RICHARD BISSELL
Agency: SSCIA
Originator: SSCIA
Document date: 8/6/75
Document type: MEMORANDUM

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JFK Assassination System

Identification Form

Agency Information

Date:

7/7/2015

AGENCY :

RECORD NUMBER :

RECORD SERIES:

SSCIA

157-10014-10169

MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M-74

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :

FROM:

TO:

TITLE:

SSCIA

RICHARD BISSELL

DATE: 08/06/1975

PAGES: 33

SUBJECTS:

Released under the John

Assassination Records

1 Act of 1992

144 USC 2107 Notel.

Case#:NW 54653 Date:

0-23-2017

ZRRIFLE

BISSELL, RICHARD

DOCUMENT TYPE: MEMORANDUM

CLASSIFICATION: Declassified

RESTRICTIONS: 1B; 1C

CURRENT STATUS : Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 05/31/2000

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS: CCBOX 354

v9.1

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Date :

Page:

08/07/95

1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY

RECORD NUMBER

RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

SSCIA

157-10014-10169

MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE--CHURCH COMMITTEE

: 07-M-74

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR :

SSCIA

FROM

TO

TITLE : RICHARD BISSELL

DATE : 08/06/75

PAGES

:33

SUBJECTS : BISSELL, RICHARD

ZRRIFLE

DOCUMENT TYPE : MEMORANDUM

CLASSIFICATION

:TOP SECRET

RESTRICTIONS: REFERRED

CURRENT STATUS : POSTPONED IN FULL

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 01/08/99

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : CCBOX 354

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

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RICHARD BISSELL

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"SENSITIVE

INTERVIEW AND ME: TNG SUMMARY

PERSE I

of

FILE:

Interview by telephone (203-677-1792) with Richard Bissell on

August 6, 1975 (6:00 p.m:) conducted by Joseph di Genova. (Bissell's

office: 203-677-2063).

I reviewed for Mr. Bissell the new documents related to the

July 1960 incident. This included the July 21, 1960 cable from

angley indicating that the

ban leaders being saven serious con remal at his thre Bissell's

independent recollection of that and events about which he had

previously testified was not jogged. He said that cable "is just

further evidence bearing on the state of mind in Washington toward

the Cuban operation." At this point I traced for him the steps of

E. to minkle, who sent out the July 21, 1960 cable, and explained

Hinkle's recollection concerning Barnes involvement in the writing

of the cable.

Bissell then noted that "Bares would probably have

told me about it at the time."

Wher asked about the langauge "receiving serious consideration,"

Bissell said that "that suggests to me that the idea was indeed

receiving serious consideration and that headquarters was anxious

to explore the possibility with the asset.". "Dulles would have

known that this was being considered." When informed that the

cable was subsequently superceded by a cable telling Havana to

"Drop Matter' Bissell said that Dulles probably considered this

particular effort "too risky, because we didn't know enough about

the asset, and because too many innocent people would have been

killed by crashing a plane." He speculated that Dulles may have

ordered the cancellation of the first cable because the plan did

not involve the killing of all three of the top leaders but rather

only one, Raul Castro Ruz.

1 informed Bissell that J.C. King said that he was probably

circumvented on this particular matter; i.e., the incident and

also the serious consideration. Bissell remarked that he would

be "surprised that King said that he would have been excluded

from that type of thing."

Bisseli could remember no cases where

J.C. King was not kept fully informed.

In this matter, Bissell

noted that "serious consideraton in the cable meant that discussions

occurred between Dulles, myself, Cabell, Barnes and King."

was very close to Allen Dulles and me and if Barnes told Hinkle

to send that cable with those words 'serious consideration' in it,

he would have known what he was talking about." "Barnes simply would

not have sent such a cable unless he knew for a fact that it was

receiving serious consideration."

Bissell then added that one reason

to suppose that the matter was receiving serious consideration was

that the cable authorized an "approach to the asset, which as you

know, is a risky act.

Barnes would not have said in the cable that

inquiry should be made of the asset unless he had reason to believe

that such an operation was being very seriously considered.

he would have only thought that if it had gotten beyond the think-

tank level at the agency."

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MEMORANDUM

TO

: Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr. and Curtis Smothers

FROM: Frederick Baron

• DATE: July 16, 1975

RICHARD BISSELL

Index to Issues

The attached "Summary of Pertinent Testimony" from the I.G. REPORT

and the transcripts of BISSELL, HELMS, HARVEY, BUNDY, and ROSTOW is

organized by the following issues:

I. EXECUTIVE ACTION: Early 1961

II. TURNOVER OF SYNDICATE CONTACT TO HARVEY

III. AUTHORIZATION BY DCI

IV. PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORIZATION

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MEMORANDUM

TO : Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr. and Curtis Smothers

FROM: Frederick Baron

DATE: July 16, 1975

RICHARD BISSELL: SUMMARY OF PERTINENT TESTIMONY

I. EXECUTIVE ACTION (Project ZRRIFLE): Early 1961

I.G. REPORI, 1967: According to HARVEY, "early in the KENNEDY ad-

ministration BISSELI called him in to discuss what HARVEY refers to as

an Executive Action Capability; I.e., a general stand-by capability to

'carry out assassinations when required. HARVEY's notes quote BISSEL

as saying, 'The WHITE HOUSE has twice urged me to create such a capa-

bility.' BISSELI, recalls discussing the question of developing a gen-

eral capability with HARVEY." (37)

