MEMORANDUM:DRAFT MEMORANDUM, DATED 26 OCTOBER 1961 (ATTACHED)
Originator: CIA
From: A/DDP/A
To: CHIEF, WH-4
Document date: 10/27/1961
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

## Page 1

14-00000

104-10227-10139 •

2022 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

00/P 1-5.5.8.1

27 October 1961

MENORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH-A

THROUGH:

Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT:

Draft Memorandum, dated 26. October

1961 (attached)

1o I have no real quarrel with the attached document, but

I would hope that we would follow the realistic and specific

position adopted by Chief, WH-4 at tie State Department meeting

on 2ó October. In other words, we have four major pointy

which need setuling with Miro according to an agreed upon line.

In addition, we need to find out what othor complaints Miro has

and try to work out solutions acceptable to both sides. Finally,

we must establish a working relationship between Wendell Johnson

and airo through which we can attempt to persuade Miro of the

need of reconstituting his efforts in order to undertake a more

constructive program that his present purely administrative one.

In the meantime here in Washington we should be recxamining

the whole question of how to deal with Cuban exiles with the

thought that we may be able to present recommendationg for a

change in the present policy position. On this last point I have

talked to Sherman Kunt's office and hope in the near future to

receive a report advising what the estimators think they can

contribute on these last issues. At that time we can also get a

time schedule.

2. I repeat, however, that for the moment let us

centrate on te major problems with Miro, eliminate the ambi-

guites which have existed between ourselves, State and the White

House and try to obtain Miro's confidence in order to be more

persuasive with him in the future.

C. TR

A/DDP/A

Attachment

Drait Memo

Original & 1 - C/WH-4 w/Att

1 - /WH w/o Att

---

## Page 2

14-00000

E.?"

Lt sher, me, Dis che

SEGITALIL,

DRAFT

I.. It is our feeling that it would be desirable to deal with one

representative of the Cuban exile movements and ome repre

atime of the

• Cuban underground. • Need for coordination of activities alone makes thia

logical However, we all recognize that both the exile movement and

the underground are badly aplit into factions. It will be a continuous

struggle to achieve cooperatior between these factions, and to achieve

complete unity as a practical political matto is not very realistic. Eveni

within the Council, and within the FRD, there are elements which will

cooperate with each other on some things and not on othere. The experience

with Jublo CARRILLO and with Manolo RAY, arnong othere, makes this amply

clear.

2. ACcordingly, as discussed by Dr. MIRO with Mr. HANLEY and

MI. CLARK, in Baltimore in mid-September, there must be ther unifying and

coordinating factors than simply asserting the U. S. Government or some

one agency will lend support through the CRC, and anyone who wants funds

must go to the CRC. For example, it has Anow become apparent that

the withdrawal of support from the AFJ, as requested by Dr. MiRO, has siroply

meant that the AFJ has become vocally opposed to the CRC. The leverage

formerly exercined with the AFJ hao now been semoved A least to forty.

we were handody able to keep them from officiting the CRC too vacatis.

3. We are sometimes dismayed to hear the charges made by Dr.

---

## Page 3

14-00000

..1

-2.

MIRO that we are not supporting him exclusively. We feel that if we

withdrow support from some of the other groups, they would become

part of Dr. MIRO's opposition. At the same time, we are dismayed at

---

the charged made by Dr. MIRQ'a opponents that, as in fact has been the case,

a very large proportion of the support for Cuban exile activittes has been

given to him. The other groups claim, as he does, to have considerable

Influence over the undorground and the exile community. They too have

contacts in the various Departments of the U. S. Government and in

business in the U. S. and abroad; and, as a long timo practical politician,

Dr. MIRO cannot be unawaro of the implications of this situation.

4. We have, therefore, never agreed that to it was feasible to

adopt the highly unrealistic viow that exclusive support could be given to

the CRC, since some other groups a) probably would unite against the CRC,

b) could get support elsewhere, and, c) almost inner inevitably would

organize a significant anti-CRC movement.

