BOOK: COMMENTS ON BOOK V, SSC FINAL REPORT: THE INVESTIGATION OF THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY: PERFORMANCE OF THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES
Originator: CIA
From: S.D. BRECKINRIDGE
To: ACTING DDCI
Document date: 08/30/1977
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

## Page 1

1704-10422-10355

2022 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

CONFIDENTIAL

I Gi Subject - Oregenal

INSPECTOR CAMD

27-1908

3 0 AUG 1977

;

• MEMORANDUM FOR: Actiny Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM

: S. D. Breckinridga

Deputy Inspector General

SUBJECT

: Comments on Book V, SSC F.inal.. Report, The

Investigation of the Assassination of President

Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies

1. Forwarded herewith is the report of a review that Mr.

Knoche requested last fall.

The undersigned was designated. as

chairman or coordinator of an Agency working group that was to

conduct the study. It proved a more ambitious undertaking than

had been anticipated.

The extensive files of CI Staff on the

Warren Commission inquiry into President Kennedy's assassination

were reviewed in detail, as were the very large file holdings of

LA Division on its cuban operations during the period preceding

and tollowing the death of President Kennedy. The most pains-

taking review and analysis was required, and

the files proved to

be so extensive that the research became a major task.

The files

of the Office of Security and the Office of the Inspector General

presented a less formidable problem.

2. The attached report, with its annexes, is the formal

result of

If the attachments seem

bulky, it is

noted that additional back-up materials are being held for the

record in the event of future inquiry. These papers represent

the result of a conscientious and painstaking effort, conducted

with high standards of review and testing kept foremost in mind.

We believe that there is little likelihood of oversight or omission

in coverage; the work was so extensive and carefully done that we

feel there is small chance of surprises remaining in CIA files on

this subject.

In brief, we found that many of the presentations of

Book V of the Final Report of the Senate Select Committee were

based on incomplete information or distorted perceptions. While

the record of CIA was not perfect, the performance at the the fact

under the understanding of the period, seems reasonable.

remains that evidence of a Castro conspiracy to assassinate President

Kennedy still has not been discovered. The Warren Commission and

JUNEIIENTIAL

RETURN TO CIA

e: x112121

:: Background use only

Do Not Reproduce...

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CIA could well have perceived the usefulness. of inquiring into

specific sources of

possible provocation of Castro at the time of

the 1964 investigation; it is clear that the general consideration

was recognized by all concerned, and pursued, but the concept of

specific possible provocations was not. A review into such possi

bilities has now been conducted, with essentially negative results.

4. The report is not to be considered a report of the

Inspector General, as such, being the result of a representative

working group.

for internal CIA consumption only. It contains third agency reports,

liaison reports, and involves sources and methods materials, as well

as evaluation and comment of a nature that is advisory to manage-

ment. Any release of this report and its annexes outside the Agency,

even in classified form, would require considerable sanitization.

It is recommended that this report be held against future inquiries,

•providing a basis for appropriate responses, and that it not be

volunteered at this time.

Behind

S. D. Breckinridge

Attachment:

As Stated

DIG/S.D. Breckinridge:js (23 Aug 1977)

Distribution:

tribution Addressee w/Copy H1 of Attireta

1: - SA/DCI (Robert D. Williams) w/Copy #2 of Att:

- ADDO w/Copy #4 of Att.

- infer PuA copy 46 of, Hetu) w/Copy #5 of Att. Desta 8/180

- Chiet, LA w/Copy #6 of Att.

- Chief, Cl Staff w/Copy #7 of Att.

- D/OS w/Copy #8 of Att.

- IG (J.L. Leader) w/Copy #9 of Att.

it1-dlestd3/11/80

- DIG (S.D.B. Chrono) w/Copy #10 of Att.^

1 - IG Subject w/Original Copy of Att. (UNNUMBERED)

+2.

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Table of Contents

Summary of Findings

Tab A. Organization for and Conduct of the Review

Tab B. CIA Performance on the Inquiries

Tab C. CIA Operations Against Cuba

Tab D. AMLASH Operation

Tab E. Materials Forwarded to Warren Commission and FBI

Tab F. Mexico City Coverage of Oswald Visit

Tab G. Selected Newspaper Stories with Comments

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Live timiddle see

SUBJECT:

Comments on Book V of the Final Report of the U.S. Senate

Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with

Respect to Intelligence Activities

1.

Book V of the SSC Final Report, titled The Investigation

of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the

Intelligence Agencies, presents a number of issues that address themselves

to the conscience of the Agency. The criticisms of CIA are based on a

series of presentations of how various investigative leads were handled,

and on the non-reporting of various Agency operational activities that

the SSC Final Report judges to have been relevant to the Warren

Commission inquiry.

2. A stated thesis of the SSC Final Report is that the operations

of the intelligence agencies against Cuba exercised a negative influence

on the quality of their support for the Warren Commission investigation.

The following statements appear in the Report:

"It (the SSC Report) places particular

emphasis on the effect their Cuban opera-

tions seemed to have on the investigation."

Page 2.

"They (senior CIA officials) should have

realized that CIA operations against Cuba,

particularly operations involving the

assassination of Castro, needed to be con-

sidered in the investigation. Yet, they

directed their subordinates to conduct

an investigation without telling them of

these vital facts." Page 7.

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The significance of these statements, to the authors of the SSh

Report, is highlighted as follows:

"Certainly, concern with public reputation,

problems of coordination between agencies,

possible bureaucratic failure and embarrassment,

and the extreme compartmentation of knowledge

of sensitive operations may have contributed to

these shortcomings. But the possibility

exists that senior officials in both agencies

made conscious decisions not to disclose

potentially important information." Page 7.

A central feature of the rationale is the concept that if Castro

had learned of these activities it would have provoked him into

retaliation against President Kennedy. The SSC Final Report makes

it clear that it feels this theory should have been perceived and

accepted at the time by the intelligence agencies (not to mention

the Warren Commission) leading to a review of the various anti-Castro

programs to see what it might reveal.

The provocation theory, in the specific form postulated by the

SSC Final Report and the press, is of more recent vintage than the

perceptions that prevailed in 1964 when the Warren Commission was con-

ducting its investigation. There was a general concern in 1964 that

the USSR or Cuba might be behind the assassination of President

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469 A 7A

Kennedy.

This was based on a more broadly recognized understanding

of the tensions that existed between the Kennedy administration and the

Soviet and Cuban regimes. The Bay of Pigs in 1961 and the Cuban

Missile Crisis in 1962 must have appeared remarkably provocative to

Fidel Castro, along with the array of American anti-Cuban programs.

The humiliation of the USSR in having to retreat in the Cuban Missile

Crisis cannot be dismissed completely as to how it might have been

perceived by a foreign power as a provocation. To note these events

serves only to remind the reader of the tensions well recognized at

the time.

The SSC Final Report has elected to emphasize instead CIA

operational activity against Cuba as requiring specific attention.

This emphasis on CIA's Cuban operations as a possible source of

provocation of Castro represents the result of an evolution in percep-

tions.

In response to it we undertook an extensive review of the

various operational activities against Cuba and Castro.

Organization for the Review

As there are no persons now in CIA who were directly involved

at a senior level in the investigation of 1964, it was felt necessary

to organize a fresh approach to the matter. The persons who, in 1963

and 1964, knew the details of the various operational activities are

no longer available, for the most part, to provide the current and

detailed factual familiarity that existed at the time of the investi-

gations.

Primary reliance had to be placed instead on the records for

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• *

the period preceding President Kennedy's death and the period following

it.

It was determined that a special research effort would be mounted

to review those Agency files that might relate to this problem. The

organization for this research is summarized at Tab A of this paper.

It required not only the meticulous review of all Cuban operations,

it necessitated careful analysis of the content and nature of the oper-

ations with special attention to their security. Files relating to the

Warren Commission inquiry were reviewed as well as those relating to

plotting against Castro.

The results of the efforts of those assigned to the task are

contained in this covering report and in the separate annexes to it,

Tabs B through G.

CIA has now conducted such a review -- looking at "the other end"

of a possible chain of evidence, where things theoretically could have

started. This has produced no new evidence bearing on the assassination,

although it has produced the basis for new lines of speculation. In

fact, the review sometimes seemed to become a futile exercise in trying

to fit facts to the provocation theory rather than being able to

identify evidence actually bearing on the assassination of President

Kennedy. The emphasis sometimes became one of asking if this activity

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÷

(whichever was under review) could have provoked Castro to order the

assassination of President Kennedy, had he (Castro) learned of it.

The SSC, in its Final Report, fell into this very trap, trying to make

the AMLASH operation actually fit the theory for which the SSC's

presentation

seemed to be tailored. (See Tab D.)

We have looked at other operational activities with the SSC's

theory in mind, but have been unable to provide tangible substance

in support of the theory. In the final analysis the reviewer is

compelled to fall back on the evidence. A wide variety of theories

can be--as they have been--advanced in strident and challenging tones.

Not all of them are susceptible to conclusive answers; the primary

possibility of finding such answers was lost with the death of Lee

Harvey Oswald. The fact is that the Warren Commission considered the

possibility of Cuban or Soviet involvement, but could not find evi-

dence of it. Were it known at the time of the Warren Commission, it

would have been reported and dealt with then; that it was not is a

simple reflection of the fact that it did not exist at that time in

the minds of Americans knowledgeable on the subject. To hold dif-

ferently would be to accept uncritically a social paranoia often

prevalent today, which would hold that a significant number of

government employees could engage in such a well-disciplined con-

spiracy to suppress evidence.

5

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Operations Against Castro

The AMTRUNK Operation, starting in 1963, sought to develop a

capability to join dissident elements among the Cuban leadership into

a group that could oust the Castro regime. It was conceived by Cuban

exiles and sold to the Kennedy Administration, which assigned it to

CIA. The program was very slow in developing substance and momentum,

with little concrete progress during President Kennedy's life. At a

later date, in 1965, it was believed to be compromised and CIA withdrew

from its association; the key members were arrested later and tried in

Cuba. There are basic questions about the security of the activity

from

its

inception, due to the involvement of personalities who are

suspected of having pro-Cuban sympathies, including possibly having

been foreign agents. While the suspicions cannot be verified, the

reservations are sufficiently basic to consider the possibility that

Castro knew of the operation from its earliest days. Its long range

objectives--the overthrow of Castro and his regime--would have been an

irritant to Castro; its inability to develop any substance and momentum

until long after President Kennedy's death suggests that it is unlikely

that it, of itself, would have moved him at that time to resort to

assassination in retaliation.

This is discussed at Tab C.

Operation AMLASH centered on a high-level Cuban official, AMLASH/1,

who had expressed his opposition to Castro and to the Castro regime.

The SSC Final Report undertakes to demonstrate that the operation planned

Castro's assassination during the period preceding the murder of

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President Kennedy; to the contrary, a full review of the operation

shows that prior to the President's assassination not only had CIA

not agreed to give any support to AMLASH/1, but had rejected his

proposals to assassinate Castro. When evidence supporting this view

was offered the drafters of Book V of the SSC Final Report, it was

dismissed out of hand as false, despite confirming evidence. The SSC

Report, instead, having asserted that assassination was the character

of the operation at that time, then undertook to show that AMLASH/1

was at least indiscreet in his conduct, risking exposure of the plot.

Alternatively, it suggested that he may have been acting for Castro

as a provocateur, to lead the United States into a plot against

Castro's life which in turn was then to provide Castro with the

justification to order President Kennedy's assassination. In either

event, had Castro learned about the relationship between AMLASH/1 and

CIA he would have known only that there was an inconclusive association

that certainly had not progressed to the point that it constituted the

basis for the postulated provocation. This is discussed in some detail

at Tab D of this paper.

The SSC Final Report discounts (at page 68) the possibility that

actual plotting by CIA with the criminal syndicate served as a source

for provocation for Castro to have President Kennedy murdered. There

are new considerations that developed in the course of the present

review that throw more light on the role of the criminal syndicate,

but they do not provide a basis. for taking issue with the judgment of

the SSC Final Report, which dismissed the activity as having provided

Castro with the postulated provocation. This is discussed at Tab C.

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Items Selected by the SSC for Critical Comment

The SSC Final Report picked out a number of selected subjects for

treatment in support of its criticism of the thoroughness of the in-

vestigation by the intelligence agencies. One of these had to do with

the allegations in Mexico City by a man designated as "D". These al-

legations were demonstrated conclusively by the Warren Commission to

have been false; why they are discussed at all in the SSC Final Report

is a question in itself. In another instance, reference is made to a

reported five-hour delay of a Cubana flight from Mexico City, awaiting

arrival of a private aircraft with a mysterious passenger; not only

was the Cubana flight on the ground for four hours (in contrast to :the

alleged five hour delay in departure) it departed an hour before the

alleged arrival of the private aircraft. After CIA reported on a

Cuban-American who departed on another Cubana flight, the FBI investi-

gated the man extensively, as is revealed by the information available

for use in the SSC Final Report; a single report that caused him to be

dramatized is so full of errors as to be highly suspect, essentially

being placed in doubt by other evidence in the record. In another

instance considerable emphasis was given by the SSC Final Report to a

cable from the Mexico City Station, replying to a 23 November 1963 in-

quiry from CIA headquarters asking for reports on contacts with certain

named Soviets. The true name of AMLASH/1 was given in the Mexico City

reply, but not as having had contact with the Soviets -- which was the

purpose of the inquiry -- but as the subject of a meeting in December

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1960 between a functionary of the Cuban embassy with a soviet, concern-

ing a press conference to be held in Mexico City by AMLASH/l in February

and March 1961. AMLASH/l's name could have been omitted from the cable

altogether, so far as its having any relevance to the inquiry about

persons having contact with Soviets is concerned. In any event, the

meeting in December 1960 was prior to President Kennedy's inauguration,

which removes it yet further from any possible relevance to the subject

matter. It really is not difficult to understand why the reference to

AMLASH/l's name did not lead to detailed research about him. This is

discussed further at Tab D.

Conclusions

Basically, the research effort for the present paper produced two

general conclusions. First, the SSC Final Report contains numerous

factual errors, both in the extensive treatment of a selected opera-

tion (AMLASH) and in a number of separate incidents that it presents.

Second, while one can make the point in principle that the Warren

Commission could well have broadened its review to include the anti-

Cuban programs of the U.S. Government, in trying to make the case for

that concept Book V of the SSC Final Report went to such lengths in its

treatment as to detract from the point at hand. It is difficult to

characterize it more generously.

In a very real sense, the SSC Final Report has compounded the

problem of public perception. On a flawed presentation it has accused

the intelligence agencies of derelictions and worse. While it has

reinforced the public sense of unfinished business yet to be done, it

has so badly beclouded the issue as to have done a disservice to

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future attempts at objective and dispassionate inquiry.

While one can understand today why the Warren Commission limited

its inquiry to normal avenues of investigation, it would have served

to reinforce the credibility of its effort had it taken a broader

view of the matter. CIA, too, could have considered in specific

terms what most saw then in general terms--the possibility of Soviet

or Cuban involvement in the assassination because of tensions of

the time.

It is not enough to be able to point out erroneous

criticisms made today. The Agency should have taken broader -

initiatives then, as well. That CIA employees at the time felt--as

they obviously did--that the activities about which they knew had

no relevance to the Warren Commission inquiry does not take the place

of a record of conscious review. The present research effort has

undertaken to conduct such a review; it is noted that the findings

are essentially negative. However, it must be recognized that CIA

cannot be as confident of a cold trail in 1977 as it could have

been in 1964; this apparent fact will be noted by the critics of

the Agency, and by those who have found a career in the questions

already asked and yet to be asked about the assassination of

President Kennedy.

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ORGANIZATION FOR AND CONDUCT OF REVIEW

Tab A

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Organization for and Conduct of the Review

1. Many years have-passed since the inquiry by the Warren Com-

mission. The persons who were most familiar with the activities

of the Agency during the period preceding the death of President

Kennedy, and during the investigation of the Warren Commission, are

no longer in place in the same work. Some of the employees have

retired or have been transferred to other work. Some have died.

2. To respond to the questions raised in Book V of the SSC

Final Report, it was necessary to review old files and to assign to

this undertaking personnel not really familiar with the activities

of the Agency during a period of a dozen or more years before. A

study group was established to consider the size of the problem and

to develop a plan for conducting the review. Chaired by a repre-

sentative from the Office of the Inspector General, the group also

consisted of members from CI Staff, LA Division, and the Office of

Security. Terms of Reference for the review were agreed upon in

early August 1976. Points emphasized for the review, because of the

thrust of Book V of the SSC Final Report, were (1) to conduct a full

review of information and operations on the Cuban target to identify

any activity that might relate to the assassination of President Kennedy,

and (2) to review the possibility that CIA activities against Cuba

did, by their nature, cause Castro to order the assassination of

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President Kennedy. A copy of the Terms of Reference is attached.

3. The two main holdings of files for the period in question

were in LA Division and CI Staff, of the Directorate of Operations,

with less voluminous files being held in the Office of Security. and

the Office of the Inspector General. The organization for the review

of those files is described below.

4. LA Division: LA Division was the repository of the files

for Agency operations conducted against Cuba. These files were known

to be extensive. Under the Terms of Reference those files for the

period 1 January 1961 to 1 January 1965 were selected for review,

covering a three-year period prior to the death of President Kennedy

and the following year. A research group was formed composed of

five full-time researchers, a group leader and a task force supervisor.

An additional four researchers participated in different phases of

the research, which continued to mid-May 1977.

5. Reference to material for this research was obtained from

the LA Division registry, the Cuba Desk machine runs, and a special

comprehensive file listing prepared for this purpose by Information

Services Staff (ISS). On the basis of this it was originally believed

that material pertinent to the search would number approximately 900

operational folders, plus numerous related 201-files. It was later

determined, however, that a thorough review should include additional

operational and subject files which brought the total to well over

two thousand files.

In view of the date of the material, much of it,

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both operational and subject, had been retired to Archives at

10

Warrenton, Virginia,

The remainder is held at Headquarters in the

files or archival material of Information Processing Group. This

material is easily retrievable through the use of specific job

numbers and file reference numbers recorded and retained in the

LA Division research group files (too numerous to cite herein).

6. Following is a breakdown of the types and numbers of files

reviewed, criteria employed in the research, the findings, and

organization of the material:

a. Types and Number of Files Reviewed

(1) Operational

1,729

601 with findings and 1,128

with no findings)

(2) Subject Files

547

186 with findings and 361

with no findings)

(3) Cuba Policy Files

(4)

Chief, WH Division Chrono Files

(Task Force W Chronos)

(5) Official 201 Dossiers

101

Total

37

100-plus

2,514

b. Criteria Used in the Research

As a guide the research group followed the Terms of

Reference referred to above. In addition to the Terms. of

Reference, the group remained alert to other items of interest

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brought to its attention by the IG Staff, on an ad hoc basis,

and to additional questions raised in the course of the

study. A name trace was always run, and/or the 201-file was

reviewed, if available, on any individual allegedly involved

in an assassination plot against President Kennedy or Fidel

Castro.

This task was made somewhat easier as the result of

a memorandum prepared by the Cuba Desk, in August 1975,

based on traces of the names in the so-called Black Book -

that Fidel Castro passed to Senator McGovern, which dealt

with individuals the Cubans alleged were involved in assassi-

nation attempts against Castro.

c. Findings and Organization of the Findings

Each researcher submitted a draft paper noting the

subject of the folder(s) reviewed, a brief description of the

activity, and a copy of those documents) or findings which

contained information believed to be pertinent to the review.

Also included were job numbers, official file numbers,

inclusive dates of material researched, and the number of

volumes reviewed. Beginning in January 1977, at the request

of the IG Staff, the researchers also began noting FBI and/or

other government agencies knowledge of information, to the

extent recorded in Agency files. Separate finished memoranda

were prepared, on the basis of these data, including the

heading Findings. This heading lists the specific document

numbers) and other pertinent data, and a few lines providing

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the gist of the documents) for purpose of easy and quick

reference. These memoranda, with a copy of the document(s)

attached, are filed in alphabetical order, by project and

subject, in hard-back green folders as part of the official

LA Division research group files under the official classi-

fication number 019-604-001 (Volumes XI through XX). Also

included in the records are two folders (Volumes IX and X)

containing 1,439 draft memoranda with negative findings. -

These records are restricted in LA Division.

7. The LA Division research effort proved to be far more

complex than originally estimated. Research continued to lead to new

files, and the requirements for meticulous analysis and correlation

of material further extended the time required to complete the under-

taking.

By completing this exhaustive review of files the Agency

can speak with considerable confidence as to what the records of

Cuban operations show, so far as they relate to the question of the

death of President Kennedy.

8. CI Staff: CI Staff assigned one senior officer to review

its files on Lee Harvey Oswald, working under the general Terms of

Reference referred to above, and also to generate papers on points

not covered by the guidelines but pertinent to the general subject.

Since December 1963, the CI Staff has served as the point

of record for all questions relating to Lee Harvey Oswald and the

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.:

Agency's role in the investigation conducted by the Warren Com-

mission.

The so-called "Oswald File" now fills 57 volumes. comprising

some 142 file folders and portfolios. In addition, the Staff has

accumulated some 50 supplemental files including the master copy

of those documents released under provisions of the FOIA to the public

in March 1976 (first series) and those documents (second series)

released in September 1976 and March 1977.

10. By necessity the documents in the file are held in chrono-

logical order; however, the file has become much more than just a

chronological file on Lee Harvey Oswald. It has now become the

Agency's central repository for information and documentation that

it holds on:

a. The life of Harvey Oswald;

b. The Agency's role in the investigation conducted

by the Warren Commission, 1963--1964;

c.

The testimony by various Agency officers before

the several commissions and committees set up to review

the validity of previous investigations.

(NB: It should

be pointed out that this portion of this file is not

complete ; and

d.

The point of record for Agency action taken in

response to requests submitted to the Agency under pro-

visions of the Freedom of Information Act.

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11. In order to come to grips with the voluminous material in

the Oswald files, it soon became obvious that, in'order to be in

a position to respond effectively and expeditiously to the Terms of

Reference and to allegations and accusations in Book V of the SSC

Final Report, it would be necessary to copy much of the file and to

place these copies in folders set up according to general and specific

subjects.

In order to check charges that this Agency had withheld

information from the FBI and the Warren Commission, and that there

was "no evidence that the FBI asked the Agency to conduct an investi-

gation or gather information," the following files were set up:

a .

Correspondence from the Warren Commission;

b. Correspondence from the Agency to the Warren

Commission;

c. Agency disseminations to the Intelligence Community,

particularly the FBI;

d. Correspondence from the FBI to the Agency requesting

assistance and information;

Chronological summary of information on and actions

taken relating to Silvia Tirado de DURAN; and

f. Chronological summary of information on and actions

taken relating to Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte.

These files provided a basis for checking statements included in the

SSC Final Report and to determine what the Agency actually did do

in relation to the Warren Commission inquiry.

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12. The approach to the problem at hand was to assemble by

chronological and statistical compilations the Agency's record on

the matter, (a) its initiation of collection requirements for infor-

mation, and the papers it originated on various aspects of the

investigation for passage to the Intelligence Community, particularly

the FBI and the Warren Commission, and (b) its response to require-

ments and requests levied upon it by the Intelligence Community and

the Warren Commission. Certain parts of the record were summarized

to record what actually happened in those instances in which it

differs from representations in the SSC Report.

13. Office of Security: The Office of Security assigned one

officer to identify material in its records believed to have some

possible relation to the Kennedy assassination. During the course of

this review, approximately fifty subject files were identified as

containing material of some relevance. This material amounted to

the equivalent of approximately two safe drawers. The files reviewed

included volumes on Lee Harvey Oswald, AMLASH, various individuals

connected with the Criminal Underworld Plot, and a collection of

files containing the results of name traces conducted at the time

of the "Garrison Investigation."

14. Office of the Inspector General: The Office of the Inspector

General held the report that it produced in 1967 on plotting against

Castro,

as well as related materials accumulated subsequently. It

also received files developed in 1973 in response to a 9 May 1973

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request by the DCI to Agency employees concerning questionable

activities. Two members of the Inspection Staff were assigned to

the project, responsible for overall coordination of the research

effort. Additionally, because of the emphasis given to events in

Mexico by Book V of the SSC Final Report, the Office of the Inspector

General employed on contract a retired employee who had served as

a special case officer in Mexico City during the period preceding

President Kennedy's death and during the investigation afterwards.

The retired employee recalled for this task conducted an extensive

review of all Mexico City files and materials held in Headquarters

or retired to Archives. The result of her research is found in

Tabs B and F.

15. The file holdings in the Office of the Inpsector General

are less than one safe drawer. However, the AMLASH file, held by

LA Division/Directorate of Operations, was reviewed by a member of

the Office of the Inspector General, as were parts of the AMTRUNK

file, also held by LA Division. These two activities are discussed

in Annexes D and C, respectively.

16.

There were a limited number of interviews to clarify

specific points.

***** * * *

Detailed records of the research undertaken are held in the

respective components participating in this effort. Selected back-

up material for the final report is also held in the Office of the

Inspector General.

CONFIDENTIAL

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!

SECRET

1 AUG 1975

TERMS OF REFERENCE

FOR REVIEW OF

ISSUES RAISED IN

BOOK V, SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

FINAL REPORT

1. The Schweiker Subcommittee has two basic theses--

(1) the general idea that the intelligence community--primarily

CIA and FBI--did not undertake a full review of the possibility

of Cuban involvement in the assassination of President Kennedy,

and (2) the idea that CIA activities against Cuba were provocative

and may have led to the assassination of President Kennedy. The

former by itself is not too difficult a problem to address. Either

there was or there was not an extensive intelligence collection

program to ascertain all possible information on the subject.

Either there was or there was not an exhaustive review of all

information in the Agency that might in some way relate to this

question. Either the Agency did or did not report what it had

to the Warren Commission for further inquiry and review.

2. The second portion of the Subcommittee's presentation

is somewhat more diffuse and complex. By way of general back-

ground it summarizes Agency and U.S. operations against Castro's

Cuba. There is an inference--almost subliminal--that these

general activities were provocative. More specific, however,

is the detailed treatment of the AMLASH operation as an activity

that the report suggests could have provoked Castro into retaliatory

action against President Kennedy.

The failure of CIA to report

this to the Warren Commission, in the context of the provocation

theory, is advanced as a failure to report relevant information.

Detailed treatment of the operation is given in the report in

support of the thesis.

3E32E1

Maor Clared

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3.. The issue of operational activity that could have provoked

a retaliatory strike by Castro against President Kennedy capnot

be restricted to the AMLASH operation. In itself it may be one of

the poorer examples of something that might have proven so pro-

vocative as to stimulate a retaliatory strike by Castro ägainst

President Kennedy. There were other operations with the un-

qualified objective of killing Castro. These contrast with the

AMLASH affair in which the agreed purpose was not so clear and

in which the sequence of events throws considerable doubt on the

Subcommittee's treatment of the activity in this respect.

a. The following questions are intended to serve as

a guide in a records review of the extent of the Agency's

investigation prior to the end of the Warren Commission.

(1) What collection requirements were issued to

the field with regard to Kennedy's assassination?

(2) What follow-up of these requirements was

there during 1964?

(3) What form did the follow-up take?

(1) Identify and describe the records with regard

to this activity.

(5) What reporting was there from the field in

response to Headquarters' requirements?

(6) What dissemination and review was this

reporting given?

(7) Was dissemination made on this reporting to

the CI Staff?

(8) Was this reporting given to the Warren Commission?

(9) What review of Headquarters' material was

ordered through 1964?

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SEMICI

(

(10) What werethe parameters of these instructions?

(11) What responses were there and where are they?

(12) What evidence is there that the "provocation"

theory was considered during the Warren Commission

enquiries, either in CIA or the Warren Commission?

(13) What action was taken with reference to this

concept as a basis for reviewing relating Agency programs?

(14) What records are there on this and where are they?

(15) Were there any efforts made to develop an

Oswald/Cuban connection?

(16) What form did they take?

-

(17) What exchanges were there with the FBI on this

subject?

(18)

. What action developed from these exchanges?

(19) What records are there on these exchanges and

where are they?

(20) To what extent were elements of the Agency

other than the CI Staff and LA Division involved in in-

vestigating the assassination during the Warren Commission

tenure?

(21) What is the total CLA information on the two

flights from Mexico City to Havana?

(22) What was done at the time to develop further

information on this matter?

(23) Can further information be acquired on this

matter now?

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is trie

(24) What is the total CIA information on "D'?

(25)

Is further information on "D" needed in view

of the SSC Subcommittee reference to it?

(26) What information does CIA have on Oswald

FPCC relations?

(27)

What does CIA know about the New Orleans

training activity and was anything provided on this to

the Warren Commission?

(28) What is the total CIA information on "A"?

(29) Who is the man photographed in Mexico City?

(30) What is the CIA information on the 4 December

1963 report of an agent meeting Oswald in Cuba?

(31) What is the total CIA information on Cuban

assassination policies and programs up to November 22,

1963?

(32) What is the total CIA information on Castro's

7 September 1963 statements re retribution?

(33) Does the testimony before the SSC of CIA

employees contain anything on the abové questions?

If so, what?

On the subject of possible provocation for the

assassination plots against Castro, each of the known activities

should be reviewed to the extent possible in order to determine

any additional relevant information on this plot.

(1) What is the total information on the plots involving

the criminal syndicates?

(2) Who was witting of the planning for the syndicate

operation?

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(3) Are there current considerations on the syndicate

operation not faced previously (e.g., a former Office

of Security officer may have knowledge that was not

surfaced in the interviews with him with the SSC or

Agency personnel. Additionally, a former LA Division

career agent may have some insights that could throw

light on one of the operations).

(4) There are a couple of cases based on agent

traffic (reported to the SSC during the study of alleged

assassination plots) indicating plans during the Bay of

Pigs period to shoot Castro.

What is the total CIA

information on these?

(5) What is the significance on the subject of

provocation in the book given Senator McGovern by

Castro?

(6) While the AMLASH operation is subject to fairly

detailed reconstruction from a very complete record,

there are points that should be addressed particularly,

because of their treatment in the SSC Subcommittee report.

For instance, is there significance in the fact that CIA

contacted AMLASH/1 in September 1963 after such a

long time? Or was it simply that this was the first time

the opportunity had presented itself since earlier meetings?

(7) Just what did the case officer tell AMLASH/1

when making plans for the 22 November meeting?

(8) What was the security of the relationship with

AMLASH/1 during the period preceding the assassination

of President Kennedy?

(9) In what time frame was Fitzgerald's Executive

Officer speaking when he stated his judgment that the

AMLASH/1 operation was an assassination plot?

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' c.

What other action might CIA have taken in connection

with the investigation? An effort should be made to list

these, including consultation with surviving officials to

determine not only what they considered the requirement

at the time, but what was omitted and why.

4. In conclusion, these "Terms of Reference" undertake

to address the entire question of possible provocation of U.S.

policy and CIA programs in the period preceding the assassination

of President Kennedy. An aspect of this is the SSC Subcommittee's

apparent view that CIA assassination plotting could have instigated

a retaliatory strike by Castro against President Kennedy, which,

therefore, should have been reported to the Warren Commission.

Just as importantly, the final paper should reflect findings in the

area of what the Agency did in response to Warren Commission

requirements (both stated by the Warren Commission and those.

that could have been conceived by the Agency), and how it pursued

these lines of action and reported them to the Commission. This

will include consideration of specific new and unanswered questions

raised in the Schweiker report

S. D. Breckinridge

0/Inspector General

P. (Jall

Robert Wall

CI Staff

de.C. Allanet

William Sturbitts

LA Division

O/Security

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CIA PERFORMANCE ON

THE INQUIRIES

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CONFIDENTIAL

CIA's Performance on the Inquiries

Book V of the SSC Final Report challenges the performance of the

intelligence agencies during the Warren Commission inquiry, empha-

sizing things that it feels should have been done but which it asserts

were not.

It is correct to say that CIA has not produced evidence or

analysis that addresses every theory that has been advanced over the

years. A record of the volume of CIA reporting to the FBI and the

Warren Commission is at Tab E. As a practical consideration, évery

theoretical question that can be conceived cannot be answered con-

clusively; there simply may be no evidence at all, or if there is

evidence somewhere it may not be accessible. The issue is what the

intelligence agencies did - in the present instance, what was the

performance of CIA -- with Book V of the SSC Final Report portraying

a patternof neglect or avoidance that is not supported by the record.

The SSC Final Report offers a number of separate subjects in

support of its case:

a. It refers to an allegation by a person identified as

"D" (pages 28-30, 41-42 and 102-103) that he overheard and

saw Oswald being handed money in Mexico City for the purpose

of assassinating President Kennedy; this was proven false, both

by polygraph and by determining that Oswald was in New Orleans

instead of Mexico City at the time the incident was supposed to

have occurred. This subject is treated in a confusing and in-

conclusive manner in the SSC Final Report.

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b. A considerable portion of the Report is given to the

AMLASH operation.

The operation' is described inaccurately.

The Report assigns it characteristics that it did not have during

the period preceding the assassination of President Kennedy, in

order to support the SSC view that it should have been reported

to the Warren Commission. This is treated in some detail at Tab D

of this report.

Space is devoted to two aircraft flights from Mexico

City to Havana, on 22 November and 27 November (see pages 60-

63). The first of these flights, as described in the SSC Report,

is based on an inaccurate report about a delay of the 22 November

flight to meet a mysterious private aircraft; the correct story

removes the basis for the inferences of the SSC version. The

second of these flights had to do with a man whose significance

arises from a patently erroneous report; the FBI investigated him

thoroughly, as is apparent from the condensed summary in the SSC

Final Report.

These examples illustrate the problem of commenting on the SSC Final

Report, the question becoming that of how to deal with Congressional

criticism presented on the basis of inaccurate factual perceptions.

To treat the problem it was felt necessary to review the record in-depth

and to report the findings, whatever they are.

Recognizing the possibility of error or oversight in 1964--both

on the part of CIA and the Warren Cormission--consideration was given

to courses of action CIA might have taken to throw some light on the

2

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• .

CONniverne

questions as understood at the time, as well as considering those "

questions that have developed since then. What would be the areas of

inquiry? Oswald was an obvious subject of investigation.

Oswald was known to have been out of the country twice subsequent

to his return to private life from the Marine Corps in September 1959.

These overseas adventures were appropriate for CIA attention. The

first of these overseas trips was when he went to the Soviet Union in

October 1959 from which he returned in June 1962. The second of these

trips was when he went to Mexico City in late September 1963, fram

which he returned in early October 1963.

In addition to these two areas of obvious specific inquiry for CIA,

there is the problem of general foreign intelligence collection that

might in some way produce information on the subject. The SSC Final

Report adds to these considerations operations being conducted by CIA

as part of a general U.S. program against the Castro regime. These

four general areas of inquiry are covered below.

I. Travel to and from the USSR 1959-1962

On 26 November 1963 a cable was sent to Paris, Rome, Madrid,

[Copenhagen, slo, HelSfhki.] Brussels, The Hague, London, and Ottawa

giving biographic information on Lee Harvey Oswald. It noted his

discharge from the Marine Corps in September 1959 and his travel to

the Soviet Union in October 1959, including sketchy details as to his

employment and marriage while in the USSR.

The cable requested:

"any scrap information which bears on President's

assassination...."

--

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*

On 27 November the various addressee stations replied, with :

14-1

Helsinki)and London providing additional details on the travel of

Oswald to the USSR. Additionally, London reported that a British

journalist claimed that during his own imprisonment in Cuba in 1959

there was a U.S. gangster there by the name of Santos, who was living

in luxury in jail because he could not return to the U.S.; the source

stated that Santos was "visited frequently by another American

gangster named 'Ruby'." (See pages 24--25, Tab C.)

Also on 27 November Ottawa reported the "delight" of the Cuban

Embassy staff over the assassination of President Kennedy although

the staff was instructed to "cease looking happy in public," in

conformance with instructions from Cuba to "govern their actions by

official attitude of Gort to which they accredited." Lostol on the

same date, reported that the Soviets were shocked, blaming the

assassination on extreme right-wing elements. Otherwise, the initial

responses produced no other information.

On 29 November The Hague and Frankfurt were queried about Oswald's

travel back from the USSR. This query was followed on 2 December by

a similar cable to Berlin, Frankfurt, Bonn and The Hague. Various

reporting produced details about the travel of Oswald and his wife

from the USSR through Germany and the Netherlands enroute to the

United States in June 1962.

The other stations involved in these inquiries had no traces or

information on Oswald; liaison services were also queried without

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CINFIOENZAL

detailed results although there were some technical operations that

produced peripheral information about the reactions of various groups

under intelligence surveillance. Considerable exchanges were held

with the Warren Commission on Oswald's Soviet record and its possible

significance.

No evidence was found tying the Soviet Union to Oswald's

assassination of President Kennedy. Book V of the SSC Final Report,

in not criticising the Agency's performance in this aspect of the

investigation, seems to have accepted it as adequate, and it will

-

not be detailed here.

II. Oswald Mexico Visit -- September-October 1963

The visit by Oswald to Mexico City, in his attempt to get

visas for travel to the Soviet Union and Cuba, has received extensive

attention. The details concerning the coverage of Oswald's visit to

Mexico is treated in another annex to this paper (Tab F): The concern

felt by all initially for the possible significance of Oswald's visit,

and his contacts with the Cuban and Soviet embassies, was obvious at

the time. The following statement is in a cable to Mexico City on

28 November 1963:

"We have by no means excluded the possibility

that other as yet unknown persons may have

been involved or even that other powers may

have played a role. Please continue all your

coverage of Soviet and Cuban installations

and your liaison with Mexicans."

OONFDEINILL

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The allegations made by "D," about having seen Oswald taking money

from Cubans in the Cuban embassy in Mexico City, received intensive

attention from CIA and the FBI, working together closely on the matter,

and with the Mexican authorities. This was demonstrated conclusively

to have been a false allegation. Oswald was in New Orleans at the

time of the reported incident, and the person making the allegations

was demonstrated by polygraph to have been lying. After the allegations

by "D" had been demonstrated to be false, Headquarters made the following

statement to the Mexico City Station on 1 December 1963:

-

"Pls continue to follow all leads and tips.

The question of whether Oswald acted solely

on his own has still not been finally resolved."

Again, on 13 December 1963 the Mexico City Station was cabled as

follows:

"Plse continue watch for Soviet or Cuban reaction

to investigation of assassination, evidence

of their complicity, signs they putting out

propaganda about case. FYI only, Soviet Intel

in India had letters sent to [U.S. Government]

leaders demanding full investigation of case."

On 17 December 1963 Headquarters forwarded a dispatch to the Mexico

City Station stated as follows:

"...Mexico City has been the only major

overseas reporter in the case. While this

partly dictated by the facts of Lee Oswald's

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life, we have not overlooked the really out-

standing performance of Mexico City's major

assets and the speed, precision, and perception

with which the data was forwarded. Here it was

relayed within minutes to the White House,

[Department of State] and [the FBI].

"Your LIENVOY data, the statements of Silvia

DURAN, and your analyses were major factors in

the quick clarification of the case, blanking

out the really ominous spectre of foreign backing."-

Essentially, Oswald's visit to Mexico City was investigated as

thoroughly as possible, producing no evidence there of Soviet or

Cuban complicity in the assassination of President Kennedy. If anything,

events during Oswald's visit there are more subject to being seen as

counter to such a possibility, given his troubles with both Cubans

and Soviets. We do not offer this thought as the final word, but more

simply that if it bears on the subject at all it is inconsistent with

speculation that he had some special relationship with either nation.

It is noted that various allegations have been made in the press

in connection with the House Select Committee on Assassinations

inquiry concerning CIA information regarding Oswald's Mexico visit;

these are commented on at Tab G.

III. General Collection Requirements

On 22 November 1963 all CIA stations abroad received a cable

from Headquarters with the following statement:

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CONAIDENTIAL

"Tragic death of President Kennedy requires all

of us to look sharp for any unusual intelligence

developments. Although we have no reason to

expect anything of a particular military nature,

all hands should be on the quick alert at least

for the next few days while the new President

takes over the reins."

It is appropriate at this point to observe the general reaction

to be expected from such a communication. Without any leads, other

than those arising from Oswald's identification, the requirements to

field stations were necessarily general. General reporting can be

stimulated by general requests, if there is something to report, and

this is what was undertaken. In addition, in any event, intelligence

assets and liaison services overseas are quick to realize the signifi-

cance of important information and will report it on their own initiative.

It is significant, in the light of these considerations, that there has

been the most limited reporting on the subject. Were there relevant

or significant information on the subject it would have been reported

either in responses to the expression of general interest, or

spontaneously, if such information was known to Agency sources.

If one believes that there was a conspiracy, with Oswald involved,

one must accept the likelihood that his fellow conspirators would not

have shared their knowledge beyond the narrow circle of thase directly

involved. Conversely, if there were no conspiracy, there obviously

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONADENTIAL

would be nothing to report in the first place. The absence of concrete

reporting seems to serve, regardless of which is the case, as the basis

for the apparent SSC view that no collection effort was undertaken.

As has been noted above, there were initial CIA collection re-

quirements to the field. What they could be realistically expected to

produce must be related to whether there was any information to collect

at all, and if so whether it was accessible. The requirements were issued,

but in retrospect it is doubtful that they could produce much of the who-

what-where-when-how information that typifies intelligence collection

reporting. A reflection of the basic nature of the problem is found in

the Headquarters cable to Mexico City on 17 December 1963 (note above)

which contains the following comment about the limited reporting from

other stations:

". . . this partly dictated by the facts of Lee

Oswald's life. .

• "

The SSC Final Report speaks in rather unqualified terms at page 10

about the resources of the intelligence agencies, including a description

of "an extensive intelligence network in Cuba," suggesting that it was

only necessary to ask to get.

It is correct to say that there were

sources in Cuba able to report on events, such as troop movements, but

there were no penetrations of Castro's inner circle, where any infor-

mation on the subject in question would exist. The distinction apparently

was missed -- or ignored -- by the authors of the SSC Final Report. As

stated by the Miami Chief of Station, quoted at page 58 of the SSC Report:

"Now if you are referring to our capability to conduct

an investigation in Cuba, I would have to say it was

limited."

This does not mean that such assets as there were did not have reporting

00N7.2=

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CONHUCIIAL

requirements levied on them, in fact, there was considerable activity

in this respect. In the course of the present review a number of case

officers at the Station during that period have described the frenetic

activity in this respect. The characterization by the Chief of Station

as to passive collection by CIA inside the United States should not be

extended to apply to what was done with reporting assets outside the

United States, as the SSC Final Report attempts to do at the bottom of

page 58.

• The SSC Final Report has undertaken to paint this in very_different

terms than the record supports. The extensive reporting to the FBI

and the Warren Commission provides a truer reflection of the level of

activity by CIA (see Tab E), even if its sources did not bear on every

question that has been conceived since then.

IV

"Unpursued Leads"

At pages 60-67, in Book V of the SSC Final Report, there is a section

that addresses leads that were felt to not have been followed by the

...

intelligence agencies. This follows the section on CIA's Performance

on the Inquiries. This section first addresses two Cubana flights to

Havana from Mexico City on 22 November (the date of President Kennedy's

murder) and 27 November 1963, raising questions about passengers reported

to be aboard those flights.

