MEMORANDUM WITH ATTACHMENTS ON AMLASH OPERATION.
Originator: CIA
From: BRECKINRIDGE, SCOTT D., OLC
To: STURBITTS, REARDON, SANCHEZ, ET AL.
Document date: 06/07/1976
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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TS 185246/A

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Iune 1976

COPY NO.

SSC Subcommittoe Drait Report on

Intelligence Aganeles! Support for

the Warren Commiesion Laguiry

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TS 185246/13 PAGES

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JUN 1976

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SUBJECT: SSC Subcommittee Draft Report on Intelligence Agencies'

Support for the Warren Commission Inquiry

1. The main problem posed for the Agency by the draft report

is its presentation of the AMLASH operation.

It is a classic example

of selective use of quotations and of quotation out of context.

Essential

features of the record are omitted, and in some instances negative

interpretation is used in place of positive facts. The chronology is

blurred in some instances, when it relates to the substantive evolution

of the Agency's relations with AMLASH/1. The resulting picture varies

significantly from the true nature of the operation, in terms of what

happened when.

The SSC Subcommittee draft may well make a valid point, in

contending that the Agency did not do a detailed review of possible Cuban

involvement in President Kennedy's assassination, in contrast to the

exhaustive analysis of possible Soviet involvement. The draft report makes

the point that the Warren Commission did not ask it, and the Agency did not

do it on its own initiative.

The preliminary reaction of the DDO representatives

who read the draft report, is that the draft is correct in noting the limited

effort on the subject of Cuban involvement.

While there arenvariety of

explanations for this, the fact remains that it is explanation instead of a

record of performance.

What such an inquiry would show -- or not show -- is

not the question, but whether an inquiry was made. This point, while made

in the draft report, becomes almost subminimal to the heavy emphasis given

the significance of the AMLASH operation.

The fascination with the operation,

and: its detailed erroneous treatment, does a disservice to the purpose of

the paper. Its extensive, repetitive treatment has been made such a part

of so much of the paper that only highly competent editorial revision can be

expected to correct it in the time reportedly available.

3. The focus of the SSC Subcommittee draft report is not fixed on the

scope of CIA operations against Cuba and Castro, and the failure of the

Agency to review these activities in the context of the Warren Commission

inquiry. It emphasizes one particular operation in support of its main

conclusion. Most of those familiar with the operation will agree that it

eventually developed into assassination plotting.

Some Agency personnel --

directly involved at the time - will not accept this characterization, drawing

a line in their own minds as to how far they went. However, to most of those

not so involved, the AMLASH operation did progress to the point that CIA

agreed to provide equipment for an assassination attempt against Castro, this

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support constituting participation in whatever was to follow. The

key point, in considering the sSt Subcommittee paper, is when AMLASH/1

could reasonably have believed that he had official U.s. support for

such specific action, and when Castro could have learned of this in

reference

to the assassination of President Kennedy. The question

presented in the draft report is whether the AMLASH operation reasonably

could have led to the President's assassination, and whether CIA therefore

should have reported it, as such, to the Warren Commission.

4. The draft report seeks to establish that (1) the AMLASH

operation was an assassination plot on the part of CIA for a substantial

period preceding. President Kennedy's assassination, and (2) it was so

insecure that Castro not only could have, but most likely did, become aware

of it in time to serve as a motive for retaliatory action against President

Kennedy. If, in fact, CIA's posture vis-a-vis AMLASH/1 provided no reason-

for him to believe that he had U.S. support for the assassination

of Castro during the period preceding Kennedy's assassination, this central

thesis of the report suffers at its inception.

this time the report appears to accept the operations with the criminal

5. There is a relatively objective basis for testing the various

interpretations to be offered at this time.

Inspector General investigated CIA plots against Castro (among others)

and prepared a report on the subject. That was done to record the

essential aspects of the operations, and not in anticipation of an issue

such as the present

one. The reports were in considerable detail; in

fact, they presented considerably more detail on the substantive develop-

ment of the AMLASH relationship than is included in the draft report of the

72325

SSC Subcommittee. Written for most limited dissemination (one copy only,

for the DCI) at a time apart from the present issue, it cannot easily be

dismissed as special pleading today. Where its reported facts contradict

assertions of the draft report they should be faced head on.

