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157-10014-10046

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Date : 08/06/95

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RECORDS SERIES : HEARINGS

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DOCUMENT INFORMATION

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FROM

: HALLEY

TO:

TITLE

"DATE : 08/19/75

PAGES

:159

SUBJECTS : JMWAVE

CIA

OPERATION MONGOOSE

CASTRO, FIDEL

DOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPT

CLASSIFICATION

: UNCLASSIFIED

RESTRICTIONS : 1A

CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW

: 08/31/98

OPENING CRITERIA

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ATION

ubject

43101435

The Atra Stater Brute K866

transcriptfile

Report of Proceedings

INVENTONIED:

DN-312/27

= EL

70076

Hearing held before

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL

OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

7-6

Tuesday, August 19, 1975

Washingron, D.C.

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned

to the Committee for destruction)

WARD & PAUL

410 FIRST STREET, S. E.

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003

(202) 541-6000

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CONTENTS

(Witness: Halley)

EXILIBITS

EXHIBIT

No. 1

No. 2

No.

3

No.

4

FOR IDENTIFICATION

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60

92

110

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• STAFF INTERVIEW :

Tuesday, August 19, 1975

United States Senate,

Select Committee to Study Governmental

Operations With Respect to

Intelligence Activities,

Washington, D.C.

The Committes met, pursuant to notice, at 1:25 o'clock p.m.

in Room 608, The Carroll Arms.

Staff: Frederick Baron, Joseph difenova, Professional

Staff Members.

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PROCEEDIMGS

MI. Baron. MI. Halley, is it true that you are here

testifying today under allas, and that Halley is not ¿ctually

your true identity?

MI. Halley. That is correct.

MI. Baron. Your true identity will be on file with th

Itview staff of the CIA and available for verification by the

Committee if that becomes necessary?

• Mr. Halley. That is my understanding.

Mr. Baron. Let me show you a plece of paper marked

"Statement Regarding Testimony and Alias" and let me ask you

whother this is the statement you signed as we were beginning

hare today which indicates your true identity land which I have

witnessed?

Mr. Halley.. Yes, that is the correct statement that I

signed today. There is a blank there where we have not filled

in the Senator's name.

МІ. Ваго.

All right.

For the moment, let us leave that blank and enter it into

the record as 1s, as Exhibit. 1.

(The document referred to

was marked Halley Exhibit

No. l for identification.)

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MI. Baron. It is your understanding, is it not, that we

have worked out an arrangement with the review staff whereby

the statement will be attached to your transcript as an Exhibit

and in a sanitized form, leaving out either of the two raferences

to your true identity which will only be available at this

Agency.

Mr. Halley. That is my understanding.

Mr. Baron. Are you aware that you have the right to counsel

before the Committee?

Mr. Halley.

Yes, I am.

Mr. Baron. Are you appearing here, voluntarily here today

without coungel?

MI. Malley. Yes, I am.

MI. Baron. Are you also aware that at any point you are

entitled to cuase answering any questions and consult with

counsel if you wish?

Mr. Halley. Yes, I am aware of that.

MI. Baron. Finally, are you aware that all your constitu-

tional rights are intact before the Committee here today,

•including your Fifth Amendment

rights to remain silent?

MI. Halley. Yes, I am.

Mr. Baron. I think we should put into the record the

arrangement that we made before we began, and correct me if this

is not your understanding of the arrangement, that we are

testifying here today without placing you under oath hecause

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there is no Senator available for that purpose, but both you and

I are contemplating having a Senator swear you in and ask you if

your transcript is true to the best of your knowledge at some

point as soon as

possible as it can be arranged after today's

session.

MI. Halley.

Yes. The statement that you have just made

is my understanding of the agreement that we entered into prior

to this conversation going on the record.

MI. Baron. Thank you.

Let us: begin then with some veryibroad questiong. •...

about your background in the Agency. Can you tell me what you

were doing in the Agency prior to your involvement with tha

IMWAVE station?

Mr. Halley. I became involved with the Cuban affair in

approximately February of 1962. At that time, I was in Head-

quarters. I was Chief of Foreign Intelligence Activities for the

Eastern European Division. I was asked to be released from those

duties to conduct a survey of the opportunitles for running

intelligence operations against Cuba.

I was released from those

duties; I did engage in

a survey of the possibilities for runnin

intelligence, counterintelligence, paramilitary operations

against Cuba.

MI. Baron. Your position as Chief of Foreign Intelligence

for Eastern Europe did not involve Cuba in any way? That was

your last position before you became involved in Cuban affairs,

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is that correct?

MI. Halley. That is correct.

I want to qualify that. Undoubtadly, there were some

actions that were being

conducted in the Fastern European area

that reflected on Cuba, but I was not Involved in the Bay of Pigs

operation. I was not fully focused on Cuban operations until

approximately February of 1962.

MI. Baron. At what point. did you join the Agency?

Mr. Hallay. I joined the Agency originally in 1951.

MI. Baron. In a very general way, can you describe the

nature of your activities at the Agency prior to February of '62?

Mr. Halley. When I was first assigned to the Agency, I was

an Army officer on active duty. I went through the usual Agency

training program. I was assigned to Eastern European activities

where I originally was focused on Polish and German operations.

I subsequently served from 1952 to 1959 in Germany.:. In the

course of that service, I spent most of my time working on the

Eastern European satellites, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary,

Romania, Bulgaria. In addition, I was involved on occasion in

Soviet operations

and East German operations.

Mr. Baron. Did you have any involvement in Latin American

affairs prior to February of '62?

MI. Halley. Yes. In the period 1960-62; I. was responsible

for setting up operational activity in Latin America that

was targetted more axplicitly on the Fastern European gatellitesi

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to some extent on the Soviet Union. This was in a perlod of time

where the Eastern European satellites were expanding their

presence in Latin America. In My duties in the Eastern European

nivision, I was responsible for gettino this ningram voing in

Latin America, so I did have an extensive axposure to Latin

America: in the period '60 to '62, as I recall those dates.

The accuracy of those dates can he checked from my official

travel records, and so on.

MI. Baron. During that period of time you were actually

in Latin America helping to set up this program?

MI. Halley. No, I was stationed in Washington, but I

travelled to Latin America during this particular period of

time.

MI. Baron. Did you travel to Cuba at any point during the

course of that operation?

Mr. Halley.

Not specifically. I think I transitted Cuba

on air stops being routed to various countries. I think I was

at one or two Cuban airfields, but simply in transit.

MI. Baron.

Not long enough even to talk to the people at

• the Station in Cuba?

Mr. Halley. No, I had no contact at any time with the

Havana Station.

Mr. Baron. Did you pick up, during this period of time,

a general sense of the attitude of Latin American governments

toward the Castro government? Could you characterize that

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attitudu, if you dia?

MI. Halley. I certainly was aware, I think, of the broad

political trend in the Hemisphere at that time, my interest was

much more narrowly focused at that time on the Eastern European

targets, and on the Soviet target, and I was not certainly

specializing In Cuban affairs at that juncture.

Mr. Baron. Cuba was not viewed at that juncture as part of

the Soviet target, as a Soviet satellite?

Mr. Halley. No, it was not.

MI. Baron. Coming

then to February of '62, ls that the

point at which you joined the JMWAVE Station in Miami?

Mr. Halley. No. When I first entered into this survey,

It was to do this on a TDY basis, temporary duty assignment;

to complete a report on my findings, to report those at that

particular juncture to Mr. Harvey who was the head of the Task

Force that was

attempting to expand intelligence coverage of

Cuba and I was not assigned to the station at that particular

point in time.

MI. Baron. At what point did you join the JMWAVE Station?

Mr. Halley. Shortly after having completed this survey.

These dates are blurred now because the survey soon turned into

a permanent assignment.

I would have to check the exact dates

from my service records, but after having completed the survey

report, shortly thereafter I was

asked to go to Miami to become

permanently assigned to the station in Miami. I do not recall

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the exact date at which that parmanent change of station took

place.

Mr. Baron. Would you assume that that was sometime before

the end of May of '62?

Mr. Halley. Yes. It was probably before that, but as I

say, thare are a couple of weeks gap that we would have to 100k

at my service record to get the exact dates, but certainly it

could have been March, it could have been April: But I reserve,

you know, the right to check my record if that is a critical

point in terms of what you are trying to astablish.

Mr. Baron. Certainly.

I should

say generally at this point, if anything we cover

today gives you that kind of problem it would be immensely

helpful to us if you would check your answers against documents

that might be available in the CIA.

MI. Hallay. Yes, all right.

MI. Baron. In fact, let me ask you if you would check that

one out, because it would be useful to know exactly when you

joined the JMWAVE station.

During the period

of time before you joined IMWAVE, while

you were conducting the survey, did you report to anyone other

than William Harvey?

Mr. Halley. In a formal sense, this TDY was conducted on

behalf of the task force commander, who was Mr. Harvey. While

I was in Miami conducting the survey, I obviously discussed

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matters pertaining to that survey to the toam who was then in

charge of the operational activity in Miami. That team was

essentially headed by Mr. Al Cox,. who has since died.

MI. Baron. Was that team the equivalent of IMWAVE station?

MI. Halley. Yes. Mr. Cox was the head, then, of what would

be the equivalent of the IMWAVE station.

• Mr. Baron.

Was he the head of JMwAVE until the point when

you replaced him, or until the point. you became Chief of the

JMWAVE Station?

Mr. Halley. That is correct.. He was the head of that

unit until such time as I replaced him.

Mr. Baron. Were you aware during this survey that you

were conducting of any link between Task Force W and the so-called

Special Group in the White House which was part of the National

Security Council

structure and used the project namer! MONGOOSE

for anti-Cuban operations?

MI. Halley. My understanding at the time that I conducted

this survey was that there was a three-man group in existence

which was headed by Mr. Robert Kennedy that was conducting a

survey to see what kind of activities could be conducted

against

Cuba. The other members of that particular group were General

Lansdale and Mr. Helms.

This three-man group had subordinate to it for all practical

purposes the task force

unit which was managed by Mr. Harvey.

I am not familiar, however, with the other terminology that you

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used, that is Project MONGOOSE, or whatever you said. I do not

know the exact words you usad. I am not familiar with that

terminology.

Mr Baron... During the whole period of your involvement

with JMWAVE, you were not made aware of Project MONGOOSE as

such?

MI. Halley. I am not aware of Project MONGOSE. I do not

recall it as an acronym, cryptonym or anything else that was in

common usage in my conversations.

Also, you have to understand that during that particular

time, Mr. Harvey was subordinate to the normal Agency chain of

command. In other words, he had parallel lines, if you will.

There was this three-man Task Force to whom he was reporting

regularly. At the same time, as the Task Force Commander, he

was reporting to the then-DDP who was Mr. Helms.

Mr Baron. You began your survey just about the time that

Mr. Helms replaced Mr. Bissell as DDP?

Mr. Halley. That is right.

MI. Baron. Were you aware of the command relationship

between the three-man

group that you have mentioned and william

Harvey as head of Task Force l?

Did that group task Harvey

directly, or did Harvey's assignments have to come through Helms

and through the DCI as opposed to this group that did not include

the DCI?

Mr. Halley. My understanding of it at the time was we were

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really talking about parallel lines. In other words, this

three-man group was meeting. Mr. Helms was both a member of

that particular group and the DDP. Therefore, when he came back

one of these meetings and issued instructions to Mr. Harvey,

it was, you know, tantamount to these things coming through two

channels simultaneously, one coming from this three-man task

force and the other instruction simultaneously coming from Mr.

Helms who was the DoP.

Mr. Baron. As far as Mi. Harvey was concerned, an assign-

ment or order from Richard Helms :was an order to be taken' at

face value? Harvey did not have to question whether it had the

stamp of approval from the DCI or not? Would that have been

your operating understanding?

Mr. Halley. That would have been my understanding, yes.

Certainly an instruction received from Mr. Helms was a valid

Agency instruction.

Mr. Baron. The DCI at this point was John McCone.

Mr. Hallay. That is correct.

MI. Baron. Do you have any knowledge of the relationship

• batween this three-man group and John McCone at that point?

MI. Halley. Not on a day to day basis. Once I went to

Miami, I came back on a regular basis to review operational

plans and programs. On ore occasion I accompanied Mr. McCone

to the white louse to give a presentation or sit in while the

presentation was being made.

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Mr. Baron. Where was this? What was the forum in which

the presentation was made.

Mr. Halley.

This was a meeting with President Kennedy and

other members of the then-Cabinet were present at that particular

meating.

Mr. Baron. Was that a Cabinet meeting or was it a Special

Group meeting as a sub-unit of the National Security Council?

Mr. Halley. You know, that happened in 1962. This 1s

1975. I do not recall then with precision as to whether it was

a meeting of the Cabinet or whether:it was a meeting of the

National Security Council, or whether it was a meeting of the

Special Group.

MI. Baron. That: is perfectly understandable. Do you recall

which Cabinet members were present at that meeting?

Mr. Halley. Yes.. My recollection of that was that Mr.

McNamara was present, Mr. Rusk was present, MI. Kennedy, the

Attorney General, was present. You know, I am just vague now

at this particular point. Those are the ones that stick out in

my memory as being present.

Mr. Baron. Was the DCI present?

Mr. Halley. Yes, the DCI was present, and he gave a

portion of the presentation. As I recall, Mr. FitzGerald gave

the other portion of the prasentation.

Mr. Baron. Who

at that foint replaced William Harvey as

Chief of Task Force W?

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Mr. Halley. Right. You know, the chronology of the Chiefs

of our Task Force were that it was Harvey, then FitzGerald,

then Screber, after that, Hart. I served with all four of those

This was a very active period, you know, with precision, I cannot

outline for you today the dates when Harvey left and FitzGerald

took over, you know, when FitzGerald left and Screber took over

and so forth. This is something that I would have to regearch

to give you the precise dates.

Mr. Baron. What was the substance of this meeting that

they had in which the President was present?

MI. Halley. This was a general review of activities that

were being conducted against Cuba.

MI. Baron.

Was there any mention of any assassination

effort at that meeting?

Mr. Halley.

No; there was not.

Mr. Baron. You were attending at that point in connection

with the survey you conducted?

Mr. Halley. No. I was attending at that point as the

Station Chief from Miami in order to make a contribution to the

issues that were being discussed, to the fact that detailed,

substantive back-up for whatever questions might be put to the

Agency spokesmen. I made reference to that because you asked

me if I knew the relationship between MI. McCone and this

three-man group. I said no, on a day-to-day basis I did not

know the relationship, but that there were meetings that ware

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attended by me in which MI. McCond was talking

to individuals

like MI. Kennedy, the Attorney General, who was a member of that

group.

Mr. Baron. Were you aware that that group might have gone

by any particular name or designation?

Mr. Halley. No, I am not.

Mr. Baron. You are not familiar with the term Special

Group?

Mr. Halley. Yes, I am. aware of the term Special Group.

I am aware that the chronology of the 303 Committee, Special

Group, 40. Committee and so forth, but as I mentioned to you

carlier, that particular time, I cannot distinguish between

whether this was an ad hoc meeting or this was a Special Group

mesting, or what it was.

MI. Baron. Did you assume at that time that the three-man

group that you referred to, including- the Attorney 'General,

General Lansdale and Richard Helms, had a formal relationship

to this larger Special Group? In other words, was that three-

man group a kind of decision-making sub-unit of the Special

Group, or do you think it operated entirely independent from

the National Security Council structure.

Mr. llalley. I do not think I can give you an authoritative

answer to that. I would go back to what I previously told

you. When I entered into this project in February of '62, the

chain of command that. I was familiar with was this three-man

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group in constant contact with Mr. Harvey. The second chain

of command, paralleling that, was Mi. Harvey reporting to the

DDP and the DDP subsequently reporting through his chain of

command to the Director, and that would be the only way that

I could characterize that with any accuracy.

Mi. Baron. Did those two chains of command continue"..

as the channals of decision-making and tasking when you were ..

or during your tenure as Chief of Station,at JMWAVE?"

MI. Halley. That relationship changed, and again I do

not have the date at my fingertips at what time that changed.

I know that shortly thereafter I was in Miami, General

Lansdale came down to visit me, to talk with me, about the

progress that was being made in the operational program. At

some point after that, this three-man group for all Intents

and purposes disappeared. General Lansdale was reassigned;

the group broke up; subsequent reviews of the program were made

at the Special Group level. As an example, we would have to

submit every month the number of operations that we were going

to run, such as infiltrations into Cuba through what would be

paramilitary means, and these were approved by the Special

Group. There was an approval procedure for setting those up.

so subsequently the three-man group disappeared and the regular

mechanism of the Special Group cama into play.

I am sorry, I cannot give you a precise date for that

change, but I am sure it is in the record and I am sure you even

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have the date because the Agency has bean researching all sorts

of maturial for you. I feel that you would just have to get

those dates for the record.

Mr. Baron.

We can do that.

would you say that every major operation that you undertook

at JMWAVe would have been approved by the Special Group or at

least they would have been put on notice of the nature of any

major operation that you were planning?

MI. Halley. Why do you not define for me what you consider

to be a major operation so we do not get into, you know, a

problem? If'you feel that you cannot.do 'that it?..

Mr. Baron. Perhaps we can turn it around and say, could

you characteriza the kinds of operations generally that you

to

would refer to this three-man group initially, in the Special

Group later, for their approval, or at least to put them on

notice,:. the kinds that you might not refer and instead proceed

unilaterally?

Mr. Halley. Initially, the three-man group was seized

with the problem of conducting the survey of what could be

done against Cuba. As soon as that was more or less agreed

upon, my understanding of this, as I told you, the three-man

group was disbanded or atrophied or went on to other things

and then the formal mechanism came in for approval, that is,

the Special Group. As procedures. became more formalized, we

had to submit a monthly schedule of the kind of operations that

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would ba conducted against Cuba in the paramilitary

slaldo.

In other words, if we were going to run an operation that

was 90lng to be a cacho replacement in the Cuban mainland, that

had to be put in, say in our October schedule, that october

schedule had to be submitted to the Washington Headquarters so

they could make it available to the Speciali Group sometime in

September. So I would regard a cache, say the lowest

kind

operation in terms of sensitivity, and then you could move up

from team infiltrations that had to be approved in advance,

resupply missions, paramiltary operations against fixed instal-

lations would all be approved.

Mr. Baron. If there had been any operation with the

assassination of Fidel Castro, or other high Cuban government

leaders as its objective, would such an operation have been

referred to either the three-man group or later the Special

Group.

Mr. Malley. If such an operation had been proposed. from

Miami; it would have had to have gone through that particular

process.

Mr. Baron. Your answer seems to indicate that only

operations that originated at the JMVAVE Station would be

referred up for approval. Is that correct?

Mr. Halley. That is the kind of activity that I have

FIrsthand knowledge of. Ihen I became the Station Chief, I told

you my time at this was essentially February of 1962 through

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aither June or July of '65. That was my stewardship

That was

my involvement in the Cuhan operation.

During that particular period of time, my firsthand knowledge

of these events would be, It that kind of operation were to go

forward it would have had to go through this approval mechanism,

it would have had to have been some formal action taken. If it

were something that certainly would -- for some reason might not

be committed to paper, somebody may have wanted to discuss 1t

orally from Miami, the chain of command would have been from me

to whomever was the head of the Task force In Washington, or

later, when the Task Force became reintegrated Into the Western

Hemisphere Division, I would have had to talk to the Chief of

the Western Hemisphere Division, who at one time was fitzGerald.

Mr: Baron. But a plan that originated at the CIA above

the level of the Chief of Station at JMWAVE would not necessarily

have been referred to Special Group for approval, 1s

that

correct?

Mr. Halley. I have no firsthand knowledge of that, there-

fore I am.trying to restrict myself to those things that I have

personal knowledge of. In other words, that is the kid of

thing that I think you should talk to, you know, those

who were

involved directly, because I think you can talk to Mr. Harvey

or Mr. Screber or others who would be able to give you, a better

perception of that.

I want to make one point here, that once I went to Miami,

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I was a regular visitor to washington, but always'for one or

two days at a time when there was always a full agenda of events

to be discussed that related to the Station in Miami. I did not

carry here, I did not engage, you know, in idle conversation with

my associates. Therefore, I was not aware of the firsthand

situation of how they conducted business on a sustadned basis

on items that did not immediately impact on Miami.

Mr. Baron. Do you have any personal knowledge of any

operation run out of the JMWAVE Station that could

pe construed

as an assassination effort?

MI. Halley. No, I do not.

Mr. Baron. Do you have firsthand knowledge of any operation

run out of Florida with CIA involvement that could

be construed

as an assassination effort?

• Mr. Halley. No, I do not have any firsthand knowledge.

You also have to put this in a historical perspective. In

other words, from what I have read in the Press since then,

obviously I could put certain things together. You are asking

me in this timeframe, 1962 to 1965, did I have any Élrsthand

•Knowledge at that particular time?

Mr. Baron. Exactly.

Mr. Halley. The answer to that is no, I did not.

You also have to put yourself in the historical context of

that particular time. Thousands of refugees were coming out of

Cuba, coming into Miant, Dade County up and down tha florida

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Keys. There was a regular mechanism to screen these people.

Any number of these people had plans or ideas for changing the

situation in Cuba, among those ideas for changing the situation

in Cuba were plans to assassinate any number of people in Cuba.

This was something that was talked about, you could go down to

any coffee house in downtown Miami and Cubans would be talking

that kind of language..

So I do not want to leave you with the impression that the

word assassination never came across my radar screen, but we

are talking about, and my answer was geared to a planned opera-..

tion by CIA.

Mr. Baron. Or with CIA involvement of any sort?

MI. Halley. CIA involvement? I know of no operation that

was a planned operational activity, you know, for the sole

purpose of assassinating, you know, Mr. A, B or Mr. C..This was.

ambiente.

the : ällerteof the time.

People were talking about these

things in the refugee community, these kind of things were

being discussed.

MI. Baron. MI. A, B or C could have been Fidel Castro,

Raul castrop.....

Mr. lialley. It could have been anyone. This was the mood

of the Latin American revolutionary where a coup, you know, is

a way of life, where restaurants and coffee houses abound with

conversation about how to run a coup. In the running of a coup.

one of the things that people talk about is how do you control

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the leadership which then exists at that time.

MI. Baron. Are you saying: that:you are not aware of any?

operation; which. could:have had as one of its subsidiary objec-

tives, whether the primary objective or not, the assassination

of Fidel Castro, Raul Castro, or Che Guevara, Which was run with

CIA involvement?

Mx. Hallay.

I would like to phrase that question slightly

differently, because I think, you know, you have several things

tied together. I would like to answer your question this way.

During my tenure in Miami, I did not put forth any proposals

to mount an assassination operation. In other words, there

was no formal plan, I did not put forth any operational proposals

along this line.

Secondly, I am not aware of any assassination plans being

put forth, you know, by Mi. Harvey or by anyone else at that

particular time. That is the way I would prefer to answer that.

MI. Baron. What. kind of problem did you have with the

question as it was •asked?

Mr. Halley. Well, you lumped a number of things together.

•I am trying to separate these out. In other words, you put in

there a secondary or tertiary consideration.

Mr. Baron. Right, I am interested in that.

Mr. Halley. That is what bothers me, because I did not

put forth any plans. On the other hand, I do not want to be

held responsible for such things as CIA being in touch with a

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paramilitary group in Cuba whose primary mission was the

collection of intelligence, whose secondary mission might ba to

organize a resistance and, unbeknownst to me, might have had

their own ideas which were never consulted with us, you know,

never discussed with us, through the communications channels

that we had, who may have been thinking, may have planned, and

may have attempted, to implement assassination operations.

I do not feel under the command and control mechanism that

existed that I could exercise through the station over such a

situation that I could be held responsible for that. Therefore,

I cannot accept your question on the secondary or tertiary

situation because I have no knowledge of those. You may have

some knowledge and you can confront me with some statement by

some Cuban who said that this was part of his mission. I have

to look at that at the time.

