Agency: SSCIA
Originator: SSCIA
From: MCNAMARA, ROBERT
Document date: 7/11/75
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

## Page 1

157-10014-10073

Date :

Page :

08/06/95

1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

was te one

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA

RECORD

NUMBER

: 157-10014-10073

RECORDS SERIES

HEARINGS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

: 10-H-05

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR :

FROM

TO

SSCIA

MCNAMARA, ROBERT

DATE : 07/11/75

PAGES

SUBJACTS OPERATION MONGOOSE

ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES

MCNAMARA, ROBERT

CIA

DOD

DOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPT

CLASSIFICATION

: UNCLASSIFIED

RESTRICTIONS : 1B

SURRENT STATUS: RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/21/98

OPENING CRITERIA

COMMENTS : BOX 3

[R] • ITEM IS RESTRICTED

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TOR SECRETE

MION

Bubfect

MeNans

Thr United Statra Bruate

R481

tickerta

Report of Proosedings.

3/1422

• 8..

Hearing held before

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental

Operations With Respect to Intelligonce Activation

7 6

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

AS SANITIZED in attachments

4191982988

Exiday, July 11, 1975

Washingtun, D. C

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over

lu the Committee for destruction)

WARD & PAUL.

110 FIRST STREKT, S. E.

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20009

(208) 644-0000

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TESTIMONY OF

Robert S. McNamara

EXHIBITS

6

NUMBER

McNamara Exhibite Noo. 1, 2, 3 and 4

r:

10)

11

1::

McNamara Exhibit No.

14

2:,

16.

1:

:: i

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hom

mh

pons (9008 207) 590

2

EXECUTIVE SESSION

- «

Friday, July 11, 1975

...

$

#AHE

r..

United States Senate,

Select Committee to Study Governmental

Operations with Respect to

Intelligence Activities,

Washington, D. C.

10

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:05 p.m. in

11

Room S-407, Tha Capitol, Sonator Frank Church (Chairman)

1:

presiding.

Present: Senators Church (presiding), Hart of Michigan:

14

Mondale, Huddleston, Morgan, Hart of Colorado, Baker Mathias

11,

and Schweiker.

16

Also present: William Miller, Staff Director, Frederick

1::A. 0. Schwarz, JI., Chief Counsel, Curtis R. Smothers, Minoriey

1i: Counsel; Elizabeth Smith, Joseph diGenova, Charles Lombard,

Frederick Baron, Patrick Shea, Robert Kelley and Michael J.

Madigan, Professional Staff Members.

asne...

:!,

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The Chairman. All right. The hearing will come to order.

Mr. McNamara, would you please stand and take the oath.

Mr. McNanara. Surely.

4

The Chair"an. Do you swear that all of the testimony you

6

are about to rire in this proceeding will be the truth.

6

the whole truth and nothing but the truth, no help you God?

Mr. McNamara. I do.

The Chairman. Me. Schwarz will commence.

TESTIMONY OF ROBERT 8. MCNAMARA

Mr. Schwart.

Mr. McNamara, I understand you have a

prepared statement. Before making that could I juat put a

:: couple of things on the record.

First, your name and address, if you could.

MI. McNamara.

Robert S. McNamara, 2412 Tracy Place,

:: Washington, D. C.

..

Mr. Schwarz. Now, further, as a procedural matter, we

always go through this with all our witnesses and you know

you have the right to counsel -- a right to counsel.

Mr. McNamara. I do.

MI. Schwarz.

And if you want to stop to obtrin counsel

at any time you have that right?

MI. McNamara: I understand.

Mr. Schwarz.. And you also have all of the constitution?:

Ilghts, including those under the 11ll of Rights.

Mr. McNamara.

I read the rules of the committee and :

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think I am familiar with them.

2

The Chairman. Your Constitutional rights are not ex-

tended by virtue of any committee action.

(Laughter)

The Chairman. But If you do have a prepared statement,

6

Mr. McNamara.

Mr. Schwarz. Do you have extra copies?

8

MI. McNamara. I unfortunately don't. I gave one to the

counsel a few minutes ago. It is a brief statement, three

10

and a half pages.

The Chairman. Would you commence with the statement?

MI. McNamara. Yes.

On June 6, Mr. Chairman, as you will recall, I wrote.

1: to you saying, and I quote, "I want you to know that although

1!!! I doubt that I have anything to contribute to your investigation

1f : 1f your staff or your committee wishes to question me about

my knowledge of the events you are investigating, I will be

very happy to respond."

My letter was wiitten because my name had been

associatel

in the press with repeated discussions within the Government

: in the summer of 1962 of a possible assassination attempt

:: aqainat Premier Castro.

The Chairman. Did you mean to yay repeated or

:: reported discussion?

Mr. McNamara. Beg your pardon. I meant to say reported.

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masw.-8°rr. D6 20001

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It seems to me the seriousness of, the repeated or reported

seriousness of, the charges your connittee was examining outweighed

any question of the appropriateness of my testifying, given

6

my obligation as an international civil servant.

The first thing I want to say le that I have no knowledge

6

or Information of any proposal for the amassination of Premder

Castro coming from Preaident Kennedy or Robert Kennedy. In

8

fact, I would regard such a proposal am totally inconslatent

with everything I know about the two men.

secondly, It has been assertod in the press that in a

1:

meeting I attended on August 10, '62, with Socretary Rusk,

1::

John McCono, then Director of Central Intelligence,

!!: and McGeorge Bundy, the question of assassination was raised

14

and dismissed but that shortly after meeting a memorandum

1! ¿ was circulated by Major General Edward Lansdale calling for a

number of actions relating to the situation in Cuba, Including

:: "

the preparation of contingency plans for Castro's assassina-

! tion; that when a copy of the memorandum recahed ME. MoCone

1..

he called me and I agreed with him that an assassination

i attempt should not be considered and the itom was in

..

fact eliminated

from the

memorandum.

Other press stories appearing

since my testimony was

scheduled before you have quoted lieneral Langdale to the

effect he had been requested by Robert t. Kennedy to develo::

"..

assassination plans for disposiny of Castro, and the projeci

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anvisioned the whole speatrum of plans from overthrowing the

2

Cuban leader to assassinating him, although the then Attorney

General It was said never uned the word assassination.

Landale was reported to have said he developed the plans

5

without the knowledge of myself or MI. McCone, but that me

6

both had become aware of the planning later.

Later news stories state that Lanodale modified him

8

statement to say "perhaps some place in the plans there was

9

something to do about the leader who had threatened the

1::

lives of millions of Americans", and to claim that he, Lanadale.

i:: "ruled out assassination" because "that is not my bag anyway".

Since roading these press utories I have tried to recon

"iatruct the actual sequence of events and I have refreshed my

in: recollection from documents in your committee's possession,

; from conversations with other persons involved, and from a

?:Elle memorandum written In 1967 that Mr. MoCone was able to

produce for me.

1.

As I reconstruct it this is what happened.

Following the Bay of Pigs and extending throughout the

spring and summer of '62, there was a good deal of concern

within the U.S. Government about attempted subversion of Lati:

:: American (overnments by the Communist regime in Cuba.

To

thwart these attempts the continuing program of covert ac-

:: tivities directed against the Castro rogime was mounted under

::: the direction

of

inter-Agency group. And I want to return

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later to the question of the appropriatones of these actions

2

beloro completing my statement.

I believe General Landale had been attached from the

assignment in the Defense Department to serve as Stall

Director of this group beginning sometime in late '61 or

early '62. In August '62 several meetings of the group vere

held. On at least one occasion prinelpals, including secretary

Rusk and myself, were in attendance.

In one or more of the meetings of the group the subject

of

a 88

assination of Premier Castro was apparently discussed.

1: 1: Some nows reports have asserted the subject was advanced at

': "

the August 10th meeting in Secrotary Rusk'g conference room

i:" In which I was present, and one nows source asserte i

1: raised the subject myself.

The report does not state whether I supported or

ji opposed such action. I have no recollection of even discuss

' ing the matter.

No one of the senior officials present at tho meeting

:: with whom I have talked recalls me discussing it. Mr. MeCon.':

:.

recollection

in his file memorandum prepared sometime five

years later, on. April 14, 1967, ls that the subject was

probably raised at another meeting in

the JCS conference a d.:

or two before the meetiny

• I attended.

In any event, apparently everyone agreos the subject hi:

:: dismissed. It appears, nevertheless, that General Lansdale

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Included a request for contingency plans. for the assassination

2

in the memorandum he later prepared in hia capacity as

Staff Director to the inter-Agency group and addressed to

the CIA lalsun officus, in. Hat Ci. : dld act men apa tane-

5

dale memorandum when it was prepared and did not learn of

6

ita exiatence until Mr. McCone telephoned me about it when

7

It was brought to his attention.

At that time I expressed opposition to any assasmination

attempt and I agreed with Mr. McCone no such planning should

]

be undertaken. I understand the memorandum was modified. i

I have no knowledge or information about any other plans

1:.

or preparations for a possible assassination attempt against

Premier Castro.

14

I believe now and I think Mr. McCone's memorandum

supports my recollection, that I believed then that the

ir.

U.S. Government should

not undertake or encourage assassina-

1:. tion openly of secretly as an instrument of national policy

against people with whom we

are

not at war.

It may be argued that given the extensive program of

: covert action against the Castro regime in which the u.s.

%..

government was engaged at the time that it would only be

short term to attempted

assassination but I can't accupt that

i.:

argument on its face.

Bribery and industrial sabotage are

::, not the same things as murder. But having said that I want

:: '

to conclude this portion uf my statemont by saying that I

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ballove we completely misjudgod the seriousness of the poten

tial danger to this country from Cuba and that we overreacted

accordingly. In fact, I have serious doubte about the

value or the propriaty of covert intervention in the attairs

i of another country in almost any situation except as may be

Incidental to the completion of essential intelligence.

Later, perhaps, MI. Chairman, I would add two pointe to

8

this.

angern. D6

The Chairman. Mr. McNamara, may I Just ask before you

continue, because the last sentence you have read happens to

::' so coincide with my own belief that I would liko to coroad it

!:: and then ask you a question concerning 1t..

1:

MI. McNamara.

Surely.

The Chairman. In fact, you read, "In fact, I have serious

::!doubts about the value or the approprdateness of covert inter-

:: vention in the affairs of another country in almost any

.: situation except as may be incidental to the completion of

.. essential intelligence."

Was that your bellef at the time you were Secretary of

Defense?

:.:

Mr. McNamara. No.

The Chairman. That has come to be your belief since

that timo?

Mr. McNamara. Yes. It is based, frankly, on both partii:.

::pation in approval of covert notion designod to interveno

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In the affaire of another country. Thia statement 1a baued

2

both on the fact I did participate in authorizing that and in

observing the results which I think were amall in relation to

the heavy cost to the country carrying this out, and particular-

ly the cost in terma of - I am using a bilef statement - I

6

will expand on this 1f you wish . cost in terms of eroding

7

the credibility of a Democratic Government with ite own people.

The Chairman. Yes.

you don't have to expand on that for my benefit, I

1:

agree with you, but I interrupted you, Do you want to complete.

!:: your statoment?

Mr. McNamara. The remaining points, Mr. Chairman, I

i would prefer to defer until the end and they may not be

necessary at the time.

i:!.

The Chairman. Very well, Mr. Schwarz, then, would you

!:: like to begin the questioning?

Me. Schwarz.

. Mr. McNamara, I want to call your atten-

tion to the moeting in August '62.

MI. McNamara. Yes,

gir.

Mr. Schwarz. And we have previously marked and I will

: .

ask. Mr, diGenova to put in front of you four documents: thi

minutes of the August 10, 1962 meeting, which has been marked

as Exhibit A.

Dues everybody know where these are by now in the bork::

That In at Tab R in the Lansdale book, the section mart.:

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1

2

4

5

6

7

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Tab 38-8.

The second marked as Exhibit 2 1a Mr. Landale'n men-

orandum of August 13, 1962 which is at Tab 38-D of the Lang-

dale book.

The third marked as Exhibit 3 the August 14 memorandum

Iron MI. Harvey to MI. Helma.

And Iinally, marked as Exhibit A Mr. McCone's memorandum

to f1le of April 14, 1967, which in the second entry at tab R

of the MoNamara book which you have just obtained, the chinner

book.

1: 1:

1:

17

14

(The documents referrod to worc

marked McNamara Exhibits Nog. I.

2, 3 and 4 for Identification.)

16.

::.

2: 1-=

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4108100160190)

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Mr. Schwarr. Going back to your statement -

2

MI. McNamara. Yes, s1r.

Mr. Schwarz.

Why don't you pull them out so he has

them all in front of him.

6

Going back to your statement, Mr. McNamara -

MI. McNamara. Yes, alt.

Mr. Schwarz, - would you state again whether you have

any present recollection of the subject of ammasminations

coming up at the Auguat 10, 1962 meeting?

1i

MI. McNamara. I have no such recollection. I should

i: expand on that to say quite frankly I have no recollection of

the neeting at all. And although I referred to it in my state

ment, my recollection or my roference, as I indicatod, was

:: based on a reconstruction of the events of the time by refer-

;ence to documents that you and your associate have shown

me and by conversations with certain of my sendor colleagues

who were reported to have been in attendance and by certain

other conversations, including a conversacion with Mr. Mocone

::and reference to a memorandum which he had dictated in 1967,

a copy of which he sent me.

• Me. schwart.

I want

to come back to what all those.

conversationg were.

:::

First, let me make clear what you do or do not now

:; remember.

:.:

Apart from the August 10 meeting, do you now recall wi

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subject of assassinations being raised at any meeting?

2

•MI. McNamara. I have no recollection of that ever being

raised in any meeting.

Mr. Schwarz. Didyou ever raise the subject of assassin-

5

ation, as far as you recall?

6

Mr. McNamara. I have no recollection of salming it at

7

¡l any elmo, and I have talked to four of the people uno attendou

the August 10 meeting who said they had no recollection o1

my radsing it.

10

Whon I say that I am aware you have a memorandum from

1: I Mr. Harvey you referred to a moment ago which indicates that

1: I raised the question on August 10, but I have no recollec-

!!'" tson of doing so.

Sonator Mondale.

We have heard from John McCone whu

1! said that he thought he heard McNamara bring it up; 15

'' that correct?

Let's review the record.

I think what we have heard from some of the participanty

.! is slightly different than what you have said about the main

principals; is that correct?

Do you want to bring this up in some other -I thank

you ought to know what we have heard and you can roact to thi

The Chairman. It is my recollection that McCone tost:-

fied that the subject did come up and he thought that McNair: :

had brought it up.

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mone lares 202):

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Senator Mondale. That in right, and Harvey said that.

MI. Schwarz. Mr. Harvey's memo says that.

Sonator Mondale.

Did he say he heard it in testimony?

The Chairman. Harvey was present in the meeting.

MI. Schwarz. I think he confirmed his memo.

Can I check on MI. McCone's testimony for a moment?

Senator Mondale. Yes, so you know what he said.

while he is looking, what did Goodwin say?

Mr. Schwarz. Goodwin is going to be examined on cuba.

Senator Mondale. He hasn't talked about that. What

have the others? Do

we have any other direct testimony?

Mr. Schwarz.

Rusk said -

Senator Mondale. Said he did not hear 1t.

The Chairman.

Incidentally, Mr. Secretary, we have no

purpose and no intelition to try in any way to entrap you or

any other witness and we would prefer to the best of our

recollection and ability to recount to you other testimony we

have received so you can comment on it and help us try to

ascertain what the truth may be.

Mr. Schwarz. I think I ought to say with respect tr

Mccone's testimony, at payo 33, you asked Senator Mondale,

who made that suggestion to which you refer in your memo.

and you will recall that Mclone's 1967 memo does not attri-

bute the suggestion

to any particular person.

Motione answered, according to the record it was Mr.

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McNamara according to Mr. Harvey's record -

2

Senator Mondale: Do you recall who made the suggention?

MI. MoCone: NO, I can'e recall de from memory, I can

only reconstruct it from the record.

Senator Mondale. In that the only reference?

Mr. Schwarz. I am going ahead and doublechecking

with McCone.

Senator Mondale. Here it ia on page 51. He maid he

just doesn't know.

10

Can you testify it was not Secrotary McNamara?

1:

McCone:, No, lt could have been.

"You just don't know?"

Mr. Melone: "I don't know".

Senator Baker. On pago 32 there is another colloquy

on the same point you might turn to.

McCone: "I am not sure

that McNamara used the word

assassination, he could have used another word, elimination or

removal.

And Mr. Harvey in preparing this memorandum

::' for Helms, who was then Deputy of Plans and Information usu

the word assagsination rather loosely."

Might that be the rationale for the aituation, might

your views --

Mr. McNamara.

I don't think it is and I think you

should be very careful in concluding that Mr. McCong recalls

that I raised the subject at all using the word assassinatio.

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or elimination. The reason I say that, at the clak of

diverting you for a moment to show you why this in a

matter of groat importance to me and why I anked for careful

and precise action by this committee, let me say that I

perhaps more than anyone else, other than Robert Kennedy, have

been charged with approving the concept and/or planning and/or

action related to the assassination of Castro. I don't belleve

I ever did approve any of those thinga. I don't belleve I

ever suggested it. None of my senior associates whom I

havo talked to can reall it. But I have here a set of

clippings from the press in Belgium, Germany, Sweden,

Notherlands, France, Italy and England, which atates that 1

"did.

C.

And I have hore a statement of the U.S. press, an artic!!

1:: In the Time Magazine of August 30, which states that McCone

and another man present, that is to say, at the August 10

i meeting, remember McNamara raised the question of disposing

:: of Castro. And it goes on to imply that I did.

The AP report indicates that Lansdale was my assistant

and presumably acting under my instructiong when he wrote the

momorandum you referred to.

The New York times quoting the AP five daya lator, by

the most unbellevable.error, says I wrote the memo to CIA

instructing them to plan the assassination.

Now, this la serlous to me as an individual. It is muc!:

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more serious to the World Bank as an institution as to my

2

role in the Bank. 80, I must ask your forebearance today

11 I attempt to be unusually precise on matters. And I want

to conclude by saying that because of the fine Magazine article

It said MoCone remembered, I raised this matter, I called

McCone on June 25, and I have given a copy of the memo of

conversation I made after that to membors of your staff.

8

And in that conversation, after I related to MoCone everything

I knew up to that point which had come from Belin off the

11:

Rockefollar Commission and the press and others, including

11

a referonce to the larvey mamo and all the rost of this --

the memo is in front of you, I asked John if he could add

to my knowledge what took place during or after the Auguet 10

:: '62 meeting of 54/12 Augmented took place in Dean Rusk's con-

:: " ference room to consider reports.

He remembered the elimination of. Castro was discussed

:: during the course of the meeting but does not recall whether or

not I raised the subject.

Now, I have read the press that McCone states he re-

: calls that he told me. He doesn't recall it.

senator llart of Michigan. I think in the oxchange bert:

Senator Baker and Senator Mondale the point 19 mado by

MI. Mccone he has no memory, that all he is reconatructina ai

from the follow Harvey. This 1s consistent.

:!

Mr. McNamara. This is exactly my understanding, sir.

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The Chairman. That la borne out by the transcripti

MI. McNamara. I think the transcript indicated I Insinted

asling this be repeated on the record becaune I am facina some

very serious problems around the world because of lack of un-

5

derstanding of that particular point, and i chink misguotes

6

7

of John Mccone in Time Magazine.

Mr. Schwarz. Tha most contemporaneous record, however.

1a the August

13 memorandum from Mr. Lanadale which, an you

know, tasks Mr. Harvey with developing a paper concerning,

11:

among othor chinas, the liquidation of loaders.

i :

Those words were crossed out.

1:

Mr. McNamara.

Yos, sir.

1..

Mr. Schwarr. And the August 14 memo about Mr. Harvey

1÷

that tells us those were the words. It says it was foolish

16

to put it in writing. It says the matter was brought up

at the meeting and was brought up by you.

Now, there isn't any evidence that this matter lod to

anything. Indeed, the CIA in their own study of the whole

:: Castro assassination matter specifically wrote that the

:.

August 10 meeting didn't lead to any of the actual evonts.

:..

So we are concerned, it seems, with the single issue of whar

::

was the attitude toward assassination expressed at the mectin.

:.:

because that does bear upon other ultimate questions we hav

:: to deal with. The attitude is important.

:.!

Isn't the best evidence of what happened at the meetin

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the contemporaneous memorandum?

Mr. McNamara. I am sure that witten statements carry

more weight than faulty memories. My memory certainly la

faulty over a period. But even the written atatement of

Harvey, as I have seen it = I do not have a copy of it but i

have seon it, your ataff showed it to me.

