DEPOSITION OF BERNARD HUGH TOVAR
Originator: HSCA
From: TOVAR, BERNARD HUGH
Document date: 29/6/78 00:00
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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180-10131-10325

JFK Assassinatio. 1 System

Identification orm

Agency Inform ition

Date:

10/19/20

AGENCY: HSCA

RECORD NUMBER:

180-10131-10325

RECORD SERIES: SECURITY CLASSIFIED TESTIMONY

AGENCY FILE NUMBER: 014725

Document Info: mation

ORIGINATOR:

HSCA

FROM:

TOVAR, BERNARD HUGH

TO :

TITLE: DEPOSITION OF BERNARD HUCH TOVAR.

DATE: 06/29/1978

PAGES:

48

SUBJECTS:

CIA, METHODOLOGY

TOVAR, BERNARD HUGH, TEST IMONY BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE

OSWALD, LEE, RUSSIAN PERIO), DEFECTION TO RUSSIA

DOCUMENT TYPE: TRANSCRIPT

CLASSIFICATION:

Top Secret

RESTRICTIONS:

3

CURRENT STATUS :

Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW:

03/26/1997

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS:

Box 5

49.1

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TESTIMONY OF:

Bernard Hugh Tovar

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ASSASSINATION OF JOHN F. KENNEDY

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Thursday, June 29, 1978

U. S. House of Representatives,

John F. Kennedy Subcommittee of

select conmittee on Assassinations,

Washington, D. C.

Deposition of:

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BERNARD HUGH TOVAR

called for examination by stiff counsel for the subcommittee,

pursuant to notice, in the oifices of House Annex II, Room 3370,

Second and D. Streets, Southwest, Washington, D. C., beginning at

2:00 o'clock p.m., before Albert Joseph LaFrance, 'a Notary Public

lin and for the District of Crlumbia, when were present on behalf

of the respective parties:

For the Subcommittee:

MICHAEL GOLDSMITH, ESQ. Staff Counsel

ELIZABETH WOLF

For the Deponent:

(There was-representatirn by counsel)

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TESTIMON? OF HUGH TOVAR

Mr. Goldsmith. State your name for the record.

Mr. Tovar. I sign my name B. Hugh. My full name is

Bernard Hugh Tovar.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Tovar, my name is Michael Goldsmith,

Senator Staff Counsel of the Select Committee on Assassinations.

I have been designated by the Committee to take your deposition

today. You are here voluntarily today?

Mr. Tovar. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. You hive the right to have counsel present.

Do you waive that right?

Mr. Tovar.

Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Have you read a copy of the Committee's

supporting resolution?

Mr. Tovar. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Have you had a chance to read Rule Number

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Mr. Tovar. I have.

Mr. Goldsmith. The Committee rules provide for the tran-

script of a deposition to he made available to

a witness and

actually be delivered for retention by any witness that gives

the Committee a statement. However, by virtue of the arrange-

ment that the Committee ha: worked out with the CIA, the Agency

has asked us to request Agency employees testifying before us

to waive the right actuall! to receive a copy of the transcript.

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The reason for that is because the transcript freguently

will contain classified information and the Agency prefers for

that information to be kept in our secure area here. So I

would'

like to ask you to waive your right to receive a copy of

your statement but in so doing, I want to assure you that you

will be given a right to review the transcript for accuracy,

o make comment upon it and if necessary, to give an additional

statement.

Mr. Tovar. I agree.

Mr. Goldsmith. I would like

to inform you that the court

reporter will provide you with a transcript and the transcript

will be certified by the reporter as a complete, accurate and

true record of all the tes:imony that you give here today.

Now, you are employed by the CIA, is that correct?

Mr. Tovar. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith.. I had given you earlier a copy of a letter

dated 23 March 1978 from M:. Carlucci to the Chairman of this

Committee. Have you had a chance to read that letter?

MI. TovaI. I have.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do yo1 understand it?

MI. Tovar. I underst.ind it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Then I think we are ready to proceed to

the substance of the questioning. What is your present position

with the CIA?

Mr. Tovar. I am the chief of the Counterintelligence

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Staff of the Directorate o: Operations.

Mr. Goldsmith. How long have you been working in that

capacity?

Mx. Tovar.

Ever since a year ago April.

Mr. Goldsmith. How long have you been working with the

Agency?

Mr. TovaI. Thirty yeirs.

MI. Goldsmith. What was your assignement prior to becom

ing Chief of the CI Staff?

Mr. Tovar. I was recently returned from overseas where I

was Station Chief in

and three years before that,

Chief of the Station in

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Mr. Goldsmith. Prior to

assuming your position as Chief

"of-the CI Staff had you hai extensive experience in the area

of

counterintelligence?

Mr. Tovar. No, not pirticularly. We don't as a rule

specialize. We are normally generalists. I do not consider

myself a counterintelligence expert.

Mr. Goldsmith.. During the years 1959 to '63 what position'

did you occupy with the Agency?

Mr. Tovar. In 1959 I was Chief of Station in

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In 1920, I came back ind I was originally Deputy Chief and:

then Chief of the Branch ir Far East. Division which controls

operations in the Phillipires, Malaysia, Indonesia, Australia,

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New Zealand, and Oceania. That was until 1964.

Mr. Goldsmith. Have you had a chance to review CIA

document number 1817 and the pages that follow it?

Mr. Tovar. Yes, I have read these. I had not read these.

They were released by one of my subordinates, Mr. Friedlander.

Mr.

Goldsmith. Are you teiling us that today is the first;

chance you had to read thein?

Mr. Tovar.

I did not read them this time. They went to

you, to the Committee but i have since read them.

Mr. Goldsmith. They vere prepared by whom?

Mr. Tovar. Jack Friellander, Chief of Operations. They

were signed by him, not prepared by him.

They would have been

originated probably by Mr. Kowalski or Mr. Bradley, I am not

sure which.

I think Kowal:ki almost certainly.

Mr. Goldsmith. The memorandum which is labeled CIA No.

1817 was a response by the Agency to an inquiry by the ::

Committee as to whether it was standard operating procedure for

the Agency to debrief what in effect were repatriated defectors

I believe it is fair to sa! by way of summary that the memo

says that it was not in fait standard operating procedure

during the years 1959 to "i3 to debrief such individuals. Is

that correct?

Mr. Tovar. Insofar as I understand it. My knowledge is

limited to what I see here before me in the paper. During this

period in question I was not involved, so I didn't know what

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the current policy was then.

What I have been told since by those who should know is

that there was no policy

a:; set: forth here.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know what the criteria were for

selecting the 117 individuls whose files were reviewed?

