CASE OF YURIY IVANOVICH NOSENKO, VOL III, PART 6.
Originator: CIA
Document date: 01/01/0000
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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CASE DE YURIY MANOWICH

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VI. Production

A Pesitive intelligence Ipformation

NOSENKO'S positive litelligence production.

has been

meager,

and nothing he reported acrited disseminition as an

intelligence report.

According to his blography, NOSENKO's

entire adult life until defecting had been spent

either as

& student or as an intelligence officer,

and in explanatios

of bis lack of positive intelligence infornation, he has

stressed that since the early 195D's he had few

outside

interests and "no real cuntacts" outside the lGE itself.*

NOSENKO's assignments to the Soviet delegations to the

Disarmament Conference in 1962 and 1954

were, he has said,

for cover purposes only, and he neither had

any connections

with officials or organizations

in

the USSR concerned eith

arns control or disarmament policies nor did he take any

part in the substantive work of the delegations.

During the period 18 to 23 Februaiy 1964, & wide range

of questions covering various aspects of nuclear

weapons,

missiles, electronics, communications, unconventional wea-

pons, military industry, military untts and equipment, and

rebearch and development were put to MOSENKO in order to

evaluate his knowledgeability.

He had no direct knowledge

of any of these topics,

although he was able to identify in

general a few

of the KGB orkanizations which protect sensi

tive instollations such as suclear weapons production and

storage sites.

NOSENKO was given a set of requirements

fron the Defense Intelligence Agency on 24 February 1964.

These questions were premised on his two TDY tours to the

Disarnament Conferences in Geneva; thuy dealt with such

matters as Soviet underground testing, Soviet efforts and

progress in the fields of chemical and biological warfare,

Soviet aims and purposes at the disarmament talks, and

Soviet views of the corresponding attitudes and intentions

of the United States.

NOSENKO stated he had us information

on any of these questions but expressed his personal opinion

on a few of them,

in general terms.

NOSENKO's answers to

other questions

of a positive intelligence nature--those

concerning the viability of the current Soviet leadership.

plans for a new Soviet constitution, anti-Semitisu as

governmental policy, personality data on Soviet lcaders,

and other political

and social matters--were couched in vague

and general terms and were not based on concrete knowledge.

*At the start of his first meeting with CIA on g June 1962,

however, when explaining how he knew of the real state of

affairs

inside the USSR

(as opposed to that presented by

Soviet propaganda), NOSENKO

"I circulate among

ministers, with the friends of my father, and I hear

what they say."

TOP SECRET

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40350000079

B. . Soviet Intelligence Personalities

As indicated in the accompanying tabulation, NOSENRO

has provided information on a total of approximately 1,000

Soviet citizens

tho are staff employees of, or have other-

wise been affiliated with; Soviet intelligence and security

organizations.

At the time NOSENKO defected, 64 of these--

51 officers and 13 agents or contacts--were abroad. Of the

51 oificers then abroad, 41 were already known or

suspected

of being Soviet intelligence officers.

KGB Staff Personnel

Leadership and administrative components

First Chief Directorate

Second Chief Directorate*

25

165

. 435

Third Directorate

Seventh Directorate

Eighth Chief Directorate

Ninth Directorate

Operational Technical Directorate

25

5

11

12

Border Guards Directorate

Republics nd Oblasts

Retired or deceased

Possible KGB officers

Total

74

55

12

830

KGB Agents

First Chief Directorate

15

Second Chief Directorate

116

KGB Trusted Persons, Cooptees

19

Tot primary use to First and Second Chief

Directorates)

Total KGB-connected

980

HOI NOSENKO'S intormation on 435 Second Chief Directorate

staff employees,

47 had been identified previously as KGB

officers.

Another 140 were identified by NOSENKO only by

last name, and he could provide no additional infornation

which might identify them further; most of these names were

of persons engaged in strictly internal economic, industrial

and political security activities.

Of the remaining 248,

NOSENKO's information on the majority of them is inadequate

for identifloation parposes if they should travel abroad.

TOP SECKET

1ly, 144

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GRU Staff Personnel

Current (1964)

Former

Suspect

Cooptee

14

7

Minute iAniniamia.a

Total

23

Total Soviet Intelligence Staffers and

Coopted

Agents

1003

The following is a tabular summary of NOSENKO'& 10for-

nation on First Chlef Directorate personnel (who are the ones

now abroad or likely

to be stationed abroad).

Total Identifiable First Chief Directorate Personnel: 146

(and 3 possible)

Previously identified:*

Previously suspect:

New Identifications:

103

9

37

Of whom:

No record of any travel abroad:

Not abadad since 1963:

6

7

After NOSFNKO defected, returned

prenaturely to USSR:

5

Were out when NOSENKO defected

or came out thereafter and re-

turned routinely

Deceased since NOSENKO's defection

1

Stationed abroad in December 1966 11

In sum, of the 37 First Chief Directorate personnel

newly compromised by NOSENKO's defection,

the time of his defection or have come abroad since.

*There are,

however, some conflicts between the reports by

NOSENKO and those by other Soviet sources on the KGB organi-

zational elements or specialties with which certain of these

officers (as well as some in the Second Chief Directorate)

are associated.

As with Second Chief Directorate personali-

ties,

the notation "previous identifications" does-not 1n-

clude those fron any Soviet sources subsequent to GOLITSYN.

TOP SEGRET

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352.

C. KGB Headguarters

1. Structure and Functions

Prior to NOSENKO's contact with CIA in June 1962, tho

nost recent information on KGB structure and functions had

been provided by GOLITSYN, whose information was current as

of December 1961 when he

defected.

GOLITSYN's data and that

from the Polish defector GOLENIENSKI wero the first detailed

new information on this subject available to the U.S. intel-

ligence community since 1954, when DERYABIN, RASTVOROV,

PETROV, and KHOKHLOV defected, just prior to the change-over

fron the Ministry of Internal

Affairs

(tVD) to the Committee

for State Security

(KGB).

GOLENIEWSKI and GOLITSIN had re-

ported on the 1959 reorganization of the KGB, the first major

realignment of the KGB's functions since the

abolition of

the Committee

for Infornation in 1951.

It encompassed

the

absorption into the Second Chief Directorate of the duties of

the

former

Fourth, Fifth

and Sixth Directorates. which had

been responsible for political, econonic-industrial, and

transportation security, respectively.

It also included the

upgrading of the Illegals Department to the status of a

Special Directorate within the First Chief Directorate, the

consolidation

of counterintelligence operations abroid into

one new department, the

Fourteenth, and creation of a new

department--Department "D" (Disinformation)--to .coordinate

and intensify the KGB's activities in the area of deception

and misinformation.

although placed in the First

Chief Dircetorate, was established to serve the needs of the

entire KGB.

NOSENKO's 1964 information on the organization and fune-

tions of the KGB indicated refinements of responsibilities

in the Second Chief Directorate in accordance with the 1959

absorption of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Directorates.

The formation of the so-called

"Service" (Sluzhbal as a

component of tle Second Chief Directorate centraTized those

political security functions (formerly handled by the Fourth

Directorate) which were unrelated to

foreigners in the USSR;

the creation of an element entitled "the Directorate" (Uprev-

accumplished the

same thing

for industrial-dconomic

functions formerly managed by the Fifth and Sixth Directorates.

As for the first Chief Directorate, NOSENKO reported the up-

grading of the Scientific and Technical Department to direc-

torate status, and the expansion of the Information and

Counterintelligence Departments to UService: Number:l" and "Ser-

vice Number 2,"

respectively; according to NOSENKO, the

latter organizational designation permits an increase in

personnel without a corresponding rise in the bureaucratic

level of the component.

The accompanying charts offer a comparison of the or-

ganization of the KGB in 1961,

as known from GOLITSYN (and

supported by GOLENIEWSKI),

and in 1964, as given by NOSENKO.

Comments on particular weaknesses in NOSENKO's information

on the KGB organization since its formation in 1954 will be

found in Part VII. B.l., Statements of DERYABIN.

TOP SECRET

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ISYN Information: December 1961

E Chief Directorate

sign Intelligence)

{:

A.M. SAM!AROVSKIY

ind Chief Directorate

nterintelligence)

1: 0.M. GRIBANOV

nirectorate of

order Troops

Secretariat

Third Directorate

Counterintalliger.ce

in Arted Forces)

fourth Directorato

lincorporated into

Second Chief Direc-

torate ca 1952)

Fifth Directorate

(incorporated into

Second Chief Direc-

torate ca. 1959)

Sixth Directorate

(Transport: incorpor-

ated into Second

Chief Directorate

ca. 1959)

Seventh Directorate

(Surveillance and In-

vestigation):

Eighth Directorate

(Cipher and decipher)

Ninth Directorate

(Protection of the

Government)

353.

USSR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

Committee

for State Security

Chairman: V.Ye. SEMICHASTNYY

Deputies: P.l. IVASHUTIN

A.I.

PEREPELITSYN

Colleat un

Party Committee

Technical Operations Directorate

Chief: (Enu) WILIN (sic: LYALIN)

Investigation Directorate

Supply Directorate

Personnel Directorate

Jepartment of Schools

Department for Collation

of Operational Experience

Department of Government

Communications

Commandant Department

pperational Registry

and

Archives Department

Finance Department

Ehekist Museum

Collegium of the

Chekist Journal

TOP SEGRET

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ENKO Information: January 1964

354.

USSI Council of Ministers

Committee for State Security

KGB

Chairman:

V.Ye. SEMICHASTNYY

Deputies:

N.S.

ZAKHAROV

A.I.

PEREPELITSYN

S.G.

BANNIKOV

L.I. PANKRATOV

Secrotariat

Chief: KISELEV

Chairman'& Group

Chief: V.S. BELOKONEV

at Chict Diiceforate

oreign Intelliyence)

of : 1.3. SAKHAROVSKIY

oris Chiet Directoratel

ternal Counterintel-

ligence)

af: P.M. GRIB/NOV

Directorate

mad forces Courter-

Intelligence)

LoL: I.A. FADEYKIN

seventh Dirtiterate

(Surveillance)

Chief: V.I. ALIDIN

Bigith Chiet Directorate

(Cipher-Communications),

Chief: S.N. LYNLIN

pparattonat-tecnical Directorate

Chief:

PATRUKHIN

KGB Higher School

Chiof: Ye.P. PITROVRANOV

TOP SEGRET

Ninth Directorate

IGuards -

"OKHRANA"

Chief: V.Ya. CHEKALOV

Chiet Directorate. of Border Guards

Chief: P.I. ZYRYANOV

InvesEigative Depur Ement

Chiof: N.F. CHISTYAKOV

Registry-Archives Department

Chief: A.V. PROKOPENKO

'CHEKIST Cabinet

Chief: A.M: • IVANOV

(Personnel Directorate

Chief: P.I.

VASILYEV

Administrative Directorate

(KhoZU)

Chief: A.D. CHETVERNYA

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## Page 8

ITSYN Information: Decombor 1961

Secretarint t

st Department

Inited States)

ef: B.S. IVANOV

ond Department

ngland, Scandinavia)

IL Department

ustria, riermagy)

ith Department

rance,

Italy, Holland

uxemburg,

Belgium,

witzerland,

Greece?)

ch Department

stin

America?)

th Department

frica?)

enin Departinent

ear Last?)

epariment

East?)

355.

KGB

First Chief Directorate

Chief:

A.M. SAKHAROVSKIY

Deputios:

(fRu) MORTIN

(fnu) KOTOV

Ninth Department

(Emigre)

Tenth Department

Scientific and Technical

Chief: L.R. KVASNIKOV

Eleventh Department

(Advisors)

Twelfth Department

Outlving Districts

Thirteenth Department

(Executive Action)

Chief:

RODIN € N.B. KOROVIN

Fourteenth Department

(Counterintelligenco)

Chief: V.M. KLIMKIN

Fifteenth Department

(Intelligence through other

agencies)

Sixteenth Department

(Information)

Party Committeet

Special Directorate

(Illegals)

Chief:

(Enu) KLIMOV,

e V.G. PAVLOV

Disinformation

Department

(Department

'D"')

Chief: 1.I. AGAYANTS

Communications Department

Editorial-Publishing

Department

Finance Section

Personnel Department

Registry and Archives

[lishor Intelligence School

I Language Courses

TOP SECRET

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NOSENKO Infornation: January 1964

Chief's Group

Special Directorate

(Illegals)

Chief: M:S. TSYMBAL

Directorate for Scientific-

Technical Intelligenco

Chiof: NOVIKOV

Servico No. 1

(Information)

Chiof: (may be L.R. KVASNIKOV

Service No. U

(Counterintelligence)

Chief: G.F. GRICORENKO

Departmen? "D"

(Disinformation)

356.

XGB

First Chief Directorate

(Foreign Intelligence)

Chief: A.M. SAKHAROVSKIY

Deputies:

F.K. MORTIN

V.V. MOZSHCHECHKOV

F.

KOTOV

V.G. PAVLOV

First

Department

(Unitod States

and Canada)

Chief: KULEBYAKIN

Second department

(United Kingdom, Scandinavia)

Chief: LITVINOV

Third Departnent

_(Austria, Germuny)

Fourth Department

(Western Europe, including

Greeco)

Fifth Department

_(Eastern)

Sixth Department

(possibly Latin America)

Chiof: S.N. ANTONOV

Seventh Department

_(includes india and Pakistan)

Eighth Department

_unknown

Ninth Departmont

(Emigres)

Eloventh Department

(Satellite Advisors)

TweTfth Department

(may no longor exist)

Thirteenth Department

(Terror, Assassination and

Sabotage)

Chief: L.A. STUDNIKOV?

Fifteenth Department

(Cover Organizations-

Moscow)

Chief: Ye.T. YELISEYEV

Special Group

(Chinese)

Chief: N.A. VLADYKIN

Operational Registry

Dopartmont

Chiof: P. ZAYTSEV

TOP SECRET

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TSYN Information: December 1961

357.

KGB+

second Chief Dirnctorate

Chief: O.M. GRIBANOV

torate

for the Security

he Foreign Diplomatio

Inited states Dopt.

ingland Dipt.

Ithers.

Secretariaa

First

Dopartment

(united States)

Chiel: S.M.

FEPOSPYEVI

Sccond Department

(England; possibly

Canada and the

Cormonwealth!

Third Department

(Austria, Germany,

Scandinavia)

Fourth DupirEment

(Other European coun-

tries--France, Italy

Switzerlard, Greece,

other::; Scandinavia un-

til ca. 1960)

Fifth Department

(The East; probably

treaty organization

countries,

Iran, Tur-

key, Thailand)

Sixth Department

(The East; probably non-

treaty organization

countrien)

Party Conmittee

Seventh Department

(Visiting Tourists

and Businessmen)

eighth Department]

(Investigations)

Ninth Department

(Soviet Delegations

and Tourists)

Tenth Department

(Counterintolligence

among

the Intelligensia

and

visiting Delegations:

crcatud ca. 1959)

Fleventh Department

(Nationalists; created

ca. 1959)

Iwerth Department

(Economic Enterprises;

created ca. 1959)

Thirteenth Department

(created ca. 1959)

Fourteenth Department

(Transport; created

Ca.

1959)

Fifteenth Department

(Collation of Second

Chief Directorate

Counterintelligence

Experience)

Sixteenth Department

(Struggle against

Contravand; createa

1960)

Personnel

TOP SECRET

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SENKO Information: January 1964

secretariat

Chief: V.V. PETROCHENKOV

irst Department

(U.S. and Latin America)

hief: S.M. FEDOSEYEV

econd Department

(U.k. and Commonwealth,

including Canada)

hie.t: G.V. BONDAREV

• Ird Department

(Germüny, Austria, Scan-

dinavia)

hief: N.P. NOVIK

oural Department

(Western

Euroy)

hief: Y.G. POVAROV

ifth Department

(East:

Turicy,

Iran,

Israel,

hicf:

Japan)

A.P.

DAVIDYAN

1xih Departinent

(Afghanistan, Africa,

India, all others)

hief: N.N.

DUBAS

358.

KGB

Second Chief Directorate

(Internal Counterintelligence)

O.M. GRIBANOV

Asst. to Chief:

MOLITOSLOVOV

Secy. to Chief: Ye. S. KIRPICHNIKOV

Deputies: F.A. SHCHERBAK

F.D. BOBKOV

I.A. MARKELOV

KARDASHEV

Seventh Departnent

(Foreign

Tourists)

Chief: A.G. KOVALENKO

Tighth Department

(Analysis and Machine Records)

• Chief:

V.M. KCPYTOV

Vinth Department

(Students and

Satellite

Liaison)

Chief: P.V. TOPTYGIN

Tenth Department

(Intelligentsia, Foreign Cor-

respondents,.

and Ministry of

Foreign Affairs)

Chiet:

Ye.N. ALESHIN

Eleventh Department

(Soviet Travellers Abroad)

Chief: T. ZHARIKOV

Twelfth Denartment

(Speculants,

Embezzlers,

Foreign Air Lines)

Chief: K.Z. DRAGUN

Special Sectio

Technical Support.

Chief: N.A. GAVRILENKO

Directorate of Second Chief

Directorate Industrial Security

Chief: K.I. MAKAROV

Service uf Second Chief Direc-

torate

(Political Security Control)

Chief:

KARDASHEV

Personnel Group

Chief:

V.I. KUDREV

Finance Group

Chief:

KOLOSOV

TOP SEGRET

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359.

2. Modus Operandi

Less measurable or precise in comparison with kob

structure and functions are the operational methods and

Headquarters proceduros of the KGS.

JOSENKO himself has not

been

as productive in revaling Tourist Departurnt rethods

as

was the document which he provided on this subject in

1964•

He has not been

able to pro:ide a systonatir, detailed,

or documented review of the methods of the other second Chiet

Directorale compenunt to

which h. was assigned,

the u.s.

Enbassy Sectior, not of the nothods of the Surycillance

Directorate with wiich he worked closely.

JOSESKO neverthe-

less has

furnister insignts into the U.S. Enbassy Section

and Surveillance Dirictorate methods in the course of dis-

cussing specific operators.

VOSENKO brought to Ini: Gunera muerings

in 1964 a draft

of a report to the Colligium of the KGB dated March 1963 on

the work of the lourist Department of ibe Second Chief Direc-

torate.

Ile claimed to nave

written st hinself, and it bore

corrections

in his handwritirg.

This draft descrihed KGB

investigations of

and operations against lestern tourists

suspected of being agints of forcign intelligence services,

primarily in the periud oi 1961-1922.

functiors of rach

conpon.nt of the Tourist lepartment and

the number ard qualifications of the operational staff,

giving figures on length of service, educational background,

foreign travel and languages, and training.

It

wrnt on to

cite

statistics on the

number of foreign tourists visiting

the l'SS?,

and

the number of foreign agent susprets uncovered

among them through the

work of the KCB.

A wido variety of

techniques used by the Tourist Departrent were mentioned,

with examples of certain successes

interspersed in the

discussion.

On cho hasis of the detail on

techniques and

modus operandi set torch in this report, ClA prepared the

study entitled 'KGB work Against foreign Tourists" which was

diss+minated to the U.S. intellignce community in June 1964.

Aside from the case examples

which were added as illustrative

materiai, derived from

the many reports

from

Americans who

wern targets of such klib operational artivity, this study

drew alnost exciusivoly on the material discussed in the

NOSESKO document.

The study received high evaluations from

all

recipients.

NOSENKO has

made numerous references to the techniques

described in this report,

as discussed in the many

cases

reviewed in detail in tne foregoing treatment of his KGB

career.

then interviewed for further information on the

statistics which appear throughout the 1963 draft, however,

NOSESKO was unable to identify the oporations leferred to in

the numerical citations, nor those included as illustrative

examples of operational techniques, with one exception.

exception

was the example of the use of the concealed trans-

mitter "N-EkSIRA" in

the Restaurant Praga to monitor an

attempt by an American

intelligence officer to recruit a dip-

lomat of one of the neutral countries; this

was identified

by NOSENKO as the incident involving

the Indonesian

attacke ONGO, discussed in detail in Part VI.I.7.b.*

#IT VOSENRO is correct in identifying this as the ONGKO case,

the reference is to a recruitment effort on

the part of an

American Embassy officer, not a tourist operation.

TOP SECRET

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## Page 13

пок 360.1

other eccaniong, when thie deport moe me arella de lee Hila

NOSE:KO could not provide as much detall un second Chief

Directorate operational techniques and methods as is con-

tained in the written report.

The document refers also to the role of the leadership

of the Tourist Department in briefing other organs of the

KGB on work against foreign tourists.

NOSENKO was questioned

on this activity but ould

any infornation contained

in such lectures or discussions.

Although the document also

emphasized the daily need for coordination of the Tourist

Departnent activities with numerous other components of KGB

Headquarters and with local organs of the KGB throughout the

Soviet Union,

NOSENKO was unable to explain how such coordina-

tion was effected in practice, nor could he describe require-

ments for the preparation and

approval of correspondence

pertaining to such coordination; in many instances he asserted

that telepnone calls sufficed, but he said he could not indi

cate who was authorized

to coordinate informally in this way.

Apart from this information on Tourist Department modus

operandi, NOSENKO has described the operational methods or

the V.S. Envassy Section of the Anerican Department and of

the Surveillance Directorate in connection with their coordinated

activities against Embassy targets.

Uf particular note is

Part V.F.3.c., in discussions of operations against Embassy

code clerks.

3.

Staff Procedures

In recounting various operations

in which he participated

or which ne supervised, NOSENKO described operations and

events which encompassed various KGB procedures.

these were:

authorization for recruitment; file checks;

correspondence and coordination with other KGB departments,

directorates, or regional units; technical support of opera-

tions; adainistration of safe houses; KGB files

and travel authorizations and accountings.

to time asked to describe such procedures systematically and

in detail.

From such questioning it was not possible to

derive any detailed picture of current KGB procedures.

little NOSFNKO was able to provide did not differ from infor-

mation dated 1954, and was only a small fraction of the lutor-

mation available from earlier sources.

He had no information

on changes or developments in the interim.

Examples of the

level of NOSENKO's knowledge of certain procedures may

found 1n Part VII.B.1, DERYALIN'S Conments, as may instances

of inaccurate reporting of procedures.

TOP SECRET

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## Page 14

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D. KGB Activities

1. Operations Against Americans

In the context of iGA recruitment operations and investigations,

NOSENXO has mentioned 111 Americans:

Forty-nine

of them were said

to have been recruitedith the kGB; investigations

33 were under development, and

seven rei

fused to collatorate

remaining 22 erisans were reportedly predicated on KGB sus-:

picion or knobledge of inelr afillation with U,S. Intelligence.

Of the 49 Americans

edge of nine of them

to

recruited, noSENKO attributed his knowl-

his

owr direct, personal irvolvement in

the approaches, usually

as recruiting officer;

these cases are

discussed at greater

length in connection with SOCaNKO's KGB

career (Part.:;.

His knowledge of 11 other recruitments

was said

to have derived irom

either indirect involvement or contact with

the targets of these operations; NOSENKO indicated that he be-

came aware of these il persons

through his duties at various times

in the America: and

Tourist Departnents of the KGB Second Chief

Directorate.

(recause of interest in Americar correspondents

during 1954

and 1955 while in the American Department, for exam-

ple,

he was able to report that five of then were XGB

agents, al-

though he had taken

no part in their

recruitments, which had

been

achieved earlier; likewise,

he learned

of two recruitments when

an ATerican Department officer twice visited the Tourist Depart-

ment with a request for operational assistance during 1962 and

1963, when NOSENKO was a Deputy Chief of this departnent.) In

four

cases--äll First Chiel Directorate operations--NOSENKO said

he lcarned

the recruitments unofficially

from discussions with

friends and fron remaris by other case officers which he over-

heard.

Two of these

four cases were considered by NOSENKO to be

among his most significant information,

the penetration of the

Orly Courier Transfer Station by U.S. Army Sgt. Robert Lee JCHN-

SON and the recrüitment in Moscow and later handling of code-

machine mechanic Dayle W. SMITH; detailed information on the

JOHNSON

and

SWITH

cases is

presented after the tabulation (below)

of NOSENKO'S Anerican leads.

NOSENKO has provided no sources for his information on 25

of the 49 successful jGB recruitment operations against Aneri-

cans, although he has sonetimes identified the case officers in-

volved in them; most of this information was contained

in handwritten

notes, which

NOSENKO carried

to Geneva

in 1964.

According to NOSENKO,

• he learned of these cases casually while Deputy Chief of the Tour-

ist Department during 1962 and 1963; many of the recruitnents were

said to have been accomplished in 1960 and 1961 at a time when

NOSENKO was serving in the American Department.

He has explained

these notes as follows:

"If I did not participate in a case. I

don't know much about it.

Please understand me.

Since 1962

when

I first began to get ready for this act (defection), any time

got a whiff of sonething which smelled like an agent, I would

put

it down. I have a regular safe in my office and then I have a

hidden wall safe.

There I may put my personal

papers, notes.

÷1

am the only one who has a key and any little notes, like those

mentioned, I would put in there."

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 15

14-00000

The tabulation below presents NOSENKO's American case leads

under the categories of successful recruitment approaches,* de-

relopnent operations, unsuccessful recruitment approaches,

KGB investigations,.

in that order:

within each of these cate-

gories, the tabulation suenarizes NOSENKO'S information the re-

sourcing and the year he reported the lead to CIA,

sults of investigations of the NOSENKO leads by U.S. and other

lestern security

services.

As indicated in the tabulation, cer-

tain cases are discussed in greater detail elsewhere in this

* This tabulation also

was recruited by

Part VI.D.2.a.

includes one

agent, John A. SHUBIN

GRU, thus bringing

the total listed in

TOP SEGMET

---

## Page 16

Tabulation of Ancrican leads

Succee. to keeruitment ApProaches

1.ead

TOK/CKOCTOK:

(N0Sld0 has given

SEN TATETTE and PROCTOR

illous occasions.?

A valuable First

1el Mireitorsic agent whe travelled

'ertly to mostern turope, where lic

taino: a visa from Soviot contaits

went on to the USSk clandestirely.

-BRECHT. Nelson Charles: Born 1938

rital by tho

T1.5

CITIZON TO-

scriets in 1000 en

le la:it it compromisits

material;

gain visircd the UsSi in 1901 and

old follow tourists

he was de.

by the Soviets in 1960 for

rachuthereering.

IRRFIT

chert: a guide at the

•5. Mainition in Moscow

IRRETT

in

1959,

was trapped in homoscreal

spromise by agents VOlkot and

EFRENON, WhOM NOSLNKO handled.

nough resulting photographs were

figood mality, i moratorium had

een inpred

on

approaches at the

shibition bacause of KRUSHCHEY'S

lanned irip to the United States.

ane photographs vero used suc-

essfully to recruit BARRETT when

streturned with another exhibit

2001.

363.

Sourcing and Date of Report

Tourist lepartmint officer v.N. NOS-

of the case from

identified first Chief Directorate

officer.

and he reported it to NOSENKO.

(1961 notes)

Source not named.

Recruited by Tour-

isi deparimont during period NOSENKO

in American department.

(1964 notes)

Learned of compromise in 1959 through

personi!

intolvement is

responsible

officer and handlor of homo-

scrual agonis.

Source for informa-

sion concerning subsequent recruitment

nol giron, (1961 notes)

....

Investigation Resul:?

Onc Vernon

PROCTOR travelled to

the Soviet Union during the suncer

of 1963.

Investigation cunthialog.

BARKETT reporied his compronise

recruitment

the FBI in Junuary:

1962, immediately after his

io the United

States; claimal to das

drugged at

tine of conpronlic.: sco

V.D.4.m. for details::

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 17

ANSTOCK,

Natalie:

Recruited by

c NoB during i Tood visit to the

5R, with full knowledge of che

Bi that she was an American Intel-

sence agent; case turned over to

epariment D," and if she returns

the

USSR

an effort will be made

break her;

KGB Knows of her

le in the AlS attempt to contact

• soviet ballerina Natalia SLAVA-

EVSKAYA.

SCHES, diam:

Born in 1896; has

latives in

the USSR and was re.

siteù on idcological grounds

ile there with a tourist group

September 1960.

364.

Source not named. A Tourist Depart-

ment case.

officers were K.G.

KRUPNOV and A.G. KOVALENKO.

(1964

notes)

source not nancu.

Tourist Department

case while NOSENKO in American Depart-

ment.

(190% notes)

r"i."

NOSENKO's information

on BIENSTOCK'S

part in the AIS approach to SLAVA-

CHEVSKAYA is correct.

RIENSTOCK con-

fessed in July 1969 to recruitment

during

tourist trip to Moscow in 1962

and to clandestine contaces wich XGB

upon return to USA; she claimed all

contact was broken

in late 1962 or

early 1963, at Soviet initiative.

Born in 1890; has a brother Alerzader

born in 1890.

GOLITSYN repurted that

Tourist

Department

officer told him in

1960 that Adam BROCHES had been Soriot

agent in 1920's and 30's in Parix under

V.M. ZARUBIN,

then

an Illegal; as

guide for MAUPIN Tours visited USER

two or more times in 1959 ar 1900

via Finland; KGB knew of his history:

as Soviet agent, but suspecind nis

• visits to USSK might be cover for

American Intelligence opcratios

dinod

at effecting contact with zanurln:

KGB placed BROCKES under intensite

surveillance, and the Chief of Trus-

ist Department was planning

1619;

cuss with ZARUBIN what

done about

BROCHPE rOY

by FBI; T

TOP SECRET

• i-

---

## Page 18

INDANIN

inu:

Born in 1017 and

So?

emiere; has

gruered on 1002 on idcologiel

ounds; was in employee of the

our Kinds Travel Agency" in New

rk City but left it; case is in-

give, but the KGB is waiting

for

open his own travel agency.

IRGI. Richard: Recruited in dicy in

ó onTasty

homosexual

compromise

NOSINKO and Neputy Chief of tie

urist lepartrent,

A.S. KOZLOV.

ING1 is a professor at Yale Un1.

Accruitment historle-

ly significant as it was first

recessiul approach by

Tourist De-

rtment, established in 1955.

LEW

Gorge: Visiting the USSR

Ta tocrist in 1959, DREN was

otted as a honosexual by YO-

"NO's agents WOlKOV and YEFRE-

DV. NOSENXO recruited DREW in

ningrad on basis of homosexual

mpromise stagod with assistance

Ela homosexual agent of the local

iB in leningrad.

PISON, Henry: U.S. citizen of

ruenian origin; recruited in

pril 1963 by the KGB of the Ar-

chian SSR; recruitment based on

deological

grounds but not firm;

scheduled

to return to the

SER in 1901, at which ime che

3t.5.

Source not named.

Tourist lepartment

case landled by

Vitaly Grigorevich

DERA. (1904 notes)

Eugene

Peter

BUNDARIN,

1917,

is

the

boro is 80811

son

of

travelled to

the

Soviet Inset

day's in 1962; employed by

Travel Agency"

from

727211

April 1902,

when

he

abroad; now

working

Inc

California

15I1

for flares

Personal involurment as responsi.

ble case

officer and

handler of

homosexual agents.

(1962)

debriefed by ful

TOP SECRET

Personal involvement:

Agents

reporter!

to NOSENKO who made the

approach. (1962)

DREW reported the incident to

FRI

Source not named. Tourist Depart-

ment

case.

(1964 notes)

Henry APISSON, a naturalized U.S.

citizen visited the USSR in 1965

and planned to return in 1964; 0w18

3 hotel and restaurant near lest

interviewed in 1964

pod admitted contacts with soviets

, Зі А

in Armenia; said he may have givon, act

---

## Page 19

KGB will accompt to consolidato

the relarionship; has access to a

military installation in the New

York suburbs.

FRIPPI, Arsene:

Ancrican Express

Company

representative in Moscow

recruited bo NOSENKO and V.D.

CHELsONov, deputy Chief of the

Four parent emperis en

basis heterosexual compromise..

NOSENKO handled FRIPPEL until he

he later returned with

groups. Unpreductive agent:

GROVER

Preston: Currently Asso-

crater Press

correspondent in

Mos-

com; 18y reiruited KGB agent.

BARKIS

Cisulia: An employce of

the Aerican Txpress Company in

Salt Lake City, HARRIS visited

the USsR is i tourist in 1958 and

wis recruited hy NOSENKO on basis

of her romantic involvement with

sovici ma!e.

Case turned ovcr

to First Chief Dirertorate and

NOSENKO unnware of subsequent

developments.

366.

Personal

involvement:

Took part in

recruitment

and was later handling

officer.

(1902)

source not named.

ment case.

(1954)

A Tenth Depart-

Personal involvement as recruiting

officer.

(1964)

impression of willingness

Soviets in

Usd if they sirould visit

West Point; said he did not roal.

ize the approach was for intelli.

gence purposes:

American Express Company Tapiaseria.

tive

in Moscow from April 1959 10

January 1961. Interviewed hy FBI

No derogatory

informat.13h;

TROVER

retired

in 1965 and

France with his wife..

born in

St. Petersburg,

emigrated

ring en the Revolution

time of

GROVER met her in Moscow,

was a correspondent..for

paper.

FBI

sad

she

HARRIS

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 20

ARI.

Herbert:

Recruited ly thie

his

four month The to she

•Imbussy in Moscow in the spring

1062; was on temporary UslA ser-

on a publications procureneni

sion.

8f.,

San:

This ABC correspondent

roscow is an

active KGB agent

divated and iccruited by v.A.

Nov.

INSON

Robert 10e:

in 1962 and

The ToR Ted an agent, same

nown, who was assigned to in

tane military installation

Paris and had

iccess to highly

sitive materials.

On Sax Or

on occasions technicians fron

• Special Technical Section 01

Second Chici Directorate

welled to paris to assist in

ning envelopes taken from the

ilt at this

installation.

¡ENKO described this First Chief

, octorato case as the most im-

sant information he learned

ile in Moscow

Juring 1962-11167.

367.

u.s.

Tabasgy Section, ailed NOStNiO's

help in obtaining a horel room

near HowlRu's for a woman fron

Leningrad. (196÷)

Embassy section.

acHed GrAZNOV for an agent who

could be used against a

visiting

American delegation,

and JAFFE was

suggested.

time, NOSENKO

in Tourist Department.

(1964)

Sources were various technicians of

the special Technical Section

were directly involved in the case

and with whom NOSENKO was on good

terms by virtue their collaboration

in Moscow Tourist Department opera-

t:ons.

(1954)

HOWARD

FET

has denied recrultse

Before NOSENKO's information

has re-

ceived, JAFFE reported recrulinent

by "Slava" KISLOV in Octobor

1202:

in a CIA interview in Deceaber 1966

JAFFE did not recognize A.K. RISLOV's

photograph but identified a photograph

of KUSKOV as being the NGH officer

who recruited him in 1962.

JAFFE

as expelled trom the dook in acrobot

1905: he is now servins visarhore

abroad and apparently has not yer.

been interviewed

by the Fil on tia.

basis of NOSENKO's infornation.

Identified as Sgt. Robert Lee JOHNSON

who, in January

1965, Confossed ROV-

ing

been KGB agent since 1953 and

unfirned NOSENKO's descriution oi

vault entrics at Orly Courier Traug.

JOHNSON IS

fesd.

For full description sea Part Vi.D.

3. c.

....

TOP

SECHET

---

## Page 21

visited the USar

approached

alipity, kiant said he would veir

::: in 15% if contactor; diar

motore bag not folloned up

=i..

marnich; not in actic

TARE CHloric philology, wits

Servie: in sofan on the basis o: "

honixual comoromise.

NOStIkE,

Pho wis in sota on temporary

crioment is an advisor to the

sooni servion, helpod the bulgarians

to munni cho uperation but dad rou

participite directly.

LUNT DIC-

virusly visited Moscow several

times and his homosexual tenden-

bios had been noted by the kos.

369

Caree

not naned. A Tourist

Depictront

tase.

11964)

anand involvement as KGB ad-

iner to lulgarians; LuNt's homo-

sexuality earlier reported to

weaRike by on or both of his homo-

suchal agents, VOLKOV and YEFREMOV.

KRAIT SIOTA

10037-

phlet

about the 1958

incidarit which

was available

to lecture

Midlenas

at loust as early as

1366.

Immediately following

ment by the Bulgarian MUD on 6 May

1961.

JUNt travalled to Yugoslavld

where he

recounted th

incident in

jetail to

an!

acadonic collaagus.

ütor In Cur-

rentiy a

proto 300I

and Mend bi tho

• Department

S1:9iC 145746445

arid

Litorature

1 TOP SECRETE

---

## Page 22

SON

W.E.: 1 Baptist minister

catitornia, JoINSON visited

Soviut Union in 1962

and was

éted mailing

letters which were

(critical or

soviet life.

It

decided

to approach him

and

¿ him to stop

this acrivity.

it has been determined that

NSON was a homosexual, a compro-

ciwas arranged involving one ot

ENKO's two homosexual agents:

KOV and YEFREMOV:

Compromising

tographs were made in

the Metro-

Hotel in Moscow and JOHNSON was

roached by NOSENKO, who obtained

igned statement

in

which JOHNSON

"ged to stop criticizing the

R.

No attempt was made

to re-

it him

for intelligence acti-

JOHNSON

was later

seen

enter-

The U.S. Enbassy, and it was

umed

that he had reported the

roach.

In 1962 NOSENKO

said

is. happened in January of that

пт: in

1964, he said

the approach

simade

in the spring of 1962.

NTOR, Melvin: A student at Har-

who was

recruited on ideolo-

cal grounds

in 1961; case turned

or to the First Chief Directorate.

368.

Personal involvement

as handler

of homosexual agents. and Tourist

Department officer who approached

JOHNSON.

NOSENKO alluded to

the

without naming

approach in 19864 he brought a note

JOHNSON.

to Geneva with JOHNSON'S

name and

the date "S January 1962."

He in-

sisted in 1964, however,

that this

date had no connection with JOHNSON

arl had no significance to him.

(1962)

JOHNSON reported

the

approach to

the American

Embassy

on

5

January

1962, describing his compromise and

the approach by

Georgiy

Ivanovich

NIKOLOV (sic; NIKOLAYEV was

one

of

NOSENKO'S

aliases).

Source not named.

A Tourist Depart-

ment case in 1961 while NOSENKO was

in American Department. (1964 notes)

Marvin KANTOR, a Slavic-language

instructor at the University of

Michigan, visited USSk

in 1958

and 1959: admitted Soviet Intelli-

gence contact in 1959 when inter-

viewed by CiA in 1961; reinterview

by FBIS

---

## Page 23

Visited tho desk

Fio deroos asd oca frprarchad

wir äcß bin tames; although

slipurrt, kailt said

he vonld betp

Mie te in U9a 1f contnctor: 11g-

CLUSLLnL Oi KHAIT. tIrSE Chiri

Mreeutare las nor tollowal di

tiir approuoh; not dn cotsre

tiltin

ARON SE CE-G1a

IUNT, an Americin

or slaric philolojy,

was

recrurred in 1961 by

the Bulgarian

gervici in sofla on the basis vi i

homosriyual compromise. NOSENKO,

Who iis ti

sotls on temporary

ássiannent as an advisor to the

local service, helped the Bulgurians

to mount the operatiun but did not

participate directly.

LUNT pre-

vinusly visited Moscow several

Éimes and his homosexual tenden-

dies had been noted by the kGa.

369

süurce not named.

Department case.

Tourist

(1964)

KKAlT WInto a pum-

piilut about tho 1958 inciuent wnich

was avallablo

t:0

leulure audlences

at loast ao

cirly as

1960.

Porschal involvemont ag KGB ad-

visor to Bulgarians; LUNt's homo-

sexudlity carlier reported to

NOSEIKO by onc

ür both of his homo-

sexual agents, VULKUV and YFFREMOV.

(1902)

Inmediately following his rocruit-

ment by the Bulgarian MVD on & May

1961, LUNT travelled to Yugoslavia

where he recounted the inciuent in

detail to Ambassador George KENNAN,

an acadomic collcague.

LUNg is cur-

rently a professor and Head of the

• Department of Slavic Languiges and

Literature at Hlarvard.

TOP SECRED!

---

## Page 24

MEPPENS.

Bolert: Professor from

Tennessee who was recruited by the

KGa in minsk in 1950 on homoscrual

grounds: case na no value and was

deupped

by the KGB.

NIXON.

Patel:

imoricon tourist

TOTT

lil

Porcow on dune 19t,3.

Bernard:

PECHTER WIS

Thi KOn in Mosco

100.

Purick:

Cate to tho

Telot: T057 bath a dele.

galion of Amricon metallurgists

and wis recriled by the kG!; case

chen

handed over to the First

thiet

DiscoLorate.

370.

Personal involvement

as responsible

case officer who approached MERTENS.

Reported without name in 1962.

source not saned.

NOSENKO said:

"This is

The Seventh

Tourist! bebartment recruited hin

but 1 lion': knew the cour officer.

¡ was on thi at the time so I ron't

know any coiaiis."

119641.

Source not named.

11064 notosi

TOP SECRET

Source not namod.

(:y64 notes)

Identified as Aron PRESSHAi, @ 103J-

timo Communint and a close friend

of Bernard KOTEN (sce Fort V.F.6.)8

in about 1945 sister marrIed & Si

iet citizen identified an & coNELor

for soviet Intelligenca." Gis her

been living in soviet-union adch.him

for many years sinco.

---

## Page 25

15K,

2ater:

president of world

1ộc

was recruited on the lish

1k1960 an his made

several trips

ince: urad for spottiny

tourists

ith intolligence affiliations; nol

recrivod

oniy one open

code

assige from

RASk

since recruit-

int.

spencer:

Recruited on

3019:81

rouds in

Soch!

it

319:21"s 1962; case turned over

ser.

РБ1:

cossin lecked co the K3X.

ther

the torna: 5041"

Fioza Ambassador' s

unt not teacher in Amorice"

in Moscow was

recruited ca

ofsixual involveronts

1133.

"'Fr

Jolin :

During a 1959 visit

sTaton his honosexuality was

Lacuvrud buc no action tiken un-

in 1962, when

HUFE was recruited

na homosexual compromise; case was

egminated in 1963 and

while active

only of marginal value.

371.

source not named.

Recruited by

ronist Department officer ie.N.

MistY while NOSENKS was in Ameri-

can Department.

Hot by American

Soction officers on trips

subsegsent

1960. (1964 notes)

source not. tamei.

Case run by Ameri-

ca: Digurtment because ROBERTS

embassy employee in

cuse ortivers were v.M.

1l11111!'

musEum toernod of events

fion bod. SolotTIs, First

Chinf Lirectorate Officer assigned

to thi carricar

Department. (1454)

soiled tot maneda

in perican De-

D31 tri::-

cist.

iuchis said he did

=it know is recruited for because

ae did not

in bad. Imbassy Section,

imerioon

Duportant, at time of

r1li.atina

citri notes)

saurie ant nared.

A Tourist Depart-

went cane at timo NOSENKO serving

there. (1901 notes)

Former CIA contact who had travelled

several times to the, USSR, reported

an approach in 1951.

Had been first State erpatement

am-

ployee coopted

as ClA representative

Moscow ca.

1949-50.

debriefed by the FBI

In 1962 ROSS reportod to the unri-

can Embassy her arrust in Kiev is

1958 on charges of immoral rehavior

with

a Sovict citizon; in

•196%

SN FBI

USA.

In 1964 RUFE, a New York attorney,

confessed that he had bach compromised

in the USSR in 1962 and war la con

tact with Soviets

in USA durtire 1962

and 1963; contact broken in dOor!

ber 1963.

1 TUE SECRETI

---

## Page 26

Gerald:

Tout SC Department in

Recruited in Moscow

1058

or

1959

Ideological grounds.

He is valu-

all purpose agent.

His KGB

tonym is "EDVIN."

APIP".

irrespondent who

sole

tine

prior to

when NOSEYXO entored Ameri-

n! Department.

Basis of recruit-

nt

uninown.

SHAPIRO produced

Ly

political information.

His

"VALERIY" for

18)

years

but has now been changed

PPITR.

In

1953 SHAPIRO waS be-

g handled by lenyamin Alekseye-.

ch KOsloV and in 1901 his

C350

ficer was Filip Denisovich BOBKOV,

et the deputy chiefs of the

cond Chief Direciorate,

At one

me

was handled by Vladislav

IVSHUK.

Sofia Greta: Recruited

"Poland sy sovers in 1916-17

I nevri contacted because KGB

lieved she was known

to

American

telligence; again recruited in

'Prcaber 1962 when sho returned

•soviet Union.

372.

Sources irre

the Deputy Chief

of the lourist Department,

V.D.

CHELNOKOV

and the case officer,

V.M. IVANOV.

NOSENKO was Deputy

Chief of the section working

against Anerican, British,

Cana-

dian,

and Commonwealth tourists at

the tine.

(1964 notes)

COSENKO read SAPIPO's development

file in 1953 when responsible for

operations against Aerican journal-

ists.

Case then

being handled by

NOSENKO's friend, V.A. KOzLOV.

(1962)

Source was D.A. DITYATEV, Tourist

Department case officer

who re-

cruited SHATTAUER.

(1964 notes)

Russian-born parents; name origin-

ally was. Gennadiy SEVASTYANOV.

joys special residence arrangements

in Moscow; strongly,suspect

agent prior to receipt of NOSENNO

lead.

Friend of a nunber of ClA

staff personnel.

SEVERN has not re-

turned

to the United States since

July 1961 and has not been interviewed

by the FBI.

GOLITSYN said that in

early 1959, the American Section of

the Fourteenth (Counterintelligence)

Department, First Chief Directorato;

had an agent whose KGB cryptonys was

"EDVIN"; possibly an Anerican wich

Russian

background or relatives.

SHAPIRO has

lived

almost exclusivoly

in USSR since 1933 and is

married

to a Soviet

citizen.

GOLITSYY TO-

ported in 1961

that KGB officor SOV.

SHUK had been

handling an Ascrican

correspondent,

whose cryptonya ias

"VALERIY":

GOLITSYN believed

thi:s

waS SHAPIRO.

FBI

Et 15 CA

31631842

---

## Page 27

NUKIN

Mlls a proteisor

FUniversilt.

Horn 1915

n Californi:,

tits

spoiled by toB

uricillance riding

in lili car in

sumetime curine

10sr or 1959.

miries were made with the oil.

in icquered that tie

KOB male

in contact 5:181N.

On this

to be

BibblY has in Moscew

GRU agoni

in in 1063.

MITH..

"= code-machine

achanic it the merican Embassy in

was recrui.od by dorman

9ad-1995 (xar1005 doles Given at

arione raes).

"ANONEY"

provided

uch valuble infoimation in Moscow

ind after his

return to the b.s.,

GB officer V.M. NOVSilVi travelled

• Mashington to reactivate nin:

$ 1962.

As

ANDREY" was working at

ome military district command in

lashington area and was furnishing

information of value.

This case

de of two items NOSENKO first

ffered to sell CIA in 1952.

373.

MOSEsko was in the Tourist Depart-

munt at time of StUkIN's first visit

and because of his Russian: haciground

special surveillance was assigned to

SHUBIN.

When SHUSIN arrived

in 1963,

NOSENKO, who was Deputy Chief of the

Tourist

Department,

was informed by

thief

of the

American

Tourist

Section, V.G. DERA.

(1904)

Various sources named

at different

times.

KOVSHUk appears to be main

source, but others mentioned were

л.G.

CC BAGROCH(1562)

V.A. CHURANOV, and

John Andrew

SHUBTN,

born

26 FAlTUNTY

1915, & professor

In the mid-1940's

of

ccon-r..cs

NYU.

SHUBIN

BESOCIALEÚ

GRU I1l8e

= 1

identi

2727

c075e

gUi

21172382

TOP SECRET

Identified as Dayle W. SMITH,

who

in 1903 confessed his recruitmore

bj the KGB

while in Moscow but has

denied furnishing anything of valle

to the Sovicts.

SMITH iS CUITCHELY

being questioned by the FBi. do so-

tired iron

the Army in Dacenser 1961

and lost access to U.S. Goverruant

information at that time.!

SONS :N35€

VI.D.3.b.

VA JOUrCe

1k1-2.a

---

## Page 28

SOCHICK, Heward: The Time Life

man 1iT

SOSCOW

Tor one or twis

years; his

probably an agent of Vadim BIRYUKOV.

3.i%.

source not named.

Tourist Depart-

ment involved in case in 1962.

(1964)

SONS ASS

U.6. Cortes-

pontent

she nor there.

reporting or pol:.

Ical mitters; roguice to cocoa.

the Urited

Stitos se in Cereva

later on.

ST 3034

Eative

i.:

snoopriall

ind

12a0t.16:s

to soviit rectaritions;

-o ?

soviet

worian ard!

Bia : tolerant with other dovut

women Mlt hire both fäctors in his

souice was perhaps ton. kOdlor, who

handling

in 1953.

SEiKO sand he may have

"accidentally" when kosLov

ashod him to

translate an AP dis-

patch.

(1902)

sauto not mural.

20220-000%6276 Jor 1.596-

1r: moocHi's 1100-106i assignment

tute inericor

separiment.

NOSENKO

seen STEVENS in company

Didn' to une this to incroose ci:-

tro: cher had.

1s of lord, 2217268

Nus furnisting oniy superraoli:

intornation.

STiVING.

Frincid: Former Stat: Depart-

assigned to Moscon; vis-

Itod USSR in 1901 as a tourist: then

working as a correspondent: nas.com-

promised in a blacinail opcration in

which he wis accused of rape; agried to

cooperate.

stevIas described approach in

a lecter to his mother which he luft at the

Embasgy.

letter was opened and read by

Minister Counsollor, who at once dictated

= cablo to the State Department describing

the events:

This was heird by the kos via

Serice not named.

U.S. Embassy

Saction case handled

by V.M1.

KOV-

SiCk and Vod. MLY"IN when NOSENKO

assigacá to section in 1960-1961.

(1964 notes)

SOCHURER, who was in Moscow fron 1958

until 1960, reported to tha U.S. Emb-

assy a number of instances when

sovicts attempted to pressure him and

described contact: with 163 officers;

naned BIRYUKOV as the guide

iterpreter who invariably accompan-

led him while stationed in the uSsr.

Numerous reports of commurist affilia-

tions and of suspicion that ho was

infornant for the Soviets; married

a Soviet national.

formorly a nember of the CrUsA, StEVENS

claing

to have

broken with che

the carty

1930's; soon

Party

thereafter he

first visited Moscow and has liveo

there intermittently sinces married

to a Soviet;

many IepOrts

on file

of his extongive blackmarket

111+-

yal currency

activities

Sand

close Iclationships with soviets;

FBI interview,

Left a detailed writton report. at the

Embassy for Ambassador MiTMYCH 100-

mediately after the incidost ard vas

interviewed by Minister.

Conne4110r

the

next day; f

FRI

---

## Page 29

1n, 19r151197

375.

he

micronhone in the Minister Counsollor's

ffice.

l'an0 was given to First Chict Direc-

orate.

Pon planned to condort STElLAS in Now

ook, but NosENio was unsure whether this was

one.

Alrrander:

suis,"

Just New the Crated acency?

Owner of "Afton

and of

Russam-language bookitors an

Chicago:

is recruited by the Tourist Department:

in

OSCOW

ng

1951: was used to spot interest-

20021555

coming

to liSOR.

in autums

thon Finse Coputy Chick of the

jurast impartmont, cock case cret ixon

rev-

only Miniayerich meady and subacguratly

Le a vacate Patien for com recand

ivors

as FB: .00t hard been

rescliai.

A TENN

Bit basis of

recruit flatt

her

for d

oviet: turned ovor to Firct Chiat

siociorate which noiped her cbrain

27-

tomo: 10 to Gi triu Given do dd101.

de wen ta omisie operalante

Personal participation

as senior

Born in

Russia, SVENCHANSKIY emi-

Tourist Department

officer after

grated to UsA

in 1923. Has travelled

ciansfor from

american

Department

frequently to Moscow; during and fol-

in 1962.

SVENCHANSHIY'S

case offi- lowing world War 11 hud extensive

cer

after mid-1963. (1964 notes)

contacts with Soviets; close con-

nections with

of known CPUSA

members.

Several accusations of

ict espionage. on record. Linkeu to

Sovict espionage in USA by Marry

GOLD 1n 1950.

Anothor similar state-

rent by GOlD reported in Now York

Times in 1953 (see Part V.B.S.).

sorica not nandi.

recruited by

Tourist Genuitront wiiie NOSENKO

"as

in Ancrican Department.

(1964)

source not nanca.

Recruited by

Tourist Department in 1962, when

NOSENKO there.

(1964 notes)

In 1960 it was reported that TORPLY

planned to defect to the USSR because

sne was in love with a soviet narca

Yuriy Petrovich NIKOLAYEV: in 1301

she married an Ancrican.

In 1962 the

KGB defector COLITSYN reportad KGB

attempts to recruit an imerican last-

tifiable with TORREY during in octo-

ber: or Noverber 1959 visit to Moscow.

There is no indication she had boon

UN or NATo, alt'ough

she worked for the pan American Union

during 1954-1959.

À carponter and scligious lanotic

living in California; has a rocoro

of many sIrestos may

bo cantally dis

turbed; travolled. to USSR in 1962.

FBI

not cast

TOP SECHET:

---

## Page 30

376.

Koris:

the deroad, voisely was re-

President of "Anori- Scurer not named.

ment case in

1962.

udred in 196: on idcological

ounds: his mission is to spot

spicious tourists. and

to notify

BiNGB lu open code.

Tourist Depart-

(1961 notes)

GLACE.

William:

Student at Vienna

ivermir:

Fecruited in 1901 in

c8s2 or leological grourds; now

maled by sor First Chief Direc-

Source not naned. Tourist Depart-

ment rise

in 1961, when

NOSENKO

American Department.

in

(1964 notes)

Thoma: American cor-

sponden: Thomas WilTNEY was re-

need ly the KGB in Moscow some-

le betore 1053, when NOSENKO

ibed the kGB.

In 1953 ho was

ing handled by Venyamin NOzlOV

the American imbassy Section.

was furnishing information

•ne American ambassy, political

oration,

and personal

infor-

Ion on Americans in Moscow.

•uscU

to cooperate further with

IXüB after leaving Moscow.

NOSENAD said he perhaps learned of

the case "accidentally" from

V.A.

KOZlOr who

handling WIlTNEY in

1953. (1902)

Interriowed br

WALLACE visited

the soviet inion in

1961; intervicwed on 29 Febtuary 1505

in Vienna

he admitted approach dy

unidentified Soviet but chairsu he

refused to "help them"; said there

have been no further attempts to con-

tact him.

WHITNEY was

interviewed by the fOl

CIA

ras

See far!

dcrogatory intormation.

v.c.?.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 31

OUNGER ,

1al ph

79d Folks.

Ar-

20.1ts

KGB in the trik t1902: they

Men toiled to appear at a noot-

rig

site da Penairs.

as recruitoe,

Curity his

1960

Isit to the USSR, on the basis

invoitnune in bincrmarketeer-

sime

.s.

nounce 0411.

'er, possibil military

intol 11-

lence, miri was stationed in

raany 4200 1955

to 1957, 15 a

GB agoni:

¡ermany as a deprotrent chits in

ntelligence in iate 196: or

arly

1263.

lame unknown:

i u.s. cititor tav-

28 in angland; a currier pried

" soviet national who is horseif

long-tina KuB agent.

He was Ic-

uited when he visited Loningrad

or fur

exhibits between 1950

nd 1961.

377.

Snurce not named. 1362

American

Department

NOSENKO'S

friend

and tormer American Embassy dection

subordinate, v.v.

KOSOLAPOV, was

directly involved in the case, which

took place when NOSENKO was back in

the Tourist Department. 11962)

Source not naned.

Tourist Depart-

ment

case while NOSENKO

was

American Department.

(1264 notes)

PurGe was M.A. SHALTAPIN, who re-

crutcra

sasha"; also possibly heat

of case from Yu.I. Gui,

ROv, and V.M. KOVSHUK.

No indiantion of source.

(1961)

On mission for the U.S. Army at the

time of their arrest, the YOUNGERS

reported thair recruitment immedi-

ataly on leaving the soviet Union.

KGB officer KOSOLAPOV travelled

to Copenhagen under alias in 1962,

at the time the YOUNGERs. were sup-

posed to meet with KGB in Denmark.

Interviewed in London in 1954,

ZIRING

admitted blackmarketeering but denied

recruitment:

Unidentified.

Investigations by

• CIA,

ACSI ind

the

FBI continue.

Part VI.D.3.a.

Unidentified, possibly

Daniel

SHERICH, who married

soviat

ional in 1955, marriage was

ciently unugual at that time

Echiel

па-

suffi-

to

be

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 32

ame Unknown

KGB cryptonym

ToW: X K08 agent

in Geneva

vere he is employed by the

nternational Labor. Organiza-

ion.

ame Unknown: X.N. SMIRNOV

ravelled from Now

York City to

eneva in 1962 (while NOSENKO

is thore) to meet an agent,

writer who was a

former u.s.

rare department

employee, possi.

ly with prior

service in Mos-

'N: in 1962 this target had

tremely good

connections

in

afluential U.S. circles.

378.

Source was Yu.I. GUK, in Geneva

in 1962.

Unidentified, possibly Joseph

Wilson HAYDON,

long-time counsellor-

librarian of the ILO; as early as

950 was reported to

be

"well known

or his Communist sympathies".an

for being associated with Soviet In-

telligence networks in the United

States and Canada.

Other possible

candidates also under examination.

Unidentified, possibly Francis

STEVENS (see

above).

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 33

379.

Development Operations

Lead

MSTRONG, Robert: The Ambassador's

Je in Muscon

Ts

a homosexual and

close iriend of Stephan HOFFMAN

éc helow): ne is known

to be hav-

§ homosexual relations with

hannes

BUILE, a code clerk at the

nish Embassy; no other informa-

on available.

Y. Frank:

NOSENd identifiod DAY

a State Department enda

1960-1961 period.

a target of either KOSOLAPOV or

YAZNOV (NOSENKO could not recall

hur ne active operational

asures wore luten igainst him for

cl of opportunity.

NOSENIO SaId

remember anything inter-

microphones, telephone tapes,

surveillance and that he did not

member DAY'S NGB file,

although he

d "sxinned it."

NOSENKO also said

a8 he did not know who DAY's

osest American or foreign friends

re, or the names or descriptions

any agents working against him.

also did not know of any trips

Y may have taken outside the USSR

¿ doubtod that DAY took any inside

The KGB had no deroga.

ry information on lAY and was

awaro of any vulnerabilities he

ghe have had..

Sourcing and Date of Report

Source not named. A U.S. Embassy

Section case at

timo NOSENKO said

he wils Deputy Chief of this section.

(1901)

Investigation Results

Recalled from Moscow on the basis

mitted he truth of the strona

the truth of

allegations

and resigned from

the State Depart-

ment in August 1964; he denied having

been approached by the KGB.

Involvement as supervisor of opera-

tions against Ancrican code clerks.

(1964)

DAy arrived in Moscow by train from

Helsinki in

May 1960 and served

there until October 1961.

living alone for several months in

America House, he moved into the

Embassy compound where he roomed

successively with State Nepartment

code clerks BRIDGEWATER,

SALSAVAGE,

and GARLAND.

In July 1961 DAY

travelled to the Caucasus with his

friend G. Stanley BROWN, who was the

Agricultural Attache at the Embassy

and who formerly had been an overt

employee of CIA (see Part V.E.3.f.).

DAY later reported to the State De-

partment Office of Security that the

two were followed by five surveil-

lants at all times, that on one

occasion when they

returned to their

hotel room they found four "repair-

nen" there,

and that while traveling

by train on this trip they shared

a compartment with "un available and

attractive Soviet femalo." DAY de-

nied any approach by Soviet Intelli-

gence, any homoscual activities,

and any heterosexual activitios with

Soviet females

in Moscow, or that he

had participated in blackmarket activi

ties while there. (He was aware of

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 34

380.

----

4256662

C9t1k:ne:

ine in Septonder

3034 de bulkoved that

on ring the:

perichu: involvement as supervi-

sor of code clark opcrations and

hindiler of horosexual

agents YEFRE-

MOv and

(1964)

isto

the fact that a number of his

acquaintances were involved in cur

rency transactions with tua

KOSOLAPOV's agen:.

according

tO NUSENKO.)

DAY said that be hou

sold a hi-fi set at a darço profit.

to an Egyptian her legula GRiAZNOV's

(probably eaten

agent, accuraing iu

.

DWELLY was assigned tó Moscut as

¿ code clerk from April 195? to July.

19600

He was interviover by

thn Cf-

fice of Security of

of State

in

March 1965

Of NOSENIO'S

informat

5720

.::

mitty and that

the deidlin ot the

centity 01 dii

been word me st hame

yants who might hatr

"'le moe ott!-

Under intrrotrion in 1oork

any Man, mosesto said chase do the

USE G: 131

"behavin:

when vittiry

pratic mit's roon," tie KGB was

"1?0

per cunt sire" that to vas a homosasual.

There ins,

wealthe mard, "a big lunt

on a number of cranings

when Disilt was known to be free iron

NOCk, NOSENHO, GHINENOV, KONOMOV.

and volkov writod in vain in 1 KGB sur-

ellenee car in the hope that DELit

would visit downtown Muscow and contret

could be established with him.

to pnoto-.

graphs ut NWELLY were obtained: there

was no approach and nu recruitment.

¡NOSENKO could recall no other informa-

Ition on DwELLY at this tim:, but later

he said that perhaps GRYANOV's homosexual

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 35

381.

nt

"VOLODYA" had spoken with DwEllY

I publin roilet in a

muscum or a

and believed on this basis that.

was "

humidscruil.

Thorns: A consul in Moscow,

F, wis sporied by NOSENio's homo-

ual agoni volso, win exchanged

nces with FAiN and was "almost

per cent

sure that FAIN is a homo-

vai";

this was in 1059, when FAIN

¡teu the bosk fion his post in

astavia,

and thore was

insuffi-

rit tine

to mount an opcration

inst him durirg this visit;

When FAIN

arrived in Moscow,

oscar rat in his place no

ther dotails available.

Fiported to NOSENKO by his homosexual

agent VOLKOV.

(1964)

сидитейті

CIA has

derogatory information on DWeLLY

from other sources.

GOLITSYN also

rovided information concerning a

iGs oneration against a homoscxual

American code clerk at about this

cime.

GOLITSYN reported that he

mad learnod from

discussions in the

American Department in the spring

of 1960 that the KGB had photographs

of a code clerti

engaged in homosexual

acts but that KGB Chairman SHELEPIN

had forbidden their use at that time

because of possivle political reper-

cussions.

(See Part VI.E. 3.d. for

details

on this lead.)

Apart from

the coincidence of dates and the na-

ture of

the compromise, there is no

infornation available to permit an

equation of the NOSENKO and GOLITSYN

information.

FAIN was interviewed by Sccurity

Office

Department of State,

TOP SEGRET

---

## Page 36

K.