Mr. Schwarz. It 1a marked as -

Mr. McNamara. In advance of the hearing.

Mr. Schwarz. Markod an Exhibit 3.

MI. McNamara.

Even the statement of Harvey's memo

doesn't say I proposed assassination of Castro. It says the

question of assassination of Castro was raised or was up, to

be precise.

I don't wish to try to read into that moro than li

appropriate, but it doesn't say I proposed it, and I am not

about to say I proposed it. I have no recollection of 1t.

The four senior associates I have talked with, Mesara.

Taylor, Bundy, Gilpatric and Rusk, have no recollection of in:

raising it. It la entirely out of character with what I belive

I thought at the time and I do not read into that those words

a statemont I did propose it.

Senator Baker. Could I say a word?

I think page 33 of the McCone testimony 19 helpful in

:..

this respect.

As the Chairman says, we are not trying to push anyon!:

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In a corner, trapping the witness, we are trying to find the

2

baseline minimum of what was said with respect to assassina-

tion or elimination of leaders. My Interpretation of the record

so far la that 1t 18 alleged, and I belleve proven with good

5

6

evidence, both verbal testimony and documentary evidence,

that the subject proposale came up at that meeting, but not

beyond the shadow of a doubt that it was sald by the Secretary.

8

Let me tell you why I said that.

Page 33 of McCone's testimony ia as follows:

10

"I take it then that according to your best rocollection

the subject of liquidating Castro and possibly other top

::! Cuban leadors did come up at that mooting and you did take

::'" atrong exception to 1t7"

McCone: "Yes."

So it seems clear to me McCone does remember independent!!

the subject coming up.

To continue with McCone's answer:

"I was not alone in that.

'I rememver that very clearly."

MI. Murrow took exception.

It acems to me the barcline minimum is that apparently

the subjoct did come up and was shot down. We have only thi

remaining question of whether or not the witness bofore us

i:

now brought it up or somcone else did.

Then the question I will put to MI. McNamara, do you

remember it coming up?

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Mr. MCNamara. I do not remember it coming up.

2

Mr. Schwarz. One further question I think wan 1t shot

down or not at the meeting, and in that connection Mr. Lanadale

did mend out a memo taking the CIA?

5

Do you belleve Mr. Lanadale would have sent out a menor-

6

7

andum tasking the CIA to investigat as a contingency liquida-

thon of lenders 1f the matter had in fact been shot down at

the meeting?

9

MI. McNamara. Mi. Schwarz, I would rather not anmuer

1i

that.

I have cortain knowledge of

MI. Lansdale, General Lana-

dale, but I would rather not comment upon whether he would or

not. I will report to you what I know with respect to that my

based on what Mr. McCone told me what his memo says, but i

1' would rather not speculate on Lanadale's willingness to in-

dependently suggest that.

The Chairman. Mr. McNamara, I think it is Important for

the committee to at least have the benefit of jour opinion.

on an issue that is as central to our inquiry as this, be-

cause we are confronted with a memorandum that lansdale wrote.

soon after the meting in which he instructs or directs ClA

to at least inquire into schemes for liquidating foreign leadi.

Wasn't that the term?

MI. Schwarz. Liquidation - Including liquidation it

leaders.

::

The Chairman.

Including liquidation of leadors.

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Will you read the whole sentence?

?.

Mr. Schwart. You have to put the two together. But it

would read:

"Papers reguired from each of you for the Tuesday meeting:

6

7

Mr. Harvey, Intelligence political (splitting the regime, in-

cluding Ilquidation of loadera,) economic sabotage limited."

,The Chairman. Do you have that before you?

Mr. McNamara. I do.

. The Chairman. Notice at the beginning of this Landale

memorandum is the following. The first sentence la "In com-

i:

"pliance with the dosires and guidance expressed in tha 10

:: August policy meeting of operation MONCONSE".

Then he goes on to instruct Mr. Harvey as indicatod.

14

Now, we know the words that are deleted from this

i: memorandum have been since suppliod to the committee, were the

i including liquidation of leaders.

Now, if General Lansdale thought that the group had

.: given him such authority, that could have bean based upon a mil...

•underatanding of the group's intentions, or it could have beer:

an enlaryement of his instructions, he don't know for sure

what it was. But there it is and I think you ought to respo:..

to the question as best you can.

Mr. McNamara. Well, I should tell you that at the moine!

I am so personally annoyed at Genoral Lansdale for what 1

consider loose and irresponsible and at times contradictory

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1

tastimony in the press, in the whole matter in the last three or

2

four weeks, I don't feel I can speak in a fair manner with

respect to him and I don't propose to.

The Chairman.

Then can you tell the committee apart

5

from --

MI. McNamara. I take it those in the room will hold this

7

In confidence.

6

Ed Landale in a fine human being. I am damn annoyed

at the damage he has done to dead people. I am not an unblased

reporter on Ed Lanadale's motives.

1:

The Chairman.

I can understand your feeling.

2:

But apart from General Lansdale and any feelings you

may have toward him, can you give the committee any explana-.

1: tion, any other explanation of why such words should have

!: appeared in that?

16.

MI. McNamara. No, I cannot. It seems to me inconsistent

: with what Mccone has told me and what your record shows McCone

said and what McCone reports Ed Murrow as having sald, and

:: the genural tone of the August 10 meeting as it has becen

:. reported to me.

I can

giva you no explanation.

:.

Senator Mondale. Did you say earlier that you had cai. !

McCone when you saw the Lansdale memo and objected to that

lanquage and it wag

then deleted?

Mr. McNamara. No; I reported that when I read the Time

:: Mayazine report dated Juno 30, 1975 =-

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Senator Mondale. Then you called him?

Mr. McNamara.. That reported MoCone as saying that I or

ho recalled that I initlated a suggestion relating to the

elimination of Castro. I called McCone and at that time he

told me that he had brought this matter to my attention after

6

ho, McCone, had seen the Lanadale memo in 1962, and that he.

McCone, objected to the language in the Lanadale memo, and

McCone reported to me in 1975 that 1, too, objected very

9

strongly and vigorously to 1t in 1962.

1:;

Concurrently with McCone talking to mo in 1962, Harvey

i:

was apparently talking to Lansdale, according to McCone.

and as a result of llarvey's discussion with Lansdale the

words were excised from the memorandum. But in any case

McCone and I, so McCone says, agreed that there would be no

action of the kind contemplated by the Lansdale memo, no

is " planning of any such action.

Senator lart of Colorado. Mr. McNamara, in refreshing

'your own recollection you referred to a conversation, your

recent conversation with Mr. Mecone, and in that connection

:.

the fact that he had done a memorandum for the files, I think

:..

you said April 14 or August 14 '67--

Mr. McNamara. April 14, I bellovo.

,..

Senator Hart of Colorado.

Do you know in what connect:.:

¿i, he did that memorandum?

MI. McNamara, I can relate to you what he told me

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• =

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relating to the memorandum. This 1o fron a memorandum I

2

made of my June 25, 1975, conversation with him.

MI. Schwarz. That 1a Tab S of the McNamara book.

MI. McNamara. The last paragraph - 1I you have coples

of that in front of you - Item E states in 1967, following a

conversation with Jack Anderson held at Ted Kennedy's requent.

8

ho, Mr. McCone, prepared a memo of conversation which referred

to some of the events surrounding the August 10, '62, meeting:

but that contrary to the impression I had recelved from

101"

Dillon and others the memo did not rofor to me. He will

:: " end me a copy of the mono next Monday whon he returns to his

¿: " office in Los Angelon.

That was his recollection on June 25, 1975 when I callo!

1'

. him, at which time he was in Seattle. The memo was, he

¿i thought, In his office in Los Angeles.

:As it turns out, he was. in offor in one respect be-

!: cause the memo did refer to me, and when he sent it to me I

gubsequently discovered that.

In any case, the origin of the April 14, 1967, Moconu

memo apparently was a conversation he had with Jack Anderson

at the time.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Thank you.

::

Senator Morgan.

Mr. Chairman.

;::

The Chairman. Sanator Morgan.

Senator Morgan. Mr. McNamara, flrat lot me preface

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my remark by saying that I personally think who raimed the

3

question of assa--ination 1a now not immaterial, but I think

the fact that it has now been ostablished to my satisfaction

that the question was raised, that probably meets the needs of

5

the committee as fal as I am concerned and I am not interested

6

really in pointing out or establishing precisely who did or

didn't.

8

But there 18 one point that' I would like for you to

9

comment on.

10

Following the minutes of the mooting on August 10, we

11

1?!

have a number of memoranda which have already been reforred

to, and as the Chairman has pointed out, the memorandum of

1: " August 13 from Lansdale, which was just three days after the

14

meeting, starts off, as our Chairman so well pointed out,

:!.

"In compliance with the desires and guidance expressed in

the 10 August policy meeting".

1:

I note, it seoms to me, Just three days afterward, it

1.:

would be unlikely that he would write that into a memorandum

1f he did not feel that that was actually his inatructions.

:. and disseminate that memorandum.

Then when you go following that memorandum, that is thr

one you recall that he usod the words that were later excist.

The very next day wa have the Harvey memorandum which

takes feneral Lansdale to task for raising the question of

2:

assassination. Hut then he goos on to say that "I was preser

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or "I took careful notes on the comments at thia meeting on

the point", and so on.

He says a question of assassination, particularly of

Fidel Castro, was brought up by Secretary McNamara at the

5

6

meeting of the Special Group, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.

And the last sentence of a paragraph in "I took careful

notes".

8

Now, add to that the Inspector General's report that

9

10

was made in 1967, which was seven years ago, which says -

does he havo a copy of that?. It 18 under Tab C.

1:

The Inspector General raport starts off saying that

2::

Tom Parrott's minutes of the meeting make no montion of tho

subject of assassination. Both McCone and llarvey recall that

14

McNamara raised the question or raised the subject.

Harvey's notes taken at the meeting show that

It was also mentioned by Murrow but the nature of the comment

1:: was not recorded, Mi. McCone states in the memorandum 14 April

'67, that he recalls meetings on 8 or 9 of August in Joint

i, Chief's operation room in Pentagon, and on August 10 In the

section, and so forth, at one'of these meetings and MeCone

::.

now

rocalla it at JCS the suggestion was made that top people

in the Cuban regime, Including Castro, be liquidatod.

Now, this memorandum was made, as I say, seven, eight

years ago

it the time when

it seems that Mr. McCone's

memory would bo probably more koen than it is at the present

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tlme. And would you not agree that those three documents

would indicate that perhaps you did raino the question?

Mr. McNamara. Not at all. Not at all and I think

end nash

ob fols

4

5

6

7

8

0

11

MAND A PAUL

7 г,

2 :

16

16,

dIred: 6009 88. 1009.09910 Dr 80001

1.:

1.

2

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2

7

Senator Morgan. Would you tell me why?

Mr. McNamara. Yes, because if you wish to put heavy

weight on what happened eight years ago - read MeCono's

momo of April 14, '67--

Senator Morgan. All right, leave that out.

Mr. McNamara. You can't leave it out. That la part of

oight years ago.

Sonator Morgan, Lot me leave it out for the purpono

of my question, 1t you will, pleaso.

Why would General Lanadale only throo days after the

meeting in a memorandum preparod for general circulation matr

such a statement and than the nuxt day Mr. Harvey, the court!

day after, make such a statement and

3ay that he made notes

of 1t.

MI. McNamara. Well, I am just addressing your question

to me, which, If I misstatod correct me -- your question is

!:: do not those three memoranda support the contention that I

raised the question of assassination. I don't think they do.

Schator Morgan.

I agree.

I will accept your answer of

1U

:.

:.

that.

11001040000991.88

:.:

Thinking back and just take the two menoranda made thr

third and fourth days after the meeting, both of which had

yenoral circulation, were not made in secret, wero not kope

in separate files but generally curculated.

For instance, Lanadale'a was circulatod to liarvey, to ...

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протА (Дла 202) 944-600

?-

r

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.

1

Stato Department, to General Benjamin Harris, Defense. Who

2

was ho?

Mr. McNamara.

He must havo bean a representative of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I don't rocall him.

Senator Morgan. Lon Wilson.

It seems to me those two memoranda that quickly alter

that meeting for general circulation would tend to indicate

that certainly in their minds and according to their notes

that you did raise the question.

MI. McNamara, Lanadale's memorandum makos no reforence

1: "

to me whatover as having raised the question so

Senator Morgan. But it notes the quostion was raisod.

Mr. McNamara. But it dousn't indicate I raisod 1t.

and it certainly indicates I support it and not even the

liarvey Memo Indicates I support it. The Harvoy momo simpli

!'

says I raised the question. I could have rained the questio.

::.' In opposition.

I don't mean to be trying to read into these statoments

words that aren't there, but I must he vory careful. I hav

:.

no rocollection of it, my sonior associates have no rocoller:.

:..

ion of it, it is totally inconsistent with my moral stand.i:

:::

now

and then.

sonator florgan. Your moral standards have changed a !:.

now from what they were?

--

45. McNamara.

int my moral standards.

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Senator Morgan. Your willingneas to engage In covert

02

г.

r.

. .. to .

activity?

Mr. McNamara. But not for moral reasons. For perfecely

practical political reasons and associatod with the view of

5

Domecracy. But I don't mean to be nit-picking with you on

6

this point, but it 18 a very important point to me, and there

is nothing in the Lanadale memorandum that in any way indi-

catos I raised or supportod tha laguo of assassination. And

tho important point, 1f I may continue, sir, la that I didn't

know of that memo before it was sont out, so McCone says.

When he brought it to my attention, I immediately agreed

with him there should be no consideration of assassination.

It is unlikely I would have said that then if I had beon

::. In support o! It two days earlier.

Senator Morgan.

Mr. McNamara, as I said carlier, I

i' think 1t 1s really immaterial and I don't moan to be nit-

picking but I am simply not willing to accept your statement.

in the light of the hard evidonce that we have that as a

matter of fact you did not raise it.

MI: "Camara, It may be immaterial to you whether !

raised it. It lan'e immaterial to me, gentlemen, and i know.

of no hard evidenco you have that 1 supported assassination

of castro.

Senator Morgan, No question of supporting it, the queuir:

of raining the question.

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roastingtan 1.8 2000)

1

Mr. McNamara.. That in why I used the word mupport,

2

because the only evidence you have in from a MI. Harvey

3

whom as far as I know, I don't know, who says I raised the

question. That is a long way from supporting.

6

7

8

I don't want to jump to the conclusion that I even

Falsed it, but in any event there du no evidence you have

that I supported 1t and it sounds lik0 nit-picking and

I don't want to waste your time on it, but it 1a not nit-

picking to me, thia is my life and I am not about to -

1i

The Chairman. It doesn't sound like nit-picking to mu.

Mr. McNamara. It 18

a terribly important point for you. I

::' think it is an important point from the lank, the institution

you represent, and I regrot very, much that there has been

i" such an assortment of statement in the press about this

matter. We live with that every day but this Committee

has been very careful

to avoid leaks.

MI: McNamara.

You should be proud of it; you have.

The Chairman. Thank you.

Mr. Schwarz. I think it may be helpful in light of

the discussion of the neetiny to read into the rocord what

the CiA said, not about who raised it but about what happened

:: in connection with it.

Senator Morgan. What are you roading from?

Mr. Schwark. Iron Page 118 of the CIA Inspector Genero:

Report.

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-.

"?

••9ж+4+TV

Senator Morgan. We don't have that.

2

Mr. Schwarz. It'a not in there and this le a tho

column set of rather cryptic conclusions that has on the left-

hand column published detailes or unpublished details, and

5

on the right-hand column the facts as we know them.

On this subject the following is stated in the left-hand

column unpublished dotails.

8

The Chairman.. Does the witness have this before him?

MI. Schwarz. No, he does not becauso we didn't copy it.

li

Mr. McNamara. I will follow 1t orally.

1:

MI. Schwarz. The left-hand column unpublished detall

there was a meeting at the Department of Statn in which the

asgassination of Castro. was discussed., Then under the right-

:; hand column under the heading facts as we know them, true.

the subject was raised at a moeting at State on 10 August

1962 but it related to any actual attempts of assassination.

It did result in MONGOOSE action memorandum by Lansdale

assigning to CIA action for planning Iiquidation of leaders.

The offending phrase was later exercised from copies

i forwarded to CIA, State Department and USIA, but tho danger

:..

may hove already been done.

Senator Schweiker. Mr. Chairnan.

You say, Mr. Sucrotary, there

is no evidence that suggest:

:: affirmative decision was made, yet the memorandum that wear.

talking about was written on the assunption, in fact, the grown

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5

6

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1:

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that you were in did make that decision and did procead

about, and the only correction that was made for the record

was that it was corrected to the point that they didn't want

to talk about it but they were going forward with it.

That i8 exactly what the evidence ia that we have, and

while you may contradict the ividence, we do have evidence

of that.

MI. McNamara. I am contradicting tha evidence or 1 am

saying I don't soe any evidenco that you have that indicates

I supported assassination of Castro. That is. number ono.

Number two: McCone's memory apparentyl in '67 and

certainly in the momo ho wrote in '67 Indicates that he sero:::

opposed assassination at the time, and I strongly opposed

planning for assassination at the time.

That is in writing before you. I think that to rather

clear evidence that the two of us would not have directed

or supported or accepted planning of the assassination of

Castro. I know of no contrary evidence.

Senator Schweiker.

The contrary evidence is that they

going ahead and

planning on that basis and only should hr

referonce to the planning and operation be deleted, and en

fact it was on the agsumption that that group did support

the assassination.

I don't want to nit-pick either but I think we ought !.

keep the rocord atraint.

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Mx. McNamara. I haven't seen the evidence, to use your

phrase, they were going ahead and planning on that baula.

As a matter of fact, I heard the counsel road a statement

from the CIA Inspector General which indicates they were not

going ahoad and planning on that basis.

Numbar 2, MeCone's objection to the letter man not, or

to the Lanadale momo, was not to the written statement that

they should plan. His objection was to any planning and

my opfection was to any planning and his memo makes that very

Icoar. I am relying on his memory, not mine, but the meno

was written in '67 and la very clear on those points.

Senator Schwelker.

Havon't you scon the llarvey mano?

Hasn't the staff shown you the llarvey

memo?

Mr. McNamara. I havo seen the llarvey memo and that

gives no indication that the mocting of August 10 approvad

the planning or the

action to assassinate Castro. It says

in a very ambiguous way that McNamara raisod the question

unquote and doesn't indicate whether I raised de to dismiss

it, to object to it or to support it.

Senator

schweiler. I would like to reread it.

Upon receipt of attached memorandum I callod - thin !:

Operation

"0:C0OSE. Operation MONGOnSS as I understand it.

w3a being directed by i man under you, General Lansdale.

Mr. Mciamara. May 1 interrupt you. lansdale was not

under me.

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!!

Senator Schwalker. Who was he under?

MI. McNamara. lle was under the Committee, he was working

for the Interagency Committee. He was not taking instructiona

5

9.

:.

i:

i:..

! "

Senator Schweiker.

What role did you have in Operation

MONGOOSE?

MI. McNamara: If I may digress just a socond, I am not

entirely

clear on the organizational atructure at the time.

But as I understand it, thore wore neveral committeen Involved

in covort actiona.

one was the 5112 Group. So far as i know

they were not concerned with MONGOOSE. The ancond was tho

Special Group. My undorstanding of the special Group 1a

that they were a group responsible for considering countar-

insurgency actions. I was not a membor of elthor the 5412 grou:.

or Special Group.

Senator Schweiker. He was only a Deputy, a member of

either group?

MI. McNamara, Yes, sir.

Senator Schweiter. And in fact did ropresent you?

MI. McNamara. Yes, did roprosont me. And let me digres:

again to say whatever my Deputy did I assume rosponsibility

for. I had an extremely close relationship with them. I con

not believe he did anything of any importance they didn't

discuss with mu. I am fully prepared to accept full rospon.

' sibility for whatover my poputy did In those two. In any

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event neither one as far as I know had anything to do wich

MONGOOSE.

Thon there was what I underatand to be a Special Group

MONGOOSE. And I am told that General Lanadale was acting as

program director for that Special Group. He was taking

directions from that committee and not from me. Dut I am

sorry, sir, I interruptod you.

Senator Schwelker. That ia all right.

I think it do important to set the rocord streight on

L".

.

8

9

10

11

1: "

that.

Paragraph four of the memo says: "Upon roceipt of

the attached memorandum I called Lanadalo's office and in

1:': his absence pointed out to frank lland the inadmissibility and!

stupidity of putting this type of commont in writing in such

a document. I advised. Frank land as far as CIA was concerned!

