## Page 1

File #:

62-116395

Serial Scope:

586- Bulke

Released under the John F. Kennedy

Assassination Records Collection Act of

1992 (44 USC 2107 Note]. Case#:NW

B8E08 Date: 03-18-2025

[

INW 88608 Dgc/d:32989638 Page 1

---

## Page 2

62-

HQ-116345

Serial 586

# 3565

BULKY

S2-HQ-116359-E586

FBI - CENTRAL RECORDS CENTER

HQ - HEADQUARTERS

Class / Case #

Sub

Vol.

0062 116395

BOX 3565

Serial #

586

ONLY

2/13/85777

NỬ 88608 Docld: 32989698 pages pondan

---

## Page 3

INSPECTION

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

AUGUST 17 - SEPTEMBER 9, 1971

MW 88608 (Docld:32989638 Page 3

---

## Page 4

RETAIN COPY

15056109

11:--0111

Reconmand entire document be classified "Secret,"

XEDS 1, 2, 3.

Portions recommended for excision fron attached have

been uncerlined in rec or bracketed in rou in loit nacgin.

Gencrally, criteria for excision vece:

1. Information vhich could identify sousces or

sensitive techniques

2. "ames of individuals or organizations those

privacy requires protection

3. Infornation which would reveal our overall success

or lack of success in a riven investigative area

4. Infornation fron "thisi Agencies" or frienaly

Forcin agencies

3.

Identities of Bureau personnel belor the Section

Chier level

The adequacy of Personnel Sections, in genecal,

discloue the extent of our commitment in specific arcas oi

courterintolligence activity. He have given the Connittre

Mininistrativa Division figures regarding total nanpover

involved in security investigations but, to my knorleuge, ie

have not given them a breakdon as to here these personnel

ore assigned, A polley decision is necessary as to thether to

vant to pinpoint, through release of "Adequacy of Personnel"

sections of these inspection reports, precisely how much or

ho- liccle nanpoier 'e have on specific types of investigations.

It is questionable whether the information regarding

criminal cases in the San Francisco seport is germane to the

Committee's inquiry. It would not seem improper to me to

delete all references to criminal matters and mecely substitute

a page saying that "pages.

to

relate to criminal

investigations."

NM 66608 Docld:32989638 Page 4

---

## Page 5

TABLE OF CONTENTS

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 5

---

## Page 6

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SPECIFIC DIVISION OPERATIONS

• Ellsberg Case

East Coast Conspiracy

ACCOMPLISHMENTS•

Internal Security Section

Research Section

New Left Section

Espionage Section

Extremist Intelligence Section

'Nationalities Intelligence Section

SURVEYS, PROJECTS AND/OR INTENSIFICATION

PROGRAMS

Security Index Program (Basic Revolutionary

Organizations)

Counterintelligence - White Hate Groups

Thumbnail Sketch Program

Security Informant Program (Basic Revolutionary

and New Left Organizations)

Security Index Program

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 6

Page

1

23

31

39

43

57

66

74

89

91

93

94

97

---

## Page 7

Page

Surveys, Projects and /or Intensification Programs (Continued)

Emergency Detention Program

Technical and Microphone Surveillances

Survey Regarding Potential For Racial Violence

New Left Movement

Key Activist Program

Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) .

Worker Student Alliance (WSA)

The Venceremos Brigade

PROSAB

ALEM Program

' BANPOP Program

CANIL Program

COKMA Program

DESECO Program

East - West Exchange Program

Radio and Technical Equipment

Purchased by the Soviets

Black Extremist Matters

Black Nationalist Movement

97

98

99

101

105

107

107

110

110

114

115

116

117

119

121

123

125

127

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 7

---

## Page 8

Surveys, Projects and/or Intensification Programs (Continued)

Black Panther Party

Black Revolutionary Party

Congress of African Peoples (CAP)

International Black Workers Congress, aka Black

Workers Congress

Junta of Militant Organizations

Nation of Islam

Republic of New Africa

Student National Coordinating Committee (SNCC)

Communist Influence of Black Extremist Groups

Key Black Extremist Program

• Extremist. Informants

Ghetto Informants

Counterintelligence Program - Black Extremists

Name Checks of Aliens Holding Diplomatic and

International Organization Visas

Communist Coverage Along the Mexican Border

BOCOV

Security Index - Cuba

American Repatriate Program

Intelligence Coverage of Friendly Foreign Countries

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 8

Page

132

136

137

139

140

142

144

146

148

151

152

• 154

156

158

159

161

164

165

---

## Page 9

Page

Surveys, Projects and/or Intensification Programs (Continued)

International Organizations - Dangerous Aliens of Nations

Outside the Soviet Bloc

Chinese Aliens Entering the U. S.; Chinese Entering the

U. S. Claiming U. S. Citizenship

Counterintelligence Operations Against Chinese Communist

Intelligence Activities in the United States (CHICOIN)

Visitors to Communist China and Contacts by United

States Residents of Chinese Diplomatic Establishments

• LEGAL ATTACHE OFFICES - FOREIGN LIAISON

Bern

Bonn

Buenos Aires

Hong Kong

London

Madrid

Mexico City

Ottawa

Paris

Rome

Tokyo

Beirut

167

169

172

173

...

178

179

180

180

181

182

183

184

185

185

186

187

NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 9

---

## Page 10

1

Page

Legal Attache Offices - Foreign Liaison (Continued)

• Caracas

Copenhagen

La Paz

Managua

Tel Aviv

Chinese Communist Activities

Subversive Activities Control Board

ADMINISTRATIVE OPERATIONS

Dividing Domestic Intelligence Division Into Two

Divisions

Antiriot Laws and Bombing Matters

• Computation of Case and Work Load in the Domestic

Intelligence Division

Potential Double Agent Program

PERSONNEL MATTERS

Adequacy of Personnel - Agent

Adequacy of Personnel - Clerical

SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM

Payments to Security Informants and Confidential

Sources

188

190

191

192

193

200

213

215

224

239

244

249

300•

314

NW 88606-Hoeld 32989636-Page 10

---

## Page 11

Suggestion Memorandum (Continued)

Survey Concerning Computerization of Security

Informant Indices

Supervision and Control of Security Informant

Development and Coverage by Internal Security and

New Left Sections

Utilization of Inserts in Reporting Investigative Results

in Criminal Cases by Legal Attaches

Black Nationalist Photograph Album

Young Socialist Alliance Internal Security - Communist

(Trotskyist)

Automation of Intelligence Data re New Left and

Extremist Individuals

Preparation of Interview Reports (FD-302) in Security

Type Investigations

Black Extremist Activities In Penal Institutions -

Extremist Matters

Page

321

324

- .

325

327

329

331

334

340

----

---

## Page 12

Specitic Livision

---

## Page 13

ELLSBERG CASE

4-A-3

INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER:

This case is currently being afforded

preferred supervisory and investigative

attention. You are requested to furnish the following information about the

case:

1. Brief narrative of basic investigation involving Ellsberg and provide

current status.

2. You have advised this case may be part of a greater conspiracy. Advise

what part you feel this and other leaks may be.

It is realized the broad aspects

of this case may be yet unconfirmed conjecture; however, furnish narrative

of conjecture.

3. Advise what progress we have made and anticipate making in projecting

our investigation into areas described in number two.

4. Advise as best you can at this point how "big" this investigation may

become from a supervisory standpoint and indicate what impact an overall

successful investigation may have on Governmental processes in our system of

Government.

5. In regard to the administration of this investigation handled by the

Nationalities Intelligence Section and due to certain intricacies of supervision

the following information is requested individually from both Division Head

and Section Chief:

a. At the outset of the investigation, what instructions were issued

Section handling case?

b. What subsequent instructions or suggestions have been

issued?

c. What have been the manpower requirements of the case thus far

and how have you worked these out with this Section?

d. Division Head and Section Chief requested to make any further

comments considered appropriate at this time.

Comments of Assistant Director Brennan and Section Chief Wannall requeste:

/TESTIC ENTELLICENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

NW 88608 1Pgad:329896381 PA9813

---

## Page 14

ELLSBERG CASE

4-A-3

SECTION CHIEF W. R. WANNALI WRi

NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE SECTION

1. Initial investigation by Bureau opened 1/20/70 based on informa-

tion from step-mother of subiect's former wife to the effect that subject, with

his children, took papers from his office at Rand Corporation in Santa Monica,

California, and copied them with intent that they be made available for Senators

Fulbright and Goodell. This information had come to knowledge of Carol

allsberg through the Ellsbers children,

, Initial investigation continued through

9/25/70 when basic facts were presented to Department of Justice with note that

no further action would be taken in the absence of a specific request from the

Department. No such request was received.

On 6/13/71 "The New York Times" commenced publishing a series

of articles purporting to report on the history of the U. S. decision-making process

concerning Vietnam policies for the period 1945-1967. "The New York Times"

claimed the articles were based on a study. later identified as a 47-unlume history

entitled "United States - Vietnam Relations During the Period 1945-1967, "

commonly known as the "McNamara Study." The "McNamara Study" was

prepared beginning in 1967 and was classified "Top Secret."

On 6/15/71 the Attorney General requested FBI to conduct all necessary

investigation into the matter relating to the publication of classified information

by "The New York Times." Our 1970 investigation and initial reports from

sources obtained in instant matter pinpointed Ellsberg as the prime suspect

responsible for the leak of classified data to news media. Extensive investigation

•at Los Angeles pinned down the identities of individuals present in October,

1969, when Ellsberg duplicated classified documents available to him through his

employment at Rand Corporation in Santa Monica. Also revealed were his own

statements to his former wife that he, in fact, was converting the classified

documents to his own use to furnish them to various Congressional figures. The

Los Angeles investigation has resulted in Ellsberg's current indictment alleging

violation of Section 793(e), Title 18, U. S. Code (unauthorized possession of

documents involved and unlawful retention of same) and Section 641, Title 18

• (conversion of the documents to his own use). The Los Angeles investigation was

the sole basis for this indictment and served as the basis for current imprisonment

on charge of contempt of court of Anthony J. Russo who was present on one

occasion when Ellsberg allegedly duplicated material in his possession.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/23/71

WRW :ams

4-A-3

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 14

---

## Page 15

- 2 -

Investigation at Washington, D. C., has pinned down Ellsberg's access

to the documents in question and has additionally revealed his early change from

"hawk" to "dove." It has also revealed his contacts with individuals at high

levels in Federal Government attempting to persuade them to put before American

public details of decisions underlying the U. S. policy in Vietnam.

Investigation at Boston has uncovered activity by Neil and Susan

Sheehan, employees of "The New York Times, " in late March, 1971. This

activity has included extensive details of sessions where duplication of portions

of the "McNamara Study" were involved. Revealed have been details identifying

the printing companies utilized by the Sheehans, considerable travel between

these companies and apartments available to or utilized by Ellsberg. We have

• uncovered extensive detail of Ellsberg's contacts from his Cambridge,

Massachusetts, residence with members of the news media. Also revealed has

been contact by Ellsberg with factions of the New Left and anti-Vietnam peace groups.

We have recently expanded our investigation in attempt to uncover details

of dissemination of the "McNamara Study" by Ellsberg to other newspapers in

which articles appeared attributed to the "McNamara Study." This investigation

has revealed at least three newsmen from the Washington, D. C., bureaus of

the newspapers involved were in the Boston and/or Cambridge area during the week

immediately prior to Ellsberg's surrender on 6/28/71. We have learned that at

least one newspaper had been contacted by an unknown individual in Boston who had

offered the "McNamara Study" instructing that if the newspaper involved wished to

avail itself of the offer, the classified documents could be picked up in Boston

• after contacting a given telephone number in that area for more detailed instructions.

We are pursuing this facet of the investigation vigorously to pin down exact activities

of the newspaper personnel involved and when this is done, we contemplate

interviewing them for additional details.

Extensive investigation has been afforded the possibility that Ellsberg

benefited from considerable assistance from other individuals in his attempt to

disseminate the "McNamara Study" to the news media. Along these lines we have

detected early reports of Ellsberg's cooperation with elements of the War Resistors

League and have identified individuals in that organization described by Ellsberg

as the principal influences on his change to a militant opposition to the U.S. -

Vietnam policies. Investigation is continuing along these lines to establish if any

• individuals in these dissident groups may have assisted Ellsberg in his alleged

violations of the statutes noted.

A relative of Mr. Haldeman at the White House, France Raine, reported

that while attending a football game in Los Angeles in October, 1970, he overheard

a conversation between two men sitting near him whom he believed to be prominent

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 15

---

## Page 16

- 3 -

in the Business Executives Movement for Vietnam (BEM). This conversation

involved the plan on the part of an unidentified individual to leak secret informa-

tion to the press in the Spring of 1971, with the unidentified individual being

mentioned as being an employee of Rand Corporation and having formerly served

as an advisor to Dr. Kissinger at the White House. Also mentioned by the

. conversants was the plan on the part of two White House aides to resign their

positions sometime during the Summer of 1971 and to make anti-Administration

revelations at that time regarding U. S. - Vietnam policy. Ellsberg was known to

have appeared on at least two occasions as a speaker for BEM functions in

Los Angeles and Washington, D. C. A close associate of his in Los Angeles was

a former leader of the BEM chapter in that city. We have intensified our investiga-

tion of BEM and conducted extensive investigation to pin down identities of persons

seated near Raine during the game in question. We are continuing our investigation

along these lines to pinpoint a possible conspiracy existing as early as October,

1970, with ramifications of anti-Administration activity and revelation of classified

information.

We have recently received from Attorney General clarification of the

areas in which we can conduct investigation in this matter and, as a result, are

extending our interviews into news media circles where we feel we can uncover

individuals who will cooperate with us in revealing details of the Ellsberg

revelations and any conspiracy that may have existed involving him and others to

expose to public scrutiny the classified information involved in this case.

2. At the outset of this investigation Assistant Director Brennan spoke

at a Division Chiefs' Conference and also directly to the Section Chief, Nationalities

Intelligence Section, regarding the possibility of a wide-scale conspiracy in which

Ellsberg could be involved. His observations along these lines were recorded in

a memorandum to all Division Chiefs dated 7/23/71 and captioned "Re: Organizationa

Survey (Priorities and Manpower)," In this memorandum he commented upon the

fact that the Ellsberg case might be a landmark in historical significance in view

of the long-range potential regarding Governmental operations and the FBI's role

in rel ation thereto. He stated that the leak in this case represented a deliberate

and determined effort on the part of certain individuals to seriously disrupt and

destroy the Government's capacity to carry out effectively its foreign policy in

various areas.

Mr. Brennan noted that the past 15 to 20 years had witnessed the evolution

of a new breed of fanatics who were determined to disrupt and destroy Governmentai

operations and to alter this country's foreign policy. He further noted that the

movement supported by these fanatics bordered on treason which must be dealt

with if our current form of Government is to survive.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 16

---

## Page 17

"!

During the early stages of the investigation in this case it became

quite evident that Ellsberg had received assistance in getting into the hands

of various newspapers the "McNamara Study." He admitted as much on

6/28/71 in responding to questions raised by reporters when he surrendered

himself at the Boston Courthouse following issuance of a complaint charging

him with violating the Espionage Statute. Accordingly, the thrust of our

investigation has been directed toward identifying any individual or individuals

or organization that may have assisted or conspired with Ellsberg. It was

noted that developments had indicated that at least part of the "McNamara Study"

was reportedly in the possession of the Institute for Policy Studies and that

while a page-by-page review of the Bureau's file on that Institute had not

revealed any information concerning Ellsberg, we had developed material in the

Ellsberg investigation showing connections between him and some of the Institute

employees.

• On 7/6/71 the Director prepared a memorandum for Messrs. Tolson,

Sullivan, Brennan and Bishop to advise that the Honorable H. R. Haldeman,

Assistant to the President, had called the Director about the Elisberg case.

The Director Stated that My. Haldeman said the President wanted a report

on the case immediately to bring him up to date and then to keep him filled in,

and that the President was particularly interested in the complicity of individuals.

On 7/6/71 with the Director's approval a conference was held with

Departmental attorneys during which Assistant Attorney General Robert C.

Mardian explained that information coming to his attention from Departments

of Detense and State officials indicated that a group at each of these Departments

may be involved in a ring to pass out classified information. He said that while

- this may or may not be related to the Ellsberg case he was most désirous of

getting a complete rundown on Ellsberg's background to determine if any of his

associates may have come under suspicion in connection with other leaks. He

also said the President was vitally concerned not only with the Ellsberg case but

with all aspects of leaks of classified information of the Executive Branch.

We have not developed any hard evidence confirming that a wide-spread

organized conspiracy exists to leak Government information. We are aware,

however, of one thread common to certain of these leaks. That is, individuals

such as Ellsberg, who were either bitterly opposed to the U. S. - Vietnam policy

"or in disagreement with other major foreign policy issues, have set themselves

up above the law, claiming the right to decide what should be released to the

public regardless of Executive Branch classification assigned to information.

Many of these individuals in common with Ellsberg have been affiliated with one

or more of the so-called "think tanks, " such as Rand Corporation, have served

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 17

---

## Page 18

5

in a number of sensitive positions inthe Executive Branch of the Government

and to a large extent are acquainted with one another, at least on a professional

basis. Communications to appropriate field offices dated 7/7 and 12/71 contained

instructions regarding the necessity for exploring the various facets of this

situation.

The conspiracy aspects of the Ellsberg case as revealed to date are

set forth in Item 3 below.

3. Speculation that Daniel Ellsberg conspired with others in obtaining,

reproducing and disclosing the "McNamara Study" has some basis in public

• remarks made by him on 6/28/71 indicating that "It is implicit... that other

individuals helped out in various ways," and that he and the press share the

responsibility for the newspapers' obtaining the study. We have, however,

pursued the possibility of conspiracy from every conceivable angle and while

investigation has produced some circumstantial evidence to support this theory,

we have not found grounds to indicate existence of an over-all plot or conspiracy,

threading its way throughout Ellsberg's actions.

Count One of a two-count indictment returned by a Federal grand jury

on 6/28/71 charges Ellsberg with unauthorized possession, access to, and

control over copies of what, in effect, was the "McNamara Study," from about

September, 1969, to approximately Octöber, 1969, while Count Two of this

indictment charges that during the same approximate time span Ellsberg

willfully, knowingly and unlawiully converted to his own use copies of these

documents. We have established Ellsberg legally had access to the Study in the

course of his employment with Rand Corporation at Santa Monica, California,

but that he also obtained and had in his possession 18 volumes of a preliminary

"draft of the Study for at least nine months without the knowledge of the Top Secret

Control Officer at Rand in Santa Monica. Failure of Rand employees in Washington.

D: C., and at Santa Monica to adhere to established, in-house security procedures

accounts for the fact Ellsberg was able to conceal his possession of these 18

volumes, and while over-all possession by Ellsberg of the Study and its

preliminary draft volumes continues to be closely examined, no evidence exists

of conspiracy at this point of the case..

Count Two of the aforementioned indictment, relating to conversion

of these documents, is founded on information that Ellsberg reproduced a large

quantity of classified documents in October, 1969, at the office of one Lynda Sinav.

in sion, have destre individe to salie a present a this ep, oduction

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 18

---

## Page 19

- 6 -

interviews of these persons have developed nothing to indicate they were aware

of the nature of the items being reproduced or of what use Ellsberg intended

to make of the copies reproduced. Anthony Russo, a fellow employee of

Ellsberg's at Rand in Santa Monica, would have been in an excellent position to

have been aware of the ultimate purpose of Ellsberg's actions but has refused to

talk to the Federal grand jury in Los Angeles, and is currently in jail for

contempt of court relating to this refusal.

Subsequent to the duplicating of documents in October, 1969, Ellsberg,

•by his own statements, claims to have made efforts to furnish copies of these

documents to Senator J. William Fulbright and former Senator Charles B. Goode 2

and Senator George S. McGovern may also have been approached by Ellsberg

concerning making these documents public. Representative Paul N. McCloskey,

Jri, is also known to be in possession of documents which he publicly admits

were given to him by Ellsberg. Data available concerning this phase of Ellsberg's

actions also fails to indicate he acted in concert with anyone.

On 6/13/71 "The New York Times" published the first of a series

of articles purporting to have been based on the "McNamara stuay, " aná a

number of other newspapers in the U. S. subsequently printed similar articles.

Investigation has placed Neil Sheehan, a reporter for "The New York Times, " in

Cambridge, Massachusetts, during March and April, 1971, under an assumed

name, and we have determined Sheehan and his wife engaged in a number of

frantic copying sessions of documents during the period 3/21-23/71. Four

blurred Xerox copies discarded during this duplicating have been identified by

the National Security Agency as being reproductions of pages appearing in the

•'McNamara Study.

It is highly probable Sheehan and Ellsberg cooperated closely

in actions which enabled "The New York Times" to obtain the documents utilized

in articles published by this newspaper and we have recently uncovered evidence

indicating representatives of at least three other newspapers which have published

articles based on the "McNamara Study" were in the Boston area in June, 1971,

for the apparent purpose of obtaining copies of these documents. A source closely

• connected with one of these newspapers has advised that his newspaper obtained

the documents after receiving a telephone call from an unknown individual who

instructed that a reporter from the newspaper go to Cambridge and make the

necessary arrangements to obtain them by calling a certain, unidentified telephone

number. Investigation subsequently placed this reporter in Cambridge, but we

have, to date, been unsuccessful in determining who furnished him with the

material in question. While the newspapermen thus involved may have cooperated

with Ellsberg in various ways in order to obtain the desired documents,

available evidence does not suggest they conspired with him in carrying out the

disclosure of these documents, but rather took advantage of his offer to furnish

them with the material.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 19

---

## Page 20

-1.

We are, however, vigorously pursuing all leads relating to the

possession by "The New York Times" and other newspapers of the "McNamara

Study" and have proposed that the field be authorized to immediately initiate

interviews with friendly newsmen concerning this matter. We believe this area

of investigation offers excellent possibilities of effecting a major breakthrough

in this case.

There remains the suggestion Ellsberg may have received the coopera-

tion of or conspired with various New Left, anti-draft, anti-Vietnam war

elements, and this possibility has received the most penetrating examination.

We know Ellsberg to have been friendly with a number of individuals connected

with the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS) in Washington, D. C., and evidence

exists that the IPS has been in possession for some time of documents which may

be identical with the "McNamara Study." We have also learned, in tracing the

development of Ellsberg's thinking from "hawk" to "dove, " that from August,

1969, he became increasingly associated with a number of the more prominent

anti-war exponents in this country, many of whom occupy important posts at

Harvard University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. We are in the

process of tying together all of this data, in an effort to surface, if possible,

any possible connection between these elements and Ellsberg in the disclosure

of the highly classified "McNamara Study, " but information available to date

does not, as yet, substantiate or corroborate existence of a conspiracy in this

regard.

:::?

4. With particular regard to the President's concern expressed by

NE H

Haldeman to the Director, mentioned hereinbefore, with respect to the

complicity of individuals, and

the instructions of the Attorney General that the

Bureau in each leak case identify the individuals responsible, it is quite clear

that we must resolve all allegations, especially those pertaining to possible

conspiracies, during the course of our inquiries. As noted in Item 1, our

inquiries have expanded to include not only the leak to "The New York Times"

but to encompass the eight other newspapers which carried portions of the

"McNamara Study.". Since its inception, the Ellsberg case has required expanding

supervisory attention here at the SOG..

Nine men are currently committed to the

case. There are no indications at this time that less supervisory attention will be

needed in the near future. In fact, all indications are that there may have to be

more commitments in this regard, particularly if the Department refers additional

leak matters to us for the intensive investigative attention which has been

requested in the past.

• A successful investigation followed by a successful prosecution would

certainly have a very important impact on Governmental processes, particularly

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 20

---

## Page 21

- 8-

within the Executive Branch of our Government. When the Supreme Court

refused to grant injunctions sought by the Executive Branch against newspapers

publishing the "McNamara Study," this upheld the freedom of the press.

The

question has not yet been litigated with respect to the right of the Executive

Branch to protect its secrets through its classification system.

Unless Ellsberg is prosecuted successfully, anyone within the

Executive Branch would apparently have the right to decide on his own initiative

what information he wishes to place in the public domain by turning the informa-

tion over to the newspapers. Much of the sensitive negotiations of the Executive

Branch with foreign countries is dependent upon the secrecy with which they

are carried out.

If through a classification system or some other means the

Executive Branch is not able to preclude the unauthorized disclosure of its

secrets it is felt the Branch will be weakened to the extent that it cannot effectively

function on the/national scene certainly, and probably on the domestic scene in

some instances. Thus, the structure of the Executive Branch might well collapse.

Ari unsuccessful prosecution would buttress the considerable support,

particularly from the news media, for Ellsberg's contention that his disclosure

of the classified documents was basically motivated by conscience and by deep

concern that the public should be informed. It is closely related to the viewpoint

held by a small but growing minority that an individual is free to follow the dictates

of his conscience and to be the final arbiter of the validity of our criminal and

civil statutes. If this thesis were to be supported, then it could apply to murder

and bombings of Government and private institutions where such acts are dictated

by conscience.

It could follow that the Legislative, Executive and Judicial

'functions of the Nation are exercises in futility. This would be a road to anarchy.

From the above, it would appear that the outcome of the Ellsberg

case would have a direct bearing on the Executive Branch of our Government and

could affect the entire Governmental structure.

5(a). At the outset of the investigation, Assistant Director Brennan

instructed the Section Chief to afford special attention to this case and to let

him know of any manpower needs. He emphasized the importance of the case in

his mind and wanted it handled as a special.

Within a day or two Mr. Brennan introduced the Section Chief to

Departmental attorney James McGrath, who is a special assistant to Assistant

Attorney General Mardian Mr. Brennan advised the Section Chief that garat?

was the coordinator for Mangan of the various groups under vardan engaged

in consideration of phases of the Ellsberg case. For example,

'he explained that

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 21

---

## Page 22

-9-

one group headed by Departmental attorney John Martin analyzed all investigative

results received by the Department in an effort to establish whether a case was

being made. Mr. Brennan advised the Section Chief that Mr. McGrath would be

in a position to furnish any information required by the Section Chief from the

Internal Security Division and instructed that copies of daily teletypes received

from our various offices be furnished through Mr

McGrath to the Internal Security

Division as they came in.

5(b). Approximately two weeks after this case was instituted, the

Section Chief asked Mr. Brennan if he would brief both the Section Chief and the

Section Number One Man on his concept of the magnitude of this case and its

various ramifications. This was done and Mr. Brennan again emphasized the

need for following all facets on a special basis.

Following the conference with Departmental attorneys 7/6/71,

mentioned hereinbefore, Mr. Brennan summoned Inspector D. E. Moore and

Section Chief Wannall to his office and instructed that a "book" be prepared on

Ellsberg covering his activities and associates during a period of a couple of

years. He explained what he wanted in this book and provided for an Agent from

Research Section to be assigned full time on its compilation.

On 7/15/71 Mr. Brennan instructed that a copy of each teletype received

at the SOG on this case be furnished to him.

: On 7/28/71 Mr. Brennan summoned Inspector D. E. Moore, Section

Chief, Section Number One Man, and all Agents working on this case to his

office for a conference. In compliance with his request, he was briefed on

investigative results to date. He asked if serious consideration had been given

• to the possibility that Ellsberg himself was not directly involved in turning over

the "McNamara Study" to "The New York Times," and instructed that we look

into this phase of the matter very carefully.

On 8/2/71 Mr. Brennan summoned to his office the Section Chief and

Case Supervisor Wagoner for the purpose of introducing them to Mi. fed

Liddey of the White House. He explained that Mr. Hiddey, was coordinating all

White House interest in this matter. Mr. Lidgey pointed out that the White

House wanted this case handled as a "Bureau special"' and that a letter from the

White House to that effect would be forwarded.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638

Page 22

---

## Page 23

- 10 -

5(c). At the present time there are nine Agent Supervisors assigned

to this matter.

Investigation was instituted 6/15/71 and from then until 6/23/71

manpower assignments were handled within the Section.

On 6/23/71 two additional Agents were placed in the Section on a loan

basis and they were assigned to operational desks, as Agents permanently assigned

to those desks from within the Section were assigned to the VicLek case.

On 6/28/71 an Agent was assigned on a loan basis from Extremist

Intelligence Section and this loan Agent has been rotated on a weekly basis

since.

He has been utilized to cover an operational desk while one of the

regularly assigned Agents in the Section (H. J. Morgan) has been assigned

full time to this case.

On 7/8/71 an Agent from Research Section was assigned full time to

prepare a "book" on Ellsberg and has worked on this exclusively with the

•exceplion uf an annual leave period uf 8/2-13/71. Ile has not participated in any

other phase of the case on a day-to-day basis.

On 7/8/71 one man on weekly rotating basis was assigned temporarily

from the Espionage Section and continues to the present time. This loan Super-

visor has been utilized to cover.an operational desk within the Section while the

regularly assigned Supervisor on the desk (J. R. Hagy) has been utilized full time

on instant case.

On 7/29/71 an Agent from within the Section (L. E. Belanger) was

assigned part time to handle special aspects of the Ellsberg case, relating

specifically to electronic surveillance checks on potential witnesses.

Memorandum Mr. Felt to Mr. Tolson 8/4/71 captioned "Adequacy of

Personnel, Leak Cases, Domestic Intelligence Division (DID), " recommended and

the Director approved that the number of Agents assigned to handle leak cases,

including Ellsberg case, be increased immediately from five to seven, these

two additional Agents to be diverted from other assignments in Domestic Intelli-

gence Division with at least one to be diverted from the CP, USA Unit. The

Director approved this. At that time we had five men working full time on

instant and related cases, including J. M. Sizoo, who was involved exclusively

in preparation of a "book"' on Ellsberg.

On 8/9/71 in the absence of additional manpower from outside the

Section, the number of Agents committed to instant and related cases was increased

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 23

---

## Page 24

-.11 -

Be five to seen bot as basis get i within the de tion out American

Unit (B. M. Perez). Perez was replaced by SA W. W. Hamilton on 8/16/71.

On 8/13/71 two additional Agents were provided from outside the

Section, one on a full-time basis and one on a rotating weekly basis. The Agent

assigned on a tull-time basis (1. J. seabaugh was immediately assignea to

the McLek case. The Agent assigned on the weekly rotating basis was

assigned to assist on one of the regular operational desks within the Section

and an Agent who had been continuously on loan with the exception of an annual

leave period of 8/6-16/71 (J. P. Benedict) was assigned full time. to instant

matters.

In summary, manpower from outside the Section have been assigned

òn a temporary basis on 6/23/71 (two Agents); 6/28/71 (one Agent); 7/8/71

(two Agents); and 8/13/71 (two Agents). Three of these loan Agents are now

working full time on Mclek case while four are assisting in covering opcrational

desks that exist within this Section. Six Agents from within this Section are

assigned full time to McLek case.

• 5(d): From above discussion, it will be noted that this case is

directed at developing evidence concerning violations of Federal statutes under

which we have investigative jurisdiction and our principal efforts have been

directed toward this responsibility. There are also far reaching aspects of the

case which require investigative attention and because they are so diversified

there is a necessity for directing efforts in the first instance along those channels

which are of greatest importance. These channels relate: especially to the

possibility of a conspiracy, if in fact one exists, on the part of individuals to

acquire and release without authorization classified material of the Executive

Branch of the Government.

As noted above, evidence has been developed which would support

those prosecutive aspects which to date have been considered by the Department

and efforts are currently underway to resolve the potential conspiracy aspects.

The principal problems which have arisen with respect to supervision

of this case have related to efforts on the part of Assistant Attorney General

Marcian and attorneys within his Division to (1) conduct investigative activity

on their own and (2) to direct our investigative activities frequently into areas

tangential to the main thrust of the case. With respect to investigative efforts

Dy

Mardian,

the following are cited as examples:

NW 88608 Docld:32989638. Page 24

12

---

## Page 25

i = 12 -

On 6/29/71 Mardian telephonically advised he was sending a Depart-

mental attorney to see Senator Charles McC. Mathias, ar. who had received

from Ellsberg some copies of classified documents.

He said the Departmental

attorney would discuss with Mathias the possibility of Mathias' turning these

documents over to him. Mardian asked i we wanted to have an Agent accompany

the attorney. The Director concurred that no Agent accompany the attorney,

stating, "Let Mardian's emissary accept them."

On 7/21/71 when Agents of Washington Field Office endeavored to

interview Mr. Charles W. Cooke; Special Assistant to the Secretary of Health,

Education and Welfare, they were advised by Cooke that he would not submit to

interview in the absence of clearance granted by the Deputy Attorney General.

This was in pursuance of a lead which had been referred to us by Mardiah, and

when the Cooke interview was attempted it was learned for the first time that two

attorneys from the Internal Security Division had been designated to conduct.

the interview with Cooke

On 8/10/71 one of Mardian's attorneys telephoned to say that he was

going to interview an informant the next day in connection with this case and asked

if the Bureau would arrange a place where he could meet securely with the

informant and whether the Bureau desired to have an Agent present during the

interview. In concurring that Bureau should not accede to these requests, the

Director noted, "If Mardian's outfit would refrain from what are basicaliy

investigative activities and leave it to the Bureau there would be less friction."

On 8/12/71 the Bureau received through misrouting a communication

which Mardian had addressed to the Attorney General to summarize current

information in what he described as "Our continuing investigation into the

acquisition of the 'McNamara Study' by the 'New York Times.'" The Director

inquired whether Mardian's outfit was conducting their own investigation in this

matter, as indicated by the contents of the memorandum. As a matter of fact,

material summarized by Mardian was nothing more than information extracted

from Bureau teletypes showing FBI investigative results.

With respect to Marcian's efforts to direct our investigative activities,

the following are the most recent examples:

instructions for conducting of investigation in the Ellsberg matter.

By letters dated 8/12 and 8/23/11 we received from Marcians guathy

evident from a review of these communications that the requests contained therein

are the results of disorganized review of the material furnished to Department

by the Bureau.

NW 88608 . Docld:32989638 Page 25

---

## Page 26

- 13 -

For example, both letters contained requests to conduct investiga-

tion previously conducted and reported to the Department. Certain other

requests contained therein would more logically fall within the province of the

Special Task Force Committee established by the Department of Defense to

analyze Rand Corporation security procedures. Other requested investigation

had previously been initiated by the Bureau and other investigative requests were

not on their face germane to the violations or potential violations of law. Certain

of the requested investigation appeared to be based on unsupported assumptions

and theories of the invdvement of other individuals in the leak of the "Pentagon

Papers" but offered no basis or reasons for the requested investigation.

The most recent letter, 8/23/71, contained request for investigation

of Ellsberg's travel. We have been developing this information since the

inception of our investigation and it has been furnished to the Department on an

almost daily basis. This letter also requested inquiries concerning certain

telephone calls by Ellsberg, investigation concerning most of which had also

been previously initiated. Mardian also stated Department files had no intorma-

possible source of the Namara study" material which will be published by

whose name has recently come up in this case as ine

the Beacon Press in Boston. We have in this and other cases furnished information

on Rodberg in approximately a dozen communications.

The analyses of these lengthy letters from Mardian requires the

end ture rent considerable direct ou investigation, ay prate tint arsions

. some of which are relevant but many of which are not relevant to the main thrust

of our investigation, some of which should be referred elsewhere, and others of

which have been previously answered.

In accordance with instructions issued by the Assistant Director, we

are furnishing to Mardian, copies of the daily teletypes from our field offices.

These teletypes contain

"raw" investigative results not coordinated. The

coordination of these results regularly appears in our investigative reports

which are also furnished to Mardian.

We feel that the reports resolve many of

the questions which have been propounded by Marcian in the past and it would

enhance our investigative efforts to eliminate dissemination of the daily teletypes

in the future and give to the Department investigative results in report form,

supplemented by a weekly summary letter which we regularly forward to him.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 26

---

## Page 27

4-A-3

ELLSBERG CASE

ASSISTANE DIRRCTOR C. D. BRENNAN

I generally concur with the comments of Mr. Wannall

as to the progress and status of this case from an investigative

standpoint. I have reminded Mr. Wannall that the development of

direct evidence should not be obscured by the broadening of the

scope of this case. He has been advised that his objective must

consistently be the development of substantial admissible evidence

necessary to establish a conviction as to Federal violations

charged in the Los Angeles indictment of Ellsberg and others which

may develop from other corollary investigations being conducted.

Exom the outset, as stated by Mr. Wannall, I expressed

the importance of this case and instructed him to advise me of

any manpower needs.

The question of manpower is discussed under

the caption "Adequacy of Personnel" found in 6E of this report and

was the subject of my memorandum to Mr. Sullivan 7/29/71 captioned

"Proposed Adjustments of Work Assignments, DID," memorandum of

H. Ro

Wannall to Mr. Felt 8/12/71 captioned "Adequacy of Personnel,

DID,!:

and my memorandum to Mr.

Sullivan 9/12/71 captioned "Adequacy

of Personnel, Leak Cases, DID."

In reference to Mr. Wannall's concluding suggestion in

his writeup, the procedure of furnishing daily teletypes to the

Department in major cases is not unusual.

The high level interest

of the Department, which will eventually be responsible for the

prosecution

of this case, as well as the interest of the White

House dictates that teletypes in this matter be disseminated

consistent with the Director's instructions, copy attached.

It

appears we should clarify the Department's use of these "raw"

investigative results as set forth in our teletypes and suggest

their detailed reviews be conducted from Bureau investigative

reports, which are the normal communication for such use.

Mr. Wannall

will be instructed to advise the Department by letter with regard

to the foregoing pointing out that our weekly summary letters and

investigative reports will resolve many of the questions they raise

as to information in our teletypes.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/27/71

CDB: 1ml

4-A-3

13

NW 88608 Docld:32989638_ Page 27

---

## Page 28

VIEU STATES ONIAATMENT

FEDERAL HERBAG OF INFESTIGATIS

WASHENGTUX, D.G. 10035

April Iü, 1071

MONICO RANDUM FOR MIX. SULLIVANT

NR. BUENAN

ME. ROSSN

I have tried to ley domi intelligent guidolines as

do what should be sercend miet shouto mot ba sonc to eno Insermal

have noted a numbor of memorenda addsecrod to the Attornoy

Ocueral and the Depaty Aborney Goneral about matters about

which tho inéognal Securiby Division should tave beca adrised

and I bove had to condithese baci and sognost test emorania

be exproyalery addressed to the Apalatons estandey Genoral

of the intonial Security Division, Apperently i bave filed in

pointing, out the gutsalisen i resirad, no booceforth yon slonlo

wend overthings inciucing dus latchen stove it je comes in, to

tos Intoural Security Division, lie hopelose to got a considored

uncardbanging of aly tiebee in trag mundice, mind i cobove de

largely dao to somo degree of stabortunas hecause of ibe roced

disciplinazy action I lad to take when we fadiad to adrise the

Attoracy Goneral about the laccid burglery.

Therefore, es I haro indicated

, honoctoria you will

send everything to the internal security Dorinion dut in any

wey relates dinoctty or incurectly to the wore and juriadiction.

of that Decisiolic

Very truly yours,

i. Edgar Hoover

John Elgar Hoover

Director

TEH: EDM (7)

ib

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 28

---

## Page 29

ADDENDUM

INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER:

This case involves the publishing of parts

E. White:bhg, 9/7/71)

of the "McNamara Study" in June, 1971,

by "The New York Times," The evidence

to date strongly indicates Daniel Ellsberg is responsible for furnishing the

classified data to representatives of this newspaper, and he has been indicted

by a Federal Grand Jury for the unauthorized possession and conversion of

these documents. This is the case simply stated; however, this matter is

far from being so simple. From its inception, this case has been complicated

by the enormity of the work to be completed and problems inherent in this

unusual investigation.

In regard to the amount of work involved, a survey was made

to establish how many communications were dated during the period of a

single week (Saturdays and Sundays included). As a result of this survey,

the following represents the number of communications dated during the

weeks noted below:

INCOMING

7/11-17/71

8/1-7/71

8/8-14/71

Teletypes

107

81

82

Airtels Reports Letters

21

5

2

26

5

3

24

4

2

OUTGOING

Teletypes

Airtels Letters

7/11-17/71

8

4

8

8/1-7/71

14

8/8-14/71

19

0

.

3

8

10

• INTRA - SOG

Memo

15

7/11-17/71

8/1-7/71

8/8-14/71

7

15

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 29

17

---

## Page 30

The above-noted chart is believed to be representative of the

high volume of communications received daily. Many of these communications

were lengthy and/or complicated requiring close analysis by one or more

supervisors assigned to this "Special." Also, a check of the work devoted to

the preparation of daily summary memos and of weekly summaries disclosed

a supervisor would arrive at the office at approximately 5:30 a.m. each morning,

Monday through Friday, to have the daily memos dictated and typed by 8:15 a.m.

the same day, and the Supervisor responsible for the weekly summary due each

Monday would spend approximately 6 hours preparing this communication on

the prior Sunday. Noteworthy, too, is the fact that many responses to the

letters from the Attorney General's Office require extensive research.

With the approval by the Attorney General to interview newspaper-

men, it is anticipated that the work load will increase rather than decrease in

the immediate future. Initially there will be at least 75 newspapermen to be

interviewed and numerous additional leads will be developed from these inter-

views. This investigation involves numerous facets and requires extensive

work and supervision.

Presently there are 9 Supervisors assigned to this case and their

responsibilities are as follows:

Summary memorandum, weekly White House memorandum in Ellsberg case,

SALT Lek case (leak of classified information concerning Strategic Arms

Limitations Talks appearing in "The New York Times"), and the Toll Lek

case (leak from State Department cables concerning alleged misconduct of

Bert M. Tolleison, or

Jr.); assists in setting out leads irom daily teletype

correspondence from field.

Supervises operation of lead box in Ellsberg case; responsible for follow-up

communications on outstanding leads; has basic responsibility for preparation

of weekly White House summary; assists in preparation of daily memorandum

summarizing prior day's investigative activity in the field.

J. R. Hagy, as case Agent, has all supervisory responsibility

for Toll Lek; conducts research on all New Left aspects of Ellsberg investi-

gation and responsible for preparation of comprehensive analysis of New

Left implication in the case; responsible for setting out leads relative to New

Left associates and contacts by Ellsberg; responsible for following field

investigation; corroborating attendance by Ellsberg at New Left functions;

assists in leads obtained from daily teletypes in McLek and Toll Lek cases;

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 30

---

## Page 31

assists in preparation of daily summary memorandum; and assists in prepara-

tion of weekly White House summary.

H. J. Morgan, as case Agent, has primary responsibility for

supervision of SALT Lek case; reviews all incoming correspondence and

sets out pertinent leads relative to SALT Lek; assists in preparation of daily

"memorandum summarizing investigation in all three major leak cases afore-

mentioned; assists in review of daily teletype traffic in all three major leak

cases; review of dissemination of weekly reports in SALT Lek; assists in

preparation of White House summary.

L. E. Belanger handles all ELSUR checks; reviews, correlates

and conducts necessary research relative to all material received from

Department of Defense in Ellsberg investigation; responsible for backup file

reviews in connection with New Left contacts by Ellsberg; assists in preparation

of weekly White House memorandum; assists in preparation of daily summary

memorandum.

T. J. Seabaugh assigned exclusively to a comprehensive study,

charting and research into extensive trayel performed by Daniel Ellsberg;

responsible for setting out leads to insure complete coverage of all details

of travel facets of investigation.

J. P. Benedict responsible for extensive file reviews regarding

numerous news media personnel and personalities involved in Ellsberg

investigation to ascertain their susceptibility to interview as cooperative

sources; conducting extensive research and charting of the considerable

telephone traffic involved in this matter, including traffic from Daniel

Ellsberg, Anthony. Russo, the Sheehans

"The New York Times," the

• Washington bureats of all newspapers involved, traitic from various hotels

utilized by Ellsberg and his contacts, and all other individuals whose

telephone traffic has been subpoenaed as a result of Departmental action via

Grand Jury subpoena.

W. W. Hamilton assists in preparation of daily summary memo-

randum; responsible for review and appropriate preparation of all summary

teletypes for dissemination to Department of Justice; file reviews on the

numerous news personalities being considered for interviews as potential

cooperative sources in the Ellsberg investigation; handling of correspondence

connected with leads obtained from daily teletypes; assists in preparation of

White House summary.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 31

---

## Page 32

J. M. Sizoo assigned exclusively to the research and preparation

of an extensive biographical write-up on Ellsberg. In this regard, facts con-

cerning Ellsberg's life, behavioral patterns, associates, education, political

views, personality transformations, family, and influences will be studied

and analyzed.

In addition to the above specific assignments, each member of

the unit on a daily basis is required to participate in Section, Unit and/or

Branch conferences for resolution of investigative facets of the Ellsberg,

Toll Lek and SALT Lek investigations.

Some of the problems involved in this investigation are:

(1) Whether Ellsberg was alone responsible for this crime, or

whether he was part of a small or large-scale conspiracy.

(2) Whether the purpose was for idealistic reasons (anti-Vietnam

War beliefs),

to discredit the Executive Branch of the Government, or to

make available classified information to a foreien nation.

(3) Investigations have been conducted by agencies other than

the FBI: State Department, Department of Defense, NSA and the Attorney

General's Office, and it is the Bureau's responsibility to review and analyze these

investigations.

(4) To determine what other persons and newspapers received

these documents and from whom they received this data.

(5) Innumerable interviews involve newspapermen, Government

officials, and persons having far left leanings, against U. S. policy in Vietnam

and antagonistic toward the present Administration. These are all delicate

interviews.

(6) To determine whether the New Left and/or any anti-Vietnam

peace groups are involved in this case.

(7) All logical avenues of investigation to bring this case to a

successful prosecution must be explored.

An unsuccessful prosecution would

open the door for anyone at whim to disclose classified information which

could easily endanger the stability of the Executive Branch and impair our

relations with other nations.

20

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 32

---

## Page 33

(8) The White House and the Attorney General's Office are closely

following this matter and all other leak cases, and in this respect the Attorney

General's Office has sent numerous communications requesting certain leads

be covered by the FBI. These requests must be analyzed by DID and the

appropriate communications answered, which is a time-consuming administrative

procedure.

In regard to the last situation noted above, you are aware that

the Department is reviewing for lead purposes the daily teletypes we furnish

them. Thereafter, they send us a communication requesting us to conduct

these leads. This must be stopped. Such a procedure is unproductive and

time consuming, resulting in additional unnecessary communications to the

Department. You are instructed to immediately advise the Department that

the purpose of the daily teletypes is to make them cognizant of the devebpments

in this case and that the FBI fully intends to pursue all other logical investi-

gation based on these communications.

With the importance of this case, the urgency of the problems

• to be resoived, the innediacy of the work to be performed, and the volume .

of communications received daily, there appears sufficient work at the

present for nine Supervisors. However, you must constantly evaluate the

work load to assure that the assigned manpower is fully justified. Also, much

of the present work is exploratory, which involves researching and analyzing

and thereafter assuring that the many facets are immediately and fully

probed. Once these exploratory aspects are sufficiently investigated, this

case will be directed toward more specific objectives which will narrow the

investigative field. As this transition period is entered, immediate con-

sideration should be given to reducing the manpower assigned to this matter.

Also, it is incumbent upon you to make certain that all logical investigation

is expeditiously and fully conducted in order that the Bureau will not be

subjected to criticism by any person or agency.

A review of this matter indicates that you should continue affording

it top priority supervision and direction.

Comments of Assistant Director and Section Chief Wannall requested.

21

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 33

---

## Page 34

ADDENDUM

SECTION CHIEF W. R. WANNALD:

(WRW:ams 9/7/71)

The analysis and observations of

the Inspector have been noted.

We will continue affording top priority

supervision and direction to this case. In addition, we will immediately advise

the Department that the purpose of daily dissemination of teletypes to the

Internal Security Division is to make that Division cognizant of developments in

the case and that the FBI fully intends to pursue all other logical investigation

based on these communications.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNANE

(CDB:mls

9/7/71)

I concur with the above.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 34

---

## Page 35

EAST COAST CONSPIRACY

4-A-4

At the time of the last inspection this

matter was being afforded urgent

supervision and investigation for the purpose of identifying all of the

conspirators and perfecting cases for prosecution against them.

You are requested to provide a brief narrative summary of this investigation

and bring it up to date. Indicate in your response the number of subjects

on whom we have developed prosecutive cases, the number yet to be developed

and in each instance indicate what you feel are the possibilities of successful

prosecution.

In this regard, identify any cases in which successful prosecution is in

dount and indicate what action is being taken to erase the doubt.

What is the current status of prosecution of these cases and when do you

feel these cases will be adjudicated?

From a supervisory standpoint, advise how much manpower is being

expended presently on the supervision of this (these) cases and indicate when

you feel these men can be reassigned to other work.

Comments of Assistant Director requested.

SECTION CELET R. I SHACKELEORDAD

The investigation of the

East Coast Conspiracy to

Save Lives (FASTCON) is concerned with plots in Washington, D. C.,

to blow up the tunnels housing the heating system servicing

Government buildings and to kidnap a high Government official.

Individuals connected with these plots are all associated with

the Berrigan antiwar movement.

An indictment was returned during

8/24/71

FBG/ GHM : p1m

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/19/71

*ESM:wmj

*4-A-4

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 35

23

---

## Page 36

the last inspection (1/12/71) at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, which

charged six individuals with complicity in these plots and

two

of these six were charged additionally with a violation of the

contraband statute in that they caused unauthorized letters to

be exchanged into and out of the Federal Penitentiary a Lewisburg,

Pennsylvania. There were also seven individuals named in the

indictment as unindicted co-conspirators.

Our investigation into this matter continued, and on

4/30/71, a superseding indictment was returned which expanded the

charges

and strengthened our case. Eight individuals were included

in this indictment as defendants, and the number of unindicted

co-conspirators was reduced to four. The superseding indictment

includes those charges listed above and added the conspiracy

aspects of

the selected Selective Service break-in cases in

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Rochester, New York; Wilmington,

Dover, and Georgetown, Delaware.

Two additional counts added to

the superseding indictment involve three individuals and charged

them with the mailing of a threatening communication.

In addition to the substantive case, potential witnesses

have been either cited for civil contempt of court or indicted or

criminal contempt of court in connection with their refusal to

answer questions before the Federal Grand Jury (FGJ) in Harrisburg

after being granted immunity.

Five individuals were cited for civil

contempt, and four individuals were indicted for criminal contempt.

Two of these cases are currently the subject of a petition by the

Government to the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of

certiorari, and the other cases are being held in abeyance until

the Supreme Court renders its decision.

From the investigation conducted to date and the comments

to the

of the prosecutive staff of the department, there does not appear

to be any reason to believe.....'. that prosecution of this case

will not be successful.

The substantive EASTCON case is currently in the pretrial

stage. with numerous motions of both the Government and the defense

still pending before the court. At present, it appears that the

court

will be unable to set this matter for

trial until January,

1972.

Even though we are well on our way to

trial, due to the

complexities of charges in the indictment and the broad scope of

the violations involved, there exists additional facets of investi

gation of a continuing

nature which will possibly increase as the

trial date approaches.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 36

---

## Page 37

2222

For example, in the Fall of 1970 we undertook to

determine through an Automatic Data Processing (ADP) project

whether EASTCON principals had established a long distance

telephone communication network.

The basis for this theory was

information received from our informant, pH 1211-S, who advised

that fictitious telephone credit card numbers were being utilized

by

members of the Berrigan antiwar movement to facilitate contacts.

This project disclosed voluminous calls between EASTCON principals

and between them and sympathizers from their own telephones and

also corroborate the fraudulent use of fictitious telephone credit

card numbers.

This information was of value to the Department in

the examination of witnesses before the FGJ since it placed

witnesses in a position of either admitting contact between each

other on specific dates, committing perjury, or claiming the

Fifth Amendment. This project has more recently been extended

and is now being utilized to identify individuals involved in the

Washington, D. C., plots of the EASTCON case through "nonhit"

telephone toll calls between EASTCON activists and persons not

previously known to have been active in the movement.

It is

believed

that recent information from this project, developed

further by investigation,

has identified. a Capitol

Hill elevator

operator who was recruited for these plots.

The project is a

continuing one,

and the investigation of pertinent developments

hopefully will

identify an engineer who was consulted on the

tunnel plot, as well as other individuals involved in the

Washington, D. C., action. The very technical nature of the

raw material developed by

the ADP project has resulted in

individuals at the Bureau and certain offices such as Philadelphia,

New York, Baltimore,

and WFO having become well versed and

particularly adroit

in the interpretation of such complicated

information.

The investigation of EASTCON includes the handling of

two informants; the first, PH 1211-S, is the individual who will

be responsible

for the introduction of the most convincing

evidence against all of the defendants - the letters between

Philip Berrigan and Elizabeth McAlister which relate to every

count in the indictment.

Since the testimony of this informant

before the FGJ, he has become theoretically the responsibility of

the Department, as a Government witness, but of necessity, the

Bureau has coordinated his activities, etc., because of his

a Festives at e

peculiar status until he testifies at trial. He is currently

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 37

---

## Page 38

living many miles from Harrisburg under an assumed identity and is

gainfully employed through the assistance of the Bureau.

All of

these problems have been coordinated through the Bureau

to insure

the security of this valuable source. As an example, the informant's

father recently died and unfriendly members of the news media

became aware of funeral arrangements.

By instructions of the

Bureau and

through very competent handling by the field, the

security of this informant was maintained in spite of the presence

of unfriendly members of the press at the funeral. It will be

necessary to continue to coordinate any other problems of this

nature until his testimony is heard during trial. In this regard,

as the trial date approaches, other problems develop

requiring

Bureau assistance such as arrangements for "in depth" conferences

with the Department's prosecutive team under secure circumstances.

This will be a very important conference since the informant has

only been interviewed (briefly) by the Department on one occasion,

and no opportunity has existed since his appearance before the FGJ

to further explore his testimony.

We have also developed another informant, Pi 223-S, who

Is a close friend of Philip Berrigan and active sympathizers in

the Berrigan antiwar movement.

He is the only individual no nas

obtained any identification of possible MEDBURG suspects from

1022/PAtex Grady (arrested in the Camden Yederal Building break-in

Grady indirectly claimed credit for that action and by

inference named other people who are considered prime suspects.

The informant has recently accepted a position of running a

newspaper at Harrisburg,

Pennsylvania, on behalf of The Defense

Committee, the legal, bail bond, and public relations arm of the

Berrigan, antiwar movement. He is a unique and cunning individual

who is now in

a vital position to keep us informed of the on-the-

. scene and behind-the-scene activities in Harrisburg during the

EASTCON trial.

One extremely important example of the valuable

information this informant has furnished resulted in our initiating

(as a corollary investigation to EASTCON) an Espionage - X-type

case based upon information he received from an ardent Berrigan.

supporter who has stated the intention to obtain classified

documents from the Lyndon B. Johnson Library in Austin, Texas,

to be publicized for the benefit of the antiwar movement in the

same manner as those circulated by Daniel Ellsbere.

With respect to The Defense Committee, investigation is

being coordinated as to the activities of this loose-knit group

due to its direct relationship to the EASTCON case.

There has

evolved a national organization, and the activities of local

groups, as they become organized, will be followed by the Bureau

for intelligence information.

As an indication of the potential

of this body, recognizing that its real push for funds

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 38

6

---

## Page 39

will reportedly not begin until the Fall of 1971, information

has been received that they already have substantial funds in

their coffers.

From information developed by PH 1223-S, it was determined

that John Peter Grady was planning an "action" which from an

analysis of the facts known at the Bureau appeared to centered

in the New Jersey area. After observations in this regard were

furnished to the field, investigation culminated in his being

located in the Camden, New Jersey, area.

The investigation which

followed resulted in the arrest of 20 individuals on 8/22/71 in

the act of destroying

and stealing draft board records in the

Camden Federal Building. The individuals arrested included Peter

Fordi (an original member of the East Coast Conspiracy to Save

Lives), Paul Couming, and John Swinglish, both indicted at

Harrisburg for criminal contempt after refusing

to testify

before the EASTCON FGJ when granted immunity from

PH 1211-S determined Swinglish vas the "recruiter" fosecution.

Washington, D. C., plots in the EASTCON case.

It is to be

expected that other individuals who are EASTCON activists will

also be indicted at Camden.

The evidence already obtained in

that case discloses other EASTCON activists were responsible for

the Selective Service draft board break-in at Trenton, New Jersey,

5/21/71.

Likewise, the obviously coordinated Bullato, New york,

draft board break-in on the night of 8/21-22/71 Involved

sympathizers.of the EASTCON movement.

Much of the foregoing represents the continuing

intelligence coverage of the Berrigan antiwar movement, absolutely

necessary to the Bureau's interests!

aside from the important

development of admissible evidence in the EASTCON prosecution.

• Further, many pretrial motions (by defense counsel) have been

ruled on by the court, and many others are still outstanding.

In

anticipation of the court ruling on a motion for Discovery and

Inspection as

provided by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,

the Government, in order to expedite such matters, has

previously

allowed the inspection of certain evidence in this case.

This

has been done at various field offices under Departmental super-

vision.

The lists of evidence made available, other arrangements

and details with regard to such inspection, has been handled by

guidance from the Bureau.

Approximately one half of this evidence

has thus far been inspected with hundreds of items of evidence

still to be inspected in Washington, D. C.,

Philadelphia, and

Baltimore. The court has ruled in favor of the defense broadly

interpreting the right of Discovery and Inspection, particularly

as to photographic evidence,

Laboratory, and Identification

Division reports.

The Department has requested such material

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 39

27

---

## Page 40

to be made available for inspection at the Department in the

near future, and this project is being coordinated by the Bureau.

There are estimated approximately 1,000 photographs submitted by

11 offices. The Laboratory (document examinations) and Identification

Division reports will be voluminous since they include not only

those prepared in connection with the EASICON case itself, but

also all of those prepared in connection with six Selective

Service Act cases included as conspiracy charges in the EASTCON

indictment.

It is apparent that the evidence from the three

offices covering these six Selective Service Act cases will be

voluminous and require close coordination by the Bureau with the

Department into the EASTCON case for a successful prosecution

at trial.

At present, two supervisors are

assigned full-time, and

one supervisor spends approximately one half of his time in the

supervision of this case.

This investigation continues to generate

a great deal of paper not only on the substantive case but also in

connection with the other matters directly related thereto.

It

is anticipated the time of two and a half Agents will be the absolute

minimum required to effortively handle this matter through the

completion of the trial. Depending upon the volume of work

generated by necessary requests of the Department in the pretrial

and trial stages, additional manpower may be necessary at various

times.

The Inspector has specifically inquired as to when these

men can be reassigned to other work.

It is to be noted that since

the return of the superseding indictment on 4/30/71, two other

full-time supervisors have been reassigned to other

work within

the Division.

It is not anticipated that the two supervisors assigned

full-time to this case will be released prior to the conclusion

of the trial in this matter.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN:

(JAS :Irs)

8-24-71

I have read the attached and concur

in the views expressed by Section.

Chief Shackelford.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 40

28

---

## Page 41

ADDENDUM •

INSPECTOR E. S. MILLERL

(ESM:wmj

8/26/70200

You should insure that every action

is taken to insure successful

prosecution in this mater.

Assistant Director please note.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN:

The Inspector's comments

(JAS:m15 - 8/30/71)

have been noted. The

Bureau may be assured that

every possible action is being taken in the interests of

successful prosecution.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 41

29

---

## Page 42

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

4-E

Briefly set forth the noteworthy

accomplishments of your Division,

with a section breakdown, since the last inspection, which ended on 1/26/71.

This request deals with specific accomplishments other than statistical accomplish -

ments. Specifically where you have devised a program for a definite purpose

furnish also where possible specific tangible accomplishments on this program.

This will give you an opportunity to set forth any Division achievements pertain -

ing to the Bureau's progress, welfare, efficiency or any other items not covered

elsewhere in this inspection.

A short paragraph on each phase should be sufficient. Do not include

identifying data concerning highly confidential matters and any references to

such matters should be in general terms.

Comments of Assistant Director requested.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN

Attached are individual

(JAS:mls 8/20/71)

write-ups from each Section

in the Division pertaining

to the accomplishments of that particular Section.

8/17/71

NW 88608EDoCid:32989638 Page 42

30

---

## Page 43

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

INTERNAL SECURITY SECTION

4-E

SECTION CHIEF - ARBOR W. GRAY A

Attached are memoranda setting out noteworthy

accomplishments of the Internal Security Section since the

last inspection.

This Section is responsible for supervision of

investigations of the Communist Party, USA, its fronts, pro-

Chinese communist groups, selected Trotskyist-communist

groups, Klan and white hate groups, international organizations

affiliated with the world communist movement and international

New Left extremist movement, individuals affiliated with these

organizations and movements, as well as sedition cases.

Our

purpose is to gather evidence to support prosecutions

subversive organizalions and inuividuals under various statutes

relating to the internal security of the Nation and to gather

intelligence of interest to Government officials and other

agencies. The Section also supervises the development and

administration of security informants in basic revolutionary

organizations and other subversive and New Left groups.

appropriate, the Section directs counterintelligence operations

against subversive groups and individuals in cases under our

• supervision.

NW 88608 Dold 2989638 PaGEA&IGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

---

## Page 44

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA, UNIT

The major accomplishment of this Unit evolves

from the case entitled, "Solo, IS - C.". Due to the

sensitive nature of this case, it will be orally discussed

with the Inspector.

In essence, this case involves sources developing

intelligence information of the highest quality concerning

the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), the Soviet Union

satellites and the world communist movement Since its

been completede

is continually

levels of our Government and, in many

instances, is information not available from another source.

Examples

of this since early 1971 include the following: Soviets

requested CPUSA to provide analysis of public opinion in U.S.

regarding Nixon Administration and U.S.-Soviet relations to be

used by General Secretaty vi the Communist Faity vi the Soviet

Union (CPSU), Leonid Brezhnev, in speech before 24th Congress

of CPSU in March, 1971, and essence of analysis was provided;

during the 24th Congress, it was learned Soviets doubted whether

U.S. was serious on disarmament and they were concerned over

U.S.-Chinese communist improved relations; Soviet countermeasures

to counteract include planned vast propaganda campaign against

U.S., initiation of a European Security Conference to isolate

Uos., and

improvement of Soviet relations with Japan; General

Secretary, CPUSA, Gus Hall, planned visit to North Vietnam

and Laos Spring of 1971, thereafter returning to U.s. to hold

mass rallies to raise antiwar movement in U.S. to a new high;

visit was set for 5/15-20/71; however, North Vietnamese

canceled same,

angering Hall who felt this resulted from

Chinese communist pressure; information concerning possible

split in CPUSA along racial lines; details concerning meeting

Of CPUSA leaders and Soviet Ambassador to U.S. Anatoliy F.

Dobrynin, at which time Dobrynin stated hope for world peace

would be improved if President Nixon were re-elected in 1972.

All of this information was furnished the White House

and other interested officials of our Government, usually by

-teletype.

central nie igence

est in information developed by t

requested

to include pertinent data developed

• classified document for senior U

Board orilcials.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/18/71

Pine PCM: SEW

NW 88608 Dold: 32989638 Page 44

32

---

## Page 45

The two principal informants in this operation

have received the "Order of Lenin, " with the title "Hero

of Soviet Labor" from the Soviets. This is the highest

award given civilians by the Soviet Union and was given

our sources for their "invaluable contribution to the

international communist movement."

Continued

high-level penetration of the CPUSA

represents a sustained major accomplishment. At the time

of the last inspection, we had 1l informants who were

officially members of the CPUSA National Committee.

This

In addition, we have another informant

who is an ex officio member of the National Committee because

of the sensitive nature of his Party assignments. This latter

source is also a member of the Political Committee which, in

effect, runs the Party.

This top-level coverage is responsible

for furnishing information regarding policy-making matters

on a day-to-day basis as they occur.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/18/71

_PCM: SEW

4-E

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 45

-2-

33

---

## Page 46

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

FOREIGN INFLUENCE AND PRO-CHICOM UNIT

A prime responsibility of the Bureau and the intel-

ligence community is to develop intelligence

relating to efforts

of foreign hostile governments, organizations, and individuals

who influence, direct, or dominate the domestic subversive and

extremist movements.

There has been considerable evidence

compiled over the years of this foreign influence. Since the

last inspection, the following noteworthy achievements in our

investigations relating to foreign influence have been

accomplished:

1. In March, 1971, a coalition of leftist individuals

including subversives

and extremists under the sponsorship of

the Clergy and Laymen Concerned About Vietnam, American Friends

Service Committee, and Fellowship of Reconciliation traveled to

Paris where they

were in contact with the North Vietnamese and

other elements antagonistic to the U.S. We developed two informants

to participate in this travel and as

result, identified all

170 people in attenuance,

theii activities, contacts, and

objectives.

All information developed was

afforded dissemination

to appropriate Government agencies and we were commended by one

intelligence agency for the excellent coverage.

2.

• The World Peace Council is the leading Soviet-

dominated international effort to discredit and subvert U.S.

domestic and foreign policy. Upon determining the world Peace

Council would hold a General session in Budapest, Hungary, in

May, 1971, an effort was made to obtain informant coverage.

An

informant

was developed for the travel and coverage resulled in

the identification of all American participants including the

Communist Party, USA, delegation and the activities of these

individuals at the meeting.

All pertinent documents relating

to the Conference were obtained, as were the contacts and

activities of American subversives at the Conference. Widespread

dissemination of intelligence relating to this Conference was

made and both the White House

and Central Intelligence Agency

favorably commented

on its exceptional value.

3. During the past six months, the Unit has afforded

specific coverage to the travel of U.s.

citizens to three hostile

communist countries: North Vietnam, North Korea, and Communist

China.

All individuals traveling to these countries during 1970

have been identified and, where

pertinent, investigations have

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/18/71

4-E

- 3 -

34

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 46

---

## Page 47

been opened. Careful records have been maintained regarding

U.S, citizens who have visited these countries during the

current year and arrangements have been made to receive

quarterly reports from another intelligence agency which will

enable us to double check our files and insure cases are opened

on visitors to these hostile countries, when warranted. We feel

this is a strong achievement because, as noted below, we have

developed evidence that Americans are currently being recruited

for intelligence assignments in these countries.

Early in 1971 it was determined an informant who

had participated in Venceremos Brigade travel to Cuba had

an invitation from the North Koreans to visit their

of three other

other Amexicans and traveled to kola Pants ou

In kocea he was recruited by the North Koreans for

an intelligence assigment, furnished funds, and,? code. This

is the first individual

affiliated with the domestic suaversive

movement

acting in a capacity for the is. Government, has

we bolieve this informant

relating to foreign intelligence and political influence of the

North Koreans_ in the domestic subversive movement.

Through cooperation with the

tas ecurty

Service we

have developed, suring the past six months, direct

connection between an haliquamhowas associated with the

weatherman in the is and bombing activities in England.

British intelligences extreme interested in this matter

and we are carefully following it for developments.

Through intensified investigation of the Revolutionary

Union (RU) and Venceremos Party (VP), we have been able to identify

over 200 hard-core Marxist-Leninists who have all indicated

violence-prone propensities.

Of particular note is the fact

that our closely supervised

investigations in this area have

developed an informant on the National Committee of the, RU and

have resulted in identification of an extremely militant RU

group in Eugene, Oregon.

The Department has expressed extreme

interest in our RU investigation and has indicated a desire to

explore prosecutions at the first opportunity.

In late 1970 Mark Lawrence weters, the student body

president of the University of New Hampshire,

traveled with a

National Student Association group to North Vietnam.

While

there he made recorded speeches encouraging the servicemen in

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/18/71

UH: SIW

кальної

NW 88608 DotTd?32989638 Page 47

-4 -

---

## Page 48

South Vietnam to lay

down their arms or turn their guns on the

real "pigs." Wefers' incendiary comments were broadcast over

Radio Hanoi. Intensive investigation has been and is continuing.

to be.conducted and the Department has indicated an interest to

prosecute Wefers, under the sedition statutes at an early date.

This will represent the first prosecution under the sedition

statutes since the 1950's.

A suit was instituted against the Director and two

Special Agents of the Memphis Office seeking preliminary

injunction against the FBI and punitive and compensatory

damages amounting to over $100,000 against the Director and

The suit was instituted by the Southern Conference

Educational Fund claiming harassment and intimidation of war

resisters. Former communists, extremists, and subversives

were involved as plaintiffs.

In July the

plaintiffs dropped

their plea for a preliminary injunction.

Excellent information

identifying the principal plaintiff, on whose statements the

false allegations were based, as having a criminal

record

involving furnishing of false information and theft, has been

subject of a current jutstanding State Beach Warrant.

It is

rassment of the communist subversives and

extremists involved.

The Unit endeavors to keep track of all efforts to

discredit the U.S. military effort through organization of

antiwar coffeehouses, oriented groups, and publications.

January we intensified investigation on Peoples House, a

Last

coffeehouse operated by subversives in Clarksville, Tennessee.

Excellent information has been developed, all the principal

subversives participating have been identified, and details

have been furnished to the Department and interested military

Intelligence agencies. The House Committee on Internal Securits

nas taken an interest in this coffeehouse and it is expected tr

be the subject of a Congressional hearing which will publicly

expose the involvement, tactics, and objectives of the extremist

elements behind this. subversive endeavor.

:

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/18/71

- 5 -

36

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 48

---

## Page 49

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

KLAN AND WHITE HATE GROUPS UNIT

4-E

The FBI has continued its investigation of 18

Klan-type organizations including 255 klaverns (units)

throughout the United States which had a slight increase

in membership from 4,300 a year ago to approximately

4,500 at present. This increase in membership is primarily

attributed to renewed interest in Klan-type organizations

brought about by Federal directives regarding school busing

in order to achieve racial balance in public schools.

In recent months the UKA and Shelton have under-

taken a major campaign aimed at harassing the FBI. The

initial step of the campaign was named by Shelton as

"Operation Polly" in which he sought to obtain polygraph

machines to help "weed out FBI pimps."

We have taken steps

to assure he is not successful by instructing our key

informants to talk it down and, if necessary, to ultimately

refuse to take such an exam.

contacted a potential supplier to be assured we are aware

of any positive action taken by Shelton in this regard.

Further, as a result of our hard-hitting investi-

gation and interviews of Klansmen, shelton printed a series

of articles in the monthly Uka publication

""The Fiery Cross,"

entitled "Exposing the CIA and FBI," in which Shelton

vehemently attacked the Bureau as a "Gestapo-like police

force" and the Director as "a man who has sold out his

country for his prided FBI."

Richmond FBI Offices to protest interviews of Klansmen by

FBI Agents as infringement of the individual rights of Klan

members also took place recently and Klansmen were instructed

to attempt to secure photographs and identities of our Agents

in order that this information could be published in 'The

Fiery Cross" with the intent that the FBI be embarrassed and

our Agents transferred. This information was furnished to

appropriate field offices and to the Department. To date

our Agents have avoided having their photographs taken by

the Klan.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/19/71

4-E

- 6 -

37

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 49

---

## Page 50

Violence has been noticeably absent among Klan-type

organizations during the past year.

This is due in the main

to our effective informant program. We have been able to

direct our informants to positions of leadership throughout

the country, and these informants have been extremely success

ful in forming nonviolent Klan policy. We have also been able

to keep local authorities advised of potential Klan violence

in time to thwart such action.

head of Minutemen,

Since last inspection, information was also developed

through Joan Gourley, former mistress. of Robert DePugh, con-

cerning murder of Halter Barnes.,

former Minutemen member wh

was allegedly murdered and buried by DePugh while in underground

hide-out in New Mexico prior to his arrest by the FBI. Gourley.

traveled to New Mexico to locate gravesite in company of local

authorities who granted her immunity. Gravesite disclosed only

four small bones identified by coroner as coming from foot of

human victim.

Gourley

furnished statement to Nev Mexico

authorities and, in addition, stated DePugh had indicated in

July, 1970, while imprisoned,

that body. had been removed from

original gravesite, but she did not believe him at that time.

Local District Attorney, while believing Goucley's story, felt

prosecution not feasible without body.

During July, 1971,

SD 1155-R, a Minutemen informant of this Bureau furnished

information and explosives reportedly to be utilized in the

bombings of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Division (ATFD)

and Internal Revenue Service offices in the California area,

resulting in the arrest of several individuals, including

informant, by ATFD, thus preventing the bombings.

Subsequent to last inspection, dissemination has

been made concerning weapons, possible violence and demon-

strations of these groups which has resulted in the curtailment

of activity and disenchantment with the Klan and other white

hate

contisca

weapons

Department based on our information. We have also made

apprehensions of extremist subjects for illegal possession

of firearms following conviction of a felony, a violation

under our jurisdiction.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/19/71

4-E

38

NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 50

---

## Page 51

ACCOMPLISHHENTS

4 - E

SECTION CHIEF R. D. COTTER:

There follows & summary of

accomplishments of the Research

Section since the last inspection:

Central Research Unit

This Unit performs a wide range of research and

writing assignments and preparation of various documents

and

special reports. These include the following:

An extensive special assigument on new left research

for the Director.

A special report which is kept up. to date on FBI

usage of electronic surveillances.

The "FBI Current Intelligence Analysis" issued

approximately every week sunnarizes significant items of

interest in subversive field.

"TRY Summary of Extremist Activities" issued weekly

sunmarizes significant items relating to black extremists.

'"The Extremist Speaks" is a monthly compilation

showing extremist views taken from their publications.

A pamphlet entitled "The Black Panther" was prepared

for public distribution.

A pamphlet entitled "1970: Year of the

Urban

Guerrilla" was prepared for distribution.

The monograph entitled "The CPUSA Annual Intelligence

Digest" was issued in February.

A number of papers were prepared for the Intelligence

Evaluation Committee.

A number of book reviews of interest were prepared.

Special reports are prepared on a continuing basis

for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Special

Committee.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/19/71

MSR:amt

4-E

34

AM 88608-Docid: 32982638 Page 51

---

## Page 52

. -2÷

The Unit coordinated the preparation of material

for the Division's participation in the conference with

police officials concerning attacks on police and prepared

a special packet of material for distribution to those police

officials in attendance.

This Unit also was responsible for coordination of

preparation of damage assessnents relating to Domestic

Intelligence Division documents stolen in the burglary of

the former Media, Pennsylvania, Resident Agency, and handling

other aspects of

the ledburg case as related to this Division.

In addition, the Unit also collected and prepared

naterial for various

articles, speeches, and surveys.

Personnel

of the Unit have handled lectures on subjects of communism, the

new left, and racial extremism.

These have consisted of

classified lectures to Bureau's New Agents and In-Service

classes, appearances before other intelligence agencies and

National Academy classes and appearances before outside groups.

Special Records Unit

This Unit is primarily responsible for records

keeping for emergency planning. Further details concerning

programs handled by this Unit are set forth in Section 4-H.

o unit are

Civil Disorder Reporting Unit

This Unit, formerly called the Racial Reporting Unit,

has continued to coordinate all phases of disturbances, violence

and

other developments where race is a factor as well as infor-

mation bearing on the potential for violence throughout the

country.

Material being reported on a daily basis by the field

offices is reviewed, coordinated and disseminated to interested

officials and agencies and current teletype summaries are

furnished to the White House, Attorney General, and other

high officials. Statistical

data on civil disorders, school

disorders and attacks on police is extracted fron communications

received from the field and is maintained in this Unit for use

in the preparation of special papers. Detailed statistical

data is prepared for automatic data processing.

This Unit also prepares on demand certain studies

and briefs concerning specific subject matters relating to

racial extremists and racial situations.

Examples of these

are a detailed study on the extent of foreign influence on

the black extremist movement completed in February of this

year. A current document on this subject matter is presently

NW 88608 Doeld:32989638 Page 52

---

## Page 53

- 3.

being prepared for early dissemination,

In June,

1971,

a comprehensive document on the potential for violence in

the Nation during the Summer of 1971 was prepared for high-

level dissenination.

In addition to the above, this Unit prepares a

monthly "FBI Digest of Civil Disorders" briefly summarizing

all disorders occurring in the previous month growing out of

racial unrest.

The incidents are listed geographically and

chronologically so that the White House and other recipients

can tell at a glance the general nature of incidents and

problens and where they are.

Current Intelligence Reporting Unit

This Unit, formerly known as the new Left reporting

Unit, coordinates coverage of activities relating to all

New Laft, student, and antiwar denonstrations, as well as

other civil disturbances arising from issues other than

racial in nature.

A daily teletype summary on demonstrations

and other disruptive activity is prepared for dissenination

to the White House, the Attorney General and other interestea

Government piticials.

--.

Continuing and timely dissemination is made concerning

major demonstrations in addition to the teletype summary ind

advance infornation concerning possible denonstrations is

furnished Govermment officials (principally. the President

and Vice President) traveling throughout the country.

Since the last inspection, this Unit has covered

the sollowing major demonstrations;

Marches on Washington, D. C., and San Francisco,

A series of disruptive demonstrations held in

Washington, D. C., during the period 4/1-5/71 sponsored by

People's Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) and May Day

Collectlves.

During this series of demonstrations, sone

12,000 arrests were nade.

A series of demonstrations in Washington, D.

C.,

sponsored by the Vietnam Veterans Against the War

(VVAW)

during the period 4/18-23/71 to protest continued U.S.

involvement in Vietnan.

41

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 53

---

## Page 54

A massive demonstration in Washington, D. C., on

4/24/71 sponsored by the National Peace Action Coalition

(NPAC). A sinilar demonstration was held in San Francisco.

The Washington, D. Co, demonstration attracted an estimated

400,000 persons.

A March for Victory demonstration sponsored by the

Reverend Carl icIntire held in Washington, D. C., 5/8/71 to

protest Withdraval Of U.S. forces from Vietnam.

A "smoke-in" sponsored by the May Day Collectives

In Washington, D. C., 7/4/71.

Nationwide demonstrationg during the period

8/6-9/71 sponsored by NPAC and PCPJ, as well as other peace

groups to protest the war in Vietnan and to commenorate the

atomic bombing of Japan.

This Unit also prepared studies and briefs when

they are called upon to do so and regularly issues the

monthly "FBI Intelligence Calendar of Major Events."

AlSO

SEIStLOS aE maintainod concerning the disorders ior use

as needed.

..:

42

• NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 54 •

---

## Page 55

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

NEW LEFT SECTION

SECTION CHIEF - R. L. SHACKELFORDY

Attached are comments

from each unit setting out the most noteworthy accomplishments

of the New Left Section since the last Inspection.

not, no exort accomp, aimen

Section is responsible for the supervision of investigations

of the New Left movement,

including terrorist groups and in-

dividuals engaged in bombings,

arson and assassinations,

and other New Left groups and individuals both on college

campuses and off campus.

Investigations concerning New Left

publications are also supervised in this Section,

as are

sabotage investigations, and Protest and Trotskyist groups.

DID INSPECTION

8/18/71

_ NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 55

43

---

## Page 56

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

• SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS UNIT - WEST

The primary objective in this Unit has been and.

continues to be the goal of overcoming the threat to American

institutions presented by violence prone extremists, such as

those within the revolutionary Weatherman organization.

This

Unit and the Special Investigation Unit - East, supervise

security investigations of the Weatherman group and its

individual members.

Through coordination with the General

Investigative Division, which has handled certain criminal

investigations involving Weatherman members, and with the Special

Investigative Division, which has supervised the investigation

of Weatherman fugitives, substantial accomplishments in the

task of neutralizing these extremists have

been achieved. A

number of Weatherman leaders have been indicted on Federal

charges involving violations of the federal Anti-rlot, gun control

and bombing statutes. Many leaders and activists in the

Weatherman organization have gone underground and the organization

is currently composed of a few hundred adherents including

those underground and above ground.

Its underground existence

and the fugitive status of its leaders have isolated Weatherman

from the mass of American youth.

Consequently, Weatherman

has experienced a considerable reduction in strength, based

on the number of its present adherents and its influence

among young people.

Weatherman, though a small group, continues to be

extremely dangerous in view of its violent and destructive

tactics. It is noted that Weatherman has claimed credit for

a number of bombings, including the bombing of the national

Capitol building on 3/1/71.

Weatherman continues to receive intensive investigation.

In recent months,

including attorneys, who are acting in a covert support role

for Weatherman.

The Department of Justice has now indicated in

a letter to the Bureau that it will institute Federal Grand

Jury proceedings concerning activities at this Pine Street address,

with the prospect of further indictments and further discourage-

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/18/71

4-E

-2 -

44

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 56

---

## Page 57

ment of Weatherman sympathizers.

Approval has been obtained

for this Unit to supervise this

Pine Street case in view

of its intimate connection with the overall

Weatherman

investigation. Approval has also been obtained for this Unit

to supervise a New Left - Violence case in Tucson, Arizona,

which involves Unlawful Possession or Receipt of Firearms

(UPRF)

charges. This Tucson case concerns

five New Left

extremists, three of whom have now been indicted by a Federal

Grand Jury. Iwo of these have been apprehended and the

third is a fugitive.

Another subject in this case has been

sentenced to jail for contempt of

court for refusing to

testify before the Grand Jury.

An example of the salutary effect of vigorous

investigation and prosecution of New Left extremists is seen

in the Seattle area. There, a radical group calleã the

Seattle Liberation Front (SLF), which was composed of

former Weatherman members, had

fomented continuing violence.

Then SIF leaders were tried in Federal court on anti-riot

charges.

This trial ended in a mistrial but the SIF leaders

were cited for contempt of court.

Since that mistrial in

December, 1970, SIF has been disbanded and most SLF members

have left Seattle.

There has been a noticeable reduction

in New Left violence in Seattle.

In the several cases referred to above, it is noted

that in each instance information crucial to the prosecution

of New Left extremists was provided by New Left informants.

In recent months significant accomplishments were

made in a case involving

two extremists in Ohio through the

use of a tesur installation. These two extremists were

Between February and June,

information concerning the plans of May Day, Leader Benna Davis.

for the recent May Day national action.

extensive information on planned demonstrations and strikes at

Kent State University on May

the killing of Kent State students by the National Guard in

May 1970.

This source furnished information concerning

activities and movements of suspects in the Capbom case and other

New Left extremists.

This source also developed information on

plans for the Women's March on Washington on April 10, 1971.

- 3-

45

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 57

---

## Page 58

As a result of dissemination of advance information developed

by this source, authorities were able to further control

these demonstrations and reduce the violence arising out of

such activity.

With reference to the complicated Weatherman

investigation, much progress has been made recently in the

development of information on the technical aspects of the

actual operation of the Weatherman underground, particularly

its use and methods of obtaining false identities, its

courier system, its use of radical attorneys in covert

support roles

and in the movement of its

support personnel.

Effort is continually being, made to develop nev techniques

Indeapproaches to facilitate this investigation. A "stop

program in NCIC, for Bureau use only, concerning

extremists on Priority I of the Security Index was initiated

in June, 1971. This program enables our field offices to

receive

prompt notice by teletype when police agencies make

inquiries about these subjects.

In addition,

new procedures

have recently been devised whereby

the Identification Division

can better disseminate to the field arrest information on

Security Index subjects for whom no fingerprints are on file.

This is accomplished by periodic submission by the field of

Security Flash Notices to determine if fingerprints

have been

received since the last check.

4

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 58

46

---

## Page 59

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS UNIT-EAST

Incidents of sabotage currently being investigated

by the Bureau are, for the most part, the "home grown variety"

occasioned by attacks against the military and related

operations on the part of New Leftists, dissidents, and

elements opposed to U.S. participation in the Vietnam War.

There are under investigation at the present time

9 sabotage initiated investigations with prosecution pending,

involving 21 subjects who are charged with various violations

including Attempted Sabotage, Destruction of Government

Property, Antiriot Law violations, Civil Rights violations,

Violation of National Firearms Act, Possession of Destructive

Device, Interstate Transportation of Stolen Motor Vehicle,

Contempt of Court and Conspiracy.

Since last inspection and as a result of sabotage

investigations, 10 individuals have either boon tried in

Federal court and found guilty or have entered guilty pleas.

Three of these individuals have been sentenced to

a total of

30 years while the remaining 7 are awaiting sentencing.

Additionally, since last inspection and as a result of

sabotage investigations, 6 additional individuals have been

indicted but not yet brought to trial. Two of these 6 are

currently

in a fugitive status.

It should be noted that as

• a direct result of this Bureau's sabotage investigations, 5

subjects are currently included in the Bureau's Most Wanted

Fugitives List and Identification Orders are currently in

effect concerning another 3

subjects.

8/18/71

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

4-E

-5 -

47

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 59

---

## Page 60

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

VENCEREMOS BRIGADE

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS UNIT - EAST

4-E

The Venceremos Brigade (VB) came into being

June, 1969, as a coalition of representatives from various

New

Left organizations including Students for a Democratic

Society, Young Socialist Alliance, the militant Black

Panther Party and a supporting cast of Old Left organiza-

tions including the Communist Party, Progressive Labor

Party and Socialist Workers Party.

Four contingents have traveled to Cuba since

November, 1969. The first group was composed of 216

Americans who obtained their own transportation to

Cuba in defiance of the State Department ban on travel to

that country.

these joung ravolutionaries were returned.

to Canada on

2/12/70 at the expense of the Cuban Government

which converted a cattle boat into a makeshift troop ship.

The second

contingent of 687 sympathetic American youths

were loaded aboard this boat for its return trip to Cuba.

This group, like the first contingent, worked in the

sugar cane

fields until its return by the same means of

transportation on April 23, 1970. In August, 1970, the

third contingent of the VB, made up of 407 persons,

journeyed to the Isle of Youth where they participated

in a Cuban agricultural experiment of planting and ferti-

• lizing citrus trees.

This group returned to the U.s.

mid-October, 1970. The fourth contingent of 233 young

Americans

traveled by air tò Cuba during the last week of

March, 1971, and were returned to Canada by Cuban ship on

Each group worked approximately 72 hours a day,

5z days a week, and in their free time were afforded the

opportunity of

absorbing communist propaganda offered by

the Cubans, North Koreans and North Vietnamese. They

were reminded by the Cuban

camp director that they were

here to show

, "solidarity with the socialist struggle, to

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/18/71

4-E

- 6 -

48

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 60

---

## Page 61

smash the U.S. blockade, and to make a breach in the

facade of the U. S. imperialist monster."

Each of the more than 1500 brigade members has

been the subject of a

security investigation which includes

the identification and obtaining of background data as

well as a personal interview with each brigade member.

These investigations are being made to determine the

in the revolutionary movement in the U.S. Upon comple-

tion of the investigation and the interview of each of

these individuals, the field must recommend either the

inclusion or noninclusion of the subject in the security

Index. In addition the field must continue to report

every 90 days for a period of one year on the activities

and whereabouts of each brigade member.

The intelligence responsibilities of the Bureau

in regard to the VB hays been. handled through the placing

Of Bureau informants in the ranks of the various contingents.

Accurate on-the-scene reports concerning the training and

activities of these groups in Cuba have been furnished to

the intelligence community and factual responses have been

made to congressional and other legitimate inquiries re-

garding these young supporters of the Castro Regime.

AS

a result of our investigations, more than 275 VB partici-

pants have been placed on the Security Index and it has

been noted that about 25% of those individuals currently

being intensively investigated as extremists in the New

Left section, are ex-VB members.

Plans for

a fifth contingent of the VB have been

formulated.

This new group is tentatively scheduled to

depart for Cuba in early January, 1972, and 1s to be

comprised of 225-250 individuals

politically oriented to

the socialist cause.

- 7-

49

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 61

---

## Page 62

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

SUBVERSIVE INDIVIDUALS - NEW LEFT UNIT

Among the primary responsibilities of this unit

is the identification and investigation of individuals who,

because of activities or affiliation with one or more

violence-prone revolutionary groups, are dangerous or

potentially dangerous to the internal security of the

nation. In most instances, this unit handles initial

stages of the investigation and carries it through to

completion. In some instances where individuals are

determined

to be of an extremist nature, those cases

are referred to the units in this section handling

extremist cases.

At the conclusion of each investigation

or at the phase of the investigation when it is determined

that the individual therein could be considered a danger

to the internal security of the counity,

an evaluation is

included a ap sorelate, the individual's name is

on the Security

The immense volume of cases handled in this

unit is clearly exhibited by the fact that since the

last inspection approximately 5000 cases have been

handled in

been opene this unit.

To be exact, 5418 cases have

and 4951

cases have been closed.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/18/71

4-E

-8-

50

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 62

---

## Page 63

PROTEST AND TROTSKYIST GROUPS UNIT

This Unit is responsible for the investigation of

worthy of note are as follows:

FASTCON

As a result of our investigation of the plots to blow

up the underground tunnels housing the heating system servicing

Government buildings in Washington, D. C., and to kidnap

high Government official, an indictment was returned at

Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, on 1-12-71 covering six individuals

as defendants and seven unindicted co-conspirators.

Our

investigation into this matter continued, and on 4-30-71 a

superseding indictment was returned at Harrisburg which added

two additional defendants and reduced the number of unindicted

co-conspirators to

In addition, five individuals have

been cited

for civil contempt for refusal to testify before

the Federal Grand Jury regarding this matter, and four individuals

have been indicted for criminal contempt.

By letter dated

2-25-71 to the Director, Assistant Attorney General Robert C.

Mardian advised of his appreciation for cooperation extended

by the Bureau in this case and singled out the efforts of six

members of the Domestic Intelligence Division, as well as two

Agents of the Philadelphia Office.

Of paramount importance to the successful prosecution

of this case is our principal witness, Boyd Frederick Douglas.

He testified before the Grand Jury in January 1971, and

subsequently assumed a new identity and has been living under

Inasmuch as he is a

appropriate cover in Dos Moinese the Department is primarily

rather than an informant,

responsible for his welfare and his cover. We maintain liaison

between the witness and the Department in order to insure that

the Bureau's interests are properly looked after. The. death

O1 the intormant Tather in cuttes created a situation

whereby the informant's identity and location could have been

ascertained by irresponsible members of the press.

Through

the concerted efforts of the Omaha Office, the informant and

his wife attended the funeral with no adverse effects. Assistant

Attorney General Mardian, by letter dated 7-21-71, praised the

high degree of proficiency of five Agents of the Omaha Office

in protecting

the identity of the witness.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8-18-71

EBG: 02m

4-E

- 9 -

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 63

51

---

## Page 64

The development of a highly placed informant,

PH 1223-5, within the pro-Berrigan forces

; is also a significant

accompliShment. This individual has gained the confidence of

leaders in the

Berrigan movement and is privy to information

not available from any other source.

The informant has furnished

a wealth of information regarding fund raising and strategy

and

tactics planned by movement leaders to propagandize

their position and to attempt to gain public support for

the Berrigan cause.

In the course of this coverage, the

informant furnished information concerning plans of the group

for action in the event parole was not granted to Philip and

Daniel Berrigan, on 1-20-11.

He also furnished plans of the

group to mount an attack on the Bureau of Prisons which

culminated in a hunger-work strike at the Federal Correctional

Institution,

Danbury, Connecticut, on 8/6-7/71.

This action

resulted in

the transfer of eleven inmates to the Medical

Center for Federal Prisoners, Springfield, Missouri.

We

furnished

plans of

this proposed action to the Bureau of

Prisons, and in a letter to the Attorney General dated

8-11-71, the Director of the Bureau of Prisons notea that

the action of the inmates confirmed our intelligence reports

received several weeks prior.

Pi -223-S also furnished information concerning the

intention of the group to embarrass the administration by

having Daniel Berrigan prepare the text for a Mass composed

by musical conductor!

Leonard Bernstein. This Mass, 15 to be

part of the dedication ceremonies for the Kennedy Center for

the Performing Arts in Washington, D. C., and is to be performed

n 9-9-71.,

The words prepared by

Danie? Berrigan, were to have

• been in Latin and were to follow an antiwar theme.

The group

anticipated the President and high ranking administration

officials would applaud the work and subsequent publicity

would be to the effect that they had applauded antiadministration

This information was furnished the White House and,

vecording to the news media, the President has declined to

attend the ceremonies on 9-9-71.

pH 1223-S has also furnished information showing the

Berrigan supporters are interested in obtaining classified

material such as that publicized by Daniel Elisberg in an

effort to embarrass the Government. The individual who is

to attempt to get these papers is Linda shaw Finlay, an

ardent supporter of the Bexrigan cause.

Her target is the

Lyndon B. Johnson Library at the University of lexas, Austil,

which is

the repository for former President Johnson's papers.

We have a separate espionage investigation underway regarding

this situation.

- 10 -

52

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 64

---

## Page 65

ANTIWAR MOVEMENT

This Unit is responsible for the investigation of

dissident protest groups in order that their potential threat

to the internal security of the country can be assessed,

This

includes development of informant coverage and the dissemination

of timely intelligence information, as well as possible

violations of Federal laws.

The organizations concerned are the communist

socialist lorkers Party (siP), Its youth group, the Young

socialist Alliance (YSA), and

the student Mobilization

Committee to End the War in Vietnam (SMC) which is controlled

by the SWP/YSA. All three of these groups utilize the National

Peace Action Coalition (NPAC) as a vehicle to project their

antiwar message.

The Peoples Coalition for Peace and Justice

(PCPJ), continuation group of the New Mobilization Committee

to End the War in Vietnam (NMC), also exercises considerable

influence in the antiwar movement and is a target for

intiltration by the Communist Party, USA (CP). The May Day

Collective (MDC), organized by.

Rennie Davis, is a militant

group which split from the pery following the way, 1971,

demonstrations in Washington, D. C.

• "Also of considerabie

interest is the Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW) which

came into prominence during the Washington demonstrations.

We have disseminated on a daily basis hundreds of reports and

memoranda concerning the activities of these and other groups,

as well as information regarding principal activists.

This

dissemination has been augmented by the preparation of several

CINALS pertinent to specific demonstrations, conferences, or

activities.

Of particular value has been our coverage of national

conferences and conventions sponsored by various groups which

are used to plan future antiwar activity and demonstrations.

We have been able to cover these sessions most effectively and

eut cover these

demonstrati onsch

have furnished other interested Government agencies with

advance information of their plans. Included in these

conferences were the following:.

2/19-21/71 - National student antiwar conference,

Washington, D. C., sponsored by SMC.

5/15/71 -- SMC National Steering Committee

meeting.

• 6/25-27/71 - PCPJ national conference, Milwaukee,

Wisconsin.

- 11 -

53

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 65

---

## Page 66

7/2-4/71 -- NPAC national antiwar

convention,

New York City.

8/8-15/71 - SWP national convention, Oberlin, Ohio,

which also included Student Activist

Educational Conference of the YSA.

8/13-17/71 - MDC national conference, Atlanta,

Georgia, preceded by regional conferences

in Washington, D. C., and Fayetteville,

Arkansas.

With regard to the MDC national conference, our

intormant coverage led to the apprehension of three leaders of

the New York MDC contingent by the New York City Police

Department for possession of firearms. Our informant determined

the exact location in a specific vehicle where a shotgun, 22

caliber rifle, and 357 Smith and Wesson revolver, all loaded,

were recovered.

In addition, in excess of 500 rounds of

ammunition for

these weapons

were seized.

Our investigation of the Committee of riaison with

Families of Servicemen Detained in North Vietnam (COLIFAM)

produced significant intelligence information with regard to

the exchange of letters

between prisoners of war in North

Vietnam and their families within the U.S. By letter dated

8-9-71, the Directorate of Special Investigations, U.S.

12

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 66

54

---

## Page 67

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

NEW LEFT GROUPS UNIT

Included in the work of the New Left Groups Unit are

the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) factions (with

the exception of the Weatherman), other New Left campus

groups, the Key Activist program,

New Left Movement reports,

New Left publications, and the maintenance of a library of

research material on the New Left for use of Bureau

ofticials in connection with approved speaking commitments.

In 1969, the Worker Student Alliance (WSA),

Weatherman, and Revolutionary Youth Movement (Ryn) factions

of SDs split into separate groups. Accomplishnents concerning

Weatherman are reported elsewhere in this survey. The RYM

faction of SDS is now practically defunct.

the

Currently,

largest faction of SDS is the WSA faction, which is

dominated by the pro-Chinese Marxist-Leninist Progressive

Labor Party (PLP,.

Appoximately twenty Bureau informants attended the

SDS/SA National Convention in Chicago, December 26-30, 1970.

This convention was dominated by PLP controlled leadership;

however, dissent was widespread, much of which was led by

our informants. Since the last

Inspection, this dissent has

spread further and has resulted in additional factionalism

within the 'SDS/WSA.

During the past winter, the SDS/WSA has continuously

attempted to inject itself into labor disputes without success,

due mainly to factionalism. The objective of the SDS/WSA is

to build ties with workers inasmuch as in the old Marxist-

Leninist tradition, they view the students-workers as the

vanguard of the revolution. in this regard, the sDs/lSA set

up a

Summer Project with the twofold objective of a massive

recruitment program and the fostering of a general strike,

nationwide, through infiltration of industry and unions. We

have been on top of this program from its inception and have

kept all interested Govem ment agencies advised of developments

on a continuing basis. In addition, again largely due to

factionalization, the

SDS/WSA Summer Project program has not

had significant success in any of its twenty-one target cities.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/19/71

DPW : jIm.

4-E

- 13 -

55

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 67

---

## Page 68

1340.304991

New Left Movement reports submitted quarterly by

each field office have enabled us to furnish interested

agencies timely and informative documents on the activities

of the New Left movement.

This is a substantial contribution

to the objective that responsible Government officials

be alerted concerning

the nature and extent of this aspect

of subversive activities and the threat it

presents to our

democratic society.

By conducting an intensive review of many New Left

publications which range from the pornographic to the clearly

revolutionary, we have determined the leadership of these

publications;

their subversive activities and whether or not

they urge violence; and sources of funds. Since these

publications are the voice of the New Left and are influencial

in recruiting youth, pertinent factors concerning them are

disseminated to interested officials and agencies. Since

our review of these "underground" publications has revealed

many of them frequently come into being and become defunct

within a short time, we are alert to the birth of new publications

by perusing various underground news service lists as

well

as other documents and books which report new publications in

this field.

A library of research material on the New Left is

maintained

for use of Bureau officials in connection with

approved speaking engagements before Government officials and

responsible citizens.

In this manner, we have assisted these

Government officials

and responsible citizens to more fully

understand the subversive and anarchist maniféstations of the

New Left movement.

Through the key activist program, we have focused

investigative attention on the leaders of the New Leit movement

with the aim of prosecuting these leaders under appropriate

statutes, Federal or local, wherever possible.

has proved successful in that we have been able to closely

follow the activities of these individuals and furnish interested

agencies and high Government officials with information concerning

their subversive and agitational activities.

Of particular note

is the fact that more than half of the 73 individuals designated

as key activists are subjects of some type of prosecutive action.

- 14 -

56

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 68

---

## Page 69

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

4-E

Section Chief W. A. Branigan

Espionage Section

The primary mission of this Section involves

counterintelligence operations against Soviet-Bloc Intel-

ligence Services (SBIS). Counterintelligence, by definition

and in practice, is a reaction

to initiative displayed by

a hostile intelligence service.

This factor largely inhibits

bold and aggressive initiatives on our part and the major

part of our efforts is spent in routine, programmatic, non-

remunerative work and patient, painstaking analysis of

information developed.

Positive counterintelligence

achievement in the final analysis depends on the ability to

detect and exploit in a timely fashion circumstances

which arise naturally--contriving, to the extent this is

feasible, to anticipate, encourage, or modify circumstances

the disadvantage of the SRiS:

In this perspective, the accomplishments listed

below are most

noteworthy.

These are highlighted by the

agens since the lasi

inspection.

From both a quantitative and qualitative view-

point, these successes represent an extremely high level

• of accomplishment in these two vital areas.

In keeping with the Inspector's instructions,

brevity will be stressed in the examples portrayed.

Security

and the "need-to-know" principle also requires limitation

of detailed information on many cases discussed.

These

matters, however, are identified sufficiently so that any

additional data desired may be obtained from the individual

file.

Accomplishments cited are restricted to the most

significant and/or representative.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/19/71

5

7

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 69

---

## Page 70

4-E

I. Defectors-in-Place (DIP)

The most valuable asset which counterintelligence

can acquire is the recruitment of a Soviet-bloc official

who is an active intelligence officer or who otherwise has

access to intelligence information. Such a source can

produce information of incalculable value not obtainable

from any other source.

Highest priority and emphasis is

assigned to cases which have such potential. Although we

have had success in this area in the past, at the time

of the last inspection ve had no Di Currently we are

operating four sources in this category which are briefly

described below.

IRONCLAD is a sensitive, highly placed DIP who

furnishes, on a

continuing basis,

a large volume of high

level information concerning operations of Soviet Intelligence

intelligence operations.

penetrations cather Government, agencies as, welmas substantial

information which has been of high interest to the White

House.

The value of information he has furnished and has a

potential to furnish is beyond estimate.

WINGTIP is a DIP who is in a position to furnish

information concerning Polish intelligence activities

He

was recently recruited and his potential is still being

exploited:

KIELBASA is a DIP who is a Polish intelligence

officer whose recruitment was recently effected. He is

under continuing development.

SPINNAKER is a DIP in the Yugoslay field who has

furnished information on Yugoslav intelligence activities

pertaining to identities of intelligence agents, their

sources and targets.

Dissemination of pertinent information

furnished by him has been made to interested U. S. agencies.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/19/71

4-E

-2 -

58

NW 88608-Docdis2989638-Page 7022222277937

---

## Page 71

4-E

II. Double Agents

A double agent is an individual under Bureau

control who has been

recruited and given intelligence assign-

ments by SBIS. Double agent development is given great

emphasis since this is a primary method to obtain valuable

information concerning

hostile intelligence operations,

targets, techniques and personnel.

At the time of the

last

inspection, this Section listed 138- double agents, 296

potential double agents, and 49

inactive double agents.

as the moste

significant accomplishment lies in the quality of the double

agent operations which has developed since the last inspection.

A representative number of these situations are set forth

below.

CHOWLINE is a double agent which began in 1958.

Through the years

S this operation has grown steadily in

significance and productivity.

messource nas been-padd

over 852, 000he soviets while passing carefusy cleared

which was deceptive in nature deception

concept concerning nonexistent titary ca

has been accepted by the soviets and their attempts to

counteract

this capability have reportedly caused them to

Lion 0 their defense bidget Most significant

developments were the identification of two Soviet illegal

agents in the U.S. as a direct product of the CHOWLINE.

operation (see Palmetto and Ixora).

We initiated interviews with this individual on a pretext

SIS and agreed to cooperate with the Bureau.

During June,

Ishe met with? Soviet contact

through corroborative

information from DiD, We know that soviets still acceptit...

him as one of their most trusted and valuable u.

is agents.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/19/71

4-T

- 3 -

59

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 71

---

## Page 72

4-E

BASELINE is a double agent operated against

CANDY is a double agent operation directed against

Ils on intermittent basis for 14 years.

HIS, interest was

dormant from 1966 to 1970 ben this operation Vas reactivated

presure.

bring about intelligence meetings in the U. s.

In 1968 HIS Under Cover Of the last-Nest Exchange.

is now under our control. Under HIS instructions

he la Sen

to seck permanent residence in this counts tourther his

intelligence mission. This is being done under our control.

AQ 366-s Is a double agent serenT AIX

Foxce in Ney Mexico, He has been operated against the GRu

Litary Intelligence) He receives radio messages

originating with

he hat ngo a dua seen exicon and the soviet principat

vas identified as an official from the soviet imbassy in

Mexico city Considerable information has been developed

this case concerning Soviet capabilities,

-systems.

In three double agent operations in the y, S - Mexican

morder area we have identified four Soviet efficials assigned

-to Mexico Cityas intelligence officers.

In addition,

we

have uncovered a Soviet illegal agent.

EP 628-5: ER 656-S3

19314

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/19/71

4-E

- 4

-

60

341W/886087Docld92989638xRaget2

---

## Page 73

4 -E

III. Soviet Illegal Operations

These operations are staffed by officers or agents

of SIS who enter the U. S. and operate without any connection

with the legal bases, i. e., the intelligence residencies

staffed by intelligence personnel under cover of official

position located at the Soviet Embassy and Mission to the

United Nations.

In view of the completely clandestine nature

of these operations, they are the most difficult to detect.

We have in the past

achieved some success in detecting several

illegal operations. Since the last inspection, three such

agents have been identified in the cases outlined below.

PALMETTO is an investigation of an individual

successfully identified through intensive, discreet investi

staves an exter on current doing 88 quate vortion

is underway in this case to determine additional information

concerning this indiviúual's activities with a vion to...

uncovering other Soviet agents in the U.S. whom he may be

servicing.

In another outgrowth of the CHOWLINE case, we have

identified the IXORA subject as a soviet Illegal agent. This

individual is an Austrian national who entered the u.

in 1968 as a permanent resident and resides and is employed

nt as an energency contact

indeed are tee to determine the extens

Intensive investi-

of this individual's activities and contacts.

In a double agent operation (referred to above),

a Soviet illegal agent has been

identified as a resident of

Juarez MexiCo who has been used in servicing Soviet agents

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/19/71

_EWLipdr

4-E

- 5 -

61

MW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 73,

---

## Page 74

4-E

IV. Counterintelligence and Special Operations

In this category, on a highly selective basis

we take initiative in actions which are designed

to disrupt,

deter or otherwise aisadvantage the operations of SBIS.

We

employ our own resources and whenever feasible, those of other

U. S. agencies.

Brief examples of activity in

this category

since the last

inspection are set forth.

assigned

Soviet recontacted this American we were in a position to

control the latter's actions.

At our direction the double

agent wrote a letter to the soviet united Nations Ambassador

complaining apou

treatment

he had received

indiscretions committed by

the soviet. The soviet has been

reprimanded and there are indications that his assignment

iu ineü. S. wiil be cui siurt:

• A Soviet defector who formally operated as a KGB

officer in the Ussr vas recent used by us to contacte

an East-West

national

agent

it so Union To tech VaS suspected.

of being affiliated

_with czech intelligence.

An approach

although the Czech couple seriously considered

the proposition for defection put to them, they finally

recided against such action and returnea to czechos ovaria

During our contacts some information of low level intelligence

significance was

developed.

The Soviet Government is currently engaged in

personne of the Consulate General

• DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/19/71

EWL: par

4-E

62

NIX 88608 Docld: 32989638 Page 74

---

## Page 75

4-E

the soviets are settling on a property considered by us

to offer the best advantage for counterintelligence coverage.

In late January, 1971, we furnished information to

State Department and White House concerning activities of

a very aggressive KGB IIICer in Washington we

was attempting

Communications" system used by white House and other agencies.

