrest for interrogation: Eusebio Azcue,

Luisa Calderon and Alfredo Mirabal.

The two

men are Cuban national and Cuban consular

- 166

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-55a-

*Regarding the issue of whether Calderon's comments

could reasonably be interpreted to indicate possible

foreknowledge, the CIA position is as follows:

During the Rockefeller Commission inquiry,

Calderon's conversation was identified

as a possible item of information from

the Agency's Cuban and Soviet telephone

intercepts that might suggest foreknowledge

of a plot to assassinate the American Presi-

dent. This involves a faulty translation of an

answer Calderon gave to her caller.

In answer

to the latter's question as to whether she

had heard the latest news, Calderon said:

"Si, claro, me entere casiantes que Kennedy."

The

verb entere is mistranslated. Me entere

(the first person of the verb enterarsede,

past tense) should be translated as

found

out (or I learned) /about it -- the assassination/

almost before Kennedy Ldid/." In other words,

Calderon was saying she heard about the shooting

of Kennedy almost at the time the event took

place...

(CIA Doc., Memorandum

Regarding

Luisa Calderon conversation, p.l).

The Committee fundamentally disputes the

narrow interpretation of Calderon's comments

double

spacer

assigned by the Agency. It is the Committee's

position that translation of Me Entere as

either "I found out" or "I learned about"

does not foreclose interpretation of Calderon's

comments as a suggestion on her part of possible

foreknowledge of President Kennedy's assassination.

The interpretation, i nany event

shouldhawebon/effto

Hejudgement of theisarren commission, not FrecIA

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i foAm gongrole see eaterial extracted

from ClA - controlled gigsuments.)

This cable does not state the basis for

arresting Calderon.* However, the CIA's copy of this

cable bears a handwritten notation on its routing

page. That

notation states: "Info from Amb Mann

for. Sec Rusk re: ...persons involved with Oswald

in Cuban Embassy." Mann went on to state in urgent

I terms: "They may, quickly be returned to Havana in

order to eliminate any possibility that Mexican

o government could use them as witnesses.

JAY.

Ibid.

According to CIA files, Calderon made

reservations to return to Havana on Cubana Airlines on

December 11, 1963, less than four weeks after the

assassination.

(CIA DOC. CSCI-316/01783-65, 4/26/65)

Calderon, Azcue and Mirabal were not arrested

nor detained for questioning by the Mexican federal

police.

However, Silvia Duran, a friend and associate

of Calderon's and the one person believed to have

*It 1S

the Committee's belief

that Mann was prompted

to request the arrest of Calderon on the basis of

Gilberto Alvarado Ugarte's allegation that Calderon

was present at the Cuban Embassy when Oswald

was allegedly given a sum of money presumably to

carry out

the assassination of President Kennedy.

June 1964, Attachment. C)

joi

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-57-

had repeated contact with Oswald while he was in

Mexico City, was arrested and questioned by the

Mexican police on two separate occasions? (CIA

DoC. DIR 84950, 11/23/63, CIA DOC. DIR 85471, 2C/3:

11/27/63)

During

her second interrogation, Duran was

questioned regarding her association with Calderon.

There is no indication in the reinterrogation report

accounting for the questioning of Duran about. Calderon.

(CIA Doc. DDP4-0940, 2/21/64):

The information regarding

Duran's interrogation was passed to the Warren Commission

on February 21, 1964, more than two months after

Calderon had returned to Cuba

(Ibid.)

17/

Information was reported to the CIA during

May 1964, from a Cuban defector, tying Luisa

Calderon to the Cuban Intelligence apparatus. The

defector, AMMUG-1, was himself a Cuban Intelligence

Officer who supplied valuable and highly reliable

information to the CIA regarding Cuban Intelligence

operations. (CIA Doc., Memorandum of Joseph Langösch

to Chief, Office of Security, 6/23/64) Calderon's

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170

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-57a-

173

ties to cuban intelligence were reported to the warden

Commission on June 18, 1964

'(CIA Doc. FOIA #739-319)

6/19/64)- However, the Committee has determined from

its review that the CIA did not provide Calderon's

conversation of November 22 to the Warren Commission.

Consequently, even though the Warren Commission was aware that

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Calderon had connections to intelligence work,

as did other Cuban Embassy officers, the vital

link between her background and her comments

was never established for the Warren Commission

by the CIA. The Agency's oversight in this

regard may have forclosed the Commission from

actively pursuing a lead of great significance.

Calderon's 201 file reveals) that she

/arrived in Mexico City from Havana on January 16,

1963, carrying Cuban Passport E/63/7. Her date

of birth was believed to be 1940 (CIA Doc. Dispatch

HMMA21612, no date given) Calderon's presence in

Mexico City was first reported by the CIA on July

15, 1963 in a dispatch from the CIA's Miami field

office to the CIA's Mexico City station and to the

Chief of the CIA's Special Affairs Staff (for Cuban

operations). (CIA Doc. Dispatch JFCA-10095, 7/15/63)

That dispatch had attached to it a report containing

biographic data on personnel then assigned to the

Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. At page three of the

attached report Luisa Calderon was listed as Secretary

of the Cuban Embassy's commercial office. The

DD0081

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59

-

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notation indicated that a report was pending on

No such report is present

Calderon. (Ibid., p. 3 of attachment) The

in Calderon's

201 File.

Agency has attémpted, without success, to locate

the report.

Luisa Calderon's association with the Cuban

DGI was first recorded by the CIA on May 5, 1964.

(CIA" DOC."

