Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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176-10036-10167

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA

RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10167

RECORD SERIES : National Security Files

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : DOS

FROM : Ambassador Lodge

TO : Rusk

TITLE :

DATE :

PAGES : 2

SUBJECTS :

DOCUMENT TYPE :

CLASSIFICATION :

RESTRICTIONS :

CURRENT STATUS :

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000

OPENING CRITERIA :

Cables. Box 2

COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 201: Vietnam, 10/29/63-10/31/63, State

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at 51714116661

•VERSION

Nuv Ba la

SOZTOP SECRET

SECTION QNE OF THREE

2- File

VIA CAS SAIGON 2063 FROM AMBASSADOR LODGE DIG 301030Z

TO SECSTATE WASH EYES ONLY FOR RUSK, MARRIMAN, BALL, HILSMAN, HUGHES

OSD EYES ONLY FOR MCNAMARA, GILPAIRIC; TAYLOR, KURLAK, MR. Wi. BUNDY

WHITE HOUSE/EYES ONLY MCGEORGE BUNDY,

INFO CAS HONLULU FOR ADM FELT EYES ONLY

CIA/EYES ONLY NICONE, CARTER, HELMSTU

REF: : CAS WASHINGTON 79109

17

•WE MUST; OF COURSE, GET BEST POSSIBLE ESTIMATE OF CHANCE OF

COUP'S SUCCESS AND THIS ESTIMATE MUST COLOR OUR THINKING, BUT

DO NOTITHINK WE HAVE THE POWER TO DELAY OR DISCOURAGE A COUP.

DON HAS

MADE IT CLEAR MANY TIMES THAT THIS IS A VIETNAMESE AFFAIR.

IT IS THEORETICALLY POSSIBLE FOR US TO TURN OVER THE INFORMATION

WHICH HAS BEEN GIVEN TO US IN CONFIDENCE TO DIEM AND THIS WOULD

UNDOUBTEDLY STOP THE COUP AND WOULD MAKE TRAITORS OUT OF US.: FOR

PRACTICAL PURPOSES THEREFORE I WOULD SAY THAT VE HAVE VERY LITTLE

INFLUENCE ON WHAT IS ESSENTIALLY A VIETNAMESE AFFAIR. IN ADDITION,

THIS WOULD PLACE THE HEADS OF THE GENERALS, THEIR CIVILIAN SUPPORTERS,

AND LOWER MILITARY OFFICERS ON THE SPOT, THEREBY SACRIFICING

A SIGNIFICANT PORTION OF THE CIVILIAN AND MILITARY LEADERSHIP

NEEDED. TO CARRY THE WAR AGAINST THE VC TO ITS SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION•

AFTER OUR EFFORIS NOT TO DISCOURAGE A COUP AND THIS CHANGE OF HEART,

WE WOULD FORECLOSE ANY POSSIDILITY OF CHANGE OF THE GN FOR THE BETTER.

DIEM/ NHU HAVE DISPLAYED NO INTENTIONS TO DATE OF A DESIRE TO CHANGE

THE TRADITIONAL METHODS OF CONTROL THROUGH POLICE ACTION OR TAKE

ANY RPT ANY ACTIONS WHICH WOULD PREJUDICE THE POWER POSITION OR SOLIDARI-

: undeemine

TY OF IHE NGO FAMILY. THIS, DESPITE OUR HEAVY PRESSURES DIRECTED

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334. IF OUR ATTEMPT TO THWART THIS COUP WERE SUCCESSFUL;

WHICH WE DOUBT, IT IS OUR FIRM ESTIMATE THAT. YOUNGER OFFICERS,

SMALL GROUPS OF MILITARY, WOULD THEN ENGAGE IN AN ABORTIVE ACTION

CREATING CHAOS IDEALLY SUITED TO VC OBJECTIVES.

•2°1

WHILE WE WILL ATTEMPT A COMBINED ASSESSMENT IN A FOLLOWING

MESSAGE, TIME HAS NOT YET PERMITTED. SUSSIANTIVE EXAMINATION OF

THIS MATTER WITH GENERAL HARKINS. MY GENERAL VIEW IS THAT THE

U.So IS TRYING TO. BRING THIS MEDIEVAL COUNTRY INTO THE 20TH :

CENTURY AND THAT WE HAVE MADE CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS -IN MILITARY.

AND ECONOMIC WAYS BUT TO GAIN VICTORY WE MUST ALSO BRING THEM

INTO THE 20TH CENTURY POLITICALLY AND THAT CAN ONLY BE DONE BY

•EITHER A THOROUGH GOING CHANGE IN THE BEHAVIOR. OF THE PRESENT

GOVERNMENT.OR BY ANOTHER GOVERNMENT.

THE VIET CONG PROZLEM IS

PARILY MILITARY BUT IT IS ALSO PARTLY PSYCHOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL.

3. WITH RESPECT TO PARA 3 RET, : I BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD CONTINUE

OUR PRESENT POSITION OF KEEPING HANDS OFF BUT CONTINUE TO MONITOR

AND PRESS FOR MORE DETAILED INFORMATION. CAS HAS BEEN ANALYZING

POTENTIAL COUP FORCES FOR SOME TIME AND

IT IS THEIP. ETIMATE THAT

THE GENERALS HAVE PROBABLY FIGURED THEIP CHANCES PRETTY CLOSELY AND

PROBABLY ALSO EXPECI THAT ONCE THEY BEGIN TO MOVE, NOT ONLY PLANNED

UNITS, BUT OTHER UNITS WILL JOIN THEM. WE BELIEVE THAT VIETNAM'S

BEST GENERALS ARE INVOLVED IN DIRECIING THIS EFFORI.. IF THEY CAN'T :

PULL IT OFF, IT IS DOUBTFUL OTHER MILITARY LEADERSHIP COULD DO SO

SUCCESSFULLY. IT IS UNDERSTANDABLE THAT THE GENERALS WOULD BE RETICENT

TO REVEAL FULL DETAILS. OF THEIR PLAN FOR FEAR OF LEAKS TO THE GVN.

GP-1

•BT

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