He sussested state that subject be dectared persona y

decided instead to personally admonish a representative of

state, after securing concurrence of White House,

the Soviet Embassy concerning these activities.

This action

resulted in curtailing the Soviet's intelligence activities

and probably resulted in his early recall.

A Soviet attached to the state of the new Consulate

General in san francisco came to our attention as a nGE

tricer who had formert been stationed in China.

He had

been declared persona nongrata and expelled from Peking

with some publicity. This information was furnished by us to.

a cooperative newspaper sourced ran rancisco and resulted

in a newspaper article which

repeated

the charges.

•Considerable

embarrassment was caused and long range curtailment of this

Soviet's intelligence activities is hoped for.

V. Prosecutive Action

One objective of counterintelligence investigations

is prosecution.

Since most intelligence officers have

diplomatic immunity, this objective is rarely attained.

A Soviet intelligence officer operating under cover

of employment at the United Nations Secretariat has requested

classified information from a double agent regarding the

F-14 aircraft being manufactured by Grumman.

The facts have

been presented to the Department of justice and Department oI

State and both have approved prosecutive action.

The Soviet

was scheduled for arrest during May, 1971, but this action

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/19/71

Bit: par

4-E

_7-

63

NW 88608 Dold: 32989638 Page 75

---

## Page 76

4-E

was held in abeyance pending final approval of the White

House, which had requested a temporary delay. Soviet has

been on summer leave and recently returned to the U.s.

We are currently seeking concurrence from the White

House

so that arrest may take place at the next meeting scheduled

for 9/13/71.

VI. Dissemination of Significant Intelligence Data

One of the products of our counterintelligence •

operations is the development of intelligence data of interest

to other U.S. agencies.

The following are examples of

significant data which has been disseminated on a high level

since the last inspection.

•1. Dissemination to National Security Agency

regarding an unknown subject connected with that Agency who

was

reported to us as cooperating with the KGB.

2.

Dissemination to Atomic Energy Commission

concerning a high officiai vi that Agency who was boing

cultivated

by the soviets for intelligence purposes.

3. Dissemination to State, CIA, and the White House

of information we developed concerning the delivery to the

Soviet Embassy on June 17, 1971, of a package containing a

copy of the "Pentagon Papers."

4. Dissemination to White House, CIA, and State

concerning an intelligence approach made by the Soviets to

a member of the President's Science Advisory Committee.

s. Dissemination to the White House of information

we developed concerning the receipt by Soviet intelligence

'of information concerning Dr. Kissinger's trip to China prior

to the release of this information by the president.

This

information was obtained from an American agent of the KGB

in Washington, D. C..

6.

Dissemination on high level to White House and

CIA concerning Soviet intelligence targets relating to the

Strategic Arms. Limitation. Talks then in progress.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/19/71

EWL: pox

4-E

-8-

64

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 76

---

## Page 77

4-E

7. Information in the CHOWLINE and PALMETTO cases

has been disseminated to Dr. Kissinger and the Attorney

General. Dr. Kissinger has commended the Director and

the FBI in this matter and specifically requested that he

be kept informed of any additional developments

• VII. Soviet Information

Collation System (SICS)

SICS is the system in which we have utilized

automatic data processing equipment to record data

concerning Soviet officials in the U. S. Since the last

inspection, a continuing expansion has been made in this

persomend me ne

we are looking to the inclusion of Satellite

personnel in the near future. This is a time consuming

project which holds

tremendous

potential, already partially

realized, for reducing administrative work and making our

overall investigative operations

more efficient and successful.

Detailed write-up is included in Section 5-a of the inspection

report.

VIII. Recovery

$9,288.76 has been claimed as a recovery in the

SNOOD case.

This is the amountpäid. Internal Revenue Service

as tax on income belatedly reported by subject due to action

by the Bureau.

- -

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/19/71

4-E

- 9 -

65

NW 83608-D3c1d292289630 Pagent

---

## Page 78

.. :

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

SECTION CHINE GIC. MOORE C

EXTREMIST INTELLIGENCE SECTION

4-E

The significant accomplishments of the Extremist

Intelligence Section can be seen most clearly in the accomplish-

ments through our investigative efforts as well as the accomplish-

ments achieved through the extremist informants.

Since the last inspection we have supervised the

"Newkill Special." This case involves unprovoked attack on

two New York City (NYC) police officers, 5/21/71, by two Negro

male assailants. Both officers were shot and killed. Prior

to this shooting on 5/19/71 two NYC officers were machine gunned

and seriously wounded as they attempted to stop a speeding car

occupied by Negro males. Anonymous letters were received by

news media in MYC claiming credit for these shootings.

The Director met with the President and the Attorney

General regarding the killing of the two officers as this

incident received nationwide publicity. The Director instructed

an all-out effort be made to effect Bureau solution.

Intensive investigation has been conducted to identify

assailants with investigation conducted abroad and in over 40

field offices. Over 2000 people have been interviewed. The

• Identification Division has compared the fingerprints of over

700 persons with latent evidence and the Laboratory Division has

conducted about 400 separate examinations of ballistics and

other type evidence in this case.

Since its inception, we have concentrated on members

of the violence-prone Black Panther Party (BPP) as suspects.

This has paid off since four persons were arrested in NYC on

6/5/71 while attempting an armed robbery. Two of the individuals

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

8/19/71

JCD: acs.

4-E

66

NW-88608-Doeld:82989638-Rage B

---

## Page 79

arrested were Bureau fugitives. We had previously identified

the two. Bureau fugitives from fingerprints from material

submitted by them to news media in May claiming credit for the

murders. The two Bureau fugitives, Richard Moore and

Edward Joseph, were Bi? members who were reportedly in Algeria.

A machine gun utilized in armed robbery and in possession of

Moore was determined to be same weapon used in machine gunning

of two NYC police officers on 5/19/71. Moore has been indicted

by Queens County, New York, Grand Jury for attempted murder of

the two officers. He and Joseph remain in custody of local

officials.

Our intense investigation has in some respects

decimated the BPP in NYC.

We have kept them on the defensive

and in hiding. Our investigation and interview program has

resulted in developing a witness who is an associate of the

prime suspects in this case.

Based upon her testimony.of-acts of violence, she

identified seven Panthers who participated in killing a Negro

BPP leader in NYC. Of the seven, three had previously been

arrested in the above-mentioned armed robbery 6/5/71. The

remaining four became Bureau fugitives for Unlawful Flight

to Avoid Prosecution for murder.

On 8/7/71 a Panther informant of our Detroit Office

under instructions to locate the four fugitives located

Michael Dennis Hill, one of the four, who was accompanied by

an associate.

Based upon informant's report, Hill and

Anthony Nicholas Ia Borde were arrested, both armed with

IIrearms, and La Borde also had a live hand grenade in his

possession. A Federal Grand Jury has indicted Hill and La Borde

with possession of destructive device and La Borde also charged

with harboring Hilt.

Hill is reportedly the "trigger man" in shooting of

two officers on 5/19/71 and our witness has stated Hill was

extremely upset for his failure to actually kill the officers

and is a likely suspect in killing the two officers two nights

later on 5/21/71. Hill is described as the "hit man" of BPP

67

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 79

---

## Page 80

and was the planner and "hit man" in armed robberies and acts

of violence committed by BPP. La Borde was also indicted on

armed robbery charges on 8/16/71 in NYC having been identified

as the person who held up a bar during July, 1971.

i..-.

Hilt and la Borde are prime suspects in the killing

on 5/21/71 and lineup is being arranged for our crime scene

witnesses to view these two.

We have kept the White House and the Attorney General

apprised of all pertinent developments in this case and on five

to sons Meet e White House, has advised President

Director

informed on this case. -

of his appreciation of being kept fully

....=:

Through the ivestigative ettorts of the field and

the various Bureau programs, we have been able to follow closely

the development and activity of the BPP which revealed as of

June, 1971, a total membership of 710 in 39 branches located

in 37 cities..

was ¿us<-The Bureau's Black Nationalist Cöunterintelfigence

Progtam: (COINTELPRO), which was in éffect for séveral years,

""ЕЗ

was: discontinued 4/27/71. Prior to discontinuance, counter-

intelligence activity directed toward disruption of the BPP was

carried out at an accelerated rate taking advantage of and

exploiting any appropriate situation. Emphasis was placed on

creating distrust between fuey Newton, BPP Minister of

E5-35

Defense, and Aldridge Cleaver, BPP Minister of Information, "a"

fugitive in Algeria.

These efforts resulted in a break between

Newton, and Cleaver on 2/26/71 which soon grew into an irrecon-

cilable split and a name-calling contest between the two of

them. Through our mass media program, we disseminated publicity

concerning the split within the party as well as the fact that

Newton lived in a $650-a-month apartment*

while rank and file

Panthers went hungry.

1I2010-i2=.

to ciscreais

The publicity concerning the internal factionalism

as well as Newton's high living definitely served to discredit

the BPP and caused further factionalism. The financial

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 80

---

## Page 81

supporters were disenchanted bringing to a halt the flow of. "

donations into the organization. The resulting strain added

to the paranoia of Newton causing him to create complete chaos.

within BPP national headquarters. Newton, in an effort to

justify his position and to criticize Cleaver and his dissident

followers, claimed that Cleaver and his appetite for violence

were the root of all of the BPP problems in the recent past.

Newton maintained the BPP was really nonviolent but was led

astray by Cleaver and that he, Newton, will now return the

organization to a position of nonviolence and community work.

In summation, our COINTELPRO efforts split the BPP,

cut off their supplies of outside funds and created chaos within.

. As a result of the ever increasing information being

reported by our informants regarding the acquisition of weapons

by black extremist groups, on 5/17/71 an airtel was sent to all

SACs setting forth instructions regarding the handling of such

information. This airtel sets out in detail the possible gun

law viclations under the National Firearms Act, Stats Firearms

Control Act and the unlawful possession or receipt of firearms.

The field was instructed that we have secondary investigative

jurisdiction in such matters and that information developed by

our informant coverage regarding possible gun law violations

should be handled by us and vigorously pursued looking to the

ultimate prosecution of the black extremists involved.

The Black Afro Militant Movement (BAMM) was organized

in the Miami Division in the early part of 1970. The leader of

this group was Alfred Dwight Amos Featherstone

visited Fidel Castro in Cuba.

Through the outstanding informant

coverage developed by the Miami Office and the aggressive investi-

gative techniques used, this dangerous extremist organization

has been completely destroyed and is no longer a factor in the

extremist activities in the Miami area. Dur informant coverage

developed information

regarding the participation by BAMM leaders

and members in fire bombings in the Miami area including a

bombing at the University of Miami. Through this coverage and

other investigations an excellent criminal case was developed

69

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 81

---

## Page 82

regarding the teaching and demonstrating of explosive devices

by BAMM leaders.

In December, 1970, Federal Grand Jury in Miami,

Florida, rendered indictment charging Featherstone and two other

BAMM leaders with violation of the new antiriot laws. All

three subjects have been found guilty in Federal court Miami.

leatherstone and Charles Riley

Jr., another BAMM Leader, have

een sentenced to the custody of the Attorney General to

periods of four and two and a half years respectively. The

third subject, after testifying for the Federal Government, was

placed on probation.

Earlier this year, one of our informants being operated

by the Richmond Office reported on a conspiracy by leaders of

. the Washington, D. C., Chapter of the BPP and leaders of the

Richmond Information Center. (RIC), an affiliate of the BPP, to

steal and transport weapons from Richmond, Virginia, to

Washington, D. C. This informant reported

on the theft of such

weapons in Richmond and their subsequent illegal transportation

to Washington, D. C., by this group.

As a result of this information developed and öther

investigation, two of the BPP leaders in Washington and three

RIC leaders in Richmond, Virginia, were subsequently indicted

by a Federal Grand Jury.

Our informant testified in Federal court as the

principal Government witness resulting in the conviction of

the two Washington, D. C., leaders and two of the RIC leaders.

The trial for the fifth individual involved is scheduled for

8/20/71 in Richmond. The sentencing of the convicted leaders

is scheduled in the near future.

As a result of the conviction obtained based on the

excellent infornation furnished by our informant, the RIC has

been completely destroyed and conviction of the two Washington

BPP leaders has been highly significant in curtailing the

activity of the Washington, D. C., BPP Chapter.

The continued operation and development of extremist

informants has resulted in a steady flow of valuable intelligence

information, which information has brought about the apprehension

7

WW 8860% Docld 37989638 Page 82

---

## Page 83

of badly wanted extremist fugitives, confiscation of explosives

and firearms in possession of extremists, the prevention of

violence and the saving of lives. In addition, these informants

have been responsible for bringing about the arrest of 630

individuals since the last inspection, 145 of these individuals

were Bureau fugitives, as well as being responsible for the

recovery of $327,760.53.

Concerning the development of information as to black

extremist activities outside the United States effecting the

United States, we have placed an informant in Canada ynderathe

greetent the Rodet Canadian Mounted Pe ceo mant operatio

This operation

Some of the concrete examples of our informant and

investigative accomplishments can be seen in the following:

Ghetto informants in June, 1971, developed information

concerning the motive and circumstances leading up to an

unsuccessful attempteú fire bumving of a Jackson, Mississippi,

police vehicle; identified a local subject involved in assault

in arranging for the surrender to FBI Special Agents of a 16-

year-old male who was badly wanted by the Buffalo Police

Department 'in connection with a shooting incident.

Omaha informants advised of the location of several

weapons which were owned by members of the Black Revolutionary

Party in Omaha and which were subsequently seized by the Omaha

Police Department; Houston informants furnished information which

was the basis of a raid by the Houston Police Department on the

headquarters of the Peoples Party II, which resulted in the

arrest of nine individuals, eight of whom were charged with

burglary and firearms theft, and the recovery of numerous

weapons.

Detroit extremist informants advised concerning a

BPP member who was involved in a holdup killing in Detroit.

He also advised that this individual was carrying the same

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 83

---

## Page 84

pistol used in the killing, which enabled the Detroit police

to arrest the EPP member, recover the pistol and determine that

this weapon was used in the killing referred to above.

A Tampa informant furnished information concerning

identity of two Negro males who placed a fire bomb in a garage

in Tampa, Florida.

A Miami ghetto informant was instrumental in obtaining

advance information concerning problems in a local high school.

It is noted there was a walkout by students at this high school

and as a result several Negro students were arrested.

Washington Field informant obtained information concerning

Stokely Carmichael"

strid to the United States trom Africa anc

this information was verified by the New York Division.

Detroit informant provided information which saved

two lives. This informant, who was a member of the BPP, was

instrumental in saving the lives of two BPP members who were

being disciplined by the BPP and his information when furnished

to local police was responsible for arrest of seven BPP members

who were chaiged with kidnaping and assault to do bodily harm..

less than murder.

A Memphis informant furnished information which

prevented a. shootout between members of the BPP chapter and

the Memphis Police Department.

Extremist intelligence information gathered through

our informants and investigations makes up a major portion of

the Bureau's sophisticated document which is disseminated to the

White House and other high-level Government agencies.

document captioned "FBI Summary of Extremist Activities" furnishes

the White House and other agencies with a digest of the extremist

problem in the United States.

The quality of our informants can also be judged by

the fact that since the last inspection 16 Special Agents have

been recommended for either incentive awards or letters of

commendation for their work in developing and handling these

informants. In addition, Il extremist informants were given bonus

awards for valuable information furnished and services rendered.

72

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 84

---

## Page 85

In relating to the accomplishments of the Extremist

Intelligence Section, comment must be made concerning the

contributions regularly being made by the Inspection Division

during their analysis of extremist matters: in the various field

divisions.

In addition to acting upon information furnished to

them by this Section, the Inspection Staff, through their on-the-

spot review of extremist matters in the field, are often able to

detect weaknesses not apparent at the Seat of Government and

offer constructive assistance to the office involved in

strengthening their operation.

The information furnished in the Inspection reports

is used by this Section to do a comprehensive analysis of every

field office operation and to furnish the results of the analysis

to the field divisions by communications captioned "Administrative

Review." These reviews have been most helpful in strengthening

the various field office operations.

Since the last inspection, informant coverage has

improved in the Boston, Charlotte, Cincimati, Cleveland, Newark

and New Haven field divisions and this ingrovement can be

attributed in part to the Inspector's anallysis of the above

operations.

73

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 85

---

## Page 86

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

4-E

SECTION CHIEF W. R. WANNALL

NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE SECTION

There is attached a summary of significant accomplishments

of this Section set forth by individual units. Specific tangible accomplish-

ments resulting from programs supervised by this Section are outlined

in write-ups separately submitted and will not be repeated herein.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/19/71

AID:ams

4-E

74

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 86

---

## Page 87

4

E

SPECIAL COORDINATION UNIT

FBI liaison Agents stationed abroad in 17

foreign posts have facilitated and encouraged the prompt

handling by foreign agencies of FBI requests for

investigation in the countries covered by those agencies.

The productivity of this liaison during the first six

months of 1971 was demonstrated by the location in those

1,387 persons wanted in the U. s.

Eighty-

eight automobiles, stolen in the U.s., were recovered

abroad during the

same six months and

the total estimated

value of stolen property and funds recovered abroad was

$596, 442€

:.::.

..!.

Requests for U. S. information and investigations

within the U.s. are handied on a icoiprocal

basis for the

foreign agencies with which we are in contact.

This

cooperation has played a large part in maintaining

our

dominant position 'in international police work and has

encouraged a spirit of cooperation between the countries

concerned.

During

the first seven months in 1971, we

handled a

total of 1,773 investigations under our Foreign

Police Cooperation program. In one of these cases initiated

as

an FPC matter but transformed into an Interstate

Transportation of Stolen Property case, New York City Agents

were successful in locating

the famous

painting by El Greco

"La Asuncion de la Virgen," which had been stolen in Spain

in 1936 and brought into the U. S. in 1968 through Mexico.

This painting, a

Spanish national

as worth a minimum of one million dot are sadies lestiated

has received exceptionally wide publicity in Spain and

resulted in expressions of gratitude to our Legal Attache

..for FBI cooperation.

i ::

13:2

•.:.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 87

---

## Page 88

4 - E

The expansion of our operations abroad was under-

taken at the instruction of the President for the specific

purpose of developing high-level political intelligence and

each such item submitted is identified by the code word

"HILEV." After a slow start in January, when the new

offices were just getting underway, the production of HILEY

items has increased to the point that during July, 1971, 73

such items were submitted of which 53 or 72.6% were actually

disseminated to Dr. Kissinger and the Attorney General.

Through August 17, 1971, a total of 245 items have been

SO

Isseminated. By letter March 3, 1971, Dr. Kissinger,

reterring to our work, stated "it is gratifying that efforts

thus far have been so fruitful" and "your contributions in

the foreign area

are deeply appreciated." In June, 1971,

the President informed the Director that he desired that

we

again expand our foreign liaison in view of the valuable

information which had been procured by the Bureau in its

operations abroad.

:..

Agents of the Unit receive telephone calls from

the other agencies in the Executive Branch who neea

information or have problems they wish to discuss with the

FBI.

Some of these

are referred to the interested division

but every effort is made to resolve them without un-

necessarily involving Bureau officials. As an example,

In May,

1971, we received an

of

all

Army proposal for the checking

fingerprints submitted by applicants for enlistment

•or induction into. the Armed Forces.

Special Agent Schwartz

immediately discussed this proposal with the Deputy

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Security Policy and a

Special Assistant

to the Under Secretary of the Army and

was able to convince these officials that no change in the

present procedures was necessary or desirable.

As a result

of the efforts of Special Agent Schwartz,

the Bureau was

saved a large volume of fingerprint classification and

searching,

and he was commended by the Director for his

successful handling of this proposal.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 88

---

## Page 89

4 E

CUBAN UNIT

This Unit has responsibility for neutralizing Cuban

intelligence and subversive Puerto Rican independence activities

against the United States.

The Cuban Mission to the United

Nations (CMUN), New York City, is the focal point for Cuban

spying operations, but Puerto Rican terroristic endeavors

are carried out by several groups, some being strictly local

San

Juan operations and others, under Cuban direction, carrying

out incendiary bombings and acts of sabotage in the New York

City area, as well as in Puerto Rico.

Cuban Intelligence Matters

We currently have 1l active, 2Il potential and one

inautive double agonts in the Cuban intelligence field. Through

a concerted effort mounted against the CHUN in February, 1970,

we had developed 24 DESECO-type sources at the time of the last

inspection.

cultivated,

Since that date, 19 other similar sources have been

and each is being used in sone capacity on a continuing

or intermittent basis in our efforts to establish blanket coverage

of the known intelligence officials at the CMUN 2 out of a 15

man complement) and to develop a defector-in-place there.

o develop at do

Recently we have developed documentary proof that an

Attache at the con legacy purchase teles ion cameras

In ViOlation of United States regulations, and State Department

is considering persona non grata action based on this data.

One of our sources has obtained the repair contract for CMUN

automobiles which assures

us continuing access to then:

In March, 1971, the Director's approval was obtained to

carry out a concerted defection eftort against a CMUN Second

Secretary, using a Special Agent of the dew York office who has

: a Latin American background and who has gained the complete

confidence of the Cuban intelligence official through his facility

with the Spanish language and his finesse in posing

asa

The White House has been offered this arrangement as a vehicle

to feed disinformation to the Cuban Government, and it has

responded with enthusiasm that serious consideration is being

given to use of this communication channel.

NW-88608-Doold;32989638_Page 89

17

---

## Page 90

4-E

In other positive moves we have arranged for a

In New York City, to prepare feature arcicles

who have settled

happily in the United States. In conjunction

with State Department, we received concurrence of Secretary

General U Thant of the United Nations to bar two strong-arh-type

Cuban intelligence officials from United States territory even

though neither had ever been in the United States or performed

any known acts of violence against United States property or

citizens.

Mr. U Thant pointed out that this was a landmark

action, as the United States had never before presented a case

which warranted entry denials in the history of the United Nations.

Our around-the-clock coverage of Cuban intelligence

activities has allowed us to identify, with a minimum of effort,

the various extremist, New Left and subversive Puerto Rican

independence leaders who maintain contact with the CMUN. Two

valuable double agents in the Miami

ares have gained the complete

confidence of a top Cuban collaborator based in New YorK CIty,

,and

they are able to provide full details concerning Cuban

Government military and civilian targets in the Miami kea.

One

of these double agents is being groomed to make clandestine trips

to New york cleys and it is anticipated that we will receive

valuable data concerning other Cuban Government targets when

these trips materialize.

The field offices responsible for covering Cuban

intelligence activities have consistently taken an imaginative

approach to the problem, and supervisory personnel in the field

and at the Seat of Government consistently strive to insure that

a11

available tools are furnished the investigating Agents.

Subversive Puerto Rican Independence Matters

The terroristic Puerto Rican proindependence movement,

• responsible for over 230 incendiary bombings

in Puerto Rico and

over 40 in the New York City area since 1967,

is a very real

menace to major United States installations and to the security

of Puerto Rico, as well as to the United States. While only a

small minority of persons desiring independence

for Puerto Rico

is involved, we now have approxinately 1,900 individuals marked

for special handling in case of a national emergency, and a

majority of these have been associated in some way with violent

acts against public or private property.

The largest of the extremist Puerto Rican independence

groups is the Puerto Rican Independence Lovement. (MPIPR) , while

others practicing violence are the Puerto Rican Socialist Workers

NW 88608. Docld:32989638 Page 90

78

---

## Page 91

4-E

Party (PSO), Armed Revolutionary Independence Movement (MIRA),

Armed Commandos for Liberation (CAL), and the Nationalist Party

of Puerto Rico (NPPR), the oldest of

the revolutionary groups.

MIRA and CAL, in particular, are dominated by native Puerto

Ricans who had many years of sabotage training in Cuba, returned

surreptitiously to Puerto Rico and led the wave of major

explosions which heavily damaged United States installations

in metropolitan Puerto Rican areas.

Property loss resulting

from such acts of violence since 1967 has been estimated at over

$15 million with an economic loss of over $100 million.

In addition to the previous apprehension of

Filiberto Cieda Rios Cuban espionage agent and leader of several

major bombing expeditions, the TBI was instrumental in the

arrest. by Police of Puerto Rico (POPR) of Narciso Rabell

Following

the deatls of two police officials and an BOTC cadet during a

riot in March, 1971, at the University of Puerto Rico, one of

our informants was

able to identify and bring about the arrest

of a Federation of University Students for Independence (FUPI)

leader involved in the killings.

TUP] is a radical college

student group which advocates violence in bringing about indepen

dence for Puerto Rico. •

Our sources in the Puerto Rican independence field

have given us information concerning subversives traveling

between Puerto Rico and New York City to transport incendiary

devices

for use in acts of sabotage. Alse a close rapport has

been established between POPP and our San Juan Office in recent

months.

The resulting arrests and seizure of explosives, as

well as intelligence material, have slowed down the acts of

violence noticeably during the first seven months of 1971.

We are quite apprehensive that the National Conference

of Governors has been scheduled for Septenber 12-15, 1971, at

San Juan. Realizing the volatile nature of the Puerto Rican

independence movement, we have directed an airtel to all offices

pointing up the powder keg situation and asking that every effort

be made to obtain advance information concerning planned acts

of violence to be carried out against participating officials.

lie are watching this situation closely and are prepared to give

the POPF. all logical assistance in helping to curtail any such

plans.

NWe dalen DOc C32989638 Page 91

---

## Page 92

4 - E

• .

MIDDLE AND SOUTH AMERICAN UNIT

This Unit is primarily responsible for the

overall supervision and direction of the FBI's activities

relating to countries in the Western Hemisphere commonly

referred to as the Latin American nations.

Such

activities involve Espionage, Internal security,

Registration Act, Neutrality

Matters and the collection

dissemination of foreign intelligence data.

In

addition, the Unit handles anti-Castro activities, pro-

Castro organizations and individuals, Cuban Security

Index matters and cases

and Cuban travel, immigrant and

refugee matiers.

The nil is aiso respunsibie fui the

supervision of

cases involving Spanish American and other

ethnic groups.

...

**""

The President and other policy makers have

indicated a continuing interest in political intelligence

information from areas in South and Central America and

the Carribean.

The critical need for such data from

these areas,

which are in constant political turmoil,

prompted us

to augument.our office in Buenos Aires and

to establish new offices in La Paz, Bolivia; Managua,

Nicaragua; and Caracas, Venezuela.

These offices coupled

with our offices in Mexico and Buenos Aires give us

representation in the areas from which political

intelligence data is urgently needed.

To further develop

such information,

we have established sensitive coverage

in Panamanian and Chilean fields.

•:.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 92

30

---

## Page 93

4 - E

..:::.

We have on a continuing basis been able to

provide the President and other responsible officials

with information of the type needed. With increasing

frequency our Legal Attaches have been able to provide

high level intelligence information which has been given

exclusively to the White House and the Attorney General.

one such item,

for example, provided by the Legal Attache

in• La Paz on 5/20/71 and disseminated on the same date to

the White House and the Attorney General dealt with plans

of the Bolivian Government to request the withdrawal

of

Subsequently on

5/22/71, the Bolivian Government did request the withdrawal

of this group from the country. A representative of the

National Security Council.commented favorably concerning

this data and the Legal Attache was commended by the

Director for developing the source who was able to produce

this type of information.

• The Unit continues to be successful in thwarting

the plans of militant anti-Castro groups which have sought

to infiltrate Cuba and to attack ships and

property of

foreign nations engaged in trade with Cuba.

Successful

development of key informants who have infiltrated anti-

Castro groups under Bureau direction has enabled the

Bureau to keep abreast of their activities.

Cuban exile

activities are embarrassing to the U. S. Government and

could lead

to a major confrontation between the U. S. and

the Soviet Union which has assumed the role of Cuba's

protector.

An example of our success in this area was the

arrest by appropriate authorities of four members of

Alpha 66, militant anti-Castro group, on 7/11/71 and the.

seizure or machine guns, ammunition, explosives, nana

grenades, other weapons

Seizure of this

material has hurt Alpha 66's capability to conduct raids

on Cuba.

Action taken in this instance was based on data

furnished.by FBI informant.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 93

-2-81

---

## Page 94

CHINESE UNIT

• 4-E

During February,

1971, we identified Robert Moling

(65-73910) as the individual reported by Royal Canadian

Mounted Police (RCMP) as having had clandestine contact with

Canada,se 2722n15e Pens nas outstanding credentials as ava,

canace chinese Nationalist diplomat and a former United States

Government employee.

His background makes him an ideal type

for covert use by the Chinese Communist Intelligence Service.

Since February, 1971, Teng has attempted to gain employment

on

the White House staff,

Department of Justice, and with a contractor handling work

for: National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

of these efforts through a sensitive source, and were able to

alert

responsible officials concerning Teng

July, 1971, with Director!s approval:

a desk-level

conference regarding Chicom matters was held at the Bureau

with our RCMP counterparts.

The conference was most rewarding

and informative and the results were furnished to the Director,

who instructed that a memorandum, based on results of the

conference, be prepared for Dr. Kissinger at the White House.

This memorandum was sent to Dr. Kissinger, who replied with a

personal letter of thanks to the Director. Dr. Kissinger noted

that the Bureau's timely coverage of these matters is most

important, and he requested to be further advised of these

developments as they occur.

An analysis of our existing method of handling cases

on Chinese seaman deserters was made during February and March,

19.71. .

This study resulted in a recomnendation, approved, to

streamline handling of these matters.

Annual savings of

$16,160 realized from this new procedure (see Bureau letter to

Albany dated 3/22/71 captioned "Chinese Seamen Deserting in

the U.S., IS - CH" 105-129735)

In view of the recent increase in the number of con-

tact cases growing out of the establishment on a Coicon Embassy

am tawa canada. It was recommended and approved that

Legat Ottawa.

submit communications in unknown subject contact

a manner which would allow prompt. relay to appropriate

field offices inasmuch as identification of unknown subjects

is of extreme importance at the outset.

EXO: dgo

8/19/71

4-E

NW.88608 Docld:32989638. Page 94

---

## Page 95

In view of the increase in the number of contact

cases mentioned above, Legat, Ottawa, has been

requested to

devise a form he can utilize in furnishing pertinent infor-

mation to the Bureau.

The present manner of submission of.

this data does cause some administrative problems here..

During August,, 1971, one of our sources bégan a trip

scheduled to last almost three weeks during which he will con-

is with the concurrence E RCMP

With chicon intelligence officers in ottawas

Travel to Canada

provide

in order that we can evaluate the results. of

coverag

the source's

efforts.

During the last three months,

two other sources

being directed against the Chicoms traveled to Hong Kong where

•they were

scheduled to meet with their Chicom contacts.

Another source, who is under Bureau direction and

who is employed at the United Nations UN) is now in

Red China on home leave.

This travel was made at no cost to

the Bureau and when debriefed, it is expected that this source

will be able to provide us with up-to-date information regarding

conditions in Red China and possibly valuable political intelli-

gence

During July, 1971, Paul lin described by RCMP as

the foremost Chicom

agent huence in, Canada,

visited

Cambridge, Massachusetts,

to consult with Harvard University

officials.

His schedule

also called for a meeting with

Senator Kennedy who has exhibited a keen interest in U. S.

relations with Red China.

One of our sources was able to main-

tain personal contact with Lin during this visit, and Lid has

asked the source to carry tasks for him.

It should be lated

that RCMP has described lil as the person most likely tombe

involved in any future discussions in the United States

relating to chicon ertorts to ensure anury into the u

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 95

25-

8.3

---

## Page 96

4 *E

NATIONALITIES UNIT

Israeli and Middle East Investigations

Information from these investigations continues

to be of extreme interest to the White House, the Secretary

of State, and high-level officials within the intelligence

community. We have continued to furnish information from

our sensitive coverage in the Iscaelt field under a

program of dissemination which has been assigned the

security designation of "SCOPE SCOREs information is

disseminated only to select individuals at the White House

and Department of State and to a previously cleared chain

of command within agencies of the intelligence community.

Data primarily relates to attempts by officials of the

Israeli Government to obtain favorable reaction and support

within

a Unitod States Governmont circles for continued.

support of

the Israeli Government politically and

economically,

as well

as affording military equipment.

The personalities involved in these dealings with Israeli

officials have included prominent members of the

United States Congress, as well as individuals in the

Exeative Branch.

With regard to the information we have

furnished, favorable comment has been received from

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger at the White House, the Secretary

State and other dignitaries within the

intelligence

community relative to its timeliness and value in

formulating United States Government policy and keeping •

abreast of the continuing tense situation in the

Middle East.

This Unit has the supervisory responsibility for

Nationa

currently conducting ax, such op

operations,

art or which are

most successful and responsive to high national priority

requirements in the production of cryptanalytic and

intelligence data.

Two of the above-described operations

were accomplished

since January, 1971.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 96

84.

---

## Page 97

4 -E

In view of the sensitivity of these particular

operations, it is suggested that I

or my. Number One Man

be consulted for details.

Investigation of Unauthorized Disclosure of

Classified Information to "The New York Times:

¿by Daniel Ellsberg

On June 15, 1971, the Attorey General requested

•the FBI conduct all necessary investigation into the

publication of classified information by "The New York

Times."

Our continuing investigation on a "special" basis

into this matter has,

from its inception, identified

Daniel Elisberg, senior Research Associate, Center of

International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of

Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts, as being the principal

suspect in this matter.

Investigation has revealed that

Ellsberg had access to the material involved while employed

at Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California; reproduced

classified documents in Los Angeles, California, in

Ostober, 1969; and subsequently

made copies of this

material

available to various members of Congress who failed

to make

the data public.

Strong circumstantial evidence has been

developed indicating that in

March, 1971, he made copies

of the information available to representatives of "The New

York Times" for reproduction.

On June 28, 1971, a Federal Grand Jury at

Los Angeles returned

a two-count indictment charging Ellsberg

with violation of Section 793 (E) of the Espionage Statute

in that he unlawfully retained classified documents and

failed to deliver them to appropriate Government officials.

He was also charged with violation of Section 641 of the

Theft of Government Property Statute in that he converted

•to his own use certain documents having a value

of excess

of $100.

Investigation revealed that Anthony Pusso, former

employee at Rand Corporation and associate of Ellsberg,

assisted Ellsberg. in the reproduction of documents in

October,

1969.

He was immunized from prosecution and

-2-

85

NW 88608 • Docld:32989638 Page 97

---

## Page 98

4 - E

subsequently refused to testify before a Federal Grand Jury.

As a result

he was held in contempt and

was committed to

jail on 8/16/71 until such time as he purges himself by

testifying.

• Considerable evidence has been developed

indicating employees of'The New York Times" have also

violated Section 793(E) of the Espionage Statute in

regard to their unauthorized possession of classified

information and refusal to deliver the information to

appropriate officials of the United States Government upon

demand.

The summary of tacts in the Ellsberg matters

as

stated

above, derived from a mass of details uncovered by

extensive investigation handled on a "special" basis in

four of the Bureau's major offices and represents lesser

degrees of investigative activity in virtually every Bureau

continental office,

as well as several Legal Attaches.

The

Unit has successfully coped

with the supervisory

:

responsibilities of this investigation in date and itia

servicing of the numerous inquiries in this matter has

contributed to the Bureau's stature in the eyes of the

highest levels of the Executive Branch who have evidenced

concern in the overall problem of the leak of classified

information to unauthorized persons.

Ramifications of the

Ellsberg investigation could foreseeably touch every level

óf Government operation in view of the necessary revisions

in the handling of classified data pointed up as being

required because of shortcomings uncovered in this

investigation.

The need to uncover such shortcomings and

to uncover any indication of a concentrated conspiracy to

subvert the national security by violation of classification

rules continues to be a matter of considerable concern in

our investigation of Ellsberg and shares equally with the

• Unit's recognized responsibility for overseeing the

investigation looking toward successful prosecution of

Daniel Ellsberg and others involved in this matter.

- 3'-

NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 98

86

---

## Page 99

SURVEYS, PROJECTS AND/OR INTENSIFICATION PROGRAMS 4-H

INSECTOR E. S. MILLER:

You are requested to furnish

information regarding various

*surveys, projects and/or programs in effect in your Division. This infor-

mation should include identity of the project or program, background and

date of inception, scope and desired objectives, positive results achieved

since last inspection, extent and nature of current supervision, current

justification for continuance, and frequency of evaluation and date of last

justification. Identify any surveys, projects or programs you have in

operation that are not set forth in my request. In addition, identify any

surveys, projects and programs completed or discontinued since the last

inspection. Identify only investigative-type matters in this category.

Each of these projects or programs should be separately captioned

and prepared in such manner that your comments regarding each topic

are separate from comments on any other topic. Your comments are

specifically requested on the following topics and any new programs

instituted since the last inspection or other topics not included herein you

may wish to comment on:

2.

3.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

Security Index Program.

Security Informants.

Extremist Matters. (Black extremist groups)

Extremist Informants.

White Extremist Groups.

Technical and Microphone Surveillances.

Counterintelligence.

Communist Infiltration of Extrem ist Groups.

New Left Movement.

Espionage.

Any other program deemed pertinent.

Comments of Assistant Director requested.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN:

(JAS: m15

8/20/71)

Attached are individual

write-ups from each of the

Sections concerning the

Lbove.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/17/71

ESM :wmi

4-H

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 99

87

---

## Page 100

SURVEYS, PROJECTS AND/OR INTENSIFICATION PROGRAMS

4-H

SECTION CHIEF ARBOR I. GRAY: AD

In connection with the

Inspector's request under

above title, write-ups are attached relating to the following

handled

by the Internal Security Section:

(1)

Security Index Program

(2) Security Informant Program

...(7) Counterintelligence Program - Disruption of

White Hate Groups

(11) Other Programs Deemed Pertinent

(a) Thumbnail Sketch Program

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/19/71

LLA: CO

4-H

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 100

88

---

## Page 101

SECURITY INDEX PRUGRAM

BASIC REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATIONS

4-H

BACKGROUND AND DATE OF INCEPTION

Studies pertaining to the handling of individuals

who in time of an emergency would represent a potential threat

to the national security began prior to World War II. The

actual program began in June, 1940, and dealt mainly with

lists of individuals considered for detention in the event of

a threat to the national security.

SCOPE AND DESIRED OBJECTIVES

This program is field-vide in scope.

The goal

of the

Security Index (SI) Program is the identification of individuals

who because of their membership and activity and/or association

with subversive organizations are dangerous or potentially

dangerous to the internal security of the country. The program

includes the collection of sufficient information relating to

the activities of such individuals to justify their apprehension

and detention in the event of a national emergency. Another

goal of the SI is to maintain it in a current status in the

event immediate implementation is necessary to minimize

possibilities of espionage, sabotage and subversion.

The SI is

broken down into three Priority groupings, the cards being tabbed

either Priority I, II or III in accordance with the relative

factor of dangerousness. Most dangerous individuals are tabbed

Priority I.

POSITIVE RESULTS ACHIEVED SINCE LAST INSPECTION

By way of background, in February, 1969, as a matter of

temporary expediency, the Executives Conference approved a

moratorium on certain Security Matter - Communist investigations

and periodic report writing in Priority II and Priority III

Security Index cases; moratorium later extended to January 1, 1971.

By memorandum October

29, 1970, from the Executives Conterence

to Mr. Tolson, approved by the Director, the moratorium was

lifted. At the time

there were approximately 10,690 individuals

on the

SI who were of the Priority II and III types. Virtually

no investigation had been conducted regarding approximately 7,000

of these individuals since the imposition of the moratorium in

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/18/71

4-H

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 101

170

---

## Page 102

SECURITY INDEX PROGRAM

BASIC REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATIONS

4-H

February, 1969.

Many of these persons had changed residence

and/or employment and their whereabouts were unknown. It can

thus be seen that the lifting of the moratorium was an aggressive,

timely and precise step toward fulfilling our current

responsibilities, especially in knowing the whereabouts of these

individuals.

Implementation was directed by airtel November 3,

1970, to all offices, and in doing so ve took a realistic step

in permitting the field to stagger the reopening of these cases

so that they would be

spread out over the period November 3, 1970,

to June 30, 1971. This was considered essential in view of our .

approximation that it would be necessary to reopen about 7,000

of the Priority II and III. types.

Our experience in the nine

months since moratorium was lifted has demonstrated the wisdom

of the lifting of the moratorium as it was found that many of

these subjects had changed residence and/or employment, thus

necessitating substantial investigation to determine new

whereabouts.

There are presently pending a number of these cases

for the precise purpose of determining whereabouts.

EXTENT AND NATURE OF CURRENT SUPERVISION

Responsibility for administrative handling of the SI

rests with the Special Records Unit of the Research Section.

Responsibility for individual cases rests with appropriate

supervisory personnel.

I personally follow this matter closely

to insure'it is current and that necessary changes are made

where desirable. This program receives constant supervision.

JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUANCE

This is a major internal security program based upon

Title II of the Internal Security Act of 1950 and is to be

implemented in the event of a national emergency to minimize

acts of espionage, sabotage and subversion.

FREQUENCY OF EVALUATION

The SI Program is constantly being re-evaluated.

The

most recent justification is contained in memorandum from

R. D. Cotter to Mr. C. D. Brennan dated January 12, 1971.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/18/71

SFP:rrd

4-H

-5 -

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 102

---

## Page 103

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE - WHITE HATE GROUPS

4-H

BACKGROUND, DATE OF INCEPTION AND DESIRED OBJECTIVES

This program was initiated in September, 1964,

for the purpose of counteracting and neutralizing white

extremist organizations, leaders and adherents.

During

period January, february, and March of 1971,

there were

17 field offices involved in this program and as specific

situations arose, other divisions participated.

THE UNITED KLANS OF AMERICA, INC., (UKA)

Under the leadership of John Paul Rogers,

Grand Dragon, Realm of Florida,

the UKA in that area

i become increasingly aggressive in recent months

and has been afforded generally favorable coverage by

the news media in Florida.

In addition, Rogers

has been

infuriated by recent interviews of Klansmen by the FBI

and has been increasingly vehement in his verbal attacks

As a result,

Rogers has been considered

a primary subject for counterintelligence activity. Tampa

has instructed its informants to discredit Rogers wherever

possible without creating suspicion.

John Paul Rogers above has also recently

devoted practically all of his energy to the UKA to the

exclusion of has mine came have more get g

barber to handle most of his business; yet he purchased

a $19,000 home.

Tampa is seeking ways to create suspicion

of Rogers by other Klansmen.

purchase polygraph machines in order to "weed out

informants."

Chicago, with Bureau authority, interviewed

Walter Van De Weckin

past president of the

American Society

of Polygraph Examiners, in an effort to ascertain who we

should logically contact in the polygraph field to prevent

Shelton and the UKA from purchasing this machine.

Interview,

which was handled in a discreet manner and in complete

confidence, revealed that we should not expand this

endeavor

further at

this time due to the large number of individuals

and companies involved.

In the event we learn of a specific

firm or individual the

UKA desires to contact :for this

purpose, further consideration will be given to this matter.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/20/71

LIA:CO

- 6 -

4-H 1

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 103

9

---

## Page 104

During March, 1971, Washington Field Office

was authorized to interview Robert Lee, admitted

National Socialist White People's Party (NSWPP) official

allegedly involved in raid on Mobilization Committee to

and to disrupt cooperative relationship between respective

organizations and effect possible defection of Lee

Interview appeared to be successful in that rapport was

established with Lee which may be beneficial in the future.

Lee volunteered information concerning NSVPP matters not

previously known to the Bureau and indicated he would be

or enfuro.

receptive for further contacts. It is felt this matter

has long range potential.

CURRENT STATUS OF PROGRAM

While counterintelligence of Klan and white

hate groups is an ongoing

thing all counterintelligence

programs as such which were operated by this division

were discontinued by airtel to all field offices 4/27/71.

In exceptional instances where counterintelligence action

appears warranted, recommendations are now submitted to

the Bureau under

the individual case caption to which it

.

pertains.

These recommendations are then considered on

an individual basis.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/20/71

LIA: CO

4-H

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 104

---

## Page 105

-'

THUMBNAIL SKETCH PROGRAM

4-H

This program was initiated and authorized by

SAC Letter 53-72 (J) dated October 27, 1953, to insure

that the field is using current characterizations of

subversive organizations and to provide uniformity in

characterizing such organizations. Those characterizations

deemed to be of field-wide interest are now to be

furnished to the field by letter to all offices on an

annual basis rather than by SAC Letter as was formerly

the practice, in accordance with approval of suggestion

in memorandum J. J. Casper to Mr. Mohr dated December 7,

1970.

The background and value of this program is

the same as it was at the time of last inspection. Since

June 1, 1971, we have been receiving and processing the

annual

submission of thumbnail sketches.

To date

thumbnail sketches on 387 separate organizations have

been received and these are being processed by appropriate

supervisory personnel at the Bureau. Those of field-wide

¡interest, which there are 70 at this time, will be

furnished to the field by letter to all offices.

Others

are being returned to submitting field offices as they

are approved.

This program was last reviewed and analyzed

and its continuance approved by memorandum R. L. Shackelford

• to Mr. C. D. Brennan dated October 12, 1970.

Annual

approval will again be requested when

the current project

is completed.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/19/71

HEM: cb

.- 8 -

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 105

93

---

## Page 106

SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM

BASIC REVOLUTIONARY AND NEW LEFT ORGANIZATIONS

4-H

At the time of the last inspection in January,

1971, the Internal Security Section handled informants

only in the basic revolutionary organizations and related

groups.

There was no security Informant Unit as such,

informants being handled on subversive organization

desks.

On June 16, 1971, a Security Informant Unit was

formed and this Unit now handles informants in the

New Left field as well as in basic revolutionary

organizations and related groups.

At last inspection there were 264 member informants

in the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA) ; at present there are

226,

2

decrease of 38.

At last inspection there were 31

member informants in the Socialist Workers Party (SWP);

at present there are 48

It yes, tet, date of latest montsty tabulation, the

security informant unit nandiea a coiai vi 795 securiiy

informants and 671 potential security informants, a total

This includes 630 informant cases transferred

of l the New Left Section to the Security Informant Unit

from

In the Internal Security Section on June 16, 1971.

There has been continuing recognition of the

fact there must be no letdown in mainthining adequate

informant coverage.

However,

become a primary factor.

In

economy has increasingly

line with the President's

message on August 15, 1971, tightening economic controls

and our continuing efforts

to hold down expenditures, the

field is being instructed by letter to all offices to cut

down payments to security and extremist informants and

sources by five percent.

To assure uniformity and fairness

in the application of thiscutback throughout the field,

each office was instructed to follow this formula:

Total expenditures, for all such intormants and sources

for the six month period

ending July 31, 1971; reduce

"this total by five percent; divide the resulting figure

by six (months).

The resulting figure is to be the

guideline for each office.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/19/71

HEM: Cb

My 4TH

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 106

94

---

## Page 107

: *

SECURITY INFORMANT, PROGRAM

HEM: Cb

8/19/71

This instruction is not a mandate to reduce

payments

across the board on all informants and sources.

Offices are to evaluate expenditures within the

determined guideline amount and adjust individual

payments accordingly.

These instructions do not mean the Bureau will

cease authorizing payments

where new informants: are

developed and fully justified. It is incumbent on all

offices to evaluate these matters within the guideline

figure.

There are to be no increases in payments to

informants and sources for the next 90 days, in line

with the Director's instructions.

• Each office was

instructed to advise the Bureau

by return airtel of the guideline figure determined. By

close of business September 30, 1971, the Purcau is

to be. .

advised by each office that these instructions have been

complied with and that expenditures have been reduced by

the five percent factor.

On the basis of our expenditures

during the past fiscal year, the five percent reduction

will result in an annual saving of approximately $129,000.

• supervision. It is not technically a program justified

semiannually or annually but rather a fundamental procedure

in our investigative operations that requires and receives

vigorous day to day attention.

The Security Informant Unit maintains an up-to-date

index of Security Informants and potential security informants.

Later as on a go to the coneson nest satsve

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/19/71

HEM: cb

- 2-

4-H

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 107

95

---

## Page 108

SECURITY INFORMANT. PROGRAM

HEM: cb

8/19/71

At the time of last inspection in January, 1971,

a total of 1,159 security informants was being operated.

As of July 31, T971, the number had increased to 1,182.

or an increase of 23. During the same period the number

of potential security informants increased from 765 to

84t, or an increase of 76

DOMISTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/19/71

HEM: Cb

4-H

3

96

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 108

---

## Page 109

SURVEYS, PROJECTS AND/OR INTENSIFICATION PROGRAMS

pociN

Section Chief R. D. Cottor:

• 4-H

Following are applicable activities.

0f Research Section.

Security Index (SI) Program

Refer to white write-up prepared by Internal Security

Section (s-H), which has investigative responsibility under this

program.

Research section, special Records unit, mantains

records applicable to the Si and is responsible for coordinating

program.

In line with this responsibility, Research Section

prepared & memorandum to Assistant Director Brennan, dated

1/12/71, re-evaluating sI.

As of 12/15/70 there were in the Index 3,450 persons

of leadership capacity (Priority I and II) and 8,614 rank-and-

1%le subjects (Priority III) 10r a total of 12,084.

Of these,

351 and 1,710, respectively, are communists? total of 5,549

or 46 percent.

As of 7/15/71 there were in the Index 4,013

persons of leautiship capacity (Prioraty I and Ill and 8,589

rank-and-Ille subjects (Priority III) for a total of 12,

693.

Of these, 325 and 4,329, respectively, are communists-a total

o1 5,154 or 40.6 percent..

Emergency Detention Program

The Emergency Detention Program (EDP), which is

field-wide, Involves the planning ior apprehension and detention

of persons

considered potentially dangerous to

the national

defense and public safety of the U.S. in time of a national

emergency and for the search and seizure of contraband.

EDP is not a program as such but is based on Title II of the

Internal Security Act (ISA) of 1950: The basic responsibility

for the operation and implementation of the EDP rests with the

Attorney General. Detailed plans regarding the EDP are drawn

up and

included in the "Attorney General's Portfolio," copies

of which are in the Bureau's possession.

This program has been maintained in an up-to-date

status.

Administrative plans for the implementation of the

program in each office are maintained in the form of a "Detpro

Survey." Lists of individuals to be detained are furnished to

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/18/71

MSR: amt

9

7

406608 Docld:32989638 Page 109

---

## Page 110

-2.

the Internal Security Division of the

Department each month

and

the listing of places to be searched under authority of

the Master Search Warrant are maintained on & current basis.

The Seat of Government and all field divisions maintain

essential records for successiul implementation of the ED?.

Each office also maintains instructions to be turned over to

the U.S. Attorneys and U. S. Marshals upon implementation.

This progran is coordinated by Special Records Unit,

ResesrCh

section.

Primary responsibility rests with the

Department and changes can be made only upon approval of the

Department.

We merely recommend and/or suggest any desirable

changes. Periodic checiss are made to insure that all records

connected with the EDP, stored away frow Headquarters city"

are current.

Field division surveys are kept up to date and

the Bureau is advised simiannually of the status.

Legislation has been introduced in the 92nd Congress

to repeal Title II of the ISA of 1950.

In the event Title II

should be repealed at a luture date under new legislation,

the Government's inherent right to protect itself internally

will continue to be safeguarded by the Bureau under its basic

responsibility for protecting this Nation's internal security.

This progran is under constant supervision and

re-evaluation so that any necessary changes and streamlining

may be nade.

A nenorandun justilying the

continuance of this

program was last submitted on 1/12/71.

Technical and Microphone Surveillances

There has been no significant change regarding

the

utilization of these techniques in the internal security field

since the last inspection.

also have two

tesurs. in operation at the request of the State

DepartmenT

We are conducting four, microphone surveillances

Agency (NSA) and one at the request of Central Intelligence

Agency.

In addition, 62 teletype facilities are being covered

at the written request of NSA.

*Only such records presently maintained away from SOG"or

field office headquarters are located at Quantico, Virginia.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 110

---

## Page 111

- 3 -

Survey Regarding Potential for Racial Violence

This progran was initiated In 1964 under the title

"possible Racial Violence, lajor Urban Areas." It requires

each field oilice to conduct a continuing survey of localities

having a potential for violence based on current racial con-

ditions. Objective is twofold-to insure Bureau receives a

current, realistic, and comprehensive picture of existing

conditions which may lead to violence, and to obtain advance

Information of developnents clearly pointing to the possibility

of violence.

The Lield subnits seniannual reports summarizing

information received.

Of course,

pertinent information is

subnited on a timely basis depending upon the circunstances

involved. The survey provides the basis for a cogent analysis

of potential for violence and pertinat information is dissemi-

nated to the White House, Attorney General, and other Government

agencies.

In the spring of each year an analysis entitled

"Potential for Violence in Hajor Cities in Summer" is prepared

and disseminated on a high level in the Government.

rre..

".V3"

•*,.

-.."

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 111

---

## Page 112

SURVEYS, PROJECTS AND/OR INTENSIFICATION PROGRAMS

NEW LEFT SECTION

SECTION CHIEF - R. L. SHACKELFORD

Attached are comments

concerning surveys, projects and/or intensification

programs in effect against the New Left Movement. This

section is responsible for the supervision of investiga-

tions of the New Left Movement, including terrorist

groups and individuals engaged in bombings, arson and

assassinations, and other New Left groups

and individuals

both on college campuses

and off campus.

Investigations

concerning New Left publications are also supervised in

this section, as are sabotage investigations, and protest

and Trotskyist groups.

•. =

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/18/71

4-H

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 112

100

---

## Page 113

SURVEYS, PROJECTS AND/OR INTENSIFICATION PROGRAMS 4-H

New Left Movement

Special Investigations Unit - West

The following surveys, projects and/or intensification

programs are in effect against the New Left movement:

New Left Extremists

By letter to all field offices dated 2/13/70,

the field was advised that the violence-prone Weatherman

group planned to go underground and to direct "strategic

sabotage" at military and police installations.

The field

was instructed tovigorously investigate the Weatherman group

and to advise appropriate local police agencies of leatherman

plans. By airtel to all offices dated 3/19/70, the field was

advised of Weatherman plans

for extreme violence. The field

was instructed to locate and identify Weatherman communes

and activists. Intensive investigation of Weatherman leaders

was ordered.

By airtel to Chicago dated 3/24/70, that office

was instructed to initiate investigations and interview all

individuals arrested in Chicago during a Weatherman rampage

• in October, 1969, where such investigations had not already

been undertaken.

More than 280 persons had been arrested,

most of whom were either members of or closely associated

with the Weatherman group. In connection with cases of

bombing or arson which appeared to have New Leit or black

extremist connotations, SAC Letter 70-18 (C), dated 4/7/70;

captioned "New Left and Black Extremist Terrorism - Bombing

Matters" provided the field with guidance. In those cases

where

no Bureau substantive jurisdiction

exists or where the

Department has advised that no investigation is warranted;

the Bureau must be immediately advised concerning involvement

of subversive groups or individuals suspected in the incident

and recommendation made concerning additional investigation.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

• 8/19/71

THM: jta/ bjn

4-H

-- 2 -

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 113

10

---

## Page 114

By teletype to all offices dated 4/17/70, the

field was advised of specific areas of investigations to be

made against New Left terrorist groups and standards were

set for investigations of communes.

The field was also

instructed to develop necessary intormant coverage of these

comnunes and groups so that advanced knowledge of planned

violence could be obtained, preventive action initiated, and

prosecution undertaken where possible.

By Bureau airtel to all offices dated 5/13/70,

instructions were given concerning implementation of investi-

gations of New Left terrorism which were begun with available

manpower and further implementation was to be as rapid as

possible. All adherents to the Weatherman ideology which

advocated a Marxist-Leninist revolution and the use of

terroristic tactics in furtherance of revolution are made

subjects of these investigations. These subjects are to be

considered for Priority 1 of the

Security Index and when

placed on Priority I, the Bureau must be advised every 45

days of their current residence and other pertinent intormation

developed.

Each office was instructed to submit a monthly

airtel beginning 6/1/70 setting forth (1) identities of

communes or organizations; (2) number of cases opened during

month on individuals in these categories; (3) total number of

cases under investigation; (4) informant

coverage utilized

against these communes and organizations; and, (5) a brief

summary of New Left violence in area during preceding month

and action taken.

By Bureau airtel to all offices dated 5/15/70, the

field was furnished a copy of a Departmental letter concerning

specific areas of interest to the Department of Justice in

campus disorders looking toward possible prosecutive action.

The field was specifically instructed to develop information

concerning New Left involvement in campus violence and

concerning agitational activities prior to and during violent

campus disorders by subversive groups.

_3-

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 114

102

---

## Page 115

By airtel to all offices dated 7/16/70, the field

was advised that New Left terrorism was continuing through

bombings, arsons, and other violence and that each Special

Agent in

Charge must personally insure that sufficient

personnel are assigned to handle these matters and to

investigating New Left terrorists.

SAC Letter 70-46 dated 9/1/70, captioned "New Left

Movement - Violence, Internal Security - Miscellaneous

(Weatherman)" instructed the field to develop better informant

coverage of Weatherman and other terrorist groups.

By airtel

to all

offices dated 9/3/70, captioned "Attacks on Police,

Extremist Activity" the field was instructed that in view

of

increased attacks on the police, it could be expected there

will also be physical attacks against the FBI and that all

Special Agent personnel should be fully cognizant of this

possibility:

To obtain comnlete intelligence data concerning

any extremist influence in attacks on police,

the field was

instructed to institute appropriate investigation when

information was received concerning an impending attack on

police and informants directed to develop full facts concerning

the attack.

SAC Letter 70-48 (B) dated 9/15/70, captioned "New

Left and Black Extremist Terrorism - Informant Coverage"

instructed the field to immediately institute an aggressive

policy of developing new productive informants who can

infiltrate terrorist groups.

SAC Letter 70-57 (C) dated 10/13/70, captioned "New

Left Movement - Police Training Matters" advised the field

that in view of recent violence by New Left terrorists, the

Bureau will consider requests for SACS or ASACs to brief

local law enforcement command and supervisory personnel

regarding New Left extremism and violence.

These briefings

would be at law enforcement meetings and conferences where

attendance is restricted to full-time duly constituted law

enforcement officials.

-

4-

183

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 115

---

## Page 116

Bureau airtel to all offices dated 9/9/70 advised that

a special single fingerprint file on Weatherman fugitives and

other New Left terrorists has been initiated. The field was

instructed to submit to the Bureau the identity of New Left terror-

ists whose fingerprints should be included in this special file.

By airtel to all offices dated 6/15/71 the field

was

advised that a new "stop index" program had been instituted in

the National Crime Information Center (NCIC). This program is

for Bureau use only and concerns extremists who are in Priority I

of the Security Index and who are not already carried in the

NCIC Wanted Persons file.

Through this program, the field

obtains prompt notice from NCIC by teletype whenever a police

agency makes inquiry concerning one of these extremists, which

enables the field to better follow the activities and movements

ot extremists.

By SAC Letter 71-37 (E) dated 8/10/71, captioned

"Security Flash Notices Regarding Security Index Subjects" the

field was advised of new procedures which will enable the

Identification Division to better disseminate arrest information

on Security Index subjects for whom no fingerprints are on file

in the Identification Division.

periodic submission by the field of Security Flash Notices

(FD-165) which determine if fingerprints of a Security Index

subject have been received since the last check and if so, a

stop is placed in the fingerprint record to assure that the

field is advised of all subsequent fingerprint submissions.

The Security Flash Notice is periodically submitted at different

intervals depending on the priority of the subject's Security

Index status.

Intensified investigation of New Left extremists

has led to numerous prosecutions and indictments of extremist

leaders.

To provide further guidance for the field in these

matters, SAC Letter 71-10 (E) dated 3/9/71 and captioned

"Security Informants - Judicial Matters" advised the field of

procedures to be followed in handling informants who are

developing information on New Left groups and individuals who

are in contact with these New Left activists or with their

attorneys.

- 5 .

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 116

104

---

## Page 117

The Department of Justice has

advised that

informants may be utilized in furnishing

information

concerning the location of fugitives or the location of

other New Left activists even though such utilization may

result in the informant inadvertently learning of defense

plans or strategy.

The

field has been instructed

that when

an informant is present in a conversation between an attorney

an individual under indictment he should, if possible,

leave, or it this is not possible,

he is not to report the

substance of any such conversation to the FBI. Since radical

attorneys are deeply involved with New Left extremists, not

only in their legal defense but in their other activities, the

above procedures are most helpful in extremist investigations.

Intensified investigation of New Left extremists

has severely disrupted their operations and limited their

influence. Numerous Weatherman leaders have been indicted

and subsequently arrested or remain in fugitive status.

The Weatherman organization has gone underground and is

isolated from contact with the mass of American youth.

ontact with

The

number of adherents to Weatherman is significantly less as a

result of these prosecutions and investigations.

The

Weatherman group continues to be most dangerous

' in view of

its adherence to violent tactics and continuous effort is

being made to develop new approaches and techniques to

facilitate this investigation.

Key Activists

By airtel to all offices dated 10/23/68, the Key

Activist program was intensified and expanded.

The field

was instructed to maintain high-level informant coverage on

individuals designated as key activists in the New Left

movement. At the present time there are 73 key activists

under investigation.

- 6 -

105

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 117

---

## Page 118

A Key Activist album containing photographs and

biographical data on each key activist has been furnished to

all offices.

This album is maintained in a current status

and has proved

invaluable in following activities and travel

of New Left key activists. By airtel dated 3/10/69 to all

offices the field was instructed to submit reports each

three months on key activists. The field was also instructed

to prepare communications suitable for dissemination when

these key activists filled a speaking engagement and whenever

they made statements indicating a propensity for violence or

urging

student agitation.

The purpose of this program is to

secure testimony and evidence concerning violations of

statutes particularly where these key activists are involved

in campus disorders.

The field has also been instructed to

develop detailed information on sources of funds used by

key activists and to closely follow their travel. Handwriting

specimens of each key

activist must be obtained and placed

in the National Security file maintainea by the laboraiory.

The key activist program has been most successful.

Wé have been enabled to closely follow the activities of

these individuals and to provide other interested agencies

with pertinent information.

It is noted that more than half

of the individuals designated as key activists are subjects

of some type of prosecutive action.

7

186

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 118

---

## Page 119

NEW LEFT GROUPS UNIT

STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY (SDS)

WORKER STUDENT ALLIANCE (WSA)

In Bureau airtels 5/24/71, 6/2/71 and 6/3/71,

appropriate field offices were alerted to the SDS/WSA Summer

Project and its twofold objective consisting of a massive

recruitment program in 21 target cities and the fostering of

industry and labor unions.

appropriate offices to take aggressive measures to expand their

informant coverage during the SDS/WSA recruitment effort,

and to develop and

furnish information concerning the SDS/WSA

Summer Projects in their territories. Numerous SDS/WSA

members have been identified as having moved into cities

other than those in which they usually operate, in connection

with the SDS/WSA Summer Project...

New University Conference (NUC)

The NUC, composed of

radical professors, graduate

students and teachers, is committed to the growth of a

revolutionary socialist movement in the U.S., with educational

institutions and professional associations being their primary

targets. In Bureau airtel 6/4/71, the attention of Chicago

Division, office of origin, was directed to the fact that the

NUC claimed 42 national chapters plus fifteen pre-chapter

grouping me a mationed men ers, and anticipated turther

expansion. Chicago Division was instructed to insure appro-

priate leads were set out to confirm the existence of all

NUC chapters and to conduct appropriate investigations in

accordance with Bureau instructions relating to investigations

of organizations connected with institutions of learning.

It was further instructed these investigations should include

information concerning the leaders and leading activists,

aims and objectives and the activities of these chapters.

New Left Movement Reports

By airtel to SAC, Albany, and all offices dated

10/28/68, a program was instituted

to obtain a comprehensive

study of

the whole New Left movement. Offices were instructed

to prepare summary reports on the New Left movement in their

=8 -

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/18/71

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 119

---

## Page 120

territories and to follow these

reports with a report each

quarter, similarly captioned,

showing the status of the

movement and its activity during the preceeding three-

month period.

These reports have enabled the Bureau and

the submitting field offices to assess the potential

dangerousness of the New Left movement, determine from one

document the divisive or unifying issues within the movement

and whether the activity is increasing, decreasing or

continuing at the level indicated in the previous report.

Since individual reports have not been required on the many

small local New Left groups in each territory in lieu of

adequate LHM, inclusion of pertinent data concerning these

groups in the quarterly report alleviates the need for

regularly submitted reports and puts the activities in a

better perspective within each field division. Additionally,

these reports have presented on

a continuing basis a clear

cut picture of the entire New Left movement which identifies

its leaders, sources of funds, propaganda outlets, and shows

the extent to which the New Left movement has been influenced

by domestic and foreign subversive elements. This program

has enabled the Ruraan and the field to make a self

analysis

of all facets of our investigation of the New Left movement

so we may expand and intensify our investigation of those

phases indicating a need thereof.

These reports

have served

as a valuable research tool at the Bureau and afford the

individual field divisions

an opportunity to evaluate the

direction and success of their investigations in the New Left

movement.

New Left Movement - Finances

In February, 1970, M

sources of various revolutionary groups.

since that time,

information of this nature has been gathered and transmitted

periodically by memoranda to the White House, Attorney

General, Deputy Attorney General, and Assistant Attorney

General, Internal Security Division, after approval by the

Director,

Key Activist Program

The Key Activist Program, described in detail in the

Special Investigations Unit - West

write-up, is coordinated by

the New Left Groups Unit.

- 9 -

108

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 120

---

## Page 121

New Left Movement - Publications

By letter dated 11/5/68 to all offices under the

Caption of "New Left Movement, Publications, Internal Security -

Miscellaneous," the field was instructed to cover the

principal propaganda mills of the New Left which are

described

as "underground" newspapers.

This survey has

been particularly beneficial in view of the fact that the

to spread its propagandtent, depends on the written word

The survey has disclosed that

in excess of 200 papers

are published on a regular basis

with a central theme being criticism of the "establishment"

in general and law enforcement, the draft and the Vietnam

Nar in particular. Youth, particularly students, are the

nain target of these publications, which are effective

vehicles for agitation and recruitment in that they reach

a large portion of the student population. Additionally,

the survey has revealed the papers are in poor financial

condition and often miss publication datesde to lack of

funds.

Funds are generally received from advertising:

subscriptions, donations and benefits. Volunteer Labor is

used in most instances and many times the stati of the

publication resides collectively in a commune.

A survey of underground publications is currently

being conducted by the New Left Groups Unit, the purpose of

which is to determine if trend information can be developed.

Trend information is being developed during the course of

this survey

into an educational-type document. Based on this survey, it

appears the New Left movement is at a crossroads and is

groping for a sense of unity and direction. This unity,

if developed, will no doubt include future activity in

political channels. These newspapers, which are often written

in the foulest language, are a major influence on the youth

in this country and are

the strident propaganda voice of the

New

1. Left movement.

Informant Development - New Left Groups

Bureau airtel to all offices dated 11/5/70 concerning

informant development in New Left groups directed each SAC

to submit to the Bureau by 11/13/70 a complete analysis of

his informant coverage in New Left groups, clearly setting

forth the weaknesses and productive steps

being taken to

rectify these weaknesses.

As a result a clear-cut view of

each division's informant coverage was obtained as well as an

- 10 -

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 121

109

---

## Page 122

analysis of where programs needed shoring up Those offices

found to be deficient in their coverage were

directed to

submit periodic communications detailing their coverage

and setting out what steps are being taken to increase the

coverage in terms of quantity and quality.

The Counterintelligence Program - New Left was

discontinued by Bureau airtel to all offices dated 4/28/71

in view of the fact that sensitive intelligence techniques

and disruptive activities were involved and absolute security

was difficult to achieve.

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS UNIT - EAST

The Venceremos Brigade

The field was authorized by airtel to all offices,

dated 5/11/70, to interview all Venceremos Brigade (VB) members

on SAC authority except in those instances where the subject is

under 21, currently a student, professor, has some connection

with an institution of learning or is a journalisi.

Bureau

approval is still needed concerning the latter individuals.

Bureau airtel to all offices, dated 5/15/70, instructed

the field to immediately intensify investigations of all VB

returnees Irom Cuba,

ascertain their whereabouts, conduct prompt

interviews and submit current reports with Security Index recom-

mendation. In view of rebuttable presumption of at least sympathy

to a violent Marxist-Leninist revolution and willingness to

participate in that revolution by these VB members, the field

was also instructed for one year to advise the Bureau every 90

days of whereabouts and activities of Priority II and III and

non-Security Index returnees.

In case of Priority I Security

Index subjects, this information is to be furnished the Bureau

every 45 days.

Prosab

Current Bureau instructions require development of

adequate informant coverage of Strategic Air Commana and

Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Bases of the United States

Air Force (PROSAB) to insure that our investigative responsi-

bilities in the sabotage, espionage and internal security fields

can be properly discharged.

Semiannual reports are submitted by

each office having a Strategic Air Command Base or an Inter-

review of semiannual reports submitted by the field as of 7/1/71

- 11 -

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/18/71

CFT: cae

NW 88608 D80032989638 Page 122

---

## Page 123

des sitise

PROTEST AND TROTSKYIST GROUPS UNIT

May Day Collective (MDC)

Prior to May, 1971, MDC was the hard-core youth activist

group of the Peoples Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) and was

May, 1971 n

the main force behind massive civil disobedience in Washington, D.C.

There has been a definite split between the to groups over the

question of violence which is favored by MDC. Following regional

conferences in Fayetteville, Arkansas, and Washington, D.Co, MDC

held a national conference in Atlanta, Georgia, 8/13-17/71

its future course and to plan antiwar

By airtel to all offices dated 7-26-71, the field was instructed

to determine the existence of MDC organizations in the respective

divisions and to furnish all available information to Bureau by

8-30-71 with comments regarding extent of coverage. Potential for

violence by MDC was emphasized, and the field was alerted to

possibility of violations of Federal laws.

Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW)

Letter to all offices dated 9-3-71 instructed each office

to initiate a survey to determine existence of VVAW. This action

was necessary in the light of increasing indication that the VYAW

may be a target for infiltration by subversive groups such as the

Communist Party, USA, and the Socialist Workers Party and their

respective youth groups. VVAW has also been involved in aiding and

financing U.S. deserters, including false identity papers and

reportedly in one area has a cache of arms. VAl has become

increasingly active in the antiwar field and must be considered

a prime target for infiltration.

East Coast Conspiracy to Save Lives

(EASTCON)

This is an extremely important investigation requiring

constant supervision and review at the Seat of Government.

involves plots to blow up the tunnels, housing, heating

• systems

servicing Government buildings and to kidnap a

high Government

official. Conspiracy aspects of selected Selective Service

break in cases are included in the indictment as well as violations

involving the contraband and issuing threatening communications

statutes. The Eastcon case is the subject of a write-up in

Section 4-A-4.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/18/71

33 T°BG:p]m

- 12 -

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 123

---

## Page 124

SUBVERSIVE INDIVIDUALS - NEW LEFT GROUPS UNIT

Bureau airtel to all offices, dated 11/3/70,

instructed the field to resume verification of residence

and employment in priority II and Priority III Security

Index cases and to resume periodic report writing in

proportionate number in Priority II Security Index cases

so that all such cases would be opened by 6/30/71.

As a result, annual reports in Priority II

Security Index cases

are being received pursuant to

existing instructions and where verification of

residence and employment shows a change, appropriate

changes are being made on Security Index cards.

Bureau airtel to all offices, dated 11/4/70,

instructed the field to initiate investigation of

and sis members as weld as members o1 procommunist,

militant New Left-type campus organizations who follow

SDS advocacy of revolution and violence and that

each individual investigated should be considered

for the security Index.

Results of investigations in

these cases are being received and supervised in this

section. Activities in each instance are evaluated

and where it is found the subject could be considered

a danger to the internal security of this country 1r

the event of a national emergency, the individual's

name is included on the Security Index.

SAC Letter 71-35 (D), dated 7/27/71, instructed

the field to discontinue use of Internal Security -

Miscellaneous, Security Matter - Miscellaneous, and

Security Matter - Anarchist as characters in security

investigations.

Instructions for using new characters

were set out.

This action was necessary in order to

facilitate routine of mail at the Bureau and to more

properly describe the characters of security investiga-

tions.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

10/10/11

1/o

NW 88608_ Docld:32989638 Page 124

---

## Page 125

SURVEYS, PROJECTS AND/OR

INTENSIFICATION PROGRAMS

4-H

Section Chief W. A. Branigan

Espionage Section

The following programs discussed immediately

hereinafter are currently the

responsibility of the

Espionage Section:

Alem Program,

Bureau file 65-69532;

Banpop Program, Bureau file 65-70741; Cokma Program,

Bureau file 65-73750; Canil Program,

Bureau file 65-70719;

DESECO Program, Bureau file. 105-71688; East-West Exchange

Program, Bureau

file 105-42300; and Radio and Technical

Equipment Purchased by the Soviets, Bureau file 105-36365.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/19/71

LW: bkr

4-H

113

NW 88608_ Docld:32989638 Page 125

---

## Page 126

decades

ALEM PROGRAM

Bufile: 65-69532

4-H

1. ALEM is the code name for the Bureau program to uncover

Soviet "illegal" agents who have entered the U. s.

under assumed identities as 1. alien husbands of American

wives or 2. as male immigrants on first reference

petitions because of certain professional and technical

Ski sethe bas this rostan into mation turnted

by the Fedora informant.

This program was initiated in

August, 1965. Individuals entering the U.S. under

the above two categories have been determined through

a machine run of Immigration

and Naturalization Service

form G-T88 wunch cards. The Bureau

u has reimbursed

the

Immigration and Naturalizat on seruce for xpenses.

incurred in sorting

the

these cards for immigrants entering the

U. S. between the years 1960=1965.

2.

Approximately 2100 cases have been opened under this program

since its inception, of which 77 are now pending. We have

not uncovered any illegals to date although we have been

as an immigrant

Buckboard case, Bul17 05=681882

3.

ALEM is supervised in the Espionage Section, Special Cases

Unit, by Saab Litrento. The responsibility of reviewing

the pertinent G-188 cards

and initiating investigations is

placed with the Washington Field Office.

The procedures

followed in opening cases do not require the use of much

personnel or many man hours by the Washington Field Office.

4.

according to the Fedora informant, the KGB has used the

reportedly arrived in

the U.s. under category number one

to information the Fedora informant was able

to obtain tron a Kee toricer in the New rory Residency.

5.

This program is evaluated on an annual basis. It was last

evaluated on December 24, 1970.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/19/71

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 126

N14

---

## Page 127

BANPOP PROGRAM

Bufile: 65-70741

4-H

1.

BANPOP-is the code name for a program initiated in

August, 1966, in an attempt to identify illegals in

banks. She o may be receiving funds through Swiss

banks.

The basis

the program was an analysis-of

four Soviet illegal cases between 1955and 1966 in which

the Soviets

ers are screened

with the following criteria: (1) the person or individual

beneficiary is named; (2) the amount of the transfer is

is directed to a specific bank account..

2.

The program is now operated in the New York, Chicago and

Philadelphia Offices.

3.

When one of the offices locates an individual who might

be a possible suspect. the Bureau is advised by letter

and a copy is sent to

the appropriate field office requesting

investigation to identify this person. The title includes

the name of the subject and the code name of the program

to insure that all mail is handled by the same Supervisor.

At

the present time,

there are 7 pending cases.

For the

six-month period ending 4/1/71, Philadelphia reviewed 2950

transfers, has two pending cases and used two Agent hours

per

"R month.

Chicago reviewed 1000 transactions, opened no cases

and used six Agent hours per month. New York Office reviewed

6050 transactions, opened 8 cases and used 15 Agent hours

per month.

4. This program is supervised by SA J.P. Lee of the Special

Cases Unit, Espionage Section.

5. All offices keep the Bureau advised of the progress of the

program on a six-month basis.

The program

was last justified

by memorandum of April 1, 1971..

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/19/71

4-H

115

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 127

MERIZZINE

TOITEM

---

## Page 128

CANIL PROGRAM

Bufile: 65-70719

4-H

1. CANIL is the code name for the Bureau program to

uncover soviet illegals who may have arrived in

American consulates in Canada This program

Is based

on the Cowslip

case waich involved soviet

idlegal

husband and vite team who used

this method Of entE

Legat Ottawaffected arrangements. kith various.

mercan consulates in Canada to obtain he

Immigration Visa and Alien Registration IVAR tors

filed by European immigrants prior to their destruction

these forms for 16 to 18 months then to destroy thems

Legat Ottawa, forwards these forms to the New York

office where they are reviewed..

To develop suspects,

the New York Office

uses criteria developed from analysis

of the Cowslie case.

2.

Since inception of this program in june, 1966, 35 cases

were opened. There are I cases pending. Megas

have been uncovered to date.

• The procedures

рариоикот зняжню

in this program

m do not require the use of much personnel

or many man hours by the New York Office.

3. CANIL,is supervised in the Espionage Section, Special

Cases Unit, by SA A PLitrento

4.

The detection of Soviet illegals is one of the most

difficult problems facing the Bureau in the security

field.

It is felt this program still has a good

potential in uncovering illegals because it is logical

and has a sound basis.

Past experience has

shown that

Soviet intelligence will use the same modus operandi

continuously, if successtul.

5.

This program was evaluated in February, 1971. Legat,

Ottawa, has suggested discontinuance of this program

and New York's comments have been requested by Bulet 8/5/71.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/19/71

APL: tap

4 - H

116

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 128

---

## Page 129

COKMA PROGRAM

4-H

65-73750

1.

Title is code word for physical surveillance

coverage of known meeting areas utilized by Soviet intelli-

gence in the past several years. The New York Office

Instituted this program in july

This program receives

close supervisory attention,

is evaluated on a continuing

basis and was subject of justification memorandum dated

8/16/71. In view of the success of this program by the

New Yors Office, consideration has been given to lEs ImpLementatIon

by the washington tieta oftice, however, the sence

transportation facilities.used extensively by the soviets in

York City precludes its adaption by the Washington Field

OfIice.

2.

East physical surve ances Soviet inter-

double agents upcratins assinst soviet Intolligence officers t

is almost impossible toconduct a discreet physical,surveillance

Ofa trained intelligence officer and this program places out

Agents in an

area where there is a likelihood of

hout surve tiance nazards that coula tavernestings.

note meet

objective is to identify American agents meeting Soviet intelligence

officers under clandestine circumstances.

•3.

The New York Office utilized

our man team initialy

in connection with this program.

During the initial six months

ot this program ever soviet intelligence officers were observed

in the area selected for coverage (Jamaica area of the Queens,

New York,) on 22 occasIons. Two Individuals were observed in

Contact with Soviets and one individual contacted Poren

africal. Based on the results obtained, coverage, was. expanded

to the Flushing and Woodside section of the Queens,

as well as

the Rege Park section of the queens..

radding an additional lour man

Since January known or suspected Soviet intelligence officers

for meetings. While we are still affording this area, some coverage

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/19/71

4-H

117

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 129

---

## Page 130

COKMA PROGRAM

4-H

mentioned al

tend concentrator one the that selected developments

recent date, has

been the detection ta known Committee for

State Security (KGB),

officer who during his tour of duty in

has made approaches to Soviets who detected

To hit cone intent a entence the done to ne

to this country V

a. The

occupant

investigation and

"It is anticipated he witt be interviewed to

determine

the nature his contacts with the Soviets

This program is supervised by Special Agent F. J. Casside

Soviet Unit-New York, Espionage Section.

Expense and time in

handling this program is negligible at Seat of Government. Since

program in field consist of surveillance activities there must be

close supervision at field level.

This program is sound and has enabled us to uncover

Soviet intelligence activities with minimum expenditure of

manpower.

has aiso given is additional insight into Soviet

modus operandi.

Manpower limitations have restricted our

full utilization of this investigative technique. Special Agent

personnel assigned to this program must be familiar with Soviets

assigned to the New York area and must be experienced in

surveillance procedures.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/19/71

BER: CgC

4-H

118

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 130

---

## Page 131

DESECO PROGRAM

Bufile 105-71688

4-H

1. The Deseco Program (program for development

of selected contacts to be directed against Soviet-bloc

officials) originated as result of conference between field

and Bureau representatives in December, 1957.

Purpose is

to select and develop individuals to be placed in contact

with soviet-bioc intelligence officers as a means of (1)

penetrating Soviet-bloc intelligence; (2)

exerting control

by keeping intelligence officers occupied with running our

sources; and (3) assisting in possible defection of bloc

intelligence officers.

2. Nineteen offices are engaged regularly in

this program and other offices on occasion conduct investi-

gations to develop background on selected sources.

Greatest

activity has been in New York, Washington Field, Chicago and

san francisco which cover soviet-bloc establishments.

The

19 offices are authorized to conduct "sounding-out" inter~

views of prospective sources without prior Bureau authority.

Follow-up interviews with potential Deseco sources are con-

• ducted on a UACB basis. New York and Washington Field

submit monthly progress letters summarizing the results of

the program.

The other 17 offices submit summaries on a

semi-annual basis.

3. Between the last inspection and July 15, 1971,

approximately a 6-month period, 26 Deseco subjects were placed

in contact with Soviet-bloc officials.

Of these, four have

developed to the status of security informants or double

agents.

4.

This program is correlated in the Espionage

The program is handled in the

assigned to Soviet-bloc investigations who are familiar

with the habits, weaknesses and intelligence targets of bloc

personnel and are qualified to select and develop the type

individuals needed

cases in this

program

in this program.

Unusual or sensitive

are routed to the Division front office

for approval.

All rules, policies and procedures regarding

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/19/71

14-H

119

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 131

---

## Page 132

But turnad

DESECO PROGRAM

interviews, developments and

handling of Deseco sources

are contained in Section 105 0, pages 42-44, Manual of

Instructions.

5.

This program is re-evaluated on an annual

basis.

It was last justified by memorandum ". A. Branigan

to C. D. Brennan, dated

March 29, 1971.

Limitations on

other investigative techniques have underscored the value

of this program demonstrated in the individuals developed

as security informants or double agents.

Selectees have

enabled us to uncover and pin-point Soviet-bloc intelligence

targets,

identify Soviet-bloc intelligence officers and

furnish

information

of value in considering defection

appioaches.

the month of Marcher a double

agent,

developed through the Deseco program,

was instru-

mental in enabling the Bureau to identify a Soviet illegal

insure improvenent in our coverage of Soviet-bloc intel-

ligence operations.

DOMESTIC • INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/19/71

4-H

120

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 132

---

## Page 133

EAST-WEST EXCHANGE PROGRAM

Bufile: 105-42300

4-H

This program originated in 1955 in an attempt to

provide internal security safeguards regarding the admission

of Soviet and satellite nationals. Soviet intelligence regards

the visits of East-West Exchange Agreement participants as

opportunities to promote intelligence activity.

As a result of the 1970 Inspection revisions were

made in the investigative action taken in this field. The

change was made

as a reult of other manpower commitments.

SAC Letter 70-25 provided that no investigations will be

conducted of

groups or individuals participating in the East-

West Exchange Program in the absence of any information

indicating affiliation with Soviet intelligence. Bufiles

are checked on all soviet participants and where information

is developed showing intelligence affiliation, cases are then

opened and the field instructed to conduct necessary investiga-

tion.

During the period of January-June, 1971, 982

individuals were scheduled to enter the U. S. under the provisions

of this exchange program and of this number, we had information

indicating Soviet intelligence affiliation on 25 of these

individuals.

With regard to Soviet exchange students there are

currently

'32 in the U.S.

Based on information furnished by

defector sources and investigations of Soviet students previously

in the U. S., we have determined that Soviet intelligence

utilizes

these students in an intelligence capacity, principally

as spotters. In view of this, we afford these students active

investigation. We have also found that a number of these students

return to the U. S. for assignment at one of the Soviet establish

ments and in most instances, contacts which they made while in

the U.S. as students are generally reactivated. The case of

Yuriy Aleksandrovich Gostintsey is an example of an individual

entering the U.

under the

East-West Exchange Program

graduate student and engaging in intelligence activities.

Ironclad, our sensitive defector period ot vi

advised that Gostintsey

Who entered the 5/9/7t for

research at three

mexican unersities kas workingfor De

Martin Summerfield at a

a Laboratory at princeton University.

According to our source

i turned over a

portfolio of T

-hes to a

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

cost steeet inter trence officer who

8/19/71

4-H

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 133

12/

---

## Page 134

RE: EAST-WEST EXCHANGE PROGRAM

took the documents to the Soviet Mission to the United Nations,

aparan one a the agender the tast-liest

Similar,

Scientic Exchange Agreement. for three months to vor under

Summerfield.

He left the u.

in 12/69 and returned again

In

5/71

!

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

L WW 88608 D8638 Page 134

---

## Page 135

4-H

RADIO AND TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT PURCHASED BY THE SOVIETS

105-36365

1.

Program commenced in March, 1955, in order to have

central repository for information developed in connection

with investigations of Soviets in this country pertaining to

radio and technical equipment purchased by them.

2.

Washington Field and New York Offices furnish infor-

mation developed concerning these purchases on a monthly basis.

Dissemination of the material is made to Department of State,

Central Intelligence Agency, Army, Navy, Air Force, Atomic

Energy Commission, Bureau of International Commerce,

United States Department of Commerce and where pertinent,

to the National Security Agency (NSA) •

Material submitted

includes name of Soviet purchaser, date, quantity, description

and cost of the items purchased.

It involves maintenance of

three control files; one each at Bureau, Washington

Field and

New York Offices. Program established

to achieve following

objectives: disseminate to interested Government agencies

information concerning purchase of technical equipment in the

United States by Soviet officials; determine whether Soviet

intelligence is circumventing restrictions regarding material

appearing on Department of Commerce restricted export control

certain technical

permit its identification

through owe t

future time.

Since January, 1971, Program has disclosed continuing

purchases by Soviet nationals

of Grundig Satellite Multiband

portable radios. During 3/71 one KGB officer in Washington

purchased 12 of

these radios at one time. Soviet husband

and wife illegal team previously in U. S. used one of these

radios to receive clandestine broadcasts from USSR which con-

tained their operating instructions. Program made it possible

to secure serial numbers for possible tuture identification.

Analysis of purchases enables Laboratory to make reasonable

estimate of internal communications used at Soviet establishments

and

security devices being operated. Program also disclosed

detailed information concerning two new antennae systems purchased

by Soviets from company in Nebraska.

It appears one of these

will be used at new Consulate General in San Francisco when

permanent location for that establishment secured. Details

concerning such installations are of interest, not only to FBI

Laboratory, but to State Department and NSA in connection with

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/19/71

00507203441

123

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 135

---

## Page 136

RADIO AND TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT PURCHASED BY THE SOVIETS

4-H

its worldwide coverage of Soviet communications capabilities:

Intelligence agencies of the mititary,

, such as Navy and Air" Force,

Took Burea for tarts concerning purchases of this type

* Soviets since

enables reasonable estimate of their

military communications.

abits honor and tered soviet into et push se on

During 771

• Program

" Identified*

sophisticated electronic apparatus, in New York which can

utilized for radar or communications satellite tracking:

They

"had nor requested" export license"

"from Commerce Department for

tructer my be intended ron clandestine use inu.S.

for satellite

improve accuracy of Soviet

ICB guidance, systems" We have notified"

White House and

interested

Government agencies concerning this activity which is being

conducted clandestinely from Soviet establishment in Washington,

D. C.

4.

Program supervised by speciat gent zugene, keterson,

soviet Unit - washington, Espionage section.

Expense and time

utilized in handling program is negligible.

UISSEmInatIOn oi

material

submitted by Washington Field and New York Offices

requires minimum of time each month on part of Bureau Supervisor

and no weaknesses in program are apparent.

Administrative

tickler for control maintained on Soviet Embassy Desk, Soviet

Unit - Washington, Espionage Section.

5.

Program is of value not only to Domestic Intelligence

Division and field offices but to agencies receiving dissemination

of material developed, Possession of some equipment on which

discreet markings

previously placed by FBI Laboratory of

could se ve to identic has with 1 sement in sortalets

intelligence activity.

Program is evaluated annually to determine

Justtrication for continuance.

6.

Program last evaluated and justified January 8, 1971.

Tickler maintained for reevaluation by January 15, 1972, and

each year thereafter, if still of continuing value.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/19/71

ucr:eco

NW 88608 Dold p2989638 Page 136

124

---

## Page 137

SURVEYS, PROJECTS, AND/OR INTENSIFICATION PROGRAMS

SECTTON CHIEF GEORGE C. MOORE SON

EXTREMIST INTELLIGENCE SECTION

4-H

BLACK EXTREMIST MATTERS

Racial matters investigations were intensified through

establishment of the Racial Intelligence Section on 10/2/67.

By memorandum dated 7/14/71 it was recommended, and

the Director approved, that the Racial Intelligence Section

would, thereafter, be known as the Extremist Intelligence Section

and the character

• of cases supervised would be changed. from

Racial Matters to Extremist Matters. This action was taken

as

the majority of extremist activity in U.S. is not based solely

on racial hatred but based on a desire to overthrow U.S.

Government by revolution.

This section handles extremist matters investigations

involving black extremist organizations and individuals.

Objectives are to identify organizations and individuals that are

involved in extremist activities, that advocate or had actually

committed or have conspired to commit acts of violence, that

advocate revolutionary or terrorist activities and that violate

Federal laws.

The dangerousness to the U.S. of such individuals

must be assessed and a determination made as to whether they

should be included in the Security Index.

The extent of

foreign influence or influence of the Communist Party or other

domestic revolutionary groups among black extremists, especially

black extremist organizations, is a prime objective.

To

accomplish these objectives, sources have been developed who

can furnish quality and timely information concerning individual

extremists and extremist organizations. Such sources likewise

have forewarned us of potential violence and enabled the Bureau

to stay on top of the black extremist situation. These sources

have assisted the Bureau in executing its responsibilities of

alerting local authorities, and of keeping other Government

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/19/71

_WHA: cal

4-H

125

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 137

---

## Page 138

agencies dependent upon us for information informed of

pertinent developments and advance intelligence, including

data concerning potential violence.

Our informant coverage has made it possible for us

to keep a constant flow of information going to the White House,

the Attorney General and other Government agencies having an

interest. Additional information pertaining to black extremist

intelligence matters and the survey regarding "Potential for

Racial Violence" is set forth under data furnished by the

Research Section.

Reports submitted by the field are thoroughly reviewed

at the Seat of Government to insure that essential information

is being obtained on a timely basis and that it is being promptly

disseminated in the field, as well as at the Seat of Government.

The activities of black extremists continue to place

a heavy demand upon the Bureau's manpower and resources.

There are numerous black extremist groups throughout

the nation, the majority of which are local in nature and

relatively small in membership. These groups, however, either

directly or indirectly, advocate defiance of the law, hostility

toward constituted authority and, in some instances, advocate

outright destruction of Government and establishment of a

Marxist-Leninist form of Government. The activities of these

groups constitute a constant threat to the internal security

•of the country through their propensity for violence, hatred

of and outright opposition to our form of.

Government.

126

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 138

---

## Page 139

BLACK NATIONALIST MOVEMENT

Bufile 157-8415

4-H

Black extremism is concentrated in organized activities

of 64 groups, some of which have chapters in major cities through-

out the U.s.

The five major nationwide groups have chapters

in 139 cities. Hard-core membership in these black extremist

groups totals in excess of 8,300. This membership figure,

however, disguises the real following of extremist groups in

black areas of our cities and the extent of influence and

leadership they exercise. This real support, especially from

young blacks, is surfaced during confrontations with police

and the Establishment. In fact, hostility toward the police

by black extremist groups, as well as by black youths, continues

unabated in many of our major cities.

Set out hereinafter are summaries concerning the key

black extremist organizations that are presently under active

and penetrative investigation.

Computerized Telephone Number File (CINF) was expanded

on 2/26/71 to include telephone numbers of black, New Left and

other ethnic extremists. As a result, black extremist groups,

black extremist Security Index subjects and individuals included

in the Black Nationalist Photograph Album have been entered

into the CINF. This has proven to be extremely valuable investiga-

tive tool and has saved the field considerable investigative

time in ascertaining subscribers of telephone numbers since

"hits" are made on 15.5 percent of numbers checked against the

file.

The Black Nationalist Photograph Album (BNPA) was

established on 3/8/69 to assist in identification of militant

black extremists who travel extensively.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/19/71

WHA: CalME

4-H

127

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 139

---

## Page 140

The BNPA is maintained in all offices. BNPA includes

a photograph and biographical data on leaders of black extremist

organizations, militant black nationalists who are known to travel

and black extremists who are Bureau fugitives. Each office pre-

pares a form on such individuals within its territory and the

form is then furnished to the Bureau and all offices where it is

maintained in a complete album. In the event of travel by any

of these individuals, the office covering the area being visited

already has a photograph and biographical sketch of the individual

immediately available. The album is also furnished to the Legats

in Ottawa and Mexico City and to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police

and Central Intelligence Agency, in the event of foreign travel.

Over 470 extremists are currently carried in this album. Informa-

tion concerning fugitives was included to insure each office has

a photograph and biographic sketch immediately available for its

use in conducting investigation to locate or apprehend them.

To insure broad circulation among investigative personnel

and to serve as an avenue for greater utilization of informants,

especially extremist sources, we initiated the Black Extremist

Bureau Fugitives List in June, 1970. This list, which is prepared

quarterly and sent each field office and selected Legats,

identifies those Bureau fugitives who by reason of their

activities

• or organizational affiliations are black extremists.

For the

months in which no quarterly list is prepared, all offices and

selected Legats are advised of deletions and additions to this

list. Currently there are 64 fugitives listed, 20 of whom are

IO fugitives. This list has given greater emphasis to the

location of these fugitives, particularly among Special Agents

handling extremist matters and extremist informants and has been

effective in affording greater exposure of these fugitives among

extremist informants, Thirty-two of these fugitives have been

arrested since the list was initiated.

Bureau airtel 11/12/70 advised the field of formation

of Black Extremist Section of Single Fingerprint File in Latent

Fingerprint Section of the Identification Division. Field was

instructed to insure all black extremists who have a propensity

for violence or who would logically be considered suspects in

serious crimes in which the Bureau may have an interest were

included in the Black Extremist Section.

128

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 140

---

## Page 141

By airtel dated 3/19/71, captioned "Black Extremist

Sectio Mat See Fi open ee i dented at on lesterse

emphasis to this program on a continuing basis due to increasing

participation of black extremists in crines of violence and

continued reports from knowledgeable sources of plans of these

extremists to participate in bombings, hijackings, kidnapings

and other crimes of violence. As a result of this communication

and aggressive supervision by Extremist Intelligence Section

supervisors, the black Extremist Section of the Single Fingerprint

File has doubled. The value of this valuable investigative

tool was demonstrated in the special investigation being handled

by this section known as Newkill. This case involves the murder

of two New York City police officers on 5/21/71. Latents

forwarded by our New York Office for comparison against this

file resulted in the identification of two Black Panther Party

(BPP) members and directly led to the solution of the machine

gunning of two New York City police officers on 5/19/71. This

information has also resulted in these individuals being

developed as suspects in the Newkill murder. Supervisors are

constantly alert to insure logical black extremists are included

in this file.

In view of the high percentage of black extremists who

have been reported to have weapons in their possession, the field

• by letter 3/18/71 captioned "Firearms Acts!' and by airtel

5/17/71 captioned "National Firearms Act, State Firearms

Control Assistance Act, Unlawful Possession of Receipt of Fire-

arms, Racial Matters,"

emphasized that active investigation

should be initiated concerning firearms violations steming

from Bureau investigations over matters within our primary

jurisdiction, including racial (now extremist) matters investiga-.

tions.

Field was instructed to vigorously, pursue possible

violations arising out of extremist matters investigations.

Such

investigations will lead to statistical accomplishments and to

the neutralization of black extremists. It was emphasized that

all Agents assigned to extremist matters should thoroughly review

all of the criminal statutes involving Federal gun law violations

so that they would be in a position to recognize and vigorously

pursue possible violations coming to their attention during

extremist matters investigations.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 141

---

## Page 142

Numerous investigations have been initiated by the

field as a result of these instructions and recently four BPP

leaders in Richmond or Washington, D. C., were convicted for

Federal gun violations and one is awaiting trial. With the

emphasis being placed on violations of Federal gun laws by black

extremists, the number of convictions will increase and add to

the Bureau's statistical accomplishments as well as neutralizing

black extremists.

Investigation disclosed in Fall of 1970 that increased

campus disorders involving black students posed a definite threat

to the nation's stability and indicated the need for increase in

both quality and quantity of intelligence concerning Black Student

Unions (BSU) and similar groups which were targets for influence

and control by violence-prone BPP and other extremists. On

10/29/70 the Executive Conference approved a program to conduct

discreet preliminary inquiries, limited to established sources,

on BSU and similar groups, their leaders, and key activists to

determine if the activities of these groups and individuals

warrant further active investigation. On 11/4/70 instructions

were sent to the field to implement the program authorized by

the Executive Conference.

•The results of these discreet preliminary inquiries

were analyzed and it was concluded that our responsibilities

could adequately be handled by limiting our inquiries to black

student groups on college campuses which have engaged in violent

and lawless activities or are reported by knowledgeable sources

to be moving in the direction of violence and lawlessness.

As

a result, field offices were instructed by letter dated 7/26/71

that, thereafter, discreet preliminary inquiries on black student

groups on college campuses should be limited to those groups

which have engaged in violence and/or lawless activities or are

moving in the direction of violence and lawlessness. Results of

any preliminary inquiries conducted through established sources

only in accordance with the above provisions must be reported to

the Bureau in form suitable for dissemination along with recommenda-

tions regarding whether an active investigation of the group

and/or its leaders is warranted. The field was instructed that

13%

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 142

---

## Page 143

if established sources report a black student group is moving

toward, or being influenced in the direction of, violence and

lawlessness, although no such activity has occurred, the facts

are to be furnished the Bureau with field office recommendations

regarding active investigation. No active investigation of an

organization connected with an institution of learning is

conducted without prior Bureau authority.

The following pages set forth summaries concerning

the key black extremist organizations that are presently under

active and penetrative investigation.

13/

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 143

---

## Page 144

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

4H

The Black Panther Party (BPP), a black extremist

organization, continues to be extremely active throughout the

country. Formed during late 1966 in Oakland, California, for

the obstensible purpose of patrolling the black community to

prevent alleged police brutality, it was originally known as

the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense.

It expanded rapidly throughout the United States

during 1967-68, then suffered a gradual decline during 1969.

Revitalized in December, 1969, and throughout the 1970s, it

expanded until there were approximately 48 branches of the BPP

with an estimated 1,000 hard-core members supported by many

thousands of sympathizers as of December, 1970. Another gradual

decline began in 1971; and as of June, 1971, the Party had 710

hard core members in

39 branches representing 37 cities.

In February, 1971, the differences between Huey

Newton, BPP Minister of Defense, and Eldridze CLeaver, then RPP

Minister of Informationa

100 BPP members In New York and New Jersey declared allegiance to

Cleaver and became known as the BPP-Cleaver Faction.

The official goal of the BPP has always been the violent

overthrow of the United States Government and its replacement with

a Marxist-Leninist system.

The BPP has openly advocated urban

guerrilla warfare, assassination of Government Leaders and other

forms of violent terrorism.

Since its inception, the BPP has

aimed its most vicious invectives against law enforcement and

particularly local police.

"Off the pigs," BPP jargon for "kill the

cop" is the battle cry of the organization. Newton now claims the

BPP was led astray by Cleaver in his quest for violence when

actually the BPP is a-nonviolent, community serving organization.

In spite of Newton's peace loving front, the truth is that Newton

and his BPP are just as much anarchists as ever. On 6-30-71 a

Washington, D. C. BPP leader and follower of Newton stated "the

ultimate goal of the BPP is the complete destruction of the

United States Government and its replacement with Marxist-Leninist

socialism."

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8-19-71

PaB

-RNB: bado

4H

132

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 144

---

## Page 145

Our investigation of the BPP was instituted in 1967

and since that time has expanded as the organization itself

expanded.

By letter to all offices dated 2-27-70, approved by

the Director, offices having BPP investigations were instructed

• to submit intelligence reports on the BPP every six months in

compliance with instructions in the Manual of Instructions.

Previously, offices were submitting quarterly reports on the

BPP. The changes made on the basis of a recommendation by a

Racial Informants Conference of field supervisors to eliminate

some paper work in the field.

All field offices conducting an active BPP investigation

are required to submit a monthly airtel summary of the status and

activities of the BPP within its territory. This survey was

commenced as a biweekly summary in November, 1968, and changed

to a monthly summary on the approval of the Director by letter

to all offices dated 2-27-70. This change is a result of a

recommendation by the Racial Informants Conference of field

supervisors to cut down paper work' in the field. The monthly

summary relieves the field of some paper work and at the same

time keeps the Bureau and the field up to date on BPP developments.

San Francisco

as office of origin in the BPP case

continues to submit a biweekly summary and analysis of the BPP.

Because of the excellence of this summary and the need for such

an analysis by the field, San Francisco was instructed by Bureau.

airtel 1-21-70 to furnish copies of its summary to all continental

• offices which is the current practice.

All field offices conducting an active BPP investigation

were instructed by airtel 617-70 to submit a monthly summary on

the financial activities of each BPP branch. This financial

summary includes data.on sources of income, foreign funding,

expenses, the mechanics of local finance operations, and the steps

being taken by each office to develop full financial data. This

summary enables the Bureau to keep abreast of all financial

developments regarding the BPP on a national and international basis.

133

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 145

---

## Page 146

San Francisco was instructed 8-19-70 to submit monthly lists of

nationwide bank accounts and expenses for BPP. This survey was

devised

by San Francisco; and since it is very helpful in

establishing the "big picture" it is being required monthly.

The Black Panther Party has formed a corporation known

as Stronghold Consolidated Productions, Inc. (SCPI) to control

all BPP funds and assets and to act as purchaser and/or lessee of

any property utilized by the BPP. The corporation and its

activities are under intensive investigation which has revealed

that its activities are centered in San Francisco and New York.

By airtels 1-7 and 1-19-71 to San Francisco and New York, these

offices were instructed to submit a weekly summary of all pertinent

developments concerning the corporation during the previous week

plus a monthly review of SCPI bank accounts. These summaries keep

the Bureau aware of SCPI operations and also enables us to

regularly fulfill our dissemination requirements.

It is noted that there are currently 25 field offices

conducting active investigations of the BPP. Our intensive

investigation has enabled us to identify its leaders, members

and new branches. In addition, we have developed detailed

information concerning its operations and activities including

organization plans, funding programs, extent of control by

headquarters and foreign support and internal factionalism.

All field offices having a BPP investigation were

required by Bureau airtel 10-3-68 to submit a monthly report

containing evidentiary data required by the Department, and they

were also required by Bureau airtel 6-25-69 to maintain records of

and to use permanent I symbol numbers to identify all concealed

sources in BPP organization reports. Both of these requirements

were based on Department requests.

The Department advised that the

need on which these requests were based no longer existed, and the

field offices were instructed by Bureau airtel 5-17-71 to

discontinue both programs.

134

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 146

---

## Page 147

By Bureau airtel 11-6-70, all continental offices were

instructed to submit a biweekly airtel regarding underground BPP

operations within each field office. This specific requirement

was removed by Bureau airtel 4-29-71. However, all offices were

admonished to keep the Bureau advised of any developments in this

area.

"The Black Panther" newspaper, official organ of the BPP,

had been printed in San Francisco since 1967 until recently when

the printing was changed to New York City. The Bureau receives

a sufficient quantity of the paper frôm New York to disseminate it

to interested agencies and all Legal Attaches.

New York also

furnishes one copy of each weekly issue to all field offices. This

newspaper in the past has been the best indication of current

Party line; therefore, this

program is essential to our

intelligence gathering eftorts.

Our ultimate objective is the prosecution of the BPP

as an organization or by individual members for any violations of

Federal or State laws.

As in the past, we will continue to

disseminate to local authorities any information we may receive.

concerning possible local violations. A secondary objective is to

more completely develop information concerning the activities and

objectives of the BPP for intelligence purposes.

In July, 1969, the Attorney General established a

special task force for the specific purpose of developing a

prosecutive theory against the BPP.

Attorneys of this task force,

known as the Special Interdivisional Unit, have interviewed many

of our informants in furtherance of this purpose.

It is recommended that the intensive investigation

of the BPP including all surveys and procedures outlined as

above be continued.

135

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 147

---

## Page 148

BLACK REVOLUTIONARY PARTY

157-15276

The Black Revolutionary Party is an all black

revolutionary, political organization which was formed in

April, 1971,

at an internal meeting of the pro-Red China

Communist Party of Canada (Marxist-Leninist) (CP of C-ML) •

Among 16 people present were four Americans including

matter ae te coes knox does Black Pantaer

Party leader in Des Moines

The BRP was formed within the CP of C-ML to

organize blacks in the United States and Canada operating

from headquarters in Detroit, Michigan. The BRP follows

the political line of communist Chinese leader MAO Tse-tung

and publishes

a newspaper which serves as its vehicle for

disseminating its revolutionary dogma known as the "Black

Revolutionary," the first issue of which appeared in May, 1971.

The BRP intends to maintain its existence secret

until firmly established which is estimated at taking from

one and one-half to two years.

It intends to draw recruits

from both sides of the current Black Panther Party factionalism

l its proposed revolutionary program will reportedly be

based on the issue of racial suppression.

This is to be

accomplished by the formation of armed self-defense units to

"fight

against the barbarous rule of the monopoly, capitalist

• class."

on July 12, 1971, Charles Knox and an additional

Omaha black extremist

were detained temporarily by United States

Customs officials in Detroit while returning to the

United States from Canada.

Search of their vehicle by Customs

officials determined Knox and his companion were in possession

of numerous pamphlets and leaflets of a pro-communist nature.

Investigations of the BRP and its identified

leaders and members are being aggressively pursued and, where

pect a Gest ara nated with Royal canadian Mounted

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/18/710

PEN: page

4-H

136

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 148

---

## Page 149

CONGRESS OF AFRICAN PEOPLES (CAP)

157-16554

CAP was formed as an international black separatist

organization as the result of the convening of the fourth

annual gathering of black power advocates in the United States

and Atlanta, Georgia, during September, 1970. The organization,

which is heavily infiltrated at the leadership level by black

extremists, advocates the unity of blacks and the establishment

of a black nation via the revolutionary ideology of Pan-

Africanism as espoused by CAP supporter and well-known black

•evolutionary, stokely Carmichael:

CAP is now active in 15 cities across the Nation and

is vigorously pursuing its objectives in this country as well

as establishing rapport and lines of communication with black

groups and individuals abroad.