David: Professor in Phila:

phin and frequent

visitor to

USSR, tie Loringrad KOP hoped

recruit him

on idcological basis

through use of a tonale

tro pi sistors love attair with

oviet he dirt

refused a visa in

but thie deB has arranged

that he will be admiried if to.

Lies again.

Norman:

visited the USSa as

Our 15:

1950,

when

he

wis

esser

as a lonosciual; if le re-

hi will

recruirment tar-

I period who was an aperational

rget of Vidimir DeikIN.

in

suary 1965 no correctly identi.

d himan a state Department

le clerk, saying imat vor. kosh-

POV was

the responsible case

ficer

and that. he,

NOSENKO, super-

sed KUB operational activity sui.

unding GAfFEY.

The KGB attempted

lure GAFFEY into downtown Moscow

ing

svetland IVANOVA, i maid in

erica Mouse and one of DEMKIN'S

ents.

Despito hor repeated invi-

tions, GAFFlY would not meet her.

her than IVANOVA, NOSENKO knew

no foreign friends of GAFFEY or

any trips ho made have made in-

de tho soviet Union or abroad.

382.

Case brought to NOSENin's atten-

rion when

FINK was dcnied a visa

and the leningrad Kok ohjected.

NOSENED WaS

Deputy Chief of Tourist

Department it the tinc.

(190.1)

HOSENko copied name when retiring

File of one of

his homosexual

agents,

VOLKOV OF YEFREMOV. NOSENKO said

that when

such a file is retired,

Kon requires case officer to draw up

u list

of persons on whem

the agent

reporied.

NOSENKO

made a

copy of list

and gave il to ClA. (19641

involveinent as supervisor of KGB

operations

against Ancrican code

clerks in Moscow.

(1964)

FINd's sister was trying to marry

Sovict citizen,

but

the soviets

refused her a visa to do so

interviewed by the FBI

FISK travelled to Europe and USSR

with his wife and

parents

In

10.

interviewed by FBI

GAFFEY arrived in Moscow in Sep•

tember 1961. Fred KADERA, # dellow

resident it

America House, FEar

repurtod

during a State Department

18Y

intervier m

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 37

GB. NOSENKO said,

had no icroga-

information

GAFFEY

and was

dare of any vices he may have

PRF.

American correspor.

was

AG" rocruiiment Larget

953.1958, Due HOStNiD did not

the the he was subscanently so-

B7 1955, when

ational contact dis

established

cen him and the luB; details ot

act unknown.

MAN

Sierben: Currently assigned

ne

Ame ritan

Embassy in Moscow;

indulged in homosexual acts

an Armenian in Yerevan and is

ndly with Robert AlMSTRONG,

her suspected homosexual (see

e?: KGRis now mounting a com-

Ise operation ugainst HOFINAN.

383.

Personal involvement: When COSEikO

joined the M.S. Enhassy Scution

1053, he was given GiiORl's develou-

mont! tile to read and was despon-

sible for nundling agents reporting

Source not ramod. (1961)

Source was Gal. GRYAZNOV, liho Cane

to NOStAKe, then in the Tourist l0-

partniont,

to arrance for conpromis-

ing photography of HOFFMAN.

(1964)

tlind.

GAFFEY was recalled

from

Mos-

COW

in the

summer of 1962, before

expiration

of his regular tour,

because

of drunkenness.

During ques-

tioning

by

the State Department

Office of Security

Eddy Lanicr King GIlMORe first went

to Muscow

in 1911 and was chief of

the A!' Burcau there from 1945 to

the summer of

1953.

Married a Soviet

citizen.

• FBI

Profossor Michael GINSBERG reported

to U.S. officials

in Helsinki in

August

1956 about

& recruitmont

approach.

---

## Page 38

HUSTON (fnu): Travelled TDY to Mos-

cow from

Belgrade

and was photographed

making a blackmarket deal in a taxi;

case not completed because lUSToN has

not returned to the USSk.

384.

Source not named.

An American

Department case in 1960, when

NO -

SENKO waS

serving there. (1964)

JENNER,

Paul francis:

In carly 1960,,

NOSENKO originated the idea for

When

the heß Tearned

through nornal

this operation, was involved in

Channels

that JENNER was to be

its planning and in arranging

assigned to the U.S. Embassy in MOs-

KOSOLAPOV'S trip to Helsinki;

cow, It was supposed that he was a

later KOSOLAPOV reported to NO-

code clark because he was listed as

SENKO on his trip and contact with

• Secrotar-archivist, a frequent

G.I. GRYAZNOV, case offi-

cover for code clerks.

As first

cer for the female agent, also sub-

#tep in development of JENNER, U.S.

Embassy Section officer V.V. KOSO-

LAPUV travolled to Helsinki, where

he boarded the train on which JEN-

NER was travelling to Moscow, and

then struck up an acquaintance with

him.

Additionally, a female KGB

agent boarded the train after it

crossed the soviet border and she

too became acquainted with JENNER.

The

plan was to continue these relationships

in Moscow.

Because JENNER refused to

do so and because he turned out to

be a pouch clerk and not a code clerk,

the operation was put aside.

No re-

cruitment approach was made.

USIA employee Hayden Henry HUSTON

was arrested in Yugoslavia in 1954

for sexual activities; this, the

only adverse information about him.

was reported to USIA on 30 October

1963; he

claimed no

recruitment was

made in his 1963 interview and

sain

he made two trips to USSR during

Belgrade tour.

Other than his ar-

rest in 1954,

he stated there were

no other incidents in yugoslavia

or elsewhere in the soviet Bloc

which could be used to embarrass

him.

Currently serving in Taiwan

with USIn and has not been

Inter-

viewed on basis of NOSENKO's alle-

gation.

GOLITSYN described

a similar opera-

tion involving

KOSOLAPOV, dating

it in late 1960.

JENNER reported

meeting girl and her brother to

Embassy officials on arriving in

Moscow, but reports no encounter

with person matching KOSOLAPOV'S

description.

Official Finnish

travel records show KOSOLAPOV was

not on sume

train as JENNER, but

returned to Moscow two days

after

JENNER travelled from Helsinki to

Moscow. See Part V.E. 3.6.

TOP SEGRET

---

## Page 39

кзан

A wealthy Baptist layman

a visited the usse six of seven

is and has met with Russian Rapt-

on cach occasdon; personally

ainter with riesident JonksoN

Knew President KENNEDY; undEI

* by

the second Chief Director-

to chrain blackmail materials:

JIE: JONES Ducamu involvel with

femalr, and although she is

KGB agoni, the KGB has taken

raintionship undcr

control ind

to oh-

compromising photographs on

trips by fees.

IZAI;

Charles: Goject of much

during his 25 October-

stenie: 1563 visit to the ussri

¡B atticer under cover made con-

man and planned to continue

contact ap the United States.

ÓV (Enu) : Visited the USSR in

• when he was assessed as a

rexual e he scturns he will

Iccruitmont target.

atas

385.

Source not. named.

Case handled

by NOSENKO's Tourist Department

subaräirate, Vitaliy DERA.

(1962)

sourer not raned.

NOSENKO explained

that the First Chief Directorate

Inquested Tourist Department assist-

ince in arrmaing contact with

Kiroal in Moscow and that "we ex-

eited all efforts to help them make

this contact."

NOSE:KO at time was

Daputy chief of Tourist nepartnent.

11904)

Name included in list NOSENKO said

ho made when retiring file on one

of his honosexial agunts, see above

entry for FISk. (1264 notes)

His earlicr-äctiviin

on in a 1361 Top

secret

Fra coser!

furnished to

CIA bY GOLITSYH dr :31

citing JONES' Bible-anuggling

act:

vities and giving his nare.

Charies P. HAMZAUI, ROn-iN-laW O!

Alexander SAFFIAN who wis repurtes

in contact with goviety in the 1911

HAMZAUI himself was noted in traged.

contact with Soviets since.arrit..

in the

USA in

1955;

FBI

Only possible

candlinta

Swedish citizen, not

en

AnBriCaI.

TOP SEGRET

---

## Page 40

386.

Robert: In 1963 MOSLiK)

HOLDULKOV, whoM NOSENKO described

as friend whom he had known for

akov, ino had been

selected by Presa-"about two years" (since 1962).

nE KENYADY as a contianal

chance! (1964)

correspondence with KirUSHCleY,

at Robert KENNEDY had long wished

sắt the

soviet Union.

BOLSIine also

I'd NOSENKO

that, when the Boshoy

het had been on tour in the United

in one of its loading perior-

ROSENED or

basis proposed to doi. crisavor,

ict

o:

secord!

ciaof birtcrorate,

invited to tre iSSR, sci

"primte guartres, and jibin the

carpes" arcarment,

including

iSKAY? 1E he wanted.

propose that KENNEDY be compromises

that an attempt be made to recruit

n; the purpose of this plan cos oili

int to tine Over the

chanaot tr

den Fresident KENNEDY and ministChEV,

lich was then being handid ty zoe

crabaor trought the alan s good

and said do would discuss to rath

rustion he dory overine ones

¡órtly thereafter.

BOLSHAKOV'S

role as a soviet "dis-

information"

channel was.publicized

in the press in 1962, after he

assured the white House that the

soviets hug no offensive missiles

in Cuba. &

ma identified

BOLSHAKOV aS

visU

officer.

NOSENKO'S

developmental plan for Robert KEN-

NEDY cannot be checked.

Robert

KENNEDY had already visited the USSR

once,

when he accomparica supreme

Court Justice William DOUGLAS in

1955

1956.

See Part V.F.9.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 41

Martin:

A graduate student,

Avisited Moscow for about four

hs

in 1955 and homosekual tenden-

Kai suspocked

Moi intelligence ties.

opcration sirded

in Moscow

1/ rOOm, bUt MATIA

insistra on

ing off lights and

no plioto-

hy possible.

oach tude.

consequertly

Again visites USSR

961, but nas more carcful and

her opportunities did not pre-

thorselves.

dates of MALIN's visits

1962.

D. Reich:

Suspusted of having

sexul!

lendencies during his

visit to the USSR: will

be s

et for recruitment if le ve-

NE.

Josinh: State Departient

clear.

joseph MORONE was r

atinnal target of the u.s.

say Section in 1960-1961.

he travelled to warsaw on

• in into 1960, a Polish girl

was a U3 agent was placed on

tonin to reduce hin.

Con-

ising photographs voie mado

it saw.

At NGR Inquest, the

gent. was later brought

again

oscor where more photographs

made. Operation was terni

d before approach could bu

because inoricans ordered

NE. Out of Muncon betore the

of his tour, possibly because

intirate relationg with

et females at America House.

397.

Personal involvement as case offi-

cer; for this operation, NOSENKO

borrowed Viktor BELYANOVSKIY; CryptO-

nym

"STROYEV," a homosexual agent

of thr British Department, KGB SeC-

ond Chief Directorate, and arranged

the comptonise operation in the Mos-

con hotel.

(1964)

NOScikO noted name when retiring

file ni PEPPEMON or VOLFOU, his

honorexual agents; see above en-

tries for risk and kaRLov.

(1964)

Personal invoivement; NOSENKO in

charge of code cleri sperations at

the tine and nelped plan the compro-

mise en the train.

At the time

MOROND went to warsaw, NOSENKO waS

oi Thy in Cuba, but details were

reported to him on his return.

A U.S. Navy Intelligence officer

during the Second world War and

a periodic CIA contact sinos,

MALIA Visited the USSR in 1955

and again in 1962.

In the spring

of 1963, he told the CiA that he

had had no involvement with black-

marketeers, homosexuals, or females

on crips

to USSR;

Identity confirmed as Ralph MATLAW;

casc still under investigation.

A sensitive CIA source reported in

detail on the KGB compromise opera-

tion in 1961.

na a result, MURaNE

was interviewed and polygraphed in

Sagin May 1961 and admitted inti-

Mashes with the Polish fonile: ho

denied ever being approached by

cither the UB or Soviet Intolligence.

He was transferred to lisbon in

August 1961, a yoar after ho first

arrived in Moscow.

sue Part. V.2.3.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 42

388.

SEN,

Philip: NIELSEN's first

NOSENKO was involved in the de-

tourist.

the USSR was in 1957 or 1958, termination of NIELSEN's possible

Because he made the

intelligence status on first trip.

laintance of some

"teildy boys"

No scurce given for subsequent in-

¡oscow and tried to acquire a

foimation.

Tourist Department

of the Moscow phone Directory

officer LiONOV and American De-

them, the KGB suspected he was

partment officer Viktor KOPEYKIN

acted with cIA.

NIELSEN waS

were involved at various stages of

junder surveillance during this

the operation.

(1964)

all subsequent trips, but was

•• observed in other intelli-

i& tasks.

On one of his visits

oscow, NIELSEN fell in love with

agent

Tamara KUNGAROVA, and the

devided: to use her in the de-

pment of NIELSEN.

For thie pur-

'gof

assessment, LEONOV, a

ist Department officer, was

equently introduced to

NIELSEN

he IOle Of KUNGAROVA's father,

there were. nö

positivo results.

c. perhaps in

1960 or 1961

¡NOSENKO was in the U.S. Imbassy

ion, he heard that the "active

•section (ponetration of Ameri-

Intolligence opprations) of tho

joan Department was planning to

further on NIELSEN, but NOSENKO

ened no more in this connection.

Ild hear, however, that NIELSEN

KUNGAKOVA had married and as of

liwere living in Lundon.

NOSENKO

ulated that one of the

reasons for

failure of the recruitment opera-

lagainst NIELSEN is the possibility

ho learned that KUNGAROVA didn't

a father or that she tola him

the operation surrounding him.

NIELSEN travelled to the s

viet

Union by private car in Ap

il 1958;

he was.a CIA agent at the .

ime and

one of

his tasks on this t

Lp was

to obtain a Soviet phone bopk.

NIELSEN met KUNGAROVA on a later

trip, in January 1959, andäreturned

to soo hor in Moscow in January

1960

despite indications and warmings

that he was involved in what appeared

to be a

KGB operation.

Because XUNGA-

ROVA'S

"father" allegedly objected

to the plans

of the couple to marty,

NIULSEN agreed to talk to him.

In-

troduction was made at the Hotel

Praga in Moscow.

NIELSEN' later

noted that the

"father" bore no

resemblance to KUNGAROVA, although

her brother "could have been her

twin.

CIA terminated relationship

with NIELSEN after

this trip.

He

Icturned to Moscow in 1962 and mar-

ried KUNGAROVA.

They subsequently

lived in Paris. KUNGAROVA died in

Franco in 1965 (see entry for John

THOMPSON) •

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 43

paul: contacted by the

-ITe squan Valley Olgin-

but not yet recruited; to be

stacted in switzerland.

389.

Source was K.G.

KRUPNOV, case

officer in

Anerican Section, Tour-

ist Department, who arranged con-

Chief Directorate officer, (fnu)

SAVESEV, When OMFLICH visited Mos-

(1964)

Personal involvement. (1964)

EBRENNTKOV,-

Seracy:

Ir. 1955,

67 о 1951.

SEREBRENNIKOV, an

lover of the library of Congress,

site Noseow with a Congrensional

rgatio:..

He had a brother, a

icai doctor, living in serdluvsk,

She dos arranged to bring

the

rosENko told the rel that it was

to use the

"reunion of the two

at a possible wedge toward

ruitmont of SEREBRENNIKUV"; he told

that the KGB had information indi-

ing SEREBRENNIKOV to be connected

hancricon Intelligonce and that the

pose ot the meting was "to feel

out."

NOSENKO himself arrangou for

EBRENNIKOY's biother to be brought

Moscow and then briefed him to meet

EBREN:IxOV. "first as brother moeting

ther."

ilo told thie brother that che

would have further instructions for

after the first mecting.

A meet-

did tako place, but it

was "vury

tIonal" ind the brother later told

foD that he had no opportunity

discuss with SFREBRENNIKOV the pos-

ility of his helping the Soviet

ол.

Aa SEREBRENNIKOV was only in

cow for a few days, do further meet-

s/ took place and no further action

taken by tlie ice.

NOSENKO Said

& the iGB fult that SEREBRENNIKOV

suspicious of his contact with his

ther.

In further detailg.

Mach

© FBI (

concerning

nis 1956 tour of the sov-

ict Union accompanying

Senator Henry

!!. JACKSON and Licutenant Coloncl

Edward HATHAWAY from

the Pentagon.

On his last night in Moscow he re-

ceived a telephone call in his hotel

room from a person who said he was

SEREBRENNIKOV's brother from Sverd-

lovsk, whom he had not, seen sinco

1918.

The brother tenuested a mect-

ing.

SEREBRENNIKOV was convinced

from the caller's uneducated speech

and other signs that he was not in

fact his brother.

Therefore, he re-

fused to see him. Immediately after

the 10-minute conversation, SEREBREN-

NIKOV called Senator JACKSON'& hotel

room to

report what had happened.

Senator JACKSON sent Culonel lATHA-

WAY to SEREBRENNIKOV's hotel room,

and they discussed the entira inci

dent.

At JACKSON's suggestion.

SEREBRENNIKOV then moved into the

Senator's room for the night.

SERF,-

BRENNIKOV also advisad thn U.S. Emb-

assy of the incident. After his return

to the United States, the story of

the phone call wus written up in

Newsweek magazine.

The articlo

wrongly stated that SEREBRENNISOV

knew his brother was dead.

...

---

## Page 44

Marcisco:

carrespond-

SAT, FRONT

Wil's

an oreraitondl

1E 0e the U.s. Envassy Sectiün,

Leon Marthat, during 1993

195%.

Nichou wis assigned

•with terrorsibility for

such

along.

NOSEYKO LeAd 41.

c.1-

dentll file or carIssoY

but

1 t

impossible to

tcl1

tiles itother the targel

c.

•10:

12:

nether

SUTToN, iho

JEcT

2

torist fin in the

Astaies, visited the USSR

veini

croisions

mind? became

ved with NGH mert larissa

Jun, in Inturist inter-

NOSEiKD's

FICT

1D5o brell 1950, when

ot martini

and

retired.

suspected that

she hurl

relationship with cuttoN

ethans 109 sitinate with

she did not rrack: this,

P. are their for NOSENKO

SUTION uICi

ife: SODOTOVA

letiris and

ards which he signed "alord."

390.

rorsonal

involvemert.

Fead develop-

mental file

On SALISBURY and also

handled to

KGP

ayents, a chauffeur

and a maid, vin word

reporting

on

him.

(1454)

SALISBURY was first in Moscon

tt 1984

and again lived there from 1949 to

1954.

He was closely assoriated

with

Thomas WHITNEY and WilTNtY'o

wife during later period (see abora).

Personal involvement as SOBO-

ROVA'S CasO

officer.

(1964)

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 45

391.

Asie Willian:

rew York city

Icean:

wis

worker on by the

inian ken in Juns 1663 with

rol rosults; had beer pre-

in. Mascar dui-

An marland Coal in 1958, luit.

concilood

tunid and un-

Rising get at

that tine.

source not named.

NOSENSO Suid he

had no personal involvement,

1950 and 1963 trips made during

NOSENKO's service ir Tourist De-

partitat:;

trip, which

NOSENKO did not montion, was wien

NOSENKO war

in the ericar De-

partment.

Supervisor of operations against

amorican code clurks.

(1964)

Travellod to

the

USS in 1908, 2760

and 1963, and had a cia alueloi dur-

in the 1960 trip, upon satin trou

1950 trip, reported istalle of tus

approachos in 1958 and 1940, Sanying

receptance of soviat preg

OTTE FBI ST

TOR

NiSENiO identified

state

Dupartment code

ok

who was a target of v.V.

1OI.APC'V.

NOSPNTO did not recall

de mYLUK surved carlier and

#ho was not aware of any bick-

ind intermation the KGB miaht

¿hal concerning him.

The sov-

maid who cleaned laytor's room

a KGB agent,

and at KGB direc-

rucceeded in getting TAYLOR to

TAYLOR

BCIVEd In TO! ATIV

1898 g

code clerk from Mitti 1959 en -5op

tamber 1951 and later confootal that

during this tous ha parfoird clandas-

tina

taghs (including che prosago

of clapuified vessages)

for a min

ho believed to se a santa: of Isragli

Intelligance.

He arrived in Moscow

in February 1960 and, after living

a month in a Sovlot hotel, aoved into

quarters in the Embassy: Hiu sala.

was Sophia ALEKSEYEVA:..:

iccordins to

---

## Page 46

392.

apartment where she lived with

rlfriend.

TAYLOR and the maid

mie intimate; however, no com-

Lsing

photographs were taken

apartment

as the kGB pre-

ad to lure him to a diffurent

tment which was better suited

this purpose.

By studying his

acter, the muid learred that

ough

not a Communist,

TAYIOR

sympathetic

toward the people

way of life in the USSR.

At

point it was decided to insert

LAPOV into the operation

lo accomplish this,

LAPOV contacted

the agent's girl-

nid and recruited her as an op-

Y was then arranged at the maid's

tment, and KOSOLAPOV was intro

TAYIOR as a friend of the

It was KOSOLAPOV's in-

don to develop TAYLOR further

make a thorough assessment with

deological approuch boing the

1 objectivo.

This was toward

and of TAYLOR's tour.

V never mot him again, and

a was no recruitment approach.

as NOSENKO's opinion thirt no

impt was made: to recruit TAYLOR

his time partly because the

did not want to jeopardize

more importart STORSBERG case

Part V.E.3.c.) Uy risking &

Tho casu was turned ovor

De First Chief Directorate when

OR was reassigned from Moscow.

TAYLOR, he began to have intimate

relations with her in

about Septem

ber 1960.

On the first four occa-

sions, their relations took place

in TAYLOR's quarters, but there-

after, because TAYLOR roomed with

the code clerk Paul JENNER,

Sophia

irvited TAYLOR to her apartment.

Taxi her could ave been inesmate

Shortly after he began having rela-

tions with her. Sophia announced

that she was pregnant; TAYLOR Of-

fered her money

for

an abortion but,

he said, she refused to take the

money.

In about December 1960,

Sophia invited TAYLOR to visit her

girlfriend's apartment (she had no

roommate).

TAYLOR recalled that

this was

a well-furnished apartment

with, he believed, a full length

mirror on the closet door; TAYLOR

thought the KGB could not have

acquired photographs because the

lights wore out during their rola-

tions.

Around Christmas or New

Years

1960, TAYLOR also recalled,

there

was a party in Sophia's apart-

two soviets who did not speak

TAYLOR

left Moscow in February 1961.

has denied ever being approachod for

any purpose by Soviet Intelligence.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 47

racin

In 1957 or 10ia, in

Intoratore or his-

beime involved

with Tamar KUrGA-

a doB agent within Inturist.

al-

age Protonsor thomason nec

intimate

zions with duNgaRova and protogrugha

2acgu:rud,

ho was not appro. ined

recruited by the dos.

It was pinined

conciline asshosmont ot THOPSON and

sanditional grounds for roccuitment

le icturnod to the dash.

ile did not

lowine ion Liin (date not givers

marionind

that the case be retirre

Ge Archives.

393.

cnsik0 reviered THoMPson'g file.

(190:)

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 48

394.

ROr,

merican profes-

TWAROG

cale to the

Soviet Union

1062 o: 1963 and was the target

an operation run by k.G. KRUPNOV.

ROG is i suncidlist. in Russian

nature nd end fluent Ruser

I!: was lurod into a compronising

uation by a fraale KGB agent ind

cographs were

taken.

At one point

officer Yevguniy NOSKOV was piaced

Irect contact with INAPhs, but It

decided not. to approach him as

comproniring photogcaphy wag not

sidered infficiant bagat for ra-

itment ind he was expected to

wen to the USSR in 1964 or 1965.

No source given. (1964)

maritalin

iliale

in

THOMESON rapOrtoù JE

that a sorior sonalin:

had toid his that Mortsix

tligate sitt

SEVEN

debts and 1g

ronaldo.

someond tiny

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 49

335.

APardi, Lage: lawrence Alician,

Source not named.

NOSENKO said

Merican o: Timonian bacrground,

"he was a

tourist and that's why

Sator the CoaR in November 1303; he

our min made the

first contact

satactod

the

kap and told thom of an

with hin."

This war one of the

ArT:

main in tilitary Ine louds which Nosfukh "sirpiy

in tell

jutter denti

seccase

KG CE 10г1610

Tatulli ponce use

oc vision, it crossue

the intents outage soloure tor

(196,4)

captati

IN

Birchene

pleader.

ne placed or a train going fron

arlin to doscow sor time in 1953

261051, in order lottrite 10 ..

did bacore roguninted with

and

gave

hin nor address and

Although

was

ip, ne

sure

she would

heir fron

never did call hur in

anorard hoird this story tron

PANTRATOO, WICSt

POSANKO

that thr case officee wording

gORAnt VAN LACTEM himself nos

sible for work against al! niem-

bors of the Air Attache office

at that time.

TOP. SECRET

GROIDS VAN LALTHEN WAS. 100I9EANE

Army ittacho

at tha 0.8.2068088

In Hogcon

fron March 1351 to March

19530

and again from March to

May 1955.

He was the erypingraphic

sccurity officer, in charge of

tho

the activiting or tha madalary codo

clerks and mechanica, Ircluelng

Dayle SMITH, and

1955 arsignmant on 29lates to tho

usu of new and

sonsitivo electionle

equipment carsted by allitary atraches

on trips.

This equipton: was captured

by the KGa in Stalingrad in Msy 1955.

He has boen Intarviewed on a numbas

of occasions and has reportod. no

incident similar to that concribea

by NoSENKO..

see.V.C.36(4)-fo5. do-

---

## Page 50

EFFORD.

Frederick rayne: A guide

the merican

exhibition in Moscow

959 and roonmate there of Robert.

ETT (iru abova?).

WILLENFORD became

Ived wich Nosauko's homosexual agents

Ov and MERaMOV and plotographs were

recalagina to approach hi, wis

da, however, because of a screral pro

tion on

¿ecruitment attempts it the

bition in connoction with tHROSHCHE"s

lcoming trip to tho United States.

Matthes

NOSENKO supervised

oR duverophent

ajaration against

fary code rierr quiUs, who replaced

•* SPONSPIRG at the

murical Embassy

961.

As

part of this cocclopmunt

iNKO

direct: his

agent: C021323

a studying n

caudintaince at Anoric

in.

10r1t00l1y

osadwas to help

Ive bull's with a soviet

female.

became fiicads with t00s during

mber of visits

Anerica lious?,

was isle to accomplish and report

was reserved by nature.

sing came of the overation.

MaUrICC:

JOSENKO identified

Anerican

I who was actively worked on" in

•ow durina the 1960-1361 poriod;

NO supervised activity ajainst

An agent, nime unkrown, an Arab

ni tho

Fosptian Enbassy, introduced

NG tO Tags VArIAMOVA, an agent

of

U.S. Embassy Section, and ZWING

Ited

her apartment several times.

• NOVA diA

not like ZWANG, however,

did not want to have intercourse

30t.

poisonal involurment as case

officer

for agents

VOLKOV and

YEFRENOV: was behird two-way

mirror ind viewed compromising

acts.

(1961)

Perional irvolvement as case

officer.

(1904)

Invoi vament

as supervisor of

cpurations against American

code clerks.

(1964)

Interviewed by

tin

mber

1965, he

said

he had

met

i but did

Mida to him for

not know

hig names and

only about 15

minutes on one occasion; admitted

sexual rolationships with a number

of third nationals

in Muscow.

CIA

has information conceining othet

activity

againat ZUJUS at Andrica

House, which NOSENKO did not In-

late to him. sue Part V.P.. J.c.(v).

ZWANG, a State Department oode

clert.

served in Moscow fron Fobru-

ary 1961 to January 1942.

His maid

from February

to October 1961 was

Sophia ALEKSEYEVA.

*1.3

ate

Deva.

TOP SEP--

---

## Page 51

397.

rosthis reason the case was

ropped

and

no ricruitrent

approach

wan

ado to ZwANG.

In 1965 NOSENKO

said that

•V. MOSOiAPOV was the case officer respon-

ible ior zwiNd and wrote the opcrutional.

aln concerting hi.n.

It was G.I. GRYARIN!.

everthriess, who arrangcd for the Egyptian

gent to visit imerica

House,

where he not

nd cocologed rintG.

cRYAgNOY was also thr

tie introduced to zaave trourk

tie

gyptiii.

at the time bostito left tho

.s.

midasy soction in January 190%, thoir

lither activity

mirrounding

other merid in cotad with

"!:"

C TOP SECRET

ZWANG has

been descrain by fallou

Americans

in

MOscoW

80 a beavy iyam-

bler;

he

has

a150

bean

cogurred by

various sources

to liars

bec" active

in currency speculation and black

mcket activitica centering around

witon NOSLiNKO

identitiud an KOSULAPOV' &

agent.

He resigned tron: the state

Department.

---

## Page 52

Unsuccessful Approaches

spelt

Load

"R,

Peter: The KGB attempted to re-

-, BINDER, an Army sergeant

assigned

1e U.S. Embassy

in Moscow on the

sof his involvoment with & Russiail

at merica touse.

The attempt

NS.

Horsit

Henry: A foriner Soviet

zen who

Tert the USSR with re-

ting German troops in 1912, BRAUNS

target of unsuccessful approach

he returned to

the

Soviet Union

courist to visit relatives

in

• BRAUNS was cold he would be

yed with war crimes unless he

pted recruitment; he initially

ed, but later refused to co-

ate.

The KG3 has dropped the

STONE, Richard:

recording to

con given on § June 1962, the

obtained

photography

showing

STONE, Second Secretary at the

Embassy, engaging in both

sexual and neterosexual acts;

KGB approached him

on this

slin eithor 1958 or 1959; HARM-

E rojected recruitment and Ic-

ed the incicent to his superiors;

id not tell entire story, how-

• but said only that he was

sached

on basis of heterosexual

romise.

NOSENKO volunteered

398.

Sourcing and Date of Report

Source not named.

NOSENKO said

he nover read BINDER's file,

he saw some "materials"

concerning him in 1961 while in

the li.s.

Embassy Section.

more information after return to

the Tourist Department in early

january 1962.

Vladimir DEMKIN and

FEDOSEYEV named by NOSENKO as

participating ir case.

(1964)

Personal involvement as supervisory

Tourist Departmet official and

later as recruiting officer.

SENKO reported that when BRAUNS IE-

fused to cooperate, he (NOSENKO)

travelled to Leningrad to speak

wit? him.

Parts of lead lrained

from K.G. KRUPNOV, who originally

approached BRAUNS in Moscow.

No source given in 1962: in 1964

NOSENKO said he learned of the

case from Chief of the U.s. amb-

assy Sectior, V.M. KOVSHUK. Did

not know who made the approach.

(1962)

Investigation Results

BINDER reported the attempted

re-

cruitment at once and was recalled

from Moscow; 4

served

in Moscow from

until 22 January 1963.

V. D.4.c.

16 March 1961

See

Part

HARMSTONE served in Moscow from

October 1957 until routinely trans-

ferred in October 1959.

On 23 May

1959 he reported an approach by

KGB during which was shown photo-

graphs of himself in homosexual

acts with a Soviet acquaintance.

Claimed he did not participate.and

was drugged when photos made.

knowledge of Security officer and

Minister Counsellor,

HARMSTONE kept

first appointment to meet same sov

iet who approached him but then

broke contact.

Tentatively

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 53

tithin report was not made in the

A85y l'u!

did

not clalorado.

In 1961

ENKo inli ClA that KcH knew HARSTONE

be homosixual, but hau no photographs;

refoir approach made on basis of

s.

showing hir in hetcrosexual

On basis cf

information fron micro-

nes in

KGB wis certain

the riid not raport kGb's knowindge

his homosexuality.

Later said this

osharu on telephone tapa and fact.

EHARISTONE was not removed from

cow immediatoly.

In loth versions

ENKO mid that this fact would lie

auto prescare

HARASTONE should he

ear again abread.

SERC

Jarrs:

Tie KCB discovered that

Code clock, was a homosexual

one

ne the

WeB ajonts at Ancrics

se

spotted hin kissing a menier of

isitlin

Tc0 Capades

tow..

Appar-

the Maricans determined KEYSEAS'

iness at the same time.

as prepira-

ne wire inmediatoly made to

remove

SERS croin Morcow.

Bocatrc.of lack

time.

ill the

KGB could jo vas to

S KEISERS a lotter pointing

out he

lin duep trouble and urging

hin to

ect.

¡SYGERS reportod this

lotter

inarioon pificials.

it tho airport,

N KEysERs was inaving Moscow, he

appronched by rosEnio, wio mide

al bid

fOr KFYSERS to rorain in the

ihen originally reporting this

d, NOSENKO named the Mnerican as

US ani then, a

few days

later, called

pecial meeting with CIA to correct

mistake

399.

Personal involvement as incrican

repurtment officer responsible

for operations against u.s. code

clocks; porsorail: accosted KEy-

SERS it Moscow airpurt.

(1962,

without name)

identified Soviet as KOVSHUK.

After

Icturning to hashington,

HARMSTONE.

ade tad taylore Department t

Subsequently resigneu.

CHERLPANOV papers

ment dated August 1958 which details

KGB plans for operational

against HARMSTONE..

See Part VI.D. 8.6.

KEYSERS, who performed code clerk

duties

for a

short

time in addition

to his regular administrative func-

tions in the office of the Military

Attache, was recognized as a homo-

saxual in the

spring of 1961 and

was

removed from Moscow shortly there-

after.

lie had earlier been relieved

of code clerk duties

due to lack of

interest and aptitude.

Events

in-

cluding delivery of the letter and

the approach at the airport were

much as NOSENKO described.

KEYSERS

unable to identify NOSENKO photo-

graph.

Sae Part V.E.3.c.(vl).

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 54

TH, Edward:

KGB cryptonym "RYTuYY."

arity Officur at the

U.S. Einbassy

was the target of an unsuccesseul

ceruitmont operation.

In 1954 or

the basis of faisified

SMITH and his Kussian maid

sexual relations, the KGB tried to

on the fact that he was

an affair with

sent to him In a let-

Whith ser up a meeting with

game to the mooting, bur did not

ge to recruitment; ayreed to come

another mucting.

He did not appear,

Mateur receiving sevoral more

datoning letters from the luB,

Gon tessud to the ambassador and was

ORSBERG,

James Harry: Military code

ork who was NOSENKO

s principal re-

ultrent target during 1960-1261.

ow-moving development operation

naisted of involving

STORSBERG

rét with a series of soviet fenales

th the aid of NOSENKO's agent, Johan

EISFREUND,

a Finnish businessman;

cond in blackmarket activities;

d finally,

with the did of n.s.

VORI'SUV (who posed as a French

Binessian) with more female KGB

ants.

Compromising photographs

400.

NOSENKO claimod case officer in-

volvement in the operation

1962, bu! in 1961 retracted this

and said he learned of the case

from V.M. KOVSHlUk who was the

case officer.

His only role was

in a surveillance phone-watch.

Personal involvement.

said he devoted almost full time

to this case for about a year.

In 1964 NOSENKO said he was pres-

ent in the hall outside the

hotel room in

which STORSBERG

was approached.

In 1962 NOSENKO

had said that he personally

approached STORSBERG. (1962,

without name)

GOLITSYN told of

reading, some time

.in 1957, of a case against a U.S.

security Officer, not namea,

on his love affair with his

By KGB instruction

she was being forced to work for

the KGB and would be arrested if

she did not.

He helped her by pass-

ing her talse information,

the KGB objected, after which he

paused i mixture

of false and true

material.

This took place between

1953. and 1957.

Edward Ellis SMITH

ichnowleuged to CIA his having ro-

ceived letters las described by

NOSENKO) --in June 1956--but denieu

having personal meetings with the

confess to the Ambassa-

dos, but only to having been intimate

with the maid.

Not until 1962, when

confronted with the details from

GOLITSYN, did he confirm the truth

of the rest of the story as GOLITSYN

At all times he deniea

accepting recruitment.

VI.D.A.c. for detailg.

GOLITSYN reported two leads which

may relate to this operation.

First was to a military code clerk

in Moscow who had been developed

to the point where recruitment

was virtually assured by spring

of 1960.

(STORSBERG was one of

two American "military code clerks"

in Moscow at the time.)

Second

lead was to American

at U.S. Emb-

assy

who was successfully recruited

with

the aid of PREISFREUND in

late 1960.

(NOSENKO and PREISFREUND

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 55

obtainca and STORSAERG

was

sached on basis his activitics ard

incial ared shortly before he was

isianna

in lair 1961.

STORSBERG

cooperate, but did not Ic-

the approne!

to

the Americans ard

i approiched again by the KGB if

ames

abroad.

Scllette:

SCHWARZENBACH

the

Earact or an unsucressful

KGB

•uitment

approach ir 1358 or 1959.

was woking in Moscow at the time

tell in love with a male KGB agent.

KGB 113d

contromiring photographs

or with this soviet,

but it

Was

S850'i orinion that these weie

no,'

which was

based

aftection

the Sov-

• Nostar aid not know wild made

100rca.0 or urier what cilcur-

ho was curtain the attempt

1.01!.

101.

NOSCHKO said he nas not sure from

wom he learned this information,

but it. may have

come from v.i.

MIKHAYLOV Of the U.S. Embassy

Sec-

tion no directed the operation.

POSEiro did not read the file on

SCHWARZENBACH, but saw it and the

cunpromising

photographs.

(1964)

reported that PREISFRFUND look part

in

anis one operatio

against STORSBERG.)

HE FRI

and the Air Force Offico of Special

Investigations

(OSI).

ritalia

During 1955 and 1956, SCHWARZENBACH

was secrotary to Mrs. BOHLEN, the

imbassador's wife, anà Director

of the Anglo-American School in Mos-

cow.

In 1950 and 1957 she worked

for Hunry SHAPIRO, UP representative

there (see fart VI.D.2.a.J

While

emplojed by SHAPIRO she became

acquainted with one Vi):tor'I. SER-

GEYEV, & functionary in the pub-

lishing business.

In January 1959

she was approached by a KGB officer

in Riga

on the basis of compromising

photography and

wis asked. to provide

sprcific information

on the U.S.

Embassy.

She reported this at

once

to Henry SHAPIRO, who told

Anbassador THOMPSON.

SCHWARZENBACH

left the USSR in carly 1959, shortly

after the incident.

She was inter-

viewed by the

State Dopartnent

Re-

gional Security Offi

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 56

402.

Investigations

NOsINtO was the KGB

uring 1900-1961.

ABIDIni, the U.5.

mbassy Socurity Officer,

was con-

idered

to be a cIA officer and

the

ost important target of the second

hdet Diroctorate in this period.

owner, it was decided merely to

atch

51M

aac not attomor recruit-

ant

in hopes of "caichl:,

unother

Ded!" Icha GRU licutenant

colonei

ho had her handled ty

former

ecurity Officur Russeli

LANGELLE

nd who, according to MoSaMio, was

pprctuaded an 1059 through surverl-

WUSENIO rECeiVd

the report-

ng from those agents who wore in tonen

ith ARIDiaN and supervised surveil-

ance

coverage

on him.

Ät che

IA90%.

ARIDIAN waS noted

visiting

maddress on Pusiir.in Street ir. Mos-

on which appeared suitable for d

ad drop and special surveillance

fi this location was begun, but there

2E

no

eusults.

Only later, When

OSANKO

was no longer in the u.S.

moiss!

suction, was it. trioned this

his dios site was relatra to the Pin-

Duskii operation (eRu colonel who vis

gent source for CIA and British in-

elligence).

Donald:

Born in 1937, . U.S.

Itizes, travelled to the USSR

in 1963

nid wils

the target of a KGB investi-

ation in Sochi; he was thought to be-

ang to imerican Intelligence because

his contacts with

# KGB agent,

syptonym

"TRAPEZUND."

P'ersonal involvement as AbIDIAN'n

casi officer.

Attor ARIDIAN visiteo

Pushkin Street addiess, NOSENKO

inspected area and later received

reports of stationary surveillance

established across the street.

(1962)

ABIDIAN was a CIA cooptee during

this period

and among other assign-

ments visited the dead drop on one

occasion, as mentioned by

NOSENKO.

This visit was occasioned by re-

ceipt of what appeared to be a

telephone signal from PENKOVSKIY.

It took place on 30 December 1961,

¿ year after the date given by

NOSEUKO and several days before

NOSENKO allegedly

transferred to

the Tourist Department.

VI. D.7.b.

Personal involvement; supervised

of local

KGb organika-

cion; discussed cose with the

American Department and with 0.11

GRIBANOV, Chief of the Second Chief

Directorate.

(1964)

Donald ALBINGER travellad to

saviot Union in 19639.

VEL FBI, E

the

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 57

7057.94

ORN, Frederick: BARCIDORN, a

-Tale University, vas

Of a KGB provocation operation

35 the fiGl planted disintorne-

1 BARGHDORY and then arrested

he purpose of the piovocation:

counteract the Fil arrest of

connuction

he BUTENFO

ly tracing

discotroging

such artists

BARGUOURN

at the time of IVANOV's

considered the

availabir hostage for i

LEMY, Zoras Fran: lin:

Twice

urIst Tircups to the USSR in

nid was assessed as in Aniri-

-telligence agent; DNNTHELEMY

ntact witho

Sa Xin agent.

a Fin:

403.

Personal involvement in prelimi-

nary

discussions and

selection

of

BARGIOOKI as victim; NOSENKO was

present

during initial stages of

BARGICOIN'S

interrogation follow-

ing his arrest.

(1964)

BARGHOORN was arrested in

Moscow on 31 October 1963 after an

unknown Soviet approached him on

the street and placed what purported

to be classified documents

BARGHOONN's account of the

provocation-arrost and its aftermath

goncrally coincides with that given

he NOSENKO.

BARGHOORN Iccognized

NOSENKO's photograph as that of one

of the Soviets present at his inter-

rogation.

see Part V.F.7.

Liarod of BARTHBENY's contact

with alte from the Loningrad KG&

whil those on TDY in 1963.

THELERY hau been under observa-

tion by the 'fourist Department in

boaaase KGB had intornation

no had graluated from an intel-

This information

was in his file in luurist Depart-

A clA contact whose intelligence

connections vere

assuned to have been

compromised during trips to the USSR;

nand appears in a KGB

Western

tourist

operations,

supplica

by GOTITSYN in 1962.

BARTHELEMY I0-

contacts with

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 58

BENSON, an Army major,

Assistant Army Attache in Mos-

11955: because of his status he

intelligenc

was cherofore studied.

KGB had wanted

de ne alectronic intel Agend-

nent being used by the Ameri-

As carly as the beginning ot

authorization was given the

endassy Section to steal this

was accomplished in

when BENSON was on a trip

ngrad with follow attaches

MUiE and William STROUD.

dainod that the american attaches

tie equipment in their hotel roon,

broke in ät

All three

dans were then derlared persona

Other than normal sur-

ance, no other action taken

a reason during deacon cour.

while visiting the

Union

TERMAN, an American

ind prominent jurist, was

unded by KGB agents,

but the kGB

Ildo nothing with him.

404.

Personal involvement as U.S.

Embassy Section officer working

against military attaches in 1953-

Took part in initial attempts

to securo electronic equipment, but

had transterred to Tourist Department

in June 1955, before the theft took

place and was not involved. (1964)

In May 1955 the KGB officers forced

" their way into the Stalingrad hotel

room occupied by Assistant Army

Attaches BENSON, MULE and STROUD,

pinioned the officers, and loft

with sensitive electronic equip-

The three were immediately

declared persona non grata by the

Sovict Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

See Part V.C.3.b.

GOLITSYN also

reported on the Stalingrad equip-

seizure; he added that a KGB

general organized the operation.

When the Soviet General Staff gave

the equipment a very high evalua-

tion, it was then recommended for

by the Soviets abroad.

iN: Lewis: In 1960 the KGB

dered that Lewis BOWDEN was

acurity Officer at the American

ssy and that he was "perhaps

noted with Cia or the Fal.

He

lealing with

counterintelligence

ers such as "SK" li.e., was con-

aộ with security of Americans

SCOW. The IJ.S. Embassy Section

Source not named, and NOSENKO

did not provide date he obtained

this intormation. He said he did

not know anything about BERMAN other

than that he is a professor of law,

came to the USSi quite often, and

was being studied. (1964)

KOVSHUK, who told NOSENKO about

BOWDEN in 1959 when NOSENKO was

in Tourist Department.

NOSENKO

used Arsene FRIPPEL,

KGB agent

recruited in 1959, as a source

on BOWDEN. (1964)

BERMAN is a professor at Harvard

University specializing in the

Soviet legal system; he has visited

the USSR on several occasions for

study and research and has described

several incidents in Moscow which

appear to have been provocations.

was Second Secretary in the

Internal Affairs Section of the

U.S. Embassy in 1958-1960.

connected with CIA or the FBI

at this time.

He is the subject

of the CHEREPANOV paper giving

an operational plan, dated Febru

ary 1960, which sets the goal of

"exposing his possible agent

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 59

Officer working against him

•A. KUSKOV, and V.M. KOVSHUK

was acquainted with him.

Robert Charles:

CHRISTNER

prested while touring the sov-

nion by automobile.

(NOSENHO

this case in passing while re-

ng a list of Americans who had

ad the USSR; he was not ques-

& further on it.)

ILIN, Howard L.: A lieutenant

and Assistant Army

Attache

1953 until 1951 or 1955, when

18 declared persona non grata

tallation for a similar not

10 Unired states.

FEi,CHI.IN

iutomalically.ascunod to be

telligence officer and was

led accordingly.

LOUSER, Richard:

The U.S. Einb-

Section

suspected that FUNK-

iR was a CIA officer because he

specialist on Russia, parti-

•Ly economics.

NOSENKO did

doall the names of agents to-

ng on FUNKHOUSER but reported

the case officer responsible

lim was V.A. KUSKOV.

ксіми

IOFF

Ray: At Geneva disarma-

talks

in spring of 190% and

olled to the USSR in 1963 and was

noted by the KGB of being an

ican Intelliyence officer;

NKO assigned to watch him in

va in 1962 and close watch was

405.

None indicated. (1964)

Personal involvement as Aneri-

can Dupartment case officer re-

sponsible for FELCHLIN.

NOSENKO

held FELCHLIN's file and directed

aunts surrounding him. (1964)

Source not named.

NOSENKO thought

he may

have read some of the

"matorials"

concerning FUNKHOUSER,

but could not recall their con-

tent.

(1964)

Source not named. Tourist De-

partment case while GARTHOFF

was in USER.

(1961)

contacts, as well as his counterin-

telligence activity in the Embassy."

See Part VI.D.7.c.

announced in the press and as

a KGB document on Aneri-

can tourists which GOLITSYN pro-

vided, CHRISTNER was arrested on

chaiges of espionage in the summer

of 1961.

He had a CIA assignment

time, but reported that he

managed to

maintain

his tourist

cover through intensive interroga-

FELCHLIN, who arrived in Moscow in

July 1953

was declared

persona

grata with Major Walter MCKINNEX

on 25 March 1954; they were charged

with spying while

VOstOK.

trip to Vladi-

soe Part V.C.3.b.

FUNKHAUSER was Counsellor for Econo-

mic Affairs at the U.S.

Embassy

in 1961-1962; ho was not associated

with CIA, although this official

position was at one time overtly

hold by a cla officer known to the

KGB.

A former overt CIA employee, GARY-

HoFF is now an advisor to the State

Department and instructor at ti

sino-soviet Institute at George

Washington University; he is a

specialist in Soviet political and

military policy.

---

## Page 60

406.

him in 1963, wich. KGB igents were

gainst him; possibly using inter-

cover.

¡Birnard:

A member of the ¿PUSA

Irsiient of New York City, KOTEN

A a numbur of contacts with a

MIEN travelled to the suvic

in 1963.

he carried with him th

is of relatives of this agent and

iod to visit them.

NOTEs cherr-

as considered

to

be

a probable

éni.

and bccause

of

this and

signs of FUI

susaicion of the

incy began pregitations

tis grit

agent out of the

United states.

ROTH: was in the Cosk, he wis

sfully compromisco by a xos

pual igent, was arcested, inter-

id, and inprisoned. lis deter-

áu beon requusted by the Firs:

Directorate, which wanted to

time for the sun açunt to 0s-

refore NOTEN returned to the

Supervised the case as Deputy

Chief of

the

Tourist Department

and

sanutioned KOTEN's compromise

and detention in the absence of

C.M. GRIBANOV and NOSENKO's other

superiors. (1444)

FillroreK.:

Repinted MICKEl-

Ariny Attache (see below aad,

was automatically assuned to

Matary intelligence offiece:

(surrounded with agents, and-

le entered the country for the

time, his baggage was searched

gopy of his service record found.

was no approach to him, anc no

buses or vulnerabilities wire

during his tour in Moscow.

personai involvement as case

officer responsible for military

attaches durirg 1953-1955. NO-

SENKO was present when baggage was

scarched with assistance of the

Special Technical Section of the

Secund Chief Directorate.

twins!

KOTEN,

an instructor at NYU and mem-

ber of a number of Communist front

organizations, wasinterviewed by

representatives of the State Depart-

ment in January 1964.

He described

his arrest, interrogation, and

month-

long inprisonment in August-September

1963, saying that he denied being

an FBI agent and that the Soviets

later told him the arrest was all

a mistake.

He was released on 28

September 1963 after intervention

by the CPUSA.

In unprecedented

move, fact of arrest

on horosexual

charges leaked to Western press by

Inturist, and case received wide

publicity in u.s.

newspapers in

1963.

Army Attache in Moscow in 1954-

1955, replacing MICKELSON.

A nun-

ber of incidents, including one

recruitment approach, on record--

none of which has NOSENKO reported.

See Part V.C.3.b.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 61

ISON,

Part 4.:

Army Attache and

ed military

intelligence officer;

fore, main task of U.S. Embassy

on was not recruitment, but to

nt him from carrying out his in-

jence mission in

the USSR by

File

ir

surveillance.

MICHEL-

the

U.s.

Embassy Section

ined nothing unusual or

Interest-

rom any souice and no derogatory

nation.

P.F. PANKRAIOV was the

al case officer working against

and the case was turned over to

KO in 1954.

It may have been

LSON rather than MEARNS whose

je was searched (see abuve).

Walter:

Captain MULF was an

tant Army Altache in Moscow in

1955.

I. either 1953 or 1954,

KO accompanied N.M.

BORODIN and

KOVSHUK

to Leningrad, where BURO-

ropositioned MULE

to work for

MULE retused.

In 1955,

was with Benson and StroUd in

ngrad when the KGB broke into

hotel room ard stole classified

ronics equipment.

He was declared

se non grita

shortly afterwards.

BENSON, atove.)

Lee Harvey:

When OSWALD in 1959

red his desire to defect to the

Union and particularly after he

rted

suicide ly

slashing his

wrists,

B felt that there

waS

"something

• with him and decided to leave him

ily alone.

OSWAID was never

iched by the KoB at any time during

tay in the USSR or subsequently and

o he nor his wife Marina were, at

Ime, KGB agents.

407.

Personal involvement as

responsible case officer

in

1954. (1964)

Served as Army Attache from 1952

until December 1954.

See Part

v.c.3.b.

Personal involvement as respon-

sible case officer in 1954-1955.

NOSENKO and KOVSHUK blocked MULE's

calt from Loningrad hotel

that BORODIN

room

50

could

talk to him in

1953 or 1954. (1964)

Leningrad incident took place on

29 September 1954 and was reported

at once by MULE.

Along with BENSON

and STROUD, he was declared persona

non grata on 7 May 1955. See Part

v.c.3.b.

Personal varlicpation; NOSENKO

Documents provided by the Soviet

was first involved with OSWALD in

Government after

the assassination

1959, when as a Tourist Department

are consistent with NOSENKO'g

officer, ne had a part in considera- account and give no indication of

tion of OSWALD's application for

KGB interest in OSWALD. See Part

Soviet citizenship and the KGB's de- V.D.6.

cision to "wash its hands of him."

In 1963, after President KENNEDY'&

assassination, NOSENKO, then Deputy

thief of the Tourist Department, took

part in investig.tions of OSWALD.

(1964)

---

## Page 62

Gahrirl:

Head of the Cosmics

REINER Tency; has visited the Soviet

Union and is of interest to the NGe

whach has pinerd

officor: ir contact

with him:

horrors, he is besseved 1o

in contact with the FRi, and no

madr to

recruit him

for his renson:

REINEs is talkative,

sarond, and lotte ta he would not t

Joud pinns naturiod, and any attempt

to contremiss tim

sculd de.

waste ot

time.

RECHANIS

1122: Lieurorant colonel

RECIT

..is

rin

Areistant Army attacke

in Moscor during

1954 and

1955 and is

suen was a suigece of study. HOSENKO

was

esponsille case offloor and hand-

er ?0r.l6 160r110G Ca RICHARDS.

hier: maliling

naul

RIARDs interosting 0: 14-

filc.

any food fred da merica vio

jophie shop in triw

"LiGER has visited the USER

revoral times, possibly in 1960 and

1901, und is suspected of bring

FAI

din'..

1: Now York he has

had

dealings with i numbur of soviet

visitors who cans to his store and

seemed to display more than normal

interost in then.

he

When it was thought

migit make some contacts or do

sonetling interesting in the USSR, the

Tourse lepartment put an agenc,

the

orner uf a Moscow photographic shop.

in contact with him.

They became

finds and may have exchanged cor-

respondence. there was no plan to

408.

Source not named. REINER was

in contact with Tourist Depart-

mont officer V.D. CHEINOKOV and

was considered

for KCB recruit-

ment in connection with. NOSENKO'S

plan to rccruit tourist fimm et-

ployces for use as spotters.

(1964)

Perconal

involvement; case offi-

cer.

(1961)

Sources not naned.

Tourist De-

pistront case officer was YuM.

DVORAIN; SIESTIGER visited USSR

at tine NOSENiN was in the rour-

ist repartment.

(1964)

Born in Lithuania or Poland, REINER

came to the United States in 1922:

he is a momher: of the New York City

Bar Association and has managed

Cosmos since 1935; he had travelled

extensively to the USSR and Satcl-

countries and is a registered

foreign agent on Inturist; he

has not been interviered by the FBI.

RICHARDS was Assistant Army Attache

from

July 1954 to July 1956.

He

was interviewed by CIA in November

1964 and mentioned a:number of sov-

iets with whom he had contact and

whom NOSCNKO: had identified as KGB

igents.

Crie

of these was Lyudmilla

GROMAKOVA, his language teacher,

whom NOSENKO identified but did not

associate with RICHARDS.

See Part

V.c. 3.6.

FBI

LTOP SECRED I

---

## Page 63

approich SLESINGER, but only to

study him.

NOSENKO had

no other

details.

STROUD, William R.: Captair STROUD

an Musistant Army Attache

And 1965.

conccaled micro-

phones tho KGB learned before his

arrimid in Moscow

that STRoUd ras an

axport in clectronic intelligence

techniques.

toyother with

and MULd 1g.V.l, was caught

by the bon an Stalingrad an posses-

sion i: ilectronic intelligence de-

vices and was declared persona nos

Other than this,

NOSENTO

mob nothina interesting or unusual about

STRodo Erom any source.

WASHENKO, Steve: The KGs considered

MastENko, the Agricultural Attacle, to -

oc cither a CIA officer or contact.

Or..'

drips onside Moscow he authent intor-

aation in manner of an intelligence:

Officer and was heard discussing rc-

ports on his return via concealed

microphones.

He once mailed a letter,

probably

in

1959, to a KGB-controlled

agent inside the USSR.

Also, he con-

tinually checked for surveillance.

American Department therefore in-

stituted special surveillance,

surrounded him with agents, and applied

metka

to his clothes to detect lotici-

maiTings.

409.

Personal involvement as respon-

sible case officer in 1954-1955,

but ind left first Department in

June: 1955, before

the Stalingrad

theft too!: place.

(1964)

source not named.

NOSENKO said he

joined U.S. Embassy Section in

January 1960; WASHENKO was

in Mos-

cow until March 1960.

(1964)

Assistant Military Attache from

FolIowing the

tronic equipment in Stalingrad.

Another source has connected this

operation with information re-

ceivod by the KGB from conceuled

microphones.

See Part V.C.3.b.

WASHENKO was in Moscow from January

1958 until March 1960; he had been

detached from his job

CIA employee but was coopted by the

cin for clandestine work during

Between April 1958 and

ary 1960, he mailud a total of 11

clandustine letters to addresses in-

side the USSR:

at least eight of the

addressees are now known to have

been under KGB control at the time

of the mailings.

The CHEREPANOV

Papers identify. WASHENKO as a CIA ;

officer.

See Part V.E.3.

I TOP SECRET 1

---

## Page 64

WINTERS was the

tle compromise of CIA agent

KGb surveillance detected WINtEkS

ma letter to POPOV in January

nd In this way got its first indi-

so that porov was working fox cIA.

because of his conduct, had

onsidured a ClA dificer and par-

pattention

was given hin prior

petter railing.

E's was voM. NovsulUk, who used the

and the cover of the Sov-

nistry o1 Forcign Affairs.

not ricolared pirson"

With LINGELD after the arrest:

OV because the KGB did not wilt

POPOV was discovored, in

pe that wINtERs

might attempt

-onal Intror mailings.

lally declared persona non grata

410.

First hoard of WINTERS from

KOVSHUK probably in 1959, when

KOVSHUk said that he had an

appointment to meet WINTERS and

therefore could not go out drink-

ing with NOSENKO; KOVSHUK probably

did not indicate that WINTERS was

a suspoctid ClA officer at this

after the POPOV compromise,

NOSENTO learned from KOVSHUK that

WINTERS, nOt LANGELLE, was the

true caus. of the compromise.

WINTERS served in Moscow from

June 1958 until October 1960, when

he was declared persona non grata

for his part in the POPOV opera-

tion.

(LANGELLE, POPOV's case

officer in Moscow, was declared

persona non grata a year carlier.).

A CJA staff officer, WINTERS mailed

one letter to POPOV in January

and performed other support func-

tions in connection with the case.

In debriefings he has described

his relationship with KOVSHUK, whom

ho saw frequently.

POPOV compromise is also given in

the CHEREPANOV Papers, many of

which

concern WINTERS.

vI.D.7.a.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 65

41!.

3. Selected Cases of Recruited Aner: cars

Of NOSENKO's loads to Americars recruited by the KGB,

were thres who, he indicated, had access to

classified U.S. Government information at the tine

he first reported

then to Cir.

These three cases--

"Sos sore in france le est Robert deeperso

therefore have been selected ior detailed discussion.

a. "SASHA"

(1) ROSE KO'S Information on the Agent

Ai the first meeting with ClA in 1541 NOSENKO arnounced that

he could not

continue to work in place for ClA; ne nas

going to

nutright, he said, rüther than do back to the Soviet Union.

He was told that

to make the arrarjements cor

his secure

removal from Switzerland

it would be necessary to expand the

limited number of people in ClA who vere arare of his case; in

this conrection it was extremely important that he think hard

about nether he knei of and indication ci penetration of cla.

His first reaction was to shrug his

shoulders

indicating that he

but upon

his case officer's insistence he thought

further about the question and finally said:

"I do not know of

any in ClA, but there 1s one in your military intelligence.

This

one worked

in Germany and then returned to America in 1955, and

then afier 1955 he worked in Germany.

He explained that he had

frst leorned of this case fron M.A. SHALYAPIN, who had been the

case officer

for ties operation in Germany.

This agent, whose

name NOSENKO did not knoi, was still in Cermany

SHALYAPIS lefe Berlin in about 1957.*

SHALYAPiN told him that this

agent's kiß cryptonym as "SAStiA," and that he had recruited

"SASHA" hamself in Germany,

on a purely financial basis.

if "SASHA" wore a uniform

while meeting his kGh handler, JOSENKO

said he appeared in

clothes.

He knew "SASHA" has of offi-

cer status,

but whether he was in civilian or military intelligence

he could not say; he thought, however,

the agent las working

against military

NOSENKO added that

"SASHA" returned to

the United States in

the 1960's, then specified i962, and returned

to Gernany again

after that.

February 1964, talking about another matter, NOSENKO

had remembered something that might help to identify

"SASHA." He had heard that the KGB had not had luck in getting

intelligence from high places in the U.S. Government during the

Cuban missile crisis in late 1962.** SHALYAPIN had

*On the basis of the collateral evidence on KGB officers in

Germany named by NOSENNO in connection with SHALYAPI

(see

below), it has been

established

that--despite NOSENKO's

dates

of 1955 to 1957--"SASHA" would huve been in Germany and

recruited some time

between early 1957. and late 1959, when

(according to NOSENKO) SHALYAPIN left Germany for an

assign-

ment to Cuba:

**See also Part V.F.10, for. NOSENKO's statements about the

role of GRU Colonel G.N. BOLSHAKOV in the Cuban missile crisis

of October 1962.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 66

sir: 412.0005.36:.:

=entioned in this contex: that "SASHA" had been stailoned in

United Siries

this period but had not been able to

infe:aatien of value.

105kv50 concluded trom

"SASHA'S"

secoul assignment to bernani, riere he served

intriligence,

dii nit tane nlace until

sometine after the Cuban crisis--Novonber 140? at the carliest,

ard perhaps noi wilsi the first part ot

firmly that SilAltipl had not toid hin this pari of the case,

but he was unable to sa; nho had.)

NOSE:X0 was not certain which department of the First Chief

Directorate nas criginally responsibie

"SASHA"; at first he

thought it was the Third (Euicyear, Department, because the agent

had been sucruites in Germany, but then he reierred to Cermany as

a special situation aid sald he thought li might have been

First (Anerican)

departnent, since the agent sas an anerican.

any event,

siaied, the

Seriive do.

"was the last First

Chief Directorate element responsible for the case, ilich indi-

cared that it nas not a valuabie operation producin, intelligence-.

otherwise the Anerican Department would

maic given it up to

Service do. 2.

HOSENKO knew no other ioo case ofticers bho

been personally intolved in

the care with or after SHALYAPI".

(ii) NOSESKO'S SourCing

NOSEVKO was iniervened intensively about SHALYAPIN and

the "SASHA" Case

a number of occasions.

Concerning. SHALYAPiS,

he said tiat

thus KöB officer had been

stationed in the United

States in 1914 or 1945, at which time he

worked as

in the United Nations for the Ukrainian Minister of Foreign

Affairs, D.i. MANIlSklY

SIALYAPIN was in tir United States

Or Sie IsSE. but NOSENKO did not iron in what year he

Upon returnins, he was assagned by the

Directorate to work

the merican Department as

the four directions

department. Sew York.

washington, Canada, ind Latin

later date SHALYAPIS

Deputy Reindent ind then Resi-

dent for the KGB in Uruguay, succeeding I.P. MisHlY in this

capacity.*

His next foreign

issiganent sas berlin.

did not knon definitely the period oi this cour

but believed it

was from 1955 to 1957; he did know that V.V. KRI:OSHEY

Germany for a short time after SALiAPis artired. tr

s. S. SKVORT-

SOV was also there for a short shrie, because shaLlaPl took

over SKVORISOV's cases before the latter left to return to

Althoügh NOSENKO Invariably has given 1955-1957 as

SHALYAPIN's dates for his Germany assignment, he has also said

SHALYAPIN left Germany because he had to go to Cuba,

he went to Cuba some time

He was recalled from

Cuba around January 1962 because he had been rude to the Cubans,

quarrelled with the Chief of Cuban Intelligence,

and was drink-

ing heavily. NOSENKO said that he met SHALYAPIN for the first

*On the basis of this item from NOSENKO, SHALYAPIN was iden-

tified from photographs as being identical with M.G. KOTUKHOV,

assigned to the Soviet Embassy in Montevideo from July 1950

to June 1955, with five or six months' home leave in 1953.

