TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM E. COLBY, DCI
Originator: SSCIA
From: COLBY, WILLIAM E.
Document date: 05/23/1975
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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TRANSCRIPT

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :

FROM:

TO :

SSCIA

COLBY, WILLIAM E.

TITLE: TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM E. COLBY, DCI

DATE: 05/23/1975

PAGES:

118

SUBJECTS :

ASSASSINATION PLOT

CASTRO

SSCI TRANSCRIPT, TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM E. COLBY, DCI

OPERATION MONGOOSE

CUBAN OPERATION

DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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INTELLIGENCE-COLBY TESTIMONY/SSCIA 5/23/75

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TO :

TITLE :

SCIA

TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM COLBY, MAY 23, 1975

DATE: 05/23/1975

PAGES:

.118

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FBI

TRAFFICANTE, SAM

STURGIS, FRANK

DOCUMENT TYPE: TESTIMONY

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TESTILIONY OF:

Willian E. Colby,

Director, CIA,.

•-- accompanied by --

Scott S. Breckinriage, Jr.,

Deputy Inspector General,

Enno inoche,

Assistant to the Director,

George L. Cary,

Legislative Counsel

NUMBER

Colby Bhibit Nos. 1, 2, and 3, cardboard-backed

photographs, deemed

marked in

an off the record

discussion early in the transcript.

Colby No. 4

Colby No. 5

Colby No. 6

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TESTIMOiY OF WILLINI E. COLBY,

DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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Friday, May 23, 1975

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.:

United States Senate,

Select Committee to Study Governmental

Operations with Raspact to

Intelligence Activities,

Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice at 9:15 o'clock

a.m., In Room 107, The Capitol Building, Senator Frank

Church (Chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Church (presiding), Hart of Michigan,

Mondale, Huddleston, Norgan, Hart of Colorado, Mathias and

Schreiker.

Also present: William Miller, Staff Director, P.A.O.

Schwarz, III, Chief Counsel; Curtis R. Smothers, Minority

Counsel; Willian Bader, Professional Staff Member.

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maeman church. due nearing will come to order.

Mr. Scott Brechinridge is accompanying the Director this

morning and may be called upon from time to time to testify.

For that purpose, MI. Breckinridge, will you please stand

and be sworn?

Do you swear that all the testimony you may give in this

proceeding will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but

the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Breckinridge. I do.

Chairman Church. Mr. Schwarz will commence the questionin

this morning.

Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Colby, did you have some things you

wanted to supply to the committee?

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MALARIA DO CULISE, DIRECTOR, CIA,

ACCOMPANIED BY SCOTT S. BRECKINRIDGE, JR:, DEPUTY

INSECTOR GENERAL, ENNO KNOCHE, ASSISTANT TO THE

DIRECTOR, AND GEORGE L. CARY, LEGISIATIVE COUNSEL

Mr. Colby. I have an answer to a few of the questions

that vere raised at the meeting the other day

and there are a

couple of clarifications I would like to make.

One, with' respect to the security investigations in the

United States. The question was asked whether we ever used

private investigators, and I said we normally used our own

investigators. We have some relationships with private

investigatory firns which provide cover for our investigators

and, secondly, we have a few firms which we own which are

proprietary'if you will, whereby our investigators appear to

be private.

I said that in the past it is. clear that on occasion ve

did ask for private investigator firms to help us to some

degree.

It was usually the one that was giving us cover, and

for reasons of overload we asked them to have their own people

to do a few of the investigations.

•.

My general Counsel says that this is illegal. I have a

strong question about its propriety, if not legality, ard I

am undertaking to revicw this matter to see whether we can not

just eliminata that practice ertisely, continuing the proprie-

tary and continuing the ase of private investigators as cover

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But I did want to clarify that. I think 'I mentioned it

last time that there have been occasions on which this was

done.

NARU

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Chairman Church. Mr. Colby, would you in connection with

your review of this matter supply the Conmittee with the spe-

cifics in those cases where the Agency has in fact engaged

private investigators to do Agency work?

Mr. Colby. I will certainly try to, Mr. Chairman. I

confess this may be a tough job to locate every case but I

certainly will do my best.

• Chairman Church. Will you provide the Committee with the

opinion of your Counsel with respect to the legality of such?

Mr. Colby. I will.

Chairman Church. such use of private investigators?

Nr. Colby. Yes.

Chairman Church. And then I would ask the staff also

furnish the Committee with a

brief on that question so that we

are-fully advised with respect to the law.

Mr. Colby. Right.

The second subject, Mr. Chairman. Senator Mondale asked

for our command and control regulations for the approval of

covert action projects. These were supplied to the staff on

the first of May and are available to the staff.

Thirdly, I was asked if 'Ir. Willian Harvey was removed

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from the Agency because of his involvement in the assassination

plans 'against Prime Minister Castro.

The facts are-that in June 1963 he was assigned

Chief

ChisE 05 Station in

and in February of '67 he was

reassigned to CIA Headquartors. He retired

voluntarily under

our retirement system on 31 of December 1967.

If I may, there is a reason why he was taken out and if I

could go off the record and mention that to the Committee. It

is a matter of his privacy.

Chairman Church. Very well, off the record.

(Off the record discussion)

Mr. Colby. : Back on the record.

Senator Schweiker asked me whether Howard Hunt or James

McCord were in charge of Mexican operations at the time of

President Kennedy's assassination on 22nd of November '63.

Howard Hunt fron. July '62 to August '64 was assigned as a

Section Chief in the Division of Plans Directorate, which is

now the Operations Directorate at CIA Headquarters, which had

no

responsibility whatsoever for Mexican operations.

Senator Schweiker. What were those dates again?

Mr. Colby. July '62 to August '61.

Senator Schweiker. Hasn't he at some point in Mexico

City and in charge of that office?

Mr. Knoche. Way back in the '50's he served ir. Mexico

•City. Way back. He was not in charge.

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MI. LOIDy. ne was a case oilacer then.

Senator Schweiker. So that is the period you are saying

he had no jurisdiction in any way with Latin Arerica or Mexicor

Affairs.

Mr. Colby. No, he was in what we call, and we have since

changed the name, to Domestic Operatiors Division at that time,

our operations here in this country, and that is a whole

different subject I would have to explain some day.

Mr. McCord from June '62 to June '64 was assigned as a

CIA Security Officer in ChelCrAss

4944.40

and he had no responsibilitics for Mexican operations at that

point.

Senator Morgan last time asked what infornation was given

to the Warren Commission concerning Agency assassination plans

concerning Castro, and I have been advised our records do not

indicate that the Warren Commission was provided with informa-

tion on this subject.

Allen Dulles, of course, I would note, who was the CIA

Director until the fall of

'6l, was a member of the warren

Conmission, but beyond thit fact I have nothing I could offer.

And then who made the decision not to provide it, if none

was given? Our records do not indicate that there was a CIA

decision on this matter not to tell the Warren Commission.

I could add that I beliave the relationship with the

Warren Connicsion was handled by ora of our staffe royfich

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I cannot say that for sure, but I know the compartmentation

system was such.

Chairman Church. What was the name of the CIA agent who

was given the responsibility for liaison between the CIA and

the Harren Commission?

lir. Colby. To my knowledge it is Mr. Raymond Rocca.

Chairman Church. Where is it now?

Mr. Colby. He retired at the end of December of last year.

He remained working for us for a few months. I think he is

retired. I think he is retired. I bellove he is still in

the Washington area.

Mr. Knoche. Yes, he is still working with us.

Mr. Colby. Still vorking with us to help on the transi-

tion of the whole counter intelligence program.

Chairman Church. Why did he retire?

MI. Colby.. That was the Angleton case, Mr. Chairman, and

the facts of that case were that I had had some professional

diffejences in the organization with Mr. Angleton as to the

way the counterintelligerce business was run and the way the

Israeli account was handled. I belisved that it required a

higher degree of coordination of the other elements of the

Directorate and of the Agercy. We had dabated this on various

occasions in thr past. I dia reorganize that staff in 1973 ard

too! a numbar of functions way from it. The liaisoro

with 1h?

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+ + = .

endeavored to open up the Israeli account to a better Iclation-

ship with our other fear Eastern activitics. Me dabated this

over many months and on several occasions. We could never

really agree to it because he insisted on the importance of

retaining it where it was.

Mr. Angleton had done a very good job of establishing that

liaison years ago and knew a lot of the senior Israeli who

were involved in it.

I believed there was inadequate coordination in the Arab

areas.

• Also, I believed that there was a undue degree of compart-

mentation of that staff, that it needed more interchange with

our other divisions. We debated this and discussed it and I

set as my time limit for this discussion the end of December

because there were some very substantial retirement benefits

that people would loose if they stayed after that point. Ther

unfortunately the Seymour Hirsh article of December 22nd came

to our attention before it was actually published, and so I

brought Mr. Angleton up and said that I was going to make two

basic decisions. I was going to move the Israeli account fron

his control and I was going to put some sucessor leadership

into thie Head of the Countarintelligence Staff. I said I woule

offer him a post of tying together some counterintelligence

doctrine, he could stay wothing with us.

He did not have

tio

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scuedu. t la meshed to rotire the opportunity was there. He

chose to retire. I insisted that I

talk to him before the

Seymour Hirs- article appeared.. I knew it was coming. I

didn't know what it was going to say. I wanted to make cloar

between him and me that the decision was based upon our long-

standing discussion of how to run that particular activity.

The question then came up no would be his succassor and

Mr. Rocca was his Deputy. There were two other officers who

vere possibilities. One of the officers, Mr. Hood, had said

in carly December that he planned to retire at the end of

December.

The other two, Mr. Rocca and tir. Miler, were inforned

that they would not be the successor Chiaf of that staff.

They

ware offered a chance to stay on in their then current jobs.

They chose to retire. All

four of them agreed to stay with

us on a consultant basis over

the next several months to help

us on the transition of new leadership into that job, and they

have done so.

Chairman Church. Well, without getting off the track, I

just have one further question here in connection with it.

Angleton himself.

Is it true that he is still being paid as a consultant?

Nr. COlby. I believe it has dropped off, Mr. Chairman.

Ke did help us for three or four months but I believe that it

is termirated. It is about time to terminate it, I know, ard

wether it is

on this particular date has been teaminated.

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we set ourselves about six month period where we would hive

to --

- Chairman Church. There is no, plan to retain hin indefi-

nitely?

Mr. Colby. Absolutely not. It was to help us get over

this transition and phase him out.

Chairman Church. Very well.

Senator Mondale: I asked for vouchers on payments with

respect to assassinations?

Mr. Colby. I am looking for that. I don't have al answer

for you yst, Senator.

The request was also made whether we had any information

concerning plots to

assassinate Chou En Lai. He have rrports

of two such examples, incidents, both conducted by the Chinese

Nationalists without our prior knowledge and without our

participation.

One in Aptril 1955, an Air India aircraft crashed at

sea off Indochina after departing from Hong Kong. Several

Chinese communist delegates for the Bandung Conference were

on board and it had been rumorsd that Chou En Lai would he on

the aircrait.

on the 1lth of Januaxy 1956, the British Colonial Osfica

in London issued an official statement reporting they had

evidence that the Chinese Nationalists had bribed a Hong kong

airport: employce to place a time homb on the airplane.

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and the US for sabotaging the aircraft. The aircraft employee

had flcd to. Taiwan. We had nothing to do with that incident

and frankly heard about it after it occurred.

In the fall of 1956, a senior Chinese Nationalist Official

informed an officer of CIA that a Chinese National planned to

assassinate Chou En Lai during his visit to Cambodia in

Novenber '56 and had been thwarted by the Cambodian arrest of

the Chinese Nationalist officer sent to. Phnom Penh to supervise

the attempt. We learned of

this after it had happened and ve

had nothing to đo with

it.

We had a relationship with the Chinese Nationalists

intelligence Servica over the years and, they clearly have done

things without our knowledge or involvament, and in a number

of areas, but we have also worked together on some areas.

These are two that were separate.

Also I was asked to look at the photographs of Howard Hurt

and Sturgis that appeared in. Newsweek some years ago. We

obtained this photograph from the FBI last night about 5 o'clock

We had not had it before.

We had a copy of the Newsweek

edition..

These are photographs of Howard Hunt in 1949, 1950 and

1961. This is the only photograph we have of Mr. Stuggis.

It is talen out of the newsweek.

He have had no consection with Nr. Sturgis ard

so we have

TORO

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taurujango du te is subject to the problems of it.

We had our photographic experts and analysts and so forti:

look at these two individuals here who were picked up. He

examined then in considerable detail, and talking about the

'61 Hunt photograph, comparing it with this, and this is the

photograph, Hewswesh photograph. You will see that there is a

lot of sortof fundamental differences in the kinds of

appearances they have, different characteristics of the

individuals.

With respect to Sturgis, of course, we are not as confi-

dent because wa don't have as good a base to work fron in our

comparison but at the same time we see differences there also.

Now, we further looked, had one of our disguise people --

we obviously have people who can disguise you -- the red wig

eipisode. It wasn't red, thay insist, it wasn't ill fitting.

That is the thing that they got upsetaout. But thay say that

it would not be feasible to have them actually in a disguise,

have these individuals actually in this disguise, that it is

too-big'a jump, it differs.

Senator Huadleston.

How about the size of the individual,

are they pretty close?

Ax. Colby. These two are. la looks like a shorter man

from the surroundings.

And Hunt is about medium height, rather

than this short.

Mr. Knoche. Hunt is sive feet ton and a half-frabes.

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• du ty menu un andeyses ana they really

were able to do a pretty good job on lunt and, what they do is

identify certain key points, make measurements and put adjust-

ments, the same thing we do for the satellite photography in

terms of these measurements, and things like that, and compara

it in that sense, and their conclusion: is that clearly this is

not Hunt. They are absolutely confident that this photograph

is not Hunt. They are less confident that it is not Sturgis

because of the base on which they are operating, but they think

it is not.

I point out that this analysis vas done overnight, about

3

o'clock in the morning.. This is Sturgis.

Mr. Schwarz. And to the right?

Mr. Colby. This is a rewspaper photograph of Hunt, a

recent one. These are sort of Agency photographs of him when

he was an employee.

Senator Hart Of Colorado. Were those men ever identified

by the Dallas Police?

" Mr. Colby. They must have booked them or something if

they carried them in. I really don't know. If they took them

in I would assume thay would have had to book them.

Senator Hart of Colorado. What are these pictures on the

lower right and left?

Mr. Colby. These are

the blowups of the particular

photographs.

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Senator Hart of Colorado. Not the one you had carlier?

Mr. Colby. They are different.

Senator lart of Colorado. They are different angles?

Mr. Colby. This is reversed.

Senator Hart of Colorado. They are different photographs?

Mr. Colby. It is reversed.

Senator Hart Of 'Colorado. No. They are. not A and B

ever

reversed.

Mx. Colby.. They can do that kird of a turn through the

Senator Hart of Colorado. They can twist the photographs

around?

Mr. •Colby.. They can make it appear at a different angle.

Senator Hart of Colorado.. B at least is a totally dif-

ferent poss. They turned his mouth down. His eyes are closed

They have really done a job if they changed B to that lower

right.

: Mr. Colby. They can change them, honest.

Let me get my brief on that and I will answer that

-

question.

