Agency: SSCIA
Originator: SSCIA
From: HELMS, RICHARD
Document date: 06/13/1975
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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157-10014-10075

Date

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08/05/95

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION

FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY :

SSCIA

RECORD NUNBER

: 157-10014-10075

RECORDS SERIES

: HEARINGS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

: 10-H--07

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA

FROM

HELMS, RICHARD

TO

TITLE

DATE

PAGES

:

SUBJECTS

06/13/75

191

ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES

CIA

OPERATION MONGOOSE

DOCUMENT TYPE :

TRANSCRIPT

CLASSIFICATION

UNCLASSIFIED

RESTRICTIONS

1B

CORRENT STATUS

RELEASED

DATE OF LAST REVIEW

07/21/98

OPENING CRITERIA

COMMENTS

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WITH DELETIONS

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Uhr Anited Staten Britate

Helms

Report of P'rooeedinge

R297

INVENTORIEE

• 3lU.

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Hearing held belore

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental

Operations With Repeat to Intelligenoe Motivities

7"8

Folday, June 13, 1973

Washington, D.C.

(Stenosype Tape and Waste turned over

the Committec for destruction)

WARD & PAUL

410 FIRST STREET. 8. E.

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20008

(202) 644-0000

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SIMIENTE

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TESTIMONY OF

Mr. Richard Helme

AFTERNOON SESSION - p. 93

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Mr. Richard Helms - Resumed

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EXECUTIVE SESSION

Friday, June 13, 1975

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United States Senate.

•Select Committee to Study Govermental

Operations with Respect to

Intelligence Activities

Washington. D. C.

The Committes met, pursuant to notice, at 10112 o'clock

a.I., In RoOm S-407, The Capitol, Senator Frank Church

(Chatman), presiding.

Prasant: Senators Church (presiding), Morgan, "last of

Colorado, Baker, Goldwater, Mathias and Schwalker.

Also present: W11llam Miller, Stall Director:

Frodorick A. O. Schwarz, JI., Chiat Counsal, Curtis R. Smothers.

Minority Counsel; and Charles Kirhow, Willlam Bader, Michael :.

Madigan and David Maron, Professional Staff Manhars.

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PROCERDINGS

Tha Chairman. I am going to ask Fritz Schwars le he would

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give us a short rundown on what it 1a we intand to focus on

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in the questionina today, what we expect to cover, what ne hone

to get, and anything, I suppose, Mr. Smothers, that you would

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11ke to add, just to give us a sense of direction in connection

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with the proceedings this morning.

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Mr.. Schwarz. MI. Helms was Dissell'a Deputy during the

parlod that the Bay of Plas was planned. lie apparently was

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kapt pretty, much out of that, that is both consistent with what

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show.

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he sald yesterday and with what the wiltter sacord appeara to

He took over as Daputy Director of Plans ln the Winter u

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1962 and remalued in that position essentially until he bocine

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the haad of the Agency in 1956.

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The flrst thing that I think that we should cover with

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him is to go through his porspoctiva on what was happaning

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with respact to cuba generally without getting to the assassir.

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tos: question. On that ho's noing to say, I ballove, baser o:

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intorviswing him yesterday and what ho sald to the Borkelll as

Cunnission, that there was contiauind late:so progsure in du

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sonathiny about castro or gut rid of Castro or overchrow the

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Communist government in Cuba.

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: think ha will say that in that cornaction, in difect.

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anythand gogg.

Or, as Sanator coldwater put the quostion the

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other day, there ware not any limitations. But 1t's going to

bu worth a little bit exploring with him and understanding wha:

he means. Does ho mean that the CIA could have dropped bombs.

could have blown up ships in the harbor? What dous he mean bu

anything goss and what does he mean by there wara no limita

tions?

When we come to the subject of assaunination. ! think.

you will see his tastimony kind of bounce hack and forth. Or.

the one hand, he la going to be saying, well, anything goes.

and that in something. On the other hand. he's goinn to be

saying, I think, well there raally wasn't anything sole du the

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He will admit that ho linow about :15, Hosella, he will

admit, I ballove, that he, indeed he and his man llarvey toor.

Over Hoselll.

But 1 bullove you'll find the tastimony, baßesi

On what he said to the Rockataller Commission and what he said

yesterday, quite vague on that subject.

He will turn on that sublect bafore too long to the lor

memo which is the most complete description of the averts in

consoction with Castro, He had that prepared becaurs Preside

Johnson asked him to brlof President Johnson on the alleratic..

aluut castro that wore arpeariny lu the Press. Then

Johnsos

vi him owi added Trujillo and Diem.

sanator Baker. Is this the Draw Pearson

articlo?

i. Schwarz. Yas, which President Johnson Had been

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personally told about and had been told additional detall

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I chink he will say the memo ia accurate. He will discuss

what he did after the mano was written telling paople to destroy

cartain documents relating to the mano. No will have to take

him through the parts of the mano which say he decided or ha

agreed with llarvey's decision not to brief McCone. But that is

stated on thra occasiona in the memo. I think he will tortily

either he remanbers no such thing. That lo what he sald

yesterday and what he said to the Rockefeller Commission.

Mormover, I think he's golns to disagree with secon's

testimony about iccone'n attitude toward aisassination, and

at loast say that he naver huard scrone express aly doubte d'ou

assassination, A, and 1i, that 1f McCone hur! such doubts he woul,!

have heard them.

Sanator Baker.. What's he going to Bay, Foltz - wall. !

thought you were finished. no ahead.

MI. Schwarz. Anothor thing on Castro. On the general

subject of disclosures to President, l hals a hook on mall

opening which we should ot get into the dotalls of but 1r

relevant in this sanse, in the so-called Huston llan which n=

and J. Edgar Hoover, Gaylor and Bammatt, General Bonnett.

signed there was a flat statoment, and this was In dund into,

that mail ovening has bosh discontinued that was adaned by hi

and submitted to PInaldant Mixon. In fact, tho mail operira

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project lasted into 1973 In New YorX and was just starting on

his authority in San Francisco at the very time he was wilting

President Nixon saying it had been discontinued.

That is worth having him explain.

The Chalrman. llas he explained that to you previously?

Mr. Schwarz. He didn't, because we didn't have this in

mind until afterwards. That is essantially lt on the Castro.

The Chalrman. What did he say on the queation of

Pronidential authority In assassination?

Mr. Schwarz. Wall he puts it in this senne, Senator.

Anything goos, and we know the president wentail the rovernmar

overthrown.

The Chairman. Nothing more spackfic?

115. Millar. I disagroo. If I might, 1 think this mish:

halp, Fritzi

Yasturday In the discussion we follower the theme that was

ralsod by Bissell without stating whare - In fact, we did

expross the rotior of plausible danial.

1r. Schwarz. Yes; we should discuss that with him, wher

dous it inusu and so forth.

Mo. siller. And we cant baldly out with the questior.

could this have happened without the President's approval. di

I think, it 1s my impression arr there may be othor aradings

on this, bocause he was vary careful in his answer, was he fid

not think so. Tho President and the Attorney renoral were awai

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of these things and the prussure of the times - this la where

he la vary good - he talks about the intense destro to do

something about cuba, 90 miles off the coat and so on, that

thare was pressure, very intoise pressaro dilla i 10÷ca..

to mount oparations and get things done.

Senator Goldwater. Hould you yield at that point?

MI. Miller. Yes, sir.

Senator Goldwater, I think 1t will bo very helpful to

this Conmitten 1f we could, In some way, have Me. Helns axplals.

the philosophy that is wrapped up in the President knowing or

not knowins. This lan't confined to this Committee, 1h19 19

International and I think chay have to protect the presidert.

And when Uissell sald in affect, yes, l would 1le, : would do

it to.

115. Miller. lle got into that question yesterday.

Sanator Goldwater. If wa could develop that philosophy.

bacause I don't think enough of the staff or enough of the

manbars have aver boon

exposed to that kind of thirkina. In

othor words, is it batter to have one man assassirated or ha'a

to go to war and all of us qut back into the business of killi

chousands.

Mr. Schwar?.

He cortainly says that there vas Intenso

pressure and lo explicitly sald that thore were no limitations

expraayer with rogard to cha: praugura. On the spacitic o!

assassinations, no gold that may have boon discussed do an

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option but he la vory luesy when you get down to was it

actually discussed.

Mr. Smothers. What in very halpful, l think, and we spent

nome time with him yesterday, on simply going through his

Impressions of how Mongoose developed and how he had come to

the fouling that. he articulated very clearly that there was no

doubt in his mind about what his marching ordura were about

what they wanted done, they being the President on down.

Wa talked ahout the quastion of the various sources of thir

kind of impression, mootings he had with cablnet noople, meatles

that Mr. McCone would have, his conversarlons with Mccone.

While not explicit, it in vary clear that all of these moorin'i

appear to him to be consistent.

I think the other thing that may be very halilul for un

to try to got a close 100% at is the nature of the coordinarls..

again as refluctad by Mongoose.

Here we have a pulling tore her

of ossentially all of the government aroncios in an affort to

get a task dond, and if wa focus on songthir, like, one the

Attorroy Goneral's Involvement, it appsars as he sold vesterday

cha: the whole concept of the speclal Group dunmented was to

allow for cho Attorney General's input, and also to provin

for the stewardship of Lansdaly who, for the firat time, whose role

bocones a little clodrar hare as we l00k at why cansialo come:

out of sowharo.

1 third 18 we really pursue, the question of how this

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coordination affort looked, 1t will probably give us the best

Inaight on the authority then.

I think I also found Interesting yestorday his atticude

toward the Malla people. lla clearly talke about then as jus:

another asset, but his attitude - and correct me lt I'm uron:

hare - was more or leas to pooh-pooh it. Here was sonething.

It was wild-ayad, it probably will never work, but lt's somether

we'll throw agalnst the wall. Mid I think loft us with the

Impression, okay, lot him go out and try It. but, you know.

nobody rually axpects anything to come of this, and he la

particularly pooh-poohed when he talks about what was expecte

of Mosslil. And I bellave he finally aded up unina the tarr

s1lch as to what they would got out of that alfort.

nut I think probably the most valuable thina ho can do for

Us is to livo us some of the impressions, some o! the feelin's

about what was going on in that timeframe. I don't thiak he's

tarribly specific as to saying what.

Sanator Bakst, "lay I ask a question, Mr. Chairman, and :

think a way to get him in late is not to

leave him out thare

wich Dan Schoor too long. Tell me about his trans of mind.

his attirude.

Dogs ho soon apprahensivo, avagivo? la there any poir.

in us thinklug while oxanining the withoss, what 1s la holdin

back, if anything? Is there any necessity, I thinl, to thir

abuut tho possibility of immunity?

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Mr. Millar. I think the attitude that, number one, he

stated, I mean thia la the statement, that he 1a going to

respond to any quastion by the Committee fully. That was his

Intantion declared.

Secondly I think that he feels that trenty-flve yoars, his

twenty-fiva years of service to the government is under attack

now. lle stated that it ls his ballet that everything he has

done 1u government has been under direct order or lawful

authority.

Sanator Schwelker. From the top, B11l?

M5. 111105. Yas, lie was vary heated on that polnt at one

poirt. I think it would he well worth, you know, pressing ihi..

button.

So 1 think it 19 a mixture of sayina vou nust understar!

the times. Helms higolf was actiog under lawful authority or

direction.

Thirdly, he vauts to axplain to the Committee why he did

thiras and so on. I must say that yesterday, trying to hold

him onto a question was difficult.

Mr. Schwarz.

¡Ho is a vory, vary intellingit withoss.

and if you ovar want to pin the man down on precise tacts, lis

knows vory woll how to make that difficult.

:15. Millor. I think the way you can draw the most ir ur-

mation out of him in asking him in the contost vi the times.

the proceduras by which thinga vare done, aud he telly more

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about In fact through impreasions, he gots more precise Infor-

mation out hy which he calla Impressions than 1f you ask him

specific questions.

Senator Goldwater. Wall let me back up. I know thie

fellow vary, very wall, and he la vary touchy on the subject o!

his years of service to the government.

Tha Chalrman. 11l right, let's' have him in.

MI. Schwarz. The only document that on Its face - only

foldor that on lta face la not sell-explanatory are a bunch o!

handwritten notes.

Thoss'are his notes, I think. for the

purpose of briefing Presidant Johnson on the subject.

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(Mr. Helma entered the hearing room at 10:28.0.m.)

The Chairman. Mr. Helms, rould you please stand and be

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Do you swoar that all of the testimony you are adving ir.

these proceedings will be the truth, the whole truch and

nothing but the truth, so help you rod?

Mr. Helms. Yes, sir.

The Chalrman. Mr. Schwarz will begin the questioning.

1s said a have

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TESTIMONY OF MR. RICHARD HELMS

Mr. Schwars. Just some procedural matters, Mr. llelms.

As we discussod, you know you have a right to counsel?

Mx. Helms. Yes, thank you.

MI. Schwarz. And you have your constitutional righta, as

we discused yesterday. And you also have the right to stop

and obtaln counnel if you want, do you know that?

Me. Halms. Thank you.

MI. Schwarz. You joined the rgency at len outset, la

that right?

Mr. lalms. Yes, Mr. Schwarx.

MT. Schwarz. And you harl bean in the OSS belore that?

Ma. lolma. Yes, I was in the 0s9 ant then 1 want on to

the, what was later known as the Su in tho State and var

Departments. Then I was in the CIG and when the CIG was

mubsumed in the CIA, I went to the CIA which had been set up

under the vational Sacurity Act of 1967.

Mr. Schwarz. And you were on the operational side of the

Ayency or the clandestine side, ls that right?

Mr. Hasma, Yos. I startod la what uas known as the perica

of Special. Operations and that later became the clandestine

service.. And I was in that until 1965.

HI. Schwarz. Moving to the late '59's, were you the

Daputy Diroctor for Plang?

Mr. Helms. No, I didn't -- lot ma seo, I bacame Deputy

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Direotor for Plans In early 1962.

Mr. Schwarz. All right.

Mare you the second In command in the Plans section?

Mr. lalms, Yos. I had the Eltle of Chiel of. Operatiors

which was the number two.

M5. Schwars. And you reported to Mr. Blasell?

No. Ilalma. I raported flat to Mi. Wioner and then to

Mx. Dissoll.

Mr. Schwarz. And then when Mr. Dismell left in the winter

of '62 you left his place as the Deputy Director for Plans?

Mr. Helms. That la corract.

Mr. Schwarz, And you stayed in that job unthl you hecare

Del, or did you have an Intervening joh?

Mr. lalms. No, I was Daputy Director of Central

Intolligence which was a job that I recolved in I think de wan

April of 1965.

Mr. Schwarz. Ne about the time Admiral Rayburn took

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Mr. Helms. Exactly the same time.

Mr. Scwharr. And then you succeeded Admiral Kayburn as

DCI?

•15. Helms, That is correct.

Mr. Schwarz. And you hold that Job until the winter of.

1973?

Mr. Holma. I think It was very early in '73.

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Me. Behware. At that point, you vent to your present

post, which la Ambassador to Iran?

Me. Helma. Yos, sis.

MI. Schwarz. All right.

Nould you racount for the Committee, turning to the country

of Cuba, your underatanding of the relationship between the

United States government and Cuba, starting with Mr. Cantro's

takeover and running up to the time you becene Dolo

RAnd whor.

l say rolationahip, I don't mean the formal Alpiomatio sendo.

but. In the sanse of what was the United States government

Interestod in accomplishina au far au the government of Cuba

wan concernes.

Ar. llelms. Well, this cecital may ho somewhat impresalos.

Latic bacauso 1 have not gone into any detalla about detes.

In fact, I don't sacall right now what yar it was that Cantro

t0o% ovar, in the real sanso.

When was that?

Mr. Schwarz. 159.

:Ir. Helms. '59.

Aftar he took over there was no doubt that President

Fisonhower's Auninistration rogarded thas llevalomont as a mos.

untortilate ond, and starting sarly on, various chought was

alven to hus this tatsover of Cuba ly a Comundat could bo,

how the balánce coula ha reitanred.

You sanemher there was somy tronble. I ballove, down du

columbla at the timo. Ore o! our secretarlas o! State went

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down there, at which time . thia van before Castro took over

but at which time ho was Identifled specifically as a

communint and there was a very real feeling in the fleenhorer

raministration that having a Communist regime 20 miles fron cha

whores of the United States was a most unwelcone development.

These thoughta led to the project which over time has

come to be known under the rubric of the Bay of Pigo. It was

certainly not known as that when 1t began and lt was begun as

projoct to orjanize Cuban exilus, Cubans who had bean exilet

by Castro from Cuba or had flod of their own volition, Into a

brigade tralned in guerrilla tactica, the objective baina to

land in cuba in the hope that with this show of force, those

Cubans still there who were anainst Castro word rise up and

Implicit in this scheme was that lf the Invasion

force got fror

any sardous trouble, or conversely if ther had a no0i chance

of making it, they

could probably rely on American military

support or Anarican support of some kind.

In any avant, you all know the history of the nay of plas.

It: failed, 1t.was a traumatic experience. I want to say for

anybody who was serving in the Contral Intelligence Muency i.

those days it was vory traunetic. nu: it did lsdl. I think.

some 90 people lost their lives in the brigade, four Mericars

or five Anericans - pladse don'e hold no to those dotally ...

I quens alou: a hundred on the other gian and about 130n oi

the brigado were taken prisoner which lad, 1! you will recail.

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later to a very complicated serlos of negotiations to troo

then prisoners or at leant to fres some of then.

You will recall also, because I think we must pue in this

«lament that 1t was President Eisenhower under whom the original

concept of mounting a guerrilla operation againat the laland

came into being, but by the time the execution of the operation

vas to taxe place.. President Kennedy had come into office.

Therefore this project had boun at work under tro presidente.

It has been sald since -- I don't know se this is

ralavant to our discussion this morning -- that one of che

ruasons for this misfortune was that Premident Kennedy had boar.

1n office such a short. time that he had harolly had a chance to

get ahold of the governmant apparatus before this thing was

presented to him and mounted and off. it went. In this was

pretty tough on him and pretty tourh on everybody Involved.

Subsoquent to the sav of pigs, obviously there was a

licking of wounds and a sort of tenrouping, and than as 1

recall it, sometime in late 1961, I quess -- the Bay of Plas es

1 recall was in April of '61 -

H5. Sowharz, horil of '61.

Mo. Helna. so thin would have boon In tho !all, 11ke

Octobur or !lovelaber.

He were instructed to at ladat the daoicy was Instru!

to not going on: plans to net rid of castro by some device thl..

obvioualy would havo to be covert because nobol; harl any

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stomach anymore for any invasions or any military fiascos of

that king.

The Charman. Mr. Helma, could you be more specific on

this particular point?

You say that in the fall of '61 after the regrouping and

the licking of wounds, the Agency received Instructions to gat

on with a plan to get rid of Castro.

Now junt from whom did these instructions come andhat

was the nature of the Instruction. Can you be more precise

about this?

Mr. llelma. Sir, l am not very helpful in this perlod here

for the simple russon this came to me second or maybe third

hand, and. 1t did not involvo me particularly.

The Chairman. At the tind, what was your position?

the fall of '61?

MI. Holma. I was Chief of Operations or the Deputy

Director for Plans. In othor words, it was a number two job.

The Chairman. Socoml in command of covert operations?

Mr. Helms. Yes.

The way this harl boon workerl, Ir. Bissell had come 1a

as Diroctor of Plans, having buai in the Money and having le-.

the ayont, If you ramember, of U-? operations and that kind,

and lie brought those things with him Into the lob of the Din

and ho spont, a good loal of tims prior to the sav of Pius

wurting on that.

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In other worde, Lt was a big operation for an organization

for the CIA. In retrospect, lar too big. so let's not shilly-

shally with the words about that.

I think he spont. a great

deal of time on it, and my role

was to try and take care of what. remained of the vorld.

Therefore, I vas absorbed outside, obviously on the fringes of

this, but not Involved in the decisions or hor 1t was to be

sone or who was doing what or anything of that kinel.

so lt van -- as I say, we yo dounhill into, I think 1e

was late: 1961 or marly 1962 and l'd have a hard tina putting

my finger on axactly when, Mr. McCone had by that time become

Director. Ard as l rocall it, this was the flest time that I

was sort of brought into Cuhan operationa. And ho indicato! I

should intorest mysalf nore on this that we had to bulld M

In ordar to conduct a larger affort.

And this then bogan. Than later, somewhat later, !

bocame Deputy Director, I thin It. was In February, and then

obviously those this came generally under my deals.

He Bet up

sort of a task force in order to work. On t:9e

Cuban problems.

MI. Schwarz. Was Mr. Harvey the mass in charro?

Mr. Holma. Mr. Harvey was than pue in charge of that

sometime in this tino tramo.

I'm sure in the documents it shows what it was caller,

Tank Force l or sonsthing ol that kind sticks in my mind, bu:

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that may b: wrong.

Then later, and i don't know anymore in terms of time.:

but a bit later, I bellove, General Landale vas brought in

to huad up this Cuban effort.

Senator Schwelker. Within the CIA?

Mr. l'mims. No, sir, I'm sorry. I'm not being very

specific, Sanator Schwalkar, I'll clear that up right now.

In tho CIA, wa vare informed that caneral Lanadale, who

vas working in the supartment of Defense In an offlee which i

think at that time was headed by Caneral Prakinel?), lt was

an office in the Department of Defense which was dodicatel to

supporting covert operationa and actlons of the Cantral

intelligence Agency, That was ons of its functions, among

others, I have no doubt, but that was one of them.

But In other words, It was the point at which the cIn in

these matters plugued into the Department of Defense. My

recollaction is that the proposition at llest was that General

Lansdalo was going to ornanize a whole organization underneath

himsoll, sort of outside of other existire departmenta and

agarcles to work on this Cubar. operation.

isut in any ovent, that was a vory

short-liver tund becaus

1 think so. McCone objected to putting, sonlira his people our

of the agency to. Do unlor sonybody also's command. I think

the stato lapartment objoctad. So that died aborning.

' so the result was that caneral lansdala bocame a sort of

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Chief of Operations, Charman of the committee, is you'd ilke..

which would alt down at the table with rapresentatives of

State and l guman Dalense and CIA and I think USIA vas also

involved, to mount what you could only refer to, I think.

properly as a governmental approach to the Cuban probles, in

other words, to organize all of the facilleles of the govern-

marit. And I remanbor that the fns was brought in, and even

tha Customs and the Coust Guard and so forth.

The Chalrman. This committee operatel under the polley"

direction of the 51/12 Special Group?

1r. lolma, Yas; alr, but yr. Chalrman, In those daya.

that famous Committos was called the Spaclal Group, so for enr

purposes of thia timoframe, that la what lt was callod.

There came Into vogue the term Special Group (Augmental)

which meant that when the Speclal Group was sitting on protec

Involviny Cuba It became Augmentad. Otherwise, lt stayed the

Spacial Group. And when it was Augmented, 1: had adder in

roprosentatives of USIA, I think, othor representatives o!

tho Department of lafense and! State, the Attornsy

General

principally -- that was one of the reasons 1t vas callel

augmented, because normally he wouldn't have boon luvolveil i..

any of these things.

15. schwarz. Has the corle name Mongoose used for that

oparations?

:r. lolna, Yos, When thia neudou a code name, l this: ai

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I socall it 1t was a code name contributed by the Agency.!

don't know who thought it up, but - so this becane known an

Operation Mongoose.

And Operation Mongoose I bollave • now this 18 the best

of my recollection - stayed in existence until the Cuban

missile criola in the fall of 1962 at which elme 1: was disbandled

In that form.

Mr. Smothers.

M5: Inbassador, bafore no get avay trom

Landalo who was, as you say, ln charge of operationao do

you know, or do you have any impressions as co uno Lanadeli

reporter to, What was the line of authority that he responder!

to with respect to the Special Group?

isr. "alms. Holl, Mr. Smothers, l° vas my impressior. ae

the time that he had been put into the job by the retorney

Genural, "on I don't have this tirathand, I was not there wise!

ho was given the asaignment, but this was my understandiny.

. You will focall perhapa that General Lansdale hail had

quite a rich experience in political action and golfeical

warlord. "hen he worked for the Contral Iatailinance Moncy

he had boun in the Philippines and had helped to organle

the Elghtlag against the llukg and after "hat he nover to

Vlotnam ard was instrumental ln sotting us the blem governme:"

trom the chaos that axloted hafore that.

So la had substantial credentials for, 1! you want to

Bay, a political warrior, and I hava no doshe that it was !.

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smason that he attracted the attention of the powera that bo.

Mr. Smothers, At this time, was the Attornay General

chalring the Special Group Augmented de this time?

Mr. Holma. I bellove so. After all, he would have been

the sendor official. I think he was, yes.

Mr. Smothers. So was it your impression that he was sort

of sotting the tone for the group's action or activity?

MI, Helma. On, yes, nir, there wasn't any doubt aboue

that. lle was vary much interested in this and spent a great

deal of time on it.

Mr. Schwarz. Ve want to come back to thon particulara.

but would you continue with your answer an to what the Uniter!

States government was trying to do ahout cuba?

You had reached the missile crials which was in October

of 1962 and the miasile crisis was resolvod by some kind of

an understanding betwoon Chairman. Khruschev and President

Kennedy. Do you know the nature of that understandina?

MI. Helms, I don't know anymore about it than anybody.

would have known from reading the papers at the time.

I was

see privy to any insido information.

No. Schwarz.: Some kind of conbinationi the missilo:

ware removed.

Mr. Helms. The Il-28's were removed.

: 1r. Sewharg. Now, after that, what happoned to the

efforte of the United States government to overthrow the Cas:!

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rogimo altos the miastle oriola and up to the time you bocane

DC8 1n 1965 08 '66?

MI. llelma. You remanher that after the losilo crials

and I think l'm right about this, and I would approciate 1t

Mr. Chaliman 11 there's anybody In the room, where I got my

historical lacts wrong, would correct me, because ! have no

Interest in trying to get this ald messed up. Thia la Just my

best recollection.

The Chalrman. We understand.

Mr. Holms. There was quite an operation in the organtation

of Amarican Stator'altor the mianile crinia to organizo a

combined unarican approach to laolating Cuha.

and l hollers

It was out of thers dallburatious at the OlS at that time

that came the economic embargo of Cuha.: But also, there were

various sanctions which the United States government was

trying to work out.

I don't know if I'm using the right word here, now, bu:

thay cortainly would like to have punished Castro for the

Cuban missile crisis becauss I think 18 I remember the tempor

of those days, there wore a lot of lumps li poople's throats

all ovor. tho United Stater when they caalized how close a call

we had had on this really axtraordinarily daring operation

of thruschav's to Insurt thore nissiles there sacretly and

have than pointing down the throats of Americans.

So in those days, the tamper of jotting a'tor Castro was

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a real one. I mean, people had their heart in 1t, I must

say, and there didn't seem to be much disposition on the part

of the congress or the imerican people to cabal with doing

anything that was possible to punlah this man.

