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2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS, ACT OF 1992/05-

:,'ineral Carter:

Here is your writer

Tressage:

& have

taken

no acrous.

Wilder

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SECRET

30 October 1962

URGENT

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Marshall S. Carter

At the Executive Committee meeting this morning, the President

directed as follows:

1. CIA do everything possible to insure no refugee or

emigre provocative actions against Cuba are undertaken with of

without our knowledge during the next several days. The Miami

station and the MONGOOSE Task Force should be alerted to exercize

every precaution to see that no unauthorized attempts are made.

This should be done without discussion or disclosure to the refugee groups.

2. CIA should attempt to estop Alpha 66 actions during the

next several days. The President was informed by DCI we have no

contact with or control over Alpha 66. DCI was instructed to attempt

through every resource available to influence Alpha 66 to stand down

operations during the next several days.

3. The activities of Operation MONGOOSE are to be stopped

during the next several days and therefore all prior approvals for

sabotage, infiltrations, guerrilla activities, caching of arms are to be

temporarily suspended. The direction of Operation MONGOOSE will be

reconsidered after current negotiations are completed.

NOTE: After the meeting McCone, Bundy and the AG

discussed the approved plan of sabotaging Cuban ships

or shipping (Item 2-B of Lansdale's memorandum of 10/26)

and it was the opinion of Bundy, DCI and the AG that these

operations should be suspended for the next several days.

NOTE: General Lansdale was informed by DCI by grey

phone of 1, 2 and 3 above - 10/30 at 11:00 A.M.

4. The President requested that all the principals who are

attending Executive Committee meetings and those in the Departments

who were in intimate contact with the Committee's procedures and

decisions not contact anyone of the Press for the next several days.

Press contacts are to be made by Salinger and Sylvester and a

representative of State. Any necessary Press contacts by ClA, and

these must be kept at a very minimum, perhaps should be made by Col. Grogan.

(This was not mentioned in the Executive Committee meeting.)

SECRET

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SECRET

30 Octoñar 1962

URGENT

MEMORANDUM EOR: Ganeral Marshall S. Carter

At the Ixecutive Committee meetiag this morning, the President

directod as followe:

1. CIA do everything possible to inoure no refugee ar

amigre provocativa actions agalant Cuba are undertaken with o

withost out knowlodge during the next several days. The Miam!

station and the MONGOOSE Task FOXCO should be alestod to exercise

overy precaution to see that no unauthortend attempts are made.

The shonld be done without dlecuaalon or dincloruse to the refugee groups.

2. (LA shoald atterapt to estop Alpha 66 actions daring the

nost several days. The President was informed by DCI we have no

contact with os contral over Alpha 66. DCI Mas iantructed to atterapt

throsgh every resource avallable to influence Alpha d6 80 stand down

operatione during the next soveral days.

3, The activities of Operation MONGOOSE ate to be eropped

durlag the saxs semeral days and therelore all pilos approvals for

sabotage, Infiltrations, guerrilla settritles, caching al arms are to be

temporarily suspended. The Alrectlon of Operation MONGOOSE Will be

reconsidered siter cattent negotiations axe completed.

NOTE. After the mosting MeCons, Bundy and the AG

discussod the approved plan of ssbotaging Caban ships

os abipplas (Item Z-B ol Latnadaled nemorandura ef 10/26)

and 1l was the opinion of Bundy, DCI and the AG that these

operations should be suspended for the nest several days.

NOTE: Ganeral Lanadale was inforraed by DEI by grey

piano of 1. 2 and 3 above - 10/30 as 11:00 A.M.

1o The Prestient sequested that all the principala who are

attending Iscocatito Commlttee meetlage and thare in the Departments

who were in lattmate contret with the Corsmittes's procadases and

decisions not contact anyone ol the Press fos the nast several daya.

ProBE contacts are to be made by saltager and sylvestar and a

representative of State. Any necesary Presa contgera by ClA, and

these must be kept at a very mintmam, perkaps should be made by Col. Grogas.

(This was not mentioned la the Exacutive Committee meeting.).

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SECRET

The above has been communicated to you by telephone. Thie

memorandum serves to conlirm deciatons ubich require losplementa-

thore by your.

JOHN A. NECONE

Director

...

