ARRB REQUEST: CIA-IR-04: DISPOSITION OF ANGLETON FILES
Originator: ARRB
From: BARRY HARRELSON
To: JOHN PEREIRA
Document date: 12/18/1997
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

## Page 1

1104-10336-10003

2022 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 -

CIA IR-04

TION

Assassination Records Review Board

600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530

(202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457

80€

December 18, 1997

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS

RELEASE IN FULL

2000

Mr. John Pereira

Chief

Historical Review Group

Center for the Study of Intelligence

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 02505

Re:

Status of CIA Responses to Assassination Records Review Board's Requests for

Additional Information and Records

Dear John:

I am writing to follow-up on our telephone call earlier today and to convey my serious

concern about the status of CIA's responses to the Review Board's requests for

additional information and records. Although CIA has completed its responses to

several requests, and many others have been answered in part, a significant number of

requests have not been answered — including some that were made more than two

years ago. On many occasions we have been assured that responses would be

forthcoming, only to have promised dates come and go without answers. It is now

extremely important that these requests be answered promptly so that we may conduct

a proper follow-up if necessary. The issues that we can now identify as being of the

highest priority are identified in the text below by double asterisks (**)' and we request

that they be answered within the next month. We request that the remaining requests

be answered by April 1, 1998.

The remainder of this letter is divided into two parts: first, a listing of the formal

requests for information and records, and second, a listing of the informal requests for

information and records. Please let me know if your understanding of any of the

following points differs from ours so that we can resolve any potential discrepancies.

'As identified more fully below, the issues are: CIA-1 Organizational Material,

CIA-6 Cables and Dispatches, CIA-13 Backchannel Communications, CIA-IR-03

HTLINGUAL Documents, CIA-IR-04 Disposition of Angleton Files, CIA-IR-07 Claude

Barnes Capehart, CIA-IR-15 Electronic "take" from Mexico City, CIA-IR-21 DRE

Monthly Operational Reports, CLA-IR-22 "A" Files on Clay Shaw and Jim Garrison.

BOARO MEMBERS: John R. Tunheim, Chair • Henry F. Graff • Kermir 1. Hall • William L. Joyce • Anna K. Nelson

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...^;..

.-sa

18 De 97

Mr. John Pereira

December 18, 1997

Page 6

Informal Requests

Each of the following informal requests was previously made to CIA. For future

reference, they will be referred to by the "Informal Request" (IR) number provided

below.

CIA-IR-01 Personnel Assigned to Post from 1959-64 (see RIF 104-10065-10199).

This request is complete.

CIA-IR-02 Location of Cable Identified in JFK 1993.07.20.10.18:29:650630.

This request is complete.

**CIA-IR-03 Full Computer Search for List of Documents in HTLINGUAL File.

CIA agreed to undertake a computer run for all HTLINGUAL documents in

April 1997. To date, no response has been received by ARRB. All computer

searches for these documents should be documented in a formal letter for the

record.

*ECIA-IR-04 Disposition of Angleton's Files.

The Review Board seeks to ensure that it has taken all reasonable steps to

account for any files that James Jesus Angleton possessed or controlled that

related to the assassination and to Lee Harvey Oswald. Because of the perceived

controversy surrounding the disposition of Angleton's files, the Review Board

believes it prudent to obtain a clear understanding of the types of files that he

maintained and their ultimate disposition. (The Review Board does not seek to

explore any subjects in Angleton's files beyond those that may have pertained to

the assassination.) To date, CIA has made available certain documents provided

by the CIC and the case files for Mangold v. CIA. The Review Board requests any

additional information in the possession of CIA that would explain the

disposition of Angleton's files.

In addition, the ARRB staff's review of the Mangold v. CIA files designated

additional documents from those files as assassination records. These documents

are: Tab D, documents Nos. 95, 109-116, 120, and 121; and from the Denied

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Mr. John Pereira

December 18, 1997

Page 7

Documents file: documents Nos. 496, 498, 499, 500, and 510. The Review Board

is awaiting confirmation that these documents are at HIRG for processing.

CIA-IR-05 Possible Foreign Source for Records on Oswald.

CIA was informally requested to use its contacts to pursue certain records

related to Oswald that were orally described to CIA. The Review Board

understands that the CIA has taken steps to pursue these records.

CIA-IR-06 QKENCHANT.

The Review Board seeks information regarding the purpose of QKENCHANT

and its connection with Clay Shaw, Howard Hunt, and Monroe Sullivan.

The Review Board was initially provided some information in regard to this

request that now appears to be incorrect. CIA is now seeking additional

information to correct or to clarify its previous answers. The Review Board seeks

an immediate, full, and accurate formal response to this request. Once the formal

statement is provided, this request will be complete.

**CIA-IR-07 Claude Barnes Capehart.

The ARRB staff has reviewed all records that CLA has been able to locate to date.

During the course of this review, additona muestions were raised thät CIA.!

agreed to pursue, CIA also agrec at condirt aaltional searches to determine

whether there may be additiong/eteyable.cord. oHMr. Capehart, The

Review Board seeks a full and accurate formal response to this request. Once the

formal statement is provided, this request wilbe complete.

* * CIA-IR-08 Unredacted Copy of the "Family Jewels" Memoranda.

ARRB has reviewed a redacted version of the "Family Jewels." Additional

questions have been raised. At meeting between HRG, ARRB and the DCI/IRO

on December 11, 1997, specific redacted pages were identified for ARRB staff

review. These pages should be made available as soon as possible.

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ALSO BY TOM MANGOLD

The Tunnels of Cu-Chi

The File on the Tsar

BARRY

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS

RELEASE IN FULL

2000

COLD

WARRIOI

JAMES JESUS ANGLETON:

THE CIA'S

MASTER SPY HUNTER

Tom Mangold

SIMON & SCHUSTER

New York London Toronto

Sydney Tokyo Singapore

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320 COLD WARRIOR

Golitsyn." Rocca replied that he knew very little about the defector or

his handling.

Perplexed, Kalaris countered, "Ray, you're the deputy in here. Jim

stressed Golitsyn's importance to me yesterday."

Still no briefing. Kalaris concluded this was turning into a waste of

valuable coffee-drinking time.

"What can you tell me about, Ray?" he asked patiently.

"I can tell you all about The Trust," Rocca replied brightly.

"But that all happened a half century ago," wailed Kalaris in de-

spair. "I want to know what's happening now!"

Rocca continually referred Kalaris to Angleton after each successive

question. Finally, Kalaris acknowledged defeat and went for his cof-

When Angleton eventually arrived for work, Kalaris asked him for

an up-to-date situation report: current cases, operations, personnel

problems, budgets, and so on. To his alarm, Angleton instead began to

talk again at length about Golitsyn and his brilliant analysis of the

international Communist threat. A great sense of déja vu descended on

Kalaris. Angleton next launched a ferocious attack on Colby, bitterly

complaining how Colby had destroyed the CIA's counterintelligence

capability, and how he had taken the Israeli Account away.

Angleton also specifically complained that the Counterintelligence

Staff had lost the right to vet DDO assets—-the new sources being

developed by the case officers in the field. As a former senior official

in the clandestine service, Kalaris knew the answer to that one. The

vetting process had become so inefficient under Angleton that it was

taking up to six months to clear an operation. CIA officers trying to

develop assets were seeing them slip from their grasp during the in-

terminable wait for head office approval. Colby had turned over the

vetting process to the CIA's Foreign Intelligence Staff, which had

quickly revived it.

At midday, Angleton took Kalaris to one of his celebrated liaison

lunches at La Niçoise in Georgetown. The waiters bowed and scraped

on cue as Angleton entered the restaurant. The two men were ushered

to Angleton's usual table, where a senior British liaison officer was

already waiting. Angleton tossed down four huge martinis as he and

his foreign guest, to the deliberate and humiliating exclusion of

Kalaris, proceeded to talk in code about several active cases of which

the new chief as yet knew nothing. .

On their return to Langley, a stack of cables awaited Angleton in his :

' office (now officially Kalaris's office, though he had temporarily taken

a smaller adjacent room as he waited politely for Angleton to leave).:

Had Jim read any of these cables, Kalaris asked. "No," answered:

BACKWARUS IN THE MIRKOK | 127

Angleton bluntly. "Well, I guess I better start reading them," said

Kalaris heavily. He turned to Angieton's (now his) secretary (the loyal

Bertha Dasenburg had retired several years earlier) and instructed her

to ensure that all future cable traffic come to him first. The secretary

looked at Angleton and winced. Kalaris made a mental note to dis-

pense with her services as soon as possible.

As Kalaris went on to assemble his own deputies and they began to

consolidate their arrival, the time for game playing with the ancien

régime finally came to an end. Kalaris was becoming increasingly

anxious to find out what had actually been going on inside the staff.

First, his new team attacked the Fort Knox array of safes and vaults.

Expeditionary forces led by intrepid junior officers found entire sets of

vaults and sealed rooms scattered all around the second and third floors

of CIA headquarters.

Even before these safes were opened, one team (literally searching

on its hands and knees) had discovered a packet of some forty-five

letters which had slipped behind a safe and lain there unopened for five

years. This political time bomb was placed unceremoniously on

Kalaris's desk. Gingerly, he poked the pile and established that this

mail was an infinitesimal part from the take of HT-LINGUAL, which had

simply gotten lost inside Angleton's domain. These letters had been

sent by Soviet citizens and Americans visiting the USSR to people in

the United States. All of the addressees were friends or relatives, rather

than spies and traitors.

Kalaris contemplated the pile with anguish. He knew full well that

it was a federal offense for him even to have the letters in his posses-

sion, let alone open them or, God forbid, destroy them. The pile ticked

menacingly in his in-tray for several days as he devised a plan for what

to do. This was the post-Watergate reform era. He and the CIA needed

another scandal like rowboats need hurricanes.'

Kalaris eventually untied the Gordian knot by using a series of

untraceable cut-outs to have the letters dumped on an earnest young

Capitol Hill staffer who was preparing evidence for congressional hear-

ings on Operations CHAOS and HT-LINGUAL. The CIA's involvement

was suitably obscured. (The letters were eventually forwarded to the

addressees with an apology, although there was no clue provided for

the puzzled recipients as to why the U.S. mail had taken five full years

to deliver them.)

As the Kalaris commandos pressed forward, they came across safes

which had not been opened for ten years. No one on Angleton's

remaining staff knew what was in them. Worse, no one had the com-

binations anymore. In one case, Kalaris was forced to call in the CIA's

Office of Security, which sent over a crack team of safebusters to drill

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- 328 | COLD WARRIOR

open the door. The entire safe-checking operation took several weeks

to complete, since there were more than forty safes involved, each

weighing about 1,000 pounds. The final stages of each opening were

accompanied by a breathless hush, as a trained counterintelligence

officer withdrew the contents.

The audience cheered when, inside one stubborn safe, they ex-

tracted a primitive African bow and arrow (it had come from South

Africa). In others they found tapes, photographs, and "bizarre things

of which I shall never ever speak"' —as Kalaris later muttered myste-

riously to his team.

