COVER AND DECEPTION PLAN
Originator: JCS
From: JOINT STAFF
To: CINCLANT
Document date: 2/1/62
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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• JFK Assassination System

Identification Form

Agency Information

Date:

6/24/201

AGENCY :

RECORD NUMBER :

RECORD SERIES :

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ARMY

198-10007-10000

CALIFANO PAPERS

•

Document Information

ORIGINATOR: JCS

FROM: JOINT STAFF

TO: CINCLANT

TITLE: COVER AND DECEPTION PLAN

DATE: 02/01/1962

PAGES:

69

SUBJECTS:

DISRUPTION OF CUBAN SUGAR HARVEST

DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION: Secret

RESTRICTIONS: 1C

CURRENT STATUS: Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW:

03/04/1998

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :

Califano Papers, Box.6, Folder 1. JCS directive to CINCLANT re: plans for disruption of the Cuban

sugar harvest.

• EXEMPT PER E.O. 13526

SEC 3.3(b) 50x5

DATE EXEMPTED MAR

2016

JS RE-REVIEW DATE 31 DEC2037

Separtment of the Army EO 13526

• Declassify = Exclude • Exemp

v9.1

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OP SECRET

THIS IS A COVER SHEET

The information in this document

is classified and

as such will be

treated

according to OSD Securily

Insiructions. Writing

on this

cover sheer

is prohibired.

TOP SECRET

£47840

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SECRET INFORMATION

COVER SHEE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

TOP SECRET INFORMATION COVER SHEET

CONTROL NUMBER, S)

INCLOSURES

The attached TOP SECRET information contains data

the security aspect of which is paramount, and unauthor.

ized disclosure of which would cause EXCEPTIONAL GRAVE DANGER TO THE NATION. Spécial care in the handling, cus-

tody, and storage of the attached information must be exercised in accordance with the

security rerulations.

This cover sheel is NOT A RECEIPT but a record of persons who have read all or any part of the document(s) iden-

rified by number above.

Each person receivine

the attached TOP SECRET information shall sign and fill in

the information required

below.

NAME

RECEIVED

RELEASED

REMARKS

(Indicate portions and all of document) read)

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

SD FORM

¿ JAN 54

194

PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS FORM ARE OBSOLETE.

(When attachmento

TOP

SECRET INFORMATION

COVER SHEET

this form is unclassified)

H32705

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

BASIC: Cover and Deception Plan

APPENDIX I: Implementation Schedule

ENCLOSURE: (1) JCS Directive to CINCLANT..and CINCONAI

in the form of an Outline Plan designec

to test CINCLANT OPLANS 314/316-61 and

CINCONAD OPORD 1-61

ANNEXES TO ENCLOSURE (1)

ANNEX A:

CONCEPT FOR CINCLANT

TAB A:

FORCES INVOLVED, INCLUDING OPLANS 314/316-61

APPENDIX I TO ANNEX A: RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

ANNEX B:

CONCEPT FOR CINCONAD

TAB A:

FORCES INVOLVED

ANNEX C:

INTELL ICENCE ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

ANNEX D:

ELINT COLLECTION

ANNEX E:

IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE

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JOINT STAFF

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

I FEBRUARY 1962

COVER AND DECEPTION

1. General Situation:

a. The Department of Defense has been directed to take

action to disrupt the Cuban sugar cane harvest.

In order to

achieve this mission, it is necessary to interfere with the

civilian labor force

to

the extent that they would be unable to

conduct

or support the

harvest.

b. The sugar harvest period is 15 January through 15 April.

The most critical period is from 1 February to 1 April.

Therefore time is of the essence.

c. A general

call-up of the Cuban militia would have a

deleterious effect upon the Cuban sugar harvest by reducing the

size of the available labor force.

d. Enclosure 1 is an outlined plan for the test of CINCLANT

Cuban Contingency Operation Plans simultaneously with a test of

CINCONAD's plan for the defense of southern Florida (Southern

Tip, CONAD OPORD 1-61).

e. Procedures and command relationships outlined or directed

by this plan effect only this plan and do not effect nor

constitute a precedent for future command arrangements.

I. Assumptions:

(1) Information can be passed to the Government of

Cuba that the test of CINCLANT Contingency Plans and the test

of the Air Defense of

southern Florida is in reality a cover

for an invasion of Cuba by the United States.

(2) The conduct

of

the operations involving the test

of the contingency

operation plans

and the air defense

of

southern Florida will

cause Castro to call-up militia for

the defense of Cuba.

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(3) The call-up of the militia will disrupt the

sugar cane harvest to

a major degree.

2. Mission:

a. CINCLANT and CINCONAD will plan for and execute the

simultaneous tests of CINCLANT Contingency Operation Plans

314/316-61 and CINCONAD Operation Order 1-61 in accordance

wi.th

Enclosure 1. CINCSTRIKE, CINCPAC and other

theatre

QUEMENT AND

and force commanders will support as directed borein.

b. Information will be passed through appropriate

channels

to the Government of Cuba that these tests are, in reality,

a cover for the invasion of Cuba by the United States. It is

recognized that this information may result in an alert

of Cuban forces thus tending to jeopardize a successiul

accomplishment of the OPLAN 314/316-61 mission, if the OPLAN

were to be necessarily executed. However, any Cuban

mobilization thus engendered might cause a related economic

harassment, considered an underlying desirable result.

c. Normal publicity will be given to the test operations.

Foreign observers will be invited if practicable. Although

SOLIDARITY I, conducted in 1961, was attended by high level

Latin American officials, a similar group should be invited

to observe the Vieques

demonstration; on a l-day show of

progress in armament,

technique, materiels, equipment, and

procedures.

Their presence in

the area

as guests of the US

would tend

to give an air of Western Hemisphere solidarity to

this portion of the exercises.

d. The operation will be conducted in early March 1962,

if basic task remains to be disruption of the sugar harvest.

If policy considerations, military impracticality, or other

factors affect the timing of a policy decision (required by

12 February 1962), alternative slippage dates of 1 May 1962, to

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coincide with the Communist "May Day" celebration (a time which

would find a semi-military alert, probably not desirable yet

possible quite concentrated in the Havana area), or 26 July 1962

which would coincide with "Castro" Day (again confronting a

semi-mobilized situation but which imaginatively could be

interpreted as a deliberate taunt to Castro). Other dates are

under study. Additional guidance concerning slippage dates will

be provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff if the arrangement of

other currently scheduled exercises conflicting with this plan

make changes militarily or politically desirable.

3. Operations:

a. Concept:

(1) Enclosure 1 directs CINCLANT and CINCONAD to

prepare operation orders for the testing of CINCLANT OPLANS

314/316-61 in conjunction with a test of CINCONAD Opord 1-61.

b. Phases of Operations:

(1) Deception

(2) Alert CINCLANT, CINCONAD, CINCSTRIKE, and CINCARIB.

(3) Alerting and Prepositioning of Forces

(4) Maneuvers

(5) Withdrawal of CONAD forces

(6) US Courses of Action if Attacked

(7) Withdrawal of CINCLANT forces

(8) Cover

c. Phase I - Deception

(1) Tasks - To cause the Cuban ruling body to believe

that

an attack/invasion

' is imminent.

(2) Concept - To be

accomplished through pre-planned

leaks.

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(a) Deception Story - Covertly release to reliable

Cuban agents

a deception story that an invasion of Cuba is going

to take place under the guise of an air defense exercise.

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Aircrett are deployed in Puerto Rico, and are being carefully

guarded:

pendal shipments of armament have been received

at deplorent bases and aircraft crews are under constant

a. Phasa II - Alert CINCLANT and CINCONAD

(1) Tasks - JCS forward Enclosure 1 to CINCLANT and

DENOUNAD for execution on or about 14 March 1962, as directed by

(2) Concept

(a) CINCLANT and CINCONAD prepare Operation Orders

co implement Enclosure 1.

(b) Continue deception through an increased tempo of

Activities and interest, 1.e. Notices to commercial users

or the Caribbean

area that major military operations are to be

consucted

in

that area (NOTAMS).

¿. Phase III - Alerting and Prepositioning of Forces

(1) Tasks

(a) To place forces in position to accomplish the

mission; to include the

conduct of the exercises while maintaining

an optimum readiness posture for any actual contingency action

ordered by higher authority.

(b) Commence normal publicity for a scheduled

operation to test the air defense of Southeastern United States.

(c) Commence normal publicity for a scheduled

operation to test the capability of US Armed Forces to react

to emergencies in the Caribbean area.

(2) Concept

(a) A "tailored" CINCLANT Joint Task Force to

be in position to conduct airborne and amphibious operations

In the vicinity of Vieques as outlined in Enclosure 1.

(b) Normal Guantanamo augmentation forces to be

available to reinforce Naval Base Guantanamo should the need

arise.

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(c) CINCPAC forces required for support of CINCLANT.

CrAm: 214/376-61 will be alerted and deployed in accordance

wit Enclosure 1 and Annex A thereto.

(e) CINCSTRIKE forces required for support of CINCLANT

DeLANS 314/316-61 to be alerted on a test basis. (CINCSTRIKE

Marces participating in the "tailored" Joint Task Forces : as

clined in Tab A to Annex A to Enclosure 1).

(e) Available CINCLANT forces not participating in

operational test of OPLANS 314/316-61 or the air defense

i southeastern Florida to be alerted and

engaged in loading

tills and other maneuvers on the East and Gulf coasts of the

NG.

(I) CONAD forces (an ADC target fleet, AFW & C

carrast and interceptors) to be in position to conduct

opedations as outlined in Annex B to Enclosure 1.

(5) Forces required - As specified in Enclosure 1.

