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62-116464-59

BULKY ENGL

SU

E

BIN #H6-DH6G

OM 1B-873

ITA

XEROX COPY OF COVER LETTER ENCLOSED

62-

HQ-116464

BULKY

Serial 59

62-H0-115464-E59

FBI - CENTRAL RECORDS CENTER

HQ - HEADQUARTERS

Class / Case #

Sub

Yol.

0062 116464

Serial #

59

ONLY

4/14/203771

RRP005R2DW

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I LEGAL AUTHORITIES

II JURISDICTIONAL AGREEMENTS

III ORGANIZATIONAL CHART

IV POLICIES

AND PROCEDURES

REQUEST 7-22-25 HSC

1----=

7-20-75 T. Fili-:

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(MATERIAL MUST NOT BE REMOVED FROM OR ADDED TO THIS FILE!

CLACSISIENTION NO.

FEDERAL BUREAU

of

INVESTIGATION

Bureau File Number

Serials

Voluma Numakes

she also Nos.

SAiAH. WALTER 10-37972

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62-116464-59

The Attorney General

• 904-75.:

U.S @HOUSE SELECT COMMITIEE

ON INTELLIGENCE ACIVI'S (HSC)

ReiSClet 7/22/75 reg'nd materials & documnis pre-

viously provided by this Bu to SSC. Encisd for

ur aprovl & forurang to Committee is orig of nemo

w/enclsr which is profferred as partial response

to abov-cited req of the HSC. A cc of this memo

is being furnshd for ur records. "K."

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LEGAL AUTHORITIES

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-=."

Offire of the Atorney Erneral

Mashingtun, A.C.

September 14, 196'7

MEMORAITDUDI FOR THE DIRECTOR, FEDERAL

BUREAU OF INVESTIGACION

..:

Although the bulk of criminal offenses occursing

in the course of recent siots have been local rather

chan coderal in nature: the question a=

to whether

there

vas an organization which la, had made aaranceo

plans fos, and (b) was active during any of the ciots

in the summer of 196% is one thai cannot always be

readily resolved by local authoritias.

In view of the

seriousness of the riot activity across the country:

it is most important that you use the marimun aveilanle

resources, investigative and intelligence, to collect

and report all facts bearing upon the question as to

whether there has been or is a scheme or conspiracy by

any Eroio oi whatever size, effectiveness or affiliation,

to plan, promote os aggravate riot activity.

In this connection the following federal statutes

could be applicable depending: of course, moon the desiuel

situation that develops:

Title 18, USC, Section' 2383, which proscribes

the inciting or engaging in any rebellion or

Insurrection against the authority of

the

Unitad States.

Title 18, USC, Section 2384, wich prosarioes

conspiring to overthrow or to destroy by force

the Government of the United States or to

oppose by force the authority thereon or by

• force to prevent, hinder or delay the execution

of any lan of the. United States.

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• c

2

Title 18, USO, Seation 2385, which proscribes,

inter adia, advocacy of overthrowing the

Government of the united states or the Govern-

ment of any staus, territory, District or .

possession hereo

or the Government of any

political subdivision therein by force or

violence.

Activities Affecting Armed Forces, 18 USC 2388

Selective Service, 50 USC (A00.) 462

Travel and Interstate. Transportation,

18 USC 1952 (Arson)

18 USC 831-33 (Explosive)

Assault and Killing of Federal Officers and.

Employees, 18 USO 111, 114 and 2231

Destruction Öf Covernment Froperty, 18 USC 1361 et al

Federal Firearms Act, 15 USC 901-909

,. Crimes on Federal Reservations, 18 USC 13, 81 et a1.

I appreciate that the Bureal. has constantly been

alert to this problem and is currently submitting intelli-

gence raports to us about riots and about the activity of

certain groups and individuals berore, during and aiter

a riot. Indeed, the President hes said both publicly and

privately that the zBI is conducting extensive and comprenen.

sive investigations of these matters.

There persists, however, a widespread belief that

there is more organized activity in the riots than e

presently know about. We must recognize, I believe,

thei

this is a relatively new area of investigation and intelli-

gence reporting for the FBI and the Department of Justice.

We have not heretofore had to deal with the possibility

of an organized pattern of violence, constituting a

violation of federal law, by a group of persons who make

the urban ghetto their base.of operation and whose

activities may not have been regularly monitored by

existing intelligence sources.

• In these circumstánes, we must be certain that

every attenot is being made to get all information

bearing uvon these problons; to take every step possiole

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to determine whether the rioting is pre-planned or

organized: and, if so, to determine the identity of

the people and interests. involved; and to deter this

activity by prompt and vigorous legal action.

As a part of the broad investigation which must

necessarily be conducted, it is requested that all

available information be reported and analyzed regard-

•ing each sniver caught in any riot or extremist

activity and. regarding those arrested during the course

of a riot or significant racial disturbances wo were

not, residents of the general area

noreover, sources

or informants in black nationalist organizations, SacC

and other less publicized groups should be developed

and expanded to determine the size and purpose of

•trese

groups and their relationshio to other groups, and aiso

FederaL, Lan.

Further,

we neea, to Investigate fully

allegations of conspiratorial activity that come to our

attention from outside sources such as those reported

regarding Newark in Life Magazine for July 28, 1967,

and those regaraing the detrolt riot which were furnishes

to the Depariment by walter Sheridan of the National

Broadcasting Company (summary of latter is attached).

Hansen

RAMSEY CLARK

Attorney General

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ÜRecrOir

rueral Eurom of inestigutim

Maitoà States Department of Justice

Marisgton, D. C.

August 24, 1936.

CONFIDENTIAL, MEMORANDU!

RoosEVELT

This norning, in accordance with the request of the President

conveyed to me personally by him last Wednesday in New York City, I callea

at the white House at 9:15 and was with the President until 10:15.

He was desirous of discussing the question of the subversiva

ecüivities in me Unlied States, particularly Fascism and Coumunisu Se

had previously received the nemorandum thich I had prepared covering ay

conversation with Ganeral Smedley Butler and the effort of Father Coughlia

to have Generalibutler head an expedition to Mexico.

I intormad the Presides

concerning certain recent developments in the Comminist activities in the

countri, particulerly the eiforts of the Bridges organization in San Fran-

cisco and their progressive control of the shipping on the Pacific Coast,

the Gulf Coast and treir recent expansion to shipping operations or the

Atlantic Coast. I told hin that while their contract will expire on

September 30, 1936, they are endeavoring to have it temporarily extended

until April I, 1937, in order to conform to the same date that ine Unitu

Aline Workers' contract expires, thich organization is headed by John I.

Lewis. I told biw that the Bridges organization was practically orüro?]ê&

by Connunists and that the Communists had non decided to make very definite

plans to

got control of the Lewis organization.

I called his attention to the activities of the Newspaper Guild

headed by Heywood Brown, which has strong Communistic leanings, and whies

has been responsible ior putting out of oparation the Seattle Post Intel-

ligencer. I told him that m infomation ras that the Communists had planned

to get control of thesa three groups and by doing so they voulá be able at

any timo to paralyze the country in that they could stoo all shipping in

and out through the Bridges organization; stop the operation of industr

through the hiring Union of Lewis; and stop publication of any nemspapers

of the country tarough the Newspaper Guila.

I also related to him tae activities which have recently oc-

curred nithin Governmental service irspired by Comnunists, particularly

in some of the Departments and in the National Labor Relations Board.

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 10

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COLTIDEITIAL HENORANDUM

-2-

8-24-36

I likewise informed him that I had received information to the

infect that the connuns Invernationale in mascow has recently issued in-

siructions for all Communists in the United States to vota for Prasideni

Roosevolt for realection and against Governor Landon because of the fact

that Governor Landon is opposea to class warfare.

The President stated that he had been considerably concerned

about the movements of the Connunists and of Fascism in the United States

na that while the Secret Servica of the Ireasury Department bad assured

hin that they had inormants in every Communist group, he believed that

If thai was true it was solely for the surpose of getting any infornation

upon plots upon his life, hercas what he was interested in was obtaining

a broad pictura of ine genaral movement and its activities as may affect te

econonic and political life of toe country as a mole. I told him thai thera

is at the present time no governmental organization vaich is getting any

so-called "genaral intelligence information" upon this subject. He inquired

what suggestions i nignu orter relative to this matier.

I toid hin ai

the appropriation of ine Federal Bureau of Investigation contains a provi-

sion that it night investigae any matters referres to it by the Deparinent

of State and that if the State Department should ask lor us to conduct such

an investigation ne coulà do so under our present authority in te anpro-

priatica already granted. He stated that he is reluctant to have a 10s2ai

requesi cone through the State Department because of the many leaks therein, i

but that shat he nould do toula be to put a handritten memorandum of sis.

on in his safe in the linite House, stating he had instructed the secrevary

of State to revuest tels information to ba obtained by the Department

Justice.

He stated he would have the Secretary of State at the Wite House

tomorro: afternoon, and asked me to call at the mite Housa at 1:45 p.r.

to see him, the President, and the Sacretary of State, at mnici time the

matter could be further discussed and an oral request could be made on ue

by the Sscretary of Stata for investigation so as to avoid ary possivility

of any leak.

He sugsested that I endeavor to coordinate any investigation

along similar lines nich night be made by the Military oi Naval Intelligence

ServiCES. He stated that the Secret Service was not being brought in on this

investigation as they should confine themselves strictly to the matier of

protecting his life and the survey nich he desired to have made was on a

much broader field.

John Lagar Hoover.

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DIRECTOR

firderal Them of Duurstigation

Huited States Departmrat of Justice

Magington, 1. C.

August 25, 1936.

CONFTDENTIAL MENORANDUM

Poday, in line nith the request of the President, I called at the

White House at 1:15 p.n., and present at the conference were the Presideni,

the Secretary of State and mysel •*

The President related to the Secretary o

State his concern -lative to Conninist activities in this country, as "ell as

*Fascist activities. He stated that he was very desirous of having a survey

made of these conditions and inforned the Secretary of State that this surey

could be made by. tre Department of Justice if the Secretary of State requested

the Departuent to conduct the inquiry, as under the Appropriation het this

Bureau would have autiority to make such investigation if asked to do so sy

the Secretary oi Suate.

The President pointed out that both of these love-

ments vere interrutional in scope and the Commisn particularly vas directed

from Moscon, and tact inere had been certain indications that Ownsi, at

tonhen in the Russian Soviet Erbassy, ras a leadirg figure in some of the

activities in this rountry, so consequently, it was a matter which feli wither

the scope of foreign affairs over which the State Department rould have a rigit

to request an inquiry to be tisce.

The Secrotary of State irguired if a request should be made in

writing.

The President indicnted that it should not be sizce he desired tee

matter to be handles quite confidentially and that it would be sufficient that

the President, the Secretary of state and I should be the ones aware of this

request.

The Secrotary of Siate asked that the investigation be nade anù tien

made several suggestions - one, relative to the making of a protest, gitaer

formally or inforcally, to the Pussian Government relative to its intes ere-co

with affairs in this country. Discussion vas also had as to the iniosmtion

obtained irdicating that the Third Internationale had indicated preference fos

Roosevelt as egainst Landon. It las the opinion of the President that some

statement should be rade along this line by the Attorney General at an early

date.

Tho President asked that I speak to the Attorney General, upoi his re-

turn to the city, about this matter, and he suggested to the Socretary o

State that he talk orer the technique to be follored in this particular aspect,

with the Attorney tieroral.

John Edgar Hoover.

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Sept:abor 10, 1053.

Statetle Caaasaso1

in talking sitin tie abussacy Goneral today

caicorning tie

radical situation;

His de ine

coacoranes thics

ted

donû on Coctomber I, 1650,

•ati

is.c

Exa

Piec

arctury un Seato nog pecsoat, and aù

cine to Socratary of Suco, at too Pracident'e

de to bapartache de cuctice, to leve annesula--

tio? i-do of the subversing activitics ir

courbig, including consunior and Earciano

this

tientalitia mis relest to tao attornoy Coneral,

ana the disano; Courul vesbally directod no to.

arocoed nith this investigation and to coordiasta,

as tie prosidont suggestos, Infomition

215203:

c15r,

Did too State Departmone.

Tris,

is the

the

cornct of thisp-arestination, which choula

courss, so landlod 15 a sost diacred una con-

fidenticl numor.

/

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover,

Director.

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cite 1.00

0.°0016.0.040"05

1. no sla, d. 00.101s:1

DIRECTITE OF THE PRESIDENY ON CHE UNITED SPASTS

SEPTEMBER 6, 1939

"The Rttorney General has been requested by me to instruci

the Feáoral Bureau of Investigation of the Department of justive

to take charge of investigatlve work in nailors icinting to espir ire

sabotage, and violations of the neutrality t gulations.

"Thilò task must bo conducted do a compochoacius ood

Birective manner on a national basis, and all autormacgo inter be

carclully sifica out and correlatca in order to uvora contusion ain

SIeSpOnSibiliiY.

"To sthis cra I request all police orricers, sherrlie, tid

turn ovar law enforcenent officers th the thated States prorptly to

to the searest representative of the Federal. Sureau o

Investigation any niormation obtained by then reinting to espiozage

countcrespionage, sabotago, subversive uctivlties and vioLations o

the neutrality lawo."

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T...

REPORI SECURITY MATTERS TO FBI

"On September 6,

3939, I issued a

di"

recive providing that

thc

Federal Bureau of

the Deparimeri of

justice

should take charge of investivative work in

narters relaiing io espionage, saborage and

violarions

the RulIalily

regulaiions,

poinzing out inal the invesiigations must be

conducted in a comprehensive

палдеї,

Од а

national basis, and all igiormaiion careiully

sified out and

correlated

in

order io

avoid

confusion and

irresponsibility.

I then

requested all police officers,

sheriifs,

and

other law enforcement officers in the United

Stales, promptly to zura over to

ühe nearest

representalive of the Federal Bureau of

Investigation

any such informaiion.

"I am again calling ihe attention of all

enforcement officers

10

the reguest that they

copert all such infoimoiive prunpoir lu tne

nearest field represaniaiive

tha federal

Bureau of Investigation, which

is charged

with

ine responsibiliiy of correlaiing this.

material and reierring matiers which are

under the jurisdiction

any other Federal

agency with

responsibilities in this field

to the appropriate agency.

"I suggesi ihai all pairiotic organiza-

tions

and individuals likenise report all

such

information relating to espionage and

related matters

10 the Federal Bureau oi

Invesiigation

in the same manner.

"I am confident thai all law enforcement

officers, who are now rendering such invalu-

able assistance sonard the success oí the

internal

safeiy

in

this

January 8, 2943

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HE WINITE HOUSE

: rely 24, 1950

INEORIATICN RETATIC TO DOLESTIC ESPTONCE

Stach

SCS:

On Septorber 6, 1938 and January 8, 19113 a Presi-

dential Dizective ins Issued providing that ine juderal Eureau

of Investigation of the Dapartuant of Justica should tale

charie of investigative nock in riters relating to espionage,

caboiags, subversive activities and related maiors.. It tras

pointid out that the' investigations must he conducted in a

•courschonsive sander on a Mational basis and all Information

carefully sifted out and correleted in order to avoid confusion.

T. ahold lin to again mall the ettention st cil Enacecanant

officias, both federal and Sits, to the request that they to-

port ail inforration in the above chunerated flulds prosotly

to thu unprast Field Representatire of the Fedaral Diresi: of.

Investmen, which is changed mth tie responsibility of

correluling this rascrial and rufouring inusio mich ire under

tho jurindiction of any othor roderal igency iith responsibili-

blos In unis flold to the appropriate agency.

I suggest that all patriotic organizations and

individils likariso report all such inforaction rolating to

espionngi, sabotage and subversivo actvities to the Foderal

Bureau of Investigation in this sana tanner.

Naplinia,

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DIRECTIVE OR TILS FRESIDENT OF TIE UNITED SIATES

DECE!BER 15, 1953

"On Sopteuber 6, 1939, Janunty 8, 1913, and July 24,

1950, Iresidintini Directives weie

Issued requusting all enforco-

ment officers, both reucial and State, to oport promptly 111

intormation relatsir to espionage, sabotage, subversive activilios

and reinted mattern to the nearest field representative of the

d'eder&3.

Bureau of Investigation.

I rhe leccarl Bureau of Investigation la charged wich

Investigating ill violations of the sionic Fuerly ACi,

incruding

the dilegal expori or import of jissionable maicriai,

the illegal

ponsession or trenoperiation o tissionable material

and the

Illegal production;

Lansto or possescion of any equinnent or

devsee utiliaing fissionable miterial or alonic enerry as a military

VCapon.

"Fissionabie material' means plutonium, urrniul-des or

inters a seans pluto

other, materiai chich the Atonic Enerky Commission has determined

to be capabic of reicasing substaniai quantities of enexey tacugh

nuclead ghain reaction. I an requesting that all chiorcemen.

offscors both Federal

and State, deport all infornation reicults

to violafions of the Atonic inerty lot to the nearest Ilold repier

sentative of the lodicial Burcau of Investigation.

"I surgesi thai all patrolic organizations and ludivIdul&

Ilerice report ali such information to the redcral Burceu of

Is restigation in the same nauuer. "

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оппона годо..:

1248 196813

1:26 6.

sonia 98

US: TED STATES COVE

MENT

Memorandum

Mr. Dalbey

NON: I A Marie G

UBJECT:

FBI JURISDICTION: CRIMINAL

INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

DATE:

5/16/72

You requested analysis of the legal authority for FBI

criminal intelligence collection and its relationship to ow statutory

jurisdiction in criminal matters.

"The gathering of criminal intelligence information"

describes activity not subject to precise definition. However, its

general objective is well understood by those engaged in law entorcement.

There exist individuals and groups whose daily occupations are direciod

toward proût without regard to the restraints or ine law. rei, y ine

very nature of their associations. little actual participation in criminal

acis may be observed by the most astute law enforcement observer.

Their existence and contribution to the sum of criminal behavior has been

detected and to some degree measured by the collection of data concerning

their personallife-styles, property holdings, associates, influence, and

access to capital. Such information has been characterized as "criminal

intelligence.

For years, the FBI has been aware of the need to identity

these resources of the criminal element. Congress responded to this

need through the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970.

The Congressional

findings were that organized crime in the United States is a highly.

sophisticated, diversified, and widespread activity that annually drains

billions of dollars from America's economy by unlawful conduct and by

the illegal use of force, fraud and corruption.. Legitimate business and

labor unions are infiltrated and corrupted and our democratic processes

are subverted. The problem was declared lo be of of national concern

both as to our economy and the domestic security.

• CONTINUED - OVER

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Memorandum J. A. Mintz to Mr. Dalbey

RE: FBI JURISDICTION: CRIMINAL

INTELLICENCE INFORMATION

The Act attempted to attack organized crime by making

criminal the management of syndicated gambling and by prohibiting

racketecring activity characteristic of organized crime including the

use of illegal proceeds for investment in legitimate business enterprises.

The long-established suspicions of law enforcement officer's

were confirmed by the Congressional findings but statutory enactments

did not eliminate the conduct described as evil therein. There remains

the task of establishing the identities of those constituting the national

menace and developing prosecutable evidence of their guilt.

"Criminal

intelligence" collection is one means by which this responsibility may

be fulfilled. It may be the only practical means in view of the scarcity

of witnesses willing to testify and of the high mortality potential of those

who do appear. A classic example of such intimidation is reported in

United Statos v. Addonizio, 451 F2d 49 (3rd Ulr. 1572) Where d Muoveüire

cose found an ancaymale anto on the cost of hic

car which read "This could have been a bomb. Keep your mouth shut. "

" Accepting the need for intelligence gathering as a practical

necessity,

the issue remains as to its propriety in the face of Consticutiona

protections.. If the Supreme Court announces that individuals have a

Constitutionally protected right of privacy that may be overcome only

through established arrest, search, and subpoena procedures, the issue

will be settled. But, thus far, the Court has only drawn upon the concept

of Constitutional privacy to resolve cases involving special circumstances

such as marital affairs (Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) ) and

interception of communications (Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)

More specific Constitutional limitations on the criminal

intelligence function may be found in the First Amenciment protections of

speech and assembly; the Fourth Amendment prohibitions of unreasonavie

searches and seizures; and the Fifth Amendmont priviloge against

compulsory sclf-incrimination.

The theme consistently found in decisions having a bearing on tl

relationship between these rights and the collection of criminal intolligo co

is that, when in direct conflict, the collection ciforts must yield. Such is

- 2 -

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Memorandum J. A. Mintz to Mr. Dalbey

RE: FBI JURISDICTION: CRIMINAL

INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

not to label criminal intelligence as necessarily the product of malpractice.

but to recognize the paramount nature of the Constitutional interests being

safeguarded: Other incidents of government regulatory authority have

been required to yield as well when confronted with legitimate claims of

Constitutional protection, e.g: the administrative search cases; Camara .

Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).

Overt and obtrusive conduct susceptible of being characterized

as harassment may well be enjoined as, for example, was the case of an

obvious 24-hour-a-day physical surveillance of an individual, his home,

relatives, friends, and associates (Giancana v. Johnson, 335 E2d 366

(7th Cir. 1964) cort. den. 379 U.S. 1001. Similar results might be

expected where an identified officer loiters in the subject's place of

business (Bee See Books. Inc. v. Leary, 291 F. Supp. 622 (SD V. Y. 1963)

or openly attends organizational meetings where his presence innivits

ammuninition and tha trancention ni the hainage of tha acconnhis (Tincai

309, United Furniture Workers V. Gates, 75.F. Supp. 620 (ND Ind. Ised) ).

However, open photographic surveillance of public gatherings (Donahoe v.

Duling, 330.F. F. Supp. (ED (ED Va. 1971)) and secret monitoring of

criminal activities through the use of undercover agents (Levis v. United

States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966) ) and informants (Hoffa V. United States, 355

U.S. 295 (1966) ) have met with judicial approval.

Obviously, criminal intelligence information gained by un-

reasonable search and seizure or through compelled self-incrimination is

tainted and subject to judicial condemnation upon complaint of one having

the requisite standing.

Perhaps, the decision coming ncarest to discussing the

legality of criminal intelligence collection was Anderson v. Sills. 106 N. J.

Super. 545, 256 A2d 298 (1969), (reversed on the ground more complete

record was necded to support the decision) 56 N.J. 210, 265 A2d 678 (1970)

New Jersey had responded to the threat of continuing civil disorders by

collecling intelligence information on persons and events alleyed to have

some relationship to such activitics. The trial court held the collection

effort to be unconstitutional because it conflicted with the First Amendment

= 3 -

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Memorandum J. A. Mintz to Mr. Dalbey

RE: FBI JURISDICTION: CRIMINAL

INTELLIGENCE NFORMATION

However, the court order to destroy the intelligence files excepted instances

"where such information will be used to charge persons with specificall;

defined criminal conduct." 256 A2d at 305. Thus, the decision may be

interpreted as drawing a distinction between collection of intelligence

information where political or social factors are involved and First

Amendent freedoms therefore may be directly inhibited and collection.

of criminal intelligence information where the objective is the establishmen:

of criminal conduct and the identities of the offenders. While the Fourth

and Fifth Amendment may be enjoyed by the guilty and innocent alike, it

is improbable that the First Amendment would be stretched so far as to

protect freedom of speech and assembly when such speech and assembly

constitute clements of a criminal offense. On appeal, the Supreme Court

of New Jersey returned the case for further development of the record

and observed "

.. . the executive branch may gather whatever information

it reasonably believes to be necessary to enable it to periorin the pouce

roles, detectional and preventive. A court should not interfere in the

dionini ué pivui ui vai iail us armiarinesos" duo aêu ai ûûû.

A tentative conclusion may be stated, subject to further develoy-

ment of the case law. The gathering of criminal intelligence information

for the purpose of developing evidence of specific offenses characieristic

of organized crime is legally justified as well as practically necessary.

Where there is diversion from the proper objective and such collection

efforts are manipulated to cause harassment or where such activity conflicts

with Constitutional rights, to that extent the criminal intelligence program

must be reformed.

NW 54933 Docld:32989719• Page 21

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тва ён., го, но. 11

UNITED STATES GOI

Memorandum

MENT

Mr. Dalbey

DATE:

5/18/72

FROM

: J. B. Hotis

SUBJECT:

FBI AUTHORITY IN DOMESTIC

INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

You requested an analysis of the Bureau's authority to conduct

domestic intelligence investigations. The question of the jurisdictional

basis for these investigations is being examined at length by the Domestic

Intelligence Division and will not be discussed here.

It is fair to say that the domestic intelligence program is one

of the more controversial areas of the Bureau's activities. For one thing,

an intelligence investigation casts a broader net than inquirics that are

die ced toward the proof ofa sporifir offense.

A large amount of raw cinta

is collected, much of which has no immediate bearing on potentiai offenses

or offenders. But seemingly trivial information may later become important

in the detection and prevention of violence or civil disorder. There are

also fears that these investigations may. eventually touch upon one's

political belieis, habits or associations; or that information coliected for

proper purposes may eventually be misused at the hands of Government.

Each is a legitimate concern. The notion of Government prying into the

personal lives of its citizens is repellent to all of us. And yet there is a

strong sense that the Government must acquire necessary intelligence

information if it is to meet its responsibilities in connection with the

national seculty.

One of the major concerns about our domestic intelligence

activities is that they are not supervised or monitored by any outside

agency. The claim is made that the Esecutive Branch has been left wide

discrction to define its own authority, and to choose the directions, mothods,

• and focus of its investigations. For one thing, the law has never made

clear what facts and circumstances must be present to authorize an

intelligence investigation, nor how far such an investigation may lawlully

proceed without being directed toward proof of a specific offense.

V8N:

•CONTINUED - OVER

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Memorandum J

Hotis to Mr. Dalbey

RO: FBIAUTHO

KITY IN DOMESHC

INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

And unlike the practice in criminal cases, our electronic surveillances in

security matters are not submitted for prior court approval. For anothcr,

the exclusionary rule which provides the usual incthod of judicial control

over investigative.procedurcs, is not often availbic in security cases.

Since the goal is largely preventive, these cases seldom come before the

courts. As a result, the public, the courts, and the Congress have very

Little information about how we operate in domestic intelligence matters.

and what we do with the information acquired.

In response to this situation, some members of the Congress have

pressured for tighter controls over the Bureau, perhaps in the form of a

watchdog committee to oversee our operations.

Senator Ervin, who chairs

the Senate Subsommittee on Constitutional Rights has expressed particular

concern about the right of privacy and the authority of the Government to

gather information. In an exchange of correspondence with the Departmeut

of Justice, the Sentor has requested specific documentation of the

Department's guidelines for the gathering and retention of domestic

intelligence information. He has also suggested nat iegisiaiion mighi ve

enacted, requiring a showing of probable cause before an investigation can

be initiated by the Government. It is doubtful that any such measue would

pass the Congress, but the proposal does show the mood of the times.

A parallel trend may be developing in the courts. In several

recent cases, plaintifis have made the claim that Government information

gathering, which goes beyond the effort to apprehend criminal suspecis;

may have a "chilling cffect"' on the exercise of First Amendment rights.

These challenges thus far have not been successful. Anderson v. sills:

56 N. J. 210, 265 A2d 678 (1970); Donahoe v. Duling, 330 I. Supp. 300

(E. D. Va. 1971); American Civil Liberties Union v. Westmorcland. 323

F. Supp. 1153 (N.D. Ill. 1971).

The courts have generally recognized that one of the principal

functions of the Bureau is to gather information law violators, agitators of

Peace Parade Committce, ctal. v. J. Edgar Hoover, ci. al., 70 Ci. 2540

HRT, docided Fcbruary 16, 1972. The Court of Appeals for the Districi of

Columbia Circuit, has observed that the identity of the agency gathering

such information is determinative of the significance of any allegus chill lo

= 2 =

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## Page 24

Memorandum J. B. Hotis to Mi. Dalbey

RE: FBI AUTHORITY IN DOMESTIC

INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

to First Amendmentrights. Thus, in Davis v. Ichord, 442 E2d 1207 (D. C.

Cir. 1970) although appellants allegedly felt chilled by a Congressional

Committce's investigation of them, the Court of Appeals found there was.

insufficient justiciability in their claims to create a viable case or

controversy. This was because appellants had "failed to bring the fear oi

investigation by the present Committee home to themselves,' their fears

were wholly speculative; there were no criminal proceedings contronting

them; nor was any action pending. Moreover, the Court in Davis found

that the power of a Congressional Committee began and ended with the

investigation; whenever a Committee of the Congress seeks punilive action;

the Judiciary must become involved, and thus every investigation has a

judicial check which operates to guarantee the protection of constitutional

rights.

This latter aspect of the Davis decision was given perspecare by

the Court of Appeals in Tatum. In contrasting the potential impact on First

Amendment rights occasioned by investigations conducted by the military

with investigations conducted by a civilian investigative agency, such as the

Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Court observed:

The compilation of data by a civilian investigative

agency is thus not the threat to civil liberties or the

deterrent on the exercise of the constitutional right

of free speech that such action by the military is, because

a civil investigative agency has no inherent power always

being subject to the well-defined restrictions of law and

the approval of the courts. * **

There,the Court pantedly examined the "source of the chill!' as it had in

Davis, and in applying the "chilling effect doctrine", singled out the FBI

as a source which does not senerate a reasonable basis for inhibitions or

apprchensions. In this connection the Court stated.

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Memorandum

B. Hotis to Mr. Dalbey

RE: FBI AUTHORITY IN DOMESTIC

INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

Referring to our holding in Davis that the

"source of the chill"' is important in determining whether

there is any inhibiting cilect on the exercise of First

Amendment rights, we think that there is a significant

difference between investigative actions taken by a

military agency in reference to civilians and similar

investigative actions taken by a regular investigative

agency of a civilian branch of the Government.

One of the functions of a civilian investigative

agency, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, is

to compile information on law violators, agitators of

violence, and possible subversives. It has always been

recognized that this is a delicate function, and it is

exercised under the direction of the Attorney General.

Investigation is performed by man a majority of wiùm die

under the direction of lawyers in the Justice Depariment,

and the information compiled is only usable and effective

through court action. The FBI is powerless to imprison

or to affect his liberty in any way except through the

action of the couts.

As to the surveillance of public meetings through the use of

informants, it has been held that such surveillance is not per se actionable.

See Donahoe v. Duling. 330 F. Supp. 308 (E.D. Va. 1971) (police -

surveillance of street demonstrations held not to offend First Amendment

rights).

The Supreme Court in Hoffa v. U.S., 385 U.S. 293 (19G6), hold

that the usc of secret informants is "not per se unconstitutional"

, and does

not violate the Fifth Amendment privilege against sclf-incrimination, nor

the Fourth Anendment prohibition against unrcasonable searches and

seizures. The Court upheld, as reasonable under the Fourth Amendment,

admission at trial of evidence obained by an undercover informant to whom

a defendant spoke without knowledge that he was in the employ of the police.

385 U.S. at 300-303. See also Lewis v. U.S., 385 U.S. 200 (1066) and

Lopez v. U.S., 373 U.S. 427 (1963).

^ 4=

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Memorandum J. B. Hotis-to Mr. Daibey

RE: FBI AUTIIORITY IN DOMESTIC

INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

Moreover,

the Supreme Court in U.S: V. Whitc, 401 U.S. 745

(1971), recently held that the use of secret informants does not violate

any constitutionally justifiable espectation of privacy under the Fourth

Amendment, even wheh an informant uses electronic equipment to transmit

his conversations with defendants to other agents.

If the use of undercover government informants without a

warrant does not violate the Fourth Amendment and invade a defendant's

constitutionally justifiable expectations of privacy, Hofia v. U.S., supra.

and such informants may write down their conversations with ceiendants

and testify concerning them, or simultaneously record and transiit such

conversations to others, who may testify against them, On Lce v. U.S.,

343 U.S. 747 (1952); U.S. V. White, supra, then clearly mere visuai

"surveillenco" ef plaintlte in plair tiow by informanto at publio mcclngs

would not violate their constitutionai rights.

It would seem that those who elect to present their views actively

in the public arena delibcrately expose themselves to the public. See

Associated Press v. Walker. 388 U.S. 130 (1907). Any recording of their

activitics by the deienciants does not invade their privacy any more than

does a newspaper, radio, or television story, and, indecd, much less since

any information compiled is usable and effective only through coutaction.

Tatum v. Laird, 444 F2d 947, 957 (D. C. Cir. 1971).

More difficult questions are presented where the investigation

delves into the private affairs of the individuals or organizations. But

even here, the courts have generally sustained our procedures so long as

they comport with the restrictions of the Fourth, Filth and Sisth Amendments

The Fifth Avcnue Peace Parade Committce, et. al. v. J. Edyar Hoovcr.

et. al., 70 Civ. 2016 HRI, cecided February 10, 1972. (examination oi

bank records)

U.S. v. Gerhart. 275 F. Supp. 443 (S.D. W. Va. 1967)

(examination of banl records); Minker v. U.S.. 312 F2d 632 (3d Cir. 1962)

trssh.ves), Conenv: U-S.s 249 (1070 (itetion 196)Kamil covaos

packages in the mail); Mancusi v. DcForte, 322 U.S. 361 (1908) (seizure of

union rccords); Ilolla v. U.S., supra; U.S. v. White, supra; (use of

informants).

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 26

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Memorandum J. B. Hotis to Mr. Dalbey

Re: FBI AUTHORITY IN DOMESTIC

INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

In summary, it is premature to say that the First Amendment

line of cases, dealing with the "chilling" concept offers any substantial

impediment to our intelligence investigations. There is less reason for

optimism, however, with regard to congressional intervention. We

should be arcpared,

therefore, to meet arguments regarding the need

for outside supervision. The sound answer, which should satisfy

governmental needs and individual rights, is found in tight internal

controls and carefully developed guidelines.

• I

• 6

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## Page 28

FOSITION DAPPR

DOLISTIC IRTIEMIGIEICE DIVISION

KONS RE STEYEREION

May 23, 197%

• ..

: 1.

...

This paper coals with the conduct by the fbI of

Intelligence-po lavestigations sunzrvised by the Donestle

•Intelligence Dilisdon.

Auchority jor thoso investications

"Is documeniod und outlined, including situatious wiere thore

13 no direci riointion of lay.

Criicsin and controls and

dissonination policius implcienting this authority to

detaiica.

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TABLE OF CONTINTS

INZTILIGINCE COLLECTION

AUTTORYTY

Congressionrl Ennctments

treaddential. Directives

Policy Instructions oí sitorney General

Mcdonni Security Council DireCtives

Interngoncy Agreoments

SLIPLE INNATION OF AUDHORILA

hoministrntive Index

Revolutionary Croups

Subveraive, Revolutionary and Extrenist Individuals

Unniilliaiod Indivicunir

Espionage nd foreign Inclligence Investigations

Restrictious on Investicutions

Incorantion Storage and Retrioval

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 29

20

20

11

12

13

13

15

17

29

19

21

21

23

25

27

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## Page 30

IRCELLICENCE COLLECTION

Tho IBI's Intelligenco funciion is well established

aid documonted. Toi, our wock in Bathoring intolllgence has

been the subject of

continuing criticion Iron segments of the

press wiün charges boing more tink the lEt is conducting without

authority security investigations of persons who are not in

violation cs tho lar. It hus also boen charged that our niel.

rigonce colloction is uncontrollod, erpricious and dwells on

saraola? tringyncorntes asthoir there boins any security interest

juvolved, Fragmonto oi incounation, detortod and tristed to

convoy the false impresaion that the BI is santonly disregarding

the privacy of clerions, have been pullished.

The FbI does not conduct security investigations of,

Individuals without cloar-out authoriiy and tigui controls.

Cátes have taken iragnents di intelligence which have come to

their actention and built them up into thai is ropresentod as

the end product of security instigations with political ovci

•tones.

In theso insinaces, the tons upon which such importance

sas placed have bech tragueniary intolligenco Iron substantive

NW 54933. Docld:32989719 Page 30

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• .. :"

investigations and could not be vowed in their real sigafricance,

except as thoy lit into the overall. perspactive of the case.

This 1s indicativo of the dangor of using piecemeal intolligence

taken out of contost; properly used, howevei, intelligence

1o a logitimate and nocussars part of all security invesiigailons.

Intelligenco is informiion and the collection of lt is

Inseparablo Pron efficient investigative operations. In fact the

two-minvestigation and intelligonce are nuthálly dopendent.

In the socurity liold, it 1s vital that the Federal

Govermeni doieci facions which have a discoi bauring on

•zaaihle melotion do Yoy 0a?20d t0 220 01091230 09 20542202222

of the Govarment, intelligence developed to identify individuals

who have i propensity for revolutionary or racial violence oi

have carrillations with subversive or revolutionary groups 15

essential in tho enforcement of the laws desighed to protect the

Integrity of the Government. Intolligence 1s also essential to

the detection of attoupts or consylracios to nove against the

Govertrent, actions which may themselves be crimes.

•No consüliutional provisions, statutory enactments

or Judicial rulings have attempted to doprive law enforcement

of lis intelligence junction, although various attempts have

2

NW 54933 Docld: 32989719 Page 31

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bean nado to defino or linit. the arcas encompassed by

intolligence and particularly the techniques of collection.

it la also recogulued that sono inicilizenco cuthering

activities say have an Incidental "chilling" offect on Individual

cltizeds. The spoctre of the Governmont's investigatory

presence say cause a reaction in citisons, Inhibiting tho

oxorcise of their full consticutional richie. therefore,

& balanco between the requirements of the Goverument and the

constriutional righis of citinens aust bs naintained.

The intolligence function of investigation, must be

Lock concosable shu coachool. go vadoo 1o golue and laterally

nich the seriouross of tho provision it seckg to enforce.

It Is neither reasonablo nor praculoni to lnunch an acercasire

intolligence collection effort concorning the activities of those

who might potentially violate a loca) untilattoring ordinance.

Detection o1 a compiracy to borb che lhite louse, on the

.. ..

•Other hand, cortninis justifies a continuous and tatonsive

Intelllgence effost to idenilly tho particlyants and gain

knowledge of any specific plans.

...

•.

."

3

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 32

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It 10 mandatory that a Governont protoct 1t3

inority and this has boch recognised by judicial

AUthOTItLeS. OdIuSIY CinOS ViCtInize an Indivianal or

groups; crinos agaiust the enlatonce of tho governuont

victiniao sochety. Carrying these crinos to their ultimate

produces tha ultinia crino arzinst socioty. the destruction

or that sochoty.

It is clons that the aspirations of nost revolutionary

troups los exceed thoir capubility to achdove thols untinate

objoctives. They are, however, quito capablo oi erodiur

the integrity o1 tho denocratle systen by Icsoer acur end, ti

not discowaged os thwasted, might loll accusulate tho will

Dina

jonOr i0r BOre dCCisive actior. The dilutio succoeS ci

the Castro revolution is a sufficiont esample. Consequontly,

continuing inteliicenco collection relating to all revolutious

si individuals ano organizations, comensuate with the immediate

threat posed, is iuperative to proper vigilauce.

The FBi scives as a prine producer of intclligence

sox the locutive Branch, Over the years it has provided

informilon concorning hostlle actions diractod against the u. I.

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 33

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Dy forcign sovariuents, thoir intolligance sorvices and othors

acting in their hehalf. On the domestic Econe the FBI has

ponotried conspiracles ranging from the connunist underground

to tha hooded night eidore of tho kian to terrorized our

black citizons. But, in the 1960's cintosive changes occurred

au tho internal security srobiona iaced by the country. These

changes sere

reflecied in both the scopo and nature of the

IBi's responce and in the iniciligence roquirenents levied

upon the IdI by the mecutive Eraucl.

In the decade on the '60's, social change and upheaval

added to the critical avens of the IDI's intolligenco

responsibilities the arobions of revolutionary and extreulat

activites, America jas stunned by violent student disrupesons,

bonbings and Ilats. Spanning the docado Fero civil rIghts

protests, rections agalust then, and tragically, the burning

and 200rzug of Wits in 1955 and the conflagrations in Detroti,

Novark and Mashington, D. C. And, what had been the youthful

idealism of the energing new left in the 1952 Pori llurou

Statement was drowned out by the obscono leatherman war cries

5

_Nw.54933_docld:32989719_Page 34

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...

as they took theis revolution to the sticots of Chicago 1n.

1969 during their "Days of Rage."

As tho tido oi crine and disruption sweller, 1ù

brought niüh tù now and pressing problems on the donestic

Becurity soone. ThI denostie sochity Investigations increaced

accordingly. Thoro ina alao an dunediato increase in FBI

Intolligence collecitou concorning the lamlessness and violent

¿actios of cheao crosging sevoluidonary elcuents.

Incolliponse collccidon vas ecsonilal. in contonding

nath thee sen domutic socurity problong. Ile tact was

recognized by this reports of two Irccidentin! Counissions.

Pho LOposE of the Marlonal Advisory Conmiscion on Civil Disorders

fiernor Counlesson, 1968) atressod that the absenco on accurute

¿oformation besoro und during disondora cronica spacial control

Woodens. It cophasized that law Cuforcenent orgartentions

musi develon tho bonna to obtain adaquato Intcilagonce. for

planning purposes and that law enfosconent should "gather,

1.d3-8-0e

'ovnluate, analyze rud disconinato inforuation on potential le

welL as actual civil disorders."

6

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 35

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Eirilsly, tho President's Connission on' Caupus

Unrest (1970) took upocial noto of tho nead for intelligence

• In eifectiva lan enforceuent. The Coumssion sinied In Its

Loport, "It is an undoubiod faci that on soue chupuses thera

arO ten and onen tho plot, all too oftch succusstully, to

bunt and boub, and sometiuer to nalu and kill." Tho roport

concluded that the beat, and sonetines the only, cans

Jaw enforcemut has to thrart or proyont such plots is

through "clundestine satelligence work,"

Provention La the very essence of the propes 1ao

mo be forewarned se to be placed 1i a

position to carry out councesmensuros to nect a threat. During

the mas actions and violoni confroninciona of the 1960's,

IT Intelligence" colloction was crystnilized in dissonination

of informnison to other goverment agencies. This intolligence

provided thou with an essential

working tool to coutend vith

public disorders and activitios of a revolucionary nature.

In a memorandun to tho Diroctor of tha FBI, 9/14/67,

Atiorney Goneral Clark stressod the inportanco of intelligence.

The Attorney Generni assertod. "It is most inportant that

NW-54933_Docld:32989719 Page 36

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you use the anxious evadiablo renounces, Investigative and

intelligence, to colloss and report all facts boaring upon

(I10i scúsvity)." Ilaborating o3 this polut, lo said, "In

theao circumstances we must be costnin that overy ntccupt is

boing nade do got all information bearing upon these probions;

to take overy ston possibio to decoruino hothon tho xiotáng

In p20-plannod or organized; ard, 11 so, to detonatno the

¿dentiis of the poople and interoses invoired; and to dotei

¿has actvity by proupe and vigorous Logai action." tio

Attornay General's crailation of the imposinues os

Intelligence in this instaros appilos vich oquel forco to

other arcas of the TRi's socurity work.

In December, 1907, tue Depastuoni of dustice, awarc

of the high palosity of Intolligence in donling vita cival

desorders, crenica the Inter-Divicion information Dust. Th4o

"Is a ropository for "roports which aclate in individual or .

oreanizational activitios shich may play a pari la Lustigatice

or sprcading civil disorders" and includes Intciligence

"olating to black powor and binck natioballa organizations,

-

NW. 54933_Nocld:32989719 Page 37

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officors and members thereos, reelal incidents throughou

the country; and any spochile acconatrationg which aro

boing planed and are of such nacure ag in ronder them

subject to the possibility cs violonco." Quick ictrieval

of this intolligenco was eupbasized througn the use of couputers.

Attorney General Michell wrote to the IBI Direcior

on lay It, 1071, conecialug the Intellluenes Svaluation.

Committeo, created to analyzo and evaluato intelligones fox

the guidanco of the hice House and other departments of

the Brecutive Branch. In this memorandun, the Altorney Gonoral

sinted, "Intousified accivitics on the part of militant

"groups here in vashington, D. C., and oicewhere lin the country

escarly golds up the necd not ouly for sho enthering of

the highest quality intolligenco available but also for an

expert analysis and evaluation of the intelligence producl

desols. "

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 38

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AUTHORITI

111 IBi Investigations and intolligence collection

functions in the internal security field are based on

authorizutions in Congressional enactments, Presidential

directives, policy instructions of the Attorney General,

National Security Council directives and Interagency agree

menis as set forth below.

Congressional Enacinents

Attorney Goneral direction of FBI • 28 U.S.

Code, Section 533

Irenson • 13 U. S. Code, Section 2381

(U.S. Constitution,

Article III, Section 3)

Rebellion and insurrection - 18 U.S. Code,

Section 2033

Seditious Conspiracy • 18 U.S. Code, Section 2351

Advocating violent overthrow of Government

18 U.S. Code, Section 2385 (Smith Act)

Sedition - 18 U.S. Code, Sections 2387, 2388,

2391

Recruiting for armed hostilities against U. S.

118 U. S. Code, Section 2389

Designation of Organizations as "communist-action"

• and of Individuals as members of such sicups

after hearings by Subversive Activities Control

Board • 50 U.S. Code, Sections 131-198 as amended

or repealed (Internal

security Act of 1950, Subchapter

I, called Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950

and amendments by Conmunist Control Act Of 1954)

See also Exccutive Order 11605 below

=10 -

NW 54933 Döcld:32989719 Page 39

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Espionage - 18 U. S.. Code, Section 792 et sea.

Sabotage - 18 U.S. Cose, Section 2151. et sea.

PrIvate Coriespondence with ForCign Governments .

18 U.S. Code, Section 953 (LogaN Act)

Registration of Foreign Agents • 22 U.S. Cods,

Sections 611-621

Atomic Energy Act o1 1951 - 42 U. S. Code,

Section 2122

Deportation for Subversive Activities - 8 U.S. Code,

Section 1481 (Inmigration and Nationality Act. 1952)

Possession, threatened use, or use of emplosives

• Ios' illicit purposes --18 U.S. Code, Section 811

Travel in or use of facility of interstate conmerce

•to pronote or incite riot, to

commit violence in

furtherance of riot or to abat others in inciting

PeE20-256106 28 92200. 1 13 40 9: 8006: 17602009

231-203, 215: 2101-2102

Neutrality Matiers • 18 U. S. Code, Sections 956,

958-502; 22 U. S.. Code,

Sections 193%, 401

(Hunitions Coatrol Act)

Intelligence exchange with CIA - 50 U. S. Code,

Section 103 (Nazional Security Act)

Presidential Dircctives

Directive of the president - 6/26/39

directing that investigation of all espionage,

counterespionage, and sabotage matters are handled

iby FBI.

Directive of the President - 9/6/39

requesting the Attorney General to instruct FBI

to take charge of investigative matiers relating

to espionare, sabotare, and violations of the

neutrality regulations.

NW 54933 Döcld:32989719 Page 40

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residential Directive

• 1.18/13

recorated instructions of prorious dircotive of

9/6/39 and requested law enforconent oilicois,

patriotic cronizations and indivicuals turn oves

lO LbL ALL TalormAtIon IcEaluIne espronage.

sabotage and violations of neutrality regulations.

Peridential Diicctivo - 7/24/50

reiterated substanco of 9/6/39 and 1/8/43 directivos,

MOLINE

: they provided for EBl to take charge oi

Investigative vork in matters relating to espionage,

Enbotose, subversive activitios and related maticis.

Directive oî Presidoni 12/15/53

sefcried to previous fresidential. Directives

and added investigation by Fbi of violations

of Alonic Bnergy ici.

Executive Ordor 10450 4/27/53

established prograns to insure that the employment

consistont with the interests of national security.

Requires chock of it Fingerprint Files and, in

cases where darogatory information develops, BI

conducts a full-tiéld investigation.

Executive Ordes: 11600 7/2/71

calis for subversive dotivitios Control Board,

when petitioned by the Attorney Goneral, to

determine after hearings if any organization is

totalitarian, lascist, communist, subversive, or

whether ii has adoyied a policy of advocating the

commission of acis of force oi violence to deny

othci's their Constitutional or statutory rights.

By inference, the TBI, as investigative

arm Of

the Attorney Ceneral, would develop evidence lor

hearings required, Also, fBI, by infercuce, would

develop evidence of nembership in such organiza

tions, which nay ba basis for denial of Government

employment:

POliCy Instructions of Attorney Coneral

September I1, 1967: instructions of then Attorney

General

Ransey Clots for FBI to investigate possibility

of colspiracy to plai, Dionore, or aggravate riot activey.

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February 18, 1963:

Instructions from the Asaistant

Attorney Ceneral, Internal Security Division, toI

FBI to obtain information concorning possibility that

underlying subversive groups were giving illoga?

directions or guidance to nunerous campus disorders.

(Other policy instructions iron Attorney Ceneril and

Department have been reccived, amplifying points set

forth above; many oi these concerned specific cases.

NationnI. Security Council Directives

Direcilve on Incrial security, March 23, 1913,

establishing Interdepartnental

Intelligence

Committoc (IIC) responsibic to ccordinate investigur

tion of comestic espionage, counterespionage,

saboidge,

subversion and other relatod intelligence matters

affecting

internal security. FBI repiesented on IIC.

Unitod States Intelligence Board (USTB) established

Septembor 15, 1038,

to naz2ta1n CoordInaTiOn jiwden

CiA sno other intelligence agoncies. FBJ. & member or

USIB to provide conestic intelligence for correlation

wich foreign intelligence.

Interagency Agrocmonts

Delimitations Agreement signed by IIC mombers

March 23, 1919, to establish jurisdiction in

investigations

by monbeis of espionage, counter.

espionage, subversion, and sabotage und io provida

for exchange of information on above matters.

FBI-Secrel Service Agrechont signed Movember 26,

1971, to provide for transmitial of incornntion

frOM

FBi to Secret Service regarding individuals

and organizations "ho, because of their pro-

pensitics, represcht of uny represcht a danger to

the safety of the President and certain other persons.

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IMPICISNTATION OF AUTHORITY

The criteria and guidelines for fBI Invesiigations

are furnished to the field in a "anual of instructions,"

the "E. B. I. Handbook," and in Letters to all Special Agents

Il Charge, In addition, ins:, rions and guldance are given

to the field In Headquarters Commurications on specific cases.

compliance with criterlinio quicolines is obtained by super

VISiON 1n boüh the field and at Búreau Headquarters. In

adallion, regula. Inspections or field and Headgunters

Divisions assure that Bureau poldoies conceruing lavestiga

tions are being followed.

In the socurity field, the basic responsibility of

the Thi is to investigate revoluilonary organizations dedicated

to the

violent overthrow or destruction of the Unlied Siates

Government. These Include old line Marxist groups, for example,

the Conmunist Party, USA, and the Trotskyist Socialist Worlors

Party; and such new revolutionary groups as the Students foi

& Denocratic Society, the Black Panther Party and the Weathermai.

in the investigation of subvers

vo individuals & deternination

Is made of the dangerousness of the individual and efforts are

sade to obtain evidence of violations of any applicable

14

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Fodcral, laws.

To

assist in catriosutng tho level of

dangerousness

of these individuals and to rctrieve quickly

Information concorning. them, the Domestic Intelligence

Division maintains a card flle known as the Acministrative

Index.

Aninistrative Indes

Title Il o1 the Internal Security Act of 1950

(Emergoncy Detention hot) before ii vas repealed on

September 25, 1971, provided lor emergency detention of

subvorsive Indiviouls in the event of a national energency.

To implement that provision of the act, the FBI and the

Depariment of Justice uaintained tho Security Index. This

Index was, of cquise, discontined with the repeal of the

Emergency Detention Act. By memorandum of October 22, 1971,

horever, the Attornoy General noted

that the repeal of

Titlo Il "does noi alter or limit the rBI's authority and

responsibillty to record, file and index information secured"

In this field and concurred in the establishment of an

soninistrative indes to, assist in "making readily retrievable

and avallable the results of lis (the FBI's) investigations

into subversive activities."

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To this end, such an index (called Adex) was.

Instituted for making quickly retrievable Information on

four calogorlos of individuals in order of dangerousness:

•I) National leaders of revolutionary or extremist

groups, menbers who have exhibited i propensity for vlolenca,

members with training in sabotage, espionage, or guerrilla

raclare, unaitiliated revolutionnies mith a proponsity

for violence, and revolutionaries with access to key facilities.

II) Secondary leadership of revolutionary and

extremist groips, active membors of these groups, and

masslipsed parnistionaries of extremists with & propensity

Sor violence against properiy rather than persons.

III) Rankmanánfile nombers of revolutionary groups

nichin the brevious five years, leaders of fronts for revolu

tionary groups, and individuals with revolutionary ideologies.

likely in a national energency to comnic acts of espionage,

sabotage, or terrorism.

IV) Persons likely to assist, financially 0x

othervise, revolutionary groups, or persons in a position to

Influence others to comuit acts inimical to the national defense.

Investigation of an individual is conducted to

determine whether or not he should, consistent with the

criteria or these categories, be listed on the Adex. If, as

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the resuli of the investigation, it is determined he does

not meei tho critarin the case is closed. If, on the

other hand, he does meet the crileria, he is listod in

the Adax according to the determined degrec of dangerous

ness. Category i cases continue under investigation for

as long as the individual cornisar. to varrant that Category

Insting. When an individuals listed in Categories II,

III, and IV, however, the investigation is closed, subject

80 periodic reopening to vorify his location, to determine

hia activities and io ascertain wiether he still qualities

too caciusion in the fior: Previnion do mado fur uperceiro,

dongrading and purging an individunt from the Adox as his

activities and level of dangerousness fluctuate.

Revolutionary Grouns

Investigations of individualo for a determination

of whether or not they neet the crltoria for ides gonerally

Involve their degree of affiliation with rcvolutionary and

extrenist groups.

The purpose of investigntions of basic

revolutionary and nev-lelt typergroups. Is to: (1) provide

Intelllgence to the Executive Branch which will enable the

President to Îullil1 his Constitutional responsibilities;

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(2) detect developing conspiricies to violate substantive

laws and initiate prosecutive action whenever possible to

prevcht such conspiracies fron boing carried oui; and

(3, develop evidence necessary foi the Aütorney Gencral to

file petitions before the subversive Activittes Control

Board in accordance with provisions of the Intornal Security

Act of 1950 and Exccutive Order 11605.

The criteria, guidelines and restrictions on tha

investigations of revolutionary groups are outlined belon:

Investigation is initiated upon recoipt of

Infornation indicating

that crganizrtion

Gorcranent or engages

in activity to deny others their Constitutional

or statutory rights.

Investigation is conducted to establish alins

and objectivos, location and sire, comination

and control ly

hostile loreign power, identities

..0f all leaders and members.

In regard to their front groups and organizations

which they have infiltrated:

Investigation 1s initiated upon receipt of

Information that organization is dominated,

controlled or influenced to substantial

degree by revolutionary organization.

Investigation is conducted to determine

degice of infiltration, ains and objectives,

Iocation and size and identitios of all

readers.

∞ 18

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Exterint Groups

The purpose of investigations of whito hato

and black extremist organizations 1s to: (1) provide

intclligence to the Ixecutive Branch which will enable

the Presidont to fulllil his Constitutional responsibilitles;

and (2) deteci developing conspiracies to violate substantive

lans and initirio prosecutive action whenever possible to

nevent such conspiracies from being carried

out. Investiga

tions or white hate groups are confined to those which have

actually of allegedly connitied or have conspired to commit

acts oi violence or have aúopieù a pulicy di advocating es

inciting the use of violence to deny othors their rights

undor the Constitution. Investigations of black extremist

organizations concern thoso groups which take extrenist,

antil. S. Government, anti-white position and those

activitics have involved then or nay involve then in civil

unrest and/or subversive activity.

Salversive. Revolutionary and Extrenist Individuals

Individuals referred to as subversives are

gonerally airillated wich old line basic revolutionary

organizations; those termed revolutionaries are usually new

loft typos; and those called extremists are fundamentally

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involved in violent or revolutionary activities based on

.race. Procedures for the investigation of these types of

Individuals are similar and the criteria are outlined as

follows:

Membership in a basic revolutionary organiza

tion

Espousing the tirec.

"rEvolutionary novements

special training aume: in leadership train

ing,

In a revolutionary group

Individuals having access to licy facilitles

who have been membors of a revolutionary

group at any time

D22a0ne Mith raunlutionhry. Lexcorist.

anarchistic or extronist balioes tho

likely to seize upon a national emergency

to endanger public saiety

Individuals who have actually or allegedly

committed, conspired to commit, or adopted

policy to connii acis of violence to deny

other's their rights under the Constituiion

Extremists and revolutionaries who have.

demonstrated a propensity foi violence,

have involved or may involve themselves

In civil unrest, or who advocate violent

overthron or the Government

Persons who Influence others to engage in

acts ininical to thr. --i-mal defense or

sho are likely to "mion financial or other

assistance to revolutionary or extremist

elements because of their sympathies,

associations or ideologies

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Unaffilinted Individuals

In the areas of revolutionary (new left) and

extremist acülvitics, some investigations are conducted

of individuals who are not affiliated with organizations.

Investigazion of an individual is undertaken when informa-

tion is received that the person:

• ".

Is a revolutionary and aeres to the

Weatherman idcology of advocating a

revolution now and uses tcriorist tactics

In furtherance of revolution

Is a revolutionary or extremist and

demonstrates by acts or statements.

propensity lor violence against property

Exhibits revolutionary or extremist

Ideology and is likely to seize opportunity

in national emergency to commit espionage;

sabotage, terrorism or otherwise interfere

with federal or local governments or

defenso efforts

Influences others to engage in acts

inimical to national defense or likely

to furnish financial or other assistance

to revolutionary or extremist elements

Espionage and Foreign Intelligence Investigations

The mission of the FBI In the

foreign intelligence

Liold is one of counterintelligence. The objectives and

priorities of counterintelligence have been variously stated

Dud evaluated. Generally, these objectives may be listed in

doclining priority as follows: (1) the detcotion and

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identification of intelligence operations and agents;

(2) the penetration of these operations for the purpose

of control aud the development of intolligence infornation;

(3) neutralization of hostile intelligence operations through

disruption and disinformation; and, (1) prosecution. Matever

the

assigned priority, the overall objeciive is to deny access

to information sought by whatever practical means are available.

Foreign intelligence investigations are grounded in

the Espionage statute. and related laws including the Registr

tion and Atomic Energy Acts. Individual investigations are

Initiated usually on the basis of a know or suspected connec

tlon with a foreign Intelligence service, foreign country or

subversive organization vith such connoctions. Since these

Investigations emanate from various sensitive sources and.

involve special considerations, extensive criteria and

limitations are defined and enumerated in current instructions.

In general terms, the governing criteria are desiened

to preclude initiation and continuance of investigations which

are not justified. The limitations are designed to coutrol

the scope of investigation in order to insure security of our

, Interests through close supervisory scrutiny.

22

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 51

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:. "

Restsictions on Investizations

fbi guidclines go beyond the rules for opening,

investigating and closing cases; they also impose restrictions.

to make certain that ve do not violate the constitutional

rights of any individual and to preclude investigations frOm

beconing "fishing expeditions.

49

In the security field these

are some of the restrictionalien are upplied:

Security cases are evaluated continually

to determine if ve are fulfilling ow

responsibilities.

Those cases not

warranting further investigation are

closed prompily.

There ate no investigations oi members

of an organization which does not advocate

use of torce to bring about cristing charges

in the Covernment.

Bremples are the Socialist

Party; the Independent Workers of the World

and independence Party of Fuerto Rico.

Persons arrested during disruptive demonstra

tions are identified since circumstances of

an arresi, in some cases, may indicate

propensiiy for violence.

arrest in connection with a domonstration is

an insuilicient basis in itself for security

investigation. The arrest must ba coupled

with a demonstrated propensity for violence

or with subversive or revolutionry activity

on the part of the individual arrested.

When it is determined that a security subject

is a member of the armed services,

the

investigation is discontinued immediately and

the military advised.

Civil richts orgonizations are not investigaiod.

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inbassadors or heads of permanent missions

to the United Nations are not investigated.

No surveillances are conducted at the

White House, the Capitol, the Supreme Court,

the House and Sonate Office Buildings or

the United Nations.

No telephone or microphone surveillances

are operared vithout prior written

approval

of the Attor":: inexal.

Bureau authority icrEQu.ED.. for:

Investigations of officals and diplonatic

representatives of foreign countries.

(Department of State authority is also

required. I

Investigation of comnunist infilmation

Developing sources connocted tách an

institution of learning.

Interviews of subjoots of active, current

security investigations.

Investigations of faculty rembers.

If

approval is granted, only established

sourCes LunCtIoning

in an administrative

capacity may la contacied on the campus.

Other established sourcos and informants

must be contacied away fron the campus.

Contacts with students, graduate students

and faculty meniers must also have Bureau

authority.

Interviews of labor irauors and persons in

-saucational, mass media or publishing fields.

These examples demonstraio & consciousness ot the noed

soimpose limitations on investigations and the continuing imposi

tion of them.

NW 54933-Docld:32989719-Page-53

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Infornntion Storare and Rotrieval

The siorage ai rotrieval of information 15 &

basic operational necessity of any investigative oi

Intelligence-gathering agoncy. Procedures within tho FBI

for theao functions provide for written records of informan

thon received fion a vardone

2902c0S- confidential

sadomants; considential resentin? techniques, and open

sources-und the storage of us invormation in airierent

typos of diles. These include accive investigative files

on organizations and individuals and some generai Liles.

These "ran" tilos are maintained both ai tha Seat of Governs

ment and in the various field offices. Information in the

• IIIos is thoroughly indexed so that data can be retrieved.

In the intelligence field, when an allegation

vithin the jurisdiction of the FBI is received, a case on

an individual. or on an organization may be opened, depending

on the quality of the allegation. Nonspecific information

that is received on an individual. or organization is placed

In the pertinent file, il one exisis, or is placed in a

genoral file 11 the arganizat. a or sadividual is not the

subject of a specific file.

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These illes are an integral part of the intelligence

Enthering function, By-the very nature of tho IBl's assiginent

to coordinate internal security information, the maintenance

"I data over i period of time is required and It is necessary

that a system for retrioving this information be used.

Because these files orrer: contain derogatory

intornation that moy not surtined aed by further investi.

gation (the derogatory information recoived may not be germane

to a matter within the IBI's jurisdiction), the Attorneys

General have long taken the position that these files should

Not ba available for public scrutiny. incalculable damage

to individuni reputations could result fron the disclosure

• of single liens of information vithout knowing the full

background concerning the receipt of a particular lien and

the context within which it was recorded.

Tho late Justice Moberi Jackson, In his Capucits ,

as hitorney General, wrote In 1911:

Disclosure of infornation.contrined in the

reports (FBI files) mighi also be the

grossest kind of injuatice to innocent

Individuals.

invest: "re reports include

loads and suspicions.

inri conetines even

the siatenonts of inlicious or misinforned

scople. Even though Inter and more complete

reporis conciate the individuals, the use

oi particular or selected reports might

constitute the grossest injustice, and we all

knoy a correction never catches up with an

accusation.

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Dissemination

Tho Burcau's general polloy on dissemination 1s

that information developed by or coming to the attention

of the fBI 15 promptly Icierred to all agencies of the

Executive Branch of the Federal Government having 2

potential interest in It ^

enribility ion taking

action concerning it,

NEESHEN

billty is apparent or known:

This policy is Ii accordance

with numerous formal agrcements entered into beireen the

Eureau and other Goverunent agencies. It is also in

Bureau to act as clearing house for incormation affecting

the internal security of the U. s.

Despiic this gonoral libernl policy of dissemine-

tion, ve have recognized thrt with rogard to highly sensitive

information a dotermination must be made on an individual

basis as to what information should be disseninated and how

1t should be transmitted. The degrce of sensitivicy and/o

tho secúrity classification will determine level of dissemina-

tIon to any interested agency z.i the method of transmittal.

In certain instances, sensitive tuformation may le turnished

to & high-lovel official with a request that dissemination

in his agency be restricted to his personnel on a need-to-know

basis. Such information might be disseminated by socure ilctype,

courter, liaison, and there necoastry, by secure telephone.

information furnished orally is confired la writing.

_MW 54933_ Docld:32989719 Page 56

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The Atturncy General

Director, Fil

August 7, 1973

ANDMUTIORITY I. DO IESTIC

INTELLIGIICE INVISTIGATIONS

During our mecting on July 26, 1973, you referred to a discussion

you had with &chator Charles MeC. Nathias, Ir., of Maryland during your con-

firmation hearings as to the statutory authority of the FBl and the l'epartment of

Justice in the lield ol domestic intelligence investigations. You then arlied

Mr. Wiltium D. Ruckelhens to work with the FBI in weighing the pros and cons

with roguad to stautory authority in this crca. I mentioned that rescarch was

touch with fir. Ruchclahous with regard to this matter when we have completed

the recults of our concideration and lindings within the FBI.

Actually, i study has been going on in the FBI for more than two

jears as to tho scope of Fill jurisdiction and authority in comestic intelligenc

invostigations. When Mi'. I. Patrick Gray, III, was designated as Acting

Directur cí the FEI, he inctructed that a position paper be propared concern-

ing the jurisdiction and authority of the FBI to conduct domestic intelligence

investigations. A position paper was prepared which in essence sinted that

authority of the Fill in this field is based on legislative enectments, even

though te may have publicly relicd heavily on Presidential directives as the

basis for such authority. Ir. Giay cidered mn in-depth study made of the

position and in August, 1972, a detailed report was furnished to him. The

following is a summary of that report.

Over a period of several months there were a number of public

siatelients questioning authority and jurisdiction of the Fill to conduct comestic

intelligence-type investigations, particularly where there is no clear-cut

legislative authority apparent. One of the most scarching inquiries was con-

tained in a paper presented by Professor John I. EluS et a two-dey, conicence

it Princeton University in October, 1971, sponsored by the C'ommittee for Public

Justice.

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The Atturney General

A major thrust of Proicssor Ellill's paper concerned F'BI authority

derived fron legislative enactmunts as opposer to that derived from Presidential

circetives, begitning with & directive insued by President Roosevelt in

Sepêundor, 1929, Protossor Illitf is of the opinion that Die 1939 dircetive,

which was reiterated on three subsequent occasions, was magnitied by the

FbI from its original purpose to a definitive order to conduct intelligence-type

investigations.

Senctor Sam i. Irvin, as you know, had been probing into the

nature and oxtont of R3l intellionce-type investigations. Sonator Ervin had

even announced that he intended to propose legislation to prohibit the kEl

from investigation ony persor: without that incividual's cousent, unless the

Government has renson to bolicre that person las committed a crime or is

about to commit a crime. Other Congresanch indicated a similar interest

in Fil investigative activities..

Our study revealed that the fBI had deulnred publicly over a

long period of time that its responsibilities in the domestic intellicunce field

are authorized under legislative enactments, I'resicential directives, and

instruetions of the Attorney General. The Presidential dircutives are obviously

the 1) directive Cuted Septenbe: G, 1030, tud reiterated January 8, 1943;

July 24, 1050; and December i5, 19J3, und 2) Exccutive Order 10450 dated

April 27, 1953 (ond anencied but not yet implemented by Ixecutive Order

11G05 dated July 2, 1971) •

In curcfully analyzing, the languege of the first dircotive, dated

September 0, 1930, and considering that the subsequent directives are all

hinged on that one, le believe that there is a misconception as to the extent

of jurisdiction or authority conveyed to the FBi by those dircetives. It

appearc that while the 1939 directive fixed responsibility on the FBI to handle

espionoge, sabotage, and neutrality mattors, it did not convey any authority

or jurisdiction which the Fäl did not alroudy have from lugislative enuctments.

It is dilficult to road into this directivo or in any of those which followed ary

autharity to conduct intelligence-typo investigations which would or could

not la conducted under an umbrella of legislative enactments.

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The Alturnoy Generai

As a matet of historical frot, President loosevelt in August,

1936, did roquest former Directs) e. Idgar lioover to conduct inventinations

of subversive setivition in this country, including communion anu losciem.

This request, horever, was a contidential cral request and there le doubt

that any record o it was made cuiside the Fil. This request, or frosidential

mandite, was based, iucidentrily, on the fact that the law provided that the

ral could conduct nuch investigationa il the accretary of Stale should so

rogusit.

The study roverlud that while the 1033 et sug, dircetives did no:

frant cuy special intelligence-guthoring cuthority to the FCI, we were respon-

sibla under these dircotives to cellect all intelligence infoenation furnished

lu local, site, and Federal law enforcomont agencies and patriotic cisons

and to cift and coordinate all such information fur indications of subversive

setivity covered by Fodoral stainies.

The study concluded that the FDI has the responsibility to con-

duct whatever investigations tie tiecessary to dotormine if sictutes relating

to espioutge, satolege, insurrecion or rebellion, sedition, sediticus con-

spiracy, covocacy of overthrowing; the Government, and other suen crimes

affecting the national sccurity have been viciated. In Dis connection we

note that in a letter datod September 11, 1967, the Department of únetico

advisud that the FDI is continually alert io the problem of rocurring riots

and is submitting intellirenco reports to the bopertment of justico concern-

ing such uctivity, 'This lutter enumerated several Puderes utatutes and

statoe theso could be applichble in using musiraum uvallublo rascurses,

investigativo and intelligence, to collect and roport all fucts bearing on

tho guestion of achomes ur conspirzcies to plan, pronote or eggravate rot

sctivity.

In other words, the Department was requesting all possible

intolligence-type investigative aetivity based on the existence of curtain

statutos. We sec this as being no ditcrent irom our intellgeroe-type

investigations relating so plans a groups or individuals to overthrow,

destroy, interiere with or threnten the survival of clfcotive operation of

national, state, and local governments.

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 59

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T'ho Altorney Gencral

Based on this study, we believe that had there rever been a

clugle one of the Presidential directives in question the PRI vould have

conducted ani will, throuch necessity, continue do conduet the came intelli-

gence-lype inve tigitions as vote conducted froin 1930 to the present doie.

¡a ileo beliove, however, that in orrie to counter the criticiom end skopii-

clam of such individuals as Professor illiff and Senator Sam J. Ervin that

an up-to-cate Executive irder chould bo issued elsarly establishing & nerd

for intelligence-type investigations and delineating & clor authurity for the

Fal to conduct nuch investigationa based on guidelines establiched by the

Atturncy Gentral and adhering to constitutional princiles.

The study concluded with two basic recommondations.

1) That the Dopartment of justice be requested to sponsor comprchensive

legialition speling eut the Fol's investigutive authority in the collection o

Dopartment of ductice be roquestec to seek a comprehensive lsecutive erdor

which would cover iny possible gap behreen statutory authority and Excculive

necessity in preteciion of the national security .

•At, first glance those recommendations may appear to contradict

our' position that we aleudy have staluttry authority lo conduct security-lypo

invostigations; that this being the case we do not need additional legislative

enestments, nor do we nocu an lxccutive order. But being realistie we thiuk

that the basie statutes upon which we rely for our cuthority to conduct

domestic intelligonce investigations nead to be updated to fit 1073 needs.

"Title 18 U.S.C. Scarions 2503, 2384, and 2385 relate to the national eccurity:

but tho legislativo hiatory of 2393 and 2384 indicutes that they were designed

for the Civil War cra, not the l'wentieth Centusy, and Section 2385 has been

reduced to a fragile shell by the Supreme Court. 'These statutes are unques-

tionably still valid, but updating is certainly indicated. The bills introduced

as H.R. 0046 and S. 1400 in the 93rd Congress appear to contain language which

shold fill our statutery neuds, except perhaps for those groups, such as the

Ku klux Klen, which do not seek to overthrow the Government, but never-

theloss are tutalitation in nuture and seck to deprive constitationally guarunteed

rights.

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The Attorney Goboral

As to the need for an Executive order, we think that to issues

are involved. No have statutory authority, but what we need is a dictinitive

reguirement from the President as to the nature anci type of iniciligence data

he roquires in the pursuit on his responsibilities based on our statutory

authority, In other words, there is a neod, from our stundpoint, (ol both

authoritative and definitive guidelines. The statutes five us the authority.

The Exocutive order would defino our national security objectives.

Members of Congress, Including such mer as Senaior Robert C.

Byrd of Heat Virpiria, have proposed legiliation to spoll out jurisdiction and

authority of the kil in this ficid. It would appear lint the Presidunt would

rather spell out lis own roquirements in an Executive ordar instead of having

Congress tell hiin what the kul night do to hulp him fujill' his obligations and

responsibilities as in'esident.

The political clinite of cuspivion and distrust resulting ircm

disclosures coming out os the Potorgato nearings could present so costecle

to getting any such Eaccutivo order signed in the immediato futize. However,

the rationale is novertheless valid ind when scrutinized closely, the language

‚In the Executive order wo horcinalter propose establishes definitive guidelince

which have heratsfore been unclear. It is my belief that we should go forward

with tisia.

We therafora propose and recommend that on Executive order

along the following lines be subinitted to the While louse with s strong

recommundation ius approval. The language which follows is merely to

Illustrate the type of Ixecutive order which we think would be appropriaie

and clues not necessarily represent an lucal format or style which should

bo submitted to the White House.

EXECUTIVE ORDER

"Whereas the Constitution of the Uniled States was established to

insure, unong other thing's, comostic trunquility; to provide for the common

defense; and to pronote the general welfare for tho people uf the United States:

and

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The Attorney General

"Whereas the President of the United States has the constitutionally

imposed responsibility of defcuding the Constitution and the existence of the

Government thereundcr; and

"Whercas there have been continuing unlawful acts of violence

perpetrated against the Government of the United States or against citizens

of the United States or against persons entitled to the protuction of the

United States therchy endangering the domostic tranquility, threatening the

common: dofense, nnu jeoparcining the genéral welfare of the people of the

United States; and

"Whereas the Congress has enacted laws prohibiting acta such as

troason, ecoition, sabotuge, espionage, Insurrection and rebellion, seditious

sussopiiay, sini isvicuitne, riving, assussination, sionaping, aeprival

of civil rights, and conspiracies to commit such acts; und

"Whereas the President of the United States as Chief Executive

in the maintenance of the Government thereunder must have intelligence

Information for appropriate decisione in the discharge of his constitutionally

Imposed responeibilides;

"Now by authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes

of the United States and in the interest of orderly operation of this Government

and in furtisrance of the domestic tranquility, common defense, and general

welfare of the people of the United States it is ordered that;

"The Attorney General proparo and issue quidelines, conforming

to the principles of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, and outlining the

necessary direction, coordination, and guidance of investigations to assure

thet the Federal Bureau of Investigation provides on a continuing basis

intelligence information essential to the execution of laws pertaining to sub-

versive activity and other such activity affecting the national seeurity,

domestie tranquility, and general welfare of the United States. "

The Nation has been going through a time of terror. The concent

of urban guerrilla terrorism has been adopted by various extremiat elements

'in the Urited States. Bombings of public buildings and national institutions;

-B=

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The Attorney Gencral

killing of police officers who, by their uniform, are a symbol of the democratic

establishment; hijaching of sircraft in furtherance of revolutionary novements:

terrorist assaults on foreign diplomatic personnel and establishinents; und open

declaretion of war on our' form of government are only a few of the violent acts

which have been perpetrutec by doinestic subversives who seek to destroy or

seriously cripple our Government. Terrorist guerrilla ittacks which were

once confined to far away places and relued to problems of no immediate con-

cern ol ours are now possible in this country. Forcign terrorist groups in

collusion with domestic terrorists have laid plans for in airport messacre of

the type which recently occurred in Isracl. Other foreign terrorist elcents

have laid plans for (errorist attucks on American soil. Already oue foreign

official has been assassinated, possibly by terrorists.

It would be folly to adopt an investigative policy based on

the concept of investigation only when there is rcason to believe a crime

involving the national security has been committed. The FBI must

obviously anticipate the crimes described move. We believe thut in

order for the Government to be in position to defend itself against revolu

tionary and terrorist efforts to destroy it, the FBI must have sufficient

investigative ithority to conduct intelligence-type investigations not

normally associated with enforcement of the statutes. In other words we

think the President has the inherent Executive power to expand by further

defining the FBI's investigative authority to cnable it to develop advance

information concerning the ylans and aspirations of terrorists and revolu-

tionaries who seek to overthrow or destroy the Govornment. However, we

_ also belleve that such expanded authority must be forinally set forth in an

Executive order and that this recommendation is responsive in the Attorney

Genersi's expressed interest in laying more formal guidelines to our work:

in areas where definition is not now clear.

We consider the issuance of a new Executive order delineating

our jurisdiction, authority, and responsibility to gather and report intolligence

information relating to the national security to be a very important and high

priority matter. Ye believe the issuance of guidelines by the Attorney Genoral

under Title 28, Section 533, United States Code, to be equally important.

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The Attorney General

For' your information, our own invostigative guidelines as con-

talaod in our lanual of Instructions rclating to domestic subversive investiga-

tons have boon completaly rewritten to cunicrm with the concept that our

Ginnetic intelligeace-type investigations we based on Federal statutes. These

Enticlines provido that in each instance, the domustic intolligence investigation

munt be predicated on information indicating that the organization or incividual

is engaged in scurity which could involve a violation of specific stututes relaung

to the national eccurity. A copy of the new guidelines was previcusly provided

to the Departmont of dustice in connection with the request of Senator Edward M.

Kunacy to obtain a copy of tha FbI's Section 87 of the Manual of Instructions.

In clicctive dato of the new guidolines wos. August 1, 1973.

1 - The Doputy Attorney Gencral

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1s v

A1080ITIC9°

PaN (68.68H1 101.81.8

PNE STATES COT

MENT

Memorandunz

Clirence M. Kclley

ligector

chiral Burcau of Investigation

sIen E. Pomneiching

dialstant Attorney General

fai seministration

reileral Employee Security Program

Encutive Order 10450

DATE: NOV 1: 1971

This is in response to; your menoranda, entitled as above,

dated hay 8, 1974 and August 19, 1974, directed to the Deputy

Executive Order 11785 which amends Executive Order 10450. In

view of the involvement of my staff in these matters, I will

undertake to answer your questions with the concurrence of the

criminal Division.

As you know this matter has been under continuing review

both in the Task Force, chaired by a representative of this

office, of working level representatives of various agencies

in the

security field and is now under study to a lesser degree

in Project #10 of the

"Domestic Council on Privacy".

You ask that the Department; (a) provide specific instruc-

tions to the Bureau to conduct intelligence-type investigations

to identify and determine the activities of organizations nov

described in the amended Section 8(a) (5) of Executive Order

10450; (b) furnish guidelines to be used by the Bureau

in 1n1-

tiating investigations of individuals under the captioned matter

pursuant to Executive Order 10450 and specifically, criteria to

be utilized in determining whether available information is a

sufficient basis for investigation.

Under the amendment to Section 8(a) (5) of Executive Order

20450, we now have only two types of organizations; (1) those

which

unlawfully advocate or practice the commission of acts

of force or violence to prevent others from exercising their

rights under the constitution or laws of the United States or

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any State, (2) or which scek to overthrow the Government of

the United States, or any State or subdivision thereof, by

unlavful peans: (Emphasis added).

Of course, the key words which are underlined indicate

that the investigation should be initially based on a possible

violation of a federal. (such as the Smith Act) or state statute

prohibiting unlawful advocacy or the commission of any unlawful

act of force or violence. However, in order for the Bureau to

detoct organizations with a potential of the above nature, it

is important that tie

investigation proceed on the basis of in-

formation indicating thai the organization nay be of the

natuse

mentioneà. It is not necessary that a crime occur before the

investigation is initiated, but.only that a reasonable evaluation

of the available information suggests that the activities of the

organization may fall within the proscription of the Order. Ihe

most recent example of the type of organization, that you have

advised is becoming more prevalent, is the small but dedicated

to violence, Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA). Organizations. of

this natic would ciearly ials within the order and should se

investigated as soon as infonnation is available indicating their

potentiality for violence and of course, if possible, prior to

the fulfillment of their purposes.

It is true that Executive Order 11785 eliminated the prior

communist, totalitarian, fascist, and subversive characterizations

and definitions, but there was no intention of restricting the

investigations of such organizations if their programs call for

acts of force or violence or the unlawful advocacy of the com-

mission of acts of force or violence in furtherance of these

programs.

It is not possible to set definite parameters covering the

initiation of investigations of potential organizations falling

within the Order but once. the investigation reaches a stage that

offers a basis for determining that the activities are legal in

nature, then the investigation should cease, but if the investi-

gation suggests a determination that the organization is engagea

in illegal activities or potentially illegal activities it should

continue.

' It follows in answer to your second question that indivia-

uals who are active either as members of or as affiliates of

2

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zations described above should be investigated when

nation is received indicating their involvement. The

yardstick indicated above for organizations in deter-

fing whether the investigation should continue, should apply

incerning individuals and when a determination can reasonably

e made that the individuals activities, either within the

organization or as an individual, do not appear to be in vio

lation of any law, then the investigation should cease.

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•INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

POSITION PAPER ON JURISDICTION

• .

February 13. 1975

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Basis for FBI National Security Intelligence Investigations,

W. Raymond Wannall

II. Authority Granted to the FBI by the Presidential Directive

of June 26, 1939, in the Area of Intelligence and Internal

Security Investigations and Subsequent Pertinent Documents

III. Appendix of Exhibits Concerning thé Directives

IV. Statutes and Executive Orders Affecting FBI Jurisdiction

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. :

I. BASIS FOR FBI NATIONAL

SECURITY INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS

W. Raymond Wannall

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BASIS FOR FBI NATIOTAL

SECURITY INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS

On July 31, 1972, the Intelligence Division issued

a position paper which in effect drew the conclusion that the

FBI has the responsibility to conduct whatever investigations

are necessary to determine if statutes relating to espionage.

sabotage, insurrection or rebellion, sedition, seditioue

conspiracy, advocacy of overthrowing the Government and

other such crimes affecting the national security have been

violated. In carrying out this responsibility, the FBI has

the authority to undertake Investigation prior to the actual

commitment of such a crine to determine if groups or

Individuals are engaging in activities which if uninterrupted

could result in a violation of a specific statute. . The

position paper noted that the FBI had declared publicly

over a long period of time that its responsibilities in the

donestic intelligence fleld were authorized under legislative

enactnents, Presidental directives, and instructions of the

Attorney General. The Presidential dircctives cited were

those of September 6, 1939, and three subsequent ones of

January 8, 1943, July 21, 1950, and December 15, 1953, which

reiterated the directive of Septenber 6, 1939. It was stated

that it was belloved there was a misconception as to the

extent of jurisdiction or authority conveyed to the FBI by

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these directives. It was said that it appeared that while

the 1939 directive fixed-responsibility on the FBI to handle

espionage, sabotage and ncutrality matters it did not convey

any authority or jurisdiction which the FBI did not already

have fron legislative chactments.

The position paper was forwarded to former Acting

Director Gray but no action was taken with respect to it.

Following the appoiniment of MI. Kelley as Director of the

. FBI, on August 7, 1373, the results of the study were called

to the attention of the Attorney General by letter and it

was suggested to him that an executive order be prepared which

would in effect establish definitive guidelines which it was

felt had been theretofore unclear.

Subsequently on August 24, 1973, at the request

of the Department, we furnished to MI. Milllam D. Ruchelshaus,

the Deputy Attorncy General Designate, a copy of the position

paper together with a copy of Section 87 of our manual in

which new guidelines had been promulgated to assure that the

field thereafter predicated investigations in the internal

security area of our operations on specific statutes.:' The-new

manual section had been issued and went into effect during

August, 1973.

The copies of the position paper and our new Section

87, of the Manual of Instructions, were returned to us by

•the Departnent without comment. On Septenber 12, 1973, the

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Attorney General stated. that he thought it would be premature

to recommend to the President that an executive order be

Issued until "we were fairly certain in our own minds as to

how much should be and can be accomplished at each level of

delegation.". There has been no followup from the Department

with regard to the Attorney General's statements as of this

time.

On June 1 and 5, 1974, Assistant-Director V. R.

, Wannall and former Inspector Thomas J. Smith of the Intelligence

Division appeared before the Committee on Internal Security

House of Representatives (Ichord Committee). The results

of their testimony are set forth in a publication entitled

"Domestic Intelligence Operations for Internal Security

Purposes Part I." Pertinent portions of this testimony

appear on pages 3571 through 3574 and on page 3591. These

sessions of the conmittee were under the direction of

Kr. Alfred M. Nittle, Legislative Counsel of the Conmittee,

and he propounded most of the questions.

Referring to the directive of September 6, 1939,

Mx. Nittle said, "Now for the purpose of carrying out that

directive, has the Attorney General by standing and general

orders now in effect instructed the FBI as to precisely

what investigative work is to be enoraced within the expression

'subversive activities?""

3

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In responding to the question, Wannall Icad into

the record a strictly confidential memorandum dated

September 10, 1936, prepared by former Director Hoover for

MI. E. A. Tamm, Associate Diroctor. In the memorandum,

Mr. Hoover

referred to a conversation he had had that day

during which it. Hoover briefed the Attorney General with rogard

to a conference he had had with the President on September

1936, during. which the Secretary of State was present and

requested Mr. Hoover as the representative of the Department

of justice "to have investigation made of the subversive

activities in this country, Including communism and facism."

The memorandum shows that the Attorney General verbally

directed Mr. Hoover to proceed with this investigation and

to coordinate, as the President suggested, information upon

these matters

in the possession of the Military Intelligence

Division and the Naval Intelligence Division. In effect,

this

constituted a standing and general order to the FBI from

the Attorney General with regard to the Presidential directive

of September 6, 1939. While the Attorney General's order pre-

ceded the September 6, 1939, directive by some three years,

it has never been abrogated and the manner in which it

relates to the order of 1939 will be explained hereinafter.

Mr. Nittle then pointed out that he saw no specific

reference to statutes which would show basis for the FBI to

•- Investigate subversive activities. It was explained to him

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that prior to the issuance of MI. Hoover's September 10, 1936,

menorandum he had had meetings at the thite louse, one of

which included the Secretary of State, and Mr. Hoover had

insisted that the Secretary of State request that the FBI

conduct investigations

relating to subversive activitics,

including comnunism and facism, since under Title 18, Section

533, U. S. Code, the Attorney General is authorized to instruct

the IBI to conduct such other investigations as are required

by the Secretary of State in carrying out his authority.

Later during the testimony, MI. Nittle pointed out that it

was his assumption that at least one of the bases for the

President's authority for issuing the directive of September 6,

1939, was his constitutional duty to protect and defond the

Constitution and that it was adequate to lend support to the

Federal investigative jurisdiction vithout reference to any

statutes. It was acknowledged that the FBI does not question

the Constitutional power of the president to delegate

Investigative jursidiction.

Following his appearance before the Ichord

: =.