Mr. TovaI. No. I think someone mentioned the other day

that the names were incorporated in a memorandum I think ori-

ginionally by the FBI but would not certify to that.

Mr. Goldsmith. MI. Tovar, since you have no direct

knowledge as to the manner in which this memo was prepared and, i

for example, you don't know the criteria that was used for

choosing these 117 people, I am not going to ask you questions

pertaining to that document:. I would like to request that you

communicate with the Office of Legislative Counsel at the

Agency and tell them the individual who was involved in the

actual direct preparation if the document so that I could spendi

some time with him.

MI. Tovar. The documint, of course, is over my signature,i

so I stand behind the docunent.. I am responsible for what

was said there. If

it is ncorrect then I am incorrect in

leeting that document out. I have no personal first hand know

ledge of the research he did to arrive at the conclusion here

which he presented to me and I endorsed. I am prepared to

stand

behind it but I will give ou his name.

MI. Goldsmith. I wan: to ask you some questions about the

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document. CIA no. 1818 inilicates that CI Staff has completed

review of the files of 117 US persons who had "defected" to

the USSR between 1959 and '63 and since returned to the United

States. Is that correct? '58 to '63?

Mr. Tovar. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. I woud like you to review the statement

under the name Thomas Morr: dian M-O-R-R-I-D-I-A-N. While you

read that paragraph, I wil. state for the record thst the way

the memo is set forth it indicates that it was not standard

operating procedure to deb:ief such individuals, that of 117

people whose files were reviewed only ten were debriefed.

Then it proceeds to list the ten individuals who in fact were

debriefed.

I have now requested lir. Tovar to read the first summary

which is right next to the name of the first person who was

debriefed.

MI. Tovar. Yes sir.

Mr. Goldsmith. When' did that individual defect?

Mr. Tovar. 1947 is the year he went to the USSR.

I

assume that is the year he defected, if that is the term.

Mr. Goldsmith. So

thit in fact that individual was not

someone who defected between 1958 and 1963?

MI. Tovar. That is correct.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let us; look at the next individual under

B, Joseph Marshall.

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Mr. Tovar.

Yes sir.

Mr. Goldsmith. When did Mt. Marshall defect?

MI. Tovar.. It is not clear. He was born in the Us in

1897. He said he was emplyed in Hawaii in 1921. There is no

indication whence he went to the USSR.

Mr. Goldsmith. There :s no indication he defected between

'58 and '633

Mr. Tovar.

No. He wis arrested by the Soviets in 1945.

Conceivably he might have defected after that.

Mr. Goldsmith. The letter "C", Tommaro S-G-O-V-I-0.

Would you please read that section and tell us when this indi-

vidual defected?

Mr. Tovar. Again, he went to the USSR with his parents

in the 1930s. No indication when he defected. He left the

USSR in 1960. No way of telling.

Mr. Goldsmith. This individual did not defect between

"'58 and '63?

Mr. Tovar. At last we have no indication he did. One

would assume to the contrary.

Mr. Goldsmith. Letter "D", Mary Mackler, will you please

read the first summary and tell us when she defected?

MI. Tovar. There is to indication when she defected.

She went to the USSR with ter parents in 1931. Sometime after,

married a Soviet.

Mr. Goldsmith. Again, no indication she defected between

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'58 and '633

ME. Tovar. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you look at letter "E".

Sonia and

Fred A-S-I-N-I-A-N. When lid they defect?

Mr. Tovar. They renoinced their US citizenship in 1948.

So I assume that is the operative year.

Mr. Goldsmith. Will ou look at the letter "f" now?

MI. Tovar. Jack Kuralski.

Mr. Goldsmith. When lid he defect?

Mr. Tovar. He recounced his US citizenship in '34 and

departed USSR I assume in 1934.

Mr. Goldsmith. The point I am trying to make is that the

memo responding to the Comnittee's inquiry makes reference to

ten individuals who defected between the years '58 and '63.

It:then proceed to provide us with ten names. But in fact,

if we continue to look through the list we will see that seven

of the ten individuals did not defect during that time period.

Some of them did return during that time perioa.

MI. Tovar. And were lebriefed.

Mr. Goldsmith. And were debriefed.

MI. Tovar. Contacted.

Mr. Goldsmith. Of the ten, perhaps three or four returned

during the relevant time period. I asked those questions

mainly to draw your attention to the fact that the response

given. was not really --

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Mr. Tovar. - precisely what you wanted?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Tovar. I don't know the answer to that. I would :

assume that the criteria tley applied here as best they could

was when did he defect, when did he return, was he debriefed

or contacted? In some casts they hit one out of three, in

other cases two out of thie. I think they were giving the

best correlation with your criteria that they could.

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand that. My point might be then

that the introductory section should not have stated that these?

were people in 1958 and '6: when in fact they were not.

Mr. Tovar. You are right. That is an incorrect statement

Is your requesting memo here? That is not a very good state-

ment.

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MI. Goldsmith. Here is the letter dated April 6, 1978

which I show you just for your information to show you what the

Committee was requesting from the Agency. If you will look

under number two.

Mr. Tovar. Then this would appear to correlate with that.

You asked to indicate whetter the AGency from '58 to '63

interviewed or debriefed former American defectors. So, the

time they defected is not the operative consideration.

Mr. Goldsmith. No, it was not.

Mr. Tovar. The time of the debriefing --

MI. Goldsmith. Yes, that would be the focus.

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Mr. Tovar.

So these would be at least consistent with that.

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes, that is true. I would like also for

purposes of further clarif: cation, to have you read the letter

dated May 12, 1978 startin with the second full paragraph.

It is not 'numbered.

Mr. ToVar. Yes..

Mr. Goldsmith. I show you that only for your background

purposes, not to ask you any questions about it. In any event i

I would appreciate having the name of the individual who

prepared the memo passed a.ong to the Office of the Legislative

Counsel.

Mr. Tovar. Yes sir.

Mr. Goldsmith. The rusponse that was provided to the

Committee indicates that the CIA had no standard precedure

for

debriefing returning US de: ectors. What was the basis for that

policy or actually for the absence of the policy?

Mr. Tovar. I don't know. I can speculate only -- not

having been there and not laving any involvement -- I don't

know what mentality of those in charge was at that time.

Mr. Goldsmith. What would your specilation be?

Mr. Tovar. I would speculate that the contact with and

debriefing, in effect the supervision of Americans in that

category would be FBI's prerogative and the Agency as a rule

would not have had any bas c interest or reason to be involved:

unless there were a specife counterintelligence concern.

