## Page 1

Date

Page

15

: 06/25/98

1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY

RECORD

NUMBER

RECORDS

SERIES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

NSC

: 180

145-10001-10187

Released under the John

F. Kennedy

Assassination Records

Collection Act of 1992

144 USC 2107 Notel.

Case#:NW 54214 Date:

10-10-2017

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR

FROM

: BRIG. GEN. LANSDALE

: THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

TITLE : MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

DATE : 08/31/62

PAGES : 21

SUBJECTS : OPERATION MONGOOSE, PHASE II

PROJECTION OF ACTIONS, PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION

:

RESTRICTIONS : 1B, 1C

CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 02/23/98

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :

NO JOINT STAFF OBJECTION

TO DECLASSIFICATION

ELY EN CONCURRENOE OF

DATE:

MAR

2016

[R]

- ITEM IS RESTRICTED

54214

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## Page 2

TOP SECRET NOFORN

SPECIAL HANDLING

MONGOOSE

31 August 1962

SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

From:

Brig. Gen. Lansdale:

Subject:

Phase II, Operation Mongoose:

Pursuant to your instructions, transmitted herewith is a proposed

projection of actions to be undertaken as Phase II, Operation Mongoose.

This projection incorporates the suggestions of the operations team

designated by the major departments and agencies charged with Mongoose

planning and implementation.

The format employed is responsive to the 16 August 1962 guidelines

for Phase II, Operation Mongoose, and to your comments at recent meetings:

The projection is divided into each objective contained in the 16 August

guidelines, and then lists proposed actions to attain that objèctive.

guideline objectives have been given short titles as follows:

A. Discredit and isolate the regime

B. Harass the economy

C. Intensify intelligence collection

D. Split regime leadership and relations with Bloc

E. Assist Cuban exile groups and Latin American

governments to take actions

F. Be prepared to exploit a revolt

In preparing this projection of actions for Phase II, Operation

Mongoose, an effort was made to restrict proposals to the "B plus" frame,

of reference provided and to assume that a broader frame of programming

under the NSAM would supplement Mongoose by separate planning.

"Special Handling'' number copies to:

Special Group (Series A)

1. General Taylori

2.

Mr. Johnson

3. Mr. Gilpatric

Added (Series B)

1..

Mr. Bundy

Mr. Rusk

Operational Representatives (Series-B)

Mr. Hurwitch (State)

6:

General Johnson (Defense)

7. Mr. Harvey (CIA)

'4.

5.

Mr. i McCone

Mr. Kennedy

6. General Lemnitzer.

3.

4.

Mr. McNamara

Mr; Murrow

8.

Mr. Wilson (USIA)

9-15.

Chief of Operations

TOP. SECRET NOFORN

SPECTAL HANDLING

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOVATIC

REGRADING:

DOES

DOD. DIR 5200.10

HOT APPLY

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## Page 3

TOR SECREI - NOEORN

SPECIAL HANDLING

PHASE II

11 August 1962 until

OBJECTIVE A: DISCREDIT AND ISOLATE THE REGIME

ACTIVITY

Political

Encourage Latin American nations, bi-

laterally and through the OAS Special Con -

sultative Committee (SCCS), to establish

controls over the travel of their nationals

to Cuba.: (State, with CIA support):

2. Encourage Latin American nations, bi-

laterally and through the SCCS, to limit

or prohibit entry of Cuban propaganda.

(State, with CIA and USIA support):

PURPOSE

To diminish travel by Latin

American nationals to Cuba and to

facilitate the collection of intelli-

gence on persons travelling. i

To diminish the influx of Cuban

propaganda into Latin America.

3. Provide intelligence of arms smuggling

from Cuba to other Hemisphere nationg:

(CIA, State, Defense):

To obtain and exploit hard evidence

of Cuban subversion in the Hemis-

phere.

To maintain the multilateral hemis -

pheric context of the Cuban problem.

4. As opportune, initiate action or support

another nation's initiative in the OAS with

respect to countering the Communist re,-

gime in Cuba. (State; with CIA support).

