## Page 1

157-10014-10006

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK Assassination System

Date:

7/7/2015

Identification Form

Agency Information

AGENCY : SSCIA

RECORD NUMBER :

157-10014-10006

RECORD SERIES :

HEARINGS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 01-H-08

-Document Information

ORIGINATOR:

FROM:

TO :

TITLE :

SSCSGO

ANGLETON, JAMES; MILER, SCOTTY

DATE: 01/22/1976

PAGES:

74

SUBJECTS :

ANGLETON, JAMES

CIA, METHODOLOGY

MILER, SCOTTY

DEFECTORS

FBI

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

DOCUMENT TYPE: TRANSCRIPT

CLASSIFICATION: Top Secret

RESTRICTIONS: Consulted

CURRENT STATUS: Withhold

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 06/24/1997

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS: Box 1

v9.1

NW 50955

DocId: 32423394

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Date: 07/31/95

Page

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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

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RECORD NUMBER

: 157-10014-10006

RECORDS

SERIES

: HEARINGS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCSGO

FROM

ANGLETON, JAMES; MILER,

SCOTTY

TO

TITLE

DATE : 01/22/76

PAGES

74

SUBJECTS

: ANGLETON, JAMES

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

CIA, METHODOLOGY

FBI

MILER, SCOTTY

DEFECTORS

DOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPT

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RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED

CURRENT STATUS

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DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/24/97

OPENING CRITERIA

COMMENTS : BOX 1

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ORIGINAS

Vọl. 1 or 3

The Muited Staten Bruate

NAZLONAL GECUA

Unadchor red Dide

colcriminal Sanct

FORMATION

Bubject

R2352

Report of Proceedings

INVENTOALE

04 2/5/77

irralina

Hearing held before

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental

Operationg With Respect to Intelligence Activities

4499hpu

0. 0

Thursday, January 22, 1976 ....

Washington, D. C

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over

to the Committee for destruction)

WARD & PAUL

110 FIRST STREET. S. R

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003

(202) 644-6000

TOP C

.: ident.

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Phone (Area 202) 948-8000

MATO A PAUL

410 Forsi Siroes, S.E., Massingion, D.C. 2000}

TOP SECRET

CONIENTS

3

4

TESTIMONY OF:

James Angleton

--accompanied by--

Scotty Miler

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FOREIGN AND MILITARY SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING

Thursday, January 22', 1976

Unitod States Senate,

Select Committee to Study Governmental

Operations with Respect to

Intelligence Activities,

Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:10 o'clock

p.m., in Room S-407, the Capitol, the Honorable Gary Hart

presiding.

Present: Senators lart of Colorado (presiding), and

Schweiter.

Also present:

William G. Miller, Staff Director; and

Joseph diGenova, Charles Kirbow, Jim

Johnston, Brict Snider,

Loch Johnson, Elliot Maxwell, Elizabeth Culbreath, Bob Kelley,

Michael Epstein, Rick Inderfurth, Charles Lombard, and Pat She.,,

Professional Staff

Members.

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PROCEEDINGS

Senator llart of Colorado. Gentlemer, let's go ahead and

be sworn and get under way if you don't mind.

Do you swear the testimony you're about to give will be

the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help

you God?

Mr. Angleton. I do.

Mi. Milor. I do.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Thank you very much.

Mr. Angleton at least has been before us before, and

routinely we remind all witnesses that they preserve all of

their constitutional rights, including the right to counsel,

the right to remain silent and so

forth and

so on, and to have

a member of the Committee present during all of the testimony.

It is my understanding we have no prepared statements to

start with, so I think I'll just open

it up to staff questions

and interject some of my own, and I understand that the general

subject matter to be discussed here today - and we are interested

in your expertise regarding the question of counterintelligence:

so, we'll just have the staff members

start.

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TESTIMONY OF JAMES ANGLETON

ACCOMPANIED BY SCOTTY MILER

Mr. Johnson. I wonder if we could begin by having both

of your gentlemen give us some information on your backgrounds,

beginning with Mr. Angleton.

MI. Angleton. I entered the OSS in 1943 from the Army.

went into training in Washington and environs and then to

London, and then

eventually to Italy, and I took over as

Chief, Counterintelligence in Italy, and eventually took over

as Chief, OSS.

I returned in about '47, '48, and various jobs in both

espionage and counterintelligence. At one time Chief of

Operations and eventually Chief of Counterintelligence, and

that was from about 1954 until 1974.

Mr. Johnson. Mr. Miler?

MI. Miler. I entered OSS in 1946. I was sent to China.

I was in China until 1949, transferred to Japan, became involved

in intelligence aspects of the Korean War. I served in Thailand,

the

Philippines, as I said, China, Japan, Ethiopia. I travoled:

extensively, was

a station chief abroad, and for the last ton

years I have been

in Counterintelligence, first in the

Special Investigations, and subsequently as Chief of Operations!

for MI. Angleton's Counterintelligence Staff.

And wien I left the Agency in December of 174, that was

iny position.

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Mr. Johnson. So both of you left the CIA in December, 19744

Since that time we understand there have been some changes

in how counterintelligence is conducted at the CIA.

Could you give us some understanding of those changes?

Mr. Angleton. I would like to defer to Mr. Miler on this,

if I may?

MI. Miler. Yes.

My understanding is there have been some rather fundamental

and

substantive changes which are a continuation, actually,

of

changes that were made first in 1973, in July of 1973

when many of the centralized counterintelligence functions were

decentralized and reallocated to different components of the

Directorate of Operations. Such things as agent approvals and

security, operational security reviews for intelligence

collection and covert action operations; the oversight on

intelligence operations, and oversight on counterintelligence

operations in the field were decentralized. Research and

Analysis has been curtailed, and the emphasis on it has changed!

There have been changes in the record

procedures.

Mr. Johnson. Could you be more specific on these changes,

for example, in research?

Mr. Miler. In research, the research is now, as I under-

stand it, pretty much on a case by case basis, not in an

overall perception of worldwide or national counterintelligun

problems. There is no -- the application of historical cases,

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historical problems la not being applied, as I understand it,

to current operational efforts or investigative needs. There is

an entirely different philosophy being applied as to what may

be required in terms of understanding the counterintelligence

threat to this nation. There is very little emphasis, if any, or

concern with such things as deception and disinformation. There

is little application of analytical and assessment work to the

overall role of foreign intelligence and security services in

political action.

There have been some fundamental changes in operational

philosophies stemming from an application of what is termed

management by objectives as it is being applied in the CIA to

operations, and there

is a - has been a distinct change in

some of the attention which has been previously placed on the

problem of penetration from foreign and particularly hostile

intelligence

services into the American community.

And there has been a very, very substantivè change in

the perception and the conduct of counterintelligence in that

there has been what is in my view a very serious

erosion

of

security and compartmentation of operations, and leakage

of information which

has not been to the best interests of

a national counterintelligence effort.

MI. Johnson.

So, from going from a rather centralized

apparatus to a decentralized situation, the dangers of penetration

have increased.

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6

Mr. Miler. The dangers of penetration have increased

significantly, and this extends also to the methods by which

relations with foreign intelligence services are conducted.

Mr. Johnson.

But how do you respond to the criticism that

during your tenure and Mr. Angleton's tenure, too tight a

rain was kept on counterintelligence information, and individuals

in the field at the station level failed to get the information

they needed to conduct their counterintelligence operation?

MI. Miler. I would have to respond to that, Mr. Johnson,

and I could only respond to it in the context of specifics.

To my knowledge, and as practiced from my position as Chief of

Operations, whenever there was information which was judged

to be of significance, importance to a

field

station, that

field station was advised, unless there was

some overriding

security source protection or other considerations, and the

decision then not to advise them was made at the Deputy

Director for Operations, as it is now called, or the Director

level.

There was, certainly, a very tight security, a very

tight compartmentation of counterintelligence information and

activities, which in my view was essential, and still is

essential, and will be even

more essential in the future if

we are to regain a counterintelligence initiative and to do

our job in the future. And I think this is the fundamental

question that the management of the CIA and the Senate and the

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Executive have to decide, is do we want a counterintelligence

effort, and if so, then we have to get to it, and we have to

put our best minds to it.

Mr. Johnson. Were there instances during your period in

counterintelligence where the Counterintelligence Staff would

conduct its own counterespionage activities, without the knowledge

of the various geographic division chiefs?

MI. Miler. There were very few of them, with the chiefs.

There may have been some.

MI. Johnson. In those cases where there were such

operations, were they cleared with the Do?

MI. Miler.

Every single one of them

wag cleared with the

DDO and/or the Director and/or the Deputy Director.

Mr. Johnson.

On important counterespionage operations,

could you tell us

in more detail what the approval and clearance

process is?

We know that for covert action the 40 Committee frequently

becomes involved. What about for important counterespionage

operations?

Mr. Miler: Well, Mr. Angleton might want to qualify my

response, because obviously

he was

involved more in this

than I was, but there would be the two primary considerations.

One was a strictly CIA, counterintelligence or counterespionage

activity. The derivation of the authority for this came from

the statutes which set up the CIA and from National Security

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ПРОВА (АгаВ 70T)

MAND A PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Walhingion, D.C. 2000)

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5/9:65

• 8

Council directives 53, 55 and so forth. The authority rested

in there. The approval would go to the then DDP, now Deputy

Director for Operations, the Deputy Director and/or the

Director.

The authorities, if it were a significant counterintelligenc

or counterespionage case, the authorities, as I understood it

then, might require the Director to go outside the Agency to

the White llouse or the Attorney General and so forth.

Alternatively, we in the CI Staff might be directed to

coordinate this with the FBI. We would go to the FBI, explain

the case and so forth. The fBI would then go to the Attorney

the Department of Justice and get authorities, whatever

authorities they would require in order to pursue the investi-

gations, conduct the case, and do it according to whatever

stipulations that the Department of Justice would put on it

in order to either neutralize the

suspected spy or agent, anu/or

conclude the case by prosecution.

