Agency: HSCA
Originator: HSCA
From: CIA
Document date: 00/00/0000
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

## Page 1

180101421005 an of redactedd

pages not hound dideron

iveed. a

On S&S NO GBISGRON TO

DSCLASSIFICATION AND/OG

MALEASEOF

22 i dacte

WHENT

better tramitio ento this section.

As discussed in an earlier section of this report,

the Warren Commission did not gain access to the CIA's

Exoduction icon

in Mexico City until an advance stage in its investiga-

JFK 22

Fober 22

Nem #2

tion. The record reflects that Mssrs. Willens, Slawson,

framcpscaraeillaxaieeaptas.om

and Coleman did not review the production until they

visited Mexico City

on April,,

1964. At that time, they

reviewed a number of

from the Soviet and Cuban

Embassies.

These

uncluded one call to the

Soviet Embassy on September 27f believed to have been

made by Oswaldy two calls made by Silvia Duran from the

give

dates

Cuban Consulate to the Soviet Consulate, and one call from

the Soviet Embassy to the Cuban Embassya made by an uni-

dentified caller. (Cite Salwson memo of April 21,

1864.)

On September 28 the

cecordeda

call by Silvia Duran at the Cuban Consulate to the Soviet

consulate. (Cite.)

confusing

tis

from

previses

On October 1 th

calls made by a person la

decorded two

-ified as ee Harvey

Oswald to the Soviet Embassy. (Cite.)

The Commission representatives were also supplied

with the

two conversations that

cow

transpired between the Cuban President Dorticoland the

pira Cuban Ambassador to Mexico, Armas. These conversations

I concerned Silvia Duran's arrest, whether Oswald had been

hard for

It's very

to see what

mue

saint is being page.

made or jer

10142-100506

---

## Page 2

SOUVENIT

- 2 -

as redactin

offered money while at the Cuban Embassypand the general

state of affairs at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City

following the assassination. (Slawson memo of April 22,

1964, pp. 45-46) •

which

The committee's

# review of CIA files

corro

borateen ee slawson's manorantum reAding,

provided to and reviewed by the

Commission. JOne

10

shit

LCIA document,

supporTina memorandur

i entitled "Material

carlica

expect

from P-8593 shown to Warren Commission" (Station Oswald

File) and is dated April 10, 1964. (FOIA 653-828). This

reader

document records that the Warren Commission was shown calls

remember

made by Oswald to the Soviet Embassy. These included three of the

comersations

it.

E September 27 listed above, one call of

September 28, two calls of October 1, and one call of

October ?

While this does not correspond to the listing of

calls set forth by Slawson, it does independently establish

« audite warren comes a20n

that no calls made of November 22, 1963 were shown to

In addition, this document corroborates the showing

Conviho of the two Dorticas-Armas conversationSof November 26,

the Warren Commission

The Committee has queried former Commission and CIA

representatives in an effort to determine if a transcript

of the Calderon conversation was ever shwon to the warren

---

## Page 3

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF THIS DOCUSENT

- 3-

Commission. The response On both accounts has uniformly

been that the Calderon conversation was never made avail-

able to the Commission nor

was its existence ever made

known to the Commission. (Rankin dep; Slawson interview,

Willens response to letter, but see Rocca deposition

wherein he states that he is sure the Commission

knew of

it, Helms hearing.) In addition, the Calderon 201 file

bears no reference to the conversation nor does it indi

cate that it was ever made known or provided to the War-

ren Commission for its analysis.

the available evidence supports the conclu-

sion that the Warren Commission was never given the informa-

tion or

the opportunity by which it could evaluate Luisa

Calderon's significance to the events surrounding Presi-

dent Kennedy's assassination. Had the Commission been

expeditiously provided this evidence of her intelligence.

background, association with Silvia Duran, and her com-

mentary following the assassination, it may well have

potential

given more serious investigative consideration to her ar

Knowledge of Oswald and the Cabar governments

the porcibili

ty of cuban trowledge.bout Asual der

possible involvement in a conspiracy to assassinate President

Kennedy•

(Quote Rankin on Wit

would have been done.)

Two difficult issues remain which are raised by

the Committee's finding. First, why didn't the Agency

---

## Page 4

tos

bet

tio

trite

- 4 -

provide the Calderon conversation to the Warren Commis

sion; secondly, why didn't the Agency reveal to the War-

ren Commission Waite full knowledge of Calderon's intel-

ligence background, her possible knowledge

of Oswald and

her possible connection to the CIA or some other American

intelligence apparatus.

The first question can be explained in benign terms.

It is reasonably possible that by sheer oversight the

conversation was filed away and not recovered or recol-

lected until after the Warren Commission had completed

its investigation and published its report.

However, this

conversation could have also beer! withheld

has toes andole to

deliberately.

radetinitio

The Committee binetmeans bordet

explanatin for the Agony's traction,

ther possibinity.

The Committee can state, however, that

Calder

whatever the truth may ber the conversation did tair

e and the transgiprt was not provided the Wairen Com-

mission.

- S

As for the question

anding t

withholding

of information concerning Calderon's intelligence back-

ground, the record reflects that the Commission was merely

informed that Calderon may have been a member of the DGI.

(Cite 5 May memo.) The memoranda which providedmore ex-

tensive examination of her intelligence background were

not made available for the Commission's review.

Signifi-

cantly, the May 8 memorandum written by

Joseph hansor ch

following his debriefingot AMMUG-1 indicatedthat AMMUG-1

No

evidence

•S.

repeat

---

## Page 5

121/68

2OA2M6d

SHE ISG OF THES,03.

as related

- 5 -

Calderon

and a second Cuban Intelligence officer believed see to

be a CIA operative. It is possible that this information

true

was not provided the Warren Commission either because

but.

there was no basis in fact for the allegation or because

sounds.

the allegation was in fact true. If the allegation

bit

were true, the consequences for the CIA would have been

stilted.

serious for It woulda

Try

demonstratedthat a CIA operative,

well placed in the Cuban Embassy, may have possessed in modify

formation prior

to the assassination regarding Oswald

and/or his relationship to Cuban Intelligenceseria that

Services possible involvement in a conspiracy to assassinate

President Kennedy•

calloron's

Regarding

•possible association with the CIA,

the tamitter has examined calitesanta file. Imarina ta Azan,

veries

Files reveale no ostensible connection between Calderon and

jos

the CIA. However, there are indications that such contact

between Calderon and the Agency was contemplated. A

e4

September 1, 1963 CIA dispatch from the Chief of the Spe-

cial Affairs Staff to the CIA's Chief of Station in Mexico

City states in part:

...Luisa Calderon has a sister residing in

Reynosa, Texas, married to an American of

Mexican descent.

If (CIA asset) can further

identify the sister, our domestic exploita-

tion section might be in a position to follow

up on this lead...Please

levy the requirement

(CIA asset) at the next opportunity.

12935, Sept. 1, 1963)

---

## Page 6

niTO

138

- 6-

Lacter

An earlier CIA dispatch from the CIA Chief of

Station in Mexico City to the Chief of the CIA's Western

Hemisphere Division records that:

Wilfredo of the Cuban Consulate, Tampico,

reported that Luisa Calderon has a sister

residing in Reynosa, Texas... Luisa may go

up to the border to visit her sister soon--

or her mother may make the trip--details

not clear.

21849, July 31, 19651

At the very least, the above dispatched evidenced

an interest in Calderon's activities and those of her

family. Whether this interest took the form of a clan-

destine-agent relationship is

not revealed by Calderon's

201 file.

The Committee has queried the author of the above-

cited dispatch requesting that Calderon's sister be con-

tacted by the CIA's "domestic exploitation section."

David Ronis, the dispatch's author, was a member

of the CIA's Special Affairs staff at the time he wrote

the dispatch. He worked principally at CIA headquarters

and was when responsible for-recruitment and handling

of

of agents for collection/intelligence data. Mr. Ronis,

when

interviewed by this Committee, stated that part of

his responsibility was to scour the Western Hemisphere

division for operational leads related to the work of

the Special Affairs staff. Ronis recalled that he normally

would send requests to CIA field stations for information

or leads on various

persons.

oftene would receive no

What soupose is

served by this sentence?

---

## Page 7

26.2K

arrelicted

• response to these requests.

It was Ronis' recollection

that the above-cited domestic exploitation section was

a task force within the Special Affairs Staff.

He also

stated that in 1963 the CIA's Domestic Contacts Division

might have been requested to locate Luisa Calderon's sis-

ter. Ronis told the Commitee that he had no recollection

of recruiting any person associated with the Cuban Intel-

ligence Service. He did recall that he had recruited

women to perform tasks for the Agency. However, he did

not recall ever recruiting any employees of the Cuban

Embassy/Consulate in Mexico City. Finally, Mr. Ronis

stated that he had no recollection that Luisa Calderon

was associated with the CIA. (HSCA Staff Interview August

31, 1978)

Various present and former CIA representatives

formal

were queried whether Luisa Calderon had ever been asso-

ciated with the CIA. The uniform. answer was that no one

recalled such an association. (Cites: Helms, Hearing, August

9, 1978, P. 136; ROCCa, Dep.-p. 148, July 17, 197d; hangose

Interview of August_, Piccolo, Interview of_

Thus, the agency'sfile

and the testimony of former

betweein

CIA employees revealso connection ki Calderon es the

CIA.

Incomplete

Yet, as indicated earlies mn hiders of Eulaft

the most glaringemission beingéthe tamps Conduson's

Rexcryptic remarks following the assassination of President

Kennedy•

---

## Page 8

0823:

RELEASE OI

is a bona fide defector or that he has

furnished us with accurate and valuable

information concerning Cuban intelligence

operations, staffers, and

agents. (Langosch

memo to Director of Security, 23 June 1964)

As an officer of the DGI, A-1 from August of 1963

until his defection was assigned to the DGI's Illegal

which

Section B

IN 58894 24 April 64) - Thia section

was responsibile for training agents for assignment in

Latin America. His specific responsibility pertained to

handling of agent operations in El Salvador. (Personal

Record Questionnaire 4 June 1964; Otta In 68894 24 April

64)

identrfredsorthe chat

A-1 knew who were the Cuban Intelligence officers

assigned to Mexico City. In this regard he intially

identified Alfredo Miraba!", Manuel Alga, and Rogelia Rodriguez

and the Commercial attache as DGI officer's posted at the

Cuban Embnesy in Mexico City. (supra) Langosch described

•A-l's knowledge of DGI operations in Mexico as follows:

In Mexico City, he knows who the intelligence

people are.

One is the Cuban Consul Alfredo

Mirabal.

He is called the Chief of the Centre.

That is his title but he is actually the

intelligence chief, or at least he was until

the 16th of April at which time a replacement

was sent to Mexico to take over.

This fellow's

name is Manuel Vega.

The source says that the

Commercial

attache whose name is Ricardo Tapia

or Concepcion (he is not sure which is an intel-

ligence officer) and another one is Rogelio.

(I might say that some of these names are familiar

• say that

to me.) (p." 5 or reel 4, 23 April 1964, debrief-

ing of A-1, 30 April 64)

---

## Page 9

- 5.-

for Presentation to the Warren Commission outlining various

positions adopted by the CIA vis a vis its investigative

efforts and assistance to the Commission. (Brief, May 14,

1964, FOIA 695-302A):

> At Tab E of McCone's brief it states:

Within the past week, significant information

has been developed by the CIA regarding the re-

lationship with Oswald of certain Cuban intel-

ligence personnel in Mexico. City and the reac-

tion in Havana within the Cuban Intelligence

Service to the news of the assassination of

President Kennedy. The Commission Staff is in

the course of being briefed on the Cuban as-

pect (cite supra May 14, 1964 FOIA 695-302A) •

The significant information referred to therein is

the information A-1 provided. - To conclusury

On May 15, 1964, the day of the Milanes interview,

the Warren Commission received its first formal communica-

tion regarding A-1. However, the Agendy did not at that

time identify A-1 by his real name or cryptonym nor did

the Agency indicate that the source of this information

was a defector then residing under secure conditions in

the Washington, D.C. area. (See

May 15 Letter from Helms

to Rankin FOIA_ .