Mr. Baron.

We will go

over some statements, but in trying

to recover this ground one more time, I think it is important

to distinguish an attempt to pin the responsibility on you,

which I am not trying to do by my questioning -

Mr. Malley.. That is a complicated question.

Mr. Baron. The attempt to simply -- undoubtedly, the

attempt to simply bring out your knowledge and any awareness

that you may have had of any kind of operation that had assassina-

tion as one of its objectives, and also involved the CIA to

any extent. That is what I am asking you for.

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Mr. Hallay. Right, and I will stand by my answer; that 1s,

I put forth no plans, I know of no plans put forth, you know,

during my tenure in Miami in which assassination was part of

the operational rationale. You know, the only way we can clarify

this perhaps to your satisfaction is to discuss some specifics.

If you are prepared to talk about specifies, maybe I can deal

with those within the framework of that general statement that

I made, you know. I know how Cubans talk. I know the rumors

that have existed over the years. I simply do not want to be

identified with any action conducted by some group over which

I had no knowledge or control. That is my key point.

Mr. Baron. I think that answers it for now, and we will

cover some specifics later.

One more question on this dual chain of command: on the

one hand, the Agency chain of command from the DDP to Harvey

to you at JMVAVE, and on the other hand, the three-man decision

making group consisting of the Attorney General, Lansdale and

Helms. Would you say in the early days that this three-man

group appeared to you to be in control of the decision making

before the Special Group stepped in, that decisions were made

in a less formal way than they were later under the Special

Group?

Mr. Halley. I really could not address myself to that.

In other words, I never sat in on a meeting of the three-man

group. In other words --

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Mr. Baron. What about the kind of Isporting that was

required of you by the three-man group as opposed to the Special

Group?

MI. Halley. My requirements for reporting really stemmed

In the early days from Harvey. If there were any special

requirements, he was taking them from the three-man group and

translating them and, in fact, much of the system of reporting

in those early days was generated by me.and' what:I'thought.".

was required to keep Mr. Harvey as a Task Force Commander

fully informed. I think that you undoubtedly know from the

record that I worked for Mr. Harvey prior to 1962 and therefore

I was familiar, you know, with his style of operation and thought

I had a clear understanding of what he needed in an informational

sense. So when I went to Miami, I organized much of the

reporting flow upward, if you will, from the field unit to

Headquarters.

MI. Baron. Had you worked for Mr. Harvey in Germany?

Mr. Halley. Yes, I had.

Mr. Baron. In Berlin?

Mr. Halley. Yes, sir:

Mr. Baron. This was on the famous and successful tunnel

operation?

Mr. Halley. No, I do not deserve any credit for the tunnel

operation. That is Mr. Harvey's activity. He kept that very

tightly compartmented and in the days when that was going on. I

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was involved primarily with Eastarn European activities.

MI. Baron. You were aware of Mi. Harvey's style of

operating?

MI. Halley. Yes.

I worked with him-- I think the date is

somewhere in June or July of 154 to somewhere in '59. I woula

have to look that up in the record, the exact date.

MI. Baron. But you say you not only had a close working

relationship with Mr. Harvey, but you came to be a personal

friend of his?

Mr. Halley. Yes, I would like to say I am a personal friend

of MI. Harvey.

MI. Baron. Returning to your statements about the chain

of command, you seem to be saying that Mr. Harvey served as the

funnel for both of these chains of command; as far as you were

concerned, you received directives from him, whatever the source

may have been originally, is that correct?

Mr. Halley. Correct.

I want to make a point. Insofar as the three-man group was

concerned, I would see Helms in his role as the DDP in the three-

•man group. I would see Lansdale -- as I told you, Lansdale cama

down to visit me in Miami on one occasion. He came as part of

that. three-man group.

But my chain of command, during my

visit was still from me to Harvey. Lansdale was down there,

I was to be, you know, straightforward, candid, discuss plans,

programs, problems. But I received my orders and instructions

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the control of money and so forth was vested in the Task Force

Commander, Mr. Harvey.

Therefore, I never

dealt with this three-man group as a

body. I dealt with the individuals, you know, and various

mutations.

MI. Baron. Would you say that the

three-man group had

less formal, more free-wheeling style of decision making, id

there was a real change in the rigor with which you were reguired

to report after the Special Group took over?

Mr. Halley. I would have to say that the total reporting

became more formalized the longer we stayed in business. I

cannot ascribe this to the difference of style of the three-man

group as opposed to the Agency chain of command or subsequent

with the requirements of the Special Group. This evolved from

a body of experience that was gained as the operation was

established and got some experience.

So I would not want to characterize that as being a result

of the groups.

MI. Baron. You did not have any problem with the proprlety

'of the three-man group in the early stages?

Mt. Halley. No, I had no reason to believe that it was

not a duly constituted body. In other words, their officers that

I reported to in that particular case, Mr. Harvey, Mr. Helms,

were my chain of command at that particular point, were the

ones who briefed me on the existence

of this three-man body

• .

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and I felt that that was a perfectly legitimate function of

that body.

Mr. Baron.

Who. briefed you on the existence of the body?

Mr. Halley.

My recollection of the initial briefing

was

from Mr. Harvey.

MI. Baron.

Do you recall how he described that three-man

group and the responsibilitles?

MI. Halley. No. This was 1962, and this is 1975. As

you know from my records, these intervening years have been

very active for me, therefore, I do not remember with precision

that conversation in all of its details. I do recall my first

briefing on the existence of this three-man group being from

Harvey.

MI. Baron. You mentioned that General Lansdale might

occasionally meet with you personally. This is in Miami, at

JMWAVE Station?

Mr. Halley. I can only recall at this point one specific

meeting where he came down to Florida in Miami to visit.

Mr. Baron. What was the substance of that meeting?

Mr. Halley. He was given some briefings by my staft on

their areas of specialization, whether it was foreign intelli-

gence collection, whether it was maritime activities, or whether

it was paramilitary activities.

I spent a lot of time with him.

personally, talking about where we stood, where we were making

progress in the collection of intelligence, where we were having

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problems, and so on.

It was a substantive management operation,

problem-oriented type of conversation.

Mr. Baronv.. What perlod of time would you place this in?

Mr. Malley. Probably sometime: In the surimer of '62,

bacause my family was already in Miami at that point, and when

I fixst went to Miami my family was not with me. I think my

wife joined me in Miami sometime in the summer of '62, you know,

I would have to research that. It is obviously available from

the records as to when my family moved and a permanent change

of station.

Mr. Baron: Was there any discussion whether direct or

Indirect of assassination of Cuban leaders during your meetings

with General Lansdale?

Mr. Halley. I do not recall any such conversations. You

know, I think that from my point of view, we are off a little

bit on this perspective a I would like to try to focus on the

perspective for you in the historical setting.

Mr. Baron. Please do.

Mr. Halley. I think by your questions and your interest,

you are narrowly focused on this assassination thing, but let

me turn that around a bit, and let me put it in my context at.

the time which may help you understand my answers.

MI. Baron. Before you do, can I stop you for one moment?

I would like to get back on the track that we originally

started on of asking you about the JMNAVE Station in general

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and the context at that time. Could I ask just a couplo of

specific questions before we do that, about the threa-man group

that you raised, and then give you a full opportunity to pull put

out of what we have said so far and everything that will follow

into context.

Did you have any individual mastings with Robert Kennedy,

who was then-Attorney General?

Mr. Halley. You mean Individual, one on one?

Are you saying did I have a mesting, a personal, private

meeting with the Attorney Genéral? .::

→.: 1.1.

?...: Mi. Baron.

YeS.

Mr. Halley. The answer to that is no.

MI. Baron. Did you have any meatings with the Attorney

General of any sort during this period of time?

Mr. Halley. I mentioned to you earlier that at this meeting

that I went to with Director McCone, the Attorney General, Mr.

Robert Kennedy, was present at that white House briefing. He

did ask some questions, which I do not remember what the

questions were at this particular point in time. I answered

some of those questions that were put during the course of that

particular presentation. Throughout that whole period of time,

that was the only, if you will, direct contact with him that

I can remember. You know, unless you can show me something.

MI. Baron. During the entire period that you were

involved with JMWAVE?

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Mr. Halley. That is right.

MI. Baron.. At that meeting -- again, I realiza what we

are doing 1s an isolation out of context -- at that meeting that

you attanded, with the Cabinet members and the President, was

there any discussion either directly or indiractly or by means

of any circumlocutions:.. of the subject of assassination?

Mr. Halley. Not that I can recall.

You know, my recollection of that meeting is, we went to it

en masse, the first --you know, Director McCone, myself,

Bruce Shiever, several other people who went. We went in

several cars. We went to the meeting, the Cuban issue was the

first item on the agenda. As I recall the thing, the Cuban

thing was over after this period of time. We, the technocrats

left, the Director John McCone stayed on. You know, during my

presence at the meeting there was nothing discussed about

assassinations.

Mr. Baron. Was there any such discussion between yourself

and John McCone or Richard

Helms at any point?

Mr. llalley. I never recall discussing assassinations with

John McCone. Now, in terms of discussions with Richard Helms,

these were conversations in which atmospherics in Miami and

problems: Ilke that would be discussed, 'and I am sure somewhere

in some of these conversations the mood of the community, the

subject of assassinations undoubtedly came un. This was part

of the life of that particular period.

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I cannot remember a specific date, you know, some time at

which that was discussed, and you know I never received any

instruction from Helms to mount an assassination operation.

Mr. Baron. Again, I am not trying to unfairly pull these

kinds of ::conversations out of their historical context.

Before

wa flesh out the historical context, do you have any recollection

of the manner in which assassination might have come up between

yourself and Helms?

Mr. Halley.

Again, I put it in this overall context of

the times. We.were.runnindForeign.Intelllgelce.coll@otfon..r:

operations. againsticuba with classical agent méans.: We wete running

•collection against Cuba through paramilitary teams. We were

involved in paramilitary operations that could be described as

commando raids. Those were the kinds of activities.

We were dealing with exile groups, we were debriefing

refugees and in all of this conversations of assassination,

the Cuban penchant for it had to come up: I cannot pinpoint --

Mr. Baron. You do not recall any reference of means to

be used or people to be involved?

Mr. Hallay. No. Even such things as discussions of

various kinds of weapons, you know, people, as you probably

know from this experience, every individual who deals with

weapons has a different view on what is the ideal weapon. If

you took a squad of ten men and gave them the

free choice, I

am sure all ten of them would come up with a different weapon.

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Therefore, when we were standardizing weapons to our

paramilitary teams, things like that, weapons would be discussed

in terms of, you know, muzzle velocity, rate:of. fire, weight.

of the weapon for the Cuban to carry, because many of them were

quite small. In this context, people would discuss what is

the range, can a guy use it to shoot somebody at a particular

range? Is this an assassination weapon? Is this a good weapon

for close combat?

Therefore the term assassination was just a part of the life,

of the fabric at that time. That is what I am trying to get

across.. I just cannot articulate any more eloquently than

that.

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Mr. Baron. I think you are being quite eloquent and

extremely informative. You mentioned that the phrase assassina-

tion would be used in the discussions about the kinds of weapons

that would be used for commando raids or equipping your

operatives.

Mr. Halley. Paramilitary teams, right.

MI. Baron. Was the capacity of a weapon to be used as

• an assassination weapon among other uses a desirable capacity?

In other words, was that phrase

used positively?

Mr. Halley. No, it was not. It is the kind of thing

that weaves itself into, you know, a conversation.

For instance, if you are planning a commando raid against

something like an oil refinery, you have to think about how are

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you going to get across the guard:force that is around a

refinary's One of the questions you have, of course, is if you

bypass them, you are successful to get in without a trail or any

kind of a struggle, that is great. But what. happens if you are

Implanting your : target and the guard stumbles on you, you know,

the guard force then becomes an

"-Immediate: risk to your operation

and usually there

is a fire fight. Therefore, this becomes a

question of weapons. In other words, what weapon is going to

give the highest muzzle velocity and make the largest

amount of

noise. Therefore, If you have two weapons of co-equal cyclic

rate of fire and one made less rate of noise than the other

for that job you would pick the weapon with

the lowest noise.

You might even silence it. You may make a silenced

submachine

gune out of it.

of weapons.

These are the kinds of things that go into these discussions

Mx. Baron: The technology of assassination and targetted

shooting, are you referring to -- when you say assassination

weapon i- to a weapon generally capable of targetted shooting?

Mr. Halley. In this particular context, I think most

people felt that the Cuban penchant for assassination, for

discussing

assassination, was the kind that would have to be

done from a long range.

You know, I think that it is generally an accepted thesis

that a group of dedicated men who are prepared to give their lives

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can in time assassinate almost anybody. Now, the Cuban was not

that kind of a person. That was:not his psychological make-up.

He tends to want to live, to enjoy life, to talk about his

accomplishment. Therefore, while they wary brave and dedicated,

they were the kind of people who would probably engage in

something like this in the context of using the sniper weapon

as a vehicle for assassination, long distance.

Therefore, in this context you are talking about range, you

know, one of the key factors becomes what is the accurate range

of a weapon if fired by an expert marksman. Therefore, that is

the kind of thing that would go into, you know, discussions of

weapons.

MI. Baron. When you were discussing weapons with high

range and low muzzle velocity, was this ever discussed in the

context of shooting Fidel Castro or other key Cuban leaders

as

opposed to targetted shooting on a commando raid.

MI. Halley. I can recall, you know, no conversation in

which it was narrowly focused on the question of Fidel Castro.

MI. Baron. Let us go back, then, to putting this all

into historical context. I am going to ask you if you can

explain more about the structure of the IMWAVE Station, both

the channels supward.': from you to the Agency and the Special

Group and the channels downward from you to your operatives,

if in the course of explaining the structure, you would like to

make some comments about the historical context, that would be

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appreciated.

MI. Halley. I think what I would like to do is to try to.

put this into some perspective.

The perspective really starts with the failure of the Bay

of Pigs Operation. After the failure of the Bay of Pigs, the

Kennedy Administration wanted another look taken at the problem

of Cuba. In order to get that other look started, the Kennedy

Administration created this three-man task force or this three-

man group and wanted to see what else could be done against

Cuba, and that is when I came into this problem in February of

' 62.

Mr. Baron. Is it possible that the three-man group that

you are referring to is actually the Robert Kennedy-Maxwell

Taylor Board of Inquiry into the reasons for the failure of the

Bay of Pigs operation?

MI. Halley. This three-man group stemmed out of that

inquiry. What its relationship was to the inquiry, I do not know,

because I was not involved and I never had an opportunity once

I plunged into this job, to go back and read those historical

documents. You know, I am sure there is a Maxwell Taylor Report,

and so forth; but I have never read it.

All right.

Therefore, my first task when I became involved in this

was the task of coming up with an operational plan to see what

kinds of intelligence could be collected in Cuba, so that by

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collecting this intelligence, an assessment could be made based

on hard facts as to what could be done against Castro. In other

words; the difference here was that people thought that the Bay

of Pigs operation was not soundly grounded in intelligence.

Therefore, this was an attempt to start the collection of

intelligence to see what could be done.

In order to collect intelligence at that particular time,

it was beliaved that all avenues of approach should be used,

so that meant classical foreign intelligence operations,

counterintelligence operations, the debriefing of refugees, and

the use of paramilitary means to put teams

into Cuba to collect

intelligence on that part of the island that could not be

covered by what you would call the more classical means of

foreign intelligence collection.

As the program was started

essentially by me or accelerated

by me, we in fact got caught up with the cuban Missile Crisis --

that is, the advent of the Soviet intervention into Cuba -- and

our whole effort shifted to covering that Soviet build-up in

Cuba, and this was an integral part to our having detected the

Soviet build-up and the United States government taking the

actions which they did, that is, to verify this.

• There was a great problem for a while when we were all

talking about hard intelligence, the President, John Kennudy,

was telling us, give us hard intelligence. We thought we were

giving him hard intelligence.

What he meant, in his definition

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of hard intelligence, as 1t turned out to ba, was a U-2

photograph. lle never articulated that to us in those terms.

:Then we got caught up into the ayaball to eyeball confron-

tation of the Cuban Missile Crisis. When that was over, we

got caught up with the problem of monitoring the disengagement

of the Soviet presence in Cuba. That took us up through sometime

into early '63.

Then we took a look again, because we knew an awful lot

more about them than we had when we started in February of '62,

to see what could be done agáinst Cuba, and it was clear at

that

point that no external Invasion was going to be possible,

because that was something that was excluded by the Khruschev-

Kennedy agreement and then it was not feasible. In any event,

therefore it was a question of what could be done.

So we were

collecting intelligence to continue to stay on top of the

situation. We were attempting to establish contacts with the

military establishment in Cuba to see if there was any force

that was opposed to Castro within the military establishment

that would be used to alter the situation and continue

to see

whether there were any economic pressures that could be brought

on. Cuba that would accelerate the whole problem of creating

an environment in which

resistance could be created on an

island.

nir. Baron.

Were those the two primary tactics used at

that point when Castro had consolidated his strength

and

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when the United States and Russia reached an agreement that no

axternal invasion of Cuba would take place, did you turn

primarily to the ways and means of finding a dissident group

within Cuba that might be capable of overthrowing Castro,

number ons, and number two, of finding means of undermining

the economic strength of the Castro government.

MI. Halley. In addition, we were continuing to support

certain elements of resistance, you know, that were still there

that were not in the Army.

Mr. Baron. What kinds of elements were those?

Mr. Halley. These were paramilitary forces that were in

Cuba, that we had put in or established contact with, or people

who were already in the bush who we had already established

contact with or they had established contact with us, and we

were providing

them with food, weapons ind so forth so that they

could survive. So that it was a multifaceted approach at that

particular time.

That went on from the middle of '63 until the middle of

'65, and these are two distinct phases of this operation.

In

affect, one, a survey, and two, the Missile Crisis and its

post-mortem, and then the next phase was the continuation of

intelligence collection, the working or taking the sounding with

military dissidents, economic pressure, and working with

natural dissident elements that were still on the island.

I think you know that all of your questions have to be put

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Into these various timeframes. When you talk

about, was there

ever a discussion of assassination, you know, when people

were coming out and being interviewed, yes, some Cuban refugee

would say, by God, I would like to go back and shoot, you know,

X, Y or z. It might have been some commandante in his particu-

lar area; it could have been

Fidel Castro. This was just part

of the fabric of the times.

MI. Baron. Can we turn now to the structure of the JMWAVE

Station and explain that a bit? low large was the Station?

What was the command structure within the Station?

Mr. Halley. The Station started expanding in whatever

timeframa it was, somewhere after the survey was completed. It

must have started expanding sometime in March of 1962. You

know, by the time that it was at its peak, which was probably

somewhere just before the Cuban Missile Crisis, July, August

of 1962, it was either the largest or the second largest -- my

recollection was that it was the second largest station in

existence at that time. I would not want to be pinned down on

a particular number of people on any particular day.

Mr. Baron.. Could you give some

idea as to the number of

employees at the Station during its peak?

you know,

Mr. Halley.. I would say somewhere in the neighbordhood of,

three hundred®

You know, again, this means staff and

contract employees.

Mr. Baron. What do you cover with the term contract

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employees?

Mr. Halley. These would be, for instance, maritime case

officers. We hired people who had specialized skills, that 1s,

that they could manage a series of vessels for us, but they

were not longterm staff employees. These would be people who

would be used, 1f you will, In a management organization, basic

implementation of the program.

Mr. Baron.

Did you have other agents or operatives among

the Cuban community or outside the Cuban community that were

affillated with the Station although not employed by it

directly?

Mr. Halley. I think we are going to have to define some

terms.

Mr. Baron. What I am trying to do now is simply get a

picture of the scope of the Station's strength and be its

activities, how many people the Station had to call upon for

its activities.

MI. Halley. Well, let me try to give you an answer, because

I think we are going to get into

a semantic problem here.

When I talk about the Station, as such, I would say that.

is roughly in the neighborhood of three hundred

was those people who would be involved in the management

people, and that 21

effort, the direction effort, the financial logistics, cover

procedures, security, that kind of thing. All right? Flowing

out

from that were people whom we would call agents, that is,

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people who ware not knowledgeable necessarily of whom they

worked for or where the cover offices were located and so forth.

Let us say, in the maritime part of the operation we might have

had at any one point in time, you know, up to five hundred

people involved in maritime activities, you know?

Again, if you pick a date, I am sure we can research it.

The records are still available and you know how many people

we had, but let us take these five hundred. What am I talking

about? These would be essentially Cubans who were the captains

of the vessles that were used in infiltration operations to

put people on the shore of Cuba, and there were a variety of

techrigues. In other words, you might start on with the mother

ship, which would be an LCI --I am not sure how familiar you

are with various kinds of vessels.

MI. Baron. What is an LCI?

Mr.. Halley. Landing craft kind of vessle, or a patrol

craft, a PC, 110-foot vessle, that would be a mother ship.

This is the kind of ship that would

take fuel supplies and

water, so that other smaller vessels could be serviced by it.

So you might start with an operation of a mother ship towing a

smaller boat, or having

it on its decks and going down to

fifteen or twenty miles from Cuha, putting the smaller boat

over the side, which was a faster boat, lower silhouette, less

likely to be picked

up by Cuban coastal radar, and then that

would take the team in close to the shore where we might finally

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put them into rubber rafts, where they would paddle in or use

a silent outboard motor if the surf was high.

Mr. Baron. The

people involved in manning those crafts

would not necessarily be employees of the Station directly?

They might be agents, aven non-paid agents?

MI. Halley. No, they

were not paid.

For instance, they

might work for a particular cover company. In other words, I

am only using this as an example. Let us say we had the ABC

Shipping Company. That shipping company was a subsidiary of

the Station, if you will,and the ABC Shipping Company ran :

maybe ond LCI and maybe two or three smaller boats which it

could deck load and that company might have fifty or seventy-

five employees, as an example, all Cubans, maybe some of them

was Nicaraguans or Costa Ricans as most of these vessels -- I

would have to go and 100k

at each vessel.

Does that give you

a feel

for the size of the problem?

Mr. Baron. How many such companies would have been in

existence at that time, companies operating as CIA proprietaries

or companies in cover and supplying the JMVAVE Station with

• personnel or with equipment?

Mr. Halley. He are talking

about all of these companies.

they probably went up

into the hundreds. I distinguish between

companies that were set up simply to provide cover as opposed

to companies that were proprietaries. You know, these terms

mean different things to me.

The nature of the Agency's

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Involvement in each is different. I am having a little

trouble --

Mr. Baron. Could you explain what different categories of

companios you were receiving halp from at that point, and about

how many of each there might have been?

MI. Halley.. I do not think I could do that.

We are

talking about hundreds of companies that we used during that

period of time.

Some of them might simply have been a company

set up and registered and run out of some attorney's

office. It simply provided back stopping for the ownership of

the small boat.

Everything has to be owned by somebody, it has to have a

Coast Guard registration, you know, things like that. Even

if

I had access to the files to answer your question, it would

take me weeks to pull all that together to give you an answer.

I don't think there is an overview statement.

MI. BarOn.

would it be fair to say that you had coopera-

tion on a grand

scale from

all kinds of people in private

enterprise. in the Miami area, or in Southern Florida?

Mr. Halley. I think it would be fair to say that we had

extensive cooperation -I do not like your word "grand" -- that

we had

extensive cooperation from the civilian sector in

Florida, in the state of florida, to facilitate the conduct of

this clandestine mission.

!r. Baron. Did you also have extensive cooperation from

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civic officials and law enforcement agencies in boing allowed

to operate fres or the law? For instance, were you allowad to

put vessels onto the water which were not properly registered,

or which could be held immune for inspaction by the Coast Guard

or other maritime authorities, and were you allowed to send

paopla through the streets of Southern Florida who may have

bean armed or violating local law in some othur way, who were

held immune by arrangements that you had with law enforcement

agencies?

