## Page 1

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

CLASSIFIED

hen blank-TOP SECRET when attached to Top Secret Documént-Automatically downgraded or declassi

i when filled in form is detached from controlled document.

CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT. DESCRIPTION

RCE

JOC.

NO.

TS::

712

DOC. DATE

COPY NO.

NUMBER

OF PAGES

1447

NUMBER

OF. ATTACHMENTS

REGISTRY

CIA CONTROL NO.

T3/97/24

DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED

131 72a 10

LOGE Tisan Pease

ATTENTION To el be peed on an or red ee the de en une to be do the our ratelligent geor

remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or

transmitted outside ONCIA.

Access to Top Secret mätter is limited to Top Secret Control personnel ayd those individuals whose ofcial

duttes relate to the matter.

Top Secret Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this form

Each individual who sees the Top secret document will sign and

and indicate period ol custody in the left-hand columns provided.

indicate the date of handling in the right-hand columns.

RELEASED

BESEEN BY

REFERRÉD TO

OFFICE

RECEIVED

•f.

SIGNATURE

DATE

TIME

DATE

TIME

SIGNATURE

OFFICE/DIV.

-DATE

NOTICE OF DETACHMENT:

When this form

and transmitted. to. Central Top secret Control for record.

DOWNGRADED:•

detached from Top Secret Material it shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below

DISPATCHED

(OUTSIDE CIA)

DESTROYED

BY (Signature)

WITNESSED BY (Signature)

DATE

OFFICE

TO

BY (Signature)

OFFICE

TO

BY (Signaturos

OFFICE

"FORIA

78-73

26

USE

PREVIOUS

DATE

EDITIONS.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 2

TOP SECRET DOCUMENI

MATERIA MVEENED AT CH: MEADQUÄRTERS IY

1O0S1: SELECT COMTH: ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MIRERS

LE TITLE NUMBER/VOLUID: :

The Examination of the

Bona Fides of a KGB Defector

1 Document - dated February: 1968

SCLUSIVE DATES:

STODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

LITIONS,

IF AVY:

CI

ROOM:

-

DATE

ECEIVED

-14-19

DATE

RETURNIED!

9327030

SIGNATURE OF

REVIEWING OFFICIAL

REVIVED BY

(PRINT NNIE)

Kenneti

Kein

Hennett klein

11001

10-71

Binet Me

Finite A

stems Sif

Sohanna Smithi

G. ROBERT BLAKEY

4053

4.22.25

22 An 75

2 at 7s

Mie Man 18

JOHANNA SMITT

S. Rohit Blahes

Splint Smitt

anna futi

SURELL BRADY

Fundi Brag

MARGO E LACKSON!

Marai e Lackm

02064

---

## Page 3

Top Secret

The Examination of the Bona Fides

of a KGB Defector

Top Secret

cy * 10

TS No. 197124

Copy Nº 10

---

## Page 4

TOP SECRET

1. Attached is copy number 10 of the February 1968

CIA study entitled "The Examination of the Bona Fides of

a KGB Defector - Yuriy I. Nosenko."

visiotsiderine

2. Please note that the CIA finds this study to be

inaccurate in many important details and to contain the

results of faulty judgements leading to unfounded conclusions.

3. We have deleted certain portions of this study

containing information which bears on the security of

ongoing, viable CIA operations, or is related thereto.

4. We request return of this study when it has served

your purposes.

TOP SECRET

6061266

---

## Page 5

The Examination of the Bona Fides

of a KGB Defector

Yuriy I. NOSENKO

February 1968

Top Secret

0001267

TS No. 197124

Copy

10

---

## Page 6

Top Secret

CONTENTS

Introduction

PAGE

1

3

Summary of Case

I

FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS

NOSENKO's Statements About liimself

Soviet Officials' Statements

The Product of NOSENKO's Debriefing

Positive Intelligence Information

Counterintelligence Information

Significant KGB Operations Not

Directly Related to NOSENKO's

Claimed Service

"The KGB Agent in Paris'

(Sgt.

"LeET JOHNSON'

"SASHA" (Identity Unknown)

"The KGB Agent in the British Admiralty"

(William VASSALL)

The KGB Audio Attack on the West German

Embassy

"ANDREY" (Dayle W. SMITH)

Edward Ellis SMITHI

II EXAMINATION OF NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES

Notes for the Reader

11

11

20

21

21

22

24

24

28

30°

31

33

37

41

41

III PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY

Birth

to 1945

Moscow Institute of International Relations

(1945-ca.

1950)

Naval RU Service (Ca. 1951-ca. 1953)

Summary and Conclusion

45

45

48

49

58

0001268

(i)

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy 10

---

## Page 7

10241226220200222

Top Secret

CONTENTS

PAGE

VI SEVENTH DEPARTMENT (June 1955-January 1960)

(Cont.)

VII

Operational Activities (1955-1958)

Entrapment of MALIA 06

Recruitment of BURGI l6

Attempted

recruitment of GEHRCKENS D

contact with LANE and BIRSE 06,06

Recruitment of SUNDAR 06

Travel to London (1957 and 1958)

Operational ActiVities_ (1958-1960)

Recruitment of HARRIS DO

Compromise of (KRAFT) 06

Recruitment of DREW 06

Recruitment of (LUKiS 06

Recruitment of WILBY 0%

Recruitment of TAYLOR 06

Recruitment of MERTENS 06

Compromise of [BARRETT 06

Compromise of WILLERFORD C6

Recruitment of FRIPPELUC

Lee Harvey OSWALD

Summary

Knowledge of other Seventh Department

American Tourist Operations

Seventh Department Counterintelligence

Operations (1955-1960)

NOSENKO's Information

Information Furnished IGB by George BLAKE

KGB Tourist Study

Summary and Conclusion

AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION OF AMERICAN DEPARTMENT

(January 1960-January

1962)

Deputy Chief of Section

Transfer to

Section

Predecessor as Deputy Chief

Responsibilities

Deputy and Occasional Acting

Chief

General Supervisory

Duties

113

114

115

121

122

123

124

127

128

129

130

131

131

132

133

134

136

137

143

144

145

146

146

148

149

150

(iii)

Top Secret

151

151

152

153

154

156

159

0001269

TS No. 197124

Copy

10

16: 8R

---

## Page 8

Top Secret

CONTENTS

PAGE

VII AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION OF AMERICAN DEPARTMENT

(January 1960-January 1962) (Cont.)

Cryptologic Attack on Embassy Communications

Knowledge of CIA Personnel

within Embassy

Suspected CIA Officers

Unsuspected CIA Officers

Personal Handler of Agents

Temporary Assignments Abroad

Planned Travel to U.S.

Travel to Cuba (November-December 1960)

Travel to Bulgaria (April-May 1961)

Compromise of LUNTJOG

Promotion and Transfer to

Seventh Department

(January 1962)

Summary and Conclusion

236

240

241

244

248

251

251

252

254

256

259

261

VIII SEVENTH DEPARTMENT (January 1962-January 1964)

Introductory Comment

Chief of the American-British Commonwealth

Section (January 1962-July 1962)

NOSENKO's Agents

Operational Activities

Entrapment of JOHNSONO6

Entrapment of JONES

Recruitment of BIENSTOCK C6

Travel to Geneva (March-June 1962)

Purpose of Trip

Investigation of SHAKHOV

Security Escort for Delegation

Visits

to KGB Legal Residency

KGB Officers within Soviet Delegation

Association with Other Soviets

Supervising Case

Officer for BELITSKIY

Contact with CIA

Operational Activities

(continued)

Attempted Recruitment of BRAUNS 06

Summary and Conclusion

: 263

263

265

265

268

268

272

273

275

275

276

278

:279

279

280

282

286

288

288

290

(v)

Top Secret

0001270

TS No. 197124

Copy

10

S/BR

---

## Page 9

Top Secret

CONTENTS

PAGE

VIII. SEVENTH DEPARTMENT (January 1962-Januaty: 1964)

(Cont.)

Deputy Chief of Seventh Department

(July 1962-January 1964)

KGB Operations

Recruttment of SVENCHANSKID6

Investigation of SLESINGER 06

Arrest and Interrogation of KOTEN D6

GRU Agent SHUBIN 06

Arrest of BARGHOORN

Investigation of OSWALD

Residence in USSR

Request to Return to USSR

Post-Assassination Review of KGB File

The CHEREPANOV Papers

Contents.

NOSENKO's Travel Document

Return to Geneva (January-February 1964)

Purpose of Trip

Visits to KGB Legal Residency

Avallability for Meetings with CIA

NOSENKO's WIitten. Notes

NOSENKO's Defection

Knowledge of Other Seventh Department

Operations

Operational Activities (July 1962-

January 1964)

KGB Counterintelligence Operations Among

AmeIlcan Tourists

Information Furnished the KGB by

George BLAKE

KGB Study of American Intelligence

• Tourist Operations

NOSENKO's Information

Summary

Summary and Conclusion

291

292

292:

293

295

296

298

303

303

305

307:.

309

314

315

316.

317

318

318

319

320

325

326

326

327.

327

330

331

331

0001271

(vi)

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

4/BR

---

## Page 10

14-00000

Top Secret

CONTENTS

IX • OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMED KGB SERVICE

Relationship with General GRIBANOV

Communist Party Status

Knowledge of KGB Forms

and Procedures

Awards and Decorations

Sourcing

Ranks

PACE

335

335

338

342

345

349

350

X PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PSYCHIATRIC ASSESSMENT

XI SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS: NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES

-355

357

Annex B - Summaries of Cases Not Examined in Text

399

Index of Personalities

437

0001272

(v11)

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

10

---

## Page 11

6 10 00005

Top Secret

Introduction

The judgment of NOSENKO's bona fides entailed the

distillation of the huge volume of counterintelligence

information assembled in connection with his case, including

the product of his lengthy interrogations, the analysis of

KGB

operations which he related, the results of file checks

of thousands

of

individuals involved, comparison of his

assertions against collateral information from all sources

and with counterintelligence

records on the KGB and related

matters:

The: examination herein reduces this volume of

material to manageable proportions, to essential elements

of NOSENKO's claims, in order to permit comparison of his

statements with matters of known fact and to permit appli-

cation of reasonable judgment.. Conclusions are drawn from

the examination of each major period in his claimed

biography. The final conclusions represent the aggregate

of conclusions independently drawn from the examination

of

each major period in his claimed biography.

0001273

1

Top Secret

TS. No. 197124

Copy — 10

---

## Page 12

Top Secret

CONTENTS

IV KGB ENTRY (ca. 1953)

Date of Entry

Role of General KOBULOV

Eligibility

Processing for Entry

Initial Service

Other Aspects Relevant to KGB Service

Summary and Conclusion

PAGE

61

62

64

67

68

70

•72

74

V AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION OF AMERICAN DEPARTMENT

'(ca". 1953-June 1955)

Operations Against American Correspondents

KGB Files

NOSENKO's Agents

Operations Against U.S. Army Attache Personnel

Custody of Case Files

NOSENKO's Ägents

NOSENKO's Targets

MICKELSON 06

MEARNS. 06

RICHARDS 06

FELCHLIN 06

BENSON 06

STROUD Do:

MULE O

BENSON, MULE and STROUD

06,06;06

Expulsion

CARDELLA 06

VAN LAETHEM: 06

Additional Reporting

Summary and Conclusion

VI SEVENTI' DEPARTMENT (June 1955-January 1960)

Introductory Comment

NOSENKO's Agents

Soviet Citizen Agents

Homosexual Agents YEFREMOV and VOLKOV

Summary

75

: 75

77

7.8

81

•83

84

87

87

88

89

90

93

93

94

•95

: 97

97

9.9

99

101

101

104

104

110

112

(iị)

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

---

## Page 13

Top Secret

CONTENTS

Introduction

PAGE

1

Summary of Case

I FOUNDATIONS OF

NOSENKO'S CLAIMS

NOSENKO's Statements

About Himself

Soviet Officials' Statements

The Product of NOSENKO's Debriefing

Positive Intelligence Information

Counterintelligence Information

Significant KGB Operations Not

Directly Related to NOSENKO's

Claimed Service

in Paris"

"The KEE AS REE TOWNSON

(Sgt.

"SASHA" (Identity Unknown)

"The KGB Agent in the British Admiralty"

(William VASSALL)

The KGB Audio Attack on the West German

Embassy

"ANDREY" (Dayle W. 'SMITH)

Edward Ellis SMITHI

3

11

11

20

21

21

22

24

24

28

30

31

33

37

II EXAMINATION OF NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES

Notes for the Reader

41

41

III: PRE-KGB BIOGRAPIY

Birth to 1945

Moscow Institute of International Relations

(1945-ca.

1950)

Naval RU

Service (Ca. 1951-ca. 1953)

Summary: and Conclusion

45

4.5

48

49

58

0001268

(i)

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy 10

---

## Page 14

Top Secret

Summary of Case

The NOSENKO case opened on 5 June 1962 in the corridors

of the Palais des Nations in Geneva during the United Nations

Disarmament Conference.

A Soviet official approached an

American diplomat with the suggestion that they get together

for a talk the following day.

The diplomat advised CIA of

appointment, explaining

that he thought the approach so

unusual that it might be an offer of cooperation or defection.

He said he believed the Soviet to be Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO,

a member of

the Soviet Disarmament Delegation.

Later

meeting with the American diplomat, the Soviet

official identified himself as NOSENKO. and stated he was

a

KGB counterintelligence officer sent to Geneva to ensure the

security of the Soviet delegation.

He knew that the American

had previously served in Moscow and erroneously believed

that

he was the "American Rezident" in Geneva.

NOSENKO stated

that he needed

approximately 900. Swiss francs immediately to

cover. KGB

operational funds which he had squandered

liquor and a

prostitute in Geneva.. He offered for this amount

to sell two items.of information to American Intelligence.

These were the identity of a

former American Embassy employee

in Moscow who was a KGB agent "near ciphers" in the Washington

area, and the identity of a Soviet in Moscow who, although

ostensibly a CIA agent, was actually controlled by the KGB.

In reply, the American explained that he was not an intelli-

gence officer, but

that he

could place NOSENKO in contact

with an appropriate u.S. official in Geneva later that same

day.

evening NOSENKO was met by

a CIA officer

and a three-

hour meeting followed

at a CIA safehouse in Geneva.

Describing

KGB major experienced in operations against the

American Embassy in Moscow and against tourists and other

travellers to the Soviet Union, NOSENKO told the CIA officer

of his financial difficulties and repeated his offer to sell

3

Top Secret

0001275

' TS No. 197124

Copy -10

---

## Page 15

Top Secret

Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO

Top Secret

0001274

TS No. 197124

Copy 10

---

## Page 16

Top Secret

(Summary of Case)

the two items

of information. He said that the need

for money

was his

immediate morive for

contasting ClA, alchough In the

ensuing discussion he aiso expressed dissatisfartion

Communist regime in the Soviet Union.

NOSENKO met CIA representatives

four more rimes in Geneva

in June 1962.

Wich the second

meeting on i1 June, his earlier

expressed reservations disappeared almost

entirely. He

answered most questions put to him on KGB organization and

operations.

His knowledgeability was almost exciusively

limited to the KGB Second Chief Directorate (responsible for

counterintelligence and security within he USSR;.

NOSENKO

seemed

to be what he claimed to be:

a KGB officer in a

sensitive position with knowledge of important KGB operations.

NOSENKO returned to Moscow on 15 June, having promised

to do everything within certain limits to colleir information

on matters indicated to be of interest to CIA.

The only

restrictions he placed on his cooperation were his absolute

refusal

to permit operacional contact with him inside the

USSR and his request that no mention of his collaboration be

communicated to the American Embassy in Moscow.

He promised

to notify CIA via an acconmodation addiess when he came to

the West again.

NOSENKO again accompanied the Soviet delegation to the

Disarmament Conference in Geneva in January 1964.

Since last

meeting with CIA he had been promoted to the rank of lieu-

tenant colonel and had become the Deputy Chief of the largest

department in the Second Chief Directorate.

At the first

of the new series of meetings on 23 January he announced

that he had decided to defect to the United States.

cited as reasons his continuing dissatisfaction with the

Soviet regime and the fact that he probably would have no

further opportunities to travel to the West in the foresee-

able future.

Although he implied that he wanted

to defect

as soon as possible, he agreed to remain in place in Geneva

while arrangements

reception were being made in

Washington.

NOSENKO had brought a large amount of new

information, much of it in scribbled notes, on KGB opera-

tional activity which he had collected in the 18 months

since his last meeting with CIA:

4

0001276

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy -

---

## Page 17

Top Secret

(Summary of Case)

On 4 February,

four

days before the date tentatively

for NOSENKO's defection, he reported that he had

received a cable from KGB Headquarters ordering his immediate

return to Moscow to participate in a KGB conference on

foreign tourism to the Soviet Union.: That night exfiltration

plans were implemented and NOSENKO was driven across the

border to. Germany where his debriefing was resumed

Frankfurt safehouse..

The decision was reached: on l1 February

to bring NOSENKO to the United States, and in the early

evening of 12. February he and his CIA escorts arrived in

Washington via commercial aircraft, thence

to a safehouse

in the Washington area.

At the request of the Swiss and Soviet Governments,

NOSENKO met on 14 February with representatives of their

respective Washington Embassies in the offices of the U.S.

Immigration and Naturalization Service.

He told both

he had defected on his own free will after careful consider

ation and that he had no desire to return to the Soviet

Union. In answer to the questions of the Soviet represen-

tatives, he orally renounced his status and rights as

.a.

citizen of the

. USSR.

CIA completed its initial debriefings of NOSENKO on

18 February, and on 24 February he was introduced to:

representatives of the FBI for questioning.

At about the

same

time,

there was a marked change in NOSENKO's comport-

ment. While outwardly cooperative during most debriefing

sessions, it became increasingly difficult to get him

respond to specific questioning. His free time in Washington

and

nearby cities was punctuated'by drinking bouts, crude

behavior, and disputes with his security escort. He explained

his behavior by saying that he was under great tension as

a result of his defection,

abandonment of his wife and

children, and the disgrace that he had brought

name, and on this basis CIA acceded to NOSENKO's demand for

a vacation: On 12 March, NOSENKO left Washington with a

and two CIA security guards for a two-week

visit to Hawaii.': There his behavior deterioriated still

further. He drank heavily and almost constantly; he

consorted with a number of prostitutes; he was loud and crude

in public places; and he spent money extravagantly and

conspicuously.

5

Top Secret

0001274

TS. No. 197124

Copy -10

---

## Page 18

Top Secret

(Summary of Case)

During NOSENKO's absence from Washington, consultations

were held with the FBI regarding steps to be taken

to restrict

his movements and activities.

that his behavior would attract undesirable atrention and

publicity, perhaps police arrest, and that doubts about his

bona fides, which were becoming known to a widening group

in the U.S.. Government, might be inadvertently revealed to

NOSENKO himself.

The FBI on 1 April indicated

ic would

"not interpose objection" to the CIA plan to limit NOSENKO's

freedom of movement, and the Acting Attorney General, the

Depariment of State, and the White House were advised.

On 4 April NOSENKO was

driven to a new safehouse in a

Washingion suburb, and told that this safehouse chenceforward

would be his regular place of residence.

Since that time

NOSENKO has had contacts with CIA personnel only, has been

under full-time guard, and has not been permitted

access to

news media.

Intensive interrogation of NOSENKO, including a polygraphic

examination, was begun on 4 April 1964 in order to obtain

information

which he had been reluctant to divulge earlier,

and to clarify contradictions

In what he had already reported.

polygraph examination results were inconclusive.

phase of the interrogations was terminated on 24 April 1964.

Despite the searching nature of the questions and the

implicitly and explicitly expressed doubts of his veracity,

NOSENKO asserted that he was willing to answer, or to try to

answer all questions put to him.

Because more information

pertinent to the question of his bona fides was needed, a

new series of interrogations was begun in mid-May 1964.

Different interrogators were introduced and questioning was

resumed in a neutral, non-hostile manner. The period of

neutral

questioning continued until mid-November 1964.

After further consultations with the FBI, a round of

hostile interrogations began on 26 January 1965. Between

then and 5 March, NOSENKO was questioned for a total of

about 140 hours by individual interrogators and interrogation

teams, and he was directly challenged on many of his previous

assertions.

He admitted that certain of his earlier statements

had been incorrect, and that he could not explain contradictions

6

0001278

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy -

---

## Page 19

Top Secret

(Summary of Case)

in his testimony: Nevertheless, NOSENKO maintained he had

been basically truthful, and that he had come to the United

States solely

for the reasons he had originally given.

These interrogations were suspended on 5 March 1965c

Questioning of NOSENKO during the

summer and autumn of

1964

and the interrogations of January and February 1965

concentrated on the period of his claimed service in the

American Embassy Section of the American Department, KGB

Second Chief Directorate, from January. 1960

to January 1962*

Among the reasons for selecting this particular period were

the comparatively large amount of collateral information

available against which NOSENKO's statements could be checked;

the importancè of the Embassy and its personnel as critical.

KGB Second Chief Directorate targets; their importance from

the standpoint of American security; and the extent of

NOSENKO's

claimed knowledge of the

activities of the Embassy

Section, of which he claimed to have been Deputy Chief.

In keeping with a Soviet practice with which NOSENKO was

familiar; CIA asked NOSENKO in February 1965 to sign a series.

of interrogation reports, so-called "

protocols", most of

which cöncerned

the period of his clained service in the

American Department

These were written by the CIA

interro-

gators, and they were designed to set forth NOSENKO's exact

statements and meaning on various specific subjects.. The

protocols were

in no way presented to. NOSENKO as

documentary

portions of a

"confession"

but rather as distilled and

final

statements of what he did

and did not know concerning

particular

topics. NOSENKO was

asked to read each. page.of

each protocol carefully and to sign his name at the bottom

to indicate that he understood and agreed with its contents;

he was allowed the use of a dictionary and was permitted to

ask any questions and make any changes that he wished.

(Amendments were entered by the interrogators and were

initialed by NOSENKO.)

NOSENKO was asked, after reading

each page

and after completing the entire protocol, whether

he understood what was written there and whether there were:

any more changes he wished to make. He was then asked to

sign and date the statement,

"I have

read and understood

this report and certify it as correct"

at the end of the

final page. With one exception, he did so calmly and without

objections.

In. one or two

instances he remarked chat his

statements were presented in such a manner as

to make them

Top Secret

0001279

TS No. 197124

Copy -10

---

## Page 20

Top Secret

(Summary of Case)

look foolish, but he was not able to suggest any changes of

fact or presentation which would make them more accurate.

Commenting on the

use of interrogation reports, NOSENKO said

on 4 March 1965: "My life story is absolutely correct.

Anything I have

signed is absolutely correct.

I absolutely

understand what I am doing when I am signing any paper.

This is an official document, and I fully understand what

I'm doing when I sign it as being absolutely correct."

Further questioning was conducted from 26 July until

14 August 1965 with the participation of Petr DERYABIN, a

former KGB officer. These interrogations, held in Russian,

were for the purpose of using DERYABIN'S KGB experience to

obtain a clearer understanding of NOSENKO's claimed personal

professional background.

During

the period 19-25. October 1966, NOSENKO was

questioned for seven days on specific aspects of selected

copics ranging from his identity to his involvement in and

knowledge of specific KGB operations. Questioning

boch Russian and English. Although the interrogations

identified topics and time periods in NOSENKO's accounts

which contained the greatest number of contradictions and

discrepancies, neither the contradictions nor the discrep-

ancies could

be resolved.

Because of the incidence of deranged persons CIA has

encountered among would-be defectors, the question of

NOSENKO's mental stability was

a matter considered early

after his defection in Geneva.

From his arrival in the

United States in 1964 NOSENKO has been under psychiatric

observation. A CIA psychiatrist and a CIA psychologist,

both with extensive experience with Soviet Bloc defectors,

monitored many of NOSENKO's interrogations. In May 1965

the psychologist for three weeks

questioned NOSENKO on his

life from birth until 1953, when NOSENKO claimed he joined

the KGB, in an attempt to identify psychological

factors

which might underlie NOSENKO's contradictory and inconsistent

accounts.

The psychiatrist has continued his

periodic

observations of NOSENKO to the present time. The psychiatrist

and the psychologist concluded independently, on the basis

of their observations, that NOSENKO was mentally stable.

8

0001280

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy -

---

## Page 21

Top Secret

(Summary of Case)

NOSENKO has not been interrogated since October 1966.

The period since has been devoted to the examination and

review of the accumulated interrogation notes, transcripts

and other materials, and in the preparation of the present

paper:

9

Top Secret

0001281

TS No. 197124

Copy - 10

---

## Page 22

28S22

Top Secret

CHAPTER I

FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS

Evidence of NOSENKO's bona fides is

comprised of his own

statements, the corroborating statements of Soviet officials,

and the counterintelligence information he has provided.

NOSENKO's Statements About Himself

In his meetings in 1962 and 1964 with CIA abroad

the course of the interrogations since, NOSENKO has made

statements about himself. More than any other,

however, a statement written in July 1964 (after the initial

hostile interrogation was concluded) is a thoughtful and

well-expressed

exposition of how he wished CIA to regard

him. It is quoted here in its entirety.

My life, my childhood and youth passed in very

comfortable circumstances since the position of

my father gave us the opportunity to live without

lacking for anything. And the only difficult

periods of my life before the death of my father

were at the naval schools attended in Kuybyshev,

Baku and Leningrad, and at the beginning of my

working life, when I was in the Far East in 1950-

1952.

The opportunity. to be always well-dressed,

to have a sufficient amount of money, to have my

own car, to be able to use the car given me by my

family and

also my father's car, the opportunity

to travel

to the South and

to vacation in the best

sanitariums, dachas, and so forth; all

unquestionably left its mark on me and became

something of a habit. After the death of my father,

my successful progress in my work gave me a higher

salary, and although I did not have all that which

I had while my father was alive, still I did not

experience any serious difficulties. But already

wanted to live still better.

0001282

11

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy 10

---

## Page 23

Top Secret

(FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS)

Úp to 1953, over the course of my entire life--at

school, in the Institute, at work, at home in the

family--it was always pounded into my head that

Stalin was a great genius, that he was good, keen,

etco;

and the thought never occurred to me to

question his

words or his deeds because everything

that he said, and everything he did, were completely

axiomatic. The arrests. and trials

only involved

traitors

and it was considered and explained that

the betrayor of the people was Yezhow, the head of

the NKVD. Not even the shadow of doubt fell' on the

name: of Stalin.

Soon after Stalin's death in 1953

I read a certain document given me by my father.:

This was

asecret letter of the Central Committee

of the CPSU on the 'case of the doctors;' it was

not addressed to. all communists but only to members

and candidate

members of the Central Committee.

I was deeply shaken

by this letter which described

in detail how these people, important specialists

in the field of medicine, were brought to such a

condition that they

condemned themselves; that is,

they confessed to things which had never happened,

to things which they'had never, done.

They were

simply forced to

give the evidence which was needed

by the investigators.

The secret letters on the

cult of Stalin and

much that: I heard in the KGB

about the reign of Stalin, all this left its mark

and forced me to think deeply about the real truth

and to look at everything more critically.

I no

longer had faith in all those ideas which for years

had been pressed into my head.

The new leaders (Khrushchev

and Company) used the

same methods but already diluted with the

water' of

democracy, with playing up to the people and attempts

"to convince.them

that a new

eta would arise, a new

and better life; and that now the Party was always

going to concern itself with the welfare of the

people...In

fact, it was a struggle for power and

the use of

all means in this

struggle,

even micro-

phones. (they listened to the conversations of

Beriya and his friends; later they listened to the

conversations of Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich, and

others).:: Khrushchev's endless blabbing about

12

0001283

Top Secret

TS. No. 197124

Copy -

---

## Page 24

Top Secret

(FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS)

successes, when in fact they didn't exist, the

figures about how the USSR had passed the USA in

the production of butter and milk, when in the

stores they were available only infrequently.

endless promises of a better life when in fact

nothing of the sort is taking place.

All this

similarly forced me to re-evaluate not only the

events which were taking place in the country, but

already the entire ideology of the Party, its

external and internal course.

The events in Novocherkassk where 20,000 to

25,000 people rose up and the way in which this

popular indignation was suppressed by troops with

many casualties.

This also made a deep impression

When I was resting in the summer of 1961

in Nikolayev, from my relatives--my father's

brothers--I understood well the real relation of

the workers both to the leadership and to the .

Party as a whole. At the same time I saw how the

workers really lived, how they eat, what they have

and what they can buy with their wages.

I heard a great deal from my father about the

domestic policies of Khrushchev in regard to the

development and the course of construction in

industry, about his complete illiteracy in

engineering technology and industrial economics,

about incorrect decisions in regard to many

industries, and this was not only the opinion of

my father, but also of other important leaders in

various fields of industry. But no one dared to

open his mouth and when in

December 1955 my father

tried, as an engineer, to prove that a certain

decision would be incorrect, he received such a

rebuff from Khrushchev that

he was profoundly

shaken

and in the opinion of my mother

this brought

him to his illness and

death in August 1956.

The events in Germany and

especially in Hungary

showed with absolute clarity the bankruptcy of

communist ideology. What was especially important

for me was the fact that in these countries it was

protest not of individuals or groups, but of the

13

Top Secret

0001284

TS No. 197124

Copy —

10

---

## Page 25

Top Secret

(FOUNDATIONS

OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS)

entire people who could no longer endure a regime

imposed

on them by force.: Here it is necessary. to

emphasize that the life of the people in these

countries was much better than that of the people

in the USSR. (I saw for myself how people live in

Czechoslovakia, in Germany, and beyond any doubt

they live better than the entire people of the

Soviet Union):

The split of the international Communist move-

ment became for me a clear fact and confirmed: my

opinion that the theory of Communism is a theory

built on sand and that it is practiced according to

the needs of the leadership.of

the Party at a given

stage of life and that in reality: full material

welfare would never be enjoyed by the people but

only by the

leadership and the Party and the

governmente

Working in the KGB I came to understand much and

became conscious of the contradiction between the

internal and external course of the USSR. Such

questions-as disarmament, the ban of atomic weapons,

the position of the USSR in the United Nations--all

these are used only in the interest of propaganda

and as

a screen for carrying out of the policies

needed by the communist party... (I was myself

present at the negotiations

in Geneva. and saw the

politicst of the

Soviet delegation.)

My trips abroad opened my eyes wide to the true

reality.

With my own eyes, I saw how people live,

how much they earn, how they can dress and live on

their

wage's,

and I paid special attention..to the

life

of ordinary people and not to that of scientists,

engineers,

etc.: And all the propaganda about the

enormous armies of unemployed in the countries of

the West, about the 'heavy exploitation', and the

'unbelievably difficult life' was immediately

dispelled.'. And what I met in my own work, how

which Soviet citizens get sent where abroad--this

finally debunked this propaganda.: Many of my KGB

acquaintances think back with great pleasure

about

life abroad.

14

0001285

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy -

---

## Page 26

4-00000

Top Secret

(FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS)

I entered the Komsomol

completely without thinking

about it.

The time came, the right age, and

became a Komsomol member like all the others. It

was different in regards to the Party: I joined

the Party in- 1956 after the death of Stalin and

while I was working in the KGB and already at that

time there was

a lack of faith and indecisiveness

in me. My father continually insisted on this,

saying that without the Party I would never move

ahead and would not have success in life. But I

myself understood and saw that I would not be able

to work in the KGB unless I was a member of the

Party.

And if I worked somewhere else, I would

truly never move ahead in my career unless I entered

the Party.

But from the very beginning of my entry

into the Party, I deeply hated all the Party talmudism

and dogmatism.

All the Party meetings were literally

a torture.

Especially when I became the Deputy

Chief and then Chief of a section, and then Deputy

Chief of a department, because then I had to speak

at these

meetings.

Because this meant to lie, to

twist my

soul, and to attempt to show myself as

deeply dediçated to the Party and its course:

In 1960 my oldest girl's asthmatic attacks became

worse.

The question of a

change of climate was

raised. At that time the

Second Chief Directorate

needed to send an officer to Ethiopia for two to

three years to conduct counterintelligence work

among the Soviet specialists there.

It cost me a

great deal of effort to personally talk Second Chief

Directorate Chief General GRIBANOV into letting me

go.

The Party and work references had been confirmed,

all the questionnaires were already filled out, the

photos had been submitted; that is, all the formal-

ities had been accomplished. But at the very last

moment the Central Personnel Office of the KGB began

to protest against my going with my family to

Ethiopia.

The reason for this was

that from the

house check made at my place of residence they

received information that I

sometimes

came home in

a drunken condition and on this ground had quarrels

with my wife.

A tour abroad with my family was

necessary because of the health of my daughter

15

Top Secret

0001286

TS No. 197124

10

Copy

---

## Page 27

Top Secret

(FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS)

(since 1963 the illness has become better)

and also

it would have been advantageous from the financial

point of view.

From

this time on I understood that

Personnel would

not let me so abroad with my family:

Knowing many officers in the First (Foreign

Intelligence) Chief Directorate, "I began to under-

stand that being sent abroad is entirely determined,

not by knowledge, experience in work and success,

but only by the absolute 'cleanliness" of the

person's autobiography and complete assurance as to

his limitless dedication to the Party and the

government,

But not

only being sent abroad but the

assignment

of personnel in the First and Second

Chief Directorates.and the

entire KGB depends on

the reasons indicated by me and also on good relations

with the leadership and good connections with workers

in Central Personnel:

I lived about 11 years with my wife and our life

was not a hell. It is true that there were quarrels

and basically they boiled down to the fact that she

took an extremely unfavorable attitude towards my

delays at work and also when I would be delayed with

some of my friends and

acquaintances after work and

would. come home with a few drinks under my belt. Of

course, I

loved and love my children and only the

fact.

that

they are taken care of financially until

they grow up and have received an education to

some

extent consoled me in taking the decision to leave

the USSR. What do I have in mind when I speak of

financial security? After the death of my father,

the family received a

a large monetary allowance, plus

the money that my mother had saved and valuable

property, etc. My mother many

times offered to

divide all this in three parts; for me, my brother,

and for her, but I

suggested that we not do this

before her death.. And, of

course, my mother will

not leave my children without attention,

and my

share of

the property and the money will be given to

my children.

16

0001287

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

---

## Page 28

4-00000

Top Secret

(FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS)

If the defections of (former KGB officers] PETROV,

RASTVOROV

and DERYABIN passed

without evoking any

particular thoughts, the defection to the United

States of GOLITSYN, whom I had heard of as an

intelligent person and a capable officer, undoubtedly

caused me to think very deeply. Because to act thus,

it is necessary to have not only boldness and

decisiveness, but also great strength of will. And

already I put to myself the question, will I be able

to act thus in view of the dissatisfactions and

disillusionments

which had accumulated inside of me?

Being in Geneva in 1962, not long before my

departure I myself of my own desire entered into

contact with you.

The reason for this was the loss

of money received by me for operational expenses.

I would have been unable to accumulate such a sum

money before my departure and there was nobody

to borrow from.

To tell the truth about the loss

of the money

would have meant that it would be

necessary to explain where and in what circumstances

it had been lost. This would have risked expulsion

from the KGB and a serious reprimand from the Party.

Not to tell the

truth,

to think up some sort of a

story--they wouldn't believe, and worst of all, they

might think that I had appropriated the money, that

is, stolen it. And this would be for me the worst

of

all and I would, of course, in such event have

told the truth.

To tell the truth, it was only after my return

home from Geneva in 1962 that I gradually, not

immediately, began full to realize all the seriousness

of my contact with you and its full meaning.

And

although I did not give you any promises or assurances

about our continued contact in the future, I under-

stood that you sooner of later would

set yourself

the task of continuing our contact.

here it was

that weighing up all the reasons and causes which I

have indicated above that in 1962 I took for myself

to leave the USSR at the first opportunity

and that I started to work towards being sent on

trip abroad.

17

Top Secret

0001288

TS No. 197124

Copy 10

---

## Page 29

Top Secret

(FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS)

Of course, I wanted to come abroad with

some sort

of

'baggage'

, that

is, with materials which could

be useful and

necessary for you.

In this entire..

period up to January 1964 I tried to collect infor-

mation which would be of the maximum value for you.

My assignment to the position of Deputy Chief of the

Seventh Department: in July 1962 gave me a greater

opportunity than

before.

But at the same time this

assignment almost

excluded the possibility of a trip

abroad and it was only with great difficulty that I

was able to get away for the trip in January. 1964.

It was necessary to convince my superior CHELNOKOV

and then to ask. CHELNOKOV to convince others.

• In

chis I advanced many reasons:

that I had not spent

all the money. (in foreign currency); that the

medicine which I bought for my daughter had proven

very successful and that I needed to buy

some..mor.e

medicine to carry out one more series of

treatments;

that this trip would not be a long one and

that

since

I was already the Deputy Chief of the Department I:

would not be able to travel abroad any more and so,

therefore; this trip would probably be my last.

course, all this was said at convenient moments and

outside of work.

Things were easier with the

Eleventh Department (which deals with trips abroad)

because I was on good terms with the KGB officer:

who covered Switzerland, besides which when I came

back from Geneva in 1962 I had brought him a number

of presents:

The publication in 1963 by

the foreign press of

the VASSALL case put me on my guard since

In the

newspaper limes it said outright that the English

learned about him thanks to the Americans who

learned about VASSALL in the

spring of 1962.

Fortunately, the leadership of the First Chief

Directorate,

as I learned from my colleagues, came

tó the conclusion that here the Americans had been

helped by GOLIISYN. But at the same time the

First Chief Directorate was not completely sure of

this.

" But the

publication in the American press of

Alsop's articles on the CIA

alarmed me extremely.

This article in one spot said plainly that as far

as is known the KGB does not have any sources in the

18

0001289

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

---

## Page 30

r..l...1.1e0."

Top Secret

(FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS)

CIA while at the same time the CIA has penetrated the

KGB. From this moment, I do not conceal this fact,

I began to feel afraid that the KGB would somehow

learn of my

contact with you. This article deeply

'interested' the KGB.

During 'the closed

trial of PENKOVSKIY I got a

pass from the Second

Department and went, in order

to look at him myself.

For sometimes it is enough

to simply look at a man, to see how he holds himself

and to hear how he speaks in order to form some sort

of an initial opinion of him.

Personally, I liked

how PENKOVSKIY held himself at the trial; I liked

his appearance and I understood that everything

which had been

said in the KGB about him and the

sort of person

they were trying to make him out to

be (that he was

morally degraded, that he had

descended and sunk into a swamp) that all this

was

nonsense, bluff, and chatter.

And PENKOVSKIY, the

same as GOLITSYN, gave me a feeling of greater

confidence in the correctness of the decision taken

by me to leave the Soviet Union.

26 July 1964

Signed: Yu. NOSENKO

19

Top Secret

C0012S0

TS No. 197124

10

Copy -

---

## Page 31

Top Secret

(FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS)

Soviet Officials' Statements About NOSENKO

The portrait of NOSENKO which emerges from Soviet

officials! statements about him since his defection coin-

cides markedly with NOSENKO's self-description.. According

to the comments of Soviet officials, principally intelli-

gence officers most likely to be speaking authoritatively,

defector NOSENKO was the son of the deceased Minister, he

served over a decade in the KGB, his personal shortcomings

were overcome

through the patronage of KGB General GRIBANOV,

and

in connection with operations against Americans he

occupied positions of progressively greater trust änd

responsibility, ultimately: becoming Deputy Chief of the

largest department in the key

Second (Counterintelligence)

Chief Directorate. According to these sources, his defection

wrought severe damage "for years to come" to the KGB

because of his knowledge

of KGB operations against American

targets, and his treachery

prompted: the expulsion and

disgrace of numerous senior KGB personnel,

the recall of

many others from

abroad, the virtual suspension of KGB

operations in the United States,

and extraordinary plans to

assassinate him.

20

0001291

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy..

---

## Page 32

14-00000

Top Secret

(FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS)

x418:

The Product of NOSENKO's Debriefing

Positive Intelligence Information

At his first meeting with CIA in 1962 NOSENKO asserted

that he was acquainted

with Ministers of the Soviet Govern-

ment, who were friends of his father, and he heard what

was said in their circles.

His debriefing and interroga-

tions did not bear out his

assertion that he was informed

of the attitudes and

aims of the Soviet leaders. His

responses to questions about the viability of the then

Soviet Government, for example, were couched in vague and

general terms and

did not reflect any specific knowledge.

From his debriefing it emerged that NOSENKO had spent his

entire adult life either

as a student or as a state

security

official, and he stressed

that since the early 1950's he

had had few interests

and "no real contacts"

outside of the

KGB itself.

Questioned on a wide range of topics, including

various aspects of nuclear weaponry, missiles, electronics,

communications, unconventional weapons, military industry,

military units and equipment, and

research and development,

NOSENKO repeatedly said that

he had no knowledge of such

matters and

that his responses reflected only personal

opinions.

Because of his two assignments to Geneva with

the Soviet Delegation to the Disarmament Conference, questions

were put to NOSENKO about Soviet underground

testing, Soviet

efforts in the fields of chemical and biological warfare,

Soviet disarmament aims and Soviet views of the corresponding

attitudes and intentions of the United States. Because

his assignments to the

Soviet Disarmament Delegation were

so ponding

for cover purposes only, NOSENKO disclaimed any special

knowledge.

He explained

that he took no part in the

substantive work of the Delegation nor did he have any

connection in the USSR with officíals or organizations

concerned with arms control or disarmament policies.

NOSENKO's failure to provide

any

useful positive

intelligence information was not unique, although previous

KGB defectors did not have NOSENKO's claimed access, either

on the basis of his family ties or on the basis of his KGB

counterintelligence position within the Soviet Union. KGB

21

Top Secret

0001292

TS No. 197124

Copy 10

---

## Page 33

Top Secret

(FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS)

officers who defected earlier to Western

services provided

no. significant military, economic or scientific information

on the USSR, and the political information provided by a

few (usually relating to the personalities and relationships

1n the ruling group of the Communist Party) was of marginal

value.

Counterintelligence Information

NOSENKO's knowledge of KGB foreign intelligence operations

was limited, for his whole career had been spent in the

Second Chief (Counterintelligence) Directorate concerned

with KGB operations within the Soviet Union.: His information

on Second Chief Directorate operations, however, was

apparently a counterintelligence windfall, because most of

his KGB assignments, involved operations against American

targets, either visitors to the Soviet Union or members of

the Embassy

staff

in Moscow. From this circumstance he

represents himself as an authoritative source on KGB success

and failure in recruiting Americans in the USSR during the

years 1953-1963°

NOSENKO has described scores

of

KGB operations

mounted

against American

Embassy personnel during that ten year

period. Because of lasting relationships he established

with KGB colleagues, NOSENKO kept abreast of KGB operations

against the Embassy, even while serving elsewhere than in

the Embassy Section. NOSENKO has

stated that he would

know if the facts were otherwise,

and he has asserted

unequivocally: that no American

stationed

permanently.at

the Embassy was recruited between the early 1950's and his

defection in 1964.

staff who rejected RGB

NOSENKO named six members of the Embassy

recruitment overtures, and all have

confirmed his assertions. He provided information on the

vulnerability of a significant number of Embassy personnel;

in particular, two Foreign Service Officers were consequently

withdrawn

from Moscow. Physical search has confirmed the

information he provided regarding the KGB audio surveillance

installations in the Embassy.

Among Americans other than Embassy. personnel whom NOSENKO

described as KGB targets, he provided information leading

to the identification of 51 KGB agents, including seven

correspondents in

Moscow, the Moscow representative of the

29

American

Express Company, the former code clerk "ANDREY"

(Dayle SMITH, see p• 33),

and Sgt: Robert Lee JOHNSON,

22

0001293

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

UBR

---

## Page 34

Top Secret

(FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS)

Mrs. JOHNSON, and James Allen MINTKENBAUGH. Iwenty-five of

this number acknowledged KGB recruitment before or after

NOSENKO's information was received.

In fifteen other

instances NOSENKO's information has been corroborated

in

part by the individuals' admissions of contact with (if

not recruitment by) the KGB, or by other sources' reports

of their recruitment.

Besides these 51, NOSENKO provided

leads to four other American KGB agents, including

officer in an American military intelligence organization,

none of whom has: yet been identified. Lastly, NOSENKO

identified 22 Americans whom the KGB knew or suspected to

be American Intelligence agents.

From NOSENKO's information 68 non-American KGB agents

have been identified.

Although investigations are still

incomplete, in 39 of

these cases the individual's KGB

recruitment has been reported by other sources, or the

individuals were suspect fog other reasons. Among these

68 individuals were a French

a Canadian Ambassador to

Moscow, an

Austrian and an Indonesian Army Attache, all

Director and a Deputy Secretary of the indian) Foreignil

Ministry, and a British Admiralty employee (William VASSALL,

see below). In addition, NOSENKO provided leads on 22 other

KGB foreign agents, yet to be identified. NOSENKO's infor-

mation about the KGB

electronic attack on the German] Embassyll

in Moscow was confirmed by subsequent technical and physical.

With respect to

the KGB itself, NOSENKO named (if not

completely identified) approximately 1,000 Soviet citizens

who are or have been affiliated with. Soviet intelligence

and security organizations.

These included over seven

hundred active KGB staff officers, of whom 435 were serving

In the Second Chiéf Diréctorate:

Of the 165 KGB officers

he named

as belonging to the

First Chief (Foreign Intellí-

gence) Directorate, over

one hundred had been previously

reported to be KGB

personnel, as reflected in ClA files.

NOSENKO's information

permitted updating CIA holdings on

previously received reports of the 1959 KGB

reorganization,

particularly as it affected the Second Chief Directorate.

He described further refinement of responsibilities, the

Second Chief Directorate's absorption of previously

pendent directorates, the creation of new units from elements

23

Top Secret

0001294

TS No. 197124

Copy —

10

4/8R

---

## Page 35

Top Secret

(FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS)

formerly belonging to other numbered directorates, and

individual officers prominent in each. NOSENKO was not as

productive with respect to KGB operational methods and

Headquarters procedures, although he furnished numerous

examples, particularly regarding operations mounted against

Embassy personnel, which provided useful insight on these

topics.

Significant KCB Operations Not Directly Related to

NOSENKO's Claimed Service

All of the KGB operations which NOSENKO has described

are favorable evidence of his bona fides, but they break

down into.two

qualitatively different groups. Operations

which NOSENKO related to specific KGB positions he held at

particular times are described in the following section in

connection with an examination of his KGB

career.

The

remaining operations are those which NOSENKO said he learned

of informally, or by accident, or even despite (not because

of): the KGB position he held at the time.

Since these are

not material to his claimed positions at various times in

the KGB,

they are summarized in Annex B.

(NOSENKO's leads

to most non-American KGB agents belong in this latter group,

but for reasons of brevity they are omitted from this paper.

Among the items of information which NOSENKO provided

but which do not relate to specific KGB positions he held

at particular times,

there are several which merit special

note here.

These, which

are among the most significant of

his revelations, are the leads to Sgt. Robert Lee JOHNSON,

"the KGB agent

in the British Admiralty" (William VASSALL),

"SASHA" (the KGB agent in American Military Intelligence),

"ANDREY" (Embassy military code clerk Dayle W. SMITH),

Edward SMITH (CIA officer).

and the KGB

electronic attack

on the West German Embassy in Moscow.

"The KGB Agent in Paris"

-(Sgt. Robert Lee JOHNSON)

The first item of information given by NOSENKO

upon meeting CIA in Geneva in 1964 was a lead to a KGB

agent who was'an American serviceman stationed at a sensitive

U.S. military installation in the Paris area:

The agent had

been the source of documentary intelligence which had been

0001295

24

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

i/BR

---

## Page 36

cond tota

Top Secret

(FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS)

shown to Premier Khrushchev personally. Although still

active, the agent had lost access to classified documents.

some months earlier, in 1963. NOSENKO characterized the

lead as the most important

single counterintelligence item

that he acquired during the

year and a half he was a CIA

collaborator at KGB Headquarters in Moscow.

NOSENKO's Information

Shortly after returning to Moscow from Geneva in 1962,

NOSENKO first learned of a KGB agent's successful penetra-

tion of a classified documents vault at an

"important

American military installation" in the Paris area. Because

the documents included information on strategic targets in

France

as well as in the Soviet Union,

he assumed that it

was a "strategic planning installation".

The installation

had

its own airfield

that

there were "procedures for

bringing Iop Secret documents in and for taking them out".

There had been six successful entries of the vault, four

in 1962 and two in 1963.

On each occasion Special Section

technicians travelled TDY to Paris under diplomatic courier

cover to assist the local KGB case officer in the technical

details of the

operation.

Their function was to advise the

case officer concerning the entry to the vault and later

surreptitiously to unwrap

and re-seal the documents.

The

case officer, on this basis, would give appropriate instruc-

tions to his agent, and the technicians probably

never met

the American.

Although this was a First Chief Directorate operation,

officers of the Special Section of the Second Chief

Directorate were used.. The. Special Section was comprised

of technicians transferred from the KGB Operational-

Technical Directorate, and usually it handled

surreptitious

entries

to Western embassies in Moscow.

Among these officers

were S.A. IONOV, L.A. LEBEDEV, S.D. ILYIN, V.V. SINITSYN,

V.Z. KARETNIKOV, M.I. PREOBRAZHENSKIY and Fedor FOFANOV.

IONOV, LEBEDEV and ILYIN took part in this operation, and

FOFANOV was later involved.

The specialists were not the ones that carried out the

operation.

It was carried out by the

case officers of the

Paris Legal Residency. The specialists just opened and then

60012S6

25

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy _10

---

## Page 37

Top Secret

(FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS)

resealed the packages. LEBEDEV said that they also placed

some radioactive substance, with the help of the American

agent, in the lock of the vault door; when the substance was

removed, they could pick the lock.

They did the same thing

lused some radioactive substance] to the safe in the vault.

Before everything was finally ready, the Special Section

technicians had to visit Paris several times.

The first

time was the beginning of 1962.

The paris Residency couldn't

have launched the operation beföre 1962, because they

couldn't do it without the help of Special Section techni-

cians and the latter did not travel to Paris in 1960 or 1961:

Entry into the vault area was first achieved after the

agent used some radioactive substance to determine

the

combination. The agent also photographed the lock for KGB

study.

Subsequent entries were always made between two and

five

o'clock in the morning.. The agent removed documents

from

i the vault and delivered them to his KGB case officer,

who in turn passed them to Special Section technicians.

The envelopes were then opened, photographs were made,

the

documents were repackaged, and the envélopes were given

back to the case officer for return to the vault.

There'-

after, the Paris Legal Residency pouched the

films to Moscow',

and the technicians themselves left Paris until the next

opportunity for

entry

The KGB officers were able to complete the whole operation

during the agent's night duty. During this time, they had

to pick up the

materials, drive some place ("naybe the

Soviet Embassy") open the documents, photograph them, close

them again just as they were, and return them to the agent.

The KGB

could not specify which documents the agent was

to

bring out; the fact that all the documents had to be opened

shows that they were sealed when they were received from

the agent.

Since

he heard that almost all of the material obtained

was of interest to

the Ministry of Defense, NOSENKO concluded

that it came from a military installation. The agent couldn't

bring out a great. deal of material, only what he could hide

on his person.: From what the KGB technicians said, NOSENKO

thought the agent was not alone on duty. The technicians

said that "the agent explained Ito co-workers] that he is

going out for coffee or a sandwich", and that "he is gone

for only 5 or 10 minutes".

0001297

26

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy:

---

## Page 38

Top Secret

(FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS)

The last time the vault was entered

was in the fall of

1963.

At about that time the agent, a military man,

received a promotion and was relieved of his night watch

duties. (The agent was

scheduled for rotation to the

United

States but, with his promotion, he had obtained

an

extension until May 1964.) Although the agent was still

active in January 1964 and was still assigned to the same

military post,

he had lost access to the classified

documents. The information obtained from the agent's vault

was highly sensitive and so valuable to the KGB that the

Paris Legal Rezident as well as several case officers there

had been rewarded

i that here

for their part in the operation.

Before leaving Moscow for Geneva in January 1964,

NOSENKO had been told that the technician FOFANOV had been

sent to Paris in the KGB hope that the agent would be able

to re-enter the vault again before his transfer to the

When NOSENKO visited the soviet

Embassy in Paris on 19 January 1964 while en route to

Geneva, FOFANOV was on duty at the entrance and NOSENKO

chatted

with him.

he had hopes

The American

agent was getting paid by the KGB and he

was recruited with the promise of a substantial sum of

money. NOSENKO didn't know if he was recruited in Paris

or if it was even a formal recruitment, nor what plans the

KGB had for him

after he left Paris.

..'

NOSENKO learned of the case "in little pieces"

separate times from various members of the Second Chief

Directorate Special Section who participated in it,

principally LEBEDEV or KARETNIKOV in Moscow, and FOFANOV

later in París..

• [Under intensive questioning, NOSENKO has

also alleged he learned of the case

from IONOV, the Chief

of the Special Section.] NOSENKO explained that he knew

LEBEDEV and KARETNIKOV

from their visit to his office to

discuss technical installations at new tourist hotels, when

NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department.

27

Top Secret

G001258

TS No. 197121

Copy -

---

## Page 39

Top Secret

(FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS)

Comment:

NOSENKO's lead was identified as Army Sergeant

Robert Lee JOHNSON, who served in the period

1962-1963 at a military courier station at Orly

Field, Paris.

JOHNSON confessed to KGB

recruitment of himself and his wife, his

recruitment of James Allen MINTKENBAUGH, and

the latter's subsequent collaboration with the

KGB .

Mrs. JOHNSON

and MINTKENBAUGH have

corroborated JOHNSON's statements.

NOSENKO is apparently unaware of JOHNSON's

earlier (since 1952) involvement with the KGB

in Berlin,

the United States, and in Orleans,

France.

With respect to the

1962-1963

surreptitious entires of the

courier station

vault, however, JOHNSON!s admissions coincide

with the information provided by NOSENKO, with

no significant differences.

"SASHA" (KGB cryptonym. identity unknown)

When NOSENKO announced in Geneva in 1964 that he

was going to defect, he was told that as a consequence

additional persons

in CIA would be informed of his case

and he was asked to search his recollection for any

evidence of a KGB penetration of CIA.:

NOSENKO. knew.of

none in CIA, but he recalled a KGB agent,

; an American

known

as "SASHA"

, "who was a member of a U.S, military

intelligence organization.

NOSENKO's Information

NOSENKO learned'of

"SASHA" from M.A. SHALYAPIN; the KGB

officer who, while assigned to the Fiist Chief Directorate

and working in Berlin; recruited the agent in 1955-1957.

"SASHA"

who had been recruited by financial inducements,

had officer status; he wore civilian clothes to his meetings

with his KGB handler and he could have been either a

civilian or military intelligence officer.

"SASHA"

returned

to the United States

"in' the 1960's" or "in 1962".

"SASHA"

was stationed in the United States at the time of the Cuban

missile crisis but had been unable to provide the KGB any

0001299

28

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

---

## Page 40

Top Secret

(FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS)

relevant intelligence of

any significance. NOSENKO thought

that "SASHA" served as a department chief in intelligence

when he was re-assigned to Germany in November 1962 - early

1963.

NOSENKO met SHALYAPIN for the first time in September or

October 1962 lafter NOSENKO's first visit to Geneva and

initial contact with CIA] through his friend, Yu. I. GUK.

GUK had known SHALYAPIN when they had served together in

the First Chief Directorate in Moscow. SHALYAPIN had

served

in the United States, Uruguay, Berlin, and Cuba.

In

1962 he had been assigned

to the Latin American Department

of the First Chief Directorate, as a case officer.

retired from the KGB and through NOSENKO's intervention with

Second Chief Directorate Seventh Department Chief CHELNOKOV,

SHALYAPIN obtained a position with Inturist. Presumably

out of gratitude to NOSENKO, SHALYAPIN felt free to talk,

and over drinks he expressed his bitterness at his treat-

ment by the First Chief Directorate which, without him,

would

not have had the

agent

"SASHA" in Germany

"at that

time"

• [1963]: NOSENKO

heard

such details as he knew. of

"SASHA" in the course of several such talks with SHALYAPIN.

Under intensive questioning on the "SASHA" case NOSENKO

retracted his statement that he had first heard of the case

SHALYAPIN, though maintaining that he was sure he had

discussed :the case with SHALYAPIN

"at some time".

Pressed

to identify his first source, NOSENKO then cited

several

officers--some

First Chief Directorate, some Second-who

could have told him about it because they were likely to

know of it though none of them was actually involved in the

operation.

Ultimately NOSENKO refused to commit himself

on this point, saying

he did not remember from

whom he

first

"SASHA".

Comment:

"SASHA" has not been

identified.

29

Top Secret

0001300

TS: No. 197124

10

Copy -

---

## Page 41

Top Secret

(FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS)

William VASSALL ("KGB Agent in the British Admiralty")

Asked in the June 1962 meetings with CIA if he

was familiar with the case of George BLAKE, the former KGB

agent in MI-6, NOSENKO replied that he knew of another, more

important, KGB

agent who was employed in the British

Admiralty.

NOSENKO's Information

The KGB has/ now (in 1962) an

agent in a high government

position in London

who provides most valuable information,

some from NATO intelligence services' conferences.

The

agent was recruited in Moscow in 1956 or 1957 on the basis

of a homosexual compromise. In Moscow he was "a First

Secretary" or "chief of protocol" of the British Embassy.

After leaving Moscow he became

an assistant to the Minister,

or "something like that" in the Admiralty.

"He may be an

assistant, chief of the secretariat, but he's close to the

Minister.

All papers for the Minister go through him. He's

not an intelligence officer. He is

meeting with the KGB

now.

Several KGB officers received

the Order of Lenin for

their part in the operation, including the London Rezident

RODIN. NOSENKO learned

of the agent's existence, but not

of his identity, from his friend and colleague in the Second

Chief Directorate,

: VA. CHURANOV, who had made the recruit-

ment while chief of a section in the British Department.

Comment:

GOLITSYN had earlier provided a lead to a KGB

agent who was

the source of Admiralty documents

which

GOLITSYN had

reviewed in KGB Headquarters

On the basis of that lead,

British security

authorities on ll June 1962 passed

to CIA a

list of twenty suspects, including VASSALL.

On 17 June CIA gave the British authorities a

preliminary report on NOSENKO's information,

on the basis of which the twenty-man list was

reduced.to

VASSALL and one other suspect. Full

0001301

30

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy -

---

## Page 42

Top Secret

(FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS)

Comment:

(Continued)

details of

NOSENKO's information were passed to

British authorities on 20 August, and on 12

September 1962 VASSALL was arrested. He promptly

CO VASSALL'S

VASSALL's confession confirmed what NOSENKO

had reported. He had been recruited in Moscow

in 1955, after a homosexual entrapment, by two

KGB officers, one of whom he identified as

CHURANOV:

He continued to collaborate with

the KGB after returning to London,

first in

his job in the Admiralty Naval Intelligence

Division,

as clerical officer assistant to the

Civil Lord's private secretary, and finally,

as an employee in the secretariat of the Naval

staff.

In London he was- met by KGB officer

"KOROVIN" who has been identified as London

Rezident RODIN. VASSALL's last meeting with

the KGB in London was on 17 August 1962.

At

the time of his arrest in September he had, in

preparation for his next meeting on 30 October,

fifteen rolls of film containing 140 photo-

graphs of classified Admiralty documents.

KGB Audio Attack on the West German] Embassy

In 1962 and 1964 NOSENKO reported on KGB microphones

concealed in several Western embassies in Moscow. Aside

from the American Embassy (see p. 25), he furnished the

greatest detail

- on the microphones in the West German Embassy.

NOSENKO's Information

The KGB was able to enter

surreptitiously every embassy

In Moscow, with the exception of the American and British

Embassies. It had been particularly successful with respect

Il to the West German] Embassy:

KGB microphones monitored the

I' West German Ambassador as

he dictated his reports or held

discussions with diplomatic colleagues, including American

Ambassador Thömpson.

The microphones

were operative during

the period 1959 through 1961, and the KGB monitored then-

Ambassador Kroll's dictation

of cables, dispatches and

06

31

Top Secret

0001302

TS. No. 197124

Copy -10

5/BR

---

## Page 43

Top Secret

(FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS)

conversations

on: the: Soviet Union.

as well as passages. of a book he was writing

NOSENKO learned of the KGB microphones either from

O.S. BUBNOV, Deputy. Chief of the Second Chief Directorate's

Third (Austria and Germany) Department, or Mikhail SKORIK,

Chief of that Third Department's First Section. In 1960-

1961 Tatyana GRISHNYAT brought from the Operational

Technical Directorate to NOSENKO in the American Embassy

Section dally monitoring reports from microphones in the

American Embassy.

On such occasions she had a much larger

volume of material addressed to the

Third Department, from

which NOSENKO

concluded that the KGB was even more successful

in monitoring the

¡West German Embassy than it was the

American

Embassy

Comment

NOSENRO's information was substantially correct.

Independent of that information, however, West ln

German authorities learned in 1963 that their

technical security officer in Moscow had been

recruited by the KGB.: They surmised that the

recruitment may have taken place as early as

1956•

In August 1964 the leader of

a technical

search

team: was

seriously disabled by mustard

gas poisoning; presumably at the hands of the

KGB.,

in 1965, finally, another search tear

completed a "tear down"

of the west German'll

Embassy, in the course

of which two separate

audio systems with 24 microphones were

found,

as

well as 27 microphones in the residence of

the Ambassador. In addition, evidence was

found indicating that the Embassy had been the

target of a sophisticated electronic attack

against its cipher machines and its acoustic

room.

NOSENKO's assertion that the KGB microphones

were operative in 1959 and his

sourcing of his

information to the periodic visits of Tatyana

GRISHNYAT to the American Section, are contra-

dictory.. NOSENKO claims he was not in the'

American Section until 1960.

32

0001303

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

31BR

---

## Page 44

....

Top Secret

(FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS)

"ANDREY". (Dayle W. SMITE)

When

contacting CIA in 1962 NOSENKO offered to sell

information about two KGB operaldles, one of which he knew

only under the KGB cryptonym

., a KGB agent recruited

in Moscow in 1949 or 1950 who in 1962 was working in

Washington "near ciphers"

NOSENKO's Information-1962

"ANDREY" was a U.S. Army sergeant who was

spotted for the

KGB by "QUEBEC" (Roy RHODES).

RHODES served in Moscow

from April 1951 to July 1953. He dated his own recruitment

by the KGB as January 1952.] RHODES was still in Moscow.

when "ANDREY" was recruited by the Second Chief Directorate,

although RHODES was

not aware of "ANDREY's" recruitment.

The KGB approach to

"ANDREY" was based on "women

and

money".

"ANDREY" worked satisfactorily in Moscow for the KGB,

providing "materials"

and information on ciphers.

promised that he would cooperate with the KGB in future

assignments abroad; but would not work with them in the

United States as he did

not want to "sit in the electric

chair". He was paid well for his cooperation in Moscow.

The KGB wanted to pay him more but he refused; he said he

could not plausibly explain the possession of too much

money. When the KGB offéred him diamonds and other gems for

later sale, he did not take them, telling his case officers

that possession could arouse the attention of the American

police.

In 1950. the agent left Moscow for the United

States.

The

KGB waited for him to reappear in some other

country, but he did not.

Finally, in 1955, the KGB

sent

V.M. KOVSHUK, the then-Chief of the American Embassy Section

of the Second Chief Directorate, and

a participant in

"ANDREY's"

recruitment in Moscow, to the United States to

find the agent.

KOVSHUK travelled under the alias "KOMAROV",

under the cover of either Second or Third Secretary of the

Soviet Embassy in Washington.

33

Top Secret

6001364

TS No. 197124

Copy-10

---

## Page 45

Top Secret

(FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS)

KovsHUk, with the help of the KGB Legal Residency in

Washington, learned where the agent was living,

identified

his automobile, and contacted him at the end of 1955 or

the beginning of 1956.

KOVSHUK had looked for him a long

time•

He found where

"ANDREY" parked his car, but "ANDREY"

lived in

a place where there were

many other people and it

was difficult to get close to him.

At first

"ANDREY" was

frightened and refused to work, but when at the third

contact he was offered $1,000;

the agent accepted the money

from KOVSHUK because, due

to his gambling, he was again in

financial straits. From that point on he worked well with

the KGB.. He again provided good information, information

considered important by

the KGB•

Whẹn KOVSHUK found him,

"ANDREY" was working in the Pentagon and he was still

working there in 1962.

In reference to his modus operandi for meetings

with

"ANDREY"

• KOVSHUK knew he was under surveillance by the

FBI.. His meetings always took place in cars. KOVSHUK

would lose his surveillance the day before the meeting and

travel outside of Washington where he would wait by the

highway; "ANDREY" would drive by and stop, KOVSHUK would

the American would drive on.

The KGB officer who compromised Rudolf Ivanovich ABEL

[Reino HAYHANEN, who defected in Paris in May 1957] also

provided the information leading to the arrest of Roy

RHODES. When RHODES was under investigation

"ANDREY"

was called as a witness because he had worked with RHODES

in Moscow.

"ANDREY" was the only such witness called,

and he was called upon several times to tell how RHODES

had behaved in Moscow. "ANDREY". could be identified as

the only person who testified at the trial.. During this

investigation of RHODES, "ANDREY" stopped meeting KGB

officers, because he was afraid he too would be exposed and

arrested.

"ANDREY"

may have feared that RHODES was involved

in his own recruitment, or he may merely have been panicky

because he knew

he could be accused of the same thing as

0001305

34

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy .

---

## Page 46

4-00000

Top Secret

(FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS)

RHODES. Little by little, however, "ANDREY" resumed

his

meetings with

the KGB, "having little other choice"

KOVSHUK turned "ANDREY" over to a member of the Washington

Legal Residency and returned to Moscow.

NOSENKO did not

know who succeeded KOVSHUK as the handler, but KOVSHUK's

successor eventually turned the case over to N.G. BAGRICHEV,

who concluded his tour in Washington in 1961. NOSENKO did

not know BAGRICHEV's successor, but asserted

must have been one since. "ANDREY" was still working with

the KGB in 1962.

NOSENKO's Information-1964

While continuing to associate "ANDREY's" recruitment

with RHODES' presence in Moscow, NOSENKO in different

discussions of

the case asserted that "ANDREY" was

in

"1948-1949", "in 1952 or earlier", or "in 1953".

recruited

"ANDREY" had been recruited by KOVSHUK and

N.M. BORODIN.

After returning to the United States, "ANDREY" worked at

the Pentagon,

"in codes", but by the.

time KOVSHUK recontacted

him in the United States

he was nearing the end of his

enlistment, and he was working In an Army recruiting office.

He was still working in the recruiting office when BAGRICHEV

took over the case from KOVSHUK.

was not RHODES' trial at which "ANDREY" appeared, but

he was among persons called during the pre-trial investigation.

"ANDREY" was called just once, and he was scared to death.

"ANDREY" did not testify at the

RHODES trial.

..":

In Moscow, "ANDREY" had explained to the KGB how the code

machines in the Embassy worked and may have given the KGB

parts of code machines

as "discs

[sic, meaning

rotors).

Aleksandr SELEZNEV, a deputy

department chief in the

Communications Directorate of the KGB, had been involved in

the

"ANDREY" case:

NOSENKO first saw

him in 1953 during the

period that "ANDREY" was working for the KGB in Moscow.

SELEZNEV came to meetings in the American Department to

discuss and plan KGB meetings with "ANDREY".

reason for

SELEZNEV's presence was that the case officers were not

technical specialists, and SELEZNEV would supply them with

35

Top Secret

0001306

TS No. 197124

Copy -10

---

## Page 47

Top Secret

(FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS)

questions to be asked of "ANDREy"

• Since SELEZNEV came to

these

meetings in civilian clothes, whereas NOSENKO later

saw him in uniform in his visits to the American Department,

NOSENKO speculated that SELEZNEV may have attended some of

the meetings with "ANDREY". Although NOSENKO did not know

how the KGB exploited him, he repeatedly emphasized "ANDREY'S"

great importance to the KGB during the time he worked for

them in Moscow.:

"Thanks to his help. they were able to read

your State Department codes... To date we have never been

able to read your military codes..."

"ANDREY" brought no

military code material to the KGB; only State Department

material. Mainly, he described the operation of code machines

and

what daily or other periodic settings were made.

"ANDREY" supplied valuable material from the time that

the first recontact was made in

the United States until he

ceased meeting the KGB because of the RHODES trial.

Again,

after the trial, he was able to furnish good material. This

was true both while KOVSHUK was handling him and while

BAGRICHEV was the case officer. Between June 1962 and

January 1964, while NOSENKO was in Moscow, he heard that

"something is going wrong with this operation".

Comment:

"ANDREY" was identified as former U.S. Army

Sergeant Dayle W. SMITH, who served as a code

machine mechanic while assigned to the office

of the U.S. Military Attache in the

Embassy in

Moscow from April 1952 to April 1954.

NOSENKO's information has been confirmed as

substantially correct by admissions of Roy.

RHODES and Dayle W. SMITH

informed'

("ANDREY"):

RHODES

the FBI in a

1963 interview that

among other American enlisted personnel.of

the

Embassy in Moscow, he reported on SMITH to

the KGB.:.

After denying involvement with the

KGB in interviews with the FBI in 1964 and

1965, SMITH admitted that he had been approached

by the KGB in Moscow

in late 1953, that he had

offered a large

sum of cash

and gems in

exchange: for classified information concerning

Embassy cipher systems, and that he had provided

•36

0001307

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy -

---

## Page 48

4-00000

Top Secret

(FOUNDATIONS OF

NOSENKO'S CLAIMS)

Comment:

(Continued)

the KGB

with

a

mock code machine rotor. He

further acknowledged that he had been

recon-

tacted by the KGB in the United States in

1957, where he met KGB officers regularly

until September 1962. He identified by photo-

graph all of the KGB officers described by

NOSENKO as

having taken part in the operation.

NOSENKO "cannot be certain"

that he did not

know about "ANDREY" while he served in the

Embassy Section in 1953-1955, and when pressed

to describe specifically the source of his

information, he invariably indicated that he

learned of

the American agent later, informally

from KGB colleagues.

Edward Ellis SMITH

• NOSENKO's Information

In the context of a 1962 discussion of KGB operations

against the American Embassy

in Moscow, NOSENKO was asked

whether he knew "about SMITH". He answered:

"SMITH?. The

red-head. Listen, he headed the FBI, he was a colonel and

headed counterintelligence."

NOSENKO went on to describe

the mounting of a blackmail operation, of which he was

the case officer, against SMITH (whose KGB cryptonym was

"RYZHIY"

, Or "REDHEAD").

SMITH had been sleeping with his Russian housemaid, who

was an agent planted on him by the KGB. When the KGB was

unable to obtain actual incriminating photographs,

she was

instructed to take photographs of herself on SMITH's bed.

These were then combined with photographs of SMITH to

produce photomontages, copies of which were delivered to

SMITH together with a letter inviting him to a meeting with

the KGB.

SMITH came. The KGB was represented at. the

meeting

by GRIBANOV, NOSENKO and one other officer. At

this initial meeting SMITH was not interrogated nor asked

for classified information. SMITH agreed to come to further

meetings.

37

Top Secret

0001308

TS No. 197124

Copy - 10.

---

## Page 49

4-00000

Top Secret

(FOUNDATION OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS)

When SMITH did not come to the next scheduled meeting

with GRIBANOV, NOSENKO sought out the

maid

to find

out what

had happened.

She reported

that SMITH was in a state of

desperate indecision; he had paced his room all night as

if his mood was alternating between despair and defiance.

To increase the pressure on

him, the KGB

sent him threatening

letters on each of

the succeeding three days. Finally, on

the third day, instead of meeting the KGB,

SMITH went

to

Ambassador BOHLEN

and reported

the blackmail attempt.

SMITH

was

immediately withdrawn from Moscow and (as of 1962) he

was

"still in intelligence work".

In 1964 and afterwards NOSENKO denied that he had played

any personal role in the case.

He explained that as

junior officer in the American Embassy Section at the time,

working on correspondents, he would not have taken part in

so important an operation.

He said that he had heard

about

the operation from V. M. KOVSHUK, SMITH's case officer.

(On a later occasion NOSENKO said

that his only personal

role was being assigned to a phone-watch

to receive

surveillance reports connected with the initíal KGB approach

to SMITH.)

GOLITSYN's Information

In February 1962 GOLITSYN reported that in 1957 he had

read

a two-volume KGB study which gave examples of successful

operations against the Embassy in Moscow.

One case concerned

an American, probably single, who was either the Security.

Officer or

the counterintelligence representative in the

Embassy.. He had a dog, and lived in an apartment in the

city or a country house outside Moscow. His Russian maid

The KGB concluded that

to ordinary blackmail and

consequently the maid, a KGB agent, was instructed to confess

to him that she

had been

recruited

by the KGB against her

will and would be arrested if she did not fulfill her KGB

tasks.

The American agreed to help her, and GOLITSYN believed

that he did not report

to his

Washington headquarters.

GOLITSYN also recalled that the American first supplied

only misinformation to the KGB, but when the KGB complained,

he provided

mixture of truth

and misinformation.

GOLITSYN

said the case study he read was based on a true incident

38

0001369

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy -

---

## Page 50

4-00000

Top Secret

(FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS)

which took place between 1953 and 1957, but he was not sure

that the operation actually resulted in a successful recruit-

ment, as was alleged in the study.

Comment:

Edward Ellis SMITH (a redhead), Embassy

Security Officer (and CIA employee) from

July 1954 to June 1956, reported to the

Ambassador on 5 June 1956 that he had received

four letters from the KGB. The first,

received on 2 June 1956, enclosed incriminating

photographs of himself and his Russian maid and

requested him to come to a personal meeting

with KGB representatives outside the Embassy.

When he did not do so, SMITH subsequently had

received three threatening letters.

In

reporting

the matter to the Ambassador, SMITH

admitted having been intimate with his

Russian

maid.

SMITH was recalled from Moscow on

8 June 1956, and he left CIA employment a year

later.

When interviewed in March 1962 on the

basis of the GOLITSYN information, SMITH

admitted that he had maintained his

affair

with the Russian maid during most of the time

of his Moscow

assignment, 20 July 1954 to

8 June 1956, and

confirmed that to help her

he had in fact passed unclassified information

through her to the KGB for many months.

NOSENKO clearly ascribed the SMITH operation.

to the period when NOSENKO was in the

American

Embassy

Section, in 1953-1955. SMITH's state-

ment that he reported the blackmail

attempt to

the Ambassador in June 1956 is confirmed.

If

NOSENKO was; as he says, transferred to the

Seventh Department in 1955, he could not have

played

any role

in the KGB approach to SMITH.

If he played such a role, he was in the Embassy

Section in 1956, not in the Seventh Department

as he claims.

If he played a role in the SMITH

case as well

asin the Seventh Department

recruitment of BURGIj (see p. 115), it remains s

possible that he was neither

an

officer in the

Embassy Section nor Seventh Department

and was

acting in some other KGB capacity.

39

Top Secret

0001310

TS No. 197124

Copy 10

I'BR

---

## Page 51

14-00000

Top Secret

CHAPTER II

EXAMINATION OF NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES

What NOSENKO has said

about himself, the information

about the KGB which he has provided, and the apparently

corroborative statements

which Soviet officials have made

since his defection represent prima facie evidence that

NOSENKO is a former senior KGB officer.

To permit a

conclusive judgment that he is a bona fide defector, the

information NOSENKO provides about his life and related

persons and events must be coherent, and his accounts of

important events

must be consistent.

Allowing for personal

vagaries such as

lapses of memory and so forth, as well

as for factors of accident and coincidence, the information

he relates must conform within reasonable

limits with that

which is known from independent and reliable sources to

the United States Government about Soviet realities and

about the events, topics and individuals NOSENKO describes.

Lastly, the information NOSENKO provides must plausibly

relate primarily to the KGB positions he held, and his

account of how he functioned in these positions must be

substantiated by verisimilar detail.

The following portions of this paper, organized in

chronological fashion insofar as possible, summarize this

examination of the significant aspects of

NOSENKO's claims.

Notes for the Reader

In order to follow the examination as presented the

reader should note the following:

The examination tests the validity of the presumptive

evidence favoring NOSENKO in terms of coherence,

consistency,

and compatibility with fact and plausibility.

41

Top Secret

0001311

TS. No. 197124

Copy-10

---

## Page 52

Top Secret

(EXAMINATION OF NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES)

Notes for the Reader (Continued)

NOSENKO's claims are judged in the light of his own

assertions and in comparison with collateral information.

It is not the function of the examination

to speculate

about possibly credible alternative explanations for the

paradoxes reflected in NOSENKO's statements, except when

such explanations are advanced by NOSENKO himself.

If there is no immediate explanatory note pointing out

the relevance or significance of some item in the text, the

reader may expect that the item's relevance or significance

usually will be developed in the immediately-following text.

Otherwise seemingly minor points are included because of

their aggregative significance:

they will be a matter of

comment in the Summary and Conclusions section following

each major portion of the examination.

Direct questions and NOSENKO's replies about his

contradictions, inconsistencies, ambiguities, retractions,

omissions and the like, are reflected in the

text. Where,

during his interrogations, it was not possible to

direct questions without furnishing NOSENKO information or

insight into the interrogators'

purposes, the topic was

covered exhaustively, if indirectly, and NOSENKO was

provided every opportunity to comment on the matter in

question.

When the text indicates that NOSENKO apparently

not asked about a particular matter, or that "hé didn't

, or "didn't comment" or "didn't indicate awareness".

so forth, the reader properly may assume that the

matter was covered

extensively.

In instances in which NOSENKO contradicts or retracts

earlier assertions, no more weight is necessarily given

to his final assertion

as opposed to earlier contrary claims.

To assist the reader in following what are sometimes

lengthy and complex accounts of events, NOSENKO's narrative

is broken from time to time by a clearly identified

editorial comment which seeks to

draw the reader's attention

to the relevance or significance of NOSENKO's assertions,

or to what conclusion is drawn.

42

0001312

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy -

---

## Page 53

Top Secret

(EXAMINATION OF NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES)

Notes for the Reader (Continued)

At the end of each episode in NOSENKO's biography

there appears a conclusion resulting from the examination

of NOSENKO's Claims with respect to that period of his

life:

The judgment of whether NOSENKO is a bona fide

defector is the sum of

these independently drawn conclusions.

43

Top Secret

0001313

TS No. 197124

Copy

---

## Page 54

Top Secret

CHAPTER III

PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY

NOSENKO's biography from birth to entry into the KGB is

relevant to his bona fides insofar as it is material to

establishing his true identity, his general veracity, and

his eventual eligibility for KGB service.

Below are

summarized pertinent events in his early

life, his study

at the Moscow Institute of International Relations, and

his RU service, as reconstructed from statements he

volunteered as

well as from the accounts obtained in

repeated interrogations.

Birth to 1945 - NOSENKO's Account

NOSENKO was born on. 30 October 1927 in Nikolayev, in the

Ukraine.

At, the time of his birth, his father, Ivan

Isidorovich NOSENKO, was a shipyard mechanic and an evening

student at the Nikolayev Shipbuilding Institute.

Shortly

after NOSENKO began kindergarten in Nikolayev, in September

1934, his father graduated from the Shipbuilding Institute

and the family moved to Leningrad, where NOSENKO started

the First Class of school in September 1935. From 1935 to

1937 NOSENKO lived in Leningrad where his father was director

of a shipyard. In 1938 the elder NOSENKO became Deputy

People's Commissar of the Shipbuilding Industry and the

family moved to Moscow, where NOSENKO completed the Sixth

Class in June 1941 just as the war broke out.

NOSENKO has given two versions of his whereabouts for

the next two years.

In one, he said that on the outbreak

of hostilities he was enrolled in the Moscow Special Naval

School which was evacuated to Kuybyshev where he finished

the Seventh Class; thereafter he transferred to the Lenin-

grad Naval Preparatory School (which had been evacuated

to

6001315

45

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

10

Copy -

---

## Page 55

Top Secret

(PRE-KGB. BIOGRAPHY)

Baku), where he finished the Fighth Class in spring, 1943.

In a second version Imore probable since entry to the Moscow

Special Naval School required prior completion of the

Seventh Class] NOSENKO said that when the war broke out he

and his mother were evacuated to Chelyabinsk, where he

completed the Seventh Class in summer of 1942.

They returned

to Moscow afterwards, and NOSENKO was then enrolled in the

Moscow Special Naval School (then in Kuybyshev) where he

completed the Eighth Class in 1943; in the fall of 1943

NOSENKO was enrolled in the Leningrad Naval Preparatory

School (then in Baku).

After just six months in Baku, without completing the

Ninth Class, NOSENKO ran away from school and returned to

MOscow.

Comment: NOSENKO has asserted variously that he ran

away and fought

on the front at Tuapse, and

that he had finished the Tenth Class in Baku

and then spent the period 1943-1945 at the

Frunze Higher Naval School, the equivalent of

Annapolis. He has retracted both assertions.

NOSENKO completed the Ninth Class in June 1944 at the

Moscow Mining Institute, and when the Leningrad Naval

Preparatory School returned to Leningrad from Baku, he

resumed his studies there.

Early in 1945, however, NOSENKO

received a gunshot wound in the hand, and

after being

hospitalized for a month, he left the Naval school.

46

Top Secret

0001317

TS No. 197124

Copy

---

## Page 56

(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)

NOSENKO completed the Tenth Class at the Leningrad Ship-

building Tekhnikum in June 1945, and he successfully passed

the necessary examinations to qualify him for entrance to

the Moscow Institute of International Relations that summer.

Birth to 1945: Summary and Conclusion

NOSENKO is virtually the sole source of information on

his early life.

However, this portion of his claimed

biography is consistent with the NOSENKO family's where-

abouts

as publicized in press accounts at the time of his

father's death in 1956, and with the existence

of the

schools he claims to have attended.

Allowing for exaggerated claims of boyhood heroics

claimed identity as the son of Minister Ivan I. NOSENKO

netracted are interrogation, NoSEN

and the substance of his claims about his life until 1945

are accepted as true.

47

Top Secret

0001318

TS No. 197124

Copy -

10

---

## Page 57

Top Secret

(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)

Attendance at the Moscow Institute

ef International Relations (1945 - ca. 1950)

In all of his accounts, NOSENKO has. stated that he entered

the Institute's Faculty of International Law and English in

September 1945. He completed his first year in spring 1946.

NOSENKO Claim

In 1947, on completion of his second year at the Institute,

NOSENKO claims he received a commission as a junior lieutenant

"in the reserves"; he does not recall in what arm he received

a commission, other than being sure that it was not in the

Navy •

Comment:

Soviet students completing their second year of

higher institutions are commissioned, but in

an arm (Army, Navy, Air Force) of Soviet defense

forces.

te cheer inte

At that time they receive their voyennyy

bilet

(military booklet) which reflects their

assigned MOS and category (sostav) • CIA interro-

gators were unable to resolve why NOSENKO

pleaded ignorance on this matter, and concluded

it may relate in some manner to his claims to

subsequent commissioned service in the Navy.

In 1947, also, NOSENKO married the daughter of a Soviet Army

Lieutenant General, Augustina K. TELEGINA "just after" her

father had been arrested in connection with Stalin's campaign

against Marshal Zhukov's associates.

NOSENKO recalls neither

the date of that marriage, in what

occurred, nor how long after her father's arrest.

then inste

season of the year it

(The

significance of this first marriage lies in NOSENKO's contra-

dictory statements about when

and how he obtained his divorce.

See below.]

48

Top Secret

0001319

TS No. 197124

Copy .

---

## Page 58

Top Secret

(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)

NOSENKO has said at various times that the Institute

course was of four years'

duration and that he entered

the

Naval RU on graduation in 1949; that it was four years'

duration and that because he failed a state examination

he

was graduated later, in 1950; that it was of five years'

duration and he graduated in 1950, on schedule; and that it

was of five,years' duration but he failed an examination

which delayed his graduation for

three months.

Comment: See p.367 for report that NOSENKO joined the KGB

upon graduation from the Institute in 1947.

The duration of the Institute course and

the

date of NOSENKO's completion are materiai to

the plausibility of his claimed Naval RU service,

which he said followed almost immediately upon

his departure from the Institute.

Naval RU Service (ca. 1951 - ca. 1953)

NOSENKO claims that upon completion of his studies at

the Institute of International Relations he entered the

Naval RU, serving in the Far East and then in a Baltic post,

finally successfully "transferring" to the KGB through the

intervention of his father's friend, KGB General KOBULOV.

49

Top Secret

0001320

TS No. 197124

Copy 10

---

## Page 59

Top Secret

(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)

The significance of NOSENKO's RU service is the fact

that he claims it launched his intelligence career and

served as the means through which he secured appointment

to the KGB after once having been rejected... The two or more

years he claimed to have served in the RU represent a

significant perioa of his adult life for which he should

have no difficulty accounting. Finally, the date of his

actual transfer from the Naval RU to the KGB is critical to

determining the time from which his claims about kgB service

can be judged credible.

NOSENKO volunteered extensive comment on his Naval RU

service

at his first meetings with CIA in 1962. After his

1964 defection, it was the topic on which he made one of

his initial retractions

and his first admission that he had

earlier made a false claim. The subject of his Naval RU

service was consequently prominent in interrogations

in

1964, 1965 and

1966.

However, throughout these interrogations,

challenges of his assertions about his RU service prompted

adjustments in his claimed date of graquation from

the

Institute or claimed date of entry into the KGB, just as

challenges on those latter topics prompted amended state-

ments with respect to his RU service.

