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176-10033-10145

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA

RECORD NUMBER : 176-10033-10145

RECORD SERIES : Church Committee

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : WH

FROM : Schlessinger, Jr.

TO : Kennedy, John F

TITLE : CIA Reorganization

DATE : 6/30/1961

PAGES : 15

SUBJECTS :

DOCUMENT TYPE : Paper, Textual

CLASSIFICATION : Declassified

RESTRICTIONS :

CURRENT STATUS :

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 2/14/2001

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :

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BENITILED MUL: 10•261 & 5/12

SECRETI

@iA.

June 30, 1961

:..

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: CIA Reorganization

I submit the following viewe as one who worked in OSS during the

was and served as a periadlo ClA consultant la the years since.

On balance, GLA's record has probably been very good.

has the

nature of clandeatine operatione, the fitumpha of an intelligence

agency are unknown.; ad the public heard about for should hear

about) are its error8. But again ln the nature oí the case. an

ageney dedicated to clandestine activity can afford damned few

The important thing to recogulze today, in my

judgmont, le that the ClA, as at present named and constituted, has

about used up 1e8 quote.

its masgin fox future astor ta practically

One more GlA debacle will shaie faith conaiderably

In us policy, at home ad mall as abroad. And. until ClA 18 vialbly

reosganised, il will fae in the Algerian lastance) be widoly blared for

developmenta of ubich it is wholly iunocon..

The argument of this memorandum la that CiA lo trouble can be traced

to the autonomy with which the agency has been permitted to operates

and that this autonomy de due to threo main caudes: (l) an inadequara

doctrine of clandestine sporationa, (2) an inadequate conception of

the relationhip between opexations and policy; (3) an inadaquate

*Or should be .. a gross and repeated ClA falling has been ita

occasional readineda to succumb to the temptations of favorablo

publiaity.

The Guatemalan end Iranian operatione weze almost

nullifted by the load al self-congratulatory publicity which tollowed

them fe. g., the artieles by Richard and Gladye Harkoese.

"The

Myoterious Doinge of GIA, " Saturday Evening Post, Oet, 30, NN. 6.

19, 1954)

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canception of the relasionship betreen operations and intolligence.

The memorandur aloo euggests waye in which dame di these prou

leras can perhapa be allevinced.

1 CIA Autonomy

GIA conducte tiree main forms ol deczet works clandsotine intelli

gence collection covert political operations; and paramilitasy

activities. l carmen on insue functions wits relative au unuray.

The restone for tho antonary ago Matarical.

Wasa ElA begas, the State Department, atill tainting too much la

torrao of ite traditional miusions in foretya allated, loutsed as tita

new ventaço mits qunptatos and renunced the oppostunty lo arize

tista control al clA operations.

I did not, for enemple, thy to

establion any allective oyeren el clearance for ClA activitlees and

SOTTO ATTAESAdOrA ETRNilY Preserted not to triow what ClA WAs uN tO

in theis contrice. Atlar 1953 the fact that the secretasy & Stale dni

the Director ol Central Intelligence were brothare funder confizmed

ClA's indepandence droo enperviston by state Degastment dente.

In tãe meantime, CLA grew in site and porres.. During lso fleted it

begas in dome aresa te oafatrip the stata Departenant to ede quality ol

¡to perdozael..

Partly bacquse GlA pold higher andertes and avon

more portage because Allen Dullee gave his jecole couragenue pro-

tectión againot liccertlyite astrela. CLA una able to attract anl hola

a large number of abte and independent minded nes

The more it

ended Balllant activito to tto atall, tho moro sadmontura ite onarations

seveloped, and the greater role is played la tão lufflation of polley.

By the time that state had bogun to do fully stare of the prouterso

crested by as sctive and autonomove CIA. it had long alnce uleces

the chance to eutatitch fte cura ultimate anthority While State xe-

tained a nominal supervision over covert politteal operations, thia tas

to some degree oftiet by ClA'a tendency to progent a propoded operation

almost an a tait ascomoli stara neves baátitte ta castrol quest

clandentte intelligence collection and t lad toet ground in such

arona so overt politicel reporting and even is the raetrtensico ol

overt diplomatia contacter

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For its past, CIA had developed a whole series of fusettons paral.

deling already estating functions of the State Department, and of

the Defense Department en well.