They magnified them to the same scale using the eyes and

mouth. The contrast and texture differences were minimized,

continuous tone photographs employed and angular compensations

were made to offset errors incident to the different heads.

they can mix then droud in that kind of fashion.

Schater Schucilar. Mare these men detained?

If they

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detained maybe there are photographs from their detention.

Were

these mon arrasted?

- Mr. Colby. At the time we have had to work on this we

just looked at the photographs.

Senator Schweiker. I assume that is where they are going

to ba detained.

Mr. Schwarz. Wasn't the same analysis done for the

Rockefeller Commission about two months ago? In other words,

there has been an analysis at least once before last night,

hasn't there?

Mr.. Knoche. Not by us.

Mr. Colby. Perhaps by someone else.

Chairman Church.

Mir. Director, that is a different

photograph.

Mx. Colby. It does look like it.

I will answer that question next time I come up.

Chairman Church. All right. How can we follow up on the

identity of these two paople in connaction with the Dallas.

Police?' Would that be done through the FBI?

Mr. Colby. FBI. I could ask or you could ask, it might

be better if you ask.

Chairnan Church. Pell, I think we should. I think these

should be markad as Committee Exhibits and staff should ba

instructed to follow througl: with the FBI to get what further

information there may be about the photographs and these tio

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Senator Schweiker. Did you get the other photogra

supposed Oswald photograph leaving the Embassy?

Mr. Colby, I don't have that with me. It is in the

Marren Commission published report. It is in there.

Senator Schweiker. It is in there?

Mr. Colby. Yes. It was cropped slightly in order to

conceal where it was taken but it was --

Senator Schweiker. It is in the Warren Commission?

Mr. Colby. Yes, it is in the Warren Commission.

Just one additional matter.

• Chairman Church. Just one thing I would like to say to

you, Mr. Colby, before I forget it. You have made reference

to the Israeli account and the special way that it had been

handled under ir. Angleton. Before we finish our review with

you of covert operations we would like to have a more detailad

statement of that matter.

Mr. Colby. Right.

- Chairman Church. And I think you should prepara to

discuss it with us and we will have further questions to ask

you in connection with it.

I just wanted to give you notice.

Mr. Colby. Right. In our lexicon it doesn't count as a

covert action but that is

all right, no problem, I will cover

it.

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Cademan church. Add light. At sone point then in our

investigation?

Mr. Colby. Sure, no problem.

The only other one thirg I would like to suggest for the

record, Mix. Chairman, with respect to the discussion of the

attempts made against Mr. Castro, in no way justifying them.

My position on this is quite clear. I do think it important

to put that exercise in the context of the times, which was

the times of the Bay of Pigs, which was a decision made by

the Government. The Cuban missile crisis, and following that,

a program approved by our normal covert action approval mecha-

nism to try to generate an overthrow of Mr. Castro from within

Cuba by assisting various groups to go in with sabatage and

by putting economic pressure on the country, and so forth.

That went on for a number of years after the 1961-62 episodes

and I think it does put a cover of policy attitude toward Cuba

and toward Mr. Castro that is an important factor in evaluat-

ing the thing, without in any way justifying the particular

attempts to assassinate him.

Senator Hart of Michigan. But was there any evaluation

done at or about the time of that Cuban missile crisis?

Mr. Colby. There was an evaluation done after the Day

of Pigs, a rather intensive Investigation Internal Security

Branch Review of the activity and then the Cuban missile

crisis came along shortly tharsafter before anything very much

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got going. Thorcafter, however, a number or prograns ver

conducted, which I am sure the Committee might want a general

summary of. I am just giving you one sort of a paragraph

summary of it, which were aimed at putting economic pressura

on Cuba in the hopes that this would put pressure against him

and lead to its disorder and problems there and, secondly, to

encouraga revolutions, sabotage and so forth, from within

Cuba through a variety of programs of propaganda, support of

exile movements, landing of teams on the coast, things of this

nature.

Chairman Church. The difficult with this is, as I see it

although, what you say is true, once an agency begins to argasa

in assassination attempts the disease spreads. Your own

testimony shows it spread

at least as far as the Dominican

Republic and we are going to get into closer questions on

other matters such as Lmunba and Chile.

So that I don't think this issue can be confined really

to the emergency that did in fact exist between the US and

Cuba and the seriousness of that emergency at the time.

Mr. Colby. I agree with you, iir. Chairman. I am against

it and have been against it for a long time, but nonetheless

I think in fairness to the people involved at that period I

think it is important to give total context.

Chairman Church. Yes.

FORD

Fix. Schwarz..

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to dotermine, assuning intornally thain might have contomplate

additional efforts to assassinate Castro after the Bay of Pigs,

after the missile crisis, it would not have acted unless direct

by the very highest authority, would it?

Mr. Colby. That is not that clear, Senator Mart. I think

the evidence we have is that the then Director was not a arc

of some of these activities and, therefore, one would have a

very difficult time saying that it was pursuant to a specific

authorization. It was consistent with an overall policy which

was the point I was saying, but nonetheless I think the spa-

cific action we cannot say was approved even within the Agency

at the Director level.

Senator Hart of Michigan. Is there any indication that

the Director, who did know of at least an earlier attempt --

is there any indication that following the Bay of Pigs, or

föllowing the missile crisis; he explicityly brought the sub-

ject up for review?

- Mr. Colby. There is one documentary evidence that Mr.

McCone dictated in 1967, I believe it was, in which he recounted

being informed of a meating, of an intsr-Agency meeting at

which the subject of assassination was raised, and he made a

particular point of indicating after the mesting -- he was

not at the meating; I believe, but he heard of the meeting and

he made a particular poirt of saying he disapproved of this

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and did not agree with it, to the other members.

Senator Hart of Michigan.: Who was at that meeting McCone

heard about?

Mr. Colby. That was the meeting we were talking about at

the last session.

Mr. Schwarz. You brought up a new document which was Mr.

McCone's dictation of recollection of '67.

Mr. Colby. Yes; I think you have that.

Mr. Schwarz. That I have not seen. • I know we do not

have that.

Mr. Colby. I am sorry, I thought you did.

Mr. Schwarz. Could that be supplied?

• Mr. Colby. No problems, yes. This is our document and

• Chairman Church. Will you supply the Conmittee with the

document?

-

Mr. Colby. Yes.

Excuse me, I beg your pardon. He states in '67, at one

of these meetings, about this time, I recall a suggestion made

being made to liquidate top people in the Castro regime,.

including Castro. I took immodiate excaption to this suggestion

stating that the subject was completely out ce bounds as far as

the US Government and CIA were concerned. The idea should not.

he discussed nor should not be discussed now should it appos

in any papers.

Senator Mondala.

Hr. Colby, the other day when

Yớu

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tostified there was a nemorandum that you

gave us from I think

Mr. Osborn, which objected to a memorandum by General Landsdalc

which referred to assassinations of political loaders, in a

memorandum

regarding Operation Mongoose, which was Cuba. And

it referred

1, to an attached nemorardum which I think you said

was the property of the FBI..

Mr. Colby. Of the National Security Council.

Senator Mondale. NSC.

I gather you have a copy of that, but you don't feel

authorized to let us see it?

Mr. Colby. I do have

a copy of it. The understanding

we hava had with the other agencies is that each of us gives

our

own material but we refer to the other agency for any

documents belonging to the

other agency.

Chairman Church. Well, it is very difficult for the

Committee to operate that way. I think that since the Committa-

is entitled to this information, that when it is pertinent

and as we proceed in our haarings from one subject to another,

we ought'to ba able to secure the information without having

to go back through executive channels.

Mr. Colby. May I undertake to get the permission to give

it to you? I will undertake to do this today.

Chairman Church. Any observations that the Committes

wishes to make on this kind of a problen?

It is the first cime it has come up.

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Senator llart of Colorado. Is this the understanding we

have had or not?

Mr. Schwarz.

It has been a total frustration to the staff

and I am vary happy it has come up here because wa get chasta

around the corner by one agency to another. It is called the

"third agency rule." It was intended to have nothing to do

with Congressional hearings. Obviously, it had to do with

declassification to the public, and it. has happened to complotall

delay our ability to get information bacause we go at one agency

and then they determine that it really isn't their documant

or it mentioned some other agency, and then we have to go to

the other agency ..

This is an example of how frustrating it is.

Senator Mondale. Have we tried to gat this document from

the NSA?

Mr. Colby. No; this particular document had just come up

on Wednesday --

Senator Schweiker. Does the counsel have any suggestions

as to what he feals the Conmittee position should be in this

area to enable him and staff to do an affective job?

Mr. Schwarz. I think the Committae's position ought to be

that pertinent information should be produced by any agency

that possesses it, and if thay wish to inform another agency

that they are doing it, they that is their business.

But I

think they should have to picduce it if they possess

it.

• FORD

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back to

Senator bordale. Apparentiy this meno from ticiore rofers

the meating about which Osborre memorandum

1 arid

the

Lansdale --

Mr. Colby. The series of two or three meetings at that

time, yes.

Senator Mondale. I think this is very important because

apparently this was a metting at which Mcwamara and Rusk were

present, and apparently McCone was present, so we had all of

the top principals.

Mr. Colby. At least one of them.

Senator Mondale. And they discussed assassinations at

that meeting. Arid then Osborne cama back with a meno which is

now part of the record.

Mr. Colby. I think it is Edwards in that case. Harvey,

excuse me.

Senator Mondale. Harvey. He came back with a memo which

the Director supplied, objecting not to the assassination but

to putting it in writing.

Chairman Church. Of course what we don't know is whather

the assassination or subject of assassination that came up at

this meating was conjacture or whether it had to do with a

revelation of actual attempts that had involved the CIA or

that it had to do with an ongoing assassination effort by the

cIn.

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Senator Mondale. Yes.

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Chairman Church. All we know is the subject of assassina-

tions apparently came up in the course of the mecting.

Mr. Colby. Mr. Chairman, as one of the agercies involved,

if I could offer one explanation for the Third Agency Rule

even in this circumstance. And I am particularly interested in

this because sometimes our documents have material whose

sensitivity is not apparent on the face and we assume that this

will be handled in certain compartmented channels, and if it

gets out of the compartment it might give problems that the

individual at the other end wasn't aware of. That is the

basis for the rule. The thought being go back and ask the

originator, and he has a feeling for that and could make the

particular case if something particularly sensitive is involved

Chairman Church. I would suggest, Mr. Colby, without

binding the Committae to a precedent, with respect to dealing

with the Third Party Rule, that in this case you undertake

to

secure from the NSA --

Mr. Colby. I will.

Chairnar. Church. -- its permission to turn this particular

document over to the Commistea so it may be made a part of these

hearings.

Mr. Colby. I will endeavor to do that today, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Morgan. I am going to inquire from Senator

Mondalu what memorandun were you raading about #cCone and the

group being prese:t?

FORD

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Serator Mondale. No havo a menorandus, it is righi

here,

fron tir. Harvey. Do I have the wrong one?

Xes, it is dated, I wili show it to you, in which he

objects to --

Chairman Church. What is the date of it?

Senator Mondale. 14 August 1962.

Senator Morgan. Do wa have that?

Mr. Schwarz. It was shown to us on Madnesday, marked

or deemed marked

as part of the record, and raturned to the CIA

who returned it to us today.

Mr. Colby. I have anothar copy of it.

Senator Mondale. It refers to a meeting in Mr. Rusk's

office at which presumably. McNamara and Rusk, I gathur

from

th13

later mano, and McCora ware present, ard it says this.

"I called Lansdale's office and ir. his absence pointea o

to Frank Head the inadmissibility and stupidity of putting this

typs of comment in writing in a document. The words he objectad

to wers including liquidation of leaders. I advised him as

far as CIA was concerned we would write no document pertaining

to this and would participate in no open meeting to discuss

it."

I read that to mean we will go ahead and do it but we don't

want anything in vriting and don't want to be in a meeting where

it is going to lunt. That nates a lot of sense. No livirg

politician wants to be associated with an assassination, ever.

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if he wants someone assassinated. I thirk that is conmon sense.

That is why I think these documents are so crucial.

Chairman church; Of course they are crucial and wa must

have them.

The ambiguity, however, that we have yet to clear up is

in the third paragraph, Senator liondale, where the menorandum

reads the question of assassination, particularly of Fidel

Castro, was brought up by Secretary McNamara at a meeting of

the special group augmented in Secretary Rusk's office in

August. It was the obvious consensus at that meeting, in

answer to a comment by lir. Ed Nurrow, that this is not a subject

which has been made a mattar-of official record, the subject

being the question of assassiration.

Now, that leaves us still without any documentary proos

that it was revealed at this meeting that the CIA was in fact

engaged in an effort to assassinate.

Senator Mondale. Was Lansdale working for the CIA at

this time?

•

Mr. Colby. Pardon?

Senator Mondale. Was General Lansdale working for the

CIA at this time?

Mr. Colby. General Lansdale was Assistant to the Secretary

of Defense, not CIA, at that time.

Serator Mondale. Had Lansdale bacn with the CIA?

T. TORO

Mr. Colhy. He was with CIA in about 1952 to about

1955,

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more or less.

- Senator Mondale. During the Philippines.--

No. COlbY. During the Philippines and in Vistnom at that

time. Then he left CIA. lle was a

regular Air Force officer

all this tine but he was

assigned to CIA for the time he was

in the Philippines and the time he was in Vietnan. Ha then

reverted to the Air Force and was an Assistant to the Secretary

of Defense until about 1964 or 1965. Then he went out to

Vietnam where he was an Assistant to the Ambassador, not

working for CIA. We were associated with him but he was not

a CIA officer at that time.

Sanator Mondale. Do wa know what his job at the Pentagor.

was?

24

2.5

Mr. Colby. It was Assistant to the Secretary of Deferse.

I can't tell you exactly what the job was entitled but

he was active in the Secretary of Defense's participation in

a variety, you might call it a 40 Committee type of oparation.

I think ha probably was most cognizant of the various 10

Comnittee --

•

Senator Mondale. If he were involved with that, ha

would have close liaison with all mambers of the 10 Committee,

including the CIA?

Mr. Colby. Yes, sir..

Chairman Church. I would lika to call your attention also

to this sentence.

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I took careful notes on the comments at this meeting o

this point and the special group augmented in not expecting

any written coments or study on this point.

Thora, again, the ambiguity.

It is within the range of the possible that one of the

ongoing efforts of tha CIA was in fact raised and discussed.

It is also possible that the question of assassirating

Fidel Castro --

Senator liondale. Do we have those notes?

Chairman Church. I was going to ask that.

And that it was agreed that no study or review of this

should be'submitted as an abstract matter, should be submitted

in written form.

So we are left without an answer to this question.

However, with respect to the notes that ara referred to

here, can you tell us whether those notes exist?

Mr. Colby. I dor't know of any, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Church. He said he took careful notes.

Mr. Colby. I don't know of any but I certainly will look.

Mr. Breckinridge. When we raviewed this problem in 1967

we found no such notes.

іонО

<

Senator Huddleston. Let me inject a thought or two along

this line.

It sears to na like one of the things me are going to have

so astermina as ve go ilomy is as to what extent there vas oi

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: 2.5

there is a standard operating procedure of your Agency an

effort not to make notes, an effort for certain individuals

not to have certain knowledge by design.