The extent of the

still-unreconciled discrepancies and contradictions in

NOSENKO's various accounts is best perceived in comparison

of his statements made in 1962, 1964, 1965 and 1966

NOSENKO's Information-1962

NOSENKO finished the Institute of International Relations

In

1950 and immediately reported for duty with the RU.

He did not amplify how he drew such an assignment.] In

September 1950 he was offered

Moscow, and in the far taste and he mense the car gast "so

no one would think he would take advantage of his father's

position"

He was

assigned to a radio signals interception

unit in Sovetskaya Gavan' (on the Soviet coast opposite

Sakhalin), where he collected Order of Battle information by

monitoring the communications of American units operating in

50

Top Secret

0001321

TS No. 197124

Copy -

---

## Page 60

Top Secret

(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)

Korea. In spring 1952 NOSENKO suddenly fell ill. Returned

to Moscow and given a medical examination, he was diagnosed

to have "a small spot on a blood vessel under his collarbone"

and he was confined to the Hertzen Sanitorium outside Moscow

for two months.

examination er has coll osca

In summer 1952, again eligible for duty,.

NOSENKO was offered an assignment to the Military-Diplomatic

Academy, but he rejected the opportunity because the

curriculum was almost identical to that of the Institute

from which he was graduated.

In summer 1952 NOSENKO was ordered to the Baltic city of

"the former German city of Pillau". (Baltiysk, a

larger city close by Primorsk, is the former German city of

Pillau.]

There NOSENKO was involved in the formation of

"agent-observation posts", in which candidates from among

Soviet seamen were formed into three-man teams and trained

as stay-behind agents in the event of war.

In early 1953,

after less than six months in the Baltic assignment, NOSENKO

returned on leave to Moscow where he met at his father's

dacha KGB General KOBULOV, First Deputy to then-MGB [KGB]

Chairman Beria.

KOBULOV, on finding that NOSENKO did not

care for his RU assignment, invited him to consider joining

the KGB.

NOSENKO's Information-1964

Prior to NOSENKO's graduation he had been tentatively

assigned by the Institute's military commission to the RU,

and on the instructions of the Institute's "secret unit", he

was interviewed by a RU Colonel KALOSHIN at the RU Personnel

Department. After passing the state examination on the

second try, NOSENKO entered the Navy in September 1950, when

he received orders calling him to active duty as a junior

lieutenant.

He also: received orders assigning him to the

Intelligence Staff of the Seventh (Far East) Fleet. He

left Moscow approximately 1 October 1950, travelling for

ten days by train to his unit, which was

stationed near

Sovetskaya Gavan'. He was there assigned to a Reports

Section with duties which included translating American

naval publications and making summaries of Order of Battle

information of American naval forces in the Far East.

radio signals intercept unit was connected with NOSENKO's

unit, but [contrary to what he asserted in 1962 and 1965] he

was not personally concerned with that unit's activities.

51

Top Secret

0001322

TS No. 197124

Copy -10

---

## Page 61

Top Secret

(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)

In spring 1951 NOSENKO was promoted to the rank of

lieutenant.

At the end of 1951 NOSENKO was assigned as an

"apprentice" in the Agent-Intelligence Section near

Sovetskaya Gavan', an assignment which involved subchaser

delivery and pickup of agents from Hokkaido and Sakhalin.

In early 1952 NOSENKO filed by mail for divorce from

TELEGINA in a Moscow court. In April 1952 he returned to :

MOSCOW on

leave, where he visited the Naval RU Headquarters

personnel officer, Col. KALOSHIN, and requested

..a transier

from the Far East. During May and June 1952 he was on

leave accrued during his two years' service in the Far

East.

Following his leave, in summer 1952, NOSENKO was

ordered to proceed to Rostock but he refused and took

unauthorized leave.

He could not learn what his actual

assignment

was to be in Rostock, and he heard that the Naval

Intelligence Points in Germany were being closed down.) He

subsequently was assigned to the Baltic city of Baltiysk,

where he reported for duty with the Intelligence Staff of

the Fourth (Baltic) Fleet.

He was assigned to a Naval

Intelligence Point being set up in Sovetsk (sic, see p. 57),

a small town.

"in Primorskiy Kray" near Baltiysk.

Comment:

Primorskiy Kray is in the Far East, as NOSENKO's

interrogators pointed out to him at the time.

NOSENKO subsequently claimed it was his earlier

post, Sovetskaya Gavan', which was in Primorskiy

Kray, a fact known to him from the way his

letters were addressed.: This is also an ercor.

See below

In Sovetsk NOSENKO prepared training materials for agents.

Comment::

NOSENKO also said that after refusing to go to

Rostock he himself had received training in

Moscow and then was sent to Rostock and Sassnitz,.

0001323

52

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

---

## Page 62

Top Secret

(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)

Comment: (Continued)

in East Germany, before going to Baltiysk.

In

retracting that claim, he explained that he

knew his CIA interrogators would not believe

that he had successfully refused the assignment

in Germany•

In August or September 1952 NOSENKO returned to Moscow

for 7 to 10 days to complete the divorce proceedings which

he had initiated in the Far East.

This was not regarded

as leave,

but official business.

He afterwards returned

to Sovetsk, but he did not like his work there, and in late

1952. he requested leave to return to Moscow to seek a transfer.

When his unit commander refused him leave, NOSENKO appealed

to Admiral GOLOVKO in Baltiysk, and because of the elder

VOSENKO's influence, was able to return to Moscow for a month's

leave in January. 1953.

At the end of January NOSENKO visited

the RU Personnel Officer, KALOSHIN, and stated his distaste

for his work.

KALOSHIN

told him to

"look around"., and

NOSENKO spent February 1953 "at the disposal of the Personnel

Department", not doing anything. Since he wasn't working,

he didn't receive his pay, and he lived with his parents.

Comment:

Just before giving this account of his January

1953 leave, NOSENKO claimed that he spent

January and a part of February at the Kubinka

Sanitorium. He has never reconciled these two

statements•

NOSENKO's Information-1965

Prior to his graduation from the Institute, a military

commission tentatively assigned NOSENKO to the Navy, after

which he visited a special section at the Naval Ministry

to file special forms for a security check. Although nothing

was said at the time, NOSENKO

believed then that he was slated

53

Top Secret

0001324

TS No. 197124

10

Copy -

---

## Page 63

Top Secret

(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)

to join Naval Intelligence.

After passing all of his

examinations, in the fall of 1950 NOSENKO received orders

calling him to active duty Offered a choice of assignments,

NOSENKO chose the Far East "to prove that he was now ready

to make a man of himself". Arriving in Sovetskaya Gavan' in

Primorskiy Kray (sic) , NOSENKO was assigned to a Reports®

Section.

Comment: Questioned in 1965 on the location of Sovetskaya

Gavan', NOSENKO insisted that it was located in

Primorskiy Kray•

Shown contemporary Soviet maps

clearly locating it in Khabarovskiy Kray!

NOSENKO angrily asserted that the map had been

falsified by his interrogators to confuse him.

NOSENKO's contention is somewhat analogous to

being stationed in Oregon for an extended:

period and thinking oneself to be in California.

In Sovetskaya Gavan' NOSENKO liked the work and did a

good job despite rigorous working and living conditions,

and during his service there he was commended as an out-

standing officer. NOSENKO and his officer colleagues

analyzed the product of some 300 radio intercept operators

as well as information received from Sakhalin and Vladivostok.

In spring, 1951,

after about seven months' service,

NOSENKO was promoted to lieutenant, the normally reguired

time in grade of one year having been reduced to six months

for Far East service.

In early 1952 NOSENKO published in a local newspaper his

intent to divorce his wife, and he forwarded the necessary

legal papers to Moscow:

NOSENKO's two-year tour would not end until October or

November 1952, nor was he entitled to any leave before that

time.

An understanding superior, however, arranged for him

to take leave in April 1952 so that he could return to

Moscow in time for his father's birthday on 1 May. On ? May

0001325

54

Top Secret

IS No. 197124

Copy

---

## Page 64

Top Secret

(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)

he reported to the Naval Ministry and was told to return

for reassignment at the end of his leave.

NOSENKO was on

leave in May and June 1952, and he remained "at the disposal

of the Naval Ministry".

[According to his 1962 and 1966

versions, he was hospitalized during this period.]

In the summer of 1952 NOSENKO was offered assignments to

them all down.

He rejected the opportunity to attend the

academy, because he had had almost all of the courses

earlier at the Institute of International Relations.

"Sometime after his return to Moscow from Sovetskaya

Gavan'

"" NOSENKO completed the formalities to secure his

divorce from TELEGINA.

(According to his 1964 account,

NOSENKO visited Moscow later, from his Baltic assignment,

to complete divorce proceedings. I

In August 1952 NOSENKO received an assignment to Sovetsk,

in the Baltic, where he arrived in early September 1952.

His assignment there was as a political officer, in which

capacity he was involved with sailors being trained for

wartime sabotage missions. His main task was to prepare the

training plan for the agents, to instruct them in such

subjects as

"The Foreign Policy of the USSR", and generally

to see to their needs.

NOSENKO did not care for his

assignment in Sovetsk and in December. 1952 he obtained leave

to spend the holidays with his parents in Moscow.. In January

1953 NOSENKO and his parents visited KGB General KOBULOV

at the latter's dacha and KOBULOV, learning of NOSENKO's

dissatisfaction with the RU, suggested he consider working

for the KGB.

After New Years in 1953 NOSENKO went "to rest for several

days" at the Hertzen "House of

meters from Moscow near Kubinka Pest", Located 65-70 k110-

he met his second

wife, Lyudmila Yulianovna KOZHEVNIKOVA.

[In 1964 and 1966

statements NOSENKO claimed he was not "resting" but was

hospitalized with tuberculosis for several weeks in January

and February.]

55

Top Secret

0001326

TS. No. 197124

10

Copy -

---

## Page 65

Top Secret

(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)

NOSENKO's Information-1966 (April)

At an interview with the military placement commission

at the Institute before graduation,

NOSENKO indicated that

he wanted to work in "some sort of a military organization"

Soon thereafter the chief of the Institute's special section

gave him a telephone number to call. NOSENKO recognized the

number as one belonging to the MGB [the predecessor of, and

hereafter referred to, as, the KGB]. NOSENKO was invited to

an interview with KGB officials who queried him about his

background and his knowledge of English.

Later, however,

the chief of the Institute's special section informed

NOSENKO that his qualifications were unsuitable for assign-

ment to the KGB:

During the summer of 1950 "while state

examinations were underway"' lin earlier versions NOSENKO

claimed

the examinations were over in Junel, NOSENKO began

to process for entry into the Naval RU, through Colonel

KALOSHIN, the Chief of the RU Personnel Department. He

filled out

questionnaires in duplicate, wrote two auto-

biographies and, in August or September, submitted copies

of his diploma.

Note that this version of events omits

any reference to delayed graduation caused by his having

to take a state examination a second time.]

For the next

nine months, until March 1951, NOSENKO awaited being called

to RU service.

[In earlier versions, NOSENKO claims he

entered the RU in 1949

or 1950.]

On 12 March 1951 NOSENKO received two orders from the

Naval Ministry, one calling him to active Naval service and

the other assigning him as a translator to the Intelligence

Unit of the Seventh Fleet in the Far East.

On 13 March,

on KALOSHIN's instruction, NOSENKO reported to the Moscow

City Military Commission and was issued his travel documents,

and NOSENKO departed Moscow for

his post on 16 or 17 March.

At the end of March NOSENKO arrived at his post near

Sovetskaya Gavan' and began work in the Reports Section of

the Seventh Fleet Intelligence Unit.

0001327

56

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy -

---

## Page 66

Top Secret

(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)

At the end of April 1952 NOSENKO left Sovetskaya Gavan'

on

leave, arriving in Moscow on 28 April. Note earlier

versions in which he was transferred because of illness.

and that he was permitted to return to Moscow because of

his father's birthday.] While on leave he became ill with

tuberculosis and spent almost two months in May and June.

1952 in a sanitorium near Moscow.

During the month of July 1952 NOSENKO was ordered to

the Naval Intelligence Point of the Fourth (Baltic) Fleet

in Sovetsk, in Kaliningradskaya Oblast (at the head of the

Bay of Gdansk).

Sovetsk was a small village located on

the spit of land between Kaliningrad and Baltiysk.

only Sovetsk in Kaliningradskaya Oblast is located many

miles inland from Kaliningrad, in the opposite direction

from Baltiysk.

When NOSENKO was shown their locations on

contemporary Soviet maps, he insisted that he was correct,

although Primorsk, where

NOSENKO had said in 1962 that he

was

assigned while in the Baltic, is located on a spit of

land between

Kaliningrad and Baltiysk.] NOSENKO remained

in "Sovetsk" but a short time, and he

returned to Moscow

at the end of 1952 to seek another assignment. Before

his departure he was promoted to the

rank of lieutenant

of the Administrative Service.

[In previous versions he

claimed to have become eligible for promotion and was

promoted while in the Far East, after less then a year's

service.1

On 1 January 1953 NOSENKO and his parents were guests at

the KOBULOV dacha. NOSENKO indicated his dissatisfaction

with his RU assignment and KOBULOV promised to find him a

place in the KGB.

From the middle of January to the middle of March 1953

NOSENKO was under treatment at the sanitorium near Moscow

where he had been hospitalized in 1952, and there he became

acquainted with his second wife, Lyudmila Yulianovna

KOZHEVNIKOVA.

[NOSENKO's earlier accounts either omitted

reference to this period of hospitalization, or indicated

that it was of considerably shorter duration.]

57

Top Secret

C001328

TS No. 197124•

Copy -10

---

## Page 67

Top Secret

(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)

NOSENKO's Information-1966 (October)

In his most recent account, in October 1966, NOSENKO

said that before graduation from the Institute

the military

placement commission sent him to the KGB, but there he was

told that

he was not qualified as a candidate because of

mediocre academic record and drinking habits. NOSENKO said

he did not mention this rejection earlier, because his

interrogators would not have beljeved that he ever became

a KGB officer after once being rejected.

NOSENKO also volunteered that he had "lied"

when he

claimed to have entered the Naval RU in 1950. In fact,

he said, he entered the RU in March 1951 and was on active

duty in the Far East from 1951 until 1953.

Comment:

This

latest assertion discredits almost all

of his earlier claims regarding entry into

the RU, including the date of his graduation

from the Institute, the timing if not the

fact of his promotion, the number, sequence,

and purposes of his visits to Moscow, his

hospitalization with tuberculosis, and his

assignment to the Baltic Fleet.

Naval RU Service: Summary and Conclusion

According to NOSENKO's contradictory statements, which

are

still unresolved after interrogations over a three-

year period, he graduated from the Institute of International

Relations in

either 1949 or 1950. Before graduation, he

(a) was selected for Naval assignment,

(b) sought a Naval

assignment,.or (c).

was selected for and rejected by the

KGB and then he sought an assignment to the RU; or,

immediately following graduation, or three months or nine

months later (in the following year), he was called to

0001329

58

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

---

## Page 68

Top Secret

(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)

active Naval service and

assigned to the RU.

With neither

training nor indoctrination he was assigned initially to

the Far East for nine months or three years; there he

participated in agents' operational training, or reports

In the latter capacity he was or was not involved

in RU radio signals intercept operations.

He either never

served in the Baltic. or, if he did, it was for three

months or six months, during which

he either participated

in agent training or

was an administrative or political

officer. He was promoted to lieutenant in the Far East

or in the Baltic, after either seven months' or thirteen

months' RU service.

Despite his claimed active commissioned service in the

Navy. NOSENKO knows nothing of Soviet Navy tradition,

doctrine, organization, or procedures. He disctaims

know-

RU organization other than at the posts where he

served, "because of his junior rank". However, even at

those posts he describes neither the staff, the functions

nor the personnel intelligibly nor does he describe the

posts"

actual locations.

The sole Headquarters RU officer NOSENKO identified was

the personnel chief, Colonel KALOSHIN..: He identified no

ranking officers in either the Baltic or Far East intelli-

gence staffs.

Some thirty GRU officers he did identify,

by his own admission; NOSENKO knew not from his Naval RU

service, but through social acquaintance, later, in Moscow,

or through his visits to Geneva.

Conclusion

NOSENKO did not serve in the Naval RU in any of the

capacities at the places and times he claimed.

59

Top Secret

i:: 1330

TS No. 197124

Copy -10

---

## Page 69

Top Secret

CHAPTER IV

KGB ENTRY

Comment:

Stalin died in March 1953, an event which was

accompanied by extraordinary repercussions

The Ministries of Internal Affairs (MVD) and

State Security (MGB) merged under the MVD, Of

which Beriya became Minister. There followed

a period of widespread reorganization entailing

the transfer or dismissal of many personnel:

Beriya's arrest just four months later in June

1953 was followed by another extensive (if

and Evdokia PETROV, Yuri RASTVOROV, and Petr

DERYABIN, among others, defected in the wake

of these events. From information they pro-

vided, as well as from

l that acquired from other

sources, CIA has a substantial amount of infor-

mation against which NOSENKO's accounts of this

period may be weighed.

For the convenience of the reader, the term

"KGB" is used hereafter to refer as

well to its

predecessor organizations in 1953-1954.

In statements volunteered in his early meetings with CIA

in Geneva in 1962, NOSENKO mentioned that he had joined the

MVD/KGB in 1953. In a biographic statement written immediately

after his defection, however, he asserted his KGB service

began in 1952, a date he insisted was correct even

reminded he had earlier said 1953.

Repeated interrogations

produced a variety of dates of claimed KGB entry, ranging

from

"the beginning of 1952" to April 1953, all of which

were accompanied by modified accounts of the circumstances

of his entry (as well as of his earlier period of service.

61

Top Secret

0001331

TS_ No. 197124

Copy -

10

---

## Page 70

Top Secret

(KGB ENTRY)

in the Naval RU and of his date of graduation from the

Institute of International Relations) •

To the extent to

which he has been consistent at all, he has cited March 1953

as the time of his entry to the KGB.

Date of Entry

NOSENKO at his first meeting with CIA in Geneva in 1962,

volunteered how and when he joined the KGB. NOSENKO hao

just returned from his Naval RU assignment in the Baltic,

said, when he met KGB General KOBULOV and KOBULOV urged

him to join the KGB. NOSENKO stated that after completing

his processing, he reported for

duty in the Embassy Section

of the Second Chief Directorate's American Department in

March 1953,

"just after Stalin died". (Stalin died on

5 March 1953.)

Comment:

According to KGB defectors, the precise date

of entry to the KGB would not likely to be

forgotten by a KGB officer.

The date is the

basis for computing length of service and is

a common entry on KGB administrative forms

periodically filled out by KGB officers in the

course of their service.

According to NOSENKO in January 1964, he transferred to

the KGB from the Naval RU "in something like 1952"; "just

after Yu. I. GUK transferred from the Second Chief Directo-

rate"

Comment:

GOLITSYN had reported that GUK was transferred

out of the Second Chief Directorate in January

1952.

0001332

62

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy -

---

## Page 71

Top Secret

(KGB ENTRY)

In February 1964 NOSENKO wrote a biographic statement in

which he noted that he entered

the KGB in 1952, and in which

he back-dated by one year his 1962 account of his activities

in the period 1945-1955. Although he was then reminded of:

his 1962 statement and the contradiction was discussed with

him, after study he indicated his approval by signing an

official biographic statement (for the Intelligence Community)

which indicated that he entered on duty with the KGB in

about May 1952:

At the first hostile interrogation in April 1964, NOSENKO

was

confronted with his contradictory claims. In response,

NOSENKO stated that he returned to Moscow from the Baltic in

August 1952 by most of his other accounts,

NOSENKO returned

in January 1953] and entered the KGB on 5-7 September 1952.

By March 1953, NOSENKO stated, he had already worked in the

Embassy Section for some months against American correspon-

dents, and it was "just after Stalin's death, after the

reorganization". that' he

assumed responsibility for operations

against American Army Attache personnel.

[NOSENKO ultimately

settled on June or July 1954 as the time of this reassignment.

See p. 84.]

Challenged in April 1964 to resolve the contradictions of

his earlier claims that he joined the KGB variously in

January 1952, September 1952, or March 1953, NOSENKO

asserted that the truth was that his service dated from March

1953, after Stalin's death. He

finished his Institute studies in 1949 (sic),

went on to explain that he

"defended his

diploma" and then failed one of the four required State

examinations. All four examinations, he said, he had to

take over again, and as a result he didn't receive his diploma

until 1950 although he "officially" graduated in 1949.

NOSENKO said

that to avoid admitting

"this unpleasant thing"

he claimed he joined the KGB in 1952 and after claiming that

again,? fact, "did not want to correct it, to twist it around

NOSENKO went on to say that the actual date of entry

was while Stalin was still alive, on "12 or 15 March 1953"

or about 15 March 1953.

63

Top Secret

0001333

TS No. 197124

10

Copy —

---

## Page 72

Top Secret

(KGB ENTRY)

Comment:

NOSENKO's explanation takes no account = ==

fact that he had already said (in 1962) =-==

he joined the KGB in March 1953.

KGB defectors

describe the period irred-ately

following Stalin's death in the KGB as ene

extensive reorganization and uncertaint: ==

which new candidates were not being accep==:.

Other evidence of the improbability of SIO's

entering the KGB in

March 1953 is discusses

below.

NOSENKO repeated during 1965 interrogations the cat=

13-15 March 1953•

In 1966, however, in a written statement,

he said he entered the KGB on 2 April 1953, but a week later,

in another signed statement, he said it was. the

"micale of

March 1953".

In his final interrogation in October 1966 NOSENFO said

he entered the KGB in March 1953 and he acknowledgee tia=

he had lied, and had known at the time he was lying, when

he had said he joined in 195k "There was no sense.

Asked by his interrogaicrs

why he had lied, NOSENKO said,

=e

went on to explain that because he was only an average

student and a heavy drinker, he had been found unsuitabie

by the KGB. entry commission when he first applied in 1550;

he had tried to conceal this by adjusting his accourt u

one year, since his interrogators would not have belieres

that he was eventually accepted by the KGB after an earlier

rejection.

The Role of General Bogdan Zakharovich KOBULOY

In all of his accounts NOSENKO has attributed to General

KOBULOV's initiative and intervention his entry to the fes..

In the account which he volunteered in Geneva to CIA ==

1962, NOSENKO said KOBULOV was a friend of the elde= sENio

go us - tong on

whom he met when the KGB General "dropped by" the MisEro

dacha outside of Moscow, and KOBULOV at the time ("east:

1953") was First Deputy

to Beriya, the Minister of re

64

0001334

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

---

## Page 73

Top Secret

(KGB ENTRY)

then-MVD. NOSENKO said that when KOBULOV learned of NOSENKO's

dissatisfaction with the Naval RU, KOBULOV encouraged him

to enter counterintelligence and invited him to visit the

General's office. : NOSENKO said he did not, but nevertheless

received a week later a telephone call from the KGB Personnel

Office asking him to appear at the secretariat of General

king him to a

KOBULOV and informing him that General KOBULOV had already

arranged for a building pass.

NOSENKO gave an this version, he first met KOBULOV, a

somewhat more detailed account

friend of the NOSENKO family, in February 1953. NOSENKO said

KOBULOV had visited his father in the latter's office, and

that evening the elder NOSENKO brought him to the NOSENKO

dacha to spend the weekend. [NOSENKO had just before been

informed by his interrogators that KOBULOV was at that time

posted

in Germany, not in Moscow.]. According to NOSENKO,

KOBULOV was in Moscow on a short visit from Germany. : "My

father invited him to spend Saturday night and Sunday...On

Sunday we were playing billiards

and KOBULOV asked me what

I was doing, and I told him I was at the disposal of the

(Naval RU) Personnel Department and that I didn't want to

return to the Baltic."

NOSENKO said that KOBULOV offered

to call the KGB Personnel Office and have them "look

NOSENKO over", and NOSENKO assented, after which he twice

visited the Personnel Office where he filed completed forms.

NOSENKO asserted that KOBULOV did not forget, because "just

as soon

as STALIN died; KOBULOV imnediately returned from

Germany" after being "summoned by Beriya or someone", and

on "maybe the

l0th of March" NOSENKO received a call from

KOBULOV's assistant.

NOSENKO claimed he reported to KOBULOV's

office;

although he waited two hours to see the General,

the latter was busy elsewhere. Instead of seeing KOBULOV,

however, NOSENKO said he was finally taken to the office

of Second Chief Directorate Deputy Chief SHUBNYAKOV, who

assigned him forthwith to the Embassy Section of the American

Department.:

In April 1964 NOSENKO introduced a new variant. He said

that he met KOBULOV while accompanying his parents on a

visit in January to KOBULOV's dacha [NOSENKO had previously

graphically described KOBULOV's weekend visit at the elder

NOSENKO 's], KOBULOV intervened in his behalf, and he was

called to the KGB Personnel Office to be interviewed and

to

65

Top Secret

0001335

TS No. 197124

:10

Copy.

---

## Page 74

Top Secret

(KGB ENTRY)

receive necessary forms. NOSENKO stated that he heard

nothing further until after Stalin's funeral, wien he was

summoned to KOBULOV's office and afterwards assigned to

the Second Chief Directorate.

During the July 1965 interrogations NOSENKO retracted

his earlier claim that KOBULOV and his father had been close

personal friends. He stated that his father's relationship

with KOBULOV was not personal, and that KOBULOV had never

visited the NOSENKOs.

In a biographic statement written in April 1966, NOSENKO

said that he had met KOBULOV but twice, once on 1 January

1953 at the latter's dacha, and the second and last time in

the elder NOSENKO's office as NOSENKO's father and KOBULOV

were departing to attend Stalin's funeral.

On that latter

occasion, NOSENKO clained, KOBULOV promised to concern him-

self with NOSENKO's entry into the KGB and it was several

days later that NOSENKO was summoned to KOBULOV's office

and told ie was appointed to the KGB.

Comment:

General Bogdan Zakharovich KOBULOV was a career

security official, but from the immediate post-

war period until after Stalin's death he was

not assigned to KGB Headquarters. As of 1952,

he was posted to Germany with the Chief

Directorate of Soviet Properties Abroad, then

directly subordinate not to the MVD but to the

Council of Ministers and latterly to the

Ministry of Foreign Trade.

Until he returned

from Germany in March 1953 to assume the

position of Beriya's deputy, he had no office

In KGB Headquarters. KOBULOV was arrested

with Beriya in June 1953, and also later executed.

In light of the foregoing, it is improbable

that KOBULOV was instrumental in NOSENKO's

appointment to the KGB at the times NOSENKO

claimed.

If KOBULOV ever interceded in

NOSENKO's behalf, it is probable that NOSENKO

would later have

been purged after KOBULOV's

0001336

66

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy -

---

## Page 75

Top Secret

(KGB ENTRY)

Comment:

(Continued)

and Beriya's arrest and execution:

NOSENKO's

eventual retraction of his assertion that his

father and KOBULOV were intimate acquaintances

makes it the more unlikely that KOBULOV played

any role at any time in NOSENKO's appointment

to the KGB.

Eligibility

Throughout the various versions NOSENKO has provided

about his entry to the KGB, he has emphasized how influen-

tial was his father's prominent position in the Soviet

Government.

Comment: In the period 1953-1954, during which NOSENKO

claimed he entered the KGB, it was KGB policy

to avoid recruiting the children of senior

Soviet officials.

NOSENKO asserts that he was rejected for KGB appointment

upon graduation from the Institute of International Relations.

Comment: Other than claiming to have completed an

undistinguished period of service with the Naval

RU, NOSENKO acknowledges thät he was no möre

eligible in 1953 for KGB appointment than he

was at the time of his rejection.

0001337

67

Top Secret

TS. No. 197124

Copy .—-

---

## Page 76

Top Secret

(KGB ENTRY)

NOSENKO states that in March 1953 he was already twenty-

five and a half years old, a member of only the Komsomol,

and that he had not been recommended for Party membership.

He further claimed that. on entry to the KGB he became

secretary of

the Second Chief Directorate Komsomol organi-

zation.

Comment: Eligibility for Party membership, if not

membership itself, is a requisite for KGB

appointment. By Komsomol statutes of that time,

twenty-five was at that time the maximum age.

Thus, at the time of NOSENKO's claimed KGB

appointment, he was within six months of being

dropped by the Komsomol as well as still

unqualified for Party membership. He could

not have been secretary of the Second Chief

Directorate Komsomol organization, as discussed

on p. 338.

NOSENKO has referred frequently to having contracted

tuberculosis for which he was periodically hospitalized.

Comment:

According to KGB defectors

familiar with the

standards in force at the time, no candidate

was

accepted who had ever had tuberculosis.

KGB Processing for Entry

NOSENKO has stated (in chronological order) that at his

initial interview with a KGB personnel, it was not necessary

For him to complete any forms or questionnaires since the

KGB had his Naval RU file; that he was told that the KGB

would request the Naval RU file and meanwhile he was given

three copies of a four to six-page biographic form to complete

at home; and (at his last interrogation in 1966) that he

68

0001338

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Сору -

---

## Page 77

Top Secret

(KGB ENTRY)

never. spoke to any KGB personnel officers nor visited the

personnel office (and thus

completed no forms provided by

them) •

Comment:

The most important document filled out by

prospective KGB officers was a detailed 16-page

personal history questionnaire, Anketa

even when blank, the form was not permitted to

be taken home.:

KGB defectörs have described

completion of the form "as an experience not

likely to be forgotten.

NOSENKO omits in all

accounts reference to other documents which are

known to have been required in connection with

a KGB officer's processing for duty:

NOSENKO insisted that he took no physical examination in

connection with processing for KGB entry:

Comment:

A medical examination was a routine and mandatory

part of a KGB

candidate's processing. Former

KGB defectors could think of no instance in

which the examination could be waived, parti-

cularly for a candidate with a recorded history

of tuberculosis.

NOSENKO claims in all of his accounts that he entered the

KGB building and, with a pass obtained at the Pass Office,

was permitted to proceed without escort. NOSENKO specifically

asserted that the name of the interviewer did not appear on

the pass.

0001339

69

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy 10

---

## Page 78

dylan tartagra si

Top Secret

(KGB ENTRY)

Comment:

Persons not holding a valid KGB identity

document were not permitted entry to or move-

ment in the building without escort.

The

interviewer's name did

appear on the building

pass.

The interviewer's name was essential

to the issuance of the pass:

the interviewer

had complete responsibility

• for the visitor's

custody while on KGB premises.

Initial Service in KGB (1953)

NOSENKO stated that in the period of Beriya, in March-

June 1953, the two existing directorates were the First

Chief Directorate, which was the foreign intelligence

existings

directorate, and the Second Chief Directorate, the counter-

intelligence directorate.

The designations were later

reversed for a few months, he said, by Kruglov, Beriya's

successor.

Comment:

Beriya reversed the designations of the First.

and

Second Chief Directorates in March 1953,

and they were not changed back until March 1954.

NOSENKO does not know how his

own directorate

was designated either at the time he allegedly

entered on duty or during his entire first

year of KGB service.

NOSENKO described the KGB identity document of the period,

but in spite of repeated questioning could not recall any-

thing unusual about it.

70

0001340

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

---

## Page 79

Top Secret

(KGB ENTRY)

Comment:

Iwice, following Stalin's death in March 1953

and again following Beriya's arrest in June

1953, all KGB identity documents were temporarily

recalled for revalidation." On both occasions

new stamps were placed on the document, lacking

which the bearer could no longer enter the KGB

installation. KGB defectors state that the

events were the topic of numerous anecdotes at

the time.

NOSENKO claims he received no training

in the KGB, but

was assigned operations responsibilities immediately upon

reporting for duty.

He had explained that training was

unnecessary because of his Naval RU experience.

Comment:

NOSENKO's lack of training is unlike that of

any other KGB defector. His Naval RU service,

by NOSENKO's own account, provided little if

any preparation for his subsequent KGB duties.

NOSENKO

that his initial KGB basic pay was 1700

rubles

officer, plus

secrecy, language and

longevity pay, plus 500 rubles, "rank pay" as a lieutenant.

He recalled that there was one year, 1954, when KGB officers

dia not receive the pay for rank.

Comment:

KGB officers! rank pay was abolished in

September 1952 and not restored until April

1954, a

period which covers NOSENKO's first

year of claimed service in the KGB.

71

Top Secret

0001341

TS No. 197124

Copy 10

---

## Page 80

Top Secret

(KGB ENTRY)

NOSENKO claimed that he was promoted to the rank of senior

lieutenant in April 1953, shortly after joining the KGB.

Comment:

All promotions in the KGB were frozen from the

time Beriya became Minister in March 1953

until late 1953. NOSENKO's actual sequence of

promotions

has never been established.

He has

also claimed this promotion occurred in 1952

and in 1954. See p. 351.

NOSENKO acknowledged that his qualifications for continued

gone okaran negative cotton vith sack-

ground would have come to light.

he could only assume that the important and

He stated influential

however, that

position of his own father outweighed the negative factors.

Comment: NOSENKO has never mentioned any influence his

father had on his KGB service aside from that

exercised through KOBULOV, who was himself

arrested and executed.

Other Aspects Relevant to 1953 KGB Service

NOSENKO insisted that the KGB was organized from components

of the MVD not earlier than late 1954 or early 1955.

0001342

72

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy -

---

## Page 81

Top Secret

(KGB ENTRY)

Comment:

The KGB was Organized in March 1954, in a final

reform of Beriya's organization of Soviet

security agencies."

Preceded by a series of

purges, the inception of the KGB would presumably

be memorable to a KGB officer serving in Moscow

Headquarters at the time.

NOSENKO stated that the MVD Intelligence Directorate

(subsequently to become the KGB First Chief Directorate,

was located in 1953 in four buildings, including the

Agricultural Exhibition and the "KI (Committee of Infor-

mation) Building".

Comment:

The Agricultural Exhibition and the "KI

Building" were one and the same.

From his

statement, NOSENKO is unaware that the KI

(a combined foreign intelligence agency)

ceased to exist in 1951, a matter perhaps

unfamiliar to a KGB officer serving at a

substantially later time, but one which

other KGB officers serving in Moscow in

1953 recalled

easily.

NOSENKO did not know where the Chief Directorate of the

Militia was located in 1953-1954.

Comment:

According to KGB defectors, a staff officer in

the Counterintelligence Directorate at the time

would have had frequent occasion to deal with

the Chief Directorate of the Militia.

73

Top Secret

0001343

TS No. 197124

Copy -10

---

## Page 82

5303S

Top Secret

(KGB ENTRY)

KGB Entry: Summary and Conclusion

NOSENKO's assertions regarding the KGB in the 1953-1954

period throw

no more light on the actual date of his KGB

entry than did his claims of when he transferred from the

Naval RU; the contradictions and

inconsistencies are

interrelated.

It is possible that a former KGB officer, relating the

truth as he recalls it about events occurring ten years

earlier, could be inconsistent; that he could forget his

date of entry, not remember what administrative procedures

were, fail to recall the circumstances of the organization

he joined were, be inaccurate about what his pay was, and

be vague on what his KGB identification document looked

like.

Recognizing that administrative regulations and

procedures are on occasion honored in the breach, it is

also possible that NOSENKO was accepted by the KGB despite

the

fact that he was the son of a senior official, that he

had

tuberculosis, that he was unqualified for Party member-

ship, that he had been previously rejected and all at a

when the KGB was not accepting new recruits.

The probability of these events being coincident, however,

is remote.

On examination, NOSENKO's latest admission, that

he

"actually" entered the

• KGB in March 1953, is no better

substantiated than earlier accounts citing other dates.

Conclusion

NOSENKO did not enter the KGB in the manner nor at the

time he claimed:

0001344

74

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy -

---

## Page 83

Top Secret

CHAPTER V

AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION OF AMERICAN DEPARTMENT

(ca. 1953-June 1955)

NOSENKO claims to have served in the American Embassy

Section of the American Department (Second Chief Directorate)

from his entry in the KGB until June 1955. His targets

during this period were at first American correspondents

residing in Moscow and later Army Attache personnel of the

American Embassy in Moscow.

His assignment involving

American correspondents lasted anywhere from six to eighteen

months (depending on the various dates he claimed he entered

the KGB) •

His involvement with the Army Attaches lasted

from sometime in 1954 until his transfer to the Seventh

Department in June 1955.

NOSENKO has sought to avoid discussion of his own of

other KGB activities during this entire period which he

characterized on occasion as "not relevant" or "of no

consequence"

He has repeatedly stated that he "found

himself" only after this initial KGB service in the American

Embassy Section.

Until then, he asserted, he was a wastre

and "did not pay attention to the work".

(He has variously

dated his self-discovery as occurring in 1955 when he

case; and after August 1956 when the death of his father

forced him to pull himself together.)

operations Against American Correspondents

NOSENKO exempted himself from reporting details of KGB

work against any specific American correspondent in Moscow

in 1953-1954 by saying that, as a new, very junior employee

he had no access to operational files and did not partici-

pate personally in the handling of any of the correspondents.

75

Top Secret

0001345

TS No. 197124

Copy -

10

VIBR

---

## Page 84

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - ca. 1953-June 1955)

Although able to identify correspondents in Moscow who were

then recruited KGB agents, NOSENKO learned this information

either in conversations with his superior [V.A.] KOZLOV or

at some point and in some undefined way after he no longer

was working against these targets.

NOSENKO made clear that

he was not the case officer responsible for the more important

correspondents:

"KOZLOV himself was working with them,

chief of the section himself--with SHAPIRO/with SHAPIRO 06

wife. I also know that KOZLOV was working with WHITNEY 06

According

to NOSENKO, he was in no way involved with [STEIGER andOb

06

Edmund STEVENS, American correspondents who he alleged were

recruited agents of the KGB•

Comment:

06

[SHAPIRO was identified as a KGB agent by

GOLITSYN in 1961, before the lead was received

from NOSENKO-O SHAPIRO's KGB agent cryptonym,

known to NOSENKO and GOLITSYN, appears in the

CHEREPANOV papers (see p. 309) •

The KGB

defector Nikolay KHOKHLOV in April 1954

C6

identified the Polish-born wife of WHITNEY as

a KGB agent, an allegation which she denied.

NOSENKO said his early months in the job were spent

reading personality (not operational) files on a number of

the correspondents in Moscow, (none of which indicated the

individual's developmental of agent status) and familiarizing

himself with KGB methods.

Later NOSENKO was assigned the

"agent network" of drivers, clerical personnel, and domestics

surrounding four of the correspondents, SHAPIRO, GILMORE, €6,06,06

SALISBURY] and WHIINEY.". He met with his agents periodically

to determine whether they had developed any important infor-

mation.

His superior KOZLOV often went along to the meetings

with NOSENKO, first to show him how to handle the agents and

afterward whenever something interesting would begin to

develop.

In fact, according to NOSENKO, KOZLOV would

accompany him to meetings with these Soviet citizens-agents

when there was even a hint that something of interest might

0001346

76

Tion Garret

TS No. 197124

Copy -

I/BR

---

## Page 85

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - ca. 1953-June 1955)

develop.

NOSENKO has descrived some of these agents in

general terms, but for all but a few he recalled neither

their names nor personalia concerning them.

06

WHITNEY

On the day of his acceptance into the KGB, NOSENKO

stated that he was taken directly to the offices of the

American Embassy Section.

There he met the section chief!

V.A. KOZLOV, who told NOSENKO that he would take over the

work of the departing case officer, Captain Anatolly

TORMOZOV, in operations against American correspondents in

MOSCOW

When NOSENKO reported for work the following day, he

found a desk in Room 615 and, "There were three other guys

sitting there. At first I was running traces, and at the

same time I was reading the files on journalists. I think

there were seven files in all, and I didn't see any other.

NOSENKO listed these files

as those on Henry SHAPIRO, Eddy 06,06

GILMORE (as well as ones on GILMORE's wife SEREBRYANKOVAJO 6

and her sister CHERNYSHEVA Harrison SALISBURY and Thomas

WHITNEY 06

06

and gave us some material, but he refused to work for us

when he left the country" D GILMORE, NOSENKO said, was an

active recruitment target in 1953 and 1954, but NOSENKO

did not know whether he was recruited. Likewise, he did

not know the status of SALISBURy as of 1953.

- 06

NOSENKO stressed that the files he was given to read

during the early period of his KGB service were develop-

mental files (delo formulyar) rather than the operational

files of the agents.

The developmental files were less

out whether he from the touche mee bandage bigure

out whether he

NOSENKO explained that, once a person became an agent,

another file is

set up, and these agent files were held by

the chief of the

section, KOZLOV. NOSENKO stated that he

read the

sectión,

files on the seven persons "slowly and made some

extracts. for myself in my personal log--such things as

0001347

77

Top Secret

TS. No. 197124

Copy

10

12/SR

---

## Page 86

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - ca. 1953-June 1955)

notations of their dates of arrival, things I could not

remember".

He was also given the files on the agents.

surrounding these correspondents, their drivers, maids,

and cooks.

Agents Reporting on Correspondents

NOSENKO said he was responsible

who were reporting Off SHAPIRO, WHITNEY, SALISBURg band the

06 GILMORES and met them regularly to learn whether" "anything

was new, whom did (SHAPIRO meet, what might be interesting

in his behavior, what might be suspicious in his behavior,

whom he is contacting, etc"

.

He then reported to KOZLOV and

would sometimes prepare a written report of his conversations

with the agents.: Asked to describe these meetings, NOSENKO

replied:

06

"Let us take the same case of SHAPIRO. I would

meet drivers about three times a month or even two

times. Oft the meeting I would ask the driver what

was

in SHAPIRO"s behavior since our last meeting.

theY (SHAPIRO had suspicious contacts with forei-

gners, about his meetings with Russians, were they

conducted openly or, perhaps, was (SHAPIRO walking 06

behind the person he met. And then the man [agent)

would begin his report.

Of course, if he spots

anything suspicious he calls immediately, and I

would see him the next morning.

Otherwise, I would

tell him at the meeting that I would see him again

in about ten days or in two weeks, but if there was

something interesting he should call immediately.

It was the same with

the maid and the cook.

Upon

returning to the office I would have to report to

KOZLOV about my meetings, either orally or in

writing.

If,. for example, IV.M.] KOVSHUK lalso of

the American Embassy Sectionl had a meeting with his

agents, he too had to report immediately to KOZLOV.

If the meetings were taking place late in the day

and lasted until midnight or later and there were

no written materials submitted at the meeting, I

could go home and then report the

next morning."

0001348

78

Top Secret

2138

TS No. 197124

Copy -

---

## Page 87

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - ca. 1953-June 1955)

KOZLOV accompanied NOSENKO to meetings with the various

agents surrounding the correspondents.

"At first he was

teaching me.

Then he would go in cases when something

interesting would begin to develop, even when it hadn't

yet begun to develop but when there may have been a hint

in a case of some other case officer.

NOSENKO's agent network consisted mainly of domestic and

clerical personnel in contact with the correspondents and

their families. Asked to describe them, he said:

"My first agent has a woman agent, a cook, who

was working at GILMORN's place.

She also worked

at the Associated Press later.

Her. codename was

'AGLODINA', a funny one."

(While reviewing a list

of Soviets employed by Americans in Moscow, NOSENKO

in the fall of 1965 identified one Yelena s.

KOSIENKO as his former agent "AGLODINA".

"At that

time he told CIA that he had taken over KOSIENKO

from TORMOZOV upon entering the American Embassy

Section

for and in 1953, and that she subsequently worked

reported on GILMORE's successor, Richard 06

KASISCHKE. NOSENKO said that KOSIENKO "never

provided any interesting information.) "my second

agent was a chaufreur whose cryptonym, I think, was

SERGEY'

I think he was driving for WHITNEY. 06

Then I also had SHAPIRO's chauffeur, a funny little

fellow. In other words, charwomen, chauffeurs, this

was my agentura lagent network].".

Although NOSENKO was able to give a breakdown of this net-

work in terms of the numver and type of agents targetted

against particular individuals, he had forgotten their true

names and could not provide personality information on any

don't remember now.

They all

passed by like a river because they were turned over often."

NoSEnKO did recall that it was he who

the agent wows placed in SAto tied a eter

this agent had earlier worked in the offices of Moscow News,

an English-language newspaper published in Moscow.

0001349

79

Top Secret

6/BR.

TS No. 197124

Copy 10

---

## Page 88

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - ca. 1953-June 1955)

NOSENKO estimated that he was responsible for handling

ten to twelve agents in operations against the correspon-

dents.

This, he said, 'was a normal load, although more

experienced case officers might have as many as fifteen.

NOSENKO described his agentura as follows:

Target

Bady GILMORETCE

Agents

Two agents, the cook and the

driver; one operational contact,

a part-time cleaning girl; and

a girlfriend of GILMORF|'s sister- 66

06

Thomas HITNEY

in-law and GILMORE'S

Russian wife.

06,!!

One agent, his driver, "SERGEY".

Three agents! [SHAPIRO's secretary

and his chauffeur, plus an old

woman who was a relative of

06 SHAPIRO's wife and lived with

Do the SHAPIROS In MOscow.

secretary and chauffeur later

worked for Kenneth BRODNEY] anal

reported: on him to NOSENKO;

C6 BRODNEY, temporarily took SHAPIRO's C6

06

Harrison SALISBURY

place in Moscow -06

Two agents; SALISBURY's driver,

and a part-time cleaning girl.

NOSENKO classified two other of his agents as "neutral",

in that they did not have specific

tärgets on whom to report.

The first of these was the director of MOSGRAN, a Russian-

language training program for foreigners in Moscow..

HiS

cryptonym

was

"RAKETA", but NOSENKO could not recall his true

name.

The

second "VOLODINA", was a female teacher in this

same program who instructed some of the correspondents, and

Embassy employees in their homes; he could not recall the

true name of "VOLODINA".

Then NOSENKO was relieved of his

responsibility for the correspondents in 1954, he turned over.

all of his agents to other case officers in the American

Embassy Section

with the exception of.

"RAKETA" and "VOLODINA",

whom he continued to handle in his work with Army Attaches.

0001350

80

Tan Carret

TS No. 197124

Copy -

---

## Page 89

Top Secret

(AMFRICAN EMBASSY SECTION. - ca. 1953-June 1955)

Operations Against U.S. Army Attache Personnel

NOSENKO claimed specific responsibility for work against

American Army Attaches during twenty months of 1954-55, a

period in which NOSENKO claimed no supervisory responsibility

to divert his attention from personal operational duties.

(NOSENKO, explaining why he did not know more details about

the Embassy, Section's targets while he was its deputy chief

he we see a

in 1960-1961, said that as a supervisor he was too busy

overseeing subordinates.

Hence, NOSENKO continued, he could

not be expected to remember as many such details as would

be possible had he been a case officer working daily on only

four or

five targets. Elsewhere, he contrasted operations

against tourists, who often came and went in a matter of a

few days, with the work against the service attaches and

diplomats permanently stationed in Moscow, who could be

studied systematically and slowly.)

NOSENKO has said in different contexts that as the

American Department case officer responsible for operations

against Army Attaches he received and was responsible for

assimilating the product of a wide variety of sources on the

individuals who were his targets. He has mentioned infor-

mation received from the KGB First Chief (Foreign Intelli-

NOSENKO entered the American Department.

Comment:

NOSENKO has said variously that the microphones

in the Army Attache offices were his most

valuable source of information on his targets

of 1954-1955; that he knew nothing of these

microphones until he re-entered the Embassy

Section in 1960; and that he learned of their

existence during 1953-1955 but not where any

were located.

81

Top Secret

0001351

TS. No. 197124

10

Copy -

---

## Page 90

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - ca. 1953-June 1955)

Information was also received according to NOSENKO from the

network of Soviet chauffeurs, cooks, language instructors,

and

other agents in the Embassy; permanent and roving

surveillance patrols outside the Embassy; fixed observation

posts next to, across from and near the Embassy; advance

notification of intent to travel by the attaches and their

itineraries; and reports from outside Moscow, including

surveillance, agent networks, the Militia, and the military.

The point of collecting and assimilating this information,

NOSENKO said, was to be able to know what the military

attaches were doing in Moscow and thereby to control their

intelligence collection activities.

the goal of recruiting military attaches; NOSENKO knew of

only a few instances when this was attempted, and all of

these efforts allegedly failed.

The KGB's principal interest in control rather than

recruitment has been NOSENKO's explanation

for knowing little

about the backgrounds

and personal lives of his targets--such

information, he stated, simply was not pertinent to the

primary mission of

control.

He has also used this explana-

tion to support his assertion that there were no recruitments

of American military personnel during this period.

Comment:

0001352

NOSENKO's assertion that the KGB's mission was

to control rather than to recruit American

military attaches is contradicted by the

emphasis KGB tradition and doctrine place on

conducting operations against the United

States, the "main enemy", in the KGB parlance,

in this case American officials with access to

classified information, who were residing in

the soviet Union.

In the USSR, especially in the early 1950's

prior to the U-2 reconnaissance, the Service

Attache travel program was the primary means

by which the U.S. Armed Forces acquired intelli-

gence information on the Soviet Union's

military-industrial complex.

The prevention

or inhibition of this collection activity fell

consequently to KGB components concerned with

the security of military-industrial installations,

82

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy -

---

## Page 91

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION

ca. 1953-June 1955)

Comment:

(Continued)

with transportation facilities, and with the

geographic regions to which the Service:

Attaches travelled.

Approval of Service

Attache travel itineraries was not within the

competence of a case officer within the Embassy

Section; the determination would have to have

been

made by officials concerned with the

USSR's military and

industrial security and

aware of reciprocal privileges being extended

to Soviet Service Attaches in the United

States, matters involving the GRU as well as

the KGB.:

An Embassy Section case officer

would have as a matter of course monitored

reports of Service Attaches' travel, searching

for personal vulnerabilities among his targets,

and assisted local KGB elements in setting up

provocations outside of Moscow.

NOSENKO,

however, has included neither of these latter

functions as having been among his responsi

bilities.

Custody of Case Files on Army Attache Personnel

"Sometime in the first half of 1954" NOSENKO said, he

was relieved of his responsibilities for the correspondent

cases, and

from then until his transfer from the American

Department he handled KGB Second Chief Directorate operations

against the officer personnel of the Army Attache's office.

NOSENKO's account of the turnover of the correspondent files

to his successor and of the acceptance of the attache files

is presented below.

-8 April 1964:

"I took over the Army Attache cases from

Nikolay KHRENOV..•

When I was leaving in 1955, I turned

the attache files over to Valeriy BUDYLDIN."

83

Top Secret

0001353

TS No. 197124

Copy 10

---

## Page 92

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - ca. 1953-June 1955)

-10. April 1964: "I made a mistake (when] I said I

accepted the cases from KHRENOV....

I accepted the cases

from Pavel Fedorovich PAIIKRATOV. This was in the beginning

of 1954."

-15 April 1964: NOSENKO said that he thought he turned

over the correspondent files to F.V. KISLITSYN (who returned

to the USSR from Australia in May 1954) • NOSENKO asked

when the PETROVs defected in Australia; he explained that

he was not sure about KISLITSYN and could have given them

to another officer.

"If KISLITSYN came [back from Australia)

in 1953, then it was to KISLITSYN. Otherwise, it was some-

one else."

"18: June 1964: "KISLITSYN came into the Embassy Section

in 1954 and I gave him the files on American correspondents.

BUDYLDIN also joined the section this year and took the

files on the Army Attache and his assistants from PANKRATOV.

BUDYLDIN left later that year and turned those files over

to: me.....

Yuriy LEONTIYEV joined the section in 1955, and

gave him the files on the Army Attache and his assistants."

NOSENKO has also been indefinite as to the date he assumed

responsibilities for the Attaches.

As noted above, he said

on

10 April 1964 that he received the files in the beginning

of 1954.

Ile had earlier said that he worked on the corres-

pondents "only alout six months".

If the date of March 1953,

which he most often gave for his entry into the KGB, is

correct, this would place the turnover in the fall of 1953.

On other occasions he has said specifically that he turned

over the correspondent cases and began work against the

Attaches in January 1954, on still others that this occurred

in May 1954.

In February 1965, NOSENKO said that he could

not remember when he changed assignments.

Agents. Reporting on Army Attaches

Asked in April 1964 to describe the agent network

(agentura) at his disposal in operations

against Army

Attaches during this period which began in 1954, NOSENKO

replied: "There were two maids, a cook, drivers...about ten

persons, plus the agent. 'SERVIZNIY' and the one with the

cryptonym 'DMITRIYEV'....

These additional two agents,

about 12 or 13 agents altogether." With one exception, this

84

0001354

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy -

---

## Page 93

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - ca. 1953-June 1955)

networl: remained constant until NOSENKO transferred from

the American Embassy Section in mid-1955. He met each agent

about once a week, except for the chauffeurs who were met

three times

a month in a safehouse or on the street. The

Assistant Army Attaches used a pool of five drivers at

random, all of whom were his agents, NOSENKO said..

Apart

from the permanent driver for the senior Attache, none

was targetted against specific members of the attache

office.

Comment:

As noted earlier, NOSENKO named "VOLODINA" and

" RAKETA"

...as agents he used against correspondents

and against Army. Attache targets, but he never

again referred to them and, in describing his

own activities, he never indicated how or in

what cases they were used:

According to NOSENKO, this network was "just a supporting

agentura, which very seldom was worthwhile," the main source

of information on the Army Attaches being the microphones in

their offices.

Newly added to the network while NOSENKO held this

position was a maid inserted to report on Army Attache

06

BarI L. MICKELSON and his successor Fillmore K. MEARNS! 06

Her name, NOSENKO thought, was NOVIKOVA. She. was an

English-speaking university graduate but "hid her knowledge

of English in order to overhear conversations or read

letters without taking them outside"

Besides NOVIKOVA, NOSENKO named one other maid who was

his agent. Mariya NEVEROVA, cryptonym "SHVEDOVA,

and she

was targetted against the Assistant Army Attache, [Ira 06

RICHARDS. He described NEVEROVA as a "little, old, thin

woman,"

from whom he never obtained anything of interest.

They met in a safehouse on Kuznetskiy. Most.

85

Top Secret

3/BR

0001355

TS No. 197124

Copy 10

---

## Page 94

• Top Secret

(AMERICAI EMBASSY SECTION - ca. 1953-June 1955)

Of the KGB agents among the chauffeurs, NOSENKO named

Nikolay SHNYRYEV, who was used by various

attaches.

"He

reported where they went, what they said, whether they took

notes or photographs, whether they had unusual packages

with them, and so on."

When viewing photographs (see below) in September 1964,

NOSENKO identified Vladislav VOROBYEV as his former agent

"SERVIZNIY". He had been working in the Embassy since its

establishment, starting first as a messenger boy and, in

NOSENKO's time, performing clerical tasks. VOROBYEV had no

direct connection with the Army Attaches,.

and NOSENKO said

he himself did not know why he had been given VOROBYEV to

handle in 1951.

The main function of this agent was

delivering to NOSENKO copies of the unclassified telephone

listings of the Embassy, Issued monthly.

"DMITRIYEV's" true name may have been Dmitriy KUKOLEV;

NOSENKO saw this name on a 1962 phone list and thought, but

was not sure, that this was his agent.

An electrician who

worked on the

Embassy's electrical wiring systems and

elevator,

"DMITRIYEV"

reported to NOSENKO on antenna wires

and other wires he had observed on the top floors.

Like

VOROBYEV, "DMITRIYEY" had no direct

connection with the

Army Attaches.

Comment:

Elsewhere NOSENKO described an electrician who

provided some technical information on the

Embassy, but he related him to his second tour

in the American Embassy Section in 1960-1962

1060-19621

and did not then claim that the electrician was

his agent.

In Septemuer 1964 NOSENKO was shown a series of 260

biographic cards on Soviet citizens employed by the American

Embassy in Moscow.

Each card contained a photograph of

the

person involved and short biographic notes, including his

name and job in the Embassy.

The first time he went through

these cards, NOSENKO was permitted to see only the photo-

graphs; NOSINKO diù not identify the photograpis of SHNYRYEV

0001356

86

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy -

---

## Page 95

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - ca. 1953-June 1955)

and KUKOLEV but said that the face of VOROßYFV was familiar.

adding that he thought his name was VOROBYEV. Then shown

the Embassy biographic cards on SINYRYEV and KUKOLEV,

he

identified each of them as his agents during the 1954-1955

period in the American Department and equated them to the

cryptonyms given previously. In the case of SHNYRYEV, when

shown the biogtaphic information, which listed SHNYRYEV as

"chauffeur for the military attache," NOSENKO exclaimed:

"Oh my God,

this is my own agent."

He later said it was

good photograph of SHNYRYEV.

NOSENKO's Targets

Asked in February 1965 to list the Army Attache personnel

for whom he was directly responsible during 1954 and 1955,

NOSENKO orallY listed the following names: ["MICKELSON,)

MEARNS,.

RICHARDS, FELCHLIN, BENSON, MULE,

• STROUD, and

CARDELLA.""

06,06,06;06,06,06, 06, 06

Comment.:

In the örder as given by NOSENKO, the list

comprises two generations of Army Attaches in

MOSCOW

It is neither in alphabetical order

nor chronological

according to date or service

In Moscow. It is, however, in descending

order Of rank from Colonel MICKELSON through 06

Captains MULE and STROUD, to Chief warrant

Officer CARDELLA.

06

06

MICKELSON

NOSENKO correctly identified Earl I. MICKELSONas a

O8 [colonel and the Army Attache in Moscow during 1954 and 1955:

PANKRATOV. was the case officer originally handling MICKELSON, 06

and the case was turned over to NOSENKO in 1954. When aske

about agents who might have been working against MICKELSON, Ob

NOSENKO said that there was one cook, a KGB operational

contact whose name he did not recall, and MICKELSON's maid, 06

whose name NOSENKO Lelieved was NOVIKOVA.

In addition to

these two, the only other source reporting on MICKELSON was 06

his chauffeur, whose name NOSENKO also did not remember.

87

Top Secret

iZIBR-

C0L1357

TS No. 197124

Copy -

10

---

## Page 96

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - ca. 1953-June 1955)

NOSENKO said that the KGB learned nothing interesting about

D6 MICKELSON from concealed microphones, telephone taps, or

surveillance, and that no operational approach or recruit-

ment was attempted.

There was, in fact, no interesting or

derogatory information on MICKELSON from any source.

Comment:

MICKELSON was involved in at least two

incidents inside the Soviet Union which

HOSENKO has not reported. In May 1954 he was

arrested in Thilisi on the (false) charge of:

having photographed a bridge.

In August 1954

C6 MICKELSON was arrested again for illegal photo-

graphy south of Kharkov; on this occasion he

was held for two hours before being released.

It is judged that such events, particularly

those staged by the KGB, would be known to the

KGB case officer responsible for the attache

officer concerned.

06

MEARNS

C6

06

NOSENKO accurately identified Fillmore K. MEARNS as

MICKELSON's replacement and said that he was the responsi-

Ble case officer.

There were two agents and one operational

contact working against MEARNS.$6 Of these, IOSENKO couLd

recall the name only

of NOVIKOVA, the same maid who reported

earlier on MICKELSON, SoBesides being told to attempt to over-

do hear MEARNS conversations, NOVIKOVA was instructed to

search his clothing and to copy any notes she might find,

but she never overheard or found anything of interest to

the KGB. NOSENKO recalled that MEARNS' personal effects D6

were searched by the KGB while they were being shipped to

Moscow from the United States,

and that all his service

records had been discovered and photographed. (NOSENKO

has told this same story about (MICKELSON.) NOSENKO described 06

MEARNS as being more "active" in Moscow than MICKELSON had 06

been and said that information from concealed microphones

showed him to have a strong character. Nothing of interest

concerning him was received from these microphones or from

telephone taps.

0001358

88

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

MiSR

---

## Page 97

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY, SECTION - ca. 1953-June 1955)

RICHARDS

06

NOSENKO correctly identified Ira B. RICHARDSas a

Lieutenant colonel who served as an Assistant Army Attachel. 08

in Moscow.

The one agent reporting on RICHARDS whom NOSENKO 66

could name was the maid Mariya NEVEROVA, KGB cryptonym

"SHVEDOVA"

but she had never provided any worthwhile

information about RICHARDS. In addition, some soviet drivers

reported on RICHARDS but nothing useful was obtained from

* trivers

them:

Comment:

06

06

RICHARDS served in Moscow from July 1954 to

July 1956.

There was a microphone in the office

which he shared first with MICKELSON and later

yIth MEARNS. 36

- 06-

16 RICHARDS confirmed that Mariya NEVEROVA Was

his maid and described her as a "mousy" woman

who had a heart attack during the period she

was employed by him, an incident which was

not recalled by NOSENKO.

For about four months of his Moscow tour,

RICHARDS, took Russian-language lessons from

Ludmila GROMAKOVA in his apartment. During

Ob these lessons, (BICHARDS) often discussed labor

conditions and wages in the United States and,

on one occasion, had her record her speech on

his tape recorder. GROMAKOVA was pregnant and

xed the time

unmarried at the time. In another context,

NOSENKO named GROMAKOVA as a KGB agent during

1960-1962 but did not relate her to RICHARDS 06

or to the 1953-1955 period.

OL RICHARDSidentified one

"Volodya" (the

diminutive of Vladimir) as his principal

driver. About 62 years old in 1954, Volodya's

father was a rich jeweler in Moscow

at the time

of the Revolution. Volodya himself was well

educated and, on one occasion while picnicking

outside Moscow, he spoke intelligently with

89

C001359

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy 10

HIBR

---

## Page 98

4-00000

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - ca. 1953-June 1955)

Comment:

(Continued)

06 RICHARDS about the Revolution, propaganda, and

news media.

NOSENKO did not know of Volodya.

who, as RICHARDS& driver, was NOSENKO's agent

Uy NOSENKO's own account.

06

FELCHLIN

06

NOSENKO correctly identified Howard L. FELCHLIN as a

lieutenant colonel who served

as Assistant Army Attache in 08

Moscow.

By far the most aggressive of his targets and hence

the object of special interest, NOSENKO said FELCHLIN servedol

in the Soviet Union during 1954 and part of 1955, until

being declared persona non grata.

the names. of any agents specifically targetted against

08

FELCHLIN, although he thought FELCHLIN must have had a maid U8

who would have been a KGB agent. Additionally, NOSENKO

O8 said, the Assistant Army Attache? shared a pool of cars and

drivers, and these were his agents. Unable to recall the

08 precise

date of FELCHLIN's expulsion, NOSENKO related it to

some event regarding Soviets stationed in the United States

for which the Soviet Government decided to reply in kind..

NOSENKO was imprecise as to the pretext used to expel

DO FELCHLIN, but said the action was based on information which

had been accumulated from a number of sources and incidents.

@For example, FELCHLIN had been caught taking some photo-

graphs and a report had been written; along with other

Osimilar indications of FELCHLIN's activities and reports of

for possible future use.

FELCHLIN during the February 1965 interrogations. He said

then that FELCHLIN alone had been declared persona non grata,

and that no other

attaches had been involved. NOSENKO

explained his having but few details concerning this action

by the fact that it took place after NOSENKO had transferred

from the American Department to the Seventh Department in

June 1955. NOSENKO knew nothing of FEICHLIN's background.

0001360

90

Top Secret

1818R

TS No. 197124

Copy

---

## Page 99

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - ca. 1953-June

1955)

Comment:

FELCHLIN visited the USSR as a merchant seaman

and a diplomatic courier before arriving in

July 1953 as an Assistant Army Attache Offe

served in the latter capacity for one year,

until July 1954, when he was expelled. He had

previously served in Austria and Nest Germany

and had been in official contact with known

GRU officers

at both posts, as well as in the

United States. During his entire tour in

Moscow he was the object of intense KGB

surveillance.

•& Shortly after his arrival in September 1953

FELCHLIN, with fellow Assistant Army Attache 08

Martin J. MANHOFF and Ewo Air Force Attaches, 08

Eook a train trip to siberia, the first trip

permitted such Americans in many years. Six

months later, on 25 March 1954, the Soviet

newspaper Trua carried an article falsely

O alleging that FELCHLINLand his companions had

lost some "spy documents" on the train. On

another occasion, while travelling with a

British Military Attache, EELCHLIN returned to08

his train compartment to find a scantily clad

Soviet female in his berth. NOSENKO recalled

neither of these incidents.

In June 1954, while in the company of

Areutenant Colonel F.J. YEACER, an Assistant06,08;06

Army Attache, FELCHLIN was arrested in Kiev

Soviet Army officer for photographing a

military target.

(NOSENKO has never mentioned

YEAGER's name; when told the name and asked

for an identification, NOSENKO said that he

had heard it and that he thought YEAGER was 06

the Air Attache. A large crowa gatherea ana

after some jostling, FELCHLIN and YEAGER were 06,06

taken to a Militia station where they were

ordered to sign a confession. They were held

eleven hours, and their arrest caused the

American Ambassador to deliver a strong protest

note 06 (FELCHLIN was told on 3 July 1954 to

depart the Soviet Union within 48 hours.

Major walter A. MCKINNEy the American Air 06

91

Top Secret

0001361

TS. No. 197124

Copy-10

175R

---

## Page 100

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - ca. 1953-June 1955)

Comment:

(Continued)

Attache and one of [FELCHLIN's travelling

companions at the time ther

spy notes" were

allegedly lost, was declared persona non grata

at the same time.

Ambassador Bohlen success-

fully insisted, against initial Soviet refusal,

that his personal plane be allowed into the

USSR to fly FELCILIN and (MCKINNEY out. In 06,06

February 1965 NOSENKO was asked to describe

the unusual circumstances under which FELCHLIN 06

left.

NOSENKO said he could not, inasmuch, as

he was no longer in the American Department

at the time.

Told that the expulsion took

place in 1954, NOSENKO said this was not the

correct date.

06

Queried concerning SHYRYEV, RICHARDS and

FELCHLIN immediately recognized his photograph

and name as one of the chauffeurs assigned to

the office of the Army Attache at the Moscow

Embassy; RICHARDS was taken on his first trip 06.

outside Moscow by SHNYRYEV. He remarked that

the Attaches referred to SHNYRYEV as either

"Nikolay Perviy" (Nicholas the First) or

"Nikolay Vtoroy" (Nicholas the Second) to

distinguish him from another chauffeur with

FELCHLINI said that SHNYRYEV 06

drove primarily for the Army Attache himself,

Jut sometimes drove for the Assistant Army

Attaches, and he remembered that SHNYRYEV was

not well, suffered from war wounds, and had

continuing chest or lung trouble. Asked whether

SHNYRYEV had any medical problem; NOSENKO said

he was not aware of any.

0.6 FELCHLIN said his maid Dora FEDOROVA was

in her 50's.

When she spoke with FEICHLIN O6

about a job, she asked for about 120 rubles a

month, which seemed excessive, so FELCHLIN D6

offered 80. FEDOROVA refused

and left. Two

days later she returned and accepted.

spoke little English. Other maids came to

the

back door of [FELCHLIN's apartment to "chat" with06

her, and suspecting that they were reporting to

FEDOROVA, FELCHLIN teased her avout it.

06

0001362

92

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy -

---

## Page 101

Il

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - ca. 1953-June 1955)

Comment:

(Continued)

FEDOROVA's previous employer at the Embassy

gave. her full name to columnist Drew Pearson

a statement that she was

one of the chief

spies and the local "boss" of the Embassy net-

work. Pearson printed the allegation.

summer 1s 195, according to EELCHLIN, 06

the maid approached FELCHLIN with the article, 06

waved it in his face, and accused him of being

Pearson's source. NOSENKO did not recognize

FEDOROVA's name and did not recall hearing or

reading of this incident.

BENSON

06

NOSENKO correctly identified his target John

S.

BENSON

as a major and assistant Army Attachej in Moscow.

Ob recall the

He

said that BENSON was with (MULE and STROUD. (see below)(in-06,06

10;07 Stalingrad in 1955 when all three were caught by the KGB

with electronic "spying" devices.

persona non

got on 230 n

names of any agents working against BENSON but06

They were declared

grata.

The KGB had

no other derogatory infor-

mation on BENSON from any other source.

06-

STROUD

06

NOSENKO correctly identified William R.

STROUD as

captain and an Assistant Army Attache. The only agents

working against him were the Army Attache drivers.

"From

concealed microphones, the KGB learned before STROUD's 06

arrival in Moscow that he was an expert in the use of

electronic spying apparatus:

ID in Stalingrad and was declared persona non grata along with

them (see below). Other than this, NOSENKO said,

the KGB

knew nothing unusual of interesting about STROUD from any

0.6

93

Top Secret

0001363

TS No. 197124

Copy 10

ZLIBR

---

## Page 102

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - ca. 1953-June 1955)

Comment:

06.

06

STROUD

witi BENSOIl and MULE,

was the victim

Of

the Soviets' seizure of technical equip-

nent in Stalingrad and was declared personall

non gratã on 7 May 1955. On 31 January 1955 04

he travelled to Kharkov from Moscow with First

Secretary Frank SISCONto interview an AmericanOb

defector. living there. According to NOSENKO,

J6SISCOE was suspected by the KGB of being a CIA

officer. The visit ofTex-FBI agent SISCOE and 08,U0

a military officer to an American defector is

judged to be an event in which the KGB would

have. taken interest and one which the Attache's

KGB case officer would find memoraule.

MULES 06

06

NOSENKO correctly identified (alter MULEjas an

O& Assistant. Army Attache and

as such said that he was the case

officer responsible for him.

NOSENKO described an operational

0b approach to MULE,

in which he himself participated:

In 1953

or 1954 there had' been several defection approaches to

Soviets in the United States with the promise of money and

a new life.

After the KGB Second Chief Directorate decided

to try the same measures, MULE was selected.O He was only a

081

[captain) despite his lengthy service in the Army and infor-

mation from concealed microphones indicated that he was often

disparaged by the other Attaches.

When MULE] received lettersib

from home, he threw them in the trash, and the maids turned

these over to the KGB. From this mail it was understood

OL that MULE did not have a house.in the United States but

lived with his family in a trailer. The father of two

Ochildren, MULE had sent his wife from Moscow to Germany for

an abortion, as a third child would have imposed too great

an economic burden.

On the basis of all this the KGB

appointed N.M. BORODIN, a recruiter of the American Depart-

ment, to attempt to defect MULIAO Together with BORODIN,

KOVSIUK, and L.A. LEBEDEV (from the Second Chief Directorate's

special

technical section), NOSENKO travelled to Leningrad

for the operation. LEBEDEV installed a clock containing a

concealed camera as well as microphones

in MuLe's hotel room,

0001364

94

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

19/SR

---

## Page 103

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - Ca. 1953-June 1955)

O6 Potato need there room he he see En RoDEN

and

tried to back out, 'but NOSENKO and KOVSHÜK closed the

door from the hall and prevented his escape. BORODIN

Obreviewed for MUld the facts the KGB had accumulated about

his lack of success in the Army, the disdain of his fellow

Attaches, and his shortage of money and then offered him a

job as a

"consultant"

BORODIN had either $5,000 or

$10,000 in an envelope to encourage MULE]to accept. According06

to NOSENKo, MULE refused outright, telling BORODIll to get

out.

06

Comment:

06

MULE]

reported this incident. He said that he

was locked in his hotel room and subjected to

a recruitment attempt by an MVD agent calling

himself Jack SIEGAL, who offered him $10,000

for "work" on a long-range basis.

SIEGAL

emphasized that MULE would not be required to 06

Obconcerning MULD's personal life that could

have been obtained only from listening devices

Ob in MULE's apartment or office.

SIEGAL left

after about 20 minutes, having warned MULEI not 06

to report the incident. MULE identified

identify NOSENKO.

KGB lack of interest in recruitments, which

NOSENKO elsewhere cited to explain his ignorance

of the personal backgrounds of his Army Attache

targets, is belied by the MULi)case. 06

06,06

06

BENSON, MULE aNd STROUD

Expulsion from the Soviet Union

After NOSENKO had been transferred to the Seventh

Department in 1955. BENSON.

MULE land. STROUD|were the targets 06,06

of a KGB operation

which resulted in

all three men veing

06

declared persona non grata:

of this incident:

non grate time.

NOSENKO gave the following account

some time the Second Chief Directorate

had been trying to acquire a small, convenient piece of

95

Top Secret

C001385

TS -No. 197124

10

Copy.

---

## Page 104

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - ca. 1953-June 1955)

electronic equipment which American Intelligence officers

were known to be using during their travels inside the

Soviet Union. As early as the beginning of 1954, the

American Department had been given authorization

from

the

Central Committee.of the Communist Party to steal this

equipment from the Americans, provided that the success of

such

an operation was assured.

Before his transfer to the

Seventh Department in 1955, NOSFNKO himself had helpea to

develop plans for the operation and had even arranged an

abortive attempt to seize the equipment from an Attache at

a railroad station outside Moscow.

06 trouD were on one of their trips latter NosEs of MuLa and 06, 06

s transfer)

It was learned that they had the equipment with them, and

the KGB decided to take it from them in Stalingrad./D The

hotel rooms of BENSON STROUD

from a visual observation postand MULE

were watched constantly

and it was noted that they

never ate in the hotel restaurant but always in their rooms.

It was also noted that the apparatus was placed under a

pillow before they began to eat.

While they were seated at

the taule having dinner, therefore, the KGB officers suddenly

entered the room and seized the equipment. In order to

partially cover the illegality of

his act, it was decidec

to make a show of expelling BENSOM MULE and STROUD from the Of

Soviet Union, and' this was done by having the Foreign Ministry

declaring each persona non grata.

06

Comment:

The equipment was seized from

BENSON, MULE | and

06 STRoUD, on 5 May 1955, and the three were declared

persona non grata on 7 May, a month before

NOSENKO claimed to have transferred to the

Seventh Department.

then the 7 May date was

given to NOSENKO during the February 1965

interrogations, he replied that the operation

was handled at

a higher level, that he did not

directly participate in it, but that he had

been involved in the earlier planning to seize

the equipment. It was pointed out to him that

he had always said he was in the Seventh

Department at the time of this operation, and

that he had consistently said that he transferred

from the American to the Seventh Department in

June 1955.

NOSENKO offered no comment.

13IBR

0001366

96

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy .

---

## Page 105

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - ca. 1953-June 1955)

CARDELLA

-06

NOSENKO said that in 1954 and 1955 there was a

civilian administrative officer in the Embassy by the name

of James CARDELIA O The KGB had no interesting or unusual

information concerning CARDELLA from any source, and NOSENKO

could say nothing more about him. 0b

Comment:

As a memuer of the Army Attache's staff,

06 CARDELLA also would have been NOSENKO's target.

06

Chief Warrant Officer CARDELLA) served in Moscow

from September 1953 until June 1955. In 1964

a microphone was discovered in the Embassy office

U6' CARDELLA had occupied. The microphone was

believed to have been emplaced in 1952•

see

p. 227.

VAN LAETHEM

06:

06

&NOSENKO incorrectly identified George VAIT LAETHEM as

an Assistant Air Attachelat the Embassy against whom an

operation was attempted in 1953 or 1954.

He said that

during this period a Russian actress, Alla LARIONOVA, was

placed on a train going from Berlin to Moscow with the

mission of striking up an acquaintance with VAN LAETHEM 06

which could be followed up in Moscow. She succeeded in

meeting him and gave him her address and telephone number.

Although she was certain that she would hear from him, he

never did call her in Moscow.

NOSENKO said that he had

heard about this from P.F. PANKRATOV, the case officer

handling LARIONOVA.

, He

added that, CHURANOV was the case

officer responsible for VAN LAETHEM along with other 0b

members of the Air Attache's office at that time. NOSENKO OS

knew of no other KGB interest in or activity concerning

VAN LAETHEM

97

Top Secret

C001367

TS No. 197124

Copy -

---

## Page 106

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - ca. 1953-June 1955)

Comment:

VAN

LADriE: Iwas not an Assistant Air Attacine 08

out an Assistant Army Attache serving in

Moscow fron March 1951 to March 1953.

When

06 VAN LAETEiT completed his two-year tour in

Moscow in lärch 1953 (when NOSENKO said ne

entered the KGB), ile was succeeded by Walter 06

MULE, for Wilom NOSENKO has claimed responsi-

vility.

The fact

to the responsible KGB case officer, in this

case, NOSENKO.

As (cryptographic security 08

officer and officer in charge of the Embassy

обов

code room, VAN LAETHEiT had supervisory respon-

sibility for the military code clerks and

mechanics, including Dayle SilTH, and ie was

on fairly close personal terms with Sergeant

ROY RIODES until VAN LAETHEMs departure from06

Moscow in March 1953. VAN LAETHEll's üuties 06

also included responsibility for sensitive

electronic activities in the Embassy.

VAN LAETHELl was again in Moscow from 19 March

to 19 MaY 1955, when NOSENKO claims to nave

been the KGB case officer for Army Attaches.

Altiough this visit was only a temporary as-

signment, it was represented to the Soviets

as a permanent assignment of an Assistant Army

Attache (and

thus, presumably NOSENKO's tar-

get because of the sensitive nature of his

duties. He was project officer for the entire

signals collection program at tne Emvassy,

and he went to Moscow to review the program

including the planned use of the new electronic

napient wach was seized from BENSON, MULE] 96,06

and STRoUD in Stalingrad in May 1955 (whiled

D6 VAN LAETEN was still in iloscow) • VAN LAETHEL, U6

stateu that no meeting such as the one iOSENKO

descrived witi LARIONOVA ever occurred.

6001368

98

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy -

I7/SP

---

## Page 107

4-00000

scout

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - ca. 1953-June 1955)

Additional Reporting

Knowledge of another KGB operation involving Americans

was said by NOSENKO to stem from his 1953-1955 service in

the American Embassy Section, against CIA officer and

Embassy Security Officer Edward Ellis SMITH (see p. 37).

NOSENKO claimed to have personally participated in

the

operations against E.E. SMITH in 1954-1955. The incidents

which NOSENKO described, however, occurred in June 1956,

by which time NOSENKO, by his own account, had been out of

the American Embassy Section for a year and when he was

involved in the Seventh Department recruitment of RichardU

BURGI)

His involvement in the BURGI case has been confirmed.

NOSENKO has also described the KGB recruitment of military

cipher machine mechanic "ANDREY" (Dayle SMITH, see p. 33),

whose

true name he claimed not to have known.

He dated the

recruitment as occurring "in 1949-1950" and "before he

joined the KGB", although he said that he knew of the

existence of the

agent during his first tour in the Embassy

Section in 1953-1955.

However, NOSENKO also related that

"ANDREY" was recruited while Roy RHODES was in Moscow, that

"had spotted 'ANDREY'".

"ANDREY" and RHODES over-

lapped in Moscow from April 1952 to July 1953.

"ANDREY"

fixes his own recruitment as occurring in December 1953,

and until his departure in April 1954 he was responsible

for the entire Embassy code room. In that capacity "ANDREY"

was a direct subordinate of the Army Attache cryptographic

security officer, NOSENKO's target Army Captain Walter MULE. U6

If NOSENKO served in the 'Embassy Section during 1953-1955

as he claimed, it is difficult to perceive how he could have

remained unaware of "ANDREY's" identity.

According to NOSENKO, immediately upon entering on duty

with the KGB he was assigned without training to what he

describes as the most sensitive and important section of

the Second Chief Directorate.

There, after first handling

agents covering American correspondents resident in Moscow,

99

Top Secret

TS. No.

NO 757524

Copy - 10

3/BR

---

## Page 108

.1..

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - ca. 1953-June 1955)

he was made the case officer solely responsible for opera-

tions against the commissioned officers of the Embassy's

Army Attache office, until his transfer to the Seventh

Department. Alleging complete knowledge of all service

attache operations, NOSENKO flatly asserts that there were

no KGB recruitments of American military personnel during

the period of his assignment to the Embassy Section.

Pertinent to the consideration of NOSENKO's statements

is his reluctance to discuss the 1953-1955 period, and his

inconsistent accounts of the dating and circumstances of

his entry into the Embassy Section, of his assumption of

responsibility as sole case officer for Army Attache tar-

gets, and of his transfer to the Seventh Department. Al-

though NOSENKO could plausibly claim failing memory to ex-

plain some areas of ignorance, he does not do so.

Instead,

he is positive and insistent that his statements about his

targets are a factual and complete account of what was then

known to the KGB. His assertion that the KGB was not in-

terested in his targets'

vulnerability to recruitment is

belied by his own statements as well as by the MULE] case, 06

as he himself related it.

He is uninformed about both At-

tache personnel and agent-informants who, by his own ac-

count, were his targets and his agents..

Conclusion

NOSENKO did not serve in the American Embassy Section

throughout the March 1953-June 1955 period as he claimed.

Specifically, he neither entered the Section in March 1953

nor transferred from the Section in June 1955. In whatever

period he may have served, he was not the sole case officer

responsible for commissioned officers in the office of the

Army Attache. Unaware of many aspects of KGB activities

involving Army personnel and by his own account not involved

with either Air or Naval Attache personnel or diplomats,

NOSENKO has no valid claim to certainty that the KGB re-

cruited no American Embassy personnel during this period.

0001370

100

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy -

IBR

---

## Page 109

Top Secret

CHAPTER VI

SEVENTH DEPARTURI! (June 1055-January 1960)

Comment:

Mosturo's clained Socond Chief Directorate

service during 1055-1960, in Thich he was

involved with seventh Department operations

against merican and British tourists, coin-

cides with the growth of a suistantial

Imerican and Britis Intelligence program!l

aimed at

exploiting tourists visiting the

Sovict Union. Boginning in 1956, the growth

of tourism which followed the post-stalin

thai in the ussr had grown to the point

where it could

be usefully exploited ly CIA.

Initially, returning American tourists were

debriofed on their experiences in the Soviet

Union anc particularly with regard to their

acquaintances there with Soviet citizens who

might be

susceptille to eventual recruitment.

Gradually, leads were

developed to Americans

planning to visit the USSR, and from among

these, agents were selected, trained in

clandestine operational techniques, briefed

intelligence requirements, and instructed

how to identify and develop potential agents

from arong their soviet contacts.

The

American agents performed a variety of clan-

destine tasks including passive assessment

of Soviet candidates for recruitment, propa-

ganda activities, and infiltrating equipment,

loading deaddrops, of mailing letters bearing

secret writing, all destined for CIA agents

in

the

soviet Union.

the program reached its height in 1959,

hy the end of which over one hundred and

fifty agents under tourist cover from CIA

alone had performed missions in the USSR; by

101

Top Secret

C001371

TS No. 197124

10

Copy -

;. U

---

## Page 110

"?."

Top Secret

(SEVENTIL DEPARTMENT. - June 1955-January 1960)

Comment:

(Continued)

then a substantial number of similar missions

had also been launched by American military

intelligence organizations and by the Britishll

and allied services.

It is a matter of fact, not of conjecture,

that as early as 1957 a large number of these

agents were coming to the attention of the KGB

within the soviet Union.

Few were arrested.

Instead, all were surveilled, and some pro

voked or entrapped, as the

Second Chief

Directorate and its provincial KGB counter-

intelligence elements sought to identify the

Soviet citizens with whom the American

agents

were in contact, as well as the agents'

specific clandestine tasks. By the summer

of 1959 the KGB had obtained from its British

agent,

George BLAKf, complete details of the

objectives and methods of CIA and British i

Intelligence tourist programs, together with

a number of case examples.

It is within this context that one must

examine NOSENKO's claims to KGB service in

and consequent knowledge of Second Chief

Directorate counterintelligence operations

against American and British tourists in 1955-

1960 °

NOSENKO claimed he served with the Seventh Department

from June 1955 until January 1960.

According to him, the

Seventh Department exercised counterintelligence functions

involving foreigners then visiting

the Soviet Union,

including businessmen,

seamen, foreign delegations

and some

tourists, as well as the hotels and restaurants utilized by

these visitors.

He said that by 1958, however, the number

of foreign tourists visiting the soviet Union had grown

visiting the

appreciably, and in June 1958 the Seventh Department

Tourist Section was split, and two new sections were created.

NOSENKO explained that one

of the new sections became

0001372

102

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

2BR

---

## Page 111

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT June 1955-January 1960)

responsible for counterintelligence operations conducted

against American and British Commonwealth nationals, the

other section was charged with all other nationalities:

It is convenient to divide the examination of NOSENKO's

claims to service in the Seventh Department into two

periods.: The first of these covers the years from June

1955 until June 1958, during which NOSENKO said he was a

case officer handling and recruiting agents of all nationa-

lities and planning and managing other operational activi-

ties.

The

second period covers HOSENKO's service from June

1958, when he claimed to have become Deputy Chief of the

newly-created American-British Commonwealth Section, to the

beginning of 1260.

IOSENKO described his personal and direct participation

in Seventh Department operations during this four and one-

half years as including:

-Recruiting and handling Soviet citizen agents and

targetting them against American tourists.

HOSENKO 'S

agentura varied in number from eight to fourteen agents,

most of whom were employees of Inturist.

-Mounting operations against fifteen foreigners,

principally Americans, in the Soviet Union.

-Recruiting a pair of Soviet homosexuals as agents

to be utilized against foreign homosexual targets. NOSINIKO

managed the pair from their recruitment in 1957 and 1958

until their retirement in 1962 or 196306

-Recruiting and handling Arsene FRIPPED, the American 08

Express Company representative in Moscow.

(NOSENKO continued

Ob to meet FRIPPELeven after the latter was transferred from

Moscow to New York and after NOSENKO was transferred from

the Seventh Department.

From personal involvement or otherwise MOSEHKO claimed

that he learned of all the important operations conducted

against American tourists during this period of his Seventh

Department service.

