HART REPORT.
Originator: CIA
Document date: 1978-01-01 00:00:00
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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1 1 10

THE MONSTER PLOT

Introduction

Chapter I

Organizational Background:

CIA'S

Handling of Soviet Positive Intelli-

gence and CI Matters

..

. . . . .

Chapter Il Biographical Data: 1927-1962 . . .

Chapter III Chronicle: 1962-1969 . •

......

A. Initial Contacts

:.. . ......

B. Bona Fides ... . . . . ......

C. The Case Against Nosenko. . . . . .

D. Defection . . . . . . . . . .....

E. The Problem of Disposition • ...•

F. Erratic Behavior and Its Aftermath •

G. The Decision to Incarcerate . . . ..

H. First Polygraph Examination •

...

I. Incarceration

and Interrogation...

J. Elaboration of the Plot Theory • ..

K. Life in a Vault . . . .

-...

L. Inter-Agency Disagreement •

M. Voices of Dissent . .

N. Helms Takes Control •

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Chapter IV

..

Chapter V.

Chapter VI

Chapter VII

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0. Resolution of the Case

Nosenko's Contribution: A Summary

Evaluation

...

A. Information on KGB Personnel . ..

B. US Recruis ent Efforts Against

.

C. Moscow Microphones

D. William John Christopher Vassall

E. Leads to Foreign Nationals

...

'F. Summary Evaluation

The stel Fioal Foundations of the

. ..

'......

A. Lack of Systematic Interrogation

B. Faulty Record of Conversations

With Nosenko

c.

CIA Misapprehensions Regarding

Nosenko's Life Story

..

D.

EITOrS

EFA Headquartess RecordAvailable

E. CIA Assumptions about the Secon

hief Directorat

F. The A Priori Assumption of

Disinformation as Applied to

the Popov and Related Cases .

Dezinformatsiya: Origins of the Concept

and Application in the Nosenko Case

Golitsyn Vs. Nosenko:

A Comparison of

Their Handling By CIA . .

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Chapter VIII

Use of the Polygraph in the Nosenko

Case

• :

..

Chapter IX

Psychological and Medical Findings

A. The Role of the Psychologist

B: The Role of the Psychiatrist

C. Conclusions . .

÷.=

Chapter X

Chapter XI

Chapter XII

A. The Case of

B. Effect on Other Potential Opera-

tions . ....

C. How CIA Worked to Defeat Itself . •

Methodology and Leadership

A. Lack of Counterintelligence

Methodology.

B. Influence of Chief, CI on

Methodology • •

c.

Impact of_ Faulty Counterintelli-

gence on Positive Intelligence

Collection . . ...

D. What Went Wrong?

E. Summary . .

..

Conclusions and Recommendations

A. The Letter of Instructions

B. Recommended Action

..

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Introduction

This act was the first in a chain of

events that is unequaled in complexity by any other Soviet

operation handled by the Central Intelligence Agency since

its establishment.

Because the case still has important

implications for

the overall Soviet intelligence effort

the United States, and because it raises nany basic questions

about the techniques of handling Soviet agents and defectors,

a reinvestigation of the case was commissioned by the Agency

in June 1976.

The results are embodied in this report and

its annexes.

Although United States officials of many agencies, up

to and including a president of the United States, were

briefed

on the case

and either played some role in making decisions

concerning it or actively participated in running the opera-

tion, it does not now appear that,

single individual has ever been fully informed as to all

aspects.

The complexity of this investigation therefore

stems in large measure from the fact that the case has pro-

ceeded

and often more, compartmented

along at least two to get a total picture of what

the effort

transpired has involved

an unusual amount of research in the

files of various components of

the Agency, plus personal in-

terviews with a large number of present and former Agency

employees.

The actions taken in regard to Nosenko were not the

result of decisions made by a unitary Agency acting as a

corporate entity; rather, in this case more than in most,

decisions were made by a

number of senior individuals on

basis of their own strongly-held views, which sometimes con-

flicted with the equally strongly-held

opinions of other

senior colleagues.

Thus, this report must,

if it is to be

comprehensible,

attempt to depict the decision-making process

in all its complexity by referring when necessary to the

individual participants.

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The quintessential quality of a report such as this

is that it be bjective.

refrained from expressing our opinions.

our openions. Even to erve tried

to

do so would have been futile

for two rather obvious

reasons.

first, into the reconstruction of events of the

complexity herein described there always enters a degree

of selectivity and judgment; in this sense, "opinion" pro-

vides the essential matrix of our product.

secondly, ke

have viewed öur task as one of constructive criticism.

oy i into ringgit cons

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CHAPTER I

Organizational Background: CIA's Handling

Of Soviet Positive Intelligence and CI Matters

The history of the Nosenko case can only be comprehended

within the framework of the organization and day-to-day func-

tioning of the Central Intelligence Agency

as a whole.

fact, opinions regarding the handling

In

of the Nosenko case may

differ substantially according to individual's differing

views regarding internal Agency organization and functioning.

This being the case, it is useful at the outset to make

explicit our understandirg of how the Agency actually func-

tioned in the relevant period, the 1960s,

as distinct fron

how it might theoretically have functioned

according to

Agency organizational charts and regulations.

The two instrumentalities for the conduct of day-to-day

operations in the Soviet field were the Soviet Bloc Division

(known successively by this and several other names* and

the Counterintelligence Staff.

In the nature and interrela-

tionship of these two organizations we find the key to much

of what was to happen in the Nosenko case.

Although the SB Division was considered a "line" organi-

zation, the CI Staff's name would imply (if the Agency's

organization were to be taken at face value) that its

function was limited to advising a command echelon. In fact,

such a distinction was never enforced.

"CI Staff" was actually a misnomer, because the organi-

zation carrying this name did not even

concern itself to any

appreciable extent with the counterintelligence function of

the Agency on a worldwide basis.

Rather,

it concentrated on

the USSR and Soviet Bloc countries.

Within the SB Division, there was lodged the so-called

the CI Staff.

Soviet CI Group? concerned itself, during most of the

which was in many respects a competitor of

period to be covered in this report, primarily with information

*This area component during the period of this report was

known as Soviet Russia Division

(1952-1966) and

• Soviet Bloc

Division (1966-1974). The two names are often used inter-

changeably.

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on the intelligence and counterintelligence organs of the

USSR, and as

such was inevitably somewhat redundant

since

the same field was the major preoccupation of the Cl Staff.

Nevertheless, as will emerge later in this report, there

during most of the period with which we are concerned a

substantial congruity of

views between the SB/CI Group and

CI Staff that militated in favor of coherent operational

policy, even though the two organizations might disagree on

matters of detail.

One curious aspect of the organizational problem should

be mentioned at this point because,

it may have played a significant role. • While the SB Division

understandably. had a number of competent Russian linguists,

the Cl Staff did not have a single Russian linguist who could

be brought to bear on either the Nosenko or Golitsyn case.

The staff was therefore dependent for its data on translations

of Nosenko material and,

tion obtained fron discussions conducted with him in English,

a language in which he was not fully fluent.

A third organizational participant in the Nosenko case

was the Office of Security.

This office had overlapping

jurisdiction with Cl Starf and, to a lesser extent,

SB Division

in any matter that involved a suspected Soviet or Soviet Bloc

penetration of the Agency.

Nhile not usually a problem, the

overlapping jurisdiction was considerable in both

Golitsyn and Nosenko cases because so much of the activity

in connection with both operations revolved around allegations

that the Soviets had penetrated the Agency at a high level.

Although allegations that the Soviets had recruited

Agency staff emplojees did not first originate with Golitsyn,

it was he who lent special force to them by spelling out a

complicated theory of Soviet intentions and modus operandi.

He thus provided a detailed conceptual framework within which

to develop a hypothesis towards which some members of the

Agency were already predisposed. Golitsyn thus became the

ideologue's ideologue.

Prior to Golitsyn's defection, the Agency as a whole had

been hard hit by its

dealings with

high-level Soviet penetra-

tions of Western governments.

detail on them, since they have been well documented else-

where, but they included British representatives such as

Kim Philby and George Blake.

Another important penetration

was Heinz Felfe, who rose to be Deputy Chief of Soviet

2)

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Counterintelligence in the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND).

The Felfe case

is particularly significant because it was

believed by a number of counterintelligence specialists in

he Agency that felfe's career had been systematically pro

noted by the Soviets through what came to be known as thi

"throw-away" technique.

According to the theory of this

group, a considerable number of valuable and productive

Soviet intelligence operations in Germany were made avail-

able to felfe so that, by detecting them and signaling their

presence to the West German

authorities, he could build

up

his reputation as a counterintelligence specialist.

while

there is

debate about the value of the assets the Soviets

made available, there appears to be enough substance to this

theory for it to have had a strong impact within the Agency,

particularly upon those persons who were members of

the

former

Eastern European (EE) Division of the Plans Directorate.

In the course of time, the continuing record of KGB

success in penetrating Western

governments nade it the more

feared of the two principal Soviet intelligence services.

Although we had had our successes also in penetrating the

Soviets, they were primarily through GRU defectors-in-place

such as Popov and Penkovskiy. The defection of Anatoliy

Golitsyn on 15 December 1961 was thus a major event.

Once again, it is not necessary here

to go into details

regarding Golitsyn, because this case has been covered exten-

sively in a recent studj. However, two points are worth

noting:

1.

First, Golitsyn was diagnosed early in

1962 as a "paranoid personality.

Although account

was taken of this psychological problem, It was

-considered in the light of a threat to the con-

tinuity of the debriefing process rather than as

a factor reflecting on the validity of the purported

intelligence he

apparently felt

ported

depend not only upon the objectively vera tabio

we could

facts he gave us but also upon his often very

theoretical generalizations.

2.

Secondly, Golitsyn presented us righ: from

the beginning, continually elaborated throughout

the years, a complicated rationale for believing

that the KGB was successfully pursuing a mammoti

program of "disinformation" to the detriment of the

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United States and its lestern allies.

This ratio-

nale

is covered in more detail in Chapter VI of

this report.

It is against this background that we view the approach

to CIA by Nosenko and his subsequent handling.

In doing so,

we shall

for ease of refcrence from time to time allude to

the thesis regarding KGB operations and intentions--claborated

by Golitsyn and others--as the "Monster Plot."

In fairness,

it must be allowed that this term was in common usage not

by the thesis' proponents but rather by its detractors; yet

no other name serves so aptly to capsulize what the theorizers

envisaged as a major threat to United States' security.

If

the term carries with it emotive connotations, the latter

were certainly shared by both sides to the controversy; and

this fact alone is enough to justify including "Monster Plot"

in the lexicon of this study.

.

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: 8

'-7-

CHAPTER II

Biographical Data: 1927-1962

Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko was born 30 October 1927 in

Nikolayev,

Ukrainian

SSR, son of Ivan Isidorovich Nosenko

His father

and Tamara Georgiyevna Markovskayar the time of his death,

was born in

1902 and died on

2 August 1956.

the senior Nosenko was Minister of Shipbuilding, a member

a number of the highest

Soviet awards and medals.

He received a state funeral, and

he is commemorated by a plaque on the Kremlin wall.

Nosenko's

in 1944, was

a student at

the Institute of International Relations as of 1964.

From his birth until 1934, Nosenko lived in Nikolayev.

In 1934 he and his mother joined the senior Nosenko in

Leningrad, where the latter was working as chief engineer

Nosenko continued his

at which time he

and his mother followed

the senior Nosenko to Moscow, where

he was

to

serve as Deputy People's Commissar of the Ship-

building Industry.

In 1941, shortly after the war broke out, Nosenko and

his mother were evacuated to Chelyabinsk in the Urals.

Nosenko stated that he and a friend tried to run off to the

At age 14

Men be tele we cough and hunted, hi got vas

was relocated to Kuybyshev.

forced to relocate again, this time

to Achinsk in Siberia.

Nosenko did not want to go to Siberia and,

through the in-

fluence of his father, was accepted at the Frunze Naval

Preparatory School in Leningrad (not to be confused with

the Frunze Higher Naval School,

also in Leningrad), which

oy this time had been relocated to Baku.

and Talent die auce an eterning ho too i

separate occasions to get to the

esperate one did sue in turing hone to oscow wich-

out authorization.

These escapades seem to form part of a

behavior pattern that was eventually to culminate in defec-

tion.

By August 1944, Nosenko had resumed his studies at the

Frunze Naval Preparatory School, which had returned to its

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original location in Leningrad. Cadets from this school were

sent to a forest (some

two hundred kiloneters from Leningrad)

on a wood-cutting detail.

In about November of that year he

He decided set to return to the frunze Naval Preparatita

and was hospitalized.

School and again, through his father's intervention in about

January 1945, entered a

shipbuilding college (tekhnikum) in

Leningrad.

At the end of world war ll, Nosenko returned to Moscow.

le had meanwhile obtained a certificate from the director of

the shipbuilding college that attested to his study in, and

the completion

of, the tenth class.

At some time prior to July 1945, Nosenko accompanied his

father, who went to East Germany with a group of engineers.

For purposes

of that trip, Nosenko received

as an Army senior lieutenant, with appropriate documents and

uniform.

Nosenko entered the Institute of International Relations

in Moscow in July 1945.

Upon completion of the second year

at the Institute, and by virtue of his participation in a

military training program roughly equivalent to the ROTC,

Nosenko received the rank of

Nadministrative service" (sic)un The extet meaning of this

term is unclear.)

In 1946, according to Nosenko, he married, against his

parents' wishes,

had gotten pregnant.

obtained a divorce almost imnediately following their marriage.

In about 1947, he married the daughter of Soviet Lieutenant

General (Major General, US-style) Telegin.

later born with a harelip and a cleft palate. Nosenko in-

sisted that this was not his child.

Nosenko completed a four-year course at the Institute

of International Relations, but he actually received his

diploma a year later, in 1950, because he had failed the

examination in Marxism.

He had had to wait an extra year in

order to retake this examination.

In March 1951, Nosenko was assigned as an English

language translator in naval intelligence (Naval RU),

serving first in the Far East.

While on leave in Moscow.

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(late April 1952), he developed an illness that caused him

to cough up blood, and he entered a tuberculosis sanatorium

near Moscow for treatment.

For reasons of health, he did

not return to the Far East but was sent instead to the

Baltic area.

thile on leave in Moscow in late 1952, Nosenko accompaniec

nis parents to a New Ycar's Eve party at the dacha of :

certain General Bogdan Zakharovich Kobulov.

indicated interest in changing jobs, the genezal made a vague

offer of help in getting employment

the Ministry of State

Security (NGB).

In March 1953, while again in Moscow, Nosenko

was called to Kobulov's office.

Kobulov had just returned

from Germany to become the First Deputy Minister of the MVD

(Ministry of Internal Affairs).

Nosenko did not see Kobulov

personally but was referred by the latter's assistant to the

deputy chief of the Second Chief Directorate (internal coun

terintelligence), hereafter referred to as SCD, by whom he

was hired.

His first MGB

assignment was in the First (American

embassy) Section of the

First (American) Department of the

In March 1953,

following Stalin's death, Lavrentiy

Beriya emerged from

the resultant reshuffling of the top

leadership as chief of both the MVD and MGB.

In March 1954.

the new "Committee" for State Security--the KGB--was‹formed.

In June 1953 Nosenko married his third wife, Lyudmila

Yulianovna Khozhevnikova, who was a student at the Moscow

State University.

Nosenko,

a member of the Komsomol since 1943, was

elected secretary of the SCD Komsomol unit in June 1953 and

served as secretary of that unit until about June 1954.

However, earlier in 1954, Nosenko had contracted venereal

disease

and gone to a clinic; to disguise his identity, he

used operational

documentation in alias in applying for

treatment.

When he did not go back for final treatment

as instructed, the clinic sent a letter to his ostensible

place of work

as shown on the alias document.

The MVD found

out about this improper use of alias documentation and re-

ported it to the seD.

Nosenko was not only disciplined

by the chief, SCD (reprimanded and placed under arrest for

15 days),

but the Komsonol also removed him as secretary

and expelled him from its organization.

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In early spring 1955, Nosenko received a poor

charakteristika (pertormance evaluation), which described

rim as unsuitable for work in the first Department. None-

theless, he was neither dismissed nor transferred.

Although Nosenko survived the 1954 episode as well as

the poor performance report, these

events caused him to go

on what he has described as a "big drunk," which resulted

in his having to spend a month under hospital care.

To

keep Nosenko out of further trouble, his mother intervened

by making a telephone call to Petr Vasilyevich Fedotov,

chief of the SCD.

Seemingly as a result of her efforts,

Nosenko was transferred in the latter part of May 1955 to

the Second Section (which operated against tourists) of

the seventh Department,

SCD.

In late 1955, Lieutenant

General Oleg Mikhaylovich Gribanov was appointed chief of

the SCD.

From a number of indications, Nosenko's relation-

ship with Gribanov developed, despite

the difference in rank

an the told together, heady drinkions and moning esprings

together, heavy drinking, and women.

Despite

numerous indiscretions, Nosenko's

survival within the

and

KGB

his subsequent promotions to increasingly responsible

positions may well have resulted in part from Gribanov's

patronage.

To a considerable degree,

of course, his rise

must also be attributed to his being

the son of

a highly-

placed member of the Soviet government.

Komsomol membership and not achieved

At this point in his KGB careef'CP-member status.

Nosenko had lost his

was not until 1956 that he was accepted as a candidate mem-

• ber of the CP, and only in 1957 that he was admitted as a

full Party member.

Once this happened, according to Nosenko,

the Komsomol removed its reprimand from his file.

In December 1959, Nosenko was promoted to the rank of

captain.

19e ades that he had beed

despite having been promised he would be promoted

several positions that were

usually filled by officers of higher military rank.

Nosenko worked in the Seventh Department, SCD until

January 1960,

when he was transferred back to the First

(American embassy) of the First Department.

Then

he held the position of

a deputy chief of the First Section.

He was retransferred back to the Seventh Department as of

late December 1961-early January 1962.

In July 1962, he

was appointed deputy chief of the Seventh Department.

He

nationleinetle molone

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continued in this position until 18 January 1964, the date

he left Moscow on

TDY to Geneva.

Nosenko defected in Geneva on 4 February 1964, leaving

behind in Moscow his wife, Lyudmila, and two daughters.

His prior travels to the West had included two TDYs to

first TDY to Geneva from

also went on Tly to Bulgaria in 1961.

etails of his de

fection

and subsequent developments

are covered in Chapte

III.

......

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CHAPTER III

Chronicle: 1962-1969

A.

Initial Contacts

the Soviet delegation to the

being held in the Palais des Nations

in Geneva.

advantage of the fact that he was the watchdog

for the

delegation' whereas its members could not watch him,

Nosenko used his freedom of movement to approach the

Agency, ostensibly for personal financial assistance.

Is he told it, Nosenko had recently slept with a

Swiss woman who had stolen 900 Swiss Francs of official

funds that he had on his person at the time; inability

to reimburse this relatively trivial amount

(about US

$250 at the time) would jeopardize his career.

In ex-

change for 2,000 Swiss Francs, he therefore proposed

that he provide us with two items of information.

These items, subsequently verified, related

to:

1.

KGB recruitment of a US Army sergeant

while he was serving in the American embassy

in Moscow as a "code machine repairman."

2. A Soviet official whom the Agency

had ostensibly recruited but who was being

run against us under KGB control.

At this time Nosenko was not forthcoming in response

tives inside the USSR.

Nevertheless, he "agreed "perhaps'

meet us when abroad" again at a later date.

our interest in him was whetted by his identification of

his deceased father as a former minister of the USSR.

In addition,

such information as he gave about himself

1911

indicated that he would be of high operational interest.

Inter alia his most recent assignment in Moscow was as

head of a KGB sub-section working against American

tourists.

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Missarzin

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B. Bona Fides

aust to belga to than often potato senative

SUBJ CONCLUSIVELY PROVED BONA FIDES. PRO-

VIDED INFO OF IMPORTANCE AND SENSITIVITY

SUBJ NOW COMPLETELY COOPERATIVE.

WILLING

MEET WHEN ABROAD AND WILL MEET AS OFTEN AND

AS LONG AS POSSIBLE UNTIL DEPARTURE 15 JUNE.

With the question of bona fides seeningly resolved,

the tapes

as follows:

Chief, CI:

•we got the first message.