Mr. Halley. You have asked me, in essence, three

questions.

MI. Baron.

Right:

MI. Halley. Let me try to divide that and deal with each

question separately.

Let ma first

deal with the vessels. Every vessel that we

had

was appropriately registered. There were no short-cuts:

insofar as the U.S. Coast Guard was concerned. That is, any

vessel that was registered in the United States met appropriate

safety standards and so forth, so we were not putting any

vessels into the water that any citizen could not have put into

the water. That is we are talking about ten, fifteen, twenty

foot boats, thirty foot boats, thirty-five foot boats, things

like that. These boats were owned in elther a corporato name

or by a private individual who had to register them with the

Coast Guard and pass

normal Coast Guard regulations.

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(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Baron. To continue with this, I understand that

safety regulations would have been complied with, but was there

some sort of immunity from inspection, say inspection for

carrying armaments aboard a vessel that the CIA had arranged

with maritime authorities, or local law enforcement authorities?

Mr. Halley. When we had operations going, these were

coordinated with the Coast Guard in terms of their knowing that,

you know, at a particular date, time group, that there would be

a rendezvous between two vessels which were our vessels, and

this was coordinated with the Coast Guard.

Mr. Baron. Would you return to the second part of that

large question? Without reference to vessels, were CIA

employees or agents on the streets of cities in Southern

Florida immune from search

or arrest by local law enforcement

authorities?

Mr. Halley. They were not immune.

Let me ask to dispel one myth that I think has developed

which is reflected in your question. We were meticulous to

insure that no weapons were issued to anybody until the men

were on the vessel outside of

the immediate waters of

south

Florida, and we were meticulous to insure that when they came

back from a mission that they were met at sea and all the

weapons were taken away from then.

So, when you talk about a group moving around in Florida,

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we did work out through the entire state, and I did not want

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you to feel that I was being less than candid with you, and

you keep saying south florida, I want to say to you that we

operated in the state of Florida, men moving around armed under

our control in the state of Florida, is just not correct.

This was all carefully controlled and they did not have their

weapons when they came back, we.took them before they landed,

so they were not immune.

Mr. Baron. You did have general arrangements or agreements

with law enforcement agencies throughout Florida for the

treatment of CIA operatives who were affillated with the JMNAVE

Station?

MI. Halley. We did have, through our office of Security,

a continuing dialogue with a number of law enforcement agencies

in Florida. If a problem developed, we would then contact them

and look at the issue

within the context of what had transpired.

Certainly there was no immunity. In other words, this has to be

looked at on a case by case basis.

For instance, you know, we had a training site in north

Florida, as an example. If somebody came off of that site that

was drunk and disorderly in town and could not speak English,

the local authorities did have a number to call to raise this

with us to see whether this was somebody that was of interest

to us, and then we would have to go and settle that particular

case.

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MI. Baron. Back to the structure of the relationships

between yourself as Chief of Station at JMWAVE and any operatives

or employees who worked underneath you at that Station, would

it be fair to say that any activities run out of the Station

ultimately were channeled out through you?

MI. Halley. They should have been, and they were -- you

know this Station went through several mutations in organization.

during its existence. I guess the organizational structure that

existed for the longest period of time was something like I

am

going to describe to you.

There was a Chief of Station, which was myself. I had a

Deputy Chiaf of Station for operations. That is the gentleman

who is now setired, I think he is still alive, by the name of

Moore, Robert Moore. I had

a second Deputy Chief of Station and

he was for support Patterns. That is a gentleman who is

also

retired, a MI. Corris.

Then

the rest

of the station was organized into a number of

branches. Each branch was organized along functional lines.

Let me give you an example.

There was a Foreign Intelligence

Branch. These were

people in, what in my terminology would be

classical foreign intelligence operations. That is, trying to

Itcruit a . Cuban diplomat abroad, as

an example, dealing with,

you know, a Uruguayan diplomat in the Uruguayan Embassy in

Havana. They are working with resident agents in Cuba who might

live in some city like llavana and have a legal job as a baker or

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butcher or something but had a radio set in which they could •

communicate with us, through which they could communicate to us.

Then there was the Paramilitary Branch. This was the

group that ran the commando operations. This was the group that

ran, and put people back into Cuba, into rssistance groups, or

established contact with resistance groups. This was a group

that also worked in putting in caches that would supply people,

sither paramilitary forces in Cuba or agents that were being

run by the Foreign Intelligence Group.

All right. Then there was a Covert Action, people who

dealt with exiled refugee groups that were involved in radio

activities, publications, that kind of thing.

Then there

is a

whole panoply of -- then there was Maritime, in terms of

finance, and so on.

Security was a branch. Obviously, under

that kind of system, no executive, whether he is president of

a corporation or a Station Chief, can

see every single piece of

paper that comes in or

out, but clearly there was a review

procedure whereby program reviews were conducted, individual

operational reviews were conducted.

Mr. Baron. By yourself?

Mr. Halley. By myself. I do not want to leave you with

the impression that I knew every single thing that was going

on evary minute and could account for the activities of three

hundred employees on a daily basis.

• Mr. Baron: In talking about the personnel affiliated

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with the station a moment ago, I think we may have created a::

misimpression that the only people involved in CIA operations

were people who were paid by the Agency. Isn't it also true

that thera were many members of Cuban exile groups in Florida

who participated voluntarily from time to time in CIA sponsored

operations?

Mr. Halley. I think that you may have to sharpen that up

for me. I am not sure what you really maan.

If you are talking about foreign intelligence collections,

you know, the people who were producing --

Ms. Baron. I am talking now about the paramilitary

operations.

Mr. Halley. No. I do not know of any people that were

involved in paramilitary operations that ware not in some way

paid.

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MI. Baron.

By the Agency?

Mr. Halley. By the Agency.

Let me make sure that we understand each other, because

during this period of time there were a lot of independent

Cuban groups who claimed that they had sponsorship from the

Agency but did not, and were operating, and there was a period

in time when these groups could not run their operations from

Florida without running the risk of being picked up by Customs,

Immigration, Coast Guard, the FBI, or if we had information on

it, you know, we might pass the information to the Coast Guard

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so that they could keep them from going.

If that is what you are referring to, somebody like Alpha 66

or commando I or somebody like that, they were not a part of

the CIA apparatus.

Mr. Baron. Although you might be aware of their activities?

Mr. Halley. We would be aware of their activities,

certainly.

Mr.. Baron. Can you explain if there is anything to add

to what we have already said? The chain of command, apart from

yourself as Chief of Station, to Task Force W and to the

Directorate of Plans within the Agency?

You would report directly to William Harvey?

Mr. Halley. William Harvey was Chief of Task Force W.

later FitzGerald. My chain of command was from me to them.

You know, they had a subordinate staff who helped them monitor

the Station's activity, so that it just was not the fact, you

know, that Mr. Harvey and Mr. FitzGerald were totally dependent

on what I told them. To have an appreciation of what was going

on in Miami they had their own staff that was following

• individual operations.

For instance, they had a paramilitary staff that would

review our proposals for a paramilitary operation and i might

say we think that the Station has overextended itself this

month, they want

to run twenty-five operations given the

weather during this particular month of October. We do not

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think they could do it. We think they should be guided to run

only twenty, fifteen, something like that. So they were not

totally dependent on me.

MI. Baron.

What was the nature of the split of responsi-

bility between Task Forca W and JMWAVE Station?

In other words, were there certain operations that were

run directly out of Task Force W?

Mr. Halley. Also, you have to put this into a historical

time. What period are you talking about.?

Mr. Baron. During the period of your tenure. If there

were changes during your tenure at JMWAVE, why do you not

explain those?

Mr. Hallay. There were.

Each one is different. Let me

give you a couple of examples.

Washington, Task Force W, essentially did not run

any paramilitary operations where they took command and control

for sending people to Cuba. For instance, if Task Force W in

Washington wanted to plant a radio in Cuba which was to be pickod

up by foreign intelligence agents who could report, they would

task us to implant that radio in a cache in a particular area

in Cuba, for instance, Oriente province. We would know simply

that it was a radio perhaps: Wy would then put it into

Oriente province, write up the site, give them the rip cord.

They would communicate to the agents' in Cuba who would go

recover the cache.

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So they had agents in Cuba that were reporting foreign

intelligence to them so they had collection assets that were

reporting to them along the same lines that we did. They:did

work at a downstream point when FitzGerald came in with a

couple of groups -- in other words, they had contact with

Artime. I had no contact with the Artime group as a general

rule. They also had contact with Manolo Ray which I did not

have contact with. So they were working with these kinds of

larger exile groups.

The Task Force also specialized in much more economic

activity than I did. That is a question of looking at such

things as

Ăng Laund

bus exports from

to cuba. 13,13

Mr. Baron. In terms of paramilitary operations, if an

assassination operation had been run by Task Force w, would

you have assumed as Chief of Station in Miami you would have

been aware of such an operation?

Mr. Halley. No, I do not assume that.

Mr. Baron. Would it not have been sound managerial

practice to let you know that there was an operation that might

'have been run through Florida into Cuba?

Mr. Malley. No.

You know, the Agency is a highly compartmented mechanism.

You know, let us dispel one thing very promptly here. If you

are asking me was I aware of all these contacts, you know, with

the Mafia -- and I think I can tell you frankly at that tima I

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was not -- Harvey would come, you know, to Miami, to visit me

to review the activities of the station, and while there would

go off on his own and make his contact with whomever he was

meeting. I knew he was meeting somebody, but it was not up to

me to find out with whom he was meating or why he was meeting

them or what he was doing with them.

MI. Baron. My question really was, I think more innocent

than that.

Jas ft strictly one of involving what correct management

techniques would be, or what kind of knowledge the Chief of

Station of JMWAVE would have to have in order to do an effective

job in dealing with the Cuban community and running operations

into Cuba? You seem to be saying that it would not be ...

necessary to run an effective job to have knowledge of every

other operation that the CIA is running against Castro?

MI. Halley. I think what I am saying during that particu-

lar time-- I do not want you to come to the conclusion that

I was knowledgeable of everything that ran in from or through

the state of Florida, because during that period of time, for

• instance, Mr. Harvey in particular was a very compartmented

gentlaman, and it would be keeping with his style to run an

operation in which the locus of the operation might be Florida

and I would not know about it.

Now, that would be an unusual thing, but it is not precluded.

MI. Baron. Let us turn for a moment to following i

up on tha

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nature of your contacts with Willlan Harvey in raference to any

operations he may have in running unilaterally against Castro.

Do you recall aiding Harvey in an operation that he was in charge

of and that was not affiliated: with JMWAVE?

MI. Halley. I do not recall anything, I do not recall

anything specific. In other words, the pattern was in terms of

command and control, I would come to Washington on a regular

basis to review activity with Harvey after we submitted our

paperwork. Harvey was also a frequent visitor to Florida.

We would have operational discussions. He would talk to the

Branch Chiefs, he talked to people.

He also went out on his

own, and he was meeting somebody, it was clear to me that he

was meeting people. But it was frankly in the way that the

Agency is run and managed, it was not a concern to me whom he

was meeting.

MI. Baron. Would it have been proper of you to inquire

of him whom he was meeting?

Mr. Halley. No, it would not have been.

Mr. Baron. Did you have suspicions or speculation about

whom he might have been meeting or for what purpose that ha

was having thesa meetings?

Mr. Halley. No, not for what purpose. There

is a whole,

you know, panoply of things going on at that time. You know,

frankly I was a very busy guy, when Harvey was there, it occupied

one hunk of a lot of my time. If he wantad to go off, you know,

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do something else and was going to meat someone alsa, that was

fine with me. It enabled me to get back to my immediate and

more pressing problems.

In this business you just do not ask your suparior, what

are you doing? That is just not cricket; that is not the way

the game is played.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall a time when larvey asked you to

procure arms and equipment to be passed to a Cuban exile?

Mr. Halley. To a Cuban exile?

MI. Baron. Let me strike the reference to a Cuban exile.

Do you recall a time when Harvey asked your aid in procur-

ing arms ard aquipment to be given to a man named Tony Varona

who was a contact of Harvay's?

Mr. Halley. I know Tony Varona. He was in the period --

prior to the Bay

of Pigs, he was part of the consejo.

Frankly, if you've got something that you can sharpen that

up, I think you need

some basis, that. I think that can trigger

my memory here. I do not remember frankly Tony varona being

in Harvey's --

Mr. Baron. In contact with Harvey?

MI. Halley. You know, I may have procured something for

Harvey, some kind of equipment or done some kind of operational

support task.

Mir. Baron. Let us make it more specific.

Do you recall helping Harvey load a U-Haul trailer full of

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56

about $5,000 worth of arms and equipment to be left in a parking

lot and picked up there by a contact of Harvey's?

And this

would be in approximately April of 1962.

Mr. Halley. I do vaguely remember something about a rented

truck. Quite frankly, I do not really recall all the details

of this at this particular time. I do not remember, you know,

personally procuring any material, but it is conceivable that

I did get a request from Harvey, that I did go to the logistics

apparatus, and whatever he had requested from official stocks

he was provided.

MI. Baron. During that same period of time --

Mr. Halley. I do recall something about a truck. I do

not recall anything about a trailer. My recollection of this

truck incident seems to be --I do not remember what it was.

We did do something for him logistically, I do remember a truck

being involved with some logistic material in terms of a

parking lot.

But frankly that is about all I can recall of it

at this particular time.

MI. Baron. Do you have any recollection of hearing of

poison pills In any connection during your tenure at JMWAVE?

Mr. Halley. No, I do not recall -- poison pills?

Poison

pills, the only kind of thing I can recall occasionally when

people were talking about being on mother ships, you know, what

would happen if they were captured. This was a discussion

occasionally of whether any kind of drugs should be issued to

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the people who were manning these vassals so they could do

themselves in if they were to be captured, things like that,

but we never issued any such pills but there were discussions

of that kind of a problem. I do recall specific agents who

were sent back to Cuba to run a collection or to go back into

the bush and so forth who asked for some sort of pills which

they could kill themselves with if they were captured.

But other than that - if that is what you were referring

to, I think they are called I pills, or something, as they

were referred to in those days.

Mr. Baron. Why were they called I pills?

MI. Halley. Everything has

a number or nomenclature, I

do not know.".

Mr. Baron. Did you ever hear of poison pills to be

used

in assassination

operations against Fidel Castro or other

Cuban leaders?

MI. Halley. No.

Is that referencing to this material that I might have

provided for Harvey? Because if that is the case, I can dispel

that quickly, because I would not have had access to them.

Mr. Baron. You would not have access to poison pills?

Mr. lialley. No, I would not have access to then.

11X. Baron. Why not?

Mr. Halley. I did not have them in my inventory. That is

not anything that I have, you know, command and control of. That

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is.why --

Mr. Baron. They would have had to come directly from

Technical Servicas Division at CIA?

Mr. Halley. That is what I'm trying to clarify what it is

that you are trying to establish from me.

In other words, if you are saying --

MI. Baron. Let us move further, I think we can be more

spacific now.

We have a document that. I am about to show you. I just

wanted to clear up. the background of it before we discussed

the document.

Mr. Halley. Let me just make this point. If you are

talking about drug pills, I had no source of such things, so

if that is the nature of your question, I can say I had nothing

to do with that. If you are talking about, you know --

MI. Baron. Arms and equipment --

MI. Halley. -- weapons or something, yes, that was in my

inventory. I could have issued that to Harvey, you know, guns,

ammunition, plastics, that kind of thing I could have had

access to, yes. That is why I am trying to sort out really

where the thrust of your questioning is.

Mr. Baron. There were two prongs: to the question, you

have picked both of

them up. One is whether you had ever heard

of poison pills in connection with an assassination operation

against Fidel Castro, and your testimony would be that you had

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not, is that correct?

Mr. Hallay.

That is right: I would not have had access

to those pills myself, nor did the Station. In other words, if

I had wanted something like that, I would have had to corres-

ponded with Washington in order to have had access to it, if

in fact it existed.

Mr. Baron. You never had any such correspondence?

Mr. Halley. I never had any correspondence that I can

recall.

Mr. Baron. The other problem was the supply of arms and

equipment to which you already replied.

Have you ever read that Inspector General's Report of

1967, prepared at the request of the DCI to fill him in on any

assassination efforts to which the CIA may have been connected?

MI. Halley.

No, I have not read the report.

MI. Baron. Before you came here today you were not shown

any excarpts from this report to refresh your recollection at

the CIA?

Mr. Halley. The IG Raport?

MI. Baron. Yes.

Mr. Malley. No, I have not.

Mr. Baron. Were you shown any other documents at the CIA

today to refresh -- or in preparation for today's session --

MI. Malley.

No.

In preparation for today's session I have had several

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conversations with Seymour Boultin --

Mr. Baron. Walt Elder?

Mo. Halley. I talked to Walt Elder on the phone. You know

the people who are involved in this thing. I have asked for

that, I talked to our attorney, Clarke --

Mr. Baron. George Clarke?

Mr. Halley. Yes.

- I talked to a numbar of people, I asked to sea the.

newspaper clipping from the Miami Herald on the McGovern

activity. Yes, I have looked at that kind of thing. But I

have not looked at the specific IG Report. I have not read it,

I have not seen an extract of the IG Report.

Mr. Baron. Were you given any specific instructions as to

the kinds of things that you could say of not say here today?

Mr. Halley.. You know, nothing beyond what you and I

touched on which you have already put on the record.

Mr. Baron. Which is not to mention the names of CIA

officers who are still operating under cover?

Mr. Halley.

Right, or agents who would still be viable

that I know of.

Mr. Baron. Right.

Then let me

show you a document which we will mark as

Halley Exhibit No. 2.

(The document referred

to was marked Halley

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idantification.)

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MI. Baron. Which is an excerpt from the Inspector General's

Report of 1967 at pages 49 and 50, and I will ask you to read

tho portions that I will bracket which deal with a report of

meeting betwean yourseif and ililliam ilarvoy involving tha

supply of arms and equipment.

(Pause)

MI. Halley. I have no reason to doubt this. I may have

provided this support.

I do not recall sitting in a parking lot

observing --

Mr. Baron. For the record, we are discussing the passage

that begins, "When the pills were

given to Varona through

Roselli, Varona requested arms and equipment needed for the

support of his end of the operation. Rosalli passed the request

to Harvey. Harvey, with the help of (Mr. Halleyl, the chief

of the JMVAVE Station, procured"

Continuing.--And then it continues to say a large shopping

list of arms and equipment, which cost about $5,000 and were

supplied in

a parking lot of a drive-in restaurant in a rented

U-Haul truck.

Would the cost of $5,000 have been an unusual expenditure

at that time at JMVAVE

Station

for

arms and equipment?

MI. Halley. No, $5, 000 would not have been an unusual

expenditure.

Mr. Baron. Not unusual enouth, in fact, for you to have

a particular memory of thu event?

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Mr. Hallay. No.

Now that I read over this thing, I do recall, as I told

you earlior before

you showed me this document something about

a ranted truck and being involved with Harvey in providing him

some logistical support for an activity. I do not recall this

specific list of equipment being involved, you know, soilewhere

you got this and if I could check it against the files, if there

are any files available, I could verify whether this is correct

or not.

Mr. Baron. Whether or not the particular list is correct,

you would say that these couple of passages from the IG Report

generally characterize your involvement with Harvey in this

one incident correctly?

MI. Halley. I would want to sharpen this up, because you

have one, two, two paragraphs here. In the first paragraph

there is a reference to some pills. I had nothing to do with

any pills. I have no recollection of any pills.

Mr. Baron. Let us jump then to the very last statement and

let me ask you if this confirms your own sense of your knowledge.

The report says: "Harvey says that (Halley)" -- here I

am using your alias = "never knew to whom delivery was made nor

for what purpose.

(Halley] was merely called upon to furnish

support for a headquarters operation from which he was otherwise

excluded."

Dors that generally characterize correctly your point of

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Involvement with this activity?

Mr. Halley. I would say that is correct.

I want to go back to these other points, though, because

I want to be meticulously correct here. I do not recall the

specifics of this inventory of equipment. I do not recall,

you know, sitting in a parking lot, surveilling any kind of a

vehicle. On the other hand, I do recall having been involved

with Harvey in some sort of an effort with a U-Haul truck.

Now therefore that last sentence you have read is correct, • :.

I knew nothing about any of this delivery.and Iwag called upon

to furnish support for a headquarters operation from which

was otherwise excluded.

MI. Baron.. You are not denying, are you, that you may have

sat near the parking lot and surveilled the truck until it was

picked up?

Mr. Halley. I have no recollection --

Mr. Baron. One way or

the other?

Mr. Halley. No, I would say that my sitting in a parked

car with Harvey surveilling a parking lot is the kind of thing

• that would have

stuck in my mind.

I do not recall ever doing.

that and that is the thing that has me a little perplexed here

and I am having trouble matching this thing up with my own

mamory. It would have been

damned unusual for Harvey and I to

have sat in a parking lot, and I just do not recall that.

I do have a vagua

recollection of being involved with him

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in some sort of caper involving a U-Raul truck.

Mr. Baron. At that time, if Harvey had made a request of

you to supply $5,000 worth of equipment like explosives,

detonators, •30 caliber rifles, .45 callber handguns, radios

and boat radar, would you have supplied that equipment to Harvey

or to anyone he designated without asking him what the purpose

of the operation was?

Mr. Halley. Yes, I would have supplied it to Harvey or

to his designated representative, depending on how that person

identified himself to me with the equipment that he requested.

That was my chain of command and, if he had told me that he

had wanted this material for any operational activity, I would

have seen to it that it was issued to him. That is the way the

Agency functions.

Mr. Baron.

Would it have been standard

procedure in a

paramilitary operation to procure equipment that would not have

been traceable to the United States as the In Report indicates

was done in this case?

MI. Halley. It depends. It depends on what was the

• sponsorship that was trying to be conveyed to tha paramilitary

group.

In other words, let us say there was a Venezuelan busiress-

man who may have been giving some assistance to a Cuban exile

group. If somebody had gotten in touch with that Venezuelan

businessman and he was saying I brought weapons into Florida

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€67

or aquipment which I will give you, then maybe under that kind of

a circumstance we wouldn't want anything that would clearly

identify it with the U.S. government and then that would be the

normal thing to do. I would have to know the sponsorship.

Mr. Baron. This request would not have been extraordinary.

either, to provide "sterile" equipmept to a contact of Harvey's?

MI. Halley. It would not have attracted my attention to

make it seem out of the ordinary.

Mr. Baron. Were you aware of the presence of a CIA officer

named Jim O'Connell in Florida at that time?

Mr. Halley. No: ....

....

..:.

: Mr. Baron. Had you been'aware of any operational. •

involvement that Jim O'Connell had with anyone in' Florida. at

any time?.

- Mr. Halley: I do not know Jim O'Connell. I have seen

references to Jim O'Connell in Jack Anderson's columns and

things like that since I have been reading

the Press, but I

do not know. Jim O'Connell. If he walked into this room, -I

wouldnot recognize him because I do not think I ever met the

man. I do not know who he is.

I asked

several of my colleagues

when I first saw his name appear in the

Press who it was, and

nobody could describe him in a way that would enable me to

remember ever having seen or met the man.

Mr. Baron. lad you heard of the man in connection with

operations against Cuba --

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Mr. Hallay. I had not.

Mr. Baron. -- before reading it in the newspapers

recently?

Mr. Halley. Before reading in the newspapers and I do not

know what year I first read this, because somewhere in the back

of my mind is & Jack Anderson column --

MI. Baron. And a Drew Pearson column before that.

Mi. Halley. -- a couple of years ago in which it was

obvious that this was obtained from a military assignee to the

Agency named Brad something -- I cannot think of his name

right now -- and that he was the source of that information.

