TESTIMONY OF RICHARD HELMS
Originator: SSCIA
Document date: 09/11/1975
Document type: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

## Page 1

157-10011-10060

2022 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

Date: 09/30/93

Page: 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY

: SSCIA

RECORD NUMBER

: 157-10011-10060

RECORDS SERIES :

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA

FROM :

TO. :

TITLE :

TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING

DATE : 09/11/75

PAGES : 71

SUBJECTS :

TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING: WITNESS, HELMS, RICHARD

EXHIBIT: MEMO FOR THE RECORD RE CUBAN OPERATIONS

CABLES

EXHIBIT: MEMO FOR RECORD RE SILENCER FOR FAL AUTO RIFLE

REBELLON, JOSE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION : T

RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED

CURRENT STATUS : P

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 09/29/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :

SSCI Box 247, Folder 4

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

NW 50955

DooId: 32203828

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gsh 31

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Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

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6'

TOP SECRET

really know all of this in detail.

Mr. Kelley. Do you know who Aprile was?

Mr. Helms. He was a Cuban exile leader, is the best

definition to give to ARIME

Mr. Kelley. I am told by a member of our staff who

reviewed these documents in their unsanitized forms that

BI

Bell.

was ARTIME

that I-1 was AMLASH, and that the case

officers whom they have questioned about these documents -

Mr. Helms.

Wasn't Anna also a member of the Cuban

Brigade?

First

Street

S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

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Pigs.

Mr. Kelley. He was very heavily involved in the Bay of

INT MISH

L-1 was AMLASH in the period '64-'65,

and the case officers who were invölved in these documents

have testified, they say, that Desmond Fitzgerald knew all

about what they were doing, that he was informed that they

were trying to put AMLASH in touch with our teammate in order

to effect AMLASH's goal of assassinating Castro, and that

the case was a very big one, at least in their view of what

the DDP Directorate was doing at the time.

Mr. Helms. Who said Fitzgerald knew all of these things?

Mr. Kelley. The case officers that they were working

for Fitzgerald.

Now my question is did you know what Fitzgerald was

doing? Did Fitzgerald report to you what he and his case

officers were doing with respect to AMLASH?

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ash 33

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TOP SECRET

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

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this case,. I think, two of them out in Europe some place,

handling an asset -- and just how often you put your finger

into the pie, if at all, other than getting yourself routinely

briefed by one of your trusted --

MI. Helms. It would be the latter. Fitzgerald would be

the man who would report to me and tell me what was going on.

Get what authorizations he needed for me, bring me whatever

papers had to be signed in order to carry on his work. Obviously

minutes of 303 Committee meetings would come to me with

regard to participating, whether I did or didn't.

In other words, I would keep in the policy line there.

But the actual operational details, day to day, would " n

be handled by Fitzgerald and his people in these various

stations, Miami, Madrid, and so forth. They would come into

him in Washington.

What telegrams going back and forth I would see of would

not see, I would not have every single telegram there to

find out, but this was generally, he reported to me. I didn't

go down and talk to individual case officers about these.

Mr. Kirbow. One other question.

Mr. Helms. Except on rare occasions.

Mr. Kirbow. Sure.

After Desmond Fitzgerald returned from his trip to meet

with AMLASH, hoding himself forth, apparently properly to be

a representative of the United States government, do you recall

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SEC

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CiTE

SECRET 031240Z

3. MAY 64

IN 74774

REF: DIR 16696

1. AGENT ASSESSMENT SUBJECT PARA TWO REF IS HE INTELLIGENT

CLEVER COURAGEOUS PICTURESQUE INDIVIDUAL WHO HAS CONFIDENCE OF

AGENT-1 AND SUBSTANTIAL KNOWLEDGE LATTER'S ANTI REGIME PLANS

INCLUDING DETAILS OF DISPOSAL. THOUGH EARLIER NOT INCLINED SHARE

AGENT-1 ENTHUSIASM AGENT NOW ENTIRELY CONVINCED BY RECENT TALKS

WITH SUBJECT THAT HE WELL MOTIVATED VERY USEFUL COLLABORATOR

FOR AGENT-1 PARTICULARLY IN CUBA AND IS NOT PLAYING DOUBLE GAME.

IN MAKING HIS ASSESSMENT AGENT OBVIOUSLY ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE

TO FACT AGENT-I GAVE SUBJECT THE CLOSELY HELD "N" ACCOMMODATION

ADDRESS.

2. SUBJECT DOES NOT PLAN STAY EUROPE BUT IN KEEPING RECENT

ADVICE BY CHE GUEVARA NOW EXPECTS GO BACK CUBA IN THREE OR FOUR

MONTHS. MEANWHILE HIS LODGING BEING PAID BY CARRILLO WHO DURING

UPCOMING TRIP CUBA WILL SEE WHAT MORE CAN BE DONE. SUBJECT DOES

NOT WANT BE ASSIGNED EMBASSY PARIS AS WOULD HAVE TO REMAIN AT LEAST

YEAR AND HALF BEFORE RETURN CUBA. SUBJECT HAS HAD IDEA GO SPAIN

IN INTERIM BUT AGENT HAS SOUGHT APPARENTLY SUCCESSFULLY DISCOURAGE

HIM.

3. SUBJECT TOLD AGENT HE REPORTED TO CARRILLO A RECENT

APPROACH BY MIGUEL ROCHE IN PARIS ON BEHALF OF AMERICANS. BY SO

DOING SUBEROMEELS HE INCREASED STANDING WITH CARRILLO. IN RE

406 → 1915

CIA

SECRET

APPROVED FOR RELENSE 1903

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEN PROGRAM-

AS SANITIZED

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3

SECRET

COPY CANNOT BE XEROX

CiTE

ARI

SECRET 031220Z

REF: DIR 16696

3 MAY 64 IN 74775

1. MSG WHICH SUBJECT PARA TWO REF HAD FROM AGENT-1 WAS THAT

LATTER WANTS SILENCER FOR THE BELGIAN FAL SUBMACHINEGUN SOONEST.

THIS TO BE DELIVERED TO M FOR J. AGENT NOT ABLE GET BETTER

DESCRIPTION WEAPON BUT SAYS IT IS THE NATO WEAPON WHICH MILITIA

CUBA CARRY.