**According to ClA records, KRIVOSHEY was reassigned from Berlin

early in 1957.

To date no

trace has been

found which confirms

SHALYAPIN's presence in Berlin or in East or hest Germany at

any time, under any name.

---

## Page 67

14-00000

tize in about Septenber or Oriober 1962, throusa lu.l GUt.

had worked in

the American Department of the First chief

torare

in Moscot Headquarters

with SHALYAPlY al sone tine. pro-

bably before Gui was assigned to

the inited States.

When SHALYAPIN came back from Cuba,

he nas to be a case

American Departarnt of the First Chief

Directorate, under

SHALYAPIN,

a full colorel

at

time, resented

there vas also consider-

able animosity between himself

ANTONDY, whuse work in Anerica

had been criticized by SHAYAPls, the desk officer

for ANIONOV at

Thus SHALYAPIN decided to retire:

and he applied to

tre

sedical Commission of the KCB for disability retirement on

the

hasis

of ailments he had contracted because of his work.

(On

one

occasion NOSEitO claired that a friend

of a iriend of his was

on this

commission, and NOSEiKO used

his irfluence with him to

help

SHALYAPIN

get

his medical retirimert.

He retired on full

pension,

and JOSENKO then helped hin to get a jon with Inturist.

When SKVORTSOV

and ArtoNor heard oi this. they tried

to

inter-

cede with V.D. CHLiNOKC:,

chief of the

isurist Department, Second

Chiei Directorate, to prevent him 1ion getting the job, because

ney both wanted to revenge themselves on SHALlAPIN for his

having exposed both of them in the past a poor work.

NOSENKO,

horever, personally told CHILlOkOr of ile truc background of

and pointed out to him how good a case oificer

SHALYAPIN WaS.

HOSENKO got SAiLYAPIls file fron the Tourist

Depärtment officer who orderid

it in connection nith the Inturist

job and broughi it to CHELsoKOl.

As a result of this interven-

tion by SOSENKO,

SHALYAPIN got the Inturist job.

These actions

on jOSENXo's part made him a close trird of SHALYAPIN.

Because of this SHALYAPIS felt free to talk to NOSENKO,

and over drinks he expressed his particuiar bitterness at the way

the First Chief Directorate had treated nim. Since without him

it wouid not have had an agent like

On a couple of other such occasions, SHALYAPIN

told NOSENKO some of the details about "SASMA."

334312"

The above story is what NOSENKO most often cited as the back-

Ground for his having happened to learn about

'SASHA."

Under in-

tessive questioning, however. on exactly wher and how he first

"SAStil" case, JOSESKO backed off of his original

attribution to SHALYAPIN; he said he did not remember when or from

he had first picked this up, but that it could have been

frOM GUK, Or LOPUKHOV, maybe SilALYAPIN or others.

He added, how-

ever, that he was surr that SHALYAPIN had talked to him about the

at some time.**

*GLK was in the United States from. August 1954 to September

1956.

He had transferred fron

the Stiond Chief Directorate

to the American Department of the First Chief Directorate in

January 1952,

according

to GOLIISYN.

Trus if te and SHALYAPIN

served there

together,

it was elther during the latter's home

leave in May-October 1953, or in late 1956, before SHALTAPIN

went to Germany.

**At this time NOSENKO had already met ClA representatives in

Geneva and had agreed to collect information for

them.

---

## Page 68

14-00000

bri: 0583190100

412b.

NOSENKO has indicated that others to urom the "SASHA" case

Has known

were GUK, because he

worked in the trericar Departnent

when he returned from Switzeriand in 1962: KRIVOSHES, because he

was a good friend of SHALYAPIS; LOPLKHOY, inn waS TIth NOSENKO

when SHALYAPIN talked about "SASHA"; and Shionisor,

"Is sly" and had many acquaintances.

Also aware of the case was

Ye.A.

ZAOYSTROVTSEV. because he too

"is sly" and "knows every-

thin? that is going on wherever he is"; ZiOVSIROVISEY was in Ger-

nany for many

about "SASHA.

years. NOSENKO said be trought KOVSHLk also knew

Although he had first attributed

story of 'SASHA" in re-

lation to the Cuba missilo crisis to SHAYAPly, In subsequent

discussions of the "SASHA" case, NOSENKO has dinied trat he learned

Of It IrON SHALYAPIN..

lle could

not recall irom thon he did hear

"perhaps from (Yu.l.) GUk, from

(yu.A.; LOPLKOV, or from

(V.M.) KOYSILK.

(111) GOLIISYN's Lead to "SASHA"

GOLITSY" provided a lead to a KiB ricruitment of an agent

in Germany who had lie KCB cryptonym

connected with American litriligence.

and sithougr originally

this was an operation of the linigre Departrent, KOB. First Chief

Directoratn, it was taken

over by the

Fourscenth (counterintelli-

gence) Department,

predecessor of

service lo.

COLITSYN first

learned some

details of this case

in about 1955.

thirt

---

## Page 69

D.

lil Introducies

Ir. corraiting ClA in June 1952, HOSENKO offered to sell

irsormät ion

airdr keD operatains in seturn for money

10 :eplace operational

funds he hus squandered on a Gereva bar-

He fiise made this offer to David MARk on

the afternoon of

9 hune 1952, descriling one 18Ch 10 li8K

tre case of an imert-

can who had coen

requirdüy the Kig in liaa.0n while assigned to

the U,S. Erdaary,

and wir was then liune 1902l working in Hashing-

"rear ciphug:."

on the eroting of the same day he gave this

lead an areater dolair io

CIA case ofti.er and said "ANDREY"

на. trє КОВ скурсопу

ingesko dis not trid lis true name bit gave

50:e. data which

lointificarton.

Dariy in the 1954

meetings with bossuke tr

•¿NDREY"

U:"-

again discussed, and

äfrie further

Irvestiga-

rira that three as chiy or. plosior candidate for

"ANDREY":

Sergeard Davie i. MITH, acode-nachine repa lion in the Voscow

Enbassy from doil 19st loul 19040 win hed retired from the

U.S. Arniy ch

"costonet 190l.

SuIT war thee crestioned by the

ANiSENKO 1:ad.

Irst denied

The folloding deview

of the "ANDREY" rase

1.: divided irto

several part::

NOSENKO's Intormarion in linde

her information

in 1904.

-our.:r.u

¡he investigatior of the Nostino lead.

informatior, aud the results of

(31)

diced

NOSENKO'S

interpation: 1202

In 1904,

ANDREY ase:

al the firse meetiny ir Gereva, NOSENKO irtro-

NOSENKO •

Now I wili tell you labout the scord of two cases).

I did not wort. on this case personally.

A code

machine mechanir was recruited in Moscon.

He was

reviled with woon und money.

In 1950 or 1949.

Question.

Wher was thi:?

NOSENKO:

1949, 1950.

warb this case it is more difficult.

Because I will rot be able. to give you his name.

Bur I will give you such fact: which will allow you

to

find

They recruited hit.

Ho worked In

Moscow satistacrocry.

He gave infornation on

ciphers.

Pie dave materials...

He promised he

would cooperate with us abroad, but he said he

wold not work with us in Anerica. He said: "In

no case do i want to sit in che electris chair."

They paid nim

desi erough.

He did rot want to

work In ATEr 16.a...

QuestIon:

He was recruited when?

NOSENKO:

In 1949-1950, in Moscow.

*The other item was

the

¿ Taentarication of BELITSKIY as a KG8-

controlled agent against CIA see Part VI.D.6.

TOP SEGRET

---

## Page 70

Guestior.: Yes, yes, I am saying, was he alread; at that time...

NOSENKO:

I tell you I was not working on this case. He was

recruited in 1919-1950.

Question:

When did he leave Moscow?

NOSENKO:

He left in 1950. It seems so, yes. He said that he

would not work in the USA.

NOSENKO went on to say that 'ANDREY" was the cryptonym

assigned to the agent by the Second Chief Directorate at the time

of his recruitment.

Although NOSENKO was not sure of the dates,

he was certain that this man, a U.S. Army Sergeart, had been

for the KGB by Roy RHODES, whose KGB cryptonym was

"QUEBEC".

RHODES was still In Moscow when "ANDREY" was -e-

cruited; he had told the KGB

about many other U.S. Embassy

employees, including military personnel, and the name

"ANDREY"

would mean nothing to RHODES because he

did not know that the

KGB had recruited this man.*

The mechänic worked

satisfactorily in Moscow for the KGB,

providing materials and information on ciphers.

"ANDREY" pro-

mised he would cooperate with the Suviets in future assignments

abroad, but would not work with then in the United States as he

did not want to "sit in the electric chair."

he was paid well

for his cooperation in Moscow,

and the Soviets wanted to pay

him more but he refused to accept it because he said he couid

not plausibly explain the possession of too much money.

KGB offered him diamonds and other

gems for later sale, he

did not take them, telling his case officers that possession

of a large dianord of more than a carat in the United States

could arouse the attention oï the police.

left Moscow for the United States, and the KGB waited for him

to reappear in some other country, but he did not.

Finally in

1955 the KGB sert an officer, who had participated in the re-

cruitment of the agent in Moscow, to the United States

purpose of finding

"ANDREY" and the officer had no other

..I. After NOSENKO's first mention of Roy RHODES' role in this

case, records were checked for the dates of RHODES' assign-

ment in Mosco, which were April 1951 to July 1953. Accord-

ing to RHODES,

the date of his own recruitment by the KGB

was January 1952.

When these dates were cited to NOSENKO

on two separate occasions during the 1962 meetings he

changed the original date for the recruitment from 1949

or 1950 to 1952 or 1953.

In 1962, as well as in 1964,

he said he was certain that the recruitment had already

taken place prior to his (NOSENKO'S)

entrance on duty with

In 1962 he gave this date as

1964 and since he has given a variety of dates for this,

Ianging from the beginning of 1952 to April 1953.

Part V.A.)

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 71

Tre man went under the name of komArov" as a secord

to the soviet Embassy in Washington. After

long searci..

"ANDREI" nas fourd.

HOSENKO's Impression

k'as that.

the agert worked at the

Pentagon then and that in 1952 he was

st1l1 norkirg as the Pentagon.

KOVSHUK (KOMAROV), with the help of the KGB Legal Residercy

in Washington,

ageni was living, identified his

automobile, and contacted him finaliy at the end of 1955 or the

beginning of 1950.

Speaking of the difficulties the KGB had in

• NOSENKO saia: "... He (KCVSHUY.) said they

were looking for him a long tine, the places where they looked

they fourd where he parked his cat, where he lived -

in a piace nter- there

were many other people and it was difficult.

to get ciose to hin.

Then (he told! about his surveillance, the

'ANDREy'S' return from work; sometimes he was sitting in

the nories.

But we know that he had

made a contact..."

nas frightened and refused to work, but when at the

contact le ias offered a package of

$1,000, "it went dif-

ferertiy.'

The agent finally accepted the money from KOVSHUK

due to his gambling, he was agair. in financial straits.

Frain that point

on he worked

well with the KGB.

He again pro-

videa good

information

and was stall doing so as of 1962. NOSZIKO

what kind of materials he was giving ther.

knew that he was close to codes at that time and this

tion was considered important by the KGE.

NOSENKO Deliered that

when KOVSHuk found him,

"ANDREY" was working in the Pentagor. and

that le was still there in 1962.

In reference to the modus operandi for reetings between

"ANDREY,"

NOSENKO reported that koVShk knew he was

suiveillarie by the F3I, for the Soviets were intercepting

the FBI surveillance-radio traffic which included references

"The Trree Musketeers".

monitors knew this to be

a term applies to KOVSHUK

and his colleagues.**

NOSENKO was not

= NOSENKO IdentIfied KOMAROV as the alias used abroad and in his

Ministry of foreign iffairs cover job in Moscow by v.M. KOVSHUK,

who had become Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section, Aterican De-

partment, KGB Second Chief Directorate,

by the time he was sent

to dashirgton to locate this

GOLITSYN had previously

identified KOISHUK as an officer of the imerican Departmert who

had come to Hashington in 1957 for nine or ten months.

not know the specific reason for the trip but said that in

view of KOVSHUk's job it would be to solidify a developnental

operatior begun in

Moscow or to recontact an agent already

recruited

He identified a photo of KOMAROV as

A FBI

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 72

416.

aware of the identities of the ornar

tir Sovieis conprising the

NOSENkO descriped the meetinos as having

tar.en place almiys in cars:

KOVSHUK

his surveillance

the day before the meeting and go to another state where he would

wait by the highway; the anerican would drive by and stop his

car; KOVSHUK would sit dow:, with him in the car, receive the

materials,

and give him the money; ther. KOVSHUK

would get out,

and the American would drive on.

Accordirg. to NOSENKO, the person who compronised Rudolf

IvanOVich ABEL (REiNO HAYFIANEN,

who defected to CIA in Paris In

May 1957) also gave away information on Roy RHODES, who had been

Ir: Moscow as a garage

superintendent.

When RHODES

was under

called as a witness because he had

•Orked with RHODES in Moscow.

"ANDREY" was the only person called

as a witness, ará he was called upon several times to tell how

RHODES had behaved in Moscow.

The agent, NOSENIO stated, could

be identified by the fact that he was the only person who testi

suffered during this investigation period

and stopped meeting the soviets.

afraid he would be ex-

posed and crrested too, as a result of Rhodes' acrest.

suggested that "ANDREY" may have had some suspicion of RHODES'

irvolvement In his sun recruitment;

or he may merely have been

panicky because he knew he could

accused of the same thirg

as RHODES.

Little by lnttle, however,

"ANDREY" resumed his

meetinas with the soviets, having little other choice.

KOVSHUK turned "ANDREY" over to a member of the washington

Legai Residency and returned to Moscow.

NOSENKO did not know

who succeeded KOMAROV as the handler but said that this

officer eventually turned the case over to N.G. BAGRICHEV, WO

coriuded his tour in Washington in 1961."

NOSENKO did not

KroN BAGRICHEV'S sucCessOr, but said in 1962 that the case was

(111) NOSENKO'S Information - 1964

" When the "ANDREY" case was discussed with NOSENKO in

Geneva in 1964 and in additional discussions after his defec-

tion, he altered several details of the 1962 story and supplied

new details about the recruitment, various

officers know

ledgeable of the case, and information provided

"ANDREY."

Only where the 1964 information differs from thai of 1962 or

adds to it is 1t included below.

The recruitment of "ANDREY" took place in 1948 or 1949

according to one interview, in 1952 or earlier by another.

in 1953 according to a third siscussion of the case with

The association in NOSENKO's mind between "ANDREY' and

Roy RHODES remained firm,

but he could not be certain whether

"ANDREY" was still in Moscow in 1953 or that he heard nothing

about the agent in 1954.

"ANDREY" used to play cards, NOSENKO reported, and may

have played poker for high stakes.

also said that "ANDREY"

had worked at the Pentagon - In codes - but by the time that

KOVSHUK got in touch with him he was nearing the end of his

* BAGRICHEV was

reassigned from Washington in June 1960 but

returned on TDY from 3 July to l November 1961.

TOP SECRET

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## Page 73

enlistment

ard was working in ar Army recruiting office, where

he sriii was assigned wher BAGRICHEV took over the case from

KOVSHUK.

NOSENKO was told by CIA that "ANDREy" nad not yet been iden-

tified.

Fie réplied:

"I'd like to say that you have selected a

a sligntly wrong way of tying to find him.

You should not be

looking for him during the trial.

It was the investigation,

during the investigation was when he mañe an appearance.

once he appeared during the investigation.

He was called just

once, and he was scared

to death..."

Asked if he thought this

information to be correct, NOSENKO answered: "Oh, absolutely.

I'm absolutely sure it is,

It's absolutely correct.

The

fast

that they called him

- they summoned him to be interrogated during

the investigation - this 1s absolutely correct..."

later he

"As I told you,

take all those who were called up for the.

pre-trial investigation of RHODES, not who were at the trial but

at the pre-trial and among those

people must be

'ANDREY'

Questioned further on whether "ANDREY" had testified at the trial

of ROy RHODES, NOSENKO repeated:

"No, he did not testify at the

trial, and at

the pre-trial investigatich he was only called up

for questioning because he had worked with RHODES at one

Describing "ANDREY's" production in Moscow, NOSENKO stated

that he explained to the KGB how the code machines in the u.s,

Embassy worked ard on one occasion NOSETKO expressed the opinion

'ANDREY" may have given the KGB parts of code machines such

"discs" (sic, meaning rotors).

In this connection, NOSENKO

recalled that one Aleksand SELEZNE, a deputy department chief

in the Communications Directorate of

the KGB, had seen involved

in the 'ANDREY'

NOSENKO said he

saw him in 1953

during the period that "ADREY" was working for the KGB in Mos-

SELEZNEV came to meetings in the first Department, Second

Chief Directorate, held to discuss and plan the

"ANDREY" opera-

tional meetings.

The reason for SELENEV's presence was that

the case officers were not technical

specialists,

and SELEZNEV

supply them with the questions to be asked of "INDREy."

Since SELEZNEV came to these meetings in civilian clothes,

whereas NOSENKO normally saw him in

the First Department in 1960 and 1951, NOSENKO speculated that

SELEZEY may have gone in person to some of the mectings with

"ANDREY" NOSENKO was asked if SELEZNEV had instructed the case

officers working with

"ANDREY" to ask him for discs from inside

the code machines, but NOSENKO replied that he did not know,

Although he did not know how the KGB exploited him; NOSENKO

repeatedly emphasized

"ANDREY'S" great importance to the KGB

during the time he worked for them in Moscow,

"Thanks to his

help they were

able to read your State Department codes.

date we have never been abie to read your military codes...

NOSENKO was asked if "ANDREY" had brought military code material

to the KGB, and he replied: "No. I believe it was only State

Department material.

What he did mainly was to describe the

operation of code machines and what daily or other periodic

settings were made...

According to NOSENKO, "ANDREY" supplied valuable material

from the time that the first recontact was made until he ceased

* See Parts V.3.c..

and VI.D.9. on KGB operations against U.S.

code clerks as KGB. cryptologic successes.

TOP SECRET

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## Page 74

***TOP SECRET

418.

meetings because of the RHODES trial, again after the trial he

was able to furnish good material,

not only orally but also in

the form of documents, papers, and written material.

This was

true for the period KOVSHUK was handling him

and also for the

BAGRICHEV phase of the operation.

NOSENKO was queried as to

whether during the period between June 1962 ard January 1964 he

had heard

about "ANDREY" continuing to

supply good information.

"No, something is going wrong there with this

operation."

TOP SECRET

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## Page 75

119.

NOSE:TO das asked in

19t2 now he had learned about tre

repliti

03 the Firan

occasis::

"will, cocause

I was doriano in tie first

Al::our I workes there

quite a bir larii.*

the ünited States) is my iriend.

cince: here

Firsi (Criedul hear soredlina, there these are sciends. in che

Directoraito

calCist hinsold ignonce borking

in the Seccid intestorait.

wil, jou ack: Kolye (excalciey,

Ton were jou dorking with

Hill hissachi traat

Soud materiali

W002Y2"

Tut it is in-

proper to sor. for the rianie..a

At another decting in 195=. NOS-

EXO said oe thee case: "1 truned of this deerior chicagh

both kostk and BiGaleiv.

machichie hand else doom an the

Secord Caret

Directorate it re tiht...

Since he returned

1o aunts to deed what his attorbuted

MiG ArOmledge as

this

vere vitt:..? of ibe 6431.

ond ecaron he sacd tat tual. SiX

ali

aaour the case,

HamaaaN iberas with bem, mad tie basic

rocruitment nas made ly d.M.

in maoiner arousher he wai

asked

Heir he hed leathe tour "iNDrEl.'

"'AVORRY'?

It won in i convertties.

'ANDREY."

zion - nas alse? - SiK kner ahout

•ANDFEY:...

i mont have heard from similar gize - rayke from

BORODIN, who said that when he was leaving he

returned the

itor.Es...

Voseko said that it was fron dovoick that he learnea

abour what had happened in Mashitto.

and about aAGRICHEV working

with "wigrey."

KoiSHUK told him don

"WiDREY" red been frichtened

at the tire of the RODES trjai, and later Glk tolé him the same

story.

Or. let another occasion SElKO was act whether Suk

knew of the case, and he asseiied that he had reier discussed

"ANDREY" with GiK.

(v)

Results oE Investigatione

AS a rEsuit of NOSEKÚ'5

the FBI

interniered BRy RilODES,

4717.

in

1962,

8.4722:

* As noted

the preceding discussion,

in 19€2, NOSENKO gave

date of entry into the XGB

as Marcl: 1953.

TOP SEGHET

---

## Page 76

air.

707 823727

---

## Page 77

6;

LW: 9552 EUL 3

beo?=

erui t??""

10 ot. er 11:.

-7H1-.

iojin:

.ste.

5T7:

.."

. 3..a

i=5:

-2orasc.

11135

KOP

---

## Page 78



---

## Page 79

has

r.0t

J:er.

went ttoonldigd

TOP SEGTE

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## Page 80

Roy RHODES:

raine was

first pubireizua

wher he

appeared as

a witness in fadolf ABEl's

trial, 0n.21

October

1957.

SMITH

was.

intervieros by the FBI

consorting

153627

BASKICHEV #26 CUt.

of thü Urited States Iron

ig-June

to 20 September

1957.

when he returned to his post'at the

Soviat Mission

to tie

"nites Nations i. New jork caty.

CIA reCOrOS dO

not

refleur any travel for nim, to nashings

•ton ni elsewhere,

tren until 2i November 1957, when

he was trausterrsa te

the Soviet Inbassy,

Washingiona:

KOMAROV (KOVSAL) ended his Tot in the United states

14 January 10955, ard Roy RODES courtnartial opered on

11 Fubruary 1958, tre date on wich SMIT

appoired as a

witness

for the prosecutaco.

on the basis of there dates,

1t appears that the thithai k5ß sartact

with suit in the

United States occurred in October or possibly November

1957: this seens to conflict, however, with the number

and frequency of meetings with koMan, as SMITh has:

described taim.

TOP SECRET

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## Page 81

.... 44.7 . =.diis

---

## Page 82

TOP SECRET

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## Page 83

427.

c.

The KGS Agent in Paris (Sat. Rober: Lee JOINiSON)

(i) Introduction

The lead to the penetration of a sensitive l.f. military

installation in the Paris area during 1962 and 1903 was the first

plece of irformation NOSENKO gave ClA after reestablishing con-

tact in Geneva in January 1964.

NOSENKO Characterized this lead

then and later as the most important single counterintelligence

iten that he had acquired during the year and a hale he had been

a CIA collaborator at KSB Headquarters in Noscow; the subject of

the liad had provided the KGB with significant documents, some

of which has teen

shown to Premier KHRÜSHCHEY persoraily.

acrive at the time NOSENKO left Moscow jor Gereva,

the agent

nevertheless had lost access to the sensitive information some

morichs carlier.

NOSENKO explainec that the agent was

scheduled

to serain with

crie American Armed Forces in Paris Until May

1964,

when he would be rotated to the United States.

interim: one of the Second Chiet Directorate's spesial techni-

clans: an expert at opening and resealing envelopes, had been

assigned on extended TDY to the KGS Legal Residency

in Paris

against the possibility that access would be regained before

this transfer.

NOSENKO was unaware of any other services this

agent may have earlier performed for the KGS and estimated that

he had been recruited in 1962.

NOSENKO 's lead eventually led to the identification of

Tig. Krmy sergeant Robert Lee JOHNSON, JOHNSON's wife Hedwig,

ard James Allen MINTKENBAUGH, a friend, as KGS agents.

three had been recruited In Berlin Ir. 1953 and had worked

closely together since. Although Mis. JOHNSON's direct par-

ticipation (she served

as a courier)

ended with JOHNSON'S

transfer from Berln in 1954 and despite KGB efforts to com-

partment the activities of JOHNSON

after 1959,

aware of the others' clandestine work.

NOSENKO 'S

lead to JOHNSUN therefore compromised the other two.

While investigations of the NOSENKO lead were proceeding

in the early autumn of 1964, JOiSON deserted his duty assign-

ment at the washington Area Courier Station in the Pentagon

and disappeared until the end of November, wher he voiuntarily

turned himself in to Air Force Police officials in Las Vegas.

Nevada. JCHNSON had arrived at his Pentagon assignment in May

1964: for the previous nine months he had been

cormissioned officer in charge of the classified

section of the Seine Area Command Headquarters in

Des Loges, France: for two years before this, until Aug-

ust 1963, he had been assigned to the U.S. Armed Forces cour-

¡er Transfer Station at Orly Field in Paris.

latter assigment JOHNSON had regularly stood weekend

watches in

the Station's vault area,

and it was to this period

of time that NOSENKO's lead

In confessing to American authorities in January 1965,.

JOHNSON admitted having penetrated the Orly vault for the

Soviets about seven times during December 1962 and the first

five months of 1963.

Although there were certain differences

in timing and detail, JOHNSON's confession closely matched

the complete description of this operation earlier given by

NOSENKO.

Except to implicate himself and other participants,

few essential details that were not already

TOP SECRET

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## Page 84

1. 1 94

known.

Johnson's loss of access to the orly vault in august

1963 coircided ciosely with the date wer MINTREiBAUCH 105t.

cortait with the KGB, probably in September of that year.

NOSENKO has described the Paris operation as being entirely

a First Chief Directorate Case..

first learred of it in 1952,

shortly after returning from his meetings with CIA in Gereva, in

casual corversations with one us more Second Chief Directorate

technicians who nad been sent IDY to Paris to assist tho local

Legal Residency.

NOSENKO was not sure which technician told him

about the case.

or under what circumstences.

Additional infor-

mation was similarly obtained

pieces" from one or

the other of the technicians over the next year

and a hall,

NOSENKC had most recently discussed the case with the ToY "flaps

ard seals" expert in Paris while he (HOSENKO) was enroute to

Geneva

ir mid-January 1964.

NOSENKO explained that, although as

a Second Chief Direstorate

officer re had no rightiul access to

information on this operation, he had worked wach the special

techricians in operations egainst tourists and ocher foreigners

in loscow and was on good terms with them.

Its such circunstences,

NOSENKO

said.

it frequently happens that KGB officers kill tell

other KGB officers "some details of operations or which they are

working."

The following discussion of the derails of the operation

commences wish a revier of NOSENKO's statemerts on the case end

the way in which he learned about it.

The remairder of the dis-

•cussion covers events leading up n

confessions by the

JOHNSON couple and MINTKENBAUGH; the suostarice of treir admis-

sions, incising the security problems posed by Mrs. JOHNSON'S

mental condition and the Soviet concern

for her allress; and

the assessment of the damage to U.S. Irteresis caused by the

activities of JiHNSON.

lii! The Lead from NOSENKO

The agent was described by NOSENKO as being a U.S. ril1-

tary man, probably not an

officer, who served rightime guard

duty with others at

an American military instaliatior. in

France where an airfield vas

ard where top secret

documents were held in a vault which he had helped the KGB

to penetrate.

He was scheduled to leave France in May 1964.

Through him the KGö acquired documents on U.S.

strategic bomb-

ing targets in the USSR and France;

"almost all" of these

materials were of interest to the Soviet Ministry of Defense,

NOSENKO said.

From early 1962 until the agent was promoted,

the KGB Legal Residency in Paris effected six ertries into

the room with the assistance of technicians from the Special

Section, KGB Second Chief Directorate?

whom NOSENKO named.

• After the agent lost his access. Fedor FOFANOV** was sent to

The

Special Section,

according to NOSENKO, handled surrep-

titious entries into Western embassies in Moscow.

**FOFANOV was assigned from June or July 1963 to February 1964

to the soviet Embassy in Paris as an employee, and he 18

believed to have replaced a suspect KGB offiser in this

overt position; he abruptly left Paris immediately after

NOSENKO's defectIon. NOSENKO indicated that FOFANOV was one

of several technicians transferred from the KGB Operational-

Technical Directorate to form

the Special Group of the KeB

Second Chief Directorate.

NOSENKO proposed that he himself

participate in a CIA recruitment approach to FOFANOV in

TOP SEGNE

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## Page 85

429.

Paris "in case he will get access açair some time, even just a

quick possibility."

NOSENKO's statements concerning this lead

are given in cironological order below.

NOSE::KO said at the 23 January 1964 meeting* thit: he first

learned of the successful agert penetration of tre classified

documerts rault at an

"importart American military organization"

in the Paris area shortly after returning fron Geneva in June

NOSENKO did not know the designation or preciso nature of

the instaliation involved

In this operation, but because the

documents ircluded information on strategic targets in

France 88.

well as in the Soviet Union, he assumed that it was a "strategie

planning irstallation."

He also knew that the installation had

its our airfieid

that there were

"procedures for bringing top

secret documen's in and for taking them out."

There had been six successful entries of the vault, four

in 1962 and two in 1963.

On each occasion Special Section tech-

nicans had travelled TDY to Faris under courier cover to assist

the local KGB case

officer in the technical details of the opera-

Their function was to advise the case officer. concerning

the entry and later to process the documents.

The case officer,

on this basis, mould give appropriate instructions to his agent.

and it seemed probable to Nostriko that the technicians had never

met the American.

Entry into the vault area was first achieved after the

agent had used some radioactive substance to determine the com-

biration.

(NOSENKO thought that the agent had also photographed

the lock for KGB study.)

Subsecuent entries were always made

berntin two and five o'clock in the morning.

The agent removed

documerts fiom the vault and delivered them

to his case officer,

who in turn passed them to the Special Section techricians.

ervelopes were then opened, photographs were made, the documents

were repackaged, and the envelopes were given back to the agent

by the case officer for returr to che vault.

Thereafter,

Paris Legal Residency pouched the films to Moscow, and the

technicians themselves left Paris until the next opportunity

for entry.

The last time the vault lad been entered was in the fall

At about that time the agent, a military man, received

a promotion and was relieved

of his night watch duties.

agent was scheduled for rotation to the United States but, with

his promotion, had obtained an extension until May 1964.)

though the agent was still active in January 1954 and was still

assigned to his military post, he therefore had lost access to

the documentary information.

NOSENKO characterized this

formation as highly sensitive and valuable to the KGB,

that the Chief of the Paris Legal Residency as well as several

case officers there had been rewarded for their part in the

operation.

Because of technical difficulties in recording the first

part of this meeting with NOSenKO.

it is not possible to

account of his initial statement on this

what NOSENKO said at this time has seen pieced to-

gether from remarks he made later in the meeting, from

recorded recapitulations of his statements by his case

officer later during the meeting and from notes taken at

the meeting.

Ц!.

no stun

---

## Page 86

Finally, at the 23 January 1964 meeting NOSTiKO reported

that three of the Special Section techniciars whe had travelled

to paris to participate in the operation were S. A. I0:OV, L.A.

LEBEDEV. and

S.D. ILYIN; he said he could probably identify more

of diplomatic couriers who has travelled to

ROSENKO did not know

the identity of the Paris-based

those concerning strategic

targsts, NOSENiO had no information on the nature of the

documents which

had veer. obtaired.

He explained that he had

never seen ary of these documents, that the technicians who had

seen them diü not read English,

and that they had learned about

the targettera data orly

casually, from asking the case officer

"what's this stuff?" at the time they were taking photographs.

Asked on 1 February 1964 whether CIA could do anything with

its information

concerning the travels of LEgEDEv which might

help to identify the FGB

agent of the Paria Legal Residency,

For instance, find out

when inose rcuriers were

what were the dates of treir

stay trere,

keeping in mind that this will be ore and the sate

LEBEDEV, (V.V.) SINIISY, that Venyamin KARETNIKCV*...

FOFAYOV - he came in the fall and did not get invoived.**

- SINITSYN ard KARENIROV, whose first name and patronymic have

also been given by

• NOSENKO as Venedikt Vasilyevich were also

in the Special section, according to NOSENKO.

**NOSENKO gave CIA a similar clue concerning travel by the spe-

cial technicians on 12 June 1962:

"The Chief of the Special

Section is

sergey IUNOV, an excellent man.

He is on a mission

to Paris.

Note: CIA has been unable to equate any soviet in

time with IONOV.

There is no record that IONOV

has been abroad under

that name since December 1955.

several trips to Paris and

Brussels during the 1953-1955 pe-

r1od.) ...In the Second Chief Directorate there are good spe-

with experience.

Trese lads sometimes go to Aüs-

tralia, to France, immediately when something is

This means

that there is something (going on) where

In this Section there are two or three spe-

cialises vino

can open any package and then seal it back up as

there are only two or three of these altogether,

Therefore, when there is something somewhere abroad, there is

an immediate request to send these guys.

One went to Australia

one or two years ago.

This means that there was something

One went to France.

Then this IONOV received the

Boyevoye Krasnoye Enamya for this.

Every time (they travel)

they use a different

last name. every time a different one...

There are three men there that can open anything and then make

it look as if nothing had been done... I know them. But they

never come out in their own last names.

Each time they have

a different one.

There were (M.I. ) PREOBRAZHENSKIY,

KARETNIKOV; and LEBEDEV. "

In speaking of IONOV's assignment

of KGB "flaps and seals" specialists

to France, NOSENKO apparently was not referring to the JOHN-

SON case; NOSENKO said he first heard about the case after

returning from Geneva in 1962, and JOHNSON stated firmly that

the first

entries of the Orly Courier Transfer Station did

about six months after NOSENKO

KARETNIKOV as having a part in the Orly penetration. Contrary

to his statement, however,

both travelled under true nare

on their temporary assignments. CIA had no traces on

TOP SECRET

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## Page 87

43:.

we

must lou% at. inat rund of an orgarization (the U,S, installa-

tion isi :

Some

Iradirg

merican personality who has his own

alrport, uno cece his irail deliverru by plane, who has posses-

510n

of

strategic plirs.

And ther. rike a look at the peoplé.

quarding this estaclashuent.

Start from there,

Then, see if

you can get fron the french a surdown on the

activities of cer-

¿ain members of the (soviet)

Embassy during the period when

these specialists nere there.

This in addition to a careful

study of those wis

work tnere, of the guards, and who takes the

night duty, specifically during those years and during those

times.

Also ino among the guarde you a promotion - jurped ahead.

Try to pinpoint the imericen installation.

This one has an

airstrip.

This installation would be the one which would hold

the war plans,

ever combing target data on France.

where would

such materials be found?

It seems to me that there would be

only one such installation.

It would not be in 10 different

places...

It is a pIlate

aircrome, not a public one.

I don't

know whose base it 1s, I only know that they have the airstrip

and that people

come from there carrying in mail. They bring

mail from the alrdrome, from their airdrone, their airplanes.

NOSENKO said on 6 ipril 1964 that before leaving Moscow.

for Geneva in January 1904, he had been told that the Paris

Legal Residency agent had lost his access and that POFANOV was

sent to Paris in the nupe that the agent would again be able

to get into the vaul. refore his transfer to the United

States.+

When NOSTIO arrived at the Soviet Embassy in Paris or. 19 Janu-

ary 1904 valle on roste to Geneva, FOFANOV "was on duty at the

entrance to the Embassy,

re was the duty man, and of course

when he saw me, he said

George, leorge!"

So we chatted and

he said he was not doorg

good, but he would probably be sitting

there until May...

asked him how this

case was (going),

was he doing any good.

and he said

for the present, he

was not doing arything good but he had hopes that something

might happen.

that's all.'

Also on 6 April 1964 NOSENKO stated that the penetration

operation was "strictly a First Chief Directorate case."

then went on to describe the role of the Second Chief Direc-

torate's technical specialists in gaining entry to the vault

änd in photographing the documents:

"The specialists were not

the ones that carried out the operation,

It was carried.

by the case officers of the Residency.

The specialists worked

on the packages which they would open and then reseal again

later.

Wher this happened and how they got the keys made, I

(footnote continued fron preceding page)

LEBEDEV until he was placed on the official Soviet courier

list in 1962; NOSENKO provided the first indication that

he had intelligence cornections and in July 1962, a month

later, LEBEDEV took his first trip abroad under this name,

travelling to Brussels.

CIA's only record of KARETNIKOV is

a request

he made for

a visa to travel to Paris in

1963, but

it is not known whether he made this trip.

* FOFANOV, • a member of the Special Technical Section

accord-

1ng to NOSENKO,

applied for a French visa on 22 June 1963

and arrived in Paris on 27 July 1963.

JOHNSON received

notice of his transfer out of Orly on 4 August and left

Orly on 5 August 1963; (see below).

TOP SECRET

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## Page 88

432.

don't iron.

LEBEDE!, by the way,

said that they placed radio-

active particles, with

the help of this agent.

the door at che beginning.

Then (LSIEDEY said) that the par-

ticles were cendved

that they were picking the lock this way;

same thino

was with the safe.

After they had tre keys to

room-tren

had to open the

Before everything was

finally ready they (the special Section technicians) had to

there (Pares) several times.

How mary times they came in

I know it was the beginning of 1962.

Questionedwin detail about his krowledge of the Paris case.

NOSINKO provided the following information on 29 July 1964:

think me (the agent) was rot an officar, considering that he was

having this all night duty. but nothing was ever said akout this

either.-

•E amagine th. operation was successful in 1962 be-

cause the boys from the Special Section were going several times

I Think tre besidency didn't have the chance to do

-his before :1962, because they couldn't do it without

the help

boys from the Special Section and they weren't going

did noi go abroadi in 1960 and 1961.!

I know he was work-

ing on the basis of money - they were giving him money. I think

was recruited on the basis of

I chly heard

that it was a big

sum of money.

I don't know if he was recruited

in Paris and don't know if

it was even a formal recruitment.

don't know what plans the KGB had for him after re leaves Paris.

They were

thinking that he must go soon.

He was to leave in

And then in mic - 1963 he got this

step up, went a step

higher, ard so he was then to stay intil mid-'64.

He no longer

had regular access and this is why FOFAOV was sent: In case

he nill get access again sometime, even just a quick possibility,

then he can tell them and FOFINO: will be there to handle it

ImiTediately:

"Taking into consideration that I heard that

almost all

of the material they got was of interest to the Ministry of

Defense," NOSENKO continued, 'I think it was a military irstal-

lation.

It was a military installation.

It was definitely an

installation and. not just a single person wich access to these

secret documents.

I know the operations were carried out only

at night.

The whole operation

was completed while the agent

The agent collan't bring out a great deal of

material;

only: what he could hide on his person.

From what

the boys were saying, I would think that he was not alone on

I was even asking the boys: 'How can he take these

things out?:. And they said:

•Oh, he just says that he is

going out for coffee or a sandwich; he is gone only 5 or 10

minutes..."

I think he was stall in the same installation even

though he lost immediate access to the room after his promotion.

This is why FOFANOV was sent in mid-'63.

FOFANOV said when I

on 18 January 1964 iNOSENKO means 19 January) that the

agent is supposed to stay in Paris until May 1964.

He said

that the agent is supposed to leave in May and then he (FOFANOV)

will be finished there.

According to CIA records,

LEBEDEV, who has frequently travel-

ed abroad under true name since July 1962, first visited

Paris, erroute to Rabat. in December 1962.

matches JOHNSON's statement as to when the first penetration

was made.

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433.

"I kron that they went by car and that they were able to

complete the whole operation diring tre tour of city of the

Trey had to pick up the materiais.

drIve some place -

rajie the soilet Embassy - oper. she documents, photograph them.

close them again just as they were, and get back to return

them to the egent all ir this time.

They did not specify

which documerts the agent was to bring out.

But they were

travelling as Soviet diplomatic couriers and i think their

various stops were plarred

to coincide with the arrival of new

materials at this instaliation.

Also the fact that they had

to oper. all the docurerts shows that they were sealed wher they

received tren from the agent.

"I don't know if it was a key or a combination lock on

the door:

"KOSENKO concluded.

"I know trey had to apply radio-

acrive material to learn how to open elther the dcor or the

safe.

The agent had to open the door and inside ne had to open.

a safe.

(iL) NOSENKO E SOUPELEg

NOSFIKO has beer asked or a number ci occasions to explain

when and under what circumstancas he learned of the Paris Legal

Residency's

operation

against the U.s, mi:tary irstallation.

always replied that he reard

"in little

pieces' at separate times fion varlous renders

cí the Special

(Technical) Section viao participated in 1º.

NOSENKO, however,

has beer. vague ard at times inconsistent in describing what he

learned fron miom and how and when he isarned this information.

Generally he gave either LEBEDEV or KARETiIKOV as his principal

source; under repeated questioning, NOSESNO has sometimes ra-

maired corsiatent in describine the time, place, and other con-

ditions urder. which he learred a particuiar iten of information,

but he has

said in one telling that it care from LEBEDEV while

in the next that he learned at from KARENIKOV.

NOSENKO has

also contradicted himseif regarding which of these two origin-

ally told him of the operation and has

said that he cannot re-

call which zi was.

The series of NOSeikos statements abouc

the sources of his irformation is presented in chronological

order below.

"In connection with the thing in faris... just exactly

shat did you rear about this military group?"

asked on 23 January 1964.

"Who told you, in exactly what con-

so forth? Try to do it word for word...

and who?"

NOSENKO answered:

"Well, you know this Spectal

Section, this is IONOV and LEBEDEV ard well now, let's see.

Ir. Moscow that's PREOSRAZHENSKIY, and ILYIN was in

(pause) "They are subordinate to the Techrical Section.

were counting the agents and what was needed - the target, the

rooms. safe.

and everything else.

He took molds and samplings

of radio-acrive substances which could

reflect characteristics

in this American military installation."

The subject changed

without NOSENKO answering the next question, about what the

Special Section officers had done in this operation.

volurteered ro additional information concerning his sources

for the lead. and he was not questioned further on the matter

during this:

the first of the 1964 meetings.

The transcript

of this meeting suggests. however,

that NOSENKO got his infor-

nation from one of the technicians who not only travelled to

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434

Paris to instruit the Legal Residency case officer on the technical

aspects of the eniry but also was involved in photographing the

documents provided oy the agent.

NOSEiKO tOld CIA on 28 January 1954 that he had learned

of this operation, shortly after returning to loscon from Geneva

in 1962.. from a friend in the KGS,

one of several technicians who

participared in the operation.

NOSENkO thought the source of this

information was either LEEEDEV OF FOFANOV.

During intensive debriefing on 6 April 1964 NOSENKO stated:

"I first reard about this from KARSTHIK)V." After describing the

functions of the Special Section in Moscow, he went on to say that

KARETNIKO! came frequently to the Tourist

Department to see him.

The reason for their association was thät NOSEIKO then supervised

work with the hoscow hotels designated for use by foreign tourists,

Special Section set up equipment in various roums of

these hoteis.

The debriefing continued:

NOSENKO :

Why do they come to see me?. First of all, they krow

me quite well ard, secondly, simply because I super-

vise this (Anerican Tourists!

come,..to chat arong other things.

KARENIKOV told

me about this, in Paris.

Question:

What did KARETNIKOV say when you first heard about

this?

NOSENKO:

That they had carried out operations several times in

Paris, that two had already been there for this pur-

pose, that they went there as diplomatic couriers to

Paris...

(NOSENKO at this point repeated KARETNIKOV' g

description of the role of the Special section tech-

nicians in advising the Paris-based KGB case officer

and the methods which were used to gain initial access

to the vault.)

NOSENKO:

KARETNIKOV was the first and then LEBEDEV. LEBEDEV

was later.

Question:

NOS ENKO:

These were the only two people, you say?

only two, only two.

Question:

But you told me before that FOFANOV told you about

it t00.

NOSENKO:

FOFANOV, FOFANOV.. I knew that FOFANOV is here in

He was on duty at the entrance to the Em-

(Here NOSENKO told of his conversation with

FOFANOV about the case. NOSENKO then explained that

he had already heard from LEBEDEV that the agent had

lost his access and that FOFANOV had been assigned

to Paris against the possibility that ne would re-

gain it.)

According to NOSENKO on 29 July 1964, he "first heard about.

officers of the Special Section in 1962 - from

LEBEDEV or KARETNIKOV, but I can't remember which was first.

LEBEDEV Or KARETNIKOV visited my office and maybe I might say:

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'I haven't seen you in a long time, what have you boen doing?'

And he would say: 'Oh, I have just

been to Paris on a trip.' Or

mayba I asked KARENIKOV where LEHEDEV was because I hadn't seen

him in a long time, and he told me that LIEDEY was away on a

trip."

When asked on 29 July 1964 which officers had ever rentioned

this case to him, in any way at any tine, NOSeNKo replied "KARET-

NIKOV, LEBEDEV, and IONOV in Moscow and FOFAVOV in Paris in Janu-

ary 1964."

He affirmed that he had never discused the case wish,

or mentioned 1t to, anyone else.

"Yes," he continued, "I think

LEBEDEV was the first one to speak to me about this cese, oscause

1n 1962 I was Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department and was super-

vising the work of the Third Section

on hotels and restaurants.

LEBEDEV was a member of a commission which had been get up in the

KGB to plan for the operational exploitation of new hotels which

were being built or planned.

He was coming to see me about these

matters.

So while I might hear just a little bit about this from

IONOV, I would hear more

froM LEBEDEV, because he was a good friend

and was coming to my office on business."

The following is from the protocol which NOSENko aigneu on

18 February 1965:

"I first learned of the penetration of an American

installation in Paris after my return to Moscow in June 1962

and at & time that I was a conscious and willing coliaborator

of the CIA

and was attempting to gather information of inter-

est to Americar Intelligence.

I inmediately recogrized the

importance

of this information to American Intelligence when

I first heard it.

"I learned of this case in small pieces,

in several

conversations (some in my KGB office and possibly others

elsewhere) with several different officers of the KGB over

a period of several months.

These officers were KARETNIKOV,

IONOV, and LEBEDEV, all members of the Special Technical

Section of the Second Chief Directorate.

"I do not remember from which of these three officers

I first heard of the case, which of these officers told me

What portions of the story, or when I learned the irdivia-

ual details of this case which I have reported to CIA, oI

the season of the year in which I learned them.

"I do not know why these officers told me of the

Paris case,

except that we were in good relations:

such circumstances it frequentiy happens that KGB officers

will tell other KGB officers some details of operations on

which they are working. **

I don't know whether they told

other KGB officers this information.

As my relationg were

equally good with

each of those three officers, any of

then could have told me any part of it.

This would place NOSENKO's earliest knowledge of the case some-

time after July 1962, when he said he became Deputy Chief of

the Tourist Department.

**This sentence was added at NOSENKO's request prior to signing

the protocol.

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## Page 92

"i though Thad not spoken with POFANOV about this case

before he left Moscon for Paris and althouch SOFANOV had

50 isea chat I was anare of any datails of this case at the

time, he arsiered ni ino or three questions about

this case

during a short

stop in Paris while i was enroute to Ceneva

17 January 1964= I may have told him that I knew about it."

(iV) JOiSON and MINTKEUBAUCH

After prelimirary investigation of the NOSENKO lead by the

FBI, CIA,

the U.s..

AlI Force OffIce Of Special Investigatiors, and

Department. of the irmy (icsi), it was decided in early Septem-

ber 1964 to concentrate on Army Sergeant Robert Lee JOHNSON as the

likeliest candidate

ior reing the KCB agent in this operation. On

2 October 1954, however,

¿OhNsoN disappeared from his home in

Alexandria, Virginia,

after telling his wife that he was on his

JO:NSON, i courier with access to "secret" materials li

at the Pentagon, failed to appear for duty or Monday, 5 October.

Army counterintelligence officers then called at the JOHNSON home

to intervier his wite.

JOHNSON said that she had detected

in her husbard's behavior during the previous sev-

eral weeks, that he had simply left for the office at about 2:45

p.m, on Friday:

the bra, and had not returned. She did not know

why he had ieft or where JoiNson might rave gone,

MIS, JOHAiSON

repeates this statement in two later

Interviews,

end of october and the second in the midle of November 1954.

Soon after JOHNSC!'s disappearance, representatives of ACSI

interviewed an Arlington, Virginia, real estate salesman, james

Alien MINIKZYBAUGH.

He had been näentified by Mis. JOHNSON as

her husband's closest civilian acquaintance: having known JOHNSON

from the tine

12 years cörler when they served together in the

MINTKENRAUGH had first learned of JOHNSON's disappearance

on Sunday. 4 October, wher, he celephoned the JOHNSON home and had

talked to Mrs.

Trice the same day and once the next

MINTKENBAUGH had telephoned the Pentagon in hopes of locating

he told the ACSI representatives

idea where JOrNSON was.

The last time he had seen

JOHNSON, MINTKENBAUGH said, was several weeks earlier, at which

time everyching seemed normal, although JOHNSON had complained

of difficulties raised by his wife's mental condition.*

JOHNSON failed to reappear by 9 October 1964, the Army

thereupon decleared him a deserter, and the FBI was brought into

the case. The FBI reintervrewed both Mrs.

JOHNSON and MINTKEN-

several occasions in search of information which might

•lead to JOHNSON's whereabouts: On 10 November, immediately. follow-

ing his third FBI Intervien, MINTKENBAUGi asked his roommate, whom

he knew to se employed ly sIA, to take him to CIA Headquarters to

"a matter of importance."

During an interview that same

evening MINTKENBAUGH confessed to a CIA representative that he

had been a Soviet agent since 1952 or 1953, following his recruit-

ment by JOHNSON.

He described in general terms his own espionage

activities during this 11 or 12 year period as well as those of

Sgt. and Mrs. JOHNSON. No mention was made of the Orly peretration,

The next day, while his roommate was, out of the apart-

ment, MINTKENBAUGH packed his

things and disappeared, leaving a

note saying that he would be "back in the spring."

* JOHNSON had told a Pentagon co-worker shortly before he went

AWOL that.

'My wife is driving me crazy!".

noticed that JCHNSON appeared nervous and seemed to be drinking

heavily in the days immediately preceding his disappearance.

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FORSON remained at large, his whereabouts uniron, until

25 November 1964.

At that time

he turned himself in to a U.S. Air

Force policeman in Reno, Nevada...

fic had, he said, run out of

money.

JOHNSON was immediately incarcerates on the charge of

beirg

absent without leave.

On 1 December representatives of the FBI ard ACSI visited

Mrs, JOHNSON to inform her that her husband had been found.

she launched into a long.

detailed account in

implicated JOHNSON,

MINTKENBAUGH,

and herself in espion-

age activities for the soviets.

not confessed earlier.

she said.

because of fear of what JONSON might

JOHNSO!: described what JOHISON had done on behalf of the

while stationed in Berlin during 1953 and 1954, while serving in

the United States from 1957 to 1959, and during his recent tour

to hugust 1964.

TOHNSON,

she said, had told

her In 1962, when he was assigned

to the Orly Field Armed Forces

Courier Station,

that he had removed documents from the vault

there on three oscasions and had passed them to the soviets.

A joint FBI-ACSI team two days later began to interrogate

JOHNSON on the basis of the information

which had beer received

from NOSENKO, MIS. JOINSON, and MIEKENBAUGh, JOHNSON stead-

fastly maintained his innocence: He had gore AhoL, re said, only

in order to force the Army to hospitalize his mentally ill wife

and to require the Army or sone other agency to find a means of

taking care of his children.

(He later insisted that he had had

no idea of the suspicions concerning him at the time he deserted.)

During these interrogations, which lasted until 22 December,

JOHIISON was confronted with

the allegations made by his wife and

MINTKE'BAUG.

He rade a point-by-point denial.

KENBAUCH himself had beer. located by the FBI on 5 December at

his brother's mountain cabin in California and was under inter-

rogation..

was courtmartialed for desertion in December 1964

and was sentenced to reduction in grade,

forfeiture of pay, and

was ordered to reimburse the government for the cost of return-

to dashington.

The sentence included no confinement

as he continued to profess his innocence, he was home for

Christmas.

FBI-ACSI plans called for a resumption of question-

ing on the espicnage charges after the New Year.

On 1 January

1965, however, before the new interrogations began.

walked in and made a voluntary confession.

doing so, he said, was solely to help his children ara his wife.

whose mental condition was worsening.

The substance of this

confession is given in the section which follows.

(v) Information from Other Sources

The confessions by the JOHNSON couple and MINTKENGAUGH

constitute the bulk of evidence on the case.

They indicate

that the operation which began in 1953 reac'.ed its peak in late

1962 and early

1963 when JOHNSON peretrated the vault at Orly,

that Mrs. JOHNSON's mental condition posed a serious threat to

the security of the operation and that the KGB recognized this

fact no later than late 1960.

After August 1963 KGB interest

in JOHNSON's access to classified information declired markedly,

and MINTKENBAUGH's contact with the KGB was severed at approxi-

mately the same time.

The JOHNSONS and MINTKENBAUCH were

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## Page 94

mutually

supporting in all major respects.

s. for they pala little

heed to KGB efforts at compartmentation and continued to discuss

their clandestine activities with each other.

Trell statements

are summarized below, folloied by a detailed

presentation of

their accounts of the operation. Mrs. JOHNSON S

others aboit the agent

of her husband, ard the

JOH:SON's mental iilress which causes her.to

make these revelations.

An effective and reliäble agent from 1953 cn, JOHNSON

arrived at Orly in lay 1961, out it was rot urtil the fall of

1962 that he obtained the combination of the vauit.

Probably in

December JOHNSON made the first of his sever entries into the

Five more penetrations

appear to have beer made during the

perzod January to March 1963; and tre final one occurrea in May

As summer approached and the days became lorger, JOHNSON's

KGB case officer told him he was suspending the operation, on the

grourds that the storter hours of darkness hau increased the risk

beyond acceptable limits. bur the vault entries would recormence

and intensify in the fall. In August, however, JOHNSON was trans-

ferred to che Seine Area Cenmand headquarters at Camp Des Loges,

France: and lost access to tre vault.

is noncomnissioned officer

in charge of the Classified Control Certer at Camp Des Loges,

JOHNSON had access to all classified documents originating with

the Headquarters conmand ard wich certain

other cormands as well;

yet the KGB rever pressed him to produce these documents and,

said, seemed uninterested in the docunents he offered

to provide.

When he was transierred to che United States in 1964

following NOSalKOs defection, JOHNSON received

the impression

from his KGB handler that

he was being "dropped."

JOHNSON claims

to have had no contact with the

the six months

between his reassignment to the Pentagor. and his apprehension

in December 1904.

MINTKENBAUGH first served the KGB

as a spotter of American

personnel in Berlin during 1953 and 1954 and later

frcm 1956 to

1959, as a courier between

JOHNSON and officers of the KCB Legal

Residency in kashington.

At the time JOHNSON was assigned

to Orleans, France:

in late 1959, MINTKEiBAUGY was taker to

for his "most important assignment."

instruction,

MINTKENBAUGH moved from California to Arlington. .

Virginia,

in 1960.

The plan

was for him to establish a self-

owned business so that he could be joned by a female la KGB

Illegall who was to become his wife and operational assistant.

this was accomplished MINTKENBAUGH was to act as a courier,

servicing a retwork of KGB

agents throughout the United

Despite repeated KGB pleadirgs and admonitions: he took no fur-

ther steps to establish the desired cover, and

the Soviet plan never materialized.

Moreover,

said by early 1962 he was depressed ana disillusiored and was

looking for e way to break concact with the KGB; from this point

or somewhat earler he claims to have performed his various KGB

assignments in a perfunctory way or rot at all,

Contact was

finally broken sonetime in the

late summer or early fall of

1963 when MINTKENBAUGH was unable to read directions for fur-

ther meetings which the KGB passed him on photographic film via

The KGB took no steps to reinstitute contacts, and

MINIKENBAUGH's own efforts - after apparently experiencing a

change of heart - proved unavailing,

Hedwig JOHNSON's espionage career was limited to the 1953-

1954 period, when she acted as a courier betweer. JOHNSON in rest

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439.

and the KGB at Karlshorst. Although she was subsequently

aware of the details of JOHNSCN's work and even on occasion accom-

panied him to operational meetings in Flarce, she apparently never

again played an active role.

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a

JOHNSCN'S Statements

Having admitted his espionage activities to deSI and the

FBI, JOHNSON gave

what he said was the complete history of his

relazionships with

Sovict Intelligence since the carly 1950's.

The following account is based

largely on ACSI reports to the

U.S. Security board on 12 and 26 jaruary 1965; they provide the

details of his original confessior ard elaborate on his activities

during his most recent tour in France."

In 1952, JOHNSON was stationed in West Berlin were he wis

the acting first sergeant of a Transportation Corps company.

Despondent because he was passed over for promotion and not

the first sergeant position, and believing that his application

to marry would le disapproved, JoinisoN decided to defect to the

SOVIETS.

His first attempt to defect was aborted in February

1952 when Heärig admitted to JOHNSON at the last minute that she

had lied to him when she had informed him earlier that she had

contasted the Soviet autorities in East Beriin and arranged for

their defection as he had requested.

to defect: JOHNSON persuaded Hedwis to return to East Germany to

contact the soviets, which she did.

ed efiolt to defect:

Hedrig and JOHNSoN met with the soviets in

East Germany. JOHNSON irformed the Soviets he was "fed up with

the American

way of life" and wanted to defect to the USSR. JOHN-

SON was toid

there was no hurry about his proposal to defect, a

statemert

with

which he agreed.

Another meeting was arranged

for the following week. During the period between the first

neeting and his marriage to Hedwig on 25 Aprii 1953, JOHNSON met

almost weekly with the Soviets.

JOHNSON was finally told that

he would be oi more use to the

Soviets if he were to remain in

the American Sector.

He agreed to do

SO

and

at the same time to

perform

tasks for Soviet Intelligence.

JOHNSON has stated that

he refused the money the Soviets offered for his services at

that time, but he continued to work for Soviet Intelligence until

his transfer to Rochefort, France, in April 1954.

During his Berlir. assignment JOHNSON conducted the follow-.

ing activities on behaif of Soviet Intelligence:

- He was given a Minox camera by the Soviets and

trained in its use.

- JOHNSON's first

important assignment was to call

on

be

"Willie" (presumed by Hedwig JOHNSON to

Willie BRANDT, present Mayor of Berlin)

uniform at the time he called on

"willie, "to see " hide"

in his jeep by telling "willie" the Americans wanted to

speak with him.

He was to drive

"Willie" to the Check-

point between East and west Berlin where "fillie" would

be taken into custody by the Soviets. JOHNSUN was

instructed to use any force necessary, and he agreed

to bring

"Willie" to the Checkpoint dead or alive.

JOHN-

SON. went to the address in Schoenenberg, West Berlin,

provided by the Soviets, entered the residence, but made

no further attempt to carry out his orders.

Although the FBI subsequently debriefed JOHNSON in depth on

his entire espionage career,

these two ACSI reports contain

the main substance of his story.

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- After

his marriage on 25 April 1953, JOHNSON apert &

week in Brandenberg, East Gerrary, as a guest of the soviets,

during which time various meetings were held, usually in

JOHNSON'S rOOM.

the week there JOHNSCH was questiored

extensiveiy about his personal life and was asked routine

questiors about his organization. He was given a book on

the history of communism which he read several times, and on

one occasion he das questioned to such a degree on general

subjects trat JOHNSON felt he was possibly being psycho-

analyzed.

when JOHNSON returned to nest Berlin. Hedwig re-

mained in East Germany to act as courier between JOHNSON

and the Soviets.

JOHNSON subsequently met with Heawig on

a weekly basis.

- JOHNSON vas directed by the Soviets to try to obtain

an assignment with CIC or the Military Intelligence Detach-

ment (MID).

He believes he may have tried to get into CIC,

and he definitely applied for ar ässignment in MID but was

- JOHNSON was given the assignment of furnishing the

names of CIC personrel in Berlin,

He accomplished this by

utilizina the Berlin Post Telephone Directory, which he

also subsequently supplied to the Soviets. The Soviets were

extremely pleased with this accomplishent.

- In about May 1953, JOHNSON was reassigned to the G-2

Section of the Berlin Command, with a secret security clear-

ance. ard assigned duties as a Message Center clerk.

cause MINTKENBAUGH. then

assigned to the G-2 Section as

chief clerk, would be able to detect JOHNSON taking photo-

graphs in the office. and because JOHNSON believed that

MINTKENBAUGH could ast as a lookout for JOHNSON during the

period he was photographing documents, JOHNSON decided to

recruit MINTKENBAUGH.

He subsequently "tested" MINIKEN-

BAUGH and recrulted him to commit espionage for the Soviets.

The recruitment was accomplished without the prior know-

lEdge or approval of the Soviets.

JOHNSON believes MINT-

KENBAUGH was agreeable because of the excitemert of the

idea.

JOHNSON and MINTKENBAUCH subsequently lived to-

gether and were closely associated in espionage activities.

Hedwig

later escorted MINIKENFAUSH to East Berlin, after

which MINTKENBAUGH came under the direct supervision of

the Soviets and no longer worked for JOHNSON.

- During his assignment with G-2, JOHNSON photographed

almost everything in his office,

including cables,

rosters,

intelligence summaries, alert plans,

evacuation plans, and

possibly clearance documents. Usually he photographed the

documents on his lunch hour. JOHNSON also wrote reports

containing his personal observations and activities, which

he photographed for transmittal to the Soviets.

Hedwig

acted as their courier, carrying the film to East Germany

in the hollowed out portion of the heel of her shoe.

- When JOHNSON informed the Soviets that he expected

to be transferred out of Berlin some time in 1953 due to

an overage in his MOS, he was instructed to try to obtain

an assignment in Heidelberg, Germany.

At that time JOHN-

was disillusioned with the Soviets since they had

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442.

informed him that much of the information he passed to the

Soriets was of no interest to trem..

He therefore made no

atrempt to obtain the Heidelberg essignment.

Irstead, JOHN-

soN took leave to Wiestsien, Germany.

nner. JCHNSCH next met

with his Suviet handler in Karlshorst, East Germany, JO:NSO!:

informed the soviets he had been to Heidelberg and rad re-.

quested an assignment in the G-2 Section there.

He was

questioned in detail about his

trip, but believes he was

able to convince the soviets of the truth of his statements.

in the United States In 1957, through MINIKENBAUCH.

Ir. July 1956 JOHNSON was discharged from the Army and moved

to Las Vegas,

Nevada,

In the early pare of 1957 MINTKENBAUGH IE-

contacted JOHNSON in Las Vegas and gave him a present of $500 from

the soviets.

