## Page 1

178-10004-10056

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK Assassination System

Date:

8/27/201

Identification Form

Agency Information

AGENCY :

RECORD NUMBER :

ROCKCOM

178-10004-10056

RECORD SERIES : ASSASSINATION FILES

• AGENCY FILE NUMBER: MISC. ROCKEFELLER COM. AND CIA FILES (9)

Document Information

ORIGINATOR:

FROM:

CIA

TO : DIRECTOR, CIA

TITLE:

[Restricted]

DATE: 11/14/1962

PAGES:

33

SUBJECTS :

CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

CUBA

CIA

ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES

DOCUMENT TYPE:

MEMORANDUM

CLASSIFICATION: Top Secret

RESTRICTIONS: 1B; IC

CURRENT STATUS: Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW:

08/04/1993

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS:

v9.1

39

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TOD SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST

178-10004-10056

SCI

THE WHITE HOUSE OFRIGE

MEMORANDUM FUK:

SUBJECT

:

Director of Central Intelligence

CIA Handling of the Soviet Build-up

in Cuba, 1 July - 16 October 1962

1.9

14 November 1962

CONTAINS

SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION

A.

The Background

1. The USSR's decision to develop Cuba as a military

base must have been made by the spring of 1962, and prepara-

tions within the USSR must have been under way

from that

time on.

There also must have been planning activities in

Cuba, particularly reconnaissance and survey work.. The

only indication of these operations which has so far been

found is a single intercepted personal message on ll April

to a Russian in Cuba who had previously been at the

Kapustin Yar missile test range.

This fragment was not

judged solid or important enough to warrant inclusion by

itself in current intelligence

publications.

2. Thus, until the first evidence of the deployment

began to come

in late in July, Washington had no warning

'of the USSR's intention. Intelligence officers dealing with

Cuba were focussing during July on the direction soviet-

Cuban relations would take following Soviet acquiescence in

Castro's assertion of his leadership of Cuban Communism in

the "Escalante affair."

This attitude was reflected in

reporting

on the visit of Raul Castro to Moscow early in

the month.

The President's Intelligence Checklist, which

will normally be used in this memorandum as the record of

CIA reporting to the President, Secretaries of State and

Defense, General laylor, and McGeorge Bundy, reported on

4 July that Raul was "probably seeking more

aid and, specifically, more advanced equipment such as the

MIG- 215

and surface-toair missiles which the USSR is

already providing to Indonesia, Egypt, and Iraq." The

Checklist of 19 July, however, noted that Raul had left

Moscow without the usual publicity and communiqué, and

surmised that this was "a pretty good sign that the visit

was unproductive." (The Central Intelligence Bulletin,

whenever coordination permitted, carried material generally

similar to the content of the Checklist.)

SCI

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GeratoR: Pois Laren

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3. The Intelligence Community view of the Cuban problem

In this period was crystallized in NIE 85-2-62,

The Situation

and Prospects in Cuba, passed by USIB on 1 August 1962, as

the intelligence foundation. for MONGOOSE. This estimate

stated that:

"By force of circumstarces, the USSR is

beconing ever more deeply conmitted to preserve

and strengthen the Castro regime. The USSR,

however, has avoided any formal commitment to

protect

and defend the regime in all contingencies."

b.

"We believe it unlikely that the Bloc will

provide Cuba with the capability to undertake major

independent military operations overseas. We also

believe it unlikely that the Bloc will station in

Cuba Bloc combat units of any description, at least

for the period of this estimate."

"The Soviets...would almost. certainly

never intend to hazard

their own safety for Cuba's

sake," but "have sought to create the impression

that Cuba was under the protection of their missile

power...

d.

"We believe that the Bloc will continue to

air missiles, and modern radars,

or even the pro-

vision of a token number of IL 28 jet light bombers...'

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Gerald R. Ford Librery

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is:;

1OU3

B.

The Soviet Operation Begins

4.

During the last two weeks of July, Soviet ships

carrying equipment and personnel for the build-up made

their first voyages to Cuban ports, the first arriving in

the period 26-29 July. Knowledge of some of these move-

ments reached CIA through routine intelligence coverage

of Soviet shipping before the ships reached Cuba.

No

particular significance is normally attached to such

voyages.

However, evidence gradually accumulated that

the "behavior pattern" of these ships was similar to that

of Soviet ships carrying arms to other countries, that

even greater security measures than usual were in effect,

that a number of the ships were coming from Baltic rather

than Black Sea ports, that some of these were passenger

ships, and finally that there was a general movement of

Bloc shipping toward Cuba: on an unprecedented scale.

5.

Apparently, the first recognition of unusual

activity in any

intelligence publication was a note in a

daily review of economic intelligence for CIA internal

use.

Commenting on an NSA report that certain Soviet

ships were en route to Cuba which had declared for other

destinations,

this paper stated on l August that "at

lease some, if not all, of the ships involved probably

are carrying additional military equipment to Cuba."

This statement was in direct contradiction to NSAs con-

ment on the same information, lre., that it tended to

corroborate a report by the Brazilian Ambassador in Havana

(earlier intercepted by NSA) that Raul Castro had asked

the USSR to take

back excess war materiel.

6.: CIA was also in disagreement with DIA over inter-"

pretation. of

intelligence on the movement of shipping to

Cuba throughout the month of August. The resulting dif-

ficulties in coordination of the Central Intelligence

Bulletin held up publication from 3 August to 9 august

of the first item on the Cuban build-up in that publica-

tion.

As late as 29 August, DIA in its own daily

Intelligence Summary said that "The high volume of

shipping probably reflects planned increases in trade

between the USSR and Cuba...

" There were further dif-

ficulties resulting from CIA-DIA differences in the

interpretation of photography of aircraft crates deck-

loaded on Soviet ships; the record shows that CiA was

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Gerald R. Fand Library

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right. Finally, it should be noted that there is a

long history of CIA efforts to obtain better photo-

graphy on deck cargoes and faster service in returning

these pictures to Washington.

The Checklist reported the accumulating informa-

tion fully to the President. On 4 August, it stated

that "Eleven Soviet ships are on their way to Havana

and we strongly suspect they are carrying arms. Such

a delivery would not be far short of the total amount

of arms delivered in the first half of 1962." On

9 August, it said "Soviet shipments to Cuba have been

arriving on an unprecedented scale since mid-July. Some

32 vessels are involved; at least half of these we believe

to be carrying arms.

Five passenger ships with a total

capacity or about 3,000 persons have already arrived.

Some of the personnel are said to be Soviet technicians,

and

we have no reason to doubt this. We do not believe

there

are any combat troops among them."

8. The DCI on 8 August briefed the Republican Policy

Committee, emphasizing the arrival of Soviet military

equipment

and technicians.

Iwo days later, at a hoNGOOSE

meeting, he again stressed the importance of this intel-

ligence

and raised questions as to what purpose

was behind

the sudden movement of men and materiel.

