MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD: SCHWEIKER REPORT REVIEW.
Originator: CIA
From: BRECKINRIDGE, SCOTT D., DEPUTY, IG
Document date: 07/16/1976
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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2022 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

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16 July 1976

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Schweiker Report Review

1. Yesterday afternoon I met with Bob Wall (CI Staff),

Bill Sturbitts (LA Division), and Jerry Brown (Office of Security).

The purpose of the meeting was to get an idea of the work involved

to review the issues raised in the Schweiker report and to review

what the Agency did in relation to the Warren Commission.

2. I reported that Mr. Knoche did not wish us to seek

access to the Warren Commission proceedings at this phase of

our review.

3. Bill Sturbitts said that Judy Cline.)now with CI Staff,

is very familiar with the LA Division files on much of this subject,

particularly Mexico. Speaking on the provocation/retaliation

aspect of this, he observed that the Miami Ops and CI files ran

some 5,000 to 10,000 linear feet. There was agreement that this

posed a massive research problem on just the question of provocation.

It was noted that we were discussing "provocation" in its broadest

sense, in terms of the government policy and Agency program;

we probably know the details of the so-called assassination plots

and the files in question would be unlikely to turn up anything new

in this respect. Sturbitts noted that a detailed paper had been

prepared commenting on the information in the book given by

Castro: to Senator McGovern.

4. Bob Wall noted that he was Deputy Chief of PM in Miami

for three years. He raised

a question as to whether the broader

program was relevant to the issue of provocation, in the terms

posed by the Schweiker report. Later in the discussion he

expressed the opinion that whatever we wrote on the subject might

be a prejudiced interpretation. I expressed the view that the

overall program established a context for what happened and that

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we should, consider providing a statement of it. Until we have

tried we wouldn't know what we had. Sturbitts was asked if

there was a IMWAVE history. When he said that there was I

undertook to review the history to see if some general state-

ment of the overall program could be extracted.

5. Jerry Brown raised the question of what Castro could

have assumed, as distinguished from what he knew, observing

that a lot of the Cubans were planning things. Sturbitts observed

that the Agency did support "fronts" that did things we didn't

know. He observed that, in fact, we are making payments to

the families of some of the people involved. There was brief

consideration of what the Agency's responsibility would be for

people that it paid but did not control or direct. The point was

also made that there were Cuban exile organizations, with

which we had no connection, that had programs of their own.

6. There was some general discussion about what the

files would show on incidents questioned in the Schweiker report.

The two aircraft flights from Mexico City to Havana were men-

tioned, it appearing that we know quite a bit about the individual

involved in one of them but nothing about the other; in the latter

instance there had been no follow-up.

7. Jerry Brown raised a question about Frank Sturgis,

aka Frank. Fiorini. He said that it would take further study, but

there are some indications that Sturgis at one time worked for

Castro in connection with the gambling concessions. This would

have brought him into contact with Trafficante. This connection

might also explain the role of Orta in the original plot, Orta

having also had something to do with the gamblers. Brown pointed

out that if a careful review of this established this connection, it

might represent a security flaw in the original Castro plot. As

these possible connections were unknown previously, and as they

have not yet been researched, it was agreed that this was an

important subject for study. Sturbitts noted that none of this

showed in Sturgis' 201 file and it was agreed that Security and

LA Division should study this together. Brown emphasized that

this is only a possibility and might not stand up under study. It

was noted that this is one of those things that might have been

turned up at the time of the Warren Commission had the Agency

done a more thorough job.

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8. It was noted that Lonnie Zeibell, now working in OGC

on FQIA,is familiar with much of this. At present he is working

on the Fensterwald FOIA request. It was noted that Fensterwald

claimed that he knew who the man was in the photographs taken

in Mexico, some of which have been made public although cropped

to obscure the background. Larry Houston wrote a memo in 1971

on Fensterwald's claim. Fensterwald, however, has declined

to reveal who the person was. It was suggested as a "long shot"

that the man's photograph ought to be compared with those of known

Soviet couriers.

9. Bob Wall said that there were 95 files on Oswald.

Angleton had a dozen folders on the Oswald case including such

things as press reports of the Castro interview on 7 September

1962, and correspondence concerning possible connections with

the Kennedy assassination. He cited a 23 May 1975 memorandum

by Ray Rocca for David Belin, saying in effect that while there

are nuances subject to interpretation, there was no evidence; this

had been laid before the Warren Commission in 1964.

10. It was noted that Tony Siorza, a former career agent,

had served under the Havana Station prior to the Castro takeover.

Gambling had been his cover. He might be able to provide some

information on the Trafficante/Sturgis question.

11. Bob Wall thought that it would be helpful if there were

written terms of reference for this study. I indicated that I

wasn't sure that the results of this first review had told us

enough to do this very well. I undertook to write a first draft

which I said would be "all-encompassing." I noted that there

are two time-frames to be covered--what happened before the

JEK assassination, and what CIA did after the assassination to

collect information and provide it to the Warren Commission,

as it applied to the Cuban connection. There also were two

general subject areas--one of these having to do with the question

of assassinations, as provocation for retaliation, as well as the

broader question of provocation, and the other having to do with

whether the Agency did all it should have in reporting to the

Warren Commission. I said that I would write a first draft on

this and have it to them early next week for discussion. As we

did not yet really know much that we needed to know I was sure

there would be problems with this first draft.

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