There was one enormous safe-everyone called it the "Grandpa"

safe which was located in a storage room down the hall from the

main Counterintelligence Staff offices. The troops reckoned that this

huge contraption with five file drawers inside had come from Angle-

ton's own office. When an Office of Security safecracker finally opened

it, they found it crammed with Angleron's own most super-sensitive

files, memoranda, notes, and letters. Among these papers were files

from the Sir Roger Hollis and Graham Mitchell investigations. There

were also files on journalists, including a number of reporters who had

worked in Moscow.

To the surprise of the new team, they discovered that Angleton had

not entered any of the official documents from these safes into the

CIA's central filing system. Nothing had been filed, recorded, or sent

to the secretariat. It would take a team of highly trained specialists

another three full years just to sort, classify, file, and log the material

into the CIA system.®

Angleton left behind three main vaults on which the Kalaris team

focused their attention. Firstly, there was his own front office vault,

which contained executive office materials; files produced by Angle-

ton, his secretary, or Rocca; and anything Angleton needed for further

reference. Secondly, there was a vault holding the HT-LINGUAL files,

containing boxes filled with copies of letters intercepted from the mail-

opening program. Thirdly, and most importantly, there was the sub-

stantive vault of counterintelligence records, which contained some

forty thousand files stored in endless racks of brown envelopes. In all,

there were ten racks with double rows, each rack standing 8 feet high

and some 40 feet long. As far as the new team could determine, a large

number of these files were not at all relevant to proper counterintelli-

gence functions and had no real value. They contained data on for-

eigners, dead individuals (for historical purposes), former KGB and

GRU officers, and U.S. politicians and legislative aides who had been

in contact with Soviet bloc assets or the KGB.'

The files had been deliberately segregated for the private use of the

1918C A NO 18 M000 A18 A 8000 1000000000001 d000

Counterintelligence Staff, thus placing one of the most sensitive and

delicate functions of the CIA beyond executive control. As these

records were restricted to the second floor only, they were kept orga-

nized and guarded by a staff officer posted at the vault every day.

Access to the files was recorded in a logbook. Although the rest of the

Directorate of Operations had been undertaking a crash program since

1972 to computerize its archives, none of this counterintelligence data

had been entered because Angleton did not believe in the technology,

nor was he going to share information through terminals blinking his

secrets throughout the building

In other words, Angleton had been quietly building an alternative

CIA, subscribing only to his rules, beyond peer review or executive

supervision.

Leonard McCoy waded through some four hundred of these name

files before he concluded that the procedure was too time-consuming

and exhausting for him to complete. He ordered his staff to finish the

chore and to report to him on the merits of maintaining specific records.

When they had finished the tedious work, they advised McCoy to

retain less than one half of 1 percent of the total, or no more than

150-200 out of the 40,000.

McCoy ordered these few sanctioned records to be placed into the

central registry, and the remainder to be rechecked again page by page

for relevant material. The discards were then to be burned. (It was to

take years just to destroy all of these files. The process was still

continuing when McCoy left the staff a full four years later, in 1978.)

He also advised that neither Angleton nor Rocca should be told of the

destruction of their files.

Kalaris and McCoy then instituted a strict new policy for the cre-

ation of a Counterintelligence Staff file. The primary criterion was that

there had to be a "reasonable national security suspicion" before a file

could be opened on any person. On Kalaris's watch, very few new files

were opened.®

When the Kalaris commandos reached Jay Lovestone's "JX Re-

ports," the reviewers paused for breath and sat down to read them in

loving detail. They contained a remarkable amount of high-class

dinner-table gossip, including, by volume, approximately one foot of

pages full of Washington chatter alone. The files confirmed that An-

gleton had indeed routed much of this salacious tittle-tattle to the DCI's

office on the seventh floor. When the readers had finished their review,

Kalaris phoned the chief of the DDO's Labor Division (the CIA sec-

tion which should have been running the Lovestone operation all along)

to reveal the existence of the Lovestone connection and invite him to

take over the whole "JX" filing system. (When this officer heard the

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WANKIUK

news, he loudly feigned a nervous breakdown. He had never been told

that Lovestone was a regular CIA informant-cum-agent!)

A flanking platoon of Kalaris aides was delayed for several weeks

when they came across Rocca's famous Research and Analysis files on

The Trust and the old wartime Rote Kapelle. (They discovered no less

than forty separate studies on The Trust alone.) Beyond those half-

century-old insights, they found files researching yet another decades-

old caper: a World War Il operation involving Soviet deception of the

Nazis in the Caucasus. Kalaris was unable to comprehend their rele-

vance to the real world of 1975.

Kalaris and McCoy personally led the elite force that stormed the

inner sanctum: the super-secret Special Investigation Group's office

and vault. Despite all of Angleton's gloomy briefings, they found not

one single shred of hard evidence in the hundreds of SIG files that

proved any of the accusations against any of the HONETOl or other

molehunt suspects. The SIG had been the engine behind Angleton,

solitsyn, and the Fundamentalists, a perpetual generator grinding out

the wattage for a bleak scenario in which Soviet agents were taking

over key men in key positions throughout the globe. Yet the entire

raison d'être of the SIG turned out to be so much documentary fantasy.

Time and again, in file after file, the two men found only newspaper

clippings, elevated gossip, chatty memoranda with waspish handwrit-

ten notes added, and unsubstantiated allegations.

Kalaris read through the two key British files, on Harold Wilson

(OATSHEAF) and Sir Roger Hollis; there was nothing substantive in

either of them. He perused the large file on Averell Harriman and

smaller ones on Armand Hammer and Henry Kissinger (contrary to Ed

Petty's belief that the latter didn't exist).' The new Counterintelligence

chief was so ashamed at the unacceptable quality of the intelligence he

uncovered that he had several dozen of the most egregious examples

destroyed as soon as possible.

A simultaneous priority for the hard-pressed Kalaris was dealing

with what came to be known as "the Golitsyn factor." Angleton was

insistent from the outset that Kalaris should inherit his prized Soviet

defector and should treat Golitsyn with proper reverence and defer-

ence. Kalaris was less than enthusiastic. He already knew more than he

wanted to know about the former KGB officer and his bizarre theories,

and did not subscribe to the view that Golitsyn came with the Coun-

terintelligence Staff's furniture.

Angleton, however, pressed his successor to attend a get-acquainted

dinner with Golitsyn at an Italian restaurant in nearby Alexandria in

late January 1975. Scotty Miler, who was still officially Golitsyn's

case officer, came along too. As usual, the occasion began with a great

BACKWARDS IN THE MIRROR

deal of drinking. In between toasts, Golitsyn offered to enlighten

new Counterintelligence chief with all of his views about the kus

intelligence services. Angleton nodded enthusiastically, while Kal

gritted his teeth and reached for his cigarettes.

After being bombarded by dozens of unfamiliar names and ir

that didn't seem to make any sense, the pragmatic Counterintellige

chief began to wonder whether he and Golitsyn were inhabitants of

same planet. There seemed to be some sort of galactic gap between

gruff Ukrainian's allegations and the reality of the intelligence wi

that Kalaris had moved in for more than twenty years.

To add to Kalaris's discomfort, Angleton and Miler kept nodd

• their heads in vigorous agreement with every new point Golitsyn '

making. "See, George," they would repeat, as the defector hung

one more unsupported conclusion on a trembling line of unchecl

evidence. Throughout the spaghetti, scampi, wine, and Scotch, Kal:

simply couldn't understand what Golitsyn was talking about. I

respectful way, he tried to explain this to Angieton, but he sensed i

his message was not getting through.

Kalaris left the dinner with relief, only to be ambushed by

Fundamentalists again a month later, when they insisted that he m

Golitsyn once more—-this time in one of the CIA's favorite hotels,

Key Bridge. Marriott at nearby Rosslyn Circle. It was an afternc

session, with Angleton and Miler again attending. Golitsyn talked a

talked, and Kalaris again found it quite impossible to comprehend 1

briefing. As the three CIA men were leaving the hotel, Kalaris turn

to Miler and told him, "This is the last time I intend to meet Golits)

I don't understand him or anything about him. I cannot and will i

waste my time like this. In the future, if Golitsyn has something for l

staff, I will send someone else to deal with him."ll

"You can't do that!" a horrified Miler replied. "Golitsyn is ve

important and he has always dealt only with the top men."

Angleton supported Miler. "You've got to try hard with Anatoliy

he advised Kalaris. "These things can take years."

Kalaris relented and reluctantly agreed to a third meeting a few da

later. Another lunch, more wine, more of Golitsyn's ponderous le

turing. Kalaris, eyes glazing, tried his best to show interest and rema

calm. But when Golitsyn started talking about the "alleged" Sin

Soviet split, Kalaris exploded. "Are you telling me that what we ha'

been seeing over there for fifteen years is not real?'' he thunderer

"You don't understand, you don't understand," grumbled the Si

viet defector.'

When Kalaris returned to his office, he summoned one of his truste

officers, Ernest Tsikerdanos. "I've decided to give you an assig!

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430 NOTES

interview with TM, June 12, 1989. In February 1974, Hersh had learned

about the CIA's top secret, $500 million Glomar Explorer project to retrieve

a sunken Soviet submarine off the bottom of the Pacific Ocean-and he had;

withheld publication on national security grounds.

31. William Colby strongly denies that he leaked any information to Sey-

mour Hersh or that he had planned in advance to use the Times story to get rid

of Angleton. "That's a lot of bull," Colby says. "I suspect Hersh got the

information from several sources. If you look at his story, you can see he put

it together. I would have handled Hersh the same way if Angleton were not

around."' William Colby, interview with TM, June 12, 1989.

Hersh states simply, "Colby was not the source for my story."' Seymore

Hersh, interview with TM, June 20, 1989.

32. William Colby, interview with TM, June 12, 1989.

33. As DCI, Colby was fully authorized to fire Angleton at his own

discretion without appeal or outside review. For security reasons, the CIA was

the only U.S. federal agency that permitted its director to take such unilateral

action and bypass normal civil service regulations. The CIA's 1947 charter

stated that the DCI may in his discretion, terminate the employment of any

officer or employee of the agency whenever he shall deem such termination

necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States, Confidential

interview.

34. Donald Moore, interview with JG, December 6, 1988.

35. Peter Wright, interview with TM, February 22, 1989.

36. Seymour Hersh, interview with TM, June 20, 1989.

37. ABC-TV News, untransmitted footage, held in a commercial film

library in New York City and viewed in June 1990.

38. David Atlee Phillips, The Night Watch (New York: Atheneum, 1977),

pp. 264-66; David Phillips, interview with TM, May 1, 1988. Phillips con-

firmed this anecdote from his book before he died in July 1988.