6. The attached package consists of a series of preliminary comments

on the SSC Subcommittee draft report.

Some are simple editorial critique

(although the first couple of pages include relevant portions of the 1967

report by the CIA Inspector General), some raise questions of fact for

internal CIA checking, and others present points for possible security

consideration.

Copies are being sent to the representatives of the Office

of Security, CI Staff, LA Division and to Mr. Bolten. We should be prepared

to discuss our approach Tuesday afternoon at 1400 in the Review Staff

Conference Room.

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7. The classification of Top Secret derives from the present

classification born by the SSC Subcommittee draft report.

70 Buckin't

S. D. Breckinridge

Deputy Inspector General

Attachment:

As stated

SDB:pam (7 June 1976)

Distribution:

-Bill Sturbitts - LA

03 Dan Niesciut, - CI

Ray Reardon - OS/SAG 3E49

03 (Steve Hunt)- Review Staff

Nestor Sanchez Q LA

SDB Chrono

SDB Working copy

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Page 2.

Page 7.

Page 8.

Item Comments on Draft Report of SSC Subcommittee

Line ll. The word "agents" may describe FBI employees,

but it is not a term ordinarily applied to CIA staff

employees.

2d complete paragraph, 2d line. The phrase 'backed by

CIA, " in describing the Bay of Pigs operation, is im-

precise. CIA was the government instrument for con-

ducting the operation, but there was considerable other

participation in an operation that was "backed" by the

government.

Characterization of the Castro plots "as another method

of achieving a change of government" is imprecise; it

suggests a degree of separation from other government

activities that is not that clear. The so-called first

phase of the operation involving the criminal Syndicate

was coincident with the Bay of Pigs and more logically

part of that overall government program, however

compartmented in its own activity. The so-called second

phase was moze than coincidental, the case officer being

the CIA representative in MONGOOSE activity. It may

be an interesting editorial phrase, but imprecise.

The statement that the FBI knew about these plots by at

least May 1962 needs some elaboration. These plots

didn't involve AMLASH/1 at that time, so far as

assassination was concerned. This also has to be

reconciled with the statement at page 12 that gives the

date of FBI learning of it as July 1964. The first was

prior to AMLASH/l's involvement in plotting assassination

with CIA, and the second is long after the Kennedy

assassination. If reference is to FBI knowledge of the

involvement of the criminal Syndicate, it has to refer to

more than knowledge of the contacts, but also the substance

of the operations. Something is amiss here.

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2nd and 3rd paragraphs. The status of operational

activity in June 1973 was that there was no activity in

the Syndicate operations for months (it had been agreed

that they were discontinued), and there had been no

contact with AMLASH/1 since August 1962. In the latter

case AMLASH/1 was given no encouragement on his

thoughts that Castro had to be killed, so far as U.S.

support for it was concerned. Statements by Castro.

about retaliation for "terrorists" had to apply to other

activities.

Paragraph bottom of page (continuing to page 9) .

References by Castro (12 September 1963) to "covert

activity" undoubtedly referred to the not-so-covert

activity of MONGOOSE operations. This mixing of

general operational aggression--short of open war--

and individual operations, makes the editorial treatment

of the draft report difficult to read. It is pretty loosely

done.

Bottom of page, speaking of 29 October 1963 meeting

between AMLASH/1 and Fitzgerald, the draft report

Bays ". . . within weeks of this meeting CIA escalated

the level of its covert operations, telling AMLASH the

United States supported his plan."

This misrepresents what AMLASH/1 was told,

and tries to raise the inference of a connection .

between that version of what was said and other

operational activity. There is no planning

relationship between the inconclusive relationship

with AMLASH/1 and what was then going on under

MONGOOSE.

The meeting with Fitzgerald, preparing for it,

and what followed, is key. to how the relationship

with AMLASH/1 was at that point.

