USIA INFORMATION AGENCY GUIDANCE ON CUBA
Agency: NARA
Originator: USIA
Document date: 10/2/63

## Page 1

JFK Assassination System

Identification Form

Agency Information

Date:

5/5/2016

AGENCY: NARA

RECORD NUMBER:

176-10010-10078

RECORD SERIES :

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

NSF

Document Information

ORIGINATOR:

USIA

FROM:

TO :

TITLE : USIA INFORMATION AGENCY GUIDANCE ON CUBA

DATE: 10/02/1963•

PAGES:

5

SUBJECTS :

ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES

- DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION : Confidential

RESTRICTIONS: 1C

CURRENT STATUS : Withhold

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 08/23/1993

OPENING CRITERIA : UPON AGENCY REVIEW

COMMENTS : NSF:CO:Cuba, General, 10/63:Box: 39

v9.1

HH 49061 DocId: 32205474

Page 1

---

## Page 2

ĐONF IDENT BAT

USIA INFORMATION GUIDANCE ON CUBA - OBJECTIVES AND THEMES

October 2, 1963

SECTION ONE - VOICE OF AMERICA BROADCASTS TO CUBA

I. OBUECTIVES

Our main objective in the Cuban broadcasts is to keep the people of

Cuba informed about developments inside Cuba and in the outside world,

providing them a perspective in which to view their experience. In this

effort, we strive to demonstrate U.S. support for Cuban freedom and con-

cern for their present plight; to encourage the spirit of resistance in

the Cuban people to the communist ideology and the pressures they face

(each man and each family is a fortress against communism); to keep alive

the hope and conviction that Cuba will again be free; and to discourage

adjustment and cooperation with the regime which betrayed their hopes for

the revolution. We do not, however, urge the Cuban people in any way to

revolt.

II. THEMES

A. In pursuance of this objective, we stress the following aspects

of U.S. policy toward Cuba:

1) The U.S. "cannot coexist with a Soviet satellite in this hemisphere."

2) The U.S. has made it clear, in the words of President Kennedy, that

live would not accept a Hungary in Cuba."

3) The U.S. is exerting every means except those which would being on

the danger of an international war (i.e. military action and blockade)

to isolate and destroy the Castro communist regime.

4)

Although not bound by a no-invasion pledge, it is not the intention

of the U.S. under present conditions to invade. One reason for this

position, in the words of President Kennedy, is that it would mean

"killing thousands of Cubans and Americans, with all the hazards

around the world" (Press Conference, February I4, 1963). He also

said (December 31 backgrounder), "we are involved in attempting to

check the advance of the Sino-Soviet bloc of a billion people, so

that we have to maintain a perspective that is bound to be different

than theirs (the exiles)."

The economic measures taken by the U.S. against Cuba are aimed at

freeing the Cuban people from the communist regime, not making them

suffer.

GONT

DECLASSIFIED

E. Q. 11652,

BELONGINARS, Date 19/29/24

DENTAL - GROUP 4 (Downgraded at 3-year intervals.

Declassified 12 years after date

of

origin)

NH 49061 DocId:32205474 Page 2

---

## Page 3

GONFIDEN

-2-

6) In its dealings with the Cuban exiles, the U.S.Government takes into

account the desires of the much larger number of people inside Cuba.

President Kennedy has explained (April 24, 1963) that the U.S. refuses

to recognize a government-in-exile because there is "no evidence that

the exiles themselves could develop a government which would necessarily

be the government which the people of Cuba would freely choose."

7) The U.S. is convinced, as President Kennedy has said on a number of

occasions, including the Declaration of Central America, that "Cuba

will soon

join the family of free nations."

8) We are also convinced, as are Cuba's other neighbors, that "A genuine

Cuban revolution will live again." (Declaration of Central America.)

The U.S, is on record as sympathizing with the original aims of the

revolution and as recognizing the right of the free Cuban people to

carry out progressive reforms. Giving special emphasis to this theme,

we want to reassure the Cuban people that the U.S. would not lend its

support to any movement which would attempt to restore the oppression

and corruption of the Batista dictatorship.

B. In reporting and commenting on developments inside Cuba, we stress

• the following aspects:

1) The continuous loss of freedom as the communist system tightens its

grip on the people, relating this to communist ideology and tactics

and dispelling the

rationalization that these measures are only temporary

or "voluntary" sacrifices for the revolution.

2)

The material losses of the Cuban people under the communist regime,

relating these losses to the worldwide failure of communism to produce.

Contrast the contradiction between promise and fulfillment, making the

point that old promises are forgotten and new ones made and that this

will always be true as long as the communist regime is in power. Give

special attention to: a)

decreases in production; b) the meaning of

the emulation (work norms) campaign; e) the enforced savings campaign;

d) rationing; c) the loss of labor benefits; f) the new levelled wage

scales; g) the false agrarian reform and restrictions on the campesino.

Whenever possible, in commentaries and interviews, the Cuban people

should be given credit for their refusal to cooperate and work en-

thusiastically for the communist regime. Caution: In reporting

economic conditions to the Cuban people who are well aware of their

own situation, extreme care should be exercised in determining the

reliability of the source. We should never pitch our message solely

on materialistic grounds, which are open to change, but should link

CONFIDE

NH 49061 DocId: 32205474 Page 3

---

## Page 4

GONF IDENTIAL

-3-

the material losses to the loss of basic freedoms, giving priority to

the latter.