39. Wright, Spycatcher, p. 377.

40. James Angleton, letter to Marcel Chalet, February 28, 1975.

41. Cicely Angleton, interview with TM, May 30, 1988.

42. Peter Wright, interview with TM, February 22, 1989.

43. William Hood, on the other hand, offered to continue temporarily,

since he felt he could make a contribution to the reformed Counterintelligence

Staff.

• 44. Newton Miler, interview with TM, February 13, 1989.

NOTES

431

46. Leonard McCoy, interview with TM, June 8, 1988.

47. Ibid.

CHAPTER 22

1. Quoted in the New York Times, December 25, 1974, p. 1.

2. Confidential interview.

3. William Colby, interview with TM, June 12, 1989.

4. The non-attributable quotations in this chapter have been collected

from friends and colleagues of the primary sources and have been carefully

cross-checked.

S. Confidential interview.

6. Confidential interview.

7. Confidential interview.

8. Confidential interview.

9. Henry Kissinger, interview with TM, June 15, 1989. Henry Kissinger

has told TM that he is unaware of the existence of any file on him from the

Counterintelligence Staff.

10. As each of these files was destroyed, a complete record was carefully

maintained about what had been done.. Kalaris signed off on every file and the

DCI's office was notified. Confidential interview.

11. Confidential interview.

12. Confidential interview.

13. Confidential interview.

14. Cordelia Hood, interview with TM, August 26, 1989; confidential

interviews.

15. The CIA announced the results of Tweedy's investigation and distrib-

uted a condensed version of his final report to the delegates at the next CAZAB

meeting at Camp Peary, Virginia. Confidential interview.

16. Confidential interview.

17. Newton Miler, interview with TM, February 14, 1989.

18. Leonard McCoy, interview with TM, June 1, 1988, and interview

with JG, June 15, 1988.

10 Confirlantini intamin..e

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,24-JUN94

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

• 24 June 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR: Fred Wickham

FROM:

SUBJECT:

Barry Harrelson

ARRB Request re Angelton and Scott

Jeremy Gunn, ARRB staff, has requested (via

telephone) access to the following files/documents:

Winston Scott documents, including the entire

manuscript_It Came to Little, and personal effects seized on

Winston Scott's death;

b. files of James Angelton housed in the CI

vault.

As Linda Cipriani handled the recent FOIA

litigation brought by Michael Scott (Win's son) for all

documents on his father, Linda has copies of documents

responsive to Gunn's first request in her office.

I have

spoken with (Linda and we agree that, with your concurrence,

the best course of action would be to have Gunn view the

scott documents and manuscript at oge.

You should be aware

that during the course of that litigation,

searches were

conducted to locate personal effects seized by CIA upon

Scott's death.

Those effects were never located, but a

destruction

record that seems to refer to these personal

was located

and provided to OGC.

Gunn would need

to that destruction record as well.

3.

The second request of Gunn also was an issue in

the Scott FOIA litigation.

At that time the Do told IP&CRD

that all Angelton documents were sorted through in the 1970s

and that a separate CI Angelton holding no longer exist.

Official files were incorporated into DO record system and

material not deemed to be official records were destroyed.

To the extent that any destruction records exist on

Angelton's records, Jeremy would like to see these as well.

Linda and I suggest that the DO search for any such

destruction records and forward them to OGC.

In this way,

Jeremy can view them at the same time he views the Scott

documents.

4.

Jeremy has agreed that if CIA allows him to view

the above records "informally" and he finds nothing that

relates to the assassination, then he will not make an

"official request" for these records. Of course, any

records he believes to be relevant, he will have to make an

official request and they will then become part of the JFK

Collection.

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

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ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

5.

Please let me know if you have any problems with

the above proposal

Feel free to phone me (30292) or Linda

(76124) if you have any questions or concerns.

STan

Barry Harrelson

Name

CC:

C/HRG

Linda Cipriani

Ellie Neiman

• 2

ADMINISTRATIVE -

INTERNAL USE

ONLY

---

## Page 11

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CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS

RELEASE IN FULL

2000

=7-09

ALSO BY WILLIAM R. CORSON

The Betrayal

Promise or Peril

Consequences of Failure

The Armies of Ignorance

The New KGB (with Robert Crowley)

BY JOSEPH AND SUSAN TRENTO

Prescription for Disaster

BY JOSEPH TRENTO

The National Aeronautics and Space

Administration (with Richard Hirsch)

WIDOWS

William R. Corson, Susan B. Trento,

and Joseph J. Trento

1979

CROWN PUBLISHERS, INC.

New York

---

## Page 12

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54 WIDOWS

ment. Somewhere in the CIA, and perhaps elsewhere in the U.S.

government, at least one mole was digging in, and this unbelievably

bright and complicated man wanted him trapped.

Within the CIA, everyone realized how tough Angleton's job was.

Hank Knoche recalls Angleton's outlook: "Angleton had a special

view of the world... colored very much by the responsibilities he

had as chief of the CI staff, [a position he had held] for years and

years. You almost have to be 100 percent paranoid to do that job. You

always have to fear the worst. You always have to assume the worst

of your enemies. You always have to assume, without necessarily

having the proof in your hands, that your own organization has been

penetrated and that there's a mole around somewhere. And it creates

this terrible distrustful attitude."

Angleton's power exceeded by far the responsibilities of his job at

the CIA. Although he never had more than 120 people working for

him, he became a feared and revered legend. CIA employees would

point Angleton out in the hallway, only to discover years later that

they had pointed to the wrong man. He cast a giant shadow across the

entire CIA, and yet few people ever worked with him. His search for

the mole was spurred on by the warnings of one defector. Angleton

had become almost bewitched by the conspiracies woven by a Soviet

defector named Anatolyi Golitsyn.

Golitsyn defected in Helsinki in late 1961. Characterized by those

who had to deal with him as arrogant, nasty, and loaded with details

of KGB operations around the world, Golitsyn was the only defector

Angleton ever trusted. "With the single exception of Golitsyn, Angle-

ton was inclined to assume that any defector or operational asset in

place was controlled by the KGB,

," said Clare Edward Petty, who

worked for Angleton.' But Angleton was so infatuated with this man

that he lowered his carefully constructed guard, which had, in the past,

always prevented him and his counterintelligence staff from being cap-

tivated by defectors.

Before and after Golitsyn, other defectors did not fare as well as he

did. Michal Goleniewski-code name SNIPER-the highest-ranking

Polish agent ever to defect to the West, had so worn out his welcome

by the early 1970s that no one from the CIA even remained in touch

with him. According to Petty, Angleton considered Goleniewski a

provocation, a Soviet agent sent to the West with carefully prepared

false information. He was not to be trusted. But from the time he

defected in West Berlin in 1960 with his mistress, his information

"proved to be reliable. He had warned the West of a Soviet mole—a

"midlevel agent," and his warnings were ignored. The mole was the

infamous British agent George Blake, who turned out to have been

working for the KGB.

PAISLEY: MOLE

55

In 1970 the British contacted Petty and told him that they needed lo

speak to Goleniewski about an investigation they were conducting into

the loyalty of Sir Michael Hanley, a senior official in MIS. Petty ex- :

plained that the CIA had broken off its relationship with Goleniewski,

but the FBl in New York kept in contact with him. Months later the

British called Petty to tell him how extraordinarily helpful Goleniewski

7 had been. Then they dropped a bombshell. As an aside to Goleniew-

, ski's devastating accusations about Hanley, he charged that Nixon's

National Security Adviser-Henry Kissinger-was a Soviet agent.

Petty was told by the British that Goleniewski had an office mate who

had previously run operations for the Soviets in East Germany during

the last few years of World War Il and after the war. This agent

handler had run some very sensitive cases, and he had a safe. When

the agent handler died, Goleniewski was commissioned by the UB

(Polish intelligence) to open up his safe and read the contents and

inventory them. It was during this inventory that Goleniewski ran

across a case of two Soviet agents run by his deceased colleague.

According to Petty, Goleniewski said both of them had cryptonyms,

exact information as to when they had been recruited, and a case file

of what they had done. Goleniewski identified one as Henry Kissinger.

He said that Kissinger had been returned to the United States and had

been contacted subsequent to his return to continue his work for the

Soviets in the United States.

Goleniewski knew that Kissinger had been put to work on a CIA

project at Harvard. Petty and his colleagues were reasonably certain

that Goleniewski could have come up with most of his information

from open sources, but not the part about Kissinger's CIA connec-

tions. That had been secret. In 1971, Angleton's staff reluctantly began

an investigation of Kissinger. They had no choice, according to Petty:

"Despite the fact that Goleniewski had been widely discredited as

being mentally deranged or perhaps a Soviet agent, the specificity of

his lead was comparable to that [which was] characteristic of his best

work, and could in no way be ignored," Petty said.

The Cl division began using all its sources to pull together a dossier

on the flamboyant and egotistical National Security Adviser. In the

opinion of the counterintelligence officials at the CIA, Kissinger

treated them as bothersome meddlers when they requested that he

follow normal security precautions in dealing with the Soviets.

Petty gave Angleton a memo on the charges. But instead of notifying

the FBI and ordering an investigation, Angleton, according to Petty,

"sat on it." Although the British had vouched for Goleniewski, some

at the ClA thought the defector was mentally unstable, and that his

insistence that he was related to the Tsar was symptomatic. Angleton

told the British, through one of MIS's assistant directors, Peter Wright.

---

## Page 13

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94 WIDOWS

Soviet Foreign Ministry. Ogorodnik was eventually transferred back

to Moscow to work at the Foreign Ministry, in the Global Affairs

Section.

Ogorodnik was not a believer in American democracy, but he did

believe in capitalism. He sold out the Soviet government for several

large payments in gold. The CIA's Soviet Division gave Ogorodnik the

code name TRIGON. For two years a wealth of material-much of it

gossip involving key personalities in the Soviet Foreign Service—

emerged from TRIGON. But the handling of this source was neither

careful nor skillful. Use of standard tradecraft in Moscow, such as

dead drops, was considered both dangerous and potentially embarrass-

ing. The KGB is so overstaffed that putting full surveillance on all CIA

people in Moscow is standard practice. The compromise of Martha

Peterson was fairly predictable, considering the risks of working in the

Soviet Union.

Once Peterson was arrested, the CIA considered TRIGON compro-

mised. It was clear to McCoy that Peterson had been set up for her

arrest at the drop site. What the CIA did not know was how long the

KGB had been onto TRIGON, or how they had got onto TRIGON in the

first place. Another thing the CIA had to know was if the KGB had

forced TRIGON to start feeding back phony material, and if so, when.

