SUMMARY OF FACTS, INVEST. CIA INVOLVE. IN PLANS TO ASSASS...LEADERS
Agency: WILDEROTTE
Originator: ROCK
From: BELIN, DAVID
Document date: 05/30/1975
Document type: REPORT

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JFK Assassination System

Identification Form

Agency Information

Date:

8/27/201

Released under the John F.

AGENCY :

RECORD NUMBER:

WILDEROTTE

178-10004-10091

RECORD SERIES:

ASSASSINATION-RELATED MATERIALS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

RPT. ON INVEST. OF CIA INVOLVE..FOREIGN LEAD.

Document Information

ORIGINATOR:

FROM:

TO :

TITLE:

ROCK

BELIN, DAVID

SUMMARY OF FACTS, INVEST. CIA INVOLVE. IN PLANS TO ASSASS...LEADERS

DATE:

PAGES:

SUBJECTS :

05/30/1975

83

ORGANIZED CRIME

ASSASSINATIONS, FOREIGN LEADERS

ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION

ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES

BELIN, DAVID

CIA

CUBAN EXILES

DOCUMENT TYPE: REPORT

CLASSIFICATION: Top Secret

RESTRICTIONS: IC

CURRENT STATUS: Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 08/06/1993

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS :

Later draft can be found at 1781000310355.

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DWBelin:rj

5/30/75

178-10004-10091

SUMMARY OF FACTS --

INVESTIGATION OF CIA INYOLYEMENT IN PLANS TO

ASSASSINATE FOREIGN LEADERS

The following is a summary of facts gathered by the

Executive Director of the CIA Commission concerning possible

CIA involvement in plans to assassinate foreign leaders.

The Executive Director requested complete access to papers

of the National Security Council including papers of the forty

Committee and its predecessors and papers of any special groups

or special operating groups.

Such access was not granted.

Also, time did not permit examination of documents that might

be available in the Eisenhower, Kennedy or Johnson presidential

libraries. Consequently, the investigation is not complete with

regard to the question of who, if anyone outside the CIA, author-

ized or directed the planning of any assassination attempts against

foreign leaders. However, with particular reference to the plans

directed against fidel Castro, the investigation is sufficiently

complete to show that plans were undertaken by the CIA. •

President Ford has announced that assassination is not and

should never be a tool of American foreign policy. The Executive

Director concurs and believes that it is against the constitutional

and moral principles for which this nation stands for there to be

any direct or indirect participation of any agency of the United

States Government in any plans involving the assassination of

any person in peacetime.

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The Scope of the Commission's Investigation

The first knowledge that the Commission had con-

cerning possible involvement of the CIA in assassination

plans directed at foreign leaders was when the CIA informed

the Commission staff at the outset of the Commission's

work, in response to an overall staff request for possible

unlawful activities of the CIA, that such plans existed.

The Commission staff was told that there was no evidence

of murders or plots for murder against persons in the

United States carried on by the CIA. However, the Commission

staff was told that there had been discussion of plans

for assassination attempts involving overt acts occurring

within the boundaries of this country with regard to

attempts on the life of Cuban Premier Fidel Castro.

Although there was some question whether or not

an assassination plan aimed at a foreign leader fell

technically within the charter of the Commission, even

though overt acts may have taken place. in this country,

the Commission and its staff determined that because of

the nature and seriousness of the matters involved, the

doubts would be resolved in favor of undertaking an

investigation of the facts. Only after such investigation

could the Commission make an informed decision as to its

jurisdiction.

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Furthermore, the Commission and its staff felt

that it was also important to proceed in this area because

it related to the charges to the Commission and the

President's executive order directing the Commission to

"determine whether existing safeguards are adequate to

prevent any activities which violate the provisions of

50 U.S.C 403" and also related to the charge by the

President that the Commission should "make such recom-

mendations to the President and to the Director of Central

Intelligence as the Commission deems appropriate."

On the basis of its investigation, the Commission

has determined that agents of the CIA were involved in

planning in this country with certain citizens and others.

to seek to assassinate Premier Castro. The Commission

has also determined that the CIA was involved in shipping

arms from this country to persons in the Dominican Republic,

who sought to assassinate Generalissimo Trujillo (who

himself had been involved in an attempt to assassinate the

President of Venezuela.)

The Commission has not found evidence of any other

attempts to assassinate any other foreign leader which

had significant oert activities within the United States.

However, the nature of the activity and the degree of

secrecy and compartmentation

within the Agency is such

that it is difficult to find any evidence of this kind

unless specific facts are brought to the attention of an

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investigating body. With regard to activities outside

of the United States, the Commission has not found any

evidence of CIA participation in plans to assassinate

foreign leaders, except as described in the next four

paragraphs.

However, the investigation of the Commission

in such areas, which had no domestic aspect which might

bring it within

the Commission's jurisdictional mandate

under the President's Order, has not been extensive.

In the course of the first stage of its investiga-

tion to determine its jurisdiction, the Commission made a

preliminary investigation of charges that the CIA was.

involved in the death of Patrice Lumumba, who was killed

in early 1961. The Commission has not found any evidence

that the CIA participated in that killing, although there

is evidence that prior to Lumumba's death some CIA personnel

and others discussed the possibility of undertaking a plan

to assassinate Lumunba.:

*In an affidavit, C. Douglas Dillon, a member of this

Commission, stated that while he served as Under Secretary.

of State from June 1959 until early January 1961, he heard

no discussion of assassination attempts against anyone,

except discussions which occured in late July or early

August of 1960 at a meeting at the Pentagon which covered

a great

variety of matters in which "...a question regarding

the possibility of

an assassination attempt against Lumunba

was briefly raised.

The CIA representative indicated that

the Agency did not

undertake this sort of operation. This

ended consideration of this subject."

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According to Richard Bissell, who was the CIA

Deputy Director of Plans at the time, he was aware of dis=

cussion of plans within the Agency concerning the possible

assassination of Patrice Lumumba and that "a case officer

was directed to look into the possibilities. He reported

back in a matter of weeks and convinced me that this was

probably unfeasible, and probably an undesirable course

of action. According to the case officer, who is now

retired, Bissell asked him to go to the Congo and there

murder or arrange for the murder of Lumumba, and the case

officer said that he told Bissell that he refused to be a

party to such an act." Bissell said the Agency had nothing

whatsoever to do with the death of Lumumba.

Bissell also testified that there was discussion

within the Agency of the possibility of an attempt on the

life of President Sukarno of Indonesia which "progressed

as far as the identification of an asset who it was felt

might be recruited for this purpose. The plan was never

reached, was never perfected to the point where it seemed

feasible."

He said the Agency had "absolutely nothing" to

do with the death of Sukarno.

*The case officer gave

this

Information in an oral telephone

conference at which time an

appointment was arranged for

the taking of his testimony before a member of the Commission

staff and a court reporter. The case officer

failed to keep

his appointment.

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With regard to both plans, he stated that no

assassination

plans would have been undertaken without

authorization outside the Agency, and that no such authori-

zation was undertaken for plans against either Lumumba

or Sukarno.

Since the Commission found no aspects to bring

the Sukarno and Lumumba matters within the scope of its

investigative authority, no further investigation in these

two

areas was undertaken. However, the Connission did find

sufficient domestic aspects in the Castro and Trujillo

plans for the Commission to undertake an investigation.

The President concurred in the approach of the Commission

to interpret its authority so that the Commission would

(1) ascertain whether the charges of assassination plots

have a basis in fact and involve unlawful domestic CIA

activities and (2) determine whether existing safeguards

• would prevent activities of that nature in the future

regardless of whether they might involve domestic or

foreign conspiracy.

The following is a summary of facts pertaining to

CIA participation in assassination plans to assassinate Premier

Fidel Castro.

The facts have been developed through a

raview

of the

internal investigation of the CIA, examination of docu-

ments, and interviews and testimony.

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B. Participation of CIA Personnel in Plans to Attemot to

assassinate Fidel Castro

An analysis of the involvement in the CIA in plots

to attempt to assassinate Fidel Castro illustrates the

development of larger schemes out of smaller schemes, and

also illustrates how important it is to have adequate

internal and external controls on the Agency.

The initial CIA schemes relating to Fidel Castro

were an outgrowth of large-scale plans by the United

States Government to attempt to change the government of

Cuba.

There had been great dissatisfaction with the

government of Cuban leader Batista. As Castro's influence

increased, attempts were made to persuade Batista to

resign and turn over the reins of government to a group

that was more attuned to the needs and desires of the

Cuban people, particularly in areas of democratic govern-

ment and social reforms. According to an interview with

the former Chief of the CIA Western Hemisphere Division,

an unofficial ambassador from this country approached

Batista in December 1968, asking that he resign and turn

the reins of government to new leadership. This request

was refused.

Fidel Castro shortly thereafter took over the Cuban

government.

There was great concern on the part of

American leadership about the presence of a government so

closely aligned with the Soviet Union barely ninety miles

from American shores.

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Therefore, the CIA, with appropriate authorization,

undertook the development of an operation in support of

Cuban exiles seeking to overthrow the Castro Government,

the culmination of which became the Bay of Pigs disaster

in. April 1961.

As the plans for the attempted overthrow of the

Cuban government were developed, one of the considerations

...-

-.... ..

related to Fidel Castro as the dominant figure.

There has also been testimony before the Commission

that at the request of the CIA the Air Force provided a

plane in late 1959 or early 1960 which was used to fly

two Cuban exiles into Cuba. The witness was unable to

provide the Commission with names of these two Cuban

exiles or names of any CIA personnel which he said were

involved. However, at the time of the events the witness

was an Air Force officer who had liaison functions between

the Department of Defense and the CIA. He testified that

he believes a plane was provided and that the two Cuban

exiles were to carry with them one or more rifles with

telescopic sites to be used in an attempt to assassinate

• Fidel Castro.

The Commission sought to investigate this matter.

In a "Memorandum for the Record" dated May 15, 1975, the

CIA admitted that in reviewing its files relating to Cuban

operations during the period 1959-1961:

"a number of

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documents were found that referred to the intent on the

part of some of the Cuban teams operating inside Cuba to

attempt

to assassinate Castro... Additionally, the files

indicate that there was considerable interest in procurement

of Helio Courier (the civil version of the L-28), but there

is no definite indication that they were intended for

Cuban operations. Also, there is mention of the air drop

of Springfield rifles with telescopic sights."

1. 1960-61 and the Phase I Plans

The Phase I plans involved the preparation of

poison botulism pills by the CIA, the delivery of those pills

to organized crime figures who in turn were to get the pills

delivered to contacts they had in Cuba, who in turn were to

get the pills into the hands of someone who could place them

in a beverage to be drunk by Premier Castro.

a. When the Plans Began

There is some disagreement about exactly

how the Phase I plans began. The two people in the CIA who were

the most intimately involved were Richard Bissell, Deputy Director

of Plans, who was the person in the CIA who had direct respon- •

sibility for the Bay of Pigs operation, and Colonel Sheffield

Edwards, the Director of the Office of Security of the CIA.