He said that

the United States must face the possibility of the USSR

locating MRBMs in Cuba as a step that it could justify

because of US missile bases in places like Italy and

Turkey.

9:

Soviet operations in August involved primarily

the establishment of

surface-to-air missile and coast

defense missile positions. By the middle of August

CIA was receiving a large volume of agent and refugee

reporting which, while understandably garbled and

fragmentary, enabled

analysts to pinpoint areas of con-

struction and identify some of the equipment coming in.

On 18 August, the Checklist reported "There are grounds

for thinking

that the large

influx of Soviet military

equipment and technicians into Cuba lately could be

connected with the beginning of construction of surface-

to-air missile sites.

What we know so far is that

transportation and construction equipment, some of it

arriving Soviets are construction personnel... " There were

further Checklist items along the same line on 23 and 28

August.

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Gerald R. Fond Wrary

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C. The July Overflight Program

On 10 July, General Taylor, motivated primarily by

the extensive use of aerial reconnaissance in following Chi-

nese Communist military activities in Fukien, had asked the

DCI for a comprehensive review of aerial photography activi-

ties.

The end-product of this exercise was a series of mem-

had provided "conclusive evidence that recurring reports of

submarines and missile bases in Cuba have been false," and

that "our most important need is for any evidence of

the de-

ployment Of SA-2 missiles and/or MIG-2ls in Cuba." This

proposal was approved by the Special Group on 19 July

and

later by the President.

The first of the two Cuban U-2 missions authorized

for. August was flown on 5 August, probably just too soon to

detect significant reflections of the Soviet equipment enter-

ing the isiand at that time.

The second mission was orig-

inally scheduled for 8 August but cancelled because of weather.

The next day the Special Group gave the DCI discretion to fly

the second August mission "whenever the immediate situation

with regard to Soviet materiel justified it." COMOR reaffirmed

its requirement for the second mission on 13 August. The mis-

sion was again scheduled for the period beginning on the 19th,.

held up for 9 days by weather and eventually flown on 29 August.

(See Para 19)

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Gerall R. Ford Library

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D. Promulgation of NSAM 181 and the Response

12. On 21 August the DCI attended a meeting in Secretary

•Rusk's office at which were also present Secretary McNamara,

Under Secretary Johnson, the Attorney General, Generals Taylor

and Lemnitzer, and MCGeorge Bundy. He told this group that in-

formation available since 10 August indicated the extent oi So-

viet aid was much greater than previously thought, and that

this probably included highly-sophisticated electronic installa-

tions

or missile sites, probably ground-to-air.

The DCI again

raised the possibility that the Soviets would locate MRBMs in

Cuba, and there developed a discussion of possible US courses

of action in case they did so. It was agreed that the DCI would

fully brief the President the next day (which he did) and that

Rusk, McNamara, Gilpatric, Taylor, Bundy and the DCI would dis-

the situation with the President on 23 August.

13. At the meeting of the 23rd, a number of actions were

decided upon to deal with what was agreed to be a critical

problem for the United States. These actions were formalized

in NSAM 181. (In addition, the President asked for a continu-

ing analysis of the number and types of Bloc personnel and

equipment in Cuba).

Thus, by 23 August CIA had alerted the

highest levels of

the government to a rapidly unfolding

military development in Cuba, including the probable establish-

ment of surface-to-air missile sites, and the danger of surface-

to-surface missiles. Furthermore the President had taken ac-

tion on the intelligence received. There was at this time no

evidence of any sort that surface-to-surface weapons were being

installed--in fact, the MRBM units had scarcely started en route •

from the USSR--but the possibility had been discussed by the

President and his advisors.

14. The paragraphs of NSAM 181 applicable to CIA dealt

with: a) release of information, b) MONGOOSE, and c) "An anal~

ysis which? should be prepared of the probable military, po-

liticãl and psychological impact of the establishment in Cuba

of either surface-to-air missiles or surface-to-surface missiles

which could reach the US." The first two subjects are outside

the scope of this memorandum; the third exists as a memorandum

dated 31 August prepared largely by McGeorge Bundy and the DD/I.

This paper, which had the benefit of preliminary results of the

29 August U-2 mission, concluded that the introduction of sur-

face-to-air missiles was the "most probable present Soviet mis-

sile activity," and that such missiles would be a serious

threat

to aerial reconnaissance, but not to "determined US at-

tack." It stated that "surface-to-surface missiles with nu-

clear warheads would constitute a very significant military

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Geral R. Furi Ubrary

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PROPERTY OF

THE WRITE HOUSE OFFICE

threat to the continental US." The memorandum concluded that

introduction of any missiles

"will have a substantial political

and psychological impact, while surface-to-surface missiles

would create a condition of great alarm."

15. In a memorandum of 27 August, General Carter reported

to Mr. Bundy what actions CIA was taking in response to NSAM

181.

He named the officers responsible for the three items

mentioned above and listed the following additional measures:

a. Task Force i was to look into the possibility of

removing restrictions on mounting clandestine operations out

of Guantanamo.

b. The Board of National Estimates was to establish

a procedure to ensure continuing analysis of the numbers and

types of Communist Bloc personnel entering Cuba, quantity and

types. of Bloc equipment and its probable use, and all construc-

tion, particularly missile sites:

c.

The Board was also to assess the

physical and

psychological dangers to the US and Latin America of missile

installations in Cuba. (The two Board actions, which were

later synthesized in

the paper which eventually appeared on

19 September as SNIE 85-3, had already been set in motion by

the DD/I, in a memo to the AD/NE Of 24 August).

d.

CIA was to begin immediately publishing a daily

paper on Cuba, including

current intelligence, estimative as-

sessments and coverage of the press, to be distributed to the

President, Bundy, McNamara, Gilpatric, Lemnitzer, Rusk, Taylor,

and Robert Kennedy.

This

dum, was issued by CIA beginning 27 August, using a philosophy

and

format similar to the Checklist. A few additional officials

were later added to its distribution. It was discontinued on

19 September, because General Carter and the DD/I concluded

that sufficient emphasis was by then being given to Cuban re-

porting in regular

intelligence publications).

e.

CIA would arrange intelligence collection over-

flights "as frequently as the situation demands." (The results

of this action make up the central theme of this paper.):

f.

Task Force I was to prepare a plan of operations

fOr MONGOOSE B PLUS.

16.

The minutes of USIB show that at its next meeting,

29 August, Mr. Hilsman requested an SNIE on the military build-

up in Cuba, to be submitted to USIB at its next regular meeting.

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Presumably Ir. Hilsman was also acting in response to NSAM 181.

In any case, the paper he requested and the Board memorandum

already requested by the DD/I were combined. Successive drafts

of such a paper, prepared by the ONE staff, were quickly over-

taken by the photography which became available after 29 August.

At the USIB meeting of ? September, further attempts to write

it were deferred until the new information could be digested.