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Mr. Goldsmith. Does he Agency today have

a policy of,

as a matter of routine operating procedure, debriefing return-

ing defectors?

Mr. Tovar. None that I am aware of.

Mr. Goldsmith. Again, would you say you relied on the

FBI to conduct those interriews?

Mr. Tovar. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is there any coordination between the

Agency and the FBI so that the Bureau is informed when someone

in fact is returning?

Mr. Tovar. On Americin defectors, the type you are speak-

ing of here?

Mr. Goldsmith. An Amrican defector who is repatriated.

Mr. Tovar.

I know of no case where they would be

interested in the subject. I can't say there is a procedure

in being. Knowing the way we relate to the FBI, if we knew of

a case of returning Americins, Say we learned it from an

overseas station and it semed of interest, we would probably

refer it directly to the FlI by letter.

I am speculating here because I know of no case in point.

Mr. Goldsmith. There is no standard procedure for contacti

ingthe Bureau and informiny them of a returning defector?

MI. TovaI. Not that : am aware of.

Mr. Goldsmith. You would be the person who would be aware!

of such a procedure?

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MI. Tovar. Berween the Soviet-East European Division and

CI Staff we should be aware of it. The two were most primarily

concerned with the USSR.I think one or the other of us would

inform the Bureau. This is not our primary concern: The

Americans, even when they lave been. naughty boys, having gone

to USSR and decided to retirn, we still don't have necessarily

a professional interest in that type of person.

Mx. Goldsmith. What is the responsibility of the CI Staff

within the CIA?

Mr. Tovar. In a coupe of sentences it is

a little

difficult. I will tell you what we do. The CI Staff has two

principal areas of activity.

We are first of all a staff.

Are you familiar with the taff as opposed to the division?

Mr. Goldsmith. No, I am not.

MI. Tovar. You have ween the table of organization of

DDO?

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Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Tovar. You know "enerally how we are organized?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

MI. Tovar. The main let of components of the Directorate

is divisions and staffs. "he divisions operate a function overt

seas.

We are staff and thit is in the military sense we support

the Directorat and we

support the Director, we suppor one

another in an advisory capicity and in various ways. So, we

are not an operating component.

We don't run spies. We have

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a lot of activities which impact on operations but we are not

in

the true sense of the term an operating element.

so, having said that, the primary field of activity for

the CI Staff is

research and analysis, and then the other,

what we refer to as operat:.ons coordination. Now, that is sort

of the term which does not -- research and analysis is clear.

We examine and analyze cases, essentially cases. We are not

scrutinizing people. We ae looking at intelligence operations;

old and current, primarily things that are not terribly

current. We don't tend to follow current operations in the

analytic sense. We take Od cases and look them over to see

if mistakes were made, to see ifve can derive lessons from

mistakes made in the past. We publish papers for the Agency's

community at. large, all in the R&A field.:

On the other side we unction in

the sense of a true staff.

We keep our fingers on the activity of the Directorate overseas

We monitor what they are doing, not in the sense of being

spooky but we simply read he correspondence. We are given

normal distribution of most: correspondence coming back from

overseas. We keep a hand on the pulse of counterintelligence

activities abroad.

To do this, we obviou::ly have to have reasonable currency

on operational activity ac:oss the board. So, we are generally!

aware of the operational pitterns of activity that prevail in

various overseas stations. On that basis we are in a position

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to advise the DDO or Direc:orate as to the level of performance,

the kind of activity condurted; the quality, the proper of

improper degree of emphasi::.

We maintain an overview on behalf

of DDO.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is your concentration oriented towards

counterintelligence threats of a foreign nature?

Mr. Tovar. Yes, totaily.

Mr. Goldsmith.

You would not be concerned at all with

counterintelligence threat: domestically?

Mr. Tovar. None whatsoever.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is it correct to say that would be the

responsibility of the Bureau?

Mr. Tovar. Absolutels.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, lee Harvey Oswald returned from the

Soviet Union in 1962. Whie in the Sovietion Únion he worked

as a worker in a radio factory. Upon his return I imagine there

was someone concerned about: his being a counterintelligence

threat. Is it fair to say, and I do not want to ask you leading

questions but would it be fair to say that would be more

the responsibility of the lureau rather than the Agency upon

his actual return?

Mr. Tovar.

Yes, the question whether or not he was, let

us say, a counterintelliger ce threat.

MI. Goldsmith. KGB agent?

MI. Tovar. That would be a Bureau concern, no question

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about that.

Mr. Goldsmith. However, would the Agency make any effort

to interview Osald while Oswald was entroute from the Soviet

Union to the United States?

Mr. Tovar.

You are speaking of what the Agency might have

done in '63 or '62?

Mr. Goldsmith. *62.

Mr. Tovar. Again, we are speculating concerning the

intelligence of the men why were in charge then. Today I

would like to think we woud be interested in what he is doing i

At the time I don't know. I would think, why not. On the

other hand, I couldn't say they would or should be interested.

It was not their primary pecise prerogative. I think if they

could, as I assume they dirl, the Bureau would discharge its

responsibilities vis-a-vis any American of questionable

propensity, I should think they would be deferring to the

Bureau.

Mr. Goldsmith. That would be the aspect of Oswald where

there was a concern taht he posed a counterintelligence threat

What about the fact that O::wald may have had positive intelli-

gence information that woud have been helpful to the Agency?

That would not be within the jurisdiction of the Bureau?

MI. Tovar. I think in that context it might have been

appropriate for the Agency, if the assumed the point you made,

to seek an interview with him. I think the appropriate

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vehicle for that would have been the Domestic Contact Division

which I think handled most of the contacts referred to in this

memorardum.

Mr. Goldsmith.

What is the function of the Domestic

Contact Division?

Mr. Tovar. They are esponsible for intelligence that

can be checked properly an legally in the United States

normally through American businessmen or American persons and

nonofficials who travel ab:oad and acquire intelligence of

interest. This is not jus: USSR. It could be any

other

country. Their primary field of activity is to contact and

debrief on a vluntary basis, if they so choose to respond,

Americans who return from overseas.

Mr. Goldsmith. I notice that the Committee's inguiry

concerning the CI's policy as

to returning American defectors

was routed to your staff, iI Staff. When the memo was prepared

by the cI staff for the cormittee, was it done with the thought

of representing the entire agency or just the CI Staff?

Mr. TovaI. It is difficult for us to presume to speak

fOr

the entire Agency. I thin: on this matter we are speaking for

the Directorate of Operations, not for the entire Agency.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

That is really the area with which

I was concerned anyway, Directorate

of operations.

