Originator: SSCIA
Document date: 09/17/1975
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

## Page 1

157-10014-10189.

JFK Assassinatior System

Identification l'orm

Agency Informition

Date:

7/7/2015

AGENCY: SSCIA

RECORD NUMBER :

157-10014-10189

RECORD SERIES :

MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

07-M-94

Document Information

ORIGINATOR: SSCIA

FROM:

TO :

TITLE:

DATE: 09/17/1975

PAGES:

9

SUBJECTS :

CIA

WATCH LIST

NSA

DOCUMENT TYPE: SUMMARY

CLASSIFICATION :

Unclassified

RESTRICTIONS:

1C

CURRENT STATUS :

Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW:

06/26/2000

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS:

v9.1

NH 47129

DocId: 32423577

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INTERVIEW AND MEET ING SUMMARY

Summary of an interview with Lou Tordella.

Interview took place in Carroll Arms, Foom

on September 17, 1975 at 2:30 pm.

Present

were Tordella, Ray Tadaki, who like Tordella

is from NSA, Britt Snider and Eric Rictard

from the Senate Select Committee.

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VII -B-4-b(USA) - 1-WTordelle)

o.iind"

INVENTORIED:

51/22

gN.

(NOTE: This summary of the discussion with Tordella

does not cover his comments concerning Project LPMEDLEY.

For information on that matter, see the summary by Britt

Snider.)

BACKGROUND

Tordella came to the Naval Security Group in 1942.

He remained there and then began with NSA at the time of its

creation in 1952. Tordella became Deputy Director of the

Agency on August 1, 1958, and retired from that position on

April 23, 1974.

Since that time he has been a consultant.

He claims that he now works a 30-hour week instead of 60-

hour week.

WATCH LIST

Tordella had little memory of the witch list and pre-1967.

He does not recall when the first watch list containing

U.S. citizens was established; he believed that it may have

been in response to negotiations with the Secret Service

following the assassination of Presiden: Kennedy. Tordella

stated that, at that time, the Secret Survice did ask NSA

to establish a watch list of "names" bur: that no specific

discussion took place as to whether or not these included

names of U.S. citizens. Tordella said he simply never saw

any meaningful distinction between placing U.S. names and

other names on the watch list. In fact. Tordella claims

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INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY

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that he never saw an actual list of any of the names until

sometime in the early 197Q's, probably 1972. Tordella did

not know whether the early watch list activity included

telephone monitoring, or only monitoring for printer traffic.

Tordella said that he believed that in this early

period, names were submitted to the watch list by the FBI,

the CIA and the Secret Service. He dirl not think that any

other agency had submitted names. He said it was possible

that the Office of Security might have submitted names,

but that he had no specific recollection of this. He stated:

"I would not have considered that a bac idea."

1967-1969

Tordella was shown the Yarborough cable which bore his

initials. He had no independent recollection of the communi-

cation, however. He stated that he dic not know whether this

cable was the first time that NSA was tasked to place rames

of U.S: citizens and groups associated with Black and anti-

war movements on the watch list. Similarly, he did not

know what; if anything, was included on the watch list for

the first time in response to the Yarborough cable.

Tordella

knew of no meetings that took place inside NSA, or with other

agencies, as a result of the telegram. In addition, he did

not know whether the ACSI had ever received any product from

NSA. In general, Tordella knew of no new measures taken by

• NSA because of the Yarborough communication.

Tordella was shown the roughly-typed 4-page document

containing a list of names that was

supplied to the Committee

by NSA. He said that he had never seen it before, but that

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INTERVIEW AND MEET ING SUMMARY

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or 9

it looked like an internal NSA working paper. He stated

that it was possible,

although he did not remember whether

this was the case, that this document had resulted from

• discussions between NSA and ACSI.

Tordella was shown the reply from lien. Carter in response

to the Yarborough telegram, which was sent out to all the

members of USIB. Although Tordella harl no independent re-

collection of this document, he surmised that the wide

distribution it was given did not impl! that Yarborough's

telegram had

also been sent to all the members of USIB.