Almost immediately, Leonard McCoy, who had been a reports officer

on so many similar cases, would now look at the TRIGON case as a

counterintelligence officer. Since early 1975, McCoy had been the

number-two man to George Kalaris, who had replaced James Angle-

ton. Neither Kalaris nor McCoy had any real experience in counter-

intelligence when they took over from the renowned spymaster. And

in the ensuing years, they did little to impress many counterintelli-

gence veterans or the FBI. But, as discussed later in this book, the

biggest body blow to Kalaris and McCoy was the bizarre management

of the Nick Shadrin case. 37

By 1977, when Martha Peterson was arrested, McCoy's reputation

as a counterintelligence expert was suffering badly. McCoy says that

CIA Director Adm. Stansfield Turner gave him only two weeks to find

out how trIGON was compromised. In an attempt to find out what had

happened that caused the Peterson arrest and the subsequent execu-

tion by the KGB of TRIGON, McCoy found himself in a political mine

field. For a brief time, McCoy suspected that Dr. Henry Kissinger may

• have played a role in the compromise of TRIGON. One piece of intelli-

gence that came McCoy's way was a bizarre NSA intercept from the

Soviet Embassy in Washington in April 1977. The cable was sent by

Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin to the Foreign Ministry in Moscow. It

referred to advice Henry Kissinger had given Dobrynin on how to deal

with the new Carter administration in the ongoing SALT II negotia-

PAISLEY: THE JABBERMOLE?

95

tions. For McCoy, the cable was a shocking document. The idea that

a former Secretary of State and National Security Adviser would meet

alone, as a private citizen, with the Soviet Ambassador to discuss

negotiating techniques seemed almost beyond belief to McCoy.

The cable gave credence to an old file McCoy had inherited when

he moved into CI-the file of the original investigation and supporting

documents looking into Kissinger's loyalty that grew out of Michal

Goleniewski's charges in 1969. What made matters worse was that

Angleton's old office files also reflected long meetings Kissinger and

Dobrynin had had alone during the Nixon years. Angleton noted that

Kissinger had refused to be debriefed after those meetings. All McCoy

knew was that Kissinger had displayed a questionable pattern of be-

havior. Now a key source in the Soviet Foreign Ministry had been

lost, and it was a source that Kissinger was in a position to identify to

the Soviets.

---

## Page 14

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01/08/97 MEU LY: VO FAA ZUZ 124

U4DI

951N97

MEMORANDUM

To:

-Bar

Ly Harrelson

From: -

T. Jeremy Gunn

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS

RELEASE IN FULL

2000

Subject me Requests to CIA. for Records- Related Information- UPDATE

Date:

january 9,

1997

0703) 06 R

The followingis alist of our current requests for information. These should be

considered informal requests for which we await your response. If you have any

additional questions or responses you should call elther Bob Skirot or the analysts

identified below. Weare Wiling to formalize any of the requests into our numbered

• serdes yout yould so prefer

partial

response

10/96

pending

9/6/96

9/6/96

pending

9/6/96

partial

response

10/96

pending

pending.

pending

pending

pending

pending

pending

pending

9/5/96

9/96

8/96

10/17/96

10/24/96

10/24/96

11/06/96

12/10/96

12/10/96

01/07/97

pu Faldniles. Are all files In collection? It CIA has any

additionalties (eg. personnel, 201, eic.), we would like to

request them.

pas raidin file in Box 15 tolder 34. Who is the person

signing the DCD messages? Did Raikin work for CIA? Did

he work for DGD/00? What is relationship between

documents in fie and Raikin?

Location of cable Identried in JFK

1993.07.20.10.18:29.650630 (Box 34, F 22) p. 2 Cable

number (IN 24708) 7 July 82. We can send fax if helpful.

ManynD Murettles. Are all files in collection!: If ClA

has any additional files (e.g., personnel, 201, etc;), we

would like to request them.

Information on HITLINGUAL

Information on Arigleton's filing system at Cl

Location of DRE, CRC, MRF(?) monthly operational

reports

Tapes

Moscow

Tapes of Alvarado Interrogation

New Orleans, Hunter Leake, Clay Shaw, QKENCHANT,

and ZRCLIFF

Claude Bames Capehart

Howard Guabler

Combs

Combs

Legaspi

Combs

Combs

Combs

Legaspi

Combs

Marr

Legaspl

Skwirot

Gunn

---

## Page 15

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-

SECRET

SECOND DRAFT 3/6/97 [arrbci.do2]

NOTES BY TJG FOR ASSASSINATION RECORDS REVIEW BOARD

JANUARY 15, 1997

Cleveland Cram

Untitled (History of the old CI staff) (beginning to dismissal of Angleton)

II Volumes (c.1981)

1063 pages

The Post-Angleton CI Staff

2 volumes (uly, 1993)

The ARRB requested access to any and all internal CIA histories of the CI staff for the

purpose of determining whether they contain any information that would be useful for

understanding the assassination of President Kennedy, including for example, the

activities of Lee Harvey Oswald, the structure of CI with respect to the components of

the office that had responsibility for handling Oswald's file at different times

(particularly CI/SIG), and any aspect of HTLINGUAL related to Oswald. Because the

Agency keeps these histories closely held, it was believed that they are relatively more

likely to be candid assessments of CI and its activities than one might obtain from more

widely circulate documents.

I was provided complete access to the entire 11 volumes of an untitled history of the old

CI staff (hereafter Old CI Staff). The Old Cl Staff covers counterintelligence at CIA from

its origins to the departure of James Jesus Angleton. The histories appear as typed

legal-size pages in green, cardboard folders. The first volume is hand dated (1981) and

is signed "Cleveland Cram." I was also provided complete access to a second history of

counterintelligence, the Post-Angleton CI Staff (hereafter Post-Angleton) which starts with

the departure of Angleton and continues to the conversion of the CI Staff into the CI

Center in the spring of 1988.

By all appearances, the histories appear to be relatively candid assessments of CI Staff

activities. I was able to identify information that illuminated some of the issues of

concern, and those will be outlined below. I identified no information that would lead

to any significant reevaluation of the role of CI in issues related to Oswald or to the

assassination. For the purpose of understanding the assassination of the President or

the other issues that come within the scope of the Review Board's mandate - other than

the information identified below - I do not believe that the histories themselves, nor

copies of any of the pages of the histories, would provide any significant useful

additional information that would enhance the understanding of the assassination and I

see no need for any further information to be released from the histories. IIt is my

preliminary judgment that the page numbers highlighted below should be copied

and attached to this memorandum so that they can be made public.]

---

## Page 16

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- :

The information contained in the histories consists largely of case studies of important

counterintelligence activities. As a rule, the histories do not describe the structure of the

CI offices, the personnel, the filing system, or operations generally - although

discussion of some of these issues arises. The principal sources used by the authors

consisted of documents from the CI Staff and interviews with officers. There are

relatively few footnotes dn the citations are, accordingly, quite thin. There are, for

example, only 8 footnotes in volume 1 of the Old CI Staff history, which themselves are

sketchy.

÷ Old CI Staff

1. The introduction to the Old CI Staff refers to an earlier CI history that was

written by a person who was provided only limited access to Angleton and the

files. The author, accordingly, found the history to be unhelpful for

understanding sensitive CI activities. (Old CI Staff, pp. 1-2). There are references

o two additional documents that should be requested: The Bronson I weedy

(w/Goleniewski?] study on Golitsyn (1975) and the John Hart study on Nosenk

(called "The Monster Plot"). (Charles Battaglia, Staff Director of the SSCI, told

me that the ARRB should request The Monster Plot for review under the JFK

Act.)

2. There is a reference to a 1959 IG survey of CI which should be requested for

review. (See e.g., Old CI Staff, pp. 47,56)

3. The 1959 IG analysis stated that, within the CI staff, "96 were professionals, 75

clerical and four staff agents. The Staff also had one Headquarters contract

agent, and several agents under projects." (Old CI Staff, p. 48)

4. There is a discussion of the Special Investigations Unit (circa 1959) and

HTLINGUAL. Copies of pages 49-51, and 55, which describe the SIU and

HTLINGUAL, should be evaluated to determine whether they contribute to

understanding of relevant issues.

5. Angleton was on sick leave from the agency from May, 1960 to 12 January

1961. During Angleton's absence, [S. Herman Horton] was Acting Chief and

James Hunt was Acting Deputy Chief. Hunt subsequently became the regular

deputy and served until 1969. (Old CI Staff, p. 58)

6. Routine liaison with FBI was conducted by Jane Roman "from the late 1940s

onward..." (Old CI Staff, p. 70). Sensitive matters were handled, however, by

Angleton or Hunt (Old CI Staff, p. 70) although this practice "did not develop

until the early 1960s after the defection of Golitsyn...." (Old CI Staff, p. 71).

7. The activities of CI/SIG are described on pp. 141-45. The sources cited in the

---

## Page 17

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Old CI Staff are the 1955 and 1973 descriptions of its activities. It should be

decided whether these two pages should be copied for attachment to this memo.

• I did not find that the references to Nosenko provided additional information that

enhances the historical understanding of the assassination. Mr. Angleton's testimony to

the Church Committee is much more illuminating in that regard.

The Post-Angleton history, although covering the period after Oswald and the

assassination, discusses the issues of the disposition of the files of James Jesus Angleton

and a few other matters. Because of the speculation about the contents of the files,

discussions of their disposition would seem to be relevant. The pertinent points are as

follows:

Post Angleton, Volume I:

1. The volume describes the CI staff, at the departure of Angleton, as being

seriously disorganized and as being intellectually detached from the work of the

rest of the agency. (Post-Angleton, p. I:6-8.)

2. The Angleton office files were voluminous and in disarray at the time of his

departure from the Agency. It may be appropriate to make copies of pp.I:8 (ast

paragraph) up to the last paragraph on p. 14, 53-57 to illustrate this.

3. [Fliles were found on the assassinations of President John F. Kennedy and his

brother Robert F. Kennedy. These included autopsy pictures of the remains of

Robert Kennedy. Although Nosenko's account of the KGB's involvements with

Lee Harvey Oswald and his denial that the KGB had anything to do with the

murder of John Kennedy might reasonably explain an Angleton interest in the

John Kennedy assassination, neither Kalaris nor Blee, with whom Kalaris

consulted on this bizarre finding, had any idea why Angleton had the pictures.

Neither could they think of any reason why it was appropriate for CI Staff files to

contain them. They were accordingly destroyed." (Post-Angleton, p. I:11). I

subsequently spoke with the author, who told me that he had spoken to Kalaris

and Blee about this, and neither man could remember anything in the files except

the Robert Kennedy photographs and some newspaper clippings.

4. The files revealed evidence that Angleton conducted "counterintelligence

[operations or activities?] abroad as Chief of the CI Staff in the way in which the

local station would be effectively cut out and command channel and

communications would run direct to counterintelligence headquarters in

Washington." (Post-Angleton, p. I:22.) (sic). I interpret these words to say the

following: Angleton conducted counterintelligence operations [activities?]

abroad as Chief of the CI Staff in such a way that local stations would be

---

## Page 18

13-00000

effectively cut out; command channel and communications would run directly to

counterintelligence headquarters in Washington. [Gunn would like to re-review

this page to make sure that he has quoted from it correctly.]

5. The author cites two examples where Angleton ran liaison with friendly

governments without the local station chiefs being specifically aware of

Angleton's activities. The station chiefs found this "frustrating." (Post-Angleton,

pp. I: 25-26).