JAM/ mEb

Orig & 3cc to addressee

Ice - DCI chrono

Ice

DCI #5 file

2

380 *

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SECRET

The above has been communicated to you by telephone. This

memorandum serves to confirm decisions which require implementa-

tion by you.

Director

- 2.

SECRET

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SEGRET-EVES ONLY

November 14, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Carter, DDCI

Attached le a copy of a memorandum for my file outlining

polley decision in connection with the Cuban prisoner transaction.

In your absence this memorandum was discussed with Mesara.

Helms, Houston, Miskovaly and McManue, and upon receiving

final approval from higher authority at 1:45, MI. Houston was

inatructed by me to initiate appropriate actiona.

It is exceedingly important that great care be exercised

to minimize the publicity and to emphasise humanitarian interest

on the part of the United States Government in securing the release

of the prisoners. Both the President and the Attorney General are

anxious that the explanations giventhe Cuban Families Committee

be handled with great care. I agree with this and urge that extreme

caution be taken to avold attribution or CLA implication in this matter.

SIGNED:

John A. McCone

Director

Attachment

JAM:at

1 cc - DCI Chrono

VAcc - DCI Memoranda

1 cc - Memo for the Record

SEOLA-LIZO ONLY

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1119

3

14 November 1962

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

CONCERNING THE NEGOTIATION FOR THE RELEASE OF THE CUBAN

PRISONERS.

The meeting took place at the residence of the Attorney

General at 10:30 a.m., on Thuraday, November 14, at the DCI'S

request.

McCone explained that ha had had dinner the evening before

with Mr. Edward Foley (former Under Secretary of the Ireasury,

logal representative and a DIrector Of the Drug Industry Assoclation).

MT. Foloy had questioned DCI concerning the negollations

10x release ol Cubas prisoners in exchango for some 50 million

dollars in drugs, and statod that MI. Danovan had been in touch with

mombers of the industry (presumably Pfizer and Merck) in the past

few days, that indleations were that the transactlon was to be worked

out promptly, and the subject would undoubtedly be discussed at

longth at the Industry'a Board of Irustees meeting in New York on

November 16th.

Mr. Foley stated that the Industry had no clear understanding

of the Groverament's positios, most particularly in viow of Cuban

developments of the last three weeks.

Alter explaining to Foloy the background of the transaction

I tald him that MI. Donovan had been told to do absolutely nothing

in this matter and expressed great surpride that the subject was a

copie of current discussion among members of the Industry.

in the menting with the Attornay General l eXDIeSsed graVe

concern over the altuation, pointing out that CLA hao 20 million!

dollars on covert deposit in the Bank/of Canadaland that two Letter's

of Credit had been issued by the Ball, one in the amount offlo millio.

dollare to Priser, and one for jeventmillion dollars to Matck.7) A

long as this money was on deposit and the letters outstanding, there

was a danger of publicity emanating from elther Donovan or the drug

industry; or both. Despite the fact that no official government

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SECRET-EYES OMLY

connection had over been admitted, publicity would implicate the

Administration and CIA in the negotiation because ol recent press

storios (most particularly the Herald Iribune articles) identifying

Administration and ClA activities and citing the exact amount of

17 million dollars as representing the Government cost of the drugs.

I pointed out that certain elements of competition between the members

of the drug industry made it almost a certainty that "leake" would

come from industry sources as long ae the letter of credit were

outstanding, regardless of MT. Donovan's denials.

Furthermoto, consunmation of the transaction seemed

totally unzealistic in vlow of current difficulties with Castro and 11

an article appeared indicating we mere still purauing this transaction.

the Amerleas publie and a great many others would ba conlused and

disenchantad.

'or the above reasons, and fooling that damaging publicity

undoubtedly would appeas. I strongly recommended that we arrange

for the bank to withdraw the Letters of Gredit, and for the withdrawal

of a subntantial part of the money from the Banklot Canadal Also

advise Mi. Donovan that the pursult of this affort must await a better

elimate although our Interest remained constant. I urged that

action be commenced today.

The Attorney General, alter some discussion involving an

exploration os possible alternatives, agreed with the course of

action.