Rather, he felt that Carter had sent out his wider response

in order to bring to the attention of the other members of

USIB this new and constructive project that Yarborough was

proposing.. That is, the wide disseminition of the reply

was meant as a "pat on the back" for Virborough.

AFTER I JULY 1969 (MINARET)

Tordella did not know who authored the MINARET charter.

He said that he did not

believe that he had seen it til after

it was issued, and in fact not until atout 1973. Tordella

stated that this charter was simply a way of making sure that

materials from an ongoing project were being properly con-

trolled, and receiving appropriately restricted distribution.

Tordella had no recollection of whe was consulted within

the National Security Agency in the preparation of the MINARET

charter, and did not know who suggested that it be prepared.

He doubted that anyone outside NSA had been consulted. He

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said that the primary motivation for the document was probable

FILE:

to avoid problems that would

arise if iny of the communica-

tions intercepted by NSA were forced to be produced in open

court.

Tordella was then asked when the first time was that

BNDD had first become involved in the watch list activity

with NSA. Tordella stated that he though it had been origi-

nated by William Sullivan of BNDD around 1973, and that this

NSA's contact with BNDD. Tordella was then shown the

memorandum that John Ingersoll sent to NSA concerning watch

list activity in 1970. Tordella said *hat he stood corrected

and that contacts with BNDD probably. bogan in 1969.

Tordella stated that in his opinion the monitoring on

behalf of BNDD was never connected with law enforcement.

However, he said that NSA at the time had no objection to

BNDD's using the materials produced by NSA for leads in

law enforcement investigations.

Tordella noted that in this

period, whenever the Justice Departmen: canvassed various

federal agencies in response to discovery motions on wire-

tapping in criminal cases, the Justice Department request

was worded in terms of "wire tapping," rather than electro-

nic surveillance. Therefore, NSA always denied that it had

engaged in any of the practices as to which the Justice

Department was inquiring. Later, the Justice Dept. modi-

fied the wording of its requests to included all electronic

surveillance. After this time, NSA began to answer the

relevant inquiries in the affirmative.

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INTERVIEW AND MEET ING SUMMARY

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entries

Tordella stated that he did not know how many total

of U.S. citizens were on the watch list from its

start to its termination. He also did not know what the

greatest number of U.S. citizens on th watch list at any

one time was. In fact, Tordella can only remember two

specific names from the watch list:

Jine Fonda and Mohammed

Ali.

FILE:

Tordella had no information on the amount of product that

was generated on an average month of what criteria were used

to decide which messages were worth processing.

While he

stated that he may have been shown the product at various

points, he had no recollection of this

he stated that:

"It just wasn't interesting enough to ring. to my attention."

He did state however that the human julgment of the analyst

probably determined what product was d: sseminated. Analysts

simply developed a "feel" for what a particular customer

wanted. Tordella however knew of no key individuals or

groups as to which all interceptions were always disseminated

He stated that an exception to his lacl: of recollection

might be that all messages to or from lanoi were disseminated

Tordella was

asked about how the footnotes

on the

MINARET product were compiled. While lordella knew nothing

of the role of NSA 's biographic files in this matter, he

stated that SIGINT analysts had discretion to call the FBI ,

CIA, or other agencies on their own for the purpose of ob-

taining identification information on persons mentioned in

SIGINT.

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Tordella stated that the distribution of the MINIRET

product to the agencies would not be limited to the pro-

duct concerning names submitted by the receiving agency.

Here again, the judgment of the analys: was key. The analyst

would have in mind the substantive regiirement that had

come in from the consumer agency (such as foreign connec-

tions to domestic demonstrations). Anything that the analysts

saw relevant to the substantive requirement would be sent

to the consumer agency.

Tordella stated that by the time of the institution of

Project MINIRET, the product was distributed only by courier.

In the early days of the watch list, i: is possible that the

product was electrically distributed.