16.

we would write no document pertaining to this and would

participate in no open meting discussing it. I strongly

i..

urged lland to recommend

to Lansdale that he excise the phras

in question from all copies of this memorandun, including

:

those disseminated to State, Defense and USIA: Shortly there-

::.

after Lansdale called back and left the message that he agre:.

?.;

' he had done so. "

Now, the point of this whole thing is that ho isn't

i blowing the whistle and saying we ayrred

not to assassint

Castro or that was a misconception, he is saying juat delet.

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чо:

It and delete it in the copy that your office had, but no

reference at all about going wrong or not doing it or what

all, so the assumption certainly la vory cloar to the authority.

of the memo it was to go ahead but not call it that. I don't

see how you can say thero ia no contradictory evidence. You

may disagree and say it is wrong, but there cortainly 1e.

MI. McNamara. AGain, I don't want to be nit-picking.

He ought to be clear what I am disagreeing with.. (as I am

disagreeing.with any statemont that thore is evidence that

I proposed or supported or authorized the proparation of

plans or any action relating to tho abrassination of Castro.

I know of no such evidence.

(b). I agree that this language in paragraph four of

45. Harvey'a mano of 14 August i8 ambiguous. It would bo

consistent with the CIA having prior to August 10 been

planningassassination, and it would he consistont with them

continuing to do so afterward. But I call your attention to

the fact it doesn't say that. It states it only reporta to.

only relates to the discusgion of assassination. It doesn'

say we are not requesting to discuss it. We are going to

go ahead und do it. I think one has to be very, very carefu:

an roading this lanquage.

The Chairman.

Senator Schweiker, were you finished?

Senator Schweiker. Yes.

The Chairman. I think that it may be well to point ou:

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the delimma that faces thia Committee.

We have received your testimony that you at no time,

neither at the August 10 meeting nor any othor time, advo-

cated or approved, discussed, or undertook to authorize the

assassination of castro, 1o that correct?

Mr. McNamara. That is correct.

Senator Daker. Stop a second. Let'a try to deal vory

precisely bacause I want to listen carefully. Discuised --

you intend discussed to be in there?

Mr. McNamara. I have no recollection of over discussin

= -

it•

1:

Senator Baker. I was rolating that back to our

disagreement. Surely that is a discussion of it.

Mr. McNamara, Well, I didn't state that I disagreed

with it. In discussions.

Senator Baker. I am trying to help, not hurt.

MI. McNamara. I know you are and --

Senator Baker. Lot discuss out and it will make me fue!

better.

Mr. McNamara. I would be happior to have discuss out'

because there is evidence from Harvey that I did discuss it

and I would ho happier to have it out too, air. But, I ha:..

no

recollection of it and none of my senior associates hav.

recollection of it.

The Chairman. We alan have received evidence from 0:

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senior associates that they never participated in the

authorization of an assassination attempt against Castro

nor ever directed the CIA to undertake such attempts.

We have much testimony establishing the chain of command

5

whore covert action was concerned, and all of it has been

6

to the effect that the Special Group or the Special Group

8

nugmented had full charge of covert operations, and that in

that chain of command any proposal of this character or any

9

other proposal having to do with covert oporations being

diroctod againat the Castro rogime, or against Castro personali:.

wore to be laid before the spocial Group Mugmanted and were no.

i: to he undertaken except with the authority of that group am!

the direction of that group.

low, at the same time we know from the ovidence that

the CIA was in fact engaged during the period in a series ,!

attempts. to asgassinate Castro.

Now, you see what we are faced with is this dilemma.

Either the CIA was a rogue elephant

rampaging out of contre:.

over which no effective direction was beiny given in this

matter of assagsination, or there was some secret channel

circumventing the whole structure of command by which the ?:

and certain officials in the CIA were

authorized in proces

with assassination plots and assassination attompts agains:

Castro.

Or the third and finst

point that I can think o!

is that somehow these officials of the clA who wore go

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engaged misunderstood or misinterpreted their scope of author-

2

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a-on

wu:

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Not 1t 18 terribly important, 11 thore 1a any way

that we can find out which of these three points represented

what actually happened. That is the nature, that in the

quandary.

Now, is there anything that you can toll us that would

assiat us in finding an answer to this contral question?

Mr. McNamara. I can only tell you what will furthor

your uneasiness. Because I have statod before and I believe

today that the CIA was a highly disciplined organiention.

fully under the control of sonior officials of the governmunt.

so much so that I feel as a sonior official of the government

I must assume the responsibility for the actions of the tro.

putting assassination aside just for the moment. But I know

of no major action taken by CIA during the time I was in the

government that was not properly authorized by senior officials.

And when I say that I want to emphasize also that I believe

with hindsight we authorized actions that were contrary to

the interest of the ropublic but I don't want it on the

record that the CIA was uncontrolled, was operating wie!

its own authority and we can be absolved of responsibility

for what cin did, again with excoption of assassination, duan

which I say I nover heard of.

The second point you say that you have, you know that !:

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was engaged in a corles of attempte of assassination. I

think to une your words. I don't know that. I accept the

fact that you do and that you have information I was not

• con

aware of. I find that impossible to rocile. I just can't

understand how it could have happened and I don't accept

the third point, that they operated on the basin of mimunder-

standing, bocause it seems to me the McCone position that ho

was opposed to 1t, hia clear recollaction and his wiltten

momo of 196% that I was strongly opposed to 1t.. his stato-

ment that Murrow was opposed, all should eliminate any

point of misunderstandina. So i frantly can't roconcile.

The Chairman. Just to give you some further information.

::' We also have vory hard avidonce that Mccone was not told alast

the assassination efforts dirocted against Mr. Castro and

1:

that Helms agreed not to

16

Senator Mondale. loins and Harvey agreed not to toll

him.

The Chairman. Helms and llarvey both agreed not to tell

Mccone.

•Serator Mondale. The other thing that is interestin

in the Boquence of some of these events. Those attempts

at castro's live occurred before the August 10 mootina.

that

is many of them did know

something was underway long

hefore the sugust loth meeting, and the Aunust 10th mectin:.

if you beliove the woret, simply ordered a papor from the

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CIA on the question of liquidating foreign leaders. It wasn't

an order to liquidate any foreign loaders.

Nor did Harvey

at that meeting advise anybody what he was doing.

So we are presented with the ponsibility that we had some

troo-wheeling, operating on their own. Wa don't know.

Senator Baker. Could I say a word in that respect?

The Chairman. Yes. Would you liko to comment at this

point?

Mr. McNamara. No, I will

hear the senator, then try to

explain.

Senator Baker. To heighton your dintross or discomfore

a little moro, I know in tho opening linen of the Inspector

Goneral's report datod 25 April '67 are these -- the commite....

has heard me read them before. "The reconstruction of the

Agency's involvement and plans to assassinate Fidel Castro

is at best an imperfect history: Because of the extreme

sensitivity of the operations boing discussed or attempted

as a metter of principle, no official recorda were kept o!

planning, of approvals nor of implementation."

so, you see, in addition to the almost irreconciable

alternatives that we have suggested to you, we have an exei: .:

of pollay by cin that no docunent should reflece this, in! "

implying clearly if plane wero made that we will defy you i

find them.

Turn to paro 110 of Is report. What do other compones:

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of government know about this oporation, meaning am assinations.

Quoting from the IG report.

"Former Attorney General

Robert Konnedy was fully briofod by Houston and Edwards on

7 May '62. Momorandum confirming the oral brlefing was forwarded

to Kennedy on 14 May '62." The memorandum does not use

the word "sassination," but there la little room for

misinterprotation of what it meant.

Presumably the original of that momo la still in the

filos of tho Justice Dapartmont. It should bo noted the

briefing of Konnedy was restricted to Phase I operation which.

had ended about a yoar carlier. Phaso it was already under

way at the time of the briefing but konnedy was not told of de.

The Chairman. I think that latter part which sonator

Baker was fair enough to include, together with some testimon:

that corroborates the fact, indicates at one point the

Attorney General was briefed about phase l of the operation

having to do with an attempt againat Castro's life, but was

briefed in such a manner that he was lead to belleve that the!

was over, that was over, and was not told at that brietiny

that this was a phase Il, a new effort then underway to

assasginato Castro:

Mr. Mclamara.

Mr. Chairman, May I make ono comment n::::

respoct to this

Borios of comments?

The Chairman.

Yes.

Mr.. MCNamara.

It relater to what I think sonator

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Schwelker raded a momont ago. Didn't Lansdale and Halvay

2

receive instructions from the August 10 meeting to develop

plans to assasinate Castro? From what I have just heard.

and I had no previous knowledge of what I have just heard.

It sounds to me that something I still can'e conceive

6

was going on, tha the CIA had been planning assas inations

and perhaps attompting assassinations againat Castro for some

8

considerablo poriou of time prior to August 10.

The Chairman. That ia corroct.

1G

Mr. McNamara. Masuming that for the momont it fa not

1:

vory likely that llarvoy and Lansdale wore takiny their in-

structions for planning assassination from the suyust 10

11.

meeting, and I think that interprotation should

not be

considered --

The Chairman. That is correct.

i e.

Mr. McNamara. -- as a likely one.

Senator Schweiker. I didn't read paragraph 3, but this 1:

right to the point of this issuc and not indiroct.

The Chairman. What are you readiny from?

Senator Schweiter. The sile August la memo, This is in::

days after the mectiny.. It is the best evidence we have o!

what happened four days after and we have nothing that is

more dirretly relevant in turns of the historical docunone!..

The question o' assuasination, particularly of fidel

:: Castro, was brought up ly Secretary MeNamara at tho mootin:...

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the Special Group Augmented In Secretary Rumk'n office on

10 August, 1t was the obvious consensum at the meeting in answer

to a comment by MI. Liu Muriow, ühat I'!r 1- not a subject which

has boen made a matter of official record which ties into

Sonator Baker's point. I took careful notes on the commont.

at this meeting on the point these noter are four days old

and the Spocial Group lugment is not expecting any written

commenta of study on this point. Ne couldn't have more diroce

ovidenco unloss you had notes.

Mr. MCNamara. (a). I havo no notos. (b). I think

this ambiquous sentenco can be rcail in a varloty of ways.

It can be read that some of us had begun to hoar of

assassination attempts and were opposed to it. and wanted it

clarified or we wanted no more talk of it. There are a whrl!

series of interpretations that can be made. What 1a apparent!!

completely clear to you and again to upset me is that there

1s evidence that prior to luquet 10 thero were assassination

plans and attempts against Castro.

The Chairman.

Oh, yes, going bac' to the Eisenhower

Administration.

senator Mondale. Had you ever heard about that?

Mr. Mclamara. I had never heard about it and I still l

it difficult to bolinvo. I accept the statement that you hit.

virence that in acceptable to you and I share the concluri:

you have come to, therefore, but this is totally inconsistrn:

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with the whole merles of my briefings, one of which ia that

2

the CIA was fully under control of the senior officials of

the government and that we, therefore, must stand responsible

for whatever important actions CIA undortook. I have felt

that way, I have sald it publicly, I said it as recontly au

60 days ago, and with the exception of assassination, I

still feel that way.

"I can not roconcilo why they would

be acting on assassination plans or attempta without propor.

9

authorization.

Tha Chairman.

That is the quastion with which we are

faced. Thero

1s no doubt but what the CiA in fact did

angage in a serios of attempte against the lifo of Castro.

i': He have all of the evidence.

The testimony has bean confire.

by CIA's own investigation of the affair. The mon who

participated have so testified. The particulars have bean

laid before us involving attempts to accure the assistance

of

men thought to have been long connected with the Malia.

It is all there. It all happened. And though it le gallant

ir:

to assume a responsibility, you could only have one, the

President himself could only have one, if he did not dire

the ClA to engago in such activitios only in the broadne

military sunse of a commander who must assune responsibili:

for. the actions of his subordinates evon if he loos not

order,. even if he has no knowledge of it:

senator Schwelker, I think one other thing wo shoul

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say in falrneos to the Becretary 1a that we mentioned Genoral

Lansdale, and it 1a true his testimony is contradictory, and

In falrnesa to the Secrotary we should also point out that

in his Interview with the Washington Star - I am trying to

get a whold of the one with cDs News. -

Senator Mondalo. Do we have that yet?

Senator Schwelker. No, we are trying to get it by telo-:

phone.

Where ho tella a complatoly difforont itory than no

told our committne. He doos not rofor to you. He refors

in this intervinw to Robart Kennedy, So I think when wo

talk about coneral lanadale we should mate clear, coneral

Lansdale in this interviow does not in any way implicate

you.

1:

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Senator Mondale: Then Lansdale beforo us said the stor:

was cockeyed, he hadn't said that. So I don't know.

MI. Mclamara. On the Lansdale matter, I don't want to

speculate on his motives or what he would do or wouldn't do

without authority. I would repeat to you only two points.

(a). That your staff showed me a momo indicating he had bu:

detached : ron the assigment to the pertagon, in sometime.

I forget whether it was late 'Ol or carly i62 to work for et

account of ond of those committees and, therefore, while t

might still have carriod the title Assiseant secrotary o!

Defense, he was not taking instructions

from the Secrotar! "

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Defense during the porlod we are dinousing, and secondly.

2

I will report a conversation I had with General Landale,

simply referring to notes I made at the time.

The Chairman. When did this take place?

Mx. McNamara. I am Just trying to find the exact date.

6

It was in reference to one of these newspaper articles.

7

Give me a moment to find the particular reference.

A fow wooka ago on the lasue of whom he recelved him

instructions from.

11:

On the 30th of May, two conversations in the same day.

1:

This is bocause of a most unusual situation but let me refor

::. to that bocuase it rolatos to this. It also shows my

1: problem.

On May 24, the NP and Washington Star reported relatiny

i!..

to the August 10 meeting, that I had been there, and that

!: It then says, AP says, while one source who has seen the

.: minutes said the subject was immediately dismissed, i.e..

planning of

assassination of Castro, two sources say a memo

was written two days later and by assigtant to then secrer. y

of Defense MaNamara directiny the CIA to develop continijone:

plans for a possible assassination of the cuban leader.

ly the most amazing error, six days later the lew Yort

Tiness in an article on the Maria and the ClA, burdod duer

:..

in the article, states, quoting the AP: "The Rockefeller

commission who had obtained minuton of a meeting on August

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attended by the secretary. of Defense McNamara, Rusk, MeCone,

Bundy, the meeting," the AP reports sald, "included

discussion of killing Mr. Castro." One source told the AP

the matter was inmediatoly dismiased but the wire service

quoted two other sources. This is the important point. •The

wire service, AP, quoted two other sourced who maid a memo

was written two days later by McNamara directing the CIA to

prepare contingency plans for the elimination of Castro.

Neodless to way, whon I read that I was deeply upsot.

Lot mo complete this, 1f 1 may, Mr. Schwalker, then come

back because this is a complote misstatemont of what the.

AP said.

I was concerned enough whon I read the AP bocause the

implication was that Lanadale wrote the momorandum undor

my direction, as Assistant to McNamara he must have been

reporting to me, he must have taken instructiona

from me an!.

therefore, I was responsible for Lanadale's memo. But I ha

learned enough about this kind of problem to know that to

tIy to jet this point cleared was going to make a two-day

story out of a one, so frankly, I didn't recall the AP on t::

On the 30th of May we get this kind of story. I was so u;s.

I called lorrick, under whose byline this appeared, and

sought to correct it, and he wan

shocked whon I road it to

him. Ho hadn't hoad the printed vorsion of the story. 11.

maid that is not the story I filod. The Al made clear you

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you didn't write it, Lanadale wrote it. I have to talk to

2

my editors. And he talked to them and called me back and

said it is a horrible error and we will correct it, and I

don't know whether they have or not, I haven't moen a correction.

But assume for a minute they have. I said when you correct

6

it correct the impreasion Lansdale wrote the memo under my

Instruction because ho was not operating for me at the timo.

9

I learned this in the Interim. " Horrick said no, we can't

correct

that, wa can only correct our minquote of the AP.

I said correct that and I will talk to the AP, Before !

talk

to the Ap to bo damned sure I was right, because my

::

memory 19 very bad ahout this period, I called three people.

::" I called Max Taylor, Roswell Gilpatric and Lansdale to find

out who Lansdale worked for and who he was

taking instruction:

from at the time, and it was with respect to that I will now

answer your question.

My call to Lansdale, I, made two calls to Lanadale on May

30, and my note says, in

answer to my question, Lansdale

said he was not working for me at the time of the August 19:

'62 meeting, but then I would rather not say what cise he

said becaun I think it is wrong, for somebody else, and !

probed him on it and ho said not exactly something olse, and

I probed him and got something else later on in the same di!

1 called AP and reported

all this to then oxcope I said that

I just wanted to make clear Lansdale was

not working for me .!.

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taking instructiona from me. They sald they would report

2

that, correct the miestatement, correct the statement. But

when they reported that they would have to report their source

for the story. Ind I said I don't give a damn, report your

5

source. By the way, who was it? They said it was Lansdale.

6

I said you had better damned woll get on the telephone and

7

talk to Lanadale becauso I Just talkod to him and he said i

was not instructing him at the time. I said, furthermoro,

when you call Lansdale and you ask him whother he was

taking instructions from me with rospoct to that memorandum.

1:

1f he loavos you with any doubt on the matter, you call mo

::

back because I want to sit down with the two of you in porsor.

:"': that afternoon and get this straightenod out. I am quite

clear Lansdale was not working for me, wasn't taking instruct.

Ions from me; I didn't have a damn thiny to do with the memo

and I don't want any misunderstanding on it. I am not tryini

to hand it on Lanadale, I want to make this clear, I want

to

make it perfectly clear ho wasn't working for mo.

That was about three d'clock on Friday aftornoon. I

heard nothiny more of it.

I would just an soon hive this off the record.

The Choirman.

Very woll.

(Discussion off the rocord.)

sonator schweilor. on the rocord..

"9r. Melamari, who did renoral banadalo work for? cn

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you cloar that up for us?

2

MI. McNamara. The plece of paper that your staff showed

me Indicatos that sometime, I think it 18 in the latter part

of '61, at Whita House direction, he was assigned to work for

5

an intoragancy group that was planning and perhaps authorizing

covert action against the Government of Cuba.

Senator Schwolker. Who would he have reported to?

8

Mr. McNamara, llo would have reportod to the Chalrman o!

this group and the group itself.

Senator Schweikor.

That would have boen whom?

Mr. 'chamara. Well, you have the evidence much better

:: than 1.

1:

The Chairman. We have a record.

Mr. INamara. I am not trying to ovade it, I am con-

i fused about the groups and I don't have it clear in my mind

how they are organized..

I wasn't chairman of the group and

he wasn't taking instruction from me and he clearly underst.:i

.: that or recalls it.

The Chairnan. Mr. Schwarz.

Senator

Baker. Just a minute.

Senator Schwellier. May counsel tell us who was chair...

of the yroup?

Mr. Schwarz.

Genoral Maxwell Taylor.

senator mondalo. Special Group Mugnented, and Taylor

i.:

was the head of it.

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a.nd....

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Senator Baker., Mr. MoNamara, tell us who those people

were that told you who Lansdale worked for and who they clalmed!

he workod for.

Mr. McNamara. I talked to Max Taylor or Romell Gil-

patric and to Ed Lansdale himself. The three of them, before

I called the AP, and the reason I did, I was going to anx the

nowspapore to correct my statement, what I thought was a min-

statement.

Sonator Bakor. Who did thay say he worked for?

MI. McNamara. Well, I would rather leave it that thoy

said he didn't work for me.

Sonator Baker. No, no.

Mr. McNamara.

Max Taylor tole me he worked for him.:

don'e want to draw Max Taylor into this.

The Chairman. General Taylor told us the same thim.

MI. McNamara. All right.

Senator Schwelker. He has been here.

The Chairman. lle told us that.

Mr. Melanara. I am not trying to broaden the net. :

don't want to blackon anybody.

sonator Baker. No don'e want to blacken anybody, i.

"Ise; is anybody?

Mr. "IcHamarn. Well, all I can tell you, Max Told me e!

landale worked for him at the tine. Ros Gilpatric told .

that it was his undorstanding he worked for Max at the tin.

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In any case, he didn't work for me. That was the thing I

wanted in and I wann't an careful that afternoon to find out

...

who he did work for. To be damn sure he didn't work for me

and Lanadale told me he didn't work for me. Well, the Lansdale

story I don't want to repeat.

Senator Baker. I would like you to ropeat it.

Mr. McNamara. I would rather not because It was two

different stories. It was just a hock of a mess and this

1a what lead to this damn CIA, I mean CBS roport that eveniny.

