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176-10036-10185]

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IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA

RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10185

RECORD SERIES : National Security Files

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FROM :

TO :

• TITLE : Memorandum of Conference with the President

DATE : 10/29/1963

PAGES : 4

SUBJECTS :

DOCUMENT TYPE :

CLASSIFICATION :

RESTRICTIONS :

CURRENT STATUS :

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS: National Security Files, Box 317: Meeting on Vietnam. Box 1

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MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT

October 29, 1963, 4:20 PM, Subject: Vietnam

Others present: Vice President, Secretary Rusk, Secretary

:. McNamara, Attorney General, Director McCone,

•General Taylor, General Krulak, Under Secre-

tary Harriman, Mr. Alexis Johnson, Mr.. William

Bundy, Mr. Helms, Mr. Mendenhall (State),

• Mr. Colby (CIA), Mr. Bundy, Mr. Forrestal,

Mr. Bromley. Smith

Mr. Colby.of ClA gave the current status of coup forces. He estimated

that the pro-Diem and anti-Diem forces were about even, approximately

9800 on each side; with 18, 000 listed as neutral. The briefing was illus-

trated with a CIA order of battle map.

The President asked what Diem had learned from the attempted coup

in 1960. Mr. Colby replied that Diem now had much better communica-

tions with military forces deployed outside Saigon. He could thus call

into Saigon rapidly loyal forces to oppose rebel forces in the city. The

:1960 coup was frustrated when forces outside Saigon remained loyal,

moved into Saigon, and defeated the forces which had surrounded the

palace.

Mr. McGeorge Bundy suggested that the assessment just given the

group be sent to Saigon to see if our officials there agreed with it. He

asked whether Ambassador: Lodge should return to Washington now and

mentioned that some of those present felthe should stay in Saigon.

Secretary Rusk said we must assume that Diem and Nhu have heard

rumors about a coup.

The question for us is whether we think there is

- enough prospect of a successful coup to make the decision to keep silent.

Should we let the coup generals know that a protracted civil war must

not be the result of their efforts to overthrow Diem? Should we tell

them we would support them only if the coup is short and bloodless? If

fighting between the two sides takes place, each will ask for our help.

If we support Diem, then we will disrupt the war effort because we will

be acting against those generals who are now fighting the war against the

Viet Cong. If we support the rebel generals, then we will have to

guarantee that they are successful in overthrowing the Diem government.

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Ambassador: Lodge was asked by General Don to stick to his departure

plan so.Lodge should go as he had planned. . We now have little informa-

tion. . We need 48, not 4, hours advance notice of any coup. We should

put our faith in no one, including General Don.' We should caution the

generals that they must have the situation in hand before they laurch

a coup. . We should tell them we have

no interest whatsoever in a long

civil war in'South Vietnam.

The President agreed that Ambassador Lodge should leave Saigon for

•Washington as he had planned. He thought the rebel generals should

talk to General Harkins. He said the odds were against a coup. He

suggested that General Harkins be put in charge of our mission in

Saigon when Ambassador Lodge leaves. If Ambassador Lodge delays

his departure, Diem will know we are aware of coup plans. It would

be good to have Ambassador: Lodge out of the country when a coup takes

place:

Regarding the estimate that the pro: and anti-Diem forces are evenly

balanced, the President commented that it always looks this way until

the coup actually begins. Then support for the coup is forthcoming,:

as was apparent, for example, in Korea.

General Taylor cautioned against looking at the Vietnam situation as

if it were a football game. He said a few key people are crucial to

the success of a coup and are more important than total numbers.

The President asked that we try to find out who these key people are.

Secretary McNamara asked who of our officials in Saigon are in charge

of the coup planning. He suggested that the Deputy Chief of Mission,

Truehart, the Acting Chief of CIA, Smith, and General Harkins form a

group which would(djointly decide on what our agent Conein would say

and do, and: (b)hear.all of Conein's reports.. If any of the three dis-

agree, a report would be sent back to Washington at once. General

Harkins may not know what the Embassy and CIA are now doing.

Truehart should head the Vietnamese country team until the coup was

initiated.

" At that time, General Harkins would take over with Truehart

becoming his political adviser.

Director McCone did not agree that a troika should be set up in Saigon.

He said it would be better for the CIA officer to take direction rather

than participate in a decision-making.group.

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The Attorney General, acknöwledging that he had not seen all of

the reports; "said that in his opinion the present situation makes no

sense to him on the façe of it. : The situation in Vietnam is not com-

parable to that'in Irag or in a South American country where a coup

could be brought off promptly. The situation now is no different

than that of four months ago when the generals were not able to

organize a coup. To support a coup would be putting the future of

Vietnam and in fact all of Southeast Asia in the hands of one man

not now known to us... Diem will not run from a fight or quit under

pressure.. A failure of a coup risks so much. . The reports we have

are very thin and the information about the assets which the rebel

generals have at their commard is limited. We have a right to know

what the rebel generals are planning. We can't go half way. If the

coup fails, Diem will throw us out. If we send out the draft cable...

as it stands, it will appear that we are.in favor of a coup and only

want more information.:"My view is the minority view."

Secretary Rusk replied that if we say we are not for a coup," then the

coup-minded military leaders will turn against us and the war effort

will drop off rapidly.

General Taylor said he agreed with the Attorney General. When

pressed by the President, General Taylor said that even a successful

coup would slow down the war effort because the new central govern-

ment would be inexperienced. In addition, all of the province chiefs

appointed by Diem would probably be replaced by a new government.

Director McCone said he agreed with General Taylor. The failure of

a coup would be a disaster and a successful coup would have a harmful

effect on the war effort.

The President asked General Taylor why all the province chiefs would

be replaced. He replied that as Diem appointeees they would'be loyal

to Diem, and,

therefore, not trusted by the rebel generals who had

overthrown Diem.

Secretary Rusk said the important question was whether the rebel

generals could achieve quick success. He felt that in the long run;

if the Diem government continued, the war effort would go down hill.

Mr. Harriman said it was clear that in Vietnam there was less and

less enthusiasm for Diem, We cannot predict that the rebel generals

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can overthrow the Diem government, but Diem cannot carry the

country to victory over the Viet Cong.: With the passage of time,

objectives in Vietnam will become more and more difficult to

achieve with Diem in control.

The President said it appears that the pro- and anti-Diem military

forces are about equal.. If this is so, any attempt to engineer.a coup

is silly. If Lodge agrees with this point of view, then we should in-

struct him to discourage a coup.

Mr. McGeorge Bundy said the most unfortunate development would be

a three-day civil war in Saigon. The time remaining for us to instruct

Lodge is very short. If a military plane were sent to pick up Lodge.

the Ambassador could stay longer in Vietnam during the uncertain days

immediately ahead.

Secretary. McNamara thought that we ought to leave it up to Ambassador

Lodge when he would leave Saigon for Washington. In commenting on

the draft cable, he said he thought Lodge would read it as a change of

signals. Lodge now believes that he is not to thwart a coup. The draft

instructs him to call in General Harkins, which would be difficult to do

in view of the fact that Lodge is not now keeping General Harkins in-

formed of developments. The Ambassador should be given an option to

delay his return if he wishes.

The President asked what were Lodge's existing instructions. In reply,

Secretary Rusk readia paragraph from the October 5 telegram.

The President agreed to ask Lodge what he thought he ought to do about

returning to Washington. Mr. McGeorge Bundy said the working group

would rewrite the draft cable.

Bromley. Smith

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