By way of background it is noted that during that period Cubana

flights traveled on a round trip basis between Havana and Mexico

City every other day.

More specifically, there were flights at this

time on 22 November, 25 November and 27 November. The flights on

10

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22 and 25 November to Havana were passenger flights, while the one

on 27 November appears to have been essentially a cargo flight, with

one passenger, the man referred to in the SSC discussion. All flights

to Havana apparently carried some freight.

CIA conducted regular surveillance of Cubana flights, filing cable

reports to Headquarters. There was one [unilateral] CIA surveillance

team (LIFIRE) that observed arrivals and departures of Cubana flights,

reporting any unusual incidents and providing copies of flight manifests.

The Mexican

Authorities)also had a surveillance team of its own at the

airport, which provided photographs of passports and also provided copies

of passenger lists. Additionally, a telephone tap operation (LIENVOY)

against the Cuban embassy provided transcripts of conversations with

the Cubana office and the Mexican Airport Control Office.

The 22 November 1963 Flight

At pages 30, 60, 61 and 103 of Book V of the SSC Final Report,

reference is made to a reported five-hour delay of a Cubana flight from

Mexico City to Havana the evening of President Kennedy's assassination,

22 November 1963. The SSC Report describes the delay as being from

6:00 P.M. EST to 11:00 P.M. EST. The especially intriguing aspect

of the report was that the reported delay was to await arrival at

10:30 P.M. EST of a private twin-engined aircraft, which deposited

an unidentified passenger who boarded the Cubana aircraft without customs

clearance and traveled to Havana in the pilot's cabin. The SSC Final

Report emphasized CIA's apparent failure to follow up by inquiring

further into the matter.

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Book V of the SSC Final Report states that CIA could not explain,

at the time of the writing of the SSC Report, why there was no record

of a follow-up.

In fact, the SSC was advised that the Mexican authori-

ties were asked about the reported flight delay, although there was no

recorded response. The current review revealed additional information

from the surveillance noted above, which bears directly on the subject.

In reviewing that information below, it is noted that the conversion

of Mexico City time to Eastern Standard Time (EST) in the SSC Final

Report tends to distort the time perspective somewhat. Mexico_City

times are used in the following discussion.

The LIENVOY transcripts record a series of discussions about the

status of the 22 November flight--when it was to arrive and when it

departed. These records show that the flight arrived at the platform

at the airport at 1620 hours Mexico City time; presumably it landed

a few minutes earlier. At one point prior to arrival of the aircraft,

one person speaking on the telephone stated that the aircraft was due

at 1630 hours and "it will go" at 1730, suggesting a quick turnaround

that would have reduced unloading and loading time, as well as

servicing, to a relatively short period. However, the key report on

the departure of the aircraft was a statement at 2040 hours that the

aircraft had taken off five minutes earlier, i.e., 2035 hours.

The following facts stand out, in contrast to the presentation in

the SSC Final Report:

1. The Cubana flight was on the ground in Mexico City

for

total of four hours and about ten minutes.

It was not

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delayed five hours, as

alleged.

2. The Cubana flight took off at 2035 hours Mexico City

time, 55 minutes ahead of the alleged arrival at 2130 of a

private flight with a secret passenger. This also contrasts

further with the alleged departure time of the Cubana flight.

which the report stated to be 2200. Actual departure preceded

substantially the reported arrival of the aircraft for which it

allegedly was delayed.

In view of the surveillance coverage of the Cubana flight, it is

very doubtful that the alleged activity involving the private twin-

engined aircraft and passenger would have gone unnoticed or unreported

had it occurred. Personnel in Mexico City at the time were aware of

these sources and probably knew the above facts, feeling no need to

follow further.

The report in question was in error, and misled the SSC in its

summary of the matter.

The Passenger on the 27. November 1963 Flight

At pages 61-63 and 104, the SSC Final Report describes in con-

siderable detail information concerning a Cuban-American who came to

the attention of the CIA and the FBI in the period following the

assassination of President Kennedy. The introductory comments of the

SSC Final Report state that:

... one source alleged that the Cuban-American

was 'involved' in the assassination."

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The SSC Report states that the CIA reported the case to the FBI, "almost

immediately," but that the Bureau did not conduct a follow-up investi-

gation "as part of (its) work for the Warren Commission."

Further

down the same page the SSC Report states that "(t)he FBI did investi-

gate this individual after receiving the CIA report of his unusual

travel." At page 63 the SSC Report observes that "...the suspicious

travel of this individual coupled with the possibility that Oswald had

contacted the Tampa chapter (of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee--FPCC)

certainly should have prompted a far more thorough and timely investi-

gation than the FBI conducted..." We do not know just what the Bureau

did in this respect, nor have we tried to resolve the apparent incon-

sistencies in the SSC Report noted above, but the SSC Final Report

contains considerable detail about the man, presumably reflecting the

results of FBI inquiries.

While this section of the SSC Report is directed primarily at the

FBI, we reviewed the reporting because of CIA's initial role in reporting.

about the man. There is also one implicit criticism of CIA, which will

be noted.

Book V of the SSC Final Report has the following summary statement

at page 104, in the chronology section:

"December 5 - Mexico Station cables that someone who

saw the Cuban-American board the aircraft to Havana

on November 27 reported that he 'looked suspicious'

..."

At page 61 it states that there "is no indication that CIA followed-

up on this report (that the man was "involved in the assassination"),

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_..

except to ask a Cuban defector about his knowledge of the Cuban

American's activities."

The presentation of this matter in the SSC Report contains some

inaccuracies.

First, the Mexico City Station did not cable Washington

that the man "looked suspicious." There was a cable, dated 5 December

1963, but it reported that the man had "crossed at Laredo, Texas on

23 November," that he registered at a certain hotel in Mexico City at

a certain time on 25 November, that he checked out of the hotel at a

certain time and departed for Havana "as only passenger on Cubana

flight on night 27 November," and that there was a good photograph of

him taken at the airport.. This was followed by a dispatch the same

date, repeating the basic information in the cable, enclosing the photo-

graph, and containing the following cryptic statement:

"Source states the timing and circumstances surrounding

Subject's travel through Mexico and departure for Havana

are suspicious. "

This comment is cryptic, at least, and--given that dramatic moment in

history--doubtless reflects a preliminary comment of a person who

was on the alert at that time for anything that might be construed as

possibly unusual. The above quotation was the Station's actual report

of the observation by the source, and is what was reported to the FBI;

it differs from the quotation in the SSC Report. There was an internal

memo in the Station that was even more cryptic, but which was in the

nature of an informal reminder, which stated that the man was reported

15

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to have "looked suspicious"; but this formulation never found its way

into the more careful statements that usually characterize official

reporting.

The point is that the observation was cryptic and impres-

sionistic, rather than constituting a tangible basis for dramatic

activity or final conclusions.

There is one piece of reporting that could confuse those reviewing

the record, but which is essentially resolved when considered in the

context of known facts. On 19 March 1964, Monterrey Base cabled

that a source of a local (Monterrey) "agent of the federal judicial

police" had information on a man; the description seems to have the

same Cuban-American in mind. The following should be noted about the

report:

it misspelled the man's name; it offered a bare statement

that he "was involved in Kennedy assassination"; it states that he

entered Mexico "on foot" from Laredo, Texas (according to the SSC Final

Report, the FBI concluded that he entered by automobile); it asserts

that he stayed at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City (while the dates and

times of his registration and check-out at a specific hotel in Mexico

City, where he stayed, were known); it gave an incorrect number for his

passport; and, it stated that his Mexican tourist card was issued

in Nuevo Laredo (when it was known to have been issued in Tampa,

Florida). The report, on its face, was factually incorrect on a number

of known points. The source patently was extensively misinformed, the

hard facts of his report being in error. The Chief of Base at the time,

when queried about the report in the course of the present review, could

not recall it.

Mind art

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...

There is one additional aspect of the matter, in which the

record is confused.

If we are to comment negatively on the pre-

sentation by the SSC in its emphasis on report, we must point out

that the Mexico City Station's response to the Monterrey report

contributes to such confusion as may exist on the matter.

When

Mexico City received the Monterrey cable the Deputy Chief of

Station replied that the information in the report "jibes fully

with that provided Station by (Mexico City source) 4 December 63.".

It did not jibe in most respects, other than the date and place of

entry into Mexico. The mistake of that cable cannot be explained

today, but wrong it obviously was. It does, however, serve to

highlight the basic unreliability of the report and indicate how

it should be considered responsibly.

Implicit criticism of CIA's not collecting more information

on the man is not well founded. It had no real sources with access

to information concerning him; when a defector from Cuba became

available with such information he was queried and the results

were provided the authorities.

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_Tab c_l

CIA OPERATIONS AGAINST CUBA

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CIA Operations Against Cuba

The SSC Final Report speaks of operations against Cuba and the

Castro regime, and contends that they should have been reported in

detail to the Warren Commission as part of the subject matter that

it consciously took into consideration. A case can be made for

specific considerations of these various activities by the Warren

Commission, at least as part of the unique background of the times;

it might have provided it additional investigative leads. However,

to advance the general thought is not to discard the usual tests of

evidence that must still control how the findings are treated.

It should be noted that at the time of the Warren Commission

inquiry there was no secret about the tensions between the Kennedy

Administration and the Castro regime. Book V of the SSC Final

Report refers briefly to some of the more dramatic events, such as

the Bay of Pigs in April 1961 and the Missile Crisis in October 1962

(see pages 2, 3, 10 and 11). In fact, the totality of American

policy and practice must have appeared threatening to the Castro

regime, and most certainly must have been considered by it as pro-

vocative.

Additional U. S. policies and programs that could have been

viewed negatively by Castro were the breaking of diplomatic relations,

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economic and political sanctions, paramilitary operations (which re-

ceived recurring publicity in the press), as well as a variety of

covert operations that were not known publicly. On 18 November 1963

President Kennedy -- four days before his death -- delivered a major

policy address in Miami, accusing Castro of having betrayed the Cuban

revolution; at the time the press, reportedly on the basis of what

"White House sources" said about it, viewed it as a call for the Cuban

people to overthrow the Castro regime.

The United States provided a haven and base for Cuban exiles, who

conducted their independent operations against the Castro government.

Some of these exiles had the support of CIA, as well as from other

elements

of the U.S. Government, and still others had support from

private sources. With or without official U.S. support these exiles

spoke in forceful Latin terms about what they hoped to do. The Cuban

intelligence services had agents in the exile community in America

and it is likely that what they reported back to Havana assigned to

CIA responsibility for many of the activities under consideration,

whether CIA was involved or not.

We do not know the extent to which the Warren Commission took

what might be characterized as "judicial notice" of the tensions

between the two governments and their leaders; it certainly was in

the public domain. That consideration was given the possibility of

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Cuban or Soviet involvement in the assassination is no secret, clearly,

reflecting a recognition of the question at the time. That a request

was not made by the Warren Commission, nor volunteered by the intel-

ligence agencies, for extensive review of all Cuban operations is being

faulted today. Yet, in the light of understandings at that time, it

could well have appeared to members of the Warren Commission and its

staff as not directly relevant, in fact, to the specific issue of the

murder of the President. In the absence of evidence to the contrary

a case could still be made for that view, although the evolution of

public perceptions probably would not accept it without reservation.

The SSC Final Report has fixed on the Cuban operations of the

intelligence agencies--primarily those of CIA--for special attention

in considering the question. Implicitly it accepts the theory that

there could well have been conspiracy in the murder of President

Kennedy, and that Castro could have been behind it, having been pro-

voked by depredations against Cuba or plotting against his own life.

However, in advancing its thesis, the SSC Report cautioned that it

had "seen no evidence that Fidel Castro or others in the Cuban govern-

ment plotted President Kennedy's assassination in retaliation for U.S.

operations against Cuba. "

In response to this perception, conveyed in Book V of the SSC

Final Report, we have conducted a major review of Agency files (the

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organization of that effort is discussed at Tab A of this report). This

was for the express purpose of identifying any separate activities that

could have provoked Castro to order the assassination of President

Kennedy had he learned of them, and to evaluate their security.

Today, in 1977, it is difficult to reconstruct exactly everything

that did and did not occur in the course of the Warren Commission in-

quiries in 1964. Not all that happened is a matter of record. For

instance, in CIA at that time there were many individuals assigned to

various aspects of Cuban operations. They were familiar in detail with

those activities, with what they were and with their strengths and

weaknesses. They doubtless made numerous conscious but unrecorded

judgments about what seemed relevant or irrelevant to the considera-

tions of the Warren Commission. Had they been aware of any aspects of

those activities that may have related to the assassination of the

President it is safe to say it would have been surfaced in some way.

While CIA produced considerable material for the investigation (see

Tab E) that more was not reported is a meaningful indication of what

was known then by those actually involved, as distinguished from what

might be hypothesized at a later date. To contend to the contrary --

which has been suggested by some -- would require a unanimous con-

spiracy of many American citizens, employees of CIA, many of whom

knew aspects. of even the most closely guarded activities.

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Today, the knowledge of the persons involved directly in the

various Cuban operations in the period preceding President Kennedy's

death cannot be recaptured in the form that it existed then. Those

persons are scattered, their memories are blurred by time, and some

are dead. The SSC, for instance -- in its attempt to capture ele-

ments of the past -- seems to have led some employees into expressing

opinions on subject matter they did not know in 1964, apparently in

response to representations by SSC staff members as to the facts; this

illustrates at best the difficulties in resolving hypothetical issues,

today, on. a responsible basis.

The SSC Final Report devotes considerable time to the so-called

AMLASH operation, which centered on a high Cuban official who was

dissatisfied with the Castro regime. The Agency had only a tentative

relationship with this man during President Kennedy's life, although

the SSC Final Report -- in trying to prove its thesis -- has attempted

to present it differently. Because the case is discussed so exten-

sively in the SSC Final Report, it is treated in a separate annex in

this paper, at Tab D. The key point is that prior to President

Kennedy's death the relationship with AMLASH/1 was amorphous and

without substance.

Had Castro learned of it he could learn only that

there was a contact that had not developed to the point of an under-

taking. This will not be treated further in this section of this

discussion.

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In the face of the hypotheses advanced by the SSC Final Report,

it has been felt necessary to review in depth all records of Cuban

operations conducted by CIA during the period in question, 1961-1964.

The organization of the review is described at Tab A. It was not

possible to predict the form that information turned up by this

inquiry might take, and special care had to be exercised in the effort.

In doing this the "provocation concept" of the SSC Report was kept in

mind. In the months that it took to complete this extensive review,

it is significant to observe that three areas of specific operational

activity were found that either might meet some of the requirements

of the provocation theory, or throw some further light on issues

already considered. To report this conclusion is not to dismiss the

original questions that faced the Warren Commission as to whether

there might have been Cuban or Soviet connections with Oswald. That

such possibilities

remain unresolved in some minds is apparent, but

that the records of CIA, in such a review, do not add significantly

to evidence on the subject, is the conclusion of the present inquiry.

The areas of operational activity noted above can be described

briefly as follows:

1. Operations directed against the Cuban leadership (AMTRUNK) •

2. Operations involving the criminal underworld.

3.

Other reports of plans to assassinate Castro.

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Operation AMTRUNK

There is one other general activity that was considered in the

course of the present research, which is discussed below.

This

activity, AMTRUNK, was to develop a capability for splitting the

leadership of the Castro regime and eventually overthrowing it. It

never reached the point of implementation; however, because it suffered

possible security vulnerabilities, it is treated here even though it

never materialized. In our professional judgment this activity,

because of its failure to ever develop substance, is not really rele-

vant to the question. It is included simply because it might be viewed,

by virtue of its security vulnerabilities, as fitting in part the

hypothesis of the SSC Final Report; it seemed better to include it than

try and explain at some later date why it was omitted, although the

reasoning should be apparent. If its inclusion in this report is subject

to question because of its lack of substance, perhaps it serves some

purpose in indicating how little turned up in the course of this

research to meet any of the rather loosely formulated provocation thesis

of the SSC Report.

In early 1963 there were Cuban exiles who wished to change the

direction that events seemed to have taken in Cuba. Two of them, Nestor

Antonio Moreno Lopez and Enrique Cayardo Robera, developed an oper-

ational concept to overthrow the Castro government, which came to be

known as the Leonardo Plan. Cayardo had been a public figure in Cuba,

who had no apparent role in the activity following original inception

of the plan.

Moreno was the son of a Cuban senator and Minister of Public

Works; as a lawyer in Cuba he had been involved in only a minor way in

the anti-Batista movement.

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Moreno defected to the United States in April 1961, settling

in Miami where he associated with anti-Castro exiles.

Among his

associates was Jorge Ajbuszy Volsky, a Cuban citizen of Polish origin.

Volsky had been in prison in the USSR in the 1940's, and enlisted in

the Polish Air Force during WWII under the British Air Command. After

WWII he married a Cuban national, and for a period operated his own

business in Havana..

Although avidly pro-Castro he reportedly was

imprisoned for a few weeks following the Bay of Pigs invasion. As

he held a valid U.S. visa, he left Cuba, arriving in Miami in May 1961.

Cayardo and Moreno discussed the Leonardo Plan with Volsky. He,

in turn, discussed it with Tadeus (Tad) Witold Szulc, a reporter with

the New York Times. Szulc had reported on Cuban activities for the

New York Times prior to the fall of Batista, during which time he had

developed a wide acquaintance among Cubans. He was transferred to

the Times Washington Bureau in April 1961, where he claimed to have

an entree to the White House through his uncle, Ambassador. John C.

Wiley.

He also claimed to have a standing invitation for direct con-

tact with President Kennedy, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, and

McGeorge Bundy on matters concerning Cuba. While the actual nature of

this entree is not known to CIA, it is through his intercession that

the Leonardo Plan gained government-level support and approval.

In early 1963 Szulc arranged an interview in Washington with

Mr. Richard Goodwin, a White House advisor. Volsky and Szulc then met

with Robert Hurwitch, a senior official in the Department of State,

who presented the concept to the CIA with Department approval. CIA

assigned it to its Miami Station, where it became known as AMTRUNK.

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...

AMTRUNK was conceived as first identifying disaffected key per-

sonnel in the Cuban armed forces with the long range objective of

uniting them against the Castro regime. On 4 April 1963 CIA cabled

certain stations and bases orders to identify Cubans who might be

used in the activity. During that period the CIA Chief of Station

in Miami questioned CIA control of the operation. Noting uncertain

security considerations, he felt it best to fund the operation gen-

erously in order for it to proceed independently:

On 17 April 1963 Szulc informed Hurwitch that the Miami Station

had given Volsky responsibility for the decision of whether or not

the operation was to proceed; this was not consistent with CIA

intentions:

In August 1963 things still had not progressed very far. A

Headquarters cable on 5 August 1963 to certain stations and bases

complained about the absence of responses to the 4 April cable. It

emphasized that activity to penetrate the Cuba armed forces was a

high priority objective. In early September 1963 AMTRUNK had three

intelligence sources in Cuba: Miguel A. Diaz Isalgue, Ramon Guin

Hector Robello, and Modesto Orozco Basulto. One of these sources,

Guin, was reportedly close to AMLASH/1, a man with whom CIA was

dealing separately through a Headquarters case officer - but at

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*

that time unsuccessfully -- in trying to develop an operational ap-

proach similar in some respects to AMTRUNK. The AMLASH operation is

discussed at Tab D.

It was decided at the end of October 1963 that Moreno should be

separated from the operational details of the AMTRUNK operation be-

cause of numerous indiscretions and poor security practice. Arrange-

ments were made to involve him in a radio program to be used in con-

nection with the Rebel Army that eventually it was hoped would arise

against Castro. Moreno threatened to appeal this decision through

Volsky and Szulc to the President.

In November 1963 the program was still trying to develop leads

into higher echelons of the military and civilian leadership. The

operation moved slowly, with preliminary infiltrations designed to

set up infiltration/exfiltration routes. Although it had success-

fully recruited some persons during 1963 in Cuba, it had made prac-

tically no progress in establishing an organization or any capability

for action. At a much later date as its numbers increased its secur-

ity became less certain. In 1965 its security was believed to have

been seriously compromised and the decision was taken to cut off re-

lations with it. Various figures were arrested, including Guin, Diaz

and AMLASH/1.

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The reason for selecting this operation for discussion here is

just not its denouement in 1965, but possible security weaknesses

from the beginning. Szulc and Volsky are considered to be highly

suspect and they are discussed below, with another person who became

involved in the activity.

a. Tad Szulc. Szulc has been suspect since 1948 when

the FBI recorded reports that he was a communist. Re-

portedly he was in frequent contact with communist party

-

leaders and functionaries throughout Latin America. Sus-

picions about his motives or possible connections with

foreign intelligence services, have never been proven.

Nicole Szulc, daughter of Tad Szulc, is reportedly an avid

communist. Philip Agee's Inside the Company: A CIA Diary

credits Nicole Szulc with having "obtained vital research

materials in New York and Washington, D.C." She is be-

lieved to be an agent of the Cuban DGI. Doubts about Tad

Szulc arè unconfirmed but remain alive. Of Polish origin

Szulc became a U.S. citizen in 1954 by a special bill of

Congress.

origin.

b. Jorge Ajbuszyc Volsky. Like Szulc, he is of Polish

He and Szulc became acquainted in 1959-1960 in

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Cuba. A CI Study of Volsky, dated 24 August 1964, prepared

by a JMWAVE analyst, makes the following statement: "Volsky's

knowledge of clandestine methods of operation, together with

his Russian prison background and his ingenuity as a middleman

in U.S. Government/CIA activities, made him an excellent

candidate for a communist penetration agent and that the pos-

sibility existed that he might be a singleton, sleeper or

stringer for the RIS." There has been no confirmation of

these suspicions. Volsky became a naturalized U.S. citizen

on 10 April 1969.

c. Jose Ricardo RABEL Nunez. Born in Cuba, he was the

son of a native born American citizen. He was educated both

in Cuba and in the States and later (1940) enlisted in the

U.S. Army. After discharge he returned to Cuba but kept

moving back and forth between the U.S. and Cuba. Viewed in

retrospect, his career presents a patter of changing alle-

giances. He enjoined the anti-Batista forces in March 1952

first with the Cuban exiles in the United States and later

from inside Cuba.

He joined the Cuban Army under Batista

and was the Cuban liaison officer with the U.S. Army mis-

sion in Cuba from November 1954 until 1956. During his

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entire period in the Cuban Army, he was involved with

dissident army elements. RABEL was arrested in April Ï956 when

he participated in an attempted coup. After a short imprison-

ment he returned to the U.S. and worked with one of his brothers.

In October 1957, he returned to Cuba and became involved with

the 26th of July Movement and later with the Cienfuegos Group.

Shortly after the Castro victory, Castro called upon RABEL to

set up a Cuban Marine Corps, a job he held until 1960, at which

time he was appointed Chief of Viviendos Campesinas (Rural

Housing). Approached by CIA, he refused to work in place but

was willing to defect, which he did in December 1962, being

recruited by JMWAVE Station where he was used in AMTRUNK

activities. He returned to Cuba on his own in 1965, reportedly

to attempt the exfiltration of his family. Upon return to Cuba

he was arrested and sentenced to 30 years imprisonment but was

set free in July or August 1967. There were accusations that

RABEL was a Cuban agent as early as July 1963. The accusations

were never proven.

In view of the later roll-up of the AMTRUNK operation the

tentative opinion has been offered that the operation could have

been an ingenious plan by the Cubans from the beginning, using access

at high levels in the U.S. Government to learn the identities of

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individuals in the Cuban hierarchy who were disloyal to the regime.

Whatever the later penetrations by Cuban intelligence, the role of

Szulc and Volsky, in the early phase of the operation, could have

exposed both its members and eventual objectives to Cuban intelli-

gence.

Accepting the possibility of vital security flaws in the

operation, it must be observed that there was very little progress

and no concrete planning during the life of President Kennedy. The

eventual objective was to develop sufficient support and organization

to overthrow the Cuban regime. It never made much progress,

although it did lay down caches and conducted some infiltrations

and exfiltrations in 1964 and 1965.

An attempt to build support that might eventually have the

capability to attempt a coup against the Castro regime obviously

would have been irritating to Castro. That it never really prog-

ressed very far during the life of President Kennedy is a relevant

consideration to whether or not the tentative beginnings would have

provoked Castro to order the assassination of President Kennedy.

New Considerations on the Syndicate Operation

In the course of the present review a by-line story by Paul

Meskil in the New York Daily News attracted special attention because

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of one statement that it contained. One of a series of stories!

printed 20-25 April 1975, it quoted Frank Sturgis as follows:

"The third (assassination) scheme involved

planting a bomb in Castro''s office.

'I had

access to the Prime Minister's office,' Sturgis

said.

'I knew Fidel's private secretary Juan

Orta.

I recruited him to work with the embassy

(American Embassy in Havana).'"

Sturgis has been something of a soldier of fortune over the

years, having served in different branches of the U.s. military

and having been in the anti-Batista movement prior to Castro's

takeover.

Sturgis stayed on in Cuba until mid-1959, during which

time he reportedly had some role in the Castro regime's control

of the gambling interests. He came to the United States in 1959.

Sturgis gained notoriety when arrested on 17 June 1972 in the Water-

gate break-in. He has claimed on a number of occasions to have been

an employee of CIA, although there is no record of any such relation-

ship. He was in contact with some of the CIA Cuban employees in the

Miami area, but had no direct relationships with the Agency.

The particular feature in the above excerpt from the newspaper

story is that it constitutes the first public reference to Juan

Orta in the role of an assassin in plans against Castro. Orta was,

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in fact, the first man who reportedly was to have been used in the

operation that CIA had, with the criminal syndicate, to kill Castro.

Orta was the director of the Office of the Prime Minister, which

gave him the access that would make it possible for him to poison

Castro. The plan failed because Orta lost his position, and with

it his access, in late January 1961. This was prior to delivery

of the poison pills to him in late February or early March 1961.

Orta's role in this connection was over when he took refuge in the

Venezuelan Embassy in Havana in April 1961. He was allowed to leave

Cuba in October 1964 and settled in Miami in February 1965. As for

Sturgis' assertion that he recruited Orta to work with the embassy,

CIA files have no record that Orta was recruited for CIA by anyone

during the period there was an embassy in Cuba. While Orta was

reported in early 1961 as being used in the CIA-syndicate attempt

against Castro, CIA had no direct relationships with him until he

left Cuba, at which time he was used as a source of information on.

the Cuban leadership.

The fact remains that Orta did at one time have the role of

intended assassin.

Sturgis' identification of Orta in this capacity,

prior to its becoming known to external investigators in 1975, raised

the question of just what Sturgis had known, and whether he could

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SESHET,

have been a source of information on the subject whereby Castro

could have learned of CIA's earlier plan against his life.

Newspaper stories are not necessarily reliable sources of

information.

However, because the statement by Sturgis in 1975

indicated a familiarity with Orta's availability to play the role

of assassin in 1960, additional attention was given the statement

in the press to see how it might fit in with other things that are

known. What follows is subject to reservations that must attach

to the reliability of newspaper stories.

The New York Daily News stories (20-25 April 1975), and another

story by the same author on 13 June 1976, refer to possible relation-

ships between Sturgis and Trafficante, also mentioning a Norman

Rothman as a gambling partner of Trafficante. The Office of Security

wrote a memorandum in 1975, in conjunction with the first set of New

York Daily News stories, noting that there was a connection between

Sturgis and Rothman in 1960, citing FBI reports. It is pertinent

to note here that in addition to the role Sturgis is reported to

have had with the Castro government in relation to the gambling

activities, Juan Orta's availability for the assassination assignment

was understood to be due to his having lost payoffs that he had once

received from the gambling interests. One can deduce that Sturgis

and Orta could have known one another because of their connections

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with the gambling activities as well as having contacts with

the men heading the gambling organizations.

The New York Daily News story of 1976 also reports a claim by a

Marie Lorenz that she acted in 1960 in behalf of Sturgis, in an

attempt to assassinate Castro. She had also been mentioned in the

1975 stories.

Ms. Lorenz reportedly was Castro's mistress at one

point, and her access, so the story indicates, was used as a means

for getting to him. The 1976 news story concludes that "soon after

her murder mission failed the CIA recruited Mafia mobsters . . . to

kill Castro

..."

In the news story she claimed that the plan

involved the use of poison pills which she concealed in a jar of face

cream; they dissolved and could not be used.

On page 79 of the SSC Interim Report on Alleged Assassination

Plots the following is extracted from an 18 October 1960 memorandum

from

the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to the CIA

Deputy Director for Plans:

"During recent conversations with several

friends, (Sam) Giancana stated that Fidel

Castro was to be done away with very shortly.

When doubt was expressed regarding this state-

ment, Giancana reportedly assured those

present that Castro's assassination would occur

in November.

Moreover, he allegedly indicated

that he had already met with the assassin-to-be

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on three occasions. . . Giancana claimed that "

everything has been perfected for the killing

of Castro, and that the 'assassin' had arranged

with a girl, not further described, to drop a 'pill'

in some drink or food of Castro."

This seems to confirm some plot involving a woman to kill Castro

with poison.

However, the dating of events does not fit the time

frame known to CIA. While consideration had been given to various

schemes, there were no CIA pills for delivery until February 1961.

It suggests that the syndicate may have been moving ahead on its own.

Following collapse of CIA's access to Castro through Orta,

Johnny Roselli, the man who had served as the Agency's original inter-

mediary with the syndicate, stated that he knew a Cuban exile leader

who might participate. This man, Tony Varona, headed the Democratic

Revolutionary Front, one of the exile groups that also received

support from CIA as part of the larger Cuban operation. Varona was

dissatisfied with the nature and extent of that support; Miami Station

suspected that he was not keeping his bargain with the Agency. In

fact, it is possible that Varona already was involved in independent

operations with the criminal syndicate when first approached prior to

the Bay of Pigs in March 1961 to carry out the Castro assassination.

The 1967 IG Report refers to two FBI reports that bear on this.

One of them,

on 21 December 1960, indicates support by the criminal

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380t4a

underworld for some of the Cuban exiles. The other report, on

18 January 1961, suggests that Varona was one of those receiving

that support, although this was not confirmed. As a matter of

interest, as late as 10 June 1964 there was a report that gangster

elements in the Miami area were offering $150,000 for anyone who

would kill Castro (an amount mentioned to the syndicate repre-

sentatives by CIA case officers at an earlier date). These bits

of information, fitted together, could provide the basis for an

explanation of why Varona was so readily available when approached

by Roselli. It also may throw light on a question noted in the

1967 IG Report. The operation with the syndicate had been called

off following the Bay of Pigs in April 1961; yet, when it was

reactivated in April

1962 the case officer felt there was something

already ongoing in spite of the fact that the operation had been

terminated a year earlier. It is possible that CIA simply found itself

involved in providing additional resources for independent operations

that the syndicate already had under way. The criminal syndicate

had important interests in Cuba, and to recover them may well have

sought on its own to eliminate Castro. In a sense CIA may have been

piggy-backing on the syndicate and in addition to its material contri-

butions was also supplying an aura of official sanction.

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What do these various considerations suggest? It is obvious

that many lines of speculation can be developed, not the least of

which is that the Agency did not know the full extent of syndicate

activities.

Clearly, the Agency's case officers felt that they were

initiating a new activity that had the sole purpose of accomplishing

the elimination of Castro. The additional considerations can be

listed as follows:

1.

The criminal syndicate may well have had some inde-

pendent activities of its own underway prior to CIA involve-

ment in late 1960. These operations could well have con-

tinued after the CIA standdown following the Bay of Pigs,

being ongoing in some form when CIA reactivated the plan

in April 1962.

b. The syndicate operations could have activities such

as those that are reported in the New York Daily News

stories in 1975 and 1976.

3.

Frank Sturgis seems to have had contacts with the

criminal syndicate, although from outward appearances he

was not a member of it. He could well have been used by

the syndicate in its activities.

4. Sturgis has not been a reliable source, so his

statements are treated with considerable reserve. He

probably did know Juan Orta when both of them were in Cuba.

He was outside of Cuba, however, when Orta was given the

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role of assassin. Whatever he knew at that time--and

his knowledge may be of a much later date--could have been

in the form reported fifteen years later in the 1975 •

newspaper stories.

If there was such an operation it

was not CIA's; it could have been an earlier operation

of the syndicate. While Sturgis could have known of

or have been involved in earlier

activity by the syndicate,

whatever its form, he may also have had no part in any

of it; he may merely have fabricated a story from bits -

and pieces learned by him from gossip in the Miami

community after Orta settled there in 1965.

5.

If the syndicate was conducting its own operations,

that would tend to reinforce the thought that the details

of its operations would have been characterized by discre-

tion--or security--despite the FBI report in October 1960.

The authors of Book V of the SSC Final Report felt that the

operation seeking to employ the resources of the criminal syndicate

would not have provided Castro the clear provocation that was hypothe-

sized for the AMLASH operation. At page 68 the Report stated:

• . . it is unlikely that Castro could have

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distinguished the CIA plots with the underworld

from those plots not backed by CIA. In fact,

the methods the CIA used in these attempts were

designed to prevent the Cuban government from

attributing them to the CIA."

In a sense the SSC made a conscious judgment, in the context of its

provocation theory, that was made less consciously and in a different

context in 1964 by the few CIA employees who knew of the operations

with the syndicate -- that they bore no relation to the assassination

of President Kennedy.

Possible Ruby--Trafficante Contact

There are fragments of unevaluated reports that leave one aspect

of the involvement of the criminal syndicate as a question. This can

only be noted here, as the means for resolving it one way or another

are not within the Agency's capabilities.

As noted earlier (see Tab B. page 4), a 27 November 1963

report records statements by a British journalist that during his own

imprisonment in Cuba in 1959 he knew of a gangster type named "Santos"

who was in jail where he was visited by another American gangster type

named "Ruby." Current speculation has considered the possibility that

"Santos" was Santos Trafficante who may have been in jail there in

1959. An FBI report of 14 August 1964 recorded a statement by a person

jailed in Cuba that he shared a cell with Trafficante.

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If the "Santos" in the British report was Trafficante, the

British and FBI reports tend to support one another on the narrow

point of his imprisonment in Cuba in 1959. This is a material

consideration, as there are reservations about both sources.

It may be that the FBI has more information on this point, but

there is no further known relevant information

in the Agency

on the matter.

The significance of this is that if Trafficante was in

jail in Cuba in 1959, he could have been available for a visit

by Jack Ruby if such visits were allowed. Ruby, in fact, did visit

Cuba in 1959. The long time gap between 1959 and November 1963

removes the two incidents from candidacy for consideration as

evidence of conspiracy against President Kennedy. However, if

Ruby was running an errand for someone in 1959, it would provide

an interesting lead for those inquiring into the possible signi-

ficance of past assocations or contacts.

Both the British report and the confirmation of Ruby's

1959 visit were known to the Warren Commission, and Ruby

reportedly spoke at length about his visit when questioned.

24

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However, Ruby is dead and Trafficante has declined to testify "

at all. A later allegation of a visit by Ruby to Cuba in late

1962 or early 1963 is believed not to be true.

Other Reported Assassination Proposals

There were other references to possible assassination plots

against Castro that seem not to have been addressed in the Interim

Report of the SSC on Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign

Leaders. They are summarized briefly below:

In May 1975 a Cuban exile who came to be a contract employee

stated that in February 1961 he was given a rifle and the mission

to enter Cuba to assassinate Castro. He claimed to have tried to

enter Cuba three times, but failed each time in gaining entry to

Cuba. Agency files have no further records on this matter.

As a result of a column by Jack Anderson in May 1977, a check

was made of Agency files referring to an Antonio Veciana, cited

by Anderson as a CIA employee. The man was never an employee of the

Agency, but he was connected with ALPHA-66, a Cuban exile movement.

On three separate occasions (December 1960, July 1962, April 1966)

he proposed to CIA employees the assassination of Fidel Castro.

He was rebuffed on each occasion. Again in 1970 there was a report

of his making a similar proposal while an AID employee at an overseas

post. The details of his actual role is unknown to the Agency,

although the FBI may have more details on him. This is touched on in

Tab G, which comments on selected newspaper stories published in the

course of this research effort.

SECRET:

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SEBREI

• -.

Agent Messages in 1961 Mentioning Plans to Kill Castro

During the investigations in 1975 five agent messages were

identified that made reference to plans to kill Castro, or proposing

such action. Three of these messages related to the same operation,

the other two relating to separate proposals; there is no indication

that any of these proposals was the result of CIA initiative. The

existence of these messages was mentioned during Mr. Colby's testimony

before the Church Committee. In response to a request from the Deputy

Inspector General, LA Division prepared a summary of the messages

and on 8 August 1975 forwarded it to the Review Staff, then charged

with serving as an interface with the congressional committees.

Records of the Review Staff do not show how this paper was handled.

The subject was not covered in the Church Committee's interim report

on Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders and is

summarized again below.

I

2. Three of the messages involved the same group of agents,

and seem to relate to the same plan. The first message, dated

27 March 1961 (prior to the Bay of Pigs) was sent by an Agency

asset, AMBRONC/5. The message requested the Agency's opinion on

a proposed sabotage of the electric company in Havana, stating that

this could be coordinated "with attempt against Fidel in public

appearance (at) Sports Palace." The cable expressed the view that

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an "attempt against Fidel (is) in accordance with general plan."

There is no record that this message was answered. Two days later,

on 29 March 1961, possibly because of the absence of a reply, the

same agent sent another message. This stated that the plan was

scheduled for 9 April. Castro was to speak at the Palace, and an

"assassination attempt at said place (will be) followed by a general

shutting off of main electric plants in Havana." General anti-regime

developments to follow this were then outlined. This message was

answered on 30 March agreeing that a "major effort should be launched

Havana on date you selected." It recommended contacting other named

persons, looking to a more general uprising. The message addressed

the general issue, making no comment on the proposal to kill Castro.

A third message, on 5 April 1961, presumably from the same agent,

reported that the persons he had been directed to contact had arms

for only 50 men. While stating that the sabotage of the electric

company and "possibly attempt on Fidel" would be carried out 9 April,

he emphasized that to do so would make it impossible to maintain a

clandestine organization in Cuba; "your military aid is decisive. If it

does not come that date we are lost." There is no indication that

this message was answered. No further reference to this plan has

been found.

3.

We have reviewed the files of the persons identified in the

cables, and have interviewed a case officer who was responsible for

one of them, in an attempt to learn more about the matter.

The

four agents in question are commented on briefly below:

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a. AMBRONC/5 is the agent who sent the messages out-

lining the proposed sabotage effort and attempt against

Castro.

(1)

201 file opened 15 July 1960. A POA was

not issued until 18 December 1961, and an A on

31 January 1962. A debriefing of him in November

1960, prior to the Kennedy Administration, revealed

that he had been in touch with people who had

plotted the assassination of Fidel Castro, and claimed

to have tried himself to make similar plans. He was

infiltrated on 9 December 1960, exfiltrating 15 February

1961.

(2) AMBRONC/5 was infiltrated again 3 March

1961 and exfiltrated again 19 June 1961. This

covered the period of his messages and the Bay of

Pigs.

His sole mission was to organize resistance

groups.

(3) AMBRONC/5 was infiltrated again on 19 December

1961, exfiltrating 29 March 1962, again with the same

mission.

(4) AMBRONC/5 was infiltrated finally 2 May

1962, was arrested 29 May 1962, and was executed

30 August 1962. He has been reported as never admitting

that he was a CIA agent. His name is not one of those

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in the book given Senator McGovern by Castro, listing

those claimed by Castro to have plotted attempts against

his life.

b.

AMCOAX/1 was one of those AMBRONC/5 was told to

contact for his general plan for April 1961.

(1) POA on 5 January 1961. His mission was to

organize paramilitary activities in Cuba. He in-

filtrated in February 1961 and exfiltrated in July

1961 following the Bay of Pigs. This period covered

the above messages.

(2) Re-infiltrated 29 July 1961, with the same

organizing mission, he was arrested on 17 August 1961,

and is serving a thirty year term. His name appears

in the book given Senator McGovern.

c. AMPUG/1 was another of those AMBRONC/5 was told to

contact for his general plan in April 1961.

(1) Recruited in September 1960, he was in-

filtrated that month, receiving airdrops in December

1960. He returned to the U.S. 15 May 1961, following

the Bay of Pigs.

(2) Infiltrated again on 29 June 1961, with the

mission to organize resistance groups and conduct

sabotage operations, he was arrested in July 1961, and

is serving a thirty year term. His name is among those

in the book given Senator McGovern by Castro.

29

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d. AMPANIC/7 was another of those that AMBRONG/5 was

told to contact for his general plan in April 1961.

(1) This man was a "walk-in" 15 April 1960,

a POA being issued 30 January 1961 (although there was

a MOC since 12 July 1960). He was to organize resistance

groups in the Havana and Pinar del Rio areas.

(2) Infiltrated 3 March 1961, he was arrested

23 April 1961, and is serving a thirty year term. His

name is among those in the book given Senator McGovern

by Castro.

(3)

Records relating to this man mention his in-

filtration into Cuba in August 1960 and exfiltration

in November 1960 (prior to his being issued a POA).

His "mission" during that period is mentioned tersely

as being "to organize resistance groups... for

mounting sabotage operations . . . and assassination

of prominent Cuban Communist members in the Castro

entourage..." The records refer to "his own

personal objectives" during this period and criticizes

how he functioned during his stay in Cuba from August

to November 1960. The record then specifies how he is

to conduct himself and focus his efforts on his return,

which was to develop sabotage operations. We were able

to contact one of his two case officers, who has retired

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(the other had died), to ascertain his recollections;

Stating that at the time the focus was on developing

organizations for operations, he stated that an

assassination mission, such as attributed to AMPANIC/7

on his earlier time in Cuba, not only was not authorized,

but would have compromised the effort to organize.

Any such assassination mission, the case officer states,

would have been at AMPANIC/7's own initiative.

4. It is clear that AMBRONC/5 envisioned a general uprising

in Cuba, to commence with sabotage of the electric plant in Havana

and an attempt on Castro's life. The third of his messages reflected

pessimism,

and the fact is that the operation did not come off.

While the man had no express mission from the Agency to mount an

operation against Castro personally, it is clear that no specific

objection was recorded to his statement of intentions. The one

recorded reply addresses the concept of general action and makes

no reference to the proposal to make an attempt on Castro.

5. The fact is that the 9 April 1961 operation did not come

off, and AMBRONC/5 has not been identified as an Agency asset.

Nor was his name included in the book given Senator McGovern

by Castro. The other men, none of whom had a mission of assassi-

nation from the Agency, are now serving thirty year terms. That

their names were included in the list given Senator McGovern by

Castro may be an attempt on Castro's part to enlarge on the facts

31

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!

rather than to report what he truly believes. They were not

executed, a consideration that may support this view.

6. The records are incomplete on the events identified by

the three messages. The time in question predates the Bay of Pigs.