I. Phase IV - Maneuver

(1) Tasks

(a) To maneuver in such a manner as to convince

the Cuban Government that an attack/invasion is imminent or in

progress.

(b) To take such protective measures as necessary

to retain integrity of all elements of the joint and other

participating forces.

(c) Io maintain a readiness posture for any actual

contingency situation which might develop.

(2) Scheme of Maneuvers

(a) CINCLANT (Joint Task Force 122) forces will be

alerted for Cuban contingency operations as a test of applicable

contingency operations plans. Certain tailored elements of

these forces will maneuver in the Caribbean Sea in such a

manner that while ostensibly conducting an air/sea assault on

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Viscus island the Joint Task Force could launch an assault/

LanCiNg cascast the Cuban land mass.

; CINCPAC force programmed for employment in

CONTAINS ORLANS 134/316-61 will be deployed enroute to, and

Craneto the Panama Canal for CHOP to and utilization by CINCLANT,

" requested by CINCLANT.

(c) Additional CINCLANT (JTF 122) forces will

vonduct, loading drills an deployment maneuvers along and off

Cho Oulf and East coasts of the US, further signifying a

monsing-out operation in a test of existing contingency plans.

(d) CONAD (USAF ADC target fleet) aircraft will fly

weedetermined zoutes. A flight of 19 B-57 aircraft out of

NodaLl ErR, will fly to approximately 10 miles off the Northeast

conot o2 the Yucatan Peninsula and then head for the west coast

of Cuba. Upon reaching a point approximately 10 miles off of

Supe

the aircraft will turn to maintain a track that will

parallel the North coast of Cuba approximately 10 miles off shore.

upon reaching a position directly south of Key West, the

aircraft will turn north and recover at Key West NAS, Homestead

2? N2CD111 A7S. The 15 B-57 aircraft being scheduled out of

Tramey AFB will initially fly southerly and then head for the

CINCLANT Vieques Joint Task Force; then changing to northerly

course, fly around the east end of Puerto Rico; taking a

course to the north of the Island of Hispaniola; then heading

directly toward military and governmental targets in Cuba.

Upon reaching a point approximately 10 miles off shore

(initiating turns at 15 miles), the aircraft will alter

course to maintain a track parallel to the North coast of Cuba

approximately 10 miles off shore. Upon reaching a position due

south of Miami the aircraft will turn north and recover at Key

West NAS, Homestead or MacDill AFB. The target force will

be launched at a time to have the forces from Ramey AFB arrive

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DATE/TIME GROUP

11. (Continued)

12. C-Date minus 48 hours

to ü-2÷ hours

13. C-Date minus 24 hours

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H-Hour

OBJECTIVES TO BE

SUPPORTED

TASK

Provide nocessary intelligence for

Obtain FLINT and Electronic

operation

Order of Battle

General Readiness to prevent sur-

prise

in event of hostile Cular

reuction

Conduct Air Defenee Frercise

Increase readiness

a. FoOü COAD: Op Ora 1-61

b. Provide ciose air cover

for demad tescot flned don

attück by CRAT

3006200

314-60

26.51

VL CINCLANT Ug Piens

Goodost toked asphibicar

Condict coost sid resente

at vreques.

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IMPLEMENTATION

ACTIONS

(6) Commence special operational

weather observations and

broadcasts.

IAC ELINT aircraft commence snooper

flighte

Increase alert of all commands and

forces participating in exercise.

CONAD Target and ELINI aircraft

approach Cuba on courses similating

an attack to harass Cuba.

Break off

at 10 miles and parallel Cuban coast

at icriman oi 10 miles distance.

Continue to US and make simulated

attacks against US targets to test

CONAD air defeasee.

CINDANT forces provide close air

cover for COMD target aircraft

withia 50 miles of Juban coast line

and until, CONAD aircraft enter

i3; All reces scheätled for opera-

ONE dECLAN: Up Plan 314-61

will be on alert. Ail transpor-

bation it be assembled and on

Guand-py aleri.

(2j Sue moody lnil Ron with embarked

RESPONSIBLEA

AGENCIES O

WX SERVICES T

JCS, USAF

TAC

SES PARTICCES

PATING COMMANDS

JOS

CINCONAD

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OF FCITVES TO BE

SUPPORTED

IASK

IMPLEMENIATION

ACTIONS

BIT to be at sea in vicinity

of Guantanamo.

(3) Standby Phib Ron with a BLI

embarked (or Lant Phiblex forces)

conduct amphibious exercise at

Viegnes with token forces

lauding.

(+) Conduct token or simulated

air-

drop of supplies

(5) hirilt the standby battalion of

Marines at Cherry Point, N.C. to

Guantanamo.

(6) Pacific fleet augmentation unit

(1/5 Marine Division/Wing team)

will be at sea in the Caribbean

srce, but at sufficient distance

that their location will not be

known

in Cuba.

2, Conduct Despons Dotcnetcation(2) OINOLAI: hoat I-day weapon demon-

id deteriod feasibie and

strationg for Latin Americans

92270222620

rocerience i by CINCARIB

(CONCARCE to sacist with invitations,

transportation, etc.)

RESPONSIBLE

AGENCIES

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at the East coast of Cuba at the same time as the target forces

fron Tyndall AFB arrive at the West coast of Cuba. When in-bound

toward CONUS, these forces will simulate attacks on US targets

in the Southeast US area to test the US Air Defense:

(e) CINCLANI will make provision for carrier and

land based fighter escort in support of the CONAD Target

Fleet aircraft as outlined in Annexes A and B to Enclosure 1.

Basically, the fighter escort will be provided from the time

the Target Fleet elements approach within fifty (50) nautical

miles of the Cuban land mass until they enter the coastal ADIZ.

Close air cover operations will also be made available to support

AEW & C and ELINI operations on an "as required" basis. In the

event that CONAD (ADC Target Fleet and AEW & C) aircraft are

attäcked by the Cuban Revolutionary Air Force (CRAF), escort

aircraft will take action in accordance with Appendix I to

Annex A to Enclosure 1. CINCLANT fighter escort will carry

live loads with ammunition fed into the chambers. All pilots,

will be briefed on and adhere to the "Rules of Engagement" as

specified in Appendix I to Annex A to Enclosure 1.

(f) Prior, during and subsequent to the above

operations, intelligence information will be gained by all means.

Elements of TAC perforning ELINT operations will comply with

Annex D to Enclosure I. Target aircraft crews will be provided

with cameras. ELINT aircraft, shipborne and land-based communi-

cations will actively seek out and retain intelligence

information.

(g) In the event that CONAD (ADC Target Fleet)

aircraft are attacked by CRAF elements, they will evade away

from the Cuban coast and terminate their participation in the

exercise.

(h) To heighten the illusion of the threat CINCLANT

will direct the evacuation of selected civilians from

Guantanamo.

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(1 Air activity in the Cuban area will be increased

by extra flights scheduled from Key West.

(J) "Heckler" flights will be directed, with aircraft

moving toward cuba at a high altitude, diving for the deck about

30 miles out and returning to base. Thirty minutes to an hour

later these procedures may be reversed with flights going out

low and returning high. All "heckler" aircraft will remain

at least 10 miles from the Cuban land mass.

(k) Resupply of the Guantanamo Naval Base will be

accelerated; to include planning for water resupply.

(1)Aseries of unusual Washington, D.C. activities will

be suggested, 1.e., meetings of senior US personnel; special

White House/JCS meetings; re-call of senior representatives to

Washington for White House meetings, etc.

g. Phase V - Withdrawal of CONAD (Target Fleet) aircraft.

(1) Tasks -

(a) To withdraw the CONAD Target Fleet aircraft from

the vicinity of Cuba and terminate the tactical evaluation of

the CONAD air defense test participation in the exercises in

the event of hostile action by the CRAF; and ensure Integrity of

all elements of US CONAD forces.

(2) Concepts -

(a) The CONAD Target Fleet elements will withdraw

and the tactical evaluation of CONAD Opord 1-61 will be terminated

immediately upon positive hostile action by CRAF aircraft

against

the Target Fleet. AEW & C aircraft will remain on

station unless

directly attacked, in which case evasive action

will be taken by the aircraft under attack.

TAC ELINT

aircraft will continue to fly the routes specified in Annex D

to Enclosure 1, unless directly attacked, at which time action

will be taken as directed by CINCLANT. Hostile forces

attacking elements of the CONAD Target Fleet, AEW & C aircraft

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Orm SECRAJ TAC ELINI aircraft or elements of JIF 122 forces

will be engaged as directed by CINCLANT. CINCLANT Will be

prepared to Implement CINCLANT OPLANS 314/316-61 as directed

by ine JOA,

h. Phase VI - US Courses of Action If Attacked by Cuban Forces

(1) Implement CINCLANT Operation Plan 314/316-61.

(2) To intervene against the attacking force with air

superiority fighter aircraft in alrepace outside of acknowledged

Cuban territorial waters and/or airspace.

(3) To intervene against the attacking force with air

superiority fighter aircraft to the extent of hot pursuit

into acknowledged Cuban territorial waters and/or airspace.

(4) Call on OAS for mutual support against Castro

Regime because of the unprovoked attack on US forces.

(5) Proteststo the United Nations and Organization of

American States.

(6) Deny any provocation or violation of Cuban airspace.

(7) Exploit through the press, UN and OAs the hostile

actions by the CRAF against unarmed US aircraft acting as

targets in an air defense tactical evaluation.

1. Phase VII - Withdrawal of CINCLANT Forces.

(1) Tasks -

(a) To withdraw the CINCLANT (JTF 122) Joint

Task Force forces from the vicinity of Vieques should there

be no hostile Cuban reaction.