1.:

It just got all scrowed up and it 1a still a mous in the

::. pross. I got hack to my office last Mondlay morning and my

secretary - I had been out of town on the weekend - my

secretary put on my desk, I guess it is a Washington Star

Roport, headline -- you undoubtedly have seen

1e, but the

" :

headline of last Friday, you can see 1t from where you arc.

if. And this indicated July 3, whatever that would have been,

the end of last week. "LANSDALE NAMES REK IN CASTRO PLOT".

The Chairman. I know, I am aware of that story, we

questioned Langdale about it.

MI: Mclamara. You want me to talk ahout Lansdale.!

don'e want to talk about Lansdalo, I don't want to repeat

i lot of erroneous information.

The Chairman.

15. Mellamara, lue me just say this. i

One of the probions we have

is to rvaluace the tostimony !:

that Genoral lanadalr has given this Committeo. The

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credibility of Lanadale as a witness la one of the lanues bofori

2

us. Now, I think that senator Baker's question le pertinent

becauso what Lansdale told you bears upon his credibility.

lle has been before us, wo know what he has told us, and we

havo had various appraisala given this Committee of Lanadalo

by people who know him vory well. He claims he has been

7

misquotad in the press. In unsworn tostimony he did not

charge Robort Konnedy with having given him inatructions as .

to assassinate Castro.

Now, that in tho altuation.

If you could tell un

::

what he told you it would holp us in our svaluation of cho

::' testimony he has given the committer.

Senator Bakor. Thank you very

much.

1÷

Let mo simply say for MI. McNamara, let me mato a

1::

statement that I think the Committce fully

understands but

I want him to understand.

In the course of my career in the Senate, I have nover

been involved in a situation of such great sensitivity as

this situation. In the course of this inquiry I think one

of the most romarkable attributes of this Committce has her:

its calr in the fact of coordinated circumstance unfolding

and unlikely paradox that appear before

us. I think that :.

nember of the committee will auren that no effort has been

made so far tu bully the reputation of any living or doat

;::

and that the temptation to do so for partisan purposes has

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been totally and completely and effectually resisted. No

one is attempting to do that now. The committee knows 1t and

I want to know it.

Mr. Chairman, I would like the witnoss to answer the

question.

• Mr. McNamara. I have tried not to sully anyone'a repu-

tation and I haven't commented to the press except my own

reputation being sullied, and one of the reason i haven't

is that until the full story gots out, explanations of

partial partisan is bound to stimulnto other partisan respon

sos and it simply perpetuates this speculation about

indivisuals, some of them dead, and others incapable of

jefending themselves.. So I have been vory caroful what 1

have said.

Now, I will answer. your questions, since you know more

than I do already about Lanadale, I think in this aituation.

But in answer to my question, to him as to whom he worri:

for, he said ho worked for

a committee and the chairman of

the conmittce, but this was only after ! asked him about thr

memo relatiny to the August 10 discussion that was referre!

to in the press as statiny that Lansdale asked CIA to prepar

an

assassination plan. I said who gavo you the instruction.

to prepare that memo and his reply to me was the

Prosiden:.

And I said now, Ed, don't toll me that. Are you suggenti.:

that

jou were in the presence of the Prosident and he yave

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that Instruction? I said I don't bellove it.

Now, this 1a to disagree a second. That was a telephone

call... I know Lanadalo well. The last timo I saw Lansdale

personally, to the beat of my knowledge, was in saigon.

5

Ellaberg was with him, civilian and dreased in combat fatigues

with a 45 calibar platol on his belt and two of them were

playing cod knows what gamos.

8

I havon't seon him from then to now. So I tracked him

9 :.

down to raiso this quostion. And he said, in response to.

1: who authorizod that memo -- he said the president. So 1 sali.

•: . Ed, don't kid me now. I can't bellove that you wore in the

presonce of the Presidont and ho authorized you to send that

¿i mamo to cIA.

lo said, no, that wasn't exactly it. I said

¿: goddamn, tell me exactly what it was. Don't tell me it was

¿. the President. I am not trying to put words in your mouth.

i I want to know what happened. The first thing I have got

to get clear, it wasn't me, and he said that is clear, it

wasn't you, and the second thing I have got to got clear.

you weren't working for me. In said that is cloar, I was

:.

workiny for the committee and the Chairman, and the third

thing I want to got, who did authorize you to do it? He

:.

said, oray, it wasn't the prosidunt. 1 said who was it.

He said a this is where it got vague a well it wasn'e the.

presidont. f'inally I dropped it. This is all on the tole-

phone.

5o1 dropped it. 1 yot it clear it wasn't mo and

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It wasn't thé Prosidont. And then I went back to the Ap.

and it was at that point the AP said woll their authority for

printing in effect ho was my hasistant and I authorized him, !

said you had better darn well got him on the telephone,

which is what they did, and this is what intervened between

three o'clock and the time Ethel called my wife and my wifo

called mo. Three hours fourty-five minutes lator Ap wont

back on Lansilalo and according to AP Lanadale in a songe

gave tham the same point, the Prosidont authorized it.

said it was ultimatoly the Prosident. The AP roportor was

smart enough to know that is unlikely, not really the

President, it was a high intormediary. At this point you

not two stories. It may be two different reporters. One of

them said was the high intermediary McGeorge Bundy, and Lansdh!..

said no, it wasn't McGeorge Bundy, it was higher than that.

And the reporter said well, I guess the only person higher

than that could have

been Robert Kennedy. Is it a fair

assumption it was him? And

Lansdale said that is a -- I ar

not quite certain now the exact words, but something,

well that is a conclusion one could drat, or some such thin.

as that, and it was from that that the cos not that story

that nighe at 7 o'clock on the cronkite show.

This is what has been going on, gentlomen, an explanat...

of my reluctance to spcal: to you.

I don't want to sully Lanadale. I sure as holl don'

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want to sully Lanadale. I sure as hell don't want dead

poople -

Tho Chairman.

He know what has beon going on, Mr.

McNamara, and we have heard Mr. Lanadale's testimony under

oath that it was not Bobby Kennedy and that he was

misconstruad in the pross.

All right, Mr. Schwarz, would you continue with the

questioning.

Mr. Schwarz. Would you look at the Exhlbit 1, again.

which are minutos of the meting of suurt 10, and road

into the rocord from tho page 2 as far as this in at 38 B

in. tho laneralo Book - what la raportad on a subjoce that

is not assassination, what is roportod that you said on

another subject.

Mr. McNamara.

Yos, paragraph 5 on page 2 of tho mamo

indicates that discussion then turned to the objectives. of

the MONGOOSE program. McNamara questioned whethor we can

no:

separate the building up of agent aggets within Cuba from

action that would hurt the us. in the oyes of the world

opinion. This lead to the suggestion by renoral taylor we

should considor changing the overall objective from one o!

:: overthrowing the Castro regina to one of bauging its visi!..

:..

MI. Schwarz.

le suggests you were concerned

about

:: something, you wanted the U.s. not to do things that woul.!

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hurt it in the eyes of the vorld opinion.

2

Do you have any rocollection whatsoever what you had

in mind?

MI. McNamara. I don't. I belleva by August 10, 1962

Chat the Bay of Pigs oporation was a total disaster, an error

6

in every sense of the word, and certainly would have

opposed any military action of that kind. As a matter of

fact, 60 days aftor that August 10 meeting, during the Cuban

9

miasilo crisis, I strongly opposed military intorvention in

] "

Cuba bacause I thought it would kill moveral thousand

cubans, kill several thousand Americans, run the risk of

Soviet responge in some arca of the world and danyer the

U.s. In the eyes of the world opinion. So by this time i

hail loarned the error of my support of the lay of Pigs of

::' a year and a half carlier and I was quite conscious of the

. і

desirability of avoiding actions that would hurt the u.s..

but quite frankly, I have no recollection of what those

actions were.

• 15. schwarz. In the MONGOOSE program, it is corruce.

:.

in it not, that the MonGoos! program was a program which in:

fully authorizod hy the President?

Mr. Mcitamara. I belicvo so.

let me start out din. You showed me or one of your

ansociates showed me

a mero late 19r1 establishing an orig.:...

structure for carrying out what was later called the Monia:

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program. I don't know whether the memo referred to it as

2

such and I am sure, therefore, that the program in the sense

of the original structure and action to consider what could

be done to weaken the Cuban regime was authorized by the

Promident. I don't wish to imply that whatever actions we

6

took; and I have lost rocollection what they were - I

don't want to imply avery ono of those Individual actions

8

10

was authorizod by the President. I doubt it vory much.

Mr. Schwarz. Was a program to ovorthrow the Castro

rogime authorized?

• Mr. McNamara. I think ono would phenso it somowhat

definitely. I think a progenm to woaken tho Castro rogimo

j' with the hope that it would be overthrown was authorlead.

I think that was the objoctive.

• I tried to recall as bost I can what the objective was

and I think that is the best exprossion of it.

MI. Schwarz. There is a memorandum which is dated

April 13, '62, it in the Taylor Book generally here or not?

Senator Moryan.

No.

Mr. Schwarz. I can read the whole thin into the encor

It 1i a memorandun from Maxwell 1. Taylor for the record

April 13, 192. Subject:

operation M0:60051i, and it refer

to you, Mr: secretary, and I would lite to ask you to uxpli::..

if you can, what you understand the position attributod tr

to be after it had been read into the record.

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"On April 13, General Taylor discussed with higher

authority the MONGOOSE meeting of April ll and 12 reporting

the foeling of Secretary Rusk and MeNamara that the MONGOOSE

5

program should have no target dati. Taylor pointed out che

probable porsonnel problems which would arise if the schedule

6

were completely indefinito.

"Taylor was informed that we would have to live with the

consequencos of no date, doing the best we can to bolster

motivation. Taylor commented that wa can probably carry

out the first phase as planned with the roviow of the

!: situstion about sugust 1.

"Illghor authority favors a atrong offore to rocruit

:: Cubans for the U.S. Army, He was told that

a now look is

: being taken and that by lower administration standards we

i: can do better than in the past."

Now, what do you understand the statement attributod to

you and Secretary Rusk that the MONGOOSE progIam should havr:

no targot date to mean?

Mr. Melamara: Well may I give a rather long answer en

this, Mr. Chairman, to try to explain what I think it meant:

I want to no back to the lay of plas.

The kennedy saministration some 9D days altar l came i::

office vas confronted with a nood to dociso whothor to peace:

with or distan the operation that lator became known as Bay

of pigs.

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I and others recommended to the President we proceed

with it. Thore was no opposition from anyone in a sendor

position that the President counsoled with that I am aware

of other than Senator Fulbright, and we were all wrong, it

was a clear error. This became apparant to some of us

shortly afterwards. It certainly wasn't apparent prior to

tho time but it became apparent shortly afterward.

Dospito our foeling that it was a sordous orror, there

was also an opposing forco influencing us, because during

that period from the Bay of Plys until this dato of 13.

April 1967, my recollection is thore wore continued offorts

:: by the cuban Government to subvert the established governmen:.

:!.elsowhore in the hemisphere. I think I am right, I may be

:: wrong on the date, but I think I am right there were actunli;

:: efforts to assassinate Betancourt, the President of Von zurl.

and at the time, for exanple, so we were very disturbed abo

It. The President was very disturbed about it.

But I think what you see reflected in this memo of

April 13 1s a fculing on Dean Rust's part and

ming that wi

should have learned something from the Bay of Plys, we shi!

understand that it wasn't possible to, by militar! action

and probably not by others and certainly not by a fixed

date, which in the point of this memo. le way cortainly

not possible by a fixed date to so monten the covernmene ::

castro as to insure ian overthrow, and it would be dandern..

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So I think you can read in the memo in our opinion to have

2

a fixed date that is kind of objective, it in that kind of

situation that lead to the miserable failure in the Day of

Pigs. This is the way I interpreted this and I submit as

evidence in support of that the action we took in October of

'62 In rasponse to what then was a very sorious problem of

tho actual introduction of miasilos and nucloar warhoada

on the Isle of Cuba..

A limitedaction that ia to say.

a limitod responso, I should say, to the action..

Mr. Schwarz.. Would you put bofore the witnoss the

document from McNamara Tah N, which is some moro rocord of

the ist standing proup meuting No. 2/63, Morll 23, 1963.

After this I am goiny to have just ono more question.

:: after this memo.

You aro citod, Mr. Molamara, as stating after

Mr. Bundly

presented a memorandum or really before a memorandum was

discussed, you are indicated

as taking the position that

before the group should discuss the substance you should

consider whether the present policy would produce a major

change, and that "r. Castro's position over the ghorttern

would improve if the u.s. tool no additional actions.

"Ile made clear "his beliel that alimiantion of the cani:.

regina wass a requirement and that if others

agreed our

prosent policy would not rosult in its downfall ve should

develop a program

for amproval which would produce chances

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on on.

6-

C.

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110

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acceptable to us.

"The program should aim at creating such a altuation of

dissidonto within Cuha an to allow U.S, to use force in

support of anti-Castro forces without loading to retaliation

by the USSR or the west."

And I call your attention further to the proposed throo

#tudies by the Attorney Genoral on the following page. which

Includo as atudy (a)

a listing of meanuren which would

take following a contingoncy such as doath of Castro or

shooting down of tho U-2.

The committee has had

lota of inatancos of language such

as elimination of

Cho Castro rogine.

Now; (a). did you take the position reflectod there?

(b), does what you say there, to the best of your

recollection, include assassinationg as a tactic? If not.

why not?

Mr. McNamara. This is tho first time I can recall seein;

this memo in many

years, and first let me get cloar on the

.: date. I can't bellove this date is correct, April 23, '63?

Mr. Schwarz.

well it does fit with some other nundy

:..

docunents we looked at this morning, so I am sure it is

correct.

:::

•Ir. Meliamara, Whan

was the missile crisis?

Mr. schwarz.

Octoher, '62.

Mr. Mallamara. Well, this sounda por-missile crisis tu

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me. I can't bolleve lt 1o post-miontle crinto, Lot me just

2

leave it with you. It doesn't sound right to me and it

100ks to me to be April 23, '62.

I would be almost sure that is the case. In any event,

with respect to your quostion -

6

7

Mr. Sciwara. I am sorry, incidentlally, 1f we do not

show you this document --

Mr. McNamara. That is all right. Let me take a second

too read it.

li

Tho roason I mentionod it, you see, Item 1 1a reference

1:

to the shooting down

of U-2. There had beon a U-2 shot down

::

about this period. This is one of the

reasons I qucationed

::whether the date i8 corroct.

1÷

I don't interpret any of these actions, and certainly

;:.

not the thrce listed on page ? under the heading the Attorne;

General proposed three studies, A, B, C. -- I don'è Interpro:

any of those ag suggesting or authorizing preparation of

plans for the assassination of Castro. I do interpret thos

three and certainly the further list of seven items on

page three as indicatiny a bolief that it was in the inter..:

of the U.i, to weaken the Castro Government and ultinately

see its replacement by a non-Castro regime, presumably

Democratic non-Communistic ronimo. I think that was the be::

::

desire of the linsident at the time and the basic objectiv

:.:

of the proyram.

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"not

Mr. Schwars. One of the studies proposed, as you say,

was a liat of measures we would take following contingency

much as tho death of Castro. Assume, if you will, with me,

as is the fact demonstrated by the recrod this morning

that in this perlod of time. there were a number of such

studies, culminating, incidentally, in one that said it

would not improve the position of the Unitod States.

But

do you know of any other country whore stidies were mado of

what would happon if a particular leader died?

Mr. McNamara.. I am sure - - I am sure thero wore

studios of that kind. Thero were. At tha time the govornmen!!

of many parts of the world were unstahle, there were frequen:

changes.

I remember in connuction with the then Conso,.

for example, there were possibilities of raplacement of

leaders, and I am sure that studios were made of action we

would take if "x" were to be overthrown or died or othorwise

be replaced.

It was quite: a customary contingency to ixamino.

1r. Schwarz. Do you remember spocifically examining

that contingency with respect to cuba or iny other countr:?

"Ir. "chamara. "o; I ronember more in relation to the

Belgian Congo than 1 do in Cuba, I have no recollection o:

studying the contingency in the case of cuba.

In the cane of the Belgian conun in the 60'8, 1 ques:.

the first half of the lo's, the situation was so unstable w

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frequently conaldorod what would happon 1f "X" was replaced.

The Chairman. That completes Mr. Schwarz's questions.

Mr. Smothers, do you havo any questions?

MI. Smothara. Yos, MI. Chairman.

5

Pirat, MI. McNamara, do you recall a Goneral by the

6

namo of Mr. Richard Goodwin?

• Mr. MCNamara. Yos, I do.

MI. Smothora. In what capacity did you know liam?.

Mr. McNamara. Woll, in the carly period of the kennody

Administration he was assignod to the White llousn. I was

.:: going u say to the office of the Assistant for National

:: Security Affairs. I am not oxactly cortain of that.. but in

any event he was assigned to the White House.

Then followin

:: that assignment he was assigned to the Stito Department and

In both capacities my associates and I expect I had contace

wich him.

MI. Smothers. Was your contact with him oxtensive

enough to form an opinion regarding his reputation in the

government at that time?

ir.tc'..mara.

well, I have been lead to respond to

one question on reputation, "entlemen, l am not yoing to

TaBpoNl to any morr.

Mr. Smithers, We will come bach to that, Mr. Secretar:

Dn you socall a Cuban tast forci Chaired at one time li

Paul Mitze?

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Mr. McNamara. No als, I don't. I am not suggesting

he didn't chair one but I don't recall it.

MI. Smothors. Do you rocall an invostigative effort

out of the White House aftor the Bay of Pigs?

Mr. McNamara. Well, I recall after the Bay of Pige

bacause with hindaight so many of us in monior position»

recognized lt as a serlous error, that Prosident Konnery

askod Goneral Taylor, who was rotirod out of the military

service at tha timo, to come out of rotirement and join with

the then Attorney Goneral and perhaps others - I am not

clear as to whother thore were othera or not . Lo condidor

what mistaks lad been made and how we could

prevent mating

similar mistakes in the future.

That group carried out the study after which my

recollection is that a spocial group to considor counter-

insurgency was set up, and that was dirocted. by General

Taylor. I belleve, and carriod on out of the white llouse.

Mr. smothers. May wo yo, please, to tabp of the

Mellamara Book, and this would be lixhibit --

Mr. Di lenova. Seven.

"r. inothers, let's enter

it as Exhibit 7.

(Documont referred to is markel

¡clamara. Exhibit No. 7 for

identilication.)

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MI. Smothers. Appearing at Tab P 1e an Interview with

Mr. Richaru Goodwin, concluded by members of this staff on

May 27, 1975, and I ask, please, to go to paragraph number

I headed Assassination.

Roading from number paragraph one, McNamara Exhibit 7.

6

wa find those words: "In goneral, Goodwin had not heard

much spocific talk of assassination although it would not.

have surprised him if it had gono on. Me mentioned one

spacific instance in which he heard call. of assassinating

Castro. Aitor the lay of pigs and tho Task forco was

established, first chaired by Paul Mitzo, then ly Goodwin

::in his capacity is Whito House Staff Officer. At the mentin:

of that Taka Force." Is this document before the witnoss?

MI. McNamara. Yes, 1t 1s.

Ir. Smothers. --"hold at the State Department, McNamara

suggested, 'getting rid of Castro', Soncone from CIA perhaps

Dissill, then asked if McNamara meant, 'Bxecutive Action'".

"McNamara responded that he did and stressed his intore:

in the idea.

"However, rootin did not brina up thie topic. Later

in the morting after tenanara lete the idea was not reasond!

even apart fron ill objection, the bay of fiys showed

political as politically difforont, because he would elthor

be replaced by Raol of Cho cueveren, " both words thon "Castri

Does this relating of conversations with Mr. rondwin

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прото (Ална 202) 308-6001

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and

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bring to your mind any new rocollection of any dincuraions

of assassination rogarding Caltro?

MI. MCNamara. No, it does not. I didn't see this

document until perhaps two or three hours ago when your

Counsel showed it to me.

I don't quito undorstand, since I mot twice with the

committee stall, it wasn't shown to me until today. I have

no rocollection of 1t, 1t 1a 14 years ago, and it sounds

extramoly unlikely to mo.

I know one thing. I didn't normally

attend that group. I am not saying I didn't attond, 1!

Goodwin nasd i did that day, I don'e know what day no la

::

talking about. He doosn't show any dato.

Mr. Smothers, We don't either at this point.

No. Mcilamara. It just sounds so loose. I am not

::: prepared to accept it as a rellable reprosentation of what

went on at the time.