This estimate, SNIE 85-3-62, was in fact passed by USIB on 19

September. Its substance will be discussed later. (See

Paras.

26-29)

17.

• Also at the 29 August USIB. meeting, two other perti-

nent subjects were discussed. First, General Carter and Mr.

Cline raised the question of more rapid delivery from Turkey

and Denmark of Navy photography of outbound Soviet ships (see

Second, General Carter informed the Board that he

had two days earlier asked General Lemnitzer about the possi-

bility of low-level photography using RF-101 or FSU aircraft

and that Lemnitzer had replied that something "could be dug up."

The conversation with Lemnitzer was the result of an instruction

telephoned from out of town by the DCI, who was concerned over

the long delay of the 29 August mission by weather.

(The DCI

departed Washington on leave on 23 August, went first to the

West Coast, left the country on 30 August for the Riviera, and

returned to Washington on 23 September.) On 30 August Lemnitzer

told the Special Group of this discussion with General Carter.

The Group agreed to take cognizance of the matter and reopen it

"when specific targets and information needs could be identified."

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Gorald R. For Library

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.12a

E. Hard Intelligence on the Build-Up (Defensive Phase)

During the last week in August, CIA continued to

follow the progress of the Soviet build-up, using shipping

• information, communications intelligence, and agent and

refugee sources.

The Checklist of 29 August reported that:

"There is no sign of a let-up in the movement

of

Soviet equipment and personnel into Cuba.

"By latest count, there have during the

past six weeks been

some 80 voyages to Cuban

ports by Bloc vessels and 20-35 by ships

under Communist charter.

"We note that deliveries of industrial

equipment, foodstuffs, and other nonmilitary

items are

being made largely on chartered

Western ships, probably because so many

Soviet ships are involved in hauling military

gear."

19. The first hard evidence on what the Soviets were

up to in Cuba was provided by photography of the 29 August

mission. The President was told, in the Checklist of

31 August that:

"Preliminary information from the 30 /5ic7 August

U-2 mission shows at least seven SA-2 sites on the

western half of the island.

Manning of this many

sites would require some 1500-2000. Bloc troops.

We

are able to report on the basis of what is known so

far that construction of the sites appears to be

fairly advanced and that there are canvas-covered

missiles in the vicinity of some sites. The existence

of additional sites can probably be assumed.

"The same source reveals seven or eight Soviet

missile-equipped torpedo boats and an undetermined

number of Soviet tanks.

The Cubans have had Soviet

tanks for some time, but this is our first indica-

tion that they now have boats of this type. They

appear to be KOMAR-class converted PT-boats, mounting

two surface-to-surface missiles with an estimated

range of 35 nautical miles."

After further analysis this information appeared in the

Central Intelligence Bulletin of 6 September.. On the 4th

and 5th, General

Carter briefed a number of congressional

leaders, including the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed

Services Committees.

In a White House statement, also of

4 September,

the President publicly confirmed the presence

of SA-2s and KOMAR-class boats.

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Saraid R. Ford Library

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20. The 29 August mission had confirmed the establish-

ment of a missile defense of Western Cuba.

The first mission

for September (of the two which had been authorized as a

routine matter by the Special Group on 19 July; see para

10)

was flown on schedule on 5 September and revealed similar

defenses in Las Villas Province.

In retrospect, it can be

seen that the two groups of SA-2 sites surrounded the areas

in. which MRBM and IRBM site construction was planned.

Photography of these areas in the 29 August and 5 September

missions, however, gave no recognizable evidence that any

such construction was then under way (although re-examination

showed a few vehicles and some construction material at

Guanajay Site 1 on 29 August). In fact, there was probably

no ballistic missile equipment in Cuba at the time (see

discussion in paras. 36-39) •

More detailed readout of the 29 August mission had,

by about 6 September, led CIA analysts to suspect the presence

of another kind of missile site--possibly surface-to-surface--

at Banes, on the northeastern coast. General Carter so:

informed

the President and the Secretaries of State and

Defense on 6 September. No equivalent of such a weapon had

been identified in the USSR in earlier U-2 photography.

Lacking

such background, further information and study were

necessary to determine the characteristics and range of the

missiles. Programs for both were set in motion.

22. COMOR, at the request of the Secretary of State,

on 9 September reviewed the vehicles available

for reconnais-

sance of Banes. The next day, General Carter in a memorandum

to the Secretary of Defense requested "necessary actions,

(including Special Group approval) to provide for the employ-

ment, when directed by higher authority, of tactical-type

reconnaissance" against the cruise-missile site at Banes.

At the Special Group meeting of 14 September, a JCS repre-

sentative briefed on capabilities for low-level coverage of

certain targets in Cuba; hewever, the Secretary of Defense

was recorded as not wanting the operation considered further

until results of further U-2 reconnaissance of these

targets

vere available, l.e., General Carter's proposal had beer

overtaken by the decision on U-2 coverage taken on 10

September (see paras 24-25). Meanwhile, further analysis

of the 5 September photography had resulted in a CIA study

dated 14 September which concluded definitively that the

site was intended for a

Short-range coastal defense

missile. A fully checked-out item appeared in the Central

Intelligence Bulletin of 18 September.

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23. One

additional item was picked up by the 5 September

mission, the presence of an assembled MIG-21 at Santa Clara

airfield, along with several others still in crates.

This

was not reported by CIA in the Checklist, but was reported in

• the Central Intelligence Bulletin of 8 September. Actually,

these MIG-21 crates (readily identifiable from photographs)

had arrived in Cuba about I September aboard a Soviet ship

which had been photographed en route, but the, photographs were

not received in Washington for several weeks. Upon the

arrival of these and photographs of other ships carrying

MIG-21 crates, an item was published in the Central Intelli-

gence Bulletin of 27 September--with DIA withholding con-

currence (see para. 6) --that between 22 and 30 MIG-21s had

been delivered to Cuba.

This information was also reported

in the Checklist of 27 September.

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Carale R. Fort Library

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ME TARONG

F. The New Overflight Program

24. The results of the 29 August and 5 September mis-

sions, in particular the confirmation of SA-2 sites, led to

'a full review of the overflight program for Cuba.

This took

place in the White House on 10 September.

Among those pre-

Mr. Robert Kennedy, Mr. McGeorge Bundy,

General Carter, and General Lansdale.

The decisions of this

meeting are crucial to the record, and some discussion of

the atmosphere in which they were taken is required. There

were three major factors:

a.

major play in the world press.

This had been followed

• on 8

September by the loss of Mission GRC-127

over Communist

China, acconpanied by even greater publicity. As a result,

most of the participants were--to varying degrees--reluctant

to chance another U-2 incident

at this tire.

This meant

that they were naturally hesitant to authorize any flights

over areas where SA-2s might be operational.

b. Second, there is no record that the MRBM

problem was discussed.