The men mentioned above had more specific missions, other than

that of assassination. They exfiltrated subsequent to the event

described in the messages, and were arrested during subsequent

infiltrations into Cuba. There is no record that any of them had

a mission from CIA to kill Castro. The person who proposed the

act in 1961 -- AMBRONC/5 -- never acknowledged that he was & CIA

agent, and is not listed among those Castro reportedly believes

had the mission of his assassination.

11

7. Another agent message dated 4 June 1961 asked about a

man who had identified himself as Moratori of the Italian Embassy,

who claimed to work for U.S. intelligence and to be in touch with

one Martin Elena and others (none identifiable), who "have plans

for an invasion within 30 days, after the killing of Fidel." A

reply, dated 6 June, stated that the information was untrue and

that Moratori was not known and should not be trusted. (Insofar

as CIA records show, there was an Italian diplomat of that name

in Cuba at that time. Little is known about him.) The originator

of the agent message cannot be identified from present records.

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III

8. Another agent message dated 3 May 1961 Prom a member of

the Revolutionary Recovery Movement in Cuba said "will try to kill

Fidel today." A reply to this message dated 4 May told the agent

and his companions to "lay low" for the time being, and "Will

advise when operations can resume."

There were no follow-up

messages on this subject in the records. The agent who sent the

message possibly was AMPUG/1, but as noted earlier his mission did

not include instructions to kill Fidel. His companions have not

been identified.

33

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AMLASH OPERATION

Tab D

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!

1. AMLASH OPERATION

Comment on the AMLASH operation, in the context of its presenta-

tion in Book V of the Final Report of the SSC, is complicated by the

treatment given it in the Report.

Rather than being treated in a

unified way, reference and discussion is found throughout the Report.*

The actual nature and the significance of the AMLASH operation

differs materially from that presented in the SSC Report. The Report

leaves the inference that AMLASH/1 was perhaps an agent of Castro, with

the mission of provoking a plot against Castro (pages 3, 74 and 79),

which in turn provided Castro with the justification for launching

Lee Harvey Oswald against President Kennedy in retaliation. Alternatively,

the Report suggests that AMLASH/1 was so insecure in the conduct of his

activities that the details of his plotting could have become known to

Castro, thereby providing the same basic motivation (pages 74 and 75).

Whichever of these alternatives, so the reasoning would be, the AMLASH

operation should have been reported to the Warren Commission. We believe

that neither thesis applies. The character of the relationship between

CIA and AMLASH/1, prior to Oswald's assassination of President Kennedy,

was so insubstantial and inconclusive that it provided no basis for

*See pages 2, 3, 5, 6, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 202

24, 25, 26, 27, 28

29, 31, 35,

79, and

- a text, and Dages 1o0, 131, 402, 103, 104, and 105

or the eige ten a to es the text.

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- a ball

AMLASH/J to feel that he had any tangible CIA support for plotting

against Castro.

Whether one is inclined to see AMLASH/l as either a

double agent or provocateur, or simply as a man who carelessly revealed

what he was doing, there was little for him to report or to leak.

* * * * * * * * * * * **

In preparing the current comment on the AMLASH operation, as

treated in the SSC Report, it was judged best to approach it in two

ways. A sequential summary of the AMLASH operation is intended to

present the Agency's understanding of the true nature of the activity.

Following that, selected points made in the SSC Report are addressed.

It is hoped that this presentation will help establish a clearer per-

spective for judging the actual substance of the operation.

* * * * **

****

As early as March 1959, AMLASH/1 was reported as expressing

directly to Castro his dissatisfaction with the situation in Cuba.

At that time he also was reported as expressing his disillusionment

and that if he "...did not get out of the country soon, he would kill

Castro himself."

Two years later, in March 1961, AMLASH/1 was met in Mexico City

by a CIA case officer stationed there. The occasion was AMLASH/l's

presence at the leftist-sponsored Latin America Conference on National

Sovereignty, Emancipation, and Peace. The meeting was arranged by

AMWHIP/1, a long-time friend of AMLASH/1. A dispatch in July 1961,

giving a general round-up on operational activity against Cubans in

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Mexico City, described the meeting (along with others) as follows:

...the Station made an unsuccessful 'approach'

to (AMLASH/1)... the 'approach' consisted of a

'friendly' talk between a case officer, a mutual

friend of (AMLASH/1) and (AMLASH/1) when he last

was visiting in Mexico. While (AMLASH/1) did not

pick up the opportunity at that time, he apparently

did not report the incident to his superiors and

the ground work may have been laid for a similar action

in the future."

Later in March there was a report that AMLASH/1 and another Cuban wanted

to defect and needed help in escaping. Consideration of their exfil-

tration ended with a report that the Cuban police were aware of AMLASH/l's

intention and plans.

In August 1961 AMWHIP/1 reported plans by AMLASH/1 to attend the

French National Student Union Cultural Festival, and that AMLASH/1

•..

wanted to meet with a "friend" of the Mexico City case officer's. The

files do not reveal that such a contact actually occurred.

In June 1962 there was a report that AMLASH/1 would be travelling

via Prague to the World Youth Festival in Helsinki. AMLASH/1 was

reported as wanting to defect, and also that on his return from Helsinki

he would pass through Paris where he hoped to meet AMWHIP/1. The FBI,

which was aware of CIA's association with AMWHIP/1, met with AMWHIP/1

in Miami and took steps for him to be referred to CIA if he should

contact the Paris Legal Attache.

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In July 1962 CIA contacted AMWHIP/1, who made known his dis-

satisfaction with the way CIA handled AMLASH/l's "planned defection" in

Paris in August 1961. Plans were made for a CIA case officer and

AMWHIP/1 to travel to Helsinki and anywhere else necessary in an attempt

to bring about AMLASH/l's defection.

The first of a series of meetings with AMLASH/1 was held in

Helsinki on l August 1962. The original objective of his defection

became one of recruiting him in place. AMLASH/l was reported as feeling

that if he could "do something really significant for the creation of a

new Cuba, he was interested in returning to carry on the fight there."

AMLASH/1 spoke of sabotage of an oil refinery and the execution of a

top ranking Castro subordinate, of the Soviet Ambassador and of Castro

himself. The case officer's report stated:

"While we were making no commitments or plans,

we pointed out to [AMLASH/1] that schemes like

he envisioned certainly had their place, but that

a lot of coordination, planning, information-

collection, etc., were necessary prerequisites to

ensure the value and success of such plans."

(Emphasis in original).

The security hazard of too frequent meetings in Helsinki led to

further meetings in Stockholm and Copenhagen. AMLASH/1 was next

met on 16 and 17 August in Paris where AMWHIP/1 and the case officer

were joined by another case officer. AMLASH/1 was given SW training

and supplies. On 20 August he was taken to the south of France for

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a demolition demonstration. He refused to be polygraphed. The case

officer reported on 17 August:

"Have no intention give [AMLASH/1] physical

elimination mission as requirement but recognize

this something he could or might try to carry

out on his own initiative."

The Headquarters cabled reply the next day stated:

"Strongly concur that no physical elimination

missions be given [AMLASH/1]."

-

On 29 August 1962 AMLASH/1 left Prague by air for Havana. This was

the last time that he was met until he next left Cuba in September

1963.

COMMENT:

It is noted at this point that AMLASH/1 was not a

recruited agent at that time--nor was he ever. for that

matter, as Operational Approval was never granted for

this purpose. By the end of August 1962 the CIA rela-

tionship with AMLASH/1 had made no real progress,

although he was viewed as an operational contact with

potential.

Over a year passed between August 1962 and

September 1963 when he was next contacted by CIA.

In terms of the relationship that he had with CIA the

critical period, for purposes of this paper, is there-

fore between 5 September and 22 November 1963.

AMLASH/1 attended the Collegiate Games in Porto Alegre, Brazil

from 5 through 8 September 1963, as a representative of the Cuban

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Government. He was met there by AMWHIP/1, and by the CIA case

officer who was to take over the relationship with him. AMLASH/1

said that he had written two SW messages (only one had been received).

He expressed his reluctance to use this form of communications because

of Cuban postal censorship.

It is pertinent to what followed to note where the relationship

between AMLASH/1 and CIA stood at that time. At page 13 of Book V

of the SSC Final Report the following statement appears:

"

• . . the CIA took steps to renew its contact

with a high-level Cuban official named AMLASH. -The

CIA's previous contact with him had been sporadic;

he had not been in contact with the CIA since

before the missile crisis of October 1962. The

exact purpose the CIA had for renewing contact is

not known, but there is no evidence the CIA intended

at this time to use AMLASH in an assassination

operation." •

The reason for there having been no contact since August 1962 was

simply that AMLASH/1 did not leave Cuba after that until September

1963. If it is narrowly correct to state that the "exact purpose"

for renewing contact was not known to the authors of the SSC Report,

it nevertheless is quite clear why he was met. He was an important

potential asset whose usefulness remained to be explored. At this

point, not only was there "no evidence (that) . . . an assassination

operation" was intended, it is quite clear that it was not under

consideration.

The problem at the time was how to deal with the man.

At page 14 of the SSC Report it is stated that the first meeting

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in September 1963:

• may have been to gain intelligence and to

cultivate him as an asset for covert operations . . ."

A 7 September cable, cited on another point in the SSC Report,

provides an insight as to how AMLASH/1 was assessed at the time, as

well as emphasizing the uncertainty in the minds of the case officers

of how to deal with him in the future:

"AMLASH cocky totally spoiled brat who will always

be a control problem. . (he) will not take time or

have patience prepare or receive constant stream S/W

messages, let alone OWVL. AMLASH also needs strong

confidant inside who will push and serve as chaplain . .

."

CIA headquarters replied on 9 September, saying in part:

• . . Based on what little feel we here have for

subject however appears he is hopeless as intell

performer and is best approached as a chief con-

spirator allowed to recruit his own cohorts among

whom we may then find persons susceptible to long

distance and covert disciplines...

The cable then went on to spell out long-range requirements prior to

any action based on such internal organization as AMLASH/1 may put

together.

Clearly, at that point, while AMLASH/1 was viewed as potentially

important, he also was viewed as a person of uncertain capabilities,

• requiring careful but long-range development for whatever course of

action that might later ensue.

'..

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SEGRET

Page 14 of the SSC Final Report cites the 7 September 1963

cable reporting the first 1963 meeting with AMLASH/1 as follows:

"AMLASH was interested primarily in getting the

United States to invade Cuba, or in attempting an

'inside job' against Castro, and that he was awaiting

a U.S. plan of action." (Empahsis added).

This suggests a plan of action targetted specifically against Castro

himself. That may have seemed implicit to the authors of the SSC

Report, but the actual language of the cable states it somewhat differently:

-

"AMLASH still feels there only two ways accomplish

change either inside job or invasion he realistic

enough realize latter out of question. According

AMWHIP, AMLASH still awaiting for US reveal plan of

action."

COMMENT:

At this point, after a year out of touch with a

•...

man with whom there had been no working understanding,

AMLASH/1's views were of interest, but were very general,

as might be expected after such a long time. The actual

reference to an "inside job" did not specify Castro,

as suggested in the SSC Report, but was directed towards

the more general question of how to bring about change.

It was offered alternatively, in the context of con-

sidering both external and internal action, and not with

the specific connotation provided by the SSC presentation.

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SEGMET

The point is, as stated in the SSC Report, that it left

AMLASH/1 "awaiting a U.S: plan of action." There was

nothing substantive or conclusive. To the contrary, things.

were left very much up in the air.

Footnote 17 on page 14 of the SSC Report states that

"characterization of this phase of the AMLASH operation

is disputed." (Emphasis added). The footnote observes

that the SSC Interim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots

concluded that the AMLASH operation was an assassination

operation, which begs the question of what it was for "this

phase" of the matter. In fact, the SSC Interim Report on

Alleged Assassination Plots notes specifically that "From

the first contact with AMLASH until the latter part of 1963,

it was uncertain whether he would defect or remain in Cuba."

(Page 86). The point is that the SSC Final Report, Book V,

itself describes the very general nature of the approach

by AMLASH/1, and the absence of a U.S. response (supra). .

Any dispute over how to characterize the operation at that

time arises from the presentation of it in Book V of the

SSC Report.

Reference to the dispute may reflect views

expressed by CIA representatives on reviewing the draft of the

SSC Final Report.

The next paragraph in the SSC Report, Book V, presents

in inferential sequence, an interview Castro held

with an AP reporter, Daniel Harker, in which Castro inveighed

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L6.8NDT

against anti-Cuban terrorist plans of U.S. leaders.

The intended inference, as is known from discussions with

SSC staff members, was that AMLASH/1 may have reported (or

leaked) to Castro what the authors of the report elected

to see then as assassination plotting. This characteri-

zation is even more explicit at pages 3-4 of the Summary

and Findings of the SSC Report, presenting the inter-

pretation as categorically as though it were fact.

The fact remains that whatever views AMLASH/1 may have

expressed, he had no response from his CIA contacts of

any support for his proposals at that time. Whatever

may have been the cause for Castro's remarks at that time

they could not have stemmed from anything said to

AMLASH/1 by CIA officers as they proposed nothing and

undertook nothing.

AMLASH/1 flew to Paris on 14 September, ostensibly to attend a

meeting of the Alliance Francaise. The trip actually was for an

extended vacation, which AMLASH/1 intended to report to Castro

after the fact. On 16 September he wrote AMWHIP/1 that he did not

"intend to see (be interviewed by) your friend again" referring to

the CIA case officer.

On 3 October 1963 the case officer nevertheless

arrived in Paris to meet with AMLASH/1. Station officers were already

in contact with him, two of whom participated in meetings that followed.

On 11 October the case officer cabled Headquarters reporting that

AMLASH/1 claimed to have the "necessary people and equipment inside

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[Cuba] to accomplish overthrow without [U.S.] assistance." AMLASH/1

was reported as wishing a meeting with a senior U.S. official,

preferably Robert F. Kennedy, for assurance of "moral support" for

any action AMLASH/1 undertook in Cuba. The cable recommended that

the request for a meeting:

"be given

highest and profound consideration as

feeling drawn by all who in contact AMLASH is that

he determined attempt op against [Castro] with or

without [U.s.] support."

A 21 October cable to Washington reported a 17 October meeting with

AMLASH/1--"Basically he wants assurance that [U.S.] will support him

if his enterprise is successful." (Emphasis added).

Desmond Fitzgeräld, then Chief of the Special Affairs Staff,

was going to Paris on other business and undertook to meet with AMLASH/1.

The plan for the meeting, written in advance, was outlined as follows:

"Fitzgerald will represent self as personal

representative of Robert F. Kennedy who traveled

to Paris for specific purpose of meeting [AMLASH/1]

and giving him assurances of full U.s. support if

there is change of the present government in Cuba."

(Emphasis added).

On 29 October Fitzgerald met with AMLASH/1 in Paris, representing

himself as a spokesman of Attorney General Kennedy. The third person

at the meeting was the case officer, who served as an interpreter.

11

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gine die

On 13 November the case officer wrote a memorandum summarizing high-

lights of the meeting.

It reads in part as follows:

"Fitzgerald informed [AMLASH/1] that the United

States is prepared to render all necessary

assistance to any anti-communist Cuban group which

succeeds in neutralizing the present Cuban leader-

ship and assumes sufficient control to invite the

United States to render the assistance it is

prepared to give. It was emphasized that the

above support will be forthcoming only after a

real coup has been effected and the group involved

is in a position to request U.S. (probably under

DAS auspices) recognition and support. (Emphasis

added). It was made clear that the U.S. was not

prepared to commit itself to supporting an isolated

uprising, as such an uprising can be extinguished

in a matter of hours if the present government is

still in control in Havana. As for the post-coup

period, the U.S. does not desire that the political

clock be turned back but will support the necessary

economic and political reforms which will benefit

the mass of the Cuban people."

At the time of the CIA Inspector General's report on the subject

in 1967,

additional details were elicited from Fitzgerald, who re-

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called that AMLASH/1 spoke repeatedly of the need for an assassination

weapon. He wanted a high-power rifle with telescopic sights, or some

other weapon that could be used to kill Castro from a distance. Fitzgerald

stated that he rejected this request. Fitzgerald's Executive Officer,

although not present at the meeting, was kept posted by Fitzgerald and

had a recollection the same as the one noted above. The case officer

is reported as not recalling the exchange on the weapon. His memorandum

stated that:

"Nothing of an operational nature was discussed at

the Fitzgerald meeting. After the meeting [AMLASH/1] stated

that he was satisfied with the policy discussion but now

desired to. know what technical support we could provide him."

On 14 November 1963 AMWHIP/l was met in New York City. He reported

on AMLASH/l's reaction to the 29 October meeting in Paris. The contact

report on what AMLASH/1 understood, as relayed by AMWHIP/1, is as

follows:

"The visit with Fitzgerald, who acted in the

capacity of a representative of high levels of

the Government concerned with the Cuban problem

satisfied [AMLASH/1] as far as policy was con-

cerned, but he was not at all happy with the fact

that he still was not given the technical assistance

for the operational plan as he saw it. [AMWHIP/1]

said that [AMLASH/1] dwelt constantly on this point.

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He could not understand why he was denied certain

small pieces of equipment which promised a final

solution to the problem, while, on the other hand,

the U.S. Government gave much equipment and money

to exile groups for their ineffective excursions

against Cuban coastal targets. According to

[AMWHIP/1], [AMLASH/1] feels strongly on this point,

and if he does not get advice and materials from a

U.S. Government technician, he will probably become

fed up again, and we will lose whatever progress we

have made to date."

COMMENT:

At this point it is important to note that Agency

documents summarize what AMLASH/1 was to be told,

and what he was told, which matches a later report

of what he understood. In essence he was told there

would be no U.S. support until after the fact, and then

only if he was successful. While that may not seem a

very realistic way in which to bring about the overthrow

of a government, it is directly relevant to the question

of what AMLASH/l was told and what he understood.

It is

contrary to the statement in the SSC Final Report (page 18)

to the effect that it was not clear how AMLASH/1 inter-

preted the put-off by Fitzgerald.

LSEGRET;

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Interesting confirmation of AMLASH/1's understanding

is provided by a July 1964 FBI report (mentioned variously

at pages 35, 72 and 74 of Book V of the SSC Report). This

report was from an FBI informant who stated that AMLASH/1

was unhappy with the CIA response and that Attorney General

Kennedy had refused to support the plan. Given the substance

of this aspect of the report it is apparent that although the

date of the report is June 1964, this particular information

dates back to 29 October 1963 when AMLASH/1 was told by

Fitzgerald, representing himself as speaking for Robert F.

Kennedy, that he would not be given support in this opera-

tion. While this is not the reason the FBI report was cited

in Book V of the SSC Final Report, it provides additional

clear confirmation that AMLASH/1 understood that he had

been turned down at the 29 October meeting.

Following the 14 November meeting with AMWHIP/1 CIA reviewed what

could be done to maintain the contact with AMLASH/1. On 19 November 1963

Fitzgerald "approved telling AMLASH/1 he would be given a cache inside

Cuba.

The cache could, if he requested it, include …..high-power

rifles w/scope..."

On 19 November AMLASH/1 told a CIA officer that he planned to

return to Cuba. On 20 November Headquarters cabled Paris requesting

that AMLASH/1 "delay departure... (to) permit one more meeting which

AMLASH/1 requested."

On the same day (20 November) in response to

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a telephonic request, AMLASH/1 agreed to delay his departure "if it

is something interesting." The case officer told him that "he could not

assure it interesting but that it was to be a meeting which AMLASH

had requested."

The cable reporting this exchange noted that it was

a "rapid conversation" inhibited by the presence of a second person

in the room.

The SSC Final Report (page 19) attempts to expand this brief

and cryptic telephone conversation into the "first indication that he

might receive the specific support he requested." More factually, and

quite significantly,: the Report acknowledges that no specific support

had been offered up to then. Beyond that it is at best a piece of

highly speculative analysis, not supported by the evidence.

The case officer from Washington arrived in Paris the morning of

22 November and met with AMLASH/1 late that afternoon. As they left

the meeting they learned of President Kennedy's assassination. They

probably were meeting when President Kennedy was shot.

Whatever the relationship with AMLASH/1 following the death of

President Kennedy, there is every indication that during President

Kennedy's life AMLASH/l had no basis for believing that he had CIA

support for much of anything. Were he a provocateur reporting to Castro,

or if he was merely careless and leaked what he knew, he had no

factual basis for leaking or reporting any actual CIA plot directed

against Castro.

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II. SPECIFIC SECTIONS OF THE SSC REPORT

Section 1, B

This section of the SSC Final Report, the Summary, states that "it

places particular emphasis on the effect their (the intelligence agencies)

Cuban operations seemed to have on their investigation." It states

that the report "details these operations to illustrate why they were

relevant to the investigation." It states that presentation of the

AMLASH operation is to illustrate why that operation should have been

examined by the Warren Commission.

-

The view of the Subcommittee, as to why the AMLASH operation

warranted such review, is summarized at page 5 of the Report as

follows:

"The AMLASH plot was more relevant to the Warren

Commission's work than the early CIA assassination

plots with the underworld. Unlike those earlier

plots the AMLASH operation was in progress at the

time of the assassination; unlike the earlier plots,

the AMLASH operation could clearly be traced to CIA;

and unlike the earlier plots, the CIA had endorsed

AMLASH's proposal for a coup, the first step to him

being Castro's assassination, despite Castro's threat

of retaliation for such plotting."

As stated in the preceeding discussion the AMLASH operation was

without substance prior to President Kennedy's death; it is particularly

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unsuited to make the Subcommittee's intended point. It is literally

accurate to note a coincidence in time, of the contacts with AMLASH/1

prior to the death of President Kennedy, but that is all. It is incorrect

to say that "CIA had endorsed AMLASH's proposal." There was no agree-

ment with AMLASH/1, or commitment to him, and even had Castro learned

of the contacts with him there was nothing to learn beyond the fact

of the contact. The relationship was most tenuous and without any

support promised to him for whatever he planned. Castro's "threat"

--as noted above--must be considered irrelevant to the substantive

nature of the AMLASH relationship at that time.

This viewpoint was conveyed to the Subcommittee prior to publica-

tion of the report. At the same time it was observed that theoretically

there was greater possibility of leaks from the earlier operations

involving the criminal underworld, although there was no known evidence

of such leaks. While general rather than specific, this could have

provided more reasonable support for

the Subcommittee's view that there

were CIA operations that should have been reported to the Warren Commission.

The SSC Subcommittee saw otherwise, outlining its position at page 68

as follows:

"...it is unlikely that Castro could have

distinguished the CIA plots with the underworld

from those plots not backed by CIA. In fact,

the methods the CIA used in these attempts were

designed to prevent the Cuban government from

attributing them to the CIA."

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The result this has on the present comment on the SSC Final

Report may seem anomalous. It places CIA in the position of con-

testing the interpretation given the AMLASH operation in the SSC

Final Report, and to that extent the thesis that the presentation

was supposed to support. At the same time, however, we are

inclined to acknowledge in principle the possibility--not seriously

considered as a likelihood during the Warren Commission inquiry--

that other operations could have suffered the defects attributed

to the AMLASH operation by the SSC Report. In protesting the

presentation in one instance, and the specific conclusions it seeks

to support, the effect is to disagree with a substantial portion

of the report as written. On the other hand we tend to not contest

a general thesis that more specific attention could have been given

by the Warren Commission to the anti-Castro programs of the U.s..

Government, including CIA activities.

******* * * * * * *

At page 4 of the SSC Final Report Desmond Fitzgerald, in a

meeting with AMLASH/l, is quoted as having:

"stated the United States would support a coup."

Again, at page 19, the report states that Fitzgerald:

"also gave general assurances that the United

States would help in bringing about the coup."

The last version is attributed to the case officer who was present at

the meeting in 1963, in his testimony before the SSC in 1975. This

presentation of the case officer's statements in 1975 does not match

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the report of the meeting in 1963, which was written by him at the time.

In considering the processes by which this version came into being, it

is noted that the following statement appears at page 87 of the SSC

Interim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots:

"Fitzgerald met AMLASH/1 in late fall 1963 and

promised him that the United States would support

a coup against Castro,"

citing testimony by the case officer who was present at the meeting.

An interesting footnote (#3) on that page reads as follows:

"3. The contact plan for the proposed meeting

stated: 'Fitzgerald will represent self as personal

representative of Robert F. Kennedy who travelled to

(foreign city) for specific purpose meeting AMLASH/1

and giving him assurances of full support with

a change of the present government in Cuba.'"

(Emphasis added).

The underscored portion--the word "with"--in fact read in the actual

document "if there is." This substitution of language in a purported

quotation may seem only a matter of nuance, but it treats with what

Fitzgerald planned to say, which takes on special significance when

matched with the expressly limited statements that he actually made

(as discussed at pages 11 and 12 of this annex) and what AMLASH/1

understood (as discussed at pages 13-15).

****** * * **

At page 5 the SSC Final Report quotes officers in CIA responsible

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for the investigation at the time of the Warren Commission as stating

to the SSC that had they known about the AMLASH operation in 1963 it

would have affected the investigation. It is only noted that it is

likely that views elicited from CIA employees in 1975 probably were

responsive to representations by SSC staff members as to what the

operation involved, as distinguished from what it actually was.

***** * * * * * * * *

At page 24 the SSC Final Report contains the following

statement:

"According to the 1967 Inspector General Report,

=

CIA Headquarters cabled the AMLASH case officer on

the morning of November 23, and ordered him to break

contact with AMLASH due to the President's assassi-

nation and to return to Headquarters."

This statement is at least a literary extension of the statement of

the IG report, which was in its entirety as follows:

"[The case officer] states that he received an

OPIM cable from Fitzgerald that night or early

the next morning telling him that everything was

off."

The SSC was unable to get the case officer to support its expansion on

the reference in the 1967 IG report. His testimony is cited,

apparently despite suggestive prompting, that:

"

..

• he recalled receiving such a cable, but

could not recall whether it made specific mention

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of the President's assassination as the reason for,

breaking contact .

• "

It is noted that the cable was never found; it may never have been

sent, being a misrecollection of the case officer. In any event,

the two sources cited in the SSC Report do not support its version.

******* * * *

Footnote 30 on page 17 treats the question of the security of the

AMLASH operation. As noted in the above review of the AMLASH operation,

AMLASH/1 was on the record as expressing his disenchantment with the

Castro regime. He had told colleagues of his meetings with AMWHIP/1.

Through sensitive sources we know that other Cubans were aware of his

fulminations against the Castro regime. We do not know, beyond these

generalized statements, what he actually conveyed at that time to what

persons. We do know how little substance there was to his relationships

with CIA during this period, and how little he had to tell others were

he inclined to do so.

Assuming that AMLASH/1 was to attempt to organize a coup, he.

obviously had to try and associate himself with people of a like mind.

To crystallize their support he might have felt constrained to convey

assurances of external support. To the extent that he may have, we

do not know whether he would have claimed to have been promised things

that in fact had been denied him. It was not until much later that the

question of security--always a consideration, especially when more than

one person is involved--became a point of sufficient concern for CIA

to

break relations with him.

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Some have speculated that AMLASH/1 was, in some way, Castro's

provocateur.

such a possibility is always a proper subject for

consideration. There are questions that feed the theory, but the

issue remains debatable. We do not offer an opinion here, although

we do note that he was rewarded strangely if he was. When finally

arrested he served ten years of a thirty-year term. His public trial

did not mention his Agency associations for the period March 1961 to

November 1964. An interesting consideration is that when Castro pro-

vided Senator McGovern with a list of persons the Cubans claimed had the

mission of his assassination, although AMLASH/T was among those

included, the reported period for his activity also omitted this

earlier period.

*************

At page 26 of the SSC Final Report it is stated that on 24 November

the Mexico Station responded to a Headquarters request for the names

of known contacts of certain Soviet personnel in Mexico City. The SSC

Report acknowledges that the purpose of obtaining these names was to

determine the significance of Oswald's contact with Soviets and to.

assess their activities. The SSC Report states that:

"AMLASH's real name was included in the list

of names on the Mexico Station cable."

This is used as a basis for a discussion in the SSC Final Report of why

the inclusion of that name in the cable did not lead to the identification

of the AMLASH operation.

The treatment of this point in the SSC Final Report seems to rest

on a misconception of the context in which the name of AMLASH/1 was

mentioned.

The reference had to do with a contact between a member of

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the Soviet embassy and a Cuban cultural attache -- in December 1960 --

about a press conference planned for AMLASH/T in Mexico City" in

February and March 1961. It was not a report of a contact between

AMLASH/1 and the Soviet, which was the subject of the inquiry; the

name of AMLASH/1 could well have been omitted from the cable.

In

any event, the December 1960 date preceded the inauguration of

President Kennedy, which further removes the question from any

relevance to the subject. There was no reason to check the name.

The presentation in the SSC Final Report is confusing and mislead-

ing on this point.

-

* * * *

*****

Page 72 of the SSC Report refers to a July 1964 FBI report con-

cerning a CIA meeting with AMLASH. The SSC Report states "that the

purpose of those meetings had been to plan the assassination of

Castro." This is the same FBI report that helped confirm the

earlier turn-down of AMLASH/1 at the 29 October 1963 meeting (pages

14 and 15, this paper). While it stated that "there is now under

discussion some plan to kill Fidel Castro" (July 1964) it badly

mixes times and events. In any event, this aspect of the report

substantially post-dates the death of President Kennedy, and is

not directly relevant to the Warren Commission inquiry.

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* * *****

*

* * *

At page 75, the SSC Final Report quotes the testimony of the Chief,

SAS Counterintelligence. His recollections are very uncertain.

He

is quoted specifically as saying that he could not recall the exact

time frame, which is central to analysis of the operation, and speaks

of his "vague recollections" that the Fitzgerald meeting was related

to an assassination plot against Castro. The SSC Report nevertheless

gives this opinion full play despite the extensive qualification as to

its reliability.

********** * * *

At pages 68-75 of Book V of the SSC Final Report, consideration

is given to what was known of the AMLASH operation by certain CIA

employees, how they understood it, and what conclusions they could or

should have drawn from what they knew. The treatment seems to accept

as a premise that the relationship was an assassination plot throughout,

and overlooks the basically inchoate quality of the relationship with

AMLASH/1 during the period in question.

There will always be uncertainties in the developing relationship

with political action assets; that such was the case with AMLASH/1 is

noted in the discussion above.

In the present instance the uncertainties

were recognized and clearly recorded, as well as the limits placed on

positions that would be and were taken with AMLASH/1. It is important

to keep this in mind in considering the testimony of witnesses,

as

presented in the SSC Final Report.

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Different witnesses before the SSC would obviously view the AMLASH

affair in different lights, the basis for their understanding relating

to different levels of knowledge at different periods in time. What

did they know in 1963, and what more did they learn under what circum-

stances at

a later date? What they testified to in 1975--perhaps

on the basis of representations by SSC staff members as to what it

was--required quite a clear and precise treatment. The SSC Final

Report did not accord the subject that treatment.

***** * * * **

At pages 78, 79 and 105 of the SSC Final Report reference is made

to a Cuban exile designated as "A," who informed the FBI and CIA in

mid-1965 of activities of AMLASH/1 in Cuba to eliminate Castro, and

of his involvement with CIA. A careful reading of the SSC Report made

it clear that "A" was unaware of AMLASH/l's 1963 associations with CIA.

This information, reported in the context of the badly blurred

time frame of the SSC Final Report, was given a significance that it

did not otherwise have. First, the information was a year and a half

after the death of President Kennedy. Further, the informant had no

knowledge of the earlier period of CIA-AMLASH/1 relationships. When

this is placed alongside the clear record of the inconclusive nature

of the relationships in the 1963 period, it becomes something of an

irrelevancy.

It is noted that a footnote in the SSC Report, at this

point, records the fact that the book of material given to Senator

McGovern by Castro on persons who allegedly had plotted his

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assassination also contained no reference to that period, although

AMLASH/l's later activities were cited.

********** * * * *.

It is useful to recap the sequence of events. The record shows

that initially there was uncertainty as to what AMLASH/1 represented

as a potential asset. There was early consideration of his defection,

which changed to his possible use for intelligence purposes. As his

self-discipline was assessed as being inadequate for this task it was

determined that it was best for him to go it alone, developing his

own organization for whatever followed. The reservations that were

held concerning his qualities were reflected in the specifically

conditional arms-length position taken with him during the period

preceding President Kennedy's death. He had to succeed with his

own program before he could expect support from the U.s.

Eventually -- but not until after the death of President

Kennedy -- firmer indications of support were offered. Even then

the volume of equipment promised was not large, especially to a

man who claimed to have the "necessary people and equipment inside

[Cuba] to accomplish (the) overthrow ..." The nature of the

relationship never did firm up. As late as the fall of 1964

(page 77, Book V of the SSC Final Report) CIA was telling AMLASH/1

that it could not be associated with his concept of the first step

of a coup, which he viewed as requiring the death of Castro. While

one can reason that any association with AMLASH/1 included

association with all his plans, it nevertheless appears that those

directly involved structured their thinking differently.

SEGRE!

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The Inspector General's report in 1967 treated the AMLASH

operation in its study of assassination, as did the SSC Interim

Report on Alleged Assassination Plots.

At the time of the 1967 1G

report there was no issue of how to characterize the operation at

different times, and the question was not addressed. Facing that

question now, it is clear that however the operational relationship

developed after the death of President Kennedy, it was unformed and

without substance during his life. During that time it was not an

assassination plot. The treatment of this question in the SSC

Report is both imprecise and misleading.

28

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MATERIALS FORWARDED TO WARREN COMMISSION AND FBI

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Volume V of the SSC Final Report conveys an impression of

Timited effort by CIA in the course of the Warren Commission

inquiry. As is noted in other annexes to the present report,

CIA did seek and collect information in support of the efforts

of the Warren Commission. Additionally, it conducted studies and

submitted special analyses and reports.

The following pages list reports and other papers submitted

to the FBI (which had primary responsibility .for the investigation)

and to the Warren Commission.

It is felt that this compilation

is appropriate to consideration of the extent of the CIA effort,

to the extent that it reveals something of the results of that

effort.

The lists fall into the following sections:

E.1 Dissemination to the Intelligence Community

E.2 Dissemination of Information to the Warren Commission

E.3 Disseminations to the FBI on Rumors and Allegations

E.4 Memoranda to Warren Commission

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AGENCY SUPPORT TO THE FBI AND THE WARREN COMMISSION

Information received from the Agency's field stations was dis-

seminated to appropriate agencies and departments as soon as

The following list of some 100 cabled

disseminatites, eScips, and memoranda restora ded to the bleeral

10 October 1963 through September 1964.

AGENCY DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION TO THE INTELLIGENCE

COMMUNITY (FORMAL AND INFORMAL DISSEMINATIONS)

I

*10 October 1963

DIR 74673

• I11

(WH/3/Mexico)

Recipients: FBI, I&NS, Navy, State. [Warren Com-

mission]

*24 October 1963

DIR 77978

(WH/3/Mexico)

_ Request for two copies of most recent photograph of

Lee Harvey OSWALD.

Recipients: Navy. [Warren Commission]

23 November 1963

DIR 34915

(WH/3)

Information relating to telephone call on 28 Sep-

tember 1963 to Soviet Embassy in Mexico City.

Recipient: FBI

I

- Document Date

- Document Number

III - Originating Office

* - An asterisk indicates that the document was also made available

„to the Warren Commission.

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24 November 1963

TDCS-3/565,829

Subject:

Cuban Precautions following Assassination of

President Kennedy.

Recipients: State/INR, State/DIR, DIA, Army/Acs1, Navy,

Air, JCS, SECDEF, NSA, NIC, AID, USIA, OCI, ONE, OCR,

ORR, 00, EXO.

25 November 1963

DIR 84950

(WH/3/Mexico)

Subject: Silvia T. DURAN, Mexican Employee of the

Cuban Embassy [sic - Consulatej in Mexico City;

Contact with Lee Harvey OSWALD.

25 November 1963

DIR 84951

(CI/SIG)

Agency requests information relating to OSWALD's

Activities in Mexico City.

Recipient: FBI

26 November 1963

CSCI-

(WE/BC)

Subject: Reported Anonymous Telephone Message.

Recipient: FBI.

26 November 1963

(WH/3)

CSCI-3/778,826

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD, Suspected Assassin of

3 October 1963

Recipient: FBI.

26 November 1963

CSCI-3/778,829

(WH/3)

Subject:

Lee Harvey OSWALD, Suspected Assassin of

President Kennedy.

(Encloses transcripts of tele-

between 215 september sna 3 October THis OSWALD

NB: This dissemination may be identical with

CSCI-3/778,826. The above CSCI number appears to

be the correct one, according to a copy of the

document in CI/SIG file No. 568.

Recipient:

2

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26 November 1963

DIR 85069

(WH/ 3)

Subject: Travel of Pro-Communist Costa Rican Congress-

man to Texas on 26 November 1963.

Recipient: FBI

*26 November 1963

DIR 85089

(C/WH/3)

Gilberto ALVARADO, a professed Castroite Nicaraguan,

stated to U.S. Embassy in Mexico City on 26 November

26 November 1963

DIR 85176

(WH/3)

Subject: Marina Nikolaeva OSWALD (information volun-

teered on Marina OSWALD by Moroccan student Mohamed

REGGAB studying in West Germany.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy.

26 November 1963

DIR 85177

(WH/3/Mexico)

subject: Telephone communication between Cuban Presiden

ORTICOS and Joaquin HERNANDEZ Armas, Cuban Ambassadro t

Mexico.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service re-

ceived copy.

26 November 1963

Unnumbered

(CI/SIG)

Subject: HUNTER Report No. 10815.

Recipient: FBI.

26 November 1963

Unnumbered

(CI/SIG)

Subject: HUNTER Report No. 10816.

Recipient:

FBI.

3

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27 November 1963

CSCI-3/778,881

(WH/3/Mexico)

Subject:

lexico City,

Lee Harvey svenDe Sivist Activities in

Recipient:

FBI.

*27 November 1963

DIR 85182

(WH/3/Mexico)

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. On 23 November, Richard

That a i we Are i he a enerts regarding

recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy. [Warren Commission

27 November 1963

DIR 85195

(C/WH/3)

United States Ambassador to Mexico requests passage

of message to Secretary of State RUSK, Mr. McCONE,

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy.

27 November 1963

DIR 85196

(C/WH/3)

According to information from Nicaraguan Security

intellence sot tonio to gust to tear

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

*27 November 1963

DIR 85199

(WH/3/Mexico)

Information solicited from Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte.

Recipients: FBI.

recipients: FBI, state, ohite siouse; Secret Service

27 November 1963

DIR 85222

(WH/3/Mexico)

Subject:

Silvia T. DURAN, Mexican Employee of the

Cuban Embassy [sic - Consulate] in Mexico City,

contact of Lee Harvey OSWALD.

Recipient:

FBI.

4

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27 November 1963

DIR 85246

(WH/3)

oy else on 21 sverely 19 5o 5

27 November 1963

DIR 85471

(C/WH/3)

Subject: Rearrest of Silvia DURAN.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House.

27 November 1963

DIR 85573

(WH/ 3/Mexico)

Information from U.S. Ambassador MANN for Secretary

of State RUSK regarding Ambassador HERNANDEZ, Cuban

Ambassador to Mexico, and Gilberto ALVARADO.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House.

27 November 1963

Unnumbered

(CI/SIG)

Information on Ernesto RODRIGUEZ relayed by tele-

phone to S. PAPICH.

Recipient: FBI.

27 November 1963

Unnumbered

(CI/SIG)

Information regarding photographic coverage of

Cuban and Soviet Embassies in Mexico City passed

to S. PAPICH of the FBI.

Recipient: FBI.

27 November 1963

Unnumbered

(CI/SIG)

Telephone contact with S. PAPICH with regard to

OSWALD's presence in New Orleans in September 1963.

Recipient: FBI.

28 November 1963

DIR 85657

(C/WH/3)

On 26 November 1963 a British journalist named John

WILSON-HUDSON gave information to the American Em-

bassy in London indicating that an "American gangster-

type named RUBY" visited Cuba around 1959.

Recipients:

FBI, State, White House.

5

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*28 November 1963

DIR 85662

(C/WH/3)

Further interrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House. [Warren

*28 November 1963

DIR 85665

(C/WH/3)

The Hague Station reports that on 23 November 1963,

a Tocal Castroite named Maria SNETHLAGE talked to

Third Secretary Ricardo SANTOS of the Cuban Embassy.

SNETHLAGE claimed she knew the Mr. LEE [sic] who

murdered President Kennedy.

State, White House; Secret Service

received copy. [Warren Commission]

29 November 1963

CSCI-3/778,893

(WH/ 3/Mexico)

Subject: Interrogation of Silvia Tirado de DURAN

and Horacio DURAN Navarro.

Recipient: FBI.

*29 November 1963

DIR 85666

Acting upon FBI request, the Agency requests ALVARADO

se turned over to Mexican authorities for additiona

interrogation and investigation

Recipients: FBI, State, White House. [Warren Com-

mission]

29 November 1963

DIR 85668

(WH/3/Mexico)

Highlights from interrogation of Horacio DURAN Navarro

and his wife, Silvia Tirado de DURAN.

Recipients:

FBI, State, White House-

*29 November 1963

DIR 85670

(C/WH/3)

sensitive sources ..

• have reported that when the

23 November arrest of Silvia DURAN became known to

the personnel of the Cuban Embassy there was a

great deal of discussion.

Recipients:

FBI, State, White House.

[Warren

Commission]

6

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29 November 1963

DIR 85676

(WH/3/Mexico)

Subject: Travel of Soviet diplomatic couriers.

Recipient: FBI.

*29 November 1963

DIR 85691

(C/WH/3)

Series of anonymous telephone calls to the office of

the Naval Attache in Canberra, Australia, by a man

claiming to have knowledge about a Soviet plot to

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy.

29 November 1963

DIR 85714

(C/WH/3)

Release of Silvia DURAN for second time on

28 Noients FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy.

*29 November 1963

DIR 85715

(WH/3/Mexico)

Subject: Travel of Lee Harvey OSWALD (October 195!

to May 1962).

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy.

29 November 1963

DIR 85744

(C/WH/3)

Interrogation of Gilbert ALVARADO Ugrate.

Recipients: FBl, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy.

*29 November 1963

DIR 85758

(WH/3/Mexico)

Translation of interrogation of Silvia DURAN and

Horacio DURAN Navarro.

Recipients: FBI

Recipied so Be State Commissiouse; Secret Service

7

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*29 November 1963

DIR 85770

(C/WH/3)

Series of incidents which have produced a report alleging

advance information on assassination.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service re-

ceived copy. [Warren Commission

29 November 1963

Unnumbered Memorandum

(CI/SIG)

Telephone contact with S. PAPICH concerning rumor that

Oswald had made a bank deposit.

29 November 1963

Unnumbered Memorandum

(CI/SIG)

Telephone contact with S. PAPICH relaying the Director's

suggestion that FBI check all bank accounts and safe

deposit records in New Orleans, Fort Worth, and Dallas.-

30 November 1963

CSCI-3/778/894

Subject: Article in 29 November 1963 issue of Washington

Pest sentes ting two men involved in assassination.

