MANOLO RAY'S ATTITUDE TOWARD KUBARK.
Originator: CIA
From: ALFONSO RODRIGUEZ, SAS/SO
To: MFR
Document date: 06/19/1963
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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2022 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

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SECRET

19 June 1963

HEMORANDUM FOR THS RECORD

SUBJECT: Manolo RAY

June in both

Our meetings were largely devoted to the

effort of contacting and attempting to recruit or cause the

defection

of Carlos

FRANQUI.

The following, however,

conclusions of my brief effort to discuss the general

situation

Manolo RiY's Attitude Towards FUBARK: It has become

obvious to me on this second meeting with lanolo RAY that:

A.

RAY is convinced that the Agency had in the past

purposely and actively attempted to destroy him as a

political leader.

In this connection,

RAY feels that the

Agency, following the Bay of Pigs Invasion, was partially

rosponsible for the break up of the ARP clandestine net-

work and resistance potential in and out of Cuba. RAY

stated that he has proof of the participation of at least

one KUBARK officer in a plot with certain MRP officials to

renove him from the ARP as a condition for KUBARK's

assistance to that organization.

SAY added that the

officer in question hes been fired.

He either did not

know or could not recall the individual's name or pro-

ferred not to mention it.

b. On the strength and position of the State White

Paper on Cuba prior to the Bay of Pigs, RAY's MRP Joined

the FRD dater the CRC).

While his organization wes &

nonbor of the FRO, the attentton of sUBaRk and the u.s.

Government was callod time and tine again. by the thi

the URP to the infiltration and uso.of notorious

Batistianos in anti-Castro activittes.

Despite these

nothing vag done to senove these pooplo,

nore doing or that our purposed were self-servias.

RAY claima that ho and his falloross hayo repostodiy

aRkod 10F KUB*RE holip to Improment cortetn pion for setion.

No specifically, reminded no

of one of the

ostetnally pre-.

rented, concepts

for action,

• plan to: froo Hubor Matos

which goes back to RAY'a rolatlonship with

our CoS 1n

Jin Nool.

RY has tho reeling that, it 10

futtlo to present us with any nore plans or tders; for.

To baro

novor helped, have almays refused, or not answered.

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3.

RAY told me that be felt it possible to speak in a

completely frank manner with me.

I urged his to do so,

stressing that only in such an atmosphere was there any hope

of our eventually arriving at some constructive understanding.

I attempted to assure RAY that our motives were never sinister,

that every action we have ever taken was based on a need to use

those instruments which promised most in our effort to free

Cuba.

He replied that he believed that this might be an honest

statement on my part, but that I could not speak for the past

actions of certain individuals. At this point I told him that

we had many friends in our Agency as well as in the U.s.

Government, but that naturally there were people who believed

him to be too far to the left. I also stressed that our

assistance to anyone could not be a one-way street, and I

reminded hin that I made the same point to hin in our first

neeting almost a year ago.

I pointed out that we naturally

work best with

those who cooperate.

I told him of our need

for intelligence,

not with any

desire to know all the secrets

1 his organization and its poiltical plans, but with. the end

of gaining that knowledge which could help in more quickly

restoring freedom and

democracy to Cuba.

Toward the end of

this phase

of

our

discussion, I asked RAY if he would be willing

to give us

the intelligence product of his activities inside

Cuba if we

were,

1n

turn, to give him certain material support.

Ms reply was an emphatic yes.

4.

The Present

Plans of the JURE: I asked RAY what he

was doing of a positive nature Inside Cuba today.

He told me

that the major effort of the JURE at this time was the caching

of resistance materials and supplics inside Cuba.

I commented

that the

caching of supplies implied the existence of individuals

inside. Cuba to

receive them.

RAY did not respond to this comment,

leading me to believe from previous conversations that it would

probably be some time before he is willing to trust us with the

Knowledge of his assets inside Cuba. Naturally I also concluded

Irom the silence. and from remarks nade later

on that be does

not, in fact, have a large organized resistance network inside

Cuba.

RAY went on

to comment that with help of no help they

(JURE) would proceed day after day, and month after month in a

plan that they were certain would bring about a change in cuba.

i Stated that their path ia sure, albolt,

frought with pertl

and difficulty

nit certain. The "way" apparently is based on

ChOse assumptions:

Cuba 18 a

"mosg". it will becone focreasingly

chaotic, altenating larger and larger segments of the

population

The JURE is politically and norarly clean.

It has

not comprodised its

principles for any advantare.

It 18,

and will focreasingly become

acceptable as the heir to

the revolution.

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c .

The JURE represents a group of nen of unquestioned

integrity,

intelligence, organizational ability, or general

competence

to run a free Cuba in the tradition of the

revolution.

d.

The JURE has a sense of timing, the patience that

must go with this, and an appreciation

of the need to

create a truly Cuba "mistique" in a novement to fight for

the liberation

of Cuba.

(In this connection, it is

Important to note that RAY did not, and would not, expose

himself

to an effort against FRANQUI without sode assurance

of success.

He

stated openly that it

rould 1l1-become

hin to

associate himself with failure.)

e.

place and ready

This was clearly implied but not actually stated. RAY

stated that no purpose would be served, except to expose

those who will assist them, by engaging in clandestine

activities that do not have the necessary material and

Jogistical support.

various aspects of the above ground

fron different angles and I reiterated again the fact that

cooperation

street which RAY acknowledged in

seemingly sincere tones; he was completely forthright in stating

that whereas they needed assistance and would gladly take it,

they have always been refused it and in essence the time has

passed to

ask, for without it or not, their role and goal are

clear and in one manner of another they will succeed.

6. Reconnendation for Future Relations with RAY (JURE):

RAY cannot be overlooked in the struggle for Cuban

freedom; of all the Cubans I have not, he is the nost

purnoseful, nethodical, as well as the most experienced

clandestine operator.

overthrowing Fidel, but it will bo a long, hard struggle

For the U.S. Of SUBARt to continue to pass up the

C=.

I reconnend that me: maintain e steady contact ulta

RAY,

feeltng assured

that no tin bo increasingly cooperatire.

In addition, Erogonrond that ve subsidize the elforts of

JURE for the running

of autono ousrops with fixed monthly

sus (perhaps 95,000) for a trial portod of aporortastely

want

2: 141,5700

missa nine

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one year.

In return for our assistance, RAY is to provid

SUBARE witn all manner of intelligence derived from JURI

operations inside Cuba.

d.

The assistance to RAY and contact with him should

produce enough information to judge his true effertivenss

and make possible his neutralization when and 11 this

should become necessary.

7. Conciusions:

Because the cables sent in to Hqs both fron Saw

Juan and Paris are an accurate, 15 condensed, version of

xy relations with RAY in his operational efforts against

• Carlos FRANQUI, Enrique CABRERA Infante and Gustavo ARCOS,

& separate memorandun for the record will not be prepared

unless so desired by the Chief, SAS.

b.

RAY has known me as Alfredo Fernandez, but

because of operational imitations. (false identity

documents, reservations in true name) it becare necessary

1or him to call me in my true name.

He was not, however,

told that this. latter name was in fact true.

In all our

personal meetings he continued to call me

"Pernandez."

ral and recogn in remembered haring met fEarl

Altonso Rodriguez

8AS/S0

SECRET

in L

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