CR 105-379908-75, CR 105-379908-76
Originator: FBI
From: DIRECTOR, FBI
To: STUKEY, D. E. II, DIRECTOR, CIA
Document date: 1/3/90 00:00
Document type: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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File #:

/ 105- 379908

Serial Scope:

75, TL

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SECRET

I: -SCD SUSPICIONS CONCERNING IVAN YEFREMOV

-IVan YEFREMOV, was one of the most prestigious and

talented Russian science fiction writers. He was also a Soviet

scientist and paleontologist.

Nearly every Russian home has al

book written by YEFREMOV.

The source heard a bizarre story, about tarREMov Irom

.. at least two different sources:

not cite seen attry Department of the KeB's

Second Chief Directorate (SCD); and his instructors from the

Minsk Higher Counterintelligence School. The story is as

follows.

Shortly after YEFREMOV's death in the 1980s, a man

went

to SCD Headquarters and asked for a meeting with KGB British

specialists.

The man claimed that he had been recruited by

YEFREMOV to

work for British intelligence against the USSR.

The source does not know whether the information' was

valid or not.

After some investigation, however, the SCD

The SCD believed that he

"may have been handling a network of Soviet agents.

started to review his travels within the USSR and

determined

that his trips were always to closed areas of the country....

The source could not recall any additional details on

this case.

REFERENCE:

1. January 11, 1990, Debriefing. Tape #1B. Counter $427-458.

USSK

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SECRES

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The KGB believes that PENKOVSKIY's disclosures:

he most damaging tent information he their to tons were

Americans and

British.

As a result of his disclosures, the

Soviets were forced to destroy all equipment in the silos and

fill them with water.

The technical equipment and auxillary

material were so heavy that the Soviets simply left them behind

and buried them.

Ivan MARKELOV was one of the original SCD case officers

in the PENKOVSKIY investigation. He received an order of the

Red Star for this operation.

Everybody was promoted for working

on the case.

MARKELOV eventually replaced Gregoriy GRIGORENKO as

Chief of the SCD in the early 1980s.

PENKOVSKIY was, of course, executed by firing squad for

his treason.

sefore he was executed, he admitted that he hao

made many mistakes.

He asked for leniency in the form of a

prison sentence, but to no avail.

PENKOVSKIY was quite brave

during the entire judicial proceedings. Mr. WYNN, however; was

not so brave, and he frequently cried.

The SCD knew that Mr.

WYNN was not

a british intelligence officer, but was acting as a

co-optee 'to handle PENKOVSKIY.

=

The source learned most of the above information from

his review of the file, although STEKLOV told him some things

about the operation, including the location of the dead drop :

under the radiator.

REFERENCES:

1.

January 12,

1990,

Debriefing.

Tape #1A.

Counter #392-525.

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SECRET

OLEG

PENKOVSKIY \CAS

when the source first joined the Second (British and

Commonwealth) Department of the KGB's Second Chief Directorate

(SCD) in 1982, he was allowed to read the original SCD files of

the PENKOVSKIY case.

The Second Department was directly

responsible for investigating PENKOVSKIY, and they encourage new

case officers to read. the file to enhance their knowledge and

expertise.

The source was required to get the permission of the

Chief of the Second Department (at that time Nikolai STEKLOV) to

review the file.

The PENKOVSKIY file consists of twelve or more thick

volumes.

Much of the file consists of rather tedious technical

and physical surveillance reports on PENKOVSKIY.

PENKOVSKIY first came under suspicion in 1960 during a

period of time when the SCD decided to place total surveillance

on all British Embassy personnel and their families.

The file

did not indicate why the SCD made this decision, and the source

does not know the reason. According to the source, there was

nothing in the file to suggest that information about PENKOVSKIY

had leaked to the KGB, thereby prompting the SCD to initiate full

-surveillance of all British nationals in the Embassy.

The full surveillance of British Embassy personnel

lasted for several days.

Finally, one of the surveillance teams

observed the wife of a British diplomat, who was not an

intelligence officer, coming out of the

entrance of a shabby

Russian building.

It appeared strange to the surveillance team,.

particularly because she was pregnant.. They continued to watch

the building: A few minutes later, a man emerged from the house.

The KGB followed him with five or

six men in two cars.

They followed the man to an office building of the

State Committee for Science and Iechnology (GKNT). His entry

into this office building fueled their suspicions.

They

subsequently identified the man as oleg PENKOVSKIY.