We agroed that me should carefully explaia to the Families

Committee and possibly to Miro Cardona that we were ln no way

abandoning our intention to secure the relosso al the prisoners but

were forcad becaune of eircumstances beyond our control to ser the

negotiation aside ponding further dovelopments on other important

problems involving our Cuban xelationship.

McCons discused the above with Mr. Bundy who personally

approved the action and, in turn, received approval from bigher

authority. The latter was communicated to the DCI by telophone

at 1145 p.m.

Copy to General Carter w/

covering memo

JOHN A. McCONE

Director

JUNELLO

/EMC

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TOP SECRET

November 6, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Cline, DD (I)

SUBJECT: Castro as a Threat to the Americas.

I think that in analyzing Castro's potential in the Western

Hemisphere as covered by paragraphs 9 through and including 21,

we should consider his posture and potential under various alternatives

of possible United States decisions and probable Soviet policies.

Let us assume for the moment that the United States meets

the exact letter of the Kennedy-Khrushchev exchange and no more.

This would mean the withdrawal of IL 28s, the halting of the establish-

ment of

a submarine base, and some acceptable form of inspection

verifying the removal and assuring against the reintroduction of

offensive devices, U.S. commits not to invade. At this point U.S.

commitment on propaganda, sabotage, guerrilla activities and other

actions designed to overthrow Castro is not very clear, but I think

that we can

i assume that such activities if attempted would be no

more successful in the future than they have been in the past, which is

about zero.

TOP SE

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TOP SECRET

Having reached this point, the Soviets have at least three

alternatives:

One, they can abandon Castro, reduce military and economic

aid, cut their losses, and in such event Castro would soon collapse.

Current intelligence does not support such a probable Soviet course

of action, otherwise they would not be disposed to leave such quantities

of extremely valuable modern military hardware, including the SAM

sites, communications equipment, and extensive Naval and ground

equipment and a large number of technicians.

Second, they could maintain about the same level of economic

and military support as in the past, although I would feel this could not

be a very reasonable assumption from the standpoint of military support

as the presence of large amounts of additional military equipment, in-

cluding those mentioned above, would necessitate a higher level of

military

support than before in order to provide operational readiness,

training, maintenance, spare parts, replacements, etc. This does not

mean more economic supportalthough I think Castro could insist upon

it on the grounds that Soviet equipment is a burden to him and of course

Dorticos alluded to this in statements in New York.

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0P SOMET

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TOP SECRET

Third, the Soviets having accomplished one of their objectives,

that of securing a U.S. guarantee against invasion, will increase their

military and economic aid so that all military materiel will be work-

able at all times and the Castro economy will be reasonably well off.

Under each of these alternatives, Castro's posture and his

effect on the United States and other Western Hemisphere countries

will differ vastly and I would suggest that your paper be oriented so

that it will project for the benefit of policy makers the consequences,

favorable or unfavorable, under these several alternatives.

It is my personal opinion that Mikoyan will return to New York

in a few days and will announce an agreement for some perfunctory

Red Cross ground inspection of the missile sites and nothing else,

will deny any intention of a submarine base, will dismiss the IL, 28

issue as wholly beyond the Khrushchev-Kennedy agreement, will

indicate that all Soviets are leaving Cuba except economic and

agricultural advisers, and will state most persuasively that the

Khrushchev-Kennedy agreement has been fulfilled to the letter and

demand our non-invasion commitment.

He will then build Castro up and indicate Soviet intention for

supporting in every way and to go right down the line with him.

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TOP SOMET

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Castro will feel secure, his political and military structure will be

manageable, and Cuba will be used by Castro and the Soviets more

aggressively in the future than it has in the past in disturbing

Western Hemisphere countries.

This is the situation I fear, and I think our policy makers

whose negotiations are trending toward the establishment of a set

of conditions and commitments which will make the third case

mentioned above a probability, should have the benefit of our

thinking

as to the consequences. In doing this, equal attention

should be given to the first two alternatives.

In further reference to the paper, the historical background

is excellent, the country by country annex useful, although if time

permitted we might get the chiefs of station to give the current view

of their contacts as Win Scott did. The inventory of equipment is

useful but I propose that it be broken down into three columns, a

pre-July Ist, 1962,

added since July 1962, and the total as of now.