The May 15 communication did state that

the Agency had established contact

"with a well-placed individual who has been

in close and prolonged contact

officers of the Cuban Direcion General de

the cuban t

with ranking

Intelligencia." (Cite)

Attached to the May 15 communication was a copy of

Langosch's above referenced memorandum of May 5, 1964 re-

---

## Page 10

garding Atl's knowledge of Oswald's probablf contact with

the DGI in Mexico City. (Cite above.) The attachment

made no reference to the source's status as a defector

from the DGI.- Siguficance?

As set forth in the section of the report concerning

Luisa Calderon, on June 18, 1964, Howard Willens of the

Warren Commission reviewed Langosch's May 5 memo and

the questions upon which the information set forth in the

meno was eldeited. Neither the questionses the memo shown

to Willens made reference to the source's status as a de-

fector collaborating with the cIA'l

(Cite Arthur Dooley

memo, 19 June 1964, FOIA 739-319) .

so. How imported is

this really?

Based upon review of the Langosch memoranda, the Com-

mittee has determined that significant intormation regard lat

ing luisa Calderon was withheld from the warren Commission info?

(Cite Calderon section). This information was derived

from ..: debriefings of A-l. (Cite May 7 and 8 Langosch

this

covered

memos.) From the Committee's review of the A-1 file pro-

vided by the cIA, the committee has not found any credible outin

evidence indicating that other information provided by A-l fuy

othe

to the CIA was relevant to the work of the Warren Commission.

info?

However, in its review the Committee has determined that

wheld?

specific documents referenced in the A-l file if not present

in that file.

Ore

Bie missing item of considerable concern to the Committee

---

## Page 11

Ites

bien

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

An reacted

- 7-

This

is a debriefing report of A-l entitled "The Oswald Case."

(Dispatet.

7035, 23 March 1965) Dr MaRch 23, 2965, a

CIA dispatch records the transmittal of the report, along

with eleven other A-l debriefing reports. (Cite supra.)

Next to the listing of the "Oswald Case" debriefing report

is the handwritten ritation "SI."

A CIA employee who has

worked extensively with the Agency files system bahamm te

warth Symbol tal

KNIA ES

this notation to stand for the CIA component Special In-

- telligence. Other

CIA representatives betieved the nota

tian ta stand for the CIA component-seecial Intelligende.

Other CIA representatives believed the notation was a re-

ference to the Counterintelligence component CI/SIG. In

a CIA memorandum dated

,it us stated

Quote Barbara's memo.

denitring

The Agency has been unable to locate this document

and therefore the Committee cannot pass judgement upon the

substance of the missing materials.

The Committee has queried A-l's case officers regarding

about

additional information that A-l may have supplied regartiny

Oswald. Joseph Lanogsch when interviewed by the Committee

stated that (HSCA staff interview Joseph Langosch, August

21. 1978) he did not have contact with the Warren Commission

and does not know what information derived from A-l's de-

briefings was

ngs was supplied to the warren Commission it

(Cite also

Hidalgo and Piccolo.) He also stated that he does not

interpens

---

## Page 12

TECIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF THIS DOCILENT

as redacted

- 8 -

costa haara provide other inter a to a i o, anis

bassin Este alders

asclisatsetserein

unterview.)

In a further effort to clarify the substance of informa-

A-/

tion that 11luG provided to the CIA regarding Oswald, the

..Committee has attempted to locate flude, The CIA has also

sip: "fattempted to locate Awl (give date of separation from CLA)

'i"but has been unable to determine his present whereabouts..

A-1

i criti

Thus, gaps do exist regarding information AMMue may

i have guessed the con all age an is mats de

the tries racere a i, the l except lot the caldero

episode,

provided the warren commission with alf

Information

of investigative significance. A broader question remains

however. The Agency, as noted earlier, did not reveal to

the Warren Commission that A-l was present in the Washington,

D.C. area and, under controlled conditions accessible to the

Commission. Even considering the CIA's serious concerr

for protecting its sources, the fact that A-l's status was

not disclosed foreclosed the Warren Commission from exercising

a possible option, i.e. to take the sworn testimony of A-1

it concerned Oswald and the Kennedy assassination. On

sir?

this issue, as the written record tends to show,

unilaterally rejected thebasibht@fexeccgny.nirg

the Agency

option.

I shouldnt

have dare $0

The CIA did not fall, in A-l's case, the

énormous problems-establishing bona fide as it did with vorenko.

exciahtyin light of the establishment of A-l's bone fidas

(Cite Langosch's quote supora), his proven reliability and

---

## Page 13

THE AMLASH OPERATION

During 1967, the CIA's Inspector General issued a

report which examined CIA supported assassination plots.

Included in this report was discussion of the CIA-Mafia

plots and an Agency project referred to as the AMLASH

operation (67 IGR PP: 1-74, 78-112). The AMLASH operation

involved a high level Cuban official (assigned the CIA

cryptonym AMIASH/I) who, during 1962 while meeting with a

CIA representative, expressed the desire to assassinate

Fidel Castro (1967 IGR p.84). As a result of AMLASH's

expressed objective and the CIA's desire to find a viable

political alternative to the Castro regime, the Agency sub-

sequently provided AMLASH with both moral and material

support designed to eliminate Fidel Castro. (1967 IGR

Lat

you

pp. 80-94). The AMLASH operation was terminated by the

CIA in 1965 as the result of security leaks (1967 IGR

meun

pp: 104-106). During 1965, AMLASH and his conspirators

these

?were brought to trial in Cuba for plotting against Castro.

terr

AMIASH was sentenced to death, but at Castro's request the

sentence was reduced to twenty-five years imprisonment.

(1967 IGR pp. 107-110) •

In its examination of the AMLASH operation joy the 1967

IGR concluded that the CIA had offered both direct and in-

direct support for AMLASH's plotting (1967 IGR p. 80).

The most striking example of the CIA's direct offer of sup-

port to AMLASH reported by the 1967 IGR states:

---

## Page 14

- 2 -

more

explint.

it is likely that at the very moment Presi-

dent Kennedy was shot a CIA officer was meet-

ing with a Cuban agent in Paris and givinghim

an assassination device for use against

shot tot

CASTRO. (1967 IGR p. 94)

The 1967 IGR offered no firm evidence confirming

or refuting Castro's knowledge of the MAlASH operation prior

to the assassination of President Kennedy. The Report

does note that, in 1965, when AMLASH was tried in Havana

date drago ros

nt court, November 1964 was given as the initial point i

time at which AMLASH's actions were tad to CIA support.

(1967 IGR p. 111)

The Church Committee in Book V of its Final Report

examined the AMLASH operation in great detail. (SSC,

Book V, pp. 2-7, 67-69) The Church Committee concluded:

The AMLASH plot was more relevant to the Warren

Commission work thaky the early CIA assassination

plots with the underworld. Unlike those earlier

plots, the AMLASH operation was in progress at

the time of the assassination; unlike the earlier

plots, the AMLASH operation could clearly be traced

to the CIA; and unlike the earlier plots, the CIA

had endorsed AMLASH's proposal for a coup, the

first step to him being Castro's assassination,

despite Castro's threat to retaliate for such

plotting. No one directly involved

in either

investigation (i.e. the CIA and the FBI) was told

of the AMLASH operation. No one investigated

---

## Page 15

- 3

connection between the AMLASH operation and

President Kennedy's assassination.

Although

Oswald had been in contact with pro-Castro

and anti-Castro groups for many months before

the assassination, the CIA did not conduct

a thorough investigation of questions of

Cuban government or Cuban exile involvement in

the assassination. (Church Committee, Book V,

Final Report, p. 5)

In 1977, the CIA issueded a second Inspector

General's Report concerning the subject of CIA sponsored

assassination plots.. This Report, in large part ,was in-

tended as a rebuttal of the Church Committee's findings.

The 1977 IGR states:

The Report (of the Church Committee) assigns

it (the AMLASH operation) characteristics that

it did not have during the period preceding

the assassination of JFK in order to support

the SSC view that it should have been reported

to the Warren Commission. (1977 IGR p. 2)

The 1977 IGR concluded that prior to the assassination

of President Kennedy, the AMLASH operation was not an

assassination plot and that the treatment of the issue

by the Church Committee was both imprecise and misleading. Starte

(19771 IGR Tab D, p. 28)

why

Nevertheless, the 1977 IGR did state:

---

## Page 16

= 4

it would have served to reinforce the credi

bility of (the Warren Commission) its efforts

had it taken a broader view of the matter (of

The CIA,

too, could have considered in specific terms

what most then saw in general terms--the possi-

bility of Soviet or Cuban involvement in the

assassination because of the tensions of the

time.

It is not enough to be able to point to

erroneous criticisms made today.

The Agency

should have taken broader initiatives then as

well. That CIA employees at the time felt--

as they obviously did--that the activities

about which they knew had no relevance to

the Warren Commission inquiry does not take

the place of a record of conscious

review.

(1977IGR p. 11)

It should be noted that. Richard Helms, as the highest

level CIA employee in contact with the Warren Commission

ona regular basis, testified to the Rockefeller Commission

that he did not believe the AMASH operation to harbeen

relevant to the investigation of President Kennedy's death.

(Rockefeller Commission, Testimony of

Richard Helms, 4/24/75

pp. 389-391, 2) In addition, Mr. Helms testified before

the committee that the aul ast operation was not deaigned

to be an assassination plot (Richard Helms, Executive Ses-

sion testimony, 8/9/78 pp. 26-27).

A contrasting view to the testimony of Mr. Helms was

offered by Joseph Langosch who in 1963 was the Chief of

ate

Counterintelligence for the CIA's Special Affairs Staff area

(hereinafter SAS). During 1963, the Special Affairs Staff

was the CIA component responsible for CIA operations di-

rected against the Government of Cuba and the Cuban Intel-

ligence Services (HSCA Affidavit of Langosch,

Sept. 14,

this,

staff

""'.

---

## Page 17

- 5 -

1978, p.l) The Special Affairs Staff was headed by

Desmond Fitzgerald and was responsible for the AMLASH

operation (Church Report, Book V, pp. 3, 8, 79) $ Langosch

as the Chief of Counterintelligence for the Special Af-

fairs Staff was

responsible for safeguarding SAS against

penetration by foreign intelligence services, particularly

the Cuban Intelligence Services. (HSCA staff,

supra)

It was Langosch's recollection

a. san.

that the AMLASH operation prior to the

assassination of President Kennedy was

characterized by the Special Affairs

staff, Desmond Fitzgerald and other

senior CIA officers as an assassination

operation initiated and sponsored by the

CIA.

Langosch further recollected that as of 1962 it

was highly possible that the Cuban Intelligence Services

were aware of AMLASH and his association with the CIA and

that the information upon which Langosch based his conclu-

sion that the AMLASH operation was insecure was available

to senior level CIA officials including Desmond Fitzgerald.

(HSCA Langosch Affidavit p. 4 supra)

However; the issue before this Committee is not

simply whether the AMLASH operation was an assassination

plot prior to President Kennedy's death. The broader

and

more significant issue, as the 1977IGR has identified

it, is whether the AMLASH operation was of sufficient

relevancy to have been reported to the Warren Commission.

writer:

---

## Page 18

= 6 -

In the case of the AMLASH operation the determina-

tion is a most difficult matter to resolve.

Reasonable

men may differ in their characterization of the Agency's

operational objecitves.

Based upon the presently available evidence it

is the Committee's position that such information, if made

available to the Warren Commission

mey have stimulated

the Commission's investigative concern for possible Cuban

involvement or complicity in the assassination. As J.

Lee Rankin commented before this Committee:

...when I read...the Church Committee's

report--it was an ideal situation for them

to just pick out any way they wanted to

tell the story and fit it in with the

facts that had to be met and then either

blame the rest offt on somebody else or

not tell any more or polish it off.

don't think that could have happened back

in 1964.

a much better change of getting to the

heart of it.