The hard intelligence gathered

so far on the Soviet build-up (the Banes problem was

still

up in the air), was not such as to produce a sense

alarm or a feeling that urgent action was required.

The establishment of SA-2s and other advanced defensive

systems had been foreseen in the NIE of 1. August and

their probable arrival had been fully reported during the

Intervening period. Hence confirmation came not as a shock,

but as a problen to be dealt with deliberately. (It may

even have served to relax the sense of urgency generated by

the President's decisions of 23 August, the known usually

being less alarming than the unknown.)

The participants

therefore felt that the next step was to provide systematic

coverage of the rest of Cuba, from which the full story of

what the USSR had

2253

put into the island could be developed.

They felt no immediate need for re-coverage of the areas

covered by the

two previous missions.

c. Finally, the participants were operating in

the atmosphere of the time. The Cubans had been claiming

that U.S. invasion was imminent.

The Soviet diplomatic

and propaganda apparatus was attempting to focus attention

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Gerald R. Ford Libtary

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on Berlin and hinting at a confrontation late in the year,

thus creating the impression that a Berlin crisis would not

come until after the US election. In fact, the USSR in its

statement of the following day (1l September) on Cuba stated

• this explicitly. There were vague hints of Khrushchev's in-

tent to attend the UNGA in New York. Khrushchev appears now

to have been throwing up a diplomatic smoke-screen behind

which to carry out the deployment of strategic forces into

Cuba, but those present at the meeting of 10 September did

not have the benefit of this hindsight. Furthermore, they

must all have been acutely aware that Cuba was potentially

the campaign issue that could most seriously damage the Admin-

istration in the election campaign then beginning.

At the meeting, the Secretary of State objected to

the CIA proposal for two extended overflights covering the

remainder of the island not covered in the 29 August and 5

September missions.

He insisted, instead, that coverage of

the rest of Cuba should be designed so that peripheral flights

over international waters would not be combined with over-

flights of Cuban territory. To meet his wishes, the program

was divided into four flights, two overflights and two peri-

pheral.

One overflight was to be over the Isle of Pines and

the other over the part of Cuba east of 770 West to cover.

Guantanamo and

Banes.

One peripheral flight was to cover

the north coast of eastern Cuba, the other the south coast.

The overflights would be quick "in-and-out"

operations, while

all four were to be designed for maximum safety.

There

is apparently no written record that a decision was made not

to fly over known SA-2 sites, but in obtaining approval for

the tracks it was necessary to provide assurance that they

did not do so.) Later the DCI negotiated with the Depart-

ment of State permission to extend the Isle of Pines mis-

sion over the Bay of Pigs area of Cuba proper.

proper The s in

dent approved this program, authorizing three flights in

September in addition to the one remaining of the normal

September allocation (Special Group action of 19 July).

Thus, the record shows that the President authorized every-

thing the Speclal Group requested.

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WhE whitE House defice

G.

SNIE 85-3-62

26.

The lack of urgency expressed in these decisions was

also reflected in the deliberations over and the content of

SNIE 85-3-62, The Military Build-up in Cuba, passed by USIB

on 19 September.

This estimate, which was generated by the

issuance of NSAM 181, must be viewed as

a symptom of the state

of mind in

draft. Its key findings are as follows:

"We believe that the USSR values its position in

up in Cuba is to strengthen the Communist regime there against

what the Cubans and the Soviets conceive to be a danger that

the US may attempt by one means or another to overthrow it.

The Soviets evidently hope to deter any such attempt by enhanc-

ing Castro's defensive capabilities and by threatening Soviet

military retaliation.

At the same time, they evidently recog-

nize

that the development of an offensive military base in

Cuba might provoke US military intervention and thus defeat

their present purpose."

b.

"The Soviets themselves are probably still uncer-

tain about their future military program for Cuba. Indeed

they probably intend to test US and Latin American reactions

as they go along."

"As the build-up continues, the USSR may be tempted

to establish in Cuba other weapons represented to be defensive

in purpose but of a more

'offensive' character: e.g, light bomb-

ers, submarines, and additional types of short-range

surface-to-

surface missiles...."

d.

"However, they are well aware that the question

of

offensive as opposed to defensive weapons in Cuba has become a

major political issue."

e.

"The establishment on Cuban soil of Soviet nuclear

striking forces which would be used against the US would be in-

compatible with Soviet policy as we presently estimate it.

It

would indicate a far greater willingness to increase the level

of risk in US-Soviet relations than the USSR has displayed thus

far...However, Soviet military planners have almost certainly

considered the

contribution which Cuban bases might make to

the

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Soviet strategic posture and, in that connection, the feasibility

and utility of deploying nuclear delivery systems to Cuba. There-

fore, this contingency must be examined carefully, even though

it would run counter to current Soviet policy."

"Soviet planners might see some utility in deploy-

ing MRBMs and IRBMs to Cuba in order to supplement the limited

number of ICBMs now believed to be operational in the USSR and

to reach

targets beyond the range of submarine-launched missiles."

g..

"The establishment on Cuban soil of a significant

strike capability with such weapons would represent a sharp de-

parture from Soviet practice, since such weapons have so far

not been

installed even in Satellite territory... The Soviets

might think that the political effect of defying the US by sta-

tioning Soviet nuclear striking power in so menacing a position

would be worth a good deal if they could get away with it.

ever, they would almost certainly estimate that this could not

be done without provoking a dangerous US reaction."

h.. "Although the

Soviets may see some military advan-

tages in Cuba as a strategic strike base, the risks would be

great and the political implications would run counter to the

kind of policy they are actually pursuing in Latin America.

They do not propose to win the region for communism by military

conquest. They count instead on a process of political action...

27.

In commenting on these statements it must first be rec-

ognized

that the judgment on the degree of risk which the USSR

was willing to accept was gravely in error.. It should also be

recognized that the community was virtually unanimous in support

of this judgment; deployment of ballistic missiles and nuclear

weapons

outside the USSR was without precedent.

Further, while

the first ballistic missiles had probably arrived in Cuba in

the period 7-15 September, (see para. 37) the first reports from

ground observers who had seen them had not arrived in Washington •

by 19 September; there was no evidence available that MRBMS

were

What the estimate failed to do, however, was to give

adequate weight to the pace at which Soviet operations were mov-

ing and to the great probability that the new installations were

manned by Soviet personnel. The community was still thinking in

terms of

the rather deliberately-paced Soviet military aid pro-

grams for the UAR, Iraq, and Indonesia (and indeed for Cuba in

the 1960-62 period) when there was already good evidence that

the Cuban program had departed from this pattern.

28. Moreover, the Indonesian program too had broken the

pattern only a month before, when the Ussr showed itsell will-

ing to accept a substantially increased degree of risk for the .

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/ 3F

sake of a political gain something less than vital to Soviet

interests.

The

original contracts for Indonesia had been

roughly similar to those for the UAR and Iraq.