Committec, Wannall undertook personally to conduct research to

determino if there is a basis for concluding that rBI intclli-

gence investigations are in fact based upon a delegation of

authority under the President's Constitutional powers. This

course was pursued for the following reasons:

∞ 5 =

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•1. In testimony before the Appropriations

Committees, Ir. Hoover had consistently stated that the FBI's

responsibilitics in the domestic Intelligence field are auth-.

orized under legislative enactments, Presidential dircotives

and instructions of the Attorney General. He said they include

Investigative jurisdiction over matters relating to espionage,

counterespionage, sabotage, treason, sedition; subversion

and related internal security functions. He pointed out that

subjects of investigation included the Communist Party USA,

Communist Front Groups and other totalitarian organizations

Including Individuals or groups who are alleged either to

seck the overthrow the Government of the United States by

force or violence or to conspire against the rights of citi-

zens. He further stated the FBI has primary responsibility

for Investigating matters of these types in the United States,

Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. Following his testimony,

the Congress consistently appropriated funds to permit the

FBI to carry out investigations in these areas.

•2. Deputy Assistant Attorney General Kevin C.

Maroney of the Criminal Divison of the Department made

appearances before the Ichord Conmittee: on February 20, April 1

and April 2, 1974. Ilis testinony as recorded on pages 3366

and 3439 of the publication "Domestic Intelligence Operations

for Internal Security Purposes Part I" contained statements

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bearing on this subject matter. For example, after Mr. Nittle

had referred to the September 6, 1939, Presidential directive

and the subsequent ones, "MIr. Nittle asked if he regarded the

directive as embracing within its terms a requirement that the

FBI also take charge of investigative work of subversive

activities generally. Mr. Maroney said that he thought it dia

generally direct the FBI: to take charge of investigation of sub-

versive activities and, "

...I think through the years what was

embraced through that condition was, in various exccutive orders,

and in other directives of the Attorney General relating to civil

disturbance matters." On page 3439, lit Maroney is reported to

have discussed investigations in the internal security area

conducted by the FBI. He stated that in connection with

particular investigations after a period of tine or after an

accumulation of information the FBI subnits the information

to the Department and the Department will give an opinion

as. to whether the facts constitute a prosecutable violation

and will also advise whether additional or continual investi

gation is requested. Maroney stated, "Sometimes it will be

Indicated "no further investigation is desired. However,

if any relevant future information comes to your attention,

please advise.'" Mr. Nittle then inquired if ir. Maroney

was telling him in effect that not only are these investigations

being conducted but that he construed the Attorney Gencral's

• directive to be a directive to the FBI to conduct broad,

• 7=

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on-going Investigations with respect to subversive activities.

Mr. Maroney replied that "he thought they (FBI) are under a con-

tinuing mandate of the Attorney General to continue

investigations of crines which include seditious conspiracy

anti-riot statutes and many other statutes.

3. In our position paper of July 31, 1972, the

conclusion was drawn that no additional investigative

authority was conveyed in the first paragraph of the

September 6, 1939, Presidential directive wherein the

FBI Was

s instructed to take charge of investigative work

In matters relating to espionage, sabotage, and violations

of the neutrality regulations. Since these were statutory

matters, the position was taken and, I feel correctly, that

this direction nerely fixed responsibility in the FBI to

Investigate previously

existing statutes. However, the

position paper did not take into consideration the possible

significance of the last paragraph of the directive wherein

the President called upon "all police officers, sheriffs,

and all other law enforcement officers in the United States

promptly to turn over to the nearest representative of the

Fedoral Bureau of Investigation any infornation obtained by.

then relating to esplonage, counterespionage, sabotage,

subversive activities and violations of the neutrality laws."

•.

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• As noted hereinbefore, Mr. Hoover in his memorandum

of September 10, 1936,

wherein he explained that the rBI had

been charged with investigating subversive activities indicated

that the menorandum was classified strictly confidential.

On June 26, 1939, the President issued a directive

which was classified confidential. In it he stated, "It is my

desire that the investigation of all espionage, counterespionage

and sabotage matters be controlled and handled by the Federal

Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice, the Military

Intelligence Division of the Mar Department and the Office of

Naval Intelligence of the Mavy Department. The directors

of these three agencies are to function as a committee to

coordinate their activities." He went

on to point out that no

investigation should be conducted by any investigative agency

of the Government into matters involving actually or potentially

any espionage, counterespionage or sabotage except these

three agencies and the directive, which was issued to these heads

of all departments, stated that the President would be glad

if the heads of tho departments would instruct agencies other

than the three named to immediately refer to the nearest

office of the FBI any data, infommation or material relating

to these matters.

The directive of September 6, 1939, was not

classified. It was issued to the public. In it the President

said the Attorney General had been requested to instruct the

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FBI to take charge of Investigative work in matters relating to

espionage, sabotage and violations of the neutrality regu-

lations. It was in this paragraph that the President

publicly fixed responsibility for investigative work with

respect to statutes relating to these three subject matters

in the FBI. However, in the third paragraph of the

September 6, 1939, directive the President stated, "To this

end I request all police officers, sheriffs and all other

law enforcement officers in the United States promptly to

turn over to the nearest representative of the Federal

Bureau of Invesigation any information obtained by them

relating to espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, subversive

activities and violations of the neutrality laws." It will

be noted that in this paragraph he referred specifically to

violations of three statues which he had enumerated in the

first paragraph but he also asked that there be turned over to

the FBI any information relating to countorespionage a word

which he had utilized in the confidential June 26, 1939,

directive and also the words subversive activities a phrase

which had been utilized by Mr. Hoover in explaining the

delegation of authority in Septenber, 1936.

• Mr. Hoover's nemorandum had been classified strictly confi-

dential and memoranda concerning his visits with President

Roosevelt and the Secretary of State which proceded the

Issuance of his September 10, 1936, memorandum revealed that

= 10 -

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the President wanted this matter treated in the greatest

of confidence. Accordingly, there is the basis for a

strong conclusion that in 1936 and in June, 1939, under his

constitutional authority, the President had already delegated

responsibility to the FBI for investigations relating to

counterespionage and subversive activities in classified

directives. For this reason, the first paragraph of the

Septenter 6, 1939, directive did not include the delegation

of responsibilities for investigative work relating to

counterespionage and subversive activities because

of the

classified nature of these matters but there was"än

acknow-

ledgement in the third paragraph of the September 6, 1939,

directive of the previous delegation of authority to the FBI

by the president in these two areas..

• Since the June 26, 1939, directive indicated that the

FBI and the War and Navy Departments should function as a

committee to coordinate their activities with respect to

Investigations of espionage, counterespionage and sabotage

• •

matters, Wannall requested the Research Section of the

Intelligence Division three weeks ago to undertake a study to

determine how this committce was formed and how it functioned

thereafter. The results of this study are set forth in the

attached 35-page paper.

• 11.

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On page Y of the attachment, it will be noted

that the Interdepartmental Intelligençe Conference (IIC)

was formed as an independent cormittee pursuant to the Presidential

directive of June 26, 1939, to coordinate the investigative

efforts of the three agencies. Io faciliate coordination, the

• IIC adopted the Delinitations Agrcement of June 5, 1940.

The nembers cited in the preamble of that document that in

conformity with that directive contained in the. Presidential

memorandum of June 26, 1939, as augumented by his directive

of September 6, 1939, charging them with Investigation of all

espionage, counterespionage, sabotage and subversive

activitios the responsibility for these investigations would

be delineated as contained in the agreement. The Delimi-

i tations

Agreement was revised on February 9, 1942, and again

on February 23, 1949.

As shown on page 9 of the attachment, the IIC as

an independent committee ceased to exist in 1949 as pursuant

to the National Security Act of 1947 it was absorbed and then

chartered by the lational Security Council presided over by

the President. In the charter, reference vas made to investi-

gations of donestic espionage, counterespionage, sabotage,

subversion and other related intelligence matters affecting

Internal security.

• 12 .

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Page 10 of the attachment relates that supervision

of the IIC was transferred by the National Security Council

to the Attorney General In an Action Memorandum dated June 9,

1962. On March 5, 1961, the Attorney General issued

instructions to the FEI wherein the Attorney General was

indicated as the individual through whom the authority flowed

as opposad to the National Security Council. In a memorandum

to former Director Hoover explaining this dated March 5, 1964,

the Attorney General again referred to the coordination of

all Investigations of domestic espionage, counterespionage,

sabotage, and subversion and other related intelligence

matters

affecting intornal security.

A reading of the enclosure will show that the IIC

was primarily concerned with matters of internal security

which had ramifications international in scope, However,

It should be noted that on November 1, 1950, an attempt was

made to kill President Truman by two members of the

Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico when they endeavored to

shoot their way into the Blair House which he was then

occupying. From a letter to Mr. Hoover as Chairman of the IIC

and Ir. Raymond P. Whearty, Chairman of the Interdepartmental

Cormittec on Internal Security, dated November 6, 1950, signed

by MI. J. Patrick Coyno, National Security Council Representa-

tive for Internal Security, It is apparent that the President

• 13 -

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felt that both the IIC and ICIS had interests and respon-

sibilities in the domestic terrorist field, in light of the

fact that he, through the National Security Council, made

inquiry of the IIC regarding "the recent outbreak of violence

by the Puerto Rican Mationalists." The President requested

that the IIC and ICIS report to the

National Security Council

on the lessons to be learned from that incident on domestic

terrorism. Indicated by the detailed questions posed by the

president and. the detailed response given.by the IIC, it is

apparent that the President intended that IIC have great

Latitute in the area of subversive activities and terrorism

It relates to internal security matters assigned to the

IIC.

:

Keeping in mind that it was during the admini-

stration of president Truman and based upon racommendations

that he made that the Mational Security Act of 1947 was

passed, I feel that his request of the IIC for a report

regarding the activities of a purely domestic group, the

• Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico, provides an indication of

what he had in mind with respect to the responsibilities.

of the IIC with regard to investigation of subversive

activities.

I think this is well stated on page 14 of the enclosed

• document. "Nen do not opcrate in a vacuum and their acts and

documents are guided by their knowledge, Instructions and

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understanding of instructions at that time in history: The

delimitations agreement of 1940 must, therefore, speak to

existing problems and only the anticipation of future prob

lems. All prior knowledge and understanding of instructions

and orders could only have been interpreted to clearly

include investigation of United States citizens."

The foregoing information and the information con

tained in the attachments are supportive of the conclusion

that the intelligence-gathering activities of the FBI have had

as their basis the intention of the President to delegate his

Constitutional authority as indicated by certain Presidential

directives, the provisions of Title 28, Section 533, U.S. Coûe

and the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947. These

Intelligence-gathering activities are also based upon statutes

defining violations pertaining to the national security, a

list of which is attached hereto.

0•15 -

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II. AUTHORITY GRANTED TO THE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION BY THE

PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVES IN THE AREA OF

INTELLIGENCE AND INTERNAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS

AND SUBSEQUENT PERTINENT DOCUMENTS

A. L. Lacey, Jr.

A. F. Watters, Jr.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Synopsis

I.

Verbal Presidential Instructions of August 24, 1936,

and August 25, 1936

II.. The Presidential Directive of June 26, 1939, a

confidential Directive

Ill.

The Presidential Directive of September 6, 1939, a

public Directive

IV. The Presidential Directives of January 8, 1943,

July 24, 195.0, and December 15, 1953

V. How has the FBI complied with the verbal instructions

of August, 1936, and confidential Presidential Directive

• of June 26, 1939, as augmented by his Directive of

September 6, 1939, and what other Presidential documents

reaffirm subsequent Presidential approval of this investi-

gative authority

A. Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference

B. IC under the charter of the National Security

Council (NSC)

C. IIC under the charter of the Attorney General

D. What are the primary areas of inquiry

• considered by IIC in fulfilling their responsi-

bility? Do they include United States citizens?

VI. What Other Areas of Intelligence Investigation Have Been

Recognized By the Executive to Fall Within the

Jurisdiction Delineated By the Directives?

VII. Has Congress Recognized the Dual Intelligence--Criminal

Role of the FBI Which Results From the Directives

VIII. Do the Directives in Any Way Alter the FBI's Jurisdiction

as Assigned by Statute or Other Executive Order?

IX.

What Effect Would Be Realized If the FBI Had Not Had the

Directives or If the Directives Were Revoked?

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3

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10

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Synopsis;

Oral and written, confidential and public Directives of 1936 and

in June and September, 1939, ordered the FBI to investigate matters of internal

security, to include "subversive activities," and to coordinate such with the

military intelligence services. In compliance, the FBI and military.formed the

Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC) and delineated their areas of

investigative responsibility in the Delimitations Agreements of 1940, 1942, and

1949, basing their authority on the Presidential Directive of June 26, 1939, as

augmented by the Directive of September 6, 1939. The Delimitations Agreement

stated that the FBI will investigate matters affecting internal security, including

United States citizens. This authority for intelligence investigation was restated

and reaffirmed in 1949 when the National Security Council, presided over by

the President, chartered the IIC and adopted the Delimitations Agreement in

total. In 1962, the President assigned the internal security responsibility

to the Attorney General by National Security Action Memorandum 161. The

Attorney General rechartered the IIC pursuant to this authority and therein

reaffirmed the Directives by adoption in total of the Delimitations Agreement.

Pursuant to the Directives, the FBI has had continuous authority

to conduct intelligence investigations of internal activities which have potential

to subvert the ability of the Nation to maintain continuing existence under the

Constitution. (Emphasis Added) This authority has remained constant though

the nature of the threats has changed. As illustrated herein by use of examples,

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the original problem was global war and how internal subversion affected the

• war effort through actual or potential espionage and sabotage. This problem

continued through the Cold War to the present time. In more recent years, a

strictly domestic threat arose; riots, racial militants, hate groups, and terrorists.

Cognizant of the continuing authority for intelligence investigations, these

threats were faced by the FBI not only because of the immediate effect on the

national welfare or possible violation of statute but the evaluation of potential

for subversion during a national emergency.

This authority for intelligence investigation in the field of internal

security precipitated the dual role of the FBI as it exists today; (1) intelligence,

and (2) criminal investigations. This has been recognized by the Executive,

the Attorncy General, and the Congress.

In addition to the authority granted under the Directives, the FBI

has (1) a broad field of statutory authority, and (2) authority under Executive

Orders to investigate employee loyalty matters; neither of which is in any way

affected by the authority granted under the Directives.

In summary, the Directives granted intelligence authörity and

placed the FBI in an internal security intelligence posture, in addition to the

original statutory responsibility in the investigation of solely criminal matters.

(ii)

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AUTHORITY GRANTED TO THE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION BY THE

PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVES IN THE AREA OF

INTELLIGENCE AND INTERNAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS

AND SUBSEQUENT PERTINENT DOCUMENTS

I. Verbal Presidential instructions of August 24, 1936, and August 25, 1936:

Verbal instructions were given to Director John Edgar Hoover

by President Franklin D. Roosevelt on August 24, 1936, and August 25, 1936,

to investigate "subversive activities in the United States, including Fascism

and Communism," and "to coordinate any investigation along similar lines

which might be made by the Military or Naval Intelligence Services."

(Emphasis Added) President Roosevelt saw these activities "as international

in scope" and advised the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, to request "such

investigation" under the Appropriations Act (Title 28, Section 533, United States

Code, which was done orally as the President wished the matter to be "handled

quite confidentially." President Roosevelt instructed Mr. Hoover and

Secretary Hull to speak with the Attorney General "upon his return to the city"

about this matter. The discussion of August 24 and 25, 1936, covered the

area of communist and fascist "movements" in the United States and President

Roosevelt was interested in obtaining "a broad picture" of the movement and

activities "as may affect the economic and political life of the country as a

whole." (Confidential momoranda, John Edgar Hoover, dated August 24,

1936 and August 25, 1936.)

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On September 10, 1936, Mr. Hoover advised the Attorney General

regarding "the radical situation" and his conference with the President

and Secretary of State, wherein he acted as the representative of the

Department of Justice, and wherein the request was made "to have investi-

gation made of the subversive activities in this country, including

Communism and Fascism." (Emphasis Added) The Attorney General

orally directed Mr. Hoover to "proceed with this investigation and to

coordinate, as the President suggested, information upon these matters in

the possession of the Military Intelligence Division, Naval Intelligence

• Division, and the State Department. This, therefore, is the authority upon

which to proceed in the conduct of this investigation, which should, of

course, be hanäled in a most discreet and confidential manner." (Memorandum

for Mr. Tamm, strictly confidential, from John Edgar Hoover, dated

September 10, 1936.) *

It is noted and emphasized that, throughout the memoranda,

Mr. Hoover referred on a recurring basis to "subversive activities, in-

cluding communism and fascism" and the overall gist of the conversations

as reflected in the memoranda demands the understanding that this

authority was granted for a widespread and diverse look at all subversive

activities within the United States. It should not be overlooked that the

United States was then on the brink of global war and, of necessity,

information regarding subversive activities of all manner were of vital

importance to the President and Scerctary of State.

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il.

The Presidential Directive of June 26, 1939, a confidential Directive:

"It is my desire that the investigation of

all espionage, counterespionage, and sabotage

matters be controlled and handled by the

Federal Bureau of Investigation of the

Department of Justice, the Military Intel-

ligence Division of the War Department, and

the Office of Naval Intelligence of the Navy

Department. The directors of these three

agencies are to function as a committee to

coordinate their activities.

No investigations should be conducted by

any investigative agency of the Government into

matters involving actually or potentially any

espionage, counterespionage, or sabotage,

except by the three agencies mentioned above.

I shall be glad if you will instruct the heads

of all other investigative agencies than the three

named, to refer immediately to the nearest office

of the Federal Bureau of Investigation any data,

information, or matcrial that may come to their

notice bearing directly or indirectly on espionage,.

counterespionage, or sabotage." (Emphasis Added)

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In the Presidential Dircctive of June. 26, 1939, President

Roosevelt clearly and uncquivocably ordered that "the investigation of all

espionage, counterespionage, sabotage matters" be handled by the Federal

Bureau of Investigation, Military Intelligence Division (MID), and Office of

Naval Intelligence (ONI) and that their directors were to act as committee

to coordinate their activities. This is unquestionably delegation of investi-

gative authority for Bureau investigations of the enumerated areas of activity

to the exclusion of other agencies, save the MID and ÖNI. In the second

paragraph, the Directive also clearly and unequivocably. states the President's

intent to have investigation made of actual or potential espionage, counter-

espionage or sabotage as he directs no other agency to enter the field of

actual or potential espionage, counterespionage or sabotage investigations.

(Emphasis Added) On the contrary, in paragraph three, he directs other

agencies to "refer immediately" to the FBI any data, information or material

bearing directly or indirectly on espionage, counterespionage, or sabotage.

If such matters are to be referred to the FBI, the President's intent obviously

is that he desired the FBI to "control and handle" the correlation of such

material as reflected in paragraph one of the Directive and as he had pre-

viously verbally instructed Mr. Hoover to do in 1936, in other words, to

coordinate any investigation with the military.

Reflecting back to the verbal Directives of August, 1936, as

compared to the Prosidential Directive of June 26, 1939, it is noted that tio

major premises can be made, one being the intent of the President for the

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FBI to investigate "subversive activity, including Communism and Fascism,"

an area of concern akin to and overlapping in many respects the area of

espionage, counterespionage, and sabotage; and secondly, his intent that

the FBI and Military Services coordinate their efforts of investigation as

assigned by these Directives. Emphasis Added)

IlI. The Presidential Directive of September 6, 1939, a public Directive:

"The Attorney General has been requested by me

to instruct the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the

Department of Justice, to take charge of investigative

work in matters relating to espionage, sabotage, and

violations of the neutrality regulations.

This task must be conducted in a comprehensive

". and effective manner on a national basis, and all

information must be carefully sifted out and correlated

in order to avoid confusion and irresponsibility.

To this end I request all police officers, sheriffs,

and all other law enforcement officers in the United States

promptly to turn over to the nearest representative öf the

Federal Bureau of Investigation any information obtained

by them relating to espionage, counterespionage, sabotage,

subversive activities and violations of the neutrality

laws."

(Emphasis Added)

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Interpreting the Presidential intent in this Directive, a public

document, it must be first noted that in the first sentence the President states

"the Attorney General has been requested by me to instruct the Federal Pureau

of Investigation of the Department of Justice to take charge of investigative

work in matters relating to espionage, sabotage, and violations of the neutrality

regulations." (Emphasis Added) The use of the past tense requires one to

understand that the President, through prior instructions and Directives,

oral or written, had, to his own satisfaction, specifically delegated responsi-

bility for these investigations. The President restates publicly the need for

handling of these matters comprehensively and on "a national basis." He

restates matters previously covered in verbal and written form by expressing

his desire to have the information "sifted out and correlated." One need only

refer to the verbal instructions of 1936 and the confidential Presidential

Directive of June 26, 1939, to clearly see that the main intent of the President

is here again reflected, only in this instance, publicly, and with an appeal for

assistance from law officers.

Further, and a point believed worthy of note, the President

instructs in this Directive that law officers in the United States remand to

the FBI information relating to espionage, counterespionage, sabotage,

subversive activities, and violations of the neutrality laws.

Emphasis

Added) Carefully note that the President included in this request that.

information regarding subversive activities be turned over to the FBI as

- 6-

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:

well as information involving espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, and

violations of the neutrality laws. This is the precise language of the verbal

Directive or instruction of August, 1936, and it is logical that if the President

instructed Mr. Hoover to investigate subversive activities in 1936, he would

desire that information regarding subversive activities be furnished to the FBI

by law officers in his public Directive of September 6, 1939, in order to

increase and enhance the tempo of incoming information regarding subversive

activities in which he had a grave interest. (Emphasis Added)

IV. The Presidential Directives of January 8, 1943, July 24, 1950, and December 15,

1953, in main, restate and reaffirm these basic instructions and orders based

on then current developments at the time of their respective issuances.

V. How has the FBI complied with the verbal instructions of August, 1936, and

confidential Presidential Directive of June 26, 1939, as augmented by his

Directive of September 6, 1939, and what other Presidential documents reaffirm

subsequent Presidential approval of this investigative authority?

A. Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IC):

The Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IC) was formed

as an independent committee pursuant to the Presidential Directive of June 26,

1939, to coordinate the investigative efforts of the FBI, MID, and ONI. To

facilitate coordination, the IIC adopted the Dclimitations Agreement of June 5,

1940. The members cited in the preamble of that document that in conformity

with the Directive contained in the Presidential Memorandum of June 26, 1939,

-7-

is

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as augmented by his Directive of September 6, 1939, charging them with

investigation of all espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, and subversive

activities, that responsibility for these investigations would be delineated

as contained in the Agreement. (Emphasis Added)

It is apparent that the members of IIC recognized their authority

from the Presidential Memorandum of June 26, 1939, and that their duty

under that Directive was to investigate the aforementioned areas, including

subversive activities, as Mr . Hoover had been directed to do in August, 1936.

(Emphasis Added)

The IIC in issuing the revised Delimitations Agreement of February 9,

1942, again cited the Presidential Directive of June 26, 1939, as augmented by

the Directive of September 6, 1939', as authority. IC members stated in the

preamble that investigative responsibility of IIC extended to "all activities

coming under the categories of espionage, counterespionage, subversion,

and sabotage." (Emphasis Added)

The Agreement was redrafted in the Delimitations Agreement of

February 23, 1949, and again the members in the preamble cited the

Presidential Directive of June 26, 1939, as augmented by his Directive of

September 6, 1939, the Delimitations Agreement of February 9, 1942, and the

Presidential Directive of October 30, 1947 (pertaining to employee loyalty

investigations), as authority. As before, the IIC members referred specifically

to the delincation of responsibility of investigation of "all activities coming

undci the categorics of espionage, countcrespionage, subversion, and sabotage."

(Emphasis Addcd)

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B.

IIC under the charter of the National Security Council (NSC):

The IIC as an independent committee ceased to exist in 1949, as

pursuant to the National Security Act of 1947 it was absorbed and then chartered

by the NSC, presided over the President. The Council chartered both the IIC

and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (CIS), which consisted

of representatives of the Departments of State, Treasury, and Justice, and the

Military Establishments. * The IIC charter issued by NSC dated July 18, 1949,

-.

reads in part:

"Pursuant to the provision of Section 101 of the

National Security Act and NSC 17/4 as approved by the

President, the National Security Council hereby

authorizes and directs that the Indepartmental

‹ Intelligence Conference effect the coordination of

all investigation of domestic espionage, counter-

espionage, sabotage, subversion, and other

".

related intelligence matters affecting internal

security. The IIC shall be guided by the terms

of this charter.

A. ORGANIZATION

(1) The Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference

shall be constituted as set forth in the Presidential

Directive of Junc 26. 1939, that is, the Director of

* See Appondix for ICIS Charter

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the Fedoral Bureau of Investigation, the Director of

the Intelligence Division of the Army, the Director

of Naval Intelligence, and in addition, the Director,

Office of Special Investigations, U. S. Air Force,

which office has been created since the issuance of

•C.

• the original Presidential Directive." (Emphasis Added)

IC under the charter of the Attorney Genéral:

Supervision of the IIC was transferred by National Security

Action Memorandum 161 issued by the President, John E. Kennedy, dated

June 9, 1962, which reads in part:

"(2) Accordingly, I have directed that the two

interdepartmental committees concerned with internal

security--the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference

(IC) and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal

Security (ICIS) --which have been under the supervision

of the National Security Council, will be transferred to

the supervision of the Attorney General. The continuing

need for these committees and their relationship to the.

Attorney General will be matters for the Attorney General

to determine."

Pursuant to National Security Action Memorandum, the Attorney

General in a memorandum to John Edgar Hoover, Chairman, IIC, dated

March 5, 1964, which, in essence, restated the IIC charter as issued by

d..

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the NSC, with appropriate amendments, causing it to read in part:

:

"Pursuant to the provisions of the National

Security Action Memorandum 161, dated June 9,

1962 from the President, the Attorney General hereby

authorizes and directs that the Interdepartmental

Intelligence Conference effect the coordination of all

investigation of domestic espionage, counterespionage;

sabotage and subversion, and other related intelligence

matters affecting internal security. The IC shall be

guided by the terms of this charter.

A. ORGANIZATION

(1) The Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference

"shall be constituted as set forth in the Presidential

Directive of June 26, 1939, that is, the Director of

the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of

Justice; Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,

Department of the Army; Director of Naval Intelligence,

Department of the Navy; and the Director of Special

Investigations, the Inspector General, Department

of the Air Force (the latter position having been created

since the issuance of the original Presidential Directive.)"

(Emphasis Added)

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ser.

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It is apparent that all authority granted by NSC and the Attorney

General subsequent to the Presidential Directives of August 24-25, 1936, and

June 26, 1939, which authorized the FBI to conduct intelligence investigations

refers to those Directives and recognizes, adopts and reaffirms their instruction.

D.

What are the primary areas of inguiry considered by HIC in fulfilling

their responsibility? Do they include United States citizens?

A review of the voluminous files relative to IIC reflects that the

primary considerations of IIC were directed at such matters as security of

plants, protection of industry and transportation; obstruction of commerce and

vital utilities, registry of boats, security of wharfs and docks, public radio

broadcasting, alien entry and control matters, diplomatic establishment

radio authorizations, visiting foreign nationals, Communist Party, USA,

and alien seamen, to mention but a few.

Obviously, the IIC was primarily concerned with matters of

internal security which had ramifications "international' in scope," as

President Roosevelt described previously herein, and this is only natural

as these were the primary problems during the heat of the Cold War of the

late 1940's to the mid-1960's. These problems continue today. Domestic

terrorism was not a problem in this country at the time, except on a very

limited basis. Mr. Hoover, when preparing proposals for the Delimitations

Agreement of June 5, 1940, suggested to the members that "subversive

• activity" be understood to include "espionage, sabotage, groups organized

to assist hostile forces ("Fifth Column") and Subversive propaganda, " all

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• :

which ard matters obviously pertinent to internal security challenges from

without the Nation's boundries. One primary consideration cannot be lost,

however, and that is the central fact that from the earliest verbal instructions

• in 1936 through and including all other orders, the FBl, without reservation,

has been directed to "investigate," "take charge," "correlate," "sift out,"

"control," and "handle," all intelligence matters concerning the internal

security of the United States whether it be called "subversive activities,"

"subversion," "domestic espionage," "espionage," "counterespionage,"

"sabotage," or "subversion and other related intelligence matters affecting

internal security." (Emphasis Added) Secondly, and of primary importance,

is the fact that the thrust of these investigations as ordered by the various

Directives and charters has not been limited to the alien principle or agent

operating in the United States but directed at the United States citizen when

he or she acts or functions in a manner to fall within the above terms used to

indicate a threat to the internal security. Supporting this fact is the Delimitations

Agreement of June 5, 1940, wherein the members, conforming with the Presidential

Directive of June 26, 1939, as they so state, outline their respective areas of

responsibility to investigate. Item 2 of this Agreement reads in part:

"II. FBI will assume responsibility for all

investigations of cases in these categories involving

civilians in the United States and in its territories

with the exception of the Panama Canal Zonc, Guam,

Samon and the Philippine Islands."

(Emphasis Added)

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Men do not operate in vacuum and their acts and documents are

guided by their knowledge, instructions, and understanding of instructions

at that time in history. The Delimitations Agreement of 1940 must, therefore,

speak to existing problems and only the anticipation of future problems. All

prior knowledge and understanding of instructions and orders could only have

been interpreted to clearly include investigation of United States citizens since

Item 2 of the Agreement speaks so specifically to this point.

1. Has the Executive adopted Item 2 as set forth in the Delimitations

Agreement of 1940?

Absolutely. The Delimitations Agreement of 1940 was replaced by

the Delimitations Agreement of February 9, 1942, wherein reference for authority

is again based on a Presidential Directive of June 26, 1939, and Item 2 is

changed in language but not in meaning. Item 2 reads in part:

"II. FBI will be responsible for:

1. All investigation of cases in the

categories involving civilians in the

United States and its territories with

the exception of the Republic of Panama,

the Panama Canal Zone, Guam, American

Samoas, Palmyra, Johnston, Wake and

Midway Islands, the Philippine Islands

and the Tcrritory of Alaska other than

that spocifically described in Paragraph III."

(Emphasis Added)

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..

The IIC issued the Delimitations Agreement of February 23, 1949,

again basing authority on the Presidential Directive of June 26, 1939, and

again restated the position to investigate United States citizens; which is

clearly stated in Item 2, which reads in part:

"II. FBI will be responsible for:

1. All investigations of cases in these

categories involving civilians and foreign

nationals of all classes in the continental

United States, Puerto Rico, the Virgin

Islands, (the State of Hawaii), and the State

of Alaska except as specifically described

hereinafter in Paragraph V, Section 5."

The Delimitations Agreement of February 23, 1949, was in effect

on July 18, 1949, when the IIC was chartered by the NSC. The President was

Chairman of the NSC. The NSC charter to IIC reads in part:

"D. Nothing herein shall be construed as

modifying or affecting the Presidential Directives

issued to the members of the IIC relating to their

individual responsibilities and duties. The

Delimitations Agrement among the members of the

IIC relating to the investigative responsibilities and

• duties of the individual members and other agrecments

• .

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among these members relating to the same matters

shall remain in full force and effect and shall continue

to be amended, changed, and supplemented at the

discretion of the IIC." (Emphasis Added)

The President herein clearly adopted the language of the Delimitations

Agreement of February 23, 1949, to include Item 2 of that Agreement, wherein

it is specifically stated the FBI will investigate United States citizens.

2. Does this adoption apply to the charter issued by the

Attorney General in 1964?

Yes. Pursuant to the authority of the National Security Action

Memorandum 161, dated June 9, 1962, from the President, the Attorney General

chartered the IIC and that charter reads in part:

". "D. Nothing herein shall be construed as

modifying or affecting the Presidential Directives

issued to the members of the IIC relating to their

individual responsibilities and duties. The

Delimitations Agreement among the members of the

IC relating to the investigative responsibilities and:

duties of the individual members and other agreements

among these members relating to the same matters

shall remain in full force and effect and shall continue

to be amended, changed, and supplemented at the

discretion of the IIC." (Emphasis Added)

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. •

In summary, the Executive has, over the years, granted continuing

authority to the FBI to investigate matters threatening the internal security, including

investigation of private citizens of the United States and their activities.

VI. What Other Areas of Intelligence Investigation Have Been Recognized By

the Executive to Fall Within the Jurisdiction Delineated By the Directives?

Examination of the question illustrates that over the years the

scope of internal security problems has been expanded from the nriginal

category of "subversive activities" as described by Mr. Hoover in

his proposed definition of the term to a much broader field of intelligence

responsibility. It has been illustrated that the oral and written Directives

of 1936 and 1939 vested intelligence investigative authority in the FBI and that

this authority has been reaffirmed over the years. The authority was granted

originally to meet the problems of the 1936-1939 period and has continued

in effect to meet. the problems involving internal security as they arose in

subsequent years.

Originally, the problem facing the Nation was obviously the threat

of communist and fascist espionage, sabotage, and subversive activities, acts

such as infiltration of vital functions, dissemination of propaganda, and fostering

discontent that would weaken the national fabric at a time when the Nation was

faced with global war. These concerns have grown and evolved over the years

to include domestic "hate groups," anarchists, and terrorists. The following

chronology illustrates this evolutionary aspect of the recognized problem:

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By letter to Mr. Hoover, Chairman, IIC, and Mr. Whearty, Chairman,

•ICIS, dated November 6, 1950, from Mr. J. Patrick Coyne, NSC Representative

on Internal Security, it is apparent that the President felt that the IC and the

ICIS had interests and responsibilities in the domestic terrorist field in light

of the fact that he, through the NSC, made inquiry of the IIC regarding the

then recent Presidential attack by Puerto Rican nationalists. The President

requested that the IIC and the ICIS report to the NSC on the lessons to be learned

from that incident of domestic terrorism (see App. Section I). As indicated

by the detailed questions posed by the President and the detailed response by

the IIC, it is apparent that the President intended that IIC have great latitude

in the area of investigation of subversive activity and terrorism as it relates to

internal security matters assigned to IIC.

It should be obvious that the concern of the President and referral

of this concern to the IIC and ICIS for answers affirms and illustrates the

President's atritude that such matters as domestic terrorism certainly affect,

the internal security and national welfare and are the responsibility of IlC.

The FBI is the member of IIC charged with investigation of "subversion" under

the Delimitations Agreement of February 23, 1949. What more subversive activity

could be imagined than an armed terrorist attack on the President?

In a report to the NSC on the status of the internal security program

dated March 5, 1954, prepared jointly by the IIC and the ICIS, the scope of

intelligence investigation of internal security matte's was described in connection

with outlining specific major goals of the program:

in

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"1. To coordinate the activities of all agencies and

and departments concerned with internal security matters,

including investigations, the collection of domestic

intelligence, and the integration of foreign intelligence

pertinent to the domestic intelligence field.

2. To continue the acceleration of investigations

designed to provide the basis for the apprehension,

prosecution, or other action, against persons involved

in subversive activities.

3. To detect and maintain security indices on

persons considered dangerous to the national defense

and public safety.

4. To neutralize Communist front and Communist-

dominated organizations of the United States."

It may be seen that in addition to their interests in prosecuting

statutory violations, the IIC members recognize their responsibility as assigned

by the Directives to obtain a broad-based intelligence picture regarding the

subversive potential of individuals and organizations.

In a joint status report to the NSC dated August 27, 1958, the IC

and ICIS discussed the dual aspects of their jurisdiction. It is pointed out

that there is occasional conflicts between the prosecutive jurisdiction under

statutes which might tend to interfcre with the intelligence-gathering function.

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In such cases, it was noted that prosecution is frequently foregone in favor

of the more valuable collection of intelligence. The report states in part:

"Following the Supreme Court decisions reversing

the convictions of 19 Communist Party leaders for

violation of the Smith Act of 1940, action by various

Circuit Courts of Appeal has resulted in the acquittal

• of 20 additional Communist Party functionaries and

the remanding for retrial of 29 others. While selected

cases are not scheduled for retrial during the fiscal

year 1959, problems have arisen in other cases due

to the lapse of time since the periods covered by the

indictments. In most instances, several years have

been consumed by trials and appeals with the result

that witnesses have died, have become invalid, or

are unavailable for other reasons and at this late date

their testimony cannot be replaced. Another problem

has been the stringent evidentiary standards established

by the Supreme Court in the case of the California

communist leaders.

In other cases, the Department of Justice must

consider the loss, through their appearance as witnesses,

of additional confidential informants of the FBI. It

is necessary to weigh the difficulty of developing

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:

informants within the Communist Party and its related

groups together with the value of the information they

secure against the benefit to be derived from using

such persons as witnesses."

On November 6, 1958, former Director Hoover gave a presentation

to the President and the Cabinet, which reads in part:

"We have still a sixth program under which we

..

continuously evaluate the espionage and sabotage

potential of individuals whose current activities

indicate that they might constitute a threat to the

country in the event of a national emergency. These

include members of the Communist Party of the

United States and other individuals dedicated to

the violent overthrow of our Government. We.

maintain a special index of such persons to enable

us to effect their immediate apprehension in the event

the President so directs the Attorney General. For

your information, there were 12,835 names on this

index.

Communist Party Icaders are hopeful that, by

exploiting such current national and international

issues as racial discrimination and peace, they can

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bring about a resurgence of Party activity and influence.

For example, Benjamin Davis, chairman of the Party's

New York District, in a report made in September of

this year to top communist functionaries, stressed

that the Party should concentrate on the integration

issue as symbolized by the Little Rock school situation.

Diligent efforts are made by the communists to infiltrate

Negro groups, particularly at the local level, so as

to agitate and create confusion.

The public usually associates the FBI's internal

security investigations with Communist Party activities

only. Nothing could be further from the truth. Our

investigations encompass any and all organizations based

on a creed of force and violence to determine whether they

are a threat to our internal security or whether they have

violated any Federal laws.

We investigate the activities of such diverse and

international organizations as the Marxist Socialist

Workers Party, and the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico.

(Responsible for attack upon President Truman,

1950, and Congress, 1951.) Further, we investi-

gate such fanatical and so-called 'hate' groups as

the Negro Nation of Islam; the Ku Klus Klan; the

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National States Rights Party, an anti-Jewish and anti-

Negro organization; and the 'Confederate Underground.'

The latter is a name which has been mentioned on

a number of occasions in recent bombing threats and other

forms of violence.

Since January 1, 1957, there have been over 90

' bombings, or attempted bombings, in the United States.

Of these, at least 69 have involved Negro victims and at

least eight, Jewish religious and educational facilities.

In the early bombings there was no evidence to show

that these bombings could be attributable to specific

organizations. Rather, they were individual acts of

terror strictly within the jurisdiction of local authorities.

When these outrages occurred, we in the FBI have made

immediately available to local authorities our laboratory

and fingerprint facilities here in Washington.

As the bombings directed toward religious and".

educational facilities continued, the FBI extended its

cooperation to cover out-of-state leads which local

authorities could not handle.

We extended such

assistance to the Jacksonville, Florida, and Birmingham,

Alabama, Police Departments in conncction with the

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bombings of a Jcwish center and a Negro high school

in Jacksonville on April 28, 1958, and the attempted

bombing of a Jewish temple in Birmingham on the

same day.

Recently, however, there has been some indication

of a general interstate pattern to these bombings. For

example, one of the men indicted on October 17, 1958,

(Richard Bowling) for the bombing of the Jewish temple

in Atlanta, received from one of his fellow conspirators

two checks amounting to $200. One of these checks

was dated October 4, 1958, the day before the Clinton,

Tennessee, High School bombing, the other, October 9,

1958, three days before the Atlanta temple bombing.

Recognizing the danger to the national welfare from

a general pattern of organized terrorism, the FBI has moved

to expand its assistance to local law enforcement in the

recent bombings at Clinton, Atlanta, and Peoria, Illinois.

We are now providing all-out investigative assistance

in these cases. We are closely checking the activities

of individuals prominently involved in racial disturbances,

such as the notorious John Kasper, the executive

secretary of the Seaboard White Citizens Council of

Washington. As a further aid to local law enforcement

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:

agencies, the FBI has schoduled a series of special

conferences for November and December, 1958, to

discuss our cooperative services regarding bombings

and threats of bombings against religious and educational

institutions.

Our entry into these cases at this new level is not to

• be interpreted as an attempt on our part to usurp the

jurisdiction of local authorities. To give the FBI this

jurisdiction would relieve local governments of the

basic responsibility to maintain law and order, and

the ultimate responsibility rightfully rests at the local

level."

As specifically stated by Mr. Hoover in his comments to the President

and the Cabinet, he therein delineates that there is an internal domestic aspect

to the intelligence-gathering function of the FBI and this is based on the fact that

he recognizes the danger to the "national welfare" from a general pattern of

terrorisin which does, in fact, affect the internal security of the United States.

By letter of May 17, 1961, McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to

the President, requested of the IIC and the ICIS, pursuant to Presidential wishes,

reports covering current and contemplated internal security programs which fall

within the cognizance of their respective committces. The reports were to

include such items as: description of the program and its objcctives, the

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datc of initiation, reference to the Directive or other authority pursuant to

which the program was undertaken, highlights of the results achieved and

significant problems encountered, to name but a few.

Pursuant to this request, Mr. Bundy was furnished by letter of

July 25, 1961, a copy of the IIC status report dated July 25, 1961, wherein

he was advised in part as follows:

"I. IDENTIFICATION AND INVESTIGATION OF POTENTIALLY

DANGEROUS PERSONS IN THE UNITED STATES*

The FBI maintains a current list of individuals, both

citizens and aliens, to be considered for apprehension

and detention, if necessary, in a period of emergency.

Approximately 12,000 individuals are listed at this time.

This list is kept current on a daily basis by the addition

of new individuals whose activities make. them potentially

dangerous to the United States, and by the deletion of

individuals who are no longer engaged in subversive

activities. Included on the list of potentially dangerous

individuals are nearly 200 persons who are engaged in

pro-Castro Cuban activities or who sympathize strongly

with such activities. In addition to members of the

Communist Party, it also includes certain members of such

organizations as the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico, the

Nation of Islam, and the Socialist Workers Party."

*Sce Appendix for additional information concerning Emergency Detention Law

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As indicated in the last sentence, from information furnished to the

President, it is apparent that the problem area being discussed included not only

members of the Communist Party and their apparent capability of action in the

field of sabotage and espionage during an outbreak of war but also such organi-

zations as the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico, Nation of Islam, and the

Socialist Workers Party, organizations whose potential for internal disruption

in time of emergency is the matter in question.

In further illustration of this point, on May 11, 1961, former

Director Hoover submitted a memorandum to top Bureau officials, wherein

he described a presentation to the President concerning the FBI's intensifi-

cation of its coverage of Cubans in this country, both anti-Castro groups

and pro-Castro groups. During an NSC meeting on April 27, 1961, it is

apparent that the thought in the minds of the men discussing this matter

extended not only to the possibility of espionage and sabotage activities of the

pro-Castro groups discussed but the possibility that the anti-Castro groups

discussed might well be involved in activities which would involve terrorism

or violence of a domestic nature.

• As previously noted, in 1962, the supervision of the IIC and the

overall responsibility for the internal security programs of the United States

passed by National Security Action Memorandum 161 to the Attorney General..

From that date to the present time, the FBI has received on a case-by-case

basis specific instructions from the Attorney General regarding investigative

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matters pertinent to the delegation of intelligence investigation authority in

numerous areas involving individuals or organizations which advocate violence

or the denial of rights of others.

Let us pause to summarize the position of the FBI at this time in

history.

The Directives cast the FBI in an intelligence-gathering posture

which was recögnized by the Governmeat as a body and the American public.

As herein indicated by the previous examples, the FBI gradually came to be

assigned intelligence investigations outside the foreign controlled espionage

and sabotage matters and into an area of intelligence investigations regarding

"other intelligence matters affecting the internal security," to wit; Puerto Rican

nationalists, anti-Castro

groups, Nation of Islam, Socialist Workers Party,

"hate groups," and others advocating the violent overthrow of the Government

or who could, on reasonable belief, cause disruption of the "national welfare"

and in time of emergency, be of assistance to foreign powers. These matters

were automically referred to the FBI because we had been cast in the "intelligence

posture" as a direct result of the Presidential Directives coupled with the fact

that the FBI has statutory investigative jurisdiction of the criminal violations in

the general area of internal security: Our position had become twofold:

(1) intelligence gathering in the area of internal security and (2) investigation

of criminal statutory violations, both in the internal security arca.

in

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During the turbulent 1960's, Executive concern for the internal

security and national welfare naturally increased due to campus riots, racial

unrest, militant groups who ambushed police and bombed, the increase of

activity of "hate groups," both "far right and left," and the open advocacy

of entirely domestic groups to overthrow the Constitution and Government of

this Nation. Because of the intelligence criminal investigative posture of the

FBI in the internal security field, the inquiries and orders were naturally

directed to the FBI. We responded because we had come to recognize and operate

within our dual posture of intelligence and criminal investigation.

Can we illustrate how this dual posture was magnified and

expanded since the 1950's and early 1960's?

Clear evidence exists that past Presidents and Attorneys General

:

have assumed the FBI's intelligence-gathering authority.

For example, by memorandum dated April 28, 1965, to Bureau

officials, former FBI Director Hoover recounted a conversation with the laté

President Lyndon B. Johnson, which occurred on that date, during which

Johnson expressed profound concern that his military and foreign policy

with respect to Vietnam was being undermined by anti-war agitation in

the United States, particularly on the college campuses. The memorandum

of former Director Hoover noted that, during their conversation, he informed

the President of FBI information concerning forthcoming demonstrations and

instructed that a memorandum be prepared for President Johnson concerning

the Students For a Democratic Society.

sai

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Further, by letter of September 14, 1967, the Attorney General,

Ramsey Clark, obviously concerned with recent riots of that period, directed

a letter to the FBI, wherein he instructed that the FBI conduct investigation to

determine whether there was an organization which made advance plans for

and was

active during any of the riots in the Summer of 1967. He pointed out

that, in view of the seriousness of the riot activity across the country, it is

most important that the FBI use the maximum available resources, investigative

and intelligence, to collect and report all facts bearing upon the question

as to whether there was scheme or conspiracy. He enumerated various criminal

statutes, which he pointed out should be considered if prosecution was a

possibility based on the investigation but clearly recognized the intelligence-

gathering role of the FBI.

:

To 'further illustrate, reference is made to the Attorney General's

letter to Director, FBI, dated February 18, 1969, wherein he requests broad-

scoped and comprehensive investigation of the Students For a Democratic Society

in relation to the illegal and violent campus disorders of that period. (For

Details, See Appendix.)

It must be recalled that, pursuant to the National Security Action

Memorandum 161, the President had assigned to the Attorney General the

responsibility of the internal security in 1.962. As illustrated, no more broad

instruction for intelligence investigation could have been phrased. These letter's

clearly iccognizc the dual function of the FBI in its intelligence-gathering

role and in its criminal investigative rolo.

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Further evidence of the recognition of the dual role of the Ecderal

Bureau of Investigation is illustrated by reference to the Intelligence Evaluation

Committee (IEC). Based on the President's need to know, Presidential

representatives, Attorney General representatives, and others, on or about

December 17, 1970, formed this Committee with the purpose of obtaining reports

and information concerning militant terrorist groups operating within the

United States. This was for a dual necessity, its efféct on the internal national

welfare and how such activity might affect the foreign policy and war effort.

This Committee, composed of members of the Executive, pursuant to their

authority under the Interdepartmental Action Plan for Civil Disturbances,

a plan for the Executive to meet emergencies, requested through the Attorney

General that reports and intelligence information be furnished to the Committee

for the benefit of the Executive. This is another graphic illustration of how the

Executive has relied on the intelligence function of the FBI.

In summary, the FBI has had authorization and approval of the

President and Attorney General to investigate matters concerning internal security

since the verbal instructions of August, 1936, the Presidential Directive of

June 26, 1939, as augmented by the Presidential Directive of September 6, 1939,

down to and including the charters by the NSC and the Attorney General. The

FBI has conducted these intelligence investigations under the scrutiny of the

Executive Branch as herein indicated.

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VII. Has Congress Recognized the Dual Intelligence--Criminal Role of the FBI Which

Results From the Directives?

Absolutely. On November 30, 1939, some 85 days after the public

Directive of September 6, 1939, former Director Hoover appeared before Congress

as reflected in the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Bill of 1940

testimony wherein he states that in September, 1939, the General Intelligence

Division was organized based on the Presidential proclamation that all complaints

regarding violation of the National defense statutes be referred to the FBI. He

described in his testimony that the function of the Intelligence Division was to

"compile extensive indices of individuals, groups, and organizations engaged

in these subversive activities, in espionage activities, or any activities that are

possibly detrimental to the internal security of the United States." (Emphasis Added)

Again, in testimony under Justice Department Appropriation Bill

of 1941, former Director Hoover specifically cites verbatim the Presidential

Directive of September 6, 1939, the public Directive not the confidential

Directive of June 26, 1939, and thereafter in narrative describes the general

intelligence activities of the Bureau, the coordination system between the FBI

and military intelligence services, plant protection, and the opening of ten

added offices to handle the volume of work in the intelligence field. Further

testimony was furnished on June 6, 1940, with reference to the Supplemental

National Defense Appropriations Bill of 1941 and such testimony has continued

in subsequent years to the present, each time setting forth the specific areas of

intelligence investigations. This testimony includes, for example in the 1973

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=..•

VIII.

appropriations testimony, information regarding investigations of New Left

terrorism, antiwar demonstrations, student agitation, Communist Party, USA,

Socialist Workers Party, Progressive Labor Party, racial extremism, Black

Panther Party , Student National Coordinating Committee, Junta of Militant

Organizations, extremism in penal institutions, Klan-type organizations, urban

guerrilla warfare, bombing matters, espionage and counterintelligence to

mention only the work done by the Bureau in the intelligence field.

In addition, voluminous intelligence information has been furnished

to investigative committees of the Congress regarding internal security matters

and at no time did Congress, having been advised as above, offer objection by

means of legislation or enactment to the intelligence field of investigation.

Do the Directives in Any Way Alter the FBI's Jurisdiction as Assigned By Statute

: or Other Executive Order?

Nothing herein alters the FBI's basic responsibility assigned by

the Attorney General under Title 18, Section 533, U. S. Code, to investigate

statutory violations which are the mandate of Congress and specific Executive

Orders of the President relative to employee loyalty matters.

IX. What Effcct Would Be Realized If the FBI Had Not Had the Directives "ór..

If the Directives Were Revoked?

The effect of the Presidential Directives of August, 1936, and June 26,

• and September 6, 1939, is to place the FBI in an affirmative intelligenec-gathering

posture. The FBI overtly secks intelligence information in the internal security

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field based on the Directives:

Should they be nonexistent or revoked, the FBI

would be placed in a position of merely investigating violations of statutes. Investi-

gation would commence only at a point where some set of facts would indicate a

"strong suspicion," "reasonable grounds to believe," or "probable cause" that

a violation of law was about to be or had been committed and a person or group of

people committed it, i.e., no overt, offensive search for intelligence information

in the internal security field regardless of lack of specific statutory violation.

In summary, the question should be not one of whether the FBI has

authority to conduct intelligence investigations, this has.been herein reflected,

but whether the FBI has acted reasonably under that authority.

Compare, if you will, the FBI Agent who, having lawful probable cause

to search for three large stolen television sets, obtains a search warrant, valid

on its face, for a residence and thereby enters and conducts a search pursuant.

to the warrant. He is lawfully and with authority in the residence but while

there searches a small drawer in a desk, where no television set could possibly

be secreted. Narcotics are found. Are they admissible? No. The search is

"unreasonable" under Fourth Amendment standards as it pertains to the narcotics,

however, this in no way effects the Agent's lawful presence in the residence

under the authority of the warrant.

This is analogous of the situation in which the FBI finds itself today.

The FBI has the authority to be in the intelligence field under the Directives,

however, will be challenged as to the rcasonableness of its activitics and conduct

in the field. (Emphasis Added)

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The FBI has over the years limited the boundaries of this authority

on its own with minimal guidance from the Executive and the Attorney General. In

most instances this self-limiting has been more to restriction than liberalism. If

outside challenge is made to the FBI's conduct to date, it should be properly

addressed to the limits and boundaries of our activities, not the authority itself.

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III. APPENDIX OF EXHIBITS

CONCERNING THE DIRECTIVES

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

A. HISTORICAL HIGHLIGHTS OF FOREIGN ACTIVITY; 1933-1939

B. CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDA: JOHN EDGAR HOOVER

AUGUST 24, 1936

AUGUST 25, 1936

SEPTEMBER 10, 1936

SEPTEMBER 5, 1936, INSTRUCTIONS TO FIELD OFFICES

C. PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVES:

JUNE 26, 1939

SEPTEMBER 6, 1939

JANUARY 8, 1943

JULY 24, 1950

DECEMBER 15, 1953

• OCTOBER 30, 1947

D. THE DELIMITATIONS AGREEMENT OF 2/23/49, AS AMENDED

E. NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL CHARTERS OF THE

INTERDEPAPTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE

AND THE INTERDEPARTHENTAL COMMITTEE ON

INTERNAL SECURITY

: F. NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM 161, JUNE 9, 1962

G. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MEMORANDUM, DATED 3/5/64,

TO FORMER FBI DIRECTOR J. EDGAR HOOVER,

SETTING FORTH NEW CHARTER FOR THE INTER-

DEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE UNDER

•THE SUPERVISION OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

H. THE PREAMBLE AND SECTION 101 OF THE NATIONAL

SECURITY ACT OF 1947

I. MEMORANDUM FROM J. PATRICK COYNE, NATIONAL

SECURITY COUNCIL REPRESENTATIVE ON

INTERNAL SECURITY, DATED 11/6/50, CONCERNING

NECESSARY INTELLIGENCE MEASURES RELATIVE TO

VIOLENCE BY PUERTO RICAN NATIONALISTS

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J. EXCERPT FROM REPORT ON THE INTERNAL SECURITY

PROGRAM, DATED 3/5/54, PREPARED BY INTER-

DEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE AND THE

INTERDEYARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY

K. EXCERPT FROM REPORT ON THE STATUS OF THE INTERNAL

SECURITY PROGRAM OF THE UNITED STATES AS OF

JUNE 30, 1958, DATED 8/27/58, PREPARED JOINTLY BY

THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

AND THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON

INTERNAL SECURITY

L. EXCERPT FROM FORMER FBI DIRECTOR HOOVER'S BRIEFING

OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL PRESIDED OVER BY

THE PRESIDENT, DATED 11/6/58

M. LETTER TO MCGEORGE BUNDY, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE

PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, DATED 7/25/61,

ENCLOSING MEMORANDUM CONCERNING UNITED STATES

INTERNAL SECURITY PROGRAMS UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE

INTERDEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE,

MEMORANDUM PREPARED IN RESPONSE TO WHITE HOUSE REQUEST

N. BACKGROUND INFORMIATION CONCERNING THE EMERGENCY

DETENTION PROVISIONS OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT

OF 1950 AND THE EFFECT OF THEIR REPEAL UPON FBI

AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT NATIONAL SECURITY INTELLIGENCE

INVESTIGATIONS

0. MEMORANDUM BY FORMER FBI DIRECTOR HOOVER, DATED 5/11/61.

CONCERNING FBI INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION ACTIVITIES

RELATIVE TO CUBAN INDIVIDUALS AND GROUPS

P. MEMORANDUM BY FORMER FBI DIRECTOR HOOVER, DATED 4/28/65,

RELATIVE TO CONVERSATION WITH THE PRESIDENT CONCERNING

EFFECT OF ANTI-VIETNAM DEMONSTRATIONS UPON THE CONDUCT

OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY AND

LETTER TO MCGEORGE BUNDY, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE

PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, DATED 4/28/65,

ENCLOSING FBI MEMORANDUM TITLED "COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES

RELATIVE TO UNITED STATES POLICY ON VIETNAM" DATED 4/28/65

-2 -

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Q. MEMORANDUM

FORMER ATTORNEY GENERAL

AMSEY CLARK,

DATED 9/14/67, CONCERNING INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATION

RELATING TO URBAN RIOT ACTVITY

R. DEPARTMENTAL MEMORANDUM, DATED 2/18/69, CONTAINING

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE INVESTI-

GATION CONCERNING CAMPUS DISORDERS

• S. EXCERPTS FROM TESTIMONY; FORMER DIRECTOR HOOVER;

1) EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS BILL, 1940

2) JUSTICE DEPARTNENT APPROPRIATIONS BILL, 1941

3) FIRST DEFICIENCY APPROPRIATION BILL, 1941

4) SUPPLEMENTAL NATIONAL DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS BILL, 1941

5) 1951 APPROPRIATIONS ESTIMATES FOR THE FEDERAL BUREAU

OF INVESTIGATION

6) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION APPROPRIATIONS, 1973

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A. HISTORICAL HIGHLIGHTS OF FOREIGN ACTIVITY

1933 - 1939

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On January 30, 1933, Adoll Hitler became

Chancellor of Germany.

On March 10, 1935, Hltler rejected the Versailles

Treaty and ordered conscription in Germany.

On March 7, 1936, reoccupation of the demilitarized

Rhineland Zone (a violation of the Locarho Ireaty) was

begun by German troops.

In March, 1937, the German army under Hitler

invaded Austria.

In the "Munich" conference of September, 1938,

Bavaria, Britain, and France agreed to Hitler's demands

and Czechoslovakia ceded to Germany Sudetenland.

May 7, 1939, Germany and Italy announced a

military alliance.

In August, 1939, a nonaggression pact between

Germany and the U.S.S.R. was signed in Moscow by the

terms of which each of the signatories was bound to refrain

from any act of force against the other and agreed not to

support warlike acts against either by a third power.

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On September*1, 1939, German forces invaded

Poland. On September 3, 1939

,. Great Britain and France

declared war on the German Reich.

On September 8, 1939, the President of the

United States proclaimed a national emergèncy "to the

extent necessary for the proper observance, safeguarding

and insuring the neutrality of the United States and the

strengthening of our national defense within the limits of

peacetime authorizations."

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•.

• .

B. CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDA:

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER

AUGUST 24, 1936

AUGUST 25, 1936

SEPTEMBER 10, 1936

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DIRECTOR

Aederal Burrat ot Junigatim

Quite Sutra Department of Shutter

Mashingtan, D. C.

August 24, 1936.

CONFIDENTIAL MNORANDUM

ROOSEVELT,

This morning, in accordance with the request of the President

conveyed to me personally by hin last Wednesday in New York City, I called

at the thite House aù 9:15 and was with the President unüil 10:15.

He was desirous of discussing the question of the subversive

activities in the United States, particularly Fascism and Comünise. He

had previously received the nenorandun hich I had prepared covering ay

• conversation vith General Smedley Butler and the effort of Iator Coughlin

to have Genoral Butler head an expedition to Mexico. I incornoù tha President

concerning certain recent developmenis in ina Commnist activivies in ac

country, particulerly the eiforts of the Bridges organization in San Fran-

cisco and their progressive control of the shipping on the Pacific Coast,

: the Guli Coast and weir recent expansion to shipping opecations on te

Atlantic Coast. i told hin that while their contract vill expire on

September 30, 1936, thoj are endeavoring to have it temporarily extenica

until April 1, 1937, in ordes to concorn do the same date that the Uniteu

Mine Workers' contract expires, veich organization is headed by John I.

Loris. I told him inat tne Bridges organization was practically controlled

by Coumunists and that the Commnists haà now deciued to make very deiimite

plans to

get control of the Lewis organization.

I called his attention to the activities of the Newspaper Guild

headed by Heywood Brown, which has strong Coumunistic leanings, and which

has been responsible for putting out of operation the Seattlo Poat Intei-

ligencer. I told him that my inforaation ras that the Communists hau planned

to geù control of tesa three groups and by doing so they would be ablo at

any tine to paralyze the country in that they could stop all shipping in

and out through the Bridges organizution; sion the operation of industry

through the Mining Union of Lewis; and stop publication of any newspapers

of the country through the Newspaper Guila.

I also related to hin the activities which have recenily oc-

cured within Goverrmental sorvice inspired by Communists, particularly

in some of the Departnents and in the National Labor Relations Board.

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CONFIDENTIAL MCKORANDUM

- 2 -

8-24-36

I likewise informod him that I had received information to the

effect that the Communist Internationale in Moscow has recently issued in-

structions for all Communisis in the Uniied Statas to vote for President

Roosevelt for reelection and against Governor Landon because of to fact

that Governor Landon is opposed to class warfare.

The President siated that he had been considerably concerned

about the movements of the Communists and of Fascism in te United States

and that vaile the Secret Servica of ine Ireasury Departnant had assured

him that they had infornants in every Conmunisi group, he believed that

If thai was true it was solely for the surpose of geiting any irformiion

upon plots upon his life, inereas what he vas interested in vas obtuining

a broad picture oi te general morement and its activities as may affect tre

economic and political life oî the country as a role. I tola nia thst inere

is at the present time no governmental organization which

1 is getting any

so-called "genaral intelligence information" upon this subjeci.

He inquired

what suggestions I night offer relative to this mattes.

I cola hit that

the appropriation of tne Fedoral Bureau of Investigation contains a prori-

sion thai it night investigate any matters reierred to it by the departeni

of State and that if the State Departnent shoula ask for us to conduct such

an investigation ne could do so under our present authority in te appro-

priation already granied. He stated that he is reluctont to have a form?

request come through the State Departent because of the many leaks therein, !

but that what he would do rould be to put a handmitten memorandu. on his

own in his safe in the thite House, stating he had

instructed the Secratáo..

of state to reuest this information to be obtained by the Depertmost oi

Justice. He stated he rould have the Secretary of State at the thave doüse

tomorrow aîternoon, and asked me to call at the inive House at 1:45 g.".

to see him, the President, and the Secretary of State, at which time the

natter could be further discussed and an oral request could be made of me

by the Secretary of State for investigation so as to avoid any possibility

of axy leak.

He suggested that I endeavor to coordinate any investigation

along similar lines which night be made by the Military or Naval Intelligence

Services. He stated that the Secret Service was not being broughü in on this

investigation as they should contine themselves strictly to the matter of

protecting his life and tho survey nich he desired to have made was on a

much broader field.

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 134

John Edgar Hoover.

---

## Page 135

DIRECTOR

ederal Barran of Inuestination

Kniten Stutea Departmeat of Butior

Mashingtan, 1. C.

• August 25,.1936.

CONTIDENTIAL LEMORANDUM

White House at 1:45 p.ll., and present at the conference were

Today, in line with the sequost of the Presidenu, the Presidoni,

I called at the

the secretary ol state and myseli

The President related to the Secretary of

State his concern relative to Communist activities in this courtry, as weil as

-Fascist activities. He stated that he was very desirous of havilg a suvey

made of these conditions and informed the Secretary o State thai this surrey

could be made by the Department of Justice in the Secretary of Siate iccuestea

the Department to conduct the inquiry, as under the Appropriation Act this

Bureau would have aubority to make such investigation in asked to do so by

the Secretory of State.

The President pointed out that bow of these move-

rents were international in scope and the Comunism particularly nas directeu

from loscow, and that there had been certain indications that Ounansist, at-

tachea to the Russian Soviet Babassy, nas a leading figue in come on the

activities in this countzy, so consequently, it was a matter wich fell withi

the scope of foreign ailairs over

waice the State Departzent would nava a rigat

to request an inquiry to be made.

The Secretary of State inquired it a request should be made ia

triting.

The President indicated that it shonla noù ba since he desirca the

matter to be hardlea quite confidentially and that it roula be sufficient thai

the President, the Secretary of state and I should be the onés aware

ci this

request.

The Secretary of State asked that the investigation be made aru then

made several suggestions - one, relative to the naking of a proiesi, eimer

formally or infornally, to the Pussian Government relative to its interfezence

with affairs in this country. Discussion was also had as to the inionmuion

obtained indicating that the Thira Internationale had indicated preference foi

Roosevelt as against Landon. It ras the opinion of the Presicent thüt some.

statement shoula be made along this line by the Attorney General at an early

Tho President asked that I speal to the Attorney General, uoon his re-

with the Attogney lieneral.

John Edgar Hoover.

X Zeleines Alicit,

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 135

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## Page 136

Septenbar 10, 1053.

Striotta Considantial

In talking iith the attorney Coreral today

concoming tie radical sitiatio.,

= informed

hi of the coctorenco thica I and sit. due Prosi-

dent on Captanhen l, 1005, at salon time the

Becactory of Stato recipresent, and at rich

tino the Seerstury of Suado, st tho Prodiduatt=

sunscculon, requento od de, the roacesecralvo

of tie Doparinent of Justice, 10 tavo aproctica-

tion indo of tho cubvereira cotivities in

this

counbij, inclaling communica and zurciamo

and the Ationnoy Goirul vorsally discotoi do to.

procood its undo inusuization ané to cousdinate,

ao the Postident sungostss, infoseition apon

wiese natuoso da die yossercion co tackleears.

Intellenco Firsion, dooraval Intelligerce.

This,

1s the choris upon maich to proceed in the

¡condion oi this, trents.

Satise, mies sould,

courco, de landled in I post diceroot sad coc-

fidontial 1u:122.

Vory truly jours,

ate tea

John Edgar joover,

Dircctor.

de portion of into this

serial declassified for

Eise in "The H'II Story."

14-152%

1:0

C5P 1 5 19396

NW 54933 Docid:32989719 Page 136

51-9529-417

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## Page 137

LETTER OF FORMER FBI DIRECTOR HOOVER

TO FIELD OFFICES, SEPTEMBER 5, 1936

Dear Sir: The Bureau desires to obtain from all possible.

sources information concerning subversive activities being

conducted in the United States by Communists, Fascisti and

representatives or advocates of other organizations or

groups advocating the overthrow.or replacement of the

Government of the United States by illegal methods. No

investigation should be initiated into cases of this kind

in the absence of specific authorization from

the Bureau,

but you should forward to the Bureau information obtained

from all sources, and in those cases in which investigation

is desired the Bureau will issue appropriate instructions

to you.

It is desired, accordingly, that you immediately

cransmit to the Bureau any information relatina to subversive

activities on the part of any individual or organization,

regardless of the source from which this information is

received. It is desired that you give this letter your

:

close persohal attention and arrange through the agents

attached to your office to furnish to the Bureau data or

information of the type outlined above.

very truly yours,

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER, Director

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 137

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## Page 138

C. PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVES:

JUNE 26, 1939

SEPTEMBER 6, 1939

• JANUARY 8, 1943

JULY 24, 1950

DECEMBER 15, 1953

OCTOBER 30, 1947

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 138

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## Page 139

....

DIRECTIVE OF 'IRE PRESIDEN OF THE UNITED SIATES

•jUNE 26, 1939

"It is my resire thai the investigation of all copionare,

countcrespionare, and sabotage mutters be controlled and hnidica

by the federal. Bureau of Investigation of the Duparonent of

tho Misery Intolligence Divicion of the War Depariment, and Lha

0fs3.00 nô Naval Juichligence of the lavy Departient.

of thess thres agencios are to junciion as i commitice to courdinart

their activities.

"No investigaiions sholild be conducied by any instigative

agency of the Governuent into matters involving actually or

potentlully any espionage, counterespionage, or sabotage, excont

Dy the threc agenches mentioned above.

"I abnis bo glad 11 50u w1ll instruct the heads of n15

other investigativo agencies than the three named, to telei

immediately to the nearcst office of the Federal Buzere of Jurenticon

ton thy dats, incrnacion, or nuichel that osy cone co their

notice lening directly or indirecily on espiounge, counterespionage,

ot saborsge."

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 139

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## Page 140

DINUSCIIVE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STAITS

SEPTEMBER G; 1939

the Attorney General lins been requested by me to instrues

the Fcicini Bureau cf Investigation. of the Department of

justice

to take charge of Investigailve work in mitors rclating to espic iro

sabotage, and violatsons of the neutrality r-culations.

"This task must be conducted in

o. conprchensivc and

BrICCLIVe ManhCh On a nai20n21 basiS, and all LatOrnacrOn must Be

•carcaully sitica out and correlated in ordce to avora contaion in.

responsibiliiy.

"To this end I request all police officers, shersiis,

asid

turn over to the scarest representative or the roderal. burewd ci

Investigation my iniormation obiained by then rointing to espionage,

counterespionage, sabotago, subversive activities and violations oi

the neutrality jarc."

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 140

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## Page 141

RETORT SECURITY MATTERS TO

FD

"On September 6,

rective

3939, I issued a di

providing. that the Federal Bureau of

Investigation

Denärine.I

of justice

should

iake charge of investigaiive work in

matters reläiing

io espionage, saborage and

violaiions oi

the neutrality regulaiions,

poinzing out that the investigations musi be

conducted in

comprehensive mannici, on

national basis, and all informaiion carefully

sifted

out and correlated

order io avoid

confusion

and

irresponsibility.

i then

requested all police officers, sheriiis,

and

other law eniorcement oificers in the United

Stales, prompily to sura over to ile nearest

represenlalive of the Federal Bureau of

luvestigalion any such information.

"I am

again calling the attention of all

enforcencit officers to the requesi that thcy

report all such informaiion prompily io the

nearesi field representaïive

rederal

Bureau of Investigaiion, which is charged

with the responsibilily o1 correlaiing inis

material and

referring matters which are

under the jurisdiction oi

any other

agency with responsibilities in ihis field

To the appropriate agency.

"I suggest thai all patriotic organiza-

Lions

and individuals

likenise report all

such

informaiion relating to espionage and

related

mailers to the Federal Bureau oi

to etirede

Investigation in ine same manner.

"I an confident that all law enforcement

officers, who are now rendering such invalu-

able assistance toward the success oí the

internal

safety of

in this

matter. " Our country will cooperate

tickland/issele

January 8, 1943

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 141

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## Page 142

VISITE HOUSE

July 24, 1950

. 1.

INFORNSEION RETARDIE TO DOMESTIC ESPTONACE,

SUBONES,

ita.

On September 6, 1939 and Jenuary 8, 1913 a Presi-

dential Diractive ins issued providing that the icieral Eureau

of invostigation of the Departuent of justico should take

charze of Invustigative mont in matters relating to espionage,

cabotage, subversive actinities and ralated inters. It ras

polited out that the Investigations must ba conducted in a

•couprchensive inter on a National basis and all Inforsation

crafully siftod oui and correlated in order to avoid confusion.

I should lino to again call the attantion of and Entorcamunt

Offioors, both Fodbrai. and sits, to the request that they re

pore all information in the above enumurated fiolds prostly

to tho narest Fiold lepresentatim or the Federal Dureau of.

Invastigation, which to changed mith to responsoility of

corcluting thas roderial and rudesring rates mich die under

cho juanciculon of any other roaeral agency inth responsabili

clos in this fiela to tho appropriat renor.

I suggest that all pallotic organizations and

individuals Milonise roport all such inioractica rolating to

esplorago, sabotage and sub'arsiva activitias to the Fodoral

Bureau of investigation in this sane tanner.

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 142

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## Page 143

DIRECIIVE OF TIDE PRESIDENT OF THE UNTED STATES

DECEMBER 15, 1953

"On Septenber 6, 1939, Januniy 8, 1913, and July 24,

1950, Presidential Directives were Issued requusting all enforco-

officers,

both Federal

and rolated matters to the nearest field represeniative of the

Foderal Bureau of Investigation.

"The Federal Bureau of Investigation 15 characà wiüh

Investigating all violations of the lionic Fnerty Act, including

the illegal export or import of iissionable micrial, the 1110gn1

possession or transportation of fissionable matrial

and the

11l0cal production, transfo s or possession of my equitment or

device utilizing sissionable mterzai or atonic energy as a military

Weapon, 'Fissionable matorial' neans plutonium, uraniumiss or

other materal which the Atonic Enerry Commission his determined

to be capable of Icleasing substaniini quantities of encrey drough

nuclesi shein reaciion. I un requesting that ail enforcemens:

officers' both federal and State, "upori all Informullon relating

to violations of the Atonic Enerty hot to the nearest field rapie

sentativa of the Federal Burcau of Investigation.

"I surgest thai ali proriotic organizations and ludividunlo

Ilterise roport all such inforiation to the Federal Burcau of.

It restigation in the same nanner. "

NW 54930 Dold: 32989719 Page 143

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## Page 144

octobor 30, 19÷7

Do toralia progma revidod for in Licentivo eresi

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ANMV 54933 Postd:22989719 Bage. 144

---

## Page 145

THIS WILM 3 CUSE

KASIUNERON

TIE ASSISTANT DO PIC PISZUENZ

Noventes 3, 1937

DEMONUT D304 2:

AT 22203

223.4

..

-

Last triany the lacsinent rand tho ascaried

statomont to sho Cabinos and seid thod is tould turnson

a copy to oncil of choso prosent. la has naked no,

therofoso, to sond you this cony for your considential

430%

Attachmont

1s/ John ila Stconn

Ix-create

Marria Rari ALS

1/222/07

tittierce

COPY

NW. 54933 Docid:32989719 Page 145

Cage 196A

---

## Page 146

54933 Docld:32989719 Page 146

---

## Page 147

• ..

D. THE DELIMITATIONS AGREENENT OF 2/23/49,

AS AMENDED

:

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 147

---

## Page 148

Delimitatiors Aercen

The followind agreement

was approved and signed on 2-23-49 by the

Diractors of the Fodoral Huroou of Investigation; Intelligence Division

af the Army; Difice of Spocial Investigations}

Air Force;

and the

Chief of Naval Intelligence:

"Subject:

Delimitation of Investigative Duties of

the Federal

Bureau of Investigation, the Office of Naval Intell-

igence, the Intelligence Division of the Army, and

the Office of Spacial Investigations, Inspector

U. S. Air Force.

The Agreenot for Coordination oi the Federal Burezu

of Investigation, Office of llaval Intelligence, In-

telligence Division of the Army, and the Office of

Special Investigations, Inspector General,. U.S. Air

"I.

The undersigned have reviewed the directive contained in the Presi-

26, 1939, as augmented by his Directive of

September E, 1939, the Delimitations Agreement of Febzuary 9, 1942, and•

the Presidertial

Directive of October 30, 1947.

In addition,

Done are and e

cognizance

has been tahen of the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act

o: 1946, and

•the specific application of that Act is set forth in Section II hereos.

A1l other provisions of this Agreementsare apart irom and hate no reiation?

to the stated requirements of the Atomic Energy Act.

In view of the

above, it is now agreed that responsibility for the investigation o: 211

aotivities coming under the

categories

counterespionage,

subversion and sabotage (hereinaiter reserred to as

of espionage,, these categories';

will be delinited as indicated hereinaster.

The responsibility assumed

by one organization in a given field carries with

it the obligation to

exchange freely and directly with the other subscribing organizatiors

a11 information of nutral interest.

When the organization with primary

operating

responsibility is unable for any reason to produce material

In that field desired by the subscribing agencies, such special arrange

ments

as

may be legal or desirable will be corked

out through negotia-

tion at the national level prior to activity by one agency in another

agency's field.

It is recognized by the subscribers hereto that the

Headquarters Department of the Army has

decentralizei such functions

to its major subordinate comanders.

when the major subordinate con-

manders of the Department of the Army cannot effect satisfactory

special arrangements, the matter will be reierred to the Director oi

• Intelligence of the Army for further negotiations at the sational level.

Close cooperation and cooriination between

the four subscribing organiza-

tions is a mutually recognized necessity.

" +

NW 54933-Docld:32989719-Rage-148.

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## Page 149

*II. FBI will be re

ponsible for:

91.

All investigations of cases in thest categories involving

civilians and forcign nationals of all classes

in the continental

United States, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Illands, (the State oi

Hawaii, Jand

hercinafter in Paragrapa V, Section 5. 11

the State of. Alaska except as specifically described

=2.

121 investigations of violations of the Atomic Energy Act of

1946.

Tbere are no territorial or personnel linitations on this

provision.

"3.

The coordination of the investigative activities of civilian

agencies in the United States, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands,

and the state of Alaska except as specifically descrioed hereinafter

11 Paragraph V, Section 5, which provide infornation regarding

subversive movements aná activities in these categories.

Keeping

the other subscribing organizations

advised of important

developments in these categories within' its cognizance, particularly:

Activities of inactive

reserves of the armed service,

Including the National Guard.

"B. Developments affecting plants engaged in armed forces

contracts.

Developments concerning the strength, composition, and

intentions

of civilian groups within its

cognizance which

are classed as subtersive and wiose activities

tential danger to the security of the United States.

Developments affecting those vital facilities and ritai

utilities which have been designated by the secretary of

Defense.

"e Developments affecting critical points of transporta-

tion and communications systems which have been designated

• by the Secretary of Defense.

"(Tor b, &, and e abore no protective coverage is contemplated.)

"III. ID, Army will be responsible for:

The investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories

involring active

and retired military personnel of the Army.

=20

The disposal, but not investigation,

of all cases in these

categories involving civilian employees

of the Army in the United

States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin

Islands.

*3.

The investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories

Involving civilian employees

of the Army stationed in areas

other

than the United States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands,

noEditorial revision of this Agreement to reflect the statehood of

• Alaska was approved by the IIC on January 7, 1959.

(**Revision

to reflect the statehood of Hawaii was approved by the

IIC on September 9, 1959.1

NW 54933-Docld:32989719 Page-149

---

## Page 150

excert that pai

such intertigations as ha

ramifications

In the United

States, suerto rico, or in virgio

Islands.

"4.

The investigation' of all cases in these categories involving

oivilians

and foreign nationals wo

are not employees of the other

subscribing organizations, in areas

where the Army Cornander has

suprone jurisdiction over the armed

forces stationed therein,

Including possessions of the United States other than Puerto Rico

and the Virgin Islands.

*5. Informing the other subscribing organizations of any important

developments.

"6.

Advising the Federal. Bureau of Investigation of the identity and

location of the plants

engaged in Arny contracts.

"IV. ONI will be responsible for:

*I. The investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories

involving active and retired naval personnel of the Navy.

"2.

The disposal, but not investigation, of all cases in these

categories-.involving civilian employees of the Navy in the United

•States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. •

=3.

The investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories

involving civilian enployees of the vary stationed in areas other

*4.

The intestigation of all cases in these categories involring

civilians and ¿oreiga nationals "bo

are not employees of the other

subscribing

organizations, in areas where the Navy Conmander das

suprene jurisdiction over the armed lorces stationed therein,

including possessions of the nited States other than Puerto

Rico

and the Virgin Islands, andlinlthe State of Alaska except as

desoribed in Section

5, below.

*5.

The investigation of all cases in these categories

involving

oivilians and

foreign sationals wao

are not employees of tre

other subscribing organizations and with the exception oi cirilias

employees of the Executive Branch of the coverament on sodiai and

Afognak Islands adjacent to the Alaska Peninsuia and Adar Island

=6. Informing the other subscribing organizations of any important

developments.

"7.

datising the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the identity

and location of the plants

engaged in Navy contracts.

(*•This paragraph added.

September 15, 1954, and

June LIC decking Committce Minutes

. 8, 1955.]

of

NW 54933-D6cld:32989719 Page 150

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## Page 151

1.

lenerai, U..S.

"V.

The Office of

dir Force will be

Investigations, Inspect

sible for:

*1.

The investigation and disposal of all cases in these catejories

Involving active and

retired military personnel of the Air force.

: =2.

The disposal, but

categories

not investigation, of all cases in these

involving civilian employees

of the Air Force in the

United

States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.

"3.

The investigation and disposal of all cases in

these categories

involving civilian

employees of

the Air Force stationed in areas other

than the United

States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin isiands, except

that part of

such investigations as

have ramifications in the

United States, Puerto Rico, or the Virgin Islands.

"4.

The investigation of all cases in these categories involving

civilians and foreign nationals who are not employees of the other

subscribing organizations, in areas where the dir Force Commander

has

supreme jurisdiction over the armed forces stationed therei.,

Including possessions of the United States other than Puerto Rico

and the Virgin Islands.

Ise investigation of the same cases

described above in that portion of Alaska described in Section 5;

below, with the excepilca of civilian employees of the Executive

Branch

of the covernment.

"5.

The investigation of all cases in these categories involving

civilizas,

except as described bereinabove, il) in that part of tba

Alaska Peninsula wich is separated by a line drawn

from Iliansa.

Bay northwest to the town of Old Ilianna and thence following the

south shore of lake illanna to the krichak niver to the iricial

Bay; (2) in the islands adjacent to the Alaska Peninsula excluding

Kodiak and digitar Islazas

which are the responsibility of the

Office of Naval

Intelligence;

•Adak Island maica

(3)

in the Aleutian Islands exciuding

se responsibility of te

Office of Naval

• Intelligence; and (4) in the Fribilos Islands."

"6.

Informing the otber subscribing organizations of any important

developments.

Adrising the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the identity

and location oi

the piants engaged in dir Force contracts.

"VI. I. Where sections III, IV, and V involve general territorial

coverage, responsibility ior such coverage nill pass iron one

the armed forces to another automatically when a change

of command responsibility ensues.

This provision is subject to

modification by direc- agreement between the interested elements

of the armed forces.

While investigative jurisdiction over the civilian populace in

former enemy

territories

occupied by the armed forces has been

provided for in Sections ilI, IV, and V above, those provisions are

subject to direct adjustment

with the Department of State if and

when that Departnent

an ironi bana.

("•Original paragraph changed.

See IIC Working Committee Minutes

of

September 15, 1954, and june

9, 1955.)

Nw 54993-Đocld:32989719<Page-151

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## Page 152

....i:

assumes govermental direction in such areas of occupation.

"VII. From time to time it may be desirablo in the light of changing

conditions to modily or amend this Delimitations Agreement. Subject to

the exceptions aiready provided for above, goneral amendmonts or modi-

..lications involving all of the four subscribing organizations shall be

Issued in the iom o1 a revised Delimitations Agreement and not as sep-

• arate instructions.

"VIII. During periods of martial lan, or periods of predominant armed

forces. Interest not invoiving martial lair, when agreed upon by the sub-

scribing agencies, the provisions of Appendix A or 3, hereto attached,

will additionally apply.

"IX. All agreements of a continuing nature and applicable to tiro or more

of the subscribing agencios to the Delinitations Agreement which affect

the basic jurisdiction thereof wnich are now or hereafter nutually entered

into by any of the subscribers thereto will be reduced to writing; irill

thereafter become supplements to the Delimitations igreement, and dis-

tributed only to the extent agreed upon by the co-signers.

"APPENDIX A

PERIOD OF MARTIAL, LAT

MI. It is further agreed that then 'a state of martial lair has been de~

clared by the President, the armed forces conmander till assume respon-

sibilities for coverage

in these categories. His authority to direct

and control the subscribing agencies of the arned forces ill be limited

only by such instructions as he may receive fron the secretary of Defense.

He till have authority to coordinate the intelligence activitias of the

subscribing azencies in his area of responsibility, within ihe limits o1

their available persornal and facilities, by the assignment of missions,

the designation of objectives, and the exercise of such coordinating control

as he deens necessary.

not authorized to control the administration

or discipline of the subscribing agencies in the area of his responsibility,

nor to issue instructions to them beyond those necessary for the purposes

stated above.

"II. Personnel of the subscribing agencies in the area of responsibility

of the armed forces commander sill still send reports to and be under the.

continued supervision of their respective headquarters. They Till render

such aid and assistance to the armed forces commander and his designated

representatives as are possible and practicable. They mill lumnish all

pertinent information, data, and other material that are or may be necessary

or desirable to the arced forces comander by the most expeditious neans

and nothods possible consistent iith requisite security. Each head-

quarters of the subscribinz agencies will promptly be advised by 1t3 agen-

cies of all information and data appropriately identified as having been

furnished to the armed forces commander.

• .;

NW 54933, Dốcld:32989719• Page 152:

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HAPPENDIX B

PERIODS OF

PREDO INANT MILITARY

INTERESTS, NOT INVOLVING MARTIAL LAW

"I. In time of war certain areas will cone intó prominence as potential

theaters of operation. "hen an armed forces conmander of such a potential

theater is designated, he definitely has interest in, though not control of,

the civilian life within the area. In order that the amed forces commander

may prepare himself for the discharge of the possible responsibility which

may affix to hin, the following procedure is agreed upon

1]. Agents of the FBI; of ONI; ID, Arny; and the OSI, IG, U.S. Air

Force will continue to function in accordance with the provisions of Sections

II, III, IV, and V.

112. In addition thereto, the armed forces commander may take steps

to analyze the facilities existing and to explore the manner in which co

plete coverage will be obtained if nartial lar is declared. Adequate liaison

with the other subscribing agencies will insure that the armed forces commander

M11 have the benefit of the exparience, judgment anä knowledge of the repre-

sentatives of the other agencies.

"3. The armed forces commander is authorized to request and receive

such information from the other three agencies as he may desire and they nay

..be able to furnish.

"II. The analysis and exploration referred to above will shom the coverage

furnished bj each of the subscribing agencies and any additional coverage each

subscribing agency can undertake.

when the commander feels thai more complete

coverage is required, iù is

recognized that he is authorized to augment the

coverage with such elements

of the subscribing agencies as are uncer his

• Jurisdiction. Frior to any invasion of the spheres normally coming under

the cognizance of the other subscribing agencies, the armed forces commander

should obtain the necessary authority from the secretary of Defense.

"III. Irrespective of the fact that the preceding recommendations have

placed the initiative in the hands of the armed forces commander, wherever

any of the other services feel that such a survey to determine adequacy of

coverage should be undertaken, it should be so.

reconmended."

(2) Instructions

The major differences between the foregoing Delimitations Agreement.

and previous versions are as follows:

The Director, OSI, USAF, is a party thereto.

The Bureau has jurisdiction over all civilians insofar as espionage,.

counterespionage, subversion and sabotage are concerned, regardless of em-

ployment.

NW 54932 Docld:32989719 Page 153

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20

Supplemental Afreements to the Delimitations Afrcemeut

On 6-2-49, fivi vi

mental agreeneats to tho De

Fitationo Agreemont

..were approved by ta

enuers of the Interdepartme:

Intelligence Con-

Ierence, and they are set out below.

Instructions

where necessary, con-

cerning

each

of the

supplements will be found at the

end of that supple-

ment:

8o

Supplemental Agreement No. (I]to the Delimitations Agreement:

*COOPERATION AND COORDINATION BETWEEN

THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTICATION

THE INTELLIGZUCE DIVISION OF THE ARMY

THE OFFICE OF MAVAL INTELLIGENCE AND

THE OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS, INSPECIOR GENERAL, U. S. AIR FORCE

"The Director of Intelligence, U.S. Army, the Director of the

and the Director of the Office of Special Intestigations, Inspector

General, U.S. Air Force, with a view to promoting

the closest

possible

cooperation and

coordination. between the Field Services

of

these agencies agree tiat the following recommendations will be trans-

mitted to their field installations:

•(a) Special Agents in Charge of the federal Bureau of Intestigation

Divisional Offices, Military Intelligence Officers of the pertinent

Inspector General, U.S, Air Force, and Naval

Officers will maintain close personal liaison between those offices

and their representatives, including a meeting of representatives

of

the four agencies, preferably the officers in charge, at least twice

per month, for the purpose of discussing pending and

contemplated

Investigative activities, and any other subject necessary to insure

that there is proper coorcination of their investigative work. •

"(b) The close personal liaison to be naintained between represent-

atives of the iour agencies at all times should insure that there is

no duplication of eisort in any field, and that a proper coverage of

the whole investigative field is maintained.