In citing material losses, we should not give the im-

pression that the pre-Castro years were the "good old days" and should

recognize that many Cubans are no worse off materially under Castro

than they were under Batista.

3)

Internal political developments, such as the formation of the PURS

(United Party of the Socialist Revolution) which demonstrate that the

inevitable tendency of power is away from Castro and the young July 26

revolutionaries and toward the experienced organizers of the communist

old-guard.

4)

The dependence of the Cuban regime on the Soviet military and Bloc

technicians and teachers (e.g. the report that 100 out of 600 professors

at the University of Havana are foreigners), often meaning a loss of

power and position for the Cubans.

C. In reporting and commenting on Cuba's relations with the communist

Bloe, we stress the following aspects:

1) The inability or unwillingness of the Bloc to provide economic aid in

sufficient quantity to prevent the Cuban people from suffering food and

goods shortages;

2)

The exploitive nature of the economic relationship: the Soviets take

hides and fruit while the Cubans lack shoes and food. The Soviets have

a good deal in their purchases of Cuban sugar for which 80% of their

payments are in barter and which they sell to the Russian people at

cents per pound.

3) Castro's trip to the Soviet Union did not represent a tribute to him

personally or to Cuba as a nation, but instead represented a successful

maneuver by the Soviet to use Castro as a pawn in their struggle with

the Chinese to retain control of the international communist movement.

4)

Castro's subservience to Soviet dictates is apparent in his acceptance

following his visit to Russia of the role of Cuba in the Communist Bloc

as a raw material supplier.

In emphasizing the importance of sugar and

in postponing industrialization, the Castro regime is assuming a role

which it previously claimed made underdeveloped countries slaves to

imperialism.

5) Cuba is a pawn in the Soviet game, as was so evident in the withdrawal

of the missiles, and there is the ever-present possibility that the

Soviets will sell out their Cuban followers when it suits their interests.

CONF IDENTIAL

HH 49061 DocId:32205474 Page 4

---

## Page 5

GENT IDENT TAL

-4-

III. SPECIAL TARGET AUDIENCES

the armed forces

In addition to such primary targets as labor, /and farmers, efforts

should be made to weaken the regime's support from the following sectors:

A. A special effort should be made to convince Cuban youth, who

are generally considered

the hard core of Castro's support, that the

attention and importance they are now given is only temporary and that

the system they are helping to maintain will rob them of all freedom and

subject them to a discipline that stifles their natural desire for change

and freedom of expression. The current campaign in the Soviet Union to

rescind the freedom of expression which was allowed after Stalin's death

should be exploited. The loss of university autonomy in Cuba should be

exploited.

B.

For the Cuban Negro audience, who comprise some 30% of the

population and a large part of Castro's support, special attention

should be. given to factual reporting of the U.S. racial scene and a

careful backgrounding of developments. We cannot hope to convince the

Cuban Negro that there will be any early solution to the U.S. 's serious

racial problems, but we can strive to offset the deadly Cuban propaganda

exploitation of events such as those in Birmingham, Alabama, and to

knock down the venomous exaggerations of "Radio Free Dixie."

IV. PROGRAMMING RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Use should be made of recorded interviews with reputable Iatin

American leaders, including labor and students, who take a critical view

of Cuba's communist regime and Cuba's ties to the communist bloc.

Our

aim is to convince the Cuban people that the Castro regime's claims of

solid support from the Latin American people and of the imminence of other

Cuban-type revolutions in Latin America are false and to show that instead

the Latin Americans are choosing a democratic path to social and economic

progress. Reports of specific progress under the Alliance for Progress

(the building of schools, hospitals, housing, ete.) should be given atten-

tion in the broadcasts to Cuba.

B. Interviews with Cuban refugees in the broadcasts to Cuba should

be considered primarily as vehicles for reflecting the resistance of the

Cuban people to communism.. Through the reports of our interviewees of

specific and local resistance, we hope to give our audience a sense of

identity with a general national resistance to the communist pressures

demanding collaboration and conformity. (Refugee interviews in the other

Spanish hours for the Latin American audience, by contrast, should be

primarily vehicles for reporting conditions in Cuba.) The interviewee

should be encouraged, if this can be accomplished convincingly, to pay

GONF TUNT TAI

HH 49061 DocId: 32205474 Page 5

---

## Page 6

CONFID

- 5-

tribute to the courage of the people who remain in Cuba, as a means of

off-setting the natural resentment of those left behind toward the exile.

®. Regular use should be made of analyses, book reviews, documentaries,

and dramatizations which give an understanding of communist ideology and

practice as a means of providing the Cuban people with a perspective on

the experience they are enduring and bolstering their will to resist. The

Liberal use of quotations from U.S. and Latin American leaders and writers

which contrast the philosophies of Democracy and Communism is recommended

as useful in setting the inspirational tone suitable for Latin American

audiences.

NOTE:

SECTION TWO FOLLOWS/

SONPIDENT EAT

HH 49061

DocId: 32205474

Page

6

---