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2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 19925 ; L

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. C.2050S

13 December 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Executive Director

Assassination Records Review Board

SUBJECT:

(U) Identity of Human Sources

(We request that this memorandum be returned to CIA

once the Review Board has completed its deliberations on the

issues discussed below.)

1.

(U) Issue.

The purpose of this memorandum is to

/relate CIA's concerns to the Review Board regarding the

release of the true names of human sources of intelligence

which appear in the JFK Collection and to present a proposal

on how this problem could be addressed.

I. Factual Background

2.

(U) In general, CIA "sources" are foreign

nationals, recruited and living in a foreign country, who

provide information to the U.S. Government under a promise

of confidentiality.

Their act of passing information to the

U.S. is generally against the national interest of their own

country and would be considered espionage, which is a

capital offense in most countries.

Just as in this country

when a spy is caught, should a CIA source be discovered, it

would be "headline news," even 30 years after the fact.

The

Review Board will recall that when former National Security

Agency employee Robert Lipka was arrested approximately a

year ago for espionage he allegedly committed 30 years

earlier, this received a lot of attention in the United

Lipka is currently awaiting trial in the U.s. for

his alleged espionage activities.

3.

(U) This

month, the Review Board will be

considering approximately 50-60 true names of human sources

for release. These particular sources range from encrypted

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assets to one-time contacts. It is our understanding that

additional source names appear throughout the JFK Collection

and will be reviewed in the future.

It is important,

therefore, that the Review Board and CIA agree on a

consistent method of dealing with source names appearing in

the JFK Collection at this time so as not to impede the

future review of documents.

4. (C) The Review Board has recently developed a

policy for releasing the true names of covert CIA employees.

Although there are many similarities between covert

employees and sources, there is an important difference that

should be reflected in the way the Review Board looks at

this issue.

With CIA covert employees who are mentioned in

this collection, it has been possible in some instances to

go to them and seek their permission to reveal their names.

Some of these former employees have even been made available

for interviews and depositions.

With most sources, it is

not possible to do this.

with

First, CIA has dropped contact

some of these sources and may not be able to locate

them.

Attempting to find these individuals would create

some risk of creating suspicions that they were or are

associated with this Agency or the U.S. Government.

If CIA

were unable to locate a particular source, there would still

be some risk in releasing his name.

Just because CIA cannot

locate him, does not mean that he is not alive and well-

known in his own community.

Even if

we were able to locate

a source without risk to his safety, it is probable that he

would not want to be visited by the CIA again after so many

years.

More than likely, sources do not now want their past

association revealed when they have undoubtedly moved on in

their lives to do other things.

Some may be in political or

private enterprise positions where CIA affiliation would

damage them professionally and/or harm them and their

families personally.

5. (U) Another important distinction that needs to be

taken into account is the difference between CIA and Federal

Bureau of Investigation

(FBI) "sources."

Perhaps the most

significant difference is that many FBI sources provide

information with the understanding that the information and

the source will be publicly revealed.

FBI sources are often

used in criminal prosecutions as witnesses.

CIA, on the

other hand, promises secrecy and confidentiality to its

sources.

CIA sources rarely appear at public trials.

In

fact, not only is the identity of CIA sources protected from

public acknowledgment, but also it is closely held within

the Agency itself. Another difference is the fact that a

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foreign national cooperating with CIA is usually committing

a unique violation of his own country's laws--espionage.

If

one gets caught committing espionage, the punishment in many

countries is for a capital offense.

On the other hand, a

foreigner who cooperates with the FBI is not usually

committing espionage. Cooperation may be with the full

knowledge of his government--such as cooperation in a

criminal investigation.

Therefore, the risks for

cooperation with the FBI are not usually as great as

cooperation with CIA.

In addition, the FBI has greater

means for protecting individuals who provide information to

it, for example, the witness protection program, which CIA

does not have.

II. Legal Considerations

6.

(U) Although Section 11(a) of the JFK Act provides

that when the Act requires release of information, it takes

precedence over all other laws that would otherwise prohibit

the true names of sources.

