MEMORANDUM: YURIY I. NOSENKO
Originator: CIA
From: DAVID E. MURPHY CHIEF, SOVIET BLOC
To: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Document date: 1966-10-25 00:00:00
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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41.

PECLASSIFIED Department of State

Guidelines. July 21, 1997

Date:

10-29.2021

25 Actober 1961

CUSJECT:

Pirector of Central Intelligence

Yuriy I. S09F440

• . 1..

1.

The attached menorandum

describes the technires

used and the results

natained in the first rha.? of pre

musent interrocation of Mostrin.

The most significant

iten to ereire

nuestioning and related nolveranh

lestirg

nertained to

runjeet's

story on lee liarey eStolE.

¡unjact's reactions to the nolveranh indicate that he

nover hears of oskalD intil after President Kennedy's

assassination in

Soverber 1903

, Plat he was not an active

narticinant in the

claired and that his whole

story on LSALD was pronared by to kG3 and given to us

at their diroction.

areas of strong reaction refer to Subject's

suspected contact vili tie

Kro whale in Geneva in 1962 and

1964 and to Abidian and the rushlin Street drop (key factor

in the PENKOVSKIY corprorise).

Subject becane very unset

at auestioning on this subject and refused to ciscuss his

okin

alleged involverent in

also touched upan

•CSENKo's pare.tal achground,

periods of irorisonrent end

honosexuality.

Icactiors here all pointed to clear-

cut contradictions in the ston he has told us.

There still remain several areas of interest and

importance to be covered with the

techniques used to date.

se expect to complete this line of questioning by 28 October.

This first phase hns enabled us to confirm our

analyses of key

astocts of this case.

s'ere imnortant is

the fact that MOSFiO knots he is reacting in sersitive

areas and this is worrying hi, because he

15 not sure ha

much we kron or ok we learred it.

NOSENKO's reactions

have given

hope that ie

this nrocedure have hegun

to strike home.

He do not know what it is that reens this

nan sittine montil after month in his present situation.

No speculate that one factor ray be confidence that the

KGB will get hin out.

Related to this mar be the thoucht

that the iGR hes CIA so deenlv nenetrated that it would de

wealthy for hin to confess.

gation, expanded and used

Duir current line of interro-

forcefully, rig'it

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too sud

• 2 .

break down sone of his obstacles to confession by showing

us in a different and stronger nosture.

Therefore, we now

plan to so beyond the limited sins originully sot for this

phase of the interrogation.

We plan to continue the inter-

rogation in the hope of setting

confession; written plans

wili be submitted when they are nore definitely fornulated.

David E. Mumhy

Chief, Soviet

Bloc Division

Attachment

Acting DDP (w/attach)

Chief, Cl (w/attach)

Director of Security (H/attac!)

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•• *

24 October 1966

1.

This 18 an interim report on progress to date in

the new phase

In the interrogation of NOSENKO, which began

on 18 October 1966, and covers the first four days, 18-21

October. After a break, 1t will resume on 25 October.

2. Our alms in thia phase of the interroçation hava

limited.

In view of the possibility of losing access

LO NOSENKO, wa have sought (a) to strengthan our basic report.

now in preparation, by testing his story further, clarifying

points of confuaion and roveling ner contradictions, and

by polygraph exaninations of key areas, and (b) to lead

toward his eventual confession by directly exploiting our

hypotheses about the true background of NOSENKO and this

KG3 operation, to convey to NOSENKO the impression that we

knor more than before, that we possess irrefutable proof

of his guilt and that he has no prossects for release.

refrained from doing this in earller phases of the interro-

gation, but at this point there seens little to lose.

3.

The iirst four days have shown that the method 18

usefill.

NOSENKO again proved a good reactor on polygraph,

hu seemed aisturbed by our knodledge and the spocial areas

of internst we revealod, and we were able to develop 1m-

portant new information, contradictions and indications

concerning the background of this operation.

Mathod

4.. Our basic approach has seen to question HOSENKO in

specific terms on selected and detailed aspects-of the story

he has told to date.

we gave him no explanation for our

reneral of the interrogation, nor has he asked for any. Our

questions have been pointed and deciled and neither require

nor permit long-winded answers, they do not seek new intor-

mation but are clearly designed to check information he pro-

vided earliers our questions are slanted to build up the

Impression that they are based on data we have learned in-

The subject matter is taken up in a preister-

dependentlY designed for maxinun impact on NOSENKO.

mined order

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2.

Hiahl1ghts to Date

5.

OSNALD Case!

The opening session wes a polygraph

examination conducted by Nicholas Stolaken, when liOSziKO

recognized as his earlier polygraph operator.

Iole in the oswinD case.

he hit this point before any other

In order (a), to permit clean polygraph testing on this key

natter without having disturbed him with other questions.

and (b), to get over to LOSENKO tie gravity of our concern

on this

matter of highest state interest. The operator's

conclusions weres

subject was not personally or actually in-

volved 17 the OStilo case from 1953 whila OSitio vas

In the Soviet Union.

