CONTACT OF LEE OSWALD WITH A MEMBER OF SOVIET KGB ASSASSINATION DEPARTMENT.
Agency: CIA
Originator: CIA
From: ASSISTANT DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS
To: ACTING CHIEF, SR DIVISION
Document date: 11/23/1963
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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Date: 11/23/04

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY

INFORMATION

AGENCY : CIA

RECORD NUMBER : 104-10050-10149

RECORD SERIES

JFK

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

80T01357A

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

Released under the John

Assassination Records

Collection Act of 1992

44 USC 2107 Notel

ase#:NW 53199 Date:

AGENCY ORIGINATOR : CIA

TO

DATE

DATE

PAGES

11/23/1963

: 2

SUBJECTS

: KGB

USSR EMBASSY

OSWALD, L H

KOSTIKOV, V

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER

CLASSIFICATION

RESTRICTIONS

SECRET

CURRENT STATUS

: RELEASED IN PART PUBLIC - RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

OF LAST REVIEW

07/15/93

COMMENTS

: F6: 1993.07.15.16:50:28:180150 : PART OF VOL

II, COPY 2 OF HELMS HEARING.

[R]

- ITEM IS RESTRICTED

104-10050-10149

_ HH 53199

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55, 3-5958

23 November 1963

£X-25550

MIMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director, Plans

FROM:

SUBJECT:

Acting Chief, SR DIVIsion S

0

Contact of Lee OSWALD with a member of Soviet KGB

Assassination Department

1. According to an intercepted phone call in Mexico City, Lee OSWALD

was at the Soviet Embassy there on 28 September 1963 and spoke with the

Consul, Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV. This was learned when OSWAID called .-

the Soviet Embassy on 1 October, Identifying himself by name and speaking

broken Russian, stating the above and asking the guard who answered the phone

whether there was "enything new concerning the telegram to Washington."

The guard checked and then told OSWAID that a request had been sent, but

nothing bad as yet been received. (MEXI 6453, 9 October 1963)

The FBI llaison

officer, Mr. Pappich, told me on 23 November that the Bureau has reason to

that OSTALD's visit was to get Soviet support for a U.S. passport or

visa matter [perhaps the new passport mentioned in the press articles/.

2.

KOSTIKOV is an Identified KGB aPiser.

He was a case officer in an

operation Waich is evidently sponsored by the KB's 13th Department (responsible

or sabotage and assasstations lals operation, which is controlled by th

BI under the cryptonyn TUMBLEWMD, involved a German-national resident o

Oclahoma wao wes recrutted in Dure, and ast. this year with KOSTKOV in Mexica

City and shortly thereafter with a known 13th Department officer leE BRYKIN,

in New Tors. the astructions given TuMBlaweed by the two officers, (pinpointin

objectives for sabotage and the circumstances of their involvement in the case,

left no doust that both of them were working for the same KGB component, the

13th.

3. Of course it 1s not usual for a KGB agent on a sensitive mission to

have such overt contact with & Soviet Embassy.

However, we have top secret

Soviet Intelligence documents, describing Military Intelligence doctrine, which

shot that very important agents can be met in official installations using as

cover for their presence

there some sort of open business:

Vice Admiral

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Document Number

for FOlA Review on

RECORD COPY

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APR 1976

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW

CONDUCTED ON 6 APR 1976

E Z IMPDET CL BY C1.2258

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I. BEKRENEV, In a top secret lecture to a Soviet Military Intelligence course

at Military-Diplomatic Academy, 1960, said,

"Case officers who use as cover, let us say, the Soviet Trade

Representation, TASS or Soviniomburo, can use their cover

assignments as backstopping for non-clandestine meetings with

certain agents whose particular activities officially associate

them. with the previously mentioned Soviet institutions. Howaver?

such non-clandestine meetings within a legal residency should be

restricted to a mintmum both as to place and time.. Meetings of

this type should be carried out only in exceptional cases with;

tested and reliable agents in arder to avala provocation by the

local counterintelligence service against the Soviet Installation

being used as coxer. Such meetings are held as a rule in the work

offices of the case officer or of the agent during working hours.

It is necessary that such meetings be conducted naturally, that

they do not attract the attention of outsiders, and that the receipt

and transmittal of intelligence matters, properly camouflaged, be

carried out discreetly. In setting up such meetings, measures against

tapping must be taken.

One must bear in mind that a meeting with

persons outside official premises and during non-working hours usually

signifies a relationship

between the two parties that is above and

beyond official natters."

Also, such contact in official installations may be caused by the agent's owe

carelessness. Again Admiral BEKRENEV speaks.

"Some agents, because of inexperience or because of deliberate

violation of the rules of security through pecullar personal

rashness, approached our case officers at places not stipulated

as operational meeting sites, others, telephoned the case officer at

his sovtet installation add aiscussed personal contact arrangements,

white others stift showed up personally at the Sortet Installation in

order to contact the case officer.

4.

I called the above connections to the attention of Mr. Pappich by

phone to his FBI office at 1030 houds on 23 November.

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