Originator: SSCSGO
From: HALPERN, SAMUEL
Document date: 04/22/1976
Document type: TRANSCRIPT

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157-10014-10008

2023 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

Date

07/28/95

Page :

1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY:

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RECORD NUMBER

157-10014-10008

RECORDS SERIES

HEARINGS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

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DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR

FROM

SSCSGO

HALPERN, SAMUEL

TO

TITLE

DATE : 04/22/76

PAGES

: 66

SUBJECTS : HALPERN, SAMUEL

CIA

ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

OSWALD, LEE

FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE

KENNEDY, JOHN, ASSASSINATION

DOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPT

CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET

RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED

CURRENT STATUS : POSTPONED IN FULL

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/25/97

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : BoX

?

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

NW 50955

DocId: 32423396

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The nitro Stafre Ornate

R2992

Report of Proceedings

DEVENTENTIES

IN 3/2/22

Hearing held belore

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental

1912-9

Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities

17A 04

7,640.

Thursday, April 22, 1976

Washington, D.C.

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over

to the Committee for destruction)

WARD & PAUL

3017 WILSON BOULEVARD

ARLINGTON, VA 22201

(703) 841-0800

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TESTIMONY"OF :

Samuel Halpern

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EXECUTIVE SESSION

61. 10

Thursday, April 22, 1976

6

8

United States Senate,

Select Committee to Study Governmental

Operations with Respect to

Intelligence Activities,

Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 o'clock

a.M., in Room 608, The Carroll Arms

Hotel, the Honorable Richar

S. Schweiker presiding.

Present: Senator Schweiker (presiding).

Also present:

jim Johnston, Professional Staff Member.

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PROGDERINGS

Senator Schweiker. All right, Sam, may I swear you in.

If you'll rise and raise your right hand, please.

Do you solemnly swear the testimony you're about to give

Is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so

help you God?

Ms. Halpern:

I do..

Senator Schweiket.

Be seated.

Mr. Johnston.

Would you state for the record your full

name and address?

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TESTIMONY OF SAMUEL HALPERN

Mr. Halpern. Samuel Halpern, H-a-1-p-e-I-n, 2202 Popkins,

p-o-p-k-i-n-s, Lane, Alexandria, Virginia, 22307.

Mr. Johnston. Mr. lalpern, you previously testified before

the Committee, and I assume you know that you have various right.

the right to coungel, and that you previously have been furnished

a copy of the Committee rules, is that correct?

Mr. Halpern. That is correct.

MI. Johnston. And you're testifying here today voluntarily.

MI. Malperh: That is correct.

Mr. Johnston.

What was your position with the CIA in the

period, say, June to

December, 1963?

Mr. Malpern. I was the executive officer for the Special

Affairs Staff of the Directorate of Plans.

The staff was

responsible for operations against Cuba at that time.

Mr. Johnston. And you were executive assistant to Mr.

Fitzgerald, who was chief.

Mr. Halpern. That

is correct.

Senator Schweiker.

Were they two different capacitics, i

the same?

Mr. Halpern. It's the same. The actual title was Executiv

Officer at that tine.

Senator Schweiker. Okay.

Mr. Johnston. And prior to Mr. Fitzyerald's taking over

the Special Affair's Staff, Mr. Harvey was in that position, is

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that correct?

Mr: lalpern. That's correct, It was then called Task Force

W, and was under Mr. Harvey.

Mi. Johnston. And did you have a similar capacity under

him?

MI. Halpern. Yes, I was Executive Officer under TEW.

MI. Johnston. And when did you leave the Special Affairs

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Staff?

Mr. llalpern. To the best of my recollection, sometime

around late summer or around

Labor Day of 1964.

Senator Schweiker. When did you come aboard it?

Mr. Halpern.

The staff?

Senator Schweiker.

In other words, Task Force W. In

other words, whatever it was called

at the

time, Task Force W

I guess.

Mr. Halpern.. I was in the branch of the Western Hemisphere

Division when it was taken out of the Western Hemisphere Division

and turned into Task Force w, and that was in early '62.

Mr. Johnston.

What vere your responsibilities as executiv

officer to ir. Fitzgerald?

Mr. Balpern. Almost anything he wanted me to do. Basically

it was to be sure that all of the papers that did reach his

desk

were in correct form, content and distribution and routiny.

screened cable traffic for him to be sure he saw what I thought

he should

see. The same was true with memoranda coming to his

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office, aispatches from the fiela coming to his office, basically

a paper-pusher, traffic cop on paper, people problemsy my door

was open to any and all to discuss matters that they themselves

didn't feei that tilty wanted to talk to the boss about, and I

acted as a screen in that regard. But basically I was there

to do whatever the boss wanted me. to do, as an alde does.

MI. Johnston. Did you have operational responsibilities?

Mr. Halpern. Only those he gave me from time to time.

Nothing in the line of command. From time to time I did get

involved in operational activities. I had one specific field

of endeavor, and that was liaison with

British intelligence.

• Mr. Johnston. Were you knowledgeable of operational

matters?

Mr. Halpern.. Yes, quite a bit. I didn't see everything,

but I saw an awful lot, and I was knowledgeable of most operational

matters.

Senator Schweiker. How large a staff at Langley did

Desmond Fitzgerald's SAS have at its peak

at lleadguarters?

Mr. llalpern. To the best of my recollection, about 150

at

Headquarters.

Senator Schweiker. When it was Task Force W, how large willi

it be?

Mr. Halpern. 200, 225, something like that. That's vorj

much a guess

at this point. That includes officers and cleri...!

that's

the total force.

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Senator Schwelker

Right.

Mr. Johnston. Who did Mr. Fitzgerald report to on Cuban

matters?

Mr. Halpern. To the DDP.

MI. Johnston. That was Mr. Helms at the time.

Mr. Halpern, That's right.

MI. Johnston. Did he also report to Mr. Cane, J. C. Cane?

Mr. Halpern. Oh, no, no, no, there was nothing like that.

It was taken completely out of the divisional, regional lines

of command and made a special staff.

Senator Schweiker. There was nothing that related to

Cuba, Cuban activity of anti-Castro activity, after that was

done, that went through the formally normal channel.

Mr. Malpern. Only

in regard to seekiny the help of the

Western Hemisphere Division and its stations, to help us in

our activities. Obviously Cuba was still part of the Western

Hemisphere geographically, and

you need to have help, for

example, if we are going to send

people from TFW Or SAS into

Mexico or into Venezuela, you had to get permission of the

holding division. So in that regard we had an awful lot of

work to

do with and constant liaison

and communication with the

Western Hemisphere Division, the same kind of activity we had

with other divisions such as Europe, where we had quite a bit

of activity in Spain because of the Cuban refugees in Spain.

But most of it was at that time obviously with the Western

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Hemisphere Division.

Mr. Johnston. Did SAS in the fall of 1963 have any of its

own

people in Mexico City?

Mr. Halpern. Yes. How many, I don't know, but we did have

some that were attached to the station there, under the station

command.

The staff had no authority to break the

chains of command,

and everything that was communicated to and from the SAS

assignees anywhere else in the world went through

WH Division

here in Washington, and they saw the replies when it came from

the station.

Mr. Johnston. Do you recall whether Mr. David Phillips as

one of the SAS people in Mexico City?

Mr. Halpern. No, I do not.

Mr. Johnston. You do not recall?

Mr. Halpern. I do nọt recall.

Mr. Johnston: Who provided counterintelligence support

to the Special Affairs Staff?

Mr. Halpern. We had our own small counterintelligence

staff. I believe, if memory

serves me, it was headed

up sone:!

during this period by lal Swenson, who is a CI specialist, and

we always had, of course, the support of the CI Staff of the on.

under Mr. Angleton.

But basically each of the divisions in this case, it was

in effect a division, even though it was

called a staff, hadi.o..i

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own small counterintelligence operation.

Senator Schweiker.

Going back to a question that Jim

asked, the SAS office in Mexico City was headed up by whom ?

MI. Halpern. I don't know, sir.

We had people

assigned to the station in Mexico, but I don'

know who was there. I don't remember.

Senator Schweiker. SAS had people.

Mr. Halpern. Yes. We had people there, we had some in

Madrid, I believe, and we may have had them in other places.

at various

strategic areas around the world.

Senator Schweiker.

Well, who would

the head of the SAS

in Mexico City have

reported to?

Mr. Halpern.

To the Chief of Station.

Senator Schweiker. To the Chief of Station.

Mr: Halpern. To the Chief of Station, that's correct.

Hie

was

under

the Chief of Station's command.

Senator Schweiker.

The Chief of station would have reporte

to the Western Hemisphere Division?

Mr. Halpern.. That is correct, but the way it operated

not.

only with Mexico but any other place is that the sAs people

reported through the Chief of Station. The Chief of Station';

messages were then sent to Washington, and all messages were

addressed to the Director and the cable secretary who made thi

distribution because of the necessary slugs that were on there.