The SCD then thoroughly checked the entrance of the

shabby Russian house and discovered a likely dead drop under a

radiator. Investigation of PENKOVSKIY rapidly escalated.

The scd and keB surveillance used a camera to illn

PENKOVSKIY's movements and activities. They observed that he

acted in a very suspicious manner.

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The SCD also eguipped his living areas with cameras.

The source does not know what types of cameras, but he was

certain they were primitive at that time.

on one occasion,

they observed him photographing or

making a picture of an artillery guidance system. At that point,

at they he to interce

the scD realized that they had to intercede, and he was arrested.

The SCD had some thoughts about using him in a controlled double

agent manner to entrap British or American intelligence

personnel, but it was thought to be too risky in this case.

his review of the file, the source estimated that the entire

investigation took about 6-8 months.

After his arrest, PENKOVSKIY immediately informed the

SCD of his contacts with Greville WYNNE and how he was handled by

the CIA and British intelligence.

He told the SCD that he first

went to British intelligence, but they didn't believe him and

thought he was a provocation.

He then went to the Americans who

accepted him. Later, the British also jointed the operation.

During one of his foreign trips, the British made him an

"honorary" Army Colonel and gave him his choice of uniforms. The

I. SCD did not find any espionage paraphernalia at PENKOVSKIY's

workplace, probably because he was too experienced to make that

mistake.

KeB security officials in the first Chief Directorate

(FCD) had previously noted that

PenKovSklY exhibited behavior of

possible security concern (e.g.; too many girls and too much

money), particularly during his tour in Turkey. The KGB's Third

Chief

Directorate, which was normally responsible for the

investigations of

GRu officers who are suspected of treason,

never seriously suspected PENKOVSKIY, however.

PENKOVSKIY had

Following his arrest, PENKOVSKIY fully disclosed the

extent of information he had passed to the Americans and British.

He admitted passing vital information on the Soviet Union's

strategic nuclear weapons and air defense systems.

He also

admitted passing information on GRU operations.

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The KGB believes that PENKOVSKIY's disclosures:

"regarding nuclear missile silo shafts and their locations were

the most damaging items of information he passed to the

=

Americans and British. As a result of his disclosures, the

Soviets were forced to destroy all equipment in the silos and

fill them with water.

The technical equipment and auxillary

material were so heavy that the Soviets simply left them behind

and buried them.

Ivan MARKELOY, was one of the original SCD case officers

in the PENKOVSRIX investigation.

He received an Order of the

Red Star for this operation.

Everybody was promoted for-working

on the case.

MARKELOV eventually replaced Gregoriy GRIGORENKO as

chief of the SCD in the early 1980s.

PENKOVSKIY was, of course, executed by firing squad for

his treason.

• Before he

was executed, he admitted that he had

made many mistakes.

He asked for leniency in the form of a

prison sentence, but to no avail.

PENKOVSKIY was quite brave

during the entire judicial proceedings. Mr. WYNN, however; was

not so brave, and he frequently cried.

The SCD knew that Mr.

WYNN waS

not

a british intelligence officer, but was acting as a

co-optee

'to hanale PENKOVSKIY.

=

The source learned most of the above information from

his review of the file, although STEKLOV told him some things

about the operation, including the location of the dead drop:

under the radiator.

REFERENCES:

1. January 12, 1990, Debriefing.

Tape #1A.

Counter #392-525.

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SECRET

EKGB PENETRATION OF MI-5

==

Even before the publication of Peter Wright's book,

" the source heard that the KGB previously had a

mole in the high circles of British counterintelligence fi.e.,

MI-5) •

The source heard about this KGB success

from four

separate sources.

First, the source heard about this success from his

instuctors in the Minsk Higher Counterintelligence School in

These instructors were all retired intelligence and

counterintelligence officers.

Some of them dealt very closely

with the British intelligence target. The only instructor the

responsible for the flood of illegals from Fast Berlin into west

Berlin.

The source did not believe these instructors at first.

He assumed they were exaggerating such accomplishments for their

own aggrandizement.

Subsequently, however, the source had a conversation

with his boss Nikolai STEKLOV,

then chief of the Second (British

and Commonwealth) Department of the KGB's Second Chief

Directorate.

STEKLOV told the source that the KGB did have -a

very good success in MI-5 at a certain perioa.

The conversation with SIEKLOV took place in the early

19805, perhaps 1983. During this conversation, STEKLOV was

recalling old cases and a personal meeting he once had with

British defector Kim PHILBY.