(b) To withdraw the CINCLANT (JTP 122) Joint

Task Force forces participating in loading and other operational

maneuvers along and off the East and Gulf coasts of the US

for return to prealert posture should there be no hostile

Cuban reaction.

(c) To return CINCLANT temporarily allocated

PACOM forces to a prealert posture should there be no hostile

Cuban reaction.

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(d) To return the CINCLANT Ready Caribbean

amphibious forces, including embarked Marines,

to normal

Caribbean operations.

(e) To return any evacuees to Guantanamo, to signify

the determination of the US to retain the Naval Base.

(f) To return

all US forces involved in the

execution of CINCLANT OPLANS 314/316-61 to normal posture

following the successful accomplishment

of the 314/316-61

mission and the establishment of a Cuban government friendly

to the US.

(2) Concept:

(a) Should there be no hostile Cuban reaction

to the exercises described herein the following will pertain:

a Upon completion of the Vieques area air/sea

exercise outlined in Annex A to Enclosure 1, participating

CINCIANT forces will be returned to home bases and parent

commands as directed by CINCLANT.

b When directed by the JOS, CINCLANT Will

return those OPLANS 314/316-61 designated forces participating

in East and Gulf coast exercises to a prealert status.

Similarly, when directed by the JCS, CINCSTRIKE will return all

other alerted STRIKECOM forces to a prealert status.

§ When released by CINCIANT, the temporarily

allocated PACOM forces will be returned to the PACOM area

by CINCLANT.

d When directed by the JCS, CINCLANT will return

the Ready Caribbean amphibious forces, including embarked

Marines, to the normal Caribbean readiness and training opera-

tions.

e When directed by the JOS, CINCLANT will return

the/any selected evacuees to Naval Base Guantanamo.

(b) Should US military intervention in Cuba become

desirable and CINCLANT OPLANS 314/316-61 executed, upon

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accomplishment of the mission, the phase out and withdrawal of

participating US forces will be in accordance with OPLANS

314/316-61 as directed by CINCLANT and with the approval of

the JCS.

(3) Forces Required

See Implementation Schedule - Annex E.

j. Phase VIII - Cover

(1) Tasks - Io mold world opinion that the United States

forces

conducted routine

exercise aimed

at determining

defensive capabilities of the forces deployed to the southeast

US. Target aircraft flew routes over the Atlantic Ocean and

Caribbean Sea to simulate enemy bombers approaching military

and civilian targets in the southeast US and at no time

penetrated Cuban airspace.

(2) Concept - In the unlikely event that Cuban authorities

would make no protest, release to the press within two hours

after maneuvers time a prepared statement announcing a routine

air defense exercise of the forces in the southeast United

States.

No mention should be made of the proximity of the

target routes to the Cuban land mass.

(a) Should the Cuban government protest concerning

provocation or violation of Cuban airspace, the United States

should

make an emphatic denial, setting forth as a major

effect the fact that radar control aircraft were positioned over

international waters

at least 50 to 100 miles from the Cuban

land mass

assure positive control of US aircraft, to provide

navigational assistance and to preclude a violation of Cuban

airspace.

However, it was necessary to

deploy the target

fleet overseas and to transit overwater routes in order to

exercise the air defense capability of US fleet units

and

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92 SECRET

also to simulate the routes that might be flown by a force

attacking US targets in the US. If aggression by the 'Cuban

forces

is attempted, immediate protests through Press, UN, and

State Department

channels should be made from prepared

statements or

releases.

(b) Advance press releases should be prepared to reveal

that an air defense tactical evaluation of the forces deployed

to defend the lis is being or was conducted

using the target fleet

of USAF ADC B-57 aircraft. These aircraft were specially

modified as target aircraft,

unarmed and with bomb bays

sealed to provide space for special equipment used in evaluations

and to provide a realistic environment for training of the air

defense forces. Further, it was necessary to fly near but

outside of the recognized Cuban airspace to add realism to

a simulated attack against US fleet units as well as US

targets. In addition, special actions were taken by radar

controlling aircraft to provide navigational assistance on the

overwater portions of the routes flown by the target fleet

and to prevent inadvertent penetration of recognized Cuban

airspace.

4. Timing

a. Deception - Covert release of deception stories until

USAF target fleet is launched from deployment bases.

b. Alerting and Prepositioning of forces

-

(1) In accordance with Annex E to

Enclosure 1.

c. Maneuver - Forces will deploy in accordance with Annex

E to Enclosure 1 or as directed by CINCLANT. Proposed date

for ADC tactical evaluation and CINCLANT amphibious exercise

is 14 March 1962, or as modified by the JCS.

5. Command Arrangements

a. The maneuver portion of this plan will be conducted as

three separate and distinct exercises.

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(1) Commander in Chief, Atlantic will plan for and

conduct both the air/sea exercises in the Vieques area as well

as maintaining a ready Guantanamo augmentation capability.

AUGURUT CINCLANT

CINCSTRIKE will Suppost with those forces outlined in Annex E to

Enclosure 1.

augmented

(2) Commander in Chief, Atlantic, supported by

CINCSTRIKE, Will

plan for and conduct preloading, loading,

and readiness for

sea operations along

and of the east and

Gulf coasts of

the US, utilizing those

forces designated in

OPLANS 314/316-61 that are not participating in the

Vieques portion of the exercise.

(3) Commander in Chief, CONAD will plan for and conduct

the air defense operation and the tactical evaluation thereof.

Air superiority forces required to protect the target, AEW & C

and TAC ELINT aircraft will be provided by Commander in Chief,

Atlantic.

(a) CINCONAD will retain responsibility for

controlling the target fleet of aircraft, determining the routes

to be flown (within guidance provided in Annex B to Enclosure 1),

flight timing, adherence to the scheduled operation;

identification of faker aircraft; and termination of the

evaluation

and recall of the target fleet as

specified herein.

This will include provision of navigational assistance to the

target fleet aircraft, the scheduling and control of the

AEW

C aircraft, and

briefing of CONAD aircraft crews. In

case hostile reaction by the CRAF is encountered, operational

control of the special

station AEW & C aircraft (Annex B) will

be assumed by CINCLANT, or his designated representative,

to

provide interim warning and control of fighter escort

aircraft.

(b) Operational control of air defense forces

deployed for the defense of the southeast US will be as

directed by CINCONAD.

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(c) CINCLANT will exercise operational control over

all other forces involved in the conduct of the air defense

exercise, including air superiority fighter escort aircraft

oper: ling outside of the ADIZ, as well

as TAC ELINT aircraft.

Rules of Engagement will be as specified in. Appendix I to

Annex A to Enclosure 1.

(d) Should hostile actions against the target

fleet of faker aircraft occur within the coarsal ADIZ,

CINCONAD or his designated representative will direct

the recall of CONAD aircraft, terminate the air defense portion

of the exercise and increase the air defense posture of the US.

b. Command coordination and control of the over-all

simultaneous exercises will remain in the JCS.

6. Implementation

a. Upon approval of the over-all mission and concept of this

plan by the Secretary of Defense, the implementation schedule

will be annotated to reflect C-day; the JCS will direct that

detailed operation orders be prepared and implementation actions

initiated. Tentative target dates are 12 March 1962 with an

alternate liability period from 1 April to 15 April 1962, or as

modified

by the JCS.

b. This plan will not be implemented until a policy

decision has been reached

by higher authority and implementation

subsequently directed by the Secretary of Defense.

c. To preclude a lowering of contingency combat readiness,

individual and unit basic loads of amnunition, supplies and

equipment will be provided to all forces in this plan (Target

fleet aircraft excepted).

SECRET

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23

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DATE/ TIME GROUP

1. As soon as plan

is approved

2. C-Date minus

number of days

NOFORN/

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3. As soon as plan is:

approved

4. C-Date minus number

of days

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SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED

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LIMITED DISIRIBULION

ANNEX E

IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE FOR OUTLINE PLAN "(NICKNAME)"

SECRE

OBJECTIVES TO BE

SUPPORTED

TASK

IMPLEMENTATION

ACTIONS

RESPONSIBLE

AGENCIES

PHASE I - PREPARATION

Assign Codeword to plan

Provide cover to plan

Provide using agencies

and related meaning

with codeword

JCS

Assume State Department is aware

of plan and prepared to counter

any protest or to initiate pro-

test if appropriate

Have prepared statement ready

Specific guidance will be issued by

release to press or to use in

DOD to all participating departments,

protests to fit all contingen-

agencies and commands concerning

cies cited in this plan. Have

releases to press on all aspects of.

prepared statements for release operation.

DOD

STATE

JCS

SERVICES

USIA

to press concerning exercise if

querried by press:

PHASE II ALRI CINCLANT AND CINCONAD

Test of CINCLANT Op Plans 314-61

a. Forward Enclosure I (with

and 316-61 and CINCONAD'S Op Ord

Annexes) to CINCLANT and

1-61.

CINCONAD

b. Direct preparation of imple-

CINCLANT and CINCONAD prepare imple-

menting orders and directives to

accomplish mission

JCS -

CINCLANT

CINCONAD

menting plans: and orders.

Conduct test operations

Warn interested activities of

Indicate increased interest and activity

forthcoming military exercises

In Caribbean Area (1.e. notices to

commercial users of Caribbean area that 'HYDROGRAPHIC

major military exercises are to be

conducted in the Caribbean Area. (NOTAMS)

E - 1

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DATE/TIME GROUP

5. C-Date minus 30 days

6.. C-Date minus 22 days

T. C-Date minus number

of days

9. C-Date minus approp

riate number or days

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED.

NOFORN

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

RESPONSIBLE

AGENCIES

OBJECTIVES TO BE

SUPPORTED

TASK.