• • ол

Nosenko from Geneva,

and (the principal

case officer) was ordered back,

and we

had a big meeting here on

Saturday morning,

and (the principal case officer) thought

he had the biggest fish of his life.

and everything

heard from him was in direct eontyast from

what we heard fron Golitsyn. I mean, we

Chief, CI:

ficerfot hold

docker and roughe Ranch here on of-

Q: What you're saying is that it was unreason-

able for

a Second Chief' Directorate man to

be there

...

Under the circumstances, getting drunk and

needing $300 to

"not to be recruited

but to give us three full, big secrets"

for an exchange for the money in order

that he could replenish the account from

which he embezzled the money on a drunk.

So I brought (the principal case officer)

in here one evening, I think it was Friday,

Saturday and a Sunday, and I brought about

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10 to 15 volunes of Golitsyn's

interroga-

tion,

just

to read

without prejudicing him in any way,

and he had all the

books out,

and at the end of it all he

said that

there was no question about

it,

that they were being had.

I mean, mind

you, he was of split motivation because

this was the big case of his entire life

and yet there he was reading material,

So we went to Dick (Helms, then

ebli and we put up a propositi the reaie

should permit Golitsyn

to read the real

material, I sean the

transcripts and

everything fron Nosenko.

And he wouldn't

agree to that, but we made a conpromise

and that was to take the material

and

falsify it as though it was an anonymous

letter sent to the embassy by an alleged

KGB person.

So the anonymous letter

was

drawn up, and [the principal case officer)

interviewed Golitsyn with the anonymous

and Golitsyn's statement was that

to see the petter he eat a sira

lo see the

tion because ke didn't have a letter.

But he began to point out in sone detail

exactly what was instigating and inspiring--

in terms of what he'd already given to us

and he very wisely stated that he wanted

everything on tape, because he knew that

as time passed in hundreds of interviews

and their counteraction took place, there

would be people accusing him of not having

divulged certain information.

The principal case officer's review of the Golitsys

information had indeed converted him to the view that

Nosenko's defection was bogus.

Equally convinced, as

clearly indicated by a number of documents that he

drafted, was his superior, the person who had become

Chief, SR Division

in December 1963.

The reasons for

Chief,

SR's conviction may

the principal case officer not have been the same as

but for all practical pur-

poses the views of the two men at the time were identical.

A joint CI Staff-SR Division recommendation was

therefore made to Richard Helms, the Deputy for Plans,

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that the transcripts of the Nosenko debriefings be

made available to Golitsyn for comment.

relas agreed,

with

the single reservation that Nosenkc not be identi-

fied by name as the source.

As a result, a number of

items of information from Nosenko were embodied on a

letter ostensibly stemming from an anonymous KGB source;

in this form, it was assumed, the information could be

shown to Golitsyn without disclosing the source.

ruse seemed plausible enough, since a previous defector,

Michal Goleniewski, had written CIA a number of anony-

mous letters before eventually defecting and disclosing

his identity.)

In carrying out the plan, the principal case offi-

cer made his own views clear

to Golitsyn:

I told (Golitsyn) that

... I thought it quite

possible,

in view of his own statenents about

disinformation, that this was the beginning of

a disinformation operation possibly relating to

[his] defection.

Golitsyn felt, in general and without having

the full details necessary

to an assessuent,

that there were indeed serious signs of disin-

formation

in this affair.

He felt such a dis-

information operation,

to discredit him, was

Likellhood

as he had

ficer could be permitted

earlier

A KGB of.

to tell everything he

knew,

field as colitsyn had.

if he worked in the same general

When told that so far

this source had not done anything to discredit

Golitsyn, and had in fact reported that the KGB

nish later.

Nable dinart et ant-

to divert our attention from investigations

of his leads by throwing up false

scents, and

to protect their remaining sources.

He also

added,

"There could be other aims as well.

The

natter should be looked into.

It seems

serious

to me."

He thought the KGB

night allow a first

series of direct meetings with the KGB officer,

to build up our confidence, and then in the

next session do whatever the operation's purpose

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might be (discredit Golitsyn, kidnap, pass

serious disinformation

items, etc.).

C.. The Case Against Nosenko

Virtually

any information provided by Nosenko, or action taken by

him, was interpreted as part of a KGB "provocation."

If his information was in accord with that from other

sources, this fact not only confirned our suspicion of

Nosenko®

but was interpreted

as casting doubt on the

other sources as well.

While the above aspect will be covered at length

in Chapters V and VI, one example will serve to highlight

the attitude that prevailed.

Nosenko had, during our

neetings with him in 1962,

contributed information that

materially aided in the identification

and arrest of

William John Christopher Vassall, a British Admiralty

official who was also a KGB agent.

Because Golitsyn

had previously provided similar, but less specific,

information,

the usefulness of Nosenko's intelligence

was discounted; once Vassall had been identified, it

was concluded that Nosenko had been allowed to expose

him in order to support his own bona fides.

The argu-

ment ran that Vassall would in any case have been identi-

fied sooner or later on the basis of Golitsyn's leads.

In January 1964, Nosenko reappeared in Geneva ac-

"companying another Soviet delegation.

By now, the case

against him had been well established in the minds of

those dealing with the matter, and the record is there-

fore replete with manifestations of suspicion.

A particu-

lar example of our tendency to intetpret unfavorably al-

most anything Nosenko said is provided by notes that

Chief, Sk forwarded to Helms on 27 January 1964, with

the suggestion that they "convey very well the flavor

of the man .

• and the complexities of the operation."

By way of background, although Nosenko's cryptonym at

he had previously been

designated AEBARMAN.

this juncture was AEFOXTRs bit of history led to the

following incident during a safehouse meeting:

I cannot attribute to coincidence a bizarre remark

AEFOXTROT made on 24 January. As I went

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sand e ande there onto the are o

saw me standing

face lit up and

said with a smile,

You are the barman."

Yow this could be ar

idle pleasantry about my standing there like

a bartender,

but it is not

funny as FOXTROT

(ex-AEBARMAN) seemed to think it was and I

am afraid it means that he knows his own CIA

cryptonyn.

The above incident cxemplifies a main theme that ClA

was itself penetrated.

This fear had existed before

Golitsyn defected, but it was fed constantly by the lat-

ter's allegations

that information concerning him was

leaking to the KGB,

and the conclusion that the leaks

must have originated within the Agency.

Thus it was that a memorandum from Chief, SR on 27

January 1964, submitted to and approved by Helms, began

as follows:

Our goal in this case must be eventually to

break Subject and learn from him the details

of his mission and its relation to possible

penetrations

of US intelligence and security

agencies and those of allied nations as well

as to broader disinformation operations in

woe a betest served it sealece were brerests

as early as possible but since this is

mlikely, our actions must be conceived and

carried out in a manner which contributes to

our basic goal without alerting Subject unduly

at any stage.

Far from "alerting Subject unduly," on the surface

the Agency welcomed Nosenko with both cordiality and

generosity.

The following excerpts from a 30 January

1964 meeting make the point clearly:

Nosenko:

i asked sentiMent to tee

this question, "What should I ex-

pect in the future?"

Principal case officer:

The following awaits: As I presented it,

you wanted to

come

to the United States

and

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Nosenko: Absolutely.

Principal case officer:

ur. Helms said yes, flatly absolutely yes,

in fact I would say enthusiastic .

that's

the only word to describe it.

We

talked

discussion

about?11 repeat all of it whether

and since this was a business

it was pleasant or unpleasant.

So the next

thing will be some details that we spoke

about.

We talked about the means by which

(you) could have a solid career with a

certain personal

independence.

Because of

the very great assistance you've been to us

already and because of this desire to give

you a backing, they will give you a little

additional personal security.. • (salary

details follow).

• D. Defection

As might be expected, the principal case officer

devoted a good deal of effort during the second Geneva

visit to persuading Nosenko to stay in place.

however, dismissed out of hand the possibifity of remain-

contact with CIA from within the Soviet Union,

he became increasingly

anxious to defect immediately.

When the principal case officer continued to press him

to remain

in Geneva long enough to effect an audio pene-

tration of the local rezidentura, Nosenko forced the

issue.

At a meeting on 4 February, he announced that a

cable had been received from Moscow ordering him back

home for a "tourism conference."

Though this claim was

subsequently to be the source of almost endless contro-

versy,

it was accepted at the time without apparent

question.

Preparations therefore immediately began for

evacuation to the United States.

A layover in another country en route to the United

States lasted about a fortnight.

It was used for further

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debriefing and assessment, but, while useful from the

preration as handle charge became impatientay raised

problems as their charge became

CAN EASILY CONTINUE DEBRIEFING FOR ANOTHER FEW

DAYS ALONG ABOVE LINES.

SUBJ IS CARRYING MANY

NOTES OUTLINING DETAILS ALL SCD OPS KNOWN TO

HIM WHICH HE WANTS TO CARRY PERSONALLY AND

PRESENT TO HEADQUARTERS IN ORDER TO AVOID

ARRIVING WITH ENPTY HANDS.

WORKING ON THIS

MATERIAL WILL OCCUPY US PROFITABLY BUT SUBJ

NEEDS SOONEST SOME EXPRESSION OF HEADQUARTERS

REACTIONS AND PLANS FOR ONWARD MOVENENT. HIS

VIEW OF CURRENT SITUATION IS THAT IT IS

NECESSARY TRANSITION. HE WILL NOT UNDERSTAND

INDEFINITE DELAY.

REMEMBER THAT SUBJ HAS JUST

MADE AN ENORMOUS DECISION AND FACED A TURING

POINT IN HIS LIFE.

SIMPLY TO MOVE THE LOCALE

TO ANOTHER COUNTRY AND SIT WITH THE SAME CASE

OFFICERS FULL TIME IN A SAFEHOUSE IS HARDLY

WHAT HE EXPECTS.

REQUEST URGENTLY THAT HEAD-

QUARTERS PROVIDE SOME RECOGNITION TO SUBJ.

AMONG ALTERNATIVES WE CAN SUGGEST ARE:

A.

[CHIEF, SR] TRIP WITH ONE OR TWO DAYS DIS-

CUSSION OF LONG RANGE OPS PLANS AND AD-

MINISTRATIVE PREPARATIONS FOR ONWARD

MOVE . ..

The above cable triggered a visit by Chief,

Nothing that happened during this visit modified his al-

ready well-formed views.

After a conference with the two

principal handlers he wrote:

Subject was ere a smimons defeheir.viau that

contact with us in Geneva and subsequent

defection were,

according to these officers,

clearly undertaken at the direction of the KGB.

I was particularly interested in (one officer's]

statement that he had suspected Subject from

the very

first meeting on the basis of Subject's

emotionless

mechanical delivery of his

statement announcing his intention to defect.

After my talks with the case officers.

i had

ny first visit with subject at the safehouse:

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This lasted from 2000 to 2230 and included

dinner with Subject and the case officers.

Conversation during this first meeting was

general in nature and followed no special

agenda.

Hokever, it did give me an oppor-

tunity to take Subject's measure.

I started

by telling Subject that I had come to form my

own impressions

of him as a person and an

intelligence officer who desired to place his

knowledge and experience at the disposal of

the United States government.

I added that

I Wished to determine

for myself why Subject

had come

a most serious step

which. neither we nor

to the lest, subject should under-

estimate in terms of its lasting effect on

Subject's own life and those of his family

left behind.

Subject rose to this opening by

first assuring me in a most fawning manner

that he,

as an intelligence officer,

fully

understood the need

for a senior officer to

make his own judgments on

went on to explain his motivation

ivation for tarse

He then

contacting us, his reasons

for defecting and

his intense desire to collaborate with us in

Soviet operations sim.e he has no specialty

other than intelligence.

These remarks were

repetitious of his original statements

lelivered in the same mechanical fashion, the

najor difference being that Subiect was intensely

nervous at the outset, calming down only after

it appeared that I was accepting his statements

at face value.

By the end of the evening I had come to the

same conclusions reached by [the principal

handlers].

The totality of our conclusions

are treated in detail in a separate memorandum.

in reaching them,

I was beset by a

viction they could pull off an operation like

this successfully and by a feeling of distaste

for the obvious and transparent manner in which

Subject played his role.

Chief, SR's distaste was sufficient to overcome any

interest he might otherwise have had in a recruitment

opportunity suggested by Nosenko:

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One other subject touched upon

was the

possible recruitment of Vladimir

sus lov, Under-

Secretary in the UN Secretariat ar

top-ranking

Soviet in the UN organization

Subject

(described) Suslov as a playboy who liked liquo

and women

and who could be easily blackmaile

into cooperation for fear of hurting his career

in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

I objected

to the blackmail angle

saying that it could

cause a tremendous political flap if it back-

fired.

Subject modified his position

to assure

"crude

blackmail" in which we would have to get

directly involved.

I certainly got the impres-

sion that Suslov's recruitment is part of the

plan and that we would

succeed no matter how

half-heartedly we tried.

Despite his misgivings,

however,

convinced

It will be necessary to maintain an effective

degree of secrecy with regard to our knowledge

of Subject's

status

and

to secure from him a full confession.

intentions, we will probably be forced to act

prematurely.

With these considerations in mind, he therefore re-

newed the commitments previously made by the principal

case officer:

I informed Subject that I was satisfied that he

ceed to make arrangements to bring him to the

States.

Second,

I confirmed our agreement to

pay him... (financial details follow].

On 12 February, consistent with the above commitments,

Nosenko was flown to the Washington area and lodged in a

safehouse, under close supervision of the Office of

Security.

Now that he was in the United States' them-.

• (and the US government as a whole) found

selves faced with a seeming dilemma, much more crucial

than the problems facing them while

he remained abroad.

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solutions ta

7 of a menorandum written by Chief, SR and approved by

Helms on 17 February 1964:

While admitting that Subject is here on a KGB

directed mission,

it has been generally agreed

by both us and the FBI that he still possesses

valid information which we would like to obtain.

st the smust be reen a least believe that

point if we are

to learn something of the full scope of the

KGB plan, the timing for its execut addition,

the role played by others in it.

we must have this information if we are to

decide what countermeasures we should take in

terms of counter-propaganda, modifications in

our security practices soviet target.

planning for future

operations

against the

Admittedly,

our

desire to continue

debriefing to obtain

additional information may conflict with the

need to break Subject.

Clearly, the big problem

is one of timing.

How long can

we keep Subject,

or his KGB controllers, ignorant of our aware-

ness of this operation

and how long will it

take us to

assemble the kind of

brief we will

need to initiate a hostile interrogation in

conditions of maximum control?

If we are to proceed along the lines indicated

above we should accept in advance the premise

that we will not be able to prevent Subject

from evading our custody or communicating with

the Soviets unless we place him under such

physical restraint that it will become immedi-

this may are be a an eate sust cal it is

This may not be an acceptable risk

we should so

determine right away and

decide onna completely dinterent course of

action.

If this is to be the case

area under full-time guard and com-

mence hostile debriefing on

the basis of the

material we already have (although the prospects

for success would not be great).

Disposal would

probably be via Berlin followed by a brief press

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release to the effect that Subject had con-

fessed to being a plant and had been allowed to

return

to Soviet control. (In the seantime,

• SR Division would:]

-- Advise Subject that during this phase he will

continue to live and work in the safehouse

and will be escorted at all times when on

because of his

shopping trips faulty English

While we can explain this regime

White cantee cain this custome as deeded

or his security, we cannot keep him locked

up in the house

24 hours a day.

--Provide Subject with "flash" docunentation in

another name

to be carried

on his person

so he person to te to seen accepted.

-Make available to Subject a portion of the

(money) promised him

which he can use foi

purchases of clothes, cigarettes, personal

effects, etc.

--Agree that whenever this first phase is over

(four to six weeks) that he be pernitted to

take a two-week vacation with escort.

The vacation period will be of greater benefit to

us since it will provide us with an opportunity

to review and make judgments on the value of the

information already obtained and also to con-

sider the progress made in the other aspects of

the case outlined below.

During the vacation we

can decide whether we should proceed to the

second phase or are ready to commence hostile

interrogation under controlled conditions.

If

it is the former, we will have to reckon with

the need to modify the living and working

arrangements for Subject in a way which will

inevitably give him some additional freedom.

At the same

time,

we would be expected to

nove forward with

Subject's legalization,

i.e., final decision on a name he will use,

securing an alien registration card, estab-

lishing a bank account, etc.

Therefore, it

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will be terribly important to make the proper

decision

the end

of

phase one.

This decision will depend not only on our

evaluation of the material obtained during

the debriefings but on how far we have been

able to go in clarifying other cases which

are related to Subject case

and form an

impor-

tant part of

explanation of the KGB's goals

in this operation.

Nosenko was surrounded from the first with ambi-

On the one hand, he was housed

describes as

one could possibly want I remenber all of the effort

and the money we spent to get a billiard table.

On the other hand, this handler, who was assigned to this

case after having

worked on the

Golitsyn affair, was told

at the outset that Nosenko was "dirty, that he had been

sent by the KGB .

writing of his first meeting with Nosenko on 13

February, the handler recorded his first impressions of

Nosenko:

In this brief meeting lasting actually less than

wo hours, I couldn't prevent myself from

putting him in three ,successive categories.

In the first few minutes I put him in the cate-

gory of a Cuban exile living in

the Harlem section

of New York City.

his impression came to m)

mind strictly on

the basis of his clothing (dar

trousers and sport shirt, black elevated shoes,

sharply pointed and with

a design)

and his

mannerisms .

Half way through the session I put him in the

category of a big city but

small-time con man.

while dictating ..

exactly what he wanted to

from his notes,

and how he wanted

to say it.

But when I had brief conversations

with him on other topics

or when I saw him

stealing glances in my direction to size me up,

I could almost see the con man's wheels turning

rapidly in his head.

I had an urge to check my

wallet just to make sure it was still safe.

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As the session ended and we moved into the

living

room

I put him in a third category.

Before leaving the debriefing room I noticed

how he touched (another case officer) on the

i: shoulder.

When (that case officer) went down-

stairs for a few minutes,

(Nosenko] and I

walked into the living room.

During thạt

brief walk I decided to give him a President

Johnson handshake (hand

and elbow grasp, Texas

style) on departure and a few sincere words

about how pleased I was to meet and talk with

him, but his actions soon changed my mind.

As

soon as we reached the middle of the living

room he gave me an

unexpected

and prolonged

hug around the shoulders and waist, the type

that one man gives another well known to him

only after some achievement such as making

the decisive point in a football game.

His

embrace really took me by surprise and I had

to pull away

from him without hurting his

feelings.

At this point I realized that I

couldn't go through with the President Johnson

handshake; he'd have to settle for less.

this,

In

the third category, I saw him as a jazz

musician who sells heroin

on the side and has

homosexual tendencies.

A week later, on 20 February, however, the handler

reported more favorable impressions, those

of

of the Office

Security personnel assigned to guard Nosenkó at the

safehouse:

Subject is not at all concerned about his own

security or the threat of assassination or

kidnapping.

He seems to think the present

security system is fine.

washed conest to dolisyn; behavior as

marked contrast to Golitsyn's beharior.)

was in

Subject is not a heavy drinker and is never

"under the influence"

Subject is not a heavy smoker . ..

At mealtime Subject sits at the dining table

with the guards and acts

as if he

is one of

the boys.

He does not sit at the head of the

table but to the side.

He always offers the

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boys a drink,

asks them

to take more food, and

kids then .

He doess a dha nods entioned heckerse est

in chess,

does not gamble and doesn't seem to have any

hobby or inside activity to keep himself busy.

He has shown a desire to play pool •

..

Subject does not say anything for or against the

USSR or the Communist Party.

Even when viewing

the Olympics on

TV Subject never once commented

on how good the Soviets were and how poor a

showing the Americans made.

The same could not

be said for

(Golitsyn) • •

On the con-

trary Subject wants to be an American as soon

as possible.

Subject's sexual desires appear to be normal . ..

Subject has made several joking references to

their

all

going together to a house of prosti-

tution

• Subject definitely wants a woman

and the

sooner

the better ..

idiot twai

including the

Compared with other

cases he is ideal.

He is polite, likes to kid,

doesn't have a drinking problem,

doesn't have

3 mental problem

and wants to become an

American and work like and with Americans as

soon as possible.