The Charman. That was particularly truo after the

mastle crimia?

Me. lolma. This la my point, this lo my point.

Mr. Schwars, so not only the multilateral elforts througs

the O1S, as you described, but what might be called the

unilateral afforta by the United States to tale covart action

agadnat Mr. Castro to overthrow continued after the missile

CrIRis.

Mr. Helma, They did Indeed. Ma 1 say, Cperation

Mongoose, as I socall it, disappeared, but it simply vas

Isplaced by a continuing effort on the part of the cia to

mount harrassment operations and so forth against Cuba.

The base in Miami from which those operationg were

conducted was continued in being, and i: contirued in being

for two or three yoars thereafter, but on a sonewhat doclinira

acale, becausa first, the operation, l just confess, was not

vary successful. I moan, thare were some things done and rome

yood intelligence acqulred, but as far as tha sabotage - and

if I may call it, the rough stulf was concorned, it was not

Very affoctive. The Russians harl moved i: to Cuba, into tha

Cuban sacurity garvice anil had dont a rather astoriahina lob

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of bringing the Cubans into the trentloth century when it cane

to security and counterintelligence. And thay ran it with a

very skilled hand, so they ware constantly rolling up and

arresting these Various operations, landingo and air drops and

all the roat of those things. So that I am sad to say lt was

a rather unsuccessful show in

the and..

Mr. Schwarz. Did these afforts continue up to the '65.

'66 Elmo trane?

Ms. Holma. It suoms to ma it was still golng li '64, yes

I'm rolativaly cortain thuy were continued to the '65 timalran

on a somewhat roduced scalo. It was after that, I bollave, or

around this time that no hogan to ast. for some relle! from chis

responsibility bucauso Vietnam was picking up in those days an!

there was a naul for manpower that understood paramilitary aceivie

les and things of this klud, not only in Vietnam, but ir.

Laos, so that the ngoncy was running short of effective.

manpower in this field.

Thorafore the Cuban elfort dropped off as interest ir

Cuba tended to drop of! and cool and interest in vietnam built

up.

Mr. Smothars. Wall, I think in terma o!, we're talkin

about those efforts, Mr. Anbassador, and those responsibiliti

I thinr what we want to do is try to got ahold of what thos

elfurto aul responsibilities waro.

Would it be lair to say that it was your understandin

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of Mongoose that the tank was to got rid of Castro by ant

means without limitationa, not limited to overthrow?

Mr. Helms. Hell, my distinct recollection at the time

was - 1 perhaps phrased the injunction on un in a vary

sImplistic American language which you could use other words,

but le was to get rid of Cantro or the Castro regime In Cuba..

Int'a put lt that way, and no limitations vere placed on the

moans. In fact, I nover rocall having bean told by anybody

don't do this, don't do that, don't do the other thina.

Mr. Smothers.

Let me ask then what do you fael you could

do at chat time?

Del that Couldnn change any as this moved?

PIr. Halms. Well, l think this 1s reasonable to atato, du!

1. hope thin la responalve to your question. The perceptiona s

the diministration, and 1 say, also, 1 bellove the Congress and!

tho American prople, as roflected by the diministration, as

those things intensified on two or thres occasions in

connection with Cuba, obviously the extent of the means that

one thought rare avallable, obviously increasod too.

In other words, the prossure was pretty intense, and !

remember vividly it was very intonge.

And theretore, when you

yo into the record, you know, you find a lot o! vary nutty

#chones thore and thoss nutty schemes were burn of the intensio.

ut the prosauro. And wa voro quite trustra:ad.

115. Smothers. Holl Juet try to traco that prossure as

It develops and suboides for ua. I think that would bo

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helpful.

Mr, Holma, Hell I think you find it building up to the

Bay of Piga and you have a crescendo and you have the aftermath

of the Bay of Pigu and things lying gulat. Mall, there's a

grant concurn about the prisonera, what's to be done about then

and so forth. And then at the and of the year, "61, you find

the Intenalty building up agaln whore it vas very strong at

the and of '61 and '62.

He than go along into that parlod, de you will recall, lao

the munmer of '52 whin thore firat saports were coming out abot

missilos in Cuba, and you remenher - I'forget which senator

it was that had some inuide intormation -

Senator Mathlas. Senator Keating.

115. Helms. Is any avest, thas began to get vary day..

And than we came into the missilo crisis Itself which l quers

was the hottast moment at all in Intensity., Ho doubt about 1".

It was white heat.

And than that continued on. for some time until it

yradually bajan to taper off. I would have thought - well, ¿:

lasted pretty nuch through '63, becauso l car. still ramember

mestings about how are no doin with econonic warfarei have

no turned off the oll delivories, what are we doing about talli

care of bus deliverios. I think the boyland lus company in

Spain wanted to sell

some buses to cuba and we did everythin::

that we could to stop the sale and

ao forth.

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MI. Schwars. Well, le that the kind of thing that the

process worked? Reading the Mongoose files . and son 1e this

was a fair summary of the procoss - there vere Intensive

meetings, frequent meetings and a great deal of pressure to

have action occur.

Mr. Helms. Mr. Schwarz, I think the sacord will show

06 F

18 I'm not mistaken that those meetinge were attendod by very

high leval mambara of the government.

MI. Schuarz. And the promsure to have something accom

pliahed was being put on the Agency in other places of the

government by the Attornoy Goneral, the secretary of State,

the head of the Dafense Department and so forth.

Vow, at meatings there would be discunsions of there war

discussion of vardous plaiis and options, la that right?

Me. llelmg.

Yes.

The Chairman. Did It. Helma attend the mestings of the

Spacial Group rugmented?

Ar. Helms. Mr. Chairmas, 1 am sury that l must have.

did not do it with any great rogularity, because 1t is my

recollection that normally ir. Mccone was the Diractor who was

a member of the conmittes would usually tate the task force

chief wich him to the meetings. I must have attandel some c!

then, cartainly, but l was not locossarily a rasular

attendant.

24

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Mr. lichwari. Hut. at the onds you dir attend, there woul. "

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bo discussiona of speolllo operations and plana, los example,

blowing up - we talked yesterday to sabotage a coppar mine or

some mine In Cuba. Do you remamber that?

Mr. llelms. Well I think there were various sabotago

operations. I remember one againat an electrioity plant that

was supposed to be, have the wab for all of Cuba. And it was

• major operation waged against that.

• Mr. Schwars. And those specifica wore discuined Cirat

al plane and then as matters that vere asthorised, an you

underatand it, both from attendance at the meating and your

understanding of the meatinant

Mr. Holma. Yes, alt.

Ir, Schwarz, I think to give you - to not only confirm

what you say, hut to yive you the ploture - this

Special

Group Augmented was the place that the tank force chiel and

everybody alas vent to say we're planning this, we're ready to

9o, we'll go at midnight tomorrow night, no, It's been caller!

off, no, we go back and so forth. So they were in the ploture

almost on a dally basia.

'r, Schwarz. In dotall, and on a dally basis.

ir. Helms. That's right.

i15, Schwarz. ias, to your knowledge, the subject of

assassinatiny Castro authorized in that lashion at any: of those

moatin s?

Mr. llalma. I don't know that a plan to assassinate Castro

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mas authorized In auy fosual may llle that. These schemes

and 3 call then schemes - marle save taken place in the

context of doing what you could to get rid of Castro, and the

difficulty with this lint ol thin, as you gentlemen are all

painfully avare, la that nobody vusts to embarrass a President

of the United Status diacumstay the essassination of foreign

lenders in his presence Mits la son thiay that has got to

be doalt with in now other Enchlow.

Even though you are euphanians you're still got a problon

and undor our mynten: of gourment, « Prenident is eluctid. or

four yours normally and ha"s not like a Prime Ministor who

can ba thrown out or « nomant's socice hecause of something

that has gone astray so the this Soocial Group was the

rechantin that vas sut up erlier or to use as a circuit

breakor so that these chiara. 112 sce explode in the Presides:"':

face aul that he was not laid tenacasible for them.

•ow when President Firentower took responsibility Cor 11.

Un? flights, that mes on his on - for the 11-? flights -th..

was ou his parsonal optior la masa'= oblinal to do chat.:::

other nords, he had his mechnise to blame lt on, if he wanta:

to.

All thoss people coult be firal.

The Chairman. I. Hans, his makes it all the more

important

o rocogatre fi what you sen ani dr unlorstandin.

this makes le all the note impartar: for the Committer to know

whether, within the specie: our Augmented which was in cher..

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of the general effort againat the Castro regine and which

2

approved thuse various sohemes whether that group specifically

3

took up the matter of assasainating Castro an auch and authorized

an assassination of Castro as such?

Can you tell un, do you know?

Mr. Helms. The only thing I can contribute lo what you

have here in a document, a discussion which took place in a

menting which I did not attend. And the aftermath of that

meatlig, 1I I was aware of what -what 1 now learned la that

Me. McCone want to saa MI. MCNamara who sald =

Ento but that doesn't mean ho didn't do le, but I don'e recall

ever having boon told by "r. Mccons that any attenuts on Castro!s

11fe ware out of bounds, they were not to be done.

I do not

rocall this.

I must say that !r. loCone had viven me my Job, he had

promotod me to bo seputy Director of Plans, No had a very

yoou relationshin, a very good working relatlonshio. I saw

him constantly ous daily basis, l folt warmly toward him, and

therefore l would not have dons somethlia he asked no not to

do. ind I would like to say, Ir. Chairman. 111 may just whil

we are at this podnt, that in my twanty-five yodrs in the

Contral Intelligence Agancy, I alwayy thought l das working

within auchorization, that I was doinn wha: l häil bour asked

to du ly proper authority and whan I was oberatina on my ow

I was dolna what I bollavar to bo the legitimate business o? !.,

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Agency an It would have been expoatod of me.

And therefore I don't want to loave in anyone's mind in

this room that I over regardod myself an an unquided missile

or that I had authoritlas or povera that vere exercised in s!

own sight. And therefore, whatever thinga may have occurred.

or whatever de may seem in 1975 looke poor on the rocord, & car.

only say that I felt that I was acting alwaya under orders.

and when i read in the vanhington lost the other day, Maine

Johnny-on-tha-spot, that I always seemed to be around where

the Illogalities came around, I must say it suamed rather

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Sanator Dakar. ile. Chairman, va have a live quorum now

and 1 have a question or two in that connection.

The Chalrman. May I just ask one follow-up question?

I personally have naver suspacted that you operated excepe

as you understood you should within the chain of authority.

Our endeavor la to determine as best we can what that chain o!

authority may have been on the spocific mattor of assassinatic::.

Whan you say that Mr. Mccone, with whom you worked vari

closely, never told you that assassination was out of bounds or

gave you any reason to thirk that this was so, did that or

that suggests a corollary question.

Did Mr. ¡cCone ever expraagly tall you, in so many warin.

that assassination was within bounds ard we should proceed, or

the Ayercy should procoad, with assassination plans?

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Me. Helma. ME. Chairman, I don't recall his ever having

put 1t in anything as spacifio so that.

The Chairman. I see.

Sonator Schwalker. Mr. Charman, Just followim this

point, ve have some othur documentation or testimony to the

•flect that on a couple of occasions relating to the Cuban

altuation, you decided with somone not to brial Mr. McCone on

« couple of occanions, and obvioualy you must have had a good:

season of authority for doing that, and l lunt vondered what

that route was and why that happened?

Mr. llelma. That la a portectly dood question, senator

schwelter. I bellove what we're talkina about was che - an

occasion which shows up in an Investluative report that !..

astod to have made in the Agancy in 1067, that Mr. Harvey sa1!

we had talled about a plan he had to use a gangster named johr

Rosalll and that I had agroad not to brie! yr: yccore.

I frankly don' recall having agreed to this, but airca

I havo no reasor. to question Mr. Harvey's word either, in this

question, l heve been going through my surmisus since and thes.

are surmises, that 'Ir. Harvey was the former ayent of the fll.

He had server thore for many years and ho camo to me and sai!

he wanted to see what he could determine about interworld

Jinks with Cuba throuch Rosalli since Rosalll har been involve!

with the Agency carlior on in an offort against cuba in

connoction with other ganasters and so forth.

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My recollection la that 1 had very grave doubta about the

wisdom of this, but he tried to convince me that ho had been 1s.

the role long time and handled these mattars and so forth. And

an I recall it, we had so few ansats Inalin Cbs at that time

that I was willing to try almont anything. nut the thing did

not loom large in my mind at that time. I was enormously:

buay with a lot of other things, taking over a new job. 1

Mocone was relativaly now in the Agency anl I quens I munt have

thought to myself, well this la going to look very pecullar to

him and I doubt very much this le going to no anyplace, but 1!

It does, then that is time enough to bring him into the

picture.

I boldave that's the -

Senator Schwalker: "Do you Incall any other altuationi

where you might not have brleled Mr. McCone?

MI. Helma. I don't socall any other altuations. As ! !.

say, Senator Schwalker, I uned to see him avary morning. He

used to get together aftor our staff meetinos, so we

saw each other almost on a dally basis.

now obvlously hodidn't noed a full belaling on everythir:

that we were doing, but he cartainly was up to date on the

things ho was Interested in knowing. l roported to him

Injularly and Me. McCono, if l might say so, was a dooil

executive. lle know how to run organizations. There was no

doubt about it. And ho was an insistant and pretty tough

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Chief. So I don't want to gut a ploture of the man today at

ago 79 uho's still pretty sprightly, but in those daya ho was

mighty sprightly, and he had a mighty glinty blue eye and. 18

It would divert the Committee at all, when he was really aolno

after you and most seriously he nover ralsod his voice, he

never soned to ba the slightest bit drritatod, hu aimply

would start the conversation by saying, 1 am totally dinsatis-

Eled and then he would go on from there.

Hull, I got totally dissatialled with Cuba and I got

totally dissatiafled with Chine and there were varfous othurs

durina this perlod, but wa saw each other regularly.

And & want to say, Mr. Schwelker, because I lon't wart o

leave any misimpression In your mind, that la my boss recrea:doss

of somethiny that happened a long time ago, but there was ro

attempt on my part to keep somathing from Ir. McCone per as

because I told him everything.

Senator Schwelker. Again. I gather you lult that what was

happening haro was in accordance with the Spocial Group's

polley ard plune and while you diin't rosard lt as a loani!!,

alternative, It foll withln the "rangwork of what you undorses.

the policy at the tine was?

!sr. Helns. Yes, sir.

Tho Chairman, Mo'll take a lIve minute recoss for the

vote ard then we will come back, 'Ir. Schwarz.

(A brlot tocoss was taken. )

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Chairman Church. The hearing will come back to order.

Mr. Bchwarte.?.

Mr. Schwarts. No prevlously marked three documenta

relating to Mongoose an Exhibita l. 2 and 1, and ve will come

back to those in a moment.

Mould you turn, Mr. Ambassador, to Exhibie S, which 1a

• single plece of paper previously furniuhed to you, dated

May 23, 1967. It 1s 1n all of the folders of the Senator..

It la a memorandum for the record from J.S. Earman, subject,

"Report on Plota to Assasminato Fidel Castro," datod May 23,

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Mr. llolma. Yos sir.

Mr. Schwarz. MI. Earman was Inspector Conoral?

Mr. Holma. Yes, he was. Mr. Earman had previoumly been

special Asslatant to Mr. Allen Dulles and then he was mado

Inspector Goneral. Unfortunately he la now deceased.

MI.. Schwarz. And you asked him to prepare a report on

plota to assassinate Fidel Castro?

Mr. llelms.. Yes sir.

Mr. Schwarz. Did you do that because of requests you

had received from someone olse?

MI. llelms. Yes. My rocollection of asking the Inspecior

General

to look into these matters resulted from, I bellove.

a roquest from proaldent Johnson.. I bellovo chatthere not

only had bean at that timo a column by Drow Pearson but 1

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bollve that Dren Pearson had apoken privately to the President

about the subject mater of that column and the President askod

me about the facte and & sald, well, I would have to try to

ascertain then, and it was a result of that that I asked the

Inspector General to get Into this mattor, and I realised that

mamory gets vary loggy with timo but my impression vas I asked

him to do a good morme case detalled invontigation so that whon

1e was finlanod I could roasonably ansure the Presidont of vine

the facta wore.

And just to finlah thia off, I do rocall going to the

Presidont later after thia matorial had beon given to me and

briefing him orally aboue the contonte.

Mr. Schwart. The rapore that was submitted to you you

read beforo going to the President?

MI. llelms. Yes.

MI. Schwarz. And you have a copy of the report in front

of you, do you not?

Mr. Helms. Is this it here?

Mr. Schwarz. It 1a intended to be a tab relating to Mr.

Castro.

Mr. Holms. Yes sir. This looks like ti anyway.

Mr. Schwarz: "The report was, as far as you know the

facts, a good job, an accurate job?

MI. Helma. I don't rocall that I went ovor this ropore.

noticud that in the early part of the report there are a

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couple of notationa in my handwriting. I have no recollection

anymore of what they vore or the reason for them. I bellove that

8 uned thia report an a fact-finding ropore. I don't have

any recollection of having gone over it in decall for accuracy.

particularly, except to the extent this was the best they were

able to get out of the varlous people they interviered, but

de antialled my requirement because it set in proper perspec

elve the assertions which Drew Pearson vas making.. It separated

them and enabled me to explain to President Johnson what had

been going on.

Mr. Schwarz. All right, in that connection, MI. Reporter.

would you put in front of Mr. loima the proviously marked

Helma Exhible 6, which aro ME. Helm'a handwritten notes, and

the previously marked Helma Exhibit 1, which la page 118 from

the study.

Those again are both in the Senators folders.

Page 118 of the study 1e headed "The Drew Pearson Story?"

Mr. lielms. Yes sir.

Mr. Schwarz. And it has two columns. It publiahed the

details and the facts as wo know them?

Mr. Holms. Yes sir, I have them now in my hand. Mr.

Schwarz.

. Mr. Schwarz. It in in your folders.

Now, turning flat to your notes, la it your bollet

that those notes were prepared in order for you to briot the

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President?

Mr. Helms. Hell, at this late date I can't say that with

any iinality but they must have been for some reason and 1

think that ran probably why I did It. Thay look like the kind

of thing that are those reminders out of a report that you

wanted . a point you particularly vanted to make for some.

reason or another, which has now long since blown out to sea.

But I have no reason not to

accopt the theals that maybe this

da what these notes were.

Mr. Schwarz. The notes carry the story through mid-6).

you will see in the middle of the page of your handwaltten

notes.

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MI: Helms. Yes air.

Mr. Schwarz. Did you toll, to the boat of your

recollection, President Johnson that, according to the 1967

study, the efforts to assassinate fidol Castro had continued

into President Johnson's Presidency?

Mr. Helms. I just can't answer that, I just don'e know.

I can't recall having done so.

What was it - after he bocame President? Refresh my

memory, If you will. You say thoy continued into him

Presidency? Which episodes were those?

Mr. Schwarz. The MMLASH episode, Mr. Cubela: In any

ovont, the 1967 study indicatos that in Presidant Johnson's

Presidency offorts wore made by the CIA to aupply guna to t'i

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Cuban person known an AMLASil, in code, and Cubela in actuality

Mr. Halms. I think I can't point to somebody else whose

perceptions might be more accurate than mine. I don't think

that one would have approached the AMLASIl thing as an

assassination plot against Castro. I think that one would havo

approached that as an extension of our efforte to set up some

kind of opposition group to Castro inaide Cuba of which Cubola

was. I queas, our prime opportunity, and that the pressures,

an I recall it. for guns and things of that kind all came from

Cubela himsell, thay didn't come from the Agency, This maon'e

somothing we wore trying to sot up.

Thia was somothing Cubelo

was trying to sot up. Ile hatod Castro and wantod to got rid

of him.

MI. Schwarz. The Ayency facilitated that by helping

him got guns: is that right?

MI. Holms. I think the number of people we tried to

givo guns to in the history of these Cuban operations was

multitudinous.

Mr. Schwarz. But you did give gun's to Mr. MLASH Or --

MI. Helms. If the record

shows that we did.

Mr. Schwarz. And you just don't remember whathor that

was disclosed to Prosidont Johnson - it occurred during his

Prosidency?

Mr. Helma. I don't recall it, but I can as l ait here

today, I can see why it wouldn't have occurrod to me to do il.

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Mr. Schwars. All right, now, would you look at rshalle

7, which in the tro-column

Senator Goldwater. Could I ask a question?

Did the CIl ovor do anything to try to find where theso

leaks came from?

ME. Holma. Which leaks wore those?

Senator Goldwater. To Pearson, to be able to wilte his

column.

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Mr. Holms. At the tlmo this review was made, Senator

Goldwater, and I think that it appears in the back of de

somoplaco, becauso that 1s what refreshed my menory - this lo

many yeara later. I am not saying I remembor all of these

things just cold as that. But from roading this and trying

to remembar concrete tho circumatances of the time, thore was

an effort made to figure out who might have done this, and

I think it may well be that this is one of the reasons I have

got these names up in the top of those handwritton notes of

mine - 1t might have been the lawyer, Ed Morgan, it might

be Roselll, It might be Mahou, or Garrison, who was out in

Los Vogas,. with Mahou and some of the others. In other wordi.

I think that is what this noto could very concedvably, the toy

one, refer to. It was for me to indentify to Preaident Johnson

where this might have come from.

Senator Bakor. Meaniny that you wore listing the peopl

who mighe have had access to this information?

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MT. Helms. I am sorty, I can't see very well with my

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MI. KIrbow. Ho has Exhibit 6.

Mr. llelma. Thoso namos here just at the top where the

first line In Morgan, Roselll, Mahou, Garrison, March in Las

Vegas.

Senator Bakor: Yes.

Mr. Helma... At the vory top. Those names conceivably

could havo rolated to my affort to idontity to Premident

Johnson where the loak came from. Underneath i see Morgan,

and Jack Anderson, and in those days Jack Anderson was a

principio assistant to Drow Pearson, I ballove, and he knew

Ed Morgan. That was probably a possibility whore the

information could come from. But I don't know to thia dato

with any accuracy.

Senator Goldwater.. Did you ever chase it down?

Mr. lielms.. No farthor than that, Senator Goldwater.

I want to say that, since you havo asked the quention.

that leaks to newspapers have been an albatross around my nech.

for sc

many years and have gotten me obvioualy by hindaight

in more trouble than any other single thing and i don'e know

of anytime except on one or two occasiona when there was realli

a protty accurato research of who had done the leading, bue

nothing was ever done about it.

Mr. Schwarz. Canwe go to the summary headod "The Drew

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Story' Rublinhed Detaile and the Facts an We Rnow Them.

Mr. Helma. Yen air.

Mr. Schwarz. Exhibit 7.

Mr. Helmg. Right.

MI. Schwarz. And does everybody have that in front of

them? It 18 page 118 of the atudy.. The page le on les sido.

All right, non, would you read the munmary and state

whether 1t does in fact accurately reflect the facts as you

understood them at that point, or an you understand them now?

MI. liaime. Well, an I look this over I think de la not

only simplistic but I don't think dt really accurataly colloces

all of tho facts.

I would be hard prossad to tell you in apecific

Instances

where it want wrong, but I noticed this businens about hired

assassing and lone survivor and so forth. I don't recall

anybody having any hard information this was the case. I

don't know that anybody over demonstrated those men ever got

to Cuba. And the CIA hatched a plot to knock of! Castro.

I think this is using Drew Pearson's lanquage, 1f I am not

mistakon, because I can't imagine any Inspectors using languays

like that.

MI. Schwarz. But the right column is your Inspector's

languagu?

Mr. Holms. That 1e right. And I think they are doing

their boat to idontify to me in the most simplistic and over

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simplified terms what their investigation allegedly showed abour

these Drew Pearson allogations, But an I look at the facts

as ve know them I think that they, too, are incomplete.

Maybe some of tho other witnesses canflosh out mome

of that for you. But let's,

for example, say Rosells informed

Harvey prenumably on the basia of Information from Verona that

a team of three men was inside Cuba. That was nover demonstrated

and I can only say that basod on Verona's track record and

Romelli's track socord, those aro not very good witnesses.

MI. Schwars. Let's take tho pilla quostion, which 1a

under the heading of unpublinned dotalla. The unpublishod

detall, that la the dotall which was given to Promidont

Johnson informally, Dy MI. Pearson. In that your bollo!?

Mo. Holma. I quoss so. I honestly don't know.

MI. Schwart. The first unpublishod detail, pilla were

mont to Cuba for use in the assassination, and your Inspector

General's staff sald with respect to that, summarizing their

investigation, true. At least we were told by Roselll that

the pilla were sent in during Phase I. and again in Phaso Il.

Phase I was the pro-Bay of Pige operation, 1a that rinhe?

Mr. Helms. That is right.

Mr. Schwarz. And Phase II was the operation that occurrel

or allegedly occurred while you wore Deputy Diroctor for Plans:

in that right?

Mr. Holna. Yos sir.

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MI. Schwars. Now, in lt no that the CIA was told that

pilla wor sent in during Phase II?

MI. Holma. My recollection of thia da that there 1a

pretty good evidence that the pilla got an far an Florida, that

the avidence is most unsatisfactory they evor went any further.

Mr. Schwarz. Did you authorise.at least their getting

to Florida?

The purpose of the pilla was to kill Castro?

ME. Holms. I belleve they were poluon pille and I don'e

recall necessarily on this day approving them, but since

Harvey allegor to havo them and saya that ho took them to

Miami, I must have, I must havo authorized them in some fashion.

Mr. Schwarz. And the study also says that guns vero

supplied during Phaso 1l for the purposo of as

mination of

Castro?

MI. Helms. Mr. Schwarz, Chat Phase II wich the Rosell:

and Verona so far to me ended up, 1! I may use the vernacular.

zilch. I don't believe that any of these things were done.

There was never satisfactory cvidence adduced that these peoli:

wero playing fair with

us. They were taking money and all ?!.

rest of it. Nothing ovor came of it and 1 am quito prepares.

to bolleve to this day lt was a cock and bull story.

The Chairman. But, Mr. Holma, that roally avoids the

point. Whother they carried through as they ropresented the:

would ia quite a

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Mr. Helma. I reallee that 1a true.

Chairman Church. You did and the CIA did engage them

for the purpose of assassinating Castro, and pilla were

supplled and guns wore supplied for that purpose. The fact

that they falled to do it or may not have carried through in

quito a different question.

Mr. llelms. I undorstand.

Mr. Schwars. Lot's look at the other item under

unpuliahod dotalla. The item 1a quotes There was a meting

at tho Dapartmont of State at which the asassination of

Castro was discussed" the conclusdon of your Inspector

•General and his taff was truo,"tha subjoct was salsod at a

meoting at State on 10 August 1962, but it 1a unrolated to sny

full attampto to assassination", then they describe the

Lansdale momo that we have discused previously.

But do you agrce with their statement of true and chat

It was unrelated, or not?

MI. Helms. I just don't know anymore. But there is no

reason for me to question the documents, and 18 tho documones

indicate that this was the case, I am prepared to accept 1e.