No conditions vere attached to the gift, but johNson

was, offered a saiaried job if he nould re-join the mmy and again

work for the soviets

The Soviets instructed JOHNSCN to obtain

some type of work involving security.

as instructed on 18 February 1957 but applied for missile train-

ing on his own initiative. JOHNSON was assigred to Fort MacArthur,

Los Angeles, California, on 18 February 1957 and from there sent

to the NIKE-ijax Missile School at Palo Verde, California, for

training. JOHNSON stated that, while assigned to the school, he:

BILE

- Photographed all training manuals he could procure.

Most were balieved to be unclassified,

although ore or two

could have been classified "confidential."

- Stole a sample of JP-4 NIKE fiel.

- Photographed

a Hercules missile in detail.

estinated he took 15 to 20 photographs of the missile from

all .ängles.

- Took several photographs of the installation while

"on duty as a security guard in a tower overlooking a secure

area at the missile school.

- Photographed the inside of a NIKE Missile Site, but

with negative results as the photos did not come out.

JOHNSON maintained contact with MINTKENBAUGH on a bi-monthly

basis.

He passed photographs, personal reports and. the Jp-4 fuel

sample to the Soviets through MINTKENBAUGH and was paid by the

Soviets on an average of $300 per month. JOHNSON was paid an

additional bonus for the JP-4 fuel sample, which was of particular

interest to the Soviets. He signed receipts for all payments

received.

In 1958 JOHNSON was trarsferred to Fort. Bliss where he was:

assigned duties as a supply sergeant with no access

to classified

TOP SECRET

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## Page 99

No: 443-94365

irformation,

DurIag trus assignment, JONNSO!: ascompanied KINT-

KRIPRUCH 50

wastington, D.C,, on one socasion and was introduced

LO MINTKEIRAUGH's hardier.*

JOnTiSON was transferred to Orleans. France,

and reported there or. 29 October for duty with the Mutual

Security Section, U.S.

many supply Control Agercy.

The soviets

this transfer, and within several days of his arri-

val JOHNSON was contacted by MINTKRiBAUCH who explaired that he

been sent in order to arrarge contace betwee. JOHNSON ard

the Soviets.

A day or so after this, MINIKaNBAUCH, JOHNSON, and

JCHiSo:'s wife traveiled to Paris, Where the JoriSoNs were met

by Vitaliy URZHUSOV,

who introduced himself as "Viktor."**

M=s. JOHNSO: '= presence, URZILMOV expressed

an interest in JOHN-

SO:'S new dity post,

a salo supply installation, and in JODISON's

job: which involves the handling of requisitions for supplies and

replacement parts for NIKE missile sites.

He asked JOHNSON to

roner his

intelligence work, ard JOHNSo! agreed.

Beginning in tarly january 1960, JOHNSON had

approximately.

eight meetings with URZELNCV ir. Paris.

These reetings took place

on the first

Saturday of each month, and during the first few of

accompanied by tils fife.***

Origirally it was

plar..ed that redwig woulà act as a courier, but this plan was dis-

carded because

it would have reguired that JOriSON give her a

detailei oral explanation of the

information which he was turnish-

ing the soviets:

The meetirgs with URZiU:OV lasted from 15 to 30

passed the irformation he had managed

underwent training.

and assisted in the development

of dead drops and emergency plar.s.

While stationed at Orlears: JORNSON furnished the Soviets

with photographs of ¿ccuments, typewritten reports of his obser-

vations, and personality data on other persons working in the

Mutual Security

srance of the orunarce agercy.

Specifically he

passed information on the french S-i0 ard S-11 anti-tank wire-

controlled missiles, then in use by the tito forces and on parts

supplied to NIKE-Ajax units in Italy as well as the locations of

these units.

also gave the Soviets a complete description of

his own job and duties and of the organization and structure of

the ordnance agency:

In late 1960 JOHNSON found it necessary to seek a transfer

tie dis-

cussed this transfer at length with URZHUMOV, who agreed that the

MINTKENBAUGH tOOk JOHNSON to washington on his own initiativé,

according to MINTKENBAUGH, he told his case officer

became greatly

MINTKENBAUGH tO task

for acting vithout instructions:

Nevertheless, he went to the arugstore and visited with JohN-.

** URZHUMOV was in Paris as an Attache in the Political Section

of the Soviet

Embassy as of March 1959.

He replaced a sus-

pected Soviet Intelligence officer, and GOLIISHi stated that

he was almost"corvinced" that URZHUMOV was a KGB officer.

URZHUMOV was scheduled to leave Paris in early 1965.

*** In a later debriefing,

JOHNSON sald that theymet "gererally

ings on a regular basis until some time in

JONSON'S wife apparent Vovember 1960.

attended meet-

****Hedwig JOHNSON's mental condition is discussed further

below.

---

## Page 100

14-00000

444.

irformation coming fron the ordnance agency at Orieans was "not

too inportant."

URZIUOY advised JOHNSON to ILy to get an assign-

r.ent either

aE SHAVE Or CJCOM since the Soviets could

source at either of these headquarters.*

JOHNSON reenlisted in

April 1951, ard naving requested assignment at Headquarters,

seine Area Command

Paras; he was posted to the courier station

at Orly Field, a unit shich he knew nandled iop secret and crypto-

graphic material.

According to JOHNSON, URZHUNOV appeared to be

very happy when ne heard this.

JOHNSON arraved at the Oriy Courier Transfer Station in May

1961

ard for the next year met frequently with URZHUMOV. He was,

however, unable to furnish anything of intelligence interest be-

cause of stringent security precautiors, but he did

give URZHUMOY

reports of personal activities, personality sketches,

and sug-

gestions as to which individuals seemed to ce potential recruits

for the Soviets.

At one of their regular meetings in the fall of

1962, URZHUMOY Introduced JOHNSON tO a ner Soviet

case officer.

G.N. VLiSOV, who called himseli 'Felix,

"** Thereafter JOHNSON

saw very little of his former handler.

According to JCHNSON, the rature of the operation changes

after VIASOV iook over.

VLASOV': handling, JOHNSON said, proved

to ve more direst and itas discreet than URZHUMOY's had been:

URZHUMOV mOSt Of JOHNSON's time was spent on locat-

ing dead drops, the foimulation of emergency plans.

and

training,

peretratior of the vault now became his prinary mission.

The

firse break in this direction came, JOHNSON

sald, when he was

outain the combinarion to the door leading to the vault

area:"** one of the officers in chaige had thrown in the trash

can a piece uf paper containing the combination in coded form

and JCHNSON retrieved It after

the officer left the room.

(JOHN-

SON had earlier made an impression of the key to the irrer door

of the vault when one of his co noikers had inadvertently loft

the key in

the doot.

The Soviets had made a copy.)

JOHNSON

described this phase of the operation as being slow and careful.

He füIst wIote eports

on every asiail of the courier service,

including schedules for arrivals,

deliveries, and hardling of

classified materials.

On VLASOV'e instruction he also photo-

graphed the vault door ard the office and made detailed measure-

ments of the door and the vault, this was accomplished at night,

using a Mirox camera furrished by the Soviets.

* JOHNSON later said "Viktor" had told him that the only in-

formation of value that he had supplied while stationed at

Orleans was that concerning the S-10 and S-ll missiles.

** VLASOV was scheduled to be replaced in Paris in January 1965.

***JOHNSON has described the courier station as consisting of

an office area and the vault.

"Ertrance to the

vault from the outer room was through two metal doors.

The

first door was secured by a steel bar at either end of which

was a Sargent and Greenleaf combination padlock. The second

door was secured by a key lock."

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## Page 101

18445.30

Daring this period, too, JOHiSoN degar. to establish a work

pattern by volinteering to work straight through the reekerd

beginning Saturday morning and ending Monday morning.

plained to his superiors and fellow workers that he wanted to

have Morday and Tüesday off in order to do the shopping and noise-

cleaning for his wife, iho was not vell.

This arrangement wag

agreeable to all, as everyone would have every weekerd off.)

JOHNSON also begar to bring ris

saving equipment and feod to the

France bag; this bag was to be used in the opera-

tion, and it was necessary that it be thought commonplace for him

to carry it around,

JOHNSON estimated that about a month elapsed hetween the time

he obtained the combination to the vault and the first penetration.

During this time he and VIASOV met about every third night to dis-

cuss the penetration and plans were discussed for removing the

aocumer.ts.

the soviets' processing of then, and their gee return

The plan,

35 finally agreed upor, called for a

meeting on the friday night before the peretration was to be made

to discuss details and arrange meetire

All penetrations

were to be cairied out during the midright hours on Saturday:

Jorison was to enter the vault at

2305 hours, obtain the material,

leave the office

2315 hours, and make the delivery to the

soviets at 2315 hours.

As things worked out in practice, JONSON

said. he sometimes entered the vault sonewhat earlier.

tion of documents was on the basis of their addressees, all were

wrapped."

He wouid then go outside to make sure no U.s. per-

sonnel were in the area,

frort door, open the vault,

take the materials, lock the vault.

and with the documents in his

Air France bag drive to the meeting site a short distance away.

There he would exchange the bag for an idertical one provided by

the Soviets, containing sandwiches ard a bottle of doped cograc.

and return to his duty post.

JOHNSON explained that if on re-

turning to the station he was corfronted by a visitor, he wes to

say that he has gone out to get some food: if it appeared that

the visitor planned to stay

long enough to upset the plan,

cognac was to be used (it never was used).

A second contast

with the soviets, to retrieve the materials, was scheduled for

between 0300 to 0400 hours at a different meeting site, about

six minutes' drive away,

On one or pernaps two occasions when the combination to the

lock had been changed: JOHNSON used a special device (supplied

by VLASOV! to determine the new combination.

On 23 February

1965, JOHNSON

said that he was quite

certain he used this de-

vice twice, in February and March 1963.

This device was in

two sections, one of which was a plate.

The device fit srugly

over the lock, the plate being placed to the rear of it, and

the device recorded

the combination of the lock by means of

radioactive material in one section of it.

JOHNSON said that

VLASOV gave him the new combination to the lock about a week

after he had placed the device on the lock as irstructed.

JOHNSON had earlier made photographs and detailed measurements

on the locks used to secure the vault door; because the

* JOHNSON did not know precisely what documents he gave the

ACSI confirmed that there is a document, such as

that described by NOSENKO, which lists bombing targets in

France and that it had been sent to France during this

period,

TOP SCARET

---

## Page 102

14-00000

4÷5.

radioactive device supplied by VLASOY fitted tren exactly, he

supposed that it has been made especially for this penetration

operation.*

JOHNSON could not recall the date when the first penetration

of the vauit was made, but he said that it couid not have been

fore November 1962 as his car was our

of comnission througrout

October.

Definiteiy,

according to JCENSON. there was ? peretra-

tron just before or after Christnas i96è, and tre first four pene-

trations were spaceà closely togetter.

Questiored in detail on

this subject during February 1965, ICANSON evertually arrived at

the estimate that there was ro penetration made in November 1962,

that this entries were made

and chat live more pene

trations took place during January.May 1963.

Regarding the Decen-

ber penetrations, he first believed that they might have veen on

ard 29th of the month, thor.

sater said that he thought

they had taken place on conserütive

Saturdays.

and finally re-

affirned his belief that one was made

on the 29th and ruled out

the possibility of one on the 2ind.

He believed that the January

entry took place in che middle of the morth, probably the

and said he was quite certain that ar entry took place on 26

The operation procreded without disruptior until it was

terminated during tre summer mcnchs of 1953

on instrustions from

VLISCV, who felt that the days had crom too long and that the

operation could not be carried our in düylight.

cussed for expanding the operation vien it was resumed in the fall,

Up until this time JOHNSO! had beer. instructed not to

15 enveropes at a time as the Soviet

techricians** couid nor handie a larger quartity during

available.

In the stepped-up operation, according to VLiSOV,

sufficient perconnel

and failities sould be available to process

approximately

30 envelopes.

* NOSENKO, however, described this device, or one very similar

to it, in Geneva on 12 June 1962

"X-rays are beamed against

a safe in order to determine the combiration by radiation...

in order to open a new aare, any sôie...

The (spe-

equipmert is contained In two suitcases: they turn it

and rays are emitted

to sense which combination

should be choser."

JOHNSON said the devise was contained in

two separate pocket-sized packages as a guard against. harm-

ful radiation,

ard both JOHNSON and NOSENKO have described

the possible effects of this radiation on the health of its

operator. NOSENKO was not asked and dia not volunteer why,

if this equipment was available at least as early as June

1962, it was not used earlier in the Orly penetration oper-

** By matching Saturdays with the dates on which CIA records

technicians named by NOSENKO to be in Paris,

ACSI arrived at the following possible dates for the penetra-

15 December 1962, 22 December 1962, 19 January 1963.

26 January 1963, 16 February 1963, 2 March 1963, and 25 May

***JOHNSO!, who never met them, was told that it was necessary

Soviets to fly the technicians into Paris from

Moscow for each penetration of the vault.

TOP SECRET

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## Page 103

Mere vere, however, no further penetzations.

on 4 august

IO:DISCN received orders transferring hit to the Seine hea

Command at Camp Des Loges, not fer fron Parie.

Cormercing Officer and told him that he did not want the trens-

fer, that he was happy with his current assignment, and that it

was better for his wife to be near the hospital facilities in

The officer replied that he would try to lind another re-

placement ior the position at camp des Loges but that, in the

meantime, Joliso" would have to rspurt for duty as ordered. (PIlor

to leaving oriy, JOriSoN informed viASOY of the transfer and offor-

ed to attempt to recruit à fellow-worker to take his place in the

peretration operation; VLiSOV gave him defirite instructiong not

to make any recruitment attempts.

iids assignment at camp

as non-commissionod officer in charge of the "Classified

arcompanded by & promotion. JOINSCH reported

for duty on 5 August 1951.

JOiSON served at camp Dos Leges lor rine mottho, until May

1964.

During this time ho took pert

ir. only one operation

for the

soviets, photography dé a seine ires Cornara catcloge.

classi-

fied

"secre's".

This zi-page docurent gave a syropsis of each

seine Area command evacuation rien."

solison managed to photogropt this document during normal

working hours, probably sometire at tre ond at 1903 or in January

19t4 using a special roll-over"

camera, wrich he then returned to

VLASCY.

Asout a reek later,

SchisoN agair met with viksoy, who

tolà him that he did not

consivier the information worth the risk

involved and called oif future ariempts.

The main piroose of the

operation.

Vlavov said, which was to acquaint JOHNSON with the

"Ioll-over" camera and its use, had been accomplished.

JOHNSON described this camera

as having a built-in light

source aná as resembliny a cigarette case:

To expose the filt.

JOHNSO:i rolled the cainera across the pages.

iccording to JOIN-

SON, the Soviets attached great importance to this camera, una

it was not given to him until he had provided detailed plans

and descriptions of the building ard office ir which he worked,

locations of the safes, and descriptions di the personnel there.

Furthermore, JOHNSON was instructed

to return the camera to his

case officer the night after taking the picturos or in any case

within three days whether or not he had been able to take the

pictures.**

* JOiSON later identified this document as the "Combat Opera-

tions Index and Status of Emergency Plans."

"secret," it sunmarizes the cortents of various individual

emergency and evacuation plans for units under the Seine

Area Comrand.

**A camera apparently of the same type was already knom to

In January 1962, a British double agent, believed to

be compromised to the soviets, was issued a document camera

ith its own licht source in the

form of a cigarette case.

asker aprovided tvies information con-

cerning a aucument camera with its own

light source the size

of a cigarette case.

When the KGB agent John BUTENKO waS

arrested in the United States in October 1963, the FBI

seized a document camera with its own light source built

into a metal cigarette

(The camera

given the gritish

double agent

"ehe serfai number 56249. While BUTENKO'*

had the serial 56248.)

TOP SECRET

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## Page 104

448.

• During an intervier on 18 February 1955, JOHNSO! stated

that he did not feel that his espionage efforts at Camp Des Loges.

had been very profitable for the Soviets.

it was his opinion that

the most important document to which

he hed access during this

period was the top secret one on Seventh Army plans for retreat.

to the Pyrentes in the event of a soviet Army attack.

When he

proposed that he attempt to obtain it for the

Soviets, however.

ViASOV showed a complete lack of interest,

VLASOV's attitude led

JOHNSON to believe that the Soviets already had the document.

JOHNSON

stated further .that it was his usual practice to scan

documents which came into his possession and to make oral and

sometimes written reports to the soviets on their general contents.

He specifically recalled discussing with: VLASOV the periodic

counterintelligence summaries issued by CIC to which he had access.

but VLASOV had not seemed interested in them.

JOHNSON believed

these discussions came up in connection with possible use of the

"roll-over" camera, and that VLASOV's response had been that the

information involved was not worth the risk of his exposure.*

JOHNSON recalled that "at their last neeting ard for à few

meetirgs prior thereto, he and

'Felix' (VLASOV) did noi stop at

a cafe as had beer. their practice.** Instead, the entire meeting

was conducted as they walked in the area of their point of con-

tact in Paris.

At one of these meetings 'Felix' appeared to be

visibly apset.. In fact, he had not appeared for a meeting on

the appointed

The contact was not made until the alter-

suggested that he (JCHNSON)

knew why they had not met as scheduled.

Whenhe (JOHNSON) replied

that he did not know,

explained to him that a soviet In-

telligence officer had defected in Gereva and that they had to

be extremcly cautious.

'Felix' told him that he did not have to

worry, that the off:cer did not krow him, but

'Felix' instructed

him to destroy arything which could identify him with Soviet

Intelligence.

, who normally was very calm and self-

assured, was completely out of character on this occasion.

and succeeding meets before he returned to the United

States, he (JOHNSON) tried to tell

about the status of

his expected rotation to the United States ir. May.

'Felix' did

not appear to be interested in anything he had to say, Finally,

JOHNSON said that in the Classified Control Section he had

access to all classified documents originating with Seine

Area Command and to some classified documents originating

in other headquarters; he was responsible for supervising

the printing of classified documents and for accounting.for

and distributing all

authorized copies of these documents.

JOHNSON was asked on 18 February 1965 whether it would have

been possible for him to take original documents or copies

of them to his Soviet handlers.

He replied that he could

have forged receipts and taken a document fron the Center

on his person and, in addition, he could have made extra

copies of any classified document.. He did not do this

to the ore document he did copy; he said, be-

cause he had an interest in seeing

and using the "roll-

over" camera.

** This change apparently occurred following NOSENKO's defec-

tion in early February 1964.

TOP SECHET

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## Page 105

449 cine

early April, when

'Felix' told him that it was

their last meeting, which came as a surprise to JOHNSoN, he

(JOHNSON) raised the questior. of how he was to rotify 'felix' in

the event there was a change in his anticipated assignment to

the courier Station in dashington for which he had not yet been

given official orders,

in reply instructed him to place

on a designated "all of a building somewhere in Paris the letter

"W' if he reserved orders for assignment in the washington area

and the letter 'X' if he received orders for assigment elsewhere."

At this meeting VLASOV also told JOHNSON that he was rot to

worry if contact was not established immediately upon his return

to washington,

He then gave JOHNSON contact instructions which

called for the first meeting to take place in New York City in

eight months later.

sions with VLASOV, JOHNSON told the FBI, he was

URZHUMOY enter the cafe where they were sitting and join them at

the table.

This was the first time that all three had met to-

gether since UPZHUMOV had turned him over to VLASOV in 1961, prior

to the OIly penetrations.

reviewed the arrangements for reestablishing coract in December,

which gave JOHNSON an opportunity to express concern that he was

to be out of contact for such a long time and to suggest the

desirability

of some sort of emergency contact arrangements such

as he had had during his duty tour in

told JOHNSON that such arrangements would not be necessary.*

JOHNSON claimed to have had no contact with the Soviets

during his assignment at the Pentagon Courier Transfer Station

from May 1964 until he went ArOL in October of that year.

*!

According to MINTKENBAUGH, when JOHNSON contacted him in

Arlington after his return to the United States, JOHNSON

said that when he was leaving Paris the Soviets. treated. him

as though he was being

"dropped."

JOHNSON said he had been

instructed to get rid of all materials used in the operation

before leaving france.

He also told MINTKENBAUGH that an-

other reason for this belief was the fact that he had asked

for instructions regarding emergency meeting procedures but

had been told by the Soviets that none were needed. in

KENBAUGH remarked to the FBI that this was a change

usual procedures.

TOP SEGRET

---

## Page 106

S, MiNTKENENCH'S Statemints

Wher. he waited

in to CiA or 10 November 1964 and during

his first interview

by the FBl on 5 Decenber 1968, MINTKEN-

BAlGi discrubed has ricrultront by dOWNSON in Berlin in the

sumter of 1453 and his collaboration with JoiNSoN in tha

clardestine plotography of documents and their transmittal,

TOMASON, to tha Soviets

in East Berlin until the

fail of that year.

He aiso desiribed his role in JOHNSON's

Iractiration as

3 KCB agaat In carly 1957 and his own acti-

and Soviets stationed

in Washangton, D.C. untis the summer of 1959.

On the basis

of 1n1s personal involi mert.

he has buen able to give whet

purports to bo a fairly complete accourt o1 JO:iSOV's espion-

9ge activiries during rids ilk year period.

Witt. a number

of minor variations, which appear nitributabie to

description

Is consistert with the story

his corteision are given

below, s-parated iato tio

sections, ose

what MIN-KENBAUGH

maid about JOHNSON and one on

what he said

about hinselt..

On Robert Lee JOHNSON

After JOHNSON was transier-ed to Orleans,

France: in

1959

and following MINIKENBAUCh'S special training in

MOSCOw

(se= b: low) that fail, the KOB instrueted both agents to

srico ali ties with one another in an attempt to compartment

what row had become separate oparations.

Both JOHNSON and

MINTKENBAUH igured these instructions.

The two corresponded

by ma it.

thoughout 10!5501's scivice

tr= first things JOWSON did after getting settied in Washing-

ton upon his retur to the Unit-d States

the spring rf

1964

wis

to look up his did frina.

got together

and swapp-d espionage stories.

From this, WEIKENBAUGH was

abir: 1.0

soil the FRI ir

corsid rahl: ditall about the Orly

Corrier Station peretracion.

Although MINTKENZAUGH'S infor-

mation addid authing

was far less detailed than

lat:r given by JOHNSOY, the two accounts were consistent.*

On His Owy Actirities

MINTKENBAUSH piotured himself as an agent with no

unique across to signigicant irtelligence, initially dis

trusted by the KCB,

later used as a spotter and then as a

courier, ineffertial in carrying out the ore important as

signment gived him by tre KrB, but partly successful in

*JOHNSON and his wife also were knowledgeable of MINTKEN-

BAUK's a-tivities during the 1959-1963 period.

BAUCH appalently told them that he had been to Moscow for

espionage

training.

Fron his letters to

the JOHNSONs had a good idea of MINTKEN-

BALCH's principal mission in the Washington area, and when

JOHNSOY contacted him after returning from France in 1961,

MINTKENBAUGH described his other assignuents as well.

TOP SEGRET

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## Page 107

451.

fulfalling other less Importart KGB raiks." He also indicated

that; durirg the latter part of his

agent

career, he was a

reluctant collacorator ard became & handling problem for his

KG2: ease officers.

MINTKENBAJGH's career as a KGB agent began in the summer of

1953, shortly after a chanse encounter wiir his old acquairtance,

Within a matter of wecks JOINSON told MINTKaISAUCh that

he was a Soviet agent ard then, without

sorsulting the KGB, re-

cruited MINTKENBAUCH as an assistant.

JURiSON'S KGS handlers...

'extremely upset" when they learned what JOHNSON nad done:

ard 1t nas not untai October 1953, some monins

that they

agiee to meet MINIKENBAUGh.

irterim heassisted

by standing watch while

jatter photograplied doc'u-

From October 1953 to April 1954, wher MINIKENBAUCH was

transferred temporarily to duty with a miliary hospital in

he carried out a number of assignments for the Soviets,

alinost ald connected with the spotting

and assessment of imericans

stationed in Berlin.

five-morth per10d he was in

MINTKENBAUGK claimed to have been out of touch with the kgs.

returning to terlin in september: 1954, he resumed his spotting

activities ard spent a part of his time learning photography, che

construction and use of dead drops.

secret writing techniques

preparatior for his impending transfer to the United States.

He left Berlin ir February 1956,

MINTKENBAUGH performed his rext espionage assignment a year

later when, in January 1957, he visited

and reactivated Sergeant

JOHNSON at KGB instruction.

The iollowing montr. he began service

as a courier between JOHNSON, who was stationed first in Califor-

nia and then in Texas, and the KGB In Washington, D.C.

these periodic courier trips, MINTKINBAUCH carried out no other

KGB

assignments until the late fall of 1959.

Probably in October 1959, MINTKENBAUCH flew to Berlin and

from there,

in company with a KGB officer, to Moscow,

was lodged

in a safe apartment.

For about three weeks he received

individualized training in photography, iryprography, and marual

Morse reception, wich emphasis on the latter.

At the end of this

period, his case officer asked for the first time whether MiNikaN-

BAUGH was willing to marry a Soviet woman and live with her in the

According to the KGB plan as explained to MINT-

KENBAUGH at this time, he would establish a roof over his head"

near Washington, preferabiy in Ariington;

then, with the assis-

tance of his

"operational wife" he would serve

* Although NOSENKO did not report on MINTKENBAUGH, he and JON-

SON were so closely connected operationaliy and

had such com-

plete knowledge of one anocher's aitivities, that the confes-

sion of either agent would almost inevitably result in the

apprehension of the other.

For this reason MINTKENBAUGH'S

is given here in some detail.

This account, for the

most part, was given as part of and subsequent to

BAUGH's confession of complicity

in Soviet espionage, but be-

fore he was convicted for conspiracy.

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## Page 108

452.

colieating information from a network of Soviet agents for

delivery to tne KCB via drad

Several days after this,

*hilE MINTKENBIUCH was still considering the KGB proposal,

he was visited by "Alex."

SINTKENBALCA waS told "Alex"

a sendo! NCB official and a "very important person."

was later identified as Aleksandr FENLISOr, then Chief of

the American Department of the KCB First Chief Directorate

and later,

under the rame FOMIN, KGB Legal Fesident in

Washirgton.j

"AlEx" told MINTKEYBAUCk that als Soviet wife

as a cover for MISTKENBAUGH's espionage:

Her presence would allow MINTKENBAUCH to truel freely

throughout th+ United States (yew York, Callioraia, and New

Mexico vete mentioned specificaily

without having

"ragging wife."

would be able to help hin

operationally, paiticulariy vich radio communications.

nanner ard questions, MINKENBAUCH

gathered that he

tad come rainly to "size him up" for this assignment, which

WINTKENBALGH now agreed to accept.

Subs-quently MINTKENBAUCH was

introduced to his intended

bride, known to hin only as "Irect,"' and the two spent some

together to set acquairted.

She tad either been informed

or recognized thar MINTKENBAJGH was a homosexual and told

bin she krew.** MINTKENBAUGH returned to the lnited States at

the end of Decomber 1959.

His only assigniest from the Mos-

trip was to establish his owr business in the Washington

al'ea as soon as possible so that

"Irese" could join him.

Following KCB instructions, NIN KEYBAICH

Arlington, virginia, in about October 1960, but ialled to

anything about his "roof."

Shortly after nis arrival and

without advising or securing she appro'al of his KGB handler,

he entered into a home-remodering venturo with a femele

frierd from his days in Piriln..

Wren MINTKESBAUGH told his

rase officer about this after the fact,

the intter became -

"Extreatis upset," explairing that lo instructing MINTKE'-

to establish cover, the kCB had m-art to determine what

business de was to enter.

He told MIstKerollch to get out

of the partnership as

soon as possibie ard into a business

of his own.

Wntle still continuing this activity (he

erentually persuaded the KiB to accept his partiripation and

to con.ribute financial support) MiNIKENEA.Gh took out a

Firginia real estate license in the spring of 19E1 and found

empioyment with an Arlington dealer.

MINTKENBALGH said that

although his KCB officer seened "pleas:d" that MINTKENBAUCH

was working for this firm, it was indicaed that evertually

the KGB would like him to get a real estate office of his

own, which the sovlets would tinance.

MINIKENBAUGH took

no steps to do so.

MINTKENBAUGH was also given a number of other assign-

ments diring this period.

One of these struck him

as being

probably related to "Irere's" dispatco

to the United States:

Sone time in 1960 (MINTKENBAUCH is not sure of the date) be

#presumably "Irene" was to become a KGB Illegal who would

enter and live in the United States urder a talse identity.

**Although MINTKENBAUCH is certain that the KeS knew of his

homosexuality from the start of the operetion, this 1ß the

only mention of it to him by the KGB personnel during his

entire agent career.

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## Page 109

4453 Pis

wan

sert to vencouver, Carada, to secure the birth certifi-

catr of

a scale Canadian citizen, about the same age as

"Irene"; tris female had ingrated to Finland with her faraly

as a child.

Because of her age and "Irens's" Baltic orizin,

MINTKESBAUCH speculated that the

assignment night be related

to his principal

ore.

In November 1960 MINTKEYBAUCH

waS

turned over to a new

Soviet case ufficer who, probably sume

time in 1461, gave him a list of assignments.

which required

that MINTKENBAUGK travel to Oklahona

to locate a number of

i missile sites.

He was also to trace a petroleum pipeline

running from Texas to Pennsylvania,

to pinpoint the location

of a U.S. Department of State mia! frequency

transmitter

near harrenton, Virginia, and to determine the location of

underground facilities of either the State Department or

CIA rear Gettysburg, Pransylvania.

MINTKENBAUGH WAS SUCCESS-

fel in carrsing out

sone

of these tasks and failed in others.

By carly 1962, accurding to MINTKENBAUGH, he was in

considerable financial difficulty.

The real estate firm

where he was employed was going bankrupt,

• his runodeling

business required sizeable additional expenditures, and

was also needed to

support other real estaie

ventures

MINTKENBAUCH again approached the KGB for

funds, which were reluctantly givin.

KGB cass officer

was "quite upset" on

this oscasion and told MINTKENBAIGH

that the KCB could not continue to

"four noney into the

[comodeling) operation."

He again instructed MINTKENSAIGH

possible so that he

could "stop wasting time" and establish his own cover firm.

Depressed by his financial raverses, WINTKENBAUGit nOw

"began to feel increased pressures" because of his involve-

ment with the soviets.

He has since clained that at this

tine ne wanted desperately to break off his relationship

with the Soviets but did not know how to do it.

stated his emotional condition

"became so serious that he

decided that he had better leave town for a while before he

had a nervous breakdown." During

this period, MINIKENBAUGH

was furnishing no information of value to the

KGB but was merely going through the motions of cooperation.

For these reasons, MINTKENBAUGH sold his share in the

house-remodeling business to his partner in the spring oi

resigned his position with

the real estate firm,

to the KGB, flew to Florida for about a nonth.*

He financed the trip

with part of the money he had recently

recaived fron his KGB handler.

Shortly before departure

MINTKENBAUGH wrote a letter to JOHNSON in France explaining

that he was sick, that he was in dire financial difficulty

and needed more money,

ard that he was going away for a

He told JOHNSON to pass the letter to the Soviets.

MINTKENBAUGH later told

the FBI that he had no intention at

*This was not the first time MINTKENBAUGH made such an

unannounced trip.

In 1958, on his own,

flew to Berlin to

complain about his currert handler in

Washington, whom he

considered "creepy," and to request a change in case of-

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## Page 110

the time to remain perranently in Florida:

trip was 1n

an attempt to "run ara?,

out of his espion-

aze activities.

He hoped the KGB would lose interest 10

his in his absence..

The leiter to JOHNSO!,

XINTKENBAUSR

said, was to give the Soviets a logical explasation for b15

absenco.*

Nevertheless, MINTKENBAUC! returned to kashington in

for his next

scheduled aceting with his KGB case officer.

He returned, MINTKENBAUGH toid the FBI, "to face the music."

The KGB officer was repurtedly furious that HINIKENBAUGH bad

tO JOiNSOY, a violation of the very specific instruc-

tions MINTKESBAUGH had earlier received to destroy JOHNSON'S

address and break all contacts with him.

Shortly after bis

WINTKENBAIGH Pound a job with arother Arlington

estate agency.

this point on to the end of the

principal assigament was to photograph rental

applications aubmitted by

persons he knew or believed

for CIA or otherwise to be oi interest to the KGB.

The

subject of the independent cover business and of

"Irene's" arrival in

the Unired States was not dropped,

however.

Soviet offoris reached a high point, MINTKENBAUCH

estinated. in August 1962 when ho was summoned to a special

meeting and found "Ale%" (FENLISOV), whom he lad last seen

in Moscow,

waiting for hin at the meet site.

In that im

pressed MINTKENBAUGH as a "pay talk,

" it was explained by

"Alex" thai he had cond ail tho way from Moscow to see bim..*

MINTKENBAUGH, he stated,

was worthl a great deal of money to

the Soviets, who were williag to give it to him, but MINKEN-

BAUCk must take immediate steps to establish his own business.

FLKLISOV indirated that there had been no change in the plan

to serd "Irene" to Hashingion orce this was dore.

Emphasizing

this point,

"Alrix" said that the Soviets would assume respor-

sitility for all exponses involved in setting up such

business and nould color

and loses which

might result.

Nuitover, he advised MINTKE BAlGH to devise some sort

cover story to expläin the large amounts of nones

the KGB

Other aspects of MIsTkeNBAUGh's

porformance, including his failure to follow up on various

assignments in the Rashington area, were also discussed.

*In fart, if MINTKENBAUCH had not written to JOHNSON, it 1s

that his absence would have gone unnoticed by the KGB,

for he had no dead drops to service or mectings scheduled lo

this period.

There are other examples of this alleged ambi-

valence on MiNTKENBAliH's part.

He has told the FBI on

several occasions that he was looking for a way to break con-

tact with the KGB and once said the "during recent years he

had been intentionally careless from a security standpoint

and did not care whether he would be apprehended in connection

with his Soviet operation. "

On the other hand,' JOHNSON has

said that MINTKENBAUCH was depressed when the KGB finally did

drop contact with hin and that MINTKENBAUGH went to consider-

able lengths to reestablish it.

**The August 1962 date is apparently incorrect, as 15 "Alex's"

statement that he came to the Inited States especially to see

MINTKENBAUGH.

Travel records indicate that FEKLISOV, who

arrived in lashington in 1960, was out of the country. frou

18 July to 10 September 1962.

TOP SECRE!

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## Page 111

Mention continued to be nado of the KGB

plan at seetingg

subsequent to

"Alex's" talk; HINTKESEAUGH had no doubts that,

as he had been lo!d in Moscow, his primary mission was to

estäblish himself in a cover business of his ow..

Inese meetings VINTKENBAUCH was told that "Irene" had

111, but that the KCB planned to sond someone else in ber

place as soon as MINTKENBJUGH could

latest mention of the plan which MINTKENBAUGH could recall

Eas at a meeting in the late summer of 1963.

a1g KGB case officer was distressed because so steps had

been taken and told him: "I have been here two years with

sou and this has not haperned."

MINTKENBAUGH's confession that he ever tood any decisive

steps. to comply with KOB wishes in this regard.

These meetings in the late summer and/or early autumn of

1963 were apparently

the last diract coutacts MINTKENBAUGH

bad with the KCB.

At one of them,

he recalled, his KGB

the verbal recognition

signais to be used

in the event that it became necessary

an unknown Soviet

to contact hin and said that he, the KGB officer,

not be around in the future.""

MINTKENBAUCH next unloaded

his dead drop probably in Septembar 1963, and he attempted

to de:,-lop the jiln on which,

according to established

proofdures, schedules and sites for future reetings and dead

irops were given.

Only parts of the KGB instructions could

be made out,

MiNIK?:BAUCH took the bane for this,

telling the

fil that te had

"botched up the film" by using

faulty developer.

He was able to detormine only trat his

tsergency meeting site had been changed

and that his

dead drop was scheduled for loading on

23 Noverber 1963, but

he did not know In: location of either.

LINTKENBAUCH'S

neans of contacting the KUB therefore was brokas.

thereafter he appeared at various of his previous meeting

sites in the Washington area and called the energency tele-

phoze number given him by his case officer, MiSTKENBAUGH

Bas unsuccessful in restablishing contact.

The KG3 took

Is initiative to do so, insofar as

MINIKENBAUGH knew.**

JOINSON's disappearance and an FBI interview concerning

JOHNSON on 10 November 1964 caused MINTKENBALÜH to prevail

on bis roonrate, known to him to be a ClA employee,

bim to CIA Headquarters.

There, during the night of 10-11

November, he confessed his espionage

activities to a CIA

representative.

Ibe next day, before the FBI had a chance

to talk to him.

MINTKENBALCH moved out of his apartment in

•Arlington and disappeared. The FBI located him on 5 Decem

ber 1964 at his brother's mountain cabin in California.

*WINTKENBAUGH's case officer at the time was S.D. ROMANOVISEV,

who did not leave the United States until December 1964, more

than a year later.

**According to JOHNSON, MINTKENBAUGH told him in the spring

of 1964 that he was considering as a last resort travelling

to Mexico under a false identity in order to recontact the

Soviets there.

There is no evidence that he attempted to do

50.

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## Page 112

14-00000

Tearfully, XINTKENSAUGH clained that he was "in the post-

ilon of a man with a rope

around his

neck," that te deserved

to be indicted and arrested for his past deeds, that ho was

"one of God's mistakes," that he had not found out he was

"queer" until he was 27 years old and this revelation had

"almost killed him, " that revenge

"got. into hin" and he had

to get even, and that it was all "God's fault."

Then

finally in control of himsell, he made a detailed confession.

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## Page 113

457.

(e) HEdWis JOHNSON'E Statements

Mrs. JOHiSON's active participation in Soviet espionago

short in tino and limited in scope, encompassing only the

period from 1953 to 1954 when she acted as a courier for

JOHNSON 13

She did, however, remain knowledgeable

Of JOHNSON'S,

to & lesser degree MINTKENBAUGH'S,

gence activities and was later able to describe these to the

Mrs. JOHiSON's account of her recruitnent generally

agrees with that given by her husand.

She told the FBI

how JOHNSON, embittered over his failure to receive an

expected promotion, had sent her to East Gernany to contact

Soviet officials for the purposus of offering them his

XIa. JOHNSON said that JOHNSON was primarily

Interosted in revonging himself against the U.S. Army and

had forced her into accepting this mission by

telling her

that he would not marry her otherwise.

Her first attempts

to ostablisi contact with the Soviets at Karlshorst. in early

1953 were fruitless, and it was not until about three months

later that she succeeded in delivering JOHNSON's message.

She was told to return to Karlshorst the same evening with

her husband.

At this firet meeting,

the JOHNSONs were questioned by

a group of about seven Soviets concerning JOHNSON's desire

to cooperato against the United States and his motivations

for wishing to do so.

JOHNSON gave the Soviets no classified

information at this

time and no decision was made that night

about using him.

The Soviets said they first wanted to

check on JOHiSON and his wife.

At the close of the weeting,

Mrs. JOHNSON was giver. falso identity papers to facilitate

future crossings of the sector border.

Shortly thereafter, Sir's. JOHNSON eccompanied her husband

second meeting with the Suviets.

Again, she

said,

JOHNSON passed no information to the KGB other than a copy

of his leave papers. After the meeting, however, JOHNSON

asked her for a pair of shoes so the Soviets could alter

the heels to form a concealment device.

•This was done.

five occasions prior to JOHNSON's transfer to the

the border carrying fllm

negatives which JOHNSON had placed in the shoes.

According

to Airs. JOHNSON, she never knew what was on the film and she

received no money other than for expenses from the Soviets.

JOHNSON married hery as promised, in April 1953.

This apparently comprised her total espionage career,

but JOHNSON was in the habit of discussing the details of

hiB

activities with her.

In addition, she often accompanded

JOHNSON to operational meetings after his return to France

in 1959 and until her deteriorating mental condition made

this inadvisable in November 1960.

still went with

JOHNSON to the vicinity of the meetings and waited for him.)

Her knowledge of his activities thus was practically total.

JOHNSON, for example, gave her full details of the Orly Pere-

tration, including descriptions of the methods used to achieve

initial

entry, how he selected documents for the Soviets,

and the procedures used to pass the documents to his case

officer and later return them to the vault.

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## Page 114

458.

MT3. JOHYSON's knowledge of MINTKENBAUGH's espionage

activities was less detailed.

She had accompanied SINTKEN

BAUGH when he was first introduced to the Soviets und wag

present at at least one later meeting; she was aware that he

photography of documents with JOHNSON

in Berlin; Hrs. JOHNSON knew that MINTKENBSUGH hed "gone to

Russia and there received an assignuent from the Soviets."

FroM MINTKENBAUGH'g-letters to her and JOHNSON while they

stationed in France, Are. JOHNSON learned of dIwIkeN-

BAUGH's real estate ventures

and got the impression that

"WINTKENBAUGH *as using his real estate background to assiat

Soviet agents in gotting located (in the United States):

JCHNSON, she said, put a stop to the exchange of letters

with MINTKENBAUGH, telling her that MINTKENBAUGH had gritten

things he should not have mentioned and that Mrs. JOHNSON

(who was about to inter a mental hospital for treatment)

"night talk about Soviet agents entering the United States"

and setting up business firms."

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## Page 115

(d)

Mental Condition of lecuik JOHNSOY

STE. JOHNSON's mental instability

first ranifested itself

in serious form in late 1960,

while sO iSON

was assigned to the

ordinance

agency of the Orleans Area Command in France.

At that time, Jollisor said she persisted in claiming trat

she was boing

followed by a black sedar, that there was a

nicrophone in the refrigerator, that she had been acquainted

with the recent American defectors dartin and Mitchell,

and that JOHNSON was having an affair-with a local French-

girl who stajed with their children.*

As a result, Mi's. JOHNSON was admitted to the Army

Hospital at La Chapelle,

France, in November 1960 and was

Jater noved to another hospital at Landstunl, Germany.

was under professional observation for about a month on this

occasion and returned home shortly before Christnas 1960.

Following her release from the hospital, Mrs. JOHNSON was

unable to sleep,

and as the local doctor would not prescribe

more than two sleeping pills a werk, JoHNSoN took her to

Vienna in January 1961.

After she had been

exanined, Joth-

SoN was told that she would have to remain in a private hospi-

tal there for an indefinite period of tine for medication.

When JOHSON later returned to vienna,

the hospital doctors

advised him to have vis.

JOHNSON live

for several years in

Vienna with her fanily or, as

an alternative,

in some other

large city with a German-speaking population

in order to

provide an environment to which she nad been accustomed.

She returned twice to Vienna for shock treatment and

examinations while JOHNSON remained in France.

When JOHN-

SON travelled to Vienna to get Mrs. JOHNSON after the second

of these visits in the fall of 1962, her doctor told him that

she had referred to him (JOINSON) as a "Russian general"

and had accused one of the nurses of bring a Soviet spy.

(Earlier, in the presence of neighbors, JOHNSON was accused

by his wife of being a spy.)

JOHNSON learned from his

father-in-law that Mes. JOMNSON had also told him that JOHN.

SON was a Russian general.

Eventually Mrs. JOHNSON was

persuaded to connit herself to a U.S. Army hospital, and at

the end of April 1964 she was evacuated from France

to Walter

Reed Hospital in Washington.

(JOHNSON and his children

returned to the United States several days later.) She was

released shortly afterward, but her erratic behavior, JOHN-

SON said, prompted his disappearance in October 196%.

The FBI report of this debriefing of JOHNSON states

• that "as an overall analysis of his wife, he described her

During the past 10 years

her sexual derands

had tripled over what they had previously been and she never

seemed to be sexually satisfied."

MINTKENBAUGH's statements

tend to confirm this evaluation.

He has described Mrs.

SON as being a nyuphomaniac who indiscriminately indulged in

any kind of

sexual activity with persons of either sex.

thermore, for two jears she prostituted herself regularly with

JOHNSON's knowledge while weekending in Las Vegas; he gamoled

with the proceeds.

Mrs. JOHNSON

is now confined in a Virginia mental insti-

tution.

*JOHNSON has denied the latter charge.

Nevertheless, JOHNSON

on his own initiative did tell the French girl that he was a

Soviet spy, and he

sounded her out concerning her williagness

to work for the Soviets.

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## Page 116

760.

(e) Soviet Concern About Birs. JOHNSON's Illness

When it became apparent that his wife's treatment in

Vienna had been unsuccessful and that. he would have to

leave Orleans to find a more suitable environment for her,

JOHNSON discussed the

matter. in detail with his KGB case

officer.

In the fall of 1962, after he made photograpas

of the vault dour for UR¿HUMOY, "the Minox camera was re-

turned to the kussians.

This [according to JOHNSON!

was done

because of Soviet concern over Hedy's mental condition.

JOHNSON

was instructed to retain no incrininating naterials

in his possession."

After URZHUNOV learned of Mrs. JOHNSON'S

confinement in a U.S. military hospital, JOHNSON said he

became

"all shook up" about the possibility that she might

talk.

URZHUMOV told JOHNSON to inform his

wife that he was

no longer working for the Soviets, and JOiSON must never

again

bring her to an operational meeting.

URZHUNOV also

advisrd JOHNSON to cease all intelligence activity for a

while, and all espionage paraphernalia

was to be returned to

the Soviets.* Reviseu and more elaborate emergency contact

arrangenents, providing for contact in Vienna and

Washington

as well as Paris, were agreed upor to replace earlier, un-

successful procedures,

and preparations were made for JOhN-

SON's recape should he be compronised.

He said on 6 Janu-

ary 1965 that there was no particular pressure concerning

the emergency contact. and escape arrangements

there was always the question and concern that his wife

might talk."

Soviet fear that Urs. JOHNSON might talk also was re-

flected in the handling of WINTKENBAUGH in washington.

KENBAUGH explained to the FBI that "during the period

Hedy was confined to an Army hospital in Europe (November

and December 1960l his KCB case ofticer arranged with him

to effect an

'eye-to-eye' meeting-at-Brentano's Bookstore

in downtown Washington, D.C.

MINTKENBAUGH was scheduled to

visit the bookstore three times a woek for a three-week

The Soviet Indicated that this procedure was to be

adopted in order that it would be assured that Hedy had said

during her hospital confinement which would expose

the operation.

MINTKENBAUGH

said that he presumed that the

Soviets had efferted arrangements in Europe to become aware

in the event lody would reveal any facts concerning her know-

ledge of Soviet Intelligence.

In the event Hedy did talk

and a dangerous situation resulted, the Soviets were to ad-

vise MINTKENBAUCH through a drop or by a meeting."

*In other tellings, JOHNSON

has also said that the esplonage

equipment,

which included a Minox camera and tripod and a

flashlight with a

"hollow-battery" concealment device,

W&S

returned to URZHUMOV at his (JOHNSON's) own suggestion.

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## Page 117

*Compilation of the final damage assessment has been compli-

cated by three factors. One was the difficulty involved in

determining what specific documents may have passed through

the Orly Courier Transfer Station during his assignment there.

Second, since all documents remained

wrapped while at the

station,

JOHNSON himself has been of little assistance in

Identifying them, although he has said that he concentrated:

his selection on documents addressed to particular commands.

Firally, Armed Forces courier service records for this period

have been destroyed.

**During the investigation JOHNSON eliminated as material not

available to him an

exemplar envelope for the only CIA pouch

sent to europe through the Arred Forces Courier System.. It,

therefore, appears that while at Orly he did not compromise

CIA material directly.

1.= •817.

-461

(vt) Damage by JOHNSON to U.S. Interests

The following excerpts are from a preliminary damage

assessaent* of JOHNSO''s espionage activities since 1953

which was submitted to the U.S. Intelligence Board by its

Security Committee on 11 January 1966:

"The relatively low level of sensitivity of the

information which JOHNSON

passed to the Soviets during

his assignments in Berlin, the U.S., and Orleans,

france, coupled with the passage

time since those

activitics, permit an initial assessment of relatively

"The damage done by JOHNSON at Orly, however, 1s

of another order of magnitude.

Extensive investigative

cfforts by the affected members of the U.S. Intelli

gence

community (NSA,

CIA, State Department, DIA, and

the

military services. have succeeded in identifying

both the type, and in some cases,

the specific docu-

ments, which were in the orly vault at some tine during

the poriod November 1962 to May 1963.

But it has not

been possible to identify precisely which documents

were in the vault un the dates of the penetrations....

viable assumption...is that all the documents

to which JOHNSON had physical access during the period

of his vault penetrations,

i.c., all the documents in

the vault, were subjected to possible compromise by

the Sovicts.... The review, which is continuing,

volvos a considerable volume of documents which may

total more than a thousand.

"The full extent of jamage will only be known

the current review of docunents by all affected

agencies is completed.**

The damage

the military services, however, based on a

review of their documents to date, indicate that as a

result of access to documents in the Orly vault, the

Soviets may have learned:

Details of the Single Integrated Opera-

(SIOP) including

the attack plans of

the Joint Chiefs of Staft, the identity of Soviet

targets, the tactical plans of USAF elements in-

cluding weapons systems and methods of delivery.

TOP SECRET

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## Page 118

2.

U.S. Intelligence holdings on Soviet

military capabilliles,

aronic enersy production,

weapons storage facilities, industrial complexes

and order of battle.

3. Daily U.S. Intelligence summaries 10-

cluding our

connents and reports on military and

political developents around the world.

Comprehensive comparisons of U.S. and

Soviet SAM Systems.

Indicationg of the scope and success of

the U.S. national SIGINT effort.

6.

analysis.

A wealth of material for use in cryptos

these prelininary

reports...it is evident

that Sgt. JOHNSON's cooperation with

Soviet Intelligence

has resulted in most serious damage to U.S. national

security."

The initial damage assessment does not cover the period

from August 1963 until May 1964, wher JOHNSON had access to

all classified documents originatiry with the Seine Area

Cormand and to documents from a number of other commands.

JOHNSON has insisted that, during this period, he passed only

one

"Secret" document to

his Soviet handlers; be has admitted,

however, providing oral and some written

reports concerning

documents he read which were classified "Secret" and "Confi-

dential" and which concerned emergency and evacuation plans

of tie Seine Area Command.

laving clained no contact with

the soviets after he began his duty tour at the Pentagos,

JOHNSON has thus indicated that he furnished no information

to the KGB for that period, which began

ended in his disapptarance in October 1961.

TOP SECHET

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## Page 119

14-00000

ahis pities

14637

4. Unsuccessful Approaches to t.S. Citizens*

a. The HAPHSIONE Case

{1) Introduction

after providing the two promised leads** at his first

meeting with CIA on 9 June 1962, NOSENKO then volunteered

that the KGB-in 1958 or-1959 had made an unsuccessful. re=

cruitment approach to Richard C. HARMSTONE,

Secretary

at the U.s.

Enbassy in "loscow.

Inttially NOSENKO said that

the KGB had photographs of HARUSTONE in homosexual as well

as heterosexual

acts; but in 1964 he stated that although

the KGB knew MARYSTONE tO

be a honosexual, it had no photo-

graphs of hin in such activities.

The KGB,

thanks to micro-

phones in the limbassy, learned that HARUSTONE did sot tell

authorities the full story of the approach, omitting

ine approach was based partly on his homo-

sexuality.

HAFNSTONE'S report of the approach was

made in the imbassy.

When HARMSTONE was reassigned

from Moscow, a sunmary of his KGB file was turned over

the KGB First Chief Direciorate, and NOSENKO indicated

he was unawaro of

any developments in the case thereaiter.

Since the approsch

made prior to his transfer to the

U.S. Embassy Sectior of

Department in January

1960, NOSENKO said he did not personally participate in the

operation but was informed of it by V.M. KOVSHUK, Chief of

the Section.

who did take part in the case

could not be ideril?led by NOSENKOe

HARUSTONE, a bachelor, was posted to Moscow in Octo-

ber 1957.

He went to the

security office in the Embassy

23 May 1959 to report a series of events which tad culminated

the day before in his having been approached for recruitment

by a self-admitted KCB officer (then known to HARNSTONE only

as "Sergey" but later identified as KOVSHUD)..

The approach

was based, with accompanying photugraphs,

on his alleged

homosexualits, ar ailegation

which HARMSTONE denied in his

Intervier by the Embassy

Security Officer.

He refused

collaborate, HARNSTONE said,

but he had agreed to meet. "Sergey"

on 23 May.

In keeping with

instructions from

U.s. authori-

ties, HARISTONE lunched with

"Sergey" that afterroon and

thereafter avoided holding meetings with him.

After his

reassignnent from Moscow in October 1959, HARKSTONE admitted

tọ the Department of State Security Office that he had a

homosexual background and the photographs shown to him by

KOVSHUK had been genuine, but he again claimed to have rejected

the recruitment attempt.

HARUSTONE subsequently resigned from

the Departnent.

Among the CHEREPANOV papers passed to the Moscow Embassy

in November 1963*** was a document dated August 1958 on the

KGB plans for operational activity against HARMSTONE.

*NOSENKO has described a total of five unsuccessful

by the U.S. Embassy Section,

American Department. KGB Second

Chief Directorate to recruit U.S. Embassy personnel stationed

Two of these, the attempted recruitments of mili-

tary code clerks KEYSERS

and STORSBERG in which NOSENKO sayS

he participated personally, are discussed in Part V.E.3.C.

The remaining three are described here.

the BELITSKIY and "ANDREY" leads, discussed in

Parts VI.D.6. and VI.D.3.b., respectively.

***For further information on the CHEREPANOY papers, see PRIt

VI. D.7.C.

TOP SECRE

---

## Page 120

Awarke

464.

Details on the HARUSTONE case fron NOSENKO and other

sources are presented below.

(11) Information from NOSENKO

On 9 June 1962, at his first meeting with CIA in Goneva,

NOSENKO said at the outset that he would sell two itons

information in return for the money he needed, and that he

would tell CIA no more. After he had-finished describing

the "ANDREY" case, however, he rolunteered a story about

HAR#STONE, a Second or Third Secretary at the American

bassy in loscow.

The KGB tried to recruit him,

but he re-

fused the approach.

Previously the KGB tad used both female

and male agerts against him, and the KCB had photographs of

the homosexual side

well as his activitles with girls.

NOSENKO believed that HAHNSTONE did not tell the whole story

to the U.S. officials, reporting only that there nad been

an approach to him based on compromise with

report on the approach had not bech submitted in

(NOSENKO did not say where he reported it, however.)

this meeting, having calied the BE, ITSKIY case the first

matter he would give to ClA and "ANDREY" the second, NOSENKO

characterized the HARISTONE case thus: "HAFNSTONE.

STONE.

This is alleady the third item. Be patient. That's

enough for today. (Läughing.)"

In February 1964 at CIA Icquest, JOSENKO reviewed the

CHERERANOV documents,

one of which concerned a KGB plan for

operations against Richard HARMSTONE.

Part of the plan,

according to the document, eas to got HARiSTONE drunk and

photograph hin in intimate relations with a Soviet girl.

NOSENKO said this was in fact the way the KG3 did get the

material on which it based the later approach to him: "They

got him drunk.

At the

same time they had him photographed.

And after that they talked with

They tried to recruit

him, but he eraded the proposition.

He declined the recruit-

ment.

But he also said

nothing; he did not report.

reason they consider that if he

comes into their view agair

someWherE,

even in a third country, ther they will get to

him and

say:

'How abou: recruitment?

This happened on such

and. such.

You did not report it.

Have you thought it over?

You are hiding it for so long from jour government, from the

State Department, that you had cortact with Soviet Intelli-

gence. ""

NOSENKO waS asked how thr KGB knew HARVSTONE had

not reported the approach.

He replied:

"He was monitored,

and we would have heard if anything about this matter was

reported.... Undoubtedly if he reported it, something would

[the KGB microphone in the Minister.

Counsellor's (office]....They would dictate a message on this...."

Asked who tried to recruit HARYSTONE, he said, "I do

not know.

That was prior to my coming into the department.

This was

in the year 1958 or 1959.

I don't know who was the

case officer who spoke to HARNSTOVE."

Asked if this officer

was still in the American Department, he replied:

"I don't

think he 1s. I don't think

he is concerned with it anymore.

Later reinterviewed concerning the HARISTONE case,

NOSENKO repeated his assertion

that he could not identify

who were persorally involved in the case,

addirg that he had learned of the case from KOVSHUK.

also repeated his statements that the KGB knew HARNSTONE

---

## Page 121

had not given the Embassy

a full account of the recruitsent

approach; this was known fron the microphones

from the telephores, ard from the fact that HARiSTONE did

not leave the Soriet Union immedia-ely:

(He thought that

HARUSTONE had left the Soviet Union rot long after the ap-

proach was made, toward the end of lis tour,

an early departure.)

The KCB also knew HARMSTOE to be a

homosexual,

but did not nave ans pictures of him in this kind

of activity; the KGB did have, however, a serles of nude

pictures of

hin with a fenale

and NOSENKO believed

these photographs had been shown

HARMSTONE in the course

of the recruitnent attempt.

SOSENTO thought that the KGB

may hare had more informatior

On HARUSTONE. than he, NOSENKO,

was aware of and could tell CIA--otherwise,

would not have made the approach.

After HARUSTONE left

Mosco:, NOSENKO added, a summary of his file was given

the First Chiet Directorate, but he rever heard whether they

had made an attempt to contact hir thereafter.

(111) Information from Other Sources

HARKSTONE, ore of the econoric attaches at the Embassy,

shared an office with William TURPIS, also an econonic

attache, until TURPIN was replaced in August 1958 by George

WINTERS

and HARSSIUNE worked together until MAry-

STONE firished his tour in October 1959.

The KCB plans for operational activity against HARISTONE

outlined in the CHEREPANOV document dated

Auglist 1958 tally

closely with information reported in Foreign S-rvice dis-

patches by TURPIN, HARMSTONE,

and janes RAISEY, and sub-

sequently confirmed by HAPKSTONE in interviews conducted by

The descriptive details in the CHEREPANOV document

about the agerts to be used against HARISTONE are quite

specific and, when matched agairst the Foreign Service dis-

patches, make it possible to idertily them even though the

document uses only cryptonyms when referring to then.

example, the plan states:

"Through the agent 'NIKONOV, ' who

works in the Institute of Economics of the Academy of Sciences

USSR, continue to rerder to HARUSIONE small favors on a re-

ciprocal basis (cooperation in arrarging visits with economists,

visits to the irstitute, etc.) trying, on his pail, to obtain

from HARMSTONE materials on the economics

of South America

(the specialty of

TURPIN, HARUSTONE himself,

and WINTERS each reported having many contacts with Yu.Y. BELOV,

who was the American Embassy's liaison contact with Soviet

econonists, particularly in the Institute of Economics of

the Academy of Sciences.

was fluent in Spanish, and

was concerned with economic problems of South Anerica.

Similarly, most of the other agents have been identified with

individuals on whom there tas detailed information available

from overt contacts in Moscow.

HARISTONE came to the security office ir the Embassy

on the morning of 23 May 1959 and stated that he was in

serious difficulty and wanted to discuss the matter.

of having been drugged while diring at the home of BELOV in

April 1959; also present was & "cousin" of BELOV'S who was

*See Part VI.D.T.a. for a review of MINTERS' role in the POpOV

CaSe.

TOP SEONE

i:..

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## Page 122

weeks later, Haristore seid, he and winters

sore inulted to the BELOVs for the afternoon. but wINteis

was busy so HARUSTONE had to go alone.

He naged the various

other soviets who were

part of the day's outing,

a couple named "SOKOLOV" (identitiable in the CHEREPANOV.

paper as the casa officer A.". MIKHAlLO! and the agent

"KRICHININA"').

At a visit to a dacha after lunch, a iriend

named "Sergey" was present and nade HARASTONE's acquaintance.

A few days

later "SOKOLOV" invited HARUSTONE to have lunch,

and mentioned-that "Sergey" would probably-Join then,-as-be:

After lunch.the

three went out to visit "Sergey's".;

"SOKOLOV" soon disappeared to take a nap.

"Sergoy" then identified himself to HARMSTOND is a worker

of the KGB who had been investigattug

the case of a "notorioug

homosexual," nuing BELOV's "cousin."

He brought out photo-

graphs purporting to show MARYSTOVE and the "cousin" engaging

in sexual relations.

HARMSTONE reported that he told

"Sergey" the photographs were fabricated: He had never had

homosexual relations with

or any other.

then made recruitment overtures, which HARISTONE rejected,

did agree to lunch with

"Sergey" the following day.

Also, "Sergey" offered to assist HARMSTONE 10 his career,

gave him his office number,

to be called from

Embassy lest HARUSTONE should be overheard making the

Following the initial interview with the Security 01-

ficer, the latter reported the situation to the Minister

Counsellor, Richard DAVIS,

who concurred in the Security

Officer's belief in HARUSTONE's innocence of the homosexual

allejation.

The two agreed that HARUSTONE might

keep the

scheduled appointment to have lunch with "Sergey" that same

arternoon.

"Sergey" did nost of the talking that afternoon, ac-

cording to HARUSTONE, commenting on a number of the Embassy

personnel and various prominent Soviet personalities.

"Sergey" planned for HARNSTONE to lunch with him the fol-

lowing week, but, followirg instructions of the Security

Officer and Minister Counsellor, HARISTONE thereafter fended

off "Sergey" by telling him it was pointless for HARNSTONE

that the KGB knew the situation to be "completely

phoney, " and

that the KGB should stop harassing him; he

no assistance, no further luncheons, no other appoint

ments with KGB personnel.

HARMSTO"E successfully avoided

contacts with "Sergey" thereafter, until the latter broke in

on a dinner HARMSTONE was having in a restaurant with a

casual Soviet contact (a student)

HARMSTONE

sald he repeated his refusal to see "Sergey" and the latter

departed.

In August or September of 1959 HARUSTONE passed a note

to the Security Officer in the Embassy in which

V.M. 'KOMAROV'* He explained how he had come to this discovery:

*KOMAROV is the allas used by KOVSHUK on his ten-month visit

to the United States In 1957-1958 and later in Moscow with

his American contacts, until 1963 when he began to use his

true name.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 123

"George TINIERS' contact in Foreign Ministry V.M, KOMAROV

called the other day,

His volce sounded

go such like that of

'Sergey that I asked George 11 I could

see a photograph of KOMAROV on his 1957 visa application.

If KOMAROV 1s not

'Sergey,' he could easily be latter's

twin brother.

The only difference is that when I have seen

"S" he was always wearing glasses.

In the picture he 13 not

wearing glasses.

George has never seen hin wearlog glasses..."

HARKSTONE's note_then_went_on-to_mention other-points nich

support the identification.

In October 1959 HARMSTONE completed his l'oscow tour and

returned to hashington.

was interviewed by tbe Security

Office of the Department of State and polygraphed on his

Moscow exporiences..

At this time he admitted to a homosexual

background, and acknowledged that the KGB compromising photo-

grapis were genuine, but reiterated his rejection of recruit-

ment. He subsequently resigned fron the Departnent.

TOP SECRET

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## Page 124

668.

b, Edward Ell's SHITH

In 1862 NOSENKO told a-detsiled story of a KGB attempt

to recruit the security Officer at the U.S. Erbassy

10.1954

OX 1935,

a man nanod SKITH,

His KGB cryptonyn was

(J' 8 dhead)

"RYZHYY"

because he had red hair.