It might have only revealed

that we are involved in all these things

and who is involved in it and who approved

it and all that. But I think that would

have at least come out. (Rankin p. 91)

The Committee is in agreement with Mr. Rankin

that had the AMLASH operation been disclosed to the warren

Commission, it may have been able to foreclose

ation and contecture that

she footnote to the

turbulent relations

between Castro's Cuba and the United States.

---

## Page 19

₽

You need an introcuting section on

Berk - Write-üps

the perpose if the study. prior to

this section on the study's scope.

I. Scope of Study

Into should out time strate i the

rest How about prey oute

On April 23, 1976 the Senate Select Committee to suie

Study Governmental Operations (hereinafter SSC) issued itsit wi

report regarding "The Investigation of the Assassination me?

of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelli-

gence Agencies." This report set forth a limited study

of those federal agencies, primarily the Federal Bureau

of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency, that

provided assistance to the Warren Commission in its investi-

gation of the circumstances surrounding the

assassination

of President Kennedy. In particular, the SSC examined

the relevancy of certain information pertaining to alleged

assassination plots by the CIA against Fidel Castro and

the withholding of this information from the Warren Commis-

sion. The SSC conclusions pertaining to these alleged CIA

sponsored assassination plots

have generated additional

public and private inquiries regarding the substance and

quality of information reported by the CIA to the Warren

Commission.

During 1977, the CIA issued a report prepared by

the Agency's Inspector General (hereinafter 77IGR). This

report was intended to be, in large part, a rebuttal to

the findings of the SSC pertaining to alleged CIA sponsored

---

## Page 20

- 2

assassination plots. The 77hGR response concluded:

1) That the SSC Book V final report "contains nu-

• merous

factual errors, both in the extensive

treatment of a selected operation (AMLASH) and

in a number of separate incidents that it pre-

sents" ;

2) "While one can make the point in principle that

the Warren Commission could well have broadened

its review to include the anti-Cuban programs

of the U.S. Government, in trying to make the

case for that concept, Book V of the Senate Se-

lect Committee Final Report went to such lengths

in its treatment as to detract from the point

at hand. It is difficult to characterize it

more generously.* (CIA 77IGR, p. 9)

The 77IGR further concluded that the SSC Final Report

conveyed an impression of limited effort by the CIA to as-

sist the warren commission in its work. The TIGR was in

fundamental disagreement with this characterization of the

SSC findings and noted that "CIA did seek and collect in-

formation in support of the Warren Commission. Additionally,

it conducted studies and submitted special analyses and

reports." (Introduction to Tab E of 1TIGR).

* The 77 IGR comments regarding Warren Commission lack of

knowledge of anti-Cuban programs of the U.S. government

will be addressed at lord! in another section of this report.

---

## Page 21

split infinitive

In order

to further demonstratesthe scope of support

provided by the CIA to the Warren Commission, the 77IGR com-

piled a comprehensive listing of CIA generated material

provided to both the U.S. Intelligence Community and the

Warren Commission regarding the assassination of President

Kennedy. In this respect the conmittee agrees with the

77 IGR wherein it is stated that

"This compilation (of CIA generated material)

is appropriate to consideration of the extent

of the CIA effort, to the extent that it reveals

something of the results of that effort."•

(77 IGR, Introduction to Tab E)

Therefore, in order to examine the broad issue of

the CIA's scope and quality of support to the Warren Com-

mission in both an objective and disciplinen manner, the

Committee has reviewed in detail the 77 IGR's listing of

information pertaining to the assassination provided the

Warren Commission and the U.S. Intelligence Community

The

Committee has particularly focused its attention on the

specific issue of whether the CIA or any employee or former

employee of the CIA misinformed, or withheld information

relevant to the assassination of President Kennedy from

the Warren Commission. In addition, the Committee has

attempted to determine whether, if the Warren Commission

was misinformed or not made privy to information relevant

to its investigation, whether the misinforming or withhold-

ing of evidence from the Warren Commission was the result

of a conscious intent to do so by the Agency or its employes.

---

## Page 22

In examining the Agency's comprehensive listing of

CIA generated material referenced above, the Committee has

paralled its review to the structure given to these materials

by the 77 IGR. In this regard, the 77 IGR details four

interrelated compilations of Kennedy assassination material.:

These four compilations are:

1) Agency dissemination of information to the Intel-

ligence Community (Formal and Informal Dissemina-

tions,)

2) Dissemination of material to the Warren Commission

Agency dissemination to the FBI et al regarding

rumors and

allegations regarding President Kennedy's

assassination

4)

Memorandum submitted by CIA to the Warren Commis-

sion on Rumors and Allegations Relating to the

should

President's. Assassination (Introduction to TabE, 19IER)

tear Compilation mines above was reviewed by

explain

a staff member of this Committee. This review focused

outret

upon those documents identified in the compilation fas hav-

ing been made available to member agencies of the U.S. In-

significent

telligence Community but not having been made available

distinction,

to the Warren Commission for its review. HIt should be noted

that merely because a specific document was not made available

to the Warren Commission does not necessarily imply that

substantive information relevant to the Warren Commission's

work was withheld from it. The substance of such informa-

---

## Page 23

In

Opherwise,

least

specify

More.

precisely

why y

categories

55

-4-

tion may have been made available in a subsequent com-

munication or report to the Commission. Nevertheless,

these materials have been analyzed to determine if

and

substantive relevant information related to Presi-

dent Kennedy's assassination was provided by the CIA to mem-

thatwas

ber agencies of the U.S. Intelligene Communities a not

provided by the CIA in some manner to the Warren Commis-

sion.

(2)

pan Compilation set forth above consists of

those materials provided by the CIA in written form to the

Warren Commission. These materials were reviewed, analyzed,

and contrasted against those materials related to Presi-

dent Kennedy's assassination provided by the CIA to member

agencies of the U.S. Intelligence Community.

• Those materials set forth in the

- Compilation (3)

listed above were in fact included in the first compilation

cited herein.Therefore these materials were subject to the

same standards of review applied to the seat Compilation (1)

Those materials set forth in the m

- Compilation(4)

listed

above were in fact included in t

Compila-

tion

n. Therefore, these materials were sub-

ject to the same standards of review applied to

Compilation(z

As a visual aid to the analysis of the materials

contained in the four compilations discussed above, a chart

weing

used.

---

## Page 24

Where is this chant?

I think remind of your rest should

be tied into the chant more directly

has beenprepared which illustrates the flow of written in-

formation

Jo the CIAyconcerning President Kennedy's assassina-

tion

to the Warren Commission and the U.s.

intelligence

community thiefhart

sets forth

• the CIA's

desig-

nation and satect matter chartel a cuments

The date of enthe

document's

& desseminates. whether domas made available

to the Warren Commission en, the U.s. Intelligence communityorboth.

secondary purpose of

this chart

indicateg

for selected

subjects the volume of information provided

to the U.S. Intelligence community as opposed to the warren

Commission.

During the course of this study, additional Agency

files have been reviewed. These files have been examined

in an effort to resolve certain issues created by the re

view of the Agency's compilations discussed herein. Where

apparent gaps existed in the written record, files have

been requested and reviewed in an effort to resolve these

gaps. Where significant substantive issues have arisen

related to the kind and quality of information provided

the Warren Commission, files have also been requested and

reviewed in an effort to resolve these issues. As a result,

approximately thirty files, comprising approximately nine this

anstuff member.

tand tous report examined and analyzed by

ta committeethpreparia

me The findings set forth herein

are subject to modification due to the following considera-

---

## Page 25

-7=

tions. During the course of the past fifteen years, the

CIA has generated massive amounts of information related

to the assassination of President Kennedy. In spite

of the Agency's sophisticated document retrieval system,

certain documents reguested by this Committee for study

and analysis have not been located. Whether these docu-

mentsthave merely

been filed incorrectly or destroyed,

eitherastheresuit.or

at regulation or (individual whim, gaps

do

in the written record

still exist.

Ldo we

have

of this

Secondly, due

to dissimilar standards of relevancy

the cAr and this Committee,

adopted by certain files requested by the Committee for

review have either not been made available by the Agency

or have been made available to the Committee in a sani

tized fashion. Therefore, to the degree reflected by the

Agency's denial of access and/or sanitization of certain

materials, this study's conclusions are based upon the

best evidence available to the Committee though this may

not be all relevant evidence to which the Agency has

access.

evilence

Il is.

indicate

deal

ww/

later

section.

One must, moreover, give due consideration to the

role that oral discussions, oral briefings, and meetings

of Warren Commission and CIA representatives may have

played in the supply of assassination-related information

by the CIA to the Warren Commission. The subject and

substance of these discussions,

briefings, and meetings

may

not always reflected by the written record made the

---

## Page 26

- 8-

subject of this study. Therefore, the Committee has

conducted interviews, depositions and executive session

staffandmembess

hearings with key Warren Commission and former or present

resolve quations

Late

CIA representatives in an effort to fill the gap created

et addressed

•by

the written

formal means of communication.

The results of the Committee's efforts to chronicle this

aspect of the working relationship between the Warren

Commission and the CIA will be a subject for discussion

herein.

-There if no section IIk)

#: no weed to label this Ia.

• II..a)

Warren Commission relationship with CIA regarding in-

formation made available by CIA to Warren Commission

The Committee has queried both representatives of

the Warren Commission staff and those representatives of

the CIA who played significant roles in providing CIA gen-

erated information to the Warren Commission. The general

not

to

use

consensus of those queried was that the Warren Commission

Jame

word

and the CIA enjoyed a successful working relationship dur-

consecutive

Rankin,

ing the course of the Commission's investigation Yeites? :

- He

tence.

many no

DepO Of R. Rocca 7/17/78, p. 18) William Coleman, a senior Longe

staff counsel for the Warren Commission who worked closely

agree

cul

with Warren Commission staff counsel W. David Slawsong on

thir

matters which

utiliz

the CIA's j

resources, characterized the CIA representatives

with whom he dealt as highly competent, cooperative, and

intelligent. (See HSCA staff interview 8/2/79). Mr.

Slawson expressed a similar opinion regarding the Agency's

---

## Page 27

out

= 9-

cooperation and quality of work. (Executive Session Testi-

mony of W. David Slawson, November 15, 1977, p. 17, see

also JEK exh. 23.)

J. Lee Rankin, General Counsel for the Warren Com-

mission, testified that the Warren Commission and its

staff were assured that the Agency would cooperate in its

work. (HSCA deposition of J. Lee Rankin, August 17, 1978,

Classified, p. 4).

John McCone, Director of Central Intelligence at

the time of President Kennedy's assassination and during

the Warren Commission investigation, supported Mr. Rankin's

testimony in this regard by characterizing the CIA's work

vis a vis the Warren Commission as both responsive and

comprehensive. (HSCA deposition of John McCone, August 17,

1978, p. 5) Mr. McCone testified that he was personally

responsible for determining whether Lee Harvey Oswald was

ever associated with the Agency. Mr. McCone was

further

responsible for ensuring that all relevant matters

conveyed by the CIA to the Warren Commission

(McCone

deposition pp. 5-6) Mr. McCone Further testified that:

The policy of CIA was to give the Warren Com-

mission everything that we had. I personally

asked Chief Justice Warren to come to my of-

fice and took him down to the vault of our

building where our information is microfilmed

and stored and showed him the procedures that

we were following and the extent to which we

were giving him--giving his staff everything

that we had, and I think he was quite satis-

fied. (McCone Deposition p. 9)

date

-again,

try

to

using

the

wond

---

## Page 28

- 10 -

Mr. Raymond Rocca, one of the CIA's key represen-

tatives to the Warren Commission during its investigation,

also characterized the Agency's role as one of full sup-

port to the Warren Commssion. Mr. Rocca, who served as

the Chief of the Research and Analysis Division for the

Counter-Intelligence Staff of the CIA recalled under oath

that Richard Helms had direeted thatgiven the following diractive:

All material bearing in any way that could be

of assistance to the Warren Commission should

be seen by CI staff and R and A and marked

for us.

He issued very, very strictly worded

indications--they were verbal in so far as I

know--that we were to leave no stone unturned.