Particular attention

should be paid to avoiding any duplication in connection with the use

of informers.

"(c) A distinction should be recognized between the investigative

Interest of indiviaual agencies and

the coverage

interest.

believed that all four agercies

should study, from time to tine, the

coverage of the investigatire field in order

to insure that all

channels of interest and

avenues of information arè adequately

covered by at least one of the participating agencies.

•(a) Where there is doubt as

to whether or not one of the other'

agencies is interested in information

collected, it should be trans-

mitted to the other agency.

*(e) Consideration should be given to the fact that certain classes

of information are

of ¿eneral interest to the Military, Naval, and

NW-54033-Eocld:32989719-Rage-154

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Air Force intellinge services in connection with background and

knowleuge of cipi

¡wu jabotade orgarization

-military, Naval, am

Mir Force intelligenceljervi

en though the

may have no

apparent direct investigative interest.

"(1) Should differences of opinion of a minor nature occur, the

four intelligence agencies feel

that with proper

personal liaison, such difierences can be satisfactorily. adjusted

locally by the oificials in charge of the various divisional organi-

zations."

(1)

Instructions

This supplement recommends meetings at least twice moathly of

the interested agencies.

Where desirable or necessary, these

meetings may be belá

nore often than twice per month and in

certain areas, because of the travel distances involved or other

factors,

meetings are being held once per month by special

agreement.

It is not necessary that the Bureau be advised

the business discussed at these meetings, unless, there is a

particular matter of which the Bureau should be cognizant.

The

Bureau should be promotly informed of any change in the schedul-

Ing of these meetings or of any agreement to commence or dis-

continue meetings

in a field office area.

bo:

Supplemental Agreement No. II

to the Delimitations Agreement: [Rescinded.

Supplemental Agreement No. III to the Delimitations Agreement:

«INVESTIGATIVE JURISDICTION ON VESSELS

•OF MILITARY SEA TRANSPORTATION SERVICE

"1.

The investigative jurisdiction of all activities under the

categories of espionage, counterespionage, subversion and sabotage

on vessels of the Military Sea Iransportation Service is as follows:

Intestigative

jurisdiction on vessels purchased by the

Navy will be the responsibility of the Office of Naval Inteili-

fence.

"B.

Vessels obtained by the Nary through a 'bare boat charter'

will be

under the investigative jurisdiction of the Office of

Naval Intelligence.

"Ci Vessels allocated to the Military Sea Iransportation Service

which are manned and supervised by their private owners are under

the investigative jurisdiction of the FBI.

=":.

::.

NW.54933_Docld:32989719 •Page 155

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i Gotte

-"?.

above icach a l

When personnel who are subjucts of an investigation under a or o

5.

or prior to re:

¿ such port, if practicable

he Department oi

the

Navy will prompt

jurnish the FBI all poftine:

pformation concerning

the investigation.

persounel wno are

subjects of an investigation

as above remove themselves from the vessai upon arrival o1 the vessel

In port and further surveillance is considered necessary, the Nary will

continue surveillance until notified by the FBI at local

FBI has taken over jull

responsibility for the case.

Navy and FBI will make every effort to transfer responsibility upon

PEESE

level that the

However, both the

arrival of the vessel at the port.

When the FBI opens

an irvestigation under c above or when an FBI

investigation in progress develops or is believed about to develop

ramifications under a, b, or c above, the FBI will prompoly lurnish

all pertinent information to the wavy and will thereaiter coordinaie

its actions with the vary whenever and wherever deemed necessary to

Insure proper pursuit of the case."

d. Supplemental Agreement No. [IV]to the Delimitations Agreement:

"INVESIIUATION OF PRIVATE CONTRACIORS OF THE ARMED FORCES

"It is agreed by the subscribers of the Delimitations Agreement

(hereinafter referred to as subscribers) that with reference

• Investigatións of civilian employees, applicants for

employment,

and key personnel of prifately owned plants and facilities,

working or bidding on contracts

important to the Army, Navy, or Air

Force (hereinaiter reierred to as the Armed Forces) procurement, the

following will be followed insofar as practicable.

Exceptions thereto

will be adjusted by mutual agreement between the

subscribers concerned.

"(a) The Armed Forces

will conduct background investigations of such

persons unless there

is a particular reason for

requesting that an

Investigation be conducted by the FBI or the FBI has a special interest

in a particular case

and has notified the Armed Forces of such interest.

"(b) The FBI will conduct conplaint investigation of such personnel

upon specific request in each case by one or

more of the Armed Forces,

• If one of the armed forces has no further

need for an investigation

requested, "but not completed, prompt notification will be made to the

FBI.:

" (c)

Investigations conducted by the Armed Forces under (a) above

will be terminated and all information passed to the fBI when credible

derogatory infornation of a loyalty nature is

uncovered.

Upon receipt

of such. a case,

the FBI will proceed as under (b) above if one of the

Armed Forces so requests.

*(d) When one of the subscribers is aware that another is conducting

an investigation on a person or firm identical or closely connected •

with a person or firn it

contemplates investigating,

will be undertaken without the consent of the subscriber which has an

investigation in progress.

The investigation agency will-make arailable

to the other interested agency copies of the reports of the intestiga-

tion made.

Normally, identity of confidential informants will not be com-

municated from

one subscriver to another; however, when such

communica-

tion occurs, ine receiving subscriber will employ

the highest possible

safeguards to insure that such informants are not compromised.

transmittal.of information concerning co.fidential informants

to a third

subscriber or

ajency is authorized except by specific con-

sent of the orijinator.

• сі ід::

'a.

NIV 54933' Docld:329897191, Page 156

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## Page 157

*(f) A subscrib

another subscribei

& third subscribe

who receives a report of inv

ay freely transmit copies oi

scept as provided in (a) abo

iration from

ch reports to

"(E) A report of

completed investigation received by the Armed forces

from the FBI will not be reopened without

the approval of the FBI

except to obtain auditional background iniormation.

In such case, the

FBI will be furnished copies of all infornation obtained. Other

Information required by the armed Forces will be requested of the fBI.

"(h) If one of the Armed forces

requests the FBI to conduct an

investigation or to conduct additional investigation as provided

(6) above, and if

for any reason the FBl declines or is unable to

conduct such investigation or adiitional investigation, the Armed

Force

concerned may proceed with the investigation.

be furnished copies of the results thereof ij the FBI so requests or

If the armed Force concerned considers the results to be of FBI

interest.

*(1) Nothing abore is to be construed as altering the basio Delimita-

tions Agreement o1 1949 or current agreements concerning subversive

organizations."

Supplemental Agreement No. [V]to the

Delimitations Agreement:

*INVESTIGATION OF RESERVE AND CIVILIAN

COMPONENTS OF THE ARMED SERVICES

*It is agreed by the subscribers to the Delimitations Agreement that

the army, the Navy and the Air Force nay conduct

background investija-

members of the inactive reserve and National Guard vào aro

anticipated being called back to active duty, or where an investiga-

tion is undertaken for

the purpose ci ieternining whether the indi-

vidual should be disenrolled iron his military status, or to deternize

whether the indiridual

nay be granted access to classified military

information.

The following procedures shall be pursued in each of

the above circunstances:

•(2) The intelligence agencies of the Army, Navy or Air force before

undertaking such

background investigation will consult the fBI to

(a) if the FBI has an investigation in progress; ii

no investigation will de undertaren by the intelligence agencies

except as

may be nutrally agreeable to the Armed Force concerned and

the FBI; (b) il the FBI already has made an investigation; ii so, ine

results will be made available to the other agencies; (c) if the fBi

has information on the individual even though it may not hate con-

ducted an investigation.

*(2) Il, after consulting the FBI, investigation is undertaken by

the other agencies, it will be pursued no further than is necessary

to make the determination required by the other agencies, and all

information developed

pertinent to the four categories will be fur-

nished promptly to the FBI."

This supplement has béen discussed by the Interdepartmental Intelligence

Conference, and

it was

agreed on 9-10-58

that the "consultation"

requirement vill be satisfied if the FBI is notified, by means of a

statement included in a forn request for a name check, that investiga

tion is being initiated concerning the individual.

NW. 54933 Docld:32989719: Page 157

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- a salisatias

If. Supplemental As

ement to. VI to the Delimitat' 1s Agreement:

VESTIGATION IN AREAS NOT

SPECIFICALLY ASSIGNED

"It Is agreed by the military subscribers to the Delimitations

Agreement that the relerences therein in paragraphs III.

IV. 4i,

and V. 4. to

'areas where the Army (Nary,

iF Force) Commander

has

supreme jurisdiction over

the armed forces

stationed therein'

shall be interpreted

as reierring to areas where the Department of

the Army (Mary, Air Force) is responsible for the administrative ard

logistic

support of the Readquarters of Commands established by the

Secretary of Defense." (Approted by IIC November 4, 1959.) ]

NW-54933_Docld:32989719,Page 158

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E. NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL CHARTERS OF THE

INTERDEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE

AND THE

INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SÈCURITY

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 159

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## Page 160

CORNDENTAL

NSC?.

COPY NO.

A REPORT

TO THE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

by

on

:.f

WASHINGTON

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 160

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## Page 161

WARNING

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NA-

TIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF

THE ESPIONAGE ACT. 50 U.S.C., 31 AND 32, AS AMENDED. ITS IRANS-

MISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO

AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

NW 54933* Docld:32989719 Page 161

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NSC 17/5

June 15, 1949.

CONFIDENTIAL

•.

NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

to the

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

on

INTERNAL SECURITY

Reference: NSC 1774

Pursuant to paragraph 7 of NSC 17/4, the en-

closed draft charters for the Interdepartmental Intelli-

gence conference (1IC) and the Interdepartmental Committee

on Internal Security (ICIS), prepared and unanimously

approved by the members of

the respective Committees with

the advice and assistance of the National security Council

Representative on Internal Security, are submitted here-

with for consideration and approval by the National Securi-

ty council.

SIDNEY W. SOUERS

Executive Secretary

Distribution:

The President .

The Secretary of State

The

secretary of the Treasury

The Secretary Of Defense

The Attorney General

The

Secretary of the Army

The secretary of the Navy

The Sccretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, National Security

Resources Board

NW 54938 Dold 32989719 Page 162

..:"

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT

CHARTER OF THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 101 of the National

Security Act and NSC 17/4 as approved by the President, the National

security Council hereby authorizes and directs that the Interdepart-

mental Intelligence Conference effect the coordination of all

Investigation of domestic espionage, counterespionage, sabotage,

subversion, and other related intelligence matters affecting.

Internal security. The IIC shall be guided by the terms of this

charter.

A. ORGANIZATION.

• (1) The Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference shall

be constituted as set forth in the Presidential Directive of June 26,

1939, that 1s, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation,

the Director of the Intelligence Division of the army, the Director

of Naval Intelligence, and in addition, the Director, Office of

SpecIal Investigations, U.S. Alr Force, Which office has been

.created since the Issuance of the original Presidential Directive

(2) The chairman shall be elected annually by a majority

vote of the IIC from Its membership. A permanent secretary shall

also be selected by the IIC and he shall be responsiblé for main-

talning the necessary records. Such additional secretarlat as may

be necessary and desirable shall be provided as needed.

(3) The IIC, through its chairman, shall Invite non-

member agency representativos. as ad hoc members of the IIC when

matters Involving the responsibilities of such non-members are under

NSC 17/5

-NW-54933-Docld:32989719 Page 163

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDEITIAL

consideration.

• (4) A representative designated by tho NSC and under the

direction of the Executive

Secretary of the NSC shall participate

as an observer and adviser in all meetings of the IIC. This NSC

representative shall have no power of instruction, airection, or

supervision over operations of the IIC. The reports of the Natlonal

Security Council representative referred to In paragraph 6 of NSC

17/4 shall be made available to the IIC for observation and comment

within a reasonable period of time prior to submission to the

National Security Council.

B. POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES.

(1) The IIC shall take the necessary action to insure

that there is no duplication of effort by governmental departments

and agencies in those matters under 1ts jurisdiction.

•(2) The IIC shall make appropriate studies and take

action to Insure that complete Investigative coverage 1s maintained

by appropriate departments and agencies. In matters described herein.

(3). The IIC shall endeavor to resolve conflicts of

jurisdiction in the investigative fields named herein and determine

by what agency or department necessary Investigations can be handled

most logically and efficiently.

(4) The IIC shall study and make recommendations with

reference to legislation and executive orders needed to achieve the

objectives si; forth herein.

• (5) The IIC shall promote appropriate exchange and co-

ordination of Infomnation among

the various agencies and departments

of the government.

NSC 17/5

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 164

=2 .

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

:

(6) The IIC shall Incorporate under it or absorb the

functions of existing Interdepartmental committees which are operat-

1ng In Its fleld of responsibillty

(7) The IIC shall perform such other functions as may

be necessary or as may be assigned to lt by the National Security

-

Counc1] or other appropriate

authority falling within its field of

coordination of activities relating to domestic espionage, counter-

espionage, sabotage, subversion, and intelligence matters affecting

internal security.

(8) The IIC, In 1ts field, shall make the necessary plans

and preparation for adequate internal security in the event of a

•wer-related emergency.

C. PROCEDURE

(2) The IIC shall establish such ad hoc and working

committees as mey be desirable and necessary for the purpose of

discharging Its responsibilities.

(2) The IIC shall initiate and coordinate necessary,.

studies, projects, and surveys relating to its responsibilities.

It shall request, receive, and correlate suggestions or actual

studies, projects, and surveys from non-member agencies in the

field of responsibility assigned to the IIC.

(3) The IIC shall maintain coordination with the Inter-

departmental Committee on Internal Security through the chairman of

the IIC and the representative of NSC. Whenever appropriate, the

IIC will hold joint meetings or establish joint sub-committees with

the Interdepartmental Cormittee on Internal security.

NSC 17/5

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 165

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

(4) The IIC shall submit to the NSC those problems which

require consideration or action by the NSC and thoso problems which

cannot be resolved and worked out through cooperative consideration

and action.

D.

Nothing herein shall be construed as modifying. or

affecting the Presidential DIrectives Issued to the members of the

IIc relating to their individual responsibilities and dutles.

The

DelimItations Agreement among the members of the IIC relating to

the investigative res,onsibilities and duties of the Individual

members and other agreements among these members relating to the

same matters shall remain in full force and effect and shall con-

tinue to be amended, changed, and supplemented at the discretion

of the IIC.

...

NSC 17/5

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 166

=4 =

CONTIDENTIAI

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CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT

CHARTER OF THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL, COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 101 of the National

Security Act and NSC 17/4, as approved by the President, the Nation-

security Council hereby authorizes and directs that the Inter-

departmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS) effect the co-

ordination of all phases of the Internal security field except as

pertains to the following functions which are assigned to the Inter-

departmental Intelligence Conference (IIC): The coordination of

the investigation of a1l domestic espionage, counterespionage,

sabotage, subversion, and other related intelligence matters ai-

fecting internal

security. The ICIS shall be guided by the terms

of this charter.

A. ORGANIZATION

• (1) The ICIS shall be composed of representatives from the

Departments of State, Ireasury, and Justice and the National Mili-

tary Establishment.

(2). The chairman shall be elected annually by a majority vote

of the ICIS. A permanent secretary shall also be selected by the

ICIS and he shall be responsible for maintaining the necessary

records. Such additional secretariat as may be necessary and de-

sirable shall be provided as needed.

(3) The ICIS, through its Chairman, shall invite non-member

agency representatives as ad hoc members of the ICIS when matters

Involving the responsibilities of such non-members are under con-

sideration.

NW 54955C DocTa: 52989719 Page 167

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

(4) A representative designated byothe National Security

Council and under the direction of the Executive Secretary of the

• National Security Council shall participate as an observer and ad-

viser in all meetings of the ICIS in accordance with paragraph 6 of

NSC 17/4. The reports of the National Security Council representa-

tive referred to in paragraph 6 of NSC 17/4 shall be made available

to the ICIS for consideration and comment within a reasonable perica

of time prior to submission to the National Security Council.

B. POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES :

(1) The ICIS shall make appropriate studies and take necessary

• action to insure that complete coverage is maintained by the appro-

priate departments and agencies in all matters in the fiald of

• Internal security except those matters which fall specifically

within the purview of the IIC, as indicated above.

(2) The ICIS, In Its fleld or in collaboration with the IIc,

shall take the necessary action to Insure the establishment and main-

tenance of the highest practicable state of internal security.

(3) The ICIS In Its field shall assure the existence and

coordination of, and establish guidance for, the necessary plans

and preparations for adequate internal security in the event of a

future emergency.

(4) The ICIS shall study and make recommendations with refer-

ence to legislation, executive orders and regulations needed to

achieve the objectives of the ICIS.

(5) The ICIS shall take the necessary action to insure that

NSC 17/5

NW.54933 Docld:32989719 Page 168

CONFIDENTIAL

- 6 -

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CONFIDENTIAL

there 1s no duplication of effort by governmental departments and

agencies in those matters under its jurisdiction.

(6) The ICIS shall take the necessary steps to procure resolu-

tion of any confllets of jurisdiction that may arise in the field

of Internal security for which the ICIS Is responsible, and shall

determine by what agency or department necessary action will be

handlea.

(7) The ICIS shall promote appropriate exchange and coordina-

tion of Information, as well as action, among the several agencies

and departments of the government.

(8) The ICIS shall incorporate under 1t, or absorb the

functions of, existing interdepartmental committees which may be

operating in its field of responsibility.

C. PROCEDURE

(1) The ICIS shall establish such ad hoc and working commit-

tees as may be necessary for the purpose of discharging Its respon-

sibilities.

(2) The ICIS shall Initiate and coordinate necessary studies,

projects, and surveys relating to its responsibilities. It shall

request, receive, and correlate suggestions or actual studies, pro-

jects, and surveys from non-member agencies in the field of respon-

sibility assigned to the ICIS.

(3) The ICIS shall maintain coordination with the IIC through

the Chairman of the ICIS and the representative of the National

security Council. Whenever appropriate, the ICIS will hold joint

NW 549856odid:35989719 Page 169

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENIIAL

meetings or establish joint subcommittees with the IIC.

(4)

The ICIS shall submit to the National Security Council

those problems which require consideration or action by the NSC

and

those problems which cannot be resolved and worked out through

cooperative consideration and action.

NW 5493S6ocld732989719 Page 170

CONFIDENTIAL

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• .

F. NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM 161.

JUNE 9, 1962

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 171

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THE WINITE HOUSE

11. SASUINOTON

1.1:8

11;

10.01.8 d

CONFIDENTIAL

June 9, 1962.

• NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM 161

TO:

Tho Sociotary of Sinto

The Secretary of Defense

The Secrctary of the Trcasury

The Secretary of Commerce

The Attorniy Genrici

The Director of Central Intelligence

Military Representative of the President

Administraior, Federal Aviation Agency.

Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission

SUBJECT: U.S. Internal Security Programs

In line with my continuing effort to give primary

responsibility for the initialive on major matters of

policy and adminietration in a given field to a key

membér of my Administration, 1 will look lo tho

Attorney General lo take the initiative in the gövern

ment in ensuring the devclop ent of plans, programa,

and action proposaid to prote : the internal. security

of the United States, I will e poct him to prepare

re ommendations, in collaboration with other depart

mento and agencieo in the gor ernment having sho

responsibility for internal securily. programe, with

respoci to those matters requiring Presidential action..

CONFIDEI TIAL

...d.

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 172

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".!"

THE WITE HOUSE

•NASHINGTON

CONFIENTIAL

. - 2-0

2. Accredingly, I have directed that the two inter-

departmental commiltees concerned with internal

security--the Interdepartmental Inteiligence Conicrence

(IIC) and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal

Security (ICIS) --which have beon under the supervision

of the National Security Council, will be transferred to

the supervision of the Attorney General. The continuing

need for those commitices and their relationship to ine

Attorney General will ve matters for the Attorney Generai

to determine.

tillus

111:8

(John F: Kennedy)

J. Edgar Hoover, Chairman Interdepartmental V

Intelligence Conference

John F. Donerty, Chairman Laterdeparznental

Commitice on internal Security

Ao Russell Ash, NSC Staff

lilly dirt

1480s

• 151818t

711

: 1881:80 111

68..

CONFIDENTIAL

mati fine

rela lips.

IW 54933. Docld:32989719

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G. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MEMORANDUM, DATED 3/5/64,

TO FORMER FBI DIRECTOR J. EDGAR HOOVER,

SETTING FORTH NEW CHARTER FOR THE

INTERDEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE

UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 174

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Oifice of the aMarry Denial

Mas|jingtan, I.C.

• March 5, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Edgar, Hoover, Chairman

Interdepartnental Intelligence Conference

SUBJECT:

Continuation of the Interdepartmental

Intelligence Conference

fursuant to the authority vested in the Attorney General by

National Security iction Menorandun 161, dated June. 9, 1962 froa the

President, and in view of the proposed rescission by the National

Security Council of its document 5425/1, I hereby direct that the

Interdepartmental Intelligénce Confezence shall contirue in operation

with the present organizational structures and terms of reference.

The IIC Charter is hereby anended as follows:

l. The first paragraph is amended to read: "Pursuant to the

pIoViSions of Mational Security iction Merorandon 161, dared

June 9, 1952 from the aresident, the Attornay General hereby

authorizes and directs that tho

Interdepartnantal Intelligerce

Conference effeci ira co-ordiacon of all investigation of

domestic espionags counterespionage, sabotage and subversion;

and other relati: - sailigenc:atters affecting internal

security. The Ill jil be guided by tha tams si this charter."

2.

Paragrapn ¿it; is deleted.

30

Paragraph S(ü) is mended by striking out the words "Nacional

Security Courcil" and substituting therefor the voras "Attorney

Gencral"

4. Paragraph C(3) is amended by striking ou= the words "and the

representative of the National Security Council".

5. Paragraph C(4) is asended by striking out the words "National

Security Council" and substituting therefor Inc words "Attorney

General."

Attorney General

-M So docld: 32989/19 Page 175

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## Page 176

CHARTER

OF THE

INTERDEPARIMENTAL INTELLIGINCE CONEERENCE

Pursuant to the provisions of National Security Action

Memorandur 161, dated June 9, 1962 from the President, the Attorney

General horoby authorizes and directs that the Interdepartnental

Intelligence Conference effect the coordination of. all Investigation

of domestic espionage, counterespionage, sabotage and subversion,

and other related intelligence matters affccting internal security.

The IIC shall be guided by the terms of this charter.

A. ORGANIZATION

(1) The Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference shall be con-

stituted as set forth in the Presidential Directive of June 26, 1939,

that 15, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department

of Justice; Assistant Cilef of Staff for Intelligence, Departnent of the

Azmy; Director of laval Intelligence, Department of the Mavy; and the

Director of Special Investigations, the Inspector General, Department. of

the Air Force (the latter position

having been created since the issuance

of the original Presidential Directive.)

(2) The chairman shall be designated by the President from the

membership of the Committee after consultation with the Attorney General.

An executive secretary shall also be selected by the IIC and he shall

be responsible for maintaining the necessary records. Such additional

secretariat as may be necessary and desirable shall be provided as needed.

(3) The IIC, through its chairman, shall invite noumember agency

representatives as ad hoc members of the IIC when matters involving the

responsibilities of such nonmenbers are under consideration.

B. POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

(1) The IIC, in its field, or in collaboration with the ICIS, shall

take the necessary action to insure the establishment and maintenance of

the highest practicable state of internal security, including the making

of necessary plans and preparations for adequate internal security in the

event of a war-related emergency:

(2) The iil shall make appropriate studies and take action to

insure that complete investigative coverage is maintained by appropriate

departments and agencies in matters described herein.

(3) The IIC shall take the necessary action to insure that there

18 no duplication of effort by soverrmental departments and agencies in

chose natters under its jurisdiction.

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 176

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## Page 177

:

(4) The IIC

mall endeavor to Icsolve confl

is of jurisdiction

in the livestigative fields named herein and determine by what agency

or departuent necessary investigations can be handled most logically

and efficiently.

(5) The IIC shall study and make recommendations with reference

to legislation and executive orders needed to achieve the objectives

set forth herein.

(6) The IIC shall promote appropriate exchange and co-ordination

of information, as well as action, among the various agencies and

departments of the government.

(7) The IIC shall incorporate under it or absorb the functions of

existing Interdepartmental committees which are operating In its field

of responsibility.

(8). The IIC shall perfort such other functions as may be necessary

or as may be assigned to it by the Attorney General or other appropriate

authority falling within its field of co-ordination of all investigation

of domestic espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, and subversion, and

other related intelligence matters affecting internal security.

C. PROCEDURE

(1) The IIC shall establish such ad hoc and working committees

as may be desirable and necessary for the purpose of discharging its

responsibilities.

(2) The IIC shall initiate and co-ordinate recessary studies,

projects, and surveys relating to its responsibil...les.

It shall request,

receive, and correlata suggestions or actual studies, projects, and surveys

'from nonmember agencies in the field of responsibility assigned to the IIC.

(3) The IIC shail maintain co-ordination with the Interdepartmental

Committee on Internal Security through the Chairman of the IIC. Whenever

appropriate, the IIC will hold joint meetings or establish joint subcon-

mittees with the Interdepartnental Committee on Internal Security.

(4)

The IIC shall submit to the Attorney General those problems

which require consideration or action by the Attorney General and those

problens which cannot be resolved and worked out through co-operative

consideration and action.

D.

Nothing herein shall be construed

as modifying or affecting the

Presidential Directives issued to the members of the IIC relating to their

individual responsibilities and duties. The Delinitations Agreement arong

the members of the IIC relating to the investigat. a responsibilities and

duties of the individual members and other agreement. among these neavers

Iclating to the same matters shall remain in full force and effect and

shall continue to be amended, changed, and supplemented at the discretion

of the IIC.

• 2 .

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 177

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HI. THE PREAMBLE AND SECTION 101 OF THE

NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 178

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## Page 179

~ NATIONAL SECURITY ACT

Act of July

1917 (61 Stat. 495-510), as amended b

t of dug. 10,

1979 (63 Stat. 5Td-302), by Reorgunization Plan No. 4 of 1912

(63 Stat. IUGT), by leorganization Plan No. & of 1053 (07 Stat.

63t), by lcorguization Plan No. 7 of 2953 (UT Stat. 630), by

Act of April t, 1953 (07 Stat. Ü39), by Act of April 1.

• 1953

(67 Stat. 19, c. 10), and by P.L. S5-599 82; 50 U.S.C. 88 402,

403-The National Security Act of 1947:

"ABLENDING THE DECLARATION OF POLICY

"SEc. 2. Section 2 of the National Security Act of 1917, as

amended (50 U.S.C. 101), is further amended to read as foliows:

"Sec. 2. In enacting this legislation, it is the intent of Congress

to proride a comprehensive program for the future security of the

United States; 1o proride for the establishment of integrated poli-

cies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions

of the Government relating to the national security; to provide a

Department of Detense, including the three military Departments

of the Army, the Jary (including naval aviation and the United

States Marine Corps) and the tir Force under the direction,

authority, and controi of the Seerctary of Defense; to provide that

each miltary deparument shall be separately organized under its

orn Secretary and shall junctión under the direction, authority:

and control of the Secretary of Defense; to provide for their uni-

fied direction under civilian control of the Secretary of Defense

but not to merge these departments or services; to provide for the

establishment of unified or specified combatant commands, and a

clear and direct line of cominand to such commands; to elimi-

nate unnecessary duplication in the Department of Defense, and

particularly in the heid of research and enginecting by resting

its orcrall direction and control in the Secretary of Defense: to

proride more erective, elicient, and economical acministration

in the Departnent of Defense; to provide for the unified strategic

direction of the combatant forces. for their operation under uni-

fied command, and for their integration into an efficient team of

land, naval and air forces but not to establish a single Chief of

Staf' over the armed forces nor an overall armed forces general

staff.'

"NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCI

"Sec. 101. (a) There is established in the Executive Office of

the President a council to be known as the National Security

Council (hereinafter in this section referred to as the Council').

"The President of the United States shall preside over rhe meet-

ings of the Council: Proviled. That in his nusence he may desig-

nate a member of the Council to preside in his place.

"The function of the Council shall be to idvise the President

tith respect to the integration of aloestic, forcign, and miltary

policies relating to tho national security so as to enable the mili-

tary services and the other departinents and agencies of the Gur-

ernment to cooperite more ellectively in matters involving the na-

«The Council shall be composed of-

"(1) the President;

"(2) the Vice President;

"(3) the Secretary of State:

"(4) the Sceretary of Defense;

"(5) Director of the Foreign Operations Administration,

who shall not delegate this function;

«(G) Director of the Oilice ot Defense Slobilization, sho

shall not delegate this function;

"(7) the Scereraries and Under Secretaries of other ereci-

tave departments and of the mitary departments, the Chair-

man of the Alunitions Board, and the Chairman of the Pa.

search and Derclopment Board, when appointed by the Pres

NW 54933-Docld:32989719-Page-17gident by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to

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## Page 180

I. MEMORANDUM FROM J. PATRICK COYNE,

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL REPRESENTATIVE ON INTERNAL SECURITY,

DATED 11/6/50, CONCERNING NECESSARY INTELLIGENCE MEASURES

RELATIVE TO VIOLENCE BY PUERTO RICAN NATIONALISTS

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 180

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## Page 181

¿XECUTIVE OFFICE O

NATIONAL

ZASHINGTUN

SECRET

COPY

Hovember 6; 1950

_MENORINDEX FOR:

Mr. J. Edgar Hoouer, Chairman

Interdeportmentol Intelligence Conference

Ur. Paytond F. Thearty, Choirman

interderart.enial comnittee on Internal Seciry

:..

The president has assed that the Ild and ICIs report

" to

the Nationel security council on the lessong to be learied

from

the recent outbrian of violence by the fuerto Risen

Nationalisis irsojor as internol security measures cre concerned,

including suci questions as:

do fere intornal security restonsibilities clearl!

assigned, properly executed and caeguotel! docri

,,nated, both in ard betueen the continental

Untied stutes Cho Fuerto Rico?

De

What additional or ingroved measures could be

taren eitner in the intelligence or operctionol

sields to preuent or do ercuered for rature situa

Upon completion

It Is

suggested thet your joint

repore be submitted to this office for approprinto reference

to the couroil.

• ..

HOn

Patrick Coyne

S. Co REPRESENTAILIE ON INTRIAL SECURITY

1s/ Jo Petrick Coyne

• y"

Nel 50

NW 54933 - Docld:32989719 Page 181

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## Page 182

COP

November 8, 1950

J. Patrick Coyne

National Securit! Council

Executive Office building

Hashington, D. C..

Dear Pat:

Reference is made to your memorandum

dated November 6, 1950, which acuised that in

President nas asted that the aTc and the ICTs

repori to the lational security Council on the

lessons to be learned from the recent outbreai

of violence by the Puerto Ricar Mationalisis

insofar as internal security neasures are

concerned.

: Attached hereto is a report in this

connection which has been arepared by tie

Interdeparinental Intelligence Conference.

Sincerely yours,

Chairman

Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference

Enclosure

1:

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 182

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## Page 183

REPORT RI THE INTERDEPARTUENTAL IUTELLIGENCE CONESRENCE TO THE

NATICHAL SECURITY

PRINCIL

НЕ ЗОСЕНТ 01133345

VIOLENCE BY PUERTO RICAN

NATIONGLISTS

The following summary has been prepared in answer to

a request for information received fron the National security

Council on the lessons to be learned from the recent outorean

of violence by the Puerto Bican Nationalists insofar as internal

security measures are concerned.

The suntary has been designed to answer the following

specific questions:

..

Were internal security resporsibilities clearly

assigned, properly executed and adequately coorci-

nated, boin in and between the continental unitea

States ana Puerto Rico?

B.

What additional or indroved measures could be taken

either in the intelligence of operational fields to

prevent or be prepared for future situations of

this character?

SUMATION

• Although investigation is continuing, it would appear

-on the basis of cuailable cata trot recent events in Puerto

Rico

constituted more or less spontaneous acts of violence, apparently

touched off by a raid bu Insular folice on a ictionalist Porty

cache of arms and annunition.

This GisturDance was brought quickl!

under control. suer effective action reflects the efficiencú of

the close, established coring reintionships between the FBI ano

agencies hoving intelligence and opercting responsibilities in-

volving internal security matters in puerto rico.

Insular cuthorities vere prepared to meet the assaults

on the peace due to the previous warnings of Nationalist

to the pries

preparations for revolution.

Evidence to support the assumption that these assaults

- reflected spontaneous action and not carejul extensive planning is:

The absence of major acts of sabotage.

B. The foilure to attemot to capture centers and lines

of communication such as racio stations, telephones,

telegraphs, etc.

....

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 183

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## Page 184

No evicence has been developed that Nationalist

Party leader, Compos, ordered of had inowledge of

the outbreak.

: Do

The acts of violence did not proceed according to

a pattern nor were they choracterized by even

elementary coordination and timing.

HISTORY OF THE MATIONALIST PARTY

The Nationolist Party of Puerto Rico clains that its

origin can be traced back to September 23, 1868,

when a small

revolution took place at Lares, Fuerto Rico, for the purpose

of overthroiving the spanish Government, preparatory to establish-

•ing a Republic of puerto Rico. This revolution was quickly

quelled by spanish authorities.

On November 25, 1897, Spain recognized the Republic

of puerto fion in a document referred to as the "autonomis

Charter."

Shortly therecfter, when spoin was defeated in a

war with the United States, Puerto Rico was ceded to this country

in accordance with the ciains of the treaty of Paris.

The

Nationalist Party refused to recognize this irecty, charging it

null and yoid where puerto rico is concerned.

Although there has long been an independence movement

in Puerto Rico, the lotionalist Party as it is known today dic

•not come into existence until 1922.

In this

year it was formaily

established at lio Piedras, Puerio Rico. Tie declared ourposes

of this party were ano still are: (1) to secure the separation

of puerto rico ¿rom the United states; ano (2) to create "a free,

ndepencent, and sovereian nation.

The declared means to this

end include the use of force and violence leading to open, wide-

spread armed rebellion.

The history of the Nationalist Party has been closely

identified with Pedro Albizu Campos, current president of the

Party.

He is a Puerts Rican by birth and a graduate of taruard

_University.

He serued in the United Stotes Army from Mau,

1917, to April, 1919, receiving ot that time an honorable

discharge. Following this discharge, Campos instituted a vicious

-2-

=s.""...

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 184•

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## Page 185

propaganda campaign crainst the lnited states in neiclf of

puerto rican incependence, which he has continued to date.

marchino upon the Canitol in san Juan to force

to adont the jationalist flag. One person was tillca and telve

others injured.

In the same year,

the Party organized the

"Liberating army of the Republic.

•In January of 1936, nonbershis in this "Army" was

nade obligatory for cl1 male

menbers of the Party. On July S1,

1936, Pedro Albizu Connos and seven oüner lecders of the

Nationalist Party vere convicted in the Ecceral court at

san Juan for

"inciting rebellion" and "corting to overtarou the

Goucremoni of the United states. "

Cannes was

released from

the genitentiary on June s, 1943.

on larch al, 1037, nineteen persons dere hilled cra

approcinatel! 100 others were wounded in a gun battle which took

piace beiween the

Police end IPp? members do ponce, fuerto Riço.

In June, 1927, ton newbers of the APPa fired upon l.S. District

Judge Robert l. cooper at son Juan; the cutenated assassination

was instecess.?ul.

In tull, 192ô, a group of ipp? menbers ncce

on unsuccessful cobent to kill the sonorable glonton tinsio,

Governor of Puerto Rico.

On the some date, these ipp? members

killed a arominent officer of the puerto picon lational Guard

and wounded coprodinutely twenty other persons.

•#ith reference to the assault on the lederal Judge in

June, 1037, eight of the guilty iPPe members uere sentenced to.

five lears

in au.s. penitentiary and two other menders received

a senience at tio and one-nals years each. It is interesting to

• note thai one of the hP? members convicied for the citomot

on

the life of the federal Juage mas Rainundo Diaz-Pacheco uno did

- Lead the attaci october Sugan Insular Police on muard tiere.

1950, arainst the Governor's Palace

in san Juan and was killed

As a result of the attented assassination of the Governor (in

• which a rational Guera leader vas killed) in Jul!, 1529, six

NPP? nombers vers subsecuently convicted. of murder in the Insular

-. Court at Force.

These men were sentenced to lije innrisonment,

but the sentences were commutca and otheruise modified in indi-

vidual cases.

one of thic six, Tomas hopea-je victoria, figured

proninenül! in the reccht insurrection.

•some too docid iden

INW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 185

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## Page 186

During the seriod from June, 1913 to Decenber 15,

1947, Campos was in New York City.

In the fall of 1947 in

anticipation of the return of Cairoos to fierto lico from New

York city, nainindo Diaz-iacheco orcanized and trained a small

group of young men in military drills.

These young men were

at the dock on December 15, 1947, dressed in the Cadet uniform

Of the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico's Army as an Honor Guard

to

receive their President, Pedro Albizu Campos.

During the period, 1948 to 1950, the Nationalist Party

took steps to develoo and enlarge its Codet Coros. During

1949, eight Nationalists were convicted and sentenced to the

penitentiary for a violation of the selective service Act of

- 1948.

At the Annual Assembly of the Nationalist

party of

Puerto Rico held on December 18,

in Puerto Rico, Campos

is reliably reported to have stated,

194ahe Cadet Corps must be

made the most powerful army in fuerto Pico, ready for action."

Other information received during 1950 revecled that

individuals connected with the Nationalist Party were engaging

firearms practice.

SEQUENCE OF RECENT ACTS OF TIOLENCE

I'he recent incidents in puerto tico have followed a

pattern of sporadic outcrecks.

The

first occurred at approvi

mately 12:30 dol. on October 27, 1950, when the Insular Police

at Rio Piedras arrested a group

se Nationalists who were

travelina in on autonobile acconochuing Pedro Altizu Campos

from Fajarco there he had mode a speech carlier in the evening:

The Nationalists in the automobile had attempted to crowd a

•. police car off the road on the may to

the individuals in the car vere found to be carrying conceared,

weapors. Also

-found

in the car vere five gasoline bombs.

On October 28,

Insular Penitentiary, Pio

1050, a jail break occurred from the

Diedras diring which 112 prisoners

= escaped:

Two prison guards were killed ond four more injured.

At about 4:15 A.l. on October 30, 1050, in the little

town of Penuelas, about sisteen solice officers were proceeding

to a residence in that cree to carry nut a search

for hidden

arms where they encountered armed tationalists uno fired unon

the police.

Six police

officers were wounded and several persons

believed to de Nationalists vere

killed.

MW. 54933..Docld:32989719 Page 186

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## Page 187

At approximately 9:00 A. Hl. on October 30, 1950,

there was an incident near Fonce in which one police officer

was killed. Two police officers who were

sent out to answer

a call were ambushed in the jeep in which they were riding.

• One of the officers was killed.

-

On the morning of October 30, 1950, at Arecibo,

grous of ictionalists citached the police station and milled

four policemen.

At 12:00 noon on October 30, 1950, an attaci was made

•on the Gouernor's Falcce at san Juan.

FOUr

"ationalists were

reportedl! killed ana one wounded.

ramundo Liar Pacheco,

Treasurer of the lationalist Party os puerto Rico ana Commander-

•in-Chief of the Nationclist Army, was among those killed.

At this point the National Guard was called out by

Governor Louis Munoz licrir.

At 2:05 P.M. on October 30, 1950,

reports of sporadio incidents were still being received.

The

•Post Offices at Utuado and Jayuya were attacked. At Jayuya

the post office was sei citre one the post office, selective

service Office, and the farm security Office all burned.

San Juan there was an exchange of gun fire between the Natioral

Guard, Police, and the Nationclists. Vidal Santiago, one of

the Nationalisas, was wounded.

town of San Juan

was blocked.

•. Off and the Governor's Palace placed under heauy guara.

October 31, 1950, the towns of Jayuya and Utuado were retaken

•by the National Guard end order rastored. By Movember 1, 1950,

0l1 cots of violence had ceased und the Insular police were

• rounding up all iroun Nationclists.

Pedro Albizu Campos, lied

• Of the lationalist Party of fuerto nico, was arrested by the

Insular police on lovember 2, 1950.

No further acts of violence

sere reported in Puerto rico.

On wovender 7, 1950, the National

• Guard was released from active duty and the Insular Police

assumed full responsibility for maintcining civil order.

ASSIGHNENT OF INTERNAL SECURITY RESPONSIRILITICS

Under the provisions of federal statutes and the

-

Delimitations Agreement, signed february 23, 1949, by the Iederal

Burecu of Investigation, the Intelligence Division of the Arm!l;

the Office of iaual Intelligence, and the Office of Special

Investigations of the dir force,

the rederal Bureau of Investigation

nas the responsibility for the investigation of espionage,

•counterespioncge, subversion, and sabotage involving civilians

• ".

. *.

....

'":

•i......

.......

=5m

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 187

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## Page 188

and foreign notionals of all classes in the continental

United States and in the territories of Havaii, Puerto Rico,

the Virgin Islands, and all but a portion of Alasko. The

Intelligence Division of the Army, the Office of Naval

Intelligence, ond the office of special Investications of the

Air force have the responsibility for these investinations in

these areas when they involve active and retired military personnel

of their respective services.

OsI, in addition, covers that

portion of Alaska not covered by the fEI.

These oblications.

carry the responsibility to exchange freely and directly with

the other named agencies. all information developed which

is of

: mutual interest.

The Insular Government in Puerto Pico has police

jurisdiction and is responsible for the enforcement of local laws.

The assignment of internal

security responsibilities in

Puerto Rico is, in general, parallel to the assianment of these

responsibilities nithin

the Unitea States and ure cleurly defined.

•.

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 188-

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STEPS TAKEN TO EXECUTE AUD CCORDINATE INTERNAL

SECURITY COVERAGE

I. In. Puerto Rico.

Coucrage laintained.

Representatives of the iBI, the hit force, the Army

and Mavy are in daily contect with each other on all phases of

internal

security ina other intelligence and counterintelligence

problems.

Bo Field Interdepartnental Intelligence Conferences.

Representatives of the FBI, OVI, G-2 (Arny), OSI

•(Mir Force) who constitute the Interdepartrental Intelligence

Conference meet weekly to revieu current developments in order

to rauise the appropriate authorities of situctions ard trenos

involving potential threats of espionnge, sabotage,

and sub-

version.

special conferences are conuened as the

situation

requires.

C. Exclinnge and lissemination of Infornotion.

Intellicence and information ceveloped bu cll IIC

..agencies in Puerto Rico is exchanged freel! on a continuing and

current basis:.

-.

D. Relations with puerto Pican Autrorities.

The FBI has long mcintained e close working relationship

with Puerto Pican ruthorities as woll as entensive Licison witn

•foreign intelligence end police officials throughout the carribbean.

The FBI. relations with the Insular Police in Puerto Rico are very

. close.

The special Division of the Insular Police knoun as the

Internal Security squor ros been in eristence since 1042 at wich

time it uns orgarize chu ircines. by the FBI. Close contacts

• are maintained between the FBI and the Internal security Squaa

which has been concucting security investigations of the National-

ists for many veers; agents of the fBI work frequently with

-

internal security Suucc

officers on security invescigctions..

The Insular Government which had prinary responsihility for the

maintenance of the pence of puerto rico was aware of the collection

by Nationalists of arms

and explosives ano also appreciated tre

significance of such activit: and were familiar with the tenser

and bacioground of the inciviouals involved.

wince the return

of rationalisi lecder Compos to Puerto Rico in 1717, the Insular

Gouernment has concorned itself with adequate proicotive neasures

•3"3

jogginst the tupe of violence that the ictionclists had previously

_carricd out.

.....!....

::..st..........

NW 54933 Dlocld:32989719 Page 189

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## Page 190

The Insular Police have maintained a constant open

surveillance on Carpos "and have covered all rationalists

meetings.

In addition, they have carried out numerous investi-

gations of individual ictionalists.

Evidence of tie effective

exchange of inforction and close working rolations is cisarly

shown by the rapid arrest of over sit hundred individuals on

-

uhom the police had subversive recores.

The Special Agent in Charge of the FBI Office in San

Juan has conferred over a period of years with the Governor of

Puerto ico concerning the Nationalist fart:, its leaders and

In this connection, covertor louis wuno.

Harin is quoted in a press release as cauising secretary of the

Interior Chapman on lovember 2, 1950, thot "If You will

remember when you were here three weeks ago, I ciscussed this

situation with you and went over the FBI reports on the

Nationalists plans for an uprising and the tie-in viti a jew

the Island - - - the cooperation of the FBI in

Puerto Pico and the mainland has been most helpful, ond had

these precautions not been token, I feel thet the

nagnituce

0f

the incicents of the last few days would have been greater."

2. In Continental United States.

Monthly Interdepartnental Intelligence Conferences

composed of the Lurectors of FBI, ONI, G-2 (Amy), OSI (Air

Force) supplemented bu more frecuent oring Connittee meetings,

coordinate effectivel! the collection, escharge and dissemina-

tion of internal security deic throughout the ünited states,

its territories and possessions in accordance with the belinita-

tion Agreement.

All caditional agencies having an interest in

the internal affcirs of Puerto Rico have been kept currently

advised of developments perseiring to the lationclist Party of

Puerto Rico es mentioned previously, such as the department of

Justice,

the Departnent of Interior, the state Department, and

the military services.

On June 3, 1913, Campos, lender of the Nationalist

Party, was released

grow the penitentiary.

As early as June 4,

a memorandum was furnished the Lepartment of Justice which

rejerred to the previous data furnished to the Department re-

--lating

•to the revolutionory aims and activities of the

Nationclist Part!! of Puerto Pico.

This memo ronaum requested

the Department of Justice to aduise ij these activities con-

stituted a violation of any fecerals tatute.

Secretary of Interior Chapman, on November 3, 1950,

advised the Director of the federal Burcou of Inuestigation

ringio

ride deed died

-8-

NW. 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 190

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## Page 191

that the FBI had done an excellent job of keeping the proper

officials. injorned of every minute dotail as to the happenings

іт ристіо ріс.

3o Between Puerto Rico and the United States.

There is a continuing exchange of information and

intelligence between the Hashington,

c. hecdquarters of IIC

agencies and their field representatives in Puerto Rico.

has

Party activities not only in puerto Rico but also among the pro

Nationalist Puerto Ricon elements throughout the United states,

particularly in Hew York City.

.

OBSERTATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

In wiew of the constant threat from world Communism,

as

well as frot other revolutionary conspiratorial groups such

as the liationalist Party of Puerto Bico, dots of violence ajject-

ing the internal security of the United states must always be

anticipated.

-..

TIc agencies recognize the necessit! and urgency for oto-

viding operational authorities with rdequate

intelligence data to

- serve os a basis for executing counterneasures.

Intelligence

agencies con provice the facts but these facts must be acted upon

: is inimical forces are to be neutralize.

• In the case of fuerto Rico, no positive reutralizing

action wes taken until the overt acts of violence occurred.

The.

broader question

naturall! arises from this series of incidents.

as to whether it is necessary to quait eatensive damage ou

expocted acts of violence from well-identified revolutionary

rand or subversive groups bejore taking positive action.

In conclusiOn,

it me! be said that the effectiveness of.

the work of Ill agencies nos been adegiatel demonsirated. There-

fore, changes in fundamenicl policies are not recommended:

is strongly. celieved that security worl should be augmented by the

just-and denocratic coplication of punitive neasures predicated

-

welfare of this nation.

NW 54933 Dodid: 32989719 Page 191

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• J. EXCERPT FROM REPORT ON THE INTERNAL SECURITY PROGRAM,

DATED 3/5/54, PREPARED BY

INTERDEPARTNENTAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE AND

• THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 192

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TOP SECRET

I.

OBJECTIVES

The over-all objective of the Internal Security Program is to

protect the ünited States against the threats of Communism and other

subversive movements, particulorly arainst the designs of soviet

Russia and her satollites upon the security of the United States.

Sabotage, espionage and súbversion within the United States can cause

not only the loss of imerican lives and the loss of battles anywhere

in the world, but can cause serious disruption of our productive

capacity and adversely affect the maintenance of a stable economy•

Communist doctrine provides that a period of peace is to be

used to consolidate and strengthen the Communist forces in the world

while at the same time weakening and dividing the democratic nations

including disrustion of the internal life of these nations economically,

politically and socially. Thus the present Soviet "peace tactics"

• emphasize that our internal security protective corerage must be

maintained at a high level.

Soviet Russia can continue to increase

subversive, disruptive tactics without risk or cost to herself commen-

surate "ith the potential beneficial results to the Soviet cause.

The Internal Security Program was formulated on the assumption

of a continuance of peacetime "cold war" conditions. Hoever, it

includes the ejements to be expanded for a tartine operation.

The major specific goals of the Internal Security Program are:

1a To coordinate the activities of all agencies and departments

concerned with internal security matiers, including investigations, the

collection of domestic intelligence, and the integration of foreign

intelligence portinent to the domestic intelligence rield.

2a To continue the acceleration of investigations designed to

provide the basis for the apprehersion, prosecution, or other action,

against persons involved in subversive

activities.

3o To detect and muintain security indices on persons considered

dangerous to the national defense and public safety.

4a To neutralise Communist front and Cornunist-dominated organi-

zations in the United States.

DOWNGRADED TO

SECRET

Per

Date

ADG TASH T42

NSC 5407, Part 9

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K. EXCERPT FROM REPORT ON THE STATUS OF THE

INTERNAL SECURITY PROGRAM OF

THE UNITED STATES AS OF JUNE 30, 1958, DATED 8/27/58,

PREPARED JOINTLY BY

THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE AND

THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 194

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AGRADED TO

SECRET

SECRET

Ths 1957-1958 plina of Czechoslovaldan military incallitence in

the United States include insurictions to locate secret rupositories for

radio receiters and transmitters for eventual use by elansestine agents.

The Hungarian Intelligence Service, which sent agents io this country posine

as refugees in the vaka of the liugarian revolution, is also engaged in

developing ita claricestine operations.

Rovelopsent of evidense upon which legal action can be taken

against suversive incividuals and organizations:

Following tre Supreme Court decisiona reversinr the convictions

of 19 Communist Farty Leaders for violation of the smth Act oi 19h0s

action by various Circuir Coucos of Appeal has resultud in the sequitial

o1 20 additical Comunist lardy imetionaries and the ramending for cotria?

of 29 othere.

while selocted cases are not scheduled for retrial curing the

fiscal year 1959; zoblena have arisen in ober cases que to the lapse of time

since the periods sorered by the indictrents.

In nosy irobaross. ssveral. yaars

have been consuned by triula end appaais with the zeauló diat ritnasses have

died, nave becone invelli, or are mavailabie for other roasons and a this

late date their testimony cannot de repluced, Another problon las been the

stringent evicentimy standaris estabiished by the Suprane Cout in the case

of the Califonia commist leaders.

In other suses; the Espertrent of justice muni consider thia leas:

through thair appenzancs so minesses, of adcitional coridential infernanés

of the FPI. It 15 necessaur to weigh the dfficulsy oi coxsloping indoorants

within the Commit Farn and lus related moups tourior with the value of

the indoorizon they secure spaint the benetle to ba contrad fawn sing

such persuas as witnesses.

do Untering counta intellicenca infomation as it relates to

sensitive nilitary arens and dorange facilitias:

The Ill arencius, in view of the continuing effois coordinated by

sorict blan agonts in thás country do secure full knoledge concernin: cur

indastrial and nilitary operations, remain particularly alert to accivilios

in these ficles and continue to emphasize the investigation and identification

of scourity risks in both industrial o miliary facilities.

No naterial change in the level of these asceous of the IIC irvossi

gative propan is mbicified by the IIC imbers during the nost riceal year,

In the susanca nt unforesson inburnational developrams, ner legislatien

or no procco initiated by ider authority mien sould increase or coécease

ihoir scaponsibali}.

2.. Danauton of Crazzationa cud Indriduals

The deciniceo of Mi. Daincd States Surene Court in duss, 1937, In he

ducks and lutee casus have canniles in the reversal st 10 Suith Aet canos

Emotine do Trainlosals. Indiercants Javolving 22 decendanto vere orcure

ANW 54933. Docld:32989719 Page 195

49 -

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## Page 197

L. EXCERPT FROM FORMER FBI DIRECTOR HOOVER'S BRIEFING

OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

PRESIDED OVER BY THE PRESIDENT, DATED 11/6/58

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 197

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## Page 198

Our fifth prosram is'aimed at solving the difficult problem created by

(EXHIPIT TO.

(20)

the use of microdots in espionage. Since it is extremely difficult to detect

these tiny photographic messages once they have been placed in correspondence

or otherwise concealed, we have instituted coverage of the filn outlets in this

country which deal in the special emulsions necessary to this process.

We have still a sixth program under which we continuously evaluate the

espionage and sabotage potential of individuals whose current activities indicate

that they might costitute a threat to the country in the event of a national

emergency. These include members of the Communist Party of the United States

and other individuals dedicated to the violent overthrow of our Covernment, We

maintain a special index of such persons to enable us to effect their immediate

apprehension in the event the President so directs the Attornez General. For

your information, there were 12, 305 names on this indexras-of-October-27,-10554

77

An aach

Lini die

-30 -

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 198

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## Page 199

Jontr Manahi Ar fute gcateo

o- 869.351958

Seutis

Él incini.

? ??"

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 199

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## Page 200

Communist Party leaders are hopeful that, by exploiting such current

national and international issues as racial discrimination and peace, they can

bring about a resurgence of Party activity and influence. For example,

Benjamin Davis, chairman of the Party's New York District, in a report made

in September of this year to top communist functionaries, stressed that the Party

should concentrate on the integration issue as symbolized by the Little Rock school

situation.

Diligent efforts are made by the communists to infiltrate Negro groups,

particularly at the local level.

so as to agitate and create confusion.

The public usually associates the FEI's internal security

investigations with Communist Party activities orly. Nothing could be

further from the truth.

Our investigations encompass any and all

oxganizations based on a creed of force and violence to determine whether

they are a threat to our internal sccurity of whether they have violated

any Federal laws.

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 200

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## Page 201

We investigate the activities of such diverse and international

organizations as the Marxist socialist Workers Party, and the Nationnlist

(sag. 150)

(31)

Party of Fuerto Rico. (Responsible for attack upon President Truman, 1950,

(32)

and Congress, 1954. ) Further, we investigate such fanatical and so-called

"hate" groups as the Negro Nation of Islam; the Ku Klux Klan; the National

(35)

States Rights Party, an anti-Jewish and anti-Negro organization; and the

(rama 13. 155n) (36)

Confederate Underground." The latter is a name which has been mentioned on

a number of occasions in recent bombing threats and other forms of violence.

Since January 1: 195?, there have been over 90 bombings,

or attempted bombings, in the United States. Of these, at least 69 have

involved Negro victims and at least eight, Jewish religious and educational

facilities.

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 201

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## Page 202

prove 1953

in the early bombings there was no evidence to show that these bombings

could be attributable to specific organizations. Rather, they were individual

acts of terror strictly within the jurisdiction of local authorities. When these

outrages occurred, we in the FBI have made immediately available to local

• ..

authorities our laboratory and fingerprint facilities here in Washington.

As the bombings directed toward religious and educational facilities

continued, the FBI extended its cooperation to cover out-of-state, lends which

local authorities could not handle. We extended such assistance to the

Jacksonville, Florida, and Birmingham, Alabama, Police Departments

in connection with the bombings of a Jewish center and a Negro high school

(37)

in Jacksonville on April 28, 1958, and the attempted bombing of a Jewish

(38)

temple in Birmingham on the same day.

=33 =0

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 202

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Recently, however, there has been some indication of a gencral

interstate pattern to these bombings.

for example, one of the men indicted

(39)

on October 17, 1958, (Richard Bowling) for the bombing of the Jewish temple

assaras

in Atlanta, received from one of his fellow conspirators two checks worth

• nearly $200.

One of these checks was dated October 4, 1958, the day before

• (40)

the Clinton. Tennessee. Bish School bombing; the other, October 9, 1958,

three days before the Atlanta temple bombing:

Recognizing the danger to the national welfare from a general

:

pattern of organized terrorism, the FBI has moved to expand its assistance

to local law enforcement in the recent bombings at Clinton, Atlanta, and

(11)

Peoria, Illinois. We are now providing all-out investigative assistance in

these cases.

We are closely checking the activities of individuals prominently

(42)

involved in racial distrubances, such as the notorious John Kasper,

the

• 34=0

NW 54933 Docid:32989719 Page 203

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## Page 204

(43)

executive secretary of the Seaboard White Citizens Council of Washington.

As a

further aid to local law enforcement agencies, the FBI has scheduled a series

of special conferences for November and December, 1958, to discuss our

cooperative services regarding bombings and threats of bombings against

religious and educational institutions

Our entry into these cases at this new level is not to be interprcted

as an attempt on our part to usurp the jurisdiction of local authorities. To give th

FBI this jurisdiction would relieve local governments of the basic responsibility

to maintain law and order, and the ultimate responsibility rightfully rests at the

local level.

To counteract a resurgence of Communist Party influence in the

United States; we have a seventh program designed to intensify any confusion

and dissatisfaction among its members.

During the past few years; this program

se.

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 204

- 35 -

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M. LETTER TO MCGEORGE BUNDY,.

SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR

NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, DATED 7/25/61,

ENCLOSING MEMORANDUM CONCERNING UNITED STATES

INTERNAL SECURITY PROGRAMS UNDER THE CONTROL

OF THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE,

MEMORANDUM PREPARED IN RESPONSE TO WHITE HOUSE REQUEST

"...

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 205

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## Page 206

SECRET

jRaDed to

SECRET

orig

- Bunay

5 - IIC

Nr. Belront

Mr. Sullivan

1

• Liaison

1 - Mr. Wells

July 25, 1251

BY COURIER SERVICE

Honorablo NoGeorge Bundy

Special Assisient to the President

The khite jlouse

Washington 25, D. C.

Hy dear dr. Fundy:

Reference is neue to your leticr of lay 17, 19612

Intchli: cice:

Conferencs sinit by July 31,

a resort concerniay

Internal Security Prograns laich fall within its cognizance.

I there is enclosed the Inc report concerning

Interassurity aronrans for the periou July 1, 1050,

Ebroggh gane 30, 1951.

Upon

removal of classified enclosure, this transmittel

• letter becones

sincerely yours,

J. EDGAR HOSTER

Chaiman

Kotoriopartental save do conference

-??.

En to fire (Copy No. 1)

31:354

802001 LETS

ATE MIL 28 1951

(Cover memorandum from Mr. WAilier

(11)

ENOLOSURE

ir. Sulliven, 7/21/61, re

Security Programs,"

RAW :ike

breon This letter is classified op

because the enclosure is scalassi

ret"

ied.)

N.31

olson

sImont

oht.

allerhan

St.o0ch

ans

alone.

soon

wel

7245

My St God 31886e Page 200VE: UNIT

---

## Page 207

UP SECRET

СОРУ NO. 2

SUES ME. S. PENN SEON MORE

JULY 1, 1960, THROUGIL JUNE 30, 1961

PREPARED BY THE

INTERDEPARTHENTAL INTELLIGENCE CONTERENCE

JULY 25, 1961

DOWNGRADED TO

SECRET

Date.

OP SECRET

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 207

66-8603-9724

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RAP SECRET

TABLE OF CONTENTS

BACKGRCUND OF INTERDEPARTIENTAL

INTELLICENCE CONPERENCE (IIC).

I. DENTIFICATION AND DIVESTIGATION OF POTENTIALLY

DANGERCUS FERSONS IN THE UNINED STATES

II, INTENSIRIOD COVERAGE OF SOVIET BLOC OFFICIALS

IN THE UNITED STATES AD PENTETRATION OF

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE OPZRATIONS IN THIS COUNTRY

A. Number of Officials in the Unlied States..

Bo Soviet Bloc Intelligence Targets.

C. Public Source Data.:

D. United Nations Secretariai.

E. Establishment of False Identification.

F. Miscellaneous Operations

Go Reconnaissance Trips

H. Technical Data and Equipment

I. Use of Hostage Situations.

J. Soviet Bloc Propaganda

XII. CUBA.

IV. COVERAGE OF COMMUNIST PARTY ACTIVITIES

MA. 'Goncral

B. legal Action.

V. CONCLUSIONS

sia

SECRET

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 208

rade

1

2

3

3

4

4

5

5

6

7

7

8

9

10

10

10

12

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## Page 209

OR SECRET

STATUS OF U. S. INTERNAL SECURITY PROGRAMS

BACKGRCUD DE IHAREDEPARTNONTAL

INTELUPICE EOLDERENCE (IIC)

The IIC was established on June 26, 1939, by a

Presidential Directive which charged the Directors

of the

Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Miliary Intelligence

Division of the Har Deparment, and the Office of Naval

Intelligence of the lavy Department with functioning as

a committee ió coordinate the investigation of all espionage,

counterespionage, and

sabotage matters. • Subsequent aircciaves

latest on July 24, 1950, providing that the

FBI should take charge of investirative work in matters relating

to espionage, sabotage, and sübversive activities.

On July

• 18, 1949, the National Security Council

granted a charter to

the IIc authorizing and diracting the

IIC to effeci the coordination of all investigation.

domestic espionage, counterespionage, sabotage and subversion,

and other ralaied

intelligence matters aifocting

internal

security.

The TIC membership vas retained

intact with the

addition

Of the Director of Special Investigations of the

Department of the Air Force, which deparinent had

been croated

since the issuance of the original Presidontial Directive.

The

IIC has

functioned

under this charter as an internal security

adviser to the liational Security Council concerning matters

Within its fieid of responsibility.

In order to clarify the responsibilities of each of

the ile members, an Agreement delimiting shese has ben entered

into by the members.

this has been amended from iine

to time

to take changing circumstances into account.

The Agreement

provides for the free exchange among the members of all

Information of mutual interest. The FBI is responsible for the

investigation of all espionage, counterespionage, subversion,

and sabotage involving civilians and forcign nationals in

Puerto Rico; the Virgin Islands, and the entire United States:

with the exception o1 certain arcas of Alaska which are

specifically assigned to the Naval and Air Force members.

Each

of the military mönbers is responsible for the investigation of

DOWNGRADED TO

SECRET

=1 -

DA ADG/543 T41742

SECRET

418003

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 209

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• SECRET

all such cases involving active and retired personnel of its

service and ine disposal, but not the Investigation, oi all cases

involving its civilian employees in arcas assigned to the FBI.

In addition to the matters handled directly by IIC

within its field of responsibility, the lIC participates in the

consideration of problems in ciosely allica fields.

For exanpie,

the IIC Chairman, representing IIC, is a member of

the Natioral

Security Council Net Evaluation Subcommatice, a group which

operates under national Security Council Directive 5816,

The investigative program of the IIC agencies is

designed to carry out the responsibility levied on she IIc.

by its charter.

ine primary objective of the program 1s to

counter the ever-increasing and

continual threat irom inter-

national communism and soviet bloc espionage and subversion,

This goal demands continuing aggressive investigative action

by the Ile agencies through their investicative programs.

the major Investigaïive programs oi the lic agencies are

as follows:

I.:.

DENTIFICATION AND INVESTICATION OR POTENTIALLY

DANGEROUS TONS DIS

DED UNNED SENAES

The FBI maintains a current list of individuals,

both citizens and

aliens, to be considered for apprehension,

and detention, Ii necessary, in a perzod of emergency.

Approximately 12.000 individuals are listed at this time.

This list is kept current on a daily basis by the acdition

of new individuals whose activities make them potentially

dangerous to the United States, and by the deletion of.

individuals who are no longer engaged in subversiva activities.

Included on the list of potentially dangerous individuals are

nearly 200 persons who are engaged in pro-castro Cuban

activities or who sympathize strongly with such activities.

In addition to members of the communist Party, it also incluces

certain members of such organizations as the Nationalist Party

of Puerio Rico, the Nation of Isian, and the Socialist Workers Party

The military services have continued their programs

designed to detect and eliminate potentially

dangerous members

of the armed services and to propare for action with respect

..2 .

AP SECRET

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 210

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NOP SECRET

to other potentially dangerous persons located in civilian arcas

within the investigative responsibillty of the military services.

As an example, the Air Force has a program under which background

investigations are conducted on all dir force military personnel

on active duty and appiicants for enlistment or appointment who

are either aliens or U.S. citizens with connections in

communist-controlled countries.

duty Air Force military personnel have been identified and

investigated under this program.

program has been extended io include Cuba as one of the

}

communist-controlled countries.

Consideration is being given to expanding this program

to include reserves who ara not

on active duty and the Air National

Guard. Individuals in the Air National Guard and those reserves

who have mobilization assionnents and are considered as ready

reservists wouid be investigated under this progran.

Office of Special Investigations-FBI joint counter-

intelligence coverage of Strategis Air Command missile and

manned combat elements now includes 68 Strategäc Air Command

bases and 12 missile sites. This coverage includes Patrick

Air Force Base and the Air Force Missile

Test Center at

Cape Canaveral, Florida, Coverage of new installations is

initiated severai months prior to the time the installation is

scheduled to become operationai.

As a further example, the military services have

parallel programs which also inciude a special briefing of

personnel who

may be subjaci is nostage pressure through threats

of harm to relatives in comnunist countries.

II. INTENSIFIED COVERAGE DE SOVIET BICO CRFICIALS

IN NIC URNED SPANIS AND MURRANTON DE

FOREIGN LITELLIGENCE OPERATIONS IN ALIS CCUNTRY

A. Number of Dificials in the United States

There are in this country 1,605 Soviet and satellite

diplomatic and official personnel, including their dependents.

Of this total, 654 are oificials and dipiomats and 951 are

190

SECRET

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 211

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•:

TO SECRET

dependents. Of the total number, 849 of the individuals are

soviet officials, diplomats, and dependents. Soviet diplomatic

and official personnel alone total 366.

It should be noted that the total number of such

personnel and their dependents has increased yearly since 1951.

t the mee Set in inclane diplomats,

and dependents in this country.

the figure of 1,605 represents

an increase of 250 since July i, 1960.

The FBI has continued its special program of intensified

coverage of soviei bloc officials in this country, and since 1951

nas identitled 593 Soviet bloc officials ag erther being or

nighly suspected or being engaged in inteiligence activities. 0f

the 654 officials stationed in the United States on June 30,

1901÷

a total of 138 were either know to be or highly suspecied of

being engaged in intelligence operations.

These 138 are comprised

0f 72

Soviet cificiais ana 66 satellite

officials.

This

large

number of individuals

engaged in such activity points up the

intense soviet bioc effort directed against the United states,

and represents over trenty-une per cent of all Soviet bloc

officials in the United States.

B. Soviet Bloc Intellicence Targats

soviet bloc inteiligence targets include military;

scientific, political, economic, and technical data, both

classified

and unclassiiied.. Soriet bloc intelligence personnel

have been aggressive in their miasspread intolligence collection

activities. Thoy have not hesitated to atzempt to develoo and

subvert U.S. citizens.

the effort of the Soviet blee intelligence

services is coordinated and guided by the Soviets. The satellite

intelligence services have been developed according to the

Soviet pattern, their key personnel have been seiected and trained

by the soviets, and the soviets have access to all data obtained

by the sateilites.

• C. Public Source Data

Soviet bloc intelligence agents have taken full

advantage of public sources of internation, both in Government

and industry.

Information has been collecied through the

purchase of readily avaiiable publications, both fren Government

and private industry, and by attendance at

scientitic and

technical conventions, contrrences, and exhibits which are

frequently conducted by industry in this country. As an examplo

• 4 =

SECRET

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 212

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SECRET

United Staies Army hold its annual

"Evaning Stari carried an article exposing Soviet bloc

attendance at this convention.

Included in the article wore

numerous photograpns of soviet bloc personnel viewing exhibits

and filling their brief cases wich unclassified literature made

available by various companies which were taking part in

the convention.

D. United Nations Secretariat

Pursuant to NSC 5427, Soviet citizens in the United States

have been restricted from entering certain areas of this country

in reciprocity for soviet action barring all loreigners from

certain areas of the Soviet Union.

in adaition, Soviet dipiomatio

personnel are

required to give advance notice oi proposed travel.

Soviet emplojees of the United Nations Secretariat,

however, have been exempted from these travel restrictions, and

the Russians have not hesitated io use their nationais, who are

employed by the U.N. Secretariai, in intelligence operations.

For example, in November: 1960, a Soviet U.N. Secratariai

employee

travaled to a New Jersey city to meet a U.S. citizen

whon he had been developing for intelligance purposes.

In July,

1960, anothes Soviet, also empicyed by the U.i. Sacretariat,

unexpectedly arrived

in lashingion, D. C., and

• contacted

a U.S. Government emicree.

The contact appeared to be an

attempt to develop the U.S.

employee as an intelligense source.

The above tro cases illustraie

the ease wiin which Soviet

employees of the U.. Secrotariat can travel.

No permission need

be requested by them and they do not have to indicate the area

they intend to visit. These facts make coverage of such personnel

more difficult.

E. Establishment of False Identification

In August, 1960, a Soviet official requested that an

FBI source obiain for him

a blank U.s. passport.

The official

requested, in the event this could not be obtained, that the

source loan him his passport and gave assurance that it would

be returned in usable condition.

The same official had

previously

requested blank diplomas from an ciementary school, a high school,

and a university. He also had requested birth certificates of

-5 .

SECRET

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SECRET

a male and female who were born in the United States between 1930

and 1935 and had since left the United. States and had not returned.

It is obvious inat the soviet was attempting to establish suitable

identification and background data to facilitate the entry and

operation oi Soviet illegal agents sent to the United States.

A Soviet Counselor at the United Nations took a

actalled tour of the Department ci dealth, lew lork Cy.

in October, 1950. de evidenced extreme interest in the handlin

of birth. death, and marriage certiticates by New York Cay

authorities. During the tour, he was interested in obtaining

samples of the forms

used for the ragistration of births, deaths,

and marriages. This is another case of an attempi to secure.

documents which can be used is establish identification for

individuals sent io the United States as iliegal agents.

F. Miscellaneons Overations

A Soviet Assistant Naval Attache has used a source

of the FBI to conduci numerous espionage assignmenis for the

soviets.

for example, during february: 1901, he instructec

the source to obtain books on the subject 01

oceanography and

Uos. geological survey maps. of fifteen U.s. cities.

the source

turned over the requesied maps after the maps had been cleared by

appropriate Government agencies for transmittal to the Soviets:

He was then instructed to obtain maps of tweive other U.S. cities.

Also in February, a Czechoslovakian Embassy official

instructed a source of the

FBI to ebiain telennone directories

of the Defense Depariment, the United States Iniormation Agency,

and the International Cooperation Aiministration, Io further its

efforts to penetrate the nited States Government, the Czech

official also suggested that the source seek employment with

the State Deparinent and USIA.

A Soviet Attache during March, 1961, requested that

another source of the IBi obtain a report of the Heuse

throughout the world to detect wire tapping and concealed

microphones.

Again in March, 1961, an employee of the Soviet

Embassy was in contact with another FBI source. He offered the

source five hundred dollars it the source would obtain two

• classificd U.S. Arny manuals for him.

-6.

SECRET

tei

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Go Reconnaissance Trips

In addition tò the attempted

• use of U.S. citizens as

sources of information and as agents, soviet bloc personnel

have traveled extensively throughout the U.s.

As an illustrations

in Narch, 1951, to Soviet Assistant Air Attachos made a

reconnaissance througn the States of Texas, lew Mexico, Colorado,

Utah, and Arizona. During this trip, thay exhibited interest

•in the Atomic Energy Commission office at Grand Junction,

Colorado, and in various Air force bases in Colorado.

They were

• observed

taking motion pictures from a site on Franklin Mountain

overlooking El Paso, Texas. From this point, they wore able

•to observe tne bl aso, Texas, and Juarez, lexico, area

which

:.contains a portion of Fort Bliss and Biggs Air Force Base.

In addition to making trips themselves, Soviet bloc

officials have requested

sources oi

•the rBI to make such trips,

On March 23, 1961, an official of the Soviet Babassy requested

that a source of the FBI make an espionage reconnaissance trip

to Her London, Connecticui: and obtain data concerning the

submarine base at new london. The source was instructed to

speak wiith sailors in taverns and to take a tour of the

submarine base.

H. Technical Data and Emuipnent

The Soviets have also utilized the Amtorg Trading

corporation, New York Ciir, to obtain Information and equipment.

In April: 1951. an official of the Amtorc

1 Tracing Corporation

requested that

an

FBI

source

purchase ten

1 thousand doliars

worth c electronic equipment.

The Amterg official specifically

saince

not to obtain an export license for such

equipinent but insicad to bring it directly to amtoro. It is

probable that the Sovieis contemplated shipping such

equipment

to Russia by diplomatic pouch, thereby circumventing United States

export laws.

As an example of Soviet interest in technical data

available in the United States, an official of the soviet

Embassy has contacied over one hundred U,S. corporations for.

information regarcing their products.

He has joined two

technical societies and has subscribed to fourteon technical

publications.

lle has shown particuiar interest in steel,

glass; plastics, electronics, and automobile manufacturers.

I. Use of llostage Situations

The Soviet bloc has not hesitated to prey upon the

fears of U.S. residents with rolatives behind the Iron Curtain

-7-

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TY SECRET

in order to use a U.S. resident as a source.

a U.s. resident returned to poland and marrica vovern rational

in Warsaw. Wile attempting to expedite his wife's ebtaining

a Polish passport to come to the United States,

he was contacied

by Polish intolligence and was requested to assisi it by making

available to Poland data coming to his attention in connection

with research being done at a U.S. university:

In April, 1961, an Albanian employee of the Albanian

United Nations Delegation contacied an individual who had recently

Immigrated to the U.S. from Albania

for the purpose of developing

nim as an Albanian agent.

He exhibited a letter to the inmigrant

which allegedly was Irom the immigrant's cousin in Albania.

This letter stated that the cousin was in an Albanian prison but

that he would be forgiven his orime if the immigrant cooperated

with the Albanian Governinent.

• Soviet Bloc ProDaganda

The Soviet bloc countries have been active in spreading

their propaganda in this country.

In September, 1950, the

Soviet Embassy piaced an order with a dew York company for tha

names of 22.000

high school principals and the

names and addresses

of 1,200 college and university bookshops.

In november, 1960,

by the Soviet Enbassy. A number

of letters have

been received by the EBI from

private citizons, teachers, and

principals of schools indicating that they have received

copies of this publication.

unsolicited

in adúition: it has been noted thai

through the years many eigmentary and high scheol siudents have

requested fron the Soviet Enbassy and the encassies of the satellite

countries data regarding economic and living conditions in those

countries to be

used in their school work.

the material provided

by those embassies, of course, presents the Soviet bloc countries

furnished to pertinent U.s. agencies, and in addition, it mas

suggesied to the Department ot Health, Education, and Welfare

that it might be desirable for some agency of the U.S, Government

to prepare tactual material regarding economic and living

conditions in the communist countries which would be distributod

to schools in the United States.

the above examples are but a few of the many instances

oi soviet bloc intelligence activities in this country. It requires

SECRET

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SECRET

aggressive, alert measures to counter this activity. The IIC

program of intensified coverage of Soviet bloc activities has been

established to meei

this threat to the United States.

III. CUBA

The close ties between the Castro Government of Cuba

and the Soviet bloc have required that Cuban activities in the

United States be given intensive coverage.

At the present time,

the FBI has approximately one thousand pending cases relating to

cuba, and has managed to develop more than Inree hundred separate

sources concarning Cuban matters.

farticular attention is being

devoted to the July 26 Movement and to the Fair Play tor

Cuba Committee.

The U.S. membership of the July 26 Movement consists

chiefly of Cuban alions

and naturalized U.S. citizens of Cuban

extraction. Its membersnip is estimated at approximately

thirteen nundred, Iccated principally in New York City ard

As a result of FBI investigation of this

organization, in july, 1960. It was required to rocistor with

the Attorney General

under the Foreign Agents Registration Act.

The Fair Play for Cuba Committee is the principal

outlet for pro-casiro

propaganda and agitation on the part of

U.S. nationals sympathetic to the Castro regime. There are

indications that this organization is receiving

funds from the

Cuban Government. In addition.

investigation has shown that

this group has been heavily infiltrated by the Communist Party,

USA (Crusa) and the socialist loners Party (Sir), Doth of

which have been desinnated by the Attorney General

pursuant to

Executive Dider 10150.

In fact, some chapiers of the group

have been diractly arganized by and under the complete control

of the CUSA or the SiP.

In connection with the intensified coverage of

Cuban activities, it has been determined that Castro intelligence

agents have been

active in the United States, particularly in

Miami and New York. These agents have for the most

part

endeavored to gather data regarding anti-castro activities.

However, on occasion their operations have extended to plotting

the abduction of anti-castro leaders, staging incidents designed

to emiarrass the United States or disrupt U.S.-Cuban relations

•and planting agents in anti-castro organizations.

The close

relationsnap existing between soviet bioc countries and

Cuba greatly increases the possibility that these agents could

• 9∞0

SECRET

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TY SECRET

be utilized by the Soviet bloc against U.S. national defense

targets.

There are over one hundred thousand Cuban aliens in

the United States.

This large number of aliens offers an

opportunity for the castro regime to infiltrate agents into the

United States and also offers the Soviet Dioc a mechod of

gaining entry to the U.S. by Soviet illegal agents. The IIC

program is designed to counter this threat.

IV. COVERAGE OF CODINIST PARTY ACIIVITIS

A. General

A major part of the llc investigative program is

devoted to coverage of the Conmunist Party, USA (CFUSA) , and

related groups.

The CrUSA fanatically backs the policy of the

Soviet Union, and acts as a vehicle for Soviet propaganda and

...agitation in the

insted stateson The advantag

The advantage io the Soviet

Union can be readily seen by considering how valuable it would

be to the U.S. to have inside, the Soviet Union a pro-united States

organization which would vociferously support U.s. policy

through its speeches and its controlled press and

which wouid

be highly critical of any soviet policy mich conflicted with

U.s. policy.

The CrUSA is active in agitating and spreading

aissension in the U.s.,

and during the current racial disturbances

in the south, It has attempted to take full advantage of the

situation.

The Party has endeavored to bring pressure to bear

and student groups.

has suggested that the United Nations be brought into the

racial situation.

At the present time, the FBI has under investigation

two hundred known or suspecied communist froni and communist-

infiltrated

organizations.

nany of these organizations are

national in scope with chapters in various cities throughout

the United States.

These groups represent transmission belts

through which the

CFUSA can further its line.

B. Logal Action

One of the main purposes of the investigative program

concerning the Conmunist Party and its related groups is the

development of evidence upon which legal action can bo taken.

• 10 .

SECRET

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SECRET

against subversive individuals and organizations. In connection

with this aim, it has been necessary to infiltrate the Crusa

and

other subversive organizations and to develop informants who

can act as witnesses in any court proceeding.

Thare have been

two recent important Supreme Court decisions in connection with

supreme ve pran a love-to a is ta united states

Conmunist Farty, USA (CrUSA), is a communist action organization

within the purview of the Internal Security lot oi 1950 in that

it is substantially dominated, directed

and controlled by the

Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CFSU) and operates to further

the aims of the CPSU. The Court

further hold that the mere

Jisting with the Attorney General of the officers and members

of the CruSa, together with information regarding the Party's

finances and printing presses. is not unconstitutional.

The

majority opinion did not, however, decide the constitutionality

of

the various criminal penalties for failure to register as

ordered, or of the sanctions Imposed by the Internal security

Act of 1950 on the Party and

! Its officers and

members following

registration.

Gus Hall, General Secretary of the CPUSA, has publicly

stated that the Party will not register as ordered, and the

Attorney General of the United States has replied that the

Governnent will vigorousiy enforce the pertinent provisions

of the Act. Obviously, additional iong drawn-out litigation

is in the offing.

On June 23, 1961, the Supreme Court granted a petition

by the CPuSA for a renearing of the court's June 5, 1961, decision.

This rears las vision may be authorized should the Parts

This hearing on the petition will nor take place until the court

enconvenes in betober: 19od. Should the rehearing be denied,

refuse to register.

Also on June 5, 1961, the United States Supreme Court,

in a five-to-four decision, upheld the constitutionality of the

membership provision of the Smith Act of 1940, which prohioits

membership in an organization advocating the violent

overthrow

of the United States Government. The Court interpreted this

section of the Smith Act as prescribing only "active" membership, .

combined with knowledge of the illegal objectives of the organi

zation accompanied by a specific intent to further these aims.

-11 .

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COP SECRET

As a result of this decision, Junius Irving Scales,

a former functionary of the Conmunist Party, USA (CPUSA) , must

serve a six-year sentence imposed on him by the trial court.

On the same date, the Supreme Court, in a companion

decision, reversed the conviction of John Francis Hoto, a former

ground thai

CPUSA is an organization which advocates violent overthrow of

the Government

now or in the future.

At the present time, there is one case under the

membership section of the Smith Act awaiting retrial in Chicago

and there is a toral of nine additional indiciments outstanding -

seven in New York, one in Chicagó, and che in Boston.

One

conviction under this section is on appeal to the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals at San Francisco and

another: convicted defendant

is awaiting sentencing in Philadelphia.

The decision as to final prosecutive action in the

case set for retrial. as well as any possible additional

prosecutions under the membership

section of the smith Act,

rests with the Depariment of Justice..

On May 31s 1961, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals,

Denver, Colofado, reversed the conviction of six former

functionaries. of

the CPUSA Who had been convicted for the

second time on charges of conspiring to teach and advocate

the violent overthrow of the U.S. Governnent.

The reversal

was solely on the casis of failure of the Government and the

triad quage to comply with the provisions of the rencks law:

which governs the production of statements of Government witnesses.

The Depariment has requested the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals

to clarify iis opinion as to whether this error may be corrected

by a hearing befora the United States District Court, Denver,

or whether a third trial is necessary.

. V. CONCLUSIONS

The highlights of the major investigative programs

of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC) agencies

Illustrate the continuing aggressive action required to counter

the internal ihrcat fron international conmunism and sovict bloc

espionage and subversion.

The programs of the IIC agencies

designed to counter this

thicat are investigative in nature.

The IIC has consistently followed the policy of recommending

necded changes or additional investigalive coverage at the time

nceded; therefore, no rocomnendations are being made in this

report.

- 12 -

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N. BACKGROUND INFORMATION CONCERNING

THE EMERGENCY DETENTION PROVISIONS

OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950

AND THE EFFECT OF THEIR REPEAL

UPON FBI AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT

NATIONAL SECURITY INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS

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It will be recalled that Subchapter Il of the "Internal Security

Act of 1950" (64 stat. 987-1031) as amended, provided for the emergency

detention of "each person as to whom there is reasonable ground to believe

that such person probably will engage in, or probably will conspire with

other's to engage in, acts of espionage or of sabotage." From the time Sub-

chapter Il of the Internal Security Act of 1950 was enacted until the repeal

of this law by the Congress, the FBI operated under a Congressional mandate

which required the identification of all persons who might be covered by its

provisions in the event of a national emergency.

What is the effect of the repeal of Subchapter II of the Internal

Security Act of 1950 upon the jurisdictional basis for investigations conducted

by the Intelligence Division?

Essentially none. During the time Subchapter II was in effect,

lists of individuals to be considered for apprehension and detention under the

provisions of Subchapter II during a period of emergency were compiled based

upon information derived from investigations of subversive organizations and

individuals. However, investigations were not instituted for the sole purpose

of determining whether an individual should be considered for emergency

apprehension and detention under the provisions of Subchapter II. The

• '

identities of individuals who might be appropriate for apprehension and detention

in a national emergency were a by-product of the FBI's investigations in the

subversive fild based upon statutes, Executive Orders pertaining to national

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 222

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## Page 223

security and instructions from the Director of Central Intelligence pursuant

to power vested in that office by the National Security Act of 1947. In summary,

passage of the detention provisions incorporated in Subchapter II of the

Internal Security Act of 1950 did not enlarge or restrict the FBI's jurisdiction

to collect information pertaining to national security. Our national security

jurisdiction has been delineated by Congressional statutes and Presidential

Directives independent of the detention provisions of Subchapter Il of the Internal

Security Act of 1950.

This provision of the law affected how information collected

pertaining to national security was to be administèred, retained, and retrieved

should exigent circumstances arise. Consequently, although repeal of the detention

provision of the Internal Security' Act of 1950 eliminated the Congressional mandate

requiring maintenance of lists of persons to be considered for apprehension and

detention during the period of emergency, it did not limit or enlarge the jurisdiction

and authority of the FBI to collect information in the national security field.,

In this connection, it is worthy to note that on November 30, 1939,

shortly after issuance of the Presidential Directive of September 6, 1939,

Director Hoover offered the following testimony before the House Appropriations

Committee in connection with the FBI Emergency Supplemental Appropriations

Bill of 1940:

"Purpose and Work of General Intelligence Division

In September of 1939 we found it necessary to organize a

General Intolligence Division in Washington. The establish-

ment of this division was made necessary by the President's

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 223

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proclamation directing that all complaints of violations of

the national defense statutes and proclamations be

reported to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. This

division now has compiled extensive indices of

individuals, groups, and organizations engaged in

these subversive activities, in espionage activities, or

any activities that are possibly detrimental to the

internal security of the United States.

The indexes have been arranged not only

alphabetically but also geographically, so that at

any time, should we enter into the conflict abroad,

we would be able to go into any of these communities

and identify individuals or groups who might be a

source of grave danger to the security of this country.

Their backgrounds and activities are known to the

Bureau. These indexes will be extremely important

and valuable in grave emergency."

Thus, it may be seen that the compiling of lists of potentially

dangerous persons and individuals had been undertaken by the FBI prior to

enactment of the detention provisions of the Internal Security Act of 1950 as part of

the Burcau's implementation of the Presidential Dictive of September 6, 1939.

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 224

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0. MEMORANDUM BY FORMER FBI DIRECTOR HOOVER; DATED 5/11/61,

CONCERNING FBI INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION ACTIVITIES

RELATIVE TO CUBAN INDIVIDUALS AND GROUPS

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## Page 226

May 11, 1961

MEMORANDÜM TOR MR. TOLSON

MR. PARSONS

MR. BELMONT

1

on Apail 27, 1351, l attended, at the request of the attorney ceneral, -

a meeting of thorational security Council presided over by the President.

The first part of the meeting consisted of a discussion of the situation in

Laos, which in no way invcived the FBI.

The secoad part of the meeting doalt with the Cuban situation. There is

was a general discussion by varions members of the National Fecurity Coincil a3

to the meny phases that enter into this over-all problem.

The President inquired of me what my views were concerning the than

present sitiation. I told the president that thore were aoprosinntely so, 000 Cubank

nationals in the diami, Florida, reneral area and this cross nosed a secrity

problem because oi the fact that many oi these individan!s aro bitter and disillusiono:

as a result oi the intasion deieat. I stated that large rubers di refugess wio

participated in the invasion prees are cominy into florida by plane and by boat

frora the training camos maintained in Central minerican countries. I stated trut

a suostantial mamber will iina it duticalt to bacone reaujusted to civilian lié.