*30 November 1963

DIR 86063

(C/WH/3)

Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte admits his story a fabrication.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House. [Warren Commission]

3 December 1963

DIR 86496

(C/WH/3)

Information relating to OSWALD's presence in Mexico.

Recipient: FBI.

*4 December 1963

DIR 86702

(C/WH/3)

Travel information regarding OSWALD and his wife,.

June 1962.

recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Servic

received copy.

Warren Commission

8

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5 December 1963

DIR 87189

Known Soviet intelligence officer in New Delhi

demanding full probe into assassination.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House.

(C/WH/3)

*6 December 1963

DIR 87520

(C/WH/3)

Correction of DIR 87502.

Received so B, State Comitesious

State, White House; Secret Service

*7 December 1963

DIR 87667

(C/WH/3/)

Reinterrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO concluded.

Recipient: FBI.

[Warren Commission)

9 December 1963

DIR 87731

(WH/ 3/Mexico)

Richard BEYMER, American movie actor, in touch with

Cuban Embassy, Mexico City.

Recipient: FBI.

*9 December 1963

DIR 87796

(WH/3)

Letter mailed in Stockholm on 25 November 1963

alleging assassination arranged by Communist

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy. [Warren Commission]

9 December 1963

Unnumbered Memorandum

(CI/SIG)

Telephone contact with S. PAPICH regarding identity

of a source who claims plot to assassinate Kennedy

prepared and executed jointly by the Communist

Chinese and Cubans through intermediaries.

JMWAVE 8658 IN 75902).

Recipient: FBI.

11 December 1963

TDCSDB 3/658, 408

Subject: Comments of Soviet official regarding

(a) Moscow views on international situation

following death of President Kennedy, and (b)

resumption of disarmament talks.

Recipients:

General distribution.

9

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12 December 1963

CSCI-3/779,048

(C/WH/3)

ubne tiLSON, SOM, huds. hn (also: MILSON-HUDSON,

Recipient:

FBI.

*12 December 1963

DIR 88643

Subject: Letter Relative to Assassination of Presi-

dent Kennedy Sent to United States Embassy in Costa

Rica.

Recipients:

FBI, State, White House. [Warren Com-

mision]

12 December 1963

DIR 88682

(C/WH/3)

Cuban Ambassador to France received instructions not

to comment upon the assassination.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House.

12 December 1963

DIR 88747

(C/WH/3)

ubject: Second Interrogation of Silvia DURAN

ecipients: FBI. State. White House

*13 December 1963

CSCI-3/779,136

(C/WH/3)

Subject: Mexican Interrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO.

Recipient: FBI. [Warren Commission]

16 December 1963

CSCI-3/779,135

(C/WH/3)

Subject: Peter DERYABIN's Comments on Kennedy

Assassination.

Recipient: FBI.

*18 December 1963

DIR 89970

(C/WH/3)

Further information on Richard Thomas GIBSON.

Received sopy. state onite House; Secret Service

received

10

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SECRET

*18 December 1963

DIR 89980

Subject: Actions of Silvia DURAN after her first

interrogation.

reciped so - state, comies iouse; Secret Service

19 December 1963

CSCI-3/779,225

Subject: Nomenclature of Weapon Possibly Owned bj

Lee Harvey OSWALD.

Recipient: FBI.

19 December 1963

CSDB-3/658,870

(WH/Reports)

Subject: a.

Disagreements between Fidel CASTRO and =

Rauo ROA y Garcia.

Probable Future Plan of Action for

Carlos RAFAEL Rodriguez.

Recipients: State (Miami) and others (not identified.

27 December 1963

CSCI-3/779,297

Subject: Assassination of President Kennedy (arranged

by the Cuban Government and the Communist Chinese).

Recipient: FBI.

3 January 1964

Unnumbered Memorandum (CI/SIG)

Telephone contact with S. PAPICH on 3 January 1964

regarding newspaper article appearing in El. Caribe

on 27 November 1963 and possible connection with

ALVARADO's interview in the U.S. Embassy on 26 November.

Recipient: FBI.

*10 January 1964

CSCI-3/779,482

(WH/3/Mexico)

Subject:

Second Mexican Interrogation of Silvia DURAN.

Recipient:

FBI.

[Warren Commission]

11

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14 January 1964

CSCI-3/779,510

(CI/SIG)

Subject: Assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

(Regarding liaison with FBI and latter's handling of

27 January 1964

CSCI-3/779,729

(CI/SIG)

Subject: Possible Relatives of Marina Nikolayevna

OSWALD.

Recipient: FBI.

30 January 1964

CSCI-3/779,814

(CI/SIG)

Subject: Jack L. RUBY, Lee Harvey OSWALD.

Recipient: FBI.

4 February 1964

CSCI-3/779,817

(SR/CI/R)

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. (Information on names,

Sodret Uniond telephone numbers relating to the

18 February 1964

DDP 4-0860

emorandum for the Director, Federal Bureau o

Investigation.

Subject: Assassination of John F

Recipient: FBI. [Copy to Warren Conmission]

18 February 1964

DDP 4-0861

Memorandum for the Director, Federal Bureau of

Investigation.

Subject: Assassination of

President John F. Kennedy.

Recipient:

FBI. [Copy to Warren Commission]

18 February 1964

DDP 4-0862

Memorandum for the Chief, United States Secret

Service.

Subject:

Assassination of President

12

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SECRET

John F. Kennedy. (Verification of entry in "Historic

Diary" relating to OSWALD's attempted suicide.)

Recipient: Secret Service.

[Copy to Warren Commission]

18 February 1964

DDP 4-0864

Interangunce and Research, Department be Streetor of

1, Department of State.

Assassination of President John F. Kennedy -

Verification of Entry in "Historic Diary"

Recipient: State. [Copy to Warren Commission]

(SR/CI/R)

20 February 1964

CSCI-3/779,988

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. (Information regarding

SETYAEVA and RAHM.)

Recipient:

FBI.

22 February 1964

DIR 03101

(C/WH/3)

Subject: Further Information Provided by Moroccan

Student Mohamed REGGAB.

Recipient: White House (attention Secret Service).

11 March 1964

CSCI-3/780,344

Subject: Summary of Findings in Regard to Allegations

by Mohamed REGGAB Relative to Marina OSWALD.

Recipient: FBI.

20 March 1964

CSCI-3/780,612

(SR/CI/R)

OSWALD).

Recipient:

FBI.

16 April 1964

CSCI-3/780,996

(SR/CI/R)

Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO.

Recipient: FBI.

20 April 1964

CSDB-3/660,704

Subject: Plans by British and French to Publish

BUCHANAN Articles on Assassination.

Recipient: FBI (?)

13

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22 April 1964

CSCI - 3/780,881

(SR/CI /R)

Subject:

Assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

(Information regarding Lydia DYMITRUK.)

Recipient:

30 April 1964

Unnumbered Memorandum

(CI/SIG)

Telephone Contact with S. PAPICH on 29 November

advising PAPICH to contact SOLIE of the Office

of Security for information.

8 May 1964

DDP 4-2351

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Marina OSWALD's Notebook.

Recipient: Copy of attachment forwarded to FBI.

11 May 1964

CSCI - 3/781,172.

-

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD.

(Traces on Soviet names,

addresses, and telephone numbers from an address book

belonging to Marina OSWALD.)

Recipient: FBI.

13 May 1964

CSCI -3/781,282

(SR/CI/R)

15 May 1964

to the Assassination of President Kennedy.

14

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13 May 1964

CSCI-3/781,351

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD's Access to Classified

Information about the U-2.

Recipient: FBI. [Warren Commission - DDP 4-2444]

19 May 1964

CSCI-3/781,386

Subject: Paul DIMITRIK (aka Pavel DIMITRUK).

Recipient: Navy.

5 June 1964

CSCI-3/781,543

(CI/R&A)

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. (Use of Machine Colla-

tion Program to Check Out Cubans Mentioned in Letter

of 27 November 1963 from Mario del ROASRIA Milina.

(CI/R&A)

10 June 1964

CSCI-3/781,841

Subject: Information Concerning Jack Ruby.

Recipient: FBI.

29 June 1964

CSCI-3/782,058

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Investigation of Allegation that OSWALD was

in Tangier, Morocco.

Recipient: FBI. [Warren Commission

2 July 1964

DDP 4-3401

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Lee Harvey OSWALD.

Recipient: Copy to FBI.

6 July 1964

DDP 4-3470

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

15

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27 August 1964

CSCI-316/00856-64

Subject: No Indication of Subject's Defection Having

Been Used for Propaganda by the Soviet Union.

Recipient: FBI.

3 September 1964

DDP 4-4600

lemorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN

subject: OSWALD Documents Supplied by the Cuba

Recipient: Copy to FBI.

1 October 1964

DDP 4-5110

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Joachim JOESTEN.

Recipient: Copy to FBI.

6 October 1964

CSCI-316/01446-64

Subject: [VIADUCT Interview on 9 September 1964; His

Comments on Seven Photographs Forwarded by the FBI.

Recipient: FBI.

23 October 1964

CSCI-316/01709-64

Subject: Raymond F. FRIESECKE.

Recipient: FBI.

2 November 1964

CSCI-316/01779-64

Subject: Testimony in the Warren Commission Report in

the Assassination of President Kennedy.

Recipient: FBI.

23 December 1964

CSCI-316/02545-64

Subject: Allegation of Unidentified Scientist of

Cuban Involvement in Assassination.

Recipient:

FBI.

-

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2 March 1965

CSCI-316/00925-65

Subject: Marvin KANTOR, Possible Connection with Investi-

gation of Lee Harvy and Marina OSWALD.

Recipient: FBI.

8 April 1965

30 June 1965

CSCI-316/01398-65

Subject: Correspondence to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico

Retypient: FBI. [Copy to Secret servicel

CSCI-316/02654-65

Subject: Silvia DURAN.

Recipient: FBI.

2 September 1966

CSCI-316/04482-66

Subject: Rima ZMITROOK, Lee Harvey OSWALD's Intourist

Guide in Moscow.

Recipient: FBI.

9 May 1967

CSCI-316/02153-67

Jim GARRISON to show that OSWALD was a CIA agent and

was to be used to assassinate Fidel CASTRO. GARRISON

ay Senator Robe Ken i aut brizing presen americans

This memroandum is intended to record that such letters

never existed and therefore could not be in GARRISON'S

possession.

Recipient:

14 June 1967

CSCI-316/02669-67

Subject: Allegations of Unidentified Woman Regarding

Mario GARCIAS et al.

Recipient:

FBI

17

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24 July 1967

CSCI-316/03243-67

Subject: Allegation of Oscar COUNTRERAS, Mexican newsman,

hat OSWALD visited UNAM Campus shortly after the Cubal

mbassy refused him a visa to visit Cuba. CONTRERAS

statement of dubious credibility; information passed to

Mexican authorities.

Recipient:

7 May 1968

CSCI-316/01678-68

Subject: Promotional Literature Concerning the Alleged

Assassination Conspiracy of Jfk written and Mailed by

Joachim JOESTEN in Support of District Attorney Jim

GARRISON's Allegations.

Recipient: FBI.

16 September 1969

CSC1-316/03323-69

Subject: Charles William THOMAS.

Recipient: FBI.

DISSEMINATION OF REPORTS TO CI STAFF

Since CI Staff held the Agency's official file on OSWALD,

all cable traffic (theoretically) including disseminations by

cable was sent to the Staff for filing in the official file. Ad-

ditionally, cables disseminations were released by CI/Liaison.

Copies were, therefore, available to the Staff.

Since CI Staff released all long-form CSCI's, coordinated

on short-form CSCI's, and maintained the CSCI log, the CI Staff

received copies of all CSCI's.

13 December 1963

DeeD SEATON OF MATERIAL TO THE MARE CAMISSION

[Commission Document No. 100]

Memorandum

Subject: Analysis of World Reaction to President

Kennedy's Assassination.

(Supplied

by A. W. DULLES.)

18

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21 January 1964

[Commission Document No. 300]

b. FBIS-28 on OSWALD case.

21 January 1964

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Draft Questions for Submission to the

Government of the Soviet Union.

22 January 1964

[Commission Document No. 691]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN:

Subject: Suggested Questions for Marina OSWALD.

25 January 1964

[Commission Document No. 321]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Chronology of Lee Harvey OSWALD's Stay in

the Soviet Union.

Alphabetical List of Persons in the Soviet

Union Who Were Known to or Mentioned by

Lee Harvey OSWALD or His Wife.

31 January 1964

[Commission Document No. 347]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Information Developed by CIA on the Activity

of Lee Harvey OSWALD in Mexico City, 28 September - 3

October 1963.

5 February 1964

Note from Thomas H. KARAMESSINES to J. Lee RANKIN.

Fourteen attachments including recent Soviet State-

ments on Lee Harvey OSWALD (as of 5 February 1964).

5 February 1964

[Commission Document No. 361]

Memorandum from Thomas H. KARAMESSINES, ADDP, to

J. Lee RANKIN forwarding three copies of Appendix B,

a summary biography of Mrs. OSWALD and her relatives.

19

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8 February 1964

[Commission Docjment No. 1182]

Letter from Thomas H. KARAMESSINES, ADDP, to J. Lee.

RANKIN regarding Soviet weapon mentioned in one o

Lee Harvey OSWALD's documents.

[Information passed to FBI.]

18 February 1964

Memorandum for the Director, Federal Bureau of Investi-

gation, attention Mr. S. J. PAPICH. Subject: Assassi-

abroad.)

[Copy to Warren Commission.]

18 February 1964

DDP 4-0860

Memorandum for the Director, Federal Bureau of Investi-

gation, attention Mr. S. J. PAPICH.

Subject: Assassi-

nation of John F. Kennedy.

(Request for information

relating to OSWALD's attempted suicide.)

[Copy to Warren Commission.]

18 February 1964

DDP 4-0861

Memorandum for the Director, Federal Bureau of Investi-

gation, attention Mr. S. J. PAPICH. Subject: Assassi-

nation of President John F. Kennedy. (Request for copies

of 47 photographs found among the effects of Lee Harvey

OSWALD.)

[Copy to Warren Commission.]

18 February 1964

DDP 4-0862

Memorandum for the Chief, United States Secret Service;

signed by Richard HELMS, DDP. Subject: Assassination

of President John F. Kennedy. (Verification of entry

in "Historic Diary" relating to OSWALD's attempted

suicide.)

[Copies

to Warren Commission and the FBI.]

20

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18 February 1964

DDP 4-0864

Memorandum for Mr. Thomas L. HUGHES, The Director oT

Intelligence and Research, Department of State.

Subject: Assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

(Verification of Entry in "Historic Diary".)

[Copies to Warren Commission and the FBI.]

19 February 1964

[Commission Document No. 384]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

(TS No. 187908.) Subject: Information Developed by

CIA on the Activity of Lee Harvey OSWALD in Mexico

City, September 28 to October 3, 1963.

19 February 1964

DDP 4-4581

-

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Cuban Consulate and

Embassy in

• Mexico City.

*21 February 1964

DDP 4-0940 [Commission Document No. 426]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Translations of Interrogations Reports of

Silvia DURAN.

Attachments: OUT Telegram No. 85758, 29 November 1963.

Translation of Interrogation of Silvia

DIRAN and Horacio DURAN Navarro.

CSCI-3/779,482 of 10 January 1964. Trans-

lation of Official Mexican Polic Report

on the Second Interrogation of Silvia

5 March 1964

DDP 4-1171

[Commission Document No. 448]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

ubject: Summary of Findings in Regard to Allegatior

/ Mohammed REGGAB Relative to Marina OSWAL

*6 March 1964

DDP 4-1224

[Commission Document No. 692]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Information in CIA's Possession Regarding

Lee Harvey OSWALD Prior to November 22, 1963.

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18 March 1964

DDP 4-1423

[Commission Document No. 528]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Article Alleging that OSWALD was Interviewed

by CIA in Moscow.

24 March 1964

DDP 4-1555

[Commission Document No. 674]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

to the Secret

Subjece but not yet made avainable to the fresident's

Commission.

*24 March 1964

DDP 4-1554

[Commission Document No. 631]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. -

Subject: CIA Dissemination of Information on Lee

Harvey OSWALD, Dated 10 October 1963.

Attachments: OUT Message No. 74673, dated 10 October

OUT Message No. 77978, dated 23 October

25 March 1964

DDP 4-1576

27 March 1964

Note from Richard HELMS to J. Lee RANKIN.

Attachment: Five copies of "Rumors about Lee Harvey

OSWALD", dated 23 March 1964.

DDP 4-1606

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to Thomas L. HUGHES,

*31 March 1964

[Copies to Warren Commission and the FBI.]

DDP 4-1655

[Commission Document No. 698]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Reports on Activities and Travel of Lee

Harvey OSWALD and Marina Nikolevna OSWALD.

Attachments: OUT Message No. 86702, 4 December 1963,

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to the White House, the Department of State, and the

Federal Bureau of Investigation, with copy to the

Secret Service.

OUT Message No. 97520, dated 6 December

1963, to the White House, the Department of State,

and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with copy to

OUT Message No. 85715, dated 29 November

1963, to the White House, the Department of State, and

the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with copy to the

Secret Service.

OUT Message No. 85182, dated 22 November

1963, to the White House, the Department of State, and

the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with copy to the -

Secret Service.

OUT Message No. 85665, dated 28 November

1963, to the White House, the Department of State, and

the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with copy to the

Secret Service.

*3 April 1964

DDP 4-1699

[Conmission Document No. 710J

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Richard Thomas GIBSON.

Attachment: OUT Message No. 89970, dated 18 December

1963, to White House, Department of State, and the

Federal Bureau of Investigation, with a copy to the

Secret Service.

6 April 1964

DDP 4-1739 [Commission Document No. 708]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

subject: Reply to Questions Contained in Your Memo-

randum dated 12 March 1964

"Certain Questions Posed

by the State Department Files")

7 April 1964

DDP 4-1787

[Commission Document No. 726]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Actions of Silvia DURAN After Her First

Interrogation.

23

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7 April 1964

DDP. 4-1786

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Mohammed REGGAB.

20 April 1964

DDP 4-1997

[Commission Document No. 817]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: BND Report Pertaining to Allegations Con-

cerning Anton ERDINGER.

21 April 1964

Letter from Raymond G. ROCCA to Mr. Samuel A. STERN.

Attachment: CSDB 3/660,704 (Plans of British and

French Publishing Firms to Publish the Thomas

BUCHANAN Articles on Assassination of President

Kennedy.)

24 April 1964

29 April 1964

4 May 1964

6 May 1964

DDP 4-2099 [Commission Document No. 844]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Lydia DIMYTRUK; Acquaintance of Marina OSWALD.

DDP 4-2160 [Commission Document No. 871J

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

SUBJECT: Photograph of Lee Harvey OSWALD.

DDP 4-2256

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Additional Information on Lee Harvey OSWALD.

DDP 4-2296

[Commission Document No. 902]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Criteria for Dissemination of Information to

the Secret Service; Recommendations of the Central

Intelligence Agency Relative to Presidential Protection.

8 May 1964

DDP 4-2351

[Commission Document No. 911]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

Marina OSWALD's Notebook.

24

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13 May 1964

15 May 1964

DDP 4-2444

[Commission Document No." 931]

Memorandum for the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD's Access to Classified Informa-

tion about the U-2.

[CSCI-3/781,351 - copy to Warren Commission]

[Commission Document No. 935]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Role of the Cuban Intelligence Service ir

Processing Visa Applicants; Reaction of that Service

to the Assassination of President Kennedy.

19 May 1964

DDP 4-2533

[Commission Document No. 944]

-

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Hours of Work at Cuban and Soviet Consulates;

Procedures and Regulations for Issuance of Cuban Visas;

Mexican Control of U.S. Citizens' Travel to and from

Cuba.

*19 May 1964

DDP 4-2534 [Commission Document No. 943J

Memorandum from Rixhard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Allegations of Pfc. Eugene B. DINKIN, U.S.

Army, Relative to Assassination Plot Against Presi-

*22 May 1964

DDP 4-2624

[Commission Document No. 971]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

•Anonymous Telephone Calls to United States

Embassy in Canberra, Australia, Relative to Planned

Attachinati ouf Message - Red, dated 29 November

Attachment:

1963, to the White House, Department of State, and

the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with a copy to

the Secret Service.

25

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27 May 1964

DDP 4-2688

[Commission Document No." 985]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Letter Accusing the Chinese Communists of

Plotting the Assassination of President Kennedy.

Attachment: OUT Message No. 87796, dated 9 December

the secret sere or investigation, at er a cops to

27 May 1964

DDP 4-2692

[Conmission Document No. 990]

1 June 1964

3 June 1964

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Discussion between Chairman KHRUSHCHEV and

Mr. Drew PEARSON Regarding Lee Harvey OSWALD.

DDP 4-2747 [Commission Document No. 1000]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte.

Attachments: OUT Message No. 85089, dated 26 November

1963, relative to Gilberto ALVARADO.

OUT Message No. 85199, dated 27 November

1963; subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD.

OUT Message No. 85662, dated 28 November

1963, relative to Gilberto ALVARADO.

OUT Message No. 86063, dated 30 November

1963, relative to Gilberto ALVARADO.

OUT Message No. 85666, dated 28 November

1963, relative to Gilberto ALVARADO.

OUT Message No. 87667, dated 7 December

1963; subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD.

Memorandum, dated 12 December 1963;

subject: Mexican Interrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO.

DDP 4-2764

[Commission Document No. 1001]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Documents on Lee Harvey OSWALD Furnished by

the Soviet Government.

3 June 1964

DDP 4-2770

[Conmission Document No. 1012]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject.

George and Jeanne de MOHRENSCHILDT.

26

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4 June 1964

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Information Developed on the Activity of Lee

Harvey OSWALD in Mexico City.

5 June 1964

DDP 4-2844

[Commission Document No. 1041]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Allegations Regarding Intelligence Training

School in Minsk, USSR.

10 June 1964

DDP 4-2922

[Commission Document No. 1054]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Information Concerning Jack RUBY (aka Jack

RUBENSTEIN) and His Associates.

*12 June 1964

DDP 4-2988 [Commission Document No. 1089]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Letter Relative to Assassination of President

Kennedy Sent to United States Embassy in Costa Rica.

Attachment: OUT Message No. 88643, dated 12 December

1963, to the White House, Department of State, and the

Federal Bureau of Investigation.

19 June 1964

DDP 4-3169 [Commission Document No. 1131]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Soviet Brainwashing

Techniques.

26 June 1964

DDP 4-3366

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

Soviet Brainwashing Techniques

29 June 1964

DDP 4-3347

[Commission Document No. 1188]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

Investigation of Allegation that OSWALD was

in Tangier, Morocco.

[Copy to the FBI.J

27

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1 July 1964

DDP 4-3389

[Commission Document No." 1201]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD's Arrival Time in Helsinki

on 10 October 1959.

2 July 1964

6 July 1964

DDP 4-3401 [Commission Document No. 1216]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD (Remarks by Soviet Consul

Pavel Antonovich YATSKOV).

[Copy to the FBI.]

DDP 4-3470 [Commission Document No. 1222]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to U. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Statements Reportedly Made by George anc

Jeanne de MOHRENSCHILDT Concerning Lee Harvey OSWALI

and the Assassination of President Kennedy.

[Copy to the FBI.]

22 July 1964

DDP 4-3712 [Commission Document No. 1273]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Apparent Inconsistencies in Material Fur-

nished the Commission by CIA and the Department of

State.

23. July 1964

DDP 4-3769 [Commission Document No. 1287]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD.

Attachment: Affidavit respecting origin and circum-

stances of a photograph of an unknown individual

furnished by this Agency to the FBI on 22 November

23 July 1964

ĐDP 4-3770

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD

Attachments:

Translation (original documents included. )

28

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31 July 1964

DDP 4-3916

[Commission Document No." 1358]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Length of Time Required for Obtaining Soviet

Tourist Visas in Helsinki and Stockholm, 1964.

7 August 1964

DDP 4-4037

[Commission Document No. 1356]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Soviet Hunting Societies.

28 August 1964

DDP 4-4479 [Commission Document No. 1443]

Memorandum from Thomas H. KARAMESSINES, ADDP, to J.

Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Konstantin Petrovich SERGIEVSKY.

-

31 August 1964

DDP 4-4581

3 September 1964

DDP 4-4600 [Document No. 50, List 21

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: OSWALD Documents Supplies by the Cuban Government.

[Copy to the FBI]

14 September 1964

DDP 4-4775 [Commission Document No. 1483]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to U. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Length of Time Required for Obtaining Soviet

Tourist Visas in Wester Europe in 1964.

11 September 1964

DDP 4-4793

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Publication of Documents Furnished to the

Commission by the Central Intelligence Agency.

11 September 1964

DDP 4-4794

[Commission Document No. 1479]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Certain Questions Posed by the State Depart-

ment Files.

(Revised)

(Attachment to CD No. 1479)

29

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11 September 1964

DDP 4-4795

[Commission Document No. 1479]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Soviet Hunting

Societies.

(Revised)

(Attachment to CD No. 1479.)

11 September 1964

DDP 4-4796

[Commission Document No. 1479]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Length of Time Required for Obtaining Soviet

Tourist Visas in Helsinki and Stockholm, 1964.

15 September 1964

DDP 4-4801

[Commission Document No. 1493]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

Information Concerning Jack RUBY (aka Jack

RUBENSTEIN) and His Associates.

17 September 1964

DDP 4-4823

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Hours of Work at Cuban and Soviet Consulates;

Procedure and Regulations for Issuance of Cuban Visas;

Mexican Control of U.S. Citizens' Travel to and from

Cuba.

17 September 1964

DDP 4-4838

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: State Department Files.

17 September 1964

DDP 4-4893

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. •

Subject: Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV.

17 September 1964

DDP 4-4841

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

sub the publication of memorand um, dated 2 eury

(Regarding Agency approval

concerning Lee Harvey OSWALD.

Not authorized.

30

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18 September 1964

DDP 4-4847

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: COmmunications from the Department of State.

18 September 1964

DDP 4-4848

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Departure from the USSR of Soviet Citizens

Married to Foreigners.

18 September 1964

DDP 4-4850

lemorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN

ubiect: Passport and Visa Office

18 September 1964

DDP 4-4873

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Intourist Hotels in Moscow.

18 September 1964

DDP 4-4882

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Technical Examination of Photographs of Lee

Harvey OSWALD's Application for a Cuban Visa.

18 September 1964

22 September 1964

DDP 4-4886

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Resettlement of U.S. Defectors in the USSR.

DDP 4-4921

lemorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN

ubject: Silvia Tirado Bazan de DURAN

17 September 1964

DDP 4-4922

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Eusebio AZQUE [sic - AZCUE] - Former Cuban

Consul, Mexico City.

31

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18 September 1964

DDP 4-4952

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWLAD.

Information regarding

OSWALD's stay in Helsinki.)

18 September 1964

DDP 4-4953

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Identification of Persons Appearing in FBI

Photograph No. D 33-46 (Commission Exhibit No. 2625).

1 October 1964

DDP 4-5110

[Commission Document No. 1532]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Joachim JESTEN.

[Copies to FBI, I&NS, State]

13 October 1964

DDP 4-5275

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

Publication of Documents Furnished to the

Commission by the Central Intelligence Agency.

16 October 1964

DDP 4-5334/1

Memorandum for The President's Committee on the Warren

Commission Report.

Subject:

CIA's Role in the Support of Presidential

Foreign Travel.

20 October 1964

DDP 4-5341

[Commission Document No. 1545]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

Information Developed on the Activity of Lee

Harvey OSWALD in Mexico City.

DDP 4-5558

29 October 1964

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Transmittal of OCR Publication:

Press Reaction to the Warren Report", and Follow-Up

Report, dated 22 October 1964.

32

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AGENCY DISSEMINATIONS TO THE FBI ET AL REGARDING RUMORS AND

ALLEGATIONS REGARDING PRESIDENT KENNEDY ASSASSINATION.

10 October 1963

DIR 74673

Lee Harvey OSWALD, Contact with Soviet Embassy, Mexico

City, 1 October 1963.

Recipients: FBI, I&NS, State, White House.

23 November 1963

DIR 84915

Information relating to telephone call on 28 September

1963 to Soviet Embassy in Mexico City.

Recipient: FBI.

25 November 1963

DIR 84950

Subject: Silvia T. DURAN, Mexican Employee of the

Cuban Embassy [sic - Consulate in Mexico City;

Contact with Lee Harvey OSWALD.

Recipient: FBI.

25 November 1963

DIR 84951

CIA requests information relating to OSWALD's ac-

tivities in Mexico City (from FBI interrogation

of OSWALD).

Recipient: FBI.

26 November 1963

Subject: Reported Anonymous Telephone Message.

Recipient: FBI.

26 November 1963

CSCI-3/778,826

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD, Suspected Assassin of

Encloses transcripts of tele-

phone calls made on 27 and 28 September and 1 and

3 October 1963.

• Recipient: FBI.

33

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26 November 1963

CSCI-3/778,829

Subject: Same as above

(Comment: This dissemination may be identical with

CSCI-3/778,826. The above CSCI number appears to

de the correct one, according to a copy of the docu-

nent in CI/SIG file no. 568.

Recipient: FBI.

26 November 1963

DIR 85069

Subject: Travel of Pro-Communist Costa Rican Congress-

man to Texas on 26 November 1963.

Representatives of this Agency in Costa Rica suspect

that Julio SUNOL Leal, pro-Conmunist, pro-Castro deput)

to the Costa Rican National Assembly, will try to

gather data in Texas to use in pro-communist-pro-Castro

propaganda in connection with the assassination of

President Kennedy.

Recipient: FBI.

26 November 1963

DIR 85089

Gilberto ALVARADO, a professed Castroite Nicaraguan,

stated to U.S. Embassy in Mexico City on 26 November

1963 [sic - 25 November 1963] that "on 18 September

1963 he saw Lee Harvey OSWALD receive six thousand

five hundred dollars in a meeting inside the Cuban

Embassy in Mexico City."

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received a copy. Warren Commission.

26 November 1963

DIR 85176

Subject: Marina Nikolaevna OSWALD (information volun-

teered on Marina OSWALD by Moroccan student Mohamed

REGGAB studying in West Germany.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

26 November 1963

DIR 85177

Subject: Telephone Communication between Duban Presi-

dent DORTICOS and Joaquin HERNANDEZ Armas, Cuban Am-

bassador to mexico.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy.

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26 November 1963

Unnumbered

so i INTER Report Mo. 10815.

26 November 1963

Unnumbered

Subject: HUNTER Report No. 10816.

Recipient: FBI

26 November 1963

Unnumbered

Subject: Passage of IN 68291 from Mexico City to the

Jhite House. (OSWALD's reported presence in Mexic

•ity on 18 September 1963.

27 November 1963

CSCI-3/778,881

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD, Soviet Activities in

Mexico City, 18 - 24 November 1963.

Recipient: FBI.

27 November 1963

DIR 85182

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD.

Submes aBsen arvemerican iving in Switzerland, ard

vas acquainted with OSWALD, made statements regarding

latter to a close friend in Bern.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy. [Warren Commission?

27 November 1963

DIR 85196

According to information from Nicaraguan Security

Service, Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte was a Nicaraguan

intelligence source from 1962 to August 1963.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy.

27 November 1963

DIR 85199

Information solicited from Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte.

Recipients:

received spy State, contes House; Secret Service

35

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27 November 1963

DIR 85222

Subject:

Silvia T. DURAN, Mexican Employee of the Cuban

Embassy [sic - Consulate] in Mexico City, contact with

Lee Harvey OSWALD.

Recipient: FBI.

26 November 1963

DIR 85246

Dr. Jose GUILLERMO Aguirre of Mexico reports information

regarding Lee Harvey OSWALD.

Recipients: FBl, State, White House; Secret Service re

(Also relayed to S. PAPICH of the FBI b

CI Staff on 27 November 1963.)

27 November 1963

DIR 85471

Subject: Rearrest of Silvia DURAN.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House.

27 November 1963

DIR 85573

Information from U.S. Ambassador MANN for Secretary of

State RUSK regarding Ambassador HERNANDEZ, Cuban Am-

assador to Mexico, and Gilberto ALVARADO.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House.

27 November 1963

Unnumbered

Information on Arnesto RODRIGUEZ relayed by telephone

to S. PAPICH.

Recipient: FBI.

27 November 1963

Unnumbered

and soviet messin in trico hity overed to Su PAPIC

of the FBI.

Recipient: FBI.

28 November 1963

DIR 85657

on 26 November a British journalist named John WILSON-

HUDSON gave information to the American Embassy in

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London indicating that an "American gangster type named"

RUBY" visited Cuba around 1959.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House.

28 November 1963

DIR 85662

Further interrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House. [Warren Commission]

28 November 1963

DIR 85665

The Hague Station reports that on 23 November 1963,

a local Castroite named Maria SNETHLAGE talked to

Third Secretary Ricardo SANTOS of the Cuban Embassy.

SNETHLAGE claimed she knew the Mr. Lee [sic] who

murdered President Kennedy.

Recipients: FBI

State, White House; Secret Service -

received copy. [Warren Commission]

29 November 1963

CSCI-3/778,893

Subject: Interrogation of Silvia Tirado de DURAN and

Horacio DURAN Navarro.

Recipient: FBI.

29 November 1963

DIR 85666

acting ed over to Meces authorities for additional De

interrogation.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House. [Warren Commission]

29 November 1963

DIR 85668

Highlights from the interrogation of Horacio DURAN Navarro

and his wife, Silvia Tirado de DURAN.

Recipients:

FBI, State, White House.

29 November 1963

DIR 85670

Sensitive sources

2 sivenes arrest of silve upar ed the moen the

37

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29 November 1963

Be perise or the cuban ene sy there a en coat seo

Warren Commission

DIR 85691

Series of anonymous telephone calls to the office of the

Naval Attache in Canberra, Australia, by a man claiming

to have knowledge about a Soviet plot to assassinate

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service re-

ceived copy.

29 November 1963

DIR 85714

Release of Silvia DURAN for second time on 28 November._

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy.

29 November 1963

DIR 85744

Interrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

29 November 1963

DIR 85758

Translation of interrogation of Silvia DURAN and

Horacio DURAN Navarro.

Recipients: FBI

State, White House; Secret Service

received copy. [Warren Commission]

29 November 1963

DIR 85770

Series of incidents which have produced a report

alleging advance information on assassination.

Recipients:

receivedts: Bl state comtes iouse; Secret Service

29 November 1963

Unnumbered memorandum

Telephone contact with S. PAPICH concerning rumor

that OSWALD had made a bank deposit.

Recipient:

FBI.

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30 November 1963

CSCI-3/778,894

Subject: Article in 29 November 1963 issue of Washington

ost suggesting two men involved in assassination

ecipient: FBI

30 November 1963

DIR 86063

Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte Admits his story a fabrication.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House. [Warren Commission]

3 December 1963

DIR 86496

fipate relating to OSWALD's presence in Mexico.

7 December 1963

DIR 87667

Re-interrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO concluded.

Recipient: FBI. [Warren Commission]

9 December 1963

DIR 87731

Richard BEYMER, American movie actor, in touch with

Cuban Embassy, Mexico City.

Recipient: FBI.

9 December 1963

DIR 87796

Letter mailed in Stockholm on 25 November 1963 alleging

Rocer doy are are tong perei service

9 December 1963

Unnumbered Memorandum

(See JMWAVE 8658, IN 75902.)

12 December 1963

CSCI-3/779,048

Subject: WILSON, Carlos John (also:

WILSON-HUDSON,

John; WILSON, John Hudson.

Recipient: FBI.

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:

12 December 1963

DIR 88643

Subject: Letter Relative to Assassination of President

Kennedy Sent to United States Embassy in Costa Rica.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House.

Warren Commission]

12 December 1963

DIR 88682

Cuban Ambassador to France received instructions not

to comment upon the assassination.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House.

12 December 1963

DIR 88747

Subject: Second Interrogation of Silvia DURAN.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House.

13 December 1963

CSCI-3/779,136

Subject: Mexican Interrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO.

Recipient: FBI. [Warren Commission]

16 December 1963

CSCI-3/779,135

Subject: Peter DERYABIN's Comments on Kennedy Assassination.

Recipient: FBI.

18 December 1963

DIR 89970

Further Information on Richard Thomas GIBSON.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy. [Warren Commission]

18 December 1963

DIR 89980

Subject: Actions of Silvia DURAN after her first

receive dipy: atre, one douse; secret service

received copy.

27 December 1963

CSCI-3/779,297

Subject: Assassination of President Kennedy (arranged

by the Cuban Government and the Communist Chinese).

Recipient:

FBI.

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3 January 1964

Unnumbered Memorandum

Telephone contact with S. PAPICH on 3 January 1964

vember.

Recipient:

FBI.

10 January 1964

CSCI-3/779,482

Subject:

Second Mexican Interrogation of Silvia

DURAN.

Recipient: FBI. [Warren Commission]

27 January 1964

CSCI-3/779,729

Subject: Possible Relatives of Marina Nikolayevna

OSWALD.

Recipient: FBI.

30 January 1964

CSCI-3/778,814

Subject: Jack L. RUBY, Lee Harvey OSWALD.

Recipient: FBI.

4 February 1964

CSCI-3/779,817

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. (Information on names,

addresses, and telephone numbers relating to the

Soviet Union.)

Recipient: FBI.

18 February 1964

DDP 4-0860

Memorandum for the Director, Federal Bureau of

Investigation.

Subject:

Assassination of John F. Kennedy.

("In connection with our efforts to assist the

President's Commission on the Assassination of

President Kennedy by providing information which

might be helpful in interpreting available ma-

terials relating to OSWALD's activities abroad,

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we have considered the entry with regard to attempted

suicide.

We consider this entry as being of consider-

able importance and one which might be subject to

Recipient: FBI.

[Copy to Warren Commission]

DDP 4-0861

18 February 1964

Memorandum for the Director, Federal Bureau of

Investigation.

Assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

47 photographs which were among the effects of

Lee Harvey OSWALD, •

It appears that most of

the photographs were taken in the USSR and depict

Soviet contacts of OSWALD or scenes in the Soviet

Union. ")

Recipient:

FBI. [Copy to Warren Commission]

18 February 1964

DDP 4-0862

Memorandum for the Chief, United States Secret Service.

Subject: Assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

(Verification of entry in "Historic Diary" relating to

OSWALD's attempted suicide.)

Recipient: Secret Service.

i tempted servide. [Copy to Warren Comnission]

18 February 1964

DDP 4-0864

Recipient: State. [Copy to Warren Commission]

20 February 1964

CSCI-3/779,988

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. (Information regarding

Annette SETYAEVNA and Lillie May RAHM.)

Recipient: FBI.

22 February 1964

DIR 03101

Subject: Further Information Provided by Moroccan

Student Mohamed REGGAB.

Recipient:

White House (attention Secret Service.)

42

SECRET,

---

## Page 155

13-00000

SECRET,

11 March 1964

CSCI-3/780,344

Subject: Summary of Findings in Regard to Allegations

by Mohamed REGGAB Relative to Marina OSWALD.

Recipient: FBI.

20 March 1964

CSCI-3/780,612

Subject: Assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

(Photograph of an individual closely resembling

Recipient: FBI.

16 April 1964

CSCI-3/780,881

Subject: Assassination of President John f. Kennedy. -

(Information regarding Lydia DYMITRUK. )

Recipient: FBI.

8 May 1964

11 May 1964

DDP 4-2351

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Marina OSWALD's Notebook.

Recipient: Copy of attachment forwarded to FBI.

[Warren Commission]

CSCI-3/781,172

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD.

(Traces on Soviet names,

addresses, and telephone numbers from an address book

belonging to Marina OSWALD.)

Recipient: FBI.

13 May 1964

CSCI-3/781,282

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. (Identification of

photographs sent to CIA by FBI.)

Recipient:

15 May 1964

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Role of Cuban Intelligence Service in Processing

Visa Applicants; Reaction of the Service to the Assassi-

Ration ent President aerend omission?

Recipient:

43

[SECRET

---

## Page 156

13-00000

SECRET.

5 June 1964

CSCI-3/781,543

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. (Use of Machine Colla-

ion Program to Check Out Cubans Mentioned in Letter

f 27 November 1963 from Mario del ROSARIA Milina.

10 June 1964

CSCI-3/781,841

Subject: Information Concerning Jack RUBY.

Recipient:

FBI.

29 June 1964

CSCI-3/782,085

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Investigation of Allegation that OSWALD was

in Tangier, Morocco.

Recipient: FBI.

[Warren Commission]

2 July 1964

DDP 4-3401

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

(Remarks made by Soviet Consul Pavel Antonovich YATSKOV.)

Recipient: FBI. [Warren Commission]

27 August 1964

CSCI-316/00856-64

Subject: No Indication of Subject's Defection Having

Been Used for Propaganda by the Cuban Government.

Recipient: FBI.

[Warren Commission]

3 September 1964

DDP 4-4600

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: OSWALD Documents Supplied by the Cuban

Government.

Recipient:

FBI. [Warren Commission]

6 October 1964

CSCI-316/01446-64

Subject: VIADUCT Interview on 9 September 1964; His

Comments on Seven Photographs Forwarded by the FBI.

Recipient:

FBI.

44

SECRET

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## Page 157

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SECRET

23 December 1964

CSCI-316/02545-64

2 March 1965

30 June 1965

Subject: Allegation of Unidentified Scientist of

Cuban Involvement in Assassination.

Recipient: FBI.

CSCI-316/00925-65

Subestig an of kara, ey sid earina otion with

Recipient: FBI.

CSCI-316/02654-65

Subject: Silvia DURAN.

Recipient: FBI.

2 September 1966

CSCI-316/04482-66

Subject: Rima ZMITROOK, Lee Harvey OSWALD's In-

tourist Guide in Moscow.

Recipient: FBI.

14 June 1967

CSCI-316/03243-67

Subject: Allegation of Oscar COUNTRERAS, Mexican

Newsman, That OSWALD Visited UNAM Campus Shortly

After the Cuban Embassy Refused Him a Visa to

Visit Cuba. CONTRERAS'

Statement of Dubious

Credibility; Information Passed to Mexican au-

thorities.

MEMORANDUM SUBMITTED BY CIA TO THE WARREN

COMMISSION ON RUMORS AND ALLEGATIONS RE-

LATING TO THE PRESIDENT'S ASSASSINATION

31 January 1964

Subject: Information Developed by CIA on the

Activity of Lee Harvey OSWALD in Mexico City,

28 September - 3 October 1963.

45

SECRET

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## Page 158

13-00000

SECRET

5 March 1964

Subject: Summary of Findings in Regard to Allegations

by Mohammed REGGAB Relative to Marina OSWALD.

18 March 1964

Subject: Article Alleging that OSWALD was interviewed

by CIA in Moscow.

.31 March 1964

DDP 4-7655

Teletype Message No. 85665, 28 November 1963 -

Remarks Made by Maria SNETHLAGE and Thirc

3 April 1964

7 April 1964

4 May 1964

DDP 4-1699

Subject: Richard Thomas GIBSON.