IMPLEMENTATION

ACTIONS

Support noverent of contingency

forces

PHASE III ALERTING AND PREPOSIRIONING OF FORCES

Obtain MSIS shipping to move

contingency forces

ICS authorize and CINCLANT

requisition MSTS shipping as

required to effect

sea: lift

of seaborne contingency forces

that cannot be accomplished by

available amphibious shipping

Support operations

Obtain 1/3 Marine Division/Wing JCS authorize and CINCLANT alert

Team from CINCPAC Forces to

CINCPAC to provide 1/3 Marine

support CINCLANT Contingency

Division/Wing Team for test of

operations

CINCLANT Contingency plans.

CINCPAC commence loading and

movement.

Commence normal publicity for

DOD, JCS, CINCLANT make approp

test of U.S. Armed Forces

riate press releases for exer-

abris by to react to emergencies cises in the Caribbean area

in the Caribbean Area.

Comsino nomal publicity for

tesü of Air Defense of the

Southeastern U.S.

Provide aratlability of CINCLATT

Liit and forces for contingenoy

operations if required

alert fonses to tucure avail.

ability for assault on c-iay,

if requirad, and test reaction

times.

DOI, JOS, CINCONAD make approp-

riate press releases for air

defense exercise in the South-

caster i.s.

(al des cirect CINCSIRIKE to alert

SISDOM forces and transporta-

tation

to insure availability

of all forces designated for

contingency operations in

CINCLANT OU Plai: 314-61.

E - 2

•SECRET

JCS

CINCLANT

CINCPAC

JCS

CINCIANT

CINCPAC

DOD

JOS

CINCLANT

DOD

JCS

CINCLANT

JCS

CINCLANT

CINCSIRIKE

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DATE/ TIME GROUP

9. (Continued)

10. C-Dale minus approp-

riate number of days

11. C-Date minus approp-

riate nuber of days

OD ECTIVES TO BE

SUPPORTED

Provide availability of CORAD

Forces for test of CINCONAD OP

Ord 1-61

Prerarations for operations

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED

NOFORN

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

JASK

IMPLEMENTATION

ACTIONS

RESPONSIBLE

S

AGENCIES

a. Forces to be alerted in time frames

envisaged in CINCLANT Op Plan 314-61

to test reacti on times.

JOS

CINCLANT

CINCSTRIKE

b. Forces and transportation to be

positioned to make assault land-

ing on C-date, if required, or

in position

to execute operations

directed in Annex A and this

schedule.

CINCONAD alori forces in prepara- CINCONAD alert and preposition forces

tion foX test of CINCONAD Of Ord for teEt a CINCONAD OR Ora 1-61. Tiest CILCONAD

to be conducted on C-Date in accord-

ance with Annex B and this schedule.

Complete freliminary tasks

(1) Alert and increase Air/Sea Rescue

Activities

CINCLANT,

USAF

USCG, NAVY COM

NAV BASE GIMO

(2) Obtain facilities for Air opera-

cions (Mayaquana, etc.)

(3) Commence MATS flights to pre-

position supalies

STATE, DOD

CINCARIB

JOS, MATS,

CINCLANT,

CINCARIB,

SERVICES

(i Tibion additional. NOTAM's

corditing all coocerned of

romartave military operations

22 Colorean area.

(5) Begin Icading of assault forces

for operations directed in

JCS, FAA

HYDO. OFFICE

JCS, CINCLANT

CTNCSIRTKE

USAF, USN

E = 3

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LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

OUTLINE PLAN FOR THE EXERCISE OF DESIGNATED US FOTECIAL HANULING

NIK¢NAME :

References: a. CINCLANT CONTINGENCY OPLANS 314-61 and '316-61

D. CINCONAD OPORD 1-61 (Southern Ilp)

1. Situation

a. General

(1) The Cuban Revolution of 1959 under the leadership of

Fidel Castro, a self-professed communist, has resulted in the

growth of a full-fledged

communist satellite in the Western

Henisphere.

Through Soviet economic, illitary and technical

assistance, the military structure in Cuba has rapiary

developed into a threat to the US and other Western Hemisphere

nations. Soviet Colonial Empire and Chinese communiso

infiltration of influence, personnel, and military equipment

is expected to proceed at an increased tempo.

Effective

governmental control over the institutions and dajly life

of the Cuban people is likely to increase, making effective

internal opposition more difficult and risky. There is no

foreseeable development in the internal economic or

political

situation which would be likely to bring about

a critical shift of popular opinion away from the present

government. On the contrary, all indications are that the

existing communist ruling body in Cuba will consolidate its

dominant political position, and will continue to present a

constant threat of harassment and a potential base for

hostile actions against the US. This threat will increase with

the passage of time.

(2) Incident to the communist threat presented by Cuba,

CINCLANT has been directed to and has

prepared contingency

plans for execution in the event that the JCS determine

that US military operations in Cuba are necessary. (Reference a)

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(3) Incident to the communist threat presented by Cuba,

CINCONAD has been directed to and has prepared and implemented

plans for an increased air defense capability in the southeast

United States area. (Reference b)

(4) In the event of US-Cuban overt military hostilities, it

is probable that both CINCLANT contingency operations and

CINCONAD air defense operations would be required and conducted

concurrently.

(5) In accordance with existing directives that require

military forces to be exercised and evaluated to determine

their capability to perform their assigned mission,

and in order

to practice the coordination required in the event of US-Cuban

overt military hostilities, this Outline Plan provides for the

conduct of concurrent CINCLANT/CINCONAD exercised which will

accomplish the following:

(a) Test and evaluate CINCLANT Contingency OPLANS

314-61 and 316-61 as realistically and thoroughly as possible,

utilizing a joint airborne/amphibious task force in the

Caribbean area.

(b) Test and evaluate CINCONAD Operation Order 1-61

(Southern Tip), including the capabilities of the air defense

forces assigned.

b. Enemy Forces

See Annex C (Intelligence)

c. Friendly Forces

(1) CINGSAC

Provides base services as required in support of

this plan.

(2) CINCARIB

Provides base services as required in support of

this plan.

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(3 COMSTS

Provides and operates seaborne transportation in

support of this plan.

(4) COMAIS

Provides and operates air transportation in support

of this plan.

(5) COMIAC

provides electronic reconnaissance aircraft and air

rescue aircraft in support of this plai.

(6) STATE DEPARIMENT

Provides support to the Department of Defense as directed

by higher authority.

(7) CIA

Provides support as avaiiable, In accordance witi

accepted requirements, or as directed by higher authority.

(8) USIA

Provides support to the Department of Defense

as

directed by higher authority.

a. Assumptions

None

2. Mission

CINCLANT and CINCONAD will conduct concurrent training

exercises in the Caribbean/Southeastern US area in order to

Increase the readiness in conducting contingency military

operations and air defense operations in this area.

3. Execution

a. CINCLANT

(1) Conduct operations to tactically evaluate CINCLANT

contingency plans for military operations in Cuba in

accordance with the concept in Annex A hereto.

(2) Provide fighter escort for CONAD aircraft in

accordance with Annexes A and B hereto.

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(3) Collect ELINT on Cuba in accordance with Annex D

hereto.

(4) Provide search and rescue services for the joint

exercise.

D. CINCONAD

(1) Conduct operations to tactically evaluate the CINCONAD

air defense capability in the southeast United States in

accordance with the concept in Annex B hereto.

(2) Provide navigational assistance to over-water

aircraft as required to prevent overflight of Cuban

territory.

c. CINCSTRIKE

(1) Provide Army and Air Force combat-ready forses to

CINCLANT in support of this plan.

d. CINCPAC

(1) Provide and deploy designated forces to CINCIANT

In support of this plan.

x. Coordinating Instructions

(1) This plan is effective for planning upon receipt

and effective for operations as directed by JOS.

(2) Planned effective date for operations is early

March 1962.

(3) CINCLANT and CINCONAD shall maintain close liaison

for planning and coordination of operations.

(4) Reproduction of this plan in part as required in

preparation of supporting plans is authorized.

(5) Use of nuclear weapons is not contemplated in

executing this plan.

4. Administration and Logistics

In accordance with existing directives and references

(a) and (b). To preclude a lowering of actual contingency

readiness, individual and unit basic loads of ammunition,

supplies and equipment will be carried.

4

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5. Command and Signal

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a. Command Relations

SPECIAL HANDLING

(1) This is a joint CINCLANT/CINCONAD operation under

the JCS. CINCLANT and CINCONAD shall conduct their respective

phases of the exercise keeping one another informed of

schedules and operations to insure integration of effort

and non-interference.

(2) CINCLANT shall act in support of CINCONAD in providing

fighter escort for CONAD aircraft.

(3) CINCSTRIKE forces required for support of CINCLANT

OPLANS 314/316-61 will be alerted as requested by CINCLANT

and placed in appropriate DEFCON as directed by the JOS.

Actual STRIKECOM forces participating in the "tailored"

JF 122 Vieques exercise and the coastai loading-out

maneuvers will CHOP to CINCLANT as directed by the JOS.

(4) CINCPAC forces

required for support of CINCLANT

OPLANS 314/316-61 will be deployed and CHOP to CINCLANT

as directed by the JCS.

b. Communications

(1) As mutually developed by CINCLANT and CINCONAD.

(2) Code word for this operation is

(TS) .

c. Headquarters Locations

JCS

Washington, D.C.

CINCLANT

Norfolk, Va.

CINCONAD

Colorado Springs, Col.