I stated it mast ba remambarod that this large grouy was loosing for

and expecting United States leadership and sympathy in their continuinz efforts

againat Castro. I nointed out that the sons oi Sardona and varora doth were e abers

of the invasion forces and vera cantired by Castro and I siated that there were no

doubt many other Caban families in the iciami area who had close members oi their

families who participated in the invasion and have cithor been stiled or cantured,

and this all pointed up to the necessity for the United states maintaining the care

for those rota-ces and giving thom some guidance. I strassed the importance of

MiSuniled States having close lizison with this Cuban grou! and its sevoral factions

moras to give guidance to it.

-TIEDN (7)

XEROX

MAY 12 1961

REG 73

3% - 102

62- 1205

19 MAY 12 1951

MAIL, ROON

TELETYPC UNIT 1

Nocid: 3230W 19: Page 226

vi

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## Page 227

Memorandum for Messrs. Tolson, Parsons, Belmont

May 11, 1061

I outlined to the President the fact that the 73l had intensified its

coverage of Casaas in this country, both anti-Castro groans and pro-Castro

groups. I commented bricily anoa the activities of tha fair Play for Cuba

Committea and the clamonia in back of it.

I pointed out that the situation within Caba would be, of course, even

more acute now than in the past and that Castro no dost had been materially

strengthened militarily as a rosalt coi the failure of the inresion.. I stated that

Castro's gorernraont wead continue to raceive military cauip cant from the iron

Curtin nations in view of the fact that the port of lavana was onen. I said.

therefore, even thosen the econorale aituation in Cuba ray beconia more critical,

certainly froz the noint of viev ci military control and the running of a pulice

state, Castro was probably stronger now inon at any tire in tha past.

# I note on the attached mumorandum dated i ay 4, 1051, daaling with

the request made üy at, John fairenthaler, Administrative Assistant to tia

Attornay Canoral, to determine hoi far the president should go in clamping

down on Cian reiugees, paricularly as to the security nroblem inveiveri in

the situation, that it was sargested oy tre Domestic Intelligence Division thai

the Cubansorgees in cleride as a wable do not pose ony sirmlicant security

proble, aí uzi at a corapiete loas to anderstand this statement in vlow of tha

bries prepares for my ass in the Domestic Iielligence Division, which is aitaches

nereto end which on pages j and & crossos ine point that there is a real cecurity

probiem in the handling oi the refugees in diami.

Very traly yours,

15/ V.E.

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Attachments (with original only)

∞ 2 -

SENT FION D. O.

E2A18

PAS:3 -

DY

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P. MEMORANDUM BY FORMER FBI DIRECTOR HOOVER, DATED 4/28/65,

RELATIVE TO CONVERSATION WITH THE PRESIDENT CONCERNING

• EFFECT OF ANTI-VIETNAM DEMONSTRATIONS UPON THE CONDUCT

OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY

. AND

LETTER TO MCGEORGE BUNDY, •

* SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR

NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, DATED 4/28/65,

ENCLOSING FBI MEMORANDUM TITLED.

"COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES RELATIVE TO UNITED STATES POLICY ON VIETNAM!"

DATED 4/28/65

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 229

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Ropty, Ploani Refer to

File No.

ICHORANDOL FOR 142. TOLSON

MAR. DE LOACE

ME. ROSEN

This zerolog I Stended the smacring-is cásumonies at tse Wilto

Houso of Láminal Facada 2=6

2.22.

of the Coatral Intolligesco Agenty: Following to encariag-la corozosics,

tho Presideni saised ze to doo dia do bio patrato outes dad to converced sucti

zaricus zacátess.

un The President indeszcú so that to was quite concenaed cyce the anti-

Viotnam Situation Mat nso devolored in to sountry and ho appreciated

pardonasty deo atomini loci wa best lira yastesany centuralay clappings 1201a

co leo coltimainão so toro mas 50 doco an Sis ziri Sui Lat Chay Dazo Solla:

the distayicacos tent have ciraady occuracd. 30 coi so due just received inca

holAganna Agoney stated Just dota indolligence Showed duct

the Chisd56 and Nestis Vidzasseso beilsto dad by taspssLying do agitation 1

this county, panicalcaly ca do sollago comgur corsia, 1a moula so coziace

and divide iie i

Bank: Viewas noald havo to be

Vietrameso to zora in di caco, ass, tontlose, d sac the secommerdation

of tho Conleai Strolliganco Agency tant the bombing di Cicada Vietraza se

intenalitoà corestag practiocily dia cairo aron thorato at tho procent tiano

It is lisatiod to cololy miltony pasus, sonds, aná balágus to provant cho dazia

portation cá cupatios to do gussailos di Nerda Vistenna apprating is Scuti

matter ovar ao ho aná jaci seccarad tas lettes an ho would tal: wil: dacaotary

of State Jual: cod Sacrotesy ci Bolonse Richicaca, bride,

ase President, TE

dicterbed Sooneso to balioved tied 1i cuca Itossilesaloz 02 bonising dol plaço

16 Dostd inevizoy Sino Iio do ciunilos to Calacco and Decodly do Fuasians

1- Milos Zoleos

IN 54933 Docid:32989719 Page 230

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240

April 25, 1953

= iC: Lesore, Tolsos, Baluen, DeLoach, Rose, Selliva

and to mucula dean. 5o 1a dos a juli coutoR morla was. Ee statca this ima

corsettiny ho 15 Cataninod to stold but do was MEnaigs acterzinaá sai to

tiltedraw the tooge inosy Victanai and to conilnue to bombing ca to basis

st has bach cose, batbo, ui corso, intendoá to discully ovaicate tao

rocormondstica có alo Contesi Jatolligoneo Ageady.

5o ciciod is would like

mo to tato prompt aid immodiato atogo du balci c: legst too donature cad tro

Congressman,

cossay ci tho asti-Vision tacugs no that they sight la tur ros caly erio

specches open to deuro di Contrass bit alas prollerg:

"are of the Sonatore

no ci cay congrecamon but loit tast to zy judgenert.

I nicerod tho Presidon: Mant] had jest roscived word tils rernig

botoro comsay to tbo Madio Zeuso triplane badiser mado ison Jiay 8 iu

May 3 to deenammo in 03 citiss of tuis counsry by doo Sundents Scs Dusic-

cratto Eccity, v

Mon 35

ated by communitin eud which ice bean

voras into tha carli sis

Domporale Goulasy maica 3 seold dy to got to Lina by touzorrot, Eno Presidcat

stated so was "es:

€ 2:

ica

md, aitsough bo did not say be

570 leaviny tetay

292 2 2=

chare 20

dat 2 taat prepared imascistoly a zacascaea2uz

Pos Dozesaallo Sccloty.

Wallo realiso wo may ao: 30 ablo to lochsiacliy

plato dian li is cua suuri communist engenization, gestatale go do lenor ene

HO CORI

Acco 1n 1

Zaadi 2a mason te mure ablo to ideally 75 communiaso

from Now Io:

d: Chy so baing in that manch, chas taongh tosse mere bany caesa

sainio and be coalà nud be castain 16 was a

CO

onus casels to wat he with inor cracuy

¡bellovo no chcald itenslig tarcagi aùl iho clola citices to instructor

¿azis Bos Dozocrade Socioty ao dat We wis lavo

¡on do tani Do havo la tho iu ita: talen cos too

ій :

HAVE

04933

Dostd 32989719. Page 231

in die

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April 23, 1035

Monorante fo: LosanG, Dolos, Elisaoli, DaLcach, Rosta, Sullivca

I aico dold tho Insalisat dani to truse propanias, in responso tu

by tho endi of this Wesis or sca

• E ucula pacica te

enert ovosy chiunt so listiamoy get lt do do Frustdo tale mesia co 20 ca

trice it with bine to-to manch 2os age

and to bioppiation in thas cassaore-duz

as you lanca, la to ba so pacpance a

:22 1 022

promibosé cilicialo de tua Miaiaod

3022 SC

¿opidone intendo to coza

•to varicao ences di the couriay is 3.

*: C

Te Vera

alcistica, avani a

preparod in cuci a zamass diat noso will

conerego cuc to a scod, sireag

desconctralisze sabios deva Ccou

colloges aud androssiase dava bas=

over, though they zay sou biavo tais

and ferecó Asa isano duct za Nas Sd

2s thay aio cola ci Obio Sus 522.

P0: 12250

Ici=-ty os tso cargases ca tac

seguies

was they ce loact save Jewca

Sesseroga

colonnin, and

d0 22006-8

120 do Frodicuni to gias Sonocare

in asdor.

I tiould Isso do sacasuo su

contaci, cas a Rapublicas dis cao c

Dedosed wist

• s-acuior

tho Congresciaca warid bo inciadad in do monsonanáun daco 2 hava mondesca

Abovo thei tre ane prepariag zor isa Procidesi due to uso Ci fiso nantinisticzios

spostors turcazioue tho coutiry.

The Presideal, no I indiented, istonaca mo ho mias Leawing for teo

zanch allongh ho did not say winsa, but coi statod, Eneauras il wilde toccerow

os poabibly Satanday. Io indiosiod Lat Iamodirdaly epon lo cedura dro% Abo

manca, io perico do set uo a seguia- concinio 2oo saring luadacea vich zec

vocidy co no cor dicesso varicas armano contienity periore in io Srada

n to comho Oves Cas No S200 22223287

jeazadection eno aico scine ci tas

Very saly yours,

NW 54933. Docld:32989719, Page 232*

---

## Page 233

Belmont

johr

DeLoach

• Sullivan

Aps1] 23, 1965

BY LIAISON

- Liaison

Baungardner

Shaw

• Heinisaut

Honorable licGeorge Dandy

Special Assiatant to the President for

National Socurity Afairs

The White House

Washington, D. C.

ODEMON STAMINS PROTESIDE

Dear HiT. Bundy:

In accordance with your Icquest of Assistant

Diroctor C. D. eüsach of this Durazu O1 April 27, 1065,

thore is chclosed a nonorandun zetting torch intorention

concerning criticim leveled arpinst the United States

Governent's policics in Vietnan by the Comunist Farty, UsA.

Sincerely yours,

REC'D--READING ROOM.

Пра ?8

5 48 PM

Inclosure

105-138315

1 - 100-3-31 (Communist Party, USA, International Pelations)

JI:slj ipdb

(11)

NOTE:

See-cover chorandun I. J. Baungardner to #. C. Sullivan,

dated 4-23-35, captioned "Comunist Activitica Lolative to

United States Folicy on Vietnan, prepared by Julipdb.

=01.

221bh.d2

?: REC•44.

р l.

Podi

ENCLOSURE

101829397,00

_10 BON 17 1965 41121

---

## Page 234

...

"i:

: ....

April 28, 1905

- Hir. Belmont

Hohr

hir. DeLoach

Mr.

• Sullivan

Liaison

Mr. Baungardner

Mr. Shaw

1 - Hr. Kleinkauf

:':.":

'::

COILTIST ACTITITIES RELATIVE TO

UNITED STIRES POLICE CH VISINES

NOTE:

See cover memorandum F. J. Baumgardner to W. C. Sullivan,

dated 4/25/65, captioned "Communist Activities Relative to

United States Policy on Vietnan," prepared by Ji:paò.

Original sent to the Honorable McGeorge Bundy,

Special Assistant to the President or National Security

Affairs, by cover letter dated April 28, 1965.

JK: CDB: pab

(12)

olson .

elmont.

ohr -

-l.oach

allahan

nrail -

15сП

lllvon

vNW-54933 Docld:32989719 Page 234

atta

Wer

gile

---

## Page 235

COMMIST ACTIVITISS LILITIVE TO

URITED STATES FCLICY CH. VI07219

for genes coamunist forces lavo been maring a

relentless nonaganda carnaign in this country atcaci:12?

Unlicd Statos Icroirn policy on Vietnan. Taat Campaiga

has constitued a crescondo of criticisa zined at ucjating

evoly cilot of the taitod Statos to provent Vleinna lron being

ongulied by comunis: mcressors. Featuring roncated demands

that this country recail aid nilitary corsonnot and couinment

fuch Victaca, tho compaiga socks to pave the way 1or that

engulizont.

Danicting the Undeed Statos as an acrossor in

the incornnl sifairo oi othor nations and accusing this

country oi suppressing donocracy thile charting a courso oi

colonialisa in Viotnon, the comunists hava nat with some

success in distosting the real lasuas invoica.

The intensity

of the canpaign has nounted colncidantal nith the cigatoning

of tonsion in Victana and nry be expecied to count still

furthor in lino mich tho unaltorablo

coccimination of tho

communists to achiove choir ends.

kost of the individuals

who have dononsinated against tho Govermont's policy in

Vietnam ave not verters of the Coamunist Party or coonunist

controlled erganizutions.

Tho docisions ot these neople

to dononstrate voro nou initiatod or cubsequently controlled

by cornunists. Hoovar, the Conunist 0rsy, Uch, in line ni5h

its anticinerican Victuan policy bas vigorousiy supported these

groups and excited inluence through prozagnada and by having

its norpois sucicivato in the reconstrasons. The folloring

Inforation is aet inach to roveal many or the facets of this

campaign of the Carurist Farty, USA.

COMMUNIST PIETY. USA

Long critiral of United Statos policy in Vietnan, the

Party stered un its earpaign in September, 2933, when Party

leaders listued Instruetions tant ats nonberchin aust becono more

notivo in the campaign to gui tho united States out of Vlotnau.

Those instructions vere follened by a caries oi circotives to

Inrty districts cutlining astivitics to ho conduciod to achievo

cosmunist cojectives.

Foi earnale, farty districts vere told in

larch, 1904,

that the vietnan altuation nas to bo dealt vich

constantly und tint iulitors aid telonions chonla bo sent to

President joanson uiging indediate withdrawal of United States

forces in Vietnan.

Dirty Arression"

lso insidont witch moved the communiot campaian into

hich goar mas tho accion which soos naco in thu Gull of Tonkin

in cably ingust, 1001.

the Co-aunlst Party, UsA, quickly cane

- to the support of Concunist Wrth Victna aid charactoristically

NW 54033 Docld:32989719 Page 235

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## Page 236

critiolzed Unitod States forcign policy when United States

alresalt attacica solestou tarzets in jorti Vicinan 101101

ing torpoco-boar accroig against arerican desirojers in tha

Gull oi Toniin. Speating at a noeting oi tho Party's

southern Colitozrin Distict of lugust 1, 1S3', Iistrict

Chaizzon Lorothy loaley called this action mainst

North Vieinan "liriy aggrcacion." On the sane date that

acaloy. pas spoaning 1n Calisoraia, Coumunist Party,.

New York 1n mian di condonod che "recaliatory staike"

against loich Vicizan and charged that United states vai

planes kal jacazat coath to innocent ponple. The Party

also clainad tini this action ras an espansion oi the far

1n the darestica of the policy of briniadanes. Ta release

called for all people "to speak out for reace" through

petitioas, lecters and telograns to be sent to Presideat

Jobasea, Sonators and Congressaen urging aerotiation sad

the settlonent of all the irsuas tlicugh the cisting

machinery of the li nover lenera conterence and the good

offices of the Unitod Nations.

..?.

A Merotisted Settlorent

By letter dated azust 19, 1054, and addressed to

pl1 districts, tho Commuatro Party, USA, National Carenization

Department rossisd to ile party's eress rolluse concienning

"nilitazy sotzassion" by the Jaitad Statos against

North Vistan.

The lottor mared that it ras durious that

the cantor ci

espansion oi the wu in southoast Asia remined

high and that this and siniica toreiga tolicy issues vould be

proninent i1 tha clostion campaiga. party rodors were ulgcd,

becauso oi the role oi Unitea Giares incartalica in southensi

Asia, to use ovea croates antictive to ctinuata pressure ior

a nogotiated rattlenont and the convening oi & jsnation con-

ferenco concerning Vietnan.

Bonove Unitod Statos Forses

In Izte August, 1951, Herbart Kranscorf, thei

Dietriot Garantzos for the Party's Testorn peansylvania

Districs, mainiainod at 1 Party neeting in Piüccourgh,

Ponnoylvania, that the corcrment in south Vicinan would

diosolvo 11 it vore not 10s unordean guns and 10noy to

maintain tho var. irensiori said that the sisuation in

tho Congo was sintla to that in Vicinan in thai cio

. o 2 =

NW 54933 Docld:32989719: Page 236

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## Page 237

Untted States comenced uith nilitary advisors and now has

soldiers. and piazes involved in tae war.

Cn Seytember 29,

2934, Cosaict Party, bai, Vica Casirnan lezy Viscion told.

tho Croatc os AngOles Press Clab that tha Lalied States

military forces suould be renovod fron Viccaan.

Ind Var ia Votsan!

At tho enlarged meeting of the Cormoist Party, USa,

Lonalativo ¿lacetor inold dounson ronorios on vicinan. do

ursod tho Comzunist Party, Usi, to stiliza the anny organiza-

tions and "eromanss" vaica, ho claimed, vere riuning pressure

on the unitod Dietos Covernaent do ead the ver in vestnan.

Johnson proponel that tue Party strivo tor a conieranco in

Vasbirsion, D. C., Walch would ropresent the cotalloy of

Amcrican obinion on Viatian and vould attonet to bring about

a change in baitod Staics poiloy in Vietzoi. In tus ConneC

t1on, chason suggestod that the Pardy eropare, by tie end o1

Novenber, 1054, a derisative docurost on Vlstaon and distributo

50,000 coptes of this iosuneat. Dush a cecunent was preparca

and disizibutod to Party districts vith insiructions that 1t

be tivon vide circulation.

Denand for Ponce

During a weeting of leading Comunist Party, USA,

funotionaries in late lovonber, luud, jonsson again siressed

tho roed for the Communich Party, UsA, to first amainst

extension ci ¿ta var ¿y Viei22u.

Le staicd that the cornunist

Party, USA, conia do this with the forces sertion lor peace.

Do suggested iiat a retorasian on the pariy's position ba sent

to 213 distriets.

The bay point in the nozosantun sould be the

demand for peace and an cad to the nar 1a viutean. Johncon

also surrested a poiltion and posicard campaiga against tho

vax 1n Vietnau.

"Koy Test"

Following through on Johnson's surrestiong, the

Conminist Party, idi, intional Cirenization conartneni scat

an avularche oi inscructions to ail party Ulctricts for

activitios destancu to esaieve costunist osjcatives in

Eouth Vicians. In laco ilovenber, J0sd, Passy clsiricis

vere told tuata conand for peace was a licy tolat in the

electios nandato and any Immicmortation o1 that conand calls

for an ond to the war in louch vicenan. Comunist Party, UsA,

district loaucis ticio incircicu do crganico activitics in tho

NW 54933 Dockd: 32989719. Page 237

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## Page 238

trade union novenent, in youth orantrations and in rolirious

organizations until possa is achieved.

The Party diractivo

pointed out that at this timo of year ciurch and ocher organi-

Facions raise tho question of foace on Earth, but the "rey

test" 1s what they say on Vietran.

"Peace on Barth"

The Rational Cranization Departnent Issued another

directive in carly Docenner, 1954, in maich tho corrades tero

the full' use of the "Faace

on Baria" cuoression oi the neonlo curli? the coath oi

Dacenber. Farty dicizicis vere ronuostad to advisa Comunist

Party, ual, zatlosal beacquarters taat ras boury planed and

what was beiby dong by labor, youth, vonen,, churca orrenizations

and "proîescional pasca croanisations" in their areao to nato

the greatcEi Loo

"pance on Barch,, those days wien the world is calling ics

Appeal to Anericals Conscience

ia still other directive Issued in Ierenber, 195k,

the National Carazicazion Leparizano rainod all Tarty districts

that every passiny evont noies it cora artent that all soculons

of the populazion sneak ost'"o end Ile var in south Vietnan."

Party districos nore urned i0 nale special caloris for mass

activities asd emrassions oi peace curanz tho neekond or

Decemper 10 una 2u, 1034.

Tals Party siroccire called attortion

to an enclored lorilos mica urged the zeader to "join in an

appeal to the consciarca di America to end the war in Vietran."

Mires to the mite tonse

On February 7, 1035, Loaders Of the Illlnois Communist

Party not in a closad door conference in Chicago, Illinois.

The prossodinys tere intcrusted by news chat inerican vianes

had lacnoned a "anon attaci" upca milivery 135allations 1n

Haith Vloenen.

Blani telegram l'orms wore ingeaintely abiained

and caca corrado vas oriered to urite and sign an incividuai

vire condenniry the Anerican azI strikes.

inese vireg were

thon sont to tresident johncon at the inito ilouso.

Reaction of Party Leaders

The renction of Cormunist Party lcaders on Iobruary 7,

1965, mas predictable. Tithin rinates aiter the arnouncononi

of the Auericon air scribes, the Party's Public Sulations Director,

Arnold Johnson, issued a press roicaso condonning tho air strikes

-

NW 54933 Docld:3298971,9: Page 238

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## Page 239

as "on ast of brutal areression which horrilles the world. "

Johnson urned the iroriera people is sncal out in condernation

Of United sintos incrinlica end to demand the vichdrawal ai

Al1 GIs Irca South Vietaia.

support for Loconstratios

1150 13 Icbruary, 1955, Party districts vere Instructed

to tate immediato stens to constate nith all sacional peaco.

organizaticas in rerard to activitios involvin, nicket lines,

capira, 27d s-212ch1a410n di protesi sizionanis ad vicera

nade by trade-union leaders. In this caus voan, sho Farcy

na march, tuo, cincine, calca la tuenticad cultore ai

a Brucent larch on Vashintion sáca an sanosaconcht nas nade

that such pas to taia place the jollowing nonti.

Party Speakers Active

Both Cozzinist Party leaders and the zani-and file

genbers have participated in demonstritiong or ocher activities

to caray out the communist party dircotives.

Claude Lightloot,

•a sember o tho Comunist Fazty, val, laticanl Connitice, haiu

& pross contarence ia lion tori cisy on Tebruary 12, 1005.

Lightloot, tho cad racontly raturecd fr0a a tris to Asia,

Africa and sarone, suated that everythere he vent the people,

who had previonaly trocht America las on ina side of the

oppressed peonle, urs trougat trat incrica's poiicy had changed

to tiere incrica

tas bachiag oppressive reginas such as in

South Vietna.

#Mar of Denonulation"

On Lerch 25, 1955, Comunist Party losder Gus liall

addressad an zudionce

of 800 on the occasion of tha forty first

anniversary of "tho forker," an east coast cercaist newenages

wich ras hole at lom lali, las test 43rd cercat, New York City.

varing his audross, lall ronariad tant inited strios "nocrialim"

stanas naned and coavicted as the invader, the carressor and the

although Fresicion "shnsonly pross secretaly conied that the

procident ad enonlecte of the use os poison ras, it was boing

used wion the Presiaeat visited Vloèna7, sono yoars ato.

conclating ronaris, dall decisred that the corconsibility for

the policy in Vicinan tust rest on tresident toincon, sinco che

Unitod Statos is conducting an unproccuented var oi dopopulation.

cons

#-NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 239

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## Page 240

on tho Cranus

soother Communist Irsty, USA,

curing a coronetration

nt tho bantercity of Celiacala, Serialer, Cal-ornia, Anchoker

12 V7onan 13 so Circei rosult O1 Chitsd Dietes 1r+crvcrtlon

and man tha 851002 tiatone fault. Ca reca&s, dusd, Neidio

encourered tica to maico the preciucat and thair conacors

Coxo321e3 dol incarnation ai baibod Statas Boliuy and aaking

Valdeú sentes Vicinon colicy by soating chat this corcoacut

van unlig tho fir u5 a Cuuding greund dor 1SW N9z9005; Was

elocat the Vlochero DeODla asu Vlotzan's Loncuicos; and

anthoker again spojo at a "roach-in" maich was boid at

Cloy Collogo di len lori, lion Lori City, Ca ioril 13 and 11,

1055, to cobato tha cruse di cucida du Viornen. Doioro a

croad taich vesied iron io0 to cou, he sovercy criticized

the Unjied statos pusition. He received a scasaiig ovation

March on hashir ton

Tac pirazad Studont larch on lashlinton was hold-

on horil 17.

1005. and represents the lanese stailo ¿cion.

sization belá to jata to sasiase Unised undog reston in

Victana, with an earnaced 15,0o0 participaos. 4lo due March

vas not comnist insulated, conizated or concodled, Communist

Party meaners dica cucagaoat te nacica pascisinaiod tn this

colonstration.

George loyere, a maper of sho intional Inocutivo Committea or

the Comunisi Party, Ull, disoribacod conlos di "jo locker"

durian cho Lasca.

necting hold Anail 13 Seroui Lardl 25, 1035, Lu3 7911,

Concral Lacrosany of tao Camnist Fairy, Jing 297020ed that

the Cornist Farty and individual camaicis carcicinated in

tho lanca oa larintion and cossaand the lanca as 29 "unicrgettablo

event." Lazareil suaied as this seetiny taci "ro" plajod a

docisivo rolo in the larch and anoid johnson ronorsed that

"our" people more there lich all ovoi tho country.

-

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 240

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"71x1]" at 10J Ranch

In confunction with the Student larch on Vashierton,

an "Eastor Viril" vas organized to be seid at tra lay lanch

In Joinson Clay, Taras, ovor Laster Meciend. At a Cercunist

Party Lootia? 11 das antoio, Iczas, paIda to iso vigil, a

1002l Corrunist Farin leavor ennizzized the innortance oi

this action and unmod Cosmunist Farty nonsers in attendance

to got poonie to jora che vigil. duprominaroiy ds individuals

particisared in inis vigil, masch tock piace co doril 17

throath 10, 1535. Incladed anony the participants were

individuals too have been identirica as pasi or present merbers

of tho Casuaist Faraj.

Role or the BaIty Ewess

Distribution of nice Worker" curing tho larch en

Mashington 11lusirasos to a dorice the criensive use. the.

Party has rada of lis properanda media in cha alaborate

canpaiza arairst laited States polisy in Victron. se

estrcaoly arcisa role the jarty has niayed in the canpaign -

is evidenced by the preat count oi sace all Zarty rublica

tions, such as "Ta logier," bave coroad to the varicus protest

demonstrations critical ci this Nation's policy oa the Victnon

situation. For tonino, artialos davo apocarod 1n victually

every inade of "Tea locker" attachauy laised Siates polley,

focusing attention on inoastrations rciated is protests

against that polizy and icabazza, peess reloases of the

Party dozanding an end to "ibo policy of brinimanship."

Youth Groan Actlity

-

The N. I. B. DuBois Clubs of Anerica, a Haxxist-

oricated youth organination which mas dormad in Jaze, 1904,

as a result of a mandate by the l'onunisi

Party, USA, has

follored the conunist party line callis, zor nichdrawal of

United States troops iraa Viathan since zis laception.

Local

chapters di this orrenastica have participated in denonstra-

tlons protestisy laited stados socion in Vicinan in rajor

citles thrcurscut the united States. In March, 1005, a

diroctive captioned "Inerreacy iono On Viet ina Cr1a13" mas

Issued by tso intional Cirice ci the Intois Cli's hich

euphasised tho copostunity presenied by the current Vletnan

cries to nobilizo unssive support and urged ail Culots Clubs

chapters, neers and trionus to join mith ochor ricups and

Indivicials in a stopped-up carpaign to end the war in Vlotnam.

-

• 700

NW 54933 Docid: 32989719 Page 241

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Han1n7 for tho Future

as recchtly as the meol di april zu, 1905, party

leaders callca dio tur In Viatzan ono oi "J.

3. saporialist

angression" ard called on each Iazty district to enzare 15

united iront tectics nita "loft" political action croups in

an clicet to ora the mar. pleased with tha rarciion iren the

March on Laciettan on anil 17, 1005, broteatir? tho #ar in

Vietza, tho verminist Furty, USA, mente asodeor sach

denonstratics, possibly around lenorial Day lucy 30, 1965),

ot by ino oná os tha scuoal ycar.

They mant to caphasize

Untüed ciatos ultharanal Eron Vietnan cicher boloro or nitor.

negotiaiicna. Te farty tolla like to bave a racional peace

the near inture to illustrate this policy.

- 8-

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 242

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## Page 244

Q. MEMORANDUM OF FORMER ATTORNEY GENERAL RAMSEY CLARK, DATED 9/14/67

CONCERNING INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATION RELATING TO URBAN RIOT ACTIVITY

- ÷

•••••

-..-i

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 244

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## Page 245

Office of the Attorney Erneral

Mashington, I. C.

September 14, 196°

2

Dir. Tulara

Mr. Duluadi

MIr. Monr

Mr. Bishop

MIr. Casper

Mr. Callatar-

Mr. Corrau

Mr. Felt-

DIr. Gale

DIa. Sullivan

SIr. Tavel

MI. Trutiar

Tela, 100m

Miss Holmes

Miss Gand';

lickle.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEECTOR, FEDERAT

BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Although the bulk of criminal offenses occursing

In the course of recent riots have been local rather

than federal in nature, the question as to whether

there was an organization vian (a) had made advanced

plans for, and (b) was active during any of the

riots

in the summer of

1967 is one that cannot airays be

readily resolved by locai authoritias.

In view of the

seriousness of the riot actirity across the coundry:

It is most important that you use the maximum available

resourdes, investigative and intelligence, to collect

and report all facus bearing upon the question as to

whether there has been or is a scheme or conspiracy by

any aroud of natever size, effectiveness or affiliation,

plan, promote of aggravate riot activity..

In this connection the following federal statutes.

could be applicable depending. of course, upon the lastlai

situation that develoys:

Title 18, USC, Section 2333, which proserites

the inciting or engaging in any reballion or

Insurrection against the authority of the

Unitad States.

Title 18, USC, Section 2334, which proscribes

conspiring to overthrow or

•to dastroy by force

the Government of the united States or to

oppose by force the authority thereor or by

force to prevent, hinder or delay the execution

.of any law of the United Stages.

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 245

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2

Tover are a 56

Title 10, Use, section 2305, which proscribes,

inter alia, advocacy of o'erthrowing the

Government of the United states or the Govern-

ment of any state, territory, District or .

possession thereor, or the Government of any

political subalvision therein oy Iorce or

violence.

4.

Activities Affecting Armed Forces, 18 USC 2388

Selective Service, 50 USC (App.) 462

le Travel and Interstate transportation,

18 USC 1952

(Arson)

18 USC 831-33 (Explosive)

Assault and Killing of Federal Officers and

Employees, 18 USC 111, 114 and 2231

8.

Destruction of Government Property; 18 USC 1361 et al

Federal Firearms Act, 15 USC 901-909

Crimes on Federal Reservations, 18 USC 13, 81 et al.

I appreciate that the Bureau has constantly been•

alert to this proolen and is currently submitting

intelli-

gence reports to us about riots and about the activity of

certain groups and individuals before, during and arter

a riot.

Indesa, the president has said both publicly and

privately that the FBI is conducting extensive and comprehen

sive investigations of these matters.

There persists, however, a widespread beller that

there is more organized activity in the riots than we

presently know about.

: We must recognize, I bélieve, that

this is a relatively new area of investigation and intelli-

gence reporting for the FBI and the Department of Justice.

We have not heretofore had to deal with the possibility

of an organized pattern of violence, constituting a

violation of federal law, by a group of persons who make

the urban ghetto their base.of operation and whose

activities may not nave been regularly monitored by.

existing intelligence sources.

In these circumstances, we must be certain that

every attemot is being mede to get all information

bearing upon these problems; to take every step possiole

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 246*

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## Page 247

to determine whether the rioting is pre-planned or

organized: and, if so, to deternine the identity of

the people and interests involved; and to deter this

activity by prompt and vigorous legal action.

As a part of the broad investigation which must

necessarily be conducted, it is requested that

all

available information be reported and analyzed

regard-

i-Ing each sniger caught in any riot or extremist

activity and regarding those arrested during the course

of a riot or significant racial disturbances who were

not, residents or the general area:: Moreover, sources

or informants in black nationalist orgenizations, SNCC

and other less publicized groups should be developed

and expanded to deternine the size and purpose of these

to determine due whereabouts o gersons ho might be

Involvea in instigating riot actirity in violation oi

Federat

Further, we need. to Investigate fully

allegations of conspiratorial activity thai come to our

attention from outside sources such as those reported

regarding Newark in Life Magazine for July 23, 1967,

and those regarding the Detroit riot which were furnished

to the Depariment by walter Sheridan of the Mational

Broadcasting Company (surmary of latter is attached).

Ramsey

@ain

RAMSEY CLARK

Attorney General

NW 549334 Docld:329897.19 • Page 247

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R. DEPARTMENTAL MEMORANDUM, DATED 2/18/69,

CONTAINING INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE CONDUCT OF

INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATION CONCERNING CAMPUS DISORDERS

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Then 171-19°

I8d. 4-d1т

UNITED STATES GOVI

•MENT

Memorandam

JEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

т9

TO.

Director

Federal Bureau of, Investigation

DATE: February 18, 1969

1.OM1

J. Walter Yeagley

Assistant Attorney General

Internal Sccurity Division

SUBJECT

IllegaLand/or Violent Campus Disorders

Students_ for a Democratic Society-

Seditious Conspiracy: Smith Act; Inciting to

Riot:!

li

1: 0$ 220: 6200

In an attempt to dotermine whether there is any under-

lying subversive group giving illegal directions or guidance

to the numerous campus disordcis throughout the country, it

is requested that you endeavor to obtain information regarding

the following:

Individuals who have been active in inciting

campus disorders who are not stugents at the

college or university, involved, particularly those

whose activities resulted in violence or the

violation of laus or in arrests.

It is requested

that inquiries at the colleges be made of college

officials only.

Individuals ino have traveled to other schools?

to participate in studunt disorders.

It is re-

(R MUS

quested that such infonnation be solicited only

from collar alicials and fron Bureau and Police

Depariment recoras and sources: /6ú: 170y

Plans, programs and tactics noishneriousn

reported, for the conduct of violent oi

illegal

campus disorders. It is requestedonat stan infor-

mation be solicited only from Bureau ana Policea

Department informants and sauces.

College

officials might be asked if they have seen any

menaishes

printed material concorning such activities'.

Berrie

JiB APR 25 1959

1 2 1014831 1 5001

109n

NW 54933) Docld:32989719 Page 249•

Depos

3/4/62

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## Page 250

2

Information showing a movement of

information, reports or airectives batween

organizations,

or branches cf. the same

.......... . ..

organization, at various campuses wherc

violent or illegal disorders have taken place.

It is requested that such information be

obtained from Bureau and Police Department

informants and sources.

College officials

might be asked if they have seen any such

printed material.

...

Information as to the source of funds

for bail or payment of fines where any large

number of demonstrators have been arrested.

It is requested that such information be

sought only fron bank officials, court officials

or from bureau sources.

Information not previously reported indi-

cating a movement of fúnds between organizations

from one campus area to another to support or

maintain sit-ins where college buildings have

been

taken over or occupied without authority.

It is requested that such information be obtained

from Bureau and Police Department informants and

sources only.

Individuals identified by fingerprints or

otherwise who have been arrested at demonstrations

at more than one campus. It is sequested that

such information be obtained from Bureau or Police

Department records only.

It is appreciated that a great deal of information has

already been furnished regarding campus demonstrations.

The

foregoing is only submitted as suggested areas of particular

interest for future investigative efforts.

•.;

!.:

NỤ 54933 Döcld:32989719 Päge 250

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## Page 251

S. EXCERPTS FROM TESTIMONY; FORMER DIRECTOR HOOVER;

1) EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS BILL, 1940

2) JUSTICE DEPARTAENT APPROPRIATIONS BILL, 1941

3) FIRST DEFICIENCY APPROPRIATION BILL, 1941

4) SUPPLEMENTAL NATIONAL DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS BILL, 1941

5) 1951 APPROPRIATIONS ESTINATES FOR THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

6) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION APPROPRIATIONS, 1973

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 251

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302

EMERGENOY SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATION BILI, 1910.

THURSDAS, NOvEMBER 30, 1939.

DEPARTENT OF JUSTICE

•.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

STATEMENT OF J. EDGAR HOOVER, DIRECTOR

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ESERGENCE STIPLENESTAL AIINKLATION BILI, 1910 303

The regular appropriation for this gear is $7, 300,000, und if the

supplemental estimate of $1.475,000 is granted the total appropriation

for this fiscal jear wiil be 28,775,000.

Before I take up the individual items, the phrasedlegy submitteel

for this item by the Bureau of the Budget reads as follow's:

Salaries and experies, defection and prosecution of crimes: for an erditional

amount for salaries and expenses, federal Burean of lucratuation, fiscal year

1940, including the sume objects and under the same conditions specitied under

this head in the Monariment of Justice angropriation det, 1940, 81.410.000, of

shich amount not to exceed $i00.000 may be exponded for veronal certires a

the District of Columbia: 575.000 fur the purchase aud exchange of motor prop lie

parenger-carrying vehicles: and 5100,000 to meet unforeseen emergencies at a

confidential charscter (o L. S. C. 340: 53 Stat. 497, 895), 81,175,000.

You will notice that this phraseology contains three limitations.

First, for personal services at the seat of government an increase of

$100,000 15 allowed.

Our present appropriation allows un amount of $1.872.480 avilable

for personal services at the seat of government, and

this proposed

supplemental appropriation will increase that amount to $1.972.480.

The proposed ohmscolory in this supplemental estimate allows an

amount of $75,000 for the purchuse and exchange of motor-propelled

passenger carrig volcles. The oriumal appropnation for the hecal

veer bernis the nurchase of such vetudies un the amount of $50.000.

If the supplemental appropriation for this item is allowed. the limita-

110n for 1lio

fiscal year me purchase and exchange of automobiles for the present

The supplemental estimate phraseology also includes an estimate of

$100,000 for the confidential fund, in addition to the amount allowed

for 1940 of £20.000. making a total amount of $120,000 arnilable for

the confidential fund.

At tife present time there are 41 agents and 1.011 clerks assigned to

duties at the sent of government.

The supplemental estimute provides

for an additional $100.000 which would allor us to incense the senti

at the seat of government by o agents and s clerks, making a total

The additional personnel requested would be divided as follows:

One Assistant Director. CAl 14, 86.500: 4 supervisors, C'AP 11,

at $3,800 euch; 8 stenographers, CAF 4, at 81,500 each, and 75 clerks,

CAF 2, at $1,410 euch.

NUMBER AND SOURCE OF COMPLAINTS OF ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE, ETC.,

RECEIVED BY FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

As a justification for this incrense I would like to point out that in

the fiscal year 1935 we recoired 250 complaints. involving mutters

pertaining to the national defense which includes siolations of the

espionage, sabotare, and rotted national defense statutes.

Mr. C'aNNo%. There came from private individuals?

individuns but alo from loodl law enforcement mercies.

Or. Hoovel. The complants were recited not ouly from During

the seal tear 1931 which chard dome 30, 1939, 1e coraleel a total of

1651 such enplaints.

Mr. SiDeR. from Washington, I). C.?

100118-30

_ 20

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 253

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304 EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1810

Mr. Hoover. From the entire .country. At the present time we

are receiving

214 coinpiaints necessitating investigntive attention

daily. If that average continues we will receive a total Of «pprox-

mately 78.000 complaints for the vear.

This comparison is indicative

of the incrense in tho volume of this work. If conditions become more

acute abroad, such complaints will increase materiaily.

Mr. LAMBERTSON. They are going over the heads of the local polico

officers?

Mr. Hoover. That is impossible to determine without first investi-

I do know that the complaints

not to violationg of local statutrs.

Mr. LudLow. About what percentago are you able to dispose of as

being preposterous on their face?

Mr. Hoover. Not any of these 211 are of that character.

Because

of the source, many complaints, cun be disposed of without making

any extensive investigation.

Mr. LuDLow. What is your experience as to the percentage of the

complaints that have not any substance!

Mir. Hoover. A comparatively small percentage of them. For

instance we recently rerpired complaints of sabotage against certain

large liners.

Several siich

compinints hure been given to my in

reference to those shins.

They came from sources considered reliable.

Steps had to be taken promptly to make certain that proper protection

is accorded to them.

Mr. LuDLow. You cannot take anv chances?

Mrs Hoover. No; we cannot.

This is also true with reference to

the protection of our national defenses.

There has been an increase in such complaints from 250 in the

fiscal year 1938 to 1,051 in the fiscal year 1939, and for the present

year, the total number will be about 78,000.

PURPOSE AND TVORK OF GENERAL INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

In September of 1939 we found it necessary to organize a General

Intelligence Division in Washington.

The

establishment of this

division was made necessary by the President's prociamation directing

that all complaints of violations of the national deierise statutes and

proclamations be reported to the lederal Burom of Investivation.

This division now hus compiled extensive indices of individuris.

groups, and orgunizations enguged in these subversive artivities, in

espionage activities, or any activities

thit are possibiy detrimental

to the internal security of the United Stales.

The indexes have been arranged not only alphabetically but also

geographically, so that at any time, should we enter into the contlict

abroad, ve mould be able to go into any of these communities and

identify individuals or groups who micht be a sourer of grave rianter

to the security of this country.

Their backgrounds ard

actisities

are known to the Bureau.

These indexes will be extremely important

and valuable in crave emergenes.

As a result of the present dilliculty abroad the mail at the seat of

Government hus increased tremendously.

About 10.000 commini-

cations are being received each month irom perions and organizations

ofering their services or secking positions, as well as the many com-

NW. 54933 Dockd:32989719

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EMERGENCY SCYPLENENTAL APPROPRIATION BILL. 1940 305 .

plainte of violations of the nationul-defense statutes. This corre-

spondenee in the majority of instances must be answered.

It has been necessary to establish a translation scotion within the

General Intelligence Division whose junction it is to review various

foreign-langunge material recrived und secured by the Bureau.

A code section also hus

been established within the General

Intelligence Division for the purpose of decoding any inessages which

we are able to intercept or obtain.

Since September of this year it hus been necessary to maintain a

29-hour-i-diny shift at the seat of Government.

PLANT PROTECTION PROGRAM OF F. B. I.

Another phase of the general intelligence work which will place an

additional burden on our force, is that of plant protection.

arrangements between Government diepartments, the Alilitary Intel-

ligence and Naval Intelligence

• turned over to the

Bureau of Investigation the handling of ail plant protection incusures,

in addition to the investigation of espionage and other activities.

Many factories in this country are manulacturing products for the

Anur and the dare under (invernment contract.

Mary Departments lure compiled a priority list of 1i30 plants which

they have requested the t

purpose of determining whether the proper plant protection incilities

are ariulable.

There are 12,000 additional plants that would come under the plant

protection piogram in the erent of war between this country und 8

foreign countiy.

Mr. Lidiot. Plants in the first group ore already producing, are

they not?

Mr. Hoover. Yes; they are already producing, both for the Army

and the Yasy. In many instances it has been found that adequato

plant-protection mensures have not been taken heretofore in these

plants.

To cite one instance, in one of the great airplane factories on the

west coust. a very impostant plant. plans for one of the Army bombers

were stolen.

We were successful in locating the man who stolo them

and in having the plans returnel.

The procedure under which those plans were given out each day

was indicative of the lack of a proper protection program in that fac-

tory. In the morning the draftsmen would secure plans from the loré-

man. No inqury was made as to their issuance and no recor was kept

of the plans given out.

There wore no chocks as to who had the plans

or where they were.

That is one step we have taken for plant pro-

We have taken steps to have that sort of thing corected.

Tnder nur plant-protection program we have included the securing

of proper fire-fighting equipment, as well as an eilicient and adequate

gunrd service.

It is not the intention of the Gorernment to police any of those

factories.

We have lnd our agents in the field divisions call in for conferenco,

the heads of the corporations listed on the priority list, and we havo

outlined to them the things they should do to insure protection for

NV-34933-docld:32969719- Page 255

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## Page 256

306 EMERGENCE SCLITENPNTAL APPROPRIATION BILI,, 1240

the production of their particulur articles or products that they are

manufacturing nudes demy and fary contracts.

Mr. CarsoN. Your service has been limited do casunl conferences?

Mr. Hooven.

Yes; but nitimately ir will be a matter of inspection.

Our function will be to survey the piant to see that the necessary pro-

tertive steps have been taken, or to seo that the pint does install

necessary provisions to protect the plant aguins sabotage or destruc-

tinn.

Mir. Ludlot. Do you get cooperation from the factories them-

selves?

Mr. Hoover, Les; we have been getting excellent cooperation

from muny of the factories in the country.

They welcome the sug-

gestions they have receited from us.

We hure compiled a manual of plant protection, the first munual

of its kind ever prepared in this country.

He sought the adrice of

the Bureau of Standards and army and tavy officials in the prey-

aration of this manual, so that we may in turn be thoroughly cquipped

to follow thus program through with a miunum delay and maximum

Mr. LINeseRtsoN. I thought thee plants all lnd efficiency veople.

or had a hook-mp with a national burean whose representatives risited

them frommontle nd told them how to do those things.

Mr. Hoorer. Only to a certain degree, in connection with the nut-

der of fire protection, but not seninst sabotage or destruction.

1 have been very much surprised at the absolute lack of protective.

measures in many of out great industrial piants. some of the great

plants in the country have unhved practically no measures aguinst

sabotage or destruction di property.

Mr. AlinLon. Do they not carry any insurance?

Mr. Hoover. Ther do not carry insuree agninst sabotage; ther

do carry insurance nguinst fire.

The underuriters give them certain

advice along that line.

He hanse found in many of these plants tire

harrels that luve not been tilled for months, and in some instances,

in the northern part of the country. where the water in these barrels

Cortain chemicals can be placed in those hurrels

to keep the water from freezing, and we have given them the benefit

of this knowlerge.

AMOUNT, SOCKCE. IND USE OF FUNDS OBLIGATED FOR THESE PURPOSES

TO DATE

Air. Tansen. How nuch of this money has alrendy been spent?

Ur. Hoover. I would say, Congressman, there lus already been.

obligated $022.110.

Ur. Touck. And by what authority?

Mr. Hoosen. By authority of the President's proclamation direct-

ing the Attorney General to nuthorize an increase in the statl of the

reeleral Burean of Inserton by lad special ngomes and such

Molelitional coral me me campment as would he mercert.

Me. Touck. That is in the record.

r. Housell. lassined that it was. The obliention was made

after the President's penelmation was issued

Mr. Tones. Les me not you moothes question: Will any of this

may be spent for mood the purposes for which funds were denied at

the last seralen

NW-54933-Docld:32989719 Page 256

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ESTEIGENCS SUPPLESENTAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1910 307

Mr. HooveR. It will not.

This entire sun will be spent for intelli-

gence work which has been initiated dunng this year

with operations for which funds wefe denied last fear.

MIr. HoovEr. lo.

MIr. Saidek. Mr. Hoover. in other monds. you have just pulled

some of thut money ont of tho 12-month appropriation.

Mr. Hoover. What has been authorizai. Congrestiny, was that

the monthly quota was paired and we were alaired to spend over

the monthly quota, of course. reiving ou the delicit to be met by &

supplemental appropriation.

ITo have done that, of course, under

the President's orders.

Mr. Houdhra. Mail there additional people be kept on through

the next fiscal rear?

dr. Hoover. lf the emergency continues.

MIr. Woodka. It the emergency does not continue you anticipate

the force will he reducel?

Mr HooveR. Yes.

For instance, we have opened 10 new field

oinces to conduct this work in various parts of the country.

Ne.

opened nunther office at sarannah, one in Baltimore, one at allang,

in manufacturug and shipping contore as well as puts wherem huge

naral basps are maintained.

Mr. Woopkin. and it the emergency ceases the need for the

additional forre will roase?

Mr. HooveR. Ies.

fir. Lodeon. In the field the agent is the unit?

Mr. HoovEr.

Tes. Of course, we have the field investigators.

Mr. LUDLOT.

How many agents hare you, all told?

Mr. HooveR.

Under the regular appropriation 797 field agents are

authorized.

MIr. LuDlon. And how many are involved in this recommendation?

Mr. Hoover. One hundred and fifty more.

Mr. Lodiot. Making a toil of how many?

Mr. Hoover. There will be 947 in nil.

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 257

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110)

TESTIMONY OF THE DIRECTOR BEFORE THE

HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFPROPRIATIONS

REGARDING THE REGULAR 1941 AND NATION-

AL DEFENSE AFPROPRIATION ESTIMATES OF

THE FBI

FRIDAY, JANTARY D, 1916.

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 258

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## Page 259

NATIONAL-DEFENgE WORK

ii!:

SALARIOS AND EXPENETH •

Mr. McANdRews. We will continue our consideration, of the items

for the Federal Bureau of Investigation this morning, and I will sk

Mr. Rabaut to proceed.

Mr. Passer. For the Goral year 1941 vou hare an estimate of

$2,188,000 for sularies and expenses. desection and prosecution si

crimes. I notice that there is before the deficiency subcommittee alre

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150

JUSTICE DEPARTHENT APPROPRIATION BILL, 1041

& supplemental estimate of $1,475,000 for the same purpose. Will

you tell us about that?

Bar. Hoover i will submit for the information of the committee &

statement showing & comparison of the amounts which have been

approved by the Budet Bureau for the national-defense work for

the fiscal years 1910 and 19t1.

As Mr. Rabaut has indicated, ire asked ior an amount of $1,475,000

for the balance of the tiscal year 1910, on the basis of 8 months'

operation.

For the nest fiscal year we are requesting an appropriation for

national-defense matters in the amount of $2.488.000..

This tabulation reilecis a coruparison of personal services at thie

seat of government and in the fieid, and various other expenses inci-

dent to this work.

(The statement above referred to is as follows:)

Comparison of the amounts auproved bu the Budget Bureau for national defense

for Tocal years 1940 and 1941

1010 sap-

plemeninl

estinsto

approred

by Budget

Burtau

(8-montà

basis)

1941 estl-

mote sp

prooed by

Buriger

Burcau

(annual

basis)

1911 in-

сточл

OFer 1941)

Personal seritoes, departmental..

Emplosses:

Д20, 733

$213, 000

(x3)

(11)

(138)

$145. 257

(6)

(53)

Tolel emplosees

Personal settims, field.

Employnes:

хеді.

krks

(88)

(117)

(50)

8431,600

$1.057.000

SURE 100

(150)

(8)

(259))

(100)

(61)

Tocal employme

Total personal sersices..

Tolsi emplojpes:

LErDES....

C'krks

(213)

(104)

(161)

£528.333 | 81.3002, 000

$771,687

(153)

(176)

(281)

(290)|

(100)

(114)

Total.

(331)

(551)

(220)

Otberexpenses:

Supples and materials.

Blorage of vehicles..

Communication serricos.

Travel exjenses....

185, 302

5, 800

50,

000

140.

310,000

13, 000

100, 020

121, 198

9, 400

30.0010

10u, auJ

¡ransportation of thines.

Heat, lirbs, and power

Rentals...

Repairs and alternttons..

special and miielladeous

Confdential fund.

Equipment.

* 100.000

322. 565

8888

100.000

240.000

1, 000

10, 000

5, 000

Totel, olber expenses.

848, 687.

1.189, 000

-8X, 585

811,333

Totel, all expeases.

1, 475,000

3.8KX, 000

. 1.013.0010

timerzones lund.

Orand sucal of estimatos, 1410..

1.175,000: 2..799,000

1. 013, 000/

Then t

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JUSTICE DFPARTVENT AYPROPRIATION BILI, 1811

151

MENACE DE LEPARTVENTAL AND FIELD ESPLOYEES RELUFATED IS BIPPIEMKATAI.

DITIMATE FOR 1!A1 AND IT ESTIMITE FOR 1911

fr. Hover. It will be noted that the supplemental appropriation of

$1,475,000 provides for 83 additional clerks at the sent of goverment.

and 5 agents. and 93 additional clerical employees and 150 agents in the

field, making tot of 248 employees in the field, with a total of 155

agents and 176 clerks. or a total of 3u1 employees in both the field unl

at the seat of government.

For 1911 we are asking for $2,488.000, which will be divided as

follows: 147 employees at the seat of government. including 11 agents

and 136 clerks: 15t clerical empioyees in the field, and 250 agents in

the field, making a total of ut employees in the field.

of right call to the attention of the commite the origin of this type

The President in September 1930 issued a formal statement, which

be coord need lad to the mit to the crea of desting ch a ere.

be coordinated

matters of intestigative work relating to espionage, sabotage, and vio-

lations of the neutrality regulations, and any other subversive

actinities.

(The statement abore referied to is as follows:)

The following formal statement was today issued by the Preyident of the

United States:

"The Attorney General has been requester by me to instruct the Feloral Rureau

of Intestigation of the Department of Justice to take curse of invesrigntire work

in matters reletive to espionage, sabotage.

aall siolations ot the neutrality

• regulations.

This task must be conducted in a minprehensive and entertive manner nu a

national basis, and all incorntion must be cartially siftel out and correlated in

order to arold coufusion and irresponsibility.

*To this end I request ail police oficers, sherins, and all other lat enforcement

offleers in the Unitel States promptly to turn over to the nearest represeutatire

of the Federal Burenu of Invatication auy information obtained by them relatios

to emplouage, counterespionage, canorage, subversive netiritin, nud violations of

the neutrallty hims."

Mr. Hoover. Under this authority the coordination was pinceeded

with, so that today the Federal Bureau of Investigation has primary

jurisdiction in the investigation of the violations of these laws anc

regulations.

LIXITATIOT ON PERSONNEL. DISTRICT OT COLUMBIA

"In the phraseology of the national-defense uppropriation item for

1941 thera is a limitation ou the appropriation for the seut of govern-

ment of $245.000.

That is to empioy addational personnel. to be cli-

rided as follores: 1 Assistant Director at 40,500; 10 special agents ar

$3,800; 11 stonegraphers, grade C.lF-4, at $1.800; and 125 clerks.

grade CAF-2, at $1.10, muking a total increase at the sent of govern-

ment of 147 employees.

LINITATTOS OX PURCHASE OF ALTOMORILEY

There is also & limitation on the purchase of new curs of $75,000,

providing for the purchase of 100 cars, which will he utilized loy the

additional personnel.

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152

JUSTICE DEPARTUENT APROPRIATION BITI, 1041

CONFIDENTIAL FUND

In that iten. there is also a provision for a confidential fund of

$100,000, to he used for expenditures in connection with confidentini

inatters.

OINERAL INTELLIGNTE ACTIVITIES

I would like to mant out the volume of work in connection with

national-defense matters, or what we ell general intelligence activities.

During the fscal year 1.38 the Bureau receired a total of 250 mat-

ters in that 1 year.

In 1939 this had increased to 1,651 marter.

For

the current year te will probably have a total at the rate ut which.

we are now going, of 78.000 complaints under this classification. We

are receiving complaints at the present time at the rate of 2lt new

matters a day. as compared with 250 matters for the whole year 1938.

I frould also like to point out the congestion that has arisen as the

result of this increase in work, showing the reason why I am asking

for an additional appropriation.

The Bureau has pending on its dockets 21.916 investigative matters.

of which 7,118 are unassigner. making a total of 3t percent of the

matters unassigned.

RIATI'S OF SATIONAY. I:FENSE: C'14F"

I would also like to explain, in detail. the condition of the national-

afense work.

Of the total munber of matters pending. full are in

connection with natioual-defuse matters. Of that mumber 18t7 have

not been assigned, because of lack of manpower. Because of un-

aroilable manpower t1 percent of the national-defense cases ure un-

assigned at the present moment.

There are 1,5t9 delinquent national-

defense matters on our dockers tolar.

Now, as to the amount ot work performed by the agents, the average

agent in the Burean is carrying more than 19 cases. which is an exces-

sive number of cases for a man to handle.

As I told you ou Friday:

the field personnel are workine from 3 to ă hours a day overtune.

Of the entire personnel of the Bureau we hare 3u9 agents who hare

already been trained in the handling of this special kind of work.

making a total of to percent of the staff qualified for this work today.

• COORINKATINS BESWEEN MILITARY AND SATAI. ISTEILICETCE DISINISA

The procedure we have followed since this work was assigned to us

in tele he Danto hone eithee the arr

Intelligence Disision of the Nary Department.

Ender the present

arrangement the Federal Burean of Investication handles all civilian

inrestigations arising within the United States and ils territories.

dealng with the various phases of the national-defense work. The

Whitary and aval Intelligence Divisions are contining their setiv-

ities to the armes forces, and they have ulse called upon us at times to

aid in the handling of those matters in connection with cases occurring

within the military forces of the country.

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 262

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JUSTICE DEPARTMENT APPROPRIATION BILL, 1041

153

dr. RABAUT. ASI understol you. you said that under your agre.

ment. with them the Alilitary and aval Intelligence Divisions are tu

confine themselves to certain activities?

Mir. HoovER. Yes. sir.

SIr. RABaUT. Are they doing that!

Mr. Hoover. les: they me riving that: they are conducting no

investigations in matters other than those connected with the military

forces of the country.

We are handling all matters of a civilian

character, but in some instances they hare called mpon ins to aid then

in connection with their work in the aried forces.

GESTRIE ISTFIINENCE, DIVISION

In regard to the Intelligence Division which hirs been set up in the

Bureau, when this work was assigned to us we organized at the seat

of goverment a unit called the General Intelligence Division, which

•will hare supervision of espionage, sabotage, ind other subversive

activities, and violations of the neutrality regulations.

That division consists of an assistant director and eight super-

visors.

Tre hare also organized what is called a Translation Section, the

niect being to heeg in touch mith an smbrerse men nenne

communications. donnents. or mapers nbtaimer bo mà in the conna

of our investigations.

1nd we have a Code Section in that division.

used for the examination and breaking down of codes and code mes-

snaes which come auto dur possession.

Ue hare alss initiated special investigations of gersons reported

mon as being active in ang subsersive activity or in movements deffi-

mental to the internal security.

In that conoction, we hase a general

index, arranged alphabetically and geogmplically, arnilable at the

Burean, so that in the event of any greater emergener coming to

our country we will be able to locate immediately these varions per-

sous who may need to he the subject ot furthes invesrication hy the

Federal authorities.

Incidental to the extension of this work at the set of government.

we have also been compelled to enlarge the feld sersice, und we hay

opener field divisions in the following citios: Albany. V. Y.: Balti-

more, ald: Grand Ragds, Mioh.: Honoluln. T. H.: Aumenn. Alaski:

Panama. C. d Ihn drin: San Isego. Calif.: San Jan. Y. R.:

Satanmh, Gil.

work in conneotion with national-defense mitei.

Y'an will notice

that these ofes an brated either in large shipping contors or arous.

es where there are large military bases.

For instance, die hase norer has an ollice in the Panama Canal

Case and the establishment of in flice thre has been of grent value

8e the Army.

AM 54988-0oc|0:32989719

Page 263

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## Page 264

154

JUSTICE DEPARTUPNT APPROPRIATION BILL, 1941

PLAST PROTECTION WORK

Army or the Vary.

In a time of greater emergency there mill be approsimately 12.004

such plants operating in this country.

At the present time there are

540 such plants aerively engaged in the manufacture of materials,

under contract. for either the army or the Jary.

We hute compiled the first manual of its kind, known as the Plant

Protection Manual. which contains suggestions as to methods to be

followed in the protection of there

plants. not only from the point ot

vies of fire protection. but also in regard to the safesuardina di

documents and materile in theé plants so that definite precautions

can be taken to aroid aers of sabotage or thefts of valuable documents

at plants that are making commodiries for the Army and the Nary.

Mr. Rubatt. Is that mammi given to the piants?

Mr. Hoover. Yo: it in a very confidential manual issued only to the

special agents of the Federal Burean of Intestigation and Army and

Nary intelligence nicers.

The procedure we follow in comection with this work of plani

protection is to call in for conference the aficials of the various plant:

mamle these contracts. and otlme to them the stens ther should take

in conection with precautions that must be exercised.

Then we will send me of mur agentsand we have now a total of

30 men enrared in mutional defene work-ate the various blant:

to make an inspection ni shrsical conditions existine there. and hart

him report to us upon things that should or should not he done.

Then me submit to the owners of the plant recommendations for

corrections that should he made.

We do not. furnish protection to the

plant, but our position is as adviser on technical matters in conne-

tion with plant protection.

Since last Sepreming we have been alle to complete 20 suih inspey-

tions of plants. and Bl others are new in progeras. We are doing the

best tie call with the limited personnel we have.

In all they instances where these conferences are hold-

Nr. RABaTT. To what extent are they complying with your recom-

mendations at these plants?

Mr. Honsen. He hase sereiral very excollent cooperation.

AXHIPPRITINS WIIH ANSY ANN SANT' INITIIIDENCE: NERVICES

At the seat of government the cooperation we hate developed be-

treen the Army and Navy intelligence services of the Bureau has

resulted in almost daily conferences among the three branches.

There has been, in me opinion, at no time as close and cordial a

relationship as exis today berneen the Army und Nary intelligence

services and our Bureal.

I cannot pay too high a tribute to Col.

E. R. Warner SeCabe, chief of the Army Intelligence Dirision, und

Admiral Waltes &. Anderson, direetor of the ollioes of Nary

• In-

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JESTICE DENNENT APPROPRINTIOS BILL 1861

155

telligence. They hase been most cooperative and mot helpful and

te have all been working as one in this undertaking.

There have been mant nets of sabotage, particularly mn connection

with projects that hare been necessars in the manufacture of articles

-- for the rearmament program.

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## Page 266

TESTIMONY OF THE DIRECTOR BEFORE THE

HOUSE SUBCOWMITTLE UN APPROPRIATIONS

REGENTAL APPROPRIATION ERE AMOUNTE

OF $975,000

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## Page 267

FIRST DEFICIECI APPROPRIATION BILL, 1241

179

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 19, 1941.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIOY

STATEMENT OF J. EDGAR HOOVER, DIRECTOR

SALARIES AND EXPENSES, 1941

Mr. Carror. We have bofore us'an iten for salaries and expenses,

Federal Bureau of Investigation, as follows:

salsries and expenses, Federal burcau oi investigation (national defenio)

1911; detection and prosecution of crimes (emorgoner): For an additional

amount for salaries and expences, fedoral Bureau

(national

defense), fiscal year 1u4l, including personal services in the District of C'olumbia

and elsenhere, $975,000.

What is the occasion for that deficiency, dr. Hoover.

balance of the present tiscal your.

Mr. Hooven. The amount of so it eatenested to lse for the

700 additional tield special agents, 500 of whom would be used on

•national-defense investizations, and 200

investigation of

making & total of s9s tel emolores.

clerical employecs at the seat of government.

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 267

NeArNeR or 4955407540728187. dismis

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## Page 268

proyees.

ACTIVITIES OF BUREAU PRIOR TO EMERGENCY

Mr. Cassos. Prior.

to this emergency, what did your activities

Mr. HooveR. Prior to.

the emergency,

our notivities covered

generally the investition of riointions of all Federal statutes except

countericiting, narcuties.

income tax, and postal riointions. Our

jurisdiction included kidmping, extortion,

bank robbery, white

slavery, motor velicle theit, impersonation of Gorerument officers,

frauds against the (overment, antitrust investigations, and so jorth.

Mr. LuDlow. Did it cover lynching?

Mr. Hooven. No; there is no Federi statute on that.

You recall, a for ycars ago, Congress inesed a series of so-called crime

bills; such as the one corering unlariul ilight to escape

prosecution.

for instance, a lelony is committed, let us suy, in the State of sew

York.

Now, if the perpstrator goes to Florida, we have jurisdiction

in the matter oi getting him back even though we do not prosecute

him in the Federal courts.

IM. 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 268

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FIRST DEFICIENCI APPROPRIATION BILL. 1041

185

There is alio the inntter of stolen property. You may recall thint

within the last week there has been a series of very large jewel robberies

in Miami. Now, anything in excess of 55.000 that is stolen and taken

rom ono Stato to enother, comes within our jurisdiction.

Mr. Cassos. There is also the fugitive law?

Mr. Hoover. That is correct.

LEGISLATION INCREASING INVESTIGATIVE JURISDICTION OF BUREAU

I shall be very glad to incorporate in the record a list of the major

grime laws passed during the last few years which cover mutters

investigated by the F. B. I. or which bring additional duties to us.

Mr. Carsos. If you will put such a list in the record, I think that

will be sufficient.

(The list is as follows:)

LEDISLATION INCREASINO INTENTIGATIVE JÉRISDICTION TOR FISCAL L'EARS

1937 T0 1941

LLOISLATION AFFECTINO FEDERAL BEREAU OF INTESTIGATIOS

Fiscal year 1934

Public Law No. 230, Serents-third Congress, approved May 18, 1931: To provide

punishment for killing or assaniting trideral officers.

Public Law No. 231, Seventy-third Coneress, approved May 18,

1931: Jinking

extortion of money or other think of value by means insolving interstate cold-

morce a F'ederal crime.

for ransom or reward.

Public Law To. 233, Seventy-third Congress, approved May 1S, 1934: The Fugi-

tive Felon Act-making it unlawinl to lice from one State to another to avoid

prosecution or giving testimony in certain cases.

Public Law No.

robbery-to provide punishment or cerinin offenses cummitted against banky

organized of opttative under laws of the l'nited states

Public Law No. 231, dorentr-third Congress, approved May 18, 1931: Crimes in

conncction with

pennl and correctionat

institutions- makins it

critne

for

officer or emplovere of Pederal prison to aid in any way the escape of prisoners,

on to conspire to do same.

Pubis low No. 210, Seventy-third Congrest, approsca Niny 22, 1934; Making it g

Federal crime to transport in interstate commerce stolen property valued at

55,000 or more

Public Law No. 376, Sevents-third Coneress, approved June 18, 193%: To protret

trade and commerce against interference by silenes, threats, coercion, or in-

timidation.

Public Law No. 171, Sorents-third Coustess, approsed June 26, 1931: The Na-

Investication; however,

Federal Bureat

Investiontion does invertigate

any riolations uncovered in the course of other investigations).

Fiscal year 1935

None.

Fiscal year 19.36

Public Hat No. 215, Seronty-fourth Congress, approser July 21, 1935: To pro

hibit the interstate transporration of pren-made poole reseept those mate by

Federal prisuns) where such transportation would be in riolation of laus of

Stnte to which they were to he shipper.

Public Law No. 253, Serenes-fourth Congres, approver Auguss 3, 1935: To

provide for the prosecution of federal primmers who cocope shile awaiting

triat making nuch escape a separate federal erne.

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## Page 270

186

FIRST DEFICIENCI APPROFRIATION BILL, 1011

erc. 502), amendel original act of May 15, 1931, to enter robberies or attempted

robberies of tinancial institution+ insured by the Federnl Deposie Insurance

Corporation.

This act incrased the number of banks under Bureau's protec-

tion from ti. 112 to shout 17.001.

Public Iazir No. 121,

Seventr-iourth Congress,

approved Januar! 24,

1036:

Amending Kiduap Act su make is a crine to knowingly possesy rantoin money.

Fiscal year 1937

Public Resolution No. 1, Seventy-filth Congress, approved January 9, 1937:

To prohibit the exportation oi arms and ammunition from United States to.

Spain during civil war.

Fiscal year 1998

Public Lam No. 373, Seventy-fith Coligress, approved August 24, 1937: Bank-

ruptcy Act-to prohibit certain asturinente

rixing fres or compensation on

reccivership, bankruptey, or torzanization proosedings, to prohibit the appoint

ment of cortuin persons as recciver or trustce.

Publie Law So. #i8, Seventy-fiti Congress, approred January 12,

1938: To-

prohibit the making of photographs, sictches, or maps of vital military and

novel defense installations and equipment.

Public

Lst

No. 437,

Seventy-tith Congress, approved February 28.

1933:

Amending impersonation statute to provide punshment for impersonation of

officers and employees of Government-owned and Government-controlled

corporations.

Public Law To. 465, Seventy-fifth Contess, approved April 4, 1939: Amending

section 35 of Criminal Code (C. S. C., title 18, ecc. S2), relating to theit of

Government proncris.

Publie Law No. 651, Seventy-fith Congress, approved June 16, 1938: Amending

National Firearius ict.

Norz.- This act not within primary jurisdiction of Federal Bureau of

investization: however, violations tiereof are investigated when uncovered in

course of Federal Bureau of Invessiestion, investization of another matter

which is within Bureau's primary jurisdiction.

Public Law Jo. 779, Serenty-fith Congress, approved June 29, 1939: Prohibiting

the interstate tran-portation of strikebreakers.

Public Law No, 785, Seventy-fith Congrers, approred June 30, 1938: An act

regulating the commerce in firearins cited as the Federal Firearms Act (refer

to note re Public, No. 65l, supra).

Fiscal year 1939

Public Ian No. 70, Seventy-gixth Congress, approsed May 15, 1939: Amending

Extortion Act.

Prior to this amendment, only messizes threntening to extort

valuables were ponaliced.

This act extended srope to cover all messauca trans-

mitted by mails or in interstate commerce which contain threat to kidnap or

harm: person, eren thoush no intent to extort muney of other valuadies 1s

manifested.

Poblic law No. 82, Serenty-sixth Concress, approved May 22, 1939: To pro.

bibit the reproduction and

inisuse of otlicial badges, identification cards, sad

other insignia.

Public Lair No. 121, Seventy-nisth Congress, approved June 13, 1939: To provide

for the confiscation of firearms in the pussession of persons convicted of felogy.

Fiscal year 1940

Public Ian No. 252.

Serents-sixth Concross, spproved August 2, 1950: The

Hnteh Art-to prohibit the intimidation,

coereinn, otc., fur the purpove of in-

terfering with another'e riche to vote in elootiona of federal oricials.

Act also

makes it unlawful for any person employe by todoral Ciovernment or pati from

Federal funile to be a member of any politied party or reanization earnestin

the overthrow of our constitutional form ul governons in tho l'nited States.

NWV: 54932-Docld:32989719: Rage 270

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FIRST DEFICIENCI APPROPRIATION BILL.

1011

187

•Public Tan No, 255, Serenty-sixth Congresa, approsed Algust 3, 1939: Amend-

ing National Stulen I'roperty Act-to include as a riviation sonds feloniously

converterl

and interstiste

transpnrintinn

of furred, siterer, or counterfeit

securities, and tools user in connterfeitina, altering, and forging. Also includes

as a viciation the recriving, concealins, selling, ete., these toois. The ameud-

ment alro pruvidea penalies for conspuracies to violate this dor.

Public Law

2l,

serentr-sixth

Congres, approved August 4, 1939: 1'0

provide that the statute of limitations shall not run in ollenses punishable by

death.

Pubin me he a ain or anything of aur by para or tale pretence on tho

Publie Law So. 319, Seventy-sisth Congress approved August 7, 1939: Amend-

ing the act renirits registration of agents of foreign principaly broadening.

the scope thereof.

enforcement oflicials to cooperate with federal Burcau of investigation and

investigations of espionage, sabutage, and related muttors is punted below:

"The Attorney Gonoral has been renurnted by me to instruct the Federal

Bureau of Investication of the

Drpartmont of Justice to take charze of

investigative wurk in inatters relating to espionage, sabotage, and violations

of the nentrality regulations.

"This task must be conducted in a comprchensive and efective manner

on & national basis, and ell information must be carciuily sifted out and cor-

relatel in order to avoid confusion aud irre-ponsibility.

"To this end I request all police oticers, sheriffs, and ail other lan-enforce

ment officers in the United States promptly to turn over to the nearest repre-

sentative of the F'ederal Burean of Investication any information outaured

espionase, counterespionage, sabotage, suurerive

activities, and siolations of the neutrality lawg."

Public Resolution No. 51, Serenty-sisth Congress, approved November 4, 1939:

Neutrality Aet of 1939.

Public Law No. 401, serenty-sixth Congress, approved January 13, 1910: To

provide for thé protection of witnerses appearing before any department, inde

pendent establishment. or other azeney vi the l'nited States, or the Congresg

of the l'nited Srates.

Aet penalizes attempts to influenee, intimidate, or impede

Public Jaw No. 443, Serenty-sixth Congress, approved March 23, 1910: Amend-

ing Espionage Act of June 15, 1917-t0 incresso penalties for peacetinse viola-

tion thercof.

Public Law Jo, 491, Feventy-sixth Congress, approved April 30, 1010: Amending

section 35ß of the United Statce Criminal Cude to prohinit purchase or receins

in pledse of clothine and other supplics isaued to veterans maintained in Vet-

crans® Administration facilities.

Public Law No. 545, Horents-isth Congress, approred June 6, 1940: Crimes on

Federal reservations-jinendina scetion 250 of the Criminal Code to bring

up to date (Fehruary 1, 1910; the rection of code providing, that acts not

spccifically punishahie by act of Congress, commitrod on Federal reserrations

ans he numished nurer lay of State wherein reservation is locsted, il such act

Is criminal in thnt State.

Public Lan Jo. 875, Seventy-sixth Coneresa, approved June 8, 1910: To make it

a crime to wreck ur strempt to wreck s train crsased in interstate commerce.

Public Lan To.

aruend the Criminal Cale so as lo conter coneurnt juri-liction on courts

of the T'nited Srater over crimer committee on certain bederal rearrations.

Publie Law No: 6033. Firentgristh Conanss, apprised June 25, 1910: For she

protretion anainst anlanful use of the bader, medal, embicin, or other insignia

penaltier for the sinlation theref.

Publie law din. frig, Seroneyesisth Congress, approsed June 25, 1910: Amending

ankruntor Aet of 1NIS.

Publie Law

No. 470.

Herenty-sirth Concries, approred June 29, 1910: Alien

Registration Act (Nuith Act) which probilita certain subversive activities:

amends certain prosisions of las with proper lo the armission muel deportation

of aliens, and required the fingerprinting and rogistration of aliens.

NW 54933 Doc|d:32989719: Page 271

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• 188

FIRST DEFICIENCY A ROPRIATION BILL, 1911

Public Law In. 685, Serenityesisth Congress, approved June 20, 1910: Amending

Bank Robbery der-to prohibit the receipt, possession, or disposition of

moncy or property feloniously taken from a bank urganized or operatine under

the laws of the U'nited Statey or any member of the federal keserve system.

Fiscal year 1041

Public Resolntion No. 96, Serenty-sisth Congress, approved August 27, 1910:

Authorizing President to call into active duty the Sational Guard and other

reserve compononts of the. Resular Ariny,

Additional inserprints will be

received br the Federal lureau ul Investiention as a result oi this bill.

Pasblic Law

7S3, Eeventy-sisth Conuress, approver Sentember 16, 1940:

The Sclective Training and service Act of 1940; approximarely 300, 060 finzer-

prints will be receired under this bill cach scar for 5 yeam.

Also increased

nextigative juri diction over violations for failure to register, conscientinue

objectors, induction evaders, irreguiarity of board members, recaleitrant. indus-

try, misrepresentarion of druft information, and miscellaneous vinintinng.

Public Law No. a00, Surenty-sisth Congress, approved Uctober 9, 1910: Amend-

ing act providing for the safe transportation of explosives and other dangerous

articles on board venils.

Public Law do. sol,

Seventy-sisth Conéress, approsed October 14, 1910 (not

effective until Octuber 14, 1911): Making unlawiul the intersiate tran portation

in private transactions (i. e., nonzovermental) ut convict made roods.

Publie Law No.

$70,

Seventy-sisth Congress, approved October 17, 1940: To

require the registration of certain urganizations carrying on military and political

activities in United diates and for osher purposes.

Federal bureau of investi

gation assigned investigative jurisciction over this act, which became elective

on January 10, 1941.

Public Law

No. 856,

Ferenty-sisth Congress, amproved November 30, 1940:

Amending. Saborace Act-to make it applicable to materials manufactured for

United States national delense programn.

Mr. Cassos. Are there any other agencies of the Goremment

covering the same work that these emergency emplovees are covering?.

Mr. HooveR. Before answering that question, i would like ulso to

leave with the committee a publication which lists the statutes and

proclamations and Executive orders pertaining to national defense

matters.

in answer to your question, the President in 1939 directed

that all investigations denique ith espionies, subotage, subversive

activities, mntional defense activities, would be handled by the federal

Bureau of Investigation, except those arising within the Army or the

Nary.

Other governmental ngcneies are instructed under this Execu-

tive order to report to the f. B. I. any information showing uny viola-

tion dealing with national defense mutters.

Mr. Ludiow. How would a state of war affect your activities, Mr.

Hoover?

Mr. HooveR. They would by necessity have to be espanded.

Mr. LUDLOw.

Would it change your jurisdiction?

Mr. Hoover. Tint would depend upon what laws Congress might

will be discontinued.

Mr. HoovER.

Thit is correct.

Mr. Tamen. Is your set-up for the nntional-delense work separato

from the other work?

Mr. HoovEr. It is.

Mr. Tanen. It is operated as a separate division?

Mr. Hooven. Yes.

*NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 272

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FIRST DEFICIENCI APPROPRIATION BILL, 1941

189-

In the field our field officials are under instructions to utilize ap-

proximately 50 percent of the personnel on national defonse work and

the other 50 percent on the regular work.

Mr. TabeR. But if some rush comes up, you might have to vary

Mr. Hoover. That is correct?

Mir. TABeR. According to the situation.

Mr. Hooven. According to the emergency that might arise.

If the national emergency should terminate, the structure dealing

with national defense can immediately be discontinued or very ma-

terially curtailed according to the wishes of Congress.

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 273

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## Page 274

SCILEMENTAL MATIONAL DEFENXE APPROPRISTION, 141 179

TESTIMONY OF THE DIRECTOR BEFORE THE

HOUSE SUBCO CITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

REGARDING THE SUPPLL ENTAL 1541 ESTI-

MATES OF THE BURKAU IN. THE ALOUNT OF

$3,558,800 FOR NATIONAL DETENSE

THURSDAT, JUNE 6, 1940.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL DUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

STATEMENT OF J. EDGAR HOOVER, DIRECTOR

SALARIES AND EXPENSES, 1941

Mr. Woodnew. Now, Mr. Hooser, we have an estimate here in

House Document 809 for an additional amount of $3,358,800 for the

Federal Bureau of Investigation as follow's:

Salaricy and expourer, detection and prosecution ni crimes (criersenes), fisca

vent 1911: Fur au arditional amount for valuries and exponses, during the limited

national emergener in the detection and prescention of crimes seniust the t'nitre

States, ete, including the objects nurt for tire

purpuses specided under this

head in the Departinent of Justice Appropriation Act, 1911, $3,355.500, of

which amount not to excert $302,000 my be expended for personal serrices in

the District of Columbia and $150,000 fur the purchase and exchunge of motor-

propelled passenger-carrying relicks.

Tell us about this item, please.

INCIEASES PROPOSED FOR PERSONNEL AT SEAT OF GOVERNMENT

Mr. MooreR. I would likir to make just a hrief statement as to how

the estimate is divided, and the peasons for this incrense.

Ie propose to expend $ase,000 for personnel. to lo dividod as

that arist.

for our clerical and file work, it s1,440, and 100 student lingerprint

NW 54933 Docld:32989719• Page 274

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## Page 275

1SO SEPPLENENTAL SITIUNAL IF'ENSE APPROPRNTION, 1041

classifiers at $1,140, making a total of 230 increase at the srat of

Goserument.

I would like in onth the set-up which we hare pilected at the

Washingson headmuarters in accordance with previous approral of

this committer and Congress.

Last fall we came before you for an

emergenes national defense appropriation and we requested authories

to set up a sonarue dirtion withn the Bureau to Innelle national

defense matters under an assistant director. For the information of

the committee, I have here this morning an organizational churt oi

he Bureau nt the seat of Govornmout and in the held, which show's the

fire divisions of the Bureau.

The National Defense Disision will handle and direet all investign-

tions draling with espionee, saintage, national-driense matters, and

riolations of the neutridity statutes.

COONDISATIOS OF THE INTELLIGENCE IND OTHER

SERVICES, TASH-

INTON AND THE FIXID

In line with the Prosilent's onder of last September, there has hoen

a sero close coordination of all of this intelligence services.

The

President, on

suprether di. dirvered the Burenu to coordinate the

functions on antionni defene matters in intolligene work.

We have

been holding wrokly conderoners with Military Intelligenes, Turnl

Intellicence, and other intelligence units anel today there is a close co-

ordination between all of these serviers.

'This is a tromondmas in-

provement, I believe, over the situation which existed at the time of

the last

curriney,

When there were many disided investigatise

agencis functioning in this fieli.

We have also extended this coordination and cooperation into the

- fickl sprrices.

in lickl divisions.

The agents in

chargs of the field divicions hold weekly conferences with the intel-

• ligence officers of the Army and Mary, and such other goverumental

corvices as mus be necessari.

In addition thoroto, we luve a seeralled reserve, through the aa-

tional Polico dondemy.

which has been in operation for about 5

years.

We have and police oblicers who are graduntes of the send-

ciny.

We have urranged for conferences throughout the country

ith police chire and leads of other has-enforcement noonies, in

order en utilize the facilition of State and loenl agencies in the ma-

tional-defense work.

We are scuring excellent cooperation from

the Sution's her enforcement otlicers.

As the Attorney Gieseral pointed out, we are trying to nroid the

180 of solanteer unmps.

Mony very patriotically inclined individunts

muel groups sincerely desire to saist in investigations of this nature.

It has bern our footing. herever. that the work should he handled by

the constituted lan enforeement anchorities. This procedure has

present very sati-fartory.

NEED FOR IN HEADED PERSONNEL IN DEPANTMENT

let so recrised trigone pieces of nil at the seat of goosers-

sent.

In Mus

110 chore sar an increase to 28,000 pieres - 111

NW.54933 Docld:32989719 Page 275

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## Page 276

SEPFLENENTAL NATION. LEFENSE APROPRIATION, 1011 181

incrense of 20 percent. Within the last di wrocks, there has been a 300

moreens increase in otters of cervers doe the laurenil.

Individnals from

surious surlo of the conners sorite in am otler their services to do

isestinitive

any tunes these une persons who possess

special qualications, arch as knowledge of foreign languagos.

These

nates nre all hing inderer so that, if the time comes when we can use

a person with jerial qualitications, se will be able to immediately

communicate with him.

GENÉRAL ISTELLIGENCE INDEX

There is another indesI want to refer to, for the information of the

committee: that is the indes roferred to in previous henrings as a gen-

oral intelligener indes.

That index includes the names of persons

Who say heeen potential enmies to our internal security, such as

known espionaes agents, known saboteurs. bracing members of the

Communist Pares, and the bund.

This inder has been compiled very

carat in activities decimental to the tied Stutts.

He linse no 1 indicateel, rentine it rolely to persons

Sir.

aliens. come in without

merrime them when the see off the loost

Ir. Hoover. Tes; that has been the procuture

NW 54933

Docld;32989719 Page 276

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## Page 277

TESTIMONY OF THE DIRECTOR ON FEBRUARY 3 AND

FEBRUARY 7, 1950: BEFORE THE SENATE SUBCONATTEN

ON APPROPRIATIONS REGARDING THE 1951 APPROPRIATION

ESTIMATES FOR THE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESCIGATTON

• *

NIV 54933

Docld:32989719 Page 277

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## Page 278

DEPARTMEN

OF STATE, JUSTICE, CO,

MERCE, AND

THE JUDICIARY APPROPRIATIONS FOR 1951

FRIDAY, FEBRUARI 3, 1950

UNITED STATES SENATE,

- SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTCE ON APPROPRIATIONS,

Washington, D.C.

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 278

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142 STATE, JUST

COMMERCE, JUDICIARY APPRO

ATIONS, 1951

That movement, as you gentlemen know, has changed its name

many times, while its party line changes from day to day. There

is, however, one fact that prevails and that is that the party line

is based upon the fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism.

I would like to present to the committee at this time a chart showing

the ramifications of the growth of the party in this country with

its various changes of names over a period of years.

Senator McCarray. I note that you use the term "Marxism" and

"Leninism." Leninism is a later version of Marrism, is it not?

Mr. HooveR. They use the term "MIarsism-Leninismn" as their so

called doctrine and philosophy.

That doctrine, as their own docu-

ments set forth, advocates the violent overthrow of capitalistic gov-

ernments.

They state that in their documents and in their speeches.

That doctrine further advocates the establishment, in place of the

capitalistic governments, of the dictatorship of the proletariat by

the Communists. It further states that that cannot be obtained

except by force and violence.

Une of the great instruments and teapons used today by all Com-

munists throughout the world is the resort to propaganda and

a the

resort to the boring and termite tactics.

That is an entirely

technique that came into being during the last World War, as I have

indicated, in the fiîth-column movement. That is the type of warfare

they are resorting to today to take over countries without a direct

attack. of arms, but rather by penetrating into governmental func-

tions, into schools, and into churches, where they will have access to

public expression and opinion.

I will deal with sone of those activities in detail as I go on.

COMMUNIST FRONT ORGANIZATIONS

Senator FerGusoN. If I may interrupt. Mr. Hoover, we have in the

displaced persons bill the use of the word "Communist" or "Commu-

nist Party." Is there any may you could lay down a standard by

which you could teil whether a man coming from a European country

was or was not a Communist within such a meaning?

Mr. Hoover. As regards that, senator, the only way you can deter-

mine whether an individual is or is not a Communist is through an

investigation of the background of the man and his associations and

contacts.

The Communist-front organizations are the parrots or

the "Charlie NIcCarthys" for the Communist Party. Those organi-

zations can be determined by just analyzing how they follow the

party line.

The particular man you refer to may not be a member of the Com-

munist Party of America and prohably would not be coming from

Europe. He may not even be a member of the Communist Party of

the country from which he is coming.

Since the trial in New York

of the 11 Communist lenders, memborship cards are no longer issued,

membership lists have been destroyed. and secret ways of communi-

cating with each other have been established, so that the only way

in which you could really tind out a man's connections is through an

investigation of him.

Sonator Percesos. What would you say a Marxist ras?

Mr. Hoover. There may be a small group, senator, of so-called

Marxists who would term themselves "philosophical Marxists" that.

NW 54933_Docld:32989719 Page 279

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STATE, JUSTICE,

IMMERCE, JUDICIARY APPROPRI

ONS, 1951 140

is, as adhering to the philosophy of slars mit not going as far as

Lenin. I personally think that is a fallacious line of demarcation.

I think they are Marxists and out-and-out Communists in the sense

that you and I use the word.

Senator FerGuso,. That is my judgment-a Marxist is a Commu-

nist.

Mr. Hoover. I believe that very definitely.

Senator MIcCarrly. Is not that largely true of Leninism?

Mr. Hoover. Exactly. They are synonymous terms, Mr. Chairman.

They call the philosophy Marsism-Leninism. That is one word, a

hyphenated mora.

lo go turther into this matter, many Americans have been lulled

into a sense of complacency by the claim that there are comparatively.

fery members of the Communist Party of the United States of Amer-

world-wide inderground movement, inspired from-abroad, they can-

not be dismissed lightly.

According to our best intormation, there is a total of 54,174 members

of the Communist Party in the United States at the present time.

I have here and would like to submit to the committee a chart show-

ing the distribution of the membership in the Communist Pary by

districts and by States.