The action in most cases, because it was ariginated by

an SAG

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man, the action cable, which I think wad the yellow copy, would

come to sAs, but WA Division vould get an Into copy? it it was

the other way around, if it were something that was Wil's action,

they would get the yellow copy and SAS would get an info white

copy, so that there was no way of trying to keep somebody out of

somebody's act. Everybody was in, with one man being responsible

for action. Everything

going out would then be coordinated.

Senator Schweiker.

Now, following that same line of thought,

how did the JMWAVE station report?

MI. Halpern.

Well, JMWAVE was TEW's, or then SAS's, field

station, and it reported.

Senator Schweiker. What kind of station?

MI. Halpern.

Field station.

Senator Schweiker.

I'm

sorry, field station.

Mr. Halpern. And therefore reported

directly to TFW or

SAS •

Senator Schweiker. Did you have any other field station

besides JMWAVE?

Mo. Halpern. No, sir.

Senator Schweiker. At the peak of the anti-Castro activi:.

how

laige a group was

IMWAVE, would you say, approximately?

Mr. Halpern. The peak was about the time of the missile

crisis, and shortly thereafter. I would say, including

the

commo people, who were technically not part of JMWAVE's conui.r:

although they worked almost exclusively for JMWAVE, I'd say ibu:

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600. That is again, male and female. That's male and female.

Senator Schweiker. And that was the only field station that

SAS had.

Mr. Halpern. JMWAVE had a sub-base, not a station, but

they had some people scattered through the Keys, the Florida

Keys, and there was a small unit near Key West, Which was

basically responspible for taking care of the boats and other

activities of that type, and some training areas, but basically

the station was JMWAVE, and we didn't correspond directly with

the Key West element, either. We went through JMWAVE.

MI. Johnston. In your previous testimony before the

Committee, as I copied the quote, "Military intelligence units.

were involved in working with Cuban exiles in the Miami area,

and the Florida area along similar lines of CIA."

My question is, would you elaborate on this activity?

Mr. Halpern.

I don't know

too much about it. The military

then, as now, are supposed to coordinate their activities with

us. In operations against Cuba, they not only coordinated

them, but we provided, the CIA and I'Fi and SAS actually provisel

both communications facilities for

agents, including agent

gear, agent radio gear, as well

as

using our boats to piggy-bais

on our activities going in and out of Cuba, so that we actually

did put from time to time one or

more military agents into

Cuba..

We didn't always know the identity of the military ageni,

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which was always

one of the problems we had on coordination,

sources and methods being sacrosanct. Even in the business we

don't tell each other our sources. But we do try to check

as much as we can, and when the military coordinated with us,

they tried to give us enough information to be sure that we are

not going after the

same body or stumbling over each other.

Mr. Johnston. Did this relationship exist in the fall of

1963?

Mr. Halpern. Io the best of my knowledge

it did.

Mr. Johnston. And what Defense agencies were

involved?

Mr. Halpern. DIA

and Army Intelligence, to the best of

my knowledge. I don't think the Navy was involved, and I don't

think the Air Force was involved, but I'm not sure about that.

Mr. Johnston.

In describing

these operations, they are

distinct from operations being Iun out of Guantanamo.

Mr. Halpern.

That is correct, that's correct. The ones

I'm talking about are the ones run out of the florida area.

basically.

Mr. Johnston. Who were SAS's contacts in the Defense

Department in the fall of 1963?

Mr. Halpern. I don't know the answer to that. I'm not

sure. I did not conduct the liaison myself, so I'm not sure.

Mr. Johnston. Was General Lansdale still in the Defense

Department at that time?

Mr. Malpern.

He may have been, but he

was not on cubar:

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activities, to the best of my knowledge.

Senatorsschweiker. Well, when he got into Cuban activities,

In what way did he coordinate or not coordinate with what sis

was doing?

MI. Halpern. If I can change the terminology for a minute.

Senator, SAS was after the missile crisis, and I think General

Lansdale left the Cuban activity after the missile crisis in

'62, so it would have been Task Force W. Such coordination, if

there was any, was with the Chief of the Task Force Bill Harvey,

and I just don't know.

Senator Schweiker. Then

there might not have been too

much

coordination.

Ms. Halpern.

As far as I know there might not have been.

There was no requirement on his part to coordinate with us. 'Theri

was a reguirement on our part to coordinate with him, and we

did report to him weekly on all of our activities and proposed

activities, some in response to his direction in which he

requested reports on things he asked us to do, directed us to

do,

and

some of our own ideas which we checked with him before

we did it.

Senator Schweiker. WEll, the way his set-up worked, diu

he have any field stations or any troops, so to speak, to cal!

on, or was this more of a planning operation?

MI. Halpern. It was

a coordinating operation.

Senator Schweiker. On policy levels

and directing activi: i

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as far as i know, he relied on the other agencies of

government. Including ourselves and the military, to be his

troops, because I think as I mentioned to the Committee last

time, General Lansdale's original idea, approved by the

Attorney General but not approved by the President, after

objection by the Secretary of state and Secretary of Defense

and the DCI, General Lansdale's original idea in the fall of '61

when it started was to take actually troops from each of the

agencies concerned, Defense, CIA and State, and create in

effect a small new agency of its own directly under the Attorney

General.

NOW,

this was objected to by the two Secretaries and the

DCI.

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Senator Schweiker.

And was never implemented?

Mr. Halpern. That part was never implemented. We stayed

with CIA, and I'm sure

the military,

and I know

that State,

each component stayed within its own chain of command.

Senator Schweiker. So your group, either Task Force W

SAS. would have had the main thrust of what activity was yoi

on•

Mr. Halpern. That is correct.

Senator Schweiker.

Now, you did mention DIA and Army

Intelligence, but the main thrust of what you were doing went

through your operation.

Mr. Halpern.

That is correct, that is correct. And tha:

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was true, by the way, even after General Lansdale left the

Cuban scene::

Mr. Johnston. One other question on this topic is that

generally the concept most people have of DIA is that it

relles solely on the services for intelligence activities.

Mr. Halpern. Uh-huh.

Mr. Johnston. Are you saying in this case DIA did have

its own assets?

Mr. Halpern. I can't say that for certain. DIA may have

been

representing the Army when they came to talk to us about:

things. They were supposed

to coordinate

and be

aware of what

the Army was doing at all times, but I know we talked about

DIA and to Army Intelligence, and I am not sure at this point

whether each one ran

its own,

or whether they even talked to

each other. This was kind of really in

a coordinating game

with Defense.

Senator Schweiker. At the time that you were in both

Task Force W.and SAS, Sam, who was Station Chief or Chief of

Station of JMWAVE?

Ms. Halpern. During that whole period Ted Shackley,

Theodore

Shackley. He is still in the Agency as far as I

know.

Senator. Schweiker. And he would have reported, now, to

Desmond Fitzgerald.

Mr. Halpern. In '63 --

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Senator Schwelker.

And Harvey before that

Mr. Halpern®

And Harvey before that, that!s correct.

MI. Johnston. Previous testimony before the Committee

dealt

with the AMIASH operation, and you indicated some knowledge of

that operation.

Did you know at the time that Eltzgerald had gone to

Paris to meet with AMLASH in October of '63?:

Mr. Halpern. Yes.

Mr. johnston. Did he also go there on November 22nd to

meet AMLASH?

MI. Halpern. No, sir, despite

what the committee's report

has printed, he was not in Paris on November 22nd. He was

hosting a luncheon at the City Tavern, and if the City Tavern's

records are still available, they should prove that point.

Anci

if the Agencies financial records are available, I am

sure

Fitzgerald must have gotten reimbursed for that luncheon.

Mr. Johnston.

Were you knowledgeable in October of '63

of the purpose of the AMLASH meetings?

Mr. Halpern. In a general way, yes.

Mr. Johnston. Did you know that AMLASHl was proposing a

coup?

Mr. lalpern. That is correct.

Mr. Johnston. And did you know that as part of that coup

he was proposing to assassinate Castro?

Mr. Halpern. Yes.

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Mr. Johnston. What was your

sole in getting the poison

pen device?

Mr. Halpern. I introduced the case officer to the medical

officer who manufactured or made the pen.

Mr. Johnston.

And did you know when the pen was ready,

when the manufacturing was complete?

'Mr. Halpern. I am not sure of that. I guess I must have

because I remember when the case officer went with the

pen, so

I guess I knew it was ready. I never saw the pen but I assumed

It was ready when he went.

Mr. Johnston. Did you know there was going to be a meetiny

with AMLASH on November

22nd?

Mr. Halpern. Not the

exact date, no, not the exact date.

Knew the Case Officer was going to meet him, but I didn't know

the exact date.

MI. Johnston. Did you know that the meeting depended upon

the pen being ready? Was that the main element of the meeting?

Mr. llalpern. I don't know. I just don't remember that.

Ms. Johnston. Was there

a message to the case officer

November 23rd, 1963, the day after the assassination, orderin

him

to break contact with AMLASH and return?

Mr. Halpern.

I don't remember.

There may have been but

just don't remember. I would have assumed that would have

happened just on the basis of being a professional officer, bur

I am not sure.

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Mr. Johnston.

Well let me Just refresh it.

The case

officer has testified to the effect that he had planned to retur

right after the meeting anyway, and that therefore such a cable

from. Langley to him would not have been necessary.

