POSSIBLE DOWNSTREAM PROBLEMS WITH HSCA.
Originator: CIA
Document date: 06/21/1978
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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1

19 JUN 1978

Possible Downstream Problems With HSCA

1. To date the problems with HSCA have not been major, but

some of the difficulties to date may assume increased importance in

the remaining period of the investigation. This memorandum under-

takes to consider some of them.

2. HSCA Requests and CIA Response. HSCA appears to be follow

ing a leave-no-stone-unturned approach to the investigation.

Just about

every name or reference of the files reviewed becomes the subject of

Frequently the names are incomplete and identifying material

so limited that research becomes tremendously time-consuming. If HSCA

has additional information it has appeared on occasion reluctant to

provide it, possibly because it will reveal the direction of the in-

vestigation. Two things characterize the present status of HSCA and

There are a number of requests that have not yet been

answered, and the larger portion of material made available for review

has not yet been reviewed by HSCA investigators. CIA recently has made

arrangements to improve its responses to requests, but the basic problem

will remain. We feel HSCA is falling behind and that it will be critical

of the Agency for its own failures in this respect..

3.

Access. The FBI reportedly has provided no direct access

to its files for HSCA investigators.

CIA is providing direct access

to its files with very limited sanitization.

The result is the in-

vestigators have had access to a lot of sources-and-methods material.

The criticism that HSCA investigators can make is not in our restrictions,

but the effectiveness of our responses. As noted above, steps have been

taken to remedy this.

Access to Agents. In contrast to very full access to Agency

files and documents the line has been drawn on access to agents. One

agent was interviewed over CIA objections, following the failure to

notify CIA of the intention to interview him as provided for in the

In one other case of which we are aware we have

objected to an agent being interviewed and, in the absence of CIA

assistance, he was not contacted nor interviewed.

This is the subject

of a formal protest by the HSCA chairman.

The DDCI has offered a

method, alternative to direct access to the agent, for obtaining the

answers desired.

5. Defectors. As a result of the dramatic presentations in the

Epstein Book Legend the MSCA has focussed on this issue.

Staff members

have stated recently that they consider this to be one of the two most

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SECRET

important issues that they have, so far as the Agency and the Kennedy

assassination are concerned. After considerable exchange we have been

advised that the staff no longer is interested in the question of

Nosenko's bona fides, per se. The interest is now focussed on what

Nosenko knew about Lee Harvey Oswald; questioning on this point

apparently is intended to be detailed and intensive. If Nosenko's

bona fides are not an issue the need to address the sensitive aspects

of his knowledge, and the operational use made of it, may not become

a security problem. That information, however, is revealed in varying

degrees in some of the material reviewed by the HSCA.

While we may

have some reservations about how the Nosenko problem is handled by the

HSCA, and personally how he is handled, the earlier concerns of security

consideration currently are somewhat reduced.

6.

Mexico City. The HSCA staffers have stated that CIA coverage

in Mexico City is one of the two important issues on which they currently

are focussing.

The subject matter is classically one of intelligence

sources and methods. Additionally, it involves the relationships of

the Agency with instruments of a foreign government in a way that would

be politically embarrassing to that government were it to become known.

24 Liaison relationships are part of the story, as are illegal joint 2y

operations and undeclared unilateral operations. Publicity could be

lastingly harmful to Agency operations in this important post.

7. Final Report. The Committee is faced with the problem of

credibility.

It functions under the generally reserved atmosphere

in Congress towards CIA which creates pressure to write a tough report

that shows the independence of the investigators. While a report of

Agency coverage in Mexico can be written using euphemisms for how the

coverage existed, the pressures will be to spell it out in detail.

We foresee some difficulties when the time comes for CIA's review of

the report for security considerations.

8. Performance of the Agency. The HSCA charter includes per-

formance of the intelligence agencies. Part of the vulnerability of

the Agency to criticism today is that different perceptions have

evolved than existed at the time of the warren Commission investi-

gation.

The Agency's performance during the Warren Commission inquiry

has already been criticized in the Church Committee report (by Senator

Schweiker) in-a badly drafted critique.

While the Schweiker draft is

flawed, the Agency is subject to criticism in some respects, and an

internal CIA study so stating has been reviewed by HSCA investigators.

He do not know to what extent there will be criticism of the Mexic

City Station although critical observations have been elicited from

Agency employees about management there during the warren Commission

investigation. HSCA staffers have indicated that they will be critical

of the CIA handling of Nosenko (despite their own readiness to give

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him a hard time when the question is no longer real). They are aware

that the Rockfeller Commission has already reported on this but will

probably indulge themselves in a reprise.

9.

Style. A number of the HSCA investigators have experience

as criminal prosecutors.

They are accustomed to dealing with criminals

that they intend to convict.

In the present instance the testimony

developing.

that HSCA investigators are trying to prove theories, sometime critical

of the Agency, as distinguished from gathering all the facts in a

balanced picture. Because of the HSCA approach our views on this are

for the large part. visceral, but are sufficiently firm to give us some

concern for the kinds of conclusions that we eventually will encounter

and not have time to check out.

Security. Due note should be taken at this time that the

HSCA, in its reorganized form under Mr. Blakey, has an unusual record

We are aware of no leaks.

Nevertheless, we are antic-

ipating difficulties at the time of the final report.