Subject became angry only

once and even then it

not a loss of

temper in the true sense.

The day that [the principal case officer) dis-

cussed the schedule with him, Subject became

moody and started to drink alone.

He told the

guards that he wants to use his brains and work

hard as Americans do.

He feels that the present

schedule does not utilize his talent to the

fullest.

The "schedule" referred to above had been outlined to

Nosenko in a 17 February meeting, during which the

principal case officer had assured him that "both (Chief,

SR and myself are enthusiastically optimistic about

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future cooperation with him in operations against the

Nosenko greeted plans for a period devoted to

systenatic debriefing with the statement that this

"might represent an attempt to extract all his informa-

He also said he needed a vacation at "an early date

in order to help him forget and get over the strain

and worry of his abrupt change of situation, particularly

E. The Problem of Disposition

Far from being optimistic about our "cooperation"

with Nosenko, SR Jivision was discussing

the possibility

of forcibly returning him to the Soviets if the "overall

effort to break hin"

came to naught.

In addition, an

tion of Nosenko,

escaping after he becomes aware of our attitude."

Finally,

it was agreed that Golitsyn, who had meanwhile

recognized Nosenko as the author of the ostensible

"anonymous letter" of 26 June 1962, would be brought

into the operation to back up our

interrogation.

Helms

originally had some misgivings about this procedure but

appears eventually to have agreed to giving Golitsyn

"full access" to material from Nosenko, but not to

Nosenko hinself.

The FBI viewed Nosenko much more favorably than

did CIA.

As early as 8 February 1964, Chief, CI had

sent a cable reading in part:

• [FBI liaison officer] STATED •

FRIEND OF HIS WHO IS EXPERT IN.FBI QUICKLYAT

SCANNED AEFOXTROT PRODUCTION AND CAUTIONED

US THAT "IT LOOKS VERY GOOD" IN TERMS OF CASES

KNOWN TO THEM.

indicated

defector..,they believe Subject to be a genuine KGB

serious problem.

Their concern is understandable, because a subsequent

paragraph of the Chief, SR memorandum contained plans

for the following action, to be initiated around 1 April

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which would not be appropriate if CIA were

forced,

as a result

to ceda onese a sent redey consultations,

a .

abject to be moved to a hi,

ecurity safehouse under maximum guar

Secretary of State,

plant whos be intend to return to Soviet

control after (l) trying to break him,

and (2) publicizing his case.

C.

Retain Subject incommunicado for

about three weeks during which time we will

continue efforts to break him.

publicity came seich so precedee

Subject's deportation.

As a first step,

there will be a brief official announcement

probably by a state Department spokesman

to the

effect that Subject has confessed

to having faked his defection at KGB

direction in order (1)

to penetrate US

intelligence and security agencies, and (2)

to discredit the act of

defection by Soviet

citizens.

At the same time, a press back-

grounder will be made available which will

characterize this KGB operation as an act of

desperation following a decade.of defection

and disloyalty to the regime on the part of

& score of

senior Soviet intelligence of-

ficers ..•

F.

Erratic Behavior and Its Aftermath

While planning was going on for his confinement

and hostile interrogation, Nosenko was taken on a trip

for tho weeks"

relaxation, beginning on 12 March.

and

his behavior becane increasingly erratic.

departure, he had on several occasions been violent; on

one occasion he took a swipe with his fist at the princi-

pal case officer and on another tried to strangle one of

the Office of Security escorts..

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. чі"!"!"

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The handler who spent the first part of the

vacation with Nosenko recorded these

impressions:

In my opinion Subject is under extreme ten-

sion and pressure.

Any man who skips break-

fast and starts the day off with alcohol

is on his way to becoming an alcoholic.

He drinks not for the enjoyment of it,

but

with an attempt to erase or lessen problems

of a serious nature. I suspect that these

tensions

are the result of two things:

оле,

fear on his part that he cannot follow

through

with his assignment; and, two, his

homosexual desires.

predict that the

situation will not

improve but grow worse.

Yet

the handler concluded on the following note:

Despite our oral arguments and the various

incidents we experienced, Subject and I

parted on the best of terms.

He gave me an

affectionate embrace on the night of my

departure,

and in front of [the principal

case officer] thanked me for my attention

to his needs and patience in dealing with

hin.

We agreed to see each other upon his

return to Washington.

uring the last half of the vacation, the principa.

ase officer arrived and took charge of the escort team

Nosenko was more restrained in his presence than he had

een previously,

success in eliciting information from him during tlis

period.

Not only was Nosenko uninformative, according

to

the principal case officer, but he was also very tense

and unable to sleep more than a few'hours at a time.

rashington

it cannot have been very successful.

vas still drinking enormously and had by now discovered

unfettered night life;

it is doubtful that he was physi-

cally able to respond meaningfully to interrogation during

the day.

i desent stride to nose

initialed and returned without written comment. Inter

alia, Chief, SR had this to say:

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We have concluded that there is little to

be gained by prolonging the status quo

beyond

next weekend

and every reason to

suspect

that if Subject learns we doubt

him

he will try to escape.

Accordingly,

we have instructed the security guards to

be alert

to any

attempts on Subject's part

to

elude them

Further scheduling must depend in consider-

able degree on the results of the interroga-

tion..

However, since we do not anticipate

Nosenko will ever break

to the

becoming completely cooperative, an Point of

we must assume that within five

meter the someone in este some

action will have leaked

out

throug: the

briefings (however necessary they may have

been), we should be ready to take this action:

Have State Department spokesman issue

low key statement indicating that

Nosenko is plant with mission to seek

out and report on bona fide defectors

living in the United States.

awel..

Mail letter in Moscow (or from Helsinki

to Moscow) addressed to Lieutenant

General Oleg Mikhailovich Gribanov

which makes it clear that we were on

to operation

choice nosenko as entere in

but also that

operation was a mistake.

latter point include as

a description of Nosenko behavior.

This would be couched in kide frow

clinical, language

the not

will have in preparing it, this letter

will serve to dissuade the Soviets from

an overly hasty reaction to our press

stories and should also make them

reasonably anxious to get Nosenko back

to determine what happened.

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Since failure to "break" Nosenko--i.e., force

him to admit that he had come to us not as

a genuine

defector but as a KGB-dispatched agent--was considered

virtually certain, plans were also being laid to re-

turn him to the

Soviet authorities. Before doing

this, however, it would be necessary to:

• Discuss with Legal counsel the legal

problems which might be encountered in ar-

ranging Nosenko's deportation.

The simplest

method still appears to be (flying him) to

Tempelhot in Berlin.

Thence to S- Bahnhof

Tiergarten

where subject,

in his best

civilian clothes, with diplomatic passport,

would be placed

on an S-Bahn which then

stops inside East Berlin only at the control

point S-Bahnhof Friedrichstrasse.

G. The Decision to Incarcerate

Although Nosenko had already contributed con-

siderable intelligence of value (see Chapter IV), in-

cluding information that led directly to the arrest of

Vassall in 1962

there is no indication in the files

from this period that the possibility of his being a

bona fide defector was given any credence whatsoever,

either

Within the Agency or in discussions with other

parts of the government.

On the contrary, Nosenko was treated as one whose

guilt had been established.

even while

for an "arrest," strict confinement: and hostile interro-

The long-delayed polygraph evaluation was administered

on 4 April 1964.

It did not, however,

take place under

standard conditions.

In his report of 8 April 1964, the

polygraph operator stated:

During the pre-polygraph conferences with repre-

sentatives of SR Division, the undersigned was

informed that the polygraph interview was part

of an overall plan to help break subject and

elicit the truth from him. SR Division's

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instructions were that, regardless of whether

Subject passed his polygraph test or not, he

was to be

informed at the termination of his

polygraph

interview that he was lying, and

had not passed his polygraph interview.

н.

First Polygraph Examination

To raise Nosenko's level of apprehension and reduce

his supposed defenses

against the polygraph interroga-

tion technique, an additionai mechanism was also attached

to him, which he was told was an clectroencephalograph

(EEG) •

Chief, SR later commented that "Nosenko was com-

pletely confident of the polygraph when told that it

would be used until he discovered

that an electroencephalo-

graph

was used at the same time.

The unexpected addition

of the EEG to the polygraph was successful and materially

aided the interrogators. Nosenko proved to be an excel-

lent reactor . ..

examination

Despite the unusual circumstances surrounding the

the polygraph operator's conclusions,

stated in his report of 8 April 1964, were categorical:

It is the undersigned's conclusion that Subject

is not a bona fide defector

but is a dispatched

agent sent by Soviet Intelligence for a specific

mission or missions.

According to the pre-agreed upon plan, the

different phases

involving various pertinent

areas were covered with Subject polygraphically.

Challenge of Subject's reactions was indirect

and "soft."

On no occasion did Subject even

attempt to volunteer any explanation of the

possible causes for his polygraph reactions.

He continually denied and refused

to adnit

that there was

anything to any of

the ques-

tions which were asked of him.

When the final

test questions were completed and a record was

obtained of all of Subject's polygraphic re-

sponses, the nature of the challenge and

probing was changed.

Subject was

told that he was lying to nunerous

pertinent questions and was accused of being

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a dispatched agent

Subject's only explanation

to the undersigned's direct

accusation was that

he could not be a dispatched agent because of

the

amount of information he had volunteered to

American Intelligence.

Subject,

who before and throughout testing

reflected complete self-control and composure,

now exhibited a completely different picture.

His composure was nonexistent, his eyes watered,

and his hands trembled.

Prior to being con-

fronted with the undersigned's opinion that

Subject was a dispatched

agent, when Subject

was asked on

one of the last test runs (a)

see as to genera received instructions

from the KGB on how to attempt to beat the polygraph,

his answers were given in a voice that actually

trembled.

After completion of the interview, the SR repre-

sentative at the safesite was informed, in front

of Subject,

of

the undersigned's opinion that

Subject was lying and was a dispatched Soviet

agent.

The

Subject was taken into protective

custody and escorted to his new place of resi-

dence.

Once arrived at the place of confinement, Nosenko

was confronted by the principal case officer

who broke

the news that Nosenko had been under suspicion since.

1962.

the record of the meeting,

a stormy one, is too

long to reproduce here, but the foilowing excerpt will

convey its tone:

Principal case officer:

Everything you have said in 1962 and

1964 is prepared, based on disinformation

All disinformation is true in parts.

..

That's

all right, we know that.

Now if we can

talk--what I want to do is talk the real

truth

tion which

We want to talk about the opera-

sent you and others to us ...

Nosenko:

(In Russian)

• I don't understand.

has happened?

• What has happened?

What

matter?

What's the

I don't understand.

SEGRET

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Principal case officer:

What happened in 1962?

Nosenko: What happened in general?

Principal case officer:

Your operation was known from the beginning.

suits

Nosenko:

All that I could do I tried to do. I tried

to do it for my soul.

Chief, SR reported these subsequent developnents as

he saw them to Helms on 7 April:

The results of the polygraph were reviewed with

the DDP on the basis of

our sessions on 6 April

with the polygraph examiner.

He obtained signi-

ficant reactions on those areas in which we were

convinced

Subject was withholding information or

passing deception but also uncovered for us that

Subject is somehow concerned about his biography.

The first interrogation after the polygraph was

conducted on the afternoon of 6 April

[We) monitored the interrogation through a two-

way mirror in an adjoining room.

It was agreed

before beginning this first interrogation that

its purpose was to determine whether or not

Subjegt would respond to questions or simply

the areas te planted so got tests vene some

of those on which we knew he was passing

deception material.

Ne were all gratified by the fact that Subject

was ready and

to explain himself and

in

responding to questions under tense cross-

examination, particularly with regard to the

sourcing of

some of his information, he became

quite erratic, contradicted himself

many times

and became upset physically.

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As a result of this session, we know that

Subject can be thrown off balance by aggres-

sive questioning in those areas which we know

to be important parts of the entire KGB opera-

tion.

we

lines

for several days with a specific inter-

rogation plan mapped out for each session.

At the end of the first interrogation session,

Subject noted that he had not harned the

United States in any way and that if we did

not believe him, he would consider going to a

third country because as he put it,

"I could

not return to the USSR."

When we begin the

next session with him, we will tell him that

his statement with respect to not having

harmed the US is erroneous.

We will refer

to his direct participation in the Barghoorn

case and to

the fact that his very mission

it-

self is directed against US internal security.

If he again raises the third country approach

(but only if he raiscs it),

we will advise him

that were he to go to a third country at some

point in the future that country would be fully

apprised to our information concerning his mis-

sion to the lest and the details of his personal

behavior.

Whether Helms was informed of the peculiar conditions

under which the polygraph was administered cannot be as-

certained from the record.

Chief, SR simply told him

that the examiner had "obtained significant reactions"

and that "Subject can be thrown off balance . . .

this connection,

In

it is useful to note here that, in a

number of documents related to this

luplicity, without giving the reader any hint of the

inusual circumstances surrounding it.

Even in the lengthy

study of February 1967 (commonly referred to as "the

thousand-page paper"), and in the shorter "green book"

formally published in

February 1968, one finds no

cautionary notes.

To put in perspective the developments

of this case,.

both those already reported and those still

to come, we shall therefore jump ahead briefly to quote

from a formal Office of Security report covering a review

of the 1964 examination.

The senior of the three poly-

graph specialists who reviewed it stated his conclusions

as follows,

in a memorandum dated 1 November 1966:

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1 .

Even without the revlew by reviewing examiners,

I considered the formal report dated 8 April

1964 to have been in error in that the con-

clusions reached

in

the case were a gross

misinterpretation of the extent to which the

reactions added up.

In fact, in some instances

the Subject was deemed to be lying when it is

known he was telling the truth.

with the re-

I can conclude

only that the nevial examiners did exactly what

only that the initial

collect reactions and he

the requestor asked; i.e ai.

he was told to

The fact that

reactions were not consistent (and indeed may

not have occurred) was not important since it

ad already been decided subject was wrong an

the polygraph was used only to support his de

cision.

I. Incarceration and Interrogation

Many aspects of this case did not go according to

plan, but one that did was the incarceration of Nosenko.

un Office of Security representative who periodicall

guarded Nosenko from November 1964 to May 1968, whe

questioned on 21 July 1976, described the regime as

Security Officer (SO):

While he was [incarcerated], he was being held

in a room in an old safehouse down there

i hours visual custody observance by the recurity

team.

Q: Nhat does visual custody observance mean? You

mean there's somebody in the room with him?

SO:

Of, the room had a special door. The top half

the door was a

type where we

were actually positioned outside the door on a

24-hour basis.

There were two security escorts

on duty 24 hours a day, and we were instructed

to maintain visual observance of him--just ob-

serve his activities.

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1: Now, what was the purpose of visually observin,

him

24 hours a day'

SO: Apparently to see that he made no attempts to

escape, made no attempts to injure himself.

There were never any problems along these lines.

For much of his confinement, the principal break

in a day's monotony occurred when Nosenko was under

interrogation.

It is not necessary here to cover the

various interrogations in detail; suffice it to say that,

although they

were conducted fitfully, with bursts of

activity followed by long periods of quiescence,

almost

every technique of interrogation short of physical violence

was cither tried or at least considered.

high

A few of the

points will be summarized in the succeeding para-

graphs.

After he "failed" his polygraph on 6 April 1964,

Nosenko was interrogated on an almost daily basis for

nearly three weeks.

During this period a paricipant

commented that "we have

received daily support for our

conviction that Subject was sent on a KGB mission . . . "

and by 25 April the interrogators concluded:

We have gone about as far as the time permitted

for the

"information gathering" phase of the

interrogation will allow

The task now

is to sort out and analyze the results of the

past three weeks of interrogation, to mark

out the

strong and the weak portions of

Subject's story, and to plan the strategy and

tactics of the next phase ..

In the mean-

time, Subject will be given a short haircut

to dramatize his situation, and a week or so

without interrogations to emphasize our willing-

ness to keep his (sic) indefinitely and to

heighten his tensions.

Meanwhile, Golitsyn had been brought into the case

and was being employed as a behind-the-scenes consultant

in connection with the interrogations.

Golitsyn was

given for analysis voluminous material relating to the

case and was

told that "one of the most perplexing aspects

of the Nosenko case to us at the present time

is not

whether he was sent (we all certainly agree with your

view that he was sent on a mission) but the exact nature

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of his service with the KGB."

Golitsyn's role will

be covered more thoroughly in a

separate chapter.

To ensure cooperation in the interrogation,

"Outline of Action to be Taken Should Subject Refuse

to Answer Requirements"

was drawn up on 25 August 1964.

The e porter this eular raich essent alle it, es

conveyed by the following excerpt:

Should Subject refuse to answer the case offi-

cer's questions,

Subject will be returned to

his cell at a time chosen by the case officer,

there will be no further conversations between

Subject and the guards except that which is

absolutely necessarsR. and

the case officer

will notify Chief,

At the

case officer's

discretion,

Subject may lose his cigarette

privileges

immediately.

Each day for an in-

definite period the case officer will return

and begin

a session

with Subject.

If Subject

refuses

discuss

will lose an additional privilege in the tol-

lowing order:

cigarettes

table, chair, reading

naterial. ruler, paper and pencil.

however,

will any of these privileges be removed

except with the prior approval of Chief, SR.

The basic policy to be followed during interroga-

ions was outlined even more fully in a lengthy memorandu

of 2 November 1964.

•ike all other documents on this sub-

jerapped assumed that Nosenko was lying and had to be

How the Interrogation will be Begun: Subject

will initially be confronted only by interro-

gators already known to him.

They will begin

detailed and apparently routine questioning

on carefully selected operations or other as-

pects of the 1960-1962 period.

This time,

however, the interrogators will be prepared to

stick doggedly to the particular subject.

sill probe deeper and deeper for detail, never

allowing Subject

to disniss them with such state-

ments as

"that is the way it was" of "that is

all I remember."

We would prefer to begin in

this way so that Subject will already be under

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pressure, cornered and in trouble by the

time he

realizes that this is not a routine

questioning but the climax of his long period

of detention.

In view of Subject's personality,

one psychologist believes that Subject would

otherwise welcome this climax and sharpen his

wits

for a final battle to hoodwink us and

regain his freedom.

few times, the basic theme of the interrogation

will be put to him.

He has protested his sin-

cerity and desire to convince us of his truth.

He must do this

now; otherwise he is here to

stay.

He can only talk his way

out by convinc-

ing us.

in fact, he has shown in the present

session and over

the past months that he i:

unable to support his legend.

He simply does

not know the

facts that anyone in his alleged

position would have to know.

We will confront

him with our collateral knowledge, and insist

that he answer our questions and

prove his

point.

As he repeatedly fails to do so, he

will be repeatedly accused of lying and

proving what le already know:

that the entire

service

in the American Department was a clumsy

fabrication, and he must confess it in order to

get out.

Interrogation Guides: We will identify every

detailed weakness, contradiction and omission in

line them up with care according to

his stories designed for maxinum impact on Sub-

priorities

ject, and prepare interrogation briefs accord-

ingly ...

Placing the Blane on his KGB Superiors:

planning this interrogation we have examined two

alternative methods of approach: (1) to attempt

to destroy his own self-confidence by attacking

him personally, exploiting our knowledge of his

weaknesses and

misbehavior, or (2) to pin the

ultimate blame on his superiors, who sent him

out under serious misapprehensions and with

inadequate briefing.

Psychologists who have

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examined Subject agree that he is pathologically

self-centered.

Since his own pride and his

illusions of infallibility may constitute his

The other course seens best.

As he increasingly

fails to answer

our questions, we will point out

to him the inadequacy of his

briefing and the

stupidity and fraud of which he has been made a

victin.

He will confront him with actual inci-

dences which he must know

about and then ask him

for details.

Over and over again, we will demon-

strate and emphasize how inadequate his training

and preparation was.

he will demonstrate to Sub-

ject that the KGB

consciously and callously sent

him on an inpossible mission and purposefully

deceived his about the information that Subject

himself considers the nost important to the

establishment of his bona fides . ..

The possible outcomes

foreseen as a result of the interro-

gation were also based on the assumption that he had been

lying about his reasons for coming to us:

Full Success:

have broken

with the KGB and will become

•If Subject confesses fully depen-

he will

dent upon us for. his security and well-being.