According to Richard Bissell, the plans relating

to Fidel Castro started in "the very beginning of 1961" when

he said he became aware "of the possibility that an assassi-

nation attempt might be planned using Mafia resources, or

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syndicate resources. My very uncertain recollection is that

I first heard of this possibility from Shef Edwards."

According to Sheffield Edwards, his first

.-..--..

• contact with these plans "was about the time of the Bay

or Pigs."

He said he did not "remember exactly" if it

was before or after the Bay of Pigs, but when asked whether

or not it was in the Eisenhower Administration or the

Kennedy Administration for purposes of determining the time

of the inception of the plan, he said that "It was in the

Kennedy Administration."

Whereas Bissell testified that he "first heard

of this possibility (of using Mafia or syndicate resources)

from Sheffield Edwards," Edwards testified that his first

contact was a request by Bissell who asked Edwards "if I

had any assets...that would be available into the syndicate."

Although oral testimony of both said that this

began in the early stages of the Kennedy Administration,

there is documentation which indicates that these conversa-

tions took place in the latter part of 1960 during the

Eisenhower Administration. This documentation includes a

May 14, 1962 "Memorandum for the Record" entitled "Arthur

James Balletti et al--Unauthorized Publication or Use of

Communications."

The opening sentence of the memorandur

states:

"This memorandum for the record was prepared at

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the request of the Attorney General of the United States

following

a complete oral briefing of him relevant to a

sensitive CIA operation conducted during the period

approximately August. 1960 to May 1961." The oral briefing

actually occurred in the offices of the Attorney General of

the United States, Robert Kennedy, on May 7, 1962, and

Attorney General Kennedy received a copy of the May 14,

1962

memorandum for the record.

Attending the oral briefing were three people:

Attorney General Kennedy, Sheffield Edwards, and Lawrence

Houston, General Counsel of the CIA. The memorandum itself

was prepared by Sheffield Edwards and continued after the

opening sentence: "In August 1960 the undersigned was

approached by Mr. Richard Bissell, then Deputy Director

for Plans of CIA, to explore the possibility of mounting

this sensitive operation against Fidel Castro. It was

thought that certain gambling interests, which had formerly

been active in Cuba, might be willing and able to assist

and further, might have both intelligence assets in Cuba

and comnunication between Miami, Florida and Cuba."

The memorandum then related that an intermediar

who was known to the CIA was approached' by Colonel Sheffield

Edwards "and asked to establish contact. with a member or

members of the gambling syndicate to explore their capabili-

ties."

The approach was

to be made "

...to the syndicate as

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appearing to represent big business organizations which

wished to protect their interests in Cuba." The contact

was

made with a "syndicate" member who "showed interest in

the

possibility and indicated he had some contacts in

Miami that he might use." The syndicate member supposedly

told the CIA intermediary that the syndicate person "was

not interested inaany remuneration but would seek to establish

capabilities

in Cuba to perform the desired project."

1.097.96.112..944991139.990494

The memorandum continued: "Towards, the end of

September" 1960 contact with another syndicate member

from Chicago, Sam Giancana, was made, and in turn an

arrangement was made through Giancana for the CIA inter-

mediary and his contact "to meet with a 'courier' who was

going back and forth to Havana. From information received

back by the courier the proposed operation appeared to be

feasible and it was decided to obtain an official Agency

approval in this regard. A figure of one hundred fifty

thousand dollars was set by the Agency as a payment to

be made on completion of the operation and to be paid only

to the principal or principals who would conduct the

operation in Cuba."

The CIA intermediary reported that Giancana

and

the other contact "emphatically stated that they wished

no part of any payment.

The undersigned (Sheffield

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Edwards) then briefed the proper senior officers of this

Agency of the proposal. Knowledge of this project during

its life was kept to a total of six persons and never

becane a part of the project current at the time for the

invasion of Cuba. There were no memoranda on the project

nor were there other written documents or agreements.

The project was duly orally approved by the said senior

officials of the Agency."

The memorandum continued that during the period

from September 1960 to 1961, "efforts were continued"

by the CIA intermediary and the Mafia personnel "to proceed

with the operation. The first principal in Cuba withdrew

and another principal was selected as has been briefed to

the

Attorney General. Ten thousand dollars was passed

for

expenses to the second principal. He was further.

furnished with approximately one thousand dollars worth

of communications equipment to establish communications

between his headquarters in Miami and assets in Cuba. No

monies were ever paid" to the syndicate personnel. There

was expense money paid to the CIA intermediary. The

memorandum stated that "After the failure of the invasion

of Cuba word was sent through" the CIA intermediary to

the syndicate personnel "to call off the operation" with

the further diraction that the syndicate person

"was

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told to tell his principal that the proposal to pay. one

hundred fifty thousand dollars for completion of the

operation had been definitely withdrawn." Only two copies

of the

memorandun were prepared - one for the Attorney

General and one to be retained by the CIA.

b. Factual Background--Preparation of May 14, 1962

Memorandum for Attorney General

The factual situation underlying the preparation

of the May 14, 1962, memorandum was that sometime in the

fall of 1960 Sam Giancana asked the CIA intermediary to

arrange for putting a listening device in the room of an

entertainer who at the time was in Las Vegas and who

Giancana thought was having an affair with another enter-

tainer, who was reputed to be Giancana's mistress.

According to the Phase I CIA case officer, the

request by Giancana came at a crucial time when plans

were underway for Phase I. Giancana supposedly stated

that if he did not get help to install the listening device,

he would have to go to Las Vegas himself. The case officer

said "this would have interrupted the project at a very

critical time," and therefore he sought the

assistance of

the CIA intermediary to get a private detective agency

to undertake the installation of the listening device.

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The CIA intermediary passed the request over

to another private investigator, who in turn contacted

Arthur

• James Balletti (the name of the subject of the

May 14, 1962 memorandum for the record given to Attorney

General Kennedy.) Instead of putting a listening device

-

in the room,

Balletti put a listening device on the

telephone. The listening device was discovered and

Balletti was arrested by the sheriff of Las Vegas, Nevada.

At the time of the incident, the CIA did not know of the

specific proposed wiretap.

=.==

According to the Agency investigation by the

Inspector General's Office in 1967, Edwards had once told

the Agency intermediary that if the intermediary ever got

in trouble he could say to the FBI that he was working on

an intelligence operation being handled by the Agency.

An FBI memorandum on that matter stated that the inter-

mediary claimed the telephone tap was ordered on behalf

of the Agency's effort to obtain intelligence through

hoodlum elements in Cuba. The Agency investigation file

also states that a March 23, 1962 FBI memorandum confirmed

a meeting with Sheffield Edwards in which Edwards told.

the FBI that the intermediary was involved in a sensitive

project and that the CIA would object to prosecution

because it would necessitate CIA information and it could

embarrass the United States Government. Subsequently there

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was a meeting between Sheffield Edwards and Sam Papich,

the FBI liaison with the Agency, in which

Edwards advised

Papich that it would not be in the national interest to

prosecute.

At the time of that meeting, those who had

initially authorized the assassination plans (Allen Dulles

and Richard Bissell) were gone and no one else in authority

(including Richard Helms, who replaced Bissell) had been

"eut in on the operation." Thereafter, Sheffield Edwards

briefed Lawrence Houston, who in turn briefed General

Carter, McCone's Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.

General Carter, who is now retired, lives in

Colorado. When interviewed by a member of the Commission

staff by long distance telephone, General Carter said that

he had no recollection of this.

According to Sheffield Edwards, prior to briefing

Attorney General Robert Kennedy, he briefed Lawrence

Houston, General Counsel for the Agency. Edwards said

that there was nothing that he knew about the plan to

assassinate Castro that he didn't tell Attorney General

Kennedy and that the briefing lasted "about a half an

hour, at least." He said that he told Attorney General

Kennedy everything, and that after the briefing was

completed Robert Kennedy had no comment to him but Robert

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Kennedy "cautioned Larry Houston to the effect that he.

was to know about these things. Words to that effect."

When

asked whether or not the Attorney General had told

Colonel Edwards that "you shouldn't do this at all,"

Colonel Edwards replied "No."

When asked whether or not

the Attorney General in any way said "that he disapproved

of whatever was

done in the past," Colonel Edwards Said

"No.

":

Lawrence Houston testified, "I was briefed

on this subject ater it was dropped. I was not party to

nor was

I asked in advance about it....By the time I heard

about it, I think it had been terminated some little time,

but there were personalities involved...who were both

regarded as part of the Mafia organization, and these

were people" that the CIA intermediary "had introduced to

us .

They had former gambling interests in Havana, and at

one time thought they may be able to take action against

Castro. After it fell through, my recollection is that.

they had potential criminal indictments" against the Mafia

people "and it seems

to me that the bug in the Las Vegas

hotel was involved more peripherally, but I cannot remember

the details."

Houston also testified that he told Edwards

... -

"that I thought the only thing to do was to go and tell

the whole story to the Attorney General.

So with the

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approval of the Director at that time--, well, it was

+ 63,

it must have been McCone.

We went down to brief

Mr. Kennedy on the full story" that the Agency "had set

up a project with its aim the demise of Castro, that the

project had fallen through, that these following people

were involved, and we gave them the names, and this is what

made him unhappy, because at that time he felt he was.

making a very strong drive to try to get after the Mafia.

And so

his comment was to us that if we were going to get

involved with the Mafia, in the future at any time, to

make

aire you see me first."

(This is the only evidence in the record to show

that John MCone knew about the existence of any specific

assassination plan in 1962. There is evidence in the CIA

files to show that the actual person with whom the matter

!

was discussed was the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence,

and this evidence is supported by an August 16, 1963 memorandum

from Helms to McCone, which will be discussed in the Phase II

portion of this report. )

c. FBI Memoranda Concerning CIA Assassination

Plans

According to a May 22, 1961 FBI memorandum

entitled "Arthur James Balletti, et al":,

"On May 3, 1961, Colonel Sheffield Edwards,

Director of Security, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

furnished the following information.

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"Colonel Edwards advised that in connection wit

CIA's operation against Castro he personally contacted

Robert Maheu during the fall of 1960 for the purpose of

using Maheu as a 'cut-out' in contacts with Sam Giancana,

a known hoodlum in the Chicago area. Colonel Edwards

said that since the underworld controlled gambling activities

in Cuba under the Batista government, it was assumed that

this element would still continue to have sources and contacts

in Cuba which perhaps could be utilized successfully in

connection with CIA's clandestine efforts against the Castro

government.

As a

result, Maheu's services were solicited

as a 'cut-out' because of his possible entree into under-

world circles. Maheu obtained Sam Giancana'$ assistance

in this regard and according to Edwards, Giancana gave

every indication of cooperating through Maheu in attempting

to accomplish several clandestine efforts in Cuba. Edwards

added that none d Giancana's efforts have materialized

to date and that several of the plans still are working

and may eventually 'pay off.'"