I

think somewhere in one of those articles, his name had

appeared several years ago. I frankly do not know who the quy

is.

Mr. Baron. At any point. in your operational relationship

with William Harvey in connection with Cuban affairs, did you

suspect that an assassination operation was being run out of

Task Force W'against Fidel Castro?

Mr. Halley. No.

Mr. Baron.

I would like to run down a list of the names

of some people who were involved in one way or the other with

an assassination operation that was being run out of Task force

W, and I will reprasent to you that there was indeed an

assassination effort or a series of efforts run out. of Task

Force W beginning --. and out of the CIA - baginning in October

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of 1960 involving connections between CIA officials and people

who have been characterized as members of the Mafia, of the

gambling Syndicate who had interests in Havana and which involved

the passage of poison pills to people inside Cuba purportedly

for use against Castro in the restaurant that he frequented.

And this plot by William Harvey's own admission was directed

by Harvey during llarvey's tenure as the Chief of Task Force W.

Mx. Halley. I take due note of what you are saying. I

have no knowledge of that. I will be glad to comment on any

of the names. My commenting on names is in no way to reflect

any knowledge on my part of this particular activity, because

I have no knowledge of it.

Mr. Baron.

You have already stated that you have no

knowledge of

any assassination effort involving poison pills?

Mr. Halley. - Yes.

Mr. Baron. Did you ever hear of any assassination schemes

which may of may not have been put into effect involving

exploding sea shells that Castro might pick up by scuba diving?

Mr. Halley. No, I do not recall any exploding sea shells

while Castro was

scuba diving, but the problem of Castro being

an avid scuba diver is well-known to me. As I recall, somewhere

in this thing there was a refugee group or Cuban exile group

or somebody at one time in this whole activity who had focused

On the question of whether Fidel Castro was vulnerable at the

time that he was scuba diving. I have heard that discussed but

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frankly I do not remember in what forum, and your raference to

the scuba diving has triggered that response. Nothing about

exploding saa shalls.

MI. Baron. You do not recall ever hearing Desmond

FitzGerald mention that

subject or hearing that Desmond

FitzGerald was involved in exploring that possibility, planting

an exploding sea shell?

MI. Halley. The exploding sea shell is enough of an off-

beat kind of thing that I think I would have recalled it. I

don't recall it.

I do recall Castro's scuba diving, and that representina

a vulnerability and somewhere in the recesses of my memory,

that does strike a bell with

me that some exile group, somebody

was talking about Fidel Castro being vulnerable while he was

scuba diving.

Mr. Baron. Did you! ever hear

of a plan to present Castro

with a skin-diving suit in which bacteria injurious to his health

would have been cultured, bacteria that would have produced

tuberculosis and would have produced a dreadful disease?

Mr. Halley. I have never heard of any bacteria approach

to the problem of dealing with Fidel Castro.

I do want to come back to this that I do recall something

about scuba diving, you know, on the range of Fidei being

vulnerable at the time he was scuha diving, but I do not recall

exploding sea shells or bacteria.

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71

Phone (Area 202) 346-6

Mr. Baron. Let

us turn then to the list of name --

Mr. Halley. Wait a minute.

Just let me make a note to

myself.

(Pause)

Mr. Baron: Do you have any knowledge, acquired directly

or indirectly, of any involvement of John Roselli in Cuban

operations?

Mr. Halley. Other than reading the papers -

Mr. Baron. Other than what you read recently in the papers

did you acquire any knowledge during your period as Chief of

Station at JMWAVE of John Roselli's involvement in Cuban

operations?

Mr. Halley. No. I had the impression

from Harvey going

off that he was meeting with somebody, and at one point in time

I came to the impression that he was meeting a guy by the name

of John. Who John was, I had no idea. We were involved in an

attempt to try to find two Soviets at one

point who were of

interest. The fellow who provided the lead to that had been

a member of one of the casinos in Cuba at some time.

Mr. Baron. Do you remamber who that.

was?

MI. Halley. No, I do not. I do not remember the man's.

name. It may come to me.

You are asking me things that

happened, you know, in 1962. As I have told you, I have been

in a lot of places.

Anyway, when we put in a request for a trace on the source

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72

of this lead, I was surprised with the spood with which we got

a response back on this man and the details run down that we

got on him in terms of who he was and where he worked and so

forth, and I think I concluded at that time that somebody knew

this fallow very well and somewhere in the whole labrynth, eithet

Justice or we or somebody had access to somebody who could give

us a great deal of insight into paople who had been involved

with the gambling establishment in Cuba.

Those are the only two things that. I can say to you that

I knew at the time. Obviously I have sinca read the papers and

I have put together in my own mind by deduction that the John

that I was aware of that. Harvey was in touch with must. be John

Roselli, but I cannot provide to you --

MI. Baron. Would this person with contacts with gambling

interests in Havana have been Santos Trafficante?

Mr. Halley. I would have no way of knowing. I know who

Santos Trafficante is.

Mr. Baron. How do you know this?

Mr. Halley. This is like asking me whether I knew where

• Ith Street is in downtown Miami.

Santos Trafficante is a name

that constantly was discussed among Cuban exiles and he was a

well-known figure. You could not possibly be involved. .

Mr. Baron. Did you know of any involvement that he had

in Cuban operations that were connected in any way to the CIA?

Mr. Halley. None that. I krow of. To the best of my

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recollection when I was in Miami, Santos Trafficante was in the

Tampa area and that is my recollection of it at the time.

I also think that there was some large scandal, when I was

in Miami, that was played up in the Press. I forget, some

Federal agent who was somehow involved with the Mafla and with

the Syndicate and there was some linkage in the Press between

Santos Trafficante, Cubans and the Federal agent, but I do not

remember the details of it.

Mr. Baron. ¡The Federal agent was not a CIA employee?

MI. Halley. No, he was not. My recolluction 1s he was

Narcotics or something:

Mr. Baron. You would make the same statement about John

Roselli that you had no knowledge of his connection with any

CIA sponsored operation against the Cuban government or against

Castro personally?

MI. Halley. At the time that I was there -- you know, I

want to caution you that I have read the Pross. If I have

trouble sorting this out, I want you to understand that --

Mr. Baron. I understand that clearly.

Mr. Halley. -- that this is a dilemma for me. Obviously

I told you I made my own deduction that John, the one that

Harvey was in touch with, must have turned out in the context of

20/15 hindsight. to be John Roselli. At the time, I did not

know that.

Mr. Baron. What about Robert Maheu? Did you have any

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knowledge that he was involved with Cuban operations affiliated

with the CIA?

Mr. Halley. No.

Again, at the time I had no knowledge of Robert Maheu. I

have since read about Robert Maheu in the Press, allegations:

and so forth. The name is familiar to me now.

MI. Baron. The same question for sam giancana.

MI. Halley. Again, I

say in answer that at the time that

I was involved in '62 and '65 I did not know anything about

Sam Giancana. I have since read in the Press about him.

Therefore, the name is familiar to me today.

Mr. Baron.

Did you know at that time that Sheffield

Edwards, who was then Director of the Office of Security, was

connected in any way with those efforts against Castro personally

or against the Castro government?

Mr. Halley. At that time, Shef Edwards was known to me

as Director of Security. That is all. I had no knowledge of

his involvement in any activity against Fidel Castro in a

personal sense.

Shef Edwards did help Security Officers assigned to my

staff in Miami. Therefore I would periodically go to him about

the performance of his officers who were on my staff. So during

the time that I was involved in Cuban affairs, yes, I did see

him, yes, I did talk to him

ahout Cuban affairs in Miami, the

performance of his officers on my staff, but nothing about anything

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: 75

that he might be doing, you know, against Fidel Castro.

Mr. Baron. I will represent to you that we have testimony

from Edwards and from Jim O!Connalt who was an officer working

in the Office of security under Edwards that they were involved

in the early stages of an assassination plot against Castro

which was run out of the Office lf Security and later transferred

to the DDP. But you are saying that you had no knowledge of

any such operation at that time?

Mr. Halley. I had no knowledge. As I told you before, I

did not even know Jim O'Connell.

Mr. Baron. Do you know a man by the name of Juan Orta?

Mr. Halley. That name is familiar to me. It is a name

that has appeared, you know, across my scope. I cannot tell

you why I am familiar with it. I would have to have a trace

run, you know, and look at the results of the trace. But the

name Juan Orta is known to me. That does ring a passive bell

in my memory.

Mr. Baron. Do you remember William Harvey having any

direct contact with Juan Orta?

MI. Halley. No,

I co not.

Mr. Baron. You do not have any specific recollection of

Juan Orta's point of involvement in operations against Castro?

Mr. Halley. Juan Orta, no.

It is a name I am familiar

with. I think you will find, you know, that there are a number

of names -- you asked me to look at that other thing -- a number

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of names that do ring balls with me. I raally would have to

have back-up material to clarify why they ring a bell. This 1s

one that happens to ring a bell with ma, but I have no way of

linking it to anything, and cartainly I do not lirk it in any

way in my memory to Mr. Harvey.

Mr. Baron. Do you remember ever hearing of a Cuban contact!

of William Harvey's who went by the name of Maceo?

Mr. Halley. No, I do not.

Mr. Baron. He also used the name of Garcia Gomez •and :

the name Godoy:

Mr. Halley. The only name that rings any bell with me

in Cuban contacts is Arturo Godoy. Is this the same man?

MI. Baron. No do not have the first name of that allas.

In what connection had you heard of Arturo Godoy?

Mr. Halley.

My recollection is I've known Arturo Godoy

is that he was the fellow who was active in the Cuban immigre

community in Miami. That is all I can tell you at this point.

I would have to go back.

Mr. Baron. You do not remember what group he was connected

•with?

Mr. Halley. No, I do not. But it was a name that

obviously, you know,

frequently referred to in reports. You

know at one time we did monitor the Cuban community as to what

was going on in terms of these various groups and what they

had been doing. For some reason, Arturo Godoy rings a bell with

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me. As I recall, he was some sort of an activist in some

Cuban exile group. To give you a definitive answer, you know, I

would have to get the name, trace him, have.a.run 'on: this fellow

and try to put it together in some kind of context, but that is

the only Godoy that rings any bells with me.

certainly in my relationship with Harvey, this has no

meaning to me. Godoy and Harvey just do not ring any bells.

Mr. Baron. One more name that we already discussed, that

is Tony Varona.

Mr. Halley. Yes.

Mr. Baron. You said that you did know Tony Varona?

MI. Halley. I know of Tony Varona, that he was leader of

the consejo, the revolutionary counsel that had been set up to

sort of administer the Bay of Pigs optration. In the post

Bay of Pigs era, Nua Cardona and Tony Varona were people who

still appeared on the exile seene and were prominent. We had

some dealings with Nua Cardona, officers in the Station had

dealings with Nua Cardona and Tony. Varona to pay off, you know,

injuries to peopoe who had been suffered during the Bay of pigs,

things like that, widows and so on. I kiow who he is and so

forth, the name is very

familiar to me. I never personally met

with Tony Varona.

MI. Baron. Were you aware that William Harvey had an

independent line of communication with Tony Varona?

Mr. Halley. No, I am not.

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Mr. Baron. Would it surpriso you if that were the case?

Mr. Halley. The Tony Varona thing would surprise me,

frankly. I think I would not -- I would be surprised, yes.

Mr. Baron. Why is that?

Mr. Halley. Well, because here is a case where the guy

was a prominent exile figure, essentially residing in Miami, and

I knew of no contacts or had no reasons to suspect any contacts

with this kind of an exile figure, though once it specifically

appeared, I was aware of and it was discussed. This was done

under FitzGerald's stewardship with the Task Force. I was .

aware of that. I would be surprised if sombone was in touch

with Tony Varona and I did not know about it.. If you told me

that is what happoned, that is what llarvey has testified to,

I accept that. I am

surprised by it.

Mr. Baron. What was the nature of the CIA relationship

to Artime?

Mr. Halley. Well, the Miami Station had no direct relation-

ship with him.. As to the nature of the project, you know Artime

ran'from the Agency, from other people who actually worked with

•him on a first time

basis.

Mr. Baron.

Were you aware of a project called AMLASH?

Mr. lialley.

Let me make sure we are talking about the same

thing.

Mr. Baron. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

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:79.

MI. Baron. We have just gone off the record to straighten

out the fact that we are both talking about the same Cuban' high

military officer who was known to the CIA by the cryptonym of

AMLASH.

Correct me if I am wrong, Mr. Hallay, that you and I agree

that we are referring to the same person that we have identified

off the record?

MI. Halley. Yes, we have.

MI. Baron. Were you aware of contacts between AMLASH-1,

as he was known, and Artime?

Mr. Halley. I think at the time that this was going on, I

do not know whether I was or I was not. -- I was aware that the

CIA was in touch with AMLASH.

Mr. Baron. Did you deal directly with the case officers

who ran AMLASH?

MI. Halley. I did not. My recollection of this AMLASH

case is as follows. • At some point in time, I had a conversation

with Desmond FitzGerald in Washington during one of my periodic

visits to Washington from Miami. We discussed at that meeting

the nature of our approach to the military establishment in

Cuba. In the context of that conversation, Mr. FitzGerald asked

me if I thought whether it would be a good idea for him to meet

one of these Cuban military personalities, and he subsequently

identified to me the personality he was talking about was

AMLASH-1.

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• 80

My advico to him was that it would probably not ba a good

idea for him to meet him, and the only thing that I could see

coming out of that kind of a contact would be that he, Mr.

FitzGerald, would get a personal feel for what makes some of

these people tick, in human terms, and that that probably was

too high a price to pay for the prospect if anything went wrong,

an individual as prominent in Washington as, both within the

Agency and the social world in Washinaton, would be exposed in

the Press. That would create a flap that I thought was not

worth what would be gained from that meeting.

Mr. Baron.

Would this have been in the fall of 1963?

Mr. Halley. I have no recollection of the time.

Subsequent to that, Mr. FitzGerald told me that he had

indaed met him and that he had had an interesting conversation

with him. I subsequently recall that this gentleman was met

in Spain at some point in time --

Mr. Baron. This gentleman being AMLASH-1?

Mr. Halley. This gentleman, being AMLASH-1, was met in

Spain. I also recall after having left the Cuban activity that

I read a Press article showing that. he had been apprehended

and I remember reading the publicity of that particular

activity. It is also my recollection that we put in & cache

for

him.

That is about the sum and substance of it.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall what the purpose of that cache

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TOP SECRET:

was?

Was it a cache of arms?

MI. Halley. It was a cache. I think that you could:?"

go:tothe record to establish what was in the cache. I do not

recall specifically what the material was that was in the

cache.

MI. Baron. At the point that you were having these

conversations with Desmond FitzGerald, though, in the first

instance the prospect of his contact directly with AMLASH-1,

in the second instance his reaction to his contact with AMLASH-1

do you recall FitzGerald mentioning to you the fact that

AMLASH had requested assurances that high officials of the u.s.

government would stand behind him if he undertook operations on

behalf of the CIA?

Mr. Halley. I do not recall this at the time.

You know, I also want to say, as you probably know from

the record, I was later Chief of the WH Division from 1972 to

1973, and I did read some of the files. I am familiar with

the case. But at the time -- I am trying to be schizophrenic,

you know, to put this in the time sequence in which we are

• talking about. My recollection of that is that I did not know

that.

Mr. Baron. It would then be your testimony that Mr.

FitzGerald never broached with you the subject of making a

representation

to AMLASH-1 that. Robert Kennedy or other high

officials of the U.S. government would stand behind him?

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phone (Ares 202) 344-600

MI. Halley. I do not recall that kind of a conversation

taking place with FitzGerald in this timeframe that we are

talking about.

Mr. Baron.

Do you recall any such conversation at any

point?

Mr. Halley. No, I do not, in the timeframe that we are

talking about.

Mr. Baron. When I

say at any point,. I mean at any point.

since 1962.

Mr. Halley. Well, you know, in the period 1972-73, I did

look at some of the files, I did read some of the files. I am

familiar that such conversations took place and that there

were a series of meetings. You know, I know who the case

officer was and so forth.

Mr. Baron.

You never discussed the subject directly with

FitzGerald?

Mr. lialley.

With FitzGerald, no. I can only say that my

knowledge of that is secondhand from having subsequently read

the files.

• MI. Baron. Was it your impression at that time that one

of the objectives of the contact with AMLASHl-l was the assassina-

tion of Fidel Castro or other high Cuban leaders?

Mr. Halley. No. I never had the impression that assassina-

tion was a thrust of the activity. In other words, we were

working across-the-board, both in the context that Desmond

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FitzGerald and his staff were working on what I was doing in

Miami to try to establish contacts with the Cuban military.

In other words, we saw this as a multi-faceted approach. First,

we wanted penetrations of the Cuban military so that we could

collect intelligence.

What were their strengths, weaknesses,

what was their mood, where were things going? Secondly, we

wanted from these sources operational intelligence. Who -- in

other words, who in these groups were dissatisfied as Fidel

consolidated. Who could provide leadership for a counter-

movement

against

Fidel?

We were looking for people, once we had identified them,

to sed if we could establish contacts with any of these leaders

so we could see whether there was a basis for working toward

an overthrow of the Castro government. You know, those were

the basic steps.

Now as you got down to talking about how you overthrow

Castro, obviously the question comes in of how does a 'group who

wants to run a coup or take power take power, and obviously

one of the things that has to be looked at is where does the

•existing leadership going to be during this event, who has,

control of the various units.

So our discussions were all in

that context.

MI. Baron. Would it have surprised you or would it

surprise you now to learn that at least part of the contact

with AMLASH would have involved planning for an assassination

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attempt against Castro.

Mr. Halley. I certainly was not aware of that at the

time, as I recall from, you know, looking at the files in the

'72-'73 period, saeing any evidence of that in the file at the

time.

MI. Baron. There are fourteen folders in the AMLASH file.

Did you read all of those files?

Mr. Halley. No, I did not.

Mr. Baron. How did you gather your impression that that

was in the AMLASH files?

Mr. Halley. I think I may have read one or two volumes

of whatever my question was at the time, because these cases

keep

coming up. You know, there must have been some inquiry

at the time that necessitated my looking at the folder or

discussing it with my staff and so on.

MI. Baron. As far as you knew, what was the objective of

the contact with Artime?

Mr. Halley. You mean the CIA contact with Artime?

Mr. Baron. Yes,

.....

Mr. Halley. As a concept, the Artime thing was looked at

as another track, an approach to the overall Cuban problem to

see if they could sort of do it on their own. If they could

simply be given, you know, & number of dollars, some equipment,

some guidance, and give them an opportunity to find a Cuban

solution to what was a Cuban problem. That was also, you know,

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•85

and if you have not, you should talk to the people who ran the

Artime operation, when this was set up, I think I participated

In giving Artime some tutorial training for a couple of weeks

when this operation was first established in order to familiarize

him with some of the problems of trying to manage a large

operation against Cuba because he had been out of things for a

couple of years.

Mr. Baron. Were you aware that. he had been supplied a

weapon which we already agreed could be characterized as an

assassination weapon?

Mr. llalley. You say "we." You and I?

MI. Baron. Yes.

Mr. Halley. Which weapon was that?

Mx. Baron. A high-powered rifle with long-range and low

muzzle velocity.

Mr. Halley. I am aware of the fact of this project that

Artime was involved in that he got a number of weapons, any

number of which could have been used for sniper type activities.

I am aware of the fact that he had a base in Nicaragua to

• have activities, so I would find it hard to single out a weapon.

My recollection of that that he was given a large number of

weapons.

Mr. Baron.

Was one of Artime's objectives to have been

to assassinate Fidel Castro?

MI. Halley. Not that. I am aware of.

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Mr. Baron. Did you ever hear any discussion to the

effect that the Agency was attempting to achieve through Artime

indirectly. what they did not want to achlave directly in a

fashion that would be attributed to the CIA, namely the

assassination of Castro?

Mr. Halley. I think that you have tied two issues together

there and I do not think I can

answer. the question that way.

I would llke to separate the question into two parts.

Mr. Baron. Go ahead.

Mr. Halley. The first part, as I mentioned to you earlier

the CIA did establish a relationship with Artime and he was

given funds and other support to run his approach to solving

the cuban problem. He was one of two such activities that were

run at the time. And therefore I think that your statement is

correct that perhaps he was set up so that there could be no

direct attribution in his activities

to the United States,

because he set up a base in Nicaragua, and the story as I recall

it was put out that he was receiving assistance from the

Nicaraguan government, and therefore there was a part of the

whole cover story, if you will, for him.

So, yes, there was an attempt to set him up as a parallel

track or a separate track. That does not follow

from that, in

my perspective, that was geared towards an assassination

operation, because that was a fantastically large operation

involving lots of people, you know, with substantial amounts of

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money. I was opposed to it at the time. And once it was set

up, and I did what I was supposed to do, which was to train

Artime and contribute to his training, I then did not pay an

awful lot of attention to the thing except what I picked up,

you know, over the years, and again in the '72-'73 period,

and talked to officers who had, you know, more intimate knowledge

of it and got an appraisal of it as to what they thought had

occurrad.

Mr. Baron. Had you heard at any point that Artime was

supplied weapons for the specific purpose of assassinating

Castro?

Mr. Hallty. No, not for the specific purpose of assassina-

ting Castro.

Mt. Baron. Was it your general impression that AMLASiI-1

was a reliable agent?

Mr. Halley.

I really do not know that much about him,

you know. This was an operation that was run at that time out

of Washington and, you know, my knowledge was as I described it

to you, the conversations with FitzGerald, Madrid, newspaper

•articles, so forth, in that particular timeframe.

Mr. Baron.. Did the CIA to your knowledge use any gambling

Syndicate contacts inside Cuba or people outside Cuba who were

connected to gambling interests inside Cuba for any operational

purpose including the intelligence gathering?

Mr. Halley. The only case that I recall is this case that

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I mentioned to you carlier when we were in touch with an

individual whose name I cannot remember who had been involved

with one of the gambling houses in Cuba who came to us :with

leads to Soviets from a missile site who wanted to defact.

That is the only case that I know of. I cannot think of the

man's name. I can give you a physical description of him, and

so forth. I honestly cannot think of his name.

Mr. Baron. You are not. aware of any other use of people

with gambling interests in Cuba for intelligence gathering?

Mr. lialley. Not that I am aware of. If you have something

specific that you want to pursue, if you can give me some otheri

clue than that, I just do not, out of my past memory, I simply

do not recall any other case but that. one.

MI. Baron. Are you aware of any contact between the CIA

and Meyer Lansky?

Mr. Halley. No, I am not aware of any contact between the

CIA and Meyer Lansky.

MI. Baron. Nas Howard Hunt connected with any Cuban

operations during the period of your tenure at JMWAVE Station?

Hir. Halley. Howard Hunt was

involved in the Bay of Pigs

Operation. After the Bay of Pigs Operation wss over, he did not

participate in the Cuban activities that I was

aware of. You

may know something that I do not. know, because, you know, you

have asked me a couple of questions here of things that I am

not aware of. You may know

something that I do not, but

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certainly he did not come across my horizon at the time that I

was in Miami.

Mr. Baron. Have you ever heard the phrase Executive

Action?

Mr. Halley.

YeS.

Mr. Baron. What does that signify to you?

Mr. Halley. Well, Executive Action is some sort of a

euphemism -- to eliminate somebody, I guess is how it appears

in the popular jargon.

Mr. Baron. Did you hear it in the Agency?

MI. Halley. No, I think that this is a term that has been

bandied about in the Press that has come about. in the Press to

ba synonymous with killing somebody or something like that.

Mr. Baron. It is not, as far as you know, a euphemism in

common usage within the Agency?

Mr. Halley.

No.

Ms. Baron. Had you ever heard of the ZRRIFLE Project run

by William Harvey?

MI. Halley. No, I do not know what it. is.