CIA believes that it is

important for the Review Board to consider the laws, which

have been growing and developing over the years, to

protect

classified information because they clearly reflect a larger

U.S. Government policy to protect intelligence sources.

7.

(U) By Executive Order (E.O.) and statute, the

President and Congress have made the Director of Central

Intelligence (DCI)

responsible for protecting intelligence

sources.

In his Directive of 22 January 1946 which

established the Central Intelligence Group, President Truman

made the DCI responsible for protecting sources.

With the

establishment of the CIA, Congress also gave the DCI this

responsibility.

The National Security Act of 1947, Section

103 (d) (3), codified at 50 U.S.C. 8403(3) (c) (5), requires the

DCI to protect intelligence

sources from unauthorized

disclosure. In addition, $403 (3) (d) (2) requires the DCI to

ensure that risks to the United States and those involved in

the

collection of intelligence through human sources are

minimized.

8.

(U) Protecting the identity of individuals working

with or for CIA has been of particular concern to U.s.

lawmakers since the establishment of the Agency. For

example, with Section 6 of the Central Intelligence Act of

1949, 50 U.S.C. 1949 §403g, Congress specifically exempted

the CIA from the provisions of any law requiring the

publication or disclosure of the organization, functions,

names, titles, salaries or numbers of personnel employed by

the Agency.

Although the purpose of this law is to protect

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employees of the CIA, and not assets or contacts, it

indicates Congress' intent from early on to protect those

working covertly for the U.S. Government.

9.

(U) In 1980, Congress passed the Classified

Information Procedures Act (CIPA) which sets out pretrial,

trial, and appellate procedures for criminal cases involving

or potentially involving classified information.

Working

with the Department of Justice and the courts, CIA has

successfully protected intelligence sources from public

release even in criminal trials where there are heightened

(i.e., constitutional) considerations favoring disclosure to

the defendant of all government information relevant to the

defense.

CIPA allows for in camera ex parte hearings in

which the judge can rule on questions of admissibility and

relevancy of classified information, including the identity

of human sources who may have information pertaining to the

defense, before it is introduced either to the defendant or

defense counsel, or in open court.

In some cases involving

CIA, the judge has ordered that CIA information be turned

over to the defense, but only in some unclassified form such

as in a

summary.

In other cases, judges have reviewed the

classified information and ruled

that the harm to national

security outweighs the defendant's legal rights to the

information.

In still other cases,

the defense was never

notified that CIA even had information bearing on the case

as

the judge ruled that the mere fact that CIA possessed

this information was classified and outweighed any rights

the defendant had.

Moreover, under CIPA, the Attorney

General has

the authority to drop a prosecution in those

cases where the risk to national

security is too great.

10

(U) In 1982, Congress acted to protect human

intelligence sources

by passing the Intelligence Identities

Protection Act of 1982, 50 U.S.C. §421 which criminalizes

the revelation of a source's identity.

anyone who reveals information that identifies a covert

no nat dentiti

This Act subjects

agent to prosecution with up to 10 years in prison and

$50,000 in fines.

covert agent includes:

(a) a U.S.

citizen whose intelligence relationship with the U.s.

Government is classified and is acting abroad as an agent,

informant or source of operational assistance to an

intelligence agency; and (b) an individual, other than a

U.S. citizen whose past or present intelligence relationship

to the U.S. is classified information and who is a present

or former

agent or informant of, or is of operational

assistance to, an intelligence agency.

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SUBJECT: (U) Identity of Human Sources

11. (U) These statutes are just a few examples of a

larger

government policy to protect human sources from

public disclosure.

There has also developed over the years

a significant amount of case law which further implements

this policy.

For example, in Sims v. CIA. 10 S.Ct. 1981

(1985), the Supreme Court held that pursuant to the National

Security Act, the DCI had the authority to protect from

release to Freedom of Information Act requesters the

identities of individuals conducting research on projects

financed by CIA. The Supreme Court further stated that the

DCI's authority to protect sources was broad, and was not

limited to only those individuals who were guaranteed

confidentiality.

12.

(U) Most recently, President Clinton signea an

Executive Order on classified national security information

which came into effect in October 1995.