103

Top Secret

0001373

TS. No. 197124

Copy- 10

(3/BR

---

## Page 112

4-00000

Top Secret

(SEVENTE DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

NOSENKO 's Soviet Agents

The Seventh Department Tourist Section, just established

when NOSENKO was transferred to it in mid-1955, had no agent

network for operations against American and British

Consequently, NOSENKO said, he and

the other case officers

had to "start from the beginning".

As a first step NOSENKO was introduced by a fellow.

officer to a number of "trusted persons" in Inturist.

These

were not agents, he explained, but "just persons a KGB man

could approach with questions about somebody or something".

NOSENKO collected information on these and others with the

aim of formalizing their recruitments. By the end of 1955,

he estimated, he had a network of about eight agents, all

of them Inturist interpreters. During the following

four

years, the number of agents whom NOSENKO handled varied.

Agents would be transferred from one case officer to another,

some would leave Inturist, and "things were sort of changing

all the time, back and

forth". In 1956, NOSENKO said, he

had about ten agents, in 1957 there were about twelve, in

1958 about eight, and

at the end of 1959 (when he was

preparing to return to the American Department) he had

approximately twelve. The substance of MOSFNKO's descrip-

tion of his agents is as follows:

Larissa SOBOROVA

An Inturist English-language interpreter, SOBOROVA was

one of the first agents recruited in 1955 by NOSENKO within

Inturist.

She reported to him on all foreigners with whom

she worked as an interpreter.

She worked with _NosEnKo when

he served as a guide for British subjects BIRSE and| LANE(in Ob Ob

the summer of 1957.

1357 in During 1957-19

During 1957-1959 she was involved and

possibly sexually intimate with American travel writer

Horace SUTTON

SOBOROVA was NOSENKO's agent until 1959,

08,06

when

she married and "retired".

0001374

104

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

3/SR

---

## Page 113

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARIMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

Comment:

SOBOROVA was an Inturist guide for a number

of American tourists, including CiA agents,

between 1957 and 1959. SUTTON'has identified 06

her.

In 1959 she was the head of all English-

language interpreters at Inturist headquarters

in'the National Hotel, Moscor.

Vladimir MURONTSEV

MUROMISEV, KGB cryptonym

"LEBEDEV", was recruited by

HOSENKO from Inturist in 1955. He was NOSENKO's agent!

until called into the army in about 1959, when he was sent

to a Soviet Air Force Academy in Central Asia to serve as

an

interpreter with Syrian students there: During that

period his file was held by the KGB organization in Central

Asia.

Then he returned to Moscow he was re-employed by the

KGB

Second Directorate.

Comment:

NOSENKO has said elsewhere that MUROMTSEV had

been

a Second

1 Chief Directorate agent "since

1958", implying that someone else recruited

him and that he thus could not have been

NOSENKO's agent in 1955.

MUROMTSEV was

identified in 1957 as an Inturist guide by

two CIA sources.

Nikolay ROGOV

ROGOV, KGB cryptonym "OZERO", was recruited in 1955;

He

had been formerly a "confidential contact" of the KGB:

He

worked in the central Inturist office which assigned inter-

preters to British and American citizens visiting the USSR.

105

Top Secret

C001375

TS No. 197124

Copy -10

//BR

---

## Page 114

4-00000

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

Comment: CIA records refer only to one Alexander ROGOV

who in 1960 was

a senior official at the main

Inturist office in the Hotel National in Moscow.

assing eit

Nataliya SHULGINA

SHULGINA was an Inturist interpreter recruited by NOSENKO

in 1955.

NOSENKO knew that double agent Boris BELITSKIY

[see p.282] "reported to the KGB that CIA had warned BELITSKIY

against SHULGINA".

Comment:

KGB-controlled CIA source BELITSKIY reported

to CIA that SHULGINA was a KGB agent:

CIA did

not warn him.

SHULGINA was for two years the

secretary-interpreter of NBC correspondent

Irving R. LEVINE after his arrival in Moscow

In July 1955. She served as a quide for an

American musical troupe's visit in the Ussk

in 1956 and in 1956 and 1957 she served as a

guide for American tourists in Moscow. According

to BELITSKIY, she was involved in the sexual

entrapment and KGB recruitment of British MP. Ot

Tom DRIBERG!

NOSENKO's apparent ignorance of

SHULGINA's involvement with LEVINE and other

Americans, as well as with DRISERG, and of her 06

foreign travel, belies his claim that she was

his agent during the 1955-1958 period.

Shown

her photograph in 1964, NOSENKO failed to

recognize it.

Ihen he was then given her name,

he identified her not as his former agent but

just as a Second Chief Directorate agent once

involved with BELITSKIY.

0001376

106

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy -

---

## Page 115

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

Tamara KUNGAROVA

KUNGAROVA was an Inturist interpreter recruited by

NOSENKO in 1955. In 1957. or 1959 she was involved in a

KGB sexual entrapment operation of an American professor

O6(John THOMPSON,

but there was no attempt to recruit him.

Between 1957 or 1958 and 1960 she was targetted against

American tourist 'and suspect CIA agent. Philip NIFLSEL 03

(see p.420) • KUNGAROVA married NIELSENTand emigrated to 08,05

England, and the KGB was still interested in NIELSEN at 05

the time NOSENKO left the Seventh Department.

Comment:

Elsewhere NOSENKO has said KUNGAROVA was an

agent who came to the Seventh Department from

the British Commonwealth Department in 1957

or early 1958. If true, he could not have

recruited her or have been her case officer in

the 1955-1957 period. In describing the

(3/NIELSEN case, NOSENKO indicated he himself was

not involved and; although he commented on

KUNGAROVA's role,

he never mentioned that she

was or had been his agent. KUNGAROVA was

interviewed by the FBI on the basis of NOSENKO's

information and she confirmed that she had been

06 intimate with THOMPSON while serving aS en

Inturist guide, as well as with other Americans.

She denied, however, that she had ever colla-

borated with the KGB. KUNGAROVA died in 1965.

Aleksandr A.

DMITRIYEV

DMITRIYEV, KGB cryptonym "TOMO"; when NOSENKO recruited

him in 1958, was a candidate member of the USSR Academy Of

Sciences and a specialist on Japan and Thailand.

He spoke

Japanese and English and worked at the Japanese Exhibition

in Moscow..

He

"was used against British and American

nationals"

DMITRIYEV was also used

against

conmunications

107

Top Secret

0001377

TS No. 197124

10

Copy :

16/BR

---

## Page 116

14-00000

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

personnel at the Japanese Exhibit, but while he telephoned

NOSENKO, he was meeting with another KGB case officer.

DMITRIYEV accompanied a sports delegation to Norway and a

Soviet circus to Japan.

Comment:

DMITRIYEV's travel to Norway and Japan in

1958 is confirmed.. From NOSENKO's own

statement he was aware of DMITRIYEV'S

activities, but he was not his case officer.

(Enu) IVANOV

Once a recruited agent in the Baltic area, when IVANOV

moved to Moscow the provincial KGB suggested he might be

of some use in the capital. IVANOV was a lawyer employed

by the Institute of Foreign Trade when NOSENKO became his

case officer.

IVANOV was later turned over to the British

Commonwealth Department which "planted him in the British

Trade Mission or something like that"

Comment: CIA records contain no reference identifiable

with IVANOV.

Marina RYTOVA

RYTOVA, KGB cryptonym "KRYMOVA", was turned over to

NOSENKO bY another Seventh Department case officer, I.A.

KONSTANTINOV, in 1956 or 1957. She was educated at the

Military Institute of Foreign Languages, where she studied

military subjects as well as foreign languages. When

NOSENKO became her.case

officer she was working as an

interpreter at the Russian

i Permanent Exhibit in Moscow.

She

continued this job until about 1960, when she became an

instructor in the Greek language at

the Institute of

International Relations. She reported to NOSENKO information

0001378

108

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy.

---

## Page 117

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

which she obtained on foreign delegates or foreign tourists

who visited the Exhibit in Moscow, and on foreign delegates

attending meetings at the Ministry of Agriculture, where

she served as an interpreter in English and Greek. RYTOVA

served several times as an interpreter for Khrushchev and

once participated in a conversation he had with the Iowa

farmer [Roswell]. GARST.

In 1959 or 1960 she was sent as

an interpreter with a small delegation visiting GARST's

Farm in the United Statesi, and was used by the keb Legal

Residency in Washington to report observations made enroute

and while there.

RYTOVA was married to a captain or major

who works in a military office in Moscow. She had one

daughter, approximately 14 years old.

Comment :

RYTOVA served as an interpreter for Roswell

GARST in the USSR in 1955, 1959 and 1963 and

she visited the U.S. in 1958 and 1962. Her

biographic data is consistent with the infor-

mation related by NOSENKO.

Yevgeniya ("Jane) DANKO

DANKO;

KGB cryptonym "OKSANA", worked in the American

29

Express Company office in Moscow for Arsene FRIPPEL06

(NOSENKO's agent, see p.137) and later for FRIPPEDIs 06

successor, Michael JELISAVCIC: NOSENKO took DANKO over

1505-19venth

from Seventh Department case officer I.A: KONSTANTINOV in

1955-1957. She was used to report on (JELISAVId,

Comment:

DANKO was an Inturist guide in 1956, 1958 and

1959, and she was working for the American29

Express Company office in 196006-ERIPPEL left

Moscow in 1961, by which time NOSENKO had

transferred from the Seventh Department.

109

Top Secret

C001379

TS No. 197124

Copy. 1.0

FISR

---

## Page 118

14-00000

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - Juné 1955-January 1960)

Soviet Homosexual Agents

The KGB operations which NOSENKO described commonly

involved sexual entrapment. Many of the operations in

which he claimed a personal role involved the use of homo-

sexual agents, KGB agents whose homosexuality was exploited

against susceptible male targets. Nhile NOSENKO was never

their official case officer, in specific recruitment-

entrapment operations he worked with "LUCH", "NIKOLAYEV",.

"SIBINAK", "KOSHIKIN" and "STROYEV" (Victor BELANOVSKIY,

used in the compromise of Richard BURGI, VASSALL, and the O6

Canadian Ambassador WATKINS) . He provided virtually no

personality information on them and usually could not recall

their true names.

Two such homosexuals, however, VOLKOV

and YEFREMOV, NOSENKO claimed were his own agents.

NOSENKO claimed to have re-recruited VOLKOV, a former

agent (cryptonym "SHMELEV") and recruited YEFREMOV

(cryptonym "GRIGORIY") and to have been their sole case

officer from the beginning of their KGB careers in 1957-

1958 until they were discharged in 1963 because they had

become too well known. He said he met them frequently,

and directed them in at least a dozen entrapment operations

or other homosexual encounters.

them with him when he transferred to the American Department

in 1960 and back again in early 1962 to the Seventh

Department.

YEFREMOV and VOLKOV

Because he had been seen meeting a foreigner in a

public toilet in Moscow, NOSENKO said, the KGB concluded

that A.I. VOLKOV might be a homosexual and hence of some

operational value.

To verify this possibility in 1957, a

homosexual agent of the Moscow Criminal Investigations

Department provoked VOLKOV into a compromising situation.

Then VOLKOV, who had previously been a KGB agent but was

at this time inactive, was summoned by the KGB and, after

NOSENKO interrogated him, he admitted his homosexuality and

agreed to NOSENKO's proposal to work for the KGB among

0001380

110

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

13R

---

## Page 119

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

homosexuals. VOLKOV helped NOSENKO the following year to

recruit a homosexual acquaintance, Aleksey (patronymic not

recalled) YEFREMOV. The two agents subsequently worked

as a team against foreigners under NOSENKO's direction; in

addition to specific targets, they had the general assign-

ment of associating with foreign visitors in Moscow for the

purpose of spotting possible homosexuals. NOSENKO described

on 12 June 1962 his use of

these agents:

"Although I am

a chief of section there I

have all sorts of agents.

I have a good agent

apparatus.

.. I have beautiful girls, whom I can

use as I like.

I have homosexuals, in particu-

lar, one special pair.

I am afraid they are

known to both you and the British...

I permitted

this pair to work [without specific assignments]

on their own. I give them money and tell them

to go 100k around, but only Americans. Look for

American pederasts.

They

call me at night:

'Yuriy Ivanovich.

There is a mister so-and-so

here.'

I say:

'Well, let him Ido what he

wants]. We'll talk about it tomorrow.'

So the

next day they go to a special hotel room.

We

make photographs. Then we think about what he

represents.

Is he worth it?

Then, as Chief, I

recommend that he be recruited or not--depending i

on his position, what he can give, what he can

tell.

If he can give something, I say: 'Well,

let's have a go ligratl.'

After this, I speak

to these boys:

'Well, go with him again.

whatever is wanted.'

DO

All this is observed by

the KGB:

The (hotell administrator enters.

'What are you doing?' The administrator calls

the Militia. An akt is drawn up.

'Well, you

are

a foreigner.

This is not our business. We

don't know what to do with you.'

Then the Chief

arrives and a conversation ensues:

'Listen,

what shall we do? Pederasty is punishable by

three to five years and now, on the basis of

recent legislation, by up to eight. Understand,

if your friends find out that you are a pederast--

and how can they help but find out'..."

111

Top Secret

0001381

TS No. 197124

Copy 10

---

## Page 120

Top Secret

• (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

Then NOSENKO moved from the Seventh Department to

the Second Chief Directorate's American Department in

January 1960, he took VOLKOV and YEFREMOV with him.

They

were never used against targets in the American Embassy

out, NOSENKO said, the Seventh Department "used to call

me

on homosexual prospects", VOLKOV and YEFREMOV continued

as active KGB agents until some time in 1960 or 1961.

After they were employed once more lagainst !.E. JOHNSON in Ub

January 1962] it was decided that they were

known". NOSENKO claimed that the agents were retired and

that he himself sent their files to KGB Archives in 1962

or 1963.

03

NOSENKO'S Soviet Agents: Summary

NOSENKO claims to have been these agents' case officer

for two to five years, during which he met each regularly,

assigned them operational tasks, and received their reports.

With the exception of YEFREMOV and VOLKOV, however, NOSENKO

can cite few instances of their operational use, and he has

but superficial knowledge of their personal backgrounds.

It is unlikely that this is merely the result of failing

recollection.

He knows no more about the three whom he

claimed he took with him to the Embassy Section, where he

continued to be their case officer for two more years, than

he does about the others.

In the two instances where his

agents were involved in KGB operational activity, NOSENKO

is unaware of SHULGINA's work with LEVINE and DRIBERG, andt

was not involved when KUNGAROVA was targetted against and

married CIA agent Philip NIELSEN. NOSENKO's familiarity

with the nine agents he named appears to be that which

would be acquired second-hand, not through personal contact

as he claimed.

With respect to YEFREMOV and VOLKOV, the evidence does

not sustain NOSENKO's claim that he was their case officer

in every operation Irom their recruitment in 1957 until

their retirement in 1962-1963. He is unfamiliar with either

agent's background.

now he got

He cannot say where either of them

lived or, indeed, how he got in touch with them when he

required their services.

With the exception of the w.E. 06

JOHNSON compromise in 1962 (see p.268), all of VOLKOV's and

0001382

112

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy -

4BR

---

## Page 121

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMEIIT - June 1955-January 1960):

YEFRIMOV's nown activities with respect to Americans took

place in the course of less than twelve months in 1959-

1960•

It is probable that HOStiNO's claim that he was

their sole case officer during even this relatively brief

period is also false::

In the period April-lovember. 1959,

apparently unknown to HOSENKO, VOLKOV and YEFREMOV were

involved with one Dutch and five American visitors (including

three CIA agents)

In the soviet Union. Further, in other

contexts lostko nas described their involvement with

Do Ariericans MATLAND(see p.419) and KARLOV-in 195.9, 06

an American, citizen.]

06.

Operational Activities: (1955-1958)

Tourist Section Casc Officer

According to lOSFiKO, he was among the first case officers

to arrive in the Seventh Department Tourist Section when it

was veing formed. He took part with other officers in the

acquisition of an agent network from within Inturist, in the

establishment of facilities and methods, and generally

"getting things going"

After several months, he partici-

pated in

What he says was his first operation against an

American

¡ tourist. This was NOSINIO's behind-the-scenes

(and hence unconfirmed) and unsuccessful attempt to compio-

mise American student Martin MALIA,0b MOSFNKO's next case

(the first operation in which his participation is confirmed)

took place a year later, in June 1y56, when he assisted

the homosexual entrapment and recruitment of professor On

Richard BURGI. Sometime in 1957, he said, he was personally

involved in the attempted recruitment of the German business-!!

O GHIRCKENS and in the sexual and blacmarlet entrapment of

06 SUNDAr, a Norwegian, journalist.

thoth CIRCKENs. and SUNDAR] 06

admitted to having been

the object of KGB recruitment

attempts, the

former reluctantly in a private interview, and

the latter publicly in the press. It nas been possible

question neither in detail.] NOSENKO's presence in the

third "operation" in 1957 is confirmed: he accompanied the

113

Top Secret

0001383

TS No. 197124

10

Copy —

---

## Page 122

29849/944.

3222

Top Secret

(SEVENTI DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

08,06

British publisher Sir Allen LANE

and the latter's inter-

O6 preter BIRSE

on a

tour of soviet publishing houses.

According to NOSENKO, it was for

the purpose of observing

O6 BIRSE,

a suspected British intelligence agent. 08

Attempted Entrapment ef MALIA (1955)

06

NOSENKO's Information

Martin MALIA,

a graduate student, spent about four months

in the USSR in 1955 and was suspected by the KGB of having

contact with a Soviet citizen believed to

The Soviet was detained by the KGB, and NOSENKO eventually

66 MALIÀ to a

KGB homosexual agent, and the latter enticed

06 MALIA to a specially equipped hotel room in Moscow.

NOSENKO

was on the scene (but not directly in touch with MALIA) whenlo

the introductions were made in a Moscow restaurant, añd from

an observation point in a neighboring hotel room he watched

0b the KGB agent and MALIA in homosexual practices. MALIA 06

insisted on the lights being turned off, however, and it was

impossible to obtain compromising photographs (the KGB did

not yet have infrared photographic equipment) and therefore

no recruitment approach was made to MALIA-Do During this and

a later

trip to Moscow in 1961, MALIA]was

"very cautious", 06

and the

KGh never succeeded in exploiting MALIA'S homo- 06

sexuality for a recruitment approach.

Comment:

06

MALIA, a U.S. Navy intelligence officer during

World War II, visited the Soviet Union in 1955

and twice in 1962. While buying books for the

Library of Congress and several universities

Ob in 1955, MALIA travelled over 10,000 miles

throughout the USSR, an event sufficiently

unusual at the time to be publicized in the

Soviet press.

he smugglet*

On 1955 and 1962 trips he had

contacts with dissident Soviet citizens and

he smuggled to the West literature for publishing

0001384

114

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy -

88/5

---

## Page 123

Top Secret

(SEVENTII DEPARTMELT - June 1955-January 1960)

Comment:

(Continued)

abroad.

In December 1963 MATIN was the object

of an attack in the Soviet oress which charged

that during 1962 he had "spent his time in

Mosocw looking. for dissension in the ranks of

young intellectuals at drunken debauches".

MALIA was then in periodic contact with CIA;

in the spring of 1963 he renied having had

any involvement with blackmarketeers, homo-

or females inside the soviet Union.

tion with HOSEUKO's allegations.

0.6

Recruitment of BURGI

(1956)

At the first meeting with CIA in Geneva In 1962, ROSENIO

gave a brief account of the recruitment of Richard BURGI, a 06

Yale professor The recruitment was effected on the basis

of a homosexual provocation operation which began in Moscow

and culminated with an approach in Kiev in June 1956.

This recruitment, which occurred close in time to the

death of HOSENKO's father, was by NOSINKO's later accounts

a turning point in his personal and professional life.

From it, NOSENKO said he acquired a sense of self-confidence

and responsibility and began to "grow" from a wastrel into

an effective and successful KGD officer.

As a result of

this operation, the first successful recruitment in the then

short nistory of the Tourist Section, NOSENKO asserted he:

first came into personal contact with General GRIBAITOV.

According to all accounts he gave prior to October 1966,

when he retracted the claim, NOSEIKO received the first of

a series of KGB awards for operational performance because

Obof the BURGIcase--a letter of commendation.

Within a month

of this operation, NOSENKO, said, he

was promoted from the

rank of lieutenant to captain.

0001385

115

Top Secret

- TS No. 197124

Copy 10

T/BR

---

## Page 124

4-00000

Had made adritera

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

NOSENKO's Information

NOSENKO stated that at the time of BURGI!'s arrival in

the USSR, his file contained a copy of his visa application

(anketa), "maybe" an excerpt from a cable sent by the

Soviet Embassy in the United States saying that a visa had

been granted, a routine note from Inturist giving BURGI!'s 06

anticipated date of arrival and his itinerary inside the

Soviet Union, and the results of file checks of the KGB

main Archives and of the First Chief Directorate Archives.

NOSENKO himself ran the file checks, which provec to be

negative; there was no information on record concerning

06.

BURGI, and since no other names were mentioned in the

0

material available on BURGI, no other checks were made.

The KGB interest in BURGI derived exclusively from the

fact

had contact with students who might eventually work for the

U.S. State Department, American Intelligence, and for other

target organizations.

NOSENKO did not recall who first

suggested an attempt to recruit him.

When BURGI arrived in the Soviet Union, he came in

contact with a numver of KGS agents, and their reports were

placed in an informal file maintained by NOSENKO. NOSENKO

could not recall how many such agents there may have been,

their names, or what they might have reported concerning

O BURGI. 0 BURGI had an Inturist interpreter but NOSENKO did

not know whether he was a KGB agent.) From some source,

name forgotten by NOSENKO, the KGB obtained indications

that

06 BURGI] was a homosexual, and it was decided to try to obtain

grounds for recruitment by homosexual compromise. NOSENKO

therefore approached Yu. A. LOPUKHOV, an officer of the

British Department who handled the homosexual agent Viktor

BELANOVSKIY, and asked permission to use BELANOVSKIY in

setting up the compromise.

After permission had been :

received to mount an operation on this basis, LOPUKHOV and

NOSENKO met with BELANOVSKIY and instructed him to make

BURGI!' s'acquaintance in a hotel dining room.

proceeded according to plan: BELANOVSKEY met pURCE, provise

fact of common homosexuality was recognized, and BURGI] was 06

invited to BELANOVSKIY's hotel room where homosexual acts

took place and photographs were made.

NOSENKO was in the

adjoining room and directed the compromise, although he did

not meet BURGI at this time.

06

0001386

116

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy .

14. 8R

---

## Page 125

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

As the result of NOSENKO's special request, the compromising

A report of the

back with the approving signatures of O.M. GRIBANOV and A.S.

FEKLISOV, the Chief of the American Department of the First

Chief Directorate, which had expressed interest

in using (BURGI 06

in the United States 06 BURGI's itinerary called for him to fly

from Moscow to Kiev a short while after this episode and,

having called the Kiev KGB with instructions, NOSENKO and KOZLOV

officer of the Second Directorate in Kiev who operated under

Inturist cover.

In accordance

With the operational plan, the local KGB

officer told(BURGI encoute to the city that all the hotels in

Kiev were full at the moment because of various conferences,

but that Inturist had arranged for him to stay for about a day

in a private apartment in the center of town; he would be

moved to a hotel as soon as possible... When the car arrived at

the apartment building in Kiev, NOSENKO, KOZLOV, V.S.

PETRENKO, a local KGB officer,. and (fnu) RASTYKAITE, a woman

housekeeper, were waiting for them.

Nosaiko could not p

renemper how or whether he introduced himself to BURGI.

recruitment conversation, he said, was handled by "KOZLOV-

NOSENKO", but NOSENKO had forgotten by 1965 who said what:

"I don't remember what I talked about and I don't

remember what KOZLOV talked about. Many things

were discussed. It started with how he liked his

stay in the soviet Union:..: Then we slowly pro

ceeded: to say how unfortunate it was that informa-

tion had been received about his conduct in Moscow.

We told him that his homosexual activities were

known, that this was punishable under Soviet law

according to article so-and-so of the criminal code,

etc., that he was not a diplomat, had no

diplomatic

immunity, that he could be taken to court according

to the Soviet law...

Mell, he was scared; confused,

upset, and felt uncomfortable.

Then we slowly

proceeded to say that everything could be smoothed

117

Top Secret

0001387

TS: No. 197124

Copy -

10

---

## Page 126

randyirito

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

out, and the basis was prepared for the man to say:

'All right, I agree to help'

We showed him the

pictures.

He was embarrassed of course--he was

naked

Then we prepared the basis:

'You have a

noble task.. You teach; you have students; the

students may become future specialists on Russia or

may work as diplomats, etc., but many of these

students can be used by intelligence. They may be

sent somewhere with special tasks.

Maybe you will

tell us who among the students is preparing for

government service, how they are distributed, etc.'

...

During the first conversation everything was made

completely clear...

He was not at all willing to

help or work for Soviet Intelligence.

He was told

that he must understand that in this case 'helping

Soviet Intelligence' was a very broad term. I

remember that I told him:

'Understand, nobody is

going

to ask you that you help our friends. over

there, or me, if I should be there, or that you do

anything bad or conduct any kind of subversive

activities, that you organize explosions or murder.'

After the soviet Union, he was supposed to do t

/ Italy, to visit the Russicum of the Vatican, and 08 /

here KOZLOV grabbed the subject and began to ask

He told us a bit about

osquestions seat he ascha him te write about it and

he wrote down some names of the professors who

teach Russian subjects...

According to NOSENKO, the discussion lasted about five

hours; at its end BURGI signed a short statement that he 06

agreed "to assist the organs of Soviet Intelligence"

(NOSENKO first said that it was he who took this statement

06 from BURGI but

tater he could not remember whether it was

he or KOZLOV.)

BURGI was then taken to a hotel.

This was the first time NOSENKO met BURGI. Following

the recruitment, he moved into the same hotel, a floor above

06 BURGI, and for the remainder of BURGIl's stay in Kiev became 06

his constant companion and guide. An attempt was made "to

smooth out all the dirty business that had been brought up

during the recruitment talk". NOSENKO took BURGIl to an old 06

0001388

118

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

---

## Page 127

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

cathedral in Kiev; with KOZLOV and PETRENKO they visited a

kolkhoz and the writer SHEVCHENKO's grave in nearby Kaniv.

The subject of homosexuality was not raised again.

From

06 Kiev, BURGIleft the Soviet Union without returning to

MOSCOW.

Before the approach, NOSENKO had visited the

American Department of the First Chief Directorate and had

arranged with its chief, FEKLISOV, for a recontact plan in

New York City should BURGI be recruited. BUrGilwas 06 06

instructed how to use a recognition signal for a first

meeting in the New York Public Library.

About five days after returning to Moscow, NOSENKO

turned over all his materials on the (BURGI operation to 06

the First Chief Directorate. Somewhat later Sergey GUSKOV,

Chief of the American-Canadian-British Tourist Section,

KOZLOV, and NOSENKO visited American Department Chief FEKLISOV

in the First Chief Directorate and expressed an interest in

further developments in the case.

FEKLISOV told them that

06i

BURGI. had been observed to arrive for the first meeting but

the KGB refrained from establishing contact..

The first

actual meeting in New York City took place the second or thiro

06 time BURGI appeared, and a KGB officer of the New York Legal

Residency continued

to meet with him until the revolution in

Hungary in late (October] 1956, when BURGI refused to colla- 06

borate further NOSENKO later heard from someone in the

American Department, First Chief Directorate that the case

was closed. For their roles in this first recruitment of

the Seventh Department, NOSENKO said he and KOZLOV received

letters of commendation and bonuses of one month's pay by

order of SEROV, Chairman of the KGB; PETRENKO was given a

chatrian

letter of commendation and half a month's salary; and even

RASTYKAITE, the housekeeper, got a commendation.

In 1964 NOSENKO reported for the first time that his

superior, A.S. KOZLOV, Deputy Chief of the Seventh Depart-

ment, had

also taken part in this operation, but that he,

NOSENKO, was the responsible case officer.

In August 1965,

when asked who had recruited BURGI), NOSENKO replied: 06

"KOZLOV and NOSENKO: "

Asked who recruited him first,

NOSENKO said: "KOZLOV; naturally.: lie was the Deputy

Chief

of the Department. : The collection of the materials lin

preparation

for the approachl was in the hands of Case

Officer NOSENKO."

119

Top Secret

0001369

TS No. 197124

Copy 10

18/5R

---

## Page 128

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

Comment:

In a 22 November 1957 interview with the FBI,.

B6 BURG]] had recounted how he was compromised

and recruited by the KGBwhile in the USSR in

His version substantially confirmed

that provided eight years later by NoSENko.

06 BURGI asserted (contrary to NOSENKO's account)

that the KGB officers knew a good deal more

about him than what might have been acquired

C6 during BURGI's visit to the USSR, including

O6 details of BURGi's close relatives, his work

08 40 with the Russicum] in Rome], his earlier travel

to Brazil, his military service in korea, ano

his acquaintance with Alexander KERENSKY.

D6 On 25 May 1964 BURGI positively identifiec

NOSENKO (from a photograph) as being the

junior of the two KGB officers who recruited

him.

The other KGB officer (KOZLOV) was 'the

instance of NOSENKO's participation in a KGB

operation. See p.39 for comment on the

Ob relevance of the[BURGI case to the period of

NOSENKO's claimed service in the Seventh

Department.

: 06

NOSENKO's claim that BURGI's compromise

and recruitment was based only on information

routinely acquired from BURGi's visa applica-O6

tion and from apparently chance meetings with

KGB agents on his arrival in Moscow, 1s

contradicted by BURGI's description of the U6

KGB's familiarity with his personal life.

NOSENKO cannot sustain his claim of having

personally traced BURGI through First Chief 06

(Foreign Intelligencel Directorate files (the

probable repository of information on BURGI] 06

which the KGB recruiting officers used) .

NOSENKO, as described elsewhere, is unfamiliar

with the mechanics of KGB tracing procedures..

06

According to BURGI's statement and NOSENKO's

own eventual

admission, NOSENKO lied when he

0001390

120

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

15/SR

---

## Page 129

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

1

Comment: (Continued)

06

first claimed to have recruited BURGI unaidea.

NOSENKO has subsequently retracted all claims.

regarding the effect of this case on his

career:

Contrary, to his earlier assertions,

he now says it won him neither awards nor

promotion.

06

Attempted Recruitment of GEHRCKENS (1957)

NOSENKO's Information

NOSENKO made an unsuccessful recruitment approach in 1957

08,06 to Hamburg shipping executive Han's GEHRCKENS, on the basis

06.0f GEHRCKENS" commercial ventures in the USSR. The responsi-

ble

case officer originally was A.I. VERENIKIN of the Sixth

Section of the Seventh Department; this section was then

responsible for operations against foreign seamen. Since

VERENIKIN spoke no German and GEHRCKENS was known to speak06

English, NOSENKO was selected to make the approach because

"knew English a little". When asked why a German-D

speaking KGB case officer was not used, NOSENKO answered:

"The higher-ups said 'go work on this case', and that was

all." After being rebuffed by GEHRCKENS,, NOSENKO saw himO

several more times auring the 1957 visit to Moscow, but when

NOSENKO attempted to renew contact upon (GEHRCKENS return 06

to the Soviet Union in 1958, the latter refused to see him.

06:

Comment:

GERCKENS) was interviewed by CIA on 19 July

1965, and; while generally uncooperative,

described a "mild approach" in Moscow during

1956 or 1957 which may be the one described by

NOSENKO. (He was not questioned on the

identities of the Soviets involved.) GEHRCKENS 06

continues to have extensive business contacts

with Soviet commercial representatives inVestll

Germany and was recently reported to have

0001391

121

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy. -

---

## Page 130

14-00000

360065020D

Made suita

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

Comment:

(Continued)

08

negotiated a sizable shipping contract with the

Soviet Union shortly after a visit to the

USSR.

His principal contact at the Soviet Trade

mission in CoLogne has been a CRu officer.

contact with FAME and TESS 419572

NOSENKO's Information

The British subject Sir Allen LANE travelled in the

summer of 1957 to the Soviet Union to visit various publishing

nouses and brought with him as an interpreter Arthur BIRSE. 06

The latter was of Russian extraction, having left Petrograd

(Leningrad) before the Revolution, and he served in British 29

Intelligence during the Second World war. The casa was

handled by another section of the Seventh Department, but

06 because of BIRSEl's past, "some of our leaders decided that

it would be good if one of our workers could approach him,

would get in on the case under the cover of the Ministry of

Culture, who would take care of this person, who would help

him meet with all sorts of people representing our publishing

companies.

The choice fell to me. I was chosen for this

job. "

Taking along the KGB agent Larissa SOBOROVA as an

interpreter and using the alias "NIKOLAYEV", NOSENKO

O6 accompanied BIRSE] and [LANE]in Moscow and Leningrad during

their stay there?

The only object was to watch BIRSE 06

because he was suspected of having an intelligence mission,

and no approach was made or contemplated. NOSENKO explained

that the use of the NIKOLAYEV alias with[BIRSE] and (LANE ]made Of U6

it necessary for him to use the same name when travelling

to Great Britain in 1957 and in 1958.

Comment:

06

LANE was interviewed subsequent to NOSENKO's

defection, and he was able to identify NOSENKO's

photograph as that of a "Russian official he

met in Moscow who was introduced to him as

"NIKOLAYEV".

(LANE] said that he could remember

06

0001392

122

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

15/BR

---

## Page 131

Top Secret

(SEVENTH. DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

Comment:

(Continued)

nothing in particular about NIKOLAYEV except

that he appeared a "friendly, helpful man who

had opened up considerably towards the end of

my visit to Moscow in July 1957".

NOSENKO seems unaware of the probable basis

for KGB interest in BIRSE.06 Born of Scottish>08

parents in pre-revolutionary Petrograd, BIRSE 10, 06

served with the British Military Mission in29

Moscow during lorld War II and was interpreter

J6 for Churchill during the latter's meetino

06 with (Stalin)

He was the official interpretero

for the Royal Commission investigating the

revelations of KGB officers Vladimir PETROV

ana his wife, who defected in 1954 in Australia.

NOSENKO apparently does not know that BIRSE 06:

returned on similar trips to Moscow in 1958

and 1959 (while NOSENKO was still in the

Tourist Section) and that in the latter year

two KGB officers attempted to recruit him.

06

Recruitment of Egil SUNDAR] (1957)

NOSENKO's Information

In 1057 or 1958 aNorwegian journalist, (Enu) SUNDAN,-

visited the Soviet Union and an attempt was made to recruit

him. A Second Chief Directorate officer, N.A. ARKHIPOV,

06 made SUNDAR's acquaintance and handled the entire operation

against him, but NOSENKO himself played a role. NOSENKO

presented himself to [SUNDAR,busing the name "SMIRNOV" or

"SERGEYEV" and posing as a'painter, and told SUNDAR that he06

could find women for him. A party was arranged with a KGB

Obagent as SUNDAR's date and a Second Chief Directorate secre-

tary as NOSENKO's. Late in the evening NOSENKO and his date

excused themselves, and SUNDAR had sexual relations with theO

female agent.

Photographs of the scene were taken by the

KGB.

When NOSENKO and SUNDAR saw. one another the next day, 06

O6. SUNDAR announced that he had some articles, cameras and the

like, that he wanted to sell on the blackmarket... NOSENKO

123

Top Secret

0001393

TS. No.

197124

10°

Copy -

117/BR

---

## Page 132

14-00000

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

06

offered to arrange the sale and took SUNDAR to a dingy

section of Moscow. As they arrived before a small house,

06 NOSENKO asked SUNDAR to give him the things to be sold.

this moment a KGB officer posing as a militiaman approached

and arrested the two for blackmarketeering. At the Militia

station, SUNDAR,was recruited by K.N. DUBAS, then Chief of

the Seventh Department, under threat of imprisonment.

was no further contact with SUNDAR after he left the ussr, 06

however, because on his return to Oslol he published an 10

article

in which he described his expériences, "but not all

of them".

Comment:

06,08,10

Egil SUNDAR,

a journalist for Aftenposten in

Oslo, travelled to the USSR in December 1957

as a member of a press delegation in connection

with the

opening of a new SAS air route to 21

Moscow D6 (SUNDAR wrote an article on his returr

in which he described his arrest for blackmarket

activities and his subsequent recruitment; he

also reported this to Norwegian authorities.

O6 According to SUNDAR, he was introduced to

Moscow blackmarketeers by an artist, whose

name he did not know, and was apprehended

immediately afterwards. SUNDAR |has

not been Us

interviewed on the basis of NOSÊNKO's infor-

mation.

Travel to London (1957-1958)

NOSENKO reported that his first official travel outside

the Soviet Union was in 1957 when he was selected to

accompany a group of athletes who had been invited to visit

London.

As. he explained, it was a KGB order that a security

officer accompany any such delegation.

[NOSENKO elsewhere

cited

this KGB practice, but later denied any such order was

issuedl.

The Eleventh Department of the Second Chief Direct-

orate (responsible for designating Second Chief Directorate

0001394

124

Top Secret

10/SR

TS No. 197124

Copy -

---

## Page 133

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARIMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

officers for this purpose) telephoned K.N. DUBAS, Chief of

the Seventh Department, to request an officer who spoke

English. DUBAS

asked NOSENKO whether he wanted to make

: the

trip:

NOSENKO replied:

"Why not? I have never been

abroad yet."

NOSENKO consequently travelled to London,

using the alias Yuriy Ivanovich NIKOLAYEV and posing as

"the deputy chief" of the delegation. He was specifically

instructed to observe one member of the delegation, a woman

named MYARIMYAYE, whose father had been

killed in a Soviet

prison and whose political reliability was uncertain.

Additionally, he had the general task of watching all

members of the delegation for possibly suspicious contacts

with foreigners.

The delegation consisted of approximately

60 persons and to help him

l in carrying out these duties,

NOSENKO was assigned three or four agents and several

operational contacts among the delegation members. He was

the only KGB security officer which accompanied the group.

The second trip to London took place a year later, in

the fall of 1958, again as a security escort. This time

he accompanied a delegation of eleven or twelve boxers, and

again he used the alias. NIKOLAYEV and the cover position of:

deputy chief of the delegation.

NOSENKO said he was the

only security officer with the delegation, and he had two

agents and two operational contacts among the boxers. His

assignment was general; no one in particular was kept under

observation, and the KGB had no derogatory information

concerning any member of the delegation.

NOSENKO used the NIKOLAYEV alias for travel to London

because it was the alias used earlier with the British

subjects BIRSE) and LANE. NOSENKO explained this situation

as follows:

06

06

"With BIRSE and (LANEJI used the name NIKOLAYEV,

Yuriy Ivanovich, a representative of the Ministry

of Culture. And

then when the question was raised

of sending me in 1957 with the delegation to

England, I was forced to go there as NIKOLAYEV.

Because

[of this] I went as the assistant head of

the delegation, again representing the Ministry of

Culture.

I didn't go under my own name because it

was decided that when'these people (BIRSE and LANEl

06

06

C061335

125

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy 10

6/8R

---

## Page 134

14-00000

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

went back to England, they would tell who they were

with [report their contacts in the USSR]. They

would probably question BIRSE especially, as one 06

who used to work in intelligence... BIRSElwould 06

say: 'There was this man from the Ministry of

Culture, NIKOLAYEV.

He was with us all the time,

even went to Leningrad with us.' So they would

say:

'How does he look [what does he look likel?'

He would say:

'He looked so-and-so.' I'd go there,

and they would look at me and say: 'How come this

name NIKOLAYEV. Just a matter of conspiracy.

Since I already became known as NIKOLAYEV to the

Britishers, this would be noticeable."

Comment:

That NOSENKO (aS NIKOLAYEV) took the trips is

corroborated by British records?

¡ according toll

which, a Yuriy Ivanovich NIKOLAYEV, born 30

October 1927, arrived at London from Brussels

on 20 August 1957. His visa application

described him as a member of a group invited

by the Light Athletics Association to partici-

pate in contests in London.

He left on 27

August 1957.

With the same name and date of

birth, NIKOLAYEV arrived again at London on

12 October 1958 with seventeen others, all

described as boxers.

. His visa application

described him as an

"office worker"

his landing card, NIKOLAYEV was listed as a

boxer.

He left London on 19 October 1958.

On neither visit dia NIKOLAYEV attract the

attention of any British security service. Cy

While these trips are corroborated, they

are not material to NOSENKO's claims to have

served in the KGB positions he alleges he

held at the time.

0001:396

126

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

S/BR

---

## Page 135

Top Secret

(SEVENTIL DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

Operational Activities (1958-1960)

Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section

According

to NOSENKO, the seventh Department was reorgan-

ized in June 1958, and NOSENKO's section, which theretofore

had been concerned with operations against foreign tourists

split into two new sections, one

concerned with tourists from the United States and the

British Commonwealth and the other with tourists from Europe,

Latin America, and all other countries. NOSENKO claimed

that at that time he was promoted to the position of Deputy

Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section, "the

most important section of the Seventh Department"

In September 1958, he claimed to have personally recruited

O6 GiSella HARRIS

It was also in 1958, he said, that he super-

vised. the sexual entrapment of Virgil KRAFT,Oalthough Seventh

Department Chief DUBAS

made the actual approach. Beginning

in the spring of 1959 he said he directed his agents YEFREMOV

06,,05,L6 and voLKov in a series of successful entrapments DREW, LUKis

WILBY, TAYLOR,» and MERTINS. NOSENKO stated that he also

08. 06,

used these homosexual agents in 1959 in compromising two

American guides at the sokolniki Exhibit, BARRETT and WILLER-

FORD. Finally, NOSENKO said, he recruited the Moscow

representative of the American Express Company, FRIPPEL, 29, 06

NOSENKO Claimed that his operational success during 1959

earned him a commendation from the KGB Chairman. (He has

since retracted all claims to any awards earned during his

tea re was because c

KGB service.] It was because of his position as Deputy

Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section, NOSENN

said, that he first became involved with Lee Harvey OSWALD.

NOSENKO asserted that the recruitment of agents among

foreign

tourists was secondary to his department's principal

mission, the detection of Western intelligence officers and

agents among the increasing flow of tourists visiting the

Soviet Union.

In line with that counterintelligence mission,

on General GRIBANOV's order in the fall of 1959, NOSENKO

127

Top Secret

6001397

TS. No. 197124

Copy 1Q

6/5R

---

## Page 136

14-00000

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

reviewed what the KGB knew through 1958 about the use of

tourists and tourist cover by Western intelligence services.

It was from this task that NOSENKO claimed he learned of

all the important arrests and recruitments among American

tourists as recorded by the kGß at the tine.

Recruitment of F

HARRIS (1958)

NOSENKO's Informatioß6

NOSENKO in 1958 recruited Gisella HARRIS, an employee of

29,10 the American Express Company in Salt Lake Cityl. The recruit-

ment was based on her romantic and sexual involvement with

a Soviet citizen, who told HARRIS that he was in trouble 06

with Soviet authorities and persuaded her to accompany him

to the police. HARRIS agreed to meet and cooperate with 06

the KGB in[Salt Lake City•

The case was turned over to thelU

First Chief Directorate, and NOSENKO was unaware of any.

further contact with her.

Comment:

06,08

HARRIS, a

former German citizen, visited the

USSR on a tourist visa in 1958.

According to

statements made to the FBI in 1958, the purpose

of her visit was to contact her former lover,

a Soviet soldier who had fathered her child in

Germany in 1953.

She hoped to persuade him to

divorcé

his Soviet wife and marry her. She

described her recruitment by two men, one of

whom resembled NOSENKO. When shown a photo-

graph in 1964, she tentatively identified

NOSENKO as one of the men who recruited her

and said that, of the two involved, he "was

definitely the man in charge" while

"was merely present and listened". According

06 to HARRIS,

she has had no further contact with

Soviet intelligence.

0001398

128

Top Secret

9IBR

TS No. 197124

Copy

---

## Page 137

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

Compromise of KRAFT ] 06

06,

08.

NOSENKO's Information

KRAFT, a clergyman from the Chicago area, with his

we visited the Soviet Union as a tourist in 195T or 1958.

and NOSENKO was assigned as the responsible case officer.

J6The KGB learned KRAFT had been intimate with a Soviet woman

during an earlier trip to the USSR, and NOSENKO arranged for

her to come to Moscow from Leningrad,.

where she was then

living, in order to compromise KRAFT 06 KRAFTand the Soviet Of

woman were intimate 'in the latter's"room in the Grand Hotel.

Photographs were taken, and then militiamen broke into the

06 room, finding KRAFT and the woman unclothed. NOSENKO was in

a nearby room,.

The recruitment

approach was then made by DUSAS, the Chief of the Seventh

Department.

(NOSENKO had been the case officer and had

handled the operation, but he took no part in the confronta-

tion or recruitment approach "because DUBAS wanted it for

himself"*)

Although the recruitment was not firm, (KRAr? U6

and DUBAS "had an agreement" that nothing would be done

about the compromise if|KRAFTaid not criticize the Soviet 06

Union in lectures about his trip which he was to give in

the United States. DUBAS again contacted KRAFT when he came 06

to Moscow in 1963, and afterwards his file was turned over

to the First Chief Directorate.: NOSENKO recalled that the

First Chief Directorate "said that KRAFTwas not in a good06

region of the United States.

And also it smelled like he

had spoken of the approach made to him:" Therefore, NOSENKO

concluded, he probably had not been contacted in the United

States:

Comment:

According to

the FBI, some time before 1960

06 KRAFT wrote a pamphlet in which he described

the KGB approach, omitting reference to his

sexual compromise. In a statement given to

the FBI on 4 November 1964, KRAFT, who is an

06

129

Top Secret

12/BR;

0001399

TS No. 197124

10

Copy -

---

## Page 138

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

Comment:

(Continued)

08,10

Associate Pastor of the Peoples Church in.

Chicago, stated that he had visited the Soviet

Union in 1956, 1958, and 1963. He confirmed

NOSENKO's information in detail except that he

denied having been intimate with the Soviet

woman involved. He related that the "Chief"

who interviewed him had "several photographs

which portrayed him and the female in intimate

compromising positions and which appeared to

have been taken in her hotel room". ‹ KRAFT said06

that he had told the

"Chief" that they could do

him no possible harm as "no one would believe

that they were valid photographs". (KRAFT] denied 06

agreeing to collaborate with the KGB at any

time.

Recruitment of

DREW (1959)

NOSENKO's Information

06

George DREW,

an' American who visited the Soviet Union in

the spring of 1959, was

the responsibility of case officer

V.V. IVANOV. By clance, however, DREW became involved with 06

NOSENKO's homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV and they

reported this to NOSENKO, then the Deputy Chief of the

section.

NOSENKO and IVANOV discussed the case with DUBAS

and possibly GUSKOV, the Section Chief, and NOSENKO flew

alone

to Leningrad to make the approach.

_(IVANOV was not.

judged qualified. NOSENKO arranged for DREM to be06

compromised in a Leningrad hotel room with a

homosexual

agent of the local KGB handled by a Leningrad officer

PERELETOV. Using the alias "Mr. SERGEYEV", NOSENKO alone

0b recruited DREW in an office of the hotel.

The KGB First

Chief Directorate was interested in DREW's recruitment 06

because he might be able to spot other homosexuals, possibly

some in the U.S. Government.

9/BR

0001400

130

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

---

## Page 139

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

Comment:

DREW reported the approach in 1959, describing

a four-hour interrogation by "SERGEYEV' in

Leningrad and generally confirming NOSENKO's

account of the operation.: Re-interviewed by

the FBI on 12 May 1964, (DREW)identified NOSENKO's U6

photograph as that of his interrogator and

said that, although NOSENKO was a young man,

from the way everyone reacted to him it was

clear that he was the man in charge. Another

man was present, DREW said.

06

6

Recruitment of LUKIS] (1959)

NOSENKO's Information

In June or possibly July 1959 NOSENKO personally recruited

a British subject, (nu) LUKIS (Or LUCAS); in a room of the 06

Hotel Astoria in Leningrad after LUKIS. had been compromised 06

by NOSENKO's homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV

The case

was then turned over to Ye. A. TARABRIN, at that time Chief

of the British Department of the First Chief Directorate:

NOSENKO furnished no more information on this case and did

not know its current status, but he believed the KGB has

not been in contact with LUKIS subsequently.

Comment:

LUKIS has not yet been identified by the

British services) 29

06

Recruitment of WILBY (1959)

NOSENKO's Information

06

By himself NOSENKO recruited William Stanley WILBY)in a

hotel in Moscow in July 1959, after WILBY had been compro-O

mised by_ either VOLKOV or YEFREMOV, NOSENKO's homosexual

agents. WILBY is a British citizen and his case was also Cl

(like (LUKIS, see above) turned over to TARABRIN

00014C1

131

Top Secret

TS. No. 197124

copy 10

---

## Page 140

14-00000

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

Comment:

06

WILBY reported the approach to British authori-

ties in 1959, saying that he was

"brought up

before SERGEYEV"

(an operational alias some-

times used by NOSENKO). He has not been

re-interviewed since NOSENKO,'s information was

received.

Recruitment of TAYLOR] (1959)

NOSENKO' Information

NOSENKO personally and alone recruited the Moscow

representative of British European AirwayS, whose name 29

• NOSENKO did not recall, at the Hotel Metropol in Moscow

during the summer of 1959, possibly in August.

The approach

was based on homosexual compromise involving NOSENKO's

agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV.

NOSENKO explained that the Seventh Department in 1959

had a section dealing with commercial representatives, which

eat on danga that the

was responsible for the BEAman. That section had asked

NOSENKO's section for help.29

"They said they didn't have any agents or any-

thing and didn't know what to do."

So somebody said,

'Well look, why don't you ask the chief of the

section? He's a specialist on homosexuals and can

arrange everything for you.'

So I wound up handling

the case, and TARABRIN (of the First Chief Direct-

orate) said I should report to him."

:

[In this passage NOSENKO was referring to himself, although

he has always claimed he was Deputy Chief of the section. 1

5/5R

?.. 04"4

0001402

132

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

---

## Page 141

El

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

Comment:

06

David TAYLOR,

i confessed homosexual, is

described by British servicesas a neurotic?

type who had been discharged From the R.A.E7 29

on grounds of mental instability. In 1962

(before the NOSENKO lead was received) TAYLOR

admitted his recruitment to British authori-ll

ties,> indicating that it took place in August

1959

on the basis of his homosexuality: He

reported in 1962 that the recruitment had

been effected by a "Colonel SERGEYEV"

and

when re-interviewed in 1964, he "unhesitantly

identified NOSENKO as "Colonel SERGEYEV'.,"

adding that the mere sight of NOSENKO's photo-

graph

"sent shivers down his back".

TAYLOR

also identified a photograph of VOLKOV:

06

Recruitment Of MERTENS (1959)

NOSENKO's Information

Gerard MERTENS visited the Soviet Union in July or

August 1959. NOSENKO's homosexual agents VOLKOV and

YEFREMOV, seeking out American homosexuals, accidentally

O6 met MERTENS] in Moscow and reported their

suspicions to

NOSENKO. NOSENKO wrote a report of this contact and

requested authority to take compromising photographs in

preparation for a recruitment approach, and DUBAS, his

chief, then assigned the case to him.

(MERTENS) had been 06

the responsibility of A.A. VETLITSKIY, another case officer.)

Photographs were taken of homosexual relations between

Ub VOLKOV and MERTENS on two separate occasions in Moscow.

O6 when MERTENSlater travelled to Uzhgorod he was "arrested"

by KGB officers (posing as militiamen) while he was engaged

in relations with a KGB homosexual agent from Odessa, whom

NOSENKO had arranged by phone to bring to Uzhgorod. (He

did not recall his name, and could only supply CIA with a

physical description.! MERTENS,was then brought before 06

NOSENKO, who recruited him during a session lasting

approximately five hours. NOSENKO later travelled with

133

Top Secret

0001403

TS No. 197124

Copy 10

il/BR

---

## Page 142

42: 66.2606

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

MERTENS] when he visited Ivov and Minsk before leaving

USSR.

NOSENKO said that he had used the name

"George" with

, MERTENS,

" but he could not recall what last name he had

given him.

When he related the case in 1962, NOSENKO could not

recall the American':

name. In 1964 he stated the name

was MARTIN, or MARTINS,

Comment: In a signed statement given to the FBI on

5 August 1964, MERIENS, an American professor, 06

generally confirmed NOSENKO's account.

names his recruiter as one "George PETERSON"

and stated that NOSENKO's photograph might be

that of a person whom he had met while

visiting the Soviet Union in 1959. MERTENS] CÓ

reported one KGB attempt to recontact him

after he returned to the United States.

In

September 1959, according to arrangements

made at the time of his recruitment, he

received a letter signed "George PETERSON"

telling him to be at a rendezvous point in

New York. By the time he received the letter,

however, the date of the meeting had already

and so he ignored it. (MERTENS] claimed 06

that there were no further attempts by the

Soviets to contact him.

Compromise Of BARRETT] (1959)

NOSENKO's Information

06

08.

Robert BARRETT, a guide at the Ü.S. Exhibition in Moscow]

in I959, had become friendly with the homosexual agents

YOLKOV_and YEFREMOV whom he met at the fairground.

06/ BARRETT was not an active homosexual, VOLKOV succeeded after

a long period of development in involving him in homosexual

acts, which were photographed by KGB personnel from an

adjoining hotel room. As case officer for VOLKOV and YEFREMOV,

0001404

I2/8R

134

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

---

## Page 143

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

NOSENKO was responsible for arranging the compromise, was

present when the photographs were taken, and he has described

the occasion in detail. (There was much complaining among

the photographic technicians because of the amount of time

they spent waiting for VOLKOV to succeed in his mission, and

NOSENKO recalled that he provided them with drinks and

treated them well because they were a big help to him in

this operation.) The photographs were good, but the KGB

was unable to use them in 1959 because of a general ban

placed by the Central Committee on

the recruitment of .s..

Off xhibition guides due to Eisenhower's planned visit to the

Soviet Union.

06

NOSENKO reported that BARRETT)was recruited on the basis

of the 1959 photography when he returned with another

exhibition in 1961:

The recruitment was carried out by

the First (American) Department

of the KGB Second Chief

Directorate, and NOSENKO was not involved.

Comment:

Immediately on his return to the United States

in January 1962, BARRETT confessed to the FBI 06

that he had been recruited in 1961 on the basis

of photographs depicting him in a homosexual

act with VOLKOV, which had been taken during

his 1959 trip to MosCow. He claimed that the

photographs had been taken while he

unconscious, after being drugged. (BARRETT]was06

contacted once by the KGB in New York City

following his admissions to the FBI. He was

contacted by KGB officers, including SKVORTSOV

of the First Chief Directorate, during later

trips to the Soviet Union in 1963, 1964, and

1965 and arrangements were made for meetings

in the

United States.

No Soviets appeared at

such

scheduled meetings.

00014C5

135

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy 10

---

## Page 144

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

06

Compromise of

ILLERFORD (1959)

NOSENKO's Information

Frederick WILLERFORb,' an American Negro, was BArReris

Übroommate during the 1959 exhibition in Moscow. Initially he

was a target of the Moscow City KGB Directorate which

Of believed WILLERFORD to be an FBI agent and had been collecting

information on him.

KGB element, VOLKOV and YEFREMOV had made WILLERFORD's 06

acquaintance, and NOSENKO had arranged for compromising

photographs to be taken of WILLERFORD and YEFREMOV in a Moscow 06

hotel room.

NOSENKO watched WILLERFORD and YEFREMOV through 06

a two-way mirror and was able to describe the scene in

detail.

It was only after these compromising photographs

had been obtained that NOSENKO learned of the Moscow City

KGB Directorate's interest in WILLERFORD].U NOSENKO's own

department and the Moscow City Directoräte then made a joint

request for operational approval to recruit WILLERFORD, but 06

permission was refused because of the ban on recruitmént

attempts at the time.

The case file was retained by the

Moscow KGB organization, and NOSENKO did not know whether

WILLERFORD] was approached subsequently.

Comment:

06

WILLERFORD] was interviewed by the FBI in July

1964 and "advised emphatically that he had

never been compromised by anyone nor did he

feel that he ever could be compromised by

anyone except through the use of drugs, since

he felt that he was

'too smart' and most

Soviets that he has ever met are aware of his

pro-american sentiments". BARRETT]has reported 06

J' that WILLERFORD had visited VOLKOV in his hotel

room and was friendly with him.J6 BARRETT|said

that he had often wondered if WILLERFORDwas aC

homosexual because of his manner and bearing.

00014C6

136

Top Secret

16/3R

TS No. 197124

Copy

---

## Page 145

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

06

Recruitment of

FRIPPEL (1959-1963)

As a member of the American-British Commonwealth Section,

NOSENKO in 1959 personally participated in the recruitment

29 of the American

"Express Company representative in Moscow;

06

Arsene FRIPPEI. He continued to be one of this agent's two

KGB handlers,

even after transferring to the American

Department in 1960.06FRIPPEL]left Moscow in 1961 but

returned on trips to the USSR in 1962 and 1963, when NOSENKO.

met him. The only recruited American whom NOSENKO ever

claimed to handle, FRIPPEL) confessed to his recruitment 06

when questioned by the FBI on the basis of the NOSENKO lead.

©bAlthough the FRIPPED case only started during NOSENKO's

first assignment to the Seventh Department (1955-1960), it

is described in its entirety through 1963, for the conven-

ience. of

the reader.

NOSENKO'S Information

At his second meeting with CIA in Geneva on 11 June 1962g

NOSENKO described the circumstances in which an unnamed

foreigner was compromised by a KGB female agent, Klara

Konstantinovna GORBACHEVA. He described the scene in detall

including the attempt by a KGB technician to take motion

pictures through a two-way mirror, and the confrontation of

the foreigner by the militiamen, who broke into the room.

NOSENKO identified that foreigner as FRIPPED by name the 06

following day while discussing KGB successes in Moscow:

"There

was another agent,

[KGB cryptonym] 'Artur

He was not a correspondent. He knew me as George,

Yuriy Ivanovich, and my last name as NIKOLAYEV.

He

was a permanent

representative, not in the Embassy.

06-

but of the American Express Company in Moscow: 29

ERIPPEL. Arthur FRIPPED,

He liked drinking, always

drank

He was

also strongly attracted to women.

provided him with beautiful women... well, we

decided to have a talk with him.

Why? What could

He now works in the American Express LY

Company Imain office in New York Cityl.

A new

137

Top Secret

C001407

TS No. 197124

Copy - 10

10/BR

---

## Page 146

Top Secret

(SEVENTII DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

department has now been organized

for the Soviet

Union and the Peoples' Democracies.

And he is

chief of the department...

He is no longer in

Moscow, but he was here two and a half or three

years.

We hope that he will return.

We are waiting

for him to come back. We know that the company

wants to send him again, because he knows the Russian

language very well. He is, in fact, an emigre, this

Co ERIPPEl. And he also did a good and intelligent job

of establishing relations with Inturist.

He had very

good relationships with ANKUDINOV, the Chairman of

Inturist, and with other people, both the chiefs and

the low-level workers...

But, why was FRIPPEL 06

• recruited? I was interested in knowing precisely

by whom, by name, and how approaches were being made

to our delegations lin the United States]. I was

interested in him from the point of view of counter-

intelligence, not intelligence.

What kinds of

approaches are taking place to our people in America

and by whom?

This is what interested me.

But he

didn't know anything. He provided only superficial

information, nothing

more."

NOSENKO was then asked whether FRIPPEL would not have been

He replied no, that of americans visiting the Soviet Union

the KGB had already had great success in

this by other means.

In Geneva in 1964 and during subsequent debriefings. and

interrogations, NOSENKO made additional statements concerning

the FRIPPED case.

06.

NOSENKO attributed his involvement in the FRIPPEL

recruitment as follows:

"In 1958, after 1958, when I became the Deputy

Chief of the section, my area of activity was

narrowed down.

I didn't handle all the tourists

at

that time.

worked as the Deputy Chief of the

section and I had. my own little area--for example,

he permanent representative of the American Express ?

Company, and besides that I began to collect all the

material on all American tourist firms which have

anything to do with Inturist and which send tourists

to the USSR."

0001408

138

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

6/3R

---

## Page 147

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT. - June 1955-January. 1960)

Although he had personally recruited FRIPPEL!

he did not

do so alone.. Col.

VaD. CHELNOKOV, Deputy Chief (and later

Chief) of the Seventh Department, was present, and he and

NOSENKO "carried out the recruitment together" in early

September 1959.

officer:

NOSENKO was, however, PRIPPEl's case

NOSENKO met "pretty steadily" with FRIPPELuntil January

1961, and once NOSENKO and his wife, in company with

00.

CHELNOKOV and his wife, had dinner at FRIPPEL'S home, where 06

they met Mrs: RIPPELS Odette FRIPPEL was unaware of her

husband's status as a KGB agent, and therefore NOSENKO and

CHELNOKOV used Inturist cover for their acquaintance with

FRIPPEL.

Although unusual for KGB Second Chief Directorate

case

officers to visit agents in their homes with wives

in the recruitment"

As Deputy Chief of a Tourist section of the Seventh

Department and later as Deputy Chief and Acting Chief of

the. American Embassy Section of the American Department,

NOSENKO continued to meet with FRIPPED in Moscow hotels and 06

restaurants.

Throughout this period, he was almost

invariably accompanied by CHELNOKOV: "Perhaps one time I

O6met with FRIPPEllalone, otherwise it was always with

CHELNOKOV • "

06

Usually NOSENKO would arrange meetings with

FRIPPER at CHELNOKOV's request and the two continued to

meet with FRIPPEL despite his lack of production, because

they,

"kept hoping he would give something". (In a different

context, but speaking of CHELNOKOV, NOSENKO explained that

GRIBANOV: insisted

that even Department Chiefs of the Second

Chief Directorate must each have two or three agents.)

When NOSENKO began to work in the

American Embassy

Section of the. American Department in 1960, he took FRIPPED06

Öwith him because FRIPPED was acquainted with some Americans

at the Embassy. NOSENKO questioned FRIPPEL about the Embassy

and about Embassy officers George WINTERS and Lewis W.

BOWDEN,;

but FRIPPEL never told NOSENKO anything useful.

06

139

Top Secret

gISR

C0C1409

TS. No. 197124

Copy 10

---

## Page 148

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

06

NOSENKO continued to act as FRIPPEL's case officer after

O6 FRIPPEL left the Soviet Union and after NOSENKO had been

transferred and promoted to the position of Deputy Chief

of the Seventh Department. He met twice with FRIPPELIduring06

this latter period when FRIPPEL visited the Soviet Union as 06

a guide with groups of foreign visitors.

Both of these

meetings were handled by NOSENKO alone, without CHELNOKOV.

The first meeting took place in the summer of 1962, after

NOSENKO returned to Moscow from Geneva. (FRIPPEL/ arrived 06

in the Soviet Union as a

guide for some American journalists.

(NOSENKO was unable to give the composition of the journa-

list group or to recall where they stayed in Moscow

and

where else they travelled in the Soviet Union.) NOSENKO

contacted him in Moscow. to learn what questions the newsmen

intended to ask Khrushchev during a scheduled interview;

[subseguently NOSENKO acknowledged that standard practice

required visiting journalists to submit their intended

questions for Khrushchev in writing to Soviet authorities

06:

prior to interviews,. After the interview, he recontacted

FRIPPELto learn the reaction of the journalists to their

Ealk with the Soviet leader.

NOSENKO could not recall their

specific reaction to the Khrushchev interview but did

remember that they were "satisfied".. Another reason for

Obcontacting FRIPPED, NOSENKO added in a later discussion,

was to learn whether any of the journalists might have

joined the group at the last moment in

the United States,

which might suggest intelligence connections on their part:

NOSENKO met FRIPPEL alone for the second and last time

during March 1963. Since FRIPPEL was a guide for tourists 06

aboard the ship "Olympia", which stopped for a day in valta

and Odessa, NOSENKO flew to Odessa from Moscow and accosted

FRIPPEL in the lobby of the hotel where the tourists were

having dinner.

Finally able to get away from his group,

6 FRIPPEL called on NOSENKO in the latter's hotel room

and

the. two drank and talked. NOSENKO had given FRIPPEL a O

bottle of vodka as a gift, and FRIPPEL said he wanted to 06

give NOSENKO some whisky in return.

They drove in NOSENKO'S

car to the port, where NOSENKO waited in the car while

06. FRIPPEL went aboard for the whisky.

(He had invited NOSENKO

Eo visit the ship but could not obtain a pass for him.)

0001410

140

Top Secret

LIBR

TS No. 197124

Copy

---

## Page 149

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

When FRIPPEL returned, he brought another American, so

NOSENKO had to invent

for himself a suitable cover (Inturist)

on the spot.

The three returned to the hotel and drank some

more, everyone getting drunk. During this contact, FRIPPEL] 06

reported "nothing of importance", and his most interesting

news was that he might again be reassigned to Moscow in

December 1963 as the American Express Company representative.2 /

(NOSENKO said he later read a report that FRIPPEL had been 06

assigned elsewhere, and it was therefore unlikely that his

agent would return

to MOSCOW,.

This report was submitted by

V.V. KOSTYRYA (alias VLADIMIROV), a member of the KGB Legal

Residency and overtly an Inturist employee in New York City,

who was.. a

former Second Chief Directorate colleague of

FRIPPED provided no interesting information during

NOSENKO's two meetings with him in 1962 and 1963, when

FRIPPEL returned to the Soviet Union as a tour guide.

On 3 February 1964, while reviewing the CHEREPANOV

papers (see p.309) in

Geneva, NOSENKO was asked about the

following passage dealing withERIPPED which appeared in O6

the KGB operational plan against BOWDEN:

"He [BONDEN] showed himself to be an indiscreet

person e •

One

day, as though by chance, he

[BOWDEN, blurted out to our

agent SHEDOVA [the

fact of) 'ARTUR's' affiliation with American

intelligence."

Asked who SHVEDOVA was, NOSENKO said she was "probably

a cleaning woman". [Elsewhere NOSENKO described

SHEDOVA as his own agent working against American

Army Attaches, see p. 85..]

Asked what connection

06 FRIPPED had with

American intelligence, NOSENKO replied

that he could not say.

To the inguiry why not, since

he was FRIPPEL's case officer, NOSENKO was silent.

06

06

Spencer ROBERIS [whose KGB recruitment is described

on

p.424] in August 1962 became friends with a young

Soviet male who acknowledged having been a KGB agent used

against French-speaking foreigners. Included among the

0001411

141

FIBR

Top Secret

TS. No. 197124

Copy

10

---

## Page 150

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

06

06

latter, the Soviet told (ROBERTS, was [FRIPPEI, whom the

KGB suspected of being an American intelligence agent.

INOSENKO reported ROBERTS)brecruitment but has never

indicated awareness of other KGB agents being targetted

against FRIPPEL. 06

PETER, who uses the nickname l

FRIPPER'S Information

"Arthur" was the American (7

Express Company_ representative in

Moscow From 7 April 1958

to 3 January 1961. He was first interviewed on the basis

of NOSENKO's information on 30 April 1964, and when shown a

picture of NOSENKO, FRIPPELadmitted his recruitment by the 06

KGB in 1959.

During this and subsequent interviews with

06, the FBI, FRIPPEL has reported in detail on his association

O with the KGB. (FRIPPED's version coincides with that provide

"by NOSENKO to a considerable degree, with the following

exceptions:

06

FRIPPEL asserts that at the time of his recruitment

the KGB wanted only general information on American

Embassy officials and American tourists travelling

to the Soviet Union(under American Express auspices) U8

According: to NOSENKO, (FRIPPEL) was originally (

recruited to provide information on American intelli-

gence approaches to Soviets in the United States,

and he claimed that FRIPPEL Was not needed for 06

coverage of Americans visiting the Soviet Union,

since the KGB had already "great success" by other

means. NOSENKO stated that later, when he trans-

ferred to the American Embassy Section, he took

O6his agent FRIPPEL] with him to report on acquain-

06/FRIPPEL agree that, with one exception (when

(tances among the Embassy employees. NOSENKO and

06 FRIPPEL was queried regarding BOWDEN and WINTERS) ,

06 FRIPPEL was not so used.

66 FFRIPPEL

while acknowledging that NOSENKO partici-

pated in all meetings and on occasion met FRIPPEL 06

alone, stated that CHELNOKOV "was in charge of the

entire operation"

0001412

142

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy -

21/3R

---

## Page 151

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

FRIPPEL, claims that he saw NOSENKO on three occasions,

twice in Odessa, while visiting the USSR in 1962 and

1963..

NOSENKO insisted that he met ERIPPEL but once 06

in Odessa and önce in Moscow in that period.

Comment:

06

NOSENKO volunteered his account of the FRIPPEL

case in Geneva in 1962 and 1964.

He freely

related the details of the summer 1962 and

February 1963 meetings with FRIPPED in the 06

USSR.

His account of FRIPPEL's activities is 06

consistent with FRIPPEl's, version, except as

noted above.

06

Lee Harvey OSWALD (1959-1960)

For continuity of presentation, both periods of NOSENKO's

alleged involvement with OSWALD: in 1959-1960 and in 1963

are described elsewhere.

(See p. 303.): According to NOSENKO,

he was involved with OSWALD in 1959 because he was then

Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section

of the Seventh Department:

In that capacity he participateu

in the decision that OSWALD was of no interest to the KGB

and he should not be allowed to remain in the Soviet Union.

Comment: NOSENKO's information on his involvement with

OSWALD in 1959 is insufficient to serve as

evidence confirming or refuting his claimed

service as Deputy Chief of the American Section

of the Seventh Department in 1959.

6/BS

143

Top Secret

0001413

TS. No. 197124

Copy 10

---

## Page 152

4-00000

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

Operational Activities - 1955-1960: Summary

Tourist Section as a case officer. Between 1955 and 1957

he assembled a network of agents and was involved in four

KGB attempts to recruit foreign tourists.

One of these

attempts, that against Richard BURGI, was the first recruit-U6

ment of the tourist section; it won NOSENKO a commendation,

brought him to the attention of General GRIBANOV, and turned

NOSENKO into an effective and successful KGB officer.. In

1958 NOSENKO was promoted to the position of Deputy Chief

of the American-British Commonwealth Section. He then

recruited the second member of his two-man homosexual team

and, in 1958 and 1959, participated in ten KGB attempts to

recruit American and British visitors to the USSR and one

American resident of MOSCOw. NOSENKO's success in the

Seventh Department prompted

GRIBANOV to transfer him back

to the American Embassy Section as Deputy Chief with the

critical priority task of reviving KGB operations against

American Embassy code clerks.

It is worthy of note that of the fifteen cases in which

he personally participated, by his own admission, NOSENKO

became involved in nine not because they were operations of

his section, but because the targets were the victims of

homosexual or other entrapment.

In addition, three of the

fifteen operations were not directed by his section, but

by senior seventh Department officers:.

According to his

own statements, four others were specifically the responsi-

Wility of other Seventh Department sections of KGB elements

including the Foreign Seamen Section (GEHRCKENS) , Delega- Ub

06 Obtions Section (LANE and BIRSE), Commercial Representatives

06O6Section (TAYLOR), and WILLERFORD) (Moscow City KGB). FRIPPEL 06

does not relate clearly to lOSENKO's claimed Seventh

Department service:.

NOSENKO states he was also used as an

agent of the First Department Embassy Section. Even the

remaining case, that of HARRIS, was not necessarily a

06

0001414

144

Top Secret

8IBR

TS No. 197124

Copy —

---

## Page 153

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

Seventh Department operation: by NOSENKO's other statements,

she was not a "tourist"

and she would have been the target

of the Moscow Oblast KGB because of her intention to marry

a Soviet citizen.

While NOSENKO's participation

in the attempted recruit-

ment of the targets lie describes, even where not

confirmed,

is not disputed, the evidence suggest that he was an:

English-speaking specialist in sexual entrapment, not

counterintelligence officer responsible for the identifi

cation of foreign agents among tourists or for the develop-

ment,

recruitment, and exploitation of agents for the KGB.

Nothing NOSENKO has said indicates that there was any

material change in his duties

and responsibilities after

he was allegedly promoted to Deputy Chief of the American-

British Commonwealth Section.

The evidence is that he was

more active, but not that he had any administrative and

supervisory responsibilities.

Knowledge of other Seventh Department

American Tourist Operations

NOSENKO said that upon his return to the Seventh Depart-

ment in 1962 as Chief of the American-British Commonwealth

Section, he reviewed the section's activities during his

two-year absence, e.g. January 1960 to January 1962. In

the course of that review he made written notes of the

section's operational targets during that period notes

which he brought to Geneva in 1964. (See p• 319.) NOSENKO

could not describe the operations other than to say that he

recorded the target's names and such details as he could

acquire at the time of his review.

Eleven of the operations

included in his notes were those against Bernard PECHTER, 06,06,06,06,06,06

Pätrick PRESSHAN, John RUFE, Gerald SEVERN, Sofia SHATTAUER, 06,06

‹Enu KARLOV, Norman FISK, Ralph MATLAW, Marvin KANTOR,

06:

(Michael GINSBERG, and Villiam TARASKA:06 All were fröm the

period 1956-1959 and six of the eleven individuals were

identified by the KGB as homosexuals.

All of these

cases

are described in Annex B.

6001415

145

Top Secret

TS. No. 197124

Copy

10

J/BR

---

## Page 154

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

Comment:

NOSENKO has never resolved why these cases,

which predated the records he claimed he

reviewed, were included in his notes.

More

important, he never could explain why he was

unfamiliar with American tourist cases which

occurred at a time. when he claimed that he

was Deputy Chief of the American-British

Commonwealth Section and was knowledgeable

of all such cases.

KGB Counterintelligence Operations

Among Foreign Tourists, 1955-1960

involvement or about which he learned in his capacityPersonal

Besides those operations in which NOSENKO claimed

Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section,

NOSENKO claimed awareness of what the KGB knew of the use

of tourists in the USSR by foreign intelligence services

throughout the 1955-1960 period.

Information from other

sources serves as' a basis for judging the validity of

NOSENKO's claim.

NOSENKO's Information

NOSENKO's Tourist Study

Sometime between May and October 1959, during the

tourist season, NOSENKO was ordered to gather facts for

the period 1955 through 1958.

NOSENKO said he assembled

this material from the Seventh Department's annual reports

of the years 1955-1958, supplemented by information he

obtained from discussions with knowledgeable Seventh

Department case officers.

NOSENKO recalled only that the

study incorporated statistical data on the growth of

foreign tourism; he did not remember the content of the

study, any examples included in it, or what the study

concluded about American or British Intelligence tourist

6001416

146

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy -

---

## Page 155

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

operations.

Nevertheless, based on his research for this

study as well as on his general and supervisory responsi-

bilities in the Seventh Department, NOSENKO asserted that

he could accurately describe KGB counterintelligence

operations among tourists during the period 1955-1960.

Extent of KGB Knowledge

According to NOSENKO, operations against foreign tourists

were developing slowly during this period and very little:

was known by the KGB about the American Intelligence use

of tourism at the time he wrote the study in 1959. No.

agents were definitely identified among American tourists,

and no tourists were "caught in the act" mailing letters,

servicing deaddrops or contacting agents, with one exception.

06 (MCGUIRE sic, see below.) The Seventh Department, NOSENKO

ole on tacking vener

said, developed suspicions concerning a number of tourists

because of their apparent interest in photography, or because

they were disseminating foreign literature. The KGB never

established any firm intelligence connection, however,

despite various operational measures taken such as vyemka

(covert baggage search) and maneuvering KGB agents in

contact with the suspect tourists.

No American tourists

were definitely identified as American Intelligence agents,

NOSENKO concluded.

On related matters, NOSENKO asserted

that during his 1955-1960 service in the Seventh Department

the

KGB acquired no information regarding American Intelli-

gence use of tourism; specifically, the KGB obtained no

documentary information on this topic from any agent source.

on on the top c rol

American Tourist Agents

was

one whose name he recalled as McGUIRE, and who mailed a Ob

setter in Minsk in 1959. NOSENKO said he never knew what

KGB operational activity led to the discovery of McGUIRE's

clandestine letter mailing.

21BR

0001417

147

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

10

Copy.

---

## Page 156

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

Comment:

06

NOSENKO here is apparently referring to Edward

detected by the kGB while clandestinely maling

a CIA tourist agent who was in fact

1n operational letter in Minsk, but in August

There was a Robert Alan McGUIRE]who visited

the Soviet Union during NOSENKO's Seventh

Department service, but he was not connected

with American Intelligence at the time ana he

mailed no letter. MCGUIRE, however, was a 06

former CIA staff employee.

He visited the

Soviet Union as a tourist in April-May 1959,

during which period he was the target of

numerous KGB provocations, including black-

market, females, and a Soviet citizens' request

for assistance in defecting to the Americans.

Also, a customs officer confiscated from

06 MCGUIRE a Radio Liberation Russian-language

06

script, and McGUIREj was compelled to sign an

acknowledgement of the event, although the

reasons were left blank.

Interrogation has

never resolved how NOSENKO knew the name of

06 McGUIRE, but not the background of the case,

or the background of McGOFAN's case, but not

his name.

06

MIBR

Information Furnished the KGB by George BLAKE

In 1959 the KGB obtained from its agent in MI-6,

[George BLAKE, who was arrested by British authorities in

April 1961] the complete details of the CIA-MI-6 program for

utilizing tourist agents in the Soviet Union. In early

June 1959 a three-day conference was held in London between

CIA and MI-6 representatives, at the conclusion of which a

nineteen-page document was drawn up which described opera-

tional doctrine on tourist operations, including agent

spotting, agent selection, agent assessment, agent training,

and agent tasks planned for the current (1959) tourist

season.

The document stressed CIA planned use of tourists

0001418

148°

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

---

## Page 157

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

for spotting, contacting, and assessing and, eventually,

communicating with agents in the Soviet Union. BLAKE

confessed to passing the document to the KGB as soon as it

came into his possession.

Comment:

It is not advanced that NOSENKO should neces-

sarily have known of BLAKE, although his

statements on the matter have been ambiguous.

Asked in 1962 whether he knew of BLAKE (whose

earlier arrest had been publicized), NOSENKO

affirmed that he did but indicated that BLAKE

was a less important source than the Canadian

Ambassador (WATKINS) or the agent in the

British Admiralty (VASSALL):

When BLAKE was

mentioned in 1964, NOSENKO asked

"Who's BLAKE?"

The

significance of BLAKE is that his

confession established that the KGB was fully

aware of the status and character of

American

and British Intelligence tourist operations

while NOSENKO alleges he was in the Seventh

Department.

It is judged, by any measure as

well as

by NOSENKO's statements about the KGB,

that the substance of the information if not

the document itself would be brought to the

attention of a key KGB counterintelligence

officer concerned, the Deputy Chief of the

American-British Commonwealth Section, which

NOSENKO claims was himself.

KGB Study of American Intelligence Tourist Operations

In 1961 CIA acquired a lengthy KGB Top Secret study on

the subject of the use of tourists by American Intelligence

for espionage and operational support in the Soviet Union:

The KGB study draws recognizably upon the information

supplied by BLAKE and, although concerned primarily with

American tourist operations in 1960, it also refers to

American agents whom KGB counterintelligence elements

identified among tourists in the years 1958 and 1959, while

NOSENKO claims he was Deputy Chief of the American-British

Commonwealth Section and during which time he claims

KGB identified no American Intelligence agents.

the

0001419

149

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

10

Copy

---

## Page 158

14-00000

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - 1955-1960: Summary and Conclusion

NOSENKO's description of the activities of the Second

Chief Directorate Seventh Department in this period is

almost solely restricted to his account of these fifteen

KGB operations.

Other than to allege that certain KGB

officers he named were his subordinates, he provided no

information to substantiate his claim that he had any

supervisory or administrative responsibilities.

The common

feature of the operations do not relate to NOSENKO's own

description of the function of the Seventh Department's

Tourist Section or later, to the American-British Common-

wealth Section.

Most were sexual or other entrapment

operations, and he acknowledges that several were operations

conducted by KGB elements other than his own section.. In

short, NOSENKO need not have been in the Seventh Department

sections, as he claims, to have learned of or participated

in the activities he describes.

Although NOSENKO gives a

graphic account of the Second Chief Directorate's (and his

own) counterintelligence mission, his knowledge is not of

counterintelligence operations among tourists; in the only

three such operations he describes, the counterintelligence

aspects were incidental.

Contrary to his claims, NOSENKO

is aware neither of all important KGB operations conducted

against American tourists during the period, nor what was

known to the KGB about American Intelligence and British

tourist operations.

Conclusion

While NOSENKO was associated with a KGB element conducting

operations against American and other foreign tourists

during the period 1955-1960, he was neither a

senior case

officer nor Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department American-

British Commonwealth Section.

0001420

150

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

---

## Page 159

Top Secret

CHAPTER VII

AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION OF AMERICAN DEPARTMENT

(January 1960-January 1962)

Deputy Chief of the Section

NOSENKO claims to have served as Deputy Chief of the

American Embassy Section of the American Department, KGB

Second Chief Directorate, from sometime in January 1960

until the

first days of January 1962. This section, in

his words, was working against "the most important counter-

intelligence target in the Soviet Union", the permanent

American representation in Moscow.

It regarded every

American stationed there a possible spy and, simultaneously.

as a target

for recruitment.

The functions of the American Embassy Section were

described by NOSENKO as being to monitor all contacts by

Embassy personnel with Soviet citizens, to collect all

information possible on American Embassy employees, and

somer can enator

to use this information as a basis for planning and imple-

menting recruitments.

The Americans' personalities, jobs,

personal relationships,

weaknesses, daily routines,

security

precautions, contacts

with Soviet citizens, and the major

and minor scandals in their Moscow lives formed the basis

for this work.

To gather such information, the section's

officers employed large numbers of agents and informants

among the indigenous employees of the Embassy, Soviet

citizens moving in Embassy social circles, and third-country

nationals with American contacts. The officers also

from the reports of numerous surveillance teams

as well as information obtained from

telephone taps and microphones in Americans' offices and

homes. Each officer had a limited number of American

targets with whom he attempted to become thoroughly familiar.

Annually, they submitted detailed operational plans for

151

0001421

Top Secret

TS. No. 197124

Copy 10

---

## Page 160

14-00000

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

exploiting the knowledge they had gained of their targets.

During 1960 and 1961, NOSENKO said, within the section

special emphasis was

placed on "identifying intelligence

officers in the Embassy and actively developing them,

acquiring ciphers, and painstakingly studying code clerks,

creating

the basis on which they can be recruited".

As Deputy Chief of this section, NOSENKO said, he had

access to all information concerning its activities:

"Nothing was hidden" from him.

On this basis, he expressed

certainty that in 1960 and 1961 the KGB recruited no

Americans associated with the Embassy, there were no KGB

In thin

agents among Americans assigned to the Embassy in this

period and, in fact, the KGB had recruited no American

Embassy personnel since "ANDREY" (Dayle SMITH, recruited

ca. 1953, see p. 33).

From continuing friendships with

his fellow-officers of 1960-and 1961, who remained in the

section when NOSENKO transferred, NOSENKO has also claimed

certainty that there were no KGB

recruitments from the

time he left the section in January 1962 until his January

1964 departure in Geneva.

Transfer to the American Embassy Section

In December 1959, while serving as Deputy Chief of the

American Section of

the Seventh Department, NOSENKO learned

from the Department Chief DUBAS of plans to transfer him

back to the American Department's American Embassy Section,

as Deputy Chief. NOSENKO said

he was opposed to the move

and wanted to remain in the Seventh Department:

"I was used to it there and wanted to continue.

I wanted to stay in the Seventh Department.

This

(the transfer] was no promotion.

Here I was the

Deputy Chief of section and would be the same

there. The American Department is, of course, the

most important.

But here I was working against

American tourists.

This is also important.

Furthermore, I showed [had proven] myself there in

'55, '56, '57, '58, and '59 and was considered to

be not a bad case officer.

And there, in the

American Department, I must prove myself with new

people."

0001422

152

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy -

---

## Page 161

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

NOSENKO therefore asked DUBAS to try to retain him. DUBAS

later told NOSENKO that he had twice spoken to Second Chief

Directorate Chief O. M. GRIBANOV on his behalf, but to no,

avail: In January 1960 the official orders transferring

NOSENKO were issued.

On the day NOSENKO reported to V.A. KLYPIN, Chief of

the American Department, to begin his new job, he was told

to report to GRIBANOV's office.. NOSENKO expressed his

misgivings about the change of assignment to GRIBANOV:

GRIBANOV replied that DUBAS had spoken to him but that he,

was to pay particular attention to operations against

American code clerks, the

"number one target":

Predecessor as Deputy Chief

Asked on 17 April 1964 whom he had relieved upon reporting

for duty in the American Embassy Section, NOSENKO replied:

"No one." He assumed responsibility for the Embassy security

file from KOVSHUK.

Various case officers earlier had been

responsible for Embassy Security Officer Russell LANGELLE,

including MALYUGIN, then KUSKOV, KOVSHUK, and KLYPIN; but

LANGELLE had been expelled from the Soviet Union in October

1959 and his successor, John ABIDIAN, was not to arrive

until March 1960.