For irstance, I was reading your menorardum here dated

I June 1973 in which you are reporting on a meeting that occurred

You make a point to say that you briafed someone orally. The

word "orally" is in there -- assuming that for the purpose

someone should krow that you did not put anything in writing

or you did not give him a writter. report.

• You also say that I personally managed to avoid gaining

any knowledge of what precise

actions were taken.

I think a reasonable inference there is that there is a

deliberate on your part here

-- and maybe this is standard

oparating procedure - for you not to gat specific information

so that you always will be in the position of not knowing soma-

thing.

Ir. Colby. "I don't recognize the rafarence. Cartainly,

I think in past years there ware situations ve did rot want

FOR

to commit to writing.

There is a great deal of effort made by us to what wa

call compartment information so that it is known only to certain

paopla and not known to others. The compartment is still to

be open at the top, however.

There are things that I purposaly try not to krow. I don't

want to liow the name of an agent in the Soviet Union. I have

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absolutely no desire to learn his nane because I don't necd

to know that information.

Senator Huddleston. Here we are referring to action in

this case and not individuals.

Mr. Colby. I don't recognize that. I could perhaps put

it in context if I could

see the memorandun.

Mr. Schwarz. Perhaps wa ought to mark that mamorandum.

Senator Huddleston. Menorandum for ir. William E. Colby:

I thought it was by kr. Colby.

Mr. Colby. I am sorry.

Senator Huddleston. Someore withir. the Agency apparently

is informing you about something and the subject is special

activities. I don't see a name on it.

It has information in it about both the President and

Attorney General being involved in briefings.

Mr. Schwarz. I think for convenience of referenca ve

ought to mark it as an exhibit.

"Lat's number as today's number, and wa have put in the

threa charts so far, and wa will call this, which is the I

June 1973 menorandun for tir. Milliam E. Colby, subject special

activities, from stamped pages 00.157, 00158, and 00.159, of

the so-called 694 pages.

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(The document abova refaried to was

narked Colby Exhihit :1o. 4.)

Nr. Colby. I recognise what that is, Senator huddleston.

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The reason it was addressed to william E. Colby is we

were going through that period in the middle of 1973 where I

was

technically, I guess, Director of Operations but had been

rominated to bacon: Director. This was the kind of thing that

normally would be addressed to the Director but we had an

Acting Director, Ganeral Walters, but it was pretty clear I

WaS

responsible for making the machinery run and we had a lot

of things around the Agency addressed to me and signed by me.

I believe this follows

a conversation I had with a Mr.

Walter Elder, who was an Assistant to Mr. John McCone -- he

was Executive Assistant when he was Director -- I think Mr.

Elder told me that there were certain things that he krew of

in the background that related to this effort of identifying

various quastionable activities of the

Agency, and I asked

him to go write them down so we could get them into the

Inspector General's report.

Senator Huddleston. The only question I raisa, I don't

want to gat off into the contents of a particular menorandum,

but the context with the area you were pursuing, just whether

or not standard operating procedure would require at times

thare be a deliberate avoidance by certain people in the

Agency of facts and whether or not there is a great body of

decisions that are made and implemented without anything writter

dolin, so that trere would never be any documentary evidence

ТонО

of it?

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Mr. Colby. Well, I think that you certainly can say that

there

Is an avoidance by a lot of paople of learning things

that thuy are not authorizsa to kno:. I mean the more loyal

in a sansa of our employees, say that thay have authority to

know what

it going on in, say, Cuba, they don't have a right

to know what is going on in, say, China, and they rather

carefully keep themsalves from learning what is going on in

China. I think that is a pravalence.

I think the question you are asking, however, is whether

we are trying to keep activities off of paper and it is pratty

clear that the assassination story was essentially kept off

the paper:

And I would think that is about the only one. No, the

drug thing. I assuna some of that was kept off of paper?

Mr. Breckinridga. Yas.

Mr. Colby. The lesson that I have frequently given to

my colleaguas in the bureaucracy is that however hard you try

to keep it off of papar, you will not succeed ir a bureaucracy,

somebody will write it down and, therefore, it is a totally

feckless exercise to pretand that you can keep it sacret by

not writing it down. But the fact is there were situations

in which a conscious effort was made in the past to keep things

off the record.

Senator Huddleston.

To sum up, you, as Diractor, with the

excuption of individual names for which there would be nora. for

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particular value to you and no advantage to you knowing, except

for that you make

no deliberate effort not to krow about

operations?

Mr. Colby. No. As a matter of fact, I take the opposita

position, Senator. I say that to my subordinates and have

reiterated a number of times, I cannot be subjected to surprisa.

You have got to let me know the things I ought to know. And

I have undertaken the same obligations to my oversight committass

for example, that I an responsible getting to them before

they hear about it some place else.

Senator Huddleston. The other is in this inquiry. Can

the Conmittee expect that every effort will be made to supply

to us information about various things, evan though they may

not be written down?

Mr. Colby. You hava my 'commitment to that effect.

Senator Huddleston. Going further and looking through

the files for notes and documents?

¡r. Colby. It is my hope, Serator, that I can help you

on this investigation rather than defending myself against you.

Senator Huddleston. That is all.

Mr. Colby. That is what I would like to have the relation-

ship, that I am trying to help you do this investigation.

Chairman Church. We want such a relationship and we"

are tryirg to work it out.

Mr. Colby. I know you do. You hars sail it a number

of

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tines and

I agres with you.

Chairman Church. Now, Senator Mondale.

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Scrator Mondale. The manorandum from John iccone that

we received this morning, dated 14 April, 1967, is addressed

to the Director.

Was McCore an employee or related with the CIA at that

time?

Mr. Colby. No, he left in 1965.

Senator Mondale. So this was a memorandum from a parson

no longer with the CIA, as former Director to the current

Director, which bagins "no memorardum can be located covering

the August, '62 meeting." .

That is the one that earlier says the question of

assassination was discussed. However, it is highly probable

that one exists.

Now, I would like all documentation, records, and notes

that bear on the question of what McCone was referring to,

bacause I gat the impression that the then Director, Mr. lielms

Mr. Colby. Yes.

Senator Mondale. -- was reviewing the question of documerta

tions and records affecting that meeting, or the question of

assassination, and I think we nead to know what transpired,

what was happening then, what kind of responses ha received.

Mr. Coloy•

We will curtainly give you that.

I can giva

you a basic explanation.

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This exercise stenmed from the revelation in Jack

Anderson's columns, I believe, of our relationship with the

Mafia figures at that time. This then generated the rerest

to Mr. Breckinridge to do an Inspector General's report of

this whole subjact, which he did, and which we will cartainly

make available to this Committee...

In the course of it, and with the publicity, Mr. McCore,

who does maintain an occasional contact with the Agency, he

is a friend of it'ard an ex-Director -- I sea him every now

and again and try to sort of keep him up with what is going

on in general terms without getting into political or sensitiva

matters or anything -- but he doas maintain this contact and

I am sure that somebody made contact with him or he made contact

with the Agency about the Jack Anderson column, and that then

generated this particular memorandum.

Sanator Mondale. And there was an Inspector Genaral's

study dore at that time?

MI. Colby. Yes, sir; and you will get access to that.

Senator Mondale. Can we have documentation as to how

it was originated and the response to what was done?

Chairnan Church. Yes, we should have that information.

And I might say that you are aware, no doubt, that charges have

beer made that documents have been destroyed in the CIA which

may have been connacted with the general subject of cIn

involvamant in assassination efforts.

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Can you tell this Committee whether, to your knowledge,

documents have been destroyed?

Mr. Breckinridge. I think we

can talk in terms of what

wa know is there.

On the Castro assassination, the involvement with the

Mafia, there ware a faw memorarda in the Office of Security,

and I think you have copias of those.

On the sacond phase of that, there are practically no

records at all and our investigation at that time was made

entirely on interviews.

Based entirely on interviers, an attempt to reconstruct

that activity.

The final action which

involved a Cuban by the name of

Cubella --

Mr. Colby. This was the Cuban major we discussed last

time.

• Mr. Breckinridge.

Started in the minds of the people

who yere-involved, was an attenpt to generate an internal

political action, revolt, and the records are very full because

there was no attention on the part of the people who vere

involved at that time that that would be an assassination in

the sensa that the origiral work with the Mafia was engaged in

and there is a full record. and that exists today.

In tha case of the Dotinican Republic, this developtoly

iat

Let ma finish.

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I will go back to the Cubella case.

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In the instance of the Dominican Republic, the record

was very full then and it is still very full today. I am

certain that racord is completa.

Again, in the minds of the people who were involved, they

drew a line between the support they gave to the coup group

and conscious association with assassination as such. Those

records are complete and those records were developed at the

time and thay were retained.. It was in the period of the

Mafia was involved where paople knew the purpose was assassina-

tion..

•

The records are practically non-axistent and I balieve

they never existed.

Harvey, who conducted the second phase of that, at the

time of our investigation had a handful of cryptic notes that

only he could interpret. We couldn't interpret then. And

it is my understanding that those notes no longer exist. They

were retained by him and he brought them in at the time that

we were questioning him. He was then on sick leave prior to

retiranent. Those notes were totally unrevealing.

I think that those records are in the same state today

that they ware then.

There were none in the Castro affair except the results

of our inventigation irvelving the Mafia.

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The Culella cass is fuil.. That case did progress to tha

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point that on the very day of Presidant Kennedy's assassination

a man was masting with Cubella in Paris, and in response to

Cubella's request offered him an assassination device that at

the tine of the investigation we understood he accepted but

I have sinca been told he did not accept. It was a ballpoint

pen converted into a syringe for injecting poison.

Subsequently, arms were harded to Cubella by a Cuban

refugee in Madrid, in the very carly part of 1965, and two.

catches were put down by boats off Cuba for Cuballa. I think

he may have recovered one of those but not the other. The

racords on that are pretty complete.

So, generally speaking, on those things where the Agency

was involved, with the exception of the association with the

Hafia, where from the beginning the intent was assassiration,

the records are complete, and I think that if people 100k at

those they will find this is so.

Mr. Schwarz. Is the understanding that all racords dealing

with this subject, whather they are in Inspector General

reports or underlying documents, would be produced for our

inspection?

Mr. Colby. Yes.

If I may ask only the Committee's consideration of

the

nornal treatment of compartmentation ard some discussion of

possibly some individual nanss in it that we would hope that

ve night be able to handle very privataly, or necessary, or eva:

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leave out. But the normal procedures.

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Chairman Church. Very wall.

Now, Mr. Schwarz.

ir. Schwarz. Just to tidy up one matter.

Lat me marl: as Committee Exhibit 5 the John A. AcCom

to the Director memorandum of April 11, 1967.

(The above mentioned docunent was

marked as Colby Exhibit No. 5

for identification.)

Mr. Schwarz. Might I come down with you on this document

and we will look at it togather?

Hr. Colby. •I have a copy.

Mr. Schwarz. As of April, 1967, No. licCore was so longar

at the Agency, was he?

Mr. Colby. No.

Mr. Schwarz. Was he then in his position with ITs, or

did: he have sone other position?

fir. colby. I really don't know.

Mr. Schwarz. In any event he wasn't at the Agency?

¡r. Colby:" That is right.

Kr. Schwarz. The thing that is curious about this memo-

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randun, with respact to the state of the record, is paragraph

one, which reads as

follows:

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"No mimorandun can bu located covering the lugust 10, 1062

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however, it

is hignly probabl: that one sxists."

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H0v, Mr. NeCone, was not in the Agency, is writing a

manprandum to th: Director, who was in the Agency, referrina

a search by or on bahalf of Mr. Mccone.

Now, did Mr. McCone have documents outside the Agercy,

or how do you explain?

Mr. Colby. I don't balieve he has any documents. I have

naver asked him. But I don't believe he has any documents

outside of the Agency.

Ir. inoche. Mr. !cCone wrote me that mamorandum while or

Agency premises. It was during a visit to the Agarcy and ha

had tha banafit of his ex-stalf assistant, lie. Walter Elder,

helping him in doing a littla research in this connection.

Mr. Colby. All that says is that they hadn't located it

by then. I thirk we have located some since that time.

Mr. Schwarz. Picking up on a question of Senator lars

of Michigan, he asked you whether there had been evaluations

in connection with the Cuban missile crisis, and then you

testified about valuations post-Bay of Pigs and rather continuil

evaluations of the subject of Cuba: But I

take it those wera

not evaluations or rs-evaluations of the subject of assassinaticr

Mr. Colby. All I can say is I think that question is.

a little obscure.

I know that after the Bay of Pigs failure there was

in

i:vestigation mats of the mile episode, and in the course ca

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that a discassion of was to mere then to do and a progren was

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developed. And I am speaking at secour hand here. Dut a progr:

was developed of keeping some economic pressurd on Cuba, and

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that was a natioral policy, not just a CIA -- keping an

econonic pressure on Cuba and continuing to support the

various elsments which might eventually lead to a change ir

the Cuban govarmant through some ovarthrow or otherwise.

I think some propoganda programs were kept up, some exila

activities vere kept up, some training of teams to be infil-

trated into Cuba vare kapt up, some sabotage operations vere

continued. and those continued over the following several

months. .

Right after the 1962 missila crisis.-- I cannot identify

right offhard hera any particular review of that -- but I

know that that was a subject of 40 Committee consideration at

various times.

Whathar that included assassination or not I cannot say.

My guess, as I say, is that if John McCone didn't know

about it, it was not covered in those discussions because it

would be very hard to cover tham without his being involved.

410 First Street, S. E.,. Washington, D.C. 2000)

Chairman Church. Ars you telling us that the much publi-

cized investigation of the CIA, which took place following the

Bay of Pigs fiasco, and as I remamber this review was ordered

by the President in order to datermina what had gone wrong and

way, and it was a matter of great nagency and importance ic the

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government at that time -- are you telling us that in the

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course of that review the Agency's involvement in the assisin?

tion efforts against Castro never came to light?

ir. Colby. I just don't know, lr. Chairman. That is

the ansver I have to give you. I do not know.

I believe the Inspector General report after the Bay of

Pigs does not mention it, does it?

Mr. Brackinriage.

NO •

Mr. Colby. The report of the Committae that looked into

it, General Taylor, and the Attorney Gensral and sonebody else

thera were three manbers of it -- maybe it. Dulles. I don't

balieve that report mentionad it.

Chairman Church. Do ie have a copy of the Taylor Rigort?

Mr. Colby, I think it has been made available. Or is

thät a third agency problan?

Mr. Schwarz. That is another frustration. That one has

been denied to us on the theory that it is part of the Kennedy

Library and, tharefore, we have to go through another channel

to get that.

Doss the CIA have a copy of the Taylor Report?

Me. Colby. I don't believe a do. I know we looked for

it a coupla of years ago and at that time I was told we didn't

have it.

I hate to say here war osth va do not have one, but I

Know I tried to get ahold of is and was told a couple of years

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ago that we couldn't have ons.

But there are lots of dravers

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in those safas in that building.

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I ain not tryiny to evade the quastion. I am trying to

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say I don't think we have one. It could be.

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We have a copy of our own Inspector General's report

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at that time.

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Mr. Schwarz. Does that contain any mention of the

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assassination subject?