SECTIONS OF UNITED STATES WHERE CONIONIST PARTY IS STRONGEST

Mr. Hoover. Most of the members of the Communist Party in the

United States are in the concentrated sections of population of the

country. For example, new York State has 25,000 members: Cali-

fornia, 6.977: Illinois, 3.361; Pennsylvania, 2,876; Ohio, 2,834; Michi-

gan, 1,250; Nassachusetts: 1.022; Nevada, 23; Wyoming, 10; Tennes-

see 27; Alabama, 141; Few Hampshire 13; and so on.

Even though

there are only 51,17t members of the party, the fact remains that

the party leaders themselres boast that for every party member

there are 10 others tho follow the party line and who are ready, will- V

ing, and able to do the party's work. In other words, there is a poten-

tial fifth column of 5$0,000 people dedicaied to this philosophy.

Senator SALToNSIsI. I sa a report the other day that disturbed

me very much, and it seemed to me something was wrong somewhere.

There are a number of people free under small bonds and sometimes

without any bond who are deportable cases, that is, deportable aliens

who cannot be deported because they are refused behind the iron

curtain. Are they being turned loose or are you people keeping an

eye on them?

DENIAL OF VISAS BY RUSSIA OF AMERICAN COMMUNISTS

Government of the United States by force and violence.

The Russian

Governnent has refused to grant them visas, and they thereforo

NW_54933_Docld:32989/15 Page 280 1=10

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## Page 281

144 STATE, JUS

E, COMMERCE, JUDICIARY APPR

IATIONS, 1951

cannot be sent back to Russia or to one of the satellite countries from

which they came.

Senator McCArRaN. Do you think it is a part of the plan to deny

them visas?

Mr. Hoover. I'am not far from having my suspicions along thạt

line, Senator.

I think it would be a very practical part of this

technique to have them here.

Under the rulings of our courts, those people cannot be held in

custody indefinitely. They must either be deported or released on

bond.

When they are released on bond, it is our function to know

generally what they are doing.

That merely adds to those people

whose activities we should follow in this country. I think it is almost

a travesty upon our democratic processes that you can have people 1l

this country who have been found to advocate the violent overthrow o:

our form of government, yet you cannot deport them nor hold them at

Ellis Island

Senator SartoystalL. Why can you not hold them?

Mr. Hoover. They are released by orders'of the courts.

Senator SarToNsTaLL. I understand that.

Mr. Hoover. We do not hare any law by which we can hold them.

It would be necessary for Congress to pass a law along that line.

To continue. the Communist Party is not a bona fide political party.

It is a highly organized, militant, and disciplined conspiratorial group

following the whims and dictates of international communism.

was proven in the New York case which recently concluded with the

conviction of 11 members pi the executive board of the Communist

Party.

The Communist Party of the United States constitutes a

fifth column if there ever was one.

EFFECT OF THE COMMUNIST LEADERS' TRIAL

The trial of the 11 members of the executive board of the Commu-

nist Party in New York last year took the Bureau approximately 10

ments were returned.

I have here a chart outlining the members who were indicted with

a brief statement about the case which I would like to submit to the

committee.

The trial of the Communist leaders removes any doubt in the

minds of right thinking people as to where the loyalty of the Com-

munist Party rests. It was brought out at the trial that the party is

& group dedicated to the overthrow of our Government.

The Communist trial in New York has also resulted in making the

work of the Bureau more dillicult, and I will cite the reasons why.

Before pointing out some of the problems that we have had to face,

let me siy that it was necessary in the trial to use seven informants

of the Bureau. They appeared and testified against the defendants.

We had more available if they were necessary, but the evidence was

so overwhelming that it was not necessary to introduce them.

All of the intormants who testifiod were bona fide members of the

party. They had been in the party for some years. Alr. Thilbrick,

who was one of the principal witnesses for the Coternment, had been

NW 54933 Docld 32983818"pal28t the Bureau for some years and was literary director

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## Page 282

STATE, JUSTICE,

OMMERCE, JUDICIARY APPROPR

CONS, 1951 145

of the professional branch of the Communist Party, District No. 1,

in Massachusetts. Another informant who testified in that trial, the

night before had conterred with and had been in conterence

with

high ranking members of the Communist l'arty and the nest morning

testified against them as a representative of the fBI.

DECENTRALIZATION AND UNDERGROUND ACTIVITY OF COMMUNISTS

Now, that case, as I say, has raised certain problems because with

that penetration of their apparatus, the Communist leaders have

become increasingly security conscious and hare developed certain

security measures to protect their organization.

The trend has been toward the perfection of a highly developed

underground apparatus and decentralization of Communist Party

comminist Party cent, alie pior ose almos to pea the mi their

congregating in such large groups. As a security measure, no Com-

munist carty membership cards were issued in 1sz9. The mainte-

nance of membership records has been discontinued. Ilembers speak

in a jargon of double talli, and use codes in correspondence. A cour-

ier system has been substituted to protect confidential party communi-

cations. Public meetings are maintained at an absolute minimum.

Party records have been destroyed or removed to clandestine hiding

places. Secret printing facilities and supplies have been secreted for

future underground operations. Transiers of party members from

one district to another are now controlied through the use of an elab-

orate identification system.

The party today is in the process of selecting individuals for secrel

leadership of its underground apparatus. lo counteract the FBI,

penetration of the Communist Party, its leaders have established a far-

i reaching and vigorous loyaity program of its orn, calling for the

establishment of investigating committees in each State and a thorough

investigation of each member of the party as to personal history, activi-

ties, associations, contacts, and length of membership.

Each member

which consists of 13.

Now, I state these things because these steps tending toward security

within the party have made more difficult the Bureau's maintenance

of confidential informant coverage of the activities of the party. I

do not mean to infer to the committee that me do not have good sources

of information or that me do not have good representation in the

party in varying positions of trust. But it is true that it is more

difficult to penetrate the party today. Those in the party exercise

greater caution. Investigation of party leaders requires more ingenu-

ity.. The additional budget request will materially aid us in main-

taining the type of coverage necessary for the preservation of our

internal security.

Senator Ferocsoy. Where are they getting their money?

Mr. Hoover. Various benefits and fund-raising drives are held from

which money is obtained. Then they also receive contributions from

---

## Page 283

146 STATE, JU

CE, CONNIERCE, JUDICIARY APPT

RIATIONS, 1051

individuals tho

are either members or fellow traviers and who are

individuals of wealth.

Senator FERGUSON. Are they spending a lot of money on their

pAr. Hoover. They spent a large amount of money in the New Fork

trial with regard to propaganda and legal counsel.

Senator FrrGusoN. How much would you say they spent?

Mr. Hoover. I cannot give you an otthand estimate on that.

Senator FERGUSON. Do they raise money here in Washington?

Mr. Hoover. They raise it all over the country and right here in this

city of Washington.

COMMUNIST FRONT ORGANIZATIONS

I would like now to take up the activities of certain of these front

organizations. A new drive is being launched in the Communist

Party circles to revive that is known as the united •front program

which characterized the party's greatest growth in the middle thirties.

One of the great dangers of communism is the ability of its espousers

to infltrate and corrupt various spheres of American life.

The way to evaluate the real etfectiveness of the Communist Party

is by observing its influence and its ability to infltrate otherwise

thoroughly American phases of life.

Combating the front organizations is more difficult today than ever

before. To prove party amliation is dificult: but their deeds and acts

expose them for what they are. They cannot long survive in the spot-

light of truth.

At the present time scores of known or suspected Communist Party

front organizations are under' investigation by the FBI. Many are

organizations national in scope with chapters in various cities through-

out the United States.

The Communist Party has. through its increased activities, en-

deavored to exploit youths, reterans, civil rights, foreign nationality,

¡the press, radio, television, the motion-picture industry, educational,

political, romen, and labor groups. That statement can be corrob-

grated by overwhelming tacts which we have in our possession.

Senator HrtI. Are you going to give us any illustrations of that?

Mr. HooveR. Yes, I am.

Now, in connection with the Communist front organizations, the

FBI is primarily concerned with Communist infiltration of such or-

ganizations and the manner in which Communists seek to subrert these

organizations to further the Communist cause.

Experience has demonstrated that many fronts are used as a cover

for espionage purposes and others as a propaganda media.

COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF BASIO INDUSTRIES

Now, I would like to refer briefly to the infiltration by the Com-

munists into our basic industries.

The Communists have long ad-

vocated working through trade-unions as a incans of accomplishing

their ends. Forty-eight percent of the membership of the Communist

Party is in the basic industry of this country. In this manner, they

would be able to sabotage essential industry in vital defense areas

in the event of a national emergency.

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 283

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## Page 284

STATE, JUSTICE

OMMERCE, JUDICIARY APPROPR

IONS, 1851 147

Our investigations disclose that Communist activities are most pro-

nounced in such strategic industrial areas as New York, New Jersey,

Ohio, Pennsylvania, California, and Michigan.

Communist efforts toward infiltration have been intensified in basic

industries vital to our security such as steel, heavy machinery, min-

ing, communications, transportation, the electrical industry, and the

maritime industry.

COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES

The Communists have developed one of the greatest propaganda

machines that I think modern civilization has ever known.

They

capitalize upon ill-founded charges designed to enlist honest, progres-

sive liberals to support left-wing causes.

". Of the many proiessions, penetration of the legal profession is the

most amazing. As officers of the courts, well trained and educated,

lawyers have made some of the inest contributions to American lite.

It is regrettable, therefore, that any association of lawyers mill per-

mit itself to be used and parrot the Communist Party line.

Earl Browder, then the acting head of the Communist Party, on

September 6, 1939, while testifying before a congressional committee,

defined what he meant by the term "transmission belt."

• He said, "Transmission belts reter entirely to the Communist ap-

proach to the problems of reaching the masses. Transmission belts

mean haring

Communists work among the masses in the various

organizations."

He later was asked about & group of organizations as to whether

they were Communist transmission beits.

When asked about tha

National Lawyers Guild, he replied, "Yes; they are one of the oi-

ganizations."

During the trial of the 11 Communist leaders in New York, the

bar was shocked by the actions of the deiense attorneys. Some of

those lawyers were members of the National Lawyers Guild.

; Senator lIcCarray. Mr. Hoover, it is very evident that we cannot

conclude this afternoon.

The committee will recess at this time and will reconyene nest

Tuesday, February 7, at 1: p. p.m.

(Whereupon, at 4:30 p. m., Februazy 3, 1950, the committee re

cessed to reconvene Tuesday, February 7, 1950, at 1:30 p.m.)

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 284

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## Page 285

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

appropriation

1973

'i"

:i."

"."

Testimony of John Edgar Hoover, Foriner Director.

before the House Subcommittce on Appropriations

March 2, 1972

NV 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 285

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## Page 286

INTERNAL SECURITE OPERATIONS

Mr. Hoover. The FBI's work in the internal security field continues

to mount and there is every reason to expect these matters will place

an increasingly heavier burden upon our investigative stafi. Constitut-

ing a major responsibility of the EBI, investigations of internal secu-

Ilty matters are conducted to develop evidence for legil proceedings

as trell as to enable Government officials responsible for the satety and

welfare of the citizenry to take appropriate corrective or preventive

action.

NEW LEFT TERRORISII

The New Left terrorism is best personified by the Weatherman

group, a group which split with the Students for a Democratic So-

ciety in 1969 so that it could build itself into a small, tough, paramili-

taly urganization to carry nut, guerrilla wartare in order to bring

about a revolution in this country. The Weatherman, addicted to vio-

lence and hostile to our society, has from its underground perch

59

NW 54933-Docld:32989719 Page 286

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## Page 287

claimed credit for the bombings at colleges. business establishments

and Government installations including the March 19T1 bombing of

the U.S: Capitol. Over 20 Weathermen are currently FBI fugitives

for violations of Federal statutes or local mob action laws.

The present-day Students for a Democratic Society is dominated by

the Worker Student Alliance which in turn is controlled by the com-

munist Progressive Labor Party. The Worker Student Alliance fac-

tion is critical of bombing and violence in the belief that such tactics

would impede rather than aid in the development of the revolution-

Lry movement at this time

The Venceremos Brigade. organized in 1969 by a coalition of Ner

Left groups, has proclaimed its purpose is to perform manual labor in

the citrus and sugar cane fields of Cuba as a contribution to Castro's

economy and revolution. Since December 1969, some 1,550 young

Americans, in defiance of the State Department travel ban, have

journeyed to Cuba as part of the Venceremos Brigade. Another con-

tingent. the fifth, is currently planned for llarch 1972.

While in Cuba, Brigade members were subjected to revolutionary

speeches and were provided with hard-core revolutionary literature.

Repeatedly they were told they are the vanguard of the revolution

in the United States.

Although some of these college - and high school-age Americans have

rejected the communist propaganda and rerolutionary philosophy di-

rected at them in Cuba, many of the returning Brigade members en-

thusiastically adopted the anti-United States stance promulgated in

Cuba and have aligned themselres with the violence-prone Weather-

man and other extremist groups.

New Left,terrorists present a profound challenge to lar enforce-

ment. To their threats. their violence and their total disregard for the

law, the FBI and all law enforcement offcers must respond in a lawful

and professional manner. Meeting the challenge will require continued

vigilance to protect the lives and property of the public and continued

dedication to the task of bringing these terrorists to justice.

ANTIWAR DEMONSTRATIONS

Three groups emerged during the Spring of 1971 as the main spon-

sors of the antiwar morement. One group, the National Peace Action

Coalition, is dominated br the communist Socialist Workers Party

along with its youth group, the Young Socialist Alliance. The Coali-

tion adrocates mass nonviolent protest. demonstrations on the sole

issue of ending the war.

The second group, the Peoples Coalition for Peace and Justice, is

supported by various antiar groups but more importantly it has the

unqualified support of the Communist Party-USA. This group advo-

cates massive demonstrations, including civil disobedience, to bring

about the end of the war. Into this issue, the. Peoples Coalition for

Peace and Justice injects poverty. racism. repression and women's

rights, among others, on the premise that the war in Vietnam had an

intensifying eflect on these problems.

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 287

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## Page 288

The Vietnan

eterans Against the War, the

a group, was or-

ganized in New

York City in 1967 to stimulate veterans opposition to

the Vietnam conflict. The group rallied several hundred members to

participate in thespring 1971 antiwar demonstrations in Washington,

D.C. With a current claimed membership of orer 10.000, this group

of Vietnam veterans has engaged in numerous local actions, including

picketing and simulated battle scenes, to protest not only U.s. involve-

ment in

Vietnam but also conditions of racism and poverty in our

country.

STUDENT AGITATION

Disruptions on the Nation's college campuses during the 1970-1971

school year took a heavy toll in lost academic time, property damage,.

personal injury and death. Nearly 600 demonstrations occurred, in-

cluding 49 sit-ins and building seizures. The Reserve Officers Training

Corps was the target of In attacks. There were over 30 instances of

arson and there were 1s bombings. Over 150 personal injuries mere

sustained, approximately 10t by police and school authorities. Four in-

dividuals were killed during the disturbances and property damage was

estimated at approximately $to million.

The current school year. which began in the Fall of 1971, has seen a

general lessening of student activism. There. have been only o8 dem-

onstrations reported on college campuses, including eight sit-ins, tiro

bombings, and four arsons. Injuries to police and participants dropped

to five. Approsimately 5t arrests have been reported. Damages to col-

lege facilities amount to approximately 3322,000. In gencral, & dorite

lessening in the level of student participation in demonstrations is

being reported (February 23. 1272)

OMMUNIST PARTY-USA

Completely under Soviet influence, the Communist Party-USA

consistently follows the lead of the Soviet Union. Party leaders con-

stantly criticize policies of the United States while praising policies of

the Soviet Union as the Party seeks to broaden conflicts mrithin the.

United States in areas of racial, labor, welfare, and antivar activities.

A major effort of the Communist Party-US A, has been directed

into the campaign to support Ingela Daris, an admitted communist

Party member, indicted for the crimes of murder. kidnaping and con-

spiracy in Marin County, Calif., arising out of the abortive escape at-

tempt in August 1970, by Negro convicts on trial in a county court-

room. On February 23, 1972, Davis was released on bail pending trial.

The Party has mobilized broad support from diverse elements in the

United States and abroad through its propaganda that Davis is being

prosecuted because she is i black communist. Every possible ploy is

being utilized to divert attention from the criminal charges and to

imply Davis is being tried solely because of her political beliefs.

Ever mindful of the communist dictum that the revolution mist be

led by the working class. the Party in 1970 instituted a new front

group, the National Coordinating Committee for Trade Union Action

and Democracy. Through this front the Party is attempting to regain

lost influence in the labor movement.

The Communist Party-USA has long sought to become an effec-

tive force in the peace movement and is presently making a strong

NW 54933_Docld:32989719 Page 288

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## Page 289

effort to dominate the Peoples Coalition for Peace and Justice. The

Party favors a quasi-reformist rhetoric and although it is willing to

work with the pacifist radicals and the revolutionary communists and

anarchists in the Peoples Coalition, the Party prefers an approach

which would de emphasize the disruptive and civil disobedience tactics

demanded by the more activist elements within the l'eoples Coalition.

This is in line with the Party's pose that it represents a reasonable

alternative to the disruptiveness of the radical left.

The Party is making a concerted effort to change its public image

and to gain acceptance as a legitimate political party. In the 1972

Presidential election the Communist Party-CS. aims to place its

general secretary, Gus fall, on the ballot for President and Jarvis

Tyner, a Party National Committee member for Vice President. In an-

other move intended to increase its stature. the Party again plans to

issue membership books and dues stamps. practices discontinued as

security measures in 1948. The most ambitious attempt to gain public

favor was the November 1971 filming for television of a portion of a

traditionally secret Vational Committee meeting.

Party leaders are still in demand as speakers and panelists at insti-

tutions of learning. it listing of appearances made during the 1970

1971 school year is as follors:

Dato

School

Speaker

Sept. 24, 1970.

• Oct. 9, 1970.

Nov. 4,

1970

Dec. 9

Jan.

15

1970.

197

27

1971

1971

Feb.

1971

cb.

1971

Feb. 26,1971

Mar. 10, 1971

Apr. 26,

1971

ADr. 30, 1971

May 11,

1971

May 20,

1971

June 1, 1971

Iona College, New Rochelle, N.Y.

University ol California, Riverside. Calif

University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgn, ra.

Mt. Holvoke

College, South Hadley, Mass-

University of California, Los Angeles, Calif.

Temple University, Philadelphia, Pa.-

Yale University. New Haven. Conn..

University of Miami, Coral Gables, Fla.

Miami-Dade Junior College, Miani, Fla

Augsburg College, Minneapolis, Minn.

Ohio University, Athens, Ohio.

St. Louis University, St. Louis, Mo

Villanova University, Villanova, Pa.

University of California, Santa Barbara, Calif

Yale University, New Haven, Conn.

Antioch College, Yellow Springs, Ohio.

Cerritos College, Norwalk, Calit.

St. John's University, Collezeville, Minn_.

St. John's University. Collegeville. Minn_

New Haven College.

West Haven, Conn.

Beloit College, Beloit, Wis.

Hotchkiss School, Lakeville, Conn

Arnold Johnson.

Michael Zagarell.

Charlene Mitchell.

Claude Lightloot.

Hyman Lumer.

Henry Winston.

Gus Hall.

Charlene Mitchell.

Do.

Gus Hall.

Claude Lightfoot..

Charlene Mitchell.

Herbert Aptheker.

Dorothy Healey.

Henry Winston.

Hyman Lumer.

Michael Zagarell.

Charlene Mitchell.

Jarvis Tyner.

Victoria Missic Stevens.

Fred Gaboury.

Matthew Berkelhammer.

• College preparatory school.

Mr. Rooner. At the beginning of your statement you referred to

Angela Daris. That is a State case. is it not?

Mr. Hoover. Tes. We entered it to apprehend her. There was &

warrant sworn out by state authorities to. bring about her appre-

hension: She was an interstate fugitive whom we apprehended. She

mas then returned to California for prosecution.

"PROGRESSIVE LABOR PARTY

The Progressive Taboy Party is a communist organization which

actively advocates the overthrow of tle TT.S. Government. The Pro-

gressive Labor Party controls the Worker Student Miunce, & faction

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of the splinter

Students for a Democratic Si

ty. Support and

ruidance from the Progressive Labor Party have

nelped the Worker

Student Alliance to develop its programs rimed at influencing stu-

dents to adopt revolutionary behavior through campus chapters

throughout the United States.

SOCIALIST WOrKERS PARTY

The communist Socialist Workers Party, a Trotskyist organization,

has been actively engaged in promoting and planning antivar demon-

strations through its front group, the National Peace Iction Coalition.

- Also participating in this antimar group is the Young Socialist All-

ance, the youth wing of the Socialist Workers Party. The Young

Socialist Alliance is extremely well organized and continues to appeal

o young radicals in the United States

It has virtually complete control over the broadly based Student

Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam which professes

to be the largest national student antiar group.

RACIAL EXTREMISAI

The coverage of the activities of black and white racial extremists

continues to place heavy demands upon the fBl.

THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY

Most prominent among the black extremist groups is the Black

Panther Party. The Black Panthers call for the orerthrow of our

Government which the Party claims is engaged in a massive con-

spiracy to repress all minorities, kill all Black Panthers and practice

genocide against the black race.

•(Discussion off the record.)

Early in 1971. a serious split dereloped between Huey P. Newton,

self-styled Supreme Commander of the Black Panther Party, and

Eldridge Clearer, then the Minister of Information and a fugitive cur-

rently in exile in Algeria. Warring factions loyal to each resulted.

Within 2 months. one member of each faction was murdered with each

faction accusing the other and threatening reprisals. The Cleaver fac-

tion is calling for constant violence and revolution now.

The larger Newton faction, in an effort to improve the Panthers'

image, is calling for "survival pending the revolution" which Yewton

explains means working and surviving in the black community until

the revolution occurs.

The Newton forces have 27 chapters operational throughout the

United States with some 450 hard-core members and the support of

thousands of sympathizers. The Cleaver followers number 250 plus

many sympathizers with the main strength centered in New York City

but with scattered points of support in other large cities.

The chief target of Black Panther violence and invectives has al-

ways been local law enforcement as epitomized by its perennial slogan

"Off the Pirs." Panther jarson for "kill the cops." The Panthers main-

tain that the police are an extension of the "power structure" of "im-

perialistic" United States and since the police are readily avarlable

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every day. they have urged their followers to attack the police at every

opportunity. The eftectiveness of this campaign is evidenced by the

fact that since 1967 Panthers have been allegedly responsible for the

killing of 12 police officers and the wounding of 71 others (February 23,

1972).

The Newton-led faction has toned down its public demands for vio-

lence and attacks upon police and has shifted its propaganda to em-

phasize community service in an effort to repair its image. trograms.

such as free breakfasts for children, health clinics. free clothing Ior

the poor and free bus serrice for visitors to penal institutions are being

highlighted. Panther claims to extensive accomplishments in the serv-

ice to the community, however, are highly exaggerated. Much of the

food contributed by local merchants actually is used to feed the adult

members of the Black Panther Party. The health centers are staffed by

attendants untrained for medical work and of little serrice. First choice

of clothing is given to Black Panther Party members irith the remain-

der being handed out in the ghetto areas to the accompaniment of much

publicity.

Representatives of the Newton faction made 27 appearances at edu-

cational institutions during the calendar jear 1971 as follows:

Date

School

Speaker

Jan. 21, 19/1

Jan. 26, 1971

Feb. 9,1971.

DO-.

•Feb. 11, 1971

• DO

DO

Feb. 14,

1971

• Feb. 18,

1971

Feb. 19

Feb. 24

1971

1971

Mar. 11, 1971

Mar. 17, 1971

Apr. 30, 1971.

May 28, 1971.

Sept. 17,1971

Sept. 30, 1971

Oct. 7, 1971.

Oct. 25, 1971.

Nov. 1, 1971

Nov. 10,1971

Do

Nov. 14,1971

Nov. 15,1971

Nov. 17,1971

Nov. 22,1971

Dec. 10, 1971

University of Washington, Seattle, Wash.

Elmer James Dixon Ill.

Seattle Community College, Seattle, Wash.

Do.

Princeton University, Princeton, M.J

Huey P. Newton.

Seattle Community Collese, Seattle. Wash

Elmer James Dixon 111.

Central High School, Evansville, Ind

Frank Adams, Clarence Albert,

Mike Malone, John Bennett.

•‹Reitz High School, Evansville, Ind..

Do.

Gannon College, trie, P3.

William Brown.

Syracuse University, Syracuse, N.Y.

Huey P. Newton.

University of Evansville, Evansville,

ind

Olympic Junior College. Bremerton,

Wash

Rosalind Y. Frazier.

Elmer James Dixon ill.

Portland State University, Portland, Oreg.

Kent Ford.

Lincoln High School, Portland, Oreg-

Kent Ford, Jeffery Lynn

Washington State University, Pullman, Wash.

Elmer James Dixon'lll, Michael

Indianapolis, University, Purdue Regional Campus, Fort Keith S. Parker, Donald H.

Seatle University, Seattle, Mash..

- Elmer James Dixon Ill.

Howard University, Washington, D.C.

Washington Student Union Building, Seattle, Wash

Aaron Dixon.

Harvara University, Cambridge, ilass.

Eugene Jones.

Oklahoma Stale University, Stillwater, Okla

Harold Joseph Holmes.

University of Oregon, Eugene, Oreg.

Aaron Dixon, Melvin Dickson.

Western Washington State College, Bellingham, Wash

Aaron Dixon.

Seattle Community College, North Campus, Seattle, Wash.

Frank Anthony Ware.

Winston-Salem State University, Winston-Salem, N.C.

Bobby Seale.

St. Augustine's College, Kaleigh, N.C

DO.

Adelphi University, Garden City, N.Y

Do.

Stanford University, Stantord, Calit-

Do.

University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich.

Do.

In contrast to the efforts by the Newton group to project a non-

violent image, the Cleaver faction has adopted programs of unre-

strained violence against the existing order. Individuals associated

with the Cleaver group have been linked to murders, arsons, attacks

on police officers, aircraft hijackings, and armed robberies. The official

newspaper of the Cleaver faction is known as "Right On! " This publi-

cation has called for the assassinations of the President. the Attorney

General, the Director of the FBI and other Government officials. The

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paper has also urged kidnapings of prominent citizens who could be

held for ransom for the exchange of so-called political prisoners.

eldridge Cleaver dispatched his wile, Kathieen, ona sneaking tour

of the linited States in the ball of 1971 in order to gam hnancial and

organizational support. She made numerous appearances on college

campuses across the country alternating diatribes at the Newton forres

and the U.S. Gorernment. I listing of the 22 appearances of Clearer

faction speakers at institutions of learning during 1971 is as follows:

Date

School

Speaker

Oct. 8, 197L

Oct. 22,

1971.

Oct 26, 1971

Oct. 30, 1971

Oct 31, 1971

DO.=

Nov.

NoV: 2,

1971

Nov.

4.

1971

1971

Nov.

1971

Nov. 1o, 1971

Nov.

1971

Nov. 12, 1971

Do

Nov. 13, 1971

Nov. 16

Nor.

1971

19, 1971

Nov, 21,

Nov.

1971

22, 1971

Nov. 23, 1971

Nov, 24, 1971

Dec. 2, 1971.

Cornell Universitv. Ithaca, N.Y

University of Caifornia, Los Angeles.

Calif

Los Angeles City College, Los Angeles,

State University of leve bis Stone Brook, N.Y.

Massachusetts Instriute of Technolozy, Cambridge, Mass..

Jeremiah E. Butke Scnool, Dorchesier, Mass.

Brandeis University, Waitham, Mass.

Tufts Universitv. Mediord, Hlass.

City Colleze of New York, New York, N.Y

State University of New York, Burials, N.Y

Wayne State University, Detroit, Mich.

Oberlin College , Oberun. Ohro..

Antioch Colleze, Yellow Springs, Öhio..

Central State University. Wiiberforce. Onio

Ohio State University, Columbus,

Onio.

Marymount Colleze,

Tarrytown, N.Y

Park College, Parxville, ilo

Fisk University, Nashville, Tenn

Florida State University, Tallahassee, Fla

Jackson State Colleze, Jackson, Miss.

Louisiana State University at New Orleans, New Orleans, La.

Bradley. University, Peoria, Ill.

Denise Oliver.

Kathleen Cleaver.

DO.

Do.

DO.

Do.

DO.

Do.

Do.

Do.

Do.

DO.

Do.

Da.

Do.

As his wife toured the United States, Eldridge Clearer was busy

creating tiro new revolutionary units. The Revolutionary Peoples

Communications Network was established as an international abore-

ground'liaison organization to publicize and coordinate the activities

of all revolutionary groups. Its underground counterpart is the afro-

American Liberation Army which will foster urban guerrilla var-

fare in the United States.

The organ of both new organizations is,

"Babylon," a biweekly publication which parallels "Right On!" in its

call for revolutionary violence and disruption. Clearer has assumed

personal command of the Afro-American Liberation Army from Al-

geria where he is in exile.

So that he may derote his full energies to guerrilla activities, Cleaver

has relinquished control over the Black Panther Party international

section in Algiers, naming Felix "Pete" O'Neal as his replacement.

•'Neal, also a fugitive from justice, once headed the Black l'anther

Party chapter in Kansas City, Mo.

STUDENT NATIONAL COORDINATING COMMITTEE

Another all-black retolntionary' organization is the Student Na-

tional Coordinating Committec which at the time of its founding as a

civil rights group in 1060. wns. known as the Student Nonviolent Co-

ordinating Committee. Leaders of the group have included well-

known black estremists Stokely Carmichael, who now lives in Guinea,

and H. Rap Brown. Wanted on local charges of noting to riot and

arson, as well as on a number of federal charges, brown was appre-

hended in New York City in October 1971 following the armed rob-

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William Flunt, currently titular leader of the Student National Co-

ordinating Committee, is spearheading efforts to revitalize chapters

throughout the country. Included among these efforts are programs

aimed at establishing black revolutionary labor, student and youth

groups.

OTHER BLACK EXTREMIST GROUPS

Other black extremist groups, most operating locally and region-

ally, spread revolutionary rhetoric and promote violence and con-

One such organization is the Junta of Militant Organizations, also

known as TOND. with headquarters in Florida. JONIO, dedicated to

the liberation of the black man, has declared it is necessary to bring

down the capitalistic system in the United States and replace it with

bins a yet confrontations Oh po tere patien tet in ire

police with the use of firearms.

The Republic of New Africa is another militant black revolutionary

organization. Its principal factions are located in inchigan, lissis-

sippi, and Louisiana. In August 1971, at Jackson, aliss., Its members

engaged in a shootont with law enforcement officers who approached

the Republic of New Africa headquarters there seeking four fugitives,

police ate as tie in de srin oh animate i ston, one

wounded. Eleren members of the group. including Richard Henry, one

of the founders, have been charged on a variety of counts including

conspiracy to commit murder and assaulting a Federal officer.

"BLACK ENTREMISTS IN PENAL INSTITUTIONS

It is becoming increasingly evident that black extremist activities in

our penal system are increasing at an alarming rate. Rebellion such as

occurred at the prison at Attica, V.X., has brought into sharp focus

major activities of black extremists, such as the Black Panther Party,

within the penal institutions.

The unrestricted flow of extremist propaganda, including its revo-

lutionary rhetoric, has stimulated the black, hardened criminal prison

inmates into an unholy alliance with the black revolutionary extrem-

ists. With the lessening of the Vietnam issue other extremist groups

such as the Students for a Democratic Society and Progressive Labor

Party are also interjecting themselves into the dangerous situation

that now exists in our penal institutions.

KLAN-TYPE ORGANIZATIONS

The FBI has continued to inrestigate Kan-type organizations which

had slight increase in membership from 4,300 a year ago to approx-

imately 4,500 at present. This increase in membership is attributed to

some extent to renewed interost in Klan-type organizations brought

about by rraction to school busing directires in order to achieve racial

balance in public schools. In addition to the membership, many thou-

sands of sympathizers lend their support to Klan programs and

activities.

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A number of

her small hate-type groups, erd

ively.white. con-

tinue in existence. These groups such as the National Socialist White

People's Party (formerly the American Nizi Party). the National

States Rights Party and the National Renaissance Party, obtain public

attention in excess ot their numerical strength by caretully orchestrated

demonstrations and colorful public appearances in order to gain con-

verts and/or sympathizers to their causes.

URBAN UNREST

During the calendar year 1971. 109 incidents involving mob violence

were reported as compared to 159 for all of 1970. Resulting from

the 1971 incidents were 2.033 arrests. 213 personal injurics, three

deaths and property damage amounting to about $1.7 million.

Disorders in the Nation's secondary schools continue to provide

strong evidence that racial discord is far from being at an end. A

total of 360 disturbances, during which there were 72S personal in-

juries and 2,455 arrests, Were reported for the 1970-1971 school year.

During the 1971-1972 school year, 125 school disturbances involving

331 personal injuries and 750 arrests have been reported (February 27,

1972).

According to information received by the FBI through the Uniform

from 1961 through 1969 only three ambush-type killings of policemen

were reported

During 1971, extremists were known to be or suspected of being

involved in 76 unprovoked and apparently racially connected attacks

on police, resulting in the deaths of 12 officers and the wounding of

47 others! Guerrilla-type ambushes accounted for eight of these deaths.

Although the overall number of estremist-type attacks on police de-

clined in 1971, the increase in ambush-type attacks on police during

the past 2 years is indicative of the growing terrorist threat to law

enforcement.

URBAN GUERRILLA WARFARE

Urban guerrilla warfare by black extremist organizations such as

the Black Panther Party, by white radical groups. such as the Weath-

erman, and by other organized terrorists is a serious threat to law

enforcement and the entire Nation.

Increasing evidence of bombings, burnings and unprovoked attacks

on police led the FBI to convene 51 selected State and local law enforce-

ment officers from areas where this problem appears most serious to a

seminar on urban guerrilla warfare in Washington, D.C. in Vovember

1971. The seminar explored this problem of secret and planned activity

designed to disrupt and terrorize the Gorernment. Covered specifically

tere the robbery or expropriation" of funds. arms and explosives to

a further the revolutionary objectives of these fanatical few.

** The primary activity of the urban guerrilla is the unprovoked at-

tack on police officers which is designed to show that police are power-

less to protect themselves and, thus, to convince revolutionary sym-

pathizers that society can be overthrown. The urban guerrilla also

67

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hopes to provide over-reaction by authorities in order to radicalze

sympathizers who would not otherwise engage in violent activity.

Carlos Marignella, deceased Brazilian revolutionary and author of

the "Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla," instructed that, "Every

urban guerrilla can only maintain his existence if he is disposed to

The Weatherman group claimed credit for the bombing of New

Lork City police headquarters in dune 1970 and Black L'anthers have

been identified in numerous attacks on police. The logic of the urban

guerrilla is simple, but terrifying: if police oncers cannot protect

themselves from ambushes, snipings and bombings, then the private

citizen is that much more defenseless against these weapons of the

revolutionary.

ANTIRIOT LAWS

The Federal antiriot laws, enacted in April 1968, established Fed-

eral jurisdiction for criminal prosecution in connection with certain

activities relating to civil disorders.

In May 19T1. Abbott Howard Hotiman tas indicted by a Federal

grand jury at Washington, D.C., on charges of violating Federal anti-

riot laws following an investigation by the FBI. The charges were

based on Hoffman's travel from Oklahoma to Washington, D.C., and

his activities during disruptions which occurred during antimar dem-

onstrations in Washington, D.C. in early ilay 1971.

Trial tas scheduled to begin in December 1911; however, the case

has been continued pending a decision by the U.S. Supreme Court in a

related matter. Hotiman was previously convicted for violating Fed-

eral antiriot statutes based on disruptions in Chicago in August 1908.

He was also cited for contempt based on his courtroom conduct during

Following extensive investigation by the FBI. a Federal grand

jury at Miami, Fla, in December 1970 indicted three leaders of an

organization known as the Black Afro Militant Movement. Two of

the leaders were charged with teaching and demonstrating the use of

explosive devices and possession of a destructive device in violation of

•Federal antiriot and gun control statutes. The third leader was

charged with violation of federal conspiracy and gun control statutes

based on possession of a destructive device. One defendant, after en-

tering a plea of guilty, was sentenced to 1 year's probation. The other

two defendants were tried and convicted; one was sentenced to 4 years'

imprisonment and the other was sentenced to serve 2½ years.

BOMBING MATTERS

The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, enacted in October 1970,

suestra portion of the cereal jurise tion is bitten a matter as.

stances to State or local law enforcement authorities conducting

investigation.

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Investigations authorized by the Department have involved substan-

tial commitments of manpower and resources, as typified by the fol-

lowing cases.

In March 1971 a violent explosion caused damages in excess of

$100,000 to the original Senate wing of the U.s. Capitol. This followed

an anonymous call to the etiect that the Capitol would be blown up

in 30 minutes as a protest against military operations in Laos. Exten-

sive investigation by the FBI is continuing and the matter is pending

before a Federal grand jury.

During the late evening of October I4, 1971, the Iranian Consulate

at San Francisco. Calif., mas extensively damaged by an explosion.

Damages to the Consulate and surrounding property were estimated

at approximately s1 million. Intensive investigation to identify all

persons responsible is continuing.

In duly 1970, a federal grand jury at Detroit, Mich., indicted I

members of the Weatherman faction of the Students for a Democratic

Society, charging them with conspiracy to violate Federal bombing

and gun control statutes. The indictment charged that the conspiracy

originated during a meeting of the leadership of the Students for a

Democratic society at thnt, alich., during Lecember 1969, and that

various overt acts. including bombings, attempted bombings and pur-

chases of explosives, followed that meeting. Five of the defendants

are presently free on bond, charges against one of the defendants were

dismissed in Hebruary 1971 at the request of the Government and the

other seven defendants are being sought as tugitives.

News media in several cities received handprinted letters in Jan-

uary 1972 warning that during July 1971 nine unusual prototype

bombs were planted in different banks across the country. The let-

ters stated that similar devices could be used to demand the release of

"political" prisoners." Explosive devices were located in safe deposit

boxes in banks in Chicago, San Francisco, and New York City. These

devices were bombs constructed of battery-porered calendar clocks,

photographic flash bulbs and black powder. The bombs were capable

of exploding.

The FBI conducted an intensive nationwide investigation based

upon which Ronald Kaufman, a 33-year-old Army absentee has been

charged with violating Federal bombing statutes. Kaufman is now

being sought as a fugitive.

REPORTS ON BOMBING INCIDENTS

For over a year the FBI has been collecting detailed information on

bombing incidents through its field offices. This data identifies the num-

ber of bombing incidents, types of devices, types of targets, and the

like. Beginning in January 1972, a program was instituted within the

FBI to disseminate this information on a monthly, quarterly and an-

nual basis to all law entorcement agencies through the Uniform Crime

Reporting program. This is another FBI service to keep local, State

and Federal law enforcement agencies fully informed.

NW 54933 Docld:32989779-Page 296-

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BOMB TIREATS AGAINST FBI FACILITIES

Burnths do calendar year, there recite mb threats against

ous harrassments forces us to assign a certain amount of manpower

to perform the required search of our space.

ESPIONAGE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

• Although shifting political winds periodically cause an individual

communist nation to deviate somewhat to the left or right of its set

course, there has been no indication that any has abandoned its resolve

to undermine the security of the United States through espionage and

subversion.

THE: SOVIET BLOC

The Soviet espionage services continue to lead in the intensity of

these efforts and the other Soviet-bloc nations complement their

efforts in varying degrees.

As has been true over the years, these communist intelligence agen-

cles, which uniformly regard the United States as the main enemy

use as bases for intelligence activities their diplomatic and commercial

establishments in the United States. Soriet-bloc official personnel in

this country have been increasing in number over the years and as of

February 1, 1972, the count was 2,503. consisting of 1.166 officials and

1,427 dependents. Not included in the count are couriers. members of

special delegations and other officials temporarily in the United States

but not assigned to oincial establishments.

These charts which I ofier to the Chairman show the build-up of

Soviet-bloc personnel in the United States since 1967 and a current

breakdown of oficial personnel by country.

Mr. RooNer. TVe shall insert these charts at this point in the record.

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 297

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IV. STATUTORY AUTHORITY AND

EXECUTIVE ORDERS AFFECTING

FBI INVESTIGATIVE JURISDICTION

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STATUTORY BASIS FOR INVESTIGATIONS CONDUCTED BY INTD

Statutes enumerating violations pertaining to the national security

are as follows:

Activities Against Foreign Governments

Title 18 U.S.C. 'Section 956 - Conspiracy to Injure Property

of Foreign Governments

Title 18 U.S.C. Section 958 - Commission to Serve Against a

Friendly Nation

Title 18 U.S.C. Section 959 - Enlistment in Foreign Service

Title 18 U.S.C. Section 960 - Expedition Against Friendly Nation

Title 18 U.S.C. Section 961 - Strengthening Armed Vessel of

Foreign Nation

Title 18 U.S.C. Section 962 - Arming Vessel Against Frienaly

Nation

Advocating the Overthrow of the Government

Title 18 U.S.C. Section 2381 - Treason

Title 18 U.S.C. Section 2382 - Misprision of Treason

Title 18 U.S.C. Section 2383 - Rebellion or Insurrectión

Title 18 U.S.C. Section 2384 - Seditious Conspiracy

Title 18 U.S.C. Section 2385 - Advocating Overthrow of Government

Antiriot Laws

Title 18 U.S.C. Section 2101, 2102 - Riots

Title 18 U.S.C. Section 231-233 - Civil Disorders

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Atomic Energy Act of 1954

Title 42 U.S.C. Section 2077 - Unauthorized Dealings in

Special Nuclcar Material

Title 42 U.S.C. Section 2122 - Prohibitions Governing Atomic

Weapons

Title 42 U.S.C. Section 2131 - Production Facility

Title 42 U.S.C. Section 2138 - Suspension of Licences During

War or National Emergency

Title 42 U.S.C. Section 2165 - Security Restrictions

Title 42 U.S.C. Section 2274-2277 - Restricted Data

Title 42 U.S.C. Section 2278 - Trespass Upon Commission

Installations and Photographing

Bombings

Title 18 U.S.C. Section 844 - Use and Possession of Explosives,

‹Threats

Civil Rights

Title 18 U.S.C. Section 245 - Federally Protected Activities

Crimes on Government Reservations

Title 18 U.S.C. Sections 13, 81 - Laws of States Adopted

• Destruction of Government Property

Title 18 U.S.C. Section 1361 - Government Property or Contracts

Espionage

Title 18 U.S.C. Section 792-799 - Harboring, Gathcring, Transmitting,

Photographing, Sale, Disclosure of Dolense Information

Title 50 U.S.C. Section 783 - Attempt to Establish Totalitarian

Dictatorship

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Firearms Acts

Title 26 U.S.C. Section 5812 - Transfers

Title 26 U.S.C. Section 5822 - Making Firearms

Title 26 U.S.C. Section 5842 - Identification of Firearms

Title 26 U.S.C. Section 5861 - Prohibited Acts

Title 18 U.S.C. Sections 921-922 - Unlawful Acts

Title 18 U.S.C. Appendix Section 1202 - Receipt, Possession,

Transportation of Firearms

Fraud Against the Government

Title 18 U.S.C. Section 1001 - Statements

Interstate Travel in Aid of Racketeering

Title 18 U.S.C. Sections 1951, 1952 - Racketeering Enterprises

Loss of United, States Nationality

Title 18 U.S.C. Section 1481-1483 - Loss of Nationality, Dual

Nationals, Restrictions on Expatriation

Title 18 U.S.C. Sections 911, 1015 - False Claim of Citizenship

Neutrality Matters

Title 22 U.S.C. Section 1934 - Munitions Control

Title 22 U.S.C. Section 401 - Illegal Exportation of War Materials

Private Correspondence with Foreign Governments

Title 18 U.S.C. Section 953 - Private Correspondence with Foreign

Governments

-3-

sien

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Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests of the United States

Title 18 U.S.C. Section 116 - Murder

Title 18 U.S.C. Section 1201 - Kidnaping

Title 18 U.S.C. Section 112 - Protection of Officials and Guests

Title 18 U.S.C. Section 970 - Protection of Property

Protection of United States Officials and Employees

Title 18 U.S.C. Section 111 - Assaulting, Resisting, Impeding

Title 18 U.S.C. Section 1114 - Protection

Title 18 U.S.C. Section 2231 - Assault or Resistance

Title 18 U.S.C. Section 351 - Congressional Assassination,

Kidnaping, Assault

Title 18 U.S.C. Section 1751 - Presidential Assassination,

Kidnaping, Assault

Registration Acts

Title 18 U.S.C. Section 951 - Agents of Foreign Governments

Title 18 U.S.C. Sections 611-621 - Foreign Agents Registration Act

Title 50 U.S.C. Sections 851-858 - Individuals with Knowledge of

Espionage or Sabotage

Title 18 U.S.C. Section 2386 - Registration of Certain Organizations

Sabotage

Title 18 U.S.C. Sections 2152-2154 - Fortifications, War Material,

Production of Defective War Material

-4-

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Strategic Facilities

Title 18 U.S.C. Sections 2155, 2156 - Destruction of National -

Defense Materials, Production.of Defective National - Defense

Material

Title 50 U.S.C. Section 797 - Security Regulations

Sedition

Title 18 U.S.C. Section 2387-2390 - Activities Affecting Armed

Forces, During War, Recruiting for Service Against the

United States, Enlistment to Serve Against the United States

The following statutes have been used to prosecute certain persons

involved in other subversive activities, although these are not within the

primary jurisdiction of the FBI:

Title 18 U.S:C. Sections 2, 1542 - Passport Violations

Title 18 U.S.C. Section 1704 - Renting Post Box Under False Identity

Executive Orders and orders of the Attorney General affecting

jurisdiction.

1) Executive Order #11605, dated July 2, 1971, amending

Executive Order #10450, of April 27, 1953, relating to

security requirements for Government employment

2) Code of Federal Regulations, Subpart P, Sections 0.85-0.89,

delegating authority of Attorney General to the FBI to investi-

gate violations of the laws of the United States and to carry out

the Presidential Directives of September 9, 1939, as reaffirmed

by Presidential Directives of January 8, 1943, July 24, 1950;

and December 15, 1953.

- 5 -

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JURISDICTIONAL AGREEMENTS

NW 54933-Docld:32989719-Page-304

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-2.

February 23; 1949

Subject:

Dezimitation of Investigative Duties of

the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the

Office of Naval Intelligence, the

Intelligence Division of the Army, and

the Office of Special Investigations,

• Inspector General. U. S. Alr force.

the Agreement for Coordinarion of the

Federal Bureau of Investigation,

Office

of Naval Inlelligence, Intelligence

Division of the Army: and the office

Special Irvestagations, Inspector General,

U. S. Air Force.

I. Ths underoigned have reviewed the directive contained in the

prestocat's denorandum ci June 26, 1939, as augmented by his

arcciave of september os 2939, the Derimitations agreement of

rebrusy l, 1942, and the presidential Directive of October 30.

194%.

In adulzion, coonizance has

been taken of the provisions

OT tra GEOmIC Unergy ACT di 1y40, and the specilic applicacior

of that act is set forth in section

it hereot. All other pro-

visions of thie Agreement are apart

from and

have no relation to

the stated requirements of the Atonio Energy Act. In view of the

above, it is nel agreedthat responsibilaty for the investigation

of ail activirios coming under the categories of espionage,

counterespicnages subversion and sabotage (hereinafter referred

to as "these razogories") will be delimited as indicated herein-

after. The responsibility assumed by one organization in a given

field carries with it the obiagation to exchange freely and

directly with the other subscribirg organizations all information

of mutual interest. When the organization with primary operating

responsibility is unable for any reason to produce material in

that field desired by the subscribing agenciess such special

arrangstents as may be legal or desirable will

be worked out

through negotiation at the national level prior to activity by

one agency in

auother agency's fieid.

It is recognized by the

subscribers hereto that the Headquarters Department of the Army

has dicentralized such functions to its major subordinate commanders.

When the major subordinate commanders of the Department of the

Army cannot effect satisfactory special arrangements, the matter

will hi referred to the Director of Intelligence of the Army for

surtner negotiations at the nationas level.

Close cooperation

and coordination between the four subscribing organizations 1s

a mutually recognized necessity.

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 305

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•i t

...;

..in

II. FBI will be res

sible for:

1 All investigations of cases in these categories involving

civilians and foreign nationals of all classes in the continental

United States: Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, the State of

Havaii", and

• the State of

Alaska except as specifically described

hereinafter in Paragraph Y, Section 5.

2.

All investigations of violations of the Atomic Energy Act

of 1940.

There are no territorial or personnel limitations on

this provision.

The coordination of the investigative activities of

civilian agencies in the United States, Puerto Rico, the

Virgin Islands,

and the state of Alaska except as specifically

described hereinafter in Paragraph V, Section 5, which provide

Information regarding subversive movements and activities in

these categories.

4.

Keeping the other subscribing organizations advised of

important developments in these categories within its cognizance,

particularly:

a. Activities of inactive reserves of the armed

service, including the National Guard.

D. Developments affecting plants engaged in armed

forces contracts.

c. Developments concerning the strength, composition,

and intentions of civilian groups within its

cognizance which are classed as subversive and

whose activities are a potential danger to the

security of the United States.

d. Developments affecting those vital facilities and

vital utilities which have been designated by the

Secretary of Defense.

Developments affecting

critical points of trans-

portation and communications systems which have

been designated by the secretary of Defense.

(For b, d, and e above no protective coverage is contemplated.)

*Iditorial revision of this Agreement to reflect the statehood

of Alaska

was approved by the IIC on January 7, 1959.

*Revision to reflect the statehood of Hawaii was approved by the

•IIC on September 9, 1959.

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":.o

III: De Army will be responsible for:

1.

The investigation and disposal of all cases in these

categories involving active

and retired military personnel of the army.

The disposal, but not investigation, of all cases in these

categories involving civilian employees of the Army in the

United States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.

3.

The investigation and disposal of all cases in these

categories involving civilian employees of the Army stationed in

areas other than the United States, Puerto Rico, and the

artications in the Unitat States, puerto Race, or the as have

Virgin Islands.

The investigation of all cases in these categories involving

civilians and foreign nationals who are not employees of the

other subscribing organizations, in areas where the Army Commander

has supreme jurisdiction over the armed forces stationed therein,

including possessions of the United States other than Puerto Rico

and

the Virgin Islands.

5. Informing the other subscribing organizations of any

important developments.

6. Advising the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the identity

and location of the plants engaged in Army contracts.

IV. ONI will be responsibie for:

1. The investigation and disposäl of all cases in these cate-

gories

involving active and retired naval personnel of the Navy.

categories inclving civilian empioyees of the Navy in the

• The disposal, but not investigation, of all cases in these

United States, Puerto Rice, and the Virgin Islands.

3.

The investigation and disposal of all cases in these

categories involving civilian employees of the Navy stationed in

areas other than the UnlIed States, Puerto Rico, and the

Virgin Islands, except that pari of such investigations as have

•TamilIcatIons in the United States, Puerto Rico, or the Virgin Islands.

4. The investigation of all cases, in these categories involving

the Virgin Islands, and in the State of Alaska except as described

in Section 5, below.

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--3.

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":::

8 ..

•

..?.

5: The investigation of all cases in these categories involving

civilians and foreign nationals who are not employees of the other

subscribing organizations and with the exception of civilian employees

of the Executive Branch of the Government on Kodiak and Afognak

Islands adjacent

to the Alaska Peninsula and Adak Island in the

Aleutian Chain.*

6. Informing the other subscribing organizations of any

important developments.

7.. Advising the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the identity

and location of the plants engaged in Navy contracts.

Vo The Office of Special Investigations, Inspector General,

TO So AIr FOrce WIll bE responsIDe for:

The investigation and disposal of all cases in these cate-

gories

involving active and retired military personnel of the

Air Force.

2. The aisposal, but not investigation, of all cases in

these categories involving civilian employees of the Air Force

in the ünited sidies, Fuerio Rico, anú ine Tirgin islänus.

3. The investigation and disposal of all cases in these

categories involving civilian employees of the Air Force stationed

in areas other than the United. States, Puerto Rico, and the

Virgin Islands, except thai part of such investigations as have

ramLICatIOnS In the United States, Puerto Rico, or the

Virgin Islands.

4. The investigation of all cases in these categories involving

civilians and foreign nationals who are not employees of the

other subscribirg organizations, in areas where the Air Force

Commander has supreme jurisdiction over the armed forces

stationed therein, including possessions of the United States

other than Puerio

Rico and the Virgin Islands.

The investigation

of the same cases described above in that portion of Alaska

described in Section 5, belch, with the exception of civilian

employees of the Executive Branch of the Government..

5. The investigation of all cases in these categories involving

civilians, except as described hereinabove, (1) in that part of the

Alaska Peninsula which is separated by a line drawn from illamna bay

i-4-

#This paragraph added. See IIC Working Committee Minutes of

September 15, 1954, and June 8, 1955.

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northwest to the town of old Illamna and thence following the a

south shore of lake Iliamna to the Kvichak River to the Kvichak

Bay; (2) in. the islands adjacent to the Alaska Peninsula excluding

Kodiak and siognak Istinds,which are the responsibility of the

Offico of Naval intelligonce; (3) in the Aleutian Islands excluding.

Adak Island which is the responsibility of the Office of Naval

Intelligence; and (4) in the Fribilof Islands.*

6. Informing the other suscribing organizations of any

important developments.

7.

Advising the rederal pureau of Investigation of the identity

and location of the piants engaged in Air Force contracts.

VI.

1. Where Sectaons III, IV, and V involve general territorial

coverage, responsibilary for such coverage will pass from one

element of the armed forces to another zutomatically when a

change of command responsibility ensues.

This provision is

subjoct to modification by diract agreement between the interested

elements of the arnod forces.

2 While investigativa misdiction over the civiliar

populace in former enemy ieii:

Lories soupied by the armed forces

has been provided for 1n Sections III, IV, and y above, those

provisions are subject to direct adjustment with the Department

of State if and when that Dopriment assunes, goverumental

direction in such areas of ocoupation..

VII. From time to time it may be desirable in the light of

changing conditions to nodify or amend this Delimitations

Agreement. Subject ta the excoptions already provided for.

above, general amerarints of modifications involving all of the

four subscribing organizations

shall be issued in the form of a

revised Delimitations Agreement and not as separate instructions.

VIII. During periods oi martini. law, or periods of predominant

armed forces interest not invoiving martial law, when agreed upon

by the subscribing agencies, the provisions of Appendix A or B,

hereto attached, will additionally apply.

IX. All agreements of a continuing nature and applicable to tho

or more of the subscribing agencies to the Delimitations

Agreement which affect the basic jurisdiction thereof which are

=5 -

#Original paragraph changed.

See IIC Working Committee Minutes of

September 15, 1954, and June 8, 1955.

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 309

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now or hereafter mutually entered. into by any of the subscribers

thoreto will be reduced to writing; will thereafter become

supplements to the delimitations Agreement, and distributed

only to the exteni agreed upon by the co-signers.

(Signed)

S. Leroy Irwin

Director or Intelligence,

Department of the Army

(Signed)

Thomas B. Inglis

Chief of Naval Intelligence

(Signed)

J. Edgar Hoover

Direcior, rederal Bureau o1 Investi-

gation

(Signed)

Joseph F. Carrol1

Director, Outice of Special Investi-

gations, Inspector General, U. S. Air

Force

APPROVED

6

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did door code do do code in a

APPENDIX A

PERIOD OF MARTIAL LAW

It is further agreed that when a state of martial law has

been declared by the President, the armed forces commander will

assume responsibilities.for coverage in these categories. His

authority to direct and

control the subscribing agencios of the

armed forces will be limited only by such instructions as he

may receive from the secretary of Defense.

He will have authority

to coordinate the intelligence activities of the subscribing

agencies

in his area of responsibility, within the Limits of

their available personnel and facilities, by, the assignment of

missions, the designation of objectives, and the exercise of

such coordinating control as he deems necessary.

He is not

authorized to control the administration or discipline of the

subscribing agencies in the area of his responsibilliy, nor to

issue instructions to them beyond those necessary for

• the purposes

stater ahaves.

II.

Personnel of the subscribing agencies in the area of responsi-

bility of the armed forces commander will still send reports to

and be under the continued supervision of their respective head-

quarters. They will render such aid and assistance to the armed

forces commander and his designated representatives as are

possible .and practicabie. They will furnish all pertinent informa-

tion, data, and other material that are or may be necessary or

desirable to the armed forces commander by the most expeditious

means and methods possible consistent with requisite security.

Each headquarters of the subscribing agencies will promptly be

advised by its agencies of all information and data appropriately

identified as having been furnished to the armed forces commander.

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APPENDIX B

PERIODS OF PREDOMINANT MILITARY

INTERESTS:

NOT INVOLVING MARTIAL LAW

I.

In time of war certain areas will come into prominence as

potential theaters of operation. When an armed forces commander

of such a potential theater is designated, he definitely has

Interest in, though not control of, the civilian life within the

area.

In order that the armed. forces commander may prepare hin-

self for the discharge of the possible responsibility which may

affix to hin, the following procedure is agreed upon:

U.S. Air Forse Will continue to function in accordance with ine

Air

Agents of the FBl; of ONI; W, Army; and the OSt, 1G,

provisions of Sections II, III, IV, and V. .

2. In adaition thereto, the armed forces commander may take

steps

to analyze the facilities existing and to explore the

manner in which complete coverage will be obtained if martial lar

is declared.

will insure

Judgment are leonardar the hope thatte

of the other agencies.

3. The armed forces commander is authorized to request and

receive such information from the other three agencies as he may

desire and they may be able to furnish.

:. .

II.

The analysis and exploration referred to above will show the

coverage furnished by each of the subscribing agencies and any

additional coverage each subscribing agency can undertake.

When

the commander feels that more complete coverage is required, It

is recognized that he is authorized to augment the coverage with

such elements of the subscribing agencies as are under his

jurisdiction. Prior to any invasion of the spheres normally

coming under the cognizance of the other subscribing agencies,

the armed forces commander should obtain the necessary authority

from the Secretary of Defense.

III. Irrespective of the fact that the preceding recommendations

have placed the initiative in the hands of the armed forces

commander, whenever any of the other services feel that such

a survey to determine adequacy of coverage should be undertaken

it should be so recommended.

-11 -

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candid codoo, ingride orga

Supplemental

1 AGreement Nc.

Ta the Termitations Murcement

so sent a pet edi adrani.

Cooperation and Coordination Between

The Federal Barean

Intesiication

The office of Spectal Inestigations, inspector lioneral, U.S. 11r force

The Director of' Intelligence, U.S. Army, the Director

of the Federal Bureau of Investigation,

the Director of Naval

Intelligense and the Director of the Office of Special Investi-

gations, Inspector General. Uos. Air force, with a view ic

promoting the closest possible cooperation

and coordination

between the Fieid Serrices of these agencies agree that the

following recommendations will be transmitted to their field

installations:

(a) Special Agents in Chargé of the Federal Bureau of

• Investigation Divisionai Offises, Military Intelligence Officers

of the pertinent Armies, District Officers of the office of

Special Investigations,

Inspector General, U.S. Air Force, and

Naval District Intelligonoe efficero will maintain close personal

liaison between those offices and their representatives, Including

a meeting of representatives of the four agencies, preferably the

officers in charge, at least twice per month, for the purpose of

discussing pending

and contempiated

investigative activities, and

any other subject necessary to insure that there is proper co-

ordination of

their investigative work.

• (b) The cless personal liaison to be maintained

between representatives of the four agencies at all times should

insure that there is not duplication of effort in any field, and

that a proper coverage of the whole investigative field is main-

tained.

Particuiar attention should be paid to avoiding any

duplication in connection with

the use of informers.

(c) A distinstion should be recognized between the

investigative

interest.

interest of irdividual agencies and the coverage

It is believed that all four agencies should study,

Irom time to time, the coverage of the investigative field in

order to insure that all channels of interest and avenues of

information are adequately coyered by at least one of the partici-

pating agencies.

(d) Where there is doubt as to whether or not one of the

other agencies is interested in information collected, it should

be transmitted to the other agency.

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322104202

(e) Consideration should be given to the fact that certain

classes of information are of general interest to the Military,

Naval, and Air Force Intelligence services in connection with

background and knowledge of espionage and sabotage organizations,

even though the Military, naval, and Air force Intelligence

services may have no apparent direct investigative interest.

(f) Should differences of opinion of a minor nature

occur, the directors of the four intelligence agencies feel that

with proper personal. liaisons such differences can be satisfactorily

adjusted locally by the officials in charge of the various divisional

organizations.

• (Approved by I.I.C. June

2; 1949).

NW 54933 Docld:32989719- Page 314

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Supplemental Agreement No.

the Delimitations Arreement

(As Amengea June 8, 1950)

"i" teres done

Investigative Jurisdiction on

Vessels of lIlitary

Sea Transportation Service

1. The investigative jurisdiction of all activities

under the categories of espionage, counterespionage, subversion

and sabotage on vessels of the Nilitary sea transportation service

is as follows:

a.

Investigative jurisdiction on vessels purchased

by the navy will be the responsibillty of the office of naval

Intelligence.

b. Vessels obtained by the Navy through a "bare boat

charter" will be under the investigative jurisdiction of the Office

of Naval Intelligence.

c. Vessels allocated to the Military Sea Transportation

serice which are manned and

superised by their private onnors

are under the investigative jurisdiction of the FBI.

2. When civilian personnel who are subjects of an

investigation under a or b above reach a U.S. port or a port

where the FBI has a field agency, or prior to reaching such port,

if practicable, the Department of the Navy will promptly furnish

the •FBI all pertinent information concerning the investigation.

If personnel who are subjects of an investigation as above remove

themselves from the vessel upon arrival of the vessel in port and

further surveillance is considered necessary, the Navy will

continue surveillance until notified by the FBI at local level

that the FBI will make every effort to transfer responsibility

upon arrival of the vessel at the port.

3. When the FBI opens an investigation under c above

or when an FBI investigation in progress develops or is believed

• about to develop ramifications under a, b or c above, the FBI

will promptly furnish all pertinent information to the Navy and

will thereafter coordinate its actions with the Navy whenever and

wherever deemed necessary to insure proper pursuit of the case.

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Supplementa. Agreement Ro

to the beimiiaisons Agrecent

.:.

Investigation of Private Contractors

of the Armed forces

It is agreed by the subscribers of the Delimitations

Agreement

(hereinafter referred to as subscribers) that with

reference investigations of civilian employees, applicants for

employment directors and key personel of privately orned plants

and facilities, working.or bidding in contracts important to the

Army, Navy or Air Force (hereinafter referred to as the Armed

Forces procurement, the follewing will be followed insofar as

practicabie.

Exceptions thereto will be adjusted by mutual

agreement beiween the subscribers concerned.

The Armed Forces will conduct background

investigations of such persons unless there is a particular reason

fOr

requesting that an investigation be conducted by the FBI or

the FBI has a special interest in a particular case and has

notified the Armed Forces of such interest.

b. The FBI will conduoi complaint investigations

of such personnel upon specific request in each case by one or

more of

' the Armed Forces.

If one of ihe Armed Forces has no

further need for an investigation somested, but not completed,

prompt notification will be made to the FBI.

c." Investigations conducted by the Armed Forces

under a above will be terminaied and all information passed to

the FBI when credible derogatory information of a loyalty nature

Is uncovered. Upon receipt of such a case, the FBI will proceed

as under b above if one of the Armed forces so requests.

do When one of the subscribers is aware that

another is conducting an investigazion on a person or firm

identical or closely connected with

a person or firm it

contemplates investigating, no investigation will be under-

taken without the consent

of the subscriber which has an investi-

gation in progress.

investigating agency will make available

to the other interested agency copies of the reports of the

investigation made.

e. Normally, identity of confidential informants

will not be communicated from one

subscriber to another; however,

when such communication occurs, the receiving subscriber will

employ the highest pessible safeguards to insure that such informants

are not compromised.

No transmittal of information concerning

confidential informants to a third

subscriber or to another agency

is authorized except by specific consent of the originator.

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p'e

f.

A subscriber who receives a report of investi-

gation from another subscriber may freely transmit copies of such

reports to a third subscriber except as provided in e above.

g. A report of complete investigation received

by the Armed Forces from the FBI will not be reopened without the

approval of the FBI except ‹to obtain additional background intorma-

tion.

In such case, the fBl will be furnished copies of all

information obtainca. Other information required by the Armed

Forces will be requested of the FBI.

to conduct an investigation or to conduct additional investigation

Enve sf gation the

h. If one of the Armed Forces requests the FBI

as provided under a above, and 1i for any reason the rBi decline.

or is unable to conduct such investigation or additional investi-

gation, the Armed Force concerned may proceed with the investi

The FBI Will be furnished copies of the results thereof

da the rBi so requests or if the ammed force concerned considers

the results to be of FBI interest.

Nothing above 1s to be construed as 21tering

the basic Delimitations Agreement of 1949 or current agreements

concerning subversive organizations.

(Approved by I.I.C. June 2, 1949)

2

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Suppicmental Arcement No

to the Delinitations Agrechent

.::

Investigation of Reserve and Civilian

Components of the armed services

'It is agreed by the subscribers to the Delimitations

Agrocment that the Army, the Navy and the Air Force may conduct

backgiound investigations on members of the inactive reserve

and National Guard who are anticipated being called back to

active auty, or where an investigation is undertaken for the

purpose of determining whether the

individual should be disenrolled

fron his military status, or to determine whether the individual

may be granted access to classified military information. The

following procedures shall be pursued in each. of the above

circumstances:

(1) The Intelligence agencies of the Army, Navy or

Air Force before undertaking such

background

investigation will consult the FBI to

determine:

(a) if the FRI has an

investiaation

in progress; if so, no investigation will

be undertaken by the intelligence agencies

except as may be mutually agreeable to the

Armed

Force concerned and the FBI; (b) if

the FBI already has made an investigation;

It so, the results will be made available

to

the other agencies; (c) if the FBi has

information on the individual, even though

It may not nave conducted an investigation.

(2) If,

after consulting the FBI, investigation is

undertaken by the other

agencies, it will be

pursued no further than is necessary to make

the determination required by the other agencies,

and all information developed pertinent to the

four categories will be furnished promptly to

the FBI.

(Approved by I.I.C. June 2, 1949)

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.?::

Supplemental Marcement No. VI

to the Delimitacions Aarcement

Investigation in Areas Not Specifically Assigned

It is agreed by the military subscribers to the

Delimitations Agreement that the references therein in

paragraphs III. 4., IV. 4., and V. 4. to "areas where the

Army (Navy, Air Force) Commander has

supreme jurisdiction

over the armed forces stationed therein" shall be interpreted

as referring to areas where the Department of the Army

(Navy,

Air Force) is responsible for the administrative and

logistic support of the Headquarters

of Conmands established

by the Secretary of Defense.

(Approved by I.I.C. November 4, 1959)

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:.

in dirpig: Flouse Birfer 80

File No.

SULNGTON, D.C. 20035

Fehruary 7, 1965

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGRICY

OPERATIONS IN TI UNITED STATES

JEK Act 6 (1) (B)

SECRET

GROUP 1

Excluded from automatic

downgrading and

declassification

.?..

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 320

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SECRET

JFK Act 6 (1) (B)

2

SECRET

-NIW/ 52

134- Docld:329

989719

-Page

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INVESTIGATIVE GUIDELINES

TITLE XI, ORCALIZED CRILE CONTROL ACT OF 1970

RECULATION OF EXPLOSIVES

1. General

Title XI of the captioned law amends Title 18, United

States Code, by adding a new chapter 40 with section lumbers sil

through 848

governing the importation, manufacture, distribution

and storage of explosive materials and creatina cartain federa.

offenses pertainind to the unlawful use of explosives.

Administration

of explosives regulation is vested in, the Secretary of the Treasury

as is investigative jurisdiction over the unlaful acts proscribei

in section. 842. Under authority contained in section 845 the

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Bureau of Alcchol:

Tobacco and Firearms (AlF) have concurrent investigative jurisdic-

tion as to the remainder of chapter 40, i.e., the unlawful acts

proscribed in subsections (d), (e), (f), (a), (h.) and (1) of section

841. Although not specified in chapter 40, the Postal Inspection

Service shall have

jurisdiction in invesiiyaie ail inidenis

involving explosive or incendiary devices sent through the mails

or directed against U.S. Postal Service property.

Title XI greatly broadens Federal authority pertaining to

explosives-connected offenses.

At the same tine, Congress has

expressly,

disclaired any intent to occupy the field to the exclusion

of state law on

the same subjact matter.

To effect both Congressional

purposes and to pravent unnecessary duplication of effort it is

essential that the limited. Federal investigative resources be carefully

allocated, particularly in cases in which both the ATF and the FBI

have jurisdiction.

2. Federal Bureau of Investication (FI) Jurisdiction in Ceneral

(a) Effect on prior jurisdiction - This agreement applies

only to chose incidents as to wich the fbl had no investigative

jurisdiction prior to the enactient of the captioned Taw and to

incidents previously sunject to FBI investigation by reason of chastar

65, Title 18, United

States Code (malicious mischief). Investigative

procedures in other types of incidents (e.g., train wrecking, damaging

aircraft and notor vehicles, racketeering) shall remain unchanged.

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 322

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. - 2 -

(b) Primary jurisdiction - subject to the provisions

hereof, the FBI will exercise primary jurisdiction over all alleged

violations of section 814 which are directed at foreign diplomatic

facilities or at activities: such as transportation and tourist

ortices, operating under the aegis of a foreign government althoug

not in a diplonatic status, over all alleyed violations of sucsections

844(d) through (i) which are perpetrated by terrorist/revolucionary

groups or individuals and all other violations of subsections di(e)

through (s) which are not directed at Treasury Department or Postal

Service buildings or functions.

(c) Type of Investigation to be Corducted

(1). Offenses pernetrated by terrorist/revolutionary

grouns oi individuals • The Fol til meteciately initiate a tull

investigation of all alleged violations of section 844 nich appear

at the outsec to have been perpetrated uy terrorist revolutionary

yiùups üi indiviunals no defined in aurance dy the Incoral Security

Division of the Departnent of Justice. If ATF or the Postal

Inspection Service has properly initiated investigations and infor

mation is subsequently developed indicating apparent involvenent of

terrorist/revolutionary groups or individuals, responsibility shall

be relinquished to the FBI unless a determination is made by the

Department of Justice that a transfer of responsibilities will

unduly impair further investigative efforts.

(2). Alleged offenses against Colleges and Universities -

The FBI will inmediately initiate a full investigation of any alleged

violation of section 344 which involves the use or atrempted use of

explosive (as distinguished from incendiary) materials against the

facilities of a college or university. Investigation of alleged viola-

tions involving use or attempted use of incendiary materials will ta

limited initially to

the development of background infornation as

prescribed in paragraph 6 below.

(3) Alleued offenses directed anainst foreian

diplomatic facilities and related activities - The PSI will Immediately

initiate a full investigation of all alleged violations of section 844

which are directed at foreign diplomatic facilities and related

activities

as described in paragraph 2(b) above.

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 323

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3-

(4) All other alleged violations of subsection

844(f) -- offenses involvine use of exolosives against united

States property or rederally financed orcanizations, and (i) -

offenses involvine possession of exulosives in ouildings orned

Teased,

used, eic., by the linited States - The full will irmediately

initiate a full investigation of all violations of subsection 844(g)

over trich it has primary jurisdiction hereunder, and those viclations

of 844(f) which are directed at fodoral property le.g., à military

facility, or a federal function (e.g., a salective service or noTe

in other violations of 844(f) the FSI will develop and

disseminate background information as indicated in paragraph o below.

3. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearis Division (ATF) Jurisdic-

tion in General

(a) Violations ancillary to firearns laws violations or

violation of section 0e2 - The Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearns Division

(AIF) of tie Copartment of the Treasury will exercise investiçative

jurisdiction over violations of section 244 which are ancillary to its

primary jurisdiction over the Federal firearms laws or over section

842 of Title XI.

(b) Violations of subsection S44(d) - interstate transporta-

tion of explosives with unlawful intent and subsection 844(i)

offenses aminst property used in or affecting coumerce - Subicct to

paragraph 2D, above,

the ATF will exercise primary investigative

jurisdiction over violations of subsection s44(d) and (i) and will

conduct a full investigation theraof unless notified by the Criminal

Division that pursuant to paragraph 2(c)(1), above, the Department of

Justice has requested FBI investigation in a particular marter.

(c) Violations directed at Treasury Department property or

functions - The ATF shall have primary jurisdiction to investigate all

violations of section 844 which are directed at Treasury Departrent

property or functions and will conduct a full investigation of such

violations.

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 324

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## Page 325

4. Postal Inspection Service Jurisdiction

The Postal Inspection Service shall have primary juris-

diction to investigate all violations of section 844 wnich

directed at U.S. Postal Service property or functions.

5. Special Considerations

(a) Bomb Threats, false information (section san(e)! -

The ATF and the Postal Inspection Service shall have jurisdiction

over violations of section 844(e) against Treasury Department or

Postal Service property or functions, respectively.

The FBI shall

have jurisdiction over all other violations of section 814(e). Upon

receipt of information alleging or suggesting a violation of subsection

844(e), the investigative agency concerned will review available

infornation to determine whether the identity of the offender is

known or can be readily ascertained and, if not, whether the evidence

suggests a pattern or pian or such offenses by a pariicular urfonder

or against a particular victim.

If such a patter appears or if the

offender is identified, all available information will be disseminated

as indicated in paragraph 6 below.

(b) Use/carryina explosive in conmission of a felony

(section, 844(b)) - Violations of 344(h) should be handled as an

adjunct of the felony from which they arise and should be discussed

with the appropriate United States Attorney or Division of the

Department handling prosecution of the underlying felony offense.

The agency having jurisdiction over the underlying felony will havé

investigative jurisdiction over the 844(h) violation (e.g., bank

robbery is under FBI jurisdiction).

(c) Violations of 25 U.S.C. 5861 (destructive devices) -

In incidents involving alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. 844 (which

may also involve a violation of 20 U.S.C. 5001), AlF shall not

exercise its primary jurisdiction under 2G U.S.C. 5561 involvine

destructive devices, tut the incident shall be treated in accordance

with the provisions of these

guidelines.

This is in no way a

relinquishment by ATF of its investigative jurisdiction under Title

Il of the Gun Control Act of 1968.

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 325

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## Page 326

-5 .

6. Development of Background Information

Some incidents such as those directed against Federal

property or functions (paragraph 2(b) above) require immediate full

federal investigation.

Others require a more circumspect approach

and will result in full Federal investigation only after considara-

tion of factors pertinent to the exercise of Federal jurisdiction.

Accordingly, in those incidents which these guidelines do not prescribe

innediate full investigation, the investigative agency having juris-

diction will develop background inforation which includes (a) facts

bearing ch notivation such as involvement of the suspected perpatrators

in terrorist/revolutionary activities, organizad crime, labor-managelent

disputes, or racial-religious hate activities; (b) the applicability

of stato and local laus and likelihood of state or local investigative

and prosecutive actions; and (c) any other available facts indicating

whether ur not the offense warrants Federal investigation and prosecu-

tion.

Such background information will be submitted telephonically

(202-739-2745) or by telotype (710-322-0003) to the General Crines

Section re tha Criminal Division and to the appropriate United States

Attorney.: The Criminal Division will advise the investigative

agency

concerned whether the matter varrants submission to any other

Division or Section of the Criminal Division, and when so warranted

the Criminal Division will transmit the infornation to such other

Division on Section.

%. Full Investigation

A full investigation will be initiated immediately in

those instances wherein such investigation is specified herein. In

ocher instances full investigation will be initiated only upon direc-

tion of the Department of Justice after consideration by the Division

having cognizance over the matter of the background information

developed under paragraph 6 above.

8. Reports

Copies of case reports prepared in matters investigated under

these guidelines will be furnished directly to the Department of Justice

and the appropriate United States Attorney. All investigative agencies

NW 54933 Docld:32989719: Page 326

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## Page 327

shall submit initial

reports as soon as practicable to the Departrent

of Justice and shall subiit progress reports once each 30 days or

as soon thereafter as possible.

The Criminal Division of the

Department of justice will be informed as soon as possible in each

instance wherein an investigative agency initiates an investigation

under section 844.

Such notification is of critical importance to

the avoidance of duplication of investigativa activities. Also each

agency subscribing to these guidelines shall, upon instituting inves-

notify other subscribina agencies having a logical interest thercin.

be maintained to avoid duplication of investigative effort.

Additionally, each such agency will exchance information

on a timely basis and in a manner which will not interfere with

ongoing investigations relative to types, sources, movement, and

storage of explosives which ara the subject of its investigations.

Information regarding significant developments in investigations

being conducted under these guidelines and information of an intelli-

gence nature coveloped, incidontal to investigationo mich is of logiöai

intorest to the Department of Justice shall be furnished promptly to

the Criminal Division of that Department which will be responsible

for any necessary further dissemination within that Department.

9. Review, of Guidelines

These guidelines shall be reviewed on a continuing basis by

the parties hereto to determine whether problems exist in their admin-

istration which should be alleviated or whether modification of any of

the terms of the agreement are needed in the interests of better law

enforcement.

10. Summary

Section

842

844(d)

• Iype Violation

Regulatory provision viola-

tions

Interstate transportation

(except by mail) of explosives

with unlawful intent

Primary Jurisdiction

ATF

ATF

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 327

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## Page 328

-7-

Section

844 (e)

844 (f)

844 (g)

844 (h)

Type Violation

Bomb threats - false infor-

mation - Treasury buildings

or functions

U.S. Postal Service buildings

or functions

Other

Offenses against property of

the United states or federally

financed organizations -

Treasury buildings on functions

U.S. Postal Service buildings

Other (including colleges and

universities)

Possession of explosives in

buildings ouned, leased, used

by the United States -

Treasury buildings or functions

U.S. Postal Service buildings

or functions

-...

Other

Use/carrying explosives in

commission of a felony

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 328

Primary Jurisdiction

ATF

U.S. Postal

Inspection Service

FBI

AFF

U.S. Postal

Inspection Service

FBI

ATF

U.S. Postal

Inspection Service

FBI

Agency having juris-

• diction over underlying

felony

---

## Page 329

-8-

Section

844 (i)

All Sections

Type Violatisu

Offenses against property

used in or affecting commerce

All offenses perpetrated by

terrorist/ravolutionary groups

or individuals

Primary Jurisdiction

ATF

FBI - Unless another

agency has started

investigation before

receipt of information

indicating terrorist/

revolutionary involverent.

In this event see para-

graph 2c(1) above.

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 329

---

## Page 330

• ..

AGREENENT BETWEEN THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND THE UNITED STATES

• SECRET SERVICE CUNCERNING PROTECTIVE RESPONSIBILITIES

"AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND THE UNITED STATES

SECRET SERVICE CONCERNING PROTECTIVE RESPONSIBILITIES

["I. Purpose of Agreement

"The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) originates, and receives from

other sources

large numbers of reports on individuals and organizations.

ne purposo of this agreement is to define that portion of the informatior

on tale with, or received or originated by, the FBl, which the United States

Secret Service (USSS) desires to receive in connection with its protective

responsibilities.

"The USSS has statutory authority to protect, or to engage in certain

activities to protect, the President and certain other persons.

(Certain

other persons, as used in this agreement, refers to those persons protected

by the Secret Service under Titie 18, U. S. Code, Section 3056.) The

authority of the USSS to protect the President or certain other persons is

construed

to authorize it to investigate organizations or individuals and to

interview individuals who might constitute a threat to the President or cer-

tain other persons•

The FBI has statutory authority to investigate assault,

killing or kidnaping and attempts or conspiracies to kill or kidnap the

President and other designated individuals.

: "The FBI will make available to the USSS information it may request di inive

mateu wii jy its nature reveals a definite of possible threat to the

safety of the President and certain other persons.

"A second purpose of this agreement is to insure the most effective pro-

tection for the President and certain other persons by establishing a clear

• division of responsibility between the FBI and the USSS.

Such division

will also avoid compromising investigations or sources and needless duplica-

tion of effort.

•"II: General Responsibilities

"The USSS is charged by Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 3056, with the

responsibility of protecting the person of the President of the Unitec

•States, the members of his immediate family, the President-elect, the

President of other officer in the order of

President, and the Vice President-elect; protecting the person of a former

President

and his wife during his lifetime

and the person of a widow of a

¡ President until they reach 16 years of

protecting persons

who are determined from time

the Secretary

of the Treasury, after consultation with the Advisory Committee, as being

major Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates who should receive such

protection (unless the candidate has declined such protection); protecting

the person of a visiting head of a foreign state or foreign government

and, at the direction of the President, other distinguished foreign visitors

to the United States and official representatives of the United States

i performing special missions abroad (unless such persons decline protection).

jia.

NW 54933 Docld:32989719* Page 330

---

## Page 331

:......

•The Exccutive Protective

vice, under the control of

th..

director,

USsS, is charged by Title

3, U.S.

Code, Section 202, with protection

the Exccutive Mansion and

grounds in the District of Columbia; any building

in which Presidential offices are

located; foreign diplomatic missions

located in the metropolitan arca of the District of columbia; and foreign

diplomatic missions located

in such other areas in the United States, its

territories and possessions, as the President, on a case-by-case basis,

may direct.

• "The FBI is charged under Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 1751, with Investiga-

tive jurisdiction over the assault,

killing of kidnaping, and attempts or

conspiracies to assault, kill or kidnap the President of

the United States

and other designated individuals.

"The FBI has responsibility for Federal investigations of all violations

of Title 18, U. S. Code, Sections 112, 970, 1116-1117 and 1201, relating

for the Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests

in the United States.'

"The FBI has investigative jurisdiction over violations of a wide range of

the criminal statutes of the United States including primary jurisdiction

over matters affecting the internal security of the United States.

"III. Exchange of Information and Coordination of Responsibilities

"The USSS undertakes to identify individuals or groups who because of their

propensities or characteristics, may be dangerous to the President of the

United States and certain other persons•

To assist the USSS in identifying

such individuals and groups the FBI agrees to furnish to the USSS; information

¡vies tian pubiic suurce information or information originating with orner

U.S. agencies) from its files or which may come to its attention which by

its. nature reveals a

danger or possible danger to the President or certain

other persons, or which can be construed as falling within the categories of

information desired by the USSS as set forth in Section IV of this agreement.

"The FBI will inform the USSS of the

who come to the attention of the Freidentity of individuals or organizations

as knowingly and. willfully advocating,

abetting, advising, or teaching the duty, necessity, or propriety of over-

throwing or destroying the Government of

the United

States, or the Govern-

ment of any state, territory, or possession, or political subdivision

therein, by force or violence, or by the assassination of any officer of

any such government. The FBI will furnish the USSS with reports on such

individuals

or organizations as

Juring investigation by the rb.

of such individuals or organizations, the FBI will be alert and promptl;

notify the USSS of any information indicating a possible plot against the

person of the President and certain other persons.

"The USSS agrees that it will conduct no investigation of individuals or

groups identified or suspected of being threats to the internal security of

the United States without notifying the FBI. However, when time for

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 331

---

## Page 332

consultation is not available, and an indication of immediate danger

exists, the USSS may take such action as is necessary with respect

ing out its protective responsibilities.

Any information obtained by

USSS during such action will be furnished to the FBI as expeditiously as

possible.

"The FBI will not conduct investigation of individuals or

for the purpose establishes whether the constitute then to me

safety of the President and certain other persons unless there is an indica-

tion of a violation of Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 1751, or other

statute over which the FBl has jurisdiction.

"It will be the responsibility of the FBI to advise the USSS when investiga-

tion is being initiated under Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 1751 and there-

after to furnish the USSS with copies of the FBI investigative reports as

they are prepared.

It will be the responsibility of the USSS to furnish

the FBI any information in its possession or which may come to its attention

which reasonably indicates

that a violation of Iitle 18, U. S= Code,

Section 1751, has been or is being committed.

"The USSS also agrees to furnish

the FBI any information in its possession

of which may come to its attention indicating a violation of any other

statutes. over which the FBI has investigative

jurisdiction.

"'The FBI, under its responsibility for investigation' of violations of

Title 18, U. S. Code, Sections 112, 970, 1116-1117, 1201, and 1751 will take

cognizance of the protective responsibilities of the Treasury Department

inder Title 3, U. S. Code, Section 202 and Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 3056 ti

and tiniò dues

mut limit on intericio with the authoritr of the Secretars ci

the Treasury in the discharge of his statutory protective responsibilities.

This is not to be construed

as vesting concurrent investigative jurisdiction

with the Treasury Department with respect to investigations of individuals

or organizations engaged in activities affecting the national security includ-

ing terrorism, treason, sabotage, espionage, counter-espionage, rebellion or

insurrection, sedition,

seditious conspiracy, neutrality matters, Foreign

Agents Registration Act, or any other Statute or Executive Order

relating to

national security.

investigations of such groups or individuals to

any reasons other

than in connection with protective responsibilities

must be closely coordinated with and have the concurrence of the FBI in

order to minimize interference with national security responsibilities of

the FBI.

"IV. Information to be Furnished to the United States Secret Service by

the Federal Bureau of Investigation

to the USSS.

be furnished to the extent

available:

NW 54933 Docid:32989719' Page 332

---

## Page 333

"Individua

•Identification data includin:

Sume or names,

addresses,

otograph (or statement as to

ilability of

such), phys

1 description, date and plac

birth, employment,

and marital

status.

"Organization - Name or names, address or addresses, officers,

size, purpose or goals of organization, source of financial support,

background data and such other relevant information as may be

available.

"Reason for Referral - Statement of the class or classes of

information described in Section IV B under which the individual

or organization belongs.

"Information in FBI Files - A summary, as appropriate, of per-

tinent portions of any FBI file on an individual or organization

referred.

"FBI Identification Records - The USSS will make specific requests

in each instance where a check of the FBI identification records

is desired.

"B. Types of information to be referred:

"1. Information concerning attempts, threats, or conspiracies

to injure, kill, or kidnap persons protected by the USSs

or other

U.S. or foreign officials in the U. S. or abroad.

"2. Information concerning attempts or threats to redress a

grievance against any public official by other than legal

means, or attempts personally to contact such officials

that purpose..

"3.

Information concerning threatening, irrational, or abusive

written or oral statements about U. S. Government or foreign

officials.

"4.

Information concerning civil disturbances

anti-U. S.

demonstrations or

incidents or demonstrations arainst foreien

diplomatic establishments.

"5. Information concerning illegal bombings or bomb-making;

•concealment of caches of firearms, explosives, or other

implements of war; or other terrorist activity.

"6.

Information concerning persons who defect or indicate a

desire to defect from the United States and who demonstrate

one or more of the following characteristics:

a. Irrational or suicidal behavior or other emotional

instability.

..

b. Strong or violent anti-U. S.

sentiment.

c. A propensity toward violence.

...

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 333

---

## Page 334

117.

= 55

Information concerning persons who may be considered poten-

tially dangerous

to individuals protected by the Usss

their background or activities, including evidence

of emotional instability or participation

in groups engaging

in activities inimical to the United States.

"V.