DDP 4-1784

Subject: Mohammed REGGAB.

DDP 4-2256

Subject: Additional Information on Lee Harvey OSWALD.

'A survey of Agency files indicates that all . .

information known to the Agency on OSWALD's associatior

(with communists or criminals, either in United States

or abroad) has been made available to the Commission."

8 May 1964

DDP 4-2351

Subject: Marina OSWALD's Notebook.

(Compilation of traces on what appear to be Soviet

names, addresses, and telephone numbers from an ad-

dress book identified by Marina OSWALD as belonging

to her.)

46

'SECRETI

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## Page 159

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SECRET

15 May 1964

19 May 1964

22 May 1964

27 May 1964

1 June 1964

3 June 1964

4 June 1964

Subject: Role of the Cuban Intelligence Service in.

Processing Visa Applicants; Reaction of that Service

to the Assassination of President Kennedy.

DDP 4-2534

Subject: Allegations of PFC Eugene B. DINKIN, U.S.

Army, Relative to Assassination Plot Against Presi-

dent Kennedy.

DDP 4-2624

Subject: Anonymous Telephone Calls to United States

Embassy in Canberra, Australia; Relative to Planned

Assassination of President Kennedy.

DDP 4-2688

Subject: Letter Accusing the Chinese Communists of

Plotting the Assassination of President Kennedy.

(Comment:

Letter received at U.S. Embassy, Stockholm.)

DDP 4-2741

Subject: Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte.

Enclosures:

Out Teletype No. 85089, 26 November 1963.

Out Teletype No. 85199, 27 November 1963.

Out Teletype No. 85662, 28 November 1963.

Out Teletype No. 85666, 28 November 1963.

Out Teletype No. 86063, 30 November 1963.

Out Teletype No. 87667, 7 December 1963.

Memorandum, 12 December 1963, Interroga-

tion of

Gilberto ALVARADO.

DDP 4-2769

Subject: Documents on Lee Harvey OSWALD Furnished by

the Soviet Government.

DDP

ubiect: Information Developed on the Activity o

ee Harvey OSWALD in Mexico City

47

SECRET.

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## Page 160

13-00000

SECRET

10 June 1964

Subject: Information Concerning Jack RUBY (aka Jack

RUBENSTEIN) and His Associates.

12 June 1964

suesect kettery slative to Assassines mbassy

in Costa Rica.

29 June 1964

DDP 4-3347

Subject: Investigation of Allegation that OSWALD

was in Tangier, Morocco.

2 July 1964

DDP 4-3401

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD.

28 August 1964

DDP 4-4479

Subject: Konstantin Petrovich SERGIEVSKY.

15 September 1964

DDP 4-4808

Subject: Information Concerning Jack RUBY (aka Jack

RUBENSTEIN) and His Associates.

17 September 1964

DDP 4-4839

Subject: Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV.

17 September 1964

DDP 4-4922

Subject:

Eusebio AZQUE - Former Cuban Consul, Mexico City.

18 September 1964

DDP 4-4953

Subject: Identification of Persons Appearing in FBI

Photograph No. D 33-46 (Commission Exhibit No. 2625).

48

„SECRET

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## Page 161

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MEXICO CITY COVERAGE OF OSWALD VISIT

---

## Page 162

13-00000

SEGRET SENSITI

Intelligence Sources on Oswald's Visit

to Mexico City in 1963

1: funi ateral Coverage:

From

the time the Mexico Station was opened in April

1947 Juntil the arrival of Mr. Win Scott as Chief of Station in°9

1955, the Station had developed a support apparatus to exploit

leads from the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. This umbrella

type project (LIPSTICK) consisted of multi-line phone taps, three

photographic sites, a mobile surveillance team and a mail inter-

cept operation.

Telephone taps (LIFEAT) were placed by an employee of

the local telephone company who was handled by a Station case

officer. The number of lines tapped was limited only by the avail-

ability of a listening post nearby and the availability of language

(English, Spanish, Soviet, Polish, Czech, etc.) transcribers.

Generally, these were Mexican or Mexican-American recruited agents.

Three photographic sites were handled by a Station case

officer assisted by technicians on TDY from Headquarters who

advised the Station on the best types of cameras, films, and con-

cealment devices. These operations had sub-crypts under project

LIPSTICK (namely: LIMITED, LILYRIC and LICALLA). LIMITED was a

fixed site directly opposite the Soviet Embassy (across the

street) which had both a vehicle and a pedestrian entrance.

The

E2 IMPDET

CL BY 004645

SECRET SENSITIVE

IM/4

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## Page 163

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SCOTET/SENSITIVE

gate to the Soviet Embassy was on the northwest corner of the

Soviet compound and the LIMITED site. was diagonally across a

double laned street on the southeast corner of that block (See

attached diagram). LIMITED was the first photo base and opera-

ted strictly on an experimental basis in the early stages. This

base, however, was closed when the Station received word that the

photograph of the "unidentified man" was being released by the

Warren Commission. LILYRIC was an alternate photographic base.

It was located in an upper story of an apartment building on the

same side of the street as the LIMITED site but in the middle of

the block south. It had a planted view of the front gate of the

Soviet Embassy. LICALLA, the third photographic site, was located

in one of a row of four houses on the south side of the Soviet

Embassy compound. This site overlooked the back garden of the

Soviet Embassy compound. The purpose of this operation was to get

good identification photographs of Soviet personnel. The three

photographic sites were managed by a recruited agent who was a

Mexican citizen, the son of an American mother and Mexican father

(deceased). This agent collected the film from the LIMITED and

LILYRIC sites three times a week. The film was then devleoped and

printed into 8 x 10 contact print strips. LICALLA film was ori-

ginally processed in the Station but in early (1869] due to the

resignation of a technician, this film like that of LIMITED and

LILYRIC was processed on the outside by a recruited agent.

--

-..-

2

SENNET/SEMENVE

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## Page 164

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SECRET

SENSITI

Mobile surveillance was conducted by two American

staff officers.

These two officers organized a surveillance

team of six recruited agents which used late model cars

• and a

panel truck for surveillance.

The team could be activated by

radio from the LIMITED site whenever someone of interest left

the gate of the Soviet Embassy. These agents were aware of

the LIMITED site since they had been issued LIMITED photographs

for identification purposes.

The Station also conducted a Lunt lateral mail intercept

operation, LIBIGHT, which was handled by an American case officer.

LA recruited Mexican agent, Who had a semi-official status, obtained

selected letters from a sub-agent employed by the Mexican postal

system.]

2. [Liaison]Coverage:

Liaison coverage was unreliable and insecure as charac-

terized by the nature of the Mexican Services at that time. The

Mexican Direction of Federal Security (DFS), with which We con-

ducted liaison, was a hip-pocket group run out of the Mexican

Ministry af Government. This Ministry was principally occupied

with political investigations and control of foreigners. Their

agents were cruel and corrupt. A Station officer trained a number

of them in name tracing and travel control. ]

[In 1958, at the instigation of a Mexican official, a

joint telephone tap operation came into existence. The operation,

SECRET , SENSITIVE

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## Page 165

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....

Which became known as LTENVoY, was run by a Mexican officer

The listening post had 30 lines connected at one time.

The

transcription room was staffed by Mexican Army officers. In

1961, because of mismanagement by the Mexican principals.

the Station Chief, himself, became the project case officer.

A Station officer assisted him in the daily supervision of the

listening post and in picking up the transcripts and the tapes.

There was also an American technician inside the listening post.

3. Oswald Coverage:

•24

In mid-1962, [the Mexican officer in' charge of LIENVOY

(the joint tap operation) asked the American officer at the

LIENVOY listening post for the telephone numbers of the Soviet,.

Cuban

and Satellite Embassies in anticipation of possible cover-

age.J The Station immediately disconnected all of the inflateral

telephone taps on these Embassies so that they would not be dis-

covered when the Mexicans hooked up their taps. The Mexicans

soon thereafter connected five Cuban lines, five Soviet lines,

three Czech lines, two Polish lines, and one Yugoslav line. At

the listening post, a live monitor made short summaries of con-

versations of interest which were then included in a daily re-

sume for the Chief of Station. Later, when a reel was completely

recorded, full transcripts were typed and passed to the Station;

however, there was usually a time lag of a day or two.

Reels

which contained Russian or a language other than Spanish or

TH20FT1

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## Page 166

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SECRET / SENSITIVE

English were taken to another location for translation and

typing.

Mr. Boris Tarasoff did the Russian translations but

because of the volume of Russian conversations, the trans-

lations usually ran about a week behind the date of the con-

versation.

All transcripts were made in either Spanish or

English since the Chief of Station could read only these two

languages and because he personally screened the transcripts

for operational leads.

As soon as the Station learned that an American iden-

tifying himself as Lee Oswald phoned the Soviet Embassy, Miss

Ann Goodpasture of the Station started screening all photographs.

However, here again, there was a backlog because the photographs

were picked up three times a week, but those picked up were usually

for dates a few days before since the technician who was proces-

sing the film did so on a night-time basis. Further, photographs

were not made initially until a complete roll of film was used.

Later this was changed and the operator cleared the camera at the

end of each day regardless of amount of unused film remaining..

The instructions were to cover the entire work day (office hours)

and to photograph all Soviets, their families, all foreigners,

and cars with foreign license plates. Human error did occur but

generally the agents were conscientious. The Cuban Embassy cover-

age had more sophisticated equipment using a pulse camera which

frequently developed mechanical difficulties.

SEGNET/SENSITIVE

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## Page 167

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. .

SECRET SENSITIVE

Oswald came to the attention of the listening post

operators from a tap of the Soviet line. It was picked up and

taken to Mr. Boris Tarasoff for translation because the caller

was trying to speak in Russian.

There was some delay because

Station personnel waited to review the photographs coincidentally

with the typed transcript.

4. Airport Coverage:

This is discussed

at Tab B.

-

SECRET 6 STASITIVE

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## Page 168

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SELECTED NEWSPAPER STORIES WITH COMMENTS

Tab G

---

## Page 169

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=.

In the course of the research effort leading to this general

report, there were newspaper stories relating to the assassination

of President Kennedy and to CIA. Some of these appear to have been

based on specially designed stories emanating from the House Select

Committee on Assassinations. At the time of their appearance they

were the subject of comments prepared in CIA. These newspaper

stories and the comments are attached.

The following newspaper stories and comments are listed below:

Tab G.1 Jack Anderson column on 6 May 1977 alleging

CIA activity in Dallas, Texas in 1963.

Tab G.2 Jack Anderson column on 20 January 1977

alleging that CIA is tied to a false Oswald

story.

Tab G.3 Norman Kempster story on 1 January 1977

alleging that CIA withheld data on Oswald.

Tab G. 4

Clare Booth Luce involvement with Cuban exiles.

Tab G.5 Ronald Kessler story on 26 November 1976

alleging CIA withheld details of Oswald tele-

phone calls, with report on handling of documents.

Tab G.6 John Goshko story on 13 November 1976 alleging

that Oswald told the Cubans of his plan to kill

Kennedy.

Tab G.7 Tabloid Midnight story on 2 August 1976

regarding CIA and Castro.

lab G.8 washington Post story on 1 October 1976 concernin

TA consideration of possibly interviewins

Lee Harvey Oswald in 1960.

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## Page 170

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.

CONFIDENINAL

•...

77-0484

10 May 1977

MENORAMDUM FOR:

VIA

FROM

SUBJECT

:

:

REFERENCE

Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director of Central intelligence

John M. Waller

Inspector General

Jack Anderson 6 May 1977 Column Entitled

"Odd CIA Activity in Dallas in 1963"

OLC Memorandum for Director of Central

Intelligence - OLC 77-1816 (attached)

1. Action Requested: None, for information only.

2. Background: The attached Jack Anderson column is a

mixture of some fact and error.

At least portions of it seen:

to have been leaked by someone connected with the House Select

Committee on Assassinations.

Factual information on matters covered in the article

follows:

a.

Alpha 65 was

an anti-Castro Cuban Exile

Organization.

Antonio Veciana was one of its

founders.

Veciana contacted the Agency on three

occasions for assistance in an assassination plot

against Castro (December, 1960; July 1962 and April

1966).

On each occasion he was turned down.

Agency had no rasponsibility for or sponsorship of

Alpha 66.

b. Veciana was registered in the Inter-Service

Registry by the U.S. Army for the period Movenber

1962 to July 1966 at which time he was terminated

without prejudice.

c. Veciana reportedly collaborated with a Cuban

Government Intelligence Officer, Guillermo Ruiz, in

connection with Alpha 66 activities. Ruiz is married

to a cousin of Veciana..

E2, LAPDET

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COMFIDENTAL (

d. Anderson attempts to connect one Morris

Bishop with CIA in Dallas; newspapers in Dallas

have tried to identify Bishop with our DCD repre-

sentative in Dallas, Mr. J. Walton Moore.

cording to our records, no Agency officers ever

used the name of Morris Bishop as an alias.

one named Morris Bishop was ever employed by the

Agency.

e.

The FBI identified the three men who

visited Mrs. Odio.

Lee Harvey Oswald was not.

one of them.

at the time one e

The Warren Commission was satis-

fied that Oswald could not have been in Dallas

Solo Hi,

John H. walter

Attachment - 1

Distribution:

Original - Director of Central Intelligence w/att.

1 - Deputy Director. of Central Intelligence w/att.

1 - Assistant to the Director (Public Affairs) W/att.

1 - Office of Legislative Counsel w/att.

1 - Office of General Counsel Watt.

1 - Executive Registry w/att

1 - IG Subject watt:

7 - IG Chrono w/att.

1- J.L.Leader Chronow/att.c

OIG/J.L.Leader: aal

2

CONBIDENAL

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## Page 172

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THE WASHINGTON POST

•Fedog, Big 6,7078

Jack Anderson and Les Whitten

Odd CIA Activity in Dallas in 1963

The secret files of the Housa Assas: ceived Irom his CLA contact after Ken-

had been a mix-up but never cleared

Sinations Committee contain reports of

nedy was killed.

the matter up."

strange CIA activities in Dallas on the

The CIA man, Morris Bishop, asked

A CiA witnes has told commities la-

eye of the a Kennedy assassina.

• Veciana to contact his cousin, Buil-

vestigators, seanwhile, that the Cla's

lamo Ruiez, who worked for the Cuban

monitering camera happened to breas

Credible witnesses have confirmed

embassy in Mexico City. Relates a con-

down on the day that Cswald allegediy

our past reports that the accused assas.

fidential report: "Veciana was to relay

visited the Soviet Embassy. But the

sio, Lee Harvey Oswald, was in touch.

Bishop's ofter to pay Ruiez and bis: CLA lap on the Soviet Embassy's phone

with anth-Castro Cubans In Dallas, One

wite to say that they had met with Os

produced an alleged telephone cail

conidential report states that "in 1933;:

wald in Mexico City.".

from someone who identified himself

Oswald was seen leaving the Dallas of-:

This not only would have placed Cs. as "ice Heary Oswaid.".

fice of Alpha 66." This was a Cuban

wald out or Dallas. but would navs

The CLA vitness claimed that dao ie-

commando group trained by the CLA

thrown suspicion on the Castro gov.

tual voice recording of the telepbone

A Cuban ClA operative, Antio Vz

crament The ruse was later called off.

conversation "was destroyed in Tol

ciana, aiss told investigators that he:

Instead, the ClA cited secret tapes and

tine destruction procedures approxi

had been summoned to Dallas in Au

photograpns as evidence tuat Uswald

rately

one week after it was re

gust. 1963, by his CIA contacta myste

nad been in touch with doin the cuban

ceived" Yet more than seven weeks

rious man who went by the name of

and Soviet embassies in Mexico City.

laier, the FBI claimed to have heard

Morris Sisnop. States a confidentia) :..

summary..

"When (Vecian) arrived;

The CIA kept tapes of all phone calls

the telephone conversation that the

Bishop was accompanied hy another

going in and out of the two embassies.

CLA said hail been destroyed. The

stan, Lee Harvey Oswall

Photograpas were also taxen di every-

FSI's judgment was that the voice rid

not belong to Oswald.

Another witness who impressed the :

one entering and leaving these embas

Investigators, Sylvia Odio, toid them

sies. On Oct.. 1, 1983, the CIA notified

Wrote the late FBI director J. Edgar

other U.S. embassies that "an Ameri-

Floover on Nov. 23, 1363: "The Central

that two anti-Castro Cubans had intro

duced her to an American by the name

can male, who identified himself 25

Intelligence Agency advised toas on

Oct. 1, 1963, an extremely sensitive

of Leon Oswald. She was told that Os

Lee Oswald, contacted toe Soviet Em-

wald was trying "to convince anti-

bassy in Mexico City."

source had reported that an indivicual

indentitied aimsall as Lee Crwal,

Castro Cuban groups. to kill Presi-

Oswald was describer in the cable as

who contacted the Sovie: Embassy in

dent Kennedy.

Arter the asiassina-

"approximately 35 years old, with an

Biexico City inquiring as to any messa-

tion, she recognized this American as

athletic build, about six feet tall, with

Lee Harvey Oswald.

a receding bairline.". The committee

"Special agents of this bureau, who

The House investigators don't really

files note that this "in no way physt

have conversal with Ostrald in Janar

believe that the CLA bad aBy part in

cally resembles the lee Harvey Os

Tex., have observed photograpis ot

the murder of Presidert Kennedy.

wald accused of assassinating Presi-

toe individuai referred io above ani

More likely, they suspect the CiA may

dent Kennedy."

have listened to & recording of his.

have tried to cover up some einbar-

Tie CIA sougat photographs irom

voice. Tresa special agents are of the

rassing contacts with Osivald in Dallas.

the navy to compare with its pho

cuinion tuat the acoverelerred to in-

Ia any case, the CLA took pains to

tographs of Oswald at the Soviet ein-

dividual was not Lee Harvey Osaid"

give the impression that Oswali was in

bassy. Declares a committee report

The House investigators are begin-

Maxico City at the time that witnesses

"These photographs, though ohiously

ning to wonder whetber the Cia cor-

claimed he was dealing. with the ClA-

not ol the correct Lea Hirvey Oswaid,

coctail ine whole Oswall adventurs in

guided Cubans in Dallas. Veciana, for

became the Warren Commission's ex-

Mexico City iu an aitempt to concaai

example, told of a strange call he re

hibit 227. The CiA admitted that thare

his real activinay in Dallas.

---

## Page 173

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?13!

Antonio.

516: K 1: 1

veccara

-----=

21.100: 1970

1.1/606/021-77

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Deputy Director for Operations

FROM

SUBJECTS

Raymond A. Warren

Chief, Latin

America Division

A.

Jack Anderson 20 January 1977 Column

Titled "CIA Tied to False Oswald Story"

B. Identification of the Mr. X in the

Anderson Column

1. The attached column, citing the testimony of a Mr. X

alleges that a CIA agent

tried to

link Oswald to Cuban intelli-

gence officers in Mexico.

There is, of course, no substance to

the column's allegations. The

column identifies the source. as

Mr. X because of attempts on his life, but

subsequently gives

enough information on Mr. X to establish his identity.

According to the Anderson column, Mr. X was first met

by his

CIA contact in Havana before relations with U.S./Cuba were

severed. Mr. X had helped to organize bank accountants to em-

bezzle Cuban government funds to finance anti-Castro causes.

Mr. X was reportedly recruited by a Morris Bishop (CIA contact),

to "plan an attempt on Castro's life.

The plan was to fire a

bazooka from a nearby apartment building while Castro was deliver:

ing one of his marathon speeches.

According to the Anderson

column, the plot was discovered by Castro's police and Mr. X

escaped

to Miami.

Mr. X also reportedly tried to assassinate

Castro in Chile in 1971 in league with the Venezuelan Luis Posada

carriles, who is now being detained in Caracas for the 6 October

Cubana airline bombing.

The Anderson column ends with

that Mr. X worked for CIA until 1973 for expenses, but ias report

$253,000 in cash by Morris Bishop when he vas terminated.

WARNING NOTICE

SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

'SECRET

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SECRIT

From the above description of Mi. X, it is reasonably

clear that Mi. X is Antonio Carlos VECIANA Blanch (201- 312900).

VECLINA, an assistant bank manager and past president of a public

for visas for ten relatives of the four men assigned to kill Castro,

and also requested four MI rifles with adapters for grenades plus

eight grenades.

The COS did not encourage VECTANA and subsequently

checked with an Embassy officer who reported that VECIANA had made

similar "wild-eyed" proposals to hin.

On 23 November 1961 the

Miami News published

i report of

unsuccessful attempt by Antonio

VECIANA to kill Castro.

VECIANA reportedly had arranged to

assassinate Castro and. Cuban President Osvaldo Vorticos on 5 October

in Havana, but the bazooka he was using failed to fire.

4.

There has been no Agency relationship with VECIANA. A

POA, which was granted for his use in para-military affairs in

January 1962, expired in November 1962.

VECIANA was born on

4 October 1935 in Havana.

He ivas a member of the People's Revo-

lutionary Movement, an anti-Castro group in Cuba during 1960-61, and

was one of the founders of Alpha-66.

A certified public accountant

by trade, VECIANA was with A.I.D: in La Paz in 1908-72.

VECIANA

was registered in ISR to the U.S. Army in November 1962 and he

was terminated without prejudice in July 1966.

On 23 July 1962

VECIANA Was

interviewed,

at his request, by Mr. Harry Real from

the DCD New York office.

VECIANA asked

Real to arrange a meeting

with a senior CIA officer to discuss Alpha-66's plans to assassinate

Castro and to request CIA's assistance (U.S.$100,000; 10,000 Cuban

pesos; 48 hand grenades).

There is no indication that this request

was ever acted upon by CIA.

In April 1966 a LA Division officer,

We fra Go a quest using

meeting was arranged by a retired naval officer, James Cogswell,

who had informed chen Li livision that he had

information of valuc

concerning Cuba.

arrived in New York City for the meeting,

he was

introduced by Cogswell to VECIANA.

He innediately launched

a discussion of the Cuban political situation and noted his strong

feeling that the only solution was the assassination of Castro.

Lücy advised VECIANA that he was in no position to provide him witl

assistance

or encourage him in an assassination attempt and was only

interested in gathering information which he thought was the purpose

of the meeting.

VECIANA subsequently said that his roommate lelix

clear to Lacy" however,, had excellent contacts in Havana.

It was

VECIANA was attempting to use ZABALA poten-

tially to get Agency financial support for his organization.

SECRET

2

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## Page 175

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SI: (: R1: T

suggested that 550,000

would be necded to get his

acrivities off the ground. (acylindicated to vicraNd that"

would look into the ZABALA matter and would probably arrange for

ZABALA to be contacted in Puerto Rico.

There is no indication in the file that any Agency officer

in contact with VECIANA ever used

an allas. Morris Bishop.

..no Morris Bishop listed in true name in the DDo rolls.

There is

There was

never any contractual relationship with VECIANA and he was not

paid CIA funds.

7.

On 11 January 1977 a sanitized copy of VECIANA'S 201 fil

---

was made available to staffers from the Senate Select Committee on

Intelligence.

signed

Raymond A. Warren

Raymond A. Warren

Attachment

DDO/C/LA/COG/OPS JDevineJis (9229) (21 January 1977)

Distribution:

Orig &

1

- Addressee

1

- ADDO .

- LA/COG/Chrono

- C/LAD

- 201-312966

1 - hold

1- ASST. TODCI

... .....

IM-2

---

## Page 176

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THE WASHINGTON POST

Wernesday, January 19,1977

Jack Anderson and Les Whitten

Mystery Witness in JIK Inquiry

i A mystery witness has sworn to con-

anti-Castro

forces might have

how Kennedy would die. Then the rab

gressional invescigators that & Contral

cruited Oswald, a kncwn; pro Castro

ble rouser added knowingiy that Ken-

Intelligence. Agency agent introduced

activist to kill Xennedy.

nedy "mows he is a marked man."

bim to Lee Harvey Oswald in Dallas

"The motive ou this," states the me

Milteer later admitted to the FBI

three montes before Oswald gunned

mo, "would of course be the expecta-

that he had been in Dallas in June,

down President John F. Kennedy.:

tion: that aiter the President was

1963, but denied having any knowl-

The witness, whom we have agreed

killed, Oswald would be caught or at

edge of the Kennedy assassination.

to identify oniy as Mr. X because of at-

least his identity ascertained; the law

However, the incormant told the FBI

eniorcement authorities and the pub

that he asked Miltzer after the saoot-

tempts of his life, is the founder pi a

Cuban terrorist group that worked

lie would then blame the assassination

ing whether be had known about it in

closely with the ClA

on the Castro government; and the call

advance or had merely been guessing.

The group held secret meetings at

for a forceful overthrow would be irre-

"I don't do any guessing," replied Mil-

3126 Soilandale in Dallas before the as

teer.:

sassination. Not long after Kennedy

But Hoover abruptly blocked this

But the most explosive development

was shot, a Dallas deputy sheriff was

line of inquiry by notifying the War is Mr. X's statement that he met Os

told by an informant that Oswaid had

rea Commission on Sept. 21, 1964, that

wald in the company of a ClA agent.

been associating with some Cubans at....

the. FBI had located and identified

Congressional investigators questioned

"3129 Harlendale."

Odio's callers. He named them as

the mystery witness closely on three

Loran Hall, Lawrence Howard and

i Mr. X's dramatic. testimony: casts

separate occasions. They finally con

William Seymour, all anti-Castroites.

new light, on the story Sylvia Caio, Hoover even suggested that Odio could

cluded that "his credibility is strengts.

ened by toe details'he provides consist-

daughter of a wealtny opponent of Cu-

have confused the names "Loran Hall"

ban Premier fidel Castro, told to the

ent with what he told us before. Signit-

and "Leon Cswald."

....!.

FBI. Two morths before the Kennedy

icantly, he remains very strong on the

killing, she related, she was visited in

Now the congressional investigators

Oswald signting."

her Dallas apartment by three men

have uncovered evidence that all three

The encounter occurred in a down-

denied visiting the Odio apartment

who identified themselves as friends

town Dallas building, where Mr. X had

and that the fBI had obtained their

of her father.

an appointment with ais CIA contact

deniais bejore Hoover Wrote his letter

The agent was accompanied by a man

•One was introduced to her as "Leon

to the Warren Commission.

whom Mr. & later recognized as Ken-

Oswald." When she saw the picture in

The investigators bave also obtained

nedy's killer.

tha newspapers of the man who had

the tape of a fascinating conversation,

"When he saw it was Oswald that

saot Xennedy, she fainted from snocs.

predicting two weeks in advance that

killed Kennedy," the investigators re

It was the same Oswald, she was cer-

Kennedy would be shot "from an oit-

ported in a contidential memo, "he

tain, who had visited her apartment.

ice building with a high-powered ri-

nearly freaked out, but he never said

Congressional investigators have

fle." The prediction was made by the

anything."

now learned that the late j. Edgar

late Josepb Miteer, a right-wing rab-

The investigators tried to pin down

•Hoover deliberately misled the War-

ble rouser, who also happened to have

Mr. X. on how he could be sure that

ren Commission about Odio's mysteri-

close connections with anti-Castro

man was Oswald. Mr. X replied, ac-

Ous visitors. She was such a persuasive

cording to the memo, that be nad

• witness that the commission staff was

- The conversation was taped on Nov.

learned "how to retain the character-

preparing to investigate her story

9, 1983, in Miami by an FBl informant

ics of a person; he had trained himsel?

thoroughly.

named Willie Somersett, who turned

to do that And if it wasn't Oswald, it

Stalt members even speculated, ac. the tape over to the FBI the next day. was someone who was exactly like C

cording to one internal memo, that the Milteer is heard on the tape describing"wald, his exact double.

B15

---

## Page 177

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G. 3

i1.1.

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## Page 178

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SCONST

10 January 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Counterintelligence Staff

FROM

: Russell B. Holmes

CI Operations Group

SUBJECT

: Article by Norman Kempster Appearing in

the Los Angeles Times of 1 January 1977

and Entitled "CIA Withheld Data on Oswald"

(copy attached)

In light of the inaccurate and misleading statements

attributed by Kempster to sprague, the following comments are

offered in rebuttal.

a. "The CIA withheld from the FBI for almost

two months in 1963 information that Lee Harvey Uswald

had talked with Cuban and Soviet officials about his

desire to visit those countries . .

Oswald's name did not surface in Mexico City until

Soviet Embassy.

City Station cabled to Headquarters the highlights of the

transcript of the conversation.

On 1 October 1963,

an American male who

last to bo one to te over dare 1ga consul.

Obyedkov,

checking said nothing had been received yet, but

the request had been sent.

Mexico Station said it had photographs of

a male who appeared to be an American entering the

Soviet Embassy at 1216 hours, leaving at 1222 on

1 October. His apparent age was 35, athletic

build, about six feet, receding hairline, balding

Wore khakis and sport shirt.

190191

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## Page 179

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-- 2--

(3) No local dissemination was being made by

the Station.

[MEXI 6453 (IN 36017), 8 October. }

(Note: Cablese has been rendered here into readable English,

without substantive changes or omissions. Cryptonyms and

pseudonyms have been omitted or put into clear text.)

The above information was received in Headquarters on

9 October; the following day Headquarters incorporated this

information in an electrical dissemination to the Federal Bureau

of Investigation, the Department of State, the Department of

the Navy, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

(1) On 1 October 1963 a reliable and sensitive

source in Mexico reported that an American male

who identified himself as Lee Oswald, contacted the -

Soviet Embassy in Mexico City inquiring whether the

Embassy had received any news concerning a telegram

which had been sent to Washington. The American

was described as approximately 35 years old, with an

athletic build, about six feet tall, with a "receding"

hairline.

(2) It is believed that Oswald may be identical

to Lee Henry [sic] Oswald, born on 18 October 1939

in New Orleans, Louisiana, a former U.S. Marine who

defected to the Soviet Union in October 1959 and later

made arrangements through the United States Embassy

in Moscow to return to the United States with his

Russian-born wife, Marina Nikolaevna Pusakova [sic]

(3) The information in paragraph (1) is being

disseminated to your representatives in Mexico City.

Any further information received on this subject

will be furnished you.

made available to the Immigration and Naturalization

Service. [DIRECTOR 74673, 10 October 1963.]

(Note: It should be pointed out that for some unknown reason

the Headquarters desk responsible for making the dissemination

neglected to include the information that Oswald had visited the

Soviet Embassy on 28 September 1963.)

It was not until 22 November 1963, when the Station initiated

a review of all transcripts of telephone calls to the Soviet Embassy

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## Page 180

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READE

S5GI81

-- 3 --

that the Station learned that Oswald's call to the Soviet Embassy

on 1 October 1963 was in connection with his request for a visa

to the USSR.

Because he wanted to travel to the USSR by way of

Cuba, Oswald had also visited the Cuban Embassy in an attempt to

obtain a visa allowing him to transit Cuba.

Inasmuch as Oswald was not an investigative responsibility

of the CIA and because the Agency had not received an official

request from those agencies having investigative responsibility

requesting the Agency to obtain further information, the Station

did nothing other than ask Headquarters on 15 October 1963 for

a photograph of Oswald.

MEXI 6534 (IN 40357), 15 October 1963.]

On 25 October 1963, Headquarters sent a request to the Department

of the Navy for a photograph of Oswald. [DIRECTOR 77978,

24 October 1963.] It was not until 26 November 1963, however,

that the Navy Department apparently responded to this request by

sending directly to the Mexico City Station a photograph of Oswald.

In response to a question from the Warren Commission, the

Federal Bureau of Investigation, on 6 April 1963 stated that:

"The investigation of Oswald in 1963 prior to receipt

of the Central Intelligence Agency communication

dated 10 October 1963 was directed toward the primary

objective of ascertaining the nature of Oswald's

sympathies for, and connection with, the FPCC (Fair

Play for Cuba Committee) or subversive elements. The

Central Intelligence Agency communication which

reported that a man, tentatively identified as Oswald,

had inquired at the

Soviet Embassy concerning a

telegram which had been sent to Washington did not

specify the nature of the telegram.

This contact

with the Soviet Embassy interjected a new aspect into

the investigation and raised the obvious questions of

why he was in Mexico and exactly what were his

relations with the Soviets. However, the information

available was not such that any additional conclusions

or activities at that time.

or ad vitres at that ind sys thies intentiotives

of the continuing investigation was to ascertain the

nature of his relations with the Soviets considering

the possibility that he could have been recruited by

the Soviet Intelligence Services. The Central

Intelligence Agency communication, dated 10 October 1963,

stated that any further information received concerning

Oswald would be furnished and that our liaison repre-

sentatives in Mexico City were being advised. On

SEGRET

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## Page 181

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L20LSl

-- 4 --

18 October 1963, one of our FBI liaison repre-

sentatives in Mexico City was furnished this infor-

mation by Central Intelligence Agency and he arranged

follow-up with Central Intelligence Agency in Mexico

Subsequent to

the assassination, Central Intelligence Agency als

advised us of Oswald's contact with the Cuban Embassy

in Mexico City at the time of his visit there."

[Commission Exhibit No. 833 (FBI Letter to J. Lee Rankin,

dated 6 April 1964) •1

b. "Chief Counsel Richard A. Sprague said that the

committee staff had learned that a CIA message des-

cribing Oswald's activities in Mexico to federal

agencies such as the FBI had been rewritten to elimi - -

nate any mention of his request for Cuban and Soviet

The message was sent in October, more than a month

before the November 22,1963 assassination."

Comment: It is not CIA practice to disseminate raw information in

the form it is received from the field.

Field reports are received

in Headquarters where they are first reviewed by the action desk.

The information is then written in a form suitable for dissemination

to the intelligence community, including additional intormation,

if available, from the Agency's central counterintelligence files

to make the report more meaningful to the recipient (s).

Upon learning that on 1 October 1963 an American identifying

himself as Lee Oswald had telephoned the Soviet Embassy, the Mexico

City Station cabled to Headquarters on 8 October 1963 the highlights of

Oswald's conversation with the Embassy. Because the Station at that •

time did not know that Oswald was Lee Harvey Oswald and that he had

come to Mexico to apply for visas to the Soviet Union and Cuba, the

Station reported only that information obtained through telephone

tap operation against the Soviet Embassy.

On 10. October 1963, the day after it received the information

relating to Lee Oswald and his contact with the Soviet Embassy,

Headquarters incorporated this information in an electrical dissemi-

nation to the community and included a brief summary of biographic

information obtained from central counterintelligence files on the

possible identity of Lee Oswald. Since Headquarters had no indi-

cation before 22 November that Oswald had gone. to Mexico to apply

for Cuban and Soviet visas, there was no question of eliminating any

LA6S1

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## Page 182

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-- 5 --

mention of Oswald's request for such visas.

Within its limitations and capabilities, Mexico Station had

complied with the Agency regulations pertaining to reporting on

Americans abroad.

The Station had informed Headquarters which in

turn had alerted those agencies with an investigative or policy

interest in Oswald as an American in the United States. Headquarters

also instructed the field station to inform the local representatives

of those agencies.

the sorter rosy on 9, open t go. tha chit intonation bon

Had this information been

included it would have indicated to recipients of the report that

Oswald had more than a fleeting reason to be in contact with the

Embassy; however, as already stated, the reason for the 28 September

contact and the subject of the telegram to Washington were, at that

time, unknown.

"The CIA's decision to withhold information

was reversed shortly after Kennedy was killed."

Comment:

This statement is patently false and misleading. It is

totally incompatible with Sprague's remarks to Agency representatives

An hey quarty sins Nomission or commission will not prejudge the

d. "Sprague told a press conference that it was

impossible without more information to know why the CIA

had censored its own message.

Comment: If Sprague needed more information, why did he not ask

the Agency for an explanation, instead of making it appear to the

public that the Agency has been dishonest in its dealings with the

intelligence community?

questions: what might the other agencies have done

"But he said the incident raised two interesting

differently if they had been more fully informed,

why did the CIA decide to remove 'information that was

considered pertinent enough to be put in an initial

draft of the message?' "

Comment: As already mentioned, the Agency did not know initially

why Oswald was in contact with

the Soviet Embassy in October 1963.

SECRET

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## Page 183

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-- 6 --

It was only after the news of the assassination had reached the

Station that the Station initiated a review of its holdings.

As

a result of this review, the Station learned that Oswald had also

visited the Cuban Embassy and that Oswald's contacts with the two

embassies were in connection with his desire to travel to the

Soviet Union by way of Cuba.

As to what "other agencies" might have done had they had more

information, attention is drawn to the FBI's comment in response

to the Warren Commission's question. According to the FBl's

response, some investigation had been initiated on or about

18 October in Mexico.

By the 25th of October, FBI headquarters had

informed its field office in New Orleans "that another Agency had

determined that Lee Oswald was in contact with the Soviet Embassy

in Mexico City in the early part of October 1963." The New Orleans

field office

in turn intormed the Dallas office which had juris-

diction over Oswald's place of residence. (For further detail, see

IV H. 447 and 459.) There was, however, no request, official or

otherwise, from any of the responsible departments

and agencies in

Washington

for further details as to Oswald's presence in Mexico

and his reasons for contacting the Soviet Embassy.

f.

"The committee said its staff investigators

had recently questioned a former CIA agent who had

'personal knowledge' of Oswald's visits to the Soviet

and Cuban embassies in Mexico.

As a result of that

interview, the report said, staff members were sent to

Mexico, where they found and questioned additional

witnesses.

Comment: Sprague's characterization "a former CIA agent" is probably

in reference to David Phillips.

The latter's "revelations" to staff

investigators (and also to Ronald Kessler) were unfortunate to say

that they were inaccurate, so far as we know. There

is no indication in the Oswald files that Oswald wanted to make a

deal with the Soviets in return for a free trip to the USSR.

The

"additional witnesses" in Mexico, it is believed, are Boris Tarasov

and his wife, both of whom had been under contract with the Agency

in 1963.

We have not been informed, officially or otherwise, by

Sprague what Phillips and the Tarasovs told the staff investigators.

"'These witnesses had never been sought out

before by any investigative body, notwithstanding the

fact that they had important information concerning

statements by Lee Harvey Oswald in Mexico within 60

days of the assassination of President Kennedy,

, the

report said.

---

## Page 184

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-- 7 --

Comment:

If "these witnesses" include people other than the Tarasovs

it would be impossible, at this time, to make an appropriate comment.

The fact remains, however, that if Sprague had obtained additional

details,

he should hold such information and not make it public

until the Agency has had a chance to review it and comment. There

are many examples in the Oswald files of statements made by people

claiming to have knowledge of Lee Harvey Oswald which have been

proven to be fabrications.

One such person was Gilberto Nolasco

Alvarado Ugarte who, on 26 November 1963, came to the U.S.

Embassy in Mexico City.

claimed he had been in the Cuban

Consulate in Mexico City on 18 September 1963 when a man he later

recognized to be Lee Harvey Oswald received $6,500 in cash to kill

an important person in the United States. After thorough investi-

gation by Mexican authorities, the Mexico City Station, and the FBI,

it was concluded that Alvarado had completely fabricated his story

about Oswald.

Silanet

Russell B. Holmes

Attachment

---

## Page 185

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CIA Withheld

Dãta on Oswald

Assassinations Panel

Issues Report to House

...:

BY NORMAN KEMPSTER

WASHINGTON The CIA with-

Sheld: from: the FBI for almost to

months in 1983 information that Lea

Haryey Oswald had talked with Cu-

ban and Soviet officials about his de-

¿sire to visit those countries, a House

committee reported Friday. Seat s

The Select Committee on Assassin-

sations indicated in a report to the ful

Hoise that its investigation or the

murder of President John F. Kennedy.

would locus early in 1917 on a trip

Oswald had made to Mexico City in

October, 1953: wer

iri. Chier. Counsel Richard A. Sprague

said that the "committee staff had

Clearned that a CIA message describ-

1ng: Oswald's activities in Mexico to

Lederal agencies such. as the FBI häd

been rewritten to eliminate.any men-

-tion of his request for Cuban and So-

et ver, ore ten a mont before

more than a month before

the Nov. 22, 1963, assassination.

Le The CIA discovered Oswald's pre-

sence lat. the embassies through its

§routine sui veillance.of those facilities.

a Because Oswald had once defected to

the Soviet Union, the CLA and FBI

pare bean interested in his acuvites

Erez-belore the Kennedy: assassina-

Ete cis decision to Mihold in

"formation sas reversed shortly arter

Kennedy was killed. The agency: re

-ported Oswald's efforts to visit Cuba

and the Soviet Union both to the FBI

THE LOS ANGELES. TIMES

1 January 1977

9 District of Columbia's congressional dele:

and to the Warren Commission, nich con-

gate and the chairman of the King subcom-

cluded that Oswald was the assassin and

mittee' said thai no decision bad been made

Had acted alone.

on accepting Ray's olter.

Sprague told a press conference that it

However, Sprague indicaled that it prob-

was impossible without more information

ably would be accebted.

o know why the CLA had sensored its Oist

"Any and all people who have relevant

nessage.

But he said the incident raised to inter-

information will be interrogaied," Sprague

said.

esting, questions:, what might the oiner

• In a personal statement issued. in can-

igencies have done differently if they had

junction with the report, Rep. Henry 33.

Jeen more fully informed and why did the

Gonzalez (D-Tex.), who is to become com;-

CIA decide to remove "information that a mittee chairman in the new year; said a

was considered pertinent enough to be put

thorough investigation was needed io an-

in an initial draft of the message?"

swer hundreds af pressing questions;

. There were no firm conclusions in the

"Gonzalez said that the committee liopsa

report, which the 12-member committee

to discover Whether former FBI Director I

prepared after the first three months of its

• Edgar Hoover's now well-known animosi-

investigation into the murders of Kennedy

ty toward King had airected the & Bi'S :7-

and civil rights leader. Dr. martin Luther

vestigation of the assassination.

King.?

Deen capeson Ban ee However, Gonzalez said, he comores

Technically, the committee. goes out of work could go well beyond the killings ci

business Tuesday. with the end of the ses- :

Kennedy and King: 17

sion of Congress in which it was formed.

"The committee can" shed light on tre

The purpose of the year-end report was to

urge the new Congress to reestablish the

forget that President Ford had his own

committee and to give it. oo muton openarrow escapes; no member of the House

for the nist year of what could be a two-

year investigation

wonti nastiget that the Capitol Building

WaS

"In the three months since its establish-

wribombed..

• He said the committee's ultimate lass

ment, the committee has initiated prelim.

-was "to find out not just that happered

inary investigations into new and pre-

,vicusly unpursued leads in bota assassina-

but way."

tions," the report said.

The committee said its staff investigators

had recently questioned a former CIA

agent. who bad "personal knowledge. of

Oswald's visits to the Soviet and Cuban

embassies in blexico. As a result of that in-

terviery, the recort said, staff members

were sent to Mexico, where they found and

These witresses had never been sought

out before by any investigative body, not-

sithstanding the fact that idey had impor-

tant information concerning statements by."

Lee Harvey: Oswald in Mexico within 60

days of the assassination of President Ken-

nedy," the report said.