6. (Circa 1976) "[Handling [FOIA requests for information concerning Lee

Harvey Oswald] required the creation of a task force of 13 operations officers

and analysts, plus clerical personnel, and their full-time efforts for over a

month." (Post-Angleton, p. I:67.)

7. Discussion of activities of part of CI staff circa 1976: "Double Agent Branch --

was charged with the conduct of and coordination o double agent operations

abroad. Since the vast majority of DA cases were run by the US military services,

the FBI, or - in some instances - foreign-liaison services, the branch was very

heavily a coordinator rather than active runner of operations." (Post-Angleton, p.

I:71).

8. The author refers to an August 1976 IG report sometimes called the Freer

report. It analyzes Angleton's stewardship over CI compared to that of Kalaris.

It discusses how Angleton ran CI. We should review this report. [It is cited in

Mangold, Cold Warrior, at 316.]

Post-Angleton, Volume II:

The only significant reference in the second volume pertains to the final completion of

the review of the Angleton files. (Post-Angleton, p. II:114.)

elci

---

## Page 19

13-00000.

New NotelPersonalized

CL BY: xxX

CL REASON: Saction 1.5

DECL ON:

DRV FRM:

From the Desk of Richard D. Kovar-Y-

QKSCIF

NOTE FOR:

FROM:

OFFICE:

DATE:

SUBJECT:

J. Barry harrelson

Richard D. Kovar-Y-

DCI

09/25/98 17:38:59

Jeremy's Cl History requirements

From the "Old Cl Staff":

Pages 49-51, and 55 (HTLINGUAL)

Pages 144-45 (CI/SIG)

From "Post-Angleton": (1 and Il are Roman numerals, apparently volumes)

Pages I:6-8 (Staff disorganization)

Pages I:8, starting with the last paragraph, up to the last paragraph on page 14, 53-57 (sic). (Files

Page I:11 (Kennedy files)

Page 1:22 (Cl abroad)

Page I:67 (FOIA)

Page I:71 (Double agents)

Page Il: 114 (File review)

CC:

New Note|Personalized

---..i

---

## Page 20

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JAN 27 '97 10:21AM USGOVERNMENT

P. 2/8

DRAT NOTES BY TIG FOR ASSASSINATION RECORDS REVIEW BOARD

UNCAR TA137

On January 13, 1997, Michelle Combs and Jeremy Gunn from the ARRE Staff reviewod the files

of Winston McKinley Scott at CLA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, The General Counsel's office

stated that that the files presented for our examination are the "complete" files known to the CIA on Soott

The documents total approximatily 6 inches, and include:

(1) A manuscript entitled "I! Cime to Litt," by Ian Maxwell (preud.), which contalns 221

enumerated pages. The foreword to the manuscript stater that the events rocounted therein contain "no

aggorations and no deviations from bac truth." (unpaginated forwand). It reveila that some true

names have been need, and that this hat been done without the consent of the persons named. The author

axpresses hia "most sincero admiration and utmost respect for: Mr. John Edgar Hoover, Director, Federal

Bureau of Investegation (sic); Mr. James R Murphy, wartime director of OSS/X-2; and particularly, the

late Allen, Welch Dillas, OSS Cilet In Spitzerland during World War II, a principal architoct in the

croation of CIA for President Farty Truman and the Greatest Directo" CIA has had." The author refers to

the blight of communtam, and the courageous people who havo worked to fight it, but nevertheless

concluden that "all the effort (to thwart Communism) has come to littic." (unpaginated forward)

There is only one chapter that makes any identifiable reference to the assassination, of President

Kennedy and to the eventa related to Máxico City at the time Lee Harvey Oswald was alleged, to have

vaicod. Thât chapter has been roleased in till to thè public.

(2) A Supplemental Declaration of J. Barry Harrelson from the case Michael Scotty, CIA, CA

No, 1:9SCV00686 with attached documents. The attached documents contain documents relcased in full

and some thät are redacted Accordins tO CIA, all redacted documents are a part of the JFK collection,

This should be confirmed. If thcy aro part of tho collection, no further stops need be taken. Ifmot, they

must be thily reviewed to determine whether they are assassination recorde.

(3) Documents that appear to be copies of the personnel file of Win Scott All of the documents

In this file were reviewed to determine whether any assassination records are included. Our review

disclosed no "and nation records." Althoughinot asassination records, the following information was

located in the personnel file:

- The records disclose that during World War Il, while in the employ of the FBI, Scott worked in

"connection with esplonage and subverstve activities" and in "countoresplonage" while based, in Flavana.

- Document, dated 7/23/69, refers to the possibility that CLA might attempt to recruit Scott for

the "Civillan Reserve Program (FR 20-15) following his retiroment from the agency.

- On May 6, 1969, Scott was recommended for a Distinguished Intelligence Medal by William

V. Broe, who was then Chief of WH. The recommendation includes the following statement:

"Mr. Scott built a large and highly effective organization targeted against highest priority

national security targets; namely, the Soviet bloc presence south of the border. Given the nature

of the target, Mr. Scott malded his station with a predominantly CI orientation until it has

bocomo a highly éffectivo counterintelligence mechanism capable of covering Sovlet Bloc and

Cuban [activitics]."

His Citation for the Distinguished Intalligence Medal includes the following statement:

---

## Page 21

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JAIN 27: 9? 10:23AM USGOVERNMENT

P. 3/8

CEAFT

"TEle has served brilliantly in Mexco for over twalve years where among other things he has

built a remarkable counterintelligence machine-a true bulwark helping to guard our southem

border. His station has long been a showcase of technical Intelligence methods as well as

classical operations."

-There is no record in the file that suggasts, one way or the other, that Mr. Scott was ever

treated for or sui ered from any mental or emotional issue.

Unless the following are already part of the JFK collection, they should be designated "assassination

record?" and processed under the JFK Act.

AR: Doc. 93: 8 Oct 1976 for Chief, Security Analysis Group from (105x) in Security Analysis

Group, subject: Philip B. F. AGÉE Exposure of CIA Personnel (4 pp.).

JAR: Doc. 94: discussion of Chapter 21 of manuscript

*AR: Dóc. 129: discussion of chapter 21 of manuscript

-AR: Doc. 131: discussion of removing Scott papers after his death

JAR: Doc. 132: ditto

-AR: Doc. 134 brief message re: manuscript

TIG was ahown the Records Control Schedule that appears to document the destruction of somo Win Scott

documents. Thii record should, perhaps, be designated an "arassination record."

ilen

faxed lay

Lindle.

Queries/follow-up:

Varification no other WS filos

PrOCEss ARS

Which records are already in collection?

ARRB must stil review any Scott destruction schedules

---

## Page 22

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JAN. 27 '97 10:25AM USGOVERNMENT

P.5/8

2

SECRET

2. There is a reference to & 1959 IG survey of CI which should be requested for review. (See,

0.E., Cram 47, 56

3. The 1959 IG analysis stated the within the CI start, "96 were praisssionals, 75 clerical and

four staff agants. The Staff also had ons Headquartens contract agent, and several agents under

projecta" (Cram, 48).

4. There is a discussion of the Special Investigations Unit (clica 1939) and HuiNGUAL.

Copies of pages 49-51, and 55, which describe the STU and HTLINGUAL, should be evaluated to

détermine whother they contribute to understanding of relevant isquca.

5. Angleton was on sick leave from the agency from May, 1960 to 12 Jaquary 1961. During

Angleton's absence, S. Herman Horiön was Acting Chief and James Hunt was Acting Deputy

Chief. Hunt rubsoquently became the regular deputy and served until 1969(Cram: 58).

6. Routine liaison with FBI was conducted by Jane Roman "from the late 1940s anward.."

7. The activites of CI/SIG are described on pp. 144-45. Cram's cited sources are the 195S and

1973 descriptions of its activides. It should be decided whether thise two pages should be copied

for attachment to this memo.

I did not find that the references to Nosenio provided additional information that enhances the historical

understanding of the astassination. Mr. Angleton's testimony to the Church Committee le much more

illuminating in that regard.

The Bonner history, although after the perlod of Oswald and the assassination, discusses the issues of the

disposition of the files of James Jesus Angleton and a few other matters. Becausc of the speculation about

the contents of the files, discussions of their dispostiton would jeem to be relevant. The pertinent points

are as follows:

Bannet volume I:

1. Bonner) describes the CI staff, at the departure of Angleton, as being seriously unorganized

and as being intellectually detached from the work of the agency. (Bonnes, p. I:6-8.)

2. The Angleton affice filer were voluminous and in disarray at the time of his departure from

the Agency. It may be appropriato to make copies of pp. I:8 (ast paragraph) up to the last

paragraph on p. 14, 53.57 to illustrate this.

SECRET

---

## Page 23

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JAN 27 '37 10: 26AM USGOVERNMENT

P. 6/8

3

that ho had ipoken to Kalaris and Blee sbout this, and neither man could remamber anything in

the files excopt the Robert Kennody photographs.

4. The files revealed evidence that Angieton ran "counterintelligence [operations] abroad as

chief of the Cl Staff in the way in which the local station would be effectively cut out and

command channel and communications wild rus direct to counterintelligence headquarters in

Washington" Bonner, p. 122.) (sic). I believe Bonner Is saying the following: Angleton ran

coult litely cut, common a Caled it a smir atons would ta diet ritona

counterintelligence headquarters in Washington.

5. Bonner cites two examples where Angleton ran liaison with fiendly governments without the

local station chiets being specially aware of Angliton"s sctivities. The station chiefs found this

"frustrating." (Bonher, pp. Tas-26).

6. (Circa, 1976) "Handling (FOLA requests for information concerning Lec Harvey Oswald)

en the the tit dira ta chan i i done. ran analys, pius clerical personnol,

1. Discussion of activites of part of CI staff circa 1976: "Double Agent Branch - was charged

with the conduct of and coordination on double agent operations abroad. Sinco the vast majority

if DA cases were run by the US military servloes, the FBL, or- in some instances-foreign-liaison

serviloes, the branch was very heavily a coordinator rather than active runner of operations."

(Bonner, p. 1:71).

8. Bonner refari to an August 1976 IG report sometimes called the Freer report. It analyzes

Angleton's stewardship over CI compared to that of Kalaris, It discusses how Angloton ran CI.

We should revicw this repart. [it is cited in Mangold, Cold Wardor, at 316.]

Bonner volume II:

The only significant reference in Bonner pertains to the final completion of the review of the Angleton

files. (Bonnier, p. I:114.)

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SECRET

• 1.

SECRET

DRAFT NOTES BY TIG FOR ASSASSINATION RECORDS REVIEW BOARD

JANUARX 15, 1997 -

Cleveland Cram

Untitled (History of the old Cl staff) (beginning to dismissal of Angleton)

11 Volumes (c. 1981)

(Albert S. Bonner

The Post -Angicion CI Staff

2 volumes (Tuly, 1993)

The ARRE requested access to any and all internal CLA histories of the CI staff for the purpose of

termining Whether they contain any intormation that would be useful for understanding th

assination of President Kennedy, including for example, the activities of Lee Harvey Oswald, i

tructure of Cl with respect to the comporients of the office that had responsibility for handling Oswald's

ilo at diffèrent times (particularly CI/SIG); and any aspoct of HTLINGUAL related to Oswald Because

the Agengy koops these historios closely held, it was bolloved that they are rolatively more likely to be

candid assessments of CI and its activities than one might obtain from more widely circulate documents.

