INSTITUTIONAL PLANNING
Originator: OSD
Document date: 03/13/1962
Document type: MEMORANDUM

## Page 1

202-10001-10221

2023 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

Date : 08/04/98

Page : I

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY

: JCS

RECORD NUMBER

: 202-10001-10221

RECORDS SERIES

: FOIA SERIES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

: DOC 222

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR

: OSD

FROM

TO :

TITLE : INSTITUTIONAL PLANNING

DATE : 03/13/62

PAGES: 16

SUBJECTS : MONGOOSE

DOCUMENT TYPE : MEMORANDUM

CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET

RESTRICTIONS : 1B, 1C

CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/30/98

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : Reviewed by OSD,

CIA,

State.

NO JOINT STAFF OBJECTION

TO DECLASSIFICATION

RECURES CONCURRENCE OF

DATE:

MAR

2016

[R] - ITEM

IS

RESTRICTED

HN 50955 DocId: 32424952 Page 1

---

## Page 2

Dupe

TOP SECRET

216,

The Department of State releases this decument

in part and postpones release of portion(s) of it

under the provisions of the JFK Assassination

Records Collection Act of 1992 (PL 102-526)

Reviewed on

1/30/98 Mja SLate concuro in C/A excision

Portion(s) Postponed Under 6 (1) (B)(C)

4 word "Baitesh" on p. 3

SENSITIVE

13 March 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale

Subject: Institutional Planning, Operation Mongoose

As desired by General Taylor on 12 March, the planning for Opera-

tion Mongoose is now prepared on a format of separate planning for each

‹Department and Agency involved. Revised planning along this line is

submitted herewith.

Activitiea already approved are marked with an asterisk. Further

planning must await determination of policy questions raised in my

12 March 1962 memorandum to the members of the Special Group (Aug»

mented).

Planning transmitted to you by my memorandum of l0 March 1962

should be returned to me for destruction as a matter of security.

Attachments

Distribution:

Copy:

4

6/7

8

9/10 -

To:

General Taylor

The Attorney General

Secretary Rusk/Deputy Under Secretary Johnson

Secretary McNamara/Deputy Secretary Gilpatric

General Lemnitzer (through General Craig)

Mr. McCone (through Mi. Helms/Mr. Harvey)

Mr.

Murrow/Mr. Wilson

Chief of Operations

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

DEGLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

AS SANITIZED 23 JUNE 9 Smhh

6(1) (B)(C)

OSO:

ArO OBVECTION

23 VUNE98

Excluded from automatic

regrading: DOD Directive

5200.10 does not apply.

DISAOFOISRI 87 TS 104

17u0R-155

Document contains

pages.

Copy No.: of 10 copies. Series A.

SENSITIVE

TOP SECRET

#2ZZFP

NN 50955 DooId: 32424952 Page 2

---

## Page 3

PHASE I (CLA)

ACTIVITY

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

1. * Dispatch one intelligence

agent operation to key area

selected by ClA.

L. 15 March 1962

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

Collect and report intelligence on anti-

regime attitudes, on potential resist..

ance, and on vulnerabilities and

strengths of Communist security

system.

There is a risk that this action will disclose this U.S.

intelligence activity within Cuba.

Selected personnel

are being intensively trained.

This firet team has 2

agents.

An area in which resistance has been reported

has been selected.

Agent operations must stay alive.

make useful contacts, and report securely to CIA.

Physical risk to personnel is substantial, due to lack

of intelligence. First reports from first team are

expected by the end of March, while reports from the

second and third teams, dispatched in March, are ex-

pected to start in April.

Many of the agents infiltrated into Cuba will be trained

for paramilitary skille as well as intelligence collection,

with the thought that they will be in place inside Cuba

and ready to act whenever paramilitary operationa are

decided upon. However,. ClA has noted that, once the

agenta are inside Cuba, they cannot be controlled

effectively from outside Cuba, although every effort :

will be made to attempt such control.