ANNEXES

A. Concept and Forces for CINCIANT

B. Concept and Forces for CINCONAD

C. Intelligence

D. ELINT Collection

E. Implementation

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ANNEX A

FORCES AND

NOPORNOR CINCLANE SPECIAL HANDLING

1. Forces

a. CINCLANT will plan for exercising all of the forces

currently listed in CINCLANT OPLAN 314-61. The General concept

in paragraph 2 below indicates forces to be deployed, forces

to be repositioned, forces to be alerted, etc.

b. In addition to the above, CINCLANT will plan with

COMTAC for the exercise of COMTAC electronic reconnaissance

aircraft and air rescue aircraft as required in the Cuban

area to support the joint exercises. It is estimated that

five electronic reconnaissance aircraft will be required for

a three-day period and three air rosoue aircraft will be required

for

a one-day period.

2. General Concept

CINCLANT's directives in compliance with this outline

plan will support

the following general concept:

a. A realistic tactical evaluation of CINCLANT'S

OPLAN 314-61 is required.

b. "C-Day" will be the term used for the day that US

military forces commence the exercise initial assault. This

will be the same day on which CONCONAD faker aircraft

conduct their simulated attack on southeastern US.

c. C-day operations will include amphibious assault,

air drop, and air landed (if feasible) operations at Viegues.

a. Operations at Vieques will include one PHIBRON with

embarked Marine and Army elements, Army airborne elements,

and required air and

sea support.

e. About C-22 days, CINCLANT will request those PACOM forces

designated in CINCLANT OPLANS 314-61 to be deployed enroute to

Lantcon.

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A-1

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Annex A

SPECIAL HANDLING

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TOT

StUff C-1 to C+2 days, one PHIBRON with embarked

Marines and supporting Marine air will be within 4 hours

distance

of Guantanamo (GTMO reinforcement listed in CINCLANT

OPLAN

314-61)•

g. At C-1 day, one Marine Infrantry Battalion (minus)

will be airlifted from CONUS to Guantanamo (GIMO reinforcement

listed in CINCLANT OPLAN 314-61) .

h. Starting at C-3 days, one PHIBRON will be in the

Morehead City-Camp Lejeune area conducting loading and

training drills.

1. H-hour (time of commencment of the Vleques amphibious

assault) will be scheduled no earlier than six hours

after

the first scheduled faker aircraft DiZ penetration. Partici-

pating exercise units will be ready to shift from a

"training"

status to a ready contingency status of all times.

J. CINCSTRIKE combat-ready Army and Air Force forces

will be chopped to CINCLANT in sufficient time before C-day to

ensure their effective utilization and as mutually agreed

between CINCLANT and CINCSTRIKE. These forees will be used

in the Vieques

area, the North Carolina area deployed to loading/

staging areas, or alerted at home base as CINCLANT requests in

order to realistically teet his contingency plan.

k. CINCLANT will

request required MSTS forces in

sufficient time to make them available for operations envisaged

in CINCLANT OPIAN 314-61. Although conditions may preclude all

the individual MSTS ships from active participation, in order

to properly evaluate the exercise, CINCIANI should etermine:

(1) Names of MSTS ships designated

(2) Location of these ships

(3) Degree of readiness

(4) Time of availability of Individual ships at

loading ports

(5) Capabilities of ships in speed, troop

capacity, etc.

OP

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JOP SECRE dept for some of the MSTS ships discussed In j

above, all forces will participate at least to the level of

alerting them for contingency operations at their home ‹bases.

m. CINCLANT

shall arrange for Navy, Marine or Air Force

fighter escort of all CINCONAD faker waves from the time they

approach within 50 nautical miles of Cuba until entering

the

ADIZ on their simulated strike missions.

n. Exercise forces shall at all times maintain a quick

reaction capability in event of actual hostilities; to include

individual and unit basic loads of amunition, supplies, and

equipment.

SECRET

JR. SECRET

A -3

NOFORN

Annex A

SECER HANDLING

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TAB A - Total Forces Assigned in CINCLANI Oplans 314/316/61

CAB 3 - Forces (Tentative) to be Deployed to fieques Area

LAB C - Forces (Tentative) to be Deployed to Guartanamo Area

TÁB D - Forces (Ientative) to be

Deployed

(on Employed) in

Camp Lejeune/Camp Davis,'

South

Carolina

Area

HAD D Forces fIentative

oe hup toyed in

Executron. of

CINCONADIS Test of

Air Defenses-e"

Southeastern IS.

PASECRET

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IAB A

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TOTAL FORCES ASSIGNED IN OPLAN 314/316-61

(NOTE:

All forces listed herein are on alert

status

except those operationally

listed in Tabs B through E)

ARMY

Hq. XVIII Airborne Corps

82nd Airborne Division

101st Airborne Division

I Artillery Group (1 Bn 105s; 1 Bn 155's)

4 Helicopter companies

2nd Infartry Brigade (5th Infantry Division)

1 Medium Tank Battalion

1 Armored Cavalry Regiment (Combat Command A)

combat support, Logistic, and Administrative units as required.

AIR FORCE

I Command Headquarters

6 Squadrons

Troop

14 Squadrons

Troop Carrier Aircraft

Carrier Aircraft (8o C-130)

squadrons Troop Carrier Aircret AFR (C 119)

(NOTE:

AFR Squadrons to be mobilized)

16 Squadrons

Transport Aireraft (0 124)

squadrons

Transport Aircraft (C 118/121)

3 Squadrons

Total - approximately 164 Transport Aircraft

2 1/3 Recon

squadrons (20z)

Tactical Fighter

Squadrons (243 /)

Tactical Aircraft Command Control Center (Reduced,

terial Refuelin® Aircraft as requirec

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TAB A(1)

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LAL STRIKING, COVERING AND LOGISTIC FORCES

1 Conmand Ship (CLC):

2 Attack Carriers (CVA)

Cruisers (CA/CAG/CLG)

Destroyers (4 Squadrons)

I AS Group CASW Carrier plus 8 destroyers, 2 land based

air patrol squadrons)

1

4

Airborne Early Warning Squadron

Subnarines

Tarkers

2

3

Ammunition Ships

Seagoing Tugs

Amphibious Task Force

20 Destroyers

16 Mine countermeasures ships

Amphthious ships' as available and assigned

MARINES

One Marine Division/Wing Team (less 1 Battalion landing Team)

1/3. Marine Division/Wing.

Team

(from

Pacific Command)

Combet and

Service Support Units as available ans assigned

CANTALAMO REINEORCEMENT FORCE (NOTE:

These forces are

included in the compilation above)

I Marine Infantry Battalion (-) airlifted from CONUS:

Battalion landing Team from the Ready Caribbean Amphibious

Squadron

1 Marine Aircraft Squadron

Other naval units as available and assigned.

ON CALL FORCES AS REQUIRED AND DIRECTED BY THE JOS. (NOTE:

these forces are in addition to forces listed in the compilation

ahove

(1) Army - One Infantry Division

One Combat Command (Armor)

(2) Navy

- uncommitted forces, 0.5. Atlantic fleet

....

1749:

11C2A.01/ 421"

Tantondud

Contada

Aross Cordentis

16004d

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TAB A (2)

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SECRET

SECREE

Or. SLUREL

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED

NOFORN

NOFORY

SPEGIAL MANDLING

EGACES CENTATIVE) TO BE DEPLOYED TO VIEQUES AREA

Aleroine

Battle Group

Impribious Squadron (1 attack Transport, 1 attack Cargo ship,

2 lording

I Landing Ship Dock)

I Marine Battalion landing Team (Embarked In the Amphibious

Squadron)

Tactica" Air Command Iransport Aircraft as required to lift

the Airborne Battle

Haval striking and support shipping as available and assigned

P SECRET

IDO SECRET

TAB B

NOFORN /

SPECIAL HANDLING

BUT SECRET

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SECRET

SECRET

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED

NOFORN

TOr. SECRET

ALDEORN

SPECIAL HANDLING

EORCES (TENTATIVE) TO BE DEPLOYED TO THE GUANTANAMO AREA

1 Mucine Infantry Battalion (minus) (to be airlifted into

Guantaramc Naval Bese on C Day)

1 Marine

rattalion landing Team (To be within 4 hours of the

embarked in the Ready Amphibious Squadron)

2/3 monte out apply on the to a prost. To be on tha

To be in the

vicinity but not dectectable from Cuba)

Guantanamo Naval Base l'orces

Transport

Aircraft as required to lift the Marine Battalion from

Cherry Point,

S.C.,

to Guantanamo

Naval Striking

support shipping

assigned

Amphibious shipping necessary

• to lift the Pacific Command 1/3

Marine Division/Wing

Team and the Ready Amphibious Squadron

(Approximately

5 Amphibious Squadrons)

SECRET

TOP. SECRET

TAB C

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• SECRET

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SECRET

7OP SECRET

SECRET

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED

NOFORN

NOFORN

SPECIAL HANDLING

FORCES (TENTATIVE) IO BE DEPLOYED (OR EMPLOYED) IN THE CAMP

LEJ EUNE/CAMP DAVIS AREA

1 Marine Rey wanton Landing Jeam (3 BLts)

1 Amphibious Squadron (+)

Other units as available and assigned

SPECIAL MANDLING

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Or. SECRET

TAB D

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43

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PUP SECRET

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TOR. SECKLI

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX A TO ENCLOSURE I

Rules of Engagement with Cuban Aircraft

1OP SECRET

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1. The following rules of engagement for aircraft are

applicable if Cuban aircraft are encountered.

