DISPATCH-PROGRESS REPORT: 1 JULY - 30 SEPTEMBER 1971.
Agency: CIA
Originator: CIA
From: CHIEF, WOACRE, CHIEF WH DIVISION
To: COS MEXICO CITY
Document date: 09/29/1971
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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Date: 02/21/05

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CIA

RECORD NUMBER

.: 104-10414-10345

RECORD SERIES : JFK

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

: RUSS HOLMES WORK FILE

DOCUMENT INFORMATIÓN

Released under the John

' Kennedy

Assassination Records

Collection Act of 1992

(44 USC 2107 Note) .

Case#:NW 53320 Date:

06-26-2017

AGENCY ORIGINATOR : CIA

FROM

: COS MEXICO CITY

TO : CHIEF, WOACRE, CHIEF WH DIVISION

TITLE

: DISPATCH-PROGRESS REPORT: 1 JULY - 30 SEPTEMBER 1971.

DATE

09/29/1971

PAGES

6

SUBJECTS : AFGHAN

JFK ASSASSINATION

PAPER

CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED IN PART PUBLIC - RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW

: 07/07/04

COMMENTS

• JFK-RH07 : F133

: 20040324-1064411

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[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

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ANICE Fir

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Diantir

DISTANCH

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

19F0.

Chief, WOACRE

Chief of Station, Mexico City 7"

UBtO KDAFGHAN Progress Report: 1 July - 30 September 1971

ACTION REQUIRED • REFERENCES

Artion Required: Paragraph 16 (WOACRL)

NO INDEXING REQUIRID

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK

CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

1.

SUMMARY:

During the reporting period this Project conlinued

with no change.

The KDAFGHANS continued to provide

the Station. with

protographic coverage of visitors to the Cubail Embassy.

A new case:

officer took over the project at the beginning

of

the period and has

spont the major part of his mectings witli KDAFGHAN-1 and 2 on dis-

cussing and planning ways to improve the percentage of identifications

made by

them.

What follows is a description of the operation as it

11OW

stands and the Station's plans to improve it.

2.

PRESENT KDAFGHAN ROUTINE:

Visual coverage of the

entrance

to the Cuban Embassy compound is provided from 0900 to 1800 (the

anproximate hour at which lighting conditions prevent further

pliotography with the present equipment.) Embassy hours are 0800-

2100, approximately.

KDAFGHAN-1 provides the majority of the mai-

apowei,

with KDAFGHAN-2 filling in for rest breaks,

lunch and while

KDAFGHAN-1 processes the previous day's take.

The general praciice

is to observe the entrance without optical

assistance until a person

ol vehicle is seen to be entering or leaving

the

gate area.

The

restricted size of the aperture possible in the OP for this viewing

¡a rectangular opening approximately four by five inches) prevents

simultaneous

viewing

of any other area of

saiget is

seen,

the compound.

When a

the observer shifts his head a few inches to the

reflex finder of the camera and is given a 20 X magnification of

"the target.

This is more than adequate for identification of any

target.

If the target is unknown and/or a previous photograph las

not been taken,

the observer takes one.

At the same time he records

the time of arrival/departure, whether the target is known or

unknown, and records any obvious identifying data such as license

plate, apparent nationality, apparent occupation, etc.

In addition

Attachments:

A - as

B - as

Continued..

stated.h/w

stated

use ele Artilleryon

FOSS RETOREN: E 15

Distribution:

Orig. &

2

- Chief, WHD (w/atts. A and B i/v & u/s/c)

1 - Chief, WOACRE (w/o/atts.) -i

GS COPY

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND HUMBER

DATE

HMMA - 41087

29 September 1971

indis

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Mean looka

above general visual surveillance,

the agents are

occasionally provided with photographs of targets the Station

believes might visit the compound

alert - such as visiting agent personnel and third country

subversives known. or believed to be in the area.