Foday it has tea own political

deake and military staffar it has in effect its awa foreign servicel

it has (ox has bad) its own combat forced, ll even has 1ta Ours ats

force.

Its annual budget ls about _times that of the State Depart-

1agit.

The contemporary ClA possesses many of the charactertatice

of a state within a efate.

It, Doctrine

Though GLA's autonomy developed for biatorical ressong, it has been

able to endure because there to no doctrine governing our donduct of

slandeetine operations+

The problems of docline fOr CIA la the extent

to which sta various clandestine missiono are comparible with a free

and opez soctety.

Il is tolle to argue that. because the Communtato can do suck-sid-ouch.

ve ase frco to do it t00, Gommuniem le a exend nurtared la cono

spiracy, and tho mbola point of Gammants? social and poltiteal organt.

nation le to make conapiracy sffective..

'Eighling lie wit fire' means

contracling the irnedoms traditienally enjoyed by Americane in order

to giTo more ircedom to ClA, do one sericuaty miahts to do that.

I do not feel thas we have filed eigorouely to think through the llmits

wich the maintenance of an opes coolaty places on ancret activity.

Until thia la dona. CIA 'è role will nos bo eleazly defined and under.

staddi

The problems which munt to laced ins what aort of secret

sitiulty la conalesant with the presaruellon al a fres social oxdes?..

We must bogla, i bellove, by accepting the lact that the Unitad stareo

will continie to ba a natton la viles politiciano will del quentiona ano

rake speeches, reportera will dig out esortes, nerripapera will pab-

lian oditorialo, individuala, driven by promptiago of conecteace. stil

blure out thiago harmful to the states dod so dis We do not alai lo

change these thinge and could not do so without violatlag the essence

of out society..

These thinga make up the framerora le mides ClA

must operate.

In atrost they constitute she probleras dad, de

General Marshall used to aay, "There's no polat in fighting the

prodiera."

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Thare followe from tbia, i would thini, the conclusion that secret

sctivitieg ese permisettle so long de they do not corrupt the

psincipies and practicos a lou gociety. and that they cense to be

permiessble when thor effect ta to corrupt thone oatnciples and

Pracuces.

Each form of decret setivity presente ite oun problera, Clantettine

intelligence collection has bean a eraditional function of the sational

state.

Es salee and unagas ard fairty well establiched. In the

mala capionago. Il conlucted vith discretion ahould present no

groat probles.

Howevat, when conducted aita an open checkbooks

eud a broad mandate, even espionago con begta to pueb agaires tha

inita of sacrat sortutty la an open sostety.

& soneider later, for

•esample, the question of the Controlled Americin Bourco (0As) and

whether the avertoing of CAS la not toglaning to sarm other sotluttiee

• of the goverament..

Govert political operations predoni a trichier probiesa.

artes when te in necesaary do subsidlee newapagera polticiano and

organinations in othes ccuntrier..

.Bus contuption of the polttical life

ol another nation le not e rospenetbility in bo lightly sasurad

Monder whether GIA dea not dune too much of tate for the joy of il

Paramilitary ecllustics espata an even more diffleult protleus, le

anty bocasse tho problemo of concealment are ed much moro difieult.

la general 1 so ula duggent that any seeres operation whore succeas te

dependant on the auppresiton ai nevia, en iying to Congresamen and

fournaliers and on the deception of the electorate alould be undentalen

only shos the erloto in eo coniderablo that the galas coally seem to

outweigh the diendrantegan Thie daggeore thei the qlen ot the pro.

posed operation may te al crucial importario: Small oparazione coa

bo done with a ranimura of adcompanying corrantion. Tha groates

the vestisty of tho onoration, tho more lin success depende on

tamartlag ibe impalaes and danying the values di an open society.

the stakies le bacomee, and the mure ungent it to liat as eresubelraing

case be mode fon te nedeeaity.

In short, rkon consonted uita a proposed operation te must not only

dak santhos the operattaa te technically fesaltte in dra oma parmes te

munt dat whethes ita duccede seguires pur open society to be la any

certoue stay fatee to lla eun priaciplod.

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III, Operations and Bolley

Clandestine activities should bo assessed not only in she contest

of their relationahip to an open society bai aido in the coctext of chels

ralationship to United Statea foreign pallay.

Cla ogeratione have not bern hald alectively subotataste to U. 3.

foreign palley.

l. Glandette latelligence colleeston lo, by chartes, free from

Seata Departmeni control.