On February 19, 1962, new DDP RICHARD HEIMS approves the handling

of the project on a "special basis," including unvouchered funds au-

thorized by HARVEY's certification. (39)

BISSELL:

BISSELL recalls "assigning HARVEY the task of undertaking the

ZRRIFLE project," but he does not recall "a specific conversation with

anybody in the WHITE HOUSE as the origin of that request." (51; 6/9)

BISSELL said, however, "I have no reason to believe that HARVEY's quote

(about WHITE HOUSE urgings) is wrong." (51; 6/9) BISSELL recalled

turning the project over to HELMS and briefing him on it. (53; 6/11)

pastes:

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- Conflict on Knowledge/Authorization. BISSElL began his testimony

with uncertainty about any "urgings" from the WHITE HOUSE. At a later

point, he said: "There is little doubt in my mind that Project RIFLE

was discussed with ROSTOW and possibly BUNDY." (46) He expressed the

belief that the PRESIDENT knew of the project, although BISSELL, admitted

to having "no direct knowledge". of this. (56; 6/9) But at another

point, BISSElL testified that it was a "possibility" that the CIA in1-

tiated the project:

"it was the normal practice in the Agency and an important

part of its mission to create various kinds of capability

long before there was any reason to be certain whether

Heretre

When BISSELL returned again to the theme that "it may have been

initiated within the Agency," he characterized his conversation with.

ROSTOW more as a briefing than as receiving an instruction from ROSTOW.

(80-81; 619)

Generally, BISSElt recalls that in any discussion with ROSTOW or

BUNDY, "all aspects of the creation of the capability" (50; 6/11) would

have been mentioned. BISSElL said it was "quite possible" that he dis-

cussed CASTRO, TRUJILLO, and LUMUMBA with ROSTOW as examples of assas-

sination targets. (50; 6/11) BISSELL, said that the subject might have

arisen at the weekly luncheon meetings at the State Department attended

by BUNDY, ROSTOW, and representatives from State, CIA, and Defense.

(81-82; 6/9)

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HARVEY:

HARVEY confirmed the accuracy of the I.G. REPORT version of his

Initial discussion of Executive Action with BISSELL. (36-37; 6/25)

HARVEY testified that his "net impression" from the discussion with

BISSElL was that both Executive Action and the ongoing poison pill

assassination plot were "fully authorized and approved"' (54; 6/25),

although no specific individual in the "WHITE HOUSE" was mentioned.

(81; 6/25) HARVEY said that after his initial meeting with BISSEl,

he discussed the propriety and feasibility of assassination with se-

lected CIA officers, who generally expressed a "negative reaction."

(40; 6/25) After a subsequent meeting with BISSELL, HARVEY continued

to develop the assassination capability without mounting an operation

or communicating the objective to any potential asset who was being

- assessed. (45; 6/25)

Chronology. HARVEY has notes (see attachment) of two meetings to

discuss Executive Action which he is "almost certain" took place in

1961. (51; 6/25) On January 25, he met with SIDNEY GOTTLIEB, the new

Chief of CIA's Technical Services Division. On the following day, he

met with ARNOLD SILVER, who recruited agent QWIN - the only agent

HARVEY ever employed in Project ZRRIFLE (for the purpose of "spotting"

potential assets). (50-55; 6/25) HARVEY said that these meetings took

place after his Initial discussion of Executive Action with BISSELL,

thus placing that meeting in "early January." (52; 6/25)

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ROSTOW:

ROSTOW testified that during his entire tenure in government, he

never? heard a reference to Executive Action or "such a capability or

such an intention to act by the U.S." (10) He has no recollection of

irstructing BISSELL to establish such a capability. (10) He testified

that he was "morally certain" (13) that such a discussion was "unlikely

to the point of being virtually unthinkable" (1l) for a number of reasons:

1. Such a discussion would be memorable. (1l)

2. The division of national security responsibility between ROSTOW

and BUNDY "excluded me from the covert operations business." (11)

3. He believes that assassination historically has proven counter-

productive and it would be especially so for an open society like the

U.S. where leaders are vulnerable to attack. (11)

4. Assassination Is morally "repugnant" to ROSTOW. (11)

5. By January 25-26, ROSTOW had been in the Administration less than

a week and had heavy responsibilities concerning the USSR and Laos thrust

upon him for immediate consideration. He found it "Incredible" that he

"would go launching off in that week with suggestions for the planning"

(15) of an extraordinarily sensitive operation.

6. He had no knowledge at the time that any such planning or opera-

tion was ongoing. (15-16)

7. The State Department luncheon meetings were too open a forum

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could have been held before January 26, 1961. (21-23)

ROSTOW does, however, have a calendar notation of a meeting with

BISSELL, and BUNDY at the Hay-Adams Hotel on January 27, 1961 (Staff In-

terview, 7/8 ); he has been asked to submit an affidavit on this meet-

ing.