(HSCA Deposition of Raymond Rocca, July 17,

1978, p. 24)

MI. Rocca added that, to his knowledge, Mr. Helms'

orders were followed to the letter by

all CIA employees.

date

(Rocca deposition, p. 24)

Mr. Rocca concluded, that

On this basis,

Do not

othe CIA was to turn over and

to develop any

information bearing on the assassination

indent if

that could be of assistance to the Warren

Seven then

Commission." (Rocca deposition, p. 26)

slimes.

A somehwat different view of the CIA's role regard-

ing the supply of CIA's information to the Warren Commis-

sion was propounded by Richard Helms. Mr. Helms, who

served as the CIA's Deputy Director for Plans during the

Warren Commission investigation and who was directly re-

sponsible for the CIA's investigation of President Kennedy's

assassination (Rocca dep. p.23), testified to the Committee

that the CIA made every effort to be as responsive as pos-

sible to Warren Commission requests. (HSCA Executive Session

yes hope.

Helms

being

jit?

initiato.

information.

---

## Page 29

- 11-

testimony of Richard Helms, August 9, 1978, p.10)

Mr.

Helms added further testimony regarding the manner in

which the CIA provided its information to the Warren Com-

mission. . He stated:

An inquiry would come over (from the Warren Com-

mission).

We would attempt to respond to it.

But these inquiries came in individual bits and

pieces or as individual items...Each individual

item that came along we took care of as best we

It was Mr. Helms' recollection that the CIA pro-

vided information to the warren Commission on the basis

of the Conmission's specific requests. Under el he

supported this proposition:

Mr. Goldsmith: In summary, is it your position

• that

the Agency gave the Warren Commission

information only in response to speci-

fic requests by the Warren Commission?

Mr. Helms:

That is correct.

I want to modify that by saying that

memory is fallable.

There may have been

times or circumstances under which some

thing different might have occured, but

my recollection is that we were attempting

to be responsive and supportive to the

FBI and the Warren Commission.

When

they asked for something we gave it to

As far as our volunteering informa-

tion is concerned, I have no recollection

of whether we volunteered it or not.

Mr. Helms' characterization of fulfilling Warren

Commission requests on a case by case basis rather than

uniformly volunteering relevant information to the Warren

Commission stands in direct opposition to J. Lee Rankin's

270-10097057

---

## Page 30

- 12

this is a horribl lawyer's ware?

perception of the Cas kelvestigative responsibility.

Mr.

Rankin was

• By Committee Counsel whether

he

worked under the impression that the Agency's re-

sponsibility was simply to respond to questions that

In carene,

were addressed to CIA by the Warren Commission.

Mr. Rankin

testified, on follows:

Chuck. let's disco your use of the

lanquage that precedes a color.

Not at all and if anybody had told me that I

would have insisted that the Commission com-

municate with the President and get a different

arrangement because we might not ask the right

questions and then we would not have the informa-

tion and that would be absurd (Rankin deposition

p. 4)

Rankin's

Mr. Slawson added support to a position testi-

Warren Commission

fying that

reguests to the CIA were rarely specific.

"The request was made intially that they give us all in-

formation pertinent to the assassination investigation."

settin

(Slawson Dep. p. 29)

plots at

The unfortunate consequences

the go int

of not asking the right questions

graphically

get un

illustrated by the subsequent

exposure of the CIA's anti- seeminly

Paradoxically,

Castro assassination plots (SSC Book V).

and tray

the Agency in ito deatings with the Wascen contission

from

anchytice l

wave

even if the Warren Commission had requested information

on such plots

"would have been able,

to plausibly deny

de theplots!

CAGE

CIAmvolvement. As MI. Rocca's testimony reveals, he had

aune

upottam

no knowledge at the time of the Warren Commission investiga-

tion of Agency efforts to assassinate Fidel Castro. (Rocca

framework

that

you

outlined

the

perious

Lection.

reques

---

## Page 31

No 0184988Di

10y.k1

(amind*"dep. p.50)

in providing. aul relevant informa-

tion to

Warren Commissi

on the

working-leye 1

of contact

quested to

existenc

plots, his

diced no saistantive information.

orts wor

Therecord al soireflects

Jongthe CIA desk of-

ficer who was initially given the responsibility by Mr.

Helms to investigate for the CIa, Lee Harvey okali such flato

and the assassination of President Kennedy. (GICA deposi-

tion of John Scelso, May 16, 1978, p.73, 111-112) Mr.

Scelso testified that, had he known of such assassination

plotsy he the flowing action would lave been teaker;

"we would have gone at that hot and heavy.

We would have queried the agent (AMLASH)

about

it in great detail. I would have had him poly-

graphed by the best operative security had to

see if he had (sic) been a double-agent, in-

forming Castro about our poison pen things,

and so on.; I would have

had all our Cuban

sources queried about it."

nad the CIA

and reporte

on the an

astro

the

assass?

165011

Lorma

tially investigated

tration

atter

желе

bee

nswould have

othe Ha

ren Commi

on, as it

entrenly was

discovered by the SSC.

Asthe record reflects

wittikheCHA

, these plots were known by few.

Mr.

Helms '

testimony regarding these plots reveals that the

Agency compromised its

promise

+o

supply all

relevant information to the Warren Commissiónon

nimir Both DCI

accore and General Counsel Rankin had believed to se i

redundant.

---

## Page 32

melo

- 14-

Leitera

effect.

The following exchange between Committee Gounsel

and Mr. Helms illustrates the acutesaxity the Agency's

compromise:

Mr. Goldsmith:

Mr. Heems, I take it from your testi-

mony that your position is that the

anti-Castro plots, in fact, were rele

vant to the Warren Commission's work;

and, in light of that, the Committee

would like to be informed as to why

the Warren Commission was not told by

you of the anti-Castro assassination

plots.

Mr. Helms:

I have never been asked to testify before

the Warren Commission about our operations.

Mr. Goldsmith: If the Warren Commission did not know

of the operation, it certainly was not

in a position to ask you about it.

Is that not true?

Mr. Helms:.

Yes, but how do you know they did not know

about it?

How do you know Mr. Dulles had

not told them? How was I to know that?

And besides, I was not the Director of

the Agency and in the CIA, you did not go

traipsing around to the Warren Commission

or to Congressional Committees to to any-

place else without the Director's permis-

sion.

Mr. Goldsmith: Did you ever discuss with the Director whe-

ther the Warren Commission should be in-

formed of the anti-Castro assassination

plots?

Mr. Helms:

I did not, as

far

as I recall.

MI. McCone testified that he first

became aware of the CIA's anti-Castro assassination plots

involving CIA-Mafia ties during August 1963. He stated

that upon learning of these plots, he directed that the

Agency cease

all such

activities. (McCone deposition, p.13)

---

## Page 33

'65- way

somes, lihen asked

whether

the CIA desired to withhold information from the Warren

Commission about the Agency anti-Castro assassination plots

to avoid embarassing the Agency or causing an international

crises

he respondedgave the flowing responde?

"I cannot answer that since they (CIA employees

knowledgeable of the continuance of such plots)

withheld the information from me.

I cannot an-

swer that question.

I have never been satisfied

as to why they withheld the information from me.

(McCone deposition, p.16)

Thus, the evidence indicates

that,

had

Helms bove

isapproached McCone

to discuss Informing the

Warren Commission of past and end anti-cast

anti-Castro assassina

tion plots, night have si

cost

"We

Helms

Todoso coult tare meant

his job

upport

= informingMoone that plots were still being

conclusion.

considered by the Agency& But seelterms testimony -

regarding the relevancy of such plots to the carter

Warrên

commissioncounsells

Slawsonand

commission's work,

sectione

Spector

this

relevan

last.

were in agreement (Slawson dep., p.275 that

such information should have been reported to the Warren

Commission.

"see, also Spector

Fromyle ClA's perspeitio.46) (But see Liebeler, depo.

p. 271Y

Mr. Rocca testified that had he known of the anti-

Castro assassination plots, his efforts to explore the

pos-

sibility of a retaliatory assassination against President

Kennedy by Castro would have been intensified. He stated:

sure

... in light of what has happened a completely

that

really

different procedural approach probably would

we and should have been taken.

mean, there

This

belong i?

some lagenc

and tide

Eustation.

---

## Page 34

- 16 -

the light of history.

What I can't

accept is that leads were

deliberately or otherwise ignored. (Rocca dep..

p. 45)

Is thi

"contest?

Lihat

does he

John Scelso, the above-cited CIA desk officer

who ran the CIA's initial investigation of President Ken-

nedy's assassination until that responsibility was given

by

this

to the CIA's counterintelligence staff, offered a highly

critical appraisal of Helms' non-disclosure to the Warren

Commission:

Mr. Goldsmith: Do you think Mr. Helms was acting properly

when

he failed to tell the Warren Commission

about the assassination plots?

Mr. Scelso:

No, I think that was a morally highly re-

prehensible act, which he cannot possibly

justify under his oath of office, or any

other standard of professional public service.

(Scelso dep., p.153)

Agency concern for the sanctity d

III. Introductory Section/SS+M

The length of time required by the CIA to respond

to the Warren Commission's requests for information has

been shown to have been dependent upon 1) the availability

of information; and 2) the complexity of the issues ate i fo

and s) the eatent to whit

sented by the request,

on the pro point, Mr. Helms testified tore

that when CIA had been able to satisfy a Commission Ie-

quest, the CIA would then send a reply back:

C,A

som.

"and some of these inquiries obviously took

longer than others.

For example, some might involve

checking a file which was in Washington.

Other inquiries might involve trying to see

if we could locate somebody in some overseas

country.

Obviously, one takes longer to per-

form than the other. (Helms Exec. Session

hearing, p.25)

---

## Page 35

ser

feth

as in concern

in which the diggine

zrotecstrtsgenertivesounees.oom

bidded then are Commissarin

Aest

fi: +35049728

CATION ANDOR

CHUMENT

- 17 -

Mr. Rocca, as the day to day CIA working level

contact with the Warren Commission stated that on the

average it took less than one week for the CIA to transmit

its information to the Warren Commission, after such in-

ambiguous

formation had been processed by the Agency. (Rocca dep.

probably

pp.66-67) (Add the opinion of WC staffers.)

Also, it

at tires

However,

doris andere

concern for protecting i Fisting the emo

Inction

the CIA's senstivel sources and methods, caused

the Warren Commission to experience greater difficulty

because,

if el took

relevant

in getting

information than when the protection of

CIA ]

such sources and methods was not at issue. J. Lee Rankin

expressed the opinion that the Agency's

effort

to pro

tect its sensitive sources and methods did

-Artect ™

mn the quality of the information to

whiet

request, the

the Warren Commission and its staff were given

weck

access.

transmith al

(Rankin at p.23) n

some instance

mode

As a resultane

timme

Agency

* unilateral decision earthholeör homit

@materials tobac

• the Commission. (Scelso dep.

p.158)

It oome point, you should relen to testimong by cin

1 Two

of concer

people who rockmontaged thes

is committe in which

nethods

the

pone dur-'iron.

Ten CoME

IOn

inves

Ton invo

Im-

peded the warten Commiss

1)

Investigation to song degree:

WHERE RIGATOMID

pertihing othe photosurveillance an

from tite wor

operations of the CIA's Mexicost City Station

effectsaf the

2) As a related consideration, the controversy sur-

Get better trusine. Also.

this is not

---

## Page 36

n n39

Enor

lent

NOGR

Lacter

- 18-

she

rounding photograph now referred to as that

of the "Mexico City Mystery Man"

Each of these concerns will

be examined

herein.

The CIA's concern for revealing the existence of

sensitive technical operations, as outlined above, was

evident from the.

aleception of the Warren Commission.

Mr. Scelso commented that "we were not authorized at first

to reveal all our technical operations." (Scelso dep.

p.158) Scelso further testified:

We were going to give them intelligence re-

orts which derived from all our sources, in-

not going to

cluding technical sources, including

and the intormation gotter

from the interrogation of Silvia Duran, for

example, which corresponded almost exactly

with the information from

(

)(Ext to Scelso quote, all of p.5)

Mr. Scelso's characterization is supported by

examination of the background to the first major CIA.

ceport furnished the warren Considenmen regarding fee Harvey

Oswald's trip to Mexico City. (Cite.) Much of the informa-

tion provided to the Warren Commission in this report was

based upon sensitive sources and methods, identification

of which had been deleted completely from the report.