Mr. Baron. Have you

ever heard

of--

MI. Halley. I want to maks sure here that I am accurate,

you know. You are asking me ZRFIFLE. That is a cryptonym for

something.

Mr. Baron. Let me explain further.

Mr. Halley. I want to sort of say, in the last thirteen

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years I have seen literally --

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Halley, Let me go back. You asked me about RIfLE.

This is one of a thousand

or hundreds of cryptonyms.

Evely day

I read, you know, hundreds of pages of traffic, so when you ask

me do I know what URRIFLE is, I must answer you off the top of

my head

no. I have tried to be helpful. I have asked you

several times if you could give me a steering tip or show me

what direction you are going, I might

be able to try to comment

on it, but ZRRIFLE as such

means

nothing to me. You really

could not expect that it would, given the thousands of these

things that come across my desk.

MI. Baron. That

is absolutely understandable. I want to

try to see what happens in the way of getting an unrefreshed

recollection from

you, then I will go back over these two,

especially the next one, DJWIN. Do you recall a CIA asset who

went by the cryptonym OJIN?

Mr. Halley. No, i do not.

Kriowing the system, and so

forth, normally it would have

something to do with Spain. It

does not ring any bells with me. That 1s all I can give you,

a sort of Pavlovian responge.

You flash AJVIN on the screen,

I

telling you now i do not know, but it probably

has

something to do with Spain.

Mr. Baron. Were

you alvare that a project involving the

development of a capability of carrying on assassination was

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run by William Harvey?

Mr. Halley.

to detelop the capability to carry on the

assassination?

Mr.. Baron. Yes.

Mr. Halley.

No. I have no knowledge of llarvey being

focused on a project or given the capability of carrying one

out.

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Mr. Baron. Harvey has testified, as has Richard Bissell,

I will represent to you, that instruction was given by Bissell

to Harvey to set up, to develop such a capability in early 1961

and that Harvey took steps to develop such a capability in

coordination with an asset in New York named nJWIN and I think

that period of greatest activity was in 1962 and WIN was

involved in spotting potential assets among the criminal under-

world in Europe and might be used for any number of dirty

deeds.

Mr. diGenova. It should be emphasized that the Executive

Action Plan that you are referring to has had as

its goal the

incapacitation of foreign leaders, one possibility of

incapacitation being the ultimate weapon, assassination. It

was just not assassination. It was a spectrum of activities

that could be used to incapacitate a foreign leader anywhere

from illness, chemical warfare, and then including death.

Correct me if I am wrong, but it was not just assassination.

MI. Baron. Does that ring any bells?

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MI.. Halley. No, it does

not.

MI. Baron. Do you have any recollection that the ZRRIFLF.

Project involving the development of an'Executive Action"

capability would have been tied in in any way to an operation

against Cuba?

Mr. Halley.

No, that does not ring any bells, none what-

soever.

Mr. Baron. I would like to introduce as Halley Exhibit

3

an article from Harper's Magazine entitled "The Kennedy

Vendetta,"

subtitled "How the CIA Waged a Silent War Against

Cuba," written by Taylor Branch and George Crile III.

Let me show

you this article and let me ask you whether

you have read it?

MI. Halley. Yes, I have read the article.

(The document referred

to was marked lalley

Exhibit No. 3 for

identification.1

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Mr. Baron. Let us pick out some specifics and discuss

them briefly here.

Near the beginning of this article, it mentions that JMWAVE

Station operated within an annual budget of well in excess of

$50 million.

Would that be accurate to you?

Mr. Halley. I do not recall whether that is an accurate

figure. We would have to go back to the records: You know, as

I explained to you earlier, the start of the operation taking

place in March and

escalatid up. to a high point:and then

dropped off. In the budgetary cycle, we are dealing with a

mass of figures, and I would not want to give you an inaccurate

answer. That

is something that could be researched -- we have

the files - rather than speculate for you on the buildup and

• reduction in the operation. I do not feel that is useful.

Mr. Baron. As a ballpark figure, would you be able to

place the annual

budget of the Station in the neighborhood

of tens of millions of dollars?

Mr. Halley. No, I would not, because of this transition,

you know, period, the costs were very high in the beginning to

get a start-up operation, brougit to a certain peak, and then

tapered off and starting to be peeled back. I would not want

to draw a figure of --

MI. diGenova. What would the start-up cost?

•Mr. Halley. In terms of what they

involved or dollars?

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. Mr. diGanova. Dollars.

MI. Halley. I have no recollection of the dollars.

Mr. Baron. Would you say that $50 million would be in the

right ballpark for your activities at the peak?

MI. Halley. I just have no recollection of the dollar

figure. You might want to get that figure when you can retrieve

it in the files. It is available.

MI. Baron. Were the operations of IMWAVE coordinated with

other Latin American CIA Station's, as the article indicates

here?

MI. Halley. I think my recollection of that phase is that

Cuban activitles with other Latin American stations were

coordinated with JMWAVE.

Mr. Baron. Coordinated with JMAVE?

MI. Halley. With JMWAVE.

MI. Baron. Who had the central coordinating responsibility?

Mr. Halley. Washington.

MI. Baron.. Was that. delegated by Washirgton to you?

Mt. Halley. No. Essentially Washington had the overall

coordinating responsibility, but that needs some

elaboration.

me say that we would become aware in our activities in

Miami that a number of interesting people had come in on a

flight to Mexico City. He would send a cable down to Mexico

City with an information copy to washington outlining who we

were interested in, and I would probably send somebody down to

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Mexico to look at the particular Cuban or the operational

opportunity in conjunction with the Station Chief in Mexico

City. So we were in some cases a clearinghouse.

The final coordination authority rested in. Hashington. I

will say that if Miami wanted to do something and for local

political reasons in Mexico thé Mexican Station Chief did not.

want to do it, that would be adjudicated, not by Miami, but by

Washington.

Mr. Baron. Let me quote you a passage here and see if it

comports with our discussions earlier of special arrangements

you may have, the JMVAVE Station may have had, with law enforce-

ment authorities in Florida.

The article says: "All the boat missions to Cuba were tech+

nically illegal under the Neutrality Act, the Maritime Laws,

and Immigtation statutes, so that the Station had to work out

special acrangements with Customs, Immigration and the Coast

Guard."

Is that generally accurate?

MI. Halley. I think, as I described to you before, there

• was coordination with the Coast Guard

in terms of vessel

departures. The other is Immigration?

MI. Baron. Customs, Immigration and Coast Guard.

MI. Halley. Immigration, there would not have been

coordination or a particular, you know, boat dispatch. On

the

other hand, let's say if a mission aborted for some reason and

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a small boat could not racover its position and get back to the

mother ship to be picked up and it was adrift or came in to one

of the islands or came in to the Florida coast anywhere and was

picked up and picked up by Immigration inspactors, then they

would

ask to have their case referred to a particular individual

It may have been a code number, a color code, it may have been

phrase. But then Immigration would get in touch with us and say

we have this group, here is what they say, what is your interest

In this particular group, and then that would be adjudicated

at that point.

Now the third group was Customs. Customs did have a

number of patrols and at times when boat loadings were conducted

off the Florida Keys in particular, those ware coordinated with

the Coast Guard so they would not be expending their manpower

to run down groups that were extricating with us, in fact the

Agency was doing.

MI. Baron. The article continues to say: "It was illegal

for agents to travel around with machine guns and plastic

explosives in the cars, as they often did. The Station had to

establish

liaison with seventeen police jurisdictions along

the Florida coast

and into the Keys. The result was that

any agent who was arrested for anything from drunken driving to

illegal possession of firearms would be quickly released."

Is that accurate?

Mr. Halley. I commented on that before, and we are on the

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record on that as saying that we did not drive around, there

were no vehicles moving, manned by thase Cubans with arms and

weapons on them.

In other words, you are coming back to the same point,

becauss as I explained to you, the weapons were only given to

them on the vessel and taken back from them when they came back

from a mission, so that the statament is not actually correct.

Mr. Baron. What about. the end of that

passage where they

say that the result,

and I understand that you would disagree

to whether it was

a result of this kind of a practice which

you say was not carried on at all.--

MI. Halley. It was not.

Mr. Baron. Did a situation exist where any agent who was

arrested for anything from drunken driving to illegal possession

of firearms would be quickly released.

Mr. Halley. I have to go back and divide your question

into two parts. There were no

firearms --

MI. Baron. I am not saying firearms supplied to them by

the CIA for a CIA mission or any agent travelling down the

street in Miami who happened to have a Saturday Night Special

in his car or who happened to be drunk while driving. Would

such a person be released right away of once the CIA connection

surfaced?

Mr. Halley. My ansver to that is no. In other words, if

he had a Saturday Night Special and was picked up by the police

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and detained, and if he then asked to be in contact with us,

the case would be looked at at that particular point and if he

had a Saturday Night Special, you know, there would not be any

Intervention on his behalf because it had nothing to do with

his

task on the behalf of CIA.

I did mention to you earlier we had training camps in various

parts of the State. If somebody came out of the training camp

and did get drunk and was

picked up and did not speak English

or something and the police jurisdictions did have a way of

getting in touch with us and we might intervene on a case of

disorderly conduct.

MI. diGenova. How was that established, the relationship of

liaison with these jurisdictions.

lad it been set up with

IMWAVE directly through Washington and down through the FBI?

How had that been done?

Mr. Halley. It varied. When we started expanding the

operation, you know,

there had already

been a Station there

and

there also were

two security units in the greater Miami

area.

In some cases the existing contacts at the station were

expanded, the same with Dade County. In

other cases, the

sacurity of personnel who had established contact with other

jurisdictions were used to effect the introduction. In some

cases, we had our security people who were on my staff go out

to these

jurisdictions and identily themselves simply with a

badge and a name and discuss the kinds of things that they were

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interested In so that there would not be a cross 'öf problems

with these jurisdictions and therefore a liaison was opened on

that basis, a multiplicity of approaches.

Mr. Baron. The article discusses the fact that regular

commando raids were run out of JWAVE Station to the shore of

Cuba, and that those commandos-were equipped with.all kinds of

explosives and armaments.

Is that generally a fair statement, that we were running on

a regular basis commando raids to Cuba?

Mr. Halley. Yes.

There were

a series of commando raids

run from the Miami Station against targets in Cuba.

Mr. Baron. Were assassination weapons, that is, high-powered

rifles with low muzzle velocity and telescopic sights, supplied

to those commando teams as a matter of course?

MI. Halley. .. No, they were not.

For most of those

commando teams, you were looking for a different kind of a

weapon. You are looking for a weapon with a high range of fire

power over a short distance to deal with an emergency situation

rather than the kind of, you know, weapon that we are talking

about.

In other words, you would find

that type of a group armed

with a submachine gun, as for example.

Mr. Baron. If

an assassination weapon as we have

described it was supplied to a commando team, they would have

to have a sperific purpose in mind for its use?

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Mr. Hallay. Yes.

Also, again, all of these weapons were controlled, the

weapons that were issued

at the time of the mission on the

mother ship and picked up on the team's return to the mother

ship, so there was accountability for the weapons.

Mr. Baron.

• Would

it have been

unusual to supply what we

have called an assassination weapon to a commando team?

Mr. Halley.

Well, that

depends on the mission.

For

instance, let me use an example.

Most of the missions that were run were run against targets

•that were in fairly close proximity to the shore. If you are

going

to put a party to attack your objectives, let us say the

objective was a petroleum storage tank, if you were going to do

this by putting charges up

against the petroleum storage tank

that meant that you had to have a group infiltrate close

enough to put the charges on the tank. Some distance away

from them you would give them a second element of the commando

team

which would be providing

covering fire for this.group in

case they got into trouble and cannot. handle it on the ground.

This covering fire group might have had a light machine gun.

a Belgian weapon. They could have these kinds of weapons and

they did have these kinds of weapons which

in the definition you

art

using could be used as a sniper weapon of whatever, but the

basic reason for having

that

weapon was.

to provide fire

support.

for the other members uf the commando team. And therefore when

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this mission was over and they raturned, those weapons were

taken back from them and accounted for. They were shaken down

so that we did not have weapons disuppearing out of our

control.

Mr. Baron. Such weapons, high-powered rifles with telescopic

scopes, conceivably with silencers, were supplied with some

regularity, but they were kept under tight control?

Mr. Halley. We had high-powered rifles. I cannot think now

of a case where there was a sniper scope attached to the rifle.

I can think of no case where there

was a silencer attached to

a rifle in any of these commando raids. There were a number of

raids conducted, some of them involved

teams of fifteen or

twenty men. I am not prepared to say that no man ever had one,

but.I do. not recall one. You know, if you gave me an inventory

which are in the

files, for each of the operations and

say here

is the operation plan, does this list of equipment fifteen

years

later l00k reasonable to you, I would be able to tell you yes

or no.. But off the top of my

head, I do not recall a sniper

scope or

a silenced rifle.

Mr: Baron. Do you know a man by the name of Rolando

Martinez?

•..Mr. Halley. Of Watergate involvement?

MI. Baron. Yes.

Mr. Halley. Yes, I know of him. I have never met him

personally. • I know

of him. lle was a member of our boat

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infiltration team. Ho was a UDT man.

Mr. Baron. In the Harper's article, It says that Martinez

indicated that "More than once he was given personal charge of

weapons drops in which special rifles with silencers and tele-

scopic sights were left in designated inland

spots."

Do you know of a factual basis. for that statement?

Mr. Halley. Martinez is undoubtedly factually correct when

he says he put caches on the coast

of Cuha

that contained

weapons

I do not know how he would be able to tall what kind of weapons

were in the cache.

The reason I say that is that when one of

these missions were

planned, the cache was put together and

packed by our logistics group and once the cache

was put

togather it was brought on board the vessel and the

cache was

then turned over to

the team for infiltration so he would never

have seen

the contents of the cache, he would

not have

opened

it up because it was always in a sealed container.

It is conceivable that in the pre-mission briefing that

he got before he went down that he was told that we are

putting

In a cache containing a radio or putting in a cache containing

weapons because that would influence what he selecter as a

cache typy. In other words, if it ware a

radio, we would want.

it higher and drier than we would a can containing weapons that.

were wraped in cosmolene and

so forth. He might know that they

were weapons, but he wouldn't krow that they were silenced

and they had

a scope.

I must honestly

say to you I doubt that.

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Mr. Baron. Did you know of any weapons drops that ware

mado for the purpose of supplying someone inside Cuba with a

weapon for the assassination of Fidel Castro?

MI. Halley. No, not for that clearly stated purpose.

AS

I told you, we put a lot of weapons caches in.

The weapons were

multi-purpose weapons, could be used. I know of no cacha that

went in specifically for the task of playing a contributory role

to assassinating Fidel Castro.

MI. Baron. It would not have been contrary to the policy

directives under which you were operating at the time to

supply such a weapon to someone inside Cuba who might have

access to Castro?

Mr. Halley. No, it would not have been.

For instance,

I can remember several resistance.groups that we had that had two

three hundred

men

that we were supplying on a regular basis.

Mr. diGenova. Inside Cuba?

MI. Halley.

Inside Cuba, that were essentially living in

the bush

to a large extent, whom we did supply weapons to and

got anmunition to them and so forth. And that was why I was

very careful when you mentioned this linkage before to saying

that I could

not be a guarantor

as to what these man would do

with these weapons once they got their hands on them. They

were free

agents.

Mr. digenova. This is an interesting point. This has

come up before. He are aware of our reading of the record that

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what you have

said is

a concern of not only yourself in terms of

realizing that it was a possibility but of people: like Dean

Rusk and Mr. McCone, who also said, you have to realize then

once

these agents

are in another country and are supplied that

thore is little if anything we can do to control those weapons

after they receive them. It would

be safe to say that that, of

course, was understood that there was a lack of control, and

to the extent that it was a problem, it existed and had to be

tolerated because of the nature of the operation, would that

be correct?

Mr. Halley. I do not know whether I want to phrase it

exactly as you have in terms of this lack of control. Our

mission in dealing with these groups was to first, to put them

in areas where we did not have other intelligence covers. Their

first task was to collect intelligence.

The:

second task was to organize a resistance which would

take armed action if we ever got a total package put together

that jave us an opportunity -- that was the first and secondary

missions. Once we issued the weapons to the team leader, if

you will, he had freedom to recruit from among the peasants

anybody he wanted to. If he gave the peasant a weapon, there

was no guarantee either by the team leader or by us that that

peasant would not do something that we did not want him to do.

To even shoot a militiaman, you could have an

argument, you

know, over a woman. Any numher of things.

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Mr. diGenova. Were there any restrictions, once, for

example, those weapons caches were delivered either by land or

air -- and we have spoken

to Mr. Murray who was in the lavana

Station, for example, for awhile and Arthur Avignon who :

was head of the Havana Station

for awhile who indicated that

they ware aware of the weapons drops and were intimately

familiar with where they would be.

Mr. Halley. That was

all before my time. I have no

knowledge of that. During my time, we mada no drops by

air.

Mr. diGenova.

Were there any limitations that were

placed of how the weapons would

be used that were delivered

into

Cuba to these internal resistance groups?

Mr. Halley.

I cannot speak to this period that you are

addressing.

Mr. diGenova. During your period.

Mr. Halley. During my period, the weapons were issued

essentially

as self-protection for the people who were living

in the bush. Secondly, to be used in a military operation at

such time as we got the whole package together. Thirdly, they

were to be used for self-protection if they conducted raids,

ambushes, sabotage operations.

ir. Baron.

There is one further quote from Martinez in

this article that I would like to ask you to comment on.

He is

quoted as saying: "I took

a lot of weapons to Cuba, some

of them were very special weapons for special purposes. They

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were powerful rifles with sophisticated scopas, Sprlngflalds

with bolt

action, rifles only used by snipers. They were not

sent to shoot pigeons or to kill rabbits. Everyone in the

Underground was

plotting to kill Castro and the CIA was helping

the Underground. I was with the Underground as well as the CIl,

so you can see I was involved in the

plots too, but that is

also obvious."

You commented before that there was a lot of talk in the

air about assassinating Castro. Martinez seems to by taking

that a few steps further, saying that there were actual plots

underway in the Cuban Underground to assassinate Castro and

that people who worked with the CIA were aware of those plots

and were

aiding them in effect by the weapons they were

supplying.

Is that an accurate statement?

Mr. Halley. No, I do not think I can go along with that

statement. Martinez' role as

I described it to you, he is

accurate when he says that weapons were put in and that :'..

he participated in putting them in.

I again question how he

would know what was in each cache. I just do not see that, and

I would havy to accept that

as a sort

of secondhand

statement

by him becauser of the way that the caches were put together.

I just do not see his knowing that.

Now I don't want to exclude, however, that any particular

kind of weapon did not go to Cuba. Maybe bolt-action

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Springfields did go in.

Mr. diGenova. Could he have found out about this after

the fact from people that he knew in Cuba, members of the

resistance in Cuba that he knew of who would have told him the

nature of the items that they would have received in a cache

delivery? Would that be one way that he could have found out?

was he that intimately involved, to your knowledge?

Mr. Halley. He was not at the time. This is the period

that I am familiar with, '62-'65. I do not know. Maybe some

of these

people have come out since then, and maybe he has

talked to people who have come out in '68, '69, things like that

I cannot exclude that.

At the time, I do not think, however, he would have had

that kind of firsthand knowledge, and therefore I have trouble

with that statement and I cannot identify with it.

Mr. Baron.

The Harper's article says: "By the end of

1961, several men affiliated with the CIA had already been

foiled in attempts to kill him" -- meaning Castro -- "among

them, Luis Toroella, executed; Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, still in

•prison; William Morgar, executed; and Antonio Veciana, escaped

to the United States. lad these men succeeded, their efforts

would have been tied to the U.s. only indirectly, if at all."

Let me show you the passage I am reading from and ask

you whether you have any knowledge of the connection of any of

those men named to the cIA.

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(Pause)

Mr. Halley. No, there is no connection that I know of

between these names and CIA. This guy Luis Toroella does not

ring any bells with me. Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo was a leader of

Alpha 66. He may have been in Cuba in '61. During the time

that I was involved in Cuban affairs he was in exile for -- he

was in Miami for a long period of time.

MI. Baron. Can you explain what Alpha 66 is for the

record?

MI. Halley. Alpha 66 was a Cuban exile organization that

was engaged in a number of raids against the Cuban government.

They claimed to have

attacked Cuban shipping, fishing boats, and

claimed to have an organization in Cuba that was a resistance

organization. Gutierrez Menoyo was therefore a well-known name

to me. We had no direct contact with him.

William Morgan is also a well-known name. His activities

and exploits in Cuba are well-known to anybody that has dealt

with Cuban affairs.

MI. Baron. Do you have any knowledge of a connection

batween any of these people and assassination attempts against

Fidel Castro?

Mr. Halley. I have none, no connection between these names

and CIA and attempts to assassinate Fidel Castro.

Mr. Baron. The fact that. they ary listed here as having

been involved in assassination attempts whether or not they

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109

were connected with CIA is news to you?

Mr. Halley. Well, no, I would not say that. If you had

Gutierrez Menoyo sitting here and if he were to say

in 1962 1

attempted to shoot Fidel Castro, that is Gutierrez Menoyo did

this, I would have no reason to doubt. I would have no basis

for proving it, either.

Mr. Baron.

You have never heard of these alleged assassina-

tion attempts before?

Mr. Halley. No.

Morgan'

s name I would have to do a file trace to get myself

back up to date. Morgan did get himself in trouble with Fidel

over some

issue;, as I recall was in prison.

I do not recall,

remember if he

was

executed, although this says he was executed.

MI. Baron. What about the last name on the list.

Antonio Veciana?

Mr. Malley.

That.

is a name that rings a bell with me, but

I do not attach anything to it. In other words, it is a name

I have probably read in various and sundry kinds of reports.

I remumber

no operational relationship with him between the Miami

Station and this man during my tenure in Miami.

Мг. Вагоп.

During your tenure, would you have been

in a

position to know that these paople had

led assassination

attempts against castro, if that were indeed the fact?

Mr. Halley. Not necessarily. I would say that the odds

would have been high that we would have, particularly, say

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Gutiorrez Menoyo. We did have a steady stream of reporting on

the activities of all axile groups and Alph. 66 was high on the

list of groups that had a capability of doing this kind of

thing. Therefore, they received quite a bit of coverage from

us, from the FBI, from Customs, and others.

They were on everybody's sort of watch list.

MI. Baron. Let us tum now to a document that we will

introduce as Exhibit 4, which is a report by Fidel Castro on

alleged attempts to assassinate him that he connects to the

United States government and especially to the CIA.

(The document referred

to was marked Malley

Exhibit No. 4 foI

identification.)

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Mr. Baron. Which was released recently by Gaorge McGovern,

to whom Castro had sent this report.

MI. Halley, is it true that I had askod you to review this

report before we began our session today?

Mr. Halley. Yes, you did, you did ask ma to look at the

report.

Mx. Baron. Can you point to any names ur incidents in

this report that are connected in any way in your mind to

actual assassination attempts against Cuba: -- Castro?

MI. llalley. No, I cannot point to any names that in my

mind are attached to an assassination attempt against Castro:

You asked me to look at this originally to see if

any of the

names were familiar to me in any way. I made a list of some

of the names that rang a bell with me, for various reasons.

One name is Humberto Sori Marin. I recall that he was

active, he was active with the DRE.

MI. Baron. At what page is that?

Mr. Halley. There

is no page number.

For

instance, here's

a name, Humberto Sori Marin. That is

•familiar to me. I do not know whether that was from the

reporting showing that he was in prison, you know, we constantly

got reporting on, or why, it is a name that I recognize in the

counterrevolutionary sense, that it is something that crossed

my

dask, to see the name.

All right.

The other name that is familiar is Tony Varona.

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112

That was a Cuban exile leader. Wa talked about Tony Varona. I

told you I did not know that Tony Varona had any connection with

MI. Harvey.