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Mr. Colby. No, it does not.

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Mr. Schwarz. Do you find it puzzling that the CIA doasn't

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have a copy. of the report designed to reviaw its activities

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in the Bay of Pigs, a report that led to substantial Presidential

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changes in tha instructions with respect to your jurisdiction?

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Mr. Colby. Yes.

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ir. Schwarz. I mean, it is an important document --

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Mr. Colby. Yes, sir.

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• Mr. Schwarz. - relating to the CIA.

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Mr. Colby. Yes, sir.

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Senator Schweiker. I worder if Mr. McCone has a copy?

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hi. Colby. I would doubt it.

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Senator Schweiker. That is why he came in, becaue of that?

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Mr. Colby. Roughly, yes.

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Chairnar Church. In the course of the investigation that

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look place, this investiration that led to the Taylor Rapsit,

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2. FUNE

thai tock place in the altaurath of the Bay of Pigs.

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Were records kept, that is to say --

Mr. Colby. Of contributions?

Chairman Church. lio. Did the investigation involve

written records? Did it involve tastimony taken under oath

and transcribed? Is there raw material ralating to that

investigation to which this Committea could gain access?

Mr. colby.. I don't know the answer to the question, tr.

Chairman. Maybe Mr. Breckinridge can help us.

Mr. Breckinridge. I am not faniliar with that study.

I am familiar with the approach that was taken at the time

within our organization when the Inspector General -- I was

not involved in that study but I have heard it discussed

how they approached it.

Their understanding of tha 3ay of Pigs problem was the

overall invasion plan ana

organization for that and concentrates

on that.

By way of explanation for the omission of reference to

the assassinations, so faw people knew about it, and I thin!:

it came to no ona's attention -- simply did not discover it

at that time. And it may not have been by way of explanation,

not a justification. It may not have been associated in tha

minds of the people who did know about it with the inquiry

into the military operation.

ir. Schwarz. ir. Bissel knew abont it and he was certainl:

the main architect of the Bay of Pigs; right?

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WARO & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

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Mr. Breckinridge. Right.

Mr. Schwarz. And Mr. Dulles, at least the records we

put in on Mednesday, knew about it and he vas

substantially

involved in the Bay of Pigs. Those gentleman surely vonla have

been questioned by General Taylor and Attorney General Kennedy

Is that fair?

Mr. Breckinridge. I would

assume so.

Mr. Colby. Certainly, yes. But again, if the focus was

on the military operation, it might have been that that other

operation was not involved in it.

Mr. Schwarz. The racord further shows that on May 7, 1962,

mesting was held with Attorney General Robert Kennedy in

which the contemporansous document describing that meetirg

indicates that he was not told that there was a contiruing

and ongoing operation, but rather was told of something which

was not called an assassination but vas called a project

was told of something which was referred to ir the past tensa;

is that right?

Mr. Colby. It was in the past tense. Whether there. wes

any other discussion in that meeting on this subject wa just

don't know.

Mr. Brechinridge. I thini. I can interpret what happened.

The people who briefed Astorney Ganeral Kennedy are

the

ores Who thew about what we call ths first phase of the operatic

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Colonel Edwards, who was Director of Sucurity, under whosa

suparvision. the first portion of that activity was carried on,

had withdrawn from:it.

The operation, whan it was reactivated later, was ruactivate

on a compartmented basis, and Colonel Edwards did not know

about it.

Mr. Schwarz. Even though it continued to involve

the

Kafia until early. 1963?

Mr. Breckinridge.

That is corrsct. Colonel Edwards no

longer knew what was going on. So when he briefad the Attorney

General he did not know that this second operation, this

raactivation of the operation that had formerly run urder his

responsibility -- he did not know that it was orgoing.

Mr. Schwarz. Who was responsible for the selection of

Colonel Edwards and General Counsel Houston as being the

persons who would go to brief Attorney General Kennedy?

Mr. Breckinridge. I am not sure I know that.

Nr. •Schwarz. It would have been somsone of higher

authority within the CIA; is that correct?

ir. Breckinridge.

We have tried to determine.

Nr. Houston, if I understand it, feels that he would not

have done this unless he thought the Director knew.

Hir. Schwarz. Knew what?

Mr. Breckinridge. Knaw that he was goint to do this.

But

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he did not talk to the Director about it.

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I gather that it is not all that clear in Colonel lanares

either at this point in time.

Mr. Schwarz. So someone selected these persons to go

and briuf Astorney General Kennedy, number one:

Number two, they did not know the plot for assassiration

Was

ongoing, although in fact it was?

Mr. Brackirriage. Correct.

Mr. Schwarz. Number three: therefore, Attornay General

Kennedy was given the impression that whatever was goins on

was over; is that correct?

Mr. Brackinridge. I think that is correct as I reconstruc

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it.

Mr. Schwarz. Can we determine then who was responsible

for. selecting those persons

; to brief Attorney General Kennedy,

instead of including in

the group other parsons who knew that

the Mafia part of the assassination attempt was ongoing?

I don't think that we can now.

Mr. Breckinridge.

_As I say, there is no written racord.

Kt. Schwarz. Who could it have been? Who was in a

higher position of authority, in a position to make a decision

as to who should brief Attorney General Kennedy?

Mr. Breckinridge. I would assume that ir. Bissal could

have.

Ar. Schwers.

Wes he still in the Agincy ia May of 1962?

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Mr. Briciridge. I don's know. I shirt he may

havs

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loft by then.

- Nay I reconstruct because much of my understanding is basti

on my analysis of what happened and not on clear facte.

The FBI approached Colonel Edwards when their investigation

and incident in Las Vegas eventually produced his name, and

his conversations, I think, were with the General Counsel at

that time.. I cannot reconstruct bayond that so I really can't

give you ar. answer to the specific questior. But the initiativa

came fron the FBI. Colonel Edwards and Mr. Houston discussed

it. Ir. Houston, I have been told, balieves that the Director

must have known.

ir. Schwarz: Which Director are we talking about?

Mr. Breckinridge. Whoever the Director was at that time?

Mr. Colby. By that time.

Mr. Schwarz. Of what agency?

Mr. Colby. CIA. That would have been McCone.

Mr. Breckinridge. He operated on the assumption that ir.

Mr. Schwarz. Knew what?

Nr. Breckinridge. Knew that they were going to brief the

Attorney General.

Mr. Schwarz. About?

Ir. Breckinridge. The record ou this is very unsatisfactor

and I can't clarify it for you bacause we have been trying to

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find out when fir. liccone first learned of it after the face,

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as it was.

When people discussed this with ore another, what they

conveyed to one another accurataly as to what it was they were

discussing, the record is simply not clear and I don't think

that we can reconstruct that satisfactorily today.

Mr. Schwarz. Is Mr. Edwards still aliva?

Mr. Breckinridge. Yes, he is.

Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Houston is still alive and is in Hashirg-

ton, D.C.?

kr. Breckinridge.

Yes, sir..

Mr. Schwarz. Mr. McCone is stiil aliva and is in --

Kr. Colby. California.

Mr. Schwarz.

Has Mr. Helms the successor to ir. Bissel?

No. Colby. Yes, sir.

Mr. Schwarz. Hell, let's leava a place in the record

where wa will insart it was either Mr. McCong or Mr. Bissal

Who had the job of Dyouty Director 'for Plans in May, 1952.

Mr. COlby. It certainly wasn't li. Mccone.

Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Helms or it. Bissal?

Mr. Colby.

Yes.

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Chairman Church. You see, the state of the recora

nON

suggests a cover-up, arother

cover-up. It suggests that

those who were selected

I by the higher authority in CIA to

brief the Astorney General had knowledge limited to an attemp:

on the life of Castro that had been concluded.

It further suggests that they had no knowledge of continuira

efforts then underway, even though presumably their superiors

did hava such knowledge. This leaves the Attorney General ir

a position of being told about the past program and nos bai-g

told about. the present program, and we know that he later said

to certair assistants of his that he had put a stop to

assassination attempts on Fidal Castro and he may have been

left with the impression,

as

a result of this meeting, that

there were no further attempts. He may have said he wanted

further attempts. We don't krow. But clearly he was rot told

that there were further attempts then underway.

• Senator Morgan. Ware we told yasterday or the day bafore

Yestarday, that he knew of the Cuban majors' oparation?

Mr. Schwarz. Wa were not told that.

Mr. Breckinridge. I cannos clarify the question completely

but I can introduce a little bit more.

When the discussion occurred ir. Houston did go and, falifo

with General Carter, who was then the Daputy Director -

Mr. Schwarz. Which discussion are we talkir about now?.

Mr. Breckinrite. Tha discussion about going to tha Attor:

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General.

To. go back, how the question arose, and it goes far afiela,

John Roselli, who vas the Chicago member of the Mafia who

arranged the introduction of Giancanato the Cuban syndicate

head, through whom they initially tried to run this operation

--

Giarcana had a personal love affair with a well know entertainer.

who was then in Las Vegas, and she was suspected by him of then

having an affair with another well known entertainer.

Giancana went. to Robert Maheu, through whom these introduc-

tions were first made --

Mr. Schwarz. Introduced to the Mafia personnel?

Mr. Breckinridge. Yes:

Mr. Colby. Between CIA and the Mafia.

Mr. Breckinridge. Ard asked Maheu toarrange to have the

room of the male ertertainer in Las Vegas hugged. They hired

a private detective who ther. did this. The roommate stumbled

on the equipment, the private detective was arrested, and the

FBI investigativa trail led from the private detective to Maheu

to Giâncana and eventually to CIA. Giancana had insisted that

Maheu help him because he had helped Maheu with the introduction

to the head of the Cubar syndicate, and Maheu had then agreed

to get a private detective to do it.

So this arose in the context of a domesticviolation of

wirstapping laws and the FBI was

investigating it on that basis.

Because the trail led to ciancana and reselli, wio variori

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third nember of the syndicate involved in this, both of whom

were high on the FBI list, as they progressed towards developing

a prosecution, they came to Colonel Edwards, the FBI did, and

said what is your position on this. The position of the Agency

as stated by Colonel Edwards was we did not want them prosccuted

because it would expose what he understood to be this operation,

and I guess

the time sequence gets a little fuzzy in my mind.

Mx. Schwarz. Did he tell the Director of the FBI the

nature of the operation, or simply he told him it would concern

some sensitive matter?

Mr. Breckinridge. He told him it was an intelligence

operation in country, and the Mafia was being used for that

purpose. So in the discussions as it progressed, it dealt with

the wiretap prosecution. Colonel Edivards in discussing it

with us in 1967, according to our notes, said that they briefed

the Attorney General all the way, but at that time colonel

Edwards, I think by the time they did it, Colonel Edwards thought,

it was over. So the Attorney General and the FBI were not told

the complete story.

Mr. Schwarz. They weren't told the most important part

of the story, and that was that it as continuing.

Mr. Breckinridge. They didn't know that, that is correct.

Chairman Church. So you have here two violations of law.

Apart from what was told to the Attorney General, you have two

violations of lav. One, the wiretap, it was an illegal

opcration

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We may have three. Socond, it is certainly an activ ty that

the basic law prohibited CIA from engaging in, domestic activity.

Mr. Colby. CIA was not involved in the wiretap.

Chairman Church. As I understand it, the CIA was involved

because it engaged a private --

Mr. Breckinridge. I am sorry.

Chairman Church. Maybe I misunderstood.

Mr. Breckinridge. We didn't learn about this until after

the FBI found out about the Mafia involvement in that wiretap.

This was done by a private detective hired by a private businessma

at the request of Giancana.

Mr. Schwarz.

CIA agents had comnitted the crime, in this

case, but not on behalf of the CIA.

• :

No. Breckinridge. No, no.

Mr. Schwarz. Isn't that accurate?

Mr. Breckinridge. No.

Mr. Colby. I wouldn't call Giancana an agent, getting

back to our definitional problems.

Mr.

Schvarz. CIA associates.

Mr. Colby. CIA instrument. We had a contact with Giancana,

obviously, and with Maheu. They decided on their own to do

this wiretapping, or bugging, or whatever it was, without our

prior knowledge.

They got caught. Then they said if this is

fully investigated and brought out, it will bring out the CIA

collaboration on the other subicot, and then decision

Wits mad?

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to go and brick the Attorney General to the degree briefed.

Chairman Church. After which the Justice Department dropred

the case?

Mr. Colby. It was dropped.

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Senator Hart of Colorado. Was the CIA not concorned that.

Giancana inay have told something about this Cuban operation to

the female entertainer who also may have told the male

entartainer?

Mr. Breckinridge. No. If I understand what happened,

and I an now describing what Mi. Maheu said, ard I get this

fron having Icad

some files at the Department of Justice -

recently -- when Mr. Maheu tried to explain to the FBI his

position and tried

!. to provide a rational for doing this, ha

said I thought there was a leak in Chicago and I wanted to have

the room of

this entertainer bugged so I could find out if

Giancana had leaked.

The FBI gave this the kind of credit I think it was entitled

to. They didn't pay much attention to it. This was something

he tried to develop to justify his involvement.

• .

Thare is no indication that there vere any leaks from

Chicago that we know of, something that he would know of, and

there was no instruction on our part for him to do such a thirg,

and it was for another reason Giancana asked him to do it.

Serator Hart of Colorado. As far as you can tell from tha

record, the CIA was not concarned that Giancana and his female

friend, or her male frierd, may have blown the Cubar operation?

Mr. Breckinridge. No.

Senator llart of Colorado. It was purely who was

sleepina

FOND

with whon?

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Mx. Breckinridge. I think that is still the case.

-

I would like to add one further thing.. That prior to doin

over to brief the Attorney General, the general counsel did

go spear. to General Carter. Genaral Carter said that he

undarstood -

Mr. Colby. General Carter was Deputy Director of the

Agency at that time.

Mr. Breckinridge. - he understood the situation ard

in due tine might brief the Director.

He don't know that ha

did brief the Director, who was then Mr. McCone.

Our notas

written in 1967 say there is no indication that General Carter

vas briefed or the full datails of the assassination plot.

So hile ha did approve their going and briefing the attorney

General about this association with the hafia, there is no

indication that he was told the full story then either.

Mr. Schwarz. Then in August of 1963,

the document that

you providad for us last time, Mr. lalms did know about the

ongoing operation; is that correct?

Mr. Breckinridge. I think by then he kney that the

operation was going.

Ar. Schwarz. He sent to Director McCone the menorandum

which had been prepared concerning the meeting with Attorney

General kennedy, which irdicated that the operation was complite

So the inference from that paper racord is that lie. elms vas

concealing affirmatively from the Diractor of Central Intallice

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in the same way as somebody had concealed from thy Attoricy

Gereral

the fact that the plot was ongoing.

Is that a fair, characterization?

Mr. Colby. I don't know.

Mr. Breckinridge. Could I sau the memo?

Chairman Church. The memo uses verbs in the past tease.

Mr. Schwarz. The cover

mamo

from Helms to McCone trans-

mitting a copy of the memorardum concarning the May, 1962

meating wish Attorney General Kennady.

-==•

Mr. Breckinridge. May I say first I don't know. I

just call your attention to the third paragraph.

•

Mx. Schwarz. Of the memorandum from Director Helms?