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Mr. Smothers. Nell, we know that Mr. Goodwin was not

2

a member of Special Group Augmented. He further know he

was not at the Auyust juch meetiny, I am bussy, de furt!.:

know that his recollection as the question was raised did not

5

i come from the August l0th meeting.

6

Without regard to how cloar that memory ia, thie appears

il to be another incident of at least the memory of a discussion

about getting rid of Castro, and in this instance appeara to

be attributed to you.

Mr. McNamara.

Well -

..

Mr. Smothers. I am just talking hero now about a meotin;

: which he chaired and which you apparently came in and loft.

':: I am asking merely is there any prosent recollection in your

:: mind of such a session?

Mr. McNamara. I have no recollection and I am not even

clear what year you think the meeting was held.

Mr. Smothers. Might we leave that?

MI. McNamara:

May I ask a few questions? This memo

on was not brought to my attention before I came here today

and 1 hadn't thought about it.

First, when

do you think the meeting occurred?

Mir. Smothers.

MI. roodwin will be back before this

commillet, Mr. secretary, and perhaps we will have a clurre:.

piceure at that time.

Mr. McNamara, Secondly, as to getting rid of Castro. !

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think there is no question but if that la what you are asking

me about -- lot me make a statement 1f I may, sir.

As to getting rid of Castro, if I am asked about that,

it la clear enough that we were anxious to get rid of the

¿ i Cantro government. No question in my mind about that.

6

Now, an to executivo action. Mr. Delin of the

: Rockotaller Commission asked me sometime chis spring whether i

* was familiar with the term Executive Action. To the best of

• my recollection I am not famillar with the torm. I didn'e know

1': then and I don't know now what it moant, although I am told

1: I guess l was told by Bolin and perhapa also by membors of

::your staff that Executivo Action had something to do wieh

:: assassination capabilities that wore begun or establishod in

:: Che 1950'8 and carried over into the 1960'g.

I know no mor

' about it than what I have been told by either Belin or member:

:: of your staff and I have absolutely no recollection of this

:" mecting.

Mr. Smothers.

Mr. Secretary, your answer satisfius mo

at this point and I would liko to nove on to another matter.

Mr. Schwarz.

could 1 state for the

record why we did.:

Show you

that until today?

MI. Melamara. Surely.

Mr. Schwarz. I told you when we did first meet that n

•addition to the Harvey matter there was another purson wiu

we thought would say you had raised the subject. I also

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told you I didn't want to tell you about that until we had

2

an opportunity to put the person under oath.

Mr. McNamara. Suroly.

MI. Schwarz. As we then had to put Mr. Harvey under

oath. HE had thought we would have an opportunity to put Mr.

6

Goodwin under oath on this matter but he la coming back on Cuba

and, thorefore, I decided to show it to you even though we

hadn't reached that point.

MI. MeNamara. I am gratoful to you for showing me 1t

1(

now. I wish I had boen able to think about it earlier.

Mr. Smothers.

can I take you back to the poriod when

:: Mr. Roswell Gilpatric served as your daputy in the Depart-

:!.

ment of Defense?

Mr. McNamara. Sure.

i!.

Mr. Smothers. Could you givo tho committee some infor

mation or some feeling for the relationship betweon you and

1: Mo. Gilpatric?

Mr. McNamara.

Yes, ye.

MI. Smothers. Was it a close workina relationship?

Mr. McNamara. It was very close indeed. We actod

more ne partnera than as secretary and Deputy. That is why:

sald earlior that although Mi. Gilpatree was a member of eh.

59/12 organization and Special Group and presumably of the .

c0osF committee, whatever it was called, l don't beliuve:

::

that anything imporant was authorired or approved or

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supported by Mr. Gilpatrie that he didn't discuss with me, and

2

I am fully prepared to take the responmibility for anything he

did in this capacity.

6

Me. Smothers.

Did he report to you regularly on the

MONGOOSE Bessiong -- did he keep you up to date?

Mr. McNamara. I don't want to speak specifically about

MONGOOSE because I don't recall MONGOOSP, but he reported to

mo regularly about everything he was doing.

Ms. Smothors. Was he falrly meticulous about the dis-

chargo of the rosponsibility?

Ms. Mallamara: If he mere active in MONGOOSE I have no

:: reason to belleve he didn't report to me.

Mr. Smothers. And, of courso, he was particularly

:: meticulous in fulfilling his function and keeping you up to

:: date?

MI. McNamara. Yes, sir.

Mr. Smothers. How many years have you known Mr. Gilpatra:!

MI. McNamara. 15, 14.

MI. Sinothers.

To the best of your knowledge, what hi::

• of memory did Mr. Cilpatric have?

Mo. Meliamara. Again you will havo to determine that ::

him.

8:r81:8109. 19

::

15. Smothers. You talkod to him about things that hav..

appeared or happened sometime ago, includiny the Lansdale

altuation you havo relatod to un.

Is his memory good, i...

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very poor?

MI. McNamara. I don't want to characterize his memory.

Mr. Smothers.

Ms. Secretary, la it you have no

impremsion of 1t7

ME. McNamara. I don't miah to give a personal opinion

of other peoplo's capacity. Mr. Gilpatric I know from

the rocord has tostifled before you. You are quallfied to

• appraise his memory.

Mr. Smothers. Without being disrespectful, I think

this is a porioctly legitimate question and I lo dosire a

response to it.

MI. McNamara.

I can toll you that he is in a positio:

where his performance depends on his memory and his per-

formance is highly regardod by his peers.

Mr. Smothers.

Well, again you have been in a position

to assess his powers or recollection, and this is a

question of some importance to this committee and

18 you can make that assessment I would like to have it.

Mr. McNamara. Well, you are pressing me to do things :

am not qualified for and I don't wish to pretend to this

committer l am in a position to appraise Ros Cilpatrio y

memory.

1 can tell you l am in a position to appraiso hi:

integrity. It is of the highest. I haven't worked with he"

closely for seven years..

I can't report on his physical con:

tion or mental condition or memory, and I am -- no, may l li::

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ray sentence, pleas

2

I am not trying to evade a question, but I don't think

that I should mialead this committea an to what I know and

what I don't know.

5

Mr. Smothers.

I think your statement that you are not

qualiiiod to answer 1a fine.

you montioned earlier that you had upon learning of

8

some of General Lansdalo's commonta apoken with Mr. Gilpatric.

amongut others -

MI. McNamara.

Yes, Blo.

Mr. Smothers,--regarding the job that ceneral Lanadale

:: performed while at tho Pentagon at the time that he was re-

17" ported to have been working for you?

Mr. MCNamara. No, sir, I didn't report that. I stated

11: I asked Mr. Gilpatric whom General Lansdale was working for

ir. at that time:

MI. Smothers. When did this conversation occur, approxi-

mately?

Mr.. McNamara, Let me refor to my notes a second and !

can give you the exact date. I belleve it was May 30.

:..

Yog, May 30.

Mr. Smothers. If you could, Mr. Secretary, this is

ayain

important detail for us -- could you recant that r.-

i: ...

versation?

Do. you recall

what the nature of the conversation

betwoen you and Mr. Gilpatric was?

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Mr. McNamara.

I will relate what I related earlier.

2

That on May 30 in connaction with my inquiries to determine

exactly who General Lanadale was working for at the time of

August 1962, l called Maxwell Taylor, Ros Gilpatric and

5

General Lanadale himmell, and during my conversation with Mr.

6

Gilpatric I asked him specifically whom Landale was working

7

for in August '62 and MI. Gilpatric stated that he was not

working for oither himself, that 1a Gilpatric, or me in

August '62, but rather for the committoo that was dealing with

the MONGOOSE operatin.

::

Mr. Smothers. Did he olaborate further on Ceneral Lan.:

:: dale's duties? Did you touch on that at all?

Mr. MCNamara. My notes don't indicate so and I don't I...

:: call that he did.

Mr. Smothers. Did you have any further discussions

:: of Lanadale, per se? In this conversation?

MI. McNamara, Let me say I don't want to ovade your

question.

I am not sure this came up with Gilpatric.

I don'e think

at the time. If what you are driving at am I

aware there is a notr some place in the record that indicat.

: Gilpatric and I didn't think much of lansdale? I am aware r

that but I don't think Gilpatric told me that.

Mr.. Smothers. That is not my purpose, Mr. Secretary.

I am sorry at this moment i can't share that purposo with

::

you .

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(A0ть 802)

fo.

Mr. McNamara.

I can't refresh my memory any more than

I have as to what Gilpatric said.

Mr. Smothera, Let's not mate it a tradeoli: My

concern is that, going back to that 30 May conversation, you

5 :

recall you said this guy Landale, who did he work for.

6

MI. McNamara.: That 1a right.

Mr. Smothers. And again MI. Gilpatric said to you what:

i!

•1.

as bout you can rocall?

MI. Melamara. I will refor to my notos again. I

:..

would like to he precise on this. Gilpatric said chat in

:: August of '62 Lansdale was not working for elthor Gilpatric

:: or McNamara, he was working for a committoo that had somethin:

to do with MONGOOSE, Or what 1 know called MONGOOSE. He

said I think Cuba covert action.

MI. Smothers. Cuba covert action?

MI. McNamara. Covert operation, something like that.

Mr. Smothers.

You had also testifiod earller that you

had had a conversation with several other persons in .:

effort to put together the circumstances

surrounding this

Auguse affiir?

MI. Maliamara. That is correct.

Mr. Smothers. And you mentioned dieneral Taylor, Mr.

Hundy, and Mr. Kusk. Again incognizing the purpose

is nor.!.

have you testify or reveal any confidence, I wonder if you

could recane briefly for the committre the substance of tho::

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discussions?

MI. McNamara. MI. Chairman, I don't wish to involve

others. I don't wish to be unresponsive to your committee. I

will be happy to report what my notes indicate. I don't wish

• to Indicate they aro complete.

Tho Chairman. That la fine.

Mr. McNamara. Max Taylor said, one, after rocelving his

Bay of Piga report the Prosident establishod a special group

with Max as chairman to oversee tha governmont's counter-

insurgency programs. The special group ant up special group

MONGOOSE to ovcrsoo

tho Cuban counteringurgency activitieh.

::

infiltration

of intelligonce groups and low leval sabotage.

Three, landale was not an assiatant to McNamara but was.

::. Program Manager of the Special Group-MONGOOSE.

FouI, Max servod as Chairman of the Special Group,

Special Group MONGOOSE; and what he and

I would call the

303 Committee, which was a later name for what was then

properly called 54/12.

Five. Max has no recollection of ever hearing the word

assassination mentioned in connection with

any of these ac-

tivicies.

MI. Smothers. Do you have the date of this conversati::

Mr. Mclamara. May 30.

I have given you previously the essence of my convers...

cun wich lanadale slao on May 30, and my converration with

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Gilpatric on May 30, and I «poke to Dean Rusk on June 9, who

?.

stated that (a) at no time did anyone recommend assassination

to. him: (D), at no time did his reprasentatives on the 303

committee -- and I think he would have included his represen

tatives on Special Group as well - montion to him that the

6

committee had considered assasination.

(c), ho has no recollection el assassinations being

discussed at lugust 10 '62 meeting and he balleves he would

have socall it if thero had been a serious discussion of 1t.

1•:

Mr. Smothers. And the date of your conversation with

.:

Mr. Bundy?

Mr. McNamara.

am sorry, I don't know that I have

:. notes of that. Let me check.

I have talked to him soveral times. He is president

::;of the Ford Foundation. I am a trustee of it and wehave had

i: frequent conversations primarily about Ford Foundation busi-

ness, but I think interjected in that have been discussions

:..

of this and I frankly don't have notes I can give you.

Mr. Smothers. Mr. MeNamara, in your conversation, your

most recent conversation with Mr. Gilpatric was when?

MI. Melinmara.

I think I talked to him aftar he had

testified before this committoc, whenever that way.

MI. Smothers, You also talked to him juat before his

testimony, didn't you?

Mr. McNamara.

Yes, he had dinnor with me and my wi..

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the night before he testified.

Mr. Smothers.

Didyou spend much time talking about the l

subject of this investigation?

MI. McNamara.

Well, I am sure we talked about it. I

¡don't know how much time.

I got home about 7:30 at night and

o il he was with us for dinner, my wife and s and him, and i took

7: him back to his hotel around ten. My wile was with un much of

the time and I am sure we didn't talk about it while she was

there, bocauso I haven't wanted her to dwell on this subjoce.

And aftor that I am sure we did talk about it.

Mr. Smothers.. Did you show him the 1967

McCone memoran-

::, dum?

MI. McNamara: I doubt 1t. I dun'e want to say I didn':

i: but, wait a m'nute -- I was going to say I don't think i

had papers with me that night. Let me think.

Let me refresh my memory now of dates.

I didn't receive the '67 McCone memorandum until -- 1e

was mailed on June 25. When did Mr. Gilpatric testify? Whas

.• was the date?

1r. Smothers, July 8, so you would have been with hir

on

the evening of July 7?

Mr. McNamara.

111 right, I probably did show it to

him because the memo was in my possession

at the time and i

think I took this folder home with me that night and 1

probably dad show is to him.

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6

...

MI. Smothers.

Did you discuss the tenor of that en-

orandum?

Ms. McNamara. If I showed it to him I must have.

Mr. Smothers. Do you have any present recollection of

that discussion?

MI. McNamara. I am not completely clear. I think I

must have sald to him that I was deeply diaturbed about the

problem of my own position with the press because I have

been following theso pross clippings rather closely, ad y

indicatod to you oarlior, and there has boon a series of

misstatonents about my activitler, including such

a one as an indication that l wrote the memor to cho CIA

when the memo which you have

is written by lanadale, and McCon.

rememberod me raising the quustion of elimination of Castro

when McCone said he didn't, and the memo indicates the memo ot

my conversation, which I probably also showed Mr. Gilpatric

indicates he did not remember me raising the losue.

So, I probably showed both the memo of my conversation

with Mccone and McCone's memo of April '67 to Mr. Gilpatric.

Mr. Smothers.

TO

the best of your recollection did

that memo in your discussions refresh Mr. Cilpatric's rocolle

tion regarding the events of August 10th?

Mr. MCNamara, Frankly I don'e want to comment, wish er,

comment whether it did or dadn't, I don't remember

whether

it did.

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Mr. Smothers. To be sure I understand your answer.

are you saying you do not romembor or do you not wish to

comment?

MI. McNamara. The stenographer can read what I said.

3., I think I sald I don't remember. In any case, that in what

• , I wish to say, I don't romember.

• Mr: Smothers. You do not remember Mr. Gilpatric's

* response or recollection?

MI. McNamara. No. Your question was did my showing him

these papers refrosh his momory, and frankly i don't know

whether it refreshed his memory or not.

Mr: Smother.

What, if anything, did he say after you

had shown him these papers?

MI. McNamara.

Well, you are askiny me details that

I just can't remember. I am not trying to hold ahything back.

I imagine he said he had not been involved in this problem us.

to this minute.

I am the one who has been in the press for

two monthg.

Ros was very close to me, I am very close to

him, and to be honestly frank with you in a hulliof a

MI. snothors. This wag four days ayo?

Mr. NcNamara. May 1 finish my answer, sir.

1 am

in a hell

of a mess

so my purpose in

showing thin

to kos wire to get his advice on what to

do, not to refresh 1::

memory, He is not in a problem, I am in a problem.

As ,

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friend I think I showed these to him to ask him what he thought

I should do as far as the press 1a concorned. This 1a my

concern.

I havo told you that press. all over the world has me

3

resporaible for consideration if not authorizing assassination

" of Castro and this 1a a completoly untenable position for mo,

;I cannot continuo effoctively in my present position as long

an this improssion laste.

So, I have boen talking to. Ros and to others about what

to do.

This in not the rosponsibility of the committoo, you

didn't rause it, but it do a serious problom for me and I am

concarned about it.

The Chairman. We understanil.

Mr. Mclamara, It is that which I was talking to Ros

:: about. In the course of it I showed him the McCone papers, !

.. guess to indicate to him that contrary to what Time Magazine

said, McCone said something quite different.and I don't

remember the conversation in detail but I am sure that was i!.

purpose of it and

import of it.

Mr. smothers. Mr. Secretary, l realize this is a tor-

rible decision that has been created. for you and I trust

that you undurstand the purpose of this inquiro is not mere:

to rucant iverything you may

have discussed with a friend.

:. This is a terribly important. matter or cortainly

it will bere

:: before this conitter and 1 un unking if you recall any lur.'

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• •

of hlo response to your discussion of the August 10 situa-

tion. Did he incate to you, oh, yes, I was at the meeting.

I don't remember hearing you say that?

Did you discuss it at all?

Mr. McNamara. Woll, we must havo but frankly I don't

6

recall any such details.

Mr. smothors, Ono flnal area of inquiry.

Tho momorandum from Gonoral Lanadale is directed to

u i rionoral lenjamin j. Harris.

Mr. McNamara.

Do you know him?

I have no rocolluction of having mut him.

:: I undoubtly have but I don't have any recollaction of it.

::

Mr. Smothers, I havo no further quentions.

Senator Schwolker, I had asked earlier, I should ay

!: I asked, Mr. Secretary, and several Sonators had asked your

it" understanding about if assassination were feasible, if the

1 President did or didn't know about it. I got one impression

!: from your answer. I have here your interview, I queas, of

two days ago, July 9, by Mr. Joseph E. diGenova of the commi::.

stall, and I would like to read just i paragraph from this

meinorandim with a dirert quote from you and

if I mig-

understood or whether this is a change an your posielon.

"As far as the presidential approval for assassinati

strempt, which we indicated to him had in lact", we meanin::

the investigator -- "co him had in tact been made against

::

"Casten" -- you maid "it maker me uneasy to say de. If all

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• .

:

1001.

these things were going on, assassination, I can't belleve

the top officiala didn't know about it. It la unlikely that

It was done without our knowledge, I don't belleve that these

things could have been going on without those at the top

5: knowing it. I might not have known about it but not others

6 i at the top."

Is that an accurate quote for what you told the

committoo stall a couplo days ago?

Mr. Mclamara, I don't think the last sentence carrios

}.

the connotation I would have wished to imply. I think what

::! said, I will repeat now, because it does make me unoasy, it

.:: Is going to make you uncasy.

Senator Schwelker.

Uneasy can quite reconcile with

.: what you told us about half an hour ago.

Mr. Mctlamara. What I have said here and what I said

i a half hour ago is completely consiatent:

Senator Schweiker. I think you said a little while ago .-

we can check the record to see - you couldn't conceive somer!:::

.: like this could go on in terms of the ClA, in terma

of the l'r..

sident. bring an any way involved, and that only covert action:.

ail recall, You said something en the citect that you under.

stood the covert action probably did go all the way to the tri

• you aro sure lf manassinations occurred they did not no

:..

all the way to the top. I un fairly certain, you can check

the record, you aaid that.

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рави

1"

This 18, as 1 a00 1t, quite a little different approach.

2

Mr. McNamara, Let me both refer to what I said half

an hour ago and if you don't think I am referring to it

correctly check the record, then also Int me refer to this.

5

A hall hour ago I don't bellove we were talking about che

6

President. What I was discussing was the control by sendor of-

ficials of the Administration of the CIA and I stated that

I believad that there were no major actions undertakon by

9

CIA that were not proporly

authorized by senior officials.

Now, I did not mean to imply by that every major

:: action takon by cid was authortied by the prosident. I chiri

'I vory carefully nerd the term senior offledals, and i

mean.

.:particularly the members of the 5a/12 committon, nd throu

* them I meant myself and secretary Rusk.

I did not mean to imply the President himself parti-

.:cipated in a revicw of or authorization of major actions

of CIA.

Now, I state then that, having said that, I was faced

with a dileruns of the kind you are when you toll me that

:.

assassination artempts have been carried out by cia, and i

ra1d.1 have no knowledge of it because l bellever that 1

: :

would have had knowlodge of that kind of vent carried out ?:

: cia, and 1 believe I would not have only had knowledge, !

:: believe it would not have been carried. out without my nutho:

..:

ization or the authoriantion of senior officials reportine :

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me, my deputy, and therefore I am at a loss to explain this

and I can't explain it by the third alternative mentioned of

on the part of cIn officialo.

spou

r..

ann le completely

* consistont with this except possibly for the last sentence of

si . that paragraph, and this I don't think carried the connotation

'I moant to give, It I usod that languago, i might not havo

*known about it hut not others at the top. I am not quite sur

what this impllos but I don't wish to say today that I mighe

: not have known of assassination attempes but others at the

: top of the government would have.

1 son't bollove that. !

don't believe

it for several rossons.