Alind senorandum of Hagala Swenson!

-FOIA

68÷290 5/5/64)

At that time, Joseph Langosch,

Chief of Counterintelligence for the Special Affairs

174

Staff, reported the results of his debriefing of

the Cuban defector, AMMUG-1. The memorandum stated

thạt AMMUG-1 had no direct knowledge of Lee Harvey

Oswald or his activities but was able to provide

175

items of interest based upon the comments of certain

Cuban Intelligence Service officers

(Ibia.)

specifically,

IMMUG-1 was asked if Oswald was known to the:Cuban

intelligence services before November 23, 1953.

AilluG-1 told Langosch

• "Prior to October 1963, Oswald

visited the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City-on two or

three occasions. Before, during and after these

visits, Oswald was in contact with the Direccion

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DECLASSIFICATION ANDIOR

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from CIA -controlled documents.)

General De Intelligencia (DGI), specifically

with Luisa Calderon, Manuel Vega Perez, and

Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez."

(Ibia.)

176

Langosch thereafter wrote that Calderon's

precise relationship to the DGI was not clear.

As a comment to this statement,he set forth the

CIA cable and dispatch traffic which recorded her

arrival in Mexico during January 1963 and departure

or Cuba within one month after the assassination.

(Ibid.)

On May 7, 1964, Langosch recorded additional

information he had elicited from AMMUE-l regarding

Oswald's possible contact with the DGI.

(CIA DOC

FOIA 687-295, attach. 3, 5/1/64) § Paragraph 3 of

this memorandum stated in part:

"a. Luisa Calderon, since she returned

to Cuba, has been paid a regular

salary by the DGI even though she

has not performed any services.

Her home is in the Vedado section

b.

where the fents are high.

Source (AMUG) has known

• Calderon

for several years.

Before going

to Mexico, she worked in the

Ministry of Exterior Conmerce

in the department which was known

as the "Empresa Transimport."

Her title was Secretary General

of the Communist Youth in the

department named in-the p

erIOUS

sentence.

(Ibia.

RET

179

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• k.

61

Classification: -

SECRET

(This form is to be used for material extracted

from CIA - controlled documents.)

On May & Langosch further disclosed AMMUG'S

knowledge of the Oswald casé

(Ibid, attach. 5)

4-1'5

Langosch paraphrased AMMUG's knowledge of Calderon

as follows:

I thought that Luisa Calderon might have

had contact with Oswald because I learned

about 17 March 1964, shortly before I made

a trip to Mexico, that she had been

involved with an American in Mexico.

The

information to which I refer was told to.

me by a DGI case officer... I had commented

to (him) that it seemed strange that luisa

Calderon was receiving a salary from the

DGI although she apparently did not do

any work for the Service.

(The case officer)

told me that hers was a peculiar case and

that he himself believed that she had been

recruited in Mexico by the Central Intelligence

Agency although Manuel Pineiro, the Head

of the DGI, did not agree.

As I recall,

(the case officer) had investigated Luisa

Calderon. This was because, during the time

she was in Mexico, the DGI had intercepted

a letter to her by an American who signed

his name OWER (phonetic) or something

similar. As you know,

the pronunciation

of Anglo-Saxon names is difficult in

Spanish so I am not sure of how the name

mentioned by Hernandez should be spelled.

It could have been "Howard" or something

different.

As I understand the matter,

the letter from the American was a love

letter but indicated that there was a

clandestine professional relationship

between the writer and Luisa Calderon.

I also understand from (the case officer)

that after the interception of the letter

she had been followed and seen in the

company of an American.

18U

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(This form is to be used for material extracted

from CIA -controlled documents.)

On May 11, Raymond Rocca wrote a memorandum

to Director Richard Helms regarding the information

A-I

- 182

Swenson

ad elicited from AMMUG (CIA DOC. FOIA 687-295,

5/11/64, Rocca Memorandum)

Rocca proposed that "the

DDP in person or via a designee, perferably the

A-i

former, discuss the AMMUG-I situation on a very

restricted basis with Mr. Rankin at his earliest

convenience either at the Agency of at the Commission

headquarters. Until this takes place, it is not

183

desirable to put anything in writing.

(Ibid. p.

On May 15, 1964, Helms wrote Rankin regarding

A-I's

AMMUG's information about the DGI, indicating its

sensitivity and operational significance,

(CIA DOC.

FOIA 697-294, 5/15/64, Helms Memorandum) / Attached

to Helis' conmunication was a paraphrased accounting&s

of Langosch's May 5 memorandum.

(Ibiă.)

In

that

attachment the intelligence associations of Manuel

Vega Perez and Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez were set forth.

However, that attachment made no reference whatsoever

to Luisa Calderon.

Howard Willens of the Warren Commission

requested as a follow-up to the May 15 memorandum,

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access to the questions used in Langosch's

..

i interrogation of AMUG.

(CIA DOC. FOIA 739-316, 6/19/64

Memorandum)

On June 18, 1964 Arthur Dooley of

Roccals Counterintelligence Research and Analysis

A.1'5

Group took the questions and AMMUG's

responses to

the warren Commission's office"s for Willen's review.

Willens saw Langosch's May 5 memorandum. The only

mention of Calderon was as follows: "The precise.

relationship of Luisa Calderon to the DGI is not

clear. She spent about six months in Mexico from

which she returned to Cuba early in 1964."