After full debriefing and establishment of bona

fides he will presumably be returned to a con-

ventional safehouse

and a life similar to the

January to April 1964 period in which he will

be permitted to go out with a security escort

while we continue his exploitation and plan his

future.

Partial Success: If Subject makes significant

admissions and falls back on a second

level

cover story, he will be kept in the present

safehouse.

His personal circumstances and

intensity

of interrogation will be

determined

by the situation obtaining at that time.

pailure put then errogation pelled, "e would

interrogate him again.

For this interim period,

Subject would be transferred to visibly more

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permanent and more secure quarters.

From the

makeshitt physical set up of his iresert

quarters,

the large number of guards who rotate

weekly and the round-the-clock visual observa-

tion

by two guards,

it 1s obvious to Subject

that his quarters

(and therefore his situation)

is temporary.

As long as he knows that, he can

hope.

Our only hope of breaking Subject will

be to allow hin to convince himself that he has

got into a situation fron which he can extricate

hinself only by cooperating:

This could be

best achieved by breaking sharply with the

present situation, placing him in permanent

quarters, preferably renote and more primitive

than his

present quarters, physically secure

and resembling jail, and Capable of being manned

by a minimum of guard personnel who would not

keep him under constant direct visual observa-

tion.

No Headquarters case officer would visit

him, until he has given sign that he has changed

his mind.

This period would last for several

months, pending another attempt to break him

based

on information obtained in the interin.

J. Elaboration of the Plot Theory

The stringenc) of the rules governing treatment of

Nosenko varied from time to tine,

but the general trend

an ever harder line towards him.

was assumed that he was a XGB-dispatched agent, he could

satisfy his interrogators by admitting that such

was the case.

But, while he would from time to time at-

tempt to placate his questioners with admissions of having

lied or

never admit to

amito to che key accusation on best ten-controved.

the key accusation of being

The inevitable result was not only greater harshness

toward him but a gradually spreading suspicion

in regard

to support eston ties est develope is to ed

to support his bona fides.

in a memorandum

that the principal case officer wrote

after a visit with Helms on 19 Yovember 1964:

In connection with Nosenko, Mr. Helms referred

to it as one of the greatest time consumers

he had ever seen.

remarked that I felt the

time was well spent since our examination of this

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case had opened our eyes not only to security

threats

in our own midst and within the US

government, but also had revealed that many

other important sources were in fact KGB provo-

cations and in fact that our entire counterin-

telligence effort,

double agents

and all, may

be contaminated

and useless.

According to the theory being developed, no Soviet

or Soviet Bloc agent was immune from suspicior. if his re-

porting tended to confirm anything that Nosenko had said.

Agents who were then currently producing intelligence,

not only for CIA but also for the FBI and certain European

intelligence services, all came under heavy suspicion.

The single exception was

The latter,

although

he had confirmed Nosenko's identity (which had

itself been

in doubt at one point) as well as

his affiliation with the

KGB, also contributed the elaborate rationale according

to which the KGB was

sacrificing Nosenko and a host of

other agents and operations to protect even more important,

if somewhat nebulous, assets and plans.

Golitsyn thus be-

came the touchstone

against whom the trustworthiness of

all other agents was judged.

Because Nosenko refused to "break," however, it was

hard to adduce proof of Golitsyn's theory substantial

enough to convince Helms,

the FBI, and other officials

and organizations not so

deeply committed

to the theory.

A lengthy paper on SR/CI's findings on this subject was

ilways in the offing but was continually delayed; it did

not finally materialize until February 1967.

On the

other hand, no one had at his fingertips the vast array

of facts,

and suppositions masquerading as facts, on

which the case was based.

The theory was therefore

difficult to challenge; there may even have been

reluctance

to do so, because the main proponents of the disinformacion

theory frequently referred to unhappy consequences that

would flow from abandoning the course upon which the

Agency had embarked.

Should the Agency change course,

fer tae, though imi-defined,

by simply returning Nosenko to Soviet hands,

terrible,

consequences would cer-

tainly ensue.

As the principal case officer said (again

to his

20 November 1964 memorandum of conversation with

Helms) :

I pointed out the potential dangers of return-

ing Nosenko unscathed and within a short tine.

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I thought the KGB would be

concerned

by implication,

amazed and delighted] only

y the tact that

a defector thrust into our

mits (sic) could

expect

such

casy fate

if uncovered.

K. Life in a Vault

The unforeseen stubbornness of Nosenko had meanwhile

brought SR Division to an impasse from which there was

but one escape--the more-or-less permanent

Nothing that the latter said would be be-

lieved except the one admission that he steadfastly re-

used to make (1.e., that he had been dispatched by the

Helms wanted to solve the problem

thus created by simply turning Nosenko back to the Soviets,

this solution was resisted by the division.

was that, on 27 November 1964, Chief, SR wrote:

• If he fails to convince us (which he

and refuses to confess what we already

know, the US government has every intention

of protecting itself against this dangerous

provocation by detaining him indefinitely.

The decision was therefore taken, with Helms' approval,

to build a new

detention facility.

The cell constructed

for Nosenko's occupancy was essentially a vault

enveloped

by a barracks-type building. Its projected amenities were

described as follows:

a.

Small cell with concrete floor and

ceiling and walls lined with

metal.

b. No electrical outlets in the cell,

lighting to be recessed

and grilled and con-

trolled from the day room.

c. No window in the cell.

d. One entrance to the cell which will be

of the metal bar type with

an exterior door in

front of this and a sliding panel in the exte-

rior door which will permit a complete view of

the cell area.

Plexiglass will be used in the

observation panel rather than glass.

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A toilet facility which will adjoin

the ceil and contain a shower, basin and com-

mode.

With the exception of the commode,

which will be the

prison push-button type.

all controls will

be in the day room area anc

will also contain a plexiglass observation

port with

on the exterior.

nearest door

An exercise area just outside the

which

will be fenced and screened

(so that Nosenko can only look up and see only

As the new installation neared completion, Chief,

SR on 15 June 1965 wrote Helms:

We believe that we have gone just about as far

as normal interrogation

techniques will

take

us, and that the time has come to prepare Sub-

ject for his more to the ostensibly permanent

detention site

occupancy on or about i August.

It will be ready for

Chief, SR/CI

visited the site on 11 June

and reports that

the installation is excellent from every point

of view.

marginal note next to the above paragraph:

like both you and (Chief, CI] to examine this site."

If Helms had had any doubt about the site's suitability,

he must have been reassured by a 28 July 1965 memorandum

addressed to him by the Director of Security:

Chiet, SR Division and the undersigned fin-e

chief, SR Division

spected) the newly constructed special detention

facility ..

As you

know,

to utilize

this facility to

an indefinite period.

By mid-August, the time had come for Nosenko's transfer.

The events surrounding it are recounted

in a 19 August 1965

memorandum for the record:

As planned

had a breed confrontation scene case subsert

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on the same evrning, immediately prior to his

removal to new quarters.

The purpose of this

session was not

to deliver a new message of

any sort,

or to give Subject "another

chance

to confess";

everything that could be said had

already been

said by

the previous inter-

rogators,

and there was no doubt that Subject

inderstood pertectly well the meaning anc

importance of what had been said to hin: also.

it was recognized that Subject would sense an

impending move or change of

some sort,

and that

it was inevitable that he would hope that the

change would be for the better until he saw

otherwise.

The purpose of the confrontation

was rather to close the circle:

to show him

that although (the principal case officer) had

not seen him for over a year nothing had changed,

and nothing would change until he told the

truth.

An additional effect would be to empha-

size that the interrogators who had worked with

him in

the interim were fully responsible and

authoritative, and

that just as Subject had been

told when he was first locked up in April 1964,

what he was up

against was the collapse of the

operation in which he was involved.

Finally,

[the principal case officer) would

stress ...

that the "investigation is closed" and that

Subject had only prolonged and total isolation

to look forward

to now unless and until he

decides to confess.

the meeting took place just about as planned.

It lasted for 15 minutes only (2100 to 2115)

and was essentially a formality, although it

is hoped

that Subject will have reason to re-

flect on it in the months ahead.

seen from

the attached summary transcript,

Subject did not display any hesitancy of

indecision, and his answers and statements

were made in a mechanical manner.

The 19 August memorandum concludes:

Immediately upon termination of the interview

with [the principal case officer,

Subject was

blindfolded and led out of the house according

He was clearly frightened,

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but did not put up the slightest resistance.

The move

to

the new quarters took place exactly

as planned.

The new detention

facility had been designed and

staffed with the intention of engendering

in Nosenko a

from which

the only escape

KGB agent

and revelation of the full details of how he had been

briefed and dispatched by the Soviet

authorities.

With

the exception of being allowed certain books, carefully

selected for him by SR Division, Nosenko was confined

under conditions

that were as close to stimulus-free as

was consistent with

maintaining him in good physical

health.

For example, the TV used by

the guards was

fitted with earphones,

so that there was no risk of his

overhearing snatches of dialogue.

The principal case

officer was

assured, in answer

to an inquiry, that

"while he does note

planes going overhead as well as

animal noises from the woods during exercise periods,

everything else

• • is excluded."

As to the guards,

if Nosenko were to

attempt to open conversation with

them on any subject,

in rude terms to shut up. „guards should instruct him

At this point, we must pause to consider for the

moment how the period that follows is to be covered.

Because there were long periods of time when no human

being other than the guards was in contact with Nosenko,

Yet this period cannot be ignored. It constituted

over half of Nosenko's solitary confinement. And that

three-and-a-half-year period amounts to five percent of

the total life span

of a man who lives to be 70.

Obviously, then, this period will weigh heavily

in the findings made

at the conclusion of our study.

For these findings to be valid, they must be made on

the basis of as much empirical

evidence as can be

gathered.

Because the effect on Nosenko of this long

period of confinement can only be dealt with speculatively,

such few remarks as we have on that subject will be

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Within the

body of Chapter III, we are limiting ourselves to

coverage of

the main

are seen through the

recorded events himself which

We now resume

our narrative.

his cell for the first

Cell

This is your cell.

You are to keep it clean

and will be given cleanin; materials for this

purpose.

Reading Privilege

You will be permitted one book a week which

you may retain in your cell.

Smoking Privilege

You will receive a daily cigarette ration.

Exercising Privilege

Eve viday, ve the exerd scher factors permitting,

exercise period.

Writing Material

Writing material will be provided only for

correspondence with the appropriate authorities

concerning your confession.

Schedule

This prison operates on a schedule. You will

become familiar with this schedule

and adhere

to it at all times.

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withif the framework of the above rules, which were

tractly entorced. Nosenko's only diversion was readin!

he one book per weck that he was at first allowed.

He

did not even have the distraction of being questioned,

for, When queried by Helms on 12 January 1966, Chief,

SR

stated that no one from SR

Division had seen Nosenko

since the beginning of his

confinement there, five

months earlier.

On 1 November 1965, his privileges began to be re-

duced, for reasons that

are not always clear from the

record.

From that date on, for instance, he no longer

received books to read,

and for minor

acts of indiscipline,

soap, towel and toothbrush were temporarily denied him.

Some time in January or February 1966, Nosenko

claimed to be suffering from auditory hallucinations.

In a memorandum dated 18 February 1966, Chief, SR re-

ported:

• There are hopeful signs that the isolation

is beginning

to have an effect on Subject.

doctor's) visit may have had further impact in

this direction when the doctor told Subject

that his visit constituted an

"annual" physical

exam; as he left Subject's room, [the doctor)

also

remarked,

"I'll see you next year."

ject's reaction was visible.)

Now we have just received further confirmation

of the development of Subject's attitude.

the evening of 16 February 1966, he shouted for

a few seconds in English, apparently to guards,

that he would commit suicide and kept repeating,

"You' 11 see.

You'll see."

He asked to see the

local "doctor" (he has been told that the medical

technician at the base is a doctor), but the

guards told him it was

too late

in

the evening.

Then the technician came the following day,

1l February, Subject talked at some length

about his worries that he might be going mad.

he has repeatedly stressed his belief that he

is being drugged, but said

on this occasion

that he recognized that there are no drugs

designed to make a person mad.

Consequently,

he said,

he was concerned

about the fact that

during the past day or two he had heard voices

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emanating

from various objects, such as his

and his spoon,

the engine

overhead, and a bird in a nearly tree.

questioned,

he said that the voices were say-

ing in English

"first die" while the bird was

He asked if the

"doctor" con-

sidered him

He was told that he did

not appear to be so, upon which he reiterated,

his worries and spoke of his desire to die.

He expressed his recognition that his present

circumstances do not afford means to commit

senko's alleged hallucinations triggered a speci

meeting on

24 February 1966.

e resultant memorandu

for

the record, written by a member of SR/CI, is worth

quoting at length:

Representatives of SR Division, the Office of

Security, and the Medical Staff met in the SR

Conference Room from approximately 1400 to

1430 hours this date to discuss recent inci-

dents in Nosenko's behavior and a forthcoming

examination of Nosenko by [a doctor]

The undersigned entered the Conference Room

after discussions had begun,

initial remarks are not noted here.

(An Agency psychiatrist) first described to

those present his examination of Nosenko on

21 January 1966 and stated his opinion, based

on observations made at that time, that the

recent outbursts by Nosenko and his threats

of suicide are all

contrived

and do not

represent an involuntary reaction on his

part.

Nosenko's recent behavior started with

suicide threats, then progressed to auditory

hallucinations, and has now reached the stage

where every inanimate object in his environ-

ment, including

the trees and the wind out-

doors, are talking to him.

(The psychiatrist)

expressed his view that, if Nosenko actually

does hear voices, it could normally be expected

that they would

speak to hin in his native

rather than in English as he told the

base medical technician during a recent visit.

Nosenko apparently now realizes this ((the

mino son diesa.

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psychiatrist) didn't describe how, but

presumably the technician commented on it

English--think, speak, everything.

it this point, [the principal case officer.

lescribed Nosenko's recently begun word games,

in which he takes a Russian word

and then figures

out as many root derivations as possible,

as

an illustration

of how ridiculous Nosenko's

claim

.is.

[The psychiatrist) continued to say that Nosenko

is now

agreeing to take medication and is asking

for additional medication to help raise his

spirits.

(The psychiatrist) has

told the base

medical

but

technician not

to answer Nosenko directly,

to "let it

be

known" to Nosenko that the

medication he is now receiving will help him

out in this respect.

[The psychiatrist then

repeated that he thinks that Nosenko is reacting

to his isolation, his lack of human contact, and

his

environment,

but that he is responding in a

planned,

contrived, and non-spontaneous way, from

a psychiatric point of view.

(The psychiatrist]

added that the only thing that is worrying him

at present concerning Nosenko

is his possible

urinary problem, which is now being look into.

[The principal case officer) next explained to

those present that Nosenko's current behavior

is consistent with our knowledge of Soviet training

in techniques of resisting interrogation and

isprisonment.

However, because of intelligence

and

cunning (although he has a

fair share of

principe ease officed see set casento is

probably feeling the effect of isolation and is

making this try to get out.

When he finds that

this doesn't work, he may

eventually decide "to

hell with

it" and

start to talk.

[the

principal case officer said that he and Ithe

should Nosenko raise

psychiatrist] agree that'insanity during the

the issue of his alleged

upcoming examination, the best response should

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be to the effect that, if Nosenko actually

is going out of his head, the best

thing for him is isolation, lots o Possible

This "Blace where he can't

hurt himself.

what is usually prescribed and this

i5, in fact,

the situation Nosenko already

(The principal case officer] added

that the wording of

any such response

of course, be up to (the psychiatrist).

In support of the above, (the psychiatrist]

then said that he had gone over things very

carefully during his January visit and, on

this basis, can see no basic change in

Nosenko.

When the psychiatristl arrived

at the site

he had remarked that he had come

for

Nosenko's annual physical examination

and when he was leaving he told Nosenko that

he would

see him again next year.

In [the

psychiatrist's] opinion,

Nosenko reacted to

this by saying to himself:

"How can I get

out of here?"

He has apparently decided

that the best way to escape his present

situation is to be sick with something

that

can't be handled locally and then it will be

necessary for him to be moved to a hospital.

Bitten gies sin the price on caos

officer] that it is important to indicate

that there will be none.

ne simple state-

aent suggested by [the principal case officer

may give

Nosenko the message and no further

explanation is necessary.

(An Office of Security

representativel then

asked if, under conditions of prolonged con-

finement, there is not a chance that a person

actually will go off his rocker.

The

psychiatrist] replied that this

is absolutely

50,

that this happens in many cases under less

stringent conditions of imprisonment,

and

that the person usually improved quickly when

these conditions are relaxed.

(The psychiatrist)

does not believe however that Nosenko fits in

this category.

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(The Office of Security representative) then

asked what sort of behavior can be expected

in a

person who is actually so affected by

his imprisonment.

Whether he could be ex-

pected to become

violent or behave errati-

(He) said that he was asking this

question from the point of view of his respon-

sibilities for guarding Nosenko.

psychiatrist] replied that such

The

behavior

ior, eating and be

sleeping habits, etc.

He added that there

certainly has been a change in Nosenko since

the January 1966 examination, that he doesn't

know for certain what it means, and that there

surely is a risk that he may go out of his

head.

The principal case

officer, pointed

out

that the psychiatrist's remark about

the "annual physical" may have triggered this

reaction.

(The psychiatrist) agreed, saying

that while he cannot dismiss true

insanity

as a

real possibility, he doesn't think that

this is what is going on right now.

(The Office of Security representative) next

commented that Nosenko is again asking for

reading material and asked [the principal

case officer if he wanted to give him any.

[The principal case officer] replied absolutely

not and [the psychiatrist] concurred that no

Changes should be made.

(The Office of Security

representative) then asked whether Nosenko has

any sort of skin disease, pointing out that the

guards have to wash his shirts'two or three

times to get them clean.

Both doctors said

that Nosenko is not afflicted as far as they

know and [the Office of Security representativel

asked whether it is still policy that Nosenko

is to have a clean change of clothes only once

a week.

[The psychiatrist] expressed the opinion

that nothing should be changed, at least until

after the examination on l March.

[The psychiatrist] remarked that things are

bound to change as

far as Nosenko is concerned--

he is either going to stop faking or things will

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get worse.

(The principal case officer) added

that we

• (SR)

are working hard on other sources

of intornation

and that this is set

optinistic

He added

right now nat Mr. Heims is keeping current of

the situation and goes along

fully with

present plans, without

changes.

The psychiatrist was asked what medication

Nosenko

is

now receiving.

(The psychiatrist)

replied

that he is getting 1/4 of a grain of

phenobarbital together with an antispasmodic

(for gas),

which won't have any medical effect

on Nosenko's mental state.

This is why, he

explained, he had instructed the base technician

to let Nosenko know that the medication will

help him.

It can have no real effect and if

Nosenko

suddenly improves, this will be adied

confirmation that he is faking.

On 1 March 1966,

the principal case officer and

and SR/CI representative accompanied the two doctors

to another examination of Nosenko.

One doctor conducted

the examination, while the other members of the party

observed it on a television screen.

None of the four

men

gave much credence

to Nosenko's clain of hearing

voices, but the following was noted:

Though Nosenko's mental difficulties are

it is also evident that

there has been a change in his outlook since

SR last had direct contact with him in August

1965.

If by nothing else, this is evidenced

by the single fact that he has taken a new

tack in his relationship with CIA:

He has

apparently given up hope that his legend of

"another source" can help him escape his

predicament and, as (the psychiatrist) earlier

proposed, is using his "voices" (except for

which Nosenko clains to be sane) to force

some sort of change.

For the first time in

the undersigned's recollection, Nosenko said

that he now know's that his CIA

handling offi-

cers will never

(Nosenko's emphasis) believe

hin because of his behavior and for other

reasons, and that there is nothing he can do

about it. But, beyond this, it is difficult

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to interpret the significance of his remarks

and behavior during

(a second doctor's) inter-

view--on one hand

there were

indications of

deterioration; on the other Nosenko is an

astute actor, who was clearly playing a role

for (that doctor].

Bearing in mind that these

superficial indications may well be a part of

this act, Nosenko appeared far more subdued,

almost despondent, compared with six months

ago.

For most of the interview, he slouched

or sat listlessly in his chair and only sel-

dom did he lean

forward and, by the motions

of his hands, attempt to reach and to secure

the understanding and belief of the interviewer.