On several occasions between January and June 1964 NOSENKO

hot one hut he sai

had referred to. a KGB officer named Mikhail Fedorovich

BAKHVALOV--but never in connection with the American Embassy

Section Thus, in January he first identified him as

Colonel Mikhail BAKHVALOV, the Deputy Chief of the Fifth

(Eastern Countries) Department:

In February he identified

a V.A. ALEKSEYEV as the alias of a Mikhail Fedorovich, last

name not recalled, who was Deputy Chief of the Fifth

Department:

In June, in listing KGB officers who had

received various awards for their service, NOSENKO included

the name of Mikhail BAKHVALOV, Deputy Chief of "an unremem-

bered department". of the Second Chief Directorate:

153

Top Secret

0001423

TS No. 197124

Copy -10

---

## Page 162

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

On 18 June 1964 NOSENKO was asked to list the names of

the Seventh Department in 1955 to his return to the American

Embassy Section in 1960.

NOSENKO listed fourteen officers

as having joined the section, and five who had been trans-

ferred out. In neither list did NOSENKO mention BAKHVALOV.

A week later, however, on 24 June 1964 NOSENKO stated

that "in 1959 and possibly in 1958 Mikhail Fedorovich

BAKHVALOV was the Deputy Chief of the American Embassy

Section. I replaced him in his position in 1960 and he

went to the Fifth Department as Deputy Chief". In September

1964 NOSENKO asserted that BAKHVALOV, as Deputy Chief,

Inot

the others he had identified earlierl had been LANGELLE'S

case officer. In 1965 NOSENKO first mentioned that

BAKHVALOV, not KOVSHUK, had been responsible for maintaining

the Embassy security file and stated that BAKHVALOV had

shared with KOVSHUK responsibility for supervising code

clerk operations.

Comment:

Interrogation has never resolved contradictions

between NOSENKO's earlier accounts of what

functions he assumed from whom when he entered

the Section, and his belated assertions that

BAKHVALOV was his predecessor as Deputy Chief.

Responsibilities

Shortly after reporting. for duty in the American Embassy

Section and following his short discussion with GRIBANOV,

NOSENKO said he met with American Department Chief KLYPIN

and Embassy Section Chief KOVSHUK to discuss his responsi-

bilities and functions in the section.

Repeating what

GRIBANOV had said, KLYPIN stressed that NOSENKO's most

important single responsibility in the section would be

supervision of all KGB operational activity against American

military and State Department code clerks stationed in

MOSCOW.

As for the other Americans at the Embassy, KLYPIN

0001424

154

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy -

---

## Page 163

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

suggested a division of labor under which KovSHuk would be

responsible for supervising operations against State

Department personnel and NOSENKO would supervise work

against the Army, Air Force, and Naval Attaches and their

assistants.:

NOSENKO was also to be custodian of certain

sensitive files in the section.

NOSENKO has signed a protocol which listed his principal

responsibilities during 1960 and 1961. It reads in part:

"During the entire period in the First [American

Embassy] Section, First [American] Department in

1960 and 1961 my position was Deputy Chief of

Section. My responsibilities were the following:

-General Deputy to the Chief of the First

Section, Vladislav Mikhaylovich KOVSHUK, and

Acting Chief of Section in his absence.

-Immediate supervisor for the operational work

against American code clerks.

In this capacity I

closely guided the work of case officers Gennadiy

GRYAZNOV and Vadim KOSOLAPOV:

-Case officer for American Embassy Security

Officer, John ABIDIAN.

-For about the first six months of 1960, super-

visor of the work against the offices of the Army!

Naval, and Air attaches.

Comment:

Before 1965 NOSENKO never claimed responsibility

for supervising operations against service

attache targets. In October 1966 NOSENKO

for the first time claimed he was personally.

responsible for (as contrasted to supervising)

operational activity against Naval and Marine

officers of the office of the Naval Attache.

155

Top Secret

C001425

TS. No. 197124

Copy 10:

---

## Page 164

4-00000

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

-I maintained the file on American Embassy

security.

-I maintained the log books for the reports sent

to the First [American Embassy] Section by the

Operational Technical Directorate, KGB, based on

the information obtained from all

the microphones

installed in the American Embassy. I read all

the reports and gave the pertinent reports to the

appropriate case officers in the section. . In my

absence this work was done by KOVSHUK Or GRYAZNOV.

, 'ARTUR'

and

'SARDAR' [VOLKOV, YEFREMOV, (PREISFREUND, 06

FRIPPEL and WEISS respectively].

Ohhroughout this entire period I

sat in Room 618

of KGB Headquarters at House Number 2, Dzherzhinskiy

Square, MoscoW•

GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV shared this

office

with me throughout most of this period."

Comment:

NOSENKO's assertions with respect to each of

these claimed functions are examined in some

detail in the following pages.

Deputy and Occasional Acting Chief Of Section

Since his defection NOSENKO has maintained under repeated

interrogation that as

general:deputy to KOVSHUK, with the

responsibility of taking over in KOVSHUK's absence, he had

access to and was obliged to keep current on all information

relating to the section's activities.

On this basis he

has

assured his questioners that the

KGB was 'completely

unsuccessful in its attempts to recruit Americans

to the Embassy in these two years.

assigned

NOSENKO has also said

at various times that his access to section files and his

association with section officers made it certain that

there were no such KGB successes even in the periods

0001426

156

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy.

3/BR

---

## Page 165

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

1955-1960 and 1962-1964, when he was assigned in the Seventh

Department. His statements

on this subject during February

1965 were distilled in a protocol which NOSENKO signed on

20 February:

"As the only Deputy to the Chief of the American

Embassy Section, First Department, Second Chief

Directorate, KGB; Vladislav Mikhaylovich KOVSHUK,

Irom January 1960 to January 1962, one of my :

functions was to serve as KOVSHUK's general deputy

and to assume the rights and responsibilities of

Chief of the Section during KOVSHUK's absence. In

order to perform this function I had the right and

the obligation of knowing the details

about every

important activity of the section against the

American Embassy and its personnel.

No activity

of this nature was withheld from me.

"As Deputy Chief of the Section I know definitely

that no U.s. officials serving in the Embassy were

agents of the KGB or reporting unofficially in any

way to the KGB during my service in the Section:

There were no approaches or recruitments made by

the Section during the period January 1960 to

January 1962 against personnel of the American

Embassy, including personnel of the Attaches

and Air), the Department of Agriculture

and USIA, including Marine guards, Army sergeants,

State Department code clerks except against (STORS-

BERG) and KEYSERS, both unsuccessful approaches.

"There were no approaches or recruitments made

against any employees of the United States Govern-

ment who were assigned to the. American Embassy on

temporary duty during this period.

I have read and

understood this report and certify it as correct.

6001427

157

Top Secret

2/BR.

TS No. 197124

Copy 10

---

## Page 166

14-00000

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

In the two years of NOSENKO's service in the section

there were a total of over three months when he said KOVSHUK

was ill or on leave,

NOSENKO recalled that he was Acting

Chief during KOVSHUK's two 30-day leave periods in 1960 and

1961, although he did not remember precisely in which months.

He also served as Acting Chief for about a month in the

summer of 1960 when KOVSHUK was in the KGB hospital with

heart trouble and for a week or two some time in 1961, again

when KOVSHUK was ill:. He recalled that KOVSHUK was also

absent for several days in connection with preparations for

President Eisenhower's planned visit to the Soviet Union in

1960.

As Acting Chief in KOVSHUK's absence, NOSENKO stated that

he was responsible for supervising the administrative work

and operational activity of the entire section and, in

particular, for assuming KOVSHUK's work in directing

operations

against diplomatic personnel assigned to the

American Embassy•

NOSENKO could recall no operational decisions that he

made as acting chief, nor any specific or unusual occurrences

during these times.

NOSENKO said that the only specific

responsibility of KOVSHUK's which he handled in the Chief's

about all correspondence going out of the Embassy Section.

NOSENKO stated he met none of KOVSHUK's agents during his

absences, nor could he remember any of

[whom NOSENKO said in April 1964 was his own agent and later

Ape 106 was them se

them except GLAZUNOV

said was "KOVSHUK's and FEDYANIN's"]. and the American

06

correspondent STEVENS] labout whom NOSENKO had reported in

connection with his activities in 1953-55].

According to NOSENKO, KOVSHUK had personal

contact, under

Ministry of Foreign Affairs cover, with "some" American

Embassy officers, but the only such Embassy officer he could

identify was WINTERS, and he knew of no details about

KOVSHUK's relations with him.

158

0001428

Top Secret

VIBR

TS No. 197124

Copy -

---

## Page 167

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)?

Comment:

03

NOSENKO knows neither that William N. MORELI]

was identified formally by the Embassy to the

Soviet Government to be a CIA employee, nor

that KOVSHUK (who was aware of this fact),

was In personal contact with MORELL.

03

General Supervisory Duties

In interrogations of January 1965 NOSENKO was questioned

in considerable detail about his supervisory duties as

Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section. He didn't know what

major

duties occupied most of his

time, nor which were the

most important:

He stated that "everything" was important.

His subordinates were

GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV (responsible

for code clerk operations), [Vladimirl DEMKIN assisted by

[Yevgeniy] GROMAKOVSKIY (residents of America House),

IN.A.] GAVRILENKO (Air Attaches personnel and the aircrews

of the Ambassador's aircraft), [I.Ya.] KURILENKO (Army

Attache personnel), and (Victor] BELOGLAZOV (Naval Attache

personnel) •

Except

for "little questions" which the

officers decided for themselves, NOSENKO said he directed

their activities, discussed with them various aspects of

their work, and responded to their questions as required.

If he could not answer their questions, NOSENKO stated, of

if the problem was not within his authority, NOSENKO

discussed the matter with KOVSHUK.

NOSENKO claimed he thereafter would discuss the matter with

American Department Chief KLYPIN or his successor, (S.M.]

FEDOSEYEV, and on some occasions, with Second Chief

Directorate Chief GRIBANOV.

NOSENKO stated he accompanied his subordinates to some

meetings with their agents, not because he didn't trust

them, but to hear for himself what the agent was reporting.

He cited as hypothetical examples occasions when DEMKIN

might relay reports from Ella UMANETS or Inga VARLAMOVA

(agents working against America House residents), reports

which NOSENKO would want to hear for himself, personally:

NOSENKO would not estimate to his interrogators what percen-

tage of Embassy Section agents he met in this fashion.

0001429

159

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy - 10

2IBR

---

## Page 168

Mada. 1790

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

In addition to supervising his subordinates's direction

of agents, NOSENKO said he personally managed PREISFREUND 06

("PROKHOR") and WEISS) ("SARDAR") •

0b

Supervisor of All Code Clerk Operations

NOSENKO said that, upon assuming responsibility for

supervising operations against American code clerks, he

found a very "difficult situation". Prior to the assignment

Of KOSOLAPOV to the American Embassy Section in late 1959,

all operations against code clerks had been handled by

MALYUGIN, but during MALYUGIN's two years of effort there

had been

no operational approaches and no successes.

When

NOSENKO took over there were no active developmental

operations against code clerks under way, he stated, and

the only agents or operational contacts being used against

them were poorly educated maids and waitresses none of

whom had accomplished anything of importance. No non-soviet

citizen agents were being used in operations against code-

room personnel.

According to NOSENKO, in January or February of 1960

GRYAZNOV was assigned to the American Embassy Section as a

second assistant to NOSENKO in his code clerk activities.

From this point on, NOSENKO; KOSOLAPOV, and GRYAZNOV shared

the same KGB Headquarters office.

American code clerks as well as the files on all agents

available for work against them, were stored in one large

safe accessible to all three officers. NOSENKO supervised

all of the section's work along these lines, and no provo-

cations, compromises, recruitment attempts,

could have been planned or carried out without his prior

knowledge and agreement when he was in Moscow.

If NOSENKO

was absent on a trip, he would have been told

about any such

activity upon his return.

NOSENKO said that he carefully directed the work of

GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV during these two years, discussing

their cases with them, taking part in operational planning,

and approving or disapproving all operational measures.

0001430

160

Top Secret

218€

TS No. 197124

Copy —

---

## Page 169

08,

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

When NOSENKO took over responsibility for operations

against code clerks, he read files on targets and agents,

discussed the situation with MALYUGIN, DEMKIN (the American

Embassy Section case officer responsible for the residents

his findings and

and KLYPIN. Several changes were made as a result, NOSENKO

asserted. In introducing a new program for the work of

the section, NOSENKO suggested the use of third-country

nationals (neither American nor Soviet citizens) for agent

work against code clerks; in line with this suggestion, he

personary recruitea a Syrian military officer!

Samih WEISS] 08,0 €

(see p. 181); and directed him against the America House.

After his first few visits, WEISS was specifically targetted 06

against military code clerk Matthew_ ZUJUS.

another such 05,06

agent directly handled. by NOSENKO wasthe Finnish business= 0806

man Johan PREISFREUND, who figured in the case of the

military code clerk James STORSBERG (see p. 166) • NOSENKO

also suggested initiating activity against code clerks prior

to their arrival in the USSR and specifically proposed that

operational measures be undertaken or that operational

possibilities be studied in Helsinki, the city through which

most of the American code clerks passed on their way to

MOSCOW:

Comment:

Questioned later on individual cases, NOSENKO

retracted his assertion that he read and

studied all the files on individual American

code clerks, stating instead that he did not

tea all at one an a and mason on.

code clerks received from microphones, agents

and the like, and routed the reports to the

case officer concerned.

161

5/BR

Top Secret

0001431

TS. No. 197124

10

Copy

---

## Page 170

14-00000

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

easy regrites

GOLITSYN's Information About KGB Operations Against Embassy

Code

Clerks in 1960-1961

The most significant collateral information about KGB

operations against American code clerks in this period,

with which to compare NOSENKO's assertions lon this topic,

is that provided by GOLITSYN after his defection in 1961.

GOLITSYN identified KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZNOV by name and

from photograph as being two veteran KGB officers, personally

known to him, who were in 1960 "working against code clerks

in the American Embassy in Moscow."

With respect to the

priority attached to the recruitment of American code clerks

in 1960, GOLITSYN commented in 1961 that:

"The task of

strengthening of work against Americans had been a standing

requirement, both in the past and most particularly lin

This work was particularly intensified after the

appointment of SHELEPIN. to the KGB...

In 1960, it was

recommended in the KGB to intensify the work against the

Americans at the Embassy in Moscow, and against American

colonies

In other, countries...

This question of intensifying

work against the

Americans was up before the Collegium of

the KGB.

Thereafter there was a directive from SIIFLEPIN

regarding the intensification of work against the American

cipher-clerks."

GOLITSYN said that NOSENKO was not assigned to the Embassy

Section in 1960-1961, since if he had been GOLITSYN would

have known about it.

Preparing for his assignment to llelsinki, GOLITSYN. in

the spring of 1960 visited the Embassy Section and learned

from GRYAZNOV. that the latter had as an agent an Embassy

code clerk who was scheduled to be transferred to Helsinki.

The code clerk had already provided the KGB with

some infor-

mation and he was considered by the KGB to be a "real"

agent.

GOLIISYN was told by GRYAZNOV that, if the code clerk's

transfer materialized, GOLITSYN might have him in Helsinki

as his agent.

0001432

162

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy -

---

## Page 171

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

GOLITSYN also learned from GRYAZNOV in spring of 1960

that the latter had developed an operation against an

Embassy military code clerk in which the KGB was "99 per

cent sure" that the target would be recruited:

GRYAZNOV informed GOLITSYN in April or May 1960 that an

American employee of the Embassy in Moscow, possibly a code

clerk, was either recruited or prepared for recruitment on

the basis of homosexual: compromise beginning in 1959 and

concluding in 1960. The KGB had photographed the American

in various homosexual acts but SHELEPIN, who had just become

homosexual blackmail was in this instance "too dirty", and

the KGB should find another basis for recruitment. SHELEPIN

did not exclude future use of the photographs, which the KGB

would hold in reserve:

While on a temporary assignment to Helsinki in November

1960, V.V. KOSOLAPOV told GOLITSYN that he had come to

Helsinki in order to accompany an Embassy code clerk back :

to Moscow on the train.

KOSOLAPOV planned to strike

up an

acquaintance with the code clerk which he could continue

to develop in Moscow. In September 1961 a friend of

KOSOLAPOV also visited Helsinki on temporary duty. GOLITSYN

tried to get him to talk about KOSOLAPOV's November train

operation, but KOSOLAPOV's friend would not discuss the

case.

GOLITSYN. reasoned that there would be no reluctance

to discuss the case if it had

been unsuccessful, and that

therefore KOSOLAPOV must have been successful in developing

the code clerk on the train or afterwards.

GOLITSYN learned in January 1961 from V.M. KÖVSHUK that

08jo the Finnish agent Johannes PREISFREUND had recently been.

used in the successful recruitment of an American employee

of the Embassy•

all

163

Top Secret

1IBR

0001433

TS No. 197.124

Copy.

10

---

## Page 172

4-00000

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

* Comment:

TWO Of GOLITSYN's leads may refer to STORSBERG 06

and GARLAND (see below). The other leads, more

than one of

which may refer to the

same

individual, have not resulted in an identifica-

tion of any code clerk target of the KGB.

Operations Against Military Code Clerks

Comment:

According to official U.S. Government records,

Service Attaches of the Embassy in Moscow as

of 1960 shared a single cryptographic center

and a single military code clerk (except when

two code clerks overlapped during periods of

22223

turnover). The military code clerk was respon-

sible for enciphering and deciphering the

traffic of all three military services. In

practice, at least one other member of

Service Attaches' offices in Moscow held a

cryptographic clearance and was trained to

replace the regular military code clerk when

the latter was absent.

(James STORSBERG was

the only military code 06,8

clerk assigned to the Moscow Embassy from

February 1960 to September 1961, when his

successor, Matthew ZUJUS, arrived. (STORSBERG] Ü6

himself arrived in Moscow in January 1960 and

departen to ember de Sees tour in

Moscow, back-up.

cryptographic dutes were per-

CIVO-2 HURLEY HURLEY performed these duties

on a number of occasions, including the night

of the KGB approach to (STORSBERG, and he could Ob

be loosely termed a code clerk.

(Although

NOSENKO has distinguished between (STORSBERG'S U6

function as "military code clerk" and HURLEY's U6

duties as

"military code machine mechanic", he

considered both to be within the general category

0001434

164

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy -

---

## Page 173

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Comment:

(Continued)

of "military code clerks". NOSENKO reported

that there was no KGB operation against

06 HURLEY. ) Additionally, HURLEy performed repair 06

work on the cryptographic machines and directed

certain other sensitive activities at the

Embassy D6. HURLEY's tour in Moscow began shortly

06 before (STORSBERG's, in December 1959, and he

served there until June or July 1962.

The only other person performing official

functions in the military code room during the

1960-61 period was James KEYSERS, who arrived 06

in Moscow on 22 December 1960 and was assigned

to the office of the Air Force Medical Officer.

As a concurrent secondary assignment, KEYSERS 06

worked as a clerk-typist in the office of the

Air Attache. From February until mid-April

1961, as a collateral duty. KEYSERS worked in06

the joint military code room where he was in

training to serve as back-up cryptographer.

He was relieved of this duty in April 1961

• for

reasons of low

aptitude and lack of interest;

in June 1961 he was removed from Moscow because

of

reported homosexual activities.

The significance of the following cases,

particularly that of SToRSBERg, is the extent06

to which collateral information corroborates

or contradicts NOSENKO's claims to have been

Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section.

to have supervised all KGB operations against

Embassy code clerks, and to have certain know-

ledge that no Americans'in the Embassy were

recruited between "ANDREY" (Dayle SMITH) in

1953 and NOSENKO's defection in 1964.

0001435

165

Top Secret

;8/BR

TS No. 197124

10

Copy

---

## Page 174

14-00000

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Attempted Recruitment of STORSBERG] 06

NOSENKO's Information-1962

NOSENKO first'alluded to a KGB attempt to recruit an

unnamed American military code clerk during his initial

meeting with CIA in 1962: He was describing a new technique

(which he later claimed to be his own idea) introduced in

the 1960-1961 period to overcome the reluctance of Americans

in Moscow to develop friendships with Soviet citizens.

in: 19%0 che

Beginning in 1960 the KGB instructed "third-national"

agents

(Germans, Frenchmen; and Finns; for example) to visit the

American Club on Kropotkinskaya Naberezhnaya to cultivate

American enlisted men living there.

(GOLITSYN learned of

one such agent of NOSENKO and the KGB concluded that GOLITSYN

had reported the KGB practise to the Americans, because

foreigners no. longer were permitted to enter the America

House billets freely for dances, movies, and the like at

the club there.)

NOSENKO had recruited the agent known to

GOLITSYN in order to develop an American military code

clerk. Without identifying either the foreign agent or the

American target, NOSENKO provided further details on the

case in subsequent meetings.

Recruiting a military code clerk from the Embassy was the

American Embassy Section's "number one assignment"

• and for

a year NOSENKO was involved in an operation against such a

target almost to the exclusion of all other duties.. The

case was considered to be the "number one" case, and KGB

Chairman SHELEPIN as well as Second Chief Directorate Chief

GRIBANOV impatiently inquired as to its progress.

The target

was an American Army sergeant with about 20 years' service U8

who, the KGB learned, wanted to retire and take a position

as a code clerk with

che State Department. For the purpose U8

of developing the target, NOSENKO recruited a foreigner who

visited the USSR frequently.

The "third-national" agent was

placed in contact with the American, and they had several

drinking bouts together. After about two months; NOSENKO

instructed his agent to take the American to the

agent's

hotel room and introduce him there to a KGB female agent.

3/BR

166

0001436

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

---

## Page 175

Top Secret

AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Although the girl and the American were intimate, no photo-

graphs were taken, nor were photographs taken the next time

the agent provided the American with a girl..

On the third

such occasion, however, the KGB technicians did obtain

incriminating

photographs: The foreign agent also involved

the American in an illicit currency, transaction in which

the American contributed $300 as his share to finance the

purchase and subsequent sale of some jewels. The American

was allowed to believe that he earned a $5,000 profit:

the

money was actually furnished by the KGb.

After a year's develöpment, GRIBANOV decided that a

recruitment

should be attempted, through another foreigner.

The original foreign agent was withdrawn from the operation,

and a KGB officer, Nikolay Semenovich SKVORTSOV, was

introduced to the American in the guise of wealthy French

businessman "Marcel MICHAUD" • SKVORTSOV/MICHAUD met and

drank with the American several times, "even at America

House": It was SKVORTSOV's estimate that the American was

very careful, but that he might be susceptible to recruitment

while drunk.

After meeting with the American at the club in

America House one evening SKVORTSOV telephoned him and

invited him to SKVORTSOV's hotel room to meet "two Dutch

girls"

When he arrived, SKVORTSOV explained that the girls

had refused to come;

but that he could call another girl for

the American. The girl [identified by NOSENKO in 1964 as

Inga VARLAMOVA] was a KGB agent of GRYAZNOV's who was used

for such operations, and she and the American were intimate

in SKVORTSOV's hotel room.

In an adjacent: room were GRIBANOV,

NOSENKO, KOVSHUK, and another KGB officer. In another

adjacent room were technicians of the Operational Technical

Directorate, who taped the American's conversations. when

the American left SKVORTSOV's room" at two o'clock in the

morning, he was "very tipsy". NOSENKO and another officer

Intercepted him in the hallway, escorted him into the adjacent

room, and locked the door. NÖSENKO himself solicited the

American's collaboration with the KGB in exchange

$20,000 in cash (which was offered in two packages of $10

notes) and the promise of additional sums. When the American

refused, the KGB officers disclosed their knowledge of his

plan to transfer to the State Department. They threatened

to inform the Embassy that he had collaborated with the KGB,

in which case he would get neither the cash nor the job with

167

0001437

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy 10

---

## Page 176

4-00000

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY. SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

the State Department, The American was adamant in his

refusal, although he was held in the hotel room all night

long.

At about six o'clock in the morning the KGB officers

received a telephoned report that the Embassy Marine guard

had called America House to advise that the American. was

needed at the Embassy because an enciphered telegram had

arrived.

The American was then released.

The KGB "knew" that the American did not report the

recruitment attempt.

Using that circumstance for blackmail

rather than the incriminating photographs, the KGB planned

another attempt to recruit him if he ever returned abroad.

When the non-soviet agent used in the first year of

developing the American target had come to the attention of

GOLITSYN, GOLITSYN visited the Embassy Section to see if he

could use him in First Chief Directorate operations abroad.

NOSENKO was on leave at the time, but GOLITSYN talked with

another Embassy Section officer.

GOLITSYN was told "Don't

touch him, he's ours". [The relevance of this incident is

discussed below.]

NOSENKO's Information-1964

At the second 'meeting with CIA in Geneva in 1964, NOSENKO

identified the American military code clerk as "Jim" Vt

STORSBERG.

The foreign agent NOSENKO recruited for the

case was (Johannes PREISFREUND (KGB cryptonym "PROKHOR"),

Finn!! In repeating the substance of his 1962 account of

the KGB recruitment attempt, NOSENKO emphasized his personal

role in directing both PREISFREUND and the KGB officer

SKVORTSOV/MICHAUD.

06

GRIBANOV and KOVSHUK, not NOSENKO, actually made the

recruitment attempt..

NOSENKO was not present; he waited

outside the room with GRYAZNOV. Neither did NOSENKO recruit

C6 PREISFREUND.

The latter was recruited by KOVSHUK "who

needed credit for the recruitment" although NOSENKO had

initially cultivated the Finn.!! Under KOVSHUK's orders,

NOSENKO served as (PREISFREUND' &6 case officer, although

KOVSHUK accompanied him to operational meetings with the

agent.

TBR

0001438

168

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

---

## Page 177

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

06

(PREISFREUND) was used in no KGB operation other than in

the development of(STORSBERGO His usefulness declined

because he was suspected, particularly by his fellow@innsll

of having some relationship with the KGB.

Comment::

A report of thel Finnish

security service

advised CIA in December 1960 that PREISFREUND] 06

"is a Soviet agent who calls at the America

Club in Moscow and develops Americans in an

attempt to penetrate Western circles"

After GOLITSYN's defection lin December 1961] NOSENKO (who

had by then transferred back to the Seventh Department) and

KOVSHUK concluded that (PREISTREUND) thereby had been identi- 06

fied as a KGB agent to American Intelligence; and that

06 PREISFREUND should not be used again against American

Embassy personnel. NOSENKO was told to use the (Finn in li

Seventh Department operations, but he

was unsuitable since

he knew only Finnish and Russian.

NOSENKO's Information-1965

In the

February-March 1965 interrogations NOSENKO

provided some additions as well as further amendments to

what he had related earlier about (STORSBERG. U GRYAZNOV wrote

the initial operational plan, which NOSENKO read and

approved. The plan called for a detailed study of (STORSBERG O6

and the creation of some basis on which to make an opera-

tional approach

The case developed slowly in 1960. From

Ja female clerk named YAZHINSKAYA and other employees- in the

Finnish Embassy, (FREISFREUNDJobtained background information 06

on (STORSBERG

who sometimes visited the sauna in the Finnish O

Embassy

in order to strike up an acquaintance with STORSBERG and 86

when he was successful, he managed to lureSTORSBERG to his06

hotel room,

where the KGB obtained incriminating photographs

06 of STORSBERG and the female agent Inga VARLAMOVA. (STORSBERG1,06

visited PREISFREUND's rooms many times at different hotels

O in Moscow, but the KGB took incriminating photographs on

169

Top Secret

2215R

0001439

TS No. 197124

Copy

10

---

## Page 178

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

06

only two occasions. (PREISFREUND introduced STORSBERG] to

SKVORISOV, and when they had become acquainted, SKVORTSOV

O6 invited STORSBERG to his room at the Leningrad

Hotel on a

number of occasions; but STORSBERGI always refused. On one Ot

evening in the midale of 1961, however, STORSBERG accepted O6

SKVORTSOV's invitation in the belief that he would meet

non-soviet girls. NOSENKO was in the hotel and he had

made arrangements with the KGB Operational Technical

Directorate to call at once if audio coverage of the American

Embassy indicated anything which might affect the recruitment

attempt.

While NOSENKO waited outside the room; GRIBANOV attempted

Ob to recruit (STORSBERG) on ideological grounds; his proposal

was translated by KOVSHUKQ6 STORSBERG, however, must have

given SKVORISOV's hotel room telephone number to someone at

the American Embassy; because while GRIBANOV was talking to

him someone called SKVORTSOV's room looking for the American,

When this happened, either GRYAZNOV Or NOSENKO knocked on

the door and advised KOVSHUK that the Embassy was searching

for [STORSBERG The recruitment attempt was thereupon

terminated, unsuccessfully.

NOSENKO "could not remember" if he had ever read the KGB

file on STORSBERG.U6 [In describing KGB practice, NOSENKO

consistently equated custody of a case file with being the

responsible case officer.] He had no interest in "earlier

reporting", although he had read current materials concerning

OO STORSBERGas they came into the Embassy Section.

Comment: NOSENKO at that time in 1965 was then confronted

NOSE KIne

with the substance of the 1962 meeting trans-

cripts in

which he claimed to have run the

operation, to have been deeply involved in it,

and to have personally spoken to STORSBERG 06

during the recruitment attempt: NOSENKO

interrupted

the reading of the transcript,

calling it "nonsense". He said he was drunk

at all the 1962 meetings in Geneva and

was

nervous in the presence of CIA officers.

He

WiSh

6001440

170

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy -

---

## Page 179

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Comment:

(Continued)

admitted that

he had "painted himself" as being

somewhat more active and important than facts

justified, but said this reflected only

"white lies" which did not affect the otherwise

complete accuracy of his story with respect to

the position he occupied at the time nor the

events which then transpired.

NOSENKO's Information-1966

During the 1964 interrogations NOSENKO had been vague as

to the timing ana sequence of events in the STORSBERG opera-O6

tion, and in 1965 he refused to specify dates for this or

any other operation he described, stating he could no longer

be sure when any particular incident occurred. Questioned

6

again about the STORSBERG case in October 1966, NOSENKO

insisted that he had directed the entire operation from

beginning to end, and that it was his most important case.

At his interrogator's insistence, he provided the following

chronology:

06

January 1960:

STORSBERG arrived in Moscow.

(NOSENKO

accepted the actual date as supplied

by the interrogator.)

Ol.

Early 1960

or.

<PREISFREUND

was recruited by KOVSHUK.

mid-1960:

NOSENKO, after retracting his claim

he recruzted eRDISREUND said he 0b

first met PREISFREUNDT"a week or so 06

after his recruitment" (which occurred,

according to most accounts; in early

1960). In October 1966, however,

NOSENKO said that he and PREISFREUND U

first met "in the middle of 1960, in

the summer of 1960".

06

Summer 1960:

PREISFREUND first provided a woman to

STORSBERG.

06

171

Top Secret

GIBR

6001441

TS. No. 197124

Copy 10

---

## Page 180

4-00000

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Early 1961:

Compromising photographs of (STORSBERG

and a Soviet female were first obtained

at the Hotel Peking in Moscow.

About May.

PREISFREUND was withdrawn from the

1961:

operation and SKVORTSOV was introduced

about three weeks before the approach

to STORSBERG.

06

June 1961:

Unsuccessful KGB approach to [STORSBERG

in the Leningrad Hotel, Moscow.

(Earlier in the 1966 interrogations

NOSENKO had said that the approach was

made "a month of a month and a half

O6 before STORSBERG left Moscow".

Told

06 that STORSBERG was reassigned in

November 1961, NOSENKO said that the

approach was in June 1961, five months

Db before (STORSBERG's departure.)

No. STORSBERG reported that the approach

was in October 1961. See below.]

06

STORSBERG's Information

(STORSBERG did not report the KGB recruitment approach

until the NOSENKO lead prompted his being interviewed by

the FBI on 14 September 1964. His reasons, he said, were

that the KGB officers had warned him not do so and he

ficate had varned

feared that by reporting the approach he would jeopardize

his chance for employment with the State Department.

He

said that he provided no information to the Soviets during

or after the approach in October 1961. With the exception

of the timing of the recruitment attempt, STORSBERG's 06

account of the operation is fairly close to that provided by

NOSENKO, Including the roles of PREISFREUND and SKVORTSOV, U6

whom he

positively identified by their photographs.

He

was unable to identify

photographs of GRIBANOV, KOVSHUK, Of

NOSENKO.

STORSBERG said that he first became acquainted with

U6 PREISFREUND in February of March 1960, he was

i first intimate.

with a female procured by PREISFREUND "six months or so"

0001442

172

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

15/BR

---

## Page 181

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

[e.g., ca. Junel after arriving in Moscow, and it was not

until more than a year later, in September 1961, that he

first met SKVORTSOV, posing as the Frenchman "Marcel

MICHAUD" 6 STORSBERG was uncertain how he became acquainted

with SKVORISOV; stating variously that he met him through

State, Department code clerk Joseph MORONE through friends

at the Finnish Embassy, or that he became acquainted with

SKVORTSOV while he, (STORSBERG was serving as bartender in

the America Club.

During September 1961 STORSBERG was 06

intimate with female friends of SKVORTSOV on two occasions

in SKVORTSOV's hotel room.

In the middle of October lool, on the evening of the KGB

recruitment attempt. STORSBERG. saw SKVORTSOV, MORONE,and

an unidentified female sitting together in the America Club.

Comment:

06

STORSBERG. could not have met(MORONE with

SKVORTSOV in October 19610 MORONE] was trans-

ferred to Lisbon the previous August after he

himself

was compromised by the KGB.

As far as CIA is aware, (MORONF. has never been U

questioned regarding his alleged association

with, SKVORISOV/MICHAUD Or STORSBERG. 06

06.

While MORONE was dancing with the unknown female, (STORSBERG

invited to visit SKVORTSOV's hotel for drinks.

(STORSBERG 06

and SKVORTSOV left the America Club, and [STORSBERG was again Ok

intimate with a Soviet female in SKVORTSOV's hotel room.

It was immediately after leaving SKVORISOV's room on this

night when STORSBERG was accosted by the KGB:

In a signed statement which he gave a representative of

the U.S. Air Force Office of Special Investigations on

29 July 196506(STORSBERG gave somewhat different details:

According to this account, three or four months after

arriving in the Soviet Union in November 1959 (sic), he met

PREISFREUND) through friends at the Finnish Embassy. There-

after PREISFREUND became a frequent. visitor to the America

Club and a friendship developed between the two. On four

06

6001443

173

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy -

10

2118h.

---

## Page 182

14-00000

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

occasions STORSBERG?

was intimate with females,

hotel rooms ObSTORSBERG last saw PREISFREUND6 In PREISFREUND'S

around the end

of September or the beginning of October 1961, when PREIS- D6

FREUND stopped coming to the America Club.

time, he first met SKVORTSOV through MORONE Jat the Americ:

Club. Do MORONE] left Moscow the previous August.] ETORSBERG0G

sure of the exact circumstances of his

introduction

Obto SKVORISOV nor did he know the latter's relationship with

After meeting STORSBERG,)SKVORTSOV frequently

Visited the America Club and actively cultivated [STORSBERE's 06

friendship. This soon led to an invitation to visit

SKVORTSOV's apartment, where STORSBERG was intimate with aut

Soviet female acquaintance of SKVORTSOV.

second visit to the apartment; about a week after the first,

a that apatie

It was after a

that the KGB made its recruitment approach. According to

O this as well as (STORSBERG's earlier account, the approach

occurred in the middle or toward the end of October 1961.

In connection with an OSI security interview on 5 August

19650 STORSBERG denied having furnished defense information

to any "Communist intelligence agency" or having ever agreed

to do so, that he had been contacted by a member of a foreign

intelligence agency since his return to the United States,

or that he knew of anyone at the American Embassy in Moscow

who had been contacted by a member of a "Communist intelli-

gence agency".

He also denied having agreed in any way with

PREISFREUND, to buy diamonds. U6 (STORSBERG's denial with

respect to the diamonds is in contradiction both with the

specific assertions of NOSENKO and with GOLITSYN's more

general allegation that the unnamed American was recruited

by the KGB after being compromised by FREISFREUNDJin illicit

speculation.1

PREISFREUND's Information

-

10

CIA interviewed PREISFREUND in July 1965 in Helsinki

[NOSENKO himself had suggested that PREISFREUND wOuld D6

confirm his story of the (STORSBERG case. 16 WhiTe PREISFREUND 06

correctly identified photographs of KOVSHUK, NOSENKO, and

U STORSBERG, he maintained initially that he had only a

business relationship with KOVSHUK and NOSENKO, that he never

had

anything to do with the KGB, and that he did not even

know what the initials "KGB" stood for.

0001444

174

Top Secret

24:5R

TS No. 197124

Copy

---

## Page 183

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

PREISFREUND finally admitted, however, that he had been

involved in a KGB operation against STORSBERG and he agreed Ub

to tell "the entire truth". His version of the case, while

containing some internal contradictions, only partially

coincided with that provided by NOSENKO. (PREISFREUND 06

claimed to be hazy on the date of all events connected with

his

contacts with the KGB: The dates, however, could be

reconstructed from the known dates of otherwise related events

which he said occurred about the time he was recruited or

0o first met STORSBERGor last visited the America House, and

so forth.] He described being recruited by KOVSHUK, first

dating the event as at the end of 1959 or the beginning of

1960, and later as March-April 1960. According to PREIS- U6

FREUND, he was

"cultivated" neither by NOSENKO or by KOVSHUK.

The first time he met either was when he was confronted and

recruited by KOVSHUK under threat of prosecution for black-

market dealings.

[NOSENKO is unaware of that feature of

PREISFREUND's recruitment.] On NOSENKO's and KOVSHUK's

instructions, about six months after PREISFREUND's recruit-06

ment, he became acquainted with STORSBERG, and in the summer 06

of 1960 on one occasion he lured /STORSBERG into intimacy with 06

a female KGB agent (earlier identified by NOSENKO) in his

hotel room.

He never

saw STORSBERG again; nor did he 00

participate in any other KGB operations:

Referring to the night STORSBERG was intimate with the

girl shared his bed. At one point during the evening he

glimpsed NOSENKO in the hallway, wearing a rubber apron.

He deduced from this that NOSENKO had been involved in

surreptitious photography of(STORSBERG and the girl.

Comment:

NOSENKO stated that photographs were taken of

06

STORSBERG and a girl in (PREISFREUND's hote106

room. He

has never

said anything to suggest,

however, that he ever personally was involved

in photographing any of the compromises he

claims to have arranged, nor has he ever

claimed any competence in clandestine photo-

graphy.

175

Top Secret

TIBR

C001445

TS No. 197124

10

Copy

---

## Page 184

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

06

Before his last meeting with CIA, PREISFREUND mentioned

that he was planning to visit Leningrad with his family,

but that he had learned from business contacts in Moscow

that Soviet authorities suspected him of complicity in

NOSENKO's defection.

He was apprehensive and particularly

concerned that the KGB might suspect that he had related

nis role in the STORSBERG case to American Intelligence. 06

During his final meeting with CIA on 13 July 1965LPREIS- 06

FREUND asked his interviewers for advice as to whether he

should or should not travel to the USSR. He was told that

if the situation was as he described, it could be quite

dangerous for him to return. PREISFREUND stated then thatÜ6

he agreed, that he would not go to the USSR after all.

Stutt no *

Comment:

PREISFREUND]did shortly thereafter visit the

Soviet Union as he planned, and according to

| Finnish official travel records returned to

10 Helsinki on 24 July 1965.

From his apparent

immunity to KGB pressure, it is concluded that

do PREISFREUND]is to some degree still under KGB

control:

GOLITSYN's Information

GOLITSYN,

who served as a KGB First Chief Directorate

counterintelligence officer in Helsinki until his defection

in December 1961, reported that he had met in Helsinki on

several occasions in 1960 a Finn by the name of PREISFREUND O8, 06

whom he wished to use operationally. In December 1960

(GOLITSYN's passport showed that it

1961] GOLITSYN visited the Second Chief Directorate's

American Department in Moscow to request the permission of

KOVSHUK to use PREISFREUND against Americans in Finland 06

KOVSHUK refused the request with the explanation

that

061

(PREISFREUND) "helped in one recruitment now, and it is

necessary to be careful for about six months so as not to

arouse American_suspicions". GOLITSYN learned from KOVSHUK

that PREISEREUND had met the target at America Club in

Ob

0001446

176

Top Secret

1318h

TS No. 197124

Copy

---

## Page 185

Top Secret:

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Moscow and had involved him in speculatory activities and

lured him into intimacy with various female KGB agents.

According

to KOVSHUK, the recruitment was accomplished "in

1960, at the end of 1960"; PREISFREUND "had helped to create06

the circumstances" and had been withdrawn from the operation

before the actual, approach, which was made by KGB officers.

The American target of PREISFREUND, from what KOVSHUK relatede6

to GOLITSYN, was either a code clerk or diplomat..

(GOLITSYN

later expressed his personal belief that the individual

probably was unmarried and might have been a "military

man".)

Comment:

06

If GOLITSYN's lead is not to STORSBERG

but to

some other_American code clerk against whom

PREISFREUND was used, NOSENKO's claim to have

supervised all such code clerk operations is

refuted.

06

Attempted Recruitment of STORSBERG:

Summary and Conclusion

In the absence of contrary evidence, it is judged that

GOLITSYN's lead refers tö STORSBERG. 06 The role of PREISFREUND 06

is the key to this determination.

While the time of the

operation remains

in dispute, GOLITSYN's timing is judged to

be the most plausible because of the circumstances under

which he acquired his information.

These circumstances--

GOLITSYN's visit to and discussion with KOVSHUK in Moscow,

about the use of PREISFREUND are confirmed by NOSENKO and 06

the date, January 1961; is established by passport informa-

tion. It follows that the operation against (STORSBERG] thus 06

would have taken

place more than six months prior to the time

NOSENKO and STORSBERG claimed.

Such a significant inaccuracy 06

by NOSENKO, about an event which he said took place less

than a year before he described it to CIA (in June 1962),

undermines his claim to the role he played in the case and

hence to his position as Deputy Chief of the American Embassy

Section and supervisor of code clerk operations:

0001447

177

Top Secret

1015R.

TS No. 197124

Copy 10.

---

## Page 186

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Attempted Defection of KEYSERS,

U.S. Army Specialist Fifth Class James KEYSERS served

in Moscow from al December 1960 as an assistant to Embassy

o a been ear 107 placant ten with

Meaica_ Officer Donala C. MARTIN, an Air Force Captain.U6,U8

KEYSERS was the replacement of Staff Sgt. J.G. BRADLEY who 06

had been earlier withdrawn from Moscow because he was a

homosexual. Besides his duties with the Medical Officer,

Ö (KEYSERS was assigned administrative functions in the office

of the Air Attache:@ KEYSERS was trained also to pertorm

back-up cryptographic duties under James STORSBERG in the06

military code room; but he was relieved of this duty in

April 1961. Because of his admitted homosexual tendencies,

Ob (REYSERS) was removed from Moscow by his American superiors

on 16 June 1961.

NOSENKO first spoke of what turned. out to be the

KEYSERS case in Geneva in 1962; but without naming the KGB

target or identifying him as STORSBERG's replacement.

The 06

KGB and Embassy officials almost simultaneously discovered

the American to be a homosexual, he said; and when the KGB

found out that the target was to withdraw from the Soviet

Union, a letter offering him asylum in the USSR was sent to

the American:

NOSENKO himself followed up the letter by

personally repeating the KGB offer to the American at the

airport just before his departure.

On 24 January

I964 NOSENKO described the KGB attempt

to recruit STORSBERG and then proceeded to repeat his 1962

description of the KGB action taken against STORSBERG's 06

replacement, whom he identifiea as ZUJUS•l Several days

later, NOSENKO telephoned the Geneva safehouse and requested

an urgent meeting with CIA.

Do not usu, bue estataxe set no Quite a bat was 06

KEYSERS donot ZUJUS Jhe said was

the homosexual code clerk

whom he NOSENKO had personally

accosted at the airport.

0001448

19/188

178

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

---

## Page 187

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

NOSENKO's Information

KEYSERS was STORSBER's replacement as military code

clerk, and the KGB "sensed at once." that he was a homo-

sexual, and the case preoccupied NOSENKO the exclusion of

• NOSENKO and other KGB officers, for

example, chased KEYSERS.all over Moscow, attempting (without

success) to confront their target.in compromising circum

stances.

The Anerican

Ice ballet: (Ice Capades troupe) came

to Moscow, and (KEYSERS. became involved at America House with

some of its male homosexual members.

The Embassy Security

Officer learned of (KEYSER] activities at about the same time 06

NOSENKO learned of them through a KGB agent 06The KGB woulo

have preferred to attempt to recruit KEYSERS,

but it learned

that he was to be withdrawn_from the Soviet Union. The KGB

then

sent a letter: to KEYSERS at his:room in America House,

pointing out the trouble he was in, and offering him asylum

in the USSRUb KEYSERS did not respond to the letter. On the

Obday of KEYSERS] departure, KGB surveillants reported that he

had left America House for the airport, accompanied by an

Assistant Army Attache. NOSENKO sped to the airport and in

the terminal building found occasion to approachKEVSERS D6

alone. NOSENKO asked if (KEYSERS had thought about the offer 06

in the letter, but KEYSERS did not respond and immediately 0/

reported the approach-to the officer escorting him.

In the 1965 interrogations NOSENKO added only that at

the

time. NOSENKO approached KEYSERS at the airport, the KGBOG

had concluded thatCKEYSERS had not

reported receipt of the e

letter inviting him to defect, because no information to

this effect was obtained from microphones or telephone taps

in the Embassy:

06-

KEYSERS: Information

06.

Prior to his departure from Moscow KEYSERS acknowledged

to his superiors his homosexual tendencies and he admitted

involvement in three homosexual incidents, all 'at America

HOuSE

He was rebuffed by a Marine guard in March 1961,

and he twice engaged in homosexual acts with members of the

Ice Capades troupe in May.

He denied any public display of

his homosexuality but said he could not be sure that someone

had not entered his room at America House while he and a

homosexual partner were asleep.

179

16IBR

Top Secret

0001449

TS. No. 197124

Copy 10

---

## Page 188

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

In a debriefing in west Germany on 26 June 1961,/KEYSERS}06

related the events leading to his withdrawal from Moscow.

On 15 June he had been called to the office of Army Attache

Colonel URBAN, who advised him that he was being transferred

from Moscow the following day for excessive drinking, and

cautioned him not to reveal the reasons for his transfer.

Comment:

06

NOSENKO's information generally coincides with

Teen discussed between Security Officer John

ABIDIAN and Army Attache, Colonel HOFFMAN

→ a U6

conversation which HOFFMAN concludes was among

those sensitive matters compromised by micro-

phones later discovered in the Army Attache

offices.

Similarly, Colonel URBAN's conversa-Ub

Ob tion informing KEYSERS of his impending transfer

was concluded to have been monitored by the

same KGB microphones, from which the KGB would

do tave keyses aid tapo to No receipt ottion.

defection letter to his superiors.

Ob (KEYSERS described the

Russian who approached

him at the airport as being 40 to 45 years old,

about 5 feet 8 inches tall, approximately ?25

pounds, and having a dark complexion and light

hair.

NOSENKO was then 34 years old, and he is

several inches taller and not rotund.

When

(KEYSERS) was shown photographs of NOSENKO, he

did not recognize him.

According to NOSENKO, the KGB "sensed at

Doonce" that (KEYSER$was a homosexual.

He is

unaware of

certain information relating to

O6 KEYSERS! homosexual activities, drinking, and

difficulties with his superiors, although that

information was available through KGB agents in

America House and had been widely discussed in

Embassy offices in which microphones had been

emplaced. No KGB officer directly connected

0001450

180

Top Secret

iS/BR

TS No. 197124

Copy -

---

## Page 189

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Comment:

(Continued)

06

06

with the case could regard KEYSERS. as STORSBERGIS:

replacement .06 KEYSERS arrived in Moscow almost

a year before STORSBERGs departure, and was 06

assigned to the Air Attache office.

ZUJUS.. 06

(STORSBERG's replacement, arrived in Moscow and

worked with STORSBERG about three months before

STORSBERG, departed Moscow. KEYSERS stated

NOSENKO was not the person who approached him

at the airport. NOSENKO, in asserting that he

was, forgot the name of the single American

target whom he ever personally confronted.

Developmental Operation Against ZuJus) 06

recruited and hanaled Syrian army officer Samih WEISS.

in february 1964 NOSENKO reported that he had personat t

"main agent" in a KGB

developmental operation against U.s.

0:

6

06

Army Sergeant Matthew Peter ZUJUS,06 ZUJUS arrived in Moscow

in September 1961 to assume the military code clerk duties

of STORSBERG) and he remained there until January 1963.

NOSENKO did not recall the ZUJUS case until he was reminded 06

of it by a reference to Samin WEISS which was among his

notes which he brought to Geneva. 0b

NOSENKO's Information

06

NOSENKO recruited (WEISS, a Syrian from Damascuss in 1961.

WEISS was a captain or major in the Syrian Army who was

studying at the Tank Academy. He visited the America Club,

and when he identified ZUJUS by photograph as one of the 06

to pay any attention to anyone else. WEISS

something in common in that zuJUS had been stationed in Ol

Lebanon and the Syrian was from Damascus, only a short

distance away.0/WEISS merely studied and developed ZUJUS 00

during conversations at the

America Club.

on one occasion,

O6 when [ZuwUs] agreed that it would be nice to have some Lebanese] /

voaka, the KGB arranged for some to be sent from the KGB Legal

Residency in Beirute and WEISS presented it to ZuJusas a

gift from friends 10

181

0001451

JIBR

Top Secret

TS. No. 197124

Copy: 10

---

## Page 190

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

ZUJUS!'

case officer was GRYAZNOV, and besides handling the

Ob "main agent" WEISS, NOSENKO supervised GRYAZNOV's activities

with respect to ZUJUS,06 NOSENKO read the Second Chief Directo-

rate file on the American, as well as all reports as they

came into the Embassy Section, and he discussed the case

with GRYAZNOV, KOSOLAPOV, DEMKIN (the case officer responsible

for America House), and his own superiors. GRYAZNOV wrote

06.

the operational plan, which called for thorough development

by (WEISS) in order to learn everything about him and eventually

Obto introduce an agent to ZUJUS through the Syrian. l Progress

(owas slow because ZUJUS was quiet and reserved and often

stayed alone, even in America House. Although WEISS and 06

O6 ZuJus became acquainted, they did not become good friends.

Ó. On the dạys WEISS planned to visit America House, NOSENKO

met him in hotels or restaurants, never in safehouses.

This

occurred every week or two, depending on WEIsS' availability

When they met the day following wEIsS meetings with ZUJUS, 06

WEISS would report such things as which Americans were

drinking heavily ana who at America House was involved with

which girls from foreign embassies. Although WEISS visited Ot

America House once of twice a month, and drank there with

GorzuJus he reported little of interest.

The KGB learned "something" about ZUJUS family in the

United States, the details of which NOSENKO did not recall:

he was sure, however, that there was nothing unusual or of

interest to the KGB about ZUJUS' family background. There 06

was no information on ZUJUS received from KGB microphones, 06

telephone taps or surveillance, and the_KGB was unaware

any vices or vulnerabilities which ZuJus]may have had. Off

NOSENKO did not know of any other KGB agents working against

ZUJUS. The KGB did not attempt to recruit ZUJUS while Ot

NOSENKO was in the Embassy Section. If there had been a

recruitment attempt later, after he left the Section, NOSENKO

would certainly learned of it from GRYAZNOV.

"Because no one else knew him", at the American Depart-

ment's request NOSENKO continued to manage WEISS' contact

06

D.b

with ZUJUS after NOSENKO transferred to the Seventh Depart-

ment

In March or April 1962 it was planned

Obthat WEISS would invite ZUJUS to a restaurant where he 06

would be

introduced to "a friend", but the meeting had not

0001452

182

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

---

## Page 191

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

materialized before NOSENKO turned

WEIsS over to GRYAZNov

and left for Geneva. When WEISS Peturned to Syria in Aprilll

1962, he was not turned over to the First Chief Directorate:

his file was

sent to Second Chief Directorate archives.

06

ZUJUS' Information

During a routine debriefing by U.S. Army authorities in

O6 1963, ZUJUS confirmed an Embassy Security Öffice report

that

in the summer of 1962(ZUJUS) had been intimate with an Ob

Austrian woman; "Lillian" (last name unknown), who had

visited America House with someone from the United arab

Republic and had returned alone a few days later, when she

was picked up by ZuJuS. since ZuJus]was a cryptographer, 06

the America House manager interviewed "Lillian" and learned

that she claimed to be from Vienna änd to be travelling with

her employer, a Czech.:: When the Embassy Security Officer

learned from the Austrian Embassy that no Austrian passport

had been issued to "Lillian", he asked her for her passport.

She replied that she had forgotten it and then left, saying

she

was going to her

hotel for the passport. She

never

returned to America House.'

Comment:

NOSENKO described this incident, but in

connection with KGB attempts to

entrap. Joseph

MORONE in 1960, not ZUJUS in 1962 0b (See p. 194)

NOSENKO was not in the Embassy Section in 1962.

Interrogation of NOSENKO never resolved how he

Interviewed by a CIA répresentative in November 1965,

DO GUJUS said that as manager of the America Club he had

frequent dealings with Ella UMANETS:06 ZUJUS often used her

an an interpreter in his dealings with other Soviet employees

of America House and

was able to provide considerable back-

ground information about her.

0001453

183

Top Secret

121BR

TS No. 197124

Copy 10

---

## Page 192

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Comment:

NOSENKO has in other contexts identified

UMANETS as a long-time KGB agent employed in

america House. He never related her to fung

06

In that same interview with CIA ZUJUS described having

met in Moscow a person from Damascui who had been

or a person from Beirut!

who had been

in Damascuss he Courage

Amexiea House, bul tutus met him while acting as doorman at

they conversed only for about 15 minutes

Oband ZuJus.could not recall what they had talked about.

He

may

have seen the man on several other occasions, but he

did not know his name nor why he

11

provide no physical descriptiond zurus did not.

and he coul

recall that

this person gave him (Lebanese) vodka, but he acknowledged he

Lavored the beverage. ZUJUST confirmed to CIA that his

father, Matas,lis secretary of the (Lithuanian Roman Catholic L

Allance of America, an emigre organization concerned with

the liberation of Lithuania. ZUJUS indicated that his father

often travels abroad in connection with his emigre activities.

Comment:

Emigre

organizations; including the (Lithuanian)

have been traditional KGB targets and most have

been penetrated by KGB agents.

The fact of the

elder ZUJUS' emigre activities is almost

certainly to have been known to the KGB, making

06 ZUJUS a matter of KGB concern for reasons quite

separate from his cryptographic duties.

agent "Lillian" and relationship with

KGB agent

UMANETS, it is concluded that NOSENKO's role

no supervisory function in the development of

ZUJUS. Of

0001454

184

Top Secret

2218R

TS No. 197124

Copy -

---

## Page 193

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

06

Operations Against State Department Code Clerks

KGB operations against code clerks, for which NOSENKO

claimed supervisory responsibility, included those directed

against State Department cryptographic personnel as well as

military cryptographers at the Embassy.

In several such

cases, NOSENKO's claimed subordinate, KOSOLAPOV, figures

prominently

Development of Paul JENNER 06

NOSENKO first mentioned the (JENNER case in a 1964

interview with the FBI, when he was asked whether he had

ever heard of a case within recent years in which KOSOLAPOV

had travelled to Helsinki, to intercept and establish contact

with

an American code clerk. NOSENKO "immediately recalled"

such

an incident which happened in 1960-1961.

He explained

that because Embassy code clerks were not sufficiently

accessible to the KGB after they arrived in Moscow, it was

decided to send KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki as part of an effort

to probe for a new way to get in touch with the code clerks.

According to NOSENKO, KOSOLAPOV made but one trip to Helsinki

in this new effort, and it was not tried again by others.

NOSENKO identified KOSOLAPOV's target in this operation as

Paul JENNER.

NOSENKO'S Information

06

A month before JENNERs arrival in Moscow the Embassy

Section received a copy Of JENNER's anketa (visa application) O

listing his diplomatic title as Secretary Archivist anc

indicating when he was to enter the Soviet Union from

Finland by train "at the beginning of 1960, in the middle of

the month". Believing him to be a code clerk (he was

subsequently found to be a pouch clerk)y"the group" decided

to send KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki with the mission of accompanying

JENNER\on the train to Moscow to study JENIER's behavior. Ub

JENNER and KOSOLAPOV were about the same ame

KOSOLAPOV waS

to be accompanied by a female agent of GRYAZNOV'S, "SOLISTKA"

a Russian ballerina, who was to board the train after

entered the USSR at Vyborg.

185

Top Secret

0001455

TS No. 197124

10

4IBR

---

## Page 194

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

A proposal for the operation was prepared for the approvai

of the KGB Chairman which explained that code clerks were

assigned to Moscow usually only for one year ithus limiting

their accessibility to the KGB for development) and that it

was necessary to attempt to place an agent near them even

before they arrived in Moscow.

When the Chairman's approval

was granted, NOSENKO prepared the kharakteristika (official

form) on KOSOLAPOV for the trip and gave it to the Personnel

Office. KOSOLAPOV wrote a cable for Helsinki explaining that

he was coming for two or three days. NOSENKO didn't sign the

cable, but read it, and it was taken to KLYPIN for his signa-

ture and thereafter KOSOLAPOV took it to the Second (European)

Department of the First Chief Directorate for release.

was no other correspondence with the Helsinki rezidentura

concerning the operation before KOSOLAPOV departed Moscow.

NOSENKO discussed the plan with GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV and

"maybe" they discussed it with KOVSHUK the day before

KOSOLAPOV left.

KOSOLAPOV had (JENNER's photograph and h1s06

name, and expected that the Helsinki residency could obtain

a ticket for KOSOLAPOV. on (JENNER's train.0 NOSENKO did not

recall precisely when KOSOLAPOV left Moscow or under what

name he travelled. KOSOLAPOV was gone for about a week and

he travelled both ways by train.

NOSENKO read KOSOLAPOV's otchet (official account) of.

his trip, and the réport of the female agent, "SOLISTKA".

According to those reports, KOSOLAPOV became

acquainted on

Othe train with JENNER as planned, as did "SOLISTKA", whom

in Helsinki

ezident about obtaining their help in Helsinki with th

ork against code clerks, and about using Helsinki agent

came of the discussion, however; although the Rezident and

Deputy Rezident said they would see about it, the Embassy

Section

questions",

0001456

186

Top Secret

5.BR

TS No. 197124

Copy -

---

## Page 195

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Although the KGB later discovered that JENNER)was not a

code clerk but a pouch clerk, he remained

a target for

development. Since he did not telephone "SOLISTKA" after

one or two months, the KGB arranged for her to encounter

him at the railroad station or airport when he went alone to

meet the couriers. JENNER saw her but did not approach her,

06

turning away.

The KGB took no further steps to cultivate

JENNER,

The

KGB "had nothing on JENNERJat all except a0b

suspicion he may have been a homosexual, but there

was no

proof".

On 26 October 1966 MOSENKO confirmed the identification

of other CIA sources by identifying a photograph as

that of

Vadim Viktorovich KOSOLAPOV, [born in Perm, 19 February 1928]

his former subordinate of the Embassy Section. The photo-

graph shown NOSENKO was that of one Victor Dmitriyevich

KOLOSSOV, employee of Vneshtorg, born 19 March 1927, in Perm;

who arrived in Finland by train from the USSR on 31 March

061960: [the day JENNER left] and departed on 2 April: NOSENKO

acknowledged that that data accurately refiected KÖSOLAPOV! s

alias, cover, and itinerary during his trip to Helsinki

to

accompany JENNER back to Moscow in 1960.

On 26: October 1966 NOSENKO was confronted with the Finnish

train manifest showing that Paul JENNER]was the single 06

passenger departing Helsinki for Moscow on 31 March 1960

and that KOSOLAPOV/KOLOSOV travelled on 2. April on a train

carrying no Americans.

Repeating the substance of the KGB

operation and citing his recollection from reading KOSOLAPOV's

report of the trip. NOSENKO insisted that KOSOLAPOV travelleo

on the same train with JENNER and that the Finnish manifests

must be in error. [See

accompanying exhibits.]

(JENNER's Information

06

After arriving in Moscow on 1 April 1960 JENNER reported

that he was approached on the train from Helsinki by two

young Russians, "a boy and a girl; probably university

students"

The two Russians struck up a conversation and

were soon

baiting him on the question of racial discrimination

in the United States.

"They

They said that they might see JENNero

in Moscow:

About three months later, on 29 June, (JENNERy.06

was performing his normal duty of escorting Embassy couriers

0001457

187

Top Secret

BIBR

TS No. 197124

Copy 10

---

## Page 196

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

to Sheremetevo Airport when he was again approached by the

Russian girl, "Yuliya", who acted surprised to see him and

asked

him to

go outside to talk.

"Yuliya" explained that

she was waiting to say goodbye to a friend who was leaving

on a flight to Irkutsk JENNER had seen the Irkutsk flight 0b

depart a half hour earlier) and told JENNER that her male 06

companion on the train trip to Moscow, Yura, had returne

to his studies in Vyborg. Interspersed with "Yuliya's"

Obquestions concerning JENNER's impressions and personal

activities in Moscow were others about how often he came to

the airport and how he liked his job at the Embassy.

Then

OU JENtER said he must leave, she gave him her telephone number

In Moscow and insisted that he call her.

She advised JENNLR 06

that "it would be better if you did not mention our conver-

sation to anyone".

06

Comment: As far as CIA is aware,

JENNER has never been

asked to identify KOSOLAPOV's photograph.

Besides information about his Soviet companions on the

Moscow journey, (JENNER also told U,S. Department of State

security officials abóut sexual advances made by his first

maid in Moscow and about provocative clothing worn by his

second maid.

Comment: Although IOSENKO has not identified either of

these women

were KGB agents or informants.

0001458

188

Top Secret

TIBR

TS No. 197124

Copy

---

## Page 197

Top Secret

EXHIBIT I - Complete Train Manifests, Helsinki-Moscow

na.l1a

antinose in tripestee

Jeny, Poul. Frahole

ari134.01b11%.07.23

0.J.A1n"

More in Mine one one,

U.9.4 - Losk. f8

Passiatartantaje

Seekkonog

NOTE:

0b

31 March 1960

JENNER

Isingle international passenger on train.

(Soviet passengers who may have boarded train in

USSR, including at Vyborg, would not be included.)

tejlita, jat

Sd1Ia

Fordlacht, Saur YAlbelu

oux2111011.80710

360090-

20.04,56

0I10t:80.07.M

AtOltan.

Arco111 1a 10.05_27 7:211t05

anolafeet:

trueles..

40-21.24

Jonasar.

2211 Belosa-

YsIJaa ..

Kank

I Kank opertaja

03.09,01

83,07.22

Ichts

13.07:20

27.00.22

109,08,70

503210, AZ1A7 V

t01z1tta1a 0a,12,29

Dol slatt

AA1ttrolat 7,8,06,23

KaTukankI, Dato Nat710a. 1

Jarrines, haTre rehant e Ton

m05.1225: 19.22,20

99x9960r10 57.01.84

940114.

2011aa

této, spot: 05.05.25

JeDake94T051,15.8c7/3

Elo - 1ost.

So agat

coprificat

Jomen-lori, alua (90p707110.

INTED: 110-0051:

1152707119-

LahtA-Zaparojo

(3507.7518)

1ae.2101.

(1587-T1102)

Pannistartastale

Minitan

E. Sauktones

2 April 1960

NOTE:

• No Americans on train with KOSOLAPOV @KOLOSSOV.

0001459

218R

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy .

---

## Page 198

3.618

Top Secret

(AMERICAN ENDASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Information From Other Sources

I. Ye. SERGEVEV, a KGB officer and the Soviet Consul in

Helsinki, contacted

the chief of the Helsinki police on

1631 March 1960 to ask his assistance in locating an American

named (Paul E. JENNER, wilo was due to arrive in Helsinki

the day before. SERGEYEV explained that he had some

"business" with [JENNER, but he did not specify its nature.

Reportedly, this was the first time that SERGiVEV had made

such a request of the police chief. GOLITSVN identified

the Helsinki police chief as a Soviet intelligence agent

request of tie poli

from "about 1945 on".

06

Development of

JINNER:

Summary and Conclusion

NOSENKO's version of the JENNER case in some degree

resembles less

the facts about (JENHER than IGD activities Ov

directed against John GARLAND (see below), activities which

NOSENIO asserts never occurred. GARLAND, not GENNER 0S

travelled on the same train as KOSOLAPOV, and GARLAND, not 06

JENNER, travelled "in the middle of the month".

Residency's query to the Helsinki police chief about (JENNER) Uo

indicates that KOSOLAPOV's cable contained information about

06

JENNER,: not just notice that KOSOLAPOV was coming to Helsinki.

It was at the airport in Moscow, not on the train, that

"SOLISTKA" gave JENNER her telephone number, an event which

Ob wait for JENNER to call. Finally, NOSENKO is unaware of the

actions OF KGB agents who were employed as maids by JENNER. O6

From the foregoing it is concluded that NOSFNKO was neither

KOSOLAPOV's supervisor, nor in this instance, supervisor of

all KGB operations against American code clerks.

189

Top Secret

1518R

0001460

TS No. 197124

-

Copy

10.

---

## Page 199

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

06

Development of John GARLAND

The GARLAND case is of particular significance to

judging the validity of NOSENKO's claim to complete know-

ledge of all KGB operations against American code clerks.

NOSENKO is not merely unaware of KGB action taken with

respect to (CARLANE! he vehemently asserts no such action was

NOSENKO's Information

NOSENKO on 28 January 1964 identified twenty Americans

employed by the American Embassy in Moscow who were of

interest for various reasons to the KGB. He gave a short

06

statement concerning each of the twenty, among which was

GARLAND, about whom NOSENKO said, "Code clerk, but nothin

Later asked to review the list and supply any

additional information he might have, NOSENKO stated that

Obthe KGB was studying GARLAND like the other code clerks, to

gather enough incriminating material to make a recruitment.

NOSENKO did not recall any

he had read the KGB file on GARLAND, "but he thought he must

have read reports concerning him as they came into the

Embassy Section.

There was no operational plan drawn up

Obfor GARLAND] because the KGB developed no derogatory infor-

mation concerning him; no recruitment thus was ever planned

or attempted.

NOSENKO could recall no background informa-

tion concerning GARLAND, such as his travels and acquain-

tances while stationed in Moscow.

Confronted in October 1966 with the evidence (see below]

Of KOSOLAPOV's trip to Helsinki to accompany GARLAND back Ulo

to Moscow on 16 November 1960, NOSENKO was insistent that

there was no such trip, that KOSOLAPOV travelled but once

to Helsinki in connection with JENNER in early 1960, and O

in comection

Ob GARLANDe IGs had taken no such action with respect to

(NOSENKO had earlier reiterated that he was

KOSOLAPOV's direct supervisor from January 1960 until

January 1962 and he would have had to know and to approve

0001461

190

Top Secret

12'3R

TS No. 197124

Copy.

---

## Page 200

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962!

in advance any operational travel performed by his sub-

ordinate outside of the USSR.): Reminded that he transitted

Amsterdam on a direct flight to Cuba on 15 November 1960

the day before KOSOLAPOV left Helsinki with[GARLAND) , Ob

NOSENKO stated that he would have learned of KOSOLAPOV's

travel in any case, whether or not he was in Moscow.

0b

Ob GARLAND's Information

GARLAND was first interviewed on 17 July 1962 by the

Regional Security Officer in Moscow as

' a result of the

Gotten dead. see belowl:

In this interview GARLAND denied 06

having met any Soviet of KOSOLAPOV's physical description

during the Helsinki-to-Moscow train trip and also denied

having been approached by soviet Intelligence.

On 30 July

06 1963 GARIAND was interviewed by the FBI and on 31 July he

was given a polygraph examination. The latter; according

06-

to the FBI, "disclosed no information indicating that

GARLAND was deceptive in his statements to us denying any

association with Vadim Viktorovich KOSOLAPOV or denying ever

knowingly being contacted by any foreign intelligence agent"

GARLAND, by his own statement, took the

train on 16 November

1960 from Helsinki to Moscow, to assume the duties as

supervisor of the state department code room in the Embassy:

GOLITSYN'S Information

GOLITSYN, who was not posted to Helsinki until July 1960,

reported that "about the end of 1960,

about November or

possibly by the beginning of 1961", the KGB Second Chief

Directorate sent a telegram to the Helsinki Legal Residence

advising that an American code clerk would arrive in Helsinki

in transit to Moscow:

The telegram stated that the respon

sible case officer, KOSOLAPOV, would be sent to Helsinki *

alias

and under Vneshtorg cover for the purpose of strikin

up an acquaintance to be continued with the American in

MOSCOW.

The Residency procured for KOSOLAPOV a place in

the American's compartment.

GOLITSYN himself went

to the

train to see off a Soviet delegation returning to Moscow,

and he talked with KOSOLAPOV.

Later in the summer or fall

Of 1961, GOLITSYN met in Helsinki another Second Chief

Directorate officer from the Embassy Section, and he inquired

191

8|B1

Top Secret

0001462

TS. No. 197124

Copy 10

---

## Page 201

4-00000

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

about the case on which he had helped KOSOLAPOV. From the

Embassy Section officer's refusal to discuss the case

GOLITSYN concluded that

it must have resulted in

a success-

ful recruitment; otherwise, the Embassy Section officer

would have been willing to'

talk to him about it.

Shown (GARLAND's photograph by the FBI on 13 March 1962,

GOLITSYN failed to identify it "as being that of the unknown

individual he had seen in the train compartment in Helsinki

with KOSOLAPOV".

Information From Other Sources

KOSOLAPOV arrived by train in Helsinki on 12 November 1960.

The Finnish railroad manifest of passengers travelling from

Helsinki to Moscow on 16 November 1960, lists KOSOLAPOV (as

KOLOSSOV) among eight Soviets aboard the train, and John W.

Do GARLAND

• the only American. [See accompanying exhibit.)

As he had with regard to (JENNER (see above), SERGEYEV Of

the KGB Legal Residency in Helsinki on 1l November 1960

asked the local police chief (and KGB agent, according to

GOLITSYN) for help in locating GARIAND? an American who would

arrive there on 14 November.

Development Of CARLAND; Summary and Conclusion

entailing KOSOLAPOV's travel to Helsinki. NOSENKO denies

(with a vehemence which the foregoing summary cannot accurately

reflect) that KOSOLAPOV

connection with JENNER& ravelled to Helsinki except ir

and his assertion thus cannot be

"smissed as the product of faulty recollection in which he

Confuses the casescof JENNER) and CARLAND.

NOSENKO's denial of the facts of the GARLAND]case is fatal

to his claims that he was KOSOLAPOV's supervisor, and that

he supervised all KGB operations against American code clerks.

soreover, the KGB action in the GARLAND case impugns NOSENKO' S06

claim that, as one time Deputy Chief of the Section, he would

necessarily know of any operations mounted against Embassy

code clerks.

192

0001463

1218

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy -

---

## Page 202

Top Secret

EXHIBIT ? - Complete Train Manifest, Helsinki-Moscow

Luettelo malhustajisto, jaka

ма і!

Junalla

seios-Sinecon

TaLs1Ikelen

toabatana)

....doete : ="f-=='196

Asaoserti qai erro

буперіаветня

Kaereinten

MATlEaas

Oodtoc Scametin,

L'OUTaVIOVE; HODIa

PASTO, RalI..

SoTOBOT, Alozandro

V.

.S0suln..

01pl..

k1=1011110

..1019

alphatuI._

a1pl..

otohazovak1..ales.dve

CeTislOTa,.

Laria k

rOUYA

.1922

Solon-iT, Taktor

VI1II0 10.05.27

-ESCIBnov,.

Carnik

.1922

Lkolsine..

Potr

s1Kustait

•1013

0600

La1I, Jcan Lantiato

Coxlend, Jokn IT

aipl.kur.

17:08.07

sihtoorl

22,03.33

ruchera, Henry Charles

tato o1bt.

a1pl

Bantaleinan, datu Ilnarl.

kIIveamias

14.1.19

Oksenen, Frans Oukar

sabk. asent

25.05.00

maos 5elkkl Juhant

Гат И 101207-Kand 22.02.20

N:111ton

N.111tto

Lahotyato. I1.

EOst1

N:111tto/N-8-F ,Kouttalulku

1:111tto

•:

Renakon

US1 :a

Suemen

Kouttakulku:

Ulkoasteinniniater10.

Eultiok. C.H.05, B61.

4.I1ngg,20.8.89: 161.

I1veltos1nt- 23-G, Ek1

Pesaintarcasraja:

_Titonlkanat.

вв.

Ainrenin

Saukkonen

NOTE :

November 1960

ipMuENd KOBOLAPOY exozossior exavallead on scur

0001464

ZBR

Top Secret

TS No.

197124

Copy

---

## Page 203

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

KGB/Polish UB Operations Against MORONE

At his first meeting with CIA on 9 June 1962 NOSENKO

made a son he an up so the ate n

Warsaw and later brought the agent to Moscow to further

compromise the American.

On 11 June 1962 NOSENKO was asked

whether he had foreign (non-Russian) agents working against

the American Embassy, and he replied that he himself

introduced the idea

of using

such agents to develop

Americans afraid of becoming involved with Russian girls.

He had several such agents, he said, and

he sometimes asked

the East German and Polish

security

services to supply him

with such agents.

As an example, NOSENKO cited the case

of a Marine guard and a code clerk from the Embassy who

travelled to Warsaw.

The code clerk was intimate with a

Polish female agent, whom NOSENKO had planted in their

train compartment, on the train to Warsaw, and later in

MOSCOW.

In an FBI interview on 24 February 1964 NOSENKO

were mentioned, he immediately identified them as the men

involved.

NOSENKO's Information

06

MORONE!'s case officer was NOSENKO's subordinate and

specialist in code clerk operations, KOSOLAPOV, NOSENKO read

3b the file on MORONE, and saw his visa photograph, but never

saw him in person.

NOSENKO discussed the MORONE] case with

.06

KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZNOV on a number of occasions. Several

KGB agents were employed against MORONE) including foreigner:

as well as Soviet citizens.

06

193

Top Secret

71BR

0001465

TS No. 197124

Copy

10

---

## Page 204

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Svetlana IVANOVA, a maid or waltress at America House

Interesting or useful.

SARWAT EL SHAZLY, an Egyptian employed at the Egyptian

Embassy and an agent of the Sixth (Underdeveloped Countries)

Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorâte, visited

America House and met MORONE, but he reported nothing of

value that NOSENKO recalled. 06

Pietro CECCHI, an Italian cook at the American Embassy

and KOSOLAPOV's agent, reported everything he heard or saw

about Americans to KOSOLAPOV, but NOSENKO recalled nothing

specific that CECCHI had reported about MORONE.

In early 1960 GRYAZNOV went to East Berlin to obtain two

German women who could be used against the residents of

America House.. One of these, Hanna, a blonde, was documented

as a West German. NOSENKO never met her but instructed

PRETSFREUND (see the STORSBERG) Case) to take her to America

House and leave her on her own. Hanna went several times to

America House in 1961, but NOSENKO can recall nothing that

she may have reported on MORONE! The second East German

girl was documented as an Austrian,

NOSENKO never met her

but he recalled that she was asked

for her documents at

America House on her first or second visit there.

She

replied that she had left them at her hotel, left America

House, and never returned. (NOSENKO did not remember the

time when this incident occurred, beyond the fact that he

was still in the Embassy Section and that ABIDIAN was the

Embassy security officer at the time.)

From one of these agents, Or possibly in some other

manner, the KGB learned that MORONE was planning to go on

leave in Warsaw. NOSENKO, KOSOLAPOV, and GRYAZNOV thereupon

decided to employ a Polish female agent in an attempt to

compromise him.

KOSOLAPOV wrote the draft of the operational

plan for the attempt, which was approved by GRIBANOV after

0001466

194

Top Sécret

4/BR

TS No. 197124

Copy -

---

## Page 205

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION. - January 1960-January 1962)

some editing by NOSENKO and KOVSHUK. KOSOLAPOV next met

witil a Polish UB counterintelligence officer in KGB Head-

quarters to discuss the plan.

The Pole was told that the

target was an American Embassy employee, but not that he

was a code clerk; this fact was deliberately kept from the

Poles:

As a result of this meeting, a Polish girl was obtained

by the Polish UB and sent to Moscow by train.

Upon her

arrival she was met by KOSOLAPOV, who took her to a Moscow

hotel where he gave ner instructions concerning her role

in the operation. The girl was told to meet MORONE on the 06*

train, flirt with him, have him fall in love with her,

continue the association, and study him.

She was to tell

him that she had been in loscow as a guest of her uncle, a

member of the Polish Trade Representation in Moscow, and

that she could meet nim again on her next visit.

Arrangenents were made with the KGB Operational Technical

Directorate for a technician to be placed on the train in

the compartment next to that of MORONEjand his companion, Ob

Ob BEGGS, for audio and visual (but not protographic) coverage:

NOSENKO did not recall when MORONE and BEGGS left 4oscow:

The Polish agent did, however, succeed in naking MORONEY's U8

acquaintance, and the technician from the Operational Direc-

torate reported back to NOSENKO the day after the train

reached Warsaw. The technician told NOSENKO the girl had

engaged in sexual intercourse with MORONE during the trip.ol

The technician also reported that the tape recordings ob-

tained were of poor quality.

Comment:

At this juncture in NOSENKO's interrogation

ne was reminded that he was en route to Cuba

on 15 November 1960 and did not return to

Moscow until mid-December, and that State

Department records indicated tnat MORONE and b

BEGGS left Moscow on 13 November and arrived

on the following day... NOSENKO responded that

instead of naving talked to the technician

personally, he may have read the technician's

0001467

195

G/8R

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy 10

---

## Page 206

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Comment: (Continued)

report and had seen "the film strips" after

his return from Cuba, NOSENKO, it will be

noted, had said earlier that there was no

photographic coverage of MORONS's train

compartment.

06

Because the KGB still lacked compromising materials,

KOSOLAPOV prepared a paper requesting that the girl again

be brought to Moscow and permission to acquire compromising

photography during her visit. The requests were approved

by higher KGB authority.

When the girl arrived, KOSOLAPOV

met her alone and took

her to the Hotel Peking, to a

The girl called MORONEl at Americat

room two of three times, during which photographs were taken.

These were placed in the KGB's file on MORONE]. Ohe did not

fall in love with the girl, as the KGB had hoped, and she

had no further contacts with him.

Although the KGB had the compromising photography, it

was felt that there were insufficiently incriminating to

attempt to recruit MORONE. The KGB wanted to trap him in

the apartment of a Soviet woman, to catch him in something

that was definitely prohibited.

For this purpose, Svetlana

IVANOVA (see above) was supposed to lure MORONE) out of 06

America House to somewhere in Moscow, but before anything

further could be done, the Americans ordered MORONE] out of06

Moscow before the end

of his tour, possibly because they

were concerned about his association with IVANOVA. There-

fore, NOSENKO said, the

KGB made no attempt to recruit

MORONE 06

NOSENKO has also plailed

(to the FBI) that no attempt

was made. to recruit MORONE because Khrushchev instructed

the KGB to refrain from any action which might affect the

improvement in relations which the Soviets sought with the

United States.

196

0001468

Top Secret

9182

TS No. 197124

Copy -

---

## Page 207

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

06

MORONE's Information

receive to cense formation abe, oR was misst 06

interviewed about the allegation in May I961:

On 19 August

1961 he was transferred from Moscow.

In an October 1962

security interview, MORONE stated that he had travelled with Ob

06 Frank BEGGS to Warsaw on 12 November 1960. On the train

he saw a Polish girl outside their compartment and asked her

what languages she spoke. Later she entered his compartment,

and when he tried to engage her in sexual relations, she

slapped his face. A day or two after they arrived in warsaw;

tne girl contacted him at his hotel, and he went to her room

where they had sexual relations. According to MORONE, heUt

had sexual relations with at least two other women while in

briarsaw. He and BEGGS returned to Moscow without incident.

On 6 February 1961, after MORONE had returned to Moscow D

the

Polish girl from the train called him at America House,

and

the following day he visited her in her room at the

Peking Hotel, where they were again intimate. On either

this or an earlier occasion the girl told him that she had

an uncle in Moscow. MORONE has denied being approached of

recruited by soviet intelligence.

Information From Other Sources

A sensitive Polish source reported in 1961 that on

8 November 1960 a Polish female, an experienced English-

speaking agent of the Polish UB, arrived in Moscow where

She was met by a KGB case officer named "VOLODYA". She

stayed at the Hotel Warsaw in Moscow. The KGB case officer,

apparently from the American Department of the KGB Second

Chief Directorate, on 10 November 1960 (sic) pointed MORONE 06

out to this agent at a railroad station in Moscow.: Under

As instructions, the Polish female met MOROND and was Ob

intimate with him on the train to Marsaw.

In Tarsaw. on

12 November 1960 (sic) she was quite friendly with MORONE Ub

but pursuant to instructions, she refused all overtures to

engage in intimacies.

The next day she took MORONEto a UG

suitably-prepared Polish UB safehouse where incriminating

197

Top Secret

0001469

TS. No. 197124

Copy

10

---

## Page 208

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMDASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

and stayed at the Peking Hotel:

Further compromising 06

photographs were taken of her and MORONE on this trip.

The female agent travelled to Moscow a third time and on

12 and 13 February 1961 more photographs were taken of her

and MORONE• 06

The Marine quard BEGGS has confirmed that the Polish

girl and MORONE

were intimate on the train to Warsaw, and

Jothat (MORONE) had been recontacted by the Polish girl in

Moscow in February 1961.

MORONE)s fellow code clerks and residents of America

House described him as a heavy drinker, a heavy gambler, and

a ladies' man. Various reports indicate that MORONE was 0b

involved in a currency speculation ring operated Ly SARWAT

It SHALLY, the KGB agent mentioned by MOSENKO, and MORONE C6

confirmed

that on at least one occasion SARWAT arranged the

be a close friend of the Embassy cook, and KGB agent Pietro

DOCECCHI, and MORONE had admitted that

along with other

Americans, he made it a common practice to purchase rubles

at an aron cal i

illegally from CECCHI. One report states that CECCHI asked

a Marine guard to deliver blackmarket rubles to MORONE] in theOb

State Department code room, (a restricted area to which

caccha had no access) :

A number of reports indicateâ that

MORONE! had been sexually intimate with Svetlana IVANOVA,

DEMKIN's agent, and with Ella UMANETS, another KGB agent

at America House identified by NOSENKO. 06 (MORONE) denied

having been intimate with IVANOVA.

He said, however, that

he had told his friends that he had, that he knew both

IVANOVA and UMANETS well and that he had once asked IVANOVA.

to arrange dates for him and another code clerk with two

Russian females. IVANOVA did, and sexual relations ensued,

The Army code clerk (STORSBERG has reported that (MORONE] 0%

was acquainted with the KGB officer SKVORTSOV who, as

"MICHAUD"

O GIORSEERE IS POLY. SteER Attempted meeting MICHAUD

at America House; MICHAUD had frequented the bar there:

In

one version of his recruitment (STORSBERG said that MORONE was

198

C001470

Top Secret

21132

TS No. 197124

Copy —

---

## Page 209

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

in SKVORISOV's company the night SKVORISOV lured (STORSBERG] 06

to the hotel where the KGB tried to recruit him.

06

Operation Against MORONE:

Summary and Conclusion

NOSENKO relates but one aspect of the MORONE) case,

the

use of the Polish UB. female agent.

He is apparently unaware

of information known to KGB agents (and hence to the KGB) ,

Obsuch as MORONEl's sexual involvements with IVANOVA's friends

and at SARWAT EL SHAZLY's apartment, his illicit currency

dealings with CECCHI, and his relationship with UMANETS.

Obe errs in relating to MORONE the East German female agent

sent to America House:

the incident occured, bút later,

Obwhen MORONE was no longer in Moscow nor was NOSENKO himself

still in the Embassy Section. (See p. 183.) The KGB did

not lack a sufficient basis for attempting to recruit

MORONE if it refrained from the attempt, it was for other

KGB inaction did not relate to Khrushchev's concern

for Soviet-United States relations; this was the period

between the U-? incident (May 1960) and the Berlin crisis

(August 1961) ..

Even

with respect to the Polish UB agent, there is

persuasive evidence that neither NOSENKO nor KOSOLAPOV

played the roles NOSENKO described:

NOSENKO was travelling

to Cuba and KOSOLAPOV was in Finland in connection with the

GARLAND case.

It is concluded from the foregoing that NOSENKO, in this

instance, was not supervisor of all KGB operations against

American code clerks nor would he necessarily have known of

recruitments among Embassy personnel.

Other KGB Targets Among State Department Code Clerks

In connection with his responsibility for directing

KGB operations against American code clerks in 1960-1961,

NOSENKO has commented on five other State Department code

clerks who served in Moscow during that period.: Their brief

treatment in this paper reflects not their unimportance but

NOSENKO's limited comments and the lack of collateral

199

SIBR

Top Secret

0001471

TS No. 197124

Copy 10

---

## Page 210

icine divis els 995l069-5

"birministe

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

information. The significance of these cases is the extent

to which information provided by NOSENKO accurately reflects

the KGB's knowledge of each target.

Maurice ZWANG 06

06

NOSENKO identified ZIANG as a State Department Code

clerk who was "actively worked on"

during the 1960-1961

period, An Egyptian agent, name not recalled, introduced

O6. ZWANG to a female KGB agent in an attempt to obtain incrimi-

nating photographs, but the female did not like ZWANG and U6

refused his sexual

advances.

In January 1962 (when NOSENKO

claims he left the Embassy Section) the KGB was engaged in

no activity against ZWANG Do The KGB agents had no agents

in contact with him,

and had no information indicating

ZWANG was vulnerable.