They included

14 SA-2 sites, 12 KOMARS, 26 TU-16s (12 equipped with air-to-

surface missiles) and 12

submarines, all to be manned by In-

• donesians and to be delivered at a pace consonant with the re-

quired training of personnel. However, as the crisis over

West New Guinea approached its climax of August, Soviet eager-

ness

to embroil the Indonesians in open warfare with the. Dutch

led them to accelerate delivery schedules and to permit the

use of Soviet personnel to operate some of the weapons being

provided.

Six submarines manned by Soviet crews actually con-

ducted war patrols under nominal Indonesian command. Thus by

of military engagement with an ally of the United States, al-

be the do

mid-August the USSR had shown itself willing to take some risk

beit the degree of risk involved was far less than in the Cu-

ban venture.

29. For the record, there is no evidence that the ex-

istence of SNIE. 85-3 had

any inhibiting influence on later de-

cisions. It was not, for instance, cited to support an argu-

ment against continuing overflights. Nor did it affect current

intelligence reporting; this is conducted independently of the

estimative process and provides a check on the continuing val-

idity of standing estimates.

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H. Views of the DCI

30. The only available record of dissent from the

judgments made in Washington during the first half of

September, both estimative and operational, is that of the

DCI himself, who, although vacationing on the Riviera, was

kept informed by CIA cable. On 7 September, he cabled

General Carter urging frequent repeat reconnaissance missions

and stating that "my hunch is we might face prospect of soviet

short-range surface-to-surface missiles of portable types in

Cuba which could command important targets in Southeast US

and possibly Caribbean areas." On 10 September, the DCI

again cabled "Difficult for me to rationalize extensive

costly defenses being established in Cuba...appears to me

quite possible measures now being taken are for purpose of

ensuring secrecy of some offensive capability such as MRBMs

to be installed by Soviets after. present phase completed and

country secured

from overflights. Suggest Board of National

Estimates study motives....

(The Board's response

is 1n

effect contained in SNIE 85-3:)

31.

On 13 September and again on 16 September the DCI

repeated these premonitions.

In the latter cable he added

"Do not wish to be overly alarming this matter but believe

CIA and community must keep Government informed of danger

of a surprise and also that detection of preparatory steps

possibly beyond our capability once Cuba defense system

operative."

Finally, on 20 September, the DCI expressed

reservations on the conclusions of SNIE 85-3, which had

been cabled to him, saying "as an alternative I can see

that

an offensive Soviet base

in Cuba will provide Soviets with

most important and effective trading position in connection

with

all other critical areas and hence they might take

unexpected risks in order

to establish such a position."

These views were provided to the DD/I and the Board of

National Estimates.

32. As a result of the DCI's pressure there was a

renewed

examination of other methods of reconnaissance of

Cuba.

(It should be noted here that this discussion was

in terms of what might be necessary after the establishment

of a complete SA-2 defense had made use of the U-2 impossible,

with the implicit thought that only at this point would the

Soviets risk the introduction of such weapons as MRBMs.)

On 19 September, at USIB, General Carter stated his desire

to use RF-10ls over Cuba. He also said he thought use of

the FIREFLY drone over Cuba could be justified to the Spectal

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PROPERTY OF

THE WHITE HOUSE BEHE

Group, adding that "we cannot put a stop to collection in

Cuba;

otherwise the President would never know when the

point of decision was reached." The Special Group at its

next meeting approved consideration of the use of FIREFLY

.and COMOR forwarded to USIB on 27 September a program for

its use. (No FIREFLY missions have yet been attempted.)

33. Another attempt during this period to get addi-

tional coverage was the programming of KEYHOLE Mission

9045 (29 September - 2 October) to photograph Cuba.

results were unsatisfactory, largely because of cloud cover.

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aft Notes

I. CIA Reporting during September

34. The progressive uncovering of the Soviet program in

Cuba was reported in detail by CIA current intelligence.

• Pertinent samples from the Checklist are:

a .

"The number of confirmed SAM sites remains at

12, but the likelihood that others are under con-

struction grows, with the latest evidence pointing to

the Isle of Pines as one of the additional locations.".

(14 September)

b. "A message intercepted yesterday on a net

serving Soviet forces in Germany called for 'volunteers

for the protection of Cuba.' We are not sure of the

weight to be placed on this and another intercept

referring to the isolation of 'volunteers.'

If valid,

they would suggest that the influx of Soviet military

personnel to Cuba is not finished. We are investigating

further." (15 September)

"We have spotted two more Soviet passenger

vessels en route to Cuba. Their arrival will raise

our estimate of technicians ca the scene to about

4,200.

We are beginning to see some tenuous evidence

foreshadowing the appearance of SAM sites in Camaguey

Province."

(18 September)

"The interception on 15 Septenber of a

signal

from a missile-associated radar, probably coming fron

the surface-to-air missile site

at Mariel, suggests

that the site is or soon will be operational.

"The message asking for volunteers for service

In Cuba, which we reported Saturday, has now cropped

up on enough Soviet military radio nets to reveal that

a fairly general recruiting campaign is going on.

There is no indication yet of the numbers involved."

(19 September)

e.

"Evidence is still coming in on Moscow's

canvass of its military forces for volunteers to serve

in Cuba.

This activity is puzzling; we have never seen

anything like it before.

"The move may be purely administrative: to

replace personnel who had been

suddenly ordered there with

others prepared to stay for some time.

On the other hand,

it could mean another sizable increment to Soviet personnel •

in Cuba or a belief in Moscow that its people are likely

to be engaged in combat. We are trying to get a better

answer."

(21 September)

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1.13

"Our running account of the number of Soviet

dry-cargo vessels making the voyage to Cuba since mid-

July 1s now over 100. About 85 of these probably were

carrying military hardware.

"The Cuban Foreign Office on Tuesday ordered

Western correspondents to put in for new credentials

by

today, telling

them that all of Cuba beyond Havana's

city limits is out of bounds except by special per-

mission."

(27 September)

35. During this period General Carter, at the President's

instructions, briefed General Bisenhower on

the Cuban situa-

tion on 10 September. On 12 September he briefed the House

Armed Services and Foreign Affairs Committees. Although out

of time sequence, it should also be noted here, because the

information presented was essentially more of the same, that

the DCI again briefed General Eisenhower on 3 October and

Congressman Cannon on 9 October.

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J. The Soviet Offensive Deployment

36. At this point, it is necessary to retrace a few

steps in time and discuss what was actually going on in Cuba.

Examination of information now available makes it possible

to outline with a fair degree of confidence a time-table of

the Soviet program

which is generally consistent from site

to site.

This begins with the construction of SAM defenses,

first in the west around San Cristobal and Guanajay, then in

central Cuba around Sagua la Grande and Remedios, finally in

the rest of the island. Next, in each case, comes the eviction

of local inhabitants at each site, road improvement, and the

establishment of restricted construction areas.