.. *

2. SUBJECT PARA TWO REF LED BY AGENT THINK LATTER WILL TRY

GET SILENCER TO CUBA VIA RELATIVES ITALY. ACTUALLY CIA WOULD

HAVE TO DELIVER. J IN IGNORANCE HOS KNOWLEDGE DETAILS CIA OFFICER

ASKED TO WHAT ADDRESS ITEM COULD BE DELIVERED IF DESIRED DO SO.

AGENT GAVE IDENS A AND B ON AUPN. "NICK"' HAS BACKGROUND.

3. JOSE ALBERTO IBARRA MARTIN HAS NOT COME TO PARIS AND

PROBABLY WILL NOT ACC SUBJECT PARA TWO REF. BASIC REASON IS HE

TURNED DOWN REQUEST BY FAURE HE WORK FOR DSE IN INTERNATIONAL

FIELD WHILE ABROAD. DID SO BECAUSE HE BASICALLY FRIEND OF

FAURE AND DID NOT WANT BETRAY HIM.

AGeNT

4. NO INFO ON SUBJECTS PARA THREE REF. a THINKS MAY LEARN

ABOUT THEM GENEVA WHERE GOES 3 MAY. ADDITIONAL RESPONSE TO REF

FOLLOWS SEPARATELY.

SECRET

I FROM

.. is. 1975

CIA

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AS SANTAND

le

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COPY

WiLLNOT ZEROY

"SECRET

SECRET 041736Z

4-MAy 64

DIR CITE PA

3946,

IN 75.524

1. MEDICAL DOCTOR (SOURCE) SPANISH CITIZEN WHO WENT CUBA

LATE OCTOBER 1963 AS FOREIGN TECHNICIAN, RETURNED PARI 15 APRIL,

DISILLUSIONED WITH CONDITIONS AND TREATMENT CUBA. SUBJECT IS FAMILY

FRIEND AGENT-9.

2. WHILE WORKING IN HOSPITAL IN SANTIAGO DE CUBA SUBJ SAW

AGENT-1 TOLD SUBJ HE WANTS LEAVE CUBA WITH MOTHER AND SON AND

OBTAIN SCHOLARSHIP IN FRANCE. SOURCE STATES DEPRESSED AND HAS

MANY ENEMIES IN CUBAN GOVT.

3. SOURCE STATES THAT, SHORTLY BEFORE LEAVING CUBA, CUBAN

DOCTORS AT HOWPITAL TOLD HIM "SOMETHING BIG" GOING TO HAPPEN CUBA

WITHIN "NEXT FEW WEEKS" AND ADVISED SOURCE TO LEAVE ASAP. ACCORD-

ING SOURCE DOCTORS IMPLYING THIS "SOMETHING" WILL BE ATTEMPT OVERTHRON

CASTRO REGIME AND DOCTORS ANTICIPATING THIS WITH PLEASURE. SOURCE

STATES AGENT-1 LIFE IN DANGER AND HE WILL BE KILLED IF OVERTHROW

ATTEMPT FAILS.

4. RELATED ABOVE IS ANOTHER AGENT'S STATEMENT TO SECOND AGENT

THAT AGENT ONE THREE OR FOUR WEEKS AGO WAS PLANNING ASSASSINATION

ATTEMPT. IMPLICATION WAS IT DELAYED FOR REASONS WHICH AGENT-1

APPEARED NOT TO HAVE LEARNED:

5. NO. INDEX.

SECRET

RECEI.: I FROM

AUG 12 1915

CIA

S2028

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1903

CIA MISTORICAL-REVER FROGRAM

SANTIZED

27/1194

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SE C

R

E T

FROM:

TO: PRIORITY HADR

INFO:

"PARTA

73 Decty

CITE DIR 73048

REF:

MADR

263)

(IN 47894)

MADR WITH

1. AT MEETING 22 DEC

CONFIRMED

01 09

IN ORDER DETERMINE EXTENT AND DEPTH

L-1 PLANS TRAVEL

26 DEC. PRIMARY REASON HIS MADR TRIP IS TALK WITH

CONVERSATIONS

WITH B-I REPS MADR. ALTHOUGH FROM PERSONAL SECURITY POINT OF

VIEW, SINCE HE RETURNING ZUBA,

L- DISINCLINED MEET PERSOMALLY

WITH B-I , HE INTERESTED DETERMINING FROM

WHAT CAN BE

GAINED TO ADVANCE STRUGGLE AGAINST CASTRO BY JOINING FORCES WITH

B-1 AND HIS GROUP.

2. .

WAS INFORMED BY: CIA AT MEETING IN PARI EARLY

DEC 64 THAT -UNG CANNOT RENDER ANY KIND OF SUPPORT AND WOULD NOT

BECOME INVOLVED IN ANY WAY IN HIS PLAN NEUTRALIZE CASTRO., L-I•

CLAIMS TO UNDERSTAND U,G.G. POSITION BUT SINCE HE SEES NO OTHER

SOLUTION TO CUBAN PROBLEM HE PLANS CONTINUE HIS OWN EFFORTS AND

ATTEMPT IGNITE INTERNAL COUP AGAINST CASTRO REGIME. SINCE L-I

AWARE HE CANNOT GET SUPPORT FROM U,S.G, HE MAY TRY B-I-. WHILE

HQS WOULD LIKE SEE, L-/ AND B-I • GET TOGETHER, IT IS NOT

DESIRED CIA. BE INTERMEDIARY. WE CAN ONLY ENCOURAGE INDIRECTLY AND

PERMIT THEM

REACH OWN DECISIONS..

L-1 WAS TOLD U.S-G.HAS NO

RECEIVED FROM

AUG :3 1975

GlA

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CIA HISTORICAL-REVIEW PROGRAM

AS SANITIZED

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SECRET

PAGE 2

CONTROL OVER.. BI

SINCE HE OPERATES FROM OUTSIDE ..U. 5.

TERRITORY BUT IT FACT B-I MOST ACTIVE LEADER WORKING

FOR LIBERATION HIS COUNTRY.

i.e

3. WHILE PROBABLY SUSPECTED, NEITHER L-I ! NOR B-I

KNOW THAT CIA IN UNILATERAL CONTACT WITH OTHER. CIA DOES NOT

PLAN REVEAL THIS FACT OR CONFIRM IT IF THEY MEET AND REVEAL CASE

ANOTHER

TO EACH OTHER. ALTHOUGH AGENT HAS BEEN BRIEFED IN PAST, PLEASE

REMIND HIM HE SHOULD NOT REVEAL HIS KNOWLEDGE L-I CONTACT

WITH CIA TO ANYONE.

o thea

4. IF L-I TAKES INITIATIVE CONTACT AGENT WHILE IN

MADRID, SUGGEST CONTACT BE PERMITTED SINCE THEY PERSONAL FRIENDS.*.