Mr. Breckinridge. Yes. He was then D.D.

ir. Colby. The basic memorandum, of course, merely

referred to a sensitive CIA oparation and then ir Mr. Helms

in the paragraph says I assuma you are avara of the nature

of the operation discussed in the attachment.

Again, this was an attampt not to refer on paper to what

it was.

tr. Schwarz. But the attachment refers

to it in the

past tensa.

Mr. Colby. I agise.

Senator Morgan. Who is this memorandum from?

Mr. Colby. The minotar lun ve are

discussing now of in

august 1953 nan to the Direcios fron Me. Helms, Is attaches

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a copy of the briefing of the Ablorney General in iiay, 1962.

Senator Morgan. Mr. Breckinridge, the transcript or revor:

that you sre reading from a few moments ago, who prepared

that?

Mr..

Breckinridge. This was prepared by another inspsctor

and me ir. 1967.

Sanator Morgan. When you say there is no indication that

he knew, that is just an assumption on your part, that you

don't have any positive evidence?

Mr. Breckinridge. That is correct.

Serator Morgan. The truth is you sort of suspect they

all knew what was going on. Don't you think that is true?

Mr. Breckinridge. No, not necassarily.

When we conducted our investigation we interviewed the

people dirtctly involved in the oparation, those that were

available, ard trisa to reconstruct what happened with then.

• We intervieved different people. I did not interview

ir. Bissal. I did interview lir. Harvey.

He submitted

this report

to then-Director Halms, one copy

only. Wa did not interviaw him.

Where his name

appeared

in the course of our inquiry ve

put it in our report so that

the would see how the record appeared

to paople who approached it as we did.

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The entast of the lnd lame of these different people is

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ast sasy tO roconstruc: dof fair. to assume.

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I can't answer your question.

- Saintor, Mortar.

In other cords, is you didn't have

avidance that they did know, you just assumed that -- you

didn't assume that they didn't know, you just said there is

no

evidence?

Mr. Breckinridge. That is correct.

Senator Schweicker. Let ne ask the question another way.

The documentation you collscted and what you do have

positively, who was the highest ranking official, according

to your records, who knaw?

Chairman Church. According to the positive documents

that you have of knowledge.

Mr. Breckinridge. First, let me say we did not have

documentation. It was based mostly on interviews, this

pariod involving the Mafia.

The highest person that we understood that knew during

the first phas= with Mr. Bissel. That we clearly did know

about it: There was discussion at ona point in which ir.

Bisstl, Colonel Edivards, the two of them, mat with lit. Dulles

ard had a conversation in which I can bast say there was

doubletall as to what they were discussing.

It is open to questior. how clearly this vas stated

Mr. Dulles and whether or not tr. Dulles understood.

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At the time that ve Por: maline the inquiry it vas our

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opinion that lix. Dullis probably knew, but I can't put it beo:

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that.

Senator Schveickar. lle left the Agency in 1961, as I

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Iscall.

When was your investigation?

Mr. Breckinridge. Our investigation was ir. 1967.

And our discussion with Colonel Edwards, who described

this meeting when it occurred in 1960, left us with the inpressio:

while they had met with iir. Dulles, that the corversation was

rot in precise terms. As Colonel Savards said to us, we

didn't use any bad words, which meant they didn't use the

word "assassination," but thay discussed an operation against

Castro in such terns that he felt that they had conveyed the

massage to Mr. Dulles. But there is room for doubt.

Senator Schweicker. Once Mr. Dulles left the Agency, who

then

became the highest rankirg person to know, according

to your investigation?

• Mr. Breckinridge. If Mr. Dulles did in fact urderstand,

he would be the highest person at this point.

Sanator Schweicker. At this point. But he left the

Agency in 1061. Five Years of assassination attempts enton ro

after that.

You conducted an irvestigation in 1967. What did that..-

period show as to who was the highest ranking person who knew?

bir. Breckinridne. "r. McCone did not know until much lat i

until aftar it was all over.

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Mr. Colby. He knew in 1963.

• Mr. Breckinridge..

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Mr. Colby. There was still activities going on:

it. Breckinridge. That is right.

Chairman Church. Can we get the answar first?

Mr. Brackinridge. Excuse me. I can't give you a more

precise answer because sometimes the record that we were able

to reconstruct is' not precisa and in some instances not at all

clear. We were left with some uncertainty.

Senator Schwaicker. Mouldn't that be the kay issue of

your wole investigation, and you mean to say you can't tall

me?

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Mr. Breckinridge. No, sir.

Senator Schweicker. I am flabbergasted.

ir. Breckinridge. bot me describe the investigation.

ile vere doing the irvestigation for tir. Helms as the Director.

Mr. H=lms' involvement was something known to nin ard we

submitted our description of whet happened to him. He did

not

interview hin in the course of our investigation. He did not

intervis: Mr. McCone. Wa did interview the other parties who

were available to us. But when we gave it to Me. Helms the

assumption was that he could complata the gaos.

In this sense, ordinarily, when va conduct an investigation,

a goneral investigation, we would conclade with recommendations,

and in this instance va did to. Me reconstructed as well as

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we could what happened. And the report went one copy orly to

Mr. Helms who hold it. We had only one discussion. The

Inspector General then may have had others. We had only one

discussion with him, which was when wa gava him the first

portion of the report, because we investigated thres diffarent

assassination plans, as we dascribed them then, ard our discussio.

with him had to do with the approach we had taken, and ve

said that we simply undertook to reconstruct what had happened

as best we could reconstruct it.

So we were reporting to Mr. Helms what wa had reconstructs

without having interviewed him as such. It was in one cozy

only, and quite frankly in 1967 we expected that it would

have no purpose other than to tell him what the situation was

for decisions as ha falt appropriase.

Senator Mondale. Mow, vou say it is not clear whether

Dulles knew, but yet there is a menoraudun fron Oshorn tem

the Executiva Director dated 2/15/72, Which statas, I quote:

""Indiviauals who were avare of this project" --

That is the Mafia project --

"Wara Messrs. Dulles, Bissel, Colonel King, Colonel

Sheffield, Edwards, William Harvey, James P. O'Connall, and

attornays for Robert Mahau."

Mr. Breckinridge. Mt. Osborn is writing that or the basis

of his understanding of what Colonel Edwards had to say.

Our discusaions vith Colonel Eduards laft us with this incertni:

.......

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Colonel Edwards baliaves that ir. Dulles understood the

conversation. He also said that he engaged in doubletalx so

that there was room for misunderstanding.

Mr. Schwarz. I sho: you a documert stamped 0012, headed

John Roselli and ask you what it is.

MI. Breckinridge. This is a mano prepared in the Office

of Sscurity describing John Posalli, who is the first of the

menbers of the syndicate who was used to arranga the introductio

to the head of the syndicate in Cuba.

Mr. Schwarz. And written when?

dr, Breckinridge.

I am not sure. I suspact it was writte

in 1973 but I would have to check.

r. Schwarz. Does it refer to a Castro assassiration

attenpt involvirg the mafia?

Mr. Breckinridge. Does the word "assassination" appear?

I think it rafers to the Mafia.

Mr. Schwarz. Do you have any doubt, in fact, this is

referring to the assassination affort involving Maheu, Roselli,

Trafficanta, in connection with Castro?

Mr. Brackinridge. That is correct.

Mr. Schwarz. And doas this document prepared by the

Office of Security stata "the DCI was briefed and gave his

approval"?

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ir. Breckinridge. It does.

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ir. Schwar?. And who was the Det in August, 1969?

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My. Brackinridge.

That was Mr. 'Dulles.

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- MI. Schwarz. Now, therafore, either Mr. Dulles did approve!

which the document says, or somabody wrote a document in

connection with the investigation which irresporsibly says

Mr. Dullas approved. Which is the case?

Mr. Breckinridgs. "I don't think that either is necessaril!

the case.

The understanding of the Office of Security is that Mr.

Dulles does know or did know. The question that was raised

in the course of our irguiry was that the nature of the meeting

as described to us raised a question of doubt. That we did

not resolve.

Chairman Church. I think if we accept your testinony

that there was at least an element of doubt as to whether or

not Mr. Dulles knew of the connection between the CIA and the

Mafia, and its purpose, to assassinate lir. Castro, let's get

back to Senator Schweicker's questior. After Hir. Dulles left

several more plots were formed involving the CIA and having s

to do with subsequent attempts on the life of Castro.

Now, what does your investigation show and what can you

tell us with respect to the highest officials in the CIA,

following the departure of Mr. Dulles, who may have had knowledg

of these ongoing operations?

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ir. Breckinridge. When the operation was renewed I thir

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It is clear that the Diractor at that time did not know.

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Senator Schweicker. And who was tha Director at that

time?

Chairman Church. Wher. was the operation renewed?

Mr. Breckinridge. The operation was actually reactivated

in April of 1962. It was plarned to be raactivated prior to

that but the employee who had responsibility for it did not

get free until April of '62 whan he actually reactivated it.

There is no indication that anyone above the level of Mr.

Bissal in 1961, at the time that this was discussed, thare

is no indication that alyone above his lavel knew that it

was to ba reactivated. This officer, Mr. Harvey, then took

it over and attempted to run it again through the balance

of. 1962, after April.

ir. Schwarz. He did that at the instruction of "r. "elms,

did he not?

: Mr. Breckinridge. Mr. Helms becama aware of this at a

later point.

"The confusion, as parhaps we discussed the other day, vic.

Helns signed off on a prcject that was originally initiated

by :1r. Bissel called ZP Rifle, and 7R Rifle was a project shot

Mr. Bissel was quoted as saying was at the urgency of the.

White House.

It was made no more specific than that.

don't know where in the lihite House.

ER Rifle was described as an executive action capabilisy,

a capability to gormit assassinations if consona called for

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• NI. Harvey was given the responsibility of this by Mr.

Bissel ard originally it continued as a separate action from

the Castro opsration, but ix. Harvey was also given that

responsibility, and for all' intents and purposes they bacame

wedded.

Mr. Helms was the person who formally approved ZR Riale

as a project. ZR. Rifle had a dual purpose that has not bean

clarified by our inquiry. It aparently was in fact usad for

the stated burposes, as far as organizational activities went

along, which was to stealtcodas, and Mr. alms, whan ha

approved the project, authorized accounting on certification,

which meant that rather than the usual vouchers sueporting

expenditures, that the officer involved would simply certify

that the

monay had been spent and this would be acceoted.

It had a project. amount of some dollars, $7509 - $10,000 --

some of it to include the salary of an agent, some to includ:

operating expanses.

So Mr. Helms' main appearance in the approval of ZR Rifla

does not necessarily equate with tha date when he became

familiar with the Castro operation.

Mr. Schwarz. Because of the dual purpose of Rifle, Rifle

means both, rifle files and usad rifles?

Mr. Breckinridge. It nay mean either or both.

Mr. Colby. It is supposed to disassociate but sometimes

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there is that kird of association.

• Mr. Breckinridge. I told you that I would look for wher

Mr. Helms' name first clearly appeared and I haven't don: that.

I was out of town yesterday.

Mr. Schwarz. Do you have the mano of February 1962

when Mr. Helms, according to Mr. Greer, Inspector General,

"authorized William Marvay by memo to handle the project on

special basis"?:

Ir. Breckinridge. Do I have a copy of that memorandun?

Ar. Schwarz. Yes. •

ir. Breckinridge. It

Is in the files and we can ratrieve

Chairman Church. Mr. Bissel was the Deputy Director of

Plans.

The record would indicate that he knew of the re-

activation of the operation to assassinate Castro in Meril os

1962, and itr. Harvey, I take it, was assigned that dusy?

Mr. Breckinridge. If I may go back, it was in the fall

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- Mr. Breckinridge. I think that is probably correct. It

was in the fall of 1961 that Mr. Harvey was given this assignment

by Mr. 315501. I think Mr. Bissc: left in 1962. I am not sure

of the dates, So Mr. Bissel would have known at that time.

But I am not sure after that.

Chairman Church. Helms succeeded Mr. Bissel as chief

of operations?

MI. Colby. Deputy Director of Plans.

Chairman Church. Deputy Director for Plans.

Your record shows that Helms had knowledge of the ZR Rifle

operation, which, among other things, was to develop an executi?

capability -- whatever that neans. Presumably that means a

capability to conduct an assassination if and when authorized

by proper authority?

No. Breckinridge. That is my understanding.

Chairman Church: Is that-your understanding?

dr. Breckinridge. Yes, sir.

Chairman Church. Do your records show that, or is that

based upon what has been recaled through your interrogation?:

Mr. Breckinridge. First,!

let me go back and clarify, then

I will answer this question, if I may.

Mr. Helms approved Z? Rifle, which the record showshas the

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also the responsibility for executive action capability. That

Is a difficult phrase.

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The record does not show that Mr. Helms knew when he approved

the projest that it had this dual role. So from that poin: of

view, I have

a record that shows what the project was supposed

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to have been

as far as its open description, though classified,

and the result of our interviews with Mr. Harvey which tell the

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other story about executive action capability. So it does not,

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the record does not show that Mr.Helms at that time knew what

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that was.

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Chairman Church. If Harvey knew that it had this other

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aspect, who would have told him to develop such a capability, is

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it were not his superior?

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Mr. Breckinridge. I think that is a logical conclusion, bus

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I was distinguishing what the record showed and what our interviers

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developed.

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Chairman Church. Didn't you ask. Harvey in interviewing

him shether or not Helms had told him to develop this capability!

as a part of the ZR Rifle?

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Didn't you ask him who told him to develop this capability,

or did he do it on his own?

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Mi. Breckinridge. Your question is a very proper one, and

my difficulty is with the record which goes back to wnat Bissel

instructed Harvey to do.

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NI. Schwarz. Before licims took the job, Dissel told Harvey

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to take,

charge of the Castro assassination project?

- Mr. Breckinridge. Bissel told Harvey to create the executi

action capability.

Mr: Schwarz. But he also told him to take charge of the

Castro assassination project using the Mafia; isn't

that

correct?

Mr. Breckinridge. Now, there is no record except the

record that came from our interviews on this score. All I

am trying to do is draw the distinction between what the record

shows and what our interviews: developed, and there are gaps

in that.

Chairman Church. Your interviews show that Mr. Bissel, who

preceded Helms, told Mr. Harvey to develop an executive action

capability, which was a capability to assassinate if and wher

ordered; right?

Mr. Breckinridge. That is correct.

Chairman Church. And your records show that Mr. Bissel

also Instructed Harvey to take over the Castro assassination

attempt, which was connected with a continuing relationship

between the CIA and the Mafia?

Mr. Breckinridge. I think that is a correct assumption, -

yes.

Chairman Church.

Now, when do your records show that lielins

becane aware: of larvey's whole assignment as given him by

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Bissel?

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Mr:

Breckinridge. I don't have the accurate date. We have

the 16 August 1963 memorandum. i promised Mr. Schwarz that i

would try and find the date, and I was out of town yesterday

and simply didn't do it. But I have to go through the rucord

to find the earliest date that we have, and I simply have to go

into the record to dig this out.

Senator Schweiker.. Do your records show the date of when

the actual latest assassination attempt was finished?

Mr. Schwarz. For Castro?

Senator Schweiker. Yes. When was that timeframe, roughly?