STEKLOV told the source,

you know, there was a third

man they couldn't detect.

It was a

guy who passed all information he could and was as reliable as

PHILBY. "

According to STEKLOV's account, the man was still in

place after PHILBY's defection, and he continued to provide

reliable information to the KGB. PHILBY's defection did not

interfere in the case..

wish

Aleksey Victorovich KOZLOV was a third source who told

the source about this previous penetration of MI-5. KOZLOV was a

long-time KGB officer who served in Britain during the 1950s as a

member of the KGB residency's counterintelligence branch. KOZLOV

had started his KGB career in 1945, right after the war. He

retired from the KGB in 1986.

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:

KOZLOV, of course, knew many important KGB operations,

and he told many anecdotes.

once, in the early or mid-1980s, he

-=_

said to the source

"Do you know what we did in the 1950s?

We

had a very, very high man in British counterintelligence." The

source asked KOZLOV who it was. KOZLOV said that it was either

the chief or one of his deputies.

More recently, following the publication of "Spy

Catcher," the

source heard about this previous penetration

of MI-

5 from Nikolai ZHUKOV, a Directorate K Officer who was stationed

in Britain in the mid-1980s, and may have been expelled.

ZHUKOV

is the KGB First Chief Directorate (FCD) counterpart of

the

officers in the Second Department, SCD. He is responsible for

the Russian Colony in Britain and

for all cypher reports from the

KGB residency in London. He is a frequent visitor to SCD

Headquarters.

During a conversation between ZHUKOV and Second

+ .

Department case officers (including the source) on such cases as

EMERSON and PATTERSON (see previous reports on these cases),

ZHUKOV boasted that these cases were not so significant. A

: discussion then ensued about "the boys in blue," the SCD slạng

_term for M1-5.

According to ZHUKOV, the KGB had a very high

penetration of MI-5 in the past.

In all four cases mentioned above, the subsources

not tell our source the name of the MI-5 penetration.

The source

is not certain whether it was Roger HOLLIS, former chief of MI-5, •

Based on the above accounts, however,

the source is certain it was a man in the top circles of MI-5.

le is also certain that his suosources were not referring t

BURGESS, MACLEAN, Or BLUNT. None of his subsources mentioned the

name of the KGB case officer who handled the MI-5 penetration or

how the penetration was handled.

DEBRIEFER'S COMMENTS:

Needless to say, we will continue to debrief the source

on his knowledge of the above matter with the hope of acquiring

any additional information he may possess.

SECRET

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IF REFERENCES:

=

1. January 11, 1990, Debriefing. Tape #1B. Counter #356-426.

and 753412, 1990, Debriefing. Tape #IA.

Counter #550-560

-

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SECRET

SCD PHYSICAL ENTRIES INTO THE IRISH EMBASSY IN THE USSR

SCD staff officers conduct successful physical entries

into the Irish Embassy in Moscow.

the SCD has acquired some sensitive political documents.

base for this operation is the Soviet militia station opposite

the Irish Embassy in the suburbs of Moscow.

• to end ore, the subur a

As a result of these entries,

The

The source knows about this operation because he was

brought to the operational base to review documents which were

acquired from the operation. He was selected for this assignment

because of his English language and translation skills.

The KGB codename for this operation is W'LITTLE

WEDDING."

The source could not recall any additional information

on this operation.

He believes it is still ongoing, but does not

know how long the entries have been taking place.

He does not

know how the SCD officers in this operation bypass the locks,

security alarms, and guards at the Irish Embassy to make the

physical entries.

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SECrET

SCD TECHNICAL PENETRATION OF U.S. EMBASSY

The source previously reported on SCD operations

against U.S. Marine Guards in Moscow (see debriefing document

..- prepared by the CI-IC Unit).

In the earlier debriefings, the

source reported that the Marine Guards took a Second Chief

Directorate (SCD) female Russian agent by the name of Raisa into

secure areas of the U.S.

Embassy to engage in sexual intercourse.

The source said that the SCd was unsuccessful, however, in

gaining physical access by KGB staff officers or placing any

technical devices in the secure areas.

The source also said that

the SCD was unable to remove documents from the Embassy.

In our most recent debriefings on December 27-28, 1989,

the source modified the above statements to some extent.

reports

that the SCD female agent was able to place an audio

device in a secure area of the U.S. Embassy and later remove it

during those times when the Marines took them into the secure

area for sexual intercourse.