The memorandum then went into the Balletti

situation and reported that Colonel Edwards had no knowledge

of the wire tap.

The memorandum concluded with the following

paragraph:

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"Colonel Edwards advised that only Mr. Bissell

(Deputy Director of Plans, CIA) and two others in CIA

were aware of the Giancana-Maheu activity in behalf of

CIA's program. and that Allen Dulles was completely unaware

of Edwards' contact with Maheu in this connection. He

added that Mr. Bissell, during his recent briefings of

General. Taylor and the Attorney General in connection with

their inquiries into CIA relating to the Cuban situation

told the Attorney General that some of the CIA's associated

planning included the use of Giancana and the underworld

against Castro."

Subsequently, on March 6, 1967, J. Edgar Hoover

sent to the Attorney General a letter with an accompanying

March 6, 1967, FBI memorandum entitled "Central Intelli-

gence Agency's Intentions to Send Hoodlums to Cuba to

Assassinate Castro". The memorandum referred to the

Balletti wiretap matter and stated that the FBI "checked

matter with CIA on 5/3/61 and learned CIA was using Robert Mahue

as intermediary with Sam Giancana relative to CIA's

'dirty business' anti-Castro activities.

"By letter 5/22/61 we furnished former

Attorney General Kennedy a memorandum

in thining a rundown on CIA's involvement

The originals of the letter and

memorandum were returned to us for filing

purposes.

A copy of that memorandum is

being attached to instant letter being

sent to Attorney General.

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"On 5/9/62 Kennedy discussed with the Director

a number of matters, including admission by

CIA that Robert Mahue

had been hired by

that Agency to approach Sam Giancana to have

Castro assassinated at a cost of $150,000.

Kennedy stated he had issued orders that

CIA should never undertake such steps again

without first checking with Department of

Justice and stated because of this matter

it would be difficult to prosecute Giancana

or Robart Mahue then or in the future."

The memorandum continued that the FBI had learne:

on Jure 20, 1963 that the CIA contacts with the Mafia had

"continued up until that time when they were reportedly

cut off."

The FBI memorandum also stated that it appeared

that one Mafia member involved in the plans "is using his

prior connections with CIA to his best advantage."

A contemporaneous FBI memorandum dated March 6,

1967 stated that Robert Kennedy following his briefing in

May of 1962 informed the FBI on May 9, 1962 about the

briefing. "He (Robert Kennedy) indicated that a few days

prior thereto he had been advised by CIA" that an inter-

mediary had been hired by CIA to approach Sam Giancana

with a proposition of paying $150,000 to hire some gunman

to go into Cuba and kill Castro. The memorandum further

continued that "Mr. Kennedy stated that upon learning CIA

had not cleared its action in hiring (the intermediary)

and Giancana with the Department of Justice he issued

orders that CIA should never again take such steps without

checking with the Department of Justice.

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"Mr. Kennedy further advised that because of this

matter it would be very difficult to initiate any prosecu-

tion against Giancana, as Giancana could immediately bring

out the fact that the United States Government had approached

him to arrange for the assassination of Castro."

a. Statements of Colonel Edwards re May 7, 1962

Briefing

When Sheffield Edwards and the CIA's General

-Counsel briefed Robert Kennedy on May 7, 1962 concerning.

the Phase I assassination efforts by the CIA, there is no

evidence to indicate that during that briefing Robert

Kennedy told the CIA personnel that he already had known

of this information because of prior information received

from the

FBI.

Colonel Edwards confirmed the statement in the

March 6, 1967, FBI. memorandum that Attorney General Kennedy

stated that the CIA should never undertake the use of Mafia

people again without first checking with the Department of

Justice because it would be difficult to prosecute such

people in the future.

o. Stateronts of Colonel Duvaras re Knowledge

Inside CIA

... .

According to Edwards the CIA people that knew

about the plans while they were going on were himself,

his case officer, Bissell, Allen Dulles, Director of

Central Intelligence until November 1961, and General Cabell,

Deputy Directos of Intelligence during this period of time.

Both Dulles and Cabell are now dear.

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f.

Refusal to Testify of Robert Maheu, CIA

Intermediary

Robert Maheu, the CIA intermediary, refused to

be interrogated by the Commission staff. His attorney,

Morton Galane, told the Executive Director of the Commission

that he

• (Galane) had advised his client to exercise his

constitutional rights and not answer any questions other

than his name, address, and the fact that he had under-

taken work for the CIA.

s The Carring Out of the Flan

The following facts primarily come from in-

terrogation of Colonel Edwards and the Phase I case officer:

The particular means by which the plans were

to be carried out was "by placing botulism pills in his

food. "

!

The syndicate personnel were to get the pills

to a person in Cuba who would have access to Castro.

.....

Supposedly, the reason pills were used was that

the syndicate personnel could not recruit personnel to

undertake the assassination through gunfire because the

chance of survival and escape was small.. However, the

case officer felt that it was the Agency itself that desired

to have pills used rather than gunfire?

Colonel Edwards said that he, himself, checked

out the pills on some guinea pigs "because I wanted to be

sure they worked."

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Corroboration of the Phase I plans was also

made by another retired medical officer who was familiar

with the preparation of the pills inside the Agency.

Edwards said he did not know of any plans other

than

those that involved the use of these botulism pills.

Edwards did not have any first-hand knowledge

...-

about whether or not the pills ever got to Cuba.

•According to the Phase I case officer, he delive

the pills to the syndicate member and was subsequently advised

by the syndicate member that the pills were in Cuba, but

the case officer had no direct knowledge of his own that

the pills actually got there.

Richard Bissell said he did not have any

personal recollection as to whether or not poison pills

of any kind were ever delivered into Cuba.

There may actually have been two passages of pi

to Cuba in the first part of 1961. The first passage was

in

late February or March from the syndicate through their courier

to a Cuban who supposedly had a position in the Cuban Prime

Minister's office where he had access to Fidel Castro.

According to the interview of Sheffield Edwards with the

Executive Director, the Cuban asset "got scared" and did not

try to pass the pill. Pills

were subsequently delivered to

another "asset" who was In a position to slip the pills

to

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Castro at a restaurant where the asset worked. This took

place in the March-April 1961 period. Fidel Castro ceased

visiting

that particular restaurant at approximately the

same time the pills purportedly arrived. The case officer said

it was his recollection that there were two passages of pills

to

Cuba, the

second one which was made to someone who had

access to a restaurant which Castro freguented. After the

second attempt failed, the case officer, said the pills were.

returned to the CIA.

h. How the Plans Got Started

There is inconsistency between the testirony

of Richard Bissell and Colonel Edwards concerning how the plans

got started.

According to Bissell the original approach

was made to the Agency" by the syndicate personnel because

"they had their own very strong motivations

for carrying

out this...they had been powerful under Batista in Cuba,

and they had a very lucrative set of interests for the

syndicates, and they had been in effect been thrown out,

and so they had the strongest sort of reasons for anti-

Castro sentiment on their own."

Bissell

said he first

learned about this from

Sheffield Edwards and that he had

also talked with Allen Dulles about the matter.

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Whereas Bissell testified that he "first heard

of this possibility (of using Mafia or syndicate resources)

from Sheffield

Edwards," Edwards testified that his first

contact was a

request by Bissell who asked Edwards "if I

had any assets...that would be available into the syndicate."

When asked about the inconsistency between

his own testimony and that of Sheffield Edwards con-

cerning whether or not Edwards approached Bissell first

or Bissell approached Edwards first, Bissell stated that ! .

"it is possible that my recollection is wrong,...I think

I will stand on that as my recollection...but I seem to

remember rather clearly that it was from him (Edwards)

that I first learned of the possiblity of this operation,

and that he came to see me for this purpose rather than my

sending for him. Now, could, I just say that

I had several conversations with Shef Edwards

on this matter, and it is very possible that I, that in a

subsequent conversation I did take the initiative and send

for and discuss. it with him."

The case

officer stated that he believed it was Bissell

who first approached Edwards about making the contacts with

a CIA intermediary. The case officer further stated that

although he ultimately became aware of the fact that the

people contacted by the CIA intermediary were "syndicate"

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members, initially neither he nor the intermediary knew this

to be the fact.

Rather, he said he thought these people whom

the intermediary contacted were gangster-type people who were

not necessarily members of the syndicate.

1.

Possible White House Direction or Approval

of Plans

(1).

The Testimony of Richard Bissell

recollection"|

Bissell stated that he had "no clear

/of any discussion with anyone in the Eisenhower Administra-

tion concerning any possible plan to assassinate Castro", but

there could have been. He said that if it would have occurred

at all during the Eisenhower Administration, "it would have

been with Gordon Gray." Gray testified that there were no

such conversations that occurred.

Bissell testified that although

"my recollection of this is far from clear.

I am satisfied that very early in the

Kennedy Administration I did participate" in conversations

with someone in the White House concerning the planning of

what was called an executive action capability, which was

defined in substance as a capability of the Agency to carry

out assassinations, if required. When asked with whom these

conversations occurred, Bissell said "I am almost certain

It was either Walt Rostow (Deputy Assistant to the President

fox National Security) or McGeorge Bundy (Presidential Assistant

for National Security), or probably the former, and

possibly

both."

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When asked to state what specifi-

cally was discussed in these conversations, Bissell

said:

"My recollection, which isn't too

specific, is that this was a discussion of

the desirability of developing such a capability within the

CIA that presumably would be a small, special unit, and

highi] compartmented from the rest of the organization."

Bissell said that he had no specific

knowledge but!

Ithat he "had a great deal of confidence that the two gentle-

men whose names I have mentioned, would not have discussed this

discussed with me or encouraged

any course of action that

they were not confident the President would approve." When

asked whether or not he had any discussions with any official

in the Eisenhower Administration concerning the development

of an executive action capability, Bissell replied, "not to

my recollection, and I think I am almost sure that I did not."

Later in his testimony Bissell said that the

possibility of using syndicate people to carry out an assassinatio

attempt against Castro "was discussed by me, again I think

probably with Walt Rostow. It may possibly have been dis-

cussed directly with McGeorge Bundy, but I suspect that it

was through Rostow, who was then Bundy's' assistant and on his

staff. My impression,

but again I must emphasize that this

is uncertain impression, was that I was encouraged to go

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ahead with the investigation and planning of this operation,

and by investigation I mean simply to find out what would be

involved to make some assessment of the likelihood of success,

and other aspects of the matter."

According to Bissell, he was "vague as to the

C......

final outcome of that attempt." He said that he had

"no recollection of a specific authorization that it should

go forward.

I believe, however, that we probably did move

to be in a position to carry it out, or authorize it, if

authorization were received." He said that he believed

"my own recollection of the final stages of the plan is

vague" because the plan involved "furnishing probably

some money and such items as pills or other devices through

a number of cut-outs or intermediaries to a group which

we ourselves, of course, did not, in any direct sense,

control. This was not an operation of such a character

that the communications would run through Agency channels,

or that authorization on the spot would be by Agency

personnel, or that the Agency could precisely and tightly

control it."