These stall intelligence officere may also be used in the

future for communications of agent handling, if future

developments warrant.

2. 3 third-country intelligence

stall officers in place in

Havana.

To collect intelligence.

3. Z third-country trained intel-

ligence officere, readied to

travel in Cuba for temporary

periods.

To collect intelligence.

Items marked by anterik were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962.

2000799999949

HM 60955

DocId: 32424952

Page

---

## Page 4

concuro

1. 15 March 1962 (cont)

ACTIVITY

4. * Caribbean Admission Center,

Opa-Locka, Florida, fully

activated by 15 March 1962.

PURPOSE

To collect intelligence required for the

operations, to identily and earmark in.

telligence assets as refugees arrive,

and to provide security against Com-

munist agent operatione.

5, t

Periodic intelligence esti

mates, as required by progress

of operations.

To up-date NIE 85-62, 8o that current

estimates can be considered at national

policy levels,

CONSIDERATIONS

This operation, in response to early recommendation

as essential by the Chief of Operations, is moving at

utmost speed to become fully active by 15 March, with

a new building completed and occupied,

and with a

staff of 43 at work.

Operations commenced 15 February

and, as of 9 March, 33 people were active at the Center.

(ClA responsibility, with support by Defense, Justice,

State, USIA.)

As the operationa develop, there will be both increased

intelligence collection and a need for as current an In

telligence Estimate as the U.S. can produce meaningfully.

It is likely that a more informal method of producing an

Intelligence Estimate for use at the national level (than

now governing the issuance of NIE's) may have to be

CLA is now publishing daily intelligence aum-

maries on Cuba and is planning a bi monthly or weekly

report summing up intelligence for this purpose. (CLA

responsibility, with support of othere as required.)

OTHER OPERATIONS

* Continue negotiating for

British help in contaminating

locomotive lubricants.

To cripple Cuba's rail transportation.

British assistance is required to undertake a successful

sabotage of Cuban locomotives, through contaminating

lubricante. It is expected that a minimum of 3 montha

is required before locomotives in Cuba start breaking

down, once the contaminant is introduced.

16 - 31 March 1962

INTELLICENCE OPERATIONS

7. * Two teama of agente dia-

patched to Cuba:

To collect intelligence.

* Item marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962

One team of 4 and one team of 3 agents. Both teams includ

personnel who have had resistance training and some past

experience.

TOD SEERET SENSITIVE

HH 50955

DocId:

32424952

Page

---

## Page 5

ACTIVITY

Establish 2 additional third

country resident agente in

Cuba.

%By 1 March, have 105 agents

selected and 50 agents trained.

PURPOSE

To collect intelligence.

CONSIDERATIONS

To ready agent operationa.

10. * Develop intelligence potential

of Cuban "colonies" in U.S.

'To exploit the intelligence possi-

bilities of former residente of

Cuba (including U.S. citizens) now

in the United States.

11. * Develop additional interroga-

tion centers in other areas by

31 March 1962.

To collect intelligence in a Latin

atmosphere, at dillerent levele thai

now seem possible in the continental

U.S., to spot additional intelligence

asseta and to provide security

against Communiat agent operationa.

Elfectiveness and numbers are dependent upon purpose

of recruitment, nature of training, and policy decisions

controlling these factors.

If the recruitment and train

ing are for resistance activities,

the task of recruit

ment and training will be much less diflicult than if

they are limited to intelligence-collection purposes

only.

There are "colonies" in Washington, D.C., and other

U.S. cities which are "little Cubas," Family, Church,

and business interests provoke unusual, personal ties

inside Cuba for some of these

residents; a real potential

exists for collection of intelligence not otherwise avail-

able. (FBI support and coordination in basic in thie

elfort.)

Ae Opa-Locka becomes fully activated, CLA will a

other interrogation centere as promptly as feasibl

center is being activated in Spain. Negotiationg w

local authorities are being undertaken to activate centers,

il possible, in Mexico City, Caracas

Aruba.

San

Juan, Puerto Rico, and Santiago,

re being aur

veyed for possible centere. (CLA

sibility with sup-

port by others as necessary.)

OTHER OPERATIONS

None.

* Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962.

HW 50955

DooId: 32424952

Page

---

## Page 6

ACTIVITY

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

12.* Two teams of agents dis -

patched to Cuba.

65 third-country agents, tem-

oyarily travelling legally, in

uba.

OTHER OPERATIONS

None.

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

To collect intelligence.

To collec intelligence.

Number of agents undetermined as yet.

16 - 30 April 1962

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

14. * Two teams of agents die-

patched to Cuba.

1Sj ore thir sountry lagai..

OTHER OPERATIONS

None.

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

16. * Two teams of agenta dis -

patched to Cuba.

17| 3 legal resident agents in

Cuba.

To collect intelligence.

To collect intelligence.

Teams uf 2 to 5 agents each, depending

on circum

stances.

Possible use for communications and support

1 - 15 May 1962

To collect intelligence.

Teams of 2 to 5 agents each, depending on circum-

stances.

To collect intelligence

Items marked by asterlak were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962.

50955

DooId: 32424952

Page

---

## Page 7

18

PURPOSE

To collect intelligence.

CONSIDERATIONS

19

One or possibly two trained

staff intelligence officers

(пол-U.S.) resident in

Havana*

Ten legal travellera in Cuba.

To collect Intelligence.

"Legal travel" means persons are in Cuba viaiting,

some for extended periods.

OTHER OPERATIONS

None.

16 - 31 May 1962

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS.

20, * Four teams of agento die-

patched to Cuba,

To collect intelligence.

Teams of 2 to 5 agente each, depending on circum-

Blances.

CIA will be attempting to cover as much

of Cuba as it can.

Difficult

21. One possible singleton agent

operation, lale of Pines.

To collect intelligence.

[Four additional resident agents To collect intelligence.

inside Cuba.

CIA will be attempting to cover as much of Cuba

as it can. The main factor of determining location

of resident agente is to find a place where a trained

agent can stay viable.

23. Five "legal travel" agents

inside Cuba..

To collect intelligence.

24. By 3l May, selection of 50

additional agente and train

35 additional agents:

To ready agent operations.

Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

NH

50955

DocId: 32424952

Page 7

---

## Page 8

MAYU (Cong

ACTIVITY

OTHER OPERATIONS

25.

By 31 May, develop a plan for

counterfeiting currency, which

would not be implemented until

a decision was made to debase

the economy in Cuba.

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

To debase the economy of Cuba.

A counterfeiting program is being developed. Neede

are to staff the proposal thoroughly to permit a policy

decision to be made and lo stall out a feasible distribu

tion plan. It la expected that no decision to impleme

such a plan would be made immediately.

1 June - 31 July 1962

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

26. * 10 to 15 teams of agente dis

patched to Cuba.

To collect intelligence.

27, Reinforce and resupply agente

and teams previously placed or

activated inside Cuba.

To reinforce and resupply, as

possible.

28. By 31 July, select 100 additional To ready agent operationa.

agente and train 70 additional

agents.

29

Collection of paychological

material.

To provide documentary and photo -

graphic evidence of the tyranny of

the Communist regime.

30. * Survey airfields, military

installations, and communica-

tion centers.

31.

By the end of July, have

operations to penetrate the

regime.

To provide current intelligence on

key security resources of the

regime.

To provide current intelligence on the

actions and intentions of the regime.

Number of agents in each team and selection of areas

will be determined by developments of the previous

actions and by conditions.

Numbers, areas, and supplies are completely dependent

upon conditions at the time, and upon policy approval of

methods to be used (that is, if air delivery can be used,

or if this activity muat depend upon maritime delivery).

This evidence will be used by ClA and USIA to neutralize

the influence of Castro and the Communists in the West-

ern Hemisphere.

This is conceived of as ground surveys, and the possible

recruitment of military and other official personnel as

intelligence agents.

This requires attempts to place trained agents inside

government organizationa, or to defect officials "in place.

"ems marked by asterick were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962

50955

DooId: 32424952

Page

---

## Page 9

ACTIVITY

OTHER OPERATIONS

None.

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

32. * Comprehensive and

definitive intelligence

report on attitudes and

abilities of the popula.

tion inside Cuba.

End of July 1962

To provide the Special Group (HICC 54l2

augmented) with a hard estimate of the

Cuban situation.

The intelligence estimate will provide a vital basis

a Special Group recommendation on whether or not the

U.S. should undertake actions to make maximum use

of Cuban resources as a justification for decisive U.S.

military intervention.

Items marked by asteriok were

approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

00955

DocId: 32424952

Page 9

---

## Page 10

OPERATION MONGOOSE

PHASE Il (State)

ACTIVITY

Make political decision to

intervene with U.S. mili-

tary forces in Cubas

2. ,U.S. officiale and news

relcases on policy declaion.

PURPOSE

To overtly engage the U.S. preatige in aup..

port of a Cuban revolt to an extent that would

require the U.S, to become involved in assur

ing the ultimate victory of a Cuban revolution;

thie involvement must include the commitment

of U.S, military forces as necessary to achieve

such victory.

Indicate policy and commit prestige of U.S.

government to appropriate support of the

Cuban people vs. Communist dictatorship.

CONSIDERATIONS

This political decision will require considera

tion of the legal and moral factors, assessed

in the perspective of world opinion and U..S.

security interests.

Latin American leaders,

government and public, in

support.

Commit national prestige and power of Latin

political, intellectual, labor, youth, religious,

military leadera to cause of Cuban people

againat Communiat regime. For local public

impact, international support, and morale of

resistance within Cuba.

Top officials of Executive and Legislative

branches to make timcly statements.

This

should encourage similar attitude by leadere

of other natione and help spirit of Cubans.

Development of sympathy leading to favorable

opinion about outside support for Cuban people

is a goal.

Timely and

encouraged

origin, othe

CLA assets,

USIA is involv

rig public statements will be

Maximum publicity at country of

countries and into Cuba by

Support of State action by ClA and

AW 50955

DooId: 32424952

Page

10

---

## Page 11

OPERATION MONGOOSE

PHASE II (Defense)

ACTIVITY

Alter political decision,

provide maximum U.S.

support to resistance light-

ers in Cuba who have been

#potted in Phase 1

Alter political decision,

commit U.S, military forces

in accordance with contingency

plane.

PURPOSE

To assure that Cuban "[reedom-fightera"

are fully equipped to attack the Commun

ist regime's military and police forces;

as part of the assurance, the U.S. support

must include the immediate commitment

of U.S, leadership personnel in combat

operations.

To intervene as required to achieve victory

for the revolutionary forces.

CONSIDERATIONS

DOD support planning, stock piling, readying o

equipment and personnel for commitment must

be developed with maximum lead time.

close

coordination with ClA is required to insure maxi.

mum readiness to meet the immediate neede of

the revolutionary forces.

The hazard of viability

in preparing for these support activities makes

security a paramount consideration.

Consistent with security aspect, U.S. milil

forces are placed in a state of readinesa to

accomplish the assigned mission.

The military

forces must be prepared to assiet in the mainte

nance of order until the revolutionary government

is in control.

NH 50955 DocId: 32124952

Page 11

---

## Page 12

OPERATION MONGOOSE

PHASE 11 (CIA)

ACTIVITY

Support U.S, military

actions in Cuba,

PURPOSE

To provide intelligence, guerrilla action, and

Cuban political-paychological support of U,S.

military operations.

CONSIDERATIONS

ClA capabilities must be continuouoly assessed

and considered in the development of military

planning. Executive responsibility for direct

ing the use of covert assete must be clearly

understood as resting in the U.S. military

commander of the U.S. intervention, as in

agreed-upon wartime operatione.

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

HH 50955

DocId: 32424952

Page 12

---

## Page 13

OPERATION MONGOOSE

PHASE II (USIA)

ACTIVITY

Increase news emphasie

on Cuban revolt and inter=

vention from the outside

to help the Cuban move -

ment

PURPOSE

To neutralize opposition to U.S, policy and,

1l possible, gain support for U.S. policy in

the Western Hemisphere.

CONSIDERATIONS

Optimum exploitation of news material avail-

able to ClA and Defense is essential.

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

NW

50955

DocId: 32424952

Page 13

---

## Page 14

PHASE 1 (State)

ACTIVITY

Political and economic

operatione to isolate Castro

regime and neutralize ita

influence in the Western

Hemisphere.

March - July 1962

PURPOSE

Activities in consonance with U.S, policy

established after the April 196l failure in Cuba.

CONSIDERATIONS

These activities will have some negative impact

on the Cuban people, who are part of the largel, but

are consistent with an overt policy of isolating Castro

and neutralizing his influence in the Western Hemis-

phere.

They are noted here,

for the sake of com.

pleteness, as actions now being carried out by the

Department of State under other existing programs

and projects.

50955

DooId: 32424952

Page 11

---

## Page 15

OPERATION MONGOOSE

PHASE I (Defense)

ACTIVITY

Expand special intelligence and

other sensitive intelligence cover

age of Cuba as required.

2. Develop the means of the Inter-

American Defense Board to pro.

vide substantive intelligence on

Cuban activities.

3. Provide logistic and personnel

support for CIA intelligence

apesationa into Cuba.

4.

The Joint Chiels of Stall will con-

tinue the planning and essential

preliminary actions to assure a

decisive U.S. military capability

for intervention,

March July 1962

PURPOSE

To develop increased "hard" intelligence.

To add to the U.S. intelligence coverage

on Cuba and possibly to strengthen the

concern of latin American stales for

security.

To ensure optimum implementation of the

intelligence plan.

To overthrow the Communist government

of Cuba.

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

CONSIDERATIONS

Use of cays near Cuba entail unacceptable security

riske when vulnerable to Guban landing parties.

(Defense, in collaboration with ClA.)

Sensitivity of using this multi-national organiza-

tion clearly restricts potential use by USA.

Visi

bility of operational interest is an acceptable riak

here.

The intelligence plan requires support by U.S.

military manpower and equipment.

The U.S, military intervention inust be conducted

as quickly as possible and with sufficient force

so that the Communist Bloc's ability to take

effective counter measures is reduced to a

minimum.

AW 50955

DocId: 32424952 Page 15

---

## Page 16

JPELATION MONGOOSE

PHASE I (USIA)

ACTIVITY

Propaganda programs to leolate

Castro regime and neutralize its

influence in the Weatern Hemis

phere

March - July 1962

PURPOSE

Activities in consonance with U.S.

policy established after the April

1961 failure in Cuba.

CONSIDERATIONS

These activities will have some general impact

upon Castro support and influence in the Western

Hemisphere.

There will be some new material

for use as the Phase I intelligence operations

produce but essentially the program is a continua-.

tion of that already in effect.

#0955

DocId: 32424952

Page

16

---

## Page 17

T-O-P .::

S-E-C-R-E_T

*Teams = 2 to 5 bodies

31 May 1962

31 July 1962

30 Sept. 1962

30 Nov. 1962

28 Feb. 1963

TEAMS*

INFILTRATED

13

23 to 28

28 to 33

33 to 38

48

to 53

3RD COUNTRY

RES, AGENTS

3RD COUNTRY

STAFF I0'S

10+5 temp.Leg. 51n/Zready

Travirs.

15

7

20

20

7

30

9

T-O-P: S-E-C-R-ET

LEGAL

TRAVELERS

AGENTS

SELECTED

30-5 temp.

155

AGENTS

TRAINED

85

25

255

155

35

40

50

255

255

255

255

155

165

NW 50955

DooId:32424952

Page

17

---