This face estones American foreign pottey

so a multitude of eradastasamenta when Cl ls discovered recruiting

agents of developing sourced in a irtendly country. The receat

Singapore case, wasa chi, vitiout nolice so the Consul General,

Ested lo pubvest a member of the spectal Brenda of the Stagapore .

Polico provides en instructive esample: After complicastone of

ludlerous complesiti, treluding as atternt to anbject the sectuit lo

a lenderacion tast, it turned out that the secruit had long since

informed bie supartare al the eld approach and was leading ClA

toto a trap untel, when agrung, produced constinzable embarrasa

mont so rolationa betweon the Us and the Stagipute government.

There have been trombles of a comparadle sost la Pablatan and li

Japas (whero a group of Chinese Nalionala sere emuggled into Sadebo

to tart la a dIA-NaA operation!.

ClA has sald that, in such cases, netther the Imbassy so the depart.

ment la Waabington in normally imormed of this type el operation.

In shatt, no one knowa how many potential prebioma lor us foretgo

policy - and how much parantia! Erletlos with irtendly stales . are

boing created as tate soment by GlA elandestize intalligence operationa.

Burely there la as angumeni los permlittag state to docião waether the

advantage to be gained by the sporation ferdi, the information derivable

ftor an agon withla the special Eranch of tha Singapore Palice) Qui

weighs the siai ferfe, anasperating the local goverament and shaking

its conistanco both in our purposed and in out sendel. clanciestine

intelligence operations diculd plainly be eleased both with the Depart.

ment al stare and (anve for exceptional inetances and as agreemont of

the seererary of State) with the local Uns; Ambasnados.

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2. Covert polltich! oporaltons tochnically require Etate

Department clearance.

In practice, howeves. Gis had often beon

abro to seine tha inilfalive in ways mbich seduce State'a sole almost

to that of a rubbes atamp.

Ibis has been partly tue consequence of the superios asive and

activiams of ciA parsonned. especially se compared with the alffidence

of State Department personnel. For exarepte, when men come to cla

with the assignment of devaloping covart political campaige of

organiaing coupo or preparing for paramilliary warfare, these trei

naturally fall to work with inganuity and real, thoy probably feel that

they aso not esming their pay uieds, day, lady orgasire as many

coupe so poseiale.

The concept al 'contiagency planning' lse

legitimatized the concrete preparation ol aparalione sull presumably

in a hypothotical atage: people All not at fires antice thas 'contingency

plening:' when carried to the etage of recrultmant and training ol

pOISONNEL, ¿rAREa A veSted talerest siateh often tranafariad contito

genoles into apparent necuaeittes..

Thus, ll a group da asserabled

and revved up on a contingency baots, thon the fallure to carzy the

project through (li to argued) mili irutto the disappointment and

allenation of the groupt an the presoure locressed to follew through

on what had started an a pure specsiation.

This was a central sactor,

of conreo, in tho chan dociatos to tha laet that distantiment al tho

Guhan force in Guatemala just deemed lo creato too many problema ans.

smabarrasement. Having entesed into relatione with personalities to

foreign lando. CiA has sometimes doemed to feel chet ta must there.

astor do pretty much want taty vant .. ot tlde thay will blow security

as eves go over to the comanuntala.

Thio approaca has saade us on

occaslon the prisonero al our one agenta. a

#we become pricanera of our agenta la anothor sanse toe.

The Gabas

apisode leaves the asiang improsulan tha: GIA le nil ablo to control ita

dum lourlevel epecasives.: Whito the ClA people in Washlagton aro ten

of enceptionally high quallty, the men attractod to field jobe ate sore-

t1ma00 tough and even victoua perpio motivated by artues al their ova

and not noconnarily ia polttical os even motel sympatay wila the purposes

if the operation.

Such actions an locking up the Revalutionary Courall,

such enterpriaca so Operation 10 ln Miamd whore GiA sgents reportedly

trained Cubans in methuds of sorture, auch episoded as the detention and

third degree repartsily adminietered te De, Rodolia Nodel Tarats anl

16 other democratte Cuband tals J'obruary . all these suggest thas thiago

go on under ChA spendorehip with which GiA in Washiagton de baly dtraly

soguainted..