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In advance of the meeting, as shown in the 1967

IG report, the written plan was that AMLASH/1 be

given "assurance of full U.S. support if there is

a change of the present government in Cuba, "

The record of what happened at the meeting was

recorded afterwards as follows: "Fitzgerald

informed (AMLASH/1) that the United States is

prepared to render all necessary assistance to

anti-communist Cuban group which succeeds in

neutralizing the present Cuban leadership and

assumes sufficient control to invite the United

States to render the assistance it is prepared to

give. It was emphasized that-the above support

will be forthcoming only after a real coup has been

effected and the group involved is in a position to

request the U.S. (probably under OAs auspices)

recognition and support. It was made clear that

the U.S. was not prepared to commit itself to

supporting an isolated uprising as such an up-

rising can be extinguished in a matter of hours

if the present government is in control of Havana

• . . " Emphasis supplied.

Recollections of the meeting amplified the written

report, as recorded in the 1967 IG report. AMLASH/1

wanted a high-powered rifle with telescopic sights

Fitzgerald wanted no part of such a

scheme and told AMLASH/1 that the U.S. simply.

does not do such things. Interesting confirmation

of this is found at page 134 of the Subcommittee

draft report, in a summary of an FBI report of

July 1964, some eight months after Fitzgerald met

vith AMLASH/1 in Paris. The Subcommitte

draft cites that report to prove something else,

but it really is relevant here.

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AMLASH/1 is quoted in July 1964 as saying

that Robert F. Kennedy had refused U. S.

involvement in the assassination of Castro.

And where would AMLASH/1 have obtained that

impression? At the 29 October 1963 meeting

where Fitzgerald had represented himself as

speaking for Robert F. Kennedy.

At a subsequent meeting between AMLASH/1

and the case officer, AMLASH/1 professed

satisfaction with the policy discussions (he had

been told, as noted above, that an anti-communist

coup group, if successful would be supported)

and was reported as follows: "but now desired to

know what technical supportwe could give him. "

He didn't give up easily! But the author of the

SSC Subcommittee draft sees this as the condition

by him for further meetings--or so he said in

discussions of the draft paper. AMLASH/1's

views were relayed 14 November 1963 through a

close friend in the U.S., expressing his dis-

satisfaction with U.S. unwillingness to provide

"technical assistance."

As of this time it should be reasonably clear

that AMLASH/1 had no basis for thinking that

he had U.S. --or CIA--support for assassination

of Castro. Whatever developed later, this is

significant in how one treats the operation as a

basis for what Castro could have learned if he

knew what AMLASH/1 knew.

On 19 November 1963 Fitzgerald approved--in

Washington--providing AMLASH/1 a cache in

Cuba, with high-powered rifle and telescope.

Also plans were made to prepare a Papermate

pen with a hypodermic that could be used in

administering poison to Castro. AMLASH/1

did not know of these developments until he

was met by the case officer on 22 November 1963

in Paris, the date of President Kennedy's

assassination. The development was too late

to provide a basis for any retaliatory action by

Castro against Kennedy, if he learned of it.

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As a matter of added relevance, it is noted

that the Public trial of AMLASH/1 contained no

reference to this phase of his activity. Nor did

the book provided by Castro to Senator McGovern

about pore ago

about plots against his life contain any reference

to this period, so far as AMLASH/1 involvement

was concerned, referring to the later period

instead.

The full chronology of the AMLASH/1 operation

makes it clear that the SSC Subcommittee draft

is in error in attempting to make the AMLASH

operation the basis for a claim that it could,

of itself, have led to a retaliatory act by Castro

because of its threat on his life. It simply does

not fit.

Page 12.

Allen Dulles "probably did not know about the AMLASH

operation, " as stated in the SSC Subcommittee draft

report. However, even if he had, the chronology above

would have led him to consider it irrelevant to the task

of the Warren Commission.

Page 12. Line 8.

Reference to FBI first learning of the AMLASH

operation in July 1964 (see page 8 for statement it first

learned in May 1962).

Page 13.

Ist complete paragraph. This states that the AMLASH

plot was "of far greater relevance to the Warren

Commission work. " That, of course, is the issue. Further,

those willing to testify to the AMLASH plot would have

had to be knowledgeable of it in detail, or what they said

would have had to take into account the sequence of events

as they relate to when it associated the Agency with

AMLASH/l's plans, which were following the Kennedy

assassination.

Page 14.