Recent infornation indicates

two United States CAP representatives plan a trip in the future

to Tanzania for the purpose of establishing a CAP organization

in that country.

CAP's domestic extremist element, headed by black

extensive use of disruption and violence,

in order to create Independent Black Institutions as

are necessary to accomplish CAP's revolutionary objectives by

mass action

programs utilizing "direction, dedication, and

discipline'"

CAP held a Western Regional Conference in San Diego,

California, during June, 1971, during which it was recommended

a national committee be established to consider the possibility

of establishing a black paramilitary organization which would

furnish support in the form of a united front action with all

"liberation struggles" in the United States and

internationally.

CAP is currently engaged in efforts at forming an

all-black political

party in the United States to nominate and

elect black officials at local, state, and national levels

who, it is felt, will

support CAP's plans at establishing a

separate black

nation. The organization has planned an

Eastern Regional Conference in Newark, New Jersey, for

September, 1971, and has tentatively scheduled another inter-

national meeting in early 1972.

13

NW 38608380ld: 32989638 Page 149

---

## Page 150

Investigations of the CAP, Its black extremist

leaders and members, are receiving most close supervision.

Pertinent information developed in regard to their activities

is being disseminated to the Department and interested

Government agencies and officials.

138

NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 150

---

## Page 151

INTERNATIONAL BLACK WORKERS CONGRESS, aka

BLACK WORKERS CONGRESS

Bufile 157-21532

The International Black Workers Congress (IBWC),

which is in its tormative stages, is dominated by James

Forman

an Official in the black revolutionary Stuaent

National Coordinating Committee.

The IBWC makes its

headquarters in Detroit, Michigan, at the same locale as

that of League of Revolutionary Black Workers, a black

extremist labor union in that city.

IBIYC is involved in the organizing of black

workers and students to further the revolutionary struggle

in the United States and other parts of the' world as well

as for the purpose of building unity among all third world

peoples.

IBNC's stated objective in organizing black

workers is to bring about a national work stoppage, thus

severely damaging the united states economy: James forman.

nas repeatedly stressed the necessity for blacksto be

organized to change

the capitalistic system to that of a

Marxist-Leninist society through seizure of state power.

The IBC held a regional meeting in Gary, Indiana,

in June, 1971, at which discussions centered around organizing

black workers into a Marxist-Leninist society and preparations

for a drive to organize blacks

employed in the steel industry

and in the "U. S. Post Office."

It was indicated that IBYC

would receive assistance from the pro-Chinese Communist Progressive

Labor Party (PLP) in the form of advice concerning organizing

activities.

An IBWC conference tentatively scheduled to be held

in Detroit on August 21 - 22, 1971, has apparently been

shifted to Chicago, Illinois, where the conference will be

scheduled within two weeks.

It is particularly significant to note IBNC leader

James

Dorman, together with other United states black extremists,

including affiliates of the league of revolutionary black

• Workers, recently undertook travel abroad which was to include

visits

Korea, North Vietnam, the Soviet Union, and

Algeria.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 151

139

---

## Page 152

JUNTA OF MILITANT ORGANIZATIONS

BUFILE 157-9903

4-H

The Junta of Militant Organizations (JOMO) is a

black extremist organization with headquarters in

St. Petersburg, Florida. This group continues to be the

leading organization of all black militant groups in the

State of Florida.

It was founded in St. Petersburg during

Mabe a ton of be ke

May, 1968, with 85 ghetto youths as a nucleus who believed

liberation of black people will not come about through

"normal channels." The organization has affiliated groups

in Louisville, Kentucky, and other cities in Florida. They

have attempted to organize on a national basis but have

experienced little success except with the establishment of

a chapter in Boston, Massachusetts.

The founder and leader of this organization is

Joseph Waller, Is an articulate Negro who holds the position

of "Chairman"

and states that he intends to haveall black

militant groups in Florida designated as affiliates of JOMO.

The organization's voice and propaganda organ is

''The Burning Spear" which is published on a monthly bäsis..

This publication has urged blacks to buy arms and to be

prepared to fight white America.

In this connection, JOMO

members have participated in racial disturbances, fire bombings,

and have been involved in attacks on police through the use of

violence. Members reportedly blew up a radio station in Tampa,

Florida, and participated in a plot to break out two black

"political prisoners" from a Florida prison. Members have

also been arrested for the commission of murders and robberies.

The organization has accumulated a large cache of

weapons,

and its members are taught guerrilla warfare and

receive firearms training.

Domestic Intelligence Division Inspection

8/17/71

KHAN: maz

4-H

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 152

140

---

## Page 153

Junta of Militant Organizations

Bufile 157-9903

Recently JOMO has been reincorporated under

"'The International Junta of Militant Organizations" and

now appears to be attempting to make contact with

organizations abroad and has embraced Stokely_Carmichael's

concept of Pan-Africanism.

JOMO has received contributions from all over

the United States and recently was almost successful in

receiving a large contribution from a church group in

New York; however, this latter contribution was ultimately

not

received.

141

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 153

---

## Page 154

NATION OF ISLAM

Bufile 25-330971

The Nation of Islam (NOI) is an independent semi-

religious group consisting of an adult, hard-core, all black

membership of 6,000 members. Muhammad's Temple Number 2 of the

Holy Temples of Islam, Chicago, Illinois, is the national head-

quir end of this eradition seen stancies get the

• University of Islam schools for 200 to 600 children at each

school. Local groups convene weekly, and once each year a

national convention is held in Chicago which is attended by

5,000 to 6,000 individuals.

The Not remains under leadership of Alliah Muhammed

who is the self-proclaimed Messenger of Allah and "Supreme Ruler

of the Universe."

Leaders continue to stress creation of a

The group opposes the war in Vietnam, teaches members to evade

the draft, and strongly supports the Arabs in their conflict

with Israel in the Middle East.

Although for years the leaders of the NOI have taught

members to refrain from carrying weapons and engaging in acts

of violence and open attacks on the white man, as recently as

July, 1ol1, the NO1 Mosque, lyler, Texas, planned the execution

of radio disc jockey and his associate for having previously

killed a fellow NOI member. Subsequently, seven members of

this mosque were involved in killing one of these men. Local

police recovered three pistols and a rifle from among members

of this group. The highly inflammatory antiwhite ideology

espoused by the NOI continues to make this group a highly volatile

extremist organization.

The organization is reaching new heights in accumulating

wealth.

Three-fourths of a million dollars monthly flows in

and out of bank accounts at a national level. Corporations

148

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 154

---

## Page 155

have been formed to operate food processing plants, acquire

land in the U.S. and in Bermuda, and acquire and maintain a

fleet of jet airplanes.

This group continues the propagation of its beliefs

through distributing 400,000 copies weekly of its newspaper,

"Muhammad Speaks," and radio broadcasts throughout the country.

We have conducted a continuous security and/or

extremist type investigation of this group since 1953 in

accordance with Department directives.

Each group is reported

on semiannually, and the leaders, functionaries, and those

involved in violence or extremist activities are subject to

active investigation.

The Department by letter dated 7/28/66

requested our investigation of this organization be continued.

143

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 155

---

## Page 156

REPUBLIC OF NEW AFRICA

Bufile 157-9079

The Republic of New Africa (RNA) was formed in Detroit,

Michigan, in March, 1968, by followers of Malcolm X, assassinated

black extremist. It has chapters in nine U.S. cities and a

current hard-core membership of approximately 116 individuals.

RNA was primarily formed by Milton and Richard Henry

long-time extremists in the Detroit area. When first formed,

RNA named as its President-in-exile Robert Franklin Wiliams,

violence-prone black extremist then living in China.

Williams

wis head st the et due to his on legal pestens and dissension

existing within the organization.

RNA was established to create a black nation within

the U.S. demanding from the U.S. Government the States of Alabama,

Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi and South Carolina, in addition

to individual reparations of $10,000 per black citizen as payment

for 400 years of ancestral slave

labor.

RNA's organizational structure is revolutionary in

character and its leaders have proposed efforts be made for inter-

national recognition and financial assistance fxom Cuba, Red China

and the black nations of the world. RNA, in September, 1970, made

a formal agreement of mutual revolutionary and financial support

with the leader of the Black Power Movement in Surinam.

RNA established a black army known as the Black Legion

whose function was to protect the persons and property and to

attack the enemies (police) of that nation. Training programs

were instituted and uniforms complete with leopard skin epaulets

were designed as the official dress for the Black Legionaires.

RNA maintains its national headquarters in Detroit,

Michigan, despite the fact that since early 1970, two factions

have arisen within the organization. One faction, led by Richara

Henry, is attempting to establish a national headquarters in

New Orleans, Louisiana. This faction is the most active and

militant of the two groups and has called for intensification of

RNA activities throughout the U.S. The other group, under the

NW 38628 Dold 32989638 Page 156

144

---

## Page 157

inactive for some times the Melton Henry Faction, however, has

inactive for some time.

scheduled a national RNA convention to be held in Dayton, Ohio,

September 4 through 6, 1971, which activity could herald renewed

revolutionary activity by this group.

in the past seen an ens a atten taste ete day eate

establish a black nation in Hinds County, Mississippi. During

July, 1971, this faction held a "peoples

court" to hear RNA's

case against a black farmer and owner of the land claimed by

RNA which was consecrated as the group's capitol in March 3, 1971.

The black farmer has reneged on a former offer to sell his land

to RNA. The RNA group found the farmer guilty and threatens to

seize the land by force, if necessary.

The RNA's propensity for violent action is demonstrated

by the fact that on August 18, 1971, local police officers in

Jackson, Mississippi, accompanied by Bureau Agents raided an

RNA site seeking four subjects for whom warrants were outstanding,

one of whom was wanted for Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution

(UFAP) for murder in Detroit. A shoot-out occurred during which

two police officers and a Bureau Agent were wounded. One police

officer subsequently died of a head wound. Eleven

RNA members,

include i hard he have been soughed by local unho satres

of the raided RNA headquarters determined it was a virtual

arsenal of weapons of all types including homemade bombs and

Molotov cocktails. The front door of this building had been

booby-trapped and it had an escape tunnel leading from its rear

which was accessible via a trap door in the building's interior

and a trench-bunker similar to that utilized by the Viet Cong

in the war in South Vietnam.

145

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 157

---

## Page 158

STUDENT NATIONAL COORDINATING COMMITTEE

100-439190

(SNCC)

SNCe was originally organized in Atlanta,

Georgia,

in 1960 under the name Student Nonviolent Coordinating

Committee.

Prior to the election of stokely Carmichael as

its Chairman in May, 1966, the organization operated as a

nonmembership civil

rights organization with both white and

black participation.

Carmichael

of SNC, immedately eliminated all assuming the Chairmanship

all whites from participation

and changed the organization from a civil rights-oriented

group to one whose aims were those of antiwhite revolutionary

action and the overthrow of the United States Government, a

position which the organization maintains today.

I Rap Brown, Bureau fugitive and well-known black

extremist who served as National Chairman for a time following

Carmichael's vacating of that position in 1967, again assumed

the National Chairmanship of SNCC in the Summer of 1969.

that time, it was announced SNCC was eliminating the word

"nonviolent" from its title. The organization's headquarters

wore also moved from Atlanta, Gaorgia, to New York City:

Under Brown's direction, SNCC moved to restructure

and revitalize itself in an attempt to regain its prominence

as a black extremist organization. The national leadership

issued directives on the reorganization of the national

office in New York City, as well as the local organizations

and the formation of councils to include a Revolutionary

known as the Revolutionary Political Council.

As a result of H. Rap Brown's flight in May, 1970,

to avoid prosecution in Howard County, Maryland, on local

charges of inciting to riot and arson, SNCC is presently

Political Council.

Frances Beal is the National Political

Education Officer. Hunt and Beal

are the only two national

officers of SNCC.

in Atlanta, Georgi 197e reorganizational meeting mas held

SNCC cadres gathered from several

states and

were directed by funt to study, understana,

then practice principles set forth in "Contradictions" by

Mao Tse-tung and "Dialectical and Historical Materialism"

by Joseph Stalin. SNCC members in San Antonio, Texas, are

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/18/71

146

NW 88608 'Dotid 32989638 Page 158

---

## Page 159

Student National Coordinating Committee (SNCC)

already receiving extensive political education in communist

ideology of Marx, Lenin and

Stalin.

The decision was made to

establish a State Bureau of SNCC in every state and to move

the national headquarters from New York City to Atlanta.

will support various black revolutionary labor groups and will

attempt to rally those under 25 years of age into a new Revo--

lutionary Youth Organization. The cadres discussed establish-

ment of a short-wave communication system utilizing code as a

more secure alternative to telephone and mail systems.

Investigations of SNCC,

their activities continue to receive close supervision.

ive close supervisiontes intor-

mation of pertinence concerning the organization continues to

in rested doe tient ence and a tapa tment and other

officials.

;

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 159

147

---

## Page 160

COMMUNIST INFLUENCE OF BLACK EXTREMIST GROUPS

100-442529

This intensification was initiated in August,

1964. The subject matter was previously reported in a

subsection of the Communist Party report, but the volume

and importance of this information made it necessary to

follow this communist influence in a separate investigation.

This investigation includes not only the influence of the

Communist Party but also that of the Trotskyite groups,

splinter groups and others including the New Left.

The overall objective in this and related

investigations is to protect the internal security of

the United States by submitting information relating to

possible Federal violations to the Attorney General for

prosecution.. We also have the responsibility to develop

intelligence information and disseminate to interested

Government agencies. Additionally, we take measures to

neutralize the communist influence in the black extremist

field whenever feasible.

Reports are submitted quarterly and the investi

gation is 'evaluated upon receipt of each report.

Pertinent

information is disseminated to the White House and the

Attorney General.

The year 1970 saw continued influence by

communists and other subversives in extremist groups.

In fact, the communist attempts to influence the black

extremist Black Panther Party were so insistent that the

Panthers have become wary of the motives of the Communist

Party. This has not

diminished in any way the Communist

Party's efforts to influence and support the Black Panther

Party, the communist tactic being to support the Panthers

whether they want it or not.

148

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 160

---

## Page 161

There are those in the Communist Party who oppose

or are extremely reluctant to support the Black Panther

Party especially those in the Black Panther Party who call

for "revolutionary suicide." Charlene Mitchell Secretary

of the Black Liberation of

the Communist Party, is

reportedly attempting to split the Communist Party and form

a Black Panther Communist Party which believes in violent

and dramatic action. Her group is reportedly waiting for

Angela Davis admitted Communist Party member currently

Incarcerated in California awaiting trial in connection

with the kidnapping and murder of a judge in California

during an attempted escape by prisoners from the courtroom,

to be released at which time Davis, will become public

leader of the new party. The Communist Party is girding

itself to oppose the split.

In June, 1971, a group led by James Rufus Forman,

Coordinator of. International Affairs for the black extrenist

Student National Coordinating Committee (SNCC), visited

Hanoi ostensibly to establish rapport between the

North Vietnamese and black people in the United States.

The group's trip was also to include Algiers, Guinea, and

Tanzania to reestablish old contacts for SNCC and initiate

new ones.

"SNCC Monthly," the publication of SNCC, in its

March, 1971, issue, contained an article about "Third

World People," united by "common historical oppression."

People in Cuba, Vietnam, Guinea, and the Palestinian

guerrillas were mentioned as having cut off the tentacles

of "the monster," imperialism. Another article in the same

issue was printed to politicize the readers on the Arab

Israeli conflict and clarify the similarity between the

Arab position and that of other "people of color" throughout

the world.

Curtis Nelson Powell, Black Panther Party member

involved in restructuring of Black Panther Party - Cleaver

Faction, while in Stockholm, Sweden, in early August, 1971,

149

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 161

---

## Page 162

inquired about the possibility of obtaining small arms on

behalf of Eldridge Cleaver for the Black Panther Party. He

specifically mentioned machine guns, pistols and bazookas and

stated there would be no difficulty in getting these items

into the United States. His request was rejected. Powell

subsequently traveled to Algeria, headquarters of the Black

Panther Party International Section, and then on to Tanzania.

He met with the Tanzanian Minister for Economic Affairs and

Development Planning and requested permission to open a

Black Panther Party office in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.

Although the Tanzanian Minister was sympathetic, he doubted

the Tanzanian Government would grant such permission at

this time.

• Write-ups concerning the Black Revolutionary

Party and the International Black Workers Congress are

incorporated in this survey: Such write-ups document the

pro-Red China Communist Party of Canada (Marxist-Leninist)

influence over the Black Revolutionary Party and the

Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the International Black

Workers Congress.

150

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 162

---

## Page 163

KEY BLACK EXTREMIST PROGRAM

4-H

Key Black Extremist (KBE) Program initiated 12/23/70

with Director's approval to intensify investigative coverage

of selected black extremists throughout United States who are

extremely active and nost vocal in their calls for terrorism

and violence. Ninety individuals are currently on the KBE

list, including such persons as Stokely Carmichael, Huey Newton.

and David Hilliard.

Objective of program is to develop complete and

detailed information on the day-to-day activities and future

plans of KBE individuals. Investigative summary report is

required followed by investigative report every 90 days.

A11 KBE individuals are included in Priority I of

Security Index.

Each is included in the Black Nationalist

Photograph Albun. All aspects of their finances are determined,

Their handwriting specimens are placed in the National Security

File in the Laboratory Division. Their fingerprints are

included in the Black Extremist Section of the Single Fingerprint

File in the Identification Division.

Particular attention is

paid to their travel. Possible criminal violations are

vigorously pursued. Emphasis is placed on obtaining record of

their inflammatory statements. High level of informant coverage

on each individual is required.

Supervision of KBE investigations is handled on the

individual desks and additions to and deletions from KBE list

must be approved by Bureau. Inasmuch as KBE individuals are of

the type whose investigation would ordinarily require close

supervision by Bureau supervisors, the administration and

supervision of this program entails only a minimum amount of

time above that which would ordinarily be expended on the

supervision of the cases of these persons.

Continuation of this program will be justified in

December, 1971.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/18/71

4-H

15/

NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 163

---

## Page 164

EXTREMIST INFORMANTS

4- H

The prime purpose of development and utilization

of extremist informants and sources is to provide intelligence

and evidenciary information concerning black and white

extremist organizations and individuals. These sources are

also called upon to furnish information concerning situations

affecting civil unrest in all parts of the country.

Supervision of extremist informants at the Seat of

Government includes review and approval of new informants

and confidential sources, review of progress of informants,

review of payments being made to informants, analysis of

informant coverage in each field office, analysis of nation-

wide informant coverage of the various extremist organizations,

coordination of informant coverage of specific functions such

as Black Panther Party (BPP) and other extremist groups:

conventions, supervision of operations for the development of

top-echelon BPP informants, and other special projects such as

development of information concerning black extremist under-

ground escape routes and coordinating utilization of informants

abroad with other agencies. All procedures are constantly

evaluated, in an effort to increase the efficiency of our

operation and to provide the field with the necessary supervision

with a minimum of paper work.

is of 1/31//1 we are operating a total of 1,4/

xtremist informants compared with a total of I,184 at th

time of the last Inspection. This is an increase of 293

informants. Concerning the above intormants, 583 informants

report on black extremist organizations and 353 informants

report on white extremist organizations such as the Klan.

We

are operating 6,541, ghetto informants who provide general

information within the black ghetto areas of our cities as

compared to 6,22, ghetto informants at the time of the last

Inspection which represents an increase of 317 ghetto informants.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/19/71

JCD: maz

4-H

152

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 164

---

## Page 165

In line with the fluctuating membership in the

various black extremist organizations, we have constantly

adjusted our informant coverage. This can be seen very

clearly with the most violent of the black extremist groups,

the Black Panther Party. At the time of the last Inspection

BPP membership was 1,000, and we afforded coverage of these

1,000 members with 173 informants which represents 11.3 percent

of the membership. The present membership is 11o, and we have

156 informants reporting on these individuals which represents

21.I percent of the membership. This is a net increase of

informant coverage to total membership of 4.4 since the last

Inspection. This also indicates our aims and purposes of

penetrating these organizations with the most qualified

informants and keeping within the policy of operating the

informant program in a very efficient manner.

At the time of the last Inspection we were operating

376, informants furnishing information concerning white extremist

organizations, and as of 7/31/71 we are operating 353 informants.

This is in keeping with the current membership of the Klan and

white hate organizations.

By memorandum dated 2/19/71 from G. C. Moore to

•Mr. C. D. Brennan captioned "Penetration of Black Extremist

Groups in Canada, Racial Matters" it was recommended and

approved that this Bureau attempt to penetrate the back extremist

activities in Canada due to the close working relationship

being developed between the extremists in that country and the

United States. We made available to the Royal Canadian Mounted

the RCMP

Me advised they

progress made by our source in that he has furnished information

concerning future plans for acts of violence and the establishment

guerrilla warfare training by black extremist

Toronto, Canada, area,

ROM indicated that altar dova scotia

becoming focal point of black extremist activity in Canada.

153

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 165

---

## Page 166

RCMP pointed out that the above area is visited frequently

by black extremist figures from the United States and

admitted that they have experienced considerable difficulty

in the recruitment of suitable sources in the Halifax area.

RCMP requested of the Bureau another source of the caliber

of the one presently operating in Canada.

By memorandum dated 7/29/71 it was recommended

and approved that we solicit of the field the identities of

informants who may be able to travel to Canada. This

project is presently being followed very closely.

By memorandum dated 5/5/70 from G. C. Moore to

Mr. W. C. Sullivan captioned "Racial Informant Development,

Black Panther Party (BPP), Racial Matters" it was recommended

and approved that two Special Agents of the San Francisco

Division be assigned to work exclusively on developing a top

level informant in the BPP'.

By letter dated 8/17/71

San Francisco was instructed that captioned program is being

discontinued. Review of this program showed that all avenues

leading to the possible development of high-level BPP informants

have been explored and the groundwork laid for the development

of top-echelon leaders who might defect. Therefore, it was

believed that it was no longer necessary to have two

Special Agents assigned exclusively to this program. This

will bring about a savings in manpower; however, San Francisco

is under instructions to continue aggressive efforts to

penetrate the top echelon, of, the BPP. This is being closely

followed at the Seat of Government.

GHETTO INFORMANTS

The ghetto informant program was instituted 10/11/67

to fulfill an urgent need to develop a network of "listening

posts" in the ghetto areas of our cities. A ghetto informant

is an individual living or working in the ghetto area who is

available to furnish information concerning conditions which

may create civil unrest.

154

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 166

---

## Page 167

: *

Since 1967 this program has been significantly

modified in that this vast network of informants have been

changed from listening posts to individuals who are actively

seeking extremist information as well as information concerning

violations of Federal and local statutes.

We have noted numerous incidents where ghetto

informants are being converted by the field to regular

extremist informants in that they have been graduated into

positions where they can report on a regular basis concerning

the activities of individual extremists and/or extremist

organizations.

As a valuable by-product we are also achieving

criminal statistics through contacts with our ghetto intormants.

This program was justified by memorandum dated 7/4/71 from

G. C. Moore to Mr. C. D. Brennan captioned "Ghetto Informant

Program, Racial Matters" and is scheduled to be rejustified

in July, 1972.

. -

155

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 167

---

## Page 168

4-H

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM - BLACK EXTREMISTS

Bufile 100-448006

Counterintelligence action regarding black extremists

was initiated 8/25/67 and was last justified 5/14/70. This

program was a supplement to our black extremist investigative

activities and involved a variety of sensitive intelligence

techniques which were afforded close supervision at the Seat

of Government.

No action could be instituted under this

program without prior Bureau authorization.

To afford additional security to our sensitive

techniques and operations, all counterintelligence programs,

including this program,

were discontinued and the field was

so advised by airtel 4/28/71.

was

Although this program was discontinued, the field

advised if exceptional instances arose wherein it was

considered counterintelligence action is warranted, that

recommendations should be submitted to the Bureau under the

specific case caption involved. These recommendations will

then be considered on an individual basis.

The field was

also reminded that prior Bureau authority

is required before

initiating any activity of a counterintelligence nature.

Significant results since last inspection as a

result of this program are set forth under "Accomplishments 4E"

elsewhere in this report.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/19/71

Witho

156

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 168

---

## Page 169

• SURVEYS, PROJECTS AND/OR INTENSIFICATION PROGRAMS

4-H

SECTION CHIEF W. R. WANNALL

NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE SECTION:

There are attached

separate write-ups

regarding the following programs supervised in the

* Nationalities Intelligence Section:

* ...*

1:' Name checks of Aliens Holding Diplomatic

and International Organization Visas

2.

Communist Coverage Along the Mexican Border

(BOCOV)

3.

Security Index-Cuba

4: American Repatriate Program

:5. Intelligence Coverage of Friendly Foreign

"Countries

6. Chinese Aliens Entering the U. 'S.; Chinese

Entering U.'S. Claiming U..S. Citizenship

7..

Counterintelligence Operations Against

Chinesé Communist Intelligence Activities

rin, the United States

.8.

: Visitors to Communist China and Contacts by

United States Residents of Chinese Diplomatic

Establishments

.÷..

: 3:

•"..

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/19/71

EXO: dRo

4-H

157

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 169

---

## Page 170

4-H

NAME CHECKS OF ALIENS HOLDING DIPLOMATIC AND

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION VISAS

This program was initiated in January, 1952, as a means of

keeping the Attorney General advised of information of a subversive

nature relating to the diplomats and officials of foreign countries entering

the United States in official capacities. These data are required by the

Attorney General to assist in discharging his responsibilities under the

Immigration and Nationality Act for exclusion and/or deportation of

foreign officials where their activity requires such action.

The basis for this program is found in the procedure by

Immigration and Naturalization Service in its submission of a form

advising of the arrival of the alien officials in this country, which form is

sent to member agencies of the intelligence community. The separate

agencies perform name checks on the data in these forms with the results

being channelized to the FBI. We correlate this information with data

from our files and furnish same to the Attorney General. In thuse

instances where additional investigation appears warranted, we obtain

• clearance from Department of State and issue appropriate instructions

to the field for active investigation.

Since the program was initiated, 794, 570 Immigration and

Naturalization Service forms have been processed and we have

undertaken 474 investigations based on results thereof.

The program continues to supplement our overall coverage in

the intelligence field with the majority of the work being handled by

trained clerical personnel within the Nationalities Intelligence Section

• and some isolated instances of involved investigations being handled by

substantive desk supervisors within the Division. Based on the limited

number of active investigations opened since the inception of this program,

the cost of the program, consists mainly of name check expenditures.

The

program continues to serve a necessary purpose in our overall intelligence

coverage, serving to alert us to the presence in this country of persons

having a capability for intelligence activities or who may pose a security

threat to the United States.

The program is justified annually, with the last justification

having been made February 18, 1971.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/18/71

4-H

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 170

158

---

## Page 171

4 - H

irene turi shot rice,

PROGRAM

COMMUNIST COVERAGE

ALONG THE MEXICAN BORDER

BOCOV

BUFILE: 100-356015

subutituten

I. Background, and Date of Inception

BOCOV was initiated by the Director in 1948

to fill a void in adequacy of coverage in the 25-mile

zone south of the U.S. - Mexican border by the

Central Intelligence Agency and the Immigration and

Naturalization Service

II. Scope and Desired Objectives

Three border offices, El Paso, san Antonio,

ana san Liego,

as well as the office of the Legai Attache,

Mexico, participate in this program. Ten Agents and

two Assistant Legal

Attaches devote a portion of their

time directing some 200 sources and informants.

Population of the zone areas involved is approximately

1,700,000 persons of which some 2,400 have been identified

as either members, or sympathizers

of najor Mexican

subversive groups.

III.

Positive Results Achieved Since Last, Inspection

Program has furnished valuable information

relative to threat against U. S. by Mexican subversives

residing and or operating in the border area.

Investigative results are furnished to all levels of

interested U. S. Government intelligence community.

Program continues to keep us advised of potential

trouble areas and allows for appropriate counter-measures.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/18/71

BMP-emir

4 - H

159

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 171

---

## Page 172

IV.

Extent and Nature of Current Supervision

Periodic reports on individuals and organizations

as well as informant coverage relating to BOCOV are

analyzed and correlated by Sa Bernardo M. Perez. Involved

is review of incoming letters,

memoranda, reports and

semiannual progress letters detalling informant coverage

and subversive strength. Analysis of this material

provides a basis for detecting weaknesses and making

arrangements for counterintelligence moves.

V. Current Justification for Continuance

BOCOV continues to fill the above-described

intelligence void and, in addition, is coordinated with

other intelligence programs originating in the border

area, in particular the SECOMEX program.

VI..

Frequency of Evaluation and Date of Last Justification

Program is evaluated annually and was last

justified January 8, 1971.

- 2 -

160

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 172

---

## Page 173

BOCOV

-..2

Bocov is a code word which concerns a highly

sensitive intelligence operation of this Bureau which was in

effect from 4/24/48 until 9/11/72. The purpose of this

operation was to attempt to identify foreign subversive

elements entering the U.S. Although this operation is no

longer in existence, the disclosure of the fact that it was

once carried on would undoubtedly severely impair the abilities

of this Bureau to fulfill its domestic obligations, not only

with regard to the internal security of the U. S., but also

in investigating criminal matters of an international nature.

Furthernore, unauthorized disclosure of details of this

operation could jeopardize the lives of individuals who

cooperated with this Bureau and who are currently residing

abroad.

substituted for pager areabo

in copy to sse

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 173

---

## Page 174

4 - H

SECURITY INDEX - CUBA

Background and Date of Inception

This program was instituted in November, 1960.

By that date it was obvious

that Cuba, whose Government

had been taken over by Fidel Castro in January, 1959,

was a communist state posing a real and present threat

to the internal security of the United States. In 1964,

at the time of the Cuban missile crisis, an Agent

Supervisor at the Bureau was assigned the specific

responsibility for administering this program to assure

the apprehension and special handling of the individuals

included therein in the event of a limited emergency

involving Cuba.

Scope and Desired Objectives

As of July 15, 1971, there were 409 individuals

included in the Security Index - Cuba Program, divided

into two categories:

1. Individuals placed on the

Security Index

solely on

account of their pro-

Cuban activities (Cuban

Special Section - 93

persons) •

2.

Persons already on the

Security Index because of

other subversive connections

and activities who would

warrant special attention

in the event of hostilities

with Cuba (Security Index

subjects tabbed "Pro-Cuban"

316 individuals).

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1/18/71

VHN: em j

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 174

161

---

## Page 175

!

Program is designed to maintain an up-to-date

record of location and activities of individuals included

therein, by means of established Security Index procedures

and reporting, in order that we are in a position to move

swiftly should

the apprehension or special handling of

these persons become necessary.

Positive Results Achieved

Determination

as to the validity of an

individual's inclusion in this program is constantly

under review. Since the program was last justified on

April 7, 1971, the number of persons on the Cuban Section

of the

Index has been reduced Irom yo to ys.

These 93

persons are judged to be hard-core pro-Cubans, actior

against whom in a Cuban emergency would be mandatory.

Of these 93, 28 are Cuban aliens. Each subject of pending

security investigations with Cuban ramifications is

considered for inclusion in the Index.

Extent and Nature of Current Supervision

The Agent Supervisor responsible for this

program is required to review each investigative

communication in current cases of pro-Cuban individuals

to determine whether the individual meets the criteria

for inclusion in the Index, as outlined in the Manual af

Instructions.

He must make a decision as to the degree

of dangerousness of the individual under the Priority

Apprehension Program and

rule on the field's recommendations

regarding these matters.

He initiates procedures with

the Security Index Desk of the Domestic Intelligence

Division and Voucher Statistical Section of the

Administrative Division regarding the placing of an

individual on the Index, his removal and the assignment

or change in apprehension priority.

If the individual involved is an alien,

correspondence with the Internal Security Division of the

Department is required to assure the preparation of a

pre-positioned arrest warrant by Immigration and

Naturalization Service.

Action is also taken with the

Department to cancel the arrest warrant if the alien is

removed from the Index.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 175

- 2 -

162

---

## Page 176

Current Justification

The threat to the internal security of the

United States from

• communist Cuba has not lessened in

recent years.

A workable priority apprehension system

which receives current and continuing attention is

mandatory.

This program, as presently organized and

handled, is fully justified.

Frequencies of Evaluation and Date of Last Evaluation

basis.

This program is evaluated on a semiannual

The most recent review and evaluation was dated

April

7, 1971.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 176

3-

---

## Page 177

4 - H

AMERICAN REPATRIATE PROGRAM

The American Repatriate Program which was

instituted in February, 1962, to specify procedure

to be followed upon receipt of information that U.S.

citizens residing in Cuba backbeerissuedswiss

Wannall to Mr. C. D. Brennan, dated March 25,

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1/18/71

164

-NW-88608-Docld:32989638-Page-177

---

## Page 178

4-H

INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF

FRIENDLY FOREIGN COUNTRIES

(Bufile: 65-63113)

1. Background, Scope and Objectives

Program was inaugurated 1954 aimed at developing positive

intelligence information, as well as data of value to FBI investigations.

Expansion of the program took place in 1955 and 1959 and during 1962

and 1963, as well as in 1970, additional coverage was approved.

The program has four principal phases as follows:

a. . Regular notification to the FBI by other U.S. agencies

regarding arrival in U.S. of intelligence personnel

from non-Soviet bloc countries. This phase consists

chiefly of file reviews at Seat of Government at nominal

expense.

b.

Maintenance of special coverage on official establishments

of selected non-Soviet bloc countries with the approval of

State Department and the Attorney General. We currently

have special coverage on six diplomatic establishments

of four non-Soviet bloc countries. Countries currently

covered are Panama

a Cuba.

Israel and the United Arab

our cost in operating this phase o the program

is related to translation of the intelligence product and

salary of personnel no man special coverage equipment.

Costs are analyzed on an individual basis each time the

special coverage is justified. This justification is based

on the value of the data developed.

C. .

This phase relates to the development of live sources

within diplomatic establishments of non-Soviet lo

countries as

tries as well as the development of individuas so

closely connected with official establishments they are

able to provide accurate up-to-date intelligence informa-

tion. We now have 39 actual and 14 potential live sources

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/18/71

4-H

165

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 178

---

## Page 179

4-H

at the establishments of 24 non-Soviet bloc countries.

The principal cost involved in this phase relates to

Agent time devoted to investigations of sources and

time spent in handling these sources.

d.

This phase relates to our intensification of efforts

by our legal attache offices abroad to develop and

instantaneously report high-level intelligence informa-

tion susceptible to immediate transmission to the

White House for consideration by appropriate officials

involved in determining national policy on critical

international issues.

Since the last inspection we have instituted a program operating

under the code word of "HILEV" which provides for specific channels of

• transmission and dissemination along the lines noted above. The

expansion of our operations abroad, at the instruction of the President,

has resulted in the development of considerable expertise on the part of

our legal attaches in developing the type of information required in this

area and the resulting product of their efforts has resulted in laudatory

comments by Dr. Henry, A Kissinger and other high-level members of

the Executive Branch.

2.

Positive Results Achieved

This program has enabled us to continue to produce a steady

flow of substantive information of an intelligence nature for the White House

and the highest level of the intelligence community. The program has been

particularly productive in our coverage of such critical areas of tension

as the Middle bast crisis, the continuing crisis in Panama, and the recurring

areas of tension created in South America by the frequent overthrow and/or

establishment of regimes in that continent, some of which are strongly

anti-American in political leaning. In other fringe nationality areas, the

program has served as a basis for obtaining information which has served

as a basis for advice to various high-level Government officials necessary

for policy decisions within the international political arena. The majority

of these data are not otherwise obtainable.

The daily flow of information from our sources in the various

facets of this program to the highest levels of Government has succeeded

in firmly establishing the FBI as a lucrative source of foreign intelligence.

160

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 179

---

## Page 180

3.

4.

5.

4-H

This ability to produce such information has been recognized, as noted,

by Dr. Kissinger at the White House and by various officials of the

Central Intelligence Agency in frequent contact with the Bureau.

Specific comments regarding the HILEV program and its productivity

may be found in the work papers of this inspection under Section 4-E,

Accomplishments - Special Coordination Unit.

Extent and Nature of Current Supervision

The program as it relates to all friendly foreign countries

(except West Germany) is coordinated by the Number One Man of the

Nationalities Intelligence Section working through the separate supervisors

assigned to the individual country's desk within the Section.

Current Justification for Continuation

This program continues to produce information of substantial

value relative to Bureau investigations as well as substantive foreign

political information of vital interest to the White House and members

of the intelligence community.

The information continues to illustrate

the FBI's ability to produce valuable intelligence information relative

to foreign political matters and to solidify the Bureau's position as a

valuable source of foreign intelligence data. It is recommended that this

program be continued:

Periodic Justification

Program is evaluated annually and was last justified by

memorandum dated 5/5/71.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS - DANGEROUS

ALIENS OF NATIONS OUTSIDE THE SOVIET BLOC

Program was initiated in April, 1951, to create a centralized

compilation of undesirable and potentially dangerous aliens with diplomatic

immunity against whom State Department can, when wartime emergency

arises, initiate steps for deportation or lifting of their diplomatic immunity.

The program applies only to aliens from countries outside the

Soviet bloe employed in the United States in international organizations

within provisions of International Organizations Immunities Act. The

16

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 180

---

## Page 181

4-H

program is similar in intent to the Emergency Detention Program

and the PRODIP Program; however, it involves an entirely different

type of individual.

The program is a control device only and involves no investigative

activity. Twenty-three individuals (as of 8/18/71) are included on the list,

with New York Office responsible for nineteen and Washington Field

Office responsible for four.

Current program requires only an annual letter with deletions

or additions being made by separate letter as subjects involved qualify

for elimination or inclusion. Substantive desk supervisors review field

submissions to verify need for inclusion of individuals on list.

Program continues to serve a useful purpose as a precautionary

measure for U.S. security in time of emergency. It is justified annually,

with last justification having been made 2/21/71.

168

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 181

---

## Page 182

CHINESE ALIENS ENTERING THE U.

S..

(Bufile 105-135923)

4-H

CHINESE ENTERING THE U.S.

•CLAIMING U.S. CITIZENSHIP

•(Bufile 105-12752)

Inasmuch as the criteria and objectives regarding

the above two programs are similar, both are included in

this write-up.

Investigations under the Chinese alien

program

were instituted 1/26/65 and investigations relating to

Chinese

entering the U.S. claiming U.S. citizenship

were initiated 9/14/65.

Both of the above programs are designed to uncover,

through investigation, ethnic Chinese who may enter the. U. s.

under the guise of a

legitimate

alien and/or U.S. citizen.

but who, in fact, may be covert intelligence agents of

Communist China.

Prior to inception of these

programs, we

were made aware of emphasis placed by Chinese communist

(Chicom) intelligence organizations on the need to introduce

illegal agents into the U. s.

Provided sufficient indoctrina

tion and training are given, the legal alien channel is

undoubtedly the easiest way

to accomplish the desire of

the

•Chicoms

to plant their agents in this country:

Under existing immigration laws, up to 10,000

Chinese aliens may be admitted to the U. S. 'for permanent

residence annually.

Under an additional program initiated

in 1971, another 250 Chinese aliens may be admitted to the

U: S. monthly as Conditional Entrants.

All of these aliens

have backgrounds closely connecting them with Communist China

and some leave behind on the mainland immediate family members

or

very close relatives.

Our experience in this field over

the years indicates that alien entrants into the U. S. who may

be selected for intelligence assignments would probably have

resided in a communist country while in the 1a to 45-year age

group and would probably have at least & years of formal

education.: Accordingly, our investigations of aliens are

limited to those who fit the above criteria:

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/19/71

EXO:dgo

4-H

169

NW.88608 Docld:32989638 Page 182

---

## Page 183

i..

1=2-

•4-H

."..

The key to investigations of this type is the

initial interview which is

conducted after the field office

covering the alien's residence has developed sufficient

background information on the subject.

These interviews are

designed to have the subject personally verify information

he may have furnished to U. S. authorities at some time in

the past and in cases where significant discrepancies are

aisclosed through the interview, we will intensily the investi-

gation, 100king

• toward the possibility that the subject is

noW

to recall a previous cover story.

In the event the

initial interview is satisfactory, the case is closed

to being reopened after two years

for a second interview.

The

second interview, which is conducted for the same purpose as

the first interview, will determine whether or not additional

action is to be taken.

If the second interview is satisfactory,

no subsequent action is taken with regard to the subject.

Cases investigated under the citizenship program are handled

in a similar manner.

Our investigations in both these areas produce

Intelligence information vi

various types

which is valuabli

to other U. S. agencies having a primary interest in develop-

ments in mainland China. The two programs have produced

tangible results in that a number of sources in the Chinese

field have been developed through interviews.

Chinese alien cases originate with Legal Attache,

"the criteria for investigation or any others whose backgrounds

wäre deemed to be so unusual that investigation may be justi-

cases are handled on the Desks of two Supervisors and consti-

tute.only a portion of the work on each Desk.

Results of

investigation are carefully reviewed and evaluated in line with

"our, objective of determining if the subject is or may be of

investigative interest,

i...

It is felt that these two programs are fully justi-

fied for continuation since they cover areas which may be

utilized by the Chicoms to introduce illegal agents into this

country. No other U. S. investigative agency carries out

•investigative activity along this line.

In addition, these

programs provide us with sources and positive intelligence of

190

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 183

---

## Page 184

..= 3

{-H

interest to other U. s. agencies.

No additional manpower.

is necessary to carry out our responsibilities under these

programs:

These programs are evaluated and justified annually.

Both programs were considered justified based on

Division

inspection write-up 1/12/71.

1?!

NWL88608_Docld:31

1638 Page 184

---

## Page 185

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS AGAINST

CHINESE COMMUNIST INTELLIGENCE ACTIVI-

TIES

IN THE UNITED STATES (CHICOIN)

(Bufile 105-135614)

4-H

Captioned program was initiated in May, 1965, to

combat Chinese communist (Chicom) efforts to initiate

intelligence operations and develop intelligence data in

the United States.

Analysis indicates that our current efforts

connection with our intelligence responsibilities.

Since

CHICOIN was previously defined as a means by which we were:

creating situations and placing our informants in contact

with Chicoms abroad, with the aim of their being recruited

by the Chicoms, it is felt we are accomplishing the same

objective through source and double agent development in

We are constantly aware of the need to employ

counterintelligence methods designed toward penetration of

Chicom intelligence, particularly since a Chicom official

establishment has opened in Canada and with the knowledge

that the Chicoms will probably enter the United Nations within

next 14 months.

Along these lines, we are continuing,

on an individual basis, development of

sources who can be

directed toward the penetration mentioned above..

Accordingly, it is felt that use of the term

CHICOIN in connection with our basic efforts, is no longer

necessary.. CHICOIN, as a program, is therefore discontinued.

'.".

"...:

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/19/71

FX0: 09,0%

NW 88608 Dodt 32989638 Page 185

173

---

## Page 186

VISITORS TO COMMUNIST CHINA AND

CONTACTS BY UNITED STATES RESIDENTS

OF CHINESE DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENTS

4-H

Background, Date of Inception, Scope and Desired Objectives.

This program was initiated in 8/65 in an effort

to uncover Chinese communist (Chicom) activities in the

United States.

The identities of individuals, both

citizens and noncitizens who are residents of

this country,

were furnished to us by United States intelligence agencies

and friendly foreign intelligence services. These individuals

either attempted to enter Communist China or contacted the

diplomatic establishments of the People's

Republic of China

(PRC) throughout the world.

Since 1965, the number

of diplo

matic establishments maintained by the PRC has increased many

times, particularly during the past year when many countries

."?."

recognized the PRC.

."

..:

• This program is field-wide and not directly connected

with any other investigative program.

The objectives include.

identifying those individuals

who enter the PRC and who may be

engaged in Chicom activities in their contacts with Chicom

establishments.

It is essential that visitors to Communist China

and PRC Embassies in foreign countries be identified to deter-

mine if they have access to classified material or could be

utilized for an intelligence or espionage assignment upon their

return to the United States. During recent months, the

United States Government has lifted the ban on travel to

Communist China.

However, the PRC has been very selective in

the issuance of travel documents to United States citizens. and,

-up until now, has restricted the issuance of these documents

to

chiefly a few newspapermen, some scholars, known pro-Chicom

sympathizers and a very limited

number of ethnic Chinese.

During the past month, the Department of State and the Justice

'Department have indicated that the travel restrictions will be

lifted on permanent resident aliens in the United States who

wish to visit Communist China, Outer Mongolia and Albania.

Previously, the restrictions

on United States citizens limited

the number who actually entered China as well as the number of

visitors to PRC diplomatic establishments. The lifting of the

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

•8/20/71

JEM: smn/dgo

4-H

17.3

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 186

---

## Page 187

2 -

4-H

restrictions ön United States citizens and the proposed

amendment to the law concerning permanent resident aliens

will

greatly increase the number of investigations under

this

program.

Many of the individuals traveling to China

from the United States will be legitimate merchants, scholars

and tourists.

However, they will be subjected to possible

approaches for intelligence purposes. In addition, we will

possibly be able to utilize legitimate travelers as walk-ins.

Therefore, it is essential that we fully identify all those

who enter China or contact PRC diplomatic establishments

•abroad.

The ethnic Chinese is of greatest interest to

•Chicoms as a visitor, particularly if he has relatives

the

• residing on the Chinese mainland. Based upon the experiences

of Irienaly loreign intelligence agencies, particularty

RCMP.

we have learned that the Chicoms primarily

recruit as

17US tota

interli

gence agents the ethnic Chinese.

2a

•Positive Results Achieved Since Last Inspection.

'":.

Investigations since the last inspection have

greatly increased.

Many of the investigations are in the

initial stages of identifying the individuals.

In February,

1971, the Chicoms established an Embassy in Ottawa, Canada.

During that month, 14 United States residents contacted the

Embassy.

During June, 156 residents contacted the Embassy

in addition to contacts with the Chicom propaganda news

agency, New China News Agency.

Included among

these

people

are ethnic Chinese, national

political figures in the

United States, China scholars, journalists and merchants.

The increase from February through June of over 1,000 percent

indicates the acceleration of the problem facing the Bureau

in this program.

During July, there was a substantial increase

over June.

The Chicoms have taken on a new look and are

'encouraging visitors to the Embassy in Ottawa. Our common

border, which is so easily crossed, offers no resistance, and

it is through the excellent cooperation of the RCMP that we

are able to obtain

the names

and addresses of indiviquals

contacting the Embassy or the New china News Agency (NCNA)..

It is expected that in the future the number of contacts will

increase both at Ottawa as well as at the China Travel Service

in Hong Kong and the various Embassies of the PRC in foreign

countries.. The present policies of the President and the

Depärtment of State speaking for the United States Government

17.4

NW 88608-Đocld:32989638-Page-187

---

## Page 188

- 3÷

• 4-H

will continue to encourage visitors, any of which is a possi-

ble subject for recruitment by Chicom intelligence for hard

espionage, intelligence activities or propagandizing the

American people.

Extent and Nature of Current Supervision.

Portions of this program are handled by

three

Bureau supervisors.

However, the visitors to China are

correlated by one supervisor and the contacts with Chicom

diplomatic establishments are correlated by a second super-

visor.

This has become necessary because of the increased

Legat Ottawa.

identify the individuals primarily through established

sources, if possible,

to determine their current residence

and

particularly their employment. Identification of

employment is essential to determine if the individual has

access to classified information or if he is in some field

of endeavor which is of particular interest to the Chicoms.

Each case is evaluated on its individual merits and cases

are not opened on individuals on whom sufficient background

intormation is avallable, such as nationally. known Journa-

178 tS,

scholars or political figures.

4. Current Justification for Continuation.

1924004

...a.

RCMP has advised as recently as July 9 that

they feel that at least so percent of the Chinese communist

intelligence effort in Canada will be directed against the

et the chicon Embassy otrava nes tated.

_that the Embassy

Staff in Canada will be large because

"we wiT be

responsible

the United States as well as Canada

It is absolutely

necessary that this program be continued to identify all

contacts both in Canada as well as at other. PRC diplomatic.

establishments throughout the world.

Legat, Hong Kong, has submitted a form which has been

to forward to the Bureau the identities of those individuals

who are American citizens or permanent resident aliens who

cross the border of Hong Kong into Communist China at Lo Wu.

1.75:

NW 88608-Docld:32989638_ Page 188

---

## Page 189

In addition, identity of visitors will give us a fertile

field for development of sources which we may utilize as

walk-ins, particularly at the Embassy in Ottawa.

RCMP has

5. How Often Evaluated and Date of Last. Justification.

This program is evaluated annually and.

the last

date of justification took place on 1/12/71.

176

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 189

---

## Page 190

LEGAL ATTACHE OFFICES

FOREIGN LIAISON

4-H-1

In order that the overall foreign liaison

can be fully and currently evaluated, you

are requested to furnish your comments concerning each Legal Attache Office

presently operating (17); former Legal Attache Offices which you have proposed

to be reopened (3); and proposed new Legal Attache Offices (3).

In providing this information, you are requested to be specific as to: (1)

productivity (including intelligence) of each existing office (provide examples);

(2) comment as to adequacy of personnel assigned (fully document if additions, de-

letions or changes recommended); (3) make specific recommendations regarding

continuing or discontinuing each of existing offices.

You are also requested to state your current recommendations regarding

each former and new Legal Attache Office proposed above.

Comments of Assistant Director Brennan and Section Chief Wannall

requested.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR: C. D. BRENNAN

I concur with the attached

(CDB:mls 8/25/71)

comprehensive analysis of

Section Chief Wannall in

regard to our Legal Attache operations abroad. The Inspector should

• particularly note Wannall's concluding observation that any future

expansion abroad will be resisted by the Department of State and

Central Intelligence Agency and unless specifically ordered by

the White House, will require approval from State and Bureau of

the Budget.

As Mr. Wannall points out, we are not in a position

to balance

the value of the information expected against the costs,

and I would

suggest the Inspector insure that a copy of Mr. Wannall's

overall analysis is furnished to the Administrative Division

inasmuch as the Director on 8/23/71 approved the recommendation that

the Administrative Division should coordinate and handle all requests

for increased staffing, as well as the creation of new Legal Attache

posts.

POMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8319/71

USM:wmJ

$4-H-1

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 190

177

---

## Page 191

LEGAL ATTACHE OFFICES

FOREIGN LIAISON

4-H-1

COMMENTS OF SECTION CHIEF W. R. WANNALL:

In response to the

Inspector's inquiry,

comments follow concerning (1) the ll foreign offices in

operation prior to the expansion in December, 1970, (2) the

6 new offices opened in December, 1970, and

(3) the 6

additional offices which we proposed be opened in response

to the Director's inquiry in May, 1971. With respect to

categories (1) and (2) it is noted that these 17 offices

have just undergone inspection, most of them during the

current month. As very few of

the inspection reports are

yet available, these comments are necessarily based upon those

facets of the

work which it is possible to observe from the

Seat of Government.

(1).

Offices in Operation Prior to Expansion

• . • BERN

Our operations in Switzerland are most delicate

because of the fierce independence of the swiss, who would

not permit the use of "Legal Attache" as it was

considered

too widely identified with the FBI. As a result, our

representative is known in the Embassy and in Switzerland

merely

as'

an Attache.

The office has become increasingly

important in the criminal field very recentlyas a result of

the large scale thefts of securities in the United States

and their transportation to and attempted sale or hypothecation

in Switzerland. In addition, it has long been the goal to

obtain access to information concerning bank accounts opened

in Switzerland by subjects of our investigations.

Progress

has been slow but we have been able to secure limited

information and the cooperation received is the direct result

of the personal liaison of our Legal Attache.

productivity

During fiscal 1971, the office located ? fugitives

and arranged 4 "informal deportations." Its pending case load

as of 6/30/71 was 83 which is approximately average on a per

agent basis in the foreign field.

Through 8/23/71 Bern had

submitted 7 HILEV items of which

5 were actually disseminated.

This is the smallest number of submissions of any Legal Attache

and the second smallest number of acceptable items.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

4-H-1

8/23/71

NW 88608 DoEdl2489608 Page 191

178

---

## Page 192

2 -

4-H-1

Personnel

Adequate. No increase envisioned.

Recommendation

Continue.

BONN

This is a very important European office covering

Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands.

There is a high

volume of both criminal and security work. The large

United State military presence in Germany is both an

espionage target and a source of Bureau work. The military

intercept program furnishes our office copies of correspondence

g through Germany to a

and from Tron Curtain countries

and the volume on this as so great as to require extra

clerical assistance.

The Legal Attache has Served In Germany

Since 1951 and is univers-ly respected and given full

cooperation.

productivity

In fiscal 1971 20 persons wanted in the United States

were located in the Bonn territory and 5 stolen cars were

recovered. The Legal Attache is currently working a ring

case which will result in location of an additional number.

Through 8/23/71 he has submitted 18 HILEY items of which 7

have been disseminated. This is considerably below average

and this matter was discussed with the Legal Attache during

his visit to Washington on home leave recently. He has shown

improvement as evidenced by the fact that he has submitted 4

recent has

items already during August of which 3 have been used.

His

pending case load as of 6/30/71 was 355 which is considerably

above average on a per agent basis.

Personnel

A third agent was added to Bonn in December, 1970,

at the time Austria was added to its territory. It is felt

this is adequate.

Recommendation

Continue.

179

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 192

---

## Page 193

3

4-H-1

BUENOS AIRES

For several years this was a one-man office

attempting to cover not only Argentina but also Brazil,

some 1,200 miles away and larger than the United States.

Although we had a very capable Legal Attache, he could

barely touch the high spots in his territory

and maintained

a very low case load.

Two additional agents were assigned

in December, 1970, and Paraguay was added to the Legal

Attache's responsibilities as was intelligence reporting

on Chile.

We believe the results have justified this

move although one agent is still trying to cover Brazil

on a road trip basis.

Productivity

During fiscal 1971, 38 persons wanted in the

United States were located in the territory.

The pending

case load as of 6/30/71 was 294 and above average on a

per agent basis.

As of 8/23/71, the office had submitted

47 HILEV items of which 21 have been used and 2 are still

pending.

This is well above the average.

Personnel

One agent and one clerk could be transferred from

Buenos Aires if an office were to be opened in Rio de Janeiro.

Under present circumstances, the personnel is adequate but

three agents and three clerks would not be needed if Brazil

was removed from their territory.

Recommendation

Continue. At present;

; this is our only point of

coverage for an enormous area of South America.

HONG KONG

Originally opened to provide coverage of Chinese

communist activities, Hong Kong fell heir to the entire

Southwest Pacific area when our office in Manila was closed.

We believe the area has a high potential both for cases

pertaining to the Bureau's domestic jurisdiction and for

items of high-level intelligence. The intermittent road

trips, however, do not permit adequate development of contacts

mho can be relied upon to look out for our interests. In

addition, the Legal Attache has required an abnormal

amount

180

NW- 88608-Docld:32989638_Page 193

---

## Page 194

4-

4-H-1

of supervision in regard to administrative matters. He

experiences great difficulty in meeting deadlines and

has been censured twice already this year for delays in

reporting.

He has an outstanding personality, speaks

readily and fluently, and has a good background in Chinese

matters.

Nevertheless, very lew of his HILEV submissions

have been acceptable and he has evidenced a lack of

understanding of what constitutes intelligence of interest

to the White House.

It was suggested that these matters

be inquired into by the Inspector together with the Legal

Attache's relationship with the Central Intelligence Agency

(CIA) so far as the passage of information to and from

British sources is concerned. The results of the inspection

are

not yet known.

Productivity

Fifty-lour persons wanted in the United States

were located by the office during fiscal 1971. Eight "informal

deportations" were arranged.

The case load as of 6/30/71

was 178 which is approximiely average un à per agent basis.

As of 3/23/71, the Legal Attache had submitted 27 items for

HILEV dissemination of which 7 were considered acceptable.

Personnel

The present personnel complement is not considered

adequate to discharge the Bureau's responsibilities, including

HILEV in Southeast Asia. He have,

however, recommended that

three additional offices be opened in this

area. If these

offices are opened, the complement of two agents and two

clerks should be able to handle the work in Hong Kong and,

if necessary, provide relief to any one-man office opened

the area.

Recommendation

Continue.

The resumption of relations with

Communist China will make this office increasingly important.

LONDON

This is our most productive office in Western

Europe and handles a heavy volume of criminal cases.

Our

office has developed a very close relationship with

Scotland

18/

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 194

---

## Page 195

= 5

4-H-1

Yard and its Special Branch with the result that we

receive splendid cooperation in both criminal and security

investigations in the London area.

There are always a

large number of Americans in England and Ireland and there

will always be a need for our representation there.

Productivity

As of 6/30/71, London had 333 pending cases,

the largest number per agent of any office except Ottawa.

Ninety-one persons wanted in the United States were located

by the office during fiscal 1971 and 4 "informal deportations"

were arranged dispite the British insistence upon formal

legal procedures:

As of 8/23/71, London had submitted 20

items for HILEV dissemination ll of which were accepted.

This is slightly below average.

Personnel

We have recommended that consideration be given

to assigning an additional agent to London and if approved,.

this will still leave London with an above average number

of cases per man.

We believe that the Bureau gets high value

for its investment in the London Office.

Recommendation

Continue.

MADRID

An increasing number of American travelers are

visiting Spain and they have included fugitives and other

United States criminals.

The present Legal Attache has

developed strong contacts in Spain, including Prince Juan

operating alone,

good job both in his contacts and the administration of

his office.

Productivity

Twenty-four persons wanted in the United States

were located by the Legal Attache during fiscal 1971. His

case load as of 6/30/71 was 115 which is substantially above

average on a per agent

itens

basis. To date, he has submitted 28

for HILEV dissemination of which

17 have been accepted

with 2 still pending. This is above average.

187

-NW-88608-Docld:32989638 Page 195:

---

## Page 196

6.

4-H-]

Personnel

We recently recommended that one agent and one

clerk be added to Madrid in the event of a future expansion.

While the present complement can handle the normal FBI

cases, the emphasis on HILEV items can best be satisfied

by an

additional agent.

Recommendation

Continue.

MEXICO CITY

Our operation in Mexico is unique in that we

are actively developing informants and working most closely

with the cooperative Mexican officers who haudle our cases.

there.

This is our largest office both in terms of case

load and personnel. Unlike Canada where practically all

our work is handled by one agency, we are dealing with a

number of different agencies in Mexico most of which lack

the training and sophistication of the Royal Canadian

Mounted Police (RCMP) hence the disparity in the personnel

required to handle our work north and south of the border.

In an effort to streamline

our operations in Mexico, the

Legal Attache has been instructed to reduce the number of

informants he is operating and to cut back on his investigation

* the 1 montan

in certain areas such as the American Communist Group in

Mexico.

Productivity

Two hundred and eighteen persons wanted in the

United States were located by the Mexico City Office during

fiscal 1971. Thirty "informal deportations"were arranged and

53 stolen automobiles were recovered. The case load as oi

6/30/71 was 627 which is below average on a per agent basis.

As of 8/23/71, the office had submitted 37 HILEV items of

actually disem natad

which 28 were actually disseminated. This is substantially

above average.

Personnel

We feel the present complement is adequate until

the Legal Attache recommends additional "Resident Agencies."

The large expanse of territory and the necessity of working

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 196

183

---

## Page 197

4-H-1

closely with Mexican police require our agents to be on

the scene for anything but relatively routine investigations.

The Legal Attache has for some time been considering

possibility of opening one or more additional "Resident

Agencies" to afford faster coverage and more thorough

investigations in areas which now require extended road trips.

Recommendation

Continue.

OTTAWA

With Mexico City. this is one of our two most

important and productive offices.

The establishment of

a Chinese Communist Diplomatic Mission in Canada, the

asylum afforded our deserters and Selective Service Lugitives,

and the relatively open border make Canada an area of

intense FBI interest. We are fortunate in having RCMP with

nation-wide security jurisdiction and nearly nation-wide

police jurisdiction to handle our investigations.

While

we have a two-man office in Ottawa, RCMP has a three-man

office in Washington because of the number of United States

agencies with which they do business. Our relations with

RCMP are outstanding and they are the closest counterpart

of the FBI of any foreign investigative agency.

"Productivity

The case load as of 6/30/71 was 548 which is by

far the highest on a per agent basis. During fiscal 1971,

the office located 994 FBI fugitives, 37 fugitives for other

agencies, 755 Selective Service delinquents, and recovered

92 stolen automobiles. Ninety "informal deportations" were

effected.

As of 8/23/71, the office had submitted 22 HILEV

items of

which 10 were used. This is below average.

Personnel

The sheer volume of work makes the problem in

Ottawa primarily clerical. As a streamlining measure, RCMP

has printed routing slips with spaces for our titles and

file numbers which the Legal Attache uses in forwarding RCMP

work to the Bureau.

An additional clerk has recently been

furnished Ottawa and it is expected that the recent inspection

will have noted the effect of this increase.

Recommendation

Continue.

-NW-8860t-Docld+32489638-Page 197

184

---

## Page 198

8

4-H-1

PARIS

This is a major continental office to which an

additional Agent was assigned at the time of the recent

expansion in order to concentrate on development of high-

level intelligence.

Our Legat enjoys the confidence of the

French investigative agencies and is able to secure

cooperation which is denied to the Central Intelligence

Agency as a result of the latter's involvement in a wire

tapping incident during the 1960's.

The departure of the

American military from France has

somewhat reduced the

volume of criminal matters, but the establishment of NATO

Headquarters in Brussels, also in Paris territory, has

continued the flow of security matters.

A substantial

number of friends of the Bureau visit Paris each year and

require time and attention from our Legat.

Productivity

During fiscal 1971, 23 persons wanted in the

United States were located by Legat, Paris.

tea by

His case load

as of 6/30/71 was

244, which is average on a per Agent basis.

As of 8/23/71, Paris has submitted 38 HILEV items, of which

21 have been used and one is pending. This is above average.

• Personnel

No increase in personnel is envisaged for. Paris.

This office provides both clerical and Agent relief to Madrid.

Recommendation

Continue.

ROME

In addition to Italy, Rome covers Greece, Turkey,

and Cyprus on a road trip basis. The office has not yet

reached its full potential in the development of political

intelligence, but a very satisfactory relationship exists

with the Italian investigative agencies; and we are receiving

coverage of organized crime figures and

other criminals who

It is expected that the Legat

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 198

185

---

## Page 199

"one

9-

4-H-1

will expand his contacts in Italian cities other than Rome,

such as Naples, Milan, Florence,

and Venice, in order to

widen his capabilities in the criminal field and improve

his collection of HILEV intelligence items..

Productivity

During fiscal 1971, 14 persons wanted in the

United States were located by the office and one informal

deportation was arranged.

As of 6/30/71, there were 145

pending cases, slightly below average on a per Agent basis.

As of 8/23/71, 13 HILEY items had been submitted,

of which

9 were used.

This is below average.

Personnel

We beljeve the personnel are adequate but not

excessive.

Recommendation

Continue.

TOKYO

In addition to Japan, Tokyo covers South Korea

and Formosa.

The latter presents a particularly delicate

situation as the United States moves toward recognition of

Communist China. Our Nationalist Chinese contacts, however,

have promised to continue their cooperation despite what

they view as an unsympathetic move by the United States

Government. Despite the language barrier in both South

Korea and Formosa, our representatives have been consistently

successful in getting the work of the Bureau handled in

adequate fashion.

As the United States military commitment

in Japan is reduced and as the economic goals of the

United States and Japan draw farther apart, it is increasingly

important that we

have a liaison capability in Tokyo.

Productivity

During fiscal 1971, Tokyo located 23

persons

wanted in the United States and arranged three

informal

deportations. The case load as of 6/30/71 was 279

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 199

186

---

## Page 200

— 10 -

4-H-1

substantially above average on a per Agent

basis and the

third highest of the foreign offices on that basis. Tokyo

has submitted 40 items for HILEV dissemination, of which

17 have been used. This is slightly above average.

Personnel

We have recommended that one Agent and one clerk

be added to Tokyo in the event of further expansion.

This

would permit more frequent visits to Taiwan and South Korea

and would also permit widening of contacts within Japan

itself, which is necessary if increased emphasis is to be

placed upon

Hiley production.

Recommendation

Continue.

12,

New Offices Onened in December, 1979

The following six offices were opened in December

1970, for the specific purpose of developing HILEY intelli-

gence. Four of these offices were opened in entirely new

territory while two were assigned areas previously handled

by other Legats.

In considering these six offices, it must

be recognized that they were primarily intended as

intelli-

gence collectors and not as sources of normal Bureau cases.

We have been pleased, however, to note that several of these

offices are making a substantial contribation to the Bureau's

domestic jurisdiction in addition to their HILEV work.

: BEIRUT

This is a

one-man post established in new

territory where there had previously been little need for

coverage.

The Legat has developed several very. productive

sources of political intelligence and at the present time

is the highest producer of HILEV items.

He has been commended

for this.

revertheless, should there be any reduction iI

White House interest in HILEV items, we could not Justil!

continuation of this office.

Productivity

One FBI fugitive and one Selective Service delin-

quent were located by this office between January and June,

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 200

18?

---

## Page 201

-11 -

4-H1-1

1971. As Of 6/30/71, there was a pending case load of

27, which is the smallest case load of any foreign office.

Beirut has submitted 61 HILEV items, of which 31 have

been used and three are still pending. This is the largest

number of items used submitted by any office.

Personnel

Present complement is fully adequate and cannot

-be reduced.

Vacation relief for the Legat should come

from Rome and for the clerk from Tel Aviv (we cannot send

15815e pt Legatest to relieve in Beirut because

Recommendation

In view of the high production of HILEV items,

the office should be continued.

: CARACAS

This office was opened to cover the large area

of northern South America, together with the numerous

territories and independent countries in the West Indies.

It is essentially a road trip office and affords the Bureau

coverage in an area where we have been totally dependent

upon the Department of State and the Central Intelligence

Agency for the handling of our leads.

Our Legat, who

started out with a semihostile Ambassador, has

won the

latter's respect and has made a gratifying start at

development of the large and scattered area assigned to

him.

In addition to the Latin-American countries, he is

covering French, British, and Dutch possessions; and the

effectiveness of his liaison is demonstrated by his ability

to devise channels of communication to his contacts

throughout his area.

Productivity

During the first six months of 1971, Caracas

located 11 fBI lugitives,

one fugitive for another agency,

and three Selective Service delinquents, while arranging

one informal deportation.

His case load 6/30/71 was 72,

which is well below average on a per agent basis but is.

expected to increase with the further development of his

territory.

He has submitted 25 HILEV items, of which 12

have been used. This is slightly below average.

188

NN 18608 Docld:32989638 Page 201

---

## Page 202

i = 12*

4-H- 1

Personnel

In view of the road trip nature of this territory,

two Agents will be necessary to insure continued coverage.

While the present case load is low, this is a brand new

office in completely new territory

and we expect improvement.

Recommendation

This office should be continued without regard

to the emphasis on HILEVS.

189

110 0600

Docldr32989630

Page 202

---

## Page 203

- 13 -

4-H-1

COPENHAGEN

This office was opened to exploit the potential

of the Scandinavian countries handled on a road trip basis

from London prior to the expansion in December, 1970. A

".".

magnet for youth from the United States. In addition, the

entire area is attuned to moves from the Soviet Union and

it was hoped that there would be a reasonable volume of

regular Bureau work together with a steady flow of political

intelligence. The potential of the office has not yet

been reached. The unfortunate security breach which

resulted in the change of Legal Attaches has put an

experienced man in charge but he has been there less than

two months and has not yet been able to bring the office

not yet been

into line. There has already been a marked improvement

in the rate of HILEV submissions and we expect the office

• to be more successful under new management.

Productivity

• i

Twenty-eight persons wanted in the United States

were located by the legal Attache during the first six months

Of 1971. One "informal deportation" was arranged. The case

• load as of 6/30/71 (prior to arrival of the new Legal Attache)

was 43 representing the smallest per agent assignment of any

Legal Attache.

Through July, 1971, Copenhagen had submitted

8 HILEVS of which 2 were used. Already in August, 4 submissions

have been received for a total of I2 and 3 have been used for

a total of 5 with l still pending. This is the smallest

HILEV production of any Legal Attache aud Bulet 8/4/71

pointed this out and insisted upon improvement. Results thus

far in August indicate that the Legal Attache is responding.

Personnel

While the present case load does not, on the surface,

justify continuation of a two-man oftice, we belleve the

potential for far greater achievement exists in the Scandinavian

countries and

we feel that the new Legal Attache should be

given an opportunity to exploit this potential.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 203

140

---

## Page 204

- 14 -

4-H-1

Recommendation

We recommend that the office be continued in

its present status for an additional six months at the

end of which time consideration should be given as to its

personnel complement.

LA PAZ

Coverage of Bolivia and Peru was initiated

for the sole purpose of developing HILEV data and cannot

be justified on any other grounds. The Legal Attache

has done an outstanding job under very difficult

circumstances.

The government (until 8/22/71) was pro-

communist and basically anti-United States.

The Legal

Attache is living inside a barbed wire fence with a full-

time guard at his door. We have had to armor plate his

car and furnish him a two-way radio to insure full-time

communications with his Embassy.

The altitude is such that

peisons with other than completely strong hearts and lungs

should not be permitted to visit

there.

The office gives

us coverage in an area we have not visited since the days

of sIS but normal Bureau work there is minimal.

Productivity

During the first six months of 1971, the Legal

Attache located 1 FBI fugitive and 3 Selective Service

delinquents.

His case load as of 6/30/71 was 45 which is

well below average on a per agent basis. He has submitted

24 HILEV items of which 14 have been used which is about

average. He has twice furnished advance information

concerning important political developments including the

current coup and he has received commendation from the

Director for the material he has furnished.

Personnel

The work load certainly cannot justify any increase

in personnel but it cannot be decreased without closing the

office.

Recommendation

It is recommended that operations continue in

La Paz for another six months at the end of which time a close

hard look should be given to closing the office. It is

possible that a more friendly regime in Bolivia will result in

an increase in HILEV items but it will have no bearing on his

over-all case load.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 204

191

---

## Page 205

- 15 -

4H-1

MANAGUA

This is an office opened in the right area

but

in the wrong place.

There is Bureau business in Central

America and we had

long considered recommending an office

there prior to the President's request in 1970. We did

not want to open in Managua, nowever, but in san Jose,

Costa Rica, where the living

conditions are far superior.

We were forced to settle for Managua when the Ambassador

to Costa Rica objected to our opening there. As a result,

we have two men living under difficult circumstances

resulting in varied domestic problems including education

of their children, and morale in our Managua Office is

probably lower than in any other foreign post. It was

expected that Central America would prove a fertile source

Of HILEV items because of the constantly changing political

alignments in the various governments.

This has not been

the case and Bulet 6/4/71 informed the Legal Attache of

our disappointment in his production. At the start of

June he had only submitted 2 items, 1 of which had been

used. He is showing improvement as indicated by the submission

of three items in june, tour in July, and five in August,

as of 8/23/71. The Legal Attache nas been placed on probation

as a result of administrative deficiencies discovered by

the Inspector and it is expected that this will have a salutary

effect not only in his administration but also in the

contribution of his office to the work of the Bureau.

Productivity

During the first six months of 1971, 14 persons

wanted in the United States were located in Central America,

5 "informal deportations" were arranged, and 10 stolen

automobiles were recovered. The Managua case load as of

6/30/71 was 65 which is far below average.

A total of 14

HILEV items have been received of which

9 have been accepted.

This total is below average but his current submission rate

is well above average.

Personnel

The 7 Central American countries have enough

substantive Bureau work to justify the present complement

of this office, if the potential is fully exploited.

We are

watching this situation closely and expect marked improvement.

192

NW-88608-Docld:32989638 Page 205

---

## Page 206

- 16 -

4-H-1

Recommendation

It is recommended that this office continue.

It is possible that a change in leadership may be necessary

as indicated by the Inspector's findings and recommendations

concerning this will be made as soon as it can be determined

whether or not there has been an improvement.

BEL

TEL AVIV

This office was opened solely as a source of

HILEV material and it has proved fertile in this respect.

There have been some unexpected fringe benefits in that an

organized crime figure has taken refuge in Tel Aviv and

the Legal Attache has been able to secure the cooperation

of the Israeli police in affording coverage to the anti-Soviet

Jewish Defense League, which has proven so troublesome in

the New York City area. As the office has only been open

during the current year, it is too early to assess accurately

either its potential or

its achievements.

Productivity

Eight persons wanted in the

United States

have

been located in Israel and 3 "informal deportations" arranged.

The case load as of 6/30/71 was 69, which is considerably

below average on a per agent basis.

Forty-four HILEV items

have been submitted of which 27 have been used with 1 pending,

This is substantially above average, and the Director recently

noted the Legal Attache's excellent

production and he has

been recommended for commendation.

Personnel

It is too early to make an accurate assessment as

to future personnel needs. One agent could handle the present

case load but we do not feel that the full potential of the

area has yet been reached and any reduction::." would result

in two one-man offices at the end of the Mediterranean with

Recommendation

Continue for the time being.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 206

193

---

## Page 207

-. 17 -

4-H-1

(3)

New Offices Recommended If Further Expansion Undertaken

In response to the Director's request, we

recommended by memorandum 5/28/71 that six additional offices

be opened for the specific purpose of increasing our

production of high-level intelligence of interest to the

White House.

Three of these would be offices formerly

operated but presently closed, while three would be

completely new offices.

The following are

the three former

legat offices which we proposed be opened:

MANILA

We recommended that one Agent and one clerk be

assigned to Manila to relieve Hong Kong of its present

road trip coverage and to provide closer following of

political developments in the Philippines, which area is

apparently drawing farther away from its former close

alignment with the United States.

We have a number of

applicant-type loudo in the philippines, and the handling

of these could be expedited by a representative on the

scene.

"".

RIO DE JANEIRO

assigned to reopen our office in this important population

center of Brazil, a country larger than the United States.

We are presently trying to cover this area from Buenos

Aires, which is over 1,200 miles away, and we are passing

up the opportunity to develop political intelligence items

concerning developments in this huge country which, like

most of Latin America, is in the throes of deciding between

communism and capitalism..

SANTO DOMINGO

We proposed that one Agent and one clerk be

assigned to reopen our office at the capital of the

Dominican Republic.

This would be entirely for the purpose

of developing HILEV items, although there is a modicum of.

Bureau work in the area which is presently handled on a

road trip basis from San Juan. We developed a number of

NW 88608 Docld:32989638

Page 207

194

---

## Page 208

18 c

4-H- 1

informants and sources during our period of operation there,

and we feel that these could be reactivated to become a

productive source of HILEV material.

The following are the three new offices

which we

proposed be opened, each to have a complement of 2 Agents

and 2 clerks:

CANBERRA, AUSTRALIA

office could cover Australia and New Zealand

thereby relieving Hong Kong from its present futile efforts

to cover the area, by road trip and give on-scene coverage

in this huge area where our work has been increasing.

presently are trying In cover 35 leads in the area which

indicates there is a nucleus of essential Bureau business

upon which an office can be predicated. Here again,

however, the primary function

of the new office would be

production of HILEV items.

KUALA LUMPUR, MALAYSIA

This office would cover Thailand, Malaysia

and Singapore, presently handled out of Hong Kong, and

woula initiate coverage in indonesia, Where we have no

coverage other than through State and the Central

Intelligence Agency. There is now a nucleus of 20 Bureau

cases pending, insufficient to justify the opening of an

office, but the high interest in southeast Asia would

indicate that any production of political intelligence

should include coverage in this area.

Opening of the two

foregoing offices, plus Manila, would relieve Hong Kong

of all road trips and permit that office to concentrate

on the important security matters involved in the new

relationship

between Communist China and the United States.

V//88608 Docld:32989638 Page 208

195

---

## Page 209

•- 19 .

1-H-1

NEW DELHI, INDIA

This office would open completely new territory

affording coverage of India, East and West Pakistan, and

Nepal.

high,

The potential for political intelligence here is

but there would be very little substantive Bureau

work

in the area.

Our recommendation for opening of the six

foregoing offices was made strictly in response to the

Director's request.

We cannot justify opening of these

offices on the basis of substantive Bureau business, but

•it is our judgment that these offer the most productive

locations for the development of political intelligence.

Any expansion abroad will be resisted by State and the •

Central Intelligence Agency; and unless specifically ordered

by the White House, will require approval from Budget and

State who maintain

a personnel ceiling for each

Department's representatives abroad.

We are not in

position to balance

the value of the information expected

against the costs:

?.:"

......

'i anti".

""

-56600-4ocld:32989638

196

Page 20

---

## Page 210

ADDENDUM OF THE INSPECTION DIVISION E.S.

LLER:wnj

You are requested to clarify and document go ur

observations "that any future expansion abroad will be resisted by

the Department of State and Central Intelligence Agency and unless

specifically ordered by the White House will require approval from

State and the Bureau of the Budget. "

Comments of Assistant Di rector Brennan requested.

8/26/71

197

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 210

---

## Page 211

LEGAL ATTACHE OFFICES

FOREIGN LIAISON

4-H-1

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENN

(GAD: hc

8/27/71)

The quoted observation

concerning anticipated

problems to be encountered

in connection with any future expansion is based solely upon

our experience during the December, 1970, expansion, together

with regulations whichhave been promulgated applicable to

United States personnel overseas.

In December, 1970, we asked

to open an office in San Jose, Costa Rica, but

ended

up in

Managua, Nicaragua, a much less desirable

of what

was termed

the

location, because

"objective of lower United

States

profile" in Costa Rica.

We asked to open an office in

Saigon, Vietnam, and were met with intolerable restrictions

imposed by the Ambassador, with the result that we canceled

our request. In connection with opening in Caracas, Venezuela,

the

Ambassador there demanded that we agree to coordinate any

inteiigence activities wiin the Centrai intelligence Ageucy

under the provisions of National Security Council Intelligence

•Directive 5 and that our representative measure up to a certain

standard in his ability 'in Spanish.

In fact, the Ambassador

in Caracas said he would send our man back on the same plane

if he did not possess the desired ability.

Even before

we

had made a formal request, State indicated their desire that

we not open an office in Helsinki, Finland, because of the

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) then

in progress.

Reference to approval by State and Budget is

actually reference to the procedures established for any

the pove w

increase in overseas personnel. Such procedures are of long

standing being known under the Johnson Administration as

"BALPA" (Balance of Payments) and initially during the Nixon

• Administration as "OPRED" (Overseas Personnel Reduction).

A "National Security Council Undersecretaries Committee,"

which includes representation from Budget and State,

establishes fixed ceilings on all United States civilian

employees abroad. Under the rules established by this

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/27/71

GAD: 39

98.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 211

---

## Page 212

= 2 -

4-H-1

committee any increase in these ceilings must be either

(a) a result of "special studies" or at White House direction;

or (b) by a request for a ceiling increase by proposal

to

the committee explaining the requirement and demonstrating

its consistency with national policy and approved program

plans.

The present FBI ceiling is 88, and regular reports

concerning our overseas positions are made to the committee

through the Department by the Administrative Division.

The above has been set forth in some detail in

response to the Inspector's request.

The Director has stated

that any expansion will be discussed with Dr. Kissinger at

the White House before any action is taken.

White House

approval supersedes red tape developed by other agencies.

We are confident that the President's desires can be rapidly and

efficiently satisfied onces he gives the word.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 212

---

## Page 213

CHINESE COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES

4-H-3

SPECTOR E. S. MILLER:

Since the last inspection there have

been certain significant developments

In the overall problems of meeting our responsibilities to this work." You

are requested to furnish briefly such developments and also provide your

appraisal of the situation as/presently see it. Obviously, there are strong

indications that increases of investigative manpower in the field and

imaginative supervision and direction here will be necessary. What has

been accomplished since last inspection and what are your plans for the

immediate future? Be specific in advising of programs currently being

considered for recommended implementation.

Comments of Assistant Director requested.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN

There is no doubt that our

DEM:mjt 8/23/71

work in the Chinese field

will increase both at the SOG and in the field. Attached are

comments by Section Chief Wannall with which I concur.

Proposals for implementing programs discussed will be

recommended by appropriate memoranda.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

NW 88608 Bocid2989638 Page, 713,

200

---

## Page 214

SECTION CHIEF W. R. WANNALI

NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE SECTION

At the outset it should

be noted that Western

nations have been

isolated from

Communist China for more than twenty years.

The Chinese

communists (Chicoms) have established thenselves officially

in countries of the same or similar political persuasion and,

therefore, we receive little or no data concerning the Chicoms

which is relevant to our investigative responsibilities in the

security field.

We have been fortunate, however, to receive

from Royal Canadian Mounted Police RCMP), much data relating

to their experience with the chicoms who are now firmly offi-

cially established in Canada. The programs and methods we use

or may implement in the future to deal with the Chicoms must,

in some measure,

be based on our prior experience in the

security and intelligence fields and an analysis of the data

we have received from the RCMP

Recent Developments and Appraisals Thereof:

sipe tis

Since last inspoction (1/8-26/71), the enlinwing

significant developments have occurred:

1. The Chicom Embassy in Canada has become opera-

tional.

The Embassy stall numbers. 26, Of whom nine o percent

are known or suspected intelligence officers.

The significance

of the aforementioned figures is obvious when we reca the

pant of an he source wag quote i does

official as stating

necessarily be

Large as

for the inited

"States, as well

addition. RCMP has advised, based on its

be directed against the united states.

Canada man Tope to sons per comates tal number

of inaduatatting soviet ticar establishments in Canada.

In appraising the above, we must heed the warning

flags

and prepare for a severe test of our resourcefulness.

We cannot expect less than a substantial effort by the Chicoms

to mount a variety of intelligence operations against this

country from Canada.

This situation will exist at least as long

as no official Chicom establishment is located in this country.

,.ii

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/23/71

EXO•dgon

4-H-3

01

NW 18608

Docld:32989638 Page 214

---

## Page 215

÷ 2

4-H-3

2.

Restrictions on travel of U.

S.

citizens to

Red China have been lifted entirely, and there is presently

under study by Department of State and the Attorney General

a recommendation that the prohibition on travel of permanent

resident aliens to Red China also be lifted.

: While the Chicoms have not allowed wholesale entry

of Occidentals into their country, recent events suggest

they are slowly but surely revising policy to permit more

Westerners to visit the mainland.

We are aware that the

Chicoms have openly supported revolutionaries who operate in

the U. S., and the desirability of personal contact with such

types as well as with others

who would work for the Chicoms

is obvious.

The new United States policy regarding travel of

•U.S. citizens to Red China will most assuredly prompt overt

travel by individuals of Chicom persuasion as well as by

persons who could well be subjected to an intelligence recruit-

unwittingly.

While this area may not

immediately present problems of the magnitude expected in other

areas invoiviug ine Chivuiis, we must realisticully consider

..that U. S. citizens traveling to Red China deserve a careful

look from an investigative standpoint, either as potential

sources, one-time interviews. for intelligence purposes; or

as

•individuals who may have been recruited by the Chicoms during

their visit to Red China.

.:

With regard to the possibility that restrictions on

travel of resident aliens to Red China will be lifted soon,

there are in the United States many thousands of Chinese aliens

having permanent resident status, most of whom have family

members or close relatives residing on the mainland.

If travel

restrictions on these individuals are lifted, we are faced with

an even greater danger of having Chicom-recruited individuals

returning here.

on its face, such a situation would pose an

enormous investigative

problem for the Bureau

Within

the last few weeks, secretary of State

Rogers

announced U.S. policy as regards admission of

Communist China to the United Nations (UN).

Simply stated,

Administration policy is to not oppose UN membership for the

• Chicoms while not agreeing to the ouster of Nationalist China

(Taiwan) from the UN:

There has been much talk of a "two China

policy," but this is incidental to the real problem we face.

With the removal of U,S. opposition, It is likely.. Red China

NW 88608 Docld:32989638

Page 215

802

---

## Page 216

3

-

4-H-3

•i..

will be admitted to UN membership and that its representatives

will appear in New York City between October, 1971, and

September, 1972.

When this almost certain development takes

place, we will

problems.

be faced with grave internal security/intelligence

appraising the above situation and noting that the

Chicoms, should they gain UN membership, would be entitled to

the largest delegation and largest percentage of UN Secretariat

employees of any member nation, we would clearly require a sub-

stantial increase in the number of Agents handling Chinese work

•in the New York Office. Such an increase would include assign-

ments to that office of as many Chinese-speaking Special Agent

personnel as may be available and examination of the need to

•. train additional Agents in.

the Chinese language. Dependent on

the size of a Chicom UN delegation, it might be necessary to

establish a Chinese Section in New

York Office.

Should a sub-

stantial increase in case load in the Chicom field come about as

a result of Chicom entry into the UN, it would also suggest an

increase in the number of supervisors in this field at the

Seat of Government.

With regard

to the investigative aspect of Chicom

entry into the UN, it is felt that the Chicoms, on arrival, will

proceed cautiously at the outset in any program of covert or

overt intelligence activity.

That intelligence efforts will be

undertaken, there is no doubt inasmuch as information in our

files and sound logic demand the conclusion that the Chicoms will

rely on a variety of methods by which to gather information to

assist in the planning and execution of political moves as well

as to combat or neutralize technical and

scientific progress

and military moves made by this and other countries.

The Chicons,

a base at the UN, might limit early intelligence efforts

to political matters until they have their feet on the ground.

Knowledge of their collection of such intelligence, however,

could be of as much benefit to this country as would knowledge of

Chicoms efforts to collect other types of intelligence.

The inevitability of

the appearance of a Chicom

delegation at the UN requires that we marshall all the assets

we have in this field in order to be in a position to have

broad quality coverage in the informant area and the ability to

spring into quick and effective action from an investigative

standpoint.

• 4%

on 7/15/71, President Nixon announced his plan to

visit Red China before May, 1972.

The FBI may well be called

203

NW. 88608_Docld:32989638_Page 216

---

## Page 217

4

-

4-H-3

upon in months ahead to provide intelligence support in

connection with the president's trip:

The step taken by President Nixon emphasizes the

importance our Government places on the status of Red China

as a world power. It is felt we should be in a position to

provide the White House with as much intelligence as we can

•logically gather in the event such a request is levied upon us

Accomplishments Since Last Inspection (1/8-26/71)

February,

09K, operative efforts with BONP paid Off during

we identified an ur

an unknown subject who made

a clandestine contact with a Chicon intelligence officer in

Ottawa.

RCMP, through its coverage, recognized at the outset

that preliminary contacts" by the

unknown subject were most

unusual because of security precautions demanded by him.

Within hours after our investigation was Initiated, we identi-

fied the unknown subject as a washington; D. 6.:

resident

holding impressive credentials in political circles. • Our suo-

sequent

coverage in this case disclosed efforts made by the

subject to gain employment on the White House staff as well

as

jobs with State and Justice Departments.

the white House and appropriate officials of promptly alexted

agencies.

In July, 1971, with the Director's approval, a

desk-level' conference was held at. the Bureau with our RCMP

counterparts..

The results were most productive and, at the

Director's instruction, we sent a memorandum to Dr. Kissinger

setting out the highlights of the conference.

Dr. Kissinger,

in a personal letter to the Director, expressed his thanks for

the information and noted that the Bureau's timely coverage of

these matters is most important.

He requested he be advised of

significant developments as they occur.

Two of our sources who are being developed to fulfill

double agent roles traveled from the Us to Hong Kong. where

they were scheduled to meet with their Chicom contacts. Another

source, who is employed at the IN is now in communist china,

and this trip was made at no cost to the Bureau.

We expect to

obtain valuable current intelligence information from this source

upon her return to this country.

Yet another source was directed

to undertake a

se a three-week period of travel. during which he was

to contact pro-Chicom individuals on the west Coasts of the US.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 217

204

---

## Page 218

. " =5 -.

: 4-H-3

and Canada

These contacts were planned tol serve as a basis

for his contact with the Chicom Embassy in Ottawa as the last

phase of his trip

Nine individuals are being considered for use along

DESECO lines with the expectation that we will be able to

target them against the Chicoms: either in canada or inhe

•U. S

State Department approval has been obtained to inter-

view and/or re-establish contact with 16 employees of the

United Nations Secretariat who, it is felt, offer potential to

assist us in the future

or in an early effort connected with

a joint operation with

RCMP,•

Two suggestions were submitted with a view toward

streamlining administrative and investigative procedures

in

the Chicom field.

Both were adopted and annual savings

indicated to be $16,160

¡Future Plans

In connection with foreseeable additional security

and intelligence responsibility as regards Chicom activities,

the following is set forth:

1. We have an Index of over 600 names of Chinese

graduates of universities and/or

_ China.

"We"see" eris group as a reservoir

which we

could develop

a number of sources who could be directed against the Chicoms

in the future or, if facts so indicate, could be utilized in

•connection with existing efforts to penetrate Chicom intelli-

gence operations: This would involve opening cases on these

individuals, providing instructions to the field offices

involved, looking toward interviews for the purpose of deter-

mining informant potential and willingness to assist us.

2. Five field offices are currently involved in an

effort relating to ethnic Chinese scientists having security

clearances.

Each office involved has been instructed to limit

Its efforts to ten such individuals, in the hope that we may

find some who would be willing to initiate a contact with the

205

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 218

---

## Page 219

6 -

4-H-3

Chicoms

for the purpose of making themselves

available for

possible recruitment by Chicom Intelligence.

: We have a list of approximately 3500 ethnic Chinese

scientists andee

technicians Who hay security

Clearances.

Because of manpower

limitations, we have not included

other

offices

in this program nor have we allowed more than 50 cases

of. this

type to be opened.

It would be desirable to expand

this effort to include other offices and to increase the

number of individuals involved in each office to perhaps

Again, our object is to develop a nucleus of sources who would

be of present or future value in our counterintelligence opera-

tions against the Chicoms.

We would like to consider the use of

ethnic

Chinese Special Agents as well as nonethnic Chinese-speaking

Special Agents who:.

could,

in an undercover capacity, be

targeted against the Chicoms in Canada or against any Chicom

establishment which may be located in this country in the

future.

Such an operation would require substantial indoctri-

nation, direction, and development of cover employment and

identity, and would be in essence

a most appropriate and secure

means by which to mount an operation

designed to develop a

defector. in place.

4.

Since the door to travel by U.S. citizens to.

Red China is wide open, we should expand our efforts in this

area to fully identify each traveler (other than legislators

and news media types) for the purpose of considering these

individuals for interviews in order to gather positive intelli-

gence or to identify any traveler who may

have been subjected

to a recruitment approach by the Chicoms.

We should consider instructing a limited number

of field offices to begin efforts to develop sources who could

be used in a "walk-in" program directed against the Chicoms

in Canada as veras any Chicom establishment formed in this

we would not have to look toward ethnic Chinese

but could selectively approach types who might be of interest

to the Chicoms including military personnel because of their

backgrounds in fields in which the Chicoms have expressed an.

interest:

• 6.

•In Chinese alien cases where a hostage situation

exists,

we should revamp current instructions to require a

reinterview of such persons one year after the initial interview

206

NW 88608 Docld:32989638

Page 219

---

## Page 220

4-H-3

..?.

(current practice calls for reinterview two years after ini-

tial interview).

This is felt desirable since the alien who

has immediate family and/or relatives residing in Red China

is most susceptible to a recruitment approach and is more

likely to be the type who has entered the United States on an

intelligence mission.

' '

We should consider issuing instructions to

closely examine our UN sources to determine which may be

logically directed to initiate contact with the Chicon Embassy

in canada

Contacts of this type, although they may indicate

no immediate interest on the part of the Chicoms, may well

serve as a basis for a later approach by the Chiçoms,

either

before or after Chicom entry into the UN.

are of the opinion

8. National Security A

Agency. (NSA)

representatives

on that the possibility exists that Chinese

intent gonce Service is beaming broadcasts to on yader

inted rates or tuponder count cies Canadam

Bureau instructions, our San Diego Office recently monitored

broadcasts on the basis of preaictious maue by Nsa.

Broadcasts

undoubtedly emanating from Red china were heard during this

monitoring and the clarity of the signal on our West Coast was

excellent.

Discussion with NSA led NSA representatives to

observe

that

the broadcasts mentioned above might be connected

with

адел пескода, е адреса to-make Turter

study of this situation and provide us with additional

sensitive "

ve uncovered norder, to determine if

e tie-in could be developed.

and does not definitely establish that an illegal Chicom opera-

tion exists in this country, it is an indication that we should

undertake action designed to uncover such a situation.

In the

absence of more specific data, we should consider at this time

having field offices check warranty cards submitted by pur-

chasers of certain radio equipment, primarily radio receivers

capable. of tuning in on broadcasts such as those mentioned

This would involve identification of the equipment, its

manufacturer and subsequent instructions to the field to check

warranty cards on a regular basis for the purpose of determining

names of ethnic Chinese who have submitted such cards.

Inquiry

should include developing background information on the pur-

chaser and, in cases where warranted; conducting

interviews.

i..:

20.

7.

NW-88608-Đoeld:32989638-Page-220

---

## Page 221

ADDENDUM

You have advised that items one through

(ESM:wmi 8/26/71)

nine in this write-up will be fully im -

plemented by separate memorandum in

each case consistent with the availability of manpower.

It would appear that present developments indicate that

further delay in implementation of some of these programs may seriously

retard our response to important investigative responsibilities.

You are requested to advise specifically when such

programs will be implemented and what manpower requirements are

necessary to do so.

Comments of Assistant Director Brennan and Section Chief

Wannall requested.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENN/

I believe the five areas

(CDB:mls 9/1/71)

outlined by W. R. Wannall

constitute a valid base from

which to expand our coverage of

anticipated Chicom intelligence

and subversion which will be directed against this country when

diplomatic relations are established and/or United Nations membership

is established for the Chicoms.

It is desirable to initiate these

programs as soon as possible, prior to being faced with the Chicom

activity.'

My position concerning available manpower to accomplish

this is covered under the write-up captioned "Adequacy of

Personnel," 6E. As you are aware, the proposed work load adjust

ments contained in my memorandum dated 7/29/71 will make available

some additional personnel, and further adjustments may well be

made possible by close examination of case count figures under

the new tightened procedures for counting pending cases. A mid-

month case count was prepared for the Inspection Staff as of

8/20/71, and an end of the month case count is currently being

prepared.

If these figures confirm a lower case load for

Nationalities Intelligence (8/20/71 figure is 275 case load

average and well below other Sections), I believe at least one

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

9/1/71

4-H-3

208

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 221

---

## Page 222

man from within that Section should be made available to implement

this program.

If the Inspector feels two men should be made immediately

available to this program from within the Domestic Intelligence

Division complement and the nine men currently utilized by

Wannall on the Ellsberg case are necessary and productive, a

thorough review of case loads and other gauges of work load will be

made, Section by Section, and another man added.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

9/1/71

4-H-3

• NW_88608_Docld:32989638_Page 222.

209

---

## Page 223

SECTION CHIEF W. R. WANNALI MU

NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE SECTION

In connection with our

objective of being

::prepared to counteract

and/or neutralize the

Chinese communist (Chicom) intelligence and subversion effort

we expect will be mounted against this country, it is proposed

that the following action be

immediately.

In each case, recommended for implementation

separate memorandum containing

appropriate recommendation

Will be submitted withln the next

•ten days.

1. Initiate investigation on 300 of the over 600

individuals listed in our chinese universities and Graduate

SchooLs

Is Index:

This effort would be aimed a

at developing quality

sources we can direct against the Chicoms as well as developing

intelligence from anong a group of

well-educated Chinese aliens.

Based on our initial accomplishments in this area, additional

cases on the balance of more than 300 names in the above Index

would be opened for the purposes

indicated above.

2.: Initiate investigations on 500 ethnic Chinese

scientists who have security clearances.

This represents an

, expansion of our

current effort which we have heretofore

limited to five field offices representing a total of 50

individuals in the above category.

The objective of this effort

is to identify ethnic Chinese

scientists who would, under Bureau

direction, be willing to initiate contacts with Chicoms for the

purpose of

making themselves

available for possible recruitment

…by Chicom intelligence

We have a listing of over 3500 ethnic Chinese

scientists who have security clearances, and opening 500 cases

would be our initial attempt to expand source development in

this area.

Depending on the success of this effort, additional

cases would be

considered for opening for the purpose indicated

3

Expand our investigations relating to United States

residents who visit Communist China to include development of

background information on each visitor and, except in cases

where the purpose of the visit appears legitimate on its face,

to consider these individuals for interview. Such expansion is

the obvious follow-up to the recent lifting of restrictions on

travel by U.S. Citizens to Red China.

Experience in the

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

EX00g0

8/31/71

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 223

210

---

## Page 224

• - 2 -

security field has shown that intelligence

recruitment of

individuals visiting communist countries is

an established

practice.

These investigation and/or interviews would not

include subjects of pending cases handled in other Sections

in this Division.

Examples of the latter would be travel

Red China by New Left types or black extremists

who are

subjects of .continuing investigation.

*=*

4.

Close

examination of the situation as regards

our sources in the Chinese field. now employed at or having

access to the Unite Nations who could be directed against

the Chicoms immediately.

*This must be a critical examination

closely supervised with the expectation that some of our

existing sources and others who may be developed could be

directed in early contacts with the Chicom Embassy in Ottawa

Canada

United

Our objective here is to develop within the

Nations itself sources who can supply us with quality

information on the Chicoms, who will almost certainly enter

the. United Nations within the, next year.

5.

Initiate a survey of offices having ethnic

Chinese-speaking Special Agents assigned to determine whether.

or not any of these Special Agents can be directed toward an

operation against the Chicoms involving an undercover role.

The purpose here is to establish an appropriate and secure

means for utilizing one or more Special Agents for development

of a defector in place among the Chicoms.

;:.

Implementation of the above will require a substan-

tial amount of research for the purpose of

issuing instructions

tọ field offices.

It is felt that in order to provide adequate

supervision regarding the above numbered items,

two Supervisors

should be added to the existing complement (3) of the

Chinese Unit.

Consideration has been given to all items (9). pre-

viously mentioned as being within the area of future plans for

meeting our responsibilities in the Chicom field.

It is felt

that immediate implementation of the above 5 items should be

accomplished while the remaining items herein before discussed

will be considered for implementation in light of continuing

developments in this field. We believe we have selected for

immediate implementation those matters which will bring about

the most substantial positive accomplishments in areas of current

critical need.

NW 98608 Docld:32989638 Page 224

211

---

## Page 225

8

4-H-3

Foreign intelligence agencies have concluded

that one of

the weakest links in Chicom intelligence opera-

tions is in the field of communications.

We should, there-

fore, consider renewing the Chiclet and Chiprop programs,

both of which were discontinued in 1965. Through these pro-

grams, we had a secure means to review communications between

the United states and Red China and from them we acquired

data on both ethnic Chinese and Caucasians which was of

security interest to us.

The matters discussed above are set forth in light

of our current knowledge in the Chicom field. It is realized

that continuing developments in this area may suggest new

efforts which could be initiated or could suggest further

expansion of our existing programs.

Such recommendations would,

of course; be made on a timely, basis.

Items 1 through 9 above will be fully implemented

by separate memorandum in

each case consistent with the

availability of manpower.

.....

317

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 • Page 225

---

## Page 226

SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES CONTROL BOARD

4-H -5

S. Miluck.

It is understood that additional work

is anticipated as a result of

Executive Order 11605 and subsequent Congressional action. You are requested

to advise what action you have taken to brace for this additional work and how

much volume you anticipate. Also advise as specifically as possible which

Units will be affected the greatest, and to what extent.

Comments of Assistant Director requested.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN/

The implementation of

Executive Order 11605 will

affect primarily the work of the New Left Section, Extremist

Intelligence Section and Internal Security Section.

I have conferred with the Section Chiefs of the afore-

mentioned Sections and instructed them to initiate a review

of each of the cases which the Department has indicated it intends

to proceed against to determine what additional investigation is

required to develop the evidence necessary to present to the

SACB. Administrative procedures for handling these cases have

been worked out and since the cases are supervised in three

different Sections, a Division Coordinator, who has had previous

experience in preparing cases for presentation to the SACB, has

been designated to insure that the cases are handled in a

uniform manner in each of the three Sections.

So far, the Department has indicated that it intends

to initiate proceedings against the Black Panther Party, Progressive

Labor Party, Young Socialist Alliance and Ku Klux Klan; however,

we have not

as yet had any specific requirements levied upon

us by the Department in these cases.

Based on past experience,

it' can be anticipated the services of one supervisor, full time,

will be required to prepare each of these cases for presentation

to the SACB.

Ve CWT: dj 8/26/71

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/23/71

ESM:wmj

4-H -5

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 226

213

---

## Page 227

The language of Executive Order 11605 is very

broad and generally coincides with the basis for our

investigation of extremist groups. Conceivably, consistent

with manpower available, proceedings could be initiated on

most of the organizations we have under investigation although

the Department has not indicated at this time that they will

undertake any wholesale action.

For additional observations concerning the

anticipated impact of Executive Order 11605 on the work

of this Division, see the Adequacy of Personnel write-ups

of the New Left Section, Extremist Intelligence

Section

and the Internal Security Section.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 227

- 214

---

## Page 228

A ANUINISTRATIVE

Biciceist

wiii inini: 1 ei869686RI298098N

ADMINISTRATIVE OPERATIONS

---

## Page 229

DIVIDING DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

INTO TWO DIVISIONS

5-A-la

Assistant to the Director Sullivan has

suggested that Domestic Intelligence

Division (DID) be divided into two separate divisions. In order that this matter

can be analyzed during this inspection you are requested to furnish:

1. Complete table of organization for each of two new Divisions as you would

organize them if suggestion were adopted. Do not use names of supervisors,

Section Chiefs, Front Office administrators. Use only position designations,

Section and Unit designations and number of Agents and clerks designated for

each Unit and Section.

2. In the event you feel work now being handled by another Division should

be realigned in the event above suggestion adopted, so indicate under appropriate

new division.

3. Following each of the two tables of organization for the above new

divisions, set out Section by Section and where appropriate, Unit by Unit,

your reasoning for placement in division. In this regard, it will be necessary

to take into account and balance both volume of work and nature of work being

handled.

4. Indicate advantages in adoption of above suggestion.

5. Set out disadvantages you feel apparent in dividing DID. Also indicate

how such can be overcome and resolved.

6. Since adoption of above would involve possible realignment of space in

some instances, you are requested to advise what new space would be necessary

and what other movement of personnel and equipment would be involved.

Comments of Assistant Director requested,

see attached

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/19/71

ESM :wmj

5-A-la

215

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 229

---

## Page 230

DIVIDING DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

INTO TWO DIVISIONS

5-A-1a

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN

> 1.

In accordance with

the instructions of

the Inspector there are set forth below two proposed tables

of organization for the new Divisions which would be created

by dividing the current Division into two Divisions. These

Divisions would be named Domestic Intelligence Division and

Counterespionage - Foreign Intelligence Division respectively.

PROPOSED TABLE OF ORGANIZATION

Domestic Intelligence Division

Assistant Director

Inspector

2 secretaries

1 clerk-stenographer

4 p.m. to Midnight Supervisor (Agent)

10 clerks (Includes security patrol

and Front Office mail room)

Division Front Office Total: 3 Agents

13 clerks

New Left Section

Front Office

2 Agents

2 clerks

Special Investigations Unit-East

6 Agents

5 Clerks

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/20/71

5-A-1a

316

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 230

New Left Groups Unit

4 Agents

4 clerks

Subversive Individuals-New Left

Unit

6 Agents

6 clerks

---

## Page 231

I.

Special Investigations Unit-West

5 Agents

5 clerks

Section Total:

Protest and Trotskyist Groups

Jnit

4 Agents

5 clerks

27 Agents

28 clerks

Extremist Intelligence Section

Front Office

Black Nationalist-White Hate

Unit-East

2 Agents

6 Agents

2 clerks

7 clerks

Black Nationalist-White Hate

Unit-West

Black Nationalist-White Hate

Unit-Central

5 Agents

5 clerks

4 Agents

3 clerks

Black Nationalist-White Hate-South Antiriot and Bombing Unit

and Extremist Informant

nii

5 Agents

7 clerks

4 Agents (4 Agents & 2 clerks

3 clerks

to be transferred

from General

Investigative Div.)

Section Total:

26 Agents

27 clerks

Front Office

2 Agents

2 clerks

Internal Security Section

Communist Party. USA Unit

2 Agents

3 clerks

International New Left and

Sedition Unit

Subversive Individuals Unit

2 Agents

2 clerks

4 Agents

4 clerks

Civil Disorder Reporting Unit

Security Informant Unit

2 Agents

• 4 clerks (2 clerks also handle

NW"88608-Docld:32989638-page2Curity Index)

•3 Agents

6 clerks

212

---

## Page 232

Current Intelligence Reporting Unit

2 Agents

2 Cierks

Steno Pool

14 clerks

Section Total:

17 Agents

37 clerks

DIVISON PERSONNEL RECAPITULATION

73 Agents

105 clerks

PROPOSED TABLE OF ORGANIZATION

Counterespionage - Foreign Intelligence Division

Assistant Director

Inspector

2 secretaries

1 clerk-stenographer

Midnight to 8 a.m. Supervisor (Agent)

9 clerks (Includes security patrol and

Front Office mail room)

Division Front Office Total:

3 Agents

12 clerks

Espionage Section

Front Office

2 Agents

2 clerks

Coordination Unit

3 Agents

5 clerks

Soviet Unit - New York

4 Agents

5 clerks

Soviet Unit - Washington

3 Agents

4 clerks

NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 232

218

---

## Page 233

Special Cases Unit

2 Agents

6 clerks

Section Total:

Satellite Unit

4 Agents

6 clerks

Front Office

2 Agents

2 clerks

Special Coordination Unit

5 Agents

11 Clerks

Cuban Unit

3 Agents

. 3 clerks.

Section Total:

18 Agents

28 clerks

Nationalities Intelligence Section

Middle and South American Unit

(South & Central America, Caribb

countries and ethnic groups)

3 Agents

4 clerks

Nationality Unit (All other non-

communist countzie

4 Agents

5 clerks

Chinese Unit

6 Agents

4 clerks

23 Agents

29clerks

Research Section

Eront Office

2 Agents (Section Chief R. D.

2 clerks •Cotter on loan to

Intelligence Evaluation

Committee)

Special Records Unit

1 Agent

3 clerks

Section Total:

8Agents

27 clerks

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 233

219

Central Research Unit

5 Agents

8 clerks

Steno Pool

14 clerks

---

## Page 234

DIVISION PERSONNEL RECAPITULATION

52 Agents

96 clerks

2. It will be noted that supervision of antiriot and

bombing cases currently in General Investigative Division

has been included in table of organization of proposed

Domestic Intelligence Division and specifically assigned

to the Extremist Intelligence Section. Four Agents and

two clerks are now assigned to this Unit in the General

Investigative Division and should, of course, be transferred

to the new Division.