I think I ought to make a distinction botween what !

personally remomber and what la in tho documents, but i

have no reason to fight the question.

Mr. Schwarz. As of that timo, August '62, Mr. Harvoy

was undor you, he was on your staff?

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MI. Helma. lo was under my jurindiation. In other words,

he was a part of the Deputy Director for Plans office.

Mr. Schwarz. And he was specially assigned to Cuba?

Mr. llelms. He was hoad of the task force which was tied

into the larger Government Operations under Landale.

Mr. Schwars. You knew that he was working with Mr.

Rosalls, didn't you?

MI. "olms. Yos sir.

MI. Schwart. Now, Exhibit 2, which was prevlounly put

baforo you, 1e MI. Harvey's memo to you of August 14, '62, and

1e 18 also in all of tho Sonator's folders.

Mr. llelms. Yas sir.

MI. Schwarz. Now, he rofors there to the August 10

mooting and to the fact that Mr. Lanadalo had Innued after

that a memorandum which stated that a planning document should

be propared, including in'the case of CIA plans for tho liqui-

dation of loaders, Is that corroct?

Mr. Helms.

Yes.

Mr. Schwarz.

Now, as of lugust '62, you wero awarc, ay

you just testified, that Mr. Roselll and Mr. Harvey were in

touch, and MI. Rosolli had boon retainod lor the purpose of

accomplishing assassination, da that right?

MI. Helms. Woll, I am not cavilling with this but i don':

have tho record in front of me. I thought by Auguat of 'uz.

any concorted offorts of Roselli had pretty woll diod, hadn't

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they?

MI. Schwara. No.

• MI. Helms. Am I wrong about this? I am just asking for:

the facta.

MI. Schwarz. The 1967 study demonetrates that Mr.

Roselll stayed activo, stayed in the employ of the CIA, until

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Mr. Holms. Was ho over

Mr. Schnarz. And stayod active at least until December

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Ms. lolms. I don't moan to argue with you. Was he over

in the employ or did he agrea to work for nothing?

Mr. Schwarz. I think you are quite right. He:was

associatod with you.

MI. Smothers. Maybe 1t would help if wa got some fool-

Ing about what stayed active 187

• Mt. Helms. I didn't understand.

MI. Smothers. I was saying Just to MI. Schwarz maybe

some indication of the perception of stayed active, one

helpful to you in your recollection of these events. ! am

not so sure we know what you mean by that in terms of Rodolli's

activities.

Mr. Schwarz. You want to know those details we oughe lo

100k at the study itsolf.

MI. Smothera. The witness has indicated no recollection

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of that.

Mr. Holma. I think what I was trying to say, au best I

recall this, the Roselll effort petered out and although he

stayed associated with llarvay and Harvey was In

touch with him,

it was not a vory long continued active and I use the word

active. in the sense that the man was pushing, prodding, hauling

in offorta to get something done. It didn't seem to me 1e

lanted vory long. It was pretty quiescent for quite a long

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Mr. Schwarz:. Would you look at page 52 -

Ma. Helma. Yes, gladly.

Mr. Schwarz. - of the scudy. At the bottom of 51 1t

Indicatos, colorrina to the time betwoon Soptember 162 and

January '63 -- 1t statos that in December or January '62, "63.

MI. Roselll mado a payment of $2700, or payment was made to

Mr. Rosalli of $2700.

Mr. Helms. I am finding the place now. I am sorry.

between December and January.

well, then, then it was going on, okay." That clarifies

it.

something was going on or alledgedly going.on.

Mr.. Schwarz. Now, to the boat of your recolloction. .1:

of 1962 meeting of the Spocial Group that has been discussed.

tho August 1962 mecting, in which Mr.. Lansdalo aftor askin

that plans bu developod for liquidation of leadera, did Mr.

Harvey disclose to the momborship of the Special Group, or a.:

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member. of 1t, that actual efforts were underway to assasminate

Castro as opposed to the request to look at that as an option

or plan?

Ms. lalma, I don't know. I wasn't at the meeting. 1

was nover told that this occurred. I don't know of any paper

that supports it. But I am sure maybe MI. Harvoy will remember.

Mr. Smothers. What was your relationship with Mr.

Harvay? Did you solect him?

Mo. Holms. I think I did. I think i did. I know that

thore was some discussion at the timo he was selected of erying

to find somoone who was a hard hitting officar to head up this

Cuban offort, and I cortainly, 18 1 didn't, actually was not

the one who first suggentod it, I certainly approvod the

selection.

I just don't romembor anymore. It la likoly tha:

I might have picked him. I just don't remember those deralls.

But it 1s silly of me to say flatly, yos, I sclocted larvey

because I just don't remember the exact chain of circumstances.

But I coratinly accepted him for the job, which 18 all your

are trying to find out, isn't it?

MI. Schwarz. Was he working closely with you of was hu

working more closely with the Director or with lansdale?

MI. Helms. No. Before he got this job in charge of

tho Cuban task force he had been the hoad of a staff known, a

I socall it, Chiof of FID, which meant that he was in chary:

of a stall in tho forolgn Intolliganco stall insido 1t, whos.

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30°

100 percent function was to mount operations againat embassies

and inatallations of foreign powers overseas, to acquire codes

and ciphera by surreptitious entry. That was the one function

this staff had.

MI: Schwarz. Did you know about the so-called Exocutive

Action or the portion of that assignemtn which alledgedly

relatod to a capability to kill or assassinate foreign leaders?

Mr. Helms, Hell, in rovlowing thin, these papors, I

noricod that thore was something callod zh rifLe, which

establishod and was roforrod to as an Exocutive action

capability, which ia a pretty fancy title for one man who was

to constitute a epability in being, as l underatood it, undor

Dinscll's instruction. If you nooded sonnhody to carry out.

murder 1 quess you had a man who might he preparad to carry i!

out.

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Senator Baker. A Presidential hit man?

Mr. Helmg.

some kind of hit man.

MI. Schwarz. Is that something you are reconstructing

from having read the record?

MI. Holms. No, I remember ZR RIFLE thing. I remember

more particularly my desire to got this wholo idoa put to rest

and sec if we could use that'

man in some other way usofully.

and he was overtually torminated two or three years later.

I don'e romembor hia name. I don't remomber his nationality.

I don't romember the details about him at all. But I don't

25

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and ma 1

$

1

2

Iike the whole idea no I Iinally phaned it out.

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Sanator Baker. Could I ask a question, just bolefly?

Do I understand from the tenor of these remarke that

IRRIFLE coally wasn't a big thing in the agency, in your

vlew, and you nover thought much of 1t?

Mr. Holma. No.

An a matter of fact, it was a tiny little thing and I

noticod, Sonator Baker, in one of the pagos here that Mr. Har-

vey said that he got this involved in his mind with some of tha

things ho was trying to do on Cuba.. I havo no recollaction ol

that whatever.

Senator Baker.

Mr. Blasoll indicated we ought to mato

• a clear distinction hotwoon tho gonoral effort to "aliminae"

Castro or dispose of Castro," and the %RRIFIF offort at

assassination of Castro:

Mr. Helms. In most minds those lines never crossed.

Senator Baker. Sir?

Mr-Helms. In my mind those lines never crossed. This

man was the ERRIfLE follow, I belleve, was in Europe.

Senator Baker. Thank you.

Mr... Schwarz. Maybe this is confusing and you could

cloar it up.

On page 38 of the study it states, after describing

exocutive action -. it statos the following - "Tho projoce

named ERRIFLE firat appoara in the files In May 61, although

the firat rocordod approval is dated. Fobruary 1962. Tho new

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DDP (Helma) on that dato authorized llarvey by memorandum to

handle the project on a special basis. Accounting for expendi-

tures was to bo by goneral category and on llarvey cortification.

The Initial approval was for 14, 700, consisting of 7200 for

O. J. Winn's annual salary and 75 for operational expenses".

Then, it describes ZRRIFLE as ostensibly to develop

capability for entaring safes and for kidnapping courders, that

It was soparato from the oporation against Castro until

Novamber. 15, '61, and that on that date larvey discussod with

Bianoll application of the ERRIfLE program to Cuba.

Now, firat, did you, as it says hore, authorize larvey

to handle the ZRRIFIE project on a apocial basia?

Mr. IIclms.

I quoss Imust havo. But may I oxplain

what I think undoubtedly was involvod?

in the clandestine services we had a very careful

bookkeeping system that all monies had to be allocated again

specific projects and by proper authority because, as. you

Senators will remember,. that when the Agency was set up under

the National Security Act of 1947, and then later Central

Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, thore were authoritios given

to the Director of Central Intelligenco for uso of unvouchered

¿unda and certification to tho une of those funds had to come

from the Diroctor by law. And so every Director as far as l knon.

certainly with Mr. McCone and with mo, we had a very care-

ful bookkooping and auditing systom inaide the Agoncy to be.

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mure when the year was over we knew where almost every single

dollar litorally had gone during the year, so when we aigned

the certification this had been unod for proper purposes

we had some reason to balleva lt had boen used for proper pur-

posos. So, you could have a projoct of a man getting a salary

unless somebody authorized the establishment of the plece of

paper which gave the salary and gave the circumstances and

no forth and aignod off on 1t.

Normally in most projecta there was a clearance procedure

but with a sensitive projoct, and this mould have boon a

sensitive projoct, thoro was an oxcaption made to the general

ruls so that a spacific officar could sign off on cho uno ot

the money.

llavo Imado that clcar? I want to be sure 1 have.

#ure Ihave. .

Mr. Schwarz. Did you undorstand ZRRIFLE as having one. or

two purposes?

Mr. Helma. I don't recall any more.

Mr. Schwarz. Did you understand that it had as one of

Its purposes a capability to assassinate foreign loaders?

Ms. Helms. Well, I think that Harvey would have played

fair with me and sald this was something Bissoll asked me to

aot' up and we have got it hero and hore Is this man and

so forth.

7.4

25

Yos, I don't think thore was any doubt about it, but

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there in a great deal of difference between establishing a

capability and using it.

Senator Bakor. On that point, though, was it also in the

contomplation of the partion, as ve lawyers are fond of saying,

that ZRRIFLE had a capability for the asmasination of Cas-

tro?

•

8.

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Has that discussed?

Mr. Holma. Nover that I heard of, Senator Baker, as

beat I, recall those circumstancos.

In othor words, you see, thore in a passage in hare which

says that thoso two linos cross. This linda no placo in my

rocollection.

Sanator Baker. Thank you.

Sanator Schwalker.

Tho point on thaphysical lines of

authority you just

doscilbed, to pay people under your

vouchered system, then would the CIA issue chocks to these

people or was it done by cash as a rule, or how did that

voucher follow-up occur

undor physical control?

Mr. Helms. We did 1t variously. Sometimos actual

cash was passed to a sensitivo agent.

For examplo, you might pay him in Indian rupoes, then els

man who passed the monoy would sign in the office a certifi-

cation under the cryptonym of this operation saying on such and

such a day he passed X Indian rupeos to agunt so-and-so.

Senator Schwelker. Who would give him the cash?

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Who would dispense that cash?

MI. Helms. In oach station overseas there was afther

• finance officor whose full time job was finance, 11

1t was a largo station, or another officer who had a part-

time job of kooping the accounts for that station.

So, whon the auditors wont around there was also

somobody who could prosant to them the books for that station

of exactly how much monay had been expanded in the previous

month, and no wore enormously

scrupulous about this thing.

I think you will find 1f you got the auditora from

the agency down you will find a very good job was done on

the protoction of the funds of the Unitod States.

Sonator Schwelker. Thank you.

The Chairman. All right, Mr. Schwarz.

Mr. Schwarz. Would you return again to Exhibit 7, thé

two-column thing?

•Mo. Helms. Exhibit 7?

Mr. Schwarz. The two-column thing - Drew Pearson at

the top.

MI. Helma. Okay, right.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, you havo; already talked about the

24? I1rat entry which says the CIA had a plot to knock off castro.

*:

Let's talk about the second entry, tho published details

aro Robert Kennedy had approvod an assassination plot in the

25

right-hand column. Your staff states not true.

He was briefed

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on gambling syndicate phase ona after 1t vas over. He was not

briefed on phane 2.°

3

Was that correct? In that correct, as you understand it?

MI. lelms. I don't know of my knowledge chat Robert

5

Kennody was evor asked to spocifically approve an assassina-

6

tion plot. That he was briefod on gambling syndicate phase one

1a certainly true, and the socord shows that.

I don't socall about phaso 2. I don't recall brioling him

mysold on it. Whether anybody olmo may have briofod him or

not I don't know. But out of my rosourcos and my recollec

i :

tion I don't rocall his having bean brlolad on 1t.

Mr. Smothers. Hould lt be nocossary for him to be

1.., bolofed on phase 2?

1÷

Mr. Helms, I would have thought not, sir.

I think I would probably have a more specific rocollec-

tion 18 I had gone and donc it.

1:..

MI. Smothers.

Are you saying then that he was sufti-

ciently involved in the activities and Intentions of

Speclal Group Augmented that ho would have known about phase- phase-2?

2= :

Mr. Helms.

Not necessarily. He

might have. He might

*:

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not have. But I think that larvey kept phase a pretty much

in his back pockot.

Mr. Smothers, on Phase 1, then, with respect to what you

bellovo would have been the stato of the Attorney General's

25

knowlodge, would ho havo known about the assassination plot,

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would this approval have taken place with his concurrence?.

MI. Helms. I don'tknow, sir. The phase l bualness 1a

something I had almost nothing to do with and got into

rather late in the game and my perceptions mould be of no

assistance to you, I don't think.

The Chairman.

Theso questions, are important to the

committoo bocause the documents suggest and the testimony, 1!

you corroctly romomber it, sooms to suggest that when Mr.:

Kennody, Robort Kennody, was Informed about phase l.. 1t was

done in tha past tonso - the documents bear that out

and phase l had in fact boon terminated.

so, well, the biloting related to that phase of tho

operation which has been terminated?

Mr. liolma.

That is right.

The Chairman. We don't know whether Robert Kennedy was

ever advised of the so-called phase 2 part?

Mr. Helms. No, sir, I don't. And I must say that the

presumption based on the papers I have seen within the last

two or three days, would indicate that he was not, but i

don't know this for sure.

Senator Goldwater. I am wondering out loud door it

make any difforenco?

The Chairman.

Well --

Senator Goldwater. I think thore is a lot to this

business.of l don't care whether Robert Kennedy orderod it

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or B11l Rogors ordered 1t or knew about 1t, 1t la done and gona.

2

and we know I think quite a bit about the total operation.

But I don't think it in fair to try to assign by this

lino of of questioning blamo.•

The Chairman. That ian't the purpose of the questioning.

6

I don't think, Sonator. It la to determine how these things

worked, what the line of authority may have been, and 11 1t

de true that assassination plots can-be carrled out without

the spacifle knowledgo of the highost people in the govorn-

10

mont, thia Committee ought to know that and we ought to

1:

considor whothor that ia tolerable.

1::

...

1:1

That 18 the roamon for the questioning.

Mr. Schwarz. Could wo pursue -

Senator Baker. Bofor you do I think both senator

Goldwater

and you are corroct in a way but I think we neod to

¿r! refino that point a little more because I think 1e will bo

helpful in our furthor evaluation of this witness' testimony

and our general undertaking.

It may be that the facts will not yield up the conclu-

::!

sion on whather the President or the Attorney General at any

point in time knew of these undertakings. It may be that

2%

the mose we can do is indulge in conjecture or surmiao. Ne hare:

three alternative possibilitios, it seems to mo, that are

rolovane to the inquiry of this committoe, and the problema

that wo will make.

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One, the President did know and was preserved in

deniability and it cannot be establimhod. I doubt that we

roach that conclusion.

Two. That we are not sure but that the force of

circumstances, operating procedures, intuition, but better

#t11l export tostimony from thoso who were in the coumittee

probably know. it in unlikely someone would have acted without

authority of, throo, that the CIA was acting on see own in an

IrIesponsiblo way in

mattars of oxtraordinary importance.

Tho Chairman. Yes.

Senator Baker. To the extont that ta focus on

two or throc it 1n Important. To the extont we focus on one

and try to strain desperatoly to find out Robert Konnedy or

John F. tunnedy knew or didn't know la not important, but i do

think. it 1a terribly important to ask Mr. Nolms, and wich

your permission I am going to ask him right now, whether or

not in any situation that he knows of in conjunction with any

assassination efforts against Fidel Castro, whether ornot

he or anyone he knows of in the CIA acted in a way that hu

would conceive as being heyond their authority and

beyond the instructions they received from some authority?

Mr. Helms. Sir, I believe to this day chat in theo

actions we wore taking againat Cuba and againse Fidel Cantro's

government in Cuba, that they wore what we had been asked

to do.

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1

In other words, we had been askod to get rid of Castro,

2

and an l sald a little earlier, there vere no limitations

put on tho mondon, and we folt we were acting well within

the quidalinos that wa understood to bo in play at this parti-

cular time.

6

Senator Baker. Then In vier of that anner. 1t seems

to me that the further inqulry of thia committee, of the

furthor dollboration of this committoo at this point

ought to be whather or not we ought to at this time even

10

up linos of communication between tho ultimate civil author-

:

dey of the U.s. and the intolliganco community so there 1a

expresacd and provabir line of authority or whothor it

functions adequately in lts present formal.

Senator Hart of Michigan.

Mr. Chairman, I am sorry.

::!

I was taking a deposition.

Mr: llelms. Good morning, Senator Hart.

Senator llart of Michigan.

You tell us that it is your

: *

impression that nothing done with respece to Castro by the

Agency was done without authority.

%:

Do I understand that correctly?

Mr: Helms. It was done within the guidelinos of

%!

appropriate authority. In other words, we folt that wo were

operating an we were supposod to oporate, that theso things

if not spocifically authorizod at loast wore authorized in

25

general torme.

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I am uneasy with that and

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Senator Hart of Michigan®

not at all critical either.

Does 1t moan that you undorstood that the highest

authoritlos of govornment were anxious that the Castro

governmont fall and that in somo fashion Castro go away?

Mr. Holms. Sonator last..! think you put 1t. very well.

Senator Hart of Michigan. All right.

Now, do you assumo from that, that being the general

authority, that thore was nothing you had to check back with.

11ka the sinking of a sovlot ship in llavana harbor, or napalm-

Ing the inland or assassinating Castro?

Me. lolma. 5ir, boforo you came in I was explaining

the intoriclationship brewcon the operational officials

and the special froup and our efforts to find out if that war

satisfactory to run a sald against a rafinery or whatovor

the case might bo.

In other words, there was a groat deal of interplay

here for permission, reports on succoss, reports on

failure.

and no forth:

The Chairman. That 1e what makes it so puzzling, 1f

I may, Sonator Hart, bocauso you say there was a yroat deal ..

Interplay with respect to cortain projocts lito the atcompt

againes a copper mino or nomothing of that kind. But ther..

appears to have nono, no. intorplay at all we can ele down

with respoct to the most sensitivo projoce of all, the

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assassination of the Cuban leader.

You say with respoct to that that you weren't told not

to do 1t and you weren't. told in so many words to do it, but

you underatood that that was within tha paramaters of the goner-

al policy?

Mr. Helma. Yes.

The Chairman.. Not, it is quite hard for me to under-

#tand how you go back and check

constantly with the Special

Group on ordinary sabotago operations but you have

apparently no such communication with the special Group on an

assassination plan against cho Cuban loador.

Can you axplain that?

Mr. llelma. I undorstand

your puzzloment and I don't

know whothor I can satisfactorily put the matter to coat in

your mind. I will do my

bost.

The Item that seems to loom large in this I.G. report

1g the use of John Roselli in phaso 2.

As I coseifled earlier this morning, as boat I

can rocall tho circumatances at the time, I did not havo much

hopo for what Rosolll might be ablo to do bue I was proparol

to have Harvey work with him to see if thore woro linos

that the underworld had into Cuba.

Now, l roalizud that ovon in retrospoce tho polaonod

pilla look vory had and I must asy that they don't look very

good to mo today as 1 look at thom. Bue I havo to say

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in all falrness and honesty that in the perceptiona of the time

people wore losing thalr lives in raids, a lot of peopla

had loat their Ilvos at the Bay of Plga, agenta vero being

arrosted loft and right and put before the wall and ahoe,

and that, thorefore, this operation of Roselll's wich the

pilla would soem to me to be a very leoble operation under

the best of circumstances and indeed turned out to be one.

Frankly, as the time it didn't loom large and that 1a

not bacauno I don't have any moral Judgmont or becauso 8 an

a cynical know nothing, it was aimplybecause in the

percoptions of the time and the thinga we wore trying to do

thia was ono human lifo againet many other human livos chat

voro being lost.

The Chalrman.

Even in the percoption of the times.

when you engaged cloments of tho Malla to porform and operation

for the CIA, that if it had worked out as hoped would have

resulted in the assassination of Caatro, then you toll us

that you didn't bring it to the attention of Mr. MeCono

because you didn't think that it was that important, and

that he had any

particular nood to know about 1t.

That strikes me as being very atrange. I should think

that if there was one thing that the Diroctor of the CIA

did havo nood to know would bo a connection with the Mafia.

Mr. Holms. Woll, 415--

Tho Chairman. As you know .

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Mr. Helms, Mr. Chairman, let me say that there had

already boon one connection with it which unfortunately &

say chat you say this la all strange. I agroo le sounds strange

and I rogret it and I think that at

a diplorent time and

under differont circumatances I would have santad no

relationship vith tho Malla, but an I say, we vore atruggling

very hard in those days to find anybody that had any connoc-

Elone Into Cuba and Chie was just one that I jume didn'e

Peal I could say 100 parcent no to until it demonstratod

thore

wal no such connections.

They novor dovolopod, they novor turned into anyching.

The wholo thing wont down the rat hole. Dur 1 must say thae

in cho hindalghe of 1975, and ovon at that time, I rogrot

It' very much. That 19 all. But I can't givo any

othor explanation than the ono I have givon you it la the

only one I have got.

Senator Mathlas, When MI. Bissoll was here I think I

asked him whether the job of communicating with superlor

authority was one of protecting auperior authority, and

specifically the President, protecting him fron knowlodge amt

at the same time Informing him, which is a difficule and

delicate job, and he agreod that that was really the diffi

culty.

And you this morning have nald that in adviainy a

Presidont or vory high authorley of any pareicular delicat

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aubject, that resort van had to you eupheniam.

Mr. Holma. Yes air.

Senator Mathias. Now, what energas, and I vant to

satiafy 11 my porcoption of this la right what energos 1a

laadorship within the Agancy of men who knew each othes very

woll, who could comunicate virtually without vords. In that.

correct?

Mr. Helms, That la correct.

Sonator Mathias. And to take a case in point, Mi.

Dimsell and Mr. Allon Dulles, as an example, vas it genorally

considorod that MI. Bissall was Mr. Dulles' hair apparent

in the period '60-61?

MI. Holms. That 18 an interesting quastion. I hadn'e

thought about that for a long time but I wouldn't be surprisen

If you aro corroct. I think thore was somo talk about that.

Senator Mathias. Perhapa what is more important, did

MI. Dulles and MI. Bissell considor thoy had that relationahip?

MI. Helma. I think thoy did.

Senator Mathias. And living in that kind of a rolation-

ship to each othur, did they have a sort of confidential

rolationship in which thoy could share things almose withous

words?

Mr. llelma, I woulin't lo surprisod.

Sonator Mathias. And was it in fact probably the way

that thuy communicatod on aubjocta such as tha one the Chairr

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67

has raised, the question of an amanuination, potential in

general and apecifio assanaination attempt on Castro?

Me. Holma. I think that Allen Dulles did know about

that Halla thing. I think his Deputy Cabell knew about 1t..

too, didn't ha? I think so.

• Senator Mathias. Obviously thie la not the kind of

wubject that urbane and civilized men would particularly want

to drall on, and so they

spoke about it as little as possiblr?

ME, lalma, That la ceratinly true. & don'e chink irae

oven in tha porcaptions of the timos with all the pressures

and so forth that the mosal draware of tho poople involved vero

droppod. I chink no wore juat trying to get on wich a vory

toubh job and there were cortain aspects of le we didn't litr

at all, but 1 realizo that the Chairman's problem haro about

this matter to a real

one and I wish that I could come up with

sonathing more spocific about actually rocalled conversations.

but I don't remambor them. On the other hand, you see, I don't

ho any rocollection either that 1 was being delinquent here.

I was inflagrante delleto, or whatever 1t 18. I thought 1 was

gotting on with the jon and may I say that --

Senator Mathias. If I can proceed with a couple more

pointe.

This

sort of doctrine of plausible denial which was

parcoivod to be, and l assume la still perceived to be th

aporational doctrino in the Agancy to protoct Presidento, we

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have axplored how Mr. Bissell and MI. Dulles might have

communicated without words. How about hon, to your knowledge,

did MI. Dulles communicate in thoso serious mattare with

Prosident Elmonhovor?

ME. llelma. I think that probably Mr. Dulles dealt with

6

those matters the way & subsequantly did when I became Diractos

and dealt with them; which was to discuns with the President

monochina you falt you couldn't discuss with anybody also,

thon discuss with his irmediato assistants thone things which

1.

snoned to be proper for them to help you out with, go to the.

Sacrotary of stato when you needad him, go to the socretary

i:.

of Dofonne whon you noodod him, and Mr. Dullon did go to andy

1./

Goodpastor when he could be of holp, or Gordon Gray when you

thought he was one who would be of assistance. And my recol-

lection of Mr. Dullos is that being tho astuto gentleman he

was I chink he kept hia linos cloar all over town. As best !

1: 1

recall it, I think there was a time when he didn't have these

1t:

linos so clear with some sonators about somo missiles, but

other than that I think hokept his lines procty clear.

Sanator Mathlas. Do you think he had tho capacity to

%.:.

conmunicate directly with froaldont Flsonhower on anything he

27:

felt the Prosident had to know?

Mr. Holma. No queation about it.

Senator Mathias. How about the Kennedy hrothers?

Mr, Helme. Well, I think that Mr. Dulles had woll.

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I think Directors have always had accena to the President 1f

thay want to Inalst on 1t. I think there has grown up a

licelo bit of an impraasion that thia la not the case, but

each Diractor has to docide how he la going to vork for the

Premidant and the Prosidont obviously is the first ona to decloc

hos he la going to do 1t. Than you get into a courao of

daaling and I think overy person that works in the Executivo

Branch becomon avaro of the enormous burden on a Pronident's

elma, so you don't take things to him that you really don'e

think you have juat got to take to him, but Ms. Mccone, I

don't know how much ho saw Presidant Kennady, bue 1 think ho

saw à good donl of tha Attorney Genoral both professionally

and socially.

Sanator Mathias. Maybe it la oven moro important to

explore how President Kennody and Attorney General Kennady

would wint to express themsolvas in theso dalicate araas.

To your knowledge, did thay have any inhibitions in

talking to either ME. Dulles or ME. MoCono?

Mr. Helms. Not that I ever heard of. In fact, l used

=.: to go to the Attornoy cenoral with spocifle Intolligenco

=:.. problems on which I noedud asuistance. I usud to deal with.

him directly. He was very accossible.