John A. McCone

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26 Sapteraber 1963

MEMORANDUA

SUBJECT: ClA sctivitios in South Viet Naza

1. PriOr tO JaNuAry 1962 the ClA maintainod a modest station

Is South Vlor Nars, the purpose ol walch was to suppart the Ambaesador

and Headgustters with roports on the incornal situation in South Viar

Ness, the activities al the Viet Cong and the Consentalate and their

throat to the goverament, and to sealet the foverant la to satorael

socurity probloma. Among other things me trained and equipped

Spocial l'arces mose miaston mas to conduct a variety of unconventional

setivitlas such as the infiltration of V. C. cantero, Interdietion of

supply reuros, interfaring with V.C. cormunications, sabotaging

V.G. ailerta, hatrass.

retito ete.

The ClA station erasted about a dosen training contess

tbroughoi, serth Vlot Mam in walch solactod nearby villagers would

bo trained in community dolence and elvie action. It lasted arora and

thes provided the seteal defense el the strategie bamleta created

lo the arena: Those activities maso caxeled on with tha support of

the U.S, Special F'07000, Al the activition expanded, a deterrainatton

mae sade to ahlit prize responstbility to the mallitary, vita CLA

la support, and the awlich has boen accomplished eucceadfully.

About 75, 000 south Viet Narass have been trained.

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SEGRET

ClA creatod a South Vlel Namese intelligence organization.

establlched a civilian intelligence ayatera and tratred the parronsel.

In adlition the Agoncy anolsted in the dovelopment of intelligence

apparatus within the SVN military.

In addition a vertoty al activitios pere supported designed to

asador the basle objactivo of minatas the was.

Without exception all CIA prograras ta South Viet Nau were

coordinatod with the Ambasaador and also la Washington, CLA took

no unliateral actions nor lavolved inall in designing palley. CLA bao

boon reprasanted at all policy mestings in Washlagton, Including NSC

and Exocutivo Committas mootings and all ol the McNamara-Pearl:

Harbor mpatings hold lo revton prograss. The activities of the

atation were examined by all inspocion teama such so General

Whoelet's miaston, General Kralak's several salastons.

Mt. F'orrestal'a miasiona, etc. At no flose prior to recent durge

al critical publietty beto ClA'a retivities in Salgon been reported

other than cooperative and an Integral part of as accepted and agreed

palley.

2o ClA BopOrEta

In June 1962 I traveled extenaively la South Viet Nam.

I reported upon say retura that repressive massures of the Dies/Nbu

reglose moro causing considerable critletana and that there was

-2-

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0N

danger of a coup. This situation was watched carefully by out CIA

atation and at frequent intervala ve reported that the trago of the

rogims was taralahing and hence lis ellectiveness was questionable.

A suraber of estimates and a great number of reporta and appradeals

mere lasted, asch one warnlag that the deterioration of the regima's

popularity gave tias to serious question concerning the future trend

of tho was and ClA marnod that untoas corrective useasuras vase

saken by the regime to improve 118 imago, it tas quite possible

the was moald ho last or that a popular uprtaing would cause the

resoval of the regime. F or 18 months at frequent intervais rumors

of coups mere recalved by ous atation and mere reported to the

Ambassador and to Washington, Throughout this perlod out Chiet

of Station at the direction of the Ambassador met once every tro

reeks with Ngo Dina Nhs, explored all problema relating to the

altuations in which te had a common interest, and reported to the

Ambsasador. Contacta were also maintalaed with many grespa la

South Viat Nars, with military leaders and with knowledgeable

citizens.

A review of the reparting over 18 monthe and resulting

estimates bear out that the Agency constatently warned of the

deteriorating situation and the possible consequences.

-3 .

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Durtag this period me ales analyzed the progress of the

war and the thrust al out reporting was to the elloct that ss the

AssaTiCan adVIGera mero able lo anexelee their intluanco on the

Seath Vlot Namese milltary, and our Embanay and General Harkiza

mere able to pernande Dieta to rearlent and redeploy his fosCOs.

gradual but conslatent favorable prOgress was made.