NOSENKO reported that SMITH was having An affAir with

his Russian maid; but the KGB could not marage to get photo

graphs of then in compromising situations beoguge their

Intimate relations took place in his apartment in the Embrady.

The maid was therefore given a carera to take photographs

of horself within the apartment, in

the KGB superimposed photographs of SulTH lo a photomontago

and used these to make a recruitneut approach to him.

KGB mailed hin a lotter instructing him to come to a personal

meeting, enclosing copies of the photographs with the lotter.

He came to the rooting and Socond Chief Directorate Chief

¡Old. GRIBANOV himself made tha recruitment

• IpprogOh.. SMITH

wavered, saying solther yes nor no, but freed to come baok

to another meeting.

He did not appear for the second seeting,

rowever, and NOSENKO claired that at this time he persorally

was sent after the Russian maid to find out why SMITH hed

пот comE.

She roported that he could not make up his rind

what to do, that he had boen up all night, first deciding

that he would cooperate, then deciding that he would not.

The KGB then sent him several more lettors threatoning to exa

pose him,

Finally, after three days, SSITH broke down and

told the Ambassador of the situation.

He was irmediately

sent home, and that ended the operation.

In 1964 NOSENKO denied that he had had any personal

role in the case, explaining that as a junior officer in the

U,s. Exbassy section at the time, workind on correspondents, *

he would not have taken part in so importaat an operation,

He sald that he had heard about the operation from V.!í.

KOYSHUX, whose case it was at the time.

NOSENKO claimed that in a legal sense he had a personal role

in the case; he was assigned to a phone-watch to receive sur-

veillance reports on tie operation.)

by NOSENKO Of the SMITH operation have been consistent with

the story he related in 1962.

(11): Information from GOLITSYN

a two-volume study on KGB operetions against American

Intelligence in the USSR, prepared by s.u.

FEDOSEYEY, which

gave examples of sucoessful work againgt the U.S, Embaggy in

*Soe Part V.C. for NOSENKO's dating of his responsibilitles

In the U,S, Embassy Section from 1953-19551 ho claimed to

hava boen working on correspondents until June 1954, when

he took over the Army Attaches.

He stated that he left for

the Tourist Department in June 1955.

Edward Ellia SMITH Ar-

rived la Yoscow on

The firet. letter wag datod

I Juse 1956 and receled on 2 June 1956 by SMITH.

TOP SECRET

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## Page 125

14-00000

469.

MoscOw.

One case concerned an American, probably singlo,

who was esthei the security Officer of the counterintellio

gence representative in the embassy.

He had a dog:

and livod

in an

apartment in the city or i country house outside Youcow.

His Russian mald or cleaning women

was his mistress.

thought he woule not be recruitable by ordinary blackmail on

the basis of his intimate relations with his naid, so the maid,

a KGB agent, was instructed to corfess to him that she had

been recruited by the KGB against her will end would be ar

rested 1f ahe did not ful!1ll her KGB taska.

He agreed to

help her, and GOLITSYN believed that he did

not report this

to his washington headquarters.

He also recalled that the

American first supplied only disinformation to the KGS, but

when the KGB complained, he provided a mixture of truth and

disinformation.

GOMITSIN said this case study was based on

a true incident which took place between 1953 and 1957, but

he was not sure if the operation really did result in a suc

cessiul recruitment as was alleged in the study.

(111) Information from SHITH

The CIA employee Edward Ellis SWITH (a redhead), who

was the Security Officer at the Embassy in Moscow, reportod

to the U.S. Ambassador on 5 June 1956 that he had received

four letters from the KGB,

the first on 2 June 1956.

first letter enclosed incriminating photographs of himself

and his fussian maid and

requested him to cose to a personal

meeting with KGB representatives outside the Embassy.

did not do so.

SMITH received three more letters,

threeteniag

him with exposure to the Ambassador. He sumitted he had been

intimate with his Russian maid.

SMITH was recalled from Moscow on 8 June 1956, and ho

left CIA employmunt a year later.

When interviewed in March

on the basis of the GOLITSYN information, SMITH admitted

that he had maintained his affair with the Rusgian maid

during most of the time of his Moscow assignment, 20 July

1954 to 8 June 1956, and confirmed that he had in fact passed

unclassified information through her to the KGB for many

He claimed never to have provided information of

& classified nature, although he did pass the contents of

cables in the category of Official Use Only.

In addition,

SMITH said he disclosed information which "he knew rould

reach the KGB" (presumably through

sources other than the

He also said that he never passed information that was

not true, i.e., disinformation.

TOP SECRET

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## Page 126

70.0

(c)

The BINDER Case

(1)

Information PrOs NOSENKO

While revlewing notes he had brought to a neeting in

26 January 1964,

NOSENKO first mentioned the

unsuccessful attempt to recruit Peter BINDER.

JOSENKO said

that BINDER, the

"top Sergeant in charge of merica House, "

had beonharirg sexual-relatlong-withsoviet-tozalonkts-

room at the America House for some time

and had been obtainlag

as dresses and coats

for her from the United

Because BINDER's activities were confined to America

¡House, the KOB. was unable to photograph his indiscretiono

and thus had little means to exert pressure on him.

recruitment approach consequently failed.

In later Interviers by CIA and the FBI, NOSE KO IdeAti-

fled the woman involved as Galya MORELLI, a KGB agent on-

ployed at Auerica liouse as a dishwasher.

NOSENKO said that

Vladimir DEHKIN of the U.S. Embassy Section was the case of-

Icer working against BINDER,

and that Sol. FEDOSEYEV, Chief

of the American Department, took part in

This

was ir. 196%, NOSENKO

said, after he had transferred to tho

Icurist department, and for this reason he could provide

no further details on the case.

(11) Information from BINDER

Mester Sergeant Peter BINDER arrived in Hoscow, where

he was assigned as manager of America House, on 16 March 1961.*

He was approached by the KGB on 15 January 1963 ard reported

the AGS citempt to l'.S. Embassy officials the same day.

22 January 1963 BINDER

was withdrawn from Moscow before the

completion of his tour.

At the airport as he was leaving,

the Soviets attempted to prevert his departure by saying

that he had rever beer properly accredited to the USSR.

The plane was delajed for about 15 minutes while a heated

exchange took place between Soviet officials and the American

officers accompanying BINDER.

He then was allowed to leave.

The following description of the Soviet recruitment attempt

1s drawn Iron devrieflogs of BINDER by the U.S. Embassy

curity Officer in Moscow on the day of the incident and

debriefings by the FBI and Department of the Army after his

return to the United States.

In about December 1961, according to BINDER, he first

became intinate with MORELLI, a dishwasher at America House

whom he has described as being a pretty, intelligent, well-

Their relationship

continued

until June or July 1962, at which time MORELLI "disappeared"

frow her job without notice while BINDER was on leave. During

*It was BINDER who summoned the Embassy Security Officer,

Hugh MONTGONERY, to Anerica House in the summer of 1962

he becane suspicious of "LILLIAN," the "Austrian" girlfriend

of the U.S. military code clerk Matthew ZUJUS. After..

telling MONTGOMERY

that she was going to her hotel to get her

passport, which would prove her nationality,

"LILLIAN" disap-

peared and was not seen again at America House. NOSENKO rO-

ported this incident, but associated it with the development

of another military code clerk (aee Part. V.E.3.c.).

TOP SEATT

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## Page 127

14-00000

1-M30-395

their affalr,

BINDER occasionally gave MORELLI gifts of

money and clothing but restricted his nee-isgs with asr to

his soon la the dormitory.

In about February or Sarch 1902

MORELLI Same tO BINDER and sald that she thought she was

pregnant: she sade no dezards of BINDER, horever, and said

nothing about getting an abortion... Although at his first

laterview in Moscow BINUEs said that MORELLI at no time 1n-.

dicated that she was required to obtain information for the

Soviets, he. told the FBI: in late February 1963 that on ose

occasion

in big rcom at Anerica Höuse MORELLI admitted to bin

that she was sent to America House by the Soviets and that

all employees there were required to meet la two groups once

& month with their contacts (KGB officers) to discusg the

America House personnel.

On the morning

of 15 January 1963,

the day of the ap-

proach,

left. America House on loot to got a haircut

at & soviet barbersnop, some 300 yards awsy.

While he was

enroute, a car pulled up beside him, three

"goons" strong-

arned his lato the back-seat, and he vas driven to a nearby

Militia station.

some perfunctory questioning, ore -

of the Militianen made

several phone calls, and an interro-

gator arrived a few minutes later.

The interrogator had a letter which he said had been

mailed by MORELLI to the l'.S. Embassy and had been inter-

cepted by the KGB.

The letter contained numerous allegations

against BINDER,

which the interrogator proceeded to list.

Among them, BINDER was able to recall the following:

On 25 Novenber 1961 thore was a party at America

Muuse for Soviet enployees,

a?ter which BINDER and

MORELLI Went tO BISIER'S

Subsequently BINDER?

and MORELLI lived together as man and wife.

-At another party,

in December 1961, BINDER

pointed out fiveculisted men living in America House

the letter named them telling MORELLI that they were

informants for John f. ABIDIAY, the Embassy Security

:Officer.*

He told MORELLI that the girls working in

America House should be particularly careful of Charles

GIDARO, as he waS ABIDIAN's right-hand nan.

-In February 1962, MORELLI told BINDER that she was

pregnant, and BINDER instructed her to get an abortion.

-At the George Washington's Birthday Party in 1962

BINDER pointed out ABIDIAN to MORELLI and Svetlana

IVANOVA, another employee of America House, and told them

to be careful of hin as he was the Embassy Security Offi

-At some point BINDER gave a sewing machine

Soviet citizen to sell for him

At another time BINDER

ordered from the United States a coat for the America

House enplojee Luba IIStKINO, but then told bor that 1t

had been lost in the sail.

The coat was not really lost,

however; BINDER gave it to one of the old cooks at Ameri

Ca House because she paid him money for it.

"See Part V.E.J.d. concorsing NOSENKO's responsibilities for

the KGB coverage of ABIDI.:'.

NOSENKO has not reported that

the KCR was aware of these enlisted men serving as informants

fOr ABIDIAN.

TOP SECRET

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## Page 128

n4720

After asking whether BINDER was acqualatod with

Mr. LOHRER of the west Cerman isbassy, the interrogator

asked if BINDER had given LOHSR goods to sell on the

Soriet market.

-In April 1962, BINDER told MORELLI that Hugh

NTGOMERY had arrived at the U.S. Embassy as Security

Officer, that HONTCOWZRY was & good friend of bin, and

that be had told BOSIONERY about his affair with

SORELitI but HONTCONERY had told him not to worry about

1t.

-BINDER told MORELLI and Sietlana IVArOVA that

Richard C. JACOB,* aü.S. Embass; employee, was a "well-

trained spy" and thai MORELLI and IVAJOVA should there-

fore be carsful of hia.

In describing his conversation at the Militia station,

BINDER said

the intarrogator had asked'a number

of questions, he, BINDER, couplaired that the Soviet was

talking too fast.

An Interpreter was thereupon called in

and remained until BINDER as questioned concerning JACOB.

At this point: the interpreter left and tha interrogator

continued to question BINDER on percoral matters.

for the relatively short tine the irterpretir was there;

all questioning was in Pussian, which BINDER generally under

Aiter discussing BINDER's fasily, the interrogator

BINDER what ought to be done about

the letter and the

charges it contained.

He suggested that if the letter mere

sent on

10 the American Anbassador, io whom it was addressed,

U.So officials would not beli-ve BISDER's denials of the

charges: tis career in the Army would be ruined, and BINDER

would no longer be able to support his two daughters.

According

to BINDER, his reply was that there was nothirg he could do

1f the Soriets

decided to forward the letter, and "that would

be that."

The interrogator then left the room.

When he returned about 15 minutes later he spoke to

BINDER 15 a frierdly manner, commenting that BINDER had been

In Moscow for almost two years and that it was obviously

important for him to finish his tour there and remain in the

BINDER agreed with this.

The interrogator then said

BISDER's actions whiis in the Soviet Union had been quite

that he had always been very fair to the Soviet girls

who worked for hin, and that be, the interrogator, had decided

to help him.

The Soviet continued that he was going to forget

about the letter and ail the charges contaired in it and that

the letzer would not be forwarded.

He also pointed out that

as the ittter was not golog anywhere, there was no need for

BINDER to mention the incident of his arrest to anyone. BIN-

DER was then driven back to the barber shop.

BINDER summed up the entire ircident, which lasted a

little over two hours,

by sajing that the approsch was very

los-key and that at no time was he specifically asked to aup-

ply infornation to the soviets, although this was inplicit in the

remarks of his interviewers.

*See Part VI.D. T.b. regarding the detention of JACOB in connec-

tlon

with the PENKOVSKIY case,

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 129

1730

During questioning by U.S. authoritles afterwards,

BINDER said that he had denied the truth of the allegations,

point-by-point, and that, apart from the charge that he wag

MORELLI, none of them, in fact, were true.

Specifically, BINDER told Army questioners in June 1963 that

he had laughed at his interrogator when the latter attributed

to him the auove statements corcerning MONTGOMERY and JACOB

(both CIA officers) •

BINDER denied to his U.S. Aray 13t9r-

viewers (as he said he had to the Soviets) that he knew

NONIGOMERY personally, that be tad told MONIGOVERY of his

affair with MORELLI, and that. he had told MORELLI ho had

said that he told the Soviet interrogator

that it was "ridiculous to believe that Richard JACOB

In fact, BINDER said, he had no knowledge of JACOB's

duties in Moscow and had only slight personal contact with

h1s.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 130

414

5. Operations Involving Other westerners

a. Tabulation

(1) Introduction

NOSENKO has provided identifying information on 90 YGB agents,

probable agents, and operational contacts of western (but non-

American) citizenship and he has described an additional 12 de-

velopment and investigation operations against

such third-country

nationals.

the folloring tabulation, 55 of

NOSENKO's recruitment leads and five of

the 12 anvestigative

and developmenta! leads were contained in the notes which he

brought to the meetirgs with CIA in Gereva in 1964 and

which

en-

abled him to provide

specific information on these individuals,

for exampie, their dates of birth and precise dates of recruit-

ment.

At the same time,

however; NOSENKO generally furrished

comparatively fever details concerning the KGB

operations against

other Westerners than he did in his leads to American cases;

often his information did not exceed that written in the notes.

He has disclaimed personal participation in all bu: icur of his

recruitment leads

and two of his investigation/developrent cases.

For the most part HOSENKO's foreign leads are based upon informa-

tion which he said he learred casually and noted for passage to

CIA during the time he was Deputy Chief of the Tourist

Depart-

ment in 1962 and 1963.

(With certain exceptions,

NOSEYXO nas

been questioned less

about his other lestern leads than about his

American cases, particularly with regara to

sourcing.

Most of

NOSENKO's non-American leads were passed by CIA in 1964

to the

appropriate foreign security services, and as yet the results of

many of

their investigations are incomplete.

In a few cases, in

vestigations were conducted abroad by CIA representatives with

the results as shown in the tabulation below.

inder this tabu-

lation,

the leads are presented in alphabetical order of their

country of rationality.

In cases where NOSENKO has provided no

specific source for his irformation but has indicated that the

Tourist Department was involved at a

time he has said he was

assigned there, note of this is made in the

"sourcing" column.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 131

Agent Leads

LEADS

475.

SOURCING AND DATE OF LEPORT

INVESTIGATION RESULTS

Afghanistan

source not named.

196÷1

(1962 and

the

Fin Moscow from

is a

dony-t1m.:

aguns.

POSITKO did

not know the

sE date of recruitment, the basis of

üitmont, nor what type of inforna

rhad provided

to the KGB.

relievca

A.P.

DAVIDYAN was the cass

GET fOr T

1950 until

1963

Earlier

CIs suspicions that he is

a KGB

agent

stenmed from his long

tour in lioscow, his pro-soviet atti-

tudes, and his ability to conduct

large-scale blackmarket activities

in Moscow with impunity. da

was in

official liaison with soviet

representatives in Kabul prior to

his assignment to Moscow;

his

rela-

tions with these soviets

were

IE-

portedly cordial.

I apparently

gave his full personal

support to

Prime Minister DAUD's program of ex-

panding Afghan military and other

ties to the Soviet Union.

Contrary

opinions have been receiven which

describe him as pro-west or at least

staunchly nationadistic.

NOSENKO

information onto

Argentind

Born in Orrisa

now an Argentine citizen; was con-

ted in Odessa by the Chief of the

ond Department of the Odessa KGB,

u) VARYUS*, he was met again in

Source not named, but Tourist

Department involvement.

(1964

notes)

Identified

the

investigation

SO

has disclosed

no contacts with soviet Officials

in Argentina.

o second departrents of local KGB units are provincial counterparts of the Second Chief Directorate In

Moscow.

TOR. SEGRET

H507

(

---

## Page 132

476.

ow by an officer of the Tourist

rtment, Sccond Chief Directorate,

was Iccruited.

Currently a business-

in burnos niros and has relatives

in

ida; this

case has been turned over

ho first Chief Directorate.

fnu:

Argentine dardene

recruited

in Moscow in 1961 or 1962

nomosexual grounds.

Recruited by

IMALYUGIN of the

rifth section,

rican Departmunt, Second Chief Direc-

ate, in Moscow

in

1962.*

Source not ramed. (1964)

Lemployee

от.

the

Argentine

con-

fessed to his superiors

Embassy in Moscol, Deces-

ber 1961 that he had been.

recruitad

by the KGB on homosexual grounds.

The case officer who

acted as in-

terpreter in

these recruitment

was V.L.

ARTEMYEV, whom NOSENKO

has idertified as one of the case

officers under his supervision in

1960-61.

Australia

An Australian

who

PIlo

the usor as a tourist in 1960

was

curricted at. the request of

d'rs:

Chief

Dircctorate; she

cod to

rooporate and

is an opera-

nal

contaut..dot un agont.

ustria

({nu) :

me in Moscow was possibly

ruited

after

an

extensive

culti-

ion Dj GRIBANOV in the period

0÷61.

scurce not named. (1964 notes)

Not

identified, but

NOSENFO first learned about

states when he was working

in

the

in MOSCON

American Department in 1960 and

rOI:

w1957 to

1961, but he

could

not pinpoint

tho date

more precisely.

Source

was Nikolay IGNATOV, who visited

the lipartment. on the orders of

0.M. GRiBINOV, Chief of the Sec-

ond Chief Directorate, to obtain

requirenients.

(1964)

Adcording

to NOSENRO, the Fifth sestion of the Amcrican Department is concerned with latin American Embassies

Moscow.

131 6

---

## Page 133

99071999)

An

Fast-West trader

KG8 aijent;

gultra in Vienna by Ewo Xor offI-

there on TDY.

ME UNKNOWN:

The code clerk

at the

strian

massy in Muscon in 1960

): Belgium

cruited oi.

it July

19t2

ky

It.

Col.

FKSFYEV and Capt. ROMANOVICH of the

ith section (Auto Tourists) of the

urist Departurit;

stir

ia i tour

ider for

Mustan A Belgian, was re-

ulted on 14 July 1962 by the Tourist

partinent; he is a bus driver for

and is used as a

sitei.

477.

NOSENKO brought to CIA in

Cenova a copy of the official

KGB summary ruport on time

He learned of tire through

Tourist Department involvement.

(1964)

0.S. BUBNOV of the Third Depart-

mont, second Chief Directorate,

cold NoseNko in 1960 about this

agent.

(1962)

Source not named, but Tourist

Department involvement.

(1964

notes)

Source not named, but Tourist

Department involvement.

(1961

notes)

the subject of several de-

nunciations as a

Soviet agent, is

Conmunist gympathizer; he offered

his services

to CIA in March 1961

but was terminated in 1962 on the

basis of an unsatisfactory poly-

graph examination, lack of produc-

tion, and gencral suspicions

concerning his probable KGU agent

status.

a code clerk in

MOSCOW

uring the late 1950's,

be-

cume involved with a young Russlan

and was questioned about this

by his superiors, who suspected KGB

sponsorship; he

was removed from

cryptographic work in 1961 and

placed in a non-sensitive job.

After reviewing CIA information on

NOSENKO confirmed that

the name of the agent on

whom he had reported.

Halso known as

visited the Czech

Embassy

i trussels on at least

one occagion.

(See entry on van de

His identity has been confirmed.

(See entry on

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 134

•A KGB agent

tie

in a bus

gitCh

T..

or for the

SE UNASONS: An officer of unknown

who

is employnd at a NATO

lution

in nolgimm, is an ti-

1 y

maluable KGB agent; the agent

invoived in cipher

as he

supplied

large

quantitius of infor-

iòn

which

has

assisted the

KCh

in

ding

criphered

NaTÓ communications.

efts

iron the sparial rechnical

sion

of the second Chief Director-

travelled Tot to brussels to assis:

the operation during 1962.

i Recruited or

August

I962

he

orks

DY

the

Tourist Depart-

for d

COMICIUA

•ad

in

1961

but

IE.

to moet with

her| case

officers

n she returred

•o the VOSE in 1963;

ar interpreter for

" this case will probably

to KGs Archives.

478.

Source

not named.

notes)

(1964

NOSENKO learned of this from

I..A.

LEPEDEV,

Secord Chief

Directorate technician,

who

assistid in

an entry into the

installation. (1954)

source rot named, but Icurist

Department involvement.

(1964

natos)

Source not named. (1961 notes)

1963

that

he had been recruited by

Soviet In-

telligence.

He indicated that

other employees of the

Ent agency were also Soviet

agents.

(see

also comments for

LEBEDEV's travel

to Belgium,

28

re-

flected in CIA records,

indicates

this operation touk place, in July

or October 1962.

Another source

had previously described a similar

operation occurring

at about the

same time and also

in belgium; it

appears possible

that both leads

are

to bè the same agent, who

has

not been definitely identified.

¡ quide

(Ste entry on van

any

COD.

(see entry one

---

## Page 135

AN :

A Russian emigre

,Ow

LIVING;

in brazil,

where

ho

owns

ourist firm; rocruited by the tourist

apartment in 1963.

uctor? was

ugust 1957.

& Composer aid con-

Incruited in Moscow in

canada

A naturalized

1220

a $

recruited.

Jatvian origin:

at the roquest of

the

36

First chief Directorate, by the

altis

ror

while visiting

the Baltic

pantries in ibout Detober 1963.

ME UNKLOW: A fourer citizen of

was brought to the soviet.

stor for Ilingals training in 1963

nd was in contact with su.I. Guk.

lda pinson in ditive in Canada, where

cris subordinate to and in contact

1th the KGB Ledal Residency.

Much

dentifying dat known by NOSENiO.

AME iNHECHN: Canadian Enbassy code

Lark, sho

wils recruitus in Moscow

naut 1957: ho later went to Norsiw

nare hei ins contacted by a NGB offi

o on Tor.

479.

not mont involved 70 15.

(1964

Source not named. (1964 notes)

source not named. (1964 notes)

Mostard leatred of this case

Er0"y GUK in 1963.

(1964)

Souice not ramed.

Suspicions that he is a KGB agent

pre-date 1963. Interviewed in June

1965 and denied any approach by

the KGB.

a long-time

Brazilian Communist.

His contacts

with Soviets are open.

Identified

as

#de double agent

former agu

U.S. Army Cic in

Germany rad

ears, was compromiued

to the sovirts and doubled by thom

in the 1950'5.

Confessed Soviet re

cruitment immediately to

U.S. handle

el's and was aided in emigration to

Canada.

Later recontacted by kaa

in Canada and reactivated.

(See

Part VI.d.5.c.J

A Canadian Embassy guard who contessad

his recruitment has beon

confixed

by NOSENKO as the subject of thla

lead.

---

## Page 136

A canadian of Ukrainian

entant

contacted by the Icurist.

vartment while ir the liSk as a tourist

December 1063; although not

fully re-

lited,

he came is an agreemont with a

, ¡officar and may be

contacted in

ada by an Illogal.

10:.11911.:

vanadian

"ernited by tGB on

arcade alone 1953 or 1954:

30:

thought the contadid

¡fecopirate wich dool after

1oft

560:.

NOSENio connied

that a casc

hich lurel

tiis would not

bea

thuire.

would

necessarily lake best i cirect

prouch, ind no secrecy agrooments or

cipes mould nonally be roguired.

450.

source not named: but Tourist

Dapartment involvement.

11964

notis

In 1962 when NOSENtO tirst sup-

alico tals lend

maurer a 72055 hu raid he hai

Jenner,

the case tron conversa-

tion with the case nificers.

1. г.

Jut; bo said that V.D. CHELNOKOV,

who

was later his imardiate super-

visor in the Tourist Department,

had participated in the recruit-

ment while he was in the second

(anglo-Canadian) Departmenü, Sei-

ond Chief Dircctorate,

in about

1953.

NOSENKO also said that he

first heard of the case in 1055 vi

1956 Curing

an officia: visit to

the city of Vladimir, hhore the

Iroad kaB told hin the story of

Farmhaving visited Vladinis

1954; while there he manifested

homosexual tendencies while he was

drunk; NOSENKO said brus

sia got

so drunk that he lost his shoes

and they were later returned to

hin through the mails in Moscow.

GOLITSYN provided information shout

KGB

operational interest ironis

during Ends first tour in

cow, betwion 1914 and 1951; lh0 KGa

was iware that d

Heys was a nomo-

sexual; GOLITSYN

that the XGy

was working on dam

my but did

know whether

veen

appiocched.

In 1964 Suas

Was interviebod curi

corning his experiences

in Moocut.

le admitted having been composaásed.

on the basis of homosexual activi-

ties, during his tour as di

batween Märch 1954 and April or May

1956.

3 681

---

## Page 137

stin

T55T

481.

Lisat

NAME UNKNOWN: A low-level enolovee

of tho tryptian Embassy in Moscow

was a KOD agent targetted against.

merica licuse; he wis rocruited in

Móscon prior to 1961 on the basis

of sprculatory activities.

G.I.

GRIATHOV and V.V. KOSOLAPOV of tic

Americon Department helped the

agent's

mse officer

in the cixth

Department, Kin Socond Chirf Diree.

torate, 801 200 t :300 watches that

the agoni had obtained abroad.

This case officer and GRYAZNOV met

with the agent; NOSINKO did not know

who hid recruited him.

source not known.

(1064)

NGU

she:

works

tor

1.!1.:

Asian ne

arn and also for the Finnish lourit

Association: recruited by

the Tourist

Department ind the local KGB orgars

in seniograd.

Dis DE

24209

Kee-uited in 195g by

the tourist De-

partment with the iid of the leningrad

KGB: she

works in a travel bureau in

Finland.

Suurce not named, but Tourist

Department involvement.

(1367

notes)

No source given, but Tourist

Department involvement.

(1954

notes)

• in

the

VAR Embassy, MoscoW,

was known to

residents of America

House.

He re-

portedly involved

several

code clerks

ingrican

with

women

and in

market

activities.

See

black-

Parts

V. E. 3.c.

and

vI.D.2.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 138

KKONEN, Urho k.:

NOSENKO asked

other cobirsid had told cia that

nnish Persident KiKONNEN iS & FGR

ant.

SHES

Recruited by

bus driver

For the

tourist

the KCI

belirved batewas

nuciest to american Intelliyence.

now known as

apart) :

le worked

sas tourist agency,

•ft ic in

1963; recruited in 1?61:

cise has been retired to KGB

chives.

1902

are:

is

a tour

avel

agercy

Pecruited

TOUrISE

Department;

leader

at the Finnish

432.

After the defection of GOLITSiN,

Yu.l. GUF mentioned to NOSENKO

the fact that GOLITSYN knew

KEFKONEN to be a KGB agent.

SENko did not mention this to CIA

in June 1962, but in Geneva in

January 1964 asked, "Did GOLITSYN

tëll you about

the recruitment of

a hian Finnish

statesman?"

aured, "How high?" NOSENKO replica,

"The Precident."

Then NOSENKO was

isked about the case and his source.

Souree not named. (1964 notes)

Source not named. (1964 notes)

Source not named, bus Tourist

Department involvement.

notes)

(1964

Identified by GOLITSYN in 190t a8

a KGB

"agent of influence.

Identified

---

## Page 139

A KGB

21100

arsity.

Recruites

(date

unspucifica)

y, the seventh

Dopartment jointly with

he

Ioni:aral NGB cryans.

ax.:

12241

Eployed by a travel

rSt:

agent ie-ruited ly tie

Jurist Department joirtly with the

eningrad NGn argans ir 1962.

vas recruited in

1963

department,

but has pro-

ided in infuriation

iS

yet;

work's

of the pense.

HAMP

j?

PEASA

porter dy

967 1n to d terruited agent

of the KGB;

said in his not der-

ivas an agent.

483.

No sourer given, but tourist

Depiltment

involvement.

(1964

notes)

No source, but Tourist Depart-

ment involvement.

(196; notes)

", source giver.

but tourist

Department involvement.

(1964

notes)

NOSELiKO gave this load first in

Jure 1962.

NOSENKO Irported

on

30

January 1964 that ne

learned

of the

operation in 1901,

when he accompanied o.M. GRI-

BANOV to a reception of the Ind-

ian Embassy and realized from a

comment made by ar

* that he

vas à friend

uf Griintov's and an

agent.

On 16 February 1965 NO-

SENKO

said he learned of the case

mainly through friends, and that

the Indian Inception had been held

in 1958 or 1959.

(1952)

---

## Page 140

GRIFANOV,

Chief

the

second Chief

Directorate,

is

rsonally handling

this

important agunt,

soninent French businessman; he was

quited

is

Early as 1956

or

1958

and

Excquentl!

comes

to Mosco:

494.

NOSENKO said

he know there was

such & French

agent but did not

know the name until

"there was

a call placed to the Gencral

(GRIBALOV), and when I asked

from when

then

found

out it was from

is the call'aay

then it was clear to me.

(1964)

in

1no3 by donatst depart-

", he is a section head in the

ich tourist fim as sue is

Surree not samed, but Tourist

Depärtment involvement. (1964

notes)

19

was born

nigrated

to France

in

it now

hag

tensive

business

ex-

connections in the

Soviet Union

and other Bloc cour-

tries; at the

same

time he has many

high-level connections in French

political and Inteiligence circles.

Recorded suspicions of e

soviet contacts date from 1959,

Did i ne

SHE GOLIT-

SYN

reported

in

1961 that

as early

as 1955, GRIBANOV travelled to

Vienna to meet with an

important

3q0

French businessman;

Casio

he maje a half

Cozen

trips to the USSR and It-

portedly boasted of being in contact

with General GRIBANOV and otheru

there.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 141

08

in Paris:

vas

recruited

1:1

1959

the

Tourist.

Department; he works as

vide ano

interproter for various

nch

tourist nachoius.

correspondent cantants

Din

Moscow;

a long-titiu

and

Lil.

nirectorate unent.

iRo saiddeas working for the

sch Lepartmot (counterintlli-

ide

auaint employeus of embassies

France,

Italy,

Beigium,

Lland,

luxerbourg,

switzerland).

SL::

let

nocruitt

199y

Department;

stie

àn

intúr-

tOr

tourist groups

visitin-

thon during

1957.

-59

che

the

tini

insod.

kaiin

cilsden

livingien

Paris; was

=x018ud in 1963 by the Tourist De-

anunt; he is a teacher of geography

historv at

sonid college

and works

he surrors

for the National Tour-

Center.

Director of

agency in

485.

source not named, but tourist

unpartrent involvement.

11964

riotes

NOSINKO heard passing references

from case officers of

the Second

Chief Directorate.

(1364)

source not named, but Tourist Do

partrent involvement. (1964 notes)

source not named, but Tourist De-

partment involvement.

(1964 notes)

Munio learned abous see do ta

Irom Yu.G. GRICHMANOV, Chief of

the Second Section, Touriet Depart-

ment..

Not iduntified.

Not identified.

Not identified.

for

aviet

handlas nost traval:

Embagay in Paris.

• ....

TOF SECRET

---

## Page 142

litt

ist

i&

Recruitca on 15

cificers

fron: the Tour-

Department

cind

the

Ukrainian KGB;

11!:

driver

for

agency.

Germany

formerly

Nia:

ägent

was

so-recruited by the:

Tourist

artment

in

1963.

miami

Recruited ir 1963

tho

TouFist Departirent; jives

in

akfurt and is employed by

thr

tourist age:cy.

Onrior of the

vel agency; rucruited in 1902 %;

Taurist Department.

KGB cryptonym

For, at employce of tha ename

val agency, was

recruited by hi

slat Department

in 1963.

486.

source not namod, but Tourist

Department involvement. (1964

notes)

= •

Source not named, but Tourist De-

partment involvement.

(1961 notes)

source not named, but Tourist De-

partment involverent.

(1964 notes)

scurre not named, but Tourist

Department involvement.

11964

notes)

Source not named, but Tourist De-

partment involvement.

(1964 notes)

Not identified.

When sha emigrated to Germany in 1953

ananass admitted being an vD

informant in Kazakhstan.

She was dig-

charged from a Radio Liberty job in

Munich in 1961 at a security risi.

when contacted by CIA in 1964, ahe

admitted recontact by the KGB in 1963

but said she

was given no assignmont

and had

not been

contacted by Sou

iets in Germany

Dis a Communist-controlled

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 143

ME

UNKNOW:;:

ARia

west Gernan businessman

agens who mets personally with

Mo CHIBANOV, chiet of the second

iéf pirestorate, when the German

nes

t. 105c0w.

west German Journalist

Son Itia

3525eud

wther idon-

Epang inforation available.

est Gorman code clerk

ürocruited by

the KGB in 1961.

NO-

Não troughe Luis agent was no longer

Mosorn as o: 1962.

É trawort: KGB cryptonym "AUGUST":

Meut toron citizonal ho ouns a con-

recruitid in the

3R hy tho Teurist. Deporthont in 1960.

"; 17, m39923179

S42d-513

Geroud as a K3B

POW

during world

aII and was ic-rocruited by the

utist. Departront on a visit to the

& the Hamburg

var

, Greeee

Travol agency

mirulled

in 1062 by

•ruurist Debaitment: the KGB sug-

ces ho may tie a double agent; the

SÒ

is of

no value.

$87.

NOSENKO heard about the lead from

the lourist Department officer A.P.

SARAPKIN. (1964)

Source not named. (196÷)

Not identified.

0.S. IslßNOV of the Third DE-

puriment, Second Chiuf Direc-

torate.

(1962)

Not identified.

Solice not named.

(1464 notes)

Not identified.

source not named, but Tourist

Department involrement.

(1967

notes)

Source not naned, but Tourist

Department involvement.

(1964

notes)

&

---

## Page 144

cº0035Y

961

An empioyec of the

1: MoriOw from 1057

a KGP agent.

Indiar diplomat

seat either

contact, arr

Matine narcot

deid he was mut wy

in: Geneva.

Cok rottrned

15.

August 1263 to

meet

ion.

sia

the

c.s.

day 15

Assistant

Naval Attache

Entbassy

ir

Moscow,

but had

recruited by the KGB.

1pc:, Moselko gave the came in-

int

'.!'

but nard

HAns the

ige:пі.

Wus wis sucrulted by Duracri.

tiones on this change, NOSENKO said

he wis see not sure who it was and

'ni

meybe there were ino separato cases.

"diplomatir list which

indicated

there: was mobody nimid

hat

there

was

NOSENKO

ad: i!!!!:

nams carlicri

led the name

st.ikn

in

in

7962

NOSENKO had

Itin

UNE NOWN:

" member of the Iranian

in Moscow

is a KGB agent.

No.

ils.

4118.

No, source named. (1964)

Yu.I.GUk told NOSENKO alout

this

case in Geneva in 1952, and

ROGENED told CIA then.

The 1963

dotail NOSENTO learned from GUK

also.

TOP SECRET

DuinCit's attempt to recruit

was overheard by means of

port-

able microphone on

the restaurant

table "nore the conversation took

plar..

NOSENKO was at that time

Poputy Chiof of the American Emb-

assy Gretion (in October 1966,

NOStard said that this took place

itton te had rolinquished his ve-

sponsibilities for Naval Attaches--

which included DUlACKI, a Marine--

in

the spring of 1960).

(1962

and 196!!

No sovIce giver.. (1962)

Not identified, but two.Iranlan Emb-

assy employees

are known to have

been recruited in Moscow, one in 1958.

---

## Page 145

Israel

fnu: An Isracli citizen

signed tn the United Nations in

N

їk.'

* 44

Who had

3S

agent-recruiter

(non-staff officer)

the KG3 there.

The

KGB

later had

ason

(unpecified) to suspect

it

Evas also an agent. of the

ited

itates,

Israel, and perhaps

eat Britain; he has

itherefore termi-

SiKHOV's later contacts with

in Geneva

ware

one of the

abuns for KGB

suspicion that SHA-

V himself was an Ancrican agent.

n: February 1965, NOSENKO first said

at one of SHAKHOV's contacts

in

nova was a person named out

d nos provide any other detaila.)

ME. UNKNOWN:

KGB cryptonym "MUSHL, "

¡ Israeli citizen, wa's recruited by

•e KGB in October 1962 by the Tourist

partment.

The case

was tran: ferred

the First Chief Directorate (KGB

Jal Residency,

Israel) at their

quest.

Agent is a

Russian emigre

1 director of

tourist

ency.

489.

Personal involvement in the KGB

investigation of Pavel SHAKHOV as

a possible American agent.

(October 1966)

Source not named, but Tourist

Department involvement.

(1964

notes)

and the other in 1962. The namo

angst on the Iranian

diplomatic

list seemed vaguely familiar to

NOSENKO.

This name appears in

the

CHEREPANOV Papers (Part VI.D.7.c.).

...

•".

Not Identified.

10r.62.161

---

## Page 146

ILaly

v. 1-24

One lof a group of

murists dolored mailing letters for

10! NTS 1r. 1963; was detained and

nfessod to being

ar merican agent;

wa:: thir. doubled by che rob

ind

Leased.

T3524

nt the

'11

wis re-

on horoscuii grounds; he

1s i brither employed

at thr U.S.

Licens

win the

mabasay in the

Iate 1950'g; was

cruitil by the let on the basis ot

lackminket

coalings.

llc:

wis

Y0-

ruited

subsequently by ambassy secur-

iy nsficer john !. AlTDIAN fOr Un-

pacifiid

activiting

in France and

eporica this to the XcB.

An Italian citizen

in incalin Moscow; he

was re-

raiter in the USSR by the Tourist

¡partment in Miy 1961; he is a guide

inturpreter for tourist groups

nd at Itulian ixhibitions.

490.

source not named, but Tourist

Department

involvement.

(1964

notes)

source not maned. (1964)

Involvement with NOSTNKC'5

carget.

ABIDIAN

Isee Pait

V: 5.3.2.1. (1962)

source not named, but Tourist

Department involvement. (1964

notes)

cnployed

u.s.

Embassy in Moscow.

Marsches

Interviewed by CIA,

he repcated

denials that he was a KCB agent and

said he made up the

story of his

rocruitment by ABIDIAN tO

"scale

the KGB off."

---

## Page 147

ME UNKNONN:

Italion journalist

cruiter in 1963: basis of ro-

ultment was not known.

incruited

402

the:

Tourist

Department

homosexual aroundsi he is a

pira

SBOI Offe

at

the University

Rome.

• Japan

trucially.

SR

JING

recruited in

tii:

1961 when

was caught in

intolligence

activity

in Baku;

pas planned tu

turn him over to

eriist Chirt Directorat: during

•¿Tokyo Olympics in 196%.

491.

NOSENKO heard from two officers

of the Tenth Department,

Second

Directorate,

that v.l.

KEVORKOV of that Department "nust

go meet his Italian correspond-

ent.."

source not named, but Tourist

Department involvement.

(1964

not.es)

Not identified.

sourco not named. 11964 notes)

TOP SECRET

Miniscion

In

correspondence

connected with his 1961 trip, ClA

in Japan characterized

"well-known intelligence purveyor,

though not known to be an actual

fabricator.

He was suspected of

selling stock in his trip to all

hands."..

---

## Page 148

representatives of

company, which deals

Soviet

Union; has

been

caruitid by the

KGB

ine dute given).

OSK IN

by the Tourist De-

Lien

turned

Residency

YGB

For handlarg.

NOB cryptonya "TAIGA";

1a coptember 1957

ome mue grounds; was later daid

since no

2010

ne

P85 to ted

reported

the

X&B

corsitrin. ihon he returned to

apan.

AM

VALESTINA"

*GB cryptonym

sweiish citizen of

1.i11:

Unisk in

1060 at the

céques:

08 thr First Chief Direc-

igrar.".

NAME "WN: 'OWN:

A code clork in the

Japaneur badassy

in Moscow in 1962

was i kiis agent; assisted the küs

the

Embassy to photo-

graph codi materials:

492.

Source

notes)

nut named.

(1964

suurco not named, but Tourist

Departmont involvement.

11964

10t0s)

Soirce not nared.

mates)

11954

Spiree not names.

(1964)

Source not named. (1962)

was on a mission

for the U.s.

Army and ClA while in the

Soviet

Union in 1958, but would not so-

operate with his newer

offi-

cer upon his return.

a CIA cortact, reported

his recruitment by the KGB

in

1957

and travolled again

tO

the

USSR in

195?.

T87 SEONE

---

## Page 149

+ 99959.077-7151

• г, "°=.*

493.

nISt

11: MOSCUW

to (Enu): appanese businers-

recruitid by

Department in 1957 or 1958.

the tourist

source not named, but Tourist

Depärtment involvement.

(1964

notcs)

ков cryptonym "VIaMINi?",

vy the Tourist Department in

1962 and was to be turned over to the

TGB Lound Residency in Tokyo for handl-

пд.

18) Moxico

souric not named, but Tourist

Pariment involvement.

(1964

note's)

Mexican diplomat

in MOscow from 1960 to 1302:

Rek agent.

Source not named. (1964)

ina

business

• has hud longstand-

connections in

the USSR.

Recruited by CIA in 1959,

he re-

turned from a mission to the USSR

in 1962 and was then terminated by

CIA for having failed to carry out

his

assignment.

---

## Page 150

ublisher

745-13

a i sii.

w.M.

Latin

AmerIcan

Section, Ameri-

Department,

in

1961

while

ilist. in

USSR;

"vory baluable agent";

d' later

turred ovor to t.hi:

KOB

st Chief Virolorute; in Janudry

2 he received

₫1,000,

from the NGB

al

Residency ir. Mexico City fo:

fillment of in

assignment.

(In

ater interviow in 13tt,

NOSENKO

• tiza tea

Per isas

valuabie agent

che Ilicgils Directorate, Fiisc

af Discotorate, and it was fro.:

comparent

that the $1,000 came.)

Withorlaids

matoriii

recruited by the

tment iring July 1963;

the Dutch firm

"¿ ho has provided

the KGB.

recruited

the Tourist Department

che basis of a sexual conpio-

io in a parki

che lives with hir

iband in

Tus this is a goou chs

XV279

cost,

of

1:t:

interest to the First Chief

ractorate.

1 NorvaY

Norwegian journal-

swar recruited in

BOW in 195! or 1958.

NOSENKO

ok part in the operation by

494.

NOSENKO

received this infor-

miation

from YELISESEV.

notes)

Source not named, but iourist

Department irvolvement.

(1964

rotas)

source not ramod, but Tourist

Departrent involvement.

1196÷

notus)

Personal involvement in develop-

mental

stages of operation.

(196÷)

journalist travelled

the USSk in 1957; later wrote

an article in which he told of re-

cruitment on basis of blackmarket

activities, but didn't mention sexuad

---

## Page 151

ntroducing

10

girls and then

for arrest on

of binchmarketeering.

rustment made ly

K.N. MulAt

chind

T'u:1st Department.

Sti-

parter:

the approach after

Ussk.

leaving

but did not

toll whole story.

Paul:

Mist agent

nüH

Lejal

residency in.

tack City: his son,

serge,

at Lumanda navarcity 1n

1362.

KjB

cpurthent in l9r.;

* Groak

cative: borr an Turkoy: mod Has 1118

i freckhola

193s;

15

childior in

the bith.

Kid cryptony. "NIN'";

1nnish

national; was

mulled by the Tourist beggaerone

in

1958 or tool: she nork

the Siedish

tauristl

and

laves

in sweden.

KGB cryptonym

recruited in

1963 by the

Tourist Depurtreat

on the bisis of

homosexu:l. materials

gathered

during

a 1962 trip to

the

USSR;

he

13

representative

of the

#Travel Agency.

475.

playei

Described person who

sole NOSENKO

said

he played.

Spe

Part 4.0.1.g.

Ne course nared.

(1964 notes)

Source not named, but Tourist

Cratinent invoivement.

1:96.4

TOP SECRET

source not nanod, but tourist

Pepartuant intolrencht.

(1964

source not nained, but Tourist

Department involvement.

11364

notes)

---

## Page 152

AME

Switzerland

UNKNOWW:

tonYm

•LUKA

he

recruited

in

Switzetiana.

By

964 apparently not cooperating

with

•viets any more because

of

fear.

V (En:): KGB Crypto-

-TRIANANT.

: a woman horn in Italy

nd now living in Geneva; was re-

-dited

in,1959 and turned over to

he Geneva

Legal Residency of the

G8; she has contacts with incricans.

Reportrd

in 1962 without name or any

etails

except that there was a fe-

ale agent of the Geneva Legal Resi-

ency whose KGB cryptonym was

CHANNA"; S.J. GAVRICHEV was mect-

no her at that time.)

Tunisia

UNKNOWN:

KGB

cr

Kilwan recruited by

the

l'our-

55 t

Departmont while a tourist in

he

USSR in 1050.

2).

United Kingdom

(Enu) :

In June or July 1959,

USENKO

personally recruited

ritish subject named

fter he had been compromiscu

496.

NOSENIO was told of this case

by Yu.I. GUK in 1963 and S.I.

GIVRICHES in 1964.

(1962)

In 1962 heard from Yu. I. GUK

of an incident involving her.

(1902 and 1964 notes)

notes!

Personal involvement. (1964)

Unidentified; investigations con-

tinuing.

Not identified.

Not identified.

TOF

---

## Page 153

Recruited by the

repariment on 16 July.

1062; hc

lectrical engineer, but owis

JOB and was to be usci

as a

KNOWN:

t.e

NOSERNO percOnally re-

(name not recalled)

basis was homosexual con-

KNOWN:

KGB agent within Brit.

nEerinteiligence (service in-

who supplies information on

intelligence and on agent

ons; possibly from this agent

received a

roport on the NATo

nde in Lordon that

also contained

methods

of oucrations of

nand British counterintelli-

although

specific agents

tinamed in the report.

KNOWN: i membor of the Brit-

Tralty recruited on homosexual

En Moscow in 1957.

i correspond-

MoscoW:

n'as

tha

target of

ruitment operation in carly

OSENRO was not cortain whether

recruited.

497.

Source not nanca, but tourist

nepartment

involvement.

(1964

notes)

Personal involvement. (1964)

Xu.I. GUK told NOSINKO about this

agent

in Aeril

1962.

Seo Part III.

13.

which describes NoSENkO's in-

volvement with a

scottish girl

in Geneva

and Guk's warning

that

the KOB has an agent in Bzitish

counterinteiligerce ho could

report indiscretions. (1962)

NOSENKO was told of this casc by

V.A. CHURANOV of the British

Department, Second Chief Direc-

torate.

(1962)

No source named. (1964)

Not identified.

(George BLAKE, a

KGB agent in MI-6, passed the KGB

copies of minutes

Of CIA-MI-G

confcrences on legal travel opera-

tiong; one of the

conferences was

held in London in 1959; BLAKE was

arrested in April 1961; thus he

could not have been the soviet re

ferred to by GUK in 1962; see

Part V.D.7.b.)

Identical with William J.C. VAS-

SAT.L; see Part V.D. 5.b. for de-

tailed discussion.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 154

fnu:

Ey himself NOSENKO

rudead british citizen named

n Moscow durina the 1959 tourist

sta-

on on the basis of homosexual compro-

ise involving öne of his homosexual

gents, either VOLKOV or YEFREMOV.

ase

turned over to First Chief

¡pectorate.

aal Urrauay

A Uruguayan

citi-

livos

in Montevidee and is

prominer: eraserrors there;

ecruited in Moscow in 1960 at the

equest of the KGB Illegals Direc-

orate; ile was ther turned over to

hat darcstorate for handling in

antevisco.

Verazuala

A dentist in

aracas;

recruited ir i950 by the

utist lunartment and turned over

,. the kcß first Chief Directorate.

498.

Personal involvement as case

officer of homosexual agent and

as recruiter.

(1964)

Source not named. (1964 notes)

Solice not named, but rourist

Department involvement.

(1964

notes)

TOF SECRET

---

## Page 155

Develomental and Investigation

LEAD

Travelled to the USSR

1057

15

an

niacui

new contr

with sa

Mh1:1d

enuit.

nly purpose vas to waten tokedbe-

HuBe of

possible intelligence mission.

o approach contempiated oe made.

arition citizen

and

sales lio visited

he USSi in

135y and several times

ince; the KGD is actively working

nithis case, but has not recruited

info

499.

SOURCING AND DATE OF REPORT

Personal involvement. (1964)

Sunter not numod, but tourist

Departnent involvement.

(1964)

INVESTIGATION RESULTS

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 156

Director of the

agency; was under

devedopment:

by

the Tourist Depart-

mont: First Chief Dircetorate

asked

that case he turned over to them.

This was done.

135

every your.

contact with e

1958 but dir

time:

han:

still

agents

he

Owns

to thes

USSR

NO himsols was in

Alabout 1957 or

cruit him at this

had realised what was

severed

the

relationship.

goes

the USSR and

the

surround him with

hols

not been recruites.

(fred): A canadian; is kaown

mate reggaetn homosrsual acts

while in

the

USSR as a tourist in 195";

sho kGb will attenot to recruit hit it

NAME UNKSOWN:

KGB cryptonym "KOMETA" ;

BritisH

womin who woris for some pub-

lication in sondon which publishes in

the Russian language; she visited the

USSR in 1961 and 1962 with a spotting

mission for British Intelligence,

thoro had ar affair with a KGB agent,

and has corresponded with hir; when

the agent wrote that

he would be com-

•ing to the west on a

visit in 1963,

she replied by mail thut she would

like

tộ sec him, but

could not at that tine;

the KGB

is writing

for the British to

make the neit move.

500.

sourcr

not named, but, Tourist De-

partment involvement.

(1961 notos)

Personal involvement.

Surco not nanod, but Tourist

involvement.

1196}

noto:)

Sourne not named, but Tourist

Department involvement.

(1964)

Not identified.

• :.

nief

TGP SECRET

---

## Page 157

aet-+79+45-09-086 50399

501.

source not named.

(1962)

IAME URIKNOWN :

In 1960

or 1961 the KG3

as preparing a

recruliment operation

gainst a British audio technician wno

'ame

to

the British Embassy in Moscow;

KGB female

agent enticed

him

into

let apartment, where compromising

hotographa may have beer taker; as far

aB NOSeNiO knew,

the KGB never made a

recruitment approach in this casc.

NAME UNKNOWN: i former Russian now in

rranklur:,

Germany,

working for nest

erman or Anerican Intelligence; the

KGB was tryirg to recruit him in 1961

through his distor or cousin wiso

still

lives

in the

USSR; the KGB las inct

in France: the outcome is unknown.

NAME: UNKNOWN:

A young fenale Swiss

tourist

To the USSR who works for

the

police in aurel or zurich was contacted

by the KGB on her complaint of stolen

money; the KGB arianged to return the

oney to her: she was assessed and the

load was russed to the First Chief

Directorate.

Source not named. (1964).

No source named. (1964)

A Swedish tourist

In

benlaulad

1U418}

Juno 1963; tried

recruit a Soviet citizen, supposedly

Anexicon Intelligence; the Soviet

waB & KCB agent, yno

the entire

approach

was recorded; if sitalys returns to

tho USSR an attempt will be made to

recruit him.

Source not named. (1964 notes)

Not identified.

This person is a CIA contract em-

ployee in Frankfurt who refused to

cooperate with the KGB in 1961 and

reported the approach to his super-

iors.

with

& She is

contact

KGB officers in Switzerland.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 158

(Enu): A Dutch citizon:

ravelled as a tourist to the soviet

nion in 1959; he was photographed in

smosexual activity and this will be

sed as a hasis for recruitment

pproach if he returns to the USSR.

Livas on

raunschwing,

Germany; visited the

SSR in 1959; the KGB suspects he is

homosexual

and will attempt to re-

ruit him if he returns.

502.

Souter not name!

• but tourist

Department involvement.

(1964

notes)

Source not named. (1964 notes)

TOF SECRET

---

## Page 159

503.

b.

(1)

The VASSALL Case

Information from NOSEiKO

At the 11 June 1962 meeting with CIA, NOSENKO first mention-

ed the lead which was later equated with William J.C. VASSALL, the

KGB agent in the British Admiralty.

Neither then nor later in

1962 did NOSENKO identify this agent by name.

NOSENKO was asked on 11 June 1962 whether he had ever heard

af the KGS agent George BLAKE, "the

man who compromised the fanois

cunnel operation in Berlin."*

NOSENKO replied:

"Yes, I did.

I'll tell you this, that there was a far more important Englishmi

cho was our agent than BLiKE.** He is a very big man,

and from him

ve get all kinds of materials.

We get all the details about NATO.

He is our number one agent, the best of all intelligence informa-

tion. He had reen in Moscow, and

we recruited hin there.

him on a homosexiality charge, a very extreme one involving multi-

ple persons.

The case officers who recruited him received the

Order of Lenin...

He is not an intelligence man.

He is a high-

ranking mar.

He is working on all kinds of NiTO matters and is

delivering mos: valuable information...

He was in Moscow some

time ago.

My friend and three others in the KGB section running

him received the Order of Lenin.

That is a very high distinction

for the KGB...

I do not know the man's name, cut I do know when

he was in Moscow, and I know that he has a very high position.

He is in London now." NOSENKO was reluctant to go into further

details at this, his second meeting with CIA, but he added:

tell you all about him tomorrow, my brothers.

I will tell you

many things tomorrow, and the day after...

This is our number

one operation. There is no sun of money we would not be willing

to pay him."

The next day NOSENKO was asked for additional information

about the

"high level British agent,"

and he told his case offi-

"I don't know the exact content of the material (he was

giving) except that they were very valuable military documents,

and I know that he even brought in draft copies when he was here

in Moscow.

He went to Londor,

ard I believe he works in a Minis-

I think it is in the office of the First lord of the Admir-

alty. He still meets with our case officer even now.

He brings

them extremely valuable material.

He is either a deputy or a

First Secretary, or a member of

the secretariat; the most im-

portant thing being that all material of the greatest signifi-

cant value passes through his hands.

He was recruited in 1956

I don't know when he returned to Lordon, but he was

working with the (KGB Legal) Pesident there, who was at that

time a man whose name is Major General (N.B.) RODIN.***

BLAKE, a British MI-6 officer, has admitted that he informed

the KGB of the Berlin tunnel operation (which involved the

intercept of Soviet and East. German telephone conversations

orior to the time the operation became

active in May 1955; it was terminated in April 1956.

** In September 1964 CIA sought more details from NOSENKO about

He responded:

NOSENKO said:

"BLAKE? Who is BLAKE?" when reminded,

don't know what kind of information he

what kind or

gave now much.

I think he gave information,

but: I don't know

This is a mistake on what I supposedly

said before." For a further discussion of BLAKE, See Part

V.D.7.b.

***RODIN, who served in London under the alias KOROVIN, was

previously known to have been Chief of the KGB Legal Resi-

dency in London.

side.

---

## Page 160

504.

also received an Order of Lenin for his participation in the case,

but this was for the obtaining of valuable documents and not be-

cause of ary involvement in the agent's recruitment.

RODIN waS

personally. in contact with the agent in London...

I don't know

what position he

(the

agent) held in Moscow.

I don't want to

tell you anything I don't know.

Remember, this was handled by

another section and I could not very well ask. them.

You see, it's

none of my business.

He gave us everything on military and polit-

ical matters.

I found out (about this agent) from my friend (V.A.)

CHURANOV. He was involved in the recruitment personally.

He is

in Moscow now.

He returned about a year ago from Copenhagen.

He

was there as the (KGB Legal)

Resident, under the cover of First

Secretary.

Prior to that he was the Chief of a section in the

English Department of the Second Chief Directorate.

That was

about three years ago, ard at that time he personally recruited

the Englishman."

NOSENKO told .:CIA on 13 June 1962 that the "high-level

British agent" had on one occasion provided a report on an Anglo-

American conference in Loncon, which contained referençes to

American and British Intelligence operations.*

meeting in 1962, a day later, NOSENKO again stated that RODIN

had received the Order of Lenin for his part in the operation.

When asked whether the name KOROVIN meant anything to him in

connection with operations against the British, he replied: "I

have

heard that nine.

Possibly he is the man in London now. "**

After recontacting CIA in 1964, NOSENKO reported that he

had alreary provided almost all he knew about VASSALL, who had

been arrested in 1962.

VASSALL, NOSENKO summarized, was re-

cruited in Moscow and turned over copies of official Embassy

documents while there. After he returned to England and while

he was working in the Admiralty, he was considered to be the

KGB's best agent.

His value, NOSENKO said, was indicated by

the fact that CHURANOV had received a KGB award for his role

in the recruitment and then later, when VASSALL was producing

in England, the Order of Lenin along with RODIN, the handling

officer in London.***

NOSENKO on 1 February 1964 said: "In general it was known

from some source important information was coming in from

the British, specifically, information about NATO.

as the NATO Intelligence Services would hold a meeting in

London, we had the information as to what was discussed.

When the American, Canadian, and British groups met in

London. The material came in from that VASSALL,

someone else--I don't know." On 8 September 1964 NOSENKO

commented further that in 1960 or 1961,. about the same time

he heard about these materials, he also learned that the

KGB First Chief Directorate had a good source: in British

counterintelligence.

NOSENKO said that he did not know

Whether VASSALL had access to this type of information or

whether this indicated another source.

** NOSENKO was asked on 29 January 1964 whether RODIN, VASSALL'S

handler

in London, was also known as KOROVIN. He replied he

thought so.

***Questioned on CHURAVOV's reaction to VAsso'd sast: moell,

stated on 29 January 1964 that CHURANOV had

this is all.

This is the end of my career and I'll never go

abroad again."

Shortly afterwards,

CHURANOV went to GRIBANOV

to ask to be returned to the Second Chief Directorate for this

reason.

TOP SECRET

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## Page 161

505.

NOSENKO added a few details concerning the compromise of

The KGB, he said, had

evidence uf honosexual acts

between VASSALL and one homosexual, but then the KGB managed to

acquire photographs of him

involved with three homosexuals at the

sare time. NOSaKO has unable to

recall the nines of two of them,

whose KGB cryptonyns were

"MUKH!!!" and "SIBIRYAK" (the latter a

young scientist and the only one of the three who could speak

English; the third was Viktor BELYANOVSKIl, an actor. in lioscow

who also took part in

the american citizen

Martin MALIA and Sio

CHURANOV told NOS-

ENKO that VASSALL was 'really shocked" and became sick when he

saw the photographs.

NOSENKO told CiA On 24 January 1964 that he had been very

worried in 1963 when it was reported

in an article ky Joseph

ALSOP thät VASSAiL hau been

apprenended

ny the British as the

result of a lead from the Americans.

"I remember," NOSENKO said,

"the press stated that there was a defecior who vas a diplomat

and who was about to come to England fron the States and that he

was instrumental in having unearthea this Soviet: spy, at a high-

levei place, inose name was VASSALL.*

The First Chief Director-

ate was in an uproar when they read this AbSOP articie.

matter of fact, at the kOD conferonce I insisted that our recent

flaps were a result of information from coLiTSY!, particula-ly

(On) VASSALL.

When they asked me now I knew, I said we have

records here that he was given VASSALL's inaterial to read in

correction with his own work."

NOSENKO said on & September 1954 that his fears that tre

articles in the western press might eventually bring him under

suspicion were allayed wren he learned from CHURMOV sone time

later that the First Chief Directorate had reluctantly decided

that GOLITSYN must have been the

the VAssalL lead. The

leaders of the First Giief Directorate did not want to believe

at first that SOLITSYN was the source of the lead, but it was

known that although GOLITSYN did not know VASSALl's rame, he had

on one or two occasions translated materials received from

(11) Information from GOLITSYN

On 26 March 1962 GOLITSIN

was being interviewed by British

authorities and provided information leading to the identifica-

tion of VASSALL as a KGB agent.

GOLITSY: said that he worked

in the International Treaty

Organizations Section of the Infor-

mation (Reports) Department "of the KGB First Chief Directorate,

from September 1959 until May 1960.

During this period he re-

ceived documents from the British Admiralty which were copies

of papers from top Admiralty officials concerning the construc-

tion and financial expenditures relating to a naval base at

Clyde, dated July 1959.

On the basis of many of these docu-

GOLITSIN had to prepare a report for the Soviet Minister

of Defense.

He said that he was told that the British Depart-

ment of the First Chief Directorate had also disseminated such

information, ard

after contacting the Pritish Department he was

a large file of copies of original documents from British

Admiralty, including documents of the First and Second Lords of

the Admiralty.

(The documents he read were Russian translations

of copies of original British docunents.)

There were other

* The defector source referred to by ALSOP was GOLITSYN (see

below).

TEP SECRST

---

## Page 162

506.

documerts covering all Admiralty activity mercioning navy bases,

fleet commands in the Mediterranean,

Aden and other cities in

the Mediterranean area.

There were also docurents dealing with

bases in England ard concerning important questions and deci-

sions in the hamiralty:

According to GOLITSYN, these documents were received from

an agent source ir. London, covered the period 1958-53,.

usually received at two-month intervals.

He related that he had

talked in 1955 to a KGB officer friend, Ye. G. KASKCiEYEV, * who

was recalled to the USSR in 1954 from London.

KASHCHEYEV told

GOLITSYN that at that period KGB had two other important agents,

one of whom was BLAKE.

The other important source was working

in naval intelligerce in 1954, but GUI.IISYN sald he did not know

the identity of the KGB officer handling the ramiralty agent

He suggested, however, it could have seen A.V. BARANCV

because that officer received the Order of Lenin for. his work in

England at about that time.

During a 5 April 1961 interview GOLITSYi was shown a selec-

tion of documerits concerning the British Naval Command Organiza-

tion in the Mediterranean.

He selected two cocuments he thougnt

although he

said he was not sure,

These

documents were: (a) Internal Admiralty Memorandim,

Subject:

"Commard in the Mediterranean," dated 2 July 1959; and (b) inter-

nal Admiralty documents,

Subject: "Unified Headquarters for the

Middle East," dateä 22 January 1960.

When GOLITSYN was shown additional British documents on

7 April 1962, he recalled he had seen documerts

concerning "the

whole infrastructure program, the whole of NATO." as well as

documerts concerning rotes of meetings held in the Admiralty.