Each day,

KDAFGHAN-1 processes his notes and the photographs taken and

submits them to the Station in the following form (one day's

production is illustrated in Attachment A):

a. A timetable of arrivals and departures (the number

in the

taken).

left margin indicates that a photograph was

b. The original negative.

The daily average seems to

be about eighteen photographs.

A contact print of the above negatives (the inked

numbers

on the photographs correspond to the

marginal numbers on the report).

d.

Enlargements of selected subjects: (not included).

THE AGENT PERSONNEL:

GARDALPHE spent one day, from

to 1900,

inside the OP,

observing the agents

routine.

Both seem to have adapted to a very

boring routine

Their eyesight, which has been the subject of quite

a few off-the-record comments at both Headquarters and at the

Station (viz, that they are blind), was checked out thoroughly,

but innocuously, by asking them who

and such a person was

at the gate or

in photos

and by

asking them to read

small print film-processing instructions..

While KDAFGHAN-2's

eyesight is definitely poorer than that of KDAFGHAN-1, she easily

identified the subjects and was able to read the test literature

with no problem.

She was observed carefully while manning the

OP and she missed no one in that one and one-half hour period.

Previous cases of missing known targets scheduled to visit the

Embassy are more probably the result of boredom and a resultant

lack of attention.

Their job requires them to be hermits.

have very few friends and even fewer visitors.

To break them out

of this rut,

the Station will soon start altering their work

hours to provide more extended coverage of the

target, and

them more interesting work to do.

4.

PRESENT KDAFGHAN FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT:

Op is located on the roof of

a three-story apartment house

located about eighty yards from the compound entrance (see

Attachment B). Concealment is excellent.

Windows on other

floors allow visual observation of most of the compound facing

the CP and of the entrance to the Consulate.

However,

they do

not permit photography, except on a selected basis, because of

the concealment problem. The OP proper is a small

about five by

six feet in what used to be the maid's quarters.

A captain's chair,

tripod, camera, lens and a small worktable

have been fitted in between the various plumbing fistures.

Adjacent to this is another room of approximately twice the size

which contains a desk,, cot, the printer and a wardrobe for

storing photographic materials.

This room has

a large picture

window overlooking the entrance to the Consulate.

Continued.

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5.

The photographic equipment used by the KDAFGHANS at

present consists of a Bausch and Lomb

spotting scope with 20-x

eyepiece, and a Pentax H-3. camera.

This equipment is not

satisfactory

(see below). Except for the printer,

all darkroom

equipment is located in a darkroom on the first floor.

darkroom is well equipped and adequate.

KDAFGHAN-1 makes 10

attempt to conceal

the darkroom. His cover for the darkroom is

that it is his hobby.

6. STATION PROCESSING DE TUE KRAFGHAN PRODUCTION:

Time

tables are filled and not processed - at present.

If the Station

is looking for confirmation of an agent report or a surveillance

are sometimes consulted. About every year they are

shipped to Headquarters for retention in the Archives

The

negatives and contact prints are handled in the same way:

7. The enlarged photographs are processed in the following

way :

a .

Certain photographs of unidentified persons are

sterilized and forwarded to the local office of

The Station receives no feedback or

identification of

these individuals from LNERGO.

b.

Photographs of PCS or known TDY Embassy personnel

are kept and used for identification purposes

the Station and

some are forwarded to Headquarters

for the same reason.

c.

Photographs of other

identified persons are placed

in Station personality files.

d. All other photographs (the major portion) are simply

8. LNERGO was recently queried on the value of this

operation to them.

They replied, "(these photographs)

compared with the photographs of known leaders of extremist

groups in WOCORK as well as with photographs of persons who

subjects of Identification Orders prepared on badly wanted

fugitives in WOCORK.

It is requested,

therefore, that you

continue this service if it does

not cause problems or unusual

costs to your office." While this project may be of some value

to LNERGO, it is of little value, as presently constituted,

the Station. There are other, and cheaper, means of obtaining

photographs of PCS and TDY personnel.