The source learned about this success from Aleksey

YEGOROV, an SCD officer

in the First (American) Department, seD,

-who

directed the operation to recruit the Marine Guards, and from

some of his other colleagues in the First Department.

Based on

these coversations, the source believes the SCD acquired some

useful information

from the audio devices, although he could not

provide any specifics.

The source does not know what type of audio devices

were used or where they were placed.

We repeatedly questioned

him for more specific information on which secure areas in the

Embassy were penetrated, but he only repeated "the closed areas,

the referentura. "

We do not believe he knows any additional

the operation need location(s) of the penetration(s) of on .

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SECRET

SCD TECHNICAL PENETRATION OF BRITISH EMBASSY

The Second (Britain and Commonwealth) Department of the

KGB's Second Chief Directorate (SCD) in conjunction with the

• = Fifteenth (Intrusive Measures) Department of the SCD operates a

successful technical penetration of the Left Annex (facing the .

front) of the British Embassy in Moscow. Through this technical

operation, the SCD acquires all of the conversations between

British Military Attaches.

The British Military Attaches treat

this area as a "referentüra" and believe their conversations are

safe.

They are however, seriously mistaken.

The KGB codename for placing audio devices

in foreign

embassies and housing

areas in the USSR iSLATATYANA."

The source

referred to this particular SSD operation to penetrate the Left

Annex of the British Embassy as ESPECIAL TATYANA."

Through this operation, the SCD has acquired some

useful information on the main targets and interests of the

British Military Attaches in the USSR, as well as some of their

techniques or methods of operation.

In adaition.

the SCD has

acquired useful assessment information on the British Military

Attaches and other British nationals in the Embassy.

This operation has been conducted for at least the past •

ten years:

The SCD becomes extremely

concerned

when special

British technical sweep teams and engineers arrive to inspect the

Embassy. The

source believes the British send these teams to

MOSCOW

approximately every other month and the inspections last

from two to four weeks.

a cover oathe senon

Because of their concern that this

operation will be uncovered, the Second. Department, SCD, in

concert with the Seventh (Surveillance) Directorate, follow the

members of these inspection teams no matter where they go in

Moscow or the USSR.

a

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SECRET

12/1/89

FLASH RUN

This entire communication is classified "SECRET".

The results of NK I-l's 12/1/89 debriefing are as

follows:

I.

VIKTOR IVANOVICH PAPUSHIN

W3R

VIKTOR IVANOVICH PAPUSHIN, bOrn 2/25/59 in MOSCOW,

USSR,

was until his retirement a line X KGB officer.

graduate of the Baumanskiy High Technical School (Uchilishche) in

MOSCOW.

His specialty was electronics and radar equipment.

1959 he joined the Ministry of Foreign Trade and attended

the Academy of

Foreign Trade of the USSR for three years. After

that he attended School 101 of the KGB First Chief Directorate

(FCD) at Yurlova.

He kept his cover job with the Ministry of

Foreign Trade but became an operative in Directorate I.

In 1966 PAPUSHIN was assigned to Great Britain where he

served as a Senior Engineer with the Soviet Trade Mission at

Highgate Westhill 32, London.

In 1969 he and his family were

-expelled from the United Kingdom because, the source believes,

PAPUSHIN was too active in intelligence gathering among the

research establishments in Cornwall.

In addition, he was

involved in a operation with line iR in which they kidnapped the

daughter of a member of a visiting Soviet trade delegation when

she tried to request political asylum in the U. K.

From Great

Britain, PAPUSHIN was assigned to FCD headquarters in Moscow.

In approximately 1975 PAPUSHIN was assigned to Japan as

an Advisor to the Soviet Trade Mission. He was in Japan three

years and served as the Deputy Resident for line X, a colonel's

After returning to the USSR in 1978 he was appointed chief

SE the 5th Department, Directorate I, FCD, which was responsible

for scientific and technical intelligence

about China, Japan,

Malaysia, India, etc.

In 1984 PAPUSHIN was assigned as First Deputy Trade

Representative in Sofia, Bulgaria. His intelligence mission was

SECRET

Classified by: G-3

Declassify on: OADR

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Flash Run

*Sto maintain liaison with the Bulgarian Intelligence Service and

to asses western businessmen.

DatalyA Vianurovna

At present PAPUSHIN is suffering from Cardiac

He is described by the source as a good chekist

He is married to NATALYA VIANOROVNA

PAPUSHINA, nee&CHERNENKO, (no relation to General Secretary

CHERNENKO) ,

born 3/14/32/at Moscow.