In the firme place, l belluve that if that had

been carried on in Cl and if anybody in che government ha

known about it at the top, my deputy would have, because he is:

i closely associated with control of the clA.

secondly, I don't believe the President of Attorney

General, and I would include Dean Rusk and McGeorge Bundy, i...

nave had knowledge of assassination actempts if chey didn's

impare do me, and I think if ther say they had such knowled..

chan I think 1 muse assume 1 did. I have no recolleceion

of it but i nasume t dies if they say they did. And the red

1 any ihoe, the relationships amona the toy members of the

:.,

Kennedy adminintration on mattors of this kind were so clos

1 cannoe separate mysalf tron thom d if they said

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+08(802 2017184004

: =

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The Chairman. They have not said that.

Mr. McNamara. That da the firat point. That la the point

I wanted to make. And it is contrary to what is implled hy

¿ this last sentence and I fear I may not havo made my

6 " meaning clear to members of your staff in relation to that

•I . last sentence and I want to make absolutely certain

that this committee understanda that 1 am not trying to

separate myself from other sondor mambers of the Kennedy Ad-

ministracion, number ono.

Number two, I find it almost inconceivable that tho

assassination attempts were carriod on during the Kennedy

Administration days without the senior membors knowing lt, a''!

I understand the contradiction that this carries with respec:

to the facts.

Senator Schweiker. Just one more point, Mr. Chairman.

I am groping for understanding what you did mean

because this is just a fragment of what was said, apparently.

at the same interview, where you said reference to renerl

langdale and 1 quote:

Hobby and JFK must have asked me if

Lanadale should be appointed.

MI. Mcramara. Yes.

senator schweiker.

And I must have said yes.

What was this in reference to?

Мт. Матіатятів.

tre me just find it hero.

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Fond (1090 2021 366

a ..

1

was a piece of paper in a file that Indicated that Gilpatrie

2

and I had a low opinion of Landale, or at

some point developed a low opinion of Lansdalo. I think it

ia in connection with that I was asked if lt in likely that

5

you recommended Lansdale.. And in late '61, and I can only

6

say that the probability la the President would not have appointed

Lansdalo to the job without asking me would I socorend him

and, I probably did roconmend him.

Senator Schwalker.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

That 1s all.

Tho Chairman. I think sinco this qunation has arisen

:: we should put the full three paragrapha in the socord.

Senator Schwelker. Which three?

The Chairman.

Which read as follows.

These are from

the notes of the interview, the carlier interview with Mr.

McNamara which took place on July 10, 1975.

It is a memorandum to Fritz Schwartz and Curtis Smothers

"on the subject of

Presidential approval.

The notes read:

"As far as Presidential approval for assassination aut...

: which we indicated to him had in face been mado againet Case:.

he said: 't makes me uneasy to aay it. If all thrae thiny.

i: ' were going on, asgassination, l can't hollovo that the toy

:.

alicials didn'e know about de. It is unlikely that de was :

without our knowledge. I don't believe that these things coi

have been going on wichout. those at the top knowing it.' i?:.

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* 705

:

• =

•Г.

end nash

2

not have known about it, but not othera at the top."

*He doom not remember any requeste for arma from in-

surgents. Such a request, however, would have gone through the

5412 Committoe. "'Ne were hysterical about Castro at the time

, ¡ of tho Bay of Pigs and thereafter.' And there was pressure

6

from JFK and RPK to do something about Castro. "But I don'e

? " bellovo wo contemplated assassination. Ma elli, howevor.

* .. contemplate ovarthrow. "

"Nolther Blasoll nor llolma, ho sald, would have circum-

: 'vontod Moconu and one to RF OF JFK tu ure approval for ploer..

:. 'Thal's the least like of all explanationa lo plots actually

occurred. ' Moreover, he cannot bellove that 'Dick Helms

would have kept McCone

in the dark about any such plots.

1:

No matter what you think, Dick Helme in an honorable quy. '*

well, I think that ought to go in the record.

The fact 18, Mr. Moriamara, that Dick Helms testified

before this committee he did keep McCone in the dark and we

know that the Cl was heavily chaayed

in assassination

attempts. Whether of not it was so authorized is another

question.

The final irony of all we know is that one such

assassination weapon was passed for the purpose of asuasain..

iny Castro on the very day, indeed, the very hour Pregidene

Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas.

1f there are

no further questions.

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94

r.

r.

Senator Baker. One briel question that I think will

2.

produce only a brief answer.

MI. McNamara, are you acquainted with the Drew Pearson

column of 3 March 1967, alleging assassination plots against

Castro?

• MI. McNamara.

No, Senator Baker, this ia something that

* 7

I don't recall.

It suite clearly was the article that led

Mr. McCone tu subsequently dictate that memo of whatever de van.

April of '67, but I have not been a reader of MI. Pearson's or

" 45. Anderson's column for some years.

senator Baker.

You had no conversation with the presle.

with Robert Kennedu, or with "r. Helme about that column?

ass. "schlamara.

Nong thre I know uf..

Sonator Babar. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chalrs:..

The Chairman. I want to thank you very much for your

testimony.

Mr. icilamara. Thank you vary much, Mo. Chairman.

The Chairinal.

May I

runaugt to you that it would be

helpful to the committee if you would not discurs your terri. :.

with any01is.

1 h1:0w that you have an intortion to mate 9u:..

g:0tamant t0 the Press of a lontral Character and we have ru

ubjection to your dotn that.

I would like to make just a ong line or

two line guatement t0 the bruss. I know they ary our thor:.

! chink you can underatand that will all of this ralatio

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2

PAUL

C.

me on the sacord in the Press I can't go out and say no comment.

Senator Schwalker. He certainly think you're entitled to

that. Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Yes.

Sanator Schwalker. I certainly concur with the witness.

6

Ms. McNamara, I Just don't want to appear and say "No

comment" and thereby endorse the --

•The Chairman. You can't say no comment. It only leade 1'

9

very unfortunate conclusions and inferences.

MI. McNamara.

Yes, that la a problen.

Senator Schweit.or.

In fart, I really chink, Mr. Chalr"...

:: I think I can egnur the secretary that sa can say what he

wants to say, barause there have been so many stories, and ati:

is his opportunity to perfect it.

Tho Chairman. Yas.

16

se discussed this before,the meeting, and 1t 1a underatco

I%: that ho should ard interda to say what he leela is nocessari:.

the Press. I had reference to the details of your testimor:.

MI. ¡cramara. Finibly, 1 tall you, ! Just lotted tri:

dows bolore the hearing, and I'll toll you what I'm goine a

::.

say.

alp fist go-a 58-89229-98985 D6

I wait to say that the huaring was hold' in Frecutive

Sosslos, that under such circumarances de la inappropolate ..

¿i , the withoss to comment to the rrasa; Ouly the Chalrman sho:::

do su, and that I haves ano statement to mate. I cannot lli...

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• LAN 207)

5

6

that President Kennedy or Robert Kennedy or any menfor member

of President Kennedy's Administration approved of an assassina-

tion attempt or the planning of an attampt on any political

loader, period. That 18 all I want to say.

The Charman. That's line.

Thank you again, MI. McNamara.

(harmupon, at 4:35 o'clock pom., the Committee proceode!

to other business.)

10

•=*=

1c

*.:

21.

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MONCOOSE

10 August 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT:

Minutos of Mooting of Special Group (Augmented) on

Operation MONGOOSE, 10 August 1962

PRESENT:

Sento: Mr. Ruak, Me. Johnson, Mr. Marein, Mr. Goodwin,

Mr. lurwitch

White House: Ceneral Taylor, Mr. Bundy

Defense/JCS: Mr. McNamaro, Mr. Gilpatrio, General

Leundtzer, Coneral Lanadalo

СІЛ: Mr. McCone, Mr. llarvey

USLA: Mr. Murrow, Mr. Wilson

C

Прока

0000 -

1.

Mr. MeCuno sald that the concluslon of chu Board of

Nielonal Estimates was chae tho Sovlola will nue lue cho castro

repline

faf1 locause of dia own inhuront woakneagen.. Thia thoughe

had nut

been contained as such in the NIE.

bater in the mucking.

Mr. Micone sold that ho belleves we muse face the fact that Cuba

will be

stronger in a yoar or two chan le do now; le added his per-

sonal opinion that the Soviets mighe conaddor catablishing an MRSM

base in Cuba.

He noted that these two points are

not nccessarlly

concurred in by the Board of National Estimatca or by the USIB.

2.

At Secretary Rusk's request, General Lanadale gave a briel

explanation of the four possible coursus of action outlined in recent

papers.

lio then sumarized progreas to date by saying that during

Phase 1, now completed, on intenalve Intelligence look has been

enkon at Cuba, that

we have learned a great deal, bue that we do nol

yue have a true assessment of

resistance potential.

j.

Mr. Runk sungested the possibilley that in che evene of a

blockade of berlin, the U.S. mthe wish to change 16a. posture loword

Cuba, porhaps

vIc:

engaging in direce retaliaton against sordee shippi,

le audrested chat che Borlan and Cuba contingoncy plans should

be cloudly monted. Mo. Dictmare bon mortain on this point, toying

clad les did mad belleve lamicee recallaldon of that hand would cora

Mellule in isloquade responie do a borlan blocksdo, Whores world wide

suvier fucilities would be a different matter.

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

Kpzoiapi98

PROPIXTY OF

THE WHITE MOUSE OFFICE

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• 2.

C.

Mr. Rusk emphanized the desirabillty of atcompting to

create a splle between

Castro and old-line Conmunlata.

llu pointed

out that auch a sulle would be bound to be benuficial to u.s.

Intercals no maller which way the balance of power swung.

In chia

ceneral conneceion, le was hard for him to visualize a valld protext

for U.S. allilary Intorvenedon in Cuba under any circumstancos

currently forescen.

llowever, mhould reasonably viable restatance

devolop so elie

extent for example that some provinces might oppose

tho lavana Governmone, chon the U.s. might dentre to give support

such provincial officials.

In response to che shovo, Mr. McCono

pointed out that at

ele mumone the provamaly cleod falcone batween Cantro and che

old-lina Comaniaca lavo bron rosalved in Castro's favor, and no

Craporary rapprochemone

Inaur currently exlells breween Fided and Noacou.

There has addletonally buon at loost a

He Indicated that

chle of course may be comporary..

He sold chat there has bean aerno

succena in recrudling Cuban offlotula abroad to work for cho U.s..

and that thore lave bean somo defections.

3.

The discusston

then turned lo the objocedros of the

MONGOOSE program.

Hr .

McNamara questluned wheeler we cannoe separate

sle bullda up of agent assets wichtn Cuba from acetons that would

ture the VaS.. In the eyes of world opinlon.

This led lo cho suga

¿estlon by General Taylor that we should

consider clinging the

over-all objective from one of overthrowing

tho Castro rugimo to one

of causing des visible fallure.

In this

context Mr. McCone then prosunted an alternate

plan (called hereniter the "CIA vortant") to

the

described by General Lansdale, which he unid

had

stepped-up Course B

been prepared as a

resule of

the conclusion that stepped-up

would

not In face rosule

in the overthrus of Castro.

He emphaalzed

that

che ateppod-up plan

should

not

be undertaken unless

the U.s.

18 prepared to accept

merlburability for thie necessary actiono, Including the eventual

use of U.S. mililary force. Ar. McCone bald that a stopped-up l will

risk inveim an uprising, which andghe result In a Hungary-type bloud

bach 1f unbupported. lue only would the UaS, be blaned, bue there

would also be a high nuine lovel In the prebs

ald eventually a situation

would be created whack would regulie Intervenelon.

0n.6lre o6hr hand, the CIA varlane now proposed would, In

11s. Metone's dew, evold'all us those daners because de would nue

sovide an agorising.

Mill lie repented like view chae chie U.S. might,

humever, face a stronger Cuba in the future.

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c.".

6.

The principal members of the Spocial Group felt, after

sone discussion, that the ClA variant ahould be davaloped further

for conalderation at next Thursday's mooting of the Spacial Croup.

Mr. MeCono was naked lo sercas cconomic sabutage, and to emphasizo

masuros to foment a Castro-oldlina Cormuntat split.

emphasiaod chat any actions under chis pian must be so dealered o

to avoid major attribution to the U.S.

Conoral Lemnitzer told the Group that the Navy doos not

wlah Cunneammo unad

as a baso for operational activiedes, no

augicated by clA.

le sald that the ochor Chlofa have not you given

an opinion on clife bue he thoughe that they would agree with tho

NAvy, as lio himself does.

The vlow do chat chla baso la sou Imporcane

to tha U.S. and too vulnerablo lo Cuban prosauro to take the chanco

of provoking Cuban fraction.

Tho State representativos agreed with

1r, Bundy angerstod that a hard look be cakon al the

possibilley of suppore do solected Cubon exdles on a strictly

"daengaged" baado; lu other vordo, should choy bo savon covore

- sinanclal and materdol mupport, with the down of seedly What they

could generate un thedr own.

Mr. Rusk suggested that continurd pressure should be

C placed on Castro by keeping intorest ln the polsonor losue alive.

10. Action to be taken:

CIA to prepare a new version of lta verdunt plan, in

accordance with the above-gummarized discussion.

This should be

ready by Wesnesday, August 15th.

Thunas A. Parrott

c: Generel.bansdelus.o.

¡teachaont a Agendia for Meetinsi

THE WINIE MOUSE VISICA

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MONGOOSE

10 August 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT:

Minuton of Mecting of Special Group (Augmented) on

Operation MONGOOSE, 10 August

PRESENT:

Sento: Mr. Rusk, Mo. Johnson, Mr. Martin, Mr. Goodwin,

Mr. llurwilch

Whilee House: General Taylor, Mr. Bundy

Defenac/SCS: Mr. McNamara, Mr. Gilpatrie, Coneral

Leundezer, Goneral Lanadalo

IA: Mr. McCona, Mr. Harvey

USIA: Mr. Murrow, Mr. Wilson

Mr. Mecono sold chat cho concluston of the Board of

Natlonal Encimales was chae cho soviers will nue lue the Casero

resame fall beenuse of lla own Inherent weaknesses. This thought

had nut been contalned as such an chu NiE.

Laser ln the meeting,

Mr. MiCone

said that ho belloves we muat face che face that Cuba

will be scronger in a year or sno chan lt la now; le added his per

sonal opinion that the Sovlots mishe conalder cacabllahing on MRiM

base in

He noted that these two pointe are nue necessarily

concurred in by the board of National Estimatce or by the USIB.

At Secretary Rusk's request, Conoral Lanadalo gave a brlet

explanation of

the four possible courses of action outlined in recent

then sumarized progress to dale by saying that during

Phase I, now completed, an Intenalve Intelligence look has been

eaten at Cuba, that we

have learned a great deal, but chat we do not

yet have a true assessment of resistance potentlal.

Mr. Rusk suggested cho possibilley that in cle event of a

might wisdo co change sla ponture loward

Cule, porhaps ongogang in direce.

relullallon against Souder ahippinds

He surrented that the Borlan and Cobo comingency plans should

Me, ticlamora boo uncortain on chas polue.

did nine bellove limited recallaldon of chas klud would

sleute an idequate response to a Berlan blockado, Whoress world-wlde

• Hurranement of suvlee lucillies would be a alfierent malter.

PROPENTY ÓF

THE WIITE MOUSE OFFICE

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C.

Mr.

Rusk emphasized the desirability of accompting to

create a splil botween Castro and old-line Communiato.

Ile pointed

out that such a sulde would bo bound to he bonuficial to U.s.

incerenta no matler wilch way cho balance of power swung.

In chis

ceneral connecedon, de was

hard for him to visuallze a valld protext

for U.S, military intorvention in Cuba under any circumatances

However, ahould reasonably viable restatance

devolop to the extent for

examplo that some provinces might oppose

the lavana Governmont, tlion

the U.S. might donire to givo auppore

lo such provincial

officiala.

In responso to llie shovo, Mr. MoConu pointed out chat at

the moone the

previoualy cleod fade lone bawcen Casero and

che

old-fino Communists lavo bron resolved in Castro's favor,

and no

fasur

curruntly

There has additionally buen al lonse a

reaporary rapprochemont boeueen Fidel and Moscow.

le Indicated that

shis of course mey be comporary.

He sadd that there has boon seno

succeSs In recrulein; cuban officdols abroad to work dor tho U.s..

and that thure have been

mono defectlons.

S.

The diacungion then curned to the objeceivos of the

MONGOOSE PEUgENIN.

No. MeNamara questloned whether we cannot separato

sue bullding up of agent asmete wielin Cuba from actions that would

bure the U.S. In the eyes of world opinton.

Thia led lu cho sug.

gestion by General Taylor that we should consider changing che

over-all ubjective from one of overthroning cho Castro rosimo to one

of causing den visible fallure.

In this context Mr. McCone then prosunted an alternate

plan (called hereafeer che

"CIA varlant") to the

stopped-up Course B

described by Genoral

Lindale, which he unid had

been prepared as a

resule of

the conclusion that seepped-up Is would

not in fack result

in ele

overthrus of

He emphasized chat the sceppod-up plan

should

not

do undersaken unless the U.S. 18 prepared to accept

altributability

for the necessary actlona, including the eventual

use of U.S. mililary force.

Hir.

McCone

sald that a stopped-up l will

risk inveim; an uprdein, which nighe resule lu a Hungary-type bloud

But only would the U.S. he blaned, bue chers

would also lee high noiso

lovel in the prose and eventually a sicuation

would

be created whach would sequire intervontion.

On thie other band,

the ClA variant now proposed would, 1n

11r. Mitone's reeb, ivodd all as these dangers because de would

not

luvile an uprising.

Apadn lie reported lide view short the U.S. nigle,

humever, fire a stronder cuba in the fucure.

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-3.

6.

The principal menbers of the Spocial Group felt, after

some discusalon, that the ClA vardant ahould be devaloped

further

lor conalderation at next Thursday's meating of the Special Group.

No. McCono was noked lo strcas cconomie sabotage, and to emphasizo

measuros lo fomone a Castro-oldlino Communilat

split.

It was

emphasiaod that any actiona undor this gion must bu so dundaned ta

so avoid major actribution to the U.s.

7.

Gonnal Lemnitzer told the Group that the Navy does not

viah Gurnesinno unod an a baue for operational activlelus, oa

sugscared by CIA.

Ile antd that the ochor Chiafa have not you given

an opinion on this but he thought that they would agree with the

Navy, as ho limacle doca.

The vicw is chat this baso la cou Important

1o cha U.S. and too vulnerablo lo Cuban prosauro to tako the chanco

of provoking Cuban rcaceion.. The State represontacivos agroed wich

this vies.

Hr: Bundly mussencod that a hard look bo enkon de cha

posolballey of suppore lo sulectod Cuban extles on a atricely

"Alsongaged" baolo; lu other words, ahould chuy lo ilvon covore

and motorial nupport, wich the loon of seolng what they

could generate un chels own.

Mr. Rusk Burkested that continurd pressure should be

placed on Camero by koepiog incorest in the prisonor dasue alive.

10. Action to be taken:

CIA co prepare a now version of lta variane plan, in

accordance with the above-gumarized discussion. This should be

ready by Wesnesday, August 15th.

Thunas A. P'arrote

6: General lanadil

FRUPEKIT Vi

THE WHITE MOUSL VITICI

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N!'

SPECIAL HANDLING

OFFICE OF THE SFERITARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTEN ID, D.C.

(s)

13 August 1962

MEHORANDUM FOR WILLIAM HARVEY, CLA

ROUERT HURVIICH, STATE

CEN. BENJA! HAHRIS, DEFINSE I

LON WILSON, USIA

From:

Brig. Con. Lanndalo Ecl

Subjcet:

Altornato Course I

In comuliancol sen the cicalron and quicianco exprongod in l'e

10 Auruse palley meciina on learaldon lionnouro, se sill procuco

an outline ed an tornale Courne li for cubinianion. The ClA paper

"'Derrational Mlen lieduced diflore)" sill be uocú ae the slarling:

baglu.

Since tola da 8o be a barn niniiao, lo permell furter polley

guidance lo be ceveloned, 1 bollero the papo? nere contaln only

a clatement of onjccliuca ano à liat of lapluinuntina retivitira.

The loe of acirluen will be unaer the headlne of: Intellirence.

Political, l. conomic, d'aycholorloal, d'arainillary, ind dillitary.

"o will hold an Operational ligurenentalived work Busuion In

my office, al 191.0 houra, Tuosday, 11 Auruot, lo comploso the

outline paper for suumiasion.

Bach of you de to bring s copire of

completed asolenco vore lo inla work ruesion, lu perinil caci ul

un 10 work from a full sot of cralta.

¿opere remirod irom cach di vou ior tou idrausy muesino:

Dir. Harvey: Inclligence, Mollical (aglittine tie reginse.