No identification or

operational

use is made of the photographs of the unidentified

subjects - at least by JKLANCE - and

no operational use is made

of the timetable.

For instance, license plate numbers are not

now traced as either a possible means of identification,

leads to CI or recruitment targets.

A previous effort

timetable for possible patterns of activity was

and has not been repeated.

Only in selected

instances do we try to correlate the information received from

KDBADGER coverage of the Embassy and that provided by

KDAFGHANS.

But generally this has not been successful, since

most often people with previous appointments are going

Consulate

(which we do not cover with KDAFGHAN),

unidentified people arrive around the same time at the gate,

precluding a positive identification.

While, the above evaluation

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awa

may read more like a project termination request than a progress

report, the Station does believe

project could be

productive if not extremely valuable.

to both JKLANCE and LNERGO

if faces could be related to names and other operational leads

inherent in the KDAFGHAN production were abstracted and followed

out:

Our plans to do so are outlined below.

PLANS: Technical quality needs to be improved.

present enlargements are only poor to fair in quality.

This is

due to the lens now

in use,

which only has an effective aperture

of f-22.

The Station WOACRE officer will soon initiate corre-

spondence to obtain a better lens which will not only result in

higher quality photos,

extended coverage in conditions of

darkness or twilight by increasing the light-gathering capability

of the camera.

A camera with a behind the lens

light meter will

be used from now on to prevent underexposures

conditions.

The present enlarger lens has a fungus growth which

lowers photographic quality. This will be repaired or replaced.

Since the move to this OP, a street sign in the line

of sight to the target area obstructs or spoils

over. half of the

photographs.

This prevents the Station from using the photo-

graphs with

agent personnel or contacts who might be able to

identify the subject of the photograph.

For, unless heavily

sterilized, it provides a very easy

means of identifying where

the photograph was taken, and conceivably, by using a theodilite,.

determining the exact location of the OP.

liaison, to remove this obstruction has been initiated.

An operation, throug

Identification of PCS personnel, out-bound TDY and in-

passengers can easily be raised to. near one-hundred

percent.

The Station will arrange for our current KDGLACIER

passport coverage

to be passed on a routine basis to KDAFGHAN

and, using these,

he should be able to identify all of the

that fall in the above category.

will also be

instructed to start a photo file on all TDY and

personnel and, as he builds this base up, he should be able to

and more of the in-bound

in-transit personnel.

Consideration is also being given to have him develop and process

these passport photos for both himself and the station.

would not only speed up identification of these subjects - and

the exploitation of possible ops leads - but relieve

the Station

Technician and Support Section of some of their work load.

12. The exploitation of potential operational leads through

the compilation

of data on license plates, servicemen, known

visitors and arrival and departure

times,

has previously been

tried by the Station on a sporadic basis

with no success.

is primarily due to the fact that the workload involved on

Station personnel has prevented a continuing effort.

KDAFGHAN-I and 2 are underworked (and would probably welcome

some change in their incredibly boring routine),

this job will

be given to them.

They will be required to submit monthly

reports on:

a .

All vehicles that call at the compound (frequency

figures).

b. All service calls:

c.

All Visitors and or servicemen who get inside the

compound.

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MALALA

JOINT

d. All visitors and or servicemen

who get inside the

gate.

e .

Compiled statistics on the arrival and departure

time (and method) of each known or suspect intelli-

gence officer.

This should considerably improve the Station's ability to exploit

any leads that might arise.

The one problem

area remaining, and the one where we

to strike the most

"pay-dirt" is

that of

identifying the

photographs of non-Cuban personnel who visit the Embassy or the

Consulate.

While,

true, we are unlikely to identify any DGI

personnel or illegals, we would be most likely to obtain

identification of subversives traveling to Cuba and on local.

sympathizers or contacts who could possibly serve as access

Linking unknown faces

can only be done by

technical means.

target situation and our proposed means

of attack are given below.