Mr. Tovar. The only other element of the Directorate of

Operations that would be of an interest in this type of thing,

which might be construed as having an interest in this type

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of activity, would be the C Division. On this I think the

CI staff could be considered as speaking for the Directorate.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is the Domestic Contact Division part of

the CI Staff?

Mr. Tovar.

No, part of the Directorate of Operations.

Mr. Goldsmith. The rusponse of the Agency dated April

20, 1978, which appears in CIA Number 1818, indicates that

contact seems to be based on opportunity and circumstance.

Then it

goes on to say onl! ten of the 117 persons have had

any contact with CIA. Would it be possible for you to go into

more dtail on what is meant: by opportunity and circumstance?

Mr. Tovar. In the

astche of a policy, of a guideline, a

procedure, internal instruction which says you will debrief

Americans who return from having resided in the USSR, in the

absence of that, this thirg is left to chance obviously: I

cannot explain to you how the names of these ll passed the desk

of whoever was in charge at: the time, but assuming they did,

my guess, and it is mally only a guess, would be that the

person who read that, whatever document it was, would say,

"Emmph! He looks like he might be interesting", and perhaps

would then get in contact with CCD and suggest if they get in

contact with a person, let us say he is known to be living in

New York, suggest that thes might want to seek out his location

and if possible interview him.

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I think it would be a matter of chance in the sense that

the analyst or whoever it was who reviewed that document, might

react, and yet he or she might not, too, depending on how they

woke up that morning. It s sheer whimsy.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let me explain to you why the question

whether or not it was standard operating procedure to debrief

returning defectors is important to the Committee. Since

the assassination of the Pesident, there has arisen a group

•of

researchers who have revieved the Warren Commission Report and

have reviewed releases made under the Freedom of Information

Act by the CIA and the FBI.

Having reviewed these materials the argument has been made

that Oswald received unusul treatment at the hands of the CIA.

One example of this unusual treatment is that there is no

record of Oswald having been debriefed by the CIA upon his

return. For that reason, ve are focusing on this issue. Is

there any way you can give us guidance on how to respond to

that question?

MI. Tovar. I can't becuase I am sphoulating every step

along. the way. I would hesitate to say more than Oswald

simply didn't connect with whoever happened to be looking --

let us assume his name appeared. Was his namde in the list?

Mr. Goldsmith. No.

That is the list of people who were

debriefed.

Mr. Tovar.

One hundred seventeen?

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Mr. Goldsmith. I haven't seen the list of 117 people.

Mr. Tovar. What is tis?

MI. Goldsmith. That is a list of 350 odd people I was

going to ask you about. However, since you don't have knowledge

of the 117, I am not going to ask -ou about them.

Mr. Tovar.

If Oswald's name was on the list, I can't

explain why he might not hive been contacted. Maybe he didn't

appear attractive or interesting enough. I don't know what

information might have bee:1 given with these names on the list,

such as a memo from the FBI or State Department, whoever had

originated it, what they said that would have titilated the

analyst who might have see: it that would have elicited

response on the part of the analyst who would say "Ah, let us

look into this further."

Mr. Goldsmith. In pa:ticular, a lot of focus has been

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Mr. Tovar.

I didn't ‹now that he was. It doesn't say so

here.

Mr. Goldsmith. That does not indicate the extend of the

debriefing. That information was obtained independently by

this Committee.

Mr. Tovar. The name neans nothing to me so I can't "

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enlighten you on it.

Mx. Goldsmith. Does he CIA have any affiliation with

organizations in the Unitel States who might be responsible for

debriefing someone?

Mr. Tovar. Not that I am aware of.

Mr. Goldsmith. In otier words, if anyone is going to be

debriefed it would be by the Domestic Contact Division?

Mr. Tovar. In the in elligence sense. In the sense of

elucidation of intelligence, DCD would do it. A different type

of inquiry, personal inves:igation, the office of Security,

whoever it works through, vould 'be the one.

The one we are talkin'; about, DCD is the only organization

I know of. I can visualize a circumstance under which operating

components might seek out in individual or might have in times

past but I can't think of i case in point in my own recollec-

tion. I would say, given he strictures on our operating in

the United States, we woull rely upon DCD to do it if they had

any positive intelligence connotation.

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Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Tovar. It is the division level of the Directorate.

I think I had :

better defer to the other people on that.

That is roughly where

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it stands. They certainly would not have interest in

1 debrief-

ing defectors that I am awire of.

Mr. Goldsmith.. In any event, for the purposes of summary.

there is today no standard operating procedure of interviewing

returning defectors?

Mr. Tovar. Right, iniofar as I am aware, there is none.

Mr. Goldsmith. There is no standard operating procedure

between the Bureau and the CIA which would coordinate any effort

to contact returning defec ors and share information?

MI. Tovar. None that I am aware of.

Mr. Goldsmith. Turning to another area which I would like

to get into briefly, would you define what a 201 file is?

Mr. Tovar. A 201 file is a file or files - it could be

several volumes to it - which relates to an individual. It•

might pose a dicotomy, a 211 file and project file. A project

file might deal with an activity, say collection operations in

Timbucktu, a broad scale o: activity involving several numbers

of people, there might be several 201 files, A, B, C, who were

associates in that project.

The 201 file would be on the

individual himself.

Mr. Goldsmith. Ti would contain primarily biographic

information?

Mr. Tovar. No. It would contain a much vaster - some

of them might contain one wheet of paper with name, rank and

date of birth. But if the association with him developed and

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became more extensive, it night contain a considerable amount

of information. If he becime involved with this ope-ation it

might include operational naterial, intelligence operations

as well, all part of the 211 complex.

The point I am making is that it is an individual file

as opposed to an activity file.

Mr. Goldsmith. If yor wanted to learn about the operations

that an individual was involved in, would you go to his 201

file or to his operations tile?

Mr. Tovar. I would go to the 201 file first. There might

not be an operations file. In fact, in the vast majority of

the 201 cases there are no operational files because there is

no hard and fast rule on wien you open a 201 file or who opens

a 201 file.

If I, for example, am overseas and I become interested in

a person who

looks to me to'have considerable promise from the

operational standpoint, sa! a local foreign type, I might give

my own local checks, I migit examine my own files to see if I

know anything about him. Then I say to headquarters "here is

Joe Doe. He is interestiny to me for these reasons. Will you

please check against headqiarters records. and other agencies

and let me know if you have anything of interest on him."

I might not ask for a 201 file. Headquarters might then,

because they thought he was interesting, open a 201 file.

Conversely, I might likewise say this looks terribly interest-

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ing Please open a 201 file and give me all of the information

you can collect on hin."