COPY 1 Of lo COPIES SERiES A

TOP SECRET NOFORN

SPECIAL HANDLING

MONGOOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

Most Latin American nations have consti-

tutional provisions regarding freedom of

travel.

Many Latin American countries have legal.

bars against admitting foreign publications!

Commanders requested to develop and

encourage Latins to develop alerting sys-

tems, to include anti-infiltration training

Deep division within the Hemisphere over

the Cuban issue may be surfaced. As an

example of this activity, the current

Dominican initiative in the OAS should be

supported and exploited.

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC

REGRADING: DOD DIR 5200. 10

DOES NOT APPLY

HH

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ACTIVITY

Continue the program of excluding

Cuba from Hemisphere organizations.

(State, with CIA support).

6. Stimulate manifestations critical of the

Castro/Communist regime by Latin

American political, labor; religious.

and student and other significant impact

groups. (State, with CIA and USIA

support)

7. Encourage and exploit the defection of

Cuban diplomats, officials, and delegates

abroad..

8. Keep friendly nations fully informed

of the nature of the Castro/Communist

regime and of U.S. policy with respect

to it.. (State, with CIA and USIA support):.

TOP SECRET-NOEORN

SPECIAL HANDLING

PURPOSE

To strengthen the isolation of

Cuba:

To demonstrate that Latin America

has rejected Cuba as a model to be

imitated:

To make utmöst political use of

revelations by Cuban "'insiders."

To provide for coordinated

action.

TOP SECRET-NOFORN

SPECIAL HANDLING

CONSIDERATIONS

Possible exceptions, such as in public

health, should be examined to determine

U.S. national interest.

To be productive; such demonstrations

should stem naturally out of Cuban events,

as they happen..

"Events" could include

Cuban refugee publication of substantive facts

on what is happening to students, workers,

etc. inside Cuba.

Although keeping defectors "in place" can

be more valuable, it is not always so, and

if they cannot be recruited in place, then

exploiting the defection fully for propaganda

is important. Note items 45 and 46.

HH

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ACTIVITY®

Psychological

9. Beamed to Cuba, initiate a planned series:

of statements by U.S: and other free world

official and non-official spokesmen which

support developing and maintaining the

will to resist within Cuba. (USIA, with State

and ClA support)

10:Continue Voice of America short-wäve

broadcasts to Cuba. (USIA)

11 .Continue U:S. broadcasting to the

Western Hemisphere. (USIA) .

TOP SECRET-NOFORN

SPECIAL HANDLING

PURPOSE

To maintain resistance morale

within Cuba.

To maintain regular, overt

communication with the Cuban

people:

To keep the people of the Hemis -

phere awake to the Cuban situation.

SPECIAL

WET - NOF RN

HANDLNG

CONSIDERATIONS

Moderation must be the keynoté. Some

unfavorable comment from Cuban refugee

groups should be expected, demanding a

harder line: "

The activity is based on nine hours of daily

broadcasting in Spanish, with three hours

daily specifically programmed for Cuba

Carefully documented programs.of the

failures of the Castro/Communist system

will be increased, to maintain a subjective

basis for Cuban disaffection: Emphasis -

will be given to repudiations of the Castrol

Communist regime elsewhere, particularly

This activity now includes both VOA short=

wave broadcasts. Renewed efforts will be

made to enlist support from Inter-American

Broadcasters Association members and other

groups. "Soap operas" and special commen-

taries on anti-Castro themes will be included.

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, 12.

ACTIVITY

Produce propaganda cartoon books.

(USIA): -

13. Produce photo-novels carrying the

propaganda story. (USIA).

14:

Supply TV outlets in Latin America

with materials.. (USIA):

15. Produce short films for commercial

outlets and impact groups in Latin

America. (USIA).

16. Produce propaganda exhibits (''before!"

and "after'') for public and organizational

display. (USIA).

TOP SECRET-NOFORN

SPECIAL HANDLING

PURPOSE

To build and reinforce a negative

image of Castro/Communism among

youth, labor, and other groups in

Latin América.

Same as 12 above.

Same as 12 above, plus impact

on key leader audiences.