06

Comment:

In connection with a State Department security

interview conducted after ZWANG returned from Ok

MOScOw! WANG related that in March or April

1961 an Egyptian introduced him to a Soviet

female whom he visited in her apartment on

several occasions but with whom he was not

intimate.

Although ZWANG denied it, a poly- 06

graph examination indicated that he

was

intimate with his maid during visits to her

a then a maid has been

maid has been identified as a KGB

agent. Various Americans stationed in Moscow

have reported that ZWANG was active in currency Ok

speculation and blackmarketeering with the

Egyptian and KOSOLAPOV's agent, CECCHI.

1118R

200

0001472

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy —

---

## Page 211

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

06

John TAYLOR

06:

NOSENKO identified TAYLOR)as a State Department

The KGB was inter-

in TAYLOR because of his intimacy with his Russian

maid (a KGB agent) and "his sympathy towards the Soviet

Ob Union and its people".

No attempt was made to recruit

TAYLOR because of the lack of compromising photographs of

Ob TAYLOR and the maid, and because the KGB did not want to

maid, and ke

jeopardize the more important STORSBERG case by risking a

scandal with TAYLOR 06

06.

Comment:

0t

TAYLOR has acknowledged that he was intimate

with his maid from about September 1960 untii

his departure in early 1961, on one occasion

Of in a "Friend's apartment" in Moscow, and that

maid had told TAYLOR she was pregnant and

LoR offered her money for an abortion.

TAYLOR left Moscow in February.1961 and the

KGB attempt to recruit STORSBERG did not occur 06

until June 1961, according to NOSENKO, Or

October 1961, according to STORSBERG. D6

Frank DAY

NOSENKO identified DAY as a State Department code

clerk at the Embassy who was, a target either of KOSOLAPOV

or GRYAZNOV.

The KGB knew nothing interesting about him

such as who his friends in Moscow were, or his travel in

or outside of the Soviet Union. The KGB had no derogatory

information about him and was unaware of any vulnerabilities

he may have had. No operational measures were taken against

him.

6061473

201

Top Secret

15/5R

TS. No. 197124

Copy 1.0

---

## Page 212

14-00000

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

06

Comment:

DAY was in MosCow from May 1960 until October

I961, In July 1961 he travelled to tne

caucasus with his friend and former overt CIA 08, 06

employee, Agricultural Attache BROWN. The two

were under surveillance by five persons at

all times on this trip.

On one occasion they

found "repairmen" in their hotel room upon

returning unexpectedly ahead of schedule, and

on another an

"attractive and available

Soviet

female" was believed to have been planted in

their train compartment.

06

Robert DWELLY,

Reviewing an American Embassy telephone list in

September 1964, NOSENKO said that he "believed" DWELLY] was Üo

a code clerk during the 1960-1961 per1od. There was no

O6 approach to DWELLY and he knew no details of the opera-

O6 tional plan against DWELLY)nor the identity of any agent

who might have been used against him. DWELLY's case

officers were KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZNOV.

06

Under interrogation in February 1965, however,

NOSENKO said that the KGB was "100 percent sure" that he

was a homosexual on the basis of his "behavior when visiting

a public men's room".

There was a "big hunt" for DwELLY] and 06

on a number of evenings when DWELLY was known to be free 06

from work, NOSENKO himself, GRYAZNOV, KOSOLAPOV, and

NOSENKO's homosexual agents YEFREMOV and VOLKOV waited in

vain in a KGB surveillance car in the hope that DwELLY wouldU

visit downtown Moscow and they could establish contact with

him.

No photographs of DWELLY were obtained:

approach and no recruitment. D6

NOSENKO later added that "perhaps". GRYAZNOV' s

nomosexual agent "VOLODYA" had spoken with DVELLY) in a Ub

oubiic toilet in a museum or a park and it was on this basis

that he concluded DWELLY was a homosexual.

06

202

0001474

Top Secret

BIBR

TS No. 197124

Copy

---

## Page 213

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Comment:

DWELLY

was assigned to Moscow as a code clerk

From April 1959 to July 1960. In. a Department

of State security interview in March 1966

(prompted by NOSENKO's information), he cate-

gorically denied being a homosexual. He

described two occasions in Moscow when, while

walking alone, two men, who by their general

appearance and

actions made him think they

were "queer", were trying to attract his

attention.

He recalled that, on one of the

two occasions, one asked him the way to the

toilet:

[Joseph GAFFEY

06

NOSENKO originally identified CAFFEYJas a military

enlisted man in Moscow during the 1960-1961 perioa, and an

operational target of DEMKIN. In February 1965, however,

he identified him as a State Department code clerk for whom

the responsible case officer was KOSOLAPOV, whom NOSENKO

supervised.

The KGB attempted to lure CAFFEY into downtown Ob

Moscow using Svetlana IVANOVA, the maid in America House

who was one of DEMKIN's agents, but GAFFEY rejected her 06

repeated invitations.

The KGB

was unaware of any vices

GAFFEY might have had and had no derogatory information

regarding him.

Comment:

06

(CAFFEY, arrived in Moscow in September 1961.

A fellow resident of America House, Fred

KADERA, reported during

a State Department Of

security interview that GAFFEY had tola him 0b

that he had been intimate with a girl at

America House •U6 GAFFEY told KADERA]that he did O

not know she was Russian until he was walking

her home and met IVANOVA, who identified her

as such.

America House

manager Peter BINDER] 06

reported rumors in America House that GAFFEX06

0001475

203

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy -

10

B/Sh

---

## Page 214

14-00000

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Comment:

(Continued)

was having an affair with IVANOVA in America

House. He described GAFFEY, as the heaviest Do

drinker in America House and said that occasion-

O6 ally GAFFEY] could not report to work due to

his drinking. In describing the KGB approach

quoted his interrogator as saying that GAFFEY]06

took IVANOVA to BINDER's room in America House, 96

implying that he was intimate with her at that

time.

Do GAFFEY was recalled from Moscow in the

summer of 1962, before the expiration of his

tour, because of drunkenness.

During a State

Department security interview, CAFFEY admitted 06

being intimate with IVANOVA at America House

and at her apartment 0 GAFFEY] reported that

IVANOVA had told him she was pregnant and had

asked for money for an abortion.

Supervisor of all Code Clerk Operations:

Summary and Conclusion

According to

NOSENKO, on transfer to the Embassy Section,

operations against the American code clerks were the Section's

priority task and thus his most important single responsibility

He asserts to be complete his awareness of

what was known to the KGB on this topic at the time, because

of his senior position, his personal review of relevant files

and correspondence, his personal direction of KOSOLAPOV and

GRYAZNOV, and his personal participation in their operations.

Nithout exception, in every one of the cases NOSENKO describes

there are facts substantially at variance with his account,

in direct proportion to the amount of collateral information

available.

Conclusion

From the foregoing it is concluded that he was neither

Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section nor supervisor of all

operations against American code clerks. Consequently,

he would not necessarily have known of recruitments among

other Embassy personnel.

204

0001476

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy.

8182

---

## Page 215

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Case Officer for Embassy Security Officer

John ABIDIAN

Comment:

John V. ABIDIAN served as the Embassy Security

Officer in Moscow from 2 March 1960 until

February 1962, approximately the same period as

NOSENKO's claimed service in the Embassy

Section of the American Department. The State

Department replacement for CIA officer Russell

LANGELLE, ABIDIAN was coopted by CIA to perform

a number of operational

tasks, including

performing clandestine letter mailings to CIA

agents inside the

Soviet Union and servicing

deaddrop emergency communications from CIA

source GRU Colonel O.V. PENKOVSKIY.

ABIDIAN studied in Paris in 1949-50 and then

secured employment with the Department of State

as a clerk/typist.

He remained in Paris until

1954• After special training at the CIC school

at Fort Holabird and the Secret Service school,

ABIDIAN served from 1956 until leaving for

Moscow in 1960 as a special agent in the State

Department's Office of Security.

A large part

of his work in this period was accompanying

foreign dignitaries visiting the United States,

including Soviet Foreign Minister Shepilov in

November 1956, Mikoyan in the spring of 1959,

and Khrushchev at the end of 1959:

These

205

Top Secret

0001477

TS No. 197124

Copy

10

---

## Page 216

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Comment:

(Continued)

duties brought ABIDIAN into contact with KGB

officers stationed in New York and Washington

as well as among the Soviet delegations.

One

of the members of the Khrushchev entourage was

KOSOLAPOV, NOSENKO's subordinate in the Embassy

Section,

During his 1962 meetings with CIA, NOSENKO mentioned

ABIDIAN in several instances, identifying him as the Embassy

Security Officer and as "a CIA officer" and describing his

letter-mailing activities. His knowledge of ABIDIAN was

attributed to his claimed position of Deputy Chief of the

Embassy Section.

After recontacting CIA in Geneva in 1964 NOSENKO for the

first time explicitly claimed to have been the KGß case

officer responsible for ABIDIAN in Moscow and for the first

time described ABIDIAN's alleged servicing of a deaddrop in

1960. NOSENKO has described ABIDIAN since 1964 as the sole

American for whom NOSENKO was personally accountable during

his 1960-1961 Embassy Section service, and one of the most

important counterintelligence targets of the Embassy Section

and therefore of the entire Second Directorate.

Duties as

as a Case Officer

be case officer for ABIDIAN, whose arrival in Moscow was

then expected in the near future.

ABIDIAN was to be the

only American

target for whom NOSENKO personally was officially

accountable while he served in this section. KOVSHUK gave

NOSENKO such information as the section had on ABIDIAN.

Included was ABIDIAN's visa application, the negative results

of checks of KGB Headquarters files, and a report prepared

by the American Department of the First Chief Directorate.

According to that report, which was based on correspondence

from the KGB Legal Residencies in the United States, ABIDIAN

0001478

206

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy .

---

## Page 217

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMPASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

had served as a Department of State Security Officer concerned

with the safety of Premier Khrushchey when he visited the

United States in 1959; from ABIDIAN's behavior at that time,

the Legal Residencies concluded he was an intelligence officer,

probably with CIA.

That report and the fact that ABIDIAN was

replacing the known CIA officer Russell LANGELLE as Security

Officer, made

ABIDIAN one of the most important counter-

intelligence targets of the Embassy Section and therefore

of the entire Second Chief Directorate.

NOSENKO personally opened the KGB file on ABIDIAN and

later adopted for him the cryptonym "ARSEN" used earlier by

personnel of the Seventh (Surveillance) Directorate of the

Second Chief Directorate.

NOSENKO waS

unsuccessful in his attempts to learn more

about the life and career of ABIDIAN.

He visited the Chief

of the American Department of the KGB First Chief Directorate,

but that unit had no information not included in its original

report.

NOSENKO requested that the KGB Legal Residencies in

the United States be asked for further details, but none were

ever

received NOSENKO thus never learned of ABIDIAN's

education and study abroad, date of entry into the Department

of state, promotions, personal rank, previous assignments,

military service,

•Or

foreign service status.

Prior to ABIDIAN's arrival in Moscow, the KGB decided not

to work aggressively against him with agent contacts or

provocateurs unless he first demonstrated some personal

It was considered better to concentrate on

surveillance coverage in the hope that, as LANGELLE's

successor, he might lead "to another POPOV"

IPOPOV, a

GRU Lieutenant Colonel and CIA agent, according to KGB

sources was apprehended in 1959.1

Because ABIDIAN was considered to be a CIA officer, he

was made a "special target" of surveillance from the date of

his arrival. He was always under 24-hour surveillance by

at least two and often three KGB teams, so that at any hour :

a team was available to cover him if he left the Embassy.

The only time this intensity of coverage might have been

reduced, NOSENKO

said, was during a period of about one and

one-half months

in 1961, when surveillance of the Embassy

6001479

207

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy: 10.

---

## Page 218

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

was generally reduced in order to allow increased coverage

of British targets in connection with the PENKOVSKIY case.

As the responsible case officer, NOSENKO directed the

surveillance of ABIDIAN and evaluated the operational

possibilities offered by information from surveillance

reports.

In line with the emphasis on surveillance, the opera-

tional plan for ABIDIAN written by NOSENKO in October 1960

called for no direct action but specified that:

-ABIDIAN's maid Tatyana FEDOROVICH, an "operational

contact" of the Embassy Section, was to continue to apply

metka to ABIDIAN's clothing and

"NEPTUNE-80" to his shoes.

(According to NOSENKO, these are surveillance aids. Metka

is a "thief powder" applied to clothing pockets, leaving a

trace on anything with which it comes into contact.

primary purpose is to aid in the detection of operational

letters mailed by suspected foreign intelligence officers

and agents.

NEPTUNE-80, applied to a target's shoes,

leaves a trace on the ground which the KGB even long

after-

wards can follow with a dog.)

The only item of information

received from FEDOROVICH was that ABIDIAN was having an

affair with an Embassy female employee. FEDOROVICH was

unable to find personal mail or personal papers in ABIDIAN's

apartment

-Pietro CECCHI, Embassy employee and KOSOLAPOV' s

agent, was to try to cultivate ABIDIAN and report whatever

he learned concerning him. CECCHI never obtained any

significant information on ABIDIAN's personal life.

"ABIDIAN was developing CECCHI as an informant on American

personnel at the Embassy", but NOSENKO did not recall any

specific report CECCHI gave to

ABIDIAN that was

of interest

to the Embassy Section.

-Two Embassy chauffeurs were to apply NEPTUNE-80 to

the floorboards and foot pedals of ABIDIAN's car if

necessary.

0001480

208

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

---

## Page 219

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

-All other agents and operational contacts of the

section were to be instructed to report every detail about

ABIDIAN (see below) •

-Surveillance teams were to be instructed to check all

places where ABIDIAN might be mailing letters.

-Coverage of ABIDIAN's mail was to be continued.

Apart from those specified by the operational plan, two

other KGB

agents, Lyudmila GROMAKOVA and "KAMO" (a KGB

agent = whose identity NOSENKO did not recall) were

involved with ABIDIAN. GROMAKOVA, a language instructor

for Embassy personnel, was an agent handled by Embassy Section

case officer GAVRILENKO. ABIDIAN took "only several" Russian

language lessons from GROMAKOVA and NOSENKO did not know

whether these were private or class lessons.:.

He learned

nothing of operational significance from GROMAKOVA's contacts

with ABIDIAN, and there was no regular

reporting from her.

Comment:

Although he had earlier identified GROMAKOVA as

a KGB agent, NOSENKO never associated her with

ABIDIAN intil told that ABIDIAN had been one of

her students. In actuality ABIDIAN took

regular language lessons from GROMAKOVA, normally

three one-half hour lessons per week, from

shortly after his arrival until his departure

from Moscow.

The second KGB agent, "KAMO", was an agent of the Moscow

City KGB organization who met ABIDIAN at the Baku Restaurant

by accident. When informed that ABIDIAN gave "KAMO" his

telephone number, NOSENKO recommended that "KAMO" try to

develop a relationship with ABIDIAN.

After arguing that

this was against the policy of taking no aggressive or

provocative action against ABIDIAN, KOVSHUK and KLYPIN

finally agreed, and

"KAMO" phoned ABIDIAN twice on KGB

instructions.

ABIDIAN, however, refused to meet him, and

209

Top Secret

0001481

TS No. 197124

Copy -

10

---

## Page 220

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

no further action was taken. [See below for ABIDIAN's

account of a similar incident, but one which occurred in

Armenia.]

NOSENKO did not know the room number of ABIDIAN's office

in the Embassy or on what floor it was located, but he could

have checked, if necessary, with a copy of the

Embassy tele-

phone list published monthly, since it contained the office

room number of each American employee. [The Embassy telephone

list contained apartment, but not office room numbers.]

ABIDIAN's office was in the "Zone of Security" (i.e., secure

office areas). NOSENKO said that a report from an agent

(identity not recalled) indicated that there was a sign on

ABIDIAN's office door which said "Security Office". [There

was no. such sign.] • NOSENKO was unable to determine if

ABIDIAN had a secretary. No dictation was monitored in

ABIDIAN's office because no KGB microphone was installed

there.

[In 1964 a microphone, albeit then inoperative, was

found in the room occupied in

1960-1961 by ABIDIAN.] NOSENKO

recalled no particularly interesting or important information

about ABIDIAN obtained from other microphones in the Embassy.

NOSENKO did not know the location of ABIDIAN's apartment

in the Embassy building, nor how it was furnished, since

"data of this nature was not operationally significant

unless the target had shown vulnerabilities or was under

active development".

Aware that ABIDIAN travelled from the USSR two or three

times while stationed in Moscow, NOSENKO did not know to

which countries he went or the time of year when the trips

were made.

Such information would have been of interest to

him as ABIDIAN's case officer since, like LANGELLE's earlier

trips abroad, ABIDIAN's trips were presumed to be for

operational purposes.

However, there was no possibility for

the KGB to find out where ABIDIAN had gone; even if the

Embassy Section did establish where ABIDIAN would travel,

nothing could be done about it because the foreign Legal

Residencies of the KGB First Chief Directorate "would not

accept a request for operational action against an American

diplomat coming from Moscow".

0001482

210

Top Secret

IS No. 197124

Copy .

---

## Page 221

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

With reference to whether the KGB could have photographed

ABIDIAN's passport on his return to Moscow, NOSENKO said

that the Second Chief Directorate does not photograph pass-.

ports of foreign diplomats entering the Soviet Union. Mhile

this procedure would not be impossible, it was

not considered

so important as to justify the special effort involved.

Comment:

According to ABIDIAN, he openly discussed his

travel plans with Embassy language teacher

GROMAKOVA (GAVRILENKO's agent), and on at least

some occasions used international telephone

calls

to arrange for accommodations at his

destination in Europe.

Also, the Foreign

Ministry, UPDK (which office provides adminis-

trative services to foreign diplomats

in

Moscow), to which ABIDIAN sent his passport for

an exit visa for each departure, could have

noted from passport entries the whereabouts of

his

earlier travel.

ABIDIAN took no trips in the Soviet Union outside of

Moscow, since if he had, NOSENKO would have known and

remembered them, as

it was his responsibility as case

officer to take certain actions.

Among the latter he

listed:

-Receiving notification of ABIDIAN's request to travel

from the UPDK: (the Soviet Foreign Ministry unit which

provides administrative services to the diplomatic

community in Moscow)

-Advising the UPDK of KGB approval

for the trip:

-Advising appropriate local KGB offices of ABIDIAN'S

itinerary and giving them instructions for surveillance

and any other necessary operational activity.

0001483

-211

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

10

---

## Page 222

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

-Receiving, reading, and filing all reports of

surveillance and other operational activity carried

out by various KGB units.

NOSENKO was certain that he took none of these steps. Even

if he were absent when such a request for travel was made,

he would have seen all documents upon his return; he did

not recall seeing any such documents in ABIDIAN's file.

Comment: ABIDIAN who is of Armenian origin and speaks

the Armenian language with a high degree of

proficiency, made a trip to Armenia between 5

and 9 October 1960. While in Armenia ABIDIAN

visited with various churchmen, their parish-

ioners and an Armenian who had repatriated from

Greece in 1946.

ABIDIAN attended a service in

Echmiadzin celebrating the anniversary of the

accession of the Katolikos VAZGEN I, and also

visited some relatives of his in or near the

city of Yerevan. After returning to Moscow,

an Armenian whom ABIDIAN met on that trip

tried to contact ABIDIAN at the Embassy, but

ABIDIAN refused to see him.

After being told ABIDIAN had attended a

service celebrating the fifth anniversary of

the Armenian Katolikos, VAZGEN I, NOSENKO

recalled that ABIDIAN had gone to Echmiadzin

and that an agent had reported a contact with

him there.

This agent, NOSENKO recalled, was

a priest or a monk, and the report concerned

only his conversation with ABIDIAN; the agent

had no further contact with him. NOSENKO said

that this was his sole recollection concerning

ABIDIAN's trip.

With reference to ABIDIAN's travel to

Armenia in October 1960, NOSENKO recalled

having been on leave at the time.

However,

NOSENKO's reconstruction of the

timing of his

alleged leave still placed him in Moscow at

the time of ABIDIAN's trip.

In 1966, NOSENKO

stated that he had lied, that his 1960 leave

was taken in January, not October.

0001484

212

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

---

## Page 223

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Except for the American woman with whom ABIDIAN was

thought

to have been intimate, NOSENKO knew none of

ABIDIAN's close American

friends in Moscow nor his close

friends and professional contacts among foreigners there,

NOSENKO received and read transcripts of

all telephone

calls that ABIDIAN made or received at his office and

apartment via the Moscow city telephone system, but he

recalled none of their names nor nationalities, because

there was nothing of interest in the conversations.

At the end of the January-February 1965 interrogations

concerning ABIDIAN NOSENKO acknowledged that he knew little.

about this important KGB target.

"working badly"

ABIDIAN's case officer, he said, because he had had to

concentrate on supervising the work against code clerks.

ABIDIAN's Letter Mailings

During the 1962 meetings with NOSENKO: in Geneva, he

reported KGB knowledge of ABIDIAN's mailing of at least

three clandestine letters, in each case

to KGB-controlled

agents. According to NOSENKO, the KGB detected all the

letters mailed by ABIDIAN through the use of metka.

He

cautioned

the CIA representatives from further use of Embassy

employees for mailing letters to agents in the Soviet

Union

He noted that after LANGELLE, no

mailed for a year and a half, until ABIDIAN mailed several:

He explained that Embassy employees' servants applied an

odorless substance (metka) to clothing pockets, and traces

of the substance rubbed off on any thing it contacted, such

as a letter:

All the letters mailed in Moscow were passed

through a machine which identified letters bearing tracing

of metka,

he said, and this was how letters ABIDIAN mailed

were intercepted.

INOSENKO said the machine was a fotoapparat,

literally a camera, but presumably he meant some sort of

light-sensitive device. I NOSENKO recalled that ABIDIAN had

and. two

by ABIDIAN's surveillants.

According to NOSENKO, no new

agents were discovered, however, since all of the

agents to

whom ABIDIAN mailed letters were already controlled by the

KGB.

0001485

213

Top Secret

•TS No. 197124

Copy

10

---

## Page 224

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Comment:

NOSENKO's information is substantially correct,

that no letters were

mailed for one and a half

years after LANGELLE's expulsion, and that

ABIDIAN mailed two or three letters, including

ones to the Baltic area and to Odessa,

NO

letters were mailed from February 1960 until

ABIDIAN mailed one on 1 April 1961, and of the

three letters ABIDIAN mailed, one was

to Odessa

and one each to Latvia and Estonia.

CIA has conducted tests to determine whether

a substance such as metka was being used as a

KGB control device.

Ultra-violet, chemical

and microscopic analyses developed one possible

use of a metka like substance,

Analysis of an

article of clothing of a foreign diplomat in

Moscow who served as a CIA support agent

produced a sharply positive reaction.

NOSENKO later described how metka was applied to ABIDIAN's

clothing by his maid and how, in particular, this led to

the discovery of the letters ABIDIAN mailed to the agent in

Odessa and to his parents in the United States.

"ABIDIAN's maid in Moscow was Tatyana FEDOROVICH.

She was an operational contact reporting to ARTEMOV.

She started to work. for ABIDIAN a few months after

a porters for de

his arrival, perhaps three months but no longer than

six months after his arrival.

I met her shortly

after she began to work for ABIDIAN in order to get

acquainted with her,

in order to evaluate her and

give her general instructions about her work for

ABIDIAN.

I do not know the exact date of this

meeting but it was before the fall of 1960.

wrote

the operational plan on ABIDIAN in circa

October 1960.

At this time FEDOROVICH was already

working for ABIDIAN.

This operational plan

stated

that FEDOROVICH would continue to put metka regularly

on

ABIDIAN's clothing.

0001486

214

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy -

---

## Page 225

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

"FEDOROVICH put metka on ABIDIAN's clothing during

the entire period that she worked for him.

She did

this every two or three weeks except for a few times

when she was sick or on leave. No one else had

access to ABIDIAN's apartment and therefore no other

person had the possibility of putting metka on his

clothing:

"I have said that ABIDIAN mailed an operational

letter to the KGB double agent 'ARKHANGELSKIY' (in

Odessa) • He mailed it at the mailbox on Iverskaya

Yamskaya where he had gone several times earlier.

Surveillance dia not see ABIDIAN mail the letter

but the mailbox was controlled and the letter to

'ARKHANGELSKIY' was found, along with a letter to

ABIDIAN's parents Both of these letters had metka

on them, as I was told by SUMIN (a KGB secret

writing specialist

cannot remember, the date

that ABIDIAN mailed this: letter except that it was

sometime in 1961."

Comment:

ABIDIAN had no maid in Moscow until sixteen

months after his arrival; FEDOROVICH worked

for

him part-time from July 1961 until he left

Moscow Thus FEDOROVICH could not have applied

the metka which as NOSENKO Claimed resulted in

the interception of the letter ABIDIAN mailed

:1 April 1961, and probably was

not yet employed

by ABIDIAN even at the time the letter to

"ARKHANGELSKIY" was mailed on 2 July 1961.

ABIDIANs third letter was mailed on l September

1961, while FEDOROVICH was working for him.

0001487

215

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

10

---

## Page 226

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Told that FEDOROVICH could not have been applying metka

regularly to ABIDIAN's clothing at the time of the

"ARKHANGELSKIY" letter mailing, NOSENKO insisted that no

he himself briefed her on the use of metka, that the letters

responsible.

ABIDIAN's Servicing of the Pushkin Street Deaddrop Site

In 1964 NOSENKO reported for the first time that in 1960

or in early 1961 the KGB had surveilled ABIDIAN visiting

what was believed to be a deaddrop site on Pushkin Street

in MoscOW.

He provided additional details when questioned

again in

1965.

NOSENKO's Information

In 1960 or early 1961, while NOSENKO was his responsible

case officer, ABIDIAN was surveilled from the Embassy to a

residential building on Pushkin Street in Moscow. A KGB

stationary surveillance post at the Embassy saw ABIDIAN leave

with the Publications Procurement Officer of the Embassy in

a chauffeured automobile, rather than in the car he normally

used.

ABIDIAN's surveillance team followed the car to a

bookstore. Both Americans entered the bookstore, but

shortly thereafter ABIDIAN left alone and walked around the

corner, where

he entered a residential building next to a

meat market on Pushkin Street.

The surveillance team saw

him go in but did not follow him. ABIDIAN emerged after a

few seconds.

This unusual incident was reported by the

surveillance team to the KGB Seventh (Surveillance) Direct-

can to the a

and the building was inspected that same day by KOZLOV,

the Chief of the First Department of the Surveillance

Directorate, and

MATVEYEV, the Deputy Chief of the Second

Chief Directorate's American Department.

Taking into account

the character of the building

and it's

inhabitants, the

duration and circumstances of ABIDIAN's visit, and the

suitability of the hallway - particularly the radiator in

it - for use as a deaddrop site, it was decided by the leader-

ship of the Second Chief Directorate and the Surveillance

0001488

216

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy.

---

## Page 227

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Directorate that a stationary surveillance post should

immediately be set up to cover this location.

Because of

the short time available, it was not possible to place this

post inside the building, so it was set up across the street.

In addition, the radiator was checked daily to see if any-

• the vadiator

thing the cost was maned conta nee, hod been so dese behin

which it was maintained from 0800 until midnight for another

two months.

If a package or magnetic container had been

found behind the radiator, which was checked every morning,

it was planned to attach to

"it very thin wires to trigger a

signal should someone remove the package. At the same time

a member of the surveillance team would be stationed' on the

landing of the staircase in this building, out of sight from

the hallway below.

During the three months that the post

was

maintained, nothing was found concealed behind the radiatori

nor were any suspicious persons seen

entering or leaving the

building.

The post was

then discontinued, but the address

was placed on a list of suspicious places inspected daily

by the Surveillance Directorate.

The true significance of

this location became known to the KGB only later, after the

arrest of PENKOVSKIY in 1962.

NOSENKO first heard of ABIDIAN's visit to the suspected

deaddrop site on: the day it occurred. He was

sitting in

KOVSHUK's office when he received a telephone call Irom

MATVEYEV telling him of the

incident

Although NOSENKO was

ABIDIAN's case officer and KOVSHÜK was Chief

of the Embassy

Section, the decision to place the stationary surveillance

post at

the site was made at a higher level; neither of them

was involved in it or in the later decision to discontinue

NOSENKO himself visited the building on Pushkin

Street the following day or the day after, but he remained

only a few minutes and did not recall any details of the

the po the followin and

hallway. except that there was a radiator there.

As ABIDIAN's case officer, NOSENKO recalled

receiving the

surveillance report

of his visit to the Pushkin Street building

and placing this report in ABIDIAN's file.

(This case file

NOSENKO turned over to his successor, GRYAZNOV; about

28 December 1961, just before he transferred to the Seventh

Department.)

217

Top Secret

0001489

TS No. 197124

Copy:

10

---

## Page 228

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

NOSENKO received no written reports on the results of the

stationary surveillance post, but he did discuss this matter

with KOZLOV on an almost daily basis during the first month

of surveillance, and periodically after that.

These discus-

sions took place

either by telephone, when KOZLOV was

visiting NOSENKO,'s office, or when NOSENKO visited KOZLOV's

office in KGB Headquarters. From KOZLOV or perhaps someone

else, NOSENKO learned that the post had been discontinued

after 90 days.

On the basis of these conversations with

KOZLOV, NOSENKO knew that nothing of interest occurred

during the period of the stationary surveillance.

NOSENKO was in the Embassy Section during all the period

that the stationary surveillance post was watching the

Pushkin Street site and was there when he heard from KOZLOV

that the post had been replaced by periodic inspections.

NOSENKO did not report this incident of surveillance on

the Pushkin Street deaddrop site to his CIA contacts in

Geneva in June 1962 because by that time the post had

already been discontinued without anything unusual or

suspicious having been noted, and he thought that this

incident would be of no particular interest to CIA.

When last asked whether he had visited the Pushkin Street

address several days after ABIDIAN had been seen there, as

he had earlier said, NOSENKO replied:

"I don't remember. I do not want to say that I

visited the deaddrop. I don't remember now whether

I visited it or not. It seems to me that I visited

it, but I don't remember. It seems that I visited

it with

1 KOZLOV, but I cannot say

'yes', and I cannot

say

'no'

0001490

218

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

---

## Page 229

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Comment:

ABIDIAN visited the Pushkin Street deaddrop

site only once, on 30 December 1961, a fuli

year after the time reported by NOSENKO:

As

NOSENKO reported, accompanied by an Embassy

Economic Officer, ABIDIAN left the Embassy in

an official car with a Soviet driver and

proceeded in a bookstore on the corner of

Pushkin Street.

Leaving the bookstore, ABIDIAN

entered the building where the site was located,

determined that the drop was empty, and left

one minute later, returning to the Embassy.

The deaddrop was proposed by PENKOVSKIY

August 1960÷

CIA officer Eugene MAHONEY] walked 03

by the site on 12 November and 4 December 1960;

on 21 January 1961 MAHONEY briefly entered the 0$

building to confirm the site's precise location

If the KGB had surveilled HATONEY's visits and OJ

had put the site under surveillance, NOSENKO

might be relating those events by mischance in

attributing the visit to ABIDIAN. In such a

circumstance, however, NOSENKO, as ABIDIAN'S

case officer, would have known that his target

visited a site which had been previously noted

in connection with the suspicious movements of

another Embassy official. Further, NOSENKO's

description of ABIDIAN's route, companion, and

sequence of movements is so precise as to refei

clearly to ABIDIAN.

_ Lastly, NOSENKO disIcaims

any knowledge of MAHONEYJor his activities; he US

asserts that MAHONEY was neither the object of o

KGB suspicion or concern. For reasons no

combination of circumstances nor NOSENKO himself

can plausibly explain, NOSENKO can describe

ABIDIAN's deaddrop site visit although it

occurred at a time when MOSENKO was no longer

ABIDIAN's case officer and when he was assigned

to another Second Chief Directorate department:

If he turned over ABIDIAN's file on 28

December 1961 to another Embassy Section officer,

as he claimed, NOSENKO could not have received

219

Top Secret

6001451

TS No. 1.97124

Copy- 10

5/8R

---

## Page 230

14-00000

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Comment:

(Continued)

nor filed the initial surveillance report of

ABIDIAN'S visit to the Pushkin Street site.

he transferred to the Seventh Department two

If

dáys after ABIDIAN's visit, as he claimed (and

NOSENKO's participation in

the W.E. JOHNSON case 06

indicates that he was working against tourists

by 5 January 1962), he could neither have visited

the site as he described nor could he have

received thereafter the daily surveillance

reports.

He could not, of his own knowledge,

assert that the surveillance was terminated

after three months, since well before the three

months' surveillance ended he was abroad in

• Geneva.

Lastly, it cannot be for the reason

NOSENKO claimed (that the surveillance was

unsuccessfull that NOSENKO did not mention

ABIDIAN's activities to CIA in Geneva in 1962.

Case Officer for John ABIDIAN: Summary and Conclusion

If for no other reason than ABIDIAN's security functions

with the Khrushchev entourage, files of the First Chief

Directorate would record his name: If NOSENKO states to

the contrary, that traces were negative, NOSENKO did not run

the traces himself nor know the results. According to

NOSENKO, ABIDIAN was "one of

the most important targets of

the Second Chief Directorate"; all KGB resources were

employed for two years, including 24-hour surveillance, the

exploitation of all agents with access to him, audio sur-

veillance, and technical aids, with amost absolutely negative

results.

The results could not have been negative: for

NOSENKO to so assert can only mean that NOSENKO was not

informed of the results.

In the two instances NOSENKO cited

of Embassy agents' activities against ABIDIAN, he made

fundamental errors: ABIDIAN's maid was not employed by

ABIDIAN at the time NOSENKO insists she was applying the

metka, and GROMAKOVA taught ACIDIAN Russian throughout his

stay in Moscow, not just

"several times". NOSENKO acknowledges

220

0001492

Top Secret •

1/BR

TS No. 197124

Copy -

---

## Page 231

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January: 1960-January 1962)

that ABIDIAN's travel in the Soviet Union would have had

been approved by the KGB, and that the responsible case

officer would have issued orders for his surveillance out-

side of Moscow and would have later received reports of the

target's activities.

NOSENKO acknowledged that he was not

so involved, although he belatedly recalled one trip ABIDIAN

made.

Lastly, although NOSENKO claims to know, from his

Embassy Section assignment, details of ABIDIAN's visit to

the Pushkin Street deaddrop, the event occurred at a time

when NOSENKO by his own account could not have been physically

present in the Embassy Section.

1

Conclusion

It is concluded from the foregoing that NOSENKO was not

case officer for Embassy Security Officer John ABIDIAN.

Supervisor of Operations Against

American Service Attaches

Questioned in detail in 1964 on his responsibilities in

the

Embassy Section, NOSENKO claimed no personal role in

operations against American service attaches.

He said only

that when he arrived in the section, DRANOV was the respon-

sible case officer for the Naval personnel, including the

Embassy Marine guards, and when DRANOV was transferred

shortly thereafter, his responsibilities were assumed by

BELOGLAZOV. Listing the names and functions of American

Department personnel, NOSENKO mentioned that Yevgeniy

Nikolayevich ALESHIN was Second Deputy to Department Chief

KLYPIN: ALESHIN had

the

special assignment of coordinating

Second Chief Directorate activities against all foreign

military intelligence personnel, including service attaches:

In January 1965 NOSENKO claimed for the first time that

he had among his other responsibilities as Deputy Chief that

of supervising operations

against American service attaches,

0001453

221

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy =

10

---

## Page 232

4-00000

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 19621

and for the first time claimed case officer responsibilities

against American targets other than ABIDIAN. He related how,

at his meeting with KLYPIN and KOVSHUK on entering the section

in January 1960, KOVSHUK suggested that NOSENKO assume super-

visory responsibility for the service attaches while KOVSHUK

supervised operations against the civilian diplomatic staff

of the Embassy•

NOSENKO stated "supervising" meant that the

case officers for the service attaches referred their ques-

tions to him, not to KovsHuk.

These included case officers

GAVRILENKO, responsible for Air Attaches, KURILENKO, for

Army Attaches,

and DEKIN, for enlisted personnel of all

services.

"While he was getting acquainted with the section

on DRANOV's retirement", NOSENKO himself took case officer

responsibility for the Naval Attache personnel.

This res-

ponsibility was subsequently assumed by DRANOV's former

assistant, BELOGLAZOV. NOSENKO could not initially recall

how long he supervised service attache operations; he later

said

"several months" and finally "five or six months".

Neither could NOSENKO recall what other pressing duty or

duties

caused him to be relieved of this function.

He said

this resulted from KOVSHUK's proposal that supervision of

the service attaches be assumed by ALESHIN who was Deputy

Chief of the Second Directorate's American Department and

coordinator for Second Directorate operations against

military intelligence officers of all nationalities.

Supervisor of Service Attache Operations:

Summary and Conclusion

Because of the tardiness of NOSENKO's claim to have been

responsible for operations against service attaches and

because he

was not able, when challenged, to substantiate

his claims

by providing any details of KGB activities against

these targets; it is concluded that this aspect of his

claimed KGB service is a fiction.

0001494

222

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

---

## Page 233

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Custodian of KGB File on Embassy Security

As former Deputy Chief and öccasional Acting Chief of the

American Embassy Section, NOSENKO claimed awareness of KGB

knowledge of its American Embassy target. Specifically!

NOSENKO claimed to have been custodian of the Second Chief

Directorate's file on Embassy security.

NOSENKO's Information

He received

the file from the Section Chief, kovSHUK, when

he arrived in January 1960.: As was permissible under KGB

procedures, as long as the custodian was still in the same

directorate, the

file was charged to BAKHVALOV. [See p. 153

for NOSENKO's various assertions with respect to BAKHVALOV.j

NOSENKO had custody of the file charged to himself, and from

January 1960 until NOSENKO was leaving the section on 25-28.

December 1961, only KOVSHUK, NOSENKO, and GRYAZNOV and

KOSOLAPOV (both of

whom shared NOSENKO's Office and safej had

access:

to the file.

The file consisted of two volumes, one for the old

building on Mokhovaya Street and the second (about an inch

thick) on the new Embassy building occupied in 1953 on

The file contained detailed floor plans

and photographs of both buildings.

No operational

analysis or planning by NOSENKO or others

was done on the basis of this file during NOSENKO's two years

in the Embassy Section:

It was used only for reference

purposes,

since the KGB had concluded that it was

impossible

for a Soviet citizen to penetrate the secure areas of thé

moassy because of the American security precautions in

effect,

223

Top Secret

0001495

TS No. 197124

Copy 10

---

## Page 234

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

All Soviet employees of the Embassy who entered the

restricted areas, "the seventh through the tenth floors",

were carefully questioned because of the special KGB interest

in these offices. (The secure area barred to unescorted

local employees

is comprised of the eighth through tenth

floors.1

NOSENKO personally placed some reports by KGB agents in

the Embassy security file, while he was custodian,

None of

the information was of interest or important or useful

enough for him to remember, and he recalled none of the KGB

agent sources.

[In another context NOSENKO cited an instance

in which an unrecalled KGB agent had reported (erroneously]

that ABIDIAN's office had a sign on the door reading "Security

Office".]

Nothing could be recovered from the Embassy classified

trash, which was always burned at an unrecalled location by

a non-commissioned officer or Marine guard accompanied by

an officer. [At the Moscow Embassy the Marine guard detailed

for the purpose has always burned the classified trash alone.

NOSENKO may be unwittingly referring to a U.S. military

security procedure requiring a commissioned

and to certify the destruction of classified documents.

He ruction of

officer to witness

If

NOSENKO is aware of any such procedure, he has never indicated

it in any context.]

In 1960-1961, when NOSENKO was Deputy Chief, he either

knew the location of all offices and personnel

within the

Embassy or he could obtain them from the monthly Embassy

telephone lists which the KGB received regularly from agents:

The lists gave office numbers. [The Embassy telephone lists

contain names, apartment numbers

and telephone numbers, but

omits office room numbers.] :

In 1960 a "metallic chamber" (acoustical room) arrived

at the Embassy for President Eisenhower's use and for secret

conversations:

None of the technical specifications of the

room were known, nor was its location.

An unrecalled source

reported only that meetings were held

in the room, which was

in the restricted area:

0001456

224

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

---

## Page 235

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962;

The KGB accomplished only one theft of classified materiai

during 1960-1961,

A charwoman who was an agent of BELOGLAZOV

stole a bag of papers from the Naval Attache office. The torn

and crumpled contents included a draft of a report of Naval

Attaches!

observation of ships and factories on a trip to

Leningrad. The report was only of routine interest to the

KGB.: The charwoman was granted a cash award.

Custodian Of Embassy Security File: Summary and Conclusion

NOSENKO cannot describe the location (even by floor) of

any of his own targets, such as ABIDIAN, the military code

room,

or the State Department communications center

In

fact,

he cannot describe the location of the office of any

individual or unit in the Embassy, even of the Ambassador:

When challenged to substantiate his claim to knowledge of

the Embassy security file, NOSENKO asserted that he had never

read it nor paid any

"special attention" to its content in

the two

years he was file custodian It is concluded that

NOSENKO's claim that he was custodian of the file is an

invention.

Audio Operations Against the American Embassy

NOSENKO's knowledge of the KGB microphone system in the

Embassy derived from his alleged responsibility as Deputy

Chief of

the Embassy Section for receiving and routing to

approptiate KGB personnel the reports of monitored conversa-

tions. Also, in his capacity as Deputy Chief and custodian

of the monitoring reports logbook NOSENKO claimed to have

attended a meeting

at the end of 1960 of the beginning of

1961 at which he learned details of the locations of specific

microphones hidden

in the Embassy.

Lastly, NOSENKO claimed

he obtained information on the KGB audio operations against

the Embassy, even after he left the Embassy Section, from his

former

subordinate GRYAZNOV. NOSENKO regarded the information

about the KGB microphones, first mentioned in Geneva in

1962,

as the most important he provided CIA:

0001497

225

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

10

Copy

---

## Page 236

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

NOSENKO's Information

Handling of Monitor Reports

According to NOSENKO, only a limited number of KGB

personnel, all in the American Department of the Second

Chief Directorate, had access to the monitor reports.

These

included Department Chief KLYPIN (but not his deputies),

KOVSHUK, NOSENKO himself,

and GRIBANOV, to whom important

items were shown. The existence of the audio operation and

its product were concealed from personnel in other KGB

Departments.

The reports were produced by the Second Special

Department of the Operational Technical Directorate (OTU) •

The OTU Second Special Department has several sections, one

of which was the English Section under Colonel N. Ya. KUZMIN.

KUZMIN's monitors, fluent in English, listened

to and

transcrived the tape recordings.

Their reports of the

preceding: day's product were brought daily by Tatyana

GRISHNYAT

(of the Second Special Department) to the American

Department.

(In some accounts NOSENKO has said that he

received the reports first, at other times that they went

first to KLYPIN.)

NOSENKO reviewed the reports, marked

significant portions and usually within twenty-four hours

returned the reports to the Second Special nepartment.

In NOSENKO's absence either KOVSHUK. or GRYAZNOV reviewed the

reports.

The Second Special Department prepared sterile

abstracts of the portions NOSENKO had marked, abstracts

which disguised the source of the information contained:

the abstracts were returned to the American Department for

the reference of individual case officers in the Embassy

Section and for filing in the delo-formulyar (developmental

file) kept on each American employee in the Embassy.

Location of the Microphones

In the 1962 Geneva meetings with CIA, NOSENKO emphasized

that the KGB was listening to all conversations of the

service attaches and particularly, to conversations held

in

the office of the Minister Counsellor. In addition, he

referred to "points"

[microphones] in the office of an

unnamed State Department employee,

in the Agricultural

Attache office shared by BROWl and HORBALY, and in the

Embassy code room.

226

0001498

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

---

## Page 237

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

In 1964, at the

second meeting with CIA, NOSENKO produced

handwritten note which he asserted listed all the micro-

phones in the Embassy which were operative in the years

1960-19610

NOSENKO explained that at the end of 1960 or

KOVSHUK met with Department

Chief KLYPIN.

The purpose of the meeting was to discuss

the possibility of releasing monitors from some of the

Embassy microphones so they could be assigned to Vladimir

PETROV, Chief of the American Department's Second Section

for use against non-Embassy targets.:

(PETROV had earlier

requested English-language monitors from the Second Special

Section, but had been told that English linguists were

engaged on priority targets.) At the meeting, KOVSHUk and

KIYPIN reviewed the microphone coverage of the Embassy

chancery to decide which rooms offered information of little

value, so that the monitors for those microphones could be

released to PETROV's Second Section.

KOVSHUK used NOSENKO's

notebook in which to list Embassy apartments and offices

then being covered on a full-time basis and to note those of

lesser importance. KOVSHUK

decided to relinquish, tempor-

arily, monitoring of Embassy apartments.

He continued the

monitoring of the code room, despite the limited value of

the information obtained.

At the end of the meeting KOVSHUK

gave or NOSENKo took the list, and NOSENKO retained it in

his office safe until bringing it to CIA in 1964.

NOSENKO's list showed that

microphones were located in

the following offices of the noted occupants:

"Office of the Minister Counsellor, FREERS;

"Office of the Naval Attache, HOUGHTON;

"Office of the Army Attache, URBAN; ,

"Office of the Air Attache, NEILSEN;

"Office of the Assistant Air Attache, WINDSOR;

"Office of the Assistant Air Attaches, SENIO

and SACHANEN;

"Office of the Assistant Army Attaches, MASON;

REITZ and WILSON;

"Office of the Political Officer, GLEYSTEEN;

"Office of Agricultural Attaches, HORBALY and BROWN;

"Military Code Room;

"State Department Code Room and Teletype Office;

"Apartments of FREERS, HOUGHTON, URBAN and NEILSEN;

"Eighth Floor Bar (Marines)"

06,06,06

06

227

Top Secret

TS No.

Copy

C001499

197124

10

2IBR

---

## Page 238

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

NOSENKO said that "many" microphones were installed in

the chancery building before the Americans occupied It, but

he did not know how many were installed in all, how many

were in any particular room on KOVSHUK's list, or where they

were located in specific rooms. He did recall that most of

the microphones were emplaced in the outside wall, the wall

nearest Chaykovskiy Street, as most of the offices faced

this street and microphones emplaced there were less vulner-

able to technical search and discovery.

According to NOSENKO, there were no fixed microphones in

America House, the Embassy quarters of enlisted military

personnel.. In 1960-1961 there had been a discussion of using

KGB agents

employed there to emplace temporary audio devices

for one or two days. at a time in the rooms of the Americans,

as well as in the Embassy garage.

These plans were vetoed,

however, because of the risk of discovery.

For the same

reason there was no attempt made in this period to emplace

a device temporarily in Spasso House, the Ambassador's

residence, or in the apartments of Embassy officers.

The

KGB was afraid that they

would be detected and there would

be a scandal:

Performance Characteristics of the Microphones

According to NOSENKO in 1962, the audibility of the

microphones in 1960-1961 ranged from very clear to zero,

but the microphone system was deteriorating.

The KGB could

do nothing about it because they could not gain access to

the inside of the Embassy.

Referring to the microphone in

the Minister Counsellor's office, NOSENKO said that it was

becoming increasingly difficult towork with its product.

the microphone was fading, and the recording tape sounded

as if "somewhere far away, somewhere in the cellar, someone

is speaking in a whisper'

KUZMIN, the KGB officer respon-

sible for the monitors, said that soon the KGB could recover

nothing. Of the microphones then (in

1962) in place, about

twenty no longer were operative.

In 1964 NOSENKO referred again to the microphone in the

Minister Counsellor's office.

NOSENKO learned from

DMITRIYEV [Deputy Chief of the English-language Section of

OTU Second Special Department] how difficult it was to

228

0001500

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy —

---

## Page 239

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMDASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

monitor conversations in that office. Only very experienced

linguists were used, but even they had to listen "ten,

fifteen, even twenty

"times" in order to understand portions

the recording.

After NOSENKO left the Embassy Section,

on several occasions in 1962-1963 GRYAZNOV, his former sub-

ordinate and his successor, referred to the microphones'

decline.. GRYAZNOV said the microphones were picking up

only snatches of conversation, and that in a year of two

they would be completely inoperative.

As a result, GRYAZNOV

told NOSENKO, GRIBANOV was insisting on the recruitment of

code clerks at all costs. Besides the fading quality of

the microphone's signäl, GRYAZNOV, KOVSHUK and FEDOSEYEV

attributed the diminishing. value. of the audio operation to

g value on

the Embassy use of the

"room-in-a-room"

[NOSENKO said

that in 1960-1961 the KGB had information that, in prepara-

tion for President Eisenhower's visit, a "steel chamber"

had been constructed within the Embassy where secure conver-

sations could be held.]

Microphones in the North Wing

According to NOSENKO, no microphones or other audio

devices were ever installed in the north wing (as distinct

from the chancery) prior to the' Embassy's occupancy of the

building in 1962.

In his first meetings with CIA in Geneva

he described how he knew. When it was decided to permit

the Embassy to construct the north wing, NOSENKO wrote a

proposal that audio equipment be installed. Approval

was

up by KGB Chairman Shelepin, who had reservations

because of the political consequences of discovery.

BY

the time Shelepin approved the proposal two or three months

later, renovation was far advanced, and Embassy security

Officer ABIDIAN was already inspecting the premises:: The

Consequenty the

opportunity was lost and the KGB installed no microphones:

Consequently, NOSENKO suggested to CIA that the Minister

Counsellor,

occupying rooms in the chancery which had microphones, be

moved gradually to the north wing, where the KGB had neither

audio equipment nor the capability of installing any.

229

Top Secret

0001501

TS No. 197124

Copy 10

---

## Page 240

....

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Amount, Type, and Value of Audio Surveillance Production

In 1962 while citing examples of the kind of information

the KGB obtained from monitoring, NOSENKO referred only to

the offices of the Minister Counsellor and of the

service

attaches.

According to NOSENKO, Counsellor FREERS dictated

Top Secret and Secret cables. If the content justified,

GRIBANOV was informed and he notified the KGB Chairman

immediately:

FREERS also dictated fitness reports on Embassy

personnel from which the KGB learned of various American

officers' personal weaknesses.

With respect to the service

attaches, NOSENKO said that the KGB learned from microphones

where they intended to travel, and what they wanted to find

out:

In 1964 NOSENKO provided some additional details. He

said that audio reception was good from the military code

room, but that the occupants rarely spoke.

When one of them

the might directorate to nevert onese tie dately to

Nothing was obtained from the State Department code room and

teletype room because of the interference from the noise of

the teletype machines.

The microphones in the apartments

produced rarely anything of interest.

An exception was

advance information obtained of a social affair, for which

the English-language Section of the OTU Second Special

Department would

be asked to pay particular attention. There

was a microphone with good reception in GLEYSTEEN'S (a

political officer) office, but no secret information was

obtained.

Similarly, the conversations were overheard in

the Agricultural Attache office, but nothing significant

was obtained except "something"

which made the KGB suspect

HORBALY was connected with American Intelligence.

• In a protocol signed on 26 October 1965 NOSENKO summarized

his knowledge of the value of the information obtained by

the KGB via microphones in the Embassy:

0001502

230

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy -

---

## Page 241

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

"I regularly reviewed all of the transcripts from

microphones in the American Embassy for a period of

approximately two years,

from January 1960 to January

1962. The following is the only information which

I can remember as being important, interesting or

operationally

useful to the KGB:

"From the microphone in the office of the Minister

Counsellor, FREERS, I remember that he occasionally

dictated cables about the Embassy's evaluation of

certain declarations or acts of the Soviet Government

and advised the State Department on positions for

negotiations with the USSR. This information was

of such importance that special reports were written

to the Central Committee of the CPSU.. However, I

cannot remember any specific incidents or events

which these cables reported nor any specific

evaluations: or recommendations made in these cables.

"Also from the microphones in the Minister

Counsellor's office, I remember that he dictated

fitness reports (kharakteristiki) on about twelve

officers in the Embassy.

I cannot remember who any

of these officers were of any details from the

reports.

There was nothing in these reports which

was of interest or useful to the KGB.

"From the microphone in the Army Attache's office

I remember that the service attaches regularly

discussed plans for trips within the USSR and the

targets that they wanted to cover. They also dis-

cussed the results of these trips after their return.

However, I cannot remember any information about

specific trips planned by

specific service attache

personnel or any specific targets that they planned

to cover or any specific operational activity taken

by the organs of the KGB against service attaches

on trips within the USSR which was based on infor-

mation obtained from this microphone. There was no

interesting, important,

or useful information

about

the personal or professional lives or about the.

vulnerabilities of anyone in the service attache

offices (Army, Navy, and Air) obtained from this

microphone.

231.

Top Secret

6061503

TS No. 197124

Copy - 10

---

## Page 242

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION. - January 1960-January 1962!

"I remember that from the microphones

in the State

Department code room occasionally a code clerk would

read numbers;

These numbers were only of interest

to the Eighth Directorate (Communications and Cryp

tology) of the KGB. I do not remember any conversa-

tions from this microphone.

There was no information

from this microphone of any of the code clerks which

was interesting, important, or useful to the Embassy

Section, First

• Department, Second Chief Directorate,

KGB.

"During the approximately two years in which I

daily reviewed the production from all the micro-

phones in the American Embassy I do not remember any

information on any American in the Embassy which was

interesting, important, or useful to me as the

Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section except the points

noted in the above paragraphs.

Results of Technical and Physical Search

NOSENKO's information Ino action had been taken as a

result of GOLITSYN's earlier report that there was: a micro-

phone in the Embassy office occupied by the Minister

Counsellor] was, as far

of the Embassy chancery in

it wen't, confirmed by a search

spring 1964.

According to the

USIB Security Committee damage report which followed, a

microphone and associated probe was first discovered in the

outside wall behind a radiator in Room 1008 of the chancery.

lIn 1960 this room had been the office of the Army Attache,

where NOSENKO reported a microphone was emplaced.] The

microphone's cable was traced to a major cable which ran

horizontally (several inches) under the outside surface of

the east face of the chancery, to the roof area of the north

annex. A number of vertical cables were found to run to the

various microphone: installations..:

Fifty microphones were

positively identified (ultimately, fifty-four were foundl,

although the system apparently was devised for a considerably

greater number. The microphone system covered all outside

rooms on floors six through ten, with certain exceptions.

The USIB damage report concluded that the microphones were

installed before the Embassy took occupancy of the chancery

in 1953.

00015CA

232

Top Secret

TS. No. 197124

Copy

---

## Page 243

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

The discoveries in the chancery led to the discovery of

other Soviet technical equipment

installed in the north wing

Parallel to the audio cable running from the chancery to the

north wing roof, there were found three coaxial cables, all

terminating in the concrete floor of the north wing attic.

The coaxial

cables appeared to be of more recent installation,

probably prior to the Soviets' evacuation of the north wing.

in 1962.

Comment: While not definitely established, it is assumed

that the Soviets, before the Embassy occupied

the north wing, used it as a listening post for

monitoring microphones in the chancery. In

preparation for American occupancy the main cable

from the chancery was concealed and run from the

north wing roof to the basement, and presumably

from there to a listening post elsewhere.

The

three coaxial cables may have been either

installed at that time or earlier..

Their purpose

is still unknown, but they may have been a

feature of a highly sophisticated electronic

attack against the code room, the existence or

character of which NOSENKO did not know and need

not have known. When NOSENKO was informed in

1965 by CIA that there had been a technical

discovery in the north wing, he offered his

personal assurances that nothing was installed

in the north wing and insisted that whatever

was found must be something unrelated to an

äudio system.

Damage Estimates

With reference to the damage caused by the audio penetra-

tion, the previously-cited USIB damage report stated that "it

must be concluded that due to the extensive period of penetra

tion; the cumulative effect has resulted in serious damage to

the United States. The Soviets have gained considerable

233

- Top Secret

0001505

TS No. 197124

Copy 10

---

## Page 244

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

knowledge as to the effectiveness of United

States operations

within the Soviet Union, particularly the military attache

collection program.

Soviet knowledge of U.S. emphasis upon

certain intelligence collection areas has made it possible

for them to identify priority intelligence and probably

Soviet targets and thereby permitted them to implement

specific counteractions.

The Soviets over the years must

have amassed considerable information concerning the personal

habits, problems, attitudes and weaknesses of personnel

assigned

to the Embassy which can be used by them for purposes

of exploitation at any time of their choosing in the future."

Col. Theodore F. HOFFMAIT, Army Attache in Moscow from

May 1959 to May 1961 la period coinciding with some eighteen

months of NOSENKO's claimed two years'

service in the Embassy

Section), has been more specific. Interviewed by CIA, Col.

HOFFMAN

recalled instances which the KGB, by monitoring just

the conversations held in his office, could have become aware

of the vulnerability of service attache personnel. As

examples, he cited the two occasions on which military code

do clerk STORSBERG was reprimanded for absenteeism

(unavailable

for cipher duties because he was elsewhere with "girl

friends"); HOFFMAN's conversations with America House manager

Ob Peter BINDER (the personality problems, drinking habits and

other incidents relating to America House residents and

visitors to the America Club), and the detailed circumstances

prompting the decision to remove substitute code clerk|KEYSERS 06

from Moscow (homosexuality)... [Besides his general duties as

Chief of the Embassy Section, NOSENKO claims special responsi-

bilities for each of the persons mentioned.

He supervised

the KGB officers operating against code clerks and residents

of America House, and asserts he was personally involved in

the KGB attempts to recruit (STORSBER] and (KEYSERS $6V The KGB

attempted later to recruit (BINDER'as well.)] In aumming up

his views, Col. HOFFMAN said: "To be perfectly frank, I

would assume that ... some of our modus operandi, some of

our targets, some. of the results, and all of our personal

weaknesses

were compromised."

234

00015C6

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy —

6/SR

---

## Page 245

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Audio Operations Against American Embassy:

Summary and Conclusion

Given that NOSENKO's information about microphones in the

chancery has been confirmed, that information's significance

remains the extent to which

it substantiates his claims,

e.g., that his knowledge derived from his position as Deputy

Chief, and that he for two years reviewed the reports of

what the KGB monitored from microphones emplaced in the

chancery

NOSENKO's 'knowledge of the microphones' existence is not

proof that he was Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section, (or

even proof that he served in that unit).

KGB sources serving

elsewhere than in the Second Chief Directorate earlier:

reported the microphones' existence; GOLITSYN specificali

identified one as being in the Minister Counsellor's offic

NOSEIKO's

acquisition of the list of microphones in

"1960-1961" is singular (the more so

since he never hinted

of the list's existence while describing the microphones in

the chancery to CIA in 1962). He asserts that he had no

plan to defect in 1960-1961, when the list was acquired,

that for no apparent purpose he risked keeping a highly

sensitive document in a safe he shared with two subördinates

(GRYAZNOV and KOSOALPOV), and keeping it even after he left

the Embassy Section for the Seventh Department. NOSENKO

so Pot the

has never plausibly explained the circumstances which

prompted his retention of the list until 1964, when he

produced it for CIA in Geneva.

According to NOSENKO, he reviewed what must have been

literally hundreds of monitor reports in the course of two

years, important ones of which

were forwarded to Second

Chief

Directorate Chief GRIBANOV, and others of such signi

ficance that they were the subjects of special reports sent

to the Central Committee of the CPSU.

Yet when challenged

he cites not a single example, despite the fact that this

period included such critical events affecting Soviet-United

235

Top Secret

0001507

TS No. 197124

Copy 10

---

## Page 246

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

States relations (and hence of priority interest to the KGB),

as the U-2 and President Eisenhower's visit. Of the micro-

phones which produced useful information, NOSENKO describes

those in the Minister Counsellor's office, the office of

the Army Attache, and in the code room; when challenged to

cite examples

information obtained, he asserts that none

produced any Information of interest to the Embassy Section.

Lastly, although he stresses the value of the chancery

microphones as sources of information on which he rdied

to

direct operations against code clerks and other Embassy

personnel, he again can describe no actual instance: In

the single case in which he asserted that he relied on

information procured from microphones. KEYSERS!' failure toOb

report receipt of the defection invitation), he was in error.

Conclusion

From the foregoing

it is concluded that, NOSENKO's claims

to the contrary, his information on the chancery microphones

does not sustain his claim either to have been Deputy Chief

of the Embassy Section, or his claim that he personally

reviewed the KGB microphone monitoring reports.

Cryptologic Attack on Embassy Communications

As former Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section of the

American Department NOSENKO claimed to be knowledgeable of

the extent of KGB success in its cryptologic attack on

Embassy communications,

He has consistently asserted that

the KGB had never succeeded in reading enciphered communica-

tions of the service attaches lfor which reason he claimed

00015C8

236

Top Secret

IBR

TS No. 197124

Copy -

---

## Page 247

Top Secret

àry 1962)

AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

ast to the KGBhe recruitment of a military code clerk was his priority

Of the micro-ask in 1960-1961].

He "knew", however, that the Eighth

INKO describes rectorate was reading at least some State Department

office of

nbassy traffic.

hallenged to

its that none

NOSENKO's Information

bassy Section.

chancery

At his second meeting with CIA in 1962, NOSENKO expressed

he relied to oncern that the American Embassy in Moscow might be informed

* Embassy

f him, an event which would be fatal since the KGB was

tance: In

reading all the State Department ciphers"

He knew this

ecause he saw the clear-text messages every day...In a:

§' failure toubsequent meeting NOSENKO revised his earlier statement to

was in errorsplain that while no service attache traffic was being

ead, certain State Department codes had been broken.

He

ad only rarely seen the clear-text of deciphered cables,

t the most,

"ten or twelve times" during 1960 and 1961:

The Russian text of those deciphered State Department

essages was sent to KGB Chairman Semichastnyy, who some-

imes forwarded it to GRIBANOV, Chief of the Second Chief

ENKO's claimirectorate. GRIBANOV at times forwarded some of the

y microphoneaterial to Vladimir Alekseyevich KLYPIN, Chief of the American

Deputy Chiefepartment, or KLYPIN's successor, S.M. FEDOSEYEV. NOSENKO

ersonally

aw such material on the desk of KLYPIN and later on

EDOSEYEV's desk, but was never permitted to read it.

Ikolay ZEMSKOV,

from the Secretariat of the Second Chief

irectorate, brought a book containing the broken State

epartment messages to KLYPIN Or FEDOSEYEV: He would open

he book to certain pages which had red paper and permit

LYPIN Or FEDOSEYEV to see the material.

Irectorate material, but NOSENKO did not know where or how

EMSKOV got it... At times portions of this material were

ead aloud to NOSENKO by KLYPIN, but they concerned the

osition of the American Ambassador or the U,S. Government

=lons:

n political questions and were of no significance to him.

nfrequently there was mention of the expected arrival of

of the

mericans who were not permanently assigned to the Embassy,

ageable of a NOSENKO remembered that one such item concerned the

ack on

rival of a one-or two-man "commission"; to check the work

erted that ! the Political Section.

The attitude of the Secretary of

a communicatate or the American Ambassador was sometimes expressed on

he claimed ertain unremembered topics, but NOSENKO took no interest

TS No. 197

Copy

237

Top Secret

0001509

TS No. 197124

Copy -

- 10

---

## Page 248

14-00000

U003

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

in the information as it did not relate to agents or agent

activities.

NOSENKO noted, however, that the material

concerned messages from the Secretary of State to the American

Ambassador, Moscow.

All of this material was highly sensi

tive, and few people were permitted to see it or even to

know of its existence. NOSENKO stated that it was treated

more carefully than Top Secret information.

Unable to describe the techniques of the KGB Eighth

Directorate in breaking U.S. Department of State crypto-

graphic systems, NOSENKO nevertheless did indicate methods

as known to him.

One method, mentioned by NOSENKO on

12 June 1962, stemmed from the habit of certain Embassy

officials (notably Ministers Counsellor FREERS and McSWEENEY;

dictating the text of outgoing cables aloud. When the texts

were picked up on the KGB microphones,

the Eighth Directorate

compared them against enciphered traffic intercepted by

other means.

NOSENKO has referred to the Eighth Directorate's interest

in equipment sounds and snatches of technical conversations

picked up by the microphones in the State Department and

military code rooms.

"Now, we also listened to the code room and the

teletype office, but we could never get anything out

of the teletype office because of interference

lequipment noises which drowned out conversations].

In the military code room--that was where James H.106

STORSBERG and later

(Matthew P.] ZUJUS worked--we 0b

didn't get much.

We could hear [STORSBERG swearingÜ6

on occasion, and then he would mention a group of

numbers.

This was, of course, all recorded and we

turned it over at once to the Eighth Directorate,

dealing with coding and decoding.

Of course, all

other intercepts were turned over to them also."

With respect to the use of code clerks by the American

Department, NOSENKO recalled that in 1948 or 1949 the KGB

was helped

a great deal by (James H.] MCMILLAN la military

code clerk of the Embassy

staff who detected in 19481, and

by "ANDREY" [Dayle SMITH, see p. 331. It was thanks

to

238

0001510

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy -

31BR

---

## Page 249

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

"ANDREY's" help that the KGB were able to read State Depart-

ment and ciphers.

lat. the time of SMITH's tour in Moscow

a single code room was shared by State Department and

military code clerks. As-the only cryptographic machine

technician assigned to the Embassy, SMITH had access to both

State and military cryptographic equipment.l

NOSENKO also named MARTIN and MICHELL INSA mathematicians

who defected to the USSR in July 1960] and "an American

code clerk brought to the USSR from India" lunidentified,

but possibly John Discoe SMITH, State Department communica-

tions technician who defected to the USSR sometime between

1960-1967, when his presence in the USSR was publicized.

NOSENKO said the Eighth Directorate was submitting

regular reports to khrushchev and the Central Committee on

their intercepts until "the end of 1961 or the beginning

of 1962". He learned this from GRYAZNOV, his successor in

the Embassy Section. At about the same time he learned

that various Embassy officers were less often överheard from

KGB microphones in their offices discussing significant

information.

This development GRYAZNOV and American Depart-

ment Chief FEDOSEYEV attributed to a "room-within-a-room"?

installed in the Embassy and other Embassy security measures.

(The acoustical

room was installed in December 1962] After

his own departure from the Embassy Section, NOSENKO also;

learned of the KGB's loss of its code breaking capability

from Second Chief Directorate Chief, GRIBANOV: GRIBANOV

told him

that the Central Committee was exerting consider-

aole pressure on: the KGB Chairman for continuation of the

information formerly obtained

the chairman was demanding mains meet one me

from all KGB

officers concerned with the recruitment of code clerks.

239

Top Secret

0001511

TS No. 197124

Copy -

10:

---

## Page 250

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Cryptologic Attack on Embassy Communications:

Summary and Conclusion

From USIR and NSA damage assessments following the

discovery of the microphones in the chancery, it has been

concluded that it was equally feasible for the soviets to

have recovered plain text (by analysis of cipher machine

emissions) from enciphered service attache traffic of the

period 1952-1962, and from enciphered State Department

traffic during 1952-1959.

machine mechanic the KGB

"ANDREY" (see p. 33), the code

allegedly recruited in 1953,

serviced the cipher machines in a common State-service

attache code room; his access

was not limited, as NOSENKO

indicates, to State Department traffic.

On the basis of

these fundamental errors, it is concluded that NOSENKO

was not knowledgeable of

the

extent of KGB cryptologic

and that such information

Knowledge of CIA Personnel within Embassy

As Deputy Chief and occasional Acting Chief of the

American Embassy Section, NOSÉNKO claimed that he would

"necessarily know whom the KGB knew or suspected to be a

CIA officer" under diplomatic cover within the Embassy.

Within the section, "special emphasis" was placed on the

identification and development of American Intelligence.

personnel, with the objective of an eventual recruitment.

The KGB believed that the Ambassador, code clerks, ano

Marine quards would not be used to perform intelligence

missions: any diplomat, however, was noted as "suspect

0001512

240

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

---

## Page 251

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

American Intelligence", the notation referring to CIA.

Reviewing lists of American personnel assigned to the

Embassy during 1960-1961 NOSENKO commented on those who

were known or suspected by the KGB to be CIA officers,

and

on some officers who were not.

Embassy Personnel Suspected to be CIA Officers

BOriS KLOSSON

Ob

ERLOSSON was considered to be CIA "Resident" in Moscow,

for reasons unknown to NOSENKO except that he replaced

06 David MARK, who had been regarded as "Resident" because of

his behavior under surveillance and of his clandestine letter

mailing UKLOSSONs case officer was MIKHAYLOV. NOSENKO

recalled the names of none of the KGB agents working

any clandestine activity.

NOSENKO was unaware ofKLOSSON's.06

job in the Embassy, whether his family was in Moscow or

any other features of his personal life, of his travels

inside the Soviet Union, the: identities of his close American

associates or any of his Soviet contacts. NOSENKO never

read KLOSSON's file,

:06

06

Comment:

KLOSSON was not a CIA officer and had no

connectIon with CIA in Moscow.

John ABIDIAN

ABIDIAN was considered to be a CIA officer on the basis

of his conduct as a Department of State security officer

auring Premier Khrushchev's 1959 visit to the United States

and because he replaced known CIA officer Russell LANGELLE.

Surveillance confirmed that he clandestinely mailed opera-

and visited a deaddrop site in Moscow. (See

241

Top Secret

9 BR

0001513

TS No. 197124

Copy -

10

---

## Page 252

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Comment:

ABIDIAN was a State Department officer coopted

by CIA. Although not a CIA staff employee, he

was for all intents the CIA "Resident"

Moscow from February 1960 until November 1961.

OS

Steve WASHENKO

(WASHENKO was identified as a CIA officer on the basis

of his mailing of one or two letters to KGB-controlled double

agents in the Baltic area.

Additionally, from a KGB micro-

phone he was overheard dictating an intelligence report

shortly after he returned from a field trip.

05

Comment:

WASHENKO was a CIA employee detached from his

Washington overt assignment as an (economic 08

analyst to be assigned to Moscow.

He was used

there for limited operational support activity,

including clandestine mailings.

He reverted to

overt CIA employment after his

Moscow assignment,

Lewis BOWDEN

BOWDEN was suspected of being a CIA officer for reasons

unknown to NOSENKO.

KOVSHUK was in contact with BOWDEN under

Ministry of Foreign Affairs cover.

Comment: BOWDEN had no affiliation with CIA.

0001514

242

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

---

## Page 253

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Richard FUNKHAUSER

FUNKHAUSER was suspected of being a CIA officer because

he was a specialist on the Soviet Union, particularly on

economic matters..

NOSENKO remembered the names of no KGB

agents working against rUNKHAUSEk; nor any information about

him which was regarded as derogatory by the KGB:

Comment:

FUNKHAUSER had no affiliation with CIA.

William HORBALY

HORBALY was suspected of being a CIA case officer or

cooptee because the KGB monitored through a microphone in

the Embassy his discussion or dictation of observations made

on a field trip. NOSENKO knew the names of no KGB agents

working against HORBALY, nor whether the agents ever obtained

any derogatory information about him The KGB did not try

to recruit HORBALY ®

Comment:

Like WASHENKO

HORBALY was

and economic analyst of CIA before being

an overt employee

appointed to a State Department position in

Moscow, where he openly discussed the fact

that he had formerly worked for CIA. In

January 1962 he accepted an appointment to the

Foreign Agricultural Service of the Department

of Agriculture.

While in Moscow HORBALY had no

connection with or knowledge of CIA clandestine

activities.

243

Top Secret

G001515

TS. No. 197124

Copy - 10

VBR

---

## Page 254

4-00000

Monkedi

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

George WINTERS

WINTERS was known to be a CIA officer and was given

special attention because of his operational activity in the

POPOV case (see p.207 ). KOVSHUK was in personal contact

with WINTERS under the cover of the Ministry of Foreign Af-

fairs.

In addition he was overheard from a KGB microphone

dictating an intelligence report shortly after he returned

from a field trip.

Comment: WINTERS was a CIA officer.

CIA Personnel Not Suspected by the KGB.

Stanley BROWN

NOSENKO did not recognize BROWV's name, whose name was

on a list which NOSENKO brought to CIA in 1964, a list in-

dicating that BROWN shared an office with HORBALY. In that

office there was a KGB microphone providing good reception,

but insignificant production.

Comment:

LIke HORBALY and WASHENKO, BROWN was an overt

employee of CIA who was Eransferred to the De-

partment of Agriculture prior to being assigned

to the Embassy in. iloscow. He was engaged in

no clandestine activities during his tour:

In 1960-ne visited:Leningrad with WINTERS, whom

BROWN and anotner member_of_the Embassy staff

within the USSR in 1961. 24

0001516

244

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

ZAR

---

## Page 255

14-00000

FY 1962)

Top Secret

'ERICAN EMBASSY

SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

as given

stivity in the

lal contact

Foreign Af-

3 microphone

he returned

william N.

MORELL

MORELy was not suspected of being a CIA officer.

Comment:

06

MORELL]was an overt employee of CIA who was

identified as such to the Soviet Ministry of

Foreign Affairs prior to his assignment to

the Emuassy as a Minister Counsellor. In

attempting to recruit Francis STEVENS] (see p.430) D6

a KGB officer allegedly commented to STEVENS, U

06 that (MORELD openly acknowledged himself to be

a CIA employee. KOVSHUK, under Ministry of

Foreign Affairs cover, was cultivaing (MORELy. 06

03.

Eugene MAHONEY

03

NOSENKO identified MAHONEY's name as that of an employee

nose name was the Administrative Section of the Embassy. Nothing was

a list in-

LY.:: In that

rown of MAHONEY such as his previous career, whether he

new Russian, when he arrived or departed Moscow, or where

a reception, lived while there. The KGB did not suspect that he was

CIA officer.

vas an overt

ed to the De-

being assigne

engaged in

sis tour.

WINTERS, waC

CIA officer.

bassy staff

luring a trif

Comment;

TS No. 1971

Copy

MAHONEY waS a CIA officer who served in Moscow

from October 1960 until September 1961 astan 32

assistant General Services Officer. His

specific CIA mission was to support communica-

tions with PENKOVSKIY inside the Soviet Union.

From the start of his tour he was active in

attempts to familiarize himself with Moscow

and he frequently toured various areas of the

city on foot: O3 MAHONEY went to the vicinity

of the Pushkin Street deaddrop site on two

occasions during. November and December 1960,

0001517

245

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy.

10

15189

---

## Page 256

14-00000

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Comment:

(Continued)

and

examined the site itself on 21 January

1961, See p. 219.)

Throughout his tour MAHONEY OS

was subjected to intense KGB surveillance, On

25: October 1960 ABIDIAN commented that "I find

this type of coverage (five surveillants on a

recent trip to a barber shop) completely out

of character with that which

is usually given

a new arrival of similar rank. My only

Interence 1s that the KGB has at least strono

3suspicions of MAHONEY's primary role as a cIA

(ABIDIAN's own surveillance at the

time was occasional and extremely discreet.)

MAHONEY lived throughout his tour in Moscow in

America House, for which NOSENKO's subordinate

DEMKIN was case officer and which NOSENKO had

described as thoroughly penetrated by KGB agents

among the local employees.('MAHONEY spoke

Russian, and his administrative tasks exposed

him more than most Americans to KGB agents and

informants among Embassy local employees.

Paul GARBLER

GARBLER was a naval officer in the office of the Naval

Attache and the target of BELOGLAZOV. NOSENKO knew the

names of no agents working against GARBLER.

The KGB obtained

no interesting Intormation concerning GARBLER from microphones,

telephone taps, or surveillance.

NOSENKO "aid not know"

whether or not he had read GARBLER's file.

(It will be

recalled that in other contexts NOSENKO said that all Service

Attaches were considered by the KGB to be intelligence officers.)

41BR

0001518

246

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

---

## Page 257

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Comment:

1

1

The CIA Chief of Station while in Moscow,

GARBLER had been detailed to CIA by the Navy

in 1952, and he served CIAfunder Naval cover 32,10

in Berlin from January 1953 until July 1955

He resigned his naval commission in 1955, and

in 1956 he was assigned as a CIA officer to

the American Embassy in Stockholm, under the

32,10

cover of Second Secretary and Political Officer.

He returned to active duty with the Navy in

June 1961 and on 31 August 1961 he was formally

proposed as a candidate for the position of

Assistant Naval Attache in Moscow. In response

to a request from the Soviet Naval Attache

office in Washington, in September 1961 GARBLER

forwarded to the Soviet Embassy an official

biographic summary, followed by an official

call on the Soviet Naval Attache. GARBLER

arrived in Moscow on 29 November 1961.

Prior to his affiliation with CIA, GARBLER

had served in Korea where he was acquainted

with George BLAKE. GARBLER was a participant

in the joint CIA/MI-6 discussions in Washington

in April 1960, minutes of which BLAKE had

admitted passing to the Soviets.

(See p

CIA thus assumed GARBLER to

have been identified

to the KGB as a CIA officer prior to his

arrival in Moscow.

This assumption was confirmed

by an article appearing in Izvestiya in October

1963 in which the author alleged that GARBLER

had earlier been involved in subversion and

espionage in Sweden

247

Top Secret

0001519

TS No. 197124

Copy -10.

3/BR-

---

## Page 258

14-00000

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Knowledge of CIA Personnel in Embassy:

Summary and Conclusion

With the exception of ABIDIAN, there is a paradox

connected with each of NOSENKO's identifications, as is

most evident in the cases of MORELI) and GARBLER.

It is a Of

fact that both these individuals were known to the KGB as

CIA officers, a fact of which NOSENKO apparently is unaware.

His claim is

thus false, that he would necessarily know

whom the KGB believed was a CIA officer, and to the extent

he related it to his claim that he was Deputy Chief of the

Embassy Section, that latter claim is unsubstantiated.

Personal Handler of KGB Agents

NOSENKO has named seven agents which he claimed to have

handled while Deputy Chief of the American Section during

1960-1961:

YEFREMOV and VOLKOV

NOSENKO continued to manage these two homosexual agents

whom he had recruited and managed during his assignment in

the Seventh Department, and brought with him when he trans-

Ierred to the American Department (see p. 1ll). They were

ised in no operations during the period 1960-1961.

[NOSENKO

lescribed the compromise of Robert BARRETT in 1959 and knew 0.

of his later recruitment in I961. (See p. 134.) NOSENKO

does not know of BARRÊTT's contacts with YEFREMOV and VOLKOVO6

in 1961, when he claims to have been their case officer.)

0001520

248

Top Secret

318R

TS No. 197124

Copy -

---

## Page 259

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

06

FRIPPEL

NOSENKO continued to manage the Moscow manager of the

2 American Express Company during the 1960-1961 period, as

he had earlier during his assignment to the Seventh Depart-

ment. (See p. 137. CRIPPELwas an uncooperative and

unproductive source reporting on his acquaintances in the

American Embassy:

DMITRIYEV

NOSENKO's English and Japanese-speaking agent during the

1955-1960 Seventh Department period was employed in the

Japanese Exhibition in Moscow.

(See p. 107.) He was not

used operationally during 1960 or 1961.

Marina RYTOVA

NOSENKO's agent from 1956 or 1957 (see p. 108) at the

Russian Permanent Exhibit in Moscow, RYTOVA was not used

operationally during 1960-1961

Maya LEVINA

LEVINA was a language teacher and librarian at the

Embassy used as an informant on her American language

students; among whom were a number of code clerks.

She

provided no worthwhile information on any American nor was

she ever used in operations.

"At the end öf 1960 or the

beginning of 1961 she was fired by Paul SMITH,, and NOSENKO U6

turned her over to another Embassy Section officer. The

British

Department planned later to use her in either the

British or Canadian Embassies.

(LEVINA was employed at the

Embassy from January 1958 through January 1962. [Cultural 08, 06

Affairs Officer SMITH) left Moscow in September 1961, and

could not have been directly involved in LEVINA's termina-

tion.

LEVINA thus was employed at the Embassy throughout

HOSENKO's tour of dutywith the Embassy Section.l

24.

249

Top Secret

5/BR

0001521

TS No. 197124

Copy

10

---

## Page 260

14-00000

Top Secret

¡AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

06

PRE ISFREUND

06

Recruited by KOVSHUK, (PREISFREUND was handled by NOSENKO

in the operation against STORSBERG, (see p. 106) :

He was Ob

used in no other operation during

1960-1961.

WEISS) 06

06

The (Syrian Army captain studying in Moscow was first

targetted against America House occupants, then used in

06 the development of [ZUJUS, STORSBERGs successor OThe

latter operation had not terminated when NOSENKO left the

Embassy Section in January 1962.

Personal Handler Of KGB Agents: Summary and Conclusion

Of the five agents NOSENKO claims to have brought with

him to the American Embassy Section from his previous Seventh

Department assignment, none was used operationally during

1960-1961. If NOSENKO handled LEVINA as he claimed, he

would presumably know that his single agent in the Embassy

served throughout his Embassy Section assignment and was

not fired earlier, as he asserted. 0o PREISFREUND] and WEISS] 06

are discussed in considerable detail in connection with

the KGB operations against (STORSBERG and (ZUJUS).U6 NOSENKO's

claims regarding the agents he handled during

the 1960-1961

period do not sustain his assertions that he was Deputy

Chief of the American Section, responsible for code clerk

operations, or provide conclusive evidence that he did or

did not serve in the Embassy Section.

M!BR

0001522

250

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy -

---

## Page 261

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Temporary Assignments Abroad

NOSENKO claims that he

scheduled to travel to the

United States in November 1960 (a trip which was cancelled)

and that he travelled to Cuba in November-December 1960

and to Bulgaria in April-May 1961, on KGB assignments:

The significance of his travel is the extent to which it

relates to his claimed position and functions in the Embassy

Section, and to operations in Moscow for which he claimed

supervisory responsibility.

Planned Travel to the United States

In one of the initial meetings in 1962 NOSENKO stated

that he had been in the United States.

He later amended

this to explain that he had been scheduled to make a trip

to the United States, but that the trip had been cancelled.

Jewas to. travel under: true name,.ne sala, to avold beinc

connected

to the name NIKOLAYEV,:

under which he travellec

to the United Kingdom in 1957 and 1958. In his early

account he claimed that the decision to use his true name

was his, personally, later he asserted that the decision

was made by "the people in charge of such operations"

NOSENKO stated that he was to travel under the cover of

an employee of the State Scientific-Technical Committee

IGNTK), and was to accompany an automotive delegation:

The visit, however, was part

of the Soviet-U,S: exchange

program, and when the visit was postponed in 1961, NOSENKO's

travel was cancelled:

Comment:

The name of NOSENKO appeared along with ll

others

on a 20 October 1960 request to the

Embassy in Moscow for visas for members of a

Soviet automotive exchange delegaion which

was scheduled to visit the United States in

November 1960. NOSENKO was listed as an

engineer employed by the, State Scientific

Technical Committee,

251

Top Secret

0001523

TS No. 197124

Copy 10

---

## Page 262

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Travel to Cuba (November-December 1960)

When NOSENKO first mentioned his travel to Cuba (in

1962, in Geneva), he claimed that he travelled under the

NIKOLAYEV alias, and he provided colorful details of his

activities in Havana in surveying the American Embassy

there for operational possibilities.

NOSENKO asserted that he travelled in true name, and that

his was a routine assignment to accompany a Soviet delegation

as a security officer.

NOSENKO's Information

In the latter part of 1960, at the same time as he was

preparing for his intended trip to the United States, a

special delegation of nickel industry experts from Gosplan,

the Soviet State Planning Commission, was preparing for

departure for Cuba.

The delegation was a routine one,

consisting mostly of engineers from various sections of

the Soviet Union.

Since there was no one under any sort of

suspicion, the Eleventh (Soviet Travellers Abroad) Depart-

ment of the Second Chiéf Directorate decided it was unnec

essary to include a security officer. Two days prior to

the departure of the group, however, the Central Committee

of the Communist Party ordered that a Second Chief Direct-

orate officer accompany the group.

Because of the short

time remaining before the delegation's scheduled departure,

the Eleventh Department protested that it would be impossible

to find a suitable officer who could get his necessary

travel documents ready in time. At this point, A.I. KUZNETSOV

of the Eleventh Department suggested NOSENKO, who had been

supposed to go to the United States and who had a valid

The Cubans issued NOSENKO a visa

immediately as did The Netherlands a transit visa.

NOSENKO's functions with the delegation were purely of

a security nature.

He flew with the delegation to Cuba in

October or November and spent about a month and a half

there. During this time he accompanied the delegation

0001524

252

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

---

## Page 263

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

everywhere it went, to different plants, and to meet repre-

sentatives of the so-called Institute of Agrarian Reform

to discuss how to increase production. NOSENKO's cover

assignment was deputy chief of the delegation and shortly

before departing Moscow he was introduced to the other

members as such..

He had one agent within the delegation

and developed several

"confidential contacts" during the

trip. NOSENKO would not have accepted the assignment had

he known how long and uneventful the trip was to be; he

had really wanted to go only to the United States.

On his return trip to Moscow, NOSENKO was given a special

mission. As he was leaving from Havana Airport, the KGB

Legal Rezident in Cuba, A.I. ALEKSEYEV, handed him a package

with instructions to deliver it to Moscow: NOSENKO did not

know the contents of the package until he arrived in

Amsterdam en route home

There the wrappings became loose

(it was bound only by thin string) and NOSENKO took the

opportunity to determine that it contained copies of "letters

between wiikoyan and Khrushchev concerning the prices of

sugar" and drafts of

agreements between the Soviet Union

and

East Germany,

Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania.