Provision of Federal Bureau of Investigation Personnel to Protect

the President and Uther Protected Persons

"equest set sent be detace to the esS in ser te, Seent 3056

request FBI Agents be detailed to the USSS

augment the capacity

of the USSS to perform its protective duties. Such requests should be

addressed to the Director of the FBI.

"FBI Agents detailed to the USSS are under the direction and exclusive

operational control of the Director of the USSS for the period of their

assignment.

The FBI Agents so detailed may perform an armed of other

protective function.

"VI. Implementation of Agreement

"In order to errect the best possible security oi tne Fresiveni ani ceriain

other persons and places whose protection is the responsibility of the USSs,

the FBI and the USSS will construe the terms of this agreement liberally

and will take such steps as are necessary to insure the proper exchange and

coordination of information.

"The

agreement shall be reviewed

annually by representatives of the FBI

and the USSS, or at such other times as the FBI or the USSS may request,

to

insure that the agreement is both practical and productive. Revisions may

be made on the authority of the Director of the FBI and the Director

of the USSS.

"This agreement supers

USSS.

$!1 prior agreements between the FBI and the

JUlY 16N 1073

Date

BY 1s/ Clarence M. Kelley

Director

Federal Bureau of Investigation

JUlX 30, 1973

Date

BY Is/ James J. Rowley

Director

United States Secret Service"

NW 54933 Docld:32989719. Page 334

---

## Page 335

ORGANIZATIONAL BREAKDOWNS

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 335

---

## Page 336

MAPUTER

SYSTEMS

DIVISION

13S 329° D910:03

IP

•CAM CRIME REPOSTING

CHOK:

* NI CATA SA:BICS

GOAL CRIME IRFORMATION

• 1ER SECTION:

::800s+++380857109219

PROCESSIMO SECTION:

4141248.393

CLANERGE M. KELLEY

ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR

NICHOLAS P. CALLAHAN

OFFICE OF PLANNING

AND EVALUATION

ASSISTANT DIRECIOR

RICHARS I CALLAGHEP

STUDIES AND

RECOMMENDATIONS:

ertratleks

PLANTIAG

PACCAINES

INSPECTION

DIVISION

ASSISIANT DIRECTOR

HAPIND M BASSII!

INGMACTIONS - VIELD ANO HOO

IMICIAL PROLICIS

INTERRAL AUCITS

SECURITY COCACIMATOR

¿OCURENT CLASSITICATION

r..

INTELLIGENCE

DIVISION

ASSISTANT O:RECTOR

M RAYMONO WANHALL

COUNTEPINTELLIGENCE BRAMCH: +→

CI-T SECTION:

ESPIOTACE

TOREICA AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT

MATERRAL SECURITY

C1-2 SECTION:

FORTICA M'ERTS REGSTRATION ACT

INTERKI: SECURITY

540:

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ESPIONAGE

FORENO AGENTS REGISTRATIONT AC1

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PORERA MILLIART AND RIVAL MATTI

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DOX( STIE AND VILITARY LUION

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FCPLES POLICE COCPIRATION

INTERMAL SECURITY BRANCH:

1S-1 SECTION:

EXTALMiTS AMO

RCAAATKM; AND MOYIQUALS

EATPEM31S

ACTINITIES

CIVIL LARSIS AXD ACTS OF PiCe CACT

EXIREM'SI IXSCUSANIS

19-2 SECTION:

Mitkan

SALOTAIT

iandr:

IS-3 SECTION:

TRA-RING

CEFENEL, PLANS

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 336

LEGAL COUNSEL

• 1 ASSISTANT DIRECIOR

LEGAL COUNSEL

JOHN A MINTZ

LICAL ANALYSIS

LECAL INSIPUCTION. fUJ

LEGAL PESCARCH

(ALEDONOF INT ORREFLON RES

Marisur, Chicead

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ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR-

DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR

(INVESTIGATION)

JAMES B. ADAMS

CRIMINAL SECTION:

ASSAULTI

GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE

DIVISION

ASSISTANT DIRECTOP.

•ROSERT & GEBHARDT

ACCOUSTING AND FRAUD SECTION:

ACCCUNI:M: CONTACL

ROMINISTRATIVE PMQUIMIES

INGELATINI

ARTAPACPEREERING

LEA ACT

EXTISIERINCE MIN COVIRANÇAT CORONNUÇATIONS

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE

DIVISION

ASSISTANT E BEC'ES

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ORGANIZEO CRIME SECTICH:

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C.9: 92952:1 095

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---

## Page 337

"IHIAPRIA"

ANCH,RAGE

AILAMIA

BALTIMORE

B AWI•THAM

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CLEVIIAYD

COLUMBIA

DAILAS

DENVER

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HosicluLu

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KANSAS CTIY

LAS VECAS

UUTILE ROCK

LOS ANGELES

LOU;SVILLE

ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR-

DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR

(ADMIKISTRATION)

THOMAS J. JENKINS

QUANTICO:

SLETONE DANTEG ADT.CES

H':RATCANA: PAIOLL FLASHES

CAPD INDEX SECTION:

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TECHKICAL SECTION:

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AAAlTN YLIVTeL CTAIEN

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ADMINISTRATIVE

DIVISION

ASSISTANT D'RECTOR

FIRGERE W WALSH

QUDGET AMD ACCOUNTING

SECTION:

ADMNISIRATNE PEPORT

HLORI ANU PULAL YALILN

BUREAU AGCOUMI AGSTSTEM

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•IE PRESCATASIEN DF INVESTICATNE

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FILES AND

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DIVISION

ACTIMG ASSISTAMI DIRECIOR

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AJTCICTIVE MUL

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INERCY COMIIRVANIOM

PRIMIDE RYO RCPZCOUSIISN

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PERSONNEL SECTION:

APPEICANT PICFUITING ANO MLACEMENT

ІТЛУ MEL ACCIRT

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КІС СОТТІКІЛЕКЛЯКО ІНШЧЯМСЯ

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POCATIUM AND AYUCATION RICOROS

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TRATIVE SERVICES SECTIOK:

HETIMTITUS CL'ESESUINYLNTI

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SPECIAL AGEST TRAMSFERS

AND MOYEMENT UMIT:

MIRCOAMEL LOCATICH RECOMOS

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SEPVICK

COMMUXICATIONS SECTION:

RACIO COMMUNICATIDNS IITTRA BURLAUY

"ELEGRRPH, ICLEIYPC, AND MESSAGE

ERSOO.NG DECCOTIE SERYICES

TELETHOME SERVICE

LABORATORY

DIVISION

ASSISTAYT DIRECIOR

ERIGGS I. WIITE

FRONT OFFICE:

FORINSiC SC'EACE TORIMINE UMIT

PLAAN'NC ARD EVALUATION LAIT

TECHRICAL PURLSCALIONS AND

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CHAUPED CANER CXAISNATIONS

MIADRITINC AND MAORU TING

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Pl akolsne.

TAFLRETY440K

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B OCHIVICAL

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FISCAS ANO MA'RS

L CREXICAL

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CARI AM'Д ATRO-M::'OM

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CORRESPONDEMCE AND

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WOIAI I CIOAUATON PROCKAK

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DIRECTOR

CLARENCE 17. KELLEY

ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR

HICHOLAS P. CALLAHAN

COMPUTER SYSTEMS

DIVISION

ASS:SHEY: DIREC"ER

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UNIFONM CRIME REPORTING

SECTION:

Mfol TCXYITLO1

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MATIOMAL CRIME INFORMIATION

CEXTER SECTION:

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AÇCREM: TGFIPERTS

239CJ:1R 51ST69S

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51÷.0°0 ::34: 44:39

CC:ER19° SLASIO LATIOA

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POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 338

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## Page 339

MAZUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS.

VOLUE I

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Pa ge

PREFACE. GUIDELINES FOR FBI INVESTIGATIONS

A. Guidelines for FBI Invostigations

B.

Internal Security Investigations.

C.

Criminal Intelligence - Crganized Crimo

D. •Applicant-type Matters.....

E.

General Criminal and Citil Matters.

F.

Goneral Principies....

SECTION 1. PRELIMINARY FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

F.

Go

H.

I.

J.

K.

M.

N.

0.

P.

Federal Crines.............•

United States Magistrates..

Complaints (Rule 3....

Warrant of Arrest or Summons (Rule 4).

Proceedings Before the Magistrate...

Jeopardy...

Grand Juries (Rule 6).

Indictments..

Informations.

Arrest in District Other than District of

Prosecution........

Evidence (Rule 26)....

Extradition of Fugitives from Foreign Countries.

Juvenile Delinquency Act

Deferred Prosecution System.

Federal Youth Corrections

Statute of Limitations..

SECTION 2. ARRESTS, INTERVIIWS AND CONFESSIONS, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

A. Arrests.........

B. Interviews with Witresses,

Suspects, and Subjects;

Confessions and Signed Statements...

C.

D.

... .

Habeas Corpus Proceedings; Refuting

Allegations......

SECTION 3. FIREARMS EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING

B.

C.

D.

E.

F.

G.

H.

I.

J.

K.

Leo

M.

N.

0.

P.

Q.

General......

Care of Firearms...

Use of Firearms..

Safety Levers..

Tear Gas Equipment....

Pistols and Revolvers.

Shotguns......

Remington Model 760, .308

Caliber, Pump-Action

Rifles

Deleted

Gas Riot

Gun.....

Firearms Training..

Training Dates....

Conduct on the

Firing Range

Safety Rules...

Training Delinquencies..

Firearms Courses.....

Disabling Pistols or Revolvers

1b)

2c

10

13

13

13

1

9

20

24

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[

MINUAL GE' INSTRUCIIONS

VOLUME I

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION 4.

SURVEILLANCES AND RAIDS

B.

C.

D.

E.

F.

G.

H.

I.

J.

K.

Is.

M.

N.

0.:

P.

a.

R.

S.

SECTION 5.

Surveillances in General....

Trainirg..................

' ....

Reasons

ior Conducting Surveillances

Types. of Surveillances......

Survoillance Bauirment.............

of agents on Surveillances...

Knowledge of the subject Under

Survaillance..

Activities of Agents on Surveillances.........

Renting of Premiges

for Use in Fixed Surveillances

Surveillance Siservision....

surveillance Logs..

Planning Surveillances in Aavance.:

Raids in Ganeral...

Planning Raids..

...... ... ... ....

Approach

to the

Place

Ic Be

Raided

Entering the Place Io Be Raided.

Dutios of Covering Agents......

Action Io Be Taken Aiter the Raid

Blocking of Roads.

DISCRIPTIONS OF PERSONS

A.

Bo

General...

Usual or Minimun Description Includad in Police and

I'BI KEporTS.......

Specific Discussions

oi Items in Physical

Descriptions..

SECTION 6.

BUREAU APPLICANT INVESTIGATIONS AND RELATED MATTERS

-..

SECTION 7.

A.

Bor

C.

D.

E.

F.

G.

Recruiting Aids..

Inquirias....

Employment of Relatives; Restrictions....

General Qualifications for All Clerical

Specific Qualifications for Clerical Positions...

Qualifications for Special Ageni Position..

Bureau Employees Aspiring to Agent Position..

Goneral Instructions for Processing Special Agent

and Clerical Applicants....

I. Determination of Draft or Military

Soocial

Agent and Male Clerical Appiicants.......

J.

Physical Examinatiore...

I..

The Investigation.........

Maintenance of Indices

on Bureau Applicants

M.

Classification....

N.

Character..................••:

0.

FBI National Academy Applicants.

IDENTIFICATION DIVISION DATA

A.

B.

c.

D.

E.

F.

History........

Dissemination of Identification

Taking

of Inked Impressions..

Types of Fingerprint Cards.

Typos of Files in the Identification

Division.

Operation of the Identification Division..

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 340

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1

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3

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8

10

11

14

21

22

22

23

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2b

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MANUAL UF INSTRUCTIONS

VOLUME I

TABLE OF CONTENTS

[

{

SECTION 7. IDENTIFICATION DIVISION DATA (continued)

G. Obtaining Records from the Identification Division.

H. Records Furnished by Identification Division.

I. Forms Used for Obtaining and Submitting

Identification Information.....

Jo

Missing Person[Program.....

K.

IReturn Prints..

Answering of Prints by the Identification Division.

M.

The Use of the Fingerprint Classification Formula.

N.

Surveys of Fingerprint Bureaus..........

0. Bureau Pamphiets Concerning Identification Division

Work and Functions........

P. International Exchange of Fingerprints.....

Pending Legislation Regarding Fingerprinting

Ro

The Latent Fingerprint Section.

'S.

T.

Latent Print Examinations.

Submission of Evidence.

U.

v.

Requests for Copies of

Latent Prints.

Liaison With U. S. and Prosecuting Attorneys.

W.

Court Decisions.......

X.

Return of Fingerprints..

Y.

Ze

Services of Disaster Squad...

Summary of the Services of the Identification

Divicion-

AA. NCIC Fingerprint Classification.

SECTION 8. SCIENTIFIC AIDS IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS

A.

Introduction to FBI Laboratory.

Facilities of FBI Laboratory......•...•

C.

D.

E.

F.

Go

H.

I.

J.

Ko

Cryptanalysis, [Gambling, Jand Translation®

Document Examination...

Blood and Other Body Fluids.

Explosives...

Firearms Identification..

Glass Fractures........

Hairs, Fibers, and Fabrics.

Metallurgical Examinations.

Paints, Dyes, and Stains

Pharmaceuticals.......

Mo

No.

Soils and Other Mineral Substances

Toolmarks.............

O• Toxicological Examinations.

Po Field Aids....

• Radio Engineering Section.•

IR.

Data Processing Section, Computer Systems Division....

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7

12

16

17

18)

(19]

(29]

20

20

21

24

24

25

2,5

[26]

26

[28]

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## Page 342

VOLUME 1

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION 9. RECORDS

A. Federal..

B. State..

C. Industry....

Do Territorial...

E. Production of Records by the Armed Services for

Court Ust....

[F. Dissemination of Information from Military

Service Records to Foreign Agencies...

SECTION 10. UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING

A. Background..........

?690

B.

Publication of Crime Data..

C. Other Booklets Helpful to Law Enforcement..

D. "Why Compile Crime

Responses....

Statistics?" - Suggested

E. Contacts with Delinquent Contributors.

F.

Contacts with Noncontributors............

Go

Uniform Crime Reporting Supplies Available for

Distribution..

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40

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58

58

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N" VÖLUME II'

''in disorde

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION 11.

GENERAL CRIMINAL PROVISIONS AND DEFINITIONS

TITLE 18, UNITED STATES CODE

A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

F.

Offenses Classified.

Principals.......

Accessory After the Fact

Misprision of Felony...

United States Defined..

Department and Agency

Detined..........

Definitions - Special Maritime and Territorial

Jurisdiction o1 the United States..

H.

I.

J.

K.

Definition - Obligation or Other Security of the

United States...

Definition - Vessei

→tazes....

Definition - Interstate and Foreign Commerce...

Definition - Foreign Govermnent...

Laws of States Adopted for Areas

Jurisdiction.......

within Federai

Mo

General Instructions..

N.

Confiscation of Firearms

SECTION 12. ADMIRALTY MATTER

До

B.

statutes....

Background..

Policy......

D.

Statistics.......

'Manaling of vases

F.

Classification..

G.

Character...

SECTION 13.

DELETED

SECTION 14. ANTI-RACKETEERING

* A. Hobbs Act.....

B.

C.

Elements.......

Related Statutes....

D.

Departmental Instructions

E.

Procedure...............

Investigative Guidance.

G. Organized Crime and Criminai Intelligence

Investigations.....

н.

Venue................

I.

Classification......

.

Character

' . . . . de...

Paid appoine a 00.e

→• ... .

Page

2

[6a]

8

8

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Pa go

SECTION 15. ANTITRUST

A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

F

G.

A.

SECTION 16.

Statutes..

•Elements.....

Count Decisions.

Policy..........

Investigative Procedure

Classification...

Character..

APPLICATION FOR PARDON AFTER COMPLETION OF SENTENCE

APPLICATION FOR EXECULIVE CLEMENCY

A.

B.

C.

Application for Pardon After Completion of Sentence

D.

Application

for Executive Clemency...........

Administrative Rules Relating to Both Typas of

Investigation.......

E.

F.

Classification...

Character.

SECTION 17.

ASCERTAINING FINANCIAL ABILITY

A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

Purpose.....•

Policy.................

Investigative Procedure.

Classification.........

Character.

SECTION 18.

ASSAULIING OR KILLING OF FEDERAL OFFICERS

CONGRESSIONAL ASSASSINATION STATUTE

A.

D.

E

F

G.

H.

Statutes......

Background and Definitions

Elements................

Policy...

/ € / ? / 6 6 6.68

Investigative Procedure

Venue..

' : . . . . . . .

Classification.

Character.

SECTION 19.

APPLICANT AND EMPLOYEE INVESTIGATIONS CONDUCIED FOR

OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

A.

Classifications and Administrative Procedures.

B.

The Investigation.......

C. Fraud Viclations.............

Special Instructions

E.

F.

Exceptions.....

Potential Administrative Indez Subjects.

Name Checks for Federal Judges...

3

11

13

20°

20

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denison ologies

"VOLUME II!?,

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION 20.

ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954 - CRIMINAL VIOLATIONS

A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

F

G.

H.

I

J.

Is.

Statutes..

Jurisdiction

Violations.

Penalties....

prosecutions...

Investigatiors....

Cinrad (Commurist Infiltration

into the Atomic

Energy Program)..

Deleted

Reporting......

Classification...

Character.....

' . .•

Handling of Radioactive Materials.

SECTION 21. BANK ROBBERY

[

A. Statute......

B.

C.

D.

E.

F.

G.

н.

I.

Elements..

Departmental Opinions and

Investigative Procedures and Suggestions.

Contemplated Violations

Administrative Handling

Venue.....

Classification.

Character..

SECTION 22.

BILLS OF LADING ACT

A.

B.

D.

E.

.F.

G.

Statute.....

Pype of transportation Governed by the Act

Court Decisions........

Investigative Procedure

Venue..

Classification...

Character...

SECTION 23.

BOMB THREATS

EXPLOSIVES AND INCENDIARY DEVICES

A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

F.

G.

H.

I.

J.

K.

L.

Statutes....

Violations

Ponalties....

Departmental Guidelines

Policy

Other Violations

Plan of Action for Major

Bomb Threats

Suspects.....

Statistical

Data....

Classification....

Character....•

Cases

SECTION 24.

BONDSMEN AND SURETIES

A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

Statutes.....

Elements...

Policy...

Investigative Procedure

Venue.

and Court Decisions

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 345

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4

8

11

11

11

3b

[12a]

13

15

15

15

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MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS

:....

:.:..:

VOLUME II

'TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION 24.

BONDSMEN AND SURETIES (continued)

F.

G.

Clasgification..

Character.

SECTION 25. BRIBERY AND CONFLICT OF INTEREST

A.

B.

C.

-D.

E.

F.

G.

Statutes...

Interpretation

Flements

Bribery.

Policy and Intestigative Procedure.

Venue.

Classification.

Character.........

Penalties - Maximum.

SECTION 26.

CENSUS MATTERS

A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

F.

G.

Statutes.....

Jurisdiction...

Investigative Procedure

Venue..

Classification...

Character..

Penalties

- Maximum..

SECTION 27.

CIVIL RIGHTS

A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

G.

I.

Background.

Statutes..

Related Statutes.

Policy..........

Investigative Prosedure..

Exceptions to Procedure

of Initiating Preliminary

and Limited Investigations.

Miscellaneous Instructions..

Classification......

Character..

SECTION 28. CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964

A.

B.

C.

D.

F.

G.

F.

I.

J.

K.

Is.

Background.

Statutes.......

Public Accommodations

Public Facilities..

Public Education..•

Employment.

Interference with Federally Protected Activities

Relating to Public Accommodations, Public

Facilities,

Public Education, and

Employment..

Announced Testing of Accommodations or Facilities

Penalties.....

Miscellaneous.

Classification

Character..

10

13

14

14

(16]

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THROAT OF IAOTRUCIIONS

VOLUME II

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

SECTION 29.

CONSPIRACY

A.

B.

C.

D.

E

F.

G.

I.

J.

• Statute.

Elements.

Related Statutes.

Statute of

Linitations.

Court Decisions.

Policy.....:

Investigative

Procedure

Venue....

Classification.

Character.

SECTION 30.

CONTEMPT OF COURI

A.

B.

F.

G.

Statutes..

Essential Elemerts.......

Policy....

. . . ..

Investigative Procedure.

Venue...

Classification.

Character..

SECTION 31.

COPYRIGHT MATTER

c.

D.

Statutes..

D=2:0÷ 122

Classification.....

Character.

SECTION 32.

COURT OF CLAIMS CASES

C.

Background......

Procedure for Instituting Suit.

Hearings.......

Magistrate's Report....

Argument Before the Court

Decision

of the Court..

Appeal...............:

Investigative

Procedure.

Confidential Informants..

[Accounting Working Papers.

Office of Origin..

Classification.

Character.....

SECTION 33.

CRIMES WITHIN THE MARITIME AND

DICTION OF THE UNITED STATES

TERRITORIAL JURIS-

A.

B.

c.

D.

E.

SECTION 34.

A.

B.

c.

D.

E.

Statutos...........

Crimes on the High Seas

. . . ..

Crimes on Government Reservations Other Than Indian.

Crimes on Indian Reservations.

Other Crimes Involving Indians.

EIGHT-HOUR-DAY LAW

Statutes.

Policy.

Venue..

Classification

Character.

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 347

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volunt tid

CABLE: OF CONTENES

!: "'SÉCITO 35. 'ELECTIÓN LANS"".

A.

Statutes.....

B. (Policy..........

C.

Investigaiive Suggestions

D.

Venue..

' . ..

E.

Classification.

F.

Character•

SECTION 36.

A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

F

H

K.

SECTION 37•

SECTION 38.

B.

C.

.D.

Fo

F.

G.

н.

SECTION

39.

A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

F.

H.

ESPIONAGE

Statutes.

Court Decisions.

Departmental instructions

Policy................

Investigative Procedure

Soviet Intelligence

Functional Files..

Current Espionage Digest.

Terminology..

Venue...

Classification

Character.

DELETED

EXTORTION

Statutes..........

Elements..............•

Departmental Instructions

Policy.................

Investigative

Procedure

Venue.....

Classification.

Character®®

FALSE CLAIMS - CIVIL SUITS

Statutes.

Elements.

Suits by Indiviêuals...

Policy.••

Investigative Procedure

Statute of Limitations.

Classification.

Character.

'peiteiro, no ''one idei

Page

10

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[

TABLE. OF CONTENTS

SECTION 40.: FAISE ENTRIES IN REGORDS OF INTERSTATE. CARRIERS

A.

Violations by Employees of Railroads, etc

B.

C.

D.

E.

F.

G.

H.

I.

J.

Court Dacisions........

Violations dy Inployees of Telephone, Tolegraph,

and Radio Companies...

Scong of Act.

Jurisdiction.

Investigative

Violations by Special Agents, Accountants,

or

Examinors of Interstate Commerce Commission.

of Act........

Classification.

Character.

SECTION 41.

FALSELY CLAIMING CITIZENSHIP

A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

Statutes Under Bureau Jurisdiction.

Policy..

Investigative Procedure

Classification.

Character..

SECTION 42.

FEDERAL LENDING AND INSURANCE AGENCIES

$.

D

E.

F

G.

I.

"J.

Statutes..

riviavions

Background.

Jurisdictios..

Policy.....

Investigative Procedures.

Classification.

Character..

Venue....

Penalties..

SECTION 43.

FEDERAL REGULATION OF LOBBYING ACT

Statute.

B.

Elements

C.

Policy.....r.

D.

Classification.

E.

Character.

SECTION 44. [BANK FRAUD AND EMBEZZLEMENT]

A.

B.

SECTION 45.

Banks and Banking-Type Institutions

Bank Holding Company Act of 1956..

FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT

A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

F.

statute.

Venue....

Investigative

Jurisdiction.

Investigative Suggestions..

Statute of Limitations..

Exceptions to Federal. Port Claims Act

Policj.....

н.

Classification.

I.

Character

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MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS

!:::

•VOLUME I1

TABLE Of. CONTENTS.

" SEcrioN 46.

FEDERAL TRAIN WRICK STATUTE

B.

C.

E

F.

G.

Statute.....

Violations..

Policy.•

• ...

Investigative Procedure

Venue........

Classification...

Character.

SECIION 47. FRAUD AGAINST THE GOVERNENT

A.

General...........

Federal-Aid

Road Act.

C

D.

E.

F.

G.

Anti-Kickback Statute

Unemployment Compensation

and

Iraining Allowances.

Dependents Assistance

Act of 1950........

Public Works and Economic Davelopment Act of 1965

Lead and Zino Act....

I.

1J.

Trade Expansion Act of

1962.

Economic Opportunity Act.....

The Omnibus Crime Control and. Safe Streets Act

of 1968....

K.

LIN•

0.

IP.

SECTION 48.

A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

SECTION 49.

A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

G.

I.

Investigative

Procedure

Venue.

clancialestere

'.... ... ...

Character..........

Fraud Against the Government - Security Aspect

FRAUDULENT PRACTICES CONCERNING CERTAIN MILITARY

AND NAVAL DOCUMENTS; SEALS AND SYMBOLS OF AGENCIES

OF THE UNITED STATES

Statutes..

General Information..

Policy.

Venue........•

Classification.

Character..

FUGITIVES

Definitions........•

Caution Statements

Dangerous Subjects

Fugitive Form

Letter...

Identification Orders, Wanted Flyers, and Check

circulars...... .........

Apprehension if Bureau Fugitives..

Investigations..cc

Suggested Soarces

leads ir

seeking the Appre-

hension of fugitive........

. . .

Fugitive Investigations for Other Federal Agencies.

Miscellaneous....

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SECTION 49.

J.

.

P.

0.

R.

S.

T.

U.

v.

W.

X.

AA.

AR

AC.

AD.

AE.

Ar.

AG.

AH.

AI.

• AJ.

AK.

AL.

AM.

AN.

AO.

AP.

AQ.

AR.

AS.

AI.

AU.

AV.

AW.

AX.

Ду.

AZ.

BA.

MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS

-:?%

VOLUME II

.!?

• TABLE OF CONTENTS.

FUGITIVES" (continued)

Escaped Federal Prisoners

Escape and Rescue (Formerly Federal Escape Act)

Statutes....

General Intormation...

Investigative Procedure

Policy.....

Deleted

Venue.

Classification.

Character.

Deleted

Probation Violators

Statutes..

When Investigations Are Conducted

Apprehension or Location...

Probation

Violator Warrants

Investigative leads..

Deleted

Character....

Classification

Deleted

Parole Violators and [Mandatory ]Release Violators

stat.nt.0s:.

Distinction Between Parole and Mandatory Irelease.

Issuance of werrants....

When Investigations Are Conducted

When Subjecis Are Fugitives.

Punishnent.............

Investigative

suggestions

Apprehension

or Location.

Character..

Deleted

Classification..

Deleted

Unlawful Flight Io Avoid Prosecution, Custody, or

Confinement and Unlawiul Flight To Aroid Giving

Testimony

Statutes..

Policy........

Departmental Instructions

Investigative Procedure.

Statute of Limitations.

International Extradition

Prosecutions....

Classification.

Character..

Deleted

Deserters

Background...........

Interviews and Confessions of

Deserters.

Disposition of Deserters After Apprehension

Airtels to Bureau

Reporting Location of

Doserter Fugitives.

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9

10

11

12

13

13

13

14

14

14

14

75

15

15

15

15

16

16

16

16

16

17

18

19

21

22

22

22

22

22

23

24

24

24

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## Page 352

-=

VOLUME II

TABLE OF CONTENTS

•SECTION 49.

ruGirives" (continued)

BB.

Review of Deserter's Service Record and

Identification Division Files....

BC.

Courts-Martial, Testimony, and

BD.

BE.

Investigations in Foreign Countries......

Deserters and Absentees

From the Armed

Services.

Located Incidental

Other Investigations and

Instructions Re Deserter inquiries

Classification.

BG.

BH.

BI.

BJ.

BX.

BI.

BM.

BN.

BO:

SECTION 50.

1.

Bo

SECTION 51.

B.

c.

D

Eo

F.

SECTION 52.

d.

B.

c.

Do.

SECIION 53.

в.

c.

Harboring

•Deserter Fugitives

General Fugitives.

Bond Default

Background..

Statutes..

Policy..

. . .

Classification..

Character.

GOVERNMENI PROPERTY - THEFT, ROBBERY, EMBEZZLEMENT,

ILLEGAL POSSESSION, AND DESTRUCTION

Statutes

Elements

Venue..

Investigative

Procedure.

Classification........

Character.

ILLEGAL MANUFACTURE, USE, POSSESSION, OR SALE OF

EMBLEMS AND INSIGNIA

Statutes.

Elements.

..

Investigative

Venue..

Classification.

Character.

Procedure.

ILLEGAL USE OF GOVERNMENT TRANSPORTATION REQUESTS

Statutes.

Policy..

Classification

Character.

ILLEGAL USE OF A RAILROAD PASS

Statute....

Jurisdiction.

Investigative

Procedure.

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 352

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24a

25

25

25

25

26

27

29

29

29

30

30

10

10

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## Page 353

'?.:

VOLUME"

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION 53.

"ILLEGAL USE OF A RAILROAD PASS (continued)

D.

E.

Classification.

Character.

SECTION 54.

ILLEGAL WEARING OF UNIFORM AND RELATED STATUTES

A.

B.

C.

D

Statutes.

Elements.

Portinent Court Decisions

Departmental Instructions

Venue..........

F

Investigative Procedures.

Exceptions..........

Theatrical Productions.

Classification.

J.

Character,

SECTION 55. IMPERSONATION AND RELATED STATUTES

A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

F.

H.

I.

Statutes...

Elements.........•

Discussion

of

Elements.

Portinent Court Decisions

Policy.................

Venue.

'... ......

InT00ti53+490

Bricadino

Classification......

Character.

SECTION 56.

INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION

OF LOTTERY TICKETS

A.

B.

Statute..

Violations.....

Court Decisions.

Jurisdiction.........

Investigative Procedure.

Pull 'Boards, Tip Boards, and Punchboards.

Venue....

H

Classification..

I.

Character.....

SECTION 57.

INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION

OF

OBSCENE MATTER

A.

B:

c.

D.

E.

H

I.

Statutes..

Violations.

Policy.....

Court Decisions..

Jurisdiction..

Investigative

Venue.

' ....

Classification

Character.

Procedure.

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 353

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2

4

8

2

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## Page 354

i...".

SECTION 58.

C.

D

E.

F.

SECTION 59.

B

C

Do

E.

F.

SECTION

60.

Ao

B.

C.

E.

G.

H.

SECTION

61.

A.

B.

*C.

D.

E.

F.

G.

H.

I.

J.

X.

'MANTAL OF INSTRUCTIONS

VOLUME II

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INCERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF PRISON-MADE GOODS

Statutes..............

Violation....00..,.

Investigative Procedure.

Venue................

Classification...

Character..

INTERSTATE TRANSPORIATION OF STOLEN CATTLE

Statutes......

Elements:.

Investigative Procedur

Venue...

Classification.•

Character.....

INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF STOLEN MOTOR VEHICLE

OR AIRCRAFT

Statutes.

Elements.

Policy...

Investigative

Procedure.

Court Decisions and

Vez.......0000.0000

Classification.

Character..

Departmental Opinions

INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION

OF

STOLEN PROPERTY

Statutes..

Deleted

Elements..

Court Decisions...

Policy...

. .

Investigative Procedure

Credit Card Cases......

Traveler's Check Cases.

Miscellaneous......

Venue...

. . .

Classification..

Character..

SECTION 62.

INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION

OF STRIKEBREARERS

A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

Statute..

Elements.

Policy..

Investigative

Venue.

Suggestions

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 354

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"MANAG OF HISTNUCTIONS

....

it is sins

VOLUME II

TABLE OF COWTENTS

SECTION 6?

•".j

INTERSTATE

TRANSPORTATION

OF" STRIKEBREAkERS

(continued)

G.

Classification.

Character.

SECTION 63.

INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE AND SLAVERY

Ao

Statutes.

B.

Elements..

C.

D.

Departmental Instructions

E

Policy....

F.

Investigative

Frocedure

G.

Venue............

Classification

H.

Character.

SECTION 64. IRREGULARITIES IN FEDERAL PENAL INSTITUIIONS

B.

C.

D.

Statute.......

Policy.........

Classification.

Character..

SECTION 65.

KICKBACK RACKET ACT

B.

c..

D.

E.

F.

G.

H.

Statute...

Elements..

Legal Interpretations

Related Statutes

Policyo....

Investigative

Procedure.

Classirication..

Character..

of Statute.

• -Pase

4

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 355

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...

[

[

VoLuE fri

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECETON 66 KIDNAPING EAR

A. • Statute.

B.

Elements..

C.

Explanation of flements and Court Decisions

D.

Policÿ....

.

F.

Investigative Procedure

Venue................

G.

classification..

H.

Character.

SECTION 67. LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947

A. Labor Management Relations Act, 1947.

B.

Deleted

C. [Deleted]

SECTION 68. LANDS DIVISION MATTER

A.

Background

B.

Policy...

C.

Classification.

D.

Character.

SECTION

69.

DELETED

1U.

A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

F.

• Go

Statute...

Elements..

Deleted

Policy..........

Investigative

Classification.

Character.

Procedure

_ NW 54933• Docld:32989719 Page 356

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20

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## Page 357

VOLUE III

TABLE CF CONTENTS

SECTION 71.

A.

B

C.

D

E.

F.

G.

J.

SECTION 72.

A.

B.

C.

D.

SECTION 73.

B

C.

D.

E.

F.

Go

H

I.

J.

K.

SECTION 74.

A.

B

c.

D.

E.

F.

G.

H.

SECTION 75.

A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

: i ?:

MAY ACT

Statute....

violations...

Departmental Instructions

Policy...

Court Decisions.....

Investigative Procedure

Penalty.....

Venue..

Classification..

Character..

MIGRATORY BIRD ACT

Statutes.:

Policy........

Classification.

Character..

NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY ACT

Statutes..

Elements......

Statute of Limitations..

Venue......

Miscellaneous Information.

(Scan Bankruptcyl....

Departmental Instructions and Opinions.

Policy..

Investigative Procedure.

Classification.

Character..

FIREARMS ACTS

National Firearms Act...

State Firearms Control Assistance

Unlawful Possession

or Receipt of

Departmental Instructions.

Policy...

Investigative

Procedure.

Classification..........

Character.

. .

Act..

Firearms

NEUTRALITY MATTERS

Statutes...

Violations

Policy...

Classification.

Character.

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 357

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Page y

4

[5]

5

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[6]

[9]

[9]

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## Page 358

"VOLUME IIT"

TABLE ÓF CONTENTS

Page

SECTION 76.

A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

F.

G.

SECTION 77.

SECTION 78.

A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

F

G.

SECTION 79.

B.

c.

D.

SECTION 80.

Ao

B.

C.o

Do

F.

G.

SECTION 81.

Ao

B.

0..

D.

E.

F.

H.

• OBSTRUCTION: OF JUSTICE; OBSTRUCTION: OF

COURT ORDERS;

OBSTRUCTION

OF CRIMINAL

INVESTIGATIONS

Statutes.

Elements.

Policy..

Investigative Procedure

Venue.

. . . . ...

Classification..

Charzster.

DELETED

PASSPORTS AND VISAS

Statutes..

General Information..

Policy........

Investigative Procedure..

Statute of limitations.

Classification.

Character...

PATENT MATTER

Statutes...

rolicy......

Classification.

Character....

PERJURY

Statutes.

Elements.

Policy...

Investigative Procedure and

Venue..

' . . .

Classification.

Character...

Court

Decisions.

RAILWAY LABOR ACT

Statutes.

Elements.

Definitions

Penalty - 18152

"Tenti)":

policy....

Related Statute.-

Imployers?

Liability Act

Title 45,

USC, & 60..

Character.

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 358

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MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS

VOLUME III

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1..

SECTION 82:

RED CROSS ACT

A.

B.

C.

D.

Statutes...

Investigative Procedure.

Classification...

Character

SECTION 83.

A.

B.

REFERENCE MATTERS - VIOLATIONS WITHIN THE JURIS-

DICTION OF OTHER FEDERAL INVESTIGATIVE AGENCIES

Background.

Income Tax..

Tax (Other

Than Income)

D

Food and Drugs..

Prohibition.

Civil Service......

H. Postal Violations (Except Mail Frauds).:

I.

J.

Counterfeiting...

Customs Laws and Smuggling......

K.

Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act

SECTION 84.

REGISTRATION ACT

A. Background....

B.

C.

D.

loreign lovernment agents....

' . . .

Foreign Agents Registration

Act of 1938, As Amended.

Registration of Persons Who Have Knowledge of,

or Received Instruction or Assignment in,

Espionage, Counterespionage, or

Sabotage

or Tactics

of Government of Foreign Country

or Foreign Political Party..

E.

Interriews................

* F.

Classification....

G. Character..........

SECTION 85. RENEGOTIATION ACT - CIVIL SUITS

A.

Background.

B.

Policy......••

C.

Investigative Procedure.

D.

Accounting Working Papers.

E.

F

Office of Origin...

Go

Classification.

Character

SECTION 86.

SABOTAGE

A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

F.

G.

H.

Statutes...

Violations

Venue..

Policy........

Investigative

Procedure

Submission oi Reports.

Classification.

Character.

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 359

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## Page 360

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION

87.4

LiNESTIGATIONS OF SUBVERSIV" ORGANIZATIONS

AND INDIVIDUALS

A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

SECTION 89.

A.

B.

C.

D.

•F.

G.

H.

SECTION 89.

SECTION 90.

A.

E

F.

G.

H.

I.

J.

K.

I.

M.

N.

0.

Table of Contents..

Geneial Guidelines..

Investigation of Organizations

Investigation of Individuals.

Dissemination of Data Developed.

Administrative Index (ADEX).

SEDITION

Statutes..

Violations...

Departmental Opinions.

Policy........

Investigative Procedure

Venue..........:

Classification.

Character..

SELECTIVE TRAINING AND SERVICE ACT OF 1940..

SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT

Q.

R.

• S.

T.

Statutes...

Rogictratinn..

Fenalties of

Act (Section

12, Title I) (Title 50

USC, § 462).....

Selective Service Classifications

Offenses.............

Doleted

Delinquents.......

No-Card Cases..

Turn-In Cases.

Selective Service

Miscellaneous Complaints.....•

Counseling Evasion of Act or Regulations; Hindering

or Interfering..

Malingerers and Hiding and Abetting:

Presenting Cases to USA.

Recalcitrant Industry..

Reemployment Provisions.

Status................

Classification......•

Character...........•••

Handling Delinquents

Outside United

States.

SECTION 91. DELETED

Page.

1

18]

1

2

3

5

14

16

16

17

17

18

19

22

5

6-13-73

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## Page 361

SILLION

9100

100101÷9

ORGAN LAYLONG

AND INDIVIDUAL:

1't..

TABLE OF CONTENTS

To conoral Cuiddlines..r

Investigaiire

jurisdiction.

Rebeliion

or insurrection..

Do

Co

Scditions

conspiracy.

Advocating the overthrow of the Governaent..

Internal Security Act of 1950 and Conmunist Control. Act

of 195j....

20

3.

4.

5.

6.

Prosecutive determination..

statut0g...n.

Definitions...........

Predication for

investigation.

Accuracy of characterizations.....u

Investigations and contacts with individuals connected with

institutions of learning..

Use of officers from other

agencies.

Bo

Investigation of Organizations.r

PUrDOS2.........c.og

Responsibility to initiate investigations.

scope of investigation.........ccg

Infiltration of nonsubversive groups.

Ce

Caption

and preface..........

Limitations on investigation.

do Conversion to full scale investigation.

5.

Subversive pubiications....ccouu

Investioativa stons..,

7 .

Administrative and reporting procedures.

Reporting requirements and status..

b.

Informant coveray0.....u

Topicalleadings...o.

Character.

f.

Classification........

Copies.....

ge

Closing of

Investigation of Individuals...0

1 :

General policy.......

d..

Purpose.

. 0

Do

• Individuals to be investisated

co Limitations on investigations

do Investigations requiring FBIHQ approval.•

e. Members of U.S. aired forces.

20

Investigative procedures...

scope of investigation..

b. Investigative steps.....c.c

Co

Interviews of subjects.co...

(3.) Policy.

(2) Purpos0.....

(3) Approval to intorview..

(4) Letter requesting FBIllO approval to interview

subject.....oo

(5) If intervier not conducted within 00 days, submit

letter advising FBIl0.....0se

pare

6

6

6

10

10

10

11

1

1.1

11

1.1

1.2.

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 361

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

1L

•.is..y

30

÷(6) . Conduct

(7)

intcrvlet.i.j...d.

Direction of subcct's aclivities..

(8)

Reportiny results of intervier.

Reportingprocedures..........

2.

Genera!.."0.....

• ....м. .

Do Summarizing

information.....

Co

Administrative of cover pages.

d.

Office of origin......

e.

Title of communications...

fo

Classification......

Character.

Copies of reports or LiMs....

ho

i.

Closing and reopening of cases..

Subjects traveling abroad..

I.e

Submission of information on members of subversive

gIoUps.........

Control files on former members of subversive

organizations..

no Channeling information to case files..

Movement of subjects between offices.

Do

Dissemination of Data Developed......

General policy.

Specific reauirements..

Members of

armed forces...

bo

Aliens

and naturalized citizens..

c. Individuals embloved in or having access to Key

Facilities or employees of private contractors of the

Armed

Forces..

do

Employees of public utilities.

Members of military reserve branches or National Guard...

Seamen and subjects employed in maritime industry...

Employees of Federal Government..

he

Individuals who own property or reside in immediate

vicinity of installation or other premises under

jurisdiction of branch of armed forces....co..u

i. Airmen

licensed by Federal Aviation Administration

ja Dissemination to Secret Service..

3.

Restrictions on field dissemination

E.

Administrative

Index (ADEX)..

1o

Purpose and

20

Critcria...

general policy.....

30

Reconmendation for preparation of ADEX card..

40

Format of ADEY caid......

5.

Arrangement of ADEX.

a. At FBIHQ....

Do

In field office....

(1) Miphabetical section...

(2) Gographical

section.

(3) Unavailable section...

6.

7°

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

Special

interest subjects.......

Changes

in residence and employnent

of ADEX subjects.

Changes in other background data...

Movement of ADEX subjects between

cifices.

Subject entering U. So armed forces..

Removal of cards

fror ADRy.

Reporting Procedures on Ari subjects

13. [Delcied:.......

Page

• 1?,

12

-;

1

4

4

11

14

14

14

15

15

16

16

1.6

16

16

16

17

17

17

1.7

17

17

17

17

[18]

18

18

18

1.8

19

20

21

21

21

21

21.

21

21

22

22

2.2

22

22

23

23

2

2-13-744

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 362

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## Page 363

MS KAI. GUIDELINES.

Incestigative ju

iction

Fil investigations

inder this

section are based

specific statutory:

jurisdiction and Depastmentil instructions.

Investigations conducted under this section alc to be directed to the

gathering of material pertinent to a determination whether or not the

subject has violated, or is ehgaged in activities which may result in

a violation of, one oi more of the statutes enumerated below; or in

fulfillnicnt of

Departmental instructions.

There

are three principal statutes which provide a basis for these

investigations, as follows:

Rebellion or insuirection (I1S, USC § 2393).

"Whoever incites, sets on 100t, assists

or engages in any rebellion

of insurrection against the authority of the United States or the

Laws thercoi, or gives aid or contort thereto, shalt be lined not

more than $10, 000 or imprisoned not more than

ten. years, or both;

and shall be incapable of holding any

'office under the United States."

D.

Seditious conspiracy (IlS, USC § 2384).

"If

two or more persons in any State. or Territory, or in any place

subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, conspire to over-

States, or to

Levy war against them, 'or to oppose by force

the authority

thercof,

or by force to prevent, hinder, or delay the

execution of

any law

of the United States, or by force to seize, take,

or possess any property of the United States contrary to the authority

thereof, they shall each be fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned

not more than twenty vears

C.

Advocating the overthrow a? or ootn."

the Government (T18, USC $ 2385)•

"Whoever knowingly of willfully advocates, abets,.

advises, or teaches

the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or

destroying the government of the United States or the government of

any state, Territory, District or Possession thereor

government

of any political

subdivision therein, by fore ine

violence, or by the assassination of any officer of any such

government; or

"Whoever, with intent to cause the overthrow or destruction of any

such government, prints, publishes, edits, assues, carculates, sells,

distributes, or

publicly displays

any written or printed matter

advocating, advising, or reaching the duty, necessity, desirability,

or-propriety of

overthrowing oi destroying

any governnent in the

United States by force or violence, or attempts to do so; or

"Whoever organizes or helps or attempts to organize any society,

group, or assembly of persons who teach, advocate,

or encourage

overthrow or destruction of any such government by force or violence;

ox becomes or is a member of, or affiliates with, any such society,

group, or assembly of persons, knoving the purposes thercof....

"Shall. be fined not more than $29,000 or imprisoned not more than

twenty years, or both, and shall be ineligible foi employment by

3

16=1=7.3

NW 54933-Docld:32989719 Page 363

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## Page 364

•20

i

40

the.Unitca.su

of any depariment: or. agenc

reat, for thic,

reycars next following his conviction.

"If two or more persons conspire to commit any offense nimed in tas

section, cach shall be lined not more than $20,000

os imprisoned

not more than lenty jears, or both, and shall

be incligible for

employment by the United States of any departacut of agency thereor,

for the five years next following his conviction.

"As used in this section, the terms 'organizes' and 'organize', with

respect to any society, group, or assembly of persons, include

recruiting of new nembers, the

forming of new units,

and the legiony-

ing or expansion oi exasting clubs, classes,

and other units of

such society, group, or assenbly o1

persons."

The courts have interpreted this statute to require advocacy to

action, i.e., advocacy to do something, now or in the future, rather

than merely to believe in something.

In addition to the three principal statutes outlined above, there

are two other statutes which night provide a statutory foundation for

an investigation under this section.

These are:

do [Internal Security Act of 1950 (I' 50, USC, $ 783a)

In addition to the three principal statutes outlined in sub-

paragraphs a., D., and co,

the Internal Security Act could

provide a statutory basis

for investigation of certain cases

under this Section. This Act makes it unlawful to knowingly

love one on ta ton or are cane)

contribute to the establishment of a totalitarian dictatorship

within the United States which is controlled by a foreign

Prosecutive determination

All discussions pertaining to the prosecutive potential of investigations

initiated under this section will be conducted by FBIHQ with Departnental

officials.

These cases should not be discussed with local U.S. Atromey's

office without FBIHQ approval.

Related statutes

There are a number of other statutes under the FBI's investigative

jurisdiction which should be borne in mind

in handiing these investigations.

Information concerning possibie violations

such statutes is frecuenily

developed during these investigations.

Where this occurs the field should

consider the desirability of conducting investigation in line with thie

policies and procedures governing the statute in question.

A list of other Federal statutes which may arise during these investigations

is outlined in an appendix to this manual.

Definitions

The term "subversiye activities" as used in this section denotes

activities which

Government of the United States or any of its political subdivisions by

the illegal means prohibited by statutes enumerated in A. I. above. The

term "subversive organization" or "subversive movement" denotes a group

or movement which 15 known to engage in or advocate subvcisive activities,.

as defined above.

- NW54933_Docld:32989719. Page 364

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## Page 365

s. Predication for

stigation

sed under the provisions of this

section, the first

conmunication propared for outside dissemination (report or LIM) should

show specifically the statute upon which the investigation is bascd

togethis with nocessary supporting lacts. Where investigation has bech

specifically requested. by Apartment, this should be indicated.

following examples are illustrative; however, the basis

for each

individual case must be tailored to the circumstances of

such case.

"This investigation is based on information that the subject's

activities could

involve violation of T 18, USC, § 2383 (Rebellion

or Insurrection);

, and § 2334 (Seditious Conspiracy).

A souice whose

reliability has not been determined has inforned

that the subject

as planning, along with others, to travel to Washington, D. C.,

1071, to participate in planned violent denonstrations

during the last weck in ilay, lord, to'shut down the Governent."

Demonstraiion plans include the blocking of streets

and highways,

destruction of pessonal and Government property, and pliysical

obstruction to prevent Government employees from

reporting to work."

"This investigation is based on information that the subject's

activities couid involve a violation of I 18, USC, § 2385 (Advocating

the overthrow of the Government). The subject is an admitted member

(or has bein identified as a member by a confidential source who

has provided

ieliable information in the past) of (name of group).

The (name of

group in its public statements and publications

advocates ihe desirability and necessity of overthrowing

the U.S.

Government by

force or violence, and the assassination of U. S.

Government officers.

The same source has reported that the subject

actively supporis these positions."

Where possinle, the first intra-Bureau communication prepared which

indicates thai investigation is beinglconducted]should specifically

indicate the statutory basis for the investigation. However, there

be occasions involving individuals or groups in contact with known

subversive clements where the purpose of the contact is not initially

known

and these

a preliminary inquiry must be made to determine

whether a statutory basis exists for full investigation.

In these

instances, a preliminaly inguiry may be undertaken, through estau-

lished sources, foi a period not to exceed 90 days, without specifically

indicating the specific statutory basis for the inquiry.

If after the

conclusion of 90 days it has not been possible to

establish a

statutory basis but further inquiry appears necessary, FBIHQ must

be furnished a succinct summary of the facts by letter together with

specific reconmendations as to further action.

course, investigations must be based on indications that subject

may be engaged in subversive activity, whether or not a specific

statutory basis is cited.

In the event preliminary inquiries fail to establish a sound basis

for investigation, the case should be promptly closed and there is

no need to

advise FBIIQ (unless FBIHQ has been previously advised

of the inquiry). Nor is there any need to prepare an LiN or report

Where no pertinent subversive derogatory information has been developed.

If the statutory basis for an investigation should change or be

expanded to include an adritional statute or statutes, the first

communication preparei subsequent to

such change or expansion should

specifically shoir such changes.

Similarly, this information should

be incluied in the next report or Lll prepared in the case.

...5

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 365

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## Page 366

6. Accuracy of chari

Azations

Assure that staturents rclating to characterizat

s of an individual

or organization, or relating

to affiliations with or nembership in any

organisation,

are founded on fir basese

Identify sources for such

charactcrizations or statements of affiliation or menbership if such

characterizations, afliliations or memberships are not commonly and

publicly known.

7.

Investigations

and contacts with individuals connected with institutions

of Icarning

Prior FBIID approval is required to:

(1.)

Institute investigation of

a faculty member or an organization

connccted with an educational institution.

(2)

Intervicw any student or faculty nember who is not an established

source.

(Requests to conduct interviews must include individual's

cretionosition, and an assessment of his reliability and dis-

Do Contacts with established sources in administralive capacity may

be made on campus. Contacts with oth, established sources, e.g.,

students and

nonacademic employees, should be made off campus.

8. Use of officers from other agencies

Members of other law enforcement or intelligence agencies are not to

accompany Agents handling these investigations without specific approval

by the SAC.

B. INVESTIGATION OF ORGANIZATIONS

Purpose

To develop evidence of any violations of statutes enumerated in A. 1. •

above and to keep the Department and other agencies and officials

executIve branch apprised vi information deveioped vich pertains

iv

their areas of interest and

20

responsibility.

Responsibility to initiate investigations

When information is received indicating an organization may be engaged

in subversive activities or may be a front group for

subversive organiza-

tion, field office should

initiate pieliminary

investigation confined to

established sources.

Notify FBIHQ that investigation has been undertaken.

Within(9Oldays submit results by letter with ¡ecommendation as to

whether or not further investigation is warranted.

3.

Scope of investigation

Pertinent data concerning following items should be obtained and reported:

Origin and scope

and circumstances of founding including any incorporation data.

Identities of organizers. Location of headquarters and chapters or

affiliates, if any.

bo Stated ains and purposes, especially an; information showing

advocacy of violence or illegal activity.

c. Officers

Principal officers and/or leaders wiih succinct resume of subversive

backgrounds, it any.

do

Membership

Total active membership, including logical breakdowns by organizational

structure and geographical area, if applicable. If exact membership

figures are not available and estimates are given, be certain they

are plainly shown as estimates. In cover pages or cover communications,

include evaluation of reliability of membership figures cited, as well

as comments concerning any significant factors involving membership,

e-go, incrcases or decreases, notable shift in composition of group

sex, nailonality.

etc. Be certain to secure accurate descrip-

tion of all

lists reloired

in so as to avoid confusion as to exact

identity or

significance of such lists.

Publications

All publications of group with emphasis on any which clearly depict

subversive character of organizalion.

9-13..73

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 366

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## Page 367

u..

Fusnish FBIllQ

copy of publications which

tray subversive

character of

.. of funds

gaoup or which advocate violence

Ascertain sources

for publications.

Went is operated as custinct entity,

a separate investigation should be initiated concoming the publication.

f.

Finances

Sources of funds and naturc of expenditures, in particular whether

any income is received from or contributions made to foicign elements.

Connections with other groups

Develop pertinent information concerning ties with other

subversive

elements

including maicrial and/or moral support given or received.

Be especially alert to detect connections with foreign subversive

elements or indications of foreign allegiance or control. Also

determine and report any significant connections or cooperation

with nonsubversive groups.

Activities

Describe activities of group.

Afford special emphasis to any under-

ground operations or activities involving violence or threatrned

Include any pertinent data showing success or failure of

organization in achieving its stated i.'s.

4. Infiliration of nonsubversive groups

a. General

When infornation is received indicating that subversive group is

seeking to systenatically infiltrate and control a nonsubversive

organization, available data should be submitted by lotter with

to initiating active investigation.

Recommendation

to undertake investigation should be supported by available background

information concerning target organization (including name and

locations, estinated membership, principal officers, and nature of

activities) and

resume of extent of subversive infiltration efforts

(including identities of known subversives who have joined target

organization and positions held), provide brier statement as to

Investigation planned. Il approved by FBIHQ conduct discreet

investigation linited to determining and reporting activities which

are related to or 'in furtherance of subversive infiltration.

instructions apply to local chapters or affiliates as well as national

organization.

Caption anci

preface

Captions of

communications should snow that subversive infiltration

of target organization is objective of investigation, not organization

itself, e.g.,

"Infiltration of (Name of target organization) by (Name

of subversive organization)" All communications prepared for

dissemination should carry prefatory statement which clearly conveys

this point, e g:" "This investigation is directed solely towards

establishing the extent or infiltration, domination

(Name of nonsubversive organization) by the (Name of or control of the

organization).

It is not concerned with the normal activities of the

Name of nonsubversive organization)."

In addition, preface should

succinctly show the predication for out investigation of the subversive.

involved.

Co

Limitations on

investigation

Other than with established scurces, no interviews should be

initiated with members, leaders, or officers of infiltrated

organization without prior FBIllO approval (except where they

can be handlid by suitable pretext). However,

this does not

preclude accepting information voluntecred to FBI.

7

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 367

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## Page 368

(2) Informants

souices should not be dired

dy FBi to join

or participaic in activities of target orcmsation lowever.

if subversive group requests informant to do so, laiter may

comply.

(3)

Be

certain

all persons intervicwed, including informants, are

aware that FBI is not interested in normal activities of target

organization but solely in efforts to influence of control the

organization by subversive elements.

d. Conversion to full scale investigation

If target organization becomes completely dominated and controlled by

subveisive elcments, advise FBIHQ on UACE basis thai full investigation

is being

initiated as subversive organization. Drop infiltration

designation from title of case.

5.

subversive publications

Each office

should revievlany independent subversivelpublications produced

in its

territoryllas contiasted with publications issuca by subversive

groups which are under investigation, see B. 3. e. above)lto determine

whether any advocate violations within FBI jurisdiction.

available information by ill to FBIHQ with copy of pertinent material and

make recommendations as to further action.

Insure that FBIllQ is aware of

all subversive publications with brief identifying data.

Investigative steps

Efforts should be made to develop reliable informants at all levels and

in all segments of subversive organization:

Live informant coverage should be supplemented by other logical investigation

including review of appropriate public records and publications,

interviews with former members or group and, on suieciive badio, divugi

techniques as physical and photographic surveillance.

Administrative and

reporting procedures

Reporting requirements and status

When necessary cata has been developed concerning organization's

activities (See B. (3. Jabove), submit report.

Alter Initral report,

reports should be

submitted

semiannually (unless FbIHO has instructec

otherwise in individual cases). LHM may be used to provide FBIlIQ OI

• other interested agencies with significant data of immediate interest

on an interim basis between reports.

bo Informant coverage

Cover pages of reports should include a brief summary of informant

coverage available with respect to

the organization, identifying

informants who report on the group's activities by symbol number and

showing specifically which informants are members of the group.

co Topical headings

Both reports and LHMs should be organized under logical headings,

Character

Pariy, USA; Internal Security." In case of subsidiary or front group,

character should show name oi abbreviation of the parent organization,

cago, "Young Workers Liberation League, Internal Security - CrUsA";

"Young Socialist Alliance, Internal

Security - SWP." Caption of

subversive infiltration cases should include name of subversive group

and target riganization, e.g's

"Infiltration of (Name of target

organization) by Socialist Workers Party, Interna! Security - SWP."

Classification = 100

- NW 54933 Docld:32989799 Page 368

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## Page 369

: :

f. Copies

Eurnish's copies of reports and LMs except where instructed other-

wise

in individual cases.

g. Closing of casc

If it is determined subject organization is not currently engaged in

subversive activities, submit pertinent facts in closing report.

C. INVESTIGATION OF INDIVIDUALS

1. General policy

a.

Purpose

To develop evidence of any violations of the statutes chinerated

in A. 1. above and keep the Department and other agencies and

officials

of Executive Branch advised of information developed which pertains

to their areas of

responsibility and interest.

bo

Individuals to be investigated

Investigations should be conducted to fully identify and determine

the activities and affiliations of persons who:

Are reported to be engaged in activities which may result in a violation

of statutes enumerated in A. 1. above.

This includes individuals who

are current active members of subversive organization or movement.

Where formal membership in a subversive movement does not exist, it

includes individuals who are actively supporting the subversive goals

of the movement.

Priority investigative attention should be given to. individuals who

are known or suspected of being involved in

subversive activities

• which are of a clandestine, underground, or violent nature.

Limitations on

investigations

AlL Investigations conducied sivuiù aruid muculous ün ancoping inquiries

which are

relevant to objectives.

Under no circumstances should

an investigation be conducted of any individual merely on the basis

that such individual supports unpopular causes or opposes Government

policies.

d.

Investigations requiring FBIHQ approval

Obtain FBIHQ approval for investigation of:

(1)

U. S. Government employee

(2) Officials or employees of United Nations oi other public

international organizations of a governmental or quasi

governmental nature.

(3)

Officials or employees of foreign diplomatic establishments

governments, or foreign exchange participants (representatives

of foreign countries who are in U.S. as part of official

exchange program).

(4)

Faculty members of institutions of learning.

FBIHO approval is not required for investigation of student or

• nonacademic employees of institutions of learning in the absence

of unusual circumstances.

during a pending investigation it

is discovered that the subject fits one of above categories,

suspend active investigation and advise FBIlQ with recommendation

as to further action.

e.

Members of United States

armed forces

No investigation should be conducted of activelmembers of U.S.

military fnices or retirees from the "regular" components of the

armed forces who are subject to Article 2 of the Uniforn Code of

Military Justice and over whom the military retains control (re-

tirees

from military reserve forces are not subject to the Uniforn

Code of Military Justirel. If it is determined that a subioct fits

in this category, terminate investigation and promptly furnish per-

tinent data to appropriate counterintelligence branch of U. 5.

armed forces.

Advise FBIllO in form suitable for dissemination.

• NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 369

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## Page 370

...c.o'!i!

ORGANIZATIONS• AND INDIVID

If. Candidates fo

I occupants of elective publ

office

Upon Icarning of

the candidacy for.public office of. a member of a

subversive organization,

the office of origin should promptly

furnish FBIllQ with

a conmunication suitable for dissemination

setting

forth suificient identifying data and a biief sunmary

of the individual's subversive activities together with details

of the individual's candicacy fos public office.

In the absence

of a violation of a specific Federal statute, no investigation

should be conducted until subject's candidacy for public office

is icsolved.

Information received during the period of the indi-

vIdual's candiancy indicating

a specific violation of federal

law(s) should be

furnished FBIllo by means consistent with the

exigencies of the situation along with recommendations as to

additional action warranted. Other unsolicited subversive infor-

mation received from

sources and informants or obtained incidental

to other investigations

should be channeled

to the individual's

file and, when appropriate, furnished FBIlQ in disschinative form

with recommendations as to additional action warranted.

Results of candidacy in every instance should be furnished FBIHO

under individual caption.

Should the candidate have been defeated,

necessary communication

should contain recommendations as to addi-

tional action warranted.

Should the candidate be elected, necessary

communication

should contain statement that in the absence oi

information indicating a

specific violation of a federal statute,

no additional investigation will be conducted.

At such time as the

individual ceases to serve in public office, the office of origin

should submit such information

to FBINQ accompanied by reconmende-

tions as to additional action warranted.

should intormation be

received indicating a violation of a specific Federal statute while

the individual is in office, receiving office slould submit pertinent

information to FBIIQ by means consistent with the exigencies of the

warranted along with recommendations as to additional action deence

situation

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 370

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## Page 371

2. Investigative proce

I'S

20 .

Scope of investigation

Data concerning

the

following items shoird be developed and teported,

if pertinent:

(1)

Background information, including

(a)

T'INC

name and aliases.

(0)

Date and place of birth. Lihere practicable, verily through

appropriate bureau of vital statistics or birth registrar.

(c)

(d)

Residences, past and present.

(e)

Occupations and

employments, past and present.

Citizenship status; where applicable, naturalization data.

(f)

ramily background.

If available, include identities of

ammediate family and any information indicating they arc

employed in sensitive positions or by U. S. Governnent.

member of inmediate family. is known to be engaged in sub-

(g)

(1)

(3)

(3)

(k)

versive actavitres, anclude succinct resuire.

Military records, including any service in forcign forces.

Educational background.

Arrest record and disposition of chaiges..

Physical description. Nake reasonable effort to secure

photograph.

Handwriting and/or handprinting

specimens should be obtained,

if readily

available, and kept in case file. Special

efforts should be made to secure such specinens with regard

to leaders of subversive groups and they should be furnished

to FBIHQ by letter for attertion of FBI Laboratory to be

(3)

included in National

Security File.

Sabreachre activitiee and

affiliations: includine

(a)

Information concerning membership in subversive movements,

organizations or lioni gioups, date and cricunstinces or

admission, positions held, and

participation in activities

of organization (e.g., attendance at meetings or other

functions, fund-raising or recruitment efforts on behalf

of organization, contributions, eic.)

• (b) Statements

made

the subversive nature of group, including invoivement in

underground

operations, and/or in any other illegal or

violent

actions promoted by organization or movement.

(c) Information tending to show

subject's importance in subversive

movement of organization, e go, degree of influence and

leadership exercised, close

association with national or

local leadeis, participation in policy decisions.

bo

Investigative steps

The following

steps should be considered, but are not all inclusive.

(1)

File reviews.

Office indices should

be checked.

Any pertinent

•information developed should be included in initial report.

Where logical, check files of other field offices and/or FBIHQ.

(2)

Public source

material.

Malie full use of public records and

public sources of information, including hearings of congressional

or other Government committees both state and Foderal, and

publications, including those issued by subversive gioups.

(3)

Check of files of other government agencies, both Federal and •

local, which could logically be expected to have 'pertinent

information.

10

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 371

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## Page 372

Ca

(4) Recoids

private firms.

Obtain Deitin

available information

.:* fom records of privaty liens such as, past

or present

employers.

Checks of credit agencies should be limited to securing identifying

information only.

Contacts with neighbors and fellow employers.

Such inquiries

be made only where there is capectation they will develop

pertinent information not otherwise available.

Canvass of established sources and informants.

Contact informants

and

sources in position to ve knowledgeable concerning subversive

(7)

groups with which subject is affiliated.

Physical and photographic surveillances.

These should be

considered on sclective basis when circumstances indicate they

may be productive.

Interviews of subjects

(1)

PoliCy

Subjects of investigation should be interviewed unless there

is a sound basis for not doing

SO.

be considered after background inquiries have been completed

and a good picture of

subject's activities developed

If a decision not to interview a subject is made, this should

fully explained in case file and FBIHQ advised whenever FBIHQ

(2)

is cognizant of investigation.

Purpose

To develop information regarding subversive activities in which

(3)

the subject is engaged.

Approval to interview

Ail interviews of subjects may be approved by SAC except following

instances which reauire FBIHQ approval:

(a)

Daleted

(b)

When subject is nationally prominent or where circumstances

otherwise indicate the interview could be widely publicized,

such as labor leaders, educators, religious leaders or

journalists.

(c)

When interview is to be conducted in presence of subject's

attorney and/or aide.

• (d) When subject is connected with institution of learning.

[In those instances where FBIHQ approval is not required, case

Agent should prepare a memorandum requesting SAC authority lor

interview.

nemcrandum should include a succinct resume of

the case, including a revier of office files concerning a subject,

should indicate the objectives of an interview.

Memorandum

musi be appioved by SAC oi in his absence, by a designated officiall

(4)

Letter requesting FBIliQ approval to interview subject

Letter should concisely set out available data concerning

following items:

Residence address, employment, race, dale and place of

arth,

citizenship and any health factors which could

affect 'conduct or interview.

Ilo

III.

Marital status, employment and citizenship of spouse.

succinct summary of subject's subversive activities,

membership of affiliation with subversive groups, and

positions held.

IV •

Similar sumnary regarding spouse's affiliation with

subversive activities.

Similar sunmary concerning subversive activities on

part of close relatives.

VI.

Resume of subject's cuirent sympathias and status in

subversive movement or organization and any indicativ

of disaflectione

11

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 372

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## Page 373

VII.

Su

ct's arrest iccord and dispo:

son o1 charges; any

mation indicating & propch

jur violchce.

bas. capected to be. gained .by

terview?.

List above items by number but headings necd not be restated.

Is no pertinent data is available concerning a particular

do any on case ete or at a con provocat prese

If interview not conducted within 60 days, submit letter advising

FBIHQ:

(a)

Reason intervier not conducted.

(b)

(c)

Ahether errors to peerinen subides rabi be pursuedo

desirability of interview.

after, keep FBIHQ advised at least each 60 cays as to progross

of matter.

(6) Conduct of intervier.

(a)

Intervicws of

subjects cntitled to the warning and waiver

shall be conducted in accordance with the requirements set

forth in volute interval instru code sector telligence

information rather than an admission or confession of

gu1lt,

no warning is required.

Moreover.

if the investigation

has lailed to develon information indicatins a possible

violation of lederal law by the subject,

it would ve

permissible to interview the subject without a warning as

he does not fit the criteria of those entitled to a warning

of rights.

Carefully plan interview so there will be no

compromico of

salices

sensitive techniques or interviewing

personnel.

An overriding consideration to always bear in

mind is that interview should elicit from, not provide

information to the subjecte

(b)

Intervicw at subject's place of employment should be

avoided if possible. If attorney or aide is present during

interview, interview must be conducted by two Agents.

(c)

If, during conduct of intervicw subject desires that his.

attorney or aide be present, the intervicw should be tact-

fully terminated, and FBIHQ

should be informed with recommen-

dation whether or not to resume interview.

(d)

In all other instances, SAC has responsibility and option

of deciding when two Agents should handle interview. Safety

of Agents

1s trIst priority to consider.

(7) Direction of subject's activities.

PriOI FBIllO approval is required before taking any steps to direct

subject's activities even though he may appear to be cooperative

during

the interviev.

(8). Reporting results of interview.

Record results of interview on FD-302.

Pertinent results of interview should be included in next

report or LIM unless circumstances indicate need for more

expeditious reporting.

In cover letter or administrative

pages, include observations of interviewing Agents as to

subject's cooperativeness, any relevant information

concerning subject's apycarance or characteristics, and

assessment of information developed by intervich in light

of other data known to your office.

12

6-0(1m73

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 373

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## Page 374

•i eporting Procedu

Gencral.

• it.

(1)

Pertinent information developed during investigation may be reported

either by

seport or uM.

Reports should be submitted:

Whes setling out resulis of extended inquiries such as

summary of subject's activities.

When subject is being recommended for inclusion in aDiX.

LiM should be used to report timely or significant information

rogaiding subject's current activities.

(2) A11 communications should be linited

to:

(a)

Information regarding

subject's subversive activities,

sympathics, and affiliations.

(b)

Pertinent background data concerning subversive individuals

or groups with which subject is connected.

(c) Essential

background data regarding subject.

They should not include information regarding subjoct's social

or personal affairs or other background data not iclevant to

subject's

subversive activities of affiliations.

(3)

Information in both reports and Libis should be organized under

topical headings.

Main headings and subhcadings should be

employed to make the cormunication as readable as possible.

D. Summarizing infomation.

When reporting information of

repetitious or cumulative nature, such

as attendance at regular meetings of

subversive group, use summary

•narrative staterent.

Exact dates are nut needed, but

time period

sivuid in

trueraicus

sicienchis

se facts and not conclusions. Information from ditterent soarinis

should be reported separately and any significant items must be

set forth in detail.

Administrative or Cover Pages

(1)

Material to be included

Pertinent information concerning following should be included in

administrative pages of report or cover conmunication of LHM:

References to other reports or correspondence, AdEs status,

reference to security flash

notice (FD-165) or transfer of

origin

contained in report or LiM,

leads, and other administrative or noninvestigative naterial.

Use form (FD-305) fOi ADEX Cases. If used, nonsynuul source page.

should be last page.

(2) Documentation

(a)

In documenting information originating with another field

office, file number of original. document need not be shown

provided source

date information received, and receiving

Agent are identified.

(b)

Do not conduct extensive inquiries to document background

information.

(c) In characterizing persons who associate with subject,

• identify source but further documentation not required.

d. Office, of Origin

Office

covering place where subject's principal subversive activities

occur or originate should be origin. In unusual circumstances where

13

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 374

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## Page 375

there is doubt

which office should be ori

rcquest raIllo to

designate offic

...'!.

c... Tille of corminications

Normally, only one subject should be carried in title of cach report

or UM and separate reports

should be suimitted for each

sul ject

regaidless of

elationship. However, when ecporting virtually

identical information concerning

two

relaied individuals (rg.,

travel

data concerning a husband and wife) an exception can be made

and

single LIM or repori submitied.

In such cases dual captions should

be used and an extra copy of communication provided.

•f. Classification - 100

Character

(1)

Designation "Subversive Matter" (or abbreviation Sil) should be

used in all cases.

Add organizational affiliation when chief

group with which subject is connected is under current investigation

or has approvedicharacterization.

Example:

subversive Matter - CPUSA

(2)

Subversive Matter - SWP

Where meaningful organization affiliation cannot be shown,

use caption

"Subversive Mattei."

Copies of reports or LiNs

In all instances furnish four copies to FBIllO to cover disschination

to Department (2) and Secret Service (1). Where it appears dissemination

will be made to other agencies at FBIHQ level, furnish one additional

copy for each such agency involved.

ic

Carry cases as pending until logical inquiries aimed at resolving

purpose o1 investigation have been completed.

As mininum, case

should be kept pending until essential background data regarding

subjeci has been secured

sufficient information developed to present

good picture of nature and extent of subversive activities engaged in

by subject.

jo Closing and

reopening of cases

If it is determined

that subject's cursent activities do not involve

an actual or potential violation of one or more of the statutes

enumerated in A. 1. above, case should be closed.

Case

may be

reopened at

a later date if additional information is

received which indicates subject's subsequent activities involve or

may result in a violation of

the statutes cited in A. 1.

. Ke

Subject traveling abroad (Also see

section 105G volune. IV, of this

manual).

Tale following action when information is received that subject of

current investigation intends to travel abroad or has departed on foreign

travel (except where travel is of brief duration and is known to be

for innocuous purpose, such

as vacation):

(1)

Immediately notify FBIlO ci avarlaule details concerning travel.

including places and dates of depaiture and intended leturn,

destination, itinerary, purpose of trip, and pertinent passpoit

data.

Include full description of subject, including aliases.

Set out concise resume of available subversive data regarding

subjail.

Do not delay advising FBIIQ while developing details

if time is of essence.

14

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## Page 376

(2) Il necessil

Got out lead for wid to check cords of Passport

Office; Do

iment et state.

(3)

Pertinent

muration is finished separiment of state, central t

Intelligence Agency (CIN), and interested Legal Attaches.

Furnish IDId with sis copies of LIll (3-Departnent, I-Secret

scrvice, I-state,

1-CIA) plus an additional four copies for each

Leral Attache Uflice which covers arca in

subject's itinerary

(I-Legat, 3-Legat's sources).

Also, furnish one copy of subject's

photograph, if available,

in cover letler.

„ast out equest 8e

for each Legat Office involved.

stop should be placed with security services abroad, so indicale

abroad on

sparate nubered page captioned "Leads" at end of LiN.

Request

should not refer to

Legal Attache or request investigation by

any particular service.

(4)

Advise FBIIQ promptly by LiM of subject's return. Reference

any prior nemoranda dealing with the subject's travel. If

subject has

traveled

to a communist country; furnish recommenda-

tion as to interview and advise whether additional investigation

(5)

being conducied.

Take following action when information is received that

organization or individual engaged in subversive activities is

forming tour group for foreign travel:

Advise appropriate offices, under caption of tour group

organization, as to identities of individuals participating

in tour and

furnish LIN tO FBIHO for dissenination to Stato

Department, ClA, and

interested Legal Attaches.

Include

readily available information pertaining to tour, such as

(b)

[characterizationior organization or individual sponsoring tour.

itinerary

names: and

addresses of

particibants. and

Other offices

should innediately identify participants

residing within their respective

territories and submit

those of security interest.

Refer to LIM previously

repared under caption of tour group or organization.

In

cover letter, list participants. on whom there is no subversive

information.

Submission of information on members of subversive groups.

(1) "Offices covering national headouarters or local units of subversiva

groups should promptly furnish BIHQ names and identifying data

regarding persons affiliated with such groups.

information by letter, and indicate list Is being furnished

for indexing purposes.

(2)

Information

regaiding subversive affiliation of individuals

residing in territory of other offices should be furnished to

Jatter.

(3)

Subscription lists of publications of subversive organizations

•should be indexed in field office covering address shown for

subscriber but should not be forwa ded to FBIliQ.

Mo

Control files on former members of subversive organizations.

(1) Offices having sufficieni volume nay, at the option of

appropriate supervisor, maintain control. files on forner

members of

subversive organizations.

Such files will proclude

necessity for extensive file reviens to identify persons wha

are in position to furnish information of value in particular

(2)

Where appropriale, make copics of conmunications for these files.

Insofar as praciical these files should

contain following information

regarding ex-members on subvursire groups: background, type di

information possusser, time

period covered, availabilily lui

interview and for testimony.

1.5

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Channeling inte

atIOn tO. CaSC 11l4:5

*..

Memoran

garding.membership or.activ

in subversive organiza-

tions

hiding surmaries of

informint

ports, should be

channeled la cascriies' of individuals involved. When informa-

tion from informants or surveillances is channeled lo individunl

• case files, it should be documented.

(2)

When preparing lengthy channolony memoranda reporling material of

interest 10 other offices, iimit nunbur of copies prepared to

two for cach other office.

Clearly

indicate next to. names of

other offices the page number containing information of interest

and note on cover page that distribution of material to individual

case

files

should be handled by recipient offices.

• 0.

Movement of subjects between oifices

If office of origin icceives information that subject of current of

past investigaiion changes residence to territory of another division,

office of origin roguest verification within 30 days. If new residence

confirmed, office of origin submit FD-128 to transfer origin, Office

of origin

should furnish new office with any pertinent subversive data

which has not previously been reported in a form suitable for dissemina

tion, or suitable for incarporation in an LIM or report.

Destruction oi Channeling Memoranda

At the option of appropriate field supervisors, in order to avoid the

accumulation of channeling memoranda in a case file as well as to

facilitate the subsequent preparation of LiNs or reports, the folloving

procedure may be used:

Files may be reopened for preparation of an

"investigative insert" for iater inclusion in a LIM or repoit, using

T symbols identifying informants who have furnished prior information.

Agent nrenaring

this

insert should also prepare a cover memorandum

showing what

serials in the file have been covered by his review and

also identifying all symbol nunber informants involved and indicating

the location of the original data (similar to documentation in the

cover pages of a report).

The channeling nchoranda covered

in the

review can then be destroyed and the "investigative insert" along with

its cover

memorandum can, it necessary, be forwarded io another field

division in the event the subject moves.

14• Urban Guerrilla Warfare

(Instructions relating to investigations of above subject matter are con-

tained in section 122, item 18, Manual of Instructions.)]

De DISSEMINATION OF DATA DEVELOPED

• 1a General Policy

Information developed during these investigations should be furnished to

other agencies in Executive Branch which have a legitimate interest.

See

MRR, part II, section 5, pertaining to Bureau's overall responsibilities

and policies in dissemination.

Do not disseminate earlier reports withut revicwing them to insure they

meet current reporting standards.

If they are unsuitable for dissemina-

20

1a01, prepare Lim contaning pertinent iniormation.

Speciiic reauirements

Following instructions cover representative situations which occur

frequently.

2.

Members of armed forces

Delimitations Agreement betleen FBI and armed forces intelligence

agencies (see siction 103B, vulume IV, of

this ranual.) requires frec

exchange of all information of mutual interest betwcen subscribim;

agencies.

Immediately refer any derogatory or possibly signalacant

information develoved concorning mombers of military sorvaces.

including contacts with irdividuals or groups of security interest,

to military service having primary responsibility.

16

1-15-74

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## Page 378

If it is deter

ed sublect of FBI investigatio

gas member of armed

seivices;

pertinent in

ntinue innediatcly, advise l

and disseminate

Emation

Locally la appropriate

melligence agency.

it is detemined subject has close relatives in mined josces,

promptly advise appropriate military intelligence service, and

furnish

pertanent infornation, including reports, on subject anvolved.

Evaluation of such association

military intelligence scivice.

In all instances, advise FBIHQ concerning any possible subversive

contacts or

derogatory information developed concerning military

personnel, including local dissemination made. Enclose four copies

Of LiM OI

report setting out pertinent data.

D. Aliens and naturalized citizens

Furnish any information which might have bearing on their deportation

or denaturalization to Inmigration and Naturalization Service (INS)

locally.

Co

Individuals

employed in or having access to Key Facilities, or

of private contractors of the Armed Forces

Under Delimitations Agrcenents, FBI is responsible to disseminate

ports o the chie

pertinent daia to the counterintelligence agencies of the Armec

forces. ¡Also disseminate pertinent information concernins such

Individuals to the Chiel, Deiense Industilal Security Clearance Ofice

(DISCO), Defense Supply Agency, Columbus, Ohio 13215, Attention Chiei,

Adjudication Division and advise interested military intelligence

agency of such dissemination to DISCO. However, with regard to

facilities having classified contracts with the

Atomic EnergY

Commission (AEC), dissemination to AEC is made only

at FBIHQ.]

See section 102, volume IV, of this manual for details.

do

Employees of public utilities (including state and municipal facilities)

Disseminate pertineht data locally to Army and any other Federal agency

whose interest is apparent.

e.

Members of military reserve branches or National Guard

Disseminate pertinent security data locally to appropriate military

intelligence service.

f.

Seamen and subjects employed in maritime industry, including long-

shoremen and waterfiont employees

Disseminate pertinent security data locally to Coast Guard and when

circumstances dictate, to other interested intelligence agencies,

including NISO.

Employees of Federal Government

Any subversive information received concerning an employee of an

agency o1 the Executive Branch

should be promptly forwarded to FBIllQ

for dissemination to interested agencies.

No dissemination of reports

in Security of Government Employee cases should be made in field.

Instructions regarding all phases of FBI responsibilities under EO

10150 are in section 19, volume II,

of this manual.

ho

Individuals who own property or reside in immediate vicinity of

installation or other premises under jurisdiction of branch of armed

services

Disseminate pertinent data locally to appropriate military intelligence

service.

i.

Airmen licensed by Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)

FAA issues certificates to airmen (pilot, mechanic; or member of crew);.

to individuals directly in charge of inspection, maintenance, ovei

hauling, or repair of aircraft; and to aircraft dispatchers or air

traffic control tower operation.

Furnish pertinent data concerning such persons to FBIllQ by report vi

LIM. In cover communication, recommend disscmination to fal.

17

0..13-13

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## Page 379

Dissemination

secret service

-...

ill and secret Servi

concerniny protective

responsibilities (set out" in section 102, voiue IV; oi this manuals,

reports and LiNs are disseminated lo secret service both locally

and at FBIlD in all cases which meet standards set lorth.

includes virtually all cases on individuals where any substantial

information cxists as to subversive activitics or sympathies or

subject.

When photographs are available send copies to seciet

Service locally and to FBIlQ for dissemination at headquarters

level.

(1)

Secret Service should be advised of reason for refciral; i.0.,

statement of class or classes of arrocment which apply to

subject.

FD-370 serves as letter of transmittal for both local

and FBIHO dissemination.

Forward original and one copy to FBIllQ

and maintain copy

(2)

After initial dissemination,

as changes occur in residence and

employment, advise Secret Service locally by FD-306 and furnish

tWo copies

to FBIIIQ. FD-360 must be submitted even though changes

in residence and/or employment are noted in report or LiM being

submitted.

(3)

For instructions governing dissemination to Secret Service in

matters involving threats against President, refer to section

1.34B, volume IV

(4)

transfer ol office on origin, old office of origin should

furnish Secret Service locally with subject's new residence and

business address by LHM or FD-366. Provide copies to FBIlIQ and

new office of origin for dissemination to secret Service head-

quarters and branch office covering new residence, respectively.

(5)

As an admanistrative aid to insure proper dissenination,

covers of cases in which dissemination is being made to Secrei

Service may be stamped

. 3.

Restrictions on field dissemination

If security measures are known to be inadequate at local office of

another Government agency, do not disseminate locally

but bring matter

to attention of FBIHQ for

headquarters disseminatzon.

E. ADMINISTRATIVE INDEX (ADEX)

1. Purpose and general policy

a.

To have a readily available and up-to-date listing of individuals

deemed currently dangerous to the national security.

Objective is to

identify individuals who should be affoided priority investigative

coverage in the event of a national emergency.

bo

Under no circumstance should individuals be included in ADEX merely

because of their opposition to Government policies or because of the

exercise of their constitutional rights of protest and dissent.

ADEX is strictly an administrative device.

It should not be treated

as a factor in determining basic investigative decisions, 1.e.

whether an investigation should be opened or closed, the extent of

investigation to be conducted in a particular case, etc.

2. Criteria

a.

ADEX should include individuals whose actions or statements have

established that they represent a curreht threat to the national

security, i.c.:

Individuals whether affiliated with organized groups or not) wic

have shown a willingness and capability of engaging in treason,

government officials, or othe:

such acts which would result in interference with or a threat lo

the

survival and effective operation of national, state or local

government.

18

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## Page 380

i sit mad, parian

This would in

leaders of organizations

aums include the over-..

throw or destruction of the Goverment, of the

united States or the

government of any

territory, district; or possession thereos,

• or the governaent

The term "Icaders" denotes those individuals,

St try political subdivision mercin, dyspectil

of title, who are in a position to significantly influence the

policies

activities of

the group.

Mere membership

in an organization, without the clement of leadership of without a

denonstrated willingness and capability described in paragraph a

is not

sufficient for inclusion in ADEX.

Co

Individuals should be considered a "current threat to the national

sccurity when reliable information. has been developed that they have

engaged in activity or exhibited the requisite willingnoss and capability

falling within the above-described criteria during prioi to yeais

and there is no indication thuy have ceased such activity. Howcvei,

there may be instances where retention of an individual in ADEX is

justified even though no pertinent information is available during

the prior to years.

'or example, such retention might l: warrante

1n the case of indivicuals who have gone into hidinglor minoraril

espech ampsoned some suel as she de ce tele is

such that the carliest possibic release date from actual incarcera-

tion is more than two years after sentencing, subject should be rec-

Ommended for removal from ADEX.

If possible, stop should be placed

with facility where incarcerated

so office will reccive notifica

cion of release, after which suoject should be considered for pos-

sible reactivation on ADix•

whether or not a stop call be placed,

necessary administrative procedure should be set up so that sub

jeri's cuniinued incarceracion is versiica at least every

six months.

If case is not pending, it should be placed in a pending inactive

rather than closed status.

If a subject under investigation appears

to qualify for iDEX but is under sentence for over two years as de-

scribed above, do not recommend for ADEX but follow procedures

described above to consider for ADEX upon release from imprisonment.

Sentences which permit releases in less than two years should be ignored

as a factor in considering ADEX

status.

These guidclines are for

application only as to ADEX status and have no bearing on whether or

not subjects should be investigated.

For those cases in a closed

status at time these new guidelines

brought in line with the

do

reviewed for any reason. new guidelines when the cases are next

become effective, they should be

ADEX should not include

individuals who may be idcologically committed

to a philosophy which calls for the downfall of our form of government

or which favors another form of society but who have not shown a current

willingness or capability of engaging in meaningful action to promote

their beliefs.

This might apply, for example, to rank-and-file members

of the Socialist Workers Party or the Communist Paity, USA, or other

old line revolutionary groups which have advocated an overthrow of

our present form of government but where subject's activity is

primarily ideological in nature and not oriented toward action. Each

case should be reviewed on an individual basis in the light of the

criteria numerated above.

3o Recommendation for preparation of ADEX card

When dangerousness of subject has been established, office of origin

should prepare eccommendation on FD-122, in triplicate.

original and copy to FBIHO, and place copy in subject's file.

Do

Attach additional page oi

pages to Mi-12? setting out succinct

summary of facts on which rocommendation based.

Co

Nonprosecutive sunmry report should be submitted when sunject is

recommended for ADEX unless one was previously furnished to FBIIQ.

In latter instance, submit up-to-date reporte

d!.

Do not delay reconmendution for ADEX because oi absence of complete

background or descrintive date.

19

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 380

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## Page 381

C.

Do not defer

gendation foi ADEX because

ict is missing, tem-

porarily. ouL

countey, or in prison.

:If FBID approvs

recommendation,

APIX cards

all be preparel inclul

ing two copies

fol field. Copy.or FD-122 will be. returned starped

"ADEX card

approved, copies artached." Check cards for accuracy.

• Place one in alphabetical section ai

riold office ADEX and other in

cithes geographical suction or unavailable section.

8°

When subject is approved for AbEs, submit Security Flash Notice (FD-105)

to chec records of Identification Division and post flash notice if

fingerpiints of subject are on file. FD-105 will be returned if posi-

tive identification cannot be made.

In latter event, FD-165 should be

submitied every two years

as long as subject remains on ADEX and no

fingerprint record has

been located. These submissions should be timed

to coincide with biennial revich of case.

Format of ADEX card

Data to appear on face of card

Itemized below are descriptive categories in which subject may be clas-

sified and corresponding abbreviations for use on ID-122 and ADEX card.