Same as 12 above:

Same as 12 above.

SPECI

SECRET-NOFORN

TANDLING

CONSIDERATIONS

Themes can be updated quickly (agrarian

reform problems, prisoner treatment,

Soviet technicians, guerrillas, etc). Final

Congressional action on USIA's FY 63 budget

will determine if additional funds will have

to be sought.

An anti-Castro pilot model is under develop-

ment: These novels would complement the

cartoon books (in 12 above), particularly

in urban working groups.

In addition to supplying documentaries and

news clips, a series of one-minute puppet.

shorts will be tried. Commercial TV now

covers.all major cities in Latin America

except Santiago and Valparaiso, Chile, and

La Paz, Bolivia:

Government censorship of all films in

Latin America presents a potential problem.

Three such exhibits are now being developed.

The first one contrasts Castro's promises

with his, actions. An electric motor turn's the

slats on a venetian blind exhibit, changing

the picture.

HH

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ACTIVITY

17. Publish books in Spanish and Portu-

guese, with distribution through com-

mercial sales and presentation.

(USIA and CIA).

18, Special propaganda exploitation of i

U..s. information about the agricultural;

labor, and public health situation in

Cuba. (State, with CLA and USIA

support)

19. Expand the delivery of propaganda

material into Cuba via the open mails,

legal travellers, and controlled

couriers: (CLA).

20. Develop specific proposal for use of

balloans to deliver propaganda. (CIA)

21.

Direct propaganda at Soviet and other

Bloc personnel in Cuba. (CLA)

TOP SECRET-NOEORN

SPECIAL HANDLING

PURPOSE

Same as 12 above, plus impact on

intellectuals and other opinion

leaders.

To make full use of the factual basis

for propaganda actions exposing true

conditions inside Cuba:

To dieaffect the Cuban people and

to help maintain the will to resist.

To provide a means of distributing

propaganda inside Cuba.

To make them disaffected with their

role in Cuba.

TOP- SECRET -NOFORN

ISPECIAL HANDLING

CONSIDERATIONS

Volume will depend in part on results

of USIA's request for supplemental funds

for the Latin American book program, now

pending before Congress. Several new books

are now in the pipeline.

Current research on Cuba by US depart-

ments and agencies,

outside Mongoose,

should be maintained and then be passed

into Mongoose channels for use in the project.

This includes Department of Agriculture,

Department of Labor, and the Public Health

Service.

The "Gusano Libre" theme deserves much

wider exploitation, since this is a theme

created by resistance within Cuba itself.

This distribution technique must appear as a

genuine Cuban refugee project. It must con-

sider risks of injuring population or being

exploited along that line by the Castro/Commu-

nist regime to the detriment of Mongoose

objectives.

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403d

1.3 a4

(5)

ACTIVE

22. "Voice of Free Cuba" broadcasts from

submarine. (CIA, with Defense support).

23. Continue "Radio Americas" broadcasts

from Swan Island as appropriate.

(CIA) .

24. Make available to the International

Narcotics Commission documented

evidence of Cuban exportation/ impor

tation of narcotics. (State).

25

Arrange for caches of limited Soviet

Crech arme to

he "discovered!

spreeted

Latin American countries

ostensibly smuggled in

Cuba

TOP OLGRET-NOFERN

SPECIAL MAT

PURPOSE

To have a "voice" for resistance

inside Cuba.

To provide an irritant to the Castro/

Communist regime.

To create increased awareness

in Latin America of Cuban sub-

versive activities.

To sow and increase distrust in

Latin America of the Castro/

Communist regime.

TOP SECRET-NOFCAN

SPECTAL

HANDLING

CONSIDERATIONS

The initial broadcasts indicated that this

can be made into an effective medium, at

small risk. In strengthening the effectiveness,

full use should be made of talents in the Cuban

refugee community. CIA will coordinate this

activity closely with State and USIA.

Documented evidence available or obtainable

should be fully exploited for impact upon

hemisphere and world opinion.

This activity will be undertaken only on a

spot basis, coordinated with U.S. objectives

in the specific country.