Finally

comes the arrival of equipment at each site according to what

appears a carefully prepared schedule. Apparently, no recog-

nizable missile equipment was moved to the MRBM sites and no

major construction was begun at the IRBM sites until at least

two weeks

after the last U-2 overflight of the area and until

the US had publicly acknowledged the presence of SA-2 sites

in Cụba.

37. The first large pieces of equipment for the MRBM

sites near San Cristobal were probably shipped from the USSR

on the ship Omsk, which arrived at Mariel on 7 or 8 September.

A second

shipment followed on the Poltava which arrived on

15 September.

This equipment was moved to San Cristobal by

trick at night, with the first convoys probably arriving at

the sites about 17 September. That is, 17 September is the

earliest

date at which photography might have detected the

first MRBM equipment at San Cristobal.

38. Construction equipment and material for the

Guanajay fixed IRBM sites began to arrive at Mariel about

there in the

mid-August, minor activity of an indefinite type was noted

there in the 29 August photography, and major construction

had probably begun by 15 September. (The fact that ship-

ments to Guanajay

started before those to San Cristobal

reflects the longer lead-tine required for construction of

a fixed site). It is not possible to say how soon after.

15 September the activity might have been recognizable from

the air as an IRBM site.

39..

The sites in Las Villas Province were established

on a slightly later, but similar, time scale.

Equipment

for the Sagua La Grande MRBM sites was probably landed

at Casilda, on the south coast. The most likely ship to

have carried the large items is the Kimovsk, which docked

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there on 22 September.

This equipment must have moved to

the site during the last week of September, and was probably

detectable from photography after 1 October.

The Remedios

• IRBM site construction was parallel to the Guanajay schedule,

but also about two weeks behind.. Photography of 5 September

was negative, but road improvement began shortly thereafter,

and a flow of construction material from the port of Isabela,

on the north coast, began.

The

estimated date for the be-

ginning of major construction is about 1 October. Again

the date at which the site acquired a recognizable photo-

graphic signature is not determinable.

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- PROPERTY OF

X. The Targeting of San Cristobal

THE WAITE MOLE: 008CE

40. Although the sites themselves were closed

to ground

observation; the

movement of equipment to them from the ports

• was in fact seen by CIA agents and by a number of individuals

who later fled to the US.

The agents reported this informa-

tion as soon as they were able, but in most cases had to de-

pend on secret writing for communication.

Hence, there was a

lag of several days at least before their information became

available. Refugee reports were delayed considerably longer

for other, and uncontrollable, reasons--the time of the . in-

dividual's decision to leave Cuba, his discovery of means for

doing so, and his delivery to an interrogation center.

of the reports so received dealt with unidentifiable construc-

tion activity.. Many of them, because of the time-lags noted

above, did not arrive in Washington until after 14 October,

and some are still coming in.

11. Nevertheless, by about 1 October, the San Cristobal

had been pinpointed as a suspect MRBM

site and photographic

confirmation had been requested.

This represents a consider-

able technical achievement.

To understand why, it is again

necessary to back-track in time. Since the moment of Castro's

triumphal march into Havana, the Intelligence Community had

been flooded with reports of Soviet weapons shipments and mis-

sile installations in Cuba. There were several hundred such

reports, claiming the presence of everything from small arms

to ICBMs, before August 1960, 1.e.,

plied Cuba with any weapons at all.

more specifically, CIA's

files

contain 211 intelligence reports (this does not

include

press items) on missile and missile-associated activity in

Cuba beföre 1 Jan 1962.

All of these were either totally

false or misinterpretations by the observer of other kinds of

activity.

CI/. analysts had naturally come to view all such

reports with a high degree of suspicion.

42.

On 15 February 1962 an interagency interrogation center

was established by CIA at Opa Locka, near Miami, to handle Cu-

ban refugees and improvethe quality of intelligence collected

from them.. It was manned by trained bilingual interrogators

from the armed services and CIA. The establishment of Opa Locka

coincided with a sharp drop in reports of missile activity

i re-

ceived in Washington.

When the defensive phase of the Soviet

buildup began, the volume of Opa Locka reporting rose very

rapidly, and provided good information on the types of equip-

ment coming in, on the use of Soviet personnel and on the se-

curity precautions imposed by the Soviets on this operation.

(Such reports were the basis for the Checklist item cited in

para 9).

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43. For the better part of two years, CIA had been check-

ing information obtained from refugee, defector, and agent

sources with NPIC whenever it was apparent that the informa-

tion was of a kind that could be verified or negated by aerial

• reconnaissance. In May 1962, NPIC began publishing a series of

formal listings (Photographic Evaluation of Information on Cuba)

in which these reports were evaluated in the light of photogra-

phic -coverage.

In the 7 issues of this publication between 31

May and 5 October NPIC examined 138 raw reports referred to it

for comment. Of this total, only three cited missile activity

which could not be linked directly to the SA-2 and cruise mis-

sile deployments. NPIC's evidence negated those three.

44. When the first indications of build-up began to come

in in August,ithese procedures were further tightened. CIA

current intelligence

was ordered orally by the DD/I's office

on about 14 August not to publish any information on the con-

struction of missile bases in Cuba until they had been checked

out with NPIC. (This instruction was in the field of intelli-

gence technique rather than of policy; it had no relation to.

later restrictions; (see para 50). Between 14 August and mid-

October this office sent NPIC 13 memoranda asking for a check

on 25 separate reports containing information which was thought

to raise the possibility of Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba. à

great many more such reports were checked with NPIC informally

by telephone.

In all cases, NPIC either lacked the necessary

coverage or made a negative

finding:

45.

On 20. August, the COMOR Targeting Working Group

(chaired and staffed largely by CIA) set up the first compre-

hensive card file

system for Cuban targets. An example of its

procedures is the handling of targets in the Sagua La Grande

area. Based on refugee reporting, the COMOR Targeting Working

Group on 27 August pinpointed four farms in this area as sus-

pect missile sites.

Readout of the 29 August coverage showed

an SA-2 site near Sagua La Grande which apparently was the basis

for the reported activity there, and the target card was changed

to show a confirmed SA-2 site.

It should be noted that know-

ledge that this site was in the area could have led analysts to

misinterpret any subsequent reports of MRBM activity as part of

the SAM development, but in fact no such reports were received.

46. By September, the volume of agent and refugee report-

ing had become very large indeed. During the month 882 re-

ports on internal activities in Cuba were disseminated, exclu-

sive of telegraphic dissemination. (The CIA clandestine col-

lectors report that their output represented only the small pub-

lishable fraction of the raw material collected.) A substantial

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TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST PATIA

proportion of these dealt with the deployment of defensive mis-

siles and related activities.

Knowledge on the part of the

analysts that such a deployment was in fact going on, plus the

normal difficulties encountered by untrained observers in tell-

• ing an offensive missile from a defensive one, tended to throw

a sort of smoke-screen around the Soviet offensive deployment

when it finally began.