(Ibia

However, Willens was not shown Langosch's

memorandy of May 7 and May 8, 1964 which contained

much more detailed information on Luisa Calderon,

A l's report of

including her possible association with Lee Harvey

Oswald and/or American intelligencel

(Ibia.) *

The Warren Commission as of June 19, 1964,

had little if no reason to pursue the Luisa Calderon

lead. It had effectively been denied significant

-186

1817

188

*

It should be noted that these memoranda of May 5,

7, 8, 11 and June 19 with attachments, are not

referenced in the Calderon 201 file.

(See CIA

Computer printout of Calderon 201 file)

Their

existence was determined by the Committee's

independ lassification: other agency files.

SECRETI

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from ClA-controlled documents.)

background information. This denial may have

impeded or prevented the Commission's pursuit

of Calderon's potential relationship to oswald

and the assassination of President Kennedy. But

even if the Warren Commission had learned

of Calderon's background and possible contact with

Oswald it still had been denied the one significant

piece of information that might have raised its

interest in Calderon to a more serious level. The

Warren Commission was never told about Calderon's

conversation of November 22, 196/4

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See p66%

Sili

the Calderon 201 file Dear:

reference to the conversation nor does it indicate

that it was ever made known to or provided the.

Warren Commission for its analysis. (CIA Compute

print-out of Calderon 201 file)

In an effort to

determine the manner in which the

treated the Calderon conversation this Committee

posed the following questions to the CIA:

1. Was the Warren Commission or any Warren

Commission staff member ever given access

to the transeript of a telephone conversa-

tion, dated November 22, 1963, between a

female employee of the Cuban Embassy/

Consulate in Mexico City, identified

as Luisa, and an unidentified male speak-

ing from outside the Cuban Embassy/Con-

sulate? If so, please indicate when

this transcript was provided to the Warren

Commission or its staff, which CIA official

provided it, and which Warren Commission

members or staff reviewed it.

2..

Was the warren Commission or any member

of the Warren Commission or any Warren

Commission staff member ever informed

MET

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orally or in writing of the substance of the

above-referenced conversation of November 22,

1963?

If so, please indicate when and

in what form this information was provided,

and which CIA official provided it (HSCA

request letter of August 28, 1978)

The CIA-responded by memorandum:

"Although the (Mexico City Station considered

the conversation of sufficient possible

interest to send a copy to headquarters,

the latter apparently did nothing with

it, for there appears to be no record in the

Oswald file of such action as may have

been

taken.

A review of those Warren

Commission

documents containing information

provided by the Agency and still bearing

Secret or Top Secret classification does

not reveal whether the conversation

was

given or shown to the commission.

(CIA DoC. , Memorandum

Regarding Luisa

Calderon conversation, p. 1)

The available evidence thus supports the

conclusion that the Warren Commission was never

given the information nor the opportunity by

which it could evaluate Luisa Calderon's

significance to the events surrounding President

Kennedy's assassination. Had the Commission been

expeditiously provided this evidence of her

intelligence background, association with Silvia

Duran, and her comments following the assassination,

it may well have given more serious investigative

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190

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consideration to her potential knowledge of Oswald

(This form is to be used for material extracted

and the cubaim Eleran at doesle involvement in

a conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy•

Two difficult issues remain which are raised

by the Committee's finding. First, why didn't

the Agency provide the Calderon conversation to the

Warren Comnission; secondly, why didn't the Agency

reveal to the Warren Commission its full knowledge

of Calderon's intelligence background, her possible

knowledge of Oswald and her possible connection to

the CIA or some other American intelligence apparatus.

The first question can be explained in benign

terms. It is reasonably possible that by sheer

oversight the conversation was filed

away and not

recovered or recollected until after the Warren

Commission had completed its investigation and

Are p65, circle portion as tootnorekerton

published its repori.

(See above CIA explanation)

As for the Agency's withholding of information

concerning Calderon's intelligence background, the

record reflects that the Commission was merely

informed that Calderon may have been a member of

the DGI.

(CIA DOC. 5/5/64,

Sirenson Memorandum

The memoranda which provided more extensive examina-

tion of her intelligence background were not made

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JECTION TO

•ICATON ANDIOR

DECLA

RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

67 -

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from ClA -controlled documents.)

available for the Commission's review. Significantly,

the May 8 memorandum written by Joseph Langosch

following his debriefing of aituo'1 indicated that

A-I

AMMUG-1 and a second Cuban Intelligence officer

believed Calderon to be a CIA operative.

• (CIA DOC

FOIA 687-295, attach 5, 5/8/64) It is possible

that this information was not provided the Warren

Commission either because there was no basis in

5192

fact for the allegation or because the allegation

was of substantive concern to the Agency. If the

allegation were true, the conseguences for the CIA

would have

been serious. It would have demonstrated

possible

that a CIA operative, well placed in the Cuban Embassy,

may have possessed information prior to the assassina-

tion regarding Oswald and/or his relationship to the

Cuban Intelligence Service. and that Services

possible involvement in a conspiracy to

assassinate

President Kennedy.

Regarding Calderon's possible association

with the CIA, Agency files reviewed reveal no

ostensible connection between Calderon and the CIA.

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from ClA-controlled documents.)

However, there are indications that such contact

between Calderon and the Agency was contemplated.

A September 1, 1963 CIA dispatch from the Chief

of the Special Affairs Staff to the CIA's Chief

of Station in Mexico City states in part:

... Luisa Calderon has a sister residing

in Reynosa, Texas, married to an American

of Mexican descent.

If (CIA asset) can

further identify the sister, our domestic

exploitation section might be in a posi-

tion to follow up on this lead...Please

levy the requirement on (CIA asset) at

-the next opportunity.