This is a most logical move and will afford tighter

and more effective supervision of antiriot and bombing vio

lations in view of fact that extremists and terrorists mostly

involved are being actively investigated by Domestic Intelli

gence Division (DID,. Accordingly, in addition to avoiding--

duplicative supervisory action, it follows that DID is better

prepared to handle these criminal investigations and final

prosecutive actions.

3. The line of reasoning utilized in the breakdowns

as set forth above in the tables of organization was to separate

• the work into two ategories as nearly as possible - domestic

and foreign.

The proposed Domestic Intelligence Division is

composed of New Left, Extremist Intelligence and Internal

Security Sections.

All work of these Sections is domestic

oriented consisting of domestic subversive and extremist

organizations such as Communist Party, Socialist Workers

Party, black extremists, New Left and anti-war groups as

well as individuals affiliated therewith.

On the other hand, the proposed Counterespionage -

Foreign Intelligence Division is composed of the Espionage

and Nationalities Intelligence Sections which supervise

investigations which for the most part have definite foreign

ramifications. The work of these Sections is foreign oriented

consisting of such investigations as Soviet and satellite

establishments and individuals as well as other foreign

nationality groups and nationals, including Chinese communists.

The Nationalities Intelligence Section will continue to super-

vise Legal Attaches and domestic Liaison through the Special

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 234

220

---

## Page 235

Coordination Unit. Other miscellaneous investigative matters

involving extremist groups with foreign nationality ties such

as Mexican-Americans, Spanish-Americans, and Puerto Ricans

will continue to be assigned to the Nationalities Intelligence

Section.

The Research Section has been placed in the Counter-

espionage - Foreign Intelligence Division in order to balance

the workload as well as to provide for expansion for research-

type work in espionage and foreign intelligence areas or for

the manpower therein to be used as the Assistant Director sees

most advantageous to carry out his responsibilities.

It is

recognized that this will cut DID short but it is felt DID

will be able to handle any needed research at a Section level'.

The New Left and Civil Disorder Reporting Units,

currently in the Research Section, will be placed in Internal

Security Section as data pertains

solely to domestic groups.

Likewise, administration of Security Index (SI) will be shifted

from Research Section to the Internal Security Section as most

of the cases on the SI are supervised in the DID.

In realigning work, we have provided for transfer

of three Agents from Sections within the proposed Domestic

Intelligence Division to the Nationalities Intelligence

Section of other new Division.

This has been accomplished

• by absorbing Klan and White Hate cases (2 men) into Extremist

Intelligence Section and releasing one Agent from the current

four-man Security Informant Unit of the Internal Security

Section.

The proposed reorganization will result in the

following Agent - clerical count:

Domestic Intelligence Division

73 Agents

105 clerks

This includes four Agents and two

clerks to be transferred from General

Investigative Division to handle

antiriot and bombing matters.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 235

22/

---

## Page 236

Counterespionage - Foreign Intelligence Division

52 Agents

96 clerks

This includes raising the overall Agent

complement of current Division personnel

by one to provide for a new Assistant

Director.

4.

The advantage of the suggestion to form two

separate Divisions out of the current Division is that it

would provide for smaller Divisions thus allowing for tighter

and more effective supervision.

5.

The disadvantages in dividing the current Division

far outweigh the advantages as can be seen from the following

observations:

(a) The nature of the work of DID does not

readily lend itsalf to division. The interrelationship

of foreign influence in domestic subversion cases

is well established and requires close coordination

within the Division.

If split, something would

be lost in the process, as is now the case with

antiriot and explosives and incendiary devices

cases, predominantly involving extremists who

are DID subjects being handled by General

Investigative Division. Our goal should be to

obtain maximum utilization of the knowledge and

expertise of supervisory personnel, and division

of DID would obviously result in diffusion of related

talents and a less efficient use of available

manpower.

(B) Budgetary considerations and administrative

efficiency would be affected by imposing an additional

Divisional superstructure (mail room, mail delivery

clerks, Division Head and staff, with their equipment,

odd-hour duty Agents, supply clerks, and steno pool, etc.)

to handle the work presently being handled efficiently

by existing DID.

The creation of an additional high-

level job (Division Head and staff) would be contrary

to the President's economic freeze. Apparently the

222

NW 88606-Doeld:32989636 Page 236

---

## Page 237

suggestion of Assistant to the Director W. C. Sullivan to

divide the Division referred to by the Inspector is that

set forth in memorandum from Mr. Sullivan to Mr. Tolson

dated June 28, 1971. On that memorandum the Director stated,

"I do not approve.

We do not have any provision for another

Assistant Director and all hearings before Budget Bureau and

Congress have been concluded for Fiscal Year 1972." In light

of the current national economic picture, the Director's

comment is even more meaningful today.

These disadvantages, with the exception of the

economy factor, can be overcome to a large extent by utilizing

current space in 9th and D Street building with a minimum of

carpentry work involved. The Executive office space can

easily be arranged to handle another Assistant Director and

staff. The Mail Room and Steno Pool would require alterations

involving additions of partitions.

Extra-duty shifts involving

4 p.m. to Midnight and Midnight to 8 a.m. can be arranged to

service both Divisions from operational and sacurity stand-

points. On the other hand, the biggest disadvantage is that

the split definitely will serve to lessen coordination of

cases having foreign ramifications as so many of our domestic

extremist cases do. This disadvantage likewise can be overcome

to a large extent if we make up our minds to be extra careful

to make certain that coordination between the new Division

• is such that Bureau is not embarrassed.

This could cause

a certain slow down in the handling of mail and result in

duplicative handling in some instances.

6. It is felt current space is adequate to house the

two Divisions with slight alterations as previously set out.

Equipment for a new Assistant Director should not present any

significant problem.

!

NW 88608 Docld-32989638_ Page 237

223

---

## Page 238

ANTI-RIOT LAWS AND BOMBING MATTERS

5-A-1 b

INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER:

In discussions, you have advised that

in your opinion there appears a

great deal of logic in realigning supervision of above cases from General

Investigative Division to Domestic Intelligence Division.

You are requested to advise in greater detail documentation of

your reasoning and your recommendations in this regard.

For your information, on receipt of your response to this

write-up it will be furnished to General Investigative Division for their

observations and recommendations.

• Comments of Assistant Director Brennan requested.

ASSISTANI DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN

By memorandum 8/30/68 from

Mr. Felt to Mr. Tolson,

Inspection Division did an in-depth

survey with respect to similar

problem relative to transfer of substantive violations of

Antiriot Laws and bombing cases involving subversive matters from

GID to DID.. Survey ascertained proposed transfer involved

categories supervised by GID which were so interrelated with

gathering of intelligence in racial and security field that

overlapping supervisory responsibilities constantly occurred.

Accordingly, Inspection Division recommended transfer of these

cases to DID to avoid duplication ot supervisory review and to

promote efficiency.

Transfer not effected as Director stated he

was opposed to transfer of these duties. A copy of Mr. Felt's

8/30/68 memorandum is attached together with a cover memorandum

from Mr. Felt dated 9/4/68.

Developments since 9/4/68 dictate that we take another

good look at this problem.

Activities of extremists and terrorists have

definitely escalated to the point that the overall situation

is a matter of increasing concern to the public and the

8/20/71

CWT:djr

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/19/71

ESM :wmj

5-A-I b

NW 88608 Docld:32983638 Page 230

224

---

## Page 239

administration.

Since terrorist activities such as bombings,

riots and the like are in violation of statutes under Bureau's

investigative responsibility it behooves us to make certain

that our supervision is as tight and effective as possible.

Inasmuch as DID is actively investigating the

terrorists who are in violation of these laws, it follows

Not

the DID supervisor has at his fingertips a feel of the case,

necessary background data and a full knowledge of sources who

can develop needed evidence.

In 1968, criminal prosecutions of these violations

were handled for most part by Department's Criminal Division

but now the Department has moved to invest the Internal Security

Division with the overall responsibility of prosecuting terrorist

activities regarding above-mentioned matters. Similar reorgani-

zation on our part would certainly enhance more effective

supervision.

Of course, any transfer of cases to DID would

require transfer of personnel from GID now handling these matters.

In view of the foregoing, it is recommended that

supervisory responsibility for all violations of Antiriot Laws

and substantive violations of Explosive and Incendiary Devices

Act (Bombing Matters) involving extremist and political

terrorists be transferred from GID to DID together with

required Agent personnel.

!

- 2 -

225

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 239

---

## Page 240

I September 4, 1968

-Mr. Tolson:

We have carefully re-evaluated the

preposal to shift subversive bombing cases and

antiriot cases from Mi. Posen's Division to

Mr. Sullivan's Division but find ourselves coming

back to the original conclusion.

Messis. DaLoach, Rosen and Sullivan,

are strangly in favor. We recognize this does not

resolve a wide variety of cases where supertiser

rasponsibility could everlap, hit these are the two

areas where constant overlap occurs and where we

have,great need for continuity of supervision.

The memorandum clearly spells out

that antiriot cases are handled in the Criminal

Division of the Department, racial bombings in the

Civil Rights Division and nationalist bombings in

the Internal Security Division.

07101

-..

wi man ret

9/4/68

ADDENDUM BY MR. TOLSON:

I am opposed to placing supervisory responsi-

bility for these violations under the Domestic

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 240

226

---

## Page 241

o9 1989 15 10

3010-106

848136:80193N

115.110.88

UNITED STAT

OVERNMENT.

Memorandum

TO

MR. TOLSON

DATE:

August 30, 1968

FROM

W. M.. FELI

Tal-a-

•ah:

215207

Colana

Coat=s

Fel:.

G=!:

Rose=

Sillia:

Tere!

Tisite:

Tele. Boo-

Hottes

SUIJECT:

PROPOSED TRANSFER OF SUPERVISORY RESPONSISILITY

FOR CERTAIN CASES FROM GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

TO DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

SYNOPSIS

General Investigative Division (GID) and Domestic Intelligence Division E-

propose that supervisory responsibility for substantive violations of the new Ancis

Laws and for bombing cases involving subversive matters should be transferre.

GID tO DID.

Mi. Deloach 'ecommended and the Director approved that Inspeci

Division examine mater to be certain that responsibilities are sharply and cent.

fixed.

In-depth Inspection survey reflects problem of overlapping supcrvisory

responsibilities belween divisions caanot.be climinated.unless.all inrestigative 2:

hiteligence functions nre.centered in & single division . not icasible because of

sheer volume. There are many investigative situations where occasional overlay

occurs, e. go the close connection between criminal cases handled by GID and the

Criminal Intelligence Program supervised by another division. However, propos:

transfer involves two categories now supervised by GID which are so inter-relate

with the gethering of intelligence in the racial and security fields that overlap

constantly occurs. Accordingly, these two categories (relatively small in case

volume) should be transferred to DID, as proposed, to avoid duplication of supe

visory review and to promote efticiency.

ANTIRIOT LAWS

These Jais were enacted on 4/11/63 and prohibit incitement to riot and

celated violent acts connected with riots and civil disorders. Since enactment on:

11 substantive cases have been opened; however, extensive intclligence gathering

is continuously directed by DID relative to organizations and individuals likely to

engage in riots such as sickely carnuchael, i. Rap Brown and other agriators.

throughout the country. Incavidual acts arising from riots and constituting possil

violations of Antiriot Laws are not practicably separable without causing duplie?

of supervisory review and loss of continuity in the development of cases.

'Antiriot Laws are handled by the Criminal Division of the Departed. &

now disseminates intelligence material to the Criminal Division and works with

Mi. DeLoach

1 - Mi. Sullivan

1 ~ Mi. Mohi

10

NW 88608

Docld:82989638CRage 241

3. - Mi.

Tavel

227

---

## Page 242

Memorandum to Mr. Tolson

Re:

Proposod Transier of Supervisory Responsibility

For Certain Cases from General Investiglive Division

to Domestic Intelligence Division

that Division on specific violations such as current sedition case against Stokely

Carmichael and prior requests of Criminal Division concerning activities of H.

Rap

Brown.

Since enaciment, ll specific cases have arisen, the most recent being in

connection with allegations of police brutality during the Democratic Convention in

Chicago involving injury to over 70 police officers.

BOMBING MATTERS

The same principle of duplicate supervisory review is involved in those

bombing cases that arise from the activities of subversive organizations and

individuals which are supervised on a day-to-day basis by DID. Examples are foret

nationalist groups, Ku Klux Rian, militant black nationalist groups and New Leit

groups. These cases should definitely be supervised by DID for maximum efficienc

All other bombing cases will remain with GID.

The Internal Security Division of the Department now has responsibility of

these foreign nationalist groups as well as the Klan and black nationalis: organi-

-zations. Me. Yeagley's Division is also charged with the development of criminal

violations in the recent bombings by the so-called Cuban Power group. The Citi

Rights Division of the Department usually has jurisdiction over other bombing cass

arising from white and biack late groups, but again DID has Tinison with that Divisi

on intelligence matters affecting the groups and has engaged in specific investi-

gations to observe and photograph demonstrations at request of Civil Rights Divisio

Guidélines to delineate the proposed consolidation of supervision have bas:

drawn and are set forth in an appropriate SAC Letter to so inforin the field (attache

1or approval).

EFFECT ON WORK LOAD AND PERSONNEL

The chang

proposed herein deal only in the two specific categories of As

riot Laws and certain Bombing Matters cases. Special cases that arise in the civi

rights lield such as the marder of Martin Lather King and the marger of the chree

civil rights workers in Mississippi will not be allected by the proposed changes.

Review of all pending cases that are affected by these changes discloses only one

group fll cases) that should now be transferred - these are the recent bombings

instituted by the Cuban Power group.

Analysis of all work load factors represented in the proposed switch of su

visory responsibilities i dicates that,i approved,

it would be appropriate at the

same time to reduce perdonnel complement of Civil Rights Section (GID) by one i-

supervisor and increase complement of Racial Intelligence Section (DU) by one de

supervisor.

MW 88608-Docld: 32989638_Page 242

-2-228

CONTINUED - OVER

---

## Page 243

• Memorandum to Mr.. Tolson

Re: Proposed Transfer of Supervisory Responsibility

For Certain Cases From Gencral Investigative Division

to Domestic Intelligence Division

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That effective close of business 9/16/68 DID have supervisory responsi

bility over all violations of Antiriot Laws and over those Bombing Mattors viclasic:

within guidelines set forth herein.

2 That Supervisory responsibility for the specific pending cases (Cuban

Power group of bombing cases) identified in this memorandum be transferred io

DID effective 9/ 15/68.

3. That Agent personnel complement of GID be reduced ly one and that of

DiD increased by one. If approved, to be handled by Mr. Mohr's office.

4c That attached SAC Leiter be approved.

Wel

leid

DETAILS CONTINUED • C

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 243

229

---

## Page 244

Memorandum to N

Tolson

Re:

Proposcd Transfer of Supervisory Responsibility

for Certain Cases From General Investigative

Division lo Domestic Intelligence Division

DETAILS

BACKGROUND

By memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. Deloach, 8/2/68, it was jointly

proposed by Domestic Intelligence Division (DID, and General Investigative Divisio:

(GID) that supervisory responsibility for the new Antiriot Laws investigations

(classification 176) and certain types of bombing matter cases be transferred from

GID to DID. With respect to the new FBI jurisdiction in Antiriot Laws, it was pol:

out in this memorandum that extremisi organizations and individuals who will likel

be engaged in riots and racial disturbances are the subject of continuing racial.

investigations supervised by DID. Similarly many of the bombing cases arise out

of work handled in DID such as bombing of diplomatic establishments and bombings

arising out of activities of groups in the racial field and internal security field.

Following submission of this memorandum, Assistant to the Director DeLoach

proposed and it was approved thai Inspection Division thoroughly survey the entire

question in order to draw appropriate guidelines and clearly define responsibilides

to achieve orderly transition vi ine proposei reassigmmeu of supervisury respous

bility in these matters.

thorough analysis has been made by Inspection Staff of all aspects of the

proposal and incans to accomplish it in the most practicable maner, including

reviews of representative cases that have been handled under these categories and

the overall volume and work load represented, The logic of the proposed re-

assignments appears unassailable.

In both categories of cases the principle invol:

is the same, namely; that individual violations of applicable statutes arising fior

the activities of subversive organizations or groups should be supervised within the

same division (DID) that has the basic and continuing responsibility for supervision

of the overall investigations of these organizations and groups as well as of the

members thereof and the development of informants within the groups. The obvio

benefit to be derived from the reassignment of these categories is the avoidance of

duplication of supervisory revicws of these interrelated matters and the ready

identification of individual's who may be involved in a specific violation with person

already under investigation from an intelligence standpoint. Informants who may

be utilized in specific violations or who are developed in the course of investigatio:

of such violations must of necessity be closely correlated with the supervision of

these informant programs which now rests with DID. Furthermore, violations of

the new Antiriot Laws may well be revealed in the course of general supervision

oi racial intelligence matters.

DETAILS

CONTINUED • OVER

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 244

-it-

÷238

---

## Page 245

Memorandum io Mi

T'olson

Re: Proposed Transfer of Supervisory Responsibility

for Certain Cases from General Investigative

Division to Domestic Intelligence Division

ANTIRIOT LAWS

Contained in Public Unw 90-281 enacted 4/11/68 (Civil Rights Act of 1069)

were certain new additions to Title 18, representing criminal statutes for which

investigative jurisdiction has been assigned FBi. Other provisions of this det

extended and enlarged existing civil rights legislation, the investigative jurisdick:

for which primarily remains in the Civil Rights Section and is not involved in the

subject matter herein discussed. The three pertinent statutes are as follows:

1. Section 245-b (3) of Chapter 13, Title 18, which makes it a

violation for any person to use force or threat of force to

wilfully injure, intimidate or interfere with any person engaged

in a business affecting interstate commerce during or incident

to a riot or civil disorder or attempting to perform

any of these acts.

•2. Section 2101, Chapter 102, Title 18, makes it a violation to

travel interstate or to use the mail, teiegraph, iclephone,

racho, television as other facility of interstate commerce to

incite a ridior organize, promote, encourage, participate

in or carry on a riot or commit any act of violence in

furtherance of a riot or aid or abet any person in inciting

or participating in a riot.

3. Section 231, Chapter 12, Title 18, makes it a violation to teach

or demonstrate the use, application or making of a firearm

or explosive or incendiary device or technique causing injury

or death intending or having reason to know that same will be

used in connection with a civil disorder which may interfere

with commerce or with a federally protected function or the

transportation in interstate commerce of such devices with

similar intent or the commission of any act to interfere with

any law enforcément officer or fireman engaged in official

duties in connection with civil disorder or a federally protected

function.

The foregoing three statutes have been designated by the Bureau as havia=

the character of Antiriot Laws and are all included in the new classification 175.

No other violations are included in this character or classification. Thus the

-5 -

DETAILS

CONTINUED - OVER

NW 88608 Docld:32989638

Page 245

---

## Page 246

Memorandum to Mr.

T'olson

Re: Proposed Transfer of Supervisory Responsibility

• for Certain Cases from General Investigative

Division to Domestic Intelligence Division

reassignment of the entire classification to DID should present no problems with

respect to any dirision of responsibility or routing of communications: Experience

gained thus far under apparent violations which the Bureau has been equested by t

Department to investigate supports the close correlation of such violations with

racial intclligence mater's now handled by DID. ll specific cases have been opened

thus far and are now pending: The most recent involves allegations of police brua

during Democratic Convention in Chicago involving injury to over 70 police officers.

Review of these cases disclosed them to be noncomplex in nature and in view of tie

current status of supervision and investigation, it appears most practicable for GE

to retain the specific supervision of these li cases to their conclusion. Thus super-

visory responsibility under this classification will be fixed at a clear cut-off point

after which all new cases arising will automatically be routed to and supervised by

DID from inception. No further guidelines appear necessary in this classification.

BOMBING MATTERS

A variety of different types of cases arises under this criegory and it will

hereafter represent a split classification with those cases applicable to the overall

fields of supervision in DID being hanced by that Division and the remainder

continuing under supervision of CI. "Accatingly, specific guidelines have been

drawn to delineate this division of supervisory responsibility and encompassed in

an SAC Letter in order that the field may make appropriate designation on com-

inunications to facilitate routing at the Seat of Government. Upon adoption of the

guidelines and the dual character coincidental therewith proper routing will

automatically be achieved of new matters arising (this coordinatod with files and

Communications Division).

Inspection Staff analyzed the varions types of bombing cases handled during

Fiscal Year (FY) 1968 and reviewed representative sampling of specific pending

files. There are ti, major areas herein which appear proper and logical to dolega:

future supervisory responsibility to DID. These are bombing matters arising fron

• foreign nationalistic interests and those arising from racial intelligence interests.

The reasons are the same as heretofore cited, namely the overall familiarity

within DID of aims adactivities of organizations and groups involved as well as

the following of activities of individual members of such groups and the respon-

sibility for the informant programs applicable to them. Other types of bombing

cases not falling within the guidelines set forth hereinafter will remain with GID

as in the past. Bombing matter violations (including threats) represent violations

of Section 83%, Chapter C, Title 18. The violation is the interstate transportation

of explosives with intent iley be used for destruction of real or personal property

which property is used for the objectives specified in the statute (educational,

- 6 -

DETAILS CONTINUED - OVE

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 246

2.32

---

## Page 247

Memorandum to Mi.

T'olson

Re: Proposed Transfer of Supervisory Responsibility

for Certain Cases from Gencral Investigative

Division to Domestic Intelligence Division

business, civic, etc.). Threats or false reports also constitute violations within t

statute and the entire ascussion within this memorandum includes threats or false

reports under the use of the term bombing matters.' Although the Department

frequently resorts to other statutes for prosecutive considerations, this appears

to have no significant bearing on the question of supervisory responsibility which

is directed toward the full development of the investigation to establish identity

of the perpetrators of the bombing violation and evidence to suppor prosecution.

In the vasi majority of potential bombing violations that arise from the

field, the Department is promptly advised and appropriate dissemination made

without there being a substantial supervisory responsibility thereaiter for the

folowing of investigations because relatively few are opened by the Department

for full investigation. For example, in FY 1968 there were approximately 15 bomb:

matter cases opened for full investigation at the Department's request whereas

approximately 170 instances occurred of dissemination of initial information to the

Departnent with no subsequent investigation requested. Of the 15 bombing matter

cases opened for full investigation during FY 1968, nine were in the racial fiela

(apparenty Klan inspired), five in the foreign nationast lied and one uncialed

10 Die responsibility.

The following guidelines are proposed for determination of supervisory

responsbility in bombing matter cases that hereafter will lie with DID (all others

remaizing with GID). Bombing matters (including threats) wherein:

-

I. The victim is a diplomatic or other establishment of a foreign

government (such as embassy, consulate, official or quasi-

official tourist agency, purchasing agency, etc.).

2. It is apparent or circumstances strongly indicate that the bombing

was instigated by a foreign nationalistic organizaton, group or

coalition (such as recent series of bombings by so-called Cuban

power groups), or member thereof.

3. It is apparent or circumstances strongly indicate that the bombing

was instigated by a subversive organization (such as Communist

Party, Socialist Workers Party, or Students for a Democratic

Society), or member thereof.

4. It is apparent or circunstances strongly indicate that bombing was

instigated by a white or black extremist group (such as Minuteman,

Ku Klux Klan, Nation of Islamn or Black Panther's Party), of manor

thereof.

NIW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 247

-7 m

233

DETAILS CONTINUED - OVER

---

## Page 248

Memorandum to Mr.

"Tolson

Re: Proposed Transfer of Supervisory Responsibility

for Certain Cases from General Investigative

Division to Dome stic Intelligence Division

Those cases nich fall under the foregoing guidelines will hereafter bear

a dual character in addition to Bombing Matter's or Bombing Matter's - Threats, nam

the appropriate designation for the type of apparent instigator and/or victim in

order to accomplish routing to the appropriate unit and scccon willin DD such as

Internal Security - R, Racial Matters - Klan, or Internal Security - Cuba. The

foregoing guidelines have been incorporated in an appropriate SAC Letter together

with instructons concerning use of dual character which is attached for approval.

The supervision of a particular case will remain the responsibility of the

Division originally assuming it even though subsequent developments bring it

within the purview of the type normally handied by the other Division, unless in the

mutual judgment of the respective Assistant Directors, Bureau interests are bete

served by transferring the case.

In making the proposed transter of the limited group of cases discussed

herein, no problem appears to be presented insofar as liaison with appropriate Diris:

of the Department is concerned. The Criminal Division has responsibility for Antis:

Laws. DID nor rogularly dissominatos intelligence material to that Division and :u.

closely with it on certain specific violations, such as the current sedition case agains

Stoicly Carmichael as well as provious requests to follow activities of hi. Pap Buom

The internal security Division of the Department has responsivility over the foreige

nationalist groups as well as the Klan and black nationalist organizations and has zis:

been charged with the development of criminal violations in the recent bombings by sue

Cuban Fower group. It is this Division headed.by Mr. Yeagley with which DID consis

deals on all subversive and espionage matters.. The Civil Rights Division of the Dee

ment usually has jurisdiction over other bombing cases arising from white and black:

hate groups, but again DID has regular liaison with that Division on intelligence mad:

affecting these groups and has engaged in specific investigations to do serve and phote

graph demonstrations at the request of the Civil Rights Division.

EFFECTIVE DATE O: TRANSITION AND SPECIFIC PENDING CASES

To achieve an orderly transition and to permit coordination of policy;

arising after the close of business 9/16'63. From review by Inspection Staff of the

curtait pending cases now within GID which would under the newguidelines hereaiter

fall within the supervisory responsibility of DID, it appears that none of these

pending cases should be physically transferred for remaining supervision to con-

clusion except for one grou of eleven cases.

This group constitutes relativoly rece.

cases arising from the serf;s of bombings and attempted bombings in Florida,

New Xork, Chicago, Newark and Los Angeles directed at diplomatic establishments

and other offices of foreign governments who maintain relations with Cuba. Credi

102' many of the bombings has been claimed by "Cuban Power, " a similar term o

Mack Power and several miitant anti-Castro refugee organizations and individuals

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 248

-834 DETAILS CONTINUED - OVERL

---

## Page 249

Memorandum to Mr. Tolson

R.C:

Proposed Transfer of Supervisory Responsibility

for Certin Cases from General Investigative

Division to Domestic Intelligence Division

are suspects in these bombings. There has been extremely close coordination

between GID and DID in these specific cases and DID is thoroughly conversant with

the details of the in ividual invostigations. Because of this and also in view of the

likelihood of additional such bombings arising in the future by the same gro up oi

groups it appears feasible and practicable to transfer the eleven pending cases now i-

DID as well as any new ones by the same group arising in the days ahead. These

eleven cases are Bureau flles 174-688, 174-689, 174-719, 174-759, 174-760, 171-761,

174-762, 174-767, plus three new cases which have not been assigned Bureau file

numbers, namely bombing of Mexican Airlines Office, Miami, 8/17/68; Bombing

of West Side Liberal Club, New York, 8/19/68, and Bombing of Air France Airlines;

Los Angeles, California, 7/19/68.

WORK LOAD AND PERSONNEL

The Bombing - Civil Rights Act of 1951 Unit of Ciul Right's Section, GID,

is composed of 6 Agent supervisors including Unit Chief and in addition to general

bonsing matters (those not falling under above guidelines) has supervisory

responsibilty over the Civil Fights Aci of 1904, the Federai Frain Wreck Siule, in

DiscrimiDation in Housing (Civil Rights Act of 1868). The latter violation which was

establisned in the same Public Inw as the Antiriot Laws has had only very recent

experience and appears may well generate a substantial number of cases in the

future. However, from analysis of total work load of the unit as well as of the

entire Civil Rights Section, both from a standpoint of ratios of individual cases

supervised for FY 1S6S and percentage of manpower time expended, it appears

that the transfer of supervisory responsibility for those cases as outlire d in this

memorandura will constitute the approximate full time of one Agent supervisor

and accordingly it is being recom nended that GID Agent complement be recuced by

One.

Within DID we new Antiriot Laws and the majority of the bombing maiter

cases which will be transferred will increase supervisory responsibility in the

Racial Intelligence Section. Other bombing matter cases will ba spread among

various units such as Special Investigations Unit of Internal Security Section, Cuban

Special Cases Unit of Latin American Section, etc., and based upon past experience

will not be of such volume as to require additional Agent supervisory personnel in

those other individual units. Accordingly, it appears appropriate at this time to

authorize increase of complement of DID by one Agent supervisor.

- 9

235

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 249

---

## Page 250

DO NOT FILE-RETURN

Is hit!

JiJo

P.T.

01:1

Mr. DeLo: =:

Hi. Kohr

Mr. Bishop

Nt. Casper

August 15,

1968

Mi. Callahs-

Mi. Conge

MIR.

TOLSON:

Mr. FelT.

Mr. Galo

RE:

SUGGESTED TRANSFER OF RESPONSIBILITY

FOR SUPERVISION OF CASES INFOLVING

RIOT. LAWS AND CERTAIN BOMBING NATTERS

FROM GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION TO

THE DOUSSTIC INCELLIGENCE DIVISION

Mi. Rosen

Mr. Sulliven

Mi. Tavel

Mr. Trotte:

Tele. Room.

Miss Holmes

I have for some time felt that a lack of clear

Miss Gone:

cut responsibility existed in the handling of captioned -

matters.

To be brief, it would seem logical that the enforcement

of anti-riot legislation would obviously belong to the sane

Division that is supervising the investigations and developrent

of informants and intelligence regarding the ku klux Klan, hate

groups

and racial organizations.

The question arises as

to

whether or

not the transfer of certain bombing matter investiga-

tions should also be made to the Domestic Intelligence Division.

Quite naturally, the General Investigative Division, because

the supervision of certain type cases in this catogory, should

reicin overail supervision in this field.

should be given to the homestic Intelligence Division handling

that calegory of cases wherein that Division's development of

informants and intelligence would greatly aid in the continuance

of supervision of this type case.

In view of the "gray area" involved in such supervision,

I asked Messi's.

Rosen and Sullivan to study this matter carcfull:

so that appropriate recommendations could be made to you and the

Director regarding a shift of responsibility.

The findings of

Rosen and Suljivan will be found attached to this memorandum.

ani,

however,

not yet satisfied that responsibility is sharply ar-

definitely fixed.

juld like to recommend that the inspection Division

make a survey of this entire matter and then present recommenda-

tions which will definitely tie down this matier once and for

all. This survey should be expedited in view of the new legisla-

tion passed by Congress for which the FBI will öbviously have

heavy responsibilities in the future.

Respectfully,

Enclosure

CDD : hmm

(3)

1

- DeLoach

1 - Felt

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 250

c.

D. DeLOACH

{is

236

---

## Page 251

ADDEND UM

INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER:

(ESM:wmj 8/23/71)

For the information of General Investi -

gative Division, by separate write -up

Domestic Intelligence Division (DID)

was advised that Assistant to the Director Sullivan las suggested that DID be

divided into two separate Divisions. In order that siggestion could be analyzed

during current inspection, DID was requested to furnish certain observations

regarding suggestion.

Among these, Division was asked "In the event you feel

work now being handled by another Division should be realigned in the event

above suggestion adopted, so indicate under appropriate new Division. "

DID responded, "It will be noted that supervision of antiriot and bombing

cases currently in General Investigative Division has been included in table of

organization of proposed Domestic Intelligence Division and specifically assigned

to the Extremist Intelligence Section. Four Agents and two clerks are now

assigned to this Unit in the General Investigative Division and should, of course,

be transferred to the new Division.

"This is the most logical move and will afford tighier and mure effective

supervision of antiriot and bombing violations in view of fact that extremists and

terrorists mostly involved are being actively investigated by Domestic Intelligence

Division (DID). Accordingly, in addition to avoiding duplicative supervisory

action, it follows that DID is better prepared to handle these criminal investigations

and final prosecutive actions."

A separate white write-up captioned "Anti-Riot Laws and Bombing Matters"

was prepared and DID asked specifically to comment regarding these matters.

This addendum is part of that write-up.

You are requested to furnish your views of Me. Sullivan's suggestion both

as to the present structure of DID and as to the handling in the event DID is

split. For your information, DID has proposed ARL and Bombing Matters

be handled in the Extremist Intelligence Section.

Comments of Assistant Director Rosen requested. It would be appreicated

if you would expedite this request.

2237

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 251

---

## Page 252

ADDENDUM

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR ROSEN:

(AR:ige)

The following comments are equally

applicable whether the Domestic

Intelligence Division remains intact

or is reorganized into two divisions.

Transferring these cases to the Domestic Intelligence Division (DID) would

eliminate much duplication of handling cases and would result in increased

efficiency; however, this would require transferring to DID all bombing and

antiriot cases as distinguished from transferring only those cases known to

involve "extremists and political terrorists." As a practical matter substantially

all antiriot laws investigations involve extremists and political terrorists. With

regard to bombings, substantially all investigations deal at the outset with unknown

subjects and it would be most impractical to attempt to delineate between bombings

which do or do not involve terrorists. Since the act of bombing is in itself an act

of terror it is logical to assume at the outset thai terrorists are involved and the

types of bombings delegated to the FBI by the Department's guidelines are limited

to those targets most likely to be selected by political terrorists. (These targets

pertain to Government property or functions, Federally funded projects,

diplomatic establishments, colleges and universities, and those probably

perpetrated by terrorists.)

ADDEND UM®

INSPECTOR E.

(ESM:wmj

8

12'5

Comments of Assistant Director Brennan requested

concerning Assistant Director Rosen's remarks.

ADDENDUM:

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN

I concur with Mr. Rosen's

comments.

Ris: dir

8/27/71

23%

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 252

---

## Page 253

COMPUTATION OF CASE AND WORK LOAD IN THE

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

5-A -1 c

TECTOR E. S. MILLER: Come been at and that and a tenue

computing case and work load has been

implemented within your Division. Describe and state reason for implementation.

It would appear that utilization of this system will result in a decrease

in case load figures but not necessarily in the work load picture. You are

requested to advise by Section and Unit basis the number of cases it is

anticipated that the case load will decline in each instance. Use a 'before"

and "after" approach. Case load figures 7/31/71 will be satisfactory for use

as known base (before). Be as specific as possible.

Comments of Assistant Director requested.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 253

239

---

## Page 254

ADDENDUM: 5-A-1c

ASSISTANI DIRECIOR C. D. BRENAN In February, 1971, I issued

instructions that each Section

Chief submit monthly case load figures for his Section to the

Branch Chiefs to be furnished to me with the Branch Chief's

analysis as a basis for establishing a logical and current

method of periodically assessing work loads and manpower

needs within the Division.

Inasmuch as it was intended

these Ilgures would serve as a guide for possible manpower

changes to meet Iluctuating and ever-changing problems, it was

essential that figures presented be accurate and equally

essential that like matters

be tabulated uniformly.

On August 6, 1971, I instructed that a study be made

to insure consistency

not only in the counting of the cases

but in the presentation of the monthly reports. As a result

of this study, guidelines were firmly established concerning

case counts within the various Sections.

Changes from prior

figures principally relate to cases involving (l) security

informants (2) Security Index cases (3) certain organizations

and other matters requiring only periodic reports.

Under the standardized procedures for case counts

within the Division, informant cases, whether relating to

security informants or PSIs, once initial approval by the

Bureau for designation has been granted and where active

day-to-day supervision is not necessary, are no longer retained

a pending status but are closed and placed on an admiristrative

tickler to be reopened at the appropriate time to follow for

the periodic justification letters required.. Cases involving

Security Index subjects as well as certain organizations and

other matters requiring only the submission of periodic reports

at no less than six month intervals, are now opened on a uniform

basis 15 days after the due date of

the periodic report in

order that appropriate followup may be made to insure submission

of report.

A format was devised for the Section Chiefs to submit

the monthly data required and to accunt for each Agent in the

Section and his current assignments as well as total.and

average case load figures by Unit and by Section.

248

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 254

---

## Page 255

Pursuant to your request, there follows a tabulation

of the case load by Unit and by Section as of 7/31/71 and as

of 8/20/71.

Total case load

for the Division decreased from

29,565 to 25,417--a decrease of 4,148 cases.

Some small

part of this decrease can be attributed to normal month by

month fluctuation in case load; most of it is

attributable

• to the changed procedures concerning case count as will be

readily.evident by the significant decreases in case loads

in those Units handling principally informant cases, Klan•

cases, and organizational-type cases.

This reduction in case

Load resulting from the changed case count procedures, of course,

in no way decreases the work load on the individual desks. It

is believed the current procedures for counting cases is more

accurate and equitable and places the case load figures in

perspective insolar as these figures are a factor in judging

overall work load.

This in brief constitutes the basis

for implementing

the new system of computing case. and work Inad in the Division.

In the overall, it is directly related to our manpower problems

and I have included a more detailed write-up bearing on this

new system in its relationship to the Division's overall

capacity and capability

• to fulfill its responsibilities in the

"Adequacy of Personnel" write-up (6-E) which also bears on the

matter.

• : .*

insi

241.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 255

---

## Page 256

Espionage Section

Special Cases Unit

Soviet - Washington Unit

Soviet - New York Unit

Coordination Unit

Satellite Unit

Caseload figures

7/31/71

8/20/71

Change

751

967

1223

1226

1408

• 5575

735

842

973

1022

• 1261

4833

-742

Section Total

Nationalities Intelligence Section

Special Coordination Unit

Cuban Unit

Chinese. Unit

Middle

& South America Unit

Nationality Unit

Section Total

(Handled by Clerk)

(No cases assigned)

1074

776

I125

1025

920

69%

3816

342

4158

598

632

3031

:333

3364

-794

Extremist Intelligence Section

Black Nationalist - East Unit

Black Nationalist - West Unit

Black Nationalist - Central

Racial Informant, Black

Nationalist - South

Section Total

1501

5924

1254

1749

5428

1423

845

1332

1564

2164

-264.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 256

247

---

## Page 257

New Left Section

Special Investigations - Last

Special Investigations - West

New Left Groups

Subversive Individuals - New Left

Protest and Trotskyist Groups

Section Total

Internal Security Section

Communist Party, USA

*International New Left and

Sedition Unit

Klan and White

Hate Groups Unit

Security Informant Unit

Subversive Individuals Unit

Section Total

Caseload figures

7/31/71

8/20/71

1719

1495

879

2492

.574

7159

1564

1343

812

2538

588

6845

Change

-314

548

:912

1683

1466

2636

7245

272**

-871*$

511

869

2688

5211

-2034

Research Section

No cases assigned

Division Total

29, 565-

25,417

*Unit now Foreign Intelligence and Pro Chicon Unit

**] Supervisor and 253. cases transfered from CPUSA Unit -to

Foreign Intelligence and Pro Chicom Unit 8/13/71

-4148

243

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 257

---

## Page 258

POTENTIAL DOUBLE AGENT PROGRAM

ESPIONAGE SECTION

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

5-A-1-d

SPECTOR E. S. MILLER: "Double Agent" (DA) is a commonly and frequently

used term in the field of espionage and counter-

intelligence. In the Bureau's activities in these fields, DAs are a distinctive

group of Security Informants (SIs) utilized against foreign intelligence operations

in the United States.

"Potential Double Agent"' (PDA) is a unique term used by

DID to identify an individual under development as a DA; one who is in contact

with a foreign intelligence officer but who has not yet been solicited by his foreign

contact to perform clandestinely or covertly for the benefit of the foreign intelligence

group.

-During this inspection a representative number of files were

reviewed to determine the extent of supervision afforded PDAS.

A similar

revier, was conducted last inspection. It is realized, however, that a comparison

is not possible in view of recent DID instructions regarding the administrative handling

of all SI and PSI files.

Subsequent to last inspection DID established procedure whereby

those SI cases requiring day-to-day supervision or PSIs still under investigation

should remain in active status; informant-type cases requiring only periodic

review are closed and placed on administrative tickler, to be made pending 15

days after the six-month justification letter is due. DA and PDA files are

included in these categories.

During the last inspection 237 files were reviewed. Included

in that group were PSIs and DESECOs, and not limited to PDAS. All of the files

were then in a pending status. During this inspection there were 65 files on

PDAs in a pending status and 212 PDA files in a closed status. These were strictly

PDA files and did not ind ude other PSIs or DESECOs. It has been determined

that at any given time there will probably be approximately 70 such cases in a

pending status, if the number of such investigations in the field remains constant.

Of the 65 pending files, 58, or 89%, were reviewed. Of these,

22, or 38% contained specific instructions, directions or other guidance to the field

COMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/27/71

JON:wm]

P4755E

5-A -1-d

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 258

244

---

## Page 259

-2 -

since last inspection. At the time of last inspection of 237 files reviewed, less than

10, or 4%, contained such outgoing communications.

• Also during this inspection 62 closed files on PDAs were

reviewed at random. Of these, 12 or 19%, contained outgoing communications

of the type described above since last inspection. It was observed that since

last inspection a majority of the closed files contained only the six-month

justification letter and were closed in accordance with Division instructions

described above.

Due to current Division instructions, only those PDAS

requiring day-to-day supervision or those on whom six-month justifications

are due are considered pending at any given time. Hence, it is logical that a

larger percentage of the closed PDA files will contain only the justification

letters and no outgoing correspondence since last inspection.

It is well recognized that the field of DAs is a highly specialized

one. Its success, both at the Seat of Government and in the field, requires

skillfui handling, patience,

finesse and careful aggressiveness. In reviewing the

PDA files, it was observed that many excellent candidates, with varying back-

grounds, have reached various stages of development with excellent potential for

use as actual DAs. Specitically, these cases are:

105-113525

134-11898

105-141001

134-15414

105-201286

134-18458

105-207600

134-19684

105-26896

134-19961

134-20321

134-20912

The quality of these PDAs would, in itself, suggest substantial

potential and, in turn, need for greater supervision. The above-listed cases

should be kept in a pending status, carefully reviewed, with guidance and instructions

furnished to the field. The field should be instructed to assume a more aggressive.

position in these cases and followed closely to insure proper attention is given to

development of these persons as PDAs.

Review of PDA files shows evidence of closer supervision

since last inspection. The percentage of files, including instructions and guidance

to the field, rose from 4% to 38%. However, to realize greater accomplishments

in this area of responsibility and to use our PDAs to the fullest extent, there is

still need for improvement in supervision of these cases.

Comments of Section Chief W. A. Branigan, Inspector D. E.

Moore, and Assistant Director Brennan requested.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 259

245

---

## Page 260

3

Section Chief William

A.

Branigan

The comments of the Inspector

regarding the marked improve

ment in supervision of our

work is most gratifying. As was noted during the last inspection,

evidence of supervision

appearing in the PdA informant file is not

always a completely accurate gauge of the supervisory attention

being given each case.

The informant file is designed, by pro-

visions of the Manual of Instructions, to be a repository for

information regarding the background and administrative hancling

of the source.

Information reflecting operational activities and

instructions more often appears in the active investigative file

of the Soviet-bloc principal with whom the PDA is in contact.

In view of this significant factor, it is felt that the

marked increase in supervision (from 4% to 38%) detected through

review of informant files alone, is a most favorable trend and one

which every effort will be made

to sustain.

Twelve specific cases have been cited as quality PDAS

which, by their very nature,

suggested a need for greater super-

vision due to the substantial potential of each.

The Inspector

nas instructed that these cases be kept in a pending status,

carelully reviewed, with guidance and instructions furnished to the

field to assume a more aggressive position in these cases.

These

instructions are appreciated and will be followed.

As the

Inspector has noted, the

development of double agents is a

highly

specialized field requiring special faculties, not the least of

which is careful aggressiveness.

As these comments recognize,

aggressiveness in the development of a double agent is inhibited

by the practical necessity to restrict our manipulation of the

sources to actions which appear naturally responsive to the

initiatives displayed and opportunities offered by the Soviet-bloc

representative with whom the source is in contact.

Particularly

is this true during the development phase before the source has

been accepted as bona fide by his principal. Any unnatural or

gratuitous action to hasten or strengthen the relationship is

viewed with

utmost skepticism and could result in compromise of

our interest and rejection of the source. This is not to say we

must eschew

any initiatives; but that any such options must be

pursued only after careful consideration of all the complex and

variable factors peculiar to each individual case.

:

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 260

246

---

## Page 261

Section Chief William A. Branigan

(CGS : EWL :pdr

8/30/71)

Within this perspective the 12 cases referred by

the Inspector will be kept open for intensive review to insure

that all possible action not

already taken to enhance and

exploit the potential of each

source has been considered

and, where appropriate, additional instructions issued to

the

field.

It is noted that 10 ot the 12 PDA cases referred to

were in a closed status in accordance with recent DID instructions

regaraing the administrative handling of all SI and PSI files.

Brieily under these procedures such cases are placed in

closed status and are reopened only at such time as a justi-

fication letter is due.

These criteria will continue to be

applied to PDA cases with exceptions, on a selective basis,

in those situations which fall within the category defined

by the Inspector..

Inspector D. E. Moore

(DEM:bsf 8/31/71)

The continual need for quality double agents

is certainly recognized in our counterintelligence efforts

• against Soviet bloc intelligence and the cases referred to

by the Inspector as excellent candidates will be given

careful and aggressive handling.

(DEM:bsf 8/31/71)

The comments of the Inspector. have been noted

and his instructions will be closely followed.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 261

247

---

## Page 262

PERSONNEL MATTERS

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 202

PERSONNEL

118 4775e

---

## Page 263

ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL

6-E

Please tabulate by Sections and Units

the current Agent and clerical

personnel complement of your Division as of the close of business 8/17/71.

Show actual and authorized personnel in each Section or Unit, including the

Division Front Office. Personnel on maternity leave or leave without pay

should not be considered in the overall tabulation.

i. Include positions regarded as vacant but for which authority has

been obtained to fill.

2. Identify all personnel under transfer into or out of the Division

as of 8/17/71 as well as those who have submitted letters of resignation as of

tnat date. (Show date of transfer letter or of acknowledgment of resignation.)

3. Tabulate by Section and Unit any shortage or overage of authorized

personnel as of 8/17/71.

4. Indicate your assessment of adequacy of clerical personnel and if

additional personnel is deemed necessary provide complete justification.

5. Provide specifics regarding manpower savings effected since

the last inspection as a result of streamlining or any other means.

6. Comment on adequacy of your Agent personnel.

7. In the write-up on adequacy of personnel by Sections, describe

criteria utilized in evaluation of personnel adequacy in each particular Section

or Unit. Each Section write-up should constitute a separate part of the overall

Divisional write -up.

Comments of Assistant Director requested.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

18/17/71

ESM :wmj

6-E

NV-88608-Doeld:32182630Page 263

248

---

## Page 264

ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL

6-E

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN

(CDB: amk)

8/30/71

attached lind the section

write-ups concerning each

category of information

requested by the Inspector relative to adequacy of personnel.

These comments are current as of August 17, 1971.

The personnel assigned to the Division Front Office

consist of one Assistant Director,

two Inspectors,

two Special

Agent Supervisors, five stenographic employees and twenty

clerical employees. This complement includes the personnel

directly assigned to the Front Office, those in the Division

teletype room and Mail Room and Messenger Service, and the

Security Patrol force in addition to five Agents.

The overall authorized personnel complement of the

Division at the beginning of Inspection was 120 Special Agents

and 199 clerks, compared to an authorized complement of 116

Special Agents

and lyu clerks at the time of the last inspection.

As of August 17, 1971, we had 119 Special Agents

assigned to the Domestic Intelligence Division (DID). This

includes 2 Special Agents who are assigned on a temporary loan

basis to the Intelligence Evaluation Committee in the Department

of justice (IEC).

Since August 17, 1971, SA Dean N. Lloyd

reported to the Research Section as a replacement for SA Bernard A.

Wells, who retired on 7/30/71. We are awaiting the replacement

SA George M. Quinn has been designated as SA Schaefer's

replacement but has not as yet reported to his assignment. With

include SA Tunstall in our total assigned complement.

As of August 17, 1971, we had 204 clerical employees

assigned to DID. This is because recent replacements have

reported to replace employees under transfer or resignation who

have not left as yet.

additional clerks, GS-4, report to the Division. However, we

have had two resignations submitted which will absorb them.

We have one Section with an additional employee assigned which is

dependent entirely upon the approval of a new position involving

no increase in grade or salary.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 264

49

---

## Page 265

ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL

6-E

This Division consists of six Sections.

The attached

write-ups of the Section Chiefs disclose adequate authorized

Agent complement with exception of R. D. Cotter, Research; and

W. R. Wannall, Nationalities Intelligence Sections. Authorized

is underscored since Agent personnel are on loan to the Nationalities

Intelligence Section because of the McLek Case as follows:

Espionage (1), Extremist Intelligence (2), Internal Security (2),

Research (1), and New Left (1) •

Concerning comment in write-up of R. D. Cotter, Research,

Item

6 refers to assignment of Cotter on a temporary basis to

Department and need for complete staffing of that Front office.

Originally Cotter's assignment to the Department was not considered

to be full time in that he was to be in the same building, readily

available for consultation, and capable of handling special problems

However, the situation is not desirable for a

long term arrangement and the term of that assignment is not known.

Recognizing this, the adjustment of work assignments detailed in

my memorandum to Mc. Sullivan of 7/29/71 proposed elimination of

one Section, making Section Chief Arbor Gray available to take over the

Research Section.

This would eliminate that problem with no

additional personnel required.

That proposal also makes No. 1

Man Callahan of Internal Security Section available for case

assignment.

Concerning write-up of Section Chief W. R. Wannall,

several points must be considered. Wannall's suggested build-up

of the Chinese Unit to five men from present complement of three

at this time to "handle the current work in the Unit and expand

into areas which are considered necessary . . " is reflective of

a provincial outlook and a limited concept of the relative

importance of proposed work in his area of responsibility in

relation to the overall limitation of Bureau manpower and resources.

Obviously some differentiation must be made to establish priorities.

We must first cope with the immediate problems at hand before

assigning manpower to projected problems.

Concerning Wannall's reference to needing a man for the

Foreign Liaison Desk, my observations contained in my memorandum

to Mr. Sullivan dated

8/16/71, which is attached to Wannall's

write-up, still apply. I would add to that an observation that

much of the material received from our Legats is actually handled

on the related substantive intelligence desks responsible for the

respective countries and not by the Foreign Liaison Desk. With

the current special cases requiring extensive manpower commitments,

I believe that desk can continue as is until the manpower situation

is alleviated somewhat.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/30/71

CDB: mls

6-E

•NV 88608-Docld:3298963R_Page 265

258

---

## Page 266

, •

ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL:

6-E

As to Wannall's comments concerning manpower on the

Flisberg case, under write up captioned "Ellsberg Case, " 4A3,

the personnel assigned to Ellsberg is certainly adequate and he

does not at this point request additional personnel for that case.

There are two interrelated but separate problems to be

dealt with here.

The first, and broadest, is divisionwide

adequacy of personnel and the Director has repeatedly stated

the concept that major case specials must be handled with existing

Division personnel. Iagree with this wholeheartedly and have

attempted to comply with that concept.

Also related here is the situation which uniquely affects the

Domestic Intelligence Division in that our basic area of responsi-

bility has been subjected to shifting patterns of work.

Essentially,

the rise of the black extremist was largely met with reduction

in other work areas.

The newer expanding threat of New Left

terrorist activities is similarly being met by reduction of

personnel

committed to other areas of work of less urgent priorities.

of manpower and our overall increase in caseload is indicative

of considerable strain on our manpower capabilities. Facts

concerning this increase are contained under "Pending Work and

Delinquency," 4-D-1.

I believe, however, we can adequately cope with our

responsibilities with existing personnel.

In order to accomplish

this, considerable study and review of existing administrative

practices have been made at my direction since taking over this

Division 8/1/70.

In order to put available personnel where

highest priorities existed, a major reorganization was effected

12/70 and our last inspection approved that action. The Director's

letter dated 2/12/71 advising me of the Inspection Staff findings

included the comment,

"Continue to pay careful attention to

imbalances in work load throughout the Division and take necessary

action to correct these situations, as you did recently in your

reorganization."

• With this in mind, and drawing on facts developed

during the reorganization and subsequent inspection, I directed

a memorandum to Branch Chiefs J. A. Sizoo and D. E. Moore dated

2/19/71 pointing to (1) the need for case count to reflect active

matters, (2) their responsibility to know what is going on in

their respective Branches and (3) specifically instructing them

to submit a monthly analysis of the work load of their Branches.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/30/71

CDB: mis

6-E

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 266

25/

---

## Page 267

ADEQUA CY OF PERSONNEL

6-E

The need for uniformity in case count submitted by Sections was

stressed to them, as was the need to establish a logical and

current basis for a regular and periodic assessment of work loads

and manpower needs within the Division.

Because of (1) a continued shift in manpower needs, and

(2) a growing imbalance in caseloads between Sections and

manpower demands of special cases, by memorandum to all Branch

and Section Chiefs, I instructed Section Chiefs G. C. Moore and

R. L. Shackelford to conduct a thorough survey of the Division

and make suitable recommendations for manpower adjustments to

cope with current needs of the Division. My memorandum to

Mr. Sullivan dated 7/29/71 detailed their findings and recommended

they be approved.

.*

Addendum of Inspection Division 7/30/71 approved this

except for assignment of Special Coordination Unit to Research

Section, recommending it be retained in Nationalities Intelligence

Section. Mr. Felt's memorandum to Mr. Tolson dated 8/4/71

recommended proposed adjustment of work assignments in Domestic

Intelligence Division

be deferred pending his study and Director

noted, "OK. Expedite." We are awaiting a decision.

Based on figures developed during the survey of G. C.

Moore and R. L. Shackelford, it was obvious my previous instructions

to the Branch Chiefs had not been effectively carried out, because

case count figures still were not as meaningful or consistent

between Sections as they should have been.

To correct this

situation and to establish what I intended in my original

memorandum to the Branch Chiefs on this subject, I instructed

two Supervisors, with Inspection Staff experience, to do a complete

survey of case counting procedures and prepare tight recommenda-

tions to achieve the objectives previously sought.

This was done, and after discussion of their findings

with Branch and Section

Chiefs, these new procedures were adopted

beginning 8/13/71. The results of this procedural change is

detailed in "Pending Work and Delinquency," 4-D-1, and I believe:

validates the recommended work adjustments contained in my

memorandum to Mr. Sullivan dated 7/29/71.

It must be strongly pointed out here this procedural

change does not bear on work load, but rather deals solely with

tabulation of case count into a more accurate gauge of pending

work and where the work is by desk, Unit, and Section.

The

work remains the same.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/30/71

CDB: mls

6-E

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 267

250

---

## Page 268

ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL

6-E

The proposed work adjustments contained in my

memorandum of 7/29/71 essentially took manpower from work

presently in the Internal Security Section (Klan and White

Hate cases and Informant matters) and made them available to

other more heavily loaded work areas. The Front Office staff

of Internal Security Section will be

available for other assignment

as well.

It also called for Nationalities Intelligence to absorb

one of the five men on Ellsberg from that Section's complement

because of relatively low caseload.

Details set forth in "Pending Work and Delinquency,"

4-D-1, disclose caseload decreased in Nationalities Intelligence

and Internal Security Sections by 19% and 28% respectively, which

is proportionately high compared to other Sections.

Espionage Section was proposed to receive a one-half

man's time to compensate for the

Ironclad case.

This is consistent

with that Section's 13% decrease in case count under the new

procedure.

That write-up aiso discioses a case count under the

new procedure of 275 cases per Agent for the Nationalities

Intelligence Section compared as follows: Espionage - 303;

Extremist Intelligence - 303; New Left - 334; Internal Security -

401.

These figures are based on Supervisors assigned to case

desks and do not include men on specials in any Section.

I, do not believe the problems faced by Nationalities

Intelligence Section far outweigh those of other Sections to

justify that low figure and, therefore, believe my original

•recommendation that Nationalities Intelligence absorb one man from

existing complement was justified. W. R. Wannall's comments in

write-up captioned "Ellsberg Case," 4-A-3, relative to manpower

presently utilized on this case validate this further as he has

now utilized manpower in his Section on this case. Obviously,

tangential issues will arise from time-to-time in an investigation

of this type and can and should be handled on an emergency basis

within the Section handling the special.

This has been the

traditional practice and should be followed.

The second problem is essentially intra-divisional in

nature and deals with a Division Head's responsibility and authority

to effectively utilize resources available to him to cope with

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/30/71

CDB: mls

6-E

253

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 268

---

## Page 269

ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL

6-E

the area of responsibility levied upon him.

As detailed in

Wannall's write-up captioned, Ellsberg Case," 4-A-3, from the

beginning of this case I made manpower available for the Ellsberg

case as requested by him.

As this investigation progressed,

however, Wannall continued to levy demands for manpower which I

believed unwarranted in view of (1) his failure to effectively

adjust and use his existing manpower at a time when he had a

proportionately low case load and (2) his granting extensive

leave to personnel in his Section while continuing to levy manpower

demands.

Wannall now claims to have nine men assigned to the

Ellsberg case.

I invite comparison of the handling of the Ellsberg

Case to Eastcon. Eastcon at no time has had over 5 men assigned

full time to it, even though the case is of the very highest

priority and of

a magnitude and complexity seldom matched in

Bureau

investigations. In addition to the basic and complex

conspiracy itself, the case incorporates six separate substantive

investigations (draft board entries) which had to be brought

up to trial standard for prosecution of Eastcon.

There are at

least 85 volumes to the Eastcon file alone at this time. Eastcon

was absorbed within the responsible Section until it was firmly

established that Section's case load could not continue to absorb

the impact of Eastcon. No requests for additional manpower were

refused by me on Eastcon, and those requests made were fully

supported by facts, justified and grantea.

In my memorandum to Mr. Sullivan dated 8/12/71, captioned

"Adequacy of Personnel, Leak Cases, DomestiC IntellIgence DIVISIOn

(DID)," I candidly stated my position and evaluation of Wannall's

demands for manpower (copy attached). Attention is invited to

page 2, paragraph 4, concerning the 5 highly qualified and ex-

perienced men available to Wannall, none of whom were being

utilized by him on the Ellsbexg case.

Attention is also invited

to page 2, paragraph 5, which details Wannall's claim to Mr. Felt

of "enormous" problems

and need for still 2 more men.

Note that

part of that "enormous" problem was resolved in one week with one

interview. Concerning the first reference your attention is

directed to my memorandum to Mr. Sullivan dated 8/16/71 captioned

"Adequacy of Personnel, Domestic Intelligence Division (DID),"

(copy attached) which

requesting an additional Supervisor for the Special Coordination

Unit. Concerning the second reference above, and the tenor of the

entire memorandum, your attention is invited to Wannall's write-up

in this report captioned "Ellsberg Case," 4-A-3, page 10,

paragraph 1, wherein he states 9 men are now assigned to that

case.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/30/71

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 269

254

---

## Page 270

ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL

6-E

These two references and Wannall's responses to them

clearly draw the issues: (1) Whether he used good judgment and

considered the Bureau and Division overall responsibilities

in balance with his own desires for manpower in making his

requests; (2) When weaknesses in his position were pointed out

whether he attempted to cover them by making even more demands

for manpower hoping this would somehow give them credence and

(3) Whether he or the Division Head should judge the Division's

resources and capabilities and determine their allocation and

priority of need consistent with the Bureau's overall capabilities.

In summary, the work load of the Domestic intelligence

Division as exemplified by case loads set forth under "Pending

Work and Delinquency," 4-D-1, are very high.. Being mindful of

the practical limits of Bureau resources, I believe the currently

proposed adjustment of work assignments detailed in my above

referred to memorandum of 7/29/71 will allow the Domestic

Intelligence Division to function effectively with existing

manpower •

The new method of tabulating case count affords me a

better administrative dovice to obtain mazimum utilization of

existing manpower and periodic adjustments within the Division will

no doubt be warranted and made.

The observations of the Inspection Staff as to the

validity of manpower committed to the Blisberg case, as well

as

overall manpower needs of the Domestic Intelligence DiViSIon, are

welcomed.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

NW 88608 Docld:02989638 Page 370nls

6 - E

255

---

## Page 271

Extra

wait I2, 2971

ADENIACT OE FENSONNEL

LEE CASAG

DEWSTIC ERUZLZIGENCU DITISION (DID)

Reens 0/4/11 Arou

delt to 1r. Tolson captioned as abore,

bolt rosnonsined and the

the made of genis

handlizg lean croc, in bin la increassd immuiately too 5 to 7 toăng

218 Konger.

i DID to desered pending bie stu for Consideration:

The Director Baread

Tho LOblOWing

This Antolves

ten problena:

Red propaned aunponor adjustusair recomendod ju Resorandta

3/20/22e

The Insemotion Dériclos

concurred FAth

the proposod changes in that masozaados danone or nories

8he

Mpocias coardinatson Vass which trerdiraise foss! Airsche miters

19125

E00ta+:92

to Linas approved of the orcantrational charte.

The cisitS

were sumitta by serozandua c. D.Srenuan to Gallivan B//a shea Led

to 2.

Mold"a senorandus of 3/4/71 recommensiog & 1128h02 udy.

The ascoud probles lavolvos manpover nado lor abs Slabars

seak soned

chich bore arisen since 0/25f2l. Thoac are nandled

intelligence stetion wner bastion Chiel F.i tanali.

Then the Atsornoy Corera requested we invostigate the blisserg

matter Di

the Miries"

IIiOrIty And LadIY toá hin to u0 suisiezont namponer to handle 1t.

Le hivisod us after wid initial sorenanent that he bouid nora the

Tuese sere Imediately tenporazis

renssigned to hin iron other sectious.

120 453800123

and he sould nood 2 additional superviscis.

These Ecce

thin pisaod a heary overall bardon ou all sections and led to

ay recanendation in My sonorand on 1/29/71 for acaroger Chauta

FILLIN DID 10 LASUO LUSt MANDORES SUE LOING USTA OU IIONIN LIT

#3E203720

{2)

hoot yout tad that frat hou

Koir

Fals

(CONTINUED • OVIE)

302-5311257

Hito

CAREER

kx. the to HOBIE

RECRIDAL

NW 88608

Docid:32989638 Page 271

256

---

## Page 272

it in

Hiemorandum C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan

Ro:

ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL

Ir. Felt's menorandum 8/4/71 indicates he discussed the manpower

problem on the loak cases with Wannall sho said his problons had now

become so great he would need 2 more men for & total of 7.

• In line with Mr. Felt's stated intention to initiate an overall

study of the matter, I had Mr. Wannall

suunde to me an overall analysis

of uls manpower and work load as it relates to the leak cases in his

section.

Bet forth are the case

load figuren for Ar. Kaunall'e section

from March 1 - August 1, 1971:

larch 1

April 1

Hay 1

June 1

July 1

August 1

324

322

313

291

: 2922•

224

when the Milsbers case first broke, Wannall assured me be was

using his existing nanpover to the fullest extent possible and needed

temporarily assietance from other sections to carry on the other beavy

other

burdens of his section,.

but the caso load tigures now available for the

six-weck period tron 0/10/71 to 8/1/71 sing thai ali Wanuall did was pi:

his ova men on the special (5 men) and borrow manpower 15 nen) tron otter

sections to keep his other problems in haud at the sacritice oi other

sections with equally or even more burdensome problems.

This is shown by the fact that for June and july the case load

average in Fannall's section while handling the flisberg case was us?

aud 4s4 respectively as contrasted to a Division case load average for

a11 sections during tha same period of 339 and 235. This does not evez

take into consideration that he has s highly experienced and qualified

supervisors in the Special Coordination Unit won he does not include ia

his case load count.

lie could have drawn on at least one of these men

for special, assignent in an emergency but did not.

Actually, it is now clear that Wannall responded in the Initial

stage of his problem with a panicky, prenature request for additional

manpower as he subseguently did through his observation to It. Felt that

he needed still 2 more men. In eifect, Manuall put DID in the untenable

position of giving Mr. Felt an oif-the-culf assessuentos what he

considered to be an "enormous" problem and & need for still 2 ncie men

unsupported by lacts and oblivious to the problems of the Division as

& whole. As a matter of fact, one of the leak cases which caused Wannal:

great alarm was referred to us by the Departneut on 8/2/71.

By letter

dated 8/9/71 Wannall advised the Department that we had condäcted oue

interview which showed that prosecution could not be entertained and

accordingly would condict no further investigation in the absence of

- 2-

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 272 •

(CONTINUED - OVER)

257

---

## Page 273

Memorandum. C. B. Brennau to W. C. Sullivan

RE: ADEQUACY OF FALSONNEL

spocific instructions. Therefore, one part of Wannall's "enormous"

problen was resolved in one wool with one interview and one letter to.

the Department.

„Of equal concern to me is Mannall's handling of leave requests

during the period of 6/15/71 to 8/5/71. When contonted with the Ellsber

case, he had discussed leave with me and had suggerted that if it was

necessary for hin to cancel leave requests in his section he felt leave

should be cancelled throughout the entire Division. I told him it would

be ridiculous to cancel leave Division-wide because one section had a

problem.

I advised him leave throughout the Division would be approve

on the basis of sound judgment in relation to overell Division work Ica=

and in accordance with the Director's instructions concerning individuale

involved on major cases.

I have ascertained that since 6/15/71 Wannall has approved leave

JOr I2 supervisors in bis section totaling 763 hours. This is an average

of nearly 8 days per man for each of those 12,

He approved these exter-

Elve leave requests during the sano period that he advised his probiess

were so "enormous" that he needed ? additional men.

OBSERVATIONS:

Historically, the 'bureau has learned to live with specials of

Various kinds.

I agree with the concept that such specials sre a test

Of the responsible official's ability to handle them within the frare

work of the Bureau's overall responsibilities and capabilities.

in like

manner, I expect no less from supervisory personnel under me and vill

not condone unwarranted attempts to grab manpower within the Division

regardless of whether the attempts are based on an inability to think

clearly, an incapacity to adjust to a stress situation, or oversight

resulting from a provincial attitude and outlook.

DiD has absorbed into its periphery of responsibilities many ne

problen areas involving racial and new loft eztremists in rocent years.

These problems have taxed our ingenuity and resulted in across-the coard

heavy work load increases brought about by the need to flexibly realiga

manpower to meet new challenges.

When other priorities of the Bureau

have precluded additional' manpower being added to DID, I have attempted

to take the positive approach of naking internal adjustments to julfill

our responsibilities with available resources.

In this vain, there Is attached a copy of a memorandun I prepared

for all Branch and

Section Chieis of DID dated 7/23/71 which resulted

1n my memorandum to Mr. Sullivan of 7/29/71 recomending DID manpower

(CONTINUED - OVER)

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 273

---

## Page 274

Menorandun C. D.

Brennon to W. C. Sullivan

BE: ADEQUACY OF REASONNE

anjustnents. I fool it nill serve to show why the Inspection Division

with a ninor esception approved our proposed manpower adjustments.

Porhaps it vill serve also to incilliate the study ir. lelt Indicated

he won initiating.

I hope it will resolve nuy doubts the Director or

others may have about what we are trying to do with out nanpover resources

Is DID and why ve are trying to do iù.

AUCOLENATLONS

(1) Ponding the Director's final approval of the proposed

manpover adjustuents within DID, the 5 men femozarily assigned 40

the

SLADELE CASE LEMaIN as ASSIgIOd.

(2) Any additional personnel to he assigned to tho slisborg

C2

othet jock cases at thia tine should cone iron within the Intionalities

Intelligence section in view of the relativoly lower case 10ad in that

(3) That Inspector D. E. Moore personally assume overall direction

the ALisbors, and laai cases to Insuro Vannall's proper utilization of

manpover in the direction of our objectives. This should include daily

conferences with Mannall and his men on the Elisbese and lenk cases and

a weekly progress report to me Iron inspector Moore.

Brennan is. to remarle until dare is concluded, t

(4) That 3r. Felt as instructed by the Director expedite his

study of recommended DID paupower adjusinents so thei desirable changes

can be effected without further delay to enable us to put our manpower

on our most important problens.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 274*

259

---

## Page 275

Do Go Sullivan

Aigust 16, 1971

ADROVACE ON HERSONNEL

DORS TEC

INTELIGIOICE DIVISION (OLD)

En attachod nonorandus Fanzall to Brennan 8/19/73 sequesting

ONE SECILIAIAL SUPERTISOI DE

Approved IrOn cutSido DIDDE the Fereigu

Laison Des (713)

because of a hoavy increase in work valute.

I apPos expansion of pur lngat cirices las produced vork increasa

Fiich Fouls juatiy sOctionA, Supervisor ch Fld.

lanall's recontendation concured in ly the tranch Chiot, inspoctes

De E. Aboze,

that"

eloule cose fron outside DiD,

" an mindiul oi

the Inspectzon Division's survey of vork in DID during wock of 7/13/71

Follouans zogusst dor additional superviacr in Aspionage aoction. the

Juspectoz

ocachied that the arasens supervisory capabiliêes of

DIR

733

Iuspection Diviaion's analysis 0f 1szk 23 A1D 38 36 9/1/71

GE DVOIRAI LESCONSIDILIALES IION & CASE 10RE StAREPOiNE ShOW VI

Jaly

average cass load per supervisor 18 Januery ma 322 and 26

Raunalle average case Joad in farusiy per supervisor Has

and i1 July A94an averace rine cs o11y 3 cases in the Misision

of only l0 cases in lannall's seotion in six noatha.

I sould point out to both inspector loore and Fassall

inctoza misigaze asainos requesting additiomi cupurvisura fron

outalde Dit.

Inspector soore hau acooss to those facts and shauld have

Request

explained to ranmall the seed to tollos tradltional pattsans in requestiog

AD D0d141012l 5023,

'Bo, dijasting vithia the Divisios's ovaroll cai

poter qua bork load iranerock of espahllities and responsibilities.

The doylous ausrer ie for fanmll to Iegsife

2 man trod sichin his

section to the i0.

Thia vould (1) alleviate

the work lond toore and,

{22)

bridg has cose

lead closer to tbe Division's supervisory average

se che ond en 9o days he could then roadsous his siclation

and conside iny action tb0 Lucts than Exinat.

loreves, the signiticince placed on our recent Legat

+SpaNS102

a Lit.

porte forte

185.

CallEhan

1WX0dY

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 *Page 275 •

---

## Page 276

Besorandun C.D.

Eronaaa to l. G. Sullivas

ZES:

ROMANTIC INTEZLICENCE DIVISION (DED)

Bay Icel the facts Issented by Hansall axe such to outmige all other

request au conjunction with the unarawar arjustnous survey he is tu

HALLENGE ANG

will bo nudied socortungly.

I Have

seitiated sons nes fuddelling

tor cuteraining Ditseion

manporar assigments pad case 2ode.

I colieve those will provido &

GilL Letter LaSia fOr DID &0 LuSUrG

Lis nanports in berna

405E

stiestivoly usce on priority natters.

Who. Felt may desire

40 153

Chece guidolsons iancaiately as & wasure or his study.

TASTION:

That i. delt consider the request ot

Din hu conjunction mich hin

Ben taste eper me t

come fim within the DiS.

5.r

261

__NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 276

---

## Page 277

ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL

INTERNAL SECURITY SECTION

6-E

SECTION CHIEF A. W. GRAY: NO As of close of business 8/17/71

the authorized personnel of the

Internal Security Section was 17 Special Agents, Y Secretaries,

and 13 Clerks.

A breakdown by Units follows:

FRONT OFFICE

AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL

AS OF COB 8/17/71

1

Section Chief

Secretary

Number One Man

Secretary

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA, UNIT

Supervisors

Secretary

Clerks

FOREIGN INFLUENCE AND

PRO-CHICOM UNIT

-

Supervisors

Secretary

Clerks

KLAN AND WHITE HATE GROUPS UNIT

Supervisors

Secretary

Clerks

SECURITY INFORMANT UNIT

Supervisors

!

Secretary

Clerks

SUBVERSIVE INDIVIDUALS UNIT

Supervisors

1

3 (SA Benedict assigned

temporarily Nationali-

ties Intelligence)

• 1

2

2

2

4 (SA Seabaugh assigned

temporarily Nationali-

ties Intelligence)

1

5

5

(SA WI Smith extended

sick leave

beginning

6/25/71)

Secretary

Clerks

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

NW 88608-Doc|6132889638 (Rage)277

062

---

## Page 278

• SPECIFIC COMMENTS

1.

None

2. None

3. None

4. None

5. During the period since the last inspection

manpower savings have been effected in that the following

Supervisors for the periods indicated have been assigned

elsewhere in the Division. Supervisor James P. Benedict

period since the last inspection except for approximately

12 days that he was working in the Internal Security Section.

Most of this period he was on temporary assignment in the

New Leit Section on the Special concerning the East Coast

Conspiracy to Save Lives case.

More recently he has been

on temporary assigueni io the Nationalities Inüelligence

Section on the McLek Special. Since 8/13/71 Supervisor

Seabaugh has also been on temporary assignment in

the Nationalities Intelligence Section on the Melek Special.

6.

When Special Agent supervisory personnel

currently assigned, temporarily on loan to other Sections,

are returned, we will have adequate personnel to handle

• existing case load. There is, however, an area of pending

work which could greatly increase the

supervisory work load

and require expeditious file reviews,

analysis of cases,

availability of witnesses, reviews of informant reports and

preparation of correspondence. runds were recently appropriated

by Congress for the implementation of Executive Order 11605

which broadened the powers of the Subversive Activities Control

Board (SACB) to enable the Board to hold hearings and designate

violence-prone extremist organizations as subversive. The

Department has indicated that it intends to initiate proceedings

before the SACB as soon as possible and there are

a number of

organizations being handled in the Internal Security Section,

such as the Revolutionary Union and Progressive Labor Party,

which are likely to be selected for presentation. Based on

past

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/19/71

SEP:ebC

6-E

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 278

263

---

## Page 279

experience, the preparation of a case for presentation

to the SACB requires the services of one Supervisor on

a full-time basis.

Thus, it is anticipated that the

Department's action pursuant to Executive Order 11605

will substantially increase the work load of the

Internal

Security Section.

7. In evaluating adequacy of both Special Agent

and clerical personnel the following criteria were used:

case load

mail count

name checks

complexity of cases and supervision involved

deadline matters

special assignments

experienced

supervisors

Administrative duties assigned Supervisors in

Charge rEviewing mail, conferriag-with employees, organizing

Unit, limit to some extent the volume of case assignments

handled.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/19/71

SEP: ebc...

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 279

264

---

## Page 280

ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL

6-E

SECTION CHIEF R. D. COTTER:

As of close of business 8/17/71,

the complement of this Section

was as follows: Special Agents 12, secretaries 6, and clerks 13, for a

total of 31. This is broken down by unit as follows:

Section Front Office - 2 Special Agents, 1 Secretary (Stenography),

1 Secretary (Typing), 1 Clerk (Typing - GS-5).

One Special Agent on permanent detached

assignment to Department of Justice.

Central Research Unit - 5 Special Agents, 1 Secretary, 3 Super-

visory Clerks (technical publications writers),

1 Clerk (publications coordinator), 1 Clerk

(omnibus).

Civil Disorder Reporting Unit - 2 Special Agents, 1 Secretary,

1 Clerk (omnibus).

Current Intelligence Reporting Unit - 2 Special Agents, 1 Secretary,

I Supervisory Clerk (technical publications

writer), 1 Clerk (omnibus).

Special Records Unit - 1 Special Agent, 1 Secretary, 4 Clerks.

The following responses are numbered to correspond with

Inspector's specific questions:

1. Position of Section Chief is technically vacant, with no

authority to fill. Section Chief R. D. Cotter, with approval of the

Director, has been on permanent detached assignment with the Department

of Justice since 6/1/71. Number One Man I. J. Smith has acted in

capacity of Section Chief.

One Special Agent position in Current Intelligence Reporting

Unit has been vacant since retirement of SA Bee Wells, eitective 1/30/71.

Authority granted to fill position and SA b.

N. Lloyd will report 8/18/71

as SA Wells' replacement.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/17/71

TJS: amt

6-E

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 280

265

---

## Page 281

2. SA Dean N. Lloyd is under transfer to the Division from

the San Antonio Office.

e Transfer letter was dated 6/30/11. He has

arrived in Washington and will report for assignment 8/18/71.

Mrs. J

Jacqueline Kelset Elliott, Clerk GS-4, assigned to

Current Intelligence Reporting Unit, resigned effective 8/24/71. Letter

acknowledging resignation was dated 8/3/71.

Intelligence spoone Wei, Secretary Ve 6/0/12 to furrent

acknowledging resignation was dated 7/28/71.

3. There is one GS-4 Clerk surplus to the Section complement.

This is located in the Current Intelligence Reporting Unit and is due to

fact that replacement for Mrs. Elliott (above) received prior to effective date

of resignation, 8/24/71.

4. Current cierival personnel complement is considered.....

adequate but not excessive to the needs of the Section.

5. There have been no manpower savings effected through

streamlining procedures since date of last inspection. One Special

Agent who had been on loan to Internal Security Section was transferred

permanently to that Section effective 5/24/71, with no replacement to

be provided. Overall Section complement was thereby reduced by one

Special Agent and the work load occasioned by this reduction was absorbed

by existing Agent complement with assistance from Supervisory Clerks

(Technical Publications Writers).

6. Due to nature of permanent assignment of Section Chief

R. D. Cotter to the Department of Justice, full burden and responsibility

for running the Section and handling Section Front Office functions has

• fallen on the Number One Man, I. J. Smith. A replacement for

Mr. Cotter is very definitely deemed necessary so that an acting

Number One Man can be designated to relieve SA Smith in the Section

Front Office. In the interest of continuity of responsibility and authority

it is felt that designation of an acting Number One Man is a must. A

replacement was approved by the Director for the other Agent named

along with Mr. Cotter for detached permanent assignment to the

Department. Personnel of the Section cannot be considered adequate

so long as there is only one Special Agent handling Front Office

responsibilities of the Section.

NW 88608_Docld:32989638* Page 281

266

---

## Page 282

- 3

7. Criteria used in assessing personnel adequacy in this

Section includes a number of diverse factors. As pointed out in prior

inspections, case load figures are not applicable, neither are there any

other simple qualitative measurements of the Section's work. Research

Section is essentially the service arm of the Division and handles a

wide variety of assignments involving research, study and analysis. Of

primary importance is production of a variety of documents aimed at

providing the White House, Attorney General, other high level Government

officials and Bureau officials current intelligence information relating to

the broad spectrum of the Division's work. In addition to the writing of

highly condensed intelligence summaries, digests, and analyses in

pamphlet form for high level dissemination, the Section provides a daily

teletype summary of racial disorders and developments and of antiwar,

campus disorders and other disturbances growing out of various protest

activity. The Section also handles all matters which involve the Division

as a whole, where the matter crosses section lines. Director's specials

involving such matters as wire taps, nonspecific topical subjects such as

guidelines for internal security investigations, and similar matters are

handled and/or coordinated in the Section.

The adequacy of personnel of the Section depends on the

demands leveled by the White House or by Bureau officials for the

specialized studies and other material which the Section is geared to

produce on short notice. Demands for intelligence data were extremely

heavy from the White House prior to and during the election campaign

last year. It can reasonably be expected that even greater demands will

be placed on the Bureau during the months ahead, and such demands will

invariably involve the elements of extremism, terrorism, racial and

new left agitation and other internal security problems. It is to be noted

that this Section actually wrote one speech for Vice President Agnew and

provided the material for inclusion in several others.

We also provided

Mr. Agnew with a special brief which was kept updated, for use in

appearing before various groups.

267

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 282

---

## Page 283

ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL

NEW LEFT SECTION 6-E

SECTION CHIEF R. L. SHACKELFORD!

There is set forth below

a tabulation of the actual and authorized personnel in the

New Left Section as of close of business, August 17, 1971.

Authorized

Assigned

New Left Groups Unit

4 Agents

* Agents

* Clerks

4 Clerks

Protest and Trotskyist

Groups Unit

Special Investigations -

East Unit

Special Investigations -

West Unit

Subversive Individuals -

New Left Unit

Front Office

3 Agents

3 Agents

5 Clerks

5 Clerks

6 Agents

5 Clerks

6 Agents

5 Clerks

, Total

• 5 Agents

5 Clerks

6 Agents

6 Clerks

2 Agents

2 Clerks

26 Agents

27 Clerks

53 Employees

5 Agents

5 Clerks

6 Agents

7 Clerks

2 Agents

2 Clerks

26 Agents

28 Clerks

54 Employees

I. There are no vacant positions in the New Left Section.

2. There are no transfers pending in or out of the Section,

nor are there any letters of resignation in the Section pending

as of August 17, 1971.

3. As of August. 17, 1971, this Section is one secretary over the

authorized complement.

This secretary is temporarily assigned to

the GS-6 secretary position in the Section Front Office, which

was vacated by the reassignment of the incumbent to a proposed

GS-6 clerical position in the Subversive Individuals - New Left

Unit. Upon approval of the proposed clerical position, the

extra secretary will be utilized to fill the GS-6 secretary

vacancy in the Front Office.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/19/71

RLs.cae

6-E

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 283

26

---

## Page 284

Adequacy of Personnel

New Left Section 6-E

• 4.

At time of last inspection, this Section had a complement

of 24 clerical personnel as compared to present assigned

complement of 28 clerical personnel. This increase was

occasioned by the transfer of the Protest and Trotskyist

Groups Unit with accompanying personnel from Internal Security

Section to the New Left Section.

Congress recently appropriated funds for implementation of

Executive Order 11605 which broadened power of Subversive

Activities Control Board (SACB) to designate violence prone

extremist organizations as subversive.

The Department has

indicated it intends to initiate these proceedings as soon as

possible (See R. L. Shackelford memorandum to Mr. C. D.

Brennan, August

16, 1971, captioned "Executive Order 11605").

This Section handles a number of organizations which will

undoubtedly be selected by the Department for presentation

before the SACB.

of cases for presentation to the SACB creates a considerable

increase in work of a clerical nature. If the Department's

Intention in this regard is implemented, it will be necessary

to obtain an additional clerk in the future, however, we are

not requesting any additional clerical personnel at this time.

5. The New Left Section, as of January, 1971, had an

authorized complement of

22 Agents and 23 cierks.

Current

assigned complement is 26 Agents and 28 clerks.

This increase

in complement, as

noted above, was occasioned by the transfer

of the Protest and Trotskyist

Groups Unit from the Internal

Security Section to the New Left Section.

6. The caseload being handled by the New Left Section (average

371 cases per Agent as of August 1, 1971) is considered excessive.

We are, at the present time, making a conscientious effort to

reduce

this caseload to desirable level by weeding out and

closing cases which do not require additional investigation.

It, in spite of our efforts, the upward trend continues, it may

be necessary to request additional Agent personnel to handle

the excessive caseload in this Section.

As noted in number 4 above, it is anticipated that as a

result of recent Congressional

action, the Department intends to

soon present violence prone extremist organizations before the

SACB for designation as subversive. Such presentations will,

- 2-

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 284

269

---

## Page 285

Adequacy of Personnel

New Left Section

6-E

of necessity, include several organizations currently handled

by this section.

Based on past experience, the preparation of

a case for presentation before the SACB requires the services

of one supervisor on a full-time basis. No request is being

made at this time for additional Agent

personnel. However,

based on the above, it appears that a request for one additional

Agent will be necessary when the above proceedings are.

instituted.

7.

Adequacy of personnel in the New Left Section is constantly

evaluated on basis of caseload and type of cases handled by

each Unit, review of delinquency reports, number of requests

received from Department and other agencies, and review of the

overall objectives of the Section. When it is noted, because

of special circumstances

excessive amount of work

is temporarily assigned to one Unit, personnel from other Units

are utilized to alleviate the situation.

3

270

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 285

---

## Page 286

ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL

6-E

SECTION CHIEF W. A.

BRANG CẶN

ESPIONAGE SECTION

(1) The authorized personnel of the Espionage Section

as of the close of business August 17, 1971, is as follows:

AGENT

CLERK

SECRETARY

CLERK-STENO

2

2

Front Office

Soviet Unit -

Washington

Soviet Unit -

New York

Special Cases Unit

3

2

1.

1

4*

3

1

0...

Coordination Unit

Satellite Unit

3

4

3***

5

1

1

1

*Special Agent George M. Quinn was designated to replace Special Agent

Special Agent Quinn is currently assigned to the

Yaste on sivision; date of reporting to the Espionage Section is

not known.

**Intelligence Analyst, GS-10, Mary E. Triplett, performing work in

lieu of Special Agent.

***Clerk, GS-7, A. Iris Kirby, performing work in lieu of

Special Agent.

(2) By letter dated July 28, 1971, Special Agent

George M. Quinn was ordered for assignment to the Domestic

Intelligence Division.

By letter dated August 17, 1971, Dale P. Be

Ramacciato

submitted his resignation to be effective at close of business

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8-19-71.

WAB:hke

6-t

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 286

271

---

## Page 287

ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL

August 20, 1971. Letter acknowledging resignation has not

been received.

(3) As of August 17, 1971, there was a shortage

of one Special Agent in the Soviet Unit - New York. As of

August 17, 1971, there was no overage of authorized personnel

(4) Clerical personnel is considered adequate but

not excessive at the present time.

(5)

Since the last inspection the Special Agent

complement of the Espionage Section has been reduced by two.

At the time of the last inspection the Espionage Section had a

total case load of 5,089 cases, of which 141 were handled by

clerical personnel in lieu of Agent personnel.

There was,

therefore, an average of 275 pending investigations per Agent

Supervisor.

As of July 31, 1971, the Espionage Section had a

total of 5,575 cases, of which 270 were handled by clerical

personnel.

This provided an average of 331 pending investigations

for each Agent Supervisor.

(6). By memorandum June 4, 1971, a request was made to

increase the Special Agent complement by one Special Agent.

This

was predicated on an increase in the volume and complexity

of investigations handled. The request was denied. By memorandum

July 14, 1971,

I asked to increase the Special Agent complement

by one

In order that the Ironclad case could be assigned the

full-time job of one Special Agent.

Ironclad is a unique source

of the Bureau and it is important that information from this source

is given the analysis and consideration that it deserves.

This

request was denied, and, the Special Agent complement of the

Espionage Section was fixed

at 18. In light of President Nixon's

recent request to cut back, no request for additional special Agent

personnel is being made and the present complement is considered

adequate.

(7) Criteria utilized in determining the adequacy of

personnel includes the volume of cases supervised, the complexity

of the cases, and the importance of the investigation.

In the Soviet Units - Washington and New York, we are

currently handling 2,190 cases among an authorized complement of

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8-19-71

WAB: hke

6-E

- 2.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 287

273

---

## Page 288

ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL

seven Special Agents. The greatest majority of our double agent

cases are assigned in these Units and these are among the most

complex investigations. The operation of a double agent requires

minute supervision to insure that the objectives of the investi-

gation are achieved.

The soviet Unit - Mashington also supervises

two illegal agent cases, and the Soviet Unit - New York has the

overall supervision of the Ironclad source.

The Satellite Unit, which supervises the investigations

in the Polish, Romanian, Czechoslovakian, and Yugoslav nationality

fields, has

total of 1,408 investigations, including the intormants

and double agents that are being directed against the Soviet-bloc

establishments and personnel:

There is, therefore, an average of

352 investigations in this Unit.

The Coordination Unit is currently handling 1,226

investigations, of which 178 are assigned to a Clerk in lieu of

an Agent.

Considering that this Unit has the

responsibility for

a number of special subjects and special operatione, including

the

adaptation of our records to automatic data processing

equipment, the case load is considered very high.

In our Special Cases Unit there are currently 751

investigations, of which 92 are handled by a Clerk in lieu of

an Agent. These investigations are divided among two Special

Agents.

The figure of 751 compares favorably with the total of

768 at

the time of the last inspection, which number was divided

among three Special Agents.

:

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8-19-71

WAB: hke

6-E

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 288

-3-

273

---

## Page 289

ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL

6-E

SECTION CHIEF G. C. MOORE, C

EXTREMIST INTELLIGENCE SECTION

The current authorized personnel complement of the

Extremist Intelligence Section as of the close of business

August 18, 1971, is 22 Agents and 23 clerical personnel. This

is broken down

as follows according to Units within the Section:

Front Office

Section Chief

Number One Man

Secretary to Section

Chief

Secratary to Number

One Man

- 1

- 1

- 1

Black Nationalist Unit - East

6. Supervisors including Supervisor in Charge

? clerical personnel

Black Nationalist Unit - Central

4. Supervisors including Supervisor in Charge

3 clerical personnel

Black Nationalist Unit - West

5 Supervisors including Supervisor in Charge

5 clerical personnel

Black Nationalist - South and Racial Informant Unit

5 Supervisors including Supervisor in Charge

6 clerical personnel

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/18/71

TDR: mlm

6-E

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 289

274

---

## Page 290

(1) There are no clerical or supervisory vacancies

in the Section.

(2) No one is under transfer into or out of the

Section.

(3) There is no shortage or overage of authorized

personnel.

(4) The derical personnel assigned to the Section

is considered adequate at this time.

(5) The streamlining of our operations wherever

• possible to effect manpower savings is under continual

evaluation. Examples of streamlining measures taken since

the last inspection include: (1) Abolishment of the Agitator

Index on 4/21/71 as an analysis revealed that it was no longer

the necessary aministrative tooi that ii vice was; (2) After-.

consultation with the Department, discontinued submission of

monthly evidentiary reports concerning the Black fanther Party

on May 14, 1971. At the time this program was discontinued,

23 field offices were submitting monthly evidentiary reports.

averaging 37 pages in length; (3) Limited the scope of inves-.

tigations, of black student groups on college campuses to

those groups which have engaged in violence and/or lawless

activitles of are moving toward violence or lawlessness.by

letter to all offices 7/26/71; (4) Assigned additional duties

to clerical personnel in effort to reduce the workload of

Special Agent Supervisors. Specifically, a clerk is now

handling the Black Extremist Bureau Fugitive List, correlates

the receipt and review of publications and newspapers dealing

with the black nationalist movement, reviews and forwards

to appropriate field offices information received from the

military on black extremist in the Armed Forces, and handles

certain correspondence with the National Security Agency

concerning matters of mutual interest.

In addition, we continue to utilize our teletype

dissemination facilities to the maximum extent possible

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 290

275

---

## Page 291

(6) The Special Agent complement Is 22 including

• the Section Chief and Number One Man, an increase of one

since the last inspection.

The Division was reorganized

December 17, 1970, on the basis of approximate case load

per Supervisor of 279. This figure was based on the

October 1, 1970, case

load figures. As of January 1, 1971,

the case load stood at 349 per Supervisor and a request for

two additional Special Agent Supervisors was approved. The

opening of cases on Black Student Union-type organizations

and leaders thereof on college campuses across the Nation

in December, 1970, showed up in our case load figures during

the early months of 1971.

These cases have been handled and

closed by the end of the 1970-1971 school year. As of

August 1, 1971, the case load stood at 5,428 or an average

of 271 per Supervisor assigned. These cases represent hard-

core extremist individuals and organizations and require

extensive supervision.

Additional factors dealing with the adequacy of

personnel is a speciel that was received in the Sestion on

May 29, 1971; involving the killing of two police officers

in New York City on May 21, 1971, which the President instructed

the FBI to investigate and solve. The supervision of this

investigation occupies the full time of one Supervisor. In

addition, one Supervisor was placed on loan to the Nationalities

Intelligence Section on July 19, 1971, and a second Supervisor

was placed' on loan to that Section on August 13, 1971.

With the return of these two Supervisors to the

Section, I consider the supervisory personnel as adequate.

There are several factors that would indicate that

our work in the black extremist field will increase in the

immediate future. With the reopening of school in the '

immediate future, we can foresee an influx of cases involving

extremist Black Student UNion-type groups and leaders thereof.

Executive Order 11605 signed by the President on

July 2, 1971, expanded the

activities of the Subversive

Activities Control Board (SACB). The Department has advised

276

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 291

---

## Page 292

that a Section has been formed within the Internal Security

Division of the Department to file petitions before the SACB

pursuant to Executive Order 11605 and that the Department

is interested in proceeding as quickly as possible against

such parties as the Black Panther Party and the Ku Klux Klan

among others. Such proceedings will materially increase

the workload of the Section.

Under the proposed reorganization of the Division

which is under consideration at this time, this Section, if

such reorganization is approved, will handle all Klan and

white-hate organizations, individuals and informants with

the present supervisory complement. In this connection,

the informant cases are adoptable to full assimilation into

our present extremist informant setup and a great deal of

the work in connection with the handling of these informants

will be assigned the responsibility of two grade 6 clerical

employees in the Black Nationalist - South and Racial Informant

Unit. In order to absorb the Klan and white-hate organiza-

tions and individuals, they will be assigned in accordance

with the geographic breakdown we

are presently using within

the four Units in the Section.

Black extremist activity in this country is

developing more and more in international aspects. Residents

of other countries including U. S. citizens and noncitizens

are involved in clandestine and overt operational activity

among racial extremists. We have targeted Central Intelligence

Agency as well as our Legal Attaches abroad for the develop-

ment of data regarding foreign influence in the black

extremist movement. We have levied requirements and are

expanding on such requirements on the National Security

Agency which has vast capabilities in developing the type

of information needed.

(7) In evaluating personnel adequacy, we take into

consideration not only the case load which is compiled on a.

monthly basis but also results of periodic mail counts taken

on a quarterly basis. Many of our cases on key figures in

the black extremist movement such as Huey Newton, Eldridge

conster Jae amount, super son attenthers require a

277

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 292

---

## Page 293

Analysis of current developments in the racial

field, preparation of special studies, requests from other

Government agencies, and so forth all require considerable

supervisory. time and are taken into consideration in evaluating

the adequacy of supervisory personnel.

278

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 293

---

## Page 294

ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL

6-E

SECTION CHEF W. R. WANNALL

NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE SECTION

As of close of business 8/17/71 Section complement was:

Authorized Actual

Special Agents

Secretaries (Steno)

Secretary (Typing)

Stenographer (Supervisory)

Clerical (Supervisory)

Stenographers

Clerks (GS-4, 5, 6, 7)

Totals

20

-8.

1

1

1

26

20•

77

20*

8.

1

1

26***

21***

:78

*Does not include 7 Agents on loan from other Sections for McLek

Special.

***Includes one GS-4 Clerk (Kendall Wayne Shull) assigned

temporarily to Section 7/22/71 for training purposes.

.. ".

'Section Front Office consists of two Special Agents, one Secretary

(Stenography) and one Secretary (Typing).

Cuban Unit consists of three Special Agents, one Secretary (Steno-

graphy), one Clerk (GS-5). and one Clerk (GS -4)

Nationality Unit consists of four Special Agents,

one Secretary

(Stenography), one Clerk (GS-6) and three Clerks (GS-4):

Special Coordination Unit consists of five Special Agents, three

Secretaries (Stenography), one Clerk (GS-7), four Clerks (GS-5), and three

Clerks (GS-4).

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/19/71

WRW:ams

NW 88608 Bolid:32989638 Page 294

274

---

## Page 295

2

6-E

Chinese Unit consists of three Special Agents, one Secretary

(Stenography), and three Clerks (GS-4).

Middle and South American Unit consists of three Special Agents,

one Secretary (Stenography), and three Clerks (GS-4).

Division Stenographic Pool consists of one Stenographic Supervisor

(Clerk), one Assistant Supervisor (Stenographic), one Clerk-Stenographer

(GS-5), and 25 Clerk-Stenographers (GS-4).

While the foregoing represents the organizational structure of the

Section as authorized, the actual structure has been affected by the McLek

and related specials since 6/15/71. There are seven Agents assigned on a

temporary, and in part rotating, basis to this Section from other sections within

the Division. These men, together with the 20 Agents regularly assigned to

the Section, are assigned as follows

Section Front Office - two (no change).

Cuban Unit - three (two regular;

one on temporary rotating assign-

ment--David A. Brumble of Extremist Intelligence Section reported 8/13/71).

Nationality Unit - three (one regular and two on temporary assignment--

James HI. Kavanash of New Left Section reported 7/19/71, and John L Adams.

i of Extremist Intelligence Section reported 8/9/71). This is one less than .

normal unit Agent complement.

• Special Coordination Unit - five (no change):

Chinese Unit - two (regular). This is one less than normal unit

Agent complement.

Middle and South American Unit - three (two regular and one on

temporary rotating assignment--Wilfred R. Schlarman of Espionage Section

reported 8/16/71).

McLek and Related Specials - nine (as follows):

Eugene R. Harrell (of this Section)

James r.

Wagoner (of this Section)

Jesse R. Hasy. (Of this Section)

Herbert J. Morgan (of this section

Lionel E

Belanger (of this Section)

280

NW 88608 Docld:32989638

Page 295

---

## Page 296

- 3 ÷

6.- E

William W. Hamilton (of this Section)

Joseph M, Sizoo (of Research Section)

Tony J.

Seabaugh (of Internal Security Section)

James P. Benedict (of Internal Security Section)

Harrell, Wagoner and Hamilton are regularly assigned to the

a the diban unit or easy to the thinese South American unit, Belanger

(1) All positions were occupied as of close of business 8/17/71,

although one transfer out was pending and one resignation was pending.

• (2) By letter dated 8/16/71 Linda Marie Blum, Clerk-Stenographer,

GS-4, was transferred to Phoenix Office.

Carol A. Maslow has resigned

effective close of business 8/27/71. Letter acknowledging this was dated 8/2/71.

(3) _Kendall Wayne Shull, Clerk, GS-4, was assigned to Section

7/22/71 for training purposes pending clerical opening within Division to which

he would be permanently assigned.

(4) The additional work involved in the handling of McLek and

related specials has to date required the assignment of nine Agents. There

has been additional clerical work involved which to date has been handled by

clerks regularly assigned to the Nationality Unit plus the clerical assistance

rendered by Kendall Wayne Shull from 7/22/71 to 8/17/71 and by Wayne T.

Smith who, for traming purposes, was assigned to this Section from 7/7 to 8/3/71.

It reorganization results in setting up a special unit to handle McLek and related

matters, we would require a GS-5 Secretary (Stenography) for the Unit Chief

and a minimum of three clerical employees, one to handle lead cards, one to

handle dissemination and the third to handle indices searches, file requests

and related matters. We would endeavor to fill two of the three clerical positions

from clerical complement presently in the Section by diverting one clerk from

the present Nationality Unit and one clerk from the Middle and South American

Unit. We would request that the clerical

position which has existed since 7/7/71

• for training purposes be made permanent by an increase in the clerical

complement. This would result in adding to the over-all Section complement

one Secretary (Stenography), GS-5, and one Clerk, GS-4.

(5) The principal manpower savings effected since last inspection

- was brought about through a voluntary reduction of over-all case load within

the Section to preclude the necessity for requesting an additional Agent for

assignment to the 13 operational desks within the Section (those existing in

all units except the Front Office, the Special Coordination Unit, and the Division

Stenographic Pool Unit), The case load reduction was effected by streamlining

281

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 296

---

## Page 297

4

6-E

procedures regarding the handling of cases relating to deserting Chinese

seamen (a reduction of approximately 160 cases) and restricting the opening

of investigations of the Jewish Defense League to high-level national leaders

(which resulted in a reduction of approximately 70 cases). Memoranda captioned

"Case Load Reduction, Nationalities Intelligence Section, " dated 4/15 and

5/5/71 attached.

(6) Our regular Agent complement is 20 and we have seven men on

loan from other sections. Of these 27 men, nine are presently assigned to

McLek and related specials, six from the regular Agent complement from this

Section and three of the loan Agents. The assignment of the manpower from

this Section has resulted in the temporary reduction of the complements of the

Nationality Unit and the Chinese Unit by one Agent each. While it is felt we can

continue running these two units on a temporary basis in the immediate future

with one less man assigned to each, we will not be able to expand efforts in the

Chinese communist field which, at this time, is considered critical. To do

this, the Chinese Unit should be built to an Agent complement of five. This

would permit us to handle the current work in the unit and expand into areas

which are considered necessary at this time and which are outlined in detail

in the attached write-up dated 8/18/71 and captioned "Chinese Matters."

By memorandum dated 8/12/71 one additional Agent Supervisor

was requested for assignment to the Foreign Liaison Desk. A copy of this

memorandum is attached, together with a copy of a cover memorandum dated

8/16/71 from Assistant Director Brennan to Mr. Sullivan captioned "Adequacy

of Personnel, Domestic Intelligence Division (DDD). "

(7) Criteria utilized in evaluating personnel adequacy include

continuing analysis of Agent and clerical work load, case load, mail counts,

complexity of cases, relative importance of matters to national security and

intelligence requirements, personnel capabilities, and past experience in

shifts of emphasis of work from one area to another.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 297

287

---

## Page 298

April 15, 1971

CASE LOAD REDUCTION

NATIONALITIES NTELLIGENCE SECTION

We intend to reduce our current case load irom 4197 to 3739,

a reduction of 458 active cases and a reduction in the average case load for the 13

Agents handling case supervision from 322 to 28%.

This reduction is in part contingent upon re-establishing the moratorium

on Si cases and would be effected as follows:

Middle and South American Unit - By re-establishing the moratorium

one cages, 30 pending cases would be closed. This Unit has a current case load of.

376 active cases and reduction will result in a net case load of 940.

Chinese Unit - The recently approved streamlining procedures will result

in approximately 30 days' time in the closing of 100 cases on deserting seamen This

Unit has 1098 purpont netire cases and with redhetion wili have a net a 363 notve-casce.

Nationallty Unit - We intend to restrict the investigation of the Jewish

Defense League to the high-level national leaders which will result in reduction of 043

active cases. Unit has current case load of 91? active cases and with reduction reierred

i above will have an active case load of 774.

Cuban Unit - Upon re-establishment of moratorium on SI cases the case

load in this Unit would be reduced by -25 pending active investigations. The current

case load of 1278 will be reduced to 1151.

Inaddition, re-establishment of the moratorium will resit in eliminating

approximately 600 SI cager)which are presently carried in an inactive statug.

six.

The recuction in the Chinese Unit will be accomplished within a 30-day

period. The reduction of Si cases upon re-establishment of the moratorium and the

remaining reduction will be effected upon your concurrence.

283e

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 298

---

## Page 299

1ô°

May 5, 1971

CASE LOAD REDUCTIONS

NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE SECTION

Pursuant to your request for observations concerning our comments

in attached 4-15-71 informal memorandure, following is subroitted:

We concur In the re-establishment of the moratorium on 3I cases

which will reault in somp iS0 pending active investigations being discontinued.

We have previously noted that instructions have been outstanding for

some time which will result in streamlining procedures in handling cases on

deserting Chinese geamen. During April, 4) such cases have been closed, and

it is anticipated during the month of liay about 125) more such cases will ba

discontinued in the normal course of events.

The step which we have discussed in much detali relates to chaiging

criteria foz opening cagos on individuals enanected with, the. lewich Detanse Leugue.

(JDI). The violent neture of many such individuals was the basis for our

instructing several months ago that each member who has actively participated i

and supported the demonstrations, acts of violence, er. of the group be made

subject of an individual investigation. Thie amounted to about 80individual

cases on some 8000 alleged members of the 3DI at that time.

The membership

has increased tremendously during the interim and in we continue under this

criteria, we estimate within the nest year anywhere from 600 to 1000 additional

chees would have to be opened

Despite the fact we feel we will be taking a risk in not pinpointing

comeone who later turns ove to be violence-prone setivist, we suggest that

at this time we revert to opening cases on (L) each JDI, organization os subsidiary

organisation; (2) individuals serving in a leadership capacity of such organizations;

and (3) other persons connected with the JDI, who by past actions have shown

propensity for violence or connection wife achivides Involving violence or terrorism.

This will result in our dropping from (70-30 cases in the Immediate future.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 299

284

---

## Page 300

August 18; 1971

CHINESE MATTERS

On the security and intelligence scene;

•Communist China has emerged as one of the most important

countries handled in this Section. •This fact was

dramatically emphasized by President Nixon's July 15, 1971,

announcement that he will visit Red China before May, 1972.

Available information, including an announcement by

accomplished fact within the next 14 months.

For the pur-

pose of

securing more and better intelligence on Red China

and Red

Chinese sympathizers; to develop more sources who can

provide needed information; and to have a reservoir of sources

we may utilize in intelligence operations against the Chinese

communisis (Chicoms), ii is. feli ile iviiowing iuvesiigative

areas should be activated and/or. expanded:

Chinese Universities and Graduate Schools Index -

The above Index consists of cards on more than 600 individuals

who have been interviewed under our Chinese Alien Program and

who

have attended institutious higher learning Red china.

It is felt, that these individuals, because of their educationai

background, would be the types we should approach in order to

determine their potential for use in operations against the

Chicoms.

This would require opening cases on each individual,

reviewing Bureau file in each case,

and thereafter setting out

leads and instructions to the field in order to initiate the

type of inquiry felt necessary in each case.

The objective of

this effort would be to identify those individuals whose

activities we can direct against either the existing chicom

establishment in Canada or against Chicom establishments which

are expected to be opened in this country in the near future

2.

Implementation of a program in which we would

select four or more Special Agents for indoctrination and

training, looking toward their utilization in an undercover

capacity against the existing Chicom official establishment in

Canada or against any Chicom

establishment which may be located

In the United States in the future.

285

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 300

---

## Page 301

.:.

3.

Implementation of an effort

in selected offices

whereby individuals, present sources included, could be

developed for the purpose of establishing a walk-in program

directed against the Chicom Embassyn Ottava Royal Canadian

Mounte Ponce representatives advised, aurin

during a

July,

1977, conference

would cooperate fully in an effort of

this type.

in mate?

4..

Consideration should be given to renewing the

Chiclet and Chiprop Programs, both of which were discontinued

in 1965. These programs provided us with a secure means to

gence and background information on both ethnic Chinese and

Caucasians of security interest to us.:

5. In connection with travel of U.s.

• citizens to

Red China, it should be noted that all prior restrictions on

such travel imposed by the U. S.

Government have been lifted.

The result of this action is that U.S. citizens who desire

travel to Red china no

longer need to accomplish such

*travel clandestinely. The

door is now open, and we may expect,.

in the near future, a substantial increase in such travel by

U.s. citizens.

It is felt we should fully identify each

U. S: citizen traveling to Red China and in selected cases

should conduct appropriate interviews; since our experience in

the security field historically indicates that U. S: visitors

to communist countries are frequently approached by the

intelligence services of those countries for recruitment.

This

problem may be further magnified if and when permanent resident

aliens are authorized to travel from the !. S. to Red China.

Such a proposal is now under consideration by the Attorney General

and the Department of State and favorable consideration could

result in travel to Red China of many thousands of ethnic

Chinese who have permanent resident status in the U. s.

who

would desire to travel to Red China to visit families living

there.

In these cases, a clear hostage situation exists and

such situations are

often exploited by hostile intelligence

services.

??.

6..

Immigration laws relating to Chinese aliens

entering the U: S. have been broadened substantially and in

early 1971, the Conditional Entry Program was begun.

This

program permits entry into the U. S. of up to 250 Chinese

aliens per month, who were heretofore ineligible under our

immigration laws.

These aliens, in most cases; have families

:...

=2 - ..

:.:.

".

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 301

286

---

## Page 302

residing on the China mainland, thereby creating a hostage

situation which could be used as a lever by the Chicoms

to

gain cooperation.

It is felt desirable at this time to revamp our

instructions regarding reinterviews of Chinese aliens in

cases where a hostage situation exists.. At the present time,

our policy is to reinterview a Chinese alien two years after

the initial interview.

It is felt that these instructions

should be modified to require that a second interview of

: Chinese alien having members of his immediate family in

Red China should occur one year after the initial interview.

We should expand our present source development

program at the United Nations, looking toward development of

individuals connected with the United Nations who would be

willing,

under

Bureau direction, to initiate contact with

Chicom official representatives in Canada. Based on informa-

tion provided by RCMP.

contacts of

recruitment by the Chicoms

obvious, w

this type, even ii no

= would serve to form a

chicoms.

might wett contact and/or

operate upon their

rentry into the

Uni tea Nations

Our Chinese

Scientists Program now involves five

field offices, each of which i.

Is doing background inquiries on

ethnic Chinese scientists who have security clearances:

The purpose of this program is to select

appropriate individuals

from

the above group

of 50 to target against the Chicoms. We

..have a list of over 3500 ethnic Chinese

who

fit the criteria

we are now using regarding the 50 individuals now under investi-

gation.

It is felt that continued development of good sources

to direct against the Chicoms warrants expansion of this

program, looking toward possible contact with almost all of the

3500 scientists. on the above lists.

The individuals on this

list, being ethnic Chinese and being employed in the scientific

and technical fields, would be most attractive to the Chicoms

for intelligence purposes.

National Security Agency representatives are E

the opinion that the possibility exists that chinese Intelligence

Service is beaming broadcasts to

agents in the United states

or an border countries

(Canada or Mexico Our San Diego Office

recently monitored broadcasts felt by National Security Agency

to have

ave come from china, and the clarity of the signal on our

West. Coast was

excellent.

While this does not prove that

- 3 -

28

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 302

---

## Page 303

illegal Chicom operation exists on our West Coast,

it is 'an

indication that we should undertake action designed

to

In the absence of more specific

data, we should consider at this

time checking

submitted by purchasers of certain radio equipment, r

warrant cards

primarily

radio receivers, which are capable of tuning in on broadcasts

such as those mentioned above.

This would involve identifica-

tion of the equipment, its manufacturer,

and subsequent

instructions to appropriate field offices to check warranty

• cards on a regular basis for the purpose of determining names

of ethnic Chinese who have submitted such cards.

Subsequent

inquiry should include developing background on the purchaser

and, in cases where Bureau interests may be served, perhaps

conducting interviews.

-

4

-

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 303

288

---

## Page 304

53423132

Anguat 36, 1971

9202422

ADSQMST 02 389803079

DOISTIO EITEULIGESCE ASYESJOW (DID)

Te atscchrd acomantan tannalz to Frosena 3/19/31 soquesting

ono aúditioasi supervlons to aoprovod fron autoido DiD dos tun Lacezes

13015on insh (1Ti)) bocauzy oê & hadvy snorcado la moxá volamo*

entaszaT suos poompodd seu sautrze getor me zo coreuece poato

De zonthoine Tnocipor EnsscAt Prnos tocu

333

FLz.

ENOVEE, 48 242429

28270270 S0r09m09y0251 9.10039А

aeo araaod faior,

Inore*49r

e, 30629,

2G TAIOUÇO BO 1 OORG ONTRUEO KOZE 81030 819028. 25 372

& tsip

IL/GTTÀ RO SOSA DUKINS GNE BI M2OS 70 CIXIS C,U0YETALG HOCORÁE

Joizonlog Doqueat fex cdúlizoues mpozvisar sa aspionoge doctioa. Tho •

IS FOTATILOBODE ANOCITOSnS 3000633 S00 SE0 050070595 1z6scsex

2I5

owaor furasres ooriont oh otoadepn 02

ILVIFL JO 5Y CG SF JUNG 10 SIZÊTIUE S,DOINTATO LOSLONEOZE S0E

wace bosednog

SSTYLAMIO E FOIRIAE "TIGE ANTDOE ET SOISOOdNUT SERE

os orerall auugnastbclases tron a cusc load standosiat abova &g

FUdf 200.

DOME OROZAN SACTOICES

kesd an saauuay roz axporwiser was

EỤ SOOTO & AIDC J0 GGTE 0002068 BampoS dyEg ay Dur

836 1710103

25500 DT G0S 50

(eo 904) erama sre ur somoon p urarea

ordiorx3l7.

wotle polat ous ta

bosths

Tnspectos Hoore and H0u1i1

thono factars aatipase ASA1Ui EDguaiDE SÓdiCiodad ercemiaore froh

cu5ads Duss

SACP8CEOE BUCKD ARR 205568 1&

• 10040

saots and cuoala hava

ORpIRANOS L EAUROA DOE ROOS SO LOLOE 12ACKJodR) pAStero de cOTe26198

Ba ata edoush anu, d.ooy exguctang Rachdo dio Mavdsica's cverod1

733.4x

DOSU DAG NETS LOUS REEROTrTE E:

capalsaLes and roaponasbtizi.es.

3aù sbvious aauwer io Ior 1aamall 10 teIsmss A KaN fzon rithla his

SOPLion 50 Mia 210.

This sould (aỳ aaleviaro Use moziz jous

Cusze ande

Daux has qeS 1Oud Coce %0 tho Diviou's Aervaory sverage

FSX SECE,

As ses enè ai 20 coge be coule thoa zodegeas

his sadsazios

aul coas1d a0y 201100 Sha facta tues mars2ut.

BOPOVRE, LNO MiANSLINeROS JÃRC2d On Dux LomonE Lonat enpesadon

nay id an crarizding dachos io sue Snsgeetion

DiviEdon oo M. latt sia

Sirclocize

Ludtint

jhofmase

ці "

ialla7an

1 23, AIET

• 2i, Cálboa

año dtilladg

6 C .232222352

NW 88608:.Docld:32989638 Page 304

28

---

## Page 305

KEDO283n

Sano teanoas o 1. hy Du4rA0

ARENNACH OE MNISCARA

DOMUMCIC IMXZUIGDIE DEYIGION (0I)

my feal iix shote prosoniod iy vanmnla 32c act

&e outreast a1l achez

sOa3LiorAer4.

WHURO NE 12M& 102 N+ I2J8 SO DOASILOT 1015

Foqueas in cudjuaoь2oR uch

Tho anuponar séjsatmont eizvog ie ds so

SHÁLa 5E Sta

A WUINNO BACOS RCGOEL2DE}A

I muns inielnind sono asey muâdelinos fos dosezuizios 2aV1a10B

nonpoger assigesancs and sass Zosdex

& bulaova those wii1 rrorios &

baaia

Кo2 D2& 30 J0sUre A&0 zaoporex 10 39102 20st

actoatiyoly noed on mioaady sasturz.

Smo talt mny desiro to zsg

$hase

8u30s 11n0e

Lunocissohg

& nooswro for jis eiiy.

LCON

2E2.7

3is 2ets

40s) 12r92

* tLo

9094455

BAKUIE

221300623033

Rabt

1аnиaz2

H8U05*

MADDYVESCE

additional personnel.

On wamalls lectien must

Aoie frese eeten ite S.D.3.

290

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 305

---

## Page 306

MC. C. D. Brennan

food food, foes

• Mx.. Sullivan

Mohr

• M3 •

Callaha

- Nir.

Ponder

8/12/71

!1 • Mi. Brennan

Wannall

Day

W, R. Wannall

FOREIGN LIAISON DESK (FED)

NATIONALIIIAS INTEFIIGENCE SECTION

DOMESTIC INTELAIGENCE DIVISION (DID)

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAM PERSONNEL

Fully nindiul of the urgent natters requiring

additional personnel in the DID (Dest Coast Conspiracy) and

pariicularly the Nationalities Intelligence seciion allabere

and other leak cases), we must ask for holp in the superision

of our foreign oilices. While our legai operations are Lov

the public eye, they do constitute an important area or car

work which must not be overlooked in view of the evaluation

poing placed upon tuan by the thiss house,

in annuary, 2071, during the inspoction of this

Division, we pointed out that the expansion or our forelen

liaison offices from 11 to 17 had come at & time when the two

FID Supervisors had been barely able to keep up with the flow

of paper let alone actually examine and analyse it in order to

alford construciive supervision to the foreign offices.

noted tha heavy demands nade on the time of chese two

Supervisors in walconing and supervising the visits to the

Bureau of the many loreign dignitaries who are valuable and

cooperative contacis of our legats and the 62% increase ores

the past ten years in the Foreign Police Cooperation cases being

handlea,

We pointod out that the supervisors should in pra-

paring memoranda to keep ine Diractor fully apprised of te

work being uone by our Agents abroad but just did not have tine

to do this.

As a result of the inspection, memorandum 2/1/71

fron'ur. Felt to ir. Tolson secured approval ior addition ai one

man for assigment to the FiD. He reported 2/22/71.

Contem

poransously, it bacame necessary to assign one Agent Supervisor

on a rotating basis to the New leit section on a temporary basis

to assist in the Dast Coast Couspiracy cuse.

An Agent fron

the

FID was selected for this temporary assigment, effective

4/25/71, which assigument yas nade permanent when all temporary

assigaments were converted to permanent assignments, effective

5/21/71. In eirect, therefore, the additional man was available

on the ILD only duzing the ivo

months iron 2/22 to 4/20/T3.

CONKINUED - CI3

NW 88608 Docld:32989638. Page 306

291

---

## Page 307

N. INDUREN

NOSSIGN IIANSON DESK (320)

RARICRALITING

SOCZICH

DOMARIC SIUZEGIGRSICE MIVISION (0ID)

KSQUESE

283

.

In the meastian, borraen Decenhaz,

, 1970, When the

ney forcign citicos ware oponed and Jaig, 1071, the Indeas

nonch for which figurco ase aradlabie, there has

20223g 605

La0rSRE0

papes boiag prodneed

.RIS ROCS EGINNCUSt

Burcate zooounces

ans strained

maDy Sronta

Hon bo doccide

S55%

the mituetos

vaici tho Inopootore in Jamuory felt Jucilled

A681610021

2435

DeCOSs aVOG 10729.

Sh2: T9

12 a bea sith & iakguezud 23

B3U2 A

langunge ability ens noald ho able to take borg

saredantely rachout

ertossive trasder.

oxample,

đong

in the donsorse

12016,

KM 202

397272

C0 FA

So due

so ala vsso"s comiltion Solloulas tno deach se th2.

32r02+205n dell.

043012

31 aqua]

esprestity bra poventdei.

Esor Sorcion oficiala shs ziale Brabiantos do sot

neve 4

Enparvisoz #anonG

an Spanich nud

Che addition

a2 & Prensia

or conse capalllity sonid prestly caduce sua

1450 EOK

Iata pretoze Ero the Mostincion ciald 910109 Asd eiseskess

in che bracas,

33+ 533301407

presoncip bna ese

T334

franch and sode ward dormen

3ag0rtieo2

Taore a2s others 540h

SH03

Jasguazas as 3paziah, dopan23e,

chancas, 701480, 0nd

sho

420.

I* no one wleh

emposdenco da torsign

3191505 267

be soda sucilabie, one os

45220

Langungo trasned son soniẻ 23

user stavidod a rupicenost tron outalda the Miriston 1s .

tuneisse.

Thore as eo suy 33 mici helo tan bo 3r271c0d

#3 than the

maialoe sithon a coplacenou's.

De hare elicinated

End BErenalino progeno and Bo art now ansigaier Saperrizors

on e rotatiss bala to ganzes os the loak ences,

Learius Jaatz

permanoas aacaguscio Donasinon zor ruchs et & cine.

микро-спітітам

Iad as sédiadota? Superviser be apreoved for aseige

tho javasion ageat conplaneas by eno.

ebe

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 307

---

## Page 308

- Mr. Day

C. D. Brennan

Retyped page

dated 8/12/71

re:

of

memo W. R. Wannall to

same subject

Eonotandun to

Sr. C. D, Lionias

AE:

FORMIGT LAISCH DESK (FLO)

MATTONALI TIES INTUIZIGRACE

SECTION

РОНВОТІС ПЛИСТИ DINI ОМ

REQUEST FOX ADDITIONNG PERSONAL

ADDENDINE SX P. E, BOGRE

DiNi:aen

8/14/71

MADENAINM

• Purouart to your sequest,

Chin 15 to advise that aiere

añe tro superricors in the Donostic Incelligenco Divisioa sith

Logai Atencho experience, Roberte LocaLarian who in now

assigued =0

thio decis but is non ascigaed to the

2elobaxE_ Spacial Both

Bordaging and bagy apoak Spanish.

Tacro aro 23 other supervisors In tho division wita

LSAgOge a011367.

nellstes, sponts french

che sthor

RIO LA RUSSIAD, Joponese, 36a11au,

KonnesiD, 703102,

bulgarisz,

Albanino, Forisguoso, Hengazias,

Ridaiab and Cainese.

ir

€ 3

293

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 308

---

## Page 309

ADDENDUM

ISPECTOR E. S. MILLER: During the course of instant inspection an in -depth

ESM:wmj 9/3/71)

survey was made relative to the adequacy of

personnel, both Agent and clerical, within the

DID. The primary purpose of this survey was to determine the best possible

allocation

...

of manpower bearing in mind the desirability to reallocate manpower

to top priority assignments.

ADEQUACY OF AGENT

PERSONNEL

Set forth below is a chart graphically illustrating where it is felt

reductions can be made in Agent complement:

Internal Security and Research Branch

Internal Security Section

Subversive Individuals Unit - 1

Security Informant Unit - 2

Klan and White Hate Groups Unit - 2

Research Section - 1

New Left Section

Subversive Individuals Unit - 1

Espionage and Racial Intelligence Branch

Extremist Intelligence Section - 2

Nationalities Intelligence Section

Middle and South American Unit - 1

Nationality Unit - 1

TOTAL

11

Comments and observations justifying the above -mentioned reductions

in force can be found below under the individul Section and Unit captions.

294

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 309

---

## Page 310

INTERNAL SECURITY SECTION

Subversive Individuals Unit

This Unit has an Agent complement of 5. At the time of the last

inspection it was a 3-man Unit; however, one was assigned on a special in another

Unit, leaving actually two Agents to handle approximately 1300 cases, or 650

per man. Since the last inspection the case load has increased to approximately

2600. Consequently, it would appear that 4 men averaging 650 cases per man

could handle the work of this Unit.

This position is further strengthened as it

can be anticipated that the case load will decrease since the deadline of lifting

the moratorium expired 6/30/71 and the bulk of investigations have been brought

up to date or will be brought up to date in the near future. By memorandum dated

8/26/71 it was recommended that SA,John. Quellette be returned to the Internal

Security Section due to the slackening of activity in the EASTCON case. Quellette

was formerly assigned to this Unit and the reduction could be accomplished by

reassignment of him (or another Agent) to more pressing duties elsewhere.

Security Informant Unit

This Unit presently has 4 supervisors assigned; however, one has been

on temporary assignment outside the Unit since June, 1971. The case load as

of 8/71 for this Unit was 869 and would result in about 217 cases per Agent in

a 4-man Unit, and 290 cases per Agent in a 3-man Unit. Further, you have

indicated one of the factors affecting the productivity of the Unit is the necessity

of obtaining authority by memorandum for the utilization of students and/or

teachers as security informants. It was determined that 122 memos have been

prepared since the last inspection requesting such approval. This is approximate

1 memo per workday, which does not appear to be an excessive work load. Since

this Unit was formed it has functioned with 3 Special Agent Supervisors. This

does not appear to have effected the efficiency of the operation and in view of the

work and case load it is felt that the Unit could function quite satisfactorily with

2 Special Agent Supervisors.

Klan and White Hate Groups Unit

Under the reorganization of DID proposed by Assistant Director

Brennan in his memorandum of 8/3/71 it was indicated this Unit's cases could be

absorbed by the Extre mist Intelligence Section. This would free two Special

Agents for other assignment. It is felt this could be accomplished even if the

proposed reorganization does not become an actuality.

295

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 310

---

## Page 311

RESEARCH SECTION

It is noted under the proposed reorganization of 8/3/71 a supervisor from

this Section would be reallocated to another. It is felt this could be accomplished

regardless of the reorganization. It is noted in this regard that this Section is

presently operating efficiently with an Agent supervisor assigned to the Ellsberg

case. Addressing ourselves to the lack of a Section Chief, it is felt your

recommendations regarding filling Mr. Cotter's vacated position should be handled

• by separate memorandum.

The replacement request for SA MarionS Ramey's

transferral to another Division is being handled separately.

NEW LEFT SECTION

Subversive Individuals Unit

• This Unit has an authorized complement of 6 Agents but is presently

adequately handling the work with 5, one being assigned full time to a special.

Even though the case load is high, approximately 2500, leaving 500 cases

per man, many of the matters are quite routine and can be handled with bare

minimum of supervision. Because of this, Agents assigned to this Unit are able

to handle a large number of cases and it is felt that the Agent presently assigned

to the special should

not be returned.

ESPIONAGE AND RACIAL BRANCH

Extremist Intelligence Section

During the last inspection you requested two more supervisors due

to the fact that your case load had increased to a total of 6642, breaking down

to 349 cases per supervisor. Your request was authorized. During May, 1971;

one supervisor was permanently transferred from your Section leaving you

a complement of 20 supervisors plus Section Chief and Number One Man (total

22). No replacement has been requested for this supervisor. Since 7/19/71

you have had one man on loan to the Nationalities Intelligence Section on a rotating

basis and as of 8/9/71 a second man on loan. There has been a definite decrease

in your case load since the last inspection.

However, a slight increase would

be anticipated due to the absorbing of the Klan and White Hate Groups matters.

For the last 6 weeks you have been without the services of l supervisor on a

rotating basis and for the last 3 weeks a second one. However, the Unit has

still operated efficiently. As there is an imbalance as to cases and the number

of men assigned it is felt that 2 supervisors could be transferred out of the

Section leaving 20 (including Section Chief and Number One Man) to handle

the necessary assignments (including Klan and White Hate).

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 311

296

---

## Page 312

Nationalities Intelligence Section

Middle and South American Unit

As of the close of business 8/20/71 the 3-man Cuban Unit had

a case load of 776 and the Middle and South American Unit, also consisting of

3 men, had 598 cases. These two Units, the work of which is closely related

and frequently overlaps, had a total case load of 1374 for 6 men for an average

• case load of 229. If the total case load of these two Units were handled by 5

men the average load would be 275, which appears more equitable in view of the

overall commitments and work load of the Division. In view of the above, it is

felt that the personnel of the Middle and South American Unit could be cut by one

man. With 5 incumbents and with the inter-relation and natural overlapping of these

two Units future fluctuation in the work load could be equitably handled between the

two Units.

Nationality Unit

Under normal conditions it is believed that this 4-man Unit

could be operated by 3 Supervisors. At present, there are 3 supervisors

assigned this Unit's cases (exclusive of special) and the case load as of 8/20/71

was 632 cases which represents 158 cases per Agent for a 4-man Unit, or 211

per Agent for a 3-man Unit. Consequently it is felt that 3 supervisors could

adequately handle the work of this Unit.

As can be seen, a pool of ll men has been created. Treating those

assigned on special to the Ellsberg case (9) as a separate entity, 2 men

are available for general assignment. One man could be assigned to the

Chinese Unit of the Nationalities Intelligence Section and the one supervisor

from the Foreign Influence and Pro-CHICOM Unit of the Internal Security

Section along with his cases (492). (Note this Agent is not included in' the 11. )

What is left of the Foreign Influence Unit could be consolidated with that of the

CPUSA Unit. The other supervisor from the pool of ll could be assigned to

the Special Coordination Unit of the Nationalities Intelligence Section.

This realignment would result in a considerable decline in personnel

within the Internal Security Section. However, a balancing of work load could

be accomplished through reassignment of the three-man Protest and Trotskyist

Groups Unit from the New Left Section to the Internal Security Section where it

was in the recent past. Further, as you are aware, a proposal is presently

being considered to reassign Antiriot Laws plus Explosives and Incendiary

Devices cases from the General Investigative Division to the Domestic Intelligence

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 312

297

---

## Page 313

Division. While it is realized that logically these should be placed in the

New Left or Extremist Intelligence Section, to balance work load they

could be considered for assignment to the Internal Security Section if proposal

is approved. The Research and New Left Sections would each be decreased

by one Special Agent Supervisor, the Extremist Intelligence Section by two.

The Nationalities Intelligence Section, excluding the Front Office, would be

increased by one Special Agent Supervisor.

OBSERVATIONS:

Considerable time has been devoted to this phase of the inspection to

assess as accurately as possible manpower requirements of the various Units

and Sections. In addition to ticklers and file reviews your outgoing mail was

reviewed for one work week.

During the course of this mail survey covering a five day work period,

715 pieces of mail or 143 pieces I day were generated and reviewed. Of

this number, 268 pieces or 37% were directed to the Front Office for review

and 497 pieces or 63% went directly to the field or other agencies without

Front Office review. This indices an average of 6 pieces of outgoing mail

per Agent are being prepared per work week. 55.6% of the total pieces of

mail were of a routine nature, setting forth a minimum degree of supervision

and direction. 36.1% contained a moderate degree of supervision and 8. 3%

contained a considerable degree d supervisory instruction or direction.

Of the average of six pieces of mail per Agent 3. 3 pieces were of a

routine nature requiring minimal supervision ; 2.2 pieces moderate supervision

and. 5 pieces (1/2 letter, etc.) considerable supervisory instruction or

direction per week.

• Examples of minimum supervisory content would be communications

permitting routine interview or informant payment (stamp). An example

of moderate supervisory content would be a letter to the Attorney General

with cover memo bringing AG up to date in a particular case. As example

of supervisory content of considerable degree would be instructions to interview

key witnesses on top priority cases setting out pertinent points to cover in the

interview or would furnish supervisory direction of a substantive investigation.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 313

298

---

## Page 314

It is realized the above survey reveals only a small part of the

Division's production; however, it gives some insight into the amount of

actual supervision and direction being afforded the field as an overall

consideration. It is not felt or implied that a "letter writing" program for the sake

of writing letters be instituted as obviously this does not relate to supervision.

It may indicate, however, among other things, the amount of intensity of positive

supervision being afforded, as an over view and is being furnished for jour

information as well as for mine.

The above analysis (manpower) reveals in your Division a need for

9 men on the McLek case, 2 for Chinese matters and one for Special

Coordination Unit. On a priority basis, inspection surveys reveal the manpower

is wailable as indicated. It is felt your Chinese program must "get going now"

in view of impending developments.

In addition, our proposals will allow you to assign men permanently

to McLek and make other necessary shifts in manpower to get away from

the temporary assignment basis you now have and which is aisruptive io äil

Sections involved. It is also acknowledged some of the realignment

indicated has been proposed by your Division in studies made by you prior

to this inspection.

299

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 314

---

## Page 315

ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL

CLERICAL

An analysis was also made of adequacy of clerical personnel within your

Division and after careful study it was determined that a reduction of ll clerical

personnel is possible. This reduction could be made through attrition. The

reductions possible are graphically set forth in the chart below:

Internal Security and Research Branch

Internal Security Section

Klan and White Hate Groups - 3

New Left Section

Special Investigations - East - 1

Special Investigations - West - 1

Subversive Individuals - New Left - 1

Espionage and Racial Intelligence Branch

Espionage Section

Special Cases - 1

Officials - New York - 1

Officials - WFO -1

Satellite - 1

Nationalities Intelligence Section

Middle and South American - 1

Our findings in most instances are based on a thorough review of the work

of the individual units plus case load allocations. The justification for the above -

mentioned reductions is set forth below under the individual Unit and Section

designation:

INTERNAL SECURITY AND RESEARCH BRANCH

Internal Security Section

:

Klan and White Hate Groups

Pursuant to the above proposal that this Unit be absorbed by the

Extremist Intelligence Section the two clerks and one secretary can be considered excess

inasmuch as the work presently being performed by these persons can adequataly be

performed by the clerical personnel in the new Section.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 315

300

---

## Page 316

New Left Section

Special Investigations Unit - East

The surplus clerk presently work in g in this Unit is not

needed inasmuch as the four clerks permanently assigned to this Unit were

adequately handling the work before he reported.

Special Investigations Unit - West

It is felt three clerks could handle the work in this Unit

inasmuch as three clerks in Special Investigations Unit - East handle a

comparative work load. The East Unit has four clerks; however, one clerk

handles Sabotage cases and the West Unit does not handle these matters.

Subversive Individuals - New Left Unit

Although the case load in this Unit is high the work is routine

and can be handled quickly. The Special Clerk (GS-6 Reviewer) handles much

of the reviewing of communications thus saving clerical time. This Unit is

operating With one less Agent Who is on loan to the Mclek case. Due to a

comparison of the clerical work load of the Subversive Individuals Unit in the

Internal Security Section it is felt this Unit could operate with one less clerk.

ESPIONAGE AND RACIAL INTELLIGENCE BRANCH

Espionage Section

Special Cases Unit

It is felt based upon the case load of this Unit being handled

by clerks, that with the assistance of the stenographer, this Unit could

adequately operate and function with one less clerical employee.

Officials - New York Unit

It is felt the clerk-stenographer assigned to this Unit could

handle the IRONCLAD indices in addition to taking dictation from supervisors.

This would leave the Unit with 2 stenographers for 3 supervisors and thereby

release the clerk who is presently handling the IRONCLAD indices.

Officials - WFO Unit

Based on the case load of this Unit, it is felt the clerk-steno-

grapher presently assigned could assist in clerical work, thereby releasing one

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 316

301

---

## Page 317

of the clerks presently assigned to this Unit.

• Satellite Unit

This Unit presently has three regular clerks and two Special

Clerks. It is felt that one of the Special Clerks could assist in the regular

clerical duties, thereby releasing one clerk from this Unit.

Nationalities Intelligence Section

Middle and South American Unit

Based on the case load of this Unit it is recommended that

one clerk be released inasmuch as there does not appear to be sufficient work

for three clerks.

Comments of Assistant Director regarding Agent and clerical

adequacy requested.

• •

30₴

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 317

---

## Page 318

ADDENDUM

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN

I have thoroughly studied

(CDB: djr 9/8/71)

the Inspector's comments

regarding adequacy of

personnel, both Agent and clerical, and have the following

observations to make:

I certainly recognize full well the need for

36.62

reorganizing and reallocating personnel to provide manpower

assistance to the Nationalities Intelligence Section which is

In fact, the proposed reorganization

of the Division as set forth in my memorandum of August 3,

1971, was based on the priority needs which arose from the McLek

case and which continue to be critical. As set forth in that

memorandum, manpower was to permanently be assigned to the

Nationalities Intelligence Section in order to avoid disruption

caused by handling this important case with temporary assignments.

In meeting the priority responsibilities in the

McLek case as well as in other critical areas, I am also

mindful that we do not have a surplus of manpower but are

undoubtedly faced with the supervision of more complex cases

in

the security field with fewer Agents than at any other time in

the Bureau's history. Crises brought about by terroristic acts

of black extremists,

weathermen, antiwar activists,

and other

extremists are increasing in intensity and from all indications

will continue to place heavy demands upon the Bureau.

Likewise,

the potential of Chinese Communist espionage activity in this

country is readily apparent and the increased activity of

Soviet Agènts is a fact.

These facts, coupled with special case

commitments, have stretched available manpower to the limit of

elasticity.

there will be a weakening of the supervision of the area from

In marina

In making such manpower shifts, we must recognize that

which the personnel are transferred and we must be prepared to

accept this, at least on a temporary basis,

because in the long

run such weakening could be most harmful as well as embarrassing.

For example, the Inspector has indicated that two

supervisors could be transferred out of the Extremist Intelligence

Section and, in addition, that Section should absorb all Klan

and white hate cases (now being handled by two men in another

Section): Actually, this means absorption of the work of four

men by the remaining men in the Section (18): Put another way,

the work load has been increased by almost 25 per cent.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 318

303

---

## Page 319

As will be noted in the table set out hereinafter,

case loads

are excessive in very sensitive areas of the Bureau's

responsibilities,

e.g., Soviet espionage and black and New

Left extremists who are daily escalating their revolutionary

activity in our streets.

The utilization of manpower on specials, such as

the current nine men on Mclek, will receive extremely close

scrutiny and will be reallocated to these other pressing work

areas

as soon as

possible as I do not believe the current

case loads allow

adequate supervision for any extended period

of time.

No one realizes the potential threat which the

Red Chinese pose to the security of this country better than

I. We must recognize,

however, that there has been considerable

planning on the Bureau's part dating back to the 1950s when we

had first indications that the United States might recognize

Red China.

But the fact is that we have more important

priorities at this particular time evidenced by bombings,

assassinations, arsons and other terroristic acts daily

occurring vy extremisi eienents within our investigative

responsibilities. We are faced right now with a very serious

internal security threat which demands immediate attention.

This does not minimize the Red Chinese threat at all but we

must recognize it is still a "potential" and until diplomatic

channels are opened and active espionage activity begins again

we must put "first things first."

to that work area is the limit of our available resources at

this time.

With respect to the clerical reduction of ll clerks,

which is to occur by attrition, I feel that a reduction of

this magnitude will definitely result in a hardship on the work

of the Division. I have repeatedly stressed that wherever

possible Agents should be relieved of as many duties as possible

by competent clerical personnel, thus resulting in considerable

savings of Agent manpower throughout the Division. A reduction

of the number of clerks, as recommended by the Inspector,

certainly will hamper our past streamlining efforts.

304

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 319

---

## Page 320

Set forth below, by Branch, are more specific

observations with respect

to the Inspector's comments and

recommendations; however, in summary, I desire to point out

that we cannot reassign manpower of the quantity involved for

an extended period of time and eliminate entirely by

attrition ll clerks without such action having a deleterious

effect in certain areas of our operations.

I am strongly

opposed to such

lessening of our coverage in these areas but

if such recommendations

are approved and ordered, I will do

my best to see that our responsibilities are fulfilled to the

maximum degree possible under the circumstances.

The following comments are made concerning

reallocation of Agent personnel to top priorities regarding

the Internal Security and Research Branch.

The Inspector

recommends seven supervisors be reallocated from this Branch

to other work areas.

Based on day-to-day experience in

these work areas and having available end of August case

count figures, the following alternatives are recommended

to make seven

supervisors available.

Research Section:

The present sujervisor assigned

to the Ellsberg case is a talented writer experienced in

complicated research projects and preparation of research

papers. He is utilized full time on the Ellsberg case in

this capacity and on his own time continues to handle some

speeches and research matters.

Research Section will make a

second supervisor available for the Elisberg case and the

original supervisor will return to Research Section as soon as

his project is completed on Elisberg

This is predicated on

the assumption a replacement will be provided this Section for

SA Ramey who was transferred to another Division.

Internal Security Section: Will make four

supervisors available instead ôf five as recommended by the

Inspector.

This is predicated on experience and present case

load regarding the Subversive Individuals Unit primarily and

also the Security Informant Unit.

August 31, 1971, case count

for the Subversive Individuals Unit is 2, 663

cases,

in addition,

523 cases were opened and 496 cases were closed during August

in this Unit.

This would be an average case load of 666 cases

per Agent, not including the opening and closing mail flow.

305

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 320

---

## Page 321

The

Security Informant Unit would be handling 904 cases,

averaging 452 cases when reduced to two supervisors.

Under the new case count system, these informant cases

are largely cases with mail in hand requiring attention

and close supervision because of funds being involved

as well as the general sensitivity of these cases. In

the event of sick or annual leave, one man could not

possibly

keep mail current and work loads in other units

would, as a practical matter, preclude use of other

personnel to carry out the work. The supervisor retained

would reduce the case load in the Subversive Individuals

Unit to a more reasonable and practical 533 case load

average and also allow for a limited degree of flexibility

in the informant matters from time to time as necessary.

This provides the seven men from this Branch. (This

includes one man

from the New Left Section, as indicated.)

New Left Section: Will make one man available

as recommended.

Regarding reallocation of Agent personnel to

top priorities regarding the Espionage Branch, the

following comments are made:

Extremist Intelligence Section will make two

supervisors available and absorb the 559 Klan and White

Hate cases with no Agent personnel.

It must be borne

in mind this, in effect, constitutes a net reduction of

four supervisors to black extremist matters at a time

when these activities are on a definite upswing. This

can be lived with on a short term emergency basis and

as manpower becomes available from the inevitable winddown

of Mclek, appropriate recommendations will be considered

within the Division as to reallocation of that manpower

with this in mind consistent with overall Division needs

at that time.

Nationalities Intelligence Section will make two

men available as recommended.

With regard to the two.

Units being reduced, it is pointed out that the midale

and South American Unit is

responsible for matters

306

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 321

---

## Page 322

relating to 32 countries. There are five Legal Attache

(Legat) Offices located in countries handled by the Unit

and each of these offices, except Mexico, covers more

than one country.

The Nationality Unit is responsible

for matters relating to 101 countries. Eleven Legat

Offices are locatedin the area of responsibility of this

Unit and

most of these Legat Offices cover more than one

country.

There is a high volume of material which is

received daily in these Units consisting of intelligence

information from other agencies and news media material.

All of this material must be reviewed in order that the

supervisors will be in position not only to handle inquiries

from any source relating to matters of Bureau responsibility

in the nationalities intelligence field but also to process

the high level intelligence (HILEV) items which are

received from Legats. The latter is a

very heavy

responsibility since we recognize that if one high-level

item goes to the President and he acts on it, and it

proves to be incorrect, not only the Bureau but the

White House itself migni encounier serious problems.

During month of August, of 106 HILEV items received

from

Legats, S1 were processed by the Nationality Unit ana

34 by the Middle and South American Unit.

Bach of the

two units disseminated 30 HILEV items.

Dissemination

of each HILEV item consumes approximately one hour of a

supervisor's time.

With regard to the Nationality Unit, which has the

lowest average case load per supervisor, other matters

handled in the Unit not reflected by caseload are:

providing for installation and maintenance of continued

coverage in sensitive areas essential to the fulfillment.

of requests Of the National Security Agency. (Telex.

Coverager 64 at present); establishing and maintaining

highly sensitive coverage also for ationa

relating to electronic penetration of communications

equipment; supervising and coordinating on a recurring

basis coverage relating to the various United Nations

General Assembly sessions (which includes close working

relationship with Secret Service); maintenance of all

Bureau liaison with National Security. Agency.

It must be borne in mind the reduction of four case

supervisors from the Espionage and Extremist Intelligence

Branch

and seven case supervisors from the Internal Security and

308

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 322

---

## Page 323

Research Branch are accepted to meet an emergency situation

(McLek case) but these reductions are not considered consistent

with adequate supervision nor offer necessary flexibility within

Sections to meet emergencies and specials as they

arise when

viewed in terms of an extended period of time.

It is expected

the Mclek case, as with all specials,

will ultimately wind down.

At that time and as personnel are available for reallocation,

appropriate recommendations wiil be made and considered within

the Division as to their commitment based on work loads at the

time consistent with the overall needs of the Division.

Supervisory Case Load Averages

The following chart graphically displays case loads

recommendations.

Add or

velete

present

proposed

SAS

Nationalities Intelligence

Extremist Intelligence

Espionage

Internal Security

New Left

Research

Division

286

315

-1

298

331

334

0

312

+1

444

477

333

-2

Cases

0

+559

-559

333

0

-

335

-2

341

-1

It must be borne in mind the "Add or Delete" column

pertains only to supervisors now included in case count

computations as being

assigned to regular case load duties and

does not portray total movement as recommended. Some of those

included in the recommendations are already on special assignment

(McLek, etc.) •

For example, Extremist Intelligence and New Left

Séctions will merely make permanent the personnel on loan to

McLek and, therefore, are listed as zero. Espionage will get a

man back

and is listed

as +1.

308

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 323

---

## Page 324

Nationalities Intelligence Section is giving up two

men from present assignment, one to the Chinese Unit and one

to Special Coordination Unit. The latter is a non-case

assignment and deletes one man from computation of average case

load in the Section which brings that Section more in line with

the present Division average of 335 cases per case supervisor

under the new rules for case count. This also results in one

less supervisor comnitted to case

supervision and alters the

Division average per case supervisor to 341 cases.

It is recognized the Internal Security Section has a

nigh average case load per Agent, however, that section nas

Less organization cases and proportionately more individual

matters requiring less supervisory attention than other sections.

Thisswill be followed closely an: depending on approval of

transferring EID and ARL cases to this Division and/or

resolution of Eastcon and appropriate recommendation will be

made to adjust a block of

to create a better balance there.

tor. at ance

work internally within the Division

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 324

309

---

## Page 325

As to the Espionage and Extremist Intelligence

Branch clerical reduction recommendations, the following

comments are made.

Nationalities Intelligence will reduce one clerk

as recommended.

In the Espionage Section there are 16 substantive

desk supervisors with 13 clerks actually performing the work

for these supervisors, a ratio of .81 per supervisor. To

reduce this number by four would result in the ratio .56 or

roughly 1/2 clerk per

supervisor.

The Clerk-Stenographer position provides the

incumbent to perform clerical work only 20 per cent of her

time.

The use of a Clerk-Stenographer in the Special Cases,

Officials - New York, and Officials - Washington Field Units

thus would not absorb the extra work placed on the remaining

clerks in these Units and such is not considered feasible.

The use of a Special Clerk now handling cases in lieu of a

Special Agent supervisor in the Satellite Unit to handle clerical

functions for a supervisor woulá defeat the purpose of

establishing this position and would place an unfair burden

of responsibility on that Special Clerk who should be free to

concentrate on the supervision of her own cases.

In summary, it is felt that the present clerical

assignment is the minimum number necessary to handle the

voluminous, work associated with 5,575 cases currently

•assigned to this Section.

The Racial Intelligence Section can absorb the

case load of 559 cases but will need a minimum of one clerk

to accompany these cases. This Section was not recommended

by the Inspector to reduce clerical complement and it is

not felt practical to absorb 559 cases and no clerical

personnel. This is particularly true when it is considered

no Agent personnel are being received with these cases.

I believe the above reductions, totalling three, are in

good faith with the Inspection Staff's and my own desire to

obtain maximum utilization of personnel and continue an

efficient and practical operation. Further reduction would

merely result in Agents performing clerical functions, and with

the continued escalation in case loads and current special cases

being handled, I do not believe further reductions can be made

within the bounds of good personnel management and best

utilization of clerical vs. Agent manpower.

310

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 325

---

## Page 326

ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL

CLERICAL

The following comments are made concerning reduction

of clerical personnel in the Internal Security. and Research

Branch.

Internal Security Section: In the past, it has beer

necessary on a frequent basis to afford considerable clerical

•assistance from the Klan and White Hate Groups Unit to the

Subversive Individuals Unit because of the extremely heavy

clerical duties involved in the escalating case loads carried

in this Unit, coupled with 523 cases opened and 496 cases

closed during the past month, for example.

It is necessary

and warranted to retain two of the three clerical personnel in

the disbanded Klan and White Hate Groups Unit for utilization

in the Subversive Individuals Unit. If this is not done, it

will result in an impractical clerical work load, with nowhere

to draw upon clerical help and result in supervisors being

additionally burdened with clerical functions, which they

can

ill afford to handle.

This would also be consistent and in line

with the assignment of Agent personnel in this Unit detailed

previously and allow one clerk per Agent, which is adequate

but not excessive for the type of work involved.

New Left Section: It is believed the Special

Investigations - East and Special Investigations - West Units

can function with one less clerk each as recommended by the

Inspector. It is not believed good management, however, to

reduce a clerk in the Subversive Individuals - New Left

Unit.

With one supervisor reduced, the clerical work remains the same

and retention of the clerk would allow one clerk per Agent,

which is adequate but not excessive for the type of work

involved. With the very heavy case loads in this Unit, coupled

with 768

cases opened and 776 cases closed within the past

month, for example, clerks are extremely busy. Reduction in

clerical staff merely means Agents will have to perform clerical

functions which is uneconomical and hardly practical with the

work loads involved.

Bearing in mind Agent manpower reductions in the

Internal Security and Research Branch, it is believed the Branch

can operate with

efficiency and in good faith with the

Inspection Staff and Divisions desire to use manpower to its

fullest and make the above three clerical reductions.

3/$

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 326

---

## Page 327

ADDENDUM

INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER:

Your comments and proposals with

(ESM:bhg, 9/9$701)

respect to the reallocation of Agent

personnel within the Division appear

logical and are acceptable. However, exception must be made with

respect to clerical employees.

You state it is necessary and warranted to retain 2 of the 3 clerical

personnel in the disbanded Klan and White Hate Groups Unit for utilization

in the Subversive Individuals Unit of the Internal Security Section. Based

upon figures available the case load within the Subversive Individuals Unit

approximates 2700 cases handled at present by three clerical employees

giving an average case load per clerk of approximately 900 cases. Retaining

one of the Klan clerks would result in an average case load per clerk of

675 cases which is not felt unreasonable or intolerable a burden. Further,

it is not felt that less than 1 clerk per Agent is too great a load for the Unit.

Turning now to the Espionage Section based on our survey it was felt

thất 4 clerical positions cuuid be voided through airition, vased primarily

on greater utilization of clerk-stenographers on clerical duties. You state

that, the clerk-stenographer position provides the incumbent to perform

clerical work only 20% of her time. At present there are 10 secretaries

and clerk-stenographers available for transcription of communications.

A survey of communications conducted during this inspection revealed that

the Espionage Section dispatched 121 pieces of correspondence during a

5-day period,

which results in approximately 12 communications per

secretary or slightly over 2 communications per day per employee. This

does not indicate a great work load on the secretarial force and consequently

it is felt that clerk-stenographers could be freed for clerical functions where

necessary. In view of this it is felt that at least two clerical positions

could be dissolved through attrition within this section.

With respect to the Extremist Intelligence Section, you indicate that

the case load of 559 cases can be absorbed but a minimum of one clerk

will be needed to handle these cases.

Based upon case load figures available

should this clerk. not be made available the average case load per clerk

within the Black Nationalist - East Unit would increase from approximately

470 to 660 cases. Black Nationalist - Central from approximately 715 to

940. Black Nationalist - South from approximately 780 to 1000, and the

Black Nationalist - West from approximately 210 to 350 cases per clerk.

Particular note should be made of the average case load per clerk increase

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 327

31₴

---

## Page 328

within the Black Nationalist - West Unit should the cases be absorbed there

with no added clerical employees. In view of the above it is felt that the

Racial Intelligence Section can absorb the additional cases without an added

clerk.

Based on the above it can be seen that at least 7 clerical positions could

be dissolved without an unreasonable burden being placed on the remaining.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 328

323

---

## Page 329

SUGGESTION MEMORANDA

NW 98608 'Docld:32989638 Bage 329

SUGGESTION

NICHODANGA

---

## Page 330

SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM

RE: PAYMENTS TO SECURITY INFORMANTS

AND CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES

NSPECTOR E. S. MILLER:

Present regulations allow for payments up

to $400 with SAC authority on a COD basis

to individuals being developed as intormants on security matters. (Manual

of Instructions, Section 107, page 14.) Once the individual is paid $400 and

is through usage of FD-401. After the initial payments are approved, every

6 months an FD-401 is submitted requesting continuance, and, if approved,

is stamped "approved" at the Bureau and returned. (Manual of Instructions,

Section 107, page 15.)

In view of current Government-wide coonomy more and the Bureau's

own economy program, it is imperative that the field exercise great care and

scrutiny in payments to informants to assure that payments on a "regular

basis" are fully justified and are not serving as an administrative crutch and

in ply ute te for marts to

expedient in lieu of payments under SAC authority.

A survey has been made of 80 files of informants who are presently

being paid on a regular basis with respect to the date the informant was

approved as a PSI, the date approval was given to pay him on a regular basis,

and the amount paid the source under SAC authority before Bureau authority

was sought to pay him on a regular basis.

In the following 34 informant files authority was granted to pay the

source on a regular basis before the field used the full amount that could

have been paid under SAC authority, representing 42. 5% of the total cases

reviewed:

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

314

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 330

---

## Page 331

- 2 -

134-6062*

134-6201*

134-4628*

134-10548*

134-20170

134-6316*

134-21561

134-20687

134-20051

134-19815*

134-19383

170-4295

134-20302

134-19115

134-19168

134-20038*

134-21173

134-13545*

134-20126

134-20310

134-20026

134-19732

134-18818

134-20998

134-20997

134-17812

134-19931

170-4092

134-18123*

134-21762

134-21218

170-4355

134-21305

134-21179

Those files marked with an asterisk indicate that only token amounts

had been paid under SAC authority ranging from $25 to less than $100.

This analysis would indicate SACs are abdicating authority to

approve paying sources the full amount allowed before seeking Bureau per-

mission to pay on a regular basis.

In the following 17 instances the Bureau approved the field's com-

munication seeking approval of an individual as a Psi in which the same com-

munication also asked approval to pay the source on a regular basis:

134-10532

134-8857

134-13507

134-14523

105-188201

134-20302

134-20608

134-12826

170-4355

134-21179

134-20170

134-19228

134-21516

134-19815

134-19383

134-20175

170-4295

In the following 19 cases the Bureau approved sources being paid on

a regular basis within 45 days of their being approved as a PSI:

134-6201

134-20445

134-19967

134-20089

170-768

134-17689

134-21762

134-20773

134-17337

134-21584

134-20833

134-20687

134-20051

134-19168

134-17762

134-16923

134-21622

134-18818

134-18059

These 36 cases (17 + 19) represent 45% of those files reviewed and

indicate the field's undesirable practice of asking approval to pay sources on

a regular basis upon obtaining approval to develop the source as a PSI. It

does not appear that contacts with these individuals are over a sufficient

period of time to conclude the source is furnishing data on a regular basis

to justify paying him on a regular basis.

315

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 331

---

## Page 332

- 3 -

A representative number of informant files were checked where the

full amount under SAC authority was not utilized and it was determined pay-

ments were over a 3. 3 month period, for an average monthly payment of

$73.00 for each source. Subsequent to receiving approval to pay the source

on a regular basis each source received an average of $152 over the next

6-month period. It is concluded that if payments had continued for a longer

period under SAC authority before paying on a regular basis, an average of

approximately $80 less per month would have been expended in each case.

On an annual basis this would be $960. Estimating that as few as 33% of the

present number of Security Informants including New Left, Old Left (CPUSA),

Extremists, Klan and other White Hate Groups have been developed in the

past two years of the 1507 total number of Security Informants presently being

paid on a regular basis, this could be projected into $240, 000 less having been

spent each year on these sources.

Consequently, it appears every effort should be expended to insure

that payments to informants on a regular basis should be initiated only after

the source has furnished data on a continuing basis for at least 6 months and

after he has been paid the tull amount under SAC authority on a COD basis

for value received. There should be no objection to the field's obtaining

Bureau authority to pay source up to another $400 SAC authority before paying

on a regular basis. Certainly, the request to approve an individual as a PSI

should not be coupled in the same communication with a request to pay that

individual on a regular basis. (Of course, in exceptional and unusual cases

facts could warrant conclusion that some sources could be paid on a regular

basis in a shorter period of time.) This will also help to preclude informant's

obvious conclusion that he is being paid on a salary basis because of the

similar amounts paid to him each month.

In addition, all communications approving the initial payments on

a regular basis to security informants/be routed through Mr. Tolson's Office

for review and approval.

It is felt a wider usage of payments under SAC authority to security

intormants, will in the long run, serve to substantially reduce total payments

to them and further implement efforts to curtail costs in accordance with the

Director's and President's recent directives on economy.

Comments of Assistant Director requested.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 332

---

## Page 333

Assistant Director C. D. Brennan

Security and extremist

(JAS: ebc 9/8/71)

informants are essential

to the Bureau's investi-

gative responsibilities. They operate largely in controversial

areas of old line and new left revolutionary organizations and

individuals as well as in the volatile fields of black and white

extremism and racial dissension. They are fraught with controversy

and potential for embarrassment to the Bureau. Extended experience

has taught us the absolute necessity for tight, effective, cen

tralized control of these informants by SOG.

Fundamentally, whether an informant is paid under SAC

authority or on a regular basis by SOG the same standards of

justification are

to be applied. The distinguishing element is the

flexibility of on-the-scene, spot payment authority available to

the SAC on a daily basis without the formality of time-consuming

correspondence with Bureau headquarters.

Money is paid in both

situations on a c.o.d basis and full value must be received before

nayments are made.

Initial payments to a developing informant under

SAC authority, usually made on an expedient emergency basis, are

not reviewed and evaluated at the SOG. The judgment of the

SAC

prevails.

Generally the Bureau approves payments on a regular

basis only when emergency and exceptional local conditions no

longer prevail, when the informant is active, productive and gives

promise of continuing to be so.

Should the currently authorized initial SAC-authorized

$400 be expended rapidly-as is frequently the case--there is no

objection to the field's obtaining Bureau authority to pay a

second $400 to an informant under SAC authority.

This does

require justification through submission of full facts in the

matter for soG judgment, similar to the justification required

each six months for informants paid on a regular basis.

Authorization for SAC authority to permit such payments

up to six months before the field requests regular payments from

the Bureau as suggested by the inspector, could dilute both the

central and consistent control of payments at the Bureau and could

cause an increase in paper work required to implement the

procedure.

SAC authority currently has no fixed time limit for

expenditures and in many cases this authorization could be

318

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 333

---

## Page 334

expended before the termination of a six-month development

period thus requiring additional paper work in the field

and resultant supervisory work at the Bureau.

It is extremely difficult to draw meaningful

conclusions concerning any savings between payments under

SAC authority and costs accrued under delayed SOG approval

of payments on a regular basis.

The informant while operating

under SAC authority is in a developmental stage.

It can be

expected that at any given point in his development whether

he continues on SAC authority or is approved for regular

payments, expenditures to him will increase.

It is the natural

and practical order of informant development.

The sooner a developing security or extremist

informant can be brought under SOG control the more effective

and consistent becomes his supervision.

The SAC remains

accountable, of course, for the informant's handling, the

validity of his expenditures, and the worth of his intormation.

Additional supervision, based

on broad field needs and applied

with consistency to the over-all policies of the Bureau,

necessarily is furnished by SOG supervisors and officials.

This amounts to far more effective field-wide supervision of

these sensitive matters.

Strict economy continues to be the rule in Bureau

supervision of security and extremist informants.

During the

period 4/1/70 through 6/70 for example as a result of reviewing

regular payments to informants $4392 was saved. During the

period 1/1/71 through 3/1/71 $5156 was saved.

More recently

on 8/20/71 a letter to all offices instructed them to cut back

five per cent in their total payments to security and extremist

informants--a projected saving of $129,000.

It is respectfully submitted that, in view of the

over-all sensitivity of security and extremist informants, current

procedures allowing for initial payments under SAC authority with

a shift to Bureau approval of payments on a regular basis as the

informant progresses and develops productivity, provide the most

effective

and consistent field-wide supervision for the over-all

needs of the Bureau.

-2-

NW 88608 Docld:32989638_ Page 334

317

---

## Page 335

While there is no objection to the Inspector's

suggestion that all communications approving initial payments

on a regular basis to these informants be routed through

Mr. Tolson's office for review and approval it must be pointed

out, of course,

that this creates a substantial increase in the

preparation and review of related correspondence, not previously

required.

In view of this forseeable increase in work load,

it is respectfully suggested that ve continue to handle initial

payment correspondence under existing regulations.

-

3

319

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 335

---

## Page 336

ADDENDUM

INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER:

(ESM:bhg, 9/8/71)

Your comments have been noted

and you will be advised as to any

further action necessary.

Assistant Director please note.

Assistant Director C. D. Brennai

(JAS: sjr

9-8-71)

The above observations

#by the Inspector

have

been noted.

$,

320

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 336

---

## Page 337

SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM

SURVEY CONCERNING COMPUTERIZATION OF

SECURITY INFORMANT INDICES

INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER:

During this inspection, it was noted

that the Secui ty Informant Index is

under the supervision of the Security Informant Unit, Internal Security

Section. This Index contains certain data concerning security and potential

security informants but does not include the extremist, probationary

extremist, or extremist-ghetto informants. It must be maintained on a

timely basis. As of 8/24/71, the Index had approximately 2026 informants.

This Index is maintained by 2 GS-5 clerks, one GS-3 clerk, and 30% of the

time of a GS-4 stenographer on a full time basis. This means that 3 1/3

employees are utilized to maintain this Index at an annual cost of

approximately $20, 000.

SAC Lotter 71 21 (C) dated 5/18/71 instructs the field to give

à symbol number designation to all individuals being developed as any type

of a Bureau source of information. This required the field to submit

secure teletypes to the Bureau concerning every source under development

and has resulted in a backlog of work in the Index of approximately 45 to 60 days.

In each instance, the clerical staff is required to puil and alter 2 cards (FD 348)

on each existing source or make 2 cards on any new sources. Subsequent

communications add or delete from the original information which requires

the cards to be again pulled and appropriate changes recorded.

It would appear that this Index would benefit from being

computerized which would result in a savings of clerical time and personnel.

In addition to the informants now handled by the Index, other informant indexes

could probably be computerized with a similar savings.

At the time of the last inspection, the Inspector suggested that

record keeping operations throughout the Division should be considered for

computerizing where feasible. It is suggested that immediate steps be taken

through surveys and conferences to determine if it is plausible and/or

practical to computerize and expand informant indexes similar to that

already done to the Securi ty. and Agitator Indexes. Consideration should be

...:

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

9/3/71

RHM: mea

V°88608 Docld:32989638 Page 337

32 /

---

## Page 338

- 2.-

given to the initial and continuing costs and redesigning the source information

:card (FD 348): The security of this information must be considered as

data concerning informant matters is highly sensitive.

Comments of Unit Chief Grigalus; Section Chiefs Gray,

Shackeliord, G. C. Moore, Branigan, and Wannall; and Assistant Director

Brennan are requested.

322

-NW 88608_Docld:32989638_Page 338

---

## Page 339

UNIT CHIEF GRIGALUS AND SECTION CHIEFS GRAY

Go C. MOORE, BRANIGAN AND WANNALL:

SHACKELFORD,

The Security Informant

Index contains certain data concerning present and former

informants and sources. This data basically consists of

the identity of the informant with limited background

information. The primary reason for such an index is to

have a central repository containing the number and

identities of informants. This information is readily

accessible.

Informal discussions have been held in the

past concerning feasibility of computerizing the Security

Informant Index as well as the Extremist Informant Index.

During course of these discussions, there were two prime

considerations; namely, the ready accessibility of

information on

the indexes as well as the saving of

manpower and cost to the Bureau.

Previous discussions

did not result in a positive recommendation to computerizing

the above indexes. It

is noted that the present indexes

are serving the Bureau's purpose.

In order to insure that

all avenues of savings

are considered, the Inspector's

suggestion will be carried out.

Surveys and conferences

with our expert personnel in the automatie data procossing

field will be conducted to determine if such an operation

is feasible,

practical and economical, keeping in mind

the accessibility of the information and the security of

informants.

It is proposed, therefore, that this

suggestion

be immediately acted upon.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN

I agree that it would

(JAS: cb - 9/7/71)

be desirable to carry

out this suggestion.

I will follow this matter closely to determine if such an

operation is feasible.

323

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 339

---

## Page 340

SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM

SUPERVISION AND CONTROL OF SECURITY INFORMANT

DEVELOPMENT AND COVERAGE BY INTERNAL SECURITY

AND NEW LEFT SECTIONS

At the time of the last inspection a

suggestion was submitted (pages 227 -

233) pointing out advantages in implementation of a program in this area of

operation which would make

our approach to both above types of informants

and Extremist (Racial) informants uniform. You agreed to implement for

one year; however, your subsequent efforts to initiate the program were lost

in a

"security of transmitting problem."

Your Extremist Intelligence Section solved the same problem by having

the fieid send their infurmant reports to the Bureau by socurs toletype and

it is understood that method of handling is satisfactory. The overall

Extremist Informant Program also appears productive.

It is recommended that you again favorably consider the prior suggestion

and tailor implementation after its counterpart in the Extremist Section.

Administration of such a program should be more efficiently handled now

since you have reinstituted handling of

these informants by a Security

Informant Unit.

Comments of Assistant Director Brennan requested.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN

This suggestion will be

(JAS: cb - 8/27/71)

favorably considered.

A careful analysis will

be conducted to tailor the suggestion to the needs of the

Sections affected, keeping uniformity in mind. This matter

will be closely followed by me.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/26/71

ESM:wmj

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 340

324.

---

## Page 341

SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM

UTILIZATION OF INSERTS IN REPORTING

INVESTIGATIVE RESULTS IN CRIMINAL

CASES. BY LEGAL ATTACHES

The Foreign Operations Policy

Manual, Section 10, page 1,

provides that Legal Attaches should

submit investigative

results by cover letter or cover page, on FD-263, letterhead

memorandum, or informant evaluation memorandum.

The Manual

oi Rules and Regulations, Part 11, section &, page

provides that when reporting information in criminal and

civil type cases received from the Bureau's Legal Attache,

the information should be attributed to a confidential

source abroad. In reports the source would be identified

on the administrative page.

During the course of the recent inspection of our

Legal Attache Offices, it was noted that generally Legal

Attaches would furnish investigative results in criminal

cases by airtel or letter where more expeditious means of

communications was not necessary.

In some instances, these

communications would be rather lengthy. Upon receipt of

these communications by the respective field office and

if preparation of a report was desired, the information from

the Legal Attache would have to be retyped, attributed to a

contidential source abroad, and the identity of the source

"set out on the administrative page of

the report. This

rather burdensome task could be dispersed with if the Legal

Attache would prepare an insert setting forth information

and attributing it to a confidential source abroad.

The

insert would be transmitted by airtel or letter with the

identity of the source set out.

The above is being brought to your attention for

appropriate comment and if felt beneficial, the Foreign

Operations Policy Manual should be amended

to include inserts

as the fourth means of reporting investigative results by the

Legal Attaches.

Comments of Section Chief Wannall and Assistant

Director Brennan are requested.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/18/71

JEH: bSI

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 341

305

---

## Page 342

UTILIZATION OF INSERTS IN REPORTING

INVESTIGATIVE RESULTS IN CRIMINAL

CASES BY LEGAL ATTACHES

SECTION CHIEF W. R. WANNALL

The procedure pro-

Nationalities Intelligence Section

posed by the

GAD: hc

8/20/71

Inspector could be

utilized by our foreign offices in those cases where they

recognize that an investigative report must be prepared

and where the intormation developed abroad is suitable

for inclusion in such a report.

"e do not believe, however,

that across-the-board instructions should be issued requiring

this procedure in all instances, nor do we believe that such

a requirement was visualized by

he suggests amendment of the Foreign Operations Policy

Manual to include inserts as one of four means of reporting

investigative results by the Legal Attaches. In fact,

Legal Attaches now prepare FD-302s in certain

cases when

specifically requested by the field. These are, of course,

restricted to cases in which testimony or evidence irom

abroad is anticipated.

The minimal clerical staff abroad is insufficient

to prepare inserts or FD-302s in more than a relatively few

cases.

The high volume handled by most of our Legal Attaches

requires them to use every possible streamlining device to

reduce the clerical burden.

In Ottawa, for example, our

Legal Attache utilizes a specially printed RCMP routing

• to forward RCMP prepared letterhead memoranda:

requirement that Ottawa prepare inserts or FD-302s in any

volume would be impractical.

We propose, therefore, to

amend the Foreign Operations Policy Manual to include

inserts as a fourth means of reporting without levying a

requirement that it be utilized on a wholesale basis.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C.D. BRENNAN

The Inspector's suggestions

DEM:mjt 8/23/71

and the comments of Section

Chief Wannall have been noted and we will amend the Foreign

Operations Policy Manual to include the Inspector's suggestion,

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/20/71

GAD: hc

326.

NW 88608-Đoeld:32989638-Page-342

---

## Page 343

SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM

BLACK NATIONALIST PHOTOGRAPH ALBUM

A CrOSS- MILLER: The Black mationalist photograph Album

(BNPA) was approved and established

1968 and

I at this time contains the photograph and biographical

data of 472 black extremists who travel extensively in this

country and abroad.

Each field office plus Legal Attaches,

Ottawa and Mexico City, maintain this Album to assist in coverage

of movement of black extremist individuals in the United States,

Canada, and Mexico. The Album appears to be an excellent

investigative aid by making immediately available photograph

and background data on individuals traveling from one Division

to another or out of the country whose activities must be

followed.

A review of files discloses at least 10 individuals

who are included in the BNPA traveled to Paris in the recent

past. It is noted a favorite route of Black Panthers traveling

to Algeria is through Paris. In view of the increased activity

on the

part of

the Cleaver Faction of the Black Panther Party,

it can

be assumed that travel of individuals affiliated with the

Cleaver faction to and from Cleaver's headquarters in Algeria

will continue or increase.

In view of these travels, the

Legal Attache, Paris, could utilize the BNPA to facilitate

expedite coverage of

these extremists while in France.

A review of the BNPA itself reveals that some of the

photographs attached to the FD-432 in this file do not have the

names of the individuals photographed on the back of the photo-

graph.

These photographs should have the individual's name on

the back in the event the photographs become detached from the

FD-432.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

I. That Legat, Paris, be provided with a copy of the

BNDA.

2. If a further pattern of travel develops into an

area covered by another Legal Attache, consideration should

then be given to making available a copy of the BNPA to that

Legal Attache.

TESTIC ENTELIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 343

327

---

## Page 344

3. That a review be made of all FD-432's contained

in the BNPA to insure that all photographs are identified

with the name of the individual described on the specific form.

Comments of Assistant Director Brennan and Section Chief

George C. Moore requested:

SECTION CHIEF GEORGE C. MOORE

EXTREMIST INTELLIGENCE

SECTION: The BNPA has been reviewed

and subject's name placed on

the back of all photographs where not previously done.

Legal Attache, Paris, will promptly be provided a copy of

the BNPA. If in the future it appears that the BNPA will be

of value to other Legal Attaches, consideration will be given

then to making available the BNPA to that Legal Attache.

GCM: acs

8/26/71

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION:

CDB: acs

8/26/71

I concur with the above.

-

2

-

328

- NW 88608_Docld:32989638_Page 344

---

## Page 345

SUGGESTION ME MORAND UM

RE: YOUNG SOCIALIST ALLIANCE

INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST (TROTSKYIST)

ESPECRORE. S. MILLER:

From a review of the matters being

handled by the New Left Section, it is

evident that the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA), the youth group of the

Socialist Workers Party (SWP), is the fastest growing subversive youth

group in this country. In August, 1970, membership was estimated to be

1100. During the SWP convention which was held in August, 1971, it was

determined that YSA membership had grown to 1500 members.

It is noted YSA played an important role in the activities of the

National Peace Action Coalition during the April - May, 1971, antiwar

demonstrations in Washingion, I. C.

YSA has numerous chapters throughout the United States, primarily

on campuses. In addition, the Student Mobilization Committee to End the

War in Vietnam (SMC) has chapters on many campuses. The SMC is

nothing more than a front group for the YSA and is dominated and controlled

by YSA.

YSA claims it had recruited 450 new members into its ranks during

the Spring of 1971.

Its leaders have called for aggressive YSA recruiting among colleges

this fall and have set a goal of at least doubling their present membership.

YSA leaders have called for student strikes on campuses this fall

in order to close them down and attempt to organize them for antiwar work.

The SWP is attempting to place its candidates on ballots in 32 states

and YSA is being called on to assist in a vigorous election campaign. SWP

and YSA plan to use this campaign as a means of recruiting new members

to their ranks. It is noted YSA is planning to hold its national convention

in Houston, Texas, late this fall.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

9/2/71

NW 88608_Docld:32989638 Page 345

329

---

## Page 346

".

-2 -

In view of the above and because of existing criteria which was

approved by the Department that membership in YS'A is sufficient to place

an individual on the Security Index, the New Left Section should consider

issuing instructions to the field that sufficient effort be expended on their

investigations of YSA activities to insure that all YSA members are

identified and investigated for possible inclusion in the Security Index.

Comments of Section Chief Shackelford and Assistant Director

Brennan requested.

SECTION CHIEF R. I. SHACKELFORDW)

I fully concur with the

Inspector's observations

concerning this matter.

We are carefully analyzing the informant

reports which are now

being received concerning the results of

the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) National Convention and Young

Socialist Alliance (YSA) Educational Conference which was held

8/8-15/71. Considerable valuable information has been developed

concerning YSA's future plans and activities,

including its plans

for an intensive recruiting campaign this fall. In addition,

YSA is continuing to play an extremely important role in the

activities of the National Peace Action Coalition (NPAC) and

continues to dominate and control the nation-wide activities

of the Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in

Vietnam. (SMC) •

With appropriate approval, we will furnish all field

offices with the latest known plans

and activities of YSA and

will instruct them to vigorously pursue their investigations of

the YSA and to insure all YSA members are identified and,

thereafter, to submit appropriate recommendations for placing

their names in the Security Index pursuant to existing Bureau

instructions.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN S

I concur.

appropriate approval,

the field will be issued specific instructions.

330

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 346

---

## Page 347

SUGGES MEMORAND UM

RE: AUTOMATION OF INTELLIGENCE DATA

RE NEW LEFT AND EXTREMIST INDIVIDUALS

NSPECTOR E.'S. MILLER:

The Espionage Section in close cooperation With

the Voucher-Statistical Section - Administrative

Bivision, has designed and implemented an automated system known as the Soviet

Information Collation System. It is essentially a repository of pertinent data on

Soviet officials assigned to the U. S. Through the fast and easy manipulation of

this data by the computer, outputs arranged by important elements of information

can be readily and reliably obtained for Bureau use or dissemination to outside

agencies. The Espionage Section attests to the fact it has "streamlined our

operations, promoted uniformity and assured the highest level of accuracy. At

the same time, it has resulted in a substantial savings in time, money and man-

power, both in the field and at SOG. "

It would seem reasonable a similar repository of information could be

collected regarding New Left and Extremist individuals. This would parallel

the SICS operation.

Various reports could be selected from this data such as an alphabetical

listing of Key Activist, New Left, and Extremist individuals. Other alternatives

would include listings by phone number according to geographical areas, listings

by addresses according to geographical areas, or listings by demonstrations in

which certain individuals have participated. Summary reports or listings, If

required for dissemination to the field offices or other interested agencies, could

be efficiently prepared under such a system. There are numerous other alternative

that come to mind; however, any consideration for such a program must clearly

take into account the need and benefit for such automation.

Comments of Section Chiefs Moore and Shackelford and Assistant

Director Brennan requested..

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

9/1/71

NC:wmi

33/

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 347

---

## Page 348

SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM

RE:

AUTOMATION OF INTELLIGENCE DATA

RE NETY LEFT AND EXTREMIST INDIVIDUALS

SECTION CHIETS MOORE aNd SHACKELFORDINS

As indicated elscwhere

under Automatic Data

Processing (ADP), 5-Q, automatic data banks are utilized

extensively by the Extremist Intelligence and New Left Sections

in connection with the Computerized Telephone Number Filc

(CTNF) •

CINF lists telephone numbers known to be utilized by

black, New Left and

other ethnic extremist groups and individuals.

Telephone numbers included in CTNF are listed according to

geographic areas.

In addition, a special project utilizing ADP

is being operated in connection with the EASTCON case.

In this

EASTCON project, ADP analyses of telephone calls between EASTCON

subjects are made and also new subjects are identified through

ADD

analyses ef

EASTSON tell calls.

At present, over 12,700 individuals making up the

Security Index (SI) have been

incorporated into the Bureau's

computerized data bank and this data is available to all offices

through ADP. In connection with this ADP, SI project, identifying

data concerning each subject, as well as his residence and

business addresses, are included therein along with other pertinent

'items such as his organizational affiliation. Over 20 separate

print-outs are prepared monthly for administrative and investi-

gative use of the Domestic Intelligence Division and the field.

The facilities of NCIC have also been utilized to

aid our investigations of New Left and extremist individuals.

"Stop Index" programs for Bureau use only at NCIC have been

devised which furnish notice of any police inquiry concerning

missing Venceremos Brigade subjects and all Priority I, SI

subjects who are extremists, unless they are already included in

the NCIC Wanted Persons File.

As indicated, much effort has been made to avail our-

selves of opportunities provided by ADP. The Inspector's

suggestion that further effort be made to expand our use of ADP

facilities, taking into consideration the need and benefit for

such automation, appears to have merit; this will be studied and

appropriate recommendations made as to its adaptability.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

9/2/71

-HM: sad

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 348

- 2 .

332. "

---

## Page 349

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR BRENNAY

MOi concur witta the abore comments.

• *

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

9/2/71

HM: sad

333.:

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 349

---

## Page 350

SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM

PREPARATION OF INTERVIEW REPORTS (FD-302)

IN SECURITY TYPE INVESTIGATIONS

INSPECTOR EDWARD S. MILLER:

From a review of the FBI

Handbook, Manual of Rules

and Regulations, and Manual of Instructions provisions

in regard to security type investigations, more particularly

espionage matters, Registration Act, security investigations,

internal security - nationalistic tendencies matters

ecurity Intormants, and racial matters, it was noted that

no mention is made that information which may be the

subject of later testimony in judicial or administrative

type hearings must be made a matter of record on an

do a matter a

interview report (FD-302).

• In this connection the Manual of Rules and

Regulations, Part II;

section 4. page 42, makes reference

to the preparation of interview reports in security type

cases.

Due to the discovery procedures existent in our

judicial system, the preparation of these interview reports

is most necessary particularly when dealing with information

of a testimonial nature received from security informants.

It is felt that quite possibly the seeming reluctance on the

part of investigative agents handling security matters to

prepare FD-302's may be due to the lack of mention of this

in the Manual and Handbook provisions dealing with security

investigations.

In view of the above, it is suggested that those

provisions of the Manual and Handbook having to do with

security type investigations be thoroughly reviewed and

amended where necessary to set forth the fact that when

information is received from security subjects, security

informants, or other individuals which may become the

later testimony, an FD-302 should be prepared.

Comments of Assistant Director Brennan are requested.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/18/71

JFH : bsf

334

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 350

---

## Page 351

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN,

The following are my

comments requested in

Inspector's Suggestion Memorandum entitled "Preparation of

Interview Reports (FD-302) in Security Type Investigations:"

Inspector notes at outset that from a review of the

FBI Handbook, Manual of Rules and Regulations and Manual of

Instructions in regard to the various types of security

investigations, no mention is made that information which may

be the subject

of later testimony in judicial or administrative

type hearings must be made a matter of record on an interview

report (FD-302) •

Inspector does recognize that the Manual of

Rules and Regulations, Part Il, Section 4, page 4a, makes

reference to the preparation of interview

reports in security

type cases.

In Section 4, Part II of the Manual of Rules and

Regulations, which Section pertains to Communications, there

is a subheading entitled "Reporting Information That May

Become Testimony," which is covered on pages 4

and 4a. It

is specifically

stated on page 4,. paragraphs 2b and c, that

FD-302s should

be used when information is obtained which may

be the subject of testimony. At the very top of page 4a, a

specific reference is made to security-type cases and the use

of an FD-302 in these cases.

The requirement for using an

FD-302 is further reiterated in paragraph 6 on page 4a.

Part I of the Handbook has a section commencing on

page 36, item 48, entitled "Reporting Information That May

Become Testimony." This is the counterpart to the Manual of

Rules and Regulations provisions cited immediately above.

The requirement for the use of an FD-302 is enunciated in item

number 48. •

Of particular significance is the fact that both the

Manual of Rules and Regulations and the Handbook provide in

their respective Indices for the requirements discussed above.

In the Manual, the material is indexed under "Reporting

information that may'become testimony" as well as under

"Testimony-reporting information that may become." The

Handbook index has the same two references. It is therefore

obvious that the requirements for the use of an FD-302 are

logically and easily retrievable by reference to either or both

the Manual and Handbook.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/24/71

SEP:rrO

335

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 351

---

## Page 352

A cursory spot check of some criminal violations in

the Manual of Instructions notes that there is no specific

mention made for some violations and it is quite likely that

the specific requirement for use of an FD-302 is not spelled

out for each of the many, many criminal violations covered in

the various sections of the Manual of Instructions. The

requirement is covered in the Manual of Rules and Regulations

and the Handbook as are many other requirements which pertain

to the Bureau's work generally. A primary function of the

Manual of Rules and Regulations is to have in one place general

requirements that are applicable across the board in our work.

The Section relating to Communications referred to above is a

good example.

It was observed by the Inspector that "quite possibly

the seeming reluctance on the part of investigative agents

handling security matters to prepare FD-302's may be due to

the lack of mention of this in the Manual and Handbook

provisions dealing with security investigations." It is

respectfully observed that we have not noted any "seeming

reluctance" on the part of investigative Agents handling work

in the security field. We have found that the requirements

for the use of an

FD-302 are being generally complied with and

when any shortcomings might be noted they are dealt with on

an individual case basis.

In short, we have had no problems

in this area of our operations. It may be that the Inspector's

observations are based on noting rather few FD-302s in security

reports as compared with reports in the criminal field. If

this be the case, it is observed that by and large our

obtaining of information in the security field is of an

intelligence nature with prosecutable situations being generally

the exception.

In other words, situations where information

might become testimony are rather limited.

A further aspect of the Inspector's Suggestion

Memorandum relates to the preparation of FD-302s when obtaining

information from security informants.

In this respect it is

observed that a great many of our security informants prepare

written reports which are firsthand accounts and thus preferable

to FD-302s which are

secondhand accounts.

Thus, the informants'

reports are even more valuable than FD-302s and

are available

for the same purpose as are the FD-302s. When an informant

furnishes information orally which is not backed up by a written

report from the informant and the information may become a

matter of testimony, the Agent is under the same requirement to

execute an FD-302.

We have not observed any failings to speak

of in this regard.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/24/71

SFP :rrd

336

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 352

---

## Page 353

In conclusion, it is my studied judgement that

there is no necessity for augmenting the requirement

concerning FD-302s in the various Manuals presently being

utilized in the FBI.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/24/71

SFP:rrd

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 353

337

---

## Page 354

ĐOỄND UM

INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER: The primary intent of this suggestion was to point

L. F. Hanlon wmi 8/27/71)

up a possible problem developing as a result of

the increased number of criminal violations

being encountered by Special Agents handling security work. An excellent

illustration of this can be found in case captioned 'Peoples Coalition for Peace

and Justice; IS -Miscellaneous, " Bufile 100-459771. In WFO report of SA James F.

_Whalen dated 5/7/71, serial 423, page 5, is found a narrative of events at a

demonstration on November 21, 1970, at New York.

This information was not

placed on an FD -302 and became an issue at a preliminary hearing. As the

contents of this report were not on FD-302s it was necessary to excise pertinent

portions of the report and considerable issue of this was made at the preliminary

hearing. A further indication of this most necessary indoctrination of security

Agents in the use of FD-302s can be found in the EASTCON case. Your attention

is invited to an airtel under that caption dated 8/25/71 calling for an in depth

interview of a key witness. In this airtel the supervisor felt it necessary to

instruct that the results of this interview be placed on an FD -302.

In light of the above, it is felt you should take whatever

action deemed necessary to bring to the attention of Special Agents working

security matters the necessity of placing information which could be testimony

on FD -302s.

It is felt the matter should definitely be highlighted and then followed

in the individual cases.

Comments of Assistant Director Brennan are requested.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 354

338

---

## Page 355

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN

-Domestic Intelligence

Division is appreciative

of the observations and suggestions set forth in the

Inspector's Addendum.

Accordingly, I am instructing all

Section Chiefs to stress this matter with all supervisory

personnel in the Division.

Further, all of our supervisors

who regularly lecture to In Service classes and New Agents

classes will stress this matter. We will of course follow

the field in the individual cases where it is obvious or

even appears that the required action is not being taken in

the preparation of necessary FD-3025.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/27/71

SFP: 72d

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 355

339

---

## Page 356

SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM

BLACK EXTREMIST ACTIVITIES IN PENAL INSTITUTIONS

EXTREMIST MATTERS

INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER:

By airtel to all continental offices

8/26/71 under the above-mentioned

caption, all offices race requested to determine the extent of activity

and/or influence attribumble to black extremists within penal institutions.

This was undoubtedly a result of the attempted prison break at San Quentin

Prison in Califoria in which black extremist George Lester Jackson was

killed. Reports have indicated that Jackson had hidden a gun in his afro

haircut. Further, press releases indicate that when the maximum security

cell block was searched an afro hair style wig was found.

Due to the numerous arresis made by our Agenis, it is felt

that the field should be alerted to the secreting of weapons in this manner.

Comments of Assistant Director Brennan requested.

ASSISTANT, DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

I concur with the

suggestion of the

Inspector. The Extremist

Intelligence Section is preparing an airtel to all offices

alerting them to the possibility of secreting weapons as noted

above.

CDB: bad

8-26-71

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/26/71

OrL.wm

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 356

340

---

## Page 357

INSPECTION

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

JANUARY 8-26, 1971

*.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 357

---

## Page 358

Page 5.

Why not leave in baldeman

and hardian as they are

oK

acting in on yficed caprait?

Page 7

OK

H2. Congressmens names

delited here but not on

page a TPI. Why?

# 4. Hallernan-include?

page

page 9. LastI?.. - unchde names?

Page 10

TRI

ditto

Last IP-Piddy- includy?

Page 12

page 13

Page 14

Pages 23-27

martian (last 7)?

martian?

mardian?

Each to lie in Brigin?

in Ellsherg?

paze 52

page 54

Berrigan? Ellsherg:

delete onlu

quate en

deinto afte

Page 68

TP3 Echstichman?'"

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 358

---

## Page 359

tag

Shouldnt "Israels in

YES, BUTE lAt line he deleted?

Ds line f. Shoullit

:. Lifelomatic communications'

the deleted?

Vege 109 ,

we should discuss the

Pya" Boco pragram esta

wannal-re inclusion

Bocor notincluded in programs write-up.

ditto se Cente Gero

NW 88608-Docld:32989638-Page 359

---

## Page 360

DID. INSPECTION

1/e.sr.1=,1

RETAIN COPY

Recommend entire document be classified "Secret,"

XGDS 1, 2, 3.

Portions recommended for excision from attached have

been underlined in red or bracketed in red in left margin.

Gencrally, criteria for excision vere:

1. Information which could identify sources or

sensitive techniques

2. Names of individuals or organizations whose

privacy requices protection

3. Information which would reveal our overall success

or lack of success in a given investigative area

4. Information from "third Agencies" or friendly

Foreign agencies

5. Identities of Bureau personnel below the Section

Chief level

The adequacy of Personnel Sections, in general,

disclose the cutent of our commitment in specific areas of

counterintelligence activity. We have given the Committee

dininistrative Division figures regarding total manpover

involved in security investigations but, to my knowledge, ve

have not given them a breakcion as to there these personnel

are assigned. A policy decision is necessary as to thether ve

vant to pinpoint, through release of "Adequacy of Personnel"

sections of these inspaction seports, precisely how much or

ho little manpover ve have on specific types of investigations.

It is questionable whether the intormation regarding

criminal cases /in the San Francisco repoft is germane to the

it would not seem improper toyme to

delete all references to criminal matters and merely substitute

toi

relate to criminal

investigations."

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 360

---

## Page 361

TABLE OF CONTENTS

• .•

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 361

• "=

---

## Page 362

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

SPECIFIC DIVISION OPERATIONS

Substantive ErrorS • •

East Coast Conspiracy to Save Lives

Accomplishments

• •

Internal

Research

Security Section

Section.

New Left Section.

Espionage Section

Racial Intelligence Section •

Nationalities Intelligence Section

Surveys, Projects and/or Intensification Programs

Security Index Program

(Basic Revolutionary Organizations) •

Security Informant Program

(Basic Revuiuvionary Organizations)

Counterintelligence Program •

Disruption of White Hate Groups •

Thumbnail Sketch Progran

New Left Movement

Potential for Racial Violence

Security Index Program

Emergency Detention Program •

Security Informants •

Technical and Microphone Surveillances.

ALEN Program

CANIL Program

..

DESECO Program. •

East-West Exchange Program. •

COKMA Program •

Radio and Technical Equipment Purchased

by Soviets

BANPOP Program ..

Visitors to Communist China and Contacts

by U.S. Residents of Chinese Diplomatic

Establishments

..

.

Chinese Aliens Entering U.S. and Chinese

Entering U.S. Claiming U.S. Citizenship

• Intelligence

Coverage of Friendly Foreign

Countries International Organizations •

1

2

9

10

20

24

33

43

50

•

64

66

67

67

70

71

79

80

81

82

82

84

85

86

88

90

92

95

.

96

99

102

NW 88608_ Docld:32989638 Page 362

---

## Page 363

-

Table of Contents (Continued)

Page

Dangerous Aliens of Nations Outside

Soviet-Bloc

..

.

CHICOIN

...

BOCOV •

.

• 104

• 105

• 107

Name Checks of Aliens Holding Diplomatic

and International Organization Visas.

Security Index - Cuba

American Repatriate Program

Cuban Refugee Program . .

Racial Matters.

Black Nationalist Movement.

Black Panther Party . .

Congress of African Peoples

• 109

• 111

• 114

• 116

• 117

• 119

• 122

• 126

Republic of New Africa.

Junta of Militant Organizations

Nation of Islam

Communist Influence of Raciai Groups:

Counterintelligence Program - Black Extremists138

Key Black Extremist Program .

- Black Student Groups on College Campuses:

Racial Informants . . . .....

• 144

• 145

• 146

ADMINISTRATIVE OPERATIONS

Administrative Write-Ups

Potential Double Agent Program

Espionage Section

Domestic Intelligence Division

"..?

→...

•149

Coverage of Known Meet Areas (COKMA) Program 161

PERSONNEL MATTERS

Personnel Interviewed

Adequacy of Personnel

SUGGESTION MEMORANDA•

..

.

• 167

• 168

Addition of Suitable Designation

Racial Informants For Seat of Government Routing

205

Articles Concerning Activities of Racial Extremists

Research Section

...

..

208

Egbal Ahmad •

...

211

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 363

---

## Page 364

118-26/71

Table of Contents '(Continued)

Chinese Matters . . . .

Page

216

Defector Program

...

Maximum Utilization of Ghetto Informants

Revision of Racial Informant Status Report

Form FD-405

Supervision and Control of Security Informant

Development and Coverage by Internal Security

and New Left Sections •

.

..

218

220

222

227

Venceremos Brigade • •

234

SUBSTANTIVE ERROR WRITE-UPS

Robert P. Bokinsky

PSI-PO (134-19651)

Jan Adam Klasa

IS-PO (105-186986.

Exis Nelson, PSI

IS-R (134-19669

IS-B (AIC-KGB) • •

' ......

•• 241

.. 247

oNW-88608 Pocld:32989638 Page 36t

---

## Page 365

...--

[ SPECIFIC DIVISION OPERATIONS

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 365

Specific

---

## Page 366

SUBSTANTIVE ERRORS

4-B

During the course of the inspection,

two substantive errors were detected

in files reviewed. Both of these errors involved inadequacies

in the supervision of Espionage related cases.

You should consider a further review and evaluation

of these matters in this area of your operation.

Assistant Director Brennan note.

Noted-cs

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

INSPECTION

1/26/71

32304 4-B

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 366

---

## Page 367

EAST COAST CONSPIRACY

4--A-1-a

INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER:

You are requested to furnish a very

brief narrative background e: this

case from its beginning until the present time. In addition, you showi

specifically outline the case developed on each subject showing probable

cause established as of this time. You are also requested to advise when

these cases will be presented to the Federal Grand Jury and indicate the

prospects in each instance for a return of a true bill.

Comments of Assistant Director requested.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1/8/71

ESM.wmj

4-A-1-a

NW 88608_Docld:32989638 Page 367

2

---

## Page 368

4-4-1-7

EAST COAST CONSPIRACY

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR

C. D. BRENNAN

The East Coast Conspiracy is

a loosely knit movement com-

posed primarily of Catholic priests and nuns, teachers, students

and former students and others who have manifested opposition to

the Vietnam war by acts of violence against Government agencies

and

private corporations identified as defense contractors.

The

main thrust of their efforts has been vandalism of draft boards.

The Philadelphia Office developed an informant in

Lewisburg Penitentiary who was a confidant of Philip Berrigal.

= Catholic priest seving time for destruction o

Selective

service recoras.

Investigation by prison authorities determined

this informant had been transmitting mes

messages in and out of

prison, in a clandestine manner between Berrigan and sister

Elizabeth MAlister, a nun associated with the Religious Ordex

1 the sacked Heart Oar ariow in for.

is audition

to transmitting letters, to and from Berrigan, the informant met

on several occasions with followers of Berrigan

Mclaughlin and Joseph Henderoth, unassigned

Catholic priests.

In batta

Mary Lạnd

Through these individuals he met

others associated wich

the movement.

Information contained in the metters al

result of personal contacts oi the informant produced information

showing this group intended to call attention to their anti-Vietnam

war position by blowing up the underground heating and electrical

systems servicing Government buildings in Washington, D. C., and

to kidnap a high Government official. Dr. Henry A. Kissinger,

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, was

mentioned as a possible victim.

The proposed target date

for

these actions was February 22, 1971.

Following the arrest on September 6, 1970, of several

individuals associated with this movement for

the destruction of

draft board records in Rochester, New York, which action included

extensive vandalism to the office of the U.S. Attorney as well as

our Rochester Resident Agency, the informant learned

that the

leading activists in the movement intended to expand

their

activities to include attacks against FBI offices. Informant also

learned from McAlister that the group intended to undertake some

sabotage-type action

at Picatinny Arsenal, Dover, New Jersey, on

an undisclosed date.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1-11-71

4-A-1-a

3

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 368

---

## Page 369

East Coast Conspiracy

Because of the basic responsibility of this Division

for investigations involving subversive antiwar groups, overall

responsibility for this investigation was assumed by memorandum

dated September 10, 1970. This, of course, did not include

individual Selective Service violations existing in various

stages of prosecution or subsequent substantive violations in

which affiliates of this group were suspected of being involved.

This investigation has been specifically targeted to

two areas of prosecutive potential. First, to develop sufficient

evidence to prosecute leadership of this broad conspiracy to

impede the Government's functioning and conduct of the Vietnam

war.

In this vein, a comprehensive review of pertinent naterial

discloses 16 related incidents from October 27, 1967, at Baltimore,

Maryland,

to Rochester, New York, on September

6, 1970. 01 97

individuals involved in 16 incidents during this period, 25

persons have been established as being involved in three or more

of these incidents.

This particular phase of the investigation

is most detailed and complex; however, in terms of far-reaching

damage to the movement, it is most significant. for example,

we have set up an éxtensive Automatic Data Processing (ADP)

project which resulted in a print-out showing over 300 telephone

calls of interest between telephone numbers utilized by these

conspirators and which corroborate information from the informant

regarding calls he received from principal conspirators:

Second, we are developing sufficient evidence to prosecute

the perpetrators

of the plots to kidnap Presidential advisor

• Henry A. Kissinger and to blow up the tunnels which contain steam

and electrical conduits between Government buildings in Washington, D.C.

Because of publicity given the plots to kidnap Kissinger

and to blow up the tunnels in Washington, D. C., it is imperative

this phase of the investigation be vigorously pressed toward

prosecutive action.

Consistent with this objective the Federal

Grand Jury has been hearing evidence in this matter since December 18:

1970, and according to Departmental attorney Guy I Goodwin, will

return indictments concerning the above, mentioned lots on

January 11971-G00dyin states the Federal grand jurywill

continue to hear evidence regarding other facets of this compler.

-2 -

4

NW- 88608-Docld:32989638_Page 369

---

## Page 370

East Coast Conspiracy

matter

and probably will return additional indictments at a later

According

Grand Jury i return indictments

against six conspirators named

belov and, seven indiviauals,

including Daniel Berrigan, will be named as unindictea co-conspirators

athas, time. those.

to be indicted are"Philip Berrigan,

Elizabeth

MAlister, Joseph Wenderoth,- Net McLauge 30.

= Eqbal"

Ahmad, and.

Anthony Scoblick.

Philip Berrigan:

Laboratory examination determined he authored letters

regarding plots to kidnap a high Government official and to blow

up tunnel system which were clandestinely transmitted out of

Lewisburg Penitentiary.

Eiizabeth McAlister:

Laboratory determined she wrote letters to Philip

Berrigan

an regarding above plots. Investigation, including ADP

project,

has also established her contacts with other conspirators.

Considered a leading activist in the movement.

Joseph Reese Wenderoth:

KISSET

Leading activist of the movement and reported coordinator

of plot to blow up tunnel system, with responsibility for recruiting

necessary personnel. Met and discussed plan with informant. Auto-

mobile registered to Wenderoth and Neil McLaughlin observed at farm

in Northern Maryland reported by Informant as training site used by

conspirators.

Neil Raymond McLaughlin:

Leading activist in the movement involved with bombing

plot. Met with

informant to discuss plot.

-8-

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 370

5

---

## Page 371

East Coast Conspiracy

Egbal Ahmad:

Ahmad is Pakistani citizen and

permanent resident alien.

He is a principal figure in the kidnaping plot.

ADP project

Linked him with Henderoth and Mclaughlin.

Anthony Scoblick:

ORNEDES TAME SEE.

Involved in the bombing plot. He has met with informant

and discussed plot and ADP project produced calls between informant

and Scoblick's telephone.

ADDENDUM

INSPECTOLY/A!

S. MILLER:

This case was formally received by the

1/10/11

Dumestic Interiigence division on .

JAA/ErE maz

9/10/70 and responsibility ior same

assumed by memorandun of R. L. Shackelford

to C. D. Brennan dated 9/10/70. It is presently supervised by

Superyisor James McGuise and overall supervision afforded by

Unit Supervisor Fred BeGriffith

It is acknowledged that it was necessary to issue

instructions to the field cautioning them about conducting extensive

background investigations on members close to this conspiracy

prior to the presentation of facts of this case to the Grand Jury

to preclude the possibility of compromising an informant. However,

the following suggested investigative action is being set forth for

your consideration inasmuch as it is of paramount importance that

you continue to press this matter vigorously.

These suggestions

are not to be considered as all inclusive, but are being set forth

for your consideration and appropriate action:

1.

intensifies

comprehensive background investigations on all subjects both

directly and indirectly associated with the ECCSL.

It should be

emphasized, however, that utmost discretion and good judgment should

be exercised in the

conduct of investigations of the principal

conspirators so that unfounded charges of harrassment cannot be

leveled against the Bureau.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1/18/71

JAA/FFE: maz.

6

-NW 88608L

Docial 73896384Page: 7.

---

## Page 372

During the conduct of these background investi

gations the field should be particularly alert to every

potential opportunity for developing member informants in

not only the ECCSL but also in other sympathetic and

splinter groups which develop or spin off from the vortex

of this group.

It is noted that you have pointed out elsewhere

in this report that 97 individuals have been involved

in 16 separate and distinct organized incidents and attacks

on Government agencies and private corporations.

Twenty-

five persons were involved in three or more such incidents.

2. The field should be appropriately instructed

to keep the

Bureau fully advised of all demonstrations,

vigils, harrassment tactics, etc., conducted by sympathetic

and totowers of the seCSl.

Such vigils and demon-

strations should be afforded sufficient appropriate coverage

to develop identities and background of leading activists

and sponsors

of such sympathetic activities.

During these background investigations, particular

emphasis should be placed on developing sources of funds

and financing of the principal conspirators. A review of

this file noted that the subjects appear to

travel frequently,

make numerous long-distance phone calls, rent cars, etc.,

yet outwardly, appear to have limited sources of income.

3. The field should be alerted to the distinct

possibility that other groups similar to the ECCSL are

formed as a result of the indictments returned in this

matter.

Field offices should also be alerted to other

retaliatory actions by sympathetic groups attempting

to capitalize on the

"persecution" theory thereby

exploiting the recent indictments as a sympathetic

rallying point

for more conspiratorial activities.

Assistant Director note.

-NW-88608_Docld:32989638 Page 372

---

## Page 373

EAST COAST CONSPERACY

4-A-1-a

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR - C. D. BRENNAN:

The suggestions and

comments of the Inspector

in this matter are pertinent, appreciated, and are being

complied with. Because this case is of national signifi-

cance and has received nation-wide publicity, you may be

assured it will continue to receive expeditious handling,

close supervision, and my personal attention.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1/20/71

CDB: jIm

4-A-1-a

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 373

---

## Page 374

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

4-E

INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER:

Briefly set forth the noteworthy

accomplishments of your Division,

with a section breakdown, since the last inspection, which ended on 4/17/70.

This request deals with specific accomplishments other than statistical

accomplishments. Specifically Where you have devised a program for a

definite purpose furnish also where possible specific tangible accomplish -

ments on this program. This will give you an opportunity to set forth any

Division achievements pertaining to the Bure u's progress, welfare,

efficiency or any other items not covered elsewhere in this inspection.

A short paragraph on each phase should be sufficient. Do not include

identifying data concerning highly confidential matters and any references

to such matters should ve in general terms. -

Comments of Assistant Director requested.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN:

(JAS:mls

1/14/71)

MADESHERR

Attached are individual

write-ups from each Section

in the Division pertaining

to the accomplishments of that particular section.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1/8/71

ESM:wmj

4-E

MW. 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 374

---

## Page 375

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

INTERNAL SECURITY SECTION

4-E

SECTION CHIEF - ARBOR W. GRAY (LJ

Attached are memoranda setting out the noteworthy

accomplishments of the Internal Security Section since the

last inspection.

This Section is responsible for the supervision

of investigations of the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), its

fronts; pro-Chinese communist groups; Trotskyist groups;

Klan and white hate groups; protest groups; international

organizations affiliated with the world communist movement,

the world Trotskyist movement and international New Left

movement, individuals affiliated with these organizations

and movements, as well as sedition cases. Our purpose is

to gather evidence to support prosecutions of these subversive

organizations and individuals under various statutes relating

to the internal security of the nation. This Section also

supervises development of security informants in basic

revolutionary organizations and, where appropriate, directs

counterintelligence operations against subversive groups

and individuals in cases under our supervision.

DID Inspection

1/12/71

4-E

NW 88608-Đocld:32989638-Page 375

---

## Page 376

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA, UNIT

The major accomplishment of this Unit evolves

from the case entitled, "Solo, IS -C."

" Due to the

sensitive nature of this case,

it will be orally discussed

with the Inspector.

In essence, this case involves sources developing

intelligence information of the highest quality concerning

the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), the Soviet Union and its.

satellites, and the vorld communist movement: Since its

have been completed.

operation from high-lever contacts an

movement is continually disseminated

the highest levels

of our Government and, in many instances, is information

not available from another source.

Examples include the

following: the current

among. the leadership

of the

Soviet Unionas one

1970, and

early

Winter, 1970,

truste for ower weins then

upcoming 24th Congress of the Communist Party Of the

Soviet Union

n (CPSU) ;

a message sent the Government of

giving

suggestions

North Vietnam, could aid antiwar protest, groups in the

United States.theSovietreaction.tothetreaty.signed.by

West Germany with the soviets along vith secret portions of

this treaty

which have not yet been made public;

the initzation

of avoridwide propaganda campaign by the soviets to counteract

and weaken the Unitea states-positIon in-the Strategic

Limitatzon talks, and details on the reorganization which is

SOVIet GoVErnment

All of this information was furnished the White-

House and other interested officials of our Government,

usually by teletype. • Central Intelligence Agency has

expressed great interest in Information developed.oy, this.

operation and on July 24, 1970, requested permission to

include pertinent data developed by-our operation in-a

"ToP Secret/No Fareign/Controlled Dissemination' classified

document for senior US Intelligence Board officials.

DID Inspection

1/12/71

Da RCPinkl,

4- E

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 376

---

## Page 377

The two principal informants in this operation

have received the

"Order of Lenin," with the title

"Hero of Soviet Labor" from the Soviets.

This is the

highest award given civilians by the Soviet Union and was

given our sources for their "invaluable contribution to the

international communist movement."

Continued high-level penetration of the CPUSA

represents a sustained major accomplishment. At the time

of the last inspection, we had ll informants who were

officially members of

the CPUSA National Committee.

At

the present time, this overall number remains the same,

but we have exchanged two informants to give us a better

geographical breakdown.

In addition, we have another

informant who is an ex officio member of the National

Committee because of the sensitive nature of his Party

assignments. This latter source is also a member of the

Political Committee which, in effect, runs the Party.

This top-level coverage is responsible for furnishin

information regarding policy-making matters on a day-to-day

basis as they occur.

DID Inspection

1/12/71

RCP:mk1

4-E

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 377

---

## Page 378

indistine to int

4-E

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

PROTEST AND TROTSKYIST GROUPS UNIT

This unit was formerly known as the Protest Groups

and International New Leit Unit. As of December 16, 1970, a

separate International New Left Unit was organized which took over

investigations pertaining to this particular work. Since the

last inspection, the intensified investigation of cases has

continued to produce positive results.

Selective supervision has enabled us to have advance

knowledge of New Left leaders, conferences, and demonstrations.

Through this advance knowledge, we have been able. to furnish the

White House and other interested Government agencies infornation

on a daily basis regarding pertinent activities of individuals

and groups of interest to us. We have disseminated voluminous

letterhead memoranda, reports, and teletypes concerning plans of

leaders of these groups which were most timely, particularly where

violence was a possibility. On the basis of

by this unit, two Current

published pertaining to the Student Mobilization Committee to

End the War in Vietnam (SMC) and the New Mobilization Committee

to End the War in Vietnam (NC).

These investigations furnished complete coverage of the

major antiwar demonstrations in May and October, 1970, as well as

sectional

and

national meetings at which plans for these demon-

strations were formulated.

This coverage afforded detailed

knowledge of the major shift in the antiwar movement, and the

view of its leadership pertaining to the degree and amount of

militant tactics to be employed.

We were able to follow closely

the emergence of the National Coalition Against

war, Racism, and

Repression (NCAVRR) out of the once powerful NMC and the attempts

of the Trotskyist groups to exercise greater influence within the

antiwar movement through the formation of the National Peace Action

Council (NPAC). The NCAVRR has proposed a national action for

May, 1971, whereby efforts will be made to close down Washington,

D. С., by

the use of militant tactics.

The NPAC plans national

demonstrations in April, 1971, which may verywell undermine the

impact of the NCAVRR action.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1/12/71

JJS: pIm

4-E

- 2-

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 378

---

## Page 379

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

INTERNATIONAL NEW LEFT AND SEDITION UNIT

(Prior to 12/16/70, part o1 Protest Groups

and international

New Left Un trime responsibility of the Bureau and the

intelligence community is to develop intelligence relating

to efforts of foreign governments, organizations, and

individuals to influence, direct, or dominate the New

Left movement in the U.S.

In this regard, over the years,

there have been a number of international-type conferences

often sponsored by international front-type groups frequently

under the direction or control of the Soviet Union.

Late last summer this Bureau received information

that the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam (SCV), an organiza-

tion established in 1967 which is controlled by the Soviet

dominated World Council for Peace, intended to hold a World

Conference on Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia in Stockholm,

Sweden, 11/28-30/70.

As the SCV, since its inception, has

been a

major sounding board for anti-U.S. propaganda, partic-

ularly that of the North Vietnamese, we dispatched WE 1777=S

to aïtend the World Conference.

The informant's attendance

provid di ancoptional value..

10 at sessions

of the orla conterence, y

identifying the entire

American delegation ther international organizations involved,

and foreign delegations actual

representing the

Government.

in exile,

the Provisional Revolutionary

(communist

Government of South

Vietnam, the North Vietnamese,

and communists fron Laos Informant was-able to develop.the

of the

American delegation which was

led by David.

Bell nerd notorious New Left miltant, and

the obviously

directed plans of the Conference to discredit the U.S. at the

Paris peace talks. Informant also developed the nature of

the international propaganda attack to be directed at the

U.S., worldwide action planned in support of the communist

position in Vietnam, and plans to "expose" the "criminal"

position and actions of the U.S. as relate to Vietnam.

Our coverage of this Conference was of value to

officials of other Government agencies and undoubtedly

assisted in the formulation of positive U.S. policies

The excellent

DID INSPECTION

1/12/71

DR: SEW

4-E

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 379

- 34 -

---

## Page 380

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

KLAN AND WHITE HATE GROUP UNIT

4-E

Membership in Klan-type organizations and other

white hate groups has experienced a continuous decline for

the past four years.

The Klan reached a post-World War II

membership high of approximately 14,000 in 1966. From that

point on, there has been a continuing decline in membership.

we have 18 Klan organizations made up of

225 Klaverns (units). There are, of course, in addition to

the membership, many thousands of sympathizers. Investigation

in the white extremist field for organizations other than the

Klan is centered around the Minutemen, the National states

Rights Party (NSRP), and the National

Socialist White People's

Party (NSYPP).. There are numerous other small groups which

likewise fall within this category.

This reduction in Klan

and other white hate group membership is attributable to the

continuous attention given these investigations by then Seat of

Government

and the field, with specific attention given to hard

hiytirg investigations, counterintelligence programs directed

at them, and penetration of these groups at all levels by our

racial infornants.

The year 1970 showed a continuing decline in the

membership and effectiveness of the various Klan and white

hate groups throughout the U.S. As of January, 1970, Klan

membership totaled approximately 5, 300.

Our present

figures

indicate that Klan membership now totals approximately 4,300.

The largest Klan group is the United Klans of America, Inc.,

Knights of the Ku Klux Klan (UKA) under the direction

of

Imperial Wizard Robert M. Shelton. The membership of this

group in January, 1970, was approximately 4,100 whereas it

now numbers 3, 500 members, or approximately 80% of the member-

ship of all Klan organizations.

These recent figures

represent an approximate decrease in overall Klan membership

of 17% and 15% decrease in UKA membership. Membership in

white hate organizations other than the Klan which has always

been relatively smaller membership-wise has likewise experienced

a relatively similar decline.

With the arrest of Robert Depugh, National Coordinator

of the Minutemen, in July, 1969, and his subsequent conviction

Ior federal Firearms Act violation and incarceration, this group

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1-12-71

IVilita

4-E

-8-

NW. 88608_Docld:32989638 Page 380

15

---

## Page 381

has virtually fallen apart and there is practically

no organized activity.

Membership is approximately

180, but individuals remain violence prone.

The National States Rights Party under the

direction of J. B. Stoner is likewise experiencing

difficulty in increasing either membership or activity

and consequently is planning to move its headquarters

from Savannah, Georgia, to Atlanta, Georgia.

In the

meantime this

theo and ications

organization continues to grind out anti-

Negro and anti-Jewish propaganda in crude fashion in

their publications and speeches. Membership is

approximately 150.

The National Socialist White People's Party

(NSWPP) (formerly the American Nazi Party) has its

headguarters in Arlington, Virginia, which is the

center for its activities. There is moderate activity

in Los Angeles and Chicago. Recenty a serious split in the

Leadership

has occurzed as i zogurt se counterintelligence

action taken on the part of the Bureau through use of racial

They appear to be content with publishing a variety

to be sat ember

Here again membership continues to decline.

of anti-Negro, anti-Jewish publications and preparing

their "White Power" telephone messages. Membership is

approxinately 125.

The above is set forth to show the general

accomplishments made by this Unit in the Klan and white

hate field during the past year. Some specific examples

of accomplishments are hereafter set forth:

In February, 1970, we furnished information to

the White House, the Army, Secret Service, Internal Revenue

Service, the Internal Security and Civil Rights Divisions

Of the Department and the Inter-Division Information Unit,

which we received from racial informants of our Tampa

Division who advised that the United Florida KKK had

printed 15,000 protest letters which were being made

available to the public for mailing to President Nixon

in connection with school desegregation. We also furnished

a copy of the actual protest letter for the benefit of

the White House and other agencies.

On February 20, 1970,

Robert DePugh; Nat1ona1

Coordinator of the Minutemen

mentioned above, was

Sentenced

to four years imprisonment following conviction for bond

default. It is noted Delugh was previously convicted and

released on bond for Federal Firearms Act violation.

-#-

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 381

16

---

## Page 382

In March, 1970, we again advised the White House,

the Attorney General, the Army, Secret Service, Internal

Revenue Service,

the

Internal Security and Civil Rights

Division

of the Department and the Inter-bivision intormation unit,

of information learned from racial informants of our Mobile

Dixision relative to another letter which was made available

to the public by the UKA for mailing to President Nixon as

a protest in connection with school desegregation in Alabama.

This was similar to the information previously furnished

relative to the other letter which was made available to the

public by the United Florida KKK. A copy of this letter was

also furnished to the White House, the Attorney General,

Secret Service, the Internal Security and Civil Rights

Divisionsof the Department and the Inter-Division Information

Unit.

In July, 1970, as a result of our investigation,

two individuals associated with a paramilitary right wing

group called "The Raiders," Ferra Loya Hayes and Kennetee

McMaster, were arrested by Bureau Agents in connection with

the bombing of 36 school busses at Longview, Texas, on July 4,

1970. A Federal court had ordered bussing in connection with

school integration.

A special Federal Grand Jucy at Iyler,

Texas, on July 23,

1970, returned a true bill of inditment.

charging the two individuals on two counts; count one, viola-

tion of Title 18, U,S, Code, Section 241 (Civil Rights Act,

1964), and count

two, violation of Title 18, U.S. Code,

S. 1509 (Obstruction of Court Order).

These two individuals

had also been found to have placed "flashlight bombs" in two

Negro residential areas.

Both these individuals were held in

lieu of $125,000 bond each; later reduced to $25,000 each.

They are still awaiting trial.

In July, 1970, as a result of a counterintelligence

technique utilized in connection with the counterintelligence

program directed at the Klan,

Exalted Cyclops Thomas Stipes

of Mascot Klavern 778, Mascot,

Tennessee,

was eliminated from

top position and subsequently banished from the UKA.

As a result of this counterintelligence action, membership in

this Klavern has fallen off appreciably.

On 9-25-70,

Robert DePugh was found guilty in U.S.

District Court,

Albuquerque,

New Mexico, under Federal Firearms

Act for possession of various destructive devices at the

time of his arrest in New Mexico. He received a ten-year

sentence on 10-9-70 on these charges.

He is presently

serving his sentence at the U.S. Penitentiary, Leavenworth,

Kansas.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 382

---

## Page 383

In September, 1970, as a result of counterintelligence

action taken, two of our racial informants in the Little Rock

Division were instrumental in successfully causing the

defeat of a Klansman who was running for sheriff in Jefferson

County Arkansas:

This unsuccessful candidate was Victor

Exarted Cyclops,.

Fine Bluff Klavern, Association of

-During his campagn Calvert attempted to

hide his Klan affiliation because he hoped to receive a good

percentage of the Negro vote in his area. Our informants had

discreetly spread the truth through the Negro community that

Calvert was actually an active Klansman.

As a result of this

action Calvert was overwhelmingly defeated.

In September, 1970, we advised the President, the

Vice President and the Attorney General of current information

concerning Klan activity in the U.S., the decline in Klan

membership; techniques the Klan was

instituting to attempt

to increase its income and the

fact that a black box,

resembling a coffin, was being shipped to the President by

à group called "United Parents of Duval County " Florida. .

This was being sent to the President in connection with a

protest against school integration in Jacksonville, Florida.

In furnishing this information, we advised that the individual

who paid for

the shipping was identifled

as a member of the

U.s. Klans, Knights of the KKK, Inc.

In september, 1970, we advised the President,

the Vice President and the Attorney General of the fact

that Imperzal Nizard Robert MoShelton. of the UKA was going

to request an appointment with the Attorney General to discuss

the latest interpretations of civil rights laws.

We further

advised that Shelton was preparing copies of a "night letter"

which he was

going tô make available to the news media in the

Washington, D. C., area to publicize the fact he desired an

appointment.

This information was learned from a too level

racial informant of our Birmingham Office who advised that

in addition to those of other states. Our informant advised

that Shelton would point out in his letter that appointments

for black leaders had been granted and he was requesting

equal opportunity, treatment and courtesy, on behalf of the

white people of his community. Our informant also revealed

that Shelton did not expect to receive an appointment with

the Attorney General but was doing this merely to receive

publicity as a result of this action. The appointment never

came about.

-8 -

-NW 88608-Docld:32989638_Page 383

---

## Page 384

In November, 1970, as a result of counterintelli-

gence measures taken, we were successful in causing the

resignation of I Melvin Sexton, the Imperial Kligrapp

(National Secretary,- UKA) •

This was of particular importance

in that he actually fan the UKA during the time Shelton was

in prison.

The 1970 National Klonvokation of the UKA was held

at the Ramada Inn, Tuscaloosa, Alabama, on November 28-29,

1970.

At this Klonvokation, Robert Me

Shelton was again

elected Imperial Wizard to serve for three years. During a

speech he made at the kionvokation, Shelton stated (and has

since reiterated his leerings to high-ranking members of the

UKA who are racial informants of this Bureau that he

definitely plans to use a polygraph machine and possibly

to utilize sodium pentothal (truth serum) on all Klan officials

and members in order to ferret out FBI informants.

Shelton...

in 1967, also had plans to utilize a polygraph machine and

truth serum on Klan members in order to learn the identity of

FBI informants. At that time, we used counterintelligence

techniques in various torms inciuding à press release in order

to discourage.

Shelton in this regard. It is to be noted that

many of our sensitive

racial informants are in high-ranking,

positions within the UKA.

In order to again discourage Shelton in his

desires in this regard, it was recommended on 1/5/71 that

a press

release be provided to reliable news sources through

Assistant Director Bishop's office.

Our desire is that we

will discredit

Shelton and frustrate his attempts by exposing

his desires to

the glare of publicity. The news release

release also pointed out that the Klan, which expresses

patriotism and democratic ideals, must resort to gestapo-like

tactics to hold its members in line.

The above are highlights of results of Bureau

investigations into these matters.

Many other disseminations

made throughout 1970 have resulted in the curtailment of

activity and disenchantment with the Klan and other white hate

group organizations.

-Д-

NW 88608_Docld:32989638 Page 384

---

## Page 385

SECTION CHIEF R. D. COTTER:

ACCOMPLISEMENTS

4-E

Accomplishments of Research

Section since last inspection

follow.

Central Research Unit

This Unit has continued to perform a wide range of

research and writing assignments, preparing various documents

and special repoxts, most of which have been disseminated

outside the Bureau as well as to our field offices. These

have included the following:

An extensive special assignment on New Left

research for the Director.

Statement by Director for use before President's

Commission on Campus Unrest.

Issues (14) of Current Intelligence Analysis (CINAL),

a periodic intelligence letter summarizing significant items

of interest in the security field.

Issues (9) of The Extremist Speaks, a monthly

compilation which shows the extremist views of right, lett,

and racially-oriented groups and individuals in the United States.

Monographs (7) setting out in-depth studies of

significant factors in the security-intelligence field.

A comprehensive survey concerning the potential for

racial violence, four (4) special reports for the North Atlantic

Treaty Organization (NATO), and miscellaneous research assign-

ments for the Division.

In addition, a number

of special studies have been

prepared in response

to requests from the White House, These

include:

A "Top Secret" study on domestic intelligence for the

Inter-Agency Committee for Intelligence,

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1/12/71

4-E

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 385

---

## Page 386

1s stricken

An extensive brief, "Special Report, Nationwide

Civil Disturbances, at the request of Vice President Agnew

(revised periodically).

A study, "'Stop the Bombing' Campaign: A Communist

Cause," at request of President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory

Board, concerning foreign influence in the 1964-68 campaign

seeking a halt to U.S. bombing of North Vietnam.

"Top Secret" blind memoranda (3) for a special

intelligence evaluation committee on extremist and terrorist

groups in the U.S.

A "Secret" paper for the U.S. Intelligence Board

analyzing "Racism, Radicalism, and Nationalism in the Caribbean."

This Unit has also collected and prepared material

for various articles, speeches, and surveys, and has prepared

special memoranda for the information of Bureau officials.

Personnel of this Unit have handled lectures on the subjects

of communism, the New Left movement, and racial extremism.

These have consisted of classified

lectures to Bureau's New

Agents and In-service classes, appearances before other

intelligence agencies and National Academy classes, and a

number of nonclassified lectures before civic, church, and

law enforcement groups.

Since last inspection, a total of 42

speeches have been handled involving outside groups.

Special Records Unit

Primarily responsible for records keeping, this Unit

is also engaged in emergency planning in addition, beginning

in september, 1970, the Unit has prepared the Division's

portion of the "Brief For Director's Use In Connection With

Attorney General's Staff Conference," Thursdays, at 5 p.II.

Also beginning in September, 1970, this Unit has

prepared the "FBI Summary of Extremist Activities," a weekly

sunmary of racial extremist activities, which is disseminated

to the

White House, top Government officials, the intelligence

community, and each field office, The White

House has been

highly commendatory of this paper, praising the content, format,

and style. The Director approved an incentive award for the

Agent who prepares the summary.

-t -

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 386

---

## Page 387

New Left Reporting Unit

This Unit, which coordinates covering of all New Left,

student, and antiwar demonstrations throughout the country, has

handled the reporting of the following major disruptions or

demonstrations since the last inspection.

National demonstrations 4/14 - 15/70 to protest the

war and the payment of war taxes.

National Invironmental Actions, which was heid

throughout the U.s. on 4/22/70.

Intensified and widespread student disruptions which

occurred throughout the U.S. during the last part of April and

during May, 1970.

A March on Washington on 5/9/70 to protest the

invasion of Cambodia.

Nationwide demonstrations to protest the military,

on 5/16/70.

A Yippies smoke-in at Washington, D. Ce, on 7/4/70.

This also involved attempted disruption by the lippies of the

Honor America Day ceremonies.

• The People's Army Jamboree, which was held at

Portland, Oregon, 8/28-9/3/70, for the purpose of disrupting

the National American Legion Convention.

The March for Victory, which was held at Washington, D. Ce,

on 10/31/70 by Dr. Carl mcintire.

Demonstration against President Nixon, San Jose,

California, 10/29/70.

Timely dissemination was made to the White House

and the Attorney General,

as vell as other interested officials

and agencies of the Executive Branch, concerning these demon-

strations as well as nationwide agitation occurring on a daily

basis throughout the country.

Frequently, advance information

was furnisned to such officials and agencies pointing out likely

trouble spots and predicting the possibility of violence.

-33-

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 387

22

---

## Page 388

In addition, a timely study concerning disruptive

attacks on the courts was prepared and disseminated to high-

level officials and interested agencies.

Racial Reporting Unit

This Unit, formerly called the Riot and Racial

Disturbance Unit, has continued to coordinate all phases

of racial disturbances and violence and other racial

developments as well as information bearing on the potential

for violence throughout the country. Voluminous material

being reported on a daily basis by the field offices is

reviewed, coordinated, and disseminated to interested

officials and agencies and current teletype summaries are

furnished to the White House, Attorney General, and other

high-level officials. In the past year more than 5, 500

memoranda and teletypes have been disseminated.

Statistical

data on racial disorders, schovi disorders, and aitacho vu

police are maintained in

this Unit for use in the preparation

of special papers.

This Unit also prepares highly useful research

studies concerning developments in the racial field. Since

the last inspection, these have included special papers on

the black action movement at racially harassed University of

Michigan; a review of newly formed black extremist groups;

numerous papers concerning provocative articles appearing in

the Black Panther Party newspaper; a special paper for the

Vice President concerning racial disturbances in Mississippi

and Georgia; a study on racial disturbances in secondary

schools in

the 1969-70 school year; and a detailed account of

advance information concerning the potential for violence in

support of the Black Panther Party in New Haven, Connecticut,

prepared for the Departmental Evaluation Committee. A detailed

study on the extent of foreign influence in the black extremist

movement, similar to that disseminated just after the last

inspection, is presently being prepared for early dissemination.

In addition to the above, instructions in the

Manual of Instructions and the FBI

Handbook concerning the

handling of general racial matters

were completely revised

and streamlined by this Unit since the last inspection.

NW 88608 Dócld:32989638 Page 388

---

## Page 389

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

NEW LEFT SECTION

4-E

SECTION CHIEF - R. L. SHACKELFORD)

'Attached are individual

memoranda from each unit

setting out the most noteworthy accomplishments of the

New Left Section since the last inspection. This Section

is responsible for the supervision of investigations of the

New Left Movement including terrorist groups and individuals

engaging in bombings, arson and assassinations, and other

New Left groups and individuals both on college campuses and

off campus.

The development of New Left informants and

investigations of New Left publications are also supervised

in this Section as are sabotage investigations and counter-

intelligence operations against the New Left.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1/13/71

H/HM. IIM

4-E

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 389

---

## Page 390

Katie

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

NEW LEFT GROUPS UNIT

The work of this unit concerns Students for a

Democratic Society (SDS) factions (with the exception of

Weatherman), other New Left campus groups, the Key Activist

Ney rest Hew left Movement reports, New left publications,

informants, and the maintenance of a library of

"hand-out" material on the New Left for dissemination on a

high level to Government officials and responsible citizens.

In 1969 Worker Student Alliance (WSA), Weatherman,

and Revolutionary Youth Movement (RYN) factions of SDS split

into separate groups.

Accomplishments concerning Weatherman

are reported elsewhere in this survey. The RYN faction of

SDS is now practically defunct. Currently, the largest faction

of SDS is WSA faction. WSA is dominated by the pro-Chinese,

Marxist-Leninist Progressive Labor Party; and, while not as

violent as Weatherman, is avowedly a revolutionary group.

Our efforts to achieve informant coverage in WSA

showed results when WSA held its National Convention in

Chicago in December, 1970. Approximately 20 Bureau informants

attended this convention,

and extensive information on

activities at the convention was promptly reported and

disseminated. Through informants, we have encouraged faction-

alism in WSA. At the convention,

dissident groups led by one

of our sources threatened a new split in SDS/VSA which may

occur in the near future.

Such dissension will reduce the

possibility that SDS might once again become a massive student

organization as it was before its division in 1969.

Through the Key Activist program, we have focused

investigative attention on the leaders of the New Left

movement vith the aim of prosecuting these leaders under

appropriate statutes, Federal or local, wherever possible.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1/13/71

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 390

---

## Page 391

At the present time, we have designated 75 individuals as

Key Activists. Of this number, 40 are currently the subject

of prosecutive action.

This has definitely severely disrupted

the entire New Leit movement as well as component New Left

organizations.

Through the New Left Movement reports prepared

quarterly by each field office, we have provided to interested

agencies timely and informative documents on the activities

of the New Left movement, thus making a substantial contribution

to the objective that responsible officials be fully aware of

the threat the New Left presents to our democratic society.

By closely following a myriad of New Left publications

ranging from those merely pornographic to those clearly

revolutionary, we have determined the leadership of these

publications;

their propensity for violence and subversive

activities; sources of funds; and through dissemination have

advised interestea officials

and agencies. Since these

publications frequently appeai and disappear within & short

time, we are alert to the birth of new publications by following

various underground news service lists as well as other

documents and books which report new publications in this

field.

We have recognized that in the past, informant coverage

of New Left groups has not been adequate and

accordingly have

given great emphasis to this aspect of our responsibility. As

a result, intormant coverage in this area has been dramatically

increased. At present, we have 900 informants and sources of

all types providing coverage of the New Left. This number

includes 178 security informants and 410 potential security

informants.

Since the last inspection, New Left informants have

provided information which has: led to the indictment of a

number of New Left leaders on Federal and local charges;

located fugitives including some Weatherman fugitives; provided

advance information on numerous New Left demonstrations including

plans for violence; and furnished detailed information on the

organization, membership, and activities of a broad range of

New Left groups.

-12 -

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 391

---

## Page 392

The assistance of New Left informants has been

invaluable, and we are continuing to emphasize the development

of additional quality informants in this field.

Through the maintenance of a repository of "hand-out"

materials and publications on the New Left for distribution

to Government officials and responsible citizens, we have

assisted these important individuals to more fully understand

the subversive ramifications of the New Left movement.

= 25

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 392

27

---

## Page 393

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS UNIT - WEST

ince the Summer of 1969, New Left extremists

have becoss increasingly identified as Marxist-leninist

revolutionaries, and have utilized extreme violence in

effort to achieve their purpose. In the period since the

last inspection, the prosecution of these revolutionaries

•osecution

has contired to be one of our primary objectives, to the

end that individual terrorists are neutralized and their

organizat.ons are isolated; leaderless; and finally defunct

He have bad significant accomplishments in this regard.

On

April 2, 1970, 12 leaders of Weatherman (the most violent

faction

• Students for a Democratic Society) were indicted

in Chicago on Federal Antiriot Law (ARL) charges. Other

Weatherns leaders

were indicted on local charges and became

Bureau fugitives.

The Weatherman organization has gone

underground and has taken extreme measures

to avoid apprehension.

Novartbolins, five of these Weatherman laaders have been

located se the FBI as a result of investigations by Agents

on New Lest squads in

the field and through the efforts of

New Left informants.

On July 23,

1970, in Detroit, Michigan, indictments

were obta: ned against 13 Weatherman leaders for violation of

Federal sunbing and gun control statutes.

Five of these

individua is have since been arrested or have surrendered.

Other Weatherman leaders remain in fugitive status

intensive efforts to locate

them continue.

Already these

indictments and arrests have had a noticeable effect on the

Weathermar organization.

Bernardine Dohrn, a Weatherman

leader wit in May, 1970, had declared a State of war against

the U. S.. announced in December, 1970, that Weatherman had

made a "-litary error" in tending to consider only "bombings

and picsire up the gun as revolutionary."

• Weatherman has

learned,

sohrn said, that a group of "outlaws" who are

isolated from the youth communities cannot grow to include

large numisers of people.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1/13/71

4-E

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 393

28

---

## Page 394

Weatherman and their ilk will doubtless try to

organize wider support in the broad youth culture, most of

which is not presently committed to violence. By

the

continuation of energetic efforts to prosecute the instigators

of violence, we can increase the isolation of terrorist groups

and reduce their influence on youth. This objective is being

forcefully pursued wherever

possible.

In Seattle, a group

of seven violence-prone individuals with Weatherman connections

were tried in November and December, 1970, on Federal ARL;

Conspiracy; and Destruction of Governnent Property charges.

A mistrial in this case was declared December 10, 1970; however,

due to the defendants' misconduct in court, all seven were

cited for contempt. These Seattle indictments were made possible

through New Left informant coverage.

The East Coast Conspiracy to Save Lives, led by the

notorious Berrigan brothers. has been the subject of intensive

investigation since the last inspection. This group, which

is masked as a religion-oriented

peace group, has actually

plotted kidnaping and violence. This matter has been presented

to a Federal Grand Jury with the result that six individuals,

including Philip Besigal. were indicted on January 12, 1971.

Seven other individuals,

Including Daniel Berrigan. were named

by the Grand Jury as unindicted coconspirators.

Information set forth above referring to New Left

extremists and the Weatherman organization also applies to

work handled by the Special Investigations Unit - East.

-2=

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 394

---

## Page 395

indiscreenstant insei

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

VENCEREMOS BRIGADE

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS UNIT - EAST

4-E

The Venceremos Brigade (VB) came into being

June, 196y, as a coalition of representatives from various

New Left organizations including Students for a Democratic

Society, Trotskyist Youth Socialist Alliance, the militant

Black Panther Party and a supporting cast of

Old Left

organizations including the Communist Party, Progressive

Labor Party and Socialist Workers Party.

Three contingents have traveled to Cuba since

November, 1969.

The first group was composed of 216 young

Americans who obtained their own transportation to Cubû in

defiance of the State Department ban on travel to that

country.

These young revolutionaries were returned to

Canada at the expense of the Cuban Government which converted

a cattle boat into a makeshift troop ship.

This boat

arrived in St. John, Canada, on February 12, 1970, and

immediately loaded 687 sympathetic American youths aboard

for its return trip to Cuba.

This group, like the first

contingent, worked in the sugar cane fields until its

return by the same means of transportation on April 28,

1970. In August, 1970, the third contingent of the VB,

made up of 407 persons, journeyed to the Isle of Youth

where they participated in a Cuban agricultural experiment

of planting and fertilizing citrus trees.

This group

returned to the U. S. mid-October, 1970.

Each group worked approximately 7 hours a day,

5% days a week, and in their free time were afforded the

opportunity of

absorbing communist propaganda offered by

the Cubans, North Koreans and North Vietnamese. They were

reminded by the Cuban camp director that they were here to

show "solidarity with the socialist struggle, to smash the

U. S. blockade, and to make a breach in the facade of the

U. S. imperialist monster."

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1/12/71

FBS : amk

4-E

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 395

---

## Page 396

Each of the more than 1300 brigade members has been

the subject of a security investigation which includes the

identitication and obtaining of background data as well as

a personal interview with each brigade member.

These

investigations are being made to determine the immediate

danger presented by these young revolutionaries and also

to ascertain the long-range role they will take in the

revolutionary mevement in the U. S. Upon completion of

the investigation and the interview of each of these

individuals, the field must recommend either the inclusion

or noninclusion of the subject in the Security Index.

addition the field must continue to report every 90 days

for a period of one year on the activities and whereabouts

of each brigade member.

Five approved Bureau informants accompanied the

second VB, and the third VB also included in its ranks four

Bureau approved informants. These sources have materially

assisted the Bureau in discharging its intelligence responsibilities.

While the security investigations of all brigade members are.

not completed, more than 100 VB participants have been piaceu

in the Security Index and as we conclude these investigations

it is anticipated numerous others will also be listed in

this Index.

The fourth contingent of the VB is currently

being organized and recruiting emphasis is being placed on

"quality individuals" who have open outlooks and socialist

backgrounds.

This group is tentatively scheduled to depart

for Cuba March 1, 1971, and is to be comprised of

approximately 300 individuals.

Information set forth above

referring to the Venceremos Brigade also applies to work

handled by the Special Investigations Unit - West.

-*-

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 396

3.1

---

## Page 397

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

SABOTAGE

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS - EAST UNIT

4-E

2 -

Incidents of Sabotage have been on the rise since

the mid-1960's, occasioned primarily by growing opposition

throughout the country to the Selective Service System, the

Armed Forces, and in particular to the war in Vietnam.

There are under investigation at the present

time 7 Sabotage cases with prosecution pending involving 29

subjects who are charged with 43

separate violations

including attempted Sabotage, Destruction of Government

Property, Anti-Riot Law

violation, Civil Rights violations,

violation of the National Firearms Act, Interstate Transporta-

tion of Stolen Motor Vehicles, and Conspiracy. In connection

with one of the above investigations, one subject in

October, 1970, was found guilty and sentenced to five years,

which sentence is being appealed, and another subject in

November, 1970, pleaded guilty and is scheauled to be

sentenced sometime in January, 1971.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1/12/71

ARTJM:cae

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 397

---

## Page 398

ACCOMPLISHHENTS

4-E

SECTION CHIEF W. A. BRANIGAN

ESPIONAGE SECTION

1.

Persona Non Grata and other Removal Actions

Boris Mikhaylovich Orekhov was a correspondent in

New York City for the soviet newspaper "Prayda."

from dune,

1970.

Based on the results of FBI investigation,

on the latter date he was expelled after the Department of State

informed the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D. C., on June 24,

1970, that Orekhor had engaged in activities incompatible with

His departure from the United States

was requested.

departed July 7, 1970, depriving the

Soviets of the presence in the U.S. of

a very active intelli-

gence officer.

In a similar case, also as a result of our investi-

gations, on November 6, 1970, State informed the Soviets of the

Iron LIE USSR of a U. S. correspondent.

the expulsion

In an interesting and successful counterintelligence

operation,

the Soviets were forced to remove Xergeniy Welshit

a KGB officer, from the United Nations Secretariat and send him

home. Yelshin had been in contact with sources under our control

in the aerospace field. In September, 1970, the "arrest" of one

of our sources during a meet with Xelshit was staged.

Subsequently,

Leishin was contacted by our Agents concerning his intelligence

activities. Although Yelshin had not completed the term of his

contract with the UN Secretariat,

he returned home with his

family, at Soviet expense, on 11/1/70.

In a pending case, our investigation has established

violation of U. S. immigration laws by an individual known to be

a KGB agent. He has denied

affiliation with the soviets, but has

admitted immigration fraud. INS and State have initiated

action

to have him dismissed from the UN Secretariat and expelled from

the U. S.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1/13/71

IPT: pld

4-E

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 398

---

## Page 399

4-E

Information we furnished to the Department of State

apparently has

prevented the return to the United States of two

Polish commercial officials formerly assigned to New York City.

We told State how the one, a Polish military intelligence

officer, with the assistance of the other had since mid-1969

been very active in trying to purchase electronic equipment of

defense significance and ship it to Poland in violation of

export licensing requirements.

On 3/27/70, State informed the

Polish Ambassador to the U. S. that the activities of these to

Poles must cease.

Both left the country.

We have subsequently

learned through our sources that one, expected to return to

•U.S.,

has been reassigned and will

not return.

The other has

not returned.

Thus, the usefulness of two Polish agents in the

U. S. was destroyed

by our investigations.

2. Double Agents

One measure of our effectiveness in countering the

activities of the intelligence personnel among the hundreds of

communist bloc representatives in the U. S. is our ability to

continue to develop and operate double agents against hostile

agents.

This is a matter of vital concern and continuous

attention in the Espionage Section.

the last inspection

we have continued to improve our position in this regard, as

the following chart shows:

Country

N56ZZT7

Soviet

Albania

Bulgaria

Czech

East German

Hungary

Poland

Romania

Yugoslavia

Totals

Active

Double Agents

1/1/70 12/1/70 Change

67

74

5

+7

1

5

21

1

16

-5

3

3

5

6

16

21

10

+1

+5

+2

Potential

Double Agents

4/1 12/1 Chg

207

227 +20

0

5

13

3

-5.

25

3

25

10

10

5

14: +1

-1

-2

0

+3

-2

Inactive

Double Agents

4/1 12/1 Chg:

34

33

1

OH

2

1NOO

128

138

+10

12

-

277

296 +19

49

49

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1/13/71

SPI:pld

NW 88608 Bodld:32989638 Page 399

---

## Page 400

4-E

It is obvious that despite the sophistication and

security-consciousness of the Soviet Intelligence Services, our

efforts to direct double agents against them continue to meet

with conspicuous success.

Examples of the productivity of our

double agent operations

appear elsewhere herein.

Some declines in the number of double agent operations

against the intelligence

services of countries other than the

USSR handled by this section have occurred since

the last

inspection. In part, this may be a reflection of a change of

emphasis in direction of our efforts, which has resulted in a

reduction of the number of supervisors assigned

Albanian and Yugoslar matters none Lull time andronen

part-tine supervisor vere handling this vors; at present

there

are four superviso

assigned to this wons funt time and three

part time.

However,

reference to the above chart" shows that

the bulk of the drop

in the number of active and potential

double agents has been in the Czech field. This is attributable

primarily to two factors.

Following the occupation of Czechoslovakia (CSSR) by

Soviet bloc armed

forces in August, 1968, which resulted in the

fall of the liberal Alexander Dubcek regime, the Communist Party

of the CSSE began a critical analysis of all party members who

had

supported Dubcek.

This analysis included individuals

assigned to diplomatic posts in Washington and New York and

resulted in the recall of about two-thirds of such personnel.

A number were expelled or suspended from the Party. Of those

recalled see he is yes deet in lashinston winneR neathe

latter. An extrenely vell placed source has reported that the

purge, which began early in 1970, caused great anxiety among all

the Czech personnel in Washington and New York and that morale

dropped to rock bottom and, as consequence, little intelligence

work was carried on during

the current year.

Naturally, with

the CIS agents missing or dormant, our opportunities to target

double agents against them diminished.

This unsettled political

situation,

together with the overt defection of a CIS officer

in Hashington on 6/29/70, resulted in the Cis assuming:

defensive posture and maintaining contact only with persons

considered by them to be fully trustworthy.

Indicative of the

quality of our remaining double agents is the fact that cIs has

held meets with two of our sources in the immediate past

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1/13/71

4 -E

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 400

---

## Page 401

4-E

The above chart, showing numbers of double agents at

the time of the last inspection and at present tells only part

of the story.

It does not show that there is a continual

process of review and analysis of double agent matters and

close attention to field activity in this regard.

We are

constantly striving to weed out any "deadwood" and to introduce

fresh blood into our counterespionage efforts. Presentation

of precise figures on the turnover among double agents during

the period since the last inspection is not feasible,

because

various offices have different reporting dates on which they

• inform the Bureau of additions and deletions of double agents

in the various nationality fields. However, the following

available figures clearly indicate desirable turnover. In the

soViet Ileld, Irom March I, 1970, to December 1, 1970, we added

4L active and potential double agents; a net increase 0f30

In the other countries currently supervised in the Espionage

Section, we added 28 active and potential double agents and

used

active usefulness, and some left the country.

3. Counterintelligence and Other Significant Operations

In our eyes, counterintelligence activity is activity

designed to disrupt and hamper the operations of an opposition

intelligence service.

Although it may involve harassment at

times, it is for the most part much more serious and worthy of

our efforts only when it inflicts actual damage on the effective-

ness of the enemy. To this end, we employ our own capabilities

and, whenever indicated and possible, those of other U. S. and

other Government agencies.

Following are some examples of this

activity since the last inspection.

Upon instruction from us, one of our double agents

told his Soviet handler, Vladimir

-zaryan an Antarg Trading

Corporation employee that the FBI

admitted he had been contacting Azaryan and also his predecessor,

United Nations secretariat aployee he doubte

obvioust reported the matter, tomas superiors.

after,

both soviets left the united states,

thus disrupting the

Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB).

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1/13/71

NW 88608-00C/:3389638 Page 401

---

## Page 402

4-E

As a

result of Bureau counterintelligence

action,

an Aeroflot official who was a GRU officer was hurriedly

removed fron the U. S. under soviet guard by the Soviets. In

addition, an Intourist official, a suspected KGB officer, was

also recalled from the U. S. because he was also blamed by the

Soviets for the security breach involving the aforementioned

Aeroilot official: Thus, one counterintelligence operation

caused the removal from the U. S. of two Soviet Intelligence

Service operatives.

In another operation a Soviet official assigned to

washington, a khown lub ofticer, was the principal in a bureau

double agent operation 1th state Department Clearance ye

He rejected

and asreeshe contacted in the

future he has

Feturned to the voss on home

Leave and

agreed i cet mir is again then he comes!

There are indications that the delay in

his retur

the Ti"s"

his wires Liness

This operation continues to offer the

possibility of his

recruitment either here or abroad.

On the basis of information developed through one of

our operations, two Argentinians were arrested in October,

1970 Argentina as illegal Soviet agents Our information

15 V

that they were

targeted

to ultimately operate in and against

the U.

Our effective handling of this matter stopped them

before they even entered this country.

Based on information received from a well placed

source, we recently identified a U.S. agent of the Soviets.

*he has indicated a desire to cooperate with

usana wellahousin ana counterintelLigence action

against his Soviet principat In another caserve developed

sulficient normation concerning the tute ligence operations

Vetrov

-that

Ambassador to the UN was

Of Yur its Soviet counterpart concerning Votror's activities.

to inform

Vetrov was not the subject of

persons non grata action secause

State did not vant to give the soviets the opportunity to

expel one of our diplomats

From Moscow and vetroy vas due to

leave

the detailed information in our

ambassador s possession must have caused considerable disruption

of Soviet intelligence activities in the United Nations when our

ambassador disclosed our knowledge of it.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

NW 88608

1/13/71

JPT:pld

Docla: 32989638 Page 402

32

---

## Page 403

4-E

By letter to the Director 6/10/70, the U. S.

Air Force expressed its appreciation for the invaluable

contribution of Bureau personnel in supporting an OSI

counterintelligence operation involving an East German

Intelligence Service (EGIS) officer who came to the U. s.

to service an Ait force doubte agent. We had been cooperating

with Air Force in this case since 1965.

Information was obtained by one of our double

agents against EGIS that EGIS has for some time been

1970, State indicated that it was

intelligence service in approach the employee.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1/13/71

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 403

---

## Page 404

4-E

On July 11970, the State Department announced

that Antonin Nenko, former Second Secretary,

Czech Embassy,

the U. To Nenko's action caused the termination of a

, had defected"and requested" political asyTum in

highly successiul and valuable

operation ve had been Conduct-

ing against the cis for

both in the united states and abroad. ior to his overt

perations airinst the uS Although his overt defection

is public knovledge his activities as our defector-in-

place have not been

revealed in

but the valuable information

he furnished has

been made available to interested

Government agencies®

In 1969 a Hungarian Intelligence Service CHIS

agent came to the U.s. as an immigrant: He has been under

FBI control almost since his arrival.

He was sent by his

with instructions that he would ultimately take

over the

direction of HIs illegal agents in the United States. He

has had several meetings Vith HIs handlers and the operation

involving him includes the use of clandestine communications,

secret message arops and other

sophisticated espionage techniques.

Not all of our responsibilities in the Espionage

Section involve activity against hostile intelligence

services. Among the immigrants from communist countries

are many

whose hostility to their former communist homelands

is such, that given the opportunity, they would take

violent

action against representatives of their countries

of origin.

We have effected coverage of these nationality

groups designed to permit us to alert responsible outside

agencies to threats from such people.

One example of our

effectiveness in this regard occurred in connection with the

Security Se

cooperation in its efforts to protect tito. In November,.

1970. through Legat, Paris, we received a letter thanking

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1/13/71

JPT:aS

4-E

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 404

---

## Page 405

4-E

the Bureau for its invaluable assistance in contributing to

Its successiul handling, Without serious acident ene

Because of

our extensive coverage of

anta-tito

makers and to furnish prompt responses to specific inquiries.

Returning to our more usual counterespionage work,

we developed and operated as a defector-in-place from

July 1969

70, a Soviet official assigned

to a Soviet establishment in New York City. This source,

although not affliated with Soviet intelligence, was able

to furnish information of counterintelligence value and to

identify members of the soviet intelligence community The

source left the United States in November: 1970, but

New annice received a communication

a special

The communication

eater in chan Thie un cooperate.

with the

overnment in the Future.

This possibility

I's,

of course, dependent upon,

on the source's future Soviet.

assignments.

In October, 1970, the Internal Security Division

of the Department informed

us that the Interdepartmental

Committee on Internal Security was concerned with the

espionage and intelligence activities of Soviets employed

at the United Nations Secretariat (UNSEC).

We were

requested

to prepare a paper concerning such activities. The paper

was furnished to the Department and to State during November,

1970.

We have now been informed that based on our

information U. S. Ambassador Phillips at the United Nations

is considering placing certain restrictions in effect

concerning the travel of Soviet nationals assigned to

UNSEC.

Should this take place, our efforts in this matter

could definitely lead to more effective and efficient

coverage of these Soviet intelligence personnel by the

Bureau.

Coverage of a Soviet establishment, Washington, D.C.,

revealed Soviets had constructed a ten-foot-square

covered by a door on rollers.

one intected a pattern ve opens of the toote use of tor-

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1/13/71

JPT:as

4-E

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 405

---

## Page 406

4-E

sophisticated laboratory technical equipment enabled the

accuracy of guidance system of soviet intercontinental

Banistic Missiles targeted against the United states,

_NSA

and the vetense intels gence Agency have stated that this

extremely valuable positive intelligence had not previously

been developed any place in the world.

Another counterintelligence operation which has

been conducted

against the soviets since 1966 took a novel

turn since the last inspection.

We had been using this

operation to pass disinformation to the soviets using.

couple agent. This way meeting was- the

product uprior arrangements engineered to have the

new soyet handler accept our Agent as his predecessoris

former contact the Soviet who appeared

at the May meeting

had not been previously known to be an intelligence officer.

and we continued.

.TO PaSS A1

Chiefs Of Staff axe

interested and involved in supporting

this operation. Since we substituted an FBI Agent fox, the

original double agent, we nave obtained sophisticated

espionage paraphernalia not previously acquired in our other

operations against the soviets and we have received over

$5,000 of Soviet funds.

In another sensitive double agent operation,

results of this operation indicates that it has caused

Soviets to commit one and a half billion dollars to

an attempt to counteract

the purported U.

an atly do counteract te purported have pantary

As

recently as Decembet 1970,

word has been received from

маск

the Soviets, that they plan to continue this operation

and mayuse an illegal agent to do so.

We have also

received from the soviets in this operation over $42,000,

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1/13/71

JPTiaS

4-E

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 406

---

## Page 407

4-E

4.

Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) and Other

Prosecutive Action

On April 17, 1970, the Internal Security Division

of the Department, based on our investigation, agreed to

solicit the registration of Robert Charles Owens IJI, under

the FARA, as an agent of the USSR.

On October 21, 1970, the registration of Endre

Kextesz under Title 50, U.S.

Code,

Sections 851-857, in

which he described his

assignment for the Hungarian

was secured by the Department.

This was the result of our

Intelligence Service (HIS investigation of Kertest

Hungarian immigrant who admitted he had been given an assign-

ment by HIS to gather information concerning missile sites

in the U.S.

In our exploitation of a defector from the

Yugoslay Intelligence Service

information

that the Yugoslavs had

once wen tantary formationce

employee. Based

on our information and follow-up investigation

by French authorities,

the French official, Eugere Rousseau, •

was convicted of espionage InApril in ecember:

197, the supreme court 11 arise trance, upheda his sentence

of 15 years.

5. Recoveries

In many of our double agent operations the double

agents receive payments from the foreign intelligence

service well in excess of our expenses in conducting the

operations. As such operations are concluded, we turn over

the balance of monies received to the U.

s. Treasury.

Since

the last inspection, we have turned over to the Treasury, as

a result of these operations, over $16, 000.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1/13/71

-IPT: 2,5

4-E

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 407

42

---

## Page 408

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

The key to developing racial information on a regular

and current basis is the operation and development of quality

informants along with intensified investigation.

In this

regard we have increased the number of our racial informants

since the last Inspection by 1,699 which brings our total

number of informants to 7,184.

In addition, we are continually

intensifying our investigations and in line with our need for

closer coverage of key black extremists, we instituted by airtel

dated 12-23-70 the Key Black Extremist Program.

Racial informants have been furnishing a steady flow

of valuable racial information which information has brought

about the apprehension of badly wanted extremist fugitives,

the confiscation of explosives and firearms in the possession of

extremists, the prevention of violence and the saving of lives.

In addition, these informants furnished valuable racial

intelligence on a regular basis which intelligence included

information concerning foreign influence, the Black Panther Party

(BPP) underground as well as discussions by extremists as to

South American style kidnapping of government officials and threats

to kill the President.

It is significant to note that since the last Inspection

racial informants have been responsible for bringing about the

arrest of 510 individuals, 342 of which were local arrests and

168 Federal arrests as well as being responsible for the recovery

of $330,179.03.

In order to improve our investigations and racial

informant coverage in addition to our regular supervision

furnished from the Seat of Government we held a two-day conference

with racial supervisors from 39 field offices plus two legal

attaches. The topics discussed at the conference covered the

entire spectrum of the problems inherent in investigating and

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1-12-71

JGD: bad

4-E

NW-88608-Docld:32989638_Page 408

---

## Page 409

developing informants in the BPP as well as related extremist

matters.

These topics included detailed discussion concerning

the need for full penetration of extremist groups to obtain

information concerning terroristic activities which may be

aimed against Government officials. In addition, the conference

took note that maximum attention should be given

I to the extremist

activities in Canada in connection with our investigations as well

as intensifying our investigations having international

ramifications.

The above items, along with other items affecting

counterintelligence against extremists, the BPP underground

activities and intensified investigations were fully discussed.

Concrete suggestions were obtained from this conference and were

subjects of individual memoranda which were approved thereby

increasing the efficiency of our investigations and informant

development.

Some of the above-approved suggestions are as

follows:

1. Proposal to identify escape routes utilized by

black extremists to flee the United States by utilizing a Bureau

racial informant as a decoy.

2. Intensify BPP underground investigations including

making available to select field offices copies of the film

"The Battle of Algiers," which sets forth guerrilla warfare

tactics used successfully by the National Liberation Front

and which is now being studied and copied by the BPP.

3. Granting approval for Special Agents in Charge

on their own initiative to authorize use of concealed recording

devices by a Special Agent or proven source in covering public

2xg ent

appearances by black and New left extremists except where such

appearances are at educational institutions.

4. Obtaining approval to reproduce an article by

Victor Riesel, noted labor columnist, which article was highly

critical of the BPP and set forth a proposal by a union member

that unions affiliated with the freight handlers who handle

the BPP newspaper shipments refuse to handle these papers.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 409

---

## Page 410

5. Obtaining approval for a racial and New Left

extremist activities In-Service classes.

Obtaining approval for the deletion of the

Black Extremist Bureau Fugitive List from the Black Nationalist

Movement in the United States Racial Calendar and transmitting

this to the field by separate letter in order to give greater

emphasis to these fugitive investigations.

7. Obtaining approval for revising the Agitator Index

by deleting those individuals who are also included on the

Security Index.

In addition to the above, there are other suggestions

made by the attendees at the conference and approved by the

Director which will assist in streamlining the overall

invesiigalive aud infurmant development operation as well as

making these operations more effective.

Some of the concrete examples of our informant and

investigative accomplishments can be seen in the following:

Through our investigations, we have currently

• identified and closely scrutinized the activities of the 43

branches of the BPP which covers an area of 31 states and the

District of Columbia. These investigations reveal that the BPP

membership has increased to 1,000 hard-core members which is an

increase of 250 in the last six months.

As a result of our investigations and informant

penetration along with the cooperation with local authorities,

408. BPP members have been arrested on either Federal or local

charges during 1970.

Racial informants in the Los Angeles and Chicago

Divisions were successful in penetrating the BPP underground and

now will be in a position to furnish information on BPP

underground activities.

In connection with underground activities, a Dallas

racial informant furnished the information which brought about

the arrest of Elmer Gerard Pratt, a los Angeles BPP leader and

an alleged leader in the underground. Pratt's arrest along with

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 410

---

## Page 411

the arrest of four other of his associates enabled us to

obtain possession of documents apparently relating to the BPP

underground and should give us knowledge concerning it and the

possible identities of others involved in this underground

operation.

• 1

In early June, 1970, efforts were made to establish

a National Committee to Combat Fascism (NCCF) chapter, which is

another name for a BPP chapter in Tampa, Florida. Through

aggressive investigation, including thorough interrogation of

all known members, the development of a top-level informant

and effective use of information provided by this informant,

Tampa Office was successful in decimating this group to the

point where it is now floundering, nameless and without

leadership and there is no indication of support for the BPP

in that area.

The Black Afro Militant Movement (BAMM) was organized

in the Miami Division in the early part of 1970. The leader of

this group was Alfred night Amos featherston an articulate

black extremist and an admitted communist who has in the past,

visited Fidel Castro in Cuba.

Through the outstanding

• informant

coverage developed by the Miami Office and the aggressive

investigative techniques used, this organization for all intent

and purposes, rendered inactive by the latter part of 1970.

During 1970,

BAMM engaged in an intensive recruiting program

in the Miami area directed toward young blacks, formed an action

group which participated in a number of fire bombings in the

Miami area including one such bombing at the University of Miami.

Through informant coverage and other investigative activities,

the Miami Division developed an excellent case involving the

teaching and demonstrating of explosive devices and in December

the Departmental Attorneys presented this matter to a Federal

Grand Jury in Miami resulting in leatherston harles eland

Jerome. capP- being indicted under the new antiriot laws dealing

with the teaching and making of incendiary devices. This is the

first such case brought under the new statute charging black

extremists with this particular violation.

MV 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 411

---

## Page 412

A Detroit racial informant furnished advanced

information regarding planned ambush of Detroit police officers

which, when furnished to Detroit Police Department, enabled them

to take necessary action to prevent injury or death to the officers

and resulted in the arrest of eight persons and the seizure of

a cache of weapons.

Informant also furnished information

resulting in the location and confiscation by Bureau Agents of

approximately 50 sticks of dynamite available to BPP and likely

resulted in saving of lives and preventing possible property

damage.

A Chicago racial informant furnished information which

identified an individual who is a member of the BPP as the person

who raped and shot a middle aged white housewife and then pistol

whipped her husband in Chicago on 12-25-70. The same Chicago

informant furnished information which resulted in the

identification of an individual who was responsible for the

murder of a police officer in Carbondale, Illinois.

A Springfield ghetto informant furnished information

concerning an individual who was attempting to sell explosives

for $2,000. This information enabled local authorities to

apprehend the individual and confiscate 100 lbs. of explosives.

A Boston racial informant made a verbatim recording

of a speech by a BPP member where he indicated the Panthers

should utilize South American style kidnappings in order to

effect the release of Panther political prisoners.

A Norfolk racial informant furnished daily information

relating to a demonstration at Norfolk State College 5/8-18/70.

During this demonstration she reported the Student Government

President at the college threatened to kill President Nixon and

observed another student burning the American flag. Based on

this information, Secret Service is considering prosecution against

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 412

17

---

## Page 413

the Student Government President and local police are

prosecuting the student who burned the flag.

A New York informant furnished the identities of

black extremists who were scheduled to depart the U.S. for

Al Fatah camp in the Middle East for possible guerrilla

training.

In discussing the accomplishments of the Racial

Intelligence Section, it is felt that comment should be made

concerning the contributions regularly being made by the

Inspection Division during their analysis of the racial

investigations in the various field divisions. In addition

to acting upon information furnished to them by this Section,

the Inspection Staff through their on-the-spot review of racial

intelligence matters in the field are often able to detect

weaknesses not apparent at the Seat of Government and offer

constructive assistance to the office involved in strengthening

their operations.

In reviewing the racial surveys prepared by the

Inspection Division, we regularly note concrete guidance being

afforded field offices. Examples can be found in recent

instructions given during the inspection of the Mobile Office

to direct two existing informants to seek membership in the

Nation of Islam (NOI). These instructions were implemented

•and

both informants currently report on NOI activities and have

membership applications pending.

During a recent Cleveland inspection, the Inspectors

gave instructions for the Cleveland Office to develop informants

in a leadership position with the Cleveland National Committee

tọ Combat Fascism (NCCF). As a result of these instructions,

Cleveland has been successful in developing two informants within

this organization both of whom are furnishing valuable information

on the structural composition of the organization, staff members

and proposed activities. One of these informants

is a member of

the security cadre of the Cleveland NCCF and as such has

furnished valuable information concerning firearms in possession

of members of this group.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 413

---

## Page 414

Racial intelligence gathered through our informants

and investigations makes up a major portion of the Bureau's

sophisticated document which is disseminated to the

White House and other high level Government agencies. This

document captioned "FBI Summary of Extremist Activities"

furnishes the White House and other agencies with a digest

of the racial picture.

The quality of our racial informants can also be

judged by the fact that since the last Inspection, 26 Special

Agents in various field divisions were recommended for incentive

awards for their work in developing informants and 15 racial

intormants were given bonus awards for valuable intormation

they furnished and services

performed.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 414

---

## Page 415

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

SECTION CHIEF W. R. WANNALI UN

NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE SECTION

4-E

There is attached a summary of significant

accomplishments of this Section set forth by individual

programs supervised by this section are outlined in

Specific tangible accomplishments resulting from

write-ups separately submitted

and will not be repeated

herein.

NW 88608 DOME FAELIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

---

## Page 416

4-E

Nationality Unit

Israeli and Middle East Investigations

Prior to the beginning of the 25th Session of the United

Nations General Assembly, this Unit recognized the vulnerability of

the large concentration of foreign diplomats attending the Session to

acts of terrorism and demonstrations originating with groups dissenting

with the incumbent regimes of the countries represented. We issued

appropriate instructions to the field to alert sources and provide

information immediately which would indicate a threat to the physical

security or well being of these dignitaries who were coming to the

United States for the Commemorative Session of the United Nations.

Subsequent to this action, the White House similarly recognized the

potential danger of embarrassment to the United States as host country

for the United Nations if incidents occurred, and called on the Bureau

to cooperate fully with United States Secret Service to uncover such

incidents and provide full security for the chiefs of state and missions

resident in New York City during the commemorative celebration.

We established a system of liaison with United States Secret Service

command post in New York City, as well as intensifying our liaison

with New York City police and United States Mission to the United Nations.

A flow of information from our sources was furnished to the interested

agencies locally and to the intelligence community at a national level

• which resulted in laudatory comments by Secret Service liaison

personnel who commented favorably on the Bureau's assistance in

completing the Presidentially ordered mission of United States

Secret Service in providing security for the officials mentioned.

During the same period of the 25th General Assembly of

the United Nations, we furnished a continuing flow of information to the

United States United Nations Mission regarding the the tense Middle East

-.

situation and developments related to peace talks instituted by the

United States and carried out by United Nations officials. The data

furnished to the United States United Nations Mission resulted in the

United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Charles W. Yost,

advising the Director by letter dated 11/13/70 of his desire to pay

special tribute to Agents of this Bureau who had provided him with

swift and accurate reports which he had found helpful and which provided

him with privileged insight and perspective into the maneuverings

during the 25th Session.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 416

---

## Page 417

4-E

In the Israeli field we have continued to furnish information

from our sensitive coverage under a program of dissemination which

has been assigned the security designation of "SCOPE." "SCOPE"

information is furnished only to select individuals at the White House

and to a previously cleared chain of command within agencies of the

intelligence community. These data relate to attempts by officials of

the Israeli Government to obtain favorable reaction within United States

Government circles for Israeli Government support including economic

and military assistance. The personalities involved in these dealings

have included prominent members of the United States Congress as well

as individuals within the executive arm of our Government. Favorable

comment has been forthcoming from Dr. Kissinger at the White House,

from the Secretary of State and from other dignitaries within the

intelligence community who have been privy to this "SCOPE!' information

relative to its timeliness and value to them in formating policy decisions

within our Government.

Miscellaneous Programs

This Unit has the supervisory responsibility for extremely

sensitive operations undertaken in cooperation we the atona

Security Agency ESA designed to enhance our nation's capability

to infiltrate the diplomatic communications of foreign governments.

Our first significant breakthrough in this area occurred in 1968 and

resulted in NSA estimate of $200,000 annually in evaluating the

product of our coverage. We have realized continued success in this

sensitive area with two additional successes since the last inspection

for a total of four nationality areas being totally covered by the Bureau.

at this time. Dr.

Louis W. Tordella, Acting Director, NSA. by

letter dated 11/10/70, commented most favorably. on the productivity

of our program in this area, noting that our coverage provided

information of priority concern to the NSA which would be otherwise

unobtainable to the United States Government. In view of the extreme

sensitivity of this information, it is suggested that either I or my

Number One Man be consulted for further details.

In the miscellaneous espionage area a decided accomplishment

was attained with close of investigation relating to Vernon Edward

Thompson of Santa Barbara, California. In September and October,

1970, high officials of the intelligence and military communities,

cabinet members, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger and Mr. Herbert J. Klein

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 417

---

## Page 418

4-E

of the White House Staff and other highly placed United States Government

officials began receiving cryptogram messages which, after decryption,

disclosed implication of bombings of certain major cities on 11/29/70.

Content of the messages revealed that the writer was privy to intelligence

information and possibly had knowledge of United States nuclear weapon

deployment. The receipt of these messages was the object of extreme

concern by the recipients and resulted in our investigation.

Through outstandingly aggressive and imaginative investigation

and with a dearth of investigative leads, the Los Angeles Office

successfully identified the typewriter on which the messages were

being prepared as being located in a library in the Santa Barbara, area.

Discreet and productive surveillance was conducted, which resulted in

identification of Thompson and his neutralization as a point of anxiety

and concern on the part of the highest level of officials in the executive

branch and in the intelligence community. We are now awaiting a

decision as to prosecution after review of the details of this matter

by the Criminal Division of the Department.

The President has noted the paucity of positive intelligence

information available to him for high-level policy decisions. We

have recognized our responsibilities in this area through intensified

coverage in the nationality fields supervised by this Unit as illustrated

in the increase of establishments being afforded sensitive coverage

• and through the increase of our live informant coverage targeted

against the nations involved. Three of the six new foreign liaison

posts established recently by the Bureau involve countries within

the area of responsibility of this Unit and information from those

liaison posts should add to the production of our foreign intelligence

information in response to President Nixon's requirements.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 418

---

## Page 419

Lacht lie tracant

4-E

CUBAN UNIT

Our sustained pressure on Cuban Intelligence

Service (CuIS) operations in the U.S. resulted in the recall

to Cuba of three very experienced Culs officers in April, 1970.

They had been serving as officials of the Cuban Mission to the

Inteen on loried by a cia source to the gatect that the

Cuban Government, planned to recall any personnel whom ye

State Department ee to persona non grata action by the

Based on FBI information, a leading Puerto Rican

terrorist in New York City (Carlos Feliciano Vasquez, was

apprehended by the New York City Police Department on May 16

1970, while in the process of placing a bomb in an Armed Forces

recruiting station.

After being confronted by us in early August, 1970,

a very attractive and sexually permissive employee of the

south rican embassy, Washington, D.C., aamitted her deer

involvement with the CuIs.

Washingt nod

She had furnished the Cubans data

concerning American and foreign officials with whom she was in

social contact. After becoming sexually involved with a State

Department protocol officer in March, 1970, she was able to gain

entree to diplomatic functions where she met ranking officials

and employees of the U.S. and foreign governments.

Our investi-

gation indicated she was unable to establish contact with her

principal to furnish information concerning the dignitaries she

met following her involvement with the protocol officer and she

105 she

voluntarily returned home to south Africa shortly after our

interview of her. Her name 15 Jennifer Enid Miles.

A San Juan Office source was primarily responsible

for developing information leading to the conviction on 8/26/70

of four Socialist Workers Party (PSO) leaders in Puerto Rico.

The information developed by our source enabled the Police of

Puerto Rico

to arrest a total of nine PSO members.

The PSO has

been active in the wave of bombings taking place in Puerto Rico

and the arrests were for violations of the Puerto Rican Explosives

Law.

Domestic Intelligence Division Inspection

1/12/71

4-E

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 419

54

---

## Page 420

During the Summer of 1970 a countérintelligence

program aimed at creating dissension was instituted by our

San Juan Office against the activist Puerto Rican Socialist

League (LSP). On October 10, 1970, a high-placed Miami

security informant reported the LSP was showing signs of

grinding to a halt and that it recently experienced a severe

split away from its youth group. Our counterintelligence

move was directly responsible for the havoc occurring in the

LSP.

As a result of disclosures made by Jennifer Enid

Miles and other corroborative evidence developed

oy New Yorl

and Washington Field Office, we were able to have State Depart-

ment declare persona non grata the two highest ranking CuIs

officials in the U.S. on October 9, 1970. Counsellor Rogelio.

Rodriguez Lopez and First secretary Orlando Prendes Gutierrez

of the CMUN were the individuals involved and they made a total

of seven against whom similar action has been taken by State

Department since February, 1S06, vased un IBi investigations of

CMUN personnel.

On October 10, 1970, Filiberto Djeda Rios, a known

Cuban espionage agent and a Bureau fugitive, was apprehended

by FBI agents and the Police of Puerto Rico. Ojeda,, leader of

the Puerto Rican Armed Revolutionary Independence Movement (MIRA) ,

had been the prime mover behind the wave of violence and

terrorist bombings which has occurred for many months in Puerto

Rico. Documents found at his hideout definitely confirmed the

close collaboration between the Cuban Government and Puerto

Rican terrorist groups.

On October 19, 1970, an intensification program was

instituted by our Miami Office based on instructions from the

Bureau aimed at identifying CuIS agents in the Miami area who are

believed to be tipping off Castro concerning infiltration

efforts by anti-Castro refugees in the U.s.

A coordinator had

been made responsible for directing these

efforts and progress

has been made in eliminating certain suspects as well as

developing valuable background regarding other logical suspects.

In December 1970, an actual member of the clandestine

MiRa organization prevzousty mentzoned was developed as an

informant.

This is the first informant tome in a position to

get inside information regarding the group's plans and we

previously had to depend on fringel sources to cover this very

dangerous terrorist group.

-2 -

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 420

---

## Page 421

Since our intensification program directed against

the CMUN was begun in February, 1970, we have been able to

institute some sensitive coverage for a period of six months,

have installed equipment which car monitor handie talkie

radios used by CuIS personnel, have learned that CuIS personnel

carry arms at all times, and have developed sources in a

position to keep us advised as to the activities of such

personnel on a

, 24-hour basis.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 421

---

## Page 422

4-E

• ACCOMPLISHMENTS

MIDDLE AND SOUTH AMERICAN UNIT

The President and other policy makers have

a continuing interest in current political matters

affecting Central and South America.

We have provided

officials in the Executive Branch of the Government

on a continuing basis with information concerning the

activities of political figures and leftist groups in

a number of Latin American nations. Of particular

significance was information concerning the activities

of Arnulfo Arias Madrid, deposed Panamanian President.

residing in Miami: Florida. who is planning the over-

throw of the current Panamanian Government.

In an

effort to provide the President and other policy makers

with even more such intormation, we have recently

expanded our coverage in the Chilean, Peruvian and

Bolivian fields.

The unit continues to be successful in

thwarting plans of

militant anti-Castro groups which

have sought to infiltrate Cuba and to attack ships and

property of foreign nations engaged in trade with Cuba.

Successful development of key informants who have

infiltrated anti-Castro groups under Bureau direction

has enabled the Bureau to keep abreast of their activities

and often to have advance knowledge of the plans of these

groups enabling us to take appropriate action to prevent

such activities. An outstanding example of our success

in this area was the thwarting of two militant anti-Castro

•attempts in July, '1970, to intiltrate Cuba and the seizure

of boats,

arms,

ammunition and miscellaneous military

equipment valued at $64,500 by U.S. authorities.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1/11/71

VHN: emj

4-E

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 422

---

## Page 423

THE CHINESE UNIT

4-E

As a result of our close cooperation with RCMP,

that agency, in 12/70, provided us with details of one of

its double agent operations which clearly depicted intensi-

fication of Chinese communist (Chicom) intelligence efforts

directed against the United States.

We learned that the

Chicoms have funded travel of the RCMP source to New York

and Washington, D.C., where the source undertook to fulfill

intelligence contacts and development of data for the Chicoms.

a result of getting this information, we learned that

Chicoms desire to lay the foundation to

get "our people"

(Chicoms) into the United States under suitable cover,

probably when the Chicom Embassy opens in Canada in the very

near future.

The Director's letter to the Commissioner,

RCMP, expressed appreciation for RCMP information.

During August, 1970, three of our Chinese informants

made contacts with Chicom intelligence representatives in

Hong Kong and Canada, and it is believed they were affirma=

tively assessed for recryitment. Another source has made

several hipS to ancouvery canada, and san Francisco where

he has made strides to penetrate Chicom groups which would be

essential bases for future Chicom operations directed against

the United States.

-In August 1970, National Security Agency (NSA)

advised of creased

ased interceptions of radio transmissions

toted states mediat instruct ons were directed t appro-

United States.

priate fleid offices and efforts are under way to pinpoint

areas E reception

# with the expectation that Illegal agents

will be uncovered.

Investigations have developed data indicating possi-

'ble Chicom intelligence net formed in New York City utilizing

Chinese seamen deserters as mail drops and/or couriers.

We identified a Chinese alien residing in New Jersey

as an individual who provided an intelligence report to the

Intelligence Service officer.

The alien indicated he had a

sub-agent working for him in New York City.

1/13/71

NW 88608 Dốcid: 32989638 Page 423

---

## Page 424

=2 -'

4-E

In view of the apparent upsurge in Chicon activity

we

furnished a detailed memorandum to Dr. Kissinger at the

White House and to the Attorney General under date of 9/30/70.

Our memorandum outlined the recent activities of Chicom in

the intelligence field and pointed out increasing Chicom

•support for New Left and Black militant revolutionaries in

this country.

We furnished information to State, Central Intelligence

Agency and Secret Service which led to strengthening of guard

and security around CHIANG Ching-kuo, Deputy Prime Minister

of Nationalist China and son of CHIANG Kai-shek, who was in the

United States during April, 1970.

As a result of this increased

security, an attempt by two anti-Chinese nationalist individuals

to assassinate CHIANG was thwarted.

Our investigations of the World United Formosans

for Independence (WUFI) and Taiwan Independence Movement (TIM)

develupou informution of growing Chicom interact in these

groups indicating Chicoms might desire to cooperate with them

to bring about the downfall of the Chinese Nationalist Government.

Positive information has been developed regarding the

intelligence activities of pro-Chicom individuals assigned

to the United

Nations Secretariat:

Our close coverage

determined that the three most active of these individuals

recently.

traveled to Europe, s

and coverage of their activities

has been

requested through contacts

of

We have initiated an effort in four key field offices

to develop sources among ethnic Chinese scientists

having

security clearance and who are logical Chicom targets. Ke

Dress sted this effort beatens ta dustreta security.

We brought to attention of the White House and

Secretary of State Rogers information regarding an anti-Chinese

nationalist individual who had escaped house arrest in Taiwan,

fled to Sweden and who later applied for U. S. visa.

HiS

presence in the United States could have adversely affected

United States-Chinese Nationalist relations.

Secretary of

State Rogers took personal note of this information in a letter

to the Director 10/28/70.

Other investigations indicated intensified Chicom

interest in and support of radicals in the United States.

NW 88608

Doe

---

## Page 425

SPECIAL COORDINATION UNIT

During December, 1970, six new foreign offices were

established.

As a result

of personnel moves, 19 Special Agents

and 16 clerks were transferred to foreign offices each requiring

passport, visa, and Department of State and Embassy notifica-

tion.

The numerous contacts with State and the outgoing

letters (two for each person transferred) were handled in

this Unit, together with the memoranda and notification to

the White House regarding various phases of the operation.

A special one-week indoctrination session was arranged and

attended

by most of the new Special Agent personnel. The

Director's instructions that the expansion take place were

issued 11-20-70.

Each of the new offices was open and opera

ting during December, 1970.

Through liaison with appropriate officials at the

White House, the interest of those officials in proposed

legislation

which would provide increased retirement benefits

for FBI personnel has been maintained.

officials concerning channels to be used in promoting this

legislation was secured and has been followed.

Since the last inspection, SA Haynes, has expedited

and coordinated visits of the Director to the White House on

approximately six occasions. This has included meeting

• the

Director, taking him to the meeting site, introducing him to

persons present if not known to him, and assuring his return

to his car by the most direct route following the meeting.

Through carefully controlled contacts with the

Commission on Campus Unrest, it was possible to secure a

copy of their report in advance in order to

insure that there

were no unfavorable comments concerning the FBI. The left-

wing staft of. this Commission was very active in areas of

direct interest to the Bureau, and Sa raynes was able to avoid

any contlict and there were no derogatory references to our

work made by this group:

Direct personal liaison was established during the

period with Washington representatives of two additional

directly with representatives of the Unit.

NW 88608 DO6E:02989638 Page 425

---

## Page 426

listeducti

!

Swiss Police asked Bureau assistance in establishing

Foreign Police Cooperation character resulted in the location

of Gargy in the United states.

We arranged for his arrest by

other authorities so that he might be held for extradition.

During the calendar year 1970, Agents on the Foreign

Liaison Desk handled 822 foreign visitors.

These included

not only special tours of Bureau facilities but also, in many

instances, special conferences with Bureau officials, including

the Director,

and other courtesies for these contacts of our

Legal Attache

personnel.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 426

---

## Page 427

NW 886

SURVEYS, PROJECTS AND/OR INTENSIFICATION PROGRAMS

4-H

INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER:

You are requested to furnish

information regarding various

surveys, projects and/or programs in effect in your Division. This infor -

mation should include identity of the project or program, background and

date of inception, scope and desired objectives, positive results achieved

since last inspection, extent and nature of current supervision, current

justification for continuance, and frequency of evaluation and date of last

justification. Identify any surveys, projects or programs you have in

operation that are not set forth in my request. In addition, identify any

surveys, projects and programs completed or discontinued since the last

inspection. Identify only investigative-type matters in this category.

Each of these projects or programs should be separately captioned

and prepared in such manner that your comments regarding each topic

are separate from comments on any other topic. Your comments are

specifically requested on the following topics and any new programs

instituted since the last inspection or other topics not included herein you

may wish to comment on:

1.

Security Index Program.

2. Security Informants.

3. Racial Matters.

4. Racial Informants.

5. Technical and Microphone Surveillances.

6. Counterintelligence.

1. Minutemen, Klan and other hate groups.

8. Nation of Islam.

9. Communist infiltration of racial groups.

10. New Left Movement.

11. Espionage.

12. Any other program deemed pertinent:

Comments of Assistant Director requested.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN:

Attached are write-ups from

(JAS: m15

1/15/71)

each Section

i concerning the

above.

/0/1ISTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8: DO81d132989638 Page 427

---

## Page 428

i

:

SURVEYS, PROJECTS AND/OR INTENSIFICATION PROGRAMS

4-H

SECTION CHIEF ARBOR W. GRAY: 0Y

In connection with the

Inspector's request under

above title, write-ups are attached relating to the following

handled by the Internal Security Section:

(1) Security Index Program

(2) Security Informant Program

(6) & (7) Counterintelligence Program - Disruption of

White Hate Groups

(12) Other Programs Deemed Pertinent

(a) Thumbnail Sketch Program

:..

'...

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1/12/71

-SER:Imi

4-H

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 428

---

## Page 429

SECURITY INDEX PROGRAM

BASIC REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATIONS

4-H

BACKGROUND AND DATE OF INCEPTION

Studies pertaining to the handling of individuals

who in time of an emergency would represent a potential threat

to the national security began prior to World War II. The

actual program began in June, 1940, and dealt mainly with

Lists of individuals considered for detention in the event

of a threat to the national security.

SCOPE AND DESIRED OBJECTIVES

This program is field-wide in scope.

The goal of the

Security Index (SI) Program is the identification of individuals

who because of their membership and activity and/or association

with subversive organizations are dangerous or potentially

dangerous to the internal security of the country. The

program

includes the collection ot sutiicient intormation reiating iu

the activities of such individuals to justify their apprehension

and detention in the event of a national emergency. Another

goal of the SI is to maintain it in a current status in the

event immediate implementation is necessary to minimize

possibilities of espionage, sabotage and subversion.

POSITIVE RESULTS ACHIEVED SINCE LAST INSPECTION

By way of background, in February, 1969, as a matter

of temporary expediency, the Executives Conference approved

a moratorium on certain Security Matter - Communist investigations

and periodic report writing in Priority II and Priority III

Security Index cases; moratorium later extended to January 1, 1971.

By memorandum October 29, 1970, Irom the uxecutives Conterence

to Mr. Tolson, approved by the

Director, the moratorium was

lifted.

At the time there were approximately 10,690 individuals

on the SI who were of the Priority II and IlI types.

Virtually

no investigation had been conducted regarding approximately 7, 000

of these individuals since the imposition of the moratorium in

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1/12/71

4-H

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 429

64

---

## Page 430

SECURITY INDEX PROGRAM

BASIC REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATIONS

4-H

February, 1969. Many of these persons had changed residence

and/or employment and their whereabouts were unknown. It can

thus be

seen that the lifting of the moratorium was an

aggressive,

timely and precise step toward fulfilling ou current

responsibilities, especially in knowing the whereabouts of

these individuals.

Implementation was directed by airtel

November 3, 1970, to all offices, and in doing so we took a

realistic step in permitting the field to stagger the reopening

of these cases so that they would be spread out over the period

November 3, 1970, to dune 30, 1971. This was considere

essential in view of our approximation that it would be necessary

to reopen approximately 7,000 of the Priority II and III types.

EXTENT AND NATURE OF CURRENT SUPERVISION

Responsibility for administrative handling of the st.

rests with the Special Records Unit of the Research Section.

Responsibility for individual cases rests with appropriate

supervisory personnel. I personnally follow this matter closely

to insure it is current and that necessary changes are made

where desirable. This program receives constant supervision.

JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUANCE

This is a major internal security program based upon

Title II of the Internal Security Act of 1950 and is to be

implemented in the event of a national emergency to minimize

acts of espionage, sabotage and subversion.

FREQUENCY OF EVALUATION

The SI Program is constantly being re-evaluated. The

most recent justification is contained in memorandum from

Charles D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan dated January 8, 1970, and

as of instant date (January 12, 1971) a current rejustification

memorandum is in preparation.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1/12/71

4o H

NW 88608_ Docld:32989638 Page 430

---

## Page 431

+...

SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM

BASIC REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATIONS

4-H

At the time of the last inspection in April, 1970, we

had 279 member security informants in the Communist Party, USA

(CPUSA), while at the present time we have 264 member informants

In the CPUSA, a decrease of 15.

In addition, there are 31

member informants in the Socialist Workers Party (SWP); the

number of SWP informants at last inspection is not known.

On December 16, 1970, a reorganization of Sections

within the Division resulted in a realignment of informant

handling and record keeping, with the result that only informants

in basic revolutionary organizations and related groups are now

handled in the Internal security Section. As of December 16,

1970, there were 578 informants in basic revolutionary organiza-

tions

and related groups. The number at last inspection is not

known.

There has been continuing recognition of the fact that

there must be no letdown in maintaining adequate informant

coverage in basic revolutionary organizations.

In this regard,

SAC Letter 70-40 dated August 4, 1970, captioned "Racial and

Security Informants," pointed out in-depth quality informants

in these fields

are

more imperative than ever under present

conditions in view of the upsurge in violence. SAC Letter

70-48 dated September 15, 1970, captioned "Security and Racial

Informants," pointed out

that

never in our history have we

been confronted with as critical a need for informant coverage.

This SAC Letter authorized development of informants between

the ages of 18 and 21, thus presenting the field with a

tremendous opportunity to expand informant coverage not only

among violence-prone New Left and radical groups, but also in

the basic revolutionary groups as well.

There can be no doubt

but that these instructions have stimulated development of

informants.

Security informant development receives continuous

It is not technically a program justified

annually, but rather a fundamental procedure in our investigative

operations that requires and receives vigorous day-to-day.

attention.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1/12/71

4-H

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 431

---

## Page 432

COUNTER INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM - DISRUPTION OF WHITE HATE GROUPS 4-H

BACKGROUND, DATE OF INCEPTION AND DESIRED OBJECTIVES

This program was initiated in Septembes, 1964, for

the purpose of exposing, disrupting and otherwise

activitles of white extremist organizations,

neutralizing

their leaders and

adherents.

There are currently 17 field offices regularly

participating in this program and as specific situations arise

other divisions also participate.

POSITIVE RESULTS ACHIEVED

The following are highlights of accomplishments

achieved through this program since last inspection: A racial

informant of the Birmingham Division has been able to influence

Robert Shelton, leader of the largest Klan group, Unitea kians

of America, Inc., (UKA), to be more moderate in his speeches

by opposing violence and stressing need for law and order as

well as continuing his acts against communism. This has been

effective in toning down Klan violence.

Midwest coordinator of National Socialist White

People's Party, formerly known as American Nazi Party, was

expelled from

that organization after publicity furnished under

this program disclosed he was of Jewish descent.

Through manipulation of informants, anonymous letters

and utilization of friendly press services ve were successful

ít in the un at

in creating a split in the UKA in North Carolina. This split

was brought about when a rally of dissident Klansmen in

September, 1969, showed their disaffection with the UKA leader-

ship by burning

their Klan membership cards.

This split was

highlighted in front page news stories in North Carolina

newspapers.

Who was aurel 090 vational Klony ton obert setonting

his feelings that high ranking members of the UKA may be disloyàl

and that he definitely plans to use a polygraph machine and

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1/12/71

JIA 2m3.

4-H

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 432

---

## Page 433

4-H

possibly utilize sodium pentothal (truth serum) on all Klan

officers and

we recently furnished reliable news sources with information in

belief that public exposure will deter considerably from any

future enactment of these plans. It is too early to determine

results of this move at this time.

As a result of counterintelligence action taken

through racial informants in the Knoxville Division, we

were

successiul in having the Exalted Cyclops of Mascot Klavern #778,

Mascot, and sere, The a stipes

eliminated from this top

able to have him subsequently banished from

the Klan.

This was brought about by having our racial informants

create dissension within the ranks of this Klavern.

Through the use of two racial informants of our

Little Rock Division, we were successful in causing the defeat

of a Klansmen who was campaigningto be elected as sheriff of

Jefferson County, Arkansas.

This individual.

victor calvert

Exalted op

Pine Bluff Klavern, Association of Arkansas

Klans, In conducting his campaign attempted to hide his klan

affiliations because he hoped to receive a good percentage of

the Negro vote in his area.

Our informants were

successful

in discreetly letting out the word of his secret Klan membership.

As a result of counterintelligence action taken,

Melvin SestoR, Tan organization

Imperial KLigrapp National secretary)

of the

In the country,

resigned from

position. Both Sexton and his wife, in addition to being

Klan members, were employed in the National Office of the

United Klans of America. This is particularly significant in

that for many years Sexton had been "number one man" to Imperial

Shelton of the UKA and actually ran the UKA

While Shelton was in prison following his conviction Ior

Contempt of Congress.

This resignation was brought about by

our intormants planting the seeds of distrust regarding sexton.

and

exposing the fact that Sexton had a serious drinking problem.

CURRENT SUPERVISION AND JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUANCE

The counterintelligence program requires little

additional manpower since these extremists are under continuous

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1/12/71

LiA: Imj

4-#

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 433

---

## Page 434

4-H

investigation. All counterintelligence proposals are submitted

to the Bureau for approval and positive results achieved from

this program, when balanced against the relatively small

expenditure

ot Agent and supervisory time, indicates that its

continuance is justified.

This program is re-evaluated annually

and was last re-evaluated by memorandum G. C. Moore to

W. C. Sullivan dated July 20, 1970.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION:

1/12/71

4- H

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 434

---

## Page 435

THUMBNAIL SKETCH PROGRAM

4-H

This program was initiated and authorized by

SAC Letter 53-72(0) dated October 27, 1953, to insure thai

the field is using current characterizations of subversiv

organizations and to provide uniformity in characterizing

such organizations. Those characterizations deemed to be of

field-wide interest are now to be furnished to the field by

letter to all offices on an annual basis rather than by

SAC Letter as was formerly the practice, in accordance with

approval of suggestion in memorandum J. J. Casper to Mr. Mohi

dated December 7, 1970.

The background and value of this program is the same

Upon receipt of the annual letters from the field in June, 1970,

424 Separate charactericallous wErE receivod and toriowad

appropriate supervisory personnel at the Bureau.

Those of

field-wide interest were furnished to the field by SAC Letter

70-62 dated November 3, 1970.

The remaining characterizations

were returned to interested field offices following their

approval by the Bureau. This program was last reviewed and

analyzed and its continuance approved by memorandum R. I.

Shackelford to Mr. C. D. Brennan dated October 12, 1970.

/12STC INTELLIGENGE DIVISION INSPEGTION

--

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 435.

---

## Page 436

SURVEYS, PROJECTS AND/OR INTENSIFICATION PROGRAMS

4-H

New Left Movement

Section Chief: R. I. Shackelford

The following surveys, projects and/or intensification

programs are in effect against the New Left movement:

By airtel to SAC, Albany, and all offices, dated

10/23/68, the field was instructed to expand its Key Activist

programs and these programs were intensified. Each office

was instructed to submit its recommendations on individuals

considered as Key Activists.

The field was instructed to

maintain high-level informant coverage on these individuals.

The purpose of this program is to render Key Activists

ineffective and thereby drastically reduce their influence

in: the New Left movement.

At the present time there are 75 Key

Activists under intensive investigation. A Key Activist Album

which contains photographs and biographical data on each Key

Activist has been assembled and has been furnished to all offices.

The Key Activist Album is maintained in a current status, 40

are subjects ot prosecutive action.

be invaluable in following the activities and travels of New

Left activists, both for the Seat of Government and for the

1011001ge Sat

The Album has proven to

field.

By airtel dated 3/10/69 to SAC, Albany, and all offices,

the field was instructed to submit summary reports every three

months on those individuals designated as Key Activists. The

field was also instructed to prepare an appropriate communication

suitable for dissemination in the event any of these individuals

held a speaking engagement and whenever they made a statement

indicating a propensity for violence or urging student agitation.

The purpose of this program was to develop information in

respect to the securing of testimony and

evidence concerning

violations of statutes within the Bureau's jurisdiction in

connection with leaders involved with campus disorders.

By letter to all offices dated 5/5/69, the field was

instructed that when it is ascertained that a Key Activist is

scheduled to speak oncampus, in addition to the coverage of

his appearance, they should

determine through established

sources the amount received by him and the source of the funds.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1/12/71

іжном

4-H

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 436

21

---

## Page 437

The purpose of this is (1) to provide for a central-

ized reporting of New Left activity in this field; (2) to

enable us to keep abreast of funds utilized to finance these

inflammatory speeches; (3) to enable us to take advantage of

situations

which could embarrass the New Left or stifle

future activity; (4) to facilitate the necessary evaluation and

analysis by the Bureau and other interested agencies. By

letter dated 12/23/69 to all field offices, information concerning

financial aspects of the New Left were emphasized, and the

field was instructed to develop solid information concerning

the travelling of Key Activists:

By airtel to SAC, Albany, and all offices dated

10/28/68, a program was instituted to obtain a comprehensive

study of

the whole New Left movement. Offices were instructed

Left movement in

comprehensive study of the novement in

order to assess its

Following the submission of the

original sunmary reports, offices were instructed to submit such

reports on a quarterly basis with an appropriate breakdown of

the material in the report: These reports

enable the Bureau to

maintain recent and comprehensive information

concerning various

aspects of the New leit movement.

These reports are disseminated

to interested agencies to enablè them to maintain a clear picture

6f New Left movement.

SÁC Letter 70-11 (E)

dated 3/3/70 instructed field tô

discontinue submission of quarterly letter listing identities

of New Left movement groups under investigation, coverage

afforded each group and programs of each office

to develop

necessary coverage. This inormation in order to streanline

paper work is now

to be set forth in cover pages of New Left

quarterly report.

By airtei to all officés dated 12/9/70 instructions

Were reiterated to the field concerning the preparation and

content of New

Left movement quarterly reports:

The organizations

to be included in this

report were noted as well as the

headings to be utilized. À brief

analysis

Of the current status

Of New Left activity in each Division is to be includea.

in

the

cover pages of the report as

well as the number of individual

cases opened and closed concerning SDS menbers as

well as members

of pro-communist, militant New

Left-type campus organizations

who follow SDS advocacy of revôlution

and violence.

= 2 =

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 437

---

## Page 438

Publications,

to cover the principal propaganda mills of the New Left which

are described as the "underground" newspapers. The field was

instructed to conduct a detailed survey of these publications

and to submit information concerning these obscene, seditious

and inflammatory newspapers.

At the present time, there are

over 200 such publications being circulated. Cases on various

of these newspapers which are deemed important to the New Left

movement have been opened.

By airtel dated 3/16/70 to all offices, a survey

prominent or wealthy individuals, and politically oriented groups.

form suitable for dissemination,

By letter to all Special Agents in Cuarge, dateù

2/13/70, the field was advised that the militant and violence-

prone Weatherman faction of the SDS planned to go underground

and to direct

"strategic sabotage" at military and police

installations. The field was instructed to advise appropriate

local police agencies of the aims of the Weatherman faction and

of the necessity to vigorously investigate the Weatherman group.

By airtel to all field offices dated 3/19/70 the

field was advised of the plans of the Weatherman faction of

the SDS to form conmando-type units to engage in bombing, arson

and assassination.

The field was instructed to make every effort

to locate and identify Weatherman communes and their activists.

A list of major Weatherman activists was furnished to the field

which instructed intensive investigation to determine their

whereabouts and to advise the Bureau and office of origin on a

weekly basis.

The field was instructed to utilize a caution

statement that Weatherman activists should be considered dangerous

for their known propensity for violence.

Bureau airtel to select offices handling bulk of

Weatherman investigations dated 3/24/70 reiterated instructions

in airtel to all offices 3/19/70 and specifically noted that

New Left communes were to be located and participants identified

to determine if they were violence prone.

The offices were

instructed to have Special Agents assigned to these investigations

to be reminded of their prosecutive potential and to consider

establishing a special squad to fully comply with Bureau

instructions to intensify these investigations.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 438

-3 .

---

## Page 439

Bureau airtel to Chicago 3/24/70 instructed that

office to promptly initiate investigations and interview all

individuals who were arrested in Chicago during National

Action week 10/8-11/69 if such investigations not already

undertaken. Over 280 individuals were arrested, most of

which were either members of or closely associated with

Weatherman group.

Chicago airtel to numerous offices 4/9/70

restated Bureau instructions.

SAC Letter 70-18 (C) dated 4/7/70 under caption

"New Left and Black Extremist Terrorism - Bombing Matters"

set forth instructions to be followed in bombing and attempted

bombing matters.

In those instances of bombing or arson which

appear to have

New left or black extremist connotations or

motivation and where no Bureau substantive jurisdiction exists

or the Department has advised no investigation is warranted,

the Bureau is to be immediately advised setting forth pertinent

data regarding involvement of subversive groups or individuals

suspected in the incident as well as a recommendation for any

additional investigation warranted.

Teletype to all SACs 4/17/70 set forth specific

areas of investigations to be covered by field in its

investigations against New left terrorist groups and

individuals and also set forth the definition of a commune

for purposes of Bureau investigations and instructed field

to conduct sufficient investigation of all members of the

commune when they are members of a commune falling within

Bureau standards for investigation. The field also was

instructed to develop that informant coverage necessary of

all communes and/or groups so that advance knowledge of

any planned violence could be obtained to insure preventive action

be initiated and prosecutive action broughtto bear where

possible.

By airtel to all offices 5/11/70 the field was

authorized to interview all Venceremos Brigade (VB) members

on SAC authority on completion of investigation except in

those instances where the subject is under 21, currently a

student, professor, has some connection with an institution

of learning or is a journalist.

Bureau approval is still

needed concerning the latter individuals.

- 4-

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 439

24

---

## Page 440

Bureau airtel to all offices 5/13/70 instructed

the field to begin implementation of investigations of

New Left terrorism promptly with available manpower and

scale of implementation should be as rapid as possible.

A11

adherents to Weatherman ideology of advocating a Marxist-

Leninist revolution now and use terroristic tactics in

furtherance of revolution are to be subjects of these

investigations.

All of these subjects are to be considered

for Priority I of the Security Index, interviewed and

Bureau advised every 45 days by letter of those placed in

Priority I of their current residence and any other pertinent

information developed. To facilitate handling at the Bureau,

all reports and other communications within defined categories

are to include word (Weatherman) in character.

This airtel

also instructed each office to submit monthly airtel beginning

6/1/70 setting forth (1) identities and locations of communes

or organizations under investigation; (2) number of cases opened

during month on individuals in these categories; (3) total

number of individual cases under investigation;

(4) informant

coverage used against communes or organizations; and, (5) brief

summary of New Lett-orientea violence

in area during preceding

month and action taken.

Bureau airtel to all offices dated 5/15/70 concerning

the VB instructed all offices to immediately intensify

investigations of all returnees from Cuba with this Brigade,

ascertain their whereabouts, conduct prompt interviews and

submit current reports with

Security Index recommendation.

In view of rebuttable presumption of at least sympathy to a

violent Marxist-leninist revolution and willingness to

participate in that revolution by these VB members, the field

was also instructed for one year to advise the Bureau every

90 days of whereabouts and activities of Priority II and III

and norsecurity Index returnees.

In case of Priority I

Security Index subjects, this information is to be furnished

the Bureau every 45 days.

Bureau airtel to all offices dated 5/15/70 forwarded

the field a copy of a Departmenal letter concerning the specific

areas of interest to the Department in campus disorders looking

toward possible prosecutive action.

The field was specifically

instructed to develop information concerning New Left involvement

in campus violence and all agitational activities prior to and

during violent campus disorders by subversive groups and such

information must be fully determined and reported.

- 5 -

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 440

---

## Page 441

SAC Letter 70-30 (D) dated 6/2/70 reiterated

prior instructions of moratorium on Security Matter •

Communist investigations.

Recent field inspections

indicated some offices needed clarification of this

moratorium. The SAC Letter noted instructions concerning

moratorium only applied to routine communist investigations

and not those individuals belonging to such groups as the

Weatherman, Progressive Labor Party, socialist "orkers Party

and Young socialist Alliance.

Bureau airtel to all offices 7/16/70 noted that

New left terrorism is continuing through bombings, arsons

and other forms of violence and each SAC must personally

insure sufficient personnel are assigned to handle these

matters as well as investigating individuals involved and

those following Weatherman ideology of utilization of

violent revolutionary tactics against our Government.

Bureau airtel to select oifices dated 8/20/70

handling Key Activists were instructed to promptly submit

to the Bureau suficien handwriting specimons of sach

Key Activist and the

specimen is to be placed in the

National Security File maintained by the Laboratory.

was done in view of the propensity for violence of these

propersed

This

individuals and the fact a number of them are currently

Bureau fugitives.

SAC Letter 70-46 dated 9/1/70 captioned "New Left

Movement - Violence, Internal security - Miscellaneous

(Weatherman)" refers to strategic sabotage plans of

Weatherman against military and police installations and

"Declaration of War" by Weatherman underground and instructs

all security personnel to develop better informant coverage.

This development should concern informants and sources who

can furnish advance information regarding activities of

Weatherman and other terrorist groups and was specifically

stressed.

By airtel to all offices dated 9/3/70 captioned

"Attacks on Police, Extremist Activity" the field was

instructed, because of increased attacks on police, that

it can be expected there will also be physical attacks.

against the fbl and it should be insured that all Special

Agent personnel are fully cognizant of this possibility.

If information is received targeting police, appropriate

-6 -

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 441

---

## Page 442

investigation must be immediately instituted and informants

directed to develop full facts concerning the attack.

The

purpose of these investigations is to obtain complete

intelligence data concerning any extremist influence.

SAC Letter 70-48 (B) dated 9/15/70 under caption

"New Left and Black Extremist Terrorism - Informant Coverage"

instructed the field to immediately institute an aggressive

policy of developing new productive informants who can

infiltrate the ranks of terrorist organizations, their

collectives, communes and staffs of their underground newspapers.

Constructive plans to implement this program are to be

included in Item 4 of the monthly airtel on "New Left Movement-

Violence" which was outlined in Bureau airtel to all offices

5/13/70.

Bureau airtel to all offices 10/1/70 instructed the

field to replace the word (Weatherman) as noted in Bureau

airtel to all offices 5/13/70 with the word (Extremist).

This

was done to insure prompt and efficient routing at the Bureau

as well as proper handling in the field. A new caution

statement was also to be included in all correspondence in

respect to those individuals involved in Weatherman and other

New Left extremist activities.

SAC Letter 70-57 (C) dated 10/13/70 captioned "New

Left lovement - Police Training Matters" advised the field

, that in view of recent developments concerning violence caused

by New Left terrorists, the Bureau will consider requests

and violence at law enforcement meetings and conferences where

enforcement officials.

Bureau airtel to all offices dated 11/3/70 advised

the field that the moratorium of suspension of report writing

in Priority II Security Index cases and suspension of

verification of residence and employment in Priority II and

Priority III cases is rescinded. Offices were instructed to

reopen a proportionate number of cases each month and insure

all were open by 6/30/71.

Furthermore, residence and

employment on all of these subjects is

to be verified, annual

reports submitted in Priority II cases and LHM submitted in

Priority III cases where necessary.

- 7-

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 442

27

---

## Page 443

Bureau airtel to all offices dated 11/4/70

instructed the field to initiate investigation of all members

of SDS and members of pro-communist, militant New Left-type

campus organizations who follow SDS advocacy of revolution

and violence.

Each individual under investigation should be

considered for the Security Index.

Bureau airtel to all offices dated 11/5/70 concerning

informant development in New Left groups noted that each SAC

was to make this matter his personal concern in order that

penetration of these groups by top quality informants will

be accomplished in the immediate future. Each SAC was

directed to submit to the Bureau by 11/13/70 a complete

analysis of his informant coverage in New Left groups clearly

weaknesses and productive steps being taken

to rectify these weaknesses.

Current Bureau instructions require development of

adequate informant coverage of Strategic Air Command and

Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Bases of the United States

Air Force (PROSAB) to insure that our investigative

responsibilities in the sabotage, espionage and internal

security fields can be properly discharged.

Semiannual reports

are submitted by each office havinga Strategic Air Command Base

Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Base vithin its

territory.

A review of semiannual reports submitted by the

field as of 7/1/70 disclosed that a total of 1,281 informants

• have been developed.

Bureau airtel to all offices dated 9/9/70 advised field

that special single fingerprint file on Weatherman fugitives and

other New Left terrorists has been started. Field is instructed

to immediately review files for identity of individuals who fit

category of a New left terrorist and whosefingerprints should be

included in this special single fingerprint file.

Names of

these

individuals were to be submitted to Bureau with sufficient

identifying data and as new names come to attention of office

promptly furnish the Bureau.

8

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 443

---

## Page 444

assisiticia

SURVEYS, PROJECTS AND/OR INTENSIFICATION PROGRAMS

4-H

Section Chief R. D. Cotter: Following are applicable activities

of Research Section.

Survey Regarding Potential for Racial Violence

This survey program was formerly under the title

"Possible Racial Violence, Major Urban Areas." The program

was initiated in 1964 in order that the Bureau would be aware

of potential danger spots in the U.S. The present program

requires each field division to conduct a continuing survey in

their respective territories covering all localities having a

potential for racial violence based on current racial conditions.

The objective is to insure that the Bureau receives a realistic

and comprehensive picture of existing racial conditions in these

areas on a current basis and to obtain advance information of any

impending racial developments which clearly point to the

possibility of mob violence.

Quarterly reports submitted by field in line with this

survey represent information obtained through contacts with

local government and police officials, leaders of racial groups,

and a cross section of informants and

sources.

The survey

enables us to be thoroughly knowledgeable of racial develop~

ments and potential trouble spots and provides timely and

pertinent information which is disseminated to the White

House, Attorney General, and other Government agencies.

Information developed is also used for an analysis of the

potential for violence in the U. S., which is prepared in the

spring of each year, just prior to the most active months,

in this field, and which is disseminated on a high level.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1/12/71

+754-H

NW-88608-Đoeld:32989638-Rage-444

---

## Page 445

- 2 -

Security Index (SI) Program

Refer to white write-up prepared by Internal Security

Section (4-H), which has investigative responsibility under this

program. Research Section, Special Records Unit, maintains

records applicable to the SI and is responsible for coordinating

program. In line with this responsibility, Research Section

prepared a memorandum to Assistant Director Brennan, dated

1/12/71, re-evaluating SI.

As of 4/15/70 there were in the Index 2,794 persons

of leadership capacity (Priority I and II) and 8,352 rank-and-

file subjects (Priority III) for a total of 11,146. Of these,

848 and 4,770, respectively, are communists--a

total of

5,618 or 50.4 percent.

As of 12/15/70 there were in the

Index 3,450 persons of leadership capacity (Priority I and II)

and 8,614 rank-and-file subjects (Priority ITT) for a total

of 12,064. Of these, 831 and 4,718, respectively, are

communists--a total of 5,549 or

46 percent.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 445

---

## Page 446

-3.

Emergency Detention Program

The Emergency Detention Program (EDP), which is field-wide,

involves the planning for apprehension and detention of persons

considered potentially dangerous to the national defense and public

safety of the U. S. in time of a national emergency and for the

search and seizure of contraband. The EDP is not a program as

such but is based on Title II of the Internal Security Act (ISA)

of 1950. The basic responsibility for the operation and implementa-

tion of the EDP rests with the Attorney General. Detailed plans

regarding the EDP are drawn up and included in the "Attorney

General's Portfolio," copies of which are in the Bureau's possession.

This program has been maintained in an up-to-date status.

Administrative plans for the implementation of the program in each

office are maintained in the form of a "Detpro Survey." Lists of

individuals to be detained are furnished to the Internal Security

Division of the Department each month and the listing of places to

be searched under authority of the Master Search Warrant are main-

tained on a current basis.

The Seat of Government and all field

divisions, with the exception of Honolulu, maintain essential

records at safe locations for successiul implemeniaiion of the EDP:

Each office also maintains instructions to be turned over to the

U. S. Attorneys and U. S. Marshals upon implementation.

This program is coordinated by Special Records Unit,

Research Section. Primary responsibility rests with the Department

and changes can be made only upon approval of the Department. We

merely recommend and/or suggest any desirable changes.

Periodic

checks are made to insure that all records connected with the ElP:

stored away from Headquarters cities, are current. Field division

surveys are kept up to date and the Bureau is advised semiannually

of the status.

- Legislation was previously introduced in Congress to

repeal Title II of the ISA of 1950. When the 91st Congress ended;

no affirmative action had been taken in this regard. In the event

Title II should be repealed at a future date under new legislation,.

the Government's inherent right to protect itself internally will

continue to be safeguarded by the Bureau under its

basic responsibil-

ity for protecting this Nation's internal security.

This program is under constant supervision and

re-evaluation so that any necessary changes and streamlining

may be made.

A memorandum justifying the continuance of this

program was

last submitted on 1/12/71.

81

NW 88608 Docld:32989638-Page-446

---

## Page 447

- 4 -

Security Informants

Special Records Unit maintains an up-to-date index of

Security Informants and Potential Security Informants. It

correlates personal and operating data (such as name,

address,

code, tile and symbol number) concerning these informants,

which it receives from the Division's investigative sections,

and places such material on FD-348s, three by five cards

that constitute the index.

This index is maintained on

discontinued as well as current

informants.

At the time of the inspection in April, 1970, a total

01 1 141 Security Informants were being operated.

As of 1/12/71.

the number had increased to 1,159 for a total increase of 18.

During the same period, the number of Potential Security Informants

had increased from 616

to do told total increase of 19

Technical and Microphone Surveillances

There has been no significant change regarding the

utilization of these techniques in the internal security field

since the last inspection.

As of 1/12/71, we have 40 telephone

surveillances (tesurs) in Bureau's internal security cases and

seven awaiting installation. We also have six tesurs in

operation at the request of

the State Department.

We are conducting six microphone surveillances (misurs)

in internal security field, and

four misur installations are

being operated at the request of the National Security Agency

(iNA) •

In addition, 64 teletype facilities are being covered at

he written request of NSA

82

---

## Page 448

SURVEYS, PROJECTS AND/OR

INTENSIFICATION PROGRAMS

That.

4-H

Section Chief V. A. Branigan

Espionage section

The lollowing programs discussed immediately

hereinafter are currently the responsibility of the

espionage section: Alem Program,

Bureau file 65-69532;

DESECO Prograil, Bureau file 105-71688; East-West Exchange

Program, Bureau file 105-42300; and Radio and Technical

Equipment Purchased by the Soviets, Bureau file 105-36365.

Following the inspection of April, 1970, the

Counterintelligence Program was discontinued and a GS-14

Sugorvisor was made arailable for assignment elgewhere.

No write-up has been submitted

this is now being phased

out.

for the Rega Program since

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1-13-70

WAB:hke,

4-H

83

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 448

---

## Page 449

ALEM PROGRAM

Bufile: 65-69532

4-H

1.

ALEM is the code name for the Bureau program to uncover

Soviet "illegal" agents who have entered the U. s.

pett cions

ton furnished

by the fedora intormant. This program was Initiated In

August, 1965. IndiViduals entering the U. S. under

the above two categories have been determined through

Immigration and Naturalization Service for expenses

i. ur de veen the years 1960-1966 texants enterine the

2.

Approximately 1960 cases have been opened under this program

Since Its inception, of which tub are now pending.

We have

not uncovered any illegals to date although we have been

able to identify through this program a valuable KGB agent

Belgium

0568188)

3.

ALEM is supervised in the Espionage Section, Special Cases

Unit, by SAAP. Litrento. The responsibility of reviewing

the pertinent G-188 cards and initiating investigations is

placed with the Washington Field Office.

The procedures

followed in opening cases do not require the use of much

personnel or many man hours by the Washington Field Office.

4.

According to the bedore informant

the KGB has used the

techniques ses torth above a four KGB "fllegals"

" legals"

to the U.

arrived in the U.os, Wder category number one

according to Information the Fedora informant was able

to obtain from a KGB officer in the New York Residency.

5. This program is evaluated on an annual basis.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1/12/71

4-H

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 449

---

## Page 450

CANIL PROGRAM

Bufile: 65-70719

4-H

1. CANIL is the code name for the Bureau program to

uncover Soviet illegals whe may haye arrived in

_Canada as European immigrants and thereafter entered

the U.S. On immigrant visas obtained at one of the

American consulates in Canada. This program is based

on the cowslip case which involved a Soviet illegal

husband and wife team who used this method of entry.

Immigration Visa and Alfen Registration (IVAR) forms

Illed by uropean migrants prior their destruction

by the consulates It is consulate practice to retain

these forms

SEe toms months then to destroy them.

Legat, Ottava, forwards these forms. to the New York

office where they are reviewed. To develop suspects.

the New York Office

uses criteria developed from analysis

of the Cowslip case.

2.:

Since inception of this program in June, 1966, 27 cases

were opened. There are no cases pending. No illegals

uncovered to date.

The procedures followed

In this program do not require the use of much personnel

or many man hours by the New York Office.

3.

CANIL is supervised in the Espionage Section, Special

Cases Unit, by sa

ultrento

4.

The detection of Soviet illegals is one of the most

difficult problems facing the Bureau in the security

field.

It is felt this program still has a good

potential in uncovering illegals because it is logical

and has a sound basis.

Past experience has shown that

Soviet Intelligence will use the same modus operandi

continuously, if successful.

5. This program is evaluated on an annual basis.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1/12/71

APL: tdp

4-H

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 450

---

## Page 451

7

i

DESECO PROGRAM

Bufile 105-71688

4-H

The Deseco Program (program for development of

selected contacts to be directed against Soviet-bloc

Officials) was conceived in an espionage conference in

December, 1957.

Its objective was to intensify the

development of informants and double agents to penetrate

Soviet-bloc intelligence and for use in sensitive defection

approaches.

Between the last inspection and December 1, 1970,

approximately an 8-month period, 37 Deseco subjects were

placed in contact with Soviet-bloc officials and 8 of these

have developed to the status of security informants or

double agents.

The majority of work is concentrated in the

New York, Washington, D. C., and Chicago areas where Soviet-

bloc establishments are

located. A Soviet Consulate General

is scheduled to become operative in san Izuncisco during

1971, and a skeleton staff of four Soviet officials with

five

dependents is seeking appropriate buildings for this

establishment.

San Francisco and other West Coast offices are

currently developing a "pool" of Deseco sources for eventual

use against Soviet intelligence officers who will operate out

•of the Soviet Consulate General.

Due to the increased number

of Soviet-bloc personnel in the United States and their

relative freedom of travel, particularly to technical and

scientific conventions,

a total of 19 offices have been

authorized to conduct "sounding-out" interviews of prospective

sources without prior Bureau authority. Follow-up interviews

with potential Deseco sources are conducted on a UACB basis.

Unusual and highly sensitive cases are routed to the division

front office for approval.

The New York, Washington Field and Chicago Offices

submit monthly progress letters summarizing the results of the

program. The other 16 offices submit summaries on a semi-

annual basis. This program substantially assists us to

penetrate and neutralize Soviet-bloc intelligence. The results

achieved thus far warrant the program's continuance.

It is

the best means of penetration available considering

the

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1/12/71

WW:as

4-H

опаскот

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 451

---

## Page 452

DESECO PROGRAM

limitations on other sensitive investigative techniques.

It

affords us a pool of human resources available for use against

Soviet-bloc intelligence personnel in political, economic and

particularly scientific fields in which the intelligence services

of the bloc have shown extreme interest.

This program has been

reevaluated on an annual basis. It was last justified by

memorandum dated 10/22/69, but by the action of the executive

Conference approved by the Director on memorandum of 10/29/70,

Washington and New York were instructed that every Special Agent

in those offices handling investigations of soviet personnel

should immediately open on and develop two completely new

Deseco subjects.

These instructions were sent to the field

by airtel of 11/2/70.

The program will next be justified by memorandum in

March, 1971, when progress letters summarizing the results of

the program

will be due from all participating offices.

This

program is correlated in the Espionage Section Coordination

Unit by Special Agent L. Whitson.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

NW 88608 Dold 2919638 Page 452

---

## Page 453

EAST-WEST EXCHANGE PROGRAM

Bufile: 105-42300

4-H

This Program originated in 1955 to provide

internal security safeguards regarding the admission

of Soviet and satellite nationals. Soviet intelligence

regards visits of the East-West Exchange Agreement

participants as opportunities to promote intelligence

activity.

As a result of the last inspection SAC Letter 70-25

was prepared which set forth revisions of our investigative

action in the field.

This change was made as a result oi

other manpower commitments.

The instructions in that SAC

Letter provided that no investigations will be conducted

of groups or individuals participating in the East West

Exchange Program in the absence of any information indicating

affiliation with Soviet intelligence.

Bufiles are checked on

all Soviet participants and where information is developed

showing intelligence affiliation, cases are then opened and

the field is instructed to conduct the necessary investigation.

During the period of June-December, 1970, 525

individuals entered the United States under the provisions

of this exchange agreement and of this number, we had information

indicating soviet intelligence affiliation on 28 of these

individuals.

With regard to Soviet exchange students there are

currently 31 in the United States.

Based on information

furnished by defector sources and investigations of Soviet

students previously in the United. States, we have determined

that the Soviet Intelligence Services utilizes these students

in an intelligence capacity, principally as "spotters."

view of this, we afford these students active investigation.

We have also

found that a number of these students return to

the United States for assignment at one of the Soviet establish-

ments and in most instances, contacts which they made while in

the United States as students are generally reactivated.

For

United States as an exchange student in 1966. Through a defector

source we learned

2927773

that he

p agent for

the KGBand extensive investigation under

word Nikotine"

-Butile: -

65-70250)

has resulted

in the identification of this

agent in December,

er 1970. He has

e has admitted his recruitment and

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1/13/71

• 4-H

NW 88608-Docld 32989638-Page-453

---

## Page 454

initinct

10

EAST-WEST EXCHANGE PROGRAM

meetings with Fomichev since his return to the United States.

one of the poserbitittes being considered by the KGB for "this

individual

to have him obtain employment as a Bureau Agent.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1/13/71

"PL:CgC-

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 454

---

## Page 455

BANPOP PROGRAM

Bufile: 65-70741

1. BANPOP is the code name for a Bureau program through

which an atempt is made to identify Soviet illegal

agents who may be utilizing a Swiss bank

to transier

funds to themselves.

The program is based

of four Soviet illegal agent cases between 1955-1900

In which funds were

switzerLand..

individual beneficiary is named; (2) the amount of the

transter Is between $300 and $5000" and" (3) "the last name

funds " the

same or the

The progran was initiated by Bureau letter of August 26;

1966.

2.

The program is now operated in the New York, Chicago

and Philadelpnia vifices.

The philaceipnia Office originaily

had the program in effect from September, 1966, until

May, 1968, when it was discontinued.

HowEver,

it was

renewed in that office in February, 1970.

3.

an office locates an individual who might be considered

a subject, it writes a letter to the Bureau with a copy

to the appropriate field office and requests that inves-

tigation be undertaken to identify this person.

The title

includes the name of the subject and the code name of the

program in order that all cases will be handled by the

same supervisor. At the present time, there are six pending

month in handling 10,100 records for a six-month period

ending August 31, 1970.

The Philadelphia Office utilized

four Agent hours

per month and the Chicago Office utilized

three Agent hours per month in handling its program.

4.

This program is supervised by Sat? lee of the Special

Cases Unit, Espionage Section:

5. All offices keep the Bureau advised of the progress of the

program on a six-month basis, submitting letters by March 1

and september 1 of each year.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

IPI: tdp,

1/12/71

4-H

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 455

---

## Page 456

4-H

COKHA PROGRAM

65-73750

1.

Title is code word for physical surveillance

coverage of known meeting areas utiLized by soviet intelli

sence in the past

several years. The New York OrfICe

instituted this program in July 1920

New York office has catalogued known meeting-areas.

as a result Of bast physical surveillances of Soviet intelli

gence 011 cers and intornation received from detectors-]R-pLace

and coulse agents operating a

against Soviet intelligence

oficers.

Soviet intelligence officers are trained to detect suveillances

and accordingly are extremely astute in detecting such coverage.

It is almost impossible to conduct a discreet physical surveil-

lance of them which will result in uncovering an intelligence

operation.

.. This program places our special Agents in areas

where nece kelthood of Sortet meetithout hahra

prior surveillance which would

thwant meeting. Almost all

Soviet intelligence officers spend approximatery moto three

hours in "dry cleaning" themselves to insure they are not under

surveillance When

meeting an agent. hen the soviet arrives

at the meeting area, he is confident that he is not under

surveillance.

Our objective in this program is to identify

American agents neeting Soviet intelligence officers under

clandestine circumstances.

Special Agents,-afforded physical surveillang/ork,

New York, utilizing one team consisting of four

coverage to

ricers the vesper deny throush octobes 1910 51x

Soviet intelligence officers were observed in these areas on

16 occasions To significant cases have been developed out

of this coverage and New york has current authority to Interview

one of the subjects observed In clandestine contact with a known

Soviet

committee fox state security OffiCer

New York was authorized to

On 11/10/70,.

further implement this program and

navised that it intended to cover two other known meeting areas

iD Queens,

ens, New York,

during early evening ho

weekdays

and on saturdays, which Is sumtar

• to the coverage previously

afforded.

4.

program supervised by Specialgent George M. Quinn,.

Officials Unit - New York, Espionage Section.

Expenses and time

in handling program is negligible at Seat of Government.

since

program in field consists of surveillance activities, there must

be close supervision at field level.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

NVi: 88608

Dock 314180638 Page 456

---

## Page 457

S

A-H

COKMA PROGRAM

Program offers excellent potential on basis of

results achieved during short period it has been in operation.

It must be noted that Soviets were not as active as usual

during September - November, 1970, because of Twenty-fifth

United Nations Anniversary celebration and meeting of

United Nations General Assembly. Soviet intelligence las

Manpower

investigative technique.

to this

program must be faniliar with Soviets assigned to

the New

York area and must also be experienced in surveillance

procedures.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1/13/71

GMQ: aeb

4-H

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 457

---

## Page 458

4-H

RADIO AND TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT PURCHASED BX THE SOVIETS

105-36365

1.

Program commenced in March, 1955, in order to have

central repository for information developed in connection

with investigations of Soviets in this country pertaining to

radio and technical equipment purchased by them.

20

Washington Field and New York Offices furnish infor-

mation developed concerning these purchases on a monthly basis.

Dissemination of the material is made to Department of State,

Central Intelligence Agency, Army, Navy, Air Force, Atomic

Energy Commission, and Bureau of International Commerce,

United States Department of Commerce.

Material submitted

includes name of

Soviet purchaser, date, quantity, description

and cost of the items purchased.

It involves maintenance of

three control files; one each at Bureau, Washington Field and

New York Offices.

Program established to achieve foliowing

objectives:

disseminate to interested Government agencies

information concerning purchase of technical equipment in the

United States by Soviet officials; determine whether Soviet

intelligence is circumventing restrictions regarding material

appearing on Department of Commerce restricted export control

FBI Laboratory,

list; and to permit discreet markings by soviets through?

certain technical equipment turnished to

overt

or covert means which would permit its identification at some

future time.

3.

Since April, 1970, Program has disclosed continuing

purchases by Soviet nationals of Grundig Satellite Multiband

portable radios.

During 9/70 one KGB officer in Washington

purchased

30 of

these radios at one time.

Soviet husband

and

wife illegal team recently in U. S. used one of these

radios to receive clandestine broadcasts from USSR which con-

tained their operating instructions.

Program made it possible

to secure serial numbers for possible future identification.

Analysis of purchases enables Laboratory to make reasonable

estimate of internal communications used at Soviet establishments

and security devices being operated. Program also disclosed type

of transmitting equipment and antenna system purchased by

Soviets, apparently for installation at Corsulate General in

San Francisco when that establishment becomes operational.

This

information is of interest not only to FBI Laboratory but to

State Department and National Security Agency in connection with

its worldwide coverage of Soviet communications capabilities.

4.

Program supervised by speciat agent

Eugene Co Pe

Officials Unit - Washinston, Espionage Section. Expense and tine

NW-88608-Doefd$2080638 Pager&IGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

---

## Page 459

17

RADIO AND TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT PURCHASED BY THE SOVIETS

4-H

utilized in handling program is negligible. Dissemination of

material

submitted by Washington Field and New York Offices

requires minimum of time each month on part of Bureau Supervisor

and no weaknesses in program are apparent.

Administrative

tickler for control maintained on Soviet Embassy Desk, Officials

Unit - Washington, Espionage Section.

5.

Program is of value not only to Domestic Intelligence

Division and field offices but to agencies receiving dissemination

of material developed. Possession of some equipment on which

activity.

for continuance.

Program last evaluated and justified January 8, 1971.

Fickler maintained for reevaluation by January 15, 1972, and

each year thereafter, if still of continuing value.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1/12/71

ECP : eco

4-H

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 459

93

---

## Page 460

SURVEYS, PROJECTS AND/OR INTENSIFICATION PROGRAMS

4-H

BROTTON CHIBE TIE, WANT TO

NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE SECTION:

: There are attached

separate write-ups

regarding the following programs supervised in the

Nationalities Intelligence Section:

1. Visitors to Communist China and Contacts by

United States Residents of Chinese

Diplomatic Establishments

•2.

Chinese Aliens Entering the United States and

Chinese Entering the United States Claiming

United States Citizenship

3.

Intelligence Coverage of Friendly Foreign

Countrias

4. Counterintelligence Operations Against Chinese

Communist Intelligence Activities in the

United

States (Chicoin)

5. Communist Coverage Along the Mexican Border

(BOCOV)

6. Name Checks of Aliens Holding Diplomatic and

International Organization Visas

7. Security Index - Cuba

8. American Repatriate Program

9.

International Organizations - Dangerous Aliens

of Nations Outside the Soviet Bloc

INW 88608-Docld:32989638_ Page 460

---

## Page 461

it densit

PROGRAM

VISITORS TO COMMUNIST CHINA AND

CONTACTS BY UNITED STATES RESIDENTS

OF CHINESE DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENTS

(Bufile 105-144424)

4-H

1. Background, Date of Inception, Scope and Desired Objectives.

Program was initiated in 8/65 in connection with

efforts to cover Chinese Communist (Chicom) activities in

the United States.

Through cooperation of both United States

intelligence agencies and friendly foreign intelligence services,

,the identities of United States residents are furnished to us

who attempt to

• enter Communist China or contact People's

Repuhlic of China (PRC) dintomatic establishments in certain

countries throughout the world.

This program is field-wide and not directly connected

with any other investigative program.

The objectives include

identifying those individuals who enter the PRC and who may be

engaged in Chicom activities in their contacts with Chicom

establishments.

The identity of

these visitors is absolutely

necessary in order to determine if they have access to classified

material or if they could be utilized effectively by the Chicoms

when they return to the United States. Some of these individuals

have excellent potential for informant development.

We have

utilized contacts with Chicom diplomatic establishments in the

development of selected sources who are attractive to the Chicons

BY SAC Letter No.

70-26 dated 5/12/70, we restricted our investigations to cover

This procedure was

initiated to

conserve manpower inasmuch as State Department had relaxed travel

restrictions to China on 3/16/70 in order to allow travel to

PRC for any "legitimate purpose." The President recently directed

that a committee prepare recommendations for additional steps

which may be taken to relax restrictions on travel to and promote

further trade with the PRC. This highly confidential directive,

if accepted, will permit many people to be eligible to travel to

China if the

Chinese will grant travel permits.

Up to the present

time, however, the Chicoms have only granted travel permits to

pro-Chicon propagandists such as Edgar Snow...

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1/12/71

-JEM: cal

4-H

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 461

---

## Page 462

2. Positive Results Achieved Since Last Inspection.

Investigations since the last Inspection have totaled

95. Many of these individuals were interviewed; however, it

has been determined that none were allowed to enter Communist

China.

During the cultural revolution which ended during 1970,

very few United States residents were allowed to enter

Communist China including a number of United Nations employees

who had previously made numerous trips to Communist China.

There is every indication, however, that the Chicoms have taken

on a "new look" internationally and are attempting to gain the

friendship of the western world. This program has not reached

its great potential due to the

xenophobia which existed during

the past three years.

Communist China is expected to open an

embassy at Ottawa, Canada, in 1/71 as result of Canadian

recognition. This will make it far easier for United States

residents to cross the border into Canada and either seek a

travel permit to visit Communist China or make contact with

Chicom

intelligence represontatives at the embassy in Ottawa.

3. Extent and Nature of Current Supervision.

This program is handled by one Bureau supervisor who

correlates information as received from either United States

intelligence agencies or friendly foreign intelligence services

and directs the office covering the individual's residence and

employment to conduct necessary investigation according to the

Manual of Instructions.

Investigations are conducted to fully

identify the individuals, determine current residence and

employment and ascertain

whether he has access. to classified

information. In absence of any unusual circumstances indicating

need for further action, the case is closed.

Each case is

closely supervised and

evaluated on its individual merits.

4. Current Justification for Continuation.

The potential of this program is far greater than

what has been realized in the way of results to date. As

mentioned above, the Canadian recognition of the PRC has given

Communist China a foothold in North America. RCMP advises

that then at onto percent to Chinese Contes States.

statio nation in estare niac in a Fus

-2 -

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 462

---

## Page 463

At the present time, the restrictions for crossing the border

from the United States to Canada are practically

nonexistent

for a United States resident with proper documentation. There-

fore, it is imperative that we continue such a program so that.

RCMP reports individuals contacting the PRC Embassy in

Ottawa we may fully identity these individuals

5. How Often Evaluated and Date of Last Justification.

This program is evaluated annually and was last

justified on 12/31/69.

At that time, it was stated that

the program would be evaluated and justified during 1/71;

this is currently being undertaken.

- . ---

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 463

---

## Page 464

NW 88608

CHINESE ALIENS ENTERING THE UNITED STATES

(Bufile 105-135923)

4-H

CHINESE ENTERING THE UNITED STATES

CLAIMING UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP

(Bufile 105-12752)

These two programs have similar criteria for

investigation and, therefore, are being handled under

one write-up.

1. Background, Date of Inception, Scope and Desired Objectives

The alien program was instituted on 1/26/65

and the

program concerning Chinese entering the United States

claiming United States citizenship began on 9/14/65.

-Both programs were originated in an effort to identify

Chinese Communist (Chicom) intelligence operatives who

may be sent to the United States in deep cover. In 1955,

Chicom intelligence emphasized the need to deploy deep

cover illegal agents abroad and specifically in the

United States. The number of cases currently investigated under

the citizen program has been approximately 15 to 20 annually;

only one, however, has been opened since last inspection.

These individuals

offer the Chicoms an ideal situation for

placing an illegal into the United States who has assumed the

identity of a Chinese whose father or grandfather was a

United States citizen. These individuals, once they arrive in

the United

States, are never checked on by any agency.

The

Chinese aliens, a

number of whom are students "temporarily,"

entering the United States to attend universities, have

decreased in number during the past two years from approximately

2,000 per month to 600 per month. Recent relaxation of immigra-

tion regulations will now permit a great increase in the numbers

allowed to enter the United States during 1971. Since the

inception of both programs, we have simplified

the criteria for

investigating citizens and

aliens keeping in mind the necessity

for conserving manpower in our investigations, but also

fulfilling our responsibilities.

The scope and investigation

of these two programs are identical. The prime objective of

these two programs is the identification of intelligence agents;

however, the two programs have been responsible for the

development of positive intelligence information as well as a

continuing increase in source coverage of Chinese matters, not

only in our heavily populated Chinese localities, but also

covering the lesser Chinese conmunities throughout the

United

states.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1/12/71

JEN'sem

Docld:32989638 Page 464

---

## Page 465

2. Positive Results Achieved Since the Last Inspection

Since the last inspection 151 cases

have been

opened on Chinese aliens and only one case on Chinese

claiming United States citizenship.

During this period

197 alien cases have been closed and eight cases involving

citizens were closed.

Information developed during these

investigations has been disseminated to the intelligence

community. To date, no Chicon intelligence agent has been

uncovered by these two programs; however, we have steadily

increased our source coverage and collected positive intelli-

gence which has been disseminated to the intelligence

community. This is a long-range program and it is expected

it will pay dividends during the coming year with the establish-

ment of a Chinese Communist embassy in Canada.

3. Extent and Nature of Current Supervision

The allen cases, most which originate from our

are supervised by three

supervisors

destined to in the United States. The citizen cases are

also supervised by three supervisors according to

geographic location and these cases are furnished to us as

a result of Passport Records being checked by WEO.

Cases

in both programs are closely supervised to make

certain that each subject falls within the criteria and that

when the cases are reopened for investigation after two

• years the case is evaluated

. to determine if the subject

may possibly be an intelligence agent.

4. Current Justification for Continuation

These two programs cover two vulnerable areas

whereby the Chicoms could penetrate the United States by

utilizing either aliens or individuals claiming United States

citizenship who have been fully trained in Communist China

and entered Hong Kong subsequent to 1/1/55. The screening

process at United States Consulate General's office in

Hong Kong is meager and current proposals for relaxation

of rules will make it easier for the Chicoms

to filter

agents into the United States through the easiest route,

that is, an alien or a citizen fully documented.

These

two

programs also are one of the best sources for the

development of informants and the gathering of positive

intelligence information. These programs are fully justified

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 465

---

## Page 466

for continuation and no additional manpower or expenditure

requests are needed at this time for the continuation of

these two programs.

5. Frequency of Evaluation and Date of Last Justification

These programs are evaluated annually. The

alien program was last justified on 1/22/70 and the citizen

program will be justified with the alien program on 1/22/71.

On 9/18/70, a memorandum was submitted indicating that the

citizen program would be coordinated with and justified

with the alien program during January, 1971.

_NW-88608_Đoєld÷32989638_Page_466.

---

## Page 467

4-H

INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF

FRIENDLY FOREIGN COUNTRIES

(Bufile: 65-63113)

1. Background, Scope and Objectives

Program was inaugurated 1954 aimed at developing positive

intelligence information, as well as data of value to FBI investigations.

Expansion of the program took place in 1955 and 1959 and during 1962

and 1963, as well as in 1970, additional coverage was approved.

.--

The program has three principal phases as follows:

a.

Regular notification to the FBI by other U.S. agencies

regarding arrival in U.S., of intelligence personnel

from non-Soviet bloc countries. This phase consists

chiefly of file reviews at Seat of Government at nominal

expense:

b. Maintenance of special coverage on ofticial establishments

of selected non-Soviet bloc countries. with the approval of

State Department and the Attorney, General, Y

We currently

have special coverage on eleven diplomatic establishments

of seven non-Soviet bloc countries and three additional

installations as recently approved by the Attorney General.

Countries currentiy covered are Panama, Israel, Jordan,

Chile, Bölivia and Peru.

that done tele nep and need to

personnel who man special coverage equipment. Costs are

coverage is justified. This justification is based on the

c.

This phase relates to the development of live sources

within diplomatic establishments_of non-Soviet bloc

countries as well as the development of individuals so

closely connected with official establishments they are

able to provide accurate up-to-date intelligence informa-

tion. We now have 47 actual and 22 potential live sources

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1/12/71

ERH:biR

4-H

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 467

---

## Page 468

sticki

4-H

at the establishments of 25 non-Soviet-bloc countries.

The principal cost involved in this phase relates to

Agent time devoted to investigations of sources and

time spent in handling these sources.

2. Positive Results Achieved

This program has enabled us to provide the White House and

the highest level of the intelligence community a continuing flow of valuable

foreign political information affecting the national and international interests

of the U.S. The program was particularly productive in our coverage of

such critical areas of tension as the Middle East crisis, the continuing

crisis in Panama, and the recurrent political crises created in

South America through the unseating and establishment of regimes in the

various countries covered. In the areas mentioned, as well as in other

fringe nationality areas, this program has served as a basis for obtaining

information which has provided U.S. Government with current data regarding

the international political scene and has contributed otherwise unobtainable

information for the benefit of those responsible for policy decisions at the

highest level of our Government. An example of the importance of this

information is illustrated in the comments of the US. Ambassador to the

United Nations, Charles We Y

Yost.

st, made by him in a letter dated 11/13/70

to the Director. Ambassador

Yost noted that the support given to the

U.S. United Nations Mission by the Bureau was deeply appreciated by him

and had afforded him privileged insight and perspective.

The quality of this program is further attested to by realization

• by the White House of the capabilities of the FBI to produce positive foreign

political intelligence with resulting instructions to the Bureau to expand

this capability abroad in select liaison positions. As a result of these

instructions, our capability in furnishing foreign political information

was expanded through the opening of six new liaison posts in Beirut,

Lebanon; Caracas, Venezuela; La Paz, Bolivia; Copenhagen, Denmark;

Managua, Nicaragua; and Tel Aviv, Israel. With this expansion, our

overseas

liaison Agents were increased from 28 to 42 with supporting

clerical personnel being increased in number from 32 to 46. This move

has increased the number of our foreign posts from 11 to 17. (More

detailed comment regarding increase in liaison abroad is set forth in the

work papers of this inspection under Section 4-E, Accomplishments -

Special Coordination Unit.)

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 468

---

## Page 469

4-H

3.

Extent and Nature of Current Supervision

The program as it relates to all friendly foreign countries

(except West Germany) is coordinated by the Number One Man of the

Nationalities Intelligence Section working through the separate supervisors

assigned to the individual country's desk within the Section.

4. Current Justification for Continuation

This program continues to produce information of substantial

value relative to Bureau investigations as well as substantive foreign

political information of vital interest to the White House and members

of the intelligence community. The information continues to illustrate

the FBI's ability to produce valuable intelligence information relative

to foreign political matters and to solidify the Bureau's position as a

valuable source of foreign intelligence data. It is recommended that this

program be continued.

Periodic Justification

Program is evaluated annually and was last justified by

memorandum dated 5/8/70.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS - DANGEROUS

ALIENS OF NATIONS OUTSIDE THE SOVIET BLOC

Program was initiated in April, 1951, to create a centralized

compilation of undesirable and potentially dangerous aliens with diplomatic

immunity against whom State Department can, when wartime emergency

arises, initiate steps for deportation or lifting of their diplomatic immunity.

The program applies only to aliens from countries outside the

Soviet bloc employed in the United States in international organizations

within provisions of International Organizations Immunities Act. The

program is similar in intent to the Emergency Detention Program and the

PRODIP Program; however, it involves an entirely different type of

individual.

The program is a control device only and involves no investigative

activity. Twenty-five individuals (as of 11/5/70) are included on the list

with New York Office responsible for twenty and Washington Field Office

responsible for five.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 469

---

## Page 470

4-H

Current program requires only an annual letter with deletions

or additions being made by separate letter as subjects involved qualify

for elimination or inclusion. Substantive desk supervisors review field

submissions to verify need for inclusion of individuals on list.

with last justification having been made 2/6/70.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 470

---

## Page 471

• PROGRAM

4-H

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS AGAINST CHINESE COMMUNIST

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES (CHICOIN)

(Bufile 105-135614)

SECTION CHIEF W. R. WANNALL

NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE SECTION

1. Background and Date of Inception

Chinese Communist (Chicom) intelligence service,

lacking base from which to operate in United States, must

rely on illegal and third-country operations to develop

intelligence data in U. S. Chicoin was instituted in May, 1965,

to combat these efforts.

2.: Scope and Desired Objectives

•To create situations and place our informants in

contact with known Chicon agents in foreign countries, with

ultimate aim being Chicom recruitment of our assets for illegal

operation within U. S., resulting in penetration of Chicom

intelligence activities inside our borders.

3: Positive Results Achieved Since Last Inspection

In. August 1970. we directed Los Angeles informant,

DINA, to travel

to Canada to initiate contact with

representatives.0t

New China News AgencY (NCNA). who are known

Chicom intelligence agents.. Source succeeded in making such

contact and arousing interest of NONA personnel As bonus

- Who has

who now

Of DINA to

adicoms.

-Seattle

source, code name JUDD, has developed close

association with key Chicom sympathizer in Vancouver,

BrITISN COLUMDIa

and during period was invited to visit

two Chicom

s in port at vancouver:

Source also made trip to

1/12/71

4-H

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 471

---

## Page 472

-2

-

. 4-H

San Francisco for his chicon friends taking with him books

and messages fof individuals there from pro-chicom individuals

in Canada

Two, other sources, NY 5896-S and St 2739-S main-

tained personal contact with personnel of china Travel Service

(CTS) in Hong Kong during period,

CTs is Chicom agency

specializing narcangement tips to mainland.

China and front

for Chicom Intelligence.

4. Extent and Nature of Current Supervision

Chicoin

Program is

handled by one Bureau Supervisor

-who correlates.

activities of field offices involved to insure

proper direction of informants and control of specialized

double agent operations. Close supervision of cases is maintained.

"5." Current Justification for Continuance

Counterinteiligence

and penetration of Chicom

intelligence operations is long-term process: : Sources developed

to date under this program present excellent potential for such

penetration, especially in light of fact Chicoms expected to

open Embassy in Ottawa, Canada, in next thirty to sixty days,

with strong possibility Consulates will also be opened in

border cities such as Vancouver. RCMP expects at least 50% oF

all future Chicom operations in Canada will be airected against

United States, and present sources loom large in penetration of

such operations.

Further, strong possibility exists Red China

will finally gain admittance to United Nations during Fall, 1971,

•a move which makes development. of

quality sources in this field

most imperative.

6

Frequency of Evaluation and Date of Last

Justification

Program justified annually, last justification being

on 5/7/70.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 472

---

## Page 473

4-H

PROGRAM

COMMUNIST COVERAGE ALONG THE MEXICAN BORDER

BOCOV

BUFILE: 100-356015

Background and Date of Inception

BOCOV was initiated by the Director In 1948 to

fill a void in adequacy of coverage/in the 25 mile border

zone south of the U. S.-Mexican border by the Central

Intelligence Agency and the Immigration and Naturalization

Service.

Scope and Desired Objectives

Three border offices, El Paso,

San Antonio and

Sex Do, parts pate ten Agents on te essistant hes

Attaches devote

212, sources and informants. The population of the zone

areas involved is approximately 1,700,000 Individuals oI

which 2.371 are either members or sympathizers of major

Mexican subversive groups.

Positive Results Achieved Since Last Inspection

Program has furnished valuable information

relative to threat against U.s. by Mexican subversives

residing in the border area.

Investigative results are

furnished to all levels of interested U.S. Government

intélligence community.

program continues to keep us

advised of potential trouble areas and allows for

appropriate counter-measures.

Domestic Intelligence Division

1/12/71

JEG: emi

4-H

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 473

---

## Page 474

Extent and Nature of Current Supervision

Periodic reports on individuals and organizations

as well as informant coverage relating to BOCOV are analyzed

review of Incoming letters,

memoranda",

annual progress letters detailing informant coverage and

subversive strength. Analysis of this material provides a

basis for detecting weaknesses and making arrangements for

counter-intelligence moves.

Cutbacks initiated by the Bureau for the purpose

of conserving manpower and streamlining operations have

substantially reduced manpower and number of informants

utilized. Agents and Legal Attaches participating were

reduced from 16 to 12; informants and sources utilized

from 312 to 212n

These reductions resulted in annual

savings of $19,934.65 and total manpower currently utilized

on the program

is 1.72 Agents. Effectiveness of BOCOV and

our ability to re-expand the program should future

circumstances warrant were not impaired by the cutbacks

cited.

Current Justification for Continuance

BOCOV continues to fill the above-described

intelligence void and, in addition, is coordinated with

other intelligence programs originating in the border area,

in particular the SECOMEX program.

Frequency of Evaluation and Date of Last Justification

Program is evaluated annually and was last

justified 10/2/70.

-2-

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 474

---

## Page 475

BOCOV

Bocov is a code word which concerns a highly

sensitive intelligence operation of this Bureau which was in

effect from 4/24/48 until 9/11/72. The purpose of this

operation was to attempt to identify foreign subversive

elements entering the U. S. Although this operation is -no

longer in existence, the disclosure of the fact that it was

once carried on would undoubtedly severely impair the abilities

of this Bureau to fulfill its domestic obligations, not only

with regard to the internal security of the U. S., but also

in investigating criminal matters

of an international nature.

Furthernore, unauthorized disclosure of details of. this

operation could jeopardize the lives of individuals who

cooperated with this Bureau and who are currently residing

abroad.

substituted for pages 107tro8

in copy to sse

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 475

---

## Page 476

4-H

NAME CHECKS OF ALIENS HOLDING DIPLOMATIC AND

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION VISAS

This program was initiated in January, 1952, as a means of

keeping the Attorney General advised of information of a subversive

nature relating to the diplomats and officials of foreign countries entering

the United States in official capacities. These data are required by the

Attorney General to assist in discharging his responsibilities under the

Immigration and Nationality Act for exclusion and/or deportation of

foreign officials where their activity requires such action.

The basis for this program is found in the procedure by

Immigration and Naturalization Service in its submission of a form

advising of the arrival of the alien officials in this country, which form is

sent to member agencies of the intelligence community. The separate

agencies perform name checks on the data in these forms with the results

being channelized to the FBI. We correlate this information with data.

from our files and furnish same to the Attorney General. In those

instances where additional investigation appears warranted, we obtain

clearance from Department of State and issue appropriate instructions

to the field for active investigation.

Since the program was initiated, 617, 290 Immigration and

'Naturalization Service forms have been processed and we have

undertaken 452 investigations based on results thereof.

The program continues to supplement our overall coverage in

the intelligence field with the majority of the work being handled by

trained clerical personnel within the Nationalities Intelligence Section

and some isolated instances of involved investigations being handled by

substantive desk supervisors within the Division. Based on the limited

number of active investigations opened since the inception of this program,

the cost of the program consists mainly of name check expenditures.

The

program continues to serve a necessary purpose in our overall intelligence

coverage, serving to alert us to the presence in this country of persons

having a capability for intelligence activities or who may pose a security

threat to the United States.

The program is justified annually, with the last justification

having been made February 9, 1970.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1/11/71

4-H

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 476

---

## Page 477

4-H

SECURITY INDEX - CUBA

(Bufile 100-358086-210)

Background and Date of Inception

This program was instituted in November, 1960.

By that date it was obvious that Cuba, whose Government

had been taken over by Fidel Castro in January, 1959,

was a communist state posing a real and present threat

to the internal security of the U.S.

In 1962, at the

time of the Cuban missile crisis, a Supervisor at the

Bureau was assigned the specific responsibility for

administering this program to assure the apprehension and

special handling of the individuals included therein in

the event of a limited emergency involying Cuba.

Scope and Desired Objectives

As of 12/15/70, there were 419 individuals

included in the Security Index - Cuba Program, divided

into two categories:

1. Individuals placed on the Security Index

solely on account of their pro-Cuban activities. (Cuban

Special Section - 96 persons) •

2. Persons already on the Security Index

because of other subversive connections and activity who

would warrant special attention in the event of hostilities

with Cuba (Security Index subjects tabbed "Pro-Cuban" -

323 individuals).

Program is designed to maintain an up-to-date

record of location and activities of individuals included

therein, by means of established Security Index procedures

and

reporting, in order that we are in a position to move

swiftly should the apprehension or special handling of

these persons become necessary.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1/11/71

AHS Lemj

4-H

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 477

11

---

## Page 478

Positive Results Achieved

Determination as to the validity of an individual's

inclusion in this program is constantly under review. Since

the last inspection, critical attention has been given this

matter with the result that the number of persons on the

Cuban Special Section of the Index has been reduced from

193 as of 3/16/70 to 96 as of 12/15/70.

These 96 persons

are judged to be the hard-core pro-Cubans, action against

whom in a Cuban emergency would be mandatory. Of these 96,

27 are Cuban aliens.

Each subject of pending security

investigation with Cuban ramifications is considered for

inclusion in the Index.

Extent and Nature of Current Supervision

The Supervisor responsible for this program is

required to review each investigative communication in

current cases of pro-Cuban individuals to determine whether

the individual meets the criteria for inciusion in the Indor,

as outlined in the Manual of Instructions. He must make a

decision as to the degree of dangerousness of the individual

under the Priority Apprehension Program and rule on the

field's recommendations regarding these matters.

He initiates

procedures with the Security Index Desk of the Domestic

Intelligence Division and the Voucher Statistical Section

of the Administrative Division regarding the placing of

individual on the Index, his removal, and assignment or

change in Priority.

If the individual involved is an alien,

correspondence with the Internal Security Division of the

Department is required to assure the preparation of a pre-

positioned arrest warrant by Immigration and Naturalization

Service.

Action is also taken with the Department to cancel

the arrest warrant if the alien is removed from the Index.

On 10/29/70, the Director approved the lifting of

the moratorium on report writing and certain investigative

procedures in security cases on individuals. This will

require the field to reopen by 6/30/71 and conduct investi-

gation in cases on some 372 individuals involved in this

program who have not received recent investigative attention.

The Bureau will receive in the upcoming months summary

reports, letterhead memoranda and other communications in

virtually all of these cases. The moratorium, in effect

- 2 -

NW_88608_Docld:32989638 Page 478

---

## Page 479

since february, 1969, has limited investigative and re-

porting activity in this field. As of 1/11/71 there were

18 active and 78 inactive case in the Cuban Special

Section of the Security Index (19% of the 96 case total)

and at the time of the last inspection there were 25

active and 168 inactive cases (13% of the 193 case total):

Current Justification

from communist Cuba has not lessened in recent years.

workable priority apprehension system which receives

current and continuing attention is mandatory. Instant

program, as presently organized and handled, is fully

justified.

Frequency of Evaluation and Date of Last Evaluation.

This program is evaluated on a semi-annual basis.

The most recent semi-annual review and evaluation was

dated 10/8/70.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 479

---

## Page 480

4-H

AMERICAN REPATRIATE PROGRAM

BACKGROUND AND DATE OF INCEPTION - Program was instituted

on February 28, 1962, to specify procedure to be followed

upon receipt of information that citizen residing in

however receiyed

State Department estimated 800=900 U.l. citizens vere still

in cuba and desired to return to these In february,

1967 en i appeared these us citizens might be permitted

to leave Cuba on mass instructions were issued to field out-

lining

investigation to be conducted relative to individual

repatriates.

SCOPE AND DESIRED OBJECTIVES - Specific objectives of program

are verification of repatriate's identity; ascertaining

whether the individual has or had Cuban intelligence contact,

training or assignment, or possesses intelligence infor-

mation; and instructing individuals to alert us to any future

intelligence contact. Program is field wide.

POSITIVE RESULTS ACHIEVED - From August, 1969, to July, 1970,

eleven lights brought an average of 18 citizens out of Cuba

per flight.

These repatriates were accompanied by a total

of 425 relatives and/or close friends, all of whom were

Cuban aliens.

Some 300 U. S. citizens remain in Cuba awaiting

repatriation.

There have been no repatriation tlights since

July 31, 1970.

Program has alerted us to return to this country

of Security Index subjects, Castro sympathizers, individuals

who traveled to Cuba without State Department authorization

and individuals affiliated with Communist Party, USA. As a

result of interviews conducted with repatriates, worthwhile

data concerning conditions in Cuba has been obtained and

disseminated to the U. S. Intelligence Community.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1/11/71

VHN. emin

4-H

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 480

---

## Page 481

EXTENT AND NATURE OF CURRENT SUPERVISION - Program is

supervised by one Seat of Government Agent who devotes a

portion of his time. All cases are afforded careful

supervision in an effort to detect presence of a repatriate

who may have been recruited by the Cuban Intelligence

Service for activity in this country. Thirty-two cases are

pending.

CURRENT JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUANCE - Fidel Castro has

consistently used the mass exodus of individuals from Cuba

to infiltrate intelligence agents into the U. s:

offers excellent potential for detecting such individuals

who reenter this country under the protective coverage of

their citizenship. We feel that the program is fully

justified.

FREQUENCY OF EVALUATION AND DATE OF LAST JUSTIFICATION - An

annual evaluation is made. The program was last justIfied

on September 1, 1970.

2

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 481

---

## Page 482

4-H

CUBAN REFUGEE PROGRAM

The Cuban Refugee Program, which had as its

objective the detection of Cuban intelligence agents

possibly being infiltrated

into the U. S. via

refugee

channels, was discontinued by SAC Letter

70-25, dated

5/5/70,

paragraph C.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

• 1/11/71

X-N: em]

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 482

---

## Page 483

SURVEYS, PROJECTS, AND/OR INTINSIFICATION PROGRAMS

SECTION CHIEF GEORCE C. MOORE/E

RACIAL INTELLIGENCE SECTION

4-H

RACIAL MATTERS

Racial matters investigations were intensified through

establishment of the Racial Intelligence Section on 10/2/67.

This Section handles racial matters investigations involving

black extremist organizations and individuals. Objectives are

to identify organizations and individuals that are involved in

extremist activities, that advocate or had actually committed

or have conspired to commit acts of violence, that advocate

revolutionary or terrorist activities and that violate Federal

laws.

The dangernusness to the United States of such individuals

must be assessed and a determination made as to whether they

should be included in the Security Index or the Agitator Index.

The extent of foreign influence or influence of the Communist

Party of other domestic revolutionary groups among racial

extremists, especially black extremist organizations, is a prime

objective. To accomplish these objectives, sources have been

developed who can furnish quality and timely information concerni-

individual extremists and extremist organizations. Such sources

likewise have forewarned us of potential violence and enabled

the Bureau to stay on top ot the racia situation. These

sources have assisted the Bureau in executing its responsibilities

of alerting local authorities and to keep other Government

agencies dependent upon us for information informed of

pertinent developments including information concerning

potential violence.

Our informant coverage has made it possible for us

to keep a constant flow of information going to the White House,

the Attorney General and other Government agencies having an

interest. Additional information pertaining to racial intelli-

gence matters and the survey regarding "Potential for Racial

Violence" is set forth under data furnished by the

Research

Section.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1/12/71

WHA: SeE

NW 88608 Docid: 82589638 Fade 33

---

## Page 484

Reports submitted by the field are thoroughly

reviewed at the Seat of Government to insure that essential

information is being obtained on a timely basis and that

it is being promptly disseminated in the field, as well as

at the Seat of Government.

The Director on 11/27/70 in testimony before the

Senate Appropriation Committee for the purpose of securing

additional Special Agents emphasized again the violent and

revolutionary nature of the Black Panther Party (BPP). Не

testified there has been an alarming increase in the number

of black extremist attacks against law enforcement officers;

BPP publications consistently advocate violence, including

assassination and kidnapings, to achieve overthrow of the

Establishment; BIF Leaders have participated in crimes of

violence; and Black Panthers have substantial connections

with hostile foreign elements, notably the communist

regime in North Korea and Arab terrorists in Algeria.

Increasing ties between Arab terrorists and Black Panthers,

according to the Director, raise the ominous possibility

that militants may seek to ape Arab tactics, including air-

plane hijackings, to gain the release of jailed Panther

members.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 484

---

## Page 485

BLACK NATIONALIST MOVEMENT

Bufile 157-8415

4-H

Since 1/7/69 all offices have submitted semiannual

reports presenting concisely a complete picture of black

extremist activity in its area. This enabled us to identify

groups and individuals involved in black extremist activities,

to develope quality informants who report on such activities

and to initiate intensified and penetrative investigations of

such individuals and groups. Since the desired objectives

for which these reports were originally designed had been

realized, since field informs us on a timely basis insubstan-

tive cases of pertinent data concerning this movement and to

insure manpower is utilized on priority matters, the Director

on 7/6/70 authorized discontinuance of these reports.

On 3/8/69 the Black Nationalist Photographic Album

(BNPA) was established to assist in identification of militant

black extremists who travel extensively.

The BNPA is maintained in all offices. BNPA includes

a photograph and biographical data on leaders of black extremist

organizations and militant black nationalists who are known

totravel. Each office prepares a form on such individuals

within its territory and the form is then furnished to the

Bureau and all offices where it is maintained in a complete

album. In the event of travel by any of these individuals,

the office covering the area being visited already hasa

photograph and biographical sketch of the individual immediately.

available. The album is also furnished to the Legats in Ottawa

and Mexico City andto the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and

Central Intelligence Agency, in the event of foreign travel.

Over 300 extremists are currently carried in this album.

In view of importance of an individual's fingerprint

classification for identification purposes, the field by letter

dated 5/8/70 was instructed to include such data in biographical

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

4-H

WHA:SEE

: 1/12/71

---

## Page 486

sketch concerning each individual included in the BNPA

and to amend those sketches then included in the Album

to show such data.

1

The BNPA was also broadened to include black

extremists who are Bureau fugitives.

This insured each

office having a photograph and biographical sketch immediately

available for use in conducting investigation to locate such

fugitives or in apprehending them.

By SAC Letter 70-65, item D), dated 11/17/70, the •

field was advised that, henceforth, deletions of individuals

from the BNPA would require Bureau authorization since Bureau

did not agree with some deletions made by field which resulted

in unwarranted action by all field offices.

To insure broad circulation among investigative

personnel and to serve as an avenue for greater utilization

of informants especially racial sources, we initiated the

Black Extremist Bureau Fugitives list in June, 1970. This

list, which is prepared monthly and sent each

• field office

and selected Legats, identifies those Bureau fugitives who

by reason of their activities or organizational affiliations

are black extremists.

Currently there are 45 fugitives carried

on the list, 9 of whom are I0 fugitives.

Iwenty of these

fugitives are reportedly living outside the U.S. This list

has given greater emphasis to the location of these fugitives,

particularly among Special Agents handling racial matters and

racial informants and has been effective in affording greater

exposure of these fugitives among racial informants. Fifteen

of these fugitives have been arrested since the list was

initiated, with 5 being arrested in December, 1970. One of

those arrested in December is the reported leader of the

Black Panther Party (BPP) underground.

Racial Intelligence Section prepares monthly a

Racial Calendar pertaining to the Black Nationalist Movement

in this country. This Calendar identifies scheduled racial

events throughout the country which are more than local in

nature as well as all major scheduled events which could

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 486

120

---

## Page 487

logically develop into a racial event. Purpose of the

Calendar is to assist field in coverage of these events in

view of widespread travel.on the part of black nationalists

in attendance at such affairs and to take part in demonstra-

tions commemorating certain anniversaries of interest to

blacks. A listing of recently published publications and

articles concerning the black nationalist movement is also

set forth in the Calendar. Publications included are public

source and are identified to assist the field in keeping on

top of writing by and about black nationalists and the black

nationalist movement.

Black extremist activities are concentrated in organize.

activities of over 65 groups, some of which have chapters in

major cities throughout this country. The violence-prone Black

Panther Party, for example, has 48 branches throughout U.S.

Hard-core membership in these black extremist groups totals

about 9,600. This membership figure, however, disguises real

following of extremist groups in black areas of our cities

and extent of influence and leadership they exercise. These

organizations, and particularly BPP, have substantial sympathetic

support, especially from young blacks, which is frequently

surfaced during confrontations with police.

Extent of black extremist strength is illustrated by

Louis Harris Poll which was set forth in 4/6/70 issue of "Time."

The Poll projects that nine per cent of all blacks, some two

million Americans, call themselves "revolutionaries" and believe

only a "readiness to use violence" will achieve equality.

Twenty-five per cent have "a great deal" of respect for the

BPP. Most alarming is that 40 per cent of those in the age

group 14-21 years old believe violence is necessary to achieve

equality.

The following pages set forth summaries concerning the

key black extremist organizations that are presently under

active and penetrative investigation.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 487

2/

---

## Page 488

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

4H

The Black Panther Party (BPP), a black extremist

organization, continues to be extremely active throughout

the country. Formed during late 1966 in Oakland, California,

for the obstensible purpose of patrolling the black community

to prevent alleged police brutality, it was originally known

as the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense.

It expanded rapidly throughout the United States

during 1967-68, then suffered a gradual decline during 1969.

Revitalized in December, 1969, and throughout the 1970s it

has gain currently expanded until today there are approximately

48 branches of the BPP with an estimated 1,000 hard-core

members supported by many thousands of sympathizers. It also

has an international uffice in Algiers, Algeria. The branches

include 17 chapters and 31 affiliated groups that masquerade

under the names of National Committee to Combat Fascism or

Black Community Information Center.

The ultimate goal of the BPP is the violent overthrow

of the United States Government and its replacement with a

Marxist-Leninist system.

The BPP openly advocates urban

guerrilla warfare, assassination of Goverment leaders and

other forms of violent terrorism. Since its inception, the

BPP has aimed its most vicious invectives against law

enforcement and particularly local police. "Off the pigs,"

BPP jargon for "kill the cop" is the battle cry of the

organization. The weekly Panther newspaper, "The Black Panther,"

and

its other publications and propaganda paraphernalia are

abound with articles and cartoons encouraging lethal attacks

against police and other forms

of authority.

Our investigation of the BPP was instituted in 1967

and since that

time has expanded as the organization itself

expanded.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1/12/71

ABF : dIl

4H

-NW-88608-Docld:32989638_Page 488

---

## Page 489

By letter to all offices dated 2/27/70, approved

by the Director, offices having BPP investigations were

instructed to submit intelligence reports on the BPP every

six months in compliance with instructions in the Manual of

Instructions. Previously offices were submitting quarterly

reports on the BPP. The changes made on the basis of a

recommendation by a Racial Informants Conference of field

supervisors to eliminate some paper work in the field.

All field offices having a BPP investigation are

also required to submit a monthly report containing evidentiary

data required by the Department. Original instructions in

this regard were issued by Bureau airtel 12/3/68 and the

continued submission of this monthly report is necessary in

view of possible prosecution of the BPP.

All field offices conducting an active BY investi

gation are required to submit a monthly airtel summary of the

status and activities of the BPP within its territory. This

survey was commenced as a biweekly summary in November, 1968,

and changed to a monthly summary on the approval of the

Director by letter to all offices dated 2/27/70. This change

is a result of a recommendation by the Racial Informants

Conference of field supervisors to cut down paper work in the

field. The monthly summary relieves the field of some paper

work and at the same time keeps the Bureau and the field up to

date on BPP developments.

continues

San Francisco as office of origin in the BPP case

to submit a biweekly summary and analysis of the

BPP •

Because of the excellence of this summary and the need

for such an analysis by the field, San Francisco was instructed

by Bureau airtel 1/21/70 to furnish copies of its summary to

all continental offices which is the current practice.

All field offices conducting an active BPP investi

gation were instructed by airtel 6/17/70 to submit a monthly

summary on the financial activities of each BPP branch. This

financial summary includes data on sources of income, foreign

funding, expenses, the mechanics of local finance operations,

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 489

---

## Page 490

and the steps being taken by each office to develop full

financial data. This summary enables the Bureau to keep

abreast of all financial developments regarding the BPP

on a national and international basis.

By airtel to all continental offices 11/6/70 all

field offices conducting anative BPP investigation were

instructed to submit a biweekly airtel containing specific

comments regarding underground BPP operations within the

area of each field office. This includes progress in the

identity and interviewing of expelled BPP members who, it

has been determined, are the logical candidates for member-

ship in the BPP underground. The underground operation of

the BPP has an ultimate goal of terroristic guerrilla

the BPP which is the subject of an intensive investigation.

all developments in the undergzound and to intelligently

coordinate the investigation thereof.

In recent. months the Black Panther Party has formed

a corporation known as Stronghold Consolidated Productions,

Inc. (SCPI) to control all BPP funds and assets and to act as

purchaser and/or lessee of any property utilized by the BPP.

The corporation and its activities are under intensive investi-

gation which has revealed that its activities are centered in

San Francisco and New York. By airtel 1/7/71 to San Francisco

and New York, these offices were instructed to submit a

weekly summary in form suitable for dissemination of all

pertinent developments concerning the corporation during the

previous week. This summary keeps the Bureau aware of SCPI

operations and also enables us to regularly fulfill our

dissemination requirements.

It is noted that there are currently 32 field offices

conducting active investigations of the BPP. Our intensive

investigation has enabled us to identify its leaders, members

and new branches. In addition, we have developed detailed

information concerning its operations and activities including

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 490

124

---

## Page 491

organization plans, funding programs, extent of control by

headquarters and foreign support. In addition, evidentiary

information that could support prosecution is

regularly

furnished to the Department.

Our ultimate objective is of course the prosecution

of the BPP for violations of Federal criminal, civil rights

and security statutes.

A secondary objective is to more

completely develop details of the BPP for intelligence

purposes.

In July, 1969, the Attorney General established

a special task force for the specific purpose of developing

a prosecutive theory against the BPP. Attorneys of this

task force, known as the Special Interdivisional Unit, have

interviewed many of our informants in furtherance of this

purpose and have instituted a continuing Federal Grand Jury

in San Francisco.

Ten of our informants have testified

before this Federal Grand Jury and its is anticipated that

others will be called.

It is recommended that the intensive investigation

of the BPP including all surveys and procedures outlined as

•above be continued.

-NW 88608_Docld:32989638_Page 491

---

## Page 492

CONGRESS OF AFRICAN PEOPLES (CAP)

157-16554

The CAP was formed as an international revolutionary

organization as the result of the convening of the fourth

annual gathering of black power advocates in the United States

In Atlanta, Georgia, September 3-7, 1970. This gathering

was unique in that it was attended

by approximately 2,500

blacks of so-called moderate and militant persuasion, as well

as a large number of extremists. Representatives attended

from 35 states and 21 different

nations, including Canada,

Australia, various independent nations of Africa, and the

Caribbean

area.

A number of the workshops at the CAP were dominated

by extremist elements who urged the creation of massive coopera-

tive programs and institutions designed to destroy any progress

made toward integration of the races by complete rejection

of white society, the formation of a separatist black nation,

national African

parties, and, ultimately, a World African

Party.

These objectives are to be achieved through the

unification, cooperation, and interdependence of blacks

Pan-Africanism of the well-known black extremist stoke-y

Carmichael.

ANTHTSENTASHONSE

Specifically, CAP's domestic extremist element,

headed by black revolutionaries Hayward Henry and LeRod Jones.

from Newark, New Jersey, calls for extensive use of disruptive

tactics against all segments of white-dominated institutions

and organizations, including the police and the military.

Since its founding in Atlanta, CAP has held a

number of regional meetings in various sections of the

United States for the purpose of setting up its national

organization and in furtherance of its revolutionary programs.

As a results

CAP is currently activating in at least 17

different cities with its national headquarters and Chairman

Current CAP planning indicates

the organization

intends to move aggressively through deceptive : programs

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1/12/71

PEN :mk1

4-H

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 492

12%

---

## Page 493

Congress of African Peoples (CAP)

to establish black political power through four basic activities

which are:

(1) influencing of black political candidates;

(2)

(3)

organization of the black community;

formation of coalitions with all dissident

and extremist groups whether white or black

so long as CAP benefits from same; and

(4) the massive use of disruptive tactics.

CAP has emerged as yet another deadly threat to

racial harmony and,as a result of its programs and ties with

foreign extremist elements and well-known revolutionary

Stokely carmichael, must also be considered an imposing

threat to the national security.

Investigations of the CAP, its leaders, and extremist

affiliates are receiving most close supervision.

Pertinent

data developed in regard to their activities is

being

disseminated to the Department and to interested Government

agencies and officials.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 493

12.7

---

## Page 494

REPUBLIC OF NEW AFRICA

Bufile 157-9079

4-H

The Republic of New Africa (RNA), formed in

Detroit, Michigan in March, 1968 by followers of

Malcolm X, assassinated black extremist, has chapters

in ten U.S. cities and a current hard-core membership

of 100-130 individuals.

RNA was primarily formed by Milton and Richard

КОТИОКАМІНСАЙЙКіЙЙСН

Henry black extremists of long standing in the Detroit,

Michigan, area.

When first formed, the RNA named as its

President in exile Robert Franklin Williams, violence-

prone black extremist then resiang In China. Williams

has since returned to the U.S. but has resigned from his

position as head of the RNA due to his own legal problems

and dissension existing within the organization.

RNA was established to create a black nation

within the U.S. demanding from the U.S. Government the

States of Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi and

South Carolina, in addition to individual reparations

. of $10,000 per

black citizen as payment for 400 years

of ancestral slave labor.

RNA's organizatical structure was designed to

be revolutionary in character and its founders proposed

that efforts be made for international recognition and

financial assistance from Cuba, Red China and the black

nations of the world. RNA established a black army known

as the Black Legion whose duty was to protect the persons

and property and to attack the enemies (the police) of that

nation.

Training programs were instituted and uniforms

complete with the leopard skin epaulets were disigned as

the official dress for the Black Legionnaires.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1/8/71

GTT : sef

4-H

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 494

---

## Page 495

High point in the RNA's activities occurred

during a national convention in Detroit, Michigan, in

March 1969, when members of the Black Legion engaged in

armed confrontation with Detroit police resulting in the

death of one policeman and the serious wounding of another.

The RNA is currently split with dissension with two distinct

factions. The Richard Henry Faction with headquarters in

New Orleans, Louisiana, is the most active and militant

of the two groups. The other faction is headed by Milton

Henry, with headquarters in Detroit, Michigan. Current

plans of Richard Henry call for an intensification of

RNA activities throughout the U.S.

: :

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 495

129

---

## Page 496

STUDENT NATIONAL COORDINATING COMMITTEE (SNCC)

100-439190

SNCC was originally organized in Atlanta, Georgia,

in 1960 under the name Student Nonviolent Coordinating

Committee.

nonmembership civil

rights organization with both white and

black participation.

Carmichael, on assuming the Chairmanship

Of SNCC, immediately eliminated all whites from participation

and changed the organization from a civil rights oriented

group to one whose aims were those of antiwhite revolutionary

actior

posted on one

action and the overthrow of the United States Government, a

position which the organization maintains today.

H. Rap Brown,

Bureau fugitive and well-known black

extremist

who served as National Chairman for a time following

Carmichael's vacating of that position in 1967, again assumed

the National Chairmanship of SNCC in the Summer of 1969. At

that time, it was announced SNCC was eliminating the word

"nonviolent" from its title. The organization's headquarters

were also moved from Atlanta, Georgia, to New York City.

Under Brown's, direction, SNCC moved to restructure

and revitalize itself in an attempt to regain its prominence

as a black extremist organization.

The national leadership

issued

directives on the reorganization of the national

office in New York City, as well as the local organizations

and the formation of councils to include a Revolutionary

Economic Council,

an Armed Guerrilla Tactics Council, a

Research Council,

and others which make up a body within SNCC

known as the Revolutionary Political Council.

Included among new organizational procedures are

plans for raising the number of active participants in local

cadres, the obtaining and training in the use of weapons,

the purchase of land for ostensible use in an Agrarian Reform

Plan to aid black tenant farmers but which will also serve

as a weapons training site.

Training manuals on revolutionary

activities, including guerrilla warfare and the medical care

of wounded

or injured persons, have been prepared and are to

be disseminated to local SNCC chapters in furtherance of this

reorganization;

As a result of H. Rap Brown's flight in May, 1970,

to avoid prosecution in Howard County, Maryland, on local

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1/12/71

PEN: mk1

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 496

---

## Page 497

Student National Coordinating Committee (SNCC)

charges of inciting to riot and arson, SNCC is presently

under the titular leadership of William Edward Hunt.

Hunt also serves as head of the organization's Revolutionary

"Political Council.

Hunt has successfully directed the opening of a

"coffeehouse"

Georgia.

anti-Vietnam War posture, is to serve as a propaganda center

from which to foment anti-Vietnam War sentiments among black

military personnel at Fort Gordon, Georgia, as well as among

the black civilian population in that area.

In addition,

Hunt has initiated publication and distribution of a

revolutionary news organ known as "National SNCC."

Aggressive

programs are underway to obtain new SNCC activists, and in an

effort to capture the support of black females, the organization

recently formed The Third World Women's Alliance under the

leadership of Fran Beal, a member of SNCC's Revolutionary

Political Council.

Strong evidence of progress in

connection with the

organization's plans to initiate guerrilla warfare tactics

is given by development of recent information indicating Hunt

and other SNCC leaders are in the process of selecting a

number of candidates to receive such training in North Korea.

These individuals,

on completion of training, will serve as

instructors in various parts of the country,

thus providing

SNCC with a well-trained, hard-core cadre of personnel capable

of initiating acts of terror against individuals and institu

tions of Government in furtherance of their revolutionary

objectives.

Investigations of SNCC, its leaders, affiliates,

and their activities continue to receive close supervision.

Information of pertinence concerning the organization

continues to be disseminated to the Department and other

interested Government agencies and officials.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 497

134

---

## Page 498

JUNTA OF MILITANT ORGANIZATIONS

BUFILE 157-9903

4-H

The Junta of Militant Organizations (JOMO) is a black

extremist organization with headquarters in St. Petersburg, Florida.

It is the leading organization for all black militant groups in

Florida. JOMO was founded in St. Petersburg during May, 1968, with

8s ghetto youths, who believed liberation of black people will not

come about through "normal channels."

The organization has

affiliated groups in Louisville, Kentucky and Gainesville, Florida.

During December, 1970, leaders of JOMO decided to expand their

operation throughout the nation.

Attempts are currently being

made to create chapters in Boston, Massachusetts and Miami, Florida.

Joseph waner, I., the articulate founder of JOMO, and present

chairman of the organization intenas to have all black militant

groups in Florida designated as organization chapters.

The organization's voice and propaganda

are carried

out through the publication "The Burning Spear." This publication

has urged blacks to buy arms and to be prepared to fight white

America. In this connection, JOMO members have participated in

racial demonstrations, used fire bombs and have been involved in

attacks on police through use of violence. Members reportedly

blew up a radio station in Tampa, Florida, and recently participated

in a plot to break out two black political prisoners from a

Florida prison. Eight members of the organization were arrested

in 1970 for committing three murders and 15 armed robberies.

One

of the murders was committed to obtain money to pay a water

• bill

for JOMO headquarters.

The organization is in the process of accumulating weapons

and making plans for members to be taught guerrilla warfare and

firearms training. In this connection leaders are interested in

establishing contact with revolutionary African groups. Waller

desires to create within the organization "Simba Warriors" who

would act whenever violence might be necessary in order to "bring

down the white man." During December, 1970, Waller reportedly

had in his possession two Thompson sub-machine guns.

Domestic Intelligence Division Inspection

1/11/71

CAR:dIb

NW 8860% Doc/d®32989638 Page 498

---

## Page 499

!

Junta of Militant Organizations

Bufile 157-9903

JOMO receives extensive contributions from all over the

United States.

It has association with the Black Panther Party

and other black extremist groups as well as other New Left groups.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 499

---

## Page 500

4-H

NATION OF ISLAM

Bufile 25-330971

The Nation of Islam (NOI) is an all-Negro,

semireligious organization headed by Elijah Muhammad

Under Muhammad's

Teadership,

organization with a well-disciplined and devoted member-

ship of almost 6,000 comprised of approximately 50

numbered mosques and approximately 50 unnumbered groups.

The NOI continues to teach antiwhite, anti-

United States philosophy of hate aimed at

a complete

separation of the races. It uppuses any for of

integration and at the same time has remained aloof from

other black extremist groups who favor violence. During

racial disturbances, NOI members are given instructions

to not get involved in the rioting. The NOI also opposes

the war in Vietnam as a war against other non-whites and

implies in its teachings that members should not serve

in the United States Armed Forces as they can only serve

one master, Elijah Muhammad. It also supports the Arabs

in their conflict with Israel in the Middle East. The NOI

also publishes a weekly newspaper known as "Muhammad Speaks," which

contains vicious antimite propaganda. An average of 475,000

copies of this newspaper are distributed each week in the black

communities and ghetto areas throughout the United States.

We have conducted a continuous security and/or

'racial-type investigation of this organization since 1953

'in accordance with directives of the Department. Each

active NOI group is reported on semiannually and the

functionaries and leaders of the organization are those

being investigated. The Department by letter dated 7/28/66

requested our investigation of this organization be continued.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1/12/71

4-H

CEE: sef

all

134

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 500

---

## Page 501

Communist Influence of Racial Groups

100-442529

This intensification was initiated in August,

1964. The subject matter was previously reported in a

subsection of the Communist Party report, but the volume

and importance of this informationade it necessary to

follow this communist influence in a separate investigation.

This investigation includes not only the influence of the

Communist Party but also that of the Trotskyite groups,

splinter groups and others including the New Left.

The overall objective in this and related

investigations is to protect the internal security of

the United States by submitting information relating to

possible Federal violations to the Attorney General for

prosecution. We also have the responsibility to develop

intelligence information and disseminate to interested

Government agencies. Where feasible, certain counter-

intelligence measures are employed to neutralize the

communist influence in the racial field.

Reports are submitted quarterly and the investi-

gation is evaluated upon receipt of each report. Pertinent

information is disseminated to the White House and the

Attorney General.

The year 1970 saw continued influence by

communists and other subversives in extremist groups.

In fact, the communist attempts to influence the black

extremist Black Panther Party were so insistent that the

Panthers have become wary of the motives of the Communist

Party. This has not diminished in any way the Communist

Party's efforts to influence and support the Black Panther

Party, the communist tactic being to support the Panthers

whether they want it or not.

One illustration of the communist influence on

the violence-prone Black Panther Party is the situation in

which Huey Newton, Panther Supreme Commander, found himself

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1/11/71

CEC: ekw

(4-H)

NW 886&/Docld:32989638 Page 501

---

## Page 502

in connection with a film on Angela Davis, the communist and

black revolutionary being held in California on murder

charges. The Communist Party, USA, sponsored a motion

picture on Davis, and invited Newton to film the introduction

to the film. Newton conferred with Eldridge Cleaver exiled

Information Minister of the Panthers, and told Cleaver he

positively would not film the introduction because it appeared

he would be required to follow the Communist Party line and,

according to Newton, the Panthers did not follow anyone's

line. Despite Newton's seemingly hard stand on this, the

• Communist Party found ways to make him relent, and three days

later he agreed to the communist request, muttering that he

would be "damned if he did and damned if

he didn't." As

violent as they are, the Panthers are no match for the

sophistication of the experienced communist intrigue.

The communist hoodwinking is not confined to the

Black Panther Party. The Communist Party's well-oiled

propaganda machine has started to artfully transform Angela

Davis, the accomplice in the brutal murder of a judge in

California, into a national monument and into a growing

source of funds.

Not new at this sort of thing, the

communists are well on their way to surpassing the monetary

returns they have received from other racial and ethnic

causes they have exploited, such as the Scottsboro boys,

•nine young blacks convicted twice in the 1930s in Alabama

for raping two white girls on a freight train..

The communist influence in the Southern Christian

Leadership Conference (SCLC), the organization of the late

Martin Luther King2 J,, has

continued since King's death.

Although Hunter Pitts O'Dell, a communist, amicably terminated

his position as aide to the SCLC President in December, 1970,

his influence continues as does that of Stanley levisen and

Harry Wachtel who also have communist backgrounds. Levison

handles the SCLC fund-raising. In the past Levison and

Wachtel operated behind the scenes; today they are listed

in SCLC literature as directors of

the SCLC.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1/11/71

__CEG: ekw

4-H

136

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 502

---

## Page 503

In the past year, as anticipated.

there has been

a continued merging of racial activists and extremists with

pro-Chinese communist groups, Trotskyites, the Students for

a Democratic Society, and similar groups.

In October, 1970,

Elbert Howard a Black Panther Party functionary, stated that

the Black Panther Party is composed of Marxist-Leninist

revolutionaries and no longer confines its interest to

black power or black nationalism. He added that in the

future the Panthers will encompass all revolutionaries

regardless of race.

We can expect this merger to continue.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1/11/71

CEG: ekw

4-H

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 503

137

---

## Page 504

4-H

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM - BLACK EXTREMISTS

Bufile 100-448006

Counterintelligence in the black extremist field is

a supplement to our investigative activities that cannot be

identified as a function of this Bureau because of its

extremist organizations, to prevent the growth and/or unifica-

tion of black extremist groups, to prevent such groups from

gaining respectability and to preclude the rising of a leader

who might unify and electrify various extremist factions and

individuals.

To achieve these objectives, techniques are employed

to neutralize organizations and individuals involved in

extremist activities that are a threat to the internal security

of this country. These techniques are aimed to embarrass,

expose or otherwise neutralize these organizations and individuals.

Counterintelligence action regarding black extremists

was initiated 8/25/67 and was last justified 5/14/70.

Counterintelligence operations are supervised on

individual case desks

as a logical adjunct of our investigative

activities. In addition, one supervisor is designated coordinato=

to insure that operaions

initiated in different offices do not

conflict. A quarterly letter is submitted for each participating

division showing operations under consideration and results

gained. All communications authorizing the institution of any

counterintelligence operaions are routed through Assistant to

the Director William C. Sullivan; no operations are initiated

by the field without Bureau approval.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1/12/71

WHA: sef

4-H

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 504

---

## Page 505

Counterintelligence operations and techniques were

thoroughly discussed with field representatives attending the

October 22 and 23, 1970, conference at the Bureau concerning

the Black Panther Party (BPP). The conference concluded

counterintelligence was an effective tool and there was a

definite need for counterintelligence operations to neutralize

black extremist activities.

The effect on black extremists of some authorized

counterintelligence operations are difficult to assess, but

a substantial number effected since last inspection have had

measurable consequences and some of these included the

following:

Four articles revealing extremist nature of BPP

based on information furnished a news media source in

Mississippi resulted in the closing of the BFt chapter in

Cleveland, Mississippi. Agents of the Jackson Office were

commended by the Director for this operation.

Following the arrests of BPP leadership in New Haven

after torture-murder of BPP member in May, 1969, a Black

Panther from Boston was sent to New Haven to rebuild that

chapter. He proved to be an energetic organizer who built

a closely knit and highly disciplined organization that

effectively brought about mass demonstrations, attracted

additional membership and which posed a serious threat to

established Government.

To neutralize this dynamic leader,

New Haven was authorized to forward an anonymous letter to

national BPP headquarters in California alleging he had

embezzled BPP funds.

Since then, numerous reports have been

received indicating he had fallen into disfavor with BPP

leaders and his motives were suspect. This resulted in his

transfer to an insignificant BPP chapter in North Carolina..

In Rochester, New York, an anonymous letter sent

to the Superintendent of Schools resulted in cancellation of

subscriptions to the obscene, hate-filled, extremist newspaper

of the BPP by a high school. These newspapers had been used

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 505

---

## Page 506

in classrooms and costs of subscriptions had been charged

to the school system.

Philadelphia division was authorized to send a

letter to BPP national headquarters bearing an excellent

facsimile of signature of a former BPP officer in Philadelphia

who had been expelled a week previously due to problems with

BPP leadership in Philadelphia. The letter accused Philadelphia

BPP members of stealing clothing, food and drugs collected for

poor children. All of these accusations, incidentally, were

true.

Since this letter was sent, Philadelphia BPP chapter has

experienced severe problems with BPP headquarters, has been

chastised repeatedly and prevented from participating in some

BPP activities. Several members were disciplined by transfers.

Subsequently, this situation was exploited by an authorized

mailing of an anonymous letter to Huey P. Newton, Supreme

Commander and co-founder uf BrE, which criticized ine meeiingsieu

under BPP auspices in Philadelphia September 5-7, 1970,

concerning the planning for BPP-sponsored Revolutionary People's

Constitutional Convention. These counterintelligence operations

were primarily responsible for expulsion of head of the Phila-

delphia BPP and many of his followers from BPP on 10/16/70.

These individuals have formed an independent local group in

Philadelphia which contends with BPP for local support in that

city. Thus, another result of this operation has been the

splintering of Philadelphia BPP chapter.

To exploit a split in BPP leadership in Winston-

Salem, North Carolina, Charlotte was authorized to prepare

and send a leaflet to

residents in vincinity of BPP headquarters.

The leaflet insinuated the head of one BPP faction had pocketed

donations secured for Bif Breaktast for Children Program..

The

leaflet caused consternation among BPP personnel and resulted in

young Negro males poking fun at this BPP leader and accusing him

of being a parasite. A decrease in financial donations to BPP

followed the distribution of this leaflet.

Los Angeles set up a television expose of BPP in

which George Putnam, newscaster KITV-Los Angeles, California,

noted that spread of Panther hoodlum-type revolutionary activity

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 506

140

---

## Page 507

was a serious internal security threat, with law enforcement

as its immediate target. He utilized the Director's compre-

hensive testimony on the BPP before the House Sub-Committee

on Appropriations on 3/5/70 in bringing out the revolutionary

and terroristic threat presented by BPP and its leaders. He

concluded the program with the opinion that "we are subsidizing

our own destruction if we allow this to continue."

To drive a wedge between BPP and many of its

contributors, data concerring the anti-Zionist and anti-Semetic

nature of BPP was furnished a news media source. As a result

articles were published during June and July, 1970, in various

newspapers throughout U.S., including "Long Island

Press,"

Long Island, New York;'Daily News," Springfield, Massachusetts;

and "Mobile Register,"

Mobile, Alabama. These articles

discussed the close alliance developed between BPP and Al Fatah,

ãI Arab terrorist organization vaging guerrilla varfare against

Israel. These articles emphasized that numerous pro-Arab and

anti-Israeli articles have been published in the BPP newspaper

and some of the latter articles called for the complete distruc-

tion of. Israel.

The above articles as well as many other counterintelli-

gence operations authorized since last inspection have contributes

materially to drying up of contributions to BPP. Loss of revenue

is one of the BPP's greatest problems and perhaps the best

illustration is the drop in the size and circulation of the

BPP newspaper, the Party's primary propaganda device. This

paper has declined from 20 or more pages to 12 in its 1/2/71

issue and circulation at the end of the year was less than

100,000 after a high of 183,000 in October, 1970.

Counterintelligence action has also contributed or

led to disruptions, dissension and factionalism in the BPP, the

most important of the black extremist organizations. Sources

have reported internal strife has developed among top BPP

leaders and there is a growing distrust among them of one

another. For example, Albert Howard, national leader who has

been supervising BPP

activities on East Coast, and Robert Bay:

a BPP leader in New York, have been recalled to national BPP

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 507

---

## Page 508

headquarters in California, where they were disciplined and

severely criticized. In addition, SF 3421-R* on 12/26/70

reported a degree of dissension between Eldridge Cleaver?

Minister of Information who is fugitive from justice and

particularly Newton are not keeping in touch with him and are

not keeping him advised of key developments. This matter is

being closely and aggressively followed for purpose of

additional exploitation of these circumstances under this

program.

Effective means of neutralizing black extremist

groups is by drying up their sources of funds. We authorized

the New York division to advise the Episcopal Church Center

by anonymous letters that a $67,000 requested grant from the

Episcopal Church Serconing Board in New York, New Yorki, tu

finance the Liberation School in Atlanta, Georgia, was in

fact intended for use of Student National Coordinating

Committee (SNCC) as the school was an operation of SNCC, a

black extremist organization, and SNCC in seeking the grant had

concealed its connection with the school. This operation

resulted in the Church placing such low priority on this

request that financial assistance for the school was precluded

and the Liberation School was so advised. Since SNCC is in

poor financial condition, this denial of funds was a blow to

its endeavors to revitalize itself.

The Director noted

"excellent" on 9/3/70 memorandum which advised of this

successful counterintelligence operation.

A highly successful counterintelligence operation

• exposed to college administrators the unethical and deceptive

use made of college funds by Back Student Organization,

Kalamazoo College, Kalamazoo, Michigan, to purchase literature

concerning the creation of explosive devices and concerning

guerrilla warfare. As a result of this operation, college

confiscated such literature, admonished Black Student Organi-

zation leaders and tightened administrative procedures to

preclude similar misuse of its funds.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 508

---

## Page 509

The Jackson Office was authorized to furnish data

concerning Republic of New Africa (RNA), a violence-prone

black extremist separatist organization, to a cooperative

newspaper source, resulting in the publication of an

excellent article exposing the violent nature of this

organization on the front page of the only state-wide

evening newspaper in Mississippi. This publicity on the

evening before the RNA regional conference was to begin,

jolted RNA leaders. In addition, Negro participants from

Jackson area were shocked to learn of the violent nature

of this group and withdrew their support. The scheduled

agenda was shelved and the conference was completely

disrupted. Agents of the Jackson Office and Domestic

Intelligence Division Supervisor were commended by the

Director for this operation.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 509

---

## Page 510

THE KEY BLACK EXTREMIST PROGRAM

On December 23, 1970, the Key

Black Extremist

Program was initiated, with the

Director's approval, to

intensify our coverage of certain black extremists who are

extremely active and most vocal in their calls for terrorism

and violence. As the program started about 90 were included.

With Bureau approval others may be added by the field. This

program is to provide intensified coverage of the day-to-day

activities and future plans of these people and to assure

that all possible violations of law on their parts are

vigorously investigated when they are within our jurisdiction

and are referred promptly to the appropriate agency when they

are not.

An investigative summary report on all these

people is due by February 15, 1971. Thereafter an investi-

gative

report is to be submitted every 90 days.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISON INSPECTION

1/12/71

(4-H)

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 510

---

## Page 511

BLACK STUDENT GROUPS ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES

On October 29, 1970, the Executive Conference

approved a program to conduct discreet preliminary inquiries,

limited to established sources, on Black Student Unions and

similar groups, their leaders, and key activists to determine

if the activities of these groups and individuals warrant

further active investigation. On November 4, 1970,

instructions were sent to the field to implement this

program.

The number of campuses involved is about 500,

representing approximately 750 black student groups.

officers will represent about 2,500 cases and the key

activists another 250. The potential for new cases in this

program will approximate 3,500 cases. This program includes

junior colleges and two-year colleges as well as four-year

colleges.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1/12/71

(4-H)

NY 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 511

---

## Page 512

RACIAL INFORMANTS

4-H

The prime purpose of development and utilization

of racial informants and sources is to provide intelligence

and evidentiary information concerning black and white racial

extremist organizations and individuals.

also called upon to furnish information concerning the general

racial situation in all parts of the country.

Supervision of racial informants at Seat of

Government includes review and approval of new informants and

confidential sources, review of progress of informant every

six months, review of payments being made to informants,

analysis of informant coverage in each field office, analysis

of nationwide informant coverage of an organization, coordination

of informant coverage of specific functions such as the national

convention of the Black Panther Party (BPP) and supervision

of gnecial projects such as development of top echelon BPP

informant,

using informant to develop information concerning

a black extremist underground escape route and coordinating

utilization of informants abroad with other agencies.

A11

procedures are constantly evaluated in an effort to increase

the efficiency of our operation and to provide the field with

the necessary supervision and

assistance with a minimum of

paper work.

last inspection.

This is an increase of 1,699 informants.

584 informants report on black extremist organizations. 376

informants report on white extremist organizations such as

the Klan.

(In line with recent reorganization of Domestic

Intelligence Division supervision of racial informants

furnishing information on white extremists will shortly be

transferred to the Internal Security Section.)

We are

operating 6,224 ghetto informants who provide general

information within the black ghetto areas of our cities.

Informant coverage of black extremist groups has

been increased since the last inspection with a significant

increase being noted in our coverage of the BPP.

At the time

of the last inspection we operated 119 informants reporting

on BPP as compared with 173 as of 1/12/71, which represents

an increase of 54 intormants.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1/12/71

HEH:amK

10-4-F

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 512

---

## Page 513

ACCUSELL

Our ghetto informants have materially increased

from 1,605 at the time of the last inspection to 6,224

as of 1/12/71, which represents an increase 0f 3,619.

At the time of the last inspection we were

operating 438 informants furnishing information concerning

white extremist organizations and as of 1/12/71 we are

operating 376 such informants, which represents a decrease

of 62 This is to be expected as a result of the continuing

decline of Klan and other white extremist activities.

By memorandum dated 5/5/70 from G. C. Moore to

Mr. W. C. Sullivan, captioned "Racial Informant Development,

Black Panther Party (BPP), Racial Matters," it was recommended

and approved that two Special Agents of the San Francisco

Division be assigned to work exclusively on developing a

top level informant in the bef

It was also approved

that

$1,000 could be expended for the purpose of developing a

in contact

n several occasions,

and while he has not agreed to cooperate with this Bureau he

reman renat to the contaating Agents and turther, elforts.

are contemplated

to induce his cooperation In addition ve

ave been

successtut in obtaining the cooperation of another

BPP. leader's wite, and through her cooperation we

have m

made contact with this leader.

not in

Again the leader has

indicated a wittingness to cooperate; however ad

additional

contacts libe initiated with him. This operation was

specifically designed to develop top-level informant in the

top echelon

the barwichIs critically needed.

We will

continue to pursue the development of a top-level, informant

until it 1s accomplished.

GHETTO INFORMANTS

Ghetto informant program was instituted 10/11/67

to fulfill an urgent need to develop a network of "listening

posts" in the ghetto areas of our cities. Ghetto informants

were those persons living or working in the ghetto areas who

furnished information concerning general racial conditions in

their areas. As the field has gained experience in the

handling of ghetto informants their value has steadily increased.

Ghetto informants today are being utilized by field offices to

attend public meetings held by extremists, to survey extremist

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 513

---

## Page 514

bookstores, to verify residences and employments of Agitator

and Security Index subjects living or working in ghetto areas

and to identify individuals responsible for extremist

activities tending to increase racial tensions in the ghetto

areas. We are also noting numerous instances wherein ghetto

informants

are being converted by the field to regular racial

informants furnishing information on black extremist

organizations and individuals.

As a valuable by-product

we are also picking up criminal statistics through our contacts

with ghetto informants. The ghetto informant program was last

justified by memorandum G. C. Moore to Mr. W. C. Sullivan

dated 7/17/70, captioned "Ghetto Informant Program, Racial

Matters," and

is scheduled to be rejustified in July, 1971.

TRAINING

A two-day conference of field supervisors handling

racial matters investigations was held at Seat of Government

9/17-18/70.

Representatives from 39 offices and two Legal

Attaches attended. The conference dealt specifically with

investigation

of

the BPP and informant development therein.

A number of recommendations and suggestions resulted from

this conference and were implemented. Suggestions approved

as results of the conference aré the subject of a separate

write-up.

Those in attendance were in agreement that the

conference had been most beneficial to both field and Seat

of Government personnel participating.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 514

148

---

## Page 515

ADMINISTRATIVE OPERATIONS

*NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 515

---

## Page 516

ADMINISTRATIVE MEMORANDUM

POTENTIAL DOUBLE AGENT PROGRAM

ESPIONAGE SECTION

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

INSPECTOR I

LLER:

This program is designed to develop

double agents who can give us vital

information from their knowledge of plans and illegal operations of our enemies

within the United States. A potential double agent by your definition is one in

contact with representatives of a foreign government under Bureau control but

has not been requested to give information or given assignments.

During the course of this inspection, the Inspector asked for and received

a lisi oî 298 active poleniiai douvie agents. A review of 237 files (80%) indicated

the following:

a. These files deal primarily with PSIs and some SIs who have limited

social, situational and business contacts with Soviet and Satellite nationals.

Most of these nationals are allegedly intelligence agents, suspected intelligence

agents or persons who are contacts of these nationals.

b. Generally the people selected for development as potential double agents

are correspondents and journalists who come in contact with Tass news agency

officials ana employees; American businessmen who purchase Russian products

or sell American products through Amtorg or other Russian companies operating

in the United States; neighbors and building managers where nationals reside;

naturalized American citizens of Slavic derivation who are contacted by suspected

intelligence agents; naturalized American citizens who travel to Russia and

satellite countries; leáders. of Slavic-American societies, organizations and

publications; American citizens taking educational and business tours in Russia

and other Iron Curtain countries; and prominent members of technical and

scientific societies who have an interest in similar scientific work and publications

by Russian and satellite country professionals.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1/21/71

ESM:wmj

NWL 8608 Docld:32989638 Page 516

1110

---

## Page 517

-2-

c. Generally a thorough background investigation is completed on each

individual selected to be a potential double agent before the Bureau authorizes

him to be interviewed to determine if he is receptive and willing to assist

and cooperate with the Bureau. These investigations are not completed within a

specified period. Several instances were noted wherein the national returned

to his native country before the informant could develop suitable rapport. Review

indicated several of these cases remain active although the national returned to

his native country.

a. After the Bureau has authorized the field office to develop the potential

double agent, the field office sends in progress reports each 6 months (FD-401).

In most instances only a slight social acquaintanceship is established over an

extensive period. Field and SOG supervision of these cases appears to be

mechanical and perfunctory and lacksimaginative, aggressive and timely

direction.

e. During the year 1970 there was an average of three communications

per file received from the field. Most of these were semiannual reports.

Communications from SOG to the field averaged less than one letter per

file and in almost all instances this was a very short letter authorizing in -

vestigation and development of potential double agent. There were less than 10

cases noted where specific instructions, directions or other guidance was

furnished to the field in developing these potential double agents.

f. 110 of the cases were reviewed at random for the specific purpose of

determining generally how long they had been pending. 4 cases had been pending

prior to 1960; 3 were open in 1961; 6 in 1962; Z in 1963; 6 in 1964; 5 in 1965; 10

in 1966; 12 in 1967; 10 in 1968; 22 in 1969; and 25 in 1970. The average case has

been opened 3 1/2 years and there has been an average of one piece of outgoing

correspondence from the Bureau in each file.

Very little outgoing correspondence concerning instructions or directions

were noted in these 10 files. For example, Sof the files reviewed had no out -

going correspondence in them since 1967. One file was reviewed in which the

last outgoing correspondence was in 1962. 65 of these 110 files did not have any

outgoing correspondence in the last 12-month period (1970).

Review of this program as indicated by the above observations, reveals

that virtually no direction is given the program. Separate write-ups have

been prepared on two individual cases where supervision has been most inadequate.

& NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 517

= 0

---

## Page 518

- 3 -

As a general consideration, it is felt that you have 298 cases pending in what

appears on the surface to be an important program but in reality are mere

"numbers" from a supervision standpoint.

You are requested to explain why this condition exists, what is your

justification for this type of handling, and what action you anticipate necessary

to correct.

Comments of Inspector D. E. Moore and Assistant Director C. D. Brennan.

requested.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 518

---

## Page 519

- 4 .

INSPECTOR DONALD E. MOORE*

The comments and observations

(1-24-71

CGS: EWL: DEM/ djw: ekn)

of the Inspector dealing with

a "POTENTIAL DOUBLE AGENT

PROGRAM" have been carefully reviewed and the following comments

are responsive to the questions raised:

For purposes of clarification it is important that

the terminology and designations used be defined.

designation

"Potertial Double Agent" (PDA) is a descriptive

term denoting an individual usually already approved by the

Bureau as a Potential Security Informant (PSI) or as a Security

Informant (SI).

The approval of a PSI or SI is based on his

current or potential capabilities to furnish information of

intelligence or security interest.

It individuals in either

of these categories have an association with a Soviet-bloc official,

for statistical purposes they are considered as PDA'S. This

labeling

is incidental to their primary designation as a Bureau-

approved PSI or SI, and

their administrative handling at the Bureau

conforms with overall Bureau policy and instructions relating

¿o all Bureau approvea

sources, whether or not they are

considered to be PDA's, and this designation does not alter

the administrative handling of these cases.

Justifications for Bureau-approved PSI's and SI'S

are required on a six-month basis following definitely

estalished form.

The primary purpose of this justification

is administrative in nature to insure the individual

involved continues to meet Bureau standards.

Substantive

information which may have been furnished is reported in

detail in the 134 file maintained by the Office of Origin

as required by Bureau regulations.

This information is

then reported to the Bureau under appropriate substantive

captions.

Normally the only occasion when substantive

data received from a source appears in the informant case

file is in the semi-annual justification letter in extremely

abbreviated

See Section 107K, paragraph 7, page 13,

Manual of Instructions which states,

"Correspondence in security informant and

potential security informant matters should

be strictly limited to administrative handling

of informant and should not contain information

more properly furnished under substantive case

caption. "

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 519

---

## Page 520

-5.

Regarding specific comments in paragraph c.,

as

pointed out, the primary designation of an individual

as a PSI or SI

is his ability to furnish information of

intelligence interest, which may or may not depend upon

his association with

one Soviet-bloc national:

This

association almost without exception becomes productive

only when the Soviet-bloc official initiates action to

exploit this relationship.

The fact that the Soviet-bloc

national departs this country, first, does not end their

relationship, and secondly, does not end the potential

that exists in the relationship.

Very often there is a

follow-up contact by another Communist-bloc official based

on the apparently disrupted initial relationship.

Characteristic of the patient, long-range planning and

execution of Soviet-bloc intelligence, this reactivation

may occur at some indeterminate future date.

We must be

alert to this concrete possibility in order

to fully exploit

potential that exists in such cases.

Therefore,

contacts with the source, in cases of this type, must

continue

for a reasonable period.

Concerning paragraph d.,

in cases where the

potential for development of

an individual as a double

agent is based exclusively on a

social acquaintanceship

with a specific soviet-bloc official, the initiative for

this development rests almost entirely with that Soviet-

bloc official. Experience has taught us that attempts

on our part to maniuplate our sources to hasten his

development are most often recognized by the hostile

intelligence officer as a provocation. When direction

is necessary and practical, it must be developed in the

overall context of the Soviet-bloc official's investigation,

and such direction is apparent in the substantive case

files.

be "mechanical and perfunctory" supervision which "lacks

imaginative, aggressive and timely direction, " in the

informant case file.

Paragraph e. refers to the lack of communications

in the informant files reviewed. The nature and purpose

of the informant file has been previously explained, and

in this context it can be understood that operational

instructions usually appear in the substantive files and

not in the administrative file of the informant.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 520

153

---

## Page 521

-6 -

Paragraph f notes many instances of cases

concerning

"PDA's" have been opened for varying periods

of time, and, again, the lack of extensive outgoing

communications noted. It is again stressed that the

designation of

"pDa" is an arbitrary one, these

files are

evaluated and administered on an individual basis

in

accordance with Bureau requirements related to PSI's and

SI's, and not solely on their double-agent potential.

These requirements are met in these cases.

The Inspector has commented in his Survey that

"virtually no direction is given the program."

The

foregoing comments have established 1.) the designation

of PDA to a SI or PSI does not require administrative

supervision or handling by SOG over and above that required

for any SI or PSI, 2.) if direction and instruction is

necessary and practical in a particular case, such is

given in the overall supervision and handling of the

substantive case file of the Soviet-bloc national involved,

3.? in accordance with current Bureau policy and instructions

relating to the handling of these tiles, they coniain

minimal amount of information relating to the productivity

of the source, and 4. the labeling and designation of a

ST and PSI as a PDA is an administrative device adopted

for the purpose of emphasizing the need for Double-Agents.

There is no program as such, for the handling of these

cases.

To the general consideration expressed that the

298 cases are mere numbers from a supervisory standpoint,

the above comments clearly indicate such is not the case.

These cases are not opened and maintained as a program.

They are opened on individual merit and maintained in

accordance with Bureau standards under the same requirements

as all other

PSI and SI cases at the SOG.

In summary, it appears that the criticisms leveled

in this particular Survey are

due to a misconception involving

terminology.

"PDA" is a label.

It carries no requirement

for administrative handling over and above supervision afforded

the case as a PSI or SI.

These cases are basic and vital

investigative tools.

Administration of such

cases are

guided by rigid Bureau standards; the comments made by

Inspector do not indicate these standards have been breached.

Thus, no corrective action is considered necessary and none is

recommended. This does not mean that I will not continue to

exert every

effort to see that qualified informants will

continue to be developed and that carefully considered and

logical means will be employed to have these informants

W-88608-Docld:32989638-Page-521.

154

---

## Page 522

- 7-

developed to the point they are accepted by Soviet-bloc

officials and become operational Double-Agents. I am

pleased we have increased the number of active Double-

Agents since the last inspection and will closely

follow our progress in this field.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN/

(DEM: ekn

1-24-71)

I have carefully noted

the comments of the

Inspector and also those

of Mr. Moore.

I certainly am aware that Double-Agents active

against Soviet-bloc officials are a

vital part of our

counterespionage work. I share the views expressed by

Mr. Moore and assure the Inspector. I will closely follow

the development of informants in this field and see that

proper guidance is given the field to increase the number

of active Double-Agents.

ADDENDUM INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER

(ASM:mjt 1/25/71)

Soviet espionage is one of the greatest challenges

_we

have in the Bureau today and during this inspection our review

of your program was made with this attitude. I have reviewed

with great interest the accomplishments and progress which you

have made; however, there were certain aspects of your operation

which have caused

concern. Specifically, your handling of

"Potential Double Agents"

does not nearly result from a review

standpoint with the feeling that this phase of work is compatible

with the challenges presented. Elsewhere in this inspection we

have discussed development of Double Agents in place as being

highly desirable goals in our work, yet, we have lacked success.

in this as evidenced by an extended "dry" period of almost nine

years

I feel that perhaps foreign intelligence may not be that

good and that by improving ourselves we may be able to accomplish

our goals. In the above write-up it was my feeling that your

Potential Double Agent program needs considerable attention from

a critical self-analysis standpoint for the purpose of strengthening

it consistent with its potential for providing valuable assistance

both here and in the field.

Assistant Director note.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 522

155

---

## Page 523

-8

Assistant Director C. D. Brennar

(1/25/71

• WAB:hke)

The comments of the Inspector are noted.

I most certainly share the Inspector's view that

Soviet espionage is one of the greatest challenges we have

in the Bureau today. I have and am continually stressing the

development of good double agents.

The inspector referred to

"Double Agents-in-place," and in view of the context of his

remarks, I concluded he

is referring to "Defectors-in-place,"

and I know of no higher goal in our work than developing them.

To my knowledge, the first Soviet Defector-in-place

the bureau ever developca was haare uome anuttregar agent

who was captain in the sovet, army and who vas developed in

He C2961-162 Me developed Tonate liontonent

We operated him for approximately four and one half.

Colonel in the soxiet

colonel the de soviet union on rate mine none sevate union,

he cooperated and furnished valuable information which as

recovered the trom deaddrops, In Moscow. 12100s tophat

assigned to Burma and was contacted on the beaut

country sW

With the Director's approval

was turned over t

to CIA

and operated by them land also for us since they serviced require-

ments for us) until 1962.

"thế Soviet"

unton, and to our knowledge, he is stili a cooperative Defector-in-

place and may come to the West again.

In October 1961, We developed through investigation

and interrogation the Gunson Defector-in-place, who was a member

of the illegal apparatus for the Soviet Military intelligence

contact kith

C25-25a3Bs

In 196c, we began operations with the fedora source,

the Soviet union but was again contacted by the Bureau in Canada

1969 Fedora Visited in New York and was

156

Mw nahua Docid 32989638 Page 573

---

## Page 524

- 9 .

To our knowledge, Fedora is still a viable

Vith him at sch

scientific

Military Office in Washington, D. C.

Soviet Union in October, 1964:

Contact was first made with the shamrock source in

3 Resident of the

operations.

KGB In New ToBased upon information furnished by Shamrock, the

identification of an illegal agent huchand and wite femm has

been effected. They are presently

located in Argentina.

During the summer of 1969a1gen geno thee

Office successfully developed the Harlo, source,

a Defector-in-place from July, 1969, to November, 1970* The

Harlo source was in a position to furnish information or value

and to identity members of the Soviet intelligence community.

The source left the united states in November, 19o, under

circumstances which may a cate a willingness further

cooperate i the opport amity, presented itself

While the above is a listing of Defectors-in-place

achievements in the Soviet field, we have been equally successiul

with the Satellite intelligence services. Commencing in 1963.

and keys which chabledhet onal

Security

Agency to

break the

* That Agency described his operations

044277яne

in the polish field

In addition to two Defectors-in-place/during the

ensuing years, we now operate the Panther source. who is presently

in-place in the united rations secretaria 14 xenwor

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 524

157

---

## Page 525

• 10 .

and operated him until he

return

no Washington in

on in JanuarY.

agalll

operated suc

successfully until hts

defection in June, 1970.

WE 1373-S was

diplomat and intelligence

officer who was successfully recruited and operated from

July, unti September 196

1965..

• He was believed to be the

first protessional Intelligence Yugoslay officer, recruited anywhere

in the world.

From early July 1966,, through the first week in

November 1966 we were in contact with an extremely sensitive

Defector-in-place in the ashington area.

Knowledge

of this Defector-in-place is and has

been linited to very few

Bureau personnel.

Only lour men in the ispionage section are

aware of his past cooperation, while

in contact this"Defector-in-

place turnished extremely valuable counterintelligence and has

the porential

reassigmient iû the United States. We are

currently operating

double age

agent developed by this sour

this source in an

effort to bring about bis reassignment to his

have taken action

sanst those Soviet intelligence

officers in the

urce in an

force

thus opening up the

ce to be

reassigned

to the U.S. as their replacement. Should ve su

we succeed

his knowledie would sive us an insight into the KGB legal

• apparatus

that we have

CREETSSA

ve have never previously haa.

In addition, we have been in contact with numerous

Soviet-bloc officials both through double agents who were

carefully directed by us and by Bureau Agents. At the present

time we are in contact with Henryk Cieslak, an employee of the

Polish Embassy: Agents have talked to him several times and

have an appointment to clandestinely meet with him this

Saturday, January 29, 1971 at National Airport He has

indicated willingness to cooperate with us but has some

reservations in vier is

We expect to

overcone this..

In addition, in New York,

— Alexander Adal

Messing-Mierzejewski, Chief of the Representation and Liaison

Unit Office of Interagency, Affairs, United Nations Secretariat,

-(a Pole has been contacted and expressed agreement to cooperate

and we are continuing our contacts with him and hope to develop

him fully.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 525

58

---

## Page 526

- 11 -

These are just two of many contacts we have

made during recent years, in the Satellite field.

n the soviet ted we have been particularl

anxious to develop Defectors-in-place and have made

numerous contacts. During In we had an Agent meet

clandestinely on three occasions yith Balentin

Nizhelskiy, +

third Secretary at the Soviet Embassy, Who

but prior

Prior to his departure

arrangements were made for subsequent meetings with him

Feturned He has not returned and information

recent received indicates Disis que to serious tiness

of his

Wire in the USSR.-

While the reported illness of

his vite may

be only a cover by the KGB to keep us from

knowing he reportea nis contacts, the iliness et his vire

nay be very real and it so and he returns to this

country subsequently we have excellent

ent ground work already

laid.

клітисько ка.

After a long period of working against Yuriy P

Ilsnevskiya Known GRU Agent and head of AFROELOI-Office

in New York we developed excellent information about him

and established a close relationship with him. He secured

very detailed personal information about Lisneyskiy.

and te to conted eatene had as a shaken

he did not commit himself to cooperate and after thinking

about the matter for a period of time apparently decided

to report to his superiors and was whisked back to the

SoViet Union.

Li sneyskiy and Nizhelskiy are examples of

efforts ve have made and are continuing to make in this

field. I am setting forth this very sensitive information

so that the Inspector will be aware that we have been and

most certainly will continue to do everything possible to

accomplish our goals. I feel we have very dedicated and

knowledgeable men working in this field and we are

constantly analyzing the overall field in the light of

changing world conditions to see that we take advantage of

every opportunity. The Inspector may be assured ve will

continue to do so.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 526

159

---

## Page 527

ADMINISTRATIVE MEMORANDUM

COVERAGE OF KNOWN MEET AREAS - (COKMA) PROGRAM

During the course of this inspection, a volume of

material

was reviewed, part of which were cases and investi-

gations dealing with the above program in the New York Office.

The program was instituted in July, 1970, by a team of

Special Agents in the Jamaica-Queens area in an effort to

observe clandestine activity

y there

ere based in an analysis of

previous activity l that area. SPIA letters dated 10

and 9/4/20 from New York reported, the observation Of numerous

officers under suspicious arcumstances.

It appears. that the successes of the recent and

current Ney York, efforts in these matters still have not been

brought to the attention of the Washington Field Office, in

the form of instructions or directions to analyze their

situation for possible implementation of the program (if not

already being done) in the Washington axea..

For this reason, you are being requested to advise

of supervisory procedures

you have to insure the dissemination

of new techniques and the "cross-fertilization" of ideas to

appropriate offices.

It is realized that New York furnishes copies of

communications to lastington teta stitce. That provisions

do you have at the Seat of Government to insure adequate,

aggressive attention and supervision is provided to the

in matters such as this?

Comments of Section Chief William A. Branigan,

Inspector Donald E. Moore, and Assistant Director Charles D.

Brennan requested.

**

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

121/71

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 527

160

---

## Page 528

ADMINISTRATIVE MEMORANDUM

COVERAGE OF KNOWN MEET AREAS - (COKMA) PROGRAM

Section Chief W. A.

Espionage Section

Bran gan

15519751

The Inspector's comments regarding the success of

captioned program in the new ork office, have been noted and

are valid.

Bureau has turnished

New York a communication

offering suggestions and asking for its comments

recommendations regarding expansion of the program. No

instructions or directions have been issued to WFO, concerning

possible implementation of this program in that office, although

as the Inspector notes WFO has been made aware of the activity

conducted by the New York office, since the conditions on which

the program is based are applicable only in the New York area

by reason of conditions peculiar to that office alone, ey

fact that analysis of activities by Soviet intelligence officers

nus aisclosed they use wreas a the vicinity of cectain-suoway

stops for meetings with agents either for the convenience of

" the securt ty offered to both y the

from meet areas...

Dames Travel

the washington acea is permarily by automobile,

due to, the lack of any appreciable rapid transit system, white.

in New Yock the primary means of transportation is the subyay

system Since conditions peculiar to New York do not exist in

lashington. D, Cer it was not deemed necessary to issue instructions

or directions to wro concerning this particular program.

Another factor considered by Bureau was knowledge of

prior use by VEO, of programs directed against.

geographic and

other known factors concerning Soviet. intelligence operations

peculiar to washington as-opposedntonel lock, several years

ago a program was used wherein all thoroughfares rom he strict

areas and might be detected traveling to such areas via these

routes

for this purpose.

This was discontinued due to lack of

productivity.

More recently, WFO used a "Sweeper Program" wherein

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1/22/71

161

NW-88608-Docld:32989638_Page_528

---

## Page 529

Wake sites

- 2 .

operated from about 1967 to 1968 and was implemented on the basis

of conditions detected as existing in VEO but which were not

applicable in Ney York; therefore, instructions were not issued

to New York for implementation of similar program but it was kept

informed of developments in the same manner that New York is now

informing WTO of developments occurring in instant matter. -

"Sweeper"

was discontinued due to lack of positive accomplishments such as

those which have been disclosed in the COMA Program. From about

their automobiles viththe expectation of"

disclose latters hanght afforded more.intensive

attention to ascertain nature of activity being conducted during

power limitations or need to apply personnel to areas offering more

firm possibilities for

producing positive results; however, the

principle is still utilized in connection with yeekend physical

surveillance scheduling.

Recognizing the value of accounting for a Soviets

they a

assigned, Bureau pointed out to both New York office and

Wro the valuable information disclosed through "Blitz" of their

residences and instructed both offices to develop established

neighborhood

sources who could furnish information regarding

odometer readings,

means ot insuring

would no longer be available folloving reevaluation and modification

of the program.

This instruction was also based on the fact that

impossible to cover these widespread location's with any degree of

Without some added technique:

During December, 1970, Espionage Section recommended

•distribution to all Bureau personnel at Seat of Government, WEO

and the adjacent Resident Agencies of Baltimore and Alexandria of

was approved by Director.

hundred pairs of eyes to cover individuals who are extremely

conscious of and adept at detecting surveillances. Personnel

activity other than to

observing these cars would not conduct my cit

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

ECP : eco

NW 88608-Docid32481688_Page 529

---

## Page 530

-3 -

report pertinent information concerning observation

and determination ge suspicious patterns which should

suspicious patterns which shoula be

Tened throah concentrated uve on the misie

on the basis of available information (again

COMA philosophy):

This is being used on

a trial basis

in WEO,

to test its productivity and value. If found

to be of assistance, consideration will be given to

implementing in New York Office; however, in this

instance again,

the program is designed to exploit

conditions prevelant in Washington, D.C., rather than

New or were Bureau personnel do not reside in same

general area as Soviets and therefore, might not be

expected to produce positive results.

Means of

transportation available in both areas, previously

mentioned, was

also considered.

SPIA letters themselves are a vehicle for

"cross-fertilization"of ideas between recipient and

submitting offices.

They contain monthly, detailed

summaries of intelligence activities which have occurred

in the submitting offices. They are routed to each

Espionage Section Supervisor for review.

If significant

information is contained in submission from WFO which

might be applicable to New York, or vice versa, Bureau

Supervisor directs attention of appropriate office:

to the information by means of communication in the

substantive file involved.

Weekly Section Conferences

allow for a more current discussion of significant or

unusual developments as they occur in individual cases

providing a more immediate vehicle for directing attention

of one office to developments in another which might

be applicable to a current or prior investigation.

Periodically, Espionage Section learns from other

intelligence organizations, foreign and domestic, of new in-

telligence techniques or changes in MO by Soviets which should

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

ECP : eco

1/22/71°

143

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 530

---

## Page 531

- 4<

be considered by offices having a Soviet establishment or

particular investigative situation.

This information is immediately

furnished to interested offices by

Supervisor having responsibility

for coordination of the SPIA-SATPIA matters or by the substantive

supervisor handling the particular investigation to which it

pertains.

Determination in this regard is made by Section Front

Office which issues appropriate instructions and follows prompt

compliance.

Examples are notification from British and SIA

regarding Soviet capability to use y

dial a message telephones

during meet as means Of deteating radio transmissions in area

particular activity

circumstances for consideration in their coverage of Soviet

establishments and covering double

agent meetings.

Aii naiitis pertaining

; to programs such as captioned

are routed

through Section Front Office to insure adequate and

aggressive attention and supervision is provided to field, and

make certain no possibility is overlooked to exploit such

situations

for maximum counterintelligence benefits on field-wide basis,

consistent with feasibility or applicability.

Inspector D. E. Moore

DEM: Imb

1/23/71

I share Mr. Branigants views that Cokma is not

applicable to WEin view of the different conditions existing

In the two cities..

Noting the other comments of the inspector

and the information set forth by Mr. Branigan, I would like

to advise that in communication I read, in contacts with

personnal of New York and WFO and supervisors at the Seat of

Government and in contacts with representatives of cooperative

foreign intelligence agencies, I am most alert to situations

and procedures that can be adopted by us. In conferences

with Section Chiefs in the Branch, I stress the need to be

alert for procedures that may have

worked in one area of our

operations and can be adopted to other areas.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTICN

1/22/71

564

NW 88608-Docld:32969636-Page-0

---

## Page 532

-5 -

Assistant Director C. D. Brenna

DEM: Imb

1/23/71

I have carefully noted the inspector's comments

and also the comments of Mr. Branigan and Mr. Moore.

am most alert to the development of new ideas and the need

for "cross-fertilization" of ideas and stress this in my

conferences with all

Section Chiefs at the Division.

not only seek ideas about the operations of a Section Chief

within the Section, but for ideas of operations anywhere

within the Division and throughout the Bureau.

I am

constantly alert in my many contacts with representatives

of other Government agencies, foreign liaison contacts

and representatives of business for ideas which can be

successfully utilized in our work and will continue this.

In discussions with SACs, I constantly stress the challenging

conditions the Bureau faces and the need for new ideas and

new applications. I most certainly will continue to stress

this.

ADDENDUM INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER

(ESM: sjr - 1/25/71)

It is my understanding that the COKMA concept is

not "new" in the New York, Office but, as indicated has had

recent successes.. It is realized COKMA deals with subway

travel of our subjects; however,

the concept was that to

which I alluded in the above write-up. It was my feeling

perhaps due to internal conditions in the Soviet Union and

the Polish situation etc., that Soviet Intelligence may now

be more active and consequently "pressing" for some reason

thus making it possible for us to have significant success

in New York in a relatively

short period of time.

For this reason, it was my feeling that the matter

should have been highlighted by SOG which has the responsibility

for coordination and direction of field activities.

m...

I do not agree with the concept that one field

division is different from another when we are dealing with

as important a topic as Soviet espionage.

Assistant Director Brennan and Inspector Moore

note.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 532

165

---

## Page 533

- 6 -

INSPECTOR D. I. MOORT

DEM:mjt

1/25/71

I certainly agree with the Inspector that one

field division is no different than another in connection

with the topic as important as Soviet Espionage. The

point that Mr. Branigan and I were attempting to make is

that we have to recognize the difference in methods of

operation in Soviet intelligence officers in New lock

and WFO. The Inspector may be assured that I will

follow the operations of Soviet-bloc intelligence officers

in New York, UFO and also in San Francisco in view of the

establishment of a consulate there. I will continue to be

most alert to any successful procedures utilized in one

office that may be productive in another and will certainly

see that the proceduras are applied where feasible.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAI

1/25/71

I concur with Inspector Moore.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 533

16%

---

## Page 534

PERSONNEL MATTERS

PERSONNEL

---

## Page 535

PERSONNEL INTERVIEWED

6-A-4

INSPECTOR E.S. MILIBR:

In addition to review of work

performance, various personnel,

by reason of supervisory position held, were interviewed

during the course of this inspection by a member of the

Inspection Staff.

The interviews and review of work periormance

of these personnel have disclosed no substantial delinquencies

of matters requiring recommendations for any specific action.

The personnel are:

Employee

Richard D. Cotter

George C. Moore

Robert L. Shackelford

W. Raymond Wannall

Conrad W. Thompson

Lambert L.

Thank B. Bine gon

Putnam

Dove Can Pu than

Joseph M. Sizoo

Don ye pete ar.

Louts

w. Edwin right

Category

Section Chief

Section Chief

Section Chief

Section Chief

Approved Bureau Speaker

Approved Bureau Speaker

Approved Bureau Speaker

Approved Bureau

Speaker

Approved Bureau Speaker

Approved Bureau Speaker

Approved Bureau Speaker

Approved Bureau Speaker

Recommended for Advancement

Assistant Director Brennan please note.

hotel o

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

JVB: SEW.

6-A-4

1/21/71

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 535

---

## Page 536

ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL

6-E

INSPECTOR

MILLER:

Please tabulate by Sections and Units

the current Agent and clerical personnel

complement of your Division as of the close of business 1/8/71. Show actual

and authorized personnel in each Section or Unit, including the Division Front

Office. Personnel on maternity leave or leave without pay should not be

considered in the overall tabulation.

1. Include positions regarded as vacant but for which authority Is been

obtained to fill.

of that date. (Show date of transfer letter or of acknowledgment of

resignation.)

3. Tabulate by Section and Unit any shortage or overage of authorized

personnel as of 1/8/71.

4. Indicate your assessment of adequacy of clerical personnel and if

additional personnel is deemed necessary provide complete justification.

5. Provide specifics regarding manpower savings effected since

the last inspection as a result of streamlining or any other means.

6. Comment on adequacy of your Agent personnel.

7. In the write-up on adequacy of personnel by Sections, describe

criteria utilized in evaluation of personnel adequacy in each particular Section

or Unit. Each Section write-up should constitute a separate part of the overall

Divisional write -up.

Comments of Assistant Director requested.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1/8/71

ESM:wmj

6-E

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 536

148

---

## Page 537

ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL

6-E

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN: Attached find the Section

ABK: jgr

1/15/71

write-ups concerning each

category of information

requested by the Inspector relative to adequacy of personnel.

These comments are current as of 1/8/71:

The personnel assigned to the Division Front Office

consists of one Assistant Director, two inspectors, two

Special Agent Supervisors, five stenographic employees and

19 clerical employees. This complement includes the personnel

directly assigned to the Front Office, those in the Division

teletype room, Mail Room and messenger service, the security.

Patrol Force in addition to five Agents.

I have not as yet

requested a replacement for a GS-4 clerical position in the

Front Office, which was created with the resignation of

James A Pettingill on 12/24/70.

I am attempting to absorb

the

work of this position with the present personnel comple-

ment in the Front Office.

This is on a trial basis and if it

isn't satisfactory, i wili recommenc

a repiacement.

The overall authorized personnel complement of the

Division at the beginning of the inspection was 116 Special

Agents and 190 clerks compared to an authorized complement

of 126 Agents and 186 clerks at the time of the last

inspection.

We now have assigned to the Division 116 Agents

and 188 clerks. The clerical vacancies being the aforementioned

• GS-4 position in the Front Office and a vacancy in the Mail

Room, which was created when a clerical position in the

Internal Security Section was filled.

At the present time we have outstanding requests

for two Agents to replace Special Agents George the

and C. Edwin Enright, who are under transfer to

Inspection

Division, We also have requests for two GS-2 Mail Clerks

for the Division Mail Room to replace the clerk who was trans-

ferred to the Internal Security Section and the second to replace

the GS-3 clerk who will be reassigned or rotated when the

replacement is made available to the Division. The Racial

Intelligence Section has submitted a reguest for an additional

clerk for the Black Nationalist - South and Racial Informant

Unit.

In addition, this Section is now making a request for two

additional Agent Supervisors because of the heavy increase in the

case load in the black extremist field. (Justification in

Section write-up attached).

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 537

169

---

## Page 538

Weisins

The request for a

clerk by the Internal Security Section for

a newly approved clerical position mentioned in its write-up

The Espionage Section may find it necessary

to request an additional clerk to handle extra duties assigned

to a clerk who is already leavily assigned, if the present

system (now on a trial basis) proves unworkable.

The New Left

Section may find it necessary to request an additional Agent

and clerk if the present trend of heavy increase in case

load continues.

We are watching this closely.

As you will

note in the write-up by

•the Nationalities Intelligence section

we are making

a request for two additional Agent Supervisors

at this time.

This is necessary

due to the recent increase

in foreign legats from Il to 17, increasing our legat personnel

from 60 to 88.

are:

To recapitulate, our requests for additional personnel.

Front office

Racial inteiiigeuce

Two GS-2 clerks

•One Go-s clerk

One Agent Supervisor

to replace Supervisor

Enright.

Two additional Agent

Supervisors.

One Agent Supervisor

to replace Agent Quinn.

Two additional Agent

Supervisors.

Espionage Section

Nationalities Intelligence

Section

I firmly believe that our limited requests for

additional

personnel at this time are fully justified. As

you

will note in the attached write-ups, we are not asking for

additional personnel until, after on a trial basis, we have

found it absolutely

necessary and fully justified.

The increase

of terroristic tactics by the

Weatherman

faction of the

Students for a Democratic

Society and militant organizations

such as the Black Panther Party and the Jewish Defense League

has made it absolutely imperative that intensive investigation

be conducted to identify, locate all members of these

militant

organizations and secure

evidence for prosecution, if

we are

to meet our grave responsibilities in the extremely vital field

of internal security.

This has increased the work load of

the

Racial Intelligence Section, the New Left Section, and the

Nationalities Intelligence Section. Because of this increase

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 538

---

## Page 539

in work and my interest in conserving manpower wherever possible,

we recently reorganized

the Division in order to make the most

efficient use of our manpower.

I conscientiously believe

have now trimmed my manpower

to the bone.

Under my direction,

Branch and Section Chiefs continually evaluate personnel

adequacy in order to assure we get the job done with a

maximum amount of efficiency with

the minimum amount of

personnel.

I conscientiously believe I have done this and I

will continue to pursue this policy.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 539

171

---

## Page 540

ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL

6-E

INTERNAL SECURITY SECTION

SBOTION CHIRT A. W. GRAY (lAs of 1/8/71 the authorized personnel

of the Internal Security Section was

15 Special Agents, Y Secretaries,

and 9 Clerks. A breakdown by

Units follows:

FRONT OFFICE

AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL

AS OF 1/8/71

1

...

Section Chief

Secretary

Number One Man

Secretary

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA, UNIT

Supervisors

Secretary

Clerks

SUSVERSIVE INDIVIDUALS UNIT

Supervisors

Secretary

• Clerks

PROTEST AND TROTSKYIST GROUPS UNIT

Supervisors

1

1

3

]

2 (1 new requested

but not yet

assigned)

3

2

Secretary

Clerks

INTERNATIONAL, NEW LEFT AND SEDITION UNIT

Supervisors

Secretary

Clerk

KLAN AND WHITE HATE GROUPS UNIT

Supervisors

Secretary

Clerks

3 (1 - McGuire -

.temporarily

assigned New

Left Section)

1

2 (1 - Hanning -

temporarily

assigned New

Left Section)

2.

1

1

.2

2

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1/13/71

DFXC : bcw

6-E*

-NW-88608-Docld:32989638_Page 540

172

---

## Page 541

SPECIFIC COMMENTS

1. In Protest and Trotskyist Groups Unit, one

Special Agent Supervisor McGuire and one clerk Mangigg

temporarily assigned New Leit section.

Supervisor in Charge

of same Unit (Griffith also spending majority of his time

in New Left Section assisting on special.

An additional

Supervisor from International New Left Unit (Benedict) and

one clerk from Klan and White Hate Groups Unit (Dean) are

also working majority of their time on New Left Section

special.

2. No pending transfers or resignations.

• 3. See number 1 above.

4.

We have requested one additional clerical employee

for the Communist Party, USA, Unit (request not yet filled)

because of substantial need due to increase in Unit case load

from 572 to 1076 as a result of rèorganization. We are currently

assessing need for another clerical employee in Klan and White

Hate Groups Unit to handle large volume of mail involved in

supervision of several hundred Klan and White Hate group informants.

Considering that Internal Security Section, as it

is now constituted, was established December 16, 1970, approxi-

mately three weeks

ago, no meaningful comments regarding manpower

savings as related

to this Section can be made.

We are carrying

a substantial case load, with increases in several areas. For

example,

the case load of the Communist Party, USA, Unit as a

result of the reorganization increased from 572 to

1076 with no

increase in personnel. Additionally, two Supervisors assigned to

this section

(Griffith and McGuire) are on temporary loan to the

New Left Section along with a clerical employee (Hanning)

Additionally, a third Supervisor (Benedict) and

a second clerical

employee (Dean are spending the majority of their working time

on assignment to New Left Section special. For all practical

purposes, the work of three supervisors and two clerical employees

is being

absorbed on a daily basis within the present personnel

complement which, of course, is a tangible manpower savings.

In

all Units we are constantly involved in attempting to eliminate

or curtail the volume of paperwork being handled, reducing

programs and projects to bare essentials and wherever possible,

keeping the case load volume at a manageable figure.

Another example of manpower conservation exists in

the Subversive Individuals - Basic Revolutionary Groups Unit

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1/13/71

DFXC : bcw

NW 88608 Docld:32989638. Page 541

---

## Page 542

which handles approximately 1,400 pending cases

and is

responsible for over 7,000 subjects on the Bureau's Special

Indices.

A moratorium on routine communist investigations

in effect at the time of the last inspection, which curtailed

the work of this Unit, has been removed and the case load

increases daily. The

removal of the moratorium warranted

the expansion of this Unit from a two to three-man Unit at

the time of reorganization but for all practical purposes,

the Unit has functioned as a two-man Unit with the third

man (Schwartz, on loan for the majority of the period to the

Research Section for a special project.

6. When special Agent supervisory personnel

currently assigned, temporarily on loan to other Sections,

are returned, we will have adequate personnel to handle

existing case 1oad.

7. In evaluating adequacy of both Special Agent

and clerical personnel the following criteria were used:

case load

mail count

complexity of cases and supervision involved

deadline matters

special assignments

• experienced supervisors

Administrative duties assigned Supervisors in

Charge (reviewing mail, conferring with employees, organizing

Unit) limit to some extent the volume of case assignments

handled.

115STTC INBLLIGENGE DIVISION INSPECZION

6-E

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 542

---

## Page 543

ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL

NEW LEFT SECTION GE

SECTION CHIEF R. L. SHACKELFORE:

There is set forth below

a tabulation of the actual and

authorized personnel in the

New Left Section as of close of business, January 8, 1971.

Authorized

Assigned

New Left Groups Unit

6 Agents

6 Agents

4 Clerks

4 Cierks

I Super Clerk

1. Super Clerk

I Secretary

1 Secretary

Subversive Individuals -

New Left Unit

5 Agents

4 Clerks

1 Secretary

Special Investigations -

West Unit

Special Investigations -

East Unit

4-Agents

4 Clerks

1 Secretary

5 Agents

4 Clerks

I Secretary

4 Agents

4 Clerks

1 Secretary

3 Agents

4 Clerks

1 Secretary

5 Agents

4 Clerks

1 Secretary

Special Assignment

Front Office

2 Agents

2 Secretaries

1 Agent*

1 Clerk*

2 Agents

2 Secretaries

Total

22 Agents

16 Clerks

I Super

6 Secretaries

45 employees

21 Agents

17 Clerks

• I Super Clerk

6 Secretaries

45 employees

1. There are no

vacant positions in the New Left Section.

2. Two Agents under transfer in:

perez assigned

to Subversive Individuals - New Left Unit. No resignations.

*One Agent and one clerk on temporary assignment handling major

case involving East Coast Conspiracy to Save Lives.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1/12/71

NW 88608 Docld32989638 Page 543

---

## Page 544

3.

Special Investigations - West Unit has one Agent and one

clerk on loan from the Internal Security Section.

4.

Activities by New Left terrorists during the past year

has been marked by an increase in acts of violence and

conspiracies toward violence.

The Weatherman group and

other such groups have nade it imperative that we institute

continuing intensive investigations.

By approved airtel to

SAC, Albany, and all offices dated 11/4/70, the field was

instructed to initiate investigation of all members of the

Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and members of

procommunist militant New Left type campus organizations

which follow SDS advocacy of violence and revolution.

It

is estimated that this will involve some 6,500 new investi-

gations. If this trend continues, it will

be necessary to

obtain an additional clerk in the

future; however, we are

not requesting any additional clerical personnel at this

time.

5. At the time of the last inspection, this section had

22 Agents and 27 clerical employees authorized of which

22 Agents and 25 clerical employees were assigned. As a

result of the realignment of the Division in December, 1970,

this Section currently has 22 Agents and 23 clerical

employees

authorized.

6.

As noted in number 4 above, the increase in terroristic

activities by New Left militants has increased the burden

of this Section.. On the basis of the above, if this trend

continues, it appears that it will be necessary to obtain one

additional Agent in the future.

7. Personnel adequacy in the New Left. Section is constantly

evaluated on the basis of the productivity of each unit,

requests received from the Department and other agencies

and the overall objectives of the Section.

The delinquent

work in each unit is closely followed and in special situations

where an excessive amount of work is assigned to one unit

supervisory personnel from other units are utilized.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 544

---

## Page 545

sidestinia intertaince

ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL

6-E

SECTION CHIEF R. D. COTTER:

As of close of business 1/8/71,

the complement of this Section

was as follows: Special Agents 13, secretaries 5, and clerks 15, for a

total of 33. This is broken down by unit as follows:

Section Front Office - 2 Special Agents, 1 secretary (Stenography):

I secretary (typing)

Central Research Unit - 5 Special Agents, 1 secretary,

2 supervisory clerks (technical publications

writers), 1 clerk (publications coordinator),

1 clerk (typing)

Racial Reporting Unit - 2 Special Agents, 1 secretary,

I supervisory clerk (technical publications

writer), 2 clerks

New Left Reporting Unit - 2 Special Agents, 1 secretary,

1 supervisory clerk (technical publications

writer), 1 clerk

Special Records Unit - 2 Special Agents, 1 secretary (assigned but

not authorized, see #3 below), 6 clerks

The following responses are numbered to correspond with

Inspector's specific questions:

1. There are no vacant positions.

2. There are no personnel on transfer into or out of Section at

this time and no pending resignations.

3. Only shortage or overage of authorized personnel is in Special

Records Unit. Position of secretary in this unit has been approved by Director

contingent upon final action by Position Classification Office which is now

pending.

4. Current clerical personnel complement is considered adequate

but not excessive.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1/12/71

RDC: mea

6-E

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 545

---

## Page 546

- 2 -

5. Since last inspection we have reduced one Agent from the

complement of the Racial Reporting Unit as a result of various streamlining

measures adopted relative to reporting requirements. This streamlining

involved the elimination of a substantial number of letterhead memoranda and

airtels previously required from each field office with regard to racial

conditions and the elimination of daily cover memorandum to our outgoing

racial teletype to the White House.

6. The authorized Agent complement for Section is considered

adequate but not excessive at this time.

7. Criteria used in assessing personnel adequacy in this Section

includes a number of diverse factors. Case load figures are not applicable

to work of this Section nor are there any other simple, quantitative measure-

ments of Section's work. Work of this Section involves primarily research

and evaluation and the preparation of a variety of documents aimed at providing

intelligence to the Whits House, the Attorney General, other interested

agencies and Bureau officials.

This Section seeks to.summarize into

comprehensive and meaningful "package" form information relating to current

topics of intelligence interest and concern. The finished product is

provided not only to other intelligence agencies and policy-making officials

of the Government but, where appropriate, to our field offices for their

information and guidance. The type of documents prepared varies from

daily teletype summaries regarding racial disturbances and student agitation,

to detailed monographs containing in-depth research into various facets of

our work.

During the past year there has been a continuing demand for

various intelligence summaries and this Section has been faced with a

number of expedite projects on behalf of Bureau officials, including the

Director, the White House, the Vice President's Office, and the Attorney

General. Basis for this heavy work load has primarily been interest and

cóncern in the explosive issues concerning racial and student disorders.

The great majority of our projects have revolved around the preparation

of material either for internal FBI use or for outside dissemination with

respect to these issues.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 546

---

## Page 547

ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL

6-E

SECTION CHIEF W. A. BRANIGAN

ESPIONAGE SECTION

(1) The authorized personnel of the Espionage Section

as of January 8, 1971, is as follows:

AGENT

CLERK

2

0

SECRETARY

2

CLERK-STENO

Front Office

Officials Unit -

Washington

Officials Unit -

New York

Special Cases Unit

Coordination Unit

Satellite Unit

3

2*

1

1

5**

3

4

3

1***

2****

5

1

1

1

0

*Two GS-4 Clerks (Barbara Ann Holland and Keith R. White) resigned

Gan A 1, 00%, Poportid 10 a sino anal

**SA George M. Quinn, under transfer to Inspection Division, to

départ close of business January 22, 1971. Replacement requested.

***Intelligence Analyst, GS-10, Mary I. Triplett, performing work

in lieu of Special Agent.

****Clerk, GS-7, A. Iris Kirby, performing work in lieu of

Special Agent.

(2) By letter dated December 22, 1970, Special Agent

George Quiny was transferred to the

Inspection Division.

He will depart by the close of business January 22, 1971.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1-13-71

WAB: hke

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 547

199

---

## Page 548

ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL

Barbara Ann Holland and Keith P. Wite submitted resignations

close of

business January 8, 1971. Replacements were received

as enumerated in item one above.

(3)

As of January 8, 1971, there was a shortage of

two GS-1 Clerk in the Officials Unit - Washington, but this

as remedied on January 11, when replacements

were received

as indicated in item one above. A replacement has been requested

There is no overage

authorized personnel in the Espionage Section.

(4)

present time.

the reorganization of the Division, and

combining Soviet and Soviet-bloc investigations in the

Espionage

Section,

an extremely heavy burden has been placed on the clerical

personnel handling the assignment cards for the section itnere die

nOW

5,046 cases):

This situation is being watched and it may be

that it is unworkable to place the responsibility for maintaining

the assignment cards in a GS 4 employee who is already heavily

assigned.

It this proves to be a fact, a recommendation will be

made to

add a Clerk at a GS-3 level who would exclusively handle

the assignment cards.

(5) Following the 1970 inspection, personnel handling

Soviet investigations was reduced by two Special Agents, GS-14.

Following the inspection, personnel handling Soviet-bloc

investigations were reduced by one Special Agent, GS-14, and

one Clerk, GS-4.

At the time of the reorganization of the

three GS-14) and five clerical personnel (one GS-5 and four GS-4).

• (6) Special Agent personnel is considered adequate.

(7) Criteria utilized in determining the adequacy of

personne. includes the volume of cases supervised, the complexity

of the cases, and the importance of the investigations.

In the Officials Unit, both Washington and New York,

we handle the greatest volume of complex investigations since

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1-13-71

HAB:hke

6-E

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 548

---

## Page 549

ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL

these cases include the bulk of our double agent operations.

As of December 1, 1970, there were 74 active double agents in the

Soviet field.

This is

the largest number of double agents we

have ever achieved.

At the time of the last inspection as of

April I, 1970, there were a active double agents.

The current

number of 74 is compared most favorably with the number of actual

double agents three years ago (12/1/67), when there were 47 active

double agents. At that time there were

18 case Agents handiing

Soviet matters. At the time of the last inspection, there were

16 case Agents

in the Soviet field, and the current load is being

carried by less than 14 case Agents.

Three of the 14 are assigned

part time to the handling of soviet bloc matters.

With the reorganization of the Division in December, 1970,

the volume and work load for the Supervises in the Espionage

Section were materially increased. Four Agent Supervisors who

were formerly assigned to the Sino-satellite Section were

transferred to the Espionage Section and trought with them in

excess of 4,000 cases. The only possible way that this volume

could be handied mas

by redistributing the work within the

Coordination Unit and the Special Cases Umit.

The volume of

investigations in these Units is extremely heavy considering the

nunber of special projects and special operations which are

normally assigned in the Units.

in the satellite unit handling Polish, Romanian,

Czechoslovarian, and Yugoslav investigative matters, we currently

have 1,293 active cases divided among four Special Agents.

In our Soviet-bloc counterintelligence work, we were as of

December 1, 1970, operating 64 active double agents. This should

be compared with the figure at the time of our last inspection,

April 1, 1970, when there were 61 active double agents.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1-13-71

WAB:hke

.. •

6-E

: -3.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 549

---

## Page 550

ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL

SECTON DATE NO SOON AN

RACIAL INTELLIGENCE SECTION

6-E

The current authorized personnel complement of

the Racial Intelligence Section as of the close of business,

January 8, 1971, is 21 Agents and 22 clerical personnel with

a request

pending for one additional clerk for the Black

Nationalist - South and Racial Informant Unit. This is

broken down as follows according to Units within the Section:

Front Office

Section Chief

- 1

Number One Man

Secretary of

-1

Section Chief

Secretary (Stenography) - 1

to Number One Man

Black Nationalist Unit - East

5 Supervisors including Supervisor in Charge

7 clerical personnel

Black Nationalist Unit - Central

*one Supervisor under transfer to Inspection Division

Black Nationalist Unit - West

5 Supervisors including Supervisor in Charge

5 clerical personnel

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1/12/71

IDR:bjE

6-E

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 550

---

## Page 551

Black Nationalist - South and Racial Informant Unit

5 Supervisors including Supervisor in Charge

5 clerical personnel

1) There are no clerical vacancies in the

Section; however, as it was noted previously, a request

has been submitted for an additional clerk for the Black

Nationalist - South and Racial Informant Unit which would

increase our complement to 23 if approved.

2) Special Agent Supervisor C. Edwin Enright

is under transfer to the Inspection Division, transfer

letter dated January 8, 1971. A repiacement is being

requested.

r...

3) With the transfer of Special Agent Enright

there will exist a shortage of one Supervisor in the

Black Nationalist Unit - Central.

4) The clerical personnel complement is inade-

quate and will be barely adequate if the request for one

additional clerk is approved. The workload of the Section

continues to increase and shows no signs of tapering off.

We will continue to closely watch the clerical situation

and make appropriate recommendations as required by any

substantial change in the clerical workload.

5) The streamlining of our operations wherever

possible to effect manpower savings is under continual

evaluation. Examples of streamlining measures taken since

the last Inspection include: 1) The discontinuance by each

field division of semiannual reports concerning the black

nationalist movement (Bureau file 157-8415).

This was accom-

plished July 6, 1970. 2) On November 3, 1970, the Agitator

Index was revised to delete those who were also included on

the Security Index. 3) On November 5, 1970, existing

instructions were modified concerning recordings of black

-NW 88608-Docld:32989638_Page 551

---

## Page 552

— wr

and New Left public appearances to allow the SAC to

authorize use of concealed recording devices by a

Special Agent or a proven source in covering public

appearances by black and New Left extremists

except

such appearances at educational institutions: Pre-

viously, prior Bureau approval was necessary.

In addition, we continue to utilize our

teletype dissemination facilities to the maximum

extent possible.

6) The Special Agent complement of 21 is

the same as at the time of the last Inspection.

The Division was reorganized December 17,

1970, on the basis of approximate casaluad por Supervisor

of 279.

This figure was based on the October 1, 1970,

caseload figures. Since that time there has been a

heavy increase in the caseload in the black extremist

field where at present the average caseload as of

January 1, 1971, stood at 349 per Supervisor. At the

time of the last Inspection, the caseload of

the Section

stood at 5,946 including Klan and white hate-type cases.

Under the reorganization this Section lost

the Klan and

white hate cases and as of January 1, 1971, the caseload

encompassing black extremist individuals and organizations

including racial informants in these organizations sood

at 6,642, anincrease of 696 cases since the date of the

last Inspection.

There is a dire need for additional Special Agent

supervisory personnel to handle our heavy responsibilities

in the black extremist field, if we are to afford these cases

the attention that they deserve. Based upon the Division

reorganization figures, an additional four Supervisors would

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 552

184

---

## Page 553

be required; however, we have tightened our belt and

taken streamlining measures wherever possible and are

requesting only two Special Agent Supervisors at the

present time. We will attempt to accomplish our

objectives with two additional Supervisors.

There are several factors that would indicate

our work in the black extremist field will continue to

increase. The increasing militancy of black extremists

on college campuses caused us to require the field (by

airtel 11/4/70) to open cases on all black student groups

on college campuses as well as cases on the leaders

thereof. There are numerous such groups throughout the

United States.

The Black Panther Party is growing and in

September, 1970, openeá up an international seciion in

Algiers.

In addition a grand jury is sitting in California

with witnesses being heard in efforts to develop a prosecutive

theory against the Black Panther Party, The work in connection

therewith and other aspects of the Black Panther Party invest-

igation consumes almost the full time of one Supervisor.

Black extremist activity in this country is

rapidly developing more and more in international aspects.

Residents of other countries, including United States

citizens and non-citizens, are involved in clandestine and

overt operational and propaganda activity among racial

extremists.

We have targeted CIA as well as our Legal

Attaches abroad for the development of data regarding

foreign influences in the black extremist movement.

National Security Agency has vast capabilities in developing

the type of information needed and we have alerted that

Agency to our basic needs and have made arrangements for

future assistance.

A prime factor in the rapid increase in our

caseload has been our technical coverage of the Black

Panther Party. At the time of the last Inspection we

had six such technical surveillances in operation.

We

presently have 12 installed, one awaiting installation,

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 553

---

## Page 554

and one awaiting approval. This special coverage provides

on a daily basis a wealth of intelligence information and

is most productive source for the opening of numerous new

cases in the black extremist field. With the added coverage

we can expect a continuing increase in the caseload.

In view of the above factors, there exists a dire

need for two additional Special Agent Supervisors at this

time.

7). In evaluating personnel adequacy, we take

into consideration not only the caseload which is compiled

on a monthly basis but also results of periodic mail counts

taken on a quarterly basis. Many of our cases on key figures

in the black extremist movement such as David Hilliard,

Huey P. Newton, Elbert Howard Le Rol ones, Eldridge cleaver,

Emory Douglas, and others require a considerable amount of

supervisory attention.

As previously noted, the Department is attempting

to develop a prosecutive theory against the Black Panther

• Party and as a result it has been necessary to assign one

Supervisor almost

exclusively to handle investigation of

this organization. The investigations of other organizations

require a great deal of supervisory attention and direction.

Analyses of current developments in the racial field, spacial

requests from other Government agencies, preparation of

special studies, and initiation of special projects all

require the expenditure of considerable supervisory time

and are taken into consideration in evaluating the adequacy

of personnel.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 554

---

## Page 555

ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL

6-E

SECTION CHIEF W. R. WANNALI fie

NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE SECTION

As of close of business 1/8/71 Section complement was:

Special Agents

Secretaries (Steno)

Secretary (Typing)

Stenographer (Supervisory)

Clerical (Supervisory)

Stenographers

Clerks (GS-4, 5, 6, 7)

Totals

Authorized

Actual

20

8

1

1

1

26

19

76

20

8

1

1

1

26

19

76

Section Front Office consists of two Special Agents, one Secretary

(Steno) and one Secretary (Typing) •

Cuban Unit consists of three Special Agents, one Secretary (Steno),

one Clerk (GS-5) and one Clerk (GS-4).

Nationality Unit consists of four Special Agents, one Secretary (Steno),

one Clerk (GS-6) and three Clerks (GS-4).

Special Coordination Unit consists of five Special Agents, three

Secretaries (Steno), one Clerk (GS-7), four Clerks (GS-5), and two Clerks

(GS -4).

Chinese Unit consists of three Special Agents, one Secretary (Steno)

and three Clerks (GS-4).

Middle and South American Unit consists of three Special Agents,

one Secretary (Steno), and three Clerks (GS-4).

Division Stenographic Pool consists of one Stenographic Supervisor

(Steno), one Assistant Supervisor (Clerk) and 26 Clerk-Stenographers, GS-4.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1/12/71

WRW:ams

6-E

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 555

---

## Page 556

- 2 -

6-E

(1) All positions were occupied as of close of business 1/8/71,

although one resignation was pending (described in item 2 below).

(2) Miss Agnes M, Klima, Clerk-Stenographer, GS -4,. assigned

to Stenographic Pool, submitted her resignation effective 1/14/71 and

acknowledgement of same was dated 1/6/71. This stenographic position

Miss Hatches dated 1/8/71 was submitted. Miss Hatcher actually was

transferred to the stenographic position in the pool as of beginning of business

1/11/71 when her replacement, Miss Cheryl Di. Carpenter, reported to this

Section for assignment.

(3) There was no shortage or overage of authorized personnel

as of close of business 1/8/71.

(4) Authorized clerical personnel complement is considered

adequate but not excessive.

(5) As result of last inspection authorized Agent complement was

reduced from 17 to 15. This manpower savings was effected by discontinuing

two programs and streamlining a third one. Supporting memoranda in this

regard have been submitted as attachments to yellow write-up 5-A-4on

Section and Unit Analysis dated 1/12/71.

Memorandum to All Bureau Officials and Supervisors 70-13 dated

7/29/70 noted that the Liaison Section of Domestic Intelligence Division was

being abolished effective immediately. This resulted in a cut-back of one

Section Chief plus eight supervisory Special Agents who were engaged in

domestic liaison functions. Calls from other U. S. agencies formerly handled

by these nine men are now handled by Agent personnel throughout the Bureau

who are principally concerned with the subject matter of the call. By far,

the majority of such calls are handled by Agent personnel presently assigned

to Nationalities Intelligence Section. In addition, representatives of other

agencies who were contacted in their offices prior to discontinuance of

Liaison Section frequently call at Domestic Intelligence Division for

consultation. Arrangements were made for couriers representing certain

other sensitive agencies, such as National Security Agency and Central

Intelligence Agency, to call at Domestic Intelligence Division fos the purpose

of delivering or receiving mail requiring protective services of armed couriers.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 556

---

## Page 557

- 3 -

6-E

Thus, many of the functions formerly performed by Special Agent personnel

are handled by currently assigned personnel within the Division, resulting in

the savings of the time of the nine Agents released.

As a result of the Division-wide reorganization effected 12/16/70

this Section absorbed without offsetting Special Agent personnel work

relating to Chinese matters formerly assigned to three Special Agent

Supervisors in the Sino-Satellite Section (now abolished). This resulted in

an increased case load of over 25 percent.

(6) While there are 20 Agents assigned to the Section, two are

assigned to the Section Front Office and five to the Special Coordination

Unit, which handles remaining domestic liaison functions and all foreign

liaison functions; thus, there are 13 Agents assigned to desks on which cases

are handled. The case load per Agent since the last inspection has increased

from 193 to 278, a 44 percent increase. This has been the result of cutting

back two Agents as result of the last inspection and the assignment of Chinese

work to the Section effective with the Division reorganization 12/16/70. There

has been insufficient time since the latter date to establish whether the

significant increase in case load per man will adversely affect the efficient

operation of the Section. At this time, however, no additional Agent personnel

is being requested for assignment to desks handling cases but the matter

will be closely followed and if recommendations in this connection are

considered appropriate in the future they will be submitted with justifying data.

At the present time there are five supervisory Special Agents

assigned to the Special Coordination Unit and the heavy increase in work load

on the Foreign Liaison Desk (FLD; in that Unit (to which two of the five Agents

are assigned) has resulted in a situation warranting the assignment of two

additional Special Agents to the desk. In connection with this, following is

submitted:

In December, 1970, our foreign liaison offices were expanded from

11 to 17. It has come at a time when the two FLD Supervisors have been

barely able to keep up with the flow of paper let alone actually examine and

analyze it in order to afford active and constructive supervision to our

foreign offices. This problem arises from two causes, (1) the heavy demands

made on the time of these two Supervisors in welcoming and personally

supervising the visits to the Bureau of the many foreign dignitaries who

are valuable and cooperative contacts of our Legal Attaches --such visitors

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 557

---

## Page 558

- 4 -

6-E

currently average 27 per month; and (2) the appreciable increase (62 percent)

in the past ten years of the Foreign Police Cooperation cases we handle.

The Legal Attache expansion in December, 1970, increased Bureau

personnel abroad from 60 to 88, of which latter number 42 are Special Agents.

The latest case load figures available for the 11 Legal Attache offices then

existing are for 10/31/70, at which time the 11 offices carried a total of

3, 020 cases. In October,

1960, five Special Agent Supervisors were assigned

to the FLD, one of whom devoted a portion of his time to Buplans matters,

which matters have now been transferred to another Section. At that time

the case load for all foreign offices was 1693.

In October, 1960, we had 166 Foreign Police Cooperation cases on

the FLD. In October, 1970, there were 273. This large increase in Foreign

Police Cooperation cases was absorbed as a result of the delegation to a

clerical employee of supervisory responsibility for about 95 percent of the

cases. This clerical employee, who is in Grade G3-7, is most efficient and

quite capable but cannot be expected to have the experience of an Agent t0

recognize promptly potentially embarrassing situations arising.

As we now have six new Legal Attache offices, we can expect both

the case load and the Foreign Police Cooperation requests to increase substantially.

The FLD Supervisors should be watching mail flow to determine

the promptness with which Legal Attaches respond io requests; the thoroughness

of handling such cases; and the adequacy of foreign agency contacts in a

• position to afford the Burear the desired degree of cooperation. The ELD

Supervisors should be preparing memoranda reflecting Legal Attache accomplish-

ments in order to keep the Director fully apprised of the truly excellent work

being done by our Agents abroad. As the situation now stands, the two present

FLD Supervisors just do not have time to do this and we are incurring the

risk of failing to afford direction and guidance in this very important area

of the Bureau's operations.

To comply with Bureau requirements our 42 men abroad must

seek cooperation of foreign agencies. In reciprocity they must accept

requests for investigations in the U. S. regarding matters as simple as running

down bad debtors to complex investigations involving the location of murder

suspects. The two present FLD Supervisors at this time, because of the

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 558

140

---

## Page 559

- 5 -

6-E

heavy demands on them, are unable to afford the necessary direction and

assistance to the clerical employee handling Foreign Police Cooperation

cases.

To afford the necessary and proper guidance to our foreign operations,

particularly to the six new offices which have now been established and which

will make heavy demands for immediate support, and to overcome the

present heavy work load described above, two additional Agent Supervisors,

preferably men having potential for foreign assignment, should be approved

for the FLD at this time.

(7) Criteria utilized in evaluating personnel adequacy include

continuing analysis of Agent and clerical work load, case load, mail counts,

complexity of cases, relative importance of matters to national security and

intelligence requirements, patterns of delinquency, personnel capabilities,

and past experience in shifts of emphasis of work from one area to another.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 559

---

## Page 560

ADDENDUM

INSPECTOR I. S. WILLER:

ESM:wmj

1/22/71)

During the course of this inspection

thorough analyses of work were performes

which have given some insight in the

supervision of work in your Division.

Taken into consideration was your recent reorganization of the Division

which appears to have accomplished a better balance of work between branches.

In this write-up you have requested replacement Agents for SAs C. E.

Enright and GM. Quinn, both assigned in your Espionage and Racial Branch.

In addition, you have requested two additional Agents for the Racial Intelligence

Section and two Agents for the Special Coordination Unit.

Division case load was surveyed by categories from the field administrative

reports for a 12-month period (January through December, 1970) to establish

trends over this period. Basically, portinent trends indicated increases of

70.2% in Internal Securityand New Left cases during the i2 month period; a

57. 4% increase in racial matters; 34. 9% in Security Informants; a decline of

33% in Espionage (65) and decline of 13. 3% in Internal Security - Nationalistic

Tendency (105) cases.

In addition, case loads by Section were reconstructed (in view of Division

reorganization) and compared with case loads at the time of the last inspection

as indicated in the following:

Last Inspection

5846

4746

Current Inspection

Espionage

Racial

Nationalities

Intelligence

Internal Security

New Left

Research

2944

3658

6551

No cases

•5038 (-808)

6642 (+1896)

3620 (+676) (Does not include

5318 (+1660) Spec. Coordina-

6421 (-130)

tion Unit)

To further analyze case and work load the Research Section and Special

Coordination Unit were excluded from computations and manpower was considered

on the basis of 50 men in the Espionage Racial Intelligence Branch and 33 men

in the Internal Security Branch(Section Chief and Number One Men also excluded.

Total case load in Espionage Branch currently is 15, 300 and ll, 739 in Internal

Security;case load per supervisor in Espionage determined to be 14% lower than

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 560

---

## Page 561

his counterpart in Internal Security (306 vs. 356). It is noted in this regard that

the Racial Intelligence case load raises the Espionage Branch figures, since the

Nationalities intelligence Section has an average of only 278 and Espionage

Section of only 280 cases per man. The average in Racial Intelligence Section

is 350.

We next conducted surveys to determine whether the complexity of cases in

Espionage and Nationalities work was appreciably more complex to justify the

above-noted differences in case load.

All pending 65 classification cases (total 327) were reviewed and it was

determined a total of 539 items of correspondence containing instructions

or direction emanating from SOG were contained in these files or an average

of 1. 6 pieces of correspondence in a 12-month period. Over half of this was

somewhat routine and very short.

We also reviewed the 100 most important (105s) cases and determined an

average of 3. 37 pieces of correspondence originated at SOG in these files.

62% of this was considered somewhat routine.

We reviewed over 30% of your 298 Potential Double Agent cases and

determined the average case was 3 1/2 years old and contained only l piece

of correspondence in over 3 years (subject of separate write -up).

Other surveys revealed current active cases in these categories had an

average of only 3+ pieces of correspondence in a 12-month period.

It is felt that degree of supervision and the amount of instruction and

direction given our cases can be measured in one way by the frequency of

correspondence necessitated by the individual cases.

Another survey of mail signed out at Section level revealed that approximately

57% of your outgoing mail emanates from the combined efforts of your New Left

and Racial Sections. Espionage Section contributed about 8. 7% and Nationalities

Intelligence about 15%.

On the basis of the above studies and reviews of files, I conclude that, if

anything, due to the intensity of the action that it requires more input to supervise

Racial and New Left than it does cases assigned in the Espionage and Nationalities

Sections.

For this reason, I feel you still have an imbalance in your Division which should

be corrected. That is, you still have 5 men working Espionage and Nationalities

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 561

193

---

## Page 562

work who should be shifted to other work to balance your

assignments.

I do not feel that you need two more men in the

Special Coordination Unit at this time since increased work

load considerations due to the additional Legats has not yet

happened. When and if it does, you should make necessary

intra-Branch transfers.

I agree with your recommended replacements for SAs

and Quinn; however, replacement for Quinn should be assignec

the Racial Section

and not the Espionage

Section. I am submitting

separate recommendations regarding this.

Any further additions to the Racial Intelligence Section

should be made from within the Espionage Branch from the

pertinent Sections.

To recap, I feel as a result of this inspection that your

present quota

of 116 men is adequate. I feel the replacements

requested are justified but I do not agree with your request

for 4 additional Agents.

Comments of Assistant Directoy Brennan requested:

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN:

The Inspector has noted

DE(DEM: eln - 1/23/71)

our recent reorganization

to accomplish a better

balance of work between

branches.

The reorganization was based on memorandum 10/9/70, Sizoo

to Brennan, requesting 6 additional Agent Supervisors and

memorandum

10/14/70, Mr. Felt to Mr. Tolson, denying this

request. Mr. Felt's memorandum noted there were 18921 cases

(excludinglarge volume of informants and Communist Party, USA,

matters) and based on our set up at that time the average case

load per Agent was 305 in the

Internal Security Branch and 225

in the Espionage Branch.

Details of the approach utilized in our reorganization,

12/16/70, are set forth in the attachment.

With 116 Division

Agent complement and 83 desk

agents (same figures utilized

during current inspection we distributed the Division case-

load (22,857 as of 10/31/70, or an average of 275 per desk

agent) as equitably as possible.

ment of caseload among the six

he six present sections

This resulted in apportion-

present sections as follows:

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 562

194

---

## Page 563

Section

Internal Security

Nationalities Intelligence

Racial Intelligence

New Left

Espionage

Research

Totals

Desk

Agents

13

13

19

20

18

0

83

Cases

Average Cases

Per Agent

3627

3692

4948

5491

5099

0 :

22857

279

284

260

• 275

283

0

275

During the reorganization all work as well as cases formerly

handled in three sections in the Espionage Branch was consolidated into

two sections. All cases and work formerly handled in two operational

sections in the Internal Security Branch were spread among three sections

with the creation of the New Left Section as a separate entity. This

resulted in additional Agents for New Left work.

Since 10/31/70 (caseload figures utilized for reorganization

purposes) caseloads in each section have changed as follows:

Current

Section

Espionage

Racial Intelligence

Nationalities Intelligence

Internal Security

New Left

Research

10/31/70

5099

4948

3692

3627

5491

Inspection

5038

6642

3620

5318

6421

Net Change

-61

+1694

-28

+1691

+930

0

The slight reductions in caseloads in the Espionage and

Nationalities Intelligence Sections have left the average cases per Agent

at 280 and 278, respectively, both above the norm of 275 established for

reorganizational purposes.

The Inspector has noted the number of outgoing pieces of

correspondence in the 65 classification cases, the 100 most important

105 classification cases, and a review of 80 percent of 298 "potential double

agent'' cases. The vast majority of the cases handled in the Espionage

and Nationalities Intelligence Sections are 105 classification cases.

Recognizing the Inspector reviewed the most important cases and determined

that on an average 3.37 pieces of correspondence originated at the Seat of

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 563

---

## Page 564

Government in these files, I would estimate that a conservative minimum of

over two pieces of correspondence originated at Seat of Government in each

of the 105 classification group as a whole. With an average caseload of

280 per Supervisor, this would mean that 560 outgoing communications

would be submitted each year.

Minus weekends and holidays, there are

252 workdays in a year and I would estimate an average of 32 days per

man would be accounted for by annual leave, sick leave, inspection assign-

ments, tour assignments, firearms and physical examinations. This would

leave 220 days for productive work per Supervisor. This would mean

that each Supervisor would be required to review the necessary files and

dictate approximately two and one-half communications per day. I feel this

is perhaps a conservative estimate inasmuch as many of the cases involved

relate to foreign diplomats and in each case, at the inception, we have to

prepare a communication to Department of State setting forth basic facts

about the individual and obtaining authority to investigate, and, thereafter,

issue appropriate instructions to the field. Thus, in these cases, there

are two outgoing communications prepared at the very inception.

In addition to measuring work on the basis of outgoing corres-

pondence, I think note must be taken of the fact that the Espionage and

Nationalities Intelligence Sections have a responsibility with regard to over

130 countries. The vast majority, of course, are of concern to the

Nationalities Intelligence Section.

Supervisors on the various desks have

to be aware of conditions existing which affect the Bureau's responsibilities

in the intelligence field and this encompasses the review of much intelligence

material which shows up in the incoming mail count, all of which must be

properly reviewed and coordinated.

During the inspection a mail count was kept for five days and

the results, of course, are available to the Inspector. In this connection,

during the five-day period, each Supervisor in the Espionage Section

received an average of 255 pieces of regular incoming mail (such as, Seat

of Government memoranda, letterhead memoranda, teletypes, airtels,

cables, letters from field, and letters from outside agencies) for a total

of 378

pages. Other incoming mail (such as intelligence reports and cables

from other agencies, Bureau Source 6 and Bureau Source 200 items,

publications, visa notifications and similar such items) averaged 40 items

per Agent in the Espionage Section and the pages totaled 213. With regard

to outgoing mail, there was an average per man of 11 items and 18 pages

of dictated material and 79 items and 157 pages of outgoing nondictated,

all of which involved preparation of material for dissemination to other

agencies. In the Nationalities Intelligence Section, the comparable average

figures per Supervisor were 213 items and 416 pages of incoming regular

mail, 109 items and 440 pages of other incoming mail, 22 items and 40

pages of outgoing dictated mail, and 68 items and 169 pages of outgoing

nondictated mail.

196

-SIX 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 564

---

## Page 565

SUPERVISORY NON- INVESTIGATIVE PERSONNEL

Special Coordination Unit

New Lefi Report Unit

Racial Report Unit

Speciul Records Unit

Centrai Research Unit

5

4

15

17

Front offices (Sections & Division)

(Proposed 12-5 nnn) (4-12 shift)

TOTAL HON-INVESCIGATIVE

TOTAL DEVASION COMPLOMENT

getive rersonnel

TOTAL AVAILABLE INVESTI-

GATIVE PERSONNEL

DEVISIO CASE 206D WERAGE (2021/70)

Total Division Case Count

Total Investigative Personnel

Division. Average Cose Joad

33:

3.16

33

33

22,857

8$

275

197

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 565

---

## Page 566

INTERNAL SECURITY SECTION

Cases

Men

2

Average

ront Office

Conmunist Party, USA

Unit

Bacic Revolutionary

individual Unit

International New left

Unit

Ian & thile Hate Croups

Unit

Recurity Infornant Unit*

ESt.

Oue additional man

382

1517.

26*%.

E14

726

3324**

2

191-

.:.

3

506

3

223

2.

2

353

166

:3627

15

279

*SIC tron Reseasch Section

Ad Hoo, etc.

Does noc include 268 routine CP infornent cases.

-NW-88608_Docld:32989638_Page 566

198

---

## Page 567

NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE

Average

219

207-

252

496

2S5

2300

Cases

Front Office

Cuban Unit

Middle & South, American

Unit

Nationalities Unit

Ichnic Groups Unit

(IncI. CH.)

Special Coordination

Unit

657

Men

2

3

622

926

3

4

1487

3

0

5

3692

20

13*

*Ne* Case

Supervisors

_ NW 88608_Docld:32989638 Page 567

199

---

## Page 568

RACIAL SECTION

Cases

• 0

Men

Average

Front Office

Thiee Black Nationalist

Units

Racial Informant Unit

4380

568

16

3.

4948

t 159122

21

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 568

100

---

## Page 569

NEW LETT SECTION

Cases

Men

2

Average

Front Office

Security Informant Unit

(Est.)

New Left Indivicuals Unit

• New Left Gioups Unit

• Special Investigations

Unit

Sabotage

557*

1464

952

3

4

189

488

238

2311

• 167

8

1.

293

167

5491•

22

275

*600 (Ist) cases to Internal Security Section With those

organizations transterred.

":

7-

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 569

---

## Page 570

ESPIONAGE SECTION

Cases

Front Office

Four Soviet & Two

Satellite Units

5099

Men

2

18

Average.

283

5099

20

283

NW 88608 • Docld:32989638 Page 570

---

## Page 571

RESEARCH SECTION

Cases

Front Office

Central. Research Unit

Racial. and New Leit

Reporting Unit;

Speciul'Records Unit**

Hen

2

5

Average

0-

2

0

13***

*Combining two units trees one SIC to handle iufurints

in intornal security section.

*Wil assume recuid keeping function foi Security informants.

**This low complenent of Agent porsonnol should stand up

when super clerks (4) aie taken into accouni.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Pagel571

---

## Page 572

The fact that the work on a desk is measured by more than just

caseload can best be illustrated by citing figures of incoming and outgoing

mail for Special Coordination Unit, Nationalities Intelligence Section, for

which no case load is reported.

In that Unit there were 1173 items

consisting of 1777 pages of regular incoming mail; 52 items consisting

of 137 pages of other incoming mail; 117 items consisting of 233 pages of

outgoing dictated mail; and 290 items consisting of 456 pages of outgoing

nondictated mail.

As can be seen from the above, since the time of reorganization

when equity in caseloads was established and manpower assignments made,

there has been no decrease in the amount of work responsibilities in the

Espionage and Nationalities Intelligence Sections. The December, 1970,

reorganization resulted in the assignment of significant extra work to those

two Sections. The substantial increases in caseloads in Racial Intelligence,

Internal Security and New Left Sections have resulted from the opening of

new investigations on members of basic revolutionary groups and the

removal of the moratorium on Security Index reporting, approved by the

Director, plus increased efforts in these areas by the field.

I feel a strong responsikility in our work in the Domestic

Intelligence Division in connection with the national security of our country

and am concerned with the ever increasing number of officials from

communist countries assigned to the U.S. In addition, the President

has recently expressed his urgent need for better high-level coverage

which has resulted in expansion of our operations abroad and where possible

in the U. S.

Foregoing was taken into consideration in connection with my

request for additional personnel and you may be assured that whatever decision

is reached I and the men in my Division will do our utmost to fulfill our

responsibilities in all areas.

ADDENDUM

The information furnished

INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER:

by you will be taken into

(ESM: djr

r 1/25/71)

consideration in further

evaluating your request for

additional men and you will be advised of the Bureau's decision

in this matter.

Assistant Director note.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN

dr.

1/25/71

Noted.

204

---

## Page 573

SUGGESTION MEMORANDA

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 573

---

## Page 574

SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM

ADDITION OF SUITABLE DESIGNATION

TO CAPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS PER-

TAINING TO CERTAIN RACIAL INFORM-

ANTS TO INSURE PROPER ROUTING OF

INSURE

SUCH CORRESPONDENCE AT SOG.

INSPECTOR

..S.

JULEs: Prior to the reorganization of the

Domestic Intelligence Division on

12-16-70, all informants reporting

on racial matters and white hate

groups (including Ku Klux

Klan) were supervised by the Racial Informant and White

Hate Unit of the Racial Intelligence Section. All such

informants are designated as Racial Informants.

Subsequent

to the reorganization of this Division, supervision of

substantive matters pertaining to white hate groups and

corresponding informanis (536) is hanued by the Khan and

White Hate Groups Unit of the

Internal Security Section.

Supervision of black nationalist organizations and related

informant cases (564), continues to be handled in the Racial

Intelligence Section.

As a result of the above, the Racial Intelligence

Section is receiving mail concerning racial informants who

• are reporting on white hate group activity. This mail

should be reviewed and handled by the Internal Security

Section.

At the present time, it is not possible to

determine to which section such mail should be routed without

reviewing the content of the incoming correspondence since

the caption of communications pertaining to all racial

informants indicate only that a racial source is involvea.

The type of activity on which the informant reports - black

nationalist as opposed to white hate groups - is not set

forth in the caption.

pertaining to racial sources involve white hate groups, it

field.

This will permit such mail to be routed directly to

the Internal Security Section and will save an appreciable

amount of time in getting the mail to the section where it

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

127-71

NW 88608 Doeld:32989638 Page 574

205

---

## Page 575

will be handled. Such an addition to the caption will

also preclude the necessity for the content of communica-

tions of this nature to be reviewed in the Racial

Intelligence Section.

It is believed the desired routing could be

effected by adding a characterization, such as White Hate

Group (abbreviated

WHG), to the caption of correspondence

concerning informants who are reporting on the activities

of such groups.

Under existing procedure communications

concerning racial informants reporting on white hate groups

are submitted under a caption such as: CO 1234-R. Under

the suggested procedure the communication would be captioned:

• Co 1234-R

(WHG) •

Comments of Section Chiefs Gray and Moore and

Assistant Director Brennan are requested.

=

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 575

- 2

-

20

---

## Page 576

SECTION CHIEF A.T. GRAY.

Inspector's suggestion is a good

one and should be adopted. However, in conformance with

both existing

"character"

structure of Bureau case titles

and a recommended change regarding security informant titles

Informants; 1s - Communist; NEW Leit,

(memorandum A,V. Gray to C.D. Brennan, dated 1/21/71curity

is proposed that the character designation Racial Matters

be included. Incoming communications concerning white hate

group informants only would thus bear the title:

CO 1234-R

RM - WHG

The Internal Security Section, if the Inspector

concurs,

will implement this change with appropriate

instructions to the field.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISIÓN INSPECTION

1/21/71

AWG: bCW

SECE ON CETE G. C. MOORE NEE

With respect to the Klan and

white hate informants I concur with the above.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN:

I concur with the above.

0201

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

• 1/21/71

AWG: dlb

-

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 576

107

---

## Page 577

SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM

ARTICLES CONCERNING ACTIVITIES OF

RACIAL EXTREMISTS

RESEARCH SECTION

INSPECTOR EDWARD

S. MILLER: The Research Section prepares a

number of timely monographs and

other studies dealing with the

activities of racial extremists. These papers, as well as

the daily teletype summary and the weekly "Summary of Extremist

Activities," serve to keep Bureau personnel, appropriate

government officials, and the intelligence community advisedon

the up-to-date situation involving these matters.

Much information received is from public sources or

otherwise of a non-confidential nature. The, Bureau is in a

unique position to collate and place in perspective the in-

formation concerning activities of these violence-prone ex-

/tremists.

This data could be used for preparation of articles

for publication in magazines, journals, and newspapers which

would serve to expose these individuals and organizations

what they are. Such articles would give the public an insight

into the true

nature oi these extremists who would destroy

OUr

system of government and our society.

This would serve to

diminish public sympathy and support for their activities and

would strengthen public support of law enforcement

in general.

Although the Bureau has prepared and/or been in-

strumental in the publication of a number of articles concerning

the campus revolutionaries of the New Left and of white hate

groups, the only recent material we have made available to the

public concerning racial extremist activities is that set forth

in the Appropriations testimony. There is a definite need for

good, timely articles for public consumption placing in per-

spective and showing the true nature of the activities of racial

extremists.

The Crime Records Division has sources available

• to facilitate publication of such material.

SUGGESTION

It is suggested that Research Section, with the

assistance of and in coordination with the Crime Records Division,

correlate the preparation and publication of articles dealing

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1/20/71

MSR: mcm/mkz.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 577

208

---

## Page 578

Suggestion Memorandum

Articles Concerning Activities of

Racial Extremists

Research Section

with the activities of racial extremists.

Care should be

taken to use only material of a

non-confidential nature which

would not be detrimental to Bureau operations.

Consideration

should be given to a study of the Black Panther Party along

the lines of the article

entitled "A Study of Marxist Revolutionary

Violence; SDS, 1962-1969" which effectively exposed the SDS.

Other articles, perhaps shorter and more limited in scope, on

specific activities and groups also should be considered at an

early date.

Comments of Section Chief R. D. Cotter and

Assistant Director C. D. Brennan requested.

SECTION CHIEF R. D. COTTER:

The Inspector's suggestion

-(TS/mea 1/21/71)

has merit. It is believed that

Research Section would be able

to gather together material which would be of value in educating the public

to the real nature of extremists such as the Black Panther Party. Research

Section will, consistent with current work assignments, begin preparation

of material which, in coordination with Crime Records Division, can be

made public.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1/20/71

MSR: mcm/mkz.

-2 -

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 578

209

---

## Page 579

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNA

N° I think the Inspector's

(TJS/ mea 1/21/71

suggestion is very worthwhile.

We believe that wherever

possible the truenature of extremists should be publicized. Within the

limits of available manpower, we will furnish Crime Records Division

with as much unclassified material as possible for public consumption,

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 579

- 3 -

2/0

---

## Page 580

CASE SUGGESTION WRITE-UP

EQBAL AHMAD

SECURITY MATTER

MISCELLANEOUS

BUREAU FILE: 100-448675

VISPICTOR LIVARDS. MILLAR: This casa was orisinally

opened on 1/25/68 based

upon Albany letter to the Director dated 1/19/68,

requesting Bureau authority to institute an investigation

of the subject based upon his antidraft and anti-Vietnam

protest activities. At the time, subject was also

considered to be a campus leader

and agitator at Cornell

University, Ithaca, New Yorks, where he was employed as

an assistant professor in the school of Industrial and.

Labor Relations.

-Ahmad has subsequently become involved in the

East Coast Conspiracy to Save Lives (ECCSL) and is

presently under indictment as one of the coconspirators

in this matter. (The ECCSL involves a conspiracy by a

aissident group of priests, nuns, teachers,

students

former students who have displayed opposition to the

.Vietnam War by committing acts of violence against

..

Government agencies,

including selective service boards

and private corporations.) The leaders of the ECCSL,

one of

whom is Ahmad, planned to destroy underground

electric and heating systems serving Government buildings

in Washington, D. C. The group also has reportedly

planned to kidnap a high Government official and Ahmad

was a key figure in this phase.

Set forth below is a brief summary of background

information taken from the subject's file:

Personal History

Inmigration and Naturalization Service (INS).

records a BuffaloNew York indicate that Egbal Ahmad

was born December 30 19303t Ickt Bhiar Indiar and is-

A Su zen the na prenan noe subie

Is describeda male, sal pounds brown te m

ha 1320x

(ARN) A13153502

INS records disclose that on February 3201957

AnmadS Stayus was adjusted to that of a permanent resident

alten.-

NW 88608.

Doclo:V2989638 Phge680ligence Division Inspection

---

## Page 581

Eqbal Ahmad

INS records further indicate that Ahmad first came

to the United States in September, 1957, on a trip

financed by a Fulbright Travel Grant and that Occidental

College at Los Angeles, California, provided this

fellowship. His sponsor was the Institute of International

Education.

In September, 1958, Ahmad transferred to

Princeton University on a university fellowship and

remained there until September, 1961, when he left the

United States to take up residence in North Africa. INS

records indicate that Ahmad last arrived in the United States

at New York City on September 21, 1963, destined for

Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey, on a teaching

fellowship.

INS files also set forth prior

residences at

Lahore, Pakistan; Los Angeles, California; Tunis, Tunisia;

Urbana, Illinois, and Ithaca, New Yorks.

Former employments

include "lecturer in Modern

History" at Forman Christian

College and the Pakistan Military Academy in Pakistan as

well as teaching assignments at princeion Univorsity,

University of Illinois and Cornell University.

He was registered inabsentia during 1961 and 1962

and during this time was in Morocco and Tunisia.

He was

awarded a Ph.D. degree on June 13, 1967, by Princeton

University.

On January 14, 1969, the Chicago Office determined

that Ahmad was employed at

the time by the Adlai E. Stevenson

Institute of International Affairs (ASIIA), 5757 South

Woodlawn Avenue, Chicago, Illinois. Ahmad was listed as a

recipient of funds for study in Vietnam for the period

1968-69.

In July, 1968, the Albany Division reported that

information was developed indicating that the subject proposed

to travel to North and South Vietnam. It is further noted

that Ahmad was leaving Cornell University because of failure

to have his contract renewed. He

indicated in a published

article of the "Cornell Daily Sun" that he would travel to

North and South Vietnam during the 1968-69 academic year

as a fellow of the Center for International Studies of the

University of Chicago. The article further reported that

Ahmad would carry press cards from a Pakistani newspaper and

two Algerian newspapers. He was identified as a person active

in the antivar movement

• at Cornell University.

NW-88608-Đocld:32989638-Page 581

2/2

---

## Page 582

Eqbal Ahmad

On July 12, 1968, Ahmad's former landlord at

Ithaca, New York,

advised that the subject told him that

he would travel to Vietnam in September, 1968, in order

to study and report upon the war.

Ahmad reportedly said

that this study would be within his field of interest

since he has been conducting research on guerrilla warfare

and revolutions.

Language Ability

Subject reportedly speaks fluent English, Urdu,

French, Arabic, Persian and Hindustani.

Revolutionary Background

On May 8, 1965, an issue of the "Daily Illini,"

a daily student

newspaper published at the University of

Illinois, Champaign-ürvana camus, Illinois, listed the

participants in a local "teach-in" on the war in Vietnam

to be held on Mary 15, 1965. One of the speakers was

identified as Eqbal Ahmad, assistant professor of political

science who was described

as an expert on guerrilla and

internal warfare who had worked with the anti-French FLN

guerrillas during the Algerian independence struggle and

who reportedly had studied

guerrilla movements all over

the world.

Ahmad's file cites numerous instances of Ahmad's.

involvement in antidraft and anti-Vietnam demonstrations

and activities as well as numerous anti-American statements

made by him. During his subsequent association with the

ECCSL, Ahmad has been one of the prime movers in the plot

to kidnap a high Government official and appears to have

played an increasingly important role as a leader and

advisor of the ECCSL.

In view of the foregoing information, the following

suggestions are set forth for your consideration and

appropriate action:

Eqbal Ahmad appears to have the potential

qualities (background, intelligence, education, experience

and linguistic ability) of a foreign intelligence agent.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 582

= 213

---

## Page 583

Egbal Ahmad

It is suggested that consideration be given to issuing

instructions to the field to institute an intensive

full field investigation of this subject particularly

with respect to his national origin, travel and residences

in foreign countries and involvement in foreign political

activities.

If investigation abroad so justifies, it is

suggested that consideration be given to intensifying

our investigation of the subject to include the establishment

of sources or informants close to him. Physical

surveillance and the development of highly confidential

sources should not be overlooked in effecting full

coverage of

Ahmad's current activities.

This background investigation should insure that

emphasis is placed on developing information concerning

Ahmad's income and tinancial attairs, verilication of

subject's travel to South and/or North Vietnam in

1968-69 and subject's activities in the Los Angeles,

California, area during the period of his attendance at

Occidental College at Los Angeles:

You should insure the field aggressively intensifies

this background investigation, yet it should be emphasized

that utmost discretion and good judgment should be

exercised to avoid unfounded charges of "harassment" being

directed against the Bureau.

The above suggestions are not to be considered as

all-inclusive; however, you should insure that this matter

receives close personal

supervision.

Comments of Assistant Director requested.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 583

214

---

## Page 584

SUPERVISOR WILLIAM J. MC DONNELL!

Suggestions of the

Inspector have been

noted and are well taken. Suggested avenues of approach will be

pursued and the field will be instructed to intensify its investigation

in this matter, utilizing the utmost discretion in view of pending

prosecution against the subject. For this reason, no effort will be

made, pending prosecution, to institute sensitive coverage or other

overt activity which might prejudice the prosecution, result in a

charge of harassment or otherwise be a source of embarrassment to

the Bureau.

Following final prosecutive action of subject, all investiga-

tive measures and techniques will be considered in line with the

Inspector's suggestions to determine the nationalistic orientation and

activities of the subject.

SECTION CHIEF W. R. WANNALL:

Suggestions of the

Inspector have been

noted and are well taken. Suggested avenues of approach will be

pursued and the field instructed to intensify its investigation of subject,

consistent with the fact that at this time prosecution is pending and

therefore discretion must be exercised. This matter will be closely

followed.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN:

Inspector's comments

are noted and appreciated

and prompt action will be taken to implement his suggestions along the

lines set forth above by the Supervisor and Section Chief.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 584

215

---

## Page 585

SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM

CHINESE MATTERS

INSPECTOR EDWARD S. MILLER: The DESECO Program (development

of selected contacts to be directed against Soviet-bloc

officials) has been operated with considerable success

since it was implemented as a result of an espionage conference

in 1957. As a result of this program, a substantial number

of security informants and double agents have been developed.

Simultaneous with the imminent opening of the Chinese

Communist (Chicom) Embassy in Canada in early February, 1971,

we can expect more intelligence operations by the Chicoms

in the U.S. Information already furnished by the Royal

Canadian Mounted Police indicates that possibly fiftyper cent

Of the intelligence activity generated by the Chicons in

Canada will be directed at the U.S.

It is recognized that certain steps have previously

been taken with a view toward developing double agents and

informants among the Chicoms.

include contacts with

certain Chinese scientists working in strategic technical

fields in the U.s., as well as efforts to develop some ethnic

Chinese sources who might be targeted against the Chicoms. It

would appear that these programs should be expanded and

intensified with a view toward developing an aggressive effort

directed at the Chicoms and patterned after the DESECO program.

This program should include persons who by the nature of their

occupation, national origin, or otherwise might be logical

targets of the Chicoms or would have occasion or opportunity

to be in touch with the Chicoms. This program would include

journalists, students, educators, politicians, librarians,

travel agents and the like.

Comments of Section Chief Wannall and Assistant

Director C. D. Brennan requested.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION. INSPECTION

1619-71

JAEDT: IrS

ТОРОСУРСОРАНИТЬ

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 585

214

---

## Page 586

:

SECTION CHIEF W. R. WANNALI

NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE SECTION

1/20/71

tx0: ago

47-454599

CHAOSSES

The

Chicoms,

intelligence/espionage threat posed by the

particularly in

view of the opening of the Chicom

Embassy

in Canada

during 2/71, is

recognized.

intensify our current efforts aimed at penetration of Chicom

intelligence through development of methods and techniques

similar to those utilized in the DESECO Program, We will

extend this operation on a highly selective basis and will

strive to come up with sources who will be in a position

to disrupt or neutralize Chicom intelligence efforts directed

against the U. S.

in connection wiii possible uperations in Cunada,

most cooperative with us

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN

1/20/71

DEM :njt

The Inspector's suggestion will certainly be followed.

In addition, with the strong probability the Chicoms will be

admitted to the United Nations in the near future, DESECO's

in the Chinese field will be most useful to target against

Chicom officials who will be assigned to the Chicom United

Nations Mission and who will be employed in the Secretariat.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 586

217

---

## Page 587

SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM

DEFECTOR PROGRAM

NSPECTOR EDWARD S. MILLER: The development of a Soviet

inted gence officer as a defector-in-place who will

advise us of

intelligence activities and plans

is an urgent and paramount requirement of the Bureau.

We have failed to achieve this objective in

aLmost ten years

activities. This suggests we

problem.

The present "Defector Program" operates as follows:

("Detector committees" consisting of Espionage desk Supervisors

in both the New York and Washington Field Offices select

five Soviet intelligence officers (with Bureau approval) as

defection targets.

This selection is based on a variety of

reasons which indicate the Soviets have defection potential.

These Soviets are then marked for priority attention and

"defection teams" consisting of four men in each office are

oxcluzircly assigred to assist the five casa Agents in con-...

ducting physical surveillances and to apply increased

investigative attention to these Soviet targets which will

hopefully lead towards a successful defection approach.

It is unlikely that only four men and five case

Agents would be able to obtain complete information relating

to the daylight, evening and weekend activities, contacts

and behavior of the five Soviet targets to present a true

picture of their character and psychological makeup essential

ito a successful defection approach.

It is suggested that serious consideration be

afforded to decreasing the number of selected Soviet targets

teen ls nottvated Agents, an he success at te a total

the detection of the

targeted Soviet This etfort would include physical sus

veillances t

the Placing of. Deseco, social, and double agent

Intormants.

to the target; the development of a close

friendship with the

e target by an Agent under appropriate

Whatever*

congrative and northodor procedures may be required to

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

HDC:mkZ=

1/20/71

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 587

2/8

---

## Page 588

create the best possible situation to enable the Soviet

target to defect.

This all-out effort on the "part of each

team should be highly professional and treated as a Bureau

"special" with resolve and overriding determination to

succeed.

It is fully realized that your manpower directed

against soviet intelligence has been decreased. It is also

realized that it is an extremely difficult job to defect a

trained soviet intelligence officer.

Extremely difficult

jobs require extraordinary and

sometimes unorthodox methods.

You should afford this proposal serious consideration and

survey the New York and Washington Field Offices for their

ideas regarding this proposal.

Comments of Section Chief William A. Branigan and

Assistant Director Charles D. Brennan requested.

-.

SECTION CHIEF MILLIAM A. BRANIGAN

1/21/71

(WAB: hke)

-..The suggestion of the Inspector is upprociatoa,

and it is our feeling that it has merit. Steps will be taken

to promptly initiate the survey of the New York and Washington

Field Offices.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAI

1/21/71

DEM:mjt

We are certainly cognizant of the importance of.

developing a defector-in-place in the Soviet field and will

immediately initiate the survey suggested by the Inspector.

-2-

219

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 588

---

## Page 589

SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM

MAXIMUM UTILIZATION OF GHETTO INFORMANTS

RECTOR EDWARD S. MILLER:

Since the implementation

of the Ghetto Informant

Program in 1967, it has developed into a productive source of

accomplishments for the Bureau. Experience has shown that in

addition to being mere listening posts for black extremist

action, these informants, when motivated by specific assign-

ments, also furnish valuable criminal information. As a

result of conferences held at the Seat of Government, the

field was instructed in March, 1970, to give more positive

assignments to ghetto informants. The Director noted, "This

is most important."

• The number of ghetto informants now stands at more

than 6,200, and it is essential that we continually make certain

achieving maximum results from this vast reservoir of

It is believed one additional step toward this

goal would be the giving of more specific assignments to these

ghetto informants, aspecially concerning black extremists..

living in their locality, such as subjects on the security

Index and selected Agitator Index subjects with extremist

tendencies.

Such assignments would include the development

of detailed information concerning black extremist targets

such as data relating to their daily activities, sources of income,

and information as to whether the black extremists are operating

in violation of Federal or local statutes.

Ghetto informants

would be assigned to black extremist targets with whom they are

acquainted or who reside or work in the same area. It is also

probable that in many instances ghetto informants could

also

be targeted against similar subjects of interest to the New

Left Program.

Based on our experience to date, there appears to

be little doubt but what these additional

specific assignments,

if fully implemented throughout the field, would not only

increase our intelligence coverage of black extremists, but

could also be the vehicle for putting more of these militants

in jail on criminal charges.

The success of this approach

would, of course,

be commensurate with the enthusiasm of the

individual Agents in the field

and it is necessary that pressure

be kept on it. A suggested means for checking on the Program's

progress at the Seat of Government would be to amend Form

FD-405 under the heading "Racial Informant Accomplishments"

to require the field to specifically list major accomplishments

attributable to ghetto informants during the previous month.

Comments of Section Chief G.C. Moore, Section Chief

R.L. Shackelford, and Assistant Director Charles D. Brennen requested.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

CNW 88608 D@cKP32889638 Page 589

---

## Page 590

ADDENDUM

BROTTON CHIEF GDORCE C. MOORE TOR

1/21/71

I agree that the suggestion made by the Inspector

has merit and should further strengthen the productivity

of our Ghetto Informant Program and increase our concrete

accomplishments. Necessary instructions will be issued

to the field to implement the suggestion as set forth by

the Inspector.

SECTION CHIEF R. L. SHACKELFORD:

I concur with the above

suggestion.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR CHARLES D. BRENNA

I concur with the

above suggestion and as stated above the appropriate

suggestion will be issued to comply with the Inspector's

suggestion.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1/21/71

JGD: dIb

221

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 590

---

## Page 591

SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM

REVISION OF RACIAL INFORMANT

STATUS REPORT FORM FD-405

INSPECTOR EDWARD S. MILLER: The Racial Intelligence Section

currently utilizes Form FD-405 (copy attached), captioned

"Status Report, Racial Informants, Extremist Groups

(White-Black); Racial Matters."

The form is submitted by

the field quarterly, and it requires a detailed breakdown of

militant black extremist groups, ghetto area, and indicates

the specific informant coverage, including member informants,

for each group and area, in addition to informationrequired

for white extremist groups. A complete listing is furnished

quarterly and only pertinent changes are furnished by the

field as they occur during interim months.

The FD-405s are handled centrally by the Black

Nationalist - South and Racial Informant Unit and are

furnished to Bureau Supervisors handling the substantive

case on each organization listed for timely evaluation of

informani development and coverage in each isi sifico.

This enables the Bureau Supervisor to detect weaknesses quickly

and take appropriate corrective measures.

It is suggested that in order to provide tighter

accountability for member informant development and coverage,

FD-405 be revised to include an additional section to state

as follows:

"Explain why you do not have member informants in

those groups listed in columns #1 and #3 on FD-405a.

"Indicate what specific action is being taken to

develop member informants in those groups and advise when

member informant coverage is anticipated for each group."

Comments of Section Chief George C. Moore and

Assistant

Director Charles D. Brennan are requested.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1/18/71

HDC :mk1

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 591

122

---

## Page 592

TO

FROM

SUBJECT:

FD-405 (Rev. 4-23-70)

OPTIONAL FORM NO. •

5010-106

MAY IDESUISION

GSA GEN, REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Director, FBI

SAC,

STATUS REPORT

RACIAL INFORMAVTS

EXTREMIST GROUPS (WHITE-BLACK)

RACIAL MATTERS

Re:

1. Informants

a. Listed at beginning of month

b. Added

c. Deleted

d. Listed at end of month

2. Informants (Probationary)

a. Listed at beginning of month

b.. Added

c. Deleted

d. Listed at end of.month

. DATE:

VOTE: Items 1 through 9 lis

lotal numbers; items 10 througl

12 list dollar value; tumis

details FD-4051

All racial informants

other than ghetto

Ghetto Informants

3. Number of Agents assigned exclusively

to the development of racial informants

White Estremist

Black Extremist

• 4. Total amount of money paid to racial informants for information concerning black extremist organizations and

individuals under SAC authority.

Services

Expenses

Total

STATISTICAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS

5. Subjects Arrested, FBI Cases

6. Bureau Fugitives (included in Item 5)

7. Subjects. Located, FBI Cases (not included in Items 5 or 6)

8. Subjects Arrested, other Federal Agencies

9. Subjects Arrested, State and Local

10. Merchandise Recovered, FBI Cases

11. Merchundise Recorcred, State and Local

12. Merchandise Recovered, other Federal Agencies

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 592

223

---

## Page 593

1980000(1810. 1-24-01011

Pornial emploto listine quorly - by the 10th of January, April, July, October; runnining month Mumiah only portinont clungos.

Nano, location and number

members of black extremiat

& whiie hate groups includ-

ing identitios of local

chapters & groups on col-

lege campuses.

Identities of informants

& sources providing

coverage.

Underline

member informant.

Identities of individuals

or groups who have parti-

cipated in or are active

in planning acts of racial

violence.

Identities of informants and

sources providing coverage

of the individual or groups

in preceding column.

Identify ghetto areus & esti-

mate the population in ench

ared.

INW

88608 Docld:32989638 Page 593

Furnish the number of

ghetto informant: fumishin

coverage of ench area.

---

## Page 594

F2-405b1Nii%. 123-70310

RACIAL INFORMANT ACCOMPLISHMENTS

(Summarize Informont Accomplishments for Previous Month re Rucial Intelligence Information.)

DETAILS FOR STATISTICAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS LISTED ON FD-405

(Include (1) Corresponding Item # from FD-405; (2) Identity of Case; (3) Field or Bufile i; (4) Type of Accomplishment.)

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 594

---

## Page 595

ADDENDUM

SECENON CHIEF GEORGE C. MOORES IN

1/20/71

The suggestion made by the Inspector will definitely

enable the Racial Intelligence Section to afford closer

supervision to the important task of developing quality

racial informants especially member informants in extremist

organizations.

Our present practice of reviewing the FD-405 and

no member informant in extremist organizations will be

streamlined by the suggestion made by the Inspector. In

vee suggestion made batations willere s

view of the above, appropriate instructions will be issued

to comply with the Inspector's suggestion.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR CHARLES D. BRENNAN:

I concur with tha

above views and as stated above the appropriate instructions

will be issued to comply with the Inspector's suggestion.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1/19/71

...

JGD: pdr

колоть

226

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 595

---

## Page 596

SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM

SUPERVISION AND CONTROL OF SECURITY

INFORMANT DEVELOPMENT AND COVERAGE BY

INTERNAL SECURITY AND NEW LEFT SECTIONS

INSPECTOR EDWARD S. MILLER: Each field office currently

submits an annual report on all security informants and

confidential sources, advising which informants are paid

regularly. The report lists the subversive organizations

currently under investigation by that office and includes

the following basic information: address of organization,

character of case, field file number, Bureau file number,

approximate membership. The report also lists informant

coverage of each organization as follows: officers -

Rank and File - other.

In addition, quarterly reports on the"New Left

Movement" are submitted by the field.

These reports list

informant coverage of New Left groups but do not specify

which

are member informants.

Additionally, Bureau eirtel to all officos dated

11/5/70, captioned "Informant Development, Black Panther

Party, New Left Groups," ordered a complete analysis of

informant coverage in the Black Panther Party and New Left

groups by each office in the field. This is not a regularly

scheduled analysis.

It is noted that the Racial Intelligence Section

currently utilizes FD-405, (copy attached), captioned

"Status Report,

Racial Informants, Extremist Groups White-

Black); Racial Matters."

It is submitted by the field

quarterly and requires

a detailed breakdown of militant

black extremist groups, ghetto area, and indicates the

specific informant coverage, including member informants,

for each group and area, in

addition to information requirec

for white extremist groups. A complete listing is furnished

quarterly and only pertinent changes are furnished by the field

as they occur during the interim months.

The FD-405s are handled centrally in the Black

Nationalist - South and Racial Informant Unit and are routed

to Bureau Supervisors handling the substantive case on each

organization listed for timely evaluation of informant development

and coverage in each field office.

This enables the Bureau

Supervisor to detect weaknesses and take timely corrective measures.

(NAMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECIION

7/18/71

HDC :mk1

2908977979671

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 596

227

---

## Page 597

The immediacy of the need for member informant

coverage in all extremist organizations is obvious if the

Bureau is to be forewarned of plans for bombings, kidnappings,

demonstrations, and other acts of violence in this country.

It is suggested that the New Left and Internal

Security Sections devise a form similar to the FD-405, designed

to fit the unique requirements of those Sections, which will

assist Supervisors to more accurately evaluate and control

informant development and coverage in the field. The form

should require specific information on member informant develop-

ment and coverage in each revolutionary, New Left, extremist,

and protest group under investigation in each field office.

In devising the new form,

the New Left and Internal Security

Sections should bear in mind the suggestion which has been

proposed separately for the Racial Intelligence Section

to revise FD-405 by-adding a section to read as follows:

"Explain why you do not have member informants in

thoge groups listed in columns #1 and #3 on FD-405a.

"Indicate what specific action is being taken to

develop member informants in those groups and advise when

member informant coverage is anticipated for each group."

FD-405 also lists statistical accomplishments

attributable to racial and ghetto informants.

FD-374 is

• used for criminal informants. This information is tabulated

by computer in the Voucher-Statistical Section and is

available for immediate reference, including use by the

Director in his Budget Testimony.

While not ordinarily engaged in criminal activity

statistical accomplishments each year. These include

location of Bureau fugitives,

recovery of stolen merchandise,

and other similar data.

It can be reasonably anticipated

that they will be responsible for additional statistical

accomplishments in the future.

There is no current procedure

for compiling and recording this type of statistical data

by the New Left or Internal Security Sections.

= 2 m

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 597

228

---

## Page 598

It is suggested that in order for the Bureau to

receive full credit for statistical accomplishments attributable

to all FBI informants, the new form devised by the New Left

and Internal Security

Sections should include statistical

accomplishment data as currently required on FD-405.

Comments of Section Chiefs Arbor W. Gray, Robert

J. Shackelford and Assistant Director Charles D. Brennan are

requested.

SECTION CHIETS SHACKELFORD, RANIALI, AND GRAT

The Inspector's

suggestion appears to have merit. The New Left, Nationalities

Intelligence and Internal Security Sections agree that FD-405

could be adapted to fit security informant evaluation in the

New Left movement and in basic revolutionary organizations and

related groups.

It is proposed that representatives of each

of these three sections implement the Inspector's suggestion

by revising the form for security use and preparing the

necessary instructions to the field requiring quarterly

sub-

miscion of this informant status report concerning organizations

under investigation. Coordination, routing and statistical

compilation of the incoming forms would be the responsibility

of the Special Records Unit of the Research Section which

maintains security informant records but the substantive

sections involved would be responsible for evaluation and

any

necessary action on the basis of their content.

It is believed

further that should this procedure meet our needs for evaluation

of member security informants, we should consider the elimination

of the annual security informant report now submitted by each

field office.

It is proposed,

therefore, that this suggestion

be implemented for a six-month trial period (two submissions)

to determine its feasibility

and whether it does meet our needs

for member informant evaluation. At the end of that trial

period, the results will be analyzed and a commensurate

recommendation submitted.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C.

D. BRENNAN

I agree that it would be

(JAS: sjr - 1/21/71)

desirable to carry out this

suggestion at least on a

trial basis to determine its

feasibility. I will follow this

matter and at the end of the

trial period the procedure will be

carefully analyzed to determine whether or not it should be

continued.

- 3 -

≤29

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 598

---

## Page 599

TO

FROM

FD-105 (Rex: 4-23-70)

OPTIONA: FORM NO. 10

5010-108

MAY TESZ FOITION:

GSA GEN.

RIG. NO. 2Y

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandúm

Director, FBI

:SAC,

DATE:

NOTE: Items 1 through 9 list

total numbers; items 10 through

12 list dollar value; fumist

details FD-405l

"" EJECT:

STATUS REPORT

RACIAL INFORMAYTS

EXTREMIST GROUPS (WIIITE-BLACK)

RACIAL MATTERS

Re:

1. Informants

a. Listed at beginning of month

b. Added

c. Deleled

d. Listed at end of month

2. Informants (Probationary)

a. Listed at beginning of month

b. Added

c. Deleted

d. Listed at end of nonth

3. Number of Agents assigned exclusively

to the development of racial informants

All racial inforants

other than ghetlo

Ghetto Informants

White Estremist

Black Extremist

4. Total amount of money paid to racial informants for information concerning black extremist organizations and

individuals under SAC authority:

Services

Expenses

Total

STATISTICAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS

5. Subjects Arrested, FBI Cases

6. Bureau Fugitives (included in Item 5)

7. Subjects Localed, FBI Cases (not included in Items 5 or 6)

8. Subjects Arrested, other Federal Agencies

9. Subjects Arrested, State and Local

10. Merchandise Recovered, FBI Cases

1i. Merchandise Recovered, State and Local

12. Merchandise Recovered, other Federal Agencies

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 599

230

---

## Page 600

11:11..

1, de 121)

LONDON.

1p09 Doodome quarrely on 10th of mangy, April, duly, Datobore e minine monthe dorinh oly portleone clunger.

Name, be crim and mumber

members of bluck extromist

& whire hore amups includ-Identities of informants

ing identitos of local

& sources providing

-chraples & groups on col-

coverage.

Underline

lege emposes.

member intormant.

Irientities ol' individuals

or groups who have part-

cipated in or aro active

in planning acts o1 racial

violence.

Identities of informante and

nources providing coverage

of the individual or groups

in preceding column.

Identify ghetto areas & esti-

mate the population in each

are a.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 600

rumish the number of

ghetto informants fumishing

coveruge of each area.

23!

---

## Page 601

FD-405b (Rev. 4-23-79)

RACIAL INFORMANT ACCOMPLISINENTS

(Summarize Informant Accomplishments for Previous Month re Racial Intelligence Information.)

DETAILS FOR STATISTICAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS LISTED ON FD-405

(include (1) Corresponding Item # from FD-405; (2) Identity of Case; (3) Field or Bufile #; (4) Type of Accomplishment.)

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 601

---

## Page 602

ADDENDUM

suggestion on a trial basis is considered forward-looking,

particularly since you have used this type of handling with

marked success in your Racial Intelligence Program.

It is felt, however, that a six months' period is

not an adequate period to measure the effectiveness, considering

the time requirad to reach full implementation of the program

in the field. For this reason, it is strongly suggested

you make your trial period at least one year.

Comments of Assistant Director Charles D. Brennan

requested.

ADDENDUM

ASSENT INTO, CD. BRENNE

"In line with the Inspector's

(JAS:sjr - 1/22/71)

suggestion, we will implement

the program involved and

evaluate it at the end of one year.

T

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

fIC HDC:mk2

1/22/71

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 602

- 4-

233

---

## Page 603

VENCEREMOS BRIGADE

INS PACIOR EDWARD S. MILLER: The Venceremos Brigade (VB)

originated with a group of

Americans who traveled to Cuba in January, 1969, to take

part in the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the

Cuban revolution.

The national organization of the VB

obtained support from a wide spectrum of leftist organizations

including the Communist Party, Socialist Workers Party,

and

the Progressive Labor Party, as well as violent revolutionary

groups such as the Black Panther Party, La Raza (a militant

Mexican-American civil rights group),

and the Weatherman

faction of the Students for a Democratic Society.

The idea of aiding Fidel Castro in meeting his

proposed quota of harvesting ten million tons of cane sugar

for 1970 quickly took the fancy of the young revolutionaries.

Two hundred sixteen young Americans went to Cuba in November,

1969, to cut sugar cane and returned on February 11, 1970.

The second contingent of 687 American youths left New Brunswick,

Canada, on February 12, 1970, aboard a converted Cuban cattle

boat and returned on April 28, 1970.

The third contingent of

407 individuals sailed for Cuba aboard the Conrado Benitez

on August 25, 1970. They returned to New Brunswick,

Canada,

on October 21, 1970. Presently a fourth group is being formed

to leave on or about March 1, 1971, to stay in Cuba until

approximately May 15, 1971.

While no evidence has been received that those persons

who traveled to Cuba received guerrilla warfare training in

Cuba, they were constantly told that they were the vanguard of

the revolution in the United States. They were told the only

way to defeat the imperialistic Government of the United States,

which must be overthrown, is through revolution.

Under the current instructions individual cases are

opened to locate, interview, and recommend placement on the

Security Index on each person who traveled to Cuba.

The SAC

may authorize the interview except where the person is under

21 years, is currently a student or professor, has some connection

with an

institute of learning, or is a journalist. In these

instances Bureau authority must be obtained for the interview.

Investigation of these persons, under the current instructions,

is that the case remain open for one year with 90-day verifications

of residence and employment after their interview.

The purpose

is to determine whether their inclusion on the Security Index

after the interview is warranted.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1/20/71

234

- WW 88608 Docld 32989638 Page 603

---

## Page 604

Venceremos Brigade

To date, less than half of the VB members have been

located and a large portion of those located have been

uncooperative insofar as the interview is concerned.

Over

100 of these persons have been placed on the Security Index,

and it is anticipated that numerous others will be listed.

Many have been arrested for engaging in acts of violence since

their return, have participated in anti-Vietnam demonstrations,

or demonstrated at trials involving members of the Black Panther

Party or the persons involved in the October, 1969, "days of

rage" indictments in Chicago, Illinois.

It is proposed that prior to closing any of the VB

cases after the interview and a year of following the

individual's activity on a 90-day reporting basis, he be

interviewed a second time. For those who were initially

cooperative, we should make every effort possible to convert

these persons as informants.

Those who were initially

uncooporative should be considered for Priority II handling,

and

those who have met the requirements for Security Index

inclusion in the initial stage should be re-evaluated to insure

they still meet those reguirements.

Since the members of the VB have made blatantly

false statements in their passport applications by not

disclosing their true destination, a technical violation of

the law exists. In addition, many of the applications

contained either false or out-of-date information including

incorrect or old addresses and places of employment.

technical violations and items

of incorrect information should

be brought to the attention of Assistant Attorney General

Robert C. Mardian who has recently been appointed in charge of

the Internal Security Division of the Department of Justice.

He, together with Attorney General John N. Mitchell and

James O. Eastland, United States Senator from Mississippi,

has publicly

indicated they were considering some antisubversion

bills making it a crime to give aid and comfort to the enemy,

particularly the North Vietnamese who had representatives in

Cuba to meet the VB, and toughening the law against advocating

the overthrow of the Government.

The passport violations could

certainly be reviewed and brought under their consideration for

prosecution under current laws or for new legislative proposals.

Inasmuch as

some of the VB members have indicated

they were going underground and the fact that a majority have

- 2 -

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 604

235

---

## Page 605

Venceremos Brigade

not been located for interview, you should consider placing

name stops in the Identification Division so that if these

persons are arrested or an inguiry is made by local law

enforcement authorities this fact will be immediately brought

to the attention of the Bureau.

In addition, a stop file is

now being set up by the NCIC Unit for persons other than

fugitives concerning whom the Bureau has an interest. This

file will require, in addition to the name and birth date of

the individual, as

many other items of identification as

possible such as his lingerprint classilication,

Social

Security number, military service number, Selective Service

number, and the like.

Every effort should be made to utilize stops with

the Identification Division and the NCIC Unit on these persons.

We should continue to impress upon the field the

neêu di iniormanto among the VD groups and insure that

coverage of the fourth contingent is at least at the level

of the second contingent ive informants and the third

contingent (Lour informants:

Be sure that all efforts are

made to have informants previously refused for passage with

the prior contingents, as well as those nine informants who

have previously traveled with the second and third contingents,

be considered for the currently proposed trip. Also, sufficient

• other new informants should be proposed so that coverage of

this latest contingent will be adequate for the Bureau's

intelligence needs.

Comments of Assistant Director requested.

•.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 605

- 3

236

---

## Page 606

:

MW 88608

VENCEREMOS BRIGADE

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C.D. BRENNAN:

Done inspector* teen

analysis and thoughtful

suggestions in regard to the investigation of the

Venceremos Brigade (VB) is sincerely appreciated. In

connection with the above, the following observations by

this Division are set forth:

1. As the Inspector is aware, security

investigations are

being conducted concerning each participant

of the VB.

These investigations require that background

data including any prior subversive activities be ascertained,

each

individual participant be considered for interview, and

that the field

make a recommendation as to the inclusion of

each VB subject on the Security Index (SI). Upon conclusion

of the above, the field is to advise the Bureau each 90 days

for a period

of one year as to the whereabouts and activities

ul Priurity II, Priority IlI, and any non-SI subiects who are

VB returnees.

Priority I VB subjects are regarded as

extremists and this Bureau is notified each 45 days of their

activities and whereabouts.

• 2. As to the difficulty in locating VB returnees,

it is to be noted that the first and second contingents of

the VB were comprised of approximately 900 individuals made

up of young revolutionaries who were college dropouts leading

nomadic and communal existences.

This mode of living inherently

makes the Bureau's job of locating these subjects for purpose of

interview more difficult.

In contrast, investigation to date

of the third contingent, which was composed mostly of

established college students; indicates that these individuals

will be more easily located.

Since the third contingent

returned to the U.S. approximately 90 days ago, these

investigations as to background data are now being completed

and the initial interviews will be promptly conducted.

3.

The suggestion that these subjects be reinterviewed

upon the expiration of above-mentioned one year period, will

be given serious consideration and instructions to this

effect will be issued to the field upon approval of the

Director. Efforts will be made to develop as informants those

VB subjects who are cooperative and the need for further

investigative attention regarding uncooperative individuals

will be evaluated on the merits of each individual case.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1/21/71

TJM: cae

Docld:32989638_ Page 606

1 29

---

## Page 607

Venceremos Brigade

4.

Regarding foreign travel such as that in which

the VB is engaged, it is recognized that the best interests

of this country would undoubtedly be served by prohibition

of such travel. The Internal Security Act of. 1950 contained

sanctions restricting travel on the part of Communist Party

members.

After extended litigation, the Supreme Court in

June, 1958, ruled in the Kent and Briehl vs. Dulles passport

case

that the State Department could no longer deny passports

to individuals with past history of subversive affiliations.

In June, 1964, the Supreme Court in the Flynn - Aptheher

passport case

ruled that the right of U.S. citizens to travel

abroad is protected by the due process clause of the 5th

Tie supreme he treat of ..

Amendment.

In January, 1967, in the Laub decision specifically

dealing with travel to Cuba,

the Supreme Court ruled that the

State Department could not confiscate an individuals passport

simply because the individual traveled to Cuba without

State Department sanction.

In December, 1967, in the Lyno

recision, the mistrict of Columbia Court of Appeals, ruleo

that anyone can travel to a restricted country if they did not use

their passport to enter that country.

A number of bills have been introduced into Congress

in recent years to remedy the above situation, most of which

have never cleared committee. The Senate currently has a

bill, the Eastland Bill, before the Senate to impose criminal

penalties for violation of travel restrictions. A pending

bill, H.R. 1493, was in December, 1969, introduced to restrict

travel in violation of area restrictions. This bill has been

sponsored by approximately 20 Congressmen. In view of the

above, this Division has not considered it warranted to suggest

additional legislation along these lines.

5. As to technical violations regarding false or

erroneous statements made by members of the VB on passport

applications,

all information developed along these lines

• has

been furnished both to the Department of Justice and the

Department of State for whatever action they deem feasible.

To date neither Department has requested that additional action

be taken in this matter.

6. The Inspector's suggestion regarding the placing

of name stops with the Identification Division and the NCIC

Unit for information concerning hard-to-locate VB members, is

well taken. This Division will coordinate this matter with

NCIC to determine what information is necessary to place

such stops and the manner in which this can best be effected.

Instructions will be issued to the field regarding

238

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 607

---

## Page 608

Venceremos Brigade

implementation of this suggestion.

7. The VB is currently formulating plans for a

fourth contingent to travel to Cuba approximately March 1,

1971. By airtel dated January

6, 1971, interested field

divisions were instructed to immediately initiate an

aggressive campaign to obtain informants to travel to Cuba

as part of this contingent.

These offices were instructed

to advise the Bureau no

later than 1/29/71 and weekly

thereafter as to their progress in this matter.

This

Division is acutely aware of the importance of such informant

coverage and will afford this program close attention.

ADDENDUM

attitude and instructions expressed

Un PJD: bah

1/22/71

by the President, the Director, and

many of the legislators in Congress

have been to curtail the militant

actions and the violent activities on the part of a significant

group of young people in the United States today. The thinking

of the Supreme Court of the United States with its several

recent changes may be along the lines of suppressing the

activities of those who so openly espouse the overthrow of all

forms of denocratic authority in the United States.

In

addition, the Internal Security Division of the Department

of Justice has been specifically enlarged and strengthened to

deal with these matters.

It is recognized that individual

violations of the passport laws have been brought to the

attention of the Department of Justice in prior times. It

might be well to consider presenting the matter in its entirety

to the Department showing the number and frequency of violations

for their consideration and study.

+

We cannot overlook or minimize the fact that over

1,300 individuals have willingly and freely gone to Cuba,

contrary to the State Department's specific instructions.

These persons left in many instances with the impression that

they would be trained in the use of revolutionary weapons

including explosives and incendiary devices. They were subjected

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 608

239

---

## Page 609

during their Cuban stay to all manner of propaganda.

their return to the United

States many have gone underground

and disappeared completely; others have become involved in

crime, violence, and general disruptive activities; still

more have refused to cooperate in any manner with

the duly

constituted authorities as they were so instructed by the

leadership. We cannot afford to overlook these known 1,300

potential Cuban insurgents.

Assistant Director C. D. Brennan please note.

ADDENDUM

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN:

The Inspector's observation

(JAS:sjr - 1/22/71)

with reference to the VB

cases has been

noted and

the Bureau may be assured that these matters are being pressed,

and we will press the field to furnish these

cases vigorous

investigative attention.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 609

24%

---

## Page 610

..=

SUBSTANTIVE WRITE-UPS

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 610

---

## Page 611

SUBSTANTIVE ERROR WRITE -UP.

ROBERT P. BOKTNSKY.

PSI - PO

OFFICE OF ORIGIN - WASHINGTON FIELD

WFO FILE 134-9096

BUREAU FILE 134-19651

INSPECTORS SULLER:

The Washington Field Office by letter to

the Bureau dated 12/31/69 advised that the

subject, a body shop mechanic employed by Amatucci Chevrelet Company Wheaton:

Maryland, was interviewed on 12/30/69, concerning his recent contact with Jan

Naval and Air Attache Polish EmbassY

Washington, I. C, who has been destgnated a known intelligence agent with

defection potential. The subject appeared to be frank and cooperative during the

interview and indicated his desire to assist the FBI. Accordingly, the

Washington Field Office felt the subject had definite informant potential.

In the same communication the Washington Field Office furnished the

Bureau with sufficient background data relative to subject and his wife and

requested the Bureau to check indices.

The Bureau advised the Washington Field Office on 1/7/70 that Bureau files

contained no record of the subject or his wife.

The Washington Field Office by letter to the Bureau dated 3/17/70 furnished

results of background investigation concerning the subject and requested authority

to recontact the subject and attempt to develop him as an informant in the Polish

field.

The Bureau by letter to the Washington Field Office dated 4/1/70 granted

authority to recontact the subject in accordance with provisions of Section 107

of the Manual of Instructions. The Bureau further instructed the Washington

• Field Office to furnish results of recontact with the subject along with recommenda -

tions concerning future utilization of subject.

The Washington Field Office by letter to the Bureau dated 6/30/70 advised

the Bureau that the subject had not been recontacted by Klasa of the Polish Embassy:

but due to subject's continued cooperative attitude and willingness to assist the

FBI, again requested the Bureau to grant authority to develop the subject as a

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1/21/71

ESM:wmj

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 611

241

---

## Page 612

-2 -

PSI in the Polish field.

The Bureau by letter to Washington Field Office dated 7/7/70 designated

the subject as a Bureau-approved PSI and again instructed that he be developed

in accordance with instructions contained in Section 107, Manual of Instructions.

The above comprises a summary of all correspondence to date in 134-19651

file.

JAN ADAM KIASA

IS - PO

OFFICE OF ORIGIN - WASHINGTON FIELD

WFO FILE 105-92157

BUREAU FILE 105-186986

The U. S. Department of State advised the Bureau in October, 1968,

that the subject was scheduled to be assigned to the Embassy of the Polisn

People's Republic, W

Washington

ton. D. C as Assistant Military Naval and

Air Attache, Subject subsequently arrived in Washington, D. C., on May tes

1969.

By communication to WFO dated 6/20/69 the Bureau instructed that coverage

of subject be intensified to determine the identities of any Agents he may be

operating.

By communication dated 8/4/69 WFO advised Baltimore, Chicago, Los

Angeles and Seattle Field Offices concerning identity and background of subject,

furnished each office with a photograph of subject, and set forth additional

investigative leads. The same WFO communication requested Bureau authority

to conduct active investigation of subject including Fisurs when deemed appropriate;

following clearance with U. S. Department of State.

On 9/2/69 the Bureau, with approval of U. S. Department of State, instructed

WFO to proceed with the investigation.

• Subsequent to 9/2/69 WFO and those offices listed above conducted active

investigation of subject and promptly furnished results in a form suitable for

dissemination to the Bureau.

In a progress memorandum to the Bureau dated 6/8/70, WFO advised that 'PSI

Bokinsky, has agreed to attempt to contact Klasa on a social basis. " This

information is not substantiated in the PSI file (134-19651) nor was the proposal

to use the PSI acknowledged in any communication from the Bureau.

NW 88608 Doeld 32989638 Page 612

aes lettar from MinO dotad a lo/a samanta that tha nat

---

## Page 613

- 3 -

Bokinsky, is now employed by Fenner Pontiac in Rockville, Maryland. It is

noted that this information is not in the PSI file, the Baltimore Division was

not advised, and no action was taken by the Bureau.

It is noted that the last Bureau communication to WFO in this matter is

dated 9/2/69 granting authority to conduct Fisurs as may be necessary to

determine if subject is engaged in intelligence activities.

It would appear that this entire investigation to date has lacked proper

supervision at the Bureau level.

You are requested to advise the following:

1. Explain your overall supervisory policy in directing the development

of Potential Double Agents directed against a known intelligence agent.

%. Why you failea to prompty and aggressively insiruci the washingion

Field Office to fully utilize PSI Bokinsky against Klasa, a known intelligence

agent.

3. Why you failed to properly instruct the office of origin to disseminate

to Baltimore Office and verify a change in employment by PSI Bokinsky®

Explanations Requested:

1. Unit Chief Howard H. Wallace, Jr, is requested to explain

why in his overall supervision of these cases he failed to detect the above

delinquencies.

2. Comments of Section Chief Arbor W. Gray, Inspector

D. E. Moore, and Assistant Director Charles D. Brennan requested.

NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 613

243

---

## Page 614

-4.

UNIT CHIEF HOWARD H. WALLACE, JR 24.

HHW : DOW

Are the on the doptonents

development of a security

informant, an automobile mechanic for the purpose of providing

better coverage of the activities of a Polish intelligence

officer assigned to the Polish Embassy. This development is

proceeding because the mechanic is in contact with the intelli-

gence officer in connection with repair of the officer's

automobile.

It is our policy to develop as many assets of all

types as necessary to provide coverage of the activities of

active Polish intelligence personnel. The Manual of Instructions,

Section 107A, page 3, defines various types of sources (confi-

dential sources, potential security informants, security informants,

ana double agents) developed for use in these types of investi-

The term "potential double agent" is not a status

defined in the Manual. It is rather an administrative term

used to distinguish a source being used against an intelligence

officer when the source has not as yet been solicited to handle

assignments Inr that offiger but appears to have the potential

for such functions if requested.

by the Bureau on

Bokingky, 77% designated a potential security intomant

The Manual of Instructions, Section

107K, 7, page 13, provides that correspondence in security

informant and potential security informant cases should be

strictly linited to the administrative handling of the informant

and should not contain information more properly furnished under

the substantive case caption.

The six-month justification for

the subject's status as a potential security informant (per SAC

Letier 68-47, 8/20/68) is contained in WFO letter 1/19/71.

The relatzonship of Bokinsky to Klasa is developing

In a normal pattern and at a pace consistent with avoiding

suspicion that he is under our control. Bureau supervision

has determined this through the case on Klasa, the Polish

intelligence officer against whom the potential security informant

is targeted. In that regard, a 90-day evaluation letter in the

Kasa case was submitted by WFO on 9/8/70 which stated that

attempts were continuing to have the potential security informant

The potential security informant

was to contact asa and advise him of his new employment at

maryland. again, by 90-day evaluation

letter dated 12/7/70 Wo davised the potential security informant

had been in contact with Klasa concerning an automobile repalE.

as a result, masa had requested potential security informant

to nanale the repair of Polish Embassy's automobiles whenever

necessary. It was stated that the potential security

244

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 614

---

## Page 615

-5 -

informant would attempt to maintain contact with Klasa through

the entre of automobile service. It is respectfully submitted

that a review of both cases, the potential security informant

and the intelligence officer against whom he is targeted,

shows that these matters were alforded proper supervision at

the Seat of Government.

2. The field has and must have the primary responsi-

bility for development and direction of potential

security

informants against communist intelligence officers.

The nature

and intensity of the direction of such potential security

informants must be commensurate with the apparent authenticity

of the informant's relationship to and course of conduct with

the intelligence officer against whom he is targeted.

Over the.

years it has been firmly established from both investigative

experience and information obtained from defectors that anyone

who is aggressively cultivating an intelligence officer is

automatically suspected as being under the control of opposition

intelligence and: therefore. a provocateu".

in instant case

Bokinsky's logical entre to

Klasa is Klara's need for me

mechanical

work on his and the Embassy's automobiles.

Given time and

cultivation as is being done according to 90-day letters being

received in the Klasa case he may develop a rapport or relation-

ship with Klasa That could result in his being upgraded to a

security informant. Reviews of the Bokinsky file and the 90-day

letters in the klasa file show this matter is progressing

normally and at a tempo in line with the facts of the relation-

ship existing as well as normal experience in these matters.

Therefore, it is believed there is no lack of proper supervision

at the Seat of Gevernment.

3. It is respectfully submitted that there was no

necessity for the Seat of Government to instruct the office of

origin to disseminate to Baltimore information concerning

Bokinsky and to obtain verification of his employment change

as these

items were covered in investigation.

As a matter of

long-standing policy FO has the responsibility for developing

and handling source coverage against communist intelligence

officers assigned to diplomatic establishments in the Washington,

D.C., area even though the source may live or work in suburban

Maryland or Virginia.

Review of the Bokinsky file shows that

WFO by letter dated 3/17/70 to the Bureau stated that there was

no record oi information concerning Bokinsky available to the

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 615

245

---

## Page 616

-6 -

Baltimore Office. This indicated to the Bureau Supervisor

at the

time that an interoffice communication had been sent

to Baltimore by FO. A check with WEO on 1/22/71 disclosed

that by interoffice

• letter 11/6/69 it had advised Baltimore

that Bokinsky was being considered for development as a

potential security informant by VO. His employment,

residence and date of birth were set forth and indices check

was requested.

By interoffice letter 12/12/69 Baltimore

advised "FO that its indices were negative. Subsequent

verification of Bokinsky's change of employment was unnecessary

when same was brought to the attention of the Bureau in 90-day

evaluation letter submitted under the Klasa

caption on 9/8/70,

again in 90-day evaluation letter of 12/7/70. No separate

communication was required for the informant file regarding

the change of employment because that information would be

furnished in the normal six-month justification submitted

by WFO and it does appear in the six-month justification

dated 1/19/71.

SECTION CHIEF A.V. GRAY: concur with the explanation of

AVG: bew

1/22/71

SA Wallace:

In accordance with

existing instructions, normal

procedures and at a pace consistent with security require-

ments and our experience in these matters, I respectfully

submit that there was no lack of proper supervision at the

Seat of Government.

Inspector D. I. MoOk

1/23/71

DEM: 1mb

I concur with the above comments of SA Wallace

and Section Chief Gray. I feel that PSI Bokinsky must

make any cultivation of Klasa appear entirely normal and

WFO, by letter dated 12/7/70 in the Klasa caption, stated

that Bokinsky will continue to contact Klast concerning

auto repairs

and will attempt to establish a

social

relationship.

Assistant Director C.D. Brennan

1/23/71

DEM: 1mb

I concur with the above comments.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 616

246

---

## Page 617

SUBSTANTIVE ERROR WRITE -UP

ERIC NELSON, PSI

IS - R

OFFICE OF ORIGIN - NEWARK

NEWARK FILE - 134-3757

BUREAU FILE - 134-19669

INSPECTOR

Captioned investigation was instituted

by the Newark Division based upon a

communication to the Bureau dated 12/18/69 in the case entitled "Vladimir G

Azaryan; IS-R (ATC -KGB); Bureau file 105-184321; Newark file 105-25293. "**

This communication seeks Bureau authority to interview subject to assess

his potential as a security informant or double agent.

The subject, a naturalized American citizen,is employed as the chief chemist

at Raysam Corporaton America, erson, New Jersey, and reported to

have had numerous contacts with Azaryan, who is chiet engineer at Amtorg and a

known KGB officer.

By communication to Newark, the Bureau on 1/6/70 instructed that office

to interview subject "in accordance with existing instructions relating to

interviews of security subjects" to evaluate his potential with regard to furnishing

information regarding Azaryan. The Bureau further instructed Newark in the

same communication to furnish results in a form suitable for dissemination.

Newark by communication to the Bureau dated 2/12/70 set forth background

intormation relative to subject (in memorandum form, not suitable for dissemination

as instructed by the Bureau) and stating information contained therein would be

furnished in LHM form under the Azaryan caption.

On 3/31/70 the Newark Office advised under the Azaryan caption and not the

case caption, that Nelson had been interviewed.

The above constitutes a summary of all correspondence contained in

captioned file to date.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1/21/71

ESM :wmj

Ny sebel Dold: 32989638 Page 617

---

## Page 618

-2 -

VLADIMIR G, AZARYAN

IS - R (ATC - KGB...

OFFICE OF ORIGIN - NEW YORK

NEW YORK OFFICE FILE - 105-97980

NEWARK OFFICE FILE - 105-25293

BUREAU FILE - 105-184321

The subject of this investigation first came to the attention of the Bureau

in August, 1968, via a U. S. Department of State communication advising that

the subject had been issued a visa to enter the U. S. as an employee of the Amtorg

Trading Corporation NyC New York. At that time Bureau communication to NYO

dated 8/14/68 instructed that office to be alert to subject's arrival and handle

in accordance with Section 105 K, Manual of Instructions.

Subsequent to that time the NYO and auxiliary offices conducted extensive

investigation including discreet Fisurs and kept the Bureau advised of their

progress by letter dated 12/9/68. In this same communication, a request was

made of the Büreau to contact U. S. Department of State for authority for

intensified investigation of subject including surveillances when necessary. The

Bureau by communication to U. S. Department of State dated 1/3/69 sought such

authority which was subsequently granted by State 1/22/69. The subject has been

under constant investigation by the NYO since that time with a free exchange of

information between the NYO and the Bureau.

The Newark Office advised the Bureau by communication dated 3/31/70

that elson, the Pul, had been interviewed, the results of which were furnished

the Bureau in LHM form dated 4/8/70. The results of the interview were furnished

U. S. Department of State, CIA, Commerce and the U. S. Information Agency.

On 4/17/70 Newark Office again furnished results of contact by PSI Nelson

with the subject in LHM form suitable for dissemination.

On 6/17/70 Newark reported another contact by PSI Nelson with the subject.

The NYO advised the Bureau by LHM dated 6/26/70 that on the evening of

6/14/70 the subject was observed boarding Aeroflot for a flight to Moscow.

Although a concentrate investigative effort was put forth by the New York

and Newark Offices in the investigation, it is noted that no specific directions

were given PSI Nelson by the New York or Newark Offices or the Bureau from

January, 1970, to the time subject left for Moscow in June, 1970, in spite of

the fact that Nelson and the subject had mutual professional backgrounds (chemists)

and from a review of the files appeared to speak the same language.

248

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 618

---

## Page 619

-3 -

It is noted that this case was originally opened as a PSI and

potential double agent case.

It is still in a pending status and

Is still being reported by you as a potential double agent case,

when in fact the individual Azaryan, against whom Nelson was directed

departed the U.S. in June, 1970.

A review of the Nelson file fails to contain any instructions or

directions regarding the development of Nelson as a double agent and

in addition a review of the Azaryar, file similarly contains no infor-

mation or instructions from the Bureau in this regard. There appears

to be a definite weakness in the overall administration and supervision

of this "potential double agent" at the Seat of Government.

You are requested to advise the following:

I. What is your overall supervisory policy in connection with

developing potential security informants directed against a double

agent?

2.

Why you continue in parry this case (Nelson) in a pending

status when the subject whom he was directed against (Azaryan) left

the

U.s. for Russia in June, 1970.

3. Why you failed to instruct and aggressively direct the

office of origin in the Nelson case against the double agent

target

Azaryan.

4. Why you have the Nelson case listed as a potential double

agent when in effect he was being developed as a PSI.

Explanations Requested:

1. Case supervisor and Unit Chief Bowen F. Rose for

failure to detect the above delinquencies in your

supervision

of the Nelson matter.

2.

Comments of Section Chief William A. Branigan,

Inspector D. E. Moore ánd Assistant Director Charles D. Brennan

requested.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 619

249

---

## Page 620

11d

-SA Bowen

(1-22-71

the case of tric elson,

PS1, IS-R,

was assigned to me on 12/17/70,

therefore, I was not responsible

for instruction or direction of the

office of origin in this matter

prior to that date and it has not come up for review on tickler

as yet. With regard to the case of Vladimix G. AzaryaR, IS-R,

this case is closed and has never been assigned to me.

With regard to questions raised by the Inspector,

the following is set out.

It is presumed question one relates to our super-

visory policy with

regard to the development of informants

to be targeted against Soviet officials and/or Soviet agents,

not against our double agents. It is our policy to encourage

informant development of as many individuals as possible

against a Soviet target to provide the widest spectrum of

information concerning his social, business and personal life

in order to develop data essential for in depth defection

analysis.

In addition, we seek to identify those individuals

whom the Soviets appear to be selecting for recruitment and

to develop them to act in our behalf against the Soviets.

Such highly controlled actions serve either to involve the

Soviets in time consuming and costly operations in which they

can only receive carefully selected and screened information

or disinformation or may provide us the basis for effective

counterintelligence actions against the Soviets,

as is so

well illustrated in the Azaryan case. Our supervision in

the development of informants is accomplished through the

close review and analysis of the periodic progress letters

submitted on Soviet officials; the direction which we afford

to contact cases and to the cases resulting from the DESECO

Program.

As the result of an excellent counterintelligence

effort formulated and carried out by the New York Office

with Bureau guidance and direction, a defection approach

was made to Azaryan by NY 5179-5 09 6/4/70 This informant

had previously been

"handled by Yuriy k. Kitaev.

another

experienced, aggressive KB officer.

As a result of this

action, both Soviets departed the U. S. almost immediately.

The loss of these

two experienced operatives most certainly

caused a serious disruption in the activities of the

New York Residency of the KGB.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 620

250

---

## Page 621

-5 -

• ..

We have learned through defector sources that in

instances such as described above, the entire activity of

the KGB officers involved as well

as the Residency as a

whole are subjected to most careful scrutiny to determine

if there has been a penetration; if the operation was

mishandled and what, if anything, can be salvaged fron

other operations which were being run by the officers

involved. Such a review may take many months.

No doubt

Azaryan'S contacts with Nelson have been the subject of

such careful study. Inasmuch as we did not involve Nelson

in our approach to

Azaryan, there is no reason to believe

that the KGB does not still consider Nelson as a potential,

agent.

It would be logical for the Soviets to have

Nelson'S development continued by Azaryan's replacement,

who would by how have been in the U.s. for a relatively

short period of time. Historically, a newly arrived KGB

operative takes some months to get acclimated to the

environment in which he will work and, therefore, does

not jump right in to take over a net of agents.

The Nelson, case has been maintained in a pending

status as it was felt he still possesses potential as a

source against the Soviets.

At this point the only ones

who know if this is true are the KGB. If we were to

attempt to initiate contact between Nelson and the soviets,

they

would be convinced he is a plant and lose all interest

in him. The only course of action we can pursue at this

time is to wait for the Soviets to make a move.

Newark's most recent communication in this

matter advised that Nelson is alert to our interests and

they are maintaining contact with him. This is essential

to insure we have full knowledge and control of any future

Soviet initiatives.

Experience has shown the Soviets will

long as eight years.

will be kept pending for this length of time; however,

for reasons indicated it is incumbent upon us to continue

to follow this

matter for

a reasonable period of time.

A review of the Azaryan file will show aggressive

supervision by Seat of Government supervisors, including

specific instructions to the field.. As a prime defection

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 621

---

## Page 622

target, all facets of the investigation of his activities

were carefully considered. NY 5179-s was selected as the

vehicle to carry out our defection approach. Nelson, a

contact of Azaryan, was interviewed and was cooperative.

His operation as a source against Azaryan was proceeding

in proper fashion, and having decided on the utilization

Of NY 5179-S. to make the approach to Azaryan, there was

no need to expedite Nelson's development.

By not involving

Nelson in this operation we have not unnecessarily revealed

our interests in him and preserved a potential asset.

With regard to question four, the designations of

an individual as a Potential Security

Informant and as a

potential double agent are not mutually exclusive.

Potential

Security Informant is the term defined in the Manual of

Instructions for an individual in position to become active

in intelligence activities and administrative supervision is

in accord with provisions of the Manual of

On the other hand, potential double agent is merely an

potential

Instructions.

arbitrary designation we apply to an individual who is in

contact with a soviet-bloc official, but in which the

relationship has not yet developed

into one of à coveri

intelligence nature. Such a relationship is well

illustrated in Azaryan's overt business contacts with

Nelson on behalt of Amtorg, the soviet trading company.

That such a relationship may abruptly change in character

to a covert intelligence operation is well documented in

countless cases which have arisen out of "innocent" business

oriented contacts.

For this reason the arbitrary designation

of potential double agent was given to Nelson.

In connection with the observation that the Bureau.

instructed the Newark Office to interview netson, and furnish

results in a form suitable for dissemination the Newark

Office furnished background information and advised

information would be furnished in LHM form under the Azaryan.

caption. The only occasion when substantive data received

from a source appears in the informant case file is in the

semiannual justification letter in abbreviated form. See

Section 107K, paragraph 7, page 13, Manual of Instructions,

which states:

"Correspondence in security informant and

potential informant matters should be

strictly limited to administrative handling

of informant and should not contain

information more properly furnished under

substantive case caption."

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 622

252

---

## Page 623

-7-

I have noted the Inspector's comments and I will

continue to provide the type of direction and supervision

to which those comments are directed.

Section Chief W. A. Branigan

(1/22/71

WAB:hke)

I have noted the explanation of Unit Chief

for following field investigations in individual

counterintelligence investigations.

Inspector D. E.

1/23/71

DEM: 1mb

I have carefully noted Mr. Rose's comments

and agree with them.

Beze deleos is a chemist whe has

been in contact with the soviets and I feel he will be

of continuing interest to them and that he presents

potential for

use against Soviet intelligence.

Assistant Director 0. D. Brenna

1/23/71

BE DEM: Imb

I concur with the above comment and wish to

assure the inspector

I will closely follow our progress

in developing informants to use against Soviet intelligence

and the direction of their activities.

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 623

253

---