Full name

and

aliases

(2)

(3)

Date and place of birth

Race

White

Black

W

B

Other

(4)

Sex

Male

Female

M

F

(5) Citizenship

11. S. Citizon

(0)

(7)

(8)

Alien

Residence address

AL

Employment (occupation and

address)

Type of activity

Black Extremist

BEX

Communist (pro-Chinese)

CMC

Communist (pro-Soviet)

Communist (Tiotskyist)

CMS

Foreign Nationality

CMT

Puerto Rican Nationalist

FRN

PRN

Revolutionary

REV

Miscellaneous

MSC

Activities connected with "New Left" or anarchistic clements should

be shown as "Revolutionary."

term "Foreign Nationality" covers

foreign-directed subversion, e.go, Soviet or Chicon espionage, Arab

terrorism.

The abbieviation FRN should be followed by nationality

involved e.go, FRN-AraD, FRN-Cuban.

(9) Special

Interest

Espionage Subjects

Foreign government employces

U. S. Government employces

ESP

FGE

GOV

(10)

Unavailable section

Missing

MI

Out of country

Imprisoned

PR.

(11)

Key facility geographical reference number (obtained from

Department of Defense Key Facilities List), if applicable, and

agency having security responsibility, which is Army.

(12)

Field office and FBIlQ file numbers

b.

Data to appear on separate card attachod to ADEX card in

geographical or unavailable section.

(1)

(2)

Physical description

Photograph, with date laken.

It should be most current or bost

likeness of

subject available.

20

2-13-74

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## Page 382

• (3). Dangerou:

Lacteristics of subject, cof

Jotation if subject

cariics

(1)

Any special

inforation ncided to locate

(5)

Notation

that security flash notice (FD-10S). has been posted

with Identification Division

(6)

FBI number and fingerprint classification, when available.

Case

should normally be kept pending to secure all pertinent identifying

data chumerated in paragraphs a. and be above.

however, it it

appears a considerable amount of effort would be renuired to obtain a

particular item, use judgment in deciding whether to continue in

pending status

solely for this purpose.

Use FD-186 to ieport above information. File in. case file.

5. Arrangement of ADEX

At FBIHQ.

Index is printed on IBM cards, two copies of which are sent to

field.

An alphabetical breakdown of true names and all aliases of

bo

subjects is maintained at FBIHQ.

In field office

Index is maintained in three sections:

(1)

Alphabetical section

This section includes one complete set of current ADEX cards.

(2)

Geographical section

This section includes ADEX cards of all subjects except thase

who are missing, temporarily out of the country, or in prisen.

Geographical section is broken down by residence address in

accord with needs of

each office, e.g., by state, county, city,

or if needed,

into boroughs or suburbs.

Cards are filed

alnhabetically under rach such breaknown.

(3)

Unavailable section

This section includes cards of individuals who are missing, out of

the country for an indefinite period, or imprisoned, broken down

into three corresponding subsections.

(a) Missing subjects

(b) Subjects out of country for indefinite period

Include foreign residence and employment addresses on

FD-122,

if known.

Place stops with INs to be advised of

subject's return.

Verify foreign residence annually.

(c)

Subjects

imprisoned

Identify institution in which subject is incarcerated on

FD-122.

Request prison authorities to notify us of subject's

release and set tickler to verify.

6. Special interest subjects

Following classes of individuals could be of special interest in national

emergency:

ao

Espionage subjects

Any action taken in these cases should be handled, if possible, in

such manner as in not destroy the opportunity to penetrate an active

espionage network.

Do

Foreign government employees

Any action taken in these cases musi be handled so as to minimize the

possibilities of diplomatic repercussions.

21

6-1-73

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## Page 383

atashant tan to a taped and

":s.1,

c. U.S.

Governnch

Chloyees

These subjects

of special interest to Dep

icht of Justice.

Cards on. "Spccial

interest! subjects shöuld be fit

in iegular seguence

with other ADEX cards.

7.

Changes in residence and empioyment of NDEX subjects

Develop sources to insure that my such changes are promptly brought

to our attention.

D. Submit FD-122 Whenever changes occur. Also submit FD-366 to FBI!iQ

and Secret Service locally.

8.

Changes

in other background

data

2o

submit any changes, addations, or

deletions in data required by lD-122

in an updated FD-122.

If item being deleted, specify "Delete.'

Do Make notations concerning change on existing ADEX.

card pending

receipt of revised card from FBIllQ.

9.

Movement of ADEX subjects between offices

2.

Reguests from other offices to verify addiesses of subjects should

be handled within thirty days.

b. Upon verification of new address, office of origin submit FD-128

transferring origin.

Furnish original and copy to FBIHQ and two copies

io office covering new address enclosing copies of previous reports,

ot frase notice sen-105) photogen placed seth identification Division,

other pertinent serials

note on FD-128 and designate extra copy for FBIHQ, attention Identifica-

tion Division.

d.

Old office of

origin submit current report or LIM whenever there is

pertinent information to report.

Do not delay subnission of FD-128

solely for preparation of report or LiM, but note on FD-128 latter

being prepared.

O1d office of origin furnish Secret Service locally

and bugees addreçcee hy Flaran and!

to new office of origin for dissemination to secret

10.

11°

provide copies

Service there.

e.

If new office

of origin plans no further investigation, advise FBIIQ

by letter that case is being closed.

Subject entering U. So armed forces

Submit FD-122 to cancel ADEX

and FD-366 to advise Secret Service,

furnishing copy of latter to local Secret Service office.

interested military agency has been forwarded all pertinent subversive

data regarding subject and

is avare of

subject's entry into armed forces.

Where appropriate, prepare up-to-date LiM or report for dissemination to

military agency and to Secret Service both at FBIHQ and

field level.

Whäle subject is serving in armed forces, appropriate military agency has

complete jurisdiction over his activitics and no active investigation

should be conducted by FBI.

Geographical caid for subject should be

filed in case file marked "canceled" and alphabetical card destroyed.

When subject returns to civilian status, determine i activities warrant

inclusion in ADEX.

If so, submit FD-122 so recommending as well

as

current rcport. If not, advise FBIHQ by letter.

Removal of cards from ADEX

Subject should be removed from ADEX for any of the following reasons:

Do Permanent dep-rture from U. So or Puerto Rico

Co

Designation as security informant

do Subject no longer falls within ADEX criteria

2,2

6-6-73

NW 54933 Docld:32989719, Page 383

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## Page 384

ORGANIZATIONS

AND INDIVIL

In all of the above cases reconmend rcmoval from ADEX by FD-122 with

attached succinct sunmary of facts.

In all instances exccnt c., submit

curient LIM or report for dissemination to Secrot Sorvice at FBIIQ and

also furnish ieport o1 LiM to secici service Locally.

12.

Reporting procedures on ADEX subjects

An initial summary report must be

submitted at time subject is

recommended for inclusion in ADEX.

Do Additional reports should not be submitted solely for sake of reporting;

however, in the event complerity of case or other icasons so dictate,

the SAC

or FBI!Q may instruci that reports be submitted.

c. Current significant pertinent information and/or activities of

subject should be reported on current basis as it occurs utilizing

teletypes, nitels or airtels with letterhead memoranda suitable for

dissemination.

d.

In the absence of unusual circumstances (imprisonment, proloiged

absence on foreign travel, etc.), ADAX cases should be licot jending

and a communication submitted to

FBIHQ at least every 90 days report

ing on subject's activities.

In the event subject has been inactive

for 90 days, you should comment as to whether continuation on

ADEX is warranted.

13. Deleted]

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 384:

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## Page 385

PREFAR"

GUIDELINES FOR EDI INVESTIG!

1. GUIDELINES FOR FBI INVES

LIGATIONS

Fundamental to all investigations by the FBI is the need to protoct the

constitutioial rights of any individual while still thoroughly and

expeditiously discharging those responsibilities with which it is charged

by statutes and Directives of the president and the Attorney General.

The FBI is a fact-finding agency which sooks with equal vigor to gathor

evidence which will aid in the successful prosecutior, or establish the

innocence, of allaged

violators

of laws of the United

States or of those

who are accused of seeking by force to subvert or overthrow the Government

of the United States.

The FBI makes no determination of the guilt or

innoconce of any individual or group so accused.

To this end, guidelines have been established to be followed in the

investigation of

cases falling within the

jurisdiction of the FBI,

prevent unwarranted investigations and invasions of the constitutional rights

of any person.

B. [SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS

In matters affecting the security of the United States, under no circumstance

is an investigation conducted of any individual on the

basis that such indi

vidual supports unpopular causes or opposes Government policies. All inves~

tigations of subversive or extremist activities are directed to the collection

of information pertinent to a determination as to whether or not the subjact

has violated, or is engaged in activities which may result in a violation of,

one of several specifically enumerated Federal statutes; or are in fulfill-

ment of instructions from the Department of Justice.

All communications re-

garaing these cases must be limited to intormation regarding the subject's.

subversive activities, sympathies and affiliations; pertinent background data

covering subversive individuals or groups with which the subject is connected;

and essential background data regarding the subject. No electronic surveil-

lance may be instituted without the specific authority of the Attorney General.

PrioI FBIHQ approval is required to institute an investigation of a faculty

member or an organization connected with an institution of learning or to

interview a student or faculty member other than established sources.

Inves-

tigations.uf foreign diplomatic or official personnel are not instituted with-

out

specific approval by FBIHQ and clearance from the Department of State•

No investigations are conducted of active or retired members of the U.S.

nilitary forces under terms of a delimitations agreement entered into between

the FBI and the counterintelligence services of the armed forces.

.C. CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE - ORGANIZED CRIME

Where matters

of a criminal intelligenco nature or organized crime are

concerned, investigations are conducted to develop and maintain current

information on

the activities of organized crime in general, and to develop

substantive cases against individual racket figure..

These investigations

are highly selective and are

•concentrated on the leaders of organized crime

and their reported associates.

Any electronic surveillance used in these

investigations requires approval of the Bureau, the Attorney General, and

authorization by a court order.

D. APPLICANT-TYPE MATTERS

In the area of applicant investigations, specific standards have been

established to protoct the rights of individuals.

All relevant information,

both favorable and unfavorable, obtained concerning an individual must be

duly reported; investigation is limited to checks of pertinent records and

interviews of

persons in a position to furnish rolevant information; persons

furnishing derogatory information are requested to furnish a signed statement.

Tho FBI makes no evaluation or recommendation to the requesting agency

concerning tho applicant.

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 385

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## Page 386

PREFACE.

GUIDELINES FOR FBI INVESTIGATIONS

(E.

iF.

L

-

GENERAL CRIMINAL AND CIY

MATTERS

Our investigativo jurisdiction in crimiral cases is based

on specific

violations of Federal laws.

Investigations ars conducted whon information

is received indicating a violation of a Federal law, over which

given investigative jurisdiction, has occurrod. Results of our invostigations

are furnished

to United States Atiorneys or the Department of Justice for

determination

of the course of any prosecutive action.

The decision may be

to presont the case to a federal Grand Jury or,

if the facts so justify,

to arrest the subject, in which latter instance the

arrest is

made on

basis of authorizod prosecution and the issuance of a warrant.

Upon arrest,

the subject must be brought before the nearest United States Magistrate or

Federal Judge in accordance with established rulos of Federal criminal

procedure.

Requests for IBI investigations in selected civil matters in which the United

States is or may be a party in intorest are recoived from the United States

Attorneys and/or tho

Depariment of Justice.

These are handled in strict

conformity with guidelines furnished by the Department of Justice, as are

investigations of violations of the civil rights, antiriot, election laws,

and antitrust laws.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

In addition to these principles, numerous other

restrictions apply to all

phases of our work.

For example, our authority to arrest fugitives is

statutory.

The United States Code empowers Special Agents to make arrests

and carry firearms but IBI policy further requires that only that force may .

be usod which is necessary to effect arrest with due regard being observed

for the safety of the arresting officers and others.

Special Agents aro not pernitted to shoot anyone except in self-defense.

No surveillances are conducted in the White House, the Capitol, the Supreme

court, or the house and Senate Office Buildings.

No surveillance, electronic

or otherwise, may be instituted on any rember of Congress, any Justice or

Judge, or any principal functionary of the Execative Branch.

Our Special

Agents may not engage in entrapment or any other improper, illegal, or

unethical tactios in procuring information or evidence; any critical

complaints concerning FBI personnel must be thoroughly investigatod; any

testimony by a Special Agent in court must be given clearly and without bias

or embellishment.

I'he foregoing is a genaral statement of guidelines for fBI investigations.

all investigative personnel must follow these rules.

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 386

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## Page 387

SECTION 36. ES PICNAGE.

[SECRET]

36A

rA.

STATUTES[ (UNCLASSIFIED) J

Title 18, USC, 8$ 792-798}

Title 50, USC, & 783(6)-(1) (Intornal Socurity

1ct of 1950).

Effective 10-4-61 violations may be

prosecuted

of ibere overt act occurs (Public Law 87-369).

regardless

§ 792.

Harboring or concealing persong

Whoever haruors or conceals any person

who he knows, or has reasonable

grounds to believe, has committed, or is abouù to commit,

an

offense under

section 793 or 794 is liable

to $10,000 fine or ten years' imprisonment, or

Gathering, transmitting, or losing defense information

¡or purpose of obtaining information respecting national

dofense with intent or reason to believe it is to be used to injury of u.s.

or advantage of any foreign nation, goes upon, enters, flies over, or other-

wise obtains infornation concerning any vessel, aircraft, work of defense,

navy yard,

naval station, submarine base,

fueling station; fort, battery,

torpedo staiion, dockyard, canal, railroad, arsenal, camp, factory, mine,

telegraph, telephone, wireless, or signal station, building, office, research

laboratory or station, or other place

connected with national defense owned

or constructed, or in progress of construction by U.S. or under control of

U.S., or of any of its officers, depariments, or agencies, or within ex-

clusive jurisdiction of U.S.,

or any place in which any vessel, aircrait,

arms, munitions, or other materials or instruments for use in time

being made,

prepared, repaired, stored, or are subject of research or

development, under any contract or

agreement with U.S., or any department

thereof, or with

any person on behalf of U.S., or any prohibited

place designated by president by proclamation in time of war or national

emergency in which anything for use

of Army, Navy,

or Air Forco is being

or stored, information as to which prohibited place

Frosiioni ino inioiminoù muniù vo

majuiivial iu naviunal dorenoo; ui

Whoever, for samo purpose, and

with like intent

or reason to believe,

copies,

takes, makes, or obtains,

or attempts to copy, take, make, or obtain,

any sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, may, model,

instrument,

appliance, document, writing, or note of anything connected with

defense;

(c) Whoover,

purpose, receives

or obtains or agrees

or attempts to

receive or obtain

any person, or from any source whataver, any document,

writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, etc.,

of anything

connected with

national defense, knowing or having reason

to believe, at

time he receives or obiains,

agrees or attempts to

receive or obtain it,

that it has been or will be obtained, taken, made, or disposed of by any

person contrary to provisions of this chapter: or

d Whoever,

lawfully having possession of, access to, control over, or

boing entrusted with any document, writing,

code book, etc., relating to

national defense, or information relating to national defense which possessor

has reason to believe could be used to injury of U.S. or advantage of any

foreign nation, williully communicates, delivers, transmits, or causes to be

communicated, etc.,

or attempts to communicate, etc., same to any person not

entitled to receive it,

or willfully retains

same and fails to deliver it

on demand to officer or

employee of U.S. entitled to roceive it; or

Whoever having unauthorized possession of, access to,

or control over

any document, writing, code book,

atc., relating to national defense, etc.,

willfully communicates, delivers, transmits, or causes to be communicated,

or attempts to communicate, etc.,

or cause to be communicated, etc.,

to any person not entitled to receive it. or willfully retains

fails to deliver it to officer or employee of U.S. entitled to receive

(I) Whoever, being entrusted with or having lawful possession or control of

any documont, writing, code book, etc., relating to rational defense, (1)

through gross negligence permits

to be removed from its proper place of

custody or delivored to anyone in violation

of his trust, or

to be lost,

stolen, abstracted, or dostroyed, or (2) having knowladge that same has

Classilled by Director, FBI

Exempt from GDS Category 2

Date of Declassification Inciefinite.

SECRET

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 387

1

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## Page 388

UN JU, LOTTUNAGE

(SECRET]

boon illegally remove

om its

proper place

of custoa

delivered

to

anyone in violation of

trust, or. lost,

or

stolen,

tracted, or destroyeà,

and fails to make prompt report of such loss, theft, abstraction, or

destruction to his superior officer -

Is liable to $10,000 fine

or imprisonment for not more than ten years, or

Il two or moro persons conspire to violate any of

foregoing

provisions,

and one or more do any act to effect object of conspiracy, each is subject

to punishment provided for offense which is object of conspiracy.

Gathering or delivering defense information to aid foreign government

with intont or reason to believe that it is to be used to

injury of U.

S. or adrantage of a foreign nation, communicates, delivers,

transmits,

or attempts to communicate, etc., to any foreign government,

to any faction or party or military or naval force within a foreign country,

whether recognized

or unrecognized by U.S., or to any representative, officer,

agent, employee,

subject, or citizen thereof, either directly or indirectly,

any document, writing, code book, eto., relating to national defense, shall

be, punished by death or by imprisonment for aay term of years or live.

Whoever, in time of war, with intent that same shall be communicated to

the enemy, collects, records, publishes, or communicates, or attempts to

elicit any information with respect to movement, numbers, description,

condition, or disposition of any of armed forces, ships, aircraft, or

materials of U.S., or vith respect to plans or conduct, or supposed plans

or conduct of any

naval or military operations, or with

respect to any works

or measures undertaken for or connected with,

or intended for fortification

or defense of any place, or any other information relating. to public defense,

which might be useful to the enemy, shall be purished by death

or by imprison-

any term of years or life.

(c) If two or more persons conspire to violate this section, and one or more

do any act to effoct object of conspiracy,

each shall bo subject to punishment

provided for nifense which is niort of

ranspirary.

Title 18, USC, § 798 (temporary extension of section 794), provides section

794, in addition to coming into full force in time

of war, remains in full

force until six months after termination of national emergency proclaimed

by President on 12-16-50, or such earlier date as may be prescribed by

concurrent resolution of

Congress, and acts which would give rise to penalties

under section 794 when performed

during a state of war shall give rise to

penalties when performed during period above provided for.

Photegraphing and sketching defense installations

Whenever, in interests of national defense, President defines certain

vital military and naval installations or equipnent as requiring protection

against general dissemination of information relative thereto, it shall be

unlawful to make any photograph, sketch, picture, drawing, map, or graphical

representation of such installations or

equipment without first obtaining

permission of commanding officer of military

or naval post, camp,

or station,

or naval vessels, military and naval aircraft, and any separate military or

naval command concerned, or higher authority,

and promptly submitting it to

such commanding officor

or hisher authority for censorship or other action

as he may deem necessary.

(b) Whoever violatos this section is Liable to $1,000 fine or imprisonment

for one year, or both.

Use of aircraft for photographing defense installations

Whoever uses

of aircraft or any contrivance used, or designed

for navigation or flight in the air, for purpose of making photograph, sketch;

picture, otc.,

violation

of vital military or naval installations or equipment, in

section 795 is liable to $1,000 fine or imprisonment for one

year, or both.

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 388

[SECRET]

2

11-13-74

fir.

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## Page 389

SECTION 36.

ESPIONAGE

36A

......

• ' . [SECRET.)

.. •

$ 797. Publication anu

la of photographs of dofense

tallations

On and after

30 days fro

date President defines any

military

naval installation or equipment as being within category contemplated under

section 795, whoever reproduces, publishes, sells, or gives away any

photograph, sketch, picture, drawing, etc.,

of vital military or naval

Installations or equipment so defined, without first obtaining permission of

commanding officer oi military

or naval post, camp, or station concerred, or

higher authority, unless such

photograph, sketch, picture, drawing, etc.,

has

clearly indicated

thereen that it has been censored by proper military

naval authority; is liable to $1,000 line or imprisonment for one year, or

By Executive Order 10104 dated 2-1-50, President defined following as vital

and naval installations or equipment requiring protection against

general dissemination of information re-ative thereto:

All military, naval, or air force installations and equipment

classified,

designated, or marked under authü.:tj or at direction of President, Secretary

of Defense, Secretary of Army,

Secretary

o1 Navy, or Secretary of Air Force

as "Top Secret," "Secret," "Confidential," or "Restricted," and located

Any military, naval, or air force reservation,

post, arsenal, proving

ground, range, mine field, camp, base, airfield, fort, yard, station, district,

Any defensive sea

area established hy Executive order and not subsequently

discontinued by Executive

and any defensive sea area established under

authority of Title 19, USC, § 2152

(c) Any airspace reservation established under section 4 of Air Commerce

Act of 1926 except airspace reservation established by Executive Order 10092

of 12-17-49

(al Any naval harbor olosed to foreign vessels

Anv area reouired for fleet burdoses

(I) Any commercial establishment engaged in development or manufacture of

classified military or nâval. arms, munitions, equipment, designs, ships, air-

craft, or vessels for U.S. Army, Navy,

or Air Force

All military, naval, or air force aircraft, weapons, ammunition, vehicles,

ships, vessels, instruments, engines, manufacturing machinery, tools, devices,

or any other equipment whatsoever, in possession of Army, Navy, or Air Force

or in course of experimentation,

delivery for

Army, Nary, or Air force classified, designated unctured under authority

or at direction of President, Secretary of Defense, etc.

All official military, naval, or air force books, pamphlets, documents,

reports, maps, charts, plans, designs, models, drawings, photographs, contracts,

or specifications marked under authority or at direction of President,

Secretary

of Defense, ete.

(Applicability of this Executive order should be determined in each instance

by contact with representative of armed services having security responsibility

for item in question.)

1798. Disclosure of classified information

otherwise makes available

In any manner prejudicial to

of any foreign government to detriment of U.S. any classified information -

(1) concerning nature, preparation, or use

of any code, cipher, or crypto-

(phic system of U.S. or any foreien government; or

design, construction, use, maintenance,

or repair of any device,

apparatus, or appliance used or prepared or

planned for use by U.S. or any

foreign government for cryptographic or communication intelligence purposes;

(3)

communication intelligence activities of U.S. or any foreign government;

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 389

[SECRET]

3

11.13.71

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## Page 390

#152

SA - B"

SECTION 36. ESPIONAGE

.. [sEcKEr)

•(4) obtained by processe

communication intelligence

oin

communications

of any foreign government,

knowing it to have been

so oblained

Is liable to a fine of $10,000 or imprisonment for ton yours,

or both.

(b) For precise dofinitions of terms used in this subscition, refer to Titlo

18) Soth

$798.

Nothing in this section shall prohibit furnishing,

upon lawful demand,

of information

to any regularly constituted committee

of, U.S. Senate or

House of Representatives, or joint comnittee thereof.

Period of linitation

Statute of limitations for sections 792 and 793 is ten jears; thore is no

statute of limitations for section 794 as this is a capital offense; statue

of limitations for sections 795-798 is five years.

Title 50, USC, § 783 (Internal Security Act of 1950)

(b) It shall

be unlawful for any officer or employee of U. S. or of any

department or agency thereof, or of any corporation stock of which is onned

in whole or in major part by U.S. or any department or agercy thercof, to

communicate in any manner to any other person whom such officer or employee

knows or has reason to believe to be an agent or represeniative of any

foreign government or an officer or member of any comnunisi organization as

defined in section 782 of this title, any information of lind classified by

president for by head of any department, agency, or corporation with approval

of President) as affecting security of U. S., knowing

or having reasou to

know that it has been so classified, unless

specifically authorized by president,

or by bead of department, agency, or corporation by which this officer or

employee is employed, to make such disclosure..

(c) It shall be unlawful for any agent or representative of any foreign

government, or any officer or member of any communist organization as defined

in section 782 knowingly to obtain or receive,

or attempt to obtain or

receive, directly or indirectly.

kind which shall have been classified

by president for by head of any such department, agency, or corporation with

approval

of President) as affecting security of

U.S., unless special

authorization shall first have been obtained from head of department, agency,

or corporation having custody of or control over such inframation.

Any person who violates any provision

of this section is liable to fine

of not more than $10,000, or imprisonment for not more thai ten years, or

both, and shall be ineligible to hold any office, or place of honor, profit,

or trust creáted by Constitution or laws of U.s.

Any person may be prosecuted, tried, and punished for violation of this

section .at any time within ten years after commission of offense, and if at

time of commission of offense person is an officer or employse of U. S. or

of any department or agency thereoi, or of any corporation siock of which is

owned in whole or major part by U.S. or any department or agency thereof,

such person may be prosecuted,

tried,

punished for any violation of this

section at any time within ten years

after such person bus ceased to be

employed as such officer or employee.

1 Neither holding of office nor membership in any commurist organization

per se a violation of subsection (c) or of any other

criminal statute.

• COURT DECISIONS [ (UNCLASSIFIED)}

In Gorin v. U.S., 312 U. S. 19, Supremo Court, in January, 1941, in inter-

preting phrase

"to be used ... to the advantage

of any foreign nation,"

stated that no distinction was made between friend

or enemy and it was not

necossary to prove that information obtained was to be used to injury of

U.S.

In U:S. v. Heine, 151 F. (2d) 813, Second Circuit Court of Appeals, after

finding that Heine was German

agent who collected information about

Amorican

aviation industry and sent it to Gormany surreptitiously, contended that his

information came

from sources lawfully accessible to anyone who was willing

[SECRET]

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 390

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## Page 391

[C.

OBVIJUN JO.

NO FLUNLUN

JOB - C

[SECRET]

•to take pains to find.

and collate it: Court fe.

it sinco it

cannot be unlawful to

such intorration within U.

fatuous to forbid its transmission to citizons of a friendly foreign pover.

Court stated, "it is enough in the.

case involved to hold as we do that.

lanfal to-broadcast

country, it was lawful

to send abroad

The section is aimed at the substance of the proscribed

information, not at the at of making it more readily available for use."

on Heine

decision,

it appears

Government must prove

gathered or transmitted

is to some degroe limited or restricted and not

available to general public.

DEPARIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS [(UNCLASSIFIED)]

According to Department, prohibitions in

section 793(a) b) are conditioned

upon suspect having

purpose of obtaining information respecting

national defense with intent or reason to believe that it is to be used to

injury of U.S. or advantage of any foreign nation; those in subdivision

(c) require

same purpose plus suspect's knowledge

or reason to believe that

it will be used contrary to espionage laws; subdivisions (a) and (e) relate

to suspects who already nave possession of

or access. to information relating

to national defense, either lawfully or unlawfully, which they have reason

to believe could be

used to injury of U. S. or to advantage of any foreign

nation, and no willfully transmit it to unauthorized persons or retain it

after demand made by person authorized to receive it a demand is

necessary under subdivision (a) where individual has lawful possession - no

demand is necessary under subdivision (e) where person has unauthorized

possession); subdivision (E) applies to suspects who have lawful possession

of national defense information and permit it to be lost or destroyed through

¿ross negligence or fail to report its loss to proper authorities.

Department has instructed all USAs that its prior authorization is necessary

• before instituting prosecutive action in espionage cases, except in emergency

where subiect is fueitive or damade may result from delay.

In cases involving photographing violations, Department has adrised

can be more expeditiously handled by presenting directly to USA for

preliminary opinion.

This does not alter

policy of presenting all espionage

to Department prior to actual prosecution.

Concerning section 798, Department has advised that classification may be

effected by written directive,

or by marking or stamping on item classified;

authorization may be established by written directive or oral testimony.

Decodes of unclassified information are covered by act where it can be proved

they facilitated analysis of cryptographic system.

Department holds that photographing or sketching of outside of commercial

establishment engaged in manufacture of classified military or naval arms

and munitions for U.S. Army, Navy, or Air Force would not constitute violation

of section 795 and/or 797, where no classified equipment or material appears

in photograph or sketch.

Department has suggested following procedures when obtaining and returning

photographs taken in violation of section 795:

Subject should be requested

to relinquish film.

Receipt should be

given to subject and signed statement

obtained to elfect film is being voluntarily relinquished. Film taken in

connection with section 795 should be submitted to FBI Laboratory for any

necessary processing and should then be submitted to commanding officer of

military post, or othar installation, for censorship. If film contains

photographs in violation of section 795, it should be delivered to USA either

directly by commarding officer or through Bureau.

Il prosecution deemed advisable, film should be retained as evidence and not

returned to subject unless, at

conclusion of case, USA feels that any innocuous

negatives or prints may be

returned. In such event film should be returned

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 391

[SECRET]

5

17-1271

sir.

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## Page 392

ISECRETI

to commanding officor wi

iSA's recommendation; otherwi

prints

therefrom should

min in possession of

commandi,

thoir disposition loft to

s discrotion. Requests for

Palm ind any

officer,

and

rn of film can

• then be referred

ta.commanaing officor:

As to rights of Bureau Agents in carrying out enforcement procedures regarding

violations

of

sections 795 and 796 by Soviot-bloc diplomatic and official

personnel, Department advised in summary as follows:

In all instances in which photographs or sketches of defense installations are

made by Soviet-bloc nationals, every reasonable effort should

recover and confiscate these items in interest of national security.

Soviet-bloc nationals who have no diplomatic immunity arc observed by Bureau

Agents to photograph or sketch

military installations in

violation of

sections 795 and 796, they may be arrested without warrant and film seized

as evidence.

If observation is by person other than Bureau Agent, an arrest

should be procured (because misdemeanor rather than a felony is

involved) and search warrant obtained if premises are involved.

Where Soviet-bloc or other foreign officials who may have diplomatic immunity

are observed taking photographs by Bureau Agents, they may be detained until

Bureau is satisfied they do in fact have immunity and film may be confiscated

in interest of national security. If Agents do not actually observe the

activity but received information from outside source, film may not be legally

since warrant of arrest or search may not be lawfully executed against

person or premises naving diplomatic immunity.

D. POLICY

1.

Responsibilities of FBIl(UNCLASSIFIED)]

3.

Investigation of violations of espionage and related statutes for

prosecutive purposes

I=d0ha150+00 50529262614÷400

By Presidential

directive FBI has counterintalligence responsibilities

which it shares with military intelligence agencies and is also

charged with correlating information relating to espionage and

making appropriate dissemination.

Coordination in domestic intelligence

is effected through Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference.

By National Security ouncil directive, FBI and other U.S. intelligence

agencies coordinate foreign and domestic intelligence through U. S

Intelligence Board. (See section 102A, volume IV, of this manual.)

Io aid in interpretation of Bureau's policies, following terms are

defined:

(1)

Intelligence - obtaining and distributing information required

formulation and execution of Government policy

(2)

Espionage - intelligence activity directed ipward acquisition

of information through clandestine operations

(3) Counterintelligence

- intelligence activity which is devoted to

destroying effectiveness of inimical foreign intelligence

activities and which is undertaken to proteci

security

of nation,

• and its personnel, information, and installations,

espionage,

sabotage, and subversion.

Counterintelligence

procuring,

developing, recording,

disseminating information concerning hostile clandestine activity .

and of penetrating, manipulating,

or repressing individuals,

organizations conducting or capable of conducting

such activity.

il 2. General objectives (CONFIDENTIAL)}

Principal goal is providing adequate protection to our national defense.

To achievo this end

and discharge our responsibilities, investigations

should be directed:

To perfect successiul counterintelligence

b.

To present to Attorney Genoral for his prosecutive consideration

violations of espionage and related statutes

[

(SECRET]

6

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TSECRETI

i'•3. Specific nujoctiv

SECRET)']:

:'.:

a .

Dovelopment

of

ble agents (persons actively

eratod

by foreign

intelligence

CI

izations but working secretl

bohalf of Buroau)

and defectors-in-place

b.

Development of complete intolligenco information, i.e, identifi-

cation

of

all intelligence personnel; determining targets and ob-

joctives; ascertaining. to fullest extent activities and

intelligence

personnel; and development of all information necessary

for protection of

When a and b have been achieved, to

present case to Department lor

prosecutive opinion

[

4.

opening cases [(SECRET))' where appropriats

Following general rules apply to opening of espionage cases:

3.

Where specific complaint is received

alleging that person is en-

gaged in espionage,

together with supporting circumstances to indi

cate this may be

case is opened and investigation

pursued to

point where,

if possible, allegations can be established

or disproved.

Where nonspecific complaint is received which is vague and indefi-

nite, submit iniormation to Bureau, indicating no further investigation

is being conducted.

However, this does not

mean that before case is

opened, full

or substantial evidence must be on hand.

Il responsible

sources, published data,

confidential informants,

double agents,

any reliable citizen makes allegation which would 'indicate espionage

activities, careful consideration

should be given to matter before

decision is made not to initiate investigation.

Investigation of diplomatic or other foreign official personnel, in-

cluding persons within scope of International Organizations Immunities

should not be instiïuted without prior Bureau authority.

ever, in emergency situations, discreet physical surveillances may be

conducted of such

persons apparently acting outside scope of their

authority.

In such instances

immediately advise Bureau.

1. 5. Conducting investigations [(SECRET)]

Investigations must be complete,

Bureau should be kept currently advised of important developments.

Determine at earliest possible time whether allegations have any pos-

sible basis in

fact in order to conserve Agents'

•b.

Only photographing cases should be presented to USAs for preliminary

prosecutive opinion.

Do not contact USAs regarding violations of

other statutes, but

submit to Bureau for presentation to Department.

FBI Agents may

photograph, sketch, or make graphic representations

of military or

permission

naval installations or equipment without obtaining

from commanding officer or higher authority when request

for investigation has emanated from latter or where urgent nature of

investigation prevents obtaining such permission.

In latter instance,

photographs, eic., should be submitted promptly to commanding officer

or higher authority for review.

d.

Pursuant to consultations with Department of State and Department con-

corning violations of

sections 795 and 796 by Soviet-bloc diplomatic

and official personnel, be guided by following instructions:

Executive Order 10104, which defines defenso installations covered by .

sections 795 and 796, syecifies that installations or equipment must

be classified,

... as "Top Secret," "Secret,"

"Confidential," or "Restricted."

Arrasts or seizure of film or stetchés

must not be undertaken unloss

there is no doubt that installation or

material photographed or sketched was so classified, designated, or

Spacific Bureau authority must be obtained prior to any arrests

of any diplomatic personnel or membors of their staffs (including persons

affiliated with embassies, legations, etc., and missions to UN

employees of UN Secretariat; or before any seizure of film or sketches

in their possession.

Similar authority should be obtained before any

of film or sketches from other nondiplomatic personnel (rep-

resontatives of Antorg Trading Corporation, lass News Agency, etc.)

unless it is apparent that ovidence will bo dostroyod, removed, or

delivored

to person

or place where it would not be susceptible

before authority can be obtained.

[SECRET]

7

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## Page 394

! 6.

Interviers [(SECRET.) ]

As general rule

pionage subjects are

not inte

Bureau authority

'owever, subjects may be interv

Owed without prior

ved without such author-

ity when it is ap

ent subject is cognizant of

estigation, interview

would not jeopardize investigation, and there

no indication violation

is foreign-inspired. This would include photographing violations.

Sub-

jects must not be interviewed at their places

of employment or

through

arrangements with their employers without prior Bureau authority.

(E. INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURE [ (SECRET)]

Investigation should be based on premise alleged intelligence officers

and their agents have been thoroughly

trained and their activities

directed by experts. Most successful spy is ordinary-appearing person,

who has established

an excellent "cover" for his activities.

2.

Principal goal is providing adequate protection to national

defense.

tain counterintelligence measures frequently will be more desirable

immediate apprehension and prosecution.

It may be-desirable to permit

to remain at large, whereby cuntinuing surveillance may disclose

information as to his associates, targets, or accomplices.

Every pre-

caution must be used to prevent subject from becoming aware of our investi-

3.

Climax of any espionage case is actual transmittal or disclosure of infor-

mation affecting national defense to foreign government or its répresenta-

Investigations should be

conducted with view to determining as soon

as possible actual metrod by which information involved is being transmitted

to foreign government or its representative.

It may become necessary in

some instances to make an

arrest to prevent

transmission of classified in-

formation known to be in

possession of a subjoct or to prevent his escape

with information.

4.

Although not all-inclusive, following investigative steps should be con-

8..

Ascertain complete background and activities if possible including:

residences; employment; associates; citizenship status, including

birth; credit and arrest checks, including subversive

police records; chect: of pertinent Government agencies' files; check

of public source materials; photograph and physical description; iden

tilying information

as to any automobile involved.

b..

Discreet physical surveillance,

keeping in mind surveillance may be

necessary non long perica el timo. Outain piuüographs, Including

motion-pictures, whenever possible, particularly

c.

of espionage meets.

of information, confidential informants, double

agents, and defectors-in-place

may be secured through discreet contact with neighbors, friends,

business

acquaintances, or accomplices.

Make every effort

orate conversations between informants or double agents and subject,

in order that admissible evidence may be available to corroborate in-

formant or double agent.

Make sure latter interprets

correctly and have such instructions properly recorded.

d.

Ascertain method and nature of communications, including mail drops,

through:

(I) Check of communication company records.

Facilities of these

companies should be used whenever possible and appropriate.

(2) Use of highly confidential techniques.

This is very important

and should be considered whenever security is assured.

. e.

Ascertain financial status through:

(1)

Credit checks

(2)

Check of bank records. When bank account is located, it should

be monitored and all sources of revenue fully explored.

I. Ascertain identity and purpose of all contacts through coverage as

outlined above.

Also consider:

Interviews with reliable current and past acquaintances and

associates.

Check of records at hotels and other places of

abode, as well as

public transportation companies when appropriate.

Whon feasible,

maintain liaison with such companias.

[SECRET]

::012-13-74

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## Page 395

SEUTION 3O. ESPIONAGE

36E

". "[SECRET]:"

Obtain handwri

E and typewriting specimens

formid to FBI Lab-

oratory for co

rison with national security

Indicato whether

spocimen may be

destroyed if necessary in making examination.

instructions.are.forwazdeds.only such .tests.as. result in.no.damage.

...:

will be used

and, as this excludas nearly all chenical tests, examina-

tion may not be saccessiul.

ho

When questionable material

is obtained during invostigation, forward

to Laboratory for examination.

Also, when technical cquipment needed

and not available to zield, make inguiry of laboratory.

1.

Bureau must be apprised of

contents

0= all papers, documents, codes,

blueprints, etc., in subject's possession and no opportunity

be overlooked to examine his effects. Whenever'such material

consists of items of possible military, naval, or diplomatic signif-

or subject is known to be aware of such information, advise

Bureau immediately.

i.

If subject travels abroad; consider checking Customs' records

having his baggage examined by Customs,

Also consider requesting

GIA

to cover activities abroad.

ko

Whon thorough investigation

has been

made, consider recommending inter-

view of subject.

If intervier authorized, consider obtaining waivers

of search to permit search of subject's residence and other premises

under his control.

Recommendations

should be submitted to Burear relative to placing

subject's name on administrative inder in accordance with

section 87,

volume III, of this manual.

When interviews are conducted with person who has admitted being con-

nected with a foreign intelligence service, cover following points:

All information pertaining to organization and operation of intelligence

service with which he is connected, including setup of files section and

how their material is coordinated.

Identities

deceriptione, and cover names of all diatelligence afficers

(both legals and illegals), co-opted workers, illegal agents,

and agents,

particularly those

sent to U. S. by that intelligence service; who

trained them; how they were trained; what was their mission; in which

section of U.S. they were to operate; how they were to come to U. So;

under what name they entered U. S.; whether subject knows of any infor-

mation having been

furnished by them to his intelligence service; if so,

nature of information, how they obtained it, how they communicated it,

how they were paid, for what period they were active, and when was last

time they were active.

Where lists of names are found upon subject, obtain all identifying

information concerning persons

listed and determine whether

merely social acquaintances or are of espionage significance.

Locations of all training centers of intelligence servico, both in

• home country and elsewhere,

as well as identities and descriptions of

personnel connected with these

centers.

Information concerning uses

of mail arops in this country or in for-

eign countries.

Where members of foreign intelligence services offer their

services as

defectors or defectors-in-place,

they should be questioned thoroughly as

to their motives.

Make certain they obtain no information concerning

Bureau which nould be of value to foreign intelligence service since it

is known pracüice

of intelligence services to plant person within opposing

intolligence service, and make every effort to check on latter possibility.

Codes, ciphers, secret writing, and methods of concealment

There is definite differenco between a cipher aná a code. A cipher is

made by using individual letters of message as units.

This may be

either by substituting numbers,, symbols, or other letters ior

original letters in

message; or by rearranging order of letters in

message. Ciphers obtained by first method are called substitution

ciphers and latter are called transposition ciphers.

are constructed ly replacing original words,

phrases, or.sentenceg

of message by sode words. Because of regulations governing messages

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 395

[SECRET]

9

11-13-74

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## Page 396

[SECRET]

.. sir. dy tolograph;

radio, code groups usua

Consist of fin

Code inessages may be ba

book which may c

cin as many as one hundred th

or more code

more. on

number

Dictionaries are often used as code books.

-Ordinarily code

messages.cannot be docoded without use of code book.

Frequent use has been made of books for setting up key to cipher.

"Bost sellers" have been used as their possession does not arouse

suspicion.

In making searches keep this possibility in rind.

munication with foreign countries is irequently accomplia 3y

shortwave radio or secret writing in correspondence or dacrodots.

types of secret writing may be detected with nalud eje,

there are methods with invisible inks that cannot be detected with-

out extensive laboratory examination.

When submitting codes or ci-

phers to

Laboratory for examiration, any collateral information which

might be of aid to solving code or cipher should be noted in cover

classified documents aná disclosure of classifíed data (See

section 205, volume II, of this manual.)

These cases generally are referred

by other Government agencies.

When documents are reported missing, referring agency should

advise why matter was referred and

field should confirn receipt

in writing and state whether or not investigation is being

conducted.

(2)

No investigation

should be made of administrative misplacement,

misfiling,

loss of documents in transmission.

Do not investi-

gate if referral by other agencies has

been delayed unreasonably;

promptly of facts, including reason for delay.

(3)

Investigate where there is indication of loss or compromise

through

gross negligence.

Howaver, locating missing documents is

saministrative lunction of agency having security responsibility

for such material and no search for missing documents should be

conducted for other

agencies without Rurean approval.

Investigate where there is theft, disclosure, or compronise with

to aid foreign power or injure U.S. or with reason to

believe this would result.

Advise Bureau promptly of

cases of widespread interest, probable

publicity, or where classified information is of great

strategic

importance.

b.

Investigative steps - determine:

Circumstances surrounding loss, disclosure,

or compronise

disclosing information knew it was classified and

also knew person to whom information disclosed was not authorized

to receive

Exact classified information involved

Its classification and

significance to national defense (i.e.,

would its disclosure

to unauthorized persons injure U.S.,

a foreign power), and identities of competent persons who can so

Whether information can be

declassified for purposes of prosecution

Evidence of requisite intent

gross negligence (i.e., associa-

•tions with foreign officials; clandestine conspiratorial meetings;

ovidence subject had been given security briefings or was aware.

of security regulations; utter

disregard

of such regulations;

excessive carelessness

or imprudent handling of classified infor-

nation, etc.). Where preliminary inquiries show requisite intont

did not exist

no gross negligence, discontinue and

submit closing communication.

Where there is no indication or

foreign-directed espionage but requisite

intent or

negligence does

escist, early interview of

subject is

gonerally desirable, at which time signed statement should be requested.

Conduct investigation to corroborate adnissions.

[SECRET]

10

11-13-74

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 396

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## Page 397

[SECRET]

Communist intellig

services are piacing greate.

phasis on illegal

operations

in U.S.

n view of security surroundi

such operations,

methods of infiltration must be devised apart from

usual techniques.

Experience

developing person who can be placed in contact with suspected illegals or

illegal agents for purpose of developing close relationship should be borne

in mind; howevei, illegals and illegal agents are most experienced and

extreme care should be exercised.

IF.

SOVIET INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONAL FILES [(UNCLASSIFIED)]

These files were set up to correlate information concerning nethods of opera-

tion and organizational structure of Soviet intelligence services.

tain infomation secured by field and Full@ through investigations and interviews

and from other U.S. and foreign intelligence and security services.

Included are a breakdown of Soviet intelligence services, methods of recruit-

•ment, training, communications, payments, travel and entry, security precau-

tions, cover stories, targets, and modus operandi.

They should be thoroughly reviewed by all Special Agents engaged in counter-

espionage and counterintelligence investigations.

New material received at

FBIHQ is forwarded to field for inclusion in these files; hence, Special

Agents engaged in counterespionage and

counterintelligence investigations

should review this material periodically.

IG. CURRENT ESPIONAGE DIGEST [ (UNCLASSIFIED) ]

Sevarise pete does, too distribute to a ce

of communist intelligence

• 1. Issues should be reviewed by all Special Agents handling counterespionage

ana counterintelligence investigations.

2. Be alert to recommend pertinent itens of significance.

3. •File should be maintained under custody of SAC with same security as

Classification 134 files. Issues of lasting training and educational

value, however, should be permanently charged out and securely maintained

by supervisor responsible for counterespionage and counterintelligence

investigations in location accessible to involved SAs. (Legal Attaches

should destroy each issue when read.)

H. • Deleted

[I. VENUE [(UNCLASSIFIED) ]

Venue lies in judicial district in which alleged offense occurred

[J. CLASSIFICATION - 65 [(UNCLASSIFIED)]

[к.

CHARACTER - ESPIONAGE - (Name or approved abbreviation of country) [(UNCLASSIFIED)].

Where applicable, add dual character of Internal Security Act of 1950.

[

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 397

(SECRET]

11-12

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## Page 398

IA.

BACKGROUND

There

are three princi

They are set forth under

registration statutos within

can's jurisdiction.

C, and D.

FOREIGN GOVER!IMENT AGENTS

1.

Statute

Title 18, USC, $ 951.

Agents of foreign governments

Whoever,

othor than diplomatic or consular officer or attache, acts in

U.. So as agent of foreign government ithout prior notification to Sec-

retary of State,

shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not

more than ter years, or both.

Term "creign government," as used in this title, includes any government,

faction,

body of insurgents within country with which U.S. is at

irrespective of recognition by U.s.

2.

1

3.

1

Department has advised

that no definite opinion could be rendered as to

whether agents of foreign governments are legally required to notify Sec-

retary of State with regard to spacific nature of duties to be porformed

by them.

When information is received that agent of foreign gorernment

may be engaged in activity

outside scope of duties set forth in his no-

tification to Secretary of State, submit promptly to Bureau for presen-

tation to Department or opinion

as to possible prosecution or further

investigation.

Investigative

procedure

Following suggestions, not all-inclusive, are directed toward obtaining

that subject:

Acted as an agent of foreign government

Examine subject's bank account.

Interview reliable associates

3

4

of subject.

Examine subject's personal records.

Examine Federal and state income tax returns.

compare subject's apparent anuume rivi apparoni onvonijinis.

Interview subject.

b.

Was not notified to Secretary of State

This should be done at outset

of investigation. Request Washington

Field Office (WFO) to check records of State to ascertain if noti-

fication filed and, if so, to obtain full details.

false information or information villfully omitted.

State Department

representative who can testify that subject is not

notified to Sec-

retary of State must be determined in each case prior to trial.

ecutive summary reports should indicate "an appropriate representative

of U.S. State Department, Washington, D. C."

as witness who will

testimony.

benefit of USA that this witness?

identity will be established prior to trial.

Bureau should be requested

to determine this witness' name and title reasonable. time prior to trial.

[C. FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT OF 1938, AS AMENDED

Original Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938,

known as McCormack Act, was

superseded by Foreign Agents Registration Act of

1938, as amended.

Title 22, USC, f§ 611-621, provides:

No person

shall act as agent of

foreign principal unless he has

filed with Attorney General a true and complete registration statemeni

and supplements as

required by these

sections, unless he is

exempt from

Supplementary statements must be filed every six months.

A 30-day grace period is

permitted to file these supplements.

changes in agent's activities or relationships with foreign principal

be reported within ten days.

"agent of

foreign principal" includes anyone who:

agont, representative, employee, servant, public-relations

counsel, publicity agent, information-service employee,

or political

consultant for a foreign

principal, or for a person any of whose

activities aro in whoie or in major part controlled by foreign •

principal, and who within U. S.:

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NW 54933 Docld:32989719• Page 398

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c.

d.

f.

(3)

(4)

(5)

Term

(2)

(2)

Engages, 1

Solicits,

itical.activitics.for.intor

or dispensos anything

I .foreign principal: ..

locts,

alue for foreign

principal

Represents

nterests of foreign principal

¡ore any agency or

official of. U.S.

Assumes or purports to act as foroign agent whether or not a

contractual relationship exists with foreign principal;

any other capacity at order

principal or of a person any of whose activities are controlled

by a foreign principal

"agent of foreign principal" does not includa:

Bona fide representatives of news or press services organized in

long as they are not owned or controlled or their policies

determined by any foreign principal or foreign agent required to

register under this act

Bona fide representatives of newspapers, magazines,

or periodicals

holding second-class mailing permits and not subject to foreign

Following persons

are exempt:

Duly accredited diplomatic or consular officials

Officials of foreign governments

Members of staff of diplomats,

consular officials: or foreign

ofticers other than public-relations counselors, publicity agents,

or information-service employees.

Latter are not exempt unless

their status is recognized by State Department. They cannot

engage in propaganda distribution.

engaged exclusively in bora fide trade and commerce

Persons collecting funds for relief of human suffering and regis-

tered pursuant to terms of Neutrality Act

Persons engaged in bona fide religious, scholastic, acadomic, or

scientific pursuits or of fine arts

Persons qualified to practice

law who agree to or engage in legal

==passcataties =8 = 220010002

agency of U.S. Goverrment

provided that representation does

not attempt to influence or persuade U.S. Government officials

other than in course of established agency or court proceedings

"Foreign principal" includes any entity in a foreign country, govern-

ment, political party, individual, association, corporation, etc.

Labeling and filing propaganda

Agents of foreign principals distributing political propaganda in inter

state or foreign commerce or through mails to two or more persons must

file two copies with Attorney General within 48 hours with

statement

regarding time and extent of

propaganda must

conspicuously labeled to show:

(2)

Relationship or connection

between political propaganda and

person responsible for its transmittal

(3)

Distributor is registered agent of foreign principal

Identity of foreign principal

4

Registration statement filed

by distributor is available for

(5)

inspection at Department of Justice

Registration by distributor does not imply approval of contents

• by U. S. Government

-

propaganda in interstate

foreign commerce by registered agents in strict accordance with

regulations prescribed by Attorney General.

A registered agent, in furnishing propaganda to or requesting intor-

mation or advice from any U.

S. Government agency or official, must

proface propaganda or request by accurate statement to sfiect

an agent of such a foreign principal in accordance with act.

Sinilarly,

when registered agent appears before any committee of Confross to tos-

tify in intorest of his principal, he must furnish connittoo ith copy

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 399

2

7-13-70

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## Page 400

h.

i.

k.

SECTION 34.

REGISTRATION• ACT

840

.....

of his most

registration statement

as

'fi.

with Dopartment

of Justice.

Books ana

Agonts' of foreign principala are required to keep books and records

of.activitias

as prescribed by Attorney General.

maintained for three years after agent terminutes his relationship

foreign principal.

Bocks and records are to be open for inspoo-

at reasonable times by any official charged with enforcement

It is unlantul to, or attempt io, falsify, conceal, or

destroy. these records.

Responsibility of officars

When agent of foreign

principal. is organization, officers, directors,

or those performing functions of officers or directors will be re-

sponsible ior compliance.

Contributions in elections and political activities

Act prohibits foreign agent, when acting in that capacity, from lnow-

ingly naking contribution of anything of value in connection with elec-

tion to any public

office

or primary election, convention,

or calcus

hold to select candidates for any public office.

Prohibitions are

also

jinposed against anyone knowingly soliciting or receiving such con-

tributions from any foreiga agent or foreign principal.

Government officials acting as foreign agents

All officers or employees of J. S. Government are probibited from

being or acting as agents for foreigo principal.

Exception is pro-

vided where head of employing agency certifies

to Attorney General

that employment of foreign agent is required in national interest.

Enforcement and penalties

(2)

When Attorney General judges a person is ungaged in,

is about to engage in, activity in violation of act, he may apply

to appropriate U.S, district court for order enjoining such acts

or enjoining person from continuing to act as foreign agent

ne coinpiles with ali

Coünte mus?

give Attorney General's application preferred action.

(2)

Il registration statement is deficient, Attorney General must so

notify the registrant giving specifics.

Ten days after receipt

of the notification it will be unlawíul for registrant to continue

(3)

as foreign agent nithout filing amendod statement.

Foreign agents are forbidden to enter into contracts with their

foreign principals wherein agents' fees

or compensation is contin-

(4)

gent upon success of any political activities carried on by agents.

Upon conviction,

violators of provisions of act, except as listed

below, may be fined $10,000 or imprisoned for five years, or both.

Aliens convicued are subject to deportation.

U.S. officials acting as foreign agents - $10,000 and/or.

(b) Agents contributing, or persons accepting, recoiving, or

soliciting contributions, to elections or political activities -

$5,000 and/or five years

(c)

Agent operating

on contingent fee or continuing to act as

foreign agent without filing

amended statement as required

in (2) above - $5,000 and/or six months

(a)

Agent omitting or

improperly labeling propaganda; failing to

provide statement that he is registered agent when furnishing

official; or failure to provide congressional committee

copy of most recent registration statement when testifying

before such committee - $5,000 and/or six months

2.

Policy

8..

Investigations may ba initiated without prior Bureau authority.

bo Casos are not to be

presented to USAs or discussed with them nor are

copies of reports to be furnished to them without Bureau authority.

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 400

3

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## Page 401

....

Although Bureau

been authorizad to examine

registored agent

no such examination should be

and records offi

;tompted excopt

" d.

upon specific Bü

u authority.

'Diplonatic and consular officors

are exempt from registration so. long

as their activities. are recognized by Department of State as proper

for such official.

No investigation of diplomatic or consular officers

is to be corducted

without prior Bureau authority.

are noted, which would seem to be outside regular activities of official

in question, advise Bureau promptly so that inquiry may be made of

State Department to determine exactly what official's status and scopo

Investigative procedure

When it is desired to check whether subject is registered

registered, to secure a copy of his registration statement, direct

lead to wro.

Suggastions

for investigation are being broken down by elements of

principal viclation.

They are not all-inclusive but do represent type

of inquiry mosi uniformly productive in previous

Investigations

should be directed toward obtaining evidence that subject:

Was an agent, or held himself out to be an agent, of Loreign

principal

In addition to general suggestions set forth in section B, item

3a, above, special attention must ba given those agents engaged

(a) "ropaganda activities..

Contact subject's printer or publisher, if reliable,

obtain copies of manuscripts,

orders for printing, bills

and copies of publications.

to dotermine

subject nolás seconâ-class mailing permit and ior infor-

mation regarding quantity of his outgoing mail.

Check with Library o1 Congress for all publications copy-

rinhted he cuhiant

(a)

Where propaganda agent is lacturer, information may be ou-

tainod from lecture bureaus, newspaper morgues, interviews

with members

of clubs before

which subject has

radio station records, including transcriptions of broadcasts.

(2)

Was

(a)

not registered with Attorney General

Ropresentative of attorney General who can testily

that subject did not register must be determined in

case prior to trial.

Prosecutive summary reports should in-

dicate "an appropriate representativa of

the

Attorney General,

U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D. C." as witness

who will furnish this testimony.

Note should be added for benefit

of USA that this witness!

identity will be established prior to trial.

able time prior to date set for trial, request Buroau to

obtain name and title of representative of Attorney General

who should be subpoenaed.

(3) Statute provides that in any

proceeding under this act when foreign

principal is located outside U.S. evidence of specific identity

- of foreign principal will not have to be produced.

4. Miscallaneous

This act requires registration of

foreign

principal or

persons accepting compensation from

acting in U.S. on orders, instructions, or request

of foreign principal.

Thus, agent of foreign principal engaged in send-

propaganda from U. S. to

foreign countries could be required to

rogister.

This interpretation is based on legislative history of statute.

his becomäng such agent, continue from day to day, and termination of

such status shall not relieve such agent Irom his

rogistration

obligation to file a

statement for the period during which he was an agent of a

¡oreign principal."

•..

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 401

4

1-13-72

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## Page 402

[D.

Title 22,. USC, :8

as an agent o1

person periorning

performing tho

of this: section;"

rovides:. "Dissolution of ar

functions of

an officor, or

ons of a director: from compl

→ ..

... ....

ganization acting

ny officer,

director,

or person

with the

.:. Provisions

ment or

supplements thereto as required shall be considered continuing

limitation or other statute to the contrary.

REGISTRATION OF PERSONS WHO HAVE KNOWLEDGE OF, OR RECEIVED INSTRUCTION OF

ASSIGNMENT IN, ESPIONAGE, COUNTERESPIONAGE, OR SABOTAGE SERVICE OR TACIICS OF

COVERNENT OF FOREIGN COUNTRY OR FOREIGN POLITICAL PARTY

1.

Title 50,

USC, ff 851-857,

provides:

Every person who has knowledge of, or has received instruction or

assignment in, espionage, counterospionage,

or sabotage service or

tactics of government

of foreign country

or foreign political party

shall register with attornay Ceneral by filing registration statement.

Following exceptions are made.

Any person:

Who has obtained knowledge of or received instruction or assign-

ment in espionage, counterespionage, or sabotage service or

•tactios of a foreign government or foreign political party by

reason of civilian, military, or police service or

employment

with U.S. Government, governments of several states,

political

subdivisions, District of Columbia, territories, or

(2) Who has obtained such knowledge solely by reason of academic or

personal interest

not under supervisión of

or in preparation for

service with government of foreign country or foreign political

!?!

(4)

(5)

Who has made foll

such kanutnage: instmunt.inn

assignment to officials within an agoncy of J. S, Government

having responsibilities in field of intelligence, which disclosure

has been made

matter of record in files of such agency, and concern-

ing whom a written determination has been made by Attorney General

or Director of Central Intelligence that registration would not

be in interest of

national security

Whose knowledge of, or receipt of instruction or assignment in,

espionage, counterespionage, or sabotage service or tactics of

government of foreign country or foreign political party, is

matter of record in files of

an agency of U. S. Government having

responsibilities in field of intelligence and concerning whom

a written determination is made by Attorney General or Director

of Central Intelligence, based on all information available, that

rogistration would not be in interest of national security

Who is duly accredited diplomatic or consular officer of foreian

government, who is so recognized by Department of State, while he

is engaged

exclusively in activities which are recognized by

Department of State as being within scope of functions

officer, and any member of his immediate family who resides wiüh.

(6)

(7)

Who is an official of a foreign government recognized by. U.S.,

whose name and'status and character of whose duties as such offi

cial are of record in Department of State, and while he is engagad

exclusively in activities which are recognized by Departmert of

State as being within scope of functions of such official, and

•any membor of his immediate lamily who resides with him

Who is a member

of or employed by a duly accredited

diplomatic or consular officer of a foreign government who is so

recognized by Department of Stato, and whose name and status and

character of whose duties as such member or employee are a matter

5

7-13-70

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 402

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## Page 403

•?!'

i :

"of rocord i

hartment of State, while he

Staged estably:

in performanus

of activitios recognized by lunartmon:

-÷25

boing within

•• (8)

Who

po

of functions of

such membe

or ena?:-:

•is' an off

-ally acknowledged and

sponsoron

repress--a-is. il.

a forcign governmort. and is in U.S. on an official riiii

purpose of conferring or otherwise cooperating with t.

ligenco or security personnel

Who is a civilian

one of military personnel of a1:=3--==-=01

coming to U. So pursuant to arrangements made

mutual defense treaty or agreement, or who has been intre: -:

U.S. at request of an agency of U. S. Government; or

Who is a person

designated by a foreign government te

its representative in or to an international organizaii:= =-

which U.S. participates or is an officer or employee

1=====n

organization or who is

a member of immediate family ai. i=i ==rides

with, such a representative:

officer, or employee

Registration statements maintained by Attorney Genera1

shal= :=:===÷o

public examination, except that Attorney General, having a:

national security and public interest, may withdraw.any regi: ====

statement from public examination.

Whoever willfully violates

any provision of act or any rega-==== tiere-

or in any registration statement willfully makes a za=== ====-

of a material fact or willfully omits any material fact. ==

fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more

Any alien so convicted is subject to deportation.

Failure to file a registration statement as required by act i= =

continuing offense, notwithstanding any statute of limitatie= -ier

statute to contrary.

Compliance with registration provisions of this act does act Icete

any person from compliance with any other applicable registrati= =vatute.

2.

Investigations may be initiated without prior Bureau authorit..

b. Cases are not to be presented to USAs or discussed with the= == zs

reports

c:

¿o be furnished. to them without Bureau authority.

Act provides ezemption from registration for certain diploma-i- ==

consular officers and official members of their immediate

reside with them; certain members of staff or employees of

diplonatic and consular officers; certain members of an offs===-

to U.S.; certain members of a foreign armed service in U.S. ====

mutual defense agreements; and persons in U.S. as foreign r==mazz=va-

tives to certain international organizations, or is an offices

ployee of such an

organization or is a member of the immedia-= i=m=?

of, and resides with, such a representative,

officer, or enpi:m

When information is received that individual apparently covere. - act

may be so exempted, immediately furnish information to Bures= =: ==i

inquiry may be made of appropriate department to determine eza-- -zaius

of individual.

This should be resolved prior to investigatis=.

3. Investigative procedure

a .

is desired to check whether subject is registered or,

==2

istered, to secure a copy of his registration statement, dirsa- =aa

to Wro.

b.

Investigations must develop to fullest extent possible data sa-T-=

that subject has knowledge of, or has received instruction cr aga

ment in, espionage, counterespionage,

or sabotage service or Fittis

of foreign government or foreign political party.

c.

It must also be shown that subject did not register as requirsi.

(I)

Representative of Attorney. General who can testify thai

52:-237

did not register must be determined in sach case prior : ==1.

Prosecutive summary reports should

indicate "an appropzis+s z=2

resentative of the Attorney General, U. S. Department

-=====09s

Washington, D. C." as witness who will furnish this testizz.

(2)

Note should be added for benefit of USA that witness? lies-=.

will be established prior to trial. Within reasonable

to dato set for trial, request Bureau to obtain name -=:

--ta.

of ropresentative of Attorney General who should bo suägueii-.

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 403

6

7-13-70

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## Page 404

4.

Statute

of limitati

Failure to registei

ontinuing offerse for as lon

"""

such failure exists.

INTERVICNS

....

.:. :.:

1':

Interviews

wits subjects should be considered on completion of all logicai.:

investigation.

Obtain Bureau authority.

2.

Where

subject is involved in revolitionary group or engaged in other activity

where timely intervier might produce valuable investigative

or intelligence

data, expoditiously request authorit: for interview and indicate why inter-

view proposed prior to completion of investigation.

3.

Where

such early inteivier is authorised, additional interviews with sub-

ject may be conducted on sAl authority.

F. CLASSIFICATION - 97

G. CHARACTER - REGISTRATION ACT - (Name or approved abbreviation of country)]

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 404

7

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SECTION 26: SABOTAGE.

....

86A

1..

STATUTES

TItle 18, USC, §8 2151-2155, and Title 50, ESC, $ 797

Delinitions

in this chepter:

•nie words

riyar material!

include arms, armanent, ammunition, livestock,

forest products.and standine timber, stores of clothing, air, water,

foodstüiss, luel,

supplies, runitions,

and all articles, paits or

Ingredients, intended

adapted to,

suitable for the

States of any associate

nation, in connection with the

conduct of war or

defense activities.

'war premises' include all buildings, grounds, mines, or other

places therein such war

material is being produoea, manaractured, repaired,

mined, extracted, distributed,

Loaded, unloaded,

together with

or transported,

all machinery and

appliances therein contained; and

all forts,

arsenals, navy yards,

caops, prisons; or other installations of the armed

forces of the United States,

or any associate ration.

"Ihe words war utilities"

one or staterer description, any ral

railroads, railways, electric lines,

railroad or railway fixture, canal, lock,

wharf, pier, dock,

building,

structure, engine,

machine,

nechanical contrivanca,

venicle, oat, aircrait, airfields,

air lanes,

and fixtures or appurtenances thereod, or any other

means of transportation

whatsoever, whereon of whereby such war material or any troops of the United

States,

or of any associate

nation, are being or may be transported either

the United States or upon the high seas or ei sewhere;

and all air-conditioning systems, dams, reservoirs, aqueducts, water and gas

mains and pipes, structures

buildings, whereby

air, water or

gas is being furnished, or may be furnished, to any war premises

or to the armed forces of

the United

States, or any associate nation,

and(all

electric light and power, steam or pneumatic power, telephone

finiuses, auù

mistieso

suaviuns, anù

connected with

the maintenance and

operation thereci

to supply air,

water, light,

heat, power,

oriacilities of communication

or to the Armed Forces of

the United States, or any associate nation) Premises.

to any war.

"The words 'associate nation' mean any nation at war with

any nation with

which the United States is at war.

"The words 'national-defense material' include arms, armament, ammunition,

livestock, forage, iorest products and standing timber, stores of clothing,

six, water, fcoà,

foodstufis,

supplies, munitions, and all other

articles of whatever description and any part or ingredient thereos, intended

with the national defense or

tor, adapted to, or suitable for

the use of

the United States in connection

use in or in connection with the producing,

manufacturing, repairing,

storing, mining, extracting, distributing, loading;

unloadiné, or

transporting of any of the materials or other articles herein-

before mentioned or any part or inzredient thereof.

"The words 'national-defense premises' include all buildings, grounds, mines,

places whereir

such national-defense material is being produced,

manufactured,

repaired,

stored, mined, extracted, distributed, loaded,

unloaded, or

transported, together with all machinery and appliances therein

installations

contained: and all forts, arsenals, navy yarted states."

camps, prisons, or other

the Armed Forces

"The words inational-defense utilities' include)all railroads, railways,

electrio lines, roads of whatever description, railroad or railway fixture,

anal, lock, dam, whari, pier, dock,

bridge, building, structure, engine,

nachine, mechanical contrivance, car, vehicle, boat, aircraft, airfields,

and fixtures or

appurtenances thereof, or any other means of transporta-

whatsoever,

whereon or whereby such national-defense material, or any

troops of the United states, are being or may be transported either within

the linits of the United States or upon. the high seas or elsewhere; and all

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 405

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## Page 406

air-conditioning systems,

..and pipes, structares,.

reservoirs,

aqueducts, water

mind gas mains

Wildings, whereby or in conn

with which

the rate forces of the u

nished to

any national-def.crs

ed states, and lall electric 1

and power,

steam or preumatic poiver,

relephone and tölegraph plants, poles,

fixtures. and wireless stations;.

and; the buildings connected with the mainte-

rance and operation

to supply air, sater, light, heat, power or

facilities of communication

to any national-defense premises or to the Armed

forces of the United

states."

в 2152.

Fortifications, harbor defenses,

or defensive sea areas

"Khoever willfully trespasses upon, injures, or destroys any of

the works or

property or material of

submarine mine

or torpedo or fortification

harbor-defense system owned

or constructed or in process of construction by.

the United States; or

"Whoever willfully interferes with the operation or use of any such

submarine

mise, torpedo, fortification, or harbor-defense system; or

whoever knowingly, williully, or wantonly violates any duly authorized and

promulgated order or reguiation of the president governing persons or vessels

the limits of defensive sea areas, which the President, for purposes

of national defense, may from time to time establish by executive order-

*Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years,

or both."

$ 2153. Destruction of war material, war premises, or war utilities

"(a) Whoever, when the United States

Is.at wars

or in times

emergency as

declared by the"president or by the congress,

with intent to

injure, interfere with, or obstruct the United States or any associate nation

in preparing for or carrying on the war or defense activities, or, with reason

to believe that his act may injure, interfere with, or obstruct the United

States or any associate ration in preparing for or carrying on the war or

defense activities, williully injures,

destroys,

contaminates or infects, or

attempts to so injure,

destroy, contaminate or

war material, war

promises, so no atalitico, chail du lineú sui mura inas piû, dûû us imprisoneù

then thirty years, or both.

*b Il two or more persons conspire to violate this section, and one or more

of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy,

the parties to such conspiracy shall be punished as provided in subsection (a)

of this section."

& 2154. Production of defective war material, war premises, or war utilities

"(a) Whoever, when the United States is at war, or in times

of national

emergency as

declared by the president of by the Congress, with intent to

injure, interfere with, or obstruct the United States or any associate nation

In preparing for or carrying on the war or defense activities,

to believe that sis act may injure, interfere with, or obstruct the United

States or auy associate nation in preparing for or carrying on the war or

defense activities,

willfully makes, constructs, or causes to be made or

construsted in a defective manner,

or attempts

to make,

construct, or cause

to be made of constructed in a defective manner any war

material, var premises

or war utilities, or any tool, implement, machine, utensil, or recaptacle used

or employed in making, producing,

manufacturing, or repairing any

material, war premises or war

utilities, shall be fined not more than $10,000

or imprisoned not more than thirty jears, or both.

"(b) If two or more persons conspire to

violate this section, and one or more

•l such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each

the parties to such conspiracy shall be punished as provided in subsection (a)

of this seotion."

& 2155. Destruction of national-defense materials, national-defense premises,

or national-defense utilities

"(a) Whoever, with intent to injure, interfere with, or obstruct the

national

defenso of the United States, willfully injures, destroys, contaminates or

Infects, or attempts to so injure, destroy, vontaminate or infeot any national-

defense

material,

national-acfense premises, or national-defense

utilities,

shall

be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years,

or

both.

2

4-18-61

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 406

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## Page 407

SECTION 86. SABOTAGE

861 - B

•(b) If two or more pers

conspire to violate this sed

and one or more

of such persons do any act

to

effact

the ouject of the conspiracy, each

0f

the parties to such conspiraoy shall be punished as provided in subsection (a)

of this section.":

§ 2156. Production of defeotive national-defense material, national-defense.

premises.

or national-delense utilities

"(=) Whoever, with intent to injure, interfere with, or obstruct the national

defense of the linited States,

willfully makes, constructs, or

attempts

make or construct in a defective manner, any national-defense material,

national-defense premises or

national-deiense utilities, or any tool, implenent,

nachine, utensil, or receptacle used or employed in making, producing, manu-

facturing, or repairing any such national-defense material, national-defense

premises

national-defense utilities, shall

be fined not

more than $10,000

or imprisoned not more than ten years,

or both.

*(b) If trio or more persons conspire to violate this section, and one or more

persons do

any act to effect the object of the

conspiracy, each of the

parties

to suck conspiracy shall be punished as provided in subsection (a) of

this section."

Title 50, USC, 8 797 (Public Law 831, & 21)

*(a) Whoever willfully shall violate any such regulatian or order

as, pursuant

to lawful authority, shall be or has been promulgated or approved by

Secretary of defense, or by any military commander designated by the secretary

of Defense, or by the Director of the National Advisory Committee for

Aeronautios, for the protection or security of military or naval aircralt,

airports, airport facilities,

vessels, harbors, ports, piers,

facilities, bases, forts, posts, laboratories,

stations, rehicles, equipment,

explosives,

or other property or places subject to the

administra-

the custody

of the Department

Defense, any Department or agency

of which said Department consists, or any officer or

employee of

said Depart-

• meut ur agenuy, ui vi

¿no iratiuna.

jurijury Committoo 1o=

Moroccatles co cag

offiver or employee thereof, relating to fire hazards, fire protection,

lighting, machinery, guard service, disrepair, disuse or other unsatisfactory

conditions thereon,

or the ingress

thereto or

egress or removal of persons

therefrom, or otherwise providing for safeguarding the same against destruc-

tion, loss, or injury by accident or by enemy action, sabotago or other

subversive

actions, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor

and upon conviction there-

of shall be liable

to a fine of not to excaed $5,000 or to imprisonment for

than one year,

or both.

"(D) Every such regulation or order shali be posted in conspicuous and

appropriate places."

((National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics ceased to exist 9-30-58, but

section 797 was not changed.)]

B. VIOLATIONS

[

1. [Title 18,

USC, 18 2152 (Fortification, darbor defenses, or defensive

[

tad boat

trespass upon, injury to or destruction of any submarine

torpedo, fortification or harbor-delense system owned, constructed,

or being constructed by the U. s.

Willful interference

with operation or use of any of above

Knowingly violating

any Presidential order or regulation governing

or essels in

2. §$ 2153 and 2154 (Destruction or defective production of war materials,

promises, or utilities during time of war or proclaimed national emergency)

Willful damage

to war materials, premises, or utilities with intent

to interfere with, or reason to believe act will interfere with, war

or defense activities

Willful production in defective manner of war materials, premises,

or utilities with intent to interfere with,

or reason to believe

Mill interfere with, war or defense activities

Attempts to violate

d. Conspiracy to violate a or b

e. National emergency was proclaimed by President 12-16-50

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 407

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

• Page Noi

""':

I SECTION: 92•

SOLDTERS" AND SAILORS! CIVIL RELIEF ACT.OF. 1940"::

B

C.

D

E.

Statutes..

Penalties..

Miscellaneous.

Classification. •

Character..

SECTION 93.

TARIFF ACT OF 2930

He

Statute.

Elements

Penalty...

18800.

Investigative Jurisdiction.

Investigative Procedure..

Venue..

Classification

Character.

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 408

6

5-18-59

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## Page 409

VOLUME IV

TABLE CF CONTENTS

SECTION 94. THEFT FROM-INTERSTAGE SHIPMENT

B.

D.

F

G.

H

Io

J

K

.

M.

SECTION

95.

Bo

C.

D.

E.

F.

Go

H.

I.

•SECTION 96.

A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

F.

G.

SECTION

97.

Statutes.

Fossible

Violations Under

jection 659

Elenents

Unier

jection 659..

Possible Violations

Under

section dis

Elements

Under Section 2117.

Possible

Violations Under

seotion c6o.

Elements Under Section 660.

Court Decisions.

Policy....

Investigative Procedure..

Liaison and Coverage.

Classification.

Character

TREASON

Constitutional Provisions..

Statutes................

Related Statutes...

Elements..............•

Investigative Presedure..

Policy....

Venue.

Classification.

Character.

VETERANS ADMINISTRATION MATTERS

Statutes...

Violations....

Benefits.....

Policy..

Department Instructions

Classification.

Character.

VOORHIS ACT

Co

De

E..

F.

G.

Statute..

Step Taken by Communist Party,

USA, TO Avoid

Prosecution Under This

Act..

Departmental Policy...

Venue....

Penalties......

Classification.

Character.

SECTION 98.

FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT

Ao

Statute.

B.

C.

Policy..

Investigative

procedure..

1938 (WAGE AND HOUR LAW)

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 409

1

10-18-67

Mein?

Page

7a

11

11

11

---

## Page 410

VOLUME IV

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION

FAIR LAPOR STANDARDS ACT OF 1938 (WAGE AND HOUR LAW):

(contirued)

D.

E.

Classification

Character

SECTION

99.

DELETED

SECTION 100.

WHITE SLAVE TRAFFIC ACT

A.

Statutes..

Elements

' . . . .

C.

D.

E.

Court Decisions

Departmental Instructions

Policy....

Investigative Procedures

G. Interstate Transportation of Venereally Infected

Persons.....

H. Venue.

I.

Classification

J.

Character..

SECTION 101. DELETED

SECTION 102. COORDINATION WITH OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

[

A.

minedimes.

B.

Agreements.............

C.

Investigation and Prosecution of Military Personnel.

Liaison With Other

Government Agencies

E. Foreign Liaison.............

Investigation of Federal Gambling Violations.

G. Agreement between the Federal Bureau of

Investigation and the United States Secret

Service Concerning Protective Responsibilities.

H. [Deleted]

SECTION 103. FOREIGN POLICE COOPERATION

A.

Summary•

B.

Scope.....

C. Investigations.

D. Reporting....

E. Classification.

P Character......

Go Office of Origin..

SECTION 104. DELETED

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 410

2

12-13-74

РЕдС

1

1

4а

?

7

17

23

23

26

28

---

## Page 411

103-1

3.

6 .

"...

§& 2155 and 2156 (De.

uction or defective productio.

national

defense

material, pre

iS ,

or utilities. These

stat

sare applicable

in peacetime, as well

during a proclaimed national

mergency or. war.)

Willful damage to

natzonal defense materials,

? with intent to interfere with national defens remises of utilities

b. Willful production in defective manner of national defense material,

premises,

or utilities with intent to interfere with national defense

Attempts to violate a or b

Conspiracy to riolate a or b.

Title 50, USC, $ 797

Willful violation of regulation or order promulgated or approved by

Secretary of Defense or military commander designated by him for protection

of property and places subject to jurisdiction of Department of Defense,

its subagencies, or officer or employee of that Department

VENUE

In judicial district where illegal act committed.

Venue in conspiracy

riolations in any judicial district where the, conspiracy was entered into

or overt act occurs.

POLICY

1.

Cases to be investigated

2 .

Specific complaint with prima facie evidence that act of sabotage

has been committed.

b.

Information that actual or potential saboteurs are at large in the

Speditic request from one of the military services for FBI ina

vestigation of a definite allegation of sabotage even though the

case is within the investigative jurisdiction oflAir Force, Army, or

Navylunder the Delimitations Agreement.

The intelligence agency

with investigative jurisdiction under the Delimitations Agreement

must be agreeable to the FBI conducting the investigation and the

request must be made promptly after the incident occurs and without

prior investigation by another agency,

Il inquiry through local officials or

other informed sources reveals

cause of incident and eliminates possibility of sabotage, no in

vestigation is necessary.

Keep in mind in this connection that a

saboteur may be expected

to attempt to disguise his work as an

accident where feasible.

e.

Instances of willful damage to or destruction

of aircraft in inter-

state, overseas, or foreign air commerce are investigated under

destruction of aircraft or motor vehicles statutes,

but bear in mind

sabotage violation could be involted. (See section 117, volume IV,

of this manual.)

2. Alleged plots of sabotage

a.

Information is frequently receited indicating an act of sabotage

will be committed. It is often impossible

to check the source or

accuracy of such information.

Take the following action immediately:

(1)

Advise Bureau by teletype.

(2)

Advise local representatives offAir Force, Army, and Navy in-

tolligence agencies; ]local police; and officials of plant,

facility, or utility involved.

b.

(3)

Conduct

any logical investigation to ascertain basis for report.

In disseminating information regarding

an alleged plot of sabotage,

the circumstances surrounding the receipt of the report should be

outlined and the facts allowed to

speak for themselves.

Do not

attempt to evaluate the incormation for other agencies and specifi-

cally advise them no evaluation

has been made.

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 411

4

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## Page 412

SECTION 86.

SABOTAGE

86D

0.

Protection of

1

and property in connectión

alleged plot

.of.sabot.age is

ponsibility of company or mil

ry establishment

• Involved

and. local

authorities:.

i taken

Agents risearching for alleged

Decision regarding action to.be..

bombs.will not be made by FeI.

are not to participate in searches for suspected bombs or

assume responsibility for handling bomb devices.

3. Reporting acts of

sabotage or industrial catastrophes

Advise Bureau

teletype,

Any specific complaint of

sabotage or any allegation regarding

which investigation conducted

national interest

Also advise local representatives of interested intelligence agencies.

Keep Bureau advised of pertinent developments.

Information to iurnish Bureau, if applicable:

Name and location of plant, lacility, or utility involved

Date and time of occurrence

Available details

Gorernment contracts

invoired

Identity of agency with security responsibility and any

interested agencies

Estimated damage or production loss

Any hazardous conditions or carelessness involved

8

Salvage or repair work under way

Any information indicating the act resulted from

labor union

activity,

dispute, or strike - including identity of

union; extent and duration of dispute or strike; names of union

representatives

any subversive tendencies;

any evidence

subversive influence; and names of, identifying data regarding,

and information from office files regarding any logical

suspects.

(20)

Statement as to whether

investigation being

conducted.

sargetination being annanator.

fanta must he camplate

to iustify

this course of action.

no report being

submitted,

specific statement to that effect

the Bureau of a reported act of

sabotage, it must be accompanied by a letterhead memorandum,

for dissemination, containing all pertinent information

to the alleged act of sabotage.

4. If damage reported as sabotage is definitely attributable to labor union

activity, labor

dispute,

conduct discreet inquiry if necessary

above), and await Bureau instruc-

5.

Slowdown of production

Slowdown occurs when employees intentionally reduce rate of production.

This might be sabotage during period of national emergency as

deliberate plan by subversive forces.

ò. If allegation of

sabotage through slowdown received, make discreet

inquiry to develop facts but conduct no investigation.

Adrise Bureau of

complaint.

Teletype normally not necessary.

d.

Submit closing report under character of sabotage. Include:

• Identity of company

Contracts or production involved

and cause of slowdown

Effect on production

Details of union

activity

Any indication of subversive activity

6. Biological warfare

Sections 2153 and 2155 include the words "contaminates or infects."

This specifically covers

sabotage by bacteriological, chemical, or

radiological means.

Such sabotage could be used against personnel in defense industries,

military personnel and establishments, foodstuffs and other material

to be used for national defense or the armed forces.

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 • Page 412

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## Page 413

Me dare word lee donia"

c .

Such sabotage

be accomplished by the intro

ion of

bacteria,

• chemical agents,

radiological agents in venti

ing systems,

uni forage crops.

Nave world do any eat no neerin once lasical

"chemical,or radiological" sabotage.

e.•

As preliminary investigative procedure

determine from appropriate

authorities,

such as plant physicians, public health services, or

agriculture departments,

whether cause

oi any epidemic or unusual

outbreak

of disease

nas

been determined.

Title 50, USC, $8

851-857, requires

the

registration of any person

who has knowledge of or has received instruction

or assignment

in espionage, counterespionage, or sabotage service

or

tactics of

a government of a iorciga country or a foreign political party.

In investigating any reported act of biological, chemical, or radio

logical

sabotage, determine if there has been

statute in zádition to a violation oi

don to a violat o1ats00

a violation

of this

the sabotage statutes.

7. [Presentation of cases to Department

Sabotage cases are not to be discussed

with the USA. All

questions

of law and jurisdiction and requests for prosecutive opinions are

to be submitted to the Bureau for presentation to the Department.]

INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURE

1. General

a.

Procedure will depend on circumstances of particular case. All

cases must be approached thoughtfully and aggressively.

Investigations

must be logical and complete.

b.

The investigation of an actual instance of sabotage is not complete

the cause is established and the identity of the subject

determined.

In a case of actual planned sabotage with intent to

injure the national defense, consideration must

be given to deter-

mining if there are any associates or accomplices through thorough

Investigation aná surveiliance prive iu dupiciousivu.

2. Arson

the most effective potential means

b. Determine if fire protection devices tampered with to make fire

more effective.

Make arrangements with local authorities if necessary to protect

scene.

d.

Give

early consideration to establishing Bureau's jurisdiction

prior to extensive investigative effort.

e .

Important step in arson investigation is determining point in

building at which fire originated.

Interview any witnesses immediately

and ascertain:

Where was witness when fire occurred.

What attracted his attention.

Exact point where fire burning when first observed

4

Exact time and general weather conditions

Technical infornation of value to Laboratory, such as:

Color, intensity, and progress of flame,

whether

Color and volume of smoke

Unusual odors

Whether fire at more than one place

Were any explosions heard during fire.

General observations, identity of other witnesses, or suspicious

circumstances

(8)

Action taken by winess after discovering fire

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 413

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## Page 414

.:f.. Il, fire.

occurred in.nanufacturing plants.witness

should be guestioned

with regard to employment and activities and. aiso questioned as to

iphysical.concitions.ip.plant, manufacturing processes;

type.ofiraw...

material; and other information to determine if fire

hazards were

which could have

accidentzl.or

combustion.

Question witness concerning

smoking habits of employées and experience

corcerning any previous lires.

É. Check records of local fire department; interview fire department

official at scene for leads.

Make intensive search at point of origin to determine method of

incendiarism.

Pay particular attention to obtaining suspect devices

to send to Laboratory.

Important that materials submittea

to Laboratory be accurately

described as to place,

position,

and location where found.

Consider value oi obtaining photographs.

.k.

Search adjacent torrain for evidence,

such as footprints,

1.

prints, containers which may have contained accelerant

used, etc.

Investigate all suspects fully not only with regard. to evidence

pointing to them but to background indicating motive or intent.

Set out below are some suggested sources for background investigations

of suspects:

Associates

Credit and arrest records

Bank accounts

4

5

State income tax returns

Character and reputation, including discreet neighborhood

(6)

inquiry

Records of Government agencies, INS, larmed forces intelligence

agencies, jetc.

Fellow employees

Telephone toll calls

Telegrams

11

12)

Surreillance, if varranted

Develop reliable informants in position to observe subject's

activities.

Obtain complete physical description, including nationality

and'identification record.

3.

Sabotage

by explosives

3..

Investigation follows general outline as for arson cases.

b.

examination of

scene should be made for bomb fragments,

dynamite fuse,

detonators, blasting caps, and dynamite wrappers.

This

type of evidence should be submitted to FBI Laboratory, for examination.

Also look for footprints, fingerprints, and other types of evidence.

o. Obtain complete photograpis of scene.

d. assume no responsibility for handling suspected bombs.

e. Investigate

suspects along lines

as indicated in previous section

regarding

4. Mechanical sabotage

These cases in majority and cover wide variety of destructive acts.

b. Obtain all details from original complainant so that investigation

may be intelligently planned and approached.

Establish jurisdiction early in investigation.

d.

Where foreign material caused damage, obtain in order to trace to

Submit material to laboratory where proper.

..

When damage occurs from foreign substance in lubricants or fuel,

Important to obtain

suificient quantity for FBI Laboratory

examination.

Suggested

one gallon be obtained if possible.

large amount involved, the sludge which has settled to bottom should

also be obtained and

transmitted for laboratory examination.

of unused stock of oil or luel involved shoula also be forwarded to

Laboratory for comparison.

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 414

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## Page 415

861 ::.

Where toolgy cut

inTolved,

tain damaged

part for fBI laboratory comparison with suspect

cools

when arailable:

gu all-suspocts.should de.lull/lavestigated.see.preTzoussectz0n...

on arson.

ba

Where incident is of recurring type, give consideration to utilizing

dyestufls as set forth in section 8, volume I,. of this manual.

•1.

Where board of inquiry held by another Government agency,

records

should be eramined for possible leads.

Bureau will consider granting

authority for Agent to attend such hearings as interested spectator

in appropriate cases.

5.

Defective manufacture of war or national-defense materials, premises,.

In addition to establishing the elements required by the statute,

establish whether the

defectively manufactured material will or

did malfunction when put to its intended use and what damage will

or did result from this maliunction. In order to establish

this, the following suggestions are made:

(2)

Determine

the exact function of the defectively manulactured

material.

the nature of the defect.

(3) Determine how this dafect mill affect the intended function

of the material.

b.

The following investigative procedures have been found to be of

assistance:

(1)

Establish requirements or specifications for material by

Government

specifications

Provisions of contract

Established trade practices

. (2)

Establish

existence of

any deviation Iron requirements.