1, conante (abotago, limilod

doception), and l'aramilllary. Alao, any aucroatione lor incluuion

In ollior cectluna of the paper.

LE. Murulich: Sinterent of Gljecilren, Folllland, and

Ficondinie.

¿luo, any quacocione for inelusion da ollor accilono

of the pager.

10274200Br

11'i

Th!:1 1a...:

cis.

HW

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CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

desj-but nota

Stata concerns (6lu tabs)

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TOP SECKET NOFORN•

SPECIAL HANDLING

Gen. Marria: Ficonomie (limited deception), Paramilitary

(limiled deception), and Milltary. Also, any suggestions for

Inclusion in other anctions of the paper.

Air. Millson: Paychological (including covors). Also, any

oucecallona for Inclusion in other sections of the paper.

marin

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L'OSSILLE ICTIONS TO PROVCIES

LARASS OR DINRUPI CIRA

42:811

Saction I

Soction

Section III

Section IV -

Economio

M111tory

Psychological

Othor

rain

PHOPIKIY 110

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RECTIDI: - ECSOLIE

1. S1cra112L62114

a. Iblectly?: Sook to maintain maximum mobilization of

Cubaa Arcad FOrCOS (FAR).

D. Lintbiz Courser or latten

(al Hiaload Cuban authoritles into bolleving prepara-

tions aro buing made for un invasion in the Clenfuogos-

Trinidad area, bys

(a) Interrogating Cuhan refugoes on the following

1 tems in the Clenruoçor Trinidad areas

a. Loaches.

2. Roads and trails.

3. Port facilities.

1. M1l1tary strongths.

5. Knuwn friendly peoplo.

6. Prominent personcogs.

(b) Conducting survey to locate and recrust for

future use, persongs.

L. is interpreters.

2. Faniliar with toat channels, otc., to act

as pilots.

3. Capable of operating commercial radio

stations.

L. Capablo of operatino pubile utllitius.

(e) conducting amphibious oxorcisos in Southeast

US-Caribbean-Latin Anorican areas and giving wide

public dissemination to the oxercises.

(d) Circulate rumors in Cuba of Impending Invasion.

PHOPIRIY '''

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so Selectine Diruption or Cuban ecorony.

b E:1h61P011029219400

(a) finduso sugar produciton in Cuba.

(..) Dostroy crops by firo or uso of chomicals. e'a

13) Inhlist crop grouth by sowing maribu seods. ¿':

(e) Enbotago sugar u191 machinery. &

(a) Destroy supplies of cartons, bags and othor

containers for distribiting sucar.

(o) Sabotaze vohicine, cods, railroads, shipy,

cüc., usod for haulind dieur.

(f) Causo spolags si import sugar enroute for

delivory to purchasar.

(:) it conn cutein, time plart rumor of hich in-

tensity nuclour fallout fion Sovlot nucloar shots

wanted down on Cuba during the rainy season. Has tond-

elicy to adiero to cans und aspecially dangorous

to

workers both in ino floids and in tho mills. Even

sugar will le contarinated. Us discovors fallout in

Xey Nest and southern Florida, but is of low crier and

not dangerous because was cha edgo of the pattern. As

a rosilû of the above, US survoy 1s conducted and 1è

is dotermined that Cube as ji the center of tha

pattern and speculates that intensity is such that

ciposuro for dia or threo duys paitloularly in cano,

to which it adheres roudily, cruld Jord to scriva

offects. Publicn aros de Jangorous fallous as de-

termined lis this survoy. Sier lan An flights to Cula

dio in dangor fion oxposiro to fallout. conduct

mirvey of Guantarano. Dotcinine by ricaco 1i5tru.

washed down. dom ofrog theordee thiel Slei

d80co

PROPINIY:

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commander fananano prohaule fichang ona tho conapesen

of fish eniris: loni1ls.. Vain to nativa employon of din

dangria. Pocail that in aa:le la torto, lol.iag In Duelfir

thrigio to in aliù os dangor vere cuntsminatna, that

mailion lod to be avacated and could not resura for —

(!). Dung "soft" Cuben currency at discount palcas.

(3) PrESSUSH INB, INF ind GATE so restrict Cuban

cordiis (a), loans, ots. Elsist that US Allios dewand

cain pasmont for crans - no sartor.

(i, Introduce courtaini: lusion cards - gasoline,

food, clothing.

(5) corduct selceted sucüingo of othor major Cuban

Industrios and public acrilales with polority natantica"

reing siven to transportridi; communications, poor

plants and stillilos, lu rainlago vould be undertalien

egalast sood sipplios, noddeel facilities, or diiectly

agalia: Uho population of cuba, es suci.

15

potroleum ship-

1coes to Cuba.

17) Encourage friendly nations to stop charterla, ships

to Elne envitries for trada vich Cuba.

iB) Exert infiuence on -ricinly countrios to ston

all trad: with Cabr.

(in) Pay Cuhan omployces at Guantazsao Huval Base 11

pesos.

6(1)(2)

24

THE WINDO MODI.

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7600011061:

3. Tele nil stops possible to aslet other latin Amalcan

couniric: in occumle pregarea, to inercase contrast vlit

Cubir.

1:400

PROPPIN MI

THE WHILE MO. 0000°

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tre dib.in

iltro..

LES ZINIEL - LINATARI

Jo DOD carcinor io develey nad sefino contárgonci plana i:

ordor to tain adammunac of any ilaticosuen broolis.

2. DiD continida to support dIA al other agencins is iho

full exteni of DeD capabilitles ao required.

3o duie subotayo matoriala avallablo to raslotanco elements

in Culia.

4. Creato clinato of continun alarm - particularly aù

nicht; cacato falso scerta hy irinaron of toam landings; nako

quinny

air drops.

PROPININ VI

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" Laction SisteR

a. 2i1estlia1 Ino obloctivo 1s to diaript/disabio m111-

*arj and commurcial comundcationo facilitlos in Cut.

" Sangar: This to bo accomplished by the clandestiro

1r! rcuuction of a "special" vacuum tube ints selcciou

corminications equipment. Tha tubo, which 1a ainilablo,

15 virtuaily undotectable inasmuch as its effortiveness 1g

due to tho insertion of a chomical compound in the baso of

to tube. Tre chonical, when heated boconer a conductor,

when cool a non-conductoi.

M::"

Ple Mille do treeing

17W

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virillades

1106

• 1 ?

• D110:41491 To crash or forco down Cubon MIG aircraft

wiin on all scather intorcopt capability by communications

intrusion.

I Consert:

(1) Closely monitor HIG alr/ground concunications for

tina purposo of dotermining frequency and terminology

usace for practice or renl (CI oporationg.

(2) By uso of ovorriding transmittors uid oither a

decoy nircraft or sulld weather conditions, ovorrido

Cuban controllor and have Cuban rofugoo pilot issue

instructions which run MIG out of fuol or towards Flordin,

Puerto Rico, Jamaica, a carrier, ete.

1:.

8

PROPINID 118

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1. 2a1a:10n lecredit Castin

no Oblestia: To discrediò the Castro/Cormunist reuimo.

Do lanaible Scurses er Estaten

(1) Publicize tha failure of the rastro/Connunist

regime to care for the health of the Cubang bys

(a) Plunting rumor of high incidenco á malaria

due to the failure of the governmen: to carry out

ndequate mosquito control.

(b) Newspapors in US pick un rumor, rovlow

history

of yellow fever in Cuba and U3 part in stamping 1t

out. Call attention to othor areas in Caribboon whore

yellow fover occurs. Discuss possibillty of travellois

from those countries to Cuba bringing yellow fever to

Cuba. Perhaps Bloc personnal brought 1t to Cuba.

(c) U'S publicly, for humanitarian reasons, offer

drugs end

spray chemicals.

íd)

(2) Increase program of information to batin American

countrles. on the evils of Castro's communist regline and

threat to themselvar.

Has leer tre

(3) Encourago Dominican Republic to table 1ts compluint

on Cuban Instigated subvorsion in Old HOi - to thio Ull later.

(4) Explost Dominican Republic chargos of Cuban

intervention.

(5) Mako ovullablo to tho Intornational Marcolles

Conston limitod documentos ovideco of Culan oxportatiar

london if models:.

(e) Incroreo pullodiy of tarashlas bolne endured by

Callo 01, 601611 8? 110! 1G", D1!11

110. 11111.

PHOPIKIY 11

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in dared unible idollo

woru..d

(7) Increaso publicity on lack of froedom of speach

lo c:1l:c1z0 Crstro dictatorship and communism - lack

it due proceso of law - fallure of Castro rogimo to hold

fice cloctlons and to rostoro Constitution of 1940.

(8) Emphasize that lno land has not roally been ro

Alstributed io peasants under the Acrarian Raform Law

but that the poisants ero mure tenanto of the stato.

PROPIXIY OF

THE WHITE HOUSE USTICE

HHT

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dowes..ed

2. 010121121 DICIONE ENGRiOS

i. Oblaina: To 11r0roált Sino jurlee Bloc assistanco

pro: lice to Castro/Commurilat recimo.

(1) sow silatrust amoie cuher prpulation of sino-

invlet Bloc -ssistance providad Cuby bys

(a) Planting rumara chat canned moats being

supplict to cuba from Bloc contrios 1s hurse meat.

(b)

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TOP SEGNET

7

SPECIE

: 1960001F0 F021 11d0

i l'iiduiras the ciguilavo la io croair inter uni

discineton aurians the Cuban procle.

ios irido to ios1sa 11üy, laracus, etu, (rone ic the US).

"Icare could le intermirel wler other lenfiera pisand

en le diopper. Tho number ci tichols draged could bis

turinesed,

Ire vellaity of the ticlots would huve to be

subtilcens to

p9r1.0d.

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7 6 0

a. Obtak91 me chanGive 13 to create Indler lons

to': col castro tiat hio value to dre ravoiutionary causo

dis dinirished to the point wrore plans aro bellie made

Co: his "removal."

•bi Sonc9r!: This to be ascomplaired by the use of

intelligenes monna the crascendo increastan until 1t

cuirinales in castro's discovery o: cho mochanasm or

haidwara.

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no S1.19.ilys: To Indianto to tho Cubon Governmust the

nor with wblch thor intonational communications channols

ran bo cut, and domonitrata thoir rollinao on US communi-

crisors support.

D: Concent c: lanIzticos

il) Most Intornational communicacions channels fron

Cuba nre routed through Now Urleuns, ley lost, or Mlami.

(2) 11th tho cooporation of US commercial firms

nirance for all Cubar. circuiis to be diarupted simul-

¿aneously. Varlous logical corsong can be elven, such

as mintonenco, emerzoney, break in cables, atnosphorie

conditions, or even "ulinown, but we are chocking."

c. Thepty:

(1) Much cülon could cause auch consternation in

ut lt would probably rosult in requests for increased

"Eloe aid" to provida apuropriste facilitles and

cap]-

hilltses. Tils, at best, lould so a 3 to 4

ycar priority

project.

(2) The action would emphasizo the seriousneen dit

which the Us views Cuba's current. affillations and the

determination to combat communiot infiltration into tho

inalurtare.

N:!:

PROPEFTO 11.

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• u.

silodoo..r

......i.1l..

2. Ollictlys: To provido Inducements to Cuban cltlz.no

to overthror cho Cuban Communist Recine; to put pressure

en Cuban Communists by cronting distrust and disualiy.

l. Scrcent of Queratiena

(i) ChoratIon BOUNTY ontablishes a system of financial

rowards, com. isurate with position and staturo, for

k1111ng or deliveri-s alive kron Corninises.

(2) Bevards range from two canis to 91 million and

aro dutciminod by tha position ino individual concerno

holds in the Communist hierarchy of Cuba.

(3) i reward vill ba paid to an individual upon.

presentation of a lonfici, togethor len conclusive

proof of loith and the party rovolutionary cemborship

curd of the dros.sed or anlivery to designated locations

o: knows party/revoluticnary marbers.

(4) leaflets :1ll bo dosicned to irriicato phases.

For cranple: The firot loaflcts will contain only names

of rowrunist leaders; the next loaflets will revise the

names into chronological distings; the noxt leaflot

u1l1 further roviso the names by job, 1.n., coll leader,

Infence", party membors, otc.i any of tho abovo oi s'1bar-

how and where it may ho collectod. One final leaflet

may be deemed advisablo and that ono announcing a .02e

revora for the dolivois of Castro.

(6) i proposed price list 15 as follous:

no mormol

Coll bonder

: 20, 000 - 95,000

10,000 -

10,00

(*.

15.019

29,009

• ?0.60 60.9011101:06

1 carrant Orricind

1o;

15,000

,:..

PROPERTY

1:

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i?! A national orcunration will to catadistien io

nostre itsponsiblilty for dasion and dorivory of lenslots

Litt pugmunt of rewards. Tha location of the organization

shot bu th or around Ninms: Flurida, and 1t should

coroolish branchos under suliable cover on solected

nearly islands in the Carlbbean.

id, Once this oparation 1s implementud, covert actions

hy Us agents could be initinied to klinap linown party

monber.: thereby inst1lling confidanco in the operation

anil: thn Cuban populaco and appichanstun among the

Cucan hierarchy.

"":;

PROPERIY "

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1 Lirar. 110i lieutes

i 4i1as4121 To indure elanenir or individual: of the

Caten allitary to dofust vitl agilipment.

i Gaucent: This aullults when properly planned and

i:pi untel has the offoct it decrecting milltary capabilily.

In a iotallialian system the inmediate roaction is increased

socurity accoroaled by decreased co:lulag. I: also creates

savoe l securily and intolliganco agencius. Could bo ac-

contain by intoiligenia moans and promiso of reiardo.

T0 W11'1:

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didentitlesti

7 %

000|006

?

a. Ohlsa01rai 1h0 objueerry 19 to doguroy confidenco

In sos suppled by the soviet Mloc by indicating 1t 1s

conta:inated.

1. Ephrand ihis to bo accomplished by

c(1)(e)

24

PROPERTY O

PIP MILITE MONE

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vidallai.

1Al00:

7 6 0

• U110.1.1

:. Erar:t:22 Thik Back

a, D'lunin: Ie canianes the Castro jogino thai soulst-

anco is rosenizing within luba; di to croats the inpros-

sion it an aypropilato time that a ravolutionary but

iegally constituted governmant has boon established in

Cure: mr is sonuasting assistance.

L. 201001E:

ili Using coveral automatin transmitters which can

ho circtrinically keyou, make transmissiong on appropriate

W' frequencies Indicating concuct with outside forcos as

1.là irs with croups insido Cuba.

(2) I'lu brondcasus could be in clear text or in code

or a combintion. These could bo dosigned to indicate

ostabilstinent of a procisional "free Covornient" and

mouniinr, suppor,, to forces opposing Castro without a

man ever boing aghore 1n Cuba.

13) To avoid accurate Di of tinnaissions they should

ve lImiter! to 30 soconds in duration.

(4) Transnissions would do pretsred. Contents wouid

be icsigned to enable selecivity.

(5) the transmitter wich antenna and Internal power

source, must be fabricator to employ appropriate canou-

jinge ind must be capable of a minimum us i0 trang-

missiona. desians for such equlpment aro avallablo and

iho iuscribed capablilty 1s within tho current stato of

du and. Equipmont vould bovo to bo especially fabri

cutes, all parts lovoror ard "sholl" Itors. boad elno

1i condigored to be 66 to di days. Cos: po: unit 19

Go! 19 to 1011191

• 11 6.

PH0L11..9

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bodddd....

rosasiorens. Miss covico, called the "porpuise," could

bo licer In confinecion with cho onuipmuni described nbovo

io furthor chanco the objoctive. This would allow posi-

tuning of transmittore around the entire island, 1f do-

siel, or in lakes, watei reservelrs, rivers, etc.; where

discovory would be almost. Impossible.

(7) Devices could bo airdropped or physically placod.

he fabricheod unit would tamoro offestive and of simpler

construction 1f 1t wore desicaod to lu placed clandostine..

ly, for nutoratio oraction ui cho antenna after airdrop .

:though not impossible, 1s difficult considoring tho

desired. sive of the unit.

(8) With respoit to gize and desten of the fabricated

it, to should be an agall as practicable and car be

issiral into a contairer resarubinö local "Flora."

(si if appioved, it 1s recommended that knowledge of

this operation bo restricted to an absolute minimum

number of people.

INE MONTE MUN!.

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lui didnt.

7GOOO1

10. Increaso program of Information to latin Acrican

countries on the evils of Castro's Communist regimo and thront

tothemselves.

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1. 022i Ten STOnENZO

4. Oblostlial To secure synpachy of people in Western

Hemisphere for hardships being endorsed by the Cuban

populace.

b. Concupts To publicizo plight of Cuban populaco.

(1) Publicize shortage of food and consumer coods

in Cuba.

• (2) Publicize shortago uf doctors and scarcity of

modical treatment.

(3) Publicizo lack ul froedom of speoch in Cuba.

(4)

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BLANK

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P:l1i:

SMS.IUs

11 Aregm0t 1168

#NX

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11.982691A88988: Mopolly Diree l0d (109.0000)

"ullgre.d

: Oyeedllen Mbigrirns.to:

le deliros.

Nurre dlin memderondleedno do food jouere irofosooossdio.

%..

Hl oooe d Mlle l lee GoVe Gláln Go 1l ?19004l 1o

г.".

loee ergegeee ceneloreed def Meiad elalee Geroeno 8i0:0900s

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fipsid

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ind opreecliond f.

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CIA HAS NO O3IES

CTION TO

DESLASSIRCATION

AND/OR

RELEASE OF THIS DOGUMENT

88003316110

SLGON:

AIETAYH

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SZXSKTWE

DOA3 19FY

done goure irfosdsnedondcrdorde lle gressd edlegcndidd orel isluo eo

10..0.110.00910:el

rerneer.ooolores.clooedolybr.oodl00...ndlf.ioddilondde.ed.o.l irs

vi:lo ot lhes prse abalily tlrre cirind corigglie e orrees

lpiara.10d9rs

•loalin, lirdooreolly lclded Doe l Diloled Don 1rd.10,019

iwlil)

MII.D.IAMK. IIA.CV/:Y

8:liod, 8.0.8e 80.00.0e 1V

Al0. 00718888-188

Memara lé 8irn Prnorleles dllol 13 Ansg 68.

760

132

abea

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69605

HN

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SECRET/SENSITIVE

TO: The Diractor

FROM: John A. McCono

14 April 1967

EXH. #Y

Мол.

3.12

1. No memorandum can be locatod covering tho August 10, 1962

meeting; however, it la highly probablo that ono axiate.

2. Meetings of August 8 or 9, 1962, In the JCS Operallons Room

(Репьдол) and Лиил 10, 1962, In Secretary Rusk's Conforence Room

more for the purposo of considering stall proposals for Phase ll'of opera.

tion MONGOOSE. This operation was under the direction of Goneral

Lanadalo, wilh lm. Harvey handling ClA participailon (under FlizGerald).

Al one of the so moglings - probably the moating in the JCS Room -- 1

socall a suggotion being made to liquidalo top people in tha Castro

regimo, including Castro, I took immedialo excaption so this suggostion.

slaling that the subject was completoly out of bounds an lar as the USC

and ClA wure concerned and thu idea should not be discussed nor should

1l appear in any papera, as the USG could not considor such actions on

moral or elhical grounds.

3. Immodiaiely alter the mesting, I called on Sacretary McNamar.

personally and re-einphasized my porition, In which he heartily agreed.

I did this because operation MONGOOSE

-= an intur-desarimental affair .

was undor the operational control of DOD through the JCS.

4. Al no time did the suggestion rocoive serious considoration

by lhe Special Group (augmented) nor by any individual responsible for

policy.

5. Through the years the Cuban problom was discussed in terms

such as "dispose of Castro," "remove Castro," "knock off Castro," eic..

and this meant the overthrow of the Communit Government in Cuba and

ide replacing of it with a democratic rogune. Terms such as the above

appear in mary mortini, paperi, memuranda for the record, olc., and, as

stiled, all sefer to is change in the Cuban Government.

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

419198 2e53

0 8318

SECRET/SENSITIVE

H7 50955

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RuSK-

Mc Core

A. JOHNSON.

LANSDALE

HARVEY

Don Niner

GILPATRIC

Bury (RFK

HuRwisert

LEMAISZER

Mc NAMANA

ED MARTIN

PARRETT

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1962 2 57473

PLUAY)

01.9:35,

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-ToP

SECR=T

SENSITIVE

EMES

onLy

01:S37

1710

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SEGRET

SENSITIVE

• 11 August 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Diroctor (Plans)

SUBJECT

¿ Operation MONGOOSE

r.