ROSTOW explained the discrepancy between his testimony and that of

his "close personal friend" (4) by saying that BISSElL's memory of the

period may be blurred by the traumatic experience of the Bay of Pigs

which occurred shortly afterward. (55) In the event of a blurred memory,

ROSTOW felt that he and BUNDY might have been used as possible WHITE

HOUSE contacts in BISSELL's mind because they were "his closest friends

in the WHITE HOUSE at that time." (17) ROSIOW also suggested that un-

der ALLEN DULLES, the CIA fell into the habit of operating "quasi-auton-

omously" without correct clearance from the PRESIDENT (27-28) -- a habit

which may have produced a "compulsion" to place a retrospective blessing

upon the operation. (19)

BUNDY:

BUNDY does recall being told about the development of an Executive

Action capability "in a general way" (4): as an untargeted (5) "сара-

bility coming into being" rather than a mounted operation. (7) Bundy

testified:

"I am sure I gave no instruction. But it 1s only fair to

add that I do not recall that I offered any impediment after

I was briefed. (10) ...I wouldn't have the authority to give

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any such instruction, and I would have been only the chan-

nel to give such instruction. (13) ...I would have had to

take the matter to the PRESIDENT, because I had no indepen-

dent authority." (16)

BUNDY testified that as far as he could recall, he did not take the mat-

ter to the PRESIDENT. (16) BUNDY's impression was that the CIA was

"testing my reaction," not "seeking authority." (15) BUNDY does not

recall who told him of the Executive Action project, but "it surely

might have been" BISSELI, (15), or some other senior CIA official. (14)

BUNDY said that he worked on the assumption that he would be told of

sensitive covert operations, such as an assassination plot, but BISSELI,

never mentioned

such a thing to him. (41) BUNDY said that he did not

take steps to dissuade the person who briefed him on the assassination

capability or to pursue the matter in any other way (19) because he

was satisfied

"that this was not an operational activity, and would not

become such without two conditions: first, that there be

a desire or a request or a guidance that there should be

planning against some specific Individual; and second,

that there should be a decision to move against the indi-

vidual." (7)

BUNDY rated the chance that the conversation about Executive Action

took place before January 25-26 as "near zero"' because of the problems

with which he was preoccupied in the first week in government. (9)

HELMS:

HEIMS recalls Executive Action (ZRRIFLE) as "a tiny little thing"

(52) which nonetheless had as one of its purposes a capability to as-

sassinate foreign leaders. (54) He remembered that there was a single

Mirat

[...

:. ......

that epin

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asset who was a "capability in being....If you needed somebody to carry

out murder I guess you had a man who might be prepared to carry it out."

(50) "I finally phased it out," HEIMS said. (51) HEIMS said that the

"special basis" for handling ZRRIFLE funds was for bookkeeping reasons

(53) to avoid the normal clearance procedures. (54)

II. TURNOVER OF SYNDICATE CONTACT TO HARVEY

I.G. REPORT, 1967:

Project ZRRIFLE continued on a separate course from the CIA-ROSELLI

poison pill assassination plot against CASIRO until November 15, 1961:

"HARVEY has a note that on that date he discussed with

BISSELL the application of the ZRRIFLE program to Cuba.

HARVEY says that BISSELL instructed him to take over

EDWARDS' contact with the criminal syndicate and there-

after to run the operation against CASTRO." (39)

BISSELL:

BISSELL testified that he did not recall directing the reactivation

of the project but, he said, "I think I did, as part of Mr. HARVEY'S

responsibility for Project RIFlE, instruct him to take over the contact."

(19; 6/11) BISSELL agreed that the purpose of the contact had been to

assassinate CASTRO and said that "it is a fair inference that there

would have been no reason to maintain it /the' contact unless there was

some possibility of reactivating that operation." (19; 6/11)

BISSELL, was more explicit later that day: "late in 1961 or early

in 1962... the contact with the syndicate which had CASTRO as its target

...folded into the ZRRIFLE project...and they became one." (47; 6/11)

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BISSELI does not recall telling anyone in the WHITE HOUSE that some-

thing had been done to bring a CIA officer together again with the crimi-

nal syndicate. (19-20; 6/11)

HARVEY:

HARVEY recalls being asked by BISSELL. to "takeover the ROSELLI opera-

tion" (86; 6/25) in the context of discussing Executive Action. (19; 6/11)

HARVEY does not recall any mention of the WHITE HOUSE in this discussion.

(21, 60-61;6/11) HARVEY told HELMS about the talks with BISSELL when

HEIMS took over as DDP. (63; 6/11)

HELMS:

HELMS does not recall that ZRRIFLE was ever contemplated as a capa-

bility to assassinate CASTRO. (55)

III. AUTHORIZATION WITH DCI

I.G. REPORT: In the latter part of September 1960, after BISSELL,

EDWARDS, and O'CONNELL had initiated an operation to assassinate CASTRO

using syndicate contacts:

"with BISSELL present, EDWARDS briefed the Director (ALLEN

DULLES) and the DDCI (GENERAL CABELL) on the existence of

a plan involving members of the syndicate. The discussion

was circumspect; EDWARDS deliberately avoided the use of

any 'bad words.'