(CIA DoC.

11935, 9/1/63)

An earlier CIA dispatch from the CIA-Chief

of station in Mexico City to the Chief of

the CIA's

Western Hemisphere Division records that:

Wilfredo of the Cuban Consulate, Tampico,

reported that Luisa Calderon has a sister

residing in Reynosa, Texas... Luisa may 9o

up to the border to

visit her sister soon--

or her mother may make the trip--details...

not clear TCIA DOC. #iMMA 21849, July 31,

1965)

PI SpatchNo

At the very least; the above dispatches

evidenced an interest in the activities of Calderon

and

her family. Whether this interest took

the form of a clandestine-agent relationship is

not revealed by Calderon's 201 file.

SECRET

194

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SECRET

CLA HAS NO ORJEGRION

DECLASSIFICATION ANDIOR

RELEASE OF THIS DOSUMENT

(This form is to be used for material extracted

from CIA -controlled documents.)

The Conmittee has queried David Ronis, the

author of the above cited dispatch requesting

that Calderon's sister be contacted by the CIA's

"domestic exploitation section."

(HSCA Class.

Staff Interview of David Ronis, 8/31/78) Ronis

was a member of the CIA's Special Affairs Staff

at the time he wrote the dispatch. He worked

principally at CIA headquarters and was responsible

for recruitment and handling of agents for collection

of intelligence data. Mr. Ronis, when interviewed

by this Committee, stated that part of his responsi-

bility was to scour the Western Hemisphere division

for operational leads

related to the work of the

Special Affairs staff. Ronis recalled that he

normally would send requests to CIA field stations

for information or leads on various persons. Often

he would receive no response to these requests,

which normally indicated that no follow-up had

either been attempted or successfully conducted.

It was Ronis' recollection that the above-cited

domestic exploitation section was a task force

within the Special Affairs Staff. He also stated

that in 1963 the CIA's Domestic Contacts Division

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might have been requested to locate Luisa Calderon's

sister. Ronis told the Committee that he had no

recollection of recruiting any person associated

with the Cuban Intelligence Service. He did recall

that he had recruited women to perform tasks for

the Agency. However,

he did not recall ever recruiting

any employees of the Cuban Embassy/Consulate in

Mexico City. Finally, Mr. Ronis stated that he had

no recollection that Luisa Calderon was associated

19 Le

: with the CIA. (

(Ibia.)

Various present and former CIA representatives

were queried whether Luisa Calderon had ever been

associated with the CIA. The uniform answer was

that no one recalled such an association.

(Cites

Exec. Sess. Test. of Richard Heims, 8/9/78, p. 136;

HSCA Class. Depo. of Raymond Rocca, 7/17/78, p. 148;,

HSCA Staff Interview of Joseph Langosch, 8/21/78,

Recuto, Interview offry

Thus, the Agency's file on Calderon and the

testimony of former CIA employees have revealed no

connection between Calderon and the CIA. Yet, as

indicated earlier, this file is incomplete:the

197

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from CrAm controle You er material extracted

199

most glaring omission being the absence from

her 201 file..of a

Calderon s

cryptic remarks

following the assassination of President Kennedy•

Buckground.ire

nurja amator

This Committee's investigation of Luisa

Calderon has revealed that a defector from the Cuban

Intelligence Services provided the CIA with signi-

ficant information about Lee Harvey Oswald's contacts

with the DGI in Mexico City. This defector was

A+/

assigned the CIA cryptonym AMMUG-1 (A-1 hazainafter) $

CIA files reveal that A-l defected from the

DGI on April 21, 1964 in Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada.

When he defected, A-l possessed a number of DGI

documents which were subsequently turned over to

198

the CIA. (CIA DOC. OTTA IN 68894, 4/24/64)

Following his defection, a CIA officer, Joseph H.

Langosch, went, to Canada to meet A-1, debrief him,

and arrange for A-l's travel into the United States.

(Ibia.

On May 1, 1964, 22 reels of Langosch's

SECR

das assee lion an the conto the date cannession.

Therefore, the possibility exists that A-l had

provided other

information to tassifiedby

rels

to

the

Warren Commission's work which

ted

the

issi

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28

debriefing of A-1 were forwarded to the Chief Of

Pispite

Station in Ottawa, Canada!

(CIA DOC. Dispatch OEDA

7763, 5/1/647

Effective on May I, A-I was under

contract with the CIA for operational purposes.

1201

(CIA Doc. Contract Approving Officer Memo, 6/6/64)

By June 23, 1964, Langosch was convinced that A-1

would be of great value to the Agency. He stated:

There is no question in my mind that

A-l AMMUG-I is a bona fide defector or

that he has furnished us with accurate

and valuable information concerning

Cuban intelligence

operations, starters,

and agents. (CIA Docume

Langorch-Memor@adunotJospprary

Director-of-Security, 6/23/64)

As an officer of the DGI, A-1 from August of

1963 until his defection was assigned to the DGI's

202

Drspater.na

<. Illegal Section B (CIA DOC. OTTA IN 68894 4/24/64)

which was responsible for training agents for

assignment in Latin America. His specific responsi-

bility pertained to handling of agent operations

in El Salvador. CIA Doc. Personal Record Question-

naire 6/4/64; CIA DOC. Otta In 68894 4/24/64)

A-1 identified for the CIA the Cuban Intelli-

gence officers assigned to Mexico City: Langosch

described A-l's knowledge of DGI operations in

Mexico as follows:

SECRET

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sipper

CIA HAS NO OSJECTION

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

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from ClA-controlled documents.)