"Moreover, there is evidence that CIA's investigators

made requests for files which should have given knowledge

of the AMLASH operation, but for some reason they did

not acquire that knowledge. "

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To check. What was requested, and how would

the request have produced information on

compartmented operations that those involved

may not have considered related?

Page 15.

"Although this report (1967 IG Report) raised the

questions of a possible connection between the CIA's

plots against Castro and the assassination of President

Kennedy, the report was apparently not furnished to CIA

investigators who had been ordered that year to review

again the assassination investigation. Once again, although

these CIA investigators requested information that should

have led them to discover the AMLASH operation, they

CiA saveso discover

apparently did not receive the information."

First, what was requested, to whom?

Second,

the report will be read again to see what

connection it saw between the various plots

and the eventual assassination--there may have

been some recognition of the concept, but at this

writing I recall only noting possible connections

between people in the various operations.

"Thus, the Select Committee has found that the CIA on

several occasions failed to investigate the possibility

of a connection between its own assassination plots,

especially the AMLASH plot, and the assassination of

President Kennedy."

The fact is that the possibility was not investigated,

at least so far as I know. It probably would be

less dramatic, but more responsible, to observe

that there was no investigation of possible

connections between all CIA activities against

Cuba and the Kennedy assassination. In any

event, the "especially" aspect of the AMLASH

plot is treated above.

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Page 21. Did President Kennedy "admit that the April Bay of

Pigs invasion was in fact an operation sponsored by

the CIA* The public record seems to accept the blame

personally.

Page 27.

(misnumbered 29)./

Speaking of renewal of contact with AMLASH/1, the

draft says ".. the exact purpose the CIA had for

renewing contact is not known, but there is no evidence

the CIA intended at this time to use AMLASH in an

assassination operation. "

In discussion with the author, he stated

that the "POA had been cancelled," which raised

the question in his mind. It was noted to him

that AMLASH had not been out of Cuba for a long

time. Please check this. The concluding portion

of the sentence is an editorial gratuity.

Footnote on that page. Did Nestor Sanchez (not named

in the text) testify ". • that AMLASH himself believed

assassination was the first step of any coup in Cuba and

CIA met with him on that basis"?

Footnote also has AMLASH/1 wanting a U.S. invasion

of Cuba, or attempting an "inside" job (i.e., assassination),

and that he was awaiting a U.S. plan of action. The

footnote then says, "This was communicated to CIA Head-

quarters on September 7. "

The author, in discussions, revealed that he

sees the significance of this passage in terms

of CIA dealing with AMLASH/1 on his reguests,

and therefore being compromised by accepting

them as a basis for the next meeting.

Page 29. The draft report, commenting on the Harker interview

with Castro, says "AMLASH not being a terrorist."

We agree, and it might be suggested that the statements

on page 8 be made consistent with this.

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Page 29.

(continued)

The draft report also says - "none of this other

activity would seem to warrant Castro's associating.

that activity with U.S. leaders to the extent that he

would threaten the safety of American leaders aiding

the plans." This rational statement should be

encouraged, and related to Castro's giving Senator

McGovern the book that did not show AMLASH/l's earlier

associations with the Agency.

Page 33. Was the AMLASH operation an SAS or WH operation?

Footnote%. What can we provide on the real character

of the Cuban Coordinating Committee, described vaguely

and mysteriously in the draft report?

Footnote **. This notes that the FBI learned of CIA's

operation on 10 October 1963, and suggests that this

learning of the operation led to its termination.

Actually, the termination was much later. What are

the facts on this, if we know?

Page 34.

"Special Affairs Staff" should read "Special Activities

Staff. "

Pages 36-38..

LaChuga-Atwood exchanges. This is made to appear as if

Castro closing off negotiations in a way related to AMLASH.

What have we on this?

Page 41. SASICI should read SAS/CI.

Page 42. Cites 23 November 1963 cable to Paris instructing case

officer to "break contact AMLASH." It reads as though

this action reflects recognition of relationship with

AMLASH/1 to the Kennedy assassination. What was

this, in fact?

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Page 47. Tom Karamessines, when asked hypothetically if

AMLASH/1 had been used a certain way, answered

hypothetically. He is quoted as though he was

speaking in fact. Challenge this presentation.