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ACTIVITY

-26:.

Encourage the Cuban people, as appro-

priate, to engage in minor acts of,

sabotage. (CLA):

27. Conduct selected major sabotage

operations against key. Cuban indus-

tries and public utilities, with

priority attention being given to trans-

portation, communication, power

plants, and utilities. (CIA).

TOR SECRET -NOFORN

SPECIAL HANDLIG

PURPOSE

To cause breakdowns of communi -

cations, power, and transport.

facilities; to reduce availability of

raw materials; to encourage the

spirit of resistance, even in a

"limited way.

To reduce available economic

supplies and services.

SPECIA

FOR

LING

CONSIDERATIONS

"Minor acts of sabotage" include such

actions as excessive use of electricity or

short-circuiting of telephone.eguipment,

immobilizing vehicles (stealing parts,

puncturing tires, contaminating gas tanks),

material spoilage, and crop burning:

All forms of media, non-US government

attributable, will be used to get the message

to the Cuban people; however, unless a

method of mass distribution of leaflets is:

used, it is probable that this activity will

be minor and spotty.

Depending upon circumstances, the sabotage

will be conducted either by especially

trained, carefully selected commando/

sabotage teams infiltrated especially for the

operation and exfiltrated at the completion

of the operation, or by internal assets if such

can be developed with the necessary access

to the target.

The following are currently

selected targets:

000 10: 944/7004

Laue

HH

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## Page 10

ACTIVITY

OR SECRET -NOFORN

SPECIAL

MAILING

PURPOSE

27 (continued)

403d

1.3at

(S)

SPECIAL HANDING

COLSIDERATIONS

Matahambre Mine-Santa Lucia

Texaco Refinery-Santiago

Shell/Esso Refinery-Habana

Regla Steam Electric Plant-Habana

Matanzas Steam Electric Plant-Matanzas

licaro Nickel Plant

Moa Bay Nickel Plant

Paper Mill - Cardenas

Micro Wave Towers

Each operation entails risk, not only physical

risk for the saboteurs, but also risk of attri-

bution to the U.S. in case of capture.

Care

will be taken to give these actions the appear -

ance of being done by internal resistance

groups, and in isolating team members from

press sources upon return. The U.S. handling

of information, in case of contingency, will be

established by CIA in coordination with USIA

and State.

taue

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## Page 11

ACTIVITY

28.

Sabotage Cuban assets outside Cuba

as targets of opportunity, provided

this does not unduly affect food and

medical supplies, or the Cuban people,

as such. (CLA):

29. Inspire labor groups outside Cuba

to obstruct free world trade with

Cuba: (CIA and State).

30. Discourage free world trade with

Cuba: (State, supported by CLA).

31.

Encourage the OAS Special Committee

to recommend further trade measures

against Cuba by Latin American

countries. (State).

SECRET -NOFORN

SPECIAL HANDLING

PURPOSE

To cripple Cuban commerce and

place strain upon regime security

forces.

To force the use of more Bloc

resources, including shipping.

To force the use, of more Bloc

resources, to deny Cuba hard

currency earnings, and to hasten

deterioration of Cuba's essentially

free world equipped industrial

plant.

To provide a basis for renewed

pressures upon NATO to recom -

mend trade controls to NATO

members.

TOP

SPEC

NOEL

MANDLING

CONSIDERATIONS

Things, not people, are the targets.

activity requires a capability to act quickly

: on spot intelligence. Targets are seen mostly

as shipments of products into or from Cuba.

Sabotage would be to cause undue delay of

shipment, using additives to spoil a commo -

dity, fire of water damage, etc. A recent

example was reported, post-action, on a

shipment to the USSR.

This is an activity mostly in third countries.

Most free world trading nations are opposed

to imposing necessary trade controls. Im-

porters might be dissuaded from using Cuba

as a source of supply, such as the example

of Japan recently. Preclusive buying and

other forms of economic warfare deserve

hard consideration.

OAS Special Committee action should be

geared to SCCS reports or other develop -

ments in the Hemisphere which might provide

a good basis for Special Committee action.