The descriptive term used was 'an intel-

ligence operation.' EDWARDS is quite sure that the DCI and

the DDCI clearly understood the nature of the operation he

was discussing... EDWARDS states that, while there was no

formal approval as such, he felt that he clearly had tacit

approval to use his own judgment." (18)

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BISSELL:

"Relying heavily on the I.G. REPORT" for his recollection of the

meeting with DULLES (21; 6/9), BISSELt said at one point that he "be-

lieved" DULLES had been briefed (22-23; 6/9) and at another point he

was "quite convinced" DULLES knew the nature of the operation. (24; 6/9)

He could only "guess" about whether subsequent conversations with DULLES

about the operation would have occurred (24-25; 6/9), although he was

"virtually certain" that DULLES "would" have asked for reports about

the "SHEF EDWARDS operation." (25; 6/9)

BISSElL acknowledged that before the meeting with DULLES, contact

had been made with the Mafia in connection with the operation (20; 6/9),

although the $150,000 contract on CASIRO's life had not yet been made.

BISSELL had "no explanation" for why. EDWARDS would have reported as

follows to the FBI in May 1961, in

an interview about the wiretap inci-

dent. (65; 619)

"Colonel EDWARDS advised that only Mr. BISSETI (Direc-.

tor of Plans, CIA) and two others in CIA were aware of the

GLANCANA-MAHEU activity in behalf of CIA's program and ALLEN

DULIES was completely unaware of EDWARDS' contact with MAHEU

in this connection." (5/22/61 FBI memo re- "Arthur James BAL-

LETTI, et al.") (Emphasis added.)

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IV. AUTHORIZATION OUTSIDE OF THE CIA IN THE EISENHOWER

ADMINISTRATION

A. Bissell

Bissell testified that as of the Fall of 1960, he

knew nothing of clearances outside the CIA for the

Castro assassination effort. (Bissell, Vol. I,

Tr. 30).

Bissell met frequently with the Special

Group in the Fall of 1960, but never informed the

Special Group that there was an effort underway to

assassinate Castro. (Id., 25-26). Thus, the ques-

tion of President Eisenhower's knowledge rests on

whether Allen Dulles informed him of the Castro

plot. Bissell assumed that Allen Dulles would ob-

tain the required authorization above the CIA level.

Bissell conceded that he is "guessing" that Dulles

informed Eisenhower. As Bissell explained, however,

his guess that Dulles informed President Eisenhower

"is not based on hard evidence" but is "pure personal

opinion." (Bissell Ir. Vol. I, 61). Bissell further

characterized this method as one of "obliquely" ad-

vising the President (Bissell Tr. Vol. I, 47), and

of a "circumlocutious" approach (Bissell Ir. Vol. II,

p. 6).

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On other occasions involving sensitive covert

operations, Dulles had told Bissell he had used the

"circumlocutious" approach with President Eisenhower.

(Bissell Ir. Vol. II, 10). But with respect to the

Castro assassination attempt, Dulles did not tell

Bissell he had used this approach, according to

Bissell's recollection. (Id., 11) .

B. Gray

Gray testified he did not believe Allen Dulles would

have approached President Eisenhower without inform-

ing Gray who was Eisenhower's Special Assistant for

National Security Affairs. (Gray Tr. 35). Mr. Gray

further

testified that his relationship with President

Eisenhower was such that President Eisenhower "would

discuss

with me anything that came to his attention

independently of me." (Id., 7). And he testified

that President Eisenhower never discussed with Gray

the subject of a Castro assassination or of the use

of the syndicate and Cubans in such an effort. (Id.).

Gray testified that in mid-1960 President

Eisenhower approved a "four-point program" which

ultimately resulted in the Bay of Pigs invasion of

Cuba. (Tr. 14). Gray recalled that the four points

comprised (1) sabotage, (2) economic sanctions,

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(3) propaganda, and (4) training of the Cúban exile

force. (Id.). Gray testified that discussion of

the "overthrow" of the Castro government in the con-

text of this program did not constitute authority to

conduct an assassination of Castro. (Tr. 18).

Specifically, Gray testified that unless the CIA was

given

direct order to assassinate Castro or such

assassination was included in a specific program, the

CIA had

no authority to attempt an assassination. (Id.).

Moreover, Gray emphasized that throughout the

Eisenhower Administration - through the day

President Eisenhower left office on January 21, 1961 --

"there was no plan or action committed" with respect

to launching the proposed invasion to overthrow

Castro. (Tr. 40).

The minutes of the Special Group meeting on

November 3, 1960, state that the State Department

representative, Livingston Merchant, inquired

"whether any real planning has been done for taking

direct positive action against Fidel, Raoul and

Che Guevara." (Gray Ex. 1): In response, Gen. Cabell,

the Deputy Director of CIA, is recorded as concluding

thạt such

action "is, beyond our capabilities." (Id.).

In his testimony, Gray agreed that those minutes

indicate that subject of a Castro assassination was

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discussed in the exchange between Mr. Merchant and

General Cabell.

(Gray Tr. 9, 17).

The records of a National Security Council

meeting on March 10, 1960*

and a Special Group meeting

on March 14, 1960 contain phrases that arguably refer

to discussion of a Castro assassination.