There

is another name in here, Manolo Ray. I mentioned

Manolo Ray to you. He was one of two exile leaders who had a

relationship with the Agency. You know, I told you Artime was

one; Manolo Ray is another.

He is familiar to me as a result of

that.

MI. Baron. You did not know of any involvement of Manolo

Ray in an

assassination effort against Castro?

Mr. Halley.

I do not.

Hert is another name mentioned in the same paragraph,

Aureliano Sanchez Arango. That is a name that

is familiar to

me as a prominent Cuban exile.

Mr. Baron.

You have no more specific recollection?

Mr. Halley. I am trying to be responsive to your question,

telling you which names ring a bell with me as

I run through

this.

Mr. Baron.

All I am trying to do is clarify for the

record the exact nature of your recollection of each of these

names.

Do you have any recollection of a plot alluded to in this

report to shoot Castro with a bazooka at the lavana Stadium?

ir. Halley. No, I do not have any recollection of that.

According to this, it this is correct, it took place in October

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113

of '61 which I would not have had any knowledge of because I

was not involved in Cuban affairs until, as I told, you, early

February 1962.

Mr. Baron. The same would go for the shooting of a

bazooka towards the Presidential Palace?

15. Halley. I have no knowledge.

Mr. Baron.

Do you have any knowledge of any efforts to

assassinate Fidel Castro run out of Guantanamo Bay Naval Base?

MI. Halley. No, I do not. As you know, Guantanamo had

a number

of Cuban

exiles in it, people who had taken refuge in

the base at one time or another.:. During the time that I was the

Station Chief in Miami we did have contacts with people at

Guantanamo. We did use

them for intelligence collection

purposes, but I do not have

any linkage between that intelligence

project and assassination.

Mr. Baron.

were paramilitary operations run out of

Guantanamo Bay?

Mr. Halley. They were not during my time as Station Chief

in Miami by CIA. There was an office of DNI, Office of

Naval Intelligence representative on Guantanamo. I have no

knowledge of what they may have been doing during various

periods of time. I am talking about CIA.

Mr. Baron. Any other names that struck a chord with you

in this report?

Mr. Halley. Well, you have a name here, Mario Salabarria

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Aquiar; that name rings a bell with me, for what reason, I do

not know. You know, we would have to run a name tracs.to get

a rundown of what is in the files and what is in the central

Index for me to be able to comment on it. As I told you earlier

I know that the Agency is doing all these traces after they are

completed and you get them and you want me to take a look at

it, I will ba glad to do so.

It may trigger some response.

This name, Ramon Grau Scerio, it rings a bell with me. It

is quite possible that he may have been a collection agent, just

as is written here. I am making a deduction, but again, I would

have to look at the name traces, but it is a name that rings a

bell with me.

Mr. Baron.

You do not remember him in connection with an

attempt to poison the Prime Minister in June of 1965 as it says

there?

Mr. Halley. No, I do not.

Then the next name that is on here, that is familiar.

Here is one that we discussed, that is AMLASH-1. We already

went over that one.

The other name was Manuel Artime, whom we have talked

about.

Mr. Baron. Right.

Mr. Baron. The last name on here -- I cannot find it --

the other name is Antonio Cuesta Valle. I cannot find it now,

but that is the last name that rang a bell.

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Mr. Baron. Do you have any recollaction of Cuesta

Valla's specific activities with the CIA?

MI. Halley. No. I would have to run traces on him and

take a look at what the information is.

MI. Baron. Was Frank Sturgis connected with the JWAVE

Station?

Mr. Halley. He was not.

Mr. Baron. Not under the name of Frank Fiorino either?

Mr. Halley. No, ha was not. This is again one of these

great myths. At this whole Cuba thing, Frank Sturgis was a

soldier of fortune, was constantly involved on the periphery

of the Cuban exile community. lle was involved in free lance

operations against Cuba. He was somebody that the FBI,

Customs, CIA, everybody, reported on. He was a household name,

but he was not on the CIA payroll during tha period that I was

involved in Cuban affairs, that is the payroll of the Miami

Station. I remember

name traces being run on this guy and so

forth, and the Agency had no contact with him during that

period of time.

Hi. Baron. Are you aware of his ever having been on the

payroll of the CIA?

Mr. Halley. I personally am not aware of it, and I think,

you know, if you had gone to the Agency that they must have given

you all sorts of traces on this fallow and told you the same

thing.

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Mr. Baron:

Are you aware of the AMOT program?

Mr. Halley. Yas, I am.

MI. Baron.

How was that spelled?

MI. Halley. AMOT.

Mr. Baron. What was that program?

Mr. Halley. That was a program involving a Cuban emigre

group that was used

as an operational support mechanism to

support the Miami Station.

Mr. Baron.

What kind of support did they provide?

MI. Halley. They were interviewers of refugees who came

out of Cuba. They provided translator personnel to translate

the Spanish language publications that were of interast to us.

They provided information on the various mainstream activities

that were going on in the Cuban exile community.

Mr. Baron. Did they provide support for paramilitary

operations against Cuba?

Mr. Halley. They might have identified people whom they

thought we should interview or look to or see if they would

fit into other paramilitary programs. In other words, they

had the contacts. in the Cuban community. Say we had a requiry-

ment for a diesel engineer. We would say to the MOT organiza-

tion, we would say we are looking for a Cuban who is a diesel

enginter who has a first engine's license, and they would go.

through all of their contacts until they would come up with

one, a week or ten days or whatever, having identified: :

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the fellow, where he was, what he was doing.

We would then

sand somebody around to talk to him independent of them and

pick him up to work for us in our maritime activities.

It was that kind of operational support.

Mr. Baron. People who were part of this program were

not used as paramilitary operatives, at least insofar as they

operatad under the aegis of this program. There were some of

them who may have buen in the paramilitary program

and then

left it and were subsequently picked up in the AMUT organiza-

tion.

Could we go off the record for a moment?

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Halley. 'e are now back on the record.

The AMOTs also worked with us on a common project, which

was monitoring Cuban naval traffic, things like that, so they

were used across the hoard for operational support tasks.

MI. Baron. One more

general question.

Did the JMWAVE Station have an operational relationship

with the FBI?

ir. Halley. I would not --

Mr. Baron. Was the FBI involved in

supporting your

activities in any way?

Mr. Halley. I would rather phrase that in my language,

because I think -

Mr. Baron. Go right ahead.

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• 118

Mr. Hallay. I do not know if your question means the same

thing to me. I would prefer to say we had a liaison relation-

ship with the FBI, that is, on matters dealing with counter-

intelligence matters.

There was a regular exchange of data

with the FBI. There was an

exchange of name tracas on people

that they were conducting investigations on. for: countérintellit

gence purposes, We would trace certain individuals and with the

FBI there were a couple of counterintelligence cases that we

discovered that were turned over to the FaI.

So this is in the context of the normal CIA-FBI liaison

that existed between the two agencies.

Mr. Baron. But the FBI was not involved in supporting

paramilitary commando raids to tha shord of Cuba, is that.

correct?

Mr. Halley.

I do not know what you are driving at.

their. I am having a little trouble with that. Are you saying

that the FBI dispatched paramilitary teams to Cuba as

an organization?

Mr. Baron. Were they involved in paramilitary training

of any of the CIA operatives?

Mr. Halley.

No. The FBI did not train any CIA personnel

during my tenure in the Miami Station.

Mr. Baron. Did the FBI at any point provide with you

links to people who had gambling interests inside Cuba?

MI. Halley. No. We covered the gambling thing previously.

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nene lAres 2021544-6000

AUI

410 First Street, S.E., Washingion, D.C. 20001

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TOP SECRET

119

The one case that I mentioned is this man who gave us the ..

lead of the two Soviets from the missila site, and that did not

come to the Miami Station through the FBI.

MI. Baron. Were you ever made awara of a CIA attempt to

secure the ald of a pilot, a Cuban pilot, to arrange for an

"accideht," to occur to Raul Castro when he flew on a Cuban

plane?

MI. Halley. I read this somewhere in the record in post

years, but I was not aware of this at the time, at the time I

was in Miami.

MI. Baron. Were you aware that serious consideration had

been given to the tactic of assassination at CIA leadquarters

during your period of involvement :with Cuban affairs?

MI. Halley. No, that is in the period 1962 to '65 when

I was the Station Chief in Miami, I was not aware of any serious,

you know, program operational effort towards assassinating

Castro.

Mr. Baron. Were you aware that serious consideration had

been given to the tactic or to the use of the tool of assassina-

tion at CIA Headquarters prior to your coming on as IMWAVE

Station Chief?

Mr. Halley. No, I was not aware of any, you know, planned

program effort at assassination.

MI. Baron. If we limit it --

Mr. diGenova.

What. do you mean when you say that?

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## Page 122

phone (Arad: 202) 544-600

r.

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

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TOP SECRET

7120

Mr. Halley. I went through this before before you came

in and explained to Mr. Baron that the subject of assassination

was constantly being discussed in the Cuban community and was a

part of the fabric of the times.

MI. diGenova. That I am aware of. you are not the only

one who has expressed that knowledge that they were all saying

let's kill him, let's get together.

Mr. Halley. There was a lot of discussion of this kind of

subject of assassination and that is why I keep trying to be

precise that there was no programmatic operational program that

I was aware of to assassinate Castro.

Mr. Baron. Although the context in which we discussed the

talk that was in the air of assassinating Castro was coffee shops

in Miami and conversation among Cubans as opposed to conversa-

tions among high CIA officials back in Headquarters, were you

aware that there were at least serious discussions of the

use of assassination against Castrc at CIA leadquarters?

Mr. Halley. No, I was not. We are plowing the same ground

that we covered before in this.

As I indicated to you, people would come out of, Cuba and

discuss these kinds of things.

Some of these were reported in,

you know, traffic back to Washington. People would discuss

what are the prospects of somebody assigned to assassinate

Castro. In that particular context, yes, discussions on the

assassination of Castro took place. That is why I keep coming

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## Page 123

TOP SECRET

phone (Ares 202) 344-6000

-.

PAUL

r.

410 First Street, S.E., Washengion, D.C. 20003

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121

back, if you are saying that if anybody outlined an opsrational

plan to ma, did I help construct the plan, did I make a contri-

bution to a plan, my answer is again no. We talked earlier,

you asked me about those exploding sea shells of which I said

I had never heard of but I had heard discussions of Castro's

vulnerability because he was a scuba diver. And you asked me

about bacteria, I said I had never heard of an introduction of

bacteria, but I had heard again about Castro's vulnerability

in this context.. Where I heard 1t., as I told you before, I do

not remember.

MI. Baron. I realize we are plowing some of the same .

furroughs again. I am trying to be meticulous in the way you

wert before. You just now said that the subject of assassina-

tion probably came up in the context of discussing the contin-

gencies of Castro's death. Did

it come up in terms of discus-

sing whether or not a plan should be put together to assassinate

Castro, whether of not an operation should be mounted --

MI. Halley. I cannot recall any such discussion, but in

any state where there

is a leadership dominated by one man, it

is always a discussion of succession. That question has come

up, you know, if something happened to Fidel Castro, if he is

thrown over, if he does something foolish himself or if somebody

is successful in assassinating him, somebody who decides sudden-

ly to take his machetti ard just get out in tha sugar cane

field, again, the question was, who replaces Castro, and we

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## Page 124

phone (Ares 202) 544-6006

TOP SECRET

4122

generally focused on Raul. There was talk of a collectivo

leadership.

These are all kinds of things that are always done. against

that kind of a one-man state, whether it ls, you know, a

Communist state or whatever you want to talk, call it a

military dictatorship or a dictatorship of the Bight or the

Left.

...

MARD

410 FIrsI SIreel, S.E.. Washingion, D.C. 20003

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Mr. Baron. Again, discussion of what to do upon the

contingency that Castro dies, by whatever means --

MI. Halley. Non-Agency induced.

MI. Baron. As opposed to this, which is my quastion:

were you aware of any kind of a discussion at CIA Headquarters

on whether or not the CIA should induce the death of Fidel

Castro?

Mr.. Halley.

I do not recall any such discussion. That

is why I have gone into all this background to try to explain

the mood of the times and that is why I keep referring to, in

my sense of the word,

as a professional intelligence officer,

of an opyrational plan, I was not a participant in any discus-

•sion in which an operational plan for the assassination of

Castro was discussed. That is, I think, the heart of the

matter.

MI. Baron. I have no further questions.

Joe, do you have any?

MI. diGenova. Mr. Halley, who was your immediate superior

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## Page 125

PrOnA (9108 202) 544-6000

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WARD

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S.E., Washingron, D.C.2000)

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123

in terms of reporting from Miami?

MI. Halley. Could we go off the record?

(Discussion off the record.)

MI. diGenova. Mr. Halley, we have just had a brief

discussion here about some of the things that were covered

before I arrived by Mr. Baron and you. I do not want to cover

any

more of that ground.

it is my understanding in discussing the structure of

JMWAVE's relationship with Headquarters, General Lansdale's

name came up, and that on one occasion, General Lansdale actually

came down to Miami to visit the station to get firsthand

knowledge of what was transpiring. Is that correct?

MI. Halley. That

is correct.

MI. diGenova. Do you have any idea when that was?

Mr. Halley.

No. I stated earlier it was in 1962. It

probably was in the summer of 1962 because it was

after my

family arrived in Miami. I do not remember the exact dates.

It could be established probably from records of the Agency.

I do not recall it specifically.

Mr. diGenova. To your knowledge, did he travel by himself

or was he with compatriots or aides?

MI. Halley. My Iscollection of that. was that he came down

on a special airplane. There may have been other people on the

plane with him, I do not I+call, hut he

landed at Homestead

Air Force Base. As I recall, we picked him up from there.

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## Page 126

phone (Area 202) 544-6001

Г:

C.

"mido a bau?

110 Firsi Street, S.E., Washingion, D.C. 20003

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STOP SECRET

124

Mr. diGenova. Did Ganeral Lansdale travel under his own

name or under a cover name?

MI. Hallay. Throughout the time that he was in contact

with me and the Station he was operating as General Lansdale.

MI. diGenova. Did he have contact when ha was there with

some of the assets themselves?

Mr. Halley, lle had no contact with any Cubans that I am

aware of. He did spend the night that he came down with some

friends at Homestead Air Force Base, but I do not recall, I

would have no way of knowing what he did that evening.

MI. diGenova. For the time that he was at IMWAVE he was

with officials such as yourself who had a supervisory capacity

at IMWAVE Station?

MI. Halley: That is correct.

MI. diGenova. I have no further questions.

Mr. Baron. On the record, I just want to thank you for

your testimony here today. It has been a long day and wa

have gone over a lot of things quite carefully and it has been

most informative.

I would also like to ask you, if you would, to pursua for

us that one name of the man who was connected with gambling

interests in Cuba and supplied some intelligence to IMWAVE

Station.

(Discussion off the record.)

:::".

(Whereupon, at 5:00 o'clock the hearing was concluded.)

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## Page 127

SEGRET-DV2S DHLA

HALLEY EXHIBIT

baliered he sas beird supported oy U.S. buctrossmen with

financial suries in Cuba. Roselli needed Giancana and Trafficante

in tre first phase as a means of establishing contacts inside Cuba.

lle did not need them in the second phase, because he bad Varona.

Hornver, it would be raive to assure that Roselli did not take

the precaution of inioming higker-ups 1n the syndicate that be

was working in a territors considered to le the private donain

of someone else in the syndicate.)

linen the pills vere diven to varona through Roccill,. Varona.

requested ams and equirment needed for the support of his end of the

operatior. Roselli passed tae

request to barrey. Harvey, with the

delo of led Shackley, the chief of the JivAVa Station, procured

explosives, detonators, trenty •30 caliber rifles, trenty .45 caliber

hard suas, tio radios, and one boat radar. Hartey says that the

"snopping list" included sore items that .could be obtained only fica

the U.S. Goverment. Harvey onitted those Iteas, because Rosell1,

• postaõ as a representative of private business interests, would no:

nave cad access to such equipuent. The rost of the arms and caulament,

asolit 45,000, was T/A'd to heedquarters.

Harvey and beackley rentod a U-laul trick lnder an assured pote,

loaded it with the aras and equirtent, and parred it in the parting 101

ora trucia restaurare. Tho let tere tin giren to Roselli for

- 9 -

853X7- 3 01

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## Page 128

=:

1-W6S MLY

delivery either

to Macao, in varons, ur to Varona's son-in-lai.

Evidently larry ard Roseili had noù jet come to trust cach otcer.

Perhaps fcaring a double-cross, each set about Independantly to

assure kinself that the equipment reaciced the proger hands. After

rariting the truck, lamey and Saackley kept the parking 10r. under

surveillance until the lass was completed. Roselli, accompanied oy

O'Connell, did the sane. Heither pair ew that the other as

watching. Erentually the truck was picked up and driven aray. It

was returned later, empty, and with the keys under the sest as

prearranted. Harvey returned

the rental agency. Harvey says

that shackley never tner to won delivery was sada see ios whate

purpose. Shackley was merely called

upon to fumisi support for a

headquarters operation fron which ha vas otherrise excluded.

Nay 1952

Harvey and Roselll arranged a system of telephone conmurication.

by which tarrey has kept posted on any develorents. Harvey, using a

pay paces, could call Roseili at the Friars Club in Los Angeles at 1500

hours,, Los Angales tine: Rosaili could phore latray at larey's hoze

in the evening.

poseill raported that the gilis vere in Cuba and aù

the renteurant reportedly wed recilerke ly Casero.

-i -

Page

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## Page 129

32423434

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129

La Agencia Central de Inteligencia (CIA)

de Istados tricos, ta jugado el papel -.

principal en la historia de las agresig

-es contra Cute, promoriendo, organican

do, financiando y an muchos casos diri-

siendo acciones candalices, no sulo con

ira el territorio cubano sino tarbién -

cantra nuestras representaciones e inte

roses en paises extranjeros o en aguas-

interraciorales.

En esta omplia zama de actividades des-

Flegadas por la CIA, y demás órganos --

subversivos de Estados Unidos contra --

nuestro país, se destacan for su peli--

giosidad, los reiterados planes dirigi-

cos a la eliminación física de los prin

cipales dirigentes de la Revolución y,-

en especial, contra la figura de nuesto

Friner Ministro.

Las pruebas que aportanos evidencian --

que, desde 1959, éste ha sido uno de sus

objetivos principales, mediante el em--

pleo de los más variados métodos

técni-

cos de precisión. En los casos de agen--

des radicados en el exterior, les han -

facilitado medios de traslación y comu-

nicación.

The United States

Central Intelligence Agency

(CIA) has played the leading role in the his-

tory of the agressions against Cuba, promotine,

organizine, tinancing, and, in many cascs,-an

directing vandalic astions, rot only against-

the cuban territory, but also against our ---

representations and interest in foreign coun-

tries, or in international laters.

In this wide variety of activities carried --

out by the CIA and by other United States ---

subversive bodies against our country ,the ---

rciterated plans toward the physical elimina-

tion, of the principal leaders of the Revolu-

tion, and specially, against our Primey Minis

ter, stand out because of their dangerousness.

The proofs we provide, evidence that, since -

1959, this has been one of its major aims, by

using

the most varied technical precision ---

methods. In the case of agents living abroad,.

they have been given means of transportation-

and communication.

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## Page 130

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130

Es de destacar que en las innumerables-

infiltraciores organizadas por la CIA,-

utilitando membros de organizaciones -

contrarrerclucionarias, uno de

105 09je

tivos constantes da sido tambión la eli

-inación fisica del Comandante en jefe-

Ficel Castro Puz.

La CIA, para la ejecución de sus planes,

ha utilizaco elementos contrarrevolucio

narics

en el interior y exterior del --

país. No sólo ha tenido como colaborado-

res a los desplazados del poder, sino -

tardién a elementos de distinta proce--

dencia social, incluyendo a exponentes-

de todo tipo de lacras.

Igualmente, no han tenido reparo en re-

clutar a destacados jejes y elementos -

de la raffia norteamericana, a quienes-

les han connutado fechorías a cambio de

su participación en los planes de aten-

taco contra nuestros dirigentes.

lo han vacilado tampoco en tratar de. --

ejecutar sus acciones en lugares públi-

cos, conde el rúmero de víctimas inocen

tes hubiese sido incalculable, como fue

ron: 105 atentados planificados en el -

Stadium Latinoamericano, Plaza de la Re

It is worth noticing that, in the innumerable

infiltrations organized by the CIA, using -...

members of counterrevolutionary organizations,

one of the permanent goals has also been the-

physical climination of Commander in Chief, -

Fidel Castro Fuz.

The CIA, in orden to carry out its plans, has-

used counterrevolutionary individuals inside-

and outside the country. It ras had as.colla-

borator's, not only those who had been shifted

fron power, but also individuals of different

social origins, including samples of all types

of viciousness.

In the sare way, they have had no objection -

to recruting well-known leaders ando members-

from the American maffia, to whom they have -

barred their offences, in exchange for

their-

participation in the plots against our leaders.

Nor have they hesitated in trying to carry --

out their actions in public places, where the

number of innocent victims would have been --

incalculable, as were the crines planned to -

take place at the Latin American Stadium, the

Revolution Square and the University of Ha--

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## Page 131

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i-minio los últimos noses, la prensa nor-

manuricana la publicado una crociente y-

martia incorración sobre la realización -

¿n, euias actividades, ofreciendo en deta-

is la participación de la Agencia Cen--

:.ui de inteligencia en la elaboración y-

cicoución de los planes de atentado.

In 105 informes rendidos por la llamada -

cominión Rockefeller y la presidida por -

•¿ senador Frank Church, para las investi

¿acicres sobre las actividades ilegales -

¿c la CiA, ha cuedado demostrado de forma

ca:refrica

1o antes expuesto.

¿a ri-ügente hizo públicas declaraciones-

retro la participación de dicha agencia -

in el criminal atentado perpetrado contra

el capor francés "La Coubre", donde más -

¿e un contenar de cubanos resultaron muer

ios j alrecedor de 200, heridos graves.

Brinda detalles pormenorizados sobre su -

-calización, tratando de "justificar" esta

=sianza por un desperfecto en el mecanis-

=o cel equipo explosivo

utilizado.

During the last month, the American press has

published an increasing ard extensive informa

tion about the accomplishment of these acti-

vities, offering details about the participa

tion of the Central Intelligence Agency in -

the

elaboration and execution of the crimi--

nal plans.

In the reports of the so-called Rockefeller-

Commission, as well as the one headed by ---

Senator Frark Church, for the researches.on -

the illegal activities of the Central Intelli

gence Agenci (CIA), all that we, have stated-

above, has been undoubtedly demonstrated.

A former agent made public statements about-

the participation of this Agency in the cri-

minal act carried out against the French ---

steamship"La Coubre", where more than one --

hundred Cubans were killed and about 200, --

were seriously injured. He offers details --

about his accomplisments trying to"justify"-

this killing by blaming a slight damage in -

the mechanism of the blowing equipment which

was used.

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## Page 132

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132

resuita significativa la información ---

aporiada por el columnista Jaci. Anderson

an el ciario "The Hashington Post" sobre

la intervención del ganster John Posselli

en varios planes de atentados contra el-

Primer Ministro Fidel Castro, algunos de

ellos mediante enveneramiento con pasti-

llas entregadas por la CIA. Fosteriormen

te, según la propia prensa norteamerica-

na, Posselli admitió ante la Comisión de

Inteligencia del Senado su participación

con esta Agencia en varios complots para

asesinar al Primer Ministro Cubano.

Paulatinamente, funcionarios, senadores,

jefes, oficiales y ex-agentes de la CIA,

así como conocidos columnistas de la ---

prensa porteamericana, han hecho categó-

ricas declaraciones, que coinciden con -

las denuncias formuladas, oportunamente -

por el gobierno de Cuba.