2Y

Senator Mathias. And direct?

8.4.

Mr: lolma. And vory diroct.

Sunator Mathias, You didn't need to use your auphemisms?.

25

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MI. Helms. MI. Chalrman, may I go off the record for

Just one second?

Chairman Church. Surely.

Mr. Holma. This has nothing to do with your inquiry.

(Diacusalon off the record)

Senator Mathias, You have already described to mono

axtent hor you doalt parsonally with Presidant Johnmon.

Has chore evor any doubt in your mind that you weren't

gotting through to President Johnson or that ho wasn't gettin

through to you in a clear way?

Mr. llolma. No air. In the lirat tow months that 1

was Director I had a bit of a problem as to how I was goin

to communicate with P'roaldent Johnson, but as a result of

some circumatancos surrounding tho June War of 1967 1 bogan

to see him quite regularly bonuso i becamo a mambor of what

was known as the tuesday Luncheon Group and when i did not

see him there, which was a small group where one had opportunity

1f necessary to speak to him privatoly, 1 saw him froquently

In National Sacurity Council meetings and also motings havin

to do with the Middle Fast, with Vlotnam, and thinge of that

kind. So that l hoard, I think

I was quito familiar with

Prosident Johnson's vlows, In answor to your queation.

Sonator Mathias. And he wich yours?

Mr. llelma: You sir, I boldevo so.

Conator Mathlas. llow about President Nixon?

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Hr. Helma. My dealinga with Preaident Nixon were not

frequent at all. I dealt with him almont entirely through

Mr. Klasingar, who was his Maslatant for National Security

Alfalia. I used to see Presidont Nixon In the National

Sacurity Council meetings bue i think the number of privato

talka, Including having nome staff member there during the

timo that 1 morved him, could ba counted on the fingers of one

hand, i doubt it cano oven to tha end of the fingere of ona

hand.

Senator Mathias. Did you an a rasule of this lack of

personal accoas aver havo any question about whather cho.

policy you wore executing was in laçe prosidontial polley?

Ms. Helms, I didn't have any doubts about 1t, sonator

Mathias, becauso Dr. Kissingor and General Haig waro both

VerY

articulato follows and thoy were able to got those vious

across, and when on two or three rather important occasions

Presidert Nixon In Nattonal Security Council meatings told me

whas ie wanted done on certain things in front of the others.

that made it very clear, so 1 never had the leeling that

becauso there was a difierent relationahip with President

Nixon s didn'e know what he wanted. & felt I did know wiat

he wanted.

Senator Mathias, Did Prosidanta Indulge in ouphemians

as woll as DiractOrs?

In this connection, historically, you can think of

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72

Mr. Halma. I don't know. I found in my experience that

Presidents used the entire rango of the Engliah lanquage from

euphemiams on the ono extreme to "ary explicie talk on the

othor.

Senator Mathias.

Lot me diaw an axample fron history.

When Thomas A Deckett was proving to be an annoyance, de Castro,

the king said who will old no of this man. Ha didn'e asy to

somebody go out and murdor him. He sald who will sid me o1

thin man, and lot de go at that.

Does that kind of -

MI. Helma. That la a warming sofarenco to the problom.

Senator Machias. You fool that spans the generationa

and the canturios?

Mr. Helms. I think 1t doos, sir.

Senator Mathias: And that ia typical of the kind of

thing which might be said; which might be taken by the Director

or by anybody olse as Presidential authorization to go forward?

MI, Helms. That 18 right. Dut In answor to that, !

realize that one sort of grows up in tradition of the

time and!

I think chat any of us would have found de vary difficult to

discus assassinations with a Prosident of the Unitod Statos. i

I Just chink wo all hod the foaling that

we were hired out

to koop those things out of the oval office.

sanator Mathias. And yot

at the sama time you felt that

somo spark had bean tranamittod, that that was within tho

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73

the pormisalblo limita?

MI. Holma: Yous and 11 he had disappeared fron the sceno

they would not have boon unhappy.

Senator Baker, Do you think that is good practice or

bad practice?

Senator Goldwater. It la the only practice.

MI. Helms. Sonator Bakar, that 1a an awfully hard

quention to anawer.

Senator Bakor., Inn't that what no are up against?

Mr. Holma, I think de do what you are up againue and !

think in a Chrlatian country liko the unitod Statos of Amerien

which in a Democracy, and no forth, thia quention of killing .

peopla 1a a prime moral Insue.

Tho Chairman. That Indeed is the ultimato question.

The techniques aro secondary.

Mr. Holma. A prime moral lasuo and, therefore, ! think.

that If 1t comes to be folt ly this Committee of otherwise

• chat things like this and porcoption of the present day should

be put on a differont plain

or handled in a different manner.

I could find no objection.

senator Hart of colorado, Mr. Ambassador, sevoral

paragrapha back, prior to sonator Machion' questiona, You uBe

• corm twist, the torm guidolinor. That seema to me to be

a fairly apecific torm. •

In tho poriod of '61-62 that we are doaliny with here,

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94

what are those guidalines and where did they come fron. Try

to tie thia philonophical diacuasion down a littlo more

closely?

Mr. Holma, Holl, air, I think that, as ve were saying

a bit carllar, and I think, sir, bofore you cano in. the

general affort in the aftermath of the Day of Piqs and then

In the lattor part of that - lat me atart again, bocauso you

ware not here to go through this.

Sanator llart of colorado. I think I have been hero all

morning.

Mr. Holma, But this was vory early on. Hell, anyray,

I am sorry, I got Sonator llart confuoad, I am sorry.

The genoral injunction was to get rid of Castro.

Sonator liart Of Colorado, That camo from the oval

office of the whito House?

Ms. Helms. Hell, it certainly camo to me who was down

in the organization from what I would have rogarded as

constituted athority. In other words, it came down the proper

chain, 1f you want to put it that way, fron dy Diroctor to

the man above me and to me.

Senator Mart of Colorado. Got rid of Castrol

MI, lolma, Yos alr. As I sald carlior, there were no

limitations put on

the moans, And the effore to do that was

prosidud

over by this spoclal Group, Spoclal Group Augmonted,

which I explained varlior.

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75

Senator Hart of Colorado. Yes.

Mr. Holma, And whon I used the word guidelines.

unfortunately I am not a lawyor and somatimos I get into vorda

that convoy distorant meanings to lawyers than they do to us

Lay folks. I am just sofarring to the kind of ching you saw

In thia mamorandum of Gonoral Lanadale's that here no are goiny

to do psychological warfaro, political, military, economie and

so forth. That was what I was roforcing to an guldelinos.

Senator Hart of Colorado, Due you rould admit, and oven

though 1 thinkwe have ostabllahed, the Chairman has entablishol

that the purposo of thia Committoo in not to find a amokina

gun or point a fingor at a villain, what wo aro after in how

those thinge got startod, how they are directod and controller.

and whethor, as Sonator Mathisa was pursuing, whether people

at the top want to know apocifically what is happoning.

But

the buck loos have to stop somewhere in terms of carrying out

what is the explicity purposo of a misalon. Orders to be given.

contracts have to be signed, monoy has to be authorizod.

Somebody has to do chose chings. And I chink that is what w

are all trying to pin down.

at this time, under thosu

circumatances, who was doing those chinas.

And I think the counsel may

have been touching ons point

or anothor on the 5100,000, for oxample, to the ratla contaceu.

MIr. Helms. $150,0003 Which ora was this?

Mr. Schwarz. That was the amount of money authorizod

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for Phane I. Not in fact pald but auchorisad.

Senator Hart of Colorado, Thia vas a time when tha

Ambassador was occupying?

ME, Schwars, Second in command to Mr. B1e8011.

Mr, lolma. I know nothing about that operation no i

don't know how it was funded. This in why & wan asking. !

wanted to got straight in my own mind what some of this money

1:

Senator liart of Colorado. That da all.

. M5, Nolma, May I contilbuto sonathing, ploane?

The Chairman.

Yes, cortainly.

Mr, lolma. As a rosult of my exportancos through tho

1: yeara, whon 1 bocame Diractor 1 had mado up my mind chat chas

1÷

option, If you want to put lt that way, of killing foreign

i: i leadora, was somothing that 1 did not vant to happan on my

ic" warch. My reasons for this wore those:

There are not only moral reasons but thore are also some

other rather practical rossons.

1. It is almoat impossible in a Democracy lo keep

i .

anything like that socrot. If you will examine human schavior

₴:

you will find that tho toughest nut one day six yours later

2%

may bocome just a weakling running for cover, lookiny for

aBalatanca sonathere.

I think de would be almost impossible.

If I may put le that way, to koop such a thing socrot for any

25

protractod length of time. Somebody would go to a Conyrossman.

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77

hia Senator, he might go to a novapaper man, chatever the case

may be, but it just do not a practical alternative, de sons

to me, in our socioty.

Than there is another

considaration which comes into

this. That if you are going to try by thla kind of seana to

ramove a forelgn leades, then who la going to take his place

running that country, and are you essentlally hotter off as a

mattor of practico when it la ovor than you vere before? And

•1 can give you 1 chink a vory solid axample of thia which

happonod in Vietnam whon Presidont Dion was aliminated from

the scono, No thon had a sovolving door of prime miniators

aftor that lor quito some poriod of time, during unich tho

Vletnameso Govornone at a timo in 1e8 history when le should

havo boon atrong was nothing but a carotakas government.

constantly, In other vords, that whole exerciso turned out to

the disadvantage of the United States.

So when one looks at the scope of this thing this le

why i an contributing the timo. Aftor all there is no sense

in my sitting here with all the experience

1 have had and

not sharing with the committee my foolings this day. re

isn't bocause I havo. lost my cool, or because ! have loat

my guts, it aimply la bocauso l don'e think lt is a viable

option in the Unitad Statos of Amorica thoso days.

Chairman Church, Doosn't lt also follow, Mr. Helma --

I agroo with you what you havn said fully - but doorn't it

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also follow on the practical aldo, apart from the moral olde.

that minco those socrete are bound to cone out, when they do,

they do vory, gravo political damage to the United Statos and

the world at large? I don't know to what axtone che russians

Involvad chemmelves in political assasainations, but under

their ayatom thay at leaut have a bettar prospect of keeping

it concealed. Since we do like a free soolaty and since these

socrata aro going to come out in due course, the revelation

will than do serious injury to the good nano and reputation

of the United statom.

would you agroo with that?

Mr. Holma. Yoa, I would.

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Mr. Halma. Yan, I would.

The Chairman. And linally, di Ma renerva to oursalves the

prerogativa to assassinato foralan leaders, vo nay irvito

reciprocal action iron foralys governmenta, who assume that 18

It's our protogativa to llo ao, lt 1a their precogativo as sell.

and that 1o another dangor that wa at loast Invita with this

kind of action, wouldn't you agras to that?

Mr. Helms. Yes, sir.

The Chalrman. And in that connaction, yoing back to inli

ama DIoN PeersOn StOrY on Fixhible 7 --

Ar. Holma. Yes, I havo it here.

The Chalrman. I call your attantion to the Stan 1r che

middle of the page whato Hadrsor

assorted, "Castro Inarand

enoush at leaut to hollave the CIA vas soaking to k111 him.

lle la raportal to havo cooked up a counterplot againat

Presidant Kennarly, and then on the lacts as the IG raport

summarizus them, wa road, "Thin ravortedly has come out 1r the

GaIIisON invastigatiora.

It also was atated by Castilio in

the thilippinos undor disget intorrogation. do have no ina-

pandor: confirnation of any sort. Note that carrison mat wish

kosal11 In L0a Veras is March, 1967.-

Our custimony to data indicatos that castro did learn o:

those assassinatios. attennes. Now just axactly what he ledtner

is not antiraly clour but tho lact da that he ill ledrn, ant

this of courso dinaya raiser the suapicion of whother he was

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thus furnishod with a motive to atrike baok.

well, who has -- Sanator Morgan?

Senator Daker, Mr. Chalrman, I cannot ballove, alr, that

there couldn't be some commanatary from the ultnose on a nattor

of ouch grave sensitivity an you just suggested.

The ChalIman. Do you have any comment?

Ms. Ilalms, I have no comment, because I hava nevor had

brought to my attention any convincing avidence that Castro did

leva a plot againt any of our Inadora.

The Chairnan. Yes.

Senator Baker. My convincing evidenca?

Ar. Holma, Hell, sue here, this nisht bo called evidece

on this shoot of papor, and ll you say ovidance, I say any

convincing evidence.

Sanator Dator. Do you have any other nonconvincing

avidenco?

Nr. Helma. Yo.

Senator Bakar. But quite apart iron the evidence, and l

think the connittoo is without duy such avidence, my commont

wore to notive only. I found it extraordinary when Mr. deCon

testifiad thus the clA did nos supply do Harron Commisalon wi:!

information relating to its own assagaination attampea against

Castro, which attenpes procadded the assassination ol

Prasidant tonnesly.

• Can

you onlighten us in any ranard with raapect to

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why -

Mr. Helms. No, sir.

The Chairman. - these

diaolomuros vate not made to the

Harren Commission?

Hr. lalma. If you want me to make a surride, Mi. Chalírar..

I would be glad to try that, but i have no Indedendant recol

lection of why.

The Chairman, You did not participate la that declaior?

MI. lIaims. No. My job with respect to the larren

Commandon was to answer Inquleles from the commlasion and try

to got toyothor the matatial that thoy nudied for their inves-

ciyatlon aid l spont a great deal of time on this, but l dor'e

raiseshut the quration arlainy ahour, our oun operationa and

thair aflact on these matters. lut somuhow there liners

Tha Chairman.

Hell, can you tall us why that linners, a's.

11 you must surmise why the CIA didn't loal obliaud to volunteer

infornation of this kind that does run to the question or

motive to the commission that was inveatigeting the asmaeri..

elon of the unricar. President?

Mr. Helms, Ho11, there was nuch -- 1 nadi, after all.

tho castro governmort in Cuba and the lonnaly novernment in

tha Undted States, hall Houn at dangers drawn Ovat the Subor.

mianile crisin and lt was fully publie in ornation that ther.

was abnolutely no love loat batwood the tuo, "he lay do vir

had boon atrangtal, Cantro was cartalnly aware of that. lle

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1.

was aware of all the circumatances surrounding the misalle

crials and an I say, l don't know whether ha becano avaro ol

any plots to get rid of him, but he must have known thas this

was going on nonstop among Cuban axiles and backed by tha

United States government.

Am I said, hia soviet Intolligence advisora vare runnina a

pratty good line Into the Cuban exile community In Florida and

I'm sure they must have known protty wall what was colna on.

so having sold that, that contributos to the comper of the

tima, and when the Harren Commission's Inventigation Has yol

one I had the impression and there are a lot of the seall

around who cuuld contirm or stralyhion lt out, that the Harror.

Commiauion was woll aware of afforts to dot Ill a! Castro asi

tha: *his was taken into consideration In their deliberations.

The Chairman. Sanator loryan?

Senator Morgan, Mr. Chairman, I have two or three

matters.

115. lolas. Good morniny, senator Moryar..

Senator Morgan.

but mo

•- tir. ilolms, you sere datedur

natorial torothor lur the Marion Coaniasion, you say, and us

that mine you inew of the assassinatio: plots it! had lou:

ayadnot Castro, did you not?

i85. Halng. Yob, sir.

Sonatur Morgan. And you did mo chink i: important to

gávo chas to the Marian Commiastor.?

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1'e

Mr. Molma, Well, Senator Morgan, I vas not the Director

at that time.

Sanator Morgan. Holl you vera gatherina materlal.

Ar. laims. Yas, sir; I was following about orders and

requests and i was aukod to gut together this matarlal but I

cartainly vas not ankad to go and tastily bafora the Conniusion,

Sasator Morgan, But I'm asking you now if you vare

patharing the matarial and you harl known for about three years

that thore ware assasaination plots and yet you did noe think

It important to give thia materlal to the Harron Comminaion.

That la correct, Inn't 1+7

Mr. lalina, Hell, the way you phrare the question, you

say l didn't think lt was Important, l an not trying to farco

with you, sir, l am trydid to-put the clicumitances as !

understood then at the time. I don't rocall that I was A.

*¡thar instructed or it occurred to me to cover sith the

¡larson Commission tha procies datalla of the Arency's opurat.10.l

not bacausa l mado a siqnificant judgment not to do this, but

as I sail

just a moment ano, my Iscolloction at the time win

¿. " that it was publie knowledos that the Unltar Stater was tril..

2: " su los rid of castro.

2%.

22

Sanator Morgae. Hell, you know, "Ir. intrasador. I don"

want to arous with you, but this is what discurbs no about

24

Your turtludy is that you abnume, you thoughe de van publis

25

kuwlelle, wis hover can pin anything dows. Ad you vare 10! ...

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that time just an amployee of the CIM. You were in the top

2

«cholon, the management leval, ware you not?

3

MI. Halms, Yat, I was, Sanat:: Morgan.

Sanator Morgun. And you had been a part of the

$15.0-

elon plots ayatnat Caatro?

M5. Halas. Well, you know

7

Sanator Morgan. Hall thie much la trus. ln that true.

8

that part? You wore - in that ragard, you participatos?

MI. Helma. I was avare that there had boor aflorts mado

• 10

to dat old of him by these mudno..

1]

Sanator Morun!..

Aal you were chatred with furnishing

12

Lho barron committee information from cho ClA, Autornatior 10.

I: ¡ thought was solevant?

14

isr. lalma. "lo, air. I has Inatructed to raply to

inquiries srom che varron Conmission for information from the

16

Agancy. I was not askod to Initiato any particular thing.

1'7

Sanator Morgan. Mall what I undorstood you to say to

1₴

give intornation. In other worris, you waren's askeil for i:.

1'9

you didn't aive it?

iss. Helms. Thre's sinh", sir.

21

Sanator lordai. You know also, as onu of the loaders of lu

22

CIA, that Oswald harl called the Cuban linbasoy In lexico shorel.

Daforo tho assassina. loni

24

15. Holma, doll, sir, to providal cha in'crmition.

25

Sanator doryan. You wouldled that, hut dil you not thei

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think it was necesary for you to come forward with this

2

other Information that thare had been assassination plota?

3

Mr. Helms. Hold, als, I'm sorsy, i didn'e.

Sonator Morgan. No one followed up on the telephone calla.

or the information that Oswald had contacted the Cuban Embasay

6

bayond the information that was supplled to you by sone other

govarinent?

Mo, ilalma. I don't know air, anymore, but 1 thought at

the time dawald'a viade In Mexico City had boon Investigato to

10

the maximun extont possible both by the fil and the clA.

1:

Senator Morgan.

"Ir. Holma, this la the thine that

12

bothers no, liveryborly. noma to thirt this, or presume thla.

1ai in there anyone who would know whather or not de had hamn

- 2.

14

trivastluated, bayond junt ..

15

115, ilalmn. You.

1 think Mr. Bantin, who was the Chie!

1€

Countal of che larren Commisalon would know.

17

Jorator Morgan. I'm callion about the cia followine up

0:. Uswald's call.

1'9

"o. lolng, Well, 1e mich: be posalble to flad out who in:

the chio! in loxico City at that tino. and the extent to which

2}

22

le actualiy dil those jols. I think with the derroo of

specificity which you raisal, and quite pronerly, I think you

24

would have to dos

sonsore who wus actually physically preson:

at ths timy, and l don's Incall anymore who was our chial o!

25

station ds Moxiro.

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$9

]

Sanator Morgan. Well, Mr, Inbassador, I will ntate my

concarn and than go on to my other tro questiona,

3

It concerns me that tha CIA knew that Oswald had called

the Cuban Ambasay and that this Information was turniahed to

the darren Commission, but as far an I have been ablo to

ascartain from questionina othora, there vas no affore made or

*7

the part of the CIA or anyone alsa to puraue Ovald'a call

bayond the fact that we received some infornation

that they had Intercepted a telephone call, which ..

•10

certainly ho was not golna to say anythlun on the telephone of.

11

any cornerfuence. And than-knowlid chas, that if the harren

12 l

Commission was sover furnishail laformation abu'st tha Castro

12

assastraldon plot, l am not uno who syan a bugger bahind ever.

¿Iso and 1 have sovor iuestioned tha Harson Commission's

findiny untll this Information coms out, and l chint somehow

that so soed to pin that dow...

You have said three thinns this mornino that disturb ma.

You Bald you understoos: that you vare to joo rld o! Castro and

that was your understandin.

sir, Haling.

Yas, s1r..

¡osagor Morlai, Thor you said thurs vero to limitationi

que un the madin.

That Brama to imuly lo die chat murder or musessination

vas an accoptul means thor you sali there vero no linltatio.. i

out Ois the inand. is that toe lay you understood it?

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Mo. Halas. That la the way I underatood it.

Sanator Morgan, And that had been in the page been an

acceptod practice of matting rid of anyone unwanted?

ir, lolma. Holl, I don't recall, air, any comparable

alfore, at lonat during my time, to change anothur governone.

Certainly thore vero changas at timos and there vera oparations

alloceing changes, but I don't racall anythinn that was

comparable in des affort.

senator Morgan. Nut, sir, lt asons to me that chare were

limitations put on the means, that you laply that as

81865-

elon was an accaptod practice.

15, llolns, ilall, sonator Morgan, l as not a lawyer. lie?

ma rephrase what 1 van trylus to not across.

I was not to the bust of my rocollaction, over Instructel

not to do somo specille thing with raspoct to the injunctio:

to det rid of Castro.

I toaliza there die a lot of things that would have been

implausible within the conde of ratioral sense, "hat one roul

10e day, so l didn't moan ly phraaina de that way that l woul!

Iroj as atonic tonu or do something silly like that. l was

simply trying to not across the lace that solody over told me

that raids and proviuling quas and puttiny in people to try di

get rid of the whole operation of Castro wasn't a perfoct.lv

legitimate way. la fact, l underatand lt war..

senator Hornni. In foot you undorstood it has?

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$7

10

•Me. Helma. Yea.

2

Senator Morgan, Why did you underatand le was?

Ms, llalme, Hocaure l was asted to not rid of him.

Senator Morgan. And to no: 51d of hia, you understood th

5

6

to means that killian Hould be an accaptable wayi

MI. Helms. Yor. sir.

?

senstor sorgan, Well, lat me the lt in, Mr. Chalrman, wa''s

:=÷

one final question. I won't Inuoso on the comaleted's time ani

то г н.

si i

In light of your provious statomont that this lea

1: " Chriatien country and thie thie committen ser to lace in to lie

¿: prime moral disus of thother or not killina de an accoptabl

1' way, l boliovo you said worde sanentlolly to that ollect.

In light of that statement, and that that statement was erur

It' as the time, don'e you think de would have taken affirmatlves

pernissio: or authority to kill rather than luat saying le war

1:

nos sliminatso fron the suthurity or you were not rosteletel

by that?

19

This is a thing that concerns my d'out the CiA. The this

20

That I siant to know is, 19 tallina a part do the ClA's

2: horned activities? le jo is, shon l there the snorican puller

2r say avant lu abolish is.

1! you wore carryin out merilie dinority tron hishor

*5

dro Halns. doll, air, lillim was noe nort of the Cll';

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polley. It was not part of the ClA'a armory, As a natter o!

fact, I don't know of anyhody that was killed by the cin in

the sanse that you apeak about lt, where somebody vene out and

actually killa a human baina starting from hero to pot to ha*

3

individual.

6

I won't say that In some of the limited vars in southeas

7

raja pooplo varen't killod, but in this Castro oporation, ent

I sualito you are prosalia no very hard, and l accope thia.:

have tastilled as hast l could abon: the atmosphere o! che :as..

dell ahas l underatood vas destrod, and i son's want to tate ran

1:! Du mayass liar 1 was distruntail to specifically murder Castri. Bur

:: "hat chin was yottag slu of Cantro, if lo had been isaia:

d: rid of li thas myand that this world Have bowl accentel ar

i: " accoptable to cortali induliusin, mayhe no? 10. "ho countri

but I wasn't running thase thinds in

1r i those days and l was just dody my bane to do what i thounte 1

1:! Was supposed to do.

j+.

Sanator Morgan, Thail you, is, chairman. l won't bure..

22

24

25

¿"''s chairman. Tonator "lart?

¡cialur lars ul linlorallo, dus: Ois nuation. l 1ui

miyle usurve lor the record on the last isnue there dare

¡our cha boro boon clicunsel, Trusallo, lunuale, dial aut

¡astro, tie're thres for tour, do whather do dil it oursalr..:

on nus, thron of them bat rathor violent dlesths, i

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During your watch as either Deputy Director of Plans or

Deputy Director of the CIA or se Director of CIA, there Here

• nunbar of troubliny poldelcal loaders around the world, and

I'm yolis to namo novaral and in the case ol

each of then, I

wlah you would consluer whather you, durina this cine, in any

I' of those thres capacitlos you've partieipated in, ovarheard,

spoculated d'out of participated in gossip concerning the

posuible assasination of any of than, 15. Sukarno, Mr. Nasser.

HI, Defaullo, Mr. Allenda, ME. Aralat, Mao Tae-Tuna?

Mr. llelma, I don't recall dlacuasino assassination ol

any of chan.

senator liarl of colorado, Or overhearter

antold olse

discunnin the annassinat.los?

¡r, lalms, to, sir, not to the lust of my socollardler,

did not.

The Chalrmari. lt looka like we're 1o: soln to !luly,

this morning with the quartloning. Could vou come hack a

2:00 o'clock, "r. Holns?

'Is, lalms, Yes, sir.

The chairman. That will give us a chaste of vat. Nors

dunch.

anator lost, l chink?'

sonatur lart o! Hichinar. I

quee wantal lo clear u:.

:1to mbassador, an sarlier comes of yours. It has to do

Icone aml Phags 11 anl Hartoy.

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Now, my noter have 1f you sald that you ald not tell

2

Mocone about Phase lI because you really wore letting Harvey

3

9o off on a niaslon that didn't havo any prospect of succesa.

Pr. Helms, Well, Sanator lart, may i just coline that a

little bit?

I honestly didn't racall that Me. MeCone was not Informos

and when I was told thas thore was avidence that he vasn't

Informed, I was tryiny to scratch my head as to why i didn'e

.

toll him at the time and my nurmings are the boat l can come

lu with. I am rally surprised a di not diacuss le wiin

¿il ham at tho elmo, My relations wiel him were do0d, ant so ni

:: Murinanor are lunt tho 197! l's able to do an 1075 over

6:16

Place did many years our.

• Garator lakur. 'r. Chairman, woul! Iye innator violi"

11'

In lt your imprasalon that you did told him?

so, ilalms, "lo, 1t

isn't iny

ir.

impression that I told his.:"

1: 1oase 1 don't have any impranados, unfortunataly, This 1s

blant..

Borator Boxes, Co a4:a!.

Senator last o! lichiran.

"hoste 1i a note li. tho

6.:

hospector isneral'e tile there, nade 11, that "larvey aldes a

" "uhan he briotal volns on sorelli he obtainal lolas dubroval

let lo brial the Diroctor."