Mexico City, he knows who the

chen conce

intelligence people are. One is the

Cuban Consul Alfredo Mirabal.

He is

called the Chief of the Centre. That

is his title but he is actually the

intelligence chief, or at least he

was until the 16th

of April at which

time a replacement was sent to Mexico

to take over.

This fellow's name is

Manuel Vega.

The source says that

the Commercial attache whose name is

Ricardo Tapia or Concepcion

the is

not sure which is an intelligence

officer) and another one is rogelio.

(: I might say that some of these names...

are familiar to me.. (Langosch debriefing

'Of A-1,

, 4/30/64, p. 5 of reel 4, 4/23/64)

HONEYONT

Thus, A-1

was able to provide the CIA soon

after his defection with accurate information

regarding DGI operations and DGI employees in

Mexico City. # In sert from p72

The Committee has reviewed the CIA's files

concerning A-l. This examination was undertaken

to determine: 1) whether A-l had provided any

valuable investigative leads to the CIA pertaining

to the assassination of President Kennedy; and 2)

whether, if such leads were provided, these leads

and/or other significant information were made

available to the Warren Commission.

€ 204

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74

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from ClA-controlled documents.)

The Committee's initial review of the

materials provided by the CIA to the Warren

Commission did not disclose the existence of the

AMMUG files. However, the Committee did during

the course of its review examine a file containing

material passed to the Rockefeller Commission. That

file made reference to A-1.

Included in this

file was a memorandum of May 5, 1964 written by

Joseph Langosch which concerned information A-l

205

provided about the Oswald case. ICIA DoC. FOTA 68-290

Liangosch Memorandum, 5/5/64) Also contained within

this file were the A-1 debriefing memoranda of

May 7, and May 8, 1964 previously cited with regard 206

to luisa Calderon.C

(CIA DOC. FOIA #687-295, attach's

2

and 5)

Pollowing review of the memoranda, the

Committee requested access to all CIA files

concerning referring to A-l.

From review of thèse materials the Committee

has determined that the Warren Commission did learn

during mid-May 1964 that Lee Harvey Oswald probabl:

had come in contact with DGI officers in

• Mexico City.

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-

75-

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the warren Commission

Prior to learning of Oswald's probable contact

with DGI officers, James Angleton, Chief of the

CIA's Counter Intelligence Staff passed an internal

memorandum to Raymond Rocca, also of the Counter-

intelligence Staff, which stated that he had been

informed by the DDP, Richard Helms, that J. Lee

Rankin had contacted John McCone to request that.

the Director consent to an interview before the

Warren Commission on May 14, 1964, (J. Edgar

Hoover also appeared before the Commission on

that date prior to McCone's appearance)

Warren

Commission Report,* f7 17129)(CIA Doc. FOIA 689-298,

Memo

Names- Angleton, 5/12/64 Angleton

also wrote:

I discussed with Mr. Helms the nature of

the recent information which you are

processing which originated

with the

sensitive Western Hemisphere source.

I

intormed him that in your view this would

raise a number of new factors with the

Commission, that it should not go to the

Conmission prior to the Director's appear-

ance unless we have-first had some pre-

liminary reaction or made sure that the

Director is fully aware of the implica-

tions since it could well serve as the

basis for detailed questioning.

The DDP

stated that he would review this care-

fully and made (sic) a decision as to " 8

the question of timing.

(Ibid.)

207

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Undorint Caly thelleshfunise source referred

to in Angleton's memo was A-1. This conclusion is

based in part upon the date of this memo which

was quite close in time to A-l's defection. In

addition, Rocca's staff prepared

prior

to DCI McCone's appearance before the Warren

a "Brief

Commission for Fresentation to the Warren Commission

outlining various positions adopted by the CIA vis a

vis its investigative efforts and assistance to the

Commission.

CIA DOC. FOIA 695-302-A, 5/14/541)2

At Tab E of this brief it states:

Within the past week, significant infor-

mation has been developed by the CIA re-

garding the relationship with Oswald of

certain Cuban intelligence personnel in

Mexico City and the reaction in Havana

within the Cuban Intelligence Service

to the news of the assassination of

President Kennedy.

The Commission Staff

is in the course of being briefed on the 2 / 0

Cuban asspect.? (Ibid., Tab E)

On May 15, 1964, the day of McCone's interview,

the warren Commission received its first formal 5 211

communication regarding A-1. ICIA DOC FOIA 697-294,

5/15/64)

However, the Agency did not at that time

identify A-1 by his real name or cryptonym nor did

the Agency indicate that the source of this information

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was a defector then residing under secure conditions

in the Washington, D.C. area.

(Ibid:

The May 15

communication did

state that the Agency had

established contact "with a well-placed invidivual

who has been in close and prolonged contact with

ranking officers of the Cuban Direccion General de

Intelligencia."

(Ibia) 0z13

212

Attached to the May 15 communication was a

copy of Langosch's above referenced memorandum of

May 5, 1964 regarding knowledge of Oswald's pro-

bable contact with the DGI in Mexico City. The

attachment made no reference to the source's status

as a defector from the DGI. ((Ibid., attachment)

As set forth in the section of this report.

concerning Luisa Calderon, on June 18, 1964, Howard

Willens of the Warren Commission reviewed Langosch's

May 5 memo and the questions upon which the informa-

tion set forth in the memo was elicited. Neither the

questions nor the memo shown to willens made

reference to the source's status as a defector col-

laborating with the CIA.