MI. Halpern. I just don't know.

Mr. Johnston. Did you meet with the case officer or with

Mr. Fitzgerald about the November 22nd meeting after the case

officer had returned?

Mr. Halpern.

I don't remember it. I may have.

But I just

don't remember whether we did or not.

MI. Johnston. Did you see the case officer's contact

report of that meeting?

Mr. Halpern.

No, I don't think só.

If I did, I don't

remember it. It wasn't my habit to see contact reports of

case officers most of the time.

Mr. Johnston. Do you know when the case officer

met with

Mr. Fitzgerald?

Mr. Halpern. No, I don't have any idea.

Mr. Johnston. Do you know what happeried to the pen that

the case officer took with him?

MI. lalpern. To the best of my knowledge he never took

it. I mean, the case officer took it but the agent never took

the pen. At least that's what I was led to believe, that he

never took the pen. He thought it was silly and he just didn'

take it:

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Mr. Johnston.

How did you come by that knowledge?

Me. Halpern. I belleve it was from the case officer,

somewhere along the way, in bull sessions sometime later.

Mr. Johnston.

Now, is it your testimony that you don't

recall that you knew the meeting was going to be on November 22nd?

Mr. Halpern. I do not recall that it was going to be then?

MI.. Johnston. When you heard the President had been

assassinated, did you make any association between what you did

know, l.e., the case officer was going to deliver a poison

pen to an agent, a Cuban agent, did you make any association

between that and the shooting of the President?

Mr. Halpern. None whatsoever.

Mr. Johnston. At the time you heard of the assassination.

Mr. Halpern. At the time that we heard of it, at the City

Tavern on the top floor, the only thing that crossed my mind --

and I even mentioned it to Bruce Cheever later, who was

Fitzgerald's deputy, was I sure hope that the guy isn't involved

in Cuba in some way.

Mr. Johnston. You said that.

Mr. Halpern. For a very

simple, practical, bureaucratic

reason. We had been swamped enough with

paperwork, and if he

was, it would mean an

awful lot more paperwork, as it turned

out to be on our part,

in terms of name

traces

and file checks

and coordinations and papers to write and

what have

you, not tili

I would have to do it, but I would have to be sure that it got

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done right:

Mr. Johnston, Later, on the day of the assassination,

news reports started coming out with Oswald's Cuban connections.

At that point, did you begin making any associations with the

AMLASH operation?

Mr. Halpern. No, no, I never have.

Senator Schweiker.. You mentioned Fitzgerald's deputy.

What was his name?

Mr. Halpern.

Bruce Cheever.

Senator Schweiker.

How do you spell that?

Mr. Halpern. C-h-e-e-v-e-I.

Senator

Schweiker.

How did he function?

Mr. Halpern.

He was Deputy to Fitzgerald and he had also

been deputy to Harvey in the Task Force.

Senator Schweiker. Where is he now?

Mr. Halpern. In Arizona?

Senator Schweiker.

Retired?

Mr. Halpern. Yes, he retired before I did.

MI. Johnston. Was Director McCone told of the November 221l

AMLASH meeting?

MI. Halpern. I don't know. That would have been up to

Fitzgerald and the DDP. I have no idea.

Mr. Johnston.

Do you know whether Mr. Helms was told by

Mr. Fitzgerald?

Mr. Halpern. Again I don't know for certain. I assume he

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dia, but I don't know.

Mr. Johnston. Did you see any paperwork being forwarded on

that meeting?

Mr. Halpern. No .

: Mr. Johnston. And you would have probably seen it.

Mr. Halpern.. If there had been some paperwork, I might have

seen it. I didn't see everything. But I don't think so.

Mr. Johnston.

Was there ever any discussion that you know

of about the connection between the AMLASH meeting and the

assassination of the President?

Mr. Halpern. No, sir.

Mr. Johnston. You never participated in a discussion.

Mr. Halpern.

NO.

Mr. Johnston. You never heard such a discussion.

MI. Halpern. No, sir.

Mr. Johnston. Was there any investigation of a connection?

Mr. Halpern.

Not to my knowledge.

Mr. Johnston. Why?

Mr. Halpern. I don't know why.

Mr. Johnston. Did

that question ever pose itself to jou?

Mr. Halpern. No.

Senator Schweiker. Well, you sort of . and this is a

general question. If we were out to kill Castro, wouldn't you

sort of assume he'd be out to kill us or get even, wouldn't

this somewhere along the way have been a normal intelligence

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question?

ME. Halpern. Well, we heard his threats against the

President, but it never occurred, at least to my knowledge,

to

sit down and ask somebody to do a paper or do a review or

anything like that. I just never was involved in any question

like that. It just never struck us in terms of the AMLASH

operation because while Castro may have known about the AMLASH

operation, AMLASH continued to move in and out. of Castro's

circles I think for a couple of years thereafter before he was

arrested

and tried.

Senator Schweiker. Well, let's remove it for a minute Ero:

AMLASH. Wouldn't this be a question, knowing of the other anti-

Castro efforts

terms

of assassination planning with both

Task Force W and here, that you would laryely assume that this

is one of the risks that we undertook, and that this could wel!

be a consequence of what we might be doing? Didn't somebody

bring up something like that as

part

of the

contingencies?

Mr. Halpern. They may have, Senator. I just was never

involved in it, and I never heard it discussed. It may have

been

discussed at the CI Staff level or some other level. 1

just

was never

involved

and never heard it discussed.

it may

have

been

we just never gave Castro that much credit. And I

think again it would be basically a problem of first seeing !!

and what Oswald was and did before you would

start two and

the!

together to try and pin it on Castro or the Castro government.

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And so i thinx all of the offord would have been first, as

it was, to identify Castro's background and connections.

MI. Johnston. You mean Oswald.

Mr. Halpern. Oswald. I mean Oswald. I'm sorry.

And as long as we're on that subject, talking series, then

and now, even to: this date, the one thing that disturbs me as

a professional and as a citizen is nobody has ever been able to

zero in on =I don't think you can .. but nobody has ever

zeroed in on what Castro did in the Soviet Union for the: couple

of years that he was there. Nobody had a clue where he went,

what he did, what he saw, what he was up to. He marries a

Russian girl, and suddenly, out of the clear blue sky, she gets

exit visas, which is very abnormal.

Mr. Johnston. I think again you said Castro.

Mr. Halpern. I'm

sorry.

I meant Oswald. And this has

always disturbed

me. I don't know where we can get the answers.

The Russians aren't going to give us anything, obviously. I

don't believe what Nosenko said, sinply because Nosenko's

bona

fides have

never been established, to my knowledge.. And

this

is

one big area which was never covered in all of

the

TV shows and all of the newspaper stories, and all of the

millions of words that have been written and spoken

about the

Kennedy Assassination?

What did Oswald do inside the Soviet Union from the tinie

was there, and how did his wife --. I've even forgotten her

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hame = manage to get an exit visa do fast when everybody had

so damn much trouble getting out?

It's a question. That doesn't say there's any connection

at all, but there is a question that has never been really

raised..

Senator Schweiker. Did any of the groups that you recall

working with directly or indire oly deal with these

Fair Play for

Cuba Committees as part of your operations, either infiltrating

them or keeping an eye on them?

MI. Halpern.

Neither SAS nor TEW, to my knowledge, no.

Senator Schweiker.

Not to your knowledge.

Mr: Halpern. No, sir, not at all.

Senator Schweiker. This would have probably come under

what, counterintelligence?

Mr. Halpern. Under the FBI, because we were not involved

in this at all.

Senator Schweiker. How about like Alpha 66? Would this

have been something that Task Force

W or SAS would have

been interested in or directing or financing?

MI. Halpern. To the best of my knowledge, we looked at

Alpha 66 originally mostly because of the nuisance value, and

they were i pain in the neck in. terms of

getting their boats

in our way most of the time. We never tried to work out, to

my knowledge, any kind of a system whereby we could use them i

a front for us. There was talk -- and again no proof that I kon

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off there was talk that the miiitary, our military may have been

Involved in financing some of the Alpha 66 activities. But

that was just talk in both task forces.

Senator Schweiker. So to your knowledge CIA didn't

finance.

MI. Halpern. No, sir.

Senator Schweiker. Are you reasonably certain of this?

Mr. Halpern. I am reasonably certain we did not finance

Alpha 66.

Senator Schwelker. And you're speculating that if there was

financing, it would have come from intelligence.

MI. Halpern.

Right.

Senator Schweiker. Was this DIA or Arny?

MI. Halpern. Probably Army. This is again based on my

knowledge of the situation at the time. I've got no facts.

It is kind of analysis more than anything else.

Senator Schweiker. Did you ever come

across a CIA or an

Army Intelligence person using the code name of Bishop,

Morris Bishop?

MI. Halpern. No, sir.

MI. Johnston. After the assassination, the CIA designated

the

investigation

for a period of time as GPFLOOR.

Were you aware of that crypt?

Mr. Halpern. Now that you mention it, it comes back to

mind, but if you had asked me what it was, I wouldn't have

bec:.