The 1A

policy t

limiting Warren Commission know-

ledge of CIA sources and methods was articulated as early

as December 20, 1963, at which time a cable was sent from

CIA headquarters to the Mexico City Station which stated:

Our present plan in passing information to the

Warren Coumission is to eliminate mention of

---

## Page 37

060029M0m

NELSASSOR T

arreracted

130:02

— 19-

)in order to protect your contin-

Will rely instead on statements

of Silvia Duran and on contents @ soviet

restructe

thes

sentences

this

portion.

for

fend

not fullow

swit

The basic policy articulated in the December 20,

1963 cable is also set forth in a CIA memorandum of

December 17, 1963. In that memorandum, Birch O'Neal

Special Investigations Group-

of the CIA Counterintelligence/Staff wrote that he had

been advised by Sam Papich, FBI liaison mon to the CIA,

that the FBI was anticipating a request from the Warren

Commission for copies of the FBI's materials which sup-

ported or complimented the FBI's five volume report of

That had been

Decmeber 9, 1963/submitted to the Warren Commission.

Papich provided O'Neal with this

; report which indicated

that some United States Agency was

amil

so do not. con

in Mexico, Papich queried O 'Neat whether the FBI could

supply the warren Cornission withsource off

(The FBI had knowledge of CIA

operations in Mexico City, see CIA SQCT-3/779/510)

O'Neal's memorandum r

shows that he discussed this matter

with Scelso, who, in turn, after a

ter a discussion with Helms,

was directed by Helms to prepare CIA material to be passed

to the Warren Commission.

O'Neal wrote:

He (Scelso) was quite sure it was not the

Agency's desire to make available to the Com-

mission at least in this manner--via the FBI-

sensitive information which could relate to

(28 Dec 63, subt: Lee Harvey Oswald)

(Birch O'Neal, Memo for File,

isgue.

---

## Page 38

NO DRISCTION TO

DECLASSIFICATON AND/CH

RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

O'He

. - 20 -

The opinion expressed by Scelso as of December 17,

1963 was set forth on January 14, 1964 in a formalized

fashion.

all information demed signifi

by CIA (Or

the nata

sensitivi

or reliaberity of sources,

there

I, was promply relayes to your Bureau.

Jan, 19640

LA dissem

FBI, CSC1-3/779/510)

when Helms,

expressed his

concern regarding exposureof Agency sources

Dy

the FBI

to the Warren Commission. Helms wrote that the CIA had

become aware that the FBI had already:

fort

An

called to the att

aution of the Commission,

quotation.

through its attorney, that we have informa-

tion (as determined

from Agency sources) coin-

this

ciding a which may, anet area.

ciding with the date when Oswald was in Mexico

City and which may have some bearing on his

any

expres en

activities while in that area. (CSCI-3/779/510)

use

quote

that

Mr. Helms further indicated that the CIA

called upon to provide additional information acquired

/

Helmer

concen.

past.

from checks of CIA records" and agency sources.

Summerine

suggest@that certain policies be employed to enable CIA

I had

change the

meaning of

cooperatively

to workown the commission and with he commisstors

jest

cooperation protect CIA information, sources and methods.

0fF.

were

Helmsclaimedwoul

Among the policies articulated

eE two which m

Ay toy originated

enabled the Agency to control the flow of information: -

the CIA could

reline organs

JIn this way check the possibility of

revealing its sources and methods inadvertantly. The pedi-

cies artieutated were

---

## Page 39

Chuck: The preceding, page is conforing became

you appeared to te 21-speaking generally of

policie

athen it turn out you

he referring. to

1) Your Bureau not disseminati information re-

a police

ceived from this Agency without prior concur-

arrangences

rence

2) In instances in which this Agency has provided

information to your Bureau and you consider

GHA

please

modily.

that information is pertinent to the Commission's

[sic)

interest, and/or compliments or otherwise is

pertinent to information developed or received

by your Bureau through other sources and is being

provided by you to the Commission, you refer

the Commission to this Agency. In such cases

it will be appreciated if you will advise us

of such referral in order that we may anticipate

the possible further interest of the Commission

(?)

and initiate certain preparatory

"to meeting its

needs. (CSCI -3/559/710)

The policy.

eliminating o

reference to

Agency sensitive sources and methods is further revealed

by examination of an Agency cable, dated January 29, 1964, That was

sent from CIA Headquarters to the CIA Mexico City Station.

That cable indicated that

knowledge of Agency sources and

techniques was on that date still being withheld from the

Warren Commission

Therein, it bustated that on Saturday,

February I, 1964% CIA disto present à report on Oswald's

Mexico City activities to the Warren Connission Howevet f

hus not te the types a wor

---

## Page 40

I

appropriately

- 22 -

was taberna form thatwould

the form of this presentation det enteres pro-

tect't

the CIA's Mexico City Station's sources and techniques.

(CIA Cable Dir. 90466, FOIA 420-757, 20 DeC 63)

See aloo: Angleton ceps.

and Photo surveillance

Mr. Helms offered testimony regarding the CIA's

reticence to inform the Warren Commission, at least during

oftleCommissionis cister

the initial stage of the CIA'

and photo sur-

veillance operations in Mexido city, is

damstein e

• Heims teatified.

The reason

cause it was sensitive

from the Agency's

standpoint, but

and therefore, if this had become public

knowledge, it would have caused very bad feel-

ings between Mexico and the United States!

and that was the

reason • (Helms Exec Session

hearing, pp.51-52,

Nevertheless, the CIA had provided information to

FRE

the FBI regarding the Mexico City surveillance operations

I prior to the assassination

unperiod.

prior to the arrassination e to pose to recan

of November 28, 1963 the White House, through information

made available by DCI McCone to National Security Councils

had boas made

Director McGeorge Bundy,

aware that the CIA had

his

ants

point you!

)in operation against the cuban and Soviet En-

bassy/Consulatesand that through thes

Oswald's pre-

sence in Mexico City prior to the assassination had been

malue. It

pite paint, ones

corroborated. Lite MeCone Me to Me Georg Bunds)

---

## Page 41

as richeted

- 23 -

unwillingness

The CIA's

- to inform

the Warren Conmission

of the above described surveillance operations.

in

the early stages

of the in-

vestigation.

tho

the

AS

is a-source

It 1s Indicative of an

substance

see information on the provideng

ReciA felt unconfortable

the warren Gonmission. Isee scelso deby

This process

might well have hampered the Commission's ability to pro-

ceed in its investigation with all the facts before it

even those which might have meant exposing certain sensi

tive operations to the commission. We'll have to give example.

As noted previously, on January 31, 1964, the CIA Completey

provided the Warren Commission with a memorandum that milkh

chronicled Lee Harvey Oswald's Mexico City visit during re to

September 26, 1963 - October 3, 1963. That memorandum

that

Oswald's various conver- Mc

sations with the Cuban and Soveti Embassy/Consulates had *

boy

Jund, subsequently transcribed. Furthermore, e

that

memorandum

des namention anno

shamed

nue that the CIA

transcribea conversations between Cuban

April:

Embassy employee Sylvia Duran and Soviet officials at

e beticus

the Soviet Embassy/Consulate nor was mention made of the

probat

conversations between Cuban President Dorticos and Cuban

3/30

Ambassador to Mexico

smas

and

transcribed.

maems.

---

## Page 42

- 24 -

1515

as iedactat

On February 1, 1964, Helms appeared before the

Commission (see above) and likely discussed the memoran-

dum of January 31, 1964. On Feburary 10, 1964, J. Lee

Rankin wrote Helms in regard to the CIA memorandum of

January 31. A review of Rankin's letter indicates that

alast as of his wasting

the Warren Commission

had no substantive knowledge

or the production i.e., the tapes and trans-

cripts, from that operation. Rankin inquired in the Feb-

ruary 10, 1964 letter whether Oswald's direct communica-

tion with employees of the Soviet Embassy (as stated in

of the January 31 memorandum) had been facilitated

by telephone or interview. Manifestly, if the Warren Com-

mission had been informed o

and its success

Oswald this inquiry

by Rankin would not have been made.

Good

poict.

Raymond Rocca's testimony tends to support this

conclusion. It was Rocca's recollection that between .

the time period of January 1964 - April 1964, Warren Com-

mission's representatives had visited the CIA's headguar-

ters in Langley; Virginia and had been shown various trans-

cripts resulting from the CIA's

Mexico City. (Rocca dep. P.89) However,

- Mr. Rocca

did not personally make this material available

to Commission representatives and was not able to state

under oath precisely the point in time at which the Warren

firsts

Commission learned of these operations.

---

## Page 43

CV/:

"as realiti

- 25 -

On February 19, 1964 the CIA responded to Rankin's

inquiry of February 10. The Agency response did indi-

cate that Oswald had phoned the Soviet Consulate an

was

also interviewed at the Consulate. However, the Agency did

neither

not revealthe source of this information in its response

this tosses

to the Commissionfor indicate that it would be revealed

by other means (e.g. by oral briefing).

6o0,

During the period of March - April 1964, David

Slawson drafted a series of memoranda which among other

issues concerned Warren Commission knowledge of and access

to the production material derived from the

n Mexico City. A review of

these memoranda tend to support the Committee's belief- ly?

that the Warren Commission, through Mssrs. Slawson, Coleman, should

and willens did not obtain access to cit

fate

Until April 9, 1964. At that time, Coleman, This

SIwson and Willens met with. Win Scol:, the CIA's Chief

print.

Scott

of station in Mexico Cityput provided them with various

transezipts and translations derived Eng

Jos tie cuban and soviet Embassy/Consusales, (slawson

memorandum of April 22, 1964, subject: -

:, Brior to April. I it appears doubtful

that the Commission had been given even partial access

to the referenced material. Nevertheless, by March 12,

---

## Page 44

1.112

N80LA030

DELARDS

as restacted

- 26 -

1964, the record indicates that the Warren Commission

had at least become aware that the cia die

I the Cuban Embassy/Consulate.

(Slawson memorandum, March 12, 1964, Subj: meeting with

CIA representatives). Slawson's memorandum reveals

tess the Warren Commission had learned that CIA Ine fres

possessed transcripts of conversations between the Cuban

amborticos Armaxico, Armas, and the cuban president Dorticos.

The conversations, requested by the Warren Commission

representatives at a meeting with CIA officials, including

Richard Helms,

a concerned Silvia

Duria's arrest and interrogation by the Mexican Federal

Police (cite?). menue

Helms responded to the Com-

stadling

mission's request for access,

no that he would

attempt to arrange for the Warren Commission representative*

to review

this material. (Slawson memo, March 12, 1964)

It shouldbe noted that the records reviewed do not

reveal the manner in which the Commission learned of the

Dorticos-Armas

) As detailed above, both the FBI

and White House

(through McGeorge Bundy) were aware of the

CIA

In Mexico city.

One or the other could well have provided the War-

• ren Commission with this information. Nevertheless, Ray-

mond Rocas' testimony as cited herein (Rocca dep.

lends some support to the position that the Commission had

been informed of the Dorticos-Armas conversations through

the CIA's initiative.

---

## Page 45

2069

2228

NX.99027103

as replacted

- 27 -

Another Slawson memorandum, dated March 25, 1964

concerned Oswald's trip to Mexico. Slawson therein stated

that the tentative conclusional Concerns Oswald's

Mexico tripi

that he had reached

were derived from CIA

memorandal of January 31, 1964 and February 19, 1964,

and in addition a Mexican federal police summary dof

interrogations conducted shortly after the assassination

with certain Cuban Embassy employees. Slawson wrote:

A large part of it (the summary report) is

simply a summation of what the Mexican police

learned when they interrogated Mrs. Silvia

Duran, (sic) an employee of the Cuban Consulate

in Mexico City, and is therefore only as accu-

rate as Mrs. Duran's testimony to the police.

These comments indicate that Salwson placed limited

reliance upon the Mexican police summary. Moreover, there

is no indication that Salwson had been provided the Duran

franscripts. In fact, by virtue of

Slawson's comments conerning the Mejican police report,

it would appear that the Warren Commission as of March 25,

had been provided little substantive information pertaining

to Sylvia Duran.