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It has meant to that the state Departinent, often apprtued of an

egesation only in i10 later etages, ta undes great pressure to

endorse the operation as slrandy mounted becauce of the altegod

evil congequences of exexcielag a vera. & moli retuesabes loss

Nat's ramask the dey the declaton wes mido to go ahead en Gubal

"I would naver have lavored inislating tais opexations bu, mlace it

• has gone ai far an it hat. I do not thiak me can flat calling it asl. *

Moreover, at à time when there is increadfog premiur on activier.

Elate, when it queationi GIA operationa or initiatived, cante isali lo

a priasy, sissy, negativo sots. The advocate of clandestine activitice

seems "tough' and realistic: the opponent has to lavoke auch lotangiblee

so the reputation of the Voted States, moria pubtle opinion. "What

•do wo say in the Unitad Nations?", etc., ant scutas bopeterely

tralistic, logalterie end 'sett. •

The resus of GIA's saltiative la covere polltical operations bas beca

to create situations which have loreed pottey on the State Depictment.

Thie uad not the origina. tien bahind dis.

Ad Allon Dulles wrote

in his 1947 F0ra0raníin to the Senato Arsed Bervicda Gosamitreo.

"Tho Central Intelligance Agency boutd lave nothing to do with palley, "

Tete in the yeano olace, ELi lao, in effect, "made polley in many

parts of the worid.

A number of governrasate till in powes knes

that thoy have aven bean targete of el, attempte it ovasticum " nos

a state of mind caleulated ta stimulate triendly tacliago tovard the

talled Stasee. Indonaels, ef couras. lo a pelme esample.

Tide expertence suggesta that the present ayotera by waten ClA nostites

stare of a projected covest operation de inadequate so pietece ul

Intensite.

There tuat te doud means by which flate can Be infortuad

at such operationa at an carly enough stago to elect the conception

and preliminary planing as the operation. @iberates CiA sti ceo-

ElENe to Contront StAte with propositiene having notontial luapact ou

sarsign polisy but es too late a polas to nubject that tapace to rentere

atto contzale

$.

The Controlled American Goaros) Kiss) repressate & particles

nepoct al Gie enorosgiment ou poltey making fiastiongs Cla todey

has nearly en many poople under olllotal cover oversean an State an

3900 to 3100. About 1500 of these are under State Department cover

BEGRET

19061 DocId: 32629331

PaMe A

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(the other 2200 are presumably under military or other nor-state

official cover). Originally the use of State Department cover for

CiA personnel was duppoged lo be atrictly limited and temporary.

The Dulles-Correa-Jackoon report etated in 1948. "The ClA should

not use State Department cover as s simple answer to all its problers,

But should proceed to davelop its oun outside caver and eventually la

this way and through increaded efficiency of its oversead personnel,

lind & way to temper its demande upon the State Department. " None-

thelese CIA has steadily increated its reguisitions for dificial cover.

There are several reason why GIA has abandoned lie original intenslea

if developiag sydtera of private cover. It lo caeles to arrange cover

chrough slatel ll is lese expensive: st la quicker, ll facilitates tho

accurity of aperationa as mall as of communicationas ti lasures a

pleadanter life fos the ClA paople. But tho effact is tu further the

CLA encroachment on the traditional functions of state.

Is some missions, ¿ underatand, CAS peredanet cutaumabero regular

Stato Department perdone

ls the Amesican Embaday in Vieara,

out of 20 persone lleted 1a the October 1960 Foreign Service List a0

being li the Political Saction, 16 aso CAS persomali of the 31 oflicare

Listed ss ingeging in reporting activition, over half ato das.

Of the

13 officero Iletad in the Folitieal Section in out Embansy to Chile.

On the day ol Freaident Kennady's hauguratton 47 percent

of the potstical oilicère sexving ln United States Embassios meto CAs,

Sometime e the ElA minaton chief has been li the country longer, bao

more money at hie diapoant. wields more inluence (And le abler) than

the Ambasador. Often da tua divoct accoss to the local trime

BAnister.

Sometimos (ad turing a critical period is luce) he parques

a different poltay from thas of the Ambassador; Aldo he 18 genatally

well known locally as the CiA representattve.