GOLITSYN said on 25 May 1962 that the photographic repro-

ductions of the documents were of medium or better quality, in-

dicating they had been reproduced by a process better than

hand-

held Minox camera production.

On 11 June 1962, British officials

passed to CIA a list

of 20 candidates,

including VASSALL, resulting

from their inves-

tigation of the GOLITSYN lead.

(The investigation was not being

pursued along the lines of the KASHCHEYEV lead mentioned above,

concerning a source in naval intelligence in Lordon in 1954 who

have been recruited in Moscow.)

CIA provided the British

• on 17 June 1962 with preliminary details

on what NOSENKO had

reported about the KGB source in the British Admiralty.: On

18 June 1962 the British indicated to CIA that the list of 20

candidates had been narrowed to two individuals, one of whom

WaS VASSALL.

Full details of NOSENKO's information on this

case were passed by CIA to the British on 20 August 1952.

By 12 September 1962 British authorities had focused

sufficiently on VASSALL to arrest him. VASSALL immediately

confessed.

*

See Part

v.I.7.

for NOSENKO's statements on KASHCHEYEV.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 163

507.

(iii) Information from VASSALL

On the day of his arrest, 12 September 1962, VASSHuL con-

'fessed thai he had

spied for the soviets almost continuously since

the spring of 1955."

lA search of his quarters immediately after.

his arrest resulted in the discovery of 15 rolls of exposed film

which, wher. developed, revealed 140 pho-ographs of pages from 17

official hamiralty documents dated betweer. 24 July and 3 September

1962; all were reported to be secret documents,

"the exposure of

which would gravely damage the security of the state.")

In his

confession,

VASSALL described his recruitment by CHURANOV and

another man, know. only as "Sikolay" ir March 1955 or. the basis

of compromising photographs taken during the course of a "homo-

sexual orgy" involving himself and a runker of Soviets. at the

Berlin Hotel in Moscow at the end of October

1954.

From about

September 1955 on until he returned-to England, VASSALL bought

KOS silence by bringing CHURAVOV and "Nikolay" documents from

the British Embassy.

In May 1956, in anticipation of his depar-

ture for home, vasSAlL. was introduced to a third Soviet, subse-

quently identified as RODIN/KOROVIN, who was to become his con-

tact in Lordon.

Their first meeting in England took place about

the end of August 1956.

VASSALL continued to meet RODIN once

every three weeks until the arrest of Soviet Illegal Gordon LONS-

DALE in January 1961, which resu'ed in a four morth moratorium

on personal meetings.

To these meetings VAsSAlL would bring docu-

ments that he obtained from his office

in the Naval Intelligence

Division of the Admiralty; the ducuments would be photographed

and returred to VASSALL durirg the sane meeting.

Several months after RODIN had

troken off contact as are-

sult of the LONSDALI: arrest, VASSAlL was contacted by N.P. KAR-

PEKOV**and there were

infrequent meetings from then

until May

1962.

It was not until May 1962, however, that VASSALL was told

to resume his espionage collection; he nas trained to operate an

Exakta camera and used it thereafter until his arrest.

The last

two meetings with KARPEKOV took place on 13 arid 17 August 1962.

At the meeting on 13 August, KARPEKOV tola VASSALL that he was

going away on holiday and the further meeting four days later

was arranged so that VASSALL could hand over anything he had

obtained before KARFEKOV left. At their final meeting, KARPEKOV

arranged for their next meeting to take place on 30 October 1962.

(KARPEKOV left London for the Soviet Union on 6 September 1962.)

By VASSALL's account, the first time he received any money

from the Soviets was just before Christmas 1955, when he was

Thereafter, at every fourth

."=:

VASSALL served in Moscow as clerk in the office of the British

Naval Attache from 3 March 1954 until 2 June 1955, when he

left the Soviet Union to resume his former duties as a clerk

in the British Admiralty.

** KARPEKOV was identified to British authorities as a KGB offi-

cer by

KGB double agent Boris BELITSKIY (see Part VI.D.6.) in

April 1960, before KARPEKOV was handling VASSALL. RODIN was

reassigned from London in April 1961. BELITSKIY gave CIA the

same information in July 1961.

---

## Page 164

508.

meeting during his stay in MOSCOW he was given sung of 2.000

rubles.

on his returr. to England, RODIN and later KARPEKOV paid

him sums varying from 50 to 200 pounds.. According to vASSALL.

the annual totals of these amounts varied between

500 and 700

pounds, an estimate which the British consider

"modest, to say

the least" judging from VASSALL's luxurious way of life.

..e sign pia is ve.

T87

---

## Page 165

509.

c. The Illegal

(i). intracuction

NoSEiio's caly identitiable load to a soviet Tilegal con-

cerned a Gernan arnigrant to Calria whe war in Moscow during thr

fall of 1903 for meetings with i..!.

iUr and r.d. HARDAS:iEV* of

the Arcricer: Legiremont, MGt Pirat Chict Directorate.

Fren his

friend Gli, NoSElO lecired mant dotails abou: this illegal but

not his nino.

ke commented that he had boon informe of the cage

by CJK arofficially,

over citer-bours drinks while the Illegal was

in MOSiON,

and that

cbsolutely will o" •olunteer to the

KGB that he lad given theue details

to woreuke.

NarY

1456 tear

engaged

in clandestine collection activi-

ties in East Germany for the U.S. Army,

but during this period he

had once been detained by. the Soricts ard in October

1955

he had

agreed to collaborate with soviet intelligence.

#treported

this to his Anerican superiors and

was terminated by them in carly

1956. Mith U.S. assistance, he applits for imigration to Canada

• after fuiliny to gain entry into the United States, una he arrived

there in June 1956.

Teresa

NOSENKO was asked why this canadian was considered to be

an Illegal rather than an agent.

Reaffirming that he was an Il-

legal, Noseike explained that

"an agent always has legal status.

This man may run

an Illegal net.

And they may give him money

to support other Illegals, and therefore that is the category

assigned to him."

The CIA case officer summed up this nen infor-

nation cy saying: "Therefore, in addition to the classic type of

Illegal wlio is a Soviet citizen and nho is trained for a long

time ard then goes to a foreign country to develop his legend

for entry into his target country, there are foreign nationals

KARDASHEV, who according to NOSENKO is a close professional

associate of GUK, served in dashington

from April 1958 to

April

1961 K

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 166

510.

who nould be called Illegals if they are members of a soviet

Illegal's

not or if they rus an Illegal not. thimselves, Irrespec-

cive of the nationalities of the meners of the ret."

NOSENKO

agreed that this summation vas "absolutely coriect."

(ii) Infornation fion NOSEN<O

While reviehing the notes he brought to a reeting with ciA

on 26 January 1964, before ris defection, MOSEirO

came across in

entry inich propted him to suy:

"¡ kriow one Canadian.

I'11

give you his description.

I have it iritten com.

I son't have

his first name or his

last nans, but I know trut lie is & Canadian,

his age, when he was in the soviet thion.

ie went there on a

podvisnaya visa.

This Canadian actually 13 of Gernan origin,

from Germany.

lie's i Canadian citizen,

and he is an Illegal.

took a trip to Moscow

in

1903, he was met by 66x, and

he

W'33

given morey to open a business.

He is supposed to start a busi-

ness enterprise in Cunada.

They wanted to set him up as an Il-

legal resident in Canada to run sone agent.

There are a few

other things I'll tell you later.'

NOSENKO was asked why GUK

häd met this man in Moscow, and he

anstered:

"OUk sorehow got

in contact with him. It wasn't KGb.

It was

simply an acquain-

tance."

In later interviews NOSENKO added that the Illegal:

- was

of two children:

-sina married, and the father

- may have been escorted to Moscow in 1963 by KARD-

ASHEV,

SInCe KARDASHEY had

gone to & French fort to meet

a foreigner and accompany lilit on a Soviet ship to the

USSR ;

- was given false documents in Moscon for travel

from

Moscow back to Europe;

in Moscow received"$10, 000 or something like

that" to open "sone kind of optical business:"

- returned to the West via a Satellite country,

either hungary or Rumania, and then flew

to

Geneva where

his genuine documents

were returned to him.

NOSENKO also said that the KGB had decided to have the Illegal

remain in Canada after originally planning to assign him to

Ko legal at there he would i u

New York City, where he would be under the control of the local

(111) Activities in Germany

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 167

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 168



---

## Page 169

+go.

TOP SECHET

---

## Page 170

NOSENKO IROCITES

Concia,

tias

1r:

ar.3

MOSCON

on

sat

that

he

i:ar?

kack

to

Snitzor lead.

hutie.

NS

jochentarion

CAPRICHE.

l.ad

RICIEV

went

1:0

but

they

fail

cho

to

paasea

agra

Soviet

indicat

GAVRICiEN'S

.Ket

Leoal

Resident

partod t

ch6

aceat's

Fand docurettc

them tp

in

the

valis

a:à not

think

Le=ords

thon: thor

jenevi

SAv-

September

19:3.

his

retur:.

Nhọn

31.0 m

---

## Page 171

ir.

the li

-ctirted

officei

chis

Wies

arrived

ir.

57016:20:at,

155-

che

conflines

in Ottand

che

r.isi

tork

1: Hovatic: • 1957

45 a trunslatcr

i positionte

serielle

1952 when

as c probabie KGS

n1

tors, and

TUKATIY

JañdarY 1063

CARCE

ti sorditivi dolces.

Tui

---

## Page 172



---

## Page 173

6. The BELITSKIY Operation

a.. Introduction

When NOSENKO first contacted CIA in June 1952, one of the

two. pieces of information which he said he was willirg to sell

was

the fact that the CIA

agent BELIISKIY was under KCB control.

(B. Ye. BELITSKIY, a Radio Moscow broadcaster and Soviet Govern-

ment interpreter.

had been a CIA agent in place since his recruit-

ment

at the Brussels Exposition in Septenber 1953.)

At the time

NOSENKO made his irformation known, BELITSKIY had met CIA repre-

sentatives in the West

in debriefing sessions on three separate

occasions.

The last occurres in Gereva in May 1962 while BELIT-

1 SKIY was serving as an interpreter for a mio Conferense.

time NOSENKO was also in Gereva, participating in the Disarmament

ConfeIENCE.

b. Information from NOSENKO

(i) Statements in 1962

In the discussions with CIA officers on 9 and 11 June 1962.

NOSENKO revealed considerable information on BELITSKIY.

He also

described his own connection with the case and offered his opinion

on how CIA should proceed in the light of his revelations.

He

claimed that he had first heara of the RELITSKIY case, by its

code name "BELKIN," when he was working in the U.S. Embassy Section.

American Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate.

Not directly

involved with the agent, he lcarted of the case through his friend-

ship with the chief of the section (name not given) which was then

runnirg him.*

"So I already knew there was this 'BELKIN, '" saia

NOSENKO.

He did rot acüively participate in the case, however,

until the spring

of 1962.

During his tour with the Disarmament

Confererce, NOSENKO said, he received a cabie fron Moscow direct-

ing him to give advice to the "young" and "inexperienced" case

officer, V.L. ARTEMYEV in thé event that American Intelligence

should contact BELITSKIY in Geneva.

Actually, NOSENKO continued,

the Second Chief Directorate had

"inserted" BELITSKIY into the

WHO delegation in the hope that CIA would "find him."

There was

such a contact, NOSENKO said, and therefore he knew about the

handling of the case insofar

as the Geneva meetings were con-

cerned, although he had not been personally involved in it be-

fore.

NOSENKO described BELITSKIY as a KGB agent whom the Americans

had recruitea in London and never met inside the soviet Union.

NOSENKO stressed both of these points a numoer of times:

knew that in due course he was recruited in London...'

There was:

never any contact with him inside."

NOSENKO stated that BELIT-

SKIY was an agent of the American Department in 1962, although

he had once worked for the Second (British) Department. He

NOSENKO said that at that time he himself was Deputy Chief of

the U.S. Embassy Section. It follows from this that he would

have become aware of the BELITSKIY case between January 1960

and January 1962,

In 1964 NOSENKO identified the friend who

had told him about BELITSKIY as V.I. PETROV, Chief of the

Second Section, American Department, responsible for pene-

trating American Intelligence operations, mainly those in

the UssR.

TOP SECRET.

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## Page 174

5т..

claimed not to know the date of recruitment but said that he

knew that the case was already in progress during his second

assignment with the U.S. Embassy Section lanuary 1969-Janusry

1962), and "The first time he went abroad he was already our

agert. He had been our agent for a long,

long time...

NOSENKO indicated that the KGB's purpose in rurning the

BELITSKIY operation was to lure American Intelligence into meet-

ing with the agent inside the Soviet Union.

In this way, the

•KGs hoped to learn the channels and means through which Aterican

Intelliger.ce cormunicated with agents inside the

Soviet Union:

said NOSEiKO, was the "most

important task" of

Chief Directorate.

Although BELITSKIY, ir meeting with his Am-

erican case officers, contirually pleaded fear of contacting or

being cuntacted by mesican Intelligence in Moscow, NOSENKO

claimed that this was a ruse and that the real KGB intent was to

use BELITSKIY "to ¿rad you to us - to the Soviet Union - so that

you would wors with him ro: abroad."

He said that after BELIT-

SKIY was recruitad ir. Lenson, CIA

"did not go on with him...

didn t hold 'any nectargs with him."

Nevertheless, he said; the

KGB "cherished the hope....o lead him in somewhat deeper...well,

now they have."

NOSENKO commented that the KGB First Chief Directorate,

with its own responsibilities ard objectives, was unaware of the

purpose of the Second Chief Directorate in the BELITSKIY case.

The First Chief Directorate,

through Department D.

provided

dezinformatsiya (disinformation, referred to by NOSENKO as

"deza")

Second Chief Directorate's request, but in this

case, as in other

"games," it did not know for what ultinate

purpose the "¿eza" would be used.

NOSENKO indicated that in

such cases I.I.

¿GAYANTS, Chief of Department D, did not even

in what country the disinformation was to be used, let alone

the identity of the agent.

The Second Chief Directorate, more-

was at liberty to add or discard items from the "deza" pro-

vided by Department D.*

NOSENKO stated that after the directive from Moscow arrived.

he participated in the direction of BELITSKIY's meetings with

the American case officers,

advising ARTEMYEV on specific steps

to be taken.=

example.

NOSENKO said, when the American case

officers asked

EELITSKIY whether he could establish contact

with sone Soviet on the Disarmament Delegation, NOSENKO advised

ARTEMYEV not to use anyone from the Soviet Ministry of Foreign

Affairs. Rather, he told ARTEMYEV that BELITSKIY should pretend

* While on this general subject, NOSENKO commented that the

Second Chief Directorate was looking to the day when its: offi-

in the field would not have to be subordinate to the KGB

Legal Resident in a given country, always a member of the

First Chief Directorate.

In Geneva, NOSENKO said, the local

Legal Resident was "weak" and "over-cautious."

According to

NOSENKO, this man had been ordered by Moscow to help in the

BELITSKIY case "if anything is reeded" but tried to interfere

with the actual running of the case.

At that point, NOSENKO

told him: "We don't need your help. We shall run it our-

THE SECRET

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## Page 175

319.

that he was gettirg information fron the hees of tre merican

Department of rass.

A.K. KISLOV, who was then in Geneva.«

information BELITSK:Y furnished to the Americars would, of

This plan was carried out, and

BELITSKIY rejorted information

be "deza" from the KEs. 'fIem KISLOV" to his Anerican case

officers.

To bacistop this part of the operation, in case the

Americans "checked up," NOSENKO and ARTEMYEV arIaNged fOr BELIT-

SKIY to be introduced to KISLOV.

According to NOSENKO, Departinent D prepared other disinfor-

mation for BELITSKIY to give

case officers in

response to their positive intelligence requirements.

The Second

Chief Directorate asked Department D to

"make it good information.

so the opposition will not sense

that it is "deza!

happy, " NOSENKO reported, because KGB Headquarters believed that

CIA had accepted

"at face value" the information which BELITSKIY

Among thege pieces of disinfornation, NOSEYO said, was

the name of a Soviet Intelligence officer in the who in Geneva.

Concerning

the individuals involved in this case, NOSENKO

related that BELITSKIY had been met

ir. Geneva first by the Aner-

ican case officer "Pob" and later also by "Henry'" who was "calied

out from the States." The KGB case officer, ARTEMYEV, was "still

a young feilow."

although he had good potential, and had rot

worked on the BELITSKIY case in Moscow.

beer. sent to

Geneva to work on counterintelligence matters and to direct

DELITSKIY if the Americans should make contact with him. *** ifter

the who conference ended, NOSENKO said.

Sovist participants

left in groups; BELITSKIY departed on 26, 27, or 28 May but

ARTEMYEV stayed a few days longer.

According to NOSENKO, Moscow believed that CIA had acceptud

BELITSKIY's bona fides.

From the KGB standpoint, while BELTSKIY

was "not & bad agent.

and to "acd things on his own apt to go a bit too far sometimes

for this reason, NOSENKO said,

the KGB decided not to let him spent too much time with CIA,

fearing that he might say

something

"which would cause you to

sense that he is a plant."

NOSENKO strongly and repeatedly advised CIA to "continue the

game" but under no circumstances to meet the agent inside the

Soviet nion.

Fie indicated that he considered it "in your inter-

ests" to continue to play SELITSKIY, and he remarked that the

KGB would guess how CIA found out about the case if it were

* See Part III.D.5 for further details on NOSENKO's relationship

with KISLoV.

NOSENKO commerted, concerning disinformation in general and

speaking of this case in particular,

that it is

"very diffi-

to pass disinformation,

and that there is a certain

"danger" connected with passing it - in providing

"that which

is almost true,

changed just a little bit," the agent might

give away something

that is of real value to the opposition..

There is also the danger of arousing suspicion in the minda

of the opposition's case officers if the information is not

good enough, he implied.

***See Part V.D.T.C. for additional information on ARTEMYEV'8

operational activity.

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## Page 176

74-00004. "9

520.

terminated - he and ARTEMYEV were the only officers abroad who

knew about the operation.

(ht that very moment, he said, the :

KGB was walting for someone to arriva in Moscow and contact the

agant.):

.: NOSENKO proposed a plan through which Cl: could cause

the KGB, to send BELITSKIY abroad again, and two days later he

again urged that this plan be adopted: CIA should choose an

elderly couple who were travelling to the USSR and give them

letter to mail to BELITSKIY immediately on their arrival, in the

letter there should be a hint through which BELITSKIY land tha

KGB) would realize that CIA wanted him to come out and did nót

plan to contact him inside; the KGB would then be forced to send

BELITSKIY abroad again in order to continue the "game.".

reaction would be in line with the mission of the Second Chief

Directorate "to recruit the foreigrers...

and then pass them on

to you for your recruitment.

That is our mission - give our own

Russians to you for recruitment and recruit foreigners." NOSENKO

also continued:

"Don't trust him for a second but.... give the

impression that you believe him." He stressed that the travellers

chosen for this task be "elderly," that they not be connected with

CIA in any way, end, most important, that they mail the letter

immediately on their arrival.

NOSINKO also advised CIA to do

something acout the safe apartment in which "Bob" and "Henry"

had met BELITSKIY.

He complained that BELITSKIY had noted that

the name on the door was not that of the American Counsellor

whose apartment it was

supposed to be, and he said that BELITSKIY

had also reported that he felt it had an "un-lived in" look.

(11) Statements 1B 1964

When he came to the West again in 1964, NOSENKO again dis-

cussed the BELITSKIY case.*

In January 1964, he was asked his

advice about CIA's handling BELITSKIY.

Again he suggested that

CIA

"continue the plan" in order to determine

"what actions they

will undertake when they will see that you do not plan to hava

Moscow contacts. "

He commented:

"You have a realistic basta

for not doing this in view

of the PENKOVSKIY case,

etc." **

again he expressed the opinion that "what they are trying to ào

in this case

is to pull for a Moscow contact...

The hope 19

that you would go out to meetings with him in Moscou."

Second Chief Directorate did not consider the BELITSKIY case a

big operation: "it was only a small success from our viewpoint."

NOSENKO ciained, as he had in 1962,

to have been personally

involved in directing the meetings BELITSKIY had had with the

Americans in Geneva.

ARTEMYEY "was a very young man,

fore, a cable came from Moscow ordering me to take over the

direction of the case over ArtEMYEV...

in cade a contact was

made, and it was."

indicated that it was O.M. GRIBANOV

himself, Chief of the Second

Chief Directorate, who had ordered

him to take charge.

In the meantime, CIA had continued the "game."

1962, during the week of the Cuban missile crisis (a1s-

cussed in Part V.F.10.) BELITSKIY attended a conference

$28. yas met several times by CIA representatives: (See Page

** See Part VI.D.%.b. for details on the compromise of PENKOV-

SKIY.

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## Page 177

52430

lies sides de lian learned aids dles rate adoptrally "do 1960)

un 1901" CreatEnne, chlet uf the Gecond Sectlor of the hmerican

Department.

"I don't know when the case began, but it was going

In 1960

and 1961, he said.

In 1962, he obtained more details

from ARTEMYEV, who was in the same

delegation as ZELITSKIY.

and

then the cable came from Moscow ordering him to help ARTEMYaV

in the case.

NOSENKO said he did not knon who recruited BELIT-

SKIY for the KGB, but it was not PETRov..

This operation, like

all "games" of the Second Section, was supervised by M.G. MATVEYEV,

Deputy Chief of the American Department..

In 1964 NOSENKO made a number of comments and observations

which he had not brought up in any way in 1962.

In noting,

for

that BELITSKIY had originally been a British Department

agent, he remarkea: Maybe they tried to serve hin up to the

maybe the British didn't bite."

is for the charac-

ter of BELITSKIY and the KGB's view of their agent, or. 29 Janu-

ary 1964 NOSE NO stated:

"If you were to stop

it..

then wait

until the appropriate moment, confront him, tell him the

'game'

is up - you know all about him - then he might go for this and

yu. may recruit him."

On 2 February 1954, when the CIA case

officer suggested that perhaps RELIISKIY might not have reported

everything to the KG3, especially the anourt of money he had

been given by CIA, NOSENKO agreed that perhaps this was so "be-

cause I"was very much surprised hon little money the Americars

gave BELITSKIY...

I was convinced that something was rot right,

änd I told ARTEMYEV rhat I didn'e believe that the Americans

could pay such small sums. I was convinced that BELITSKIY only

reported that he received a small part of what he actually got."

NOSENKO said that when he told PETROV that he did not believe

BELITSKIY, PETROV said he tad not quite accepted his reports

either, becausevery time BELITSKIY came home from abroad.

always tries to hand me some gift and therefore I'm inclined

to agree with you." NOSENKO said that BELITSKIY had been

thoroughly investigated but that he himself felt that "it is

possible that at any given moment a person would change his.

mind and

go off."

NOSENKO mentioned fur the first time, on

10 Jure 1964, that the British Department had a file "in which

material had been placed which would indicate that there were

some suspicions" about BELITSKIY, but that "this 'suspicious'

file has not given to the Second Section, American Department.

when they took over."

(iii BELITSKIY Photograph

In October 1966 NOSENKO said that he had seen BELITSKIY

in person on several occasions in Geneva in 1962. : Shown BE-

LITSKIY's photograph a few days later, NOSENKO failed to re-

cognize it.

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## Page 178

522.

c. Information from Other Sources

BELITSKI'S was a chemist by training and a translator and

radio commertator by profession.

At the time of his recruit-

ment, and throughout his relationship with CIA, he was employed

by Radio Moscod.

Fluent in English, he was used primarily as

a scientific commentator on programs beamed to the British Isles.

In addition to his radio work, BELITSKIY frequently served as an

interpreter for the Soviet Government, both at home and abroad.

and achieved considerable recognition

in this capacity during

such widely publicized events as the POWERS trial

and GAGARIN'S

visit to England.

Ostensibly he was fully trusted by the Soviet

authorities ard was allowed

an unusual degree of freedom in his

association with foreigers.

HELITSKIY was recruited by CIA in Brussels in September

1958 while he was serving as an interpreter

at

the Soviet Pavil-

¡on of the world's Fair.

During the period in which he was beirg

assessed as a potential

agent,

BELITSHIY created the impressions

that:

first.

he was not in full agreement with the current sov-

iet

regime and probably even harbored some grudge against

trie

soviet system because nis father häd been purged under STALIN:

second, he was not averse to considering defection at some future

date, provided he could do so with his wife; and third, he was

eager to pick up extra money, in return for which he was willing

to provide information acquired in the course of his duties.

Leads to BELITSKIY had come to CIA from three separate

All of these sources had, however, been introduced to

BELITSKIY through Aline MOSBY, a free-lance journalist whon BE-

LITSKIY had known in Brussels.

(BELITSKIY later admitted that

he had had an affair with MOSBY.) CIA's initial contact was

made through the services of Karl KOG!, a former CIC employee,

then working for Radio Free Europe (REE), who had befriended

BELITSKIY.*

KOCH was used only to make the introduction to a

CIA case officer; he was not told the nature of CIA's interest

KOCH furnished several reports on BELITSKIY to his security

officer in RFE.

It seemed obvious from KOCH's reports that BE-

LITSKIY did not manage his financial affairs well.

according to KOCH, developed a foolproof system for beating

the roulette wheel and had once asked KOCH to take him to a

certain place where he could try out his system.

KOCH, BELITSKIY on this occasion won about $320 but,

ing to leave a winner," he threw the money back on the table.

Subsequently he lost everything at the same game, and as he was

to leave for home shortly, was very anxious to get some money

with which to buy some presents.

* KOCH had been dismissed from CIC, charged with misconduct in

the performance of his duty.

He was accused of violating

direct orders and involving CIC in a possibly erbarrassing

incident, plus trying to coerce another CIC employee to make

a favorable report on an individual aliegedly formerly connect-

ed with a Soviet or Hungarian Intelligence sérvice.

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## Page 179

stin

-1. 09-7.

5220

KOCH further reported that BELITSKIY had "opened up to him

during their automobile trip to the gambling house and had dis-

cussed a wide range of persoral subjects, including his child-

hood, his work,

and his life in the Soviet Union.*

He allegedly

told KoCH that he was somewhat unhapp! because he was prevented.

on account of his jewish origin,

from advancing as far as he

thought his abilittes merited.

KOCH also reported that BELITSKIY

told him that his wife had visited the Brussels Fair as a tourist:

KOCH said that BELITSKIY obviously had "moments of great doubt"

about the wisdom of speaking freely to him leven naively asking

nim if he were

"D").

but that he, KOCh, felt that BELITSKIY did

so because he needed someone to talk to and he felt he could trust

KOCH to be discret.

KOCH stated that BELITSKIY had "protested

he would never defect," but that Kodi felt that he would "jump

if he saw a way oit."

KOCH was cooperative on learning that CIA

wished to be introduced to BELITSKIY.

He lent his apartment for

the initial contact and remaired out of earshot for some 45 min-

utes, while the irterview was taking place.

KOCH told BELITSKIY

that te

"suspected" that the "frierd" to whoin he was going to

introduce hin was an American Intelligence officer.

At the ini-

tial cortact (time was snort) BELITSKIY was offered the opportu-

nity to work in place

in return for a guarantee of future finan-

cial

in resettling in the dest, plus wratever small

current reimbursement he could satisfactorilv cover.

BELITSKIY

appeared surprised, but rather pleased.

He was willing to oper-

ate as CIA suggested for the time neing.

Financial arrangements

were made, and BELITSKIY was briefed on

fairly gereral, but high

priority, positive intelligence requirements.

He was given a

secret writing communication system and agreed, according to

the terms of his contract, to communicate with

Cia by means of

this system within four months of the date of his return to the

USSR.

In the two years prior to his recruitment, BELIISKIY had

on several occasions been rather outspoken during conversations

with certain Nesterners with whom he had come in cortact.

frankness concerning his disaffection with certain aspects of

Soviet life as they affected his career as weil

on several occasions (including an episode in which he tried to

borrow money from a member of the British Embassy in Paris sev-

eral years earlier), had convinced the British intelligence Ser-

vice (MI-ó) that he was a provocation agent.

In talking with

the CiA case officer who questioned him about this frankness,

BELITSKIY stated that he had been trying to make contact with

either British or American Intelligence

"for the past three

years", but that he had "rot been able to do so securely."

added that he felt he had been "very careful" to whor he had

spoken frankly. He said that he had "trusted" KOch and had

felt that KOCH could "put him in touch with the proper persons."

The possibility of BELITSKIY's being a Soviet provocation

was thoroughly and frequently considered, both initially and

as the case progressed.

In view of available evidence, com-

bined with the personal impressions of the CIA case officer who

* A CIA graphological analysis indicated that BELITSKIY is

most secretive about his personal affairs and does not

easily confide in anybody.

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## Page 180

524.

felt that BELITSKI! waS

sincere, it was judged at

the tine

his recruitment that BELITSKIY,

whatever his true motives, was

not controlled by the Kub..

11 hour's

of meetings in

Brussels, the

case cificer observed; RELITSKIY

sell himself," "claimed no military friends," "sifered no oper-

ational leads (ever when requested)," "dia not attempt to elicit

information," "refüsed ils contact inside the Soviet Union,"

not use a single

teim," and corvincingly

appeared to be unfaniliar with secret writing systems.

officer felt that the Soviets would have more to lose than gain

in sending a provocation agent with the scientific background

and access to information which BELITSKIY appeared to have. This,

soviet's expressed fear for his owh

security

i fincluding

staunch refusal to contact Anerican Intelligence inside the

USSR), and his apparent ignorance of intelligence terminology

and professional techniques, contributed to the initial judment

that he was not under KCB control.

BELITSKI!'s motivation appear-

ed to be a combiration of

factors,

includirg revenge for the per-

secution of his father, disaffection with the oppression by the

Soviet regime of Jeris and intellectuals (he fell

into both cate-

goriestar tie shortage of consumer goods for the average Soviet

when asked point-plank why he was

willing to cooperate

with American Intelligence,

BELITSKIY replied with the question:

"Did you read Dr. Chivazo?"

Although certair. aspects of his

past behavior were somewhat puzzling, none was actually incon-

sistent with, nor aroused any strong suspicion concerning, his

claims thas he was acting entirely on his oun initiative.

In April 1950 BELITSKIY was in London but did not contact

He later explained this in terms of his personal security

and also indicated

that he thought clA might contact him.

June 1960.

CIA sert a summary of the operation to MI-6, request-

ing any assistarce

it coula provide and offering to share the

of the operation.

In August MI-6 gave CIA its view:

BELITSKIY had come to London with a Soviet intelligence brief:

his attempts to contact Nesterners were so blatant that the KGB

must have known about them; but it was possible that not all of

the agent's activities were necessarily controlled by the KGB.

In September 1960 CiA advised MI-6 of its agreement that BELIT-

"urdoubtedly had an RIS mission when he came to the uk

earlier this year," adding the opinion that he probably had

been used in the past by the KGB; also, that the only way to

resolve the unexplained points, CIA stated, was to engage in a

secure interrogation which would include a polygraph examina-

As of October 1960 the CIA position on the case was

stated as follows:

"As matters now stand we have our doubts

as to the bona fides of BELITSKIX, but are not convinced that

all his actions have been controlled by the RIS.

We consider

him too valuable a potential source to drop without exploring

all possible avenues of investigation.

Subject has acknow-

ledged access to high-level Soviet scientists and to informa-

tion of high priority interest."

In October 1960, BELITSKIY attended a World Journalists'

Rally in Vienna but.

he explained later,

had no opportunity to

contact American Intelligence during his 10 day visit.

The next personal contact with the agent was made in

London in July 1961* when a series of meetings took place;

* PENKOVSKIY (see Part VI.D.7.b.) was also in London (on TDY

alone) in July 1961.

13 15

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## Page 181

525.

during two of these BELITSKIY was given a polygraph test.

Re

was questioned closely (albeit in a friendly manner) about his

relationship with the Kob.

ts explained that he was frequertly

in contact with persors whom he suspected to be kob, both

in

his work at Radio Moscow and particularly in correction with his

travels abrcad,

but that his only official briefing by the KSB

was in connection with the Poilas trial.

On another oscasion,

he said, he was told how to handle himself if the wrong" ques-

tions were asked

at the MARTIN/MITCHaLL press conference in

MoscoW,

but this

was not openly a kGB briefing.

BELITSKIY also

indicated that all travellers leaving the USSR were routinel!

interviewed and briefed, and were told to "sort of keep their

eves open" to locate potential targets of information.

He said

he felt

that "whatever he had been

able to do along this line"

had resulted in his being given ¿cy's abroad and having relative

freedom of movement:

At the end of the london debriefings it was concluded by

MI-6 and CIA that BELITSKIY "did not appear to be practicing

deception or to be

controlled by the RIS."

Both did agree, how-

even the tease here me ord heel that time was

The majority view at that time was

that the agent's prime motivation was a financial one, coupled

with an assurance of CIA assistance upon his defection.

It was

also believed that BELITSKIY had by then become so deeply in-

volved with CIA that it would be very difficult for him to break

contact and/or to report his plight to the KGB.

The third contact with BELITSKIY was made in Geneva in May

of 1962.

The CIA case

officer met the agent six times.

for a

total of approximately 12 hours.

At this series of debriefings

a second American case officer was irtroduced.

In his report on

the contact

the original case officer stated that he felt

"stronger than ever that

Subject's potential as an agent is

unlimited."

He stated that his original views on SELITSKIY'S

bona fides had not changed and that he felt the latter realized

that he had passed the point when he could afford to report his

collaboration with CIA to the KGB.

The second case officer

reported that the reservations which he had had about the agent's

bone fides before the meetings with him had been dispelled by

the latter's manner.

He also reported, however, that on two

occasions during the meetings he had had a "sinking feeling"

that "the relationship was not kosher."

He said that during

the discussion of the two factions which BELITSKIY claimed

were then vying with each other in the Soviet Union (the

"moderates"

vs. the "hard-liners"), he had the feeling "that

the tale was concocted and maybe the agent was trying to convey

Throughout the course of this operation various individuals

participating in it expressed doubts about BELITSKIY's boRa

fides.

Whatever doubts may have existed, however, they did

not affect the conduct of the case:. the general consensus was

that the agent was not controlled

by the KGB, and the case

continued to be run as if he were

not.

Moreover, the poly-

graph examiner reported that BELITSKIY had been

"substan-

tially truthful in his answers to the questions asked," al-

though he did recommend that the agent be re-examined under

controlled conditions.

---

## Page 182

526.

to U.S. authorities sotething

that someone war.ted to have convey-

ed and could rot have done through normal charrels."

The second

case officer was also struck by a change which he perceived in

BELITSKIY's manrer when they were discussing the matter of con-

tact inside the Soviet Union: At first,

BELITSKIY was very con-

cerned, but toward the end of the meeting he seemed to abandon

all caution ard to be quite happy about it, even suggesting that

a CIA courier could perhaps bring him some scarce goods.

Throughout: the relationship, however, BELITSKIY exhibited

great concern for his personal safety.

During the period between

the initial and the second series of meetings. CIA sent him two

open letters containing secret writing.

He responded to the first

lin time to validate the terms of the contract), but not to the

second, explaining in a later meeting that his

failure to do so

had been due to fear for his own safety,

His reasons for this

fear including the fact that the handwriting on the open

letter

"typically Anerican''), "ere juaged plausible and convincing,

and his desire

to discontinue this type of sommunicatic was

BELITSKIY did not wish to communicate by

secret writirg, he did later agree that

"in a matter of gravest

importance" he would permit CIA to send him a message via some-

one with whom he could be, logically, in professional or social

He stipulated, howriver, that it be someone who was

entirely "clear."

and completely

unwitting of the true nature of

his relationship with CIA.

He insisted, moreover,

on a guaran-

tee that if cIA ever did have to communicate with hin by any

means, it should never refer to the subject of a previous

conversation.

He felt that under such circumstances he would

stand

a better chance of refuting any accusations.

since there

would be no evidence that he had responded to the overtures of

American Intelligence.

BELITSKIY also expressed concern on sev-

eral occasions for the case officers' welfare as it related to

his own, cautioning them, for instance, never to go to Berlin

or to Moscow.

BELITSKIY was deemed from the first to have

his work to infornation of unusual value to the United States

on the soviet political scene.

scientific personalities, and

science-related events.

various relatives,

In addition,

it was hoped that through

friends, or acquaintances. he would be able

to provide some

high-priority re-

quirements.

During each of the series of debriefings he was

able to furnish some general information on Soviet political

factions and currents, on many sciertific and governmental

personalities, and on

missile and space-related events.

information was in general, however, either not of great value,

already known, or impossible to evaluate or corroborate. Never-

theless, the

case officer felt that the agent had "no way of

measuring the usefulness of any particular piece of informa-

tion" and that he was "going out of his way to provide us with

everything he thought might be of possible use."

BELITSKIY was not able to answer specific requirements

in the highest priority fields of missiles and atomic energy.

However, as he himself stressed, he did not have direct access

to classified documents,

and CIA had not expected that he

would be successful in

these areas.

On the other hand, he

did appear to have access to some military information of a

classified nature through his status in the military reserves.

Although previously, he said, he had not been interested of

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527.

attentive at these meetings ard hed maraged to avoid all due ore

refresher course,

he promised to

atterd in the future ard to try

to remember everything he could which might be of value to cIA.

Before any benetit from this aspect of his life couid te reaped,

his reserve status was charged to

limited availacility" and he

was

no lorger expected to attend meetings.

On the other hand, EELITSKIY Nas

successful in cultivating

number of individuals he

were potentially valuable sources of

information to him on prio: ity taiger areas. One of these. for

example, was à cousin who aliegedly was chict engineer in a

plant concerned wich ruclear submarines.

Furtiermore, the type

of information which BELITSKIY was reporting andicat.d that, in

the course of his

work and through cultivation and extersion of

his broad range of acquainianies, le should be able in the future

to provide CIA with extremely useful information.

for example, to report thos: stems iniin were censored from his

scientific program manus...nucs because of thel security impli-

cations.

Be also ociasionaily received interesting

vance of its publication.

He had learned of the ouster of the

Americar. diplomat, Kermit S, MIDT!!:

officially announced, in October 1952.

the attitudes and activities of certair non-soviets in Moscow

who were of interest to cih.

was acquainted with

several Westerners who had defected to the

USSR.

AlsO,

BELITSKIY remarked chat he had once known someone

who had lived in the nouse of "the real Rudolf ABfL."

friend had told him that Rudolf Ivarovich ABEL, the KGB Illegal

arrested in the United States. had merely assumed the identity

of the real ABEl, who hac died.

With regard to certain specific assignments which he failed

to carry out, BaLITSKIY Irvariably

oiteied expianarions for his

inability to do so lusually elating tear for his personal se-

curity which were difficult to regard as

unreasonable.

example was his deision

'at the las: minute not to bring to

ClA the Radio Moscow telephone book which he had been asked to

get.

"had it in his hand while pa.king." he said,

that 'hecause of a current réorganizaiion at the Radio" the

information would se

"outdated"

by the time Cli got it and that

therefore he did not think it worth

ilsking its tsing found if

his baggage should be

inspected.

Evaluations of BELITSKIY's behavior, attitudes and apparent

motivation, and production were cortinually made in the course

of the case.

Although there was a definite feeling that he had

not been frank about the full extent of his rela:ionship with

the KGB, neither the results of the polygraph examination, the

conclusions of a graphological analysis, nor the judgments of

the two individuals who had contacted him personally during

the three series of debriefings tended to contradict these con-

clusions directly.

as the case progressed, it appeared that his

reputation within the Soviet Union was growing and that his

usefulness to CIA was increasing correspondingly.

His personal

contacts and potential sources of irformation became more nu-

merous as his job responsibilities increased.

The trust which

his superiors placed in him seemed to be borne out by the

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## Page 184

528.

freedon he was allowed. It appeared that there was a good

chance he would be permitted to exit the Soviet Union from time

to time and would therefore be able to get informatior. to us

despite his reluctance.

to communicate fron within,

He was thus

considered, on the whole, to be a-nighly useful potential, if

not actual, source of positive intelligence information who was

basically motivated to help American Intelligence.

After the NOSENKO information was received in June 1962.

CIA continued the BELITSKIY

ings was held with the agent in the United States in October of

1962.

BELITSKIY was at that time accompanying a Soviet delega-

tion to "The Second Informal Conference of Influential Ameri-

cars

and Soviets" (at hidover, Nassachusetts), a gathering of

prominent Soviet and American citizens to

discuss international

problems

interests of world peace.*

tion of 16 was headed sy a member of the

The Soviet delega-

CPSU Central Conmittee,

who was listed as a representative of the Soviet Trade Union

Press.

The conference occurred during the Cuban crisis, 21 to

27 October 1962.**

During this

extremely critical period in Soviet-American

relations, BELITSKIY comnunicated the following points to his

CIA case officers:

- The members of the delegation had been briefed in

Moscow by the First Deputy Foreign Minister to be concilia-

tory, even to the degree of pointing out that the Soviet

Union disagrees with China on the distribution of nuclear

weapons to other powers, and to avoid any position which

could be regarded as offensive to the American partici-

pants.

- BELITSKIY "personally" regarded President KENNEDY's

announcement of a

"blockade" of Cuba as appalling.

stated that he was convinced that Cuba could have been

weaned from the Soviet Union by very careful handling

without alienating opinion in other countries, and that

the President's action tended to strengthen the position

of the "hard line.

tough talk" faction in the Soviet

Government.

Immediately following the President's an-

nourcement, the delegation was instructed to make the

Soviet position plain, but to do so in a moderate tone.

- The leader of the Soviet delegation had partici-

pated in a discussion with Norman COUSINS, of The

Saturday Review, who explained to him the reasons for

This conference is an extension of the "Pugwash" conferences,

originally sponsored by Cyrus EATON, identified by PENKOV-

SKIY as a GRU contact.

**Also participating was S.I. BEGLOV, who had conferred with

G.N.

BOLSHAKOV on 19

October 1962 in New York, ostensibly

on matters connected with the USSR magazine:

v.F.10.

TOP SECRET

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## Page 185

529.

the President's stand on Cuba.

According

tO BELITSKIY,

who had acted

as interpreter,

the Soviets' reply to

COUSINS was that the USSR had

refused to give nuclear

weapons to China ard that there

would se no point in

risking

in affront to Communist. Chira by giving advanced

weapons to Cuba.

He said the Soviet Urion was willing

to enter into negotiations with the United States on the

question

of the spread of nuclear weapons co other

countries.

(COUSINS' explanation of President KENNEDY'S

stand was that he was pressured by the coming election

and the need to circumvent critisist oy the Republican

Party; by Congressional leaders; and by a report that

Congress would soon learn of the irrefutable evidence

concerning the

soviet missile buildip in Cuba.

Except for once

sailing abroad on a Soviet cruise ship,

BELITSKIY has not been

seen in the West since his October 1962

visit to the United States,

His volce, however, has been heard

frequently in broadcasts

from Radio Moscow sinie that time.

Anong BELITSKIY's broadcasts was a two-part series of 22 November

and 2 December 1965, beamed to the United Kirgdom and to eastern

North America, calied • Inquest

Into the facts

surrounding the

publication of The Perkovsky Papers.

.isr..

CP SECRET

---

## Page 186

530.

7.

KG3 Invest-cation&

?.

CoMprOmiSe Of POPCY

(1) Irtroduction

Twice during

the first meeting

with cia in Geneva in June

1962 NOSEUKO alluded to the compromise of

the CIA agent penetra-

tion

of the GRU, Lt. Col. P.S. POPC'I,

and at the next meeting he

attributed the compromise to

KGH surveillance of a CIA officer in

Moscow mailing a letter to PoPoY.

Essortially the same story ot

the

POPOV compromise was givon by disinko

190%, with certain

additional

eta1l3 leing

supplied de that tine.

Ino of the CIFREFANOY papers* confirm

that kea

surveilisare

163

to the discovery of PoroV'g statug as

a CIA agent, but astri

make also said that POPOV was under some

security suspicion prior to the lette! -miline incident.

NOSENKO nor these other two couices,

supplied a

precise dite for this inciduit beyond the statement

in one of the MiEREPAiOV papers that it occurred in January 1959.

Tre actual dale of the letter maillas

alst of that month,

and hence according to loSEro, are

and the CHiEREPRiOY papers,

it was ther. rhat the KGB establishe.

ine fact of PoPov's collaior-

ation with

CIA.

Information from GoLITSiN, hovever, places the

tire of the concionise

aS

and GOLITSY has aiso

stated that a KOB agent (rather than KCs surveillance)

was the

cause of the compromise.

Presented belor are sclected portiors of the cia operatior.

with

POPOV, follo.ed by the

incorration on Poray's comprchise

(ii) CIA Operation with leroy

After 32 months of contacts lin CIA whale he was stationed

in Austria, POPOV was trunsferied in September 1955 to East Ger-

many to become a case ottier at the GRU (tacricall intelligerce

point in Schwerir,

and contacts with ClA were resumed in January

The GRU reassigned POPOV on 28 June i957 to the inspection

Directorate, i

strategic intelligercy alement in Berlin/Karlshorst.

where he handled some

being dispatched fron, Ie-

turning to, and training in East

There he remained in

contact with CIA until his recall to Muscon in November 1958 (sce

below). Meanwhile:

- During July and unti! 13 August 1957 POPOV handled

a total of five Illegals passing through East Berlin and

was made responsible for a sixth Illegal in training there.

He was relieved of the latter responsibility on 2 November

1957.

- The next and last Illegal to be assigned to POPOV,

In early October 1957, was a homan whose true identity 1s.

believed to be M.N. TAIROVA.

She was destined to join

her husband, I.A.

TAIROV, in the United States.

her dispatch fron letlin on 1 November 1957 to New York

* The CHEREPANOV papers are discussed at greater length in

Part VI.D.7.c.

TOP SECRET

н5..

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## Page 187

the

FEI

places

ur.der

llance

WArn

entered

Ine

United States at New

torr city on 27 Poverbar 1957,

and the F9I observed ver first

meeting with tAiro on 8 Dec-

ember 1957,

in accordance with

the plan which POPOV had re-

ported to cIA.

The TAIROY couple remainro urder Fel

surveil-

lance until their disaproareroo on i: March 1958. FOros

subsequently expressed

corcerr for his personal

security.

as

an afternath of leanina thit the TripoV couple told the CRU

about having been under surveillance."

- From 12 Decender 1957 to 19 danuery 1903 POPOV was

on leave in the USSR.

Upon his retur!:

to Furlir./karlshorse,

was removed fron

the Illegals-hardling unit and placed

1n

the unit dealing with Iliegal support agent..

- POPOV reports c March througin October 1958 show that

conductir.y

investigations of the Illeçais-

handling unit and that two lou counterintelligence cificers

were taking the iritiative in associating with him.

In November 1958 POPOV was recalled to tacon for

the exprersed

purpose of discussing an illegai support agent of ris, and he did

not return to berlin/ karlshorst.

prusi: contacts betreen POPOV

and Russell LANGELLE, a CIA oificor stationed at the Moscow an-

bassy, tock place on 4 and 21 January,

19 tarch.

23 July, 18 Sep-

rember.

and

15 October 1959.

George MIlERS,

also a Cii officer

at the ambassy, mailea

a letter to POPOV or. 21 Jaruary 1959.

POFOV passed a message to LiNGELLE on 18 Septemusi 1959 report-

ing that he had been arrested and doubled by the KGB in February

of that year.**

At the final brush contact, on li October 1959,

Soviet authorities artained, questiones, mole recruitment over-

tures to, ird eventually

(several hours

afterward) relcased LAiG-

Government. «e, then deciared persora son grata by the Sovice

** There are strong indications that this message revealing

POPOV'S

arrest in february 1959 was prepared at the direction

of the KGY,

The message opened with

tre following remarks:

"Concerning my compromise, I was arrested in February,

The

compromise started from the compromise of our Illegals (the

husband and wife in the u.s.)...

Then your

first letter to

(me at my home in) KALININ was intercepted." (This 18 a

ceference to the letter mailed by wiliteRs.)

***The Soviet Goverrment declared WINTERS persona pon grata

at that time the Soviet press linked him

NOSENKO was asked on 1 July 1gELLE

WINTERS was not expelled from the USSR at the time why should

in October 1959..

He answered:

"First of

ve (the KGB)

show how we found out labout POPOV)?

soch thats ends see ate letterse.

„can find more

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 188

532.

1111) Cause and Date of the Compromise

(a)

Information from liesko.

Early in the first meeting with Clh ir. June 1962, NOSEYO

outlined the terms for his cooperation with cih ard

ir. my life will i go in contact (niin CiA) in lossor or the U533.

never in my life.

1 also know about LANGELi. and POPOl. I tro

this matter.

when it was abroad it nos fire, but when you decided

to meet tim

ir. Moscow..."

He went on to explain that he did ros

want to have happen to hit what had happened to PoPov.

end of the meeting NOSEIKO remarici:

"I can tell tow

blew FOPOV - nOt LiNGELLE,

but because of whom and why we fourd

him - for your future lise, so that you wili inc. how to operate.

But LiGELLE was not guilty.

It was not LaNGElLE who was gailty,

¿ñotner person was responsible for the conpacmise.

Next time."

HoSENko fulfilled this promise.

ile logan by praising LiNG-

whom he described as a

competent officor employing sourc

operational techniques, and said:

"LANGELLE did not blor the

operation.

NINTERS blew it."

WINTERS, NOSENO continued, hac

been observed mailing a lettor by ore or two members of a KGB

surveillance team (no date giver).

The KGS intercepted the

arrested POPOV, and controlled his future meetings with

LANGELLE, about three in number.*

During an examination and discussion of that portion of the

MEREPANOV papers bearing on the porol case, NoSEio on 3 febru-

ry 1954 confirmed the authenticity of their contents and ?-

affirmed that surveillance of the

utter-mailina oy WINTERs hac

led to the identification,

ard doubling of popoy by the

Although at this time NOSEiD commented that the WINTERs

letter to POPOV definively did not contain Latke.

June 19E4 that the letter had teen chemically treated, i.e., with

metka. **

NOSENKO was asked in July 196÷ to descrlte the format ano

conterits of the official KGB orientation on the POPOV case, e?-

titled "Boomerang,"

which he clained to have read.

According

to NOSENKO,

top secret docunert made no reference either

tO WINTERS or to the letter-mailing incident.

added that

the document was not entirely factual and some of it contained

sanitized information.

(b) Information from

Besides the suspicions attached to FOPOV because of the

TAIROV case, altan reported entists that POPOV was re-

called to Moscow because of his correspondence with his

rian girlfriend via a conspiratorial address in Berlin; Chi

As previously indicated, four brush contacts were made sub-

sequent to il January 1959.

** "Metka" the Russian word for "mark" or "sign" is used to

refer to a "thief powder:" it is said by NOSENKO to have

been a KGB operational aid used in the detection

of clan-

destine mail.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 189

1io of

the JIBREPANOY documente, dated Cotover 1069, discuss

he activatics of LANCELLE and MirErO d: enort to the ide.

In

usy state the surmilience of anitas railing tre

(a) insanacion fio Gulltari

Case eeports be eure verge to tele me tires

Acroring to Col targe

175 criettation on the FOrecast dhirl: 16 1643

i"

do .

1959 or eariy 1960, tie porter opened

alth

that a no3 agent reported

look in tre Soviet

military

intelligenes system tORt) iredlvine irformation

of i military,

incchigunce, ar politiat ratlis.

believed

the:

orientaron indiata.d.inse the agent's report

was ricorred by the K33 ir. abou's

1957

The crientation

aiso sard:

The: Ki:!!

thereupon hogan an 10004t1dati0n; icarr-

ing Liat LANGälLE nos posted to Moscow for the purpose of

hardling a spocial agent, the mi inmediately passed hin

under surveiliar.ce, in the conse of this surveillance

the KCD observed a brush contact hetween LAGELLE

and

****George BLAkE, the British Inteligence officer arrested in

April 1951 on charges of espionage fur the sovicts,

acnitted

passing to the KGB

in May

ha's

and June' 1957 information

from and relateá

to POPOV: the details

which he has acknow-

ledged

giving the KGB, however, "ere not sufficiert for the

KGB to have identified POPOV as the source, nor to have

placed the agent in the Iliegals-handling unit in Berlin,

Karlshorst.

**LANGELLE arrived in Moscow in JanJary 1958.

TOP SEGRET

---

## Page 190

POPOV:

arrested.*

after the second such contact, POPOY was

- GOLITSY named a KGS officer who had been

stationed in Vienna where he was working on

lugoslas

targets; this officer was aware of POPOV's association

with

the Austria, woman (see above), suspected POPCV,

and although re reported his suspicions,

nothing was done

about them.

All of this occurred while POPOV was

serving

in Austria (until September 1355).

Some time in 1957 or

1958, GOLITSY! continued, the KGs was told by a source that

POrOV was an agent.

The KGB then assigned this KGB officer

to Germany because

he. krew POPOV and was familiar with

the background.""

- General I.A, SEROV was Chairman of tie KGB when

the first information about POPOV's agent status was

received.

In summary, what GOLITSIll has said about the compromise indicates

that a KGB agert piovided the lead to PUPOV and thai this lead

was received in 1957 or 1958.

As stated above, POPOV's message of 18 September 1959 said

he had been arrested in the previous February: if this

portion of the message is correct, the orientation there-

fore irdicates that the KGB observed the first LAVGELLE-

POPOV brush contact, on 4 January 1959, and POPOV was

arrested some time after the second brush contact; on

21 January 1959.

** Although COLITSYN gave this officer's name as KOTOV,

GOLITSY"'s other facts about him make it clear that he

was referring to KGB Colonel M.V. ZHUKOV.

Vienna during the 1953-55 period and, like POPOV, working

against Yugoslav targets, ZHUKOV was personally known to

On 23 November 1957 POPOV said:

"Can you imagine

whom I ran into in Karlshorst two or three times?

my competitor on Yugoslav operations when I was in Vienna.

Do you remember ZHUKOV of the KGB?... He may be assigned

here or (may be/ on IDY, but he has just come recently."

(A year later POPOV reported that ZHUKOV was still in

Berlin/Karlghorst working, he believed, in Anglo-American

operations.)

It would thus appear that the KGB sent

ZHUKOV to Berlin not long before 23 November 1957 and in

connection with the investigation of POPOV.

***SEROV was KGB Chairman until the latter part of 1958.

TOP SECRET

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## Page 191

In January 1964 NOSENKO gave a detailed account of the compro-

miSe of GRU Colonel O.V. PENKOVSKI%, the CIÀ and British Inteili-

gence (MI-6) penetration agent whose arrest by the kos was

announced

2 lovember 1962.

In i subsequent debriefings and in-

terrogations NOSE::KO has offered

further information on certain

aspects of the PENKOVSKlY compromise, continuing

to maintain that

it was brought about by KGB surveillance in Moscow during 19627

Also according to NOSENKO, it was not until the latter stages of

the operation that the XGB realized American Intelligerce was

involved with MI-6 in this operation.

The reports by NOSENKO and other sources on the PENKCUSKIY

corpromise are presented below, but to place them in context,

they are preceeded by a brief summary of the PENKOVSKIY operation

from

the CIA and MI-6 standpoint.

(ii) Resume of the PENKOVSKIY Operation

In August 1960 PFNKOVSKIY gave two American tourists

a pack-

age of materials to deliver to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.

These

materials included a description of a proposed dead drop site at

Number 2 Pushkin Street, which PENKOVSKJY had selected for a pos-

sible communication channel; in the letter PENKOVSKIY enclosed in

the package, he also gave his home teicphone number and instructions

for a call to be placed to him at à certain time to indicate that

the package had been received and that the Americans were interested

in further contact with him. Efforts to maxe this teiephone con-

tact with PENKOVSKIY failed, as did several additional efforts on

Street address was checked from the outside on two occasions there-

after by Eugene MAHONEY, CIA officer at the Embassy in Moscow,

who walked past the building on 12 November and 4 December 1950.

On 21 January 19E1 MAHONEY went inside the building and checked

location of the dead drop site, behind the radiator

ABIDIAN, U.S. Embassy Security Officer and coopted CIA

also went inside the building to check for possible loading of the

dead drop by PENKOVSKIY.) In April 1961, PENKOVSKIY succeeded in

making contact in Moscow with the British businessaan, Greville

WYNNE, with whom he was already acquainted from previous trips to

Moscow by WYNNE. Through wYNNE, PENKOYSKIY passed to MI-6 docu-

ments and notice of his forthcoming trip to London in April.

promptly notified CIA, and the two services jointly conducted the

operation until it was terminated by the KGB on 2 November 1962.

Throughout this period PENKOVSKIY served in a GRU element

under cover of the State Committee for Science anâ Technology

(GKKNR) in Moscow, and it was under GKKNR cover that PENKOVSKIY.

travelled abroad three times, to England in April-May and July-

August 1961 and to France in September-October 1961. In addition.

to PENKOVSKIY's personal meetings with American and British case:

officers while on these IDY's, there were 27 exchanges of

materials in Moscow.

The CiA and MI-6 intermediaries used for

these exchanges were WYNNE, on his business trips to the USSR; Mrs.

Arne CHISHOLM, wife of an MI-6 officer stationed at the British

Embassy;* and Rodney CARISON Of CIA.

* The KGB penetration agent in MI-6, George BLAKE, had iden-

tified CHISHOLM as a fellow officer prior to the time this

couple was posted to Moscow.

He had also identified MAHONEY

to the KGB as à CIA officer prior to MAHONEY's arrival in

MOSCOW.

TOP SEOMET

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## Page 192

3400000

536.

PENKOVSKIY hirself reported hatra dus-ved surveiliance

coverage at two

street meetirgs with tirs. CilISrO! in January

1962,* ard both PENKOVSHlY and WINi: noted survsillance ce

their recting

in

early Juis i262.

The iperation came to an

end when WYNNE was arrested in Hungary and Richard JACOB, of

the Cli. Station, responding to an chergency signal lo service

the Pushiin Strzet dead drop, was apprchonded at the scene on

2 November 1962.

In May 1963 a pubiic triol was hold in Moscow,

follored by ar unnouncement of PilkovStiy's execurion

and

WYNNE's imprisonment.

WYNNE was reicised on 22 Mpril 1964, in

excharge for a

Illegal jailed in ingions, and he vas sub-

sequently debriefed by ClA

and British asthorities on his ax-

periences at the hands of t!:e

(ini)

Statements by NOSENKO

(a)

At the 1962 mectings with cin in Goneva, about four muitis

wefore

the PENKCVSKIY operation was

terminated, NocENtO maje no

reference to PEliOSKIY

and the Pushkir Street dead drop.

(In

19t4 he said that before

his fanst meeting with Cha lie

nad known

of the visit to the dead

drop iy the Moi. Eaboony Sucurity Officer,

John V. ABiDIAN, but that as of dur: 1962 there das no reason

for

him to recall or report this incident.

In june laud, boiever.

NOSENIO dia

a matter wiich appears to

he directly related

to PENKOVSKIY.

This item concerned u.s.

LEO J. DULICKI,

the Assistant Noval Attache.**

teered that DULACKI was an active intolliyence ofticer believed

by the KGB to belory to clA.

The KGP "overheard"

¡from a micro-

phone in DULACKI's office) that the Assistant luval Attacite was

to meet an Indonesian in a restaurart, and the NGE therefore

placea a conceaied microphone at their restaurant table.

the monitored convursation the KGB learned

attempting to recruit the Indonesian

After the second such obscrvation, on 19 January 1962, the

last of their street meetings, l'ENKOVSKIY broke contact with

MIS. CHISHOL until 28 Maich 1962.

** DULACKI, who has had no affiliation with Cin, seived in Moscow

from August 1958 untii April 1961.

NOSE:HO said on 29 January

1965 for the first time that he personally supervisco American

Embassy Section operations against ail U.S. Military Attaches,

which would have included DuLACkI, from approximately

January

1960 until May or June 1960:

en

20 October 1965, NOSENKO indi-

cated, also for the first time, that from about february 1960 until

about April 1960 he personally vas the case officer for Naval

Attache personnel at the U.S. Embassy in audition to his general

supervisory responsibilities.

(See Part V.E.3. e.) According

to NOSENKO, DULACKI was neither recruited nor approached for

recruitment by the KGB; he could not remember the names of the

KGB agents who might have been targetted agairst DULACKI, and the

only item of interest obtained about DULACKI by the KGB from

any

source was that concerning this meeting with the f

TOP SECRET

Hide, te

---

## Page 193

537.

seeking irformation from him on

Soviet

to Indonesia.

MOSAiKO

spelled the

Indonesian's.name

148*

-At a later

meeting in 1962 Mostiko added that the rem

nas recruited

in 1961, but he did not indicate wietter this

i3d pecurred

betore or after the restaurant meeting with cuLickI.

Speaking of SiLicKI's restaurant meeting, Mosaiko told clA

in

1964 that DULATil was working against the indonesiar

aa ard he made no

or to the name crane.

rade tone to the nerd

Asked why he

given

differert nane for the Indonusian in 1962, HOSEIKO replied: "Mayce

there were two different ones.

NCSENKO was questioned further about DiLAck and the Indor-

esian during the vetober 1966 interrogations:

aestion: 110 was bULACKI's agent?

NOSENKO :

AS I was tellino jou,

there

N25

restaurant wither

of the Indonesiar.

Олі!

age:

In 1951 this was.

I don't

remember when.

It was

when I was supervising

work agairst code clerks.

when

I begar to work,

after a month or 2o, " took the files

on laval

attaches and then,

aitor tro months, I gave

then to DELOGLAZOV.

I immediately wont on leave after

two weeks,

fur a month.

I toox tie files either be-

fore or after leave.

Question: ihy only the liavy?

NOSEYKO:

It was decided by Kovshuk.

Take orly the Navy while

you're getting

acquainted with the section,

At the

same time, the case officer DRANOt was retiring.

He

handled only the Naval officers.

I didn't take

the

AImy

force.

This incident tou? place later

with

Question:

Can you give a more definite time?

NOSENKO:

He was sitting with

at a table.

Their conver-

sation was cortroilr

H-extra /e mniaturizes

trangistor terporary microphonel.

Question:

How did you hear about this?

NOSENKO:

I was Deputy Chief of the section.

I don't remember

who reported it. I saw the svodka (report)

myself.

The fe

in Moscow from

1959.10

was diamon

sing debriefed on

22

Jan-

vary

1965 about his post-arrest interrogation by the KGB,

NYwiE reported that the KGB played back a portion of a tape

recording of his conversation

with PENKOVSKIY at the judapest

Restaurant in Moscow on 27 May 1961.

This portion, WYllNE

said.

dealt with PENKOVSKIY's remarks to miNE aböut a girl-

frierd with whon he had become

May

• 1961

Tor go kordon: rEvousatyuainted during the re

called the roman

The KGB interrogators indicated to WYNne

they thought aditewas a cryptonym,

and they demanded that

WYNNE explain its significance, but WiNNE was unable to do

SO.