3. Alettado of the Station end Othere

In any difficult situation involvias guerrilla varlazo uhere

progross can not be measured in tessitary mor as lost, and in

canaalttos and prisoners, dillerances of apinton srang abservera

artoo, Libawlas Americans roguired to work mita a stubbora

and asthoritartan sagime elton bacorse exasperated by the

ditlicultles Involved. F'urtharIaaro AmerICAMacEustaTed tO DUT

civil llberties, freedoms, and the rights of the individual ase

shocked by the conduct of a government which depriver the ladiutdenl

al these privtlaged. Finally an American community living among

natives, many el whom nas viatonaly crlileal of the goverament load

ebto la the case in Saigos and fine), sto boand to be intluenced.

by, and to a degree espouse, those crittelame.

For these razadna thore bave boon serlous differencos Within

the Amertens commatally.

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711..

Within the ClA station there are differences of optios.

Soma foal the cauca la hopaloas with the Diera regirze in power.

Othors feel it beat to go along with the regime until a better one

appearo. The reportiag bas been, however, conaletent and bas

colncidod with the views al Ambassador Nolting.

Within AID and USIA there have been strong differences

of opinion and the samo la true of tha Erabassy stall. On the

other hand, the milltary which la devoted to the alngle taels of

defsating the Viet Cong, had turnad its back on political problems

and concantiated on military problams and bave been steadiast

in rafusing to be deterred by internal poliiical lasses.

Many people have become highly erotional, have talked

too much and have given the impression of very deop splits.

ec- w. Elder.

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SECRET

Situation in the last several weeks.

The Hus Ineldent on May 8th was a sartous setback for the

Liam Governman. The agreement with the Budahlats on June loth was

designed to traprove the sitzation. The agrasment as never carried

out, Increaslag agitation by the Buddhists culminatod in the raldo on the

pagodas on Auguet 21. Thie was carried out apparently at the direction

al Nha by the Speedal FOSCOS, some of mhot are do 'he Salgos - Hye

ars and by the mtlitary, In thia connection ll la to be sotod that nolther

MACV xor (LA maintalaad absaluta control ovor the deployment of the

Spacial Foxcon and it la to be noted that substandal unita al them mere

deployed to the north and engagod is thals rogular assigamento.

The actlos on August 21 broke the camal'a back as far as thase

In the United States Goverument who felt that the cause would bo lost il

the Diam regime remained Therajore, a cable was sent to the Ambassador

Instructiog him to inalot on effective reforme including reduelng the influenco

and authority of the Nhus and il this could not bo accomplished by persuation

to take such action as would accompliah this obloctive even though it meant

ramoviag the regisaa.

The fault in thie instruction was that there extoted at the time no

fixin estimate as to the possibility al succosafully rolorming the regime.

and so plan for a succaasor regime.

At this point (TA was asked by the Ambassador and Gezeral

Harkins to query cortals military leaders and to determine whother the

CEORET

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SECRET

resentment had createds body of opinion among the military, the security

Forces and the public that would carry off a coup and establial s new

goverament, El reported tale conditios did not extet. Duriag the week ol

Augant 26 and without takiag a position as to wherhor the roginse abould or

should not ba removed, the Agency xged cars and deliberation, It pointed

out that to set precipitoualy and without asturance ol succusa a clvil war

would inovitably result, the war agalast the Vlat Cong would ba last and

the Communlato would take over.

This position was highly exasperating to thoss who wished to

move procipitonaly. It la los this reason that the advocates al setton to

move procipitoualy without coozdination and without Intelligence support

are now cArtylAy on a campaiga agalast the Central Intelligence Agancy

and tha Station.

ee proze o

• 7=

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2 September 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Carter

You will note from the very brief memorandum of my.

discussion with Secretary Rusk that he made two requests --

the first, a study of the reasons for lack of action of the

Communists in Southeast Asia. This is a matter I discussed

at this morning's meeting and I hope that we can have an OCI

memorandum on my return.

The second question was concerning clandestine channels

to Castro, the Chinese Communists and Hanoi. This should be

given serious thought by DDP. Each situation differs. I am sure

we could; if we desired, open up a channel to Castro. The

Peiping and Hanoi situations are more difficult. In one respect

representative on the ICC; however this obviously is an "official"

channel and is not very productive. I think it would be well to

go over this matter with Dick Helms when he returns.

Secretary Rusk expects comments on both these points

next week.

tout

A. McCONE

irector

Attached:

Copy of MR on Discussion with Secretary Rusk

#5 file

zipc

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