Sin pretender relacionar todos los pla--

nes de atentados fraguados, exporemos a-

continuación algunos casos, que en su .-

casi totalidad no han sido de conocimien

to público y prueban la diversidad y rei

teración de la participación de la CIA y

otras agercias subversivas en estos e--

very significant is the information given Dj-

the journalist jack Anderson from"The Washing

ton Post" about the gangster John Rosselli's-

participation in varicus plots against Prime-

Finister fidel Castro, sono of them by means-

of poisoning, with pills handed to him by the

CIA. Afterwards, according to the American --

press itsel!, Rosselli, before the Senate ---

Intelligence Conmission, conceded having parti

cipated with this Agency in various plots for

assassinating the Cuban Prime Minister.

Gradually, officials, Senators, chiefs, offi-

cers and former CIA agents, as well as well -

with the denounces expressed, apropos, by the-

Cuban Goverrment.

without pretending to mention all the plots--

attempted, le expose some of them the majority

of which have not been publicly known.

They prove the diversity and recurrence of --

the CIA as well as other subversive agencies

participation in these actions:

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133

A mediados del año 1960, 105 elementos con

trarrevolucionarios Armando Cubría Ramos-

y Mario Tauler Sagué, miembros de la orga-

nización contrarrevolucionaria "La Cruz",-

se infiltraron por la zona de Punta de Hi

cacos, Matanzas:

Tauler Sagué, elemento gansteril, junto a-

Cubría Ranos tralan la nisión de realizar

un atentado a nuestro Primer Ministro, así

como perpetrar distintas acciones de sabo

taje y terrorismo. Para cumplirla fueron-

pertrechados por la CIA ce gran cantidad-

de material bélico y equipos, los que fue

non ocupados al ser detenicos.

In mid 1950, the counterrevolutionary Armando -

Cubría Ramos and Mario Tauler Sague, members --

of the "La Cruz" counterrevolutionary organiza

tion, were infiltrated through the Punta Hica-

cos zone, in Matanzas Province.

Tauler Sagué, a gangster, together with Cubría -

Ramos, were instructed to carry out a plot ---

against our Prime Minister, as well as to ----

commit various sabotage and terrorism actions.

For accomplishing this, they were given great

quantity of warlike material and equipment by-

the CIA, nich were taken from them winen arres-

ted.

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134

El Iraidor Humberto Sori Marin,

con cua

iro contrarrevolucionarios irás, se in--

Filtraron en marzo de 1961, for la cos-

ta norte de La Habana con el objetivo-

de reagrupar a las organizaciones con--

trarrevolucionarias, realizar un atenta-

do al Comendante en Jefe y desarrollar-

todo tipo de actividades subversivas pa

ra apoyar la invasión de Playa Girón.

Para tales fines fueron entrenados y ar

mados por la CIA, ocupáncoseles gran can

tidad de material bélico y otros equipos

al ser detenidos.

Entre los principales encartados figura

ban: Fogelio González Corcho, Manuel Lo-

renzo Puig Millán, Nemesio Rodriguez Na-

varrete, Gaspar Dominguez Irueba Varona,

Eufemio j. Fernandez Ortega y Fafael Daz

Hanscons, responsables de diversos grupos

y organizaciones contrarrevolucionarias

dirigidas por la CIA.

The traitor Hunterto Sori Harin hith four other

counterrevolutionaries, vere.

antiltrated in -=-

March 1961, through the north coast of Havana, -

with the purpose of grouping the counterrevolu

tionary organizations, of carrying out the ----

assassination of Commander in Chief and of deve

loping all type of subversive activities in ---

order tu support the Playa Girón invasion.

For this purpose, they were trained and

armed--

Dy the Central Intelligence Agercy. A great ---

quantity of warlike material and other equipment

were taken from them when arrested.

Amorg the participants vere fogelio González Cor

cho, Manuel Lorenzo Puig Millán, Nemesio Rodrí--

guez lavarrete, Gaspar [ominguez Trueba Varona, -

Eufamio J. Fernández Ortega. and Rafael Díaz lians

cons, heads of various.counterrevolutionary ---

groups and organization directed by the CIA.

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## Page 135

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135

In junio do 1961, se celebra una rounión

con la asistercia de un clemento infil--

trado en Cuba por la organización conira

reiolucionaria "Frente Perolucionario De

accrático" (ERD), quien traia la orden de

realizar un atentado al Comandante en Je

¡o Fidel Castro Ruz.

Fara ejecutar dicha acción fueron desig-

nados: Juan Basigalupe Hornedo, Higirio-

Menéndez Beltrán, Guillermo Coula Ferrer

y ctros, entregándoseles dinero para su-

¡ragar los gastos de la operación.

El plan consistía en situar dos jeeps --

con bazookas en el garage, sito en las -

Avenidas de .ncho Boyeros y Santa Cata-

lina, y un panel por la Cildad Deportiva,

con hombres portando granadas. Al pasar-

nuestro dirigente obstaculizarían el ---

tránsito, abriendo fuego.

Al ser detenicos, Guillerno Coula Ferrer

a licinio renéndez. acusaron a la CIA de-

ser el principal director del plan. Los-

encartados mantenían contactos a través-

de la Base Naval de Guantánamo y la Emba

jada Suiza, con miembros de la CIA y auto

ridades norteamericanas, quienes les pro

In june 1951, a neeting was

celebrated with

the attendance of an incivicual infiltrated

In Cuba by the "Frente Revolicionario Dero-

crático" (FRD) counterrevolutionary organita

tion, who was instructed to carry out a ---

a plot against Commander in Chief Fidel Cas

ino Ruz.

To accomplish this action, Juan Basigalude -

Horredo, Hisinio lenéndez Seltrán, Guillerno

Coula Ferrer and others were appointed, and

they were given noney to meet the expensés -

of the operation.

The plan was to place two jeeps with bazookas

in the garage which is at Rancho Boyeros and

Santa Catalina Avenues, and a light truck at

the Ciudad DeportivalSports City) with men -

carrying grenades. When our leaders would --

pass by, they would Stof the traffic and open

fire.

When they were arrested, Guillermo Caula Fe-

rrer and Higinio lenéndez accused the CIA of

being the principal director of the plot.

The indicted kept contacts through Guantánamo

Naval Base and the Swiss Embassy, with members

of the CIA and American authorities, who gave

them means and instructions to carry out ---

---

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136

Después del descalabro de Playa Girón, la-

Agencia. Central de Inteligencia continuó-

sus actividades subversivas contra nues--

iro país, iniciando el reagrupamiento de-

las dispersas organizaciones contrarrevo-

lucionarias bajo la organización "Unidad-

Resistencia".

Esa labor fue llevada a cabo por los agen

tes de la CIA infiltrados: Emilio Adolfo-

Rivero Caro (Brand), Adolfo Mendoza (Paúl)

y Jorge García Rubio(Tony) entre otros. Se

guidamente se dieron a la tarea de desa-

rollar todo tipo de actividades subversi

vas, incluyendo un atentado contra el co-

mante el desarroilo del acto provincial -

¿el 26 de julio de 1961 en Oriente; la --

autoagresión a la base laval de Guantána-

no, con el fin de justificar la agresión-

por parte de las fuerzas Armadas norteame

ricanas; así como ataques a las repúbli--

cas cercanas

para provocar un conflicto -

internacional.

Los planes contempian también un atenta--

do contra el Comandante en Jefe en el ac-

to central de la misma fecha en la Plaza-

Aftor the Flaya Girón doceat, the Central -

Intelligonce Agency continued its subversive

activitios against our country, starting --

the prouping of the disperse counterrevolu-

tionary organization, under the "Unidad Re-

sistencia" organization.

This task was carried out by the infiltra--

ted CIA agents Emilio Adolfo Rivero Caro ---

Ferand), Acolfo Mendoza (Raúl) and Jorge --

García. Rubio (Tony) among others. Afterwards,

they tried to develop all types of subver-

sive activities, including a plot against -

Division Commander (Lieutenant

Colonel) ---

Raúl Castro Puz, during the provincial ----

celebration of the 26 de july at Oriente --

Guantáramo Naval Base, with the purpose of-

justifying the aggression by the American--

Armed Forces, as well as attacks to negnbor

tional conflict.

The plans included also a plot against the

Commander in Chief, during

the central ---

rally the same day, at the Revolution ----

---

## Page 137

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137

de la Revolución, para 10 cual fue a coor

dinar en tenritorio de Estacos Unidos el-

contrarrevolucionario josé pujals Mederos,

quien salió clandestinamente hacia ese --

país Allí se entrevistó con los oficiales

de la CIA, jim Bender, corocico por Jin Bowl

cing, Harold Bistoo y Carl Fitch. En esta-

entrevista leceros fue rombrado jefe de -

los oficiales de la CIA que operaban en -

Cuba,

en sustitución de alfredo Izaguirre

conocido por tito, que estaba detenido.

En la Base Naval de Guantánano se lleva--

ron a cabo

las reuniones conspirativas, y-

sus autoridades (Capitán Schenweias) propor

cionaron gran cantidad de material bélico

y calipos para la realización de estos --

planes.

I mencicnado Capitán Carl. E.Schenveias, ex

jefe de la base laval, fue uno de los más-

activos organizadores de las agresiones.

Detonidos todos los encartados, se les ocu

pó gran cantidad de material y equipos bé

liCOS.

Es de significar, que todos estos planes -

subversivos fueron denunciados oportuna--

mente por el Comandante Ernesto Guevara -

en Punta del Este.

Square

or this purpose, the counterrevolu-

tionary josé Pujals Mederos made an under -

cover visit to the United States, in order-

to coondinate this action. There, he met --

CIA officers Jim Bender, known as Jim Boul-

cing, Harold Pischop and Carl Hitch. During

this meeting, teceros was appointed chief -

of the CIA officers, uno opperated in Cuba,

substituting Aldredo Izaguirre, known as --

Tito, who was arrested.

The conspiratory meeting were carried out--

at the Guantánamo Naval Base, and its

authorities (Captain Schenweias) supplied a

Iot of warlike material and equipment for -

the accomplishment of these plans.

The mentioned Captain Carl.E. Schenweias, -

formes chief of the laval Base, las one of

the most active organizers of the aggres--

sions.

when all the indicated were arrested, a --

great number of varlike material and equil

ment vas taken from them.

It is worth noticing that all these subver

sive plans vere denounced opportunely, by-

Commander Ernesto Guevara, at Punta del --

iste.

---

## Page 138

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138

En la segunda quincena de julio de

1961, un

grupo de elementos contrarrevolucionarios-

¿e las organizaciones"30 de Noviembre", "Ho

viniento Revolucionario del Pueblo" y"Fren

te revolucionario Democrático": planeaban-

atentar contra nuestro Comendante en Jefe-

y otros dirigentes.

Recibían orientaciones de la CIA a través-

¿ù contactos con Tony Varona, Manuel Ray y-

Aureliano Sánchez Arango en el exterior --

del país, y con el Almirante Eurke y agen-

tes de la CIA en la Base Naval de Guantána

no. El atentado se efectuaría en las cerca

nías cel domicilio de la compañera Celia -

ceienidos lario Chanez de Armas, Francisco-

Chanez de Armas, Foberto Coscuyuela Val---

cárcel, Orlando Ulacia Valdés, Francisco -

Gil Cruz, segundo González González y ----

otros, a quienes se les ocuparon armas y -

explosivos.

During the second fortnight of July, 1961, a

group of counterrevolutionaries from "30 =

de loviembre", "Movimiento Revolucionario-

del Pueblo" and "Frente Revolucionario De-

mocrático" organizations, were plotting --

against our Connander in Chief and other--

leacers.

They received CIA instructions through ---

contacts abroad with Teny. Varona, Manuel -

Ray and Aureliano Sánchez Arango, and with

Admiral Burke and CIA agents in Guantánamo

Naval Base. The plot would be carried out-

in the proximity of Celia Sánchez Mandu---

ley's house, in l'edado. Mario Charez de Ar•

mas, Francisco Chanez de Armas, Roberto --

Coscuyuela Valcárcel, Orlando Ulacia Val--

dés, Francisco Gil Cruz, Segundo González-

González and others vere arrested and ----

weapons and explosives vere taken from ---

then.

---

## Page 139

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139

Entre sus planes figurala también el fraca--

sado atentado al Dr. Carlos Rafael Rodríguez

llevado a efecto el 13 de setiembre de

1961

cuando dicho dirigente regresaba de Matan--

zas hacia La Habana. Con ese fin, un grupo-

de contrarrevolucionarios pertenecientes a-

las organizaciones antes mencionadas, esta--

blecieron contactos con representantes del-

"Movimiento de Recuperación Revolucionaria"

(MRR). Al frente de los mismo se hallaba --

Juan José Mariore Silva.

Estos elementos mantenían estrechos víncu--

los con un agente de la CIA, así como con un

jefe de bandidos en la provincia de Matan--

zas. Al resultar detenidos se les ocupó el-

material bélico que poseían..

Anong their plars las

also the failed plot

against Dr. Carlos Rafael Podriguez, which

was attempted on September 13th, 1961, when

he was coming back from Matanzas to Havana.

With thar purpose, a group of counterrevolu

tionary individuals,: belonging to the --.

organizations mentioned above, contacted --

representatives of the "Movimiento de Recu

peración Revolucionaria" (MRR). The group's

leader vas Juan josé Martore Silva.

These individuals kept close relation vith-

a CIA agent as well as with the chief

of a-

band in Matanzas Province. When arrested, -

varlike material was taken from them.

---

## Page 140

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140

En octubre de

1901, las organizaciones con

tarrevolucionarias "II Frente col Escan--

bray" y "Hoviniento de Recuperación Fevolu

cionaria" (tRA) dirigidas por la ligencia -

Central de Inteligercia (CIA), aprobaron un

pian conjunto do sabotajes en la capital,a

fin de provocar la indignación popular e -

influir sobre la concurrencia masiva al ag

to de recibimiento al Presidente de la Re-

= Eblica, Dr. Osvaldo Dorticós Torrado, a -

su llegada de Punta del Este.

Esta táctica estaba encaminada a viabilizar

el plan de atentado que ejecutarían el día

4 del propio mes, disparando con una tazoo

La hacia la tribuna situada en la terraza-

del antigio Palacio Presidencial desde un-

apartemento situado en un edificio conti--

gio. La retirada sería cubierta con el cri

minal lanzamiento de granadas contra el --

público, para crear la confusión y el páni

co.

sus propósitos fueron frustrados al ser de

-enidos, todos

los encartados, ocupándose --

gran canticad

de material bélico.

On Ootuber 1961, "II Frente del Escambray"

and "Hovimiento de Focuperación Revolucio-

naria" ("PR) counterrevolutionary orgariza-

tions, directed by the Central Intelligence

Agency (CIA), approved a joint plan for a-

sabotage in the capital, in order to

cause

people's indignation and to influence on --

the mass gathering to welcome the Fresident

of the Republic Osvaldo Dorticós Torrado, -

on his arrival from Punta del Este.

This tactic was ained to facilitate the --

plot, which would be carried out on the --

uth of the same month, shooting with a ---

Lazcora in direction to the tribune located.

on the terrace of the former Fresidential

Palace, from an apartment located in a --

nearby building. The withdrawal would be -

covered by the critnal launching of erenades

against the public, in order to cause confu

sion and panic.

Their purposes were frustrated when all

of the indicted were arrested and a great-

number of warlike material was taken from-

them.

---

## Page 141

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141

A principios de 1902, siguiendo orientacio

nes de la CIA y la Base Naval de Guantéra-

no, el contraprotolicionario Jorge Luis --

Cuervo Calio se da a la iarea de restructu

par algunos grupos y organizaciones contra

revolucionarias, creando la denominada ---

"Unión de Unidades revolucionarias" (UDUR).

Cuervo Calvo, Humberto Gómez Peña, Raúl Cay

Hernández, Raúl Cay Gispert y otros se reu

nieron para ciaborar planes de alzamiento-

e informar sobre los contactos estableci--

dos en la base Naval norteamericana de ---

Guantánamo para recibir material bélico y-

equipos.

La CIA persiste en sus planes de atentar -

contra la vida del Primer Ministro y de --

producir una autoagresión a la Base Naval.

Cumpliendo estas órdenes, el contrarrevo--

• lucionario Cuervo Calvo hace contacto con-

la organización DRE, procediendo a elabo--

rar lo que denominaron "Plan Z", que con--

sistía en: atentar contra la vida del Dr.-

Raúl Roa, Ministro de Relaciones Exterio--

res, 10 que les permitiría llevar a vías -

de hecho otro atentado de mayor proporcio-

nes contra el Primer Ministro y demás diri

gentes de la Revolución que concurrieran -

al sepelio.

In early 1962, Ecllowing instructions ficm

the CiA and tha Cuantánamo Naval Basc

the

counterrevolutionary jorge Luis Cucaro Cal

vo reorganized several group and counter--

revolutionary organizations, and created -

the

"Unión de l'nidades Revolucionarias" --

(UDUR.) .

Cuervo Calvo, Humberto Gómez Peña, Raúl --

Cay Hernández, Raúl Cay Gispert and others

met in order to prepare plans for uprising

and inform about the contacts established-

with the Guantáramo Naval Base

for receitirg

varlike material and equipment.

The Central Intelligence Agency insisted -

on its plots against the Prime 'Minister's-

life, and to carry out a self-aggression -

to the Naval Base. Following these instruc

tions, the counterrevolutionary Cuervo ---

Calvo made contacts with the DRE organiza-

tion, and elaborated what would be known -

as( "Plan Z", which consisted on attempt---

ing against the life of the Minister of --

Foreigh Relations Raúl Roa, What would ---

enable them to carry out another plot of -

bigger proportions agains the Prime Minister

and other revolucionary leaders who would-

attend the burial.

---

## Page 142

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142

Es de destacar que los autores intelec

tuales de este plan fueron los contra-

revolucionarios Cay Ferrández y Cay --

Gispert, militantes de la organización

DRE, que era dirigida por el agente de

la CIA, infiltrado en nuestro país, Ju-

lio Hernández Rojo.

It is worth noticing that the intellectual

authors of this plan were the counter-----

revolutionaries Cay Hernández y Cay Gis---

pert, members of the IPE organization, ---

winich was headed by Julio Hernández Rojo, -

a CIA agent infiltrated into our country.

7 6 0

7??!

---

## Page 143

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143

La organización "Resistencia Cívica Anti-

comunista" (P.CA) en cuyo seno se agruparon

el "Ejército de Liberación Nacional" (ELN)

"Hovimiento de Recuperación Revoluciona--

ria" (MER), "Agrupación l'ontecristi", y --

otros, era dirigida desde el exterior por

la CIA, a través de su agente Nino Díaz.

En 1963, la CIA orientó al bloque RCA or-

ganizar y ejecutar acciones internas que-

aparentaran la existencia de una resisten

cia popular activa, con vista a solicitar

la intervención armada a Cuba, en la reu-

nión de Presidertes de países miembros de

la OEA.

Las instrucciones eran suministradas por-

la CIA a través de la Base Naval de Guan-

tánamo. A partir de entonces la RCA elabo

ra nuevos planes de acción y atentados, en

apoyo a la invasión armada que esperaban-

en el nes de julio.

Con motivo de los actos conmemorativos --

del 13 de Marzo, planearon asesinar al --

Comandante en Jefe, desde una casa cerca-

na a la Universidad de la Habana, disparan

do hacia la tribuna, con un mortero. Los-

principales

encartados fueron Samuel Car-

The

"Resistencia Cívica Anticomunista"----

organization (RCA), to which "Ejército de-

Literación Nacional" (ELN), "'ovimiento de-

Recuperación Revolucionaria(MRP); "Agrupa--

ción contecristi" and others vere joined, -

was directed from abroad by the CIA, through

its agent Mino Díaz.

In 1963, the CIA gave instructions to the-

3CA Block for organizing and carrying out --

internal actions in order to give the ----

impression of the existence of a popular --

civic resistence, and therefore, demanding -

an armed intervention in Cuba, at the

meeting of the Presidents of countries

members of the DAS.

The instructions were given by the CIA ----

through Guantánaro Naval Base. Since then, -

tre RCA elaborated new plans for actions --

and crines, for supporting the armed inva--

tion which was expected in July.

On the occasion of the acts conmmemrating -

the 13th of larch, they plan-ed to assesinate

the conmarder in Chief, from a house near -.

the University of Havana, sbooting with aa

cortar in direction to the tribune. The ---

principal persons indicted were Sanuel Car-.

---

## Page 144

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Page

144.

balio Moreno lagente de la CIA, Luis Da

vid jodriguez González, Picardo Olmedo-

loreno, josé A. López Rodriguez, Juan -

Lucio Morales Sosa y atros.

Simultáneamente al atentado projectaron

ataques a locales de los Comités de De-

fensa

de la Revolución y Milicias Nacio

nales

Revolucionarias.

16

ballo Moreno CIA agent), Luis David Pourí

guez fonzález, Ficardo Cinedo Moreno, José

A. López Rodríguez, Juan Lucio Morales --

Sosa

and others.

simultaneously with this plot, attacks to

the Committees of Defense of the Revolu--

tion and the Mational Revolutionary Mili-

tias sites, were planned to be carried

out.

---

## Page 145

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145

inte el fracaso, la RCA elabora un --

nuevo plan contra el Frimer Ministro,

esta vez en el stadium Latinoamerica-

no el 7 de abril de 1963. En el mismo-

participarían 16 hombres armados de -

pistolas y granadas de fragmentación.

•Entre los principales encartacos so--

encontraban inrique Rodríguez Valdés-

conocido por "Mulgado", Ricardo López-

Cabrera, Chorio Torres Perdono y Jor-

ge Carlos Espinosa Escarles.

Having failed, the RCA elaborated a new -

plot against the Prime Minister, this time

at the Latin American Stadium on April 7th,

1963. Sixteen men armed with pistols and

fragmentation grenades would participate

in it.

Among the prircipal persons indicted were-

Enrique Rodríguez Valdés, known as"liülgado"

Ricardo López Cabrera, Chorio Torres Perdo

mo and jorge Carlos Espinosa Escarles.

7

---

## Page 146

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146

laboraron otro plan, esta vez contra

la

vida del Ministro de las Fuerzas Armadas

Comandante de División Raúl Castro Ruz, -

en la Plaza de la Revolución, con motivo

de la celebración del 26 de Julio. En el-

mismo

tomarían parte cuatro grupos diri-

gidos por René Sigler Sánchez Evias, Je-

sús liontes de Oca Cruz, Oscar Sibila So-

ria y Eliecer Fodriguez Suárez. El jefe-

de estos grupos era Ibrahim Machin Her--

nández.

Todas estas acciones, organizadas y fomen

tadas por la CIA a través del BloQue RCA,

fueron frustradas, detenidos sus encarta

dos y ocupadas gran canticad de armas y-

equipos.

They elaborated another piot, this

time

—- =

against the life of the winister of the ---

Armed Forces, División Conmander (Lieutenant

Colonel) Raúl Castro Puz, at the Fevolution

Square, during the celebration of the 26th-

of july. Four groups leaded by René Sigler-

Sánchez Evias, Jesús Montes de Oca Cruz, Os

car Sibila Soria and Eliecer Rodríguez Suá-

rez, would participate. The head of these -

groups was Ibrahim Nachin Hernández.

111 these actions, organized and promoted -

by the CIA through the RCA block, were ----

frustrated, the persons indicted

were i---

arrested and a great number of reapons

and-

equipment were taken from them.

---

## Page 147

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Fara el 29 de setionbre de 1961, aniversa-

pio de los Comités de Defensa de la Revolu

cion, los contrarrevolucionarios Orlando -

Martiniano de la cruz Sánchez, Juan Israel-

Cazañas León, desis Flácido Rodríguez Mos--

quera, Luis Beltrán Arencibia Pérez, Francis

co Vlanco de los Cueios, Federico Hernández

González yotros, vinculados al agente de-

la CIA Pierre Cien Diez de Ure, prepararon-

un plan de atentado contra nuestro Primer-

Ministro.