2?

Do you ting chao? 11'9 st the voro lotio.

*÷

Ir, Hol's. You, air, tost is tho snitance 10 which !

25

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rafarrad.

Sanator llart of Michigan. What la your proment mamory

of this suasion?

Mr. Holma. That'o what l meant.

Sanator lart of Michinan. All right, you've explanal

it.

7

8

What motlve would llarvay have had, to your surabao, to 89aer

-.

No. Molns, Makiny mo to do 1t and to not my aprasnant.

*7

• d.

relea.

10

YOu moan?

1:

lanator llart of Michlyan. That you arreed that the

¿:, Diractor nut bain informed.

1:: 1. 1alms. In other words, what was h1o no!lve Cor astari

1é that? l don't Incall that. 1 bollave ho's polan to terti!:

a ¿ bofore this conletao, dan't he, in which dan? saybe ho sacai:

18! Or has sono noide from the time. l'm sorty, sle, 1 son's

J:! tenander dhat his rotive was.

the thoirmss..

But you have no ransor to thirt that i! tir:

In is in 'aos his costinory that it was id: the case?

26

Mr, 1glng. 1 on't think it was, Cowntor.: i Chink 11.a:

*:

mans haia ss! sonathiny to do with, you kick, the conditloan. '

2o i cho, time of somcehinss..

lord'or dart o! lichigan. doll, mu in. - this 1o

2÷

25

miser tal, lint it you throbe you had authority to so fi

lu rest'ano je torna of gottlar ri! i Castro, What var

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9 1

7851 se

2

6

10

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the concern about keeping Mccone In the dark?

Mr. llalma. I think - Sanator Hart, l think larvey will

be able to cloar the up buttor than 1, but 1 think that lt

probably would have had to do with the fact that lt was a

Malla connection and Mr. McCone was rolatively sew to the

organisation and this was, you know, not a very savory affort.

And de waan't -- I mean, l an not seekinn rafuge and sayir :"..:

this was a good idad. As I sald a moment a40, l very much

rayrot the whole exercies.

Senator Schwelker. Mr. Chalrmn, 1'11 walt unell we e

back.

14

The Chalrman.

All riaht.

He'll adjourn until 2:00 o'clock this afternoon.

(rheroupon, at 12:19

o'clock pan,, the Cormleton soreras!

to Taconvario at 2:00

o'clock p.n, the same dlay.)

- -=

i".

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219 9 001 85+7

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AFTERNOON SESSION

93

1

?.

(2199 p.n.)

Senator lare of Michiyan, The Commietee will be in order.

I ballove that Mr. Schwars may have quentions.

Did any mambor of cha Committan caro to direct any questiona

the Ambassador at this time?

7

Senator Baker. A littla later.

Senator Mart of Michloan. Mr. Schwarx?

TESTIMONY OF RICHARD UIFI,M5 = RedUmer

ac!

Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Ambannador, l would like to soo l! ve

i: I could dot all In one place the tartimony concerning ar. recoro.

Now, as l heard the tastimony chle mornina, you had !our

1' explanationa for why you minht not have brlafor. Me. Morone

1: about cho efforts to arrassinate Me. Cantro, to's are

:: could discuss each ona of them in rurn. Can we do that?

Mi. Helms, Surely.

1::

Mr. Schwarz. All right.

I think your firat explanation, your firet testimony on i•

1'+

was that tho mattor was only exploratory, or that it wasn'e

z'. .

clear that anythiny was actually doina to happon.

Mo, Holma, l bollovo that. Yos, thoe cortabaly la paro

t: @ f ost ooooo ## -990090991100

22

24

25

Mr, Schware, Now, if you would look at the atudy on pard

₫ 9

Mr, Halmo, Yos, l'm at pana d9.

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Mr. Schware. Now, that la a long decelon that cons

?.

under the heading, April, 1962. That heading le on page 4l.

just so we're auro what time we're talkina.

MT. Helma. Yes.

Ma, Schwars. Page 11, April '92.

6

Mo. Molma, Yes.

7

Mr. Schwara. Okar.

Now apparently in April 1962 some polioned pilla were alven

to a Cuban axlle lander through YE. Roseill, Ja that 519her

10

• Mr. Halms, I don't know that fron my dun resources. It la

?: Palloner. I don't know whather they ware of not.

%:.

Mr, schwarz, Mall, the study showe that to have happener!.

1: :

Mr. Holmy. The study shows this.

Mr. Schwarr. And a the same time the study shows that

del 5181es wore diven to a Cuban oxlle, 519her

1€

MI. Helns, Yos:

Mr. Schwarz. Now, assumina those facto to he true, at the

:: polnt that poisoned pilla has boon handed to a person, le was.

:: no longer so that the matter was only oxploradory, was lt?

MI. Helma. No, I thint that one could say that somethine.

*:

you know, was boing put in train thore.

28

Mr. Schware, Lookina at paro 57, the study indicator tha:

N5. Harvoy was told that the pills were actually in cuba, at

•the bottom of pare in, aul Indoor harl bean taken lato the

2%

rostaurant reuularly used by Mr. Castro. Is that so? the vors

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95.

botton of page 50.

2

HI. Holas. Of page 307

Mr. Schware. Yes. The last santance on page 50. Mayho

If you road it Into the racord s

M8. Holms. Yan, I sao, "Roselll reported that the pllla

6

I care in Cuba and at the rostaurant raportedly unod sonularly

P i by castro.-

Ho only have Ronnill's word for that, l rould ilke to

poine out.

10

Mr. Schwars. Yos, but lt vas given to ME, Marvay, right?

Mr. Helms, I bug your pardon?

Mr. Schwars. It was savortedly given to 45. Harvay.

1"

Mr. Helma. Rosel11 sald.

Mr. Schwar. The word was alven to mr. Harvey.

i:

Mr. Helms. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. And MI. Harvay atated that he regularly

i" reportad to you on the cuha matter and indeed you would have

: expocted him to report to you, wouldn't you?

195. Holms. That's rinht.

c .

Mr. Sewharz. Now again, assuming that he did raport to

2: you,: 1t cortainly was no londor a mattar that vas exploratory.

ten it?

410+1118-1994

48,F970

тріва. f1

Mr. Helms. (lous in the affirmative. )

2: 48. Sonware. yow, accordany to your hast recollactior.

et at that point did you brief ir. MeCono?

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MI. Holma. I do not Incall hariay done so and I don't

recall why I dia not.

• ME. Schwart. Diay.

A sacond polne that you tele sious est brialing Mr. seror*

and this vas tovarde the sid = your tastimony da the morning ..

€

' Was that the offort inrolse che nila-

MI, HOlMA, ThAt HAS & MIESISA sON ChAE SInCO hO HaS now

¡ In the organiration dod this mes a sOre o! dubious enina thee !

qUess What I vas tIrinG to sar was as My perception of de la

1:

recrosted nou that l lait a thee art on he a lot mort

1: solid than lust acia: to min In! Tarima we're been In touch

i: with a follow da lhe Mallo to age i? ma're oe Underworld linta

1'. to Cuba.

Mr. Schwers. So it bad 10chan so to wich his attiture

:: tovards usina the daise?

MI. Holns, I vas undate st exy attleude ho may havo

16

1% had.

it

Mr. Schwert. Jon be tertille in cayponse to thia line of

1' quostioning.thoe 11 he Not Dota t== Ebe: Chare was an assansi,

" maelon effort underay, he toilt tire scorped such an olfort.

*:

"low, 8ª that. la your luormer:, correct?

50. 21904-0-70 -00

24

26

Ma, Schuarz. Do yau hate any josamar on

it?

= 984 : h50' anou. Mr. Schwarz.

1 8

that alsewhare 5, Morne J1atg1 Cs? he went to seo Mr.

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McNamara in connection with chia Auquat 1962 affalr and tol

"Ms. MeNanato that ho vouldn'e have anythiny to do with this.

I but 1 havo no recollection and l don'e ballove he evar sold

¿ anyching to me about his not vantina to have anythina to do

M5. Schers. And you rare close to Me. secone in that

• I pariod? You vera Mia Daputy for Plans?

Ar. Holma, I saw him almost dally,

yo, Schware. And de lt your ballet that if he had made

1: "any such statement to Mr. Metamaro that lo vould have come :o

.:: you and told you about It at nome point?.

Me. Helma. I suot don's kanw why he didn't, hur l dos'?

!! recall any such diatement. And as I said, and i would like re

:: rapedt it, Mr. McCone hail yiven ma my job, he had promotor me.

.:" lalt close to him, l loit loyal to him, and I would not hair

¿' violated an instruction he gave me 1l l could possibly havo

:"holped 1e.

Mr. Sowhare. Aut in any event, lt la your bast judgment

¿= chae ho did not indicato that ho was opposer to assassinations?

Mr. Helms, Not to mo.

i .

Mr. Scahara. All riuho.

*..

Then I think this mornino la diacuaning tho quostion o!

whother or not you adulmed ar, lecons, in another portion o!

your lastamony you madle the noint that the soneral inatrucrion

was to na? rid of Caatro, number ono.

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MI. Helma, Yas, Cat old of the Castro government.

Including Castro, but get rid of the whole buslneso..

Mr. Sowhars, Number two that that ganeral Inatruction harl

no limications placed upon 1t.

Mr. lolna. Holl to say no limitations is not proper.

6. le did not have any spacifle limitations. but the rule of casson

? rould have prevalled that 18 somabody harl some bright idea ol

* putting an atomir bomb in Cuba, l cartainly tould have regarded

o that as voll outaldo the pormissiblo paramatara and that it.

I' would have alther have been stopped or lt would have to have

:: bean takon to hichor authority or romethina.

4s. senharr. Hut do lt your teatimony that --now let 119

1: Cake one of the thiame that the rocord munponto sas actually

is attenpeod, which vas to poison ar. Castro by pille supplier

:: from the CIA to a Mafia person to a Cuban exile loarlor and

is ultimataly to do put in his food.

Is it your testimony that that activiey was withln the

'"bounda of the runeral understandina that allores vore balmo

¿• mado to yot rid of the castro government?

Mr. Helms, It is my recolloction thas the anguer is

8: affirisative.

2%.

Mr. Sowhare. And what is that baser on?

Is It bacauro = how do you decile under what you said tr

* a rule of reason, how do you distingulsh now or how did you

25

distinguish then botween accopter actlulty within the donoral

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99

inatruction and activity that you folt you could not have

Laken?

Mr. Helma. Hall, vou sos, air, we're having -at loner

¡ l'm having a difficult timo hero, bocauro to have ono epiaolo

i In a long atrina of activlelos relatina to cuba that bocause le

1, • Involves the specifie word assasalnation or the alimination o

• an individual looma large in this Inventination. I underatan!

* that and l understand the raamona for de. nut the fact of tho

, matter remains that with all of die Cllar +411.43 9hi6o bato guis.

: on al that tima, I can only say to you as boat I can recall

.... 1e, that this roomod to he within the pormianible part of chie

:: •flore.

l'oople were heing killed in ralds and varlous other ways

and I can only say that barl as it may sound i don't have any

rocollection of thinking, well, Lord, chia la unll outaldo

i anythino we vare bolna permittod to do.

Mr. Smothara. May I raise a question here?

MI. Ambassador, you indicated, and have throughout your

testinony, that assantially you felt you had your marching

:: Orilors, that you had a fairly accurato unloranting of what

:. the spacial Grous, the Director aur other persons who may havo

::been involvet hore In the leadershly element wanted cono. la

: that corrace?

45. 1o1md. 1 thouse an.

:.:

Mr, Smothere, In ll alno your undorstanding thee Mr. Verone

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as the Director had his marching orders and he undaratood what

they maant?

Mr. Holma, Yes, because many of my marching ordera came

from Mr. McCone who got hie marching orders elsewhere.

Mr. Smothers. Is there any doubt in your mind that he

had a substantial famillarity with what you ware dolag?

• Mr. Helms. Thare's no doubt in my mind.

MI. Smothers. Knowing hin as you did and working with

him, la there any Ides in your mind that he disspproved of

what you did and the undertakings in this connection, that

ho would have indicated to you that he was totally dissatia-

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MI. Helma. I would have thought so, Mr. Smothers, because

he was a pracies man and a vary forceful man, and when he

disagrood, he sald so and a man of very high intelliganca.

Hi. Smothers. Could you imagine himself as Director in a

situation whore ha was at odds with the dosiros of the President

or the Spacial Group?

MI, Helms.

Well, It's an interesting point you make,

bocause theoratically this would not be tho case, but there

was d situation in which he got himsolf very much on the othor

side of the fance from the President and that was ovar the

question of whether there were missilas In Cuba or not. or

whather the Husslans were putting missiles in Cuba.

And he stuck to the line that they were puttina

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do =

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1

then In when almost everyone else in the Federal governent was

2

saying they were not putting them in and wouldn't be putting

then in and he turned out to be right.

And I think 1o all fairness to Mr. MeCono, I think 1t'8

5

fatr to be said that he made himsall slightly unpopular with

6

the President for having baan right.

MI. Smothors. This 1s a falrly small group we're talking

8

about. Had he been hearing a different drummer from the Prasi-

9

1C

dant and those that the Preafdent wanted, that the special froun

wanted, do you think you would have bean aware of the fact that

11

he was doing something other than that which had been

1.:

sanctioned?

1°

Mr. lalms. I do, MI. Smothers, becaure I think all of us

14

working on this thing thought that we wore going to the name

15

drummer, walking, marching to the same drummer.

16

Mr. Sohwarz. Is it now your testimony that Me. McCone

17 " was aware of the assassination ufforts against Castro?

Mo. Helms, No, It 18 not my testimony, I haven't changed

It. I just wanted to answer Mr. Smother's quastion. I'm sot

2.: changing --

2::.

ME. Schwarz. Hell I'n not suggesting that you're chancin

22

your tastimony, I just want to make sure what le 1s.

2:

In lt your testimony that to the best of your knowladge

24

Me. MoCone was aware of assassination attompts againgt Castro?

25

Mr. lalms. I don't know whether he was or not, Mr. Schwarr.

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102

MI. McCOne 18 an honorable man. He has done his own tentifying.:

and all I can say la that I do not know spacifically whather

ho was aware or not.. I only can racall that ho did not tell

me that ho was against 1e.

MI. Smothers, Has totally dissatisfled?

Mr. Schwarr. Hell, lt in confusing, and Mr. Harvey

stated in 1967 that for some reason, not explained, but for

some reason, he decided and you agreed not to brief Mr. McCone

about tho alforts to assassinate Castro.

Let's see it te can come at that in a slightly different

direction.

Can you think of any reason why Mr. Harvey would say that

it lt wore not true?

Mr. Holms. No, I do not really know why he would say it

if it were not true.

Mr. Schwarz. All right, now --

MI. ¿elme. .

or 1f he did not balieve it to be true.

Mr. Schwarz. Recognizing that this may be a question on

which you are not sure, what Is your bast judgment as to

whather MI. McCone knew about the attompts to assassinate

Castro?

Mo, lolma, I have a hard timo, this thirteen or 80 years

altar the ovent, balloving that when Mr. McCone was Involved

in all of those mustinga about trying to get rid of Castro that

he could have ruled out in his mind thas somebody might take a

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Medi

103

•¡ANDA POTI

$ 64

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1.

91ran, Dr.

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shot at him, or k11l him la sone fashion or othor. I Just

2

cannot ballove that that was sot a considered part of the

3

Ilaks inherent in the operatios do vera undertaking.

4

Mr. ScHhaIr. Okay.

5

7

8

Now, let's turn to May, 1962 for a soment.

, You knew, In May '62, that there was an ongoing relation-

whip with the Malia, with Mr. Rosalli, In that right?

Mr. Holms. las.

Mr. Scwharz. And you kraw - whether or not you thought

10!! that was likaly to succeed, you kren that de was an alfort

1: " Which Involved an attempt to assassinate Mr. Castro?

12

Mr. Helms. Well, in any avert, I was in touch with the

Mafis. I knew that we were in touch with the malla.

14

Mr. Schwar. But you did keon also that the purpose of

15

being in touch with the Matia was to attempt to assassinate

Castro?

16

1:!

Mr. Helms. Hall, maybe it wast't all that clear in May

1c

1'

1962. This record is being made, you know, wa're diaging

kind of a trench here by repetition, and I am not suro it's

fair that me dig that trasch.

2:

21

Mr. Sewharz. Well, let"s just say that the 1967 record

27

2'

show's that Harvey was told by Rosalli that pills had been taken

to cuba for the purpose of assassinating Castro In lay ol 1962.

We have gone over that before.

2÷

25

• Mr. Kirbow. Mo. Chalrmas, would the General Counsel yield

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for just a momant?

I havo liatened to the testimony from this morning and

this of this aftarnoon and in all faliness l cannot agree that

that 1s what the witness said this morning. He has repeatedly

this altarnoon disavowed any personal knovledge of what the

purpose, or that thare were any pilla dellvared, or to whom.

And I think that among us attorneys the best avidance of what is

on the record is the document itsell.

If ho has no personal knowladge, I don't thisk we should

subject tho Ambassador to trying to authanticate a document

about which he has and profasses no personal knowledge. I think

we put him in a position that is untonable in this rejaid.

I think that he has mado lt as clear as he could thir

aftarnoon that ho had no personal knowledge of those events,

that 1f MI. Harvey said so, ho belloves that Mi. Harvey probably

told the truth at that time.

Senator lart of Colorado, Wall, with all raspect, I would

11ka Counsel to continue the final question.

Mr. Scwharz. The document wa're talking about was a 1967

study and it was prepared for you so that you could brief

President Johnson and did you ever tall anybody you thought

there was something wrong about that, about the document, or

that it was inaccurato?

Mr. llalms. No, as I testiflad this mornina, Me. Schwart,

I don't rocall studying the document 100 parcent from the

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atandpoint of the acourady of 1t, avery sentenca. I was trying

to relate it to some information which I had bean given, which

It appeared in a newspaper to try and sort out the facte no

that I could report to President Johneon cartain avanta which

occurred at certain placos in time, and 1 do not recall that

«var want over this document line by line to check on the

varacity of 1t, and l cortainly never vent behind the

Inspoctors : In other words, I didn't talk to the paople

Individually concerned whom they had Interrogated.

MI. Schwart. But you don't recall telling anybody that

there was something wrong with It.

Mr. Helma. No, I don't recall doing that.

Mr. Sowharz. Now the document Indicates that in May 1962

pilla wore in Cuba, Now, aasuming that was so, the reportina

I chaln was that Mr, Harvey was axpected to report to your 1s

that Iight?

MI. Helms. Yes.

MI. Schwarz. And your assumption ia. that Mi. Harvey

as a good lieutenant, did raport to you, la that right?

MI. Helms. Well he was reporting quite regularly what was

going on. Whether he reported sverything or not, I obvlously

don"t know.

Mr. Schwarz. But is lt your expectation that he would

have raportor a mattor like the pilla beina in Cuba?

Mr. Helma. I would have thought so.

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106

MI. Schwart. Now, you knew in May 1962 that there was a

problem Involving the Juatice Departmant and a Las Vogas matter

Involving Mr. Maheu

and ME. Glancana, did you, and Mr. Rosells?

Mr. llelms. Yes.

Mt. Schwarz. And you knew that the Attorney General vas

briefed about that matter?

Mr. Helma. I was told subseguently that he was.

Mr. Schwars. Wall, turning to page 65 of the document

prapared for you .=

MI. Helma. Yas, I have 1t.

Mr. Schwarz, -- In the socond full paragraph, lt reads:

"Harvoy states that on 11 May he brlafed Mr. Helmo on a meetir

with the Attorney Canoral, as told him by Edwards. Harvey, too.

advised againat briefing Mr. McCone and General Carter and

statas that Helma concurred in this."

You have no reason to doubt the accuracy of that?

Mr. Halms. It says that I didn't concur.

Mr. Schwarz. It saya that you did concur.

MI. Helms, In the recommendation. I don't have any

idea why I wouldn't have wanted him brieled if the Attorney

Ganeral had boon briefed. I don't underatand this to this day

and I don't = I have nothing specific to say to challange the

accuracy of 1t, but I don't rumumber golng along or being

consulted in this fashion, and I raallro that lt makes me look

vary guilty, the words that are here, but I do not recall this

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Aro 7027 341

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MAHO

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aston, 0 6 20001

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conversation. And it seems odd to me only because, 1$ the

2

Attorney General had baan briefed on something it would seam

3

very logical that 1t would bo vory important to briet the

4

Director at that time on the sane thing.

5

6

Mr. Schwars. Now Mr. Houaton, who was the General Counsel,

confirmed also that to the best of his racollection the Director

was not brinfed at his testinony here.

Would you look at Exhibit A now, which le a menorandun

I from Mr. llalma to the Director dated August 16, 1963, subject

Sam Giancana.

Senator Mathias. Would Counsel tell us what page it ls?

Mr. Schwart.

Thia 18 a separate document in your folders

1' j of this morning. It la dated August 16, 1963. It has a number

1a " of attachment, including a namo for the Attorney of May "62.

I Now did you sand that mano to Mr. Mccone who was the

I6 Director da August 19633

1?'

Mr. Helng. Yes, I would have thought so, It is signed

with my initials and it is directad to him.

Mr. Schwarz. Has that sent bocause of a newspaper article

zu

that Indicated sone connection batwuan the CIA and tha Malia?

21! You ware asked about that.

22

Ms. Helma. I think so. Something generated it.

'24

Mr. Schwarz. Now Mr. McCone hag testified and the 1967

atudy states that this was the first occasion on which Mr. MeCone

• 25

was advised of the CIN's use of the Malia. Does that accord

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with your racollection?

MI. Helma, I don't know. I say here, I assume you re

avaro of the nature of the operation. I must have had some

reason for the assumption.

Mr. Schwarz. Yas. Ha stated in that connection that you

and he had a convarsation on this day about it. Do you recall

that?

• #achington, Di. 20001

MI. Holms. No, but maybe that's what generated the

memorandum.

Mr. Schwarz. Can we consider the attachment, which was

May 14, 1962 and purports to bo a mamorandum for the record

14

prepared by Shoffield Edwards reflecting the conversation

¡ batween himself and Robert Kennedy and Mr. Houston, the General

Coungel of the CIA?

Mr. Helma. That la what it appeared to be, and 1f Mr.

16

liouston has testified to this, he's an honorable man, I would

1%:

accapt that.

1's

MI, Sowharz. All right.

The manorandum on May 14, 1962 describes the project as

2:,

buing completed, refers to it in the past tanse:

2)

Do you know why the Agency submitted to the Attorney Ganeral

22

---==

@ momorandum purportedly reflecting a briefing given to the

" Attorney General which described the operation as in the past

24

tonso when the documents indicate that in fact it was ongoinn.

indeed ongoing during that very month?

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109

Mr. Holma. I am not at all lamiliar any longar wich what

causes this confusion, I hope that Mr. Harvey can straighten

it out when you talk to him, but I am not able to tall you

whather this operation was ongoing, whother it had really been

stopped, whether it had been falrly stopped, whother there was

fun and games going on between the officars involved as to, we

w1l1 create a fiction that it stopped or go ahead with it.

I just don't recall any of those thinga at all, I am sorry to

say, and I think anything I say would be unhelpful.

HI. Schwarz. All right.

At any point aftar you became Daputy Director of Plans

and up to the point that you left that job to assume your

highar job, did you instruct the Agency to in effect stand down

from ongoing afforts to assassinate Mi. Castro?

Mi. Helmg. I don't recall whether there was any time at

which anything specific like that was sald.. As the oparation

I was toduced in intensity and reduced in scopo, my recollaction is

that we were continuing with a certain few oparations of which

this gangater business was not one of them. I realized that

Harvey was in touch with Roselll for some time, but I do not

have any impression any longer that after the first few months

there was any roal substance to this.

As a matter of fact, I have toothis day wondared if there's

any

substance to it from the very beginning.

Mr. Sewharz. Well, let's leave out the Mafia question.

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The question I askad was, did you at asy tina instruct the

Agancy to stand down from the effort to assassinato MI. Castro?

Mr. Heims. On Cuba?

Mr. Schwarz. Yea.

Mr. Helma. I don't recall having done so in any such

spacific tarms.

Is there anything in the record which indicates that i

did?

.06 30001

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Mr. Schwarz. Well, I'm asking you whather you did.

. Mr. lolns. I don't recall having done anything that

specific about it.

MI. Schwarz. Now the record demonstrates that in the fall

of 1963 the Agency preparad - and when I say the record, !

mean the 1967 study.

MI. Halms. Yes.

MI. Schwarz, The Agency prepared a poison pen, a Papermate

pon with a little ayringe in lt that could be used through

poison to accomplish an assassination?

Did you authorize that activity?

Mr. llelms. I don't rocall authorizing it, and it seans

to me -= is this referring to the Cubela businesa

Ms. Scwharz. Yes.

MI. Helms, He's the one who was trydng to find various

means of gotting rid of his arch-rival, Mr. Castro. The recors

does show that such a pen was taken to Paris, but l ballave

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297) 307

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the faots are that this vas nevar taken in the hand of Ma.

Cubala anyplace. He stuply did not secupt it.

Mr. Schwart. But the Agancy prepared it for him, did 1t

not?

Mo. Holes. It vas tein to him, I belleve.

6

Sanator Morgan. MT. SchnurI, could I Interrupt?

7

Who was HI. Cutale? Mas be actually in the Cuban Army?

Mr. Helms, Tes, str. le vas. it not the titular hoad.

at loast ho mas one at the lenders of a group which had bean

10

opposod-to Batista but was act the same grous which Castro

I headed. In othes vorte, this was sother group that wanted in

12. got rid of Matista, but alsc was incansely Interosted in takina

1. over Cuba for Itsail-

14

Senator Morgan. Has be atill le the Cuban Army at the

11' time all of this was geing in?

1€

Mx. Holas. I can"t recall. sit, whether he was actually

1': In the romy or sot, bue he mas certalaly living In Havanna and

he had a post ard mas sell-incur to 1. Castro.

Senator Morgan MIl Inn, this normina you referrad to the

2!,

fact, talking about the nor at che time --

2:

Mr. Helms. Tes.

22

Senator Morgan. - Cha- Castro awas lining everybody up

against the wall and shcotiat then. Thay never did shoot him.

did they?

25

MI, lolas. I understant thas he was pardoned in tha and --

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not pardoned, exoure me. I ballave that you're a lawyer and

I'm not. I think the word it, he was supposed to go before the

Ilring wall and Castro, I bollave, put him in Jail Instead.

Sanator Morgan. Hare you over satiafied as to sho he was

really working for?

HI. Helms. I have never been satlufled with any of these

operations as to exactly who wau working for whom. If lt was

ovar a frustrating time in my llle, it was trying to got these

Cubans to do the things they sald they ware going to do.

Senator

Morgan. Excuse me. I just wanted to clean up that

one point.

MI. Sowharz. And altar the November 'E1 mesting, de

which at least he was offered a poison pan, and poison for

It, Ald the Agency arrange to aupply him with guns as well?