Although it

requires that agencies make greater declassification efforts

than the prior Executive Order, Executive Order 12958

affords human

extra protection from its

declassification provisions.

Under E.0. 12958, information

declassified within five years..

revealing the identity of a human source may continue to be

protected.

(U) The above federal statutes and case law show

a long-standing practice of protecting human sources who

provide intelligence information to the U.S. Government.

In

carrying

out its statutory obligations, the Review Board

should give serious weight to this policy and afford the

protection of human sources the highest priority.

III. Operational Considerations

14.

(U) As the Review Board is well aware, in order

for CIA officers to effectively collect intelligence around

the world, they cannot acknowledge publicly that they work

for CIA and, conversely, CIA cannot acknowledge a particular

individual's

affiliation with it.

This is true even more so

with sources. In addition to the risk to a source's

personal safety, discovery of a CIA source would also reveal

any operations he was conducting and CIA case officers with

whom he was meeting or might even cast suspicion on the

The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 5552 is another

example of a federal statute that allows for the protection of human

Although the FOIA generally mandates release of government

documents, exemption b (3)

allows for withholding from release

information that is exempted from disclosure by statute.

The National

Security Act has been held by the Supreme Court to be such a withholding

Sims. V. CIA, 105 S.Ct. 1981 (1985).

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SUBJECT: (U) Identity of Human Sources

affiliation of innocent family and friends. This is no less

true with a

source who no longer works for the Agency.

source's prior affiliation with CIA is normally still

classified in order to protect him, his former contacts at

CIA, the CIA facilities at which he may have been meeting

with case officers, the cover mechanisms employed to protect

his affiliation with CIA, and the operations which he

conducted.

The public disclosure of an individual's

affiliation with CIA could and, in fact, has threatened the

safety and lives of not only the source, but also their

families, colleagues, officials of foreign governments and

other foreign nationals with whom they have had contact.

The Review Board will certainly recall the Proenza case

(since this was released by the Board in August 1995) in

which a number of Cuban officials were falsely believed to

be CIA agents.

They were arrested, convicted and spent

years in prison for their alleged treasonous activities

and

their professional and personal lives were ruined.

The

threat of violence to those who are in fact associated with

CIA is even more real. These individuals live and work in

foreign countries, many of which have a local population

hostile to the United States and especially CIA. If one

should doubt the risks that those affiliated with CIA face,

one only has to recall that, in 1992, two CIA employees were

murdered while waiting to turn into CIA Headquarters in

Virginia.

If this type of attack is possible right at the

CIA's front gate, it is not hard to imagine the personal

risks that those working with the CIA abroad face.

Clearly,

the risk is that much greater for those who are sources:

for example, as

a result of Aldrich Ames' disclosures to

the KGB, 10

Soviets who were covert assets of the CIA were

executed.

16. (U) Incidents such as these clearly demonstrate

that the policy of protecting association with the CIA is an

important one.

Individuals associated with CIA have been

and will continue to be subjected to threats, reprisals and

physical injuries from foreign intelligence

services,

terrorist groups, and other persons or organizations hostile

to CIA or the U.S. Government.

Individuals choose to

undertake these risks for many different reasons, but it is

with the condition that the CIA will protect their

cooperation with the U.S. Government.

IV. Proposal

17.

(U)

In light of the foregoing, CIA believes it is

important to work toward a general policy of protecting CIA

sources in the JFK Collection. The Agency proposes that in

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SUBJECT: (U) Identity of Human Sources

most cases a substitution for the true name be used. . In

prior releases of these same documents, the Review Board

agreed to redact the true name and substitute "source." If

the Review Board is concerned about tracking particular

sources throughout the records, a particular identifying

substitution can be used for an individual source throughout

(for example, "Mexican source 1").

18.

(S) Among the names that are currently being

considered for release by the Review Board, the following

are some that the CIA proposes be treated in this manner:

• True name of LIRING/3, an encrypted asset of the

CIA and unilateral penetration of the Cuban L

Embassy. His wife also worked at the Embassy and

he was apparently suspected as being CIA though it

was never proven.

LIRING/3 at some point

disappeared and we have no way of knowing what his

current situation is.