On

arrival at the airport in Amsterdam, NOSENKO was told that

a message had been received from the Central Committee of

the Communist Party instructing that the package was to be

delivered "urgently" to Che Guevara, who was

touring Eastern

Europe and was then in Berlin.

While the delegation continued

on to Moscow, NOSENKO was driven to the Soviet Embassy in

The Hague, and in the late evening of his second day in The

Netherlands he left by train for East Berlin.

When he

arrived in Berlin Guevara was found to have left Berlin for

Hungary, and NOSENKO delivered the papers to "Guevara's

deputy" in Berlin and continued on to Moscow.

Comment:

Travel records obtained by CIA, which include

photographs taken in both Amsterdam and Caracas

of NOSENKO's true name service passport and

his passport photograph, confirm that NOSENKO,

a "minerals engineer", transitted Amsterdam en

route to Cuba on 15 November 1960, was in

253

Top Secret

0001525

TS No. 197124

10

---

## Page 264

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Comment:

(Continued)

Caracas on 17 November, and departed Caracas

for Havana on 19 November. According to flight

manifests, on 13 December NOSENKO arrived in

Amsterdam

from Havana en route to Moscow and

left Amsterdam via air for Moscow on 15 December.

NOSENKO was travelling on

a service passport;

he did not enjoy diplomatic immunity: It is

thus highly unlikely that he did serve as a

courier, bearing documents of the nature he

described as he claimed.

NOSENKO's planned trip to the United States

and his confirmed travel to Cuba damages his

claim that he was supervising operations during

this period against Embassy code clerks in

MOScOW.

The trip occurred at the time his

alleged target, State Department code clerk

MORONE, was to be entrapped on the train en

route to Warsaw (15 November) and while his

subordinate KOSOLAPOV was in Helsinki (12-16

November) in connection with another code clerk

target, John GARLAND®

Travel to Bulgaria and the LUNT Case (April-May 1961)

In Geneva in 1962 NOSENKO reported that he had been sent

to Sofia as a KGB response to a Bulgarian Ministry of

Interior (MVR) request that the KGB provide a Second Chief

Directorate American Department officer to discuss opera-

tions with Bulgarian counterparts.

While in Sofia NOSENKO

asserted he played a key role in the compromise of American

professor Horace G. LUNT.

06

NOSENKO 's Information

Consultation with the MVR

NOSENKO first heard of the Bulgarian assignment from

S.I, YEGOROV, Chief of the KGB unit handling liaison with

Bloc counterintelligence representatives in Moscow.

YEGOROV

0001526

254

Top Secret

3I8R

TS No. 197124

Copy

---

## Page 265

JaS

light

in .

nd

cember:

sport;

1S:

ites

ring

6

Lerk

int

f

an

ROV

· 124

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

said that the Bulgarian Minister of the Interior had

requested the KGB Chairman to provide an officer from the

American Department of the Second Chief Directorate for

consultation with the MVR American Department in Sofia.

Anerican Department Chief KLYPIN subsequently instructed

NOSENKO to go•:

NOSENKO was told that he was going for

"consultations" and that KGB advisors would discuss his

duties with him.: KLYPIN told NOSENKO only that he should

see how the MVR worked, and tell them how the KGB managed

its operations...

NOSENKO had no meetings or discussions with

American Department, the names of any MVR officers, or what.

the MVR's particular problems were.

NOSENKO flew from Moscow to Sofia in early April 1961

and was met at the airport by A.s. KOZLOV, a former Second

Chief Directorate officer whom he had known' in Moscow.

The following morning he was picked up in an official

vehicle and was taken to KOZLOV's office in the Bulgarian

MVR building. NOSENKO asked KOZLOV what was expected of

him and was told that "they want to know about how to work

against the American Legation, everything, right from

letter 'A'"

NOSENKO was introduced to the Chief KGB

advisor in Sofia, Mikhail YEGOROV, and to the Chief of the

MVR's American Department, after which he was assigned an

office: In the MVR building. During the ensuing weeks he

discussed both general matters and particular cases with

Individual Bulgarian officers working against the American

carget::. On one occasion he lectured interested MR officers

on the principles of operations against foreign military

personnel in Moscow, and on another he visited an MVR

surveillance post opposite the American Legation.

He

discussed KGB methods of operations against foreign tourists.

He also addressed the entire American Department for about

five hours to tell them "what is necessary, what to pay

attention to, how to work". At the end of his visit, some

time in mid-May, NOSENKO conferred with the First Deputy

Minister of the MVR about what had been accomplished and

his recommendations for improving operations against Americans:

255

Top Secret

0001527

TS No. 197124

10

---

## Page 266

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962;

Comment:

NOSENKO doesn't know why he was selected to

consult with the MVR in Bulgaria,

As far.

as is known

to CIA, such consultation was a

function of the KGB advisors in Sofia whom

NOSENKO himself described. The American

Legation (after a ten-year absence) reopened

in February 1960. By 1961 the MVR had demon-

strated that it had lost none of its earlier

demonstrated efficiency in controlling the

activities of resident foreigners and in

establishing the basis for mounting operations

against American diplomats.

There was no

apparent necessity for NOSENKO's Sofia assign-

ment, and therefore his account is jüdged to

be untrue.

06

Compromise of LUNT]

06

In Geneva in 1962 NOSENKO described the compromise of

LUNT in graphic

terms, including his own personal confron-

tation of LUND In his subsequent accounts he had statea

Obthat while he

"never saw LUNT personally, he supervised the

activities of the MVR officers who dealt with LUNTy,

About two weeks after arriving in Bulgaria, around the

end of April 1961, NOSENKO was reviewing MVR lists of

foreigners scheduled to visit Bulgaria, when he came across

the name of Horace G. LUNT).0 NOSENKO recalled that a Slavic

When MVR

officers confirmed that

records, for which purpose he telephoned Moscow.

_An almost

immediate reply confirmed that this was the same LUNT who ib

and that he was a

(The KGB had never exploited its knowledge of LUNT's homo-.Üb

sexual activities and the MVR had not known that; LUNT|was

a homosexual.)

1016R

0001528

256

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy -

---

## Page 267

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

KOZLOV and the Chief of the MVR American Department

were very interested in NOSENKO's lead, and KOZLOV appealed

to NOSENKO for his help, since "the MVR had never recruited

an American".

The three discussed the matter with General

DUMKOV, the Chief of the MVR Second Chief Directorate, and

NOSENKO suggested that a MVR homosexual agent should be

employed, an apartment prepared, and preparations made fox

clandestine photography:

They then advised YEGOROV, the

senior KGB advisor to the MVR, and KOZLOV called GRIBANOV

in MoscoW. GRIBANOV prohibited NOSENKO's personal involve-

ment in the entrapment of LuNTland NOSENKO's role thereafter

was merely advising the MVR officers, "who didn't know what

to do"

NOSENKO suggested that the MVR officers get two

homosexual agents, since "maybe (LUNT wouldn't like one of 06

them"

, and he advised them to weigh the time element in .

deciding whether to entrap LUNT with a view to attempting 06

to recruit him at once, or merely to obtain evidence for

later blackmail. The MVR. American Department Chief and his

Tourist Section

chief were to attempt the recruitment

NOSENKO remained in a MVR office where he could be reached

by telephone in the event the MVR officers needed further

assistance

NOSENKO learned from

the MVR officers involved that

the recruitment had been successful, and that LUNT had 06

agreed to meet them again on the following day: NOSENKO

later was told that the MVR did not give LUNT arrangements

for a contact in the United States because he was expected

to return to Bulgaria for a Slavic Language.

conference in

1962 or 1963

06

Luvi's Information

LUNT

travelled directly from Sofia to Belgrade and there

• 9. May

1961 he reported to American Ambassador George

Kenhan and

to CIA

that he had been recruited under duress

by the MVR in Sofia on 5 May. After being entrapped with

a homosexual and accepting recruitment, he was instructed

to meet clandestinely with a MVR officer in Paris en route

back to the United States.. He was given no other tasks.

257

TIBR

Top Secret

0001529

TS. No. 197124

Copy - 10

---

## Page 268

..?22229222253323823

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

06

LUNT] stated that while on an earlier trip to sofia in

November 1960 he became involved with one Georgi Velev

ALEKSIEV, with whom he engaged in homosexual relations on

at least five separate occasions. He had given ALEKSIEV

American travellers checks which the Bulgarian planned to

sell on the blackmarket.

Once, while in guNt's company, 0b

ALEKSIEV had been recognized and questioned by the Bulgarian

civil police.CLUNT corresponded with ALEKSIEV after

departing from Bulgaria in 1960, and he had advised ALEKSIEV

of his planned return in April 1961 to Sofia.

.06

Comment:

LUNT's account refutes NOSENKO's claims that

the MVR had no evidence of LUNT's vulnerability 06

prior to receiving NOSENKO's information in

May 1961, and that NOSENKO"s personal partici-

pation in the MVR operation was such that he

knew that [UNT)was given no MVR contact in the

United States. 0o

NOSENKO's involvement in the LUNI]case is

unrelated to the assignment he claims at the

time. Although NOSENKO cites the LUNT case in Ot

connection with his Embassy Sectión duties,

it resembles most of all a Seventh Department

operation.

NOSENKO ' S

presence in Sofia in May 1961

(when he claims his operation against STORSBERG U

was approaching a climax and when his subor-

dinates were apparently planning to exploit

(KEYSERS' newly discovered vulnerability)

indicates that NOSENKO's presence in Moscow

was dispensable.

regarding supervisory responsibility for

all

American code clerk operations.

11BR

0001530

258

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

---

## Page 269

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY

SECTION- January 1960-January 1962)

Promotion and Transfer to

Seventh Department (January

the

1962)

NOSENKO stated that his return to the Seventh Department

resulted from GRIBANOV's wish to promote him from Deputy

Chief of the Embassy Section to Deputy Chief of the whole

American Department, However, according to NOSENKO, the

new American Department Chief, FEDOSEYEV, wanted as his

deputy KOVSHUK, NOSENKO's superior.

Under the circumstances,

NOSENKO said he preferred to be transferred back to the

Seventh Department, in any capacity.

NOSENKO reported that

he spoke to Seventh Department Chief V.D. CHELNOKOV, and the

latter proposed that NOSENKO ask GRIBANOV. to be returned to

the Seventh Department as chief of the American Section,

with the understanding that he would be appointed Deputy

Chief of the Seventh Department as soon as the incumbent

deputy [B.A.] BALDIN retired in July 1962.

NOSENKO asserted

his proposal was

made and approved by GRIBANOV in September

or October 1961 GRIBANOV, according to NOSENKO, never

indicated his reasons for planning to appoint him Deputy

Chief of the American Department of for later promoting him

to Section Chief

and

then Deputy Chief of the seventh Depart-

ment in 1962.

In view of his impending transfer, starting in December

1961 NOSENKO, said he spent several hours each day in the

Seventh Department, There he stated he talked with Depart-

ment Chief CHELNOKOV, familiarized himself with certain

files of the American

Tourist Section, and discussed current

operations and operational possibilities with the officers

ROSEN O

to the rather ses one ON ADd the 24 or 15 oDdeember

1961, and within the next

few days NOSENKo officially signed

over the ABIDIAN case file and the Embassy security file to

his successor as Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section,

GRYAZNOV. As he had when he transferred into the American

Department in 1960, NOSENKO said he took his active agents

with him when he returned to the Seventh Department.

he so turned co

259

Top Secret

0001531

TS No. 197124

Copy 10

---

## Page 270

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Comment:

NOSENKO dates his transfer as occurring

"before.

GOLITSYN's defection", which he insists.

occurred in mid-January 1962 even after learning

from CIA that the correct date is 15 December

1500. -0b3ge

1961. Obliged to take the latter date into

account, NOSENKO reconstructed the foregoing

chronology of his departure from the Embassy

Section and his assumption of duties in the

Embassy Section and his assumption of duties

in the Seventh Department.

Repeated interro-

gation has never resolved

the reason NOSENKO

attached so much significance to the date on

which he believes GOLITSYN defected.

In claiming to have transferred from the

Embassy Section just prior to 5 January 1962

(when his participation in the Seventh Depart-

ment compromise of W.E. JOHNSON]is confirmed) .0b

NOSENKO's account makes it impossible for him

to have played the role he claimed in the events

connected with ABIDIAN's visit to the Pushkin

Street deaddrop.

(See p. 216.)

NOSENKO's assertion that he was GRIBANOV'S

candidate over KOVSHUK for Deputy Chief of the

American Department is implausible. In contrast

to NOSENKO's self-admitted undistinguished

performance, KOVsHuk was a

former Deputy Chief

of the American Department who had been personally

invoived in such American Department operations

of the previous decade as recruitments of Roy

RHODES and Dayle SMITH, and the development of

-

3/BR

0001532

260

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

---

## Page 271

Top Secret

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1950-January 1962)

DEPUTY CHIEF Of the AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - 1960-1962:

Summary and Conclusion

According to NOSENKO, between January 1960 and January

1962 he was Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section,

in which capacity he was occasional Acting Chief, super-

visor of all operations against code clerks and for some

months service attaches, case officer for priority KGB

target ABIDIAN, custodian of the Embassy security file, and

reviewer of all information obtained from microphones

emplaced in the Embassy.

From a comparison of NOSENKO's

assertions, amendments, and retractions with collateral

information, he was none of these.

Further, while he may

have been familiar with the activities of some agents of

the Embassy Section, his relationship with them was not in

the manner nor circumstances he claimed.

From his position as Deputy Chiéf NOSENKO claims complete

knowledge of KGB recruitments and recruitment attempts among

Embassy personnel during the period 1960-1961 and thereafter,

of CIA personnel identified by the KGB on the Embassy staff,

and of the status. of the KGB. cryptologic attack on Embassy

communications. His apparent ignorance of KOVSHUK's rela-

Fionship with [MORELIU and KOSOLAPOV's connection with GARLAND] Ob

refute his contention that he would have known of all KGB

recruitment attempts; that he was seemingly unaware of such

events while Deputy Chief demolishes his claim that he would

necessarily have learned of them later, and while assigned

elsewhere.

Contrary to his claim, NOSENKO does not know of

ClA personnel on the Embassy staff who were identified by

the KGB:

NOSENKO's information on the KGB cryptologic

attack reflects no special knowledge; it is superficial and

in erIOI.

Conclusion

NOSENKO was neither Deputy Chief of the American Embassy

Section nor a supervisor in that section.

21SR.

261

Top Secret

0001533

TS No. 197124

Copy -

10

---

## Page 272

• 41.

12622842

Top Secret

+1

CHAPTER VIII

SEVENTH DEPARTMENT (January 1962 to January 19641

Comment: By late 1959 or early 1960 the KGB had the

complete substance of the CIA and MI-6 tourist.

agent program in the USSR.

The information ob-

tained from the KGB agent in MI-6, BLAKE, in=

cluded accurate details of the objectives and

targets of those operations, as well as the

practices employed for the selection, recruit-

ment, training and briefing of the agents in-

As a probable consequence of reports

received from BLAKE as well as by the indepen-

dent confirmation of tourist agents identified

in the USSR, the KGB by 1961 was mobilizing all

of its resources to counter the threat.

The

KGB's tasks were made no easier by the increase

in bona fide tourists to the Soviet Union, the

numbers of which were increasing by thousands

annually:

Evidently uncertain of the success

of domestic measures it was taking, the KGB

extended responsibility for countermeasures to

KGB elements outside of the Second Chief Direc-

torate.

To that end, selected First Chief

Directorate residencies abroad were instructed

to exploit all of its facilities in developing

tourist agent countermeasures.

the magnitude of its tourist agent problen,

KGB Headquarters cited the scores of American

tourist agents who had been identified in just

one year in the Soviet Union.

In fact, by the time

NOSENKO returned to

the Seventh Department in January 1962, the

threat against which the KGB was deploying had

passed.

By early 1961 the tourist agent pro-

gram was suspended when technical collection

programs and other agent operations made the

use of tourists unnecessary.

The statements of NOSENKO with respect to

Second Chief Directorate Seventh Department

counterintelligence operations among American

2.63

Top Secret

0001534

TS. No. 197124

Copy 10

---

## Page 273

4-00000

32233

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

Comment:

(Continued)

tourists during this period must be examined

in light of the foregoing facts.

Since NOSENKO

claims to have held key KGB positions from

which vantage he asserts he was particularly

well informed about KGB operations against

American tourists, it is appropriate to hola

him closely accountable for his statements.:

NOSENKO's claimed assignment to the Seventh Department.

first as Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section

and then as a Deputy and then First Deputy Chief of the

entire Department, extended

from January 1962 until his de-

fection in Geneva in January 1964. By the time NOSENKO re-

turned to the Seventh Department for this assignment, the

functions unrelated to tourists.

A newly-created Service

(sluzhba), NOSENKO explained,

assumed responsibility for

foreign religious figures, emigres visiting the Soviet Union,

and persons: travelling to the USSR to visit relatives:

The

Seventh Department's former responsibilities for operations

against foreign seamen, commercial delegations, and so forth

were similarly transferred elsewhere.

In addition to performing supervisory and

administrative

duties, NOSENKO asserted that in this period he personally

was involved with KGB operations launched against six Ameri-

can tourists and participated in investigations of Lee Harvey

Embassy Section, A.N. CHEREPANOV.

his Seventh Department duties:

Because of the senior position NOSENKO said he occupied

during his period of service in the Seventh Department, NOSENKO

claimed full awareness of

all significant KGB operations

against American tourists.

0001535

264

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

---

## Page 274

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section

(January. - July 1962)

As Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section

NOSENKO said he was responsible for planning

and coordinating

all KGB activities against American land British and Canadian

tourists in the'USSR as well as for supervising the operation-

al work of fifteen subordinate case officers. ..He had

deputy, and he did not indicate who assumed his duties in his

absence. He required several months at the beginning of 1962

to "get the feel of things"; "there were no accomplishments"

on his part in the initial period on this new job. In mid-

February 1962, within a few weeks of his transfer, he began

preparations for

his assignment to Geneva with the Disarma-

ment Delegation.

This involved discussions with the Eleventh

(Soviet Delegation) Department of the Second Chief Directorate.

as well as with case officers responsible for the investiga-

tion of one particular Soviet delegate to Geneva. SHAKHOV.

NOSENKO claimed that his preparations for his trip were only

part-time and in addition to his other regular duties: He

spent his early weeks talking to case officers, reviewing.

reports of the section's activities during the previous two

years, and discussing plans for the coming tourist season.

He proposed a study of representatives of foreign tourist.

firms in Moscow with an eye to their recruitment by the KGB,

a proposal which was accepted. [NOSENKO elsewhere attributed

the proposal to his earlier assignment in the Tourist Depart-

ment in 1958-1960, which

he alleged resulted

in the recruit-

ment of TRIPPED. 1,06

NOSENKO'S Agents

NOSENKO claimed that when he transferred to the Seventh

Department he brought with him the agents which he had been

handling in the American Department Embassy Section:

Arsene FRIPPEL

29,06

American

Express manager FRIPPEL departed from Moscow

in early 1961, but NOSENKO claimed he continued to be the

Second Chief Directorate case officer since CRIPPEL)had no U6

contact with the KGB in New York City, and that he met

FRIPPED twice in the USSR

in 1963.

According to NOSENKO,

265

Top Secret

5/BR,

0001536

TS No. 197124

Copy

10

---

## Page 275

14-00000

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

06

FRIPPEL was a weak agent: "he was afraid and gave practa-

cally nothing."

NOSENKO said that although he had

recruited

him,

"honestly speaking, FRIPPEL was not an agent." The KGBOb

nevertheless hoped that FRIPPEL] would be reassigned to Mos-06

cow at some future date.

• (See p.137 for details of the

FRIPPED

case.)

06

Comment:

06

FRIPPEL agrees with NOSENKO that they met twice

in the USSR in 1963. However, FRIPPEDasserts 06

ne also met NOSENKO In Odessa in February 1962.

which NOSENKO flatly denies. (FRIPPED is. known O6

to have planned to travel to the Soviet Union

at that time, and there is no apparent reason

why he would make a false claim on this matter.

06

06

Johannes PREISFREUND

06

The KGB considered (PREISFREUND compromised to American

Intelligence after GOLITSYN's defection lin December 19611 and

thus unsuitable for further use against Americans at the Em-

bassy in Moscow.

For this reason, NOSENKO was told to take

PREISFREUND with him when he transferred to

the Seventh De-

partment.

As the agent spoke only Finnishland Russian, however,

le was of no use against anglish-speaking tourists.

NOSENKO

net with PREISFREUND On the latter's visits to Moscow in 1952

but did not use him in any operations.

Comment:

06

PREISFREUND] asserts that he was no longer a KGB

agent after the STORSBER operation (see p.175, 06

and that although he saw NOSENKO on his freguent.

return visits to Moscow, it was only because

NOSENKO sought a companion for wenching and

arinking.

266

Top Secret

14ISR

0001537

TS No. 197124

Copy -

---

## Page 276

14-00000

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

VOLKOV and YEFREMOV

According to NOSENKO, he used the

two homosexual

agents in the entrapment of W.E. JOHNSON!

I several days after 06

returning to the Seventh Department.

This was their first

operational activity since 1959, because they were employed

in no operations during the entire period he was their case

officer while assigned to the Embassy Section. After the

JOHNSON entrapment, these agents were not used again. NO-

SENKO Claimed that in 1962 or 1963 they were retired, and he

personally dispatched their files to KGB Archives.

details of VOLKOV's and YEFREMOV's activities see p.110 :!

Comment:

There is evidence that VOLKOV was involved in

a KGB entrapment operation directed against

American tourist William J. ZUBONJin July 06

1962 (while NOSENKO claims he was still his

case officer), an event of which NOSENKO ap-

parently is uninformed:

Samih WEISS

After his transfer to the Seventh Department, NOSENKO

claimed he was instructed also to continue directing! Syrian 1,06

military officer WEISS, who was targetted against military

Obcode clerk ZUJUS] (see p. 161), NOSENKO continued to meet

Jo weiss during the first months of 1962, and in February or

attempted to have WEISS

• Oowith ZUJUS so that another KGB agent could be introduced to

the code clerk. Just before leaving for Geneva for the first

time, NOSENKO

cessor as Deputy Chief of the American Department Embassy

was scheduled to finish his studies in Moscow

in May 1962, after which NOSENKO believed he returned to

[Syria. lI

Comment: Because of the political climate in Syria!

there

has been no opportunity to query

NOSENKO's allegations.

WEISS regarding

06

0001538

267

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

10

Copy

---

## Page 277

4-00000

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

Marina RYTOVA

Until 1960 or 1961 a Greek language instructor at the

Institute

for International Relations, RYTOVA obtained a job

at a CPSU Central Committee school and thereafter ceased all

agent work.

Nevertheless, NOSENKO asserted that he was offi-

cially registered as her

case officer until his defection in

1964.

NOSENKO's Agents: Summary and Conclusion

NOSENKO's claims with respect to these agents do not sus-

tain his claims to service in the Seventh Department in this

period, since none were utilized in Seventh Department opera-

Operational Activities (January - June 1962)

As Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section of

the Seventh Department during the period January-July 1962

NOSENKO claimed he directed the compromise of W.E. JOHNSON 06

in January, briefed himself on the Section's activities, and

prepared himself for his assignment as a security officer

with a delegation travelling to Geneva. During March and

June he visited Geneva and contacted CIA and, by his asser-

tion, supervised the case officer handling of KGB double

agent Boris BELITSKIY •

Shortly after his return to moscow

in June he claimed he recruited Horst BRAUNS. O6

Entrapment of W.E. JOHNSONJ U6

NOSENKO's Information

NOSENKO first referred to JOHNSON in Geneva in 1962, when

he described how YEFREMOV and VOLKOV in January 1962 had been

used in

the homosexual entrapment of a tourist, JOHNSON, a Uk

)XTyoung Baptist from California.

The KGB was angered thât the

American was writing letters critical of the Soviet Union.

Although the American agreed to NOSENKO's demand that he work

with the KGB in the United States, the American immediately

reported the recruitment attempt to the Embassy.

268

TS No. 197124

0001539

Top Secret

Copy

6/8R

---

## Page 278

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

In February 1964 NOSENKO produced among other notes which

he had brought with him to a meeting with CIA (see_p.319)

one bearing the name of Everett Wallace (sic] JOHNSON and the Ot

date "5 January 1962"•

recalled the significance of neither the name nor the date,

that the cance

Questioned about the note, NOSENKO

and stated that the case was not a recruitment but "some

sort of developmental operation"

06

though not immediately recalling (JOHNSON's name, he eventually Ut

remembered that it was something Tike JOHNSONor JOHNSTON. and 06' 06

that he was a Baptist from the California coast, i NOSENKO:

placed the operation sometime in the summer of 1962, after his

return to Moscow from Geneva, because he also remembered he

wore no overcoat at the time. JOHNSON, who had come to the

Soviet Union as

a tourist, was discovéred to be a homosexual.

and

on this basis the KGB Second Chief Directorate considered

him as a recruitment target. The Second Chief Directorate

was not interested in JOHNSON as

access to important information and he lived too far from the

KGB Legal Residencies in the United States for convenient con-

tact:

06

Several days later KGB surveillance observed JOHNSON

mailing some letters in Moscow.

When read by the KGB they

were found to be

"so' bitter toward the Soviet Union, angry,

critical, that the. KGB decided something had to be done" to

prevent his writing letters and making anti-Soviet statements

on his return to the United States Ob"At about the

same time"

there was some sign that JOHNSON was a homosexual, and it was

decided to entrap him on this basis. The sole reason was to

halt JOHNSON's criticism of the USSR.

• No recruitment was to

be attempted because neither the First nor the Second Chief

Directorate had

any use for him as an agent and because the

KGB had concluded that he was unlikely to accept recruitment

NOSENKO did not know why he was selected to make the approach

to JoHnSoN except that "BOBKOV said' I should go."

(NOSENKO

said he had reported on duty in the Seventh Department cnly

the day before. F.D. BOBKOV, a Deputy Chief of the Second

"Chief Directorate,

supervised the activities of the Seventh

/Department.)

NOSENKO's homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV

were selected to compromise JOHNSON

06

0001540

269

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy 10.

T3/5R.

---

## Page 279

4-00000

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

JOHNSON became acquainted with _VOLKOV and YEFREMOV at the

Metropol Hotel. They told JOHNSON that they had recently ar-

rived in Moscow and invited JOHNSON to visit their hotel room.

Jo GONSON agreed because "they understood each other tight away.

They knew they were the same (i.e:, homosexuals)." Under the

guise of the hotel administrator and a militiaman, KGB offi-

cers burst in on the trio.. Photographs of the incident had

been taken (but had yet not been developed). A report.

describing the circumstances (an akt) was prepared and [JOHNSON 06

was then transferred to another room. By this time NOSENKO

had arrived at the hotel from his office and he went into the

roon where JOHNSONjwas being held.

OThe "militiaman" described what had happened to NOSENKO,

in JOHNSON's presence.

Addressing JOHNSON NOSENKO said:

"How come?"

How could you do such a thing? What are we going

to do now? After all, this is punishable by court and... people

are given from five to eight years for such relations.

It

used to be

three to five, now it's from five to eight."

Frightened! (JOHNSON wrote out and signed a promise not to

criticize the Soviet Union in the future.

The following day, after the incriminating photographs had

been developed, NOSENKO approached JOHNSON in the cafe of the 16

Metropol Hotel and asked him whether he intended to keep his

promise.

When (JOHNSON said that he planned to do so, NOSENKO06

The KGB later

Oblearned that JOHNSON had visited (or phoned, according to a

later version) the American Embassy and the KGB thus assumed

that he had reported the approach.

NOSENKO did not recall

what name, if any, he had used during this operation.

In 1965 NOSENKO dated :

the entrapment operation as having

occurred in sunner in either 1962 or 1963. Reminded that his

notes paired JOHNSON' sOname with the date of 5 January 1962,

NOSENKO insisted that the date had nothing to do with the

name, that he recalled the operation as having taken place

in

summertime.OoINOSENKO ultimately accepted 5 January 1962 as

the date of JOHNSON's entrapment, since it occurred

"immedia: !y

after his transfer back to the Seventh Department. J

0001541

270

Top Secret

15/08

TS No. 197124

Copy -

---

## Page 280

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

06

JOHNSON'S Information

According to: a statement given to the FBI, prior to his

Jo visit to the USSR JOHNSON had written a church authority. ir

Moscow requesting permission to preach there.

He was. in-

formed that some official permission was needed. JOHNSON 06

subsequently travelled to Moscow as a tourist, and he did

preach on one occasion but he suspended further such activi-

ty on the advice of Russian Baptist colleagues.29 During his

ten-day stay in Moscow JOHNSON wrote and posted letters to

some twenty persons outside the USSR.

GOHNSON reported to the Embassy in Moscow on 5 January

1962 that he had experienced an incident with Soviet plain-

Clothesmen at the Hotel Metropol earlier that day JOHNSON, O6

who had arrived in Moscow on 31 December 1961, explained

that he was dining alone at the Metropol restaurant on the

evening of 4 January when he was joined by a Soviet citizen

who identified himself as "a doctor from Riga". The "doctor"

to sc tong

spoke English poorly, and JoHNSoN agreed to visit the doctor s06

room at the hotel on the following day, when the doctor would

have with him a student friend who spoke English well. Soon

Obafter JOHNSON arrived in the doctor!'s room on 5 January, the

"student" made homosexual advances. JOHNSON protested and

started to leave when two plainclothesmen suddenly appeared

in the room and announced that all were under arrest. After

signing a statement in Russian, JOHNSON was taken to another 06

room where he was confronted with a man who identified him

self as Georgiy Ivanovich NIKOLOV. "the Chief of Police"

Ob After threatening JOHNSON. with imprisonment, "NIKOLOV" of-

fered to dismiss the matter, provided, JOHNSON would sign a U!

commitment not to criticize the Soviet Union when he returned

to the United States.

06

on 8 January JOHNSON telephoned the Embassy to report that

he had been recontacted by the "Police Chief" who reminded him

of his pledge and showed him incriminating photographs alieged-

ly taken of JOHNSON and

the "student" in the hotel room pre-

viously.

06

Shown photographs: of VOLKOV and NOSENKO, JOHNSON thought

VOLKOV. to be "familiar", but he could not identify NOSENKO as

the

"Police Chief"

271

Top Secret

16/SR

0001542

IS No. 197124

Copy.

10

---

## Page 281

4-00000

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

Comment:

From

their modus operandi the "doctor from

Riga" is undoubtedly VOLKOV and the "student"

YEFREMOV. NOSENKO frequently used the opera-

tional pseudonym Yuriy Ivanovich NIKOLAYEV

and was called Georgly pl

• Although JOHNSON apparently confirmec

NOSENKO's role, NOSENKO's version of the case

is incompatible with what must have been the

actual time frame.

According to NOSENKO's

version, within five days of JOHNSON's arrival06

in Moscow the KGB had discovered that he was

a homosexual, concluded from "two or three"

censored letters that he was a threat, and

ar.-

ranged his entrapment.

The rapid pace of

events suggests that JOHNSON's homosexuality 06

was already known to the KGB (if not to NOSENKO;

Ob before JOHNSON's arrival in Moscow. NOSENKO's

Obignorance of JOHNSON's preaching (probably the

actual cause of KGB concern) is further evi-

dence that NOSENKO did not know the complete

background of the KGB operation, and

that his

role was merely that of playing

the :"Police

Chief".

NOSENKO's participation in this case con-

tradicts his assertions about the timing of

his transfer from the American Department.

(See p. 260 .)

06

William Carroll JONES

.j..

NOSENKO's Information

JONES, a wealthy Baptist layman, visited the USSR on six 2"

or seven occasions, each time meeting with Russian Baptists.

He is personally acquainted with President Johnson and knew

President Kennedy.

He was the target of Seventh Department

case officer Vitaliy DERA. While visiting the Soviet Union

Ob in 1962 JONES became involved with a Soviet female.

Although

she was not a KGB agent, the KGB took control of her relation-

Ob ship with JONES and, on JONES' "subsequent trips to the Soviet

Union, unsuccessfully sought

to obtain incriminating photo-

graphs.

0001543

272

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

121BR

---

## Page 282

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

Comment:

06

Interviewed by the FBI in June 1964, JONES

*(the sponsor)of the annual Presidentiald

"prayer breakfast" in Washington confirmed

the substance of NOSENKO's information but

denied sexual intimacies with any Soviet fe-

male. JONES claimed to have made 24 trips

to the Soviet Union and to have successfully

08.

smuggled Bibles" into the USSR on numerous

occasions.

According to JONES,Jbin 1963

Pravda publicized an incident in which a num-

ber of Bibles were confiscated from his lug-

gage.

og

A 1961 KGB document furnished CIA by

GOLITSYN cited JONES by name in connection 06

with a description of his Bible-smuggling of

activities.

NOSENKO reported the JONES case in 1962

in Geneva and stated that the Seventh De-

partment case officer, DERA, was NOSENKO's

subordinate in the section.

However, NO-

SENKO's ignorance of JONES! Bible smuggling 06,08

(the activity which most likely prompted KGB

action) and of the fact that JONES' activities0b

had been publicized in the Soviet press, in

dicate that NOSENKO had no intimate connection

with the case.

06

Recruitment of Natalie BIENSTOCKJ

NOSENKO's Information

The KGB recruited BIENSTOCK during her 1962 visit to the

USSR. The Seventh Department

case c

officers were K.G.

KRUPNOV and A.G. KOVALENKO, who were acting in behalf of

the Leningrad. KGB.

The latter had become interested in the

American tourist while she was staying with a Soviet boy

friend in Leningrad

(NOSENKO himself would have attempted

the recruitment, but he was busy preparing to leave for

Geneva in April 1962:) During the recruitment, the KGB

officers did not disclose their knowledge that she was an

American Intelligence agent and that she had been involved

273

Top Secret

0001544

TS -No. 197124

10

Copy

BIBR

---

## Page 283

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

in the American Intelligence attempt to deliver a written

message to a Soviet ballerina in the United States.

The

allerina received the message, but passed it to the KGB

which concluded that BIENSTOCK was an agent either of CIA U

or of the FBI. After recruitment, BIENSTOCK]was turned 06

over to First Chief Directorate officers of Department D

(Disinformation). If she returned to the USSR the KGB

planned to secure her confession of her relationship with

American Intelligence.

, Comment:

06

BIENSTOCK was employed as an interpreter with

ā Bolshoi troupe touring the United States :

when she

was asked by CIA to pass a letter to

the ballerina, a letter destined for the bal-

lerina's brother in the USSR. BIENSTOCK Iẹ-06

fused, and the letter was delivered by other

means.

Interviewed by the FBI on the basis of

NOSENKO's information, BIENSTOCK] acknowledgedd

in July 1964 that she had been recruited. by

the KGB while visiting Moscow as a tourist in

1962, and that she had been intimidated by the

KGB accusation of her involvement with the

ballerina. (Note that NOSENKO stated the KGB

withheld its knowledge of that involvement.)

d BIENSTOCK also admitted having contact in the

United States through secret writing with KGB

officers, until the letters ceased at KGB in-

itiative in late 1962 or early 1963.

0001545

274

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

6IBR

---

## Page 284

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

Travel to Geneva

• (March-June 1962)

NOSENKO. visited Geneva between 10 March and 15 June 1962

a security officer accompanying the Soviet delegation to

the Disarmament Conference.

In addition to performing that

function, NOSENKO claimed he supervised the activities of

another KGB case officer's meetings with a KGB-controlled

CIA agent, Visited the KGB rezidentura in

ciated with KGB officers in Switzerland during the period.

ca vith

n Geneva and asso-

Six days before his return

to the Soviet Union, NOSENKO con-

tacted CIA:

Purpose of Trip to Geneva

NOSENKO arrived in Geneva on 10 March 1962 listed offi-

cially as an "expert" of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Af-

fairs attached to the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament

Conference.

NOSENKO explained that after GOLITSYN's defec-

tion in Finland lin December 1961] an order was issued that-

no delegation was to be permitted to depart the Soviet Union

without an accompanying KGB security officer.

INOSENKO has

since stated that he can recall no such order.]

Explaining in 1962 how he came to be designated,

as the

security escort, NOSENKO said he argued that he was needed

to direct the fifteen case officers in his section, but

GRIBANOV stated that Foreign Minister Gromyko was leading

the delegation and that someone of an appropriate senior rank

should accompany the delegation, not just a senior case offi-

cer, but a section chief or a deputy chief or a chief of a

department.

NOSENKO was the most junior section chief. His

immediate superior in the Seventh Department approved the

trip on the basis that it would last only a month.

275

Top Secret

0001546

TS No. 197124

Copy

10

---

## Page 285

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

In addition to his general security duties with the

delegation, NOSENKO said in 1962 that he was given a

special assignment to check on a senior delegation advisor,

Pavel Fedorovich SHAKHOV (see below).

During the 1965 interrogations, NOSENKO provided somewhat

varing accounts of the background of his 1962 trip to Geneva:

He said that GRIBANOV had nothing to do with his assignment,

but that [S.G.] BANNIKOV, the Deputy Chief of the Second

Directorate who supervised the Soviet Delegations Abroad

Department, made the selection. The latter department was

investigating SHAKHOV, and BANNIKOV was concerned with the

selection of a security officer because SHAKHOV, who was

suspected of being a Western agent, was to be in the delega-

tion.

Because of the seriousness attached to the case, the

Delegations Department wanted a chief of section as case

officer, and when a request was made to the Seventh Depart-

ment Chief, CHELNOKOV, the latter agreed to NOSENKO's as-

signment.

NOSENKO stated that CHELNOKOV, his superior and

friend, let him go to Geneva as "a treat"

to ten that

, even though he

had just assumed his duties as Chief of the American-

British Commonwealth Section, he had no deputy,. and the trip

was occurring on the eve of the tourist season.

Investigation of SHAKHOV

According to NOSENKO, M.G. SITNIKOV, representing the

Soviet Delegations Department, conducted investigations of

SHAKHOV in Geneva in 1961, but had been unable to resolve the

KGB suspicions about him.

early efforts, the KGB decided to send a "senior guy" to the

*E decided

Because of the failure of these

Disarmament talks in 1962, and NOSENKO was chosen

things up". Before leaving Moscow in March 1962, NOSENKO

discussed the SHAKHOV case with SITNIKOV and with. LYALIN, the

Soviet Delegations Department case officer in charge of the

SHAKHOV case.

He also read various materials on the case,

including an investigative plan drawn up by LYALIN.

NOSENKO has said that SHAKHOV was under suspicion in 1962

because he was working with different delegations at different

conferences, and there was some evidence that in Geneva ear-

lier he was

somehow connected with American diplomat Davia MARK,

0001547

276

Top Secret

MBR

TS No. 197124

Copy

---

## Page 286

Tep Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT. - January 1962-January 1964)

who was

(erroneously) considered to Le a CIA officer.

SHAKHOV "maybe" had some contact with MARKjin 1960 or 1951,06

bụt NOSENKO aid not know the substance of it.: A counter-

intelligence officer of the First Chief Directorate, S.M.

GOLUBEV, had once been on a delegation with SHAKHOV and he

had noted "little details".. While SHAKHOV was in the Unite

States, earlier, he had been terminated las an agentl by

KGB officers who had submitted a report stating that SHAKHOV

Inked life in the Unites States, Americar products, and

money

In that KGB report he was depicted as "not good"

and

not wanting. to work as an agent"

NOSENKO stated that SHAKHOV had served with the Ministry

of Foreign Affairs in the United States and that during that

service he acted

as an agent-recruiter for the KGB.

SHAKHOV

was permitted to

travel abroad even though suspected of being

an American agent, because he belonged to the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs, and "the KGB could do nothing about his

trips abroad'

"There was no proof, only suspicions, and

furthermore, SHAKHOV was a member of the personal staff of

the head of

the Soviet delegation, S.K. Tsarapkin.'

According

to NOSENKO, SHAKHOV was not and never had been a KGB officer.!

Comment:

SHAKHOV has served in and

visited the United

States since 1942, when he was assigned to the

Soviet Consulate General in New York. He at-

tended the 1945. Conference on International

Organization in San Francisco, and he had at-

tended a number of sessions of the UN General

Assembly. Most recently SHAKHOV was assigned

to the U.S. in 1963

3 as a member of the Soviet

Mission to the UN.

KGB officer RASTVOROV iden-

tified him as an MVD (KGB] officer whom he 1s

certain he saw at MVD Headquarters in Moscow,

Ba KGB defectors PETROV and DERYABIN

have reported

that from a photograph, SHAKHOV's

face "was familiar".

An FBI source, however,

in 1964 said

that SHAKHOV was a

"pure diplomat"

and that to his knowledge, SHAKHOV had engaged

in no Soviet intelligence activity until that

time.

277

Top Secret

0001548

TS No. 197124

Copy

10

V/SR

---

## Page 287

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 19641

NOSENKO described the various ways he had tested suspicions

of SHAKHOV in Geneva.

He gave SHAKHOV disinformation and then

watched for an indication that ne passed lt on to his America:

contacts.

SHAKHOV was told to perform countersurveillance

tasks during a meeting by NOSENKO with an imaginary agent,

while other KGB officers checked for signs that SHAKHOV had

forewarned the Americans about the meeting. Finally NOSENEO

revealed to SHAKHOV the location of a KGB dead drop and

checked five days later to see whether the specially prepared

materials emplaced had been disturbed in any way. NOSENKO's

conclusion was that SHAKHOV was absolutely free of suspicion.

and it was his intention to report this finding when he re-

turned to KGB Headquarters from Geneva.

Security Escort Officer for Soviet Disarmament Delegation

NOSENKO said that he was the sole KGB officer with the 94-

man Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference and as

such he was responsible for the security and behavior of the

entire delegation. (KGB officers I.S. MAYOROV and M.S.

TSYMBAL came with the delegation to Geneva, but they had left

Geneva before NOSENKO made the foregoing statement to CIA.]

To assist him in carrying out his security functions, NOSENKO

had the services of

a number of coopted informants of the KGB

who were serving in the delegation. (NOSENKO has never re-

ported what, if any, security checks he ran on the delegates

in his charge, or what, if any, information his informants

provided him.]

NOSENKO has never been precise about how he spent his days

and nights in Geneva, but he has indicated that he disposed

of his time as he saw fit, and for the most part had little

to do.

He explained in 1962 that he could come and go as he

pleased because Ambassador Zorin knew who he was, as did most.

of the delegation.

No one paid him any attention. It was

known that he was not really a Ministry of Foreign Affairs

officer, and he could absent himself from conference meetings

at any time.

278

Top Secret

0001549

TS No. 197124

Copy

sid

---

## Page 288

findinnerse

Top Secret

SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964!

Visits to the Geneva KGB Legal Residency

• Virtually every day, NOSENKO told CIA in 1962, he went to

the KGB Legal Residency in Geneva, and if he stayed away for

more than a day or two, Legal Rezident S.I. GAVRICHEV would

invariably ask NOSENKO where he had been

• keeping himself.

GAVRICHEV, according to NOSENKO, treated

him with deference,

and shortly after his arrival in Geneva in March 1962,

NOSENKO gave a lecture on counterintelligence to the assembled

members of the Legal Residency.

This lecture was given at

GAVRICHEV's request, although it was only after some hesita-

tion on the part of the Legal Rezident that all of his subor-

dinates were brought together to hear NOSENKO.

In return

for helping the Legal Residency to perform countersurveillance

on several occasions, NOSENKO said, he was sometimes allowed

by GAVRICHEV to have

the use of an

operational car and driver

to go shopping and carry out other private errands.

[NOSENKO

was not under CIA surveillance at any time in 1962 in Geneva

and his claims as to his activities there, aside from his

meetings with CIA, can be neither confirmed nor refuted.]

KGB Officers within the Soviet Delegation

NOSENKO claimed that he would know of any others, and he

was the sole KGB officer within the Soviet Disarmament Dele-

gation in 1962.

Among delegates he identified only Oleg

GRINEVSKIY as having any connection with the KGB.

GRINEVSKIY

was one of NOSENKO's own agents within the delegation: in

Moscow he was handled by KGB officers of the Intelligentsia

and Correspondents Department of the Second Chief Directorate.

Among other delegates NOSENKO described A.K. KISLOV and V.G.

FILATOV. According to NOSENKO, KISLOV was head of the Ameri-

can Section of TASS and was "a

genuine correspondent"; "de-

finitely not an intelligence officer".

Comment: CIA had tentatively identified all three of

the delegates as KGB officers. 'KISLOV was Ob-

served in apparent KGB operational activity in

both Washington and Moscow.

FILATOV served as

an alternate contact with the KGB agent in NATO,

Georges PAQUES. British Intelligence has re-ll

ported that GRINEVSKIY was a member of the per-

manent. Soviet delegation in Geneva who handled

0001550

279

Top Secret

VBR

TS No. 197124

Copy -10.

---

## Page 289

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

Comment:

(continued) i

a British double. agent. NOSENKO was in Geneva

at the time.

Association with Other Soviets

According to NOSENKO, the Soviets he saw most often in

Geneva in 1962 were A.K. KISLOV (see above), Yu.I. GUK, and

M.S. TSYMBAL. (Both KISLOV and GUK were involved in the

"ANDREY" case:

see p. 33 .)

A.K. KISLOV

TASS correspondent KISLOV was one of the three other dele-

gates besides NOSENKO staying at the Hotel Ariane in Geneva.

NOSENKO said he arranged for KISLOV's name to be given as a

notional source of information on Soviet disarmament policy

to KGB double agent BELITSKIY (see below). NOSENKO drank

and caroused with KISLOV while in Geneva, and KISLOV was

NOSENKO's companion in early June, when NOSENKO either

squandered or was robbed of KGB operational funds. [the loss

he asked CIA to make goodl, and on the night of 10 June, when

he squandered the 2000 Swiss francs CIA provided on wine and

women.

With reference to the threat posed his security by

KISLOV's knowledge of his profligacy, NOSENKO said that KISLOV

was "too drunk to know what was going on", and in any event

constituted no threat.

In 1964 NOSENKO reported for the first time that KISLOV

had been a KGB operational contact while

stationed in the

United States and that NOSENKO had been introduced to KISLOV

by a KGB officer in Moscow prior to departing for Geneva in

1962, so that he could use KISLOV at the conference.

On the

basis of NOSENKO's favorable report afterwards, he said,

KISLOV had been recruited as a KGB agent on his return.

In 1966 NOSENKO named the Soviets living with him at the

Ariane Hotel in 1962, but did not name KISLOV.

0001551

280

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

VIBR

---

## Page 290

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

Yu. I. GUK

Implying that their friendship was of long standing,

NOSENKO related in 1962 that he and GUK

were together nearly

every day in Geneva, where they went out to chat and have a

few drinks. As a consequence, NOSENKO was granted access to

the residency and was ablé to

elicit information about some

of GUK's operations in Geneva.

He described his

"big, big

friend" GUK as the Deputy Legal Rezident in Geneva and the

only "strong officer" in the residency.

Comment:

In 1964 NOSENKO attributed his gaining access

to the residency in 1962 to TSYMBAL, not to

GUK.

M.S. TSYMBAL

In 1962 NOSENKO reported ISYMBAL's presence in Geneva and

identified him

as Chief

the Illegals Directorate of the

KGB First Chief Directorate.

He alluded to having spoken with

him, but placed no particular emphasis on their relationship.

In 1964 NOSENKO claimed that he had been dealing with

TSYMBAL since 1960 or 1961, when he was looking for some

candidates for

recruitment and came across some whose back

ground would have nade them suitable for the Special illegals!

Directorate.

NOSENKO met T'SYMBAL in Moscow in the KGB Head-

tutters ast The bed orked and sevgest a meat toe raghter

to the United States.

In Geneva, he and TSYMBAL had

dinner together several times a week, sometimes accompanied

by KISLOV and sometimes alone. It was TSYMBAL's influence,

NOSENKO said, which secured NOSENKO access: to the residency

in 1962 and established

the precedent from which he was

granted access in 1964.

6001552

281

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy:

-10

---

## Page 291

Gic 202: 20921

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

08.

Association with British Female Secretary

08

NOSENKO has

described

his association with a British

secretary whom he met at a diplomatic reception in Geneva

as

one of an amorous pursuit: he disclaimed any operational

After several dates, NOSENKO could

longer reach her at her apartment, and he concluded that she

had told her superiors that he was a Russian and had pro-

bably believed him to be an intelligence officer.

Comment:

According to an official British report, when

NOSENKO became too persistent in his attentions

and the secretary reported the contact to her

superiors she was withdrawn immediately from

Switzerland and she later resigned from the

Foreign Office.

This same incident came to the attention of

the Swiss service), which later reported it to

CIA, without details, as an attempt by NOSENKO

to recruit the girl.

According to this report,

"after a time it became evident that NOSENKO'S

interest in her was not only sexual, but also

in information to which she had access in the

course of her duties":

A Swiss official in|

Geneva told CIA that NOSENKO had definitely tried

to recruit the secretary and that he attempted

to obtain "disarmament secrets" from her.

Supervising Case Officer for KGB-Controlled CIA Agent

BELITSKIY

NOSENKO's Information

Among his other activities in Geneva NOSENKO supervised

a younger and less experienced KGB case officer's handling of

KGB double agent BELITSKIY. He first heard of the BELITSKIY

case under the code name "BELKIN", when he was working in the

American Embassy Section of the American Department.

282

6001553

6/BR

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

---

## Page 292

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

learned of the case through his friendship with the chief

of the Second ("Active Line") Section of the American Depart-

ment, V.I. PETROV. BELITSKIY wasia KGB agent whom American

Intelligence had recruited in London: he had never been met

by the Americans in the Soviet Union. NOSENKO did not know

the date of recruitment

but knew the case was already in pro-

gress during his second

assignment with the Embassy Section

(January 1960-January 1962). BELITSKIY had been ạ KGB agent

for a "long, long" time and was a KGB agent when he first

aguary 2,a2)

went abroad (prior to his recruitment by American Intelli-

gence).

The KGB's purpose in running the BELITSKIY operation was

to lure American Intelligence into meeting the agent inside

the Soviet Union; to learn the channels and means through

which American Intelligence communicated with agents inside

the Soviet Union

This was the "most important task" of the

Second Chief Directorate. Although BELITSKIY, in meeting

with his American case officers, continually pleaded fear of

contacts with American Intelligence in Moscow, this was a

ruse; the real KGB intent was to use BELITSKIY to lure Ameri-

can Intelligence into contacting him in the Soviet Union.

After BELITSKIY was recruited in London, CIA "did not go on

with him. didn't hold any meetings with him'. Nevertheless.

he said, the KGB "cherished the hope...to lead him in some-

what deeper"

The KGB First Chief Directorate, with its own

responsibilities and objectives, was unaware of Second Chief

Directorate objectives in the BELITSKIY case.

The First

Chief Directorate, through Department D, provided dezinformat-

siya [disinformation]

at the Second: Chief Directorate's re-

quest, but in this case, as in other "games", it did not know

for what ultimate purpose the disinformation would be used.

(In such cases I.I. AGAYANTS, Chief of Department D, did not

even know in what country the disinformation was to be used;

let alone the identity of the agent.)

Comment:

According to GOLITSYN, Department D runs its

operations alone or in conjunction with (never

subordinate to) other KGB departments:

0001554

283

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy 10

---

## Page 293

"Sites""

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

NOSENKO did not actively participate in the case until he

received in Geneva a cable from Moscow directing him to give

advice to the young and inexperienced case officer V.L. ARTE-

MOV .

ARTEMOV had not worked on the BELITSKIY case in Moscow

either; he also had been

sent to Geneva to work on counter-

intelligence matters and only to direct BELITSKIY if the Ameri-

cans should contact the agent. BELITSKIY had been "inserted"

in a World Health Organization Delegation in the hope that CIA

would "find him".

As a result of that KGB instruction, NOSENKO juined with

ARTEMOV in directing BELITSKIY's meetings with the latter's

American case officers.

BELITSKIY was first met in Geneva by

the

American case officer "Bob", and later by "Henry", who

was "called out from the States"

• BELITSKIY noted that the

name on the door of the apartment where he met his American

case officers was not the same as that of the person nose

apartment it was alleged to be, and that the apartment itself

had

an "un-lived-in" look.

When the American case officers asked BELITSKIY whether he

could establish contact with a Russian on the Disarmament

Delegation, NOSENKO advised ARTEMOV not to use anyone from

the Soviet Foreign Ministry. NOSENKO proposed instead that

BELITSKIY claim to get information from the head of the

American Department of TASS, A.K. KISLOV.

The information,

of course, would be (disinformation) furnished by the KGB.

In case the Americans would check, NOSENKO and ARTEMOV ar-

ranged for BELITSKIY to be introduced to KISLOV.

The KGB believed that CIA had accepted BELITSKIY's bona

fides. From the KGB viewpoint, however, while BELITSKIY was

not a bad

agent!

he was apt to go too far sometimes, and "add

things on his own".

For this reason, the KGB limited BELIT-

SKIY'

s time spent with CIA, to lessen the chance that the

agent might say something which would cause CIA to sense that

he was a plant.

0001555

284

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy —

---

## Page 294

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

Comment:

NOSENKO's information about the BELITSKIY-CIA

relationship is substantially correct, except

for some inaccuracies about the origin of the

case.

BELITSKIY, a commentator for Radio. Mos-

cow, as NOSENKO described, in Geneva did meet

CIA officers using the aliases "Bob"' and "Henry"

in a safe apartment.

NOSENKO's version

of his role in the case,

however, is implausible.

He asserts that BELIT-

SKIY, a prominent Russian with acquaintances

among influential officials of the Soviet Govern-

ment, an agent ostensibly under the control of

CIA

for

several

years, was sent by. the KGB to

Geneva to resume contact with CIA.

The KGB, ac-

cording to NOSENKO, sent neither the responsible

case officer nor an officer of the KGB section

responsible for the operation. NOSENKO states

that the KGB instead detailed a 'young and in-

experienced" KGB officer who happened to be in

Geneva at the time,

an officer who had no prior

connection with the BeLlIskly. case nor even

knowledge..of operating conditions in Geneva.

NOSENKO further states that the KGB then instruc-

ted. NOSENKO, who had learned of the case unoffi-

cally who had no experience of training in

double agent operations, and who was similarly

in Geneva for other reasons, to guide the

"inexperienced' KGB officer, NOSENKO can cite

no guidance provided by KGB Headquarters, al

though he claims he exchanged messages with

Moscow about the case:

ARTEMOV was not inexperienced.

He had hạo

continuous service with the Second Chief Direc-

torate at least since 1958, and had been involved

with a series of:CIA American tourist agents in

the Soviet Union. Although allegedly familiar

with ARTEMOV, NOSENKO is unaware of the latter's

285

Top Secret

0001556

TS No. 197124

Copy: 10

---

## Page 295

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 19641

Comment:

(Continued)

involvement with American tourist agents in

1958 and 1959, during a period when NOSENKO

claims to have been Deputy Chief of the Seventh

Department's American Section.

Under interrogation NOSENKO did not know

how, when, or where the BELITSKIY operation

started, did not know the nature of British li

involvement, did not know the operational đe-

tails and contact arrangements BELITSKIY had

with CIA, did not know BELITSKIY's pattern of

activity

in Moscow or in Geneva, and did not

know the alleged objective of the KGB opera-

tion, e. g., the substance of the "disinformation"

which BELITSKIY was to provide CIA.

From the foregoing it is concluded that

NOSENKO did not exercise any supervisory func-

tion in the BELITSKIY case.

Contact with CIA

Có

On 5 June 1962 U.S. Foreign Service Officer David MARK

reported to CIA in Geneva that he had been approached by a

Soviet citizen whom he believed to be Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO,

a member of the Soviet Disarmament Delegation. NOSENKO had

merely suggested that they get together for a talk on the

following day.. In late afternoon on 6 June, NOSENKO told

06 MARK privately that he would like to talk to MARk as soon as UG

possible. He was "nöt going to pump him for information", but

"simply wanted to tell him some things". A luncheon meeting

was arranged for? June; although NOSENO indicated that he

preferred an earlier date.0 MARK advised CIA of: the appoint-

ment and commented that the approach seemed so unusual that

it might be an offer of cooperation or defection.

At the 9 June luncheon with MARK] NOSENKO identified him-

self as a counterintelligence officer sent to Geneva to ensure

the security of the Soviet delegation. He knew that MARK) had U6

previously served in Moscow and (erroneously] believed him to

0001557

286

Top Secret

713R

TS No. 197124

Copy -

---

## Page 296

Top Secret

24

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

be an American intelligence officer.

NOSENKO said ie needed

approximately 900 Swiss francs immediately to cover KGB opera-

tional funds which he had squandered on liquor and a prosti-

tute in Geneva, and offered for this amount to sell two items

of information to American Intelligence.

The first item was

the identity of an American, a former employee of the Embassy

in Moscow,

who was a KGB agent. "near ciphers" in the Washing-

ton area.

The second item was the identity of a Soviet citi-

zen in Moscow who, although ostensibly a CIA agent, had been

planted on CIA by the KGB.

Although NOSENKO proposed a one-

time transaction, he acknowledged to MARK] that he might be

unable to avoid deeper involvement with American Intelligence.

MARK introduced NOSENKO to a CIA officer the evening of

9 June and NOSENKO was taken to the first of five lengthy

meetings held in a CIA safehouse. At the initial meeting

NOSENKO described himself as a KGB major experienced in opera-

tions against the American Embassy in Moscow and against

American tourists and other travellers to the Soviet Union.

He told of his financial difficulties and repeated his offer

to sell the two specified items of information. He said that

the need for money was his immediate motive for contacting

CIA, although in the ensuing discussion he asserted also that

he was dissatisfied with the Communist regime in the Soviet

Union.

NOSENKO emphasized that he had no intention of be-

coming an American agent and that after his proposed trans-

action, he would have no further contact with CIA. Despite

this

assertion, after describing the cases of "ANDREY"

(Dayle SMITH, see P. 33) and the KGB double agent BELIISKIY

(see p. 282), NOSENKO supplied considerable biographic infor-

mation about himself and also discussed in general terms cer-

tain additional KGB operations as well as KGB organization

and operational methods in Moscow. He understood, as he had

told MARK earlier, that CIA would want more information, and

he agreed to meet again two days later.

NOSENKO met CIA representatives four more times in Geneva.

With the second meeting on 11 June, his initially expressed

reservations disappeared almost entirely. He answered most

questions put to him on KGB organization and operations, most

of his information being limited to the Second Chief Directo-

rate. Besides "ANDREY" and BELITSKIY, he provided leads to

more than a score of American citizens who had been compro-

mised or recruited by the KGB, and information on the KGB

287

Sorr

Top Secret

31BR

0001558

TS. No. 197124

10

Copy

---

## Page 297

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

audio surveillance operation against the Embassy in Moscow.

Among foreign agents of the KGB NOSENKO identified Canadian

Ambassador WATKINS (see p. 23 ) and described a British Ad-

miralty employee (William VASSALL, see p. 30 ) •

He talked

freely of his activities in Geneva, including his association

with KGB officers there, his visits to the KGB residency

and his security duties with respect to the Soviet delega-

tion:

NOSENKO seemed to CIA to be what he claimed: a KGB

officer with personal knowledge of important and sensitive

KGB operations.

He described his education, his service in

the Naval GRU, his entry into the KGB and the general func-

tions and operating techniques of the various components of

the Second Chief Directorate in which he had served, along

with the approximate dates of his service.

Ultimately the only restriction which NOSENKO placed on

his cooperation with CIA was his refusal to permit communica-

tion with him in the Soviet Union.

He was willing to meet

with CIA representatives during future trips outside the

Soviet Union, which he estimated would occur about once every other

year. He said he would not consider defecting except in cir-

cumstances in which his personal security was endangered,

citing as reasons his devotion to his wife and children (and

fear of KGB reprisal against them if he fled), his widowed

mother's dependence on him, and his love of Russia and the

Russian people:

NOSENKO promised to contact CIA and arrangements were

made for him to do so, when he came to the West again.

Meanwhile, he expressed the intention to do everything within

limits imposed by concern for his own security to obtain in-

formation which he was informed was of interest to CIA.

attempted Recruitment of Horst BRAUNS

Immediately after returning to Moscow

from Geneva, NOSENKO

claimed he personally was involved in the attempt to recruit

American tourist BRAUNS.

06

0001559

288

Top Secret

21BR

TS No. 197124

Copy

---

## Page 298

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

Jw.

ian

4d-

ed

ation

NOSENKO'S Information

BRAUNS was Russian born,

and he lived in Leningrad until

He eventually settled in the United States where the First

the Second World war when he fled when the Germans retreated) 06, 08

Chief Directorate learned he had become a technician working

for an "interesting company making computers, adding machines,

and other instruments".

Je

in

When BRAUNS visited

the Soviet 06

Union, NOSENKO assigned his subordinate [K.G.] KRUPNOV. to

handle the case, and KRUPNOV arranged for Inturist to take

O6BRAUNS).out of the Inturist hotel and assign him to

of

39

another hotel where KRUNOV met him. "KRUPNOV.. "couldn't get

Obanywhere" with (BRAUNS,0 and he called on NOSENKO for help.

NOSENKO joined him in BRAUNS' room, and eventually secured

06 BRAUNS' agreement to cooperate with the KGB, under threat of

imprisonment for_ treason (based on BRAUNS' wartime flight from 0s

iica-

st

the Soviet Union) 06 BRAUNS left Moscow the next day for Lenin-

grad, and because NOSENKO thought the recruitment was "shaky.",

do he sent KRUPNOV to Leningrad to consolidate the recruitment.

very BRAUNS) refused to see KRUPNOV, and NOSENKO went to Leningrad

cir-

and again talked to BRAUNS. BRAUNS was so frightened, now.

ever, that NOSENKO concluded that he would never work for the

and*

KGB; NOSENKO decided to terminate the case and BRAUNS] was sent

on his way.

1e

06

NOSENKO did not know why (BRAUNS visited the Soviet Union,

nor was he able to identify any Soviet citizens whom BRAÜNS

met in the USSR.

06

0.6

thin

in-:

In 1964 NOSENKO asserted that he had mentioned the BRAUNS

case to CIA in 1962, but could not at that time recall his

name.

Comment:

ENKO

vit

06

06

NOSENKO did not mention BRAUNS in 1962.

BRAUNS

arrived in the Soviet Union on 24 June 1962,

after NOSENKO had met with CIA in Geneva.

Os BRAUNS'

identify NOSENKO by photograph.

In other con-

texts NOSENKO has explained that the Seventh

197124

289

Top Secret

KIBR

0001580

IS No. 197124

Copy

10

---

## Page 299

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

Comment:

(Continued)

Department was

not concerned with foreigners

visiting relatives in the USSR nor with Soviet

expatriates, both of which were the responsibi-

lity of other KGB elements.

NOSENKO acknowledges

that the KGB knew that BRAUNS was a former Soviet 06,08

citizen U BRAUNS' plan to visit relatives in

Leningrad was informationalso available to the

KGB through his visa application 0 BRAUNS had

corresponded for a year before his visit with a

former girl friend in Leningrad.

She spent the

first week with him in Moscow (during which the

KGB recruitment attempt occurred).

The existence

of the girl friend was presumably known to the

KGB, if not through mail censorship, then from

surveillance connected with KRUPNOV's planned ap-

proach to BRAUNg in the hotel. NOSENKO was un-

aware of these facts.

06

Chiéf of the American-British Commonwealth Section:

Summary and Conclusion

According to NOSENKO, he requested transfer to the Seventh

Department to avoid being named Deputy Chief of the American

Department over his then-superior, the experienced and highly

successful KGB officer KOVSHUK.

He is adamant that the trans-

fer took place "before (the defection of] GOLITSYN", which he

asserts occured in mid-January 1962.

Among his other functions

in the Seventh Department, he.cites directing five agents

whom he brought from the American Department.

In his initial

capacity as Chief of the American Section, NOSENKO claims in-

volvement only in the W.E. JOHNSON case, his time being spent Ok

either in "reading in" on

his new job or preparing for his

initial trip to Geneva.

He alleges that he was directed to

accompany the Soviet delegation to Geneva for an extended

period, in behalf of another Second Directorate Department,

over his objections, when he had no deputy to assume his func-

tions in his absence, and on the eve of the tourist season.

5/SK

0001561

290

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy —

---

## Page 300

ins

24

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

in Geneva he said he supervised the KGB double-agent BELIT-

SKIY's meetings with CIA, before contacting CIA himself to

sell information for a relatively small sum. Back in Moscow,

immediately after participating in the KGB approach to BRAUNS, 06

he claims he became Deputy Chief of the entire 100-man

Seventh Department.

Besides the implausibility of NOSENKO's account of seeking.

transfer "to avoid becoming Deputy Chief of the American De-

partment", his dating of the transfer impugns his claims.

GOLITSYN defected on 15 December 1961. If NOSENKO transferred,

as he sala, in mid-January 1962, his

earlier participation in

6 the JOHNSON compromise (see p. 268) is not evidential of his

Seventh Department service.

If he transferred just in time

06 for the JOHNSON operation, he could not have played the role

he claimed in the Embassy Section (re ABIDIAN and the Pushkin

Street dead drop, see p.216%. In the period with one excep-

zon, none of his claimed agentura participated in a Seventh

Department operation.: No change marked his claimed increased

na erange marred

responsibilities and new functions upon being promoted to

Section Chief of the largest department in the Second Chief

Directorate.

Of the five operations.

NOSENKO described as

scaring auring this period, all had aspects for which, by

NOSENKO's description of the Seventh Department's mission,

they could have been in the jurisdiction of another Second

Chief Directorate Department. NOSENKO's various

explanations

for his assignment to Geneva in 1962 prompt scepticism be-

cause of tortuous contradictions.

In Geneva he neither.

directed

the investigation of SHAKHOV nor supervised the BELIT-

SKIY case, as he claimed.

Deputy

Chief of the Seventh Department

(July 1962 - January 1964)

In July 1962, in line with the personal wish of the Chief

° the KGB Second Chief Directorate, General GRIBANOV, NOSENKO

0001562

291

Top Secret

(3)BR

TS. No. 197124

Copy 10

---

## Page 301

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

was promoted to the position of a (one of three) Deputy Chief

of the entire Seventh Department.

A year later, he was made

First Deputy Chief, and thus second-in-command to ChELNOKOV

and general supervisor of all Second Chief Directorate tourist

operations.

The Seventh Department, which had a strength of

about 100 KGB officers, was

responsible for all operations

against tourists in the Soviet Union.

From this period NOSENKO

claimed to have learned, either by virtue of his position as

Deputy Chief of otherwise, of a number of KGB operations

against Americans, including two arrests, one recruitment, and

investigations of a

suspected FBI agent and of Lee Harvey

OSWALD.

NOSENKO as well attributes to his senior KGB posI-

tion during this period his knowledge of an American GRU agent

and of the KGB investigation of a disaffected American Embassy

Section officer, the latter occurring just before NOSENKO re-

turned to Geneva for the second time, and defected.

Recruitment of SVENCHANSKIY

NOSENKO's Information

In September 1963, NOSENKO took over from his subordinate,

[SVENCHANSKIX was the president of L'atton Tours", a travel 29,0%

agency in New York City, and the owner of a Chicago Russian-10,08

language bookstore. There was originally some suspicion

0b that SVENCHANSKIY might be an FBI informant, and the KGB was

Coalso concerned over SVENCHANSKIY's contacts with AMTORG per-

sonnel in New York City. ONOSKOV, the case officer at the

time,

"felt" that SVENCHANSKIY was not an FBI informant and

recruited him in 1960 or 1961 after he was arrested for

doskackm cooteertion was secured against KGB promises that

visiting the Soviet Union. 'SvENCHAN-

Inturist would refer business to the agent's New York travel

agency •

(SVENCHANSKIY's task was to screen visa applications of

prospective tourists to the Soviet Union for persons who

might be connected with American Intelligence. If he suspected

such a person, he would make a signal by moving the photograph

on the visa application slightly, or making a small pin-prick

or pencilled mark on the application form.

0001563

292

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy -

10/5R

---

## Page 302

14-00000

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

When NOSENKO took the case from NOSKOV in September :

1963, NOSENKO's name as the handling officer was entered

in the single-volume case file. although NOSKOV ac-

companied NOSENKO to both subsequent meetings with

O6 SVENCHANSKIY in Moscow. (in September 1963 and at the end

Of 1963).

06

Comment:

American citizen, is president of Afton

,a Russian-born naturalizea 2110,2410

Tours of New York City and the Cross World

Books ana Periodicals in Chicago: His

partner, and the actual operator of laftone!

Tours Is Sonya SOKOLOW, reportedly a one- 06

confidential secretary" of Jacob GOLOS. 08,06

Allegations of EVENCHANSKIX's Communist O

sympathies and probable involvement in soviet

espionage date back to the Second World War.

His involvement in espionage has been pub-

licized in the press (notably in a 1953

New

York Times account of Harry GOLD's 06

allegations) .

Since SOKOLQW manages the Afton Tours &

office,. while SVENCHANSKIY usually isu

occupied elsewhere with his other firm,

he

would 'be unlikely to review and mark

suspect visa applications. as NOSENKO

alleged 06 SVENCHANSKIT's background is such

as to have prevented his being interviewed

on the basis of the information NOSENKO

provided

O NOSENKO did not refer to his association

with SVENCHANSKIY spontaneously, but described

it only after referring to the written notes

brought to CIA in Geneva in 1964. (See p. 319)

06

Suspected FBI Source Alfred SLESINGER

ObOn 8 July 1964 NOSENKO reported on KGB interest in

an American named SLESINGER, a proprietor of a photographic..

shop in New York City, who was suspected by the KGB of

"having connections with the FBI."

293

Top Secret

0001564

TS. No. 197124

10

Copy

i5/BR

---

## Page 303

14-00000

(SEVENTH DEPARIMENT - January 1962-1964)

NOSENKO'S Information

06

SLESINGER came under suspicion by the KGB First

Chier Directorate because of his business transactions

with a number of soviets who visited his store and in

- whom he seemed to show more than casual interest.

The

First Chief Directorate

was of the opinion that

Co (SLESINGER was trying to become closely

_acquainted with

some soviets, to study them. (SLESINGER had visited the

Soviet Union several times. Learning SLESINGER planned0b

another trip to the USSR, the KGB suspected that

"le

might make some contacts or do something interesting"

while visiting the Soviet Union. 06 The KGB wanted to

resolve its suspicions that SLESINGER was possibly an

agent or operational contact of the FBI.

The KGB had

a file on SLESINGER and a senior case officer in the

American Section of the seventh Department, Yu. M.

DVORKIN, was the responsable case officer.

An agent

of the seventh Department who was director of a photo-

graphic shop in Moscow was instructed to become friendly

Owith SLESINGER while the latter was visiting the soviet

Union, and the two men later exchanged correspondence.

0b SLESINGER went to Odessa to visit relatives, and DVORKIN

directed the Odessa KGB to "surround" him with agents. who

If there had been any indication

of intelligence activities, the KGB would have attempted.

to recruit SLESINGER, obut since no evidence was developed,.

no approach was made. SLESINGER had travelled to the

Soviet Union before, several times.

Comment:

NOSENKO's information was substantially.

correct. Alfred Lazarevich SLESINGER, 06

• reportea to the FBI in July 1962 of fis

June 1962 visit to Moscow and Odessa.

In Odessa [SLESINGER was contacted by

• a 06

Soviet official who exhibited "intimate

knowledge" of his business In New York

City and had asked whether SLESINGER]had

"ever been bothered by the FBI."

06

294

TS No. 197124

Top Secret

0001565

Copy

13/BR

---

## Page 304

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-1964)

comment:

(Continued) :

06

In 1965 SLESINGER; reported to the FBI that

he was in touch with a Moscow photographic

shop proprietor, and he described evidence:

of

KGB interest in him during his visit to

odessa in 1962.

Previous to visiting the

Soviet Union in 1962, SLESINGERhad been in 06

contact with a number of Soviet officials

from the United Nations.

NOSENKO was not specific in describing how he learned

of (SLESINGER, who may represent

• a First Chief Directorate

case.

06

KOTEN'S Arrest

NOSENKO was asked in Geneva in 1964 whether he was

involved

in the arrest of an American tourist in the

USSR in the fall of 1963.

Almost at once, NOSENKO

identified the case as that of Bernard KOTENDa quide

fOI

29 Afton Tours in New York City (and hence an employee of

06 (Alexander SVENCHANSKIX, see above) who had been arrested

on homosexual charges in Kiev. NOSENKO said that (KOTEN) 06

was involved with an American agent of the KGB Scientific

and Technical (S&T) Directorate. NOSENKO did not know the

agent's name,

NOSENKO's Information

RoTeil was a longtime member of the American Communist

Party and a frequent visitor after the Second World War

to the Soviet Union, where he had extensive contacts among

dissident literary figures

and other Soviet citizens,

particularly among: Russian Jews.

(NOSENKO explained in

another context that the KGB is wary of foreigners' contacts

with Soviet Jews because the Israeli Intelligence Service

has freguently inspired such contacts.] Because of these

many suspicious contacts, both the KGB First and Second

Directorates had concluded that KOTENmight be a "provocatio

agent" planted in or recruited from the ranks of the

Connunist Party in the United States.

295

Top Secret

000156& opy -

TS No. 197124

10

10/SR

---

## Page 305

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

06

On the eve of KOTEN's arrival in 1963, the Seventh

Department learned from V.5. BARKOVSKIY of the First

Chief Directorate's S&I Department that (KOTEN was. U6

carrying with him the address of relatives of an.

important Sat agent of the New York residency, and that

KOTEN intended to visit the agent's relatives. while. in

the USSR. The S&T agent had asked to be: repatriated to.

the USSR, but when the KGB eventually assented, the

agent balked, arousing: KGB suspicions. When it was

Obfound that KOTEN was acquainted with the agent, the.

D6KGB concluded that KOTEN "evidently received from

American Intelligence an assignment to visit the

agent's relatives).": After KOTEN visited the relatives lo

in the Crimea, the decision was made to arrest him as

a suspect American Intelligence agent. ROTEN was en- 06

trapped with a KGB homosexual agent and arrested,

although he was released when the American Communist

Party and other organizations strongly protested.

O6 NOSENKO did not personally participate in the arrest

nor meet ROTEN, although he supervised the arrest from

KGB Headquarters.

Comment:

06

(KOTEN's arrest on charges of homosexual

activities were publicized at the time in a

report datelined Moscow and quoting Inturist

which was carried in the New York Times. In

an interview with representatives of the

Department of State, KOTEN described how he 06

had been arrested by the KGB in Kiev on 28

August 1963, accused of being an American

Intelligence agent and interrogated for three

days, and held in jail for a month.

06

GRU Agent| John SHUBIN

The name of John Andrew SHUBIN and his year of birth

were among

the notes which NOSENKO brought to the 1964

meetings with CIA in Geneva.

296

Top Secret

0001567

TS No. 197124

Copy

IZIBR

---

## Page 306

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

NOSENKO'S Information

06.

was a native of California of Russian ex

traction, a Russian speaker, and a university professor

in New York City. DoSHUBIN, who had visited the Soviet

Union twice before, visited

the Soviet Union in 1958

or 1959, while NOSENKO was serving his first tour of

auty in the Severth Department. At that time, [SlUBIN 06

was. the target of Seventh Department case officer

A.A. VETLITSKIY, NOSENKO heard later that [SHUBIN]was 06

placed under surveillance, and when the KGB surveillance.

observed SHUBIN as a passenger in a llinistry of Defense

automobile, the GRU was asked about the merican.

very furtively said that they were interested in him,

from which the KGB concluded that SHubINwas a GRu agent.

In 1962 (sic) NOSENKO was reviewing a list of foreign

visitors to the Soviet Union and he noted SHUBIN's nameul

and recalled his earlier identification as a GRU agent.

NOSENKO himself telephoned GRU General SOKOLOV's office

and informed SOKOLOV of (SHUBIN's presence (or, according0b

to another version, SOKOLOV's office was advised by

others) •

SOKOLOV's office eventually apologized for

having

failed earlier to notify the KGB of the GRU's

interest in (SHUBIN.

Comment:

06 SHUBIN had no valid u.s.

passport

between 1940 and June 1961; if he visited

the Soviet Union during that period it was

not as an American tourist under his true

Consequently, he could not then have

been the tourist target of the Seventh

Department case officer, as NOSENKO claimed.

If NOSENKO eried, and actually was referring

D6 to SHUBIN's visit in 1961, there is a further

contradiction: NOSENKO could not have

noticed his name while reviewing tourist

lists in the Seventh Department, because

he claims he was in the American Department

at the time:

297

Top Secret

VIBR

TS No. 197124

0001568 opy

10

---

## Page 307

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-Janvary 1964)

Arrest of BARGHOORW

At the first of the 1964 meetings in Geneva NOSENKO

described the provocation and arrest of Yale University

Professor Frederick BARGHOORN in late 1963. NOSENKO's

most comprehensive statement, from which the following

paragraphs were largely drawn, was made on 9 June 1964.

NOSENKO said that the purpose of the KGB operation

against BARGHOORN was to retaliate for persona

non grata

action taken against three Soviets in New York City in

the case of John W. BUTENKO [in November 1963] and to

secure a hostage in exchange for a fourth Soviet (Igor

IVANOV) in the BUTENKO case who was jailed.

(NOSENKO

had asserted in Geneva, earlier, that the operation

against BARGHOORN "was

to discourage future arrests

such as that of IVANOV, not because of any special im-

portance of IVANOV himself.")

NOSENKO's Information

In 1963 four KGB First Chief Directorate officers

assigned to the New York Legal Residency were caught in

operational

activity in the United States. Of the four,

three had diplomatic immunity, but one was a chauffeur

and had only a service passport. The three Soviet

diplomats were held three or four hours by the American

authorities and

then released.

IVANOV, the chauffeur,

was arrested since he did not have diplomatic immunity.

GRIBANOV, Chief of the KGB Second Chief Directorate,

learned of this arrest probably the next day and was

directed by KGB Chairman Semichastnyy to take "necessary

measures."

GRIBANOV thereupon called to his office

NOSENKO; A.G. KOVALENKO, Chief of the Seventh Department;

and G.I. GRYAZNOV and Ye. M. RASHCHEPOV from the

American Department.

After

describing the arrest,

GRIBANOV asked what

information the Second Chief

Directorate Departments had on any American, Embassy

employee or tourist, that could serve as the victim of

an (retaliatory] arrest. RASHCHEPOV and GRYAZNOV said

that at that very moment there were three or four

American Service Attaches in Rostov and that, in the

opinion of the American Department, these officers might

be carrying electronic apparatus.

It was known that they

had cameras, that they had been taking photographs, and

they had been observed taking notes.

They could be

arrested in Rostov before they took the return plane to

MOSCOW.

298

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

0001569 Copy

---

## Page 308

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

GRIBANOV instructed the two representatives of the

American Department to write a report on what other

possibilities existed. He also told them to request

permission to arrest and search the Service Attaches:

GRIBANOV then asked what pertinent information was

held by the Seventh Department.

He was told that there

were relatively few. American tourists in the Soviet

Union at that time.

These included BARGHOORN, who was

mentioned to GRIBANOV along with one other (name not

recalled). NOSENKO and KOVALENKO reported, however,

that the KGB had no "strong" materials to use against

them.

They were ordered to make an immediate study of

the situation and to report back to GRIBANOV as soon

as possible.

Returning to the Seventh Department, NOSENKO and

KOVALENKO gathered the entire American

Tourist Section

in their officé.

In a general discussion, it was

decided that BARGHOORN was the only possible American

target.

All information on BARGHOORN was gathered,

and NOSENKO and KOVALENKO took it to GRIBANOV.

GRIBANOV read it and was pleased; he was sure that

BARGHOORN was connected with American Intelligence:

He then asked what could be done. NOSENKO and

KOVALENKO reported that BARGHOORN was

then in Tbilisi

and that, in fact, Ye: N. NOSKOV (case officer,:

American Tourist Section) was in Tbilisi with a woman

doctor from the KGB Operational Technical Directorate

for the purpose of working against BARGHOOPN; the

doctor had some special substance which had been used

to make BARGHOORN so violently ill that he had to be

hospitalized. While he was in the hospital, a careful

search had been made of his belongings, but

nothing of

operational interest had been found. In addition, a

KGB agent was placed in BARGHOORN's room as a patient;

he made anti-Soviet statements and offered BARGHOORN

"materials": but BARGHOORN did not rise to the bait.

At the time of this meeting with GRIBANOV, BARGHOORN

was scheduled to fly

• from Tbilisi to Moscow the fol-

lowing morning, and the KGB knew from a phone tap that

he had an appointment with Theodore ORCHARD of the 06

2 British Embassy"at the Hotel Metropol the following

evening

299

Top Secret

0001570

ZIBR

TS. No. 197124

10

Copy

---

## Page 309

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTHENT - January 1962-January 1964)

It was GRIBANOV who raised the possibility of giving

"materials" to BARGHOORN in Moscow.

NOSENKO said that

this would be a provocation, but GRIBANOV replied that

this made no difference.

He instructed NOSENKO and

KOVALENKO to locate an agent who could be used to pass

the compromising material to BARGHOORN and told them

to write a summary of BARGHOORN's background with a

proposal that the Second Chief Directorate arrest him

"when he obtains materials which are of interest to

American Intelligence."

This was to be sent in letter

form to Semichastnyy over GRIBANOV's signature; the

letter was not to indicate how BARGHOORN was to receive

the materials.

(That the evidence was to be planted

was not to be mentioned.)

GRIBANOV took a one-page letter on BARGHOORN, along

with a similar letter from GRYAZNOV and RASHCHEPOV

concerning the Service Attaches, to SemichastnyY. While

the four -- NOSENKO, KOVALENKO, GRYAZNOV and RASHCHEPOV -

were waiting in GRIBANOV's office for his return,

GRYAZNOV received a telephone call from the Rostov KGB

organization informing. him that the Service Attaches

were in the air on their way back to Moscow. Shortly

thereafter,. GRIBANOV returned with the news that the

Chairman of the KGB had approved the arrests of the

Service Attaches as well as BARGHOORN.

Khrushchev was

absent. from Moscow at the time, but Semichastnyy had

called BREZHNEV and secured his approval.

When GRIBANOV. learned from GRYAZNOV that the Service

Attaches were already on their way back to Moscow, he

became furious and sent GRYAZNOV out "to do the job or

die."

Meanwhile, arrangements were made with the

"Department D" (the KGB. element responsible for dis-

information, subordinate to the First Chief Directorate).

to provide materials on missiles which could be passed

to BARGHOORN.

While these were being picked up, NOSENKO

and KOVALENKO returned to their office to plan the arrest.

BARGHOORN was placed under immediate surveillance

upon his arrival in Moscow.

At 1810 hours a radio

message was received from one of the surveillance cars

that BARGHOORN had gone to the American Embassy, and it

was decided that the agent (name not recalled, aged 25

to 30 years) would be placed in contact with him as soon

as he came

out.

The KGB knew BARGHOORN had an appoint-

ment with ORCHARD of the British Embassy at 1900 hours, 0627

but at 1900 hours a report was received that BARGHOORN

0001571

300

TS No. 197124

Top Secret

Copy —

VIBR

---

## Page 310

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

had left the American Embassy in the American

Ambassador's car.

He was alone but for the

Soviet driver.

Nothing could be done while

BARGHOORN was in the moving car.

A check on

05 ORCHARD established that he was in the downstairs

hall of the hotel waiting. It was therefore

decided to approach BARGHOORN wien he left the car

at the hotel.

No sooner had BARGHOORN stepped out. of the car

than the agent approached.

"You are an American?"

the agent asked.

"Yes."

"Please take it," the

agent

said.

The agent put the packet containing the

materials on missiles in BARGHOORN's inside coat

pocket and then ran off.

BARGHOORN had taken only one of two steps when he

was seized by NOSKOV and Petr POPTSOV, another case:

officer of the American Tourist Section, and tola

he was under arrest.

A surveillance car pulled up

BARGHOORN was placed in the car, handcüffed (on

GRIBANOV's orders, because the Soviets arrested in

the United States had received similar treatment)

and driven to a Militia station where a room had been

prepared.

L.I. YEFPEMOV and K.G. KRUPNOV from the American

Tourist Section were waiting at the Militia station,

KRUPNOV to interrogate BARGHOORN and YEFREMOV to be

the interpreter.

When BARGHOORN was brought into the

station, an "incident report" form was filled out, and

a document was

prepared requesting permission to hold

him 48 hours.

Between 0200 and 0300 hours BARGHOORN

was taken to the KGB inner prison. At 0400 hours the

Seventh Department case officers were released with

instructions to report for duty at 0930 hours.

NOSENKO and the others went höme

KRUPNOV began the questioning in Russian at 1000

hours the next day. Although BARGHOORN speaks good

Russian, YEFREMOV remained in case he would be needed

to interpret. NOSENKO entered the room several times

during these sessions.

(Although NOSENKO did not

want to reveal his face to BARGHOORN because he knew

BARGHOORN would be released, GRIBANOV had told

KOVALENKO that NOSENKO should be there when they reached

the point where BARGHOORN was to tell how he obtained

302

Top Secret

0001572

TS No. 197124

Copy.

10

1/BR

---

## Page 311

14-00000

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

the missile documents. The first sessions

concentrated on general matters,

such as

BARGHOORN's life history.

After one and one half hours of questioning

BARGHOORN agreed that the

materials were on him

when he was

arrested, but

he maintained that they had

been placed on his person.

He said

that he thought

they were "newspapers or something," that he did

not

know what they were.

The package was then opened and

shown to BARGHOORN; it contained about 20 to 25 pages

of information on missiles.