Subjact received special instructions (from

the KGB) abiut the OS;Ald case and what to tell An-

arIcan authoritios about 1t.

Subject's allegei association with the OSHALo

case both "before

and after" the Kennedy assassination

tantiatina sublect'& cover story

subject heard of OSHALD (as a case) only after

Konnedy's assassination, however he was not an active

participant in 1963 as he indicates, but was probably

6.

Geneva Meetings:

we devoted several hours of Inter-

rogation and polygraph testing to the Geneva periods, June

1962 and January-february 1964.

"e hit this point second in

order because there are clear signs of important deception

behind 1t and 1t offers us special opportunities to sugçest

Inside Information which in fact derive from observation and

seduction. Among the high points were the followings

Pavel SHAKHCV, NOSEXO's story of his "investi-

gation" of SHAKHOV, a Soviet delegation nember whom he

do sore ca that it 1. or our pate or assass, cond

....

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5'.,

3.

STINKHOV's. background in fact suggests that

he 1B actually a kGB officers

his contact in Geneva

with David MARK, a former CIA cooptes in Moscor 1s 06,08

et the center of NOSENKO's story.

ie slanted our

piestions to suggest knowledge that SilANOV 1s a KGB

officer (not a KGB Investigation guspect) and that

de may knod of some of his important operational

NOSEiKO was Inconsistent in his story

and reacted significantly under polygraph examina-

rie are currently tracing new names and data

uni are re-exanining the aignificance of this matter.

Key Control in Genevar NOSElKO reacted very

strongly and consistently to the question of whether

or not he had been sent to Geneva by the KGB to con-

tact CIA, whether he was receiving XG direction

there, and on related questions, including some re-

lated to his ostensible investigation of Pavel SuAKHoV.

c. U.Se Personnel and Installations in Geneyar

NOSINKO das Interrogated on his earlier story that

he had seen in Geneva in 1964 the file on KGB actlilty

against American installations in Geneva (KGB cryptonyw

"SKO:PICH") •

His version this time conflicted with

his 1964 version but contained the same message, that

the weak and understaffed KGB in Geneva had little

limited facilities and no success in opera-

tions against the Anericans and had practically no

Idea of the identities of CIA personnel there. In

addition, NOSENKO reacted to polygraph questions

related to whether the KGB had told him the nane of

his CIA case officers.

on the other hand, he did not

react to the names of

the then COS Saitzerlaná and

CUB Geneva, which

suggests that he was not told them

(these names were buried in lists of names).

KGB Personnel In Geneva! NOSEYXO's ansters

to questions concerning Alexandr KISLOV conflicted

with certain details earlier reported, Including KIS-

LOV's role in the RECHITCHAT case.

He seemed disturbed U<

by the questioning on KISLOV and finally said he saw

no reason to ansver any more of them.

polygraph reactions did not suggest that he was a

sensitive to KISLOV as to other individuals and matter:

covered in the same serles of questions.

we also asked,

with the polygraph, whether he was withholding anything

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4.

concerning his allaçod agent Gleg GRINEVSKIY, sn

official of the Soviet delegation his reactions ^

suggested that he may genuinely be ignorant of

GRINEVSKIY's KGB activities lēs handler of a British

double agent in Genevalat the time.

He had earlier

sald that his dally access to the KGB Residency 1n

Genova in 1964 was due to his frequent contacts dith

Fikhall S. ISYMBALy this ilie he sald that he only

sad TSYMBAL twice in Geneva

17 1964 and failed to

mention a sunday meeting with tstMbal which ha had

reported to us at the time 1t occurred.

open the whole question of hor lOSENKO can explain

his dally access to the Residency, which he himself

nod says - evidently on the basis of that he has

learned from our previous interrogations - is not

normally pernitted. This will be covered in further

questioning.

7. Matters related to the PEICVSKIY Compromises

John ABIDIAN'". Visit to the Pushkin Street

Readdrop:

USENKO reactod witn special sensitivity

and intensity when asked in a polygraph test whether

he had been instructed to tell CIA about ABIDINI'&

visit to the Pushkin Street deaddrop.

In eddition.

he refused for the first time to discuss his om

participation in the Ineident, adamantly claiming

that he does not remember when or even whether he

visited the drop or whather he read reports on

surveillanes coverage of 1t after ABIDIAN's visit.

He had earller said he visited the drop at least

trice, Immodiately after ABIDIAl's visity he des

cribed the location and nared the KGB officers.he

went with.)

In sharp contrast to hia reluctance

to discuss his personal role ves his unhesitating

and confident rasponse to other aspects of the

pushkin Streat drop

he reiterates that

AblDlai was under full time, double-strength sur-

veillance throughout his tour in Moscor and that

ABIDIAN was surveilled to the drop.