She is a dentist who has

worked at the special kremlin cliniC femlevka). They have only

one child.

II. ALEKSANDR ALEKSANDROVICH

BENIAMINOV

ALEKSANDR ALEKSANDROVICH BENIAMINOV was born in 1932 at

vladivostok.

He is a graduate of the Moscow Institute of Nuclear

Physics. After graduation he joined the KGB and attended the

FCD's School 101.

After graduation he was assigned to

Directorate I of the FCD.

BENIAMINOV served the Soviet Embassy in London in the

late 1950's and again in the mid 1960's.

In Vienna in the mid

1970's he served for three to four years with the United Nations

-International Nuclear Agency.

While in Vienna he became

embroiled in a feud with the KGB resident (FNU.)

TROFIMOV was hated by all his subordinates and was Jealous.or

BENIAMINOV for having a higher salary at the u. N. TROFIMOV had

good contacts in Moscow, so after BENIAMINOV was transferred back

home he was given an unappealing job as an analyst in the Fourth

Department of Directorate T, FCD.

BENIAMINOV's troubles

continued with TROFIMOV, who had since returned to Moscow and

became number two in Directorate I, and in the early 1980's found

himself kicked out of the FCD and assigned as an instructor at

the Red Banner Institute (Krasnoznamenyy Institut - KI),

formerly School 101.

In the mid 1980's BENIAMINOV began suffering mental

deterioration and retired.

He has since gotten worse.

His

family is very bitter about his treatment in the KGB and the lack

,of good medical care.

He is married to NINA NIKOLAEVNA

BENIAMINOVA, nee DENSHCHIKOVA, born 1932-at Ryazana

nina nikolaerna

LOSE

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Flash Run

--

' .

•III. Uncovered CIA Agent

Source has heard that the Communist Party boss at the

Red Banner Institute was discovered to be an agent for the CIA

four or five years ago. This is all he knows.

IV. KGB Relations with Other Socialist Intelligence Services

The Twentieth Department of the FCD handles liaison

with third world socialist intelligence services. The Eleventh

Department of the FCD handles liaison with eastern european

intelligence services.

In the Second Chief Directorate the

Twentieth Department handles liaison with all socialist

intelligence services.

In recent years the KGB's relations with other Soviet-

Bloc intelligence agencies have deteriorated.

Whereas before the

KGB exerted defacto control over these services, now relations

and cooperation between them and the KGB depends on the personal

relationships between the respective officials.

Now when a KGB

officer enters, for example, the Polish SB's office, the working

"apers are covered up.

In the Polish SB there has been a purge of hard line

communists, and only people more sympathetic to reform remain.

officers from the Romanian and North' Korean services are treated

as enemies when they are in the Soviet Union and surveilled.

VA Directorates Clothing Shop

Directorate S maintains a clothing shop in which it

keeps up to date western clothes for use by its illegals.

operatives from the SCD involved in false flag operations,

including the source and First Department operative ALEKSEY

EGOROV, also use it.

It used to be located on Olimpiskiy

Prospekt, but now it is on Leninskiy Prospekt in a famous house

with statues of muscular farmers in front of it. The door to the

shop, the third one, is obvious as a

standard KGB door to any one

experienced with them.

Its outside is made of vertical thin

wooden slats and there is a peephole at eye level.

KGB officers

in western countries regularly buy the latest clothes in all

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Flash Run

-sizes in order to stock the shop.

VI.

Foreign Students

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100)

• SECRET

U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

In_ Reply, Please Refer to

= FileNo.

NEWARK, NEW JERSEY

December 18, 1989

KGB SCHOOLS

This entire communication is classified "SECRET".

WARNING: THIS INFORMATION IS DERIVED FROM A SOURCE OF

EXTREME SENSITIVITY. DISCLOSURE OF THE INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN MAY REASONABLY BE EXPECTED TO LEAD TO DISCLOSURE OF THE

SOURCE'S IDENTITY, AND TO THE LOSS OF THE SOURCE.

WARNING: THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS PROVIDED

FOR LEAD PURPOSES ONLY. IT'S ORIGIN MUST BE SUITABLY DISGUISED

TO PROTECT THE SOURCE.

WARNING: NO FURTHER DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION

MAY BE MADE WITHOUT FBIHQ AUTHORITY.