5. We have, therefore, made it known to all groups inside and

outside that whilo we do not insist (except in the case of the judges) on unifi-

cation and subordination to the CRC, we would prefer that they at least

coordinate with the Council, aed We have actively discouraged any criticiam

of the Council whenever we had an apportunity, stars.

6. Our position has been made difficult by the fact that Dr. MIRO

has stated or implied to representatives of the various factions that he has

high level U. S. Government sponsorhsip and thes the factions can in the

future only obtain support through him...

He has also asserted to U. S.

---

## Page 4

14-00000

211.

3 1

officials that he has presented proposala for assisting the underground and

for aiding the underground, to o ganize and has received no support from the

Agency, The Agency is aware.of the proposal to aid RAMIREZ, with whom at

the time it waß proposed in Baltimire, Dr. Miro said he had no communica-

siong line.

We still do not know whether there is a communicationa line,

other

or many of the detaile needed to ha abdißt RAMIREZ in the Escambray. I

De. Miro now has such detaila, he might pass it to Colonel Johnson at a

separate mecting. The Agency le awaro of a poposal for a 1, 000 man

invasion force propesal which was refused by both State and the White House

before it was presented to the Agency. We see no purpose in commenting

further on that plan.

At such time as Dr. MIRO has specific plans for

operations to aid the underground, he or his designee might desirer discuss

them with Colonel Johnaon.

7. We would like to point out that during the difficult monthe since

Arpil we have continued to urge the internal resistance groups to organize.

in a truly underground manner, to establish lines of command and channela

of communications, and to look to the CRC for guidance. We know that in a

number of instances the external representatives have sought to obtain

guidance from the CRC only after our urging, thom-taietro. We would hope that

Dr. MIRO will be frank enough to recognize these contacts, and the fact that

thru these contact he has been generally informed anthelorganizational

activity in Cuba.

8. We would like to make special note for DI. MIRO that we are

:..'

SECHAT

---

## Page 5

4-00000

•4

not engaged in another invasion attempt, are not training Cubans for

an invasion, and, therefore, cannot keep him informed on any such

activity.

9. We would like to point out that Dr. MIRO has been in frequent

contact during the past few months with the Department of State represen-

tatives and has, as directed by the White Hpuse, taken his guidance from

the State Department. He has rarely sought guidance or even utilized

as a channel his contact with the Agency which has been continuously.

available. Many times it has been impossible to reach Dr. MIRO for ua

to arrange a meeting because he, according to ARAGON, was either ill,

on a trip, or preparing for an interview with the State Department or the

White House.

10. It is also worth mentioning that, as Dr. MIRO himself stated

in various meetings, it is fur security reasons neither possible or

desirable to keep Dr. MIRO informed in detail of our activities affecting

Cuba or at times certain Cuban exiles

residing in this country and under our

protection.

11. We have long felt there are certain aspects of our work which

could have been done by the Frente, but because of lack of interest or

leadership on the part of some, the Frente took the credit, but did little.

We refer here specifically to propaganda.

We feel that if the opposition to

the CRC among the student and labor groups cauld be overcome, some very

useful work could be done. We would point out that much of the DRE and

...i

SECHET

---

## Page 6

14-00000

SECRET

- 5 -

FORD activities have been done with modest, and frequently without

any, financial support:

We feel that ideas, organization and persone

with talent are much more important in these areas than money.

We

would like to urge oncong ain that the FRD and the CRC take practical

steps to work with the people in the DRE and the FORD. We certainly do

not want to see the energies of these groups dissipated as has so clearly

occured in the case of the jurists.

12. We renew our proposal once again that Dr. MIRO have his

people come up with some propaganda ideas and plans with or without

DRE and FORD type participation and we will give them our most sympathetic

consideration,

131 Despite our misgivings as to the utility of the further support

of the judiciary groupe, we understand a commitment has been made to

again advance Dr. MIRO $5, 000 for the judges and we are honoring thie

---