SA the PATtO ETabaNY tOditi LeTO atO 128 GIA pasple, GIA da Farto

has long slace begun to move into arcan ef political reporting normally

out se in te base pone a reten by pole reporting

even sought to monopolice contact with certain French political personall-

tee, among tham fus Preeldent of the National Anserably, ELA occupiss

the top fians of the Paris Embasay, a tact mell linova latally, and d

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%

the night of the Generale' peroli in Algeria, pasteze-by noted

with annusement that the top sloos was ablate with lighte. li am

informad that Ambascados Vario vau ablo te socure entrance tbat

nigal to the dIA afficeo only with disaculsy. I

ClA lo apparentiy com Mrmly committed to the ans approsch se a

pormanent solution for ite problemo. & is pressing to bave GiA

people given the rank of Counselor.

Fetore state lages contiel of

TOre and more of in presumad veraces pertonnel, and Defore dAs

beçorads permaanently integratad into lao Foreiga service, 1l movile

sem important (a) te addure overy ambaarados the lites confral

aver the local CAS statitin nominally premifed in the NSC Directive

• of january 19, 1961, and fol s0 review tho current CAS difrazion suita

an eya so a steady reductica of CAS peracanse.

Geremilitesy vsfare. & gather, le regarded la some quattore

as a purely tachnical matter, casily detacbable frass policy and thera.

foro à propos functida of the Deyartment el Delende. Yet there le

almost no ClA lunetion mato peculiarly degendent on the political.

consast than pazamilitary variare.

Thare are noveral rendone sat tate.

F'or ons thiag, a paramilitary

operation lo la ile naturo e large anê attributable operation and thereby.

de suggosted above, clanhes sith the precuppositione el cas opes

sociaty: (Thase conclantelione need not apply, howerer, to the

training ofi 4ay, tu south Viefratzedo in guerellia taclica or lo the

support e siready edoting guarilla acttuttiat For another, tha

monal aná polltica pilas di direct paramuitary talluro is acuto los

Communiato, tuon paey arimulate pararilttary setivity, une

dong mar tho morid especte from thera uhan ma do li. te appeaz

so batray ous ora profeusad principies and theretore dannot atloza to

corapound delinquancy by detente. Bioteover, la the reseat ilgarian

spicodo anovec arine me convinco the monta that va are committed to a

paramilitary erideavos. ma will he blaied for all sotto of thtaga.

Ans,

an the rotont tracteranot prisonera episode thoust, daca se do deni

men to goastbte desth, me carnet lightly unite shera olf and close ste

Tha Communiato, en tho other handa bave no scruplen aboue

iguldating e lesing short

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10.

Moreover, guerrille warfare is fought, much nose thas military

men ordinarily realize, In an ideological contor. The guerrilla

succeede when his program enlists gradstoote supporti and it lo

very difficult indeed to beat him whes the countryside to with bim.

Van Nook told General Marabail in 1946 not to worry about the

guertillas in Indonasia; "we are sendiag 50, 000 men out there

and will clean the estuation up in the three montad." Mareball,

Who had bad experteace fighting guerrilla? in the Philippines.

replted, "It von't be ed eay.

You will find that they will bleed

you to death." Cyprue and Algeria illustrate the dificulty of over.

coming guerrilla restetance through thees weight of milllary force.

Serlous guerrille movements have been detented anly three timed since

the end of the Second World War: la Greece, because Tito'e defection

closed the northers borderi in the Emilippinse; and in Malaya.

• the last two cades the guerrilla restance ended because of the

the mindo and hearts al the people, 11 therefore lavolved not any

paramilitary operationa but a vast educational prograra, organisation

st srade antons, political relorra and an oftor of national indepen once.

i the quersillas power lien in lie revoluttenary program. the enewer

Iles la past ti mecting the needs untea enable the guertilla to rouse

the countryside:

"Without a political goal. "arote Meo Fes-tang,

"GUErTIle MArIATe must lali, as ll rust If 1EA political objectives do

not coinclde with the aspirations of the peogle and ll their sympatty.

cooperation and astiatiste cannot be gained, " He added, "Do we

want tha support of the masases?. E we do, we must go among the

tRassed! aroued them to sofivily, concern outaelves with their mea:

and woe. "

8os theRe readons, abrantliary tartare cannot ba considered al

primarily a military seapate

it la primasily a political usapon and

muot therefare be dubtaited to close and cartial poltical oversighte

It probably ahould be retained in a reconitituted Cla sather Phan

frandterzad to Detente,

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5. How to untabliab Holics control? here & windes whether tie

Brit an experience sa gut dod be ei value.