Insert pz8

The Committee's belief that Slawson had not been

given access to the Duran transcripts is further supported

by reference to his memorandum of March 27, 1964 (Cite)

wherein he states his conclusion that Oswald had visited

the Cuban Embassy on three occasions. This conclusion

wiste was

is based upon an analysis of Sylvia Duran's testi-

• mony before the Mexican police.

Ibis memorandumbears

---

## Page 46

as redacted

Insert

from

23341

- 28 -

indication that he had reviewed any of the Duran

transcripts. Furthermore,

Slawson

had been given access

to these transcripts, certainly their substance would have

been incorporated into his analysis and accordingly noted

for this purpose. His analysis bould have reflected

the fact of this or alled! ther by its corroboration or

criticism of the Mexican police summary report.

78Ensatpag

As arch 25, 1964, the record delinstates that

the Warren

Co

540n

Forts te

vestigaite

Oswald

activities

Sco Cats Sauterers,

sess to the Duran transcripts.

whe Cormission had been cho

forced to rely upon the two memoranda that did notsmake

permindage:

suspea

ofA

reference to the surveillance operations, and ar summarya po-

lice report. Thus, the Agency had been successful for

over three months in not exposing the surveillance opera-

tions to the review of the concerned Warren Commission

staff members. As was stated in the CIA cable of Decem-

ber 20, 1964 to its Mexico City Station:

Our present plan in passing information to

the

Warren Commission is to eliminate mention

• in order to protect your

continuing operations. Will rely instead

on statements of Silvia Duran and

on contents

state

of Soviet consular file which soviets gave

here.

CIA cable, DIR 90466, FOIA 420-757, Dec. 20,

1964 CIA p.2144)

Maron 27, 1964 81äwson

mined that

oswatt

had visite

wrote that

deter-

the Cuban Embassy

phree

---

## Page 47

elmed citation 19

13M

- 29

RELEASE OF D

as redde

ted times.

He stated that this conclusion was based upon his

review of silvia Duran's testanone

the Mexican

(Slawson menorandum, Marc)

1964

CIA p. 1912) Howerer,

Slawson does not state

that his

conclusion

were also drawn

from review of any of the pr

duction fxom the Mexaco City

station

sureillance operations.

Slawson does

indicate,

however,

that

his reasoning

aguas regardinG Oswald's

visit to the Cuban embassy.

Logically, access to the

production would have clarified sone

ambiguities. For example, on September 27, at 4:05 p.m.

Silvia Duran telephoned the Soviet Embassy, and stated

that an American was presently at the Cuban Embassy re-

Converse

questing an in-transit visit to Cuba. This American was

late

determined by CIA analysts to be Oswald. Again

'on Septem-

Yilof" ber 28, at I1:51 a.m. Duran. telephoned the Soviet Consulate

subsclustly

stating that an American,

Identified by CIA analysts as

Oswald

at the Cuban Embassy. Thus o

definitively established that Oswald had

visited the Cuban Embassy om at least two occasions.

Moreover, the specific datesand exact times of his presence

were

in the Cuban Embassy her established as the result of the

Jad this information beer made

available to Slawson, his calcuations of Oswald's activities

in Mexico City would have been more firmly established

than they were as of March 27, 1964. These transeripts

---

## Page 48

RELEASE OF THE DOCUMENT

- 30 -

... de restact

could have been made available to the Warren Commission

at its

mneeption but as the record indicates they were

not then made available.

The record supports the Committee's finding that

as of April 2, 1964 the Warren Commission had still not

with

been given access to the above-referenced series of

faite

In

, a memorandum of that date by Coleman

really m.

sand slawson, they articulatadone question to the CIA and

two requests for information from the Agency, (Ambassador

Mann file memo April 2, 1964, CIA p. 1975) (my notes?) Colemanand

ple at slamson co rote?

vold

1) What is the information source referred to in

the November 28 telegram that Oswald intended

to settle down in Odessa;

this

He first

2) We would like to see copies of the transcripts

of the

Translated it possible, in

all cases where the

- to the

assassination or related subjects;

3) We would especially like to see

in which the allegation that money was passed

at the Cuban Embassy is discussed

The questior

stion finally posed in the above-reference

memorandum of April 2 concerns the CIt

of September 27, 1963 at 10:37 a.M.

(Slawson memo, April

Obvigiles

22, 1964, CIA P. 3223) :

Necessarily, if Slawson

- Found-sit

neeess14+9498

mart

the source of the information, he had, not beer

Hard way.

as yet

---

## Page 49

363870.

GIGANDION

MERSCOF

(MIS DOCUMENT

ar ridacted

to the riginal material

provided that source which

beause? tends to show

The first Coleman-slawson request &

te lammed

Ithat

state

the wus given access,

concerning the assassination

adicates the dennis ion lot not Been

Long dale

aquaction dat artbabar

winterpretedat

pne

(stem Numbertass I the absts)

had

notbeen

The (second

request, Jitem number three of the above

listing] reveals that

of the Dorticos-Arman

conversation of November 22, 1964,

in which the passing

of monies des discussed had not as of April 2

been provided

to the Commission. The Commission had specifically requested

the Dorticos-Armas transcripts._at the March 12, 1964

meeting between Commission

representatives and Agency re-

presentatives. (Cite.)

exprome

On April 3, 1964, Coleman and Slawson articulated

their concern for

receiving complete access to all materials

relevant to Oswald's Mexico City trip: They wrote:

The most probable final result of the entire

investigation of Oswald's activities in Mexico is

a conclusion that he went there for the purpose

of trying to reach Cuba and that no bribes, con-

spiracies, etc. took place.

---

## Page 50

CIA HAS NO ORICTION TO

DECLASSIRICARON ANDIOR

RELS SE OF THIS DOCUMENT

- 32-

...In order to make such a judgment (that all reasonable

lines of investigation that might have uncovered other

motivations or possible conspiracies have been followed

through with negative results), we must become familiar

with the details of what both the American and Mexican

investigatory agencies there have done. This means

reading their reports, after translation, if necessary,

and in some cases talking with the investigators

themselves.

The thoroughness of investigation which Coleman and

Slawson articulated as a vital concern to the Commission's

work had been

at thwarted by the CIA's we concern

legat its

however

to the Commission's investigation, the limited number of persons

engaged in an investigation of a gravity and historical signifi-

cance unprecedented in this nation's histostealsh

from 16499

1159995494011

on April 9, David Slawson, Howard Willens, and'' clearly

improp

William Coleman flew to Mexico City, Mexico to meet with the

representatives of the State Department, FBI, CIA, and the

Government of Mexico. Prior to their departure, they met with

Thomas Mann, U.S. Ambassador to Mexico during Oswald's visit

to Mexico City and at the time of President Kennedy's

assassination. Ambassador Mann intold

•the Warren

conmission representative has the CIA's Mexies City Station

was actively engaged in photosurveillance operations against

the Soviet and Cuban Embassy/Consulates (Slawson memo,

April 22, 19641 P.

---

## Page 51

CIA RONO ONECTON TO

SO RIGATION AAJOR

VIC

s redected

- 33 -

Upon the group's arrival in Mexico City, they were met

by U.S. Ambassador Freeman, Claire Boonstra of the State

Department, Clarke Anderson of the FBI, and Winston Scott of

the CIA.

That same day during a meeting between the Commission

representatives and Win Scott, Scott made available to the

group actual transcripts of the t

accompanied with

in tou lawyery

Home laquage.

sat English translations.

of the same, In addition,

he provided the group with reels of photographs for the

time period covered by Oswald's visit that had resulted from

photosurveillance of the Cuban and Soviet Embassy entrances

David Slawson wrote:

Mr. Scott stated at the beginning of his narrative

that he intended to make a complete disclosure of all

facts, including the sources of his information, and

that he understood that all three of us had been cleared

for TOP SECRET and that we would not disclose beyond

the confines of the Commission and its immediate staff

the information we obtained through him without first

clearing it with his superiors in Washington.

We

agreed to this." (Slawson memo, April, 22, 1964, p. 22)

Mr. Scott described to the Commission representatives

the CIA's course of action immediately following the assassination,

scot indicating that his start alminediately,

began to compile

dossiers on Oswald, Duran, and everyone else throughout Mexico

whom the CIA knew had had some contact with Oswald (p.22)•

scott revealea all known Cuban and Russian intelligence agents

Lad immediately been put under surveillance following the

assassination. Liaison was set up with Mexican officials,

/particularly Luis Echevarria, Acting Minister of the

Mexican Gobernacion (pp. 23-24). Slawson then concluded

---

## Page 52

CAt/0:00R3084TO

NESUAE66 0F

as related

225080

- 34

"Scott's narrative plus the material we were shown dis-

closed immediately how incorrect our previous

information had been in Oswald's contacts with the

Soviet and Mexican Embassies.

Apparently the

distortions and omissions to which our information had

been subjected had entered some place in Washington,

because the CIA information that we were shown by Scott

was unambiguous on almost all the crucial points.

had previously planned to show Scott, Slawson's

reconstruction of Oswald's probable activities at the

embassies to get Scott's opinion, but once we saw how

badly distorted our information was we realized that

Therefore, instead, we decided

to take as close note as possible from the original

source materials at some later time during our visit."

p-222d what?

, $ 4120/1097

Slawson's memorandum of April 21, 1964

records the results

of the notetaking from original source materials that he did

following Scott's disclosures.

These notes dealtexclusively

with

ertaining ferrespectively

Hothe

Duran and Oswald conversations Sorifle perrotSept a7-@ct1, 1963.

It is evident from Slawson's record that the Agency's

denial of original source materials, in this cas

seriously impaired the Commission's

accurately reasoned:

lability to draw conclusions regarding Oswald's sojourn in Mexico

City, '

e

It meant that as

of April 10, 1964, nearing the halfway point of the Warren

Commission investigation, the Commission was forced to retrace

the factual path by which it had structured Oswald's activities

in Mexico City. It further revealed that the Agency had

provided ambiguous information

to the Commission when, in fact

"on almost all the crucial points"fa

significantly more precise

could have bees made

materials mure available for analysis by the Commission.

---

## Page 53

The preceding section (l355 Leted!

porate

surveillanes, yet the co o

muellence.

Клан.

Thus, the Agency's early policy of not providing the Commission

with

vitally relevant information derived from certain

sensitive sources and methods had seriously undermined the

investigation and possibly foreclosed lines of investigation

that might have been more seriously considered had this

material been expeditiously provided; (e.g., Cuban involvement:

-charlert callera comeration

the in this section?

VI. Mexico City Mystery Man

On November 23, 1963, Marguerite Oswald was shown by

FBI Special Agent Odum a photograph of a man bearing no

fr

physical resemblance to her son.

Thel photograph had been

supplied to the FBI on November 22 by the CIA's Mexico City

Station after Agency representatives had searched their files

in an effort to locate information on Oswald.

fr This photograph

was one in a series

resulting from the CIA's photosurveillance

operations against the Soviet and Cuban Embassy/Consulates Ji it

had been linked by the Mexico City Station

Brior to the

assassination,

Lee Harvey Oswald. Richard Helms, in a sworn

affidavit before the Warren Commission, stated that the

photograph shown to Marguerite Oswald had been taken on October 4,

1963 in Mexico City and mistakenly linked at that time to

oswala. (crtcHatsb@fident.in weR)

On February 10, 1964, Marguerite Oswald testified before

the Warren Commission and recounted the circumstances under

which she was shown the photograph. Mrs. Oswald testified that

WIRI?

• she

believed this photograph to have been of Jack Ruby. (p. 153)

---

## Page 54

36-

RELEASE De

As redicted

Thomas kanamesmies Assistant DPP.!

Thereafter, on February 12, 1964, J. Lee Rankin wrote

nequaating.to0k

regarding the A

cind an

Ched bees nestertein

circumstances

" this photograph "by the

Oxplanation

710)

Central Intelligence Agency.

Rank in

reques ted that

the Commission be u

53200

the identity of the individual

depicted in the photograph it that information was available.