(2) The restimony of Gordon Gray

Gordon Gray testified that he had no

conversations with Richard Bissell or anyone else pertaining

to assassination plans.

(3)

The Testimony of Walt Rostow

Walt Rostow testified that he did not

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have any recollection of having any discussions with Bissell

pertaining to any attempt at assassination plots.

(4)

The Testimony of the Phase I Case Officer

The case officer stated that he had

been told that the project had been approved by Allen Dulles,

Director of Central Intelligence, but he (the case officer)

had no knowledge of whether or not there had been any discussion

or approval from the White House.

(5) The Testimony of Colonel Edwards

Edwards said that he believed the plans

were developed by Bissell. and that he was "sure that there were

not"

any people in the White House that knew about these plans.

He

also

said that he did not know of any attempt of plans to

assassinate people other than Fidel Castro.

(6) The Testimony of McGeorge Bundy

McGeorge Bundy said that he was never aware

any "actual decision" to go about seeking to assassinate

any foreign leader. However, he said that he did "have a

vague recollection o the existence or the possible existence

of contingency planning in this area. I am sorry to say I

cannot help you much with details about it because I can't

fish them out of my memory, but I could, not exclude

that

there were contingency plans, and a contingency capability

of some sort, or plans for such a capability at some time."

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He said that he did not know of any case where plans went

beyond the contingency stage "and I know of no such authori-

zation or any involvement by anybody in the White House staff

or anybody else, for that matter."

When asked whether or

not he ever heard any discussion

.......--

concerning a plot or plan to assassinate Cuban leaders, Bundy •

replied, "Not that I can remember...I certainly cannot exclude

the possibility that you could have had the kind of discussion

in which one or another individual would have said it would

be, that there is a possibility that thus and such a Cuban

group, if landed and infiltrated, might have as one of its

missions the following, which might have included an attack

on one or another Cuban leader. I do not have any direct

recollection that that did happen, but I cannot exclude that

it did happen."

Bundy testified that!

he did not know of any decision

to go ahead and actually undertake a plan of assassination.

"That contingent capability may have been authorized in this

field I cannot exclude, although I have no direct recollection

of it. It is the decision to

go ahead that. I am sure I do not

remember."

Bundy said that he would have been "surprised" if

any effort to assassinate a foreign leader had been under-

taken without his approval as the President's Assistant for

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Security Affairs, and said that he himself would "not have

authorized anything of that kind without much higher authority

than my own.

I could not exclude that there would be com-

munication with the President by other channels. Neither

President Kennedy nor President Johnson always used any one

channel."

There was direct access of the Director of Central

Intelligence to the President, according to Mr. Bundy.

He

said that based upon his experience, "I would not have ex-

pected...the Agency would have undertaken anything like an

attack on the life of a foreign leader without direct order from.

higher authority "

...It did not happen in the time I was

•there...but I can conceive of the President saying to some-

body, I do not want to make this decision but giving some

indication of the kind of decision he wanted made."

After Mr. Bundy completed his testimony before the

Commission, he contacted the Executive Director the next .

morning and volunteered that in thinking about some of the

interrogation overnight "I have had a vague recollection,

which I cannot pinpoint in time, that there was discussion

that I knew about at some time of a proposal or scheme or

project" in relation to the Castro regime "that did involve

poison, and the characteristic that sticks in my memory is

that it would have involved a rather large scale use of

poison and, as I recollect it, it never came anywhere near

approval."

Proposals under the overall plan with regard

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to Cuba "which did come from time to time (mostly not with

respect to assassination were reviewed in the first instance

for practicalibility and only after that for wisdom or politi-

cal rightness, and I recall no proposal for liquidation that

ever got past the first stage to the second."

A menorandum of the interview with the Executive

Director was prepared the next morning to record these addi-

tional comments. In this memorandum which was signed by

Mr. Bundy and sworn to before

a notary public in the form

of an affidavit, Bundy said that. "I simply have no recollec-

tion of plans" that "existed in January or February 1961"

which involved the attempted poisoning of any Cuban leader.

"I believe

my memory tells me in a more general way that my

knowledge of a scheme or idea of using poison probably re-

lates to the year 1962."

Bundy further stated: "I am absolutely certain that

I never knew of or believed that there was any authorization

• to go ahead with an effort to

liquidate Castro, or any other

Cuban leader."

With reference to his testimony concerning an execu-

tive action capability, Bundy said that "I recall the words

'executive action

capability' more clearly today than I did

yesterday...but I do not have any recollection as to what I

knew

about that of who requested it of how much was done

under it. I don't recall having any particular continuing

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interest in or information about that particular activity"

which

was

"something like" a "plan to have some kind of

stand-by capability for action against individuals."

(7) Documents of the National Security

Council

The Commission requested complete access

to papers of the National Security Council, including documents

of the predecessors of the Forty Committee, documents of the

Special Group, or Special Operations Group, and any other docu-

ments which might pertain to the possibility of assassination

of Premier Castro. Complete access was not granted. The Com-

mission did not have time

or staff to undertake an examination

of documents in the Eisenhower, Kennedy or Johnson presidential.

libraries. The National Security Council in response to the

request for access by the Commission Council files

on Cuba and the Dominican Republic for the period 1959-64,

delivered to the Commission what it said was

all of its documents which pertained to the question of pos-

sible assassination attempts on the life of Castro or Trujillo.

One of these documents was an excerpt from a paper on "United

States Policy Iovard Cuba" dated May 4, 1961 and prepared for

discussion by the National Security Council at its meeting on

MaY 5, 1961.

(Paragraphs No.

79 and No.

80

from this excerpt

are as follows:

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79. Castro.

A political vulnerability

of the regime lies in the person of Castro

himself.

It is not clear whether the regime

could continue to operate for long without

him. There is no question that the bureau-

cracy operates relatively freely, and pro-

bably makes many decisions

without consult-

ing Castro. However, it is equally certain

that the Castro personality and his appeal

to the Cuban people is an important element

maintaining popular support for the regime.

If Castro were removed from the scene the

regine might collapse for lack of this cen-.

tral rallying point. On the other hand, the

burcaucracy may now be so firmly entrenched

that it could function independently--although

admittedly without the degree of popular sup

port no: enjoyed. Further, by using Castro

35

a martyr it might be possible to generate

at least temporary support for his successor.

80. A further possibility attendant upon

• the

death of Castro would be the attitude of the PSP.

The party would like to assume a more open and

dominant role in the Cuban Government. Castro's

death night force or encourage the party into a

precipitate move to seize power. If this happenec

it would probably have an adverse reaction on

Latin American opinion, though principally at the

government level.

(g) General Maxwell Taylor

General Maxwell Taylor, who was referred

to in the May 22, 1961 memorandum, when interviewed by the staff

said that he had no knowledge of any assassination plans directed

against Castro.

(g) June 13, 1961 Taylor Report

According to the June 13, 1961 paper, Allen

Dulles and Richard Bissell briefed President-elect Kennedy

in November 1960 at Palm Beach. The Taylor paper was

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prepared pursuant to an April 22, 1961 direction by the

President to Taylor, Attorney General Robert Kennedy,

Admiral Arley Burke and Allen Dulles for an overall analysis

and study of governmental practices for military, paramilitary,

guerrilla and anti-guerrilla activity with special attention

"to the lessons that can be learned from recent events in

Cuba." There is nothing in the June 13, 1961 Taylor report

which

specifically discusses assassination.

However, during the time the study was being under-

taken the aforementioned May 22, 1961, FBI memorandum was

prepared and sent to Attorney General Kennedy.

j. Termination of Phase I Plan

After the Bay of Pigs operation in April 1961, ac-

cording to Sheffield Edwards "the plan, as I recall, petered

out."

Edwards said that he did not become involved with

any other person, after the Bay of Pigs invasion, to try to

get the pills into Cuba.

k. Relationship of Phase I Plan with Bay of Pigs

Sheffield Edwards, himself, thought that these plans were

developed in connection with the Bay of Pigs, and it was

Bissell who was in charge of the overall coordination of the

Bay of Pigs

operation: Bissell denies that these plans

were part of the Bay of Pigs planning. He testified that

he was "quite clear" that the plans for attempted assassi-

nation of Fidel Castro were not developed as a part of the

Bay of Pigs operation.

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1. Knowledge of Phase I Plans Inside Cuba

Bissell also

• felt that to the extent individuals in

the Cuban exile community in Miami may have been involved,

"our belief was that Castro was extremely well informed on

what was going on."

Bissell

stated that he did not think the actual at-

tempt was ever made, although it is physically possible that

the poison pills did reach Cuba. He also. said that although

he did not remember having any evidence that Castro knew of

these attempts, "it is perfectly possible that, with some time

lag, Castro would have come on some evidence of this operation."

m. Other Plans during Phase I

While the Phase I plans were underway, the Agency

received confirmation from contacts in Cuba concerning

possible assassination attempts inside Cuba against Castro.

Most of these contacts took place in the first part of 1961

immediately preceding the Bay of Pigs landing. In particu-

lar, there were several cables received referring to a

possible assassination attempt against Fidel Castro on

April 9, 1961, during a public appearance at the Sports

Palace in Havana. There were also messages received from

dissident Cubans inside Cuba in the first few months after

the Bay of Pigs invasion. In some of these messages there

were references to trying to kill Castro. None of these

possible assassination attempts from dissidents inside

Cuba appear to have been coordinated with the Phase I plans.

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2. 1962-63 and the Phase II Plans

In

late 1961 or early 1962, which was shortly

after the Cuban missile crisis, Deputy Director for

Plans, Richard Bissell, recalled asking a new case officer

"to take over a part of our reviving effort against Castro

and the Castro Administration...I probably urged him to

look into this plan... which had been the subject of active

attention nearly a year before. I have no recollection of

authorizing him to revive it, except to look at it as a plan,

or to proceed with any action along those lines." According

to the case officer, he knew of no other plan to assassinate

any other foreign leader except Castro.

a. The Testimony of the Phase II Case Officer

The case officer said that he had a conversation with

Richard Bissell, which he believed took place in the latter

part of 1961 or early 1962, in which Bissell told him in

substance that someone in the White House had raised the

question whether or not the Agency should develop what

was called an "executive action capability", which was

a capability of assassination or liquidation of leaders of

foreign countries. The case officer said that Bissell

briefed him that an operation against 'Castro

"had been

mounted" and "that it had been handled through Sheffield

Edwards."

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The

case officer said he was then briefed by Edwards

on the operation that had been previously conducted. This

testimony was corroborated by Colonel Edwards. Both.

Edwards and the case officer stated that Edwards did not

have any further contact with any subsequent phase after

Phase In Colonel Edwards put the Phase II case officer

in contact with the case officer who had been involved

with. Phase I for a briefing. The Phase II case officer

then took over this entire operation for the Agency.

The

Phase II case officer stated in a recorded inter-

view that after he was briefed by the previous case

officer and discussed the matter with Sheffield Edwards, he

then discussed the matter with Richard Helms. The Phase II

case officer took over the direct contact with the Mafia per-

sonnel, which to the best of his recollection occurred

"about early April 1962.".