The report said also thät the commiltée

staff had interviewed a person who assert.

ed that he had discussed the King murder

with James farl Ray, who pleaded guilty

to the crime. The unidentried witness sair

that Ray had told him about contacting an

associate in Europe to receive further in-

"Structions. The story, whica was told to re-

• porters by a committee member several

Weeks ago, has not been verified,

In a letter to New York Times columnist

anthony Lems, fay offered this week to.

testliy under oath at a committee hearing. I

But Sprague and Walter F. fauntroy, We

---

## Page 186

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INSTE

77-07011

745R

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Director of Central Intelligence

VIA

FROM

: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

: John H. Waller

Inspector General

SUBJECT

: President Kennedy Assassination - Mrs. Luce Story

1. Action Required: None; for information only.

Background: In 1975, Mrs. Clare Boothe Luce telephonically

informed Director William Colby of support she had rendered to certain

Cubans who were conducting their own independent operations against

the Castro Government in 1961 and 1962.

Mrs. Luce stated that she and

Mr. William Pawley, an American financier long associated with the

Dominican Republic, helped finance a motorboat for three Cubans. The

three Cubans, concurrently, were members of a CIA supported Cuban

exile organization.

After the 1962 missile crisis, all resistance

grous against Castro were ordered to cease operations.

At this time,

Mrs. Luce and Mr. Pawley also ceased their financial support. In

1963, very shortly after the assassination of President Kennedy, the

Cuban captain of the motorboat, which Mrs. Luce helped to subsidize,.

phoned Mrs. Luce to inform her that "Oswald was a hired gun"

• She,

turn, informed him to tell all to the FBI. At the behest of Director

Colby, Mrs. Luce passed the story on to Senator Richard Schweiker,

chairman of the subcommittee investigating the Warren Commission Report.

A version of the information was given to columnist Betty

Beale and was published in the washington Star on 16 November 1975

(attached) •

A staff member of the Senate Select Committee, on 10

December 1975, inquired as to what the Agency thought of the story.

The Agency oral response was that it had nothing

to add to the news-

paper story and that since this query involved U.S. resident Cuban

refugees, the FBI would be the proper agency to contact.

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## Page 187

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The transcripts were received by CIA's Inspector General

on 22 December 1976 from Mr. Colby's secretary. At the suggestion

of the Inspector General, the Office of Security sent copies of the

transcripts and a background note to: the Federal Bureau of Investi-

gation in January 1977.

We do not know whether the FBI passed this

information to the House Select Committee on Assassinations:

This story is summarized here for your background in the

event that it should be replayed by the press as a result of releases

which may be made by the House Assassination Subcommittee. While it is

not a new story, the actual CIA transcript of Mrs. Luce's conversation

with Mr. Colby could be considered newsworthy and could be presented

in a manner detrimental to CIA.

John

Waller

Attachment: a/s

Asst. for Public Affairs w/att

Mr. H. Hetu

Distribution:

Original. - Addressee w/att.

1 - DDCI W/att..

1 - Asst. for PA/Mr. Hetu w/att.

1 - ER w/att.

•T - IG Subject (Task Force) w/att.

1 - IG Chrono w/o att.

1 - J.L. Leader. Chrono w/o att.

OIG/J.L. Leader:aal

2

---

## Page 188

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Clare Buothe Luce Weav

a Fascinating Tale

One day in the latter part of October, Clare Luce re-

ceived a call from Sen. Richard Schweiker, R.-Pa.,

chairman of the subcommittee investigating the War-

Betty Beale

en Commission Report. He wanied her to persuade

some Cubans she had known - Cubans who had known

Lee Harvey Oswald - to testify before his committae

Mrs. Luce's eiforts to locate the Cubans led to a some-

what bicodcurdling warning. But let her tell the story

from the beginning

"The

trauma,, tear is

19ol, a year of great

American

she began her narration to recent dinner

Cuba and who was Truman's ambassador to Peru and

Brazil. I got to know Bill very well in India and China

where he had built up a voluntary outit called The

Flying Tigers. Bill was also called in by the ClA to re

cruit Cubans for the Bay of Pigs operation. Afterwards

he was a very unhapoy man.

"One day he called me up and said, 'How wauid you

like to get in on the Cuban Flying Tiger operation?' He

had in mind a fleet of motorcoats subsidized by Ameri

cans and manned by Cubans who had been in the Bay

of Pigs oparation - all these young kids who had been

stranded aitar the day of Pigs.

"I said, 'Fine.' So I helped to finance a motorboat.

The three lads who manned mine came up to see me

several times. They would leave the coast of Florida

and land in Cuba and come out with information. The

information they came out with was remarkably accu-

raie - that the Russians were building missile sites in

Cuba. I was told that the information was eventually

fed to Sen. Ken Keating and was passed on to the !

White House. You remember what an impression it

made and how accurate it was.

"THEN CAME THE MISSILE showdown. Soon after

the showdown I got a telephone call from Allen Dulles

saying the Neutrality Act had been invoked and all

Americans must cease and desist in any further efforts

cowards the liberation of Cuba. Of course, we desist-

Two years later she and her husband Harry (Henry)

Lice Were sitting in their New York apartment listen-

ing to the televised reports of President Kennedy's

sisassination when around midnight she received a

• phone call from New Orleans. "It was the captain of

my motorboat," said Clare,

"A young men not more

than 1, ey you stude o swayer He said, hrs. Luce l

"He

said that immediately alter the 1961

missile

showdown, FBI men had come to Miami and told the

Cubans to break up all resistance groups and disperse.

He and the other two members of his crew had moved

to New Orleans where they staried another

"Free

Cuba" group. They had been there a year and a hali

when who made contact with them bat Oswald!

"The Cubans all thought he was a kook. Oswald

bragged abou having been in Russia and Said he was

an ex-Marine. He said he could shout anybudy and he

would be happy to shoot Castro. He had no money, he

was living with his wife in New Orleans and it loaked

like he was presenting himself as a hired gun. They

didn't like the cut of his jib so they turned him off. But

they followed him and found he was in a Fair Play for

Cuba Communist cell to ribose members he was giv-

ing the same line.

"And I remember this from the telephone conversa

tion - Oswald was telling the cell that he could shoot

anyone, including the secretary of the Navy. The Free

Cubans continued to tail him and found that suddeniy

he had money, and he started going to Mexico City. He

made several trips. They continued their penetration

of the Cuban Communist cell. He said they made tape

recordings of some of Oswald's meetings and they had

taken photographs of him distriouting handbills for the

Fair Play unit. The next thing they knew President

Kennedy was shot.

"THE YOUNG CUBAN WHO called me," continued

"said that there was a

Cuban Communist assassination teen working some-

where — in Dallas, New. Orleans or wherever - I don't

remember, and that Oswald was their hired gun. Os-.

wald, he said, had tred to report the Communist plans

to the FBI some time before the assassination. But be-

cause he was out for the dough they didn't believe him.

continued!

---

## Page 189

13-00000

I suppose that the FBl must hear from a thousand

In any event. on the telephone my young friend told

me that they had these tape recordings of Oswald and

photographs and what should they do? I said, 'Go to

the Fji and tell them everything you know.' That hay.

ing been said I pui the whole thing out of my mind.

Comes the Warren Commission and says Oswald alone

was responsible and I forgot the whole matter.

"Then, in 1967, a fellow named Jim Garrison, dis-

trict adorney in New Orleans, hit the headlines charg-

ing that the assassination

was a conspiracy. At that

moment I was reminded of the information I had re-

ceived and I began to wonder whether or not the

Warten Commission had got all the facts. I couldn't

remember the names of the Cubans but I finally locat-

ed one crewman who was living in Miami again and I

asked him what happened aiter he went to the FBI.

"He said, 'We turned over copies of everything. We

were then told.to keep our traps shut and that we

would be deported it we said anything publicly. He

said one of the crew was deported to Guatemala, and

one was murdered - stabbed in front of a siore.

"THEIR INFORMATION, HE SAIL, never appeal

ad in the Warren Commission report. He sala,

marned now, I live in viams and I don't want to get

involved in it ever again.'

• When Sen. Schweiker made his request of Clare

• Luce less than three weeks ago, she telephoned anoth

er Cuban friend to see if he could locate and persuade

the young man to testify behind closed doors. Replied

the older Cuban, if the testimony was behind 13 closed

doors it would still become public.

"Americans thirk they are playing games," he told

"They don't know they are involved in a life or

death business. No. I won't tell you where he can be

found. The people working for a free Cuba would lose

their lives. A lot of them have already. They are not

interested in making political headlines for politicians.

You think the Bay of Pigs, the nuclear missiles,

assassination of the president was the end of the story?

I tell you it is just the beginning. What you Americans

don't understand is, there are trained Communist ter-

rorists, assassination, kidnapping, bombing and sabio-

"tage teams all over the country and the world."

- Hide Horld Pbolos

Clare Boothe Luce

'"A year of great American trauma."

The very day after that conversation, observed

Clare gravely, bombs went oft at the State Depart-

ment here, at the U.S.-U.N. mission and four banks in:

New York and at three places in Chicago. And close toj

the same hour she was recounting the whole fascinati

ing story to her guesis, a Cuban, anti-Communist

leader was exploded into bits in his car in irliami.

---

## Page 190

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L

UNCLASSITILU

USE ONLY

LI LUNTIUENIIAL

1 DILATI

I UTING AND RECORD ST. .T

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

Inspector General

2 E 24 Hqs.

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and

building)

10.49

OLC

ATTN: Lyle Miller

EXTENSION

6565

R-1252

OFFICER'S

INITIALS

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

16

3.

Director of Security

NO.

DATE

6 January 1977

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom

to whom.

Draw a line across column after each comment.)

SUBJECT: Attached Transcripts

The OLC and the IG concur that

the attached transcripts should

be provided to the FBI. A blind

memo is also attached.

It is requested that the O/S

pass the package to the FBI.

1D. Buchn

John H. Waller

5.

6

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

FORM

3-02

Seatt

the Off it

deceit

14. F0/-

1979-100.

05-74040

• I USE PREVIOL

ITION

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

INTERNAL

USE ONLY

UNCLASSIFIED

---

## Page 191

13-00000

6 January 1977

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT:

Transcripts of October 1975 Telephone Conversations

Between Director Colby, Mrs. Clare Boothe Luce and

Mr. Justin McCarthy

1. Attached herewith are transcripts of two telephone conversations

between Director William Colby and Mrs. Clare Boothe Luce, and one between

Director William Colby and Mr. Justin McCarthy. The conversations took

place in October 1975 and discuss Mrs. Luce's concern that certain infor-

mation, from a former boat captain, a Cuban refugee, regarding the Presi-

dent Kennedy assassination, reached the proper authorities.

While the

information in these transcripts have been provided to investigating

authorities, they may be of some assistance to the House Select Committee

on Assassinations as it investigates various allegations.

2.

The transcripts were received by the Agency Inspector General on

22 December 1976. The transcript of the 25 October 1975 conversation was

typed by Ms. Barbara Pindar on the same day.

The other two transcripts

were typed by Ms. Pindar on 21 December 1976 from her stenographic records

while clearing out the remainder of Director Colby's files. Ms. Pindar

was Mr. Colby's secretary during his Directorship.

3. A version of the telephone conversation transcript was published

in the Washington Star on 16 November 1975 (attached). A staff member of

the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, on 10 December 1975, inquired

as to what the Agency thought of the story.

The Agency oral response was

that it had nothing to add to the newspaper story and that since this

query involved U.S. resident Cuban refugees, the FBI would be the proper

agency to contact:

---

## Page 192

13-00000

4. The attached transcripts indicate that the matter was brought to

the attention of Senator Schweiker and The Federal Bureau of Investigation.

(Telephone conversation between Director Colby and Mrs. Clare Boothe Luce

on 25 October 1975, pages 2 and 3).

Attachments:

a/s

2

---

## Page 193

13-00000

: Review Staff:

75/3637

Date 10 December F975

TO

: CIA Task Force

FROM

:

SUBJECT :

RECEIVED:

The Review Staff,

SSC/HSC Request

Date

Walter Elder

Time

Paul Wallach, SSC staff, asks what we think of the

actached.

He is not writing a formal request and will

be satisfied with an oral reply.

Comments:

Action

SC/DCI

A/DDA

A/DDI

A/DDO

A/DDS&T

OGC

OLC

IG

B. Evans

Info

X

---

## Page 194

13-00000

MEMORANDUM FOR:

BL?

Filo with Mrs. CBC

talk -

the pr

assas

The slo

(I advise

her

to do so to Sa Salmed

Date

112/15/15

50R6 101

USE

5.

EDI

---

## Page 195

13-00000

Telephone Conversation Bu veen Mr. Colby and Mrs. Cla

Boothe Luce

at 12:40 on Saturday, 25 October 1975 (from steno notes of Barbara Pindar

transcribed the same day)

Mrs. Luce:

I have a big problem, a case in conscience. I got rather

deeply involved during and after the Bay of Pigs, and up to the time of

the missile crisis, with a group called the (Directorate Revolutionario

Estudiante; Note: the spelling of that is just a guess), the DRE. Whether

you know this or not, it was me who fed the missile stuff to Keating. I

knew a number of these leaders well; they were going in and out of Cuba,

and I paid for one of the motor boats. Bill Pawley did too. We thought we

were doing another Flying Tiger. The missile crisis came, and I got a

telephone call from Allen telling me that the Secrets Act had gone into

effect and that henceforth there would be no voluntary American effortg.

That ended that, and I don't know what I was doing -- maybe I went back

to Arizona, or whatever. Then came the assassination.. The night of the

assassination, right after Oswald was caught, one of my boys telephoned

me from New Orleans. Didn't I ever tell you this?

Mr. Colby:

No.

Mrs. Luce:

It was the captain of my boat.

It seems that after the missile

crisis -- a period of about a year had gone by -- he said that all the young

Cubans involved profoundly in all of this had been told to scatter and

scram, that he and two of my other lads --

Mr. Colby:

When, after the crisis?

Mrs. Luce:

(Yes. ) (were told) to leave Miami.

Mr. Colby:

In 1962?

Mrs. Luce:

Yes. They were to stop their efforts to free Cuba; and if they

did not, they would be deported. It has a very interesting end involving you.

In any event, this one had been told to leave Miami after the missile crisis

was over, and he had opened a cell in New Orleans. He telephoned me to

tell me that Oswald was -- I am telling you what his view was -- was a

hired gun; Oswald had tried to penetrate their little cell; that they turned

around and did a counterpenetration job on Oswald; all of this was done

several months before the assassination.. He said,-telling me on the phone,

he was terribly excited -- he said you see he had no money, all of a sudden

he began to get money, so we checked him and he had a little "Communists

be Free'' or 'Be Fair to Cuba'' group going in New Orleans." He said "We

---

## Page 196

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-2 -

had tape recordings of what he was telling his group. " It was a co unter-

penetration they went on. He said, "We have photographs of Oswald.

passing out handbills on the street, 'Be Fair to Cuba.''' He said, "We

are absolutely certain that Oswald was simply one of three assassination

teams, that they were working out of Mexico City (or funded in Mexico

City) by Castro." He said there were three assassination teams. Then

he said, 'We have these recordings, these tapes, and we have these

photos, what should we do?" These fellows always trusted me. I said,

"The first thing you do, the minute you hang up this phone, you telephone

to the FBI, give them everything you have got." Working in New York

with these Cubans is an extraordinary fellow, one of the most puzzling

characters I have every met; he is a devout Catholic -- Justin McCarthy.

Justin is the American patron -- although he has no money, never had

money -- of all these free Cubans in America. He never worked at CIA,

although CIA tried to pick his brains. He tried to help the FBI. I knew

Justin McCarthy, and he used to send me bulletins; he said he had been

sending them to me for the past six months, and I had never received one

of them. Out comes the Warren Report. I have many other things to do,

and I assumemy lads had reported what they knew, and maybe it had been

discounted, but I had taken the Warren Report at face value without poring

over it -- and I forgot the whole darn thing. Then, this must be nine

years ago, up turns a guy named Lloyd Garrison* -- what was he, a sheriffi

or something?. (* she means fim Garrison)

MI. Colby: District Attorney.

Mrs. Luce: And he hit the headlines that the assassination had been a con-

spiracy. Then it all flooded back into my mind that I had never been quite

satisfied with what the Warren Report had brought out. Basically, I was

troubled by the whole thing, so I said I thought I would call Garrison.

In order to call him, I had to have the names of the Cubans, which had

gone out of my bean. So I called Justin McCarthy. He, said one of them

was now, my lad, was in Miami. I got him on the phone, my fellow, and

I said, "You remember your midnight call to me about the assassination

of the President, I want to know what happened after that." He said, "We

went at once to the FBI, they took all the tapes and photos and all our

information and told us to keep our mouths shut, and shortly after that they

informed us that if any of us talked to the press or anyone, dire things

would happen." He said one of the fellows on the boat was deported to

Guatemala or Chile, and one of them was murdered. He said, "I am a

lawyer, have two children, I am making my way in Miami, and I never

want to hear a damn word about the assassination of Kennedy because you

Americans really do not want to know the truth. " He said, "We waited,

expecting the Warren Committee would want to have us, and wenever heard

a word." He said, "I want no part of it." Then the Garrison thing died

---

## Page 197

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-3 -

down, and I am a busy woman, and I forgot about it. Three days ago,

a reporter was in here -- a gal*

- asking about my life style and

said, in passing, "What do you think of the investigation of the

assassination of the President?" I am afraid I hit the roof". I said,

"I think everyone must be absolutely off their rockers.

'What possible

motive would the CLA have for murdering their own President? " I

said, "Even to assume such a thing is beyond belief because where

there is a murder or assassination, there is a motive, and there could

be no motive. " I said, "Who had the motive was Castro; but perhaps

not even Castro, possibly just a bunch of Communist Cubans or plain

Communists." I said, "They always had a motive for that sort of

thing. " Schweitker called me up yesterday -- when the reporter said

to me, "What is the name of the young Cuban?", I said, "Well, let's

call him Julio Fernandez." The Senator said to me "that is a fascinating

story." (with snist deust de girl reporter was

Mr. Colby: You told the story to Schweiker?

Mrs. Luce: He read it in the Knight paper.

Mr. Colby: You told the story to the Knight people?

Mrs. Luce: Not in the detail I told you. Schweiker asked if I could locate

any of these men involved for him, and I said I would try. That was

yesterday. I used that opportunity to say, "I do not know what you are

doing on the Hill." I said, "You are in the process?) for headlines and

destroying this country's security." He said, "If you have this informa-

tion and you can get your hands on it, it would be a good thing to lay

this story to rest." He said, "If you can find me these people, I assure

you they will be listened to in closed session.! Now comes the big

thing. Justin McCarthy runs an animal farm in Nyack: telephone

number is 914; 647-8596. I have known him to be a man of complete

integrity. He is a devout Catholic. He may or may not be a fanatic.

What makes one think he is is what he tells you is just so terribly

alarming; as he was the one, along with Bill Pawley, who involved me

with these Cubans, I tracked him down and had a two-hour conversation

on the phone with him this morning that was really staggering. When I

said to him, "Would you tell these things in the closed session in the

Senate?", he said, "I would find it more expedient and to shorten the

process to hire loud speakers and put them on top of the Empire State

Building." He said, "You don't know, Clare, the Cubans have not lost

their desire to free their country, and there are plenty of them working

---

## Page 198

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-4 -

the in

at it, and they trust me, and I trust them, and they all trust me. "

He said, "All these fellows on the Hill give a damn about is a big

headline and political attention, and if this should involve my testi-

fying and some of my fellows got bumped off, or their apparat shut

down, I could not live with myself, no I will not testify. "

I said,

"You know, Justin, if they send for you, you might have to." He

said, "They are not likely to send for me unless you tell them. " He

said, "They do not know who to ask for anyway."

(It doesn't appear

in my notes, but my memory is that he added that the reason the Hill

doesn't get to the truth is that they never know who to ask for.) He

told me a story about working once with CIA. He said, "We did this

DRE did one operation with CIA, as a result of which all the Cubans

involved were caught and killed, and I do not want any part with the

CIA." He said, "It too can be a sieve." I said, '"You have me really

over a barrel.". I said, "Justin, I have to tell someone, is there

anyone you trust?" He said, "There is only one man in this whole

country whose word at this point I would take." I said, "Who is that?"

and he said, "Bill Colby.". He said, "He is a daily communicant" --

MI. Colby: No, no.

Mrs. Luce: I did not disillusion him. In any event, if only to put my own

mind at rest since -- he always says, which is fascinating if true,

that my lads in New Orleans, yes, they did turn over the tapes to the

•FBI but they kept copies.

Mr. Colby: Really?

Mrs. Luce: So he says. If so, you are possibly, if -- I think you should

get hold of Justin and give him a couple of hours because he has plenty

to say. If what he says is true -- he also told me, which I had forgotten --

that during the time of the missile crisis, and I was the one he came lo,

and naturally the one I went to was Harry (note: this is first mention of

à "Harry''' maybe I misunderstood; could she have said ''Allen! ) because

I could trust him. In a way, Justin McCarthy supplied a lot of background

material on the Cubans to (note: could not hear what she said. He said

a few days ago -- Time is planning to do a (take-out) issue on the

assassination of Kennedy. He said that, going back through their files,

they came across my name as an informant, and he said "they tracked me

down.too." He said, then he told me -- I mentioned in passing that there

i or maybe she wes referring

ti her husband illenny luce.

wame.p.oon

inframanti

Tim

basing her name

---

## Page 199

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- 5 -

was a wonderful girl on Time that knows more about the Cubans

almost than anyone in CIA, Priscilla Badger. He said the Time

people are now trying to get information. He said, "I will talk to

no one because there are lives at stake"' -- except you. For my

own sake, if you have a go at him, I would be very happy to know how

serious it is.

Mr. Colby: I will report back to you by all means. Let me do a little home-

work on just where this (looks). You do not remember the name of the

Cubans in Miami?

Mrs. Luce: There are so many names; he talked to me so fast. He kept

saying "Chilo." I asked who "Chilo" is, and he said that was his code

name.

Jose Antonio La Nuza (Note: That last name may be all one word;

she said it means "the nut. ")

Luis Fernandez Rocha

One of those fellows was the Director of the DRE. Then he also reminded

me of a guy who used to come to see me -- Cardona. (He had been told

by the American Government to get out of Miami) and he died, having

become the President of a university in Puerto Rico.

These fellows

were scattered all over the place.. As I mentioned that to Justin, he said,

"'I know where they all are." The thing that alarmed me is that -- he

does not talk in an excited voice, but the statements are -- he said

"People think of the Bay of Pigs and the nuclear showdown and the

assassination of Kennedy as the end of the story, it is only the beginning. "

He said, "If you knew what is being laid on for the U. S.," and he talks

like that. I asked him, "What do you think happened?" He said, "Oswald

went to the FBI." He said, "I know that, he was selling them information,

and they did not believe him.". I said, "That is incredible." He said, "I

do not know how much you know about the FBI, but no day goes by without

desks being loaded with letters saying something will be blown up."

(Note: I missed a little bit here due to something else happening in the

office.) I said, "What happened?" and he said, "The FBI got the word

from on top 'Destroy the letters. "''

Mr. Colby: From on top?

Mrs. Luce: From the President, who was Johnson. I contended that if at

that point the FBI had proven that Castro had in mind assassinating the

President, we would have been in war with Cuba. It might have been

---

## Page 200

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- 6 -

an act of State to shut up about it. If I had been the President, I

would have had (Note: missed more due to outside interference).

What is hideous about this is that the CIA is being accused or

Kennedy is being accused -- anyone except the people who probably

were involved. If putting it at rest in a secret session will work,

if such evidence does exist, you are the man to present it.

Mr. Colby: Schweker does not know about McCarthy?

Mrs. Luce: He only knows this -- I said there is one man I know who

might be able to tell you where the se Cubans are, and that is a fellow

named Justin McCarthy. He said, "Where is he?", and I said, "I do

not know, I have lost track of him." He said, "If you find him, let me

know. " After talking with Justin McCarthy, I do not want him to talk

to Schweiker. I do not know what to say if he calls again. Knowing the

Senator, I may never hear from him. I leave it with you.

INXXXXXXX

NOTE: Mrs. Luce closed the conversation by referring to a CIA paper

entitled "Restless Youth"' and asked if it had been declassified. Mr. Colby:

said he would check on it, and Mrs. Luce said she would like to have a copy

if it has been declassified.

---

## Page 201

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Telephone Conversation Between Mr. Colby and Justin McCarthy at 3:45

on Tuesday, 28 October 1975 (this transcript was typed on 21 December 1976

from steno notes of Barbara Pindar)

Mr. McCarthy: I am glad to know you, even if it is over the phone.

Mr. Colby: Mrs. Luce talked to me yesterday (sic). She gave me a capsule

version of some of her chat with you.

It puts me in a bit of a jam,

obviously, because there are some things that really hold some

potential for being very important in these days (of) post-mortems

of everything. I wondered if maybe we should chat about it some-

time, or, quite frankly, one of the main things I would suggest is

that you might want to go to this Senate Committee looking into this.

MI. McCarthy: No. There are several reasons why not. I am sure we do

not need to discuss them, but there are many reasons.. Over the

period of time there have been so many things. We were theonly

ones who had the information about the missiles in Cuba for many

months, and we beat our brains out trying to get someone to do

something (or believe?) and regrettably (in) Washington there are

too many political (opportunists?), but there are too many lives at

stake. We risked our neck for all these years. We are interested

in doing the right thing.

MI. Colby: I wondered if you could (slice?) off that New Orleans thing (and

not go any further than that?)

Mr. McCarthy: As I said to her -- (can't read the next few words). For me

to be seen in

Washington, it is (can't read the next few words). We

do not trust anyone.

We did so many operations for so long, and

we were entirely successful and never lost a man, and then one day

we did an operation for the Government and lost 22 men. Lives

depend on it. Someone sent a Top Secret memo, and the one he

sent it to left it on his desk and someone came in and read (it) and

the men were arrested. She asked, "Would you talk to Bill?" I

said I would. We think it would be a good idea - - for me to go down --

I do not want to blow my cover, but I would like very much to chat with

you and tell you.

Mr. Colby: My problem is then I get information, and then what are my

obligations.

Mr. McCarthy: From the point of view of (seeing?) how to do it through persons

other than me -.. to get the end result.

---

## Page 202

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2

Mr. Colby: It might be that one of your fellows aware of some of the things

(would not mind telling Schweiker?) under some protection and

assurances of anonymity. That would be enough of a (can't read the

next word) to get started.

Mr. McCarthy: There is plenty to get started on.

Mr. Colby: Then (he?) could cut your people aut as a source..

Mr. McCarthy: She said it no uld be aclosed-door hea ring. I said there (would?)

still be someone come out of the meeting and (can't read next word)

their names in the press. You see Jack Anderson's column on Monday.

It is vitally important, and it is true evidence. It is not conjecture.

I am concerned about what it ties into - it is all the same ball of wax.

We sat on the information about the missiles. This has been going on

To a ma i rent year

for a good twenty years, and we have accumulated an awful lot of

information. We are more concerned today than when we had the

missile information. It is appalling, and it is frightening, and people

do not want to believe it. Last night I enlightened people about some of

the things that are going to happen. We feel the time has come that

some of this should come to light. It is necessary and essential to go

back and bring out some of these things that need to be brought out, but

not at the expense of (next word missing). We have done this on our

own and at our own expense. One of the reasons my people trust me is --

I am thinking of a book -- we did not want to do a book before. The

American public wants to know. It is all part of what went on then.

I think it should be clarified and straightened out what went on then.

But I am so terribly wary. I went to everyone, including the President,

about the missiles. We had evidence - what ships they were on,

where they (docked?), and a few days later they came back and said

there is no credibility of what you say.

Mr. Colby: The only thing that bothers me is the story about the existence of

some records (you?) still hold. The important part of that is that

indicates some (part?) of a failure, or possibly even worse -- that

is the kind of thing that does need investigation or (correction?) --

protecting your people that are in on it. The other possibility would

be to ask Schweker or one of his men to go and talk to you or one of

your people who would have factual knowledge of it.

Mr. McCarthy: When (Dorothy) told me about you over a period of time --

(Dorothy) said we have been through this so many times -- I took

this to editors of Life. That was the time when the guy sent the

but don't know

could be. I had written in long-hand, "Doroth."

Dorothy Farmer, Mrs. Luce's secretary.

---

## Page 203

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3

Top Secret memo and it got left on a desk in Miami and we lost a

lot of people on that. Inadvertently so many things happen. We

work so carefully.

We have information now that no one else has

because it has come to the point where so many of the people I work

with find they cannot trust people because of the opportunists. I

have never met such overbearing and obnoxious (can't read next

word). We sat on this year in and year out -- we never know when

we might get calls. I was up all night long the night before last.

Time is doing a big cover story on the thing -- the next issue --

the Today Show is bugging me.

Washington is a funny place. If I --

by and large, when your life is on the line -- one of (our?) guys hung

himself after one of the escapades we went through. He committed

suicide because he felt guilty about it.. Up here it is terrific because

I am an animal nut. A lot of the guys divulging some of this stuff

that they would not normally do.

Mr. Colby: Let me talk with Clare again as to how we handle this.

The main

thing is not so much the overall stuff about Cuba -- the main thing

is the story about records, about Oswald.. That comes at a time

when that is

a serious subject of study here by the Congress. If we.

could in some way shake that information loose without putting the

finger on any of your friends, I think we are sort of obliged to do this

in terms of clarifying the record against the (facts?) -- this is a very

key aspect of it and a very serious problem that if it was suppressed

at the time.

Mr. McCarthy: That is not all that was suppressed.

Mr. Colby: That is the thing. They are looking into it. Let me talk to Clare

again and see if I can figure out some way in which we could talk to

you (maybe?) and if you could in the meantime think of a way of

(can't read the next word) out or (can't read the next word) out this

(feature?) of it so that you give the (final result?) but not the sourcing,

and let the investigators (find their own source later on?), we would

have done our duty. My problem is that I really cannot sit on it with

my obligations. I can be reasonable about protecting other people,

and I have to be, but I also have to have the responsibility for responding

to proper investigations of things that really should be looked into.

Mr. McCarthy: Let me (can't read next word) this in. Some of our guys (can't

read next several words).

Mr. Colby: ' That is what she said.

---

## Page 204

13-00000

4

Mr. McCarthy: They and l are scared to death. I was Executive Producer

of TV programs for years -- I cannot make:-- I have earned the

respect and confidence of these people över the years. The other

night I talked all night long. If I try to push my guys -- Clare said

it needs to be laid to rest, and it does. I would like to see it get

laid to rest, but my people --

MI. Colby: I can assure you I am as interested (as) you in protecting that

part of it if there were some way of having part of the cake and

eating part of it, so that you do not lose the one or the other but to

work out some vehicle -- a way in getting the substantive information

loose but protecting people involved. There may be ways to do that if

we put our minds to it. Let me talk to Clare and see what really --

I will not do anything except with her without your permission.

NOTE: Mr. Colby tried to call Mrs. Luce on 29 October, but could not reach

her. He contacted her on 31 October (see separate notes)

---

## Page 205

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Telephone Conversation Between Mr. Colby and Clare Boothe Luce at 4:07

on Friday, 31 October 1975 (this transcript was typed on 22 December 1976

from steno notes of Barbara Pindar)

Mr. Colby: I got the Restless Youth for you. And I called Justin McCarthy.

We had a long chat. He does not want me to do anything about it,

but I said you put me in an awful position. (Note: The "you" there

refers, I believe, to McCarthy.) 'I understand what you mean about

his strong manner of talking. I think both of us are (hung?) with a

rather tantalizing story.

Mrs. Luce: If I had not known the guy for 25 years, I would take him much

less seriously.

Mr. Colby: The only real point is the thing about the tapes and the photos and

the allegation about the FBI. I tried to (argue?) him into figuring out

some way in getting rid of those but keeping himself out of the act.

Mrs. Luce: He called me back and said he talked with you and that you left

him in a box, and I think he feels now that there is some kind of a

question of conscience involved. He said, "I am going to let you and

Bill Colby decide what is best to do. "

Mr. Colby: I said I would be in touch with you and try to figure out something

sensible.

Mrs. Luce: Why don't we suggest that he bring you or me -- perhaps he feels

safer with me -- the tapes and photos if he has copies of them.

Mr. Colby: And then you pass them over to Schweiker.

Mrs. Luce: And let them decide, and I will maintain his cover -- he keeps

saying it is not worth it to him after all these years to blowthat --

the paradox, he tells me he is going to have to write a book (and

whether he is indeed going to?) so that he is not altogether a crackpot.

On the other hand, what he is doing is sufficiently crackpot. He is

taking care of broken-down animals from his entire area. However,

MI. Colby: I think that is a good idea.

You say that you and I have talked, and

we are all in a kind of box at this point, and we really in conscience

cannot sit on this stuff -- all these charges that there is remaining

evidence that (can't read next word) was held backand disappeared

---

## Page 206

13-00000

2

into the FBI, and maybe the way to do it is for him to provide it to

you, and you to Schweiker, and then I would just as soon drop out --

it does not really have much to do with me -- and in that way you

would protect him from Schweiker, and you would say you got it from

a friend -- and the source is whatever he and you agree on.

Mrs. Luce: I will do that. .

Mr. Colby: I think that is the best thing to do. If he does not buy that, I do not

know what we do about Schweiker.

Mrs. Luce: (I am going to ignore it if Schweiker comes to me.)

NOTE: The conversation continued, but it did not pertain to this subject.

---

## Page 207

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...:

SECRET

28 007 375

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Deputy. Director for Operations

SUBJECT

Senate Select-Committee on Intelligence

Request to the Deputy Director for

opexations not proper tille:

Attached, in response to the Senate Select Comnittee

request of 27 October 1975, are separate memoranda on the

DRE and several Cuban exiles.

03

R. S. Nume

Richard S. Sampson

Chief

Latin America

Division

Attachments

ly

DDO

10/28/25-

SECRET

EZ IMPDET

C1. RY 075231

/BR

---

## Page 208

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SUBJECT:

Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE, Students'

Revolutionary Directorate)

The DRE was founded by a group of students at Habana

University in 1954 as an instrument of opposition to the regime

of President Fulgencio BATISTA..

The original members of this

group were also members of the Habana University Student Federa-

tion (FEU) .

Several leading members of the DRE were killed by

Cuban authorities during and following the attack on the

Presidential Palace, Habana, in

• March 1957. The remaining DRE

leaders, as of 1958, were in exile. The DRE worked as a secret

underground organization in Cuba, generally in Habana, laying

plans

and making preparations.

The theory of the DRE

was that

success of the revolution depended on quick and efficient

elimination of BATISTA which Fidel CASTRO's forces at that time

could not achieve alone.

The DRE finally turned against CASTRO

on the issue of communism.

As of March 1962 the DRE was receiving $9,000 a month from

the Agency for salaries of 55 assets in Miami, Florida, and

$2,000 a month for overhead costs.

The DRE'S

overseas

program

(AMBARB's) at that time received $12,400 a month from the Agency.

Agency support to the DRE was terminated by mid-1967.

---

## Page 209

13-00000

Julio FERNANDEZ Molino

(No crypt)

DPOB:

23 March 1934, Havana

201-752511

Subject was of interest to AMWORLD program as a radio

operator in 1964.

A PRo Part I was submitted to Headquarters

by JMWAVE, but there was no follow-up, and Subject was not

He had previously been associated clandestinely with

RESCATE (anti-CASTRO) group in Cuba.

He came to U.S. as

exile in May 1964. In 1966,

he lived at 430 SW 11th Ave., Miami.

Julio FERNANDEZ Bencomo

(No crypt)

DPOB: 10 April 1917, Havana

201-742497

Received POA 14 January 1964, which cancelled 24 February

1964, because he was not interested

• In employment with ClA

since salary was insufficient.

He signed secrecy agreement

• He took SGSWIRL 10

and was terminated without prejudice told his wife and one

January 1964.

No derog, but he had

Carlos MARQUEZ that he would be working for CIA. He was

originally recruited for AMWORLD by one Pedro BLANCO, and was

to be used

as PM asset on a CIA vessel.

Julio FERNANDEZ Gonzalez

(AMOT -99)

DPOB: 10 May 1935, Havana

201-299222

He was employed by the Intelligence and Security Commission

of the Frente Revolucionario Democratico (AMIRON/ AMBRUSH) for

about two months in 1961.

He was brought into it by Julio

PASCUAL Abril.

He stated in a letter to Hernan HENRIQUEZ

Lorca, anti-CASTRO Cuban in Madrid who informed the FBI (who

told us in memo dated 2 November 1961) that he "was about to

take a trip to Cuba to take material to anti-CASTRO elements,

trip being financed by CIA." He received POA 10 May 1961 for

use as member of AMOT Admin Staff. File does not say who dropped

from it, but when last contacted was working for Dixie Lily

Products Company (a wholesale grocery outfit) as an accountant

at $50 weekly in December 1961. POA cancelled 24 July 1962.

---

## Page 210

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SLO AT

Luis FERNANDEZ-ROCHA Rodriguez

(Formerly AMTOPIC-2, AMHINT-53)

Rodr tues)

DPOB :

3 May 1939, Havana

201-316766

POA granted 18 April 1962. According to file, he quit

his job as Secretary General of the Directorio Revolucionario

Estudiantel (DRE) in July 1964 to pursue his medical studies.

He was paid his final salary payment of $425 on 1 September

1964 under the DRE project.

He was to do some unwitting work

for JMHOPE, Swan Island propaganda broadcasting, and WIBALDA.

There is no further indication in file that he was terminated,

no quit claim, no OA or POA cancellation. However, there is no

information on his use since 1964.

Per document dated 7 June

1965, he was studying at University of Miami and working as

switchboard operator

"for Cuban Catholic Children's program in

Miami. According

to Cuban Families Yearbook of 1974, Dr. Luis

FERNANDEZ Rocha living at 6021 W. 14th Lane, Hialeah, Florida,

33012 with wife and four children. He became naturalized U.s.

citizen on 15 September 1967.

Julio FERNANDEZ Travejo

(No crypt)

DPOB :

10 August 1934; Havana

201-297828

POA requested for use as PM trainee 21 March 1961. POA

cancelled 4 April 1962.

FBI memo dated 14 December 1961 notes

that he told FBI of CIA financial support to Frente Revolucionario

Democratico (FRD) and to Antonio VARONA, one of Its leaders, to

the tune of "Six million dollars." Subject told FBI he himself

belonged to group

led by Rolando MASFERRER which Not getting

CIA support.

Subject visited FBI 21 November 1960 after

incident in

which some paramilitary trainees of MASFERRER'S

group on No Name Key in Florida had come to FBI's attention.

That group

was called

"Ejercito Nacional Cubano."

SIST

---

## Page 211

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40037

Jose Antonio LANUZA

Miami, Florida, in November 1963.

providing information (does not say to whom) on

an anti-CASTRO organization. Not clear

Jose Antonio LANUZA

(on microfiche)

201-339258

and any additional

information should be referred to the Army

Source Registry."

A note in the file also said that there was

no present

contact

with Subject, dated 29 October 1962.

No traces Justin MacCarthy

---

## Page 212

13-00000

30 November 1976

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT:

Comments on Ronald KESSLER's Article: "CIA

Withheld Details of OSWALD Call," which Appeared

in the Washington Post of 26 November 1976

The following comments are keyed to the attached Washington

Post article, i.e., the paragraph numbers below correspond to the

paragraphs as numbered in the margin of the xerox of the article:

1. COMMENT: While CIA knew that a man identifying him-

self as Lee OSWALD had been in touch with the Soviet Embassy by

telephone on l October 1963, this information had no unusual

significance until 22 November 1963 when President Kennedy's

assassination occurred. At that time an intensive review was

made by the Mexico City Station of conversation transcripts pre-

pared on the basis of the l October telephone intercept.

These

transcripts had been reported to Headquarters and disseminated to

the interested members of the intelligence community (as a former

Marine, OSWALD was a Navy and FBI case, and potentially of inter-

est to the Department of State). This review turned up "matches"

i.e., similar materials intercepted on 27 and 28 September 1963.

These were reported by cable to Headquarters on 23 November 1963.

There is no indication in the transcripts that Lee Harvey OSWALD

hire to nake ancat iea t

tried to make any "deal" with the Soviet Embassy as claimed in ...

the Washington Post article.

Analysis based upon actual voice comparison could not

be made because the tapes, in accordance with the normal practice,.

had been erased for re-use.

The monitor was able to recall some-

thing of the voice characteristics from memory, however. He could

recall the very poor Russian spoken by OSWALD, for example.

2.

COMMENT: This statement is not substantiated by our

files.

COMMENT: The information regarding the l October 1963

contact with the Soviet Embassy -- received in Headouarters on

9 October -- was disseminated on 10 October 1963 to the Department

---

## Page 213

13-00000

of State, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department

of the Navy, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

A copy of the 10 October 1963 dissemination was made available

to the Warren Commission on 24 March 1964. (See Memorandum

for J. Lee RANKIN, dated 24 March 1964, from Richard HELMS,

Deputy Director for Plans; Subject: CIA Dissemination of In-

formation on Lee Harvey OSWALD, dated 10 October 1963. On

16 October 1963, our Chief of Station sent a memorandum to the

American ambassador on the subject of Lee OSWALD's contact with

the Soviet Embassy.

The original of this memorandum was routed

to the ambassador, the minister, the counselor for political

affairs, the regional security officer.

A copy was sent to the

legal attache, naval attache, and the I&NS.

In April 1964, Messrs. COLEMAN, SLAWSON and WILLENS,

staff representatives of the Warren Commission, visited the U.S.

mbassy in Mexico City.

Our Station then indicated that the

three men already knew "all about" the telephone conversations

OSWALD had. According to the Memorandum for the Record of l1

April 1964, the three men reviewed the product from the tele-

phone tap operation for the days 27, 28 September and 1 October

1963 when Lee OSWALD contacted and visited the Cuban and Soviet

Embassies.

They made a "schedule" of OSWALD's activities as far

as possible for these days from this source. Note: They were

shown English translations of the product, or "take", as it was

called.

(HMMA 23249, 14 April 1964:

This document, in a sani-

tized and declassified version was made available to the public

under provisions of the FOIA in March 1964 as Document Number

274 and in September 1976 as Document Number 658) See follow-

ing:

Memorandum for J. Lee RANKIN, dated 31

January 1964, from Richard HELMS, Deputy Director

for Plans; Subject: Information Developed by CIA

on the Activity of Lee Harvey OSWALD in Mexico

City, 28 September - 3 October 1963.

b. Letter to Richard HELMS, Deputy Director

for Plans, dated 10 February 1964, from J. Lee

RANKIN, General Counsel.

C.

Memorandum for J. Lee RANKIN, dated 19

February 1964,

from Richard HELMS, Deputy Director

for Plans; Subject: Information Developed by CIA

on the Activity of Lee Harvey OSWALD in Mexico

City, September 28 to October 3, 1963.

2.