Mr. Helms. I dor't'know: I think that all

through the

Cubala perlod, there were requests from him for guna of various

kinds, I think there wore efforts made to provide lay down

caches in Cuba. This

1s an ongoing prooccupation of providing

caches of arms and explosives and so forth to various groups

that we though might have some possibility of mounting an

operation.

I wouldn't question that he had asked for guns and maybe

In the end he was able to get

some. somehow, if my memory of

isading this 1s correct, he was later put in touch with a fellow

namod Artimo who was a Cuban in Florida, and the two wore sort

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1dg

tand (8126 7077) 964-461

1

of sat to work together.

2

Is lt not true that when he eventually did got some gune

3

or something he got them from Artime rather than the CIA case

4

officar?

Mr, Schwart, And that the CIA arranged that that would

6

happen.

7

MI. Holas. Hell, I think they put the doal together, but

8

I don't know whather the Agency actually arranged it or not.

Mr. Schwarz. But Cubala was an agent . now agent may

10

be the wrong word - Cubela was a person with whom the Agency

1:

had contact.

Mr. Heims. That's right.

1!

MI. Schkarz. And Cubola was a person for whom the Agency

14

preparad a poison pen and some poison.

15

Mr. Helms. Hell, I think I would llke -- my perception of

16

what happened under those circumatances is an accurate one.

1'! The Agency volunteerod this ploce of equipment rather than his

having spacifically asked for it.

1'9

MI, Schwarz. And the purpose, if he had accepted, was to

20

assassinate?

2:

Me, Helms, Was to take care of a roquest from him that he

27

had

some device for getting old of Castro, for killing him,

murdering him, whatever the case may be.

24

Mr. Sewharz. Hould you turn in that connection to the

25

Appendix to the report which is a lotter dated March 7, 1966

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1

from yoursolf to, the Honorablo Doan Rusk, Secretary of State.

2

Mr. Helms. Yos, I havo 1t.

MI. Schwarz. Okay.

5

That 18 a lottor roferring to Mi. Cubala's arrest, isn'e

It, by the Cuban government?

6

ME. Heino, Yos, the arrest of Cubela Secados and Ramon

Tomas Guin Diar.

Mr. Schwars. After their arrest, and based apparently upri

9

none judicial procoodings, the Cuban Press alleged that thay

had bean in contact with the CIA in efforte to assassinate

:: " Castro.

1:

Is that right?

13 i

Ar. Helms. Yes, I quoss. Is this what the Press sald?

14

Bacause I notice that the santance that you're coming to, I

- ..

15

abbune, is the one that says the ngoncy said was not involved

16

with either of these.

1% 1

Mr. Schwarz. Why don't you read that into the record?

MI. llelms, "The Agancy was not Involved in alther of

Is these two men in a plot to assassinate Fidel Castro as clalmed

¿. ¡ In the Prensa Latina news

reloase, nor did it ever encourage

joithor of those two persons to attempt such an act."

2:

22

Mr. Schwarz. The

quastion ia, was that true when you

i made that comment to Mr. Rusk?:

2.:

MI. Holms. Well, interostingly enough, when I read that

25

just racently, curtainly my recollection was that ho was not

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encouraged to do 1t, he vas the: ane that was doing all of the

requesting and asking and pushing and so forth with respect to

tha lasuo, Dut lt sooms to me that in 1ighe of all the

information which la in the 1967 memorandun, Chis la an Inaccurate

statement.

Yesterday, I callad up the man who recommendod ay signature

underneath there, Mr. Karamassines, and asked 1f he had any

rocollection of why we had stated the thing this way, and he

said he didn't know olthes. And 1t may be until we conductod

thas Investigation somewhat lator va didn't have the facto

atraight, or maybe we had the faces stralaht then, but we did

not have them straight later.

In any event, this 1e not truthful in the light of the '4?

mamoranda and I don't know why and he does not know why.

Senator Baker. Is that Tom Karamessines?

Mr. Helms. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, Mr. Fitzgerald was the man who worked

for you, Desmond Fitzgerald?

Mr. Helms. Yes, he succeeded MI. Harvey on those Cuban

oparations.

M5. Schwarz. And he is now dead?

Mr. Helmg. He's dead.

Mr. Schwarz, Was he someone who had a closu personal

relationship as well as a professional relationship with you?

Mr. Helms, Yes, he did, and he did also with the Attorne!

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Coneral. No vas a Harvard Colloga graduate and Marvard Law

School graduate, and I ballave thay had some things in common,

but I certainly knew his and sar hts candly trequently.

Mr. Sehware. All righe.

Now, 1f we both look at pagan 88 and 89 of the report.

under the data October 29, 1963 -

Me. Helma. 88 and 997

Mr. Schwarz. Pages 88 and 89-

Me. Helma. I am thare.

Mr. Schwars, Our copy has & numbar of blanks of names.

Mr. Helma. Yes.

Mr. Schrarz. Could you read ints the record what appears

under that date antry? And ll you vast to use a code name for

someone Instead of an actual sane, I don'e objoct 1l the

Committee doesn't object.

MI. Halms. Whare do you want ne to start reading?

MI. Schwarz. Under the entry 19 Oceaber 1963.

MI. Helms, "Desmond Pitzgarald., them Chief SAS Who was

going to paris on other business arranged to meat with Cubela

to give him the sssurances be saught the contact plan

for

the mesting, a copy of which is tr the AMLASH file has this

to say on the cover. "Pitigerald will represent sell as.

personal reprasentative of Robert E. Lennedy who travelled to

Paris for specific purpose meetiny Cubala and giving him

asgurancas of full U.S. support with a change of the present

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government In Cuba." According to Fitzgerald, he discussed the

planned mosting with the DDP (Helms) who decided lt was not

recessary to soak approval from Robert Kennedy for Fitzgerald

to speak in hia name."

ME. Schwara. All elght.

6

Firat, do you recall that conversation with Mr. Fitzgerald?

Mr. Helms. No, I do not recall the conversation.

Mr. Schwarz. Are you able to cant any light upon the

meaning of the statement purportedly made by you that it was

10

not necessary to sook approval from Robert Kennedy for Fitzgerald

11

I eo speak an his

name?

12

Mr. Holms. I don't think that's the way I would have

phrased it 11 I had been asked at the time, and this meotina

14

did Indeed take place, What I would like to say was, that

given this Cuban of his standing and all the history of the

16! relationship of trydna to find someone insido cuba sno raighe

1'''¡ head a government and have a group to roplaca Castro.

1k

This was so contral to the whole theme of everything we

1'

had boon trying to do, that I find it totally unnecassary to

aax Robert Kannedy at that point, should we go ahead with this.

21: This 1s obvlously what he had been puahing, what everybody har

2%

I, been pushing for us to try to do, and lt is in that contaxe that

'¿!.

: I would have made some remark like this.

26

It waan't that I was being snart of tricky or hiding

25

anything. I just thought this is exactly the kind of thin

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I had beon asked - in's been naking un to do, let's got on

with doing it.

Senator Morgas. MI-Criman, 11 I may ask a guestion,

mainly for the purpores of sakiry a note in the record, Ms.

Ambansador, It would be falt to assuse then that l1 MI.

Flesgerald carried eut the fantractions of advising the Cuban

that he was there an a rupertative of Robert Kennedy that--

to ansune that cantee - de dE be la fact was working for

Castro - thought tat Ite Jemmlys had orderod his assassina-

tion, whother or not they were aware of it or not, would it?

Mr. Holms. Str, when roc spoke to me a moment ago about

dealing with thase ditars and was thay were working for, and

80 forth, I don't ln earl I dox'e recall that an of this

particular polat thate seemed to be any doubt that Cubela wasn'

coprasenting what be clataad to represent, which was a man who

would like to take m. Crstro's place.

In other words. I'do not recall that we would have thought

that he was reporting to Castro on his connections with U.s.

agents in Paris.

Senator Morger- Cue other polet.

He at one tine was arrested and confessed?

Mr. Helms. Bre than is later.

Sundtor Morgar. Hut at least this was information that

was given to him, ors that Robert Rennedy knew what was boing

done?

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: Mo. Helma, You know, It's a pecullar thing, senator

Morgan, I don't - I am not fanillar anough in datall with all

of the files and telegrams and so forth at the time, but 1t

means to me that what Cubela subsequently admitted to when he

vas try vas the latter phass of the operation. I don'e know

that he really went back to the beginning of the operation and

covered all of thess things. So that thia particular contact

might not necessarily have bean in his confession, I balleve.

Now 18 I'm wrong, would ond of you strainhten me out?

Mr. Schwarz, Nell, I think one thing is worth saying.

•According to the reports that the CIA got, Mr. Cubele

confused to an effort to assassinate Castro, but according to

the reports thoy got, ho did

not confees to the involvement o!

tha Central Intelligence Agency.

Senator Morgan. Mr. Chairman, one point I was trying to

make for future reference was that if ho was in fact double

agant, then we did lead Castro to bellave that lt was a plot.

that the kennedys knew of 'it, whether thoy did of not. That is

the point I wanted for the record.

Senator Baker. I think you might also, for future retarence.

point out that according to nowspaper accountis, at least, Castro

claims to have known and claims to be in a position to supply

us information

about it.

Mr. Schwarz. Although I'm not sure he's put a date on it.

but ha has said that..

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Senator Baker. I wondar how ta could go about doing

2

that. I wonder what he doms. Anow.

3

Senator Morgan. How about you as tha Chalman of a

4

delegation go down thero.

5

Senator Baker. No, I would yield to you.

6

Senator Morgan. Hell, I apologize for taking the Committee's

time, but for me this 1s really a very crucial point, because

8

I cannot sue how a man who had access going in and out of

9

lavanna to france and all of these other places, l really don't

10

see how we could have trusted him that much. Of course, I

In i know you have to trust somebody, and I think 1l this do a very

real possibility, then we ought to pursue it, and look at 1t

1..

14

as we go along in the investigation.

Mr. Schwarz. How about as a general problem, 4r. Helma,

15

how do you know when someone says they're a double agent that

1€

thay're not a triple agant, or do you?

Mr. Holma. Thia is one of the most difficult and tricky

aspucts of secret intelligance work, and there ian't anybody

1'g

who's been in it very long who hasn't baon tricked once, twice.

20

¡ mayba many, many times. And you fust start each time afrest

taking the same chances and hazards that you took the time

before. And I must confess that it's a most axtraordinarlly

trustrating business.

24

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, may I ask Mr. Helms a question

In that raspect?

25

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294 +911 Доя

1

It has no doubt happened, but could you give ne some

2

estimate of how many times we have pretty good evidence that

say the KGB infiltrated the CIA?

ME. Helms. Noil, Senator Baker, I don't know of any place

5

where the KGB succossfully infiltratad the CIA. Certainly we

6

found traces of afforta, but may I Just say, which I think will

8

anaver your question, during the years that & vas Director,

hardly a day passed when I walked into the offica that i didn'e.

wonder if that was going to ba the day when somebody was going

10

to come up with the fact that there was somebody in that

building who had boen recruited by the Sovlots. I mean, this

12

1s the nightmare of a Director of Central Intelligenco.

Senator Baker. I don't mean to be spoctacular and I'll

14

ask you one more question

in that respect.

15

The runor 1s rampant in the Cloakrooms of the Congreas

16

that there vare KGB penetrations of Congressional offices, or

1% 4 KGB electronic intercepte of Congressional conversations while

19

you were DeI of

otherwisa. Do you have any Information on

either one of those things?

20

MI. lalms. No, sir. I never saw any raports on that.

2:

At least that I can recollact, Senator Baker. I should be

22

careful about being categorical.

*!

Senator Baker. I underatand. I understand.

24

Mr. Schwart. Wore you aware in the fall of '63 that, 1

25

guess peace foolors is the wrong word, but there was effort

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underway to try and reach some kind of accomodation with Me.

CEBtIO?

ME. Helms. In '638

Mr. Schwarz. Yas, In the fall of °63.

• MI. Holms. I don't recall that. I thought - when was

the prisoner axchange? Whan did that take place? In other

words, the negotiations to got the prisoners of the brigade out

of Cuba in exchange for medicines and no forth?

MI. Schwarz. I think that they were in their haight in

'62 and early '6?. The tractors and the druga, and so forth.

Mr. llalma. But I don't recall those peace fealers.

ME, Schwarz. Well, lat's soe if one thing will trigger a

recollaction in your mind.

Do you racall the name of a Franch Journalist, Jean Daniel

who was in Cuba In the fall of '63, allegedly carrying messages

of good will to Mr. Castro?

Mr. Holma. On whose bohalf?

MI. Schwarz. On the behal!

of the United States govern-

mant.

20

21

22

24

25

Mo. Helme, I don't rocall 1t, air. I think the name Jean

Daniel I have haard, but I do not recall him in this capacity.

Mr. Schwarz. I have just got one more question on the

fall of '63.

The record shows that a crash

effort was made to produce a

poison pen and a poison to be used in it which could be given to

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Cubela which would be usad to annassinate Castro, and lt vas

under Mr. Fitzgerald'a diraction.

Now, did you know about that?

Mr. Helms, I can't ranambar. I have trled, and the reason

say this, that I cannot remember, is that when I saw it in the

report, I thought, that's odd, I don't recall any such thing.

So I'm sorry, I Just cannot be halpful about it.

The only thing that I did check up on was that he never

took the pen. I've done this within the last forty-eight hours.

The record was not particularly clear on thia, le didn't seem

to me, and I thought, well, this is a key point and I happened

to rodlizo there was somebody in Washington whom I thought misht.

know and I just chacked.

Mr. Schwarz. Who was that person?

Mr. Helms. A man named Samuel Halperin.

Mr. Schwarz. I was planning to move on to Lumumba, unloss --

are there more matters on Mi. Castro?

Senator Morgan. Mr. Chalrman, Is the Ambassador, are

you going to be back Monday, or .

20

Senator llart of Colorado. I would only add one remark to

2i" the record, pursuant to senator Morgan's observation, that is

22 I

Cubula naudn't have baan a double agent to have creatod the

22

¡ Impression in ME. Castro's mind that the Xennedys themselves

24}

ware bahind this assassination attempt, if he just caved in

25

under Interrogation himsalf and he balloved ho was recolving his

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orders from them, the name affact would be achloved.

Senator Morgan. Or 11 he had Just talkod to ono of his

friends as we talked this morning, he can't teep a secret, ha

undoubtedly was talking to somebody in Cuba.

Sanator Mathlas. I think Senator Morgan might have gotten

the point, junt a little boasting.

Sanator Morgan. That'e right. It's logical the man would

have done a little boasting.

Senator Schwalker, I have one question on Castro.

Mr. Helms, 1f in fact Castro did know of these plots, and

It's hard for ma to understand that he did not, given all the

facts that we have seen, might this not have procipitatad a

climate hounded by the Bay of Pige that really fostered the

Cuban missile crisis that made Castro go out looking for ways

to got aven with us?

Is not that a real possibility, that 1!

In fact we did know of our attempts to kill him?

MI. Helma. Yes, but -- I had alwaya understood that the

Cuban missile crisis was something that was generated by the

1'3. Soviats and their dasires and that they approached castro to

do this. Maybe his willingness to go along might have been

2:

22

alfected by it, but there cannot be the slightest doubt that

Castro, When ha came to power, must have been keenly avare that

23

the imerican government was very antipathetic to him in every

24

concalvable way.

25

Sanator Schwelker: Wall, Just as you ware describing a

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moment ago, your truatration and pariod of unhappiness of

2

boing unable to deal with Castro and the Castro regime, de vould:

seen to me that you put it on the other loot and that kind of

3

bittersons and hostility on the recalving and would certainly

engender

all sorts of brainatorning and thinking how to gat

6

8

even and the Soviate come in and say, vall, wa'd like to put

Iminailos in, and it would just seem to ne that the assanaination

attempts; therefor, may vell have:helpedi to trisser 16e, compoundedby

the Bay of Plgs, and going back to the point you made earlier

Ir; li about you vondered about the futillty of assassination attempes.

1:

I wonder about the aqual and opposito reaction -- the law of

!:: physica, for overy action there la an opposite and equal

1'

• reaction -= by our assassination attempts or Indirect Involvemen.

" or direct wa cortainly sat up ourselves for a whiplash forelan

:: polley that could trigger a nuclear war. I think there are some

16

i real dangars from this.

I am glad to hear you say your varller statement, but it.

just seems to me it could well have taken place right in the

!: Cuban missile crisis itself.

2: :

You would agree, I would assume, that if in lack he lou:d

ei Out we were trying to kill him, 1t certainly would have made

22.

I him rather receptive to the Russian offer of missiles, I would

assume.

2:

MI. Helms. Sir, I would think it would be fair to say that

25

Fidel Castro was aware that thero were hundreds of Cuban exilas

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who would have been delighted at the opportunity of diaponing

2.

of him, lot alone of the United Statas government. I think he

was keanly avare that he was a target tranty-four hours a day,

Sanator Schwelker. Thank you, Mr. Chalrman.

Senator Morgan. Mr.. Helma,. one other observation and

6

7

then I'm going to leave, and I apologize for doing le, bue

since we aron't taking notes, the only way I know to joy my

memory later on la to put lt in the rocord.

If on the vory day that the Prosident was assassinatod,

10

we wore talking with Cubala. in Paris and tolling him that the

1:

pen was being given to him with the full knowlodge of Robert

12

13

Kennedy, It would seen cloar to me that sometime in prior

nogotiationa that it would have been convoyed to him that

Robert Konnedy had knowledge of what was going on, whether - 1's:

not Baying Kennedy did or not, but I'm saying it's fair to as-

i,

sume that Cubele thought that kennedy was a part of it, and

1%!

therefore even in boasting or as double-agant for soma time

prior to the Kennedy assassination, may very wall have dropped

:: the word that they ware involved.

ki.

MI. Helms. SlI, before I answor this quastion, this

21

meeting Fitzgerald had was when?

Senator Morgan. Was on the day the President was

assassinated.

24

Mr. Schwarz. The poison pen was offerad on November 22.

the Fitzgorald meeting is in the latter part of October.

25

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MI. Holma. I soo, lt's two or threa

weake before.

Mr. Schwara. But the polaon pan was passed on November

RUBA

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Senator Morgani. That would have been the day that

Pltigerald would have advised him.

Mr. Schwarz. There ware two meetings at loast with

Cubela. The flat meating 1s Fitigerald giving him the advice

of the U.S. government is behind him

Senator Baker. Well, make sure we get the record atralght

here.

somoplace in this 111e, I saw the breathless atatement

that the very day that President Kennady was shot in Dallas, wa

ware in Paris offering soma sort of aasistance to somebody.

Mr. Schware, It's just that there are two different

meetings, Sonator. Thare's one = that day la the day the

poison pan -

Senator Schwelker. A preliminary mesting and a passing

masting.

Mr. Sohwarz. That's axactly right.

Senator Morgan. How long was the preliminary meeting

before the passing meetina?

MI. Schwarz. It was 29 October '63.

Senator Morgan. In other words, it was about a month before

the actual passing, so that makes my suspicions evon more.

MI. Holms. But in the month bafore, I don't think we

should go bayond what's wiltton down here, because we've got to

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accopt somathing as our sarles of facts. Cubala did not know

2

what he was going to got in the October meeting at the time

that he mot with flezgerald in October.

Sanator Bakar. Ho knew ho was going to get somathing.

Mt. Helms. Heil, in other words, he didn't know whether

6

he was going to get anything or not.

7

Mr. Smothers, If we consider this meeting to be the

8

posaíble sourco of Information against kennedy, mightn't we be

9

a little bie off the track?

10

Isn't 1t trua, MI. Ambassador, that Me, Kennedy had himsel!'

11

Indicated that he dosirad contact with a Malla source? Hadn't

1?

he put out a search for Mafla people that might be of help?

1i.

Mi. Ileims. Well, at one tima that's correct, he suggesto!

14

wo might have a look at Underworld figures and so on. I'm

not

sure exactly in what part of the Mongoose or subsaquant

1€

operations this came up, but I baliov. at one time in connection

1':" With the cuban task force activities there was a case officer

Ic• actually assigned pursuant to the suggestion to check In New

York, Chicago, places like that and sad if there were any

20

Underworld figuras who had ties into Cuba,

21

ME. Smothers. So pursuant to Mr. Kennody's request, a

CIA case officori actually bagan a search for the Underworld.

2'

the Matis contacts?

Mr. Holma. Underworld contacts, I'm not sure they were

25

Malla or not.

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Mr. Smothers. But persone who had had prior dealinga in

Cuba?

5

6

ME. Helms, That is my recollection.

Some of theas facts, I think if you want to run them down.

his recollection is much batter than mine, you might try Mr.

Halparin or some of the people who ere intimatoly Involved in

the day to day work of this task

force who are still allve.

I mean, Harvey la one, but maybe someone fron the stall to talk

•=

now?

r.

r.

, Wash 79176, 06 29001

10

Sanator Baker. Which Halporin 1a this?

1:

MI. Helma, It's Samuel lalperin. It's not anybody who's

1.

known to you, lla's now ratired from the Agancy, but he was

¿ Involved in these activities.

14

Mr. Schwarz. Is ho the case officer who was assigned on

i:! the. Malla case, Is that what you're sayina?

Mr. Helma.

No, he was not. He was in the operation, but

1:" ho recalls this.

MI. Schwarz. He recalls the name that you just said?

1'3

Mr. Helms. Yes.

20 :

Mr. Schwarz. What was the name of the case officer?

*:

MI. Holms, I don't know. As a matter of fact, the reason

22 "

I don't know is that he was giving me, when we chatted about

¿: ' this for a moment, he was laughing and gave the nickname that

2÷

the casd officer was givan, and l don't ramambor what his

25

real

name was.

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Mr. Schwara. What was the nickname?

2

MI. Holma, I have avan forgot that. Machiola, or Fagiole.

or somo strange Italian name tying into the Malla business.

Mr. Smothere. Do you recall, Mr. Ambassador, about the

5

timeframe of this roquest? How long before the avanto that

6

we're talking about now in October or November of '63 did this

7

occur?

8

Mr. Holma. I don't know. I don't know at what parlod in

9

10

the apan this matter came up: I'm sorry, I don't.

Mr. Smothera. Do you recall during what phase of the

1:

deliberations in the Spacial Group it might have come up?

12

Ms. lalme. No, I don't. Please, I think honestly you

1'" would be much botter advised to ask him and pursue it wich him.

1÷

Maybe he will ramomber, but I cannot help.

6 :

Mr. Smothers.. Dut at the time of your meetlng with

rstzgerald, it was your understanding them that you karen't

17 saying anything different from what Mi. Kennedy's desire's

1E

ware, Robert Kennedy's?

13

Mr, Halms. Well, this seemed to us to be -- this Cubela

20

business, If it were sual and ha had the couraço that he claimed

21

to have, it was what we had been looking for all of this time.

27.

of a fellow that constituted an asset inside Cuba who was able

2:,

to move in the streats of lavanna, had triands, associates,

24

supporters, who might be of some real use to us. And this

25

killiny business, which was on his mind, and his desire to get

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Ild of Castro this may, vas no part of our plan.

2

Actually, 11 I recall this, and the Cubala case 10 one I

do vaguely refar to, you know . well, we would not only get

good intelligance from him, he was the asset we vare looking for.

We dadn't want him to blow himself or blow anything alse by

6

getting involved in something ilke this and have it fall. He

7

wanted him to atay in place.

8

9

Mr. Smothers. And I think what you're anying is that with

respect to your advine to Fltzgerald regarding the need to tell

2 C

Mí. Kennody, vare you simply exercising a management kind of

i: • judgment simply saying you don't nood to go to him with?

i: This is something I'm sure he's in agreement with?

]..

Mr. Holma, Sir, as best as I can rocall this kind of

i thing, Fitzgerald and I having

both of us talked to Robert

Kennedy at various timas, this would have bean the kind of a

1e:

conversation whore we would have agreed that, dan't this what

1' this has all boon about. I mean, do you really want me to go

to all of the trouble to go down to the Departmant of Justice

and go ovar the same ground again here. Go ahead and say that

from the standpoint of political support, the United States

2:. govarnment will bo buhind you if you are successful. This had

zi nothing to do with killings. This had only to do with the

:: political action part of it.

Mr. Smothers. Lat me go back for a moment 1í I might to

25. another instance whore we raised questions about the failure to

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advise.

'MI, madigan, Lot me ask one question on this specific

point.

MI. Ambassador, do i understand what you are really

saying with regard to your meating with Pitagerald about his

meating with cubala, la that you felt you had pre-axiating,

ongoing authority to indicate that the government was behind

such an action, therefore you hadno nood to check it apacifically

and roitarate 1t?

M5. Holms, I think I felt so sure that 11 I vent to see

Mr. Kennedy that he would have said yos, that i don't think

there was any need to.

Senator llart of Michigan. Has such an action • your

question was intendod

to mean what?

Mi. Madigan, It was Intended to mean the Ambassador felt.

he had pre-axisting authorization to indicate that the

govarnment was interested in dealing with Cubela and that

Cubola was the type of person that whon Flezgerald --

Senator Hart of Michigan. Dedling with respect to what?

A change in government, or assassination?

ir. Madigan. I think actually -

MI. Helma. A change in government, Senator Hait. This

1s what we were trying to do.

If I may point out --

MI. Madigan. Would that necessarily axclude assagsination.

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Mo. Ambaasador?

Mr. Helme. May I Include again that Major Cubola'a

desire for these waspons and this desire of his to hit Castro

by murder or killing was not part of our desiras at all. This

was going to ruin our whole plan, if he inalsted on this. And

I think you'll find if you get all of the telegrans, you'll

find

that there was an anormous amount of temporizing with thin

tallow to keep him on the toan, to koop him working away at the

Job, but to try and parsuade him that this was not the way to

go about it.

I think this has to show in the racord, hecause Cubela

AMLASIl must have loomed reasonably large in this whola Cuban

operation because it was one of the lew live ones we got ahold

of.

0 1

4106.08: 91-949

ir, Schwarz. You maan you wanted him as a spy or a source

in : of information as opposed to a killer?

!::

Mr: Holms. We wanted him as a spy, as a political action

*1.

:

2:

2!

25

agent. We didn't want him to go around killing paople.

Senator Baker. What did you give him the pen for?

Mr. Holms. Bacause he was insisting on somothing and this

was a temporizing gesture rather than giving him somo kind of

e gun ho had asked for, as I recall.

The question was how do you keep this fellow on the track.

now do you keap him going with you, he koops insisting ho

wants this, he wants that, he wants the other thing, and

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He want you to go back and do x.

Senator Baker. Lat me back up and take a run at this for

Just about thirty seconda.

Mr. Helms. Certainly.

Senator Baker. How many plane do you know of in the

Agency that ware mounted to assassinate Fidel Castro?

Mr. Helms. I don't have any way of coming up with any

other than the ones we have discussed.

Senator Baker, Well, how many is that? Can Counsel tall

no?

Nino la the figure that comes to mind.