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand that the fact that someone

has a 201 file does not mein at all that the individual was

involved in any operations of the Agency. If youwanted toget

information of an operational nature, would you go both to the

201 file and operations fie?

Mr. Tovar. Assuming here was information of an opera-.

tional nsture?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Tovar.. Yes, indeed we would.

Mr. Goldsmith. If soreone is an agent of the CIA -- I

am not referring now to case officers or staff agents - some-

one is a field agent for tie Agency, would that fact be indi-

cated in the 201 file?

MI. TOVaI. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. In the Directorate of Operations someone

might open up a 201 file oll an individual if the person was

of a potential positive intelligence significance?

Mr. Tovar: Or counterintelligence, either one.

Mr. Goldsmith. That vas going to be my question. The

CI Staff in particular, when would you have occasion to open a

201 file?

Mr. Tovar. CI staff vould not necessarily be the only one!

to

open a 201 file. In the case of a person of CI interest,

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a field station might have a counter-person I described earlieri

and become interested in him because he did have some CI

attraction or interest. The station itself or the division would

open the 201 file. It woud not be us. The CI Staff as a rule!

is not involved in that type of thing.

At this stage of the jame since we are not operating and

we are not out soliciting new contacts, we are not working in

that sense of the term, we don't to my knowledge originate 201

files.

Mr. Goldsmith. The C: Staff does not open up 201 files?

Mr. Tovar. There is no reason that we couldn't.

Mr. Goldsmith. As a pratical matter?

Mr. Tovar. As practicil matter it does not work that way.

Our research is primarily :ocused upon established cases, cases

that may even be dead, terminated, or dormant, or even current

in certain cases, but as a : fule not very many!

201 file is

opened by someone else. We may examine those files and review

them. We do review other ictivities. But the 201 file would

be in existence. They whould not be created by ourselves.

In former days when C: Staff

files were segregated from

therest of the Directorate it might have been different.

I

don't know.

Mr. Goldsmith. When vas that?

MI. Tovar. Say prior to 1974, 1957. Today our foles are

integrated in the files of the Directorate or it is in the

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process of being integrater. We have been working on this.

This is one of our major f nal exercises in the past two or

three years

to make sure, when you go to the central files and

research a name, if theres something in the CI Staff reposi-

tory that will turn up when you are making a check of the

index.

Mx. Goldsmith. Will nost 201 files be open as a result of

information coming into heidquarters from the field, one of

the field stations?

Mr. Tovar.

Yes, the vast majority. In years before when

they has such programs as lu Chaos, I assumed they opened 201

files of their own.

Mr. Goldsmith. What is that?.

Mr. Tovar®

MH Chaos-p'rogram?

Mr. Goldsmith. For the record, will you indicate what that

program is?

Mr. Tovar. I frankly would rather not becuase I don't

know the precise definition of the program. It was a program

which has been described ir the press as domestic surveillance.

whether that is the correct: proper designation, I don't know.

Our CI Staff does not normilly open a 201 file. We don't have

occasion to.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know what the term CI/SIG stands

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for?

Mr. Tovar. Counter Ir telligence/Special Investigative

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Group, I think it is. Investigative or investigations, I don't

know which.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is that group still in existence today?

Mr. Tovar.

No.

Mr. Goldsmith. When lid it go out of existence?

Mr. Tovar. I don't know exactly. Before my time.

think it ended in '73, '74, '75. I am not sure.

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Mr. Goldsmith. Do yor know what the function of that

group was?

Mr. TovaI. Only in a very vague sort of way. I have heard

about it, it was the inves igative group in the CI Staff that

investigated whatever the 'I Staff did in those days. I can't

speak to that with any first hand knowledge.. I know some things

they did but I would be hesitant to make a general definition

of their function.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do yot know whether the function of that

group was to investigate Ajency employees who were suspected

of having been penetrated?

Mr. Tovar. I think, because I have seen nothing in writing

on the subject, but I have been given to understand that was

one

of their functions in the context of their responsibilities

that was included. But I im no authority on the subject.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do yol know whether CI/SIG would have

occasion to open a 201 fil?

MI. Tovar. I don't kiow. I can speculate. I don't know.

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Mr. Goldsmith. What vould your speculation be?

Mr. Tovar. I would speculate in the days when they were

functioning they probably lid. You have a very unauthoriative

witness on that subject.

Mr. Goldsmith. What is the relationship if any between

the Office of Security and

the CI Staff?

Mr. Tovar.

We have bisically different functions. The

Office

of Security is unde:: the Directorate of Administration

and is responsible for the personnel and physical security of

the entire division. It focuses on personnel security and

physical security:

The CI staff as I described it, is an element of DDO

concerned with research an analysis and operation and coordi-

nation®

The relation betwen us and the Office of Security is

simply that between us and another fraternal element of the

Agency which has responsib lity which

sometimes comes close

together.

Mi. Goldsmith. Does he Office of Security maintain

files which contain informition of a derogatory nature on

individuals, not necessari Y limited to Agency employees?

MI. Tovar. To my knowledge they don't. My assumption is

ii I have never seen what s

in their files -- my assumption is

that they have files only on Agency personnel. I cannot :

visualize circumstances uniler which

they would maintain infor-

mation on people who are not in the Agency or who had not been

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applicates for employment ind then left.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is the Office of Security interested in

maintaining information so that if in the future an individual

was being considered for erployment in some capacity with the

Agency the Secuirty Offic would have that information on

him?

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Mr. Tovar. I cannot visualize that heppening today.

Mr. Goldsmith. I woud like to ask you to read CIA 0786,

which is a document that this Committee obtained from the

Office of Security files on Lee Harvey Oswald.

Mr. TovaI. That sort of suggests they maintained such

information then. I still cannot visualize there doing it

today.

Mr. Goldsmith.. Do you think the function of the Office of

Security may be different today from what it was in 1959 with

regard to maintaining such files?

Mr. Tovar. The funct on, I would use the term function,

I would say the policy of he Office as far as the way the

office operates today. I lon't know what they do intrinsically.

I cannot visualize their mintaining that kind of current

records today. Maybe this is historic, it was in the files

since 1969. With the injiction against destroying files,

the files remained.

If it was John &. Doe appearing today in a similar context

I would not visualize the office of Security maintaining this

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kind of document.

Mr. Goldsmith. To whom would this document go today?

Mr.. Tovar. You mean from the State Department?

MI. Goldsmith. Yes,

a State Department document. Which

is indicating that an American citizen is giving information,

intelligence information to

a foreign country, to whom in the

CIA would that document go?

Mr. Tovar.

I am not sure it would come to the CIA at all

because the CIA does not have responsibility for that type of

person. I think it would jo to the FBI.