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BISSELL

#1

FDB

vate:

T'rs:

Cetober Is, ISco

director

Central Intelligence agency

Atiention: Deputy Director, Plans

From:

John Edgar Hoover, Director

JINICCE:

ANTI-CASTRO ARVINS

LITTERIAL SECURITY - CULA

Tie folloving intornation has been reported by a

source whose reliabilitr has not been testod but wo is in

silosivor in potain incoration concerning the accivicios

bauel il. friancana, weil-known racketeer fron biicago,

illinois:

According to the source, during rocent conversation

with sevoral richos, Ginacana statec that fidel Castro vas to

be dore away with very shorily. when collot was expressed

regarding wig statone Giancana reporiedly assured taose.

presort tiat Cestro's assassination vould occur in lovenver.

he alleycaly indicated that ie lad already met with

tie last meeting taring

ace on a boat docked at the containbicau riotel, mani beach,

Resortoaly, Cancana claimed that everythias nas

bond perfecico for the tialing of Last and that ine

"assassin""

Latárranged vich a siri, not furthei duscribed, to drop a

"will" in some drink or food of Castro's.

The source further advised

that Giancana reportodly

staied that Castro is in the advanced stages of syphilis. anc

is not compleicly rational.

ic are makin' criorts to outain

additional information conceming these alicgations, which

have not voch substantiated, and rccipicnt agencies vill be

rept advised oi any additional

portincht cata receivei.

1- bffice or Security

ulepartment of State

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SECRET

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## Page 22

PireCtOr

Contral intelligonce Agency

1 - Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence

Departiont of the Amy

Autontion: Chick, Security Division

i- parice di opecial investigations

Air vorce

Attention: Chief, Countcrintclligence Division

i - viroctor of kaval intelligence

I - Assistant Attormey General

Halter

scagaey

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UNTIED STITES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OL

INVESTIGATION

I1 Reply, Please dirjer 10

File No.

TOP SECRET

TYASHINCTON 25, D. C.

Hay 22, 1961

ARTHUR JIES BALLETTI, et al.

On May 3, 1961, Colonel Sheffiold Edwards

Director of Security,

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

furnished the lollowing information.

Colonel Edwards advised that in conncction with

CIA's operation against Castro he personally contacted robert

Maheu during the roll of 1960 for the purpose of using Mahou

as a "cut-out" in contacts with San Giancana, a known hoodlu

in the Chicago aren.

Colonel vards said that since the

undervorld controlied

ganbling activities in Cuba under the

Batista sovoinment, it was assumed that this element would

siili cuniinit

have sourcus and contacte in Cube whinh

perhaps could de viilized

successfudiy an connection with

CIA's clandostine efforts

against the Castro gorernment.

Laheu's services vere solicited as a "cut-out"

because.of

possible entree into underworld circles.

Maheu obtained San Giancana's assistance in this rogerd and

according

to idwards, Giancana gave every indication oi

cooperating through Maneu in attempting to accomplish sevoral

•clandestine alforts in Cuba.

Lawards added that none of

Giancana's ciforts have naterialized to date and that several

plans.still are working ard may eventually "pay off."

Colonel Edwards related that he had no direct

contact with Giancana;

that Giancana's activities were

completely "nach siopped" by lancu and that Mahou vould

frequentiy raport diancana's action and information to

Euvards.

No details or methods used by Maheu or Gicacara

in accomplishing their nissions vere over reported to

Colonel idwards said that since this is "dirty

business" he couid not afford to have knowledge of the actions

of liaheu and Giancana in pursuit of any mission for cI.

Colonel Edwards added that he has neither given liaheu any

instruction

to use tochnical installntions of any type nor has

the subjeci of technical insiallations ever come

Edwards and

saheu in conneciion with Giancana's activity.

1900-53

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MEP SERET

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Colonel Edwards related that Miaheu did core t

concerning the wrest in Las Vegas of Biliciti for "vi:

Haheu cautioned Edwards that the Dalloiti artest could

sone embarrassment since sallotti was in las vegas aii

obtain coverage on some "Hollywood peopie" in connecti:

Ciancana's efforts for Cli. Edwards said that no did

the facts of the Balletii case and Maheu clains

too far' in his cricris to obinin information.

Zapati

that he was unaware of any reason ior this activity ou

or Giancana in Las Vegas and that Giancana's activity

furtherance of the anti-Castro activity was left compl:

Maheu's hands.

Colorel Edvaras advised that only Mr. Bissol:

Director of flans, CIA and to others in ClA were muc

Giancana

-Maheu

activity in behalf of CiAs progrun i

Allen Dulles was completeir unaware of cavards' contre

Kaheu in this connection.

He added that Mr. Bissoll,

his recent briefings of Goneral Tavior and the attorn:

into Cli relating

Cuban situation,

toid the attorney Geneini that sone

associatod planning included the use of Giancana and i

underworld against Castro.

"Property of FBI

This report and its contents are

lonned to you by the Fill, and

neither it nor its contants ire

1o be di tributed outride the agency

to which loaned."

2-

HEP SEMET

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CENTE

INTELLIGÉNCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

14 May 1962

MENORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

• SUBJECT: Arthur James Ballctiz ct al - Unzuthorized Publication

or Use of Communications

- 1. This memorandum for the record is prepared at the

request of the Attoiney Ceneral of the United States following a

complete oral briefing of him eclative to a sensitive CIA operation

conducted during the period approximately August 1960 to :1ay

1961.