MI. Schwarz. I would say a lot, Senator.

Sanator Baker. Hall, lat's see. Thare was the polson In

the diving sult. There was the depilatory to make his beard

all off. There were the arms caches, the explosive sed shells.

the cigars, the polson pills, the rifles -

MI. Schwarz. The poison pan. :

Senator Baker. • the poison Papernate ballpoint. I

don't know how many that is, but there are a great number. But

there was no question on earth that they were to kill Fidel

Castro, is that true?

Mr. Helms. But, air,

the diving sult nover went anyplace.

It was nover put in anybody's hands. It vas just an idea that

somebody had.

MI. Schwarz. But it was bought and the poison was put

inalde it.

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1Ar9s P0P1 $46-7004

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MI. Holma. Yes, but it never laft the laboratory in

Washington, D.C.

And the shall, this was a cock-ayed idea from the outsot.

Thia was the highly Intensive imagination of a fellow who

thought, well why wouldn't this be a great idea, but a totally

impractical thing. I mean, I cannot call that a plot.

Senator Bakei. Dut there are others, let's not call it a

plot, call it playing with fire, ll you want to, but it's sore

of a dangarous thing to do evan, just to contemplate with any

official sanction of an organization, killing someone aise.

It doesn't make any diffarance really how far 1t went.

The point I'm trying to maka ls, lt seems to me a long jump

from nine plans to kill Fidol Castro by assassination to saying

that we gave the poison pon to a fellow not to kill him, but it

to placate him.

MI. Helms. Wall, naybe I read these words wrong, and maybe

my recollection at the time is imperfect. But I thought that

this operation was really designed to not only get information

i: through Major Cubala, but to try and organize a political

2c

action operation inside Havanna and at no timé was it the iden

2)

22

222

of his case officers, or those paople in the chain behind,.

to usa him to assassinato Castro. These ideas came from him

and ho topt raising tham at these meetings.

24

Am I wrong? The tolagrams must show somethina. Do you

25

have the telegrams from that period?

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1

Mr. Schwars, To characterize the raoord la very hard.

2

The Ambassador da right.

Sanator Schwelker. Well, Mr. Ambassador, isn't what

4

you'ra saying again and again, as I listen to you on the

subject, sure you scratched some of these on the drawing board.

6

aure you scratched a low more aftar you loft the door and sure

• 7

you scratched a few more alter they left for Paria and sure you

8

scratched a law more here, but if you had thought that one of

then would have worked than it would have been go, and that

10

really la what the isaue here.

11

I maan avarytime you say you scratched something or de

$2

didn't got out of the bottle, we didn't let the horse out, onl

13

because it was althor halrbrained, dimwitted or numbskulled,

14

"not because that wasn't the objactive. So it becomes a little

16

bit irrelavant to me whather it was scratched here or there.

16

If your objective was go and you had a good plan you would

1: ¡ have gone, but you didn't have a good plan.

Isn't that what you are telling us?

1:

Mr. Helms. Sir, I thought that all of thia testimony

Indicated we thought that these things we were trying to do

21

" were within what we had bean told to do.

22

Senator Schweiker.

But every time we pin you down on one

2!

'of thase other plota, you discount de and in sasance say, well

24

25

that really doesn't count, when in fact it doas count. The

only thing that didn't count was that it probably wasn't

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workablo so you discardod 1t. That 1a where va hava trouble

cormunicating.

Mo. llelms, Noll, air, I didn't realize I was making any

trouble. I thought that what wo vere trying to do vas to use

me for my porcaptions of what I thought the truth was at the

elma, I'm doing my best.

Senator Baker. Mr. Chadrman, if the Sanator would yield.

I apologize for injecting a discordant note Into otherwise i

think a vory, very cooperativa seanion and i. think the best way

to got us back on the track la for me to ask this question, lf

I may.

9

10

1:

1:

Was lt in your vlow the goneral polloy of the goveramant

15j of the Unitad Statas as proposed to be implemented by the CIN

14

to k111 Fidol Castro?:

14

1G

Ms, lalms. I ballove 1t was the polloy at the time to got

"Ild of Castro and if killing him was one of the things that was

I'" to bo done in this connection, that was within what wa

1k:

axpacted.

410 5 ant 411009-88. HasPonaton, D C 2000)

20

21

22

Senator Baker. And without, as you say, digging the trench

Iby repotition, you falt that the Agoncy was acting fully wichir.

li

the scope of its authority as underatood by the Maancy?

23

MI. Halms: Yes, Senator Baker, that 15 my perception.

Senator Baker. Thank you.

24

lI any

Senator llart of Michigan. Did you evar obtain clearance for

one of the nine, six, tan or twelve that we talked about?

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138

Mr. Helms. I don't know what --I know, sir, this Cubala

oparation must have been

a part of the Spocial Group delibara-

tions because it want on so long and lt went through varlous

phases, and I don't know whether you have those recorde or not,

but I would have thought that it would be thare, and avery

aspact of it I would have thought would have boan in chare.

In this not the case, Counsel?

ME. Madigan. Na havan't gotten those recordo.

Senator Baker, I understand we have requested those

racordo, Mr. Helms, but we haven't recalved then.

Could you give us any advice on where we might lind those

records?

Mr. Halms. I don't any longer know under whose degle those

are. Those ware, I think, at one time National Securley work

or regardad as that. Whether they were stored in the National

Security Council files or the Agency files, I don't know.

Senator Baker. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Schwarz.

Did you look at any of them in preparing for

this testimony?

Mr. Holms. No. I don't oven know where thay are.

Counsel.

Mr. Schwarz, After President Kennedy was assasginated or

Novambar 22, 1963 and President Johnson took over, the record

indicates some afforts through Mr. Cubela continued.

Now, did the Agency regard whatever marching orders they

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139

had obtained prior to the dosth of President Kennody as at111

2

being valid and operative after the death of President Kennody?

3

MI. Holmo. This 1a not very clear to me at this atago.

4

5

A lot of the samo officara were serving Presidant Johnson as

they servod Prosident Kennedy, and I don'e -- l can't recall

6

anymore whether there was any specific lasue about whether this

7

8

was taken up with President Johnson at any meeting or any

sassion. It it had bean, I would have thought there would have

been cacords someplace.

10

Mr. Schwarz. And you have no recollection of Premident

1]

12

Johnson either being advisad or authorizing continuing afforts.

'1s that right?

14

Mr. Helms. But you see, the speclal froup would have

continued to consider these mattars, and I would have assumed

15

that whoever was chairing the Special Group would have in

turn reported to the President, which was the usual practico.

1% 1

Mr. Schwarz, Well, did the Speclal Group, after November

12

"' 22, 1963 take any action alther to authorize or to suspend or

19

In any way to focus on the question of whather the United

21

States government was

still secking to assassinate Mr. Castro?

Mr. Helms. I don't recall, sir.

22:

Senator Schweiker. Why don't we go ahead with the others?

'2!.

Mr. Schwars. To Lumumba.

24

Sonator llart of Michigan. Are there any further questions

25

on Castro?

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Mano lavas 2927 749-7009

Mr. Schwarz. You ramanber MI. Lumumba?

2

Sanator Baker, Lat me ank one question. I hate to bring

It up, but I can't rosiat, since the Ambassador la here and

w111 not be back anytime soon.

5

To advert to another unhappy perlod in our life, to go

6

back to the Hatergata hearings, and particularly to the White

House tapes, there was a conversation recordod on those tapes

8

which was released dated June 21, 1972 which was of general

9

Interest, but one of the things in that tape was a remark

10

attributod to President Nixon havina to do with the cooperation

1::

of the CIM and saying, In effect, that wa've done a lot of

1::: Chinga, of protected liolma from a lot of thinns.

1: 1

14

23 !

Do you have any ided of what he's talking about?

MI. Halms. I have never known, Senator Baker, I have ever

gotten any personal courtesies fron Presidant Nixon that I was

16

aware of, I don't know that he evar interceded lor me anyplace

1'" that I know of except to the extent that as Brasident of the

ic

United States and in connection with my official dutios he

1'9

might hava supported a request I had for some assistance in

20

Laos for some money or something of this kind.

21

But when I raad that on that tape I could hardly belleve

22.

ayaa, bacause I had no Idea what he was raferring to.

Sanator Baker. Thank you, sir.

2;

Mr. Schwarz. I vonder it before turnina to Lumumba we

could pick up somathina relating to your relationship with

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++4455820735681

410 $ 081 S1189

ranchingian. 06 20001

Prouident Nixon since that has been ralsad.

Tha Senators aach have a book headod mall opening.

I hava placed balore MI. Holma the cover tro pages and

4

pages 29 and 30 from a document entitled "special Report,

Interagency Committee on Intelligence Ad lloc dated June, 1970

6

showing on the second page that you signed that report prepared

for the President.

Now is that the report that la raferred to as the so-called

Huston Plan?

10

ME, Halms, If you say It 1s, I have no reason to quarrel

with it. I just don't romambar the offloal name of that

1:

•Iaport, and certainly 1f 1t says I signed some caport hars.

1.

and that's the raport, than let us agree that it is.

14

Mr. Schwarz. And you do recall, we talked about it

this morning, that there was an effort in the summer of 1970

16

that rasulted in a document of this

sort, sight?

19

Mr. Helms. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. Okay.

1'9

Now, that was prapared as the request of President Nixor.

for advice on whether there ware threats that were not

2:" adequataly being not by the intalligence community and whother

22

thore were restrictions on the techniques avallable to the

2?

Intelligence community that might ba changed to make it more

2÷

efficient, is that correct?

25

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142

Mr. Holma, My recollection of what they wore direct

ing their attontion to was improved and more effective in

formation doveloped on domestic affairs in the United States

on not only dissidents but penetrations of foreign intelli-

gence services and activitios of foreign intelligence ner-

vices, and no forth. I don't say that other thinge aren't

covorod in the report but my recollection

of what the whole

puspose of the exerciao was to try to improve covorago in the

domestic fleld.

Mr. Schwarz. And in that connoction to toll the Prest-

dent whether there were certain rostrictions on the ability

of the intelligence agencies to oporate chat might bo lifeed:

1s that right?

Mr. Helms. Yes, it strikes me that what he had asked

for originally was for a wide-ranging report on all of the

things that got in the way of improving this domestic

coverage from the FBI and NSA and

so forth so he could consi-

der what these various obstacles were or were considered to

be, such as laws and traditions and things of that kind.

Mr. Schwarz. One of the techniques which the Committee,

including yourself focussed on, was the one callod mall

coverage: is that right?

MI, Iclms, I assume so. Yes, we have a heading hore

mall covorage, right.

MI. Schwart.

And --

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Mr. Helma, That is part of, a larger part of the

document, It in (C) and I don't have (B) and (A), whae came

before it.

Mr. Schwarz. I think broaking and entering and cer-

tain kinda of code restríctiona on the NSA.

Mr. Helma. I see.

MI. Schwarz. Mail covarage was divided into two

types, covert and routines la that right?

MI. Melma. Thia 1a what it says. I nuat say these are

distinctions, which are pretty esoteric, lot's accept them.

Mr. Schwarz. And toutine moant just looking at the

anvelope, and covert involved opening the letters?

Mr. Holma. Yes, dee's accept chis definition hére..

These are now terms to me really and, in othor words, choy

are not famous'trade graph terms.

MI. Schwarz. In any event, we will accept when 1t

says covert it means opening the letters?

Mr. Hlelma.. I guess s0.

Mr. Schwarz.

Is that what it says in the firet

paragraph?

MI. Helms. Covere mail coverage also known

as sophisticated mail coverage or flaps and seals, lentirely

surreptitious screening and

may include opening and examina-

tion.

Mr. Schwarz. Of domostle and foreign mall?

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144

Mr. Helms. Yes, air.

Mr. Schwars. You told the President, President Nixon,

that la, that "covert coverage may be diacontinued".

MI. Helms. This la what tho caport colla him.

Mr. Schwarz.

You aigned 1t?

Mr. Helms. I signed it.

M5. Schwarz. All right, that wasn'e true, was 1e?

Mr. Helma. You see, what I don't know hore, sir, 1

wouldn't knowingly have signed something that I didn't

bolleve to be true, and I don't know whether this was referring

to covert coverage by the FBI or somebody else. At least the

agency was going to be at that time with this same small

operation in New York that had been going for some 20

years, but I can't imagine that it was referring to that

because otherwise I would be aigning something that wasn't

true, and I would have no reason for doing it. I could haave

it stuck out so I can only assume in the context of working

level meetings which produced this report this must apply to

something the FBI had been doing or planning to do.

Mr. Schward.

How would President Nixon know that.

As far as he was concerned he was reading a document that

says flatly covert coverage has been discontinued and he

kind of got in a lot of trouble on this, you remomber the re-

lease of the lluston Plan, and that it went on and President.

NIxon authorized the opening of mail for at least a short

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period of time, and he authorlzed it even though his annist-

ant told him it was illegal, and no forth.

It was kind of an important matter a lt turned out

for him, and you signed the report that said flatly it had

been discontinued when you know it was continuing?

Mr. Helms. If you were wanting to aingle me out, Mr.

Hoover aigned it and he knew it was going on. And General

Bennott and Admiral Gayler I Imagine knew thie small opera-

tlon was going on in the agency. I can'e ballovo this la

diroctod at that particular thing. I am sorry, but I..

can't hellove that.

Mr. Schwarz, How was President Nixon to know that?

Mr-llelma. I don't have any idea. I wasn't chairman

of the committce and I wasn't the one that had the job of

explaining to him.

Mr. Smothers. Did you have reason to belleve President

Nixon know this mall opening was going on, the operation

In New York?

Mr. Helms, I don't remember about President Mixon.

believe I told President Johnson about le at one time but

I don't recall telling President Mixon. It never came up.

lie was not very available for these matters, unfortunately.

I thin%

there were a lot of things that might have been told

to him.

Senator Schwelker. If I may Inject.

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I took a deposition thia waek and & think one of

the things that might come out thare, the PlY might have

terminated thoir mail covers at that point but not cIA.

Mr. Schwarz. The record la clear the CIA's lasted

untll February of 1973.

Senator Schwalker. I think the deposition I took

indicated that the FBI had ceruinated theire sometime before

that.

.Mas5104151.062000)

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Mr. Snothers. How long had ball cover been going on?

You Bay about 20 years?

ME. Helms. It was "52, '53, '54. It bogan somewhore

in there.

Mr. Smothers. HAs there ary particular deliveration

that you remember over this paracraph here on page 287

Mr. Helms. I don't recall any discusslon of thia report

ever. I mean it wag delivered to Pregident Nixon but I

never saw him in connection with it.

ME. Smothers.

Then this would not in your opinion

have been an attempt to say one thing in wilting to the

President while in fact creating--

Mr. Helms. I don't think so. I think you are goini

down a blind alley here.

MI. Smothers. I don'e want to go.

Mr. llelms. You can

find out from thege other gentlemen

but I can't belleve that be would have put this report together

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for the purpose of tricking or misleading President Nixon.

Mr. Smothers. Can you conceiva of any purpose at all

for having this paragraph in hore?

Mr. Helmo, No, excapt-what I belleve could be the case,

that we are talking about an fBI effort here.

Mr. Smothera, Can you think of anything to be gained

by CIA or any other Agency putting in thia report the fact

that coverage had been discontinued?

Mr-llelms. Mbaolutely nothing, and you know this CIA

operation in any event was on a very narrow focus. I belleve

in this connection a thought here was to have a great deal

more coverage involving

other parts of the world. CIA

operation Involvod juat the Soviet Union and this dealre, ir

recollection serves at all, to expand this domestic

collection was not necessarily in the fiold of Rusbia, 1t

was in a lot of other fieldo.

I an sorry I haven't shed more lighe on it bue I think

that you might find some of the individuals who were on the

working committee could be more specific ahout it.

Mr. Schwarz, Isn't this tho kind of thing chat a

President first ought to be informed sbout or at least

ought not to be misinformed about?

Do you agree, with that?

Mr. Helme. Yes, But, sir, I have a very hard time,

really do, belleving that there was any intention on the

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part of any of us who signod that report to mislead tho

President.

Now, what accounta for this I don't recall any more, 1

don't havo the whole document, I don't rocall the temper of

the times, but lt seoms to me for this committee to try to

make a case we were intentionally misloading the Preiident is

unfortunate.

Senator Hart of MIchigan. If you were a high school

teacher and had given an asaignment and this turnod up

in the assignment how would you grade it in terms of accuracy

and understanding -- if you were the reador of 1t.

Mr. Helms.

Senator llart, I have not read through that

entire report from cover to cover in a long time.

Is it not possible that if one read the report from

cover to cover that some clarification might emerge, or am I

wrong?

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Senator llart of Michigan. I haven't read it either and

you may

be quite right. And I really wasn't famillar with

the thing at all until the last five minute, and let me stat

my question with a little preliminary,

Did the President ask to be advised with rcapect to

whatkind of mail covers

were going on?

Mr.. Schwarz. Yes, what kind of restrictiong existed as

far as activity that might be undertaken.

Mr. Helma, Senator llart, maybe I can help to clarity.

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Senator lart of MIchigan. Lot me explain why I react

as I do. And on thia one page we have in front of us four

responalble Americans defined two kind of covers, one which

1a unaccoptable, and withi

respect to that these four good

Americane tell the President covert coverage, which la cho

one defined here, has been discontinued. And Iliatened to

the exchange it had not been discontinued.

I don't know what kind. of case it makes, if any, but

I am trying to find out. Won't you agroo that that would is-

lead a President?

Mr-llelma. As I sit horo looking at lt today I don't

know why lt wasn't clarified at cho time.

Senator llart of Michigan. It ls cluar. That 1a my

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point.

Senator Baker. This played d major role in Hatergate

hearings.

Senator Mait of Michigan. Youtake over.

Senator Baker. The document was produced with great

fanfare and there was proof, which was at least uncertain,

that Nixon authorized a go-ahead on the lluston Plan, that

Mitchell was unhappy with it and prevailed on the President

the next day to call it off, and 1t was never put into

effect. But the entire report, I think, doesnot add much

to shis infornation.

but I would call one's attention to an ambiguity which

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I think mighe be helpful to this conversation..

The CIA and military Investigative agencies have found

mail covor holpful. Then it goos on to say that

covert coverage has been discontinued because Congressional

hearings involving accusation of governmental invasion of

privacy.

Those were hearings of Army apying, not CIA spying. !

suggest that I am not entire clear, maybo this interfaces

with the Army or Defense Department rather than the CIA in

its focus on the question of continuanco.

Mrollolma, That is helpful, becauso rnally I truly

believe it has to be something like that.

Senator Baker.

I do know that Senator Ervin was

deeply involved in the invasion of privacy military spying

situation. That was the one I holleve that got so much

publicity and related back to the lugton plan.

Mr. Schwarz. I wonder if the sentence that Senator

Baker focussed on which

is the second sentence at the top,

CIA and military investigative agencies have found this

information particularly holpful in the past.

Doesn't that connote to a reader that both for the

CIA and the military it la a past matter?

Mr. Smothers.I think we have really asked the witness

about the extent of his knowledge on this. Maybe we ought

to do a little more work on It. To ask him to speculate on

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why the past tense in used I don't think we are going any-

whore.

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Senator llart of Michigan. If it la tho past tenee I

means something,

Mr. Smothors. I agreo. I don'e think the witness has

indicated to us he can help us.

Senator llart of Michigan. I would atill give lt a poor

grade it I was the high school teacher.

MI. Helma. I have to agree with you, I don't think

chis is a master plece of clarity.

Senator Bakar. I think the beat thing would be to act

Tom Charles Huston and ask him.

Mr. Helms. Senator laker, I don't want to dolay this

proceeding but I thought this thing was put together by a

committee.

Senator Baker. I think lluston was the one who probably

produced it.

Mr. Helms. Did he actually write it? I don't recall

any more. I know thore was some work group meeting and

he was the one who put pen to paper. You would remember

this better than 1, But 1 am really asking for clarification.

Was he the one who put pen to paper?

Senator Baker.

I am told now that may not be the

case.

I think he was designated in the whito House to produc

the document. But I am told that sullivan of the fBI and

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Angleton at CIA actually provided the material

that went into It. Dut I queas luston would ba the editor

of 1t.

152

Mr-lelma. It la the drafter I think we are looking

for.

Senator Hart of Michigan, Then I will reserve my grade

for him.

Senator Baker. Why don't we aak stall to intorules

Sullivan, Angleton and lluston?

Mr. Schwarz. We havo had luston.

Sonator Hart of Michigan, I underatand two have been

interviewed.

Mr. Aaron. That la correct.

Senator llart of Michigan. The third one should be.

Senator Baker. Who has been interviewed?

Mr. Maron. Mr. Sullivan was not undar oath.

Senator Hart of Michigan.

Any further discuasion of this

document?

I think counsel wanted to take up and finish with

Cuba.

MI. Schwarz. On Mr. Lumumbs, you do remember him?

Mr. Helms. Patrice Lumumba?

ME. Schwarz. Yes. WAs he someone the U.S. Government felt

favorably toward?

Mr. Helms. Back at that period

of the congo's history

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I didn't -- what I am trying to say in that I am trying vosy

hard at thia late date to place Mr. Lumumba in his propar

political nicho: I an relativaly certain that he represented

something that the United States Governmant didn't like but

I can't romember any more what it was.

Has he a rightist or leftine?

Senator Schwelker. Whatever it was ho was marked for

assasination.

Senator Mathias. The curlous thing I remembor, drawing

purely on personal recollection, we actually had him come to

Washington as a guest of the U.S. Governmant and he stayed

at Blair House and was wined and dined as our greatest friend

ac, one point, shortly after his accession to power.

Senator last of Michigan. I think Fidel Castro came

after he came to power. That was the only time congress

took an early fall recess because they didn't want to stay

around here and have to have a joint session. They quit

for the year.

Senator Baker. Whep are we getting back?

• Mr. Schwarz. Do you know a man named Justin O'Donnell?

MI. Helms. Yes, sir.

MI. Schwarz. A CIA agent?

Mr. Helms. He used to be an officor in the CIA, yos, sir.

Mr. Schwarz. Were you awaro that there was a plan to

assassinate Mr. Lumumba?

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Mr. Helms. Not at the time. I have obviously learned

about these thinga subsequently because & obvlously read that

report that was mado in 1967 at the timo so I was conscious

later on that therewas, but I have no contemporaneous

recollection of this business about Lumunha.

Mr. Smothers. Were you at all involved in that?

Mr. Helms. I don't recall having been and i think i

might vory well have but I juat don't recall thia business

about Lumumba.

Actually what was wrong with Lumumbo, why didn'e we

like him?

Senator Schwelker. That de the tragedy of the whole

thing. Nobody knows why we wanted to got rid of somebody.

Mr. Smothers.

• Do you have any recollection beyond

what appears in the report of are we just .

MI. Helma. No, I don't.

As a matter of fact, interestingly enough, when was

Malcolm X alive? He died but when was it?

In any event, it is not important about the dates but

I remember that in a particular era when he was aldve à loc

of hig followers were very much opposed to the CIA and

were making statements about it and so forth, the

allegations being widespread in that part of the black

conmunity that the CIA had done Mr. Lumumba in, and 1 remem-

bor making some inquiries at the time to find aut if there

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was any even remote relationship and was told that there was

not, and actually, too, made somo@forta to see if something

could be done to redress this misunderstanding in the black

communley, Dut that la all I romember about 1t.

Mi. Schwarz. Mr. Biasell has tostifled that there was

at least a plan to assasainate Lumumba. Did you chock with

him whan you made that check?

Mr, llelma. No, he left the

agency by that time.

Mr. Schwarz. Mr. O'Donnell testifled that he was asked

by Mr. Bissell-to actually assassinate MI. Lumumba and upon

hearing that request he went to see a man called robilleb. i

Do you know Mr. Gottlieb?

Mr. Helms. ISidney Gottliab?

Yes.

Mr. Schwarz.

And was shown some poisons and deadly

Viruses, and then he came to your office and he

stated to you that Mr. Bissell had asked him to kill Lumumba

but that he wasn't going to do it, and you said you agreed

he shouldn't do it?

Mr. Helms. I don't remember the conversation at all

but I don't have any reason to cavil with it. I don't recall

the conversation.

Mr. Schwarz. You can't add anything on that?

Mr. Helms. No.

Senator Schweiker. What capacity were you serving in

then?

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Mr. Heims. I would have been MI. Blasell's number 2

at that time.

Senator Schwelker. Chief of Operations?

Mr. Helma. Yes.

Senator Schwelker. If they sent poison down to the

Congo, would you have had to know something about that?

MI. Helma. You soo, maybo yes, maybe no, Sonator

Schwalker, becauso

@ Deputy Director could make his own

arrangements without necossarily going through his undor-

lings if he chose, and if he, had wanted to mako specific...

arrangements for something of this kind ho wouldn't necessarily

have to toll me that.

•It would be his option that. That is what I am

trying to say.

MI. Schwarz. You had a report prepared on Trujillo also

in 1967. Why did you have that report

prepared, incidentally:

since the Drew Pearson column had been limited to Castro?

Mr: Helms. I thought this was all done at the same time.

Did Mr. Breckenridge have any other recollection?

Weren't these three sports done together because

Mr. Schwarz. They were all done in the spring of

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1967.

Mr. Helms. My recollection is it was the Drew Pearson

thing that may have triggered this off in President's

Johnson's mind but I bellove he asked me for all three of chure.

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MI. Schwars. Do you recall his maying anything spo-

cifically about Trujillo, why Trujillo was included?

MI. Hoims, I think he was just trying to check on

various reports that he had heard about how these people had

come to die. You know there wore assartions around that,

and I have forgotten any more whether they were newspaper

assertions of just things sort of mentioned by the back of the

hand, but he wanted to know whother the Agency had been respon-

»ible for those deaths and that was why l asked to have this

work done.

ME. Schwarz. All right, now, on Diem. I think you told

us yesterday afternoon that he, President Johnson, had a

particular theory about the death of Mr. Diem.

Would you recount that for the committee?

MI. Helme. He once said to me that he just wondered

whether President Kennedy hadn't died because he had caused

the death of President Diem of Vietnam, and I remembor him

having said this to me because it struck me hard at the

time. I thought this was a pecullar conception, but that is

all I know about it and the conversation never went any

further.

Mr. Schwarz. You had the report done on Trujillo and

you reported back to Prenident Johnson about all three matters,

Castro, Trujillo and Diem?

Mr. Helms, Yes, sir.

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Ms. Schwarz. When you reported on Trujillo, based upon

the '67 roport, did you say that the Agency had or had not

had anything to do with the death of Mr. Truj11lo?

Mr. Halma. I gave him the controversy an I recald it chae

want on but sald that it was my opinion that the evidence

pointad in the direction of the Agency not being responsible

for his death.

senator Schwelker. On the Diam polnt, in your cIA

work with South Vietnam was thero any link that comes to your

mind as to why Preaident jonson might havo said that?

Any connoction at all botwoen

Diem and Kennedy that comes to

CIA 's attontion?