"BARGHOORN was not, of

course, given a close look" at the materials.

Following BARGHOORN's admission, another declaration

was drawn up by KRUPNOV and signed by KRUPNOV,

KOVALENKO, and GRIBANOV.

NOSENKO and KRUPNOV then

took it to the office of the Chief Prosecutor where

the incident report, the first interrogation, and

the first and second declarations were reported to

MISHUTIN, the First Deputy Chief Prosecutor.

GRIBANOV

directed

that all materials on BARGHOORN, including

information from KGB Archives, be given to the KGB

Department of Prosecution

that they could begin

legal proceedings against BARGHOOR.

After this, all

interrogations were conducted by that department;

KRUPNOV was dropped from the case, although YEFREMOV.

continued to act as interpreter.

Comment:

6001573

BARGHOORN's version of his entrapment,

arrest;

and interrogation coincide fairly

precisely with the version provided by

NOSENKO.

He identified NOSENKO from a

photograph as a KGB officer present at

one stage of the interrogation on the

second day of his arrest and said

NOSENKO took some part in the pro-

ceedings.

He recalled NOSENKO as

being

"clever and quick-witted" and as "giving

the impression that he was not a dedicated

careerist, but opportunistic and adaptive:

he seemed not to care about what he was

doing, but doing a good job nevertheless."

302

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy —

---

## Page 312

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT January 1962-January 1964)

The OSWALD CASE

NOSENKO's knowledge of the KGB's interest in

OSWALD stemmed

1 from his claimed Tourist Department

assignments. He asserted that while Deputy

Chief

of the American Section in 1959 he participated in

the KGB determination that OSWALD was of no operational

interest.

In September 1963, when NOSENKO was Deputy

Chief of the Tourist Department, he

was informed of

OSWALD's visit to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City to

apply to return to the USSR. Immediately following

President Kennedy's assassination, NOSENKO,

as

Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department, reviewed KGB:

records of OSWALD's stay in the Soviet Union including

the Second Chief Directorate file on OSWALD.

For continuity of presentation, both periods of

NOSENKO's alleged involvement with the OSWALD case

(1959-60 and 1963) are discussed here.

The information NOSENKO provided on the OSwALd

case is significant if it substantiates. NOSENKO'S

claimed positions in the KGB and confirms the validity

of his claim that he knew the extent of KGB involvement

with OSWALD:.

NOSENKO's Information

Residence in the USSR

Prior to OSWALD's arrival in the USSR, he was

completely unknown to the KGB.

Moreover,

upon

receipt of his visa application, the KGB Second Chief

Directorate determined that he was not of sufficient

importance to justify any special interest by the

Seventh Department:

Not until about October 1959,

when

OSWALD expressed a desire to remain in the USSR

did he come to the attention of NOSENKO, who was, at

that time, Deputy Chief of the American Section of

the Seventh Department.

'Al1 available materials on

him were thereupon collected and examined - the visa

application, Inturist reports, interpreters' reports,

reports from hotel agents,

and the results of a check

of KGB Archives.

NOSENKO's subordinate, KRUPNOV

interviewed the interpreter to whom OSWALD had stated

his wish to stay in the USSr.

303

Top Secret

0001574

TS No. 197124

Copy 10

---

## Page 313

• Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

Although the KGB considered it possible that OSWALD

might be an American agent, the KGB did nothing to

investigate this possibility because "this would be

done after the person is allowed to stay in the Soviet

Union."

Surveillance of OSWALD was not increased after

his request, and OSWALD was not interviewed by the KGB

in an attempt to establish his intentions.

KRUPNOV

sent NOSENKO, his chief, a memorandum on information

which had been received concerning OSWALD. The memorandum

cited reports by KGB informants at the Hotel Berlin, where

OSWALD was staying in accordance with an Inturist itinerary

and a two-page report by the Inturist interpreter to whom

OSWALD made his initial request to remain in the Soviet

Union. A file incorporating all information which KRUPNOV

had collected was thereupon opened in NOSENKO's section.

From this information NOSENKO and KRUPNOV concluded

that OSWALD was of no interest to the KGB, and both agreed

that OSWALD appeared somewhat "abnormal."

For this reason

NOSENKO instructed KRUPNOV to advise OSWALD through the

Inturist interpreter that he would not be permitted to

remain permanently in the USSR and that he must depart on

the expiration of his visa, then seek re-entry as a

permanent resident through normal channels at the Soviet

Embassy in Washington.

KRUPNOV followed NOSENKO's orders,

and either that day or the next NOSENKO learned that OSWALD

failed to appear for a scheduled tour arranged by his

Inturist guide. This prompted a search, and after several

hours, OSWALD was found in his hotel room, bleeding heavily

from self-inflicted wounds. After hearing of this incident

IIOm KRUPNOV, NOSENKO then reported it to K.N. DUBAS, Chief

of the Seventi Department. NOSENKO believed that DUBAS in

turn reported it to GRIBANOV, head of the KGB Second Chief

Directorate.

GRIBANOV upheld NOSENKO's original decision

that the

KGB should not become involved with OSWALD and

that OSWALD should not be permitted to remain in the USSR.

There was no

attempt to debrief OSWALD because "he was

not an interesting person and wasn't normal,"

OSWALD was

never questioned on his past nor asked to write an auto-

biography.

0001575

304

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy -

---

## Page 314

Top Secret

(SEVENTH

DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

NOSENKO did not know who eventually granted

OSWALD permission to reside temporarily in the USSR

or who approved issuance of his temporary residence permit.

The KGB gave instructions that he not be allowed to live

in the Moscow area: Either the Soviet Red Cross or the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs may have made this decision

to assign OSWALD to Minsk. The Seventh Department updated

his file, and it was sent, along with a cover letter pre-

pared by KRUPNOV, to the local KGB organization in Minsk.

KRUPNOV's letter summarized the case and specifically in-

structed local authorities there to take no action con-

cerning OSWALD except to observe his activities "passively"

to make sure that he was not an American Intelligence agent

on temporary "sleeper" status.

NOSENKO read this letter,

and it was signed by DUBAS. On the basis of the instructions

contained in the letter, NOSENKO said, no active steps could

be taken in Minsk without KGB Headquarters approval.: It was

NOSENKO's opinion that the only coverage of OSWALD during

his stay in Minsk consisted of periodic checks at his

place of employment, questioning of his neighbors and

associates, and coverage of his mail. After OSWALD'S

threatened

second suicide attempt, the KGB "washed its

hands.

of him" and that even though there was considered

to be

some possibility that he was a "sleeper agent,"

KGB Headquarters interest in him while he was in Minsk

was "practically, nil. "n

Request to Return to the USSR

The KGB Second Chief Directorate was not concerned

with OSWALD's return to the United States in June 1962.

by which time NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the seventh

Department.

No further word on him was received at KGB

Headquarters until he appeared at the Soviet Embassy in

Mexico City in September 1963 and requested a visa to

return to the Soviet Union. The Mexico Legal Residency

reported his visit to KGB Headquarters by cable, re-.

questing information. The KGB First Chief Directorate

had no record on OSWALD. M.I. TURALIN, Deputy Chief of

the First Chief Directorate's Service Number Two (Counter-

intelligence Abroad) called the Seventh Department to

see if the latter element had any information on OSWALD;

The Chief of the Sixth Section of the Seventh Department,

V.K. ALEKSEYEV, received the call and reported the in-

quiry to Seventh Department Chief CHELNOKOV of to KOVALENKO.

305

Top Secret

0001576 15 No. 197124

Copy 10

---

## Page 315

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

NOSENKO thought he himself was present at the time. ALEKSEYEV

was given OSWALD's background, including his suicide attempt

and the fact that he was not considered normal, and was

told to advise the First Chief Directorate that OSWALD should

not be permitted to return to the Soviet Union. ALEKSEYEV

relayed this information to the First Chief Directorate.

NOSENKO did not know to whom OSWALD had spoken at the

Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, and he knew of no contacts

between OSWALD and Cubans or representatives of the Cuban

Government there or elsewhere.

Comment: Independent sources, however, reported on

visits by OSWALD to the Cuban as well as

Soviet Embassies in Mexico City between 29

September and 3. October 1963 and on his

(apparently overt) contact with a KGB officer

under Consular cover at the Soviet Embassy

there. NOSENKO originally said he knew

nothing of any such contact. In October 1966

he revised this to say that OSWALD did not

have contact with the KGB in Mexico City.

NOSENKO explained that he had been sitting in

the office of Seventh Department Chief, K.N.

DUBAS, when a cable arrived at Moscow Head-

quarters from the KGB Legal Residency in

Mexico.

The cable, which NOSENKO said he did

not personally see, reported that OSWALD had

visited the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City

requesting permission to return to the USSR

and that the cable specified that OSWALD had

dealt with Soviet Foreign Ministry personnel

only.

0001577

306

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

---

## Page 316

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTHENT - January 1962-January 1964)

Post-Assassination Review of KGB FIle

NOSENKO next learned Of OSWALD's activities as a result

of President Kennedy's assassination.

President Kennedy was shot, NOSENKO was advised of this fact

in a telephone call. to his home from KGB Headquarters. A

short while later he wäs told, again by telephone, that the

President had died. About two hours later, NOSENKO was told

that OSWALD had been arrested, and he and the other officers

of the American Tourist Section were called in to determine

whether the KGB had any information concerning him. After

establishing OSWALD's identity from KGB files and learning

that his file was

still in Minsk, NOSENKO phoned the KGB

office in

Minsk on GRIBANOV's orders.

The local KGB dictated

over the telephone a summary of its file on OSWALD.

This

summary. concluded with the statement that the KGB in Minsk

had attempted "to influence OSWALD in the right direction"

GRIBANOV had been greatly disturbed about the local KGB's

efforts because it had been given specific instructions to

carry out nothing other than passive measures against OSWALD

there. He ordered that all records in Minsk pertaining to

OSWALD's stay there, as well as an explanation of the

meaning of the statement about influencing OSWALD, be flown

immediately to Moscow by military aircraft. NOSENKO personally

the explanation from Minsk concerning the meaning of

this statement and thoroughly reviewed OSWALD's file when

it arrived by plane. He then turned the file over to s.M.

FEDOSEYEV, the Chief of the American Department of the KGB

second Chief Directorate, who prepared a two-page summary

memorandum for GRIBANOV:

This memorandum, which NOSENKO

read, was forwarded to KGB Chairman SemichastnyY, and

Semichastnyy in turn reported to the CPSU Central Committee

and

to Khrushchev concerning it.

OSWALD'S file from Minsk contained no information to

indicate that the KGB in Minsk had taken any action with

respect to OSWALD contrary to instructions from KGB Head-

quarters.

From the date of OSWALD's arrival in the USSR

until his departure, the KGB had no personal contact with

him and had not attempted to utilize him in any manner.

307

Top Secret

0001578

TS.No. 197124

10

Copy.

---

## Page 317

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

OSWALD never received any KGB training or KGB assign-

ments.

If any other department of the KGB or the GRU had

wanted to use OSWALD in any way, it would have had to secure

permission from the Seventh Department, which originally

opened his case file.

In view of OStIALD's apparent mental

instability, no Soviet intelligence organization, particu-

larly not the Thirteenth (Assassination and Sabotage)

Department, would have considered using him.

KGB Head-

quarters did not maintain a control file on him following

his settlement in Minsk,

as it would have done had OSHALD

been of any operational interest.

The only KGB record on

OSALD maintained in Moscow was an index card giving his

name and the fact the Seventh Department had originated a

file concerning him.

The KGB maintained no separate file on Marina OS"ALD;

all information about her was kept in OSWALD's file.

There

was no indication in OSWALD's

file that the KGB had had any

interest in Marina either while she was in the Soviet Union

or after she left for the United States.

Comment:

NOSENKO later told CIA on one occasion that he

"only skimmed the file" and on another that he

had it in his possession about 20 minutes. In

October 1966 he again said that he read the

file and that while doing so he saw a picture

of OSWALD for the first time. NOSENKO added

that he never met OSWALD personally.

NOSENKO's assertion that the KGB First Chief

Directorate first learned of OSWALD when he

applied for a re-entry visa in Mexico City in

September 1963 is probably incorrect. The

consular file turned over to the U.S. Govern-

ment by the Soviet Embassy in Washington

after the assassination indicated that the KGB

First Chief Directorate would have known of

OSWALD as early

as February 1963 if not earlier.

That file contained Marina OSWALD's letter of

February 1963 and a letter of July 1963 from

OSTALD, both of

which indicated that OSwAld had

6001579

308

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

---

## Page 318

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

Comment:

• (Continued)

earlier requested permission

to return to the

Soviet Union.

In the last dated letter of the

file, one of 9 November 1963, OSWALD advised

the Soviet Embassy in Washington of his travel

under alias to Mexico, his fruitless contact

with an official (whom CIA identifies as a

KGB officer) of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico

City, his contact there with the Cuban Consulate

and his efforts to reach Havana in order to

visit the Soviet Embassy there.

without regard

to possible earlier correspondence, OSWALD'S

request for a Soviet visa addressed

to the

Embassy in Washington in July 1963 would require

the Washington Residency to report the matter

to Moscow just as NOSENKO described the Mexico

City Residency later did. NOSENKO's apparent

ignorance of OSWALD's communications with the

Soviet Embassy in Washington discredits his

claim to complete knowledge of all aspects of

the KGB relationship with OSWALD•

The CHEREPANOV Papers

Comment:

On 4 November 1963 in Moscow, a MEZHKNIGA

employee claiming to be one CHEREPANOV, passed

to an American book-buyer a package which he

requested the American to deliver to a trust-

worthy person at the American Embassy.

Embassy

officials found the package to contain a

bundle of typed or handwritten documents which

appeared to have originated in classified KGB

files.

Fearing a Soviet provocation which

could lead to a denunciation of the Embassy

for possessing classified Soviet Government

documents, Embassy officials had the documents

photographed and on the next day: 5 November,

returned the originals to the Soviet Ministry

of Foreign Affairs.

0001580

309

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy 10

---

## Page 319

14-00000

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

At his first meeting with CIA in January 1964 NOSENKO

related how a disaffected former KGB colleague, A.N.

CHEREPANOV, had stolen documents from the American Embassy

Section and in November 1963 sent them through an inter-

mediary to the American Embassy. CHEREPANOV's treason was

discovered, NOSENKO said, when the Embassy returned the

documents to Soviet authorities. CHEREPANOV fled Moscow,

and NOSENKO claimed to have taken part in the KGB search

for him. NOSENKO brought with him to Geneva the official

KGB document which authorized his travel in the search for

The significance of the ClEREPANOV incident is twofold.

The KGB documents which CHEREPANOV allegedly sent to the

Embassy appear to have originated in the American Depart-

ment's Embassy Section, and the documents relate to KGB

modus operandi, personnel, targets, and technical devices

employed in operations during 1958-1960, during part of

which time NOSENKO claimed he was Deputy Chief of the

Embassy Section.

The KGB document, the "temporary duty

authorization", is an item of physical evidence

NOSENKO

has offered to substantiate his claim to personal parti-

cipation in

the CHEREPANOV case and to having held the rank

of KGB lieutenant colonel. [The document does not itself

refer to CHEREPANOV in any manner.J

NOSENKO'S Information

The KGB officer, A.N. CHEREPANOV was born about 1920 or

1921,

During World War II he was a KGB officer working

with partisan groups behind the lines. Later he was in

Yugoslavia for fourer tive years, and was probably Deputy

Chief of the KGB Legal Residency in Belgrade.

Comment:

CIA records contain references to an Aleksandr.

Nikolayevich CHEREPANOV, a Soviet diplomat and

suspected intelligence officer in Belgrade in

1953.

CHEREPANOV left Belgrade in 1956.

Yugoslav intelligence officer who defected in

1957 confirmed that CHEREPANOV had been an

intelligence officer.

0001581

310

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

---

## Page 320

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

When CHEREPANOV returned to Moscow, he had some (unspecified).

problem getting a job, but finally the KGB Second Chief

Directorate took him into the American Embassy Section of the

American Department, working against State Department

personnel in the Administrative Section of the Embassy.

He

worked in the same room as V.A. KUSKOV, and was case officer

for three KGB targets:

Richard SNYDER. and John MCVICKAR,

counsular officers, and Marion ALBAMONTH. secretary to thell

personnel officer.

CHEREPANOV's work as

a case officer was

poor, and

as it grew worse, the KGB decided to retire him.

Because of his service in World War II, for which he

received three years' pension credit for each year of military

service, he had enough time to his credit to be eligible for

retirement. Also, he was just over the minimum age (40) for

retirement from the KGB.

Upon retiring in July or August 1961, CHERFPANOV got a

job with MEZHKNIGA:

Unhappy about his enforced retirement

and angry at the KGB, he became even more dissatisfied when

MEZHKNIGA turned down his several attempts to go abroad.

Prior to leaving the KGB, CHEREPANOV had stolen draft

copies of documents he had handled in the

the concent to the an aolen

Embassy Section.

In one case, he copied the contents of a report in his own

handwriting, evidently having been unable to steal the

document itself. All of the documents he had stolen were

intended for destruction.

In November 1963 Yu. I. GUK brought NOSENKO news about

"a catastrophe" in the KGB:

GUK said he had the story from

B.D. MAKASHEV, a common friend of GUK and NOSENKO.

MAKASHEV

had been in Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko's office when

the CHEREPANOV papers were brought there, after their delivery

by Thomas FAIN of the Embassy. MAKASHEV saw the name of

(Second Chief Directorate Chief) GRIBANOV on some of the

papers and saw that one of them was a plan for agent opera-

tions against an American. He noted that one of the documents

was at least an inch thick. Gromyko immediately called KGB

Chairman Semichastnzy, who notified GRIBANOV. GRIDANOV's

depüty. went to Gromyko's office and picked up the papers.

The KGB then began an investigation of all the personnel

assigned to the American Department during the time period

covered by the

papers, 1959 to 1960 or 1961.

0001582

311

Top Secret

218R

TS No. 197124

Copy -

10

---

## Page 321

14-00000

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

When the American Embassy saw the CHEREPANOV documents,

they were afraid that the documents were part of a KGB

provocation, and they wondered what the Russians were

trying to do. The Embassy officials photographed the

te ambasse

documents and on the next day returned them to the Ministry

of Foreign Affairs.

When the Americans gave the documents

to the Ministry, the KGB wondered why the Americans gave

them back.

The whole matter was held very tightly in the KGB during

its investigation for 20 or 25 days.

When the KGB examined

the documents, some were found to be in CHEREPANOV's hand-

writing, but no documents were found which pertained to

CHEREPANOV's own case work, or that of the American Embassy

Section. The KGB found no

documents dated later than

1961--none for 1962 or 1963--only 1959, 1960 and 1961. Thus

there were a number of indications pointing towards

CHEREPANOV, who had left the section in 1961.

The KGB did

not dare alert him by putting full-time surveillance on him,

but instead mounted fixed surveillance posts at his home and

office. In order to provoke CHEREPANOV into some precipitous

action, a former KGB colleague was sent to visit him who, in

the course of conversation, mentioned the great disturbance

in the KGB caused by someone passing stolen KGB documents

to the Americans. CHEREPANOV manifested no reaction to the

news and was quite cool about the matter.

The next day the

surveillance post observed him leaving his house in the

morning at his usual time, apparently on his way to work,

but the surveillance post

at his office soon reported that

he had not arrived at work. He had "simply dropped out of

sight".

An intensive search "all over the city of Moscow" ensued,

then spread throughout the Soviet Union: Border controls

were tightened, photographs of CHEREPANOV were sent out to

Republic and local KGB and

militia offices, and all means

of transport were covered.

Reports

began

coming in

from

various places that someone who seemed to fit CHEREPANOV'S

description had been seen acting suspiciously here and there.

Reports which came into KGB Headquarters from Gorkiy Oblast

strongly indicated

the possibility of CHEREPANOV's presence

there,

SO NOSENKO was dispatched to the area to check.

0001583

312

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy -

---

## Page 322

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

NOSENKO wen't to Gorkiy on the fourth day after CHERE-

PANOV's disappearance.

The arca was covered with very deep

woods, "where a person could los himself for life": : On the

seventh day CHEREPANOV was located and

arrested in Baku,

where he was on his way to the Iranian border.

A special plane was immediately sent to Baku, carrying

S.M. FEDOSEYEV and several other American Department offi-

cers. They brought CHEREPANOV immediately lack to Moscow;

interrogating him on the plane.: He immediately confessed

to having given the documents to the Americans.

When asked

why, he said he was "angry at the KGh, very angry", ano

besides, he thought he might ask the Americans for some

money in return for the documents.

He confessed that on

4 November he had passed the documents to an American tourist

who was a librarian interested in Russian books:

He said he

had given the documents

to the American in the entrance

hallway in the building of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

the building in which the Ministry of Foreign Trade was also

housed.

Because CHEREPANOV had eluded the KGB between the two

fixed surveillance posts which had been established, the

Second Chief Directorate suffered considerable criticism

for not putting CHEREPANOV under full, round-the-clock

surveillance., CHEREPANOV himself, however, told the KGB

that if he had detected his surveillants he would have

written to the government and newspapers a letter of protest

against "such an indignity, such persecution", and then

would have committed

suicide, leaving the KGB without proof

of his guilt.

Comment:

NOSENKO's assertions with respect to the

CHEREPANOV case, however, are not material to

his claim that he was Deputy Chief of the

Seventh Department at the time.

0001584

313

Top Secret

TS. No. 197124

Copy -10

---

## Page 323

4-00000

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

Contents of the CHERFPANOV Package

The KGB documents in the CHEREPANOV package

totalled

103 pages in the original Russian version, divided almost

equally between typewritten reports in final form and hand-

written draft reports or notes, plus two copies of letters

written by Soviet citizens to the American Embassy. The

longest single document was a 33-page Top Secret report,

dated 18 April 1959, entitled "Operational Conditions in

the U.S.A. and the Activities of American Counterintelligence

Organs against Soviet Installations and Soviet Citizens in

the U.S.A. in 1957-1958"

The report was signed by Colonel

A. FEKLISOV, lalias FOMIN, the former KGB rezident in

Washington] whose title is given as

"Chief, First (American]

Department, First Chief Directorate".

The rest of the

documents refer to KGB coverage of various American Embassy

and American diplomats in Moscow during the period August

1958 to 15 October 1960. Most of the documents were prepared

by or for one senior case officer of the Embassy Section,

First Department, Second Chief Directorate, Major V. KUSKOV.

(NOSENKO has identified V.A. KUSKOV as an officer of the

Second Chief Directorate who shared an office with CHEREPANOV

from about 1958 to 1961.)

Two reports were on Americans who

had left the Soviet Union, Edward I. KILLHAM, Second Secretary

from July 1957 to July 1959, and Wallace L. LITTELL, Attache

There were operational plans

for agent work against four American diplomats once stationed

in MoscoW,

Richara HARMSTONE, Lewis W. BOWDEN, James A.

RAMSEY, and George WINTERS.

Other documents included were

an agent's report of her relationship with MINTERS, a summary

of LANGELLE's activities while in the USSR, a list of Soviet

citizens whose letters to the Embassy had been intercepted

by the KGB, a handwritten summary

(signed by CHEREPANOV). of

derogatory

• information on

a Soviet youth who had been in

touch with American Consul Richard SNYDER, and various hand-

written drafts and notes on the foregoing

Americans.

0001585

3.14

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

---

## Page 324

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January. 1964)

The operational plan on WINTERS,

as an example, indicated

that WINTERS had already been identified as an intelligence

officer, and to ascertain the nature of his intelligence

activities, the KGB was to employ round-the-clock surveil-

lance, technical aids metka and "NEPTUNE-80", audio surveil-

lance, and investigation of his contacts among Soviet.

citizens.

The plan reflected that while the KGB judgment

was that WINTERS

"had a hostile attitude toward the USSR"

and that there

"was no basis for recruitment"

i care should

be taken not to alarm him and cause him to leave the country

prematurely, since there still might arise an opportunity

to attempt to recruit him.

NOSENKO said that he had never seen the documents

CHEREPANOV passed to the Embassy, although he was familiar

with their substance.

Comment:

The information in the CHEREPANOV Papers was

substantially consistent with what NOSENKO had

said earlier in 1962 regarding WINTERS, LANGELLE,

HARMSTONE and Embassy Section operational

techniques such as the use of metka.

NOSENKO's Travel Document

When NOSENKO first related to CIA in Geneva in 1964'

his knowledge of the CHEREPANOV case, he produced a document

(see accompanying exhibit) which he said was his official

KGB "temporary duty authorization" to go to Gorkiy Oblast

to

search for CHEREPANOV. The document, signed by General

GRIBANOV,

authorized Lieutenant Colonel NOSENKO to travel to

Gorkiy during the period immediately before NÖSENKO's trip

to Geneva, 15-30 December 1963. NOSENKO acknowledged that

it was

"illegal" to have

kept the document and to have

brought it with him from

the Soviet Union. He did it,

he

said, to show CIA.

0001586

315

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

10

Copy

---

## Page 325

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTIENT. - January 1962-January 1964)

Comment:

NOSENKO has never provided a satisfactory

explanation for his retention of the document

nor for bringing it to Geneva.

According to

an earlier KGB defector, the bearer of a

temporary duty authorization is held strictly

accountable for the document which has to be

turned in with the financial voucher.

What-

ever NOSENKO's purpose, the effect of presenting

the document to CIA was to corroborate his

statements about CHEREPANOV and substantiate

his claim that he was a KGB lieutenant colonel.

NOSENKO was not a lieutenant colonel (see p.350) •

When he eventually said in 1966 that he was

only a captain, NOSENKO was challenged to

explain how he came to possess an official KGB

document signed by General GRIBANOV and

identifying him as a lieutenant colonel.

NOSENKO asserted that it came about "by

mistake".

Return to Geneva (January-February 1964)

NOSENKO was detailed a second time to perform security

escort duties with the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament

Conference, and he returned to Geneva in January 1964 where

he resumed contact with CIA and announced his intention to

defect.

He brought with him a considerable number of hand-

written notes to which he referred when describing to CIA

officers KGB. operations of which he claimed he learned at

KGB Headquarters during 1962 and 1963. His delegation

security duties. were. not onerous.

He visited the Geneva

Legal Residency daily and met with CIA almost as frequently

while awaiting approval of his defection and exfiltration

from Switzerland, tentatively scheduled for some three

weeks later. A little more than a week after his arrival!

however, NOSENKO declared that he had to defect at once,

because he had received cabled instructions to return to the

USSR immediately. On 4 February 1964 NOSENKO was

Switzerland to Germany, and on 12 February he was brought

act robary reb are was broughe

taken from

to the United States.

0001587

316

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy —

---

## Page 326

Top Secret

Exhibit 3 - Temporary Duty Authorization for It. Colonel

Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO, 15-30 December 1963

FRONT

11933

овочноссудостоверенне e

Committee for State Security Under.

the Council of Ministers, USSR

15. December 1963

Issued to: Lieutenant Colonel

NOSENKO

Yuriy Ivanovich

For duty to:

UKGB of Gor kaya

Oblast'

Length of

temporary

assignment:

15 days

through:

30 December 1963

Authorization:

directive of Chief

of a Chief Directorate

Effective on presentation of

identity document No.: NK-2513

Chief_s./GRIBANOV of Directorate

of Department

Committee for State Security Under

the Council of Ministers, USSR

0001588

Top Secret

TS. No. 197124

Copy 1

---

## Page 327

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

purpose of Geneva Trip

NOSENKO explained that it was his personal wish that

had brought him to' Geneva, that he was allowed to travel as

"a treat"

when it appeared to be the last occasion he might

have to travel to the West.

[NOSEIKO said in 1962 that when

he became Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, as he

expected to become, he would travel to the west every two

or three years.]

He had discussed the possibility of the

trip in 1963 with then-Seventh Department Chief CHELNOKOV,

and secured his agreement.

He also talked with officers

of the Soviet Delegations Department, but after it had been

decided that he should go, the Chief of that Department,

IN.T.I ZHARIKOV, suggested that it might be unnecessary

for

a security officer to accompany this particular delegation.

[A.G.] KOVALENKO,

the new Chief of the Seventh Department,

supported NOSENKO's assignment as a personal favor. 'Although

at one time NOSENKO said that GRIBANOV approved the trip, he

has later asserted that GRIBANOV was. not involved and that

if GRIBANOV had learned of NOSENKO's plans, he would: not

have permitted NOSENKO to go.

NOSENKO's only mission was to concern himself with the

general security of the delegation, as he had done in 1962.

He had no specific tasks such as on his earlier assignment

(e.g., investigating SAKIDY or supervising the BELITSKIY

operation):

Comment: NOSENKO has never satisfactorily explained why

a Deputy Chief of the

Seventh Department would

draw an unrelated assignment abroad which

would last many weeks if not months.

another context, NOSENKO had described

a KGB

conference to take place about this time where

plans were to be drawn up

for KGB operations

during the coming tourist

season: he acknow-

ledged that he was expected to attend, but

nevertheless went to Geneva.

317

Top Secret

6001590

TS. No. 197124

10

Copy

---

## Page 328

Top Secret

EXHIBIT 3 - Temporary Duty Authorization for Lt. Colonel

Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO, 15-30 December 1963

REVERSE

Комвидированний не позднес здкевного срока по

мавдіровкі обллао преаставить

ававСовы!

позаращения

При полученли проевдного билета гроддявять в.

кел-лор, хассу хоман

дыропочнос удостоверепис для наложсная кокцостерв.

ОТМЕТКИ О ОРЕБЫВАННИ В ПУНКТАХ

Hor. Шахунско гом

м-р мця тур

быя из г. Шахиньи 177ки-ро.

Респлатвой вартійці

ралі назу но сом

КОМИТЕТА ГОСУДАРСТВЕНН

ри СОВЕТЕ МИНИСТРА

Убыл нз

Москвы p-

Прибыл в Москву и

Нач, секретариата

Печать

ДИНО -

КОМИТЕТА ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЙ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ

при СОВЕТЕ МИНИСТРОВ СССР

Выдано:

Аванс на расходи по конавцировко в сумно

• Поревозочнмо требования N6N:005867, 005870

Теловы на пладкарту NºNº

Ст. булалтер

NOTATIONS OF PRESENCE IN PLACES OF

TEMPORARY DUTY

"Arrived in city of Gor'kiy

16 December 1963"

"Arrived in city. of Shakhun'ye

17 XII 1963 Did not use

free quarters"

s./Chief of Shakhun'ye

Chief Militia Section,

Militia Major

(Illegible)

"Departed Shakhun'ye 17/XII-63

Did not use free quarters"

s./Chief of Shakhun'ye

Chief Militia Section,

Militia Major_

(Illegible)

"Left Gor'kiy I7 December 1963

Did not use free quarters"

So finne

(Illegible)

6001589

Top Secret

TS. No.: 197124

Copy -

---

## Page 329

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

Visits to Legal Residency

As in 1962, NOSENKO said he visited the Legal Resi-

dency daily.

According to strict rules, he explained, an

officer in his status

[temporary duty assignment which was

independent of Residency] should not do so, but his case

was exceptional because he was a Deputy Chief of Department

and because of the relationship he established in 1962

through the intervention of M.s. TSYMBAL.

Illegals Direct-

orate Chief ISYMBAL, NOSENKO related in 1964, was an old

friend; they had become acquainted in Moscow before meeting

again in Geneva in 1962, when they dined together frequently.

TSYMBAL's wife once had

taught NOSENKO in school, and

TSYMBAL had once offered NOSENKO a job in the Illegals

Directorate. NOSENKO asserted that TSYMBAL's introduction

of NOSENKO to Rezident GAVRICHEV in 1962 permitted NOSENKO

to frequent the Legal Residency in 1964.

Comment: In 1962 NOSENKO attributed his access to the

Residency to his "old friend Yuri GUK", not

TSYMBAL, He mentioned TSYMBAL's presence in

Geneva but claimed no close acquaintance.

Availability for Meetings with CIA

In 1964 NOSENKO behaved as if he had no official

responsibilities or any

demands on his time, and he was

willing to spend all of his time in meetings with CIA.. He

said that his absence from the Disarmament Delegation could

be explained as "security duties" since everyone on the

Delegation knew or suspected that he was a KGB officer.

From

the first meeting on 24 January until 4 February,

NSOENKO met CIA officers thirteen times for meetings usually

lasting for five or six hours. By mutual agreement, most

of the meetings started in the afternoon.

On two occasions

NOSENKO arrived as early as 0930 hours and several meetings

continued until past midnight.

0001591

318

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy .

---

## Page 330

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

NOSENKO's Written Notes

After returning to KGB Headquarters from Geneva in

1962, NOSENKO said, he had availed himself of various

opportunities to record what he learned of KGB operations

in order to inform CIA, and to pilfer appropriate KGB

documents to which he had access, when he could safely do

He brought to Geneva in 1964 three KGB documents and

a large number of handwritten notes. The latter reflected

items which he had. excerpted from various documents to which

he had access, principally the Seventh Department Chief's

special file containing periodic summaries of all Seventh

Department operations.. He last had access to this special

file, he stated; in connection with his review of it in

December 1963 to confirm that it was intact after the

CHEREPANOV affair. While the file contained no true names,

he claimed he learned such true identities as were contained

in his notes by asking KGB colleagues.

For safekeeping,

NOSENKO said he kept

the notes and documents in a wall safe

of the office which he occupied alone, as Deputy Chief of

the Department.

Questioned

repeatedly about the KGB operations referred

to in his notes, NOSENKO in many instances could not expand

on what he had written:

He insisted he had written everything

he could discover, and knew no more.

Comment:

NOSENKO's sourcing for the notes does not

explain how he learned of the cases described

the notes dating from 1957-1959, a period

not covered by the documents NOSENKO Claimed he

reviewed. Neither can NOSENKO explain why he

was not knowledgeable, without the notes, of

operations which occurred while he was Deputy

Chief of the Seventh Department's American-

British Commonwealth Section. NOSENKO acknow-

ledges that his access to a personal safe in

319

Top Secret

0001592

TS No. 197124

10

---

## Page 331

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT -

January 1962-January 1964)

Comment:

(Continued)

which to keep the notes was just: fortuitous,

since neither all offices had such safes, nor

even all offices of Deputy Chiefs.

NOSENKO's Defection

On arrival for his first meeting with CIA during the

second Geneva phase, on 24 January 1964, NOSENKO said that

after long and careful consideration since the 1962 meeting

series, he had decided to defect.

He explained that he had

recently been promoted to the position of First Deputy Chief

of the Seventh Department, and that because of the stature

and responsibilities of his new job, there would be few if

any opportunities for him to visit the lest in the future.

Therefore, he had decided to seize the opportunity at hand

and to flee to the United States at once, leaving his family.

behind. He foresaw no possibility of his wife and children

being permitted leen tease made eat ento part

with my family".. He had, however, carefully considered their

fate as the close relatives of a defector, and he felt that,

because of his mother's position in Soviet society, no harm

would come to them.

NOSENKO was told that CIA accepted in principle his

decision to defect. NOSENKO felt that it would be best for

him to disappear from Geneva without a trace, leaving all

his personal possessions behind; he assumed that CIA would

exfiltrate him from Switzerland to the United States.

wanted to carry out this plan as soon as possible, but the

CIA officers encouraged him--and NÖSENKO agreed--to remain

in place for at least three weeks more. The reasons given

NOSENKO for this request were:

-The desire to obtain further information on the

local KGB Legal Residency and the Soviet delegation to

the Disarmament Conference while he still had

access;

6001593

320

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

---

## Page 332

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

-The value of having NOSENKO present when GRIBANOV.:

made a visit to Geneva about 7 February, a visit known

to CIA only through NOSENKO;

-The potential value to be derived from NOSENKO's

in-place spotting of CIA recruitment targets among

the

Soviet representation in Geneva;

-The necessity of making arrangements,

acceptable to

NOSENKO, for his defection and resettlement.

In a three-and-a-half hour meeting on 26 January

NOSENKO emphasized that although he agreed that it was

necessary and useful for him to remain in place until

GRIBANOV visited Geneva, he wanted to defect as soon as

possible thereafter.

On 28 January NOSENKO reported that GRIBANOV might not

be coming to Geneva after all, for KGB Chairman SemichastnyY

was apparently reluctant to permit him to travel beyond

Vienna.'

NOSENKO said that he would probably have definite

information on GRIBANOV's trip by the end of the week.

On 30 January NOSENKO said that there appeared to be

little likelihood that GRIBANOV would visit Geneva or Paris.

[From 7 to 10 February 1964 GRIBANOV was in Paris, where he

was seen on the street with a Soviet identified by NOSENKO

as a KGB counterintelligence officer.] Therefore, he wanted

to defect right away.

He cited as reasons the emotional

strain of any further delay and the fact that he and his

case officers were wasting their time working against the

local KGB Legal Residency, which had no worthwhile or

promising targets. He also felt that nothing of value could

be obtained from the Soviet delegation because "Tsarapkin

himself doesn't know what he will say until he is told by

Moscow the day before" CIA handlers, however, delayed the:

defection for one week by obtaining NOSENKO's agreement

to assist

in an audio operation: CIA proposed to install

listening

devices in the offices of the KGB Legal Residency,

and NOSENKO said he would check certain physical aspects

of the delegation buildings.

As the best time for the

defection, he suggested Saturday morning,

8 February,

because he probably would not be missed until the following

0001594

321

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy -

10

---

## Page 333

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMINT - January 1962-January 1964)

Monday. This date was

tentatively scheduled, ard ISFIKO

again repeated his desire simply to 'disappear without a

trace".

He also asked about exfiltration plans.

On 31 January NOSENKO reported the results of his

reconnaissance of the KGB Legal Residency in connection with

the proposed audio operation, which would involve microphone

transmitters operating on a carrier current. He told CIA he

had accidentally overheard in the Residency that the building

used its own batteries and generator, and therefore the

scheme would not work. He repeated his willingness to remain

in place until the arrival of the CHEREPANOV Papers, (see

p. 309) which he was told were en route from lashington.

Bachould

ne axoival

He

explained that he had been alarmed at the previous meeting

because the delegation was supposed to move from its hotel

to a soviet villa outside Geneva; at the villa his disappea-

rance would be noticed more quickly. This move, as he had

now learned has keen postponed pending the arrival

housekeeping officer from Moscow.

of a

At NOSENKO's request on 1 February, it was firmly

agreed that the defection would take place on the morning of

8 February• NOSENKO assumed that exfiltration would le by

automobile

to West Germany and thence by plane to the United

States, and his case officers confirmed his assumption.

On 3 February NOSENKO reviewed the CHERFPANOV materials.

The defection was still scheduled for

Saturday, & February.

NOSENKO telephoned the Geneva safehouse from his hotel

косо а по

room in the early afternoon of 4 February and said: "I want

to come now and not go back." After arriving at the CIA

safehouse he explained that when he dropped by the KGB Legal

Residency following the morning session of the Disarmament

conference, he read a cavle ordering him to return to Moscow

immediately to prepare for a KGB conference on foreian tourism

in the Soviet Union.

The residency was arranging for a

ticket for NOSENKO to fly to Moscow via Paris the following

day and a replacement was being readied to assume NOSENKO'S

duties as security officer for the Soviet delegation in

Geneva.

Before he had left for Geneva in January, NOSENKO

then related, the Soviet Government had been deliberating

the question of expanding foreign tourism in the USSR and had

0001595

322

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy -

---

## Page 334

Top Secret

(SEVELTI DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

agreed to open a number of new cities and tourist itineraries

in this connection.

Semichastnyy had decided that it was

time to call a conference to discuss new

"tactics and

stra-

tegies" for handling the increased number of tourists

expected. Since IOSENKO had been placed in charge of the

entire conference, he was directed to leave at once to

prepare a basic report on the KGB handling of tourists;

the

report would be read to the conference either by himself of

by someone from the leadership of the KGB or the Second Chief

Directorate.

NOSENKO explained that he was the only one

who could do this job as

It: Col. A.G. KOVALENKO, the KGB

Headquarters Department senior officer, was a relatively new

man in this line of operations, having been there only four

or five years, perhaps less. NOSENKO also told CIA that "by

great coincidence" he had learned, just before the cable

arrived, he was being moved to the Soviet villa on the

morning

of 5 February.

He had arranged for a Soviet chauf-

feur to

bring a car

around at 0930 hours the next morning

for the move.

His absence would be noted at that time, and

therefore

"the main thing is to cross the swiss border

before

morning": NOSENKO felt, however, that there would

be considerable confusion among the Soviets in Geneva for

a time following his disappearance, and that there would be

no real concern until the evening.

To foster Soviet

uncertainty, he had left his clothing lying around his hotel

roon and had brought no personal effects to the CIA safe-

house

MOSENKO estimated the first soviet queries to swiss

authorities would probably be made late on 5 February or

early on the oth.

NOSENKO was driven to Frankfurt the night of 4 February

ana remained in a safehouse there until ll February,

when

press publicity about the defection and Soviet demands for

an immediate interview with NOSENKO dictated that he be

wrought to washington as soon as possible. He arrived in

the United States on the evening of 12 Feuruary 1964.

0001596

323

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy .

10

---

## Page 335

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-Januaty 1964)

Knowledge of Other Seventh Department Operations

The notes NOSENKO brought to CIA in Geneva in 1964

reference to thirteen other

KGB

operations conducted against what NOSENKO described as

tourists during the 1962-1963 period. For reasons cited

in the description of these operations in Annex B, these

operations are not material to MOSENKO's claim to

service

in 1962-1963 as cither Chief of the American-British

Commonwealth Section or as Deputy Chief of the Seventh

Department.

0001597

325

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy - 10

---

## Page 336

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARIMENT - January 1962-Jaruary 1964)

Operational Activities: - July 1962-January 1964:

summary

"To substantiate his claims to having served as Deputy

Chief of the Seventh Department during this perica, HOSENKO

describes KGB involvement in the recruitment of (SVINCHANSKIY,06

Ö the arrests of (KOTEN and BARGIOORN, and the investigations

06.of (SLESINGER, OSHALD, and of former KGB officer CHEREPANOV,

shis discovery that SHUBIN was a GRU agent, and his assignment

to Geneva. Even if NOSENKO learned of the operationsas

he descrived and they were as he described (there are substan-

tial reasons why they might have been conducted by KGB

elements other than the Seventh Department), they are atypical

with respect to NOSENKO's own description of Seventh Depart-

ment operations. They do not accurately characterize,

NOSENKO claims, KGB counterintelligence operations against

tourists, and

thus do not substantiate his Seventh Departmerit

service.: NOSENKO'S explanations for his assignment to

Geneva in 1964 are no more plausible than for his earlicr

assignment there in 1962.

NOSENKO has asserted that he was

not a lieutenant colonel as the temporary duty authorization

indicated, but a captain; a rank incongruous with a Deputy

Chief of Department and one from which he presumably would

have been promoted as he

assumed the senior KGB positions

which he claimed to have held.

KGB Counterintelligence Operations

Among

American

Tourists

1962-1963

Because of his position as a Deputy Chief, then First

Deputy Chief of

the Seventh Department, NOSENTO claimed

awareness of what the KGh posture was with respect to

326

Top Secret

0001598

TS No. 197124

Copy -

4/ SR

---

## Page 337

4-00000

tote staress

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

tourist operations, and, specifically, awareness of all

significant KGB operations against American tourists.

Information Furnished the KGB by George BLAKE

The KGB agent' in MI-6, George BLAKE, in 1959 furnished

the KGB with a documentary account of the joint CIA-MI-6

meeting in June of that year, (see p.148) and he was to

furnish other information by which the KGB could keep

sar held in at noon.

current on such hostile operations. Another CIA-MI-6 meeting

was held in Hashington in April 1960, of which a twenty-one

page summary was made.

BLAKE also passed this document as

soon as it came into his possession to the KGB.

KGB Study of American Intelligence Tourist Operations

The lengthy 1961 KGB Top Secret study referred to earlier

(see p.14)) reflects the detailed and accurate information

in possession of the KGB during the period of NOSENKO's

alleged service in the Seventh Department in 1962-1963.

Pertinent portions are quoted as follows:

"It has been established that the Intelligence

organs of the. USA are displaying special activity

in the utilization of legal channels, specifically,

in tourism, for the purpose of conducting subversive

work against the USSR.

Numerous facts indicate that

American tourists and members of various US delega-

tions, in the USSR strive to visit areas and instal-

lations to which employees of the Embassy and mili-

tary attaches have no access, establish oontact with

Soviet citizens, and collect intelligence informa-

tion.

In this regard, the channels of tourism to

the USSR are used

to dispatch experienced intelligence

to develop individual Soviet citizens with

the objective of their eventual recruitment. In

line with the preparation and dispatch of such

the tourists the Americans also make

of persons not directly connected

with American Intelligence organs.

These latter

agents are given one-time assignments such as

collecting information leading to the ideological

development of Soviet citizens.

6001599

327

Top Secret

TS. No. 197124

Copy 10

---

## Page 338

Top Secret:

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT -January 1962-January 1964)

"With the objectives of accomplishing subversive

activities,.a so-called

'Information Center; has

been established in the US with the participation

of the Department of State::

The 'Center' officially

advertises that its purpose is to inform intending

American tourists to the Soviet Union about the

opportunities and restrictions existing there.

Actually, however, the 'Center' is involved in the

ideological preparation of American tourists, whom

it instructs regarding their conduct in the Soviet

Union and the methods to be used there for propag-

andizing the American way of life.

The

'Center'

collects information about the Soviet Union from

returning American

tourists, including the political

attitudes of certain Soviet citizens, their addresses,

etc. The direction of the 'Center' is controlled

by experienced intelligence officers of CIA.

"Candidates for missions to the USSR are selected

carefully. They ordinarily possess knowledge of

the Russian language, know the fundamentals of photo-

graphy, have specific technical training and must

look upon their mission as a responsible assignment

and not as a pleasure trip. American Intelligence

organs prefer to use persons who have previously

visited the UsSR and person having relatives there.

"Once selected, the American tourist agent is

instructed as to his intelligence assignment and

his route, and he is acquainted with the security

conditions in the USSR, including passport controls,

documentation and customs controls, the hazard of

both physical and technical surveillance, as well

as the possibility of provocations and

compromise

making

the agent vulnerable to blackmail.

"Among American Intelligence tourist agent tasks

there are included visual observation and clandestine

photography, the establishment of contact with Soviet

citizens, and spotting among such citizens persons

who may be developed as sources of information.

For.

American Intelligence, any Soviet citizen, regardless

6001660

328

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

---

## Page 339

any toss sedata

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

of his social status or his personal access to important

information, is of interest, because of his ability to

travel to regions of the USSR which are of interest to

American Intelligence.

"American Intelligence tourist agents suspect as KGB

agents Soviet citizens who too openly

express anti-

government sentiments, who volunteer information about

friends or relatives who work in secret establishments,

who accept an invitation for a clandestine meeting but

display an awareness of security principles, who quickly

request aid or assistance in defecting, or who have a

good knowledge of foreign languages."

torange

Citing the increase in foreign tourists in the Soviet

Union from 35,000 in 1959 to over 50,000 in 1960, the docu-

ment instructs

a KGB First Chief Directorate Legal Residen-

cy abroad

"to utilize all its resources to expose among American

tourists persons suspected of belonging to the enemy in-

telligence or counterintelligence organs."

Promising its

assistance, KGB Headquarters instructs the

Legal Residency

"to inform KGB

Headquarters of foreigners temporarily

visiting the USSR

who are of operational interest in the

work against the main enemy (the U.S.]. With this aim,

the Legal Residency should intensify its work against local

services which are using tourism to conduct intelligence

work in the USSR; determine the role played by anti-

Soviet emigre organizations with respect to tourism; ex-

ploit tourist firms which organize tours in the USSR;

with the aim of obtaining information regarding the firms

being exploited by hostile intelligence

services; and

telegraph timely and necessary information to KGB Head-

quarters regarding tourists believed to be of operational

interest, including the individual's surname, name, pat-

ronymic, date of birth, profession, date to arrive in the

USSR, means of travel,

itinerary, description of group

with whom tourist travelling, and any other pertinent

information available to the Legal

Residency about the

0001601

329

TS No. 197124

10

Top Secret

Copy

---

## Page 340

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT- January 1962-January 1964)

tourist. The legal residency is further dirgents to in-

clude where possible among tourists groups

Residency, informing KGB Headquarters in advance of their

presence and advising how the KGB could contact the

agents in the USSR if it should become necessary. Lastly,

the Legal Residency is instructed to provide all possible

aid, including financial assistance, so that persons

favorably disposed to the USSR can visit there, with the

objective of their recruitment in the Soviet Union for the

purpose of exposing enemy intelligence agents

among other

tourists."

NOSENKO's Information

NOSENKO insisted that the operations he described accurate-

ly reflected the extent of KGB counterintelligence operations

among American tourists during his 1962-1963 service in the

Seventh Department:

In response to questions during his in-

terrogation, NOSENKO asserted that the Seventh Department, :

during his absence in 1960-1961, had only noted that "automo-

bile tourism had increased and that American Intelligence had

increased its use of multi-national tourist groups."

He stated

that the Seventh Department received no information during

1960-1961 regarding American Intelligence use of tourism as

cover for espionage,

He was aware, he said, from the damage

survey conducted in the KGB after GOLITSYN's defection, that

American Intelligence had obtained a KGB document on tourist

operations, a document

which had been written in the Seventh

Department.

Comment:

NOSENKO does not know the content of the docu-

ment, which he describes as a statistical sur-

vey similar to the study he himself drafted in

1959 (see p. 146):

0001602

330

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

---

## Page 341

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

KGB Counterintelligence Operations

Among American Tourists: Summary

BLAKE's confession and evidence obtained from internal

KGB documents establish the KGB concern for the threat of

American tourist agent operations and the scope of KGB

actions to thwart that threat. The effect of NOSENKO's

statements is that the KGB did not know of the American

tourist agent program. He averred that the operations he

described accurately depicted the nature of KGB counter-

intelligence operations during the period.

SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - 1962-1964: Summary and Conclusion

According to NOSENKO, in January 1962, at the direction of

General GRIBANOV, he was appointed Chief

of the Seventh De-

partment American-British Commonwealth Section in the expec-

tancy that he soon would be named a Deputy Chief of the Seventh

Departnent. As a Section Chief, he personally handled agents

and supervised all Second Chief Directorate operations against

American and British Commonwealth tourists, of which he de-

scribes four. In this period NOSENKO also

unrelated duty of serving as a security escort officer with a

Soviet delegation travelling to Geneva in which capacity he in-

vestigated a delegate of suspected loyalty, SHAKHOV. While in

Geneva he drew also the assignment of supervising another KGB

case officer's management of the KGB double agent, BELITSKIY.

of three Deputy Chiefs of the entire Seventh Department; in

this position he learned of all KGB operations against Ameri-

can tourists.

In this connection he described five operations,

as well as his accidental discovery of the identity of an

American GRU agent, and tie investigation and search for a

disaffected former

KGB colleague. In July 1963 NOSENKO states

331

Top Secret

0001603

TS No. 197124

Copy

10

---

## Page 342

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

he became First Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department.

Again assigned to escort a delegation to Geneva in January

1964, NOSENKO met CIA representatives again and delivered

notes of KGB operations of

which he had learned since his

last meeting with CIA in 1962. He also presented at this

time a KGB travel document to substantiate his clained rank

of lieutenant colonel. Finally, he announced the receipt of

a telegram recalling nim to Moscow, an event which prompted

CIA to accept his immediate defection.

NOSENKO's claimed date of transfer into the Seventh De-

partment is in dispute because of contradictory claims he made

regarding his Embassy Section activities. He provides no in-

formation sustaining his claim to have become Chief of the

American-British Commonwealth Section; his description of

his functions does not differ materially from that given in

connection with his earlier claimed service in the same sec-

tion, as a case officer, and he describes no administrative

nor supervisory responsibilities. None of his claimed agents,

with one exception, was employed in Seventh Department opera-

tions he described.

Because. of contradictions and the con-

flicts in his varying accounts, neither of the reasons

NOSENKO cites for his assignment to Geneva in 1962 or 1964

is credible. In Geneva, it is implausible that he conducted

the investigation of SHAKHOV as he claims, and he clearly:

did not supervise the management of the double

agent, BELIT-

SKIY.

NOSENKO offers nine "tourist" cases as evidence that he

served in the 1962-1964 period in the Seventh Department, part

of the time as Deputy Chief. These cases, which included two

religious figures, two American Communists, one emigre, one

suspected FBI agent, a First Chief Directorate target who in-

tended to marry a Soviet citizen, a hostage, and a permanent:

resident or former permanent resident of

the Soviet Union, all

have aspects for which KGB elements other than the Seventh

Department may have been

responsible. This fact and the

anomalies of NOSENKO's accounts of the cases aside, however,

the cases are evidence that NOSENKO did serve during the :

period in the Seventh Department, although they are not per-

suasive of his claim to have been Deputy Chief.

seventh be hart

A judgment of

that latter claim must

rest primarily on an appraisal of other

0001604

332

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

---

## Page 343

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964

aspects of his statements, including those relating to his

supervisory duties and to the nature of Second Chief Direc-

torate operations against American and other foreign tourists.

NOSENKO has retracted his assertion that he was a lieuten-

ant colonel, a rank appropriate for a Second Chief Directorate

Deputy Chief of department, and asserts that he was never

promoted beyond the rank of captain.

Most damaging to NOSENKO's claims that he was a supervisor

in the Seventh Department is his assertion that he accurately

describes KGB counterintelligence operations against foreign,

particularly American, tourists.

A senior Seventi Department

officer would be aware of the Second Chief Directorate's pre-

occupation with American tourists: If NOSENKO is unaware of

the extent of KGB activities in connection with American

tourists, he was not a Section Chief of Deputy Chief of the

Seventh Department.

conclusion

NOSENKO's claims, that in 1962 he was Chief of the

American-British Commonwealth Section and was thereafter a

Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, are not credible.

0001605

333

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

10

---

## Page 344

Top Secret

CHAPTER IX

OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSE!IKO'S KGB SERVICE

Most of NOSENKO's assertions can be examined in a chrono-

logical fashion, as has been done in the proceding sections.

Some can most easily be examined separately, since they

relate not to any particular period of his KGB service nor

to any specific position he claimed he occupied, but to his

entire KGB career.

The principal aspects in this category

of claims are those he made about his relationship with

Second Chief Directorate General GRIBANOV, his Party status,

his knowledge of certain KGB forms and procedures, his

sourcing of KGB operations, awards he earned for KGB service,

and his KGB rank.

Relationship with General GRIBANOV

From his first meeting with CIA in 1962, NOSENKO main-

tained that he had a close personal and professional rela-

tionship with Major General GRIBANOV, Chief of the Second

Chief Directorate.

NOSENKO described recruitment approaches

in which he and GRIBANOV took part together, conversations

they had

on operational matters, the role which GRIBANOV

played in his promotions, awards and assignments, and their

after hours carrousing.

According to NOSENKO, GRIBAITOV was

wholly responsible, against NOSINKO's wishes, for his

appointment to the

position of Deputy Chief of the American

Department Emuassy

Section in 1960, and when NOSENKO later

rejected GRIBANOV's offer to make him Chief of the entire

American Department, it was GRIBANOV who arranged his return

to the Seventh Department as Chief of the American-British

Commonwealth Section and who shortly thereafter appointed

him a Deputy Chief and thereafter First Deputy Chief of the

Seventh Department.

0001606

335

Top Secret

TS No. 187124.

10

Copy -

---

## Page 345

Top Secret

(OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S

KGB CAREER)

NOSENKO'S Information - Post 1964

Immediately following his defection NOSENKO continued to

refer to this special and personal relationship, which

touched on nearly every aspect of NOSENKO'S KGB service.

Under interrogation, however, NOSENKO could not sustain

this claim. The extent NOSENKO's statements were retracted

or contradicted with respect to GRIBANOV or contradicted by

other evidence, is seen

from the following examples excerpted

from the earlier chronological examination:

GRIBANOV wrote

the very best fitness report on NOSENKO that could be given

(Retracted.

GRIBANOV wrote none of NOSENKO's fitness

reports) ; NOSENKO and GRIBANOV carroused together with women

provided

by NOSENKO

(Retracted. NOSENKO recalled only two

occasions, and could relate only one in any detail.);

recruited

Edward SMITH (see p. 37) together with NOSENKO

(Retracted. NOSENKO played no active role in SMITH recruit-

ment attempt and was not in Embassy Section at time.);

NOSENKO accompanied GRIBANOV to diplomatic receptions in

1961

at. which the latter learned that Trench Ambassador 06

DeJean was GRIBANOV's agent (Retracted.

NOSINKO accompanied

336

Top Secret

0001607

TS No. 197124

Copy

---

## Page 346

Top Secret

(OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER)

16

GRIBANOV on only one such occasion and learned from "friends"

in 1958-1959 about DeJean) ; GRIBANOV put NOSENKO in Embassy

Section in 1960 as Deputy Chief to supervise code clerk

operations (Contradicted. NOSENKO was not Deputy Chief and

did not

supervise code clerk operations); GRIBANOV approved

NOSENKO's operational plan for MORONE's recruitment (Retracted.06

The plan was written by another KGB ófficer.) ; GRIBANOV

ordered NOSENKO to prepare study on foreign intelligence

services use of tourism (Contradicted. NOSENKO could recall

no details of the study nor whether he ever discussed it

with GRIBANOV.) ¡ GRIBANOV promised to promote NOSENKO directly

to lieutenant colonel from the rank of captain and (subse-

quently) personally congratulated him on his promotion to

lieutenant colonel (Retracted.

NOSENKO never was promoted

past the rank of captain.); GRIBANOV was instrumental in

NOSENKO's receiving personal commendations from the KGB

Chairman, the

Orders of the Red Banner, the Red Star, and

the Order of Lenin (Retracted.

NOSENKO received no such

awards.); GRIBANOV ordered NOSENKO: to Geneva in 1962

(Retiacted. NOSENIO went at the request of the Soviet

Delegations Abroad Department.); GRIBANOV ordered NOSENKO

to assume charge of the BELITSKIY case (Contradicted.

NOSENKO did not supervise the BELITSKIY case.) ; GRIBANOV

allowed NOSENKO to go to Geneva in 1964, "as a personal

favor" (Retracted. GRIBANOV was not aware that NOSENKO

was to return to Geneva a second time.): and finally.

GRIBANOV was NOSENKO's patron (Retracted. Their relation-

ship was no closer than

their relative rank and position

indicated.)

Conclusion

NOSENKO's contradictions and retractions with respect to

his claimed relationship with GRIBANOV discredit his single

and most important unretracted claim, that NOSENKO, on

GRIBANOV's appointment was Deputy Chief of the Seventh

Department.

0001608

337

Top Secret

21BR

TS No. 197124

Copy

10

---

## Page 347

Top Secret

(OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S. KGB CAREER)

Communist Party Status

In addition to other stringent requirements, candidates

for the KGB must normally be Communist Party or Komsomol

members.

The significance of NOSENKO's statements about

his Party status is the extent to which they are consistent

with what is known about Party activity in the KGR, and

consistent with NOSENKO's account of his KGB career.

NOSENKO said his formal participation in Communist Party

activities began in late 1943 or early 1944 when he joined

the Komsomol at the Naval Preparatory in Baku. The step

was a casual one, he said, and he took it without much

thought, mainly because all of his friends were joining.

He continued his pro forma membership in the Komsomol while

in the Naval RU; and when he "transferred"

to the KGB in

spring 1953, he transferred routinely to the KGB Komsomol

organization from his Naval RU Komsomol unit in the Baltic.

He was registered with the KGB Komsomol, he said, without

referring the matter to his former Baltic Komsomol

unit.

Comment:

According to knowledgeable KGB defectors,

member's acceptance in another Komsomol unit

is contingent upon the endorsement of the

individual's former unit; NOSENKO's acceptance

by the KGB Komsomol without referring the

matter to his Komsomol unit in the Baltic "is

impossible"

In the fall of 1953 NOSENKO claims he was elected

secretary of the Second Chief Directorate Komsomol organi-

zation:

He was elected, he said, at a meeting of the

Komsomol membership.

6001669

338

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

---

## Page 348

4-00000

Top Secret

(OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER)

Comment: The Komsomol membership elects only the

Komsomol Committee.

The latter elects

the

secretary.

NOSENKO cannot describe the duties of a Komsomol secre-

tary in any specific manner. He does not know who was the

secretary of the KGB Komsomol organization, nor could he

describe his dealings with that official's office.

Comment:

The secretary of the Second Chief Directorate

Komsomol organization is directly subordinate

to the KGB Komsomol secretary and would have

occasion to deal with the latter frequently.

NOSENKO stated that he did not know whether there was

Komsomol Congress while he was Komsomol secretary of the

Second Chief Directorate, but that the Congresses were

ordinarily held yearly.

Comment:

The first Komsomol Congress since 1948 was

held in March 1954, entailing considerable

work by every Komsomol member and especially

by the unit secretaries.

As Komsomol secretary, NOSENKO collected the dues of the

members of his unit:

All members paid in the amount of two

percent of their monthlÿ salaries.

0001610

339

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

10

---

## Page 349

Top Secret

(OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKÓ'S KGB CAREER)

Comment:

Komsomol dues were calculated on a sliding

scale in which members earning 500 rubles

monthly paid .5 percent, those earning 500

1500 rubles paid one percent, and those

earning over 1500 rubles paid 1.5 percent.

NOSENKO insisted that in 1953-1954 the maximum age for a

Komsomol member was 26 years of age, and that he was a

member until he became overage in October 1954, and that no

special privilege was extended to him.

Comment:

According to Komsomol statutes at the time,

the maximum age was twenty-five, a fact which

would be known by a person who served as a

Komsomol

secretary at the time.

NOSENKO would

have thus been excluded from the Komsomol when

he became overage in 1953, not in 1954 as

he

claimed.

The March 1954 Komsomol Congress retained

the 25 year age limit, but provided for two-

year extensions in certain cases. Because of

age at the time, and because of his claimed

position

as. Komsomol secretary: the matter

would have been of vital interest to NOSENKO

if the facts he related were true.

From the time he was dropped from the Komsomol because

of age, until he was accepted as a candidate member of the

Communist Party in January 1956, NOSENKO claimed that he

was the only officer in the KGB who was a member of neither

organization:

0001611

340

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

---

## Page 350

4-00000

Top Secret

(OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER)

Comment: NOSENKO is the only soviet official known to

CIA who claims to have occupied a position of

trust and who claims he was not a Party member

at the time..

In the period following, "to show his eagerness" ánd "to

improve himself", NOSENKO asked for Party assignments.

For

more than a year he ran errands and collected newspapers and

performed other such tasks.

He stated that he applied for

Party membership in January 1956, was accepted as a candidate

member in 1956, and that he was

member in 1957.

accepted as a full Party

Conclusion

NOSENKO's claims about his Party activity do not sustain

his claims to KGB service, and they suffer from identical.

discrepancies with respect to chronology, plausibility,

and contradiction by independent sources.

It is concluded

that NOSENKO was never a Komsomol secretary and, if a member

at all;

was no longer a member after reaching his

twenty-

sixth

birthday in October 1953.

The period in which he had

no Party status was twenty-eight months, not the fifteen he

in tiat sevenen

An officer unqualified for Party

membership is ineligible for:KGB service.

Consequently

the

vidence provided by examination of NOSENKO's Party statu:

indicates that he was not serving in the KGb through at

least a portion of the 1953-1956

period.

0001612

341

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

10

---

## Page 351

Top Secret

(OTHER ASPECTS: OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER)

Knowledge Of Certain KGB Forms and Procedures

In the course of his various interrogations, NOSENKO had

occasion to comment generally on various KGB forms and

procedures.

Interrogation on these points, however, developed

that while he was generally familiar with various aspects

unexpectedly there were some of which he was ignorant.. Some

of these topics are described on page

in connection with

his KGB entry, and others which are described below.

KGB Forms

NOSENKO was familiar with the anketa, the KGB Personal

History: Statement, including its appearance, the nature

of

the questions included, and the purpose of the document.

However, he maintained

that it was reguired to be completed

in two copies, that it could be completed outside of KGB

premises, and

that it consisted of four to six pages.

Comment:

The anketa is a detailed, sixteen page question-

naire.

As a sensitive document, it is not taken

from KGB premises.

Defectors'

describe its

completion as

"an experience not soon to be

forgotten".

If NOSENKO was a supervisor as he

claimed, he would recall the form from reviewing

personnel files in which the anketa is a.

prominent basic document.

NOSENKO maintained that he had never heard of the Communist

Party Questionnaire, (Lichny Listok po Uchetu Kadrov) • Shown

an exemplar, NOSENKO

stated that he had seen it in personnel

files, but had never himself filled one out.

Asked in whose

personnel files he had seen the document, NOSENKO first said

those of civilians: (interpreters, etc), and finally expressed

his belief that the KGB did not use the document.

0001613

342

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

---

## Page 352

Top Secret

(OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER)

Comment: The form is completed by every KG officer, and

while it is not of critical importance to the

KGB itself, a copy is filed in every officer's

personnel file, a fact known to any Komsomol

secretary or supervisor responsible for reviewing

KGB personnel files.

NOSENKO was unfamiliar with the name of the KGB personnel

action form, and said he did not know of it. When its purpose

was described to him, he gave a superficial description of

its content.

Comment: A senior KGB officer would be familiar with the

form, which he would see on every occasion in

which one of his subordinates was promoted or

transferred.

NOSENKO was familiar with the Employment and Service

Record (Posluzhnoy Spisok), but he claimed he filled it out

only in "1958 or 1957".

Comment: The Employment and Service Record is completed

of 1958, NOSENED With theing that he completed

only four or five years after entering the

KGB:

0001614

343

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy 10

---

## Page 353

Top Secret

(OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER)

Visitor's Pass Procedures

NOSENKO has described procedures entailed in a non-KGB

visitor's gaining access to a KGB installation, but he

maintained that the interviewer's name did not appear on, the

visitor's pass.

(See p. 70.).

Comment:

The interviewer's name does appear on the pass!

a fact which a

senior officer of more than a

decade's KGB Headquarters service would recall,

since he would have frequent occasion

to admit

visitors to KGB buildings.

Name Checks of KGB Central Files

NOSENKO on many occasions claimed that in connection with

his direction

of an operation he personally performed the

check of the targct's name against KGB files. Prominent

among these cases were BURGI] (see p.115). and ABIDIAN (p•205):

06

Comment:

NOSENKO could not describe specifically how he

performed the name checks he claimed, and his

description contained numerous errors of fact.

Among these were assertions that the Militia

retained court records of all Soviet citizens,

and that the First Special Department holds its

criminal index

separate from political and

security card indices.

NOSENKO was unfamiliar

with the KGB term spetsproverka, meaning a

clearance check.:

Despite NOSENKO's claim that

he performed name checks of American Embassy

personnel, he pleaded ignorance of any aspect

of the files held by the First Chief Directo-

rate, where any. KGB

kept.

recora on foreigners is

0001615

344

Top Secret

VIBR

IS No. 197124

Copy

---

## Page 354

Top Secret

(OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER)

Conclusion

NOSENKO's ignorance of the foregoing forms and procedures:

s evidence that he did not occupy the position nor perfor

he functions he claimed during his alleged KGB service

Awards and Decorations

Since 1964 NOSENKO has claimed to have received various

awards, commendations, and decorations for his KGR service.

His

assertions are material to any judgment of his general

credibility and, as

are mate:

well of the validity of his claims to

having occupied various KGB positions.

In January 1964 NOSINKO mentioned that in 1962, shortly

after meeting with CIA in Geneva, he received the Order of

Lenin for ideas which he developed to "enlarge the experience

and improve the quality" of Second Chief Directorate per-

sonnel in Moscow.

In the April 1964 interrogations NOSENKO was asked about

his awards, and he first said he received the Order of the

Red Banner, then corrected himself to say he received

first

the Order of the

Red Star.

He confirmed that he received

the Order of Lenin, in 1963.

[Earlier he had said 1962,

"just following visiting Geneva"

•] He claimed he received

the Order of Lenin for his performance in his Seventh

Department assignment, but when he was

asked what recruit-

ments justified his receipt of the award, he said the main

task of the Seventh Department was not to make recruitments,

but to counter the hostile intelligence service operations.

[For his contradictory statements regarding the Seventh

Department's mission, see pages 103 and 326 .] The Order

of Lenin was the highest decoration for which a KGB officer

is eligible, NOSENKO said, and besides himself, the Chief

and former Chief of the Seventh Department received it.

NOSENKO said he received in 1962 the Order of the Red Star,

he "thought" for his service in the Embassy Section in 1960-

1961, not for Seventh Department service; no explanation

accompanied that decoration.

6001616

345

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy- 10

---

## Page 355

Top Secret

(OTIIER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER)

The question of NOSENKO's awards, orders and decorations

were of some interest to the interrogators since they might

reflect the importance the KGB attached to particular

operational activities in which NOSENKO engaged.

However,

before the April 1964 interrogations were suspended, NOSENKO

retracted his claim. that he received the Order of Lenin,

saying that it was just an idle boast. GRIBANOV; NOSENKO

explained, had promised in 1963 that NOSENKO, CHELNOKOV,

and KOVALENKO would receive the. Order of Lenin "for creating

the Central Operational Communications System of the Second

Chief Directorate" within the Seventh Department, but the

award had not materialized before NOSENKO left for Geneva in

January 1964.

Comment:

Earlier NOSENKO claimed he received the Order

for ideas he developed "to enlarge the experi-

ence and improve the quality of Second Chiéf:

Directorate personnel". Questioned, NOSENKO

reverted to the earlier claim.

In the April 1964 interrogations NOSENKO was asked

to

list the dates, reasons, and types of awards, decorations,

and bonuses he had received in his KGB career.

He replied

that he received nothing from 1953 until 1956, when he

received a commendation and one month's pay for the recruit-

06

ment of BURGI [see p.115l by order of the KGB Chairman Serov •

GRIBANOV informed him of the commendation, NOSENKO said, and

NOSENKO saw his name on the list of recipients which was

circulated. No written certificate accompanied the commen-

dation, according to NOSENKO, but personnel recorded the

event in each KGB recipient's personnel file. Almost every

year after 1956, NOSENKO stated, he received something,

"perhaps on the KGB anniversary, or May Day; or Army Day"

In 1957 or 1958, NOSENKO did not recall exactly, he received

soviet AngERIANO pay pete a were the prese

deputy, PERFILYEV, made the presen-

tation at an assembly of officers

in the KGB Headguarters

auditorium. NOSENKO said he received in 1959 a second

commendation and one month's pay from KGB Chairman Shelepin

IIBR

0001617

346

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

---

## Page 356

Top Secret

(OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CARFER)

06

for "several recruitments, including Americans MERTENS, DREW,

FRIPPEL," and three British citizens whose names he could

not recall. Along with a large group of KGB officers, NOSENKO

received a commendation from GRIBANOV in 1960, he said,

"for

good work in general".

He received in 1961 the Order of the

Red Star, he statel, with a group of Second Chief Directorate

case officers "for general good work"; IVASHUTIN made the

presentation, which included a medal and a certificate which

the officer may retain.

Comment: A week later, NOSENKO said that he received this

award in December 1962.

He said he recalled

that the presentation was planned for the KGB

Anniversary on 20 December, but the presentation

was delayed and not made until the end

of the

month.

In 1962, NOSENKO claimed, he received another commendation

from GRIBANOV for "general good worl:", and he also received

the Unblemished Service Award for ten

years' service.

Comment: At this juncture his interrogators reminded

NOSENKO that his most recently claimed date

of entry to the KGB was March 1953, and that

in 1962 he would only have had nine years'

service. NOSENKO said that he could not under-

stand why, but he was certain he recéived the

service award after his return from Geneva in

1962.: (The date is consistent with NOSENKO's

earlier retracted claim that he entered the

KGB in 1952.)

The following day NOSENKO

announced that he recalled why he received the

medal in 1962 rather than in 1963; the medal

was awarded to servicemen as well

as to KGB

officers, and prior military service is taken

into account in computing KGB officers' time

347

Top Secret

S/BR

0001618

TS No. 197124

Copy 10

---

## Page 357

PS O

Top Secret

(OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER)

Comment:

(Continued)

in service. NOSENKO entered the Naval RU in

1950, he said, and should have received the

medal in 1960, but did not because of some

administrative mixup.

(See p.56 for NOSENKO'S

eventual claim that he entered the RU in 1951.)

In 1963, NOSENKO said, he received another commendation from

inspiring the Seventh Department' on 20 December 1963, the

KG, anniversary.

NOSENKO said because he left for Geneva,

he did not actually receive the medal. (NOSENKO arrived

in Geneva on

19 January 1964.]

Interrogated in August 1965 regarding his claim to having

received a commendation from KGB Chairman Shelepin for his

recruitment of the three Americans and three British citizens

in 1959, NOSENKO said that he was nominated for the Order

of the Red Banner for these successful recruitments, but he

did not

receive it, probably because he transferred to the

American Embassy Section at that time:

Comment

NOSENKO apparently is referring to the KGB

practice of conferring decorations on KGB

anniversary, 20 December. NOSENKO claims he

transferred

to the Embassy Section in January.

When NOSENKO.'s claims to various KGB awards was reviewed

with him during the October 1966 interrogations, he said

that during his KGB service he had received only the Red

Army anniversary medal and an award for satisfactory comple-

tion of ten years! service, and that he had received no KGB

award, decoration, or commendation for his operational work.

0001619

348

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy -

---

## Page 358

14-00000

Top Secret

(OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER)

Conclusion

NOSENKO's claims to having been the recipient of various

awards for KGB service are inextricably linked with his

claimed operational

successes,

his rank, and GRIBANOV's

patronage, on all of which topics he had made virtually

categoric retractions.

NOSENKO'S Sourcing

NOSENKO cited four general sources for KGB operations he

has related, and in all four there have been inconsistencies,

contradictions, and retractions.

Three of these categories,

each with an example typifying the difficulty of judging the

O6 MONSoo Man a personal participation In.E.

p. 268) cases learned in the course of specific

Obofficial duties (SHUBIN, p. 296), and information obtained

informally from KGB colleagues (Sgt. Robert Lee JOHNSON,

p.24 ).

The fourth category of sourcing relates to the

notes of KGB operations which he brought to CIA in Geneva

in 1964.

Regarding the notes, NOSENKO said he collected them at

various opportunities

in order to bring them to CIA.

He

kept them in a

wall safe in the: office which he occupied as

Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department.

[In this connection,

NOSENKO admitted that not all offices had such wall safes,

and not all offices of Deputy Chiefs of Departments, but

asserted that his did.]

Most of the notes are in NOSENKO'S

handwriting:

Those that are not include the only copy of a

typed top secret summary report from one of the Seventh

Department section chiefs, a similar handwritten report by

another Seventh Department officer, and a carbon copy of a

KGB document which summarized the recruitment of an| Austrian l|

businessman.

NOSENIO said he copied the date for the

remaining notes from such sources as the "Special File",

ospiro marized

which was held ordinarily by the Seventh Department Chief.

According to NOSENKO, he obtained access

to it for various

0001620

349

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy 10.

3/BR

---

## Page 359

Top Secret

(OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER)

reasons from time to time.

The "Special File" contained no

true names, however, and NOSFNKO said he obtained such true

names as were included in his notes by asking various case

officers for them. Questioned on case after case which

appeared in his notes, NOSENKO insisted that he had written

everything he could learn, and could add nothing more.

Conclusion:

NOSENKO's sourcing for many of the events he has related

is not credible.

NÖSENKO 's KGB Rank

When he first met with CIA in Geneva in 1962, NOSENKO

identified himself as a KGB officer holding the

rank of

major. He said at that time that he had served the requisite

time in grade and expected to be promoted shortly to the

rank of lieutenant

colonel

On defecting in 1964 NOSENKO

said that he was a lieutenant colonel.

In the course of his

career as he initially described it, his military rank

pro-

motions

had generally parallelied his assumption of

successively greater supervisory responsibilities, culminating

in his becoming Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department.

Under interrogation, however, questioning about his rank

has evoked a series of inconsistent and contradictory state-

ments leading to his eventual assertion

that he had never

advanced beyond the rank of captain.

The matter of NoSENko's

statements about his rank is significant with respect. to his

general credibility, to the fact that he brought to Geneva

in 1964 a KGB document identifying him as a lieutenant

colonel, and to the paradox that as a company grade officer

he held supervisory positions in which KGB officers of

significantly senior rank were his subordinates.

0001621

350

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

---

## Page 360

Top Secret

(OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER)

In June 1962 NOSENKO volunteered that he was then a major,

but that he would soon be promoted to lieutenant colonel.

In 1964, in Frankfurt awaiting transportation to the

United States, NOSENKO reviewed and approved a biographic

statement which included the claim that he had been a senior

lieutenant in the American Embassy Section from 1952 (sic)

until 1955, that he was promoted to captain in 1956, to major

in 1959, and to lieutenant colonel in November 1963.

In the April 1964 interrogations NOSENKO claimed that

at the end of 1953 or the beginning of 1954 [not in 1952]

he was promoted to the rank of senior lieutenant. When it

was taken into consideration.

Asked in June 1964 to list his promotions, chronologically.

NOSENKO asserted that he became a senior lieutenant in 1953,

in 1956 a captain, in 1959 a major and, in October lin

Geneva, just afterwards, he said November] 1963, he was

advised

by Personnel that he had been promoted to lieutenant

colonel

and afterwards was personally congratulated by

General GRIBANOV. NOSENKO did not recall the month of his

earlier promotions.

Comment: KGB defectors have commented that it would be

unusual for a KGB officer not to recall his

date of rank, from which he computes his

seniority and time in grade towards his next

promotion.

In January 1965, while discussing his role as case officer

for Embassy Security Officer John ABIDIAN, NOSENKO volun-

teered out of context that he had never been a major nor was

he promoted to captain in 1956, as he had claimed earlier:

He explained that he became eligible for captain in 1956,

but his promotion was withheld as punishment because he had

obtained treatment for a venereal disease under an alias,

0001622

351

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy 10

---

## Page 361

Top Secret

•(OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER)

with

the use of KGB operational documents.

He stated that

thus he was a senior lieutenant still in 1959, and although

GRIBANOV had promised him that he would be promoted directly

to major at that time, an administrative error was made in

the personnel office, and he was just promoted to captain.

Instead of rectifying

the mistake, NOSENKO said, GRIBANOV

persuaded him to remain a captain until (if a major) in 1963

he became eligible for promotion to lieutenant colonel.

In October 1963, he concluded, he was promoted directly to

the rank of lieutenant colonel; he was never a major, and

he had served as senior lieutenant. from 1953 to 1959, and

a captain from 1959 to 1963.

Comment®

According to this chronology, NOSENKO was merely

a captain when he claimed to have been Deputy

Chief of the American Embassy Section, and

still a captain for much of the time that he

was Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department.

In August 1965 interrogations NOSENKO still claimed that

he was proposed for advancement to captain in 1956, but he:

stated that he was not promoted because of shortcomings in

his work. [He earlier had claimed he was

being punished

for misuse of operational documents.]

In response to his

interrogator's question, NOSENKO, replied that he had claimed

earlier in 1962 and 1964 to have been a major because he

thought the truth would not have been believed.

In a voluntary statement written in April 1966, NOSENKO

alleged that he had been promoted to the rank of senior

lieutenant in 1956 [he earlier. claimed 19531, to captain in

December 1959 [he could not previously remember the monthl

and

that at the end of 1963 he was recommended for the rank

of major. Continuing, NOSENKO said he had never held the

rank of lieutenant

nought to been me cadate grave anders which hant

colonel, was filled out erroneously.

6001623

352

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

---

## Page 362

42 622: 204530613290: 29 0286: 22362638023

Top Secret

(OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER)

NOSENKO said in October 1966 interrogations that he had

lied when he had claimed in 1964 to be a lieutenant colonel,

that actually he had been but a captain.

Asked why he had

claimed in 1962 that he had been a major, NOSENKO denied

that he had ever even mentioned his rank

to CIA in 1962.

insistorie

Conclusion

NOSENKO has stated that he became a senior lieutenant in

the KGB in 1952, April 1953, 1954, or 1956.

He was promoted

to the rank of captain in 1956 or September/October/December

1959; a major in December 1958 or 1959; and a lieutenant .

colonel in October/November 1963. He brought to Geneva in

1964, an official KGB document dated November 1963 identifying

him as a KGB lieutenant colonel. In retracting his claim

that he was ever a major or lieutenant colonel, NOSENKO

asserts that nevertheless as a captain, he held the position

of First Deputy Chief of

NOSENKO's contradictions and retractions with respect to

his KGB rank parallel and are apparently related to his

contradicted and retracted claims regarding Naval RU

service, date of entry to the KGB, KGB assignments and

do, and T

positions held; and in short, to the totality of his claims

regarding KGB service, few of which are credible.

353

Top Secret

0001624

TS No. 197124

Copy 1.0

---

## Page 363

Top Secret

CHAPTER X

PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PSYCHIATRIC ASSESSMENT

Because of the incidence of deranged persons CIA has

encountered among many would-be defectors, the question of

NOSENKO's mental stability was a matter considered early

after his defection in Geneva.

From the time of his arrival

in the United States he has been under psychiatric observa-

tion. In addition, he has undergone psychological examina-

tion. The CIA psychiatrist and psychologist, besides being

highly-qualified professionals, have both had extensive

experience with Soviet Bloc defectors. Their findings were

reached independently.

Psychological Examination

In April 1964 NOSENKO was administered a series óf

psychological tests by the CIA psychologist.

After monitoring

numerous interrogation sessions, the psychologist interviewed

NOSENKO for fourteen days during 3-21 April 1965, in an

attempt to develop sufficient insight into NOSENKO's persona-

lity to permit the obtaining of a truthful account of his

life.

Findings

NOSENKO is a rationalizer, a distorter, and an evasive

person clearly capable of dissemvling for personal reasons.

He is not a compulsive liar.. He

is inclined to relate what

he thinks he is expected to say rather than to tell the

truth as he knows it. He lies by design as well as for

effect, however, and

he does not always embroider just to

bolster his ego. He is neither "insane" nor psychotic, and

he suffers from no "delusions". NOSENKO's rationalizations

are not the product of derangement.

0001625

355

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy 10

---

## Page 364

Top Secret

(PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PSYCHIATRIC ASSESSMENT)

Psychiatric Examination

Since April 1964 NOSENKO has been under the observation

of the CIA psychiatrist.

Besides monitoring many of the

interrogation sessions,

the psychiatrist has visited NOSENKO

weekly for the first year, monthly until 1967, and at some-

what less frequent intervals

since.

Findings

NOSENKO is neither psychotic nor neurotic. Of above

average intelligence, he is shrewd, perceptive,

adaptable. His memory is not defective. Besides suffering

from ordinary lapses of memory, however, he sometimes

falsely claims lack of recall. NOSENKO's thought processes

are unimpaired; he is rational and fully capable of distin-

guishing fact from fiction.

PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PSYCHIATRIC ASSESSMENT: Conclusion

The findings of the psychologist and psychiatrist dispel

the notion that NOSENKO's behavior and his statements are

other than willful.

0001626

356

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy —

---

## Page 365

"є ві

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

CONCERNING NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES

NOSENKO claims that he served for a decade in the KGB in

successively senior positions of authority from

which he

derived extensive knowledge of the scope, character, and

results of KGB operations against Americans in the Soviet

Union in the period. 1953-1963.

he provides an impressive array of information about KGB

personnel, organization and operations which, to the extent

that it has been confirmed, is presumptive evidence of his

bona fides. Various Soviet officials, including intelli-

gence officers, have generally corroborated NOSENKO's

claims.

The examination has compared each element of NOSENKO's

biography relevant to his claimed KGB service with known

facts and reasonable surmise.

The examination reflects

the test to which

his accounts

were put:

whether his

accounts are internally coherent and

consistent with known

fact, and whether he actually gained the information he has

from occupying the KGB positions he claims to have held.

In short, is he what he says he is, according to his own

accounts?

0001627

357

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

10

---

## Page 366

Top Secret

(SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS)

This examination had led to the following findings,

arrived at independently:

-NOSENKO did not serve in the Naval RU in any of the

capacities or at the places and times he claimed.

-NOSENKO did not enter the KGB in the manner or at

the time he claimed.

-NOSENKO did not serve in the American Embassy Section

throughout the 1953-1955 period as he claimed.

-During the period 1955-1960, he was neither a senior

case officer in, nor Deputy Chief of, the Seventh Depart-

ment American-British Commonwealth Section.

-NOSENKO was neither Deputy Chief of the American

Embassy Section nor

a senior officer or supervisor in

the Section during the period 1961-1962.

-NOSENKO's claims, that in 1962 he was Chief of the

American-British Commonwealth Section and was thereafter

a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, are not credible.

-NOSENKO has no. valid. claim to certainty that the KGB

recruited no American Embassy personnel between 1953 and

his defection in 1964.

These findings differ somewhat with respect to degree of

probability or certitude, but they reflect the preponderance

of available evidence in

each instance.

The above judgments, if correct, rebut presumptive

evidence of NOSENKO's bona fides.

The contradictions in

NOSENKO's accounts of his life and KGB service are so

extensive as to make his claims as a whole unacceptable.

While truth and fact in this case frequently cannot be

established with certainty, it is evident that truth and

fact are not what NOSENKO relates.

By almost any test,

virtually any of NOSENKO's above claims are impugned by

fact or probability, or contradicted or retracted in his own

statements. NOSENKO is not what he claims to be, and

thus

he is not a bona fide defector.