In August 1960 the undersigned was approached by Mr.

Richard Bissell then Deputy Direcior for Plans of CIA to explore

the possibility of mounting this sensitive operation against Fidel

mastro.

It was thought that certain ganibling Interests which had

formerly bcon active in Cuba might be willing and able to assist

and further, might have both intelligence assets in Cuba and

communications betwoon miami. Florida and Cuba. Accordingly,

MI. Robcit Maheu, a private investigator of the firm of liaheu

and King was approached by the undersigned and aslied to establish ..

contact with a meinber or membeis of the gambling syndicate to

explore thoir capabilities.

Mr. Maheu was known to have accounts

with several prominent business men and organizations in the

United States.

Maheu was to make his approach to the syndicate

as appearing to represent big business organizations which wished

to protect their interests in Cuba: MI. Maheu accordingly inet

and established contact with one John Rossclli of Los Angales.

: MI. Rosselli showed Interest in the possibilily and indicated he

had some contacts in liari that he might use. Mahou icported

that John Rosselli said he was not interested in any remuneration

but would seek to establish capabilities in Cuba to perform the

desired project. Towards the end of September Mi. Miaheu and

MI. Rosscili proceeded to Miami wbere, as Icported, Maneu was

Introduced to Sam Giancana of Chicago.

Sam Giancana arranged

for Mahou and Rosselli to meet with a "courier" who was going back

s= 101786

ENES CALIT

The End f3 pages

H:.14.

Carlita;

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EYES GALY

and forth to Havana. From information received back by the

courier the proposed operation appeared to be feasible and it

was decided to obtain an official Agency approval in this regard.

pald only to the principal or principals who would conduct the

operaiion in Cuba. Maheu reported that Rosselli and Giancana

emphatically stated that they wiched no part of any payment. The

under piece the bie to prone penie dicial of the senor.

Knowledge of this project during its life was kopt

to a total of six persong and never became a part of the project

current at the time for the invasion of Cuba and there vere no

monoranda on the project nor were there other written documents

or agrenchis. The project was duly orally approve by the said

senior officials of the Agoncy..

2. Rosselli and Mahou spent considerable time in Miami

talking with the couricr. Sam Giancana was prescht diring parts

of these mectings.

Several months aiter this period Mahcu told ine

that Sam Glancana had asked hiri to put a listening device in the

room of onc Fhyllis McGuire, reported to be the mistress of Giancana.

At that time it was reporied to me that lahcu passed the matter

over to one Edward Du Boise, another private investigator. It

appears that Arthur James Balletti wis ciscovered in the act of

installing the listening dovice and was arrested by the Shcriff in

Las Vogas, Nevada. Mahou reported to me that he had roforied

the matter io Edward Du Boise On behalf of Samn Giancana. At the

time of the incident neither this Agency nor the undersigned knew

of the proposca technical installation. Malicu statod that Sam

Giancana thought that Phyllis IicGuire might know of the proposed

operation und might pass on the information to one Dan Rowan,

another friend of McGuire's.

At the time that Maheu reported this

to the undersigned he reported he was under surveillance by agents

of the Fedcial Bureau of Investigation, who, he thought, were

exploring his association with John Rosselli and San Giancana

incident to the project. I told laheu that if he was formally ap-'

proached by the FBI, he could refer them to me to be briefcd that

he was engaged in an intelligence opcration dirccted at Cuba.

3. During the period from Septemüer on through April

efforis were continued by Rosselli and Maheu to proceed with the

operation. The first princiral in Cuba withdrew and another principal

EVES CaM

TO/PEse 2013 pages

Copy lio.

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1UF SORRET

ENZS GAZY

was selocied as has boen bricica to The Attorney General. Ten ..

thousand dollars was passed for cxpenses to the second principal.

He was further furnished with approxirnately one tliousand dollars

worth of communications equipment to establish communications

between his headquarters in Miami and assets in Cuba. No

monies were ever paid to Rossolli and Giancana. Maheu was

paid part of his expense moncy during the periods that he was in

Miami. Aiter the failure of the invasion of Cuba word was sent

through Naheu to Rosselli to call off the operation and Rosselli

was told to tell his principal that the propogal to pay one hundred

fifty thousand dollais for completion of the operation had been

definitely withdrawn.

4. In all this period it has been definitely established from

other sources that the Cuban principals involved never discovered

or believed that there was other than business and syndicate interest

in the project. To the knowledge of the undersigned theic were no

"leaks" of any information concerning the project in the Cuban

community in Miami or in Cuba.

5. I have no proof but it is my conclusion that Rosselli

and Giancana guesecd or assumed that CIA was bchild the project.

I never ret either of them.

6. Throughout the entire period of the project John Rosselli

was the dominant figure in dirccting action to the Cuban Frincipals.

Reasonable monitoring of his activities indicated that he gave his

best efforts to carrying out the project without requizing any com-

mitments for hirself, financial or otherwise.

7. In view of the extreme sensitivity of the information

set forth above, only one acoitional copy of this memorandum has

been mude and will be retained by the Agency.