He nor sdds.

cor the first time, that the KGS concluded that the

drop had been initlally found by a U.S. tourist or

delegation sember and that ABIDIAN was merely check-

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5.

06

[O:ICKO-252Pl MOSEXO was again queried on

Ob colonel Dulicklis bugged restaurant neating with

l|en Indonested officer, those nene he gave as [ZEpa Ut

1n 1962 and CuCKO. in 1964.

He could not clarify

Ob why he had confused the names.

since we nod know

through Greville WINNE that the Sovlets vere inter-

ested as late as early 1953 in clarifying PENKOV-

SKIY's allusion in a hugged conversation in 1961

O6 to (repp"

we believe that MOSEiKO's 1962 version

da9 E KGB fishing expedition. Horever, MOSENKO

did not react to a polycraph question

Ob tha name Zepel

not hirself know that

he was given a wrong nase for the Indor aslanj officer,

nor iny.

admiral VORONTSOV: It had been speculated

that when NOSENKO mentiched in June 1962 mectings

the name of his "big friend" in the naval GRU,

Admiral VORONTSOV, he may have been fishing for

comments from us concerning Marshal VARENTSOV,

PENKOVSKIY's protector.

Queried this time about

Admiral VORONTSOV, NOSENKO sald that ha had never

met him and had no personal or similar connection

he seens to have completaly forgotten ever having

claimed a personal relationsnip.

(PREISFREUND and STORSBERG

NOSENKO was asked about

Johan PREISTREUND

whom he had

earider claimed to have handled

clerk Jim STORSBERG.

FREUND In 1960. Me tola NOSENO that PREISFREiND tola us 0t

that he had not met NOSENKO until 1962.

NOSENKO dented

this. He then added to his concern by telling him (untruth-

Fullye but with a reasonable estimate of the true altuation)

Obthat PREISPRUaID also' said that the KCB had told him to say

he first met NOSENKO in 1960.

ihen polycraphed NOSENKO re-

acted strongly and consistently to questions on the subject.

these reactions and our follow-up may well bear on the ques

Obtiun of whethor STORSBERG was actually recruited by the KGB,

an issue we have reviewed with the FBI.

NOSENKO must be

concerned because he now Bays that the STOR$BERO case was Ob

primarily GRINAZOV's, not his own, although he, NOSENKO,

"supervised" 1t.

Thus disappears the sole case that NOSENKO

has claimed as his very oin.

ne of the basi

and personal background. There are many indications, reported

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earllor, that he has spent timo in prison and that ho is

not in fact a KGB officer, similarly, his stories of his

aarly school and military service are inconsistent and

unbollevable.

we are trying in this interrogation to

clarify this important point. Among the points coverta

so far are the followings

a. Identity: NCSEUKO was questioned extensively

on the polygraph concerning his làe.:tity.

series

of tests, for extriple,. he was asked whether

Minister of shipbuilding Ivan NOSENKO das the father

of turi Ivanovich NOSEIKO and was then asked whether

Minister NOSEN was hig father, similarly with

Tamara WOSLiKO, his ostensible mother.

NCSEKO did

not react to the question phrased "Yurs Ivanovich

NOSENKO", but reacted consistently when esked if

these were hig om parents.

He was sensitivo to

questions concerning h's marilage.

to believe he is not, in fact, married.)

He was also

given a series of teste asking for the first letter

of his siven nemo.

The whole alphabet was covered,

and the polygräph

charts shor that he became increas

Ingly tense,

culninating at the letter s (or perhaps

nhile we recognize that testing of

this sort may not give valid results, it cortainly

gets over to NOsEo the degree of our doubt and may

even help us determine who he really 19.

puraue this further, covering his patronyn and family

name as well.

HomosexualIty.

We tested polygraphically our

observations that Mosalio has homosexual tendencies

and experience.

lie showed himself extremely sensitive

to this line of questioning.. The test results tend

to show that he had homosexual experience in Sovlet

Imprisonment (see below) and with the KGB homosaxual

agants whom he has told us he recruited and handled.

Immeisonments In view of the strong indica

tong that NOSENKO has spent considerable time in

prison las reported in the past), we questioned him

on this.

He reacted strongly and consistently to the

question of whether he had been imprisoned in the USSR.

We then ren a series of testa to determine his relative

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and various years of imprisonment.

He geened con-

sistently sensitive to correctional labor camps

as the type of prison, and to several possible

causes of imprisonments

particularly homosoxuality.

desertion and felony.

Interestingly enough he was

not sensitive to questions concerning imprisonment

for self-inflicted wounds despite his story that he

had shot hinself in the hand auring the war.

Re

seened more consistently sensitive to siberia as

the area of imprisonment but the results were not

as clear as on other aspects of his story.

He seans

particularly sengitive to the years 1954-1956, which

Immediately preceed the period from 1956 onward,

when ho began to appear in KG3 operations.

-.. ...

soar

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