Mr. Goldsmith. Even though the individual is overseas?

Mr. Tovar. Yes.. He is an American. Again, this is

speculation. I don't know what moves the person who releases

cables to the Moscow Embassy today. He might decide or some-

body here in State Securit/ might decide that CIA should see

this.. In that event, it probably would go to the Office of

Security as a matter of information..

Mr. Goldsmith. Would information contained in this type

of telegram normally lead =o the opening of a 201 file?

Mr. Tovar. I would trink not.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why not?

Mr.

Tovar.

There is nothing that suggests here this

is going to be of continuing interest to the CIA. This is

1959.

Let us say in 1962 he man came back and another message!

came over and it indicated that he was available for discussion

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or was of interest and so on and maybe there are reasons for

debriefing; I can visualiz a 201 being opened if the matter

were of apparent continuing interest. I can see no reason why

a 201 would be opened in this case.

Mr. Goldsmith. What f this telegram was followed by a

aable indicating that the : ndividual had decided to defect?

Mr. Tovar. What do you mean? He is applying for Soviet

citizenship, so he is deferting here?

Mr. Goldsmith. You a'e correct. I withdraw the question.

Mr. Tovar. I think bisically my point is that it is a

fact that a 201 need not b opened up on this type - this is

a casual piece of information. If one could eliminate the

name Lee Harvey Oswald, which raises flages, it is John Doe

and there is nothing in this -- someone might say what an SOB

this is but there is nothing to indicate anything but an

unfortunate incidental event, I would say today, "why bother.

We have enought

to do withuut opening 201 files on people of

that nature." The encyclopedic approach is not one that we

try to appiy.

Bear in mind, I am doing a lot of speculating here.

perhaps shouldn't.

Mr. Goldsmith. You really aren't aware of what the

procedure would be in 1959 for dealing with a telegram like

this?

Mr. Tovar.

No. I wolld still say today I would not expect

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that kind of document to b retained in Agency files anywhere.

You know, inter-departmentil correspondence is firing paper in

all directions all the tim: on an informational basis. That

does not mean it is retained.

MI. Goldsmith. With egard to this document, after 1959

your testimony is moreorless speculation but you are saying

that today you don't think that this type of document would be

retained and have any spec..al significance?

Mx. Iovar. I don't think so. I am scratching my head:

trying to visualize circum:;tances under which it could be

retained. There is nothin, of interest to the Agency. There

is nothing of immediate

counterintelligence interest. I don't

know who would retain it o: why.

Mr. Goldsmith. For the purpose of clarification, if the

CI asked that of the CIA, ly that I mean the counterintelligence

aspect of the CIA concerned primarily with a foreign counter-

intelligence threat, in othr words, foreign nationals, foreign

citizens?

Mr. Tovar. You are asking is it?

MI. Goldsmith. Yes..

MI. Tovar. Primarily yes, but not solely. We are

concerned with Americans o: counterintelligence interest. If

an overseas station is informed by somebody that an American

is contacting the Soviets ind is apparently engaged in what

looks like espionage, we would become interested. That is

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espionage I am talking abou:.

MI.

Goldsmith. I understand.

Mr. Tovar. You reali:e of course with the sensitivity

of Americans investigation: of Americans we have to be an we

are extremely careful in milking the determination as to when a

person is of counterintell: gence interest. We have very strict

rules and regulations on the consideration of investigations,

considerations retaining information, the rights of a person.

The criteria are very stringent. Theyare under esecutive

order and Attorney General guidelines. We don't approach this

casually at all. It is proscribed activity.

Mr. Goldsmith. Both is to Americans?

Mx. Tovär... Prima::ily Americans. The Attorney General

is not concerned essentialy with non-US persons.

Our focus of

sensitivity is on US persons who are US citizens or residents,

aliens

or Us entities, orginizations, which are primarily

American in composition.

Mr. Goldsmith. Again, would you focus outside the-borders

of the United States?

Mr. Tovar. Yes.. Ins: de US is FBI.

Mr. Goldsmith. Befor when you made reference to a

station overseas, you becale aware of an American who might

be involved in espionage fur another country, you were refer-

ring to an American who wa:: living abroad, is that correct?

Mr. Tovar.

Yes, or traveling abroad.

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Mr. Goldsmith. I would like to show you CIA Number 788

which is the field personality file request form that was used

to open Oswald's 201 file. In the middle of the page there is

box which states the term 'Other identification". If someone

wrote the number of letter "AG" down, what does that stand for?

Mr. Tovar. I have no idea. What are they referring

to here? I cannot think o? anything.

Mr. Goldsmith. The form also indicates that Oswald's

file was restricted. Do you know of any reason why Oswald's

file would have been restr.cted?

Mr. Tovar.

Where is :hat?

Mr. Goldsmith. Here.

Mr. Tovar. No, I don't know. I don't know what criteria

they would have used at thit time or even today for that matter,

to open a restricted file. Bear in mind, there is a lot of

latitude given to the individual who opened these things. He

could be a very junior ana yst who for reasons of his own

decided he would do it thi:; way. Supervision would not neces-

sarily get down there very closely behind him.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know what the inter agency source

register is?

Mr. Tovar. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. What :s that?

Mr. Tovar. As I unde: stand it, it is a register maintained

in which other agencies of the government register their

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interest in a person. Let us take, for example, you are working

for the Army Intelligence ind you are in Germany and you become

interdsted in Mr. Smith. "et us say you check Mr. Smith with

the CIA and with the other agencies and in so doing you wish

to have him recorded under the ISR, Inter Agency Source

Registry, the entry of his name in the ISR will normally flag

prior interest on the part of somebody in the government, in

this case you are in the Amy.

I don't know what this symbol is but they put two asterisks

which indicates to anybody else who checks that name later the

US Army has a prior intere:it in that person.

Mr. Goldsmith. What lind of interest would that be?

MI. Tovar. Intelligence interest to me, potential

intelligence interest. Agitin, the ISR may have ramifications

that I am not aware of. In my experience the ISR has been the

place we go to check, say, a new or potentially new source to

see if there is ny other previously established government

interest in the person which means keep your hands off. The

military rely upon this ve: y heavily because we coordinate their

clandestine intelligence operations.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would an ISR index be checked prior to

opening up a 201 file as a matter of routine?

Mr. Tovar. It has beun so many years since I have done

this. The way we have become mechanized today I would assume

that a normal file check through the central files of the

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Directorate would include " would turn up anything that was

in the ISR. I am just not sure. how it works.

MI. Goldsmith. If solleone were an agent of another

intelligence organization vould that be indicated in the 201

file?