OTHER

HOS INTERESTED RECEIVING ANYTHING L- I MAY TELL AGENT.

DID NOT ASK FOR

CIA CONTACT IN MADRID AND NONE REQUIRED.

MAY ASK FOR

ON PERSONAL BASIS BUT CONTACT UNNECESSARY.

END OF

MESSAGE

DC/ WH/ SA

C/WE

SECRET

RECS) FROM

2.30 1975

GIA

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CLASSIFIEO MISSARE

2. I SECRET

NOTIFIED

1 come

117 neare

BEFRODINTION FORMIAITE?

ACTION

ADVANCE

corr

1 BA

705

RY

INCIDICI DRE NAFILE

ASLE

SECRE

T 050836

IMMEDIATE OUR INGRIMMEDIRTE WAVE

CIT<

50r6186035

REQUESIED URGENE MTE WILH CADE OFFICER A OCT.

SAIU MEE WITH

A JOURCE

3 UCI WHICH TIME SOURCE

REVEALED SOME DETAILO ME PLAID UE ACIU AIMLU AL UVERINKUW. CASTRO

GUVI• FOLL GIST SaRCE KeitAKRu:

PRESENI MISSION IS MAKE CUNCACIS AMUNG MILITARY LEAVERS OUTOIDi

CUBA • SOURCÉI GUING PARIUS OCT GIDER MLLI WITH CIUS ANOTHER

PERSON ENO IS COULEE ADDS TO BEID NO GAIS MUTELA FANDO INE

4=3

_ WITH

IIM.

ALÜU INVULVLU LUT

UN KNOWN

IF ME GOING PAMID. JOUCCE ANU

MILL RETURi. MAÜHID

9 OCT.

GROUY AWAITING UNIULNIIFIED HIGH MIL UTILER LEAVE CUBA

UNDER TRAVEL PARIS FOR "SUMMIE MEETING WISH B-I WHICH GUERILLY

TO OCCUR BY MID-NOVEMBER. PUMPOSE WOULU DE COORDINATE ACTION,

INCLUDING ASSASSINATION CASTROFOLLUWED BY MIL COUP TO TAKE PLACE.

SUNK TIME DEC 64. ESTATION COMMENT: PRESUME MIL LEAUER L-I L

HAS AGALEU ACCEPI ASSASSIN ROLLO SOURCE HIMSELE PLANNING

dACK

ENTRY CUBA 1U MAKE NECESSARY ARRANGLINIS. AUDED THAT

ALUVE MIL OFFICEK MAY NUI UE AULE RETURN

RECEIED FROM

SOURCEl SAID NE ALTING UNDER CIA INSTRUCTIONS. SAID

AN o 1975

SECRET

CIA

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CIA HISTORICAL-REVIEN PROGRAM

AS SANITIZED be

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

IN 81Z9%_PAGE 2

AND ASSETODI RECEIVED URUENS FROM CIA MELT WIIN MIN IN PARIS, MU

NUI MAURID, DUE PUBLICILY GIVEN MRR FOLLOWING SIERRA ANGLARO DiCIDE.

IMPRESSION IS SOURCES MISSION POSJIULY NOT CIA I SPOORLI

SINCE

SOURCEHAD ASKED

FOR LOAN TO PAY AIR PARIS TO PANIS

WHICH

REFUSED "FOR LACK FUNUSO" SOURCE FINALLY GOT VILLA

FROT

"G"

THIS REGAIU:

3O SOURCE HAS ASKED

(NIG

GLED MR MAHLERS

SERVE AS MIS LOCAL CONTACI, MONLVER

STALLINE MIN UNTIL STATIVI

APPROVAL GIVENE SOURCE STRESSLO HE DIU NUT INE ANNOUE TOUS SCHILI

MAR REP SPAIN BECOME WITTING

ANY ASPECIS AbUVL PLAI

MEETING WITH SOURCE TODAY AND

WILL PROVIDE GLACIUN PULL REPURI S OL

4• JOURCE TOLD

3

'ONFIDENTIALLY IAT MOST MIL LLADER'S

INSIDE CUBA "WANI NO PARI UP

AMERiCANS DAlU INLY SUFPORTING

ABOVE ACIION AS MEANS PILCLUDE

STRUE PLAL PULL MIL UNIVERS ENH

FUTURE.

SO STATION MAS NOS CONTACTLU

ATTEMPING REACH NIM PRIORS OGI TRIP, OUSIENJIOLY UUIAN HIS MUTO-

GRAPH WHICH HE PROMISEU PROVIDE, AND TRY ELICIT INTO HIS TIRAVIL MU

GROUP'S PLANS.

6 STATION UNADLE EVALUATE ANY ABOVE INFO, HOWEVER WILL ATTEMPT

DISCREETLY MONITOR THESE ACIIVITIES.

SECRET

# DISSEM PER

CABLES

RECEIVED FROM

ANG 40. 1975

CliA.

SECRET

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COPY -OiN NOT ZERO SECRET

11

FROM:

ADRID

PRIORITY DIR INFO PRIORITY

WAVE CATE MADR 41926

8 OCT 64

IN 89419

REF

MADR

1. CO MET WITH

3252

SOuRCE

5 OCT. SAID GOING PARIS SAME DAY 2000

HOURS ON AIR FRANCE FLT WITH FRIEND HE REFUSED IDENTIFY, SAYING

"I'M NOT WORKING FOR YOU YET RPT YET." PROMISED PROVIDE FULL

DETAILS HIS TRIP ON RETURN MADR 9/10 OCT. DID SAY HE WOULD

CONTACT

THERE.

2. SPOKE IN VAGUE TERMS RE "BIG PLAN" AIMED AT DISCREDITING

CUBAN OFFICIALS IN EUROPE, INCLUDING POSSIBILITY BREAK IN RELATIONS

SPAIN/ CUBA LATER SAID MIGHT NEED OUR HELP OBTAIN A

VISA FOR SELF. IN REPLY TO QUERY WHETHER HIS PROPOSED TRAVEL

CONNECTED ANY WAY WITH "CIS MISSION," SAID HIS OBJECTIVE TO KILL

CASTRO AND OVERTHROW HIS GOVT.