And I am talking now of primarily in terms of a serious

counterespionage case involving an American citizen.

Mr. Johnson. Mr. Angleton, do you know of any instances

where the Cl Staff of higher authority within the CIA went

outside the Agency for approval for important counterespionago

operations?

Mr. Angleton. I know of cases, yes.

Mr. Johnson. And what would

the approval system

be?

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Mr. Angleton. Well, it would be an ad hoc discussion

between the Director and the Secretary, and probably others,

the Attorney General.

Mr. Johnson. Does this happen frequently? Is this a typidal

procedure for a major counter operation?

MI. Angleton. If it's a major matter, it's on the basis

of need to know.

You have another kind of case where a foreigner came to

me and stated his government had a defector from the Bloc, an

excellent agent, and they would be prepared to give us the agent

if we would take it over lock, stock and barrel, handle it

in such a fashion that there would be no exposure, because of

the political consequences to their government.

I would go to the Director and the Deputy Director, spell

out the matter, and come to a determination with them whether

we wanted to take the case on. This particular case invoived

not only a person who had been in the intelligence service of

the opposition a long time, but he had access to codes, and alsd

a great deal of deciphered material. So it was kicked back

and forth, and there was a determination made that we would

take it over, the staff would take it over in its entirety.

And therefore, it meant that I called in Scotty and we

pulled together our

team, we sent them abroad. We handled the

man in the field for a long time, and then eventually brought

him back here.

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r.

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PROne (Arse 207) 384

In a case of that sort, the instruction was agreed upon

by all concerned, and the Director's instruction was that the

Division was not to be informed, the Division where this

individual came from, the Bloc area, should not be informed;

that the Bureau, only two or three people in the Bureau, by

name, should be informed, and that we would run the operation

and bury the individual at the end.

Now, it went along -

MI. Johnson. Did you say "bury the individual"?

Mr. Angleton. I'm not using it in your Committee terms.

Mr. Kirbow. You'd better clear that up for the record.

M. Miler. We would integrate him in to the American

society in such a way that he would be non-identifiable.

Mr. Angleton. He would be buried.

MI. Miler. May I just: add here also that the authorities,

the approval are very specific in terms of the agents' and the

CIA's responsibility to advise and get the approval of the

Attorney General in bringing someone like this into the

United States.

The Director got this approval. It was a formal letter

to the Attorney General, a formal reply. There was

a formal

but very limited advice to the Immigration. All of the legal

requirements required by the Attorney General, Immigration,

all other agencies, were done. However, in this instance, the:

were done on a very narrow, select basis, directly to Attorne:

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General and so forth, rather than to go through the normal

bureaucratic chain of command out of the CIA and its various

components.

MI. Angleton. With the added fact that we did not disclosd

all of the facts, nor identity. ~

Now, this is important, because the individual was of

such prominence that the country concerned

would be placed in

jeopardy diplomatically, the place where he was residing on

tour. There would be intensive investigations by his head-

quarters, and therefore we had to have covers. And so we

laid on in such a fashion that another service received infor-

mation regarding the target country that would induce them to

take certain observable actions, and then to spread the word

that the fellow had actually defected to another country, so

that their entire investigative thrust would be directed toward!

that country.

Senator Hart of Colorado. So far we've talked about

process, and I think we'll keep going on it, and return to

it, but I would like to quantify some of this if I can.

First of all, by terms of definition, is the phrase

Or

the term "counterintelligence" interchangeable with counter-

espionage?

MI. Angleton. It can be. I think technically counter-

intelligence is regarded to be all forms of investigative

activity, travel control, your data files, your dossiers, all

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of the systems that go into counterintelligence as such.

Out of that emerges a product, and one of the products is

counterespionage.

Senator lart of Colorado. I see.

Now big was the Counterintelligence

Staff?

MI. Angleton. When? Well, when it was in its prime it

was around, it was 200 some odd people. After this decentraliza-

tion took place, when we lost international Communism, which in

no service in the world has it ever been divorced from

counterintelligence; we lost our police division where we

train police from throughout the world; we lost operation.

approval, which is approval of agents; we lost our controls

over the Technical Services Division; we lost the geographic

representation; we lost liaison, which was the liaison was with

the FBI and 26, other government agencies who do investigations.

MI. Miler. They took'

counterintelligence and liaison

away from the counterintelligence component, If you can imagine

such a situation.

MI. Angleton.

So that reduced us to less than 80 people,

and this comes to, Senator, if I can just point to one of the

most important things in the legislation or in whatever the

Executive does, is that you cannot have in my view a Director

of the FBI and a Director of CIA who are independent of one

another. You have to have some higher authority to whom you

can make an appeal when decisions of this sort are made so that

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It 1s alred, and it 1s not done without the knowledge of anyone,

and then breaks, as it did, in the New York Times and what not.

Mr. Johnson. Yesterday we had the Bureau representatives

telling us that there wag really no problem or conflict when

It came to questions of this, and that there was no problem

with higher authority. Apparently you wduld.. jo:

disagree with that.

Mr. Angleton. I disagree in total with that. "I'm saying

the

decline in the Bureau over 20 years from when they had very high

grade counterintelligence until today when there has probably

been - well, it is least effective.

Senator llart of Colorado. Why is that?

MI. Angleton. Well, I think it has to do with the number.

of diversions it had in the days of the Vietnam war, when

internal security lost a tremendous number of men to other

assignments and duties.

second, I don't think that counterintelligence or the

real thrust of Soviet Bloc intelligence has ever been brought

up to policy level, and, more important, anything, that involves

penetration has always been swept under the rug.

In other

words, the question of penetration in this government or

penetration in any agency has never been brought to a responsible

level of finding out how it happened

and what has gone wrong.

And let's take one defector who said - in this case he

spent 16 years in the Soviet Union in the KGB. He gave us

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over 180 leads of penetration in France, and it occasioned my

drafting a letter for MI. McCone to give to President Kennedy

to give to DeGaul, DeGaul secretly sent to this country one

of his highest trusted military men. He was here incognito.

He

met with the defector for three days.

The French original reaction to President Kennedy's letter

was, it was Soviet provocation, because this was at the stage

when France was making certain very sensitive agreements in the

atomic field and otherwise with the United States, and therefore

these allegations of penetration had a very direct bearing on

those negotiations. And so the General who came over was

totally prepared to believe this was provocation, but after

three days with the defector, in a meeting with llelms and

myself, he stated without any question that this man was 100

percent bona fide, because he could ask him those questions

right on the nerve of their secrets, and he got the responses.

Now, this defector also gave considerable data on

the

status of penetration in the U.S. Government, documents which

he had

seen in Moscow, cryptonyms of operating agents, documents

which could only have been prepared by our organization, and

many other cases going back into the early '50s, going almost

to Cabinet level. So all of this information was made available

to the Bureau. But in due course Mr.. Hoover regarded or made

the pronouncement -- and I won't say when he makes a

pronounce

that it is one that has been recommended to him from higher

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level - that the defector in question was probably a provoca

tion, and the Bureau ceased contact with that individual, and

I would say they have not had any contact with him since 1965.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Why did Hoover make that

decision?

MI. Angleton. Well, among other things, this defector

wanted to have access to ongoing and to past cases with the

View that he had a tremendous amount of data that he could not

relate to anything, but if he could see things that were going

on, then it would be meaningful to him in terms of what he had

to contribute. And I can take the example that, with another

allied service; immediately we brought them into it and he had

seen certain naval documents that dealt with infrastructure and

budget. This happened to be British.

In time they found the documents, and when they presented

them to him, he could identify those he had

seen and those he

rassa!

had not seen. This led to the apprehension of Vassil, who

was in the admiralty. And this was the quallty of his

information.

All through the west agents were apprehended on the basis

of his information.

But there is a tremendous bulk of it which

is made up of fragments, made up of documents he's seen where

we have not been able to identify the document; a great number

of cryptonyms of reporting sources. where we cannot find the

body to fit the cryptonym. So this is the

reality. And he is

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being contacted perhaps by nine different intelligence services

Now, there is no one who has supported the question of

his mala fides. In other words, everyone, to a man, has

stated that he is bona fide, that they have never been able to

disprove a statement of fact that he has given as a statement of

fact, although they do not necessarily agree with his hypotheses.

That is the official statement.

MI. Miler. May I just add two things on this?

First, Mr. Johnson, it goes back to the business of

compartmentation and not advising stations. In the case Mr.

Angleton cited, the Paris station of the CIA was not told

anything about the information, and I think this is a very goodi

example of why you would not.

The second point I would like to follow up on is with

respect to this defector's information, there were five leads

which were passed to the FBI about penetration which involved

the CIA, for action. And one case was solved, but it was

solved only after the FBI officially sent us a letter saying

that they concluded that there was no substance to this

information.

They had to reopen the investigation -

MI. Angleton. And they also said: send it to the Army.

MI. Miler. Yes,

send it to the Army.

Now, they had to reopen the investigation when their

surveillance spotted a man coming out of the soviet embassy, and

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It was subseguently proved that he was a Soviet spy.

Mr. Angleton.

Now, that individual had performed four

separate missions for Soviet intelligence since about 1938 or

'39. One, he had been dropped in by the Soviets into Germany

on a mission with the WI set, to be captured in order to be

played back and to penetrate the German intelligence.

Second, he had moved from that into the penetration of

VIASEV

the Vassilov movement, which were the captured Russians in the

VIASON

German:. --. In the Vassilov Army.

Third, he had penetrated the anti-soviet forces in Germany

and then he was taken on by us in 1948 or '51 is when they

sent to renew his inks.

So he was with us from '51 to around '60.

Well, when the defection occurred, it was '62.

MI. Johnson. And MI. Angleton, you used a term that is

unfamiliar to us: his inks.

MI. Miler. Secret inks.

MI. Angleton. Secret inks. " In other words, the Germans

had captured a Soviet agent who had the same kind of

inks, and so

therefore the inks were compromised, so they laid

on a large operation

in Berlin and trained him in highly

sophisticated inks. And he is now residing not too

far

distant from us.

But I might add that it is very important to note that while

we maintained that he is a Soviet agent, and the Bureau disagreed

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and told us to send this off, we had a development occur which

it is not necessary for me to go into, it's still a relatively

live case, in which proof positive came that he was a Soviet

agent, and it was in the face of that proof positive that the

Bureau moved in and interrogated him. And that is what prompted

him to go to the Soviet embassy.

And after some hours there he came out, he was asked why

did you go to the soviet embassy, and he said I went there to

get my personal history and particulars regarding my family

since those are the questions you have bren asking me. In

other words, instead of - in this case the man had a wife

who was having an affair off and on with a Japanese military

person here - instead of recruiting the Japanese and the wife

to work in to him, because what we wanted was a confession,

because the point I want to stress here is in, a case of this

sort, a penetration there, he is not there as a solo person.

He is there

as a spotter.

He is a person used for entrapment

abroad. He is a person who can originate an operation,

induce you to go into the operation and bring in a weak

element, and put them in a position for further recruitment.

And I can stretch this on and on.

And the classic example is the Philby case. tilby

would have been Chief of British Intelligence. He was also

idontified positively in the end by this defector. When the

defector first knew about it, it was called the Ring of Five

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In the soviet Intelligence, flve people, philby being one.

But from the time he knew about it, in actual fact 1t

was a ring that went into the twenties, because the purpose

of the penetration is simply not to be a passive figure; it is

to be an aggressive figure who creates situations for recruit-

ment. And that case has. never been prosecuted. The man has

never confessed. He's never been broken. And yet it was in

the heart of our

SB, Soviet Division activities.

Senator llart of Colorado. Could you give us, back to the

quantification, could you give us some figures for numbers of

counterintelligence cases handled per year?

MI. Angleton.

scotty, you can.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Just so we can have an idea

of the magnitude of volume.

MI. Miler.

Well, for example, one, program that we had

going was an attempt to record penetration recruitment attempts

of U.S., American officials abroad, strictly abroad. And overi

a ten year period the number of attempts to recruit and

penetrate hit close to 1200. So we were running around 250 vr

so a year, just in that one small area of counterintelligence

concern.

The number of cases that we had would vary, but I would

say that from defectors in the last ten year, from

Soviet

and Soviet bloc defectors, we averaged around 150 cases a

jear. At one time -- I do know that at one time we had over

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500 active cases which required investigation.

We were concerned with approximately 140 to 160 double

agent opcrations a year. We had investigations which woüld

probably have a range, 25 to 30, significant investigations

that were going on, in addition to which we would have a

number of investigations, leads and operations with cooperative;

foreign intelligence and security

services which would probably,

hit an average of about 50, if you would.

There were other operations which were generated from other

investigations and so

forth, leads from the FBI, leads from

the military services, which would perhaps hit 30 or 40

a year.

Senator Mart of Colorado.

What about the number of cases

involving penetration, successful or otherwise, of the Agency

itself?

- ..

MI. Angleton. Well, the basic responsibility would be

the Office of Security. In other words, we would work with

them, but it tends to be a one way street, as it should be,

namely, they

are

responsible for personnel and for installations.

But from the one defector alone, I would say there were

five

hard leads.

Senator llart of Colorado. Over what period of time?

Mr. Angleton. Of this one defector who came out in

December of '61. But his leads were going back to '51, 1951.

MI. diGenova. Is this the same defector with whom the

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FBI has had no contact since 1965?

Mr. Angleton. That's correct.

MI. diGenova. Mas the Agency had any contact with him

since 1965?

Mr. Angleton. Yes, we've had it, but we've had our

ups and downs.

MI. diGenova.

And what have those ups and downs been

attributable to?

Mx. Angleton. Well, they are basic - well, first, there

are two different attitudes in the American intelligence

community regarding defectors. One of them is to give them

the harsh treatment and to treat them as second class citizens,

and we actually have taken on more

salvage cases

in the

Counterintelligence Staff and rehabilitated these people. In

fact, we came into that case basically because the fellow hau

gone sour. And --

MI. Kirbow. Meaning he had failed to continue cooperatingi

or was not giving you the right information?

Mr. Angleton. That's right. Well, no, it was simply that

he refused to cooperate any further, because one didn't appru-

ciate the

ideological reasons for his defection.

So these ups and downs would go on -- I mean, we would

have to change case officers because they would simply have

breakdown in communication.

Mr. diGenova. Did the failure of the FBI to utilize this

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asset inhibit you in any way from using the asset of the Agency

from utilizing it?

Mr. Angleton. Absolutely, because so much of the infor-

mation that we wanted to take up with him was also related to

FBI information.

MI. diGenova. In other words,. you needed access to

Information the FBI had, and you couldn't get 1t?

Mr. Angleton. We could get it but they wouldn't give

permission that their information would be submitted to him.

Mr. diGenova. In other words, you had a third agency

Iule blocking you?

MI. Angleton. A third agency, also in the attitude.

For instance, in one

session in which I participated, the

Bureau asked him to give the name of a source.

He refused to

give it on the grounds that the man was in the KGB, was a

friend of his, and he didn't want that man's name ever to

get back to the KGB because it would mean

the man's life.

And therefore he had a direct confrontation, refusing to give

it, very understandable.

MI, diGenova.

Was this lack of cooperation directly

attributable to MI. Hoover, to your knowledge?

Mr. Angleton.

no.

Mr. diGenova. Was this problem ever brought to the

attention of the President of the United States at any time?

Mr. Angleton. No, but he raised it with the Attorney

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General Mr. Kennedy, he had a direct meeting with him.

MI. diGenova. And what, if anything, happened?

Mr. Angleton. Only encouragement.

Mr. diGenova. Could you amplify on that?

Mr. Angleton. Well, the Attorney General handled him

very well indeed, but nothing further came out of it.

MI. diGenova. But there was no commitment on the part of

the Attorney General to see if he could budge: Mr. Hoover to

assist the Agency?

MI. Angleton. Well, the issue didn't come up in that

fashion, just the general, the general agreement that he was

prepared to work for the United States at the highest level,

because the intelligence he had went far beyond simply KGB.

It went into Soviet policy. It went into Soviet reorientation.

It went into Soviet Bloc. It went into Soviet defense matters.

It went into some of the major secrets. And therefore it wasn't

simply counterintelligence. It had to do with policy or

political action:

le knew, for example, the identity of a Prime Minister

who was a soviet agent, who at that time was trying to get us

to go into several political arrangements, and he knew

exactly how he was recruited and how he was being used

as an

agent of influence.

So these were matters that went beyond simply intelligenc

scope •

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MI. Kirbow. llow long is a man like that good for, Mr.

Angleton? I mean, by this time, or a decade from now, a lot

of that information is of no longer any value to you.

No. Angerson. iu, thul's not su. It is a fact that the

man has a computer mind. In other words, If you took all of

his interrogation reports, they ran to some 20 filing cabinets.

You try to have anyone retain in their mind, to apply that

same data against a now problem that comes up, it requires an

individual who lived that to be able to look at a case that

has arisen, and he knows

the case officer on the Soviet side,

and he can

give an analysis that this fellow was on the Scandi-

navian desk and that he was promoted to this, and that his

background is ciphers.

He had not told you that he: was ciphers

before because it wasn't relevant. So it's a new, added

factor.

And then you find that someone. is known

as a code clerk, and therefore the pieces begin to fit

together, that the man who was sent to the field by the soviets

to handle some unknown American is a ciphèr expert, and therefote

you look among who are the

code clerks.

MI, dicenova. I'd like to --

Mr. Miller. Could I interrupt. just a moment?

You spoke in this instance of 20 file cabinets from the

interrogation of one defector.

Mr. Angleton. Yes.

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MI. Miller. What kind of volume did you put together in

your years in this activity? If this is the product of one

interrogation, what kind of volume did you put together to

make a workable capability?

Mr. Angleton. Well, the first thing was to computerize

everything, and the second was to break it out case by case,

British cases, Australian cases, New Zealand cases, Dutch

cases, Finnish cases, French cases, Italian cases, all the

way on across the board; American cases; and then to take all

of the data, all of the voluminous stuff that was pertinent

to each of the leads, including the

unknowns, in other words,

Unknown 1, Unknown 2, Unknown 3, etc.

So you had the ability to pick out a file on X subject or

X individual, and there would be the direct quotation from the

interrogation,

and then whatever traces there were of follow-ups,

action taken, dissemination, etc.

Mr. Miller. Just to press

that - yes.

MI. Miler. I think your question is the total volume of

the files that were available to the Counterintelligence?

MI. Miller. Yes.

I was impressed by the fact that one

interrogation yielded 20 file cabinets, and was wondering the

total volume.

Mr. Miler. What were the figures on the cases to read?

Mr. Angleton. Well, I think I've already presented that

once, but when we were dealing with the new management and it

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was all this business of objectives and management by objectives,

and the idea of changing Counterintelligence personnel every

two years and new faces and open it all up and the rest of it,

we ran a basic job on how many, if you took 20 cases that were

imperative for a Counterintelligence officer to read, what the

statistical side would be. Those 20 cases would run into enougl

linear footage, which according to the mathematicians in the

Agency would take 22 man years to read, of if they were 100

percent incorrect, ll years to read. Those would be the 20

basic counterintelligence cases.

And the purpose of it was simply to show that it was a

profession, and that there had to be longevity to build up.

Counterintelligence officers.

Mr. Johnson. Generally speaking, within the counterintelli-

gence organizations, it seens to you perform four activities:

liaison, research, operations and

security.

Could you give us an idea of your own priorities in

terms of distributing manpower across those four activities?

Can you break it out that way?

Mo. Ingleton. Well, it is difficult to break out, but

the primary thing of all is the question of penetration in the

U.S. Government, and then

in allied governments.

That would I

my priority. In other words, when we had a defector from the

Cuban service who had information of an agrecment made betweon

the KGB and the DGI in Cuba to work against the U.s. and how

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they would differentiate the priorities, and areas where the

XGB was oversurveilled, the DGI would take over the surveillance

of our personnel and so on.

• The moment this defector arrived in the United States, I

sent Scotty to the airport immediately to see him because that's

the number one priority. Here was an individual whose job

was to work on Americans and who allegedly had seen information

from one of our embassies. Now, that is the highest priority,

and particularly because information of a counterintelligence

nature is perishable. Some is and some isn't.

The moment there is a defector, the opposition runs a

danage report. So you know certain information will be known

to them immediately that is compromised, and they will take

action to correct it. But there are certain secrets that the

man knows that their damage report will not turn up. Those

you put on the back burner. But the ones you reach for first

are those that are perishable, and this

is -- the priority is

established by the fact that here is a live, highly valuable

force, and we only have so much time to extract the cream off

of him and determine those things that would disappear.

Mr. Miler. But the whole thrust of all of our operations,

research, analysis, everything, was toward that goal. And much!

of the reason for the security of the compartmentation for

the CI activity was to protect that concern.

Mr. Lombard. I wonder if I could ask a question concerning

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the Bureau.

Nould it help today if there was a separate Bureau under

the Attorney General for counterintelligence, separate from the

FBI?

Фие.

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Mr. Angleton. You are posing the game problem that the

RCMP In Canada had. In other words, they set up, I might ada

because of us, because we brought them into counterintelligence

in a way they had never been brought into it, we brought them

down when this flst defector, this major defector

came out,

and the cases that were revealed to them, cryptonyms, telegrams

that were taken from them, an ambassador who was recruited,

one of their ambassadors and all this, led in time to the

Canadian Prime Minister desiring to set up a special counter-

intelligence. And so they had this problem of how you take

a law enforcement force and what do you do about it. And

their ultimate decision was that you had to keep it within the

RCMP. You created the separate office, and you created sort

of a director general of it, but the cadre, your people came

from the regular

force, even though they are separated

from

the rest of the RCMP, and they are independent of the Commissioner

of the RCMP. I mean, they are there for rations and quarters.

MI. Lombard. I quess what I had in mind

was more the

British model of the Yard having

MI. Angleton. Well, the British model is the most

overexaggorated model in the world. I think I can quite

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honestly state that since World War II the British have never

caught an agent where the lead didn't come from us or somebody

else. It was never self-generated.

Now, in the last year of so maybe they caught an ágent,

but up until that time they have never caught an agent.

MI. Lombard. So your answer, in effect, would be that

the counterintelligence function should stay within the Bureau.

Mr. Angleton. That is correct. I mean, not that it's

ideal, but in terms of the realities, in terms of the realities

it should be kept within the Bureau. It should, be greatly

enlarged, and the head of that should be, in my view, a Deputy

Director of the Bureau.

Mr. Lombard. All right.

Now, let me

ask you this. In your experience were there

problems where the law enforcement impded the running of

counterintelligence or counterespionage operations domestically?

In other words, were there times when you would have liked to

have run an agent domestically for a longer period of time

in order to get the rest of the guys, but they said no, we've

got to take this fellow to court now?

Mr. Angleton. That used to be prevalent back in the '50s.

Today I don't think they've got many cases. I mean, I don't

think that the job is being done, not in the last ten years.

' Mr. Johnson. Mr. Angleton, when I asked you earlier

what your priorities were, you mentioned making sure that

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we were not penetrated in conducting investigations to see if

in fact we were, which seems to give the impression that we

are defensively oriented, and that was your main priority.

Mr. Angleton. Well, I think that how could

you have it

any other way?.

If you've got a cryptonym of telegrams disappearing and

are in possession of the opposition -

Mr. Johnson.

But isn't the aggressive dimension even

more important and trying to penetrate the hostile service?

MI. Angleton. Those are all kind of theoretical arguments

to my way of thinking.

Mr. Miler. You have to know what you're penetrating first!

MI. Angleton. Imean, this idea of running operations is

not

really understood.

To run a double agent operation requires a tremendous

amount of manpower. It is a commitment that very few people

understand. If you are going to run a double, I mean, to start

from the beginning, you've got to be able to keep a diary.

Now, one is the real life is the real life of the agent and

the

other is his double life, becausc you can have

a question

from his headquarters that says, that agent you had three

years ago, would you please go back to him. You've got to

be able to read into a diary of the fictional life in order

to answer that question.

Now, this takes manpower. You've got to have meetings.

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You've got to be able to satisfy the questionnaltes, and you

can go all the way on down the line. This tles up thousands of

man-hours.

Mr. Johnson. Could you explain that "satisfy the

questionnaires?"

What does that phrase mean, "satiafy the questionnaires?"

MI. Angleton. The opposition wants to know, find out

from your sources the following guestions.

MI. Miler. In other words, the requirements they put

on the agent.

Mr. Angleton. Now, that agent is allegedly in the CIA

and there is a penetration, then you are just going through

games, and they will play such an operation.

They could have

a very senior penetration into the Agency and play along on

a double in order to lead you to believe that they do not have

a penetration. And they can tie up your manpower and put

doubles underneath him and another agent, and they can give

him a radio set, and with the radio set they can give him

crystals, and he needs other crystals, and it involves more

and more of your own personnel and manpower. And you can

tie up NSA: monitoring

all the links.

And so this idea that has all of a sudden been

novel

and

newly discovered in the Agency that Counterintelligence must

ve aggressive is in my view a joke. It's a joke.

Mr. Miler. You have to know what you're dealing with.

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You have to understand the enemy Intélligence service before

you're going to penetrate it, and you have to be secure from

penetration yourself, and you then have to run that penetration

very securely and on a very compartmented basis.

Mr. Angleton. And there is one added proviso, then, that

you can only run a first rate double agent if you have a

source superior to him

that he is unaware of. In the war,

when we broke the German code, it was no problem to run German

double agents because we could read their messages back to

their headquarters, re-enciphered, and the headquarters message?

back to the control, back to our double. So questions of

danger signals, questions of alerting him that he was under

control and so on was taken care of because of communications

intelligence.

When you don't have communications intelligence, then

the only other source that is superior is penetration, that is.

somebody who can read back from their headquarters how they aro,

in fact, absorbing the thrust of that double agent. And those

conditions do not exist for the Bureau

or for ourselves.

MI. Miler. Or for the military services, to run a lot

of double agents.

MI. Angleton. I mean, they do not have the superior

source of control over double agents.

senator llart of Colorado. Why is that?

1r. Angleton. Iccause

they are one, not breaking codes,

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they don't have the penetrations in the opposition against whom

you run the double.

Senator Hart of Colorado. But what is the prescription?

Does that mean we can't do that or we aren't, or what?

MI. Angleton. Well, we haven't succeeded. I mean, we

have had Popov and Penkosky, and both of them are dead. They.

wore shot.

MI. Johnson. It must be easier to penetrate the

so-called

Third world than it is the so-called Soviet Bloc.

MI. Angleton. Absolutely.

Mr. Miler. But that's not getting you exactly what you

want or need either. And you can divert an awful lot of time.

effort and

manpower to running what in essence would eventuall!

boil down in a year or two years to operations for operations'

sake. It will look good in:statistics. It will justify your i

budget request to the OMB. It will justify your counterintelli?

gence effort in terms of management objectives, because you've

increased from 22 double agent operations to 46 last year, but

what is the net result, and how much time, effort and so forth

are you actually using, and where are you losing focus on

what the real problems are facing the country in terms of

penetration and in terms of knowledge and in counterintelligence:

Mr. diGenova. The picture which both you and Mr. Angleton:

paint this new face of counterintelligence from your point of

view is a rather gloomy one because your comments seem to

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indicate that you belleve that this decentralization, lack of

compartmentation and in general, spreading the counterintelligence

function around is eventually going to lead to a breakdown in

the end product. We're not going to be getting what we should

be getting. You may be getting bigger statistics, and on the

face it may look like we're getting more, but in fact we're

not.

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MI. Miler. You're not going to get substance.

Mr. diGenova. Why s that decision made? That seems to

be so fundamentally apparent by

the way you explain it? Surely;

the Director must have made that decision for a reason?

Do you know why?

MI. Angleton.

Mr. Miler has known him more than -- longer;

than I have. Would you?

Mr. Miler.

Yes, I'll offer my opinion on it.

Mr. diGenova. We would like to have it.

Mr. Miler. The basic reason is that neither the current

director nor the incumbent DDO understand or perceive of what

counterintelligence actually is and what function it has, and

what the CIA's responsibility is for counterintelligence to

the nation.

That is my personal opinion. They

do not - they

have not had experience in counterintelligence. They've never

worked in counterintelligence. And quite frankly, they do no:

understand the problems involved in counterintelligence.

Countcrintelligence, as articulated previously by the

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current DDo, was station security and liaison.

Mr. Kirbow. Can you see this getting any better with

your new selectee who is coming from

the outside world?

Probably knows the term counterintelligence, but knows nothing

about the

intelligence community basically?

MI. Miler. I don't - quite frankly, I couldn't comment

on MI. Bush at all, but if Mr. Bush is going to have to rely

on the current management and the current management of counter-

intelligence in the CIA, it is my view that he will get

complotely erroneous information and not have

the advantage

of understanding counterintelligence, and would be forced to

make decisions which ultimately will be tragic to this

country as far as counterintelligence

is concerned, from

ignorance.

Senator Hart of Colorado. What kind of erroncous

information?

MI. Miler. What counterintelligence is, how it should

be organized, what the threat to the nation is that can be

hopefully countered by an effective counterintelligence organi-

zation which is integrated between the CIA, the FBI, the

military services, the Department of State, and all other

agencies concerned."

You

are going to have to have a perception of the real

problems and what is involved

in counterintelligence in order

to organize or reorganize the CIA's counterintelligence efio:..,

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to promote the best kind of a national program.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Assume something about, Mr.

Angleton mentioned earlier, about the tendency to sweep

penetrations under the rug in this country.

llas there been a pattern in the past that still prevails

of reluctance on the part of professional intelligence

officials as well as administration officials to admit that

we are susceptible to that?

MI. Angleton.. Well, I think there is no question that

there has been

a tremendous dishonesty

in facing up to hard

facts an intelligence.

I'11 take the Yom Kippur war as an example. As you know,

it was a complete failure in

terms of prediction. As I main-

tained in my testimony, if you cannot make a proper estimate

in a primitive area, then God help you when you come into the

Bloc area, and I still hold by that conviction.

But in that case, a few days prior to the Yom Kippur war,

the FBI disseminated a report to the President, the Secretary

of State, Defense and the Director of CIA which purported to

he a

discussion between Gromyko and a very senior source

to the effect that they

had given up on the Arabs, that they

would no longer

support the frags, they would no longer give

them arms, that they were going to recognize Israel, and in

'fact they had the draft notes ready for the recognition of

Israel:

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Now, I have never seen the post mortem of the whole project

on the estimation, but I would assume that any estimator who

received information by letter or memorandum, hand-carried,

quoting Gromyko, would tend to discount the fact that the Arabs

were about to attack Israel where they would have to depend on

Soviet arms, and therefore the question of the Yom Kippur war

would be out of the question. In other words, that one report,

I give it as an example.

Now, Independently a study group of the Joint Chiefs came

up with the whole question of soviet disinformation, strategic

disinformation to put us off balance on our estimating process..

Now, in our own Agency we were heavily frowned upon for

raising these questions, that there was a strong clement of

Soviet deception and disinformation that had been injected into.

the intelligence collecting program.

MI. Miler. Prior to the Yom Kippur war.

Mr. Angleton. Prior to that. But the important thing

is that that source who provided the Bureau with that infor-

mation has been providing information over a number of years,

but no one has made a study of information in hindsight in

order to evaluate that source.

And I could go into many more sensitive cases of where

again intention has come through a highly questionable source,

and yet there has been no rc-examination. There has been no

grouping or forum in which there can be any disputation. Each:

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party goes along on his own.

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Sanator llart of Colorado.. It seems to me that jou're

suggesting at the very least a naivete

on the part of our

governnent and at the worst, I don't know what.

Mr. Angleton. Well, I do suggest that there is a naivete.

Thore is no countor-disinfornation group. There's no one nio ever

studies. -- most of the information today that goes into much

of - 1t's mainly scientific. The human part of it is small.

now most of it is from overt sources.

Ir. Johnson. What about the Inner-agency Comnittee on

Defectors?

Doesn't that review?

"Is, ingleton. It has nothing to do with it.

Mt. Joinson. What does that do?

ir. Angleton. That only allocates or handles the mechanis

of who talks

to the defector and what are the priorities and?

questionnaires and whatnot.

!!r, diGenova.

The order of interrogation.

sir. Miler. It is a clearing house to get the infornation

discominated.

1r. diGenova. Mi. Angleton, I'm

interested in goim;

bac!: to one part of your most recent rasponse about the fact

¡ of your or the Cl staff', concerns about the Israeli proble

Which you alluied to was frowned upon within the agency.

What

forin did that tale? I'd be interested to know that..

it. Angleton. loll, it tool: this form, that a person

worling; with scotty who takes his military duty over there,

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two weeksevery year and whatnot, and who is very high on SaT

Intelligance, arranged for these Joint Chiefs and this group

to come over and to address an audience of hand-picked people.

So this covered both the overt side of the llouse --

MI. Miler. The three directorates, intelligence,

operations, and S&T.

MI. Angleton. And they laid out their entire thesis,

and we added to that to the rBI report to which I referred.

Afterwards I was severely criticized for having

wasted everybod?'s

time on that matter and told that if they realized it was

going to he that type of thing, we would never. have permitted

it to have talion place, et cetera, et corren.

Mr. Kirbow, Nas this by the three directorates?

I1x. Miler. No, that was from the directorate of

operations. The directorate of SaT, Scientific. and Technical

was impressed by the

presentation and subsequentl! said that

there was very great need for thought in this. And I think

also, Jim, that concurrently in the operations I had an officor

Il nho was worring on discernible or apparent deception as roflecti

in CIA reporting from the field of soviet disinformation

concerning the situation in tho Middle Last.

And we did a tremendous study on this and which was

conpletely discounted and thrown out and it vasn't even

considered.

!. M1ller. Mall, in the yon kippur war, if I'm not

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mistaken, there was a SIGINT: alert. The NSA collection systems

ware of such nature their analysts said it looks like there's

Joing to be a war within 24 hours. They, predicted the time.

They sent it over. It was immediately said, go back to bed.

Is that correct?

Mr. Angleton. All I know about it is the alleged part

of that. I remember the Pike Report that caused a great deal

of comment. I thought that the four magic words were that

NSA was not able to malie a contribution because the Egyptians

had gone into a high SIGINT alort.

In other words, that through SIGINT they couldn't learn

the intention. I don't know this fact that you are tabelling.

Ar. Miller. I think Mr. Miler is --

No. Miler. The point that we're trying to make in this

connection is part and parcel of Soviet espionage, Soviet

intelligence service activity and Soviet bloc intelligence

service activity is in the political field. It involves

deception and disinformation. A properly coordinated and run

counter-intelligence effort will bring research and analytical

work to hear which would give an analysis and an assessment

of che situation, which should be of value to policy-makers

in the government, to the intelligence directorate of the ri:..

to the Director of the CIA, and that what has happened

in tir.

cIn sinon mid-1073 is that there has boon erosion of this

facility which cannot be divorced

from counter-intelligence

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2.42

because as you focus and even as you focus on what the current

popular term, aggressive counter-intelligence operations, you

have to have some knowledge of this in order to be ablo to

equate, assess and evaluate your so-called penetration of

a Soviet or Soviet bloc intolligence service to see 1f 1t is

real. You have to have.a litmus paper to judge your penetration.

And without that litmus, you are completely at the mercy of

a system which is orchestrated and which is essentially

directed and controlled.

Me. Miller. So what you're saying is from mid-1973 on

the country, or at least the CIA has lost a valuable asset.

What happened in '73?

What was the decision?

Mr. Angloton. That's the recentralization, when all

of these components were taken away

from us, including the

liaison and whatnot, includiny international communist partios.

So this completely viscerated the counter-intelligence

as we have built it up

since 1954.

He vere, I would say without question in the lestorn

world, we gave the leadership. We croated all of the inter.

govronmental committces. We brought services

from tiny

fragmented units up into major components of their government,

the

ive major countries, which meant we reoriented their

services along priorities that met our requirements, and I

don't think there was any question that we were the acknowlry.

leaders in the Nostern world.

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By the same token, it induced people to bring their casas

to us for analysis. They camo to see us many times to see

the defectors, the stable of defectors that we had for

interrogation.

So that alone was a tremendous acquisition of counter-

Intelligence data which would not have otherwise have been

avallable to this country.

MI. Kirbow. And it's not available today because of this

spreading of the -

MI. Angleton. Hell, that's what they say. I mean I've

had one or more chief of intelligence who have surreptitiousl!

seen me since my departure. And they will naturally work

35

far as they can with the agency.

MI. Miller. When you say us, who do you mean?

Mr. ingleton. How did I use it?

MI. liller. You were referring to your capability prior

to 1973.

no. Miler. The CI staff.

'Ir. Angleton. The cl staff.

ar. Miller. The CI staff. Well, what were the numbers.

what was the capability that you had translated into

people,

into files?

"e. Angleton, Well, at the highest point ve had a lit:!:

over 200 pepple. That was clerical and officers.

Mr. Miller. That soons a fairly small group.

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Mr. Angleton. Well, they were a hardworking group. We

were understaffed. There were many things we could have

taken on and I'll give you one example because it 1s still

pending, and it gets down to the question of penetration.

But when philby was stationed in Washington, he was

given communications intelligence clearance so if NSA broke

into the Bulgarian traffic, ho could go to his Soviet control

and tell them that we were reading Bulgarian traffie. A secret

of that sort permits them to make use of the Bulgarian

traffic as a deception channel the moment they know you are

reading it. That hecones a powerful instrument in their

hands to receive.

How my point is this: io one has made an analysis fron

the day that he was briefed on that particular traffic of why

the traffic continued for two more years

and then graduall

petered out of what was put into that traffic which, if you

took that and identified an item of deception that came fron

the opposition, vou then look at your own agent reports and

Find what agonts at the sane time were fortifying that lie

or that jeer

of deception. ind it would point a finger on

21!

21. l agentr who, in fact, were under control.

"or this in just one small mercise. isn has preservoi

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avory single nioce of paper. In other vords, there's literü!!:

hundreds of thousands of agos

o? available materinl for suc

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In fact, one of our effort or common efforts was I brought him

into counter-intelligence. I brought him in with all these

foreign chiefs and whatnot in ordor to enlarge the scope of

NSA, since they can study and frame these patterng, they

can get into illegal traffics and get into many facets.

It's one, of the best outfits, as far as I know, in the

U.S. government, but they had always been denied these facts

that I just stated, such as Philby's access, the clearances,

the various

espionage cases that have happened in the west,

the people that

have hail communications intelligence clearance.

Senator llart of Colorado. Could we have a Philby level

senetration of our intelligence comnunity?

1I. Angleton. I'm not stating that there is one, but 1

have probably done more recruitment of higher level people in

ny youth in the husiness and I have never been any respector

of rani. I've dealt with prime ministers, and I've dealt with

them at all levels.

And! therefore, my point is it 1s conceivable, it's

conceivalile if you've got enough information, spotting infor

tion, and you can put. a person into a certain kind of situati.:

regardless of his rank, you will find that he is recruitalli.

It is a process of a fingernail, finger, land, arm and bod;.

Senator linrt of colorado. But all of the grills that

nes pennle of the agency inve to do through, lie detrotor ?!

so on, you're saying that they can get through that.

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MI. Angleton. I don't think anyone regards the lie

detector to be anything more than just another investigative

instrument. It does help in the sense that there are certain

people susceptible. They will in turn roveal something of their

past which they should have revealed, which, if you had

discovered Independently, would have givon you grounds to believi

they were penetration, but once the machine begins to find that

they're goggling on somethingi, then they come out: and .:.

say, well there's a story I haven't told you when I was in

Turkey, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera, and wipes the slate

clean.

So it serves a useful purpose, But it's not -.I

wouldn't give it 20 percent credibility. Now the Office of

Security probahly gives'it 70 or maybe higher.

Pir. direnova. Mr. Angleton, the point you made of the

lach: of study of traffic which followed the deception in the

cable traffic, as I understand it, you're saying that there's

been no analysis that you're aware of since that time done of

of

everything since then.

Ir. Angleton. There's never been any analysis ever.

Mr. digenova. Is the current research set-up which ci

staff now has which is oriented toward instant studies, quote

inquote, to provide data for ongoing operations inconsistent

with wanting to achieve that sort of goal, like analyzing that

data?

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Mr. Angleton. Nell, I don't know what that really means,

instant analysis. I mean we've always done instant analysis.

Mr. diGenova. I know that but it's our understanding,

we've learned from the Agency that there has been a movement

away from in-depth historical research toward more current

sort of analyses.

What you're suggesting to me by saying that there's

been no analysis done of those cables is that we've lost a

valuable CI tool since that study hasn't been done, and I'd

like to know if your assessment of the current trend toward

research is a bad one?

MI. Angleton. I think li makes no sense whatsoever.

Mr. Miler. It's disastrous. It will lead to complete

chaos within a very short time because you're trying to analyse

an individual case without having the ability to relate 40

other cases to that case.

Mix. diGenova. Theré's no integration in other words.

• Mr. Miler. That's right and you cannot operate in a

vacuum.

Mr. Angleton, We have learned from one defector, the

one of Necember '61 a complete

new understanding of what

happened from the days of Lenin.

That is not in the public record. A complete new

picture of the growth of the OGPU and of the Cheka. And in

the rcorientation of KGB part of the deStalinization in May

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of 1959, it was a roturn to the modus operandi of the cheka.

And this is from an individual, fully, who had seen all of the

documents, fully versed in it so that this plunged us back into

1t and we bogan then to find leads. And I give one example.

Goneral Orlov,. who died not long ago in the Unitad

States, was the most sendor NKVD KGD officer ever to defect,

and he died last year. The Bureau had Interrogated him in

1953 after the death of Stalin with little or no success. le

knew the code name of Philby. The Agency tried to contact him

in '58 and had a very unhappy handling problem. We went back

Into it shortly thereafter and we were able to go through his

book with

him and he gave us the true identities of 34 agents

in France.

His

uncle had been one of the senior men under Lenin,

head of wavD in the Ukrain

but with tremendous operations.

He himself vas a senior NiVD Man in Spain during the civil war. so

we spent up until his death, fir, Rocco, who was my deputy,

would travel to the Midwest and spend several weekends with him

of dredging out and recreating the operations and penetrations

in British intelligence and the British navy and whatnot,

eventually getting down, by recreating and

reconstructing,

down to the identity. Now this is research, and these are

cases where the Soviets lad every reason to believe that those

agents vere

safe and secure because nothing had happened.

And when you make that type of identification unbeknownst

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to them, then it given you tremendous leverage of how you want

to play it, whether you move in to take him on as a double

or whether you move in to arrest him.

MI. difenova. And that isn't being done today.

MI. Angleton. Well, they can't do it because they don't have

Mr. Roaco and they have fired most of the personnel. One of

the best

men we had was from the Library of Congress and

knowing where to find every piece of information. inithetigovern-

ment has just been transferred to, or he's been released or

hired back on contract, and when they are putting him in the

Freedom of Information section as a contract agent.

IBMS

And he has handled Ukrains, he's run agents, he speaks

Russian.

MI. Johnson. He are joing down with a repress! fear.

of military intelligence later on this afternoon. Could you

tell us about the coordination between nilitary CI and CIA

CI especially in the area of double agentry.

Mr. Angleton. Then I will just say one thing and then

Scotty will speak authoritatively to it.

He all came out of the war and therefore we are very

strongly in favor of a very strong military counter-intelligence.

And

therefore, we've always given them highest priority of our

tine. He've done the original training of the OSI people.

He trained teachers who went out, who in turn trained

other people. That was a three months course, if I recall.

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We sean a seminar using the highest talent that we had and

revealing as much information as we could conceivably reveal.

And so our whole mental attitude was that counter-intelli-

gence, one of its highest priorities is the defense of its

own forces. And I'm not going to justify the mail program at

this time, but some day I'll Justify it in print or otherwise

because it represents only .001 percent of Americans - a,

small coterie of Americans who wrote to the Soviets when we

had troops in the field on two occasions, and our primary

duty was the support of those troops.

so that background Scotty can tell you but the relationshi

we've had with the military.

ir. Miler. Well, the relationships with the counter-

intelligence with the military have varied. I would say that

for the most part it has been reasonably good, it has been

perhaps better in Washington than it has been in the field.

With few excentions CIA field representatives have not been

terribly concerned with conducting counter-intelligence. They

have not cooperated to the extent that the military commanders

in the field have wanted.

Some of this has to do with priorities that are impose::

on the CIA reprosentatives from Washington. Some of it has

to do with lack of manpower. Some of it has

to do with the

fact that in the opinion of many of the cid operatives, the

Army in particular, to a lesser extent the other services,

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have not undertaken counter-Intelligence activities which are

of a high enough level to justify the time and attention,

particularly of senior CIA representatives abroad.

It is, I think, also a bit of a problem because the

priorities of military counter-intelligence

in many instances

do not parallel or support CIA's priorities. They have the

responsibility for the protection of their installations and

there have also been imposed on the military the requirement

to build assets, what we term double agents which the military

term controlled foreign assets, as a contingency for possible

deception use.

Traditionally, also, the CIA, and in recent years thir

has been quite true, the CIA field operatives have wanted to

exploit military counter-intelligence assets for what is

termod

aggressive positive intelligence or recruitment attempts

of the enemy agent or officer who was controlling the double

agent of the controlled foreign asset.

There has been traditionally a problem of coordination

between the military services, the CIA, and the FBI on double

agent operations.

I think: overall this has worked reasonably well, given

the fact that -- in particular, for example, the system of

chain of command in the Army is a very confused one and is not

easy to put your finger on. There are various echelons and

reporting procedures and so forth.

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From the counter-intelligence staff standpoint, in

particular what I was concerned with was an attempt to make

sure that there was a full integration. You see, under the

operating procedures and the responsibilitles, the military

services are required to advise the CIA of its activities,

counter-intelligence and so forth abroad. In turn, they

advise the FBI of their counter-intelligence activities and

forth here in the United States.

So you have, when an activity here in the United States,

the individual involved, the double agant, the controlled

foreign asset transfers abroad, then there is a transfer of

coordination and vice versa.

Mr. Angleton. I'd like to infect this. There is

concurrent jurisdiction since the double is usually an American

citizen.

So regardless of where he is, we would always persuade

the Army or whoever it is, to notify the Bureau through their

own channel hecause you're dealing with Americans, so

geography is not really the important element..

MI. Miler.

From

a counter-intelligence standpoint,

it has had, there have been some problems as a result of that

in terms of the regular CIA representation abroad. There is

a means of working together with the military services and

so forth in terns of notifying each of the services, each of

the agencies of the potential for deception feeding and

30 forth.

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Mr. Johnson. Does the CIA have veto powers over military

proposed double-agents?

Mr. Miler. No, not the veto power.

MI. Angleton. Well, it never really comes up to a veto.

But if we took a stand against it and supplied reasoning that

made sense, they would go along the way that we wanted. We've

never had a head-on collision.

Mr. Miler. There would oftentimes be differences in the

ffeld, that would be presented through the proper channels,

say from the Army back to the ACSI

from our field station

to headquarters. And then there would be a discussion and a

resolution at the lashington level.

iow obviously, in any kind of a situation like that,

there have been instances where, you, know, there was bad

feelings and misunderstandings and so forth. But I think that

overall, at least in my experience in the way we try to

conduct the business was that it was mutually beneficial.

Now the military sorvices have complained to me because

represented and a couple of my people represented the

Agency on double agents to the military services and so forth,

that we were not as forthcoming in providing them information

about our possihle assets and so forth as they were.

Their

system was different. They had a clearinghouse

systen

where

this

was

available and so forth. Our position

on it was that if we had a roguirement, we would perhaps find

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a source or an asset in which to fulfill the requirement.

But for security and compartmentation reasons, not exclusively

due to the counter-intelligence concerns but also to the

general security and operations procedures of the Agency as

a whole, there was a reluctance to put this information forward

except when and as needed.

Mr. Angleton. And there's another point that has to be

raised here. That is when you get into the field of deception

you are bound by certain charters. Those charters have not

been approved at the highest policy level. So there's been

a great deal of tactical military cover and deception.

Our interest is more on the strategic deception, and

that paper has been resting with DI. Kisginger for some 2 1/2

years of more fos approval.

Mr. Miler. Three.

MI. Angleton. Three years.

So that is hogged down a great deal of the whole overall

deception program.

Mr. Maxwell. The paper that is in front of Dr. Kissinger

Now makes what deceptions?

Mr. Angleton. It was a paper that was pulled together

by the Joint Chiefs, ourselves, and the rbI.

Mr. Maxwell. And it proposes what?

MI. Angleton. It outlines procedures for strategic

deceptions, political deception and other deception.

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Mr. Johnson. Could you give a brief example of the CIA

role in strategic decoption, a specific example?

MI. Anglaton. No, I can't. I mean I could get into

cases but it's too vague. It's always been something that

has been arrived at ad hoc and it served the purpose, but I

wouldn't call it strategic.

Mr. Miler. No program, in other words.

Mr. Angleton. In other words, the proper strategic decep-

tion would be the president calls in the Director and says, no

one knows that in three months I'm going on the following trip.

I will have meetings with the following people. I'm not

going to announce it until a week before I leave.

so it gives you a time span of two months to use

all of

your sources to put across disinformation or information, a

letter in the mailbox to the proper addressee that, you know,

favor his role or favor his mission and helps him out. And

that's what we are trying to seek and have been trying to seek

for a long time. But there has to be a way of knowing what

are some of the intentions of the government in order to

arvance it through disinformation or deception.

Mr. Miler. With respect to the military, if I may

return to that, I think that one of the - probably the greater:

aifference and failure with respect to CIA counter-intelligence

relationships with the military was

with respect to the

situation in Vietnam because CIA did not perform a counter-

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Intelligence function of any responsibility or significance

in Vietnam. That was a tragle failure on the part of CIA

and it goes back to the basic problem of the present management,

to answer your earlier question, the present management because

the present management of the CIA was involved in the decisions

which prohibited a good counter-intelligence effort in Vietnam.

Me. Shea. In that paper that is before Dr. Kissinger,

are there any proposed control mechanisms that would act as

a filter so that the misinformation in a sense could not flow

back into the policy circles within the United

States?

*Ir. Angleton. Well, there wouldn't be. The kind of

channels used, there wouldn't be any of that happening. This

would be information given to an agent who was reporting,

say to the KGB back, say it would never hit the light of day.

Mr. Shea. So the process of misinformation as it

normally relates to the intolligence field is totally separate

In terms of the active process of misinformation as it goes

on in counter-intelligence?

Mr. Angleton. We are not dealing in overt. There ma:

ha some overt things put out that support a document that van.

riven to a double who would pass it to kGb. But if the wan

is regarded to loc an agent of the KGB, the KGB is not going to

publicize that document without having blown the alleged ayen..

Mr. Shea, But they could work on it in their process

of disinformation to come hack, and you would be caught..

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Mr. Miler. No. To be successful you would have to have

a means of monitoring. You would have to have your penetration

of, you would have to have your own lltmus to see where it

Is played back or what reflections or what requirements are

put on other double agents on the basis of the information from

this agent.

That requires a centralized screening and control of

double agents.

Mr. Angleton. If you sent the information through. Agent N

to KGB headquarters in Moscow, part of your testing wold be to see

whether your other double agents received questionnaires

which you knew related to that document.

lir. Shea. But it seems like in order to make strategic

misinformation functional, you would have to have the same

requirements that you had when you were talking about having

a double ayent: namely, somebody in a superior point of

information penetrated into that organization to make sure

that they are getting that information you're sending out

is misinformation.

ir. Miler. Not necessarily.

Mr. Angleton. It's not quite the same.

ir. Miler. It's not quite that simple because you could

see reflections of it perhaps in othor arcas in political

actions, in failure to act.

ir. Ingleton. There are other ways of doing it. You

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can go to a diplomat who has a weak eiphar systom and you

yourself can tell that diplomat in great confidence a whole

series of things. You know the

Soviets are going to break the

code and read that message.

That would be one way of doing it. There are other ways

of having, telling: a1: Erlendly foreign service. whon you

know is penetrated.

I mean it's all caso by case. But once you are given the

task, that's when you begin to look at all of your assets and

you begin to do the creative side of running a double, or now

are you going to put this across.

And there are many ways of

doing it without bringing many people in.

MI. difenova. I'd like to change the subject matter just

briefly. Part of the responsibility of the CI research

personnel

is to produce reports on

various subjects which include current

analyses on proprietary companies used by foreign intelligence

services.

I would lite to know whether of not either of you could

shed any light on the question of whether or not we have any

evidence that foreign intelligence services have established

and used proprictary companies in the United States?

' 115. Angleton. Nell, there's one case that comes to mini.

can't remenber the details but I think that as a result of

it, one of our deputy directors had a big project with this

company and they dropped it because the Foreign Intelligence

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Service had quite a penetration into 1t.

Mr. diGenova. Would that be the only instance of which

you are familiar that there was in fact knowledge of an operating

proprietary company run by a foreign intelligence service

within the continental United States?

Mr. Angleton. Offhand I can't say because the Office of

Security would be working with the Bureau, usually. I mean to

say that saT are the most likely people to have contracts with

a number of contractors and companies.

It would be Office

of security's job.

Mr. diGenova. Maybe I'm not making ny point clear.

just thought that maybe in the course of your counter-intelligene

function you may have discovered by whatever means that there

was

in fact

such a company operating in the United States

which was being used, not to contract with the Agency but to

contract or just do anything, whether it was a bookkeeping

firm or a law firm or anything, and was in fact engaged in

espionage.

Mr. Miler. Well, we've had a number in the past. We've

harl a number of leads

which were to the effect that soviet

intelligence money was in such and such a company, or somethin:

such as that. That was turned over to the flI. And whether

of not we ever hoard anything lack of did anything further on

it, no.

In other words, unless there was an investigative angle

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which we could pursue abroad or something, I'm a little bit

confused by the question because it's outside - the investigatipr

of such a thing is outside the purview of the CIA unless it is

abroad, unless it would he funded through

Switzerland or Luxem-

bourg or unless: there was a Messagerie Maritime connection where

Soviet money was being put in and they had representation here.

Mr. direnova. Well, the staff has been given information

that these analyses are done by CI research personnel or

proprietary companies of foreign intelligence services, and

either that information is wrong or we just do not understan

each other.

"I. Anyleton. Nell, I mean it's-true that there have

been analyses done. But the one that comes to mind is the

one I mentioned, was the one where in this case it was French,

had a heavy penetration of a company and that company was

contracting with our STI people and therefore, our question

was rather a project for large sums of money of using this

company would proceed, and the decision based on our counter-

intelligence analyses

was to drop

the project.

• "'I, dicenova, I'd like to ast the question.

le've been told that one of the benefits which occurs

to !.s. counter-intelligence when it focuses on hloe countrica

Is the fact that these totalitarian regimes have a habit of

acquiring great amounts of infornation about their citizon:

sail storing it, and that this is, on occasion, accessihle in ::

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and makes them somewhat vulnerable as a result of that.

Turning the coin around a little bit and looking at our

selves, are the computerized systems which we now have in our

country which put in ia. central location large amounts of

information about individual citizens and large groups of

citizens, making us vulnerable to penetration in terms of

information, more vulnerable in terms of penetration by

foreign counter-intelligence services?

Mr. Angleton. Vulnerable in what sense?

Mr. diGenova. Getting information about us, period,

which I understand

is one of the key goals of counter-intelligence,

finding out what the other side is doing.

Mr. Angleton. You mean surreptitiously getting it fron

us or officially getting

•it from us?

Mr. direnova. Both. The fact of the matter is the

information exists and it's vulnerable for them to have it,

is it vulnerable for us to have it?

Ple. Angleton. Hell, I wouldn't put it down as vulnerable

because when anyone males a request or you for information,

the first question is why. so the hurden

is on them to justifi

that they have a counter-espionage reason for asking for that

Information. And in the bulk of the cases you'll find that the'

are doing your work for you.

In other words, they've come across a telephone tap of

some American who's arrived, he's made a call to the Bulgari.::

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embassy and it looks as though:thare's a meeting being set up,

so immediately you get a flash. And thay ask that service for

traces on the individual and you come back with the why, i

and they tell you about the entire Bulgarian business. And

so we start an investigation as to Bulgarian antecedents or

anything dealing with Bulgaria,

et cotera. And 1t 1t'g

justified, we give them the information.

MI, direnova. Well, I don't think, Mr. Angleton, that's

not what I'm getting at.

We as a country are amassing properly, quote, unquote,

large amounts of information about ourselves through the use

of computer systems.

?1r. Angleton.

That's right.

Mr. dicenova. The CIA tells us that that is one of the

things they like so much about foreign countries, because the

totalitarian regimes have the tendency to amass large amounts

of information about their citizenry and when we penetrato

and act that information, that helps us.

My question is when we do that, when we centralize the

information hy using our own computer systens, no matter where

1t 1s, do we help them?

And in this regard I would note that in 1970 the Inspector

reneral's report on the question of cover noted that the fact

that credit burcaus in this country were amassing so much

information about people, including CIA personnel, that it

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posed a major threat to maintain cover, both in the United

States and abroad for CIA agents.

Now the question I raise is are we cutting off our nose

to

spite our face by using computars to really marshall together

large amounts of evidence which can be made accessible to

foreign powers either by surreptitiously or by simply openly

getting it?

Mr. Miler. Yes, the answer is yes.

Mr. direnova. Good.

Mr. Miler.

Because

it's very easy to get this infornationi.

And, for examole, the soviets have had, you can confirm this

fron the bureau, have hail a systematic systen of purchasing

from the state of Maryland, the District of Columbia, the

State of Virginia, the business directories, residence

directories, license directories for less than i35u apiece.

Mr. Johnson. If we're going to keep on our schedule,

we've got a witness who's supposed

to be here at 1:30, so

is there a final question?

Mr. Kirbow. I have two questions.

isecause of the

vast years of experience, Mr. Chairman, that we

should ast:

then to comment on, and either one of you all should ansiver.

"hat do you all consider today to be the major threats

to

this country? And

the second question is, what has been

the major foreign covert action program directer against this

country in your lifetime and experience in the Agency?

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MI. Angleton. Well, I think, no question, it's the

Soviet bloc services that represent the major threat because

they arc really a small, they are directly subordinated to the

central committee and to the hasic objectives, as I've seen then!

all my life to the change and balance of military power.

Further, that practically all intelligence operations more!

and more have political objectives, and I think. it is the fact

that since '59 they have elevated the Cuban intelligence and

all of the other bloc services to a very high degree of

efficiency, that they

are coordinated and they work as equals.

And I think that is the major threat, that is the

inability of the FBI by lack of personnel and manpower to be

able to cover these people.

There isn't the minimal coverage.

The people they cover are people who have been "identified,"

and I defy anyone to have a list of identified agents in this

country.

Now that is the legal side of it. Now the larger part

of it is the illegal, where there's been little or no success.

The only one that has

really come out is the Abel case, which

Hayharen

we handled through Hahannan. And then there was one or two

minor ones.

But that is a whole program of bloc activity, and

according

to one of the best sources we had, his view was that

the illegals rould be placed primarily in airports, dochs,

factories, and they give a whole listing. And these are the

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areas where you have:sabotage, you have explosions.yod.cán't

identify,. et cetera.

Now the illegal directorate represents a very major part

of Soviet intelligence and bloc intelligence and we just --

thera are not successes. It's just happenstance.

Mr. Epstein. It's disruption of our defense effort?

Is that what you're speaking of now? Their goal being

disruption of this country's defense effort?

Mr. Angleton. Nell, they have many assignments. But

the point is they have also the sabotage assassination part.

which is totally apart from the body politic of the KGB, and

it raises questions in everybody's mind when there is sabotage

and all other kinds of

activities and you cannot find the

culprits.

One defector stated that he believed that the computer

fire they had in the Pentagon several years ago was KGB. le

was HiGh. But he stated in effect that he thought that was

one of their operations.

Scott!?

ir, "liler. The najor threat to the U.s., I think, is

basel on the fact, as we referred to carlier, as this shoul

affect: counter-intelligence, the national counter-intelligence

effort, is to have your national counter-intelligence focuir!

on the fact that the soviets and the soviet bloes, since

of 1959 have rededicated themselves to the principles of

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Leninism. They have rededicated themselves to the shift in

the military balance of power. They have reinstituted, in

effect, what was the policy of the NEP period, the New Economic

Policy, the attraction of western business, the attraction of

lestern capital into the Soviet Union to bolster the soviet

Union, the disruption of the economies of other nations, which

would have an adverse effect on the economy of this nation --

all of this centrally controlled and directed, used through

such countries as Romania, where we have for several years now

deluded ourselves that Romania is independent, through Bulgaria,

through llungary, through Poland, all the rest of it.

This is the major threat to the United States. Counter-

intelligence is probably, in my view, at least, one of the

major ways that you're going to be able to counter this and

at least get the information hrought to the attention of the

people who are making the decisions and making the policy

For this country.

*ir. lipstein. Has our penetration effort been good enour!

to establish whether or not the

soviet Union has been involve!

in direct covert action against thc Unitcd States, such as

to underin our economy, not using other countries hut

directly?

Mr. Angleton. There's beon a tremendous amount of

inforniation on this.

I mean, for example tolay the second

head of the chanber of Commerce in Moscow is General Pitovranov.

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67

PIlor, he was Deputy Chief of the NKVD. He was the resident.

Krib resident in Peking. He's the one who with Mao set up the

underground that took over China. He was the head of Karlshorst,

the largest kil in Germany. He operated people like George

Blake. He organized the kidnapping of Otto John, the head

of Gecurity, West Germany.

lle has now been placed as the Deputy Chief, or Deputy

Chairman, of the Moscow Chamber of Commerce, the same role that

DZHERZAINIY

Lenin had 'Derjensky

'In the NEP. That is the role to be

able to deal with western capitalists with the view of abroad

recruitments and with the view of using them as agents of

influence.

How there's a tremendous

amount of data. Now this is

what I'm trying to say, that counter-intelligence has always

been kept

at a very low level as far as its ability to submit

such studies or whatnot to the Mational Security Council or to

forum where they are debated. But they happen to be the

I. M0-=-90018104 0 94- 191e+0

only hard intelligence because they are coming from men who

were 16 years in this

one

case, a part of that mechanisn and

who read all the files.

Mr. Epstein. What happens to all that?

•Mr. Angleton.

Well, that's been used by directors in

hriefings but there's never yet heen a forum where you can

actually have a confrontation with people who hold contrary

views.

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.68

Mr. Miler. In other words, how significant in the fact

then, how significant would it be lf our congress, our Executive

and our business people knew that as of 1974 the last figures

I have of 187 Soviets identified with the USSR all union

chamber of commerce, the people that are doing all of the

business with our businessmen who are coming here to the United

States, work them and so forth, when 47 of those were appointed

to that from the KGB.

I mean, what significance does this have to the United

States ?

Senator Schweiker. 47 out of how many?

!Ir. Miler. About 182.

MI. Angleton. Let's no to the scientific side on this.

The scientific side, in May of 1969 the central committee

ordered that there be added 2,000 staff officers to KGB from

the Academy of Sciences in order to exploit the opening to the

dest

and the scientific levels.

HIr. Epstein. And how would that exploitation be

accomplished?

Mr. Angleton.. For recruitment and exploitation of

contacts

in, the West in the scientific exchanges.

Mr. Epstein. The goal heing espionage of something also?

Mr. Angleton. Espionage.

Mr. Milar. Espionage and influence. How many KGB

officers?

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69

Mr. Angloton. In 1961, 1000 of those had been pulled

together. There was a briefing given by the general staff to

high koß people regarding the field of military electronics,

and during that briefing it was pointed out that they were 14

years behind us, but they would overcome and surpass us through

three means: lumber one was the Central Committee adding the

2,000 staff officers for espionage; Second would be disinfor-

mation leading our scientific efforts in the wrong directions;

And third was to enter into those kind of treaties which would

bind our own scientific progress in military fields.

when I left the Agency, I read a report by a man who

knew nothing of this lecture, and this was a group of American

clectronic experts who had made a very sensitive, Top Secret

study which stated that in this field the Soviets were four

years behind us.

This was in 1974.

No. Epstein. A final question. In the last 10 or 15

years have you experienced any situations where any hostile

powers were involved in covert action against the election

process

in this country?

MI. Angleton.

well, I think there's no question that

influence has heen hrought to hear.

Mr.. Inderfurth. llow?

r. Bustein, Meaning what?

Mr. Angleton. Propaganda, among other things.

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:70

For example, one of the most famous of the disinformation

agents, I mean they had established contact at political lovels

in this country.

MI. lipstein. Now about campaign iinancing?

No. ingleton. I don't think it figuros unless it woulr

bo the. cP.

But just to add one last point to this question of the

threat, it is my view, seeing Ingola and seeing the unwilling...

ness of this country to resist or to define its purpose, or

to deal falrly with its allies, that within a period of four

years there will be a form of confrontation on

an unpopular

issue between the soviet bloc and

the United States in which

we will back down. He will then go into our suprene isolation.

because in December of 'G1, when this soviet defected

and he

harl

read the political action prograns, he spelled out in

detail that one of the primary purposes of the reorientations

vas that all intelligence operations or political objectives,

and the main political objective was to reaffirm the United

States as the main enemy, to achiove its isolation and to achieve

political hegemony over most of Afiica and Latin America.

ile pointed out that the two largost and novest divisions

croated in KGB were Africa and Latin Ancrica.

in this was not speculative. This vas

reading actual

docinents of a lop Secret nature in which you had to have

communications intelligence clearance to even have access to

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• 71

them, and I think what he has spelled out, and I might add that

when I took him to many: countries we talked on higher levels

than we could talk in the United States. And I took him to

some countries that we could talk to Prino Ministers. I have

seen Prime Ministers and have been able to expose this. Dut

the machinery here is not of such a nature that you can get

into these matters.

Mr. Epstein. Are they disseminated?

Mr. Angleton. We're not going to disseminate.. These

are matters that should go to the Secretary of State. They

shouldn't he going up, through people because many of the

secrets are within that.

"T.. Epstein. Do they go to the Secretary of State?

MI. Angleton. No.

Mr. Epstein. Why not?

!Ir. Angleton. I don't think the Secretary of State has

ever been much interested in asking for opinions. On Romania

we sent something to the President prior to our trip.

PIr. lipstein.

But the docunents you're talking about,

the Top secret documents

Mr. Angleton.

We don't have the document. I'm stating

read those documents in Moscow.

Mo. Fostein. But the report that he read, was that

disschinated?

MI. Angleton, I don't know. It went to the Director and

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It went to many other people. But whether it actually got to

the Secretary of State, I do not know.

Mr. Miler. I think one important point here that I

would like to make is that what has happened, in my opinion

what has happened in counter-intelligence In the Ageney and

the so-called aggressive operations, the increase in double

agent operations and

so forth and the dispersal of the centralised

counter-intelligence is not going to produce a counter-

intelligence program within the CIA which is going to focus

on attempting to provide the government, policy-malers and

so forth, with the rind of information and analytical product

that is necessary if we're going

to have a successful countor-

intelligence.

Mr. Johnson. I would like to thank the witnesses, and!

unless Senator Schweiker has any questions, we will adjourn

for five minutes.

Is that accoptable?

Thank you very much.

Senator Schweil:cr.

Thank you very much.

(increupon, at 1:10 o'clock

pon., the hearing in the

above-mentioned matter

was concluded.

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