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(The Phase II plans involved two possibilities of

assassination: rifle fire and the use of poison pills.

Delivery of funds for the acquisition of rifles and handguns

plus

some medicinal drugs and anti-biotics took place

in the summer of 1962. According to the case officer, it was

somewhat less than $5,000. The money was delivered to the

Mafia

contact, and the case officer received a report

from the Mafia contact that the Cuban contact had called

to report that the arms and poison pills had gotten into Cuba.

(The

case officer stated that during the period of

time he was involved with the overall operation, he felt he

was dealing with a very volatile situation that "in the

aftermath of the Bay of Pigs failure" was the kind of an

operation that the Government, the Agency of anybody else could

not afford to have surface. "...It was quite obvious that there

was an explosion potential here--an explosion not in the

technical sense--a flap potential, if you will, but it

took some time to find out just what could be done and how

it could be done, to try to sanitize the possible reper-

cussions of this." In 1975 the case officer stated that

very shortly after taking over the operation he reached

a tentative conclusion that the plan had little chance of

success and he decided to "wind down" the plans

gradually.

The winding down was completed in the Spring of 1963 and

in June 1963, the case officer went abroad to another

position wholly unconnected with the Cuban operation.

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When

asked

why the operation did not meet with

success, the case officer said "I don't know if I have

any valid opinion why. There are a

great many things that

could have

happened. It wasn't tried, it was choked off,

it was penetrated from the start--at least on the Cuban

end--that is the end in Cuba. When I say I have no

personal knowledge of this, I am aware that Castro has

claimed there were a number of attempts on his life. I

am aware that he has blamed those on the U.S. in general

and the CIA in particular. Eut I have no personal

knowledge of facts which would prove that there was ever

actually, if you will, a shot fired or any poison

administered, or any other attempt other than in the

inchoate stage."

The case officer also stated that "given the capa-

bilities of Castro's security apparata and the general

seive-like character of the community in exile and the

number of people who knew at least something about this

particular incident or operation, before I had any connec-

tion with it, or later as a result of things that occurred

before I had any connection with it, I think and thought

at the time that it was conceivable thât it had been

penetrated. I cannot honestly state that I had at that

time any firm reason to believe that Castro was aware of

this operation."

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b.

The Testimony of Colonel Edwards re Knowledge

of Phase II

"According to Colonel Edwards, at the time of the May 7,

1962 briefing of Attorney General Kennedy, he did not know

that the new case officer whom he had earlier briefed was

undertaking another plan along the lines of Phase I and

therefore he didn't tell the Attorney General at the time

of the briefing that there was a Phase II plan underway.

c.

The Testimony of Richard Bissell ze

Authorization Of Phase II

Bissell stated that he had no recollection of

authorizing the case officer to revive the plan except to

• look at it as a plan or to proceed with any action along

those lines.

d. Knowledge of John McCone, Director of

Central Intelligence re Phase II

‹The

• Phase II case officer stated that sometime prior

to August 1962, he had a conversation with Richard Helms,

who had succeeded Richard Bissell as Deputy Director of Plans.

The case officer said that the question was raised •

whether or not the new Director of Central Intelligence,

MI.

McCone, should be briefed of the operation. "I did re-

commend to Mr. Helms that since this

'operation' and the

possible repercussions from it all stemmed from actions which

had taken place long before either Helms or myself had had

any personal connection with it, and before John McCone had

had any connection

whatever with the Agency, and since the

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decision had been made at that time that this should be

sanitized, tied off and terminated as soon as practically

feasible, I saw no reason why the new DCI should be briefed

on it, and I stronjly recommended that he not be."

The case officer said that to the best of his know-

ledge McCone at no time in 1962 knew of the fact that

Phase II of the operations were underway.

John McCone testified that he first learned

about Phase II when he was first interviewed by the Executive

Director of the CIA Commission in April, 1975, and McCone

further stated that the only knowledge he had of Phase I was

knowledge he received on August 16, 1963 upon receipt of a

memorandum from Richard Helms together with a copy of the

May 14, 1962 memoranda of the record delivered to Attorney

General Kennedy•

'Helms said that although he had no recollection of

any discussion with the case officer not to tell the Director

of Central Intelligence, Mr. McCone, in 1962 about the existence

of plans, "I have no reason to cavil" that this was the fact.

e. The Testimony Of Richard Helms

Helms was then asked whether he remembered any dis

cussions with the case

officer concerning the furnishing

of either arms or poison pills to Cuban exiles to have

them and try and carry out any assassination plans.

Helms

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replied "I don't have any question that we tried to line

them in Cuba, to bring down this government or to kill any-

body they could lay their hands on." But he did not recall'

that "a specific project was approved which was designed

for a man to go to point B and actually shoot or poison or

do something to Castro."

(Helms testified before the Commission that "he was

not aware of the CIA ever having assassinated any foreign

leader. I certainly never authorized the execution of any

such operation while I was Director or Deputy Director and

when I was Deputy Director for Plans I don't remember it

coming forward. I certainly never recommended such an

action to the then Director."

f. The Testimony of the Phase II Case Officer

re "Executive Action Capability"

The case officer said that he had a conversation

with Richard Bissell, which he believed took place in the latter

part of 1961 or early 1962, in which Bissell told him in

substance that someone in the White House had raised the

question whether or not the Agency should develop what was

called an

"executive action capability", which was a capability

of assassination or liquidation of leaders of foreign countries.

The case officer said that Bissell briefed him that an operation

against Castro

"had been mounted" and "that it had been handled

through Sheffield Edwards. "

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9 .

The August 10, 1962 Meeting of the

Special Group

(Augmented)

The Phase II case officer said that he was

at a meeting of what was known as the "Special Group (Augmented) j

the State Department in August 1962, when someone brought up the y

sibility of "Iiquidation" of Castro. John McCone was at

that meeting and according to the case officer, John McCone

"got rather red in the face" and made a remark which "was a

clear effort to stop any such proposals, suggestion or any.

discussion thereof at that meeting within that forum imme-

diately."

John McCone testified that he was at that meeting at

the State Department which took place on August 10, 1962.

The Special Group (augmented) was a group of senior people

in the Administration who were involved in overall planning

with operations directed against Cuba. Included in that

group

were

the Secretary of State: Dean Rusk, the Secretary

of Defense,

Robert McNamara, the Attorney General of the

United States, Robert Kennedy, the Assistant to the President

for National Security, McGeorge Bundy, and General Lyman

Lemnitzer (who is a member of the Commission). The coordinat-

ing officer of the Special Group (Augmented) was Brigadier

General Edward Lansdale. (Robert Kennedy was not present

at

the August 10, 1962, meeting.)

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4The CIA case officer who was in attendance at that

meeting under date of August 14, 1962, prepared a

memorandum

for the Deputy Director of Plans, who was Richard Helms, in

which he attached a copy of an August 13, 1962 memorandum

prepared by General Lansdale. The CIA case officer's memorandum

to Helms

said:

1.

Action: None. This memorandum is for your informa-

tion.

2.

Reference is made to our conversation on 13

August 1962, concerning the memorandum of that

date from General Lansdale. Attached is a copy

of this memorandum, excised from which are four

words in the second line of the penultimate para-

graph on page 1.

These

four words were "including

liquidation of leaders."

3.

The question of assassination, particularly of

Fidel Castro, was brought up by Secre-tary McNamara at

the meeting of the Special. Group (Augmented) in

Secretary Rusk's office on 10 August. It was the

obvious consensus at that meeting, In answer to a

comment by Mr. Ed Murrow, that this is not a subject.

which has been made a matter of official record.

I took careful notes on the comments at this meeting

on this point, and the Special Group (Augmented) is.

not expecting any written comments or study on this

point.

4. Upon receipt of the attached memorandum, I-

called Lansdale's office and, in his absence, pointed

out to Frank Hand the inadmissibility and stupidity

of putting this type of comment in writing in such

a document.

I advised Frank Hand that, as far as

CIA was concerned, we would write no document per-

taining to this and would participate in no open meet-

ing discussing it. I strongly urged Hand to recommend

to Lansdale that he excise the phrase

in question from

ald copies of this memorandum, including those dissemi-

nated to State, Defense,

and USIA.

Shortly thereafter,

Lansdale called back and left the message that he agreed

and that he had done so."

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The attached Lansdale memorandum under date of

August 13, 1962 had excised from it a phrase. The blan!

space was the approximate size of the phrase, "including the liquida-

tion of leaders".

(1) Interrogation of Robert M. McNamara

According to Robert M. McNamara, he had no recovec-

tion of being present at the August 10, 1962 meeting. "I'm

not suggesting I wasn't, but I have no recollection of it.

I do seem to recall. that there was such a

" group, I doubt

very nuch if I was a member of it." He said that he "might

have been a participant"

at one or more meetings. When asked

whether or not he heard

anyone discuss the possibility of

assassinating Castro or any other foreign leader, McNenara

replied:

"No. I should interject here another point I made

earlier, as I have no notes--I did not take notes of any

meetings I attended with

rare exceptions, and I have no other

basis for refreshing my memory and my memory of those years

is very bad. I'm not saying this to in any way qualify what

I'm saying except that it is a fact that my memory is poor in

relation to the perioa."

McNamara stated that "I am almost certain that were

an assassination contemplated, which seems to me...extremely

unlikely, if it were contemplated or any action been taken

to

move in that direction, it would have had to receive the

approval of not just Mr.

Bundy but other officials at that

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same level, including my deputy, I think, and my deputy

never would have approved anything like that without dis-

cussing it with me." Secretary McNamara said that he "couldn't

imagine anything relating to a CIA operation that was known

to the President and was not known to Mr. Bundy. I can

imagine something with respect to CIA known to Mr. Bundy,

not, known to the President either because they were not that

important or conceivably because it was thought desirable

to protect the President from certain knowledge...I can't

imagine Mr. Bundy himself supporting

assassination. I

can't imagine him supporting assassination of a foreign

leader, without mentioning it to the President, even though

to do so would by that action involve the President. I say

I can't imagine him supporting assassination of a foreign

leader without the President's knowledge because it is the

President who would pay if that action were undertaken and

it ever became known. Mr. Bundy recognized, more than the

rest of us, the importance of protecting the presidency as

well as the particular president, and particularly protect-

ing his ability to govern."

(2) The Testimony of John McCone

John McCone testified that he was present at the

August 10, 1962 meeting. He said that he

objected to the discussion of liquidation of leadership as

a possibility of consideration and he later talked with

Secretary McNamara and expressed the same view, and he said

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Secretary MCNamara agreed. John McCone testified that at the

time of the August 10, 1962 meeting he did not know of the

existence of Phase I of any assassination plans nor did he

know that at the very time the meeting was going on Phase II

was a continuing plan in the cia.