MI. Helms. No, that was what struck me, Sonator

Schweiker. I probablywouldn't have remembered somothing

like this if it hadn't seced to be an odd bellet to have.

My recollection la he said this to me not terribly lon

after President Kennedy's assassination and that it

may have been part of the trauma of a conspiracorial theory

of the time and I honestly don't know but it did strike me

as odd.

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Mr. Schwarz.

Isn'e he quoted by someone else in the

press linking possibly Lee Harvey Oswald to Cuba, too?

Are you aware of that? I think thia is just a news

report, this is nothing

more

than that, that one of the peup.

who talked to him thought there might be some connection

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between Cuba and Lea Harvey Oswald.

Mr. Helms. Not long ago, Senator Schralker, I forget,

I guess 1t must have been on one of my trips back here, I

don't remember which one, but I was watching a news report

one night and it seemed to me that Walter Kronkite had

some kind of a clip in the news report.

Sonator Schweiker.

Of an intorview?

Me. llelms. An interview with President Johnson in which

thig was generally advertod to. I don't remember the

exact words, But President Johnson aort of ended up saying you

know I am not entirely sure or somothing and sort of tralled

off.

MI. Schwarz. Was that the occasion on. which President

Johnson sald wa had at some points been running a burder, Inc.

in the Caribbean?

MI. Helms. No, that language wasn't used. This was an

interview after he ceased to be President. It was part of

the long series Kronkite made at the ranch sometime after he

left office.

Senator Mathias. Was this statoment by President Johnson

sort of amoral, was he drawing a moral conclusion?

Mr. Helms, It saemed to me to have a heavy overtono o!

that.

Senator Mathias, Rather than a factual historical

deduction?

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ME. Helma, Yes, s1r.

Senator Schweikar. It was clearly a suspielon, lf you

aaw the f1lm.

Senator Bakor. I think it was clearly speculative.

But I think the tone of the acatement was he had reason to be-

lleve but was not sure that there had been a conspiracy of

some kind.

Senator Mathias. That Preaident Kennedy had brought dow.

the nemeals from the skies on himself.

Sehator Baker.

I think that maybe a second conclu-

sion.

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I would request, 1f I may, that counsel obtain a copy

of transcript of that interviow and Insert that in the record.

Mr. Schwarz. Yes.

At the time Trujillo died, May 30, '61, you were Mr.

Bissell's deputy then?

MI. Helms. Yes, sir.

Mr. Schwarz. Did you have anything to do with the

passage of weapons from the United States to dissidents in

the Dominican Republie?

MI. Helms. My recollection of the Trujillo business is

this was handled largely by MI. Biasell and the Chief of

the westorn lemisphere Division at that time, Colonal King, ind

that I got into it and as the record ahows that I got into it

at one point when Bisgell must have ben away somethere.

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In other words, this authorizing some document or other.

The question has come up. about whether or not weapons were

passed in the pouch, the official pouch to the Dominican

Republic, and I was suggesting, as you remember yesterday

alternoon, I don't know whather those records exist any more,

but I was really serioualy. wondering whethar the actual

State Dapartmant pouch had ever been used for such a purpose

because I had put a watch dog on the pouch for the simple

reason that we were using State Department facilities, that

they had certain regulations about the kind of things that

should go in the pouch, and I wanted to be cortain that year-in

and your-out there were not abuses of the pouch priviloge

because of the terrible temptation on the lowest lovel for

employees to want to send

perfume and other

customs lteng

through the pouch to avoid paying dutdes and so forth, and

that also there are all kinda of abuses that one can make

over a pouch that can't be opened by foreigners or domestios.

So, I had the widow of a foreign service officer

periodically on this job to be sure there weren'e violations

of the pouch, and if it should come

to

there should be

record whether anybody made an excoption, whether

I or any*

body else in the Agency for sending guns through the pouch,

there should be something there to indicate that exception

was

made.

In other words, this is not something that somebody

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could do Just by saying send thia package in the pouch.

Mr. Schwarz. The record shows some weapons were sent

through the pouch, the record being the report made to you

1n '67.

Dut I asked you, I think, whether you know in

1960 or 1961 that the U.S. Government had supplied weapons

to dissidents in the Domincan Republic.

Mr. Helma.

I am sorry, Mr Schwarz, I don't remember.

I mean I could have known. I don't think I knew. I don't think

I was involved in that part of the oporation. But, on the

other hand, with all of the thinga that havo gone on :

through

th cycars it could have been that I have been cold about this.

Mr. Schwaiz. Then I take it also follows you can't

add anything as to whether of not the Agency had autholty to

supply guns at all, number one; had suchority to supply

guns for the purpose of assasgination, number two?

MI. Helms. I thought that when I was reading this I.G.

report that there was a voluminous amount of telegraphic

correspondence and memoranda and so forth about every move

in this whole thing being cleared with the State Department

and so forth.

Are these things not covered in that record?

Mr. Schwarz. There was a great deal of discussion of

clearance with the State

Departnent, Indeed, there is a man

called Deerborn who is in the State Dopartment who appears

to be a motivating force.

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What lan't entiraly clear la whether particularly st

the last month the knowlodge of the pornons on both aides

of the fence or in the Agoncy and outaide la on an equal

footing. All things

except for that are clear and I take it -

Mr. Helma. I can't help on that. I am sorry, I recally

can't.

Senator Mart-of Michigan. Do any members have any

questions of the Ambassados?

Senator Schwelker, Yes.

You gavo us your philosophy, Mi. Ambassador, on assassi-

nations a moment ago, and I belleve you inferrod, and maybe

said to the staff carlier, that during your tenure se

Director of the Central Intelligence Agency there were no

political assassinations that took place.

in I putting words in your mouth?

Mr. Helms. No, you are not. I sald that.

Senator Schwelker. That is correct.

I wonder again, for the guidance of this committee,

you haven't gotten into this other area you, but ! think in

view of your one statement and your expurience it would be

helpful, what was your policy as Director of Central Ingelliuoner

on what we have

read

about in the press and

media and books

and, et cetera, on termination of assets who have outlived

their usefulness or termination of other agents? I wonder

if you would for the Iccord philosophically tell us your

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policy on that while you vere Director.

MI. Helma, Yes, alI. These exotic phrases are

ouphemiams that are used to doscribe these purposes, none

of them were indulged in with my parmission and I don't

believe they were indulged in at all. I just simply did

not belleve in this method of taking care of one's embarrass-

ments, if you want to call it that, and I never authorized

any cuch actions at any time.

As I explained this morning, 1t la not only the moral

question involved but in our form of country and with our

philosophy and, if you like, theology, it aimply lan'e an

acceptable way to do business and, therefore, other methods

have to be found.

I know in the ditcrature of espionage and secret wars and

so forth, particularly Boltish, French, German, Russlan, and

so forth, there are references to the fact when an agent,

secret agent becomes an embarrassment he was eliminated, he

was gotten rid of. But i just don't belleve that this was a

viable system, either morally or any other way, for us to

conduct purselves with people who had gone sour and we just

tried to find other methods of taking care of the problem.

Senator Schweiker. In

the carlier daya, before your

tenure as Director, was this always our policy, or maybe

carlier in the cra of the CIA this was not as flrmly estab

lished or left to local option.

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what le your recollection, not whan you were Director,

but policies preceding that, from your experience?

Mr. lleims. I don'e recall any incidento of agento that !

went sour being eliminated during any of these 25 years.

I really don't recall any incidents of thie. I can't say

that other times it might not have happened

and I never

learned of it, but I don't know of any.

Senator Hart of Michigan. That is all I have.

Mr. Schwarz.

I think you sald now, or you said carlior.

that killing or assassination, killing of agants of assassina-

cions of political leaders were both impractical, because of

the likellhood of exposure, and so forth, and undesirable or .

unacceptable to our socioty, right?

Mr. Icing. Yes, that 1s right.

Mr. Schwarz.

Now, you also have said that, focussing

on the Castro operation, there the pressure to get rid of Castro

of to overthrow the Castro government constituted an author-

Ization, at least an implicit authorization to kill him, to

assassinate him.

Is that right?

MI. Helms. Yes, I think that ia generally in accurate

phrasing of it.

• Mr. Schwarz. Now, there is a conflict.

Not a conflict but a tension between those eno pieces i.:

your costimony.

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Mr. Helms. Right.

MI. Schwart.

Now when you became Director, so that

you were in charge and recognized that you knew that efforts

had been undertaken to assassinate Mr. Castro under the

general instruction to overthrow his government, and recog-

nizing further that it to your attitude or it la your testimony

that you thought that was unacceptable for both practical

and moral reasons, did you take any stepa to lasue an instruc-

tion to prevent such activity from occurring again?

Mr. Helms. Well, I do know that, and I don'e recall now

the means that this manifested itsolf in, but I certainly

made it clear to my senior

associates when I was Director.

I simply didn't want this to go on, and I think if you will

talk to them you will find that they understood this very

clearly.

MI. Schwarz. Of course that is what MI. McCone said

when he took over.

MI. Helms. I understand that.

But

I mean we can

Ioll this over and over and over, but may i just say one

thing. As somebody pointed out in the nowspaper not long

ago, if someone had killed Hitler in 1938 and '19 it might hit:.

saved the world quite a number of deaths and a very difficul

war and vast expenge and all the rost of it. And is it not

possible that even in the good senso o! the citizens of thi

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United States of America that there are some occasione on

which they seem to think that the provocation in larger chan

it la on others and that certain actions would be more accept-

ablo in one climate than they would be in another climate,

even though in the atriot interpretation of law and moral

judgment this might not be the case.

I simply have to rest my case this way because it seems

to me history showa this.

Senator Schwalker. How do you know when a llitler

becomes a Hitlor and where do you

draw the line when a

Trujillo ought to go or Lumumba ought to yo, and who makes

that docision?

Mr. llalms, It certainly ought to be made at the top of

the government, Senator Schweiker. It certainly ought to be

made by political official who are subject to the will of

the people and the Congress.

Senator Schwelker. I have one more question.

This is going ahead a little bit, Mr. Ambassador,

based on your 25 years of experience, and having seen now

many of the problems that have come to bear for the Agency,

2: "

or all intelligence, including not only the assassination prob-

"

2г.

lems but domestic surveillance problems, and

the problem with

2:

Congress and Laos and the war there.

24

What advice could you give this committee to avoid

25

areas such an this for the intelligence agency of the future

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168

1

2

so we do have a strong intelligence agency doing legitinate

Intelligence activitios yet not hamstringing it but yet

making sure some of the things we have learned the hard.

way ovor these 20-some yeara don't happen again?

What advice could you give to us to do chat?

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÷169

MI. Helms, Sir, I think that I would like to answer

you by saying that obvioualy I have given thought to these

matters. I have wondered what it was that if it had happened

differently through the years might have avoided these various

things.

I have looked at the law, the atatute, I think there

are things that should be changed in it and & think it should

be tightoned up in certain respects, but i am also mindíul of

the fact that as long as one is dealing with himan beingo.

wIltten words are not going to be the dotermining factor in

their conduct 24 hours a day seven days of the week, and that

I would hope that in the future what 1s called oversight over

intelligence activities been given a fuller opportunity,.

hecause I honestly believe that part of the problem through

the years has been that those people who had oversight over

intelligence activities, or particularly the accivities of the

CIA, were senior officials both in the Executive and in Congres

who were so bugy and so preoccuplied about other matters that

rather short shrift has been given to this activity, and if

there are better oversight or better opporcunitles to have

extended conversations with menbers of the Congreas, for

example, I think some of these things could be headed off

simply by an indication

from a hairman of a committee or

something that this didn't seem to be desirable, or from sui

other senators.

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For example, let me just take a specific Inatance.

The Senate Foreign Relationa Committee, when I was leaving,

had a hearing about

something having to do with police

departments. It was the sense of the committee that this was

an undeairable actlvity for the Agency

to be helping police

departmenta diractly, so they made a statement to the effect

this should stop. So I believe it was stopped that very day.

There don't any desire of these people to yo beyond what they

have been told not to do, But if you can't got ahold of your

oversight committee or choy don't have meetings and you aro

busy you go

ahead doing as best you can, and I honestly

believe, you know, as I look back in history that Mr. Dulles

would have been very pleased if he would have had a couple

of Senators by the hand when he went into the Bay of Pigs.

Senator Schwelker. I think you are perfectly right about

oversight. I couldn't agree with you more. And I think here

congress itself has been derellot. I agree with that. I

think that is a very serious weakness of Congress on the over-

sight committees. The other

aspect I think is important, too.

and I concede the first point is in many cases when some

oversight was tried to be exercised, and let me say very litt:!

was. I don't think the intelligence agencies leveled with thr

Congress per se, too, and I think that that is a very serioun

problem from those who want to say choy want to do a good jon

when you don't have that leveliny or credibility or whatever

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71

you want to call it, how do ve instill that in a system?

Mt. Helms, I thought that the Agency's record of lovel-

ing was pretty good when given the opportunity.

Senator Schweiker, I don't recall ever being before one

of the oversight committoos set up by Congress and not

absolutely honestly and fairly answering any question I was

asked.

senator Schwelker. Now, how about the war in Laos? i

sat on the House and Senate Armed Sarvices Committees, Mr.

Ambassador, and I think I was on there for eight years, all

during the war, before CIA owned up to conducting a war in

Laos. And I think stu Symington, who sat on the Select or on

the Committee on Superviaion of CIA made the discovery.

I can't agree with you on laos because I sat on the

llouse and Senate Armed Service Committees when you folks camu

a number of times and testified and we had to stumblo into

it backwards. I think senator Symingion really did it thraugh

Foreign Relations contacts, even

though he was on thr oversight

Committee of the Armed Services. I think there is a case where

I won't agree with you, even though I agree with what you said

about oversight.

MI. Helms. I am under oath. Would you mind if I ducked

this?

I can give you no answer except to tell the truth and

I would rather not set into it now, if you don't mind, unless

it is important to you.

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could I talk to you privately about de if you 11ke?

Senator Schwalker. Okay.

Senator Baker. (Presiding). Aro chore other questions?!

senator Schweiker. One other question I do have. In

terma of assassinations, did any membar of Congress know of

any assassination attempta?

In other words, did the Agency In

the oversight responsibility level with any members of

Congress or oversight committees about assassinations?

Mr. Helma. I don't know of any conversations about this.

Senator Schwalker. That is all I havo.

MI. Madigan. Mi. Ambassador, there have been rumors of

resent vintage that the CIA has contributed

mondy to political

campaigns.

Do you know or have any knowledge as to whether -

Mr. Helms. Where is that, sir? what political campaigns

MI. Madigan, In the United States?

Mr. Helms, Never to my knowledge.

Mr. Madigan.

None to your knowledge?

Mr. Melms. No sir.

Senator Mathias. Ambassador, You, I think explained

very fully and lucidly the way in which you felt you had

authority to act in the very situations , which was a kind ot

a blanket authority without restriction, and that once this

was determined, as Illustrated by the case of Attornuy

Genoral Robert Kennedy, you didn't feel it was necessary in!

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: 173

refresh that authority with each mucceeding apleode?

MI. Helms. Yos, I would profer, Mr. Mathias, to say that

we were seding him so regularly that we folt that we were in

tuna with what he dosired and what was acceptable.

Senator Mathias.

There was an exchange of, if not words,

an axchange of ideas and feelings that kept the situation

curront and continually kept you reassured that there was no

lack, there had been no change of direction at the highest

lovels?

MI, llelms. Yes alr.

Senator Mathias. That was truo as far as the Castro

situation was concerned?

In other situations was there an oxchange of ideas in

this same level of intensity?

MI. llelms. I don't recall except on Vietnam as many

regular exchanges on any subject as there were on Cuba.. And

to get the attention of the top members of the Government on

a continuing basis on one theme really takes a great deal of

attention to that theme on the part of the White House in

order to generate the fact that the Secretary of State should

attend that meeting rather than that meeting on a specifie dry.

The power of the President flows into these matters

in a strang

way and if the Secretary of State appears at an inter-Govorn-

mental meeting it is because he is pretty clear in his mind

that is where he ought to be that day rather than making

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174

spoach in Chicago or something.

Sanator Mathias. How did you manage then undor these

difficult circumstances -- I understand exactly what you are

saying = manago to bo. sure that, say, in the Lumumba situation.

oI Trujillo situation that there was this same kind of cor

tinuing policy, or there hadn't been any change in polley?

Mr. Holms. I don't know the Lumumbs altuation, I don't

know whore the idea came from or what the poldey was any longer

at all, and the trujillo situation I think that the record

shows an on-going back and forthing between the Agency and

the State

Department about the sicuation in the dominican

Republic.

lere it soems to me we had a situation In which it

stayed in CIA rather than inter-agency committed formally

established dealing with this matter, I know in there, for

example, Assistant Secretary Rubottom's name keeps coming

up again and again so I assume the Agency people ware dealing

on a continuing basis.

Senator Mathias. Now, after November 22, 1963, when

President Johnson came in, I think your cestimony is that you

continued to deal with Attorney General Kennedy?

Mr, Helms. I think for a time we did as long as he was

Attorney General. I foryet how long he stayed there. But !

recall even seeing him at one time and saying is there any

truth to the rumor you are goins to leave and run for the

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sonate, and ho said yes, it la true. So I must have been seeiny

him up to that time. This de just something that occurred to

me at chis moment but I do recall asking him that question.

Senator Machias, And you continued to deal on these

matters with him although he didn't atand in quite the same

relationship with President Johnson as he obviously had to

Preaident Kennedy?

• Mr. Helms. I think on the matter of the Castro business.

it would have been with that Special Group rather than him

parcicularly, because by this time that thing had wound down

somewhat. But I think that he was atill Involved. I think

that 1a right.

Senator Mathias. So there is a kind of fluidity about

the whole relationship in all of these matters that is very

difficult to

MI. Helms. Would it be helpful to you if I were to say

over this period of 25 years it has been a very fluid thing,

this busoness of getting clearances and approvals and how

close you are piped in and how close you are not piped in and

overgight and all of these things do change through the years.

It is one of the

reasons I think that the establishment of thi

Select Committee 25 years later to look at the intelligence

community is a very baluable, wize thing for our country. I

think a lot of things have

to be brought up to date, I chini:

the experiances of 25 years ought to be used to tighten this.

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176

thinga up in the right places. The Intelligence community

so-called has kind of grown like Topsy over the years. Here

was an agency and there was another agency and then you add a

third and then you add a fourth and then tou find some way to

relate them and find some way to try and coordinate them and

find some way to get Congressional oversight of them and if you

wore to start from absolute scratch and one day say let'a set

up an intelligence community you might sot the thing up

entirely differently and maybe more effoctively. So the 25

years later I think it is juat fine that this Committe has

seized thia problem. It is very difficult one and I don't

believe by circling you are yoing to find many casy answers

but it is certainly an effort worth making on behalf of our

country. After all, two things. Intelliyence is the first

line of defense hy good effective intelligence organizations,

but it has to be good, there la no sense in having an intelli-

gence organization like the ferman one during world War lI.

which was no good. That does you more harm than good. I

don't mean to keep saying that word. The ocher thing is that

in the arranging of the intelligence community, the ostablish-

ment of some kind of an organization which was sot up after

Pearl llarbor and designated the CIA to get material from all

over the Government and qive balanced judgments not subject co

political or departmental pressures, as to what they believe ru

future holds or what they belleve the strenuth of the soviet

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Union 18 18 very important because if that function falla Into

the hands of the solf-garvers there wouldn't be enough money in!

the world to support our military establiahment.

Senator Mathias. I think that in a very helpful and

useful comment.

I think we understand that by whatever means, by whatever

form of human communication was involved that original

authorizations were given even at various times

for given

projects. The projecte may have altored. I think thụ

testimony, not only your costimony but Mr. Diasall's and othera

has boen that a project undertaken to remove somebody in a

political sense might become later a project to remove that

same person in a physical sense. So the projects did alter.

But, all pursuant to the original authorization, do you

think that there was adequate political control as this kind

of undulation took place, that a Prosident or a President's

designee, for example, aufficiently aware of the undulations

and had an opportunity to veto the action at some point, at

sone critical point?

MI. Helms. I think that the basic thruat of what you ar

saying is quite accurate. As a long time, I might put it this

way, bureaucrat, it seems to me one of the great problems of

Government is that one starts sonething it takos on a life of

its own, then le gets turned off far too late, and I have bore

quilty of this in my own work, I know this, but 1t is alno

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true of departments of Government. And If the senate, lor

example, overy year had put before it a list of all the things

that it had sot up the year before, I venture to say there

might bo a percentago of them you would ilke to get rid of a

year later or five years later, but they continue going on and

getting budgeted and employing people and so forth and nobody

gets around to stopping them.

Senator Mathlas. He have a snuff box on the floor of

the Senato. It is filled everyday.

Lat me aix off the record.

(Off the rocord discussion)

Sonator Schwelker.

I have one question. Mr. Ambassador.

had the CIA, to your knowledge, ever used Peace Corpe or Peace

Corps members as either direct assistants in any way to our

overseas intelligence activities?

MI. llelms. No sir. I say no air emphatically because

I remember in this case specifically writing a paper making.

it clear to everybody that was involved in the clandestine

side of the CIA the Peace Corps was not to be used because

Sargeant Shriver whon he was head of the Peaco Corpr wont to

President kennody one day and charged that we ture wiing li

Peace Corps for cover. And I went into prove that Mr. Shriver

was wrong and as a result of this I said there l8 only one

way to be absolutely certain and that is for me to ban this,

and I am glad to ban it because we didn't noed the l'eace corus

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and I don't want to corrupt an organization which has a very

clear purpose and shining light and so forth, so I insued

those instructions and I am relatively cortain they were com-

plied with through the years.

Senator Schwalker. Can you shed any light -- I think our

Peace Corps people were thrown out of Caylon with the allegation

that thoy were helping the CIA?

Mr. Helme This was a KGD political or psychological war-

fare rather. At that time for years, even very shortly after

the Peace Corps began, that the soviet propaganda kept

asscrting that it was CiA that was under the Peace Corps, iº

was CIA, that was in the Arab press and Asiatic press and

African press, and I would assume the Coylonese pross. It wi

exactly the same, It was Communist propaganda.

Senator Schweiker. There is a wiitten memorandum or

wIitten order that is still in effect on this point?

Mr. Helms. It goes back to the early days of the found-

ing of the Peace Corps.

Senator Schwiker. I wonder if we could get that for the

record?

That is all.

Senator Baker. Let me ask you two quick questions.

Would you supply for us

now or later in one

of your subsequent

appearances some indication of how the CIA interacted or

cooperated with the DIA and the NSA?

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MI. Helma, Let no write down this note.

Senator Baker.

We can giv e you a copy of the transcript.

What I really want to say is a goneral description of how cIn

Intoracted with the other Intelligence gathering bodies of

the Government, FBI, NSA, DIA, and othere.

I understand there are 1f that have a primary intelli-

gence gathering mission.

MI. Helms, Right.

Senator Baker. And I really think lt might be better

later after you give it some thought.

Mr. Helma. Yes, I would approciate being able to refres!

my memory and on my subsequent appearancor, why don't l cover

that? I juat wanted to write the notes down to have your

request accurately.

Senator Baker. If there are no other questions we

thank you for being a patient and cooperative witness in an

entire day of testimony

and the hearing will atand in recess

subject to the call of the Chair.

MI. Helms. Sonator Baker, as the Chairman, may I say

that I would prefer not to make a statement to the press or

get involved in colloquy with them, I wantod to say this

before so I don't fly under

false colors, that I intend to

sneak out of here as best as I can.

MI. Schwarz, There is a way you can set out from

behind.

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• 191

Mr. Helms, I think ve have been trying to contrive this

through the day.

Senator Baker. We will be willing accessories to that.

(Whereupon, at 4:13 P.m., the hearing was recessed

subject to the call of the Chalr.)

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→. $

EX

4/13/75

SECRET/SHNSITIVE

11.5

11 April 1967

5:8:8.705

TO: The Director

FROM: John A. McCone

No memorandon can ba located covering the August 10, 1962

meeting; however, it is highly probable that one exists.

2. Meclings of August 8 or 9, 1962, in the JCS Operations Room

(Penagun) and August 10, 1962, in Secrolary Ruak'a Conference Room

vero for the purposo of considering siall proposalo for Phase ll of opera-

..llon MONGOUSE. This operalion was undor tho direction of Coneral

Innodalo, with Win. Harvey handling CLA participation (undar FitzGerald).

At one of these mectings -- probably the mceting in the JCS Rouin - 1

rocall a suggration being made to liguidato top people in the Castro

regime, including Cisstro.

110ok immodiato exception to this suggestion,

staling that the subject wis completely out of bounds as far as the *15G

and ClA were conceinod and the idea should not bo dirassed

nur should

it appear in any papers, as the USG could not conslate such ditions on

snoral or athieal grounds.

3. lumodiatoly aller the morting, I called un Sceretary MeNarnara

persunally and re emphasized my position,

in which he heartily agreed.

I did this because operation MUNGOOSE -• an intor-departmental affair

was under the operational cuntrol of DOD through the JeS.

4. At no time did the suggestion receive scrious consideration

by the Spocial Group (augmented) nor by any individual responsible for

policy.

5. Thruugh the years the Cuban problem was discussed in lerina

suchas "lispose uf Castro," "remove Castro, " "knock off Castro," etc.,

and this sneant the overthrow of the Communist Guverment in Cuba and

the replacing of it with a denocratic regie. 'Terins such as the above

appear in any working papors, memoranda for the record, etc., and, as

stated, all refer to a change in the Cuban Goverment,

SECKET/SENSITIVE

---

## Page 188

TOP SECRET.

HELMSEXY

6l13/75

16 Auget 1963

EYES ONLY,

• ICHORIMUM FOR:

To Director of Central Intelligenco

SUBJECT:

San Giancana

1. Allached 10 the only copy in the Ayuncy of a ramo-

randus on subject, tie ribbon copy of which ras sunt to tha

AlLorney Concial In May

I was vaguely avaro of

1h0 existenco of rich a monoraidun sinco I liao infornd

that 16 had been written as a result of a briofine given

Ly Colonel Elusio and laurenco Houston to the Attornoy

reneral in lay of last joar.

I syoke with Colonel Sharde on the lolaganno last

evening,

in tie abrence of fire Bannered on leavo, &

san with colonel Bivardse ansinlance able to locals this

As far is I sa muare, lin la tho only srilion in-

curation avallible on Aconcy rolationships with sueject.

Thope that tuls will serve your purpose.

I accure you are aware of tha nature of the ofera-

dion discussed in tho

atlachuant.

Richfra Helins

Dupply Diroctor (11273)

Allachirent

3-jnge memo disted le lay 1962,

rs- 1011,06 - 19n0 for lho Rucord

Arthur James Ballotti et al -

Unauthorized Moblication or lino

of Cominications.

TOP. SECRET

TIJeT

---

## Page 189

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---

## Page 190

SENSINE

1)4S MY

';.

le goose informalion clues, in goned algends ared wire?

wire of there goose glendid y dead this might does:

109 1100:

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---