On that same day, in a separate letter to DCI McCone

Rankin wrote that the Commission had been informed by the Secret

services that,the cIA had disseminated see reports a

communications concerning the assassination to the Secret

the's could

beautined into 1

of *

Service s

Tiece marrias request

requested copies of these

reports and other materials. Three Sit cables t

estrict

originallyidentificati

concerned wit the photograph of the individual

Oswald and subsequently shown to Oswald's mother..to ~

what tong

AJ

Or what?

additioned

son, Among the materials

bytreciA

disseminated to the Secret Service was a November 26

dissemination (DIR85177), a copy hich wertransmittedeo

thesecret ferre. That cable concerned the Dori-Armas

conversations and disclosed the existence of

Joperations in Mexico citinat the time of the

assassination and Oswald's earlier visit.

John Scelso testified regarding the circumstances

surrounding the eventual explanation given to the Commission

of the origin of the photograph in question. Scelso stated:

---

## Page 55

DECLASSIFICATION 0C

as redicted

"We did not initially disclose to the warren

Commission all of our technical operations.

In other

words, we did not initially disclose to them that we

had photosurveillance because the November photo we had

(of MMM) was not of Oswald. Therefore it did not mean

anything, you see?"

MI. Goldsmith:

.. So the Agency was making a unilateral

decision that this was not relevant to the Warren

Commission.

Scelso: Right, we were not authorized, at first, to reveal

all our technical operations.

(Scelso deposition,

150)

Bain February 1a, 1964;

in che warren

Natt

reques tod

Commission

access to

asourulof concern tutte. Gle.

production' (as discussed in the

similarioiselastere

- maclean what is the

preceding section), the su

the Walt Come Not

concert

the Agency.

On March 5, 1967, Raymond Rocca wrote in an internal

memorandum to Richard Helms that "we have a problem here for

your determination." Rocca outlined Angleton's desire not to

respond directly to Rankin's request of February 12 regarding

CIA material forwarded to the Secret Service since November 23,

1964.

Rocca then stated:

"Unless you feel otherwise, Jim would prefer

to wait out the Commission

on the matter covered by

paragraph 2 (of the above-referenced February 12

letter) •

If they come back on this point he feels

that you, or someone from here, should be prepared

go over to show the Commission

the material rather than

letter; y

pass them to them in copy.

Incidentally, none of these

punt wen items are of new substantive interest.

We have either

passed the material in substance to the Commission in

this,

retr

photographs which are

not of Oswald..."

Ca: ViRocca memo 5 March 64, FOIA 579-250)

---

## Page 56

•ісламовім ла сік емди

NO OBJECTION TO

GIA HASI

DECLASSISICATIONANDIOR

RELEASE OF THI

-38-

On March 12, 1964, representatives of the Warren

Commission and the CIA confered regarding the February 12

request for the materials forwarded to the Secret Service by

the Agency. (See Rankin letter of March 16, 1964 and Slawson

memo, March 12, 1964)

The record indicates that

the Commission at the March 12

meeting pressed for access to the Secret Service materials.

Rankin wrote to Helms on March 16 that it was his understanding

that the CIA would supply the Commission with a paraphrase of

each report or communication pertaining to the Secret Service

materials "with all indications of your confidential communica-

tions techniques and confidential sources deleted. You will

also afford members of our staff working in this area an

opportunity to review the actual file so that they may give

assurance that the paraphrase are complete." (Rankin letter of

March 16, 1964, #2)

Rankin further indicated that the same procedure

Gia.

to

be followed regarding any material in the possession of the

CIA prior to November 22, 1963 which had not yet been furnished

concerned

because it i

sensitive sources and methods. (Rankin

letter of March 16, #3)

Helms responded to Rankin's March 16 letter on March 24

(DDP4-1554, CD631 and DDP4-1555, CD 674) by two separate

communications. CD631 provided. the Commission with a copy of

the October 10, 1963 CIA dissemination to FBI, State Dept.,

INs and Navy Dept. (SS on 22 Nov.) regarding Lee Harvey Oswald

and his presence at the Soviet Consulate in Mexico City. The

response further revealed that on October 23, 1964, CIA had

---

## Page 57

- 39 -

requested two copies of the most recent photograph of Oswald in

order to check the identity of the person believed to be

her

Oswald in Mexico City. Furthermore, the CIA stated that it

had determined that the photograph shown to Marguerite

Oswald on November 22, 1963 did not refer to lee Harvey Oswald, Th's

was done by checking the photograph against the press photographs of

Oswald generally available on November 23, 1963.

CD 674 reveals that on November 22, 1963, immediately

following the assassination, and on November 23, 1963, three

cabled reports were received at CIA headquarters from the CIA

Mexico City Station regarding photographs of an unidentified man

who had visited the Cuban and Soviet Embassies during October

and November 1963. Paraphrases of these cables, not revealing

sensitive sources and methods, were attached to CD 674. The

Agency further stated that the subject of the photo referenced

in these cables was not Oswald. It

further stated that:

"In response to our meeting of 12 March and your memo

of 16 March, Stern and Willens will review at Langley

Secret service

the regional copies.of these 3 disseminations to the

Secret Service and the cables on which they were based, as

well as the photos of the unidentified man." (CIA,

p. 116444 of notes)

On March 26, William Coleman wrote in a memorandum for

the record:

"The CIA directed a memorandum to J. Lee Rankin on March 24,191

(Commission Document No. 631) in which it set forth the

dissemination of the information on Lee Harvey Oswald.

I realize that this memorandum is only a partial answer

to our inquiry to the CIA dated March 16, 1964 and I hope

that the complete answers

will give us the additional

information we requested."

---

## Page 58

- 40

should

tel

T

• 1

clear cent

Coleman went on to state:

"As you know, we are still trying to get an

explanation of the photograph which the FBI showed

Marguerite Oswald soon after the assassination.

I

hope that paragraph 4 of the memorandum of March 24,

1964 (CD 631) sent Mr. Rankin by the CIA is not the

answer which the CIA intends to give us as to this

inquiry. "

The following day, as agreed by Warren Commission and

Agency representatives, Samuel Stern of the Commission visited

CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia.

ofhis visit

SternSO memorandum reveals that he reviewed Oswald's

file with Raymond Rocca. Stern indicated that Oswald's file

contained those materials furnished previously to the Warren

Commission by the CIA. The file also contained:

Cable reports of November 22 and November 23 from

the CIA's Mexico City Station relating to the photo-

graph of the unidentified individual mistakenly

believed to be Lee Harvey Oswald and the reports on

more

diversify

those cables furnished on November 23, 1963 to

the Secret Service by the CIA.

Stern noted that these messages were

accurately para-

phrased in the attachments to CD 674 provided the Warren

Commission on March 24, 1964.

Stern

also reviewed the October 10, 1963 cable from

quotation

CIA's Mexico City Station to the CIA headquarters

reporting. Oswald's contact with the Soviet Embassy

in Mexico City. He also reviewed the October 10,

stole

1963 cable from CIA headquarters to the Mexico City

Station reporting background information on Oswald.

---

## Page 59

Chuck: You mit read Don' rant because

section a it are 41-directly relucat a must le

integrated is. failue to pride pito tepercing

Stern noted that these messages were also paraphrased

set fort

accurately as

in the CIA's January 31 memo to the

warren Connision reporting oswald's Moxico city trip. lo Yogree?

Lastly, Stern noted that Rocca provided him for his

review a computer printout of the references to Oswaldrelated

documents located in the Agency's electronic data storage

system. He stated "there is no item listed on the printout

which the Warren Commission has not been given either in full

text or paraphrased."

Thus, by the 27th of March, a Warren Commission representa-

tive had been apprised of the circumstances surrounding the

mysterious photograph.

se reference to where the circumatance

an discensei

VII. Allan Dulles' Role vis-a-vis the CIA-Warren Commission

Relationship

It has been alleged that Allan Dulles, former Director

of Central Intelligence and one of the Seven members of the

Warren Commission

casteerucial information stow. the warren

Commission.

Specifically, the Senate Select Committee

concludeg:

whos it

eves establis

""With the exception of Allan Dulles, it is unlikely

that anyone on the Warren Commission knew of CIA

assassination efforts...Allan Dulles, who had been

tut

Director of Central Intelligence until November 1961,

was a member of the Warren Commission and knew of the

CIA plots with underworld figures which had taken place

during his tenure at the Agency." (SSC, Book V, pP. 67-68)

However, the SSC did not explore further the

relationship an

allegiancedof Dulles as a Warren Commission member and Dulles

as a former DCI of the CIA. The Committee has consequently

reviewed files maintained by the CIA related to Mr. Dulles'

---

## Page 60

- 41 -

combined

Jere

service on the Warren Commission. In the course of this review,

a memorandum was uncovered which indicates Dulles w

providi information to the CIA regarding Warren Commission

This mere fond tends to shou

activities and investigative policies.

atleastone

that Dulles acted as an informant on occasion for the CIA.

concerned i

the contro

versial case of the Russian defector Nosenko. The memorandum

was written by David Murphy. Chief of the Soviet Russia Division

partientary concerned it te

who was

case, parcrea

N + 564-915

unseer's interrogation.

David Murphy's memorandum, of July 8, 1964, concerned

his discussions with Alanaules weavosenkoy

s knowledge

of Oswald.

This memorandum was prepared for DDP Helms,

Murphy wrote:

"Mr. Dulles, with whom I spoke today recalled his

earlier conversation with you on this subject and said

that there were still some members of the Commission who

were concerned lest they suppress the Nosenko information

now only to have it surface at a future date.

expressed concern that this could possibly prejudice

the entire Warren Commission Report."

Murphy responded to Dulles' statement by stating that

the Commission's concern was understandable but that the Agency

felt the Commission's final report should make no mention of

Nosenko's information. Murphy indicated that a possible

alternative would be to use language "which would allude to

the existence of other, unverified information on the Oswald

case." This language, Murphy contended, would permit the

Warren Commission to state, if challenged on this point at a

future time, that it had given consideration to the Nosenko

information.

---

## Page 61

- 42-

Murphy continued:

Chuck-

before we

ill

fake

fas

this

for, murply

be

shou

"It was agreed an effort would be made to find such

language if Mr. Dulles is again unsuccessful in

persuading his colleagues to eliminate any reference

to the Nosenko information from the report.

To attempt

this, however, we would have to know precisely in what

context the Warren Commission intended to make use of

the Nosenko information. This, Mr. Dulles will have to

determine from Mr. Rankin. He

will do this as soon as

possible. He knows that I am leaving this week and

therefore, will contact you as

soon as he has the informa-

tion he needs from Mr. Rankin."

hidi

Whether by design or as an unintended result, the

quoted language indicates that Mr. Dulles, as a member of the

Warren Commission, was prepared to compromise his position

cler

with the Commission in order to supply the CIA, specifically

Murphy and Richard Helms, with sensitive information about

the Commission's attitudes towards the Nosenko case. It lso

Ult appears that the AGency had communicated ta

meres the information

it desired regarding thr

ssion position on Nosenko, and

that Dulles was prepared to act in this regard as a high level

thes

and very well placed informant for the CIA.

Murphy prepared a second memorandum st

man a 28 July 1964.

The subject, of this memorandum cons

ned use of Nosenko's

Learly

information in the Warren C

rission's report. Participants

quilified in the discussion ung

which the memorandum was based included

Allan Dulles,

Lee Rankin, David Slawson of the Commission,

and Richard Helms, David Murphy and Tennant Bagley of the CIA.

---

## Page 62

CIA HAS NO CUSTRION 1O

DECLASS MGA TON AND/OR

RELEASE OFTHIS DOCUMEST

da sedated

VIII. Luisa Calderon

- 43

This should be included in an

eculia section on the taps..

Approximately five hours after President Kennedy's

assassination, a Cuban government employee in Mexico City named

"Luisa" received a telephone call from an unidentified man

speaking Spanish. (MEXI 7105, 27 Nov. 63, FOIA 173-615, attach-

ment) This call had beef

do d too.

by the cIA's

Mexico City Station as the result of i

Jop citl the Mexico city station identified the

Luisa of the conversation as Luisa Calderon, who was then

employed in the Commercial Attache's office at the Cuban

Consulate.