---

## Page 214

13-00000

4. COMMENT: See comments in Paragraph 3, above.

5. COMMENT: The Agency disseminated the information

concerning OSWALD's contact with the Soviet Embassy on I Octo-

ber to the Department of State, the Federal Bureau of Investi-

gation, the Department of the Navy, and the Immigration and

Naturalization Service on

10 October 1963. On 23 November 1963

the Agency disseminated to the FBI the transcripts of the tele-

phone calls made on 27, 28 September, 1 October, and 3 October

(The latter call, it was determined, did not pertain to

OSWALD.) (See CSCI-3/778,829, dated 26 November 1963.) On 23

November 1963, the Agency disseminated to the FBI information

relating to OSWALD's contacts with the Cuban and Soviet Embas-

sies in Mexico City.

6. COMMENT: OSWALD's alleged offer of information and

suggestion that the Russians pay his way to the Soviet Unian

does not appear in Agency transcripts of OSWALD's telephone:

conversations with the Cuban and Soviet Embassies.

7. COMMENT: OSWALD was in no sense "under investiga-

tion" (before 22 November 1963). None of the facts of his trip

to and stay in the USSR and return to the United States, 1959-

1962, were known to the Mexico Station before 10 October 1963,

when

the bare bones of his biography were forwarded by Headquar-

tars

to it in response to a Station cabled report of 8 October

1963 which forwarded, on a routine basis, what appeared to be.

a contact by an American for a visa to Cuba in transit to the

USSR.

It should be pointed out that the voice intercept cover-

age was not processed in "real time"

• The means of acquisi-

tion and the volume of the information precluded anything but

the spot reporting of items judged by the monitor to be of more

than ordinary interest.

Full texts of selected items required

a full transcription and full translation. One of the "trig-

gers" that normally operated to focus and accelerate more speedy

review and reporting of this kind of raw intelligence was the

mention of a name.

This was what occurred in the second of two

conversations on 1 October with the Soviet Embassy, during which

the speaker said he was "Lee OSWALD".

This was the first time

that the name OSWALD appeared in the intercepts and was report-

ed by the Station

to Headquarters (8 October 1963).

Had, at any time, a person telephoned the Soviet

Embassy, identified himself, and offered information in ex-

change for a trip to the Soviet Union, it would have triggered

3

---

## Page 215

13-00000

an immediate reaction by the monitor and the Station --

first, to identify the speaker; second, to report the infor-

mation to Headquarters;

and third, to step up technical

and

photographic surveillance.

8. COMMENT: No comment.

9. COMMENT: Tapes were not "routinely destroyed".

Tapes were erased after transcription had been made and re-

used.

Full transcripts of calls made on 28 September 1963

and 1 October 1963 were forwarded to Headquarters on 23 Novem-

ber. The person who processed the transcripts was identified

in the cable.

There is no indication in the transcripts that

OSWALD offered information or that any omissions ware made which

might have contained that information.

10. COMMENT: No comment.

11. COMMENT: Files do not support this statement.

12. COMMENT: Files do not support this statement.

13.

COMMENT: The information "given by DURAN" is sup-

ported by her interrogations.

COMMENT: "OSWALD later referred in a letter to

'meetings' he had in the Soviet Embassy."

Although KESSLER

chooses not to give details, this statement is in reference

to a letter OSWALD wrote on

9 November 1963 to the Consular

Division of the Soviet Embassy in Washington. (Commission

Exhibit No. 15, Vol. XVI of the Hearings before the President's

Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy.)

15. COMMENT: No additional comment.

16.

COMMENT: With regard to the press statement that

"CIA claimed it did not know of most of OSWALD's activities in

Mexico City until after the assassination": this is true, CIA

1nd not know of his activities, other than those revealed ir

the intercepts.

It should be noted that after the dissemination

on 10 October 1963 of the l October 1963 contact, no requests

were received from the dissemination customers for further in-

formation or follow-up. Without some customer interest being

expressed, particularly from the Navy, the FBI or the Department

4

---

## Page 216

13-00000

of State, who had the greatest interest in OSWALD at the time,

there would have been little motivation for the Station to in-

dependently pursue such a tenuous CE lead.

17. COMMENT: The discussion in this paragraph of the

article rests on assumptions and allegations developed earlier

in the article, followed by comments by Messrs. BELIN and

SCHWEIKER, apparently based in turn on information provided

them by reporters.

No further comment seems relevant, beyond

• those comments made earlier.

18.

COMMENT: Is BELIN here referring to Gilberto

ALVARADO Urgate? If so, information regarding OSWALD provided

by ALVARADO was passed to the Warren Commission as attachments

to a memorandum for J. Lee RANKIN, dated 1 June 1964, from

Richard HELMS, Deputy Director for Plans..

(See also Memorandum for J. Lee RANKIN, dated 4 June

1964, from Richard HELMS; Subject: Information Developed on the

Activity of Lee Harvey OSWALD in Mexico City. This memorandum

became Commission Exhibit No. 3152 contained in Vol. XXVI of

Warren Commission report.)

19. COMMENT: We do not know what BELIN actually said to

the reporters, when, or in response to what.

We believe, now-

ever, this may be referring to BELIN's letter of 15 April 1975

to E. Henry. KNOCHE of CIA. BELIN at that time was Executive

Director of the Commission on CIA Activities within the United

States (Rockefeller Commission). In his letter, BELIN refers to

the photograph of an American male and the question whether or

not this male was Lee Harvey OSWALD. He continues:

"The CIA and the Warren Commission both

determined that the picture was not of Lee

Harvey OSWALD and that the picture was taken

after OSWALD left Mexico. City.

"Although portions of this record have

been released to the public, other portions

have remained classified because of

concerns

by the CIA at the time that a release of the

full picture might disclose sources and

methods which the CIA felt were not in the

national interest to disclose at that time.

In light of the false allegations about the

assassination of President Kennedy and the

5

---

## Page 217

13-00000

false allegations of CIA involvement, I

feel

that it would be appropriate to re-

consider whether or not the entire matter

can be fully disclosed at this time."

An interim reply was forwarded on 23 April 1975 by

To Hear view was compete of their oldings regar? g the

photograph of the unidentified individual in Mexico City pub-

lished by the Warren Commission.

This review also included

knowledge of OSWALD's contacts with the Cuban and Soviet Embas-

sies obtained from telephone tap information and interrogations

of Silvia DURAN, a Mexican employee of the Cuban Embassy.

13 May 1975 two

summaries of the above review, one classified

and one unclassified, were forwarded to BELIN by the Agency.

Attachment:

Article

---

## Page 218

13-00000

CIA Withheld Details on Oswald Col

3j Ronald Kessler

transcript to either the FBI. or the

So, with the full coopcration of the

Wash!nn:0n 8os: Stat! Tiriler

Warker Commission,

Mexican government,

ClA

wirctaps

late September, 1963-cight

Instead, the Cly gave the FBI in

were installed on teicphone lines go-.

weaks briote the assassination of

Oclocer, 1963, only a brics report say.

ing into both embassies.

Fresident Kennedy-Lee Harvey Osi

Sing Oswald hnd' inade contict sith

The ClA was especially interested

walt toleanoned the Soviet ambassy.

this Bussinus lt gave the Warren

in U.S. citizens. who snade contact

Mexico City and tried to maic a

Commission a transcript of the tapea

with the emyassies;

conversation but for unexplainco rea-

Thus, when Oswald showed up in

exchange for unspecified infer.

sens failed to include in the transcript

Mexico City in Iale September and

mation,

he vanted a free trip to O Oswald's ofter of information and his

Iciephoned the Russian cinbassy, his

suggestion that the Russians would

conversation. was picked un from the

This conversation was intercepted.

want to pay his way. to

the Soviet

wirclap. A transcript was male and

and

vocorded by the Contral Intal.

Unict.

circulated in the CIA offices in the

Amarican embassy in Mexico City.

ligence Agency at the time. But it ivas.

The Post has:also delermined that'

no: then

turnes

the CIA, for unexplained reasons, told

The station chiet at that time was

over to the FBll the Warren Commission

the lale Winston M. Scolt, Who bei-

nich ans responsibility for investi

that it

sonally reviewed all transcripts cma-

::learned of most of Oswald's activitics

asing pessible sples, and it was not 7 ia Mexico City only after tire assas-

mating from wiretaps on Soviet blee

wee turned cher io the Warion Com.

mission during its investigation of the

sination.

The fact is, however,

installations.

that

tic CIA monitored and tapc-recorded

•The Oswald transcript, according to

ascassination.

a CiA transiato!

who worked with

his conversation

with both the Rus.

Tie anonsiered question is why

•sian and Cuban embassies in Mexico

Scoti, aroused a lot of interest:

na!?

They usually nicked un the trans-

City in the Inll of 1953, before Ken-

cripis the next day" he said., "This

Ile existonce ci the CIA telephone

irieroes of Oswald's conversution in

It was the CIA's belief that the two

they wanied right away."

What that transcript

contained

•carico City and tie contents of the l. embassies were heavily anolveá in 9a matter of some dispute, and the CIA

sam secret transeript have buen veri: g

the spy business and

that, specifi-

Lica by The Washington

Post.

The

, cally, they were ocrational bases for

says it routinely:destroyed the tape

Fest lins diso verified that the CiA

- intelligence activities directed at the

i bofore the assassination. But

sonie

inded to turn orc: the complete

United Statcs.

See OSIVALD, AT, Col. 1

LEE HARVEY OSTALD

... Ielephonca Sovict embassy

THE WASHINGRON

26 November

POSI

19750

---

## Page 219

13-00000

Pernie Who saw the transcript

Loana do tape defere the assassina.

ten reall that Oswald Was Lying to

Paxe a deal.

One of them: is David 1. Phülips, a

lowmer CIA oificer, who now heads

she Assoclation o1 Retired Intelligence

Oificers and is a leading dolencer

oi CiA activities, Philides was

once la Mexico City at the time.

The transcript revealed, Phillips re

that Oswald told

"I have" information

wold be interested in, and I know

jou con pay my way" to Russia.

The stonogranher who typed up the

transcript and the translator, who pie.

pored it had similar recollections.

"Ho said he had soine information

: to tell them" the typist said in an

interinew in mexico.

"His main con-

corn mes Resting to one of the two

countries Russia or Cubal and he

wanted thom to pay for it He said

no had to meet thom."

The Warren Commission later con•

cluced the Russians and Cubans were

not much impressed by. Oswaid, This

wei is supported by Sylvia

a Mexican citizen who worked in

would take three to four months to

process. Informed of this, Duran said,

angry and red.

wald's visit. She talked to Oswald on

1963, and recalls the mect.

He was gesticulating.: Duran said she

had to call for help from the Cuban

ing in some cotail,

consul who got into a snouting maten

In a joint interview in Mexico City

with Oswald and told him to get out.

with this reporter. and Fost special

Duran said she never sai him again.

correspondent Marlise Simons, Duran

said. Cawaid told he= that he wanted

However, Duran's story covered onli 7

so tra to duos and Russia and dis.14 the frat day at Oswald's

tiagoa documents to scoi

stay in Mexico Cler. Oswaid laler ic-

"iriend" of tie Cibon revolution,

ferred in & letter to

"meetings' ne

Among othor things, no cinimeá to be

had in the Sovict Embassy.

• momcer of the Ainerican Commu.

How interested the CIA was in

Oswald's dealings with the tiro em.

bassies is uncertain,

Duran said she informed Oswald

that in order to travel to Russia ne

The translator ard typist who han.

word have to obtain permission fron!

died the transcript of ine intercepted

ine Soviets. Cawale wont off and re-

conversation rocalica

that. the level

turned later in the

to informl5 of interest was high. But the CIA's

Darn that no hai obininea the dice.

osen actiona lead to a different con-

cocary germission, Durn

agency waited until Oct. 10,

old Corales

appliention for a visa

activitics. And Its ieletyped report

made no mention of Oswala's offer

of informintion in exchange tor a irce

trip to Ruscia or of his attempts to

travel to Cuba and Russia, "O: Cc.

tober 1, 1903," the teletype message

"a reliable and ensitive source

in Ilexico roporicá that an American

male, who idertified himself as Lea

Oswald, contacted the Soviet Enicassy

in Mexico City Inquiring whetter

the embassy had recoived any nois

concerning a telegram whieh nad bcon

sent to lashirgton."

That was strictly a routine handling

of the matter, and simalar..

standard roports made to the FBi at

that time on other contacts with the

communists by Amcricon citizens in

Even after Kennedy's assissination,

the CIA failed to turn over to the

Warren Commission the full trans.

cript of the telephone intercept it had

made in Mexico City, Osivald's offer

of information to the Russinas in ei-

change for passage was omitted from

the transarias, and

ise CiA claimed

it diù not know of most of Osaid's

activities in Mexico City until aiter

the assassination.

The significance of the CIA actions.

is difficult to assess. The FEI in the"

fall of 1963 was already showing in-

might or might not have intensified

that interest if it had been toid of

Whether the neir information would

nave affonied the Wairen Commis.

sion's deliberations is also an epon

gated the possibility cf & foreign con.

spiracy. and concluded there was to

evidence to. show Oswaid acted

beinalé of a ioreign power.

Neverthcless, there is vet no ea

planation for the CIA's benching

Dawaid's conversations. The CIA to.

would not se appropriate in the light

of an imponding investigation by tie

House Select. Commitice on

Trion asked if they conid coplain

the agencys achons, some CiA ci

sicara stationce at the time tatteri

City said the Cia i have tat

wald " that

spurnt to conceal. The cid bas d

David W. Bolin, Who wes at

sistant counsai to the Terror 5a

mission and inter executivo dice:

of the Rockcicite: commission'? ar

of the Cid, said that if the ti

Commission had crowd oi Can

conversations and other aow

mation, it woule mave ceor 1035

that the casessination was au

oí 2 foreia: concuirror

Son, Richard S. Sctuatier 1:

who led the senate intakerrar

raction and perspcours

conversations.

In interriers with ?

Who documented tie ClA giota a

he decrather...

sion, coveriod tre CiA

Warren Commissier

report lom on mered

moating in Mexico Cile jebreer

said and Cubon intellenes ars

At the timo, Cucan agento and:

naied their more imporiant ac

willa agents of the KGB, tie to:

intelligence sorvice.

Beiin eniled on the Cid to

Éut disciosure ei its anoniesco

Ostiale and hia contects iri

Cubans and Ruestare.

Commistion's caneticia

Oswald was

Killed fenner, are de teen

the CiA's conccon esout

scores soureca and intoligence

But"he said an arcater

wed that tie agency hes a pose:

"The coney to crate

mo much spree michaton.

was richunkod

---

## Page 220

13-00000

GIA Withheld

Data on Oswald

M Assassinations Panel

Assues Report to House

BY NORMAN KEMPSTER

WASHINGTON _Tre

CLA, With-

held. from: the FBl for almost to

montas in 1953 information that Lea

Haryay Oswald had talked with Cu-

ban and Soviet officials about his de-

¿sire to visit those countries, a House

committee reported Friday..ertgeg

Ine Select Committee on Assassia-

Sations indicated in a report to the full

House that its investigation of the

murder of President John F. Kennedy.

would iccus early in 1977 on a trip

¿Oswald bad made to Mexico City in

-

October; 1953: adrea

iri Chiet Counsel Richard A. Sprague

said that the committee staff had

*learned that a CIA message describ-

fing: Ostrald's activities in Mexico to

¿federal agencies such. as the FBI häd

been reivritten to eliminate. any men~

•tion of his request for Cubani and So-

- The CLA discovered Oswald's pre-

sence.at the embassies: through its

routine su veillance.of those facilities.

¿Because Oswald had once defected to

¡the Soviet Union, the CLA and FBI

shas been interested in his acuivities

Serez perore the Kennedy: assassina-

FeTe Chi's decision to withhold in

formation was reversed shortly after

Kennedy, was killed. The agency: re

= ported Oswald's efforts to visit Cuba

and the Soviet Union both to the FBL

THE LOS ANGELES TIMES

1 January, 1977

6 District of Columbia's congressional dels

and to the Warren Commission, which con -" gate and the chairman of te King subcom

cluded that Oswald was the assassin and

mittee said thai no decision bad been mad

Had acted alone.

on accepting Ray's olier.

Sprague told a press conference that it

However, Sprague indicaled that il proh

vas impossible without more information

ably would be accepted.

o know way the CLA had censored its oin

"Any and all people ino have relevan

uessage.

But he said the incident raised tvo inter-

information will be interiogated," Spragu:

said.

asiing. guastions:, what might the siher.

• In a personal staterent issued. jo coa

igencies have done differently if they had

junction with the report, Rep. Henry')3.

seen more fully informed and why did the

Gonzalez (D-Tex), who is to become com:-

CIA decide to remove "information, that in mittez chairman in the new year, said i

was considered pertinent enough to be put.

thorough investigation vias needed io al.

In an initial draft of the message?"

1: 7:

"? swer hundreds a pressing questions

There were no firm conclusions in the

"Gonzalez said that the committee horsà

report, which the 12-member committee

- to discover whether former FBI Directo: 1.

prepared after the first three months of ils

Edgar Hoover's now well-known animosi.

investigation into the murders of Kennedy

ty toward King had afiected the FBI's in-

and civil rights leader Dr. Martin Luther vestigation of the assassination.

enot seperous Dus 2200 However, Gonzalez said, the commilled's

Technically, the cordmittee does out of work could go well heyond the killings cl

business Tuesday. with the end of the ses-

Kennedy and King t i

sion of Congress in which it ivas.formed.

"The committee can' shed light on tre

The purpose of the year-end report was to

Jarger issue of political murder and vi

urge the new Congress to reestablish the ¿ olence," Gonzalez said. ".We should rel

commitice and to give it $6.5 million to pay

forget that President Ford had his. oin

for the first year of what could be a two- narrow escapes; no member of the licuse

year investigation. D

inded euroshould frican

tagui woneirget that the Capitol Building

Wris

*In the three months since its establish-hombed.

there.i,

ment, the committee has initiated prelim-

!. He said the committee's ultimate lask

inary investigations into new and pre-

was"to find out not just what heapered

- Yousy unposed meant bot assassina-

out Fily."

tions," the report said

The committee said its staff investigators

had recently questioned a former CIA:

agent who had "personal knowledge. of

Oswald's visita to the Soviet and Cuban

embassies in alexico: As a rasult of that in-

terview, the" resort said, stalt members

were sent to bexico, where they found and

questioned adcitional witzesses. see

"These vitreises had never been sought.

out beiore by any investigaive cody, not-

vithstanding the fact that taey had impor-

tant Iniormation concerning staiements by.

Lee Harvey: Oswald in Mexico within-60

days.of the assassination of Presiden: Kea-

nedy," the report said

The report said also thät the commiltee

staff had interviewed a person who assert-

ed that he had discussed the King murder

with James Barl Ray, who pleaded guilty

. to the crime. The unidentlied witness said

that Ray had told him about contacung an

associale in Europe to receive. further in-

"structions. The story, whick was told tore-

• porters by a committee member: sereral

Weeks ago, has not been verified t

In a leiler to New York. Times columnist

Antbony Lewis, Ray offered this week to.

testig under oath at a committee hearing.:

But Sprague and Walter F. Fauntroy, the

---

## Page 221

13-00000

CONFIDENTAL

MISDECREE CANERAL

710-3320

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM

SUBJECT

: John H. Waller

Inspector General

: Washington Post Story of 13 November

1976 "Oswald Reportedly Told Cubats

of Plan to Kill JFK"

1.

The Post story on Saturday states that a I. Edgar Hoover

memorandum reported that Lee Harvey Oswald told Cubans in

advance of his plan to kill President Kennedy. The attached

package was prepared by Russ Holmes of CI Staff. It is for-

warded for your information.

2. A copy of the Washington Post story has been added

to the package.

John H. Waller

Attachments: a/s

SDBreckinridge:js (16 Noy (76)

Distribution:

Original - Addressee w/atts

1 - IG Chrono

1 - IG Subject (Task Force File)

w/atts in above file

1 - Seymour Bolten w/atts

1 - John Waller w/atts

1 - Andrew talkiewicz w/atts

1 - Dave Grinwis w/atts

1 Fine leine iris7l

---

## Page 222

13-00000

(SECRET

• 13 November 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Chief, CI Staff

FROM

Russell B. Holmes

SUBJECT

"Oswald Reportedly Told Cubans of Plan

to Kill JFK"' by John M. Goshko, Washington

Post, 13 November 1976.

1. The memorandum".. •by the late FBI Director

J. Edgar Hoover saying that Lee Harvey Oswald reportedly

told Cuban officials in advance of President Kennedy's

assassination that he intended to kill the President"

is cited in Commission Exhibit No. 3152, Volume XaVI,

of the Hearings Before the President's Commission on

Assassination of President Kennedy pp. 154-157 (See Tab A).

CE No.

3152 is cited in support of statements made by the

Warren Commission in it's Report on pages 307-308 (see

Tab B).

This memorandum is based upon information which

the Agency had passed to FBI Headquarters and it's repre-

sentative in Mexico City.

ALVARADO Ugarte (referred to as "D" in the Warren Report)

came to the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City. He claimed he

had been in the

• Cuban Consulate in Mexico City on 18

September 1963 when

a man he later recognized to be Lee

Harvey Oswald received $6,500 in cash to kill an important

person

in the United States.

memorandum.)

(See Tab. A for complete

3.

The information obtained from ALVARADO was passed

in Mexico City to the Legal Attache, Mr. Clark D. Anderson,

by our Chief of Station on 29 November 1963 (See Tab C).

SEGRET

---

## Page 223

13-00000

SECRET

A short dissemination (DIR 85744) alerting custons agencies

and the Department

of State (see Tab D).

semination (DIR 87667) was made on 7 December 1963 (see

lab E): (NB: In the latter dissemination, mention was

made that a representative of the FBI participated in the

interrogation of ALVARADO.)

On 13 December 1963, the Agency forwarded under

CSC1 3/779, 136

a translation of the Mexican police

interrogation report on Gilbarto ALVARADO Ugarte (see

Tab F).

In summary, the Agency and the FBI knew of -

ALVARADO's allegations concerning Oswald, which were

sequently retracted by ALVARADO himself

as being false.

In addition, the FBI was able to prove that Oswald was

still in New Orleans at the time ALVARADO claimed he saw

Oswald in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City.

The infornation

was forwarded to the Warren Comnission by the Agency and the

FBI as evidenced by its inclusion in the Warren Commission

Report and accompanying exhibits.

Bitine

Russell B. Holmes

SHORET

---

## Page 224

13-00000

WASHINGHENN

fosT

13 NOW'HE

Oswald Reportedly Hold

Cubans of Plan to Kil JFK

By John M. Goshko:

T-shinaton Post Still Mrlier

The Justice Department

has discovered a 1964 memo-

randum by the late FBI Di-

recter iT. Edgar Hoover say.

ing that Lee Harvey Oswald

repcrtedhy. told Cuban offic

ials in advance of President

Kenredy's assassination that

he intended to kill the Presi-

•dent.::

Informed sources said yes

terjay that Hoover, in the

memo, attributed this infor-

• mation to a highly reliable

•Informant who claimed to

have been told it personally

by. Cuban Prime Minister

Fidel Castro.'.::

Castro, according to the

JEE HARVEY OSWALD

.. Hoover memo found

memo, reportedly said he

"had been advised by officials

•of • the

Cuban

embassy in

• The assertions reported in

• Mexico City. that they had

the Hoover memo go further

me't with Oswald before the

than any information cur-

Noy. 22, 1963, assassination

rently on the. record. con-

of Kennedy in Dallas and

cerning alleged statements

that Oswald informed them

made by Oswald in. a prev.

of his intentions.:

lously disclosed visit to the

Cubar embassy in Mexico

City prior to the murder of

Kennedy.

There has been persistent

surmise alsout a possible in-

volvement of the Castro.gov-

ernment in. the murder of

Kennedy, possibly as a coun

ter stroke against. CIA ef

forts

to assassinate. the

Cuban leader.

There has also been spec

ulation that the assassina.

tion may have been the work

Cuban - exile

terrorists.

• However, all of these reports

have

been

fourth-or fifth-

hand

accounts

originating

with informants of doubtful

reliability:

The: Hoover memo

was

described by the sources as

having beeti addressed.to the

Warrell Commission, ap-

pointed by former President

Johnson to investigate the

assassination.

But former

commission staffers said yes-

terday

eclection other hane

See OSTYALD, A9; Col. 1

---

## Page 225

13-00000

Memo Cites Informart

On Oswald Cuban Linte

OSWALD, From AL

said though that they believed "as an

educated guess" that it was Rolando

received such a memo or having been

Cubela, a high Cuban official and Cas-

told by Hoover or other FBI officials

tro intimate whor the CIA recruited

of the information in'it

i in 1961 and who later figured in ClA

Officials of the Justice Department

plans to kill Castro.

and the FBI refused any comment on

In the Senate intelligence commit-

the memo's existence or its contents,

tee investigation last year it was dig-

and other sources familiar with the

closed that the CIA employed a highly

assassination investigation said they

placed

Castro government, official

had no knowledgs of whether it act

with the cryptonym AMLASH in ef-

vally was sent to the Warren Commis

•*'forts to assassinate the Cuban leader.

sohose sources "ho told The Wash-

• Cubela and ABILASH were publicly

reported to have been the same man.

Ington Post about the document said

The sources also were unable to say

*its existence apparently had been un-

how Hoover came into possession of

known until

recently. It was discoy.

information from an informant inside

ered, the sources said, as the result of

Cuba, since foreign intelligence is a

information that came to the atten-

CIA. rather than an FBI function:

tion of the Justice Department and

, Some said they thought the informa:

-that prompted: Attorney. General Ed.

tion had first been given to the CIA,

wärd H. Levi to order a search of FBI:

which then turned it over to Hoover.

However, John McCone,

Who was

.. After - the

memo

was

found, the

CIA director at the time, said in a tel.

sources added; Levi put a tight clamp

ephone interview yesterday that the

of secrecy on the matter, and only a

Information reportedly in the Hoover

small number of persons

la the Jus

memo sras "unknown to me."

tice Department and FBI know about"

"It's the first I've ever heard of it,"

the document's existence. ...

McCone said. "'It's hard for me to be.

-As a result, the Sources said,

they

lieve that such a memorandum ex-

are-unable to auswer such questions

isted without it being known to me

as why the memo apparently never.

and to the staff of the Warren Com:

reached. the

Warren

Commission, = mission."

whether the information was accurate

The same point was made by David

and, if so, whether Castro was 1u-

W. Belin, who served as one of the.

formed about Oswald's Intentions' be

• " Warren Commission's legal counsels.;

fore or after Kennedy was killed!

He said, in a telephone interview, "T

Documents released recently by the

-have absolutely no

recollection

.CIA under the Freedom of Informa

such a memo. If such a document did

tion Act establish that Oswald visited

exist, I'm sure that we never saw it."

- Mexico City less tinan two montas be

• Other documents that have been

fore the assassination and met there

made public recently indicate that.

with officials of the Cuban embassy. :

- Hoover and top I'BI officials knew-

One of these CLA documents, dated

while the bureau was investigating

May 5, 1964, states that prior to Octo

the Kennedy assassination - that the

CIA was exploring the possibility of.

or three occasions

having Castro killed. However; Hoover

and was in contact with three alleged

.; • never.

informed: the Warren Com-

Cuban intelligence agents. identified.

mission of the CIA's plotting agalnst

as • Luisa

Calderon.

•Manual. Vegas

Castro.

Perez and Rogalio Fogriguez Lopez.

He

also is. known to have

talked

with an embassy official named Siliva

Duran. She reportedly has said that

; she dealt with Oswald only about his

• unsuccessful.attempts to obtain a visa

to visit Cuba:

..?.. The sources were unable to identify

the informant described in the Hoover

-''.?Inemo as having obtained the informa-

¿on from Castro. Some of the sources

---

## Page 226

13-00000

.10r0—7/27/83

IE. AUTUMN LONTINE YEN COLOPhONICALLY CONtROtON SO AN

IntorySen.

1ot, Concrete

t018gh010 quabor L& 4-7250,

Xr, MORMITZ

schnortedred that about

aço bo novad

Calcago,

81110018,

Y5OX 110S YO Te Ho

statad

that his currost busiaone aporatorindos tue auso shor tiar.

bags knows

BUSSO DURINGIE SO

Mr, gOnnIty alated that he

SAVOIVIDE JACI NUDENSTIIH ey hU

eat done part cheeseer of thei

Individust.

ur.

MONKITE tOLUDOd tO DIJO MINIOLS LYRIlODID

1010SY10Y

and statod ho airbod bo hid

achnovladgod having

ANOVS EUDENSISIX IINS

SIO ThOn RUDENSTEIS ILYAd

Calcsra.

TONING

statod NUDENSTEIN

ONLY & PaSILDE SOQUALDLSNGO DE

DIE SId DO XANT DOtINE COSCETALDE DID.

COMMISSION ExaBIr No, 3151- Continued

857

CONTRAL MNYCLUIGEMLA A

& Suno 1968

MLIHLONANDUNJORI

Mi, s, Lar Ranken

Ceneral Counsel

President's Commlenion on the

AnaBesination of Prosident Kannady

SUBJECTE

Informalion Doveloped on the Accluiiy

Of LIES HATYOY OSWALD LI MeXICO CITY

1. Or 26 November 1963 a young Latts American, rolerred

8o heroin as "D", came to the U.S, Embaery ln Ilexico City. Ho

claimod ho had beon in the Cuban Conrulato In Mexico Clty on

18 September 1963 when a man he later recognised la be too fartey

OSWALD recelved $6,500 1s cash to kill as Important person in tha

Unitod States.

2.

"'D" deseribed the circumatances as followas Mallo etardiay

by a bathroom door about noon he sale a group ol thace parsons con-

versing on a pallo a low fect inay,

One was a tall, this Negro with

reddlah har, oblouely dyed, who spoke repldly in boch Spandeh and

Engleh.

He had prominent check bones and a noticeable sear on 8he

lower right elde of dis chin. The second was a white person whore

the subject had seen prerdoualy in a walling room carrylng a Garadias

paraporta

The widso person had green eyer, blondich halr, mullls a

pompadour hairdo,

and dark eyeglassos.

The third pereon allegedly

•De dEo HaTVOy OSWALD.

"D" was coinpletely convineed of this

Trom publiahod photar ol OSTYALE dollerine she arcassinallon,

OSWALD WAI WearIng a bLack sport codi, buttonedoup mhito chiri

with short collar labe, no tie, dark gray pants, and 610ay 0988180100.

COMMISSION EXHIBIT NO, 3152

---

## Page 227

13-00000

858

He had a stees parsport la his pockal, more a seriel matri muit e

yoldore band, and eppuared to bara a piatol la a shouldos bólaier.

A sall Cuban jalned to group momontarly and passed Amarican

currency to tha Nogro.

The Negro then allegedy sald to OsWAlo

in Engles, "I rent 10 kIll tho mes."

OSWALD repiled.

"You're

col man esoush, I can do 18," The Nesto then dald la Spanies,

"I Cast so win you,

I have a lot to do."

OSWALD replied,

"The prople are walling for me back there."

The Negro then

SIre OSWALD 36, 500 In bi

denominalion U.S, bills,

"This long muca."

said

ches he selephoned the U.s.

bay in Mexica Cily severa

I limes

on 20 September.bolore lho 88828

sinatlon in an attempt lo.

report

his belles chas someono important la the United Seatoo

to

killed, dut mas flaally pold by somoone al lhe Embassy lo.

tasting his timo.

"D' was knowa to this Agency

a satia Americer docurity pereice.

Hia rollability was considerau

quentlonable.by U.S, authorities allhough ho had not bees wholly

discredited, "D'' claimed ho mao la Mexico City vorking against

Ere Cuban Communista dos die serrica,

'Cha sorvico, bowever.

äco denied thee ho was acting on lur behalfe Walle Investigation

Ya the United States showed thas OSWALD could not porelbly hero

been in Mexico Elly on l6 Septembor foe wao kpoms to kavo boco

19 Neva Orleare on bola 17 end 88 September), Laionalva salertogatios

ished to thate "D's" story.

On 38 November 1963 the Aericas pollee interviered rito.

Al Arut "D" perslated in bla story bus Os JO Notembor ho semitted

1a a signed stalement thee dia whols account about OSWALD Weo

Seles,

tia admitted do bed Dot saen Loe OSWALD as all and tras

he dad sot deon anybody pald money ln the Cucas Imbadly,

Ho

also semited ho had not tried repeated

so phono a wasting lo

the U,S, Embaory in Mexico Clly on 20 Soplember do ho had

ararlouoly clalmad.

Instead ho had serie contactod tho U.S. Iro

"D" BAld

that his mollre in tolling

the Laina Mory mao 80 belp 80% hemaels admitted into the United

Stases do les do could pertlelpalo in actloa sgalast fidal Causro.

Ho nald that ho satad Castro and thoughe laa? bie atory about osWAlo,

I ballero, mould hosp canno sho Unliad Stardo to Lako action agalore

сяльта.

(19145N 18X11114T No. 3152-Continuod

3.

Following the above interrogation, My" promptia

rotracted le corsenalon ho had mada to lho dexican authorities

assorilag Chat 1l had deed estarled from him andor prassure.

He de then quertioned by VaS, authorules valng e polyzrapy

machine.

"'D' polintertly consented to the are of thia eguigo

mento

Durina the questioninz le vas pointed out to him sral ao

ver noi bong truthlu, accordine to che polyeraph, In loandisglas

the Cubas

Paran de reyla at to person beta to Can

would sot

Lo refuto the resuito, and that he

„" Is addition ho changed sio story

ed the Cuban Consulato, Anally de-

ciding lt took

aday, 17 Septemboro It mer concluded

STom lao raguita

YEraph 1001 Rhet "D' bed Lebricated de

ALUTY abOUt OSWALD In

ls Mexican suharillas

ND" bas alnca bras departod by

Richerd Helms

Deputy DiTECtOr SOr PieTe

COMMISSION EXHIBIT NO. 3162-Continued

---

## Page 228

13-00000

Da Novomber 200

21 ORtODd MON/C 11LОГ2ЛЫУ S50s 0910291

220188 29,

travolod to Mexico,

Lude coatict ven vicaracuan communes

JONTLIN

WHo 003ie

viest the

CubIs

fer the purnogo. of

Cubs by duralading daise duentialcattos peyera

C1:176N.

40xi00

LILOTOLE

Ia staçad thet on

Soptomber d8, 1069,

MERE tO

and shilo

31tt111

and the office

Cuben

oicht

ESTINR.5000

consulato

Conoul

to b1x tas

LOCUS'S

ELSIDIO

ІСОД ШОКЛОГО

IOUTCO 82F

standing DOLE

the

dest.

bLa.

noticod

door

the

thee son

Ing & d0n

800₴

with

reddion balty the cocond

IOOD JTOYSOSSIS

holdias.

of the

CARFUlStOY RId tHE CHITE POrCOS YES

05tA4)o

SOurCa Atatod TAIE s trII CUbes

Jolaad tho abova

To You seriay and parage gone vasted atRios

CUISODOT 20

mo: 30310v197 ooaverelEos botroos th desro and

ASTALO 9E8 OVATLUREd bY SOUrCES

SETSO (LE IASIISh)I & TANT tO 211I the 223,

OSTALS: YOUITO LOT REI ODONTI, I ORO LO STO

i= 15400.

COMMISSION ExIBIT No. 3152-Continued

1 107 10

tith you.

• dn

OSTALDI THE DOODIO ATO MALEIRE InY un haeX thera,

Tags statod thet tho Xorro

RAYO OSTAIN

$8,500 19

UnTAnE?

Or largo innOminations,

sow's sucb."

71,000

The MOgTO sIOD ERYD OSYALD abnut 200

Hosscan ponor.

In a later SAtOrTION,

noures stated that tho

Unstad 3t2808 bark

noton voro in a neall pack

ebout ona feursd

shich tho Mosto

wxtra for expanana and 73, 000

tatod that Osraid had carriod a

RTOON

роское,.

SnO NO bOlIApeN tO DO OSUALD MOLTSOE

ouidor

rolater,

but hn vog not suro of this

ad thet OSTALo bRd long choos and

-a01RL

band.

to bo complotoly

According

It HORO 1t

OSXALN

tro Condulato and 80 knOT

to do knora by Cuble Connudaso pernonnol.

boxican

author spoo

Misd a copy of the

InterrOr

BATION

by tho dozdean autorillas torealod the sollordags

thet rocordod above.

at sho outrot sourcode pror no losican authorities

Но горожой во

Che dotello of tho scoro sa

wisch ha nar tho degro,

Canadion and tho

ANDRICAN CONYOTAINE

8o the doorican by the

tagathor,

PeRro, and tho contoranthos

Tagt adrinod the intoriomina toxican 918:01alr

that upon sooing tho photosseph

OL OSTALD

In the noupapors

10110118 110 2088801096100)

Preaddent

JOIN 7'.

XE'SHEDI, 20

TOCOERIZOS OSTALO RE tAO LINTIONA dO HAS SOOR dE thO CUDRA

•n ORDOrDY ITON poUrcels otatonent to desicas

so trAdElated ItON Srandos,

10 NO SOLIOTOS

183 0

GOMVISSION ExHIBII NO. 3152-Continued

---

## Page 229

13-00000

1.811

that

•1 сво хал

rnconnidnring

ho

in mice he

of. hin

CubAn Conguinto

rid

corInin

tho

ibout

СО КАЙ КЛИЧХУ

of to sEesfdens os sha Unstra

That

AMBASSIMACION

took sarantnis

In his

sast

Surrinning

ally

Thralone Auch an those

enerRello

provoking

rOACtION IrON

Cha

pOLIL OL

а кд1л.

of

Ll'an

That

ALO I110

combriany

thin anant not having

•E CAUDADE

part of dun Anosican Covorancat

ABALDÏ

YIDEL CASTOO.

Because of tho faet

to making sho

abo

•mostlonod Bletcment

to Herdean authoritles,

BOUrCO

clalacú that he deu changod his

statonont bacaudo ol SOAr,

a T86a, laxagicó, 3 onasderablo longth da Doceaber d and

ARtOI SOSCOIRLITE NIE BiNEY,

2-92 mas affordad.

24408 14Y C9760

tha cxarination

b Bi Can Can 19674° 16 1%

tha Anoricen

yuu

t1AO NO THI

BAT

shown photographs

IACh tING

responded.

"Yes,"

thLe

thp

"dscoption responso»

on thoso Ar

Indicatod

those

"stD respacE.

to

othor cucationa

SUS

dad to the concluslos

1EAL T-32 DAD

Labricator.

posated

DUE 20 NO IDLE

The polans Soden

DOR DOLDE

•136.

COMMISSION ExHIBIT NO. 3152-Continued

photog apha of OsYAes

aE t010e

Cubis

COnSULAtO,

25d ha Ta5 zetod

so roplled that do had

Iiis fasts in the

ПОСТАТАРі

not attorst to sosuto

sta

say that tho only explor:

•on do

could offor 71n

that ha

had coon

20 ABOrICIO 10

Septonbor 10,

Cuban Cocculato

10G3,

Tho reaomblod ostriD, and tsat

upos

S001DE

photograpi

Of OSTAID

sithor consciouely

La the sonogapori,

20

busze

complato badlat

or aubconsciously,

18 the Gibra

carmalato

TINO OSTASD.

857

COMMITN INHINET No 0152-602149113

---

## Page 230

13-00000

Mexico City in early Sepiembar to receive money and orders for the

assassination, ss that he had been flown to a secret airfeld somewhere in

or near the Yucatan Peninsula, 3 that he might have mada contacts in

Mexico City with & Communist from the United States shortly

before the assassination, and that Oswald assassinated the Presi-

dent at the direction of a particular Cuban agent who met with him in

the United States and paid him $7,000.30 A letter mas received from

someone in Cuba alleging the writer had attended a-meeting where

the asanssination had been discussed as part of a plan which would

soon include the death of other non-Communist leaders in the Ameri

cas,* The churge was made in a Cuban expatriate publication that in

e speech ha delivered 5 days after the assassination, while he was under

the influence of liquor, Fidel Castro made a slip of the tongue and said,

"The first time Oswald was in Cuba,". thereby giving away the

fact that Oswald had made one or more surreptitious trips to that

country, 013

Some stories linked the assassination to anti-Castro groups who

allegedly were engaged in obtaining illicit firearms in the United

States, one such claim being that these groups killed the President as

part of & bargain with some illicit organizations who would then

supply them with firearms as paymenton Other rumors placed

Oswald in Miami, Fla, at various times, allegedly in pro-Cuban ac

tivities there. The assassination was claimed to have been carried

out by Chinese Communists operating jointly with the Cubans.5ts

Oswald tas also alleged to have met with the Cuban Ambassador in

-= Mexico City restaurant and to have driven off in the Ambassador's

car for a private talks. Castro himself, it was alleged, 2 days after

the assassination called for the files relating to Oswald's dealings with

tro inference diare as thai in tie has in the ori it ha

established a secret subversive relationship which continued through

Oswald's life. Without exception, the rumors and allegations of

a conspiratorial contact were shown to be without any factual basis,

in some cases the product of mistaken identification.

Mllustrative of the attention given to the most serious allegations

is the case of "D," & young Latin American secret agent who ap-

proached U.S. authorities in Mexico shortly after the assassination

wad declared that he saw Lee Harvey Oswald receiving $6,500 to kill

the President. Among other details, "D" said that at about noon on

September 18, waiting to conduct some business at the Cuban con-

sulate, he saw a group of three persons conversing in & patio a few

feet awny. One was a tall, thin Negro with reddish hair, obviously

dyed, who spoke rapidly in both Spanish and English, and nother

was a man he said was Lee Harvey Oswald. A tall Cuban joined the

group momentarily and passed some currency to the Negro. The

Negro then allegedly said to Oswald in English, "I want to kill the

man." Oswald replied, "You're not man enough, I can do it." The

Negro then said in Spanish, "I can't go with you, I have a lot to do."

Oswald replied, "The people are waiting for me back there." The

307

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Negro then gave Oswald $5,500 in large-denomination American bills.

saying, "Ihis isn't much."

After hearing this conversation, "D" said

that ho telephoned the American Embassy in Mexico City several

times prior to the assassination in an attempt to report his belief that

someone importani in the United States tas to be killed, but nas

finally told by someona at the Embassy to stop wasting his time.

"I" and his allegations were immediately subjected to intensive

investigation. Flis former employment as an agent for a Latin Ameri-

can country was confirmed, although his superiors had no knowledge

of his presence in Mexico or the assignment described by "D." Four

days aiter "D" first appeared the U.S. Government was intorined by

tha Mexican authorities that "D" had admitted in writing that his

whole narrative about Oswald was false. He said that he had never

seen Oswald anyplace, and that he had not seen anybody paid monar

in the Cuban Embassy. He also admitted that he never tried to tele-

phona the American Embassy in September and that his first call to

the Embassy was after the assassination. "D" said that his motive in

fabricating the story was to help get himself admitted into the United

States so that he could there participate in action against Fidel Castro.

He said that he hated Castro and hoped that the story he made up

would be beliaved and would cause the United States to "take action"

against him.