Sheffield Edwards

IS #141 186

EYES CALY

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3 November 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECI: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 3 November 1960

PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Douglas, Gray, Gen. Cabell,

Gen. Lansdale

PROPERTY 1!1

THE WHITE HOUSE FIS

1.

Cuba

MI. Gray inquired once more as to the status of planning for

problems which would arise post-Castro. Mr. Merchant said he

would check into the progress of the State Department group which

has been charged with developing recommendations on this matter.

From this the Group launched into a far-ranging discussion of

the entire concept of U.S. efforts against Castro. Mr. Douglas,

supported by Mr. Gray and Mr. Merchant, expounded the idea that

perhaps things have now progressed to a point where covert activities

of the type originally envisaged for CIA to undertake will not be effèctive.

Mr. Douglas referred to the extensive program of the militia, Mi. Gray

cited the matter of arms from the Soviet bloc, and Mr. Merchant dwelt

on the increasing effectiveness of Castro's measures to control the

population in ways which the Communists have developed so well. The

latter said that he and others in the State Department had originally

thought that a popular rebellion would develop within Cuba and that

this could be augmented by the comparatively small-scale eiforts of

exiles under ClA control. Now the same people are beginning to feel

morc and more that despite the numerous defections and the economic

deprivations being experienced by the middle and upper classes, time

is actually working on Castro's side. Mr. Merchant said that he

foresaw that there would occur a point in time beyond which covert

intervention would not do the job.

reen ries

Mr. Gray expressed the opinion that we will never be able to

"clean up" the situation without the use of overt U.S. military force.

He suggested the possibility of using the CIA-backed exiles to mount a

sinulated attack on Guantanamo in order to offer an excuse for overt

TIG D0S

ICE

$80

I-ESS C17

I COTRIMICAL

FRIE: 10.2.30

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intervention. This led to an involved discussion, the general conclusion

of which was that such action on our part would not be desirable, but

that should Castro be foolish enough actually to attack Guantanamo

this would almost certainly mean war. Mi. Gray said that he had had

the subject of Cuba inscribed on the NSC. agenda for next Monday in

order to be able to arrive at a top-level decision on this very point.

- He thought it essential that the policy of the U.S. should be completely

understood by responsible officials, so that any overt Cuban act would

be met with a previously-agreed-on response.

MI. Merchant stated that,

apart from any attack on Guantanamo,

he thought that some of the previous argumentation in today's meeting

was faulty, in that we could not have it both ways. By this he meant.

that it is not logical to conclude that an indigenous uprising is impossible

and yet that it is feasible for the U.S. to go in overtly and "clean up

the mess." He pointed out that if Castro's support were such that an

uprising was out of the question then an open invasion by the U.S. would

be met by a hostile population and we would be plunged into a situation

like Algeria.

Turning to the immediate problem before the Group, Gen. Cabell

outlined the general proposal to establish bases in the U.S., with the

-casons for coming to this conclusion. He cited

specifically the

possibility of U. N. investigation in Guatemala and the increased scope

of the program, which has been brought about by the increased strength

of the Castro regime. All members of the Group expressed serious

doubts as to whether such activity could be kept at all secure.

Mr.

Merchant said at one point, that although this does not represent a

final conclusion on his part, he is inclined to think that the proposal

embodies the worst aspect of both worlds; that is, the choice should

rest between continuing our operations entirely on foreign soil or

preparing to make the best possible case for overt intervention.

Mr. Gray suggested that the decision could be put up to his

associates at the same time Tibet is discussed. Mr. Merchant agreed

that this is where it should end up, but asserted that he is not prepared

to move in that direction until a survey has been made of the possibililies

of keeping operations in the U.S. unrevealed.

In this connection Gen. Cabell mentioned the possibility of using

a refugee organization - either an existing one or a contrived onc - to

backstop the operations.

1.!.

2

08.22

I3 GILY

PROPERTY !!

THE WHITE HOUSE i

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Mr. Douglas said that in any case he would be prepared to have

the Department of Defense investigate the availability of specific

locations that would be suitable.

Finally, Mr. Merchant asked whether any real planning has been

done for taking direct positive action against Fidel, Raul and Che Guevara.

He said that without these three the Cuban Government would be

leaderless and probably brainless. He conceded that it would be

necessary to act against all three simultaneously. Gen. Cabell pointed

out that action of this kind is uncertain of results and highly dangerous

in conception and execution, because the instruments must be Cubans.

He felt that, particularly because of the necessity of simultaneous

action, it would have to be concluded that Mr. Merchant's suggestion

in bevand nur ranahilitias.

02.053

SB0ZXT - EES CMY

PROPERTY M

THE WHITE HOUSE UNFICE

....

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14. Supply Drops - Cuba

Gen. Cabell explained that the Pinar de Rio supply mission had

not taken place because of the absence of specified communication

from the DZ, and the Escambray operation had been canceled because

of weather.

He said that these missions are still planned, and assumed

_ that the Group had no objections. The members so signified.

V5. U-2, Cuba

Gen. Cabell said that the photographic coverage on the first •

flight had been only about 50%, bocause of cloud cover. He continued

that we are analyzing the exact results on a priority basis and that

some time after the middle of next week we should be in a position to

make recommendations for the missions required to extend the coverage.