There appears

to

be a slight deterioration in

his English-language fluency (see transcript

below) and his replies were broken by frequent

pauses, incomplete sentences, and confusing

revisions.

Nosenko's changed outlook next took the form of two

letters to the principal case officer, written in mid-

April 1966 (although incorrectly dated, because by now

his calculation of

the passage of time

completely accurate). The first, and briefer of the two,

read:

I ask you to excuse me for my baseness in 1962

and 1964.

Now I have completely realized all

my delinquencies and have reevaluated my past

"life."

Live at lan ready clustre yhonest et pradest

life and I am ready

my knowledge of Soviet Russia.

ah knowledge of sect Russians i believe that

I have sufficient strength to live only a real

life.

I ask you to help me.

The second letter was even more self-accusatory, and

was clearly nodeled after the self-criticisms

exacted

fron prisoners in the Soviet Union.

It began:

My despicable behaviour from the beginning of

ay acquaintance with you in 1962 led to it

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being necessar!' to create special conditions

for me and to

, which has finally

helped me to realize all my delinquencies

and mistakes and

to reevaluate

"life.

all

my past

I should have honestly told you everything

about myself, about my moral principles and

my. life in Soviet Russia in order to start

a conscientious life in June 1962.

colded latter or ree vocat are ere

ously" as a lieutenant colonel he had actually never

held a military rank higher than captain in the KGB.

It concluded:

Work in the KGB was the chief and deciding

period of my degradation--drunkenness,

debauchery, baseness, and falsehood.

I should have told you all about this in

1962 or in 1964, before flying to America.

I started my life in the United States of

America absolutely incorrectly. My behaviour

was base, dirty, and boorish.

The creation of isolated living conditions

and the appropriate assistance were necessary

for me.

But I was unable to honestly and

lirectly tell everything about myself i

1964 of in 1965, right up to the last con-

versation with you.

And only in 1966 did

I gradually begin to realize

and to correctly

understand all my mistakes and delinquencies

and to think about my behaviour.

And only

here was I able to reevaluate all my past

"life."

Now I can think correctly about real life

and work,

and therefore I address myself to

you because you know me more and better than

anyone else, with the request to decide. the

question of

my future life.

By work against

the Communists, and only with real life,

will try to justify the confidence placed in

ne.

;

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The Chief, SR commented:

The letters themselves do not represent a com-

plete break but they reveal

that his defenses

are weakening and he may be seeking a way out.

He tells essentially the

same

story

as before

but with more discrepancies of detail which

suggest further deterioration and, by this

an inability to recount his legend

consistently.

The most significant change

is that he now admits he was only a Captain

in the KGB and not a Lt.

hand,.

this may

Colonel.

On the other

be a prearranged fall-back posi-

tion.

We recall that (a Soviet agent]--who,

in telling us repeatedly in 1964 of the importance

of Nosenko, said he was a Lt. Col.--informed (us]

in February 1965 (after our

doubts about Nosenko

had become well known and Nosenko himself had

possibly missed pre-arranged contacts with the

KGB) that la Soviet agent] had heard that al-

though Nosenko was a Deputy Department Chief,

he was only a Captain and not a Lt. Colonel.

On the other hand, there can be no doubt that

own improvisation.

is proved by the fact

that one of the personal

documents that Nosenko

brought with him to Geneva in 1964 was a TDY

travel order which Nosenko claims to have used

• [and]

was clearly a

Furthermore, the rank was necessary to sustain

the fiction

of Nosenko's high supervisory posi-

tions, which in turn

were necessary to explain

his access to the information he claims to have.

Aside from the hope they offer for success in

breaking Nosenko, the most interesting aspect

of the letters is their tone.

He does not com-

plain of our treatment of him but on the con-

trary expresses

appreciation for it and says

that it was entirely justified.

They are the

latest in

a series of indications that Nosenka

is weakening.

They follow an attempt to feign

Insanity,

an

abortive hunger strike and some

erratic behaviour concerning his exercise period.

1I t turn tini

Hustle

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We plan to answer him along the lines that

¿e are willing to forgive his "baseness and

falsehood" and

discuss his rehabilitation

but only when he is prepared to drop

the legend

which he seens to maintain in his letter.

as we think,

We have clarified the medical questions which

were delaying further interrogation.

now reviewing with Chief,

TSD the proposals

discussed with you earlier concerning the use

of special interrogation techniques.

attached letters afford an ideal opportunity

to resume discussions with Nosenko whenever

(The reference to "special interrogation techniques"

harked back to a 13 January 1966 discussion with Helms,

during which the latter had stated that "he was inclined

to try special techniques on Subject in the hope that

they might somehow

provide the answers we are seeking."

In this context, "special techniques" was a euphemism for

the use of drugs as aids in interrogation.

As will be

shown later,

although Helms was willing

to discuss the

use of such

techniques in this case, he in fact

never gave

his consent and they were never employed.

Nevertheless,

the use of drugs for interrogation purposes seems to have

been contemplated for some time,

since it is foreseen

handwritten

notes made by the principal case officer as

early as November 1964, and Chief, SR and the principal

case officer continued

to press for permission to employ

them until a final negative decision by Helms on 1

September 1966.)

say th as set on 5 to 0e te delayed

in order to allow time for discussion with Chief, CI and

the psychiatrist.

Their combined judgment seems to have

been that the letters were "an attempt to relieve the

isolation by reestablishing personal contact, if only

with his interrogators."

He bolstered this view by an

appeal to medical authority:

It is [the psychiatrist's] opinion, in which

we fully concur,

that any such contact would

in fact constitute a relief for Nosenko and

that it would be a serious mistake to grant

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him this at the very moment that his

psychological defenses nay be cracking.

on the contrary

harbor that he can alter his present situa-

tion without a full confession.

Since it is the technique of isolation and

rejection that has led

to the recent promising

changes in Nosenko's attitude and behavior, we

believe that

it is logical to continue along

the same lines

and that there is a reasonable

expecta les that ise near enture! produce

further results

in the near future.

therefore

intend

to send Nosenko the attached

etter and to wait approximately 60 days before

changing our tactics.

The letter thereupon sent to Nosenko in the principal

case officer's name read as follows:

I have received

"autobiography. "Your letters and so-called

We understand

fully what

degradation the Soviet system has forced you

into and as you have been told, we are willing

to help you establish a real life.

is I told you in August, however

we have no

Further interest in reading or listening to

the legend (or its variations) that you con-

tinue to repeat.

Ne

are only interested in

evidence that you really want to talk truth-

fully.

In the future we will reply only to a

true written account of your life and how your

legend was prepared. Do not waste our time

with the lies of the past.

This legend cannot

be the basis of a new life for you.

Chief, SR's next report, dated 11 Nay 1966, was the

following:

As previously agreed on 28 April, a brief note

was passed to Nosenko in response to his earlier

note and slightly amended biographical state-

He made no response upon receiving our

note (although he did

not touch his meal

night); but on the evening of 4 May he asked

4

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for a pencil and paper, indicating, in reply

to a question from

the guard, that

he had a

statement to make in response to our note.

After writing his note,

he sealed it

in an

envelope and gave it to the guard to be

delivered.

The note, written in English, states:

Allow me to thank you very much for your kind

letter.

Now I understood

fully what degrada-

tion to the Soviet Russia had forced me into.

At last I can tell you that I really want to

talk truthfully.

Russia.

Are your eip do you are anting to ad

is to establish a real

life with your

[signed] George Nosenko

Ke have discussed his note with (the psychiatrist),

who feels that the final sentence of the

first paragraph probably reflects no real

desire on the part of Nosenko to talk truth-

fully at this

time, but is rather a further

attempt by him either to generate a personal

dialogue with us or at least to continue

this written exchange.'

Ke feel that it would not be in our interest

to answer

this latest note with another

note,

thus permitting additional and, to Nosenko

psychologically necessary contact and involve-

ment--albeit impersonal. In order to cut

off this effort on his part,

but at the same

time to allow for the possibility that this

latest note might actually convey an intention

to talk truthfully, we intend to deliver to

Nosenko the attached statement.

The require-

ment for direct "YES" or "NO"

answers accom-

panied by his signature allows for no mis-

understanding of the questions and does not

permit lengthy discourses on peripheral.

matters.

sie aren-t

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(The psychiatrist] concurs in our plan and

recommends that it be carried out as soon as

possible to achieve maximum effect.

If we

get a positive response we will follow up

in accordance with the above memorandum, the follow-

ing form was passed to Nosenko on 13 May 1966, apparently

by the Security guards:

Answer "YES" Or "NO":

1) Do you admit that you came to the United States

on a KGB mission?

YES!

NO T

•) 'Are you ready to tell us about your KGB missio

and how your legend was prepared and taught

to you?

YES I

NO D

Date

Signed

If the answers to both questions are "YES" someone

will come to talk to you.

If not, there is no

need to write any more letters.

The next major maneuver on Nosenko's part was a

hunger strike, in the course of which he lost some forty

This tactic was counteracted with the help of a

medical officer while administering a physical check-up

In the course of the examination, (this doctor)

questioned Subject on the reasons for his fast

and got hin to admit that this was a deliberate

tactic.

As planned, the doctor showed ro

concern, assured Subject that he was still in

good health, described to him in some detail

the physical and mental consequences of prolonged

undernourishment, and emphasized that Subject

would not be allowed to do hinself any damage

in this manner.

The doctors' description of some

of the standard methods of forced feeding and his

.....

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matter-of-fact emphasis that all appropriate

medical measures

could and would ve taken at

the present

site made an

instant and evident

impact on Subject,

who nevertheless continued

to assert that he

had no need or desire for

more food.

(Despite the weight loss, the re-

sults of the medical exam showed that Subject

is in good overall condition.)

visit,

Subject began to

he has been consuming all his meals since.

By 6 July he had gained 15 lbs.

The Agency's next step was to have the principal

case officer see Nosenko.

This interview, which took

place on o July 1966,

lasted for about 45

minutes and

first time that a case officer had talked to

Subject since he was noved . .

sulted in another stand-off,

the principal case officer

insisting that Nosenko admit to being a KGB agent and

the latter refusing.

Once again, however, Agency offi-

cers in charge felt

they were making progress:

(The psychiatrist), who monitored the entire

interview,

was impressed by

the

fact that Subject

had used it solely to appeal to

the pity an

sympathy of the interviewer,

and felt that thi

way in which the interview was conducted would

very effectively slam shut

still another psycho-

logical door.

It is believed that

for the first

time Subject

has come to appreciate the measure

of our resolve

actively grappling with

ling with the realities of his

and that he is

present situation.

Subject's pattern of behavior

over the past few

months

suggests that he will

need some

time to fully digest the import of the

(principal case officer's) interview, but that

he will then be impelled to initiate some new

effort to releive (sic) his lot.

Very few

alternatives short of confession--real or false-.

appear to be left to him.

On 23 August 1966 Helms, who had become DCI on 30

instructed the DDP and Chief,

ease "within about souty days assuming there ane no new

SR to close the

developments

developments Chero sa save this account of Helms, this

reasoning:

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.. the Director advised us that in his

view the time had come to consider disposal of

Subject.

He was willing, he said,

to proceed

with the imnediate plans

we had for the sodium

amytal interview

and to consider proposals for

use of special techniques within the time frame

we suggested but unless these steps developed

new information or indicated definite progress

in resolving the case, he wanted us to wind it

up.

Helms' decision triggered

a new rash of activity

within what was now the SB Division.

Chief, SR, noting

that "there is no appeal

to work on

the case, headed by the principal case officer.

A problem which the principal case officer found

was posed by

Nosenko.

con case see nay accept anal suedence.

to laymen than

has largely failed to understand it.

Despite Helms' expressed preference for returning

Nosenko to Soviet hands, the principal case officer con-

tinued to have misgivings about such a course:

notice again,

Soviets to regain

possession of him.

denial of Nosenko to the Soviets,

particularly

if they are in some doubt about his real

status/loyalty, is a form of guarantee that

the Soviets cannot take the many damaging

actions available to them if they had the

body.)

The course of action therefore must

balance the respective dangers.

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He was perhaps influenced by the psychiatrist's)

on the other hand, hardened his position.

pointing out that in his experience with sodium

amytal it had only worked once,

and then by accident;

Helms promptly revoked his permission for use of this

drug.

Helms remarked that Nosenko was "one person

on

whom these techniques were never going to be used."

The upshot was that, on 1 September 1966, Helms

limited the interrogators to the polygraph in any

future interrogations,

and reiterated his preference

for "having Subject turned back to the Soviets ... "

on L september, Chief,

SB

saw Helms again, to ask

that under the new

circumstances the sixty-day deadline

be extended.

Helms agreed on an extension until the

end of the year.

A discussion of a final report and

"disposal"

then ensued, reported by Chief, SB as follows:

• it would be imprudent I thought not to

have ready for any eventuality a detailed

study of our findings.

This would provide

ackup to our final report to the intelligence

Attorney cenercipald othe Secret the east de,

the FBI, I added, we would

most certainly

have to have such

[This remark

stemmed fron the fact that the FBI had never

fully agreed with the Agency's views on

Nosenko. )

that return to

practical solution.

might only delay our having to face the same •

problems and if accusations are leveled at

the agency it would be far preferable to

have Subject in Soviet hands.

The Director

did not believe the Soviets would refuse to

accept Subject and felt we could take the

sting out of any Soviet reaction by

our own

statement concerning Subject's mission.

If

our position is publicized first, anything

the Soviets or anyone else says about the

case thereafter will have very little effect.

In the conclusion the Director emphasized the

need to bring this case to an end in a manner

which will permit us to

arrange events and

timing to our advantage.

He does not want

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to be stampeded by publicity beyond our

control.

Interrogation of Nosenko, preparatory to the

recommenced on 18 October 1966.

terrogation was the polygraph operator whose 1964

py the office ot security: one November,

were at this very time under review

days later, they were officially and in writing

to have been invalid.

1966:

This is what Chief, SB had to report on 25 October

Nosenko knows he is reacting in sensitive

areas and this is worrying him because he is

not sure how

we know or how we learned

it.

Nos enko's

reactions have given us hope

that we may be this procedure have begun to

strike home.

We do not know what it is that

keeps this

man

sitting month after month in

his present

situation.

We speculate that one

factor may be confidence that the KGB will

get him out.

Related to this may be the

hought that the KGB has CIA so deeply pene-

rated that it would be unhealthy for hin

to confess.

Our current line of interroga-

confession by showing us in a different and

stronger posture.

SB Division did not achieve their

being a "provocateur."

Operating under the constraint of Helms'

injunction to

wind up

the case by the end of the year, the principal

case officer made one last attempt to

shatter Nosenko's

resolution.

In a long

letter, the principal case officer

outlined the hopelessness of Nosenko's situation and

adduced a number of proofs of Nosenko's prevarication,

derived in part from a fictitious

"KGB officer.

out as a provocateur whom the SB Division leadership

invented

for purposes of this letter.

A possible tactical

ertor on

their part, however, was

the inclusion of informa-

tion about Nosenko, ostensibly received from the notional

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source, which Nosenko himself would obviously recognize

as false:

"He heard that you

had been in prison in the

meet as with us in eyed according to the Sa Division

who delivered the letter, Nosenko responded to

this allegation with a belly-laugh, but he certainly was

depressed,

as his rambling remarks

to the SB Division

emissary showed:

• I know about my lies and I corrected all

my false statements, my chattering.

everything what is necessary for me to know.

And I will be here, I understand this, I will

be here so many years as you will consider it

You consider five.

• I will be

five; you consider ten .

will be ten.

I have no, I have no exit

and I have no way

out of this situation, and ...

L. Inter-Agency Disagreement

Meanwhile, enormous effort went into preparation

of SB Division's "final report" on the case.

pent, regently refery diet, the "thousand- page re-

[It) will reflect all of AEFOXTROT's state-

ments concerning his personal life, alleged

and other matters as well as sub-

sequent contradictions or denials of earlier

statements plus the results of our investiga-

tions at home and abroad of these statements.

It will also cover statements pertaining to

AEFOXTROT made by various Soviet officials

some of whom have been of are now in opera-

tional contact with the cs

[Clandestine

Service] or the FBI.

This factual portion

will be followed by

analysis and

conclusions.

The latter will be absolutely unequivocal on

these points:

a.

AEFOXTROT is a dispatched

KGB agent whose contact with us and

ultimate defection were carried out

at KGB direction.

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b.

AEFOXTROT's claim to service

in the KGB was an integral and vital

part of his KGB agent mission,

forming

as it did the basis for all that he has

nad to say about KGB operations anc

the results of our

peterrosations of REFOXTROT supported

by polygraph examination demonstrate

conclusively that AEFOXTROT did not

and could not have served in any of the

specific staff positions he has described.

Whatever the ultimate goals

of this KGB operation might be, it has

been possible

to determine that among

the most significant KGB

aims in

• directing AEFOXTROT to us were:

to persuade us of KGB ineptitude and

lack of success in

developing technical

and human penetrations of the US

government,

its security and intelli-

gence services while at the same time

deliberately diverting these services

fron specific areas of investigation

in which the KGB his been successful;

(2) to offer us leads to new sources

and new investigations which had they

all been pursued would have absorbed

our limited manpower in handling cases

in which

ultimate control rested with

the KGB.

Preparation of the report was somewhat complicated

by disagreements between ClA and the FBl,

as well as

between

SB Division and CI Staff within the Agency. The

intra-CIA disagreement stemmed from differing views on

the validity of Golitsyn information.

Whereas SB Division

insisted that Nosenko, during his KGB career, had never

"served in

any of the specific staff positions he has

described," Golitsyn had in some respects supported

Nosenko's

claims regarding his KGB service.

After a con-

ference with Chief

problem on 29 March:

Cl, the Chief, SR summed up the

Chief, CI said that he did not see how we could

submit a Final Report to the Bureau if it con-

tained suggestions

that Golitsyn

had lied to us

about certain aspects of Nosenko's past.

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recalled that the Director of the FBI had stated

that in his opinion

Golitsyn himself was a provo-

cateur and penetration agent.

On the other hand,

nost FBI agents have accepted that when Golitsyn

was

speaking

on facts known to him he was accu-

rate

even

though

they do not accept sost of his

hypotheses or

inferences drawn

fron facts.

Chief, Cl went on to say that if we submitted

to the FBI a report on Yosenko in the form we

impact our report would be able to make on the

overall question of Nosenko's bona fides ...

The disagreenents between the Agency and the FBI were

never to be resolved as long as Nosenko remained within

the jurisdiction of the SB Division and the CI Staff.

Within house,

Chief, SR and Chief, CI eventually papered

over their differences sufficiently to publish a second,

compromise report

on the Nosenko case in February 1968.

But by reporte asse dead den er even before i eat so

press.

M. Voices of Dissent

Meanwhile, although the top leadership of SR Division

remained unassailably certain of its thesis regarding

Nosenko as a KGB-dispatched agent,

at the lower levels.

not well received by the leadership, however, former.

and thus

had no effect on the handling of the case.

member of SR/CI remembers that it was sometines possible

sandrassa: brian

page paper"), but no qualification of the basic thesis

was tolerated.

The first recorded

dissent, therefore, came from

outside SR Division,

and it was

a tentative one.

senior Plans Directorate psychologist had been asked to

interview Nosenko in depth, which he did during a series

of meetings between 3 and 21 May 1965.

As a 'result of

his questioning, he became convinced that at the very

least Nosenko was in fact Nosenko. Even this rather

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bland assertion, however, was met by Chief, SR with

the statement,

sthere are things

ir this

case that

you do not know about.

Noneiheless,

in summing up

the sessions, the psychologist had this to say:

I am totally at a loss to even attempt to

rationalize why

story with

this much

pathology would be used as a legend.

Nothing

could be served other than to discredit the

man to whon it was assigned.

In some remote

sense--to me--it might have been felt it would

evoke sympathy but this is really far out and

a very

dangerous gamble on their part.

The

manner in which he has told his story and

the nuances he has introduced would require

great ingenuity and preparation.

From my

standpoint,

he has been essentially convincing

and accurate in general if not always truthful

in detail.

Here I am talking about the psycho-

logical data only--I am not prepared to ex-

press an opinion

on other aspects.

Within

whaterer

frame of reference

ical evidence would indicate that he is Nosenko,

the son of Ivan Nosenko.