2. Rules

a. If a Cuban aircraft commits

a hostile act, fighter

aircraft in Immediate area of attack will follow in

Immediate

pursuit of the Cuban aircraft that has fired

upon Us forces, flying over Cuban territory if necessary :

in order to destroy it.

b. If Cuban aircraft have been guilty of harassment

only and have not fired upon US forces, fighter aircraft

will make presence known

to harasser by

flying close

aboard until Cuban aircraft withdraws

to Cuban territoral

airspace.

c. US forces are prohibited from conducting prolonged

pursuit deep into Cuban territory and shall not deliberately

and systematically organize and dispatch a pursuing force

to effect reprisal unless otherwise directed by higher

authority.

3. In the event that CINCLANT OPLAN 314/316-61 is ordered

executed by higher authority, the order of execution will

place normal wartime Rules of Engagement in effect.

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Appenaix I to Annex.

• Enclosure

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- Sino

C

9. 1

A SECRET

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LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

ANN MOEORN)

SPECIAL HANDLING

FORCES AND CONCEPT FOR CINCONAD

1. FORCES

a. CINCONAD shall plan for exercising those of his

forces he considers necessary for a realistic tactical

evaluation of his air defense capability in the southeastern

United States area. In general these forces will be:

(1) Approximately thirty-four faker aircraft to

conduct simulated air attacks.

Four airborne early warning and control aircraft

to

provide navigational assistance to overwater aircraft.

(3) Forces of the Montgonery Air Defense Sector as

required.

2. GENERAL CONCEPI. CINCONAD*s directives in compliance

with this outline plan will support the following general

concept.

a. CONAD (USAF ADC target fleet)

aircraft will fly

predetermined routes.

(1) A flight of 19 B-57 aircraft out of Iyndall AFB,

will fly to approximately 10 miles off the Northeast

coast of the Yucatan Peninsula and then head for the

West coast of Cuba. Upon reaching a point approximately

10 miles off shore, the aircraft will turn to maintain

a track that will parallel the North coast of Cuba

approximately 10 miles off shore. Upon reaching a

position directly south of Key West, the aircraft will turn

North and recover at Key West NAS, Homestead or MacDill

AFB.

(2) The 15 B-57 aircraft being scheduled out of

Ramey AFB will initially fly southerly and then head for

CINCLANT Vieques Joint Task Force; then changing to

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C

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SECRathernly course, fly around tie east end of Puerto

Rico; taking a course to the North of the island of

Hispaniola: then heading directly toward military

and governmental targets in Cuba. Upon reaching a

point approximately 10 miles off shore (initiating

turns at 15 miles), the aircraft will alter course to

maintain a track parallel to the North coast of Cuba

approximately 10 miles off shore. Jon reaching a

position south of Miami the aircraft will turn North

and recover at Key West NAS, Homestead or McDill AFB.

b. The target force will be launched at a time to have

the forces from

Ramey AFB arrive at the East coasi of Cuba

at

the same time as the target jorces from Tyndai? AFB arrive

at the Nest coast

of Cuba. When in-bound toward CONUS, these

forces will simulate attacks on US targets in the Southeast

U.S. area to test the US air defense.

c. Faker aircraft will at no time approach closer than

10 miles to the Cuban coast. The waves should arrive at IP

10 miles off the Cuban coast at the same time.

d. Time and space factors, as determined by CINCONAD,

will affect the detailed flight plans.

e. CINCONAD will provide sufficient airborne early

Werning and control aircraft off the Cuban coasts to assist

faker aircraft in their navigation to insure that they stay

at least 10 miles from Cuban territory.

f. AEW

and C aircraft will also be exercised in their

AEW and radio relay missions.

g. Provision will be made for positive control to recall

participating forces and to terminate the exercise.

h. CINCLANT fighter escort will carry live loads with

ammunition fed into the chambers. All pilots, however, will

be briefed on the "Rules of Engagement" as specified in

Appendix 1 to Annex A to Enclosure 1.

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B - 2

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SPECIAL HANDLING

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SECRET

SECRET

PSECRET

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NOFORN

NOFORN! ZAB A

SPECIAL HANDLING

FORCES (TENTATIVE)

TO BE EMPLOYED IN EXECUTION OF CINCONAD':

EST OF AIR DEFENSES OF SOUTHEASTERN UNITED STATES

S or 6 ELINT collecting aircraft

Fighter and escort aircraft as assigned by CINCLANT

Aircraft carriers and

supporting ships as assigned by

• CINCLANT

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TAB

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SEORIE

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ANNEX C

5 Febrary 1962

SPECIAL HANDLING

INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

1. Mission.

Intelligence estimate outlining Cuban offensive and

defensive capabilities and estimating possible Cuban,

Soviet Communist Chinese and South American reactions

and possible courses of action.

2. Situation.

a. General

(1) Cuba has by far the most formidable military

machine, except for its Navy, in the Latin American

area. Cuba is a Communist beachhead

in the defense

system of the Western world, and the Soviet Bloc

nations have put

forth special effort

to entrench

their influence

in the present Cuban

government. It

is apparent that

this government fits very closely into

the world domination plans of the Communist conspiracy.

The amount of control exercised by the Soviet Bloc over

Cuba is unknown, but is probably considerable. A "lend-

lease" arrangement between the Soviet Bloc and Cuba

whereby Cuba furnishes territory for actions against

the US in return for arms and technical assistance

from the Bloc 1s a distinct possibility. There are

believed to be over 500 Soviet Bloc technicians in Cuba

traveling under various guises.

Generally, these

technicians can be broken down into groups as follows:

(a) Soviet - Government advisors, military

construction experts, economic advisors, military

planning and training advisors, and military

equipment instructors - especially instructors for

the jet aircraft which Cuba is receiving from the

USSR.

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(b) Communist CiDER xperts on suem:

SPEGIAL MANDLING

warfare and camouflage.

(c) Soviet Bloc personnel - Jet fighter instructors,

factory technicians and instructors on use of smaller

military equipment, such as automatic and

anti-aircraft

weapons.

(2) It is conceivable that the military advisors will

play

an important part in decision making if and when

the Cuban

leaders

are faced with the problem

of

whether

or not

an

actual

attack is underway. The Soviets,

being past masters at "brinknanship", might exert a

sobering

influence on such decisions.

(3) The Cubans have trained approximately 200 pilots

to fly MIGS. However, the Cuban pilot training

program is only about 18 months old and it may be

expected that the Cuban fighter pilots are not equal in

ability to pilots of the US forces. In the event of actual

hostilities, it is possible that soviet or Soviet Bloc

pilots flying MIG-19 FARMERS will be encountered.

These pilots are of the instructor category, and would

be flying high performance aircraft with possible

air-to-air missile capability.

(4) The EW/GCI capability of the Cuban military runs the

gamut of radar types from GOS to SCR-627. EW capability

may extend as far out as 250 and possible 350 miles from

the Havana area. The capability of Cuban

radar technicians

and operators is not known; however,

technician and

operator assistance must be expected from Soviet Bloc

instructors in the event of suspected hostilities. This

assistance should provide a marked increase in radar

detection

capability over that of

Cuban operators.

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SECRET Little Information 1s available on the GCI/AI

capability of the Cuban Rebel Air Force (CRAF) :

(5) Guerrilla warfare holds a high priority in Cuban

army training. The average. Cuban adapts well to military

life and especially to guerrilla warfare. He is small

in stature but rugged, strong, inured to hardships, and

able to subsist on a simple diet for a long period of

time. It should be expected, therefore, that,

if the Cuban Army were confronted with an unprofitable

military situation it would revert to guerrilla

warfare which could be. long and costly.

(6) The average Cuban fights well while winning, but

may tend to offer less and less

resistance as the

situation becomes

more untenable. The Army is reasonably

mobile with good ground communications. Areas of special

activity such as supply depots, are usually surrounded

by prepared defenses with tanks, troops, trenches,

and automatic weapon (AW) positions. The Aw positions

normally are unoccupied; however, mobile amounts

of quads, ete., could be moved into these

positions on short notice. Areas of heavy military activ-

ity and airfields are usually further protected by AA

weapons up to 57 mm. Larger numbers of .30 and .50

calibre machine guns are included in AA and ground

defense installations. Ground forces are well equipped

with mortars, AT guns, assault guns,

tanks, submachine

guns and rifles.

b. Characteristics of the Area of Operations

(1) Transportation

(a).

There

are over

5, 000 miles of all weather

roads in Cuba, some 3,500 miles of which are paved.

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An additional 3,200 miles of road are passable in the

dry season. The most important artery of communication

and chief connecting link between Cuba's major cities

is the Central Highway. Over 700 miles long, it

runs between Pinar del Rio and Santiago de Cuba

following the central axis of the island except

where it turns

north of Havana and Matanzas and south

to Bayamo and

Santiago de Cuba. From the Central Highway,

a road and highway network extends curward toward the

coast, and

ranges from farm roads, at timesunusable,

to all weather highways connecting important coastal

areas. The mountainous area

east of Santigao de Cuba

is completely unserviced by cads or railroads,

and

air or sea transportation is the only reliable means of

reaching some eastern tip areas such as Baracoa.

(b) Total railroad trackage in Cuba is over 11, 000

miles. The rail network closely parallels the

highway network along the central island axis with

connecting lines to all areas of commercial

Importance. Basically, Cuba's railroads are in

mupport of the sugar industry and their financial

stability and operative effectiveness have fluctuated

with this industry. Castro has probably seen to it

that both rail and highway systems have been brought

up to

a higher level of effectiveness than in the

pre-revolutionary days.

Assuming that the rail and

highway systems are in good repair, rapid deployment

of ground forces to any part of the island

is

distinct capability. This deployment will be further

enhanced by the three (3) self-sufficient territorial

commands designated as the Armies of the west, the

Central and the East. Each

of these Armies has full

operational control of all regular and ready reserve

units in its area.

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SECRETI

(c) Cuba has good facilities throughout the island

for air transportation. Approximately 95 airfields

in various stages of usability from highly efricient

International airports with 10, 000 feel (plus)

runways to 2,500 feet landing strips of sod, dot the

countryside. Over 45 transport/cargo type aircraft

are presently in

service with

additional Soviet

made CRATE aircraft being procured.

(a) A negligible coastal

trade is in effect in

Cuba which in some instances

uses

sailing vessels for

cargo carriers. There are a number of excellent

ports with modern facilities for international trade.

The main ports are Havana, Santiago de Cuba, Cienfuegos,

and Nuevitas.

(2) Telecommunications

(a) The entire island of Cuba is criss-crossed with

a complete network of communications including landline,

manual and automatic telegraph, teleprinter, both

UHF and VHF voice links, and facsimile circuits. All

communications are controlled by the Ministry of

Cormunications and communications systems are available

for use by the milltary as required. Complete portions

of the present communications systems

were installed

by RCA and Philco Corporations and are considered

to

be very reliable. Along with tele-communications

systems, the island is covered with an extensive

network of radio and IV stations. Nearly all areas,.

no matter how remote, may be recipients of regularly

broadcast radio and IV programs. The US embargo and

the lack of adequate telecon equipment producing

industry in Cuba together with an acute shortage of

engineers severely limits maintenance or expansion of

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the present system. However,

some development programs

are in progress and equipment for these programs 1s

being

obtained from Hungary, Switzerland and the

Soviet Bloc.

(3) Political

(a) The present regime in Cuba is in the process

of reorganizing the government into a totalitarian

political system.

The traditional provincial and munici

pal governments are being replaced by Juntas for

Coordination, Execution and Inspection (JUCEI).

Already established in each province of Cuba, the

JUCEI consists of a Provincial Congress, representative

of all major economical entities in the territory

which meets occasionally, the "plenum" of the Congress

which meets every few months, and several smaller

bodies which meet frequently and actually direct the

provincial administration. The new totalitarian

political machine is to be called the United Party of

the Cuban

Socialist Revolution, a merger of the amorphous

20 of July Movement with the well organized Communist

party. Although Castro, is, of course, to be the

supreme head of this party, the man who

is pushing

the project is Blas Roca,

the Secretary General of the

Communist party. Party membership is to be limited

to the elite of the revolutionary struggle and will

be prerequisite for appointment to any Important

political or economic position. The new organization

will enhance the already extensive communist control

of Cuban Institutions and the influence of Blas

Roca on policy.

(b) An important arm of the Castro political

organization is the Association of Rebel Youth (AJR).

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It now numbers some 150,000 members.

Many of these

teenagers are of the type which elsewhere is found

In juvenile gangs. Recognition and status accorded them

by the regime

makes them fanatical in its service.

Active

participation

in the

AJR

is becoming requisite

for educational

advancement

and eventual political

preferment.

, (4) Economics

(a) The Cuban economy is now feeling the impact of

three revolutionary changes: (1) the loss of experienced

middle and upper level managerial and technical

talent, (2) imposition of elaborate state control,

and (3) a drastic shift in the trading pattern from

primary dependence on the US to primary dependence on

the soviet Bloc.

The elimination of the US quota for

Cuban sugar has deprived Cuba of its major source of

dollar income.

US embargo has also produced

economic

difficulties especially through the denial of spare

parts for previously acquired US equipment. Although

Cuba's free world trade has declined sharply, and

foreign exchange reserves have been

exhausted, the

Bloc is taking enough exports

and

returning

enough goods

and machinery to keep the economy going.

In addition,

to trade, the Soviet Bloc has extended to Cuba 357

million dollars in credits for industrial development.

(b) In general, the Cuban economy is now

characterized by major shortages and considerable

disorganization. However, in view of the availabillty

of Bloc assistance, It is not believed that the

economy will deteriorate so far as to bring about

Castro's over-throw or to force him to make basic

changes in his policy.

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c. Cuban Military Situation.

(1) Strength

The Cuban ground forces are in the process of

thorough reorganization designed to enhance their effect-

Iveness. The numerical strength of the Army has declined

as Army personnel

are absorbed into the militia as

cadres. At the same time there has developed within the

militia differentiation between

various categories of

units.

Thus, meaningful distinction is no longer

that between the Army and the militia, but rather

that between the regular ready reserve and home guard

type units. On this basis the ground forces available

to the regime to suppress insurrection or revel

Invasion are estimated to be:

Regular Forces - 75,000 (Army, Navy, Air

active duty

militia)

Ready Reserve - 100,000

Home Guard - 100,000

(a) Army

25,000 of which 9,500 are performing internal

security and police missions in the provinces.

1 Militia (Active Duty Ready Reserve Home

Guard •

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250,000 of which an estimated 50,000 is on

active duty.

2 National Police.

9,000. The National Police were recently

removed from Armed Forces jurisdiction and assigned

to the Department of State Security.

(b) Alr Force.

The present personnel strength of the Air

Force is unknown. However, latest information

Indicates that there are about 200 Cuban pilots

who have been trained by Bloc

personnel in high

performance aircraft.

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(c) Navy

The Cuban Navy is capable of moderately effective

patrol operations along selected

portions of the Cuban

coast.

But its combat capabilities are negligible.

Mutinies, defections, and purges have left it few

professionally trained

and technically qualified

men.

Its present personnel strength

is composed largely of new

recruits and

militiamen and is estimated at not more

than 4,000. Defections among Navy personnel have been

so high

that active duty militia personnel are assigned

to units as security against further defections.

(2) Uniforms and Insignia

(a) The uniform of the cuban Army closely resembles

that of the US Army's olive green, cotton, field

uniform - although many combinations and variations

exist. The lack of uniformity in dress may be

attributed to a lack of discipline, which within

certain limits permits many combinations of what is,

in reality, a simple and practical field uniform.

(b) The majority of militiamen possess uniforms

which they have provided themselves. The uniform of the

Farmer's Militia is a straw

hat, blue work shirt,

and

olive green trousers. The uniform of

the Students'

Militia consists of a black beret, maroon shirt,

and gray trousers.

(3) MobIlity

The Cuban forces are estimated to have the

capability of reasonably good mobility for all active

duty units. This mobility is enhanced by the

acquisition of some 5, 000 pieces of military

transportation including US and Soviet made 4x4 and

6x6 truck and tractor-trailer type units. (See

paragroph 2b(1), Transportation).

The ability to

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SECRET

NOFORN

SECRET rapidly deploy combat forces will further be enhanced

by the recent reorganization dividing the island

operationally into three self-sustaining Army areas of

command.

Operational control of all forces within the

East, Central and Western Army areas is vested in the

commander of the particular area.

(4) Availability of Reinforcements

The Peoples' Militia both male and female, with a

potential strength of 500,000 spends several hours a

week in training under the tutorship of the active

duty forces. This militia is well equipped with

Communist Bloc produced small arms, plentiful

supples of ammunition, and constitute

an avilable

source of reinforcements to add depth to the active

forces.

No outside source of reinforcements is known

to be available.

(5) Serviceability and Operational Rates of Aircraft

(a) In the event that Cuba elects to act against

an exercise force,

the Cuban Rebel Air Force in an

all-out effort could probably launch about 25 high

performance jet aircraft. Conventional aircraft

possessed would probably be held in reserve to

repel

ground

and landing forces. Due to the early

stages of training, probable early stages of

organization and poor terminal facilities, the

reattack capability of the CRAF jet fighters 1s

considered to be relatively low.

(b) There is evidence to indicate that I-33 and

other American type aircraft may display US military

markings. The problem of turn around is complicated

by the fact that parts and supplies for British and

American type aircraft have been cut off. A pressure

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refueling capability is not indicated at any Cuban

base supporting jet type aircraft.

During combat

operations MIG

aircraft: which normally fly from three

Cuban fields could be expected to deploy to other

more remote airfields.

c. Unconventional and Psychological Warfare Situation

(1) Guerrilla

Some guerrilla activity against the Castro forces

can be expected by widely dispersed bands of anti-

Castro groups operating from mountainous areas of the

island. Due to the small size of the bands and lack

of coordinated leadership, it is doubtful that they

can do more than harrass the active forces cy

occasional cutting of lines of communications.

(2) Psychological

At the first indication of US operations oriented

toward the area

of Cuba, the Cuban Government is

expected to charge the US with hostile intentions.

Charges

will

undoubtedly be placed before the UN and

the OAS, and to the world public through all

propaganda media. In addition, it is expected that

Cuba, through her representatives and/or agents in all

South American countries, will try to bring pressure

to bear to cause Latin American governments to

condemn the action of the US Government.

(3) Sabotage

Sporadic cases of sabotage may be carried out by

anti-Castro groups against the communications

systems.

However, they will probably be on such a

small scale as to be an annoyance rather than a

handicap to the Cuban Government.

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SEfREuban Capabilities.

a. Cuba is capable of interfering with the accomplishment

of this training mission by:

(1) Launching high performance jet fighters and

actively

engaging

the training forces.

(2) Launching

both.conventional and jet aircraft against

exercise vessels.

Weet Tied teredotte

cr1d9 19702

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ANNEX D

NOFORN/

ELINT CCLLECTION

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NOFORN

LINITED DISTRTBUTION

SPECIAL HANDLING

2. FORCES

As determined necessary by CINCLANT and as can be

provlded is CINCLANT by COMTAC.

2. GENERAL CONCEPT

a, The conduct of

the concurrent exercises provided

for in the basic pian in the Cuban area provides an

excellent opportunity to acquire ELINT data

on Cuban

capabilities in this field.

b. This basic mission will be to locate and determine the

capabilities of the various types of electro-magrolic radia-

tion devices operating on the isiand of Cuba and adjacent

territorial and international waters, and to collect all

ninitary communications and transmissions having intel-

licence implications.

c. It is contemplated that six RB-66s and qualified

disctronic reconnaissance personnel fly sorties in the

*iciniüy of Cuba on E-2, E-l and E-day. Sorties on E-day

chold accompany each of the faker waves from IP to the

^. TAC reconnaissance forces will be under the

outzational control of CINCLANT while in the target area.

e. CINCLANT fighter escort for ELINI forces will be

provided as outlined in Enclosure 2.

SECRET

JUP. SECRET

D-1

SPECIAL HANDLING

NOFORN

SECRET

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Page 65_

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## Page 66

DacId: 32423993

SECRET

DATE/IIME GROUP

1. As soon as plan

1s approved

2. C-Date minus

number of days

NOFORN /

SPECIAL

MANI

JING

3. As soon as plan is

approved

4. C-Date minus number

of days:

SECRET

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED

NOFORN

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

ANNEX E

IMPLEMENIATION SCHEDULE FOR OUTTINE. PLAN "'(NICKNAME)"

OBJECTIVES TO BE

SUPPORTED

IMPLEMENTATION

ACTIONS

RESPONSIBET

AGENCIES

TASK

PHASE I - PREPARATION

Assign Codeword to plan

Provide cover to plan

Provide using agencies with codeword

and related meaning

Assume State Department is aware

of plan and prepared to counter

any protest or to initiate pro-

test if appropriate

Have prepared statement ready

Specific guidance will be issued by

release to press or to use in

DOD to all participating departments,

protests to fit all contingen-

agencies and commands concerning

cies cited in this plan. Have: releases to press on all aspects of

prepared statements for release operation.

to press concerning exercise if

querried by press:

PHASE II ALBRT CINCIANT AND CINCONAD

Test of CINCLANT Op Plans 314-61

and 326-62 and CINCONAD's Op on

a. Forward Inclosure I (with

Annexes) to CINCLANT and

CINCONAD

CINCLANT and CINCONAD prepare imple-

menting orders and directives to

accomplish mission

b. Direct preparation of imple-

menting plans: and orders:

Conduct test operations

Warn interested activities of

forthcoming military exercises

JCS

DOD

SIATE

JCS

SERVICES

USIA

JCS

CINCLANT

CINCONAD

Indicate increased interest and activity

in Caribbean Area (1.e. notices to

commercial users of Caribbean area that 'HYDROGRAPHIC

major military exercises are to be

conducted in the Caribbean Area. (NOTAMS)

E - 1

NOFORN

SPECI

HANDLING

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QuId: 32123993

NOFORN

SPECIAL MANDLING

TOP SECRET

DATE/TIME GROUP

5. C-Date minus 30 days

6. Colate minus 22 durs

7. C-Date minus number

of days

9. C-Date minus approp-

riate number co daye

SENCES

OBJECTIVES TO BE

SUPPORIED

TASK

Support novement of contingency

forces

PHASE III ALERTING AND PREPOSITIONING OF FORCES

Obtain MSIS shipping to move

contingency forces

TAP LANETATTON

314-61 and 316-61

Support operations

Provide Grailability of CINCTANT

lift ard fouces for contingency

operations if required

JCS authorize and CINCLANT

requisition MSTS shipping as.

required to effect sea lift

of seaborne contingency forces

that cannot be accomplished by

available amphibious shipping

Obtain 1/3 Marine Division/Wing JCS authorize and CINCLANT alert

Team from CINCPAC Forces to

CINCPAC to provide 1/3. Marine

support CINCTANT Contingency

Division/Wing Team for test of

operations

movement.

Commence normal publicity for

DOD, JCS, CINCIANT make approp-

test of U.S. Armed Forces

riate press releases for exer-

ability to react to emergencies cises in the Caribbean area

in the Caribbean Area.

Comsans coral fusicity for

tesi of Air Defense of the

Southeastern U.S.

aiend forces to inse avati.

ability for assault on clay,

if required, and test reaction

tines.

defense exercise in the South-

caster it.s.

(s' des cirect CINCSTRIKE to alert

SIB30JM forces ana transporta-

tation to insure availability

of all forces designated for

contingency operations in

CINCLANT ON PlEI: 314-61.

E - 2

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED

LIMITED DISTRIBUIION

RESPONSIBLE

AGENCIES

JCS

CINCLANT

CINCPAC

JCS

CINCLANT

CINCPAC

DOD

JCS

CINCLANT

DOD

ICS

CINCLANT

JCS

CINCLANT

CINCSTRIKE

SECRET

NOFORN

SPECIAL HANDLING

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## Page 68

Doc Id: 32423993

Page 68

SECRET

DATE/TIME GROUP

9. (Continued)

NOFORN

10. C-Dale minus approp-

riate number of days

- 11. C-Date minus approp

riate maker oi days

SPECIAL MANDING

ODECTIVES TO BE

SUPPORTED

Provide availability of COMD

Forces for test of CINCONAD Op

Ord 1-61

Preparations for operations

TASK

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED

NOFORN

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

IMPLEMENTATION

ACTIONS

a. Forces to be alerted in time frames

envisaged in CINCLANT Op Plan 314-61

to test reacti on times.

b. Forces and transportation to be

positioned to make assault land-

ing on C-date, if required, or

in position to execute operations

directed in Annex A and this

schedule.

RESPONSIBLE

AGENCIES

JCS

CINCLANT

CINCSIRIKE

CINCONAD alert forces in prepara- CINCONAN alert and preposition forces

tion for test of CINCONAD Op Ord for test of CINCONAD OP Ord 1-61. Test CINCONAD

to be conducted on C-Date in accord-

ance with Arnex B and this schedule.

Complate preliminary tasks

(1) Alert and increase Air/Sea Rescue

Activities

CINCLANT, USAF

USCG, NAVY COM

NAV BASE GIMO

(2) Obtain facilities for Air opera-

sions (Mayaquana, etc.)

(3) Commence MATS flights to pre-

pesition supalies

STATE, DOD

CINCARIB

JOS, MATS,

CINCLANT,

CINCARIB,

SERVICES

a Polion additional NOIAM's

nomiting all concerned of

connective military operations

ia c c2bbean ared.

(5) Begin loading of assault forces

for ore rations directed in

Armies A

JCS, FAA

HYDO. OFFICE

JCS, CINCLANT

CINCSTRIKE

USAF, USN

NOFORN

E . 3

SPECI

HANDLING

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## Page 69

DocId: 3212

AFORFT

SECRET

DATE/TIME GROUP

11. (Continued)

12. C-Date minus 48 hours

to c-24 hours

13. C-Date minus 24 hours

dod

NOFORN/

SPECIAL HANDLING

H- Hour

OBJECTIVES TO BE

SUPPORTED

Provide necessary intelligence for

opezation

General Readiness to prevent sur-

prise in event of hostile Chitar

reastdoin

Condunt Air Interce Mercise

Conduct

cost

VINCLANT: Up Plans

34063

175,51

TASK

Obtain FLINT and Electronic

Order of Battle

Increase readiness

a. Fesi CANAD Op Ora 1-61

3. Provido close air cover

for della tengeü fleet from

attack by CRAT

assault at Taegaes:

at Weques.

E- 4

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

IMPLEMENTATION

ACTIONS

(6) Commence special operational

weather observations and

broadcasts.

IAC EI.INT aircraft commence snooper

fliglte

Increase alert of all commands and

forces participating in exercise.

CONAD Target and ELINT aircraft

approach Cuba on courses similating

an attack to harass Cuba. Break off

at 10 miles and parallel Cuban coast

a ndnimin of 10 miles distance.

Continue to US and make simulated

attacks against US targets to test

COND air defenses.

CINLANT forces provide close air

coval j01 CONAD target aircraft

withia 50 miles of Cuban coast line

and until. CONAD aircraft enter

OS 2DUZ

Can croces scheüdled for opera-

Win iS CUCIAN: ip Plan 314-61

rili be en alert. All transpor-

tation ill be assembled and on

stad-tij slere.

(2) The zoody Thil Ron with embarked

RESPONSIBLE O

ACTIC IRS C

WX. SERVICES

JES, USAE

SES PARTICES

PATING COMMANDS

JOS

CINCONAD

TAC

NOFORN

CINCLANT

CIAL MANDLING

CINCLANT

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## Page 70

Doed: 32123993 ICA SECRET

NOFORN /

SPECIAL HANDLING

SECRET

DATE/ TIME GROUP

14. (continued)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED

NO FORN

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

OR TECTTVES TO BE

SUPPORTED

IMPLEMENTATION

ACTIONS

BLI to be at sea in vicinity

of Guantanamo.

(3) Standby Phib Ron with a BLT

embarked (or Lant Phiblex forces)

conduct amphibious

exercise at

Viegnes with token forces in

landing.

(4) Conduet token or simulated air-

drop of supplies

(5) Miritst the standby battalion of

Marines at Cherry Point, N.C. to

Guantanamo.

(6) Pacific fleet augmentation unit

(1/5 Marine Division/Wing team)

will be at sea in the Caribbean

sIca, but at sufficient distance

tinor their location will not be

Known in Cuba.

*. Concu* Vespond Dancratzation (&) CINOLANT host 1-day weapon demon-

so deterinad feasible and

strations for Latin Americans

recoumended by CINCARIB

CONCeRTE to saadat with invitations,

transportation, etc.)

RESPONSIBIEM

AGENCIES

CINCLANT F

3!

NOFORN/

CINCLANT

CINCARIB

SPECIAL HANDLING

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