358

Top Secret

6001628

TS No. 197124

Copy

---

## Page 367

Top Secret

(SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS)

Given the conclusion that NOSENKO is not a bona fide

defector, it is necessary to attempt to determine his true

motives for contacting American Intelligence and for

providing the information he has given.

Here, it must be

recognized that the evidence, largely consisting of NOSENKO's

own assertions, does not permit unequivocal conclusions:

Nevertheless, the question cannot be ignored.

The character

of the information NOSENKO has conveyed, the fact that some

of his false claims have been corroborated by Soviet offi-

cials, and the necessity to make decisions about NOSENKO's

future all require that at least a provisional judament be

made.

Of the reasonable explanations advanced for NOSENKO's

misrepresentations, the chief ones are that he is a

swindler posing as a former KGB officer for reasons of

personal advantage;

that he suffers from a deranged person-

ality or unbalanced mind; that he has greatly exaggerated

his actual rank, status and access in the KGB, for simply

personal reasons; Of, finally, that he is a dispatched KGB

agent.

The first two possibilities are easily dismissed. That

NOSENKO is not

simply a swindder who falsely claims for

personal advantage to have been a KGB officer is evident;

we believe, from the confirmed details of KGB organization,

personnel and operations which he has provided and which

could only derive from within the KGB itself.

Second, as noted in the text, extensive psychiatric and

psychological examination by qualified specialists rule out

the possibility that NOSENKO's actions and testimony are the

product of a deranged personality or unbalanced mind.

It is somewhat more plausible that NOSENKO is a KGB

officer who served in at least some

of the components for

some or all of the

time periods that he claims, but who

greatly exaggerated his positions, rank and access to infor-

mation, and invented some matters outright, to achieve

greater status with American Intelligence.

This explanation,

however, fails to accommodate the fact that several KGB

officers have asserted that NOSENKO did in fact hold senior

359

Top Secret

0001629

TS. No. 197124

Copy. -

10

---

## Page 368

Top Secret

(SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS)

positions in the KGB. Also, NOSENKO's assertions with

respect to his rank, GRIBANOV's patronage, the recall

telegram, and the like, cannot be just a product of his own

invention, since these

were the subject of comment by other

sources.

Because none' of the above explanations is consistent with

the data developed in interrogations and investigations, we

are left with the hypothesis that NOSENKO was dispatched by

the KGB. While this explanation does not reconcile all the

anomalies, none of them renders it untenable.

In the absence of further revelations by NOSENKO, Or

other persuasive evidence to the contrary, CIA finds that

the evidence establishes a presumption that NOSENKO was

dispatched by the KGB, and believes that prudence requires

that he be regarded as still responsive to KGB control, and

that his information should be assessed accordingly.

6001630

968

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

---

## Page 369

Top Secret

Annex B

Summaries of Cases Not Examined in Text

There follow NOSENKO's descriptions of KGB operations

involving Americans which do not clearly relate to specific:

KGB positions he held at particular times and which thus

could not be usefully employed in examining his claimed KGB

service.: The cases include, for example, Seventh Department

operations of which he said he learned while serving in the

American Department, and vice versa, as well as operations

conducted by KGB elements other than the Second. Chief Direct-

orate.

Unless otherwise specified, each entry reflects all

of the information NOSENKO provided;

06

ACTOR PROCTOR

NOSENKO's Information

: 06.

An American known as

ACTOR Or PROCTOR is a valuable

First Chief Directorate agent who travelled overtly to

Western Europe and there obtained other documents with

which to continue clandestinely to the USSR:

Comment:

The lead may refer to one Vernon w. PROCIOR,

who

visited the Soviet Union in the summer

DOSENKO information was limited to that

The investigation is not complete:

contained in notes he brought to Geneva in

1964

0001631

399

Top Secret

TS: No. 197124

Copy :..

10

3/BR

---

## Page 370

Top Secret

(Annex B)

ALBINGER, Donald

NOSENKO's Information

TALBINGER,

an American citizen born in 1937, visited the

USSR in 1963 and there was the target of a KGB investigation

in sochi because he was believed to be an American Intelli-

gence agent.

In Sochi ALBINGER was in touch with a KGB

agent,

"TRAPEZUND".

By NOSENKO's account, the ALBINGER case was directed

by a provincial KGB element while NOSENKO was assigned to

the Seventh Department in Moscow.

Comment: According to the FBI, Donald ALBINGER] visited

the Soviet Union in 1963 and while there, in

Sochi, was associated with one Gazarian

OHANNES (sic, probably Oganes GAZARYAN) ,

Lebanese national who repatriated to the USSR

in the 1920's.

OHANNES allegedly offered

O6(ÄLBINGER intelligence-type photos which

06 ALBINGER said he refused to accept.

ALLOYAN,

06

Lawrence

NOSENKO's Information

06

An American of Armenian background, ALLOYAN visited the

USSR in November 1963 and contacted the KGB.

He stated to

KGB officers that he had been asked by an American Army

captain and military intelligence officer, to inform the

KGB of American Intelligence use of the Monterey Language

School. Ihe Army captain's name is possibly Hugo VAN KRAKOV, 06

NOSENKO noted the case

a tourist, first contacted the KGB in Moscow

through a Seventh Department case officer.

0001632

400

Top Secret

11188

TS No. 197124

Copy

---

## Page 371

Top Secret

(Annex B)

Comment:

Interviewed by the FBI in January 1965,

ObALLOYAN denied having been in the USSR in 1963.

He stated that he was acquainted with alugo 06

i ate kno

VAN KRAKOW]who had a son of the same name,

but

disclaimed knowledge that the latter was an

Army captain..6 ALLOYAN said he had not seen

the son for twenty yeats.

The younger VAN 06

KRAKOW was interviewed by the FBI and said

that he was discharged from the Army in 1953

as a staff sergeant, and that he was not in

contact with ALLOYAN.: 06

NOSENKO's Information

was limited to that

contained in notes brought to Geneva in 1964.

APISSON, Henry] 06

NOSENKO's Information

06

An American citizen of Armenian origin, Henry EPISON

(sic) was recruited by the KGB of the ArmenIan SSR in

April 1963, on ideological grounds.

The recruitment was

believed not to have been firm, however, and the: KGB

planned to renew it if EPISON returned to the USSR in 1964.06

Ob EPISON had access

to:a military installation in the New

York suburbs:

Comment:

06

Henry APISSON,

• a naturalized American and the

owner of

a hotel and restaurant near West 00

Point, N.Y., visited the USSR in 1963.

In

1964 he acknowledged having had contacts with

Soviet officials in 1963 in Armenia, where he

may

have conveyed animpression of willingness

to

see them if they should later visit Westlo

Point. 06APISSON claimed he did not realize the

approach

was for intelligence purposes.

NOSENKO's information was limited to that

contained in notes brought to Geneva in 1964:

401

Top Secret

0001633

TS. No. 197124

Copy -

10

3/BR,

---

## Page 372

Top Secret

(Annex B)

06

ARMSTRONG, Robert

NOSENKO's Information

06, 08

ARMSTRONG,

the American Ambassador's aidel is known by

the KGB to be.having a homosexual affair with

a code clerk 08,06

of the Danish Embassy, one Johannes BUHLE.

ARMSTRONG is

close friend of another homosexual officer of the American

Embassy, [Stephen HOFFMAN, (see below).

Comment:

Recalled from Moscow and

interviewed on

the

basis of NOSENKO's allegation, (ARMSTRONG) 06

acknowledged the truth of the allegations.

Before resigning from the Department of State

in August 1964, he asserted that he had had

nO

contact with the KGB while serving in Moscow.

NOSENKO provided no source for his infor-

mation regarding ARMSTRONG, which was a

Embassy Section case at a time when NOSENKO

claimed to be serving in the Seventh Depart-

06

BARTHELEMY, Thomas Franklin

NOSENKO's Information

06

BARTHELEMY twice led American tourist groups to the USSR

in 1959, during which visits the KGB assessed him to be an

American Intelligence agent. He was subsequently in contact with

LAINE, a Finn] who was a KGB

agent.

NOSENKO only learned of

the BARTHELEM case and of his

Do contact with LAINE while visiting the Leningrad KGB

in 1963.

O6 BARTHELEMY's Seventh Department file indicated that he had

been under

surveillance in 1959 because the KGB had informa-

tion he had graduated from an intelligence school.

C001634

402

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy -

IZIBR

---

## Page 373

Top Secret

(ANNEX B)

Comment:

06

BARTHELEMT was a CIA contact whose

intelligence

connections were ässumed to have been compromised

luring his visits to

He reported his

contacts with LANE, CIA. EARTHELEMY's name 06

appeared in the KGB document on Western tourist

operations which GOLITSYN provided CIA.

(See p. 149)

06

BERMAN, Harold

NOSENKO's Information

While on one of his frequent visits to the Soviet Union,

American lawyer and prominent professor of law BERMAN) was 0b

surrounded by KGB agents, but the KGB "could do nothing with

him'

Comment:

06

BERMAN is a professor at Harvard

University!

who is a specialist in the Soviet legal system.

He has visited the USSR on several occasions

for study and research, and he had described

several incidents which occurred in Moscow

which appear to

have been KGB provocations

NOSENKO did not indicate the source of his

Obinformation on /BERMAN

' nor did he provide the

date he acquired the information.

06

BINDER, Peter

NOSÉNKO's Information

The "top sergeant

08: 0b

in charge of America House'

BINDER

was involved with a Soviet female employee at America House,

with

whom at various times he had been intimate in his room.

He obtained for her items of clothing from the United States.

Since the KGB had been unable to obtain compromising photo-

Do graphs of BINDERJand the Soviet girl, it had no means to

exert pressure on him, and a recruitment attempt thus failed.

403

Top Secret

0001635

TS No. 197124

10

---

## Page 374

14-00000

Top Secret

(Annex B)

06

BINDER,

Peter (Continued)

NOSENKO later identified the Soviet girl as Galya MORELLI,

a KGB agent employed at America House as a dishwasher.

Vladimir DEMKIN of the Embassy Section was the case officer

working against BINDER, and the Chief of the American

Department S.M. FEDOSEYEV participated in the recruitment

attempt, in 1962, by which time NOSENKO had transferred to

the Seventh Department and thus knew no further details.

Comment:

06

U.S. Army Master Sergeant Peter BINDER served

as manager of the America House from 16 March Of,09

196I to 22 January 1963. On 15 January 1963 he

reported to Embassy officials that he had been

abducted off the street by Soviet plainclothes-

men, taken to a Militia station, and interro-

gated on the substance of a letter alleged to

have been written by Galya MORELLI, which his

interrogators threatened to send to thé

Ambassador.

The letter alleged that BINDERI06

had lived with MORELLI as "man and wife" from

25 November 1961, had warned Soviet employees

against Embassy Security Officer John ABIDIAN,

that MORELLI had told (BINDER] she was pregnant 06

told ABIDIAN's replacement Hugh MONTGOMERY

about his affair with MORELLI and MONTGOMERY

had told him not to worry about it, and that

06 (BINDER]had told MORELLI that Embassy Officer

Richard C. JACOB was a "well-trained spy" and

that she and other Soviets should be wary of

him.

When BINDER denied the allegations and O6

challenged the interrogators to send the

letter

on to the Ambassador, he was allowed

to go free 06 BINDER acknowledges that he was

intimate with MORELLI and that he gave her

gifts of money and clothing; and that she

said she thought she was pregnant in February

or March 1962; she never mentioned an abortion

and made no other demands of BINDER. BINDER

06

0061636

404

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

15/32

---

## Page 375

14-00000

Top Secret

(Annex B)

Comment:

(Continued)

states that MORELLI "disappeared" in June or

July 1962, while BINDERwas on leave. 06

Except for dating the recruitment attempt.

in 1962 instead of 1963, NOSENKO's fragmentary

information coincides with BINDER's account. 06

NOSENKO asserts that the notes brought to.

Geneva in 1964 contained all information he

was able to discover.

"NOSENKO claims to have

been Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section in

1961, supervising BINDER's and MORELLI's case 06

officers, but he relates his knowledge of the

case neither to that period nor to the position

he then held.

BROCHES, Adam 06

NOSENKO's Information

BROCHES, born in 1896, visited the Soviet Union with a

tourist gioup in 1960.

He has relatives in the USSR, and

he was recruited in September 1960 by the

KGB on ideological

grounds.

Comment:

BROCHES was born in 1890. His brother,

06 Alexander), was born in 1896. COLITSYN reported

that a Seventh Department officer told him in

061960 that Adam BROCHES had been a Soviet agent

in the 1920's and 1930's in Paris and that

when he visited the USSR as a tourist guide in

1959 or 1960 the KGB suspected. that he might

be on an Amèrican Intelligence mission to

contact V.M. ZARUBIN, his one-time Soviet

Intelligence superior in Paris. According to

the KGB placed-(BROCHES] under surveil - 06

GoLfe and the chief of the seventh Department

was planning to discuss with ZARUBIN what

action the KGB should take.

405

Top Secret

0001637

TS No. 197124

Copy 10

---

## Page 376

14-00000

Top Secret

(Annex B)

UX

Comment:

(Continued)

06

Interviewed by the FBI, BROCHES] said that

he escorted tours to the USSR three times

196,0, and that on his last trip, in September

approached by Soviet officials

for information on members of his tour group.

O6 BROCHES] claimed he refused to cooperate

and

DE BROCHES said, however, that the allegation

that he had ever been a Soviet agent.

might refer to another of his brothers, Ignacy,0o

now dead.

NOSENKO's information was limited to that

contained in his written notes which he brought

to Geneva in 1964.

NOSENKO claimed to have

been in the American Department when the

Seventh Department recruited BROCHES. 06

06

BUNDARIN, Eugene Peter

NOSENKO's Information

06

BUNDARIN, born in 1917, the son of a Russian emigre,

and

an

employee of the "Four Winds Travel Agency" in New York 29

sity, was recruited b

the KGB in 1962 on ideological

rounds. He left the four winds agenc and his case is 29

inactive because the KGB is waiting for him to open his own

travel bureau.6 BUNDARIN was handled by Seventh Department

case officer V.G. DERA.

Comment:

06.

BUNDARIN, born 25 April 1917, the son of an

emigre and an employee of the Eour Winds 29

agency visited the Soviet Union for eighteen

days i

1962. He left the Four Winds agency<Y

in 1962 to travel abroad, and he now works for

1 Hermes

Travel of California. Interviewed by

06

the FBI, BUNDARIN denied

any connection with

Soviet Intelligence.

FBI reports

indicate

0061638

406

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy -

TUBR

---

## Page 377

Top Secret

• (Annex B)

Comment:

(Continued.)

06 BUNDARIN and parents associate with CPUSA

members and participate in CP front organiza-

tion activities..

NOSENKO's information was limited to that

contained in his written notes which

he

brought to Geneva in 1964.

06

CHRISTNER, I

Robert Charles

NOSENKO's Information

While reviewing after his defection in 1964 a list of

Americans who had

visited the Soviet Union, NOSENKO noted

06

that one CHRISTNER had been arrested while touring the

Soviet Union by automobile.

He did not indicate the source

or date of his

acquisition of the information.

Comment:

As described

in press

accounts of the period

and stated in a KGB document. on American

tourists which GOLITSYN provided, CHRISTNER) 06

was arrested in the Soviet Union on

I charges

of espionage in the summer

of 1961.

He had

CIA

mission at the time, but he reported that

he had managed to maintain his tourist cover

throughout his intensive interrogations.

"In'

the summer of 1961 NOSENKO claims he was in the

Embassy Section of the American Department.

FAIN,

06°

Thomas

06

NOSENKO's Information

FAIN,

visited Moscow in

-an "American consul"

1959:

stationed in/Yugoslavia,

During that visit he encountered

NOSENKO's agent, VOLKOV, who reported his suspicion that

0001633

407

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

P/BR

---

## Page 378

14-00000

Top Secret

(Annex B)

• 06

FAIN, Thomas

(Continued)

O6 FAIN

was a homosexual.

06 FAIN

There was insufficient time during

visit to arrange his

entrapment.

do FAIN was

KGB planned

assigned permanently later in Moscow, and the

at

that time

to

entrap

him

with

homosexual.

Comment:

In

a Department of State security interview

O6 FAIN has stated that he recalled no Soviets

whom he had met during his five-day visit to

Moscow in 1959, except a female Inturist

guide and the Hotel Ukraine receptionist.

He

reported no noteworthy incidents during his

later permanent assignment in Moscow.

06

FINK, David

06

NOSENKO's Information

frequent

TuNE an American

an American professor from Philadelphia and

visitor to the USSR whom the Leningrad KGB hoped

to recruit on an ideological basis and through the use of a

female agent.. Because of his sister's love affair with a

Soviet he was refused a visa in 1963, but the KGB has

arranged so that he will be admitted to the USSR if he

applies again.

NOSENKO learned of the case when the

Leningrad KGB objected to|FINK's being denied a visa: 06

NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department at the

08

Comment:

06.

Interviewed by the FBI in September 1964,

FINK acknowledged that This sister was trying 08

to marry a Soviet citizen, but

that she had

been refused a visa to visit the USSR for the

purpose 06 FINk admitted involvement with

female in Leningrad, during

a

his

visit

to the

0001640

408

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy —

12/SR

---

## Page 379

Top Secret

(Annex B)

Comment:

(Continued)

USSR in 1961,

but denied recruitment

FINKI 06

asserted that he had visited Europe every

summer

since 1957 (except in 1959, when he

went to Mexico), and that he

had only visited

the USSR once, in 1961.

06

FISK, Norman

NOSENKO's Information

FISK visited the USSR

as a tourist in 1959, when he was

assessed to be a homosexual.: The KGB planned to attempt to

recruit him. if he returned to the Soviet Union.

NOSENKO

Donoted FISK's name while: reviewing files of YEFREMOV and

VOLKOV (see p•145) in 1963.

Comment:

06

[Fisk) visited the USSR with his wife and parents

in 1959.

In an interview with the FBI'in

December 1964 he claimed that his only Soviet

contacts in the USSR were with Inturist

personnel and a spinster niece. NOSENKO has

never explained why he learned of the case

only..from

the files of VOLKOV and YEFREMOV in

1963, since he claims he was their case officer

at the time FISK visited the Soviet Union, in

1959•

06

06

GINSBERC, Michael

VOSENKO's Information

Afprofessor GINSBERG visited the USSR in 1957 or 1958,

operational contact

was established between him and

when

the KGB.

C001641

409

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy:

10

8/6R-

---

## Page 380

Top Secret

(Annex B)

Comment:

One Professor Michael GINSBERG reported to U.s.

officials in Helsinki in August 1956 that he

had been the target of a Soviet recruitment

attempt earlier in Moscow. His contact has

been identified by CIA as a KGB officer whom

according to the FBI, has met during

subsequent visits to the USSR.

NOSENKO's information was limited to that

contained in his written notes which he

brought to Geneva in 1964.

06

GROVER, Preston

NOSENKO's Information

06

08

GROVER

currently (in 1964) Associated Press corres-

pondent in Moscow, is a

recruited KGB agent handled by the

Tenth Intelligensia and Correspondents) Department of the

Second Chief Directorate.

Comment:

06

Preston GROVER?

retired in 1965 and now lives

In France with his wife. O GROVER's wife was

born in Russia and apparently emigrated

about the time of the 1917 Revolution. GROVER! U6

met her in Moscow, where she was a corres-

pondent for a French newspaper. According to

FBI reports, she associated with known

Communists in the United States. during an

earlier assignment here.

NOSENKO indicated

3 information on GROVER. 06

q/BR

0001642

410

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

---

## Page 381

Top Secret

(Annex B)

06

HAMZAVI, Charles P.

NOSENKO's Information

An American, one Charles KHAMZAI) (sic) was the object of

considerable interest to the KGB during his 26 October-1

November 1963 visit to the USSR.

A KGB officer under cover

was in contact

with him in Moscow and the KGB planned to

resume this contact in the United States.

The Seventh

Department action

with respect to KHAMZAI was in response 06

to a request from the First Chief Directorate for assis-

tance in developing

a contact with him in Moscow.

Comment:

NOSENKO's lead has been identified as Charles: 06

P. HAMZAVI, who has been noted in frequent

contact with Soviet officials from. 1955, when

he immigrated to the United States, until 1963.

According to the FBI, he was in Moscow in 1963,

when he was in contact with a Foreign Ministry

official which CIA identifies as. KGB officer

I.D. BORISOV.

HARMSTONE, Richard

NOSENKO's Information

In 1958 Or

the American Department's Embassy Section

atreupted to recruit WARMSTONe, a second or Third secretary 06,0p

at the Embassy. Both male

female agents were used?

against him, and photographs

were obtained of HARMSTONE's,0.

homosexual

as well as heterosexual activities. When confronted,

Obhowever, HARMSTONE] refused to collaborate with the KGB:

OL HARMSTONE reported

the approach to American officials, but

asserted that he was involved just in heterosexual compromise.

NOSENKO reviewed the CHEREPANOV documents (see p. 309) in

1964, including the KGB plan of operations against @ARMSIONE]. 06

NOSENKO confirmed the substance and eventual success of the

plan, which

was to get HARMSTONE drunk and photograph him

06

0001643

411

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

10

Copy

iNER

---

## Page 382

Top Secret

(Annex B)

06

HARMSTONE, Richard] (Continued)

while in intimate relations

with a Soviet girl.

Because the

KGB concluded that HARMSTONE had not reported the homo- 06

sexual compromise, it was planned to attempt to recruit him

again later, when

he was

transferred elsewhere abroad. If

O6 HARMSTONE had reported the homosexual compromise, it would

have been monitored by the KGB over the microphone in the

Minister Counselor's office.

In later questioning NOSENKO stated that he learned of

Oothe HARMSTONE case from KOVSHUK. He could not recall who

the KGB case officer was, but was certain that the latter

had left the Embassy Section. If HARMSIONE had reported 06

his compromise, he surmised, he would have been withdrawn

Immediately from Moscow, and HARMSIONEl did not leave the 06

Soviet Union prematurely.

Comment:

06

Richard C. HARMSIONE), who served in Moscow from

October 1957 to October 1959 as Second 0807

Secretary, reported to the Embassy Security

Officer on 23 May 1959 that a KGB officer had

tried to recruit him after threatening exposure

through doctored photographs purporting to

show HARMSTONE's homosexual activities. HARM- Of

STONE subsequently identified from a visa

application photograph the KGB officer as

"KOMAROV", an overt contact of Embassy

colleague WINTERS. HARMSIONE]left the Soviet06

Union six months later, admitted homosexual

activities,. and resigned from the Department

of state.

The relevant portions of the

CHEREPANOV Papers confirm HARMSTONE's admissions U6

respect to KGB

agents

with whom he was

involved.

"KOMAROV"

been identified as

KOVSHUK, NOSENKO's superior in the Embassy

Section

and the source of what NOSENKO said he

learned

of the

case.

0001644

412

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy -

12IBR

---

## Page 383

Top Secret

(Annex B)

HOFFMAN, E. Stephen 06

NOSENKO's Information

08,06

An American Embassy official and a friend of the

Ambassador's aide Robert ARMSTRONG (see above); (HOFFMAN '06"

Is known to have engaged in homosexual acts with an Armenian

in Yerevan.

The KGB

currently (in 1964) is

planning.to

attempt to compromise and recruiti HofFMAN.

Comment:

interviewed on the basis of NOSENKO's allega-

06 tion, HOFFMAN in a State Department security

interview denied homosexual activities.

Informed that the results of a polygraph

examination indicated he had practiced deception

on that question, HOFFMAN resigned from the 06

Department of State on 31 July 1964. (HOFFMAN 06

asserted that he had no contact with the KGBr

while assigned in Moscow, an assertion.

supported by the polygraph examination.

NOSENKO claims he was assigned to the

Seventh Department at the time HOFFMAN was 06

the target of the Embassy Section of the

American Department.

06

HOWARD, Herbert

06,08

NOSENKO's Information

HOWARD, a USIA employee,

was assigned temporarily for

four months to the Embassy in Moscow in spring 1962 as a

publications procurement officer. He was recruited.by the

KGB: G.I. GRYAZNOV, of the American Department Embassy

Section,.

requested NOSENKO's help in obtaining a hotel room

adjacent to HOWARD's, for a woman from Leningrad.

06

0001645

413

Top Secret

12/8h

TS. No. 197124

Copy.

10

---

## Page 384

Top Secret

(Annex B)

Comment:

06

06

HOWARD

denied recruitment in an interview with

the FBI, although a polygraph examination

indicated he was disturbed on related questions.

HOWARD had earlier declared his intention to

divorce his American wife and marry a Soviet

national. His contract with [ÜSIA)expired in 29

December 1964 and was not renewed.

NOSENKO claims to have been serving in

the

Seventh Department at the time HOWARD was

target of the Embassy Section.

06

06

HUSTON, Hayden Henry

NOSENKO's Information

06

One HUSTON (fnu) travelled to the USSR on official U.S.

Government business from his assignment in Belgrade. In O

O6 Moscow HUSTON was photographed making a blackmarket deal

in

a taxi, but the KGB did not exploit the incident because

06 HUSTON did not again visit the USSR.

Comment:

08,06

USIA employee Hayden Henry HUSTON was inter-

Viewed on 30 October 1963 regarding a

report

that he had been arrested in Yugoslavial in ll

1954 as a result of his sexual activities.

06

HUSION!

served in Yugoslavia for eight years-ll

Erom. 1953 until January 1962. During that

interview he stated that during his tour in

1D Belgrade he made two trips

to the

USSR, and he

asserted

that

there were no other incidents in

Yugoslavia/ or

elsewhere in the Soviet Bloc

which could be used to compromise him. l

06

2? Currently on a (USIA assignment in Iaiwan,

has not been interviewed

(HUSTON

with respect to

NOSENKO's

allegation.

6001646

414.

Top Secret

HIBR

TS No. 197124

Copy -

---

## Page 385

Top Secret

(Annex B)

JAFFE, Sam] 06

NOSENKO's Information

JAFFE! an ABC correspondeng in Moscow,

'is an active. KGB

agent who was cultivated and recruited by .v.A. KUSKOV. In

1963,

while in the Seventh. Department, NOSENKO asked Ameri-

can Department Embassy Section officer GRYAZNOV for an agent

who could be used against a visiting American delegation,

and CRYAZNOY suggested Carry

Comment:

Before NOSENKO's information

was received,

06 JAFFE reported

his recruitment by one

"slava

KISLOV" in October 1962:

In a CIA interview

O6 in December 1966 JAFFEldid not recognize A.K.

KISLOV's photograph but identified a photo-

graph of KUSKOV as being

who

recruited him in 1962. JAFFE was expelled Ob

from the USSR in October 1965.: As far as CIA

is aware, he has not been interviewed

on the

basis of

NOSENKO's information

KANTOR, Marvin

NOSENKO's Information

Melvin (sic) KANTOR,.

a Harvard student, was recruited on

ideological grounds in 1961.: His case was turned over to"

the First Chief Directorate.

Comment:

Marvin KANTOR,

a Slavic-language instructor

'at the University of Michigan, visited the USSR

in 1958 or 1959. When interviewed by CIA in

1961 bé admitted having had contact with Soviet

Intelligence officers in the Soviet Union in

1959, but asserted that he then had flatly

refused to collaborate with Soviet Intelligence:

C001647

4.15

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

10

Copy —

7I5R

---

## Page 386

Top Secret

(Annex B)

Comment:

(Continued)

When interviewed in 1963, KANTOR said he had

not travelled to the USSR since 1959.

NOSENKO's information was limited to written

notes brought in 1964 to Geneva.

NOSENKO

claims he was in the Seventh Department in

1959, at the actual time of KANTOR's recruit-

ment, and does not explain why the KANTOR case

was included among cases he noted as having

occurred while he was in the Embassy Section

In 1960-1961:

KAZAN-KOMAREK] 06

NOSENKO's Information

06

(KOMAREK, an American of Czech descent and

somehow

connected with a tourist service in the United States, has

been identified by the Czech Secret Police as being in

contact with Western Intelligence and they have been trying

to locate him.

possibly visit the Soviet Union and have requested [the KGB]

that he be arrestedion arrival and deported

to Czechoslovakia.

The Soviets have agreed and Inturist is currently attempting

to Induce KOMAREK into visiting the Soviet Union.

Comment:

The subject of NOSENKO's lead was Vladimir 06

Joseph KAZAN-KOMAREK, a naturalized. American

citizen and the operator of the Harvard Travel C1,10

Tourist Agency In Cambridge, Massachusett ich

He has never had any covert relationship

CIA or other U.S. intelligence

agencies. In

August 1963 the FBI was advised by another

source of the Soviet-Czech plan

KOMAREK to the

Soviet Union

and

to lure KAZAN- 06

take him to

Czechoslovakia where hewould be tried for

espionage.

0001648

416

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

MISR

---

## Page 387

Top Secret

(Annex B)

Comment: (Continued)

NOSENKO's information, which he

reported

only to the FBI, was substantially

accurate.

In October 1966, after being warned of the

risk by the FBI,

. KAZAN-KOMAREK visited Moscow 06

for an Inturist travel agents: conference and,

en route back to Paris, was arrested in Prague

when his AEROFLOT flight was diverted.

NOSENKO's sourcing for this lead, which

presumably relates to his 1962-64 service in

the Seventh Department, had not been established.

CIA did not learn of NOSENKO's report on CRAZAN- 06

KOMAREK until the latter was arrested in

Czechoslovakia in 1966, by which time NOSENKO's

interrogation had been suspended.

MATLAW,

06

Ralph

06

NOSENKO's Information

One MATLO] (sic) visited the USSR, in 1959, and the KGB

concluded that he was a homosexual and planned to attempt

to recruit him if he should return to the Soviet Union.:

NOSENKO noted

the information while reviewing YEFREMOV and

VOLKOV's file prior to their retirement.

Comment:

The identity of NOSENKO's lead has been

confirmed to be one Ralph MATLAW. 06The case

is still under investigation.

NOSENKO claims

to have been YEFREMOV's and VOLKOV's case

officer at the time one of them was in touch

with MATLAW|in 1959, but learned of the case

only later when reviewing those agents' files.

0001649

417

Top Secret

6/ BR

TS No.. 197124

10

---

## Page 388

Top Secret

(Annex B)

06

NIELSEN, Philip

NOSENKO's Information

06

WIELSEN visited the USSR the first time in 1957 or 1958.

Because hè made the acquaintance of some "teddy boys" in

Moscow and tried to acquire from them a copy of the Moscow

Telephone Directory, the KGB suspected that he was connected

with CIA.No NIELSEN was kept under surveillance during this

and all subsequent

trips, but was never observed in other

intelligence tasks. On one of his visits to Moscow, NIELSEN O6

tell In love with KGB agent Tamara KUNGAROVAl, and the KGB 06

used her in the development of NIELSEN. 06 For purposes of

assessment, LEONOV, a Seventh Department officer, was

Obintroduced to NIELSEN in the role of KUNGAROVAYS

father, but O6

with no positive result.

NOSENKO heard later

and KUNGAROVA

06, 0grad married and were living in London.

that NIELSEN U6

NOSENKO was involved in the determination of NIELSEN's 06

possible intelligence status on his first trip.

himself and LEONOV, American Department case officer Viktor

KOPEYKIN was also involved.

Comment:

NOSENKO has asserted variously that he recruited

06RUNGAROVA] in 1955 and that she was his agent

until 1960, and that she was already an agent

in 1958 when she transferred into the Seventh

Department from the British Commonwealth Depart-

ment.

06

(NIELSEN, a CIA agent at the time, visited

the Soviet Union in April 1958. One of his

tasks on this trip was to obtain a Soviet

telephone book Do NIELSEN) met (KUNGAROVA on a O

later trip, in January 1959.

Despite "CIA

warnings that he was involved in what appeared

to be a KGB operation, NIELSEN returned to seelb

her in Moscow in January 1960, and there met

person representing himself as KUNGAROVA'S

0806

father.Do NIELSEN returned to Moscow in 1962,

married KUNGAROVA, and they moved

to France.

KUNGAROVA died in France in 1965. In Januaxy

0t

6001650

418

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

20/5R

---

## Page 389

Top Secret

(Annex: B)

Comment:

(Continued)

1960,

when NOSENKO claims personal knowledge

ObOf NIELSEN's meeting with [KUNGAROVA's "father", 06

he was not in the Seventh Department, but in

the American Embassy Section.

NIXON,

06.

Dmitriy

NOSENKO's Information

An American tourist, NIXON was recruited by seventh

Department case officers in June 1963. NOSENKO was not in

Moscow at the time, and knew no further details.

Comment:

06

Interviewed by the FBl on the basis

of noSENKO's

Obinformation, NIXON admitted having been

recruited while visiting the Soviet Union. He

was not contacted by the KGB in the United

States, although such arrangements had been

made at the time of his recruitment.:'

On a visit

Moscow in 1964, after NOSENKO's defection,

NIXON

was again contacted by the KGB and he

agreed

to collaborate for fear of reprisals

against relatives in the USSR.

06

OMELICH, Paul)

NOSENKO's: Information

06

COMELICH was contacted by KGB officers during the Winter

Olympics

at Squaw Valley, California.

Although he was not

recruited, he was to be recontacted by KGB officers later,

in Switzerland D! When OMELICH visited Moscow in August 1963,

Seventh Department American Section case officer K.G. KRUPNOV

arranged for First Chief Directorate officer (fnu) ZAYISEV

to meet the American:

419

Top Secret

0001651

TS No. 197124

Copy 10

9/8R

---

## Page 390

1.'.

Top Secret

(Annex B)

Comment:

06

In 1963 OMELICH reported his earlier contacts

with Soviet officials at Squaw Valley.

He

denied that he had

ever met KGB officers later,

or that any meeting

arrangements were made for

Switzerland, although he admitted "he may have

given the impression of sympathy toward Soviets"

PECHTER,

06

Bernard

06

NOSENKO's Information

(PECHTER

was recruited by the KGB in Moscow in 1959.

Comment:

06

In December 1959, a month after PECHTER's

return from the USSR, the FBI learned that he

had revealed his homosexual compromise and

recruitment by the KGB to

a member of his tour

group. NOSENKO cited the PECHTER case not D6

from memory, but from his written

notes brought

to Geneva in 1964. Although presumably a

Seventh Department case, NOSENKO did not

relate

it to his service there in 1959,

nor did he

indicate the source of his information.

PRESSMAN, Aron!

NOSENKO's Information

Patrick (sic) PRESSMAN visited: the USSR in October 1957

with a delegation of American metallürgists

and was recruited

at that time by the KGB.. The

case was

afterwards turned

over to the First Chief Directorate.

0001652

420

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

TI8R

---

## Page 391

Top Secret

• (Annex B)

Comment:

NOSENKO's lead is believed to relate to Aron 06

PRESSMAN,

a long-time Communist and

a friend

06 of Bernard KOTEN (sèe p.295), whose sister

has resided in the Soviet Union since her 1945

marriage to a Soviet citizen who has been

identified as a courier for Soviet Intelligence.:

Ob PRESSMAN accompanied

a delegation of metallur-

gists from NYU on an

exchange visit to the

Moscow Mining Institute in 1957; he himself

surveyed Soviet

language training programs

during this visit.

He denied any recruitment"

approach was made to him there or on subsequent

06

NOSENKO cited thel PRESSMAN, case from his

written notes brought to Geneva in 1964. he

did not relate it to his Seventh. Department

service nor did he indicate the source of his

information:

06

PROCTOR, fnu

see ACTOR, DE

RASK, Walter] 06

NOSENKO's Information

RASK,

:06.08

the president of world wide Tours, was recruited in

the USSR in 1960.

He has returned to the USSR several times

since: He is used for spotting tourists suspected of having

intelligence affiliations.U6 The KGB has received only one

open code message from RASK since recruitment. [RASK]was 06

recruited by Seventh Department case officer Ye. N. NOSKOV

while NOSENKO was assigned to the American Department..On

subsequent visits to the USSR. he was met by Seventh Depart-

ment case officers of the American-British Commonwealth

Section.

6001653

421

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy 10

10/0

---

## Page 392

Top Secret

(Annex B)

Comment:

06

[RASK,

a former CIA contact who visited the USSR

several times, reported the KGB

recruitment

approach in 1961.

NOSENKO's information was limited

to that

contained in written notes he brought to Geneva

in 1964.

He did not relate the case to his

1962-1964 Seventh Department service.

06

ROBERTS, Spencer

NOSENKO's Information

ROBERIS]was recruited at the end of 1962 after being

compromised with a homosexual in Sochi, USSR.

The case was

turned over to the KGB First Chief Directorate, and ROBERTS 06

was recontacted by a KGB officer in the United

06

Reached confereed his recruituce to the fit, here of which

the KGB, and his KGB case officer in the United

States was hastily recalled to Moscow.

(ROBERTS) was handled by the Anerican Department because

he

was a former employee of the Embassy in Moscow.

The

case officers were V.M. MIKHAYLOV,. V.A. KUSKOV, and v.M.

KOVSHUK.

NOSENKO learned of the events in the U.S. from

B.A. SOLOMATIN, a First Chief Directorate American Depart-

ment case officer.

06

Comment: [ROBERISJhad been coopted as a CIA represen-

tative in Moscow in 1950, while he was a State

Department officer assigned to the Embassy in

Moscow.

He confessed his recruitment by the

KGB to the FBI in the fall of 1962. He was

contacted by a Soviet official from the UN in

New York in mid-1963. That official apparently

suddenly departed the United States in December

1963.

NOSENKO did not indicate the original

source of his information on (ROBERIS).

0001654

422

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy —

8/BR

---

## Page 393

Top Secret

(Annex. B)

ROSS,

Johanna

06

NOSENKO's Information

The former governess to the American Ambassador's family

who.

• now (in 1964) teaches at the American school in Moscow

08.

was. recruited

by the KGB on the basis "of sexual

involvements.

The case was handled by the American Department at the time

NOSENKO was in the Seventh Department.

Comment:

NOSENKO's information was limited to written

notes brought to Geneva in 1964. He does not

indicate the source of his information.

06 ROSS reported to the American Embassy of

her

"arIest in Kiev in 1958 on charges of immoral

behavior with a Soviet citizen.

In a May 1965

FBI interview she admitted contact in Moscow

in September 1963 with the KGB; which stemmed

from her continued relationship with the same

Soviet citizen, but she denied that the KGB

attempted to

recruit her or contact here

thereafter..

06

RUFE, John

NOSENKO's Information

06:

The KGB discovered that RUFE was a homosexual during his

visit to the

The case was only

marginal value to the KGB, and it was terminated in 1963.

0001655

423

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy 10

5/8R

---

## Page 394

Top Secret

(Annex B)

Comment:

06

a New York City attorney, has admitted

that he had been compromised walle visiting

the USSR in 1962 and that he was in contact

with KGB officers in the United States until

November 1963.

NOSENKO did not relate the RUFE

_case

specifically to his Seventh Department service

when he cited it from writen notes brought to

Geneva in 1964, nor did he indicate the source

of his information. His notes

was recruited on homosexual grounds by the

state that RUFEJOS

American-British Commonwealth Section of the

Seventh Department, jointly with the UKGB of

Leningrad Oblast.

06

SCHWARZENBACH,

Collette

06

NOSENKO's Information

SCHWARZENBACH

who was working in Moscow at the time,

fell in love with

a male KGB agent and was the target of an

unsuccessful KGB recruitment attempt in 1958 or 1959. The

KGB had incriminating photography, but NOSENKO did not

believe it was used, the KGB appeal being based solely

on

her affection for the Soviet people. V.M. MIKHAYLOV of

the American Department Embassy Section directed the opera-

tion. NOSENKO never read the SCHWARZENBACH file, but he

later saw it and the incriminating photographs.

06

Comment:

06,08,09

SCHWARZENBACH was during 1955 and 1956 secre-

Tary to Mrs. BOHLEN, the wife of the American

Ambassador, and director of the Anglo-American

School in Moscow.

In 1956

and 1957 she worked

for Henry SHAPIRO, United press correspondent 06,08

In Moscow (see p. 76).

While employed by

O6 (SHAPIRO she became acquainted with one Viktor

I. SERGEYEV, a Soviet publishing functionary.

0001656

424

Top Secret

IS No. 197124

Copy

9.9R

---

## Page 395

Top Secret

(Annex B)

Comment:

(Continued)

In January 1959 she was

approached: in Riga by

a KGB officer who confronted her with incrimi-

nating photographs and solicited her cooperation

in providing information on the U.S. Embassy.

She immediately reported the event to [SHAPIRO, D6

who informed then-Ambassador THOMPSON,: and

06 (SCHWARZENBACH left the USSR shortly thereafter

In early 1959.

She provided details of the

KGB recruitment attempt to a State Department

Regional Security Officer in Genevajon 4 June

195.9•

NOSENKO

did not recall from whom he learned

of the SCHWARZENBACH case, which was directed

by the: Amerícan Department Embassy Section

while

he was

assigned to the Seventh Department.

06

SEREBRENNIKOV, Eugene Sergey

NOSENKO's Information

06

29.

In 1955-1957, [SEREBRENNIKOV

employee of the Library

Congress, visited Moscow with

a Congressional delegation.

06. SEREBRENNIROV had a brother who was a Soviet citizen, a

doctor living in Sverdlovsk. Assigned to the Seventh

Department at the time, NOSENKO himself arranged for the

brother to be brought to Moscow and briefed him for a

Domeeting at which SEREBRENNIKOV would be "felt out" as

prospective collaborator with the KGB."' The meeting took

place, but the brother told the KGB that he had had no

opportunity to discuss with SEREBRENNIKOV|the possibility.@6

jof his helping the Soviet Union. SEREBRENNIKOV was in 06

Moscow

only for a few days, and there was no opportunity

for another meeting. The KGB concluded that (SEREBRENNIKOY'

$ 06

suspicions were aroused by his brother's behavior.

0001657

*425

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

10

Copy

12/BR

---

## Page 396

Top Secret

(Annex B)

Comment:

According to his 1964 interview with the FBI,

O6 SEREBRENNIKOV visited the Soviet Union in 1956

in the company of Senator Henry H. Jackson:

On his last night in Moscow he received in his

hotel room a telephone call from a person

claiming to be his brother from Sverdlovsk,

whom he had not seen since 1918. The "brother"

requested

a meeting, but SEREBRENNIKOV was O6

convinced

from the caller's uneducated speech

and other signs that he was not in fact

06 SEREBRENNIKOV's brother, and he refused

to see

him. 06 SEREBRENNIKOV immediately advised

Senator Jackson of the incident, as well as

Embassy officials. After SEREBRENNIKOV 06

returned to the United States, the incident

was described in an article in Newsweek

magazine.

SEVERN,

C6

Gerald

NOSENKO's Information

0b

SEVERN

• KGB cryptonym "EDVIN" was

recruited in Moscow

by the Seventh Department in 1958 or 1959 on ideological

grounds.

He is a valuable all-purpose agent. His case

officer was V.M. IVANOV.

Comment:

06

SEVERN, a naturalized American citizen whose

name originally was Gennadly SEVASTYANOY, hadDl

Russian-born parents.

He

enjoys special

residence arrangements in Moscow, and prior

to receipt of the NOSENKO lead he was suspected

• be a KGB agent U. SEVERN has not visited th

United States since

1961 and he has not beer

interviewed by the FBI..

NOSENKO's information was limited to that

contained in his written notes which he brought

to Geneva in 1964.

0001658

426

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

10IBR

---

## Page 397

Top Secret

(Annex B)

06

SHATTAUER, Sofia Gretal

NOSENKO's Information

In September 1962 SHATTAUER]visited the Soviet Union and

was recruited by Seventh Department case officer D.A.

DITYATEV.

She'had originally been recruited in Poland in

1946-1947 but she was never contacted again because the KGB

believed her to be known to. American Intelligence.

Comment:

06

In 1962 an FBI source reported that (SHATTAUER]

stated she was looking forward to her trip to

the USSR and "to being away from the imperia-

list policies of the United States",

and that

06 SHATTAUER] "appeared enthusiastic about Russian

ideology"

^. In July 1964 SHATTAUER] admitted. to 06

the FBI that she had. had intelligence contact

with: Soviet officers in Poland in 1947 and that

she was recontacted by the KGB in September

1962 in Moscow, after which she periodically

met a KGB officer in New York City until May

1964.

• NOSENKO'S

information was limited to that

contained in his written notes brought to

Geneva in 1964. He did it indicate the source

of his information.

06.

SOCHUREK, Howard

NOSENKO's Information

08,06

The former

Time-Life correspondent in Moscow, SOCHUREK,

was probably

recruited by the KGB and was an agent of

Vadim BIRYUKOVO SOCHUREK returned briefly to Moscow in

1962 when Seventh Department surveillance noted his associa-

tion with BIRYUKOV, a KGB officer of the Tenth (Intelli-

gensia and Correspondents) Department of the Second Chief

Directorate.

0001659

4.27

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

10

Copy .

8/6R

---

## Page 398

Top Secret

(Annex B)

Comment:

06

(SOCHURER who was assigned to Moscow in 1958-

1960, réported to the Embassy a number of

instances in which Soviet officials attempted

to pressure him or in which he was in touch

with identified KGB officers. [SOCHUREK] has 06

named BIRYUKOV as the guide and interpreter

who invariably accompanied him while he was

stationed in the USSR.

NOSENKO has not

indicated the source of his information on

SOCHUREK.

0.6

06

STEVENS,

Francis

NOSENKO's Information

06

08

STEVENS],

an American correspondent,

visited the Soviet

Union in 1961 as a

tourist.

He was the target of American

Department officers KOVSHUK and KLYPIN, who entrapped him

with a Soviet female, accused him of rape, and blackmailed

him into accepting recruitment. His

KGB cryptonym was

Ob "SERGEY". STEVENS, however, described the recruitment

attempt in a letter to his mother which he deposited at

the Embassy. The letter was opened and read by the

Minister Counsellor, who immediately dictated a cable

summarizing the events described in the letter to the

Department of State.

The KGB monitored the dictation

through the microphone in the Minister Counsellor's office.

First Chief Directorate officers nevertheless planned

to

resume contact with STEVENS in New York City.

Although a tourist and a [corespondent, STEVENS)was

the

concern of the Embassy Section because he was a former

member of the Embassy staff.

08

6001600

428

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

iüBR

---

## Page 399

Top Secret

(Annex: B)

Comment:

06

STEVENS, after his compromise concerned for

his safety for the remainder of his 1961 visit

to Moscow,

did deposit with the Embassy a

letter to his mother. However, he also gave

Ambassador Thompson a

written report of the KGB

entrapment, immediately after the incident,

and he was

interviewed about the matter by

the

Minister Counsellor the following day. Inter-

viewed periodicallyiby the FBI following his

return to the United States in 1961, (STEVENS

106

has denied any further contact with the KGB.

According to the notes which NOSENKO

brought to Geneva in 1964, on the basis of

which he reported the STEVENS ease, (STEVENS' 06

recruitment was accomplished jointly by the

American-British Commonwealth Section of the

Seventh Department and the American Depart-

ment'

s Embassy Section.

06

TIARASKA, William

06

08.

NOSENKO$s Information

TARASKA,-

a New York City policeman, had been developed

by the KGB while visiting the Soviet Union in 1958.

Although considered in 1958 a "stupid and unpromising

target"

; the Ukrainian KGB was still interested in

attempting

to recruit him while he was in the Soviet Union

in June 1963.

Comment:

JARASKA, who had visited the soviet Union in

1958,

was recruited by CIA for a mission in

1960. When he returned to the United States?

he reported that the KGB had attempted to

recruit him on both visits. TARASKA returned V6

to the USSR in 1963 and later reported to the

FBI that the KGB had again attempted to

recruit him during that visit.:

429

Top Secret

0001661

TS No. 197124

Copy -

10

8/Be

---

## Page 400

Top Secret

(Annex B)

Comment:

(Continued)

NOSENKO does not indicate the source

of his

06

THOMPSON, John]

NOSENKO's Information

American professor THOMPSON!

• a specialist in Russian

literature or Russian History, became involved with Tamara

KUNGAROVA, a KGB agent within Inturist.

He was intimate

with KUNGAROVA and incriminating photographs were taken.

The KGB did not attempt to recruit him, however, but

planned to continue his assessment and establish additional

grounds for his recruitment if he returned to the USSR.

When he did not return, NOSENKO reviewed THOMPSON's file 06

and recommended that the case be retired to KGB Archives.

Comment:

06

06,08

DIs John M. THOMPSON, Associate Professor of

History at Indiana University, was interviewed

by the FBI in April 1965.. He identified

KUNGAROVA's photograph as that of his Inturist

guide during a trip outside Moscow in 1959,

and admitted having been intimate with her.

When he returned to Moscow in 1960 he had

sought out KUNGAROVA, who told him she had

been demoted in Inturist because of her

leclared intention to marry an American (se

hilip NIELSEN). THOMPSON also visited the D

Soviet Union in 1964:06 THOMPSON stated that

he was

might have

unaware of any photographs the KeR

and

that he

was never approached

by the KGB

on either trip.

0001662

430

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

8/BR

---

## Page 401

Top Secret

(Annex. B)

Comment:

(Continued)

KUNGAROVA

wastinterviewed by the FBI in

June 1965. She confirmed that she had been

intimate

ing mate rese to com bon dented.

that 06

NOSENKO has claimed KUNGAROVA was his agent

in 1959, although he has not related

that claim

to his description of her role in the THOMPSON? O6

case:

06

TORREY, Carmen

NOSENKO's Information

06.

TORREY, who was

in love with a Soviet citizen, was

recruited

by Seventh Department case officers on that basis

in 1960 and turned over to the First Chief Directorate,

which helped her obtain employment at the UN (also given as

NATO):: NOSENKO was in the. American Department at the time.

Comment:

06

In 1960 it was reported thatl

TORREY, planned to

defect

to the USSR because she was in love

with

a Soviet citizen. In 1961 she married an

American.: In 1962 GOLITSYN reported KGB

Olattempts to recruit an American identifiable

as TORREY}during her October or November 1959

visit to Moscow UG TORREY worked for the Pan 27

American Union in 1954-1959, but there is no

indication that she was ever employed by the

UN or by NATO.

NOSENKO has

not indicated the source of his

information on TORREY. CoIn 1959,.

when GOLITSYN

reported the KGB attempted to recruit (TORREY, 06

NOSENKO claims he was in the Seventh Depart-

ment, not the

American Department.

0001663

431

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

10

Copy

iO/SR:

---

## Page 402

Top Secret

(Annex B)

06

TWAROG, Leon

NOSENKO's Information

An American

professor of Russian Literature and a fluent

Russian speaker IWAROG visiled the Soviet Union in 1962

or 1963 г

The target of Seventh Department case officer

K.G. KRUPNOV@TWAROG was lured into intimacy with a female

KGB agent, of which the KGB took incriminating photographs.

At one point Seventh Department case officer Yevgeniy NOSKOV

was placed in direct contact with TWARO, but no recruitment 06

attempt was made because the KGB had concluded that the

incriminating photographs were not sufficient to ensure

TO CRUDEEREDE

success.

The KGB deferred further action pending IWARO@'s 06

expected return to the Soviet Union in 1964 or 1965.

Comment:

In a 1965 interview with the FBI, @WAROG said

he had visited the USSR in 1957, 1960, 1962,

and 1964.

On his 1962 trip he had met and

befriended one Nina S. PETROVA, and on one

occasion they attended a party accompanied by

friends of hers, a Soviet couple.

The man's

name was Yevgenty. 0LWAROE stated that he

was later intimate with PETROVA, but was never

confronted by anyone about that fact.

In 1964

(after NOSENKO's defection), TWAROG]stated, he 0b

was approached in the USSR by Arthur HAMAN, an

Estonian whom he had met in Cambridge,

Massachusetts in 1962. HAMAN, who had defected

in Sweden in 1955, redefected to the USSR in

1962..

According to IWAROG, HAMAN offered 06

$50,000 1f IWAROG would provide background 0b

summaries of members of his tour group and

threatened him with the denial of future entry

Coto the

• if TWAROG did not comply. TWAROG 06

stated

that he refused, and no further pressure

was

applied.

NOSENKO

from notes, in

provided the information on TWAROG U6

Geneva in

0001664

432

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

is/3R

---

## Page 403

Top Secret

(Annex B)

06

VOLKOV, Vasilly Andreyevich

NOSENKO's Information

06

VOLKOV, construction company

employee and an American,

was recruited by, a Seventh Department case officer in the

summer of 1962 while visiting the

Soviet Union. He was

to

be used in emigre operations..

06.

Comment: <VolKov has been identified as a carpenter

living in California who travelled to the

Soviet Union in 1962. He 1s a religious.

fanatic with a record of many arrests, and

he may be mentally disturbed.

In an FBI

Obinterview VolkoWdenied that he had been

recruited by the KGB.

NOSENKO does not indicate the source of

his information, which was contained in

notes brought to Geneva. in 1964 c

06

VOLSKIY,

Boris

NOSENKO's Information 08

06

The president of "American Travel Abroad" (VoLSKIYwas

recruited by a Seventh Department case officer in 1962 on

Ideological grounds." His mission is to advise the KGB by

open code of any tourist whom he suspected of having some

connection with American

Intelligence:

Comment:

06

Interviewed by the FBI in May 1964, VOLSKIYY

advised that he travelled annually to the USSR

on tourist business and has frequent contacts

with Inturist officials in the Soviet Union

He denied having any intelligence contacts,

with one possible exception.

In abaut 1962

he was visited

in his Moscow hotel room by a

433

Top Secret

0001665

TS No. 197124

Copy 10

8/6R

---

## Page 404

Top Secret

(Annex B)

Comment:

(Continued)

06

person represented

to be an Inturist official

ho solicited VOLSKIYs aid in curtailin

oreign tourists' dis

ribution of Bibles

and

literature in the USSR. VOLSKIN asserted that 06

he was in no position to provide such assis-

tance, and he was not contacted again:

NOSENKO's information is limited to that

contained in written notes brought to Geneva

in 1964c

06

WALLACE, WIlliam

NOSENKO's Information

10,06

A student at the University of Vienna, WALLACE was

recruited on ideological grounds while visiting the Soviet

Union in 1961.

The Seventh Department made the

recruitment,

O and turned WALLACE over to the First Chief Directorate,

which was still managing the case in 1964.

Comment: Interviewed in February 1965 in Vienna,

ObWALLACE admitted having been approached by an

unidentified Soviet during a visit to the USSR

in 1961:

He claimed he refused to

"help

them", and said there had been no furtber

attempts to contact him.

NOSENKO's information is limited

to that

contained in written notes brought to Geneva

in 1964; he has

his information. not indicated

the source of

0001666

434

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

Copy

2/8R

---

## Page 405

Top Secret

(Annex'B)

06,06

YOUNGER,

Ralph and Evelyn

06

NOSENKO's Information

The YOUNGER, couple were identified as American Intelli-

gence agents

and arrested and recruited by the KGB while

they visited the USSR in 1961. However, later they

to meet their KGB case officer as planned, in Denmark. The

case was handled by the

American Department while NOSENKO

was in the Seventh Department.. NOSENKO's former subordinate,

V.V. KOSOLAPOV, was directly involved in the case.

Comment:

06

The YOUNGERs were on a mission for the U.s.

Army. at the time of their arrest, and they

reported their recruitment immediately upon

leaving the Soviet Union. KGB officer

KOSOLAPOV travelled to Copenhagen under alias

In 1961, at the time when the YOUNGERs were 06

scheduled to meet with the KGB in Denmark..

NOSENKO did not indicate the source of his

information which he related to CIA in Geneva

in 1962.

•06

ZIRING, Stanley

NOSENKO's Information

06

ZIRING»

a student who visited the USSR in 1960,

was::

recruited by the KGB after being apprehended in blackmarket

dealings.

Comment:

Interviewed in London in 1964, ZIRINGadmitted

blackmarketeering but denied recruitment.:

British authorities concluded that he may have

given

"the impression of willingness to cooperate

without realizing the purpose of the Soviet

offer.

British authorities report

no evidence

of subsequent contacts between ZIRING] and

Soviet officials.

NOSENKO claims

was in the

American Depart-

ment at the time ZIRINGJiwas recruited by the

Seventh Department.

06

435

0001667

Top Secret

TS No. 197124

10

Copy

gIBR

---

## Page 406

Top Secret

Index of Personalitles

ABEL, Col. Rudolf Ivanovich

34

ABIDIAN, John

V.

229, 241,

153, 155, 180, 194, 205-222, 224, 225,

242, 246,

ACTOR, EU ee PROCIORD ?59, 260, 344, 351, 404'

AGAYANTS, Ivan Ivanovich

283

"AGLODINA" (KGB cryptonym

• Ior Yelena S. KOSIENKO)

ALBAMONTE, Marion

3117

ALBINGER, Donald

400}

ALEKSEYEV, Aleksandr Ivanovich

253

ALEKSEYEV, Vladimir Kuzmich

305, 306

ALEKSIEV, Georgi Velev

258

ALESHIN, Yevgenly Nikolayevich

ALLOYAN,

Lawrence

400, 401706

221, 222, 390

"ANDREY" (KGB cryptonym for Dayle Wallace SMITH)

99, 152, 165, 238, 239, 287

O6 ANDREYEV, Igor Ivanovich

376, 3917

ANDRIANOV, Vladimir Nikolayevich

387, 395]ü6

ANKUDINOV,

Vladimir Mikhaylovich

138

06

06

"ANOD" (KGB cryptonym for Alexander SVENCHANSKIY

APISSON, Henry

401)

"ARKHANGELSKIY"

215, 216

ARKHIPOV, Nikolay Alekseyevich

06 ARKHIPOV, Petr Mikhaylovich

123

372}

O ARMSTRONG, Robert

402, 413]

"ARSEN" (KGB cryptonym for John

• V. ABIDIAN)

ARTAMONOV, Nikolay Fedorovich (Defector)

ARTUR Vladimir L' vovich

214, 284,285

(KGB cryptonym for Arsene

FRIPPED) 06

U AVDEYEV, Vladimir Dmitriyevich

389, 390]

BAGRICHEV, Nikolay Grigoryevich

35,

36

BAKHVALOV, Mikhail Fedorovich

153, 154, 223

BALDIN, Boris Andreyevich

259

BANNIK, Maj. Gen. (See BANNIKOV)

BANNIKOV, Sergey Grigoryevich

389

276, 384, 390

BARGHOORN, Frederick

298-302, 326

BARKOVSKIY, Vladimir Borisovich

06 BARRETT, Robert

296

127, 134-136, 2491

79

22, 33-37,

292

207

47, 373

137, 156

437

Top Secret

0001668

TS No. 197124

Copy

10

iS/BR

---

## Page 407

Top Secret

O6 BARTRELEMY, Thomas Frankiln

06

BEGGS, Frank

1 5, 1k1, 197. 192)

403]

BELANOVSKIY, VICtOI (KGB. cryptonym

'"STROYEV")

110, 116

BELITSKIY, Borls Yefimovich

106,2681 280,282-287, 291

317, 331,:332,.337

"BELKIN"

(KGB

cryptonym for Boris BELITSKIY)

282

BELOGLAZOV, VIktor

.159, 221; 222, 225, 246

BELOV, Ivan Andreyevich

.391

Aib.r

BENSON, John S.

87, 93-96, 981

OOBENYAMINOV, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich

50, 363|3

BERMAN, Harold

403 -1

O6 BIENSTOCK, Natalie

273, 274

BINDER, Peter

203, 204,234.

403-405

BIRSE,

Arthur

104, 114, 122,

123,

125.

126, 144)

BIRYUKOV, Vadim Os1povich

427, 428

BLAKE, George

30, 102, 148, 149, 247. 263, 327, 331

BOBKOV, F1l1p Denisovich

O6 BOLSHAKOV, Georgly Nikitovich (GRU)

- 398]

BORODIN, Nikolay Mikhaylovich (aka Norman M.

BORODIN)

35,

94, 95

BORISOV,

Ivan Dmitriyevich

411

BORISOV,

Petr Pavlovich

377.

BOWDEN, Lewis

W.

139,

141, 142,

BRADLEY, Jerome G.

"178)

242,

314

BRAUNS, Horst

268, 288-2917

BROCHES, Adam

405, 406)

D

PROCHES, Alexander.

4.051

Dnocwes, Ignacy ::

406

BRODNEY, Kenaeth

807

BROWN, G. Staniey

820,08

z0,

227, 244

BUBNOV, Oleg Sergeyevich

32

BUDYLDIN, Valeriy

83, 84

BUHLE, Johannes

402l

BUNDARIN, Eugene Peter

406, 4071

: 06 BURGI, RIchard

99, 110, 113, 115-120, 144,

344,

BUTENKO, John W.

298, 368

346]

O CARDELLA,

James

CECCHI,

Pletro

194,

87, 198

97

199, 200

208

CHELNOKOV, Col. Vladimir Dnltriyevich

18, 29, 139, 140,

142, 259,

276, 292 ,

305,

34.6

CHEREPANOV, Aleksandr Nikolayevich

76,264,309-313, 319,

06

322, 326, 381, 411, 412

[CHERNYAVSKIY,

Viktor Petrovich

CHERNYSHEVA,

387,

• 390 ,

, 395]

fnu. (Eddy GILMORE's

sister-in-law)

CHRISTNER,

Robert Charles 407

CHUCHUKIN, Vladimir Aleksandrovich

370, 372)

CHURANOV, Vladimir Aleksandrovich

30-31,97

438°

Top Secret

0001669

TS No. 197124

Copy

248R

---

## Page 408

Top Secret

06

DANKO, Yevgentya "Jane"

DAY,

Frank

109

201, 2023

DEMKIN, VladInir (mnu)

DERA, Vitally Grigoryevich

159, 161, 182, 194, 203, 222, 246, 406

272,

273,

406

DEREVENSKOV, Gennadiy Georgiyevich

370

DERYABIN, Petr Sergeyevich (KGB defector 1954)

380, 381, 396

17, 61, 277,

DITYATEV,

Duitrly Alekseyevich

"DMITRIYEY"

84

427

DMITRIYEV, Aleksandr Anatolyevich

DMITRIYEV, Sergey Georgiyevich

107, 108,249

228

DRANOV, Vasiliy (mnu)

ObDREW, George

221,

06

DRIBERG, Tom

126, 1121

222

131, 347)

DUBAS, Konstantin Nikitovich

152, 153, 304-306

124, 125, 127, 129, 130, 133,

DUMKOV, Gen. (Bulg: MVR)

257

DVORKIN, Yurly Mikhaylovich

DWELLY

TEDVIN", Robert

294

202, 203)

06

•(KGB cryptonym for

EL SHAZLY, Mohammed Sarwat

Gerald

SEVERN)

426

O6EPISON, Henry

194, 198,

1.99

(Seé llenxy APISSON)

06

FAIN,

Thomas

407, 408)

06.

EARMAKOVSKAYA, O1ga A.

392, 3937

FEDOROVA, DOIa

92,

93

FEDOROVICH, Tatyana

208,

214, 215,

216

FEDOSEYEV, Sergey Mikhaylovich

313, 406

159, 229, 237, 239, 259, 307,

FEDYANIN, Vladimir Petrovich

158

FEKLISOV, Aleksandr Semenovich

Ob FELCHLIN, Howard I.

117. 119,. 314

87,

90-93]

FILATOV, Vladimir Gerasimovich

OoFINK, David

279, 294

408,

409)

O6 FISK, Norman

145, 409

FOFANOV,

Fedor (mnu)

25,

27

FOMIN (allas of A. FEKLISOV)

314, 368

ObFREERS, Edward L.

I6FRIPPEL, ArSEnE

103,

32 :2230137-144,3249.

:265, 266, 3471

J6 ERIPPEL, Odette (MIs. AIsene FRIPPEL,

139)

FUNKHAUSER, Richard

O6 [CABELKO, Sergey Stepanovich

376]

06(GAFFEY, Joseph

203, 2043

GAMKRELIDZE, Revas

Valeryanovich

386, 387

GARBLER, Paul

246-248

JGARLAND, John

189-192, 199, 254}

GARST, Roswell

109

GAVRICHEV, Sergey Ivanovich

279, 318

439

Top Secret

0001670

TS No. 197124

Copy

10

I7'ER

---

## Page 409

Top Secret

GAVRILENKO, Nikolay Aleksandrovich

: 159, 211, 222

GAZARYAN, Oganes.

400

06 GEURCKENS, Hans

113,

06GILMORE, Eddy.

76,

121,-

1447

71. 78,

79,

80

OGGINSBERG, Michael

145, 409, 410

GLAZUNOV, Ilya Sergeyevich

GLEYSTEEN, Culver

•158

227, 230

COLD, Harry

293]

GOLITSYN, Anatolly Mikhaylovich

17-19, 30, 38, 39,

62, 76

162, 163, 166, 168;

169,176,

189,

192.,

232

235,

266, 273, 283,

191,

290,

330,

364, 376, 380, 381, 383,

396,

403, 405;407,

431

DE. GOLOS, Jacob

2937

GOLOVKO, Admiral Arseniy Grigoryevich

GOLUBEV, Sergey Mikhaylovich

277,

GORBACHEVA; Klara Konstantinovna

"GRAY"

384,

•137

53

385

392

GRIBANOV, General Oleg Mikhaylovich

15, 20, 37, 38, 115,

117, 127, 144

• 146, 153, 154, 159, 166, 167, 168, 170 г

172, 194, 235

3237

, 239, 257, 259,

260,

275,

298-302,

304, 307,

311, 315-317, 321,

331,

276,

291,

335-337,

346-349, 352, 360; 367; 368, 384, 385; 387-392 ;::

3947

"GRIGORIY" (KGB cryptonym for Aleksey YEFREMOV)

GRINEVSKIY, Oleg Alekseyevich

156.

279

GRISHNYAI,

Tatyana (mnu)

32; 226

GROMAKOVA, Ludmila

89, 209, 211, 220

GROMAKOVSKIY, Yevgenly (mnu)

159.

06

GROVER, Preston

GRYAZNOV, Gennadly:

410

Ivanovich

155, 156, 159, 160-163, 168-170,

182, 185, 186,.

193, 194, 202, 204, 217, 223, 225, 226, 229,

235, 239, 259, 267,.

298, 300,

382, 413, 415

GUK;

Yurly Ivanovich

62 ;

280,

281,

311, 318, 383, 384, 387

GUSKOV, Sergey Mikhaylovich

• 119, 130

HAMAN, Arthur:

:: 432

HAMZAVI, Charles P.

Hanna"

• Inu

194

411-

08

HARMSTONE, Richard

06LARRIS, LARRIS, Gisella

12732128315, 411, 412J

HAYHANEN,

Reino (KGB defector

1957)

34

O6 HOFFMAN, F. Stephen

402,

413]

06 HOFFMAN, Col. Theodore F•

180, 2341

HORBALY, W1ll1am

226,

2:27,

243,

244

HOUGHTON, Captaln I.

C.

227

HOWARD, Herbert

413,

414

HURLEY, William S.

164,

165)

06.

HUSTON, Hayden Henry.

414

44.0

Top Secret

0001671

TS No. 197124

Copy

16/8R

---

## Page 410

14-0000

220

lop secrel

ILYIN, Sergey Aleksandrovich

25

ISAKOV, Viktor Fedorovich

366

IVANOV, {nu

108

ObEVANOV, Boris SEmenovich

46, 50, 324, 362, 363, 366, 369,

370, 374, 386)

IVANOV, IgOI

Aleksandrovich

298

IVANOV, Vladimir Maksimovich

428

IVANOV, Vladimir Vladimirovich

130

IVANOVA, Svetlana N.

194, 196,

198, 199, 203, 204

IVASHUTIN, Petr Ivanovich

347

JACKSON, Henry ".

426

JACOB, Richard C.

404

DO JAFFE, Saw

4151

06 JELISAVCIC, Michael

109

06 JENNER, Paul

164, 185-190,

192

JOHNSON, Hedwig (Mrs. Fobert

Lee JOHNSON)

23, 28

JOHNSON, Robert Lee

24-27,

349, 380

O6 GOHNSON, Wallace Everett

1.12 ,

220,

260, 267-272, 290, 291, 349/

06 KADERA,

O6JONES, : Fred

W1ll1an Carroll, III

272,2731

203]

KALNINSH, Kharly Yanovich

385

KALOSHIN, Colonel (RU) (fnu)

51-53,

56, 59

06

KALUGIN, Oleg Danillovich

372,3731

"KAMO"

209

KANTOR, Marvin (or Melvin)

145, 415, 416

KARETNIKOV, Venyamin Zasimovich (or Venedikt Vasilyevich)

25, 27

Db KARLOV,

fnu

113, 145.

O KASISCHKE, Richard

79)

RAZAN-KOMAREK; Vladim1r Joseph

416, 4171

06 KEYSERS, James G.

157, 165, 178-181,

234,

236, 258

06

RHAMZAI, Charles

(See Charles P. HAMZAVI)

KHODAKOVSKIY, EnU

117

KHOKHLOV, Nikolay (KGB

defector 1954)

76

KHRENOV, Nikolay (mnu)

83,84

KILLHAM, Edward A.

314

06/RIPTENKO, Vadim A.

374

RISLIISYN, F1l1p Vasilyevich

84

KISLOV, Aleksandr Konstantinovich

279, 280,284,

415

KISLOV, Slava (allas of and see V.A. KUSKOV)

415

O6(RZOSSON, Bor1s

241]

KLYPIN,

Vladimir Alekseyevich

153,

154, 159, 161, 186, 206,

209, 222,

226, 227, 237, 255,

428

KOBULOV, General Bogdan

06

Zakharovich

49,51, 55,57, 62, 64-66,

KOLOBASHKIN, Aleksey Mikhaylovich

380]

KOLOSOV, (allas of V.V. KOSOLAPOV)

KOLOSSOV, Viktor Dmitriyevich (alias of V. V. KOSOLAPOV)

187, 192

441

Top Secret

6001672

TS No. 197124

Copy

10

16/SR

---

## Page 411

8 dif sno duo yek dint la

06./KOMAREK (See KAZAN-KOMAREK)

KOMAROV, Vladimir Mikhaylovich (allas of V.M. KOVSHUK)

=33, 412

•KONSTANTINOV, Ivan Alekseyevich

108, 109

KOPEYKIN, VIktOT

$18

KOROLEV, YuIly Dmitriycvich

KORNIENKO, Georgly

"KOSHIKIN"

Markovich

396,

397

366

110

KOSIENKO, Yelena S. (KGB cryptonym "'AGLODINA")

7.9

KOSOLAPOV, Vadim Viktorovich

155, 156, 159, 160-163, 182,

185-196, 199-204, 206, 223, 235, 254, 261, 435

KOSTYRYA, Vladimir Viktorovich

141

66/

KOTEN, Bernard

320181626

295, 296, 326, 421]

KOVALENKO, Anatolly. Grigoryevich

323, 346

273, 298-300, 302, 305,317,

KOVALEV, Fellks

• 366

KOVSHUK, Vladislav Mikhaylovich

33-36, 78, 94, 95, 153-159,

161, 163, 167, 168, 172, 174-177,

186, 195,

206, 209, 217,

222,

422, 428

223, 226-229, 242, 244, 245, 250,259-261, 290, 412.

KOZHEVNIKOVA, Lyudmila Yullanovna

55,

57

KOZLOV, Anatolly Sergeyevich

117-120,

255, 257

KOZLOV, Venlamin Alekseyevich

06 KRAFT, VIrg11

76-79, 216,

218

127, 129, 1307

ObKROTKOV, Yurly Vastlyevich

372

KRUPNOV,

Kim Georglyevich

273,

"KRYMOVA" (See Marina RYTOVA)

289, 290, 301, 303-305, 419, 432

KUKOLEV, DmitIly

86, 87

06 KULEBYAKIN, NIkolay Panteleymonovich

KUNGAROVA,

Tamara

370, 374,379,394, 3987

107, 112, 418,

419706430, 431

KURILENKO, Ivan Yakovlevich

I59.,

22.2

KUROCHKIN, InU

372

KUSKOV, Vyacheslav Aleksandrovich

KUZMIN, Nikolay Yakovlevich

153, 311, 314, 415, 422

228

BUZNETSOV, Aleksandr Ivanovich

yacheslar Aleksandrovtez213

ObFLAINE, V.A.

402, 403

252

CULLANE,

Sir Allen

104, 114,

122,

125, 144

LANGELLE, Russell

314, 315

153, 205, 207, 210, 213, 214, 241,.

260,

LARIONOVA, Alla

06

"LEBEDEV"

97, 98

(See Vladimir

MUROMTSEV)

LEBEDEV, Anatoliy Aleksandrovich

LEBEDEV, LeV

Aleksandrovich

25,

362 g4

27,

LEONOV, Mikha1l A.

418

LEONTIYEV, YuIly (mnu)

•. 84

LEVINA, Maya (mnu)

249, 250

LEVINE, Irving

R.

106, 112

442

Top Secret

6001673

TS. No. 197124

Copy

ic:BR

---

## Page 412

SHE SECTEL

"Lillian"

183, 184

LITTELL, Walace

L.

314

LOPUKHOV, Yurly Aleksandrovich

"LUCH"

116

110

O6[LUKAS (See LUKIS)

O6ZUKIS, Enu

127, 131]

Ub LUKYANOV, Pavel Pavlovich

06 EUNI, Horace G.

368]

LYALIN, InU

254,256-2587

06 fLYSOV,

276

Yurly Vasilyevich

06 MAHONEY,

Eugene

219, 245,

32201

375)

246

06

MAKASHEV, Boris Dmitriyevich

MALIA, Martin

311

113-115)

MALYUGIN, Aleksandr Stepanovich

CoMANHOFF, Martin

J.

917

153, 160, 161

Ub MARK, David

06 MARTIN,

241, 276, 286]

Captain Donald C.

06 MASON,

MARTIN, William Hamilton

178]

239

Major Anthony

UOMATLAW (also MATLO) , Ralph

227)

ObMATLO (See MATLAW)

MATVEYEV, Mikhail Georgiyevich

MAYOROV, Igor Sergeyevich

113, 145,4177

216, 217

278

MCGOWAN, Edward

148)

06,

MCGUIPE, Robert Alan

06 McKINNEY, Walter A.

147,

148)

McMILLAN,

James H.

91,92

Ob McSWEENEY, John M.

238

238)

McVICKAR, John

0O MEARNS, FIllmOre K.

311

85,

87, 88,

89]

MEDVEDEV, Viktor Sergeyevich

06 MERTENS, Gerard

.383, 384

127,

133,

MICHAUD, Marcel (alias

134, 347

06

of N.S. SKVORTSOV)

MICKELSON, Earl I.

85,

87, 88, 89

MIKHAYLOV, Aleksey Mikhaylovich

241

MIKHAYLOV, Valentin Matveyevich

MINTKENBAUGH, James Allen

422, 424,

MISHUTIN, fRu

23,

28

302

MITCHELL,

Bernon

239

MONTGOMERY, Hugh

06 MORELL, W1111am. No,

404

JI.

MORELLI, Galya

404, 405

159, 245, 248, 260, 261}

06 MORONE,

Joseph

U6 MULE, Walter

173, 174, 183, 193-199, 254, 3377

87, 94-96;.

MUROMTSEV, Vladimir

98-1001

(mnu)

105

MYARIMYAYE, Enu

125

167, 173, 198

426

443

Top Secret

0001674

TS No. 197124

10

Copy

233R

---

## Page 413

op Sorret

NEVEROVA,

06 NIELSEN.

Me:

06 NIELSEN,

Ph!::

NIKOLAYEV (a:

NIKOLAYEV,

122,

123

NIKOLOV,

NIXON, Dul::!!

NOSENKO,

1885

: =

NOSKOV, YEFfeE!!

NOVIKOVA,

OHANNES,

Gaza:!

"OKSANA"

(sce

06 OMELICH,

7exgd

OSWALD,

Pau: y

Lee

OSWALD, Mari-a

U6 ORCHARD, TheDie:.

"OZERO". ¡See

PANKRATOY,

Fate

PAQUES, Georgos

Ob PAVLOV,

GIcb ja:

OL PECHTER,

PENKOVSKIS,

Ca.

245,

3€9

PERELETOV,

50:18

PERFILYEV,

slacie:

PERFILYEV,

Yu?:

PETERSON,

PETRENKO,

Ґ:a.

181:

PETROV,

Erdckas

PETROV,

Vladi=::

PETROV, Vladis::

84,123.

PETROVA,

PETUKHOV, IvA=

POCHANKIN, V1r&.:

POPOV, Col. (Ga:)

POPTSOV, Pets 15:8

06 PREISFREUND.

10.=8=30.1

160,

101. *11

PREOBRAZHENS!!!.

PRESSMAN, ATO-

= =

PROCTOR,

Verac=

"PROKHOR" (NG:

"RAKETA"

RAMSEY,

Jares

KASHCHEPOV, !:

..*

.....!.$

...:

-=:.

252

¡alian used by NOSENKO)

.. = 2

POSINKO)

271

:91. 299, 301, 421, 432

?l.s .

:9:, 961-309, 326

•=.t. Addict

205.208, 217,219,

,:a.

3797

....

134

1!4

„діі"

:...-7

dalecICI 1954)

17, 61,

2: *

і й йe.

J83.

80%.

•384

244

egapionge "PROKHOR")

+ :3

1*7

•• TALISTREUND)

06

156, 160

300

Top Secret

0001675

TS No. 197124

Copy

MII3R

---

## Page 414

Tup Secret

DoTRASK, Walter

421,

RASIVOROV, YUILY (KGE

RASTYKAITE, fnu

colrcie:

REITZ, James I.

11?

17.

61,

RESHETNYAK, Nikolay

22 :]

RHODES, Roy

TImc:eses:

LAICHARDS, Ira. B.

33-37, !1:

Ci in

358

O6ROBERIS,

Spencer

. "]

06:

ROGOV, Nikolay (mnu)

ROSS,

O6/RUPE,

Johanna

if:

423

John

RYTOVA,

Marina

145, 380, 6:3.

O6 TSACHANEN,

L'vovna

Felix

06

icf.

SAGATELYAN, Mikha1l'

77

. 149, 265

O6 SALISBURY,

Rachyaner:

Harrison

ISARDAR" (KGB crypionym

76-5

06

SARWAT EL SHAZLY

for War:!

M !S]

156, 160

O6 (SCHWARZENBACH,

(See

Moharned taivad

Collette

I'L SHAZLY)

277, 396

SENIO, Walter P.

227

SEREBRENNIKOV, Eugene serfey

SEREBRYANKOVA, fnu

6:3. 436;

"SERGEY" (KGB cryptonym,

"SERGEY" (KGB cryptonyn

iderel::

ünknnwn)

79,.

80

SERGEYEV Or COl. SERGEYEY (allAs

FOI EIAHUIE SIEVENSAOS

SERGEYEV, Ivan Yefimovich

wsed by PiOSENKO)

SERGEYEV, Victor I.

154

123, 130-133

424

"SERVIZNIY" (KGB cryptonym lor 'indlelas

SEVASIYANOV, Gennadiy (s22

POROBYEV)

SVERN, Gerald

Gera:d SESERNJ

84 ,. 86

SHAKHOV, Pavel

145, 426)

Fedorovich

26..

SHALYAPIN, Mikhail Aleksardror'ch

276-278, 291, 317, 331, 332, 398

28

Spisi: ii

SHAPIRO,

Henty

16-80, 396.

U6ISHATTAUER, Sofia

424, 425)

SHCHERBAK, Maj. Gen.

145,

4271

(SHUBIN, John Andrew

Fedor Aleksererich

389

296, 297.

SHUBNYAKOV, Fedor Grigoryevich

326, 3497

SHULGINA, Natallya

106, 113

SEUSTOV,

Vladimir Viktorovici

"SHMELEV" (KGB cryptonym for à.i.

366

SHNYRYEV, Nikolay (mnu)

PO1K0Ї)

156

8c .

9:, 92

"SHVEDOVA" (KGB cryptonyn for Mar!ya NEVEROVA)

"SIBIRYAK"

110

SIEGAL, Jack (alías

of

M.M. BURNDIKY

SISCOE, Frank

95

94)

06

4 4S

Top Secret

85,

89, 141

0001676

TS No. 187124

Copy

1n

titk::'.

2l/SR

---

## Page 415

Top Secret

SITNIKOV, Mikhall G.

276

SKVORISOV, Nikolay Semenovich

Jo SLESINGER, Alfred Lazarevich

SMIRNOV (allas used by

NOSENKO)

SMITH, Dayle W. (See

"ANDREY")

287

SMITH, Edward Ellis

135, 167,

120, 172-174

293-295,

326j

123

33,

36, 98, 99,238,239, 260,

37-39,99,336

198, 199

SMITH, John Discoe

239

06

SMITH, Paul

SNYDER, Richard

SOBOROVA, Larissa

O6|SOCHUREK, Howard

427,

06/S0KOLOW:

4281

122

Gen. (GRU) Vsevolod Sergeyevich

297

Sonya

293J

"SOLISTKA" (KGB cryptonym, identity

SOLOMATIN, Borls Aleksandrovich

unknOwn

185-187, 189

422

SPRECHER, George Herman

06

377,

378

STEIGER,

Andrew J.

76]

VaSTEVENS,

Edmund

76, 158

JA STEVENS, Francis

245,

428.

429)

06 STORSBERG, James

191, 161, 164.

201, 234,

238, 250,

165, 166-179, 194, 198, 199,

260,

266

06

STROUD, William R.

87, 93-96,

98

T'STROYEV" (KGB cryptonym for Victor BELANOVSKIY)

SUMIN, Aleksey Konstantinovich

215'

SUNDAR, Eg11

113, 123, 124

SUTTON, Horace

104, 1057

SVENCHANSKIY, Alexander

292, 293, 295, 326)

SVIRIN, Vasilly. Grigoryevich

392

SYCHEV,

Aleksandr Anfinovich

• 390

IARABRIN, Yevgenly Anatolyevich

131, 132, 391, 394

TARASKA, W1111am

145,

429,

430]

TAYLOR, David

127, 132, 133, 144

TELEGINA, Augustina

Konstantinov.a

48,

ITOV, Col. Viktor Nikolayevich

36%

382j

55

THOMPSON,

John M.

107. 381. 420. 431

"TOMO" (KGB cryptonym for Aleksey A. DMITRIYEV)

TORMOZOV, Anatolly

79

TORREY, Carmen

431]

"TRAPEZUND" (KGB cryptonym for Oganes GAZARYAN)

400

ISYMBAL, Mikhail Stepanovich

TULAYEV, Vladimir Yevgenyevich

278,

373

280, 281, 318

TURALIN, Mikha11

Ilich

-3U5

06

TWAROG, Leon

432

UMANETS, Ella

159,

183, 184,

198

OURBAN, Peter

180,

06

222)

VAN KRAKOW, HUgO

400,

401

06 VAN LAETHEM, George

97, 98

446

Top Secret

0001677

TS No. 197124

Copy

22158

---

## Page 416

Top Secret

VARLAMOVA, Inga

159,167,169

VASSALL, Willian John C.

18, 23, 24, 30, 31, 110, 149

VERENIKIN, Aleksandr Ivanovich

121

VETLITSKIY, Arsenly Aleksandrovich

133, 297

VLADIMIROV, Vladimir Viktorovich (allas of

V.V. KOSTYRYA)

141, 362-364, 369

VLASOV: Gennadiy N.

380

VLASOV, Ivan Pavlovich

372

VOLKOV, Anatolly Ivanovich

110-113, 127, 130-136, 202, 248

256, 267-271, 407,409,417

VOLKOV, Vasilly Andreyevich

433]

#VOLODINA" (KGB. cryptonym, identity unknown)

80, 85

Volodya,

Inu

89,90

• "VOLODYA" (KGB cryptonym, identity unknown)

202

Volodya, Inu (unidentified KGB officer)

197

06 (VOLSKIY, BOriS

433, 434]

VOROBYEV, Vladislav (KGB cryptony "SERVIZNIY")

86,87

06/WALLACE, Willian

434

WASHENKO, Steven

WATKINS, J. B.

242-2447

110, 149

WEISS, Samih (KGB cryptonym

"SARDAR")

160, 161, 181-184,

250, 267

06, WHITNEY, Thomas

76-80]

WILBY, Willlam Stanley

CHILLERFORD, Frederick

127, 131, 132

127, 136, 144]

Ob WILSON, Charles

227]

OGWINDSOR, DaVId M.

227]

WINTERS, George P.

139, 142, 158,

244, 260, 314, 315, 412

ObYAZHINSKAYA, Enu

169]

O6XEAGER, F.J.

91)

YEFREMOV, Aleksey

(mnu)

110-113, 127, 130-136, 202, 248,

256, 267-270, 272, 409, 417

YEFREMOV, Leonid Ivanovich

YEGOROV, Mikhail (mnu)

301,

302

255,

257

YEGOROV, Sergey Ivanovich

254

YEREMEYEVA, Nina Ivanovna

383

YERMAK, Yevgenly Ivanovich

3727

435]

• Inu.

, Inu

ZARUBIN, Vasilly

Mikhaylovich

ZAYISEV,

O6 ZAYTSEV, Valentin Aleksandrovich

ZEMSKOV, Nikolay

237

O6 ZIRING, Stanley

ZIRENCOStenkolay Timseyevich

O6 ZUBON, William J.

Matas

ZUJUS,

Matthew P.

@6 ZWANG, Maurice

405

363, 364]

317

184]

161, 164, 178, 181-184, 238, 250, 267,

2007

6001678

447

T5 No. 197124

Top Secret:

Copy

20182

---