I was providod complete socess to the entire 11 volumes of Cleveland Cram's (untitled) history of the old

firêt volume is hand dated (1981) and signed "Cleveland Cram." There are 1063 pages in the Cram

history. I was also provided complete accestto Al-Bonner, history of counterintelligence, which starts

with the departure of Angleton and continues to the present.

By all appearances, the histories appear to be relatively candid assessments of CL. I was able to idoatify

information that illuminated some of the latues of concern, and those will be outlined below. I identified

no Information tat would lead to any significant reevaluation of the role of CI in issues rolated to Oswald

or to the assassination. For the purpose of underitanding the assassination of the President or the other

insuor that come within the scope of the Roview Board'e mandato - other than the information identfied

below -I do not believe that the histories themseives, nor copies of any of the pages of the histories,

would provide any significant useful additional information that would enhance the understanding of the

assessination and I see no nood for any further information to be released from the histories." It le my

prillminary judgment that the page numbere highlighted below should be copied and atached to this

miniorandurn so that they can be made public

The information contained in the histories consists largely of case studies of important counterintelligence

activities. As a rulo, the histories do not describe the structure of the Cl offices, the personnel, the filing

system, or operations generally - although discussion of some af these issues arises. The principal

sources used by the authors consisted of documents from CI and interviews with officers. There are

relatively few footnotes and the citations are, accordingly, quite thin. There are, for example, only 8

footnotes in volume 1, which themselves are sketchy. The points that enhance the historical

undorstanding of the assassination are:

1. The introduction to Cram's history refers to an carlier CI history that was wrltten by a person

ho was provided only limited access to Angleton and the files. The author of the first histor

as given, for example, no access to any CI/SIG documents. Cram, accordingly, found th

history to bo unhelpful for understanding sensitive Cl activities. (Cram, p. I-2). There are

references to two additional documents that should be requested: the Goleniewski study on

Golitsyn (1975) and the John Hart study on Nosenko (called the "Monster Plot" ). (Charles

Battaglia, Staft Diroctor of the SSCI, told me that the ARRB should request the Monster Plot for

review under the JFK Act.)

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2.

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2. There is a reforence to & 1959 IG survey of CI, which should be requested for reviow. (See,

o.g., Стат 47, 56

3. The 1959 IG analyals stated the within the CI staft, "96 were professionals, 75 clerical and

four staff agents. The Staff also had one Headquartens contract agent, and several agents under

projocta." (Cram, 48).

4. There is a discussion of the Soccial Investigations Unit (circa 1959) and HTLINGUAL.

Copies of pages 49-51, and 55, which describe the STU and HITLINGUAL, should be evaluatod to

determine whether they contribute to understanding of relevant issuce.

S. Augleton was on sick leave from the agency from May, 1960 to 12 January 1961. During

ngleton's absence, S. Herman Hortön was Acting Chief and James Hunt was Acting Deput

Thief. Hunt subsequently became the regular deputy and served until 1969(Crain, 38)

6. Routine liaison with FBI was conducted by Jane Roman "from the late 1940s onward.

(Cram, 70). Sonsitive matters were handled, however, by Angleton or Hunt (Cram, 70) although

this practico "did not develop until the carly 1960% after the defoction of Golitsyn...." (Cram,

71).

7. Tho activites of CI/SIG aro described on pp, 144-45. Cram's cited sources are the 1955 and

1973 descriptions of its activites: It should be decided whether these two pages should be copied

for attachment to this memo.

I did not find that the references to Nosenko provided additional information that enhances the historical

understanding of the assassination. Mr. Angleton's testimony to the Church Committee is much more

illuminating in that regard.

The Bonner history, although after the period of Oswald and the assassination, discusses the issues of the

disposition of the files of James Jesus Angleton and a few other matters. Because of the spoculation about

tho contents of the files, discussions of their dispostion would deem to be relevant. The pertinent paints

are as follows:

Bonner volume I:

1. Bonner describes the CI staff, at the departure of Angleton, as being seriously unorganized

and as being intellectually detached from the work of the agency, (Bonnet, p. I:6-8.)

2. The Angleton affico files were voluminous and in disarray at the time of his doparture from

the Agency. It may be appropriate to make copies of pp. I:8 (last paragraph) up to the last

paragraph on p. 14, 53:57 to illustrate this,

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JAN 27 '97 10:26AM USGOVERNMENT

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3

that ho had spoken to Kalarie and Blee about this, and neither man could remember anything in

tho files excopt the Robert Kennody photographs.

4. The files revealed evidence that Angleton ran "countorintelligence [operations] abroad as

Chief of tho CI Stuff in the way in which the local station would be effectively cut out and

command channel and communications woüld run direct to counterintalligence hoadquarters in

Washington." (Bonner/p, T-22. (sic). I bellove onets saying the tollowing: Angleton ran

counterintolligence operations abroad as Chlef of the CI Stiff in fuch a way that local stations

would be affectively cut out; command channel and communications would rua direct to

counterintelligenco hoadquarters la Washington.

5. Bonnet cites two examplos where Angloton ran liaison with friendly governments without the

local station chiots being specifically aware of Angleton's activities. The station chiefs found this

"frustrating" Bonner pp. I23-26).

6. (Circa, 1976) "Handling FOLA requests for information concerning Lee Harvey Oswald]

required the creation of a tak force of 13 operations aficers and analysts, plus clerical personnol,

and their full-time efforts far over a monta Counship. 1:67.)

1. Discusson of activles of part of CI ital circa 1976: "Double Agent Branch - was charged

with the conduct of and coondination on double agent operations abroad. Since the vast majority

of DA cases were run by the US military services, the FBI, or in some instances-foreign-liaison

services, the branch was very heavily a coordinator rather than active runner of operations."

Bonnag p. 1:71).

8. Bonner refers to an August 1976 IG report sometimes called, the Freer report. It analyzes

Angleton'& stewardship over Cl compared to that of Kalaris, It discusses how Angleton ran Cl:

We should review this report. fit is cited in Mangold, Cold Warder, at 316.]

volumo Il:

The anly significant reference in Bonder pertains to the final completion of the review of the Angleton

files. (Bonner p. Il:114.)

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JAN 2? '97 10:27AM USGOVERNMENT

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13-24 JAN97

CHOLAT

DRAFT BY KMEC AND TIG FOR ASSASSINATION RECORDS REVIEW BOARD

REVIEW OF MANGOLD V. CIA FILES

TANUARY 13 and 24, 1997

The Mautold vi CLA POLA lidigation files consist of 7 redwelds, totalling approximately 18 inches. They

are organized by "tabe," which can be described as follows:

Tab A; copter of publinbod newspaper and magazine clippings that were released in full. I see no need to

designate any documente as assassination records from the set.

Tab B: coples of published newspaper articles, the texts of which have been released in full. The agency

did redact marginals, which consisted exclusively of file names and indicators. I see no need to

designate any documents as ascaleination records from the set

sents, about Angleton from the 1940s; including his carcer with OSS. I ses no neod to

designate auy documente dr assassination records from the set.

Tab D: docs:94-230, AR (unles already part of the collection)s Docs. 95 (24 Nov. 1918.

Memorandum JIA tertimony to BSCA).

On December 11, 1978, the D.C.-based law firm of Duncan,

Brown filed, a FOLA request on behalf of James Angleton in conjunction with his anticipated, testimony

before the ESCA: P

resumaby allrecords related to thie matter are AR and should be processed under the

JFK Ac See doc. nos. 109-116; 120, 121.

Includes fitnces reports (not designated). All of the fitness reports were reviewed to determino whether

they coutaired probative information

Stuaion ta Intellence on lues rélated to litelligence. I see no need to designate any documents as

assassination records from the set.

Tab F contalns documents préviously releasod to Henry Hurt In responso to a request for documents

concerning Alexandor Orlov. Most of the documents are newspaper articles and reprints of Senate

testimony. I see no need to designate any documents as assassination records from the set.

Tab & contains documents previously released to A. Doppeli (on behalf of The Readers Digest in

response to a request for documents concerning Nicholas Shadrin. These documents Include a specch by

Ci Turer, testimony by Capt. Nicolal Fedorovich Artamonov (Shadrin) before the Comittee on Un-

Imerican Actlylties (Sept 14, 1960), & transcript of a Panorama show on Artamonov, and extensive

orrespondence from his wite to varlous USG officials about. Shadrin's disappearance. I see no need to

designate any documents as assassination records from the set

The Denied Documents File contains no assassination records and probably no ElUs, with the possible

exception of the following recorde:

From Category VI: nos. 496, 498, 499, 500, 510

Doc, no. 496 in directly relevant for potential future leads. The document is a memorandu

dated February 7, 1974. Docs 498 ls of Interest regarding the Malla, Teamsters, and Hoffa

Doce 499-500, 510 regard allegations concerning assassination plots.

Otherwide, the Denied Documents file contains background information on JA, medical records, signed

Special Clearanco forms, administrative personnel information, information from denied FOLA requests,

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## Page 28

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and various memoranda relating to different conversations between JAi and Agency officers an a wide

vadety of Issues.

The gout Relena Fol, Os to, a atitiate person information, are moled tore ecso no

need to designate any documents as assassination records fom the set

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## Page 29

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MEMORANDUM

September 12, 1998

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS

RELEASE IN FULL

2000

To:

Laura Dank

Executive Director

CC:

From:

Bob Scared

CIA Team Leader

Michelle Combs Michelle Comba

Associate Director for Research and Review

Subject:

CIA-IR-04 Records of James Jesus Angleton

Many stories exist about the records created and maintained by James J. Angleton,

Chief of Counterintelligence, over his thirty-year reign and about their reported

destruction after his retirement. The Review Board asked the CLA to search for any

records maintained by Angleton still extant or to provide records showing the

destruction or incorporation of records indentified as Angleton's. In response, the

Directorate of Operations provided three memoranda dated November 23, 1976,

August 5, 1977, and November 29, 1979 that record the CIA's review of Angleton's

counterintelligence files. These memoranda show that after a review of the records, a

small percentage were incorporated into the files of the Directorate of Operations.

Other records, either duplicates or not worthy of retention, were destroyed. The review

process took several years to accomplish. The Directorate of Operations did not

provide destruction records to the Review Board. Thus, CIA reported that any extant

records, once known as Angleton's are no longer identifiable or retrievable as a separate

collection. The memoranda describing Angleton's files are being processed for the JFK

Collection at the National Archives. The CIA provided these three memoranda in a

classified form with their response to CIA-IR-04.