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able to tell you.

"MI. Johnston.. Who in SAS, if anyone, was designated to work

on that investigation?

Mr. Halpern, I don't remember offhand. I assume it was

our CI unit,. but I'm not sure.

Mr. Johnston. Do you know whether anyone in SAs -

Mr. Halpern. Well, I don't know if anybody by identification

was named as a focal point or what have you, but we must have

had some way of coordinating our activities in terms of the file

searches and the papers that were written as a result of those

searches with the CI staff, which was given the overall job,

I believe, of investigating and coming together with reports

and documents to go to the Warren Commission. There must have

been somebody. I just can't think of who it was, the focal

point.

Senator Schweiker. Along the same line of the other

question, did you ever come across a military attache who was

stationed in Havana, Lt. Colonel Samuel Cale, who I believe al

some

point was with

the American embassy

in Havana?

It. Colon

Samuel Cale. Now, again, he is not CIA. He probably was Army

intelligence.

Mr. lialpern. It doesn't ring any bell.

Senator Schweiker. Doesn't ring a bell.

How about Ewing Smith,

who was a political advisor of

our embassy down there?

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Mr. Halpern. I don't remember that name elther

see, I didn't get Into the cuban activittes,

Senator, until

the end of '61, and the embassy had been thrown out or we broke

relations in '60, I belleve, so. I don't remember those names.

Mr. Johnston. Did you ever see any wiltten orders to

SAS of to anyone in CIA to conduct an investigation of the

assassination of President Kennedy?

Mr. Halpern.

I never saw any such orders, no, sir.

Ms. Johnston. Did you personally see any oral orders, or

do you know of any oral orders to other than SAS to conduct

such

an investigation?

Mr. Halpern. The only thing I know of were the file checks

that were made ad nauseum on everything connected with Oswald.

Even the slightest inkling was checked, double checked, and .

file traces

were

run and cables were sent out to all parts of

the world which might have had any possible connections with

this.

Mr.. Johnston.

Now, when you are saying traces and cables

being sent out, were

these cables being sent out by SAS and the

traces by SAS?

MI. Halpern. SAS sent out some. SAS coordinated on others.

It

was under the direction of the CI Staff, to the best of my

recollection, and we were just doing what we were asked to do

in terms of doing traces.

Now, a trace, once you get a trace request, you just stäre

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moving, land one thing leads to another whem yourstatatiending

messages. But everything was coordinated with the CI Staff.

Mr. Dohnston. And who at the Cr Staff?

Mr. Halpern.

'I don't remember who the taskiforce was there

I mean by task force it was a small group of people put

together. I don't remember the name. It may have been Rocca,

but I am not sure.

Mr. Johnston. Was John Whitten in SAS?

Mr. Halpern.

John Whitten, at that point, to the best of

my knowledge, was on WH Division.

Mr. Johnston. And what was his responsibility?

Mr. Halpern. I think he had one

of the branches, one of

the area branches, a few countries put together called a branch,

but I don't know which one it was. It may have been one of

the Central American branches. Or it may have been Mexico, but

I'm not sure. He was in WH.

Mr. Johnston. Our investigation suggests the following

structure for the investigation.

The GPFLOOR crypt was used

to designate the CIA activity between the time of the assassinadion

and the time the Warren Commission got rolling, and that Mr.

Whitten was of had principal responsibility in that period, whic

may

have.been a period of a month or more before Mr. Rocca of

the CI Staff got

involved.

Do you recall any meetings that Mr. Whitten had with sis

personnel relating to the assassination?

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Mr. Halpern:

No, I do not:

Mr. Johnston." And would you be knowledgeable of such meetings

if they occurred?

MI. Halpern. Not necessarily.

Mr. Johnston. Do you know of any orders not: to meet with

Mr. Whitten or not to provide information to him or other

people in connection with the Kennedy assassination?

Mr. Halpern. No, not to my knowledge.

Senator Schweiker. You mentioned thatAlpha 66 occasionally

got in the way of some of your activities.

Mr: Halpern. Xes.

Senator Schweiker. How did that happen or occur?

Mr. Malpern. Well, it could happen by we may have been

planning a landing of an agent or a sabotage raid at Point x

in Cuba, and unbeknownst to us, Alpha 66 may be going in the sain:

vicinity, and we would either hot up an area unnecessarily

they would hot up an area unnecessarily.' If they went in the

day before we were supposed to be in, the area would have been

really alerted to the enemy, so that way they would louse up

our activities, and they were a nuisance. They weren't a help

at all, they were a nuisance.

Senator Schweiker.

Then in essence, they were either

operating pretty autonomously or independently, or might have. had

some financing from Army intelligence.

Mr. Halpern. They may have. I don't know if they did, but.

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they may have.*It was not necessary for the kinds of activities

224

they were running to have much.

Senator Schweiker. If Army Intelligence had been financing

them or guiding them or working with them, would they necessarily

have kept you informed under the rules of the game at that time?

MI. Halpern. No, sir. They were supposed to, but rules

are not always followed.

Nr. Johnston. After the assassination of President

Kennedy, was anything done with regard to using the JMWAVE

assets to investigate the assassination?

. Mr. Halpern. I don't remember anything special except

that they were asked to also check their files and to investigate

through their sources in the Cuban exile community anything

and

everything that they could come up with on Oswald and any of

his activities.

Mr. Johnston. Was there a message to that effect?

Mr. Halpern. There probably was. I couldn't vouch for it.

The only way JMWAVE would get that kind of information or

directive would be by either a cable or a dispatch, and most

likely it would be cables.

MI. Johnston.

Did the CIA at this time period that we

are

talking about have

an arrangement with Customs whereby

Customs agents were detailed or affiliated or loaned to CIA

in the Florida area?

MI. Halpern. I don't remember that, the detailed

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part. he did have an arrangement with Customs and Coast Guard

so that we would tell them when our boats were going out for

action and coming back so they wouldn't got afoul of both

Customs and the Coast Guard and also unnecessarily make them

waste their time and effort to looking after our boata as an

unidentified boat on the high seas when they would know it was

ours and they could leave it alone and go on and do their

job.

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There was an arrangement, but I don't know anything about

detailing officers.

There may have been in the local area.

The Chief of Station was allowed and authorized, obviously, to

make whatever local arrangements

he needed to carry out his

activities, and that is true anywhere.

Mr. Johnston. Do you know whether Customs agents interviewed

Cuban exiles about the assassination?

Mr. Halpern. That I don't know.

Mr. Johnston, Jou previously - or you said just a minute

ago that the WAVE station tapped its sources.

Did you ever see reports of those

contacts?

Mr. Halpern. I probably

did, but I don't remember.

MI. Johnston. Do you have a recollection of

seeing such

reports?

Mr. Halpern. No, nothing specific. I just

assume that

since I did look through most of the cable traffic every day..

I probably saw it, but I have no recollection of it.

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Mr. Johnston Isithere:

a lot of cable traffla between

Langley and JMWAVE on the assassination?

Mr. Halpern.

There must have been a tremendous amount.

The: paper was just overflowing all over.

Mr. Johnston::

Where would those filea be located?

Mr. Halpern? Now? I have no idea what happened.

Mr. Johnston. Did they carry the GPFLOOR crypt?

Mr. Malpern. They should have if the GPFLOOR was

the

crypt slug for this, that slug automatically directed distribu

tion on the messages coming into the building. It would have

to have.

Senator Schweiker.

There was a Customs agent who I

understand worked for the CIA by the name of

Diosdada in

Florida.

Was Diosdada a Customs agent who was CIA? Does that

ring a bell?

Mr. Halpern. It doesn't mean anything to me. He may have

been, but I just don't know. It could have been a local arranger

ment between JMWAVE and Customs locally, or he may have had soc

special knowledge or contacts or what have

you that needed

to be used, and

the local Customs people would have made such

arrangements with our station.

Senator Schweiker. Okay.

Mr. Johnston.

Do you know of any discussions within Sho

on possible Cuban involvement? Did you sit in on any meetings

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where the participantentalked about Cuba?s

Mr. Halpern.

It may have happened, but x was not in any

such meetings. As I say, this never crossed my chin at all

at the time.

Mr. Johnston. Hould:the.fact.that you didchot/hear..any

such discussions to you indicate that they did not take place?

Mr. Halpern.. I just wasn't privy to it. if they did take

place, I just didn't know.

Mr. Johnston. Would you normally have been in such

discussions?

Mr. Halpern. No, not in every discussion, no.

Mr. Johnston. Did you ever see any paperwork relating to

suggestion of Cuban involvement in the assassination?

Mr. Halpern. No, sir.

Mr. Johnston. Did you know that on November 25th, the

Chief of Station in Mexico briefed the President of Mexico

saying that they suspected Cuban involvement?

Mr. Halpern. No.

This is the first I have heard.

Mr. Johnston. Would that be at

variance with

the activity

at headguarters?

Mr. Halpern. Not necessarily. It could have been

somethi:"

thought of in Wi Division. It would have been thought of

the CI component of SAS: I just don't, this is the first I

have heard of that.

Mr. Johnston.