=

On December 12, 1989 NK T-I, a source with whom there

has been limited contact,

but who is in a position to know the

type of information which follows, and who is believed to be

reliable, provided the following information to the Federal

Bureau of Investigation (FBI) concerning the KGB training

apparatus:

Dzerzhinskiy KGB Higher School, Moscow USsk

The Moscow school is at two locations - on

Leningradskiy Prospekt across from the Moscow Watch Factory, and

near the Olympic Village. Except for the two-year course in the

SECRET

Classified by: G-3

Declassify on: OADR

This document contains neither the recommendations nor

conclusions of the FBI.

It is the property of the FBI and is

loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be

distributed outside your agency.

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=-==

Eighth faculty, it is as four-year institution. Its faculties

are:

First -

Military (for officers for the Third Chief

Directorate)

Second

Third

Fourth

European languages

-

Asian and African languages

Technical (for officers for the Eighth,

Sixteenth, and Operational-Technical

Directorates)

Fifth

Unknown

Sixth

Unknown

Seventh -

unknown

Eighth - Two-year short course

The instructors at the Moscow school are for the most

part retires KGB officers. The language instructors are women

from various institutes.

They are prime marriage candidates for

the cadets because they are Moscow residents. •

For the first six months the cadets learn basic

military subjects.

After that they learn "special disciplines",

SDS.

SD-1 is intelligence, SD-5 is internal security/

dissident work; SD-6 is counterintelligence, SD-7 is

surveillance, and other sd's"include photography, KGB paperwork,

dealing with

criminals, national psychology of foreign nations,

counter-paratroop operations, legal topics, and others, for a

total of twelve SD's.

In the legal SD the cadets are told what

measures they can take on

their own and which they need

authority from their superiors for (which is most everything,

including wire tapping, recruitment pitches, and interrogations.)

and in saint to the at he pave a.

Directorate (FCD).

KGB Hicher School, Minsk UJSK

This information is valid for 1982, when the source

attended the school.

The KGB Higher School in Minsk accepts basic KGB

recruits who already have a mastery of a foreign language and

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SECRET

have graduated received a degree in a humanities discipline from

a university or college.

It also accepts trainees for the

--republican or territorial KGBs. Its course of study lasts for

- "one year.

=

The Minsk school is located on Vayskavyy Proeza near

Victory Square.

It was founded in Gomel in 1945 or 1946 to trair

NKVD agents to fight national resistance movements in the USSR.

It is a three or four story building with dark grey walls inside.

The cadets sleep four or five to a room.

When a new recruit arrives.at the KGB Higher School in

Minsk, he is given a thorough medical and psychological exam.

he must answer a questionnaire about himself, and say why he

wants to join the KGB. After this is done, the new cadet is

issued an Soviet Army

' officer's field uniform.

University

graduates and those with formal military training are lieutenants

(two stars)., and cadets without this

are sergeants. All civilian

clothing except for a jogging suit are taken away.

For the first month the cadets are under strict

discipline and cannot leave the school grounds.

They are given

basic military training: they are taught to shoot, march, fight

hand-to-hand,

After the first month they may leave the post

for a few hours at a time and go into town. They are also fitted

with Army causal dress uniforms. In 1982 the cadets all wore

signal corps insignia, making it easy for the locals to identify

Now, with the

worsening reputation of the KGB, the cadets

allowed to wear the insignia of any military branch.

In 1982 the cadet corps was divided into 30-man squads

with five sguads making up a "course" or platoon. Four courses

were at the school at any one time: two started

every six months.

Currently the source believes that there are only fifteen men in

each squads.

Each course has a cadet commander, an assistant

commander,

and a cipher clerk for control of secret documents.

Each course also has a chief instructor or "papa" who is a senior

KGB officer,

usually from the Border Guards.

The training week at the school runs for six days.

The

training day starts at 7 AM with a wake up by the papa. This is

done in traditional military style with lots of shouting and

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-

banging. Then the cadets go for a six kilometer run around the

school.

Then come physical exercises.

At 8:30 AM breakfast is served. It often consists of

fish, rice, and weak tea.

At 9:00 lecture/seminars begin, and last until 1 PM.

This training is divided up into the same special disciplines as

at the Moscow

school.

At 1 PM lunch is served, then there is a break of two

hours.

From 2 PM to 7 PM is self study time.

are held.

Supper is at 7 PM and usually consists of fish anc

rice.

From 8 PM until lights out at 10:30 is free time.