3. SAID PLANS MEET PARIS WITH PERSON WHO "ARRANGED" SIERRA

ARANZAZU ATTACK BY PAYING OFF RADIO OPERATOR TO SEND POSITION TO

ATTACKING CRAFT. SAID R/O HAS TOLD WHOLE STORY TO SPANISH POLICE.

4. ACCORDING SUBJ, (FNU) MORALES OF CUBAN EMB PARI WORKING FOR

ANofter

SERViCE. JOKINGLY COMMENTED MANY CUBAN OFFICIALS COLLABORATING WITH

HOST GOVT SERVICES IN MOST COUNTRIES AND CASTE WOULD PAY HIGH PRICE

SECRET

REC:) FROM

rico nor 1975

CIA

APPROJED FOR RELEASE 1093

CIA HISTORICAL-REVIEW PROGRAMM

AS SANITIZED

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IN 89419 PAGE 2

FOR SUCH INFO, HOWEVER SUBJ "NOT INTERESTED."

RECD TELEGRAM 5 OCT FROM TWO CIS AGENTS ABROAD

SHIP CIENFUEGOS IN BILBAO. MSG CONTAINED GREETING FOR SOULCELLBD

HE IDENTIFIED THEM AS: ALBERTO ORIA (AKA: JIMMY WINDOW)

• AND "MONGO FAMILIA." SAID ORIA ON OSTENSIBLE SIX MONTHS

LEAVE FROM UNIV POST. BELIEVES THEY PLANNING OPERATE SPAIN AND FRANCE.

6.

TON WILL RECONTACT SUBJ ON RETURN MADR. PLS ASSIGN

CRYPT FOR SUBJ.

SECRET

RE

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.: * 1975

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COPY: COULD NOT XEROX

10 December 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: CIA Officer

SUBJECT:

Last Meet with L-l and Case Officer

1.

according to his wife who spoke to him by telephone

10 December,

hopes to return Tuesday: 15 December. 1-1 mill debrief

him

as soon

as he

returns on the situation in Havana, and as agreed,

pass all information he collects through you.

L-1 has no phone but

will.contact you throughsuegs

You can call him at the residence

at telephone number.

2

returned from Madrid on 9 December with the information

from

later

2 regarding

the meeting with

B-1.

L-1 may meet with B-1

with

but is not prepared to meet with him until after

he talks

h- 2

and finds out the details of the arrangements. L-l is

also concerned over his own security and that of the people inside

Cuba whom he would

be committing once he ties

in with

B-1.

3. Our official line to take with regard to B-l is that he

is operating from outside the United States, is doing what he can

for his country, and is highly thought of.

Although we would like

to see B-1 and

L-1 get together, we do not want to be the brokers

in the union.

with L-1 line of thinking regarding solution in Cuba and is the

reason he would like to join forces.

B-1 does not know and

we do

not plan to tell

him that we are in

direct contact with L-1

nor

does

L-1 know and we do not desire he know that we are in' direct

contact with B-1.

4. L-l was told and fully understands that the United States

Government cannot become involved to any degree in the

"first step"

of his plan. If he needs support, he realizes he will have to get

it elsewhere. FYI: This is where B-1 could fit in nicely in

giving any support he would request.

RE

SHED FROM

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SECIZT

sop 3,4

B-/ URG: Meeting In West Palm Leach, Florida, 3 Jan 1965

SUBCT: Second Meeting Between

B-1

and

L-1.

In Madrid on 30 December 1964

1.

B-1

returned to Madrid on 30 Decenber 1964.

Fa arrived ut 1500 hours and by 1600 hours was in bis second

nebting with

L-.

The meeting lasted until 2200 hours

and

took place in an apartment on the top floor of taehighest

cormercial bullding in ladrid. The apartnent was rented the

nigat before by

mint and spent the list, one rested la the pia cont until

They rented the apart-

the conference, took place.

3-1

arrived with oTHER titSeN

arctred wits deser nad

mot hin.

In the apartuent when

L-l and

While

PERSON

C - I mas saying his hellos to .

looked around the apartant for any and

concealed tape

recorders.

He used the pretext of looking for somoting that

the Spanish security service may have planted in the apartrent

but was also checking on his brothers.

Before leaving

LieS

ordered three bottles of cider and four cans of beer.

This

was delivered and everybody except

L -l and

the

aurtsent.

3-1 10ft

They promised to call at 2000 hours to find out

. Than they snould come and pick them up.

2.

They started the conversation discussing nutual

acquaintances and flands in Cuba.

L-1 does not think

much of the DRE boys, especially Salvat, who is in alani at

this tine, but de does respoct Alberto duller who is in prison.

He stated

that luller is havingtroubles in the Isle of Pines

but he is cenonstrating his determination to resist any kird

of indoctrination which is forced upon bin.

13 -1 had a

long list of government personalities which he bad hidden in

his coat.

L-I started to laugh.

wen he extracted the lat frow Its hiding Play

L -1 asked whether

also going to ask hin about all these different peopie

because the Americans had also presented him with a long list

asking about the same people.

Be said the Anericans always

ask hin about these people and also about the new arms that

fidel may bave in Cuba.

3.

L. -I mentioned that the first thing that may

Interest

B-1 bofore

they started to talk about any

personalitles was

that all the SAd sites were in Cuban hands

and not 1s soviet bands.

He also contioned there were tro

groups with whom he was in contact sosides his own group of

the Directorio Revolucionario, one led by Cuate. Efigenio

Anetjetras from the 26th of July group and a second group

COOLED FROM

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also from the 26th of July. The latter is opposed to the

regine, but a prerequisite to joining in the coup is the

clinination of Castro.

The following officers are nenbers of

this group:

Coates.

sergio del Valle, Chief of Staff of the

Cuban Arry; Autonio lusson y Patlio; Guillermo Garcia Frias,

Commander of the liestern Army: and Victor Bordon lachadg, Chief

of artillery, Festers Army.

L -I was not too lauditory

concerning this group. He

feels they want to reap the fruit

after the big job bas been porformed. On theother band,

regarding Aneljeiras, be clairs that be bas the courage and

determination to proceed with what has to be done under any

and all circunstances.

5.

B =l asked the folloving question of

L -1:

If Fidal Castro should be eliminated, what officers would?

join a group taich would oppose the Conmunist Party, laul

Castro, Che Guevara and conpany.