HH

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ACTIVITY

32. Reduce production of export agri-

cultural commodities in Cuba, by

covert means. (CLA).

403d

1.3 a (4)

introduce damaging additives

petrolean shipments to Cuba

TOP SECHEL NOFORN

SPECIAL HANDLING

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

To cripple Cuban commerce vital

to the regime's domestic economic

program.

The main export commodities are sugar,

tobacco, tropicals, and coffee. Activities

would include chemicate, anstreeto ham-

pering of harvests by work slow-downs.

destruction of bags, cartons, and other

shipping containers, sabotage of sugar mill

machinery, etc.

To sabotage Cuba's transportation

and defense capability.

The operational difficulties in this activity

are recognized. However, a priority alert

for this is warranted

SPEC

(5)16

16

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OBJECTIVE C: INTENSIFY INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

TOP SECRE -NOFORN

SPECIAL HANDLING

ACTIVITY

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

34. Spot, recruit, and train legally estab-

blished Cubans in Cuba or in Cuban

Government Posts abroad (CIA,

supported by State and Defense)

The purpose of all activities under:

this objective is to provide maximum

intelligence coverage of Cuba with

particular emphasis on the following:

Capabilities and intentions of

the Castro Government.

b: Soviet activities in Cuba in-

cluding details of Soviet

military personnel, units.

locations, capabilities, et al

c. Activities of Cuban G -2

d. Military and militia order.of

battle and morale.

e.

State of resistance including

the tone and temper of the

population.

•Focus of power and/or stress

and strain among the 'Power

Centers" in the Cuban Govern-

ment.

• Evidence of Cuban subversive

activities in the hemisphere.

TOP SECHNE NOFORN

SPECIAL HANULING

When possible they will be recruited and

trained while visiting outside Cuba; however,:

when necessary recruitment and training will

be done inside Cuba either by established

agents or by agents infiltrated especially for

the task.

Whether this is done unilaterally

or jointly with a third country intelligence

organization 18 determined on a case by

case basis.

In some cases the travel as generated

specifically by CIA; in other cases the

travels can be utilized to meet intelligence

requirements.

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ACTI

34. (continued)

403d

1.3at

35. Spot, recruit, and train third

country nationals resident in Cuba.

(CLA, supported by State and Defense).

36. Spot, recruit and train legal travellers

who have potential access to significant

information. (CLA, supported by State

and Defense).

37. Continue Caribbean Admissions Center,

Opa-locka, Florida. (CIA, with Defense,

USIA, and other support).

TOP SECRET NOFORT

SPECIAL HANDLING

PURPOSE

In addition to meeting the above

cited intelligence objectives,

operational intelligence, and re-

cruitment leads as well as agent

material result from the Opa-locka

od Madrid

operations.

In addition

to meeting basic intelligence re-

quirements above, timely opera -

tional intelligence is vital to CIA

current operations.

See 34 above.

See 34 above.

See 34 above.

TOP SECRE

SPECIAL HA

-MOTORN

CONSIDERATIONS

The continuation of the refugee flow and

the selective debriefing of refugees provide

the most significant source of intelligence.

Follow up debriefing of selected refugees

after departure from Opa-locak will

continue.

Late

11

11H

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403d

1.3 a 4

(5)

38.

ACTIVITY

continue joint Spanish IS/CTA interes

тов селеви мостіс

39.

Maintain PAA service between the U.S.

and Cuba. (State, with CIA support).

40.

Continue and expand.

as practicag

communications inichigence covera

of Cuban communications nels

Defense and CIA).

41. Continue monitoring overt Cuban

broadcasts. (CLA).

42

Urge, assist, and/or support friendi

third country intelligence

services to

expand their intelligence.

coverage o4

nean intelligence requiremento.

(CL

SECRET-NOECRA

SPECIAL HANDLING

PURPOSE

See 34 above.

o provide intelligence and agen

and documentation,

well as to continue the exodus of

skilled manpower from Cuba.

See 34 above.

To obtain intelligence and propa -

ganda material.

See 34 above.