Since the arrival of the new DGI Chief of Center and

and Consulate has tightened drastically.

been placed on

but one of

the windows in the area suspected

of being the DGI center. • Not even a crack of light now shows

from these windows at night.

The entire compound and the sur-

rounding wall have been floodlighted.

In KDAFGHAN's words,

shadows in the place now are during the daytime":

former open grill gate to the automobile entrance has

been re-

placed by

an electrically operated solid metal

Passerbys can no. longer look into the

KDAFGHAN can no longer observe the latter:

The door into

gatehouse, which is

in the outer wall alongside the automobile

entrance,

has been changed to a heavy metal door with a one-way

mirror for observation.

No vehicles except those belonging to

the Embassy are now allowed inside. All delivery trucks must

park outside and carry their items

A completely. new,

and unknown,

telephone system has been

Access control

is now rigorous.

When a visitor now calls at the Embassy

must ring the doorbell, wait for the door to be opened slightly,

and, if he is not recognized, announce his name and business.

door is then shut in his

face, the gatekeeper calls the

person he wants to see and the person is then either let in or

If let in he no longer is allowed into the

compound - with some lew rare

exceptions

"but is

led into the

Former gatehouse which has just been converted

into a reception

The person he came

- to see comes

to the receptiön area

and interviews him there.

Very rarely is the visitor let into

the compound.

If the visitor calls at the Consulate he may

freely enter

that one room on the ground floor, but is allowed

Usually the secretary

handles all requests.

times a visitor

the Consulate who requires

interview with

one of the consuls. is

taken or sent to

the Embassy entrance

and interviewed in that area.

Our chances of implanting an

device inside the embassy,

the Consulate,

or the gatehouse with

current assets and under these conditions is nill:

There are seven telephone lines into the Cuban

compound.. Five of

these go directly to

the Ambassador's

office,

the Cultural Office, the Press Office, the Commercial Office

and the Consulate.

As far as we know, the DGI center has no

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wo hot-mile possible

Two lines go to a switchboard of unknown capacity

in the gatehouse/reception room.

These lines receive an average

of two thousand calls each

per month.

the take,

times,

in reading

we note that a person will call and say that he is

coming by

at a certain time - or he will be called and told to

If KDAFGHAN could corelate these calls

with the photographs he takes he could make many identifications

which, in turn, could be exploited by other Station assets,

KDGLACIER, or

LNERGO. Even of more assistance would be the

miking" of these lines.

That way we could

not only identify

caller to

the Consulate or gatehouse, but also who the gatekeeper

calls inside to announce the visitor.

In addition, we would also

gatehouse

i...

pick up quite a bit of conversation of interest, for the

seems to be a favorite hangout in the Embassy for DGI

personnel.

KDAFGHANS 1 and 2, being

experienced LP operators,

could easily handle the take.

could also handle the

KDAFGHAN-1, being fluent in English:

English language portions of any take

which in view of the number of English-speaking visitors would

probably be considerable.

16. Therefore, we request that we be advised what technical

information is necessary for WOACRE to determine

the feasibility

of a hot mike installation into the gatehouse and Consulate

(assuming no access to the instruments) serviced by an LP located

in the current KDÄFGHAN OP.

In the meantime, we will investigate

the possibility of tapping one of the gatehouse telephones

currently monitored by KDBADGER and running it into the KDAFGHAN

Op where it will not only be transcribed but live monitored.

PRODUCTION:

Production figures for this period were

normal.

KDAFGHAN provided an average of 600 contact prints and

150

enlargements per month. No new identifications were made.

ADMINISTRATIVE:

There were no changes in costs or

personnel during this period.

19. SECURITY:

There were no security incidents during this

To improve security, meetings have been reduced

average of one every two weeks.

Use of the safehouse is

to a minimum and

wherever possible meetings are by

car pickup.

While KDAFGHAN-l's cover for his darkroom

it is supposedly

his hobby, there is not one photograph or camera visible anywhere

in his house. He has been instructed to correct this deficiency.

#lidaritio

Jesse R. GARDALPHE

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