Page 53. Draft report states that an overseas station raised a

question of AMLASH security. What is this?

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Page 65.

Did the FBI learn the "details" of the AMLASH operation in

July 1964? Perhaps the contact, but what details? The

Draft report's summary most likely takes a few liberties

with this.

Page 78.

Page 79.

If Alvarado is "D", this tells who he is, if it is important.

It isn't clear from the text whether it was the Mexican police

or CIA that denied the FBI's repeated requests to interrogate "D".

Page 83.

Did CIA "usually" check with the FBI before supplying information

to the Warren Commission?

Page 89.

Footnote*. "FBI documents also reveal that James Angleton of

the CIA passed information he received about the Warren

Commission investigation to the FBI.

On 5/13/64 he contacted

William Sullivan stating 'that it would be well for both McCone

and Hoover to be aware that the Commission might ask the same

questions, wondering whether they would get different replies

from the heads of the two agencies.'"

He is then described as

giving some sample questions and answers: Was Oswald ever a

a CIA agent? No:-- Is there any evidence of a conspiracy? No.

What was Angleton's record during this period.

Did he try to fix the responses, as inferred?

Page 104.

The report notes that while CI Staff was responsible for

liaison with the Warren Commission, it says "They were not,

at this time, affiliated with CIA's Cuban affairs staff,"

although later SAS is described as having its own CIA Staff

which coordinated with Angleton's shop.

Perhaps we should

ask that the statements be reconciled.

Footnote*®

• "The counterintelligence Staff of CIA at that

time handled all matters relating to the activities of

hostile intelligence agencies, except for the activities

of Cuban intelligence."???

Page 105. The report notes the Soviet orientation of "CIA's staff,"

presumably the cl Staff, and makes the point that there was

no corresponding analysis of pro-Castro or anti-Castro groups.

the sAs had noe direct'

• the Chief of SAS, Counterintelligence, testified that

role in the investigation of the

assassination."

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asked or or is vo unidence hatsales is of seid s

contacts with Cuba or with cuban groups.

The Chief SAS

Counterintelligence testified that he could recall no

such analysis.

Have a Ty

Have we any comment on this? First, how

large a CI group did SAS have? Was the one

man all of it, or was he chief of something?

Further, if we did no analysis, then the

report makes a point we should face up to.

intelligence

Page 106. Report makes point that SAS's capability to obtain from Cuba

or the exiles. If we didn't take this on, we have to accept

the point.

Page 108.

an "affirmative effort" to collect information on the

assassination.

assassination of President Kennedy."

An of yes.

In our eyes this is a bit far-fetched.

hard for us to handle this.

Page 109.

Reference is made to interrogation of a KGB officer (defected)

who had access to Oswald's KGB dossier. Any security problems?

Page 110.

Warren Commission, says report, was told by FBI that CIA had

information on Cuban exile groups, but that the CIA was never

asked for it.

"There would seem to have been some obligation

for CIA to disclose the general nature of its operations which

might affect the Commission's investigation."

This point seems to have validity, and we should

review our records to see what we have on the point.

Report notes that of the Warren Commission requests to CIA

there was only one Conmission letter requesting Cuban

information, and that was on Ruby's 1959 visit to Cuba.

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Page 112.

The report cites a mysterious 1 December 1963 Cuban

flight. to Havana, with a mysterious person who traveled

in the cockpit, and therefore could not be identified.

CIA is described as replying to request for information

on it that it had no information indicating that there was

a follow-up investigation.

What is the actual story? Do we know?

Page 113.

Another "intriguing" case, of a man crossing the Mexican

border on 23 November and then flying to Cuba is cited.

What do we know about this?

Page 120:

Is CIA support for anti-Castro DRE, JURE, and 30th of

November Movement groups classified?

Page 122.

Does it reveal

a method, in describing efforts to obtain

copies of FPCC letter heads for a deception operation?

And if so should we protest?

Page 126.

• unlikely that anyone with the Warren Commission knew

of CIA-sponsored assassination attempts.

Dulles, of course, knew of the earlier

Syndicate operation.

Also, the Attorney

General had knowledge. Do we have to labor

with this one?

Page 129. People cited who had knowledge or views of AMLASH operation.