SECRET-NOFORN

SPECIAL HANDLING

CONSIDERATIONS

• Due to local conditions and problems, the

Madrid Debrieling Center will continue to

ba-more limited in size and selective in,

choiée of refugees than Oparlocka thi

is pamamly an von problem but cut wi

continue to assist as practicable

PAA requires financial assistance to con-

tinue this activity.

It is recognized that significant increase

coverage of the internal microwave

SySteI

would become a major budget and persoung

problem.

This is done on a regular basis by FBIS.

his will be handled

through c

4 601

gon channels.

16,0

16

16,10

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ACTIVITY

TOP SEGRET-NOE RA

SPECIAL HAIN

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

403d

1. 3 at

(5)

43

expand,

as practical, audio coverage

o1 potentially profitable Cuban intelli

ence tax ge ise

(910)

See 34 above.

These installations are in third countries

In Rome Gasee,

it is done unbateray 20

others it is done joutly with the host inte

gence service.

16,16

Establish program of periodic reports

from U.S. Embassies in Hemisphere

analyzing the effects of existence of

the target area regime on host country.

(State) .

To maintain a reasonably current

estimate of the impact of the target

area regime on the Hemisphere.

Page 16

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OBJECTIVE D: SPLIT REGIME LEADERSHIP AND RELATIONS WITH BLOC

OP. SECRET-NOFORN

SPECIAL HANDLING

ACTIVITY

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

45. Collect personality information on key

Cuban individuals, their personalities;

their attitudes, their associates, and

their influences. (CIA and others).

To identify channels to key

individuals and to identify frictions

between the individuals.

This is a long term continuing program.

The degree to which these channels, can be

developed depends on basic professional

work plus the "breaks of the game." The

exploitation of the channel or of any splits

in the regime will be determined in the

light of existing circumstances at the time

the channel is effectively established or

the split is detected.

46. Develop channels of communication

to selected key individual and power

centers!' öf the regime. (CIA)

To permit exploitation of the key.

individuals.

47.

Conduct psychological and political

action.:

(CLA and State).

To attain the objective.

Activity will include:

By public and private comment, to

stimulate distrust and disaffection

in the leadership and ranks of the

supporters of the Castro regime,

principally among the militia, the

government bureaucracy, by organized

labor, youth and students, farmers:

TOR SECREL AUT

SPEGIAL HANDLIN

HH

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47. (continued)

OP SECRET-NOTTRN

SPECIAL HANDLING

PURPOSE

403d

1.3 a4

(5)

TOP SECR

CONSIDERATIONS

Conduct black operations targeted

against selected key individuals 10

the regime designed to aggravate

lactional and ideological frictions

An example of black operations

would be planted evidenge by blac!

letters and other means to demon

strate an individuals disloyalty

Provoke incidents between Cubans

and Bloc personnel to exacerbate

tensions.

10

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TOP SEGRET-NOFORN

SPECIAL HANDLING

OBJECTIVE E: ASSIST CUBAN EXILE GROUPS AND LATIN AMERICAN GOVERNMENTS TO UNDERTAKE ACTIONS

ACTIVITY

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

• 48. Stimulate; support and guide covertly

the propaganda and political activitiés

of all Cuban exile groups and individuals

offering useful impact inside Cuba and

upon world opinion. (CIA, with State and

UStA support):

• To encourage and maintain the

will of the Cuban people to resist

Castro/Communist rule.

To pro-;

vide an articulate, meaningful

symbol and voice of free Cuba to

informand influence public and

official opinion outside Cuba.

Major popular impact groups can be most

effective in production, and dissemination

of propaganda that reports. on the true state

of Cuba's enslavement and misery under

-Communist dictatorship. Cubans speaking

for Cuba are the most credible witnesses

possible. Groups such as a "Free Cuban

Judicial Committee" could publicize and

openly prepare for eventual punishment of

those committing "crimes against the people

of Cuba:". This program of support for

exiles should consider exiles in hemisphere

countries and Spain as well as those in the

USA. As possible, the exiles should manage

and lead in this effort, with U.S. assisting

and advising:

49. Provide covert support to the Cuban

Revolutionary Council (CRC). (CIA):

To provide a degree of cohesion

within the exile. community and to

provide a cover and funding mechan-

ism for the invasion survivors and

prisoners. In addition some funding

of constituent exile groups is handled

thru CRC. To support and guide CRC

propaganda activities directed at

Latin America and Cuba itself.

