Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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176-10037-10414

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA

RECORD NUMBER : 176-10037-10414

RECORD SERIES : Personal Papers of Richard Goodwin

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA

FROM : Kent, Sherman

TO : Director, CIA

TITLE : Memo RE: The Situation and Prospects in Cuba

DATE : 11/3/1961

PAGES : 11

SUBJECTS:

DOCUMENT TYPE :

CLASSIFICATION :

RESTRICTIONS :

CURRENT STATUS :

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : Goodwin Papers: Cuba, General, 11/61 & Undated Box 4. Box 7.

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Sanitate breed RRd,t0

SECRET

CEN

RAI

INTELLIGENCE

OFFICE CE NATIONAL ESTIMATES

AGENCI

3 November 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUDJECT: The Situation and Prospects in Cuba

Summary

1. The Castro regime has sufficient popular support and

repressive capabilities to cope with ary internal threat likely

to develop within the foreseeable future. The regime faces

serious, but not insurmountable, economic difficulties. The

contrast between its roseate pronises nd the grim actuality 1s

producing disillusionment and apathy. Some specially notivated

elevents have recently dared to denonstrate their disapproval.

The bulk of the population, however still accepts the Castro

refire, or 1s at least resigned to it, and substantial nuribers

still support it with enthusiast. At the sane tive, the regine's

capabilities for repression are increasing nore rapidly than are

the potentialities for active resistance.

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The Econonic Situation and Prospects

2. The Cuban econory is now feeling the impact of three

revolutionary changes: (a) the loss of nost of its experienced

niddle and upper level nanagerial talent; (b) the luposition of

elaborate state controls; and (c) a drastic shift in the trading

patters, frou primary dependence on the US to prinary dependence

on the Soviet Bloc. The US embargo has produced sone econonie

difficulties through the denial of spare parts for previously

acquired equippent, alnost all of which was of US origin.. Never-

theless, the production of sugar, the principal export crop; has

been increased, and the production of tobacco and tropical fruit,

the other leading exports, has been maintained. Although Cuba's

free world trade and foreign exchange reserves have declined

sharply, the Bloc 1s taking enough exports and returning enough.

consuner goods and nachinery to keep the econouy going.

3.. The douestic production of foodstuffs and other consuner

goods, and the imports obtained fron the Bloc and elsewhere, are

together not sufficient to coupensate for the loss of former 10-

ports fron the US. Personal consumption has declined, especially

in the cities, and nost drastically in the case of the upper and

uiddle classes. In sore rural areas, however, especially in

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centers of sugar production, living conditions have been sub-

stantially iuproved, particularly in terus of housing and sani-

tation. These examples of the tangible benefits received by sone

keep alive the hopes of nany others.

4.. In addition to trade, the Bloc has extended to Cuba sore

$357 nillion in credits for industrial developuent. However, only

a few of these developent projects are yet underway, nor is nuch

Likely to be accouplished for another year or wore.

5.. In general, the Cuban econouy is characterized by najor

shortages and a high degree. of disorganization. This state of

affoirs will continue for soue tine to cone, and nay indeed get

sonewhat worse. In view of the availability of Bloc assistance,

however, we do not believe that the econouy will deteriorate so

far as to bring about Castro's overthrow, or force hit to uake

basic changes in his polley. On the contrary, the situation will

probably begin to inprove within a year or so, as the new

Camuniet-type organization takes hold, nanagerial experience

increases, and foreign trade is adjusted to new channels.

Popular Acceptance of the Regine

6. Initially, alnost all Cubans hailed the triurph of the

Revolution with enthusian,

Disillusionent, however, came quickly

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to the urban middle class, urban organized labor, and the landed

gentry. It has since spread to suall peasant proprietors and

even to hurbler folk, who are beginning to appear in significant

numbers in the flow of refugees fron Cuba.

7. The severe internal repression which accoupanied the de-

feat of the April invasion stilled, for a tire, all panifestations

of opposition within the country. By Septenber, however, this effect

had worn off sufficiently for Catholic crowds in Havana ard other

cities to dare to defy the regive's probibition of certain public

religious observances. This was the first occasion on which the

regire had been forced to use gunfire to disperse hostile public

denonstrations. It was therefore indicative of a significant

change in the psychological situation.

8. There have also been soue increase in suall-scale guerrilla

and sabotage activity and a considerable increase in such passive

forns of resistance as absenteeist. However, nost disaffected

Cubans now think pricarily in terns of escape. In uid-septerber,

soue 15,000 had completed legal arrangenents to leave the country

which were then cancelled by the governent, and sobe 500 were in

asyluri in the several Latin Auerican embassies in Havana. Illegal

departures occur almost daily.

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9.

Despite these manifestations of disaffection, the great

bulk of the population still accepts the regine and substantial

nurbers still support it with enthusiast. The sprawling revolu-

tionary bureaucracy now embodies a new class with a very definite

personal stake in the regiue.

Castrolst Political Organization

10. The regine is now in the process of a couplete reorgani-

zation of the foru of governent in Cuba, and of the organization

of a new totalitarian political party to operate and control 1t.

The Coumunist nodel is apparent in both instances.