Totos. elementes, agrupados en las organiza

ciones contrarrevolucionarias"Frente Inter

no de linidad Revolucionaria" (FIUR), "Triple

A", "l'oviniento Democrático Revolucionario"

(HDR), "Ejército de Liberación Nacional" --

(ELN), contaron con el asescramiento y ase-

guramiento de la CIA.

El plan consistía en dinamitar las conduc-

toras del alcantarillado que pasa por deba

jo de la tribuna presidencial. Liquidado el

plan y detenidos los autores, el agente --

Pierre Orien Diez de Ure, ciudadano francés

residente en nuestro país, confesó que tra

bajaba para la CiA desde hacía dos años --

aproximadamente, facilitándole informacio-

nes de diversa índole.

For septenher the beth 1963, arriversary of

the committees of Defense of the Revolu---

tion, the counterrevolutionary Orlando lan

tiniano de la Cruz Sánchez, Juan Israel Ca

zañas León, Jesús Plácido Rocriguez Mosque

ra, Luis Eeltrán Arencibia Pérez, Francis-

co Vlanco de los Cuetos, Federico Hernán--

des González and others, related to the --

CIA agent Pierre Owen Diez de Ure, prepared

a plot against our Prime Minister.

These individuals grouped into the "Frente

Interno de Unidad Revolucionaria" (FIUR), -

"Triple A", "Movimiento Democrático Revolu

cionario" (HDR), "Ejército de Liberación Na

cional" (ELN) counterrevolutionary organiza

tions, had CIA advice and support.

The plan vias to dynamite the sewage pipes

which pass under the presidential tribune.

Once the plan frustrated and the authors --

arrested, the agent Pierre Oven Diez de Ure,

French citizen living in our country, ----

confessed that he had been working for the-

CIA for aproximately two years, and that he

had given this Agency information of various

sorts.

:?

?

---

## Page 148

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32479434 - Hagen

En el mes de. marzo de 1964, se gestó otro-

plan de atentado contra el Corandante en -

jefe. El principal encartado, lario Salaba-

rría Aguiar, elemento gansteril, mantenía -

contactos con la CIA a través del agente -

Bi. Bernardo Milanés López, Jefe de una --

red, quien pasó la información del plan al

Centro CIA y gestionó desde España la ayu-

da de los apátridas Tony Varona y Juan ---

Bosch, amigos de Salabarría.

El plan consistía en instalar una ametra--

Iladora calibre 30 ó 50 en un jehículo y -

aguardar la posibilidad del paso del Coman

dante en Jefe, para atentar contra su vida.

La CIA entregó a Salabarría las armas y me

dios necesarios, incluyendo grandes sumas-

de dinero.

In Narch 1964, another plot against Commander-

in Chief was elaborated. The principal indicted

• Mario Salabarría Aguiar, a gargster, had con---

tacts with the CIA through the agent Dr. Ber--

nardo Milanés Lopez head of a net, who informed

the CIA center of the plan and sought, from -

Spain, the support of Salabarría's friends, Tony

Varona and Juan Bosch.

The plan consisted in installing a machine gun

caliber 30 or 50 in a vehicle and waiting for-

the occasion when the Cormander in Chief -----

would pass by, in order to atterpt against his

life. The CIA gave Salabarría the necessary --

weapons and means, including great sums of ---

mney.

---

## Page 149

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A. mediados del año

1954, los contrarrevolu

cionarios Osvaldo Valentín Figueroa Gálvez,

conocido por "Yankeca", Reynaldo Figueroa-

Gálvez, Felipe kionso derrera y icsé la---

nuel Rodríguez Cruz, conocidó por "Lolo", -

miembros de la organización "Movimiento de

Liberación Nacionai", que formaba parte --

del bloque de organizaciones, RCA, dirigi--

das por la CIA, comienzan a preparar un --

plan de atentado contra el Primer Ministro.

Estos individuos estaban vinculados a los -

agentes de la CIA, Alberto y Ramón Grau ---

Sierra, quienes formaban parte de la red --

dirigida por Panór. y María Leopoldina Grau-

Alsina, que posteriormente-en junio de 1965

intentaron envenonar al Primer Ministro.

El plan consistía en el lanzamiento de gra-

nadas contra nuestro Primer Ministro en el-

Stadium Latinoamericano, por un grupo de --

nueve-hombres, quienes fueron detenidos, y-

ocupados los equipos bélicos.

In mic-1964, the counterrevolutionaries

OS -

valdo Valentín Figueroa Gálvez, incin

as

"Mankeca", Reinaldo Figueroa Gálvez, Felipe-

Alorso Herrera and José Manuel Rodríguez -

Cruz, known as "Lolo" members of the "'ovi-

miento de Liberación Nacional", which be---

longed to the RCA block of organizations, --

directed by the CIA, began to prepare a ---

plot against the Prime Minister.

These persons were related to the CIA agents

Alberto and Ramón Grau Sierra, uno belonged

to the net headed by Ramón and María Leopol

dina Grau Alsina, who latter in June 1965.-

attempted to poison the Prime Minister.

The plan consisted on throving grenades ---

agairst our Prime Minister at the Latin --

American Stadium, by a group of nine men --

who were arrested and whose warlike equip--

ment was taken from them.

7

---

## Page 150

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150

En setiembre de ese mismo año (1964), un -

Grupo de contrarrevolucionarios de las or

ganizaciones "Ejército de Liberación Ha--

ción" (FIL), que cumplían misiones de 0b--

tención de información para la CIA, comen

caron a gestionar la unificación, cumplien

do también órdenes de dicha Agencia.

Enfrascados en estas labores de unidad,el

contrarrevolucionario Nemesio Cubillas Pé

rez, pone en conocimiento de Angel Miguel

Arencibia Virán, Rolando Galdós Ranzola y

otros el plan de atentado que venían fra-

gliando contra nuestro Priner Ministro en-

la Calle 11, en el Vedado, orientados por

ia CIA.

A principios de 1965, los contrarrevolu--

cionarios Julio Omar Cruz Cecilia, Fermin-

Gorzález Carballo y Giraldo Reynaldo Die-

go Solano, miembros del "Ejército de Libe

ración Nacional(irtegrado al bloque de la

RCA, dirigida por la CIA) comienzan a ulti

nar detalles de un plan de atentados con-

tra el Cómandante en Jefe en Santiago de-

las Vegas.

22

in septenbor of this same year. (1964), a group

of counterrevolutionaries from the"Ejército-

terno de Liberación" (FIL) organizations, tho

vere accomplishing instructions of obtaining

information for the CIA, began to seek uni--

fication, according, to the CIA's orders.

while accomplishing these tasks for archiev

ing unity, the

counterrevolutionary Nene--

sio Cubillas Pérez, informed Angel Miguel -

Arencibia Virán, Rolando Galdós Ranzola and

others about the plot they were elaborating

against our Frimer Minister at 11 St., Veda-

do, according to the CIA instructions.

At the beginning of 1965, the counterrevo--

lutionaries julio Onar Cruz Cecilia, Fermín

González Carballo and Giraldo Reynaldo Die-

ración Nacionallintegrated into the RCA --

block, directed by the CIA) began to -----

complete details of a plot against the ---

---

## Page 151

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157g

Desisten de

esta prinera variante y pro--

yectan otro plan que sería perpetrado en-

el stadium Latincamericano con hombres ar

mados de granadas de fragmentación, y ---

otro grupo, apostado en un edificio cerca

no, abriría fuego de anetralladoras con--

tra el público para crear el pánico y la-

confusión y

garantizando así la retirada.

They gave up this first plan and devised

another plot, which would be committed -

by armed men with fragmentation grenades

at the Latin Amtrican Stadium, and in a-

near building, there was another group--

which would open fire with machine guns-

against the people producing panic and -

confusion and, thus, guaranteeing

the

withdrawal.

23

---

## Page 152

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152

En junio de este mismo año- según se ha mon

cionado anteriormente- una red de agentes -

de la CIA, dirigidos por Ranón y María Leo-

poldina Grau Alsiralconocida for "Polita")-

se dedicaba a todo tipo de actividades ene-

migas y otras de carácter antisocial para -

10 cual se valían de contactos con seces ca

pitalistas en el país, que servían de enla-

ce con la Agencia Central de Inteligencia.

Estos elementos formaban parte de las orga-

nizaciones "Rescate",

"Movimiento Anticonu-

nista Revolucionario" iMAR) y otras dirigi--

das y subversionadas por esa Agencia.

María Leopoldina Grau Alsina recibió ins---

trucciones de la CIA de fraguar un plan pa-

ra envenenar al Priner Ministro Fidel Cas--

tro, para lo cual le enviaron un frasco de-

pastillas venenosas, que fueron ertregadas-

a Alberto Cruz Caso, quien a su vez las en-

tregó a los miembros de la organización(lAR)

Jesús Campanioni Souza y Santos de la Cari-

dad Pérez Múñez, para que efectuaran el ---

atentado en el hotel Habana Libre.

2x

As it has been said before, in june of this

same jear, a net of CIA agents, heaced by -

Pamón and María Leopoldina Grau Alsina ----

(known as Polita) were devoted to all type-

of enemy activities, as well as others of -

antisocial nature. For this purpose, they -

made use of contacts with capitalist ------

representations in the country, which were-

used as liaisons with the Central Intelli--

gence Agency.

These individuals were part of the organiza

tions "Rescate", "Movimiento Anticomunista Re

volucionario" (MAR) and other organizations

directed and sponsored by that Agency.

María Leopoldina Grau was given instructions

by the CIA to plot for poisoning Primer Mi--

nister Fidel Castro, thereby, she was sent a -

poisonous pill bottle, which was given to Al-

berto Cruz Caso, who, in turn, gave it to jesús

Campanioni Souza y Santos de la Caridad Pérez

Núñez, members of the Organization (MAR), so -

that they would commit the attempted.crime -

at the Havana Libre Hotel.

---

## Page 153

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153

Al fallar este intento, el contrarrevolucio

rario Tony Varona envió otro frasco con 500

cápsulas, a fin de tratar de realizar nueva

mente el hecho.

Asimismo, "Polita" recibió de la CIA para --

iguales propósitos, varias armas con silen-

ciadores y proyectiles especiales para aten

tados personales, las que fueron ocupadas -

en junio de 1955, al ser detenidos estos --

elementos.

The counterrevolutionary. Tony Varona sent

another botile with 500 capsules when ---

this attempt failed, in order to try to -

carry out the act agair.

Likerise, "Polita" received from the CIA -

some weapors with mufflers and special -

projectiles for personal asassinations, -

which were taken from them when arrested-

in June, 1965.

25

7

!

---

## Page 154

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Page

Una vez rás, en 1965, la Agencia Central de

Inteligencia intentó reagrupar las disper--

sas organizaciones contrarrevolucionarias, -

bajo la denominada"Unidad Resistencia -----

(UNAPE) .

En estas actividades, los elementos contra-

revolucionarios inrique Abreu Vilahu, conoci

do por Henry, Carlos Vicente Sánchez Hernan

dez, Julio de las Nieves Ruiz Pitaluga y --

etrus, planean un atentado contra el Coman-

dante en Jefe, aprovechando su visita al --

restaurant "Vita Nuova"', en el Vedado. En es-

te lugar, Abreu Vilahu abriría fuego con --

una subaretralladora Thompson contra el ---

Primer Ministro y postas del Ministerio del

Interior ubicadas frente al restaurant, a -

fin de crear confusión y evadirse.

Al detenérseles, en julio de ese propio año,

se les ocupó el material bélico para la rea

lización de sus propósitos.

26

Once more, in 1:65, the Central Intelligerce

"gency attempted io group the dispersed ----

counterrevolutionary organizations, under i-

the named "Unidad Resistencia" (UNARE). In --

these activities, the counterrevolutionaries

Enrique Abreu Vilahu, known as Henry, Carlos

Vicente Sánchez Hernández, Julio de las Nie-

ves Ruiz Pitaluga and others, plotted against

the Commander in Chief, taking advantage of-

his visit to Vita Nouva's restaurant, in the

Vedado. In this place, Abreu Vilahu would --

open fire with a Thompson machine gun against

the Prime Minister and the guards of the --.

Ministry of the Interior building located

across the restaurant, in order to create

confusion and escape.

On being arrested on July of that same year,

warlike material they had for the fulfillment

of their purposes, was taken from them.

7

?

---

## Page 155

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Page

cambién en 1966, fue detenido el ex-Comandan

=e Rolando Cubala

secades, por ser el prin-

cipal encartado en un plan de atentado cortra

el Priner Ministro. Dicho plan lua articula-

¿o por la CiA aprovhclando el viaje de Cube-

la a ladrid, lugar donde fue reclutado por -

los agentes de la CIA, lanuel Artime, Jorge -

sobreño conocido por el "Mago", luis Enrique

Trasancos y Carlos Tepedino.

Igualmente intervinieron en los planes del -

atentado, los traidores José Luis González -

Callarreta, funcionario de la embajada de Cu

ja en Madrid y Alberto Blanco conocido por -

"El LoCO".

En la entrevista de Cubela con Manuel Artime-

éste últino le garantizó la entrega de embar

caciones piratas, armas y hombres para una -

invasión que sería el complemento, en menos-

de 72 horas, de un atentado contra el Priner

Ministro.

A tal efecto, antes de regresar Cubela a Cu-

La, recibió de josé Luis González Gallarreta

un fusil con mirilla telescópica y silenciador

que le fue ocupado al ser detenido, conjúnta

mente con gran cantidad de armas y equipos -

que la CIA le había hecho llegar. También --

fueron detenidos Alberto Blanco Romariz y 1o

2>

Being the principal indicted in a plan to -

kill the Frime Minister, tre forner Commander

Rolando Cubela Secades was also arrested in-

1265. That

plan cas prepared by the CIA, --

takin advantage Cubela's trip to ladrid, ---

where he nas recritide by the CIA agents Ma-

nuel Artine, Jorge Pobreño known as"The ----

lagician" (El Mago), Luis Enrique Trasancos -

and Carlos Tepedino.

Others that also partipated in the plot, ---

were the traitors. José Luis Gonzalez Gallarre

ta official at the Cuban Embassy in Madrid and

Alberto Blanco known as "The Crazy" (El Loco).

In the interview of Cubela with Manuel Arti--

me, the later garanteed the delibery of pira-

te crafts, weapons and men for an invasion --

wich would support the plan for the assassina

tion of the Prime Minister in les that 72 ---

hours.

For that purpose, before Cubela came back to-

Cuba, he receiver from José Luis González -=-

Gallarreta a rifle with telescopic peephole -

and muffler, wich was taken from him when ---

arrested, together with a great number of --

weapons and equipment that the CIA had sent -

to him. Mihero Flanco Poraria ard dosé trás-

---

## Page 156

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156

Dirigidos por la CIA, las organizaciones

"Comando L" y "loviniento 30 de lovien--

tre", con representación en territorio -

norteamericano, se dan a la tarea de pre-

parar dos embarcaciones artilladas para-

infiltrarse en nuestro país y realizar -

actividades subversivas, a mediados de --

1965.

resisten de la infiltración y deciden ti

rotear la zona de becados de Miramar y -

el hotel Riviera, dirigiendo sus ataques-

fundamentalmente contra la residencia --

del Presidente de la República. Después -

de esta acción regresan a Estados Unidos.

En mayo de 1956, estos elementos se in--

filtraron por la zona de Monte. Barreto, -

en la capital, con la misión de realizar

un atentado al Frimer Ministro. En la ac-

ción resultaron muertos firmando Romero -

Martínez y Sardalio Herminio Díaz García,

y detenidos: Antonio Cuesta Valle, cabe--

cilla principal de los"Comandos L", y Eu-

genio Enrique Zaldívar Cárdenas, a quienes

se les ocupó gran cantidad de equipos y-

material bélico.

Estos elementos recibieron entrenamiento

de la MIA en Puerto Pier y alcuros de --

28

The

"Comandos l" and the "rovimiento

30 Ge

lovienbre", with representation in the U.S.

territory, direciod by the CIA, undertook -

the

task of raking ready two crafts equip-

ped with guns to be infitrated, and

-----

committ

subversive activities in our ---

country, about the mid-1965.

They gave up the infiltration and decided

to shoot at the scholarship zone in Miramar

and at the Riviera Hotel, mainly in direction

to the residence of the President of the --

Republic. After this action they returned -

to the United States.

In Nay, 1966, these men were infiltrated by

the Monte Parreto zone, in the capital, vith

the mission of assassinating the Primer -..

Minister. In the action, Armando Romero Mar

tinez y Sandalio Herminio Díaz García were

killed, and Antonio Cuesta Valle, principal

head of. the "Comandos L", and Eugenio Enri

que Zaldívar Cárdenas, were arrested and -

a great number of equipment and warlike ma

terial was taken from them.

7

•)

These men were trainned by the CIA in Puer-

to Rico, and some of them were the

authors-

---

## Page 157

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20

allos fueron los aliores del

cañoneo

mal buque

nercante "San Pascual", fon

¿deado en el Puerto de Caibarién, Las

villas.

of the bombardment to the "San Fascual"

merchant vessel anchored at the Caibarién

Port, in Las Villas Frovince.

HEÖULU00

---

## Page 158

:32423434

El 17 de marzo de

1967, resultaron deteni-

dos Félix Asencio Crespo, Wilfredo Martínez

Céaz y Gustavo Areces Alvarez, al tratar de

infiltrarse por la zona de Cayo Fragoso, -

procedentes de Estados Unidos.

El objetivo principal que

traían era reali

zar ur. atentado contra nuestro Primer Mi--

nistro y desatar una actividad sistemática

de sabotajes con explosivos plásticos, todo

ello complementado con ataques piratas, pa-

¿a car la imagen en el exterior de activi-

dades subversivas

de grupos en distintas -

zonas y crear una situación que permitiera

a las organizaciones contrarrevoluciona---

rias radicadas en Estados Unides, recabar -

ayuda oficial.

Para llevar a cabo sus actividades en te--

rritorio cubano, los mismos fueron entrena

¿os por la CIA, à través de las organiza--

ciones "M-30-11", ''RECE"', "Los Pinos Nuevos",

"Comandos L", "Alpha-66" y otras.

Para esta misión se les facilitó todo el -

material bélico necesario.

Félix Asencio Crespo, Wilfredo Martínez Díaz

and Gustavo ineces Aliarez were arrested on

March 17th, wnile they tried to infiltrate-

by the Cayo Fragoso zone, coning from ine -

United States.

The main objective they

should carry out-

was to assassinate our Prime Minister and -

launch a sistematic activity of sabotage --

with plastic explosives, all that supported

with pirate attacks, in order to give abroad

an image of the existence of subversive ---

activities. in different areas and, thus, to

create a situation which would permit the -

counterrrevolutionary organizations located

in the United States to succeed in getting-

official support.

In order to carry out their activities in -

Cuban territory, they were trained by the -

CIA through the "1-30-11", "RECE", "Los Pinos

Nuevos", "Comandos L", "Alpha-66" and others

organizations. For this mission they were -

given all the neccessary warlike raterial.

---

## Page 159

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159

En 1971, con motivo del viaje del Comandar.-

en jefe a Chile, se fragua un atentado -

en ese país, para el cual se unen la CIA, -

fascista chilenos y contrarrevolucionarios-

cubanos de la organización "Alpha-66".

El principal encartado en este plan era Je-

sús Dominguez Benítez, conocido por " El --

Isleño", para quienla través de contrarrevo

lucionarios cubanos radicados en Venezuela)

se obtuvo documentación falsa que lo acredi

taba cono periodista venezolano, lo que le-

permitió cubrir la visita de nuestro Primer

Ministro en dicho país.

El plan se ejecutaría mediante una pistola-

adaptada a una cámara de televisión, pero -

desistieron efectuarlo por considerar que -

no existían garantías para la conservación-

de sus vidas.

Dominguez

'Benitez, perteneció a la organiza

ción terrorista "Poder Cubano", fue acusado

por las autoridades norteamericanas de pro-

mover acciones terroristas en Estados Uni--

dos y otros países como miembro de dicha or

ganización, y arrestado por el FBI en 1968.

On 1971, due to Commander in: Chief's trip to

Chile, a plot was elaborated in that country

Cubans counterrevolutionaries from "Alphal6ô")

organization cane together.

The major indicted in this plan vas jesús Do

mínguez Benitez, known as"The Islander".

Through Cuban counterrevolutionaries settled

down at Venezuela, he obtained false documents

which identified him as a Venezuelan newspaper

man, which permitted him to report our. Prine-

Minister's visit in that country.

The plan would be carried out using a sun -..

camouflaged into a television camera, but ---

they gave this up on considering there were -

no guarantees for the preservation of their -

lives.

Domínguez Eenítez, belonged to the "Poder Cu

bano" terrorist organization. He was accused

by the American authorities of promoting ---

terrorist actions inside the United States -

and other countries, as a member of that or-

ganization, and was arrested by the

FBI in -

19€8!

7.6

71

0

?

---

## Page 160

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160

Sin embargo, en 1970 participa en el frustra-

do intento de infiltración del "Alpha-66" por

Oriente, refugiándose en la Base Naval, donde-

nuevamente se le arrestó, esta vez, por in---

¡ringir las condiciones de una fianza sobre -

una condena de 18 meses por la causa anterior

mente mencionada.

No obstante, queda en libertad y sale sin difi

cultades de Estados Unidos a Sudamérica para-

participar en el atentado. Posteriormente re-

gresa a Estados Unidos.

However, in 1970 he participated in the .

"Alpha-66" unsuccessful attempt of infiltra

tion through Oriente Province, and sought -

refuge at the Naval Base, where he was

arrested again, this time because he violated

the conditions of a bond over an 18 ronths-

condenn due to the trial just mentioned ---

before.

Nevertheless, he is set free and leaves

United States without any difficulty, and -

moves to South America in order to partici-

pate in the plot. Afterwards, he returns to

the United States.

32

---

## Page 161

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page

161

consideramos que el análisis de las infor

maciones que aportanos, las públicumente-

conocidas y las que las autoridades nor--

teamericanas poseen y no han sido publica

das, permiten afirmar que la eliminación-

física de dirigentes de la Revolución Cu-

bara, principalmente del Primer Ministro-

Fidel Castro Ruz, ha constituído una polí

tica reiterada de los Estados Unidos a --

través de sus agencias subversivas, utili-

zando para ello a contrarrevolucionarios-•

cubanos, ciudadanos norteamericanos y to-

terna como externamente, sin tomar en con

sideración las víctimas que ocasionarían-

estas acciones.

este objetivo han sido facilitadas en

grandes cantidades, armas, explosivos, me--

dios técnicos, de transporte y comunica--

ción a los participantes, para la realiza

ción de sus planes.

Estos son algunos hechos connotados y com

probados de las numerosas actividades sub-.

versivas que ha realizado la CIA destina-

das a la eliminación física de los diri--

gentes, del Gobierno Rev:olucionario de --

33

We consider that the analysis of the informa

tions we offer, the publicly known, and the-

that the American authorities possess -)

and nave not been publisned, allow us to ---

affirm that the physical elimination of Cuban

Revolutionary leaders, specially the Prime -

Minister Fidel Castro fuz, has been a reiterat

ed policy of the United States through its --

subversive agencies, making use of Cuban ----

counterrevolutionaries, U.S. citizen and all-

kind of corrupted individuals, inside the ---

country as well as abroad, without taking ---

into consideration the victims that would ---

result from these actions.

With this purpose, they have provided the ---

and communication for the accomplishment of -

their plans.

These are some uf the coonoted and proved ---

facts of the numerous subversive activities -

that the CIA has carried out aimed to the ---

assassination of the leaders of the Revolutio

nary Government of Cuba.

"Stoves

---