CIA DOC FOIA 739-319,

6/19/ 64)

215

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nater

7. 1

extracted

•Based upon review of the Langosch memoranda,

the Committee has determined that significant

information regarding Luisa Calderon, specifically

of Nov. 22

>details of her

her conversation and association with Cuban Intelligence

notforwardes

were withhetd from the Warren Commission. This

information as described above, was derived from

However,

debriefings of A-1. from the Committee's review

of the A-l file provided by the CIA, the Committee

has not found any credible evidence indicating that

other information provided by A-1 to the CIA was

relevant to the work of the Warren Commission. However,

in its review the Committee has determined that a

as

specific document referenced in the A-1 file is

not present in that file.

The missing itemisof considerable concern to

the Committee.

It is a debriefing report of A-1-

entitled "The Oswald Case."

(CIA DOC Dispatch UPGW-

5035, 3/23/65)

On March 23, 1965, a CIA dispatch

records the transmittal of the report, along with

eleven other A-l debriefing reportse

(Ibia.))

7.17

Next to

the listing of the "Oswald Case" debriefing report

is the handwritten notation "SI." A CIA employee

2100

who has worked extensively with the

agency files

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system told a Committee staff member that this

notation was the symbol for the CIA component

known as Special Intelligence. Other CIA

representatives believed the notation was a

reference to the Counterintelligence component

CI/SIG. IN a CIA memorandum dated September 27,

1978, the CIA has adopted the position that

debriefing Report No. 40 is a duplication of

the original Langosch memorandum of May 5, 1964

concerning AMMUG's knowledge of Lee Harvey

Oswald's possible

To donnes at on at

osca memorandinin.

officers regarding additional information that A-1 may

have supplied about Oswald. Joseph Langosch, when

interviewed by the Committee, stated that he did not

have contact with the Warren Commission and does

not know what information derived from A-l's de-

218

briefings was supplied to the Warren Commission

(HSCA

Staff Interview of Joseph Langosch, 8/21/78; Cite also

Interviews of Hildago & Piceato!

He also stated that

he does not. recall that A-I provided any other information

Elassification: -

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*The CIA memorandum states in part as follows:

When CI Staff learned of AMMUG-1's defection

and considered the possibility that he

might have some knowledge of

the Oswald

case, CI Staff submitted a list of questions

to WH (Western Hemisphere) for debriefing

AMMUG-1...WH desk records reflect that

AMMUG-1 was debriefed on 4 May 64 regarding

this questionnaire.../B/ecause the debriefing

on the Oswald case

was handled as a sensitive

matter, it was dictated directly to a CI

(Counterintelligence) stenographer on

5 May 1964.

/Note:

A-1 was debriefed on

several subjects on 4 May 64. The procedure

was to assign each subject discussed a

debriefing number and they were written

up in contact report form by the WH case

officer.

The instructions from CI staff

were to handle the Oswald case debriefing

very closely and not to keep any copies in

WH Division/. The "Oswald Case" was

logged in the WH notebook log as debriefing

report number 40, but the report itself

was dictated by the WH Case Officer directly

to a CI staff stenographer. There would

be no reason to include the number 40 on

the report of this special debriefing for

CI staff, since it was their only debriefing

report.

We are certain it is the debriefing

report (#40) because the date is the same;

it is the only debriefing report on Oswald

listed in AMMUG-l records; and it it (sic)

the only AMMUG-1 debriefing report in

Oswald's 201 file.

Classified

(CIA DoC., Memorandum for the Record, Regarding

92-718

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20.003.

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FF8m ElA—EsntF8lled dacuments:)

-81-

on Oswald's contact with the DGI except for that

set forth in the Memoranda of May 5, 7, and 8

as discussed herein.

(Ibid.)

219

In a further effort to clarify the substance

of information that A-1 provided to the CIA

regarding Oswald, the Committee has attempted

to locate A-1

The CIA has

also attempted to

locate A-1, whose present relationship with

the Agency is ambiguous, but has been

unable

¿ste pil a for i)

to determine his present whereabouts/*

Thế CIA'S

inability to locäte A-1 has been a source of

concern to this /Committee, particularly in

light of his long association with the Agency.

rem renter formation A-1

may have supplied the CIA about'

Oswald. Hewever, with

the exception of the Calderon episode and on the

basis of the CIA's written reocrd, it appears that

the CIA provided the Warren Commission with all A-l

information of investigative significance.

A separate question remains, however. The

Agency, as noted earlier, did not reveal to the

Warren Commission that A-1 was present in the

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dk.

*An April 1978 CIA communication to the FBI regarding

A-1 states in pertinent part:

Since 1971 (A-1) has not been involved

in any CIA operation in Miami or elsewhere.

voseph Norris is the alias of a CIA

representative who periodically debriefs

(A-l) on personalities and methods of the

Rodriguez.

God: a 1016 209-20402 02 82 7 9 /0/23

However, a CIA handwritten index card concerning

the Agency status of A-l states:

Informed "Calvia" on 15 April 1977 that

(A-1)

is still an active contact, not

receiving any salary, but could be paid if

and when used in an operation. No problems

netave folder: kept contract en Note,

15 April 1977, contained in Vol. 4 of A-1 file.

201-749651)

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## Page 108

82

Classification: -

SEC

(This form is to be used for material extracted

WashingtorronDCt-aererpllerheo.cumadet controlled

conditions, accessible to the Commission. Giving

due consideration to the CIA's serious concern

for protecting its sources, the fact that A-l's

status was not disclosed prevented the Warren

Commission from exercising a possible option,

i.e. to take the sworn testimony of A-l as it

concerned Oswald and the Kennedy assassination.