The CIA analytic apparatus, however,

recognized ind correlated the first authentic reports of MRBM

equipment ever to be received in Washington, and took action

upon them. It targeted the San Cristobal area, not as another

location where alleged missile activity should

be negated by

photography, but as a suspect SS-4 site.

47. This process took about three weeks, from the date

when

the first observation was made on the ground in Cuba to

the preparation of the target card. The two reports from Opa

Locka which triggered 1t were:

An observation in Havana on 12 September of a

convoy carrying

long canvas-covered objects which the source

identified under interrogation as resembling SS-4s. This re-

sufficient accurate detail to

An observation on 17 September of a

convoy mov-

ing toward the San Cristobal area. This information, received

on 27 September, dovetailed in many respects with the

earlier

report.

48.

The arrival of the second report led CIA analysts

to a

tentative conclusion that the two observers had in fact

seen the same convoy, and that there was a possibility of the

sS-4 identification

being genuine. A day or so earlier, a

target card on San Cristobal had been prepared on the basis

of a vague report of "Russians building a rocket base." Now

this card was removed and, with the two reports cited above

and other less specific information on activity in this area

which was beginning to trickle in, a new card was prepared

between l and 3 October which was in effect a priority require-

ment for photographic coverage:

This card was used in the

targeting of the 14 October flight (see para 63). It read

follows:

"Collateral reports indicate the existence of a re-

stricted area in Pinar del Rio Province which is suspected of

including an SSM site under construction, particularly SS-4

Shyster.

The area is bounded by a line connecting the follow-

ing four town: Consolacion del Norte (8332N/2244N); San Diego

del Los Banos (8325N/2235W); San Cristobal (8301N/2243H); and

Las PoZoS (8317N/2250W). Requirement: Search the area deli-

neated for possible surface missile construction; with parti-

cular attention

to SS-4 Shyster."

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49.

Arther report, too general to be used in the process

described aove, is nevertheless of interest as the first good

information distributed on the Soviet offensive build-up.

20 September, CIA disseminated an agent report that Castro, on

personal pilot, Claudio Morinas, had said on 9 September "We

have 40-mile range guided missiles, both surface-to-surface

and surface-to-air, and we have a radar system which covers,;

sector by sector, all of the Cuban air space and (beyona) as

far as Florida.

There are also many mobile ramps for inter-

mediate range rockets."

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Limitations on Publications

At some point, probably just after 27 September, an

the subject of possible

strategic weapons in Cuba might

'have been written for CIA current intelligence publications. It

could not be written because there was an injunction not to do

so. By the time that hard information began to come in early

in September, the USIB principals had become acutely conscious

of the distinction publicly made by the President between of-

fensive and defensive weapons in Cuba. Aware that they were

dealing with an explosive political issue and aware also that

"leakage" of intelligence on offensive weapons, true or false,

would seriously limit the President's freedom of action in deal-

ing with what might become a major international crisis, they

had evolved a system for limiting dissemination of such

infor-

mation.

Analysis would continue and senior policy officials

would be briefed, but no material would appear in formal intel-

ligence publications without the approval of the USIB principals.

These instructions were first issued orally, and later (on 11

October) formalized by USIB in the "PSALM" system (X-Ray Funnel

for SIGINT). The key passages in USIB's order were:

"Such

information or intelligence will be disseminated outside each

USIB intelligence

component only to specific individuals on an

EYES ONLY basis who by virtue of their responsibilities as ad-

visers to the President have a need to know," and "There is no

intent hereby, however, to inhibit the essential analytic pro-

cess."

51. It should also be noted

that the order not to publish

anything on missile sites without NPIC corroboration (Para 44)

had never been rescinded. The effect this would have had on re-

porting in late September and October if the other

ban had not

been in effect is difficult to determine.

52. These restrictions did not apply to the Checklist,

but the Checklist writers drew for their Cuban information

largely on the Cuban Daily Summary, a compendium of reporting

on Cuba published by CIA.

Since the Summary was affected by

the restrictions, this practice, imposed by the sheer volume

of raw material coming in on Cuba; had the effect of cutting

the Checklist off from information on offensive weapons.

53. Moreover, neither the Checklist group, nor

any other

current intelligence officers, new that the possibility that a

Soviet strategic missile base

might be established in Cuba had

been

raised by the DCI and seriously discussed by the President

and his advisors more than a month earlier (See Para 13). . In

other words the thrust of NSAM 181 had been so watered down by

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time and bureaucratic process that it reached the working level

only in the form of SNIE 85-3, which held that establishment of

such

a base was most improbable. (See, however, para 29)

54. It is difficult to say whether information from ground

sources would have been published had there not been a blanket

injunction against it. The analysts too were sensitive to the

potential political impact of the reports they were receiving;

subject with a history reaching back to Our Man in Havana. In

COMOP. Special Gro.., organization responsible for collection and

the intelligence components responsible for analysis. few, if

any, CIA analysts working on the Cuban problem even had IDEALIST

clearances.

As & result, they did not know that no overflights

of Pinar del Rio and Las Villas were included in the September

program, or that this

program was seriously delayed. They had

1.-,

no way of knowing that the photographic verification they had

requested would not be soon forthcoming, and they might well have

delayed publication from day to day in hopes of receiving it..

too get t, on 02 ti0 n

Nevertheless, it can be established that if the injunc-

tion against publication had not existed there would have been

some reflection of the refugee reports in the Cuban Daily Summary,

which is not highly selective. In retrospect, it seems quite pos-

sible--but by no means certain--that they would then have been

picked up in the Checklist, but it is extremely doubtful if

they

would have survived the coordination process for the Central In-

telligence Bulletin. Thus, at the most the President might have

Tearned that there was suspicious activity around San Cristobal

slightly more than a

week before he

apparently did.

56. In sum the CIA analysts believed they had done their

duty by

targeting the San Cristobal area for photographic cover-

age, but no word of their concern over activity in this area

had appeared in an intelligence publication. It appears highly

probable that the Special Group first heard

of this concern at

its meeting on 9 October, when (see para. 63) it ordered a U-2

mission which covered the area.

57. The gap of 7-10 days between the key analytic correla-

tion of

reports and the Special Group meeting can probably be

attributed to the cumbersome processes of the administrative

structure supporting the Special Group: This machinery was de-

signed to provide elaborate justifications and back-up paper

work before each decision was made, procedures reaching back

into the early history of U-2 operations over the USSR.

They

were intended for the control of deliberate strategic reconnais-

sance of the USSR, and not for a fast-moving situation such as

that in Cuba, which was rapidly becoming tactical. In fact,

after readout of the 14 October mission they were jettisoned.

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Marchit

M.