TOP SECKET

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## Page 194

538

Question: hay other details?

NOSEYKO:

nat I remembered i reported before.

Question: iño gave you the rame

NOSENKO :

DULACKI was also acquainted

recorded conversation

like

An Indonesian.

hut

there was no

also.

Question:

How did you hear alout this?

NOSE:XO:

norking in the First (U.S. Embassy) Section I heard

maybe from BELOGLAZOV.

]. don't

remcnicer who.

I also

heard this opinion. that maybe he was a contact or an

agent. But no proof.

Question:

What was his position?

NOSE XO:

a military officer, that is, intelligerce. I don't

remember anything else.

(b) Reports on the Compromise

when asked in January lud whether he knew how PENKO!SKIY

was

and

compromised, NOSENKO answered

that he had "all the details"

then gave the following acco.nt:

Ever since the POPOV case

had

(see Part VI.D.7.a.) there

been intensive

and

surveillance of personnel from

the U.S.

British Imbassies in Moscow.

As a result of this sur-

veillance, Mrs. CHISHUL! was seen ducking into an alcove.

evidentiy

following a Soviet citizen whom the surveillance

team was unable

to identify.

Surveillance coverage of

Mrs. CHISHOL' - and, indeed, on all British Embassy per-

sonnel - was immediately increased, and she was soon

observed following the same Soviet citizen on the street

in a clandestine manner.

The Soviet citizen was identi-

fled as PENKOVSKIY.

The KGB innediately launched a full investigation

of PENKOVSKIY, including a complete check of his back-

ground.

To avoid alerting him, knowledge of the investi-

gation was kept to a minimum, and surveillance of him was

restricted to stationary points in the neighborhood of

his residence and office.

As one part of the investiga-

tion, a man who closely resembled PENKOVSKIY and dressed

like him was made to walk in front of Mrs. CHISHOLM when

she was on a Moscow street; when she began to follow

this man, the KGB thus obtaired confirmation of its

identification of PENKOVSKIY.

Another part of the in-

vestigation entailed a search of the PENKOVSKIY apartment;

to ¿ccomplish this, he was given a drug which made him

50 ill

that hospitalization was necessary, and Mrs.

PENKOVSKIY was lured from the apartment on a ruse; nothing

was fourd during this search,

The KGB next aimed a power-

ful telescope at the window in PENKOVSKIY's apartment and

obtained an apartment directly above his; from the over-

hanging balcony of the apartment occupied by the KGB some

TSP 232027

---

## Page 195

flower pots were suspended, one of them able to take

pictures through the window of the apartment below; ir.

this manner the KuB photographed PENKOVSKIY removing

"suspicious materials" from the back part of his desk:

in the search of the apartment which followed, these

materials were found in the desk, but the KGB left them

there.

By the time WMillE visited Moscow ir. July 1962, both

he and PENKOVSKIY were under surveillarce, and their sus-

picious behavior in front of the feking Restaurant on

5 July gave the KGB another conclusive indicator of PENKOV-

activities.

Also, the KGB was able to monitor

conversations between PENKOVSKIY and NYANE in the latter's

hotel room, despite

the fact that PEKOVSKIY turned on

water faucets while they were talking.

PENKOVSKIY was arrested only when the KGB knew that

WYNNE was scheduled to go to a Satellite country.

SKIY gave a complete confession, and it was only at this

point that the KGE realized Americar. Intelligence was in-

volved in the operation.

After PENKOVSKIY revealed details

about the Pushkin

Street dead drop, the KGB correlated this

information with that contained ir

the surveillance report

Of ABIDIAl's presence at the spot.* Nevertheless,

arranging a trap at Pushkin Street on ¿ November 1962, the

KGB expected the dead drop io be

serviced by soneone fror.

the British Embassy.

Instead, JACOB lof the CIA Station

in Moscow') was apprehended there.

The KGB felt that it had obtained all pertinent in-

formation from PRiKOVSKIY and that he was "beyond redemp-

tion."

even for future interrogation.

PENKOVSKIY was

executed.

In subsequent questioning soon after his defection, NOSENKO

repeatedly claimed that the KGB had no prior knowledge of erican

Intelligence participation in the PENKOVSKIY operation until

JACOB's arrest on 2 Novemoer 1962 at the Pustkin Street dead drop,

NOSENKO was asked in July 1964 for details on the KGB

official report (obzor) about the PENKOVSKIY case.

He said that

he had rever read the report because, although printed, it had

not been circulated as of the time of his departure for Geneva

in January 1964.

By O.M. GRIBANOV (Chief of

the KGB Second Chief

Directorate) and "various other case officers," however, NOSENKO

was told of certain of the items which would appear in the KGB

official report and most of which he had already reported.

fact that the KGB surveillance

tean had failed to identify

PENKOVSKIY at his first observed meeting with Mrs, CHISHOLM,

NOSENKO added at this time, would not be included in the report,

According to GRIBANOV, whereas the report would state the KGB

knew PENKOVSKIY was working for both the British and American

services, in reality the KGB did 'not know of the Americans'

involvement until PENKOVSKIY was arrested.

with regard to this

latter point, NOSENKO said that the KGB investigation of PENKOV-

SKIY was handled by officers from the British Department: rather

than the American Department of the XGB Second Chief Directorate,

neto patient t the

-See Part V.E.3.d.

for details of ABIDIAN's visit to the Push-

kin Street dead drop on 30 December 1961.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 196

540.

except for V.M. KOVSHUK of the latter department, Furthermore,

NOSENIKO Stated,

the KGb interrogutors attempted to force ¿ACOB

to admit he was a British citizen.*

In February 1965 NOSENKO provided his most complete account

of the PENKOVSKlY compromise and the KGS investigation which

ensued:

•The first that PE:XOVSKIY appeared in life of the

KGB was during ore of Myle's visits to moscow.

knew of PaNKOVSKIy's acquaintance with NYNiE and that he

was even visiting him in the hotel where WiNNE was staying.

The KGS checked with the GRU,

GRU answered that

PENKOVSKIY was working on WYNNE as a target,

was working in the GiziR as a cover, and MYNNE was one of

his acquaintances.

Later, there was massive surveillance

of the employees of the British Embassy - I don't know

exactly with whom - but PEKOVSKIY was noticed being in

contact with someone from the British Embassy. but sur-

veillance lost him...

Later he was nosiced with the wife

of British Embassy officer CHISHOLM.

At this point, the

KGB didn't tell the GRU anything, because the GRU had no

right to have any contact with any loreign embassy people

without telling the KCB - except at official receptions

and functions.

and even here they have to tell the KGB

so that surveillance will know.

And when surveillance

noticed PENKOVSKIY with Mrs. CHISHOLM, they immediately

recognized him as the guy they had lost.

"This was the beginning of the very active work on

PENKOVSKIY - without telling the GRU.

They (the British

Department, KGB Second Chief Directcrate) were checking

his work at the GiKwR,

They managed with the help of

the KGB Third Directora-**to look at his file.

they tried to control him at home.

afraid to

put him under regular surveillance because he would

immediately find out - he was a capable officer - but

they put surveillance on him from time to time. However,

they set up a closed (fixed surveillance) post in a

building opposite his apartment, about 200 meters

They got a flat there, set up a post, and watched his

window with a telescope.

They also used the flat directly

above PENKOVSKIY's flat. Here they even put microphones

to hear his corversations with his wife and tapped the

telephone of course.

Then they noticed that he was hiding

something in his desk, taking the drawer out and putting

something behind,

And when he was taking off his shirt

he was putting notes

(inside).

They noticed him taking

pictures.

Above his flat there was a balcony with

flower boxes.

They put a camera in the flowers somehow

which could be lowered so that it could take pictures

through PENKOVSKIY's window by command (remote control)

from the closed post.

This was to get evidence, to

see the documents he was working with.

"There was another meeting with wYnnE.

PENKOVSKIY

met WYNNE in WYNNE's hotel.

They spoke in the bathroom

JACOB has not indicated that such an attempt was made.

** This Directorate is responsible for counterintelligence and

security in the Soviet Armed Forces.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 197

with the water running.

But the KGB manaçed to intercept

the conversation - not everything,

but several words indi-

cating there was something incriminating.

PERiKOVSKIY

called WYNNE

and they agreed to meet

at the Peking Restau

rant, out PENKOVSKIY was checking (for survelliance) and

did not go with WhiNE into the restaurant as they had

agreed, but walked about the city with him.

Surveillance

tried to monitor their co-versation from a

distance of 200

meters with a special microphore like a long pipe. one meter

long, or maybe a little less.

"They decided to enter PENKOVSKIY's apartment and see

what was hidden in his desk.

In the GRU they controiled

what documents PENKOVSKIY was taring...

"They used a drug to put him in the tospital, a pre-

paration which they put or his chair:

He irnaled it irto

his body and got sick.

His skin became reddened and he

felt pain and nda to go to a doctor, a military doctor

put him immeciately in the hospital.

He wert to a military

hospital - they were ready for him there - and was hospital-

They considered

his wife. then his wife s mother,

or his mother, or maid - i son't know - and the elder girl

in school. On the second day of his illness a KGB officer

disguised as a soldier cane to PENKOVSKIY's flat and cold

his wife that the doctors nanted her to be checked because

it was possible PENKOVSKIY had a contagious disease. not

serious keys had been made before.

She went to the nospital, and the flat was

tered.

They took pictures of

everything.

They found many things, code pads ard so on,

which

showed that he was really working. Ater that they

decided to arrarge his arrest.

"PENKOVSKIY was supposed to go abroad, and the KGB

did everything to prevent it, but in such a ray that he

wouldn't understand.

They even cancelled a whole delega-

tion.*

This was while they were still trying to get proof.

"Then WYNNE came to lungary.

They arrested PENKOVSKIY

and I think one or two days later they took wynNe.

"The manner of arresting PENKOVSKIY was such that

even GRU wouldn't know about it, (D. M.) GVISHIANI (head

of the GKKNR) took part.

He told PENKOVSKIY to come with

him to the Central Cormittee, and when they were down in

his car he said: "Nait here a minute while I ger a docu-

ment I forgot."

There was an entrance on Gorky

Street,

but the car was in the courtyard behind.

The KGB was

waiting here.

PENKOVSKIY got in the car, and that was

it - he couldn't call out, no one saw it.

"Two days later I know that (General S.G,) BANNIKOV

(Deputy Chief of the KGB Second Chief Directorate)

to Hungary and took WYNNE.

I don't know the details of

HYNNE's arrest, but I know that BANNIKOV returned with

WYNNE...

PENKOVSKIY was scheduled to travel to the United States in

provocationg

against the delegation PENKOVSKIY was to accompany.

TOR SEEMS%

---

## Page 198

542.

"I krow that during the search PENKOVSKIl's daughter

came home from school early.

I know that one of PeNKov-

SKIY's female relatives or one of his wife's female rela-

tives was a former KGB agent, and she intercepted the

girl...

"MIS. CHISHOL was walking on the street and they.

dressed a man just like PENKOVSKIY - he entered a telephone

booth or an apartmert house entrance or something.

She saw

him. It was necessary that they see each other at a dis-

tance before making cortact.

I don't remember exactly,

but there was a little pack or

square; and there was some-

thing connected with CHISHOLM's child, something connected

with candy.

"And about the Pushkin Street you know - that was for

PENKOVSKIY.

"The investigation was a big secret.

I found out only

when he was arrested.

It was in 1962.

Maybe a month or

hali a month before the arrest I might have heard that

there was sonething hot in the Second (British) Departrent...

The Secord Department officers were rurning around. (G.v.)

EONDAREV (of the British Department) was running to GRIBANOV

and didr't have to wait.

Something was up, but what?

May-

be (A.V.) SUNTSOV (of the British Department) told me: 'Soon

we will nave an outstarding success.'

I think that he said

thing was going

that to KOVSHUK and me, GRIBANOV's outer office it was

because it was obvious that some-

noticeable that BONDAREV was running to GRIBANOV every

day...

GRIBANOV then dismissed others, even turning away

his deputies.

BONDAREV was always there.

So I knew some-

thing big was going on, but I didn't know what - maybe it

was a recruitment.

"Of

lance.

course, I could have heard something from surveil-

I was going to the dining roon with Venyamin KOZLOV

(Chief of the American Department, KGB Surveillance Direc-

torate). I was close to him in 1960-1961. I went with him

general's dining room occasionally.. KOZLOV would

say: 'Something is going on in the Second

(British Depart-

ment, KGB Surveillance Directorate).:

the chief of surveillance for the Second Department...

"I don't remember where I was when the arrest was

announced...

The officers in the First Department didn't

know what was going on.

BONDAREY asked JACOB to confirm

that he was an Englishman.

They were expecting an English-

man, not an American.

The First Department was stunned

when they found out that an American had come to Pushkin

Street...

"The first time the KGB saw PENKOVSKIY and WYNNE

together they asked the GRU about it. I think even (GRU

Chief I.A.) SEROV himself, wnether PENKOVSKIY was working

with wYNNe. And PENKOVSKIY had written up something about

his contact with WYNNE.

The GRU replied that the contact

was official...

WYNNE was coming as a businessman.

The

GRU doesn't have a counterintelligence mission against

businessmen,

The Second Chief Directorate does,

and they

noticed. Maybe PENKOVSKIY went to WiNNE's hotel room,

TOP. SECRET

• streis

---

## Page 199

"I heard these things from SUNTSOV and from different

officers.

GRIBANOV gave lectures,

and BANNIKOV toO, GRIB-

ArOV in Caucasus (I hard it myself).

CRIBANOV spoke for,

three and a half or four hours without stop:

Diring the

first half hour GRIPHiON spoke about the work of Axerican

Intelligence.

Then he told them about the PENKOVSKIY case.

talking from notes. when I left in January 1964 I heard

that the case

study on PENKOVSKIX das finished but rot yet

printed.. ELINIKOV also gave a lecture,

for the officers

of the Second Chief Directorate, which I did not attend..

"I even visited the trial,

not the first day and not

the

last day.

I went with some of the officers...

got

tickets from the Second Department:

the officers from the Journalists Section ünd stäyed there

for about an hour.

Sone: üf the officers from the Seventh

Departmert also went during the trial.

I sat In the third

rOk!

from the end.

It's a small hall: there were about

twelve rows in front of me,

Whale I was there they were

putting questions to PENKOVSKIY and WYNNE and they were

answering this and this.

It wasr't interestig.

it was interesting to look

at PErKOVSKIY,

In GRIBINOV'S

and BANNIKOV's lectures there was

stress on PENKOV-

SKIY the man, that in Turkey he was

acting badly, and that

there was a bad knarakteristika (fitness report) in his

file...

In the trial they never said that he was a colonel

or that he was in the GRU.

In the case study there was

more.

They said many things - that he didn't give money

to his wife, only five rubles a day.

"I don't know the exact date that the surveillance

saw PENKOVSilY and lost him.

Maybe already an 1961.

remember that wnile I was working in the Fiist (American)

Department in 1960-01, maybe in 1961, there

when - maybe once or twice - they took surveillarce teams

away from is, despite the need for several brigades for

ABIDIAN, and gave them for a time to the Second Depart-

ment...

"I learned these details after the arrest.

it from officers in the

Second Department,

me,

(s.K.) ROSHCHIN could have told me,

GRIBANOV didn't

mention surveillance losing PENKOVSKIY in his lecture..•

I think the massive surveillance on the British Embassy

was November-December 1961,

but I don't know exactly,

PENKOVSKIY was in contact with someone else before this

woman, Mrs. CHISFOLM.

The KGB knew who it was.

a British

employee, but I don't know who...

This might

But GRIBANOV didn't

speak about surveillance losing him, or give the techniçal

details of the closed post or the details aoout the bal-

cony.

There was something in the case study that SUNTSeV

wanted to change, but I don't know what - the case study

hadn't yet appeared in January 1964.

I didn't read it

and don't know what it was,

have found out.

If it had appeared I coula

SUNTSOV would have said: 'Here we changed

something/ea

TOP SECKET

---

## Page 200

14-00000

san he KGB had been aware

Americans, and in particular with JACOe, for ilout two and a half

ronths prior to the arrests.*

This awareness resulted from a sarieg

of talks between nembers of the KGB and PENNOVSilt.

stated ti

hito that every asset of the KGB SuI-

millince Directorate wis

utritzud against l.s. Embassy targets dur

ing

the several months prior to. the arrests, and that this coverage

resulted in the detection of an Anorican enteiing a Pushkin Strcet

apartrent building.

The dok established a 24-hcur surveillance on

this address.

Evertually, ituroushly wos disard entering the

apartment and was

immodiately arired, inscrocoated, and cebriefed

concerning his coliaboration diti Anerican and bricish Intelligurce.

salaborarod co the February report:

When

massive suitilii

c.s.

tongay targete motored an American

visiting this address the first tine, thr

was not Echioned

inside uy survelisants,

bat

oh the second occat-snte nie folloved

closeiv and he surveilint ossarved

kiet

His toodling soon,

apparently tying his side* testimos ot

1o out that, aithough

this was not very unusual, it cas

sullic.int

ti else subricion

view of the fact

tint this, Anerteen had kirt.

attried tissting tie

sane address do tro occusicas

120651.

therefore tre

KGb establishia 24-hour coverdo utilizim

sluse circuit ti camers

equipnent.

PENKOYKIY W95

obsorved casiny

sorved louding a dead drop bobiad a lold buria: mit (radiatori;

the KGB tagged

the drop maturial vith a raconcure substarce; PEN-

rovskir was observed unloading the crop anu

proceeding to his office,

where he secreted tno material in a coaccalment ared in lis desk:

utilizing a radivactivity dotector, the rob located the corcealment

area in the

desk; the KGB also continued in surveillance of the

dead drop site, observed FRunovshli icad the coad irop, and seizec

an Anerican who rare

to unload it. FENKOVSilY is then confronted

with pliotographis evicc.ce of the loadings ind w.loadings and could

offer no defense.

Richard JACOB had never been intended to play a role in the

PENKOVSKIY case; he was brought in on 2 November 1962 us a

substitute for Rodney CARLSON, and had no other part in the

case.

PENKOVSKIY did not know JACOB

nor did he know of him.,

* In his official report of his check of the Puskin Street dead

drop, ABIDIAN noted that while he was in the vestibule a woman

entered, and he kneit down and pretended to tie his shoelaces

until she proceeded past him and on up the stairs.

*** The only ClA officer to meet PENKOVSKIY in Moscow

was CARLSON

and their introduction tock' place

in a brief encounter at an

Independence Day reception at the v.S. Embassy in 1962.

Their

next and final contact, the only one in which materials were

passed, occurred on 27 August 1962 in the bathroom of the

apartment of the U.S. Embassy officer Willian HOPBALY (see

Part V.E.3.f. for NOSENKO's remarks. on HORBAJY) .

---

## Page 201

00000

---

## Page 202

1 MoraLe: 1104

under Cir?

rat sciated

tre

ter

intornattur

20 AGE DOL

fric....

v.':.

PICOICITE

tie FGB liar

ird

1!.

the US57

articles cach to h35

purchased

or: ils

trirs

to Durope,

but the hit di:

not tensiles

inis adequate

crouros to varrant investigation.

iriC jouri before

Fanovsky's detection" (presaruoly clot 1959.

id, years before

his first contact with Piltiai.

ind meriton authorities! a KGB

CILICEI

iro was a friend of

extra-peritel relati..hip during a to to sooden "nith y

Car1s=10?.

Altho.ch

truer was no alimpt ande to blickagil

tea,

kob ofticer approached WithOusait tor miiice.

ilm

in foldes

!!.

PiT TEEIS

ictte,

hiEr. thie wongi.

In the uttali

was compelled to deput the cartes.

he

mint It: his resert

8E-3153

his approach to and adult 1r

ram.ankx had failed to 10pit

: !:.

ai ancesttnäuls.

01

"tins of

the

United

6÷10:9e3

10x

•лілій.

15'0

'01

in caterining resid!

1.

Subsequentl!.

account con-

Chin

indiscretions-

jpendirt

or foreign

MOVE.

maril learned

iliat

1210060d tig und?r

Sur -

veillance fo=

other prici

accit

October ra November

19511.

kartare is icaried cat

In donut Hoverb: 1201

SUlkin

atly mited herseif and

her husbard to stry

idy

She aided thit after

the

arrest

she learned

that pENkovSkly had

surrounded by

the

KGB" wien he attonded her husband's birthday party ir april

i9E2.

NOSENNO said

SVIRI: was ore of several officers who re-

ceived anards

for

their part in uncoverirg

PRiKOVSKIY.

---

## Page 203

! ix)

Infornation frontse on 2121 ALMerers

à document providdly a consitive cower ta riptatedly

tle Official

According to this docurent.

=ISHULM or

30 December 1961 reveals her suspicious

contact. hit a Soviet

rale.

This person vas rot idontriod initielly: era, CHISHOL

was observed at that uproared to e possibie mectiro piaces

•on 5 and 12 January,

but no contact was soor

on 19 January

1952 surveillance of Mes, alison detectea a contact Batween

her and a Soviet man, wio was then identified as PiükOVSKIY.*

(x)

Infornation fron_inwe

NYiNE's statements to CIA and Mi-6 in early 1965 re-

latirg to the compromise and irvestigation of PERKOVaKIY were

largel; based upon events during his (HYNiE's) interiogation

In trying to obtain a confession, viliNe said, the

KGB insisted that it keen everything anout the operation and

that PENKOVSKIY had made a complete confession.

WiNE stated

PENKOVSKIY reported on 23 March 1962 that he hed observed

surveillance un drs. CHISHOlM, but not on himself: on

5 and 19 January.

He had not observed surveillance on

the 12. January meetine.

As a result, PEroVSkIY sroke

off street contacts with Mrs. CrIstOl.

TOP SEGRET

---

## Page 204

547.

that he hinself resisted confessing, whereupon the KGB produced

evidence consisting

of tape recordings of conversations, photo-

graphs, and WYNNE's own business diaries.

The KGB played for WYNNE two tape recordings of conversa-

tions he had had with PENKOVSKIY; and LYNNE (who was corvinced

that the recordings were genuine) pinpointed the dates when the

cunversations were heid:

27 May 1961 and 2 July 1962.

The 27 May

1961 conversation was the one in which PENKOVSKIY mentioned his

girlfriend

"ZEp"; it further consisted of an exchange of cryptic

remarks as PENKOVSKIY indicated to WYNNE that he had material

he wanted to pass to him.

WYNNE told him not to discuss it then

and

there but to wait till they were out of the restaurant.

The photographs were of WYNNE alone, of WiTiNE with PENKOV-

SKIY, Of WYNNE with urknown Soviets, of PENKOVSKIY with Mrs.

CHISHOLM in a park,* and of JACOB at the Pushkin Street dead

drop:

concerning

the photographs of himself, WYNNE was able to

give

the dates when they were taken, and the

earliest of these

dates was 27 May 1961--the same day

"is restaurant conversation

with PENKOVSKIY was recorded.

This photograph showed WYNNE

approaching the CHISHOiM residence in Moscow.

Another photograph,

taken during his August 1961 visit to Moscow, denonstrated that

the KCB observed an exchange of materials between PENKOVSYIY

and WYNNE.

At the time

the photograph was taken, PENKOVSKIY

had brought a satchel to WiNNE containing materials for British

Intelligerce.

(The satchel appeared in the photograph.)

WYNNE

took the satchel from PENKOVSKIY, left PENXOVSKIY waiting while

he went upstairs and emptied it,

came back downstairs with.the

empty satchel, and returned it to PENKOVSKIY.

PENROVSKTY and Mrs. CHISHOLM met twice in a park, in July

and December 1961; WYNNE believed that the photograph he

saw showed trees in full foliage.

TOP STORET

---

## Page 205

c.

Comprosise of CHEREPANOV

(i)

Introduction

HOSENKO brought to his first meeting with C!i in Jaruary

1964

an official KGB "temporary dut; authorization" showing

that he had been permitted

to participate in the USSR-wide

search for A.N. CHEREPANOV the nonth bufore.*

At this

meeting and subsequently YOSENKO save details on CHEREPAYOV'S

background, his transnittal of KGB papers to an Anerican in

Moscow, his compromise, his efforts to

escape to the west,

and

his cventual fate.

Essentially, according to NOSENKO,

CHEKEPANOY was a dissatisfied former KGB rIficer who provided

American authorities with genuine KGB documents ind whose

treason was discovered as a result of

the U.s. Fabassy handing

over the documents to the

soviet Ministry of Forcign

Affairs.

authenticity ot the CHERE.

and their information

rends to confirm HOSENKO's

account of evorts citer the Embassy placed the documents in

MFA hands.

is, in addition, fro: non-Soviri sources con-

siderable infornation on CHEREPANOV pre-dating the forember

1963 inclaunt as well as reports from Americans involied in

this incident.

In the jollowing sections are presented available data

about CHEREPANOV and what ensuod alter he gave the papers

to an Americai tourist lor delivory

to the U.S. Embass;

MOSCOW.

Also given below are NOSiNio's connents on the con-

tents of the CHEREPANOV papers.

(li) Earlier Infornation on CHEREPAYOV

CHEREPANON'S name first was broight to CIA's attertion

in October 1953 as i potential Suviet defector.

Jack RAY:OND, Belgrade correspondent for th' Yew York

Times,

telephoned

a Third Secretary of the U.S. Embassy

there to tell him that he had a man in his office with in-

formation "from behind the Iron Curtain"; RAYMOND suggested

that soncone from the Embassy would find the man of interest,

but the man allegedly did not want to come to thr Enbassy.

The Third Secretary went to RAYMOND's office, where he met

the unnamed individual in the presence of RAYMOND's Yugoslav

secretary. RAYMOND explained that

man had been writing

to him from his home village, but RAYMOND had not Icplied

until recently when he told the man to stop at his office,

as he had just done that day.

RAYMOND added that the person

had offered information of a kind that he did not feel he

could use in his news reports.

The Third Secretary took the

man to his quarters and interviered him, then interviewed

him again later the same day in his office in the Embassy.

hit true

*According to the "temporary duty authorization" NOSENKO

held the rank of lieutenant colonel, as NOSENKO himself

told CIA.

He later retrauted this claim, placing his rank

1ni 1963 as captain. See Part V.G.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 206

549.

The man, Tihou DUNAYEV, waS

about 65 jears of age and

claimed to be of l'krainian origio.

He said he had beea

"nixed up in the Balkan wars," had iought with the wilte

Russians, and in 1920 had escaped with General MRiver to

Istanbul, coring to jugoslavia the sane year.

a history

in iugoslavia

which included both siiitary ard

civilian service with the Yugoslar Government, by virtue of

which he was retired or a governmont pension.

He

indicated

that in 1924 he had made the acquaintance of Captali Fase

NEDELIKOVIC, who had been a close frierd ever sireei. One

latter had told him of having been in Russia 1: 1915 :115

Prisoner of lar Commission,

to hare lives with

& Russian family at tha: time.

NEDELJKOVIC allegedly had

picture which was taken of hin with this family.

according to DAYEV, was in 1953 enployed at the post office

near the raiivay station in Belgrade, and had o:?

several

the past ycar or trio.

(Theso Russians

called at

for packazes which they irreived

from Switzerland.)

Several weaks prior to tor Octobi in

terviews,

an official had come

the post oifice, and

NEDELIKOVIC, in conversation with nin

in Russian,

told tim

of his experiences in Russia in 1915.

It soca

developsa

that this russian official was tre

of tre lanili with

whom NEDELJKOVIC had stayed, and

suited.

Aiter several neetings the Russian finaily inid

NEDEL)KOVIC that he was "up to his neck" wite tie situation

in the USSR and that he wanted to defect imediatri!.

would if he were in the test, but being ia lugosiaila, he

was afraid that the Yugoslavs would return nin to the

He allegedly told NEDELJKOVIC that when he late tie Embassy

he would not leave empty-handed--he would "bril's

with him," material of intelligence value.

stood from his friend that the Russiar was the aisisignt to

the Soviet Military Attache.

DINAYEV claimed he krew only that Ire hussia: called rin-

self "George.

DUNAYEV in order to get his advice, DUNAYli decided

New York Times correspondent was the man to put him ir: co=-

Fact with. the U.S. Embassy.

DUNAYEV was informed that the Embassy could give no

guarantees, although interested in the case.

however,

it would be necessary to know who the Russian official tas,

the full story on his relationship with NEDELKOVIC, and the

firmness of his intent to defect.

DUNAYEV agreed wit this

and added that if this did not work out, "we will try to gat

him into Austria illegally."

DUNIYEV left the Embassy just

minutes before nobs gathered before the building

and stoned

it, in protest against U.S.-British action corcerrilg

He returned to the Embassy 15 days later, explaining

trat he had

been unable to report immediately

or his sis-

cussions with NEDELJKOVIC because the militia rad been pre

venting people from approaching the Embassy.

He said he has

visited NEDELJKOVIC the night he had left the Embassy ard

had told him that he had contacted "interested persons"

without saying they were Americans.

NEDEIJKOVIC had given

him a recognition phrase which he and the Soviet had agreed

upon should a third party. contact the Soviet.

NEDELJKOVIC Lad

given him identifying information on the Soviet:

•His rame

was CHEREPANOV, he was a Soviet Embassy official working

TOP SECRET

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## Page 207

550.

"under cover" of cunsular duties; his age was given as 35

to 10, and in addition to giving a physical depcriptio.,

DUNAYEV reported that he was single, spoke 800d serbian,

some French ard ingiish:*

DINAYEY further reposted tnat

CHEREPANOY was now prepared to deliver intelligrace docu-

ments and escape Yugoslavia.

FrOn "EDELKOviE's daughter,

however,

DUNAYEV said he had learned that after certain

recent demonstrations--two days after he had last seen him

NEDELIKOVIC had fled Pelgrade planning to escape from Yugos

slavia and had not been heard from

since. • DLYAYET nonethe-

less was prepared to help

the Russian himself, ard

said that

he now knew that CHEREPA"OV visited ≤ warehouss at

she

railway station twice a week to pick up packag-s for the

Soviet Enbassy.

Ma described his plac for approaching

CHEREPANOV there, using the recognition phrase, ard setting

up a meeting later the

same day

in a park,

where he could

then pass to CHEREPAYOY the Azericans' instructions for

communicatirg. via a dead drup.

The dead drop had beca

designed

so that the site could be monitored sy imericans

surreptitiously from inside a U.S. Mission buildirg.)

This was the iast time D'AYEV appeared ir the case.

He apparently never came bacl to the Embassy, ard i" •ry

event further contact with him

was forbidden by the Amer1-

car. Ambassador who wanted no U.S. personnel personaliy 1a-

volved further in the case.

The dead drop site was observed as planned for the

several dates which DUNAYEV had been instructed to give

CHEREPANOV.

CHEREPAVOV did not appear on any of these dates,

but, on the day after the first date,

what appeared to be

survelllance was noted by the U.s. observers.

CHEREPAVO,'S

failure to appear at the drop site was

considered to ba th

end of the operation because there was no way i:"" to don-

tact him.

was decided, therefore, to discuss the case with tre

Yugoslav security service,

UDB, with which ClA has sor:

official liaison.

The Yugoslavs were told o.ly that CIA

had information on a potential Soviet defector or agent..li-

place, and ClA wanted their permission to handle tre case

unilaterally.

The Yugoslavs were not given any identifying

data on CHEREPANOV. They agreed that CIA should try a

defection approach, on the condition that the soviet there-

after would neet with the Yugoslais and make a püblic re-

quest for asylum in Yugoslavia (after which they would per.

mit hin to be removed from the country secretly if he so

requested).

An American military

attache lived in the same apart-

ment building with CHEREPANOV:

and he agreed to try to extice

him into his apartnent to discuss

defection and asylum.

was planned for the end of December 1953,

but the urexpialied

absence of CHEREPANOV and his family from 25 Decanber until

the Soviet Embassy. He was known to be married.

TOP SECRET

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## Page 208

551.

gonetime late in January 1954 delayed ¿ha approach.

It БаВ

then found becauge of many other Soviets in his apartnent

buflding, there vere no opportunitles for a secure approach.

Before an approach could be made under any set of circum-

stances, the same American military attache had & half-hour

conversation with CHEREPANCV while attending the Soviet En-

bassy's Rod Army Day reception In Fobruary 1954. The sto

teche used each of the soveral occastons when the two were

alone to probe under various pretexts for CHEREDANOV's desires

regarding a furthor contact, but CHEREPAYO% responded either

The attacie reported

his impressions that CHEREPANOV was a "confirmed

ard Icyal

Boviet official of no special statura," and that he ras

interested in nor desirous of further contact with

Two years later, In February 1958,

it was reported that

CHEPEPANOV maintained limited social cortacig with the v.s.

A1r Attache and Canaul In Belgrade.

In April 1956, at a "farewell intizate luncheon" at-

tended by a representative of the American Embassy, CHERE-

PAVOY statod that he was roturniny to loscow where he hoped

to be agsigned for a yoar or two, but he was not certain.

According to a report dated June 1956, CHEREPAYOV had

been active in courting people fron the U.S. Embassy 1n

Bolgrade, and as of the time of the report, had gone

to the USSR "probably to work in the foreiga Offico."

Niore exto. alve Information on CHEREPANOV was provided

In 1857 by 81108 GREGOVIC,

a Yugoslav who defected

British 1a October 1957.

He had been a UDS agort working

in Belgrade agairst foreign diplonate.

CHEREPAYOV wAS One

of his operational targots.

According to this source,

CHEREPANOV was first posted to Belgrade in 1348 or 1949,*

and was one of the very few Soviot diplomats who remained in

Belgrade after the broak with the Cominform, at which tire

he was charge d'affaires.

In 1952 or 1953 he became First

Secretary and head of the Consular Department.**

time he was identifled by the UDB as a Soviet intelligence

The nain reason for the UDB certainty about this

was the wide scope of his contacts with Yugoslav workers

*The break between Yugoslavia and the Cominform took placa

1n june 1918.

There was no formal break in diploratic re-

-disin latlons between the USSR and Yugoslavia, although there was

no. Soviet Ambassador present in Belgrade from 1950 to 1853,

and there was no Soviet milltary attache representation pre-

sent from 1851 to 1953.

According to the Yugoslav diploratio

11sts, Aleksandr CHEREPANOV arrived in Belgrade sometime in

1952, appearing on the diplonatic list for the first time in

November

1952, as Second Secretary,

He was one uf only

seven Soviete appearing on the diplonetic list at this

time.

The row Soviet Ambassador appeared for the first time

on the November 1953 list, bringing the total diplomatic

representation up to eight.

**CHEREPANOV was Second Secretary throughout his tour in

Belgrade, according to the diploratic l18ts.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 209

552.

and students, a number of whom were arrested by the LDB on

suspicion.

On several occasions the UDB had jelt it had

almost enough evidence

to enable the Yugosla: Government to

expel CHERFPANOV, but the evidence was never completely

satisfactoss.

Thus in 1954 GREGOVIC was assigned the task.of com

promising CHEREPANOV's wife, Irene.

Approximately three

months after he met her, CREGOVIC

persorally.succeeded in

compromising Irene.

He continued to handle her as an in-

formant over a period of about a year and a half, during

which time he also maintained their personal relatlorship

on a spasnodir basis.

Irene's information enabled the UDB

to discover that CHEREPINOV had established a network of

Informants

among workers; and

and its vicirity.

Subsequent information established

fact that he was also in cluse contact with tride union

leaders and particularly with river

port workers,

of whom were subsequently found to be

anti-Yugoslav and pro-

soviet in their outlook.

Another Soviet,

intelligence

officer who had been recruited by the UDE, contired

to

GREGOVIC that CHEREPANOV was a nember of Soviet Irtelligence.

The Soviet said also that CHEREPANOV had been an intelligence

officer during the war and had at ont stage been parachuted

behind the German lines on a special services operation

which resulted in the kidrapping of a German general.

GREGOVIC described CHEREPANOV as "always smiling but

In fact an extremely cold and cruel individual."

Although

he did not appear to be enotionally attsched to his wife,

he was extrenely jealous and watchful of her.

He frequently

urged his wife to use her exceptional beauty and seductive

charn in cultivating Yugoslav officials in order to obtain

information.

GRECOTIC also said that CHEREPANOY LaS VEry

fond of hunting, which

"appeared to give relief to his ex-

cessively sadistic nature.

CHEREPANOV was recalled to Moscow in mid-1956, according

to CREGOVIC.

TOP SERRST

is..

---

## Page 210

353.

(111) Reports by Americars

In october ard November

1963 g university librariar

Iron a midwest campus visited tre lSsk on a book-buyi=g

mission sor his universit..

M.: tad not nade auy officlal

arrangements to ron-art

SEIHKV1Cd (In*cxratior.al

Book

Agency, under the Sorict Ministry of Foreigi irade) in

advance of his trip,

but called at its office in the Ministry

of Foreign Trade buildig after he arrived in loscow.

He

explained his interest in obtaining second-hard books.

In a few minutes an Engiish-speakirg Soviet was seat to

the lobby, and he idertifird himself as Aleksandr siko-

layevich CHEREPANOV.

After discussing the librarian's needs

with hin, the can agreed to cooperate with the Arerican.

There were three more contacts with ChEREPAYOr, all 10 the

lobby of the same building.

The last cortact was on 4 Novenber, at which tine

CHEREPAYOV informed the librarian that the book procurement:

listings, except for a fei itens,

had been approted for

release.

Then, speaking softly and quickly in Russiar,

he

passed

the librarian a thick encelope which te said contained

information of ro value to the librarian but of much value

to the American irbassy.

He asked that it be passid ini.

mediatily tu

"Ir. Morton" tho worked on cuitural affairs

in the Enbassy,

and, it Mi. Morton

it to someone: else whom

the lihrarian right kno

nize as trustwortty.

CHEREPANOY further requested that the

librarian call hin from outside the Embassy to lit hin know

by use oi a code word) il the envelope had been delivered

successfully

to the Embassy.

He caütloned the librarian

not to mentior his--CHEREPANOV so.and in thr Envassy.

(The envelope was, diverid to the Erbassy secording to

CHEREPANOV's instructions, exiip: that in the Enbassy the

librarian did mention CHERUPANOV'S zare as thi Soviet who

had presented the package.) Sibsequentiy the librarian

called CHEREPAOV, as an-tructed, to confirm the sale delivery

Pent park at ceodo

of the packagé.*

The envelope fron. CLREPANOV cortained a bundle of

documents, some

typed ard soue hardwritten.

leon examination

they appeared to be classifird KGB file matcrials.

Soviet provocation, which could lead to a denurcistion

the grounds of possessirg classified Soviet

Governeat ducuments, i* Embassy sificials had the documents

photographed and on the next day, 5 Novenber, turned the

originals over to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

*At the librarians's request, on 16 November the Embassy

placed a phoze call

to a man

who identified himself as

CHEREPAVOV in order to follow up on the $2,000 order for

books left by the librarian; an innocuous

telephone conver-

sation resulted.

The individual who called hinself CHERE-

PANOV said he had written to the librarian the day before

(1.e., 15 November 1963) concerriag the matter. Tre librarian

later confirned that he had received such a letter fron

CHEREPANOV dated mid Noverber.

**Such a provocation had actusily been directed agalast

another U.S.

Embassy in another

Iron Curtain country shortly

before these events took place.

TRE SANET

---

## Page 211

554.

(iv) I-formation fion dOSESO

wrote:

A1z of the irformation wrich foilsas was fux-

sished y jOSENKO.

CHEPEPANOF HAS DOT 2-OL* 1920 or 1921.

rucing world

Har II he vas a KiB

offlice workirg with partisa: groups

henird the lies.

Later he was in Yuroslavia dos four or

Ilve years, the dates not knonn.

CHERIPANY vas probably

Deputy Chief si

the Kie degal Residerol in B+lz:ade.

While there, his wif lad an affair inh either an Englishman

or an AMEriCar.

When CHEREPA Or tEtuErEd to JuS'0",

specified prodi: settirg a job, but

jinally ine Ki? Second.

Chief Directorat: cook rin into shores.

FIDast; Section of

The AmArICan Sepa: to-re, W01k1.7

agalist the saairistrative

Section of tre Erba-sy.

He worked 1n

the saar roam as V.A.

KUSKOV,

and was iroponsabl: for tires targets:

SNYDER, a cousilar officer: john dorichaf, a consular of-

ficer; aid Marion AbalON!f, sectriary to the persoanel of-

ficer. CHEREPANCH's iDek 95 1 case officer was

foor, and

of his service in horid har li, ids with he cic-ired three

years' persion it:di: in tach star of rilitary

service, he

had crough time to a1-cridit iot: riigible for retirerent.

Also, he was just o'er tir ziranur ags (40; 10I retirement

lpon retirtig

17 my or digust 1961, CHERiPINO: got

a job with HEZuKliA.

tarappy about his enforced retirement

and angry at tre ki,

he dor an÷ eirn

more dissatisfied when

MEZUKNICA turned duns nis severai atterpts to 60 abroad.

PIlar to learing thi Kao, "HIPIPANOi stri: dialt copies

of docüments he:: liad

ia-diril i:. Inf los. Empassi section.

one case, le copid tai cordant: o1 a report in ins ona baud-

evidently bong urble to st-al the docksant him-

All of the dic-reats ba hai stoion more irserdad for

destruction.

When the U.S. Erbirsy otiitiais sa+ th- CHEFEPANOV

documerts, they dear airald that the documents vero part of

a KGB provoca.io.,

and they said to trenselves:

"Hrat are

the Russians trying

to do to us!"

mie Embassy officials

photograpred the docrats aid or the rext day returred

them to the Ministry of For-ign Altairs.

When

the Ameri

cans gave the docurents to the Miristry, the Fes said:

"What did

the Anericans give this back

to us for?

Maybe they

were afraid of provocation, but maybe a-other thing--maybe

they are trying to dentroy

thr American Dipartzast, to con-

fuse them.

And it did, it did."

In Noventer 1963 Iu.l C'K cane to visit NOSENKO and

brought news about "a catastrophe" in

the KGB;

GLK said he

had the story fron BoF. MAKASHFi, aM:tual frierd of GUK's

and NOSE KO's.* HAKAShbY hat bern in Forsign Minister Andrey

GROMYKO's office whea the CHEREPAVOY papers were brought

there, after their delivery by thongs FAIN of the t.s.

bassy.

MAKASHEŸ

Era-

saw the Lare of O.M. GRIBAND; (chief of

the Second Chief Directorate) on some of the papers and saw

that one of them was a plan for agent operations against an

#NOSENKO said he first met MAKASHEY lu Celers in 1962,

when

both were there

with the Disarranert Deiegation; he subse-

quently saw MAKASHE? occasiorally in Moscow.

---

## Page 212

of all the people who had been working in the imerican Department

during the time period covered by the papers, 1959 to 1960 or

1961.

The whole matter was held very tightly in the KGB,

investigation went on for no rore than 20 or 25 days.

KGB examired the docitents, some here jound to be in CHEREPRiOV's

handwritirg,

but no documents "ere iound which pertaired to THERE-

PANOV'5 Own case work, or that of the u.S. Embassy section where

he worked.

(NOSENKO also noted thar the

KG3 found no documents

dated later than

1951--rone for 1902 or 1903--only 1959, 1350 ard

1961.)

Thus there were a numider oi irdications pointing towards

CHEREPAÏOV, who had lelt the section. 1a 1961.

The KGB did not

dare alert

him by putting full-cine surveilance on him, but in-

stead mounted fixed

survelllance poss

at his hote

and office.

In order to provoKe CHEREPAlOV into sone precipitous action on

the basis of these suspicious poins, a former KGB colleague was

sent to visit him and, in the cour-e of conversation, to mention

the great disturbance

in: the KGB be:ause somenne had passed

stolen KGB documents to the Americans.

CHERSPAVOV marifested no

reaccion to the news

and

was quiit

cool about the matter.

next. day

the fixed surveiilence post observed him leaving his

house in the morning at his usual time.

apparently or his way

to work, but the inxed surveliiarce posi at his office soon re-

ported that he had not arrived at work.

He had "simply dopped

out of sigit.

An intensive search ali over the city of Moscow" ensued

spread throughout the soviet Urior..

Bordel controls were

tightened, photographs of CHEREPAVOV WerE sent

out to Republic

and local KGB ard

militia ofiices, all means of iransport were

Reports began contrig

in from vallous plases that sore-

who seemed to fit CiEREPANOV's description had been seen

acting suspiciously tere and there.

Reports which came into

KGB Headquarters fren Gorkiy Obiast strorgly indicated the possi-

bility of CHEREPANOr's preserce trere, so NOSENiO was dispatched

to the area to check the reports."

NOSENKO went to Gorkiy on the four:h day after CHEREPANOV'S

disappearance.

The area was covered with very deep woods,

"where a person could lose himself for life."

On the severth

day CHEREPANOV was located and arrested ir. Baku, where he was

on his way to the Iranian border.

* When NOSENKO first told this story,

at the first meeting in

Geneva in January 1964, he pulled fron his pocket a document

official KGB "temporary

duty authoriza-

tion" to go to Gorkiy Oblast for the CHEREPANOV search.

noted that he had brought it out Illegaily, to show CIA.

document, authorizing the Gorkiy KGB office to extend cooper-

NOSENKO, was valid from 15 to 30 December 1963.

---

## Page 213

556.

A special plane was immediately sent to Baku, carrying

S.M: FEDOSEYEV and several other American Department officers.

They picked hin up and beaded immediately back to Muscow,

interrogating CHEREPANOV on the plane.

He innediately con-

fessed to havirg given the documerts to the Americans.

When asked why,

he said he was "angry at the KCB, very

angry, "

and besides, he thought he might ask the Americans

for

some noney. In return for

the documents.

• He confessed

that on 4 Novenber he had passed the documents to an Ameri-

can tourist wio was a librarian Irterested in Russian books.

He said he had given the documents to this American in the

entrance hallway in the building of the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs, the building in which the sinistry of Foreigo

Trade was also housed.

Because of the fact that CHEREPANOV had eluded the KGB

between the two fixed

surveillance posts which had been

established, the Second Chief Directorate suffered

consider-

able criticisn for not putting CHEREPANOV under full, round-

the-clock surveillance.

CHERFPANOV himself, however, told

the KGB that had he detected surveillance on himself

he

would have written to the government and nerspapers a letter

of protest against "such an indignity, such persecution,"

and then would have committed suicide, leaving the KGB

without proof.

CHEREPANOY was in prison when NOSENKO left the USSR

(on 18 January 1964) and would be shot, but the affair would

not be publicized.

In addition to his wife, CHEREPAYOV

would leave a daughter as a survivor.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 214

ISF SEGREX

---

## Page 215

f.-rpes..

I0' SECRET

---

## Page 216

S!.

5C0

Jur

2a:

ICts

= *

(the GRil's

early teed

1060871!

c.in

Grade

=!:

Wher

acied

fi

have

we unspecified end.

and had

oden

Funkint

ti?'

Military

wence

schecit

i see

!:."

... i

*:.?

.i...

Asider?

shot 4:

arent.

ir:

i"t?

ist:

Hens bord:

wait.

* 2

in

Horid it:

::.

Lacking

rict posted shrual aitre

his

---

## Page 217

860.

graduation fon ire silitary Diplomatic cony

1959, and

he becaze bitter ard resentiul..

After he

had fi all; ob-

tained a job in the Ministry of Foreign. Trade, he tried to

gain revenge by passioi ministry docuncuts to a lis. Govern-

ment official visa:log

tie dinistry.

Government believed this act

to have been

a soviet provo-

cation, the docurents vere subsequchtly returned to the

Soriet Goveriment.

CHENEPATOr was arrested, Lim. ard

shot.

His vidow,

Irina,

works in a nairdressing siop ai 15 Petro?-

ka Strect in Moseow, wnich 15 ratronized by wires of fremlin

officiais; he also

left a daughter, about is years oid.

seid she could provide no further detalls.

In the course of a Cll interden 1th uterutal

30V?CS

1 li 9t

she inscribed the Soviet

Union

being

"Iike a cage, like prison, where people sonctines

run

away,

but they ithe auinoritiesi

ure able

to

track trom

anywhere.

She stated that she know for a fact that a profon was shot

in Moscow, CHERED!NOY, who worked in the came

Militaly.

Diplomatic) Acadin; as hei husband.

During. 100 ur CHIPE-

PANOV was an officer ir intolligence, and was a

"Erod, brave

and rescurceful soldier.

Thon he cane to the academy, where

he was unhappy.

He tasn't a good vorter there, considering

it a pcisonal

sligat to neve

been

sent

there with all nis

backgrourd."

lie becano

so bitter that he

gave imperiaot.

documents

to the

Anericans about 1963 or 19614024

cans, however,

thought that the documents

they

gave them

to the Soviets.

In two days CHEREFAYOV

was arrested

and in two menths he mus shot.

said that she knew this ran personally, and his wife

as

well; though

only sligntiy.

Her husband, Lurever, was g

friend of CHERIPANOV'S,

and being "very loyal," le weat to

sce his widow, although

he had only met her once.

(She was

unable to recall from whon nor husbend

had learnad of CHERE-

PAUl's death.)

that CHEREPATOr bad realls.

what he did; he

rcally had taken re

reft quoted CHEREPANOTA as

sayirg:

"I serender huw he

trol these

papei's out of the

house.

Then he returned

and took

something

fron the cabinet

or sorething.

And i asked 11!,

"rihat

is that?'

IF said,

'It 1s

sonething unircortin.

And two daj's later he

wAS

arrested." Late

Macoumented

that. CHEREPINO: had not

known the

X031

when he gave him the papors,

but he

das

"a forcigner,

friend

When asked if CHERE-

PANOV *25 a CiRl OffiCEr, E

wet said she trought he

waS & KGB officei,

but

Nas dut

of this.

However,

the documents were

"very

important ones, important enough

that he was

sliot."

SUIT.CE

Source's hisband

---

## Page 218

The kes documorts in for curl Palo, dra

103 pages 10 the orlalhat Mated Miig101

ciaont

equaliy

on Ed Mato

written

drati reports or notis, plus its exanpiir it loltels

mitten by soviet citizeus to

the anelica: Fnors.

The longest singie

StcHiT report, datra li

April 1159.

crational Conditions in thi u.s.d. mod tho crites of

American Conterintelligace Organs ascinat Soviet

---

## Page 219

562.

installations and Soviet Citizens in

the l.s.d. in

1957-1953. '4

The report bears the signature

Colonel A. FEKLISOV, ** whose title is givra as

"Chief,

First (American|

Departmint,

First Chief Directorate,

Committee fur State

sccurity under

the courial of

Ministers UsSk."

Attached to this

document is a sheet

of 16 sigiatures, with dates after all bur four, indi-

cating that these individuals had read the report

(CHEREPANOV"s is included).

At the botton ci this

sheet is indiented the fact that the report was typed

in two copies, copy number one,

which this copy is,

addressed to the Second Chief Directorate, and copy

number two disessed to a file, No.

1976, volune 5.

The rest of the documerts pertain

the U.S. Embassy and

diplorats in

Moscow for a period of over

The earliest is

dated August 1955 and the latest 15 October 1960.

of them were prepared by or for

one senior case officer

of the U.S. Embassy Section, First Departrore, SCD,

Major V. KUSKOV.****

Two reports are

or. Americans who had already left

the Soviet Union; in addition to suinarizirg the infor-

mation collected

on them while they were in iloscow, these

reports indicate the processing required for the file's

contents pilor

to retirement to KGB Archives.

The sub-

jects of

these reports

are Edward L. KILLHA!!, Secord

Secretary from July 1957 to July 1959 (document dated

October 1960) and Wallace L. LITTELL, Attacus

from June

1956 to July 1958 (document dated October 1960).

There are four operational plans for azr=: work

against Ancrican diplomats stationed in Moscow at the

time the plans were prepared:

Richard HaRuSTONE, Second

Secretary (document of August 1938; Lewis w. BOWDEN,

Second Sceretary (document of Feuluary 19601; lames

RAMSEY, Second Secretary (document of February 1960);

and GeOrgE WINTERS, Attache (on date!.****

*One paragraph

of the docunent refers to American surveil-

lance of Soviets in New York City, and the next paragraph

begins:

"The intensity

of surveiliance was unever.

From

November. 1957 to April 1958 a decrease was noticed in the num-

ber of surveillance teams assigned to work directly against

Soviet employces.

This did not mean, however, trat the Ameri

can surveillance

service reduced its surveillance of Soviet

employees as a whole."

The dates cited here approximate the

period,. from

late November 1957 to mid-larch 1958,

when the

FBI was conducting surveillance of two Illegals in New York

City as an outgrowth of an operational lead from CIA source

POPOV (see Part VI.D.7.a.).

Information from JOSEYKO rela-

ting to FBI surveillance is discussed in Part VI.F.

**FEKLISOV is the true name of the former KGB Legal Resident

who served in Washington, D.C., under the alias

"FOSIN."

***NOSENKO identifled V.A. KUSKOV as an officer ia the Second

Section,

American

Department, KCB Second Chief Directorate,

and

said that CHEREPANOV worked in the same root with KlSkov.

****For a further discussion of the role of George WINTERS in

the POPOV case, see Part VI.D.7.a.

TOP SECREV

---

## Page 220

63

Another document is typed on a preprinted letter-

head

form entitled

"Agent Repört"'; the form has all of

the KGE organizational

titles printed on it, with blank

space left to be filled in for the date, the cumber of

the section, department, and directorate, the rare of

the

agent

source and that af the case ofileer tho re

celved

it.

This particular report is toat of the agent

"LILIANA, " concerning her contacts with WINTERS between

3 and 6 March 1959.

The report describes how she mado

his acquaintance and what transpired a: each of her

nectings with him thercafter.

Followirg her report is

a brief statemert of future plans for the use of this

agent against wINTERS.

A notation appears on the first

page

that the report was translated fron Surish,

al-

though the name of the translator is not giren.

This

stoms to suggest that the agent wrote her own account

of her activities,

as she

is

identified in the report

as having recently repatriated to

the Soviet Union from

Argentina.)

The typing date appears as l$ April 1959,

and the signature line was prepared for lajor Koisuck.

"Deputy Chief,

First [American| Depart-ent' of the KGB

Second Chief Directorate.*

KOiSHUK's rare also appears

as the case officor who received the report from the

agent.

One handwritten document, entitled "Corclusions on

the Matter of Operational Development LANGELF, '** 15

on a kind of paper different from that used for ary of

the other dooments; it is lined and columned, and the

headings at the top of the columns (e.g., number and

date of document, to whom addressed or from whom sent)

suggest that the

paper is a record sheet or 10g of cor-

respondence.

It bears the date of Octobe: 1960, iut is

not sigred, nor does any designation of section, depart-

or directorate appear.

The docunent is a summary

Of LANCELLE's activities in the Sovict Union, prirarily

details of his activity as an intelligeice officer for

One facet of LANCELLE's operatioral activity 1s

described in some detail,

"On tre 28tn of

May 1958 L. loaded a dead drop at Lenin Hills.

He at-

tempted to give the visit to Lenin Hills for the fur-

poses indicated above the outward appezrance of an inno-

cent outdoor recreation trip with children.

Incidentally,

prior to loading the dead drop L. had previously cased

the travel pattern

of his surveillance, the situation at

Lenin Hills, and had visited that area with his wife.

"As a consequence, it was established that this

drop belonged to a person recently arrested by the

Directorate of the KCB under the Council of Ministers

*NOSENKO identified V.M. KOVSHUK in this position around

this time.

**For & further discussion of the role of Russell LANCELLE

in the POPOV case, see Part VI.D.7.a.

i!'

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 221

of the USSK lor the City of Moscor, REPAIKUr, who had

been recruited by American intelligence....

!*.!

HiS

meetings with POPOY in Moscow are set out accurately,

with dates.

WISTERS' mailing of a letter to pOPOr is

mentioned,

but in contrast to exact dates used throigh-

out the

MINTEDa, PAper for other events cited, the date of

mailing is given only as "January 1959."

There is a handwritten document comprised of sanes

and addresses

of soviet citizens, headed

with a state-

ment that

these are auttors of letters addressed to the

U.S. Embassy

in Moscow,

but intercepted by the KEB.

Where dates of the letters are given, they are for Octo

ber 1960.

In a few cases the contents of the letters

are characterized (e.5.,

"request for finarcial aid--

5,000 rubles," "complaints about inability to live os

persion").

Under two of the names a note appears,

which looks as though it had been added at a different

time or with & different pen, but in identical hand-

writing;

the note says

"letter enclosed."

Thase tro

letters

were unclosed in the package of docurerts.

The two documents described above--the LANCEILE

"Conclusions' and the list of Soviets who wore to the

U.S. Embassy--appear to have been writen by

the saue

persis.

Although the sample on the docurort described

nexi is only a signature, it may well be the same hand.

The name is CHEREPANOV's.

This docurent, the only docu

ment naving for its subject a Sovict citizir, 1s a type-

written summary of derogatory inforration on a Soviet

youth who began to lead ? dissolute life in 1957,

beconing a black market speculator and a homosexual.

As a consequence he was expelled

from the Komsondl and

from the Institute at which he had been studyi=g.

He

nonetheless continued his criminal activities,

iscludirg

contacts with

foreigners for purposes of fleeirg the

USSR, despite warnings by the militia and the kil, and

he had two long meetings with Attache Richard SNYDER,

"Consul of the American Embassy," to discuss his wish

to

go to America.

The document, dated February 1960,

is

signed by Lt. Col. A. CHEREPANOV, "Senior Case Ofricar

[no section

indicatedl, First Department," of the Second

Chief Directorate.

(Presumably the document is relevant

to the American Department because of the costact with

an American diplomat.)

*On 24 May 1958 LANGELLE visited the area of the dead drop

site referred to herein with his wife to case and photograph

the site arca.

The site had been described to him as

erase to ta de orach

certain section of a wooden staircase in the park area.

When his report was received at CIA Headquarters it was

obvious that because of inadequate information, he had

cased the wrong staircase, so he was told to go back as

soon as possible and repcat the casing for the other stair-

case.

He did this on 28 May 1958,

bringing his children

for

cover.

He did not put a drop down at this of any other

time.

legal travel agent actually put the drop down on

7 June

1958.

This drop

was

not intended for the agent re-

ferred to in the CHEREPANOY document, REPNIKOY, wro in fact

was not even a recruited agent at the time, although efforts

were being made--unsuccessfully-during this time to recruit

him.

At no time was any dead drop put down for REPNIKOY,

nor were any ever planned for him.

TEP SECOST

---

## Page 222

(x)

565.

The renaining papers

are handarittes draits of

reports portainine to various of the incricans named

above,

some incomplete, and extensive rough notes which

apprar to be extracts from surveillance reports, nost

of them on WINTErS.

All these notes are i: the same

handwriting, which appears to be that of X-sKOr.

NOSENKO'S Comments on the CHEREPANOV Papers

On 3 February 1964 NOSENKO was

shown all the CHEREPAYOV

papers with the excepiion of the FEKLISOV ropcit on opera-

tional conditions in

the United States.

Just b-fore they

were

given to him to read,

shown

NOSENKO was asked if he had been

the pepers before he left doscow; he replied that be

had not.

He said he knew that the documents pertained to

BOWDEN, RASSEY, HARUSTONE, WISTERS, aNd LANCEL.E,

but he

had not read thrm.

MSKEd

who in thin Second Chir: Directorate

kner exactly which docunents were involvid, NOSENKO named

S.M. FEDOSEYEV, Chief of the

Ameriran Dopart-eat it the tine;

GRIBANOY,

Chief of

the second Chief Directorats; and G.I.

GRYAZNOV,

Chief 'of

the U.S. Embass! Section.

These three

officers,

he said,

had

possession of the docunrits after

they were returned by diD to the kCB.

NOSENKO then proceeded to examine and read aloud the

contents of the documents, making ccasional rxpiaratory

comments as he went alung.

lie identified the randwriting

of CHEREPANOV himself, as well as that of KISKO;, KOVSHLK, and

BELOGLAZOV.

Concerning the

substance of the documents, YO-

SENKO made

very

few comments.

in discussing tre opcrational

plan for work against WINTERS, NOSENKO noted that this docu-

eat,

which was a hardwritten draft, had been sigied by

KOVSHIK, Chief of the U.S. Embassy

Sectior; NOSENKO then said:

"He should not have signed this.

I do not know why he signed

it.

He should not have signed it." Asked why not, he said:

"Because it is

a drait.

He should have sigrd the typed

copy.

Ard why he signed the rough draft I do not krou..."

As he studied the agent report which KO Sulk reesired

from source "IILIANA," concerning WINTERS, JOSENKO cormented

on KOVSHUK's failure to fill in the line

which is intended

to identify the safe apartnent or operational apartment

there the report was irceived.

"It is obligatory

to india

cate the place, in the second line," he added.

"It is

obligatory to write in the number of the persoral iile (this

did appear in the document) and where the cortact took place."

Reading aloud the agent plan for BoWDEN, described

therein as the FBl man in the Embassy, NOSENKO came to the

section which states:

"Ironically one day as though by

chance he (BOWDEN! blurted out to our agent SIdELOVA'

'ARTUR'S* affiliation with American Intelligence." He wes

interrupted to be asked who "SHEDOVA" was; NOSESTO said:

"Cleaning woman undoubtedly. An affiliation of 'ARTUR' with

American Intelligence.

He was then asked:

"What connec-

tion did 'ARTUR' have with American Intelligence?"

To this

*"ARTUR" was the KGB cryptonym for NOSENKO's agent Arsene

FRIPPEL; see Part V.D. 5.

TOP SENAT

---

## Page 223

- 1547

NOSENIO replied:

"That I cannot say." The CIA case officer

renarked:

"Ahy, you

should know, sou're his case of!icer..."

NOSENKO ignored this comment and continued to read the docu-

ment aloud.

A little further on in the document reference

is made to use of future agents to report on BOADEN; again

"ARTIH" is montoned, and NOSENKO identified nim this time

as FRIPPEL.

Then he

said:

"I asked FRIPPEL, and he said

'But I know nothirg."

'How is it you do not, when he is

the counterintelligence nan

In your Embassy?

He interrogates

you!"

And he answered:

'But no, he is a good man.""

In reading a draft report which appears to nave been

an attompt to summarize the KGB information

on WINTERS, NO-

SENKO read out the sentence:

"During his

stay in the USSR,

WINTERS sent eight espionage letters,* and loaded a drop

In connection with & gane the KGB played with American Intel-

l1gence."

He was asked if he knew about those eight letters,

but he said he did not.

The CIA case ofiicers made some remarks

critical of WINTERS' skill as an intelligence officer, 1n

vier of the fact that the KGB picked up these eight letters.

"But at that time I would not have run him

He did not know that he had letka on him.**

the jear 1902 did you know about Hrtke?

No, I don't believe

you did."

he was asked:

you mean those eight

letters were detected from Metka? NOSENKO said:

"Of course."

The case officer asked:

"Not Tron surveillance?" NOSESKO

Beyond the fact that he could be

seen mailing

then, the rest Metka gives....Well, that letter which was

mailed by WINTERS tO FOPOV was without Metka.

for POPUV definitely was without botke. But the other

letters, that was not so.