On this issue, as the written record tends to

show, the Agency unilaterally rejected the possibility

of exercising this option.

In light of the establishment of A-l's

bona fides, •

, his

proven reliability and his depth of knowledge of

Cuban intelligence activities, this option might

well have been considered by the Warren Commission.

The AMLASH Operation (tole invergorated into criticism directed

During 1967, the CIA's Inspector General

issued

a report which examined CIA supported

assassination plots. Included in this report

was discussion of the CIA-Mafia plots and an

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Agency project referred to as the AMLASH

22€

operation (CIA Inspector General Report 1967

PP. 1-74, 78-112). The AMLASH operation involved

a high level Cuban official (assigned the CIA

cryptonym AMIASH/1) who, during 1962 while meeting

with a CIA representative expressed the desire to

-2221

assassinate Fidel Castro (Ibia., p. 84),

As a

result of AMLASH's expressed objective and the

CIA's

desire to find a viable political alternative

to the Castro regime, the Agency subsequently

provided AMLASH with both moral and material

22-

support designed to depose Fidel Castrol

(Ibid.,

pp. 80-94)

The AMLASH operation was terminated

by the CIA in 1965 as the result of security leaks.

(Ibia. pp. 104-106)

During 1265, AMLASH and his

conspirators were brought to trial in Cuba for plotting

against Castro. AMLASH was sentenced to death, but

at Castro's request the sentence was reduced to

227

twenty-five years imprisonment.

(Ibid. pp. 107-110)

In its examination of the AMLASH operation

the 1967 IGR concluded that the CIA had offered both

direct and indirect support for AMLASH's plotting (Ibíd.

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- 84.

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The most striking example of the CIA's direct

offer of support to AMLASH reported by the

1967 IGR states

"it is likely that at the very

moment President Kennedy was shot a CIA officer

was meeting with a Cuban agent in Paris and giving

him an

assassination device for use against CASTRO."

(Ibia 227

The 1967 IGR offered no firm evidence confirming

or refuting Castro's knowledge of the AMLASH operation

prior to the assassination of President Kennedy. The

1967 IGR did note that in 1965 when ANIASH was

trted intravana, press reports of Cuban knowledge.

Of AMLASH's association with the CIA weredated from

November 1964, approximately one year after President

Kennedy's assassination

(Ibid. p. 1T1).

527-18

The Church Committee in Book V of its Final

Report examined the AMIASH operation in great detail.

(ssc, Book: V, PP. 2-7, 67-19)

• The Church Committee

concluded:

The AMLASH plot was more relevant to the

warren Commision work than the early CIA

assassination plots with the underworld.

Unilke those earlier plots, the AMLASH

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operation was in progress at the time

of the assassination; unlike the earlier

plots, the AMLASH operation could

clearly be traced to the CIA; and

unlike the earlier plots, the CIA had

endorsed AMLASH's proposal for a coup,

the first step to him being Castro's

assassination, despite Castro's threat

to retaliate for such plotting. No one

directly involved in either investigation

(i.e. the CIA and the FBI) was told of

the AMLASH operation. No one investi-

gated a connection between the AMLASH

operation and President Kennedy's

assassination. Although Oswald had been

in contact with pro-Castro and anti-

Castro groups for many months before the

assassination, the CIA did not conduct

a thorough investigation of questions

of Cuban government or Cuban exile

involvement in the assassination.

(Ibid. p.

5)

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86

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In 1977, the CIA issued a second Inspector

General's Report concerning the subject of CIA

sponsored assassination plots. This Report, in

large part, was intended as a rebuttal of the

Church Committee's findings. The 1977 IGR states:

The Report (of the Church Committee)

assigns it (the AMLASH operation)

characteristics

that it did not have

during the period preceding the assassina-

tion of JFK in order to support the SSC

view that it should have been reported

to the Warren Commission!

11977 IGR p.

2)

The 1977 IGR concluded that prior to the

assassination of President Kennedy, the AMLASH

operation was

not

an assassination plot.

Nevertheless, the 1977 IGR did state:

It would have served to reinforce the

crealbilty of (the warrer Commission)

its efforts had it taken a broader view

The CIA, too, could

lave considered in specific term

what most then saw in general terms-

the possibility of Soviet or eubai

involvement in the assassination

because of the tensions of the time.

It is not enough to be able to point

0+

234

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to erroneous, criticisms. made today.

ine Agency should have taken broade:

Initiatives then as well? That

CIA employees at the time felt-as

they obviously did--thất the activities

about which they knew/had no relevance

to the Warren Commission inquiry does

not take the place of a record of

conscious review. (Ibid. p. 17)

Richard Helms, as the highest level CIA

employee in contact with the Warren Commission on

a regular basis, testified to the Rockefeller

Commission that he did not believe the AMLASH

delete

23%

operation was relevant to the investigation of

President Kennedy's death. \ (Rockefeller Commission,

Testimony of Richard Helms, 4/24/75 pp. 389-391,392)

In addition, Mr. Helms testified before this

Committee that the AMLASH operation was not designed

233

to be an assassination plot lExec. Sess. Test. of

Richard Helms, 8/9/78, pP. 26-27).

A contrasting view to the testimony of Mr.