True name of ERTHYROID/3. the unilateral

(penetration of the Nicaraguan Service. The Review

Board will recall that it has already been fully

briefed on ERTHYROID/3 and had agreed to the

protection of the fact (that he was a unilateral

source.

(Anthony C. M. Devere (1041001210022) was [is] a

member of the British Service. JAs such, he was

(is] a liaison source.

This raises concerns about

protection of ourfliaison relationships.

Moreover, Mr. Devere's identity constitutes

"foreign government information" which, as the

Board has already been informed, the CIA does not

have the authority to release.

(S) Another type of name that similarly should be

protected from release is the new identity provided to a

Although defectors do not face some of the

dangers that "assets" overseas face, they are still given

new identities for their protection because there is some

risk to their personal safety even in the U.S. For example,

in this collection the identity of Golitsyn appears in

documents being reviewed this month.

Since the time of his

defection, Golitsyn has utilized successive identities;

because they have been unofficially disclosed, that have not

' (S) Golitsyn's identity had to be changed again.

However, there is a

risk that revealing this former identity could lead to the

identification of Golitsyn's current identity.

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SUBJECT: (U) Identity of Human Sources

been officially released and that are closely held within

the Agency. This is done for his own protection and that of

his family even though they live in the United States.

CIA

cannot, at this time, agree to the official release of

Golitsyn's assumed new identities or for that matter of any

defectors that appear to date in the collection.

(S) CIA has noted that in some cases a source is

identified by only a first name or a code name.

Where CIA

has been unable to identify any information about that

individual or there is no other source revealing information

that has been revealed in the JFK Collection, it would be

possible to release that name. For example, in a few

documents, the name "Tota" appears.

To date, CIA has been

unable to determine who this person is and there does not

appear to be any further source revealing information in the

collection. It is probably that "Tota" is just a code name

or a street name known to his colleagues. As "Tota" is a

common name, such a release would not threaten the

particular individual or his family, and as the person can

not be identified it would not seriously undermine the U.s.

Government policy to protect intelligence sources.

21. (U)

The Agency recognizes that some names may be

particularly important to the JFK story.

In such cases, the

CIA is willing to work with the Review Board to come to

the

appropriate resolution. CIA proposes that it conduct a

record search for information on that individual.

It may be

that in these cases, if the person is deceased and has no

living family, that the Review Board and the CIA can agree

that the value of revealing the true name outweighs the need

to protect that source from disclosure.

22.

(U)

It is our hope that the CIA and the Review

Board can work out a mutually agreeable policy regarding the

identity of human sources that will not undermine the

important policy of protecting those who work covertly for

the U.S. Government.

As usual, my staff and I are available

to discuss this matter with you.

John F. Pereira

Chief, Historical Review Group

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DCI/CSI/J. Pereira:

apd/x31805 (13 Dec 96)

G: /CSIFO/SHARED/Pereira.doc

Distribution:

Original - Addressee

1

- CSI/HRP Chrono

1

-D/CSI

1

- C/CSI/HRG

1

- Barry Harrrelson, CSI/HRP

1

-(Linda Cipiriani, OGC

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MEMORANDUM

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION

IN THIS DOCUMENT

September 25, 1998

To:

Laura Denk

Executive Director

CC:

Bob Skwirot

CIA Team Leader

From:

Michelle Combs

Associate Director for Research and Review

Subject:

No Evidence of Contact Between Lee Harvey Oswald and the CIA's Office of

Operations

One of the enigmas that has surrounded Lee Harvey Oswald's defection and re-defection is the

question of whether the CIA's Office of Operations (later the Domestic Contacts Division)

interviewed or took note of Oswald either before his trip or upon his return from the Soviet

Union The available evidence is somewhat contradictory. The CIA has long claimed that

Oswald was never a source, asset, or employee of the CIA. Yet, a November 25, 1963

memorandum discusses the recollections of a CLA staff officer that the Agency considered

interviewing Oswald. Further, another former CIA officer, Donald E. Deneselya, has stated that

he recalls reading an OQ debriefing report in the summer of 1962 from a former Marine re-

defector who had worked at the Minsk Radio Factory. The Review Board could not corroborate

the recollections of the two former CIA officers with additional records or information.