In addition, the Review Board staff examined the Mangold v. CIA Freedom of

Information Act files consisting of seven redwells totaling approximately 18 inches. The

edwells are organized by "tabs" which they can describe as follows:

Tab A: copies of published newspaper and magazine clippings that have been

released in full. No assassination records were designated.

Tab B: copies of published newspaper articles, the texts of which have been

released in full. No assassination records were designated.

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## Page 30

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2

Tab C: documents about Angleton from the 1940's, including his career with the

Office of Strategic Services (OSS). No assassination records were designated.

Tab D: on December 11, 1978, the Washington, DC-based law firm of Duncan,

Brown filed a Freedom of Information Act request on behalf of James Angleton in

conjunction with his anticipated testimony before the House Select Committee on

Assassinations. All records related to this matter, documents numbered 94-230, are

designated assassination records unless they are already a part of the CIA sequestered

collection. This redwell also contains Angleton's personnel evaluation reports. The

Review Board staff reviewed these reports for probative information but they were not

designated as assassination records.

Tab E: documents previously released to Edward j. Epstein in response to a

request for book reviews from CLA's internal journal Studies in Intelligence. These

documents are all copies of book reviews from Studies in Intelligence on issues related

to intelligence. No assassination records were designated.

Tab F: documents previously released to Henry Hurt in response to a request for

documents concerning Alexander Orlov. Most of the documents are newspaper articles

and reprints of Senate testimony. No assassination records were designated.

Tab G: documents previously released to A. Doppelt on behalf of The Reader's

Digest in response to a request for documents concerning Nicholas Shadrin. These

documents include a speech by Director of Central Intelligence Stansfield Turner,

testimony by Captain Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov (a pseudonym for Shadrin)

before the Committee on Un-American Activities on September 14, 1960, a transcript of

a Panorama Show on Artamonov, and extensive correspondence from his wife to

various U. S. Goverment officials about Shadrin's disappearance. No assassination

records were designated.

Finally, the Review Board staff examined the Denied Documents and Partial Releases

files for Mangold v. CIA. The Denied Documents file contains background information

n Angleton, medical records, signed Special Clearance forms, administrative personne

nformation, information from denied Freedom of Information Act requests, an

various memoranda relating to different conversations between Angleton and CLA

officers on a wide variety of issues. Documents numbered 496, 498, 499, 500, and 510

were designated assassination records unless they already exist in the CIA sequestered

collection.

s:. 14. •1

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130: 22"

3

The Partial Releases File contains additional records on Angleton such as Office of

Strategic Services background information, Office of Security files, administrative

personnel information, and medical records. No assassination records were designated.

e: combs \cia-ir04.wpd

File 4.20.1, 4.20.4, and 4.50.

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## Page 32

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C: ""ECTAL COT" TOTIONS

RELEASE IN FULL

2000

• in.

$ 24 August 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Laura Denk

Executive Director, ARRB

FROM:

SUBJECT:

J3 proJect Officer, HR/OIM

CIA-IR-04, Disposition of Angleton Files

1. The following is responsive to referent request.

2. The ARRB staff requested that the Agency provide an

explanation of the disposition of the files of James J.

Angleton, Chief, Counter-Intelligence Staff, following his

retirement from the Agency in 1975.

3. Research on the question determined the following.

After Angleton's departure, his files were incorporated

within the files of the CI

Staff and the Directorate of

Operations (DO).

Per three memoranda dated 23 November

1976, 5 August 1977, and 29 November 1979 respectively,

these files were reviewed and incorporated into the DO

records system. Items that were duplicates or not worthy of

retention were destroyed.

The memoranda describe the CI

file collection under Angleton and the process that was

followed to incorporate significant and non-duplicative

files into the records system.

Because the files

that were

once known as Angleton's have been dispersed within the DO

records, they are no longer identifiable as a collection.

4. The three memoranda are classified and have been

made attachments hereto.

They have been included within the

JFK collection for review, processing and release

National Archives.

J.

Barry Harrelson

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## Page 33

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1e1

ADMINISTRATTVE-TIVIERI

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS

ROE GANG IN FULL

2000

5 August 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM:

Leslie S. Raty

Deputy Chief, IMPG

SUBJECT: '

Processing of Documents by the Analysis Unit

in cI Start

1.

This will confirm the conclusions of a

discussion held on 26 July 1977 between the members of

the CI Staff Analysis Unit and the undersigned.

2.

It was the understanding of the ISS team

• that

surveyed the records of CI Staff that the Analysis Unit

would process information found in the Staff which had

not been previously processed into the records system.

It would compare files opened by CI Staff with files

already opened in the central system consolidating them

where duplication existed and registering unique files

centrally when warranted. It would

also process unique

documents found in the staff which had not been

previously processed. The survey team recognized,

however, that the CI Staff held literally thousands of

documents which were duplicates of documents already

processed

for the central system for other DDO

components.

These included non-record or carbon copies

DOC. MICRO. SER.

• DEC 16 1992.

-

MICROFILMED

Ims ASB

MINISTRATIVE- INTERNA

RECORD COPY!

/

USETONEY

Kx-04877

05 Aug17

678-673-001

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## Page 34

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ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONSK

of cables and dispatches and memorandums for which CI

Staff was only an information addressee.

These the

team did not believe warranted reprocessing.

these documents are an integral part of a

file being

integrated into or consolidated with a duplicate file

in the central system the documents should be retained •

in the official file but not be reprocessed

individually.

Leslie S. Raty

Distribution:

Orig - CI/RA

1

- IP/DMS

1 - IP/PB

- DC/IMPG

1

- CI/ RMO

2

ADHENISARATTYS INPERNAL USE QUEX

ae0"r.

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## Page 35

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM

SUBJECT

REFERENCE

CIA SOBOLAL COLLECTIONS

RELRASE AS SANITIZED

2 8 434 19Ÿ6

2000

Chief, Counterintelligence *aff

:

Charles A. Briggs

Chief,

Information Services Staff

:

CI Staff Records Study

:

Memorandum for the Record dated 4 February 1976,

Subject:

Meeting with Chief, Cl Staff, frOn

Chief,

Information Services Grou

A.

PURPOSE AND SCOPE

1. -

At the request of Chief, CI Staff, an ISS Analyst Team •

has worked with the CI Staff to:

Conduct a study of CI Staff's records holdings,

records keeping practices and problems.

Develop recommendations for bringing CI Staff's

twenty-five year accumulation of compartmented and sensitive

records

and files under control of the DDO Central Records

System.

c.

Design methods for recording sensitive information

in the DDO Central Records System to provide leads to CI

Staff's, holdings while providing appropriale protection.

Coordinate systems development activity needed to

help

CI Staff accomplish the recommended objectives.

2.

The ISS Team surveyed the CI Staff's records holdings

to determine hor these records relate to the DDO Central Records

System. All records being held at Headquarters were reviewed; a

sampling of the material being..held at the Records Center was

3.

The ISS team reviered current re...u. ie. Ming practini.

to measure records traffic and ascertain that material

was being

properly processed into the DDO Central Records System.

B. FINDINGS

1.

The records currently being maintained by CI Staff to

support its existing organization are generally well organized

and for the most part, properly maintained. There are cases where

3

SEGRET

E2 IMPDE

BX 060175

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## Page 36

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official files have not been opened and records are not being

processed into the DDO Central Records system because the material

is considered too sensitive.

Procedures for processing this

material into the records system are being developed.

2.

CI Staff has

accumulated several hundred feet of

files that contain a mixture of record and non-record material.

Many of these files are fragmented, reflecting previously divided

or parallel responsibilities among

CI Staff, and in some cases,

other DDO components.

There are many files, and many documents

within files, particularly CI Staff memoranda, codeword material,

sensitive liaison correspondence, etc., which

have never been

processed into the records system. Some of these files, especially

those being held at the Records Center, are ambiguously identified.

Some of the documents in these files are completely unrelated to the

subject of the file.

The files that have a continuing operational

value should be pulled together and the records in the files indexed

and abstracted in accordance with existing procedures.

The files

that no longer have an operational value should be retired in their

present form. While it is not necessary to perform in-depth indexing

of these dormant records, it is important that the names of people

with whom the Agency has

been operationally involved be identified

in the records system.

Files that contain background, reference,

and working papers are

being held but apparently are not being used.

The ISS recommendations for disposition of the files, including the

destruction of much material in accordance with approved records

schedules and the retirement or transfer of other holdings to

more appropriate components, are contained in Annex A.

3.

There are a

number of policy and management files

that shoul'd be established for the documents that reflect the

Staff's plans, policies and procedures.

The documents that provide

this type of information are currently buried in miscellaneous files

and cannot be retrieved, in an organized manner.

4.

There are several card indexes being held by CI Staff.

These indexes do not reflect current Staff needs nor do they

meet the indexing criteria established for the DDO Records System.

They are filled with extraneous information such as the names of

authors of Cl Staff papers.

neou/Research

CI/Research and Analysis Group maintains

an index of 270,000 3x5 cards that provides access by name

to its

extensive document holdings.

The cards in this index contain a

name and document reference but no biographic data to facilitate

identification.

Many of the cards should be purged, but there is

• Insufficient data on the cards themselves to make a judgment. These

indexes should not be integrated into the Records System. The names

can be indexed into the system directly from the documents that

warrant processing into the central system.

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## Page 37

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5.

Some material is considered too sensitive to be processed

by the Central Records System.

There are names

that cannot be

disclosed during a routine name trace because of the personality's

notoriety or operational significance.

There are documents which

require special handling to protect sensitive sources and the CI

Staff's interest in certain cases and subjects.

C. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

1. Annex A identifies the files being held in each CI Staff

office and the Records Center and contains

disposition.

recommendations for their

A considerable number of these files should be analyzed

to ensure that records are properly filed and identified in the DDO

Central Records System. Miscellaneous files such as background,

and working

papers that do not contain record material

need not be processed into the records system. CI Staff should review

them

to determine

their utility and destroy those that are no longer

used. The following recommendations on staffing, computer support,

and space should help to support integration of the appropriate

records into the central system. •

Staffing

(1) A project team consisting.of ISS personnel

should be established to analyze the record material and

perform the necessary codification, abstracting, indexing,

cross-referencing and cross-filing.

Experience

or training as

an ISS

analyst is a prerequisite for processing this materia.

The age and diversity of the material will present unusual

problens.

Experience with both the older records and the

facilities provided by the records system to support document

processing is desirable.

(2)

There is a total of 418

feet of record material

to be analyzed and it will take an estimated 11.9 man

• years

based on the following statistics.

# pages

* pages

per foot

per document

2000

2 1/2

* documents

analyzed per hour

7

(3) The project team should consist of four ISS

analysts.

Three of these analysts should process records

full time.

The fourth should be a senior analyst who can

supervise the project and process records half time. The

senior-analyst must have a practical knowledge of the

records system,

especially the older records, and the

C.I

Staff's past

records keeping practices.