(3) The Affidavit of Gezeral Lennitzer

Lyman Lemnitzer, now a member of this Commission, was

also present on the August 10, 1962, meeting. In an

affidavit he declared that he has no recollection of the

question of liquidation of Castro or other Cuban leaders

being discussed.

(4) The Testimony of General Lansdale

General Lansdale said that the possi-

bility of assassination may have been discussed at that

meeting.

He also said that it was possible that the excised

phrase from his memorandum was "including liquidation of

leaders," but he stated that this was merely a matter of

considering a possibility, one of several alternatives.

Iansdale had no specific recollection of the August 10,

1962, meeting although he said that "it is quite possible"

that he might have attended that meeting. He also had no

specific recollection of his memorandum dated August 13,

1962, and the words whited out. When asked whether or not

those words might have been "including liquidation of leaders"

Lansdale replied "I doubt it. I just don't recall anything

at: all on liquidation of leaders."

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(5) Interrogation of General Taylor

General Taylor said he had no recollection

of an

assassination being discussed, although he

said that it

might have been.

General Taylor was at the meeting.

(6) Additional Testimony of General Lansdale

According to Lansdale, during 1960 he was. Daputy Assistant

to the Secretary of Defense for Special Operations. He

said®

he had no knowledge of any discussion of possible plans

for the assassination of any foreign leaders.

(In 1961 Lansdale was appointed by Secretary MCNamara

as Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Special

Operations.

Lansdale said that he had a discussion with

President Kennedy. "I do not recall exactly on that. He

asked me if I would think about the situation in Cuba and

if I could come up with any suggestions or recommenctions

from such a study. It was a rather vague assignment by

him, but it was to be done for him personally."

(Lansdale "suggested an intermediary" to whom he would

report and Lansdale said the President "appointed his

brother, who was the Attorney General."

According to Lansdale, he made an initial series of.

recommendations in late 1961 or early 1962, in writing,

addressed to the President, "to see if there was a possi-

bility of using Cuban refugees to help them get their

political thinking together to see if there would be any

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feasibility of a revolution in Cuba." He says he thinks

he gave the

written report to the Attorney General for

delivery to the President and that he later saw the paper

"in the files of the President...he received it and he had

possession of it."

During the first part of 1962 there

were discussions

about Cuban exiles possibly going back inside Cuba to harass

the regime.

Lansdale stated that the possibility of these

exile groups trying to assassinate Castro "might will have

been mentioned." However, he said that "I don't recall a

single instance of any serious action being undertaken" on

any plan for assassination. He went on to say that what-

ever discussions

took place concerning assassination related

to possibilities rather than actualities.

Lansdale said that if there were directions to submit

papers, it was an authorization for submitting papers and

not an authorization for necessarily carrying out the

action. Lansdale admitted that "there might well have been"

a request for the CIA to come up with, as a possibility,

a plan for liquidation of leadership.

If that request was made, he said it could have been

one of his requests and that he "quite probably would

have discussed it with the Secretary of Defense"

and "possibly

the Attorney General with whom I was in contact."

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Lansdale said that at no time during 1960, 1961, 1962

or 1963 did he have any knowledge

of the existence of

any plans for the assassination of any Cuban leader or

any other leader.

Lansdale testified

that he never heard any discussion

of "executive action capability."

n.

Aäitional interrogation of General fayior

General Maxwell Taylor said that he was not aware

of the existence of any plans to assassinate Castro. He

said he did not have any discussions. with the President

concerning the possibility or the existence of the plans

to assassinate Castro. However, "

...in the case of Bob

Kennedy and Allen Dulles, we talked about so many things

at the time of the Bay of Pigs as we sat around the

table I couldn't say--that the desirability of the

disappearance.of Castro or what would happen if he were

assassinated in Cuba--that was not raised, I don't recall."

He said he didn't recall any conversations about assassi-

nation with McGeorge Bundy or Walt Rostow. "I couldn't say

that discussion in the abstract 'wouldn't it be a nice

thing if someone bumped Castro off' that could well have

been said, but I just don't recall it."

(Taylor said that he never knew of any authorization

for the CIA to undertake any assassination. He also said

he had no knowledge of

the phrase "executive action capa

bility' or any proposal for the CIA to develop a general

standy capability to assassinate foreign leaders.

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i.

Additional Testimony of Richard Helms

Richard Helms, now Ambassador to Iran, also testified

that

"there

was a flat-out effort ordered by the

White House, the President, Bobby Kennedy who was after all

his man, his right hand in these matters, to unseat the

Castro government, to do everything possible to get rid of

it by whatever device could be found and that was the

reason for mounting this large operation in Miami to work

on this very problem. And the Bay of Pigs was a part of this

effort and after the Bay of Pigs failed, there was even a

greater push to try to

get rid of this Communist influence

90 miles from the United

States shores.

("The business about the assassination of Castro, I have

read about this in the papers. I have heard about it

from

associates. It has been kicked around whether this was a

viable proposition or not. I have no doubt it was written

into various plans

as one of many options but I don't recall

any successful effort that was made in this direcion and .

since Castro is alive and apparently well in Havana, the

extent to which this was serious I have never ascertained."

Ambassador Helms said he did not "recall ever having

heard anything about poison pills or any of that".. He did

recall that "at' some juncture" a decision was reached "that

it would be advisable to brief Robert Kennedy as the

Attorney General." about "various things that the Agency

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had had to do" with certain Mafia members.

He did recall that

the Phase II case officer had taken over the plans but that

he did not "recall any special basis being used to try to

get them to do an assassination."

+ He said that he did not recall "any

plans that were approved or that were viable specifically

directed at eliminating Castro, but that there were conver-

sations about it, I haven't the slightest doubt."

(In response to a question concerning "Who might have

been the driving forces from the White House in efforts to do

something about Castro" Helms responded, "well, the principal

driving force was the Attorney General, Robert Kennedy-

There isn't any question about this. Involved in this was

a g:oup of individuals who were sort of hired and pulled

together by Kennedy and Rusk and McNamara and McGeorge Bundy

and all those people to get on with this job and as I sit here

and start to

think about this, Califano was one of them. It

seems to me Lansdale, who had been successful in this kind

of operation out in the far East was brought in for a while."

j. Knowledge of John McCone

"According to John MoCone, the first tine he learned

about the existence of assassination plans was on August 16,

1963, when he was given a copy of the May 14, 1962 "Memorandum

for the Record" prepared for Attorney General Robert Kennedy.

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The particular events underlying the disclosure to

Director

John McCone started on the evening of August 15, 1963.

Stanley J. Grogan, an assistant to the Director in charge

of press relations, received a telephone call at his house

from a man who

said he was Sandy Smith, a reporter for the

Chicago Sun-Times. According to a memorandum for the Iccord

prepared on August 16, 1963 by Grogan, Sandy Smith "said he

was working on a story-as a follow-up to the revelations by

Joe Valachi, who is under close guard at Ft. Monmouth, New

Jersey, who had named a man Giancana as the head gangster in

Chicago. The man in Chicago recently went to court to have

the FBI cease surveillance of him and his house and lost the

decision.

He said the Chicagoan reportedly at one time was used

by CIA to find out what was going on in Cuba, but provided no

information of value. Smith said he stated this to the

Department of Justice and they would neither confirm or deny."

The next morning the front page of the Chicago Sun-

Times contained a story by Sandy Smith with a headline "CIA SoU

Giancana Help for Cuba Spying". The story started with the

following paragraphs: "A fantastic tale of attempted Cuban

espionage involving Chicago

. gang boss Mono Salvatore (Moe)

Giancana and the Central Intelligence Agency was revealed

Thursday to The

sun-Times.

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"It was a weird gangland spy case in which, government

official said, CIA agents contacted Giancana in an effort

to obtain Cuban intelligence after the Fidel Castro regina

came into power in 1959.

"What the CIA accomplished--if anything--by negotiating

with the 53-year old Chicago rackets chief is one of many

unexplained mysteries of the matter."

Con August 16, 1963, Richard Helms gave to John McCone

a memorandum dated August 16 under the subject "Sam Giancana"

which stated: "Attached is the only copy in the Agency of a

memorandum on subject, the ribbon copy of which was sent to

the Attorney General in May 1962. I was vaguely aware of

the existence of such a memorandum since I was informed

that had been written as a result of a briefing given by

Colonel Edwards and Lawrence Houston to the Attorney General

in May of last year."

Richard Helms, when interrogated by the Commission

staff, testified he did not have any recollection of the

specific events. However, when he was shown his memorandum

of August 16, 1963, addressed to John McCone, the Director

of Central Intelligence, he remembered that he had delivered

that memorandum to Mr. McCone.

| Helms

did not recall whether

or not he had seen the May 11, 1962 memorandum for the record

sent to the Attorney General before the date he sent it to

John McCone on August 16, 1963.

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As previously noted, Lawrence Houston testified

that when he first learned about the Phase I operation, which

he said was in 1962 shortly before the May 7, 1962, briefing

of the Attorney General, he told Colonel Edwards "that I thought

the only thing to do was to go and tell the whole story to the

Attorney General. So with the approval of the Director at

that time--, well, it was '63, it must have been McCone."

According to the CIA Inspector General investigation in 1967,

the actual person with whom Houston discussed the matter was

the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, General Carters

However, General Carter had no recollection of any discussion

of assassination plans in the long distance telephone inter-

view in which hypothetical questions were asked relating to

newspaper charges.

3. Phase III -- Miscellaneous 1963 Schemes

According to the 1967 Inspector General investiga-

tion report, during 1963 several miscellaneous schemes were

developed inside the Agency for possible use against Fidel

Castro.

Helms testified he was vaguely aware of some of these

schemes, which he called "hairbrained".

There was no showing that any of the schemes extended beyond

the discussion stage. One of these schemes involved discussions

inside the CIA about trying to have General Donovan, who was

negotiating with Fidel Castro for the release of the Bay of Pigs

prisoners, give to Fidel Castro a contaminated skindiving suit.

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It was known that Fidel Castro liked to skindive.. The CIA plan

was to dust the inside of the suit with a fungus producing madera

foot, a disabling and chronic skin disease, and also contaminating

the suit with tuberculosis bacilli in the breathing apparatus.

There is no evidence that General Donovan knew of any such

schemes developed inside the Agency. The scheme was dropped

because Donovan on his own volition gave Fidel Castro an uncon-

taminated skindividing suit as a gesture of friendship.

Suring this period of time there were also discussions

about preparing a booby-trap spectacular seashell which would be

submerged in an area where Castro often skindived. The sea-

shell would be loaded with explosives to blow apart when the

shell was lifted. After investigation it was determined that

there was no shell in the Caribbean are a large enough to hold a

sufficient amount of explosive which was spectacular enough

to attract the attention of Castro. Also, a midget sub-

marine which was anticipated to be used for the emplacement

of the seashell did not have a long enough operating range.

i. The Phase IV Plan - 1963-1965

In 1963 a CIA employee who was fluent in

Spanish was assigned on temporary duty with the Special

Operations Group on Cuba. The employee is hereafter referred

to as the Phase IV case officer.