In an effort to clarify the mystery, the Review Board searched for records that might confirm or

deny any contact between Oswald and the CIA before or after his time in the Soviet Union. In

the early 1960's, the Office of Operations (OO) was a part of the Directorate of Intelligence.

This office, which interviews American citizens who might have come into contact with

information or individuals of intelligence interest overseas, later became the Domestic Contacts

Division (DCD) of the Directorate of Operations. This office normally only contacts individuals

after receiving questions or requirements from intelligence community customers looking for

particular types of information.

The Review Board staff examined OO records and operational histories to gain an understanding

of 0O practices in the late 1950's and early 1960's. The Review Board staff could find no

evidence of contact between Oswald and 0O either before or after his time in the Soviet Union.

Had Oswald departed for his trip to the Soviet Union through New York City, as did most

travelers, he possibly might have come to the attention of OO. The Review Board staff did not

locate any reference or record to Oswald's departure from New Orleans via freighter that

predates the assassination. The Review Board staff also could not locate any information to

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document an OO interest in Oswald upon his return from the Soviet Union. While 0O was

interested in interviewing tourists to the Soviet Union for general information in the 1950's, by

1962 only travelers with special access, knowledge, or skills were of intelligence interest. OO

had no specific policy covering contacts with retuming defectors although a local field office

could initiate a contact if justified by a particular situation. According to the records located,

OO only made contact with three of twenty-three defectors in the 1954-1962 time period. No

records or reporting showing any OO contact with Oswald could be located: The Office of

Operations did interview re-defector Robert Edward Webster in June 1962 on his work at the

Plastics Institute of Leningrad.

While a DCD "A" file on Oswald does exist in the CIA's sequestered collection, most of the

documents in the file are from the mid-1970's, none predate the assassination, and the file

appears to have been created as DCD personnel attempted to locate any evidence of contacts

with Oswald in response to various congressional investigative bodies. This file has been

processed for inclusion in the JFK Collection at the National Archives.

encombstded wuwad

File 4.50 (Wrap Up Memos)

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9 October 1997

Memorandum to: Jeremy Gunn

Executive Director

Assassination Records Review Board

FrOM:

J. Barry Harrelson

JFK Project Officer

CIA/CSI/HRG

Subject:

October 14 Meeting

• - Source Names

Reference:

"A" Name List of Sources

(CIA requests that this memorandum and its attachments

be returned once the Review Board has completed its

deliberation on the names discussed below.)

1. Manuel Calvillo, an unwitting source of Alfonso?

Wichtrich (see below). Calvillo became a figure in the JFK

story, when Elena Garro de Paz identified him as the person

who sequestered her in a hotel after she protested at the

who guest red los in a foR dea

Cuban Embassy.

Because of this link to stories related to

Oswald's visit to Mexico City, Calvillo is considered a JFK

assassination figure. His name and all assassination-related

intormation have been released in collection. ? However,

crypt when linked to his true name has been deleted. The

CIA requests that his crypt not be released when associated

with the true name in order to protect Wichtrich and other

involved with the LIHUFF project.

The linkage of Calvillo's

true name with his crypt could lead to his association with

and identification of Wichtrich and his assistant.

2. CIA concurs with the release of the following name

in the specific documents cited:

Miguel Nazar-Haro in documents 104-10052-10058

and 104-10014-10016.

Because of the relationship of this individual with the CIA,,

future documents containing his name must be reviewed on a

case-by-case basis; there may be situations in which the

Agency will request that the name be protected.

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3. Phillipe Thyyraud De Vosjoli:

Former head of the French Service in Washington

(1951-63), De Vosjoli retired and became a CIA/FBI asset. As

a USG asset, he had contact with German and Canadian

Intelligence Services in the mid-1960s and early 1970s. He

became

a naturalized US citizen c.1971. Apparently his case

was not handled in normal defector channels as the

responsible component has no records of De Vosjoli. His 201

file shows that his last substantive contact with the Agency

was in 1972 and was initiated by him

from Florida. Although

De Vosjoli has publicly acknowledged his unilateral

relationship with the Agency during his tour in Washington,

it is not clear if the extent of his activities following

his defection is widely known. Official confirmation of his

"defection" could potentially affect the Agency's foreign

liaison relationships.