11. The traditional provincial and municipal governrents are

being replaced by Juntas (soviets) for "coordination, execution,

and inspection" (JUCEI). Already established in each province of

Cuba, the JUCET's consists of a "provincial congress," representa-

tive of all najor econonic entities in the territory, which meets

occasionally; a "plenur" of the congress, which neets every few

months; and several sualler bodies which neet frequently and

actually direct the provincial edninistration. The prinry func-

tion of all JUCHI is the local implenentaton of plans received fron

higher authority

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12. The new totalitarian political nachine is to be the

United Party of the Cuban Socialist Revolution, a nerger of the

anorphous 26 of July Moverent (or what is left of it) with the

well organized Cormunist Party. Although Castro is of course

to be the supree head of this party, the pan who is pushing the

project is Blas Roca, the Corrunist Secretary General. Party

membership is to be linited to the elite of the revolutionary

struggle and prerequisite

to appointent to any iuportant polit-

ical or econonic position.

13. A significant arn of the Castroist political orgenization

Is the parabilitary Association of Rebel Youth (AJR), derived frou

the previous coumunist youth organization. These teenagers, of the .

type that would be found in juvenile gangs, are a terror to their

parents, their schoolnates, and the general public. They have

charge of indoctrination in the schools and have been active in

the fornation of the Cormittees for the Defense of the Revolution

(see paragraph at). Active participation in the AJR 1s to be

prerequisite to educational and eventually political advancerent.

The Castroist Security Apparatus

14. The forces now available to the regive to suppress

Insurrection or repel Invasion are:

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The Rebel, Aruy (32,000)

b. The Rural Police (9,600) .

c. The Rebel Air Force (2,000)

d. The Navy (2,000)

e. The Militia (250,000, including 83,000 woven)

f. The Rebel Youth (150,000, including 10,000 girls)

6. The National Police (9,000).

h. The Maritive Police

15. The administrative and cormand structure of these forces

1s extrerely loose; the irprovisation of ad hoc contands including

disparate elerents is the comon practice. Confusion and lack of

coordination are therefore likely in any energency situation.

16. The arry has been strengthened by the receipt of Bloc

aras and is being Instructed in their use by Bloc personnel.

However, it has had little or no corbined arnes or field training.

It displayed great tactical ineptitude at the tine of the April

landing•

17. About a fifth of the aruy are veterans of Castro's

guerrilla struggle against Batista. The reuinder are early ad-

herents. In tine, however, Castro cale to doubt, with reason,

their loyalty to the course the Revolution had taken on achieving

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power.

The militia were therefore established as an alternative

arred support for the regine. The original units were corposed

of Castro's nost ardent followers. In tine, however, the nilitia

was so greatly expanded by recruitrent under pressure that its

revolutionary zeal was considerably diluted. Castro has there-

fore transferred his favor and reliance to the newly organized

Rebel Youth, who are now his ost fanatical followers.

18. In general, the nilitia and the Rebel Youth, both part-

tine forces, have only light arns which are issued to then only on

occasion. They are not capable of sustained combat, but are ef

fective for controlling and coercing the general public. In

addition, some selected units of the wilitia and the Rebel Youth

are specially arded and trained and are, in effect, aruy units

specially dedicated to Fidel Castro.

19. The capabilities of the air force have been greatly

enhanced by the acquisition of MIG aircraft and the return of

personnel frou training in the Bloc. There are now about 35

MIG-15's and MIG-19's operational in Cuba.

20.

The navy is unreliable and distrusted; nost of its

persornel were taken into custody at the tine of the April

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landing. Mutinies, defections, and purges have left it few profes-

sionally trained and technically qualified nen.

21. Recently, the professional security agencies of the

governent - Arny G-2 (the Scuret police), the National Police,

and the Moritine Police - were transferred fron the Ministry of

the Arued Forces to a newly created Ministry of the Interisr.. This

change is likely to enhance their effectiveness. It does not in-

dicate a reduction of Raul Castro's power, since Rauiro Valdes,

the new Minister of the Interior, is one of his close assoctates.

Valdes is a Communist, forterly head of Arry G2.

22. A network of Conmittees for the Defense of the Revolution

1s being established to provide an additional agency for political

surveillance and control. What these comittees lack in professional

competence, they take up for in pervasiveness and zeal. The Rebel

Youth have been particulorly active in provoting their forration.

The announced goal is 100,000 comittees with over a million nen-

bers covering every coumunity in cuba.

If Castro Were to Die

23. Fidel Castro's personal prestige and popularity were

Indispensable to the regime in the earlier stages of its developrent.

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None of his lieutenants could have inherited the personal authority

which he then exercised. His loss now, by assassination or by

natural causes, would certainly have an unsettling effect, but

would probably not prove fatal. The Revolution is by now well

institutionalized; the regiue has fir control of the country;

Its principol surviving leaders would probably rally together in

the face of a contion danger. Indeed, a dead Castro, Incapable

of lupulsive personal interventions in the orderly adrinistration

of affairs, right be nore valuable to they as a martyr than he is

noW.

24. The fact retains that Castro has had to control tensions,

jealousies, and conflicts of interest and purpose anong his prin

cipal lieutenants: Roul Castro, the head of the arued forces;

"Che" Guevara, the director of Industrial developrent; Nunez

Jivenez, the director of agrarian refore. There could be a falling

out arong then at Castro's funeral. There would aluost certainly

be a struggle

for power mong then afterward, which uight break

into the open.

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25. A coordinated estinate of the Cuban situation and

prospects, NIE 85-62, "The Situation in Cuba," is scheduled

for USIB consideration in January.

FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:

SHERMAN KENT

Chairuan

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