During the course of the conversation, the unidentified

caller asked Luisa if she had heard the latest news. Luisa

replied in a joking tone:

"Yes, of course, I knew almost before Kennedy."

The callewent on to tell Luisa that the person

apprehended for Kennedy's slaying was the "President of one of

the Committees of the Fair Play for Cuba.".. Luisa replied that

she knew this

also. Luisa inguired whether the person being

held for the killing was a gringo. The unidentified caller

replied, "yes." Luisa told her caller that she had learned

nothing else about the assassination; that she had learned

about the assassination only a little while ago. The

unidentified caller commented:

---

## Page 63

CIA HAS NO ORJECTION TR

DECLASSIFICATION ANDIOR

RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

-.44-

We think that if it had been or had

seemed... public or had been one of the

segregationists or against intergration

who had killed Kennedy, then there was,

let's say, the possibility that a sort

of civil war would arise in the United

States; that contradictions would be

sharpened... who knows

Luisa responded:

Imagine, one, two, three and now, that makes

three.

(She laughs.)

Raymond Rocca, fo

fo1

, in response to

a 1975 Rockefeller Commission request for information on

a possible Cuban conspiracy to assassinate President

Kennedy wrote regarding Calderon's comments:

Latin hyperbole? Boastful ex post facto

suggestion of foreknowledge.

This is the

only item in the intercept coverage of the

Cubans and Soviets after the assassination

that contains the suggestion of foreknow

leage or expectation. (Rocca memo for DC/OPS,

23 May 1975, p. 15)

food Standing by itself, Iuisa Calderon's cryptic com-

ments do not merit serious attention. Her words may in-

deed indicate foreknowledge of the assassination but may

also equally be interpreted without such a sinister impli-

cation. Nevertheless, as will be discussed herein, the

700

Committee has determined that luisa Calderon's case did lanyeily

merit serious attention in the months following the assas-

sination. However, Calderon's comments were not reported

to the Warren Commission, apparently an agency oversight.

should so ut

end of thi

section

---

## Page 64

414

- 45 -

In connection with the assassination, Luisa Calderon's

name first surfaced on November 27, 1964 in a cable

sent

by then Ambassad able te me 552 that

from a Cuban defector tying Luisa Calderon to the Cuban

Intelligence apparatus. The defector, AMMUG-1, was him-

self a Cuban Intelligence Officer who supplied valuable

Azuricia!

and highly reliable information to the CIA regarding

Cuban

Cuban Intelligence operations. Calderon's ties to Cuban

intelligence were reported to the Warren Commission on Junels, 1964

Caste Date

(Did the State Department supply the cable to the Warren

Commission? Have we reviewed their' Mann file?) However,

fromitsfilereditos

the Committee has determined that the CIA did not provide

Calderon's conversation to the Warren Commission, thus,

even though the Warren Commission was aware that Calderon

had connections to intelligence work, as did other Cuban

Embassy officers, the vital link between her background

and her comments was never established for the Warren Com-

mission by the CIA. The Agency's oversight in this re-

gard may have forecassed the Commission from actively

pursing a lead of great significance.

• In that cable Mann stated:

•..Washington should urgently consider feasi-

bility of requesting Mexican authorities to

arrest for interrogation: Eusebio Azcue,

Luisa Calderon and Alfredo Mirabal. The

two

men are Cuban national and Cuban consular

officers. Luisa Calderon is a secretary in Cuban

---

## Page 65

- '46 -

Consulate here."

This cable does not state the basis for arresting

Calderon. However, the CIA's copy of this cable bears a

handwritten notation on its routing page. That notation

states: "Info from Amb Mann Sur

see Rush re:...persons

involved with Oswald in Cuban Embassy.

Mann went on to state in urgent terms:

"They may quickly be returned to Havana in order

to eliminate any possibility that Mexican govern-

ment could use them as witnesses."

According to CIA files, Calderon returned to Havana

on December 16, 1963, less than four weeks after the as-

sassination.

Calderon, Azcue and Mirabal were not arrested nor

detained for questioning by the Mexican federal police.

However, Silvia Duran, a friend and associate of Calderon's

and the one person believed to have had repeated contact

with Oswald while he was in Mexico City, was arrested and

questioned by the Mexican police on two separate occasions

(Cites). During her reinterrogation, Duran was questioned,

How do you know

regarding her association with Calderon.

No explanation is

given in this report for the questions concerning Calderon .

(Cites). The information regarding Duran's interrogation

was passed to the Warren Commission on February 21, 1964

(DDP.4-0940), more than two months after Calderon had re-

turned to Cuba.

what

you

prean

what-

type

shoild

explanation

Lave

been

---

## Page 66

MATH ORUECIICHTO

19 GASS OR THIS DOCUMENT

- 47 -

as redacted

Calderon's 201 file reveals that she arrived in

Mexico City from Havana on January 16, 1964, carrying

Cuban Passport E/63/7. Her date of birth was believed

to be 1940 (Dispatch,

12612) calderon's presence in

Mexico City was first reported by the CIA on July 15,

1963 in a dispatch from the CIA's Miami field office to

the CIA's Mexico City Séêtion and to the Chief of the CIA's

Special Affairs Staff (for Cuban operations). That dis-

patch had attached to it a report containg biographic data

on personnel then assigned to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico

City. At page three of the attached report Luisa Calderon

was listed as Secretary of the Cuban Embassy's commercial

office.

The notation indicated that a report was pending

on Calderon. The Agency has attempted, without success,

to locate the report.

On September 1, 1963, a dispatch was sent

from

the Chief of the Special Affairs Staff to the Chief of

We station in Mexico City rDispatel

insert

11935).

Luisa Calderon's association with the Cuban DGI

was first reported by the CIA on May 5, 1964. At that

time,

•) Chief of counterintelligence for the

Special Affairs Staff, recorded the results of his de-

briefing of the Cuban defector, AMMUG-1. The memorandum

states that AMMUG had no direct knowledge of lee Harvey

Oswald or his activities but was able to provide items

of interest based upon the comments of certain Cuban In-

# This dispatch reported that:

(over)

---

## Page 67

- 48

MAROLL

is redacte

telligence Service officers. Specifically, AMMUG-1 had

been asked if Oswald was known to the Cuban intelligence

services before November 23, 1963. AMMUG-1 told Swenson,

as recorder in the May 5 memorandum that "prior to October

1963, Oswald visited the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City on

two or three occasions. Before, during and after these

visits, Oswald was in contact with the Direccion General

De Intelligencia (DGI), specifically with Luisa Calderon,

Manuel Vega Perez, and Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez.

thereafter wrote that calderon's precise

conship to the DGI was not clear. As a comment to

this statement he set forth the CIA cable and dispatch

traffic which recorded her arrival in Mexico and departure, during.

DecErke 1164

for Cuba.

оп May 7, 1966.

recorded additional informa-

tion he had elicited from AMMUG-1 regarding Oswald's

possible contact with the DGI. Paragraph 3 of this memoran-

dum stated in part:

"a. Luisa Calderon, since she returned to

Cuba, has been paid a regular salary

by the DGI even

though she has not per-

formed any services.

Her home is in

the Vedado section where the rents are

high.

b. Source (AMMUG) has known Calderon for

several years.

Before going to Mexico,

she worked in the Ministry of Exterior

Commerce in the department which was

known

as the "Empress Transimport."

Her title was Secretary General of the

Communist Youth in the department named

in the previous

sentence.

---

## Page 68

CIA AND :0

DECLAS

JM 40/36

AELENSO

as redicted

SO DUOSNE

On May

ledge of the Oswald case.

- 49-

further disclosed AMMUG's know-

paraphrased ANMUG's

knowledge of Calderon as follows:

I thought that Luisa Calderon might have

had contact with Oswald because I learned about

17 March 1964, shortly before I made a trip to

Mexico, that she had been involved with an

American in Mexico.

The information to which

I refer was told to me by a DGI case officer...

I had commented to (him) that it seemed strange

that Luisa Calderon was receiving a salary from

calderon

the DGI althought she apparently did not do any

work for the Service. (The case officer) told

me that hers was a peculiar case and that he

himself believed that she had been recruited in

Mexico by the Central Intelligence Agency al-

though Manuel Pineiro, the Head of the DGI, did

not agree.

As I recall, (the case officer) had

investigated Luisa Calderon.

This

was because,

during the time she was in Mexico, the GI had

intercepted a letter to her by an American who

signed his name OWER (phonetic) or something

similar.

As you know,

the pronunciation of

des not a be gpa

Anglo-Saxon names is difficult in Spanish so

I am not sure of how the name mentioned by Hernan

dez should be spelled. It could have been "Howard"

or something different.

As I understand the matter,

the letter from the American was a love letter

but indicated that there was a clandestine-

professional relationship between the writer and

Luisa Calderon.

I also understand from (the

case officer) that after the interception of

the letter she had been followed and seen in the

company of an American. I do not know if this

could have been Oswald...

On May 11, Raymond Rocca wrote a memorandum

to Director Richard Helms regarding the information

had elicited from AMMUG. Rocca proposed that "the DDP

in person or via a designee, preferably the former, dis-

cuss the AMMUG/1 sitaution on a very restricted basis

with Mr. Rankin at his earliest convenience either at

the Agency or at the Commission headquarters. Until this

---

## Page 69

019/20 20000

20019470

DECL/ST

As ichated

DOULIZEAT

- 50 -

takes place, it is not desirable to put anything in writ-.

ing. (11 May 64, Rocca memo, FOIA687-295 with/4 attachments).

On May 15, 1964, Helms wrote Rankin regarding.

AMMUG's information about the DGI, indicating its sensi-

tivity and operational significance. Attached to Helms'

communication was a paraphrased accounting of

May 5 memorandum. (Helm's memo, May 15, 1964,

• POTA 692-294).

In that attachment the intelligence associations of

were

Manuel Vega Perez and Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez are set

forth. However, that attachment fakes no reference what-

soever to Luisa Calderon.

Howard Willens of the Warren Commission, requested

#: 8858063

as a follow-up to the May 15 memorandum, to look at the

questions used

nterrogation of AMMUG. (Dooley

memo to Rocca, 19. June 1964

FOIA 739-310). On June 18,

1964 Arthur Dooley of Rocca's counterintelligence research

and analysis group took the questions and AMMUG's responses

to the Warren Commission's officers for Willen's review.

Willens san

Jay 5 memorandun. Thei only mention

of pideron was as follows: "The precise relationship ot

Luisa Calderon to the DGI is not clear. She spent about

six months in Mexico from

which she returned to Cuba early

in 1964.

However, willens was not shown th

memoran-

dum of May 7 and May 8, 1964 which contained much more

detailed information on Luisa Calderon, including her possible

---

## Page 70

CIA HAD NO 02/S01

STON TO

DECLASSIFICAT

ON ANDOR

RELEASE OF THIS

WENT

- 51 -

association with Lee Harvey Oswald and/or American intel-

ligence.

It should be noted that these memoranda of May 5,

7, 8, 11 and June 19 with attachments, are not referenced

in the Calderon 201 file. Their existence was determined

by the Committee's independent review of other agency

files.

Thus, the Warren Commission bad as of 19 June 64, Mand

little if no reason to pursue the Luisa Calderon lead.

It had effectively been denied significant background

information which may have impeded or prevented its pur-

suit of Calderon's potential relationship to Oswald and

the assassination of President Kennedy•

Unfortunately,

One must keep in mine that even if the warren Com-

mission had been

apprised of Calderon's background and

possible contact with Oswald it still was denied the one

significant piece of information that might have aroused

regarding pass bald Gate complice tag in the die mit.

its investigative efforts to a more serious level. The

Warren Commission hever was told about Calderon's conver-

mitteeigive

testimony of fRankin, Slawson; give section

possible

motive for not telling of detailed information on Luisa

(mentions CIA association; site the dispatch close out with

Rankin quotes.)

Be sure?

Cammittee state

the caldero mention ther

was transmitted to HQ

on 11/27/67.

---