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## Page 38

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b. Computer Support

(1) It is recommended that a Video Display Terminal

and a remote printer be installed in the CI Staff area. This

display terminal and associated printer will enable the analysts

to communicate directly with the computerized data base containing

and document status information. These terminal:

name, & used to process the old records into the system and to

perform current records processing needs.

(2)

It is recommended that two Four-Phase Data

Entry terminals be installed in the CI Staff area to allow analyst

abstract records.

It is estimated that

somewhat less than 50% of the documents to be analyzed will

require processing. Using an average of two index and one

dong at

abstract records per document, approximately 500,000 records

will have to be keyed.

Remote installation at the analysts!

working area will eliminate the need to mail

documents to IP

Electronic Data Input Section for processing.

c. Space

A secure area will be needed as work space for

the analysts, computer and data entry terminals, and document

storage.

The CI/Research and Analysis Group's vault, Room 2B-2‹

to accommodate a

team of

four analysts.

Its proximity to ODP's Special Computer

Center and IP/Electronic Data

Input Section facilitates computer

and data entry terminal installation.

Also, a large portion of

the files to be analyzed are already stored

in this area.

2.

The responsibility for maintenance of files that are

split between two or more CI Staff components should be assigned

to a single component and the material in the files consolidated.

The CI/RNO should establish Policy and Management files

paid a octe on the eard that is ento on 3

4.

The senior analyst who supervises the ISS team should

also serve permanently as the CI Staff analyst to perform four basic

functions:

Process CI material currently being handled by

the IP/Data Management Section.

b.

Ensure that files are properly opened and maintained.

c.

Serve as a records referent to provide advice on hon

sensitive cases and projects can

• be processed into the records

system in

a manner that protects the privacy of sources and

methods.

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## Page 39

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Analyze and process current as well as backlogged,

sensitive material, (including CI Operational letters

and

ZRTAFFY) into the Central Records System.

5.

A computerized

information system should be developed

to enable CI Staff to maintain a contral index of names that are

considered too sensitive to record in the DDO Central Records System.

Indexes to sensitive names are currently being held by individual

case officors and it is difficult to account for the names and the

documents they are identified in.

A compartnented computer file will

enable CI Staff to identify readily their sensitive nane holdings

and account for the associated documents.

requests to be compared with the sensitive name file. The fact that

another component or agency is conducting.a trace on

• a name considered

sensitive by CI Staff concerns the Staff.

This type of comparison

will provide a mechanism for alerting the Staff to outside interest.

CI Staff personnel can then take appropriate action (such as

contacting

the requester).

7.

All processing that involves these names must be done

in a manner that affords maximum security. Annex B contains a

proposal for developing a computerized system for handling these

sensitive names. However, ISS is considering other alternatives

for meeting this requirement.

D. ALTERNATIVES

1. A11

solutiohs to the CI Staff's record keeping problems

explored by the ISS team involved processing the appropriate

holdings into the DDO Central Records System. Failure to process

the material into the Central Records System

means running the

overlooked or brought forth piecemeal to

erode the Agency's credibility

or bring into question management's control over information

collection and exploitation. The

following solutions were explored:

The various card indexes being held by CI Staff

could be entered into the records system to provide access

to the CI files.

The files could continue to be held in

hard copy or converted to microform to reduce storage require-

ments.

However, these indexes do not contain the biographic.

data nocessary to facilitate positive identification during.

a name trace of the central system.

The files themselves

must also be reviewed

and processed to eliminate fragmentation,

incorrect titles and filing, etc.

98.?

SECRET

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## Page 40

13-00000

SECRET

E.

b:

The existing records could be sent to IP/Data Manage-

ment Section for processing into the records system. IP/DMS

has the records expertise and the computer terminals necessary

to support records processing.

This approach would necessitate

moving the records from Cl Staff to IP/DNS which could present

security problems.

It would also impede CI access to the

material while it

was being processed.

Because the IP/DMS

analysts have other work to perform, the CI material would

have a secondary priority which would defer the completion of

the project:

RECOMMENDATIONS

The ISS Team's recommendations are that:

CI Staff's record material should be integrated into the.

DDO Central Records System.

2.

A project team

should be established to expedite this

records integration.

3.

Computer terminals should be installed in CI Staff to

• facilitate records processing.

4.

Fragmented files should be consolidated and responsibilities

for them fixed.

5. Policy and management files should be opened.

б.:

A computer system should be developed to allow nanes

of sensitive personalities to be recorded in the central system

for access by authorized CI Staff personnel and to enable CI Staff

to monitor interest in these personalities.

Controls for sensitive

files should be developed on a case by case basis.

7. A schior ISS analyst should be assigned to Cl Staff to

handle current records processing needs.

8.

Although the ISS Team did not attempt to make recommen-

they did see teneed

the design of the DDO

Records System,

to improve the system's facilities for

handling sensitive material.

CI Staff is not the only component

that deals with sensitive material, and other components like

CI. Staff tend to control their sensitive material outside the

central system.

methods it protecting sensitive holings

be designed into a future records system.

1E/ Chariza 1. Briars

Charles A. Briggs

#8

JEGRET

..

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## Page 41

13-00000

Subject: CI Staff Records Study

Attachments:

1.

Annex A -

Survey of the Active Records of the

Counterintelligence Staff

Attachment 1:

Records requiring processing

Attachment 2:

Sensitive records requiring special

Attachment 3:

Recommendations for Policy and

Management files

2.

Annex ฿ - Computer system proposal for handling

CI Staff's sensitive names

DDO/ISS/SG/AD/fLEichorn):bg (19 November 1976) X7371

Distribution:

Original &

1

- C/CI

(w/att)

2

- C/ISS

(n/0

1

att)

- DC/ISS

1

(N/0

att)

- EPS/EG

(w/o

att)

- ISPG

(w/o att)

- C/IMG

(w/att)

- C/ IPG

(w/0 att)

- C/SG

(w/o att)

- C/SG/AD

(w/o att)

1

1

- Project File (FLE) (w/att)

- Reading Board (w/o att)

1 - EPS/EG (Mr. Glenn Brown) (i/o att)

9

EC R

E T

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## Page 42

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29 MorTI

• C1 140-79

...

NENOREA FOR: Chief, Infornation Hanagement Staff

ATTENTICK

: Chief, Operations Group

FROM

: David H. Blee

Chief, Counterintelligence Staff

SUBJECT

CI Staff Record Study

REFERENCE . : Information Services Staff Nemorandum,

76-572, dated 23 November 1976

1. The IMS Analyst Team assigned to CI Staff has

completed a little over two years of an estimated 3.4

years' assigiment to the Staff. During this period

much of the original 417 feet of Staff unprocessed

records have been reviewed by either the IMS Analjsts

or Cl Siaff personnel.

The Analysts recently completed

the processing of over 2,000 soft files which are the

responsibility of our Technical Branch. This task was

done in a nost expeditious manner.

We remain thankful

for the caliber of personnel you have been sending to

the Staff. (C)

2.

In order to more fully understand how best to

complete the remaining unprocessed records le have

compiled a listing of those records revilied by the ISS

in 1976, but not yet completed. He estimate

that 246 feet of files have been revieied by the Task

Force and another 81 feet by Cl Staff personnel, Leaving

oushl' 90 feet of unprocessed material vet to be revierec

and possibly incorporated into the Do Central Records

System.

such of the paper revieled by Cl Staff personel

neje found to be duplicate and vere destrojed. Those

documents thich had to be processed lere given to the

1'S Analysts for processing. (U)

-

REST

RARING NOTICE

10

DESHAONE GLUY. 015:458

DISEMICH E2190+39

Canessa:- 196:2-----

---

## Page 43

13-00000

- 2-

3.

The following files remain to be revieled and

possibly processed:

(5)

LOCATION

FILE DESCRIPTION

a. C/CI

Miscellaneous Policy,

FOOTAGE

6

Operational, and

Subject Files

b. C/CI

Operation CANARY/ -

Soviet Contacts

Mise Subject Files

c. C/C1

ZRTAFFY Chrono

d. C/CI

(Records

•

Center)

REMARKS

SURe COSINT-

initerate into

existing files.

Open Subjest

files.

Integrate

into 201 files.

Sensitive -

Restricted -

None in DO

Records System.

IMS Analyst

processing

required.

Some sensitive.

5 X 8 Card Index

in CI/A/IS.

c. CI/A/ IS

(Records

Center)

Vogel-Krogery-Bulik

11

Case - The X-Y-Z

Case - DENINDOW ProjeCt-

NOSETTER Case

BGHORNING

ZRPASSKEY Project •

IRCHEST Project •

PBHULKAGE PTOJECt

MIXE/PORTIO/HAITI

-

-

AHMILKY, Case -

ITKIN File

GROUNDOG Case

Covers period 1944-

1969.

22

£. C/CI/OG

-

Misc.

Liaison Files -

sensitive portions

of 201

and Operations

Files..

SIGNET

11

1

Review files.

Some material

integrate into

PMF

and other

official files.

Obtain file

number, register

стурі.

Index

individuals

involved in

case.

Processing

required.

---

## Page 44

13-00000

LOCATION

FILE DESCRIPTION

g. CI/A/T

COMINT Case Files.

FOOTAGE

2.

h. CI/A/1S

Project

9

REMARKS

Revier for

processing into

official

files.

Some official

documents.

Includes

approximately

10,000 5 × 8

index cards.

Official subject

file 100-006-113

already indexed

but should be

reviered for

future retention.

Request IMS

advice on how

to proceed with

this review.

i. CI/A/IS

Sensitive CIA/

LIAISON Files.

30

Contains

menojanda

Very Sensitive -

d'one in DO

Records System.

In addition to the above, a member of your

Staff has heen reviewing and consolidating the WHEAT)

Project.

when the review is completed we

hope to

receive a recommendation on whether or not this material

should be processed.

This project is sensitive and

contains some 35 feet of unprocessed paper. Present

plans,

agreed to by members of your Staff, call for the

same kind of revier of the GROUNDHOG) Material (Item

prior to processing by the IMS Analysis assigned lo the

Staff.

(S)

SEBUST

12

---

## Page 45

13-00000

5. Unfortunately the time required to complete

the above will have to be a rough estimate. At times

the Analysts have been able to move rapidly through

the files, while at other times they have run into

records problems and the work has

been slow.

They

have just begun the processing of Item i above.

This

is a

compartmented coderord

file and every document

will have to be revieled and most processed into the

DO Central Records System (STAR) •

le believe there

will be considerable indexing to

do and it may take

6 to 8 months to complete this project.

The time

remaining to complete everything will depend upon the

decision made concerning the WHEAT/ Project, the GROUNDHOG)

Project, and the LCHAYFONy Material: These three files

constitute 66 feet of paper.

We will work closely with

members of your Staff on these decisions. (S)

David H. Blee

DDO/C/CI/A/1S/Bradley:as

Distribution:

Orig. &

- Addressee

- C/C1 Chrono

1

- CI/A/IS Chrono

29 March 1979

R-9429

SEGIST

13

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