Intention ceteramont on plant appicials.

Examination by fBI Laboratory

(3)

(4)

specimens of defective material to be submitted to Laboratory

'wherever practicable

Io establish possibility of injury or damage from use of such

material when put to intended use, consider testimony from one

of following sources:

FBI Laboratory

Army, Naty, Air Force, or other Government expert

Expert in private industry

Officials of company involved

of the investigation

(5)

Establish

that subjects deliberately manufacturing defective

materials.

correspondence between manufacturer. and purchaser.

Determine if manufacturing done surreptitiously.

Establish purchase and use of equipment not ordinarily

(a)

used in this manufacturing process.

Establish whether contracting parties or Government agencies

have objected to defective material or improper processes.

(6)

Establish motive on the part of subjects.

Foreign sympathies

Desire to increase profit

Desire to maintain production

(7)

General comments

If material manufactured for military, advise local representatives

(of Air Force, Army, and Navy intelligence agencies.] Request

their assistance in determining where material being used and

arranging for examination of material.

6. Aircraft crashes

The following instructions pertain to deliberately caused crashes of

aircraft connected with

the national defense which are not covered

by the destruction of aircralt or motor vehicles statutes.

section 117, volume IV, of this manual for instructions regarding

Investigations under destruction of aircraft or motor vehicles

statutes.)

fia.

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 415

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## Page 416

Majority of

3

of

Such Aircrare result, 21

LuseS

other

than sabotage.

determine cause requires

te

ical knowledge.

Cases

will norm

ly be, referred to aBl lIter. ca

use of crash

establisheà..

..Make.sure that all evidence.rhich wag.develoued.to.establisb.enusoii.id.c

been properly identified and protected and that

adequate expert testimony is available to establish

in any subsequent prosecútion.

d.

Under special

circumstances,

may conduct investigation to

establish cause of crasi

take charge of investigation

before

exact cause of crash determined.

Specific Bureau authority must be

obtained in such instances.

Some suggested investigation to

cause of crash follows:

Careful systematic examination of wreckage

Photographs or sketches showing

Tarious angles..

Close-up views from Tarious angles

Photographs of parts torn loose

Photographs of instruments and levers in cockpit

Photographs of marks made by airplane on ground

Persons to be interriered for information

Crew members or other survivors

Persons who heard the plane before the crash

Eyewitnesses

Radio operators in contact with the plane

Ground crew members and mechanics who serviced plane

Information to be sought from witnesses on intertiew

of plane prior

to crash

Did plane appear to be out of control.

Did plane dive into ground

or was landing attempted.

Were all

engines operating.

Did plane come apart in flight.

engines sound normal.

Was pilot lost or over unfamiliar territory.

Was plane on scheduled course.

landing attempt in accordance with normal procedure.

k

Was plane

radio contact.

plane's crew experience any mechanical difficulty.

m

Was log maintained while plane in flight.

Were any defects noted during previous flights.

Weather conditions at time of flight.

In determining condition of airplane or

manner in which

functioning at time of crash, it is important to obserte and

carefully note exact position of all instruments in cockpit,

such as fuel tank selectors,

switches,

throttles, etc.

condition of all control

surfaces should also be carefully

From obsertation of all these items and discussior

persons experienced in handling aircraft,

the condition of the

plane and action being taken by pilot can often be determined.

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 416

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## Page 417

Raservo Orriders. d

ng

corps (note) casos:::

a..

Department has do

mined that ROTC facilities

izute motionil-

defonse or war.

-ses within meaning of Title

,. too,: 4151, and

a-deliberate attack by arson, bombing, fire bombini,

would possibly be

"•" Föllowing additional

potatoes tate le da

US, 18.29s di 21152.

procedures

this particular

type of case in order to provide information desired ij icparount

for an opinion:

For a complete investigation all pertinent indiviiu.is must ve

interviewed, including members of college or univorsic; cumunity

unless compelling reasons to the contrary exist.

Develop existence of any plans for protest demonstra-ions or

other acts designed to dramatize opposition to 3020

protest demonstrations as enclosures to communicatione to Purezu.

Identify specific property belonging to ROIC unit which was

damaged or destroyed;

obtain a complete inventory of 211 property

maintained by ROIC unit.

Obtain an estimate of actual cost in damage to ROIC facilii; ini

any ROTC property damaged or

destroyed.

Obtain details as to ownership of ROTC

facility, includin

information as to funding and control of space of that facility

utilized for RolC training.

by which ROTC unit is identified on

(8)

exterior of building.

Determine whether ROIC training is compulsory or voluntar?. Is

a subject is developed, determine whether he nas denied,

(9) previously afforded, or is currently engaged in ROIC traini.!.

Through investigation determine whether subject made any pro-aci

or post-act statements which would aid in establishing his

specific intent to

commit sabotage.]

SUBMISSION OF REPORTS

1.

Initial report in

two weeks after complaint received

2...

Subsequent reports to be submitted in accordance with existing Bureau

reporting procedures

G. CLASSIFICATION - 98

I. CHARACTER - SABOTAGE

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 417

.10

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## Page 418

SCTION 88. SEDITION

88A

SIATUTES..

TItle 18, USE, &8 2387, 2388, and 2391

Activities affecting armed

forces generally

2-iibever, with irtent to interfere with, impalr, or influence the loyalty,

morale,

or discipline

of

the military or naval forses

of the United. States:

" (1)

advises,

counsels,

urges,

or in any manner causes

cause insubordination,

disloyalty,

or attempts to.

mutiny

or refusal

of duty by any member

of the military or naval iorces of the United States; or

* (2)

distributes or attempts to distrioute any written or printed matter

which advises, counsels, or urges insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or

refusal of duty by any member of the military

or naval forges

States

"Shall be fined not more

$10,000 or imprisoned not more than

ten years,

or both, and shall be ineligible for employment by the United States or

any department or agency thereof, for the five years next following his

- conviction.

For the purposes of this section,

the term military or naval forces of

the United

Statest includes the Army of the United States,

the Navy, Air Force,

Marine Corps, Coast Guard, Naval Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, and

Guard Reserve

of the United States;

and, when any merchant vessel is commissioned

in. the Navy or

is in the serrice of the army or the Navy, includes the

master, officers, and crew of

such vessel."

3 2388.

Activities affecting armed forces during war.

Whoever,

when the United States is at war,

willfully makes

or conveys

false reports or false statements with intent to interfere with the operation

or success of the military or naval forces of the United States or to

arounto the currass of

"Whoever, when the United States is at war, willfully causes of attempts

to cause

insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty, in

military or naval forces of the United States, or willfully obstructs the

recruiting or enlistment service of the United States, to the injury of the

service of the U.S.., or attempts to do so-

"Shall be fined not more than $10, 000 or imprisoned not more than twenty

years, or both.

* (b)

Il two or

as provided in

said

subsection (a).

* (c)

Whoever harbors or

conceals any person who he knows, or has

¡ reasonable grounds to believe or suspect, has committed,

or is about to

commit,

an offense under this section, shall de fined not more than $10,000

or imprisoned not more than

ten years,

or both.

This section shall

apply within

admiralty and maritime jurisdiction

of the United States, and on the high seas, as well as within the United

States."

§ 2391. Temporary extension of section

"The provisions. of section 2388...in

addition to coming into full force

and effect in time of war shall remain in

effe:t until six

months after the termination of the national emergency proclaimed by the

President on December 16, 1950...or such

as may be prescribed

by concurrent resolution

of the

Congress,

acts which would give rise

to legal consequences

and penalties under

section

2388 when performed

during a state of war

shall

give rise to the same legal consequences

penalties when they are performed during the period above provided for."

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 418

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## Page 419

88B -D

SECTION 88.

SEDITIC

B. VIOLATIONS

1.

§ 2387

2. A person with intent to interfere with, impair, or influence lovalse,

or discipline of military

¡orces of the u.s.

b: Advised, counseled, urged; or

any manner caused insubordinatico,

disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty by any member of the military

or naval forces of

the U.S., or

O. Person with intent to interfere with, impair, or influence Joyalty,

morale, or

or attempted to

discipline of military or naval forces of the U.s., did,

written or printed matter which advised, counselnd, or

urged insubordination,

disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty ly

2.

any member of military or naval forces of

the U.S.

82388

Person willfully made or conveyed false reports or statements

at war, or during period of extension of this section

provided in

section 2391 with intent to

interfere with

operation

_success o1

nilitary or naval forces of U.S. or with intent to

success of its enemies,

"b. Person willfully caused or attempted

to cause when U.S. at war or

during the period of extension of this section provided in section

2391 insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of auty in

military

t.S., or

..

Person willfully obstructed the recruiting or enlistment servioe

of U. S., when U. S. at war or during period of extension this

provided

section ?391,

d.

Two or more persons conspire to

violate this section and

nore such persons perform any act to eifect the object of coaspirasi:

Persons harboring or concealing any persun, iuuring us boring incis:

to believe he committed or was about to commit offonse undea this

section

c.

DEPARTMENTAL OPINIONS•

1.

To assist in determining types of utterances which fall within pronicitic:

of sedition

statutes,

Department of Justice has designated followina

of statements as being within prohibition of statutes:

a. False statements of fact in time of war intended to interfero with

the prosecution

b. Utterances in time of war which cause or attempt to cause insubordi-

nation in armed forces

o. Utterances which have the direct effect of obstructing enlistment

or the operation of the draft

Advocacy of armed revolt or overthrow of Government by force añd

2.' Above types of utterances not considered all-inclusive of possibilities

presented by sedition statutes but only guides

POLICY

1.

Department of Justice has advised that USAs are not to authorize proseci-

tion without prior departmental authority in each individual

case;/ trero::

no request

should be made of. USA for institution of prosecution. (Dejait::

has instructed, however,

that in all cases involving sedition in

facts justify consideration copies of reports should be designated for

office of interested USA.l

Copies of reports will be

referred to Department by Bureau

for decisions

elative to prosecution. / Should the USA authorize prosecution, procee

In accordance with his instructions sinca it is presuned he will tir

complied and obtained prior authorization.

Where such prosecuti:?

action is authorized by a local USA and no advice from Burcau hasü:in

received indicating knowledge that this action has been approved ti

the Department, immediately advise by telephone or teletype of

taken.

In order for Bureau to properly discharge its obligatio:

investigate all cases involving the distribution of seditious

literature and be aware of all such publications, make necessir:

arrangements to be advised of all publications in your distrint i'

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 419

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## Page 420

•..e.

.. ..re..

SECTION 88. SEDITIUN

...

UUU -1

might be considered

ditious •

Within 24 hours aftsh

seditious article

reaches general publ

each field office must prep

teletype summary

of article for Bureau which must be followed by two

copies of public.

tion in which it appeared.

such articles will be of type which reflect

race prejudice, anti-Semitism

and material tending to cause disunity.

Cover all meetings of organizations engaged in seditious activities

and bring to attention of Bureau statements oi seditious nature

or having propaganda significance by most expeditious means warranted.

Ê...

INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURE

1.

General

Ascertain whether persons involved are civilian or uniformed

personnel of Army, Navy or Air Force.

bo Ascertain whether

offense occurred on military or naval establishment,

reservation,

base, field, port or harbor, under jurisdiction of Army,

Navy or Air Force or on merchant vessel commissioned in Navy or

service of Army or Navy.

so, conmunicate facts

to proper official of Army or Mavy or Air

force and conduct no investigation until a request is received through

d.

proper channels.

General investigation should seek to establish identity and location

of all witnesses.

All persons present when words spoken should be

interviewed immediately and made matter of record before lapse of

time may impair

effectiveness and

probative value of their testimony.

Important to

in greatest detail factual setiing in which

language was used since necessary part of proof in sedition case.

f.

If member of

armed forces present, ascertain name, address,

branch of service and serial number. If men having obligations

under Selective Service dot present, ascertain locality, birth

and selective

such witness in addition to

otner identiiiavio infusmaiivi.

DIorto Jhoäld So nod= to

determine whether or not speaker was aware of presence of member of

armed forces or persons having obligation under draft laws.

speech was public in nature and delivered to audience, ascertain

in detail circumstances under which made.

Inquiry should establish

whether speech was delivered extemporaneously or from prepared

script. Inquiry should include date,

and place of occurrence,

as well as chronology of events leading up to viterance of

seditious statements: Ascertain age, sanity, sobriety and

demeanor of speaker.

Manner in which words spoken has important

bearing on speaker's intent and must be clearly. established before

facts will warrant prosecution.

Determine ii

words addressed

generally to all persons within sound

spoken without prompting or in response to a question and determine.

whether words expressed in a deliberate manner or in temperamental

•outburst.

h. Witnesses should be asked to evaluate effect of language upon

addressed.

Inquire whether result of

words was to arouse

patriotic ardor of listeners

whether its effect was demoralizing.

Determine whether alleged seditious words have been repeated by

other persons since they were first uttered and with what results.

jo Bear in mind

possibility that this investigation may uncover. other

violations of existing statutes,

such as failure to comply with

postal regulations,.income tax of registration law requirements.

2. Written or printed words

Investigation of seditious statements appearing in written

printed material should include inquiries extending beyond analysis

and examination of alleged seditious expressions themselves.

If statements appear in a publication regularly issued, obtain

copies of the publication circulated

before and

after issue in

question and analyze from standpoint of ascertaining its seditious

content and establishing criminal intent of prospective defendants.

Analysis of seditious statements should seek to determine whether

statements are in fact

original or plagiarized reproduction or

quotation from other sources.

NW/ 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 420

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## Page 421

882

7 38150011101

In some cases, it

ba necessary to examine con

t of eich issue

for a period

ral months to develop seditio

character of

publication.

'In such

cases, analysis of any one issue my fail

disclose clearly seditious

statements, whereas quantitative analysis

of number of issues may establish constant emphasis and frequent

repetition of same themes.

Half-truths, continual slanting of facts,

habitual dishonest presentation

and interpretation of world and

national events are cumulative in effect and may be seditious as a

matter of law. Efforts should be made to establish repetition

of same themes and same trosiment of them in number of issues.

Completely identify group or organization responsible for authorshis,

printing, and

publication of printed or written material in question.

not overlook possible collaboration, sponsorship,

support and financial assistance oi outside individuals and other

organizations.

consider possibility of subsidy and influence

by foreign sources.

Inquiry concerning foreign travel by principals

involved in investigation shouli be made and ciroumstances under

which travel undertaken lully developed.

Examine books of account,

financial statements, and

credit reports

of individual or organization under investigation, as well as

organization records having to do with membership, ques, contributions,

and correspondence.

Take steps to locate and obtain records of printer as soon

as possible.

Printer's complete

job envelope should be obtained and rough drafts

and corrected

printed material examined.

Drafts may

establishing actual authorship of

article, collaboration

of others in its preparation, and that printed

reproduction of material

submitted to printer.

Examine mailing list

or other compilation ef

names of persons to whom

seditious material addressed or distributed.

Ascertain manner in

which list was compiled and source from which names obtained.

Determine who is

responsible for distributior of publications and

whether'intended to reach particular

such as persons engaged

in national defense industries.

Ascertain

whether persons responsible

for circulation made any

special efforts to distribute material among

members of armed forces, or persons having obligations under Selective

Service Act or relatives of such persons.

Proof that publication

specific identified

members of above

groups will aid in

establishing that substantive evils which law seeks

to prevent have resulted.

Under first offense defined in Iitle 18, USC, & 2388, dealing

with false reports or statements courts

have held not necessary

prove such false reports or statements were made to persons who are

or are liable to become members of

the military forces.

Vith reference to mailing lists, efforts should be made to determine

whether issues

of publication distributed to persons outside U.S.

Determine if such publication exchanges mailing list or material

with other suspect publications.

Determine if persons receiving publication are paying or nonpaying

Large cities have legitimate concerns engared in business of compiling

mailing lists of particular or selected groups

ior advertising and other

should be made of

such concerns to determine whether

suspected individuals or organizations contracted for preparation of

a mailing list.

Determine from[U. S. Postal Service lwhether prospective defendants

have been granted second-class

or other mailing privileges in connec-

tion with circulation of material under investigation.

If privilege

was granted, examine statements filed with Postmaster General concerning

ownership, editorial control and circulation.

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 421

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## Page 422

ECHION 88 - SEDITION

•....

.881 - П.

5.

VENUE

Department has advised no sedition caso

has raised question or venue.

Venue

must in all casos

be determined 'by

office of USA.

G.

CLASSIFICATION - 14

н.

CHARACTER - SEDITION

Where reports are prepared involving possible violation of sedition

statutes and Selective Service Act, following

rule as to character of

to apply:

Whore individual endeavors to counsel,

aid, or abet another individual

to evade provisions

oi Selective Service Act, case should be carried

2.

under character,

"Selective

Service Act."

Where an organization counsels, aids,

or abets a group of individuals,

character should be snown as "Selective Service

Act

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 422

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## Page 423

SECTION 95. TREASON

95д - С

A CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIC

Section 3, Articie 3,

of

tne Constitution of the United

states provides:

"Treason against the

United states, sball consist only in levying War

against them,

or in adhering to their Enemies, diving them Aid and Com-

fort.

No Person

shall be convicted of Treason unless

on the Testimony

of two Witnesses to the same overt act, or on Confession in open Court.

"The Congress shali have Power to declare the Punishment of Ireason,

but no Attainder of Ireason shall work Corruption of Blood, or For-

feiture, except during the Life of the Person attainted."

B.

STATUTES

1.

Title 18, USC, § 2331, Ireason

"Whoever,

owing allegiance to the United States, levies

war against

to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort

within the United States or elsewhere,

is guilty of treason and

shall suffer death, or shall be

imprisoned not less than five years

and fined not less

than $10,000; and

shall be incapable of hold-

ing any office under the United States."

2.

Title 18, USC, & 2382. Misprision of

"Whoever, owing allegiance to the United States and having know-

ledge of the commission of any treason against them, conceals

and does not, as soon as may be, disclose and make known the same

to the President or to some judge of the United States, or to the

to some judge or justice of a particular State, is

guilty of misprision of

treason and shall be fined not more than

$1,000, or imprisoned not more than seven years, or both."

C. RELATED STATUTES

Title 18, USE,

Recruiting for service against United States

-Whoever recruits soldiers

within the United States,

or in any place subject to the jurisdiction thereof, to engage

in armed hostility against the same; or

"Whoever opens within the United States, or in any place subject to the

jurisdiction thereof, a recruiting station for the enlistment of

soldiers or sailors to serve in any manner in armed hostility against the

United States -

not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five

or both."

2.

i

Title 18, USC, $ 2390. Enlistment to serve against the United

*Whoever enlists or is engaged within the United States or in

any place subject to the jurisdiction thereof, with intent to

serve in armed hostility against the United States, shall be

fined $100 or imprisoned not more than three years, or both."

3.

Title 18, USC, $ 756.

Internee of belligerent nation

"Whoever, within the jurisdiction of the

United States, aids or

any person belonging to the armed forces of a belligerent

nation' or faction who is interned in the United States in

the law of nations, to

escape or attempt to

escape from the jurisdiction of the United States or from the

limits of internment prescribed, shall be fined not more than

$1,000 or imprisoned not-more than one year, or both."

4.

Title 18, USC, $ 757.

Prisoners of war

or enemy aliens

procures the escape of any prisoner of war held by the

United States

or any of its allies, or the escape of any person

apprehended or interned as an enemy alien by the United States

or any of its allies, or adrises, connives at, aids, or assists

escape, or aids, relieves, transports, harbors, conceals,

• shelters, protects, holds correspondence

with, gives intelligence

to, or otherwise assists aly such prisoner of war or enemy alien,

after his escape from

custody, knowing him to be such prisoner of

war or enemy alien, or attempts to comnit or conspires to commit

any of the above acts, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or im-

prisoned not more than ten years, or both."

NW 54933 Docld:32989719• Page 423

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## Page 424

"950 -E

SECTION 95. TREASON

"The provisions

in substitution

• {0

D.

ELEMENTS

1.

his

section shall be in addit

any other provision of law."

to and not

2.

Person must owe allegiance to the United States.

Statute

applicable to all persons

wing allegiance to U.s.,

citizens or aliens, domiciled or residing in U.s.

clear that every individual owes fidelity and allogiance to

Government in return ir protection he receives

from that

Government.

Citizen owes absolute and

permanent allegiance

to his Goverment until he renounces his citizenship and

becomes citizen of arother country.

Person must have perforned overt act of levying war against

the U.S.

Act of Levying war abainst le See according to

court decisions, inverpreed as where men mect overly in armed

ray or In such crowds that nece numbers supply elementor

force which might othernise be given by arms, with purpose

sInténtion of rulilying or preventing execution of general

Taw of Congress.

Resistance to U.S. in its sovereign capacity is

essential

To establish riolation must have proof of prior

agreement, intent, and of an overt

Waging of war against

U.S. requires overt acts inturtherance of a plan to over-

authority of

the Government either in whole or in

some territory or political subdivision. .Overt act must be in

furtherance of treasonable intent, and words, oral, wratter

or printede however

treasonable, seditious or crimiral.on

themselves do not constitute overt act withia meaning of

Person must have performed overt aot ci adhering to enemies

of U.S., giving them aid and comfort within U. S.,

Ipplles only to. acts done after commencement of wai

which would aid or

assist enemy or tend to weaken U. S. in

its conduct of war, such as trading with enemy, selling or

giving material or

supplies to enemy, assisting enemy in

physical conduct of war

and furnishing information

to enemy

which would be of assistance to enemy or injury to u.s.

Misprision of treason

8. o

b.

Person owes allegiance to U.

Person had knowledge of commission of act of treason.

Person concealed this knowledge and did not immediately dis~

close it to President, some judge

of the U. S.,

particular state or judge or justice of a particular state.

E.

INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURE

1.

Treason involves breach of allegiance and is highest crime known

2.

It is only crime embodied in the constitution.

Constitution expressly provides that conviction for treason

had only "on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act,

or on confession in open court."

3.

Treason differs from other crimes

in that there are no accessories,

all persons being regarded

as principals.

4.

Any evidence indicating possible violation of treason statute

should receive

5.

Bureau must be advised imnediately of basic facts.

Informants or individuals who furnish information indicating pos-

• sible violation of treason statute should be thoroughly and

• stakingly interviewed to ascertain all available details as to

words,

acts, documents, letters, et cetera, upon which allegation

of possible treason based.

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 424

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## Page 425

• SECTION SO BREASON.

6.

Information received from any source indicating

tret

l'irearms and

ammunition are being collected for possible treasonous under-

takings should be sutject of immediate and thorough investigation

to ascertain details concerning type of firearms

and annunition,

source, thereof, place of storage, ardidentity of individuals in-

Investigation must be pursued lor purpose of definitely

determining whether arms or armunition actually being collected

and storeà in connection nith treasonous plot or other possible

violations within Bureau's jurisdiction, such as neutrality laws.

Bureau should be immediately inforned of any information received

that organizations purporting to be rifle or gun clubs are, in

reality, planning activities of treasonable nature.

should be subject to discreet investigatión to determine

basis for suspicion of treason. In latter connection necessary

to ascertain following:

Identity of individuals responsible os sponsoring organization,

together with information discreetly obtained concerning their

citizenship, reliability, and loyalty

All information indicating any connection between the organ-

ization and any foreign goverment, political party, in-

dividual, corporation, or other association.. Also, any con-

nection between group

involved and groups,

organizations,

individuals operating within U.S. and known to be disloyal

to this Government.

c.

Correct nature of

activities of organization being under-

This may be ascertained by ordinary investigative

efforts or utilization of confidertial informants, surveil-

and other investigative techniques.

7. In the event specific evidence obtained indicating possible

treaserable plot an anorating: intestigation must be pursued to

• determine entire ramifications

of plot and identity of all indi

viduals involted.

8.

Actual investigative steps and methods will parallel those mentioned

in other sections of this manual in connection with national de-

fense matters.

POLICY

each case.

to Bureau.

The Department of Justice must specifically authorize prosecution in

Inquiry concerning Department's decision should be sent

G.

VENUE

• 10

Treason - where act committed and if

committed outside U.S. in

district where first brought or first found

2. Misprision of treason -

where report of

treason should have been

H. CLASSIFICATION - 61

I. CHARACTER - TREASON or MISPRISION OF

TREASON

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 425

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## Page 426

ON: 97. ' VOORHIS ACI

• 97А D

STATUTE

Titie 18, USC, & 2386.

(The voorhis Act was approved by the loth Congress

en 10-17-40, and it became effective on 1-15-41.j

Registration of certain organizations

This act provides that the lollowing organizations shall be required to

register with the Attorney General:

•Every organization subjeci to ioreign control which engages in political

activity;

"Every organization which engages both in civilian military activity and

in political

"Every organization subject to foreign control which engages in civilian

military activity; and

"Every organization,

the purpose or aim of which, or one of the purposes or

aims of which, is the establishment, control, conduct, seizure,

or overthrow

of a govermment or subdivision

thereof by the use of force, violence, military

measures, or threats of any one or more of the loregoing."

act specifically exempts

certain other organizations from the require-

ment of registration, such

she United States,

- a) The organized militia or National Guard of any State, ferritory, Distriot,

or possession of the United States, or

•(c) Any law enforcement agency of

the United States or of. any Territory,

District, or possession thereof, or of any state or political subdivision of

a State, or of any agency or instrumentality of one or more States, or

"(a) Any duly established diplomatio mission or consular office of

a foreign

government which is so recognized by the Department of State, or

"(e) Any nationally recognized ortanization of dersons who are veterans ne

the armed forces of

the United States, or affiliates of such

organizations."

The act outlines in detail the type of information desired in the registration

statements.

B.

STEP TAKEN BY COMMUNIST PARTY, USA, TO AVOID PROSECUTION UNDER THIS ACT

The Communist Party, USA, held a special convention in New York City on

November 16 to 17, 1940.

This convention declared "that the Communist Party

of the USA in convention assembled, does hereby cancel and dissolve its organi-

zational affiliation with the Communist International, as well as any and all

other bodies of any kind outside the boundaries of the United States of America

for the specific purpose of removing itself from the terms.of the so-called

Voorbis 'Act."

IC. DEPARTMENTAL POLICY

(In 1942,

Department considered holding grand jury hearings under this

act at which leading Communist Party Lunctionaries would be subpoenaed.

The Japanese attack on Pearl

stopped any action in this regard.

When prosecutive action

was initiated against the Communist Party and its

top functionaries begirning in 1948, the Department selected the Smitb

not 20 30, v5a, 1g 182-6363

§2385)

and the Internal Security Act of 1950

rather than the Voorhis Act.]

VENUE

Where the violation is the failure to register, venue will lie only in the

District of Columbia;

however,

aiders and abettors may be prosecuted in the

district in which

their criminal acts are performed,

and conspiracy charges

may be prosecuted in the district in which the conspiracy originates, or in

which any overt act thereunder takes place.

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 426

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## Page 427

PION AYOR

VOORHIS ACT

5.

PENALTIES

*Whoover violites any

the provisions of this section

more than $l0,000 or imprisoned not. more than five years!

shall be fined not

or both.

whourer in a sintement filed pursuant

to this section willfully rakes

falie statemont or willfully omits to state any fact which is required

or which is necessary to make

the statements made not misleading,

•slall be fined not more than. $2,000 or imprisoned not more

than five: years,

or both. "

CLASSIFICATION - 102

CHAKACTER - VOORHIS ACT

NW 54933 Docid:32989719 Page 427

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## Page 428

includin" for.

-

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION 10S. INTERNAL SECURITY:- NATIONALISIIG TENDENCY

Table of Contents...

Д.

3.

Goncral Information...

Threats, Possible Violenco,

or

Demonstrations

Against Foreign Establishments or Officials

in u.s...........

....

C. Immigrants and

Refugeas From Communist Countries

D.

E.

(Except Yugoslavia)..

Repatriates from Communist Countries.....

Nonofficial Visitors

from Communist Countries

(Excepi Yugoslavia)....

F.

G.

Fast-West Exchange Program.

Visitors

to Communist Countries..

Disaffection of U.

S. Citizens Abroad.

I.

Redefections to Communist Countrias..

J. Diplomatic Couriars

from Communist Countries

(Except Yugoslavia)............

I. Foreign Officials and Establishments

(Except Yugoslavia).......

Defectors (Except rugoslavial"....

....

M.

Students from Communist Countries

(Except lugoslavia)..

N. Contacts of Communist

officials and Establishments

in U.S. and Abroad (Except Yugoslavia)..

° Deleted!

Qo

Yugoslav Matters...

Ro

Deleted

S.

T.

Physical Surveillance Procedures

Classification and Character.

•Page

10

10

13

15

17

19

21

22

22

23

31

36

37

45

48

49

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 428

2a

11-13-74

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## Page 429

MANUAL VI INOTTOUILUTTO

VOLUME IV

TABLE OF CONTENTS

i...

SECTION 106.

INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF GAMBLING DEVICES

A:

B.

F.

Go

H.

I.

Jo

Statutes.

Elements..

• Exceptions..

Inspection of Records.

Departmental Cpinions.

Policy.....

Investigative Procedure

Venue.

Classification.

Character.

SECTION 107.

[INTERNAL ]SECURITY INFORMaNTS AND CONFIDENTIAL

SOURCES; [AND FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ASSETS]

Table of Contents..

Part I: Internal Security Informants and

Confidential Sources!

A. Definitions.....

Sources of Potential Informants....

C. Background Inquiries on Individuals Being

Considered for Informant Purposes..

Do Approval, Indoctrination, and Development of

Potential Intormants..

E. Bureau Policy.......

Indoctrination, Direction, and Control of

Informants........

Go

Ho

I.

J.

K.

Informants' Information.

Symbols.........

Indexing...

Indices.

Informant Files....•

M.

N.

Payments to Informants.

Monthly and Quarterly Letters.

Signing of Loyalty Oaths, Affidavits, and

Statements...

O. Discontinued Informants....

P. Furnishing Informants to Immigration and

Naturalization Service...

Q Corrective Action on False Information.

R. Confidential Sources..

—/09

. So

Panel Sources....

T. [Deleted]

U.

Utilization of Informants and Sources at

Institutions of Learning.

v. Classification......

¡part IT.

Foreign Counterintelligence Assets]

[w. Foreign Counterintelfigence Assets.

7

8

1

3

3

5

8

11

11

11

13

14

17

18

19

20

21

21

22

24

[24]

25]

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 429

3

11-13-74

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## Page 430

i.dt

TABLE. OF CONTENTS

:

SECTION 108• CRIMINAL INFORMANTS:

A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

Definition.

Illustration.

Observation..

Development of Criminal Informants.

PIocedure in Listing Potential Criminal

Informants and Criminal.Informants.•

F.

Go

H.

I.

J.

K.

L.

M.

N.

Maintaining Files on Criminal Informants.

Criminal Informant Index..

Progress Letters.....

Bureau Policy.

Paid Crininal

Informants.

Department Policy and Opinion.

Top Echelon Criminal Informant Program.

Participation of Agents.

Classification..

SECTION 109• PROSAB

A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

F.

G.

•Development of Informants.

Policy.....

Files...........

Prosab Informant Index.

Contacts

Status of Program.

Classification...

SECTION 110. DELETED

SECTION 111.

UNREPORTED INTERSTATE SHIPMENT OF CIGARETTES

A.

B.

C.

* D.

Statutes.

Elements

Venue..

Policy...

Classification

F.

Character.

SECTION 112. DELETED

SECTION 113. INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS

A. Statutes.

B.

Elements.

c.

Policy....

D.

Investigation.

E.

Classification..

F.

Character.....

G.

Venue..

6 6.60

H.

Penalty - Maximum.

4

11-13-74

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 • Page 430

'"':

Page:

3

4

4a

6

7a-b

8

11

11

12

.12

---

## Page 431

TUr

VOLUME IV

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION LIA. FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION MATTERS-

A. •Statutes and Elements..

B.

C.

D.

E.

F.

Go

H.

I.

J.

Desartmental Instructions

Possible Violations

(Not All-Inclusive)

Pertinent Court Decisions.

Policy...

Investigative Procedure.

Venue...

Classification..

Charzcte........•

Penalties

- Maxinum.

SECTION 115.

INTERSTATE TRAWSPORTATION OF FIREWORKS

A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

F.

Statute...

Violation. . a 0 ... ...

Investigative Procedure

Venue..........

Classification...

Character..

SECTION 116.

MISCELLANEOUS - CIVIL SUITS

A.

B.

Background.....

Policy.......

.

D.

Character..

SECTION 117.

DESTRUCTION OF AIRCRAFT

OR MOTOR VEHICLES

SECTION 118.

A.

B.

C.

*D.

E.

F.

G.

H.

A.

B.

c.

D.

E.

F.

Statutes...

Violations.

Venue.......

Policy,......

Investigative Procedures

Prosecution........o.

Classification..

Character..

SWITCHBLADE KNIFE ACT

Statutes

Elements

Policy..

Venue.

Classification.

Character.....•

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 431

-12-13-72

Page

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## Page 432

-i all draste it dedian

Vorone iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECIIC!: 719.

INTERSTATE TRANSPORTALION OF UNSAFE ReFRICHRATORS

A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

F.

Statutes.....

Elements.

Policy and Frocedures..

Veriue...

1???669

Classification

Character

SECTION 120.

AUTOMOBILE INFORMATION DISCLOSURE ACT

Statutes.

B.

Elements

Investigative

Procedure

and

Polioy

D

Venue............

E.

Classification...

F.

Character

SECTION 121. WELFARE AND PENSION PLANS DISCLOSURE ACT

A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

F.

G.

E.

Statutes...............

Elements...............

Department Instructions.

Policy..........

'' . ...

Investigative Procedure.

Classification......

Character..

Penalties - Maximum..

SECTION 122• EXTREMIST MATTERS AND CIVIL UNREST

[

A. Investigations of Extremist Organizations and

Individuals........•

B. Civil Unrest....

SECTION 123.

LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF

1959 - INVESTIGATIVE MATTER

A.

Statutes.....

B.

Definitions..

C.

Jurisdiction........

Do Policy.................

E.

Investigative

Procedure.

F.

Classification.........

G:

Character...

. ...

SECTION 124.

DELETED

Page

1

1

[10]

4a

10

+4N4)

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 432

ó

6-13-73

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## Page 433

VOLUME' IV

TABLE OF CONTENTS

•і', і?

•Paga

•SECTION 125:

A.

B

C.

E.

SECTION 126.

A.

D.

E.

F

G.

H.

SECTION 127.

B.

D.

E.

G

SECTION 128.

A.

•B.

C.

D

E

G

н.

SECIION 129:

B.

С.

D.

E.

F.

G.

I.

INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION IN AID OF RACKEIEERING

Statute.

• Policy..

Venue.

Classification

Character.

INTERSIATE TRANSMISSION OF WAGERING

INFORMATION

Statute..

Violations..

Jurisdiction.

Policy...

Investigative Procedure.

Venue..........

Classification

Character.

INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION

PARAP HERNALIA

OF

WAGERING

Statute..

Violations.

Policy.....

Departmental Policy..

Intestigative Procedure.

Venue.

Classification

Character.

CRIME ABOARD AIRCRAFT

Statutes.

Elements.

Definitions...

Statutory Interpretation

Court Decisions........

Investigative Procedure.

Classification

Character.

DESTRUCTION OF INTERSTATE PROPERTY

Statute..

Elements.

Policy..

Investigative

Procedure.

Destruction of Interstate Property in Connection

with Union Activity..

Venue......•

Double Jeopardy.

Classification.

Character.

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 ' Page 433

7

'6-13-73

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## Page 434

...

-

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SEGTION I30. "EXTRENTST. INFORMANTS AND SOURCES

.:: is

A.

Definitions..

1860

Development of Extremist Informants..

C.

Authority

to Designate as alPotentiall

Extremist Informant..

D. Investigation forlPotentiall

Extremist Informants...

Extremist Informants..

Confidential Source -

Operation of Informants.

Symbol....

Payments to Informants.

Informants' Files....

Indexing.......••

Extremist Informant Indices.

Informants' Information..........

. ..

Indoctrination, Direction, and Control

of Extremist Informants..

0.

P.

Miscellaneous Instructions.

Discontinued Informants..

Corrective Action on False Information

R.

S.

Extremist Informant Statistical Letter

Classification..

SECTIÓN 131.

DELETED

SECTION 132.

SPORTS BRIBERY

A.

B.

c.

D.

E.

F.

G.

I.

Statute....

Violations.

Exceptions...

. . .

Analysis of Statute.:

Policy.......

Investigative Procedure.

Venue.....

Classification.

Character..

SECTION 133.

DELETED

SECTION 134. ASSAULTING THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

AND THREATS AGAINST

THE PRESIDENT OF THE

UNITED STATES

Ao Assaulting the President of the United

States...

B. Threats Against the President of the

United States and Other Persons

•Protected by the Secret Service.

SECTION 135. FEDERAL CIGARETTE LABELING AND ADVERTISING ACT

A.

B.

Statute.

Policy..

C.

Venue..

D.

Classification

E. Character.

....

sion

5-13-74

NW 54933 Doçld:32989719 Page 434

Page

10

13

13

14.

14

15

15]

1

5

1

MH41

---

## Page 435

¿öió cot.

sorito:

SECTION 136:

A.

E.

F.

SECTION 137.

A.

E.

F.

SECTION 138.

A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

SECTION

139

A.

B..

C.

D.

E.

F.

G.

SECTION 140.

A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

Go

-H.

SECTION 141.

A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

F.

[SECTION 142.

and hal had

A.

B.

C.

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 435

•ÿ:

VOLUME

IV

PABLE OF CONTENtOn

.""'

ANTIRIOT LAWS

Statutes..

. •

Policj and

Investigative

Miscellaneous...

Classification.

Character.....

Penalties

Procedures

DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING

Statutes...

........ .

Policy and Investigative

Miscellaneous Instructions. •

Classification..

Character.

Penalties.

DESECRATION

OF THE FLAG

Procedures

• Statute

Policy.

Venue.

Classification.

Character..

TYDOPEEOUAME CREDTE PRINCACIIONS

Statute...

Analysis

of statute.

Departmental Policy...

Investigative Procedure

Venue....

Classification.

Character.

INTERSTATE OBSCENE OR HARASSING TELEPHONE

CALLS

Statute..

Elements..

Departmental Instructions.

Policy.........

Investigative Procedure

Venue..

І ơ ,6 .09

Classification.

Character....

CONSUMER CREDIT PROTECTION ACT

Statute.

Departmental Instructions

Policy.........

Miscollaneous..

Classification.

Character....

ILLEGAL GAMBLING BUSINESS

Statutes.....

AnaIysis

of Statutes..

Investigative Procedure.

fie

9

4-15-77

Page

1

15

• 15

15

MINNNN

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## Page 436

Those red.

SUN VOLUME IV:"

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION 142. ILLEGAL GAMBLING BUSINESS (continued)

D.

Departmental Policy and Seizure Power

E

Forfeiture...

F.

- Venue.....

G.

Classification.

H.

Character.

I.

Penalties...

SECTION 143.

RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS

A.

B

SECTION 144.

G

н.

A.

SECTION 145.

E

F:

A.

B.

C.

D

E.

SECTION 146.

Statute..

Analysis of Statute...

Investigative Procedures

Ventie.

Classification...

Character..

Penalties..

Department Policy..

POLICE KILLINGS

Authority...

Policy....

Investigative Procedures.

Definition......

Classification

Character..

INTERSTATE GAMBLING ACTIVITIES

Aims and Objectives...

Investigative Procedures.

Report Writing Procedures.

Classification.

Character....

PROTECTION OF FOREIGN OFFICIALS AND OFFICIAL

GUESTS OF THE UNITED STATES

A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

F.

G.

Background and Definitions.

Statutes.....

Departmental

Interpretation

of Statutes.

Protective Responsibilities of Treasury

Department..:

Departmental. Policy...

Investigative Procedures..

FBIHQ Supervision and Use of Öffice Contingency

Plan.........

H. Administrative Matters.

[ [APPENDIX]

INDEX

fie.

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 436

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Pags

1

3

13

13

14

2

5

5

5

6

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in saili

•SECTION 122. EXTREMIST MATI

AND CIVI

A. INVESTIGATIONS OF ENTRIMOST CRGINTZNTIONS AND INDIVIDI

For the purose of this section, calcemast organizationg

and individuals

relate to black exticists, Klan and white hate extremists and American

Indian exticnists

General Gidelines

investigative murisdiction

FBI investigations under this section are based on specific statutory

jurisdiction and Departmental instructions.

Investigation: conducted under this section arc to be directed to the

gathering of malcrial pertinent to a determination whether or not the

subject has violaied, or is engaged in activities which nay result

in a violation of oné or more of the statutes enumcrated bolow or in

fulfillment of Departmental instructions.

There are three principal

statutes which provide a basis for these

investigations, as

Rebellion

01: insurrection (118, USC, §2383)

"moevei incites,

sets on foot,

or engases in any

rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United

States os the lals therco, or gives aid of confort thereto,

shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more

ten years, or both; and

shall be incapable of holding

any office under the United States,"

Seditrous conspiracy (T18

"If two on more persons in any

place subject to the jurisdiction of the United

i usE state or Territoriledes, conspire

to ovcrthion, put down, oi to destroy by force the Government

of the united states, or to levy war agazusi mem, un iu vyyuse

by foice the authority theicoi

or by foice to prevent, hinder,

o1 delay the execution of any law of the United

force to seize, take, of possess any property of the United states

contrary to

the authority

thereof,

they shall each be fined not

than $20,000 oi imprisoned not more than twenty years,

or both."

Advocating the overthrow of the Government (T18, USC,

32585).

"Whoever knowingly o1

willfully advocates, abets, advises

teaches the dut destroying the government

overthrowing o1

necessity, desirability, or propriety n? Or

of the United States

of the government of any State,

derritory, District of lossess-

or the government

o1 any political subdivision

ion chercol, force oi violence, or by the assassination of any

therein,

officer

of any such goveinment; or

"Whoever, with intent to cause the overthrow or destruction

of any such government,

issues,

circulates,

distributes,

writter or printed matter advocating, advising, or teaching

the duty,

or destroying any government in

necessity, desirabilityne United states by force or

or propriety of overthrowing

violence, o1 attempts to do so; o5

organizes or holps or aticmpts to organize any society,

group, or assembly of persons who teach

advocate,

or encourage

the overthrow or destruction of any such government by force

or violence; os becomes or is a member of, or affiliates with, any

such society, group, or assembly of persons, knowing the

purposes thercof

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 437

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## Page 438

"Shall bo

than twe

year's

en not more then t side gon

'isoned not more

,. Or voth, and

méligible fox employ-

ment by

united States oi

any department or agency thercol,

{os:

the five years nest following his coiviction.

"If

two or more pcrsons conspire

to commit any offense named!

In this section, each shall be fined not more than $20,000 ol

imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both; and siali be

ineligible for employment by the United States

or any depart-

ment of agency theico, for the fiva years next following

his conviction.

"As used in this section, the terms 'organizes! and 'organize',

with respect to any

society, gioup, or assendly of persons,

include the iccruiting of new members, the forming of new

and the regrouping or expansion of existing clubs, classes,

and other units of such society, group, of assembly of pérsons."

The courts have interpreted this statute to require advocacy io

action, 1.e., advocacy to do something, now or in the future,

than merely to believe in something.

In addition to the three principal statutes outlined above, the tollow-

ing statute would pertain io investigations of. Klan and other white

hate groups.

(4)

Civil Rights Act of 1963 (ILS, USC, §211)

In summary, this statute makes it unlawful for two or more

pey cat ten on the to exercise pee tenate an ease cate

any right or

privilege secured to him by the Corstitution or laws of the

United States.

Additionally, it prohibits two or more persons

In disguise on the highway or on the premises of

with intent to prevent or hinder his free exeicise or enjoynent

of any rights secured by the Constitution or the laws of the

United States.

D. Prosecutive Determination

All discussions pertaining to the prosecutive potential of investi-

gations initiated under this section vili be conducted by FBIHQ with

Departmental officials.

These cases should not be discussed with

local U. S. Attorney's office without FBIHQ approval.

c.

Related

Statutes

There are a number of other statutes under the FBI's investigative

jurisdiction which should be borne in mind in handling these

investi

gations.

Information concerning possible violations

of such statutes

is frequently developed during these investigations.

Where this

occurs, the tield should consider the desirability of conducting

investigation in line with the policies and proceduics governing

statute in question.

A list of other Federal statutes which may arise during these investi

gations is outlined in Subsection 9 of this section.

FBI Responsibility

The FBI has been charged by various Presidents with the responsi

bility to coordinate and

collect all information relating to the

internal security oi the United States, including information tron

a11 other Federal and local agencies.

See Section 102, Volune 1'

of this manual.

This coordination and collection responsibility is

not to be confused with our

jurisdictional authority for conducting

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 438

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## Page 439

c.': The tcr

Strcnist actárities" as use

•activit.

-this section denotes

which are nined at overthro

#, destroying

i or undei....

mining

government of

the United States or any of its political

subdivisions by

illegal ecans or denying the rights of individuals

under the Constitution pronibited by statutes chumerated in do lo a.

above.. The tem "extremist. organications" denotes a group oi

novenient which is known to engage

in or advocate interial subversive

ox extichist activitics as defincu above.

f.

licdication for Investigation

In all cases handied under the provisions of this section, the first

communication prepared which indicates an investigation is being

initiated (intraoffice nemorandun, letter, airtel, teletype or report)

should show specifically the statute upon which the invostigation

is based together with all the supporting laçis.

must be included in the first communication to FBIllO and the first

report oi LIN prepared in each case.

specifically requested by Departrent, this

should be indicated in

piedication.

The following examples

are allustratave; nowever, the

predication for each individual case must be tailored

to the circun-

stances of such case.

(1)

"This investigation is based on information the subject's

activities may be in violation of IlS, USC,

§2383 (Rebellion

or insurrection) and $2384 (Seditious

conspiracy).

A SOurCe

whose reliability has not been determined has inforned thai

the subject is planning, along with others,

to travel to

Washington,

on ADril 30

1971,

washeng denons rations during the first

to participate in planned

week in May,

1971,

to

' shut down the Government.'

Demonstration plans include the

Goveinment property,

blocking of streets and physical obstruction to prevent

destruction oi personal and

Government employees from reporting to work."

(2)

"This investigation is based on information

the subject's

activities nay be in violation of Il8, USC,

$2385 (Advocating

the overthrow of the Government).

The subject is an admitted

member (or has been identified as a member by a confidential

source who has provided reliable information in the past) oi

(name of

gIoup).

The (name of group) in

its public statenents

and publications advocates the desirability and necessity of

overthiowing the U. S. Government by force of violence, and

the assassination of U. S. Government officers.

The sane source

has reported

that the subject actively supports these positions "

(3)

"This investigation is based on information the subject's

activities

deprive a citizen of rights or privileges secured by the Con-

stitution or the laws of the United States). The subiect is an

adnitted member (or has been identified as a member bì a con-

iciential source who has provided reliable infoination in t

sast, of (nam

of group).

the Constitution or the laws of the Uniied

States.

The same source has reported that the subject actively

supports this position "

1b

NW 54933| Docld:32989719 Page 439

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## Page 440

If the statu

basis for an investigation

_d change or be

www expansied to

lue an adultional statute

atutes,

the first

communication prepareil subsequent to such change or expansion should:

specificaliy show

such changes. similarly, this information should

be included in the nest report or LuM prepared in the casc.

Accuracy of Characterizations

• Assure tliat statements rélating to characterizations of an individual

or organisation, ox clating to affiliations vith or membership in

any organization, are foundod on a firm basis.

Identify sources for

such characterizations or statements of affiliation or menbersha!

if such charactcrizations, affiliations or memberships are not

connonly and publicly known.

Preservation of Evidence

Whenever conducting investigation which anvolves possible prosecution,

ansure that admissible evidence is obiarned and preserved.

2. Investigations of Organizations

a.

Criteria

Investigations should be limited to organizations which have, oi

alregedly have

defined in A. 1. Baged in or advocated extremist activities as

b.

Scope of Investigation

It is essential that reliable and knowledgeable informant coverage

be developed at all levels of organizations meeting investigative

criteria.

Pertinent information should be obtained and reported

(1)

Identity of organization, including address, location of any

subsidiary bots, phone number, and similar data regarding

cartel,

of organization.

_NW 54933_Docld:32989719 Page 440

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## Page 441

(3) Identitie

• principal officers.

64). Membershi

estimated

mitremat ace de necess:

including. total

1al membership and

Reports by office of origin

• concerning national

groups should include & bicakdown of membci-

ship by states.

(5).

Objectives, as claimed by the organization and/or as determinco

through investigation.

(6)

Sunmary of pertinent activities, including:

Acts oi violence,

teirorism or intimidation or pertinent

statements advocating or pronoting such activitres.

(0)

(c)

Other illegal actions.

Acquisition of arns,

amunition, explosives, or other

destructive devices.

(d)

Number of mectings or rallies held, both public and closed.

Include highlights with emphasis on information bearing on

extremist character of the organization.

(7)

(e) Training and recruiting activities.

Finances, including pertinent data regarding bank accounts

monthly balances if available) and source of income

(8)

(9)

Publications.

Foreign influence, if any.

(10) Connections with other extremist, subversive or revolutionary

groups.

(11) Miscellaneous. Any information considered pertinent but not

covered by the above.

c.

Reporting Procedures

(1)

Freouency of repoits. Submit initial report within 90 days.

Thercafter, office of origin should submit annual nonprosecutive

different reporting schedule be followed). This report should

provide comprehensive picture of national.

activities of the

oiganization, including concise sumnary of pertinent data reported

by auxiliary

offices.

suxillary offices should submit reports

to reach FBillQ and office of origin 45 days before the office of

origin's annual nonprosecutive summary report is due. li will

be the responsibility of

the office of origin to appropriately

auxiliary offices of the annual reporting schedule.

(2)

Submission of letterhead menoranduns (Lilms). in

addition

submission of reports as outlined above, all offices should on

a continuing basis keep FBIIQ (and office or origin, where

applicable) advised of significant information developec

concerning the

activities of exiremist organization.

would include information concerning public rallies or

demonstrations sponsored by group, incormation bearing on group's

• propensity for violence, acquisition of weapons,

regarding secret financial contrabutions, domestic or foreign.

Such data should normally be included in LIM and forwarded by

However, if actual or imminent violence is involved,

advise FBIIQ by telephone or teletype.

do Administrative Detail

Administrative pages of reports or cover pages of LiM should

specifically identify and state whether or not investigation being.

conducted regarding active members who are identified, in a report

or LIM.

In the event no investigation is being conducica, appropiiate

justifications should be set forth.

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 441

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## Page 442

Indexing" Nain

......i..:

At theitime. the animal repoil. is. submitied

. Ou

organiza trong 0111

offices should provide FBilQ by letter with a list or individuals,

with identifjing data, who are members of extremist groups or

unaffiliated

extremists whose nancs have not been included in any

prior communication to the Bureau. This is for indexing purposes at

FBIlIQ.

3. Investigations of Individuals

2.

Criteria

Investigations should be initiated concerning following:

(1)

officers of exticnist oiganizations wha

are in policy-making

positions or who are able to direct activities of other

members of group.

(2)

All other members of extremist organization who have demonstrated

(3)

piopensity for violence:

Persons who, while not affiliated with extrcmist organization,

have demonstrated strong extremist attitudes. coupled with

inclination to employ violence.

b.

Scope of Investigation

Pertinent infornation should be obtained and reported concerning-

following:

Background infornation including: check of indices; birth data;

residence and

employment; military service, if any; selective

service status, if applicable; marital status; educational

background; ariest record, li

any; description of automobile,

including

license number; photograph; FBI identilication record;

relatives; close associates; social

security number; and physical

(2)

(3)

(4)

Connections with extremist organizations and pertinent information

regarding

extremist activities or sympathies.

Full details concerning subject's propensity

for violenca.

intervier of subject.

The main purpose for interviewing

subjects of extremist investigations is to develop intelligence

information regarding extremist activities, Federal violations

in which extremists may be involved, and the evaluation of the

individual's extremist

potential.

SAC may authorize

interviers with extremist organization members and officers up

to state level or lesser office. SAC may also authorize interview

of unaffiliated extremists.

Prior to intesview of these individuals, conduct informant

arrest, and indices checks on individuals to be interviewed,

Determine employment, establish not employed or connected with

any sensitive area requiring FBIIQ authorization for interview,

prepare memorandum for SAC setting forth available facts.

Each such interview should be personally approved by SAC.

Interviews with extremist subjects should be considered carl;

in the investigation in the absence of any information diciating

otherwise. If

subject not interviewed, closing communication must

show reason for not intervieving.

Rank-and-iale extremists may

be interviewed

on the authority of SAC, however, prior FBINQ

authority must be obtained for interviews of leaders of the

extrenist groups (state level oi above), individuals

of national

prominence, civil rights organizations,

educational institutions,

news media, rcligious grOips, or other

schsitive areas.

P110Г

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 442

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...:.

?:. FBIHQ author

es also required. foi those.

'÷!

th mown. subversaye.grouys.or.

(Utilize TD-336)

its having an.:"

scien powers"

(5)

Gencial.

When good judgment dictares (i.c., for icasons of sensitivity.

of security), to agents should be gresent at interview.

safcty of Agents participating in intervic.

should be parasunt

considcration in arranging circumstances under which interviews

will be conducted.

FBID authority is not necessary prior to

intervion of extremist organisation menber in criminal or

applicant-type cases; horever: confine intervicw to subject

maticy of inquiry unless information concerning extrenist

organization is volunteered by interviewee.

[(0)

Candidates for or occupants of cloctive public office

Instructions relating to investigations of individuals in above

categories are contained in vol. III, sec. 87 C..1 (f), of this

manual.]

C.

Reporting procedures

Initial investigation should be completed within 90 days after case is

opened.

Individuals investigated under these instructions should

be considered foi inclusion in the Administrative. Index (ADEX)

(see Section 87 Manual of Instructions for details). It is not

desired that

reports be submitted merely for the sake of

reporting;

however, it is the responsibility of

the field to assure that all

significant information is reported in a form suitable for dissemination

on a current basis.

Whether or not an extremist subject is placed in

the ADEX is not the controlling investigative criteria.

The investigative

criteria should de followed

as set forth in 3. a. above.

Our dissemination responsibilities should not be overlooked and FBIllQ

and oilice ol origin,

where

applicable, should be kept advised on

a continuing basis of all significant or unusual activities on the

part of subjects especially where substantive violations are

involved. Submit such information by teletype (suitable foi

dissemination) or airtel accompanied by LIM depending on circumstances

involved.

do

Informant

development

If individual is cooperative upon interview and has potential as

source, handle pursuant to instructions contained in Section 130,

Volume

IV of this manual.

e.

Foreign influence

When an extremist subject travels abroad, advise the Bureau by

teletype if situation

so warrants, submit LiM containing details

including passport information

along with brief summary of extremist

activities. Place stop with immigration authorities to assure

notification of return and request that a search of luggage be made.

Upon return, submit follow-up LiM

and intensify investigation to

determine subject's activities hile abroad including contacts with

any known extremists residing in countries in which traveled.

4. Extremist Photographic Album (EPA)

Purpose

Album maintained at each field office as aid in identifying individuals

in extremist field

who travel or are likely to travei

D.

Individuals to be included

extensively.

Loaders of Klan and similar white nate groups, leaders of Ancrican Indian

extremist groups, and leaders of black extremist groups. Also

include extremists who are fugitives in Burcau criminal cascs,

extremist informants who travel in behalf of their respective extremist

ognizations, and any unuffilialed extremist whose activities varrant.

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 443

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r.i.i: co Procedure fo

cluding individuals in sPA

On 1D-432tyP

•co. foim indacating "none" ir

required biographical.data

..on

"unknon" if applicable.

Piace original

with photograph in individual's main case file.

l'repare lion

original 10 derox copies for Bureau and one toros copy for each

olic, attach photograph

to each

and distribute by. FD-132a.

Procedure for amending information

on

1D-432

Prepare now FD-i32 incorporating necessary changes and distribute oy

FD-43220

Use FD-132a to distribute up-to-daie photographs of

individuals included in BPA.

e.

Procedure for deleting individuals from EPA

Submit reconmendation in communication to Burcau utilizing caption

of individual.

Following receipt of Bureau approval, advise al

offices of delction by FD-432a.

On recent of delction notic

remove FD)-432

from EPA and destroy.

f.

Fugitives

FD-432 of

exticnist wo is Bureau fugitive should not be marked

"fugitive" since Album is for identification puryoses only and is

not

to be used

as basis for fugitive arrests.

5. [Deleted]

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 444

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.G..Infiltration.or.law.eufc

mment orranizations

• Any information devel

regaiding extremist affili

rankins officirs of.s

on on part of high.

•: police; sherrl's 0llicc,

Local police depart

ments should be furnished

to ming along with your recomendation as to

whether or not such information should be furnished

on a confidential basis

to the governer of state or some other appropriate local official.

Consider

advising head of law enforcement agency whenever a subordinate is involved.

No information should be furnished to

the governor of the state or other

appropriate local official and/or head of

law enforcement agency without

spechlic prior Buicau approval.. The data lurnished to such individuals

should be jurnished in wilting and a draft of the proposed letter must be

submitted for prior FBIHQ approval at the time of

mendat:101.

submitting your recon-

7.

1•8.

In preparing information for dissemination concerning extremist affiliation

of law enforcement officers exercise care to protect informants and sources,

.. confine information to data reported by sources who have furnished reliable

information in the past, and do noi include unfounded rumors.

In preparing

letter you

should state

that information is being furnished

on confidential

basis in vicw of official responsibilities of addressee.

Lotter should in

clude statement that if any action is taken as a result of information, ex-

tremist affiliation should be established by independent investigation, as

Burpau is unable to produce witnesses to testify at any hearing.

Results of investigation

on extremist organizations or individuals should

be furnished locally to Secret Service and to the local branches of

other Federal investigative agencies having a cleai-cut interest.

•isee

section or, Manual of instructions lot more detailed instructions

applicable to extremist investigation.)

Urban Guerrilla Warfare

(Similar instructions apply to section 87, Manual of Instructions, item C4.)

General investigative guidelines

Urban guerIilla warfare concerns

terrorist activities against law

enforcement

and established institutions including:

"Expropriation" of

property by robberies or burglaries.

Thefts of

weapons, dynamite, or other materials appropriate

for bomb manufacture.

Bombings of

revolutionary-type

targets, such as banks, 011

refineries, police

Unprovoked

altacks on and ambushes cy police ernment tacalities.

atlacks on police facilities.

(6)

Aircraft hijackings.

(7)

Political kidnapings.

(8) Action to enable revolutionary prisoners to escape from confinement.

bo

Investigations

(1) Purpose

(a)

lo obtain sufficient data to identify

their activities,

(b)

Soon Role te prosecute deling to beta or

and organization, if

violations involved.

(c) To assess the urban

guerrilla threat to internal security

of country.

(d) To keep Department and other

appropriate Federal and local

agencies advised on a continuing basis of these terrorists

(2)

activitics.

General Policy

(a)

With occurrence of any incident containing possible or

actual urban gueriilla varfare activity, a separate communication

is to be promptly submitted to Bureau wierein a complete

assessment is made

as to whether or not the incident was in

any way involved with extremist or revolutionary aclivity.

6

07 10

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 445

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## Page 446

(3)

I

ircau violatzon envolved,

amunication with

non incluline character for

, tantive violation.

followed.or MErtrenst inticrs..ross101c.Uromm

-:

Gucrrilla Activitios" ori"Subversive Mattors

Violence - Possible Urban Guerrilla Activities""

•whichever is appropriate.

•II no Bureau substantive volation sparent, out

indications

of urban gucrrilla activity arc present,

a new case is to be opened in tie field

preliminary

inquiries instituted to determine if extremists or

revolutionaries are involved.

Buicau to be advised by

communication under a caption descriptive of incident,

including character, but to include "Possible Urbar

(1)

(13)

Communication should set forth basis for inquiry.

Contemplated investigation should be succinctly

described.

(D)

When a significant

instance of urban gucrrilla activity

takes place, Bureau vill instruct appropriate field office

to submit "Incident Profile" by airlol to all offices

captioned "Urban Guerrilla Warfare: (Place and Date),

[Extremist Matters (or Subversive Matters) ]- Violence -

Incident Profile," whichever is appropriate.

J. Part I should describe incident and include identities

of individuals involved. as well as general modus

operandi.

II. Part II should highlight newly learned or repeated

indicators of urban guerriila warfare with appropriate

comments iu assisi aii offices in identifyin.

investigating,

and controlling

urban guerrilin

terrorists.

III. Offices receiving will insure indexing afforded same,

appropriate personnel

are notified of contents.

(c) Results of investigation are to be submitted in form

suitable for dissemination on a timely basis.

If Bureau violation involved, initial report should

contain character in addition to substantive violation

involved as "Possible Urban Guerrilla Wasfare."

Three extra

copies of such reports to be submitted

the Bureau in addition to number otherwise required.

II.

If no Bureau violation involved, submit results by Lib

under appropriate descriptive caption and character to

include "Possible Urban Guerrilla Warfare."

Five copies

are to be submitted.

(d) Reporting and investigating police killings involved in

terrorists' acts are

to be handled also in compliance

with instructions set forth in Section 144, "Police Killings,"

of Manual of Instructions.

Data to be developed

(3)

Method of operation in conmitting terrorist acts or criminal

(b)

activities.

Identities of all individuals involved, determining back-

ground, extremist or revolutionary affiliations, associates,

and contacts.

7

_NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 446

..1

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.."

:(c.). Ident

Lus of grOUpS O1 peiSOnS aSSi

these terrorists

suc!

couricrs

providing. "safe.

•or. otherwice assistine:

→..:

. (d)

(e)

(f).

Methods uf transportation.

Communications systems and codes utilized.

Revolutionary material possessed and source of samc where

possible: Furnish copies to Bureau.

(5)

Manner in which false identilication obtained and/or

utilized.

(h)

Possession of weapons and/or explosives and incendiary devices.

Determine source of

same.

Io

Check NCIC, state ant

Federal firearms registries,

and where possible, institute lactory tracings to

establish source of

ali weapons.

(i) Source of funds. Be alert to recent acts of expropriation

which may have been committed

locally.

(3)

Association or affiliation with extremist or revolutionary

grOUDS.

Investigative procedures

(1)

Roco seat enters ation

Recovered weapons and ammunition to be submitted FBI Laboratory

for fiscarms identification examinations and appropriate comparisons.

(2)

(3)

Ascertain origin of items of all false identification.

Any nandwriting located and/or handwriting specimens obtained

should

be submitted

in file of known extremistsland revolutionaries.]

(4)

All latent prints obtained are to be sent FBI Identification

Division for comparison against either Black Extremist or White

Extremist certions or latent Fingerprint File.

(5) NCIC is to be queried

on all names utilized

true identities established.

, as well as that of

(6)

All telephone numbers utilized should be

submitted to Data

Processing Section

(7)

for check of Computerized Telephone Number File.

Where individual identified

has not been

subject of prior investi-

gation, institute investigation promptly.

(8), Check

all venicles and license plates possessed by terrorists

against NCIC and determine source.

(9) Maintain close liaison with local

authorities.

(10)

Informants

and sources must be continously targeted for development

of infornation concerning urban guerrilla warfare acts as they

are developed.

(11)

Prcplanned acts of violence uncovered must be afforded immediate

anvestigation, reporting: and necessary dissemination.

(12) Deleted]

do Coordination of urban guerrilla activities

Responsibility for coordination of these matters to be placed on desk of

seld extremist supervisor in each office.

1) Coordination will involve analysis of portinent data reccivec

from Bureau and other field divisions to insure indicators of

this type of activity occurring in each division are promptly

recognized and appropriate investigation instituted.

(2) Afford

close liaison in these matters between all Agents regardless

of assignment.

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 447

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## Page 448

SECTION 12

EXTRE-IST MATTERS AND CIVIL

UNREST

122A

(3)

: "

Maintain close

Linison with local authortties to insure

urban

• guerrilla activityis immediately refered

to-Bureau's-attention

9. Statutes

Department has noted possible applicability of following statutes to

investigations

extrenist. matters. These should ba borne in mind

and possible violations should be promptly and vigorously investigatd

and Burcau kept advised

of all developments.

Detailed discussions of

these violations appear in Manual of Instructions.

(1)

Rebellion or insurrection

Title 18, USC, $ 2383

Proscribes the

inciting or engaging in any rebellion or insuirection

against authority of U.S.

(2)

seditious conspiracy

Title 18, USC,

§ 2384

Proscribes conspiring to overthrow or to destroy by force the

Government of U.S. or to oppose by foice the authority thereof

or by foice prevent, hinder, or delay the execution of any law

of U.S.

(3)

Advocating overthrow of Government

(Smiüh Act of 1940)

Title 18, USC, $ 2355

Proscribes advocacy of overthrowing Government of U. S., Or

government of any state,

territory, district

thereof, or government of any political

tructivis pos shercon

by force

or violence.

(4)

Activities alecuing armed unces during mas

TItle 18, USC,

§ 2388

Proscribes making or conveying a false report with intent to

interfere with operation or success of U.S. military or naval

forces oI to promote success of its enemies, or counseling

insubordination, disloyalty, or mutiny in the armed forces.

(5)

Selective Service Act

Title 50 App., USC,

§462

Violations nost likely to be encountered are counseling, aiding

or abetting, refusal or evasion of any duty under the act or

regulations, and interiering with administration of acto

(6)

Travel and Interstate transportation

(a) Title 18, USC, § 1952, covers interstate travel to commit

(b)

Title 18, USC, § 837, covers interstate transportation of

(7)

(8)

explosives.

Assault or killing of Federal officers and employees

title 18, USC;

§111, 1114, 2231.

Destruction of Government propert

Title 18, USC, $ 1361.

(9)

National Fircamis Act (Title 20, USC, $$ 581.2, 5822, 5812,

5814, and 5801).

State Firearms Control Assistance Act (Title 18, USC, $$ 921-928)

Unlawful Possession or Receipt of Firearms Statute (Title 18

Appo, USC, $$ 1201-1203).

(1.0)

Crimes on Government reservations

Title 18, USC, $§ 13, 81, et al.

(11)

Antiriot

laws

Title 18, USC

• 245 (U) (3),

Chapter 102 (85

2101-2102), and Chapter 12 (88 232-233).

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 448

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## Page 449

i22Л - B

10.

SECTION

EXTREMIST NATTERS IND CIVIL

: (12) i Conspiracy.

Title 18, USC.,

8:371

Department has emphasized

importance of collocting ind reporting

all facis concerning possible schemes oi conspiracies by any

gIoup of whatever size,

effectiveness; of affiliation, to plan,

or aggravaie riot activity.

(13)

Explosives and incendiary devices and bomb threats

"!".

Title 18, USC, $ 844.

(14)

ACi for

the Protcction of Forcion Officials and Official Guests

of the United States.

(15)

(1.0)

Various Civil Rights

Statutes.

Hobbs Act.

(17)

Registration Act.

CHARACTER

Exticmist Matters character (abbreviated EM) should be used as follows:

a.

Organization

Extremist Matter

b.

Individuals

(1)

John Doe

Extremist Matter - BPY

• (2)

John Doe

Extremist Matter - Klan

(3)

John Die

Extrenist Matter - AIM

c.

Unaffiliated Extremists

(1)

John Doe

Extremist Matter - Black Extremist

üüini Dui

Extremist Matter • White Haje

John Doe

Extremist Matter • American Indian

B.

(3)

CIVIL UNREST

1.

Responsibility of Bureau

Infornation concerning nationwide racial conditions and developing racial

trends is required from intelligence standpoint.

Any activities on part

of individuals, groups, or organizations which present potential for

or other incidents are of interest

disseminated to interested Government agencies locally, including Secret

Service, military intelligence agencies of Army, Navy, and Air Force;

2.

Investigation should be promptly conducted when intormation is receivec

indicating possible violations have occurred within our investigative

demonstrations rests with local

authorities.

activities within Bureau's investigative jurisdiction:

a. Instances of possible civil righus violations.

b.

Criminal act or conspiracy constituting possible violation of

statute within our jurisdirtion (e.g., Sabotage, Theft of Government

Property).

3. Reporting Procedures

a.

Pertinent information ob-uined

regarding racial developments or trends

having potential for violence should be furnished to Bureau and

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 449

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## Page 450

SECTION 122

"a!"

IREMIST MATTERS AND CIVIL

1223

intcrested agencies by most tincly nethod mutanted under circunstances.

sources and informants should be

to promptly report information

concerning my developing situations having polential for violence.

Actual or thirrioned

riots, disturbances, or disorders by indivadials

oI. organizations should be reported to Burcau by teletype unless

circumstances warrant telephone call. Teletypes

need

not be followed

by LIM provided all essential details, incluling statistical data

regarding arrests, injuries, or property damages, can be included

iclctype.

subiission of LIM is warranted, transmit by cover

airiel before close of second workday following date information vas

Icceived.

C.

Teletypes

should be prepared suitable for dissemination and should

not include administrative data in body of communication.

Include

refcrences and any lurther action being taken under administrative

heading

at end of teletype.

Specifically state in administrative

section if LIM follows.

Cite in body of teletype pertinent local

Federal agencies notified, Record in file identities of agencies and

individuals notified.

Other pertinent racial information should be submitted to Bureau

in LiM by suitable cover communication.

Public source

information

of unusual local or national importance should ilso be submitted by

• Lil, after contact with logical solices.

Furnish Bureau copy of

any article from newspapers or publications containing racial inforation

of interest.

4.

Liaison with local law enforcement

Information received which as within primary jurisdiction of local lai

enfoscement

authorities chould be propily

turnachod those anencine

together with supporting data

from

Bureau files mich would be of interest

and assistance, provided Burcau sources are fully protected. Where cogent

reason exists for not furnishing local. law enforcorent agency information,

such as possibility of

jeopardizing informant, furnish facts to Bureau.

Include your conmenis and recommendations for

use of trustworthy intei-

mediaries to advise local authorities.

50

Civil Unrest

Rumors of possible civil unrest or disorder should be immediately traced

to original source, where possible, to determine validity of allegation.

Contact other sources and informants to determine if information can be

substantiated.

6.

Riots

we real a peng

Where mob violence or rioting is threatened or erupts, inmediately:

a. Establish liaison with appropriate city and state officials.

specific assignments to informants who could aid in furnishing

pertinent information concerning causes of individuals responsible

for mob violence or riot.

C.

Determine and furnish to bureau and appropriate local agencies

identities of individuals or organizations responsible for such

activities.

do Keep Bureau

advised of developments by teletype or telephone.

Co

Furnish daily teletype summary.

7. (Semiannuallassessment of potential

fo: violence in civil protest activity

In view of the possibility of civil disorders occurring in various types

of protest activity, it is essential that the Burcau be fully aware

of trouble spots where violence is most likely lo erupt.

require the maintenance of close contact with police officers,

informants, and other sources for information regarding sigulacant

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 450

---

## Page 451

223

.. SECTiON 122.

¿TREMIST MATTERS AND CIVIL UT

developments which

may.have.a beating.on.the potent

al. for violence in

civil protest activity.

In order for the Bureau to be curiently

knowledgeavic at. the.overal.. civil uncest.situation.and. the-potential

The quality of the

: ' "assessment will be no better than the quality of souices (extremist,

criminal,

and security) who are contacted.

Informant programs

should be keyed to produce the results needed to discharge vui

responsibilities.

Chelschiannuallassessment should be submitted ii

the form of an LIll to reach the bureau by the fifth day of lapril and

Octoberlof each year.

8.

9.

CLASSIFICATIO: - 157

CHARACTER AND TITLE.

Title of case should be descriptive of activities involved followed

by character "Civil Unrest."

',

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 451

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## Page 452

AL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART I

SECTION 1. CONDUCT AND ACTIVITIES OF EMPLOYEES

[A.

Misconduct.......

B.

Confidential Nature of FBI Operations.

SECTION 2.

DELETED

SECTION 3. EMPLOYEE INDOCIRINATION PROCEDURES

A.

в.

C.

D.

E.

G.

Noninvestigative Personnel at FBIHQ.

Noninvestigative Fielú Office Employees

Investigative Employees.

Oath of Office...

Forms Executed by New Employees.

Information Panphlets Furnished

to New Employees

Special Indoctrination Services.

SECTION 4. LEAVE - PREMIUM COMPENSATION

....

B. Premium

A. Leave. compensation

for Irregular,

Overtime.........

C. Wage Board Employees:

SECTION 5. PERFORMANCE RATINGS

A. Official and Administrative Ratings.

B.

Adjective Ratings....

C.

Preparation of Rating..

D.

Deleted

E.

Dictation Ability of Agents..

r.

Initialing Performance Ratings..

Go

Review and Appeal of Performance

Unschedulea

Ratings

SECTION 6.

PROMOTIONS

A.

B.

Clerical Placement and Promotion Policy.

Special Agent Promotions.

c.

D.

Special Employee Program..

Radio Personnel Promotion Policy..

E.

Coordination of Promotions and Incentive Awards...

F

Within-Grade Increases.

G.

Special Clerk Program..

Page

2

8]

17

26

13

13

13

11

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 452

---

## Page 453

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART I

SECTION 7.

SELECTION OF SUPERVISORS

A.

B.

Special

Agent Field Supervisors.

Clerical Supervisory Program..

SECTION 8.

IESTS

A.

B.

C.

D.

E:

Clerical

Testing..

Deleted

Foreign Language Tests..

Grading of Tests..

Deleted

F.

G.

Instructions

for Affording Stenographic and Typing.

H. Rules To Be

rollowed in Grading Bureau Steno

graphic Tèsts...

.:.

I. Rules To Be Followed in Grading Bureau Typing tests.

J. Rules To Be Followed in Grading Bureau Teletype-

writer Tests....

SECTION 9. DISCIPLINARY MATTERS

A. Introduction..

...

B. Notification of

Bureau upon Receipt of Allegations

of Misconduct or Improper Performance of Duty.

C. Investigation....

D.

Interviews of Employees Involved.

E.

Reporting.....

E.

Allegations Made By Individuals Outside the Bureau..

G.

Suspension Without Pay...

'...0

Handling of Resignation Tendered During Personnel

SECTION 10.

APPRALS AND GRIEVANCES

SECTION 11.

A.

B.

C.

D.

Introduction.......

Performance Ratings.

Position Classifications

Veterans: Appeal Rights.

Salary Retention Act

Within-Grade Increases.

G.

Equal Employment Opportunity....

EX-SERVICEMEN'S RIGHTS AND SELECTIVE SERVICE AND

MILITARY RESERVE MATTERS

A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

F.

G.

Introduction...

Veterans' Counselor.

Appointment....

Retention....

Separation,

Furlough, and Reinstatement.

Adverse Personnel Actions..........

Exceptions to Eligibility for Veterans'

Preference Rights.

H.

Advancement..

I

Military Leave..

J.

Other Rights..

K..

• Selective Service

and Military Reserve Matters:

••'•

NW 54933 Docid:32989719: Page 453

2:

12-27-73

Page

1

2

[ 1]

1a

2-3

4

6

•!

---

## Page 454

[

[

[

SECTION 12.

A.

B.

C.

SECTION 13.

de.

B.

C.

SECTION 14.

A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

F.

Н.

I.

J.

К.

Is.

11.

N.

0.

• ?.

OF RULES AND REGULATIONS

: TABLE OF CONTENTS

"PART I ::

TRANSFERS - RESIGNATIONS

Transfers.

Resignations..

Exit Interviews (BiHOland Field.

AUTOMOBILE OPERATOR AND ACCIDENT MATTERS

Motor Vehicle Operator Regulations.

Traffic Violations..

Accidents....

Use of Personally Owned Automobiles for Official

Business After Regular Duty Tours.

' . ...

SERVICES AVAILABLE TO EMPLOYEES

Housing| (FBIHQ) ].

Housing (Field).

Bureau-Approved Recreational Associations (rieial

Training Opportunities for Clerical Employees

[ (FBIHO)}:

Literature..........

Recognition and

Awards.

employee compensation inners eulad Rapidjses:

Compensation Act)...

FBI Health Service...

Federal Employees Health Benefits Program.

Deleted

Deloted

Volunteer Blood Donors........

Federal Employees' Group

...

Unemployment Compensation for Federal Employees. •

Federal Safety Council.

Charity Campaigns...•

•Payroll Matter - Voluntary Allotments to

Financial

Organizations........

...

SECTION 15. CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT - SOCIAL SECURITY

A. Introduction.........

B.

c.

Application

Types of Retirement...

D.

Annuities.......

E.

survivor Annuities...:

F.

Benefits upon Separation...

Go

Deductions; Purchase

Service (Deposit

or

Rede posit ..........

н.

I.

J.

Reemployment of Annuitants by Government.

Designation

of Beneficiary..

Security..

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 454

Page

7

4

10

riNm

3а

4

4

9

11

11b

13

15

16

17

17

17

8

9

9

9

10

---

## Page 455

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART I

[

SECIION 16. MISCELLANEOUS PERSONNEL MATTERS

A.

Personnel Status Form - FD-285.

B.

Changes in Status......

C.

Vocation Records

FD-287 and FD-287a.

D.

Personnel Files (Field).....

E.

Physical Program.

F.

Availability of Doctors

and Nurses

G.

Outside Employment..

H.

Oda-Hour Shifts.

I.

Work Permits (FBIHO)

J.

Tours of Duty of Women and

Minors

I.

List of Assigned and Unassigned Stenographers

(FBIHQ) ........

M.

N.

0.

Computation of Clerk-Agent Ratio.

Stenographic Delinquency......

Firearms Training of Noninvestigative

Employees....

Service Records, Credit Inquiries, and

Inquiries Directed to Employees.

P.

Rest Periods - Vending Machines

Q.

Designation

of Beneficiary..

R.

Lost Government Checks.

SECTION 17.

EMPLOYEE CLAIMS FOR LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO

PERSONAL PROPERTY

A.

Scope...

B. Claimants..

c.

Conditions..

D.

Principal Types of Claims Allowable

E.

F.

Principal Types of Claims Not Allowable

Types and Quantity of Property..............

to

computation of Awara and finaiity of settlement.

H.

Claims Procedure.............

I.

Evidence in Support of Claim

J.

Settlement....

[SECTION 18. CIVIL SUITS INVOLVING FBI PERSONNEL

A. Initial Handling•••

Secondary Handling:•

C. Continuing Responsibility.

Page

]

la

3

3b

8

9

9

10

•.

=.w.i

...

i ::

ai.;

12327-74 treet pee ine of door codi

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 455 .

---

## Page 456

OF RULES AND. REGULATIONS

i terri

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART IT

SECTION 1.

AUTHORITY - TRAINING - SUBMISSION OF INFORMATION

A.

B.

C.

D.

Authority.

Training Programs.••

Submission of Information

Copyright.

SECTION 2. SUPERVISION - AVAILABILITY - RESIDENT AGENCIES

A.

B.

C.

Supervision.

Availability of Employees::

Resident Agencies and Resident Agents.

SECTION 3. ADMINISTRATION OF OFFICES

A. Appearance and Maintenance of Offices.

B.

Maintenance of Systems..

C. Index Systems....•

D. Administration of Files.

E.. Administration of Cases..

National Crime Information Center (NCIC)

Administration of Cases.

SECTION 4. COMMUNICATIONS

A. Definitions of Communications.

General Reporting Rules...

Reporting Information That May Become Testimony.

D.

*E.

Fo

G.

H.

I.

Jo

K.

Cover Page(s) and Investigative Reports.

Letters..

Letterhead and Blind Memoranda.

Teletypes and Airtels..

Telegrams..

CW Radio Network.....

Routing Slip, FD-4...

Deleted

SAC Memorandums (formerly SAC Letters) ..............

Mo

Regulations Applicable to All Written Communications.

No Codes......

0.

Reproduction of Material.......

P. Correcting Errors in Communications.

FM Two-Way Radio............

R.

S.

T.

U.

Telephone......•

Approval of Communications Facilities.

Mailing List of Field Divisions:...

National Crime Information Center (NCIC) Terminal.

V. Facsimile Communications.

SECTION 5. DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION

A.

Responsibility...•

Bo

Basis for Dissemination..

C.

Information To Be Disseminated..

D. Dissemination of Information in Answer to a

Specific Request...

Bo

Requests for Information

on Costs......

F. Major Cases - Dissemination of Information.

[

[G. Threat to Life - Dissemination of Information..

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 456

Page

1

1

12

12

1

7a

15d

31

6

12

13

13]

---

## Page 457

AL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS

199:90.7

TABLE OF CONTENTS

i maint

PART II

SECTION 6. PUBLICATIONS, PRESS., AND PUBLIC CONTACTS

Page

A.

В.

C.

D.

F.

Go

H.

I.

J

K.

Mo

No

Press Policy .....

FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin.

Speeches..

Interesting Case Write-Ups.•

Circular Letters,

Trade and Business Publications.

Radioland Television]Broadcasts.

Field Office Lists...

.. .:*...

Information To Be Furnished to the Bureau

Visits to Field Offices..

Miscellaneous...

Sources of Information.

SAC Contacts.

News Media Contacts....

Bureau-Wide Information Program Regarding

Matters of National Interest.

...

SECTION 7• PAYMENTS - PROPERTY

A. Travel Expense - Transportation Allowances

Transportation of Household Effects.

C. Government Shipments...

D. Contracts..

E.

Supplies, Materials, and Equipment.

F.

Automobiles.............

Payment for Services and Goods.

H. Imprest Funds......

I.

Inventories.............•

*J.

Authority to Approve Limited Expenditures for

Investigative Operations.

SECTICN 8. MISCELLANEOUS REGULATIONS

A.

Concerning Clerical Functions.

B. Concerning Investigations and Interviews

Co Court Appearance and Testimony of Agents.

D. Freedom of Information Act .......

E.

Photographs.•

Fo

Retention of Property.•

•Go

Forms......

Ho

Obscene Matter..

1.

Signed Statements, Unsigned Written Statements,

and Evidence..

J.

Inventions..

Review of Briefs Filed With Circuit Court of Appeals..

Research Monographs....•

M.

Recording Outside Contacts

Cinal Letter....

0.

Artist's Conceptions....

Legal Instruction - State Legislation - Legal Problems.

Qo Threats Against Informants or Witnesses - Protection

and Maintenance of Informants and Witnesses.

R.

Is.

National Bomb Data Center (NBDC).

Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA)

SECTION 9. CLASSIFICATION - CHARACTER = COPIES - ABBREVIATIONS.•.•

INDEX'

M97 Decld 329897,19 Page 457

6

1

2

2a

2a

3

За

За

5

5c

5c

7

9

10

9

17

17a

18

20a

22

25

33

36

22

22

22

23

24

25

27

27

28

29

30]

1

---

## Page 458

Office Memora

ClER • UNITED STA

TO

¡Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

FRoM the Attorney General

SUNJECTAICHOPIONE SURVEILIANCE

DATS;

S GOVERNMENT

May 24, 454.

155-20

pEr.

The recent decision of the Suprene Court entitled Irvine v.

Califonia, 317 U.S. 123, denouncing the use of microphone survaillances

bu city police in a gamblinz caso makes appropriate a reappraisal of

the use which may be made in the future by the Federal Bureau oi

Investigation oi microphone surveillance in connection with matters

relaiing to the intamal security of the country.

It is clear that in some instances the use of microphone

murraalenes do the only pacciate way of uncoverina the activities

a capicacos agerts

, mossins sabotares; and subversive persons. In

such insuances I an of the opinion that the national interest requires

that sacrophone sumeillance be utilizad by the federal Bureau of

Investigation.

This use need not be limited to the development of

cridence for prosscution. The ESI has an intelligence function in

connection with intemal security matters equally as important as

the drug of developing eviácace for presentation to the courts and

the national security requires that the EST be able to use microphone

surveillance for the proper discharge of both of such functions.

The Department a Justice approvos the use of microshone surveillance

by the fBi under these circumstances and for these purposes.

I do not consider that the decision of the Supreme Court

in Imine v. Califonia, supra, requires a afferent course. That

case is readily distinguishable on its facts. The language of the

Court, however, indicates certain uses of microphones which it would

be well to avoid, if possible, even in internal security investigu-

trions.

It is quite clear that in the Irvine case the Justicos ci the

Supreme Court were outraged by what they regarded as the indecency of

installing a nicrophone in a bedroom. They denounced the utilization

of such rethods of investigation in a gambling case as shocking The

Court's action is a clear indication of the need for discretion and

intelligent restraint in the use of ricrophones by the FEI in all

cases, including internal

security matters. Obviously, the installa-

tion aí a microphone in a boiroom or ir. some comparably intimate

Location should be avoided wherever possible. It may appear, hoever,

that important intelligence or evidence relating to rotteal connected

with the national securiiy can only be obtained by the installation oi

a microphone in such a location.

It is my opinion that under such

circustances the inctallation is proper and is not prohibited by the

NW 54933-Eat298019 Page asgision in the Irvine case:

---

## Page 459

Previous irterpretations which have been fumished to you

as to what may constitute trespass in the installation of microphones,

suggest that the vicus expressed have been tentative in nature and

have attempted to precict the course which courts would follow

rather then reficci the present state of the lai. It is realized

that not Infrequently the question of trespass arises in connection

with the installation of a microphone.

The question of whether a

trespass is actually involved and the second question of the effect

of such a trespass upon the achissibility in court of the evidence trus

obteined, must necessarily be resolved according to the circumstances

of each case.

The Departrent in resolving the problens which may arise

in connection with the use of microphone suveillance will revicw the

circunstances in each case in the light of the práctical necessitics

of Investigation and oî the national interest which must be protccted.

It Is my opinion that the Lepartment should adopt that interpretation

which will permit microphone covcrage by the fbI in a mariner most

conducive to our national interest.

I recomize that for the FBI.

to fulfill its important intelligence function, considerations of

internal security and the national safety are paramount and, there-

fore, may compel the inrestricieù uno uê thio tccludguo in tha sationa!

interest.

7763

NW 54933 Docld:32989719 Page 459

---

## Page 460

+ 2 00

Previous irterpretations which have been fumished to you

as to what may constitute trespass in the installation oi microphones,

suggest that the vics expressed have been tontative in nature ind

have attempted to preäct the course which courts would follow

rather than reflcci the present state of the lai.

It is realized

that not Infrequently the question of trespass arises in connection

with the installation oi a microphone. The question of whether a

trespass is actually involved and the

second question of the effect

of such à trespass upon the acmissibility in court of the eviuence trus

obtained, must necessarily be resolved according to the circunstances

of each case.

The lepartment in resolving the problens which may arise

in connection with the use of microphone surveillance will revicw the

circunstances in each case in the lighi of the práctical necessities

of investigation and of the national interost which must be protected.

It is my opinion that the lepartment should adout that interpretation

which will permit microphone covcrage by the FbI In a manner most

conducive to our national interest.

I recomize that for the FBI.

to fulfill its imporiant intelligence function, considerations of

internal securitr and the national safety are paramount and, there-

fore, may compel the unrestricuù use vi tnio donaguo in the nations!.

interest.

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NW. 54933 Docld:32989719' Page 460

COMMAND INTEGAE

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