L-1 mentioned Sergio del

Valle.

clains that he has already talked to del Valle

but the condition placed by him 1s the death of Fidel Castro

or he 19 unwilling to participate in any kind of coup.

iccordiag to -- -

he has already spoken with del Valle,

Lusson, Cuillerno Garcia Frias, and Victor Bordon Machado.

A11

of these people are in the same pogition as dol valle; tboy are

not willing to participate in anytning until Fidel Castro 1s

oliminated.

B-1

opinion, the following would also

Join the anti-Communist forces onco Fidel Castro is oliminated:

Juan Alnelda Sosque, Colarmina Castilla las and Fodro iret.

Another man who nay

also join then ig "31 Gallego" fernandez,

but he has no troops with him.

The troops are very nuch

opposed to him because he was

a nonber of Batista's old army.

He was then made a comandante in the new rebel aruy.

L→1

feels that Cmate. Manuel Cospedes fernandez, the deputy connander

of the fastern Army

1n Oriente, will probably Join an anti-

Communist group.

---

Lal 18 not certain of Cespedes but does

know his brother 1s anti-Communist.

•L-/ has not yet

spoken with or talked with Codte. Oscar Fernandez iel who is

the deputy commander in the lesters army.

L-| is rela-

Castro since Fidel 15 1lving with Fernandez's wife.

L-1

Is also certain that the menbers of the old army and the old

nayy will also join then although he has not bad direct contact

with these people.

He is sure of this because ridel at every

opportunity warns

Ramiro Valdes to check these people out and

keep a carsiul watch on them. This group consists of Ondte. Juan

Ignarra ilatarras, Chief of the Eastern Naval District 1n Banes,

whoa

L-1

claims is a homosexual; Capt. Jusa Valdez Royes,

member of PURS; Capt. Juan Vilez Carrion, Naval Base Comnander,

Clenfuegos; and Capt. Bonacio Porrata Neves, Commanding Cificer

7 FROM

SECRET

= 1975

CIA

NN 50955 DooId:32203828 Page 15

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SECRET

Southern Sector of Eastern Naval District.

Eldel has no

confidence in these people and has placed below then people

of confidence to watch over them.

L-l is not cortals.

but feels that Juan

Alneida Bosque will probably join forces

L with the ants-Castro, anti-Communist group, 215o Caute. Raul

-Sondoz lonassevich,

Chiei Operations of Central iray

L-1

clained he didn't know the rest of the list

Brooren had with

him.

Another man with whos - L-l 15 also in contact

is Cnate, jose

Rason Machado Ventura, the Minister of Public

Realth.

Machado and Cadte. Raul Vallejo Ortiz are in the

nast of a dispute since

Vallejo is desirous of setting Machado's

ministry.

L-l gave

3-1 the dotails and the exact

locationg where fidel spends every Saturday and Sunday and

spechlically every sunday at varadero.

will take

naps with bin the next time he travels to surope to see

so he can pinpoint on the naps the exact locations

where Fidel stays.

B-1

is hoping that tith these

details de can prepare an operation against that point.

Lauro Chonon Sediavilla, Mnister of Transport, Is 100 percent

Communist.

are both completely enchanted with haris and larxist theories.

7. After discussing the alfferent personalities, -_ B-I

and

started talxing about other matters.

Informed

L-1

he had talked was

B-11 thg-1e These Cuban exile leader wita whoa

L-| raciced to nase this

contact because he felt it necessary to develop a concrete

plan they could proceed to mors on.

clains he was

convinced that

actually has something because of

the way Ildel talks against hin and is opposed to him even

in private conversations.

Ll clains that the comando

raids raise the morale and spirit of resistance of the people

1n Cuba.

bo-1

15.

had one piece of advice for

B-1.

B-1

that

must concentrate his commando attacks on two

targets.

Ee was very insistent to forget military targets but!

to concontrate on econonte targets, specifically sugar and POL.

he said these two itens are in short supply and 1t infuriates.

Fidel evory time he looses one drop of oil or one pound of sugar.

The other plece of advice

had for

B-1

was that

the froquency of the attacks should be stepped up. He folt

there was too much time between operations. In order to beat

up the target,

also suggested that one month beforo

the attempt on Fidel Castro as

many targets as possible should

be hit in order to prepare tho publio and raise the morale and

resistance spirit of the people.

L-/ told

B-1

that

the militlamen or the army will do nothing once fidol is dead.

They will sit back and walt to see what the Cuban public will du.

Is the cuban public takes to the street, they will do nothing to

RELENTA FRON

SECRET

AUb e 1975

CIA

NH 50955 DocId: 32203828 Page 16

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## Page 17

CCA75

On this chord they started to reach a series of

agreenents.

at this point stated, "Now lot's see

that I have. I have what I fold you, ny group fron the dR,

winich I have again reactivated, and also the contacts with

thasa otbor poopla that I bave mentioned to you.

I have also

been in contact with the Americans since before

the Day of

Pigs.

I have been out just about every year and every year

I have had contact with the Americans,"

Ho again repeated

the fact that he had requested a silencer for the raL from

thg

Anoricang which they had not been able to provide. He said,

"The Amoricans tried to jive ne a radio to take to Cuba."

was against taxing tho risis of operating a radio

In Cuba.

L- sald, "The other things the inericans want

no to do is to organize

a coup, to organize a group of

officers, battalions and regiments la order to carry out a

coup against fidel.

But what the Americans fall to realize

is that they are not faced with another regular Latin American

government in Cuba. So long as fidel Castro is around, this

ia impossible.

when people iron washington come to talk with

no, they tals with a police mentallty, not with a political

mentality, recogolzing the sitation in Cuba."

comes to talk to him fron Wasbiagtos.

Ho fails to belleve

now whether w

Is even from

Vashlagton since he has asked

him for a silencer and he von't even give, nin a silencer.

claims the only thing that he is capable

0f doing is trying to get rid oi fidol Castro.

Ho is able

olther to shoot hia with a silencor or place a bomb in sone

place where Fidel will be. no night use, for example, a saall

bomb that he can carry and place, or with his group attacs,

the residence whore Fidel lives when he goes to Varadero.

These are the only things he can do.

Alter that he has to

pray and hope he isn't caught. le also stated ho doos not

want to bocome

a martyr and does not want to eschange his

1110 for Didel's.

He confling he is not a hero, he wants

live and see what happens alter Fidel. do says ho is not

opposed to risking his life providing he has sone assurance

or some possibility of getting out and also of assuring

hinself that he will accomplish bia mission.