Beyond that,

we are concerned that when Mr. Blakey's discipline is gone some of his

staff members--whom he has described as strongly anti-CIA--may feel free

to give their own version of things. This of course remains for the

future.

3

SEGRET

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14-60000

meiting

ASCA

OLC: 78-2406/2

20 June 1978

DIG REGORD COPY

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with HSCA Chief Counsel G. Robert Blakey

1. In the course of a meeting with Mr. Blakey this morning, we

discussed the method by which questions would be put to the agent

i owe new deed that he hat in min eve a no, a tae about

(Manuel Calvillo). I think he was not entirely clear as to these two

people, although his alternative approaches place on us a requirement

to be sure that we identify them properly for purposes of his questions.

They are discussed below:

Durant. He recalled that Durang operated the photo-

graphic surveillance post of the Soviet Embassy. I told

him that I understood that (Durant)was in charge of the

Cuban coverage.

03

b. Manuel Calvillo. He understood that Calvillo ran the

Cuban photographic surveillance site.. Beyond this,

however, Calvillo was of interest to him for other

reasons. Elena Garo dePaz told of seeing Oswald at

various parties in Mexico City, at the time of his

visit there in 1963. She also said that 'a couple of

days" after the assassination of President Kennedy,

Calvillo picked her up, took her to a hotel and inter-

rogated her.

2. Given the possible confusion of who operated the Cuban and

Soviet OPs, MI. Blakey said that he would want the individuals

correctly identified and have the questions addressed to them.

3. Additionally, Mr. Blakey wants such information as we have

on Calvillo.

Jistribution: Original -

LC: SDB:kjw 21 June OLd Chron

PCS/LOC (Shepanek)

OS (Sullivan)

ora (Young) SECRET

OP (Haudesheldt)

S. D. BRECKINRIDGE

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CONFIDENTIAL

20 June 1978

Mating

OLC #78-2310

HSCM

OLG RECORD GurT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with HSCA Chief Counsel G. Robert Blakey

At a meeting with the HSCA Chief Counsel and Staff Director

this morning, Mi. Blakey discussed approaches as to how HSCA

questions can be put to CIA agents in Mexico.

One possible approach is to use recently-new personnel

now assigned to the Inspector General. I named for him. Captain

Niles Gooding and Lt. Col. Lewis Sorley. He asked for resumes,

and I arranged with Mr. Waller to provide them to Mr. Blakey.

As an alternative possibility, Mr. Blakey suggested that Burton

Wides on the IOB staff be used. He pointed out that Mr. Wides

was familiar with the subject matter, having worked on it during

the Church Committee inquiry, and whose "Congressional roots"

would improve the appearance of his handling this mission. As

an IOB staff member, he is now a member of the executive branch.

I stated that Mr. Wides would be personally acceptable to me but

that the basic issue is non-Agency access to an Agency clandestine

asset. I added that the IOB may have reservations about Mr. Wides'

accepting such a commission if it is offered.

I undertook to report these two questions for conside ration.

Distribution:

Original - OLC Subject

1 - DDCI

1 - DDO

1 - IG

1 - GC

OLC: SDB: kjw 21 June 1978

S. D. BRECKINRIDGE

1 - OLC Chrono

CONFIBENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

fsca

OLC 77-4719

OLG RECORD COPY

3 October 1977

Viet

HSCA

77-0061

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Visit of Professor G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel

Staff Director, House Select Committee on

Assassinations (U)

1.

(C) On 3 October

.1977, Professor G. Robert Blakey,

Chief Counsel and Staff Director, House Select Committee

on Assassinations, visited the Agency for general discussions

on several matters.

First, he met with Russ Holmes, DDO,

John Walker,

.0/SA/DO/0, and the undersigned to discuss certain

Agency material relating to Mr. Loren E. Hall, who is of

interest to the House Select Committee in their investigation

of President John F. Kennedy's assassination.

, (C). Blakey then met with Richard Lansdale and

Richard Rininger, OGC,

Russ Holmes, DDO, and the undersigned

to discuss a letter which he had requested from the Agency

to the House

Select Committee on Assassinations regarding

any affiliation that Hall had had with the Agency.

While

Blakey had been informed that no such affiliation

had ever

existed, he wanted this information in writing so that it

could be shown to Hall and his attorney.

Blakey had reason

to believe that Hall would attempt to refuse to answer certain

questions put to him by the Committee, claiming that he had

a security obligation running back to

the Agency.

request from Blakey was a matter of some urgency since the

Select Committee was interviewing Hall on 5 October.

(This matter was subsequently resolved by a letter request

from Blakey and a written response to him signed by the

Legislative Counsel.

The Legislative Counsel's response

was coordinated with the General Counsel.)

3.

(C)

Subsequent to the meeting in OGC, Blakey met

vith Dan Godar, OS, to discuss a case of one of his staff

employees who did not meet the criteria of DCID 1/14 for

clearance purposes.

He was shown Headquarters Regulation 10-3

to advise him of the standards we require for CIA employees

and, in addition, was given copies of DCID 1/14 and EO 10450.

Blakey asked for

and received certain advice and guidance from

Godar on how to handle this particular problem with his employee.

cc: OGC (Rininger)

Dore 7 Слинийні

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Chief, Coordination and Review Staff

0/ SA/DO/O (Walker)

OS (Godar)

Office of Legislative Counsel

1 - OLC/Subj

1 - OLC/Chrono

OLC/ DTC/ksn

CONFIDENTIAL

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