1. Action. None. This memorandum la for your Information.

2. Reforence la made to our conversation on 19 Augus: 1962.

concerning the memorandum of lhat date from Gonaral Lanadale.

Allachod is a copy of this memorandum, excised from which are

four words in the second lino of the penultimato paragraph on

page l. Those four worde were "including liguldation of loadera."

3. Tho question of assassination, particularly of Fidel Castro.

was brought up by Secrelary McNamara al lho mucing o! the

Special Group (Augmented) in Secretar; Push's orice vii lû Augus.

Il man the obvious consensus at that meeting, in answer lo a

coinment by Mr. Ed Murrow, thai this de not a subjack which

has been mado a matter of official record. I look careful notes on

tbe commento al this mecting on this point, and the Special Group

(Augmented) is not expecting any written comments or siudy on

this point.

Upon receipi of the attached memorandum, I called

Lanadale's olfice and, in his absence, pointed out to Frank Hand

the inadmissibility and stupidity of putting this sype of comment in

writing in such a document. I advised Frank Hand that, as far

as ClA was concerned, we would write no document pertaining to

this and would aatricipal: in no upen meeting discussing it.

1 abrongly urged Hand to recommond to Lansdale that he exciso

the phrase in question from all copies of this inernorandum, in-

cluding those disseminated to Siale, Dolense, and UStd, shortly

thereafter, Linodale called back and duft the meadazo that

ho agreed and that he had done

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

41-08

(1: 8.35

SEISMILE.

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SENSERVE

3. For your information also, In your absence and since

lbe attached memorandum already had been distributed and in

rem of the possibility that this might come to the Director'a

attentios, I informally brieled Walt Elder on the above.

Mile 1)

WILLIAM K. HARVEY

Chief, Task Force W

Attachment

Memno fr Gen Lanadale did 13 Aug 62

4 %...

".:.:

.:.

01838

Has SaY

stal

1714

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TOP SECRET NOFORN

SPECIAL IDLING

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHIMOTON 29, D.G.

MONGOOSE

13 Augue: 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAN HARVEY, CLA T 4I

ROBERT HURWITCH, STATE

GEN. BENJAMIN HARRIS, DEFENSE

DON WILSON, USIA

From: Bris. Gen. LandalcEd

1130

3/8/05

Subject: Alternato Course I

In compliance with the donires and guidanco expromed la the

10 Augurs polley incoling on Operaldon Mongoose, mo will produco

an oullino of an aliernale Course B for submiasion. The CLA paper

"Operalional Plan (Heduced Elfort)" will bo wood an the slartlog

cerra lil.

Since thie la 10 be a bare outlino, lo permit further polloy

guldance lo be developed, l bellove the paper need contain only

a alalemons of objecilves and a llut of implementing activilica.

The lot of activitics will be undor the headinga of: Intelligenco.

Political, Economie, Paychological, Paramiliary, and Military.

We will hold an Operational Representalives work session in

my office, at 1400 hours, Tuesday, 14 Auguel, 8o complete le

outline paper for submission. Each of you le to bring 5 copica of

compleled assigned work to this work sension, to permit each of

us to work from a full oct of drafta.

Papera required from each of you for the Tueaday meeting:

Mr. Harvey: Intelligence, Political (opilling the regime.

_!, Economic (oaborage, lirited

deception), and Paramilltary.. Aluo, any suggeslione for includlon

da other pectione uf lie paper.

0(19.10

Mr. Murmlich: Statement of Objeclives, Polllical, and

Economnic.

of lic paper.

Nuo, any augscuitond for Incluaion in olher doctione

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

4/9/98890

EXCILLO 5301 1170:ATIC

RECHADING: DAD DIM 3200.10

DOES LOT A'PLY

TOP SECHET-ROFORN

SUECIAI

WARNING.

Thio docuzont containo a parca.

sardon.

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TOP SECKS NOFORNR

SPECIAL HANDLING

Con. Harrias Economla (limitad deceptlon), Paramilienry

(limited deception), and MUllary.

Also, any muggeallona for

Inclusion da olhar sectiona of the papur.

Mr. Wilson: Paychological (Including covers). Aleo, auy

musgantiona for incluslon la olher sectiona of lhe paper.

01811

TOY SECREI-NOFCIN/

1217

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WARAN EX5

13 April 1962

•MEMORANDUM FOR RICOND

SUBJECT: Operation Hongoose

On Apoll 19, Conoral Taylor discussed with higher anchordsy

che donoon need logo of April 11 and 12, reporting slie fouldng

of secretartin kunk and idare that the dongooss progran should

Tayloe podneed out the probable pornonnel

problemo chael would ardse 16 the schedulo more completoly

Taylos woe Informed that so would have to invo wich the

Taylor commented blat we can probably cors; vue Bl0 18588

JaDe d6 1lo0d0d, Mill a robiN ul the blundeR done August 1.

Maples obloodly lavora a seron effort do socrull Cubans

tor 1he. 0. !.

He was told chort a bow book to bedog lanes die

11ad loy lompanó admiralon standardo, no con do boeder than en eno

Maxwell D. Tayior

du distribution

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

419198203

NW

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TON SECRAT

Summary Reeded of NSC Standing Group Meeling ide, 2163,

1p8a8 1963, 1:00 1818 - Culia

The brale of lie disemenion was a memorandon prepared ly Mr. Bundly

entitled A liberale of the Cuba Aliermativan."

Secretary MeNamora sealed that buforo the group dlocusade nabulanco,

is slandled commides whethes tha prement pulley mere dolloring would

produce a major clango in Cuba. llo expressad dis dion dire lat

lord's position over the sure dorm world improve if wo tout no

his bodied Are the elimination of lio Cantre retire minded Forgoire-

mere in 1hade, if more agreed our present policy ended not resule

ins ile dustello me clisulal develope de progrin dos appeared nodials worldl

and solo oe sittin of alignidence mitlin Carlos am 10 allose la Vali, 10

iro MoGone summerided information leading him to believe done

Castine punition in lialod mould le stronged it your d6 two years froin

sum llaen it ig

mould nut corse i majur change in Cold and that De Handians could

provide sufficient aid and lechnical assistance lu pernie the Caban

cemomy lu reinsin alone whore it is now ur slighly improve.

Assistant Secretary Martin did not fully agree with the views of tho

¡ecretary of Defence us Me. Morone will respece to lise allert of

existing policy on the Castro regioo, He cited evideo do indianto

More pered sendures are crippling the Cindeed droe.eemy, localing 10

i destingers, lined cof agore parts, and even sufficied duel los pressmit

full radiose dor Cirloon militii.

Coline to defore toront tre 019519a He innind Micide More Dee Doidy Doo Gollooned

dial.e does lo Don ition perior modil Caroline log done cordle, lead prioredd

with the Wilke the mode does dongle,

rampartie credled coded approve lee dred quiete does linded defly dies,!

leo. coded or disoblope de del Blee Girlorn deserony end lord de on these Bertil und

furthermore, he maid danted sos thie hidd

set it soone i love more anake permanes comed 10d brape torer, dada lie deal mus

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

419/98

ГОРАМИКА

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1:"

те +

*ly bongle. The possibility of persuading Contro do loaro Culo was

nut fensablo beened Coolro man i love rovoluti. mory who coul not he

induced lo give up his duvolution.

The Alorney Cieneral proposed tereo aludins:

A lint of noninter mo would lako following contingenclos

arel do the doodle of Piedro d8 the arustlug dures of a 11-2.

1. A program will the objucrive of ovordirowing Caslin in

cigliseen montlin.

A program to cause do much iroublo de vo can for communior

Called durg the nodd eighteen snouth.

1.0lee 5ncrctary Hall slooled the view that we should not look de Colo

dison die pend of ries ol Cold alonde llo waid the Gideon Drollern Wals

lee toget in his perspeedivisa

This willadral of Savoid foredo from Cula

ond lie dimappearance of thie doviet promondo in Culor mod of major im-

10880186010189.

USIA Director Murrow stiled his view that we need promplly a state-

1e1d uf was we would think mas in acceptoble post-cialro Cuba.

Secrorery Dillon raigod certain questions as lo what kind of a Cuba

we could live will if it mere no logges sun boy Castro of lied la Morcow.

He sail lord American companics lad weillen olf Meir appropriated

stor propatice ma cares loud the greation demoined one los eld surended

sin lone propera dare in the evend Centro ind Commonion Gindependedd

in sislair.

Please was il discondon on slat me would do for a rood-Commmonial

daled coned shoot de credle de do get Minded to defend dern thee Wiisto Phere

operaded lee lo morne differing diese as lo clothes condonie toddsules

seen lorde seeded no read lee Girlone arenay dod seleted thee usy discold

monade lee 10 dold too Gree Dee Moe Gidle def Grindeleend Colors.

MODERNIT

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Mr. Sorensen listed the suvon iljoctives salned it the snucting as

follows:

Impore our present courna of action by doing some things

that me are not new drink.

l. Agren on millary despondes elodel me also mado to con-

lingencier, our as the shooting duen of a U-T plane.

c. Develop a program lo lat rid of Casiro.

1. Mermanen lo diarape the economy of Color.

•. A program lo Induce Sovier withdrawal.

8. The deser lneed of Culen from Muscow.

1a A progra of support lor dissident elements in Colo.

Overriding all Miese points would be a statement of our viend as lo

the mind of a regime me would mane to see in Cula pust Castro.

Broiley Smiths

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## Page 143

TOTERVIEW WITH RICHARD GOODWIN

Bordei Masy 27, 1973

Time: 10:00 ^.m.

Place: Goddaln's restdence. 1536 32n0 St. NW

Partlesgones: Soli Com. - David Aaron, Kick Indorfurth, Greg Trevorton

MILE:

submadleed by: diregory do Trevertun

Durina cho 1900 Premidential compalgo, Coodwin Old Corolga

paddy murk lor John fennedy, apochallelng in lilln Amordes. Neor the

Tilal per dead lie agrobe with the breeddont abome a last In Anorlein matter

En 19s 0008-ade once a day, down lode the badle Howme to the fall of

god, boreans border dressane Secretary of Staeo for Inter-Anordean

tem.

A:1ia31 undes, 118Nd, Mobert Woodward and then ladeen Mereln. Ater

8a10 109 die leace Corps, Goodwin was broughe bock to the White

Mouse by roenident Johnson, an the spring of 1906, deer

flies l'a81lusd

Carisis, de that time, however, le

did nue spoclalize on lalin Aorden,

Gustead urselme speeches for Jolnson.

He left the suminderoedon. hidle

in islas.

1. 11000080100:

da general, doodlin had not heard much apocatie balk is as-

...aacinodani lootso. diges line buy of Plena il Cale Done Dogre Wisse

databahed, tired bodied by band dildo and them by Goodlionn in lols

coped aty on blade More still defiant.

àt a meeting of this look lurke.

lude de the date degreend, Milnult suppended "steedle co of carsero.

NO OBJECTION

DEGLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

SANITIZED

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## Page 144

INTERVIEW AND METINO SUNMARY

Paso 2 05 6

"ExecurIve Acelon." Movamara remponded that he did and atrenned his

Incorras in the dura. Howover, Goodwin did not bring the cople up later

In the meeting after Millamora lufe. To Goodwin, the dued was not roason

able ivon apore from noral objectione, for the bay of Page had Mhown sha

Cuba man polliscally aroule; Cantro would meruly have boon coplaced

odel Maud of vill Che Gueraro, both vorao than Carero, Somowhe lator,

Goodeln sat 1n on an interview Tad Saule load with Kents to woleh 1l

8'8osidone pledged n0e lo 11ll Contro, Szuli roporlod that pledge In n

FILE:

Jank force, surduin wrote a mens recommending that the Undled Slates

868 Canero alone:

anything the United Statoe did to him could only But-

erene tols poollion

In latin Amorlei.

During liN 1820

it the stole Deportment, Goudoln nue grory

cock or so with b. 6. King. Chies of the bertorn lombaphore Division

Col the CIA, and King nover montloned i plan to arsassinade Corero. for

Els kobert dennedy ever montdon such i plan du Goodwin when loudoln

Turked sür demneds, do isen and 1907.

Goodwin did believe, however, that the Unlled Stiles Was in-

vulved, de lend inderailly, ln the succooniul plue on Trujrilo, life.

Wuring die damontower admindstratlon, the Undled Stales had sovered

diplemate colotiona alth truggalo me attendeed lo isolate the bobinied

In todd, the drivesha

rutproud blot al cornered, Montoleorborn, the diedican Consul

rooms

weapons, presumably handgun, do those forces doodoln susported that

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## Page 145

IIPROTVIEN AND MISTINA SUMMARY

vILLE:

the Frenidene probably did noe know of che gun transfer, bus he male

Chas the arsenerallon and the U.S. role ulin ronpoce to le would lava

COme dA nu surprle lo

cha l'reaident, lla doubted Chat che ClA ven

sould have had do cloar the prindfor, although a general pulley of close

more midlie dave bicon punned boy chu Special Group..

smale reparers no velor mention of airamainatione.. In face,

because viro Marlen, de nover cinech. However, an asant do this fluld

•opporting and pelledead trodden over andles. and 08 cure 90m80110

the ClA 86506 ang added tallo, or even goduse, dontrare dosin dead.

bye 058880d Bool dada followers anew the Has it lage Invardon door). Ir

sonoral, Illin. American work seemed lo metrace the worse personal in

611 Bashange0n.agenedes Including she ClA.

+ 01A02000510 BrazIL:

meanin know bleede of Cla activitios In Braall. The Undred

Seales lad sleensily backed Quodius and never liked Goulare. do the

(B)(1), 4

factious: 1110wess 1? tabil sclock and even

to three-fine trade die else:

24

24

& 49

Hew bade turtles's

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• KH

INTERVIEW AND MITINO SUMMATY

Page

FILi:

J. C1R Scelyleses 10 Chlle:

The Konnedy Auntniseration docded Chre loft Wine domeraelc

the only send of combatting commundre

influence and promoting development du the reston. That dertolen won

appaded lo Chato, and lle U.s. sustchod 1le suppore from che conserv-

eave Alrenamed Goodain ane In on meetligo of the Spocial Group undy

sarady, only 18 10880 Anorded were the nubfect of the moredor. do ho

Femembered 18, In proponale shas same 10 the speckal Groug Wish dener

medleronte, polliy poporn, no8 demerspedone of recipiente of copport or

gurdudes. In lime wilde the pulley, nuppore win deven do doll direcrald.

adelalden domeste in the 1906 cincilone, but doodoln did met dalerw

Frow much. The ilgure of 520 million, montioned by stern, did moi seem

Inconcesvable lu Goudasn. lo contestad, howover, the

annertion that

ele Chlean election was the most intendely watched election in lishlage

Lon since the 1966 Dealton campaign, From bis vancose point 1u the

stile ilouse 11 dad not borit

no.

- 12.1000610.0000 26210620101091

he due done ident duves!

majo dislode too Proddend did become delive in the door ties-a

1.1.09.d 0led Blood 1l6 Donalde Cogedidde

an Unised trade pulle; moded than, tout aupported the millers id

seeded les, and american seriort

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## Page 147

INIEHVIEW AND MITTINO SUTMARY

MILL:

lor 1oll democraelo rotorm ended. Goodwin professed himoll puraled

by Johnson's arteredon

thae he load dincovored a "murder Incorporated"

1n8 8he Carabbeon. the oody apocalle doseonce dobneon ever cllud was

Trujillo, yel Johnmon lord known about tho Trujillo assumainallon from

che vory boxinning and no

could hardly have "discovered" le allor ho

s. Cell vecrasone and Connertating:

di 1 o4198580008delos, 10s covers

action.

There wild corealnly no

no one bullover

Plore Amerlean

Phine ditterone, a doud deal of money war sione tradadns pollee thriugs

Can, much bure wan apent chrough the Pentagon equipping Laeln American

Minaries, ind there was as well sond ild ictluley.

se clore porné.

le U.s, really belleved that che communiste could not dee alected so

peries and thel the plorone wien subveradon.

Paramilleory uperielons

sse innidered dy the Spordad liroup Geounterinsurgency), Latin

Anelluno das coniaddoden e hind al prainind elend der southerese Arla.

animale le porden tral 10 cm Debe cenerinendermed dil tolle nodei 1111!0

dubie donale not

-....•

•ad plurado suppost lo guerilla

in south Anorie

RW

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## Page 148

IVIUIVIEW AND IINCINO SUMMANY

PAgO 6 Of 6

Fild::

ln responee do e guestdon about döatl'se Goodedn noted 1hit

thcse eo8ae 1998 lf dhen bromdly nleere

itd... s....i

fut?".r."".

ri ctten aiole tlrood doddsentd.

Thry were butb goneral omd. on

........ ........

.... f lo lo Gpporlo! 0at 01. 111.

donedlo ban1ed 10 hann tleo dedadls of Amerdenn acllultlos on Aotin

rineldr.d.

•. riinan dugdritloi.

coaddin dedreded de lagoe dlole do comdloe the difllaloe it

leedlsccone mepomdedepudee debeloned deeromldnes Allvsolbedd d00 1l0001 de-su-

pdall oiel.di dule..

Hlollqoe 1a GElve Groglerelndel EreoEles.

m :!e tooet el tlur del le dortit alookle inlloleo

ro16lee, mie 1 1110.

• t. frooo do0d dje perdiultdose looide doe cdedidoled dlilll dtlid modlol!

oje:.di.

•d tue tredo Del tre dooememtoelell doe Gonpleedd dind delid le

dll, il pee dound contioonoo

1n won tlll mot doe cerdalee denel

iliroreiose rorgudders.

tett dogend do geugie doede datetplododde doodwill monld doherd

1.: ?..11olaeg 11ttt in Moote LuettHoled did khldd di Metleldle dullee

meiulo Wo wde Hwdld Me Mällll Gule Giih Glur Güll detsnüd dli Öreri!

ro..mlodGddDeiGe Wlel Ghi Mld Golle dll let ddd !ld dl

irl dete,

ll dioldold Mleat theudd drd dered Gmdodennldedi lirl dWilt

Htoogtt thad Deee.1ed.

HW

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HPIWIVIEW AND IAJEFINO SUMMARY

Пара 6 05 6

FIld::

ln rosponce do dl quesedon aboue däal's, Goodeln so8ed chat.

lledo dobe calleeltor burdde dlego woondaiioie

'for: ".l.."0.

meettonarodo flrrdde doiricente.

ihy tere both doneril couud, mon

' eoldoet!

•cieöo lo loe orppeorde! en:! o1

' . *.

Pemileels soneeel lio diroo

flrs.

idlopiel li

"E amerdron sis lursdes on ie rin

cn.a8 11..0

Ivis

Masaan nellroodde popugedlodo do comeeord the dds d9ul lindf

dutchirein

ds .ir.idt

azeeotbont beeronddme divodeedd la tlll dei-lor.

wiarade pogonsend.de

ontrottwe torappoiredoddlbrnialler

rl.!.. teell!!!о.....:.?. !:т.

•:do::.l

de perea1 1eed lortde doe dleoddde drddedend tab girs

"pidi ondi, pound'tpllted

edoftodor drcmmhcdledd do londite..

rie! ituul fad

ral, t eare de mede doosel ddonddd do won wald mut dlo;

afscialod. do.11.el

lee lle Belaae10d.

maid dordfege dio gereiled do duee Batedwinwonde ronedeell trsltärllend

M..: l.ctalaori dgliice de deagdodd doandd dudned dee d khlod ot

Pecbolodd testo.

mriee docddleind der cigbe doodd altle doio till geidondd alt iseri!?

1.... .: did1iard!

ttdegeidtle nohlel

wilt. l.ad

toult. tiriowe.

i. .

/"8.1

saedee tlat leoog lrad derd dedode wddtld dire titt

1enagld pinel 19.000l.d.

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## Page 150

157-10074-10073

Declassification Review/Postponement Form

Originator:

Date:

Subject:.

711/75

HEARINGS

Original Level of Classification:

Third Agency Equities:

Remarks:

(TESTIMONT Of ROZERT MENaman)

TOP

SECRET

)NSC

Page # of Postponement

The Department of State releases this document

in part and postpones release of portion(s) of it

under the provisions of the JFK Assassination

Records Collection Act of 1992 (PL 102-526)

Reviewed on 8 On 98 he

ATTACHMENTS ONLY

Portión(s) Posiponed Under_6 (U(C2

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

AS SANITIZED

419/98

Reason for Postponement IAW Section 6 of JFK Act

No olfiction.

'OSD

NO CRUSCTION

NATIONAL ODOGARTY COUMOIL

1418-4-8-98

HH: 50955

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