Let me ask you now some specifics about some

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Information that was turned up in the investigation and see

if you know anything about it.

Did you know that on November 22nd a Cubana Air Lines flight

out of Mexico City was delayed some five hours, from 5:00 o'cloc:

in the afternoon until about 10:00 o'clock in the evening, and

that a twin engined aircraft arrived at the airport in Mexico

City, let out a passenger who bypassed Customs and rode in

the cockpit of the Cubana Aircraft to Havana that night.

Mr. Halpern. This is allinew to me. I never heard of

that.

Senator Schweiker.. You never heard of that.

Mr. Halpern.

This is brand new.

Mr. Johnston. No information like that came in?

Mr. Halpern. It might have cone in. I just didn't see it.

That's brand new.

Mr. Johnston. Did you know of the travel of a man named

Gilberto Policarpo Lopez who crossed the border into Mexico

apparently on November 23rd, and then on November 27th left

Mexico City as the only passenger on a Cubana Air Lines flight

to llavana?

Mr. Halpern. No,sir, I don't know that.

Senator Schweiker. Originating in Miami, Florida.

Mr. Halpern. This is all brand

new.

Mr. Johnston. Would you have seen that kind of informatio:

Mr. Halpern. Normally, if it had the usual slugs, I would:

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have, but there was a stack of another.

100 or a

thousand a

đay:

Mr. Johnston. Did you know a woman by the name of Jane

Roman?

Mr. Halpern.

Yes.

ME. Johnston. What was her capacity?

Mr. Halpern. She was on the CI Staff, and at that time I

think in liaison with the Bureau, and I think also had some

other liaison responsibilities with other intelligence and

security services in the community.

Mr. Johnston. Do you know of would you suspect whether

she was knowledgeable of the AMLASH operation?

MI. Halpern. If she was, we've got lousy security, or

we would have had lousy

security at that time if she knew about

it.

That was very tightly held.

Mr. Johnston. Did you ever see -- and again I'm on the

November 22nd, 23rd, 24th time period, a name trace coming from

CI Division, asking for a name trace on the true name of AMLAS!!?!

MI. Halpern. No, but I wouldn't have gotten -- a name

trace request of that type would have gone directly from the

requesting unit, in this case CI, directly to our name trace

unit

in

SAS. If the normal requests for traces came through the

front office, we would be swamped. I would not have seen that

anyway.

Mr. Johnston. Given the sensitivity of AMLASH at that

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particular time, do you have any recollection of any questions

being raised about such a name trace?

Mr. Halpern. No, I don't, but it

wouldn't have been

unusual. AMLASH was a fairly senior officer in Castro's

entourage, and if they had picked on him and only him, I would

have said there may have been a cause to question it in terms

of, you know, why they looked at him only but if they looked

at him and a

dozen other people then I would not have questioned

it at all, even at that time.

Mr. Johnston. And the name trace would have given what?

MI. Halpern. The name trace would have given

whatever

we knew about the individual except our operational contacts

with him. It would be biographic information.

Mr. Johnston. Well, if CI Division asked for information

on AMLASH, even if they were furnished biographical information,

It would not contain the fact that he was involved in some

assassination plot.

Mr. Halpern.

That's correct.. That would normally go

to the case officer concerned, who would

be alerted by the name

tracers that somebody had asked for AMLASH.

Mr. Johnston. And what would the case officer have done

in that case?

Mr. Halyern. Well, in thisse I'm sure he would have

gone

and talked

to MI. Fitzgerald about it.

Mr. Johnston. Do you know whether the case officer dic?

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Mr. Halpern.R] don't know, nos

Mr: Johnston. AMLASH's file has a document dated December

pardon me, has a document in it which appears to be, would have

been the top document in his file in this time perlod of November.

December 19631 and handwrltten on it is the phrase "not to leave

this office, per" and it uses the name of the case officer. And

It is dated December 1963.

Do you know of any instructions to that effect emanating

from Mr. Fitzgerald or yourself or anyone else in SAS?

Mr. Halpern. Not that I know of. It's possible that

Fitzgerald told the case officer not to release it without

his knowledge or something like that. That's the standard

practice. It's not unusual.

Mr. Johnston. But again, in the context of investigating

the assassination of President Kennedy, and the indication that

the name, trace was proposed on him, would it appear unusual?

Mr. Halpern. No, because again, even if it happened that

way, it would have been up to the case officer to tell Fitzgerali

that somebody has asked for the file. The file would then be

handed by Mr. Fitzgerald to whatever element needed it. In

other words, it wouldn't be handled routinely.. In other words,

what you are talking about are routine name trace requests

going through some researcher sitting

in CI to some researcher

sitting in SAS.

Mr. Johnston. So, in other words, the fact that CIA

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HE TOPIS CRET

was Involved with AMIASHy land 1 usel the word

ssination

body," would normally have been kept from the Cr? the counter-

Intelligence investigators.

Mr. Halpern. It would have been held back from the ordinary

case officer, yes. Whether it would have been held back from

the men in charge, I don't know. That would have been up to the

chief of SAS, In this case Fitzgerald, and the DD?.

Mi. Johnston. Did you have any knowledge that that question

was posed to Mr. Fitzgerald or Mi. Helms?

Mr. Halpern. No, I did not.

Mr. Johnston. And you never saw any paperwork.

Mr. Halpern. No.

MI. Johnston. Were you told or did you know of orders

that apparently emanated from the President to restrict Cuban

operations in early December 1963?

Mr. Halpern. Early December '63?

There was a slow-down of some type of activity and it was

basically, I believe, the large scale paramilitary, sabotage

raids of that type, but it was not a complete standdown.

MI. Johnston.

Were you told the purpose of that limitacione

Mr. Halpern.

I am trying to recollect.

I remember

Fitzgerald coming back

from the first

meeting

he had with

President Johnson in which the Cuban activities were discussed

and something to the effect - it is running.around in my

mind --which was sonething we had been saying ourselves,

that

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1t had not been having the effect we expected, and we ought to

sit back.and take another look at what we ought to be doing,

something like that.

Mr. Johnston. Do you know the approximate date of that

meeting?

Mr. Halpern. It was sometime in I think it was early

December, but I'm not quite sure just when it was.

The first

half of December is about the best of my recollection.

MI, Johnston. Do you know where he met with the President?

Mr. Halpern. As far as I know, it was the normal situation

room in the White House when the then 303 Committee

met, and

it was a 303 Committee meeting that Fitzgerald

went to.

MI. Johnston. In early December 1963.

Mr. Halpern. Something

• Like that.

MI. Johnston. Was MI. McCone there, MI. Helms?

Mr. Halpern. I don't know for sure. I would assume

Mr. McCone was there.

I'm not sure about Mr. Helms.

I'm just

assuming that because

of his position.

MI. Johnston: Did Mr. Fitzgerald or anyone else tell you

that they had briefed President Johnson about the AMLASI!

operation?

MI. Halpern. No, sir, it never was discussed.

Mr. Johnston. Were you aware of a Cuban policy review in

early December 1963?

Mr. Halpern. I don't remember anything about it. There

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probably was

It, was probably a result of thlo 303 meeting.

1176

remember where they said let'a take a look At least Fitzgerala

said to me, let's take a look at where ve areigoing.

Mr.. Johnston. Did you ever see any paperwork?

Mr. Halpern. If such a paper was written, I probably

saw it, but I don't recollect any. of it at this point.

MI. Johnston. Was the case officer, AMLASH's case officer

still in headguarters throughout December 1963?

Mr. Halpern. Unless he went off on TDY, he was assigned to

headquarters.

Mr. Johnston. But do you know of any instructions to

him to look into or to re-evaluate the AMLASH operation as

part

of this Cuban policy review?

Mr. Halpern.

Nothing specific, not to my knowledge, no.

Mr.. Johnston. We have seen papers going over to the

White House coming from Mr. Fitzgerald in early 1964 discussing

the Cuban operations that the CIA had. Absent from that is any

detail of the AMLASH operation.

Do you know of a conscious effort to withhold that fron

those papers?

MI. Halpern. I don't know that it was conscious. I thin

it was

just normal security. If anything like that

was

told

to the President, it would have been told to the President

directly and not through the uses of pieces of paper which go

through innumerable hands, both in our end of the building

and

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TOP SEGRET

the recipient's end of the building.

Mr. Johnston. So the only way the President would have been

told about something like AMLASH would have been.orally.

Mr. Halpern. I would think so.

MI. Johnston. And would Mr. Bundy have been privy to that

information?

Mr. Halpern. Not

necessarily.

MI. Johnston. Was he privy, to your knowledge?

Mr. Halpern. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. Johnston. On November 18th, 1963, President

Kennedy gave a speech in Miami saying - very much

anti-Castro.

Do you know whether Mr. Fitzgerald had an input to that

speech?

Mr. Halpern. I do not know. I would doubt it, but I don't

know for sure.

Mr. Johnston. Did you know the case officer proposed

telling AMLASH that Mr. Fitzgerald had drafted that part of

the speech?

Mr. Halpern. No, I did not know that. It may have been i

good ploy in terms of case officer-agent relationships, but 1

don't know of any like that.