MI. Gray commented somewhat wryly that this was all right with

him since he "would certainly not be available to discuss anything of

this kind before the middle of next week. " The other members appeared

to have the same reaction.

6. Policy Consideration Re Cuban Exiles

MI. Gray said that Assistant Attorney General Yeagley had spoken

to him after his meeting with Col. King and Messis. Esterline and

Holman.

He had said that the information given to him by the CLA

representatives, and the arrangements for future coordination if

necessary, were entirely satisfactory to him. He had stated, however,

that a problem remains with respect to action the FBI should take;

that is, the FBI needs guidance in its handling of Cuban exile groups

other than those under the direction of CLA.

The Group agreed that the best way to attack this problem would

be to have Mi. Yeagley attend next week's Special Group meeting and

discuss the matter at first hand. Mr. Parrott was asked to make

arrangements for this.

Value of Cuba to the USSR as a Base Vis-a-vis

Cape Canaveral

Mr. Parrott gave MI. Merchant the gist of the OSI memorandum

09.89

PROPERTY OL

THE WHITE ROUSL OFFICE

-

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• visit dist

Le i wait bad died

on this subject, which bad been discussed with the rest of the Group

on 20 October 1960.

JaParratt

as

THOMAS A. PARROTT

0G1R?

5

SECRET - BISS ONLY

ThE valid locketir

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Occurrence:

In the briefing

1el November Told

President-elect KENNEDY by

DULLES and BISSELL, under close questioning BISSELL states that KENNEDY was not told

of the use of the Mafia because:

1. KENNEDY was President-elect and it was inappropriate to tell him of

this, even though BIssElL himself recognized it was peculiar that he should be advised

of the planned invasion of a foreign country, but not the assassination of its leaders;

2. Neither he nor DULLES were

following the matter closely enough to have

operational knowledge; or

3. It was DULLES' responsibility in any event.

BISSELL. then allows as to how it was "quite possible" that JFK was told but, if so,

only in general terms as neither CIA official had detailed knowledge. His best recol-

lection, though, is that the subject did not come up.

Then, pressed on when

the CIA put a contract out with the Mafia, such

knowledge Is shared with t he Presidert, he retreats to saying he believes it was the

Director's responsibility to do so.

Further, he believes that through some channel

Of DULLES', JFK was briefed on the use of the Mafia, but concedes he is only guessing.

Persons/Entities:

KENNEDY, John F. (President-elect)

DULLES, Allen

BISSELL, Richard

MAFIA

Dates:

late Nov.

1960

Categorier:

CASTRO

Source:

Bissell, 6/9/75, рр. 35-40.

Files:

Staff:

R. Dawson

11 July 1975

Dece:

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TO:

Fritz So arz

FROM: Frederic. Baron

I "F: July 10, 1975

MCGEORGE BUNDY

Testimony of Richard Bissell on EXECUTIVE ACTION

1. TABS (PP. (PP. - - 0/9/75)

Bissell testified that when he asked HARVEY to

create the EXECUTIVE ACTION CAPABILITY it "could

have been BUNDY" (49) or ROSTOW (51) who asked him

to do this.

Bissell does not recall any specific

conversation (51). Bissell and Rostow are "the

names of the two people from whom it /the request

for

such a capabilityl is most likely to come from."

(53).

2. TAB I (PP. 58-59 - - 6/9/75)

Bissell said he assumes that BUNDY and ROSTOW would

have been the bureaucratic channel for such a request

(58).

3.

TAB U (PP. 80-83 -- 6/9/75)

Bissell testified that the "urgings" for an EXECUTIVE

ACTION CAPABILITY could have come at the weekly

luncheon meetings with BUNDY, ROSTOW, and represen-

tatives from STATE, CIA, and DEFENSE (81-82).

Bissell testified that as he normally operated, he

would have replied to ROSTOW in such cases (82).

"When I reported

to him /ROSTOW/ it would have

to BUNDY as well. " (82).

gone

4. TAB V (PP. 16-19 - - 6/11/75)

IG REPORT, 1967: "On November 15, 1961, HARVEY has

a note that on that date he discussed with Bissell

the application of these ZR/RIFLE programs to Cuba.

HARVEY

says that Bissell instructed him to take over

EDWARDS'

contact with the criminal syndicate, and

thereafter to run the operation against CASTRO."

Bissell testified that he did not recall directing

for Project

(19). Bissell agreed that the purpose of the contact

Ancest

0220062205

2220021026d

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-2-

had been to assassinate CASTRO and said that "it is

a fair inference that there would have been no reason

to maintain it the contact/ unless there was some

possibility of reactivating that operation. " (19).

5. TAB W (PP. 42-53 - - 6/11/75)

Bissell testified: "There is little doubt in my mind

that Project RIFLE was discussed with ROSTOW and

possibly BUNDY." (46). Bissell said he aiscussed

"all aspects of the creation of the capability.

Bissell said it was "quite possibie" that he discussed

CASTRO, TRUJILLO, and LUMUMBA with ROSTOW as examples

of assassination targets. 50).

When asked a final time, by Senator Baker, whether he

recalled discussing

assassination capability with

ROSTOW and BUNDY, Bissell replied:

"I am

about BUNDY, but

I think ROSTOW, yes,

sir."

(52)

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