Helms was offered by Joseph Langosch who in 1963

was the Chief of Counterintelligence for the CIA's Special>

The

Special Affairs Staff was the CIA component

responsible for CIA operations directed against

the Government of Cuba and the Cuban Intelligence

Services (HSCA Class. Affidavit of Joseph Langosch,

Affai

Staf

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-88-

234

Sept. 14, 1978, R. l) The Special Affairs Staff

was headed by Desmond FitzGerald and was responsible

for the AMLASH operation (SSC, Book V, pp. 3, 8, 79)

Langosch, as the Chief of Counterintelligence

for the Special Affairs Staff, was responsible for

safeguarding SAS against penetration by foreign

intelligence services, particularly the Cuban

Intelligence Services

(HSCA Classified Affidavit

of Joseph Langosch, 9/14/78, p. 3). It was

Langosch's recollection that:

... the AMLASH operation prior to the

assassination of President Kennedy was

characterized by the Special Affairs

staff, Desmond Fitzgerald (sic) and other

senior CIA officers as an assassination

operation initiated and sponsored by the

CIA.

(Ibia., P.

4-2

Langosch further recollected that as of 1962

it was highly possible that the Cuban Intelligence

Services were aware of AMLASH and his association

with the CIA and that the information upon which

he based his conclusion that the AMLASH

operation was insecure was available to

Senter sevens

1882p 880-

officials, including Desmond FitzGerald.

(Ibid., P.

4)

However, the issue before this Committee is

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extracted

-88a-

*In response to Langosch's sworn statements, this

Committee has received from the CIA an affidavit

executed by Kent I. Pollock (CIA pseudonym) who "served

as Executive Officer for Desmond FitzGerald during the

entire period in which he was Chief of the Special Affairs

stall... and aiscussed at him the AMlASH operation as it

1978, p. 1) Mr. Pollock specifically

contested Langosch's assertion that the AMLASH operation

was characterized by the Special Affairs Staff, Desmond

FitzGerald, and other senior level CIA officials as an

assassination operation.

In pertinent part, Pollock

drew the following conclusions:

To the best of my knowledge, Mr. FitzGerald

considered

the AMLASH operation to be a political

action activity with the objective of organizing

a group within Cuba to overthrow Castro and the

Castro regime by means of a coup d'etat.

I heard

Mr. FitzGerald discuss the AMLASH operation

freguently, and never heard him characterize it as

an "assassiantion operation." Mr. FitzGerald

stated within my hearing on several occasions

his awareness that coup d'etat often involves

loss of life. (Ibid., par. 3, p. 2)

He also stated:

Desmond FitzGerald did not characterize the AMLASH

operation as an

"assassigntion operation"; the

case officer did not; I, as Executive Officer, never

discussed any aspect of the AMLASH operation with

Joseph H. Langosch; the Deputy Chief, the other

branch chiefs and

the special assistants could not

have so characterized it since they did not know

about the pen (the pen was specially fitted with a

hypodermic syringe in response to urgings by AMLASh

for a means to start the coup by killing Castro.)

The case officer offered the pen to AMLASH on the day

of President Kennedy's death.

AMLASH rejected the

pen with disdain. /Ibid., par. 4, p. 2/), (Ibia.,

par. 6, p. 31

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not simply WhetHer the aleast operation

extracte

from ClA-controlled documents.)

was an

assassination plot prior to President Kennedy's

death. The broader and more significant issue,

as the 1977 IGR has identified it, is whether

the AMLASH operation was of sufficient relevancy

to have been reported to the Warren Commission.

In the case of the AMLASH operation this

determination is a most difficult matter to

resolve. Reasonable men may differ in their

characterization of the Agency's operational

objectives.

Based upon the presently available evidence

it is the Committee's position that such informa-

tion, if made available to the Warren Commission,

might have stimulated the Commission's investiga-

tive

corcern for possible Cuban involvement or

complicity in the assassination. As J. Lee Rankin

commented before this Committee:

...when I read... the Church Committee's

report--it was

an ideal situation for

them to just pick out any way they

wanted to tell the story and fit it

in with the facts that had to be met

and then either blame the rest of it

on somebody else or not tell any more

or polish

it off. I don't think that

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could have happened back in 1964.

I think there would have been a

much better chance of getting to

the heart of it.

It might have

only revealed that we are involved

in it and who approved it and all

23%

that.

But I think that would

have-at-least come.out. /(HSCA Class.

Depo. of J. Lee Rankin, 8/17/78, p.91)

The Committee is in agreement with Mr. Rankin

that had the AMLASH operation been disclosed to

the Warren Commission, the Commission might have

been able to foreclose the speculation and conjecture

that has surrounded the AMLASH operation during

the past decade. As history now records, the AMLASH

operation remains a footnote to the turbulent

relations between Castro's Cuba and the United States.

Clasificion: 338/T.

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Cover Sheet

the

The attached package of paper is the property of

House Select-Committee on Assassinations,

and is

on 100n to CiA under an agreement whereby CIA is not

to reproduce of copy the diaft or any portion thereof.

and

Notes may be taken on materials in this package,

and

rough notes may be prepared as a basis for informal

oral exchanges with HSCA representatives.

These

notes, however,

are to be held as though controlled and

are to be destroyed under agreed conditions with HSCA.

They are not to

De copied

or excerpted and are to be

held

until further instructions are reccived 1oi

• eventual disposal.

and

papers have been numbered for accountability

receipted accordingly. They are to be handled on

an secure

Ja need-to-I

though constituting sensitive papers

now basis.

REPRODUCTION

I iN

Copy 2505_42

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