Halpera: (though not named) is quoted as regarding

it as an assassination plot.

Many do, but the

issue is when it developed to the point that it

could have been so regarded. If the evidence

doesn't treat this point, then the report's citing

it generally is in error.

In this case in 1967

Halpern supported Fitzgerald's view of the October

SAS/CI also seems to have spoken broadly on it.

Do we know to what extent he was witting of the

details of the operation, its timing and

development?

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Page 133. In October 1963 the FBI could have had no factual

knowledge of the "assassination aspect of the AMLASH"

operation, as CIA had no such relation with AMLASH/1 at

that time.

The report should be corrected here (see supra).

Page 134.

The report cites a July 1964 FBI (from the CIA contact with

AMLASH/1?) quoting AMLASH/1 in his being disgruntled over

Robert F. Kennedy having refused to support Castro's

assassination. This is cited to show something else, but

in fact it supports the 1967 IG report in what Fitzgerald

told AMLASH/1 at the Paris meeting in October 1963.

Page 135. How could a "desk officer" who was unaware of the AMLASH

operation at the time it was going on, and didn't learn of it

until he was testifying (when what he knew of it was the

characterization of the questioners then) have a relevant

opinion to the Kennedy assassination? Yet he is quoted as an

authority.

Now really!

The quoting of David Belin about assassination, when he was

speaking generically (as it appears in the text of the report)

and not about AMLASH, seems a bit strained, so far as relevance

is concerned. The same applies to Griffin, whoever he is.

• Page 137.

Tha Paris as yened, isn't evant effenes the hypode it ee

incident, which is that it was 22 November 1963, the date of

President Kennedy's assassination, too late to have affected

Castro's opinion on an operation against the President.

This

is a bit of editorial self-indulgence on the part of the writer.

Page 138. If AMLASH/I were a "provocation," as suggested briefly, would

the logic of it have led Castro to be so upset. by the results of

'provocation" that he would then send an assassin to the

U.S.?

And then fail his own provocateur for several years?

Now really!

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Page 139.

SAS/CI is quoted as stating that he did not recall

the time frame of the AMLASH operation. The

quotation is to make anot her point, but this one

discredits the relevance of what SAS/CI had to say,

as the sequence of events is central to understanding

what happened when.

Pages 141-142.

This section cites 1964 events (post Kennedy

assassination) as relating to how to interpret what

AMLASH/1 was about prior to Kennedy's death.

This really gets the time sequence mixed up.

Who is "A"? It quotes him as having views that

really are not supported by where CIA's relations

with AMLASH/1 stood at the critical time. He has

to be identified somewhat better than this to be given

credibility.

- between A's stotements

Page 145•

This section claims responsibility on CIA's part to see

a possible connection in 1965 and the AMLASH security

in 1963. It also says that the FBI made a connection

between A's 1963 activities and his 1965 knowledge.

Can we throw any light on this presentation?

Page 152.

Page 161.

Attorney Morgan named. Does this matter to us?

The report says that the 1967 IG report treated "the

AMLASH operation from 1963 through 1965 as an

assassination operation. "

The 1967 IG report did characterize the operation

as an assassination operation. But at the time

of its writing no one claimed it to be nor not to be

that sort of activity at any particular point in time.

The detailed recitation shows the transition of the

relationship from a general one, in which CLA

was saying "no" to AMLASH/l's request for

support in both his coup and the assassination of

Castro, to the time that it was giving him limited

equipment in the post-assassination period. It is

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correct to say that the relationship assumed the

character of association with AMLASH/1's plans

for assassination in 1963, but that was not known

to AMLASH/1 until the very day of the Kennedy

assassination. This is hardly a bit of professional

responsibility on the part of the author of the

report.

Cables are quoted, date and time group given, and IN

and OUT numbers as well as DIR numbers. The SSC

report on alleged assassination handled this by giving

the dates of the cables, stating the sender (Kinshasha,

etc.) and quoting without paraphrasing. That seems

a proper way to handle this.

Names of Agency employees already reported in the

report or alleged assassination are repeated here. Names

reported and not identified: Alvarado, Griffin. As noted,

Morgan's name may have been printed by error, as he is

otherwise identified as an attorney.

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