CUBA: THE EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE CONCERNING COMMUNIST SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES
Originator: CIA
Document date: 00/00/0000
Document type: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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198-10007-10009

2023 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK Assassination System

Date:

Identification Form

6/24/201

Agency Information

AGENCY: ARMY

RECORD NUMBER :

198-10007-10009

RECORD SERIES: CALIFANO PAPERS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

Document Information

ORIGINATOR:

FROM:

10 :

TITLE:

CIA

CUBA: THE EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE CONCERNING COMMUNIST SUBVERSIVE

ACTIVITIES

DATE: 00/00/0000

PAGES:

SUBJECTS

COMMUNIST SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES

INTELLIGENCE EXCHANGE, LATIN AMERICA

DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION: Secret

RESTRICTIONS: 1B

CURRENT STATUS : Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 02/10/1998

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS :

Califano Papers, Box 3, Folder 10. Draft paper re: the exchange of intelligence concerning Cuban

subversive activities.

Department of the Army EO 13526

A Declassify

/ D Exclude I Exempt

Authority-

= Refer To -

Review Date DAUG< ByNuh/Callna

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CUBA

THE. EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE

CONCERNING COMMUNIST SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES

ey 16 mar63, 8u8

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GROUP - 1

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWN-

• GRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

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TABLE OF CONTENIS

I. Introduction

II. Nature and Scope of the Problem

1. Limiting Factors

2. Current Exchange Arrangements

III. Actions Recommended

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CUBA

THE EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE

CONCERNING COMMUNIST SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES

I. Introduction

In combatting Castro-Communist subversion through-

out Latin America,

there is a fundamental requirement

for intelligence

-- a

requirement which involves

the

timely acquisition and processing of information as well

as Its rapid dissemination, on a selective basis,

to

countries concerned. While efforts are now being made

by CIA, AID, and the U,S. Military Services to improve

Latin

American intelligence systems, success thus far has

been limited, and much remains to be done.

It is not

with this broad problem, however, that this paper is

primarily concerned, but rather with the narrower matter

of the need for a stronger program of exchanging essen-

tial information regarding Communist subversion in Latin

America among those who need to know it.

II. The Nature and Scope of the Problem

1. Limiting Factors

a. There are many inhibitions which tend to

discourage the exchange of intelligence on an

international basis, even among allies. National

privacy with regard

to the inner workings of an

intelligence system must be preserved. Com-

pounding the problem further, where Latin America

is concerned, is the divisive influence of the

long history of rivalries, wars, jealousies and

disputes which have characterized relations among

the nations concerned.

The wounds of past con-

flicts among pairs and groupings of nations are

not completely healed.

There is lingering hos-

tility between Peru and Ecuador deriving from

cheir boundary war

Chile and Bolivia continue

it odds over the Rio Lauca and the question of

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Bolivian access to the sea, and, even now,

Nicaraguan insurgents are harbored within

borders of both Costa Rica and Honduras.

could hardly be expected that these countries

would be eager to exchange intelligence on a

full and frank basis.

b. Beyond this, Latin America is not a homo-

geneous entity in social, political, or economic

terms, and attitudes towara the castro-Communist

subversive menace vary widely.

unifled approach toward exchange. or intelligence

concerning this menace, therefore, cannot be re-

c. Additional impediments to intelligence ex-

change are the generally low level of competence

of most Latin American intelligence services,

their lack of rapia, secure means of communication,

the absence of adequate security systems; and the

lack of security consciousness.

Deficiencies in

security

safeguards must necessarily limit the ex-

change of intelligence obtained covertly by any

of the nations involved, and particularly the

States, which has the most sophisticated

system and hence the greatest need for protection.

d. These defects promise to persist, since

the governments of some countries have little desire

to develop a competent career security service.

There is a fear that the existence of an efficient

service would constitute a threat to further ac-

tivities of members of the existing governments

at such time as they might find themselves out of

power:

Moreover, many Latin American intelligence.

services tend to label as "subversives" those of

their own nationals resident in other countries

who are opposed to the existing government.

e. These realities all underscore the fact

that multilateral intelligence exchange must be

approached on a most circumscribed basis. It

should not be concluded, however, that nothing

of value can

be accomplished multilaterally.

With proper definition, limiting the problem of

exchange to matters directly related to communist

subversive activities, such as the movement to

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and from Cuba of subversives, the production and

movement of propaganda materials which threaten

Internal stability, the movement of arms,

and the

movement of funds, It should be practicable to

marshal a useful measure of cooperation.

In

pursuing this effort, It will be important to

draw a sharp distinction between

gence gained by covert means and information

ay covert one

secret intelli-

obtained openly.

The former involves the require-

ment to protect

national secrets both as to

sources and acquisition methods employed.

The

latter, which can be of great value, can

be ex-

changed

without fear of compromise.

2. Current Exchange Arrangements

nations. There is a

• Limited amount of informal

exchange, often on a basis of personal relation-

ships between government officials having a

community of interest with respect to a parti-

cular matter.

b. The Central Intelligence Agency has

estab

lished working liaison arrangements in some Latin

American countries where such relations have been

considered to be in the best interest of the United

States.

Most of the intelligence concerning sub-

version in Latin America available to the CIA is

derived from covert operations or through contacts

with another intelligence or security service.

This inhibits the passing of such information

to

There is, however,

a substantial amount of intelligence available

from overt or non-sensitive sources which can be

provided to other countries. In 1962, CIA received

information reports from 26

services with which

liaison is maintained in Latin America and released

reports to 35 recipients. Intelligence items ex-

changed included collated studies, weekly intelli-

gence reviews, name

traces and travel reports.

c. The U.S. Army, through Its attaches,

currently

has an informal arrangement involving bilateral

exchanges of intelligence with Argentina, Colombia,

¿cuador; Uruguay, Peru; Paraguay and Venezuela.

Information provided by the Army has been concerned

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with subversive personalities, communist infiltra-

tion, weapons movements and related matters.

Reciprocal intelligence received has been of small

value.

The Army also provides selected information

on subversive activities to Brazil, Chile, Guatemala

and Mexico, without reciprocation.

The Navy has

established a Navy-to-Navy program for the exchange

of intelligence among nine South American navies, the

Mexican Navy and the U.S. Navy.

d. Exchanges of information are also effected

from

time to time through channels of the Department

of State.

e. As yet, however, the program for the provision

by United States agencies of information on subver-

sion to Latin American governments has not been

developed to an adequate degree.

Since the United

States possesses the most extensive acquisition

capabilities, as well as the only secure and re-

1lable means

of rapid communication throughout Latin

America (currently in process of improvement), the

development of an integrated United States system

for bilateral exchange offers the greatest possi-

bility of achieving the results desired.

I. United States experience in the matter of intel-

ligence exchange in Latin America, and in other areas

of the world, has led to the conclusion that bilateral

arrangements

are more fruitful than multilateral

arrangements such as those established within the

framework of NATO,

CENTO and SEATO.

Nevertheless,

this experience has shown also that multilateral

arrangements can be of some use, particularly in

creating an awareness of the need for intelligence

exchange.

g. The concept of an exchange of information among

members of the AS with regard to subversive activi-

ties has been put forward at numerous Inter-American

meetings, but has not been implemented, largely for

the reasons set forth in Section II.I.

Under the

Punta del Este decisions, the OAS members were

urged to cooperate in strengthening their capacity

to counteract threats or acts of aggression, sub-

version or other dangers to peace and security.

The Council of

the OAS is charged with maintaining

vigilance over Castro-Communist subversion, and a

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"Special Consultative Committee on Security (SCCS)"

is established

to give technical advice on request

to governments and the Council on matters relating

to. subversion.

All American governments have been

asked to furnish information on Castro-Comminist

activities to serve as the basis for studies and

recommendations by the Council of the AS on how

to counteract them.

Since the Punta del. Este meet-

ing, the OAS has been making slow progress in the

countersubversion field, but there has as yet been

no significant exchange of intelligence through its

machinery.

h. The Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) has

also

demonstrated an awareness of the need for

exchanging intelligence regarding communist sub-

version.

Annex

4 of the General Military Plan

prepared by the IADB requests the Americän States

to report information to the Board and to establish

agreements among themselves for exchanging informa-

tion of collective interest.

The United States has

approved the General Military Plan, but similar

action has not been taken by all member countries.

1. This brief summary serves to illustrate that

there is much room for expansion of bilateral in-

telligence exchange arrangements among the Latin

American nations themselves, which is now minimal

at best, as well as a need

to create an expanded

program for bilateral intelligence exchange be-

tween the United States and individual countries,

and finally, a requirement to develop the possibili-

of a multilateral approach within the recog-

nized limitations involvea.

III. Actions Recommended

telligence conducted by CIA, DOD, and other U.s. agencies,.

where it is found possible to establish appropriate

arrangements for the exchange of selected information con-

sistent with security requirements.

2. Complete current priority project to evaluate

feasibility ana desirability of establishing military

intelligence centers at the headquarters of the Caribbean

Command and the Caribbean Sea Frontier, Atlantic Command,

for further dissemination of intelligence as appropriate

in conjunction with our Military Alerting System, for

rapid processing and dissemination when appropriate, of

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intelligence on subversive activity directly to the

countries concerned through the U.S. Embassies therein.

3. Increase and expedite the existing flow of in-

telligence on subversion from CIA and the other elements

of the American Embassies in Latin America to Caribbean

Command as well as to CIA headquarters for further

dissemination as appropriate.

4. Increase the dissemination to Latin American

governments, by all U.s. agencies concerned, of unclass1-

fled studies, reports and other non-sensitive information

concerning Castro-Communist subversion.

5. Encourage Latin American countries to engage in

bilateral exchange of intelligence on Castro-Communist

subversive activities.

6. Continue the development at high priority of

U.S. communications in Latin America.

7. Increase where feasible emphasis on the provision

of U.S. Intelligence advisors to Latin American countries.

Discourage their employment of intelligence advisors from

nations other than the U.S.

8. Intensify and increase as applicable existing AID,

CIA, and Military programs for the training and equipping

of Latin American Internal security and intelligence services.

Establish such programs in additional countries where 1t

is found to be in the best interests of the United States

and

acceptable to the country concerned.

9. Undertake action in the OAs to stimulate govern-

ments to keep the Councfl and the ScS fully informed on

a continuing basis of the nature and incidence: of sub-

versive activities in their respective countries.

10. Encourage Latin American countries to approve

the General Military Plan of the Inter-American Defense

Board (IADB), and, in accordance with Annex 4 thereof,

furnish to the IADB intelligence information and estimates

concerning Castro-Communist subversive activities.

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11. Undertake to arrange for regional meetings of

senior Intelligence and security service representatives

of Latin American countries and the United States for

the purpose of fostering the exchange of intelligence

concerning Castro-Communist subversive activities and

developing the necessary mechanisms and procedures there-

for.

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