Mx. Johnston. You talked previously of your feelings about

Oswald's time in the Soviet Union. Did you ever see -- did

you know a man by the name of Dr. Porta-Villa, P-o-I-t-a

V-i-1-1-a.

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Mr. Halpern.

I know of him, buttr donut know himse

Mr. Johnston. Do you know what the impression of him was?

Mr. Halpern. No, I don't.

Mr. Johnston. Did you know that he apparently provided

CIA with a message he claimed to have gotten out of Cuba indi-

cating that Oswald had met with the Cuban ambassador while in

the Soviet Union?

Mr. Halpern.. That is new to me, too. That would be

interesting, though.

Senator Schweiker. You are familiar with the discredited

Garrison investigation in New Orleans.

Mr. Halpern.

I've never read it all, but I've heard abou

it.

Senator Schweiker. Now, some of the people that he dealt

with there, such as David Ferry and I think there were one

or two others, did have some relationship with CIA.

I am

not

linking Oswald there.

Can you shed any light on what that anti-Castro activity

was?

Who would that anti-castro activity such as David ferry's

kind have come

under?

Would that have been under JMWAVE?.

Mr. Malpern. I don't even know what ferry's activities

were supposed to be. I have no idea.

Senator Schweiker. I beliove he was smuggling arms into

Cuba.

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Mr. Halpern.:

Wellywe ran our own arms into Cuba.

•4816

We

at too:

didn't need anybody like Ferry or anybody like that.

Senator Schweiker.: Guy Bannister?

MI. Malpern. No, it doesn't mean anything to me. No,

we had plenty of ways of getting arms into Cuba in terms of

our own boats, our own

agents on the island:

Senator Schweiker. Okay. Go ahead.

Mr. Johnston. Let me ask you one more question on 1963.

Was the CIA actively involved in the relocation of exiles

in Miami to other parts of the country?

Mr. Halpern. Yes. We tried to help some of the people,

particularly the ones that were working for us, our former

agents, relocate them in this country or others. Yes. I

don't know who.

I can't give you names of people, but from time

to time we helped them, and we helped them in terms of intercediny

with HEW, with monies that they might have been getting from

HEW. That's all.

Mr. Johnston. Catholic Charities and Catholic Cuban

Relief was also involved, is that right?

Mr. Halpern. That's right.

Mr. Johnston. Was there a liaison between the Catholic

Charities and CIA?

Mr. Halpern. Not that I know of. Not an official one.

There may have been an unofficial one down in Miami, but I

don't know, or one in New York, for that matter.

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Mr. Johnston.SiDid the CIA have any covert operations in

the New Orleans area in the fall of '63?

Mr.. Halpein.

Not that I know of.

Mr. Johnston. Let me go then to 1967. What was your

position in 19677

MI. Halpern. Iwas the executive assistant to the DDP,

first Mr. Fitzgerald from January to the day he died, which

was July 23Id, I belleve, '67, and then Mr. Karamessines who

replaced him.

MI. Johnston. Well, then, did you know other than as a

witness that there was

an IG inspection on

assassinations taking

place?

Mr. Halpern. Yes.

Mr. Johnston.. And you knew that in your official

capacity?

Mr. Halpern. No, no.

I only know because I talked -- I

was asked about it.

Mr. Johnston. So you don't know whether Mr. Karamessines

came

and asked.

Mr. Halpern. The first I know, I was asked to come and

talk to King Greer, who was the IG officer involved.

Mr. Johnston.

Did you, in 1967, see the IG report?

Mr. Halpern.

No, sit.

Mr. Johnston. Did Mr. Fitzgerald

sce it?

Mr. Halpern..

I don't know.

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Mr. Johnston.. Were you

told why there was such on

investigation?

Mr. Halpern. I asked Ken!! Greer, and to the best of my

recollection he said the Director wanted it. That was good

enough for me. The Director then was Mr.. Helms.: I was not in

the habit of questioning the Director's wishes.

MI. Johnston. Do you recall when you were first aware that

there was such an investigation taking place?

MI. Halpern. No, no, I don't know the day or the month or

anything like that. It was while Fitzgerald was still alive,

so it had to be sometime before he died in July.

MI. Johnston. Did Mr. Greer ask you about any connections

between the Kennedy assassination and CIA plots against Castro?

Mr. Halpern. No. The only comment I think he made

was

something to the effect that it was strange and ironic that the

day Kennedy died the case officer was trying to give AMLASH

a poison pen. That is the only connection that I remember.

Mr. Johnston. And to your knowledge, had all plotting. but

AMLASHI

stopped prior to November of 1963?

MI. Halpern.

I only knew about AMLASH. I-didn't know

about anything else.

Mr. Johnston. That was the only operation you knew that

was

active at the time against Castro.

HI. lalpern, That is the only thing I was involved in.

Mr. Johnston. Were you ever, again in 1967, told about thu

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results of the IG investigation, anything about Mr. Helms!

briefing of the President?

Mr. Halpern. No, sir.

Mr. Johnston. When Mr. Karamessines took over, did you tell

him about the fact that there was an IG inspection on assassi-

nations?

MI. Halpern. No. I was told when I talked to Mr. Greet

not to talk about it, and I didn't.

Mr. Johnston. And other than Me. Greet, you talked to

no one else at the CIA about it in 1967.

Mr. Halpern. Well, I then talked to the IG himself when

he called me back up to go over some of the points.

MI. Johnston. Mr. Earman?

Mr. Halpern. Yes, Jack Earman.:

Ms. Johnston. And

what was the nature of that?

Mr. Halpern. Just to go over the same things over again

that I had gone over with Greer. He wanted to be sure that

what I said was what I said, I mean, what he had on his paper

was what I

said, that's all. But he again told me not

to tali

about

this, and I didn't.

Senator Schweiker. Did Bobby Kennedy have a desk or

work out of any area of CIA during the time you were in your

group?

Hir. Halpern. Not to my knowledge, no, sir.

Mr. Johnston. Would you be in a

position where you pretty

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well would have known, or not

necessarily?.

Mr. Halpern. Not necessarily. If the Director wanted to

make

space: for him on the seventh floor, I would never have

known. There might have been rumors in the building, but I

didn't even hear rumors about it. He may have used the office

over at the CIA building, the old OSS bulldings on 23rd & E.

the old Public Health Service buildings.

Senator Schweiker. They were still in operation?

Mr. Halpern. I think the Agency still has some of those

buildings,. and the old Admin building, which used to be General

Donovan's headquarters or office was a very VIP type of arrange

ment, and it's possible -- it's possible that he may have used

that, because that has been used from time to time by other

VIPS.

Senator Schweiker: By other VIPS?

Mr: Halpern. Yes, sir.

Senator Schweiker. Like what do you mean?

Mr. Halpern. When

Senator Humphrey was Vice President,

his liaison with the Agency used one of those offices down

there.

I think his name was George Carroll. He used to be trainin:

officer, and then he was liaison officer.

Senator Schweiker: To your knowledge, would any of the

SAS

group have an office where you are talking about?

Mr. Halpern. No, sir.

Senator Schweiker. Everything was over at Langley?

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Mr. Halpern.Everything was over at langley."the only

thing we did use down there was the Technical Services Division

was down there, and so we did a lot of liaison with them.

Mr. Johnston. We discussed basic facts about possible

Cuban of strange events that point toward Cuba, and let me ask

you if you knew, to put you back in the environment of 1963,

If you had known about this flight from Mexico City to Havana

on the afternoon of the assassination, and if you had known about

the Lopez travel and the Porta-Villa allegation, and the fact

that AMLASH Or AMLASH's name had come up in the course of the

Mexico City investigation, would you have felt that those

facts would have justified a more complete investigation?

Senator Schweiker.

If you had known them at the time.

MI. Johnston. If I had

known them at the time, I sure

would have tried to find out more about them, and I would have

sat down and really sat down with Porta-Villa and asked him a

hell of a lot more, and tried to find out where he got the

information, how, the reliability of his source and so on,

and

I sure would have worked with the Mexican police to try to fin!

out

more about those flights.

I don't -- this

is all new to me, and if it hadn't, somethily

was

slipping. It really should have been gone into with a

vengeance, not that we would have gotten any

answers. I'm not

predicting that, but --

Senator Schweiker. Are you finished with that?

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Mr: Johnston:

Dot mere use:

well With regard tomlet me

say, the November 22nd flight, that Information came In in early

December to CIA and was passed to Mexico City. There was

followup on it. Especially since it affected Cuba, wouldn't

a followup have been within SAS?

MI. Halpern. If it had to deal with working with the

Mexican Government and following it up, no, the action would have

been the WA Division, using SAS people in the Mexican station,

but the action would have.

gone to the Chief of Station for

his action, since he had the liaison with the Mexican police

and the internal

security people.

Mr. Johnston:

With regard to the Lopez matter, again in

March of that year, March of 1964, the Mexico City station was

informed through a source of unknown reliability that Lopez

was somehow involved in the

assassination.

You don't recall receiving that information?

Mx. Halpern. It may have crossed my desk, but I just don't

remember. I think I might have remembered if I had seen it.