Mr. Breckinridge. You

are talking about the Mafia connecti

Senator Schweiker. No; I an talking about when did ve

finally cease and desist in attempting to assassinate Castro,

from your records?

Mr. Breckinridge. Let me, if I may, and I don't mean to

confuse the issue -- the Mafia connection from beginning to end

was an attempt to assassinate Castro. The operation was called

off finally in the Spring, perhaps February, of 1963.

Senator Hart of Michigan. What year?

Mr. Breckinridga. 1963.

Mr. Schwarz. That is the Nafia part?

Mr. Breckinridge. Yes, sir. The Cuballa Association has a

different origin.

Chairman Church. First, who called off the Mafia opcratio:

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Mr. Brechinridge. As near as I could tell, larvey.

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Chairman Church. Harvey?

Mr: Breckinridge. Harvey. Harvey decided that it couldh':

succeed. Harvey was leaving the country for a foreign assignnen:

and in conversation with Roselli - Poselli was the man who was

in the bafia through whom the Agency had continued to work --

and Roselli agreed that nothing was happening, nothing could

happen, and it should be called off. We don't have a record

that Harvey went anywhere for approval. This doesn't mean that

he may not have discussed it, but I don't have the record of it.

So Harvey in his conversation with Roselli, terninated the

operation.

Senator Hart of Colorado. The meno which we saw at the

last session, which I don't know ve officially have, 'ir. Colby

made it available to us -- was a wrap-up of the whole thing, or a

memo to the files, and I can't recall now who did it.

Mr. Schwarz. That is the one referring to the meeting

with Robert Kennedy that we spent some time Icoking at.

Senator Hart of Colorado. That was the Sheffield-edwards

memo which say with the collapse of the Bay of Pigs invasion

operation, no further attempt was made with the Mafia. It ticd

it directly to the bay of Pigs.

Mr. Colby. That was the first phase. There was a second

phase that followed with the Mafia.

Chairnan Church, le now knoir from what you have said that

Harvey called off the ilafia conncation, and we don't krow whether

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that was done with the knowledge of authority of anyone more h:

placed in the CIA.

Mr. Breckinridge. I don't know.

Chuirman Church. All right, after Harvey left the country

who was then assigned to undertake the subsequent efforts again

the life of Castro?

Mr. Breckinridge. This brings us to Senator Schweiker's

question. A man by the nare of Orlando Cubella, who had been

met in Mexico City by the Agency in 1961, who had been one of

the leaders of the anti-Batista groups and held the rank of rajor

in the Cuban

army, that is the highest rank they have, Cubelia

was an M.D. and had been a youth leader and attended youth

conferences around the world, and was met first in Mexico City,

and later he was met in Scandinavia on several occasions. And

the conversations during these various meetings had to do with

Cubella's desire to have a change in Cuba, and the attempt on

the Agency people who met with him to explore his ability to

substitute a. government as well as be able to overthrow the

existing government.

These conversations were very general, exploratory,

and™

non-productive.

In one of the early meetings with Cubella, he taiked about

eliminating Castro, and the Agency employee used the word

assassination, which was reported back as being an ofiensive

word to Cubella, and instructions were issued that Cubella was

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not to be given a mission of elimination of Castro or anyone

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else.

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He was met in October of 1963, at which time he made the

proposai that he wished to have wapons with which to colmit

an assassination, and this proposal

was rejected.

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He continued to speak in these terms, and finally, I cannot

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give you the level of approval -- that might be at the level

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of Mr. Fitzgerald -- and I don't recall which job Mr. Fitzgerald

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had then, whether he headed the Cuban Task Force or whether he

had become --

Mr. Knoche. He replacca Harvey•

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Mr. Schwarz.' He did meet with this man and gave him a

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weapon or poison pen with which to kill Castro?

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Mr. Breckintidge. Fitzgerald did not give hin the pen.

Mr. Schwarz. But discussed the subject?

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Mr. Breckinridge. I was considering the question of

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level of authorization, and I don't recall. I would assume

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Mr. Fitzgerald was the highest level of authorization that Inno

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know of.

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Chairnan Church. And Fitzgerald's position at that time?

Mr. Breckinridge. I was questioning whether he had -- he

had three jobs in fairly quick succession. thether he replaced

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larvey as head of the Cuban Task. Foice, then he became Chief of

willi, the western Hemisphere Division, and then he became for

short time Deputy Dircctor of Plans. But he died of a heart

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attack:: I don't know whether he had at that time -- it wouid

be in October of 1963.

Mr. Colby. I think at that time he was cither head of the

Cuban furse or Chief of the lesten Hemisphere Division.

Chairman Church, Mill you get that for the record?

Mr. Colby. Yes, sir.

Mr. Breckinridge. The decision was taken to try and give

Cubella some instrument. A ball point pen was designed that

could be used as a syringe. Because Cubella was a doctor, the

pen was given to him in Paris on the 22nd of November, 1963,

with the suggestion that he use it.

Chaisman Church. By whon was the pen given?

Mr. Breckinridge. It was given by a case officer of the

Agency. In fact, Cubella refused to take it. When we wrote our

report, we thought he accepted it, but I've since learned he

refused it. He said it was not practical.'

Because he was a doctor it was suggested that he could

acquixe the material to put in the pen, but he refused to accept

it.

Conversations continued, and finally the Agency arranged

to put down two caches at sea off the coast of Cuba, one of

which had weapons in it, one of which had just general equiprent.

Senator Schweiker. Could cither of those involve the story

that appeared in the press under Colonel Prouty's statement?

ir. Breckinridge. No, sir:

•

MAMA MATTEN

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Senator Schveiker. Did that come later, Colonel Prouty?

„Mr. Breckinridge. We still don't know what colonel Prouty'

statement refers to..

Me. linoche. Prouty's allegations go back to 1959.

Senator Schweiker. What?

Mr. Knoche.

1959, Late 1959 and early 1960.

Mr. Breckinridge. We arranged to have a Cuban refugee

leader meet Cubella in Spain, at which time he gave nim an

additional weapon. That would have been in February of 1964,

I think.

Chairman Church. What kind of weapon was given to him?

Mr. Breckinridge. It is my recollection it was a rifle.

I

am not sure of that.

Cubella continued to have conversations and meetings

from

time to time as he came out of Cuba, and finally in the middle

of 1965 the decision was taken to cut off contact with him

because there were serious questions about the security of his

organization.

ile was arrested, I think. I think I have gotten my dates

right. It is subject to correction. He was arrested in the

early part of 1966, and tried, made a confession, had a public

trial, which was reported in the press.

I wonder if I might check those dates?

Chairman Church. Surely.

while you check those dates, perhaps Me. Colby could

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explain how it was during this period that Cubella was able

to return to Cuba and travel to Europe.

I assume he vas able to return to Cuba?

Mr. Colby. lie was a Cuban officer at that time, and

apparently loyal to Castro. He would go out on various trips

and things like that, and we would meet him there.

Mr. Schwarz. He was the man who met with Mr. Hunt in

Madrid?

Mr. Colby. He met with a friend of Mr. Hunt. A Cuban exil

net Cubella in Madrid. That is when the weapons were handed

over.

Mr. Schwarz. • Was Mr. Hunt in Madrid at that time?

Mr. Colby. Yes.

Mx. Breckinriage. No, because this man by the name of

Artimo, met Cubella in Madrid in December of 1961, and in

February 1965 he made the delivery of the weapons. Hunt was

not assigned there until the middle of 1965, after this was

over.

We don't know where that story came from.

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Mr. Colby. Hunt and Artimo are very close, and he is the

20

godfather of one of their children, and things like that. He

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may have told him about it.

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Chairman Church. During this period you have described,

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winen these various contacts were made

with Cuballa, who was

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the highest officer within the CIA who had knowledge of these

25

contacts and who authorized them to be made, as far as your

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investigation shows?

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Mr: Breckinridge. I don't know the level at which the

contacts were known. I would assume that the continuing contac

were known at a high level, but I have to assume that, and this

goes to a point when Senator Schweiker was asking the question

at the last time. This is the last instance that we know of

in which assassination was involved.

Senator Schweiker. That is, both your records and your

interviews indicate that this was the last known activity,

according to your investigation?

Mr. Breckinridge. That was specifically related to

Castro:

Senator Schweiker. And that date was when?

Mr. Breckinridge. Well, our contact with the Cubella group

was broken off in June of 1965.

Senator Schweiker.

June of when?

Breckinridge.

1965.

I don't want to confuse you, but I would like to introduce

consideration. that relates to this.

Chairman

Church, Before you do that, I have asked what

your investigation shows is the highest officer who knew and

under whose authority these continuing contacts were made, and

you said you assumed it nust have been known to higher authority.

Mr. Breckinridge. I said that abcut the contacts, About

the contacts, I assumed this was known fairly high in the Agensy.

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Chairman Church. The contacts and their purpose?

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Mr: Breckinridgc. This is

a distinction I want to make.

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The peopla who were involved, and this is difficult --

but their statenent of state of mind, and your interpretation,

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may be different things. But the people who were involved

considered that the purpose of the association with Cubella was

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he was a man who was high in the Castro government, he was a

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man who represented a dissatisfied element, he had people who

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agreed with him, and the hope was that this could be developed

into a group, in Cuba that in some way could replace the govern-

ment..

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The conversations with Cubella were really not productive,

13 and Cubella wanted demonstration of support, tangible support,

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and the conversations progressed to the point that he wanted

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equipment with which he could commit and assassination.

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In the minds of the people who dealt with him, the question

of assassination was not uppermost, so much as it was to give

him a material demonstration of support.

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I don't mean to be trite, but the United States or the

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Agency has in the past provided weapons of one kind or another

to people, paramilitary. In the minds of these people, however

credible to you this distinction is drawn, so assassination

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becare a consideration, but assassination had not been. the

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objective:

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I am sorry, one more point.

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The point at which they began to provide weapons to him

should have required higher level approval. I don't know what.

the level of approval was.

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Mr. Schwarz. It should have under the normal procedures?

Mr. Breckinridge. Yes, sir.

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Chairman Church. At one point a meeting took place and

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agent

of the CIA gave him a ballpoint pen that had been speciall

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designed to camouflage a syringe, and gave it to him with the

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recommendation that it would be filled with poison and used to

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kill Castro.

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Are you saying that the agent may have done this without

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the knowledge of the Director or the Deputy Director for Plans;

soreone high in the Agency?

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Mr. Breckinridge. No; I am saying there should have been

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authorization. I don't know the level of that authorization.

I

merely tried to draw a distinction because it is a question raise

in'my mind, it was raised by Senator Schweiker's question -- wher

was the last attempt of assassination?

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This developed to the point where assassination was

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involved, and this was the last such interest that we know of.

Senator Schweiker. Are you saying after the incident that

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Senator Church just asked you about, at that point the emphasis

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shifted fron assassinating hin to replacing him?

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Is that what you are. trying to tell us, or did I misconstru.

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Mr. Breckinridge.

No; I am confusing the issue by trying

to describe the state of mind of the people who were involved

the operation.

Chairman Church. We don't even

know who were involved. y

tell us that.

Mr. Breckinridge. As far as

I know, Mr. Fitzgerald would

be the highest level that I know was aware of this.

Chairman Church, That was his position? We are back to

that:

MI. Colby. Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division.

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Senator Morgan. Is he dead?

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- Mr. Colby. Yes, sir.

- Mr. Breckinridge. The problem that you are having, which

is ons that we have, is raconstructing certain aspects of this,

quita frankly, and we hava attempted to reconstruct it. by the

record,

whers the record supports it by intarviews, where the

interviews can fill gaps, and it was of some interest to

try to get from

tha people involved their rationale. me

• rationale is difficult, complex, ard I have tried to convsy

that because it was brought to my mind by Senator Schweicker's

guestion.

Mr. Colby:" 'If I could haly interpret this from a cultural

pattern.

I think the poirt is that wa located this major, hed

looked like a very promising contact within cuba who coula

possibly replace Castro

or bring about his disposition, and so

forth, just f-move hin without ary spacifics:

_In the course of the conversations, the 1963 Meeting with

the ballpoint pea took place.

We don't have any clear recorá

as to who authorized that particular aspect of the relationship

concerning the ballpoint pen. The fact that we then went on

with him until '64 and '65 with the offers of weapons fits

into the gencral support of that sffort ard doesn't necessarily

coircide with the daliberate attamots to assassinate him,

althougn it could, and our Iscords don't cluarly indicate one

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way or

the other on that.

- Chairman Church. A cache of weapons delivered on

the

coast of Cuba hardly constitutes an arsenal by which it reason:

could be assumed that the government can be overthrown.

It

does, howaver, fit into a schame of providiny tha major ard

his cohorts with a capability of assassinating the Cuban leader

Mr. Colby. It also coincides with the possibility of

the first step toward additional arms.

I am not denying it, Ir. Chairma.. I am saying that the

records don't clearly indicate it, and this gets back to Mr.

Schvarz's original question to ma -- can you define "assassica-

-

tior."?

I would raspactfully request that I don't qut into that

because there is a question as to when you are supporting ared

action and when you are committing an assassination. ~

Chairman Church. All right. During this whole perica

we understand that the Director of the CIA, who vas Me. liccore,

had said ha had no knoledge of these ongoing activitias.

Mix. Colby. I would inagine that his testimony that he

did not know of an assassination would ba consistant with my

comment as to the weapons being given in support of armed actio:

but not the specific assassination plans. I don't krow that

but I an sayiig that is a possibla explaration of the differenc

between those stories.

Chairmar. Church. Me will hava to question Mr. MeCone mich

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- But you are unable now to tell us in connection with thess

-.-

later activities

whether or not there was specific knowledge

of their connaction with the assassiration purpose, above the

Level of dr. Fitzgerald?

MI. Brackirriage. At this moment I carrot.

Senator Morgan. May I pursue a line of questions for just

a few minutes?

First of all, Mr.

Schwarz, this documant, Exhibit A, who

prepared it?

This is the origiral rough craft that was prepared only

- .. -

by the typists?

Mr. Schwarz. That is the Ken Greer document.

Mr. Colby. Prepared by one of Mr. Brackirride'sa

associates, ar. Kennath Graer.

Senator Morgan.

What was the purpose of the preparation

of this document?

• "Mr. Colby. It followed the 9th of day, 1973 directive

by Mr. Schlesinger for a report on all questionable activitiss.

These were gathered together by ir. Greer and the other members

of the Inspector Ganaral's offica and a summary of them was

provided to me to usa to brief the Chairman of the two committe

Senator Morgan.. This was the bast infornation that the

Agency vas able to obtain at the time?

ME. Colby..

That was the infornation available to the

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Inspector General at the time. I thirk I would say it was abl

I don't think ve instituted an aggressive, positive investigat

ile rather collacted what we had available.

Senator Morgan. Wall, there have been assassinatior.

attempts or efforts on the part of. the government. Thera's no

question in my mind. The question I want to pursue is that

in the document marked here Exhibit A, project 79 Rifle, it

stated that sarly in the fennady Administration, "the thita

-.. -

House urged Richard Bissel to create an executive actior

capability."

That is a general standby capability to carry out

assassications.:

Now, that was the primary purpose of z8 Rifle; is that

your understandina?

Mr. Colby. It was one of the purposes of the ZR Rifle

project.