Re claims that'

once be eliminates Fidel, the comandantes that he has men-

tloned bofore will jo1n

bin. At this particular time, it

is necessary for

B-

to appoar on the scene because

this will convince everybody that the Americans are also

backing the coup.

He also clains that i1 he is unsuccessful

in his attempt against Fidel, It is tho same comandantes who

will slit his throat in order to keep bin from talising.

L-l clains this is the reason he needs

3a1.

If the

attempt fails, be will have

*place to go.

If it is successful,

REde

19, Will also have

B- 1 to guarantee U.S. support.

FROM

CHA

HH 50955 DocId: 32203828

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-5-

SECRET

10.

Fidel, claius he 1s not opposed to

being president

of the junta, provided there is an equal number of reprasen

tatives

on the junta fron the internal group. Those from

6-1'5

group should be selected iron the prisoners in

Cuba.

Tor example,

would be from

1i there are six people on the junta-i

three

and Aneijeiras's groups and

plus two of his group fron inside Cuba.

11.

L-l asked that the other nembers of the junta

be revolutionary members who are presently in jail on the Isle

of Dines, that they not be old Batistianos or from the extle

communIty.

L-1

claims it has to be the former revolu

tionaries who have now served time on the Isle of Pines in

order to help cleanse the ones who have collaborated with the

regine all this time.

L-I leols they will need the

Influence the boys in prison can bring to bear on the masses.

The other point that

first three months after a coup the Cuban exiles not be per

the aeror a

L-| insisted upon was that in the

mitted to return to Cuba. The only ones who would be permitted

to reture, in a non political ard strictly technical fashion,

would be the doctors and the engineers, and only to work, sot

to engage in politics.

12.

L.-1

asised, "First, what do I need?" The first

thing he claims be needs 18 a means of escapo.

L-| said

he needed escape routes provided by

B -1

not those

belonging to the Americang.

"If you fall me, tben

Will kill you and he is unable to kill the Americans."

B-1 is going to provide

with escape routes and..

piases whero

1s able to pick him up.

Le will

renorize these points and escape routes. Ee will not take

anything bacs in writing.

L- also asked that

11-1

do everything

possible to organtze one of the restern provinces, either

Pinar del Rio or Havana, where they could have a fall back

position or where, once

Fidel is eliminated,

• L -/ can go

in order to take refuge during the perlod of chaos which may

14. Nest,

B-l 1s to provide

L-I either &

slencer for a

FAl or a rifle with a silencer.

B-1

told

L-/ ho did not know since he was not a technician, 1f

It 1a possible to make a silencer for the fAl.

L-1

stated that the Americans also told him it was technically

linpossible bocause it would reduce the effective range of the

FAl, but he wasn't sure this was the case. If

B-1

can

gIve L-l

a silencer, he will personally take the silencer

back with bim.

If it is a refle with a silencer then

13-1

vilt put a cache for.

L-1 in Cuba.

1:375

SECRETI

NH 50955 DocId: 32203828 Page 18

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C'

SECRET

-Ear

15.

The otber thing

L-/ requested of

3-1

was a bonb inside a suitcase,

a cake, & lamp or any concenled

homb that he could place at fidel's side without being stopped

and searched before setting there.

He said, "Don't send ne

nny raddos, don't expect ne to operate any radios inside Cuba."

16.

B-

offered

contacts inside Cuba.

thought about it and then stated be sould accept

these

contacts, but be would establish the contact after having

chocked then out; he did not want the contacts coming to bin

or knowing sho be nas.

B-1 agreed and stated this was

perfectly satisfactory.

L-l also would like to know the exact location

cache before he returns so he can monorize this Infor

Attor the cache 1s in placo,

asked

to write hin a lotter in Fronch natled In Paris, purporting

to be fron a french girl friend whon he had not there, talklog

about their love altairs in Paris.

He will know when

receives this letter the cache is in place and he will go

pick 1t up.

roquested several letters be vritten to

him in case

the latters should get lost. Another thing

ho requested was that the cache do placed in a

location there

he could

go with rolative ease without causing suspicion.

B-1

was unable to renember but

that the Amoricang had either given bia a cache or nad pro

misod hin a cacho.

However, it was placed in such a location

that it was

impossible for him to so recover it.

13.

L-1

also requested that once Fidel was eliminated

and the

new government formed, they would have the recognition

of at least five Latin American goveranents.

had

already offered this and

L-l approred of it.

19.

also requested that after every commando

attack

the propaganda reaching Cuba would state that is

attack vas

made possible because of the intelligence recolved

from the chief of the underground inside Cuba..

Thanks to

-p.

who is the leader of the underground this attack was

made possible.

L-1. hopes that after Fidol Castro is

Olfminated, he will be able to disclose that he was i 'p

He also authorized

B-.1

to disclose that it sonothing

happens to

L-l during this period,

8-/ 1s authorized

to disclose that

"p"

was in fact

L-.

B-1

agreed to this because he is aware of the complex which

L-l has because of the tine he has spent inside doing

nothing, going along with the Castro regime.

•12 + 1975

SECRET

AW 50955

DocId:32203828 Page 19

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## Page 20

-7- SECRET

20.

1-1

also requested that

Bul be in Cuba

one week beforo

the olinisation of Fidel.

6-1

agroed

to this provided no one, including

_/ know where ho

ras biding.

At the tine the olimination of Fidel takes place,

L-1

insists that.

must be in Cuba.

L-|

according to

B-1

has two complexes. One

is iron the

fact that he has been with fidel and the present regine for

such a long tine and no one realizes that, although he has been

In contact with the Abaricans, he is unable to publicize te

fact that he has been working

against fidel for over three

years.

The second comples, and a very personal fear, ta the

fact that he nay be loft hanging by binsolf.

Ro lacks

confidence in every body outside Cuba. The other considera

tion that

L-!

raised with

6-1

was, uponbie return

to Paris, he would type an original and one copy of the agroo

ments.

When they meet the next time, both

5-1

and

would sign both copies,

would keep one

of the coplos of the agreement, and the second copy would

be

placed in a sale deposit box to which t'! would give the

combination to a trusted person whon he did not identify.

It"

betrayed

or did not live up to the agreo

rent, bis confidant could publish the azreement.

B -|

would have the same privilege 11

does

not live up

to his part of the agreement.

B-1

considers the request

ridiculous since no purpose

can possibly be served by publishing

such a document, but realizes this is also a part of

L-i$

complex and will give

the feeling of sone control over

B- and his part of the agreement.