The notatte feature of the

Britica totalligence ayotem in the determinatton to keep clandestine

attuity undes attles Foreign Office control. Thie cuntrot is acatered

is a sumitos di wayas

a) Socrit Intelligence Service (Micé) Iaelf operated undes

Rho ilrection of tho Joint Intelligence Committee, which bao a

Foreign Olfice chairman (untll recently Sis Patrtel Dear, who

in now the Brifles depresentative at the UN) and which includes

the Serutco Intolligence directaso and representatiuca of the

Colonial Glitce and the Commonwealth Retations Offlee ae woll

an the Chief of 8i.

bi basie political vastare directives are originatad. net

by S1S, But by the Information Rodearch Dopurtment in the

Forelga Ofiles, often la consullation wíth sa interdepartmental

Working Group on Intornational Gorsuint Exonte, und under

the ultimate contral of the Supertatending Under-secretary of

the Permanent Under-Secretary a Departiniat is the Faretgo

Office:

•) Sis covert political actton sampelgns muat not only doa.

form to Forelga aflice directiven dul muct be cleared sich the

approprtate Faretyn Office geographical dente.

d) Working groups under IRD chairmanahip govern opare.

Elona do spectal arena, dual el, for esample: Stro-suvlet sola.

Henn os the world Youth Feattrato

e) & Ferolga Olict Staff Lilitoon Offleas asta neut to the SIS

Chial and Foreten Ottice afflelate derve toure of duty in 81S

sectionde

All taçrio devices siglit do adapted dos uno by tie Stato departments

Organisationally thto would mein that the intelligence agoney would

retein operational autonomy bus that la speratione muld be at all

pointo subjece to Stato Depantmont clearando « è clearance to be

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12.

enforced by diractives, by State Department cheirrasnship of

working groups, and by the infiltration af state Department

persomel into the intelligence sgency.

Obvionely this sst-up would ant succeed, however, unlesa the

State Dapestmont liself were prepared to overcome tre inbred

habite of diffusion, negativitza and delay and to take a firm and

purposeful guty on the situation.

N. Grosatione and Intels once

The relationentp between sparationa and intelligence palace partico.

larly perplating questiono. (Intelligence' included two saperable

activistodi ciandestine coilactions and roscarch, analyats and

evaluation. The first dadle with that omali portion of saw intelll-

gence procured by secret meano (is. Dulles autimated in 1947 that

"a proger analyata of the intelligence attainable by ... overt.

normal and aboveboard mosse would supply us wila ever 80 poseent,

1 should enticate, of the infortntion sequired dos the guidance of our

national palley"), the cecond lovelves the cellation and interpretation

i to terr

ef all forma ol intelligenco, however obtained and the production of

delinanted,

Unter the Britten dystem, clandestine collection le entrusted to the

Socket Itelligence series.

The sedaazet, analyale and estimating

function lo located in the Foralgo Offico Rassarch Department:

Tader tho AmerIcen ryetery GlA has Lasporathility for boch

clantostine colloction ani sebearch and and yaid.

The state Depart.

ment'o Buzanu ol intelliganes and Ronareh alde las sagearea and

analyato responsibilitied but in practice. Cts bee established

fos accopiance o rejecdon; ha other worda, where in Great Britain

the Forolgn Office playe the coordlnating role in the intelligence fell,

in the United Stated thet tale haa been anaumed try ClAr,

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The argumeut againet incarporating the research and estimate

function in State vat made by Dulles la 1947: "Fos the proper

judging of the situation la any foreign country it la important that

informatton should be proreaned by as agency whose duty lt ta lo

weigh facte, and to draw conclusicns from thore facte, without

having either tho facto or tha conclustone margad by tha inoviseble

and even proper prejudices of the raja whose duty die te to determiao

policy and vho, having ance determined a policy, are too likely to

Do blind to any facte which might fare to prove the policy to be

sacify. "

Precisely the same axgumcnt can be und with egual etfect against

to incorporation of the researah and estimare furetion in elA on

1.e., il lotalligenco la tao closely comected with operationa, then

those comitiar lo a particain operation wils fand to dolece out the

intelligenca uhian validatas the operatios.

@bviously solo argumente conclude in & case far the estabilahment of

& falsty independent rusearch and estimate group.