Senator Morgan.

"the White Hous="?

And it was done at the instigation of

Mr. Colby. lie have one record which states that l.

Bissal nade this statement without further precision.

Senator Morgan. And where is Mir. Sissel?

Mr. Colby. No. Bissel, I think, lives in Connecticut nor.

Senator Morgan. Now latar on we find that this project

continued on under a man by the name of Bill llarvay, did it

not? -

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Mr. Colby. Yes, sir.

- Senator Morgan. And then on June 27, 1973, he vrota

a memorandun to the Chief FI staff:

What does FI staff Mean?

Mr. Colby. A foreign intelligenca staff.

Senator Morgan. Stating that the criginal justification

for employing l.J. Minn no longer existed and raised the

question of his termination?

ME. Colby. *53 was

it?

Senator Morgan. Jurs of 1953.

He was terminated in

April of 1964?

Mr. Colby. Yes.

Senator Horgan. Now there is no doubt in your mira but

what this projact was known by the Director of tha CIA?

Mr. Colby. Approved by the Director. I don't think we

can say for sure.

Senator Morgan. Mr. Colby, isn't it a reasonable assumptic!

that"if a project of this magnitude was to carry out the

assassination, it woula

not ba cisated without the approval

of the Director of the CIA?

Mr. Colby. It better not ba created vithout my approval

now, I will guarantee you.

Senator Morgan. It certainly is not reasonable to assia

that even in 1961 it would have been so created?

Mr. Colby.

I would think that the general idea. whether

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the specific project of not but the general idea is so

significant, ard that is tha irdication that Mr. Dulles did

know of this act at the tine. Whether it was specifically

brought co the attention of his successor I could not acidally

testify one way or the other.

Senator Morgan. Mr. Colby, car you make any more sensitivi

a project at the CIA than one of assassination?

Mr. Colby. When Mr. Schlesinger came ir. I made sure he

was aware of anything I knev.

Senator Morgan. And this being true, aren't you satisfied

in your own mind that all your directors vere aware of this

project 23 Rifle until such time as

it was terminated?

Mr. Colly. That is a conclusion, Senator.

I can't

give testimony on that.

Sarator Morgan. It is a conclusion, but you are an

expert.

ir. Colby. Right.

- Senator Morgan.

You are the Director of the CIA and you

have had the experience and krowledge of the-history of the

CIA.

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Let me ask you, based upor your history, the history and

the knowledge of the CIA that you know of, have as Director,

and you have gained as Director, aren't you satisfied that

¿V=ry director knew of this project?

Mr. Colby. In the face of the statenent by 'tr. loCom

111:

TOn CaPET

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ha did

not know offit, I find that statenent difficult to

challenge.

-*

I agras with you, he should hava krown about it, but I

could not say for sure that statement is not accurate.

Senator Morgan. One final question.

Mr. NcCone left

the Agency when?

Mr. Colby. In 1965.

Senator Morgan. I won't ask any other questions except

for the racord I would like to say this so I car. remenbar why

I was pursuing this later on.

I asked thase quastions not to try to show the assassina:

plan, bacause I think that has already bean established, and

if that is all we are after we can move on to something else.

But the thing that does concern me is that if this proj-

continued on until and past the time that President Karredy

was assassinated, then it raises a question in my nird as to

whether or not Castro hinself may not well have know: about it

and Whither or not the President's assassination nay not have

been a part of a recrinination plan and it may just open the

door to whather or not later on we should decida to look irto

that.

That is the reasor. I have followed that line of questions.

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Chairman Church. Senator Mart.

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Senator llart of Colorado. Mr. Colby, in connection with

ZR

Rifle, I think you testified or your associate said this was

multi-purpose operation, including stealing codes, and the

development of the capability of what euphemistically is called

executive action.

In your professional judgment, and with your history of

your backyround in the Agency, does it make any sense to you that

a major operation; a major intelligence gathering operation of

the sort of stealing codes, which: I assume means from other

governments, would be mounted under the direction of a man

about whom all I know is that MI. Harvey has a background of

something like a soldier of fortune, and funded at the level,

I should say, of $7500 to $10,000?

Does it not suggest to you that stealing codes was in

fact an internal cover for what was explicitly an assassination

operation with unlimited, non-vouther financial capability?

Mr. Colby. No, not that it is purely a cover.

-

In the first place, Mr. Harvey had a very successful tour

in Sexlin where he ran the Berlin tunnel operation, which was

one of our major successful intelligence operations.

Mr. Harvey was a very colorful figure who had his lifestyle,

which is different than some others, but he had been very

effective at that, and very adventuresome in that category of

signals intelligence and a very tenturesome idea of that nature.

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He was in the assignment of Chief of the FI Division staff.

That staff's major function is to conduct the sigrals intelliguns

work which must be done in the clandestine service.

It hindles our efforts today to penetrate into foreig.

code rooms abroad, and things of that nature, and it involves

the breaking into of safes and things, all that complicated

material.

Now, the thing that puts it together with this "capability"

executive action, is the high degree of compartmentation of

this material, that kind of a project. In other words, a

code-breaking, a stealing operation, obviously that is to be

kept very, very secret. If you get caught in it, it has all

*:.

sorts of very bad diplomatic implications, and so forth.

Therefore, there is a system of very sharp compartmentation of

the work of that particular group.

You also are dealing with some very venturesome people

who are willing to crawl into somebody elseds code room and

take the chance of getting caught.

So, given you have a man who had some good technical

experience, who is a venturesome type himself and is running a

program which is not too far off the requirements of high

compartmentation, and a very high risk kind of operation, and

therefore, for MIr. Bissel to have selected llarvey to carry out

this project seens to me that it is compatible that he could

be running code-breaking projects, or code stealing projects,

BOP SEGRE

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as well as this other activity.

Now, in the lifestyle at the time, not mentioning the second!

one, this gets back into the recordkeeping that we have been

discussing. It was

not to be put on the record although to be

done. That is a perfectly proper hypothesis, it seems to me,

but to say that thewcode stealing was only a cover I think is

probably an unwarranted conclusion.

Senator Hart of Colorado. What about the level of funding

of 57,500 to $10,000?

Mr. Colby. That is not very much money for that kind of

an operation.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Precisely. I think it is too

little.

Mr. Colby. No. For a capability of that nature, it is

largely a staff operation. In other words, you use your own

staff officers. You may hire an agent or something, but I don't

think you can draw much conclusion from the actual number on

the figure one way or the other.

This might not have been the only such project. You linos,

an assassination project would cost you more money than that,

too.

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Senator Hart of Colorado.

Absolutely.

Mr. Colby. I find it hard to say that that is tre only

amount of money involved. I think you get into a situation

where additional money would be put into cither of those kinds

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of activities. I wouldn't get hung up on the bureaucratic

aspect of the number of dollars.

Senator Hart of Colorado. So Mr. Harvey, if the decision

made to try to liquidate a foreign leader, and Mr. Pa:vey

found the instrumentality, the individual to do that, and that

required $100,000, all he had to do was come back in and say?

Mr. Colby. He could get it.

Mr. Schwarz. I think we should have the record reflect

two things. The two gentlemen talking are not eyewitnesses to

what we have been talking about.

Second, and related to that, for us to pursue this matter,

we

nust have, and'must have

right away, the better evidence

which is in the possession of the CIA, which is at least the

Inspector General report of 1967; and more importantly than that

the interview notes reflecting whatever interviews you had

with shonever you interviewed at that time or later.

Mr. Colby. These we will make available to you to the

extent we have them.

1r. Breckinridge. He Ictained no notes. We kept only the

one report that we submitted to Mr. Helms at that time, the one

copy. When he left the Agency he returned it to us.

Now, the files on the Cubella affair and the trujitle affair

exist, and they are avajlable.

Hir. Schwarz. Can we have it understood that, Mr.

Breckinridge, you will as you did with the initial material,

* 0800T

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come down sometine early next week and we can go over it and

so forth?

• Mr. Colby. Sure. If we can just have the same sort of

normal ground rules about the papers.

Chairman

• Church. Sure. They always apply unless

Mr. Colby. I know.

Chairman Church. -- unless we say differently.

Mr. Schwarz.

No, just following up one more. thing on

Senator Hart's question of some time ago.

lould you determine with respect to five different periods

of time whether, first, there was any internal evaluation

within the Central Intelligence Agency as to whather or nor

the assassination attempts should continue and, second, whether

there was any discussions with persons outside of the Central

Intelligence Agency as to whether or not the piot should continus

and the period of time would be the initial authorization, which

was March 1960, after the Bay of Pigs, during the missile

crisis. ind, parenthetically there, will you state whether it

was possible Castro might have been assassinated pursuant to

an ongoing plan during a period of time when the United States

and Russia were close to a nuclear confrontation. The next.

case is John F. Kennedy's assassination.

Finally, at the tire of the break-off in June of 1965,

which I believe was Nr. Breckinridge's testimony, was anybody in

higher authority told that the eperation had been broken off?

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Because that will bear upon whether anybody in higher authority

had authorized or requested the operation.

Mr. Colby. Yes, fine.

Hx. ichvarz. Can I pick up then on another subject wich

ve just barely touched on last tine, Mr. Colby?

This is related to the question I asked you about the use

of criminal elements.

Senator Mathias. Before we leave this, I have onc question.

Chairman Church. Senator Mathias.

Senator Mathias. In light of the fact this poison pen was

actually proffered on the 22nd of November, 1963, is there a

scintilla of evidence -- and vas proffered to a Major in the

Cuban Army on active duty -- is there a scintilla of evidence

that anyone in the Cuban Government had any knowledge or suspicio:

prior to that date that this was a project

that was planned?

Mr. Colby. There is certainly no evidence that anyone

had that information with respect to the Cubella operation.

Mr. Breckinridge. No.

Mr. Colby. The second phase of the Mafia operation had been

wrapped up by then, I think.

Mr. Breckinridge. Yes.

Mr. Colby. The individual in Cuba involved in it had

take asylum, I think.

Mr. Breckinridge,

lio, the sequence is a little different.

Mr. Colby. A little later:

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Mr. Breckinridge. Yes. There vere people who reporteilly

were ant into Cuba, a team of three people -- and I said reporter

because we were working then through a Cuban exile leader.

They had the assignment of recruiting additional people to

carry out such plans as might be developed. We never knew what

happened to those people -- whether.they came back -- only that

they were sent in.

But if you are looking for a possibility of knowledge of

an assassination plot, conceivably those three people could be

the source. of it, but not that the United States Government was

behind it.

Senator Mathias. But it is conceivable that Castro and

his government could have come upon some evidence that some

plot was afoot?

Mr. Colby. He certainly could have cross allegations, and

you really must assume that various of the other kind, even

independent activities, or the first phase of the Mafia progran

could have produced allegations of attempts against him with

the comment that CIA or the United States was behind it. The

possibility of that kind of allegation is just almost infinite.

Senator Mathias. Particularly considering the nature of

the instruments that were being deployed?

Mr. Colby. Yes, sir. .

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Nr. Breckinridge. There is another consideration.

Chairman Church. You really haven't told us on the recors

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until just now, in response to Senator Mathias, just what the

second phase of the Mafia connection for assassination Castro

was. We really haven't had the detail except as you gave it

to

Senato. Mathias.

I wonder if you could complete the record on this second

phase. Give us all the information that you know about that.

Mr. Breckinridge., Before I do, one additional

consideratio

The Cuban exile community in Miami was engaged in a great

deal of plotting of its own and a great deal of hyperbole, and

it is safe to assume that

Castro also had reports of assassinati,

schenes or threats from that group. So there is one more source

to that sort of thing.

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Senator Morgan. Where is Cubella now? 'Is he still in

prison?

Mr. Brackinridge. In jail on the Isle of Pines.

Senator Horgan. Are we sure of that?

Mr. Breckinridge. I asked somebody the other day and they

said that is where they think he is.

Senator Morgan. I just wondered whose agent he really

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was.

ir. Colby. He has been ir jail for a long time if he

was Castro!s.

Senator Morgan. You testifiad he was able to go in and

out of Cuba fairly Eraquently.

'Ar. Coloy. He was an associate of Castro's, there is

no question abous that, but he had an independent relation

with us that finally got picked up. "I shiak that is imporsant,

Nir. Chairman, that we try to keep his rama out of any publisher

documants for that ruason.

There is no use getting him in

more trouble.

Senator Schweicker. That is for sure.

Chairman Church. There is no argument on that score.

Hould you please furnish us with all of the details as to

tha second phasa of the Mafia conraction?

kI. Breckäcridge. He, will giva you mora accurate datail

when wa give you the report, but I will rucits now the best

that I can recall.

H0RD

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Chairman Church.. Before you do, would you just explain

exactly ihat the relationship between CIA and Giancana and

Mahau was because that is not clear in my mird.

Hould you develop for the Committes that whole relationship.

Mr. Breckinridge. Robert Maheu usad to work for tbe

F3I and he resigned from the FBI and opened a private investiga-

tive firn here in Washington ard CIA used him from time to

time for certain kinds of support activities.

Chairman church. hat kiaù of support activities?

Mr. Breckinridge. • On One

occasion he obtained a famele

companion for an important foreign leader.

Chairmas. Church. What other kird of support?

Mr. Breckinridge. In the early days -- and Shis becones

an embarrassment.

As nearly as I can reconstruct, the people

who knew him decidad to put hin on a ratainer in the Office

of Security, which they did for awile, until he vas so

successful he said he no longer neided the retaines, which is

didn't do much to earr. He later got involved represanting

one of the Gruck shipping intsrasts and me were given the

results of some of the information that he obtained from that

Where there was a fight between liarchos and Drassis. le

think he may have had some involvement in another foreign

leadar's companionship when he was in this country. I don't

have the details. I think we can probably raconstruce it sor

you.

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Chairman Church. Can we have the file on him?

- ir. Breckinridg=. I think we will provide ore on that.

We have one, Yes•

Chairman Church. Very well.

Mr. Breckinridge. When Maheu, laft Washington and moved

out west, I think first to LOS Angeles, later to Las Vegas,

where he became

associated with the Hughes organization, and

when the question arose about getting an irtroduction to the

Hafia, because thay did have gambling interests in Cuba at

that time, the Office of Security, Coloral Edwards vas asked

if he could establish a contact, and he went to Mansu, of

had somone go to Maheu, to see if Maheu could make suen an

introduction.

Maneu knew a man by the name of Johnny roselli, tho

lival in Los Angeles, who had the concassion for the icemaki:a

machines on the strip in Las Vegas, and he arranged, Roselli

arrarged an introduction to -- the CIA actually arranged,

our man didn't meet Giarcana, I don't balieve, arrarged an

introduction,, but Giancana who in turn arranged an introáuctio

to a mar. by the rame of Santos Crafficanta.

Trafficante was the head of the Cuban gambling interests

and Castro had allowed them. First he had closed them, than

he reopened them hopint to attract tourists. And Trafficante

travelled to and fron Cuba.

Giancina sarvad only as the introduction to crafficanta.

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This was all dons through Roselli.

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• Our people never -- thay all dealt with Roselli, who ir

turn deal with the others.

Rosalli was in essency a cut-out or served as the middle

man:

Roselli was never paid for his services.

Giancana clearly knew eventually the government association.