C/0

WH/SA B-1 URG.

File: •

Internal Op

RE:

SECHETT

FROM

1975

Asse 21.

HW 50955

DocId: 32203828

Page 20

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## Page 21

SECHET

7

B-loit leeting In Vest Pala Beach, Florida, 3 Jas 1965

SUBJECT:

Polats of Agreenent Reached Between 3-1

and

L -1

Following are the points on vaich an agreement vas

reached:

17 to provide

L-1 with a stiencer

for. the dAl; 11 this 18 Inposalble,

¿s to cache

1n 3 designated location a rifle with a scope and silencer:

plus several boubs concealed either in a suitcase, a lamp:

or some otber concealment device ubich he would be able to

carry: and place. next to Fidel Castro...

..".

is to; provide

L- with escape routes

controlled by

3-1

and, not by the Anericans. The lac

of confidence:built.up. by the Bay of: P1gs loons large.:!i

3.

18 to prepare one oi the western provinces,

either Pinar del Rio or Havana, with arms caches and a

clandestine underground nechanisa.

This would be a fall

back position and a safe aroa whore nen and weapons are.

available to the group.

• 4.

3-1

is to be in Cuba one woes bofore the

elinination of Fidol, but no one, including

L-1 vill

EDOW:

B-1's locst10n.

5.

B-!

Is to arrango for recogaition by at least

five latin American countries as soon as Fidel 1s neutralized

and a junta 18 formed. This junta will be established even

though Raul Castro and Che Guevara may still be allve and

may still be in control of the part of the country. This

is the reason

L-1

requested that 3-

be

able to

establish some control ovor one of the provinces so that

the justa can be formed in that location.

6. One month to the day before the nutralization of

Fidel,

6-1

will increase the number of commando attacis

to a maxi num

in order to raise the spirit and morale of the

people inside Cuba. In all communiques, in all radio nessages,

In all propazanda

put out by

he must relato that

the raid was possible thanks to the

information received

from clandestine sources insido Cuba

and fron the clandestine

underground apparatus directed by

"p"

This will bo

L-i'se war name.

/and

SECRET

1975

APPROVED FOR AZLEASE 1993

CIA MISTORICAL-REVIEW PROGRAM

lee

27/1194

AW 50955 DocId: 32203828 Page 21

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## Page 22

7.

3-1

#111 give

4-1

several contacts insido

Cuba but will not disclose

therofore leaving

Li: Identity to the contacts,

the initiatiye for contact with

These contacts

L Will use in case he has to sond an

urgent message to

putsido Cuba.

He will utilize the

clandestine pseudonym

"pe

1a these nessages. This vill

also serve as bona fides and identification.

All these points will be committed to wilting, a

copy of which will

Do given to

and a copy of which

will bo deposited in a safo deposit box in a bank to which

_-I will give the combination to a trusted friend. In

case

betrays any part of the agreenent, his confidant

will be authorize. to publish this agreement.

The same would

pertain to

11

betrays any part of the

agroement. This in goneral was the essence of the neeting.

B-1

plans to return to Paris the end of January belore

return to Havana.

At that time they will fornalize

their provious agreementa and

will give L-1

what he has roguested.

HE SA O

File:

Internal Op

SECRET

nic .: 1976

JIA

NW 50955

DooId: 32203828

Page

22

---

## Page 23

SYA MESSAGE FOSS

SECRET

D INDEX

DJ NO INDEX

FILE IN CS FILE NO.

11S3

T6/FEB/1965

PARESE

DIRECTOR

CI

ROUTING

6

101E055: 25 268

SaC

-RTY

DOP, URI FILE, C/WE

INFO.

CITE DIR

85502

REF:

ARI: 2300J (IN 81436)

REQUEST FOR MEETING AVD MONEY APPROVED. FYI, FEEL

THIS JESTIFIED AS "LIVING" EXPENSES AND NOT CONNECTED WITH REQUEST

FOR 10,000 DOLLARS FOR OPS, WHICH, AS PARI AWARE, WAS REFUSED. ALSO

INTERESTING NOTE TO CONSIDER IS FACT THIS REQUEST APPARENTLY REPRESENT'S

SWALLOWING OF PRIDE BY L-! AND ALSO PERIAPS TEST BY HIM WETHER

10,000 DOLLAR TURN DOWN WAS ACTUALLY FOR OPS

CONSIDERATIONS AS

EXPLAINED TO HIM AT TIME, OR WHETHER IT INDICATION. CIA DOUBTING HIS

INTEGRITY AVD ABILITY SERVE AS USEFUL ALLY.

2. REQUEST

OF DEBRIEF IN DEPTH FOR REMAINDER UNANSTERED

L-/ PQMS, OF WHICH COPY LEFT PARI BY ' C/O ALSO MOST INTERESTED

FOLL: ALL DETAILS CUBAN AMBASSADORS RECENT MEETING MADRID; RESONS

FOR CHE'S TRIP TO CHINA AND PURPOSE HIS FORTECONING FAST AFRICIN IRI;

ALL DETAILS OF CLOSELY-HELD MEETING LATIN AMERICA CP'S IN HAVANI

LAST WEEK NOV 64, PARTICULARLY WHAT WAS OUTCOME DECISIONS REACHED,

POINTS OF CONTENTION, AND HOW MUCH DID IT CONTRIBUTE TO RESOLUTION

CUBA'S PREDICAMENOMES-A-VIS SOVIET-CITICON SPLIT; IS CARILLO GOING

ALGIERS SOON HOMEET CHE AND IF SO, WHY?

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993

COPROIMATIME OPRICTORIA PISTOROM RAVEN POSARAM.

AUTHENTICATIOG

-SECRET/!

-OFFICER

27/194

AN 50933 Doc1d:32203828 Page 23

---

## Page 24

MESSAGE FORIA

UNDE

SECRETL

O NO INDEE

DO FILE IN ES FILE NO.

ROUTING

5

3

FROM DIRECTOR

INFO

PAGE TITO

INFO.

CITE DIR

3.

SUGGEST MONEY PAID AFTER DEBRIEF.

END OF MESSAGE

CABLE SEC: PLS GIVE ONE COPY THIS CABLE AND REPLY TO C/VE.