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The task assigned to him "...was to collect intelligence

and. to try to organize a group of military officers inside

Cuba who were opposed to the Cuban regine-the Castro

regime."

In the latter part of 1963 he met, on a trip

abroad, a Cuban with whom CIA personnel had been in contact

since 1961. At this first meeting the Phase IV case

officer said there was no discussion about any possible

assassination of

any Cuban leader.

At a

subsequent meeting, which took place in

Europe, the Phase IV case officer said that the primary

discussion concerned "getting into more detail on the

organization of a group inside Cuba which could be used

in an internal coup against the Castro government.

("The subject of assassination was never raised

by me.

It was

never discussed in that context. In dis-

cussing the coup and how a coup would be carried out, the,

this particular contact did raise the possibility and in his

mind the very real possibility that there would be bloodshed;

and that somebody would be killed. Their, or his, opinion

was that to even get the internal revolt, a coup, underwa!

that the leadership--the top leadership--would have to be

neutralized.

Specific assassination of any of the people,

it was not discussed in those particular terms."

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According to the Phase IV case officer, the

Cuban held a relatively high position in the Cuban govern-

ment.

The Cuban "requested a meeting...a high level policy

maker in Washington, specifically mentioning Robert Kennedy

as one of the people with whom he would like to talk, to

get some assurance that Washington was serious about

proceeding with this type of an operation."

The Cuban also said "that they would need some

help in-arms probably-in getting started, in kicking off

the coup." The Cuban mentioned high powered rifles and

scopes and said "they felt that they could capture suf-

ficient arms to carry on once they started."

(Subsequently, a senior CIA officer travelled to

Europe to meet the Cuban and "assured him...that the U.S.

Government was

serious about this operation..." and "that

the U.S. Government was prepared to support the coup and

that when they launched the coup as soon as they established

themselves

in any reasonable manner inside Cuba that the

U.S. Government would support tham."

The

next meeting took place on November 22,

1963 in

Europe. The Cuban

contact requested "some type of

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of esoteric gadget with which he would be able to defend

himself" if there were a confrontation directly with

Castro:

"He had in mind some sort of a pellet pen or any-

thing that was not a hand weapon that he could carry with

him" into any conference with Castro.

Although the Agency did not develop such a device,

it did develop a ballpoint pen which had a hypodermic needle

inside that when you pushed the lever, the needle came out

and poison could be injected into someone. The Phase IV

case officer showed

the pen to the Cuban contact on Now'imber

22, 1963. The Cuban contact declined the gadget "because

of the close proximity with which he would have to get to

a person if anything developed in the form of a confronta-

tion with him."

Instead, the Cuban asked for weapons, and

the case officer told the Cuban "that a cache of weapons

would be put down for him in Cuba."

One or two caches of weapons, including high-

powered rifles with scopes, were subsequently placed

down in Cuba. In addition, according to the Phase IV

case officer, he delivered several hundred dollars to help

the liban contact with his living expenses, while in

Europe.

"It was around $1,000 at one time, no more than

that."

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Originally, the Cuban contact had been a Castro

supporter and had been a member of one of the groups

that overthrew Batista. However, "he became disenchanted

with Castro" shortly ater Castro took over because of "the

harsh police state policies that were being carried out."

The Phase IV case officer broke off contact

with the Cuban in the latter part of 1964 and was reassigned

to another task in early 1965. The Cuban contact then

was turned over to a Cuban exile group.

According to the 1967 CIA Inspector General

investigation /report, CIA support was withdrawn from

the Cuban in 1965 because too many people knew about him

and his plan.

In March 1966 a Cuban leader was arrested

and confessed to receiving rifles with telescopic sites

from the CIA to be used for the assassination of Castro,

according to a "Prensa Latina" news release. The man said

he received $100,000 toward this plan.

In a memorandum to the Secretary of State after

this news story appeared, the CIA said that the contact

was recruited to collect intelligence of military activi-

ties and objectives in Cuba. The Agency said: "There is no

truth to the allegations that the CIA paid $100,000 or

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any other sizeable sum of money" as claimed in the Cuban

newspapers

following the confession of the contact. The

said

"the Agency was not involved" with either

Agency also

of the two men arrested by Cuban authorities "in a plot

to assassinate Fidel Castro as claimed in the Prensa Latina

news release, nor did it ever encourage either of these two

persons to attempt such an act..." The memorandum to Sec-

retary Rusk was signed by Richard

Helms and was dated

March 6, 1966.

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DRAFT

GRAY/sin

5/22/75

E.

The Dominican Republic

1. Summary and Conclusion

In late 1960 and 1961, the United States, having

abandoned its policy of nonintervention in the Dominican

Republic, sought to bring about the overthrow of the regime

of. Generalissimo Rafael Trujillo and the establishment of

a moderate successor government. To accomplish this result

several measures were undertaken on the diplomatic level

and the Special Group (predecessor of the Forty Committee)

approved a program of covert action as well. At their

direction the CIA encouraged a group of internal dissidents

along

with several exile organizations. On May 30, 1961,

members of the internal group assassinated Trujillo.

There was no direct American participation in the

assassination.

The idea originated with the Dominicans;

they acquired some of the weapons on their own; and they

did the detailed planning.

They were never subject to

American supervision or control.

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On the other hand, CIA and State Department officers

in

the Dominican Republic were in regular contact with the

plotters before the assassination, and they were well aware

of the group's lethal intentions. The CIA had told the group

of practical problems with several earlier assassination plans;

it had offered to train a member of the group in the use of

explosives to kill Irujillo.

As a gesture of American support, three revolvers anc

three carbines, along with limited supplies of ammunition,

were passed to the plotters about two months before the

assassination.

One of the carbines was reportedly left at

the scene of the crime. Four submachineguns were also sent

to the Dominican Republic by diplomatic pouch. They were with-

held from the plotters because of last-minute State Department

objections.

It appears that high-level State Department and

White House officials first learned guns had been provided to

potential assassins some six weeks after the transfer, and

about two

• and a half weeks prior to Trujillo's death. A state-

ment of policy was prepared and approved by the President,

reading

"ize

must not run risk of U.S. association with

political

assassination, since U.S. as a matter of general

policy cannot condone assassination. This last principle is

overriding and must prevail in doubtful situations." The

preparation of this message, and the reguired coordination,

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consumed about two weeks: There is no evidence of any

effort during this period to

recover the weapons or other-

wise

interfere with the assassination plans. The policy

statement was cabled to the Dominican Republic on May 29,

the day before the successful assassination attempt. Both

the Consul General and the CIA Station Chief in Ciudad

Irujillo promptly protested this change in the policy which

they had followed in the belief it had been approved by

appropriate authority. Before these cables were received

in Washington, Trujillo was dead.

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2- (Proposed) General Conclusion and Recommendation

The Comnission concurs in the position taken in the

policy statement. We have concluded that there was an

improper level of American involvement in the death of

Generalissimo Trujillo. That is so even though the assassins

might have been able to procure equivalent weapons from

other sources. We also conclude that despite the apparent

good faith of the persons concerned, there

was inadequate

consideration of the risks of such involvement and inadequate

supervision and coordination of the operation.

We recommend that in the future, weapons should be

supplied to plotters of a coup or revolution only in the

rarest of circunstances, if at all. In passing on such

activities the approving authority should consider carefully

the potential damage to the foreign relations of the nation and

the feelings of the American people if such activities become

known. In our judgment eventual disclosure

is inevitable.

The procedures of the CIA should be modified to re-

quire the concurrence of the Department of State before weapons,

ammunition, explosives, and similar items are transmitted by

diplomatic pouch.

The treaty obligations of the ".s., including

particularly those under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic

Relation

should be observed and fulfilled in good faith.

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.:".

3.

The Chronology

a. The Background

Rafael Trujillo came to power in the Dominican Re

public in 1930.. By 1960 he was notorious because of the corrupt:

regressive nature of his regime, because of his systematic

use of

torture and murder as tools of government, and because

of his intervention in the affairs of other nations. The

country was in considerable turmoil as the result of several

attempts to overthrow the government, sponsored by other

•Latin American countries.

The policy of the United States at the beginning

1960 was to refrain from actions which would hasten Trujillo's

downfall but to identify, develop, and encourage a moderate

group which would take power in the event of Irujillo's death,

flight, or overthrow. This policy of non-intervention, although

clearly required by treaty, convinced many Latin Americans

that the United States supported and maintained the Trujillo

regime. Leaders such as President Betancourt of Venezuela,

whose support the United States badly wanted in connection with

operations against Castro, conditioned their support on U.s.

assistance in toppling Trujillo. In April the President approved

contingency planning for a more active U.S. role in the event

the political situation in the Dominican Republic continued to

deteriorate.

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b. The Rifles

In May the American Ambassador to the Dominican R

public returned to Washington for consultations. Both State Depa

ment and CIA files indicate that he reported the dissidents

needed

weapons, particularly a "small number of high-powered

rifles with telescopic lenses." The Ambassador has no present

recollection of any such request. He is confident that he

made no serious effort to obtain them. Nevertheless, the

request went forward. Near the end of June, according to

CIA files, the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-

American Affairs approved the provision of "a small number

of sniper rifles

or other devices for the removal of key

Trujillo people from the scene," and requested that they be

supplied at the earliest possible moment. Neither the CIA

officer who obtained this approval nor the Assistant Secretary,

now both retired, has any recollection of this meeting.

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c. Explosives

On June 24, 1960, Trujillo sponsored an unsucces:

attempt on the life of the President of Venezuela; as a

result the United States and other OAS countries severed

diplomatic relations in August. Consular relations vere

retained.

The Commission Staff interviewed the foreign serv

officer who served as Deputy Chief of Mission before the

severance of relations, and as Consul General thereafter.

It was his recollection that the dissidents had no definite

assassination plans in mid 1960, although they did speak of

that course as

the only way out of the conditions under which

they lived. It was not until early 1961, as he recalls, that

the dissidents began formulating specific plans to kill

Trujillo. The cables and memoranda of the period tend to

confirm this recollection.

Nevertheless, the CIA continued at intervals duri

1960 to discuss with the dissidents means for the assassination

of Trujillo. A memorandum in October 1960 reflects that the !

dissidents planned to kill Trujillo with a bomb, detonated from

a remote point, and then to take over the nation by means

of an armed uprising, coordinated with other paramilitary

action. A more detailed proposal along similar lines appears

to have been provided by the dissidents in December.

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On December 29, 1960, the Deputy Director for Pli

presented the Special Group with a program for covert action

to bring about Trujillo's overthrow. A portion of the program

called for Agency and consular officials in Ciudad Trujillo

to continue to work with the internal dissidents to promote

an uprising and the establishment of a moderate pro-u.s.

successor to the Trujillo regime. The plan, as initially

approved by the Special Group, contained no provision for

supplying arms or explosives to the internal dissidents.