Roselli came to know of it, though initially he was irtroduced

to the CIA porson.as a man who worked for Maheu on an assignan

by a private cliert.

So initially the cover story was Maheu's private client

who had an interest insid= Cuba. Giancana never really was

irvolved subsequently.

He dia arrange -- it was Trafficante from than on -- and

Trafficante had a source inside Cuba who had an office, had

a position in the Office of the Prime Minister. He was beliar=à

10

have access to Castro and a poison pill was developed that

he was to insart into Castro's food. The pills vera sent in

to this man. What we did not krow at the time was the man.

had lost his job and lost his access and the pills were returned

lix. Colby. That is the first phase.

Senator Schweicker. Would you dats that?

"I. Brachinridge. That would go into the early part of

1251, March-April, 1951.

Mr. Schwarz. The pills were given as part of the first

phasa to a secord person in Cuba; is that correct?

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Hr. Breckinridge. Just before the first phasa anded,

Roselli, through Trafficante, was introduced to another Cuban

exile leader in Miami by the

name of Anthony Varona. Again,

his name is a sensitive natter.

Varona was the leader of one of the groups that was being

supported by the CIA as part of the preparation for the Bay

of Pigs.

Varona was unhappy with his association, with the associatio

with the CIA, Ha felt he had not been given enough norsy.

Varona häd pisvious contact with the crininal element in Cuba

ard he was approached by Roselli with Trafficanta's introductio:)

to take on this missio.:.

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Roselli's story was that he represented sona private cline

who had interest in Cuha. The Rosalli identity was apparent,

as was trafficante's.

Varora said. he knew someone who was in a restaurant that

Castro frequented and then the pills were transportei again.

"ir. Schwarz, Could you state for the record who made tha

pills?

Mr. Breckinridge. The pills were made in what was then

the Technical Servicas Division of the CIA.

Mr. Schwarz. ilad they ever made such pills before?

Hr. Breckinridge. Not that I know of.

fir. Schwarz. Had they ver used Sotulinum as a poison in

any way bafore?

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Mr. •Breckinridge. On one previcus occasion Botulinun

had- been considered for usa on cigars that soneone had hoped

to get to castro, and eventually that never got off the ground.

This was a scheme that was never approved and never went forward

I know of that one instance in which it vas considered.

Botulinum was made into pills ard these pills were taler

again to Cuba. Castro stopped going to the restaurant uh+re

this man was. Tha Bay of Pigs occurred and the operation

was callsd off.

When Harvey took over and than reactivated the second phas:

in April. of 1962, they Went back to Varona, and one of the

strange things is that Varona started off with the rapatition

of the original restarrant approach, which I thin! caused

some question as to the gap bususen what we ware told and

what was happining.

Varona after this disa't materializa. Varona then stated

that he had sent thras man into Cuba whosa job was to recrui

aciditional peopla for such plan as may develop. He lat=r

planned to send in three more people. Ha don't beliave they

eVer went. The missile crisis intervened. There were a number

of delays and we don't think they ever did go in.

The first thrse men, if in fact they did go in -- wa

dor.'t krow who they were, ive don't know what they did, we

don't kaow winsther they came out or not.

As a matter of interest, the man who was to go back --

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Chairman Church. It is possible they went in and could

have been capturad by Castro?

Mr. Breckirriage. It is possible.

The question that Senator Jorgan asked earlier, whus they

could have krown -- these man we don't balieve could have krown.

the actual backers of the oparation, becaus: Varora was dealing

with a manber

of the syndicate with whom he had previous

connections. The people who dealt with Varona felt that Roselli

was discreet and careful.

But those men could have been captured. They could hava

suppliad the interpretation that they might rot have knova.

Hothing came of the operation, it was called off, but

essentially that is the first and secord piasa.

Chairman Church. These three men were to be sent from --

No. Breckinridge. They were Cuban exiles.

Chairman Church. To ba sent in fron the United States?

•Ar. Colby. From the United States.

_Chairman Church. And why is is you don't know whether or

not they were sent?

Mr. Breckinridge. The gusstion exists in my mird. I

am not sure it exists in other people's minds.

As I reviewed the record, when wa gos the record back, i:

preparation for these inquiries, I was struc!: by the fact that

Varona had told us at the very end of the first phase that

he was usiny this rastaurant, and when a year later the phase

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was reactivated, the same story was usad and already had been

proven not to ba so.

Later he talked in general terms about the thrae men ard

I began to develop some reservation in my mind as to whetner

or not Varona had in fact told us the truth.

That is purely spsculation on my part.

Mr. Colby: This is a problan we live with in the intellige

business. "Then you ars not able to be in direct contact, for

good reasons you are subject to fabrication, particularly if

there is some money involvea.

Chairnan Church. Did

the CIA, in comasction with phase

one of phase two, pay any of these agents for their services?

Mr. Breckinridge. In phase one I think we paid expanse

mon=y. In phase two we gave money to Varona.

ix. Schwarz.

and to 'Roselli?

lir. Breckirriage. Ma paid expanse money for Roselli.

Mr. Schwarz. You paid hin moray to buy guns?

Mr. Brackinridge. I was going to tell sha gun story:

Varora wanted money and gurs and some of ths equipment that

he specified could be obtained only from the United States

military. And the equipment that was acquired at that time

did not include that kind of equipmant. It included aquioment

that could be obtalned from other sources and excluded ij.s.

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nilitary equipment. It was provided through the assistence

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of the tiami station.

A U-llanl truck was picked up end daliv

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know.

- Mr. Breckinridge. The first man who had tha job in the

Offica of the Prime Minister, this man did get kickbacks from

the crinirals: I think that must be the one you remember. le

took refuge in the Venezuelan embassy ard stayed there until

•1961. He finally was giver safe conduct to pass out. The

Mexican embassy took over Eron Venezuela. Cuba broke diplomatic

ralations. He continued to be a political refugee in that

embassy until th= fall of 1964.

Chairman Church. What was Varona's motive for participating

in the plot?

Ir. Breckinridge.

Varona was ore of the exils leaders

who wanted to overthrow Castro. He wanted more firancing thar

he had.

He would cooperate with anyone.

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Mr. Schwarz.

I would like to pick up on the discussion

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we had.

Chairman Church. Mr. Schwarz has five minutes more, and

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we will conclude, and I would liki. to ask the Committee eu stay

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on for ten more minutes for an exécutive session.

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Mr. Schwarz. In the discussion we had on the use of

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criminal elements, we have dealt with the Castro operation.

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In the middle of the book supplied to us by Mr. Breckinridge

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earlier this week, there is a discussion about the bumumi

operation, and the Agent Q. J. Win.

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Now, is it a fact that Q. J. Win was the agent, or asset,

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however you would refer to hin, who apparently was considered

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for the effort to assassinate Lumumba, which never tock place;

is that right?

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: Mr. Colby: Yes, sir.

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• Ns. Schwarz. Now, is it accurate that Q. J. Win operatca

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in Europe trying to spot and assess individuals whom the Agency

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could use "in safecracking operations?

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Mr. Colby. This is what is reported, and it is quite

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possible.

C

Mr. Breckinridge. The record indicates that.

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Nr. Schwarz. And is it further so that one of the CIA

officers who first met l. J: Win in Luxembourg, was on a.

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trip overseas to find safecrackers and document suppliers?

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Mr. Colby. Yes, that is what it says.

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Mr. Schwarz. Now, just as a matter of historical record,

the OSS the predecessor of the CIA in some sensc?

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Mr. Colby. Yes, sir.

MI. Schwarz. Is it correct that "Lucky" Luciano was used

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to help the OSS in connection with operations in Italy during

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the Second World War?

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Mr. Colby. I don't know, but I have heard that story

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as well. It is an extensive story but I don't know the facts.

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• Mr. Schwarz. For the record, Mr. Luciano was a Mafia

figure who had been deported from the United States, or was in

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jail in the United States?

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Mr. Colby. Was in jail, I guess, and was later deported

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after the War.

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Mr. Schwarz. Now, in connection with the instructions which

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you issued in 1973 concerning activities outside of the Charter

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of the CIA, you received,

as we went through the other day, a

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report from the Inspector General leading up to that in lay of

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1973?

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Mr. Colby. That is right.

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Mr. Schwarz. And was part of the report that the CIA

had itself conducted for local police departments in Washington,

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Arlington, Fairfax and Alexandria, during the perica 1968 and

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1969, a series of classes in items which included basics in

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surveillance, photography, basic audio

and countersabotage; and

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lin addition, this is what I particularly call

Your attention to,

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1. locks and picks and surreptitious entry?

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Mr. Colby. Yes, sir.

Mr. Schwarz. I am now cading from pages 225 and 226 of

the 694 lages, which I will mar': is Exhibit do. 6.

(The above-mentioned docurent was

marked as Colby Exhibit to. 6

for identification.)

Mr. Schwarz.

Is it the fact that, for example, between

October 7 and October 18, 1968, the CIA conducted a course for

the Hashington Police Department in the subject of surreptitious

entry?

Mr. Colby. It was included in that, yes.

Mr. Schwarz. What was the purpose of conducting such

course?

Mr. Colby: lie had a relationship with various police

departments around the country. They from time to time would

like to learn our knowledge of certain subjects that are quite

unique to the CIA. There are a number of things that we have

to do in CIA which are quite frankly outside the norm of most

other agencies of the Governnent.

Chairman Church. Doesn't surreptitious entry refer to.-

illegal entry?

Mr. Colby. Going in secretly, that is what it mans:

Entering secretly in some fashion or other, yes.

Chaiman Church. That is an illegal activity for local

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d.|police, is it not?

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_Mr. Colby. Presumably, yes.

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Chairman Church. Why is CIA conducting courses teaching

local police illegal activity, ter to conduct illegal ofsations?

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Mr. Colby.

I think at that time, ir. Chairman, that was

at the request of the police department of that area, that they

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were interested in this thing, and there is a defensive elment

of it. In order to know now to protect against sorething, it

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is well to know how it is actually conducted.

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Chairman Church. Do you

construe this activity to be

within the law, the basic statute which restricts your domestic

activities?

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Mr. Colby. I don't think it is a violation of the law,

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Mr. Chairman.

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I did give some directive on that in 1973, that we not

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engage in this anynore, in compliance with the spirit of the

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amendment to the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration

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Act, which says that CIA will not provide support to the LEA

lin its assistance to local police departments. And as far as

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I was concerned, that is a policy that they don't want CIA in

touch with local police departments.

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The fact of sharing our knowledge of techniques with a

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local police department does not in my mind get us into actually

conducting domestic police activity. Therc is a difference

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410 FIrst Strool, S.E., Yashingion, O.C. 20003

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Chairman Church. Yes. But apart from the technical

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question of your jurisdiction, when you engage in teaching local

police departments how to conduct break-ins, surreptitious

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break-ins, you are teaching them how to bicak the law.

Mr. Colby.

You are teaching them how the law is broken.

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• Chairman Church. That is right.

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MI. COLDY.

which can be useful to them in their knowledge

of how the law is broken, the techniques that are feasible.

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Chairman Church. Or can be useful to them in knowing how

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to break the law?

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Mr. Colby. It could. It is an item of information that

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they can use in ahy way they wish, either properly or improperly:

Mr. Schwarz. Are you aware of any situations where govern-

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mental officials, either state, local or Federal, have in fact

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engaged in break-ins within the United States?

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Mr. Colby. I know of certain situations ralated to foreign!

intelligence operations where access to appropriate targets has

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been obtained either through subterfuge of pretending to be a

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workman or something of that nature, and I think in that history!

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there are some cases of actual break-ins.

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Now, I assure you, Mr. Chairman, we have been conducting

break-ins abroad. There is no question about that. That is,

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we train our people to be abic to do that.

Chairman Church. That is not the question I am raising

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with you.

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In other words, these courses, it is my impression, were.

generalized discussions of techniques. They vere not particular

handholding on conducting a specific operation.

I think I am accurate in that statement.

•Mr. Smothers. Mr. Colby, just a couple of quick questions.

First, with regard

to the files, memoranda or diaries you

might have of former directors, are those still on Agenci

premises?

Do you have those matters still there that were

left by former Directors?

Mr. Colby. Certain ones we do. I don't know of any that

we don't have.

As far as I am concerned, they are Agency property, and wien

leave I am going to walk out without any paper.

Mr. Smothers. With respect then to the inquiries you have

made with regard to information in the files on assassinations,

have these inquiries extended to an examination of these files

of former Directors?

Mr. Breckinridge, In one or two instances on specific

points

we have made inquiries. We have not gone through the

files in general for that purpose.

NI. Colby. We have gone through that collection I know of

Mr. Helms' files. I don't know of any specific set of files

called Mr. NcCone's files.

There is an exccutive registry where my correspondence

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kept, for instance.

- Mr. Smothers. What I an searching for is the situation

where the generic classification of materials night somchow

have not been complete enough for us to gat particular knowledge!

and I was wondering prior to our nest meeting if a search

oriented with respect to the issue of knowledge might be a

fruitful exercise?

Mr. Colby. Knowledge by previous directors of specifics

on this topic?

Mr. Smothers. Yes.

Mr: Colby. I think it is easy for Mr. Helms. I think

we have gone through his files. I don't know of any seiarate

set of files on Mr. Dulles or Mr. McCone. We will look.

, Senator Mondale. There is a reference. to john McCone's.

files in one of the menos that I looked at this morning.

Mr. Colby. I will check that, Senator.

Chairman Church. That is a good point, and I am glad you

have raised it.

I think we will conclude the hearing at this point with

the understanding, Mr. Colby, we will be back in touch with

You .

Mr. Colby. Surely. Many times, I think, Nr. Chairman.

Chairman Church.

Yes.

I think that next week we will not have any formal meetings!

of the Comittce, owing to the recess, but ve will then, I

think, we are going to have to go into tri-weikly meetings,

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beginning.

after the recess, so we can step up the pace for che

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Senator Mondale. If they could get the Lansdale memo.

Mr. Colby. I will do that tris afternoon.

I would like to add two things that have come to my attentio:

on the subject of assassinations; both of which are allegations,

both of which have been knocked down.

There was an allogation, some man has, alleged that he was

working or conducting an assassination in Colombia, and ve have

looked into the specifics of it, and there is absolutely nothing

to it. I thought I would mention it. I have the facts here

and will include them at sone time.

There is another allegation that one of our officers

had some knowledge of an attempt against Chou In-Lai, and he hasi

written me a note that points out that it is impossible for that

to have happened because he wasn't in the place at the time.

Chairman Church. Since they are allegations into which

you have inquired, I think you should make the papers available.

Mr. Colby. I will make sure the staff gets those.

Chairman Church. Thank you very nuch.

Mr. Knoche. Could I point out, I think we have the answer

to the photographs.

There were seven of these photographs taken at different

angles at the same tine, but absolutely different time intervals

during the time that the police had these men in custoly.

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Mr. Knoche. I am not sure. I am not certain for that

particular board that you were looking at.

With the blowup, they took this one of the seven photographs

which gives the best opportunity to look at the face.

Mx. Colby.

so they were separate photographs.

Chairman Church. Yes.

Mr. Knoche. I will be glad to leave that with you if you

would like to have it for your file.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 o'clock pim., the Committee

recessed subject to the call of the Chair.)

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