555.02

WA/SA/EOB

TH/SA/

iie

12.5

= FROM

AUS 7 1975

C/VE/IN A

OFFICER

AC/VIDD

COORDIMATINO

SECRET/

AUTHENTICATING

OFFICK*

NH 50955 DocId: 32203828 Page 24

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## Page 25

SECRET

18 March 1965

NEXORANTUM:

SUBJECT:

PIcposal to Exploit

Jose Rebellos In

AN

L-1

and

Operation

8

It is proposed that at the next nesting sith

we paas a messago as follors:

"A big comandante or capitan tho used

to bo a loader of the untrersity students

opered a numbered (secIet) account in

Switzerland through,Colombian Suarez (ay

succesgor). He was traveliaz in Europe at

that tine, roughly Deceaber. 1964-January 1965.

The deposit was in the anount of §10,000."

The nessage is purposely so phrased that it could apply to

both .

-and jose. Labellad bots are nant prostients....

0f the FEU (Federation oi University Students), ode is 2

comandante and the other a captain, and both were traveling

in Europe lc December 1964-Jazuary 1965.

Subject proposal has taken the follcuing inforation

into consideration.

L-li

8.

The record:

The file shows that since:

April 1959 and repeatedly siacs then !

L-1

bas throatened to eliminato CASTRO, but has

not done so.

He also was reportedly on the

verge sevaral times of dofecting but never did.

There are numerous reports of varyinz crodiballit

that he has been aud is a Castro agent. His

character is such that he has been descrthed

in a report as "a probable thief, a possibla

user of sarcotics, a homosexual or a friend of

homosexuals," but also "an exceedingly brave

Vartous reports indicate that ho is a

beavy drinker and a party lovor.

- Ibus a person

Titt such traits could resonably be beliovec

to be Involved in Irregular financial «ransactions.

65.

SECRET SUr APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1903

CIA BASTORICAL-REVIEN PROORYM

AS SANNIZED

27/1194

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Page 25

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SECRET

-2-

b. • Favorablo factors (from

ÖPS

standpoint:

In the sunder of 1962

gave

4-1

33500 in Helsinki to be deposited

in a European bank "for a rainy

day." In March 1961.

showed great

sensitivity on the subject of bank accounts

1n Europe by Cubar ofiicials, indicating that

he night shoot any official so invoived.

Conclusion:

discounted that .

L mile it carnot be.

May be a CAsirO

agoat, It cay 50 that be has beon sincere

In his dealings with

Rosolution of

doubts through an PolyGRAPH interview has

been inpossible since

bit the

celling when the matter was first mentioned.

Presumably

CiA's interest in

:1s to see his carry out bis mission

to oliminate

CASTRO The above proposal

nay actually sticulate the desired action.

If

Lal is questionod by tho regina 1n

connection with this charge, and should the

Investigation involve a certain arount of

harassment and unpleasantness, ho uight well

reach the conclusion that the time to take

matters into his own bands (which he has

threatened to do for several years) has at

last arrived.

gorg

is a Castro agent and

Castro should be aware of -h

's relation-

ship with C// Castro might conclude that

L-1

received the money fron

CIA

barked it without reporting it, and was in

fact working with

C/A againgt Castro.

Whichn

(At the recent meetings in Pardo

L-1

asked us for $19.000

He did not give him

tits sus, thought

gave bia $7,000. )

do away with

Is for aly reason the regise should

.. his alleged sympathizers

him salo

In the Armed forcos migbt feel they must react

at once to save their own sking. Given the

r

tense political situation in Cuba today,

this

1s not out of the question and certainly this

proposal could split the regime nore.

the last

his?

de

Ciny

lie

AUU. 105.1975

•CIA

NW 50955 DocId:32203828 Page 26

SECRET

CoNs

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## Page 27

-3-

SEGNET

Joge Rebellon

Rebellon 1s & aon-controveralal

target for inclusion in tbis

OPS play for

the following reasons:

Bo is closo to Castro, as woll as to

L-

and has a Cornutist background.

He 15 fraillar with the $30,000

account opened in a Swiss bank by Ambassador

Carrillo in cho fall o1 1964. Rebellon bag

boen authorized by Castro to dram on that

rund for purchases related to Castro's pet

projects.

Castro night thiak that Rebellon

had raided Castro's own Official fund.

As with

L-!

any setion by the

regine against Rebellon might widen splits 1n

Cuba and bring about further political uneasiness

and tensions in Interpersonal relationships that

we desire.

RECE!"

• 4951.

1075

GIA:

SESTET

NW 50955 DocId:32203828 Page 27

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## Page 28

SECRET

29 iarch 1965

CORANDON FOR THE RECORD

70:

C/FI

thismo

Froi:

Subject:

L=1

Reference: DIR 96056 -

H-I'S TRAINES AND. L-I

In view of the fact that it was a policy of the @-i oka) complex

fine fi?

not to disseiinate any of the infornation, inclusive of the L-l, connection, fo!

outside of the

office and that of the C/ifi, it nay be possible that

your office has not seen the attached letorandun of conversationg between

file.

B-!"

In it,

L-l explains and cites the military

connections he has,

their conditions for relping hin, their positions, et cetera.

This say be of interest to your office.

In addition,

_/ 1 has made it clear that he has no materiel needs,

other than the 10,000 which he requested in Paris (which was not made available)

The money was needai to keer certain

people in certain positions, if necessary;

for brices under sore circuratancas; for lilo éscapa, tamossible, et cetera.

Aul save him 17,000.

hinself is trying separately to raise $3,000 (cuban pesos) inside Cuba.

FYI: Although

c/sMs

22 November 1753 that

C./A would give hin everything he needed (telescopic

sight, silencer, all the money he wanted) the situation changed when

C/SAS left the meeting to discover that President Kennedy had been

assassinated.

Because of this fact, plans with

decided that we could have not part in the assassiration of a government leader

(including Castro) and would not aid L-/

in this attempt.

the following:

We would not furnish the silencer, nor acope, nor any money for

direct assassination; furthermore, we would not lift a finger to help

L1

escape froi Cuba should he assassinate Castro.

was not informed of the information in the preceding paragran

until he was

seen by.

c/0

in lovenber 1964.

understood this.

rowever, we attenpted to have the same ends accomplisied for i-

furnished hin with the silencerwhich he carried in on

33 Relruar: 1055, has made some plans Tor 115 escape Il 1-1

has the opportunity,

and told him he could count on his help.

made bal put this in

wetari- to clear his own part in it - sut since then appearg to tave decided

that lie neither likes B-i

nor trusts hin. He refused to accept the :10,000

so, him stoo had just rocent tat hin and , in addition, id

be obligated to him.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE IUEO

CIA

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