Progress of the September Overflight Program

or Mate took deRick

58. While the MRBM and IRBM deployment continued and

the first good ground reports began to filter out of Cuba,

. the four-flight reconnaissance program approved on 10 Septem-

ber

was being pushed forward. Unfortunately, this program

Guantanamo..

targets were completely cloud-covered) On 27 and 28 Septem-

ber the weather was bad again, but on the 29th the Isle of

Pines - Bay of Pigs mission was successfully flown. The

weather again turned bad until 5 October, when the south

coast peripheral mission was accomplished. The next day,

the north coast peripheral mission aborted, but was success-

fully completed on 7 October.

59. Thus, completion of the September program took 26

days, from 12

September--the earliest date on which missions

approved on the l0th could have been flown--through 7 October.

On 20 of these days weather was bad over the areas not yet

overflown (the

criterion for launch was a forecast of less

than 25 percent cloud cover). On four days successful mis-

sions were flown.

On one day a mission was launched but

aborted, and one day was used to alert a mission which was

launched the following day. Availability of aircraft was

not a

limiting factor.

60. These missions accomplished their purpose, 1.e.,

they established almost completely the location of SA-2

sites on the island.

They did not--and, since they were

designed to avoid SAM-defended areas, could not--detect the

ballistic missile deployments then under way.

The combined

effect of the Special Group decision of 10 September and

weather conditions of the period following was to delay

consideration of what reconnaissance activities should next

be undertaken over Cuba until early October.

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N. The Special Group Decision of 9 October

THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

61. By late September the delays in accomplishing the

• four-flight program, coupled with a mass of evidence that the

Soviet build-up was continuing, had generated a greatly

increased sense of urgency in Washington. It should again

be noted,

however, that high-level consideration of the

possibility that MRBls might be deployed to Cuba had always

been in terms of Soviet action after the SA-2 defense was

fully operational. There is no documentary evidence of action

directed toward the overflight of SAM-defended areas until the

Special Group (Augmented) meeting of 4 October.

At this

meeting the DCI pointed out that U-2 flights were now (before

the last two missions of the 10 September program) restricted

by the presence of SAM sites to the southeastern quadrant of

Cuba.

According to the minutes of this meeting "it was

questioned by the DCI/ whether this was a reasonable restric-

t10n

at this time, particularly since the SAMs were almost

certainly not operational."

The Group then ordered the NRO

prepare an overall program for reconnaissance of Cuba for

presentation at the Group's meeting of 9 October.

62.

On 6 October,

, COMOR provided to the NRO a memo-

randum entitled "Intelligence Justification and Requirements

for Overflight of Cuba'' for use in this presentation.

Para

Al, of this paper stated that "there is now a pressing and

continuing need for up-to-date intelligence on the progress

of the Soviet arms build-up in Cuba.

The very highest levels

of the

governnent are dependent upon this intelligence to

assist in making policy decisions of immediate and vital con-

cern to the nation."

Para Ar., commenting on the absence of

coverage of western Cuba since

29 August, included the state-

ment that "Ground observers have, in several recent instances,

reported sightings of what they believe to be Soviet MRBMs 1n

Cuba.

These reports must be confirmed or denied by photo

coverage."

Attached to the memorandum were a number of target

lists, on which the area previously targeted around San

Cristobal appears, together with recommendations for attack

of particular targets by satellite, U-2, oblique, FIREFLY,

or FSU-1P/RF-101 photography.

(USIB, considering this paper

on 6 October, recommended to the Special Group full coverage

of two of these lists which did not specifically include San

Cristobal, but which by its nature would have covered that

area and the other ballistic missile sites as well.)

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TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST COPERTY

63. At the Special Group meeting on 9 October, NRO's

first recommendation was "A U-2 probe over the suspect MRBM

site as soon as weather permits."

This referred to the area

targeted by COMOR near San Cristobal (see Para 48). The

operation, which was to be supported by ELINT collection

aircraft off the coast, also was designed to pass over one

of the SA-2 sites which was thought to be most nearly opera-

tional:

Thus the secondary objective was to determine the

status

of SA-2 defenses in order to measure the risk involved

in getting complete U-2 coverage of Cuba as rapidly as

possible.

NRO's second recommendation was therefore condi-

tional:

there is no SA-2 reaction to the initial U-2

sortie, maximun coverage of the western end of the islard

by multiple U-2s simultaneously, as soon as weather permits."

(There were also certain other

recommendations for low level,

oblique, and FIREFLY missions.)

64. The Group gave first priority to the San Cristobal

mission and recommended to the President that he approve it.

The President gave his approval--presumably learning of

San Cristobal reports at this time--and the mission was

immediately mounted. It was delayed by weather, however, from

10 through 12 October.

transferred to SAC. There is no reason to believe that the

transfer in any way delayed launching the mission, which SAC

flew on 14 October. The pilot did not fly the prescribed

track, but took a course at an angle to it. Fortunately the

planned and actual paths crossed over San Cristobal, and the

primary mission was accomplished.

65. After this mission had been approved, but before it

had been flown, CIA received on 10 October Navy photographs

taken two weeks earlier of the Soviet ship Kasimov off Cuba.

These photographs showed clearly Identifiable IL-28 crates,

which later showed up in U-? photography of 17 October--along

with a number of others which must have come in on unphoto-

graphed ships--at San Julian airfield in the western tip of

the island.

The information appeared in the Checklist of

11 October.

66. During this interim period, the DCI briefed the

CIA Subcommittee of House Appropriations on 10 October on

the build-up, including the IL-28s.

He also commented on

MRBMs essentially along the lines of his cables from Nice

(para 30), adding that there were many experts who did not

believe the Soviets would make such a move, but that he

differed with them.

He told

the Subcommittee that he had

authority for an overflight in the next day or so. General

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Carter said much the same thing to Senator Saltonstall the

Iollowing day (11 October). In reply to Saltonstall's

question about Senator Keating's charges of known MRBM sites

in Cuba, General Carter said that there were refugee reports

•but no hard evidence, and that CIA hoped to photograph the

areas in the next day or so.

General Carter also briefed

Senator Stennis on 15 October (before the photography of

the previous day was available), again along the same lines.

TOP

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1.

TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST

Notification of the President

67. By this time, photography from the 14 October

mission had arrived in Washington and readout had. begun.

The Director, NPIC, contacted the DD/I in the early evening

of the 15th to inform him that a possible MRBM site had been

identified in the San Cristobal area.

The DD/I notified

General Carter (the DCI being out of town). General Carter

told him he would notify General Taylor and General Carroll

of DIA at dinner, and MeGeorge Bundy 1f he was present.

As the readout progressed during the evening the information

became firmer and the DD/I decided not to wait until morning

to notily White House and State Department officials. About

2200 he passed the information to Mr. Bundy and Mr. Rilsman,

who notified the Secretary of State.

The following morning

•(16 October) General Carter and the DD/I briefed Bundy in

detail and General Carter at 1100 briefed the President.

sir...

THE WHIL

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photocopy

tom

Twersin R. Ford Librasy

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