His life story is

essentially as he has described it.

It is

obviously distorted in places but in each case

there

is a probable psychological reason for

the distortion and deception.

No man is a

good reporter on himself and we all use

rationalization to avoid seeing ourselves as

others see us.

My opinion, for whatever it

is north, is that Nosenko cannot be broken

outside

the context of his life story and

personality structure.

It should be noted

here that the life story is completely com-

patible with

the personality

structure as

projected by psychological tests.

The psychologist claims now that he had more doubts

about the

validity of the SR view of Nosenko than he

felt it wise to express.

The following excerpt from a

nemo randum

of conversation, dated 4 August 1976, gives

his memory of the situation facing him:

In discussing his lengthy series of inter-

views with Nosenko on

3-21 May 1965, Ithe

osychologistl said that he was very hesitant

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to express the full extent of his döubts

about the theory that Nosenko was a KGB-

dispatched agent.

The reason

for his hesi-

tation was that,

when (Chief, SRI got a hint

of (the psychologist's] doubts about the

[Chief, SR]

told (the psychologist]

doubts might make Ithe psychologist,

suspect of himself being involved

Nosenko plan.

the shere gist sidents intacles anare that

consideration.

to Helms (who was by

but still riding herd

on the case), described the interviews as "unrewarding

in terms of producing new information or insights . ..

It was obvious that Subject had given some thought . . .

to improving and smoothing over some of the rougher

spots in his story."

By the end of 1965, there were others in SR Division

who doubted the thesis,

and one of them was willing to

risk his career by putting his thoughts on paper in a

31-page memorandum

SR commenting on a "sterile"

version of SR/CI's

"notebook" documenting the case against

Nosenko. It began:

Introduction

it your request, I have read the basic Nosenke

notebook and I hope you will honor my right to

I find the evidence that Nosenko is a

bona fide defector far more convincing than the

evidence

used in the notebook to condemn him as

a KGB agent.

It is because I am concerned about the serious

ramifications of a

wrong verdict that I wish to

set forth my dissenting views in considerable

detail.

If the present verdict of "guilty" is

right I believe there must be satisfactory

answers to the questions raised herein; if it is

wrong--as I believe it is--it should be

rectified

as soon as possible.

Intelligence Production

There are several references in the Noserko note-

book to the extent and quality of the intelligence

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he provided.

In the 25 March 1964 memo to

DDP, it is

that "A comparison of

his positive

intelligence with that of other

Soviet Bloc intelligence officers with whom

we have had an operational relationship shows

that all of them were consistently better able

to provide useful

has been Nosenko. „Positive intelligence than

Tab D of this same memo

states "His positive intelligence production

" and later:

is practically n' Nosenko's positive intellin

overall, however'has been so meager for a man

gence production

of his background, training and position as to

case doubts

on his bona fides, without refer-

ence to other criteria." All

state-

ments are incorrect.

The three persons in the Clandestine Services

with the background and experience to make such

a judgnent regarding Nosenko's production and

access agree that they are incorrect.

No KGB

officer has been able to provide more useful

intelligence than Nosenko has; experience has

shown that intelligence usefulness of KGB

officers in general is "practically nil."

Golitsyn's was nil.

Viewed in the proper con-

text, therefore,

tion

Nosenko's intelligence produc-

cannot be used in his defense, but neither

can it be said honestly to cast any doubt what-

soever on his bona fides.

In the realm of sub-

stance, judgment regarding his bona fides must

therefore be made on the basis of his counter-

intelligence information.

Counterintelligence Production

The ultimate conclusions about Nosenko's bona

fides, as of March 1964 DDP memo and others

much ate he sure he soviets poencere - how

nuch did he hurt the Soviets.

the evidence shows that he has damaged the Soviet

intelligence effort more than all other KGB

defectors combined.

Chief, SR later wrote:

I have read this document and am of mixed minds.

First, it shows clearly that the so-called

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"sterile" book in the hands of a person with

none of the other background on other cases

or appreciation of the penetration problems

affecting us and the FBI can be a very

damaging document.

I question seriously

whether we should

make it available to

others

in its present form.

Second, the

book's weaknesses are principally its

language and the fact that it was made up

of memos from various periods and as our

evaluation matured, or we developed additional

information,

the tone of the subsequent memos

changed

but the reader can suggest our approach

has been superficial or inconsistent.

Third,

we cannot make the book available unless we

are prepared to deal with the totality or

near totality of the picture..

fourth, if a

book is to be used at all

in briefing

individ-

uals,

it should be re-written and questions of

the kind posed by

no matter how

this...

paper trrated (sic.

irritating

we find

them to be.

If one person

has this view, others might at

some point ...

In replying to Chief,

SR, another SR officer also

attempted to take a balanced

view:

The paper

suffers fron many faults. These

include bias,

intellectual arrogance, and

lack of CI background.

Needless to say, the

and I think

all been aware of for some time.

It is inevitable, I suppose, that all of us

who contributed substantially to the black

books will feel personally attacked by many

of the uninformed judgments and intemperate

comments contained in (this) paper.

I urge

that we all strive to overcome the temptation

to reply in kind. Despite the paper's short-

comings, it is one reader's serious and sincere

and it reflects

response to the black book'book which we must

some serious faults in the

correct.

satan, Exi

і ма

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This is not the first indication

we have had

that

some of our

analytical methods, and

pecome addicted is, are not easuay underste

are not easily understood

by "outsiders."

We have all been on this prob-

lem so long that we've gotten into the habit

of taking mental shortcuts and using elliptical

prOOIS,

considering the gaps and

omissions to

be self-explanatory ...

When the author of the dissenting paper wrote to

Helms on 4 April 1966, he included the following com-

ments:

My primary reason for bringing the attached

bootleg copy of my memorandum to your atten-

tion is the morbid effect that the Nosenko

case has, and will continue to have, on intel-

ligence collection against the USSR

by all

agencies of the US government.

The accu-

sations against Nosenko, which I believe to be

entirely false, have contaminated all current

agent operations against the USSR and most

of the past operations,

Any case which

ports Nosenko, especially the GRU and KGB

cases, Will likely be considered tainted.

Since

all such

good cases are bound to sup-

port him, US intelligence

faces a bleak

future.

The explicit ramifications of the

concept of an all-powerful KGB

concepty present us meet the senior perith

sonnel, or a knowledgeable facsinile

already apparent in the negative moods of CIA

personnel here and overseas.

Not long thereafter, Helms called the author by

phone and told him he

was having a

great deal of trouble

with the Nosenko case.

He said that he was therefore

going to turn it over to the ddCI, who he hoped could

get to the bottom of it for him.

Helms also asked the

author if he would agree to Helms' passing his paper to

an Agency psychologist.

A few days later, Helms again

called the author by phone and asked if he would agree

to his paper's being passed to both the DDCI and the

Director of Security.

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N. Helms Takes Control

With the third anniversary of Nosenko's confinement

drawing near, no resolution of the case was yet in sight.

The FBI continued

to take what Chief, SB described as a

"neutral position" in regard to Nosenko.

The conflicting views of the various interested

parties are not sufficiently

relevant to the purposes of

this study to require a detailed coverage.

What is

relevant is the fact that the stand-off increased Helms'

impatience with continued delay.

He therefore initiated

a number of measures that gradually took handling of the

entire Nosenko matter out of the hands of the SB Division.

The first of these measures was to instruct the DDCI to

undertake a thorough study of the Nosenko case.

When debriefed regarding the Nosenko case on

21

September 1976, the former DDCI remembered his

involvement

as follows:

DDCI: I became concerned as a result of Dick Helms

(saying) that there was a matter that worried

him very deeply, that needed resolution, that he

doubted that there was enough objectivity amongst

the people in the Agency who handled it so far

to arrive at any kind of a really objective

solution to the problen, and it was very sensitive

indeed, would I please look into it and let him

know my conclusions.

Then he went on to tell ne

about Nosenko,

time incarcerated

tede defector a whe

who was

at that

mentioned thät

there was a dichotomy of views in the DDP as to

whether Nosenko was a bona fide defector or whether

he had been sent on a mission, and that in any

Helms, felt that it was wrong to keep

cas confined and we had to do something eth him

one way or the other.

Q: He said that it was wrong to keep him confined?

DICI:

Yes, he was really distressed about the fact that

this fellow had been in confinement so long and

that they had never been able to arrive at a con-

clusion as to whether he was a bona fide or whether

he was a plant,

and he just had to get it resolved

and something had to be done to get this fellow

in a... oh, I've forgotten just how he put it,

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but in a more acceptable position.

So, I

would undertake this job

said, for all the background papers on

an? I

it and

studied them first.

Then I interviewed (Chief,

Cl and Chief, SBJ and arrived at the conclu-

think I talked to some other

the Soviet Division of the DDP also,

had their feet so mired in concrete of opinion

as to one side or the other of the case, that

it was just damned near impossible to get any

worthwhile information out of interviews.

And

I then wrote a memorandum to Helms in which I

indicated that ! had, after reviewing the

making a preliminary

review of the case, that

I had considerable doubt that Nosenko was a

plant; if so, I couldn't figure out what he was

planted for.

Nor could I get out of anybody

else what he was supposed

• what his mission

was supposed

to be, even in their hypothesis

. .

• My second memorandum to Helms was to the

effect that, whatever the case, I didn't believe

that Nosenko was any threat whatsoever to the

Agency, that he ought to be rehabilitated, and

I got a free hand from Helms to go ahead with

the idea of rehabilitating him.

And (the Director

of Securityl then had him moved . . .

:

Well,

do you remember anything about Dick Helas'

reactions to your recommendations?

DDCI:

He seemed rather pleased with the infornation.

I gol the impression from discussing the case

with him that he never had been

able to get what

he felt was a really fair appraisal of it from

anybody; and I got the impression that he felt

at last he had a fair appraisal of it.

Security to netic tollow he lie cor or securio

and the Director of Security re-

[The DDCI] started by asking me whether or not

I had seen the eight hundred page report summarizing

the Soviet Bloc Division's interrogation and ex-

ploitation of (Nosenko). I said that I had not

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read it personally but that

(a member) of my

Security Research Staff was now in the process

of reviewing it and commenting on selected por-

tions of it.

He then asked if I agreed with

its conclusions.

I told him that I

did not;

that it had been

the consistent position of

not convince her no a po on 1:

We were

patched by the KGB with a specific mission.

our position has always been that there

is something wrong with [Nosenko] and his story

but we

do not know enough in order to make a

final decision.

I went on to point out to the (DDCI] that I

had thought,

and had so recommended

on numerous

occasions in the past, that it would make a lot

of sense

for

(a member) of my Office to take

over the interrogation of (Nosenko] in order

to resolve several discrepancies that had always

concerned us.

Further,

said that the polygraph

examination given (Nosenko]

at the outset was.

designed only to "break hin" and was not an ob-

jective

polygraph examination

designed to establish

or deny his bona fides.

I indicated that the

Director had approved this idea but that I had

been unable to sell the idea to . . . SB Division.

The DDCI] said that he thought this was an

excellent idea.

He agreed with me that we had

everything to gain and nothing to lose through

such a course of

action and that he would

SO

recommend

to the Director.

I pointed out to

him that one of the things that had always con-

cerned us was that the Soviet Bloc Division had

never released any verbatim transcripts covering

their many interrogations of (Nosenko and that

we could make our judgment only on the basis of

written summaries prepared by the Division.

Thus, acting under the DDCI's orders, the Office of

Security transferred Nosenko to "a decent,

respectable

safehouse."

SB Division was cut out of the case, as was

the CI Staff.

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0.

Resolution of the Case

The Office of Security took over the handling of

Nosenko in October 1967.

The officer in charge immedi-

Throughout this process, he found Nosenko

tully cooperative, and without any tendency towarc

Irunkenness or other aberrant behavior.

The following is a summary report prepared on 16

November 1967:

Nosenko was moved to his current location on

27 October 1967 and the first interview with

Nosenko occurred on 30 October.

During the

first interview, particularly

Nosenko was quite nervous

and

reticence

to

talk.

This

condition

rapidly and it is considered

situation

that the current

is better than could have ever been

anticipated in view of the conditions of his

previous confinement.

Nosenko on his first day indicated his complete

willingness to answer all questions and to write

his answers to questions

on areas of specific

interest.

It was deternined that his English

is adequate both for interview and for prepara-

tion of written material.

Interviews are not

usually over two and a half hours a day, six

days a week, with Nosenko preparing from six to

ten pages of written

material

each

day.

Pre-

pared material has included life history, in-

dividual cases, trips of Nosenko, reason for

defection, and

detailed drawings

of pertinent

offices during his claimed period of KGB employ-

ment.

There does 'not appear to be any impairment of

his memory.

His current living conditions,

are luxurious com-

pared to

during the past

three years and have resulted in a relaxation

of physical tension.

Definitive resolution of the complex problems in

this case will require a considerable period of

and 0. 100116830

• risin..

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time for further interviews, preparation of

written

material

and a comparative analysis

against his previous statements and information

from other

interviews and investigation.

Nosenko freely

cerning a recall telegram while in Geneva

eedy cents certain previous via don-

having received certain awards or decorations.

All interviews with Nosenko are recorded and

transcripts of the interviews

are being prepared.

In addition, all written material from Nosenko

is being typed with

certain explanatory re-

In addition, the Deputy Director of

Central Intelligence has

been orally briefed

by the Director of Security.

present time,

it is estimated that there are

1,000 pages of material completed or awaiting

finished material is

in a form which will pe 'mit dissemination to

the FBI in part or in toto when such dissemina-

tion is considered appropriate.

Work thus far with Nosenko has resulted in a

clarification of certain areas of previous

controversy.

it is considered

that there can be at thas time listce doubt

that Nosenko was in the KGB during the approxi-

nate period which he claims to have been 1n

the KGB.

The matter of the actual positions

neld by

Nosenko during the approximate 1953-

early 1964 period is not considered adequately

resolved at this time and any speculation con-

cerning the dispatched agent aspects would be

completely premature.

If even a degree of optimism is realistic

s felt that the additional interviews and work

in the Nosenko case together with a detailed

comparative analysis of all infornation will

provide a firmer basis for a final conclusion

responsive (to] the normal consideration he is

now receiving, e.g., our current work with him,

and if it accomplishes nothing else, will at

least condition Nosenko more favorably for what-

ever future action is taken relative to his dis-

position.

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This questioning of Nosenko was paralleled by a

separate investigation conduced by the FBI.

Results

were covered in two reports published at about the

same e me,

the FBI's on

20 September 1968 and the ClA

Security's on 1 October 1968.

The essence of the Office of Security's findings

was expressed

in

a covering memorandum to the Direct:

of Security:

That to gate is so on to the ca

during 1953-January 1964, that Nosenko was

not dispatched by the KGB, and that his pre-

vious lies and exaggerations are not actually

of material significance at this time.

The conclusions of the FBI report were more sweep-

ing:

1.

The current interrogations and collateral

inquiries have established a number of significant

omissions and inaccuracies in the February 1968

CIA paper and have invalidated the vast majority

of conclusions on which that paper relied to

discredit Nosenko.

"exame coone disclosed no indication poly-

examination*

disclosed

the part of Nosenko.

He is know-

ledgeable in the areas and to the extent he

should be: he furnished logical explanations

for acquisition

information which would not

normally have been accessible to him in his

positions.

There is no substantial

basis for doubting his bona fides as a defector.

The variety and volume of information

provided by Nosenko is such that it is considered

impossible that he acquired the infornation

only by KGB briefing.

It is also illogical and

*Reference is being made by the FBI to the polygraph examina-

tion of Nosenko performed by CIA between

and 6 August

1968 as part of the interrogation undertaken by the Office

of Security.

3

is meternate increa

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-i9-

implausible that the KGB would have dis-

patched an officer of his caliber with in-

structions to disclose the variety and volume

of valuable information furnished by him. No

compensatory objective is apparent.

4.

lhe current interrogations show thai

Vosenko is in possession of information no‹

In the interest of both

intelligence and counterintelligence agencies

of the government, interviews should be con-

tinued

to exhaust

his knowledge.

There should be a thorough re-examina-

tion of all information and cases emanating from

Nosenko and other defectors where the decision

for action, or lack of action, was previously

influenced

by the presumption

that Nosenko was

not a bona fide defector.

Despite the above findings, the CI Staff never gave

up its contention that Nosenko

was a KGB-dispatched agent.

On 31 January 1969, the CI Staff argued that to accept

Nosenko's bona fides meant repudiating Golitsyn, "the

only proven reliable source about the KGB for a period of

time which appears to be vital to both Nosenko and CIA."

An undated memorandum written by the Office of

Security officer in charge of Nosenko essentially brings

this chronicle to a close:

Since April 1969, Nosenko has had his own private

residence and since June 1969, his own automobile.

Even prior to April 1969, Nosenko could have, if

he chose to do so, acted

in a way seriously

adverse to the best

interests of this Agency

since control was not of such a nature as to

preclude independent action by Nosenko.

It is the opinion of Agency representatives in

regular contact with Nosenko that he is genuinely

interested in maintaining the anonymity of his

current identity, that is, not becoming publicly

known as identical to Nosenko.

As an example,

he has very interested in having a facial birth-

mark removed.

However, he has on numerous

occasions indicated his interest in participating

under the Nosenko identity in some action or

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activity which would "hurt the KGB." Nosenko

considers that he has certain capabilities

and knowledge which could be useful in the

effort of the United States government against

This interest has not been associated

with any particular curiosity

in regard to the

activities of this Agency ...

Nosenko has consistently

expressed his deep

interest in obtaining United States citizen-

ship as soon as possible.

He realizes that

under normal circunstances, citizenship could

not be obtained until February 1974, but also

is aware that citizenship can be obtained in

less than the normal waiting period by legisla-

tive action.

Nosenko is considered by Agency personnel and

FBI

personnel in contact with Nosenko to have

made an unusual adaptation to Anerican life.

He lives like a normal Anerican and has an

obvious pride in his home and personal effects.

His home life from all appearances is quite

caln.

The fluency of Nosenko in the English

language has greatly increased and there is

no difficulty in understanding Nosenko or in

his ability to express his thoughts. Obviously

his accent and occasional incorrect sentence

structure (and nisspelling of words) has not

been eliminated and probably will never be

entirely eliminated.

Nosenko continues to complete vork assignments

expeditiously and with Interest.

As indicated

above, Nosenko is very interested in doing

"something active" which is understandable.

Full consideration should be given to this

interest since if properly controlled and

channeled, could be used in a way adverse to

the best interest of the KGB.

Nosenko has since become a United Stated citizen,

nas married an American woman

continues to lead a normal

life, and works productively for the CIA.

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fires.

CHAPTER IV

Nosenko's Contribution: A Summary Evaluation

Any attempt to assess Nosenko's value to the US govern-

ment must begin by pointing out that he might well have been

able to contribute more had

he been permitted to do so.

¡ Unfortunately, we were

unwilling to give serious considera-

tion to his stated desire to assist us in making recruitments

of Soviet officials; we discounted Nosenko's suggestions

along this line as possibly part of a plan to embarrass the

US government.

There is no telling what potential recruit-

ment targets

might have emerged had we, soon after Nosenko's

defection, briefed him with such targets in view.

In this part of our study, we therefore confine our-

siderable odds, Nosenko was able to make. Let us take them,

siderable odds,

very briefly, oie by one.

A. Information on KGB Personnel

The Office of Security's 1968 report summed up

Nosenko's contribution in this field as follows:

Nosenko has furnished information concerning

perhaps 2,000 KGB officers and 300 KGB agents

or operative contacts (here the terms agents

or operative contacts are used to refer to

Soviet nationals), mainly in the Second Chief

Directorate or internal KGB organizations.

However, he has identified approximately 250

forner of current First Chief Directorate

officers and there is a considerable exchange

of officers between the Fed and seD. In

addition, numerous officers of the sch and

other internal KGB organizations travel abroad

with delegations, tourist groups, and as

visitors to various major exhibitions such

as World's Fairs.

It is impossible at this

time to estimate

the number of KGB officers

identified by Nosenko who have been outside

the Soviet Bloc since his defection or who

will be out some time in the future.

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There has been very little attempted exploi-

tatio: of information furnished by Nosenko

concerning other KGB officers and, therefore,

the possible value of this information to

United States Intelligence cannot be esti-

mated nor can the potential damage to the

KGB be estimated.

