MEMO
Originator: WH
Document date: 11/8/61
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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176-10010-10002

JFK Assassination System

Identification Form

Agency Information

Date:

5/5/2016

AGENCY: NARA

RECORD NUMBER:

176-10010-10002

RECORD SERIES: • POF

AGENCY FILE NUMBER:

Document Information

ORIGINATOR: WH

FROM:

TO :

TITLE:

MEMO

DATE:

PAGES:

11/08/1961

4

SUBJECTS :

ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES

DOCUMENT TYPE :

PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION :

Secret

RESTRICTIONS:

IC

CURRENT STATUS: Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW:

05/08/1998

OPENING CRITERIA: UPON AGENCY REVIEW

COMMENTS:

POF:CO:Cuba, Security, 1961:Box 115

v9.1

28

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1°19

DEUIEL

29

ki:. 90 wud

8. November 1961

TYPES OF COVERT ACTION AGAINST THE CASTRO REGIME

Non-Sensitive Activities: A variety of non-sensitive political warfare

and propaganda activities are being conducted outside Cuba. These include:

(a) working with the Cuban Revoluntionary. Council and the number of other

Cuban groups in Miami in an effort to improve their competence to undertake

action on their own and also to minimize the effects of disunity among the

Cubans; (b) efforts to induce the defection of prominent Cubans from the Castro

Tegime; (c) black operations with the objective of having Castro's diplomats

declared PNG or having additional countries break diplomatic relations with

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Cuba; (d) speaking tours by teachers, student, labor, jurists and women's

groups throughout the bemisphere; (e) support of publications and distribution

of pamphlets; (f) the support of anti-Castro radio programs on some 60•

Latin America stations and 3 stations in Florida; (g) the operation of Radio

Swan; (a) the use of a broadcasting ship for intruding radio broadcasts on

Cuba t.v. channels. There is believed to be little risk that these activities

will give rise to political embarrassment, except for that resulting from the

jealousy, of various Cuban groups and criticism by one of alleged support to

another. The following paragraphs constitute a list of politically more

sensitive types of activities in progress or contemplated.

I SECRET

ONLY

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29

2. Agent Training: There are currently some 90 Cubans already trained

or now in training as activists who can be infiltrated to organize the resistance

and to develop sabotage activities. In addition there are some 22 Cuban

students in training for infiltration to conduct Agit/ Prop activities. For the

most part the training is being done in Florida. The men are trained in

compartmented small groups; the largest single unit, already trained, numbers

35. No subsequent group will be as large. The candidates are of course

volunteers and are from a number of the political groups with which we are in

contact.

3.

infiltration/ Exfiltration: We maintain and employ for training and

operational purposes a fleet of some 7 craft. They are used primarily for the

infiltration and exfiltration of individuals and, if and when feasible, of arms

Currently, infiltrations are apt to involve no more than 3 to 5 individuals at a

time but larger groups (up to 15 or 20) may be infiltrated in the future if and

when this becomes feasible. No Americans are allowed on any craft that is

going within the 12-mile limit around Cuba. Many infiltration exfiltration

operations involve a meet-at-sea with a Cuban fisherman.or a Cuban craft

4. Building an Intelligence and Resistance Organization: Contact is still

maintained; chiefly by secret writing, with 28 agents in Cuba. Their present

function is restricted to the furnishing of intelligence and in some cases the

maintenance of communication with internal resistance leaders. Every effort

will be made to infiltrate additional trained agents and communicators as rapidly

as possible for the purpose of building an internal resistance organization and

SECRET

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2 SECRET

3

2

9

establishing effective 'secure communication with internal resistance leaders.

The objective will be to develop one or more nets of dependable sympathizers

and the means of communication both among themselves and to the outside.

In the first instance such internal assets, to the extent to which they are

subject to control from outside, will be used for intelligence collection,

further clandestine recruiting, assisting in infil/exfiltration operations, and

mounting low risk sabotage operations. They will be deliberately restrained

in this phase from exposing themselves by operations involving high risk

or the assembly in one operation of any sizeable number of the resistance:

5.

Accelerated Resistance Activities: In parallel with the pecessarily

time consuming effort to build a secure underground organization, it is now

planned to support in the next few months larger scale infiltrations of men

and arms for sabotage and perhaps ultimately guerrilla activities when well-

conceived operations are proposed by reputable opposition leaders now outside

the country or are requested by the resistance leadership from within. In most

cases the sponsorship.and ultimate responsibility for such operations will

rest with Cubans and the Agency's role will be that of furnishing support in

the form of funds, training; equipment, communications, frequently the

facilities to conduct the actual infiltration itself, and resupply following.

infiltration if required and feasible. These will necessarily be higher risk

operation in which some casualties must be anticipated. It will be impossible

to conceal U.S. geographical origin but every effort will be made not only

¿ SECRET

EVES ONLY

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24

possibly to forestall identification of U.S. Government support but also to

avoid any appearance of U.S. Government control or ultimate responsibility.

What will be impossible to disprove is that the Cubans responsible obtain

help in the U.S.

6.

Air Operations: If the internal resistance grows, it will be desirable

at some point to undertake air resupply missions. These would be conducted

by Cuban crews using common types of commercial aircraft. They will be

night missions and would be undertaken only if reception parties had been

identified and were in possession of agent radio sets and; bopefully, beacons

so that resupply could be carried out with reasonable efficiency. Aside from

such air activity, proposals have been received for both leaflet drops and

bombing raids. One successful leaflet mission was recently conducted by.Y

Cubans from Florida entirely on their own after Agency support had been

refused. Such operations rather infrequently carried out may have a useful

"morale effect.. Up to the present time it has been felt that air bombing,

quite aside from international repercussions, would be contraproductive

in its effect on the Cubans:

¿ SECRET

EYES CIV

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