Mr. Johnston. And is it your testimony that SAS did not

form a task force-or any kind of organized effort to investigate

Cuban connections?

Mr. Halpern.

Not that I know of. We responded to, I know,

the CI Staff in terms of traces and whatever else they asked

for, but we did not organize our own task force.

Mr. Johnston. Were you aware of the fact that the FBI

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report on oswald's act lottle toyor leane before the

assassination was routed to SAS?

Mr. Halpern. I wasn't aware of it, but i assume it woula

have been.

Mr. Johnston. That would have been logical?

Mr. Halpern. If they had Fair Play for Cuba on it, we

would have gotten a copy from the Bureau and the front office

wouldn't have gotten it. It would have gone right to our

CI people, and the file people and the research people, and they

would extract the name and card it and have it available for

future reference.

Mr. Johnston. Were you aware of any other information on

Oswald that arrived in SAS before the assassination, specificalli

his contact in Mexico City?

Mr. Halpern. No, I

wasn't even aware of the Bureau's

report, but it is not unlikely for that, in Just normal

bureaucracy, if the Bureau puts out a report and it has the word

Cuba on it, and it gets over to CIA and you take

a look at it

and

you see Cuba, then it goes to the people who work on Cuba.

That's the way we get the information.

MI. Johnston.

And let me again make sure I understand

you.

SAS,

Did you testify that you knew of no senior staffer within

specifically assigned to the Kennedy investigation?

Mr. Halpern.

Not that I remember, no.

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Mr. Johnston, To work with Rocca or Jack whitten

MI. Halpern.: No, Jack would have been

aber say, he

was in WH. He may have been pulled out of wi to work on that

or he may have been an element of WH staff that had to work

with SAS, but I don't remember his being assigned to SAS as

such.

PAUL

410 First Street, S.E. Washingion, D.C. 20003

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Mr. Johnston. Are you aware of any direct contact between

anyone in SAS and the Warren Commission members or the Warren

Commission staff?

Mr. Halpern. I don't remember at all.

MI. Johnston. They never came around to SAS.

Mr. Halpern.

Not that I remember.

It is possible that

some of the staff may have come and

talked to some of the SAS

people, but I just don't remember

offhand.

Mr. Johnston. Wouldn't that have had to have been cleared

with Mr. Fitzgerald?

Mr. Halpern. Yes, it would have?

Mr. Johnston. And you would have seen it?

Mr. Malpern. Not necessarily. No. It could have -- if

It came in from the Warren Commission, it could have been

handled directly from the DDP to Mr. Fitzgerald, and he may

have just said at some staff meeting that Warren Commission

people will be coming around to see some of you, and I wouldn't

have made any note of that. It would have been

assumed that

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we would be taiking to them sooner or later

Mr. Johnston. You gave us some names, Hal Swenson and

Bruce Cheever. Was there anyone else in SAS who would have

been knowledgeable of the matters we have discussed today?

Mr. Halpern.. The only other one - he wouldn't have been

knowledgeable of AMLASH - was the Chief of the Fi unit, who

has since died.

Senator Schweiker. Chief of what?

MI. Halpern. Foreign Intelligence.

Senator Schweiker. In

SAS.

Mr. Halpern. In SAS, we each had the components. We had

the CI unit, an FI unit, and a covert actions unit, just small

branches.

Senator Schweiker.

What were they?

Mr. Halpern. Foreign Intelligence, Counterintelligence,

and covert actions.

Senator Schweiker. They were the three basic elements.

Mr. Halpern. The three basics, and oh, one more, para-

military, which was technically part of covert action but was

set up as a separate branch because of the heavy involvement

in paramilitary activities, but Ed Morelius was Chief of the

unit, the Foreign Intelligence branch, and he would have

been

involved, if necessary, in some of the Warren Commission

stuff, but I just don't know for sure.

Mr. Johnston. Do you know a woman by the name of Grace

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Robertsowho worked at sAS?

Mr. Halpern.

Yes.

She was In one of our 2- I think she

was a CIresearcher. I'm not sure, but i know the name.

Mr. Johnston.: Did she have any operational responsibilities,

any decision responsibilities?

Mr. Halpern. I would doubt it. I am not sure, but Iuwould

doubt it.

Mr. Johnston. And the initials C/RR were what branch of

SAS?

Mr. Halpern. Probably records, Chief, Records and Reports,

or something like that. But I'm not sure. I just don't remember

for certain now.

Mr. Johnston. And would they have access to the AMLAS!!

file?

410 First Street, S.E., Washington. D.C. 20003

TOP SECREI

Mr. Halpern. Not the operational file, which would have

been held by the case officer. They would have had

access

to the biographic file on the man, which is everything we knew

about him except the operational connections.

Mr. Johnston. Do you know whether there was any instruction.

any discussion after November 22nd, to break off with AMLASH

or to have a cooling off period with AMLASH?

Mr. Halpern. I don't know of any instructions. I'm just

conjecturing now that there probably would have been a cooliny

off

period. I doubt if there was an order to break off

completely?

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Mr. Johnston:

And why would you assume there was a cooling

off

period?

Mr. Halpern. Simply because nobody knew which way anything

was going to go on Cuba once it came out that Oswald was

connected in some tangential way with something to do with

Cuba, and things just got held, period.

Mr. Johnston. Do you have any what is the reason for

your statement that there may have been a cooling off period?

Do you have any actual information?

Mr. Halpern. No, except what later developed in the 303

Committee meeting, where our paramilitary activities were in

effect held, then. We were going to take a look, which is

something we have been

taking a look at for a long time ourselves.

Mr. Johnston. And

you associate the hold-down of paramiliay

activities with what, the Kennedy assassination or the new

President?

Mr. llalpern. I think the new President taking a look at

what we

were doing on Cuba, and that the paramilitary activities

were not having the desired effect, and I think as I testified

before, we on the task force, both under Harvey and under

Fitzgerald, kept saying this ain't the way to do it, but we

kept on doing it.

MI. Johnston. Finally, do you know, or were you present

in

any

discussions in December 1963 in the course of this

apparent policy review about AMLASH and what should be done

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with AMLASH?

Mr. Halpern. I don't remember any meetings held on that,

and the meetings would have just been Fitzgerald, the case officer

and me, probably, or Fitzgerald and the case officer, because

as far as I know, the Deputy, Bruce Cheever, was not involved

In the AMLASH activity:

Mr. Johnston. Was there any concern at the time by

Mr. Fitzgerald or the case officer about what happened to the

poison pen?

Mr. Halpern. Not - that may have been when I was led

to believe that he didn't take it, and when I asked what happenell

to it, I don't remember what kind of an

answer I got.

Mr. Johnston. Were you concerned about what happened to

the pen?

MI. Halyern. No, because it wouldn't have

been useful

for anybody. You know, if somebody found that

pen on the

street, if it had been thrown away, they wouldn't use it as

a pen. It couldn't have been used

as a pen.

MI. Johnston.

What if AMLASH had taken the pen with him?

Mr. Halpern. I think if he took the pen

with him, if he

was going to use it, he would have had

a complete change of

heart.

As he told the case officer, he thought it was silly and

it wouldn't work, and

if he took it, I don't know why he would

take it. He wasn't going to use it.

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Mr. Johnston.

would you be concerned, after the Kennedy

assassination, given what may have appeared to be a pro-Castro

automation, if AMLASH had taken the pen with him?

Mr. Halpern. No, no, because if he wanted to get rid

of Castro he would have gone ahead and gotten rid of Castro

anyway, whether Kennedy was assassinated or not.: If he was

going to have a coup, he was going to have a coup. The fact

that he didn't -- the pen didn't surface at his trial leads

me to believe that he either -- A, he didn't take the pen, or

B, if he took it, he didn't use it, he threw it away.

Mr. Johnston.

You were present at the time and I was not.

Let me just put to you the fact that if AMLASH had

possession of that pen, CIA was in a very compromising

position.

Mr. Halpern. Not true. He couldn't prove that CIA

gave it to him.

Mr. Johnston. Although he could identify the case officer.

MI. Halpern.

No, he couldn't. The case officer was

under some kind of a pseudonym.

Mr. Johnston.

But he could identify him by face.

Mr. Halpern. Well, he'd have a difficult time trying to

find him, coming up with a drawing, a police -

Mr. Johnston. And he could identify MI. Fitzgerald who

he met

a month before as the Attorney General's personal

representative.

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Ta.:

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Mr. Halpern eWell

he had met, him once and if he wanted

to find the Attorney General's personal representative, he'a

go through the whole office and couldn't find that face. So

I don't think the CIA was on the hot spot, I don't think the

CIA was under any kind of problem unless they stood everybody

up in a police line..

Senator, Schweiker. Well, refresh my recollection. Where

did he meet Fitzgerald?

Mr. Halpern. In Paris.

Senator Schweiker.

The month before.

Mr. Halpern. In October, yes, sir, not in November.

Mr. Johnston. And you indicate there was no concern

whatsoever.

Mr. Halpern. Well, I didn't have any concern. I don't

know about other people, but I didn't have

any concern.