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Mr. Tovar.

If it were an agent, agent of another service,

that would be in the ISR only if it had been of interest to

another agency which said "Put Joh Doe's name in the ISR and

indicate he is a US Army ir telligence source," at the very

least a person of interest to the US Army Intelligence Agency.

It would not be there if the Army had not put it in. So you

might not know.

Again, I think almost any agent of the military would rely

upon the ISI, I would thin': almost certainly would be entered

in the ISI, because they wint to maintain control of it, to

make sure nobody else gets in the way arnd interferes with their

operations.

Mr. Goldsmith. So if someone were an agent it would in

all likelihood be indicater in the ISR and assuming the ISR

is

checked by a CI person prior to opening up the file, he would

take note of that fact?

Mr. Tovar. Say that igain. Some of this is pretty fuzzy

to me. I don't want to mislead you by extrapolating from my

own ignorance.

Mr. Goldsmith. If soleone is an agent of another

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intelligence service, that fact would be noted in the ISR?

Mr. Tovar. Another Us intelligence service?

MI. Goldsmith. Yes.

MI. Tovar. A US military intelligence service only, yes,

the military intelligence service would normally be registered

in the ISR. Other than the military, the FBI intelligence

assets would not be registered in the ISr to my knowledge.

Mr. Goldsmith.

But the military tends to make that list-

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Mr. Tovar. In my experience the miltiary has been the

primary element involved in the use and the exploitation of the

ISR. Let me interpose ano her point here. I am not an expert

in these procedures and I im way out of touch. You live most

of your life overseas, you don't do these things-back at

headquarters. These procedures may be quite different in

actuality. I am groping through my memory to see how they were

dealt with on an active basis.

A fellow like Bill Donnelly might enlighten you much more

than I could about the ISR.

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand that. I think you can tell

I am not pressing you for detail on it.

Mr. Tovar. I would like to help you. I am prepared to

specualte as I have been doing on things that are somewhat

beyond my direct experience: and direct responsibility. There

is a limit.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, if someone checking ISR notes that

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an individual is a military intelligence agent would the fact

of that agency status be noted and a 201 file opened on that

individual?

Mr. Tovar. I am not sure. I would think it would be.

Again, I am speculating. I think almost certainly if I were

doing a file check on a person whose name came from one of the

field stations and it turned up the fact he was already

registered in the ISR, if a person is of interest let us say,

to the US Army Intelligene:, that would automatically sort of

proscribe further attempts on my part to go in and get involved.

I think a notation would be made in the 201 file.

Mr. Goldsmith. As a practical matter that would be a goodi

reason for making the notasion?

Mr. Tovar. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Does the CIA regularly use the ISR?

Mr. Tovar..

We maintain it as I understand it.

MI. Goldsmith. So if someone is an agent of the CIA,

would that fact be noted is the ISR?

MI. Tovar.

No, I don't believe it would. Again, you

can check on that to make certain. Donelly I think can help

much better on it. I cannot visualize all our sensitive sources

being registered there.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do yor know how internal memoranda prepared

by James Angleton when he was head of the CI Staff, how interna

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paperwork relating to the JFK assassination was prepared and

subseguently stored?

• Mr. Tovar. No, I really don't. I have no idea. I have

seen no documents on that subject. I have seen nothing either

originated or approved of signed by him. You realize that any

files on this subject are lead files. I am just doing my

current job. Until you pople became interested, we were not

dealing with them on a dai y basis.

Mr. Goldsmith. What lappens to the personal files of an

individual such as Angletons or even yourself after leaving the

CI STaff?

Mr. Tovar. After learing the staff or leaving the Agency?

Mr. Goldsmith. Let u, take the first after leaving the CI

-Staff, what would happen to your personal papers?

Mr. Tovar. The personal file, official file on the person

in the Agency is retained ly the Office of Personnel.

Mr. Goldsmith. That would givern your personal file,

your personal

papers. "ha: about internal memos, soft copy

type files, what would happen to them?

Mr. Tovar. Having been only one element of the organiza-

tion during my career, it is hard to say.

Mr. Goldsmith. I am not talking now about personnel file

I am talking about soft coy, working files that an individual

may maintain.

Mr. Tovar.

You mean the files he himself as an individual

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maintained?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Tovar.

Most individuals don't maintain personal files,

I don't think. I would say, for example, anything I write,

I dictate a memorandum and I send it to anybody you want to

name, in a sense that is my work, I have done it but I don't

keep a personal file on that. That goes into my office file.

It is part of the office cironological file which is maintained

by my secretary. Let us say multiply that by 500,000 over. a

period of years the foles frow. At the time I leave I am •

incidental in a sense. I just happen to be the person in the

job at the time. The files will still be there.

There is a normal retirement and destruction under normal

conditions, retirement and destruction program which eliminates

the accumulation of excessive useless material.

Mr. Goldsmith. Most paperwork would go in this office

chrono file?

Mr. Tovar. Yes, anything of significance would go in the

office chrono file. Anything I write to the Directorate of

Operations, DDO, CI, it is normally part of the chrono files.

If I want it, it is there. It is my own file in the sense that

when I am on the job I hav: total access to it. If I left

the job and wanted to look at it six months later, it is still

in the fole and I would as: somebody who took my place could I

see what I wrote. I would not take it with me.

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Mr. Goldsmith. If it is an office chrono file does that

meant that everything is filed in a chronological order?

Mr. Tovar. Not necessarily. Here you ought to consult

my secretary. There might be a subject breakdown. Ordinarily

hte front office, we don't main-ain a lot of files. There is

no point in it. Let us sa? something I signed off on, here

is a case in point, memos that are signed on my behalf or

that I might have signed, if I were

there that day, I would

not maintain that in my front office as a rule. That would

probably be maintained by the office of origination. I think

if I signed it my secretar/ would certainly maintain a log of

things that had gone throujh me for signature. But I don't

think, I could be wrong on this, I don't think as a rule she.

would maintain a routine memorandum just because I happened to

sign it because I sign so nany things on that staff. I sign

off on a host of things which are not really my creation. I

am representing the staff is a whole.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do yor know when Mr. Angleton left the CI

Staff?

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Mr. Tovar..

Yes. I an not certain of the precise date.

I think it was either Decenber '74 or January '75. That is the

position of Chief, Counterintelligence?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Tovar. I believe he may have remained in the office

for several months

after tat before he finally retired.

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Mr. Goldsmith. Do yod know whether, after Mr. Angleton

left the CI Staff, any type of followup was done by that staff

on the Nosenko issue?

