Originator: CIA
From: CIA
To: HQ
Document date: 03/26/1964
Document type: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

## Page 1

124-10365-10006

2022 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK Assassination System

Date:

Identification Form

Agency Information

6/9/2015

AGENCY :

RECORD NUMBER :

RECORD SERIES:

FBI

124-10365-10006

HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER: CR 65-68530-99

Document Information

ORIGINATOR: CIA

FROM: CIA

TO: HQ

TITLE :

DATE :

'PAGES :

SUBJECTS :

03/26/1964

7

NOSENKO RE OSWALD

DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION: Secret

RESTRICTIONS: 1B

CURRENT STATUS: Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 10/16/1998

OPENING CRITERIA: APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS: MEMO, INC MEMO, ASSESSMENT

19.1

NW 50953 DocId: 32310811 Page 1

2

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0to.

TOR SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

2 6 MAR 1964:

SEE SCOENORASOUM FOR:

8-14-48-1772

Mr. John Edgar Hoover

Director, Federal Bureau

of Investigation

United States Department of Justice

Decines

lendea.

10-709-105%4

) REFERENCE:

CSCI - 3/780, 604

Bureau

File

dtd

(S)

19 Mar 64

65-68530

1.

Transmitted herewith is a copy of a report on

eT

the SAMMY case prepared bp the Chief, Soviet Russia

Division for the information of the Deputy Director for

It is an

"in house" document containing an in- 2

terim assessment of SAMMY's bona fides and may not.be

disseminated

to other departments without permission

of this

Agency.

si. "The"

ie report is loaned to your Bureau

per paragraph

5 of referent memorandum.

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

MELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION

N THIS DOCUMENT. JM

ON these 9

After reviewing the origins of the SAMMY case,

the report discusses SAMMY's motivation, his production

to date, his behavior, and certain other cases which

appear to relate in some way to the SAMMY case. The ses

port concuudes

sIble KGB aims

to resolve the case 01

in such an operation,

th such an operateD plant, discussas post.

recommends action

In previous correspondence, this Agency has

noted the need for an early evaluation by your Bureau

of the information reported by

/ SAMMYon American Citie

evaluation not only will affect the manner

will for an important part of the finalsdeterination

ENCLOSURE

letten

of SAMMY's bona fides.

Similarly,

In making available

to your Bureau a copy of the SR Division interim report

on SAMMY's bona fides, we are interested in having as

sogn as possible your

views on other aspects of the case

described

in the report, particularly those which refer.

to operational activities of your Bureau. ENCLOSURE

In considering how best your Bureau and this

Leach de

Agency can proceed in further examination of this case,

it is probable that normal procedures for exchange. of

Setoward,

Jogtor,

information will not suffice.

SAMMY is a unique case for

which no parallel exists

insofar as we are aware and its

proper resolution suggests

the need for the clos

Vise

CLASSiFiED pOR CDA

RECQ4 65=695 300

LETTER of

aapAUG o26 1965

MAR 5 1984

TOP SECRET

14 50953

DocId:32318811 Page :

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P SECRET

TAB "E"

PERSONAL DATA, CONDUCT AND MANNER

Statements about Himself

Biography: NOSENKO has contradicted himself in his own

accounts of his life in ways which ma, especially noteworthy is

be related to the events

and personalities he is reporting on.

this shift of dates. in 1962, he said that he graduated from the

Institute of Foreign Relations in 1950, went into the Naval GRU,

then entered the KGB at the beginning of 1953. In 1964, he

said he had graduated in 1949 and entered the KGB in early 1952.

This affects his version of getting into the KGB with KOBULOV's

help as KOBULOV was not in the KGB from 1948 to March 1953.

2. Friendship with GUK and CHURANOV: NOSENKO claims to be

an

intimate friend of certain KGB officers, especially GUK and

CHURANOV, from whom he has obtained by word of mouth most of the

few operational items he has been able to provide outside his own

immediate sphere of activity.

He mentions these two individuals

so often that that alone would deserve special attention. But on

top of that these two individuals were, two of GOLITSYN's closest

contacts, from whom GOLITSYN also learned by word of mouth about

many operations - sensitive ones at that - which he had no

Yet, if NOSENKO were in fact this close to them,

right con be little doubt that COLITSYN would have known NOSENKO

there can be

better.

As it is, GOLITSYN remembers only that there wasa

accounts of what they had told GOLITSYN in the KGB damage

assessment of GOLITSYN's defection, and that NOSENKO is fabri-

cating this alleged friendship to explain how he had access to

the

same information as GOLITSYN (some of which is outlined in

Tab "D",

Table #4), which he is using -- at no cost to the KGB

as build-up for himself.