B. KGB Recruitment Efforts Against US Citizens

Most of Nosenko's own operational experience with

the KGB involved efforts against Us citizens,

either

visitors to the USSR or members of the US embassy in

As a result of this background, Nosenko was

able to provide some 238 identifications of, or leads

O, Americans in whom the KGB had displayed

some interest.

Some of the KGB operational efforts culminated in

"recruitments" that, according to Nosenko, were more

statistical than real; the KGB played the

numbers game,

for purposes of year-end reporting.

Nonetheless,

Nosenko's reporting did result in

the uncovering of

certain US citizens genuinely working for Soviet intel-

ligence:

Us Army sergeant Robert &. Johnson,

who had been recruited in 1953, was arrested

in 1965 on the basis of a Nosenko lead

agent assigned to a US military installation

outside Paris who was providing

the KGB with

inportant documents as of 1962-1963.

Johnson

vas custodian of classified documents at Orly

Field Armed Forces Courier Transfer Station

during this period, and he provided documents

from there.

Excerpts from a preliminary

damage assessment are included below:

The full extent of damage will only

be known when the current review of

documents by all affected agencies

is completed.

The damage assessments

prepared by the military services, how-

ever. based on a review of their docu

ments to date, indicate that as a re-

sult of access

to documents in the Orly

vault, the Soviets may have learned:

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(a). Details of the Single Inte-

grated Operational Plan (SIOP) includ-

ing the attack plans of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff,

the identity of Soviet

targets, the tactical plans of USAF

elements

including weapons systems

and methods of delivery.

(b):

US Intelligence holdings on

Soviet military capabilities, atomic

energy production, weapons storage

facilities, industrial complexes and

order of battle.

[c).

Daily US Intelligence sun-

maries including our comments and reports

around the word political developments

Comprehensive comparisons

of US and Soviet SAM Systems.

(e).

Indications of the scope and

success of the US national SIGINT effort.

[f]. A wealth of material for use

in crypto-analysis.

From these preliminary reports... it is

evident that Sgt. Johnson's cooperation

with Soviet Intelligence has rcsulted in

most serious damage to US national security.

2.

US Sergeant Dayle W.

repairman" who confessed

to haying

anis be recentchine

by

the KGB while serving in Moscow during the period

1952-1954.

Smith, while initially denying any con-

tact with Soviets,

finally admitted he had been

recruited and had

passed information to them.

3.

of the US Armed Forces, later

James A. Mintkenbaushin the real

formerly a member

business as a civilian.

estate

In connection with

Nosenko's lead to Johnson, Mintkenbaugh was inter-

viewed after Mrs. Johnson

identified him as a

friend of her husband's.

Mintkenbaugh unexpectedly

volunte hea chat he provided been or ruited by

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the latter in his work on behalf of the KC3.

described his KGB role

as a

collaborator with Johnson in

clandestine photography of documents, and

later as a courier between Johnson

and his

KGB handlers.

C. Moscow Microphones

In 1962, Golitsyn had in general terms reported on

the existence of microphones in the US embassy in Moscow.

This information was promptly sent to the Department of

State, but no action was taken; lack of specificity was

cited

as one of

the reasons.

It was not until Nosenko's

more detailed information was communicated to the Depart-

ment of State

in March and June 1964 that action was

taken that led to th: uncovering of a system of 52 micro-

phones, beginning in April ot that year.

Of the micro-

found,

42 were active at the time of discovery.

These microphones covered most of the offices in the

embassy most significant from the Soviet standpoint.

D. William John Christopher Vassall

in the British Admiralty.

Nosenko, in June 1962 Though this information

told us the KGB had an agent

eventually contributed to the arrest and conviction of

William John Christopher Vassall,

CIA for some time

tended to give Golitsyn credit for this success.

The British counterintelligence service stated in

1976 that, although Vassall probably

would "eventually"

have emerged as a

"leading candidate" for suspicion as

a result of the Golitsyn information, it was in fact

Nosenko's information that

"was to clinch the identifica-

tion of Vassall as the spy."

The British added that "[Nosenko's] information

affecting UK interests seems

to have been consistent with

indication in the

Leads of uninteres that Nosenko sy object might have

been to mislead or deceive."

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ridicine

E.

Leads to Foreign Nationals

F.

nationals

countries

in whom the KGB had an active interest.

Summary Evaluation

It is not feasible, within the terms of this study,

to make

comparisons between

Nosenko's

counterintelli-

gence production and that of other similarly qualified

defectors.'

Enough has been

demonstrate

on an absolute basis that, both in terms of quantity and

quality of information, Nosenko's contribution was of

great value to the US government.

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CHAPTER V

The Analytical Foundations of the "Monster Plot"

For the purposes of this study, we have not chosen to

duplicate the mammoth effort put into analyzing and validating

Nosenko's information by the Office of Security

by the FBI; we have reviewed their work and can find no pos-

sible reason to challenge their findings.

the question of how senior officials could have draw

however erroneous conclusions

so many

rom data tendered be a sourc

whom we now believe to have been cooperative and acting in

good faith.

A. Lack of Systematic Interrogation

At no time between June 1962 and October 1967 was

Vosenko afforded the kind of systeratic, objective, non-

nostile interrogation by well-informed professional in-

telligence officers which had otherwise been standard

operating procedures in dealing with defectors and in-

place sources from Soviet and East European intelligence

services.

Z2122RE

We now examine the manifestations and consequences

of this problem at various stages of the case.

1. June 1962 Meetings

The transcripts of the 1962 meetings reveal a

disastrous problem of communication:

no poker the a he Due he prefered oke

oud and dranatie to eddied hisperined spoke

--The senior case officer spoke fair Russian, but

he preferred to speak

English when saying any-

thing important.

He was largely

unable to fol-

Low Nosenko's "machine-gun style" of deliver

in Russian.

Nosenko and the senior case officer

frequently interrupted one another at important

moments.

indis, a

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-argeved on see scene for the second Rueetans

with native Russian,

filled with assurance derived from his involve-

ment in two important operations concerning

CIA sources in Soviet Military Intelligence:

Popov from 1953 to 1958, and Penkovskiy (who

was

still working in-place as of the June 1962

Nosenko mectings).

Infortunately, the com-

nunication problem was exacerbated, not only

by the case officer's showing off his know-

ledge to Nosenko rather than listening to what

Nosenko nad to say,

but also by the case offi-

cer's inaccurate

summarizations in English

rather than translations of Nosenko's state-

ments in

Russian.

This case officer's

presence

was

justified by

the fact that the

senior

case

officer could

not cope with

Nosenko's

Russian,

but the second case officer distorted so much

of what was said that he was a barrier of com-

munication.

The second meeting,

the longest of the five,

was further disorganized by the fact that Nosenko

arrived half-drunk

from partying the previous day

and most of the night.

Even during the nearly eight-

hour interview, Nosenko continued to drink.

This

point was consistently overlooked or ignored in later

examination of boastful claims Nosenko made during

this meeting; e.g., Nosenko personally handled the

Langelle/Popov

case, Nosenko personally ran

the

operation against a

US

security officer, Nosenko

personally talked

to a US

code clerk to try

to re-

cruit him, etc.

When confronted in hostile interroga-

tions in 1964 and 1965 with these claims, he denied

personal participation in all three instances (other

than directing the code clerk case behind the scene)

and said that if he had said such things in 1962 it

was because he was either drunk or under very strong

tension at the time.

Such explanations were not con-

sidered acceptable by his interrogators, and the

claims were let stand as evidence of his mendacity.

While Nosenko provided a substantial amount

of information during these five meetings, there

was little or no follow-up questioning on most of it,

partly because of lack of time but also because of

the case officers' lack of background on the KGB. in

general and the Second Chief Directorate in particular.

Ignorance of the Second Chief Directorate was only to

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se expected, of course, since Nosenko was thi

irst KGB officer ever ta talk to CIA who ha

spent his career in this component.

2.

January-March 1964

the second series

of meetings in Geneva, in

January and February 1964,

were sonewhat better

organized,

but--given the already prevailing belief

that Nosenko was a KGB controlled agent--he was not

carefully questioned on the information he gave.

This was partly because it was considered of

prinary importance not to reveal even by implica-

tion how much we

already knew, lest his mission

include elicitation of information CIA had received

from Golitsyn or other sources considered bona fide.

Debriefings in the United States after Nosenko's

defection were similarly limited to noncontroversial

generalities and were not noteworthy for attention to

accuracy and detail.

(Although most of the debrief-

ings of this period were taped, none of these tapes

was ever transcribed.

Notes were taken, and reports

were then written up on the basis of the notes.

This three-stage process did not always result in

an accurate version of what had been said.)

3. April 1964-October 1966

The hostile confrontation that took place for

some two weeks in April 1964 cannot be considered

systematic interrogation; "shouting natches" would

better characterize these sessions.

suring one period--May to November 1904--Nosenko

was systematically

obtain additional information on leads to Americans

and other Westerners recruited by the KGB, in part to

meet requirements provided by the FBI.

two objectives of this debriefing period, of greater

importance to the CIA concerns in this case, were:

--to obtain answers to questions posed in writing

by Golitsyn, whose aim was to trap Nosenko into

exposing his ignorance or "lies" about topics

Golitsyn considered central to Nosenko's

"KGB

missions."

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--to acquire fuller background on Nosenko's

alleged duties and activities in his various

KGB positions in order to use his own informa-

tion against him in the hostile

interrogation

period

that was to follow.

The January-March 1965 hostile interrogations

were carefully structured and systematic but were

not designed to collect information.

The information

Nosenko provided in these sessions

was consistently

and intentionally ignored, as the stated objectives

were to force Nosenko to agree with his interrogators

that (1) he did not know what he should have known

(according to ClA assumptions), and (2) that he had

not held the positions in the KGB that he claimed.

This objective was

"successfully" achieved in the

eyes of the

sign

interrogators by bringing Nosenko to

statements

that purported to

summarize his

statements of inadequacy of both knowledge and

ped hematie to sigh the secon

Each time, in signing these so-called

objected that the way they

"ere wooded dissented wiet he had said; however,

he acknowledged his inability to get his interroga-

tor

to

listen to what he was trying to tell him and

therefore his

inability to reword these papers in

any manner satisfactory to him.

When given one key

"protocol"

to sign--one that was a "confession"

that he nad been

sent by the KGB to deceive CIA,

and that he had lied purposely on behalf of the

KGB--he said that, if his signing this document

would serve some good purpose of CIA or of the US

government in general, he would do so, but only with

his interrogators'

clear understanding that the

entire "confession" was untrue.

Under these circum-

stances, his interrogators declined to have him sign

this document.

Thus this series of interrogations

failed in its ultimate objective--that of "breaking"

Nosenko.

Subsequent interrogation sessions were not con-

structed

to collect information any more

than the

previous ones but were designed to collect further

damaging evidence of Nosenko's ignorance

about the

KGB and of the areas in his reporting to which he

was "most sensitive" and that therefore were most

revealing of his "true KGB missions."

In

sum,

while

a greal deal of personnel time was spent in talking

sati sisterint

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to Nosenko and a large amount of paper was

generated in consequence,

the canons of proper

interrogation were rarely observed.

4. Time Devoted to Debriefing or Interrogation

A point that can easily be overlooked is that,

of the total period of Nosenko's incarceration, a

relatively modest amount of time was devoted to

actually debriefing or interrogating him. The most

generous estimate we can make is that approximately

292 days were at least in part devoted to debriefing

or interrogating Nosenko, out of a total of 1,277

days'

incarceration.

Thus,

from the standpoint of

obtaining infornation,

about 77 percent, or more

than three-quarters, of the detention period was

downtime.

B. Faulty Record of Conversations with Nosenko

The outcome of the Nosenko case was prejudiced at

the outset by the establishment of a faulty record.

Let us look first at what happened during the June

1962 meetings.

The inadequacy of the principal case

officer's Russian for use

in

an interrogation has already

been mentioned.

The problem was exacerbated

the fact that he nonetheless took notes on

ed, toNesenko by

is purported to have said

which became part of the of-

Ficial record without their being compared with tape

transcriptions by a more competent Russian linguist.

If anything, the role of the second case officer,

who had a native conmand of Russian but little patience

with detail, simply compounded the errors.

Returning

from Geneva on 15 June, the principal case officer on

18 June began to dictate, using his own notes, a series

of 30 memoranda covering highlights of the meetings as

he had understood them.

These memoranda were reviewed

by the second case officer as they were typed, but he

made only minor additions or corrections.

The so-called "transcripts of the tapes" from the

five meetings were then prepared by the second case of-

ficer between the week of 19 June and mid-August 1962.

contrary to the usual procedure, the second case officer

did not first transcribe from the tades into the combination

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of Russian and English (predominantly Russian)

actually used in the meetings,

and then make his

translations on the basis of transcrip.ions. Rather,

he dictated them into English directly, using the error-

filled nemoranda of the principal case officer's for

guidance.

In March 1964 a KGB defector of 1954 vintage was

brought into the case to examine Nosenko's reporting

in terms of his own expertise on personalities, file

procedures, reorganizations, etc.

He concentrated on

the early years

of Nosenko's

career, particularly 1952

and 1953.

In a resultant menorandum dated 12 March 1964,

he commented as

follows:

The undersigned began work on this special project

by reviewing the taped recordings of

the meetings

only, without reference to the meeting transcripts,

believing that it would be possible and preferable

to get all the necessary information and other

material firsthand in this way.

From the begin-

ning, however, it was obvious that this would be

very

difficult, if not in many cases impossible;

the early tapes (Nos. l-6 and especially No. 1)

were very poor in quality.

(These are the tapes

for meetings No. 1 and 2.)

After proceeding thus far in a review of the

tapes, the undersigned then switched over and

began

reviewing the transcripts alone and

without reference to the tapes.

This method

also quickly proved unsatisfactory; from his

memory of the discussions as actually presented

and hard to "caten,

although poorly reproduced

undersigned soon was

able to tell that the transcripts are, to say

the least, faulty.

A point-by-point review of the tapes and tran-

scripts was

then initiated and has been pursued

until the present time by the undersigned.

the course of this review, a large number of

errors--omissions and other discrepancies--

have been discovered scattered throughout the

transcript coverage of the meetings recorded on

the tapes.

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It is impossible to make enduring pronounce-

ments of the

following type without knowing the

whole situation

and being fully aware of all

the motives and factors--personal and profes-

sional--involved, yet it should be noted that

the undersigned

in many places throughout the

records of the meetings

has encountered exanples

of what he would consider errors in the handling

and conduct of those meetings.

Let it suffice

nerely to register this point here; notes on

this subject will be drafted and presented in

later papers.

He then proceeded to cite nine major examples of

errors, omissions, distortions, and procedures characteristic

of the second case officer's transcripts (and performance

luring the meetings). He concluded by saying:

The foregoing present but a few examples of

errors,

plete report of all such

be prepared upon request.

The "complete report" was never prepared, and it may

never have been requested.

Later, the first series of hostile interrogations of

rosenko,

beginning on 6 April 1964, was monitored by

the 1954 defector,

who listened from an adjacent room.

On 17 April, Nosenko was challenged concerning a clain'

he had supposedly made

in June 1962 (according to the

second case officer's

"transcripts") that he in person

had recruited an American professor of Slavic languages

visiting in bulgaria during the time Nosenko was on TY

for briefing sessions with the Bulgarian internal coun-

terintelligence service.

Nosenko denied ever having

made such a clain and went into lengthy detail explaining

just what had happened.

In effect,

because by chance he

was in Sofia when

the Bulgarians

were planning their

operation against Professor Horace G. Lunt, he gave the

Bulgarians advice on how to go about the compromise opera-

tion--a homosexual one--and how to handle the actual

confrontation and recruitment.

Apparently as

a result

of listening to Nosenko tell his story, and his vehement

denial of any clain to personal neetings with Lunt, the

1954 defector went back to the 1962 tape recordings and

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retranscribed exactly what Nosenko had said on the two

different occasions

in 1962 when he had referred to

this case.

The retranscription clearly verified

Nosenko's

detail.

Nonetheless, all

subsequent papers

on

the Nosenko bona fides question

included reference

to his having clained in

1962 that he recruited Lunt

in person.

His denial of such a statement in all sessions

from 1964 onward was lost from

sight.

In the course of the second series of hostile

interrogations in January-March 1965, a still further

discovery was made by the 1954 defector when Nosenko

was challenged on another "clain" supposedly made in

1962, which Nosenko also denied having made.

Reviewing

the tape recording of the 1962 meeting in which the

alleged claim had been made, the 1954 defector once

record was erroneous, and

that Nosenko was right again.

Later in 1965, retranscription of the 1962 tapes

was begun, faithfully transcribing Russian when Russian

was used,

and English when English

was spoken.

These

transcripts were

not translated into full English,

however,

until mid-1968 under the auspices of the

Office

of Security reexamination of the entire Nosenko case.

In late 1968-early 1969, a line-by-line commentary

on the more significant discrepancies between the two

versions was prepared. It required some 35 pages to

cover only the major errors and the effects they had

had in supporting

the charge that Nosenko was a false

• defector who "lied" and "changed stories."

adment

C. CIA Misapprehensions Regarding Nosenko's Life Story

The first step in debriefing a new defector is

obtain his most

"perishable" information; i.e., positive

intelligence and important agent leads.

The next step

usually is to obtain a biographic statement

ing his personal history, fanfly members, education and

In February 1964, all information relating to his

life story, collated

from transcripts of meetings with

Nosenko (in Geneva, 1962 and 1964), was presented in written

form to Nosenko for him to correct

or expand upon.

This

draft was so full of errors derived fron defective

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transcripts that only in the most general terns did

it correspond to his actual statements.

At this time,

however,

Nosenko was restless,

tense, and inpatient

with the tedious interviews with which ClA was trying

to keep him occupied.

It appears obvious that he paid

scant attention to the dates or terminology used in

chis draft,

because he nade only one noticeable change:

se insisted on deletion of a statenent attributed to hin

to the effect that he had attended a one-year course in

counterintelligence at the beginning of his KGB career

(a mistake dating fron the 1962 "transcripts" by the

second case officer).

Given the volume of other

erroneous

untouched, Statements in this "biography" that he left

biography

one can only assune that he considered this

an exercise of no

particular inportance.

When hostile interrogations

began on 6 April 1964,

the inaccurate biography was used as the base point for

measuring so-called "lies" about Nosenko's entire life

story.

It therefore caused him

to be accused time and

again of "changing his stories."

One of the first wrangles that arose in the hostile

interrogations concerned his responses

to

questions on

his schooling.

Among other aspects of this subject,

Nosenko told his interrogators that he had spent approxi-

mately three years during world War II

in various naval

preparatory schools--(rough equivalent of American high

school-level military

"academies").

The problem that

arose

in this instance was

traceable first

to a careless

transcription by

the second case officer but was exacerbated

by ignorance on the part of the interrogators concerning

the subject under discussion.

Because it typifies other

misapprehensions that complicate the Nosenko case, this

example is worth relating in detail.

The second case officer "transcribed" the tape of

the 25 January 1964 meeting in Geneva, quoting Nosenko

thus (underlining is ours):

• • • When I first cane here I graduated from

he Institute of Foreign Relations.

I specialized

in International Law and on the USA there.

. I

came to GRU in 1949. Before I attended this

Institute I was in a naval school.

I also

studied in Baku in a navy preparatory school

and I even studied in Frunze.

And then the war

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ended.

The only time I participated in war-

time

activitier was when heavy combat was going

on near Novorossiysk.

They threw the students

from

Baku into the battle.

After we lost Novorossiysk the remnants which

were somewhere between one third and one half

of the students were brought back to Baku.

and I was demobilized.

career

so I went to the Institute of Foreign

Relations in 1945 and graduated in 1949.

the end of the year in early 1950 the placement

commission (raspreditelnaya komissaya) [words

missing in original transcript where I wanted

to work.

I said that I've had some military

experience and I'd rather have something along

that line rather than go to MID [Ministry of

Foreign Affairs).

They said I would be called

on the

phone and they would let me know.