Mr. Johnston. That any attempt to investigate Castro and

Castro's motivation vis-a-vis Kennedy might be very difficult

if AMLASH had kept the pen.

Mr. alpern. No, I didn't. As I say, the fact that the

pen never surfaced in the course of the trial -- it was a biụ

ghow trial as I remember. It was an indication to me that A,

he didn't take it, and if my initial information was correce,

or B, if he did take it, he didn't use it and threw it away,

because not much was made of the pen as a pen, and I could

see them making all kinds of publicity gimmicks out of that if they

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had it.

Senator Schwelker. Sam, what, in your recollection, now,

just your recollection, what kind of a role was Army intelligence

playing with the Anti-Castro activities at the time? I am a

little puzzled just as to why the role was even there at all in

what they were doing.

What existed then that does not exist now in terms of

Army intelligence, of what mission they had?

Mr. Halpern. Army intelligence was to get tactical or

strategic intelligence from clandestine sources, and they were

in there trying to do as much as they could, getting intelligence

on Cuba and what the soviets might be doing on cuba.

Mr. Johnston. But if they were working with a group

such as Alpha 66, it was more, it would get into the paramilitary

covert field, would it not?

Mr. Halpern.

It would.

Senator Schweiker.

Who would have been directing that

Army intelligence setup at that time?

Mr. Halpern. I don't remember who it was, and I don't

remember who the chief of the intelligence unit was at that

time, and again, they may have been dealing with Alpha 66

for intelligence purposes, and Alpha 66 could have been using

some of that money that they got for paramilitary.

Senator Schweiker. For paramilitary

purposes.

MI. Halpern. In other words, I'm not saying the Army hau

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control over their people as we did over

some of our Cuban

groups in the course of our activities.

Senator Schweiker. But they could have been using them

for intelligence purposes and not for paramilitary purposes.

Mr. Halpern. That's correct, but even intelligence

purposes and this is one of the reasons why we finally offered

the Army to run our boats with their agents, put our agents

aboard, so that the Army wouldn't have to A, create its own

capability, or use Alpha 66 or any other kind of boats in the

area, so that they would have a source of boats, namely, us.

Senator Schweiker. In other words, you eventually worked

out an agreement with them?

Mr. Halpern. Oh, sure, we worked with them.. As I say,

we helped -

Senator Schweiker. When would that have been? When did

the agreement come out, roughly?

Mr. Halpern. Oh, '63, '64, something like that.

Senator Schweiker. And this was to avoid duplication

andl

overlap?

Mr. Halpern. Overheating areas.

Senator Schweiker. And your deal was to provide what?

Mr. Halpern. We provided radios, radio training, and ls.

the ferry service.

Senator Schweiker. The boats.

Mr. Halpern. The boats.

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WAND A PAUL

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Senator Schweiker For Whatever kind of Intelligence

operations they were carrying on.

Mr. Halpern. That is correct.

They got some Intelligence

out of the operations, too, just as we did.

Senator Schweiker. Well, In those operations did they do

some paramilitary work or nöt?

Mr. Halpern.. Not that I know of.

Senator Schweiker. Primarily Intelligence.

Mr. Halpern. Primarily intelligence, yes, sir.

Senator Schweiker. Do you recall this famous picture of

the guy entering the embassy in Mexico City that nobody can

identify?

Mr. Halpern. (Nods in the affirmative.)

Senator Schweiker. What's your recollection of what happered

•there?

Was he ever identified? Did they ever find -

Mr. Halpern. Not that I know of. I remember we kicked

this around in bull sessions and lunches and what have you, but

how and when and where and why, we never came up with any

answers.

Senator Schweiker. And do you have recollection of the lie

detector test that was given to the Nicaraguan, Alvarado, as

to whether or not he in fact was lying of telling the truth

about $6500 going from a black Cuban to Oswald, Alvarada?

Mr. Halpern.

No, sir, I don't have

any recollection of that

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at all And the polygraph ls not the

CO

everybody's

prayerreither

I was present in the eatly days of

the use

of

ait.

the polygraph when an Indonesian officer was

here on a trip,

and one of the show and tell was to show him the polygraph

and how it operates. And they tested it on him. He agreed

to be tested. And they gave him a box, a little cardboard

box with a key In it, and they said, take the

• key out. so he

took the key out and he held it in his hand. And then the

question is, were you given a box with a key in it? And not

a blip. Did you take the key out of the box? No. Not a

blip..and.so on.:.

so the use of the polygraph is a tool, it's an extra file

check, it's an extra drawer that you have to look in, but it

is not the be all and end all of all questions.

I mean, I saw this happen.

Senator Schweiker. So you are a disbeliever.

Mr. Halpern. I am a believer in that as long as you use

It as another file check and not as the answer, and this is why

people say he's on polygraph, he's off the polygraph. That

is fine. You've got to use it, but don't believe everything

that comes off of that.

And these polygraph operators have learned

a lot since

them. What I'm talking

about goes-back to about 1950, and in

20 odd years they have learned a lot in terms of trying to

equate

a persons mores, his social background, his upbringing,

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his whole society withithe polygraphe

And. we

have known. of

cases where Soviet agents dispatched from the Soviet Union have

passed through polygraphs just like a breeze, no problem.

• So it can be done. And it is a matter. of well, the

Hindus have been able to control their breathing and respiration

rates and so on, and people can be trained.

So when you mention something about a Nicaraguan being

on a polygraph, it just brought back to mind that's not the

only thing that you have to look at.

Mr. Johnston. What about the other side? If the polygraph

indicates deception, I assume you put more reliability on

that.

MI. Halpern. No, not necessarily, not necessarily.

At

least I don't, and I'm no polygraph operator, but not necessaril/.

To me it is an important check

and it should be done, but

it has no greater weight of no lesser weight than good human

sources or documents.

Senator Schweiker.

Well, we want to thank you, sam.

We think you have been very helpful, and we certainly

appreciate it. Nice seeing you

again.

(Whereupon, at 11:25 o'clock a.m., the hearing in the

above-entitled

matter was concluded.)

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## Page 65

May 3, 1976

n Trasocifit

Memorandum For:

Clerk,

Senate Select Committee

on

Intelligence Activitiea

Subject:

Corrections to Transcript of

Testimony of Mr. Samuel Halpern

given on 22 April 1976

The following is a li8t of corrections to the transcript of

my centimony given on 22 April 1976.

p. 3

1.

17

1. 24

"FitzGerald" vice "Pitzgerald"

ditto:

p. 4 1. 20

p. 5 1. 18

p. 6.1.

2

1.

7

1. 20

p. 13 1. 1

1. 13

p. 14 1. 24

p. 15 1. 6

1.

1.

15

16

p. 17 1:

7

17

p. 18 1. 17

p. 19

1.

1.

1.

1.

7

13

22

24

p. 41 1.

24

ditto

ditto

ditto

'Mr. King, J. C. King" vice "Mr. Cane, J. C. Cane"

"owning"

vice "holding"

add "Mr. Halpern" at beginning of line as

responding to query of Senator Schweiker at

end of p. 12.

"was actually to take" vice "was to take

actually"

"FitzGerald" vice "Fitzgerald"

ditto

"Agency's" vice "Agencies"

"FitzGerald" vice "Fitzgerald"

ditto

ditto

ditto

ditto

ditto

ditto

ditto

"put" vice "atart"

HH

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## Page 66

p. 22 1. 5 "seriously" vice "serleg"

p. 27 1. 10

"'1n" vice "on"

p. 32 1. 3

"ken" vice "chin"

p. 35 1. 24

"PitzGerald" vice "fitzgerald"

p.

36 1.

9

1.

11

1.

18

1.

20

ditto

ditto

ditto

ditto

37

1.

1.

1.

9

22

p.

38

1.

1.

11

12

19

ditto

ditto

ditto

"where" vice "when"

"FitzGerald" vice "Fitzgerald"

ditto

po

39

1.

2

16

ditto

ditto

p. 40

1.

1.

12

17

ditto

ditto

p. 431.

1.

21

1.

24

ditto

"Ken" vice "King"

"FItzGerald" vice "Fitzgerald"

p. 44 1. 10

ditto

p. 45 1. 18 "In" vice "on"

p. 47 1. 2 and 3

should read "...the Technical Services

Division which was down

there..." or

delete the word "was" on line 3

p. 50 1.

17

1. 22

"FitzGerald" vice "Fitzgerald"

ditto

p. 51 1. 21

"Marellug" vice "Morellus"

p. 53 1. 21

"FitzGerald" vice "Fitzgerald"

p. 54 1.

3

1.

1.

8

ditto

ditto

ditto

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## Page 67

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p. 55 1. 3

the word "automation" is obviously

incorrect

1.

23 : "FitzGerald" vice "Fitzgerald" and "whom"

vice "who"

p. 56 1. 8 " "FItzGerald" vice "Fitzgerald"

"chelr" vice

"our"

p. :

58

"or B use"

vice

"or use"

P.

60 1.

23

"then" vice "them"

0. 1

Samuel Halpen

Samuel Halpern

2202 Popkins Lane

Alexandria, Virginia 22307

765-1388

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