3. Personal Involvement in Key Accidents: NOSENKO, when he

came out in 1964, had certain information which he particularly

wanted to give us concerning practically all of the known of

notorious incidents of soviet security history in the period

Since his last meetings with us. It appears to stretch coincidence

GROUP I

TOP SECRET Excluded

From automatic

downgrading and

declassification

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THE SECRET

2.

to the limit that this one KGB officer,

NOSENKO, was personally

involved in every one of them, and could thus talk - and deliver

the KGB's "message" - with complete authority.

Note his role

in the cases of Lee Harvey OSWALD,

of Professor BARGHOORN, of

a travel order for his use in the "search" for CHEREPANOV)

and others. Note also his fortuitous friendship with Georgiy

BOLSHAKOV, which permitted him to recount in detail a provocative

version of BOLSHAKOV's dealings with the White House.

Order of Lenin and/or Case Award: NOSENKO mentioned in

January 1964 that he had received the Order of Lenin "shortly

after the 1962 meetings with us," as a result of ideas he

developed

on how to enlarge the experience and improve the

quality of staff personnel on the job.

About a month later he

mentioned to one of his security guards that he had received a

large cash award (no date, but was then reluctant to say why; it

is not clear whether this is separate from the medal mentioned

earlier). Now, such medals and awards are not given for routine

contributions. However, it is possible that NOSENK could not

resist bragging about his medal

or feared that we might hear of

it through other sources), and that he actually got it for his

1962 meeting with waste timing Would suggest me.

on one occasion he pointedly asked whether his T962 case officer

had received an award from the 1962 meetings with him.

And the

cash award may have been related to a report from another source

that some officers of the American Department of the Second Chief

Directorate had gotten cash awards for the recruitment of one or

more Americans in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow around 1960 -- when

NOSENKO was in that Department.

Claim to have Worked in Place for Us: NOSENKO has

repeatedly said that he tried earnestly to collectevery bit of

information he could for us during the period between the 1962

Yet he clearly did not try to collect

even the most insignificant

from his

many contacts, nor did he even bring out clear

organization for the First Chief Directorate, which could be had

for the asking by a person in his position.

The nearly 200

operational leads he so earnestly collected do not, insofar as:

our traces to date permit us to judge, contain the identity of a

singe active agent with any current access to NATO

classred information

6.

Shift of Job Before Contact With Us: NOSENKO claimed to

have

transferred from the American Department to the Tourist

JOP SECRET

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SECRET

3.

Department in January 1962. According to knowledgeable sources,

a provocation agent about to be put into contact with hostile

intelligence would usually be removed from his job, particulariy

if it was a relatively sensitive one, at least six months before

being sent out.

This is the exact pattern in NOSENKO's biography:

he left (at least ostensibly) the section working against the

American Embassy just a month after GOLITSYN's defection (and

about the time planning for a provocation would have begun) and

moved to the Tourist Department, whose targets and methods are

less sensitive, more transitory - and more numerous - and whose

basic techniques had been well known to GOLITSYN, partly through

a detailed document GOLITSYN was known to have taken with him

I from the Helsinki Residency. It is possible that NOSENKO did

not in fact move from the First Department as early as he claims.

7' Sourcing of Information:

NOSENKO has provided information

(1), from his own immediate vantage point in the Tourist Department,

and (2), which he has learned through other means. In the first

category we learned interesting details on methods and organization,

although their essence was already known from GOLITSYN; and a

mass of names and identifying data on agents and agent candidates

which he claims to be the totality of his Department's successes

and which turn out to be practically worthless to us or the KGB.

His own position,

however,

has enabled NOsENKo to play a role in

some more notorious events:

the OSWALD case, the KoTEN case, thes

BARGHOORN case, etc:, which are of interest.

NOSENKO's more

interesting information came from outside his

immediate periphery.

His accounts of how he got these other

items provide an interesting aspect of the bona fides problem.

8. As will be touched on again in this paper, NOSENKO has

what we get

MARCH a KOT however, practically every one of these was

outside his normal access, and was obtained fortuitously. Or

through conversations with other case officers. ThiS-way of

getting information is normal and expectable.

What is unusual

about NOSENKO's case is that his explanations are in every such

case either vague, confused or unbelievable and he quickly

becomes irritated and defensive when questioned in detail on

sources •

Almost every item that NOSENKO volunteered has an

implausible source.

A few examples are given in the paragraphs

below.

SECRET

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