Still later, when questioned by American authorities, "ID" claimed

that he had been pressured into retracting his statement by the Mex

ican police and that the retraction, rather than his first statement,

was false. A portion of the American questioning was carried on

with the use of a polygraph machine, with the consent of "D." When

told that the mwhine indicated that he was probably lying, "D" said

words to the effect that he "must be mistaken." Investigation in the

meantime had disclosed that the Embassy extension number "I" said

he had called would not have given him the person he said he spobe

to, and that no ons at the Embassy clerks, secretaries, or oticers.

nad any recollection of his calls. In addition, Oswald spoke little, 1i

any, Spanish. That he could have carried on the alleged conversation

with the red-headed Negro in the Cuban Embassy, part of which was

supposed to have been in Spanish, was therefore doubtful. "D" now

said that he was uncertain as to the date when he saw "someone who

looked Lise Oswald" at the Cuban Embassy, and upon reconsideration,

he now thought it was on & Tuesday, September 17, rather than Sep-

tember 18.. On September 1% however, Oswald visited the Lousiana

State Unemployment Commission in New Orleans and also cashed a

check from the Texas Employment Commission at the Winn-Disie

Store No. 1425 in New Orleans. On the basis of the retractions made

by "D" when he heard the results of the polygraph examination, and

on the basis of discrepancies which appeared in his story, it tras

concluded that "D" was lying 78

The investigation of the Commission has thus produced no evidence

that Oswald's trip to Mexico was in any way connected with the assas-

sination of President Kennedy, nor has it uncovered evidence that the

308

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## Page 232

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SB626T

2) Novembar 1953

MEMORINDUS TO: iF Glari Do Macarson, Lugai Mades Re!

23041

Winston if. Scott

SUBJECT

Gilberto Nolaaco ALVARADO Ugarta

1.. On the morning of 26 November an officer of this Section,

accompanied by ili. Plambecis of the Security Office, interviewed

Subject in a parked car on the south edge of tha city. The following

atatements, ualesa otherwise noted, are those of the Subject:

Subject was born 31 January 1940 in Ciudad Racsa,

Departamento Zelaya, Nicaragua. He entered Maxico by

bus on 27 August 1963 on his way to Cuba to study guarrilla sarare

tactics. Ha was to wait in Mexico until false documentation

as a Mexican citizen could be arranged through the Cuban

Consulate in Mexico. The real purpose behind his travel

involved a penetration mission for the Nicaraguan Secret Service.

Mis suparior in Mexico City is Major Roger JEREZ, Nicaraguan

ivilitary Attache, whose office is located at Pagaje latino,.

•Interior 513, telepbona 46-33-37, Viaxico City.

On 2 September Subject reported in Marico City to

Professor Edelberto TORRES, who lives a: Genaral Zuazia,

Number 37, Interior 7. TORRES is a Nicaraguan and is in

charga of Nicaraguan Communisi travellers to Cuba. He is a

well-known Communist and has a daughtar in Moscon who

travelled thare on falge Mexicas papers.

On 2 September Subject discusaed anti-Somoza guerrilla

activities in Departamento Atlantico, Nicaragua, With IORRES

zai the brothera Gustavo and Humberto Jerer Talavera:.

Fumberio is a teacher in a Mexican female normal school.

TORRES told Subject that he would receive 500 Mexican pe303

Tan Preys monthly subaistence allowance peadiag the arrangement

PERTIS

238 833 5194123

EEL r3. (2.9.4)1

TENT 2:36. ES

DE! DE (11)

DO (22

18!

SEES

RECORD COPY

6976

7X-1911

29 Not. 63

201-2893148 7-859

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## Page 233

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30A& T

-3-

cá his bravel payer 3.

On 13 Japtamber Subjeci went to the Cabaa Cousciate is

cure ovar baseport photos to Gonzu Azous, While victing

in the vailing room, he saw a group of sppcoximately 3

persona entar tha Consulaie and go into AlcUE's olice, but :

he noticed that an unknown person was sitting ai AZUl's desi.

A Cuban employee of the Conaulate kaowa to Subject in

alias as Juan Jose, about 10 years old, mustacha, normal

build, straight hair, emerged from the offica and asted

Subject to turn over his protographa. Ai this point, Subject

asicad to be shown the location oí the men's room and va3

directed through a door to a pazaageway leading io a patio.

The door of the patio opena off this passageway.

While standing by the bathroom door, Subjack saw a

group of 3 persons conversing on the patio a few feet away.

One was a tall; thin Nagro with reddish hair which appeared

¿o be dyed. Fie had prominent chaakoones and a noticeable

scar on his lower right aida of his chin. Ha spois repartedly

with a Guban accent and also spoka some Isglish. Another

one was a white man whom Subject had previoualy seen

holding a Cazadias passport in the waiting room. This person

had graen syes and darks blond hair which was arranged in a

"existantialist" hairdo with a pompadour. Ha wore glasses of

the type with a mirror-like outer surface. The third person

wag Lae Harvey OSWALD (Subjaci was comoletaly conviaced

from publiahed photos that this was OSWALD). He aaid there

was noi a shadow of doubt in his mind,

OSTYALD was wearing a black sport coat, buttoned up

waite shirt with short collar tabs, no tie, dark gray pants and

cleai eyeglasges. (Subject stuck to this story that ha was

wearing eyeglassaa despite the fact that they were not present

in publishad photos of OSWALD.)

Subject sam a tall Cuban join the group momcatarily and

pass some Americaa currency to the Negro. This unidentriad

Cuban man had apparantly come oui di AICUE's office into the

SEGRET

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SECROK

pao, is is described as tali, solidly buili, a zaciano wies

cudly hai, wearing 2 brown sui: and sed-striped bis.

Subjec: catimatei his age as approximataly 37. Subjaci

never a0w this man afies 13 September.

Sebject overheard the following conversarion bec+aaz 522

SEEN ANd OSWALD:

Negro: (in Engliss) I want to kill the mai.

OSWALD: You're not man enough. I can do it..

Nagro: (in Spanisa) I can't go with you. I have a latto do.

OSWALD; The peopla are waiting for me back there.

The Negro thea gave OSWALD 5, 500 Joilarg in large

dacornization U.S, bills saying "this isn't much". Of tais sun,

1, 500 dollara was for extra expanses. The Negro also gave

OSWALD about 200 Mexican pesos. Later the Subjet saw a

pretty girl believed to ba a Cuban employze vi the Consalara

give OSWALD an "abrazo" and tell him that she was lling ai

Galle Juares $407 in casa he wighed to find her. The gisl

aporeated to be about 20 years old and har manner reminded

Subject of a prostitute. OSWALD, the Negro and the Canadian

then want upstairs.

Subject left the Consulate building momentarily to buy a

popsicle at the corner and saw these thraa persong leava by

the Embassy gate near the corner oi Tacubaya where thay

entered a parised black car, probably a Cheviolat. Subject

reentered the Consulata waiting room and later was approachad

by the tall unidentified Cuban ino came out si AZCUZ'a office

ani told Subjact to return the next day at which time his finger-

prints would be taken and he would complete a form for

obtaining travel documents.

Subject returned to the Consulate on 1) Septembar ai

abort 0315 and filled out the form. He was told at this time

that he would be approached by an Embassy officer in maje

up a biory for his lalge Mexicas papers. Many people wara in

the waiting room on the moraing of 1i September ani tha door

SECRET

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## Page 235

13-00000

was traily closed to kosp otbars from entering.

Sabject was then told to contact 10B285, Peates2o3 la

WeRE iO TORRES' hone bu: TORRES' wife, i Cuatonalsa,

tolà Subjeci that he was at the Soviai Emband. Sibjeciwant

to ine juviet Emcasay about 1130 bui was not allowed io enter

although ha bad been there on earlier occasiona wità IORRES.

At this point, Dr. Noel JARQUIN Iolado, Nicaraguaz

Communist, wha has bean in Moscow, approached and saw

Subject standing at the gate. Ha asked Subject way ha was

thare and Subject gaid ha was looking for TORRES. JARQUIN

irformad him that TORRES was insida. IORRES 9000 came

out and accompanied Subject to the Cuban Consulate.

TOPRIS entered AZCUE's oifice alone and later excerged

telling Subject "you have nothing further to do here until i

-

contact you. " At this point, an unidentified girl entared tha

Consulate aad greeted IORRES. TORRES raplied "not now,

come back tomorrow."

On tha nighi of 19 Saptember TORRES presided over a

meeting of about 18 Nicaraguas Communists held at his home

to discuss a recent guarrilla astacia the Sagovia Region of

Nicaragua, TORRES announcad that s guarrillas had been

killed and said that the next year would be a tough one becausa

the U.S. policy might change and ta Communist mig'at find

themselves isolated.

TORRES asked Subjact it he knew the

Laguna de Parlas arsa of Nicaragua where tha U.S. is training

Cubans. He referred to it as "zona gringa". Subject replied

that he was not acquainted with the area.

Or 26 Saptambar TORRES sai: Enriqua CUADRA Collado,

an enoloyse of Carton Zavages de Vaxico, Lago de Canala 18,

to sell Subject that be should go to tha Cuban Entifulate, Subjact

weat to the Consulate but was told to wait bacause tae Consul

was vary busy.

While waiting for tha Consul, Subject yaw the Canadian:

again. Tha Canadian was smoking a cigarette and wearing a

Rolas wristwaich which a Consulaie employee was trying in buy

from him for 1, 000 paso3. Tao Canadian refuged to sell, saying

SECRET

#6975

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GECRET

-ö-

tha be hul purchased the macca in taxico and was taking is *

name as i souvenir. Tid Canadian carried a caesa

arapped acrosa his chast aad also carried i batta di obacone

paologisons which ae was anowing to Consulaie empoyaes.

The ced baired Nagro mantionad carlier then came in and too!

the Canadian austaira. As he wae leaving the vaiting coom,

the Canadia ilashed a large wad oi 6.5. dollars and said "Im

zuing. The stias are clouding up and thay're waiting ida me

at horne. "

it tae end of Septembar Subjeci phoned tha American

Dinbassy several timea to report his belief thai someone

important is the U.S. vas to bekilled. In making trage calls,

he used the name Jorge KYNAUT (phonatic) to protect his -

identity. He waa asked if tha call related to visa matters and

he replied "no, it involved a political ratter, he wishad to

spear with a person of confidence." Hia first call waa acreened

by two females and he finally spoke to a mas wao took Subject'a

phona cumber (30-19-52) and said he would call back. The man

never called. Subject tried repeatedly to contect the Embassy

by phose but was finally old "quit wasting our time; we are

working here and not playing. "

When Subject saw the photograph of OSWALD in a local newg-

paper, he contacted the Embaasy Sacurity Cifice on 25 November.

2.. The officers interviewed Subjaci on 26 November and agreed

that ha was a young, quite serious person who spoke with conviction.

He showed thai he knew enough English to undersizad rudimentary

conversation in that language.

Subject said that he had taran training in ina Panarca Canal

Zona when he was wit's tha Nicaraguan Army and admitted that

he was atill a member of the Nicaraguan Communist Party,

having originally been a convinced Marxist. Later he became

disiliusioned and for the past four years has worked as a penz-

tration agent for the Nicaraguan Govarament, He said he

expected to enter Cuba within 2 months.

subjact explaited that he was outraged by the assassination

of President Kennedy which he was "30 percent surei was a

SECRET

#S9Tó

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300207

Lommunisi pio Me said he did coi wish to become invoired

in aay big pubiicity splage and hoped tat hia naina sout oa

lap secret, bui that he ivould be willing to do "caravar

aocagsary." Ai thia time, Subjecs was liviay a: Pio 173,

Col. Santa Liaria de la Ribara, islaphona 41-07-31-.

Contast arrangamenta were made so that he could be picked in aud

interrogated further-

3. On the night of 26 November ha was interrogatod by iwo officars

of tais Section, His story remains substantially tee same as set forth

above. He recognizad photographs of the following Cuban Arbassy

pErsoNsel: Silvia DURAN, Franciaco LLAGOSTORA, OraStES RUII.,

Sanuel PEREZ, RogeliO RODRIGUEZ, RaWl APARICIO, Rolasda

ESTEVA, Heberto JORAIN, Oscar CONCEPCION, ARtORiO GARCIA,.

JO3a FErTaIdAL ROA, AAdIOS ARMONA, JOaJIin HERNANDEZ, Armas,

"Raul", Peraguina ALONSO, LUiSa CALDERON, and ilfredo MIRABAL.

He did not know any of thasa persona by rama, but was aale to giva.

partial descriptions such as duties, beight, skia coloriag, condition oi

Loath, disposition, accent, atc. He identified the photograpa of Oscar

CONCEPSION as the tall Cuon mentionad above and a photograpa of

Luisa CALDERON as tha pretty girl mentioned above. He also identified

S'IRaciaO LLAGOSTER, as the mastached Cuban whom be bad inowa

under aliza of Juan Jose, This was the same person incidentally who was

trying to buy the watch from the Canadian. Subject quictly identified

the New Orleans mug saot of OSWAID waich had baer supplied by your

office.

He said thai ho was positive of thase identificationg.

•4. At this interrogation, Suojact said

OSWALD had carried a green pageport in his pociet

and Subjact baliaves he saw OSWALD wearlag a shouider

holstar piatal. He did not seem to ba too sure oi tais

poiat. Hs said OSWAID word long aboza and had a wrist

watch with a yellow metal band. tie illustrated OSWALD's

manner of slouching in a chair at the Consulata while in

the waiting room at abou noon on 18 September. He said

thai OSWALD seemed to be completely at homa and appeared

to leno: and ba known by Gonsulate parsonal. At ont point

he heard OSWALD use the Marican slang expression "Cabror",

SECRET

16976

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626731

Subject reenacted the confessalon 2ad 10n2y Padding

Jane sascribed roove. His account oi ta coaveriasica.

was essentially the same ag reported, arcapi at this time

he bad OSWAiN una tas word kill in his first reply to the

Negro; hesco, "You're not tha man. I can kili him."

Fe said thai tha U.S, bank aotea ivere in a amall

pack abou: 1/1 inch taick bound vith a pagar band which the

Negro broise balore countiaz out 1, 500 doilars for extra

expensas and 5, 000 dollara as "advance payment."

Subject said that ha is atill a sargeant in the Nicaraguaa

Civil Guard and that he entarad Mexico illegally on 29 Auguat

without travel docaments, paying a bribe at tha border and

having transited Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvajor en

He said that ha had been to Maxico in 1961 on a mission.

for the Nicaraguan Seciel Service after a contrived escage

from false arrest in Nicaragua, followed by aperiod of asylum

in toe Meiican Embassy. He sail that his training raceived

in the Cana! Zore took place in fort Glick in March 1956 nota

Subject would navronly bean ló years old at that time).

Subject said that ha had been to the Cuban Consulate on

2 ar 3 September, 15 or 16 September, 19 September;

19 September, 26 Septembar and 25 Novemoar.

He admits to baving visited the Soviet Embazy аррґохі-

mataly 6 ox 7 timas; about 1 tineg with TORRES. He was

somewhat fuzzy on reasons for thesa visits and was not

pIegaad for decail at tbia session,

5. In order to keep Subjact availabla for further interrogation, ha

was instructed to find othar living quarters whare he should register

in an alias. On the following morning, 27 November, he rejorted that

na had regisiared as Alberto SANCHEZ, Room 203, Hotel Necas.

Ca 23 November he was arrested by vexican police at the hotal,

This

oifrce has 2o further contact with Subject.

DISSEMINATION OE THIS INFORMATION OUISIDE YOUR OFFICE

SHOULD BE CLEARED WITH CUR HEADCUARTERS IN WASHINGION.

,$.902.5

509-4-1-1.

SECRET

#6976

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## Page 239

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13 DEC 1963

Piezad Ban 66 1ат1 21121

¿trention:

Lapubg Diazcior (Plans)

4125621;

Abracsed la a casalaton ai tan sexisas solice tabarra

123 I7XI 5.2534 1BI ALAMEN

15 M

kes cisen ion.

tidy wood II erodoarinla 1s, oi coumo, zbanluely false. fer

ASTERCIT:

1795517:1013

11 26

Distriburion:

08) - Addresseo, alesi:

1 - 14, 77/250

1 ~ CI/ Lia watt

- CI/2321 7/25=

12 Docamber 1$63

BO PROSCR

2 - 14/3/198 2/21t

1 - CHR/3 /DEt

YBR

---

## Page 240

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SA:T

CReT CcilerD Mbuce LitiMdi

Ts pIrsUs (AiTAd) co13 cua: he mè 2e grass 212,

JaTa, O Ca:Dlit, a Lutiieo, SeS cono IrOn CiEiat 22,

LEMOdon: DE COLCS, SagWliC Si CiCIn, MG VID LiieS I:

Ralio 2uno 20, 173 li 8013 cojlia1 (exieo Clty).

Se Indiosiod ibas on Autà. 29 dà this petu da enieres

RENICO 110AITY, 1I1ZLA, D 20Y10S DE thE MGNiE

1i Cluian Cuuicienes, ChioyEny Meion, IO ZD Deso Ee siled

?ba: de ma renulnu conorrina soù fdo -bai taasoe ihe sujoe

t7 o fnilars the raioa or

sha dllfma, for the Eosì mur subas cons, tlia 2 t3i

AO BUDON D MEALE IEONAION LD WITER DOY DES AI9SO

1l1Izy Ábtacbs of tiso dicnnayuan Bubnsuy 15 lantee with dcoa

n3 osdng in

Le 2a3 buan collasancie- for tuco jeza anà sion paja tèr 1is

Bezos E1 Danio 50r iita s0oarsaa.

Ba Iouailon tas be zaders

D PaSDS L0 EAÄ EILlUy AçLack Di LA Locita Si Alecotó i0

FErRiaI LUSATO MSTEE, LIeI SE LS INtALlI AIE L05TIO0 DE

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---

## Page 241

13-00000

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---

## Page 242

13-00000

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---

## Page 243

13-00000

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SEGRET

---

## Page 244

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---

## Page 245

13-00000

26

C/NR. 3

D'INDEX

SECRET

5533

D NO INC

E: •

7 DEG-NUERA 2953

O FILE IN DU FILE NO

iI SSIEM TO

JUSRAL BURGAU CE INVESIICATION RE GWALD.

LONDRE CHAIRAI, INTRNETOROE ACRICY

vF:.

wH 4

3: DCHED/DCI, DDP, C/CI, C/C1/S1,. VR

7DEC63 17:152

DEFERRE CEN

ROLTINE

INFO

CITÉ DIR

PRIORITY

878.07

SUBJECI:

INE: HARVEY OSHAZO CASE

LES TE IPNEMOCATICN DY CITERIO MESARADO,

MICARACTAL INFORNANT WEO CLAIRIED

2O RAYS SEY IS ONAL DACETE SON IO ASSASSIRANIE NEY, MAS ISS CONCUSO.

OUR MEXICO CLIY STATICY ADVISES US THAI ALVARADO ALITES HE BUST HAVE BETE

MISCAKTY TE SACTIC TIA HE SAY OSHALO IN THE COMA BRASSY. AISO, HS HAS

UNCERCATI DE THE LARE ON VICH MS VIGHC HAVE SRE SOUSOTE TIRE OSNALD AND

THGUCHI II BUT HAYS EGE OY A TUESIAY, WHICH NGUEO HAUS MADE II IT SEPTRAIE

1953-

ATTECUSH THE FINAL PEPORT OF TES POLYGRAPH INTERVIEN IS NON YER

AVATTASI; THE PR

MANY FINDIG IS THAI AUTARADO EVIDENTED USCRPIION

REACTICES WHIE TARKIIG ABOUI OSHARD.

IR IS BXPECIRO THAI ALVARADO SIL, ES DEPORTET IO NICARAGUA CE 9' DEGINESA

1963.

A IRPRESEULANIVS DE YCUR BURBAU PARMICIPAITO II TES UNNAROCATION OF

SHAREL ALVARADO

•C/S COMMENT:

FICIARD FETASS

SELEASIE OFFICER

SAND OF MASCACK

Document Numbe

349=7177

for FOlA Raview on. MAY 1976

*DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT GPFLOOR CABLES

GLASSIFIGATION REVIEW

2d1-259248

CONDUCTED ON 24 MAD

ABSTRACS)

LUSEX

1MPDET CL BY Q12308

COORDINATING

OFFICERS"

Exclud ed from automatle

downerading and

coclassifiestion

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

AUTHENTICATINO

OFFICER

Copy No,

IulZ

---

## Page 246

13-00000

'SECHET

INSPECTS GENERAL

74-2482.

8

RUG 157%

5451

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM

: Raymond A. Warren

• Chief, Latin Anerica Division

VIA

Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT

Citations from Robert Dietz Morrow's Book,

"Betrayal" in "Midnight," a Weekly Tabloid,

entitled, "How CIA Plot to Kill Castro

Backfired"

REFERENCE

:

Memorandum for DCI from C/LA, Subject:

"Possible Accusations Against the CIA,"

Dated 31 July 1976

Attached is a copy of Subject article from the

Z August 1976 edition of the tabloid "Midnight."

2. Also attached is a copy of

a 24 March 1976 memorandum

for the Deputy Director for Administration from the Director

of Security relative. to Robert Dietz Morrow. "This memo

indicates

that Mr. Morrow was granted a Secret contract

clearance in September 1962 for use by the Office of Commu-

nications which contracted with Morrow Products, Baltimore,

Maryland, to produce an adapter which would greatly reduce

interference on radio receivers.

The adapter was delivered

in February 1963 and found to be worthless and the contract

was terminated. Subsequently, Morrow became involved with

Mario GARCIA Kohly and made the plates from which Kohly

produced counterfeit Cuban pesos.

Morrow and his wife,

Cecily, were arrested along with Kohly by the Secret Service

on 1 October 1963.

At that time Morrow told the Secret

Service that he had become associated with a "certain agent"

after building a device which he demonstrated to CIA.

WARINE NOTICE

SENSIVE GOTERLIGENCE SOURCES

AND METHODS INVOLVEO

E2 IMPDET

CL BY 9560

3F00ET

---

## Page 247

13-00000

SEONE?

3.

To our knowledge the allegations in Subject article

have

no basis in fact nor did we have any

relationship with

Jack Ruby, Clay Shaw or Lee Harvey Oswald.

£.22e3

Raymond 4. Warren

Raymond A. Warren

2 Attachments,

a/s

CC: DDCI

CONCUR:

Geörga T. Katarin

Chief, Counterintelligence Staff

Theodore G. Shackley

for

Deputy Director for Operations

LAL

457?

Date

© Auto

Date

2

---

## Page 248

13-00000

8:120079

MENCILIO FOR: Deputy Director for Adnisiscration

FFOU

SUB&SCT

:

Robert N. Canbino

Birector

of Security

Morrow, Robert Dietz

I. This menorandon is for your infomation only.

advised tnat Mr. Fred Blumental of Parade magasine

¿elophocically contacied hin and said that 2 Robert

locrow had written

a book entitied Botravad, which was due

for publication in lay 1976.

Mr. Diuneatnal advised

at 1s currently reviening this boox. and that li codiclas

some critical comments concerning the Agendy, c-g. ine

Agency was responsible for the assassination

of President

&. Kennedy,

Mr. Blumenthal also stated that Me. Morrow

clalas to have been a ClA contract san.

dr. bluenthal

desired to verify Nr. Morrow's ciaimed

association vich

the Agency, and Nr. Thuerner requested that this Offico

review its

files to ascertain whether MI. Morrow was

in faci associated with the Agency, and if so, what infor

macion could be passed to fir. Blumenthal.

3.

The Office of Security does have a file on

Penasylvania.

BE MOTION ProducEs, 1uc.,

located in Baltimors

; Maryland:

a ths Jacurity Clad? O Locisties vas

granted a Secret contrace clearance for use by the office

DE Connunications on 10 Sebtenber 1902.

The Agaucy thos

entared into a contrace with torren Products, Incre

produce a prototype of an adapter to be used mich

? radio

receiver which purportodly would groatty reduce 1n0ei-

Earance.

"nodel oe cho adaptor nas dolivored to cac

CRise aò Coonanications in February 10031

But

the duvice

135

Found co

ie portaluas and the concruce bos corniaatod.

06 9 1232

---

## Page 249

13-00000

GOSOCCenTlY: 07 4 0040098 1093, 22: 3. 3. 420156

C000C6 32730219 A Con 1411? 173202.

Monig Coreir Achly,

G..:

Torrow and ide wife,

Cochiy,

in concoction mies

2o: do clood Cuba Hate dad, 000.000 in cocaterfeit Debos

cootess

the Casino

eccaonny.

Kohly was tho leader of

chis schene, iniie dir, Morrow and his wife mere charged with

10T the couterigi: bill3.

Tea 1n0022032100

py the U.S. Sacret Sarrico, adrised that

lonly suppliod hin with a countorioit 20

20305 biJ2

ihich Air.

Kohly said was offared for sale to him from

goats of the Cia in Miani.

Morrow also stateà that

he had becone associated wich a

"certain agent" nater

bilding a devica which ho demonstratod so this agency.

The Secret Sorvice was adrised in 1903 that the Agoacy

did not have any interost in sir. Kohly.

5.

Thore is ao infomation in this file verifying

Me. kohly's allegation that he had obtained the councerfeit

bili from agents of to CiA.

Б.

Hit.

Thueror has been advised that he say toil

Nr. Blurenthal that the Agency entored into a contract wich

Mortox Produets, Inc., in September 1952 whereby Vi. Mortow

was to dovelop a piece oe equipagne, but that the concract

135

carminated in April 1965 after the prototype of the

equipnent harl been tested and found to be unsatisfactory.

Robert w. Gambinio

Distribution:

Orig. & 1

-Adse

1

-. D/ SeC

1

CD Reading File

1 - Subjaci File

OS/PSI/CD/KFCarroli:nf

Recyped: ArCarroll in

(24

(18 March 1976)

1976)

BR

---

## Page 250

13-00000

.,.m129?9

# 1 JUL 1S76

VECORAT FOR :

Director of Central Intelligence

FROM

VIA

SUBJECT

:

Raymond A. Warren

Chaef, Latin America Division

: Deputy Director for Operations

: Possible Accusations Against the CIA

1.

On 30 July 1976 at 1630 hours, Latin Anerica Division

was advised by Mr. Tom White of the Office of Legislative

Counsel that he had just talked on the phone to & staff aide

of Representative Thonas Downing,

Democrat of Virginia.

The

siaff aide told. White that Representative Downing had just

received information fron a Mr. Robert Morrow, author of a

rocent book (Betrayal) on the Jchn F. Kennedy

assassination.

Morrow provided this alieged information to the os angeres

Times,

New york times, a Richmond newspaper (Tines or densleader.

perhaus), and others.

According to this information, which

the staff aide said is to appear in the New York Times on

Sunday: 1 August:

a. President Richard Nixon promised a Mr. Mario

GARÇIA Kohly that if an invasion of Cuba were successíul;

Nixon would arrange that all Cuban leftists outside

Cuba would be killed. The implication was that these

killings would be carried out by the CIA.

b. British overflights froin the Bahamas showed

that there were

Soviet missiles in Cuba as early as

1960, and they were not removed until 1964.

President

Kennedy knew of this information, but withheld it from

the public.

2.

The staff aide said that Representative Doining plans

to call a press conference on Monday, 2 August, to disclose

the above information, but not necessarily to attest to its

accurac).

. • E? IMPOET

CH 0060

10T82

?..i

Misinitied

---

## Page 251

13-00000

?.

recording to Cre treends, Marie GARCIA Kohly was

maten to taintail in

Pois a formor Cuban

business-

and 100 son 02 & h0176% C1o01 17o2609d0r to Sosit. Since

Tain no has crontod to grin official U.s. Gorcinnent support,

and the

support of foreiga

Foremments, for various grandiose

schemes 10 prarthrow Fidel

Castro.

In pursuit of this goul,

he has used numercus high-ierei government contacts in an

effort io associate himself with the CIA.

In April 1964

Garcia was sentenced to one yeer in prison for forging Cuban

currenc) to introduce into Cuba to depress the economy.

He

claimed he did

this with the knowiedge of the CIA and the

U.S. Government.

CIA denisa

any Knowledge of Garcia.

Agency has had no operational relationship with Garcia.

/s/ George V. Lauder

Raymond

Warren

Cc: DDCI

CONCUR:

Deputy Director only

Operations

3O JUL I0T:

Date

---

## Page 252

13-00000

How CIA Plot To Kill Castro Backfired

By HARRY ALTSHULER

MIDNIGHT Staff Writer

The CIA and Fidel Castro were

'Kennedy

both betting on the same agent

- and Castro won=

• was

The CIA plotted to murder Cas-

tro by using a Cuban agent

code-named

Am/Lash,

who

Trying

agreed to lead a coup to overturn

the Castro government.

To Get

But Am/Lish was a doublengent.

A longtime taithtal pal of Castro.

castro,

named Rolando Cabelo, he look the

ClA's money- and spilled its plans:

But '

into Castro's car.

In angry retaliation. Castro ser up

the assassination of President John

castro

F. Kennedy.

That is the sory — areadly long.

Got To

known in sonne Wishington circles

- hehind the reopening of the the

on 1tKs murder.

Him First'

But the truth may he even more

CIA blamed Kennedy

JOHNSON refused to

complex. Now a former ClA opera-

tive. Robert1. Morrow. hasspilled

for Bay Of Pigs failure.

spill any details.

-LBJ

il dosen yeurs of secrets into a confessional book.

"Be-

ployce. working under orders. He had noidea what it wis all

trayal.

published by the Henry Kegnery Co., Chicago.

about or where his own actions filted injo the picture

Led Harvey Oswald was not the assassin, Morrow as-

A group inside the CIA itself, working clusely with dis-

seits.

gruntied Cuban exiles, plotted the assassination, saysthor.

Oswald was just the chump set up to take the blame, while

row.

the real killers escaped.

Oswald's boss was another ClA employce. Jack Kuby.

According to Morrow. Oswald was a small-time ClA em-

Ruby know the scope of the plot and wanted no part of it.

But Ruby had a racker of his own on the side, drug-running

from Cuba. li made him vulnerable lo blackmail.

ROLANDO CUBELO, almost a Castro lookalike

Kuby wis the Dallas nightclub operator who walkied up to

Oswald and. as the nation watched on TV, shot him at close•

with the beard and cigar, wore his arm in a sling

range. Kuby too is now dead, hut his claim was he performed

as a result of wounds he received in the Presi-

the act out of love for the dead President. Morrow says this

dential Palace takeover in Havana on Castro's

is the truth about Ruby:

behalf.

He was ordered to liquidate Oswald, to keep his mouth

now dead. a New Orleans businessman who was a power in

shut, and threatened with a jail sentence on a urug charge if

he hesitated.

the CIA. Morrow quotes him as declaring: "The assassina-

What did the CIA cabal have against JFK? Morrow ex.

tinn of a President may secni a monstrous act, but not if the

plains the ClA

group and its Cuban exile friends blamed

alternative is an America under communist rule..."

Kennedy for the Bay of ligs invasion failure. And they

Long afterward,

Shaw was indicied on a conspiracy

charged him with playing politics in the Cuban missile crisis.

charge, and acquilled as innocent.

"If our President ind his brother sit on the missile infor

But meanwhile. is Morrow tells it, the plot went ahead.

mation. he won't live through his first term,

" Morrow heard

Oswald was picked as the fall guy, lo be fed to the police

from an insider.

while the men who actually fired the shots in Dallas that

The CIA-Cuban exile plotters regarded JFK as a traitor.

Nov. 32 got awily.

This part of the story fits in with recent Senate Intelli-

They felt he wasn't ready enough to battle Castro, whom

gence Committee revelations of two Cuba-connected fugi-

they saw as a deadly menace to the U.S.

Their first plan was to ruin Castro by counterfciting

tives following the assassination. One fled Texis for Mexico

Cuban currency to smash the economy. They were running

the same day, and a Cuba-hound airliner was held back till

he scrambled aboard.

their counterfeiting operation with U.S. govemment funds

and salarics, but naturally they had to kcep it dark from the

The other reached Mexico the following day, and wis

immediately Nown out to Cuba on an airliner with no other

White House.

Their secrecy succceded ton well — for the Sceret Serv.

pissengers.

According to Morrow, these were the men with Mann-

ice broke in and arrested them as ordinary counterfeiters.. licher rifles similar to the one Oswald owned, who fired at

Morow himself was handed a two-year sentence, sus-

pended, in connection with the scheme.

the President from hidden vantage points. The explanation

The insiders felt the White House had interfered with

that there was more than one man firing accounts for the

their last hope — short of violence — of breaking Castro.

puzzling profusion of wounds.

"•Il we can't get Castro because of the President, we'll ge

If the truth was known or suspected in Washingion, why

ROBERT MORROW, former ClA man, holds

the President first, so we can get al Castro," one of them

has it been so long coming into the open?

Mannlicher rifle he was ordered to buy before the,::

warned Morrow.

è esse a c.aili.

Current talk in the nation's capital is that the first ones !o

assassination. Three men fired at JFK he claims.

The kingpin of the group, his book says, was Clay Shaw.

realize Castro's involvement had a terrible fear that if he

were openly accused, it would lead to a confrontation with

his backer, Russia — possibly the nuclear holocaust the

whole world dreaded.

So they kept quict — even the man in the White House,

Lyndon B..Johnson.

News commentator Howard K. Smith has now revealed a

confidential conversation with Johnson, lung ago.

"I'Il tell you something about kennedy's murder that will

rock you,"'

Johnson confided. "Kennedy was trying lo get

Castro, but Castro gos to him firse."

Smith admits. "I was rocked all right. I hegeed for details.

hut he refused. saying it will all come out some dily.

True engugh, there have been rumors for years, in MID-

NIGH'T and elsewhere, despice the massive efforis to bury

investigation under the Warren Keport.

'The ClA and the FBl were naturally reluctant to let the

world find out they hid heen hooby-trapped by a double

agent.

They didn't even wint to think about the truth — that it

wits the GlA plotting against Castro that lee do the death of

the American Prestient.

That wis why the ClA and the FiBl kepp secrets from the

ROLANDO CUBELO, left: Cuban Police Chief, Efigenio Amejeiras; Fidel Castro; and

Warren Commission and even failed to follow up leads for

Havana University President Juan Marinello, in the early days of the Castro victory.

lear oi whit they might leum.

MIDNIGHT -

Page

---

## Page 253

13-00000

ARTICLE MAIN

Document Contradicts Testimony

CiA Viewed Oswald

As Information Source

social-stass

Contrary io sworn testimony, the

•CiA once considered using presiden-

tial assassin Ice Harvey Oswald as a 1

source oi intelligence. information.:

about the Soviet Union, according to

a newly released Cla document.

In sworn

testimony beiore, the?

Warren: Commission, former- CIA:

Direcior. Richard Helms. said the :

agency never had.""or even contem-

plated"' any contacts with Oswald,

The

newly released document,

written by an unidentified CIA oilicer

three days after President John F

Kennedy was killed in Dallas on Nov.

23, 1963, says that: "we showed intel-

ligence interest.

"in Oswald and "dis-

CISSEL "

views?" thslaying on oi inter-

The unidentified officer added.trat

"I do not know whai action developed.

thereafter "a'

• THE MEMO: WAS ABIONG hUn

•dreds of pages of. documents. from:

the ClA's mle on Lee Maryey Oswald.

The material pastreleased to. The

Associated: Press yesterday unders

the Freedom of Information Act.?

A second-document reveals. that:

former CiA Director Allen Dulles,:

while serving as a member of the

Warren Commission, privately.coun-

seled CIA oificials on the best way. to

answer questions-from.the.commis-

sion about allegacions that Oswald

Dulles "thought language' which

made it clear. that. Lee Harvey Os.

wald was never an employe or agent:

of ClA would sufrice,

an unidenti-

fied CIs oficer wrots Helms in April

3954.

"When ha appeared before the.com-

mission in blay: 1964, Helms, then

head of. the agency's- clandestine

services, testified under oath that

'there's no material in the Central

Intelligence Agency, either in the

records of in the mind of any of the

individuals that there was any con-

tact had or even comtemplated with".

Oswald.

THENOY: 23, 1563, memo explains

that the agency's interest in Oswald

as a potential intelligence source was

due to. his "unusual behavior in tha

USS" to which he had defected in

3959.

Satanes-a

"We were particularly interested

in the (deleted) Oswald might pro-

vide on the Minsk factory in which be

had been employed, on certain see.

tions. of the city itself, and of course.

we though: the usual (deleted) that

might help develop (deleted) person-

ality dossiers,

" the memo states."

The memo indicates. that Oswald

•was also or interest to the ClA be:

cause or concem that his Russian

8:797227

born wife, Marina, might have been

part of a trend for Soviet women to

marry foreigners, leave the counity

and settle overseas where they could

serve as spies.:

THE MEMO ASCUT the agency's

interest in Oswald said the discus-

sions about Oswaid occurred "some-

time in summer. 1960." The author

continued: "I: don't recall if this was

discussed while Oswald and his famil

ly were en route to out country or if it

was after theirarrival."

"I agree with him

that a carefuily

phrased renial of the charges of in-

volvement with Oswald seemed most.

appropriage," the unidentitied uticer;

added

--162:i

---

## Page 254

13-00000

AGE

SIGNALCENTERUSE ON

ACT

19%

dEt

Tre

DEI

OMF

D

CLASEIIZATION

CRET:

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

STAFF

CONF: 2/553

0

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AP WIRE STORY IN WASHINGTON STAR ON FOIA RELEASE OF OSWALD'S

MATERIAL MAKES FOLLOWING STATEMENT, WHICH YOU SHOULD BE AUARE,

QUTE: IN SUORN TESTIMONY BEFORE THE WARREN COMMISSION

RICHARD HELMS, THEN A BRANCH CHIEF AND LATER CIA!S DIRECTOR,

SAID THE AGENCY NEVER HAD OR EVEN CONTEMPLATED ANY CONTACTS.

WITH OSWALD.•: NEWLY RELEASED DOCUMENT, SAYS WE SHOWED IN-.

TELLIGENCE INTEREST IN OSWALD AND DISCUSSES.•• THE LAYING ON

OF INTERVIEWS: END QUOTE. Y

MATERIAL

-2÷

ABOVE MISCONSTRUED FROM SANITIZED EAST RELEASED UNDER FOIA,

WRITTEN BY FORMER OFFICER WHO WAS INTERESTED IN POSSIBLE USEFUL IN-

FORMATION OSWALD MIGHT HAVE IN CONTEXT OF SOVIET REALITIES. IN

RESPONSE TO DCI CALL TO ALL HANDS TO RECORD WHATEVER THEY THOUGHT

MIGHT BE RELEVANT TO WARREN COMMISSION INTERESTS, OFFICER WROTE THIS

21€110

MEHO

1254 •

THE NEX DOES RECORD BRANCH LEVEL DISCUSSION BUT STATES THAT

URITER DOES NOT KNOW WHAT ACTION WAS TAKEN- E-2, IMPDET-H

DATE:

ORIO:

UNIT:

EXT:

•1: OCT. 76

CHAS - BRIGGS:DCM

L/ISS

1,596

CHRONO

DDP

COUHDIMATINE DEFICERS

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIDITED

SECRET

THEODORE LA SHACKLEY, ADDO

E 2

IMPDET

iCL

BY:053573

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INSPECIOR GENERAL

76-3086

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM

SUBJECT

: John H. Waller

Inspector General

: Washington Star Story, 1 October 1976

1. This is for your information only.

2. On 1 October 1976 the Washington Star published a news

story with an Associated Press credit line, headlined CIA

Viewed Oswald As Information Source (copy aitached). The

lead stated:

Contrary to sworn testimony, the CIA once con-

sidered using presidential assassin Lee Harvey

Oswald as a source of intelligence information

about the Soviet Union, according to a newly

released CIA document.

In sworn testimony before the Warren Commission,

former CIA Director Richard Helms said the

Agency never had "or even contemplated" any

contacts with Oswald.

The news story, in another section, made the following

statement:

The November 25, 1963, memo explained that

the Agency's interest in Oswald as a potential

intelligence source was due to his "unusual

behavior in

the USSR," to which he had defected

in 1959.

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N28. 161 S.21V

3. There was such a memorandum, written by a case

officer then stationed in Paris, recently released under FOIA.

Writing three days after President Kennedy's assassination,

this case officer recalled that there had been intcrest in Oswald.

As soon as I had heard Oswald's name, I recalled

that as Chief of the 6 Branch I had discussed..-

sometime in the summer of 1960 - - with the then

Chief and Deputy Chief of the 6 Research Section

the laying on of interview (s) through KUJUMP or

other

suitable channels.

I remember that Oswald's unusual behavior in the

USSR had struck me from the moment I had read

the first ODACID dispatch on him, and I told my

subordinates something amounting to "Don't push

too hard to get the information we need, because

this individual looks odd. "

• • I do not know what action developed there-

after . ...

4. The Helms testimony before the Warren Commission •

on this subject was as follows:

Mr. Helms. On Mr. McCone's behalf, I had all

our records searched to see if there had been

any contacts at any time prior to President Kennedy's

assassination by anyone in the Central Intelligence

Agency with Lee Harvey Oswald. We checked our

card files and our personal files and all our records.

Now this check turned out to be negative.. In addition

I got in touch with those officers who were in positions

of responsibility at the times in question to see if .

anybody had any recollection of any contact having

even been suggested with this man. This also turned

out to be negative, so there is no material in the

Central Intelligence Agency, either in the records or

in the mind of any of the individuals, that there was

any contact had or even contemplated with him.

.- 2 -

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5. Mr. Helms did state exactly the words quoted in the

nEWS

story - "or even contemplated." But the context of,

those words was what was reported to him as the result of

a search of records and memories. To this day those

familiar with the extensive Oswald records state that there

is no reflection in those records that anyone even undertook

to propose or approve a contact with Oswald. It would have

been natural to do so, but apparently any such thoughts did

not progress to formal action. From the memorandum

quoted, it is apparent that someone at Branch level did think

about it, even if nothing ever came of it. This hardly con-

stitutes a responsible or official or serious "contemplation"

of the idea. Mr. Helms' full statement on this point seems

literally correct in the full context of his statement, although

more refined qualifications might have reiterated the basis

for his conclusions. The news story is misleading on this_

point.

6. The news story statement that Oswald was considered

due to his "unusual behavior in the USSR," is exactly the

opposite of the statements of the quoted memorandum, which

reported the care that should be used if Oswald were approached,

because of his strange conduct.

7.. The statement in the news story about Mr. Dulles

consulting with Agency personnel on how to answer questions

is basically true. The interpretation to be placed on this

counselling will depend on the interpreter. The inference of

the news story is that Mr. Dulles was counselling slanted

responses on the Oswald issue, thereby tending to reinforce

the interpretation of deception attributed to Mr. Helms.

Letit Fidela

John IT. Waller

Attachment:

As Stated

Cc: DDCI w/atts

DIG: SDBreckinridge: js (R 1407) & October 1976

Distribution:

Orig Watts - Addressee'

/ watts - DDCI

1w/atts - ER

1 w/atts - IG Chrono

-3-

l watts - SDB Chrono

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