I was

called

MGB.

up by the personnel section of the old

To Nosenko's interrogators in April, "Frunze" meant

only one thing--the Frunze Naval Academy, equivalent to

the US Naval Academy at Annapolis.

naval prepae also school to which Nosenor underted was

also; it was the prep school for those Soviet

boys with aspirations

for naval command positions who

would later go on to the Frunze Naval Academy.

When Nosenko was asked in April 1964 to discuss his

schooling, he referred to having entered a naval preparatory

school--at roughly the high school level, and in Russian

called a uchilishche.

This was,

said he, the Leningrad

Naval Preparatory SChool named after Frunze*.

In 1942,

the school was relocated to Baku because of the fighting

Nosenko's interrogators clearly did not

understand what he was talking about

as they had no back-

around on these naval preparatory schools: the only Frunze

they knew of was the Academy, and every time Nosenko nen-

tioned the prep school carrying Frunze's name confusion

*In the Russian language, the fact that a school is named

after a great man

is always made explicit.

Thus, in Russian,

the George Washington University would be called the "University

named after George Washington."

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erupted.

At the end of several heated exchanges on this

topic, with the interlocutors

po say he contral hat he she that o the prun ea

Naval Academy.

The claim

was then made that he had been

made to admit

that he had not done so.

He then was ac-

tep aredze Academy, e consarienty repliedd

This discussion

no, it was the Frunze preparatory schoo interrogations,

was repeated several times

without the problem area's being resolved in the minds

of the interrogators.

April 1964, Subject:

4-11 April 1964,

tions (underlining is ours):

the morning and

¿ moon 10 Apa liternoon

Subject was interrogated in

for a total of nearly

Questioning covered his early

schooling,

his studies at the

Institute lof

International Relations], and his service in

the naval GRU, both in the Far East and in the

and contradictions in his accounts

doubt on whether

he was telling the truth

about the early years of his life and even

raised some possibility that we may not be

lealing with the real Nosenko . ..

23325

Subject admitted that he

had not entered the Frunze Higher Naval Schoo.

(Vysshaya Voyenno-Morskaya Shkola imeni Frunze)

but that he had nerely attended the

Leningrad Naval Preparatory School (Leningrad-

skoye Voyenno-Morskoye Podgotovitelnoye

Uchilishche of the

Frunze Higher Naval School.

His story now is that he

attended the Moscow

Naval Special School (Moskovskaya Spetsialnaya

V.M. Shkola) in Kuybyshev

from 1941 to 1942,

then entered the Leningrad Naval Preparatory

School in Baku, completing two classes of this

school in Baku (1942-1943 and 1943-1944), and

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the third class in Leningrad (1944-1945).

Subject insists that he was given credit

for

successfully completing each of the four years

of secondary schooling, but says that at the

end he had the equivalent of 10 years' educa-

tion.

He can offer no explanation for the

discrepancy--by his chronology he would have

completed a years or schooding plus one yea

of kindergarten.

Subject has been very weak

in providing names of teachers and classmates

and descriptions of school layouts and curric-

ulum for this period, particularly for the

period in Baku.

It is interesting that

who has identified pictures

on Sobe ta one dent has den the petre

minister Nosenko whom he knew at the Leningrad

Naval Prep School in Leningrad in the period

1944-1946,

has provided information about the

history and make-up of this school which is

ncompatible** with Subject's story, as i:

Artamonov's statement that Nosenko was

class junior to (Artamonov) and would not have

graduated from the prep school until 1946.

Subject has never mentioned (Artamonov), and

has not yet been challenged on this part of his

story.

Further compounding the confusion on this one subject

was the development of

that Artamonov, cited in

Nosenko in question, and, as shown in the paragraph cited

below from a 21 April 1964 summary of interrogations for

the second week, because his "own elementary and secondary

schooling is a

curious parallel to Nosenko's.

(underlining is ours).

excellent example of

The following is quoted as an

the reasoning process by which one

could at one and the same time be

suspicions of Artamonov's

bona fides because some of his information supported what

Nosenko said, while also citing his reporting as evidence

*Nikolay Artamonov is a Soviet naval officer who defected in

1959.

**This is not a true statement. Artamonov's statements are

more confusing than clarifying.

The possibility that

Artamonov's memory might have been unclear was not considered.

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that Nosenko was lying because Artamonov's memories of

the schools differed from Nosenko's:

'• Adding to the mystery of Nosenko's war-

time years is the information provided by

Nikolay Artamonov, the Soviet naval defector.

When Nosenko's defection was first made public,

Artamonov volunteered the information that,

this was the same Nosenko who was the son

if

of a

minister, he had attended school with him

Leningrad.

in

Later, when shown photographs of

Nosenko he positively identified him as the

same

man he had known in Leningrad in the

period

1944 to 1946 and gratuitously provided

the names of six schoolmates from Leningrad

that Nosenko should remember because they were

prominent members of the student body there.

Nosenko was subsequently queried about three

of these names, but out of context and with

no indication of who and what they might be.

He immediately identified then as schoolmates,

but positively affirmed that two

of them had

been the roommates

in Kuybyshev in 1941-1942,

while the other had been in the school in Baku.

According to Nosenko, none had gone on to

Leningrad.

Of the names provided by Artamonov,

Nosenko mentioned a fourth one independently,

but although he originally placed him in

Leningrad he later moved him to Kuybyshev and

stated

categorically that he saw him for the

last time in Moscow in 1942, before going to

Leningrad.

Artamonov, whose own elementary

and secondary schooling is a curious parallel

to Nosenko's, has provided other information on

the schools and dates which Nosenko claims to

have attended which is incompatible with Nosenko's

story but it has not been believed advisable to

requery Artamonov on this until we can be

certain that Artamonov is not deliberately

trying to substantiate Nosenko's bona fides

according to a prearranged plan which misfired

owing to crossed signals or Nosenko's poor

memory.

In May

1965, in preparation for his own set of inter-

rogations, it apparently occurred

to the 1954 defector

that the original "transcript" should be rechecked for

eat sited, cools

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accuracy

(he was right). After transcribing it into

Russian first,

transcribed it into English,

cut with

one unfortunate mischoice

translated the Russian word "uchilishche" into English

as "academy."

The Russian equivalent to the English

"academy" in the sense of a college-level institution

is "akademiya."

The following is the 1954's defector's

translation of meeting No. 3 on

25 January 1964:

Telling about his entrance into the Naval GRU,

Nosenko says:

I com-

pleted the

Institute of international Relations

in 1949.

I studied in the Juridical Faculty,

i.e.

• specialist in international law and spe-

cializing in the US.

Before the Institute,

I

studied at the Naval Academy (voyenno-morskoye

In the beginning,

scall in the special School espressholay.

Following the

Seventh Class of

the School, I

then studied at the Preparatory School (podgo-

tovitel'noye uchilishche), was transferred to

the Frunze Academy [sic--uchilishche].

war ended.

The

We weren't successful in getting

into battle.

The only time they sent us in

was when we were in Baku.

There was heavy

fighting near Tuapse.

Ne students were sent

in near

Nov., I.e., near Novorossiysk.

There

was heavy fighting

there.

We took part in these

battles there and then returned when

Novorossiysk

surrendered.

Our health

was

one-half

of

one-third

gone:

less than

of all the

students re-

mained, and they sent us back to the school.

So,

the war ended and I didn't finish Frunze

Academy (sic--uchilishche] after demobilization.

What to do? Be a soldier? I didn't want to.

Study? Where? I went to the Institute of

International Relations

and entered it in 1945.

And I graduated from there in 1949--the end of

1949 or the beginning of 1950.

When the place-

ment commission asked me where I wanted to work--

it is mandatory for the comnission to ask--I

said that I was a military man and asked that

they give me something related to military.

lo sum up, the tollowing problems typical of the

whole case are

evident in this episode:

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1.

Nosenko had been misquoted in the

second

case officer's transcript,

because

the second case officer did

not understand

what he was talking about.

He had referred

specifically to the "Leningrad Naval

Preparatory School named after Frunze," a

fact once again uncovered by the 1954 defector's

rechecking of the meeting tape, but not until

May 1965.

When Nosenko "admitted" ro his

interrogators in April 1964 that he had not

attended

the Academy, he didn't know this was

considered an admission; he never realized

his interrogators had thought he had made such

a clain.

2.

In general, wosenko's interrogators

overestimated their

substantive background.

Nosenko's "stories" about the several naval

preparatory schools he had attended during the

war are difficult to follow, because war

conditions brought about a number of reloca-

tions of these schools:

the Leningrad School

was relocated to Omsk

oblast but was still

called Leningrad School; the Moscow School was

relocated first to Achinsk, then to Kuybyshev,

but was still the Moscow School, etc.

Nosenko's

interrogators were almost totally ignorant of

these matters but did not know they were.

Because they were unable to follow his detailed

description

of

all these changes

(documented

by other informed sources, including Soviet

historians),

they thought something was wrong

with Nosenko, not with themselves.

D. Errors or Omissions in Available CIA Headquarters

Records

In this category lie many of the causes of error

in building the cast against Nosenko.

We are not

speaking here of transcript errors but rather of some-

times quite understandable lacunae in CIA's collateral

records.

Two important examples concern John Abidian, the

State Department Security officer in Moscow who was,

according to Nosenko, an American for whom Nosenko was

operationally solely responsible.

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One point at issue was whether Abidian employed

a maid in Moscow who hould have been in a position to

treat Abidian's clothes with a so-called "thief powder"

used by the KGB to facilitate postal surveillance.

Nosenko claimed that there was such a maid, and that

her actions enabled the KGB to pick up three operational

letters Abidian mailed for CIA, when the powder activated

a sensor in the Soviet postal system.

The second point concerns the question of whether

Nosenko lied in claiming that Abidian cased a dead-drop

site in Moscow that we

assumed Nosenko knew

was crucial

to the KGB apprehension of Oleg Penkovskiy.

On the first point, ClA had no record of Abidian's

having a maid, because he did not formally hire one until

a few months after his last letter mailing for CIA. How-

the maid who served an American woman in the

embassy al:o informally took care of Abidian's apartment

throughout the time period in question. Thus, we were

wrong., Nosenko was right.

The second point has yet to be subjected to con-

"cased" the Penkovskiy dead-drop site not

once,

but twice.

The CIA officer tasked with the first

asing had been too afraid to go himself, as ordered,

and therefore apparently prevailed upon Abidian to handle

the job for him.

The report submitted by the case off-

CiA however, could lead the reader to believe that the

man had carried out the first casing mission--under

circumstances and in the time period when, according to

Nosenko, Abidian handled the assignment.

Both these problems seems minor in and of themselves.

But they were not minor in the context of the inquisition

to which Nosenko was subjected.

Rather, the discrepancies

involved were evoked, as was every other discrepancy

arising from whatever cause, to bolster the case against

him.

E. CIA Assumptions about the Second Chief Directorate

Lacking contemporary information on the organization,

responsibilities, policies and capabilities of the KGB's

Second Chief Directorate from knowledgeable sources

other than Nosenko, it was necessary for Nosenko's

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interrogators to extrapolate from pre-1954 defector

information plus that received from Goleniewski and

Golitsyn.

Not one of the sources cited below by the

principal case officer had ever been regularly enployec

in the Second Chief Directorate--except Nosenko.

case officer

In a memorandum of 20 October 1964, the lengtipal

set out to demonstrate at

that Nosenko's clain to the position of deputy chief of

the American Embassy Section between early 1960 and late

1961 was completely false.

Having informed his readers

that this position was one of the most important in the

entire Second Chief Directorate, he then proceeded to

present a "job description" for

it:

Functions of a KGB Deputy Section Chief: Within

this frameworks an understanding of the functions

and responsibilities of any deputy chief of sec-

tion in the KGB is important.

The following

description of this position has been confirmed

in general terms:

a. He must be broadly informed

section's operations and individual

case officer duties in order to act in

the chief's absence, when he assumes

responsibility for the entire section's

He approves and retains monthly

schedules for planned use of safehouses

by the section.

He discusses agent meeting

schedules with individual case officers

and approves and then retains a list of

planned agent meetings for each case of-

ficer on a monthly basis.

d. He approves the acquisition of

new agents and new safehouses and their

transfer from one operation to another.

e.

He usually maintains liaison

with other KGB units on matters related

to the section's target.

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Based on file reviews and

discussions with individual case offi-

cers,

he assigns priorities for the

operations that each case officer

handles.

He reviews and approves by

general operational plans of the sec-

signature the periodic written reports,

tion, periodic section progress reports,

and

specific operational proposals of

individual case officers which are re-

quired by the KGB.

If the department

[sic--meant to read "section"] chief

signs these papers,

the deputy chief

still reads

them

in order

to

keep him-

self inforned on the section's activity.

h.

He assigns priorities for

processing microphone material and

telephone taps,

for selecting targets

for surveillance, etc.

i.

He participates

directly in

important operational activities and

is often in contact with agents or

As a senior officer

agent prospects the section's opera-

responsible for

tions, he or the section chief are

almost invariably present during the

compromise

and

recruitment of important

target individuals.

He periodically

participates in control meetings with

the section's agents in order to check

on the development of individual opera-

tions and case officer's performance.

different picture.

said that, as deputy section

chief, his principal responsibility was to supervise

operational activity

against Anerican

clerks.

embassy

code

His detailed knowledge of this activity and

his description of innovative programs he had instituted

in this area of operations have, with few exceptions, been

fully verified by

investigations and already.existing

collateral reporting.

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told him to do,

from time to time perform some of the tasks outlined

above, he denied that he had any such fixed administra-

tive responsibilities.

He contended that the other

officers in the section were not children and did not

require that Nosenko teach them what to do and how to

do it.

the duties of a "deputy chief" was

erroneous, because it was based on a misinterpretation

of the Russian word zanestitel, the term Nosenko applied

to himself when speaking his native language.

meaning of this terms was researched in 1968,

distinction was drawn

between the American and Soviet

conceptions of a "deputy":

"Zamestitel," or "Deputy," in Soviet bureau-

cratic practice and usage

is not limited to

denoting what we think of as the number 2

the office,

but rather is a broader term

which can

perhaps

most

accurately

be

rendered in

English as "assistant."

Soviet

offices,

at least at the higher

levels,

conmonly have several "Deputies"; some may

have five or six or even more.

In keeping

with this multiplicity, the Soviet term does

not carry with it the same sense of responsi-

bility and authority paralleling the Chief

and of automatic replacement as the American

term.

The

Soviet position of "Deputy" is

probably not as intimately associated with a

specific slot as is the American position

of Deputy, if indeed it is so associated at

all.

In addition, the outline of a "deputy chief's"

duties can be considered

tendentious because it was de-

signed to establish a criterion of knowledgeability that

Nosenko clearly did not meet.

Had the principal case

officer examined the validity of the criterion more

closely, he could easily have determined for himself that

it was unrealistic.

How misleading the Agency's misconceptions could be

was also brought out in a paper written by certain SB.

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Division officers in January 1969. The following ex-

cerpt is instructive:

(Officer No. 1) In the absence of a firn

informative

base, we were obliged to formu-

late a stereotype of the Second Chief

Directorate (SCD) against which to compare

Nosenko's information.

That stereotype con-

tains a variety of quite fixed assumptions

regarding the authority of the SCD in the

USSR, the extend of SCD cooperation with

the First Chief Directorate'of particular

and the manner

in which the SCD operates.

relevance, with respect to some

anomalies

Found in Nosenko's statements, are assumptions

regarding the relative weight

the SCD placed

on the

recruitment of agents anong foreigners

as compared to the control of foreigners, how

nuch the SCD itself might know of certain

events

and how much a specific SCD officer

(Nosenko) should have known and recalled.

I believe that some of our assumptions are

too finely drawn, with the consequence that,

at least in some

instances, Nosenko's asser-

tions have been improperly impugned.

(Officer No. 2] The SB Study is, I believe,

generally reflective of an exaggerated view

as to the overall capabilities of the SCD.

There are implicit judgments made that the

SCD had to be aware of certain things; there-

Nosenko should have known about them

For example, there

is some question in my mind as to the validity

of the assumption that KGB suryeillance of

Americans, even suspected CIA officers, is

such as to make it suspicious when Nosenko

is unaware of certain operational activities

these CIA officers are known to have performed.

This possibly exaggerated view is also apparent

we question Nosenko's ignorance of inci-

dents that we know occurred and which we con-

clude, or at least suppose, are KGB-inspired.

Finally,

and possibly the most important, is

the question of control as opposed to

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recruitment of American officials (excepting

code clerks).

While these two missions are

not mutually exclusive, in either Nosenko's

many times (particularly in the

case of Abidian) we have

faulted hin for not

knowing information

that would be significant

only in terms of interest in recruitment.

If control was the main

interest, as in

Nosenko's claim,

it would appear

appropriate

to judge Nosenko's information more in

context (perhaps a

comparison with the FBI's

mission with regard to Soviets would be help-

ful) than in the context of CIA operations

against Soviets abroad.

I sense that the

latter was the case.

Thus, largely because of the influence of Golitsyn,

the

Agency greatly exaggerated the competence and, in-

deed, the authority of the KGB.

Even though this

defector's claims were often extravagant, they were re-

ceived with very little reserve by senior officials who

in turn applied them across-the-board.

On a different

conceptual

level, this pattern

of exaggeration was applied.

to individual positions within

the KGB; since that organiza-

tion was conceived as an all-seeing eye, it seemed to fol-

low that individual officers within it would partake of

its omniscience.

Such habits of thought, regrettably,

vere seit-reintorcing in a situation where the objective

of Cl analysis was not to uncover the truth, but rather

to prove that a particular present or former Soviet

official was

of the need states made sile cot ene

iscoveries of duplicity on the part of any soviet Source

who came under analysis, simply

because he could rarely

ever measure up to our expectations

have known, accomplished, or said. Of what he ought to

F. The A Priori Assumption of Disinformation as Applied to

the Popov and Related Cases

The remainder of this chapter is devoted to a

retrospective analysis of the Popov case and the involve-

ment of Nosenko therein.

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1. Prologue

It is ironic that both Nosenko and Golitsyn

should have becone so involved in

retrospective

analysis of the Popov case, because neither knew a

great deal about it.

Perhaps they would not have

ecome thus involved had it not been for the dis-

information hypothesis.

Sone time after 19 June 1962 the principal case

officer was

given access to tape transcripts of

briefings of Anatoliy Golitsyn, the KGB officer who

had defected in Helsinki in December 1961.

Debrief-

ing of Golitsyn had been going on

for over six

months, compared with five relatively short, hec-

tic conversations with Nosenko.

'In a memorandum written by the principal case

officer dated 21 June 196%, the day after his inter-

view with Golitsyn, he set forth his viet's on

"Possible Control of (Nosenko)." He opened with a

"Detailed study of (Golitsyn's) produc-

tion in the light of [Nosenko's] has suggested the

possibility that (Nosenko) nay be part

Soviet disinformation operation . ..

"of a major

2. Implications of the Popov Case

Unfortunately for Nosenko he had, at the end

If his first meeting with the principal case officer

"Tomorrow, 1'11

in 1962, said, feelings ran high over this case,

tell you how Popov

was caught."

with which

the principal case officer had been

personally concerned in a minor capacity.

Petr Popov was a CIA sourcé within the GRU

from January 1953 to October 1959, when the KGB

rolled up the operation in Moscow.

He was the most

important Soviet source CIA had ever had until the

advent of Penkovskiy in 1961.

Therefore, any informa-

tion Nosenko might have on how the KGB had learned

of Popov's clandestine cooperation with CIA was of

great interest.

In Nosenko's discussion of Popov's compromise,

he explained that, in January 1959, the iGb had had

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under surveillance a member of the American

a Cas officer can thaled he were cerea toyas

a CIA officer--as indeed he was.

maserve tester in soscow the ke intercepted

mailing a letter

clandestinely

the letter, found that it was addressed to Petr

Popov, and

came to realize that this Soviet was

working for CIA.

He was arrested soon there-

after and sent under KGB direction to make

several clandestine meetings with another CIA

officer, Russell Langelle.

Finally in October

1959 the KGB apprehended Langelle immediately

with material in his

possessich just received tron Popol. The Popov

case was over.

Enter Golitsyn. Originally, his information

concerning the Popov case had been slight.

of the time of his defection in 1961, he knew

or believed only that:

a.

There had been an agent leak-

ing Soviet military, political and intel-

ligence information

to the US.

b.

When CIA officer Russell Langelle

was assