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Chief, Mi Division

CLASSAFICATAA

SECR

_1.

PROCISSING ACTION

MARIO FOR NOT KING

¡NO INDEXING HOURIO

OMY QUNIRO DISA

¿ÄN JUDGE INDI KING

MACRONILM

INUM

Chief of Station, JUWAVE

SUBMET

AKULE/MISPAAN/ANOP

AGON REQUIRED - REVIRINCIS

Plans for ODCA Nid-April Congress

REF:

JNWAVE 0180

"So,

1.

The purpose of this dispatch is to report the comments

of AMNOP-1 on 30 November regarding the forthcoming Organizacion

Democrata Cristiana de America (ODCA). Congress.

AMMOP-I said

that the precise date of the Congress is yet to be set though

l'tits still

He now feels that he will

is a full month earlier than reported in

the reference.

AMMOP-1. 1s: not a member of the committee preparing the agenda,

he said that.he. is being kept generally informed of developments

and that once the agenda is prepared he should be in a position

-to influence a revision of the agenda in the event that there

are no

items concerning Cuba or that the items

listed are not

satisfactory. - He said that the principal person with whom he

is in contact on this matter is Rafael CALDERA

and that it

will be through CALDERA that he would hope to make his influence

felt. ANMOP-1. also sald that he has been assured by

CALDERA

that the. Cuban case will be prominent in the agenda.

2 ..

We will continue to keep Headquarters informed.of

developments on this end.

Parie Archlone

Roger E. MARCHBANE.

Distribution:

> 3

- WH/COG

14-308-10

1957

dcasec...

CROSS REFERENCE TO

83- 201-767219

"? COPY

¡DERAICH SYMADI AND MUMBER

UFGA -29068

cust canon

SECRET

DEO:

DATE.

1 December 1967

MOS THE NUMBER

19-300-10

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;.iting

DISPANGL

Chlofs, A11 Il Stations and Bases

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open coa

MIOCESIINGACTION

USES 1ON SLIMO

LAFO

FROM

Chief, M! Division

SUBJECT

Christian Domocracy In Latin America

TION REQUIRED. REFERENCES

WiCROERM:

ACTION REQUINED: lione, PYT.

The following analysis has bech prepared in Wil Division and

is trancmitted to all ii Division Stations and Bases as a review

of the current status of Cirlstion Denocracy in Latin America and

an updating of leadquarters' view on the movement.

We believe

the subject matter merits close and careful study by all station

oscrations and reports officers whose comments are solicitod.

cotiunity.

However, the loczar study could not includo much of

the "Corclusions" section since it was interpretative and had

opcrational overtones:

Thus we've decided to send the full text

herein in book dispatch form.

1.. Tho decisive victory of Eduardo Fres in the Septcmber 1964

Chilcan Presidential clcction lod many to hope that Christian

Demosracy might develop significantly throughout Latin Amcrica

competing with Cornunism on idcological grounds and offering an

alcomative, denocratic route to social and econonic progress.

Christian Dinocracy's advocacy of "Third Force" concepts plus.

ficquent manifestations of anti-Yankee syndrome caused some

observers to swallow hard, but there was no denying that these

corecpis had an crotional appcal. This political charisma,

coupled with a connitient to, basic social refor and opposition to

Corrunism, and

presented within an Idcological framework stressing

the dignity of the hunan person,

corprised a package of considerable

attractiveness to the Latin American, particularly the student and

middle class clements. This dispatch will review the current status

of the CD parties and the role of organizations -- ODCA, CLASC,

Party youth and student wings and European CD groups - which

CROSS REFERENCE TO

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BOOK DISPATCH 5951

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5. 51

TH/CA

Joseph DiStefand

COORMIMATING

gb

(8 March 1967) 5006

OFFICE SYMBOL-

WH/L

WRIZ

WH/3

NP74

171/5

WHTT

CATE

CIFIERS MANE

(in draft

(in drait

(in draft

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(in draft)

in

in drate)

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C/WHD

DATE

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repiesent key factors in the developacht of the Chrlutian Democratic

coverent in Liti, serica.

Our major purpose is to detemiine, soue

tho yours after the rel victory, whether the generally enthuslastic

assessedat of Christian Desocratic prospects engendered by this

highly significaat elcotion was justified.

I - CURREST BALANCE SUBET DE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY

2.

Parties of Current Significance. Christian Democratic

paities are gercially agreed to be of current political signlficance

in only four Latin American countries -- Chile, Venezuela, El

Salvador and Peru.

8.

The Chilean PDC is the only party with the xespon-

sibility of soverning; the solid victory of Prei in the 1964

presidential clection was followed by an even more impressive:

showing in the March 1965 congressional election. However, the

Party's refore program is being implerented with less chan

deliberate speed, no progress has been made in weakening

Martist lesdership domination of the urban labor force, and

indications are that Frei's moderation will be increasingly

challerged by the left wing of the PDC:

b.

The COPEI Party of Venezuela has strong hopes of

duplicating the victory of the Chilean Party in 1968 and

appests to have narrowed the gap between itself (22 percent

of the cicctorate in 1963) and the governing Accion Democratica

Party (32 percent).

COPEI Secretary General Rafael Calders,

onc of the few Latin American CD leaders of international

stature, is expected to be the Party's standard beazer in his

fourth try for the presidency.

c.

In El Salvador, the PDC garnered 29 percent of the

votes in the March 1966 legislative clection and one of 1t8

Icaders, Jose Napoleon Duarte, retained the mayoralty of San

Salvador.

In

less than six years the PDC has become the

leading opposition party. It has little chance of capturing

the presidency in 1967, but should be a strong contender by

1972,

with Notre Danc-educated Mayor Duarte the llkely

candidate.

d.

The Peruvian PDC formed a coalition with the Popular

Actica (P) Party in 1963; 1t currently holds two cabinet

positions.

Sove would argue that the Peruvian CD (with only

4 percent of the votes in 1963) has no real future in compe

tition with the dominant AP and the long-established APRA,

both refomist parties,

and thus should not be included in a

listing of significant CD parties.

Some weight is added to

this argucent by the very recent split off of

a dissident

faction of the PDO into a separate party. However, the

inclusion of the Peruvian party here is based primarily on the

fact that it is the only CD group participating in a coalition

government and chus contributes an element of stability to the

political scene in Peru.

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Parties Of Moderate Potential, Applying even the most

generous criteris to the Judgcuent of potential, there are not

nore than four CD parties - in the Doninican Republic, Panama,

brazil and Guatcuila - that night develop as moderately important

"forces over the next five years.

The Doninican PRSC stands as a prime example of

CD' irresponsibility fron the tiue Caonabo Javier. took over

Party leadership in the wake of the Dominican Revolution in

April 1965. It has collaborated with the entire spectrum of

Matsist-lining parties, and moderation of its extreme

cilitancy in the near future appears unlikely.

The PRSC has

devalosed a suall but talented cadre of leadership, primarily

fron the university ranks, and is buttressed by the strongest

CLASC affillate (CASC) In the Benisphere:

The Panamanion PDC was registered some five years

ago sad polled only 3.1 perceat of the votes in 1964. Although

It continues a miniscule party, It has mado significant

organicational strides and its philosophy of social justice

gives it roots lacking by most Panamunian parties, which ara

largoly personalistic or tied to financial interests. "If the

Panera CD succeeds in expanding its middle-class base and

attracts militants fros the predominantly negro and nestizo

populstion, it could becone a force of some importance.

While the Brazilian PDC polled a mere 4 percent of

the voie in 1964, the Party has significant strength in three

"wuy staics of the Center-South (Parana, Sao Paulo, and

Cuanabera).

Like all other pre-Castello Branco political

parties; the PDC was unable to campaign under its own banner

in the presidential and parliimentary elections of late 1966.

Expanded political activity will probably be permitted after

the seating of. Prcsident Costa e Silva in March 196%, but It

is expected that the number of legally recognized political

parties will be limited.

have to merge with another party 1f it is to compete la the

legislative life of the country. If the. PDC joins with a

party that has strength outside the present PDC atrongholds,

and tha PDC message and mystique seta the tone for such a new

political entity, the net result could be expanded importance

for Christian Democracy in Brazil.

¿. The Guatemalan PDC was only recently recognized as

a legaily constituted party.

This nascent group has good

strength in the youth and student movement

and growth

potential in the important campesino sector. Current jirection

of the party leaves much to be desired; PDC leader Rene de

Leos eppears honest and intelligent but be has little organ-

izatioral flair or charisma.

His leadership is being challenged

by a group of militant "Young Turks" on the left.

With more

vigorous leadership and the development of middle echelon

cacres the party could develop significantly.

4. Parties of Insignificance. The remaining nine Christian

Democratic parties

- in Argentina, Bolivia, Colombla, Costa Rica,

Ecuador, lexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Uruguay … show scant

pro-isa of caveloping into

forces of national importance over the

neit five jears. Leadership of even modest stature exists only

in Asgcatins (Salvador Allende, Horacin Sualdo) and Bolivia

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(semo il Matale), Tiese parties appear doomed to the role of

bridusaalas to tho handful of parties that really count.

II - PARTY YOUTH WANGS

Co Strenth in Universities Ahead of Party Strength. As

with all political sroups in Latin irerica, the vast majority of

CD party militants are drain fron the ranks of student appendages

activo in the local univeraltics. In most countries of the hémi-

sphere, co voting strengch on the caspus is nuch

more significant

then the political strench of the parent party.

A few champles

In Panana, the Party polled 3.1 percent

of the vote in 1964 (and probably sould poll not more. than 5

percent today, while its University youth got 12.8 percent in the

January 1966

clection. The Dominican PRSC received S.4 percent of

the vote in 1962 (and its prescht strength could will be lower

because of intemal divisions and leadership conflicts), but its

youth wing on the campus garnered 40.2 percent of the vote in

May 1966

In Venezuela, COREI polled 22 percent of the vote in

1553; les student wing on the campus of the Central University,

horover, polled 40.? percent of the vote in 1966.

These comparitive

figures suggest sad conclusions which are prescnted In Paras. 19

and 20 below.

Radicalination of Youth Wings. Several CD leaders, most

notsbly Frei and Caldera, have expressed considerable concern over

the groiing radicalization of party youth wings.

that youth groups

of every political stripa assume positions to the left of their

partics is nothing new, but the situation in several CD groups has

gotten badly out of haud.

In several countries only an opaque line

divides the positions assuned by CD youth groups (or important wings)

fros the stance assured by Marxist youth elements.

"In venezuela,

the wing or the COPEI youth headed by Marta Sosa 18 80 "far-out"

it has camed the sobriquet "the Astronauts." Chilean President

Frei repostcaly told a German Christian Democrat that his youth

wing is in danger of beconing Marxiet.

In Panama, the dominant

wing of the CD youth has assumed positiong at least as radical as

And in the Dominican Republic the Social Christian

group in the National University is allied with the Communist

students.

7.

Youth Tending to Push Parties Further Left. The grcat

concers of responsible party leaders is that youth input to the

parties will swell the ranks of the radical wings and push the

parties further left. Sane observers believe that the CD youth

probiles has been

exasgerated and that the "bot heads" will mellow

once they participate direcily in party life and cope with hard

political rcality.

while this is partially true, we would take

issue with this relared vier.. Tho raw matcrial to be molded 18

far different. than it was ten years ago; since that time the demand

fo= =evolutionary (even

convulsive) change has mushroomed ard

anang the youth the cry has assumed din proportions.

The natural

cello lag process. will no longer produce the same magic.

S. Need for I-cinina:

Some belleve that the only way of

errascing the CD youts drift to the luft in the foresccablo future

lies in nassive and intensive youth and political cadre training.

Effsits in this direction to date (at IFEDEC, several national

political training institutes, ORNEU and varfous student training

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courses) have beca discouraging:

In most lastances the teachers

snare Identical blases with the students with the resule that

misconccations are reinsorced and no new horisons an epered up.

Frci ind Caldera have asked the German Institute for Iatemazional

Sollairity to incicaco les support in to stuuent ersining flold,

but che cormans, while recognizing the serdous need, live thus far

declined to luercaso thoir coltuent.

To acconglish anything

significant, the Corcans bellove a massiva protria-rust bo launched

(which nould tas thetr curent resources), sad ticy vasder shether

tha Co youth situation has been peruitted to drift too long to

salvage.

III - THE TRACT DE CLISC ON TIE CHRISTIAN DEVECRITIC MOVEMENT

9. CLASC Poses Sericus Danger for CD Movemeat. A KUSONE

study points out that "Oryanized labor could contribute substantlally

to. the "development of well-organized CD political parties in the.

hemisphere, but 1t also offers

the best chance for Co extresists

to cause haa to the novesent." Few would argue tast bow the CD

novcrent fares and the imago lt projects depend in sot insignificant

nessure on the posture assused and progress achieved by CliC.

Kore often than not, the judgement of a mass movement is based on

the logst clement comprising it a and in this regard GuSC is

chailcrged only by the party youth and student wings. As an

organized labor forco CLISC has been a dismal faflura (with the

exception of its carpesto ama); its only lupact and sole raison

d'ste un to this tino has beca as a political action listrument

with primary appeal to the working classca. It is unlikely that

CHiASC, under Maspero leadorship, will mellow as do partles when

they schieve the responsibility of government.

10. CLASC Has Maintained Posture of Independence. Despite 13

"Christian" label, CISC has consistently maintained that it 1s not

subservient to the Christian Democratic movement or any nember

The statcent canrot be disputed, for while CLISC 1s guilty

of nost of the seme aberrations as the least responsible of the CD

parties, it Invariably coits its follies independeacly, (often,

in fact, setting en exagple that is caulated by the parties). But

while CLASC can defend its claim of independence, it is also true

that CLISC does not discoursge the belief that 1t is the chosen

labor instrument of the Christian Democratic movement, although

this label has never been corally bestowed.

11. Closer Iles Betwesh CL"SC and CD Moverent Apacar Likely.

It sopcars likely that a core organic participation oi CLISC In CD

altairs is in the offing.. A Schinar was held in Montevideo frou

11 - 23 April (sponsored by the Christian Democratie Formation

Institute -- IFEDIC) for officials of CLASC who are siso officers

of Christian DerocIstic parties.

The Seminar, called for the

spocific purpose of arranging closer coordination betazes the CD

political covesent and the Christian labor movement, resulted 1n

the signing of the "Carta da Moatevideo" on 20 April.

iba Act

calls for formal Icpreschistion of ODCA in both tha Christian

labor organization. and CD party labor departments. To this end,

a Coordinating Comittea was fored - the Comite Relacionador Y

coordinador he grachizaciones Laborales y Funcionales Ee lis

Particos Demosrata Cristianos. The Act appeals to cia Co parties

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to recucut Oct spproval of the creation of tily Coordinuting

Commitaco and Onus ricognition of CLISC as 1ts chosen heaispherie

labor Instiurant.

The eventual approval of the ODCA Icadership

appears likely; irdeed, it 18 doubtful chat the Act would have

crerged fro the Montcuidco Seninar if Informal agrecnent of the

onct icadcrship had not been obtained in advance

12.

Negative CIASC Influence en Party Youth Wings:

Closer

CLASC Identification with the Cy political novent will lixely

rub off negativoly on the CD youth wings wilch Invarlably are further

left than their parent parties and identify nuch nora closely with

since January to establish youth appendages to the Christian labor

In Central America.

IV - THE ROLE DE ODCA

OnSA Contributea Little Positive Direction.

The Latin

Ancrican CD partics tonned thalr regional organization in

Montevidco in 1949 =- the Organizacion Democrata Cristiang de

America (ODCI). Tha current officore of ODCA are:

president

.: Rafael Caldera, Venezuela

Vice President 8 Hector CORNEJO Chavez, Peru

Vice President : Rene DE LEON Schlotter, Guatemala

Sceratary General: Tomas REYES Vicuna, Chile

ODCA has consistently assumed an anti-Yankee posture on a broad

range of key issucs (cost forcefully on the Ancrican intervention

in the Dosinican Republic). out on balance has been less strident

1n. 1ts criticisn than several of its member partics (notably the

chilcan, Bolivien and Dominican CD's), probably because of

cnldora's rostraining hand. The Organizatioi would merit mucr

closer attention than we have given it to date if it had substantial

Influenee on or authority over member parties, or could apply

sanctiors against national groups.. But ODCA mounts to little

nore than a fratemity. Its member parties have little Idcological

horogencity and the cement of their union appears to be based nore

on revolutionaly mysticism (which most parties are careful to

qualify with adjectives like peaceful, democratic and Christian)

end im regative foctors (hostility to the U.s., capitalism and the

oligarchies), thea on a foundation of CD doctrine or basic agree-.

nent on just

wizst they want.

14. Efforts to Firm Ue the ODCA Role. We have asked contacts

in European CD circles to prod ODCA to set criterla for merbership

and bchavior and that the Europears weigh petitions for support

• fron the Latin Anerican parties and organizatlong azainst these

critcria.

ixvour officers have arqued that while the Europcans

cannot Icalistically require nascent and 1l1-trained CD groups in

Latin lorica to hold to tha same rigid standards of political

morality that have evolved in Europe, neither should tha Europeans

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continue to toictato and thus

Lic to tale beause these to see it. oche

lesdé: Calders appears to recognise the need for cicact some

basic idiological comon ground wrong ODCA-reabor partios. But

no signal success has been achieved in thile direction to date

and no are not at all sanguine that even modest pragiess will be

made in this regard in the foreseeable future.

Reporting on the

Corgress of the World Christian Denocratic Union MEDU) hold 1n

Lins in doril 1966 Indicates clearly Doc the Latin deerican

parties will not submit althout corbat to any effort (whethor

Initiaied by the Europcan financial. backers of the CD novcment

or by Obal) that ains at inposing standardo and controls that:

will implage on their cospleto frecuon of action.

15. Formation of Contral Anerican Rextonal lawning.

Contral decricoa C) parties act in El Salvador in July 1966 to

establish a smaller regional grouping, The Union Beaucrata Cristiana

de Centrolmarica (UDCCA): This action does not appear to reflect

any elesent of pique with ODEA (the relationg of COPET and Rafael;

Cäldera with the Contral Anerican

parties appcar close and cordial)

but rather a desiro to establich a smaller and more cohesive unit

that can bottor address itsolf to the problems consos to the

arca and, to a losscr cutent, to the individual CD parties: UDCCA

is corprised of five parties

(1n Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua,

Costa Nies and Penama), wich the possibility that a sixth party

will be formed in Honduras.

V - EUROPEAN CD ROLE AND INTIUENCE

16.

Iha European Christian Denocratic Union ECDU). The

Europcan CD partics wero first to establish a regional organization,

the Nouvelle Equipe Intomationales (kEl) In 1947. The NEI never

Played a major role in world Christian Democratic affairs. From

the outset the Latin Micricen parties maintained their closest

ties with individual Icadors of the CD novement in Surope, particu

larly thoso Involved in financial operations with the sister parties

The NiI becamo progressively. lesg

significant and in rocent years was virtually moribund.

But 1n

mid-1955 the organization vas rcvamped and re-christened as the

President, Mariano Rusor, Secretary General of the Italian PDC,

at least catch the Socialist International In stature.

17. Europcan Iinaraisl Support to the CD Parties.

The two CD

organizations which have contributed nost heavily to the support

of the Latin Avorican CD parties and related organiastions are the

Institute for International Solidazity (IIS) and tic International

Solidarity Foundation (FIS). Betwech them they will contribute

an estinated $$00,000 to $1, 000,000 to the CD parties and CLASC in

Calendar Year 1967. It was recently reported that the COPEI party

of Venezuela will icceive j4s0,000 for the 1968 election from FIS

at the ruto of $100,000 per year contencing in 1905.

The IIS. The Institute for International Solidarity,

Real at recoly by dra peter on ate car coundation

uf the Geraan Christian Desocratic Union (CDü). Lito 1t8

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Socisi

in counterpart (she Pricaraci abest Foundation) •

the suit of tis's operating budget cores tion the vircan

Goycrracie.

IIs baintains several pomancit representatives

1n Incla marica aid supports soveral CD activitica directly.

Dus it also contributes sore than fifty percent of the FIS

budget.

Sha is ane Intcrnational Solidarity Fund was,

sinalty crested on 30 March 1904 to nvoid duplication of

fineroigl suppore celoits on the pure of the Europoan CD

parties and octar Co-orientod groups In Latin America. The

rame was later charged to the Intemational Solldarisy

Foundation (FIS) to avoid confusion with the solidarity fund

of CISC and other organizationo: Tho MIS opcratel as an aru

of tha ECDU, with headquarters

In Road.

Its most Important

leiders aro:

DI. Joharines Schauff. (President of the FIS, a

Cornon national and close perconal friend of Konrad Idenauer),

Untiano Rusor, Adolf Herkenrath and August Vanlatendel

(SccIctary Goocral of tho International Federation of

Christian Trado Unions • CSC).

plierence In Function of IIS and FIS. From the start

of 1t0 activicles, the Germans and Italions havo contributed

alost the entire FIS büdges (in 1964, for examplo,

Vanistendael

contributed only $15,000 fros the CISC International Solidarity

FiS appoars to be the cxclusive European CD channel for

örganizational support to the Latin Ancrican CD parties.

the Iis 1s tha rich partner in the IIS-FIS tanden and could easily

fund the Latin Americon partles dircctly, the FIS channel 1s

peaferred by the Gonsans and has two major advantages: Flist,

sincc IIS 1s a regional solidarity instrument with reprcsentation

(but not contributions) fron all the Europcan partico,

resporsibillty for support to certain controversial Latin parties

1s watered doin and distributed anong the European CD'a collectively.

Thus a Latin Idericon governent or party in competition with the

local CD's cannot casily malie a formal demarche to the 'IIS or the

Gerian government..

Socond, It 1s casier to obfuscato the magnitude

of Europson organisational support to the Christian Democratie

covcacht 12 Latin Accrica 1f 1t 18 channaled through a aulti-party

orcanization.

Tie Garaans have limited IIS funding to less

controvarsial areas - support to youth and student formation,

political training institutes and CLISC training inatitutes.

(See Attachioni. A for a detailed flow chart.)

CONCLUSIONS

19. CD's Challenge Communist Domination of the University.

It was noted in Para. Sabove that almost without exception CD

strength in the university greatly exaceds the voting strergth of

The sade is true of the Cosmunists, and It 1s

a fact tizat Ce-cunist/Christian Denocratic strength on the campus

1s ovarinel listy dosinant throughout the herisphere. Few would

take issue with the conclusion that the vast aajority of university

youth are attracied to roverents projccting an Inspirational

massage (cho-lord "inspirational" nore accurstely characterizes

the CD covenant than does "Ideological") of an aura of revolutionary

mystique. During the past few years Comunist voting losses in

the universiiy have boon picked up mainly by the Christian Devocrats

-- the vote has shifted from one roverent with a message to another.

It would appaar that the Christion Donocrata are the only political

secuo capable of challenging the Coumuniots hamlopharto donination

of tre carpus.

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Serenith of

assential.

horever,

not sulley thic the crouth of co strcartli in the university

presages a corcuponding incrcusa in CD party strongch.

while

voting patterns in

tie univirsicy provide valuabid lasights on

population (particularly youth) attitudeo and aspirations, these

pattoris are note rollable baretcr of cither on mized

strength or future potential. in no country of katin America

13 the voting strength of the co's or the Cornunists searly as

strong siong the posulation at large do 1t 13 on the campus.

Ono resson 1s that tho universis population of Lacio anerica 1s

Icos tian 2 perccat of the tosal population.

Tha CD campus leader

slizost invariably graduates inca student politica to more dircot

party involvement wen ho leaves the unlversity - even if the

party has so discerable future.

It would appear, horever, that

cho non-miversity youth (lacking the poeudo-intollectual pre-

tensions and tho solf-bestored elite label of the university-

trained) ara such less inclined to vote and militate for Christian

Democracy simply beccuso 1t las emotional of Inapirational appeal:

C2 Esilure to Iransom Affinity of Lower Classes Into

Votes. The indecuately caucasud and tic lower social classes li

Latin Accrica are Incvitably rosivated by the pragmatism of the

possible; to vose for a parsy dit has limited potential to achleve

national porar, simply becauso it espouses vious that hit responsiva

chords, is a luxury ho belloves ho cannot afford. Better, he

thinks, to vote for the lcast abjectionable of the traditional

parties. Christian Democracy remains basically a niddle-class

With iow exceptions (Chilo, the Dominican Republic and

to a lesser cutent Venczuela) it has acant worker or campasino

appeal. By and large, Christin Democracy has fatled to reach

those on the lower rungs of the social ladder.

22. Individual Party Fozames Appear Unaffected by CD

Propress Eiscinere.

Many cspcated, or at leaat hoped, that the

Frei victoiy in Chile would sirz impetus to the development of

the CD novcient throughout the heisphere. This has not happened.

Thora 1s no evidence that individual CD parties were either assisted

or hindared in their developens by the Chilean success story.

yet the view porsists that the tiltan victory was a boon to the

novement's potortial and progress.

During the past year COPel

Icüdor Rafucl Caldora has brozdosst a variation on this theme that

screial European CD leaders have taken up. They argue that COPEI

must ancige victorious in the 1953 clection if the CD movement 18

to maintain its rosentui, for sa idcologically based movement

canrot avoid peaking off,

and gradually down, if it has only one

significant victory to cite over a period of several years.

would rejcat the view -- based on elcction results in Argentina,

Colossia, Il Salvador, the Dicinican Republic and Uruguay -- that

Individual party fortunes will be affected in any significant

measure by the successes or failures of sister parties elsewhere.

Wict appesis to exorgo from these elections is rather solid

evidence that the national parties will sink or swim on their

cim dovices, based largely on leadership abilities, the development

of miculo cchelod cadres, organizational talents, appeal to the

"socisily disinhezited,"

and tha praguatism of local issues and

consicazations.

International events (with rare exception) count

for little, and the influence oi ODCA and the successful CD parties

530

GLASSANCATION

SECRET

PAGENO

9

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## Page 14

14-00000

CONTINUATION OF

DISPATCH

SECRET

5O0X DISPATCA 5961

23.

Grouch Potential Extets, But luch Less Than Originally

Anticianted.

The CD couchen't has made only nodest progress the

past two ycars.. Indications are that the developsent of the

novasent will be nuch slower and less extensive than many antlo

cipated in the first flush of enthusiasm following the frai

victory, for it has many problcas to resolve.

Chief anong those:

perhaps, 1s CD failure to rcach the lover social classes and to

develop a significant worker base.

The chances of ChISC contrt-

buting positively to cortect this failure appcar resotc. Another

major problem is the absence of an idcological caronground,

despitc the lip service pald to the Papal Encyclicals and the

Catholic social philosophers, and the failure to enunclate minimun

behavioral. standards that these philosophical roots nould tupose.

This deficlency is the root cause of two manifestationg: First.

a propensity to consort with Comunist and assorted Marxist groups

(c.go, in Coloabla, Bolivia, the Doninican Republic and Panama).

Second, the progressive radicalization of party youth wings which

thrcatens to push the parent parties further left.

The fact;

renains, nevertheless, that Christian Denocracy 1s the most mified

non-Caiunist novement in Latin America.

It cannot be labeled

democratic or anti-Comunist because of the behavioral aberrations

of several national parties.

Need for Eclectic Operational Approach to CD's. The

ranks of those wio vicied Christian Democratic prospects with

Great cathusiasu. two ycars azo - Including the European financial

backers of tho moveacht -- have drindled considerably. But those

who have been critico of Christian Democracy frou the outset (many

of whom might be described as the "visceral dentgrators") have

displayed no more perception in evaluating CD prospects. The

head-in-the-sand gencralization that Christian Democracy has no

future does not stand the challege of investigation.

Neither does

the assertion that Christim Denocracy 1s the hemispheric wave of

the future.

The only valld generalization that might be made on

CD prospects 1s that all goreralizations are false.

submit that the only valld approach to the CD phenomenon Is to assesa

the movemeat and make operational judgements on a country-by-

country basis.

There are some countries where the collapse of

the party would be no loss.

develop as a positive element in national political stability?

If so, it 1s incumbent on the Station to develop assets within

the party und to examine the need for operational involvement.

Station posture toward the CD norement must be based on the raw

rcalities of the local situation, case by case.

RUTHERFORD J. LYNER

53J

HE FALLINS COITION

CLASSi

SECRET

Le corne

---

## Page 15

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CONTINUATION OF

DISPATCH

(1 copy esch)

Isonos rites

nio de jancizo

Eclo iloriconte

Esccilia

Posto Alegre

Recite

São Pusio.

Santiago, Chile

sen jose

sarto Doningo

Guaysquil

Sain Salvador

Gunterals City

POLÜ AL PRiNCO

Kingston

Mexico City

5a172

Parans Cliy

Asuncion

Linia

Paranoribo

Po=t of Spain

ronicvideo

Caracas

S2nt1a80

de los Caballeros

FORN

H: 393

USE PREVIOUS EDITION

CLASEIRATION

SECRET

• =AiCH SiMiNA AND NUMALA

ICOX DISPATCHI. 5961

Ho Diatzroution:

(1 copy each)

Hi/Branch Chiefs

M!/Country Desks

ti/54.0

C/ini/CA

wi/Rozistry

RI

QASSIRCATIA

THATISUND

PAGENO.

41

---

## Page 16

14-00000

EUROPEAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC SOLIDARITY ORGANIZATIONS

GERMAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC UNION (COU)

KONRAD ADENAUER FOUNDATION

WORLO CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC UNION (WCOU)

Eichhola

Acaderny

Political

Leadership

Academy

Student

Institute

Cursian Christianistoratic

Democratic

Latin America

Christian Democratic

cense cupo

International Union

yuancistan

(UUDC)

International Solidarity

DIRECTOR

Adolf Herkenrath

International, Sclidarity

Foundation

PRESIDENT

Joannes Schauff

SOME DUDGETARY SUPPOAT

Support To:

Political Training Institutes

Training Institutes of CLASC

(Latin American Confederation of Christian Trade Unionists)

Youth and Student Training

Organizational Support To:

Political Parties

89001 $ 08

---

## Page 17

Secret

No Foreign Dussem

BETRAL INT

File:

en file

AGENCY

DIRECTORATE OF

INTELLIGENCE

WEEKLY SUMMARY

Special Report

Christian Democracy in

atin America

Secret

N°

1100

• 3 March 1967

No. 0279/67A

---

## Page 18

14-00000

SECRET

To Foreign disadn

CHRISTIAN REMOCRACY: IN LATIN AMERICA

The decisive victory of Eduardo Frei in the Sep-

tember 1964

Chilein presidential elcition led many to

hope that Christian

Democracy sould develop signifi

cantly throughou: Latin America, compoting with Con-

munism on ideological grounds and offering an alterna-

tive, democratic route to social and economic progress.

No such trend has yet developed.

The Christian

Democratic movement's appeal is to students and middle

class, a relatively small percentage of the population

in most Latin American countries.

•Its concepts of

basic social refora and the dignity of the human person

may appeal to the rorkers, but they

still cast their

vote on a pragmatic basis for the least objectionable

of the established parties that have an immediate chance

of governing:

The movement's progress is likely to be hampered

by its lack of strong

leaders and effective

labor

ganizations to congete against

or-

the entrenched posi

tiong of other political

movements.

Current Balance Sheet

The Christian Democratic

movement is generally agreed to

be of

current political sigrifi

cance in only

four Latin American

countries--Chile, Peru, Venezuela,

and El Salvador.

ing Marxist domination of the

urban labor force; and Frei's

moderation has been increasingly

challenged by the left. wing of

his own party, which may capture

control in the next two or three

years.

In. only one of these--Chile--

is the Christian

Democratic Party

(PDC) the governing party.

Frei's

Solid victory in the 1964

dential election was

presi-

followed by

an even more

impressive showing

in

the March

1965 congressional

election.

However, the party's

reform program

has

run

into dif-

ficulty in the upper house of

Congress, which is

still con-

trolled by the opposition; no

progress has been made in weaken-

The

only other Christian

Democratic party with

a claim

to

a role

in government is the one

in Peru.

It was brought into a

pre-election coalition by the

dominant Popular Action Party

in 1963 and, although it gained

only four percent of the votes,

it holds two cabinet posts.

Its

voting strengh has been weakened

recently by the defection of a

dissident faczion which formed a

separate Popular Christian Party.

Page

SECRET

I SEECIAL REPORT

3

Mar 67

---

## Page 19

14-00000

CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA

Country mith actoro Christian Democialic Parly

Country air meali Christian Democratic Party

Country mishout Christian Democratic Parly.

MEXICO

VENEZUELA?

AMENCH QUIANA

COLOMBIA

ECUADO

PERU

BRAZIL

EDUARDO FREI

Prosident of Chile,

Lolin Arnorica's Christian Democratic loader.

BOLIVIA

CHILE

ARGENTINA:

RAFAEL CALDERA

Venezuelan presidential aspirant and

number-Imo Latin American Christian Democrat

05800 3.87

Classified material on reverse ride of page.

---

## Page 20

14-00000

SECRET

No Foreig: Diesen.

Venezuela's Christian Demo-

crats (COPEI) have strong hopes

of duplicating the victory of the

Chilean party in 1968 and appear

to have narrowed the gap. between

their 22 percent of the elector-

ate

in 1963 and the governing

Democratic Action's 32 percent.

COPEI Secretary Géneral Rafael

Caldera, one of the few Latin

American CD leaders of interna-

tional stature, is expected to

be

the

party's standard bearer

in his

fourth try for the presi-

dency.

Ile has recently come out

in favor of a politically expe-

dient move to the right, thus

filling the vacuum of the center-

right of the Venezuelan political

spectrum and opening new sources

of support.

In El Salvador, the PDC

garnered 31.2 percent of the

votes in the March 1966 legisla-

tive election and one of its.

leaders, Jose Napolcon Duarte;

retained the mayoralty of San

In less than six years

the PDC has become the leading

opposition party.

It has little

chance of capturing the presi-

dency in 1967, but should be a

strong contender by 1972, with

educated Mayor

Duarte the likely candidate.

Applying even the most yen-

erous criteria to the judgment

of potential, there are not more

than four other CD parties--in

the Dominican Republic, Panaina,

Brazil, and Guatemala--that might

develop

as moderately important

forces over the next five years.

The Dominican Revolutionary

Social Christian Party. (PRSC) ,

led by Coanabo Javier, has aban-

doned, atleast for the time being,

the irresponsible policies it

adopted after the April 1965 re-

volt and has moved loward the po-

litical center.

made

its opposition to the Bala-

quer. government clear, but has

alsö indicated that it intends to

operate within bounds acceptable

that this moderate: line will in-

crease its following and enable

it to improve on the poor showing

it made in the 1966 elections.

The party has developed a small

but talented cadre, primarily

from the university ranks.

The Panamanian PDC was reg-

istered some five years ago and

polled only 3.1 percent of the

votes in 1964.

Although it con-

tinues a minuscule party, it has

made

significant organizational

strides

its philosophy of

social justice gives it roots.

lacked by most Panamanian parties,

which are largely personalistic

or tied to financial interests.

The PDC is currently negotiating

with the mass-based Panamenista

Party of Arnulfo Arias--Panama's

largest--in hopes of forming

coalition for the May 1968 elec-

tions.

The CDs have offered to

provide the Panamenistas with

much-needed administrative skills

in return for a share of the as-

sembly seats in the next election.

A long-range goal would be to

acquire support within Arias'

party and

inherit his mass fol-

lowing when he passes from the

scene.

The Brazilian PDC polled

¡only four percent of the vote in

Page

SECRET

SPECIAL REFORT

3 Mar 67

---

## Page 21

14-00000

SECREI

No Forbign Diosem

1962,

but the party had signifi-

cant

strength

in three important

south-central states (Parana,

Sao Paulo, and Guanabara).

all other

Like

Brazilian parties, it

nas abolished during

a political

reorganization under

the Castello

Branco

administration.

Most of

its members

then affiliated with

the progovernment

ARENA party

and campaigned

under its banner

in the November 1966 congressional

elections.

It is unlikely that

there will be any significant ex-

pansion in the number of politi-.

cal parties--the new Brazilian

constitution sets down stringent

standards that virtually eliminate

the possibility. of a repetition

of the former proliferation of

parties.

The former PDC has made

no attempt to reconstitute itself,

but its

former members will prob-

ably join with liké-minded con-

gressmen

to pursue policies con-

sistent with Christian Democratic

ideology.

The remaininy nine Chris-

tian

Democratic parties--in Ar-

gentina,

Bolivia,

Colombia, Costa

Rica,

Ecuador,

Mexico,

Nicaragua,

Paraguay,

promise

and

Uruguay--show scant

of developing into forces

of national importance

over. the

next five years.

. Leadership of

even modest stature exists

only

in Argentina (Salvador Nlende,.

Horacio. Sueldo) and Bolivia

(Remo di Natale).

Party Youth Wings

The Guatemalan PDC was only

ecently recognized as a legalli

constituted party.

This groupi

which is being financed by Cath-

olic sources in Germany and Bel-

gium, has some strength in the

Youth and student movemen't and

some growth potential among the

campesinos who make up more than

half the population. Current

direction of the party leaves much

to bedesired; its leader, Rene de

Leon,

appears honest, but he has

little organizational flair or

popular appeal.

With more vigo-

rous leadership and the develop-

ment of a middle-echelon cadre,

the party might develop signifi-

cantly--particularly if the

in-

cumbent Revolutionary Party (PR)

administration

fails to resolve

basic problems confronting it.

As with all political groups

in Latin America,

the vast major-

ity of CD party militants. come

from student organizations in the

local universities.

In most

countries of the hemisphere, CD

voting

strength on the campus is

much

greater than the political

gtrength of the

parent party.

A few examples illustrate

this

point:

In Panama, the party

polled 3.1 percent of the national

vote in

1964 (and probably would

poll not more than 5 percent to-

day); but its university youth

got 12.8 percent in the January

1966 campus election and 24.4

percent in January 1967.

The

Dominican PPSC received 5.4 per-

cent of the vote in 1962 land its

present strength could well be

lower because of internal divi-

sions and leadership conflicts),

but its youth wing

on the campus

garnered

40.2 percent of the

vote in May

1966.

In Venezuela,

COPEI polled 22 percent of the

vote in 1963; its student wing on

the campus of Central University,

however, polled 40.2 percent of

the vote in 1966.

Page

SECRET

SPECIAL REPORT

3 Маг 67

---

## Page 22

14-00000

SICKEI

do foreign Diadem

Several CD Icaders,

most

notably. Frei in Chile, and Caldera

In venezuela,

have expressed con-

siderable concern over the grow-

ing radicalization of patty gouth

In several countries the

positions assumed by CD jouth.

important wings)

almost indistinguishable

those of pro-Communist youth ela-

ments.

In Venezuela, the wing

of the COPEI youth: headed by

Marta Sosa is so "far out" it

has earned the sobriquet "the

Astronauts. "

Chilean: President

Frei reportedly told a German

Christian Democrat that his youth

wing is moving dangerously far

to the left.

•dominant wing of the CD youth has

assumed positions at least as

radical as the Communists.

in the Dominican Republic

Social Christian group in the Na-

tional University, while differ-

entiating itself from the Commu-

nist students on certain issues,

has frequently taken a parallel

line.

The great concern of respon-

sible party leaders

is

that these

students, as they progress from

campus to parent party, will

swell

the ranks of the radical wings

and push the parties further left.

Other observers, however, expect

the

"hotheads" to mellow once

they participate directly in

party life and

cope with hard

political. reality.

Both views

can be defended:

Some mellowing

is inevitable, but in the past

ten years the

demand for revolu-

tionary (even convulsive)

change

has mushroomed--and among the

youth the cry has assumed much

greater proportions.

Both German and American

observers have commented that

massive and intensive political

training of youth and political

cadres might arrest this drift

to the

left.

Frei and Caldera

have specifically asked the

West

German CD party's Institute

for

International Solidarity to

in-

crease its support in the student

training field.

However, the

Germans, who have long been pro-

ponents of organizational programs

in Latin America, appear inclined

to the position in the youth and

student field that party leaders

have permitted the situation to

deteriorate too long for even a

massive training program to pro-

duce a moderating trend.

The Labor Arm

major influence in the

development of the Christian

Democratic movement will be the

actions and attitudes of its

labor organization, the Latin

Confederation of Chris-

tian Trade Unionists (CLASC) .

So far, as an organized force, it

has been, a dismal failure except

among the campesinos.

impact and

this time has been as a political

action instrument with primary

appeal to the working classes.

In this role, it has earned a

reputation for independent action

and irresponsibility that has re-

flected negatively on the whole

movement despite CLASC's vigorous

that it is not subservient

to the Christian Democratic po-

litical leaders.

In spite of the apparent

differences between CLASC and

page

5

SECRLI

SPECIAL REPORT

3 Mar

67

---

## Page 23

14-00000

SCREI

No. Foreig: Diesen

che cD movement,

a closer

formal relationship appears

to be in the offing..

Last April,

officials of: CLASC who are also

officers of the Christian Demo-

cratic parties mét in Montevideo

between the two groups.. To

complish this goal, they proposed

that.both.the CD party labor de-

partments and CLASC be granted

formal representation in the

Democratic Organiza-

tIon of America (ODCA) , the re-

gional grouping

formed

in 1949.

The plan has not yet been

implemented, but eventual ODCA

approval appears: likely.

Closer

CLASC identification with the CD

political movement may have an

adverse effect on CD youth

wings, which--being further left

than

their parent parties--have

identified more

closely with

CLASC's revolutionary image.

Since the flyst of the year,

CLASC has intensified. its ef-

forts to create: its own youth

groups and appears to have made

some progress, especially in

Central America.

The Role of ODCA

In its 17 years of existence,

ODCA has not evolved beyond a

sort of fraternity held together

more by negative factors such as

hostility to the US, to capital-

ism, and to the oligarchies, than

by any basle agreement among it's

members on doctrine or principles.

Moreover,

the

have

individual parties

made very clear that they

will fight any. effort--whether

initiated by ODCA or by the Eu-

ropean

financial backers

of the

CD movement:--to

impose standards

and controls that will impinge

on their freedom of action.

In gencral, ODCA takes a

slightly

less hostile line on

Us policies than that of its

member parties.

This probably

results

from the influence of

its president, Rafael Caldera of

Venezuela. • The organization's

two vice presidents are Hector

Cornejo Chavez of Peru and Rene

De

Leon of Guatemala.

Tomas Reyes

Vicuna of Chile is its secretary

general.

Only in Central America has

there been any move toward a

more cohesive unit geared to area

problems.

A smaller regional

group.

the Christian Democratic

Union of Central America, was Of-

ganized last July.. It now has

five member parties, in Guatemaia,

El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica,

and Panama,

and a sixth may be

formed in lionduras.

European Role and Influence

Although Latin American

Christian Democracy like the Eu-

ropean variety, has its roots in

the profoundly

humanistic and

democratic

ideas of the French

philosopher Jacques Maritain, it

does not contain the European

fascist concept of the corporate

state.

The European reaction to

the growth of. Communism in the

1930s had little effect on the

Latin American CDs; consequently

the Americans were moving to the

political left as the Europeans

were moving to the right.

Not until 1947 did the newly

important and affluent European

Page

6

SECRET

SPECIAL REPORT

3 Mar 67

---

## Page 24

14-00000

EUROPEAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC SOLIDARITY ORGANIZATIONS

GERMAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC UNION (COU)

KONRAD ADENAUER FOUNDATION

•WORLO CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC. UNION (WCOU!.

Eichholz

Academy

Political

Leadership

Academy

Student

Institute

Institüte

fr

International Solidarity

"IS!

DIRECTOR

Adolf Herkenrath

SQME BUDG

European

Christian

Democratic

Union

(ECDU)

Christiar: Democratic

Organisatin

Latin America

International, Solidarity

Foundation

(FIS)

PRESIDENT

Johannes Schauff

• SUPPORT

Organizational Support To:

Politic.yl Parties

Christian Democratic

Union

of

Central Europe

{UCDEC)

International Union

- of

Young Christian

Democrats

(UUDC).

Support Ta:

Political Training Institutes

Training Institutes of CLASC

¡Latin American Confederation of Christian Trade Unionists)

Youth and Student Training

• Classified marerial on reverse side of pago

---

## Page 25

14-00000

SECKDI

• No Foreign Dissem

to coordinate

national CD

activity through

organization they called the New

International Team (NEI).

never achieved any

significance because European

in Latin America had

already been undermined by a basic

difference in political philosophy

the Latin American

parties had been maintaining in-

dividual relations.with the var-

jous European groups.

These ties

-were strictly on vague. ideological

grounds and for financial reasons.

The two heaviest European

contributors to the Latin Ameri-

can parties are the Institute

for

International Solidarity. (IIS) and

the International Solidarity

Foundatión (FIS):

Between

them

they rill contribute

an estimated

$800,000 to. $1,000,000 to

the

American CD parties and CLASC in

calendar

year 1967.

In addition,

it was recently reported that

the COPEI

party

of Venezuela will

receive $480,000 for the 1968

election

from FIS.

under the direction

Herkenrath,

the West German

Christian

Democratic Union with the bulk

coming directly

from the German government.

maintains several permanent rep-.

resentatives in Latin America

supports youth and student

groups, political training

tutes, and CLASC organizations.

The FIS,

under the leader-

ship of DI. Johannes Schaufs,

operates as an arm of the European

Christian Democratic Union (ECDU) ;

successor to the NEI.

Since.its

creation

'in 1968,

Germans

and

Italians have

contributed almost

its entire budget.

FIS appears

to be the exclusive European

channel for organizational support

to the

Latin American parties.

It has

assuted this responsibility

because it; is composed of repre-

sentatives of all

the european

parties.

Thus the responsibility

for support to certain

contro-

versial Latin parties is watered

down and distributed among the

European CDs collectively.

Fur-

thermore, a Latin American gov-

ernment or party in competition

with

the local CDs 'cannot formally

protest its

funding activities

to the Gernan government.

Outlook

The modest progress made by

the Christian Democratic movement

in the past tho-and a half years

suggests that its

development

will be much slower and less ex-

tensive than many anticipated in

the

first flush

of enthusiasm

following the frei victory.

One major problem is its

reach the

cial classes and to develop a

significant worker base:

strength in

the universities

and its ability to compete with

Communist groups on the campus

create unfounded optimism.

"inspirational" approach tilat

college student

has no concarable appeal among

the inadequately educated lower

classes.

Neither does

a victory for

one party seen likely to have

Page

SECRET

SPECIAL REPORT

3 Mar 67

---

## Page 26

14-00000

SECRET

No. Foreign Dissem

any major effect on the fortunes

of another.

what appears to

emerge from CD gains or losses

in

recent elections is rather

solid evidence that the national

parties will sink or swim on the

basis' of their own leadership

abilities, organizational talents,

and approach to local issues.

ternational erents count for

In-

11t-

tle, and the influence of ODCA

and the successful CD parties for

even less:

(SECRET NO

FOREIGN

DISSEM)

Page

9

SECRET

SPECIAL REPORT

3 Mar 67

---

## Page 27

7Ea 150i.

kiri

Der Tt

25 ior. 195

35:

ICRACIO ViLLIGREN ACDSIUUi

32022006 Na

30 ЗЕРГ. 1060

NEW JERSEY

19 5 2966)

Airci, Fla.

COT INDIA

---

## Page 28

14-00000,

REPORT. COVER SHEET

raccessor action.

Henry - SOMAN.

-John Ca.

TARBELL/VkI

4

PSE CRET

лат UFC - 8473.

•nic, Auguat 1966

sovace careT

_ АМОТ - 24.5

IELD-DISTRIOUTION

State

FBI

I&NS

Customs

Border Patrol

USCG

ARRING

FArA

iS DISSENINATION

"IT FISSLUINATION

figs

DCS

Sarito Domingo

HDC

-

Caracas

Cancaso de los Caballeroe

2 - Guarenala City HGG

MENTAL PUTA

MICROFILUCO

NUU 18 1966

TYPIC

SOURCE: AMOT-245. in AMOT reports as follows:

Pana. 2: DD-1874: from

Palacio BARBEITE,

10 June 1966, and DD-1888, 6 July, from BARBEITE

and Angel HERNANDEZ; paras. 3 to 7 and source comment 2, DD-1888;

paras

and source comment 5, DD-1883, 23 June, which included a copy

of the docunent; para. 9:

DD-1892, 15 July,

from HERNANDEZ, DD-1895,

21. Jull', from a conversation between HERNANDEZ and Jorge MAS,

and

VALLADARES source coment 1: DD-182 ara DD-2890, 14 Jury, Tom

3 August; para.

10, DD-1892;

Ignacio

Laureano BATISTA.

AMCRUNP-I's true name appears in this report. Inforation available

in his 201 indicates that he was

"suspended"

on 25 February 1966,

and there is no record of contact since that time.

RID: Index

Jane.FR 201=2402V%

BATISTA Falla, Laureano

Sex :

M."

FOB: 1 May 1935, Havana, Cuba.

Cit:

Cuban #

Dec or Status: < Elected erganization

secty of Natl Frecutive

Committee of MDC at congress 25-27 Feb Ec.

Trip to DR

on behalf of MDC, June 66: >

Group j.:

Excluded from

Autonatic Downgrading

and Deciassification

19-300-10

1801

1. 61 1487 гот.:3:

CS COPY

---

## Page 29

14-00000

SECRET

Page two of Cover Sheet

UFG-£973

Name :

BAZAN, Arnaldo

Sex

DPOB: 2

Cit : ... Cuban

Occ or Status:.

Emigre in DR.

Formerly with

Connection with MDC base

Nickname^. Baby, El Baby

Sex ::.

DPOB :

4 Sept 33, Havana Cuba,

Cit :

Cuban

Occ

or Status: Emigre in Miami:

Second in command of military

dept of MUC

Name: FBARBEITE Freyne, Placido A.

Sex :

DPOB: 19 Nov 38, Batabano, Havana Proy, Cuba

Cit :

Cuban

Occ or Status: Emigre in Miami. Chf_of military dept of MDC.

Name: PALACIOS San Juan, Armando

Sex

DPOB: 2

Cit :

Cuban

Occ or Status: Emigre. President of MDS in Puerte Ri02,

---

## Page 30

14-00000

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

candlin colobie

a sources of deubrul ropesiy or isodia, cago jass al rao cuinpeiane

Perin: louries

APPRAISAL OF CONTIN:.

1.alno 8. Carrial Do Migol.

4,Nn-8-a5e

triptia;

(Arpi.ar

CONFIDINTiAL

CONTROLLED DISSEM

TO FOREIGN DISSEM

coumer Cuba/Dominican Republi

REPORI NO

Ubc OActivities of theiMUci! POSSiDilitIAl Or RIPOR

of Reactivating a

Dominican Republic, Condition of

NO PAGES

Boats, Possible Alllances Hith

Other Emigré Orsanizations

REFERENCES

8 August 1956

DATE OF

29 May to late July 1968

INFO.

PLACE &

DATE ACO

United States, Miami

620 June t9n2 A45408 19661

UF6 - 8473

SOURCE:

A member of a group of Cuban émirres trained in

of information collection.

the techniques

This group has provided useful

reports since 1961.

- loader of the Movimiento Democrata Cristiano

l-ustiterned to Miani fnom the

1. Summary: Laurenno Batista ials, leader of tha Movinento Limperata Chrisileno (MDC,

Christian Dumocratic Morement), securned to Mari In late June 1966x from tie Dominienn

Republie, where he allegeuly dottera pledges of support for hla anil-Castra indertaking"

of President Balaguer.

Chief of the Alr Force of the Dominican Hepublie, pendiny rapezsunca the proval

However, the milltary department of the MUC

An Although representatlves of ta ViC have ulcusced the signire d agreements with

document in which it voiced its alrepuragement, pricarly done Senil issied a

representatives d the Students' in lutlonary Directorate (DHE), und die Cubaa

Representacion In Eviley (RECE), no alliances have yet been formed.

WItH 1790101-

(DRE) and the Cuban Representation 00. -

alliances have been made.

2 •

Laureano Batista Falla, organization secretary of the National

Executive Committee of the MDC, left Miami on 6 June 1966 for

Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic, and returned. to. Miami

•on 26 Junat: On 29 June he met with other

leaders.-of the MDC

-to inform them of the resulte of his trip?;

Bntista suld that during exerero. discussions held with deneral Juan N. Evicta

perez, Outor a we sir fores of con Laminican Repulo, he had piquested lartsarma-

sortisinitacture litthal Folch comrate with the MDC by allowing the MDC i asintain

Base Luna

W 71-45) 13 Accordän men tir BatistA

-indicated hIS WIlLINgHEDS

offered the following assistance,

subject to

President Balaguer, wion Folch said he will consult:

CONFIDENTIAL

CONTROLLED DISSEM

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

6:!

SO #

FI

RR

RE

CICS

MO

DIA

3

1

ARMY

NAVY

•AIR

NSA

USIA ( ) I&NS (0) /1

WHC/SI

1

E/IB/R.:

}

WC/WAVE

1

E/MADR

WHC/CA

1

CI/OPS/WH 2 WH/PACY (CINCSO) i

•OCR

i,b:

IS

IE 2, CI 4, FI 3, CA. 1, DO/H I.

Liaison *

FBI 12

10.10'÷

COORD

RELEASE.

---

## Page 31

14-00000

CONfIDLITIAL

CONTFOLLED DISSEM

NO FOREIGN DISSE.

6:

UTG - 8073

no use of five lalets façing Santlago de los Caballero:

•Ity sor a military case Isle.

Authorization

for MDC personnel to movo into-and out

of the Dominican Republic in a clandestine manner.

•Transportation of HDC war matcriul from Miani aboard

bainican Air Förce planes.

santiago de los

!.

calked allli Arnaldo fazun,

who is the recipient of & 3500. per monti atica aarxIstriyattacKD

sent by the MOC

to..this

Domindear Frpublic for the muintenanes ot ile: Lurin.

ran tirixitruisint who hud urranged icista's

maullar dith Folel,

cutes ors he do formerly been elth the La Gallo College of Chiny a dane lat

chiet of Santlay so los Caballuros had aude arrantants for tkaxhrixexx

or a house to be ruoled by the MUG meniors who are la chare of Bese Luna.

he T th a cure me the Mc members tho

are in chargo of base Luna?

5.

Batista expresseu enthusiasn regarding folch's proposals,

and

stressed the necessity of acting immediately, including sending

MDC personnel to the lominican Republic.

He directed Angel

Hernandez

Rojo, second in command of the military department,

to

prepare a plan to operate fron the Dominican Republic, and

Placido Bartelte Freyre, chief of the military department, to

prepare an estimate of the cost of the plans in ordai that the

necessary money eat be obtained.

corrid

Although Barbeite sgreed with Estista d reminiing the need tor preparation of operational

plans and an estionio uf the cot, iddesirertinethna he basically waricersta

atixex opposed satista's advocation of initisting imnediate action. He rolt thut it was

Inadvisable to ajisroi the implementation at the plane until Balaguer's rectio: is

known. 'Hernandes' viers coincided with those of Barbelte. Nastaders chirarstkee

xUaLs but erfuthucts The meeding ended without a solution

to the disagreement.

++ (180888-091011

WILL.

At the meeting Bation seported that uissension xithtar xists butaxacany within the

MDC In Puerto fles, purticularly between Amand. Pulagos azicier Sun Juan and Humberto

vec. kurrunny harion, president and mility chluf resocetively.

a Mados perist fires does me report to oh pen the arenant that

pluns and activities.

however, barbelte corended. Porezl action with the arguint that

military matters do not really full srirexris

within

the scope de respenclollities of the r-sident.

pResIdenT.

8.

The military department of the HDC set forth its views in a

document dated 29 May. This document incluged the following

• points:

b.

Discontent is becoming evident because of the lack of

activity which,

results from the lack of funds.

The sum centioned is $10,000.s

no that on insted stares policy eardina stoo.

A base of

operations outside of the United States is considered

to be so vitally important that the military department

would be willing to operate an illegal base if the

resources were made available:

The condition of the boats is such that the MDC has

sea transportation.

the boats are described as follows:

CONFIDENTIAL

CONTROLLED DISSEM

NO FOREIGY DISSEM

---

## Page 32

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

CONTROLLED DISSEM

NO FORCIGN DISSIM

-3-

UFG - 8473

(1)

• (2)

•.: (3)

The CADILLO I 18 docked across from Brito's Boat Yard

at Stock Island, Flarida.6

The boat is in need of.

repairs on the deck and superstructure, and the instal-

lation of clectronic navigational equipment would be

required to put

it in operational condition.

Current

docking and

paid.

routine maintenance costs are

not being

Efforts toumake commercial use of this boat have

not. been successful.

Thia boat is considered ideal for

activities which might be undertaken if there were a

base from which to operate, but under the present cir-

cunstances the expense which this boat represents is

not justifiable.

•It is recommended that consideration

be given to selling the CADELLO I if an opcrational

base ig not established within four months.

one Ke palary separtment ad to try ay a rambor

Boat Yard in Miami.

There are leaks in the hull.

The LANCHA AZUL®is in need of repairs, as well as trailer.

Repairs on

this boat are being given priority, and will

proceed as money becomes available.

d.

Informal discussions have been held with representatives-of

•'the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE, Students»

Revolutionary Directorate), and there is an "agreement in

'principlo" to coordinate future actions. There is no political

commitment.

9. In July JorgeMas Canosa,

chief of press and propaganda of representa-

Cuban en el Exilio (RECE, Cuban Representation in Exile),

proposed that the MDe enter into a pact with RECE, and indicated

that some members. of MDC waft be

offered full-time employment

preparing military plans

for the RECE. As of late July, no formal

agreement

had been reached.

Hernunde:, who feels that Ramon Font Saunell' lo incapable of formulating milltary

strategy, favors the formation of a pact between

the Mic and pect xgar which would

Font from proticipating in

the preparation of plans for milltary operations.

suld that he

slans to attempt the reorgunization of the military department of the

in a less important position than that which he currentl

MDC in order to replace Barbelte

occupies.

position in the department.

"he departmenta present position to an unport dea

11.-. In early June Ignacio Valladares Rodriguez? /expressed a desire

to participate in action

against Cuba with the MDC.

Barbeite

agreed to inform Valladares when an operation is/to be carried

out.

Before Valladares

left Miami on 6 June for'Dover, New

Jersey,

he said that within a month he would send a 57mm recoil-

- less rifle, a 50-caliber machine gun, and an unstated number of

M-1 and Garand rifles.

His address in Dover is Dover Cliff

Apartnerts, apartment 21.

CCNFIDENTIAL

CONTROLLED DISSEM

NO FORETEN DISSEM

---

## Page 33

14-00000

CONFICEITIAL

CONTSOULEC DISSEM

NO FORIIS: DISSEN

- 4-

0ri28-66.)

9.

10.

UFG - 8473

1.

Scurce Comment.

At the tize of his departure, Batista told

the executive.

committee that he was going directly to Caraças,

Venezuela.

It was not until after his return that it was

learned

that he had not gone to Caracas or to Guatemala as

he had planned.

He later explained that while he was in

Puerto Rico he telephoned his relative in Guatemala and was

infored that the latter had "failed in his efforts."

Field Comment.

Presumably he was referring to an interview

with President Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro which Batista

_NEX-22251 M0 or

had earlier said had been arranged by his

cousin::: (Cf.

3. Headquarters Coment: In early August 1964, Folch was reported to

have been in charge of Dominican xidxtor Armed Forces aid in a

xe caching operation for Cuban exiles in the lonte Cristi area.

TDCS-314/01722-66. In PRESPE#-/0079d.66, Another source reported

tad in Séptember 1964 approximately 30 Cuban exiles were taking

training at alcamp neir Punta Presidente(N 19-47, W 71-46) lie :

TocSDd.31190746.60f6.1i004i181010l10k

4. The location of the house was riot given.

5.

Source Comment.

The document, as originally drafted, was

modified because Barbeite felt that the tone was too strong.

Also, the amount of money raquested was reduced to $10,000.

Field Comment.

An earlier report from the same source

reported that the document was being prepared,:

$75,000 would be requested. ICS. UEG 8322) 2 2u-sifoinirai)

Field Comments.

6.

The CADELLO I (FL 7579 F), an 83-foot boat,, is a former

U.S. Coast Guard patrol boat. The boat yard referred to

is the Syncrolift Boat Yand on Stock Island which is owned

by Mike Brito:

Key hest and Boca Chica.

194932

The KYA-ORA, or XIA-ORA, has Florida registration FL 8665 E..

8..

The LANCHA AZUL has been described as a high-speed launch.

(Cf. 416-83275.

Besides the CADELLO I, the MDC has been

reported to own

the VICKY I, a blue V-23; the PUNCHIN CHIA

(FL 9256 SC), a 33-foot boat; and BERNARDO II.

Font is chief of military operations of Comandos L, which

has an alliance with RECE.

COP. UFG 842392505 25/02202 44)

Valladares arrived in Miami on 27 May with weapons which

he gave to the MDC.

He offered to supply weapons to the

MDC and the Association of Veterans of the Bay of Pigs

(Brigade 2506).

CONFIDENTIAL

CONTROLLED DISSEM

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

---

## Page 34

IBI

29 Jure 46 New Gol

Re: moe

Iluse 66 Florida

Re: moc

secit

---

## Page 35

14-00000

BECRET

ChOS O1 S8A8104, JAPAVE

Chios, ViD

ADMIN/TYPIC

Station Illos on Cuban Countorrovolutionary and Elle Organizations

RITBRINCE: UPGT-18519, 31 May 1988

NO ATO FOCUTDINE VOLUDO VII Of SLO HDC I11O WHICH YOU SOLE

ofth tho rolerence for Headquarters to reviou as a samplo of a group

Of 80 11los vaich aro Do lOngOr Usaful tO the Statlos.

Leadquartors

approclaton your interost li' thla

aspect of recorde laprovonont,

considoring the nood sor rotrioval, but rould lito to doser a declalus:

UntIL IDENTITY, a SUBARK dEployoO

Bio 1s TeLlIng 5000 but 10 sou

ongagod 1n viltlay historical studies, can vial8 tho starlos to

survy those Lales vith othero.

IDENTITY plaNs tO VISIt JAVAVE sor severAl daya about the

ond of July to dire up and review certais rocords for triting a

history of tho station.

Thoralore; pa would like tho 80 background

11108 to bo left intact for bis vialt.

Altorraids a decision g111

bo sado on thair rottresent or ottor disposition.

3.

Il space for storing the lilos 1o critical to will autboriso

forwardiny them to leadquartors..

but vill profor your boldiug them

temporarIly to 1as1et with the biatorical rosoarch cirod abovo.

Claudo F. GOTTFRIED

AttAchient:

1. Identity, u/s/c

2. MOC E11O.

S-COS/ JNAYB, 0/att. 1 8 2

UEGS-8388

1-WH/RMO, w/stt.]

I-YR/C/ESEC, w/att. I

p/att.1

1-Historical

TH/RMO

NOEL C. HILSON/pap

CAH/C/CA/pP

CAH/C/CA

STEPHEN G. CHACONAS

---

## Page 36

IDENTITY

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHUNT

TO U7G9-8398

• paul Loob

...

=-1

---

## Page 37

14.0000

ABI

Nuani, Ila.

3 June 44

Re: noc Confidentire

---

## Page 38

14-00000

io

i9.010.

то онее но.

zil.

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SECRET

акт.

TO BRANCH. O

Ojis.

IMiANKE

File

DC

UMI!

ACTION

ліна

& RID COPY

nice Dooreo Drones

me alba, cai, calecas, salad, ciliaz, FI,Elluet, WHE

REPROD: "" ICTE

FRCMIDITED

8p -

SECRET 219917Z

ТУРІС АММОР

REF A. MAVE e331(289790)*

B. DIR 75995

AMMOP-1, IDE!, DEPARTING MIAMI

023C H95 21 APPIL ON

PERUVIAN AIRLINE FLIGHT 55 TO ATTEND REF CONFERENCE•

SECRET

CFN 6321 003: 75535 AMMOP-I MIAMI OZDO HRS 21 PEPUVIAN 65

SECRET

---

## Page 39

14-00000

CLASSINY

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mi Ve, crOA, CAz, cAlPeOR, SAloA, alIcz, FI, ELlINT, WHB,

REPRODUCTION PROMIBIYCO

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LIMA INFO DIR CITS WAVE 2322

ТУРІС АММОР

REF WAVE 9321 (N00958)

IDEN: ERNESTO RODRIGUEZ DIAZ, MDC SECRETARY

FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.

SECRET

CFN 9322 0321 ERNESTO PODPIGUEZ DIAZ MDC

8T

SECRET

ACTION

---

## Page 40

14-00000

1or: 19119010-

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REPROCUCTID PROMIDITEO

0s.0

DA CERVE

LH S

ADVANCE COPI

( RID COPY

SDOM INTO DIS CITE WAVE €19A

DYVOUR ANTOP

1. ANCIE-D (IDENS CONTACTED EY DULCE DE LA MAZA

RODRIGUEZ, NIECE OF PRSC LEADER ANTONIO ROSARIO, HO

TRAVELEL THOUGH UNWAVE AREA. DE LA MAZA MAND CARFIED

LETTER TO ANCIE-I DATED 4 APSIL FROM FRANCISCO CORDOVA,

PSSC SECY OF INTL AFFAIPS, WHICH REQUESTED AMCRIP-I ARRANGE

FOR PURCHASE AD SHIPMENT OF IWO OR THREE USED CARS TO EE

USED FOR PRSC PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION ACTIVITIES IN DOMPEP.

LETTER WAS ACCOMPANIED WITH SIGER FOR PURCHASE AND

SHIPENT CC=T= OF CARS.

2. ANCSIF-I TELEPHONED SCSAGIO EVENING II APRIL TO

CONFIFE LETTER AND AGREED TO PROVIDE AID IN PROCUFLING CARS.

ROSARIO INFCAUSO ANCRIP-I THAT LE EXPECTED RECEIVE NOMI-

NATION AS PRESICENTIAL CANCIDATE OF PASC AT PARTY ASSEMELY

OH 17 APRIL AND STATED ¡E "OULD SELECT CESAR ESTRELLA AS HIS

RUINING MATE, SOSARIO ALSO INCICATED HE EXPECTED SOME

ELECTORAL SUPPORT FROI. UNSPECIFISD NUNGER OF APS NENDERS.

•SECÊET

is i

388

16Mh66267580

---

## Page 41

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

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•CFiNg

DI9A ANCRIB-I DULCE DE LA PAZA RODRÍGUEZ PRSE ANTONIO ROSARIO

INNAVE AMCRIP-I A FRANCISCO CORDOVA PRES -I PRSC DONGER :PAPA

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---

## Page 42

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REFS. LAVE 0194 (0 575022)

IDEMS JESUS ANGULO CLEMENTE, SECRETARY OF MOVIMIENTO

DEMOCRATA CRISTIANO SA CUSA•

SECRET

CF:: 0I95 JI3A JESUS HIGULO CLEMENTE MOVIMIENTO DEMOCRATA

SRISTIANO CUBA

586268

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---

## Page 43

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AMCRIB-I RECEIVED AIR TICKET THRU IDEN EFFORTS AND

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SECRET

METHIN BRIDEG-FIR

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---

## Page 44

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IDEN: JULIO MONCAGATIA

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CFNS 0168 8167 JULIO MONCAGATTA

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---

## Page 45

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## Page 47

14-00000

DISPATCH

SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MANNIO FOR INDLAINS

Chief, WH

Chief of Station, Santiago

NO IMOCTING REQUIRIO

CALY. QUALITIED CASA

CiN 'NOGI INDEXIMO

FROM

Chief of Station, IMWAVE i!!

SUEUECT

AMMOP/Operational

• AMMOP Circular Letter to Identity A leaders and Organizations

ACIRN REQUIRED. REFERENCES

AR : FYI

REF:

WAVE 9754

•1.

As indicated.in reference,

the AMMO? organization on

15 March 1966 sent a circular letter based on Fidel Castro's

13 March speech to Identity A individuals and cranizations.

the letter, which was signed and composed by ArMOp/l and which

was accompanied by transcripts of the speech, condemned Castro's

attack on Chilean President Eduardo Frei; requested support for

Frei's position; and asked the recipients

to join the struggle

maintained by the Cuban people to overthrow Fidel Castro and

prepare for the freedon of

Cuba from Communisn.

2.

The youth

wing of the 1440P group, headed by AMCRIB/i,

mailed a letter to its Identity A youth contacis based on the

13 and 20 March speeches by Fidel Castro along the lines cited

above.

Included in this letter were the strong anti-Castro

staterents made by Identity

B. Copies of both letters are for-

warded under separate cover.

3. According to A'NOP/l, his letter was reglayed by FUSEE

and was the basis for an article in a Santiago newspaper by

Identity C.

quashinee

Philip

ELMARD

A.

B.

Attachments:

Identities -u/sc...ri

Cys of Ltrs - u/sc.:r:

Distribution:

"3

- WH/C

wlatts

3=

COS

- C/WA

Santiago watts - Trait fovel

- w/atts -

*Please

furnish HOS file Number

CROSS REFERENCE TO

Is turt

DISPATCH SIRABL ANO ALMARIS

UFGA-24893

DARE

APRI

7956

31 March 66

MS PLE NUMBER

SECRET

---

## Page 48

g

E T

To WH C

I U/sc att

#A to

UFGA-24893

IDENTITIES: A.

Christian Democratic Party

B. Alfredo Lorca

C. Jorge

Roman

GRILPT

Exclecté trema aureralle

Ce SILE

SECRET

83 60r1

8:10. 1:6:t.-+:43

---

## Page 49

1a:z0 15 de 1900

Estimaào democratacristiano:

Después de locr una copia literal del discurso pronuncia-

do jor Castro, en la escalinata de la Universidad de La Habana, el

pasado 13 de marzo, me considero obliguão con el Gobierno, el Par-

t1ão Demócrata Cristiano y el

mente atacados por Castro durante el transcurso de su alocución, a

22223

expresar mi opinión con relación a dicha ofensa.

Digo obligado, porque el hecho de ser democratacristiano

cubano, integrante de

esa gran comunidad de seres humanos que un

¿ía se dieron a la tarea de realizar una revolución en libertad y

que lamentablemente vicron tronchadas sus aspiraciones al compro-

bar que las mismas eran ahogadas por la sangre vertida en los pa-

redores de fusilamientos por héroas cono Porfirio Ramirez, Presi-

dento de la FeU

de la provincia de Las Villas en Cuba y el Dr.Hum

berto Sori Marín, Comandante del Sjército

Rebelde y autor de la

prinera Ley do Reforma Agraria: debe servirme de experiencia para

expresar lo que pienso decir a través de estas lineas. Digo obli-

jado, porque en igual forma que nosotros hemos pedido en múlti-

ples oportunidades, colaboración y solidaridad

con nuestra lucha,

solicitud que lamentablemente no ha sido

respondida por algunos,

ricgando unas veces desconocimiento y otras imputándonos incom-

prensili con al "proceso revolucionario" que se está llevando a

cabo en Cuba, no queremos que en esta oportunidad en que son los

compañeros chilenos los que necesitan de ruestra solidaridad, va-

lanos a encontrar a alguien que por desconocimiento, no se decida

= respaldar públicamente al Gobierno, Partido y pueblo de Chile

en la actitud cívica y valiente adoptada frente a las ofensas ex-

presadas por Castro durante su discurso, entre las cuales trans-

cribimos las siguientes:

"A decir verdad, siempre he cieido que

Frei es un representante de la burguesía chilena, que su gobier-

no es un gobierno de la burguesía. Jamás he creido que Frei vaya

a hacer ninguna revolución"

.... pusteriormente, al referirse a

los sucesos provocados por los comunistas en la mina de cobre del

Salvaror conde murieron varias personas dijo: "Frei es un reaccio

Frei ha demostrado con este hecho, no ser un individuo de

irme, sinó un individuo cobarde, que abusa del podes.......

922927

---

## Page 50

14-00000

2

Frci la demostrado ser un mentiroso. Frci ha denostrado ser un po-

litigiero vulgar que para justificar su sanguinario gesto, trata

de culpar a la Tri-Continental. Frei se desermascara. Frei demues-

¿te di pueblo de Chile y al mundo qué tipo de revolución es la

que va a hacer, qué tipo de gobierno es el que va a llevar adelan-

ic. Es decii.

no una revolución sin sangre, sinó una política de

sargro sin revolución; sangre sin revolución, esa es la política

de Froi, sangre sin revolución.

ese es el gobierno de Frei, sanyre

sin rivolución, esa es la política de la Alianza para el Progreso".

Después de estas expresiones, no podemos menos que salirlo

al paso a Castro y a la camarilla que desgobierna hoy a Cuba, e

instar y pedir mayor colaboración con los patriotas que hoy ofren-

can sis vidas por liberar a Cuba, a fir de evitar no solo la con-

tinuada masacre de cubanos que se lleva a cabo en la Isla, sino

tambion ponerle fin a todos estos.

incidentes bochornosos para la

historia, en los que

aparece un cubano, ofendiéndo públicamente

ante el mundo a un Presidente, a un Partido y a un pueblo que a

contrario sensus de lo que él

esta haciendo en Cuba, sí está rea-

lizando una revolución en libertad, sí ha defendido en todo momen

to el sano nacionalismo, sí se ha puesto de frente cuantas voces

las circunstancias lo han requerido a los oligarcas y explotado-

IES.

Para terminar, sólo me queda reiterarle, que en nombre de

la solidaridad. que une a todos los demócratacristianos, exprese

públicamente, su deseo de colaborar con la lucha que mantiene el

puebla cubano por derrocar al castrocomunismo y poder realizar en

Cuba, una verdadera revolución en libertad, asf como

a la ¿ctitud asumida por el Gobierno,

el Partido Demócrata Cris-

tiano y el pueblo chilero en los actuales momentos.

Pendiente de su atención y respuesta y dejando constancia

de mi mayor consideración, quedo suyo

cordialmente.

Ernesto Roar iguez

Sec. de Relaciones/ Internacionales del

MDC de Cuba

---

## Page 51

14-00000

SECRET

JUYENTOS

FEROCRATA-GRISTIANA DE CUBA.

1732

н.x.

780

S8.

v.s.d.

Miami, Marzo 17 de 1966

Estimaso compañero:

La JDC de Cuba,

fiel al pensamiento de nuestro Apostol

José Vastí que dice: "ver en silencio un rrimen es cometerlo", no

ha guirido marginarse del daño que Castro quiere hacerle a la

Revolución en Libertad, que está realizando el Presidente Eduar-

ão Frei, su Gobierno y el Partido Demócrata Cristiano de Chile.

consciente de que es posible que no te hayan llagado

nuchas

de las informaciones relacionadas con los innobles ata-

ques públicos de Castro a Frei y su Gobierno, Calificándo al Pre

siderie de "representante de la burguesía chilena"

• "reaccionario".

"mimaio dei imperialismo yanqui ! guardián de sus intereses en

Chile'.....etc. Hemos querido carunicarte, no sólo los ataques de

Castro a Frei, sino una de las muchas respuestas que se le han

dado : castro. Nos referimos a la que en dias pasados hiciera el

Diout-so Damócrata-Cristiano Chileno, Alfredo Lorca y que a cor-

tinuación transcribimos "Realmente, Fidel Castro es un caso dig-

-o de milisis. Hace pocos dias atrás, segun expresaron diputa-

¿os qie estuvieron en Cubá, Castro dijo que Frei era un gran Pre-

sidente. agregó que si el hubiera

estado en Chile, habría hecho

lo misto que Frei.

Pero ahora, porque se le ha tocado la epidermis de la

Tri-Continental, Frei se transforma en un Castro Cualquiera.

jo estuve en cuba -añadio Lorca- en 1959 cuando Castro

sabió al poder. En esa ocasión le pregunté al ver a tantos hom

ares armados, si pensaba reorganizar al ejército. Y él me contes-

tó, con eso modo tan tropical, "chico, armas para qué cuando se .

tiene aà pueblo".

s¿. embargo, -añadió. Loca- en los siete años que fidel

=1 pueblo detrás de él, arda mas armado que un militar en

guerra. En Chile, todos los Presidentes que yo recuerdo, los

casa del mañana. ..

Ademocrata-Cristiana

---

## Page 52

14-00000

radicales,

el Sr. Ibarez, el Se. Alessandri, el propio Se. Froi.

han recorrido todo el pais sin gendarme, ni pistoleros a suoldo

que utiliza Castro.

so se puede docir que Frei sea un cobarde, un mentiroso

y un élagota como Fidel Castro afirma - ajudio Lorca-. En cambio

El csin rciguardado por metralletas y no puede dormir, ni se lo

coroce comicilio dijo porquo los hijos de los muertos en el pare-

dós le tuscan. Además -puntualizó Lorca- vale la pena

destacar que

radie se ha ido de Chile. En cambio, es público y notorio que más

de 300 500 personas han huido del paraiso fidelista. Y me atrevo

a pena:= que si Fisel Castro diera libertad a quienes quieren ir-

se de Cisa,

se quedarla solo con sus barbas y su hermano Raúl,

porcile camilo Cienjuegos ya no está. Dicon que se cayó de un avión.

Finalmente, Lorca recordo el caso del que fuera Presiden-

te de ica tribunales populares de Cuba, Sorf Marfn."Es un hombre

•Iritega:,, puro y extremadamerte justo", decía Castro de él. "Estoy

segure tie nunca condenaría a guien no mereciera la pena de muer-

los Escados Unidos. Resultado: hizo fusilar a ese hombre puro,

Integro s justo.".

Estas palabras, expuestas por el Diputado D.C. Alfredo

Lorca, señalando algunas de las muchas contradicciones de Castro:

ratifican una vez más lo que la JDC de Cuba a través de sus di-

rigortuz, le ha venido diciendo a toda la juventud demócritacris-

tiara se trérica y que hoy, con más fuerza y moral que núnca nos

permite pedirte en rombre de la solidaridad que nos unc, que ex-

porgas pisticamente

tu respaldo a la Revolución en Libertad que

viene ¿calizando el Pueblo, Gobierno y Partido Demócrata Cristia

no de Chile así como tu colaboración a la lucha que mantiene el

por derrocar al castrocomunismo existente en nues-

tra Patria.

Consciente de que nuestra solicitud será escuchada por

tÍ, Y sejuros de que nos darás a conocer la atención que has de

presta-le, quedo a tu entera disposición

Graguili

Jesás Angulo

Presidente de la JDC de Cuba

---

## Page 53

4-00000

....

pen, Gers 010

31

A•REE TO PILE TO.O

P1.8810 O

260

SECRET

PERSON: UNIT NOTI

REPADOLCTION PECMISITIO

PP-

FROM

ACTION

JywAvE

¡ADVANCE COPY

UNIT

& RID COPY

FILE, VE, WHB, SAZ, CAPROR, CAL04, FI, FIlINE, CIlOA, aliCZ

SECRET 0A2230Z

five in. no.

Facin

DIR INFO LIMA QUITO CITE WAVE 0031 (INGHURST ACTING)

TYPIC ANMOP

REF A DIR 75895%

4Ar0 189790

# VAVE 903A 1N51776

1o AMCRIB-I ADVISED BY IDEN A THAT REF A LIMA CONFERENCE

SCHEDULED FOR 23-26 APRIL, PRECEDED BY YOUTH SEMINAR 15-22 APRIL.

2. AMCRIB-I MOPES OBTAIN TICKET THRU EFFORTS DE IDEN BO

IF NOT SUCCESSFUL, STATION PLANS FINANCE AMCRIB-I TRIP TO

ATTEND BOTH MEETINGS UNLESS ADVISED CONTRARY.

3a AMMOP INVITED IDEN C, 201-7,49991, FORMER WAVE ASSET

WORKING IN QUITO, ATTEND REF CONFERENCE AS MEMBER AMMOP DELE-

GATION. IF IDEN C ATTENDS, WILL PAY OWN WAY.

4. PLS NOTE AMCRIB-10 OF REF B SHOULD BE AMCRIB-I.

SECRET FLORIA CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIO ONGRESS SCHEONGO LiLIA

CFN 9031 75895-98,34 AMCRIB-I A A 23-26 APRIL 15-22 APRIL AMCRI3-1

B NOT SUCCESSFUL AMCRIB-I AMMOP C 201-719991 AMMOP C AMCRIE-10

B AMCRIB-1

BT

SECRET

---

## Page 54

4-00000

1408, Ores D 4o

CLASSIFE TO FILE DO.

PILE NO.

PILA RIDO ART. TO DOAUCH O

DESTROT

O s16.

TROM

ACTIO

INFO

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 6

26

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT MOTIFICO

TOTAL COPIIS

31

REPRODICTION PRGTIEITEO

Pp -

1110

EL

TA

& RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY

Douro Douro Oruseo

UNIT

TIME

BY

DIR INFO LIMA QUIT CITE WAVE OB32

4h06.89798

REF WAVE B231(IN 589798)

IDEN A. UIJDC

IDEN B. JULIO MONEAGAITA, JUDCA SECY, GEN.

IDEN C. JOSE M. ILLAN

SECRET

CEN 3A32 OB3I A VIJDO E JULIO MONEAGATTA JUDCA SECY GEN 6

JOSE M ILLAN

720227

BT

---

## Page 55

14-00000

SEPORT COVER SHEET

SECRET

JAWAVE

" Henly y" SLOMAN

Sylvia B. MONESTIER

11924T N0.

UFG-7960

o, 15. February_1966

SovaCE cover

AMIOT-245

FIELO DISTRIBUTI?"

¡ PROCESSIRE ACTION

COVER'SNEET

MADELO FOR INCENIP:G

NO

INCERING GLOUIREO

OPS DATA

REPORTED

SEPARATELY

cs

DISSEUINATION

PÉCS DISSCHINATION

INTRA-AGENÇY

- Hqs.

1 :- DCS

2 - Caraças

2

Lima

Santiago

Bogota

I - JHBAR

TYPIC

State

PBI •

I&NS

Customs

SOURCE:

AMOT-245. In DD-1769, 11 February 1966.

was received from AMCRIB-10, orally, on 14 February..

Field Comment 2

RID: No Index

Group 1:

Excluded from

Automatic Downgrading

and

Declassification'

1.2002

• 2.

IS COPY:

19 - 300-10

(20)

1467

U41

0011:0:08

deirions

---

## Page 56

14-00000

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

GRÀDING OF SOURCE: A: Covetiny riala

8: Unto reliable. • Ci fairie inio:'e

to sources ol doubitul honesty o spoil, rajaidless il thar coirpaienco).

¿sai rouicös).

A-PRÄISAL OF CONTENT: 1: CocCId Ly OTTerina

ui!sa..

Si Cannot do judged

• Not usualle rosabio

at ano reliablo sources

a Frivory trua 1 Possibly iroo. & Douttul & Probably:

.CONP IDENTIAL

CONTROLLED DISSEM

NO DISSEM ABROAD

COUNTRY Cuba

selected.

REPURT NQ..

SUBJECT @ Christian Desocratic Hovemont

to Hold Congress in Alaal,

24 to 27 february 1966

DATE OF REPORT

I5 February 1966

NO: PAGES

REFERENCES

DATE OF

INFO.

PLACE &

DATE: ACQ

SOURCE:

2.

Early February 1966

United States, MaRt

(2 to 14. February 1965)

TMIDT UNEVALUATEO INFORMATIDA

UFG-7.960

P0TENT4114

A nenber of a group of Cuban emigres-trained in the tochniques

of information collection. The group has providod useful

raports since 1961.

The Hovlalento Democrata Cristiano (HDC,

Christian Democratic

lovemont) In Hiani will hold a congress fron 24 to 27 Pebruary

Delegations of Christian Democrats Iron Venezugla, Peru,

Chile, Coloabla, and Germany will attond the congress.

The MDC 1s preparing to hold elections for positions on the

exocutive conalttee.

Field Comments:

I. The Eighth National Congress of the MDC was hold in Miami

from 19 to 21 February

1965.

Delegations from Puerto Rico

and Merico attended.

(Cf.

CSDB-312/00790-657

2.

Another source, tho is a member of the MDC, reported that

invitations had been extended to delegations from these

countries,

but that no replies have been received, except

from Paru, which only acknowledged receipt of the invitation.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONTROLLED DISSEY"

HO DISSEM ABROAD

SHOUP

arcinuication

DISTRIBUTION

GS COPY

---