A lot of training time at the Minsk school is taken up

with military subjects such as rifle shooting, map reading, etc.

This school is more military oriented than the Moscow school.

Minsk school graduates are made KGB Senior Lieutenants.

When cadets enter the KGB, they have to sign a paper

saying that they will accept assignment anywhere in the USSR.

However, cadets from Moscow and Leningrad usually are returned to

those areas.

In the source's squad, twenty-five men

assigned to

the Second Chief Directorate (SCD), and five to the

FCD.

Those five all had "hooks" or connections that enabled them

to secure those desirable jobs.

USSR

Andropor Red Banner Institute (KI)

This institute is run by the FCD and is located at

furlova, in the northern region. of Moscow.

The course of study

is one to three years, depending on prior education/experience.

Cadets come from the best Soviet universities and institutes,

such as the International Relations Institute

(MGIMO) , the

Oriental Studies Institute, the Military Foreign Languages

Institute, the Máurice Thorez Institute for Foreign Languages,

Most of the students have "hooks" or influence.

KI cadets receive the same SDs as at the Dzerzhinskiy

school above.

They also receive parachute jump training

at the

airborne division in Pskov. Most of the instructors are

FCD officers; approximately five percent are former SCD

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instructors.

Surveillance, which is emphasized at KI, is taught at

TI=-the Seventh Directorate's surveillance school in Leningrad.

Newly assigned FCD officers with prior intelligence

skill, from the SCD for example, receive an abbreviated

six-month

course at the FCD headguarters.

surveillance School," Leningrad UR

Surveillants and FCD officers learn their surveillance

skills at this school. The instructors are senior Seventh

Directorate officers.

KGB Higher School, Wovosibirsk WJK

Ihis school has a one or two-year course, of study. It

teaches military counterintelligence to military officers who

wish to enter the Third Chief Directorate.

After graduation the

officers go to units, unless they have hooks and can get an

assignment to Moscow.

1.

KGB Hiaher School, Alma Ata

Provides basic KGB instruction for the locai KGB.

KGB Hicher School, Kiev ISJR

Provides basic KGB instruction for the Ukrainian KGB.

MOscow/KGB Retraining course

Ulocated on Kiselnyy Pereulok, this course is given to

students who already have several years with

the KGB. Lessons

are taught in the evening.

In addition, some KGB personnel whe

were assigned to Afghanistan received special training ir

conditions particular to that country.

Prospective department

heads receive managerial training here.

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KGB Spetsnaz School, Balashikha LUJK

This school provides commando-type training to KGB

- Spetsnaz troops.

There is also a course here for regular KGB

officers who are in a type of Spetsnaz reserve.

It lasts for two

co lour weeks and in repeated annually.

KGB Higher School for communications. orel USR

This school provides four years of instruction for

troops of the KGB Government Communications Directorate (UPS) •

Some graduates go to the Sixteenth Directorate.

School for "Friends"

This school is for students from other socialist

countries' security services. It is located at Shablovka in

Moscow near the old IV tower.

The number two officer.at this school is GEORGY

ALEKSANDROVICHARINKO, who was once expelled from Britain.

UssK

SECRET

6*

..

it

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SEGRET

1002

U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to

Eile No.

-i=

NEWARK, NEW JERSEY

December 18, 1989

:=

:

LIKGB ACTING RESERVE OFFICERS

This entire communication is classified "SECRET".

WARNING: THIS INFORMATION IS DERIVED FROM A SOURCE OF

EXTREME SENSITIVITY.

DISCLOSURE OF THE INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN MAY REASONABLY BE EXPECTED TO LEAD TO DISCLOSURE OF THE

SOURCE'S IDENTITY, AND TO THE LOSS OF THE SOURCE.

WARNING: THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS PROVIDED

FOR LEAD PURPOSES ONLY. IT'S ORIGIN MUST BE SUITABLY DISGUISED

TO PROTECT THE SOURCE.

WARNING: NO FURTHER DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION

MAY BE MADE WITHOUT FBIHO AUTHORITY:

=

On December 12, 1989 NK I-I, a source with whom there

has been limited contact, but who is in a position to know the

type of information which follows, and who is believed to be

reliable, advised the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI): Of

the following information:

• posts in various ministries and institutions. These officers

patel var tha

The position of acting reserve KGB officer is a

It is held. by KGB case officers who occupy

are still in the employ of the KGB, but their offices are at the

ministries, not at the KGB office.

are:

Some examples of these posts

SECREE

Classified by: G-3

Declassify on: OADR

This document contains neither the recommendations nor

conclusions of the FBI.