Two weeks later, the Department of

State, on its

motion, obtained Special Group consent to have the internal

dissidents furnished "limited supplies of small arms and other

equipment," meaning explosives, subject to the condition

that these materials be provided to the dissidents at a point

outside the country itself. The internal State Department

memorandum which led to this proposal

stated there would be

no thought of toppling the government by any such "minor

measure," but some sabotage potential would be placed in the.

hands of the pro-u.s. opposition with a corresponding boost

to their morale and their opinion of the United States.

The

station and the consulate were informed of the Special Group

action on January 19, 1901, the last day of the Eisenhower

Administration. President Kennedy was informed of the Special

Group action not later than mid-February.

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The Commission finds no reason to believe that ai

member

of the Special. Group intended to authorize the furnish-

ing of assassination weapons.

However, those CIA officials

who had been involved in dealings with the dissidents very

likely believed that the Special Group had authorized

support

of the planned assassination and armed uprising.

-.**

d. Revolvers.

During the early months of 1961 the CIA Station

and the consular officials in Ciudad Trujillo kept in close touch.

with the dissidents,

and they were aware of their various schemes

to assassinate Trujillo. Although these officials apparently

took no active role in the develooment of plans, they did

on occasion discuss and criticize plans developed by the

dissidents. In mid-February, two members of the dissidents'

"Action Group", which was to carry out the actual assassination,

came to the United States. They met with both CIA and State

Department officers. During these meetings they stated

repeatedly that the key to the success of the plot would be the

assassination of trujillo:

The evidence is insufficient to

permit a conclusion how far this knowledge went within the

State Department.

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In March matters took an active turn. In a cable

on March 4, a

letter on March. 16, and an airgram on March 22

the Consul General in Ciudad Trujillo reported that plans

for Trujillo's

assassination were coming to a head. He

requested additional authority to supply the pro-u.s.

dissidents with weapons.

Similar requests were made by the CIA Station

Chief of his headquarters. Three times headquarters responded

that it could

not comply with these requests because

the

restrictions imposed by the Special Group precluded the

introduction of arms into the Dominican Republic by

Americans.

On March 22, the CIA Station Chief renewed his

request that headquarters send him three .38 calibre revolvers and

ammunition by diplomatic pouch. He stated that without

some show of support the United States would lose the

dissident group entirely, while if it supplied weapons it

might have

some control over the timing of their

use.

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On the same day, March 22, representatives of the

CIA met with the State Department officer who served as their

point of contact with the Department's Bureau of Inter-

American Affairs.

Three days later, on March 25, the Deputy

Director for Plans cabled the station setting forth United

States

policy with respect to the Dominican Republic and

stating that the revolvers and ammunition would be sent by

diplomatic pouch in the near future.

There is nothing in either CIA or State Depart-

ment files to indicate whether the Department was consulted on th

decision. The memories of the participants are hazy on the

matter, but there are indications that the CIA did discuss the

introduction of handguns into the Dominican Republic and

believed it obtained approval. The then Deputy Director for

Plans testified that as

the territorial restriction on delivery

of weapons was initially imposed at the request of

the

Department of State, he would have considered the State Depart-

ment's willingness to waive the restriction as adequate authority

and probably would not have returned to the Special Group for

formal approval.

He observed that the members of the Group

or their staffs night have been advised informally.

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The use of a diplomatic pouch to send weapons

for such purposes was prohibited by regulations of the CIA's

Clandestine Services, and it is also illegal under inter-

national law.

The Deputy Director of Plans approved the

waiver of the internal regulations. There is nothing to

indicate that the Department of State was informed of the

use of the pouch, and the fact that the March 25 cable

instructed the Chief of Station not to advise the Consul

General of the use of the pouch suggests that the CIA acted

unilaterally in this regard.

The CIA files indicate that the revolvers were

passed to the dissidents, 'and the Department of State files

in-

dicate that one was passed by the Consul General and the other two

by Agency officers. Neither the Consul General nor the former

Chief of Station has any particular recollection of the matter.

e. Carbines

On March 26, the day after CIA decided to fur-

nish the revolvers, the station cabled that it had found three M-1

carbines in the consulate, left behind by departing naval

personnel. It requested magazines for the

weapons

and

permission to pass them to the dissidents. On March 29 the

Assistant Deputy Director for Plans responded that he

was

pouching the magazines, and that headquarters was "inclined to

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favor" passing the weapons and ammunition.

State

Another meeting was held with the Department of

on March 31. The State Department memorandum makes no

mention of any discussion either of the furnishing of ammunition

or of authority to pass the weapons, but the Deputy Director

for Plans granted authority to pass the carbines the same.

day. Both the State Department liaison officer, who prepared

the memorandum of the meeting, and the Consul General are clear

in their recollection that the State Department in Washington

did not learn of the pass of the carbines until the Consul

General was in Washington several weeks after the pass took

place. Nothing in CIA files indicates that this decision was

coordinated in advance with the Department of State. It is

possible that the CIA understood its initial authorization

• with respect to the handguns to extend to the carbines as well.

It is also possible that CIA decided the Special Group

restriction on importation of weapons did. not apply, as the

carbines were already inside the Dominican Republic.

CIA cabled its Station Chief on April 5 to reques

the Consul General

not to comment in his correspondence with the

Department that the arms and ammunition were being passed.

A reassuring reply. from

the Consul General was received two

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days

later.

The CIA Station Chief, who would not have been

involved in any coordination at the headquarters level,.

speculated that this injunction may have been designed to

keep the State Department from knowing "officially" that

the weapons were being passed.

It is clear that the coordination on the deci-

sion to provide the carbines was

• inadequate. It is impossible

to determine from this evidence where the fault lies.

f. Submachine Guns

As early as March 20, the consulate and the sta-

tion in Ciudad Trujillo had been informed that the assassins in-

tended to kill Trujillo when he visited his mistress--substantiall:

the plan followed some two months later. Although the plan

originally called for Trujillo's dispatch inside his mistress'

residence using silenced

weapons, the group requested five

M-3 submachineguns and 1500 rounds of ammunition for

self

defense in case the assassination plans went awry and

there

was a firefight with Trujillo's security forces. In its

March 25 cable, headquarters replied that it was prepared to

provide these weapons when the dissidents developed the

capacity to receive them at sea or in

cache on the coast,

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but that for security reasons they could not be sent

by pouch.

The Chief of Station returned to Washington for

consultations in early April. He was able to convince his

superiors that the pouch was the only feasible and secure

means of getting the weapons into the Dominican Republic

for delivery to the dissidents. The Deputy Director for

Plans approved on April 10, and the pouch was sent on April 14

but with the restriction that the weapons not be passed without

further approval. The files show that there was no coordination

with the Department of State in Washington. Because of the

Bay of Piys landing on April 17, the station and the consulate

were never given authority to supply the weapons to the

dissidents and they never did so.

On May 2, as the result of repeated entreaties

From the station and the consulate, the Deputy Director for

Plans

approved a cable for the DCI's release, stating that as it

appeared the Action Group was prepared to act whether or not

the submachineguns were provided, the station was authorized

to pass them for the additional protection of the group.

Apparently someone decided this decision should

not be made

without the consent of the Department of State,

for on May 3

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the Deputy Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division met with

Professor Adolph Berle, Chairman of the Interagency Task

Force on Latin America. According to Berle's memorandum of

the interview, confirmed by one of the witnesses, the initial

presentation stated the group wished the arms'in order to

overthrow Trujillo. After some examination, Berle determined

that the real plan was to assassinate Trujillo, and that the

guns were wanted for, that purpose. Berle responded that he

could not care less for Trujillo, but that the United States

did not wish to have anything to do with any assassination

plots anywhere, any time.. The Agency officer, who had been

in a supervisory position with respect to this effort for

approximately a year, told Berle he felt the same way.

It may be that the CIA tried to get Berle over-

ruled; on May 5 a cable informed the station that a high-level

State Department decision on the submachineguns was pending.

Nothing in the files indicates what this cable might have

referred to. In any event on May & the station was informed

that the State Department had disapproved passage of the

subrachineguns, and this ended the matter.

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g. The Policy Statement

In mid-May, as a result of increasing indications

that events in the Dominican Republic were reaching a clinax,

the White House requested situation reports and contingency

plans.

This exercise was overseen by a member of the National

Security Council Staff. A CIA briefing paper prepared for this

purpose stated that the three revolvers and the three carbines

had been passed to the dissidents for their use in personal

defense

"attendant to their projected efforts to neutralize

Trujillo." The report implied that both the revolvers and

the ammunition had bean in the consulate with the carbines,

and therefore the limitations on the Special Group authorization

technically did not apply.

The CIA liaison officer at the State Department

called to his superiors' attention the fact that weapons had. al-

xeady been passed, and apparently submitted a memorandum outlining

the reasons why the United States should not be involved

in this activity. Among them were that the United States

Government should not lend itself to direct political

assassination, that the moral posture of the United States

could ill afford further tarnishing in the eyes of the world,

that the United States would have encouraged the

action,

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supplied the weapons, effected the delivery, and then turned

over only the final execution to (unskilled) local triggermen,

and that the United States could not afford a precedent which

might convince the world that our diplomatic pouches are

used to deliver assassination weapons.

On May 15 a joint CIA-State Department memorandum

was sent the President's National Security Adviser informing him

that the plans of the pro-U.s. group were well advanced in the

direction of ousting Trujillo "by any means." This memorandum

did not call attention to the fact that the United States had

supplied

weapons to the group.

In the midst of these discussions, the Consul

General, who had been in Washington for consultation, cabled on h:

return to the Dominican Republic that the dissident group

planned to "execute action against Trujillo" that evening.

The Department replied that it would consider this timing

particularly unfortunate in view of the juxaposition of the

Consul General's return from Washington to the Dominican

Republic and the inferences which might be drawn therefrom.

This exchange of cables was furnished to the NSC staffer.

The state of the covert action program in the

Dominican Republic was discussed in the Special Group on May 18,

and again on May 25.

The

Commission has not haû access

to

the minutes.

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On May 24, the State Department liaison officer

provided the Under Secretary with a draft cable, stating that

the need to dissociate

the United States from obvious inter-

vention, and even more so from political assassination,

overrode the need to secure credit with the Dominican dissidents

and with Latin America generally. This draft was approved

at high levels in the CIA and the State Department, and was

sent to the white House fox

Presidential review. After some

redrafting in the White House, the final version in another

hand, stated "We must not run risk of U.S. association with

political assassination, since U.S. as a matter of general

policy cannot condone assassination." This version was

approved by the

• President in Paris and cabled to the Dominican

Republic. It arrived the day before Trujillo's

death on May 30.

On June

I the State Department instructed its Consul, General,

if he could do so "most inconspicuously", to destroy any

records concerning contacts with the plotters and any related

matters.

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F.

Sonclusion

President Ford has firmly announced that assassina-

tion is not and should never be a tool of United States policy.

The Commission joins in this statement. It is against thr

constitutional and moral principles for which this republie

stinds for there to be any direct or indirect participation

ot any agency of the United States Government in any plans

involving the assassination of any person in peacetime.

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