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157-10008-10150

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

*K Assassinatir n Syste

dentification Fon

Agency Inforn ation

Date:

2/23/201

AGENCY: SSCIA

RECORD NUMBER:

157-10008-10150

RECORD SERIES :

MEMORANDUM

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

Document infirmation

ORIGINATOR: SSCIA

FROM:

JOHNSON, LOCH

TO: SENIOR STAFF

TITLE: SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS RETRIEVED FROM LBJ LIBRARY

DATE: 07/21/1975

PAGES:

14

SUBJECTS :

CASTRO

COVERT ACTION AGAINST CI BA

LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENTS

DOCUMENT TYPE; PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION:

Unclassified

RESTRICTIONS

CURRENT STATUS :

DATE OF LAST REVIEW:

Redact

05/11/1994

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :

Box 393-1

-...

No. 1

MH 47129 DocId: 32203658 Page 1

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5. Memo from Chase to Bundy, 4 Decembr 1963.

Plans for a meeting regarding Cuban policy. John Crimmins will

present several options for discussion. Including unleashing of Cuban.

exiles and the intensification of the ‹overt program.

6. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 2 December 1!63.

This memo is mainly important becase it reveals who in the Admin-

Istration was dealing with Cuban polic). The list of people to attend

the meeting on Cuba held this day Inclided: Lyndon B. Johnson, Rusk,

Ed Martin, McNamara, McCone, Helms of les Fitzgerald, Don Wilson, Bundy,

and Chase.

7. Memo, Bundy to Lyndon B. Johnson, 12 December 1963.

For a press conference, Bundy recoumends the following language re-

garding Cuba:

"...say...that you expert to take every available means

to stop and turn back the spread of Conmunism in this hemisphere."

8. CIA Sumary of Costs for Cuban Opezations, FY 1960-1964, dated 15

December 1963.

This table reveals that the CIA spent §106,155,774 Jon Cuban Opera-

tions, almost 50 percent of which was spent on paramilitary action

($47,815,122). The total covert actior budget psychological and para

¿litary warfare) was approximately $81,000,000 in this four-year period

NsC

9. Chase miautes on meeting with Lyndon B. Johnson, 27 December 1963.

The meeting appears to be the first major briefing for the new Presi-

dent on Cuba. Desmond Fitzgerald did most of the briefing, which 1n-

cluded a detailed description of CIA assets in Cuba, proposed sabotage plans,

and

attempts by the CIA to stimulate an internal coup which would

dislodge Castro.

The CIA was alding two exile groups in particular:

one led by Manuel Artine, the other by lanolo Ray. Bundy recommends

that byndon B. Johnsoi

ke "a nore vigorous line /toward Cuba? than

we have in the past."r

10.

Memo, Bundy to L

& B. Johnson, 9 January 1964. . .

Bundy recoumends a Cabinet-level re/lew of the whole principle of

covert sabotage against Cuba.

He notes that Rusk and McNamara do not

support the program of sabotage, while 'McCone and the CIA are for it,

and so are nost of the middle-level offIcers dealings with the Castro

problen."

Bundy concludes:"

...In. your position, I would stop sabotage

attacks on the ground that they are 111 gal, ineffective, and damaging

to our broader policy."

NH

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action up to or including invasion."

18. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 21 April 1964.

Notes that Alexis Johnson is in charg: of contingency planning for a coup

in Cuba.

19. Meno, Chase to Bundy, 14 May 1964..

This memo suggests that a primary goal of the Johnson Administration was

"to keep the lid on Cuba" until after the November Presidential elections.

Thus, the continued exile raids were view d negatively since they increased

the noise level. The memo makes it clear that the exile raids were becoming

completely beyond U.S. control despite CLI financial support to the groups.

20. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 2 June 1964.

Chase notes that Castro has executed hree anti-Castro Cubans and jailed

two others as CIA agents. CIA admits hav.ng a connection with the executed

Cubans "but that it is completely deniabl.:."

Memo, Helms, DDP, to DCI, 10 June 1961. Subject: "Plans of Cuban

Exiles to Assassinate Selected Cuban Gove: nment Leaders'

the sources according to f so tait as toted as overmen no to noe,

under any circumstances, condone the planed actions." Apparently on 2 March

1964 a wealthy Cuban exile was approached with a Cosa Nostra offer to assassinate

the wealthy exile tired down the offer. Similar offers

were make to other Cuban exiles in early larch. A leading figure in the

negotiations was Byron Cameron, a Shippin:-businessmen from Ft. Lauderdale.

An agreement was finally made to pay the ('ameron group $100,000 for killing

castro, plus .$2,500 for expenses.

Julio lobo Olavarria, a wealthy Cuban

exile in New York was to pay much of the loney, and did pay the $2,500 on

25 AprIc Though Caner, group remainer anonymous, it was clear the Matia

was involved. Camerore

paled that his rontact was a police officer in the

St. Louis (Mo.) Vice Sq

22. Meno, Chase to Bundy, 15 June 1964. 'ubject: "Assassination of Castro."

Referring to the above memo from DDP 10 DCI, Chase notes that John

Crimmins feels the matter should be discu: sed at a Special Group meeting.

HH

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John's own inclination is that the U.S. l'overnment cannot knowingly perm

y criminal American involvement in this sort of thing, " notes Chas

1 tement in his

In marginal notations, Bundy

agrees with John and with the need to fonard the matter to the Special

Group.

23. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 16 June 1964

'A Reappraisal of Autononous Operations w.th attachment (Des FitzGerald's

FitzGerald makes a defense of the autonomous operations. Tom Mann and

Chase disapprove of the operations, thougi for different reasons.

24. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 18 June 1964.

Chase warns that further U.S. support of the autonomous groups is more

likely to lead to a U-2 shootdown and a Cribbean crisis than the overthrow

of the Castro regime.

Chase continues to be worried about noice levels

and the November election. This memo is rery much like his 14 May memo

(see Item 19).

25. Memo for the Record, Peter Jessup, 22 June 1964.

In a reference to Helm's memo on assa sination (see Item 21), it was

pointed out in a 303 Connittee meeting of 18 June that "these reports, in

effect, put the United States Government in notice that failure to take

preventive action could be construed as condonation. " The AG said Justice

would look into the matter.

26. Memo, McCone to Bundy, 19 August 1964.

McCone summarizes the FBI investigation of Cuban exile plots against

Castro as outlined in Helm's memo of 19 Jime (See Item 21). The Bureau

interviewed many

people allegedly invo ved, most of whom denied the existence

of such a plan: (The Bureau did not interv ew Cameron, since he was out of

the country). The most

discussed the matter

• wi

teresting findi ig was that Lobo had in fact

SIA.

27.. Memo, Chase to Bunn

**10 November 196l.

The election past, Chase et al. agrend that "we can usefully do some

Ley:

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basic review work on Cava." FitzGerald pushes for re-institution of CLA-

directed covert program.

Memo, R.C. Bowman to Bundy, 12 Novembr:r 1964, with JCS attachment

dated 30 October 1964. Subject: SQUARE LANCE

ban concerted in repea tered a are and at this Frage, houd

I believe this plan for covert action is even more shocking and unacceptable

than plans for assassinationg

NH 47129 Doerd: 32203658 Spage 5:

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29. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 12 November 1964, and attachment (apparently

a Bundy memo for a meeting with LBJ on i April 1964).

The Bundy memo suggests that LBJ approved various options "short of

sensee a tate to Che he he tible co that con

Fitzgerald operation was underway in November 1964 to ship contaminating

30. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 30 December 1964.

he Artime group is out of control, though State, Defense and CI

as well as Bundy) all agree that it would be unwise to try to interfer

with him at this stage.

31. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 5 January 1965.

reports a plan told to Crimmins and the CIA about an Artime plot

to stage a "palace coup" during which Castro and other top leaders would be

"neutralized.". D-Day was to be March 13. This matter was to be discussed

at an upcoming Special Group meeting on whether or not "to cut off Artime's

water."

Chase notes: "CIA at this point is loath to make a hard evaluation

of the Artime/Cubela plot."

32. Memo to 303 Committee, unsigned, 18 January 1965, presumably a CIA

Discusses the virtues of continuing Underwater Demolition Teams against

ships in Cuban harbors. If such activities are disallowed, the CIA should

be authorized to reduce its commitment i1 the paramilitary field.

33. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 8 February 1955.

This meno indicates that not even A-time had his group in control. The

meno also discusses CIA covert activities at British Gudana, such as pene-

crating the PPP and proping up the democratic trade unionism.

Memo, Murat

23 February 1965.

(INR) to Peter Jessup, White House staff,

Recomends Immediate termination of Artime support.

35.

Memo, Chase to Bundy, 2 March 1965

Discussion of who is for maintainin; a covert capability against Cuba

(presently on the shelf) and who is oppoied. Chase guessed that CIA would

be opposed ("fish or cut bait"); State wuld not.

Rusk's general attitude

toward Cuba at this time was to keep the temperature low while sorting out

the Vietnam problem.

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36. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 4 March 1965.

Chase recommends phasing out suppost to Artime. The CIA is consider-

ing diluting pesticides sent to Cuba; t'is is similar to the kinds of tactics

mentioned in Items 28 and 29 above and re a manifestation of the moral

bankruptcy of U.S. palicy. Also some tilk here of backing a new exile

group, RECE, though not much enthusiasm for the idea from anyone apparently.

Oddly, CIA wishes to drop its paramiliti ry capability, while DoD and State

want the capability maintained.

37. Memo, Grant Hilliker (State) to Burdy, 18 June 1965.

This is a summary of U.S. policy toward Cuba. The ultimate objective

is still to replace the Castro regime. The memo notes that "the paramilitary

program involving CIA controlled actions was set aside even before it really

started."

38. Memo, Bundy to LBJ, 26 June 1965.

Adm. Raborn recoumends reactivatior of a paramilitary effort against

Cuba. Bundy, Tommy Thompson, Rusk, McNauara, and Cy Vance are against this

chiefly because of the concomitant international noise level.

writes, "do not recoumend visible violent actions against Cuba." Raborn's

recommendations said nothing about assassination.

39. Memo, Rostow to LBJ, 30 May 1966.

Rostow notifies the President that a CIA exfiltration mission ran into

ambush and the agents were captured. The President could expect "the noise

level of Castro's charges of 'threatened Yankee aggression' may go up."

40. Memo, Karamessines, DDP, to Rostow, 7 August 1967.

This memo is important because it lists the names of two or three Cubans

who worked on CIA missions. If they are in the U.S., It may be worthwhile

talking to them about their activities.

41. Memo, W.G. Bow

-Rostow, 18 De :ember 1967.

The new CIA euphi

1s on developi g contacts within Castro's inner

circle. Dave Phillipe Was to be in char je of the new CIA Cube-program.

Bowdler advises that "we be alert to indications that Castro is looking for

accomnodation or his disillusioned lieut nants want to know where we stand

If they move to dump him."

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