Broup le too laterindest, one runa into the appadite danges, thas 1e.

thes nettbos policy doe operations will be dubjadted fa adsquate

Intolligence shacke,

Tho trouble mita to cuban apesation, los arample, was not tast

intelligence and opetations were corbined, but preclesly that the

Cuban oparation evaded eyelematic intalligence judgmeat. The lu-

selligence branch (aNI) ol AlA mao never informed al the exatenco

of the cuban oparatton.

Tho Clico ds Nationat Bettrated 4ut noveg

salad to comment on luo assuraptios, los examples that discontent

Had ranched the point in Gube miere « aucussetal landing operattes

gould provito upstatago baliad tre linen and defections from the

Misto.

in Dacerales and February, the OffIce of National Batimates

produced geRazal appratanta of the CuDDa situation, dut Chacs More

shally independent of the cuban operation; 1 gathas dal, ll MO

opinton had been lnutted, Del tould have given gulte a different

nntizare ol tho stata of opinton la Cuba froza chat on vateà the operas

Mons was assed,

Thiro exteted in thort dão sidiculous situation

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14.

that knowledge of the Cuben operation, Haunted in Miami bare

by any sumber of lov-level «gents la the operationa branch of Clis,

was dabled to even tho top officiale of the intelligence branch. The

Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Departraent of State

knew even lead about the cuban aperation..

The problera, then, la to have an R&T grouy dufliciently independent

of both policy and operations to resist the pressure to inake the case

for vested ideas and intereats - yet sufficiently close to be able to

subject projected operatione os policies to the sont tatonse and

searching scrutiay.

Where could thit group le located? If the CIA were to become

subordinate to State, as lif-ú in to the Foreign Office, then the R&E

function might be vested la & coordinate subagency, somewhat inde-

pendent of both state and Elf, yet closely connected with both is day"

tonday operations.

The RuE eubagency would recalve intelligence

fxom ClA and fxom steta, de wall do from the services and. of course.

Esera publie sourced. It would reptedent, in affect, a fusion el ClA/DDE

and Stata/ intelligence and Researel, It migit aise take over certaie

of the pertide functions now confided lo dia a photographte interpre

tation, biographical data: foretga broadcaet montioring, overt cellec.

Man, mage, etc.: There rolght be in addition a Solat Intelligenco Board

with sopresentatives from all the intelligence agenttes and wita a

State Department o* White House chairman

V. Concitstox.

The argument of this memorandom implied a fairly drestle rearrange.

ment of our present intelitgeace set-up. It alas implies the capacity

al the state Department ta astume conmand of the altustion and to do

so in as sifective and purposeful way: Il the State Department 3s 21

presEn ataffed te non capable el assuming elfective commend, thie le

nos, in say judgment: as arguriens agalast a rattonal reorgonization of

Intelligance.:

Il is an argument for a drsatic overhaul of the state

Departsrent,

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15.

The atructure which would meet the criter's suggented in this

memorandur would be as follows:

1) The State Department woulê de granted general

clearance authority oves all clandestine activity, Thia

might be effectuated on the Britica model by the appolatment

of a Deputy Undersecretary of State for latelligence. who

would act for the Secrelary in these matters and who might

serve de chairman of & Jolat Intelligence Board.

2) The Joint Intelligence Board would include repte-

sentatives from all elements in the intelligence coramunity

and also from the White House.

3) The operating branches of tho present CiA would be

reconstituted under some blamelese sitte (the National Inortizo

tion Sesvico).. Thie new agency would be charged with reaponsi

bility los clandestine collection, fos coveit yolltical operationa

and for paramilitary activities. It would subralt projecte to the

Deputy Undersecretary of State for Itelligence fax clearance.

In general, the agency would bear somewhas the sare relation.

ship to state as tha Disarmament Admittetration and IGA

presently do.

4) A seconê dent independent agency mould be set ug, agaja

bearing a blamelesd title (the Foreign Reesarch Agency), cootello

nate with the operations aganey. This agendy tould be charged.

sulth responalbility for collation and interpretation. ll would

Includo GIA/DDI, the Bureau of Intelligonce and Research in

State, and the vartous dervico functione now carried on by cla

(photographle laserpretation, biographical files, foreign broadcast

monitoring, scientifie intelligence, mage, overt collection eto."

It might well be lotated in the ClA Bullding in MoLean

Atthur schlesinger, jo.

cc: The Attorney General

MI. Bundy

Mr. Dungan

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