I would not blame him.

How would

He put them in his pocket--that's all." NOSENKO

added that the letter which was sent to POPOV was one of the

eigat letters to which the document refers.

NOSENKO then reviewed the document concerning Richard

He repeated his earlier statement that KAR!-

STONE had been compromised and had been approached by the KGB,

that be turned down the recruitment offer, but that he did

not report the approach to the u.s. embassy.

how the KGB knew that he had not reported the approsch, to

which NOSENKO replied:

"He was monitored and we would have

if anything about this matter had been re-

ported.:. Undoubtedly if he reported it

something would have

been heard fron the Minister Counsellor's materials as to

what this might be.

Ard they would dictate a message about

this. "**** Later NOSENKO was asked who tried to recruit HAR!STONE.

*According to CIA records, in addition to the one letter to

POPOV referred to here, WINTERS mailed only six other S/W

letters to agents in the USSR.

**The first source of information on KGB use of Metka, the

KGB code rame for thief powder or detecting powder,

was

NOSENKO, in June 1962.

***See Section VI.D.3.e. for a discussion of the HARISTONE case.

****HARMSTONE did report the KGB approach, and the Minister

Counsellor's office was the site of a discussion of the case.

102 8L0

---

## Page 224

He answered:

"I do not know; thai was prior to my coming

Into the departuent.. This was in the year 1953 or 1959.

I don't know who was the case officer who spoke to Raid-

STONE. "

POSENKO waS

asked:

"Is he still in the Lepartment?"

He replied:

"I don't think he is. I don't think he is

concerred with it any more."*

NOSENKO read the document which set forth highlights

Of LANGELLE's operational activities

in Moscow, chiefly

devoted to the POPOV. case, but also including information

(inaccurate in

detail) concerning a dead drop site in Lenin

Hills.**

As be read this section he commented:

"Incidentally,

they |the KGBi found the dead drop and contents by accident.

Little children, children."

Asked if he krew arything about

this incidont of lenin Hills, he arswered,

"Kids.

Russian

childion found it uy accidert.

For after LANGELLE had left

the arra, surveillance checked over the area, but they found

nothing....

Reading further he come to the statement that

it was later establisied that the dead drop was interded

for the person already arrested by the KGB,

REPYJKOV.

TO

this he added that REPNIKOV was known as Stanisia: "Slava"

REPNIKOV, who had been recruited by some tourist; these de-

tails were

not included in the CHERZPANOV documert.

He was

asked if REPNIKOV had been arrested and was chereafter

working under KGB control, but he said this was not the case.

He explained that he had been arrested, and thr YÜB there-

after

"roughed him up once in a while"

because he was of the

category of Soviets who were known to associate with foreigners.

He did not know what American tourist had recruited REPNIKOV,

but he was aware of the fact that REPNIKOY had not beer

arrested until after the tourist had left the l'SSR.***

When he was reviewing the sumar; of information on

LITTEL, who had left the USSR before the sunmary was pre-

pared, NOSENKO was asked if he knew anything about one of

the soviets naned as a one-time contact of LItrEl's, B.P.

VORONTSOl. The document, a rough draft with corrections,

contained a statement that a mocting between Llf'EL and

*KOVSHUK was identified by HARUSTONE as the KGB officer who

made the approach.

**See the foregoing section on the contents of the CHERE-

PANOV package for details on the inaccuracies included in

this document.

***REPNIKOV had been reported as a dissident Soviet youth

as early as 1955,

and in 1957 he told one of his Anerican

contacts that he

had once been arrested and seived time in

a Soviet prison at some time for one of his attempts to

escape illegally

from the USSk.

He was arrested sgain there-

after for a second plan for escape, and he was given psycho-

logical treatment as a result.

REDNIKOV waS

in contact with

a number of Americans

and other Western travellers again in

1958

and 1959.

In September 1959 another Soviet, a friend

of his,

told

an American tourist that REPNIKOY had been

arrested

after receiving a letter from an American which

thanked hin for his interest in being an agent and gave him

directions for future contacts.

In the sumer of 1960 there..

was a long article in Komsomolskaya Pravda

about the arrest

of REPNIKOV and a friend of his on charges of being agents of

Cla. Neither was.

TEP!

---

## Page 225

563.

VORONTSOY took place on the strect, and they went to a

restaurant together.

It further said that VORONTSOV was

continuously in contact with foreign tourists.

These two

lines are

crossed out in the draft, and in

their place 18

written:

"The Second [Counterintelligence and Security!

Department of the UkGB for the city of loscow is fully

oriented concerning him." NOSENKO HaS told that YORONTSOV

nost recently worked for Inturist at the lotel Hetropol in

Moscow, and that he had had a number of meetings with

American students and with tourists.

NOSENKO commeated:

"This is

agent work.

He is an agent." He was asked, "But

to you nothing is known?"

NOSENKO sald, "Absolutely nothing."*

NOSENKO went over the rest of

the CHEREPAYOV documentg

rapidly, for the nost part simply reading them aloud, with

side remarks on topics unrelated to the dooomenis or the

Americans discussed therein.

*In the sunner of 1963,

VORONTSOV had contacted two different

groups of joung Americans

and told

them

of his

plans for es-

cape fron

the

Soviet Union.

He also told then

he had inforna-

tion about KGB agents through his Inturist employsest, and

that the American authorities should be told of hin and his

plans; he passed on an elaborate code system which was to be

used to get in touch with him to assist hin in his

escape

plans. He was so open in his contacts, unrealistic in his

plans, and insecure in his conversations with the young Aneri-

cans (none of whom had any intelligence connections) that

when they reported to American embassies in the fest, VORONT-.

SOV was immediately assumed by U.S. authorities to be either

a clumsy provocateur or a

fanciful; immature youth.: Nothing

further was heard from VORONTSOV.

There had been no previous

record of him in CIA files; the CHEREPANOV document was the

only confirmation of his other contacts with foreigners.

---

## Page 226

RecOrt On KAI

(i)

Introdustier.

Modirit Cooth REAd 10111418

ilo

of ruperts rode

to the F5l by roch NoSElk audest sourie

Ascarding to

their inioration

the sobic's

• re

Auerican to the ison in cutection

with mis

3011114.!

M1:2h109909

piuralizel

travei

business; case there,

he mula be arrested do?

turned over

in the Cooch dinistry of te

cäuch counter-

purt of the NuBi

1.

free charges de esploady:.

LACTS-RONARiK iS

the caiy

indirt

10::

The SOlA:

on 26 Febru-

=T}

1964

Mansanes pitial toot

contaril??

information

in audition,

Torn lolance o1 N6S.750

giving

the

FbI

detail:

oi: a person mudio triling to offer the samo

or sinilar detaile to clA.

barned be me ful in darch lodd drainst

1011010:

1 1i

in

Inturis:

113101

10

Tre soviet union lau

tar.cn

plat'

Moscow to paris aitor the concreter midd

the

ptic: 1.50 to attend

last proctous

route

¡no arofiot plane o

fron

which he was i passenger war

fragile.

KOKANEk has renovod

to aircraft and pleted under arrest ti

Czech authorities.

backgreind

?S

native Circh

and inner agoni in crochoslovakia

ui item intriligence service,

rociting in socculation

vy cir nird

night

have

been dier

Aft control

trin the tine

3$0.S

clandestine activitius for the casin me carly 19a0's.

С. іП-ry

jig) Statement by SOStakO

The FBI

report di its to Feltuary 190:

concerting,

follons

(iii) Statenent by

The FBI reported the following on its intervich of

regarding

KAZAN- KOMAREK:

---

## Page 227

9 t.

Man-oner has not ted day overt Ictationship with clA

or other U.S. Intelligence agencies.

Sce Part V.F.0.

for detrils on

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 228

e. AfTed SLESINGER: Suspeciod Source of Die Fol

(i) Introduction

JUSENKO first reported on Mitred Lazarurich SilSiNGER (also

spelied SLiZINGER) on:

3 July jout wun hi

mid indi

an Anerican

of this last name, puner of a phoographic sang in den Yori Gity,

was suspeated by the KGB of having

comections with the FBI.

Consequently,

NUSENKO said, the:

SuEstiona traveiled to Moscow

the KGB Touris: Departmen arranged to place him in contact with

in agent of

the departnent, and chile SLiSINGEk s: in Odessa

the

Tourist Departnent

instructed the AGe oreonication in that

city 1o haie him

"surrounded"

ditit

ageits.

S37S

13VM

teen questioned hy

cation with

FBI,

firit

again Mile visiting indie in

Auth

1121

101d

anihorities

clout

18!3

all trip icitessa

th:

FBI

his ass0-

21:J

an! SirStRid this sub-

ject are presentes beioi.

(ii) NOSESNO's lifornat 100

SLESINGER was under suspicion by too FOB Firot Chief Direc-

torate, according to tulsio, because of hit business

transactions

with

number of soviets who cano to his store ani in nhon he

seemed

to display nore

than

normal interest.

The first Chief

Directorate was of in opinion that

suesivik ons irjing io de.

come closely aiquainied with sono soviets

10 study

them.

Upon

KGB

suspcited

Learnigns mishe nake

of his forticoning it!;

to the NSSk,& the

that

some contarts of do something

interesting. "**

Thie KGB,

NOSENd said, wanted to study SIESINGER

as being a possible agent or operational contact ii the FBI.

The KG3 had a file on slistols,

and responsible for this

case

has Yu.M.

DVORKIN, a senior case officer 1:

the American

Section of tie

Tourist

l'epartment.

n1 agant of ile: Tourist De-

partment (rise not give by NOSENTO SEr

vitamin art was director of i photographic shop

in Moscow,

and

Onl

KGB instructions he becane

the latter's

trip to Moscon; NOstAND thought that the to

later exchangeri

correspondence.

SLESINGER went to odessa,

The

FBI

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 229

beliered

110

circled.

rie

watch

for

i!s

30 contenber

said

nuttin

titliganes

sonid have

3064

-1!

red..

lia corallies,

11120

•ith

t

•JS

11.195,

and

thil

Si:

:.lied

:.ts

ipüt,

he trech:

1R1L0t0t1

in the

Sipter

t:15r.4

ber.

said

18'9610

ii:

?):.-

: t1

1:?

50.n.

july

1*1.

:.

"ra!

1!:e

i :

BiTE

1: i:3

ii::

1Pi.

S...t.

%. *

BOrn

in

Ojessa.or.

2?

inited Stries

soptercer

1509,

SLISINGER

caTe to

in

citizon

the

MS SEXIE?

---

## Page 230



---

## Page 231

3. 22202091 P202143

11230: 120-4

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restles las ture nation cas

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Microtones

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The orrates: dots! it

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apart fron

inai on the i.s.

11134571

Rose Chanting ty

Minö the best Gemar Anbuster dictailin Cities

i ?d

ater effi:ici

diabetes.

inuspenica: ef NO.

•ci

service

Tor a discission: o!

i?:

i i:a

U.s

Embassy in Moscor, see dart mk.o.g.

NoSExO said that ic

knew of microphones Leing in the drontinien and pregnayan

Embassies, is

yult is unthe ipartacnte of "ritisi: Entassy

empleyees,

and of a joB order to insial: microphones in

the

Brazilin

Enbassy; he as also abare that to microphones had

trase tacts, aucording to

nical penetrations-or hostern colassies to tosco%.

TOP SECRET

sost .56A

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## Page 233

dinaRade Soon de

Stater

1d June that the kob had teen successiu. in ellecting

clandestine entri into

foreign enbassies in loscow and had, in

fact,

been able to get

into all of den with the erception of

those of the United States and Great Britain.

SOSEYKO was then

asked

whether the KGB had also been

Embassy.

able to entor the West Geraan

He replied:

"The situation is worse with the Germans.

It is

worse.

It's a

are beir.g

listened

different matier with the Germans. They

to.

WhOLL,

thie Ambassador,* is a very intel-

ligent and stilled analys:, and he provides a

great deal of solid

infornation...

KROLL dictates everything and

even his own menor-

anda.

The memoranda he dictates are very interesting, very

interesting menorada.

That

the infornation se receive from

the bicrophones

1s very

solid

"infornation, very sclid information,

because he

knots everything.

Ile kron's what ADENAUER will thirk

ahead of time.

A very intelligent.

Jan and an excellent, excel-

lent analyst.

His analysis is tremendous.

Also,

IU.s. Anbassador

THOMPSON visits and talis with hin,

and we kron that THOMPSON was

there

and

what tock place.

Valuable

infornatior. He is very

talented, this KROLL."

NOSENKO provided additional details on the microphones in

the rest German embassy on 20 and 34 rugust 195t. His intorna-

tion vas incorporated by ClA into the following report:

"While discussing microphones in the U.S. Embassy, Mos-

Source. (NOSENKO] stated that the KGB also had micro-

chones in the west German Embassy in Moscch during the

period 1959 through 1961.

The German Ambassador dictated

dispatches, and

cables soviet Union, and

passages of a book he was writing

the iSB overheard all of this

fron concealed microphones.

According to what Source

the information in the dictation ioncerned the

political situation,

the Germar. Ambassador's position on

a given topic, and the position of other ambassadors with

khon

the German Ambassador had discussed a

specific topic.

Source learned this information either from Oieg Sergeye-

vich BUBNOV, Deputy chief of the Third Department (Germany

and Austria), Second Chief Directorate, or Mikhail SKORIK,

Chief of the First Section,

Directorate.

Third Departnent, Second Chief

Tatyana GRISHNYAT, from the Operational

Technical Directorate,

brought to Source's office material

which had been

obtained from concealed microphones in the

U.S. Embassy, Moscow, which has of concern to the u.s.

• Hans Anton MROLL became West German Ambassador to Moscow in

1953.

From 1953 to 1955 he had been Ambassador to Yugoslavia,

and from 1955 to 1958, Ambassador to Japan.

His only previous

Soviet tour was during 1923-1925, when

he was the German

Vice-

Consul

in Odessa.

March 1962, KROLL received a consider-

able amount of publicity in the lestern press when, according

to the

New York Times (2 March) there was

"an outcry in the

West German press all week over reports

in bie welt and Bild,

Hamburg

newspapers with

the

saze ownership,

that Dr. KROLL

had recommended major concessions to the Communists for a

Gernan-Soviet settlement."

As a result, ADENAUER publicly.

recalled KRoul to Bonn for consultations. He had been under

fire for similar reasons the previous November and was re-

called then, too.

1962.

He left Moscow permanently at the end of

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 234

Mistery

Embassy Section, American Department,

Second Chief Direc-

torate.

During these visits she would open her

bag and

Source could see tlie

large docunents which were destined

for the

Chief of the Third Department.

The cover letter

read:

•List number

Translated

frum German by

• To (Chief

of the Third Depart-

often joked with Tatyana and in this view would complain to

her that she always brought very thin documents for the

Anerican Department but very thick documents for the Third

Department.

On severai occasions Tatyana would be late

delivering material to Source's section, and she would state

that the typists in

the Operational Technical Directorate

were busy doing something for the Third Departnent.

On the

bäsis of his exuerience

Source knew that sonething important

must have been received

from the nicrophones concealed in

the German Ambassador's office.

"All of the intercepted material obtained by the Opera-

tional Technical Directorate was sent first to the Inforna-

tional Group of the Second Chief Directorate.

This group

decided which information should be seen by the Central Com-

mittee.

a large amount of this mater-

ial was considered very

according zu soureniricant at the time and was sent

to the CPSU Central Committee over

the signature of the

Chairman of the KGB.

"Source never read any of the above naterial. Source

does not know if the microphones

are still in place and

still operational.

"Source

the German codes. ""ot know if the KGB

was able to break

TEP

SES'

NEX

... Le

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## Page 235



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## Page 236



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## Page 237

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181998

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## Page 239

TRP

SECRET

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## Page 240

583.

Cryptologic Successes Against the U.S. Labassy

Introduction

At his second meeting

with cIg

June 1902, NOSENKO

ressed fear that the U.s.

Moscow might be advised

his contact with ClA.

Thi

wei

be a fatal move, ne said,

since the KGB was reading

i State.

Department enciphered cable

rraffic between Moscow at hashington.

NOSENÄC explained that

he knew this because,

asy

sarlor officer in tra

U,s.

Envassy

Section of the imeriçan repartment, he saw tos

siphered cables

efery day.

On this come basis and

also boatin

at his personal

nd direct responsistiit

for the section'optations against

merican code clefts

NOSEXO

assured hispan handlers on sev-

eral

occasions that the Küb

could

not, and bad. nover heen able to

read

traffic enciphered

'the U.S. Armed Forces (attache)

cryptographic systen.

Meeting withi

the next day, JOSENKO tempered his earlier

staterent about kiao

yptologie successes.

"only certain" of I

State Department ciphers were being read

by the NGB, and tha

only on rare

occasilas.

She personally saw the deciphered plain text

This information was further qualified

during the interrogations of February 1965 when VOSENKO said that

State Department erciphered traffie was broken

dom" during the 1960-1961 period and that. "we ithe

Section] never saw these documents."

NOSENKO has not changed his

original statement that the KGB has never been able to break

the miiitary codes.

NOSENKO has stressed that he has no aptitude for technical

matters and had no interest in or access to information on

spe-

cific techniques used by KGB cryptologists to break the imerican

codes.

He suggested in general terms, however,

that KGB suc-

cesses in this field were made possible in part by information

obtained from American cryptographic personnel who defected and

were recruited

in the late 1940's and the 1950's, in part by

information from the microphone installations in

the

two mili-

tary code rooms

and certain U.S. Embassy offices.

NOSENKO has

not specified how this information was used or which of these two

câtegories of sources was of

greater value,

although he did re-

port that the loss

of KGB ability to read the State Departuent

codes coincided with and was largely a result of the installation

of an acoustically secure enclosure for cryptographic operations.

(The date was late 1961 or early 1962, according to NOSENKO, but

actually late 1962, according to U.S.

authorities.) At the

same time, NOSENKO

indicated, the microphone in the military code

rOOm

(which was probably effective until late 1960, according

to NSA) was of little use.

There is a degree of correlation between NOSENKO's informa-

tion on KGB cryptologic successes and that earlier, reported by

It was for this reason that his own and the section's "number-

one mission" in 1960 and 1961 nas to recruit a military code

clerk, but this had not been accomplished; see Part V.E.3.c.

108. 250337

diapers

---

## Page 241

GOLITSYN.

GOLITSYN told CIA that "three or four zessages of

State Department cipher traffic were broken sometine in the

eriod 1945 to 1950; past traffic could be read

have not seen the evidence, but they read the telegrans o

che foreign Service in Moscod in 1960, and evidently later."

GOLITSYN then went on to say:

a code clerk of the Foreign Service."

tradict GOLITSYN. *

DIRENE

• The following sections summarize NOSENKO's information re-

garding KGB cryptologic efforts, methods, and successes and,

since they have a bearing on his report, provide excerpts from

NSA and USIB damage reports on the KGB microphones found in the

U:S. Embassy in 1964.

See Part V.E.3.c

TUP SECRET

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## Page 242

147-00

19904

b. Information from NOSENKO

-rom his personal experience, NOSFAXO said in 1962, he knew

that the hoB Lignth Directorate had broken

the

enciphered mes-

sages of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow but not those of the military

elements

there.

At the end of is61 or the beginning of 1962,

however, the

NGB cripiologic success

ended,

according to NOSENKO

in 1964.

le nas furnished

some details on

the types of Embassy

enciphered traffic veing read in clear text and on the way in

which the clear text ras treated within the KGB Second Chief

Directorate; in addition, NOSENKO has indicated that the KGB used

microphones

in the Enbassy and exploited humail sources to further

its cryptologic word.

These points are reviewed separately below.

(i)

Breaking U.S. Ciphars

The first reference by NOSENKO to KGB cryptologic successes

against U.S. Government enciphered traffic vas

made

ond

at his sec-

meeting with ClA en

11 June 1962.

At that tine he raised the

subject in connection with his personal security new that he was

in contact with CIA. He said:

"If possible, hanule things in

such a way that only a small

group knok's.

Listen, I don't trust

your records because

there are

people even

there.

you sonething more.

le are

1 will tell

reading

certain ci your codes.

There-

fore I don't trust this business and, therefore, I ask..:

better to list me

somewhere in your records as in intelligence

officer who you have uner developnent.

But don't indicate ny

rant anywhere.*

Listen, here is what l fear--I even had the idea

of going home

and

putting a bullet

through my head and ending it

all.

Because I don't trust you.

don't trust your methods and

I don't believe that you can keep i secret 'secret.

1 am afraid

that sonrthing will go wrong.

"Listen, we are reading your ciphers.

We

are even reading

your ciphers.

Certain of your ciphers

are being read.

We are

reading (them, at the present time.

I am afraid io tell you this.

Why?

You will change them and they will guess at once why there

has been a change after everything had been

smoothly for

so many years.

You must

give some thought - Let then read lthe

codes).

America is just as strong as

Nothing has happeneuit always has been.

America has not disappeared.

"We are reading ail the State Departnent ciphers.

stand, [we

are readingl all the State Department (ciphers], but

not the military (ciphers). This is the situation:

We are road-

ing all the State Department ciphers.

[Several words unintelli-

Ris present counsel on swine, thas aupson hi child, bay

All this is being

, 1.e., these ciphers are being read, but the nilitary

(ciphers are not.

The military are not.

"I know this because

worked in this business, against the American Embassy...

was a deputy section chief.

I know everything and I am

telling

you everything.

And my main work was with a code clerk...*e

NOSENKO said he was

Later in this seen of NOSENKO's rank, see Part V.G.1.

a major; for a

further discussion of

** James STORSBERG, see Part V.E. 3.c. (i1).

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 243

I can even tell you that we tried to get him there, but it didn'?

HOrk our...

"So, we are reading all the State Department ciphers. But

if you change sonething right now, they will understand at once

that it could have come

only from

All ciphers that go from

Moscow to Hashington are being read,

but not the military (ciphers),

the State Depariment ones.

unable to under-

stand the military ciphers, but the State Department ciphers

being read.

But, if you wish to protect ne,.

you must--I don't

know what to do--let them be read.

Listen, I saw them every day,

every day, i.e., the ciphers, ail enciphered State Department

cables which went from the Embassy. We had them all, down to

the last one. I saw them every day..."

During the third mecting, on 12 June 1962, NOSEYXO revised

his statements sade the day before.

He now said that only cer-

tain of the state Department codes had been broken, and that he

had only rarely seen the clear text of deciphered cables. NOSENKO

repeated that nilitary cipher systems had not been

broken.

His

statements were as follow's:

"Ile are reading) not

all, not all,

of course.

Sore are being read...

All things which are sent in

cipher are, of course,

intercepted, but not all are being read:

It is impossible to read them.

It

is necessary to incr the

ciphers to read them.

nell,

let's suppose that we send lencipiered

cables)

fron the United States.

You pick all of then up, but yo:

cannot read them.

It's the same with

US.

Everything that leaves

the

embassy, everything like a teletype machine, all this is roted,

everything, no natter how it is transmitted.

But everything is

not read...

The State Department ciphers are being read,

that what

the military

shas ut are not able. reat we can read some of what your diplo-

mats send.

Not we (the KGB Second Chief Directoratel but the

[KGB] Eighth Directorate.

They are reading some things."

Asked whether the KGB was reading all the State Department's

enciphered traffic or only a small part of it, NOSENKO replied:

"Not all.

We are not reading all the State Department (traffic)."

He also said, contrary to his statement of 11 July 1902 that he

saw the deciphered traffic "every day," these documents reached

"very seidon"--at the nost "ten or twelve times" during 1900

and 196i.

Following

his defection,

NOSENKO reported that he had learned

in discussiors

could no longer break State Department enciphered traffic by the

end of 1961 or the beginning of

(Earlier,

on 24 January

1964, NOSENXO said that he knew "definitely" that

the KGB Eighth

• Directorate was then having no success in breaking enciphered

traffic of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.) At about the same time

that State Department traffic could no longer be read, NOSENKO

reported, various U.S. Embassy officers were less often heard

According to NOSENKO, he was transferred to the Tourist Depart-

ment from the U.S. Embassy Section, American Department, about

this time.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 244

discussing significant information over the conc-aled microphones

in their offices.

This ders topment had led CRYAZOV and S.H.

FEDOSEYEV (Chief of the American Departent) to conclude that a

"roon-within-a-room" had been installed in thie tabassy and that

other security reasures, had been instituted there..

After his

transfer from the American Departuent in carly 1962, NOSENKO con-

tinued, he also had occasion to discuss the KGB ioss of code-

breaking capability with GRIbANON, Chief of the Second Chief Direc-

from him NOSENKO learned

that the Contral Committee of the

Communist Party was

exerting considerable pressure on the Chairman

of the KGB for cortinuation of the material formerly obtained

in

this manner; consequently, the KCB Chairman as demanding maximum

effort fron all officers

in the recruitment of code clerks.

In the second series of hostile siterrogations. on 20 February

1965,

NOSLiKO made the following statcuent concerning KoB crypto

logic success during 1960-1961:

"Occasionally the Eigoth Directo-

rate would break messages, but very, vory seldon. aid we never saw

the documerts."

(11) Handling of Deciphered Cablis

In mid- 1964 NOSESKO was debricied

the American Departmeal, during nis reportrd tonuli there in 1960-

1961, in handling ine clar isxt of

decipheard cavies of the U.S.

Embassy.

The report of SOSENSO's siaterents on this subject is as

follons:

"The Russian text of those Siate lapartment coded mes-

sages which had been broken was sent to StulcHASINty, the Chairman

of the KGB, alio sometimes forwarded it to Oirg Mikhaylovich GRI-

BANOV, Chief of the second Chiel Directorate.

ChIBANOV at times

forwarded some of the materiai

to vladinar Alekseyevich KLYPIN,

Chief of the American Department, or KiYPIN's successor, S.u.

FEDOSEYEV.

NOSENKO saw such material on the desk of KLYPIN and

later on FEDOSEYEV's desk, bur was never permitied lo read it.

NOSENKO knew, however, that the reader liad to sign for those

articles that he read.

Nikolay

Zruskos, from the Sceretariat

of the Second Chief Diifctorate, brought a book containing the

broken State Department MESSageS to KLYPI! or FLLOSETEE.

lie

would open

the book to certain pages which had red paper and

permit KLYPIN OF FEDOSEYEV tO SEE the material.

This was Eighth

Directorate notcrial, but NOSEiKO did not know where or how

LEMSKOV got it...

At times portions of this material were read

aloud to NOSENKO by KLiPly, but they concerned the position of

the American

Ambassador or

the C.S. Covernment on political ques..

tions and

were of no significarce to nim.

I-frequently there was

mention of the expected arrival of Americans who were not per-

manently assigned to the Embassy, and NOSENKO renembered that

one such iten concerned the arrival of one or two men, a 'commis-

sion,! to check the work of the Political Section.

Ine attitude

of the Secretary of State or the American Ambassador was some-

times expressed on certain unremembered topics, but NOSENKO took

no interest in the information as it did not relate to agents or

*See Part V.E.3:g. for a further discussion on NOSENKU's in-

formation on the decline in quality of intercepts resulting

from the decreased efficiency of the KGB microphone installa-

tions. in the U.S. Embassy.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 245

agent activities.

NOSENKO noteù, however, that the material con-

cerned messages from the American Ambassador,

Moscow,

to the

Secretary of

State and from the Secretary of

State to the Ancri-

can Ambassador, Moscon.

All of this material was highly sensitive,

and few people

were permitted to see it or ever. to know of its

existence.

NOSENKO stazed that it was treaced aore carefully

than Top Secret inforaation."

(iii) Methods of Cryptologic Atiack

Unable to describe the techniques of the KGB Eighth Diree-

torate in brealing U.s.

Lepartment of State crypiographic systens,

NOSENKO nevertheless did indicate various methods applied

Problem as known to him from his posicion as Deputy Chief of the

Embassy sero and score tea the for landline method.

of iGB microphones concealed in the Embassy.

mentioned by NOSENKO or 12 June 196?, stenmed from

certain Embassy officials (notably Ministers Counsellor FREERS

and McSWEENEY) dictating the text of outgoing cables aloud.

When the texts were picked up

on the KGB micropnones,* the

Directorate compared hom against enciphered traffic

by other means.

The two other

intercepted

methods indicated, analysis

equipment sounds and exploitation of human sources, are dis-

in greater detail belon.

NOSENKO has twice referred to the Eighth Directorate's

interest in equipment sounds and snatches of technical conversa-

tions picked up by the microphones

in the State Department and

military code rooms.

He said on 21 January 1964:

"Now, we also

listened to the code room and the teletype office, but we could

never get anything out of the teletype office because of inter-

ference (equipnent noises which drowned out conversationsl..e

In the military cole room--that was where (James N.] STORSBERG

and later (Matthew P.) ZUJUS worked--we didn't get much.

could hear STORSBERG swearing on occasion, and

then he would men-

tion a group of numuers.

This was, of course,

all recorded and

we turned it over di chie io the Fighth Dircctorate, dealing

with coding ind decoding.

Of course, all other intercepts were

turned

over to them also." NOSENKO reported on 14 May 1964:

"In 1960 and 1961

from

the State Department code room (we heard)

always the sounds of machines only.

Machines only. Three times

during these two years maybe somebody said one phrase or one of

the guys said several rumbers.

Jim STOPSBERG was sitting alone

in the military area.

The reception has good.

He seldom spoke.

Sometimes he repeated numbers to himself and sometimes a mechanic

of code machines came to him,.

a military guy, a sergeant...

I

forget his name.***

They said two or three phrases:

'Did you

.

* See Part V.E.3.g. concerning the KGB microphones in the U.S.

Embassy.

Until December 1962 when an acoustical room was installed

within the State Department to enclose cryptographic equip-

ment, teletype and code machines were vulnerable to the one

microphone

later discovered in this area.

Since that time

presumably

only the teletype equipment

could be heard.

NOSENKO is speaking of the earlier period.

On 20 February.

1965 he said,

however:

"The microphone is not in the State

Department code room,

but next door where the teletype

nachines were located."

This information was true only after

the secure room was installed.

*** William Stanton HURLEY, a Warrant Officer who supervised mili-

tary communications, repaired cryptographic equipment, per-

formed stand-by cryptographic duties when STORSBERG was un-

available,

and supervised other sensitive activities (see

Part V.E.3. c.).

7-.

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## Page 246

NNn+535859

check this?

This side good. And so on.

This was 1960

and 1961, and everything from these two rocos--State and military.-

was put in one special

SELEZNEV from the Eightplace, Colonel Aleksandr (Nikolayevichl

• Direcioräte came and looked at then.

There were numbers. He took them for one or two days and then

returned them."

NOSENKO Has more specific with regard to another source of

analytic infornation.

Questioned on 24 January 1964 concerning

recruitment and use of code clerks by the American Departent,

NOSENKO enumerated the recruitments known

to him and then said:

"As I recall, way back in 1948 or 1949,

there was a man of yours

who defected.

He stayed behind.

I believe his name was MeMILLAN.*

I don't remember his exact name, but he stayed lehind in the USSR

and I know

then a great deal.

Then, after him, was this

Thanks to his help they were able to read your State

Department codes.*

To date we have never been able to read your

military codes.

'ANDREY' was not a code clerl..

I believe he was

a code-machine technician.

After that there were many efforts

made, but there were no successes.

Right now I knon definitely

the Eighth Directorate,

which is involved with decoding,

does not have anything at all.

In the past they have submitted

to KHRUSMCHEV and the Central Conmittee on their inter-

But now they are not getting anything at all.

Therefore,

right now the highest priority mission given to the First lazeri-

can; Department and the Second (Britishi Department is to get

at code clerls. But in any event,

they never were able to get

at your military codes."

The debriefing continued:

Question: But did not 'ANDREY' bring out military code material?

NOSENKO:

No, I believe it was only State Department material.

What he mainly did was to describe the operation of

code machines and what daily or other periodic settings

were made.***

Then, of course, those two who were very

* James H. WeMILLAN, a code clerk on the staff of the u.s.

Military Atrache in Moscow, defected in 1948, because of his

devotion to a soviet noman.

SMITH (KGB cryptonym: "ANDREY") was in Moscow 1952-

It is not clear from NOSENKO whether the benefits of

SMITi's information were limited to this period or extended

Apparently the same type of cryptographic

equipnent was in use

by the State Department for the entire

See Part VI.D. 3.b. for further details on this case.

*** At the time of SMITH's Moscow tour there was only one code

room at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, used both by State De-

partment and military personnel.

is the only cryptographic

machine technician assigned to the Embassy, SMITH had access

to both State and military cryptographic equipnent, although

he was an Army sergeant assigned to the office of

the Mili-

tary Attache.

In his statements to the FBI, SMITH has

that, in fact,

the only information

lets in Moscow was fabricated by himself and therefore use-

TOP SECRET

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## Page 247

knowledgeable of such mattersthen there. was some

they gave tremendous help.*

American code clerk who they brought into the USSR,

I believe, via India.

Question: Has this HAMILTON?**

NOSENKO:

I don't know his name.

This was after MARTIN and

MITCHELL...

He helped them a bit.

No question about

To some degree anyway.

After that so far.as I

all with results.

Now they.

are attempting to get a code:clerk.

Question: Here there other attempts made?

NOSENKO: Yes, there was an attempt against Jim STORSBERG. **A

* Willian Hamilton MARTIN and Bernard Furguson MITCHELL were

NSA mathematicians who defected to the Soviets in July

Both had previousiy served with the Naval Security

Group in Japan and were familiar with U.S. intercept and

No indication is available that either

had and detailed knowledge of U.s. cryptographic procedures

- and equipment.

Victor Norris HAMILTON (also known as Fouzi di Mitri HINDALI),

a native of Palestine, worked as a linguist in the Arab

Section of NSA from 1957 to 1959, when he was released for

medical reasons (paranoid schizophrenic).

He defected to

Soviets in Prague on 12 June 1959.

He was not a code

see Part V.t...c.

which describes the STORSBERG case and

ther unsuccessful KGB recruitment

operations involving

American code clerks during. 1960

and 1961.

TOP SECRET

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## Page 248

c. U.S. Evaluations

NOSENKO's statements about the KGB microphones in the Aneri-

can Embassy led to investigations by U.S. authorities which re-

sulted in damage assessments, part of which are germane to

the

NOSENKO reports on KGB cryptologic successes.

"SA examined the

question of cryptographic security in light of the microphones.

found in the State

Department and military code rooms at the

Embassy,

while the USIB Security Committee studied

the

security

ramifications of other microphones which were discovered in

the.

Embassy. Extracts from the NSA and USIB Security Committee

reports are given below.

Although the latter report does not

specifically mention the cryptologic potential held by the micro-

phones, it states that classified cables were dictated in the

Internal Political Section offices until December 1963; nost of

the military cables:

oft, est cortain ones ore dictadd in the typed by the chasina-

(i) NSA Report

There were two code jooms

in the Embassy, one serving

the Department of State and the

other serving

the

attaches.

operating nicrophone was discovered

in each of these two rooms.*

were built for

each

of these rooms,

all cryptographic operations were per-

formed in these enclosures beginning in December 1902.

Er.clo-

sures of this type are

built to rigid specifications and have

been exhaustively tested.

They are designed to protect against

just such networks as discovered in Moscow.

Thus, We may conclude

that there has been no compromise of information

in Moscow due

to cryptographic operations

since December 1962, so long as the

enclosures were operated in accordance with the

proper procedures.

Between 1952 and 1962, however, the

code rooms were not protected

against this type of surveiliance...

"...

It was technicaliy feasible for the Soviets to have re-

covered

the plain

texts of the messages

encrypted and decrypted

by machines; in these code rooms.

This stems from the fact that

teleprinters and cryptographic

equipments do not run silently;

they emit acoustical and electromagnetic energy that isnehey

make.. noise as they type,

sounds

emitted by the macprint, and

information.

inery involve minute differences in

amplitude, frequency, and timing as different letters and charac-

ters are processed by the equipment.

Relatively insensitive

pick-up devices can detect these differences if

they are placed

at fairly close range to the equipment as was the case in each

of the Moscow code rooms.

When these

sounds are recorded and

analyzed the plain text of messages can be reconstructed.

Con-

sidering the specific equipment used, we must conclude that the

Soviets could have recovered the texts of most messages sent to

or from the Moscow Embassy from the time of occupancy until

December 1962 in the case of Department of State traffic, and

through 1960 in the case of attache traffic...

"In addition to the recovery of the plain texts of indi-

vidual messages being processed during this time period in Moscow,

it is possible that information on the cryptographic operation

* According to all knowledgeable sources queried in the investi-

gation of Dayle SMITH, all cryptographic operations, both military

and State Department, were performed in a single room on the ninth

new Embassy building in 1953 and 1954.

• Separate

code rooms were established sometime after this and before 1959.

TOP SERRET

---

## Page 249

•of the MCB (State Department cipher machine) and the KL-25

(Attache cipher machine) was recovered...

the fact that the sounds made by these equipments reflect the

internal mechanical workings of the cipher machine; these sounds

and the cryptosystem itself could

can be recorded, analyzed of this did oceur, not only the nes-

have been reconstructed.

sages processed in Moscow, but also those messages processed by

other posts using the same

machines and the same cryptomaterial

rave been lost to the extent that they were intercepted...

"The attache cryptomaterials are similarly compartmented.

During the period

1952 to 1960, various

rotor machines were used.

In 1952 to 1954, the KL-25 was used in a small net consisting

and India.

From 1955 to 1958,

to date the KL-7 has been used.

In October 1960,

placed in a special sound-pruof box which prevented any attache

traffic from being recovered

after that time, since all attache

messages were processed either in that system or in one-time pad...

ber 1960 Moroug, the bary then de hered urary he messages o-

February 1961

classified Secret and Top

Secret in one-time pads, resulting in

the loss only of the Confidential traffic during that period.

Jepartment of State found it necessary to revert to the use

tape machines for messages classified up to Secrut fron

March 1961 until the enclosures were installed.

Therefore, most

Confidential and Secret traffic was probably lost during that

period; but Top Secret messages were still enciphered in one-time

pads and thus secure...

"We must assume that all Department of State communications

hat were nachine-processed in Moscow could have been compromised

from 1952 to December 1962.

These consisted of messages of all

classifications until October 1960; Confidential messages only

from October 1960 until February 1961; and Confidential

ret messages from February 1901 until December 1962.

"Most Department of State classified messages involving

Iron Curtain posts exclusive of Moscow should also be assumed

to have been compromised during 1952-1959 through cryptomachine

information derived at Moscow.

It can be assumed that such

messages during 1960-1962 were not compromised by this means.

State Department classified messages which excluded Iron Curtain

not have been compromised by the Moscow penetration

because at the isolation of crypto systems.

Machine enciphered military attache traffic processed in

Moscow should be assumed compromised until October 1960, but was

secure after that date.

"During 1952 to 1954,

all traffic in the entire attache net

which included Moscow could have been

, compromised.

"There is no reason to believe that any information was

compromised through cryptographic operations after December 1962

when

special enclosures were installed, so long as the enclosures

were operated

in accordance with the proper procedures..

THE SIGNET

---

## Page 250

we 59.380

(li) USIB Security Committee Report

"The security practices and procedures. lat the American

Embassy appear

io have followed a pattern

from

April 1953 to

May 1960, at which time the first plastic (acoustical, room

was installed.

A change occurred in the work habits lin May

1960) in that the more

senior State Department officers utilized

the plastic room for sensitive discussions and dictation.

The

room could acconmodate only a limited portion of the Embassy

classified discussions and,

accordingly, a

number of classified

discussions were held outside of this secure

arca.

In the April

1953-May 1960 period it was an accepted practice

of the Ambassa-

dor and the Deputy Chief of Mission

to discuss openly in their

offices routine classified operations of the Embassy and to dic-

tate classified documents and telegrams.

Extrenely sensitive

matters such as high-level political decisions, matters perti-

tent to the most sensitive U.S. -Soviet relationships

intelligence operations were not dictated and it discussefositive

were mentioned in a cryptic manner...

"In the External Political Section during the 1953-1960

period there were daily staff meetings...

Work assignments

were given at these meetings to individual officers who, in turn,

prepared classified dispatches or telegrams to the (Statel De-

partment.. It was reported that the officers of the External

Political Section frequently dictated classified material, includ-

ing telegrans,

within their offices.

Officers of the Internal

Political

Section generated few classified telegrams..•

were, however, typed in the offices.

From May 1960 to date (1964)

the Ambassador-DCM operation conducted their most sensitive clas-

sified discussions and actions in the acoustic room; however

routine classified day-to-day operations were discussed and dic-

tated in the offices.

Ambassador KOHLER reported that since

August 1962 he and members of his staff working on substantive

or sensitive matters utilized the secure room and that all ma-

terial to be encrypted was drafted in long-hand or dictated in

the acoustic room.

"The pattern for the External Political Section and the

Internal Political Section remained basically the

same during

the period of May I960 to the present time; however, the most

sensitive matters were discussed or dictated in the

room. or drafted in longhand...

In September 1962 the second

acoustic room was erected

the typing section for the handl-

ing of sensitive classified material.

From December 1963 to

date it was indicated that no classified telegrams have been

dictated outside of the acoustic rooms. It was

stated, however,

that the day-to-day operations including analysis of develop-

ments within the Soviet Union were openly discussed in various

offices and the conclusions reached later became the basis of

classified documents or telegrams...

"The military attaches reported that most cables were

in longhand or typed by the originator and then turned

over to the code clerks for transmission.

In certain instances

cables were dictated in the offices..."

---

## Page 251

1.

Introduction

NOSENKO, as previously indicated, came to Geneva with the

Soviet Delegation to the Disarmament

Conference in mid-March

1962 and established contact with CIA in June of that year.

His arrival in: Geneva and his first meeting with CIA thus

occurred three. months and six months, respectively,

Anatoliy Mikhailovich GOLITSYN defected to CIA from the KGB

Legal Residency in lielsinki, on 15 December 1961,*

and was ex-

filtrated to the United States.

A discussion of what GOLITSYN said about NOSENKO appears in

Part V.I.7.

Presented below are, first, a summary on GOLITSYN,

then

survey comparing GOLITSYN's and NOSENKO's leads, and finally,

a protocol on GOLITSYN which NOSENKC signed.

2.

Background Information on GOLITSYN

GOLITSYN, a KGB counterintelligence. officer, was assigned

the Soviet

Embassy in Helsinki in Julw 1960 under the alias

of Anatoliy KLIMOV.

In defecting to CIa, he provided nore than

20 documents taken from the lielsinki KGB Legal Residency files

as well as extensive information about KCB officers

tions acquired during his 16-year carear in the KGB.

GOLITSYN had had a variety of job and training assignments

in the First Chief Directorate in Moscow and training assignments

in the Second Chief Directorate.+*

The bulk of his career was

spent in work against the American target for the First Chief

Directorate; this vas his responsibility in llelsinki and had

also been his principal area of responsibility during his pre-

vious tour abroad, in Vienna from 1953 to 1955.

(In the lat-

ter assignment he had been known to Petr DERYABIN, who defected

to CIA in 1954, and this was

the reason for GOLITSYN being

assigned to Helsinki under alias.)

Among the GOLITSYN documents was a study of American In-

telligence operations exploiting tourists visiting the USSR,

the so-called "legal travel program.****

This study, which

rung to sixteen pages in translation, was prepared in KGB

Headguarters and was

sent to the Helsinki

Legal Residency under

a cover letter, dated 7 April 1961, which suggested a number

:of steps to be

taken in order to counter such operations.

The study was based on two principal sources:

* According to NOSENKO, GOLIISYN defected on or about 15 Janu- i.

ary 1962, after NOSENKO had been reassigned to the Tourist

Department.

** As a result of this service, GOLITSYN was the original

source of numerous leads to

identifiable penetrations

of hestern Governments, including agents with access

to classified information such as William VASSALL (see

Part VI.D.5.b.) and the French officer in NATO, George

PACQUES.

***See Part V.D.7.C. for details.

---

## Page 252

595.

- The minutes of cId and MI-ó joint conferences on

legal travel operations, held

1959 ard 1960.

(Tt.e

KGB agent George BLAKE -oniessed that he had passed trese

documents to tre Kib.)

Actual cases of emerican legal travel operations in

the USSR which had been revealed to, or uncovered by, the

KGB. (Some of the

cases had seen publicized through.

Sovict

announcements of arrests ard trials, but the majority of

those cases cited by name in

the study had not previously

been known to be compromisea.

In a few instances activities

of the Americar. Irrelligence agents appear to have been

embroidered upon by the KGB. while in some others innocent

tourists were wrongly dicused ly

the KGB since CIA records

reflect rio evidence

to substantiate American Intelligence

affiliation or activity on the part of the individuals

named.)

Among recommendations made

in the cover memorardum was the in

struction

tO rECILit

or place agerts in tourist agencies hardling

travel to the USSR.

These agents couid then provide information

on the use of these farms iy foreign intelligerce services in

work against the Soviet Urion.

GOLITSYN had information on certain aspects of the KGB Second

Chief Directorate work against the U.S.

Embassy in Moscow.

to his assighment ir: Helsirki he had

conferred

Prior

several times in

April and May 1960 with officers ot the U.S. Embassy Section of

the Anerican Department, Second Chief Directoiate, concerning

possible

assistarce ne

couid render chem in their work against

American code clerks transiting Helsinki en route to their Moscow

posts.*

Durirg his assigment to Helsinki he travelled to Moscow

on TDY in January 1961, at nich time he discussed with chese

same officers the possibility of his using ir leisinki a Finnish

businessman, Johannes PREISFREUND, who had

been recruited by the

an operation against an American

code clerk ir Mosconi.""

Second Chief Directorate FOLITSYN acquired further intormation

about such

operations on at least two occasions, wher Second

Chief Directorate officers visited Heisinki

on TDY and either

called on him for support or chatted with him about officers and

operatiors.

3. GOLITSYN Leads and Information from NOSENKO

a.: Microphones in the U.S. Enbassy

In his visits to the Americar. Departmert GOLITSYN learned

by accident of KGB technical operations against the U.S. Embassy

* NOSENKO denied that GOLITSYN visited the American Department

at any time in 1960.

**Although knowing that GOLITSYN went to the American Depart-

ment in 1961, NOSENKO said that the month was not January

out July, for it was in July that he 'NOSENKO) was on leave:

SOLITSYN's passport, however, verifies he was in the Soviet

Union in January 1961 and shows no entries for July of that

See Part V.E. 3... for further details on PREISFREUND.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 253

in Moscow.

When

asked in april 196? about the product fròn such

operations, GOLIISIN said he had heard about

results raay tires,

but the only concrete example he was in a position to giva was

the following:

During one of his visits to the Amarican Depart-

ment in 1960* he heard and

saw that a report or reports of the

results of audiosurveillance in the U.S. anbassy lad been lost.

lihile he was present, the Department Chief ordered all the per-

sonnel to search once more for these papers, and as GOLITSyN

stood there they went through ail their files.

GOLITSYN said

he could see that there were many

such reports, each having a red

line on it, which signified that these reyorts were the property

of that department of the KGB Operational Technical Directorate

(OTU)

which was Icsponsible for making

the installations.

explained that this meant that

He

the American Department had to re-

turr. the reports to that directorate, and this was the reason for

& scarch

being made.

The only cffice

in the U.S. Enbassy which

was specifically menticned in connection with this search was

that of the Minister Counselor.**

b.

NOSENKO have given mutually confirming information, although

their respective reports do rot alrays cover the

sane data.

These operations, all discussed elsewhere in this paper, are:

• - Henry SHAPIRO

Part v.c.2.a

- BENSON, MULE, and SPROUD

- Thoras BAKI'HELENY

Part V.C.3.b.

- Carmen TORREY

Parts V.D. 7.c. & VI.D. 2.d.

Part VI.D.2.a.

* Elsewhere COLITSYN ras stated that he visited the inerican

Department several times betree:: April and June 1950 in

preparatien for his assignnent to ielsiiki in july 1360.

He has also incorrectly

states that he visited the depart-

ment in December 1960 (his passport and CIA travel records

show this was

actually January

1961); GOLITSIN therefore may

have been referring to this inter visit.

** In June 1962, NOSENIO, told CIA that there were microphones

in the offices of the Minister Counsellor at the U.S. Emb-

assy, and he said at that time that he had seen intercept

reports of conversations or dictations by successive mini-

In 1965 NOSENKO volunteered a story about

the loss of one of the intercept repcrts which the imerican

Department had received in 1950 or 1961; he identified it

as one which recorded the Minister Counsello: giving dicta-

tion.

According to NOSENKO, the Anerican Department was

turned upside down for a month, December, in the search

for the missing report.

Although the document was never

found, neither the Chief of the American Department nor

O.M. GRIBANOV, Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, was

subjected to any punishment because the draft fron which

the missing report had been typed was found to be in the

possession of the Second Department of OTU.

From this the

investigators concluded that the document itself had pro-

bably been returned to the OTU and burned,

and that in-

advertently no paper had been executed to record its des-

truction.

T2: 6/258

---

## Page 254

SCATTH

Parts V.D.T. C. & VI.D.2.b.

Part VI.D.4

-Part VI.D.4.

- Canadian Code Clerk

(name not known):

Part VI.D.4.

PaIt VI.D.4

Part VI.D.4.

- William J. VASSALL

- Clandestinu entry

into Swedish Embassy

Fart VI.D.5.a.

Part VI.D.9.

C.

Leads Conflicting with NOSENKO Reports

Either through direct contradictions on a key poirt or

through omissions by NOSENKO about a major feature, there are

five operations on which GOLITSYN and NOSENKO have supplied

conflicting information.

These operations, all discussed

• elsewhere in this paper, are:

- James STORSBERG &

Part V.E.3.c.*

Johannes PREISFREJND

- Adam BROCHES

Fart VI.D.2.a.

¿ Gerald SEVERN

Part VI.D.2.a.

- "SASHA" (KGB

cryptonym)

Part VI.D.2.a.

-Edward E. SMITH

d.

Part VI.D.4.b.

Leads to Oferations Against U.S. Embassy Not Covered by

ROSEMKO

GOLITSYN Iported on six operations against personnel of

the v.s. Embassy

in Moscow which have

not appeared in the re-

porting by NOSENKO.**

These operations are summarized below.

GOLITSYN heard in about 1957 of the recruitment of a fenale

employee--"like a secretary"--of the U.S. Embassy.

American girl, she had travelled to Georgia in 1957. There the

KGB placed in her path a KGB agent, a Georgian male.

They be-

gan living together, and this relationship continued ir. Moscow

where she was recruited.

GOLITSYN's lead to the American recruited with PREISPREUND's

help is eguated to STORSBERG on the basis of NOSE: KO's and

PREISFREUND's statements that FREISFREUND participated in no

other operation.

GOLITSYN reported that the target of this

operation was Iccruited: NOSENKO reported that STORSBERG. Ie-

jected the KGB approach.

** By virtue of his position as Deputy Chief of the t.s. Emb-

assy Section in 1960

and 1961, NOSENKU said, he was directly

responsible for knowing of all KGB operations agains: person-

nel at the Embassy ir. that period and definitely would have

known of any successes since his earlier tour;

he knew that

"ANDREY" was the last successiul one (1953-54).

See erase

---

## Page 255

ofcthe.f.9embassy-section-thatthe-latter-hadagaragentg"

code clerk in the Embassy who was scheduled for transfer to Hel-

This subject came up in a discussion of GOLITSYN's forth-

coming assigment to Helsinki, and SOLITSYN was told that if the

agent was transferred to Helsinki, GRYAZNOV might let GOLITSYN

have him as his agent.

GRYAZ::OV gave GOLITSYN r.0 details about

the operation other than the fact that the agent had provided the

KGB with some information and the KGB considered him "a real agent."

Also in the spring of 1960, GOLITSYN learned from GRYAZIOU

that he, GRYAZNOV, had developed an operation against a military

code clerk at the

U.S. Embassy to the point that the KGB was "99

per cent sure" that the target would be recruited.

accounts given by NOSENKO

and STORSBERG, this does not appear to

concern the STORSPERG operation, which was just beginning at this

NOSENKO has mentioned no other operation against a military

code clerk.

I.Y. KURILENKO told GOLITSYN that while serving in the u.s.

Embassy Section he had followed an American diplomat returning

to

the United States in 1959, and there he had completed the recruit-

ment which had begun while the diplomat was assigned to the u.s.

Embassy in MosCOW.*

According to KURILENKO, he had travelled to

the United States under cover of the Soviet Exhibit Committee.

GRYAZIOV inforred GOLITSYN in April or May 1960 that an

American, possibly a code clerk, but definitely an employee of

recruitient on a ichosexual basis beginning ir. 1959 and concluding

sexual acts.

the KGB, was stressing ideological rather than blacknail recruit-

ments at this time; SHILEPIN said that this method of approach was

"too dirty" and the KGB should find another way.

not exclude the future use of the photographs, which the KGB would

hold in reserve.

Arother case mentioned

by GRYAZNOV to GOLITSYN was that of

the attempted recruitment of an American female secretary on the

basis of her relationship with a KGB agent, either a lover or a

close friend.

The agent, with the help of a KGB officer, tried

to influence her, but failed.

She left the USSR prior to July

1960, but the KGB pianned to work on her again, as she was to

return to Moscon.

On a TDY trip to Helsinki in November 1960, V.V. KOSOLAPOV

of the U.S. Embassy Section told GOLITSYN that he had come there

in order to ride basi. to Moscow on the train with a U.S. Embassy

code clerk with whom he planned to strike up an acguaintance to

be continued in Moscow.**

In about September 1961 a friend of ':

KOSOLAPOV's came to Helsinki on TDY, and GOLITSYN tried to get

his to talk about KOSOLAPOV's train operation, but he would not

From this GOLITSYN was certain that the re-

cruitment had been successful.

GOLITSYN learned from V.M. KOVSHUK, apparently in January 1961,

that the Finnish agent. Johan PREISFREUND had recently been used in

the successful recruitment of an American at the U.S. Embassy.

NOSENKO has described no

successful operations in which PREISFREUND

took part (see preceding section) .

NOSENKO said that there was no operational reason for KURILENKO's

travel to the United States at the

time of the Soviet Exhibition

in New York City, and that KURILENKO's duties related only to

security; the KGB Resident in New York City, NOSENKO added, could

have given KURILENKO some special task if he wished.

** See Part V.E.4.b. for discussion of KOSOLAPOV's TDYs to Helsinki.

TOP SECRET

...... asle to malia

---

## Page 256

PATHETAM

599.

4.

NOSENKO's Information on GOLITSYN

In February 1965, after he had been questioned by

CIA about GOLITSIN,

NOSENKO signed the

following state-

ment concerning his knowledge of GOLITSYN:

"I have never net or seen Anatoliy Mikhailovich

GOLITSYN.

"During

the period 1960-1961, while I was serving

as Deputy Chief,

First (U.S.Enbassy) Section,

First

(American] Department,

Second Chief Directorate of the

KGB,

I remember that Anatoliy COLITSYN visited the

Section

to

discuss the proposed use of my agent "PROKHOR"

(PREISFREUND) in

the operations of the Helsinki Residentura.

I was away from Moscow at the time of COLITSYN's visit,

but I know that he talked to V.M. KOVSHUK, and that at

KOVSHUK's request he also talked to (Yevgeniy) GROMAKOV-

SKIY (of the American Department) about American diplomatic

couriers travelling through Helsinki en route to and from

Moscow, and

do not remember what they

to KOSOLAPOV about American code clerks;

specifically discussd.

learned about this visit from KOVSHUK after I

o Moscow from leave,

and also heard about it from

COSOLAPOV and GROMAKOVSKIY.

"I do not linow the date of this visit of GOLITSYN's,

but I do know that it was after hewas posted to Helsinki.

I believe that it was in the

summer of 1961.

I know for

icertain that I was away from Moscow at the time on leave,

because KOVSHUK told me about it after I returned from

Since he discussed code clerks, I would have met

him if I had been there.

told by my interrogators that this

visit of GOLITSYN's took place in January 1961.

not believe this to be true because I know that I was

away on leave when he came and my leave was in July

"I never heard of any other visits by GOLITSYN to

First Section, First Departnent, during the time

that I served there in 1960-1961.

"I have been told by my

interrogators that GOLITSYN

First Section, First Department, three times

in May-June 1960 before going to Helsinki and that he

talked at length to KOVSHUK and GRYAZNOV about what ne

could do. in the Helsinki Residentura to assist our Section.

in its operations against code clerks coning to the

American Embassy in Moscow.

I am sure that GOLITSYN did

such visits in 1960 and that no such conver-

sations took place at that time.

Since I directly super-

KOSOLAPOV and shared the

same office with then, any professional discussions by them

with GOLITSYN about code clerks would be either with my

knowledge of would be reported to me.

make such visits in May-June 1960, I cannot explain why I

do not know about them.

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 257

"I have been told by my interrogators that KOSOLAPOV

visited Helsinki in November 1960 to accompany an American

code clerk on the train to Moscow. " I have also been told

that on this trip he had official. contact with GOLITSYN

concerning this code clerk and concerning one of GOLITSYN'S

assignments to assist the carst section, first Departmert,

Second Chief Directorate by developing

code clerks before they left Helsirki for Moscow.

not know that KOSOLAPOV went to Helsinki in November 1960.

I do not know that NOSOLAPOY accompanied any American

code clerk to Moscow from Helsinki,

except Paul JENNER.

•I do not know that KOSCLAPOV met with GOLITSY.Y and dis-

cussed the

subject of code clerks with him in Helsinki

November 1960 or that KOSOLAPOV ever sai GOLITSYN in

Helsinki.

"I do not remember that exact date of GOLITSYN's

defection,

but I know that it was in January 1962, I

believe on the 15th or 17th of January.

I do remember

that he defected on a Saturday and that it was nor

discovered until the folloking Monday * I an certain

that GOLITSYN's defection took place after I had trans-

ferred back to the Seventh (Tourist) Department in

January 1962.

In the ensuing investigation within

the KGB, I was rever questioned on what code clerk

operations GOLITSYN may have known about.

"I know that no written damage report on GOLITSYN's

defection was prepared in the Second Chief Directorate.

In the Seventh Departnent, where I was serving at the

cima of GOLITSYN's defection, I remember that V.D.

CHELNOKOV, the Chief of the Department, has questioned

orienterovka (study) on tourist operations

which GOLITSYN was known to have taken.

"I have been told by my interrogators that GOLITSYN

the night of 15 December 1961. I cannot

accept this date because I know that I was no longer in

the First Department at the time of GOLIISYN's defection.

I agree that the true date of GOLITSYN's defection must

be know. to the ClA, and I can only assume that ry inter-

rogators have either made a mistake or are tryin! to trep

case, I still maintain that COllIe! dr? sted

the Seventh Department in January i:i2."

F.

Surveillance of Soviets in the United States

1.

Information from NOSENKO

At the second meeting with CIA in Geneva in 1962, NOSENKO

related that V.A. KOZLOV,

Chief of the American Department

of the KGB seventh (Surveillance) Directorate, had gone to

the United States the year before to investigate the suspected

cessation of survelllance of Soviets stationed in New York City

• The 15th of January 1962 fell on a Monday.

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## Page 258

601.

and Washington, D.C."

NOSENKO said

"We have sensed that something has happened in Anericanere

at that time.

"We do not feel

is no surveillance. "

surveillance.

The KGB Legal Resident in New York City,

B.S. IVANOV; had reported the situation. to the KGB First Chief

Directorate which,

in turn,' had scught the Second Chief Direc-

torate's opinion as to thy no surveillance has being noted.

Unable to suggest a reason, the Second, Chief Directorate asked

whether the surveillance of Soviets could have been called off

The First Chief Directorate doubted that this

could be the case but dia state that radio traffic normally

used in U.S. surveillance "was not on the air."

sequently was sent to the United States to assess the situ-

and in the course of a month, NOSENKO said, he visited

both New York City and Washington.

KOZLOV discovered not only

that there was no surveillarce of

Soviets but also that "they

dropped our democracies

• Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary. They

temporarily took them (surveillance) off."

Also at this meeting NOSENKO conmented that:

- "If your surveillance comes up on the radio, they

(KGB monitors) pick them up everywhere."

The practice of KGB case officers has not to

proceed directly

from a Soviet installation to a neeting

with an agent,

but rather to use other Soviets as decoys

"so that you will think we are working on somebody, where-

as in fact we are not working on then.

(American)

veillance

is onto everyody as soon as they come out

the door" of a Soviet installation.

NOSENKO's only other reference to surveillance in the

United States was made

on 29 January 1964 during a discussion

of the "ANDREY" case. **

while V.M.KOVSHUK was in the United

States trying to reestablish contact with "ANDREY", NOSENKO

said, he was usually accompanied by two other KGB officers.

KGB monitoring of FBI surveillance communications revealed

that XOVSHUK

and the othersand were referred to by the FBI as

"the Three Musketeers."

2. Information from Other Sources

&. GOLITSYN

In early 1962 GOLITSYN reported that the KGB was well

KOZLOV was in New York City From I5 November to so December

1961, except for a two-week period (from 5 to 19 December)

when

he was in Washington.

His departure fron New York City

fell on the same day that

John ABIDIAN visited the Pushkin

Street dead drop in Moscow and that, according to NOSENKO,

KOZLOV later went to the dead drop site (see Part V.E.3.d.).

KOZLOV had earlier been in the United States with the

Bolshoy Ballet, from 12 April to 14 June®

For further details on the

"ANDREY" case, see Part VI.D. 3.b.

The others, V.M.IVANOV and A.K.KISLOV, were not named by

NOSENKO.

TS: 239A

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602.

acquainted with Americar counterintelligence surveillance

tactics, and since abour 1953 the KGB,

through special ap-

paratus, was able to monitor radio raffic stonming from

hmerican surveillance of

Soviet Embassy personnel.

while at

the KGB Juridical Institute in 1957-58,

COLITSYS said, he

had read studies on

the nethods used by U.S. counterintelligence

and Fondugting surveillance of sovict officials in

Washington

New York City.

The studies included sone American documents,

obtained through KGB agent sources, containing instructions

for carrying out surveillance on Soviets. The KGB, SOLITSYN

added, used

this information defensively abroad and in adapting

its own surveillance techniques withir

the USSR.

c.

CHEREPANOV Document

One of the documents provided by CHEREPANOY in November

1963*

was entitled "Operational Conditions in the l.S.A. and

tia Activities of American Cousterintelligence Organs Against

Soviet Installations and Soviet Citizens in the U.S.A. in

1957-58.'

dearly half of this document, signed by A.s.

FEKLISOV,"* vas devoted to a discussion

of the organization

and methods

of FBl surveillance of Soviet officials statloned

in New York City and

lashington.

The information

(sources

not indicated) covers radio

communicaticns.between

fixed

surveillance posts and mobile surveillance posts.

The CHEREPANOV documents are reviewed at greater length.

•in Part VI.D.7.c.

FEKLISOV.

under the alias FOMIN, previously served as KGB

Legal Resident in Washington:

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