TOP SECRET-NOFER

SPECIAL HANDHING

In spite of its many inadequacies, the CRC

performs a variety of useful functions which,

if it were to be disbanded, would have to be

handled by possibly less efficient means.

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ACTIVITY

TOP SECREL-NOFORN

SPECIAL HAND LING

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS.

50. Encourage and support other govern-

ments in the hemisphere to undertake

programs for Cuba along lines of our

own effort. (State,, CIA).

To develop a multi-national pro-

gram with common goals and

timing, upon a separate-but -

collective basis. To direct

attention and effort toward

initiative of Latin American

countries instead of placing focus.

mainly on the U..S:

This will require the highest order of overt

and covert U.S. actions, to stir and support

initiative in other national leaders, Reasonable

but not prohibitive criteria for consultation.

and coordination is involved, with recognition

that the U.S. is helping not employing the

third nation efforts.

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OBJECTIVE F: BE PREPARED TO EXPLOIT A REVOLT

TOP SECRET-NOEORN

SPECIAL HANDLING.

ACTIVITY

PURPOSE

51.:

Continue to develop and refine contin-

gency plans. (Defense).

To assure maximum readiness from

the standpoint of military planning

for military intervention if directed.

Continue planning with Defense and the

various sub-commanders for the parti-

cipation of others in military contingency

plans for Cuba. (State, CIA and USIA).

To provide support to the military in

the event of execution of military con-

tingency plans:

53. Establish and maintain in being the

necessary communication and crypto

links between CIA and Defense, in-

cluding various sub-commands. (CIA)

To provide the communication capa-

bility to support the military con-

tingency plans:

54. Develop post-Castro concepts, leaders,

and political groups. (State, with support

of others)'"

To provide a focal point for anti-

Castro resistance elements and to

facilitate the transition of a post

Castro government in the event of a

successful overthrow. of Castro/

Communism:

TOP SEGRET-NOFORN

SPEGIAL

HANDANG

CONSIDERATIONS

These plans are well advanced

These links have been or are in the

process of being established

This is a matter which will require con-

tinuing study and which may be subject to

substantial change due to circumstances -

which exist at the time.

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ACTIVITY

55.

Cache arms, ammunition, and other

supplies in areas of Cuba accessible

to known resistance elements and in

potential resistance areas. (CIA).

56.

Recruit, train, and supply small re-

sistance cells in the major cities and

in other selected areas of Cuba.

(CIA).

TOP SECRET-NOFORN

SPECIAL HANDLING.

PURPOSE

To have available in Cuba a re-

serve of arms:and ammunition.

To provide controlled intelligence

sources and to be available in the

event of an uprising:

TOP SFCHET

NAFORN

SPECIAL HANDLING

CONSIDERATIONS

This will require extensive maritime

infiltration/exfiltration opetations.

considered likely that Cuban maritime

patrolling will be such that in the near future

if the job is to be done, submarines must

be used in lieu of surface craft

Experience and continually tightening

security controls have demonstrated the

difficulty of infiltrating and monitoring

individuals or "'Black Tearns" in the target

country for an indefinite period: Nor has

any method yet been devised by which ing

filtrees can become "legalized." Therefore

•two to five man teams will be infultrated to

recruit and train small ''legal" compartmented

intelligence and/or resistance cells.

completion of training, the infiliated team

will be withdrawn if it is seriously endangered

or if its continued presence jeopardines the

"legal" residents. The program will be

developed to the extent that proves feasible

and possible in the light of existing circum-

stances, including Cuban security controls.

morale and motivation of agent matecial ara

the willingness of the Cuban population to

support infiltrees. Increased Cuban defensive

capabilities may require the utilization of sub -

marines or aircraft as a means of infiltration

and/or exfiltration in lieu of surface mari-

time facilities.

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