MINUTES OF MEETING OF SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED) ON MONGOOSE, 9/6/62
Agency: MATHENY
Originator: NSC
To: RECORD
Document date: 9/6/62
Document type: MEMORANDUM

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JFK Assassination System

Identification For

Date:

8/27/201

Agency Information

Released under the

Kennedy

John F.

Assassinat ion Records

olleetion det of

1992

144

2107 Notel -

AGENCY:

RECORD NUMBER:

MATHENY

178-10004-10264

RECORD SERIES :

SSC SERIES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER: DRAFT REPORT-APPROVAL OF QUOTATIONS (2)

Document Information

ORIGINATOR:

FROM:

10:

TITLE:

NSC

RECORD

MINUTES OF MEETING OF SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED) ON MONGOOSE, 9/6/62

DATE: 09/06/1962

PAGES:

5

SUBJECTS :

CUBAN EXILES

OPERATION MONGOOSE

CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS

ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES

DOCUMENT TYPE: MEMORANDUM

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

RESTRICTIONS: 1C

CURRENT STATUS: Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW.:

08/11/1993

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS: Unmarked but probably TOP SECRET.

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approves +1 100-46467

DRAFT MONGOOSE Minutes

-916/62

TAP /mm

('

178-10003-10090

178-10004-10264

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT:

Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) on

Operation MONGOOSE, 6 September 1962

PRESENT:

Mr. McGeorge Bundy; the Attorney General; Mr. Martin;

Mr. William Bundy, General Decker, General Lansdale and

General Harris; General Carter; Mr. Murrow

1.0

Sabotage Operation

General Carter reported that information should be available by

Sunday as to the success of this previously-approved operation.

Buidy requested that the White House be informed as soon as the

Mr.

information is obtained.

2.

General Lansdale commented in general on his paper of August 31st.

-He noted that some of the operational representatives.had questioned

• whether this was responsive to the changed situation engendered by the

Issuance of NSAM 181, but sald that this plan had been prepared within

the framework of the previously-approved guidelines (those of August 16).

Mr. Bundy noted that most of the paperwork in response to. NSAM 181 has

been done and the President's statement of Tuesday night had clarified

the situation to a considerable degree. He thus felt that the approach

taken in the August 3lst paper was satisfactory.

i'3.0

The following specific comments were then made on Activities

listed in the paper:

(It should be noted that final approval was not

given to the paper at this meeting.)

Mr. Martin said that number 20 (balloons) was tricky and that

he thought a very careful look should be taken when a specific proposal

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Is prepared. After considerable discussion, it was agreed that

details should be presented to the Group, to include the content of

the leaflets which would be dropped, and specifics as to the method

and place of launching, the technical details of the release of

leaflets, etc., etc.

b. Mr. Martin felt that number 25 ("discovery" of caches of

arms) involves an important aspect of timing. He said, and the Group

agreed, that any such action should be coordinated with U.S. objectives

toward Cuba rather than confusing it with activities in connection with

, a third country. Mr. Bundy emphasized that any such undertaking should

• be done with: the idea of providing a pretext for further action.

c. In answer to the Chairman's question, Mr. Murrow, supported

by State, said that Radio Swan (number 23) should be continued even

though it is not entirely effective. This led into a discussion of

the possibilities of intrusion into radio and IV channels in Cuba. Mr.

Murrow explained the far-reaching reactions that the Cubans could mount

against U.S. radio stations, and said that he felt on balance it would.

not be profitable to provoke this kind of electronic warfare. The Group

asked, however, that a detailed paper on the pros and cons of such

Intrusions, to include the legal aspects involved, be prepared.

d. At General Carter's suggestion, number 21 (propaganda directed

at Bloc personnel in Cuba) was assigned to USIA and CIA, rather than

• just to the latter.

e. On number 28 (sabotage of assets outside of Cuba), the purpose

was changed from crippling to harragging Cuban commerce.

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f. General Carter pointed out that reference to support of all

Cuban exile groups (number 48) 1s Impractical. The word was changed

to selected.

g Mr.. Martin cautioned that results of number 50 (actions to

be undertaken by other Hemisphere goverments) would not be expected

overnight.

• it.

General Carter urged that, in contection with number 22

• (submarine broadcasts), General Lansdale should be given more latitude

in warking up other deception possibilities. Mr. Bundly Felt, on the

other hand, that particularly berause of the possible liban counter-

measures which had been outlimed by Mr. Murrow, tihe fraup should look

at other possibilitles in sone detail.

1. General Carter feilt that a determination should be made as

to how far the l.S. is prepared to go in ecaronic harrassing actions.

He emphasized that sabotage operations such as those under number 27

will not in themselves ibe especially effective in grecking the Cuban

enonomy.

restaurt bacha

9911271977:

4..

The Group then burned to a discussion of number 32 (agricultural

sabotage). General Carter emphasized the extreme sensitivity of any

such operation and the disastrous results that would flow from some-

thing going wrong, particularly if there were cbvious attribution to

the V.S. He went on to say, however., that it would be possible to

accomplish this purpose by methods more subtile than those indicated in

the paper. He mentioned specifically the porsibility at producing crop

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failures by the introduction of biological agents which would appear

to be of natural origin. Mr. Bundy said that he had no worries about

any such sabotage which could clearly be made to appear

as the result

of local Cuban disaffection or of a natural disaster, but that we must

avoid external activities

such

as release of chemicals, etc., unless

they could be completely covered up.

5. A suggestion was made that small explosives or incendiaries which

could be distributed to Cubans should be infiltrated. General Carter

explained that the problem is not one of such supplies, since they can

be easily improvised, but rather that the people have shown no inclination

to use such. materials despite many exile claims to the contrary.

It was-suggested that.the.matter.of.attacking and harrassing of

Soviet personnel within Cuba should be considered.

7. The Attorney General and Mr. Bundy said that no reprisals against

exiles who undertake active operations on their own are contemplated.

8. • It was

suggested that the possibilities of counterfeiting be looked

into further.

9.

General Carter urged again that a decision be reached as to how

much latitude would be allowed the operating elements of the government,

within broad policy lines. The Chairman indicated that it would not be

a simple matter to delegate responsibilities of this kind to any great

degree.

10. Mr. Bundy then raised the basic question of the entire spectrum

of other contingencies beyond those envisaged in the MONGOOSE program.

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He mentioned

as examples what the U.S. response should be in the event

of a revolt and whether or not a naval blockade should be mounted.

The Group agreed that such planning, in addition to the military continger

plans already prepared, must be pursued.

Although recognizing that this type of activity is not within the

MONGOOSE Examework, Mr. Dundy fit hat Gencral Lansdale' group,

mile

particularly the State representative, could do the initial exploration

of possibilities for later consideration by the Special Group, the

Secretary of State and higher authority. On the other hand, General

Carter felt strongly that if General Lansdale and his associates

were given the responsibility for developing the spectrum of possible

decisionsof this kind, it would inevitably detract from the time

available for MONGOOSE operations. Thie matter was left open for further

consideration at a meeting next week.

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