Tordella could not remember the precise time when the

watch list activity was ceased. He though this took place

about the time of Attorney General Richardson's letter.

Subsequent to receiving that letter, Tordella said that

he had first refused to accept the name of the five people

who are presently on the watch list as Secret Service pro-

tectees.

However, after receiving the oral approval of the

Attorney General for these names, Tordella approved their

submission to the computer dictionary.

Tordella said he did not remember whether the idea of

terminating the watch list came from inside NSA or from the

Dept.. of Justice.

He said he did not now when the Dept.

of Justice first became aware of the witch list activity.

He said he thought the first time that Justice obtained this

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awareness was just before the issuance of Richardson's

letter.

Tordella could not recall any of the legal issues

of cases which were discussed in the curse of terminating

the watch list.

Tordella then recounted that he har! had a meeting

with

•Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger within about one

month of the time that Schlesinger

assumed that post.

Tordella thought that this meeting had taken place shortly

before the watch list activity had terminated in 1973..

'Schlesinger's response was simply to siy "I'm glad you told

me everything you are doing. Is that all?" Tordella replied

"Yes." No orders or instructions to NSA concerning the

watch list activity were issued as a Isult of the meeting.

Gen. Sam Phillips, then Director of NS, was also at the

meeting. No one else was present. Tordella stated that

after the meeting, he wrote a memo in 'onghand, which was

never typed. He stated that he had supplied this to NSA

and Ray Tadaki said that he had seen the memo.

Tadaki said

that he though that David Lowman had a copy of the memo.

Tordella then told Tadaki that if Lowmin had made any copies

of the memo, Tordella would slit Lowman's throat.

Tordella stated that no subsequent action of any kind

was

taken by NSA as a result of the Schlesinger meeting.

Tordella also stated that he thought that the President's

Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board know of the watch list

at some point, through routine briefings provided

to it by

NSA. Tordella could not remember any pecific

times when

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or 89

this knowledge had been imparted to PF AB, but he did not

remember anyone on that board having d sapproved the matter.

VOICE MONITORING

As stated earlier, Tordella did. no: remember when NSA

had first initiated voice monitoring a: the réquest of BNDD.

He did however remember the CIA takeover of this monitoring.

He said that CIA had initially undertaken this responsibility

from a station in Florida. However, Tordella did not know.

who.at NSA had requested CIA to take over this responsibility

of whether NSA had provided CIA with a list of names for moni

toring. Tordella said that when CIA discontinued its acti-

vity in this area, he was told the rea on, and in fact saw

the Houston memorandum on the lawfulness of this activity.

Tordella said he felt that Houston was simply using legal

matters as an excuse to disentangle the CIA from an expen-

sive operation.

He said that CIA offeed to put its per-

sonnel who had been involved in the project on NSA's bud-

get, but that NSA refused this offer. Tordella said that

he simply did not

read Houston's memo is stating that moni-

toring for law enforcement purposes wa:; unlawful, but rather

to state that CIA monitoring from within the United States

was unlawful.

Tordella said that he personally issued a verbal order

to stop the drug watch list activity after consulting with

the Director of NSA. He said his reason for this was that

he feared "uninformed public criticism".

FILE:

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Tordella did not know why NSA had continued to monitor

•U.S.-South American telephone calls after the termination.

of

the watch list. He did state, however, that this activity

was "utterly a waste of time" from the point of view of pro-

ductivity. Tordella stated, if fact, that he did not know

for sure that the monitoring had continued..

He stated that

if it had continued, it may have had other independent value.

Tordella was questioned about the destruction of documents

relating to the drug watch list. He stated that these

materials

were destroyed because no ont saw any future use

for them, and that "It was a nice tidy. little package.". Tor-

della did not know why DEA had sent its materials back to

NSA for destruction but guessed that it was probably be-

cause DEA had no secure facilities for destruction.

stated that this was not an unusual action.

Tordella stated that the lack of serialization on the

watch list product was designed as further protection in

case some of these materials had to be produced in open

court.

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