Mr. Tovar. Followup ork?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

For example, one of the issues, the

key issue with regard to M:. Nosenko was his bona fides.

Mr. Tovar. Yes, inderd.

MI. Goldmsith. After Mr. Angleton left was any additionall

analytical work done on that issue?

Mr. Tovar. A very de:ailed study was done by my predecessbr

George Kalaris. A very thorough analysis was made of the whole

Nosenko question.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are you referring to the Hart Report?

Mr. Tovar. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Other than the Hart report was any type of,

followup work of

analytica:, work done after Mr. Angleton's

departure?

Mr. Tovar. I don't know. for certain. The Hart Report is

a thick piece of paper. In the preparation of that report

there were probably all kinds of drafts, scratchings and sort

of preliminary jobs. All that I know would be in the context

of:that report. All I know would be same representations in

response to the Director's inquiry or your inquiry or someone

else's inquiry as to what happened, what did it say, what does

it mean, that type of thin, but really correlary efforts.

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Mi. Goldsmith. Think for a moment on the Nosenko issue.

As Chief of the CI Staff, if it were

demonstrated to you very

clearly that the story given by Mr. Nosenko on Lee Harvey

Oswald was full of contradictions and in addition to contra-

dictions, it was in many ways simply incredible, what impact

would that have on the Agency's assessment of Mr. Nosenko as

being a bona fide rather than a dispatched defector?

Mr. Tovar. Well, it is difficult to answer. You are

posing a question in a nar ow sense. You are focusing on one

point, Nosenko vis-a-vis Oswald and contradictions that may

emerge there. I would ansver by saying that again I am not an

expert on Nosenko. I don': profess to have a full grasp of

his bona fides or anything related to it.

I would say that ques ion alone would not be enough to

satisfy me that the inquir? had been made carefully. There is

much more to it than what osenko had to say about Oswald.

There are more aspects aboit the bona fides issue, more than I

could give you today.

Mr. Goldsmith. I have read the Hart Report.

Mr. Tovar. He tried to deal with the whole consideration!

the whole Oswald, the handling, the methodology. He did not

go into every jot and tittle of the issue.

Mr. Goldsmith. In fast, the Hart Report did not mention

the word "Oswald" even one time. Even so, the question I have,!

if it were demonstrated to you that Nosenko's story on the

Nit

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Oswald issue is untrue, cannot be believed, would that have any

impact on the Agency's assessment of him as a bona fied?

MI. TovaI. The first reaction would be I would be deeply

distressed and concerned, I would want to know more about it.

You have to exptrapolate from me to the Agency. Other people

have views on this other tan myself. If you carried this

thing

further and convinced ever/thody, the point you made is valid,

then you would have --

Mr. Goldsmith. We ar: talking hypothetically now. Let

us go beyond you. If it were demonstrated to the Director of

the Central intelligence Ajency that the story given by Nosenko

on Oswald -- I am not talking about any of the other information

he gave, but on Oswald - simply cannot be believed because,

A, part of it is incredible, B, it is full of contradictions,

what effect do you think tiat would have on the Agency's

assessment of him as a bon.i fide defector?

MI. Tovar. I literally don't know. I am not sure what

the comparative weight of that point would be when considered

against the backdrop of the full Nosenko question.

Mr. Goldsmith. As Chief of the CI Staff, you would

personally be troubled by hat?

Mr. Tovar. Yes, I think I would be troubled by it. I

would be troubled. I woull be troubled that our current

assessment is wrong. That would trouble me.

Again, I would say, 1uo, if this is a serious proposition

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you are making, let us say you adduced a number of analysts

who examined this thing thoroughly and were in a position of

making that kind of judgment, I would say, "I want to have

these analysts talk to my analysts because I am not in

a posi-

tion to make that kind of judgment."

Mr. Goldsmith. First of all, I am not making the statement

that Nosenko's story on Oswald is inaccurate in any way.

Secondly, even if the story is inaccurate, I don't want

to suggest that because of that anyone on this Committee has

any feeling that that means Nosenko is not bona fide. My

question is really very linited. A, if it were demonstrated

that the story on Oswald is inaccurate, what impact would that

have on your overall assessment?

MI. Tovar. You mean demonstrably inaccurate?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

MI. Tovar. It

would have to be examined. It would have

to be examined the full panoply of the whole Oswald issue.

I would say weiwill get this team of analysts and we will

fight it out. We are talking about hypothesis.

Mr. Goldsmith, Yes. I would prefer to stay away from the

term "fighting it out" because there is no one here who is in

the posture of making a fighting issue out of it.

I no longer have any questions. I will have questions to

ask whoever on your staff participated in the preparation of

the memo that we discused earlier.

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Normally whenever a witness has an opportunity to testify

before the Committee at a rearing, the Committee gives him five

minutes at the end to make a statement. This is not a hearing.

However, if you would like to make a statement for the record,

feel free to do so. If no:, you will be given a chance to

verify the record for accuracy.

Mr. Tovar. Since I hive no position to present and no

point to make it is probably improper to make a statement.

The only think I would reiterate is that I have been sort of

speculating here in many ruspects. Bear in mind there is an

area here where I have a pirview that is perhaps: valid. We

are talking about a lot of things which are way beyond my

immediate experience and curtainly my current responsibility.

I would say, take som: of my speculation with a grain of

salt, because I don't mean to be dogmatic on these things.

The procedure for handling the 201 file, there are some GS-7

girls down the line who could tell you much more about the 201

files than I would ever be able to compile for you. They are

the ones you really should talk to.

Things like the ISR,: know the ISR in a limited framework

from the standpoint of a guy overseas who is dealing frequently

with the military and regi:ters military sources in the ISR

and checks the ISR either on behalf of the military or to see

if they have already regis:ered prior interest and so on. There

may. be other aspects of th thing that you should ge more

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professional advice on.

I think your question: have been reasonable. I have found

no objection to try to mee:: you more than halfway on it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine. Thank you very much.

(Whereupon, at 3:20 p.m., the deposition was concluded.)

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•-----

CERTIFICATS OF NOTARY PUBLIC

I, Alfred Joseph LaFrince, the officer before whom the

foregoing deposition was tiken, do hereby certify that the

witness whose testimony appears in the foregoing deposition

was duly sworn by me; that the testimony of said witness was

taken by me in stenotype to the best of my ability and there-

after reduced to typewriting under my direction, that said

deposition is a true record of the testimony given by said

witness; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed

by any of the parties to te action in which this deposition

was taken; and further that: I am not a relative or employee

of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties thereto,

nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of the

action.

Notary Public in and for the

District of Columbia

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My Commission expires Noverber 14, 1980.

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