4 .

The CIA requests that the three names discussed

below from the A List be protected. All are, or were,

covert assets of the Agency.The Agency has

a moral, and

possibly

a legal, obligation to protect their identities.

As a basic tenet of the covert relationship, the Agency

agreed to protect the fact of their relationships with the

USG; and they, in turn, promised to keep those relationships

secret.

To our knowledge, the individuals have honored this

basic contractual commitment.

The Agency believes that the

possible harm to the individuals, their families and/or

associates, and the potential for damage to

sensitive

intelligence operations, outweigh the contribution the

release of these three names would make to public

understanding of the assassination.

The Agency is

particularly concerned about the erosion of the principle of

protecting the identity of sources and the potential

chilling effect on future agent operations and recruitment.

The Agency is further concerned about the possibility of

liability to the individuals and their families for failure

to honor its commitments of confidentiality.

A. Franklin Anthony Garcia Wheelock.

The Agency acknowledges that Wheelock is a key figure

in the Alavarado story, and it has released all information

(including his crypt) except for his name. It is not known

if Wheelock is still alive.

However, he had five children

who may still be living in Nicaragua

and are probably

unaware of their father's Agency relationship.

of his name could have negative repercussions

for Wheelock

and his family.

Nicaragua is a small, provincial place, and

Wheelock's patronymic name is a prominent one in the

country.

Revelation of his name and his relationship with

CIA would be quickly disseminated within Nicaragua, and his

family members would be easily identified. Such

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identification could result in anything from public

humiliation to dangerous retaliation by the thriving leftist

Sandinistas. In either case, disclosure would undercut the

Agency's ability to recruit sources in small countries such

as Nicaragua.

-B: Jose Marie Mankel.

Mr. Mankel is a central figure in the Agency project

The Agency has released his crypt and al-

most all the information related to the project.

Mankel's

relationship with the Agency commenced in November 1960 and

ended in February 1964. Our files do not reflect any contact

since that time.

It is presumed that, if Mankel is still

alive, he is living in Luxembourg.

Mankel had numerous acquaintances in European criminal

that Mankel worked for the USG/CIA could result in personal

harm to him, his family, and associates. In addition, his

201 file, which is in the JFK collection, contains a number

of references to his support of the Bureau of Narcotics and

Dangerous Drugs. Given the potential compromise of

individuals and operations totally unrelated to the JFK

story, the Agency requests that Mankel's true name continue

to be protected. Coordination with DEA may also be required

in this case.

Mankel's 201 File is available for review in

the CIA secure area.

C.

(Alfonso Rudolph Wichtrich.

A WWII intelligence officer, Wichtrich worked with the

Agency in Panama during 1947-49

and in Mexico City from

1954-70 in various capacities (Station contact, field agent,

and contract agent). A prominent businessman,

he was general

manager of the Royal Crown Cola Company in Mexico and later

was executive vice president of the American Chamber of

Commerce in Mexico.

During the JFK time frame, he was

primary agent on a

cA project (LIHUFF), initially set up to

support a conservative front organization. He later became

the

sole focus of the project.

In that role he also served

as the cut-out for an unwitting individual, Manuel Calvillo

(see above). Wichtrich's only link to the JFK story appears

to be his relationship with Calvillo. A review of his files

(OP, 201, C, Production) by the ARRB staff did not identify

any

other connection to the JFK story. A

selection of

documents from his file are attached.

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Given Wichtrich's high profile, the release of his name

could impact both past and future intelligence operations

and directly affect Mr. Wichtrich and his family. His son

had contact with the Panama City Station in 1979; we are

trying to determine the extent of that relationship. In this

case, the Agency believes that the potential for harm

clearly outweighs the contribution the release of

Wichtrich's name would make to the JFK assassination story.

Bandan

Barry

Harrelson

Attachments:

AS

stated

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