It is the property of the FBI and is

loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be

distributed outside your agency.

NW 54934 DocId: 32989481 Page 25

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SECRET

Novosti Press AGency (APN)

APN is divided up into geographical departments headed

→=by editors.

The deputies in these departments are all from the

Seventh Department (Correspondents) of the KGB's Second Chief

Directorate (SCD) .

Intourist

Intourist is divided up into departments in the same

way that Novosti is.

The deputy department heads used to be

undercover KGB case officers from the Sixth Department, SCD.

Now they are more overt, calling themselves representitives of

the "security service".

These KGB officers run every guide and

translator that has dealings with foreigners.

Ministsy-ofForeion-Affairs,

Moscow State Institute of Inter-

national Relations

KGB OIfIcers from the Iwelfth Department, SCD occupy

many posts in the ministry and the institute.

They

officals serving abroad, on delegation members, and provide a kgi

presence in delegations travelling abroad.

NUnion of

Friendshio Societies (SOD

for the SOD.

The Fifth Department, SCD officially bas responsibility

The case officer

the few female KGB officers.

the First Chief Directorate

also have representatives in the sod.

SECRET

2*

4SSK

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.

EGRET

U.S. Department or Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to

?. File No.

NEWARK, NEW JERSEY

**-

December 12, 1989

SECOND CHIEF DIRECTORATE ORGANIZATION

This entire communication is classified "SECRET".

WARNING: THIS INFORMATION IS DERIVED FROM A SOURCE OF

EXTREME SENSITIVITY.

DISCLOSURE OF THE INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN MAY REASONABLY BE EXPECTED TO LEAD TO DISCLOSURE OF THE

SOURCE'S IDENTITY, AND TO THE LOSS OF THE SOURCE.

WARNING: THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS PROVIDED

FOR LEAD PURPOSES ONLY. IT'S ORIGIN MUST BE SUITABLY DISGUISED

TO PROTECI THE SOURCE.

WARNING: NO FURTHER DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION

MAY BE MADE WITHOUT FBIHQ AUTHORITY.

On December 11, 1989 NK I-I, a source with whom there

*has been limited contact, but who is in a position to know the

type of intormation which follows, and who is belleved to be

reliable, provided the following information on the Kee Secon

Chief Directorate (SCD) organization (subordinate entities are

second Chief Directorate ACRUSHKO

First Department (United States!_(sn

Second Department (UK, Canada, Ireland, Austral. , etc.)

Third Department W. Germany, Austria,

Rumania)

Ninth Department (Other European countries and Israel)

Twelfth Department (For. Min.,. Int'1 Relations Inst.)

SECRET

classified by: G-3

Declassify on: OADR

This document contains neither the recommendations no

conclusions of the FBI.

It is the property of the FBI and is

loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be

distributed outside your agency.

4

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SECRET

: Usse

=

Deputy

Fourth Department (Non-communist Asia, Middle East)

Fifth Department

(Africa)

Sixth Department

(Tourists)

Eighth Department (Latin America)

Sixteenth Department (China, N. Korea., Vietnam)

Seventh Department (Correspondents)

Tenth Department (Customs,

narcotics

traffickers)

Thirteenth' Department (Soviets travelling abroad)

eputy (G. V. PIPIYA

Directorate N (Änalysis

Deputy (Personnel) MERMAKOV)

Group 33 (also directly subordinate to SCD)

Personnel Department

Mobilization Department

Deputy (Technical) SOKOLOV)

Fifteenth Department

(Embassy Penetrations)

Liaison with Eight and Sixteenth Directorates

Secretariat

Group 25 (gifts, safe houses)

Financial Department

Duty Officers

Twenty-first Department (IsPOIS - operations center)

Typing Pool

Party Committee (ZHOGA).

Komsomol

committee

anknown subordination:

Eleventh Department (Terrorism, Pushkin Institute

Fourteenth Department (Active Measures)

Seventeenth Department*

Eighteenth Department*

Nineteenth Department*

Twentiety Desartment (blason with friendly security

Research Institute of Prognosis

SECRET

2

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*The 17th, 18th, and 19th Departments formerly made up the old

Directorate A.

Their responsibilities include: search for

== illegals, territorial KGB liaison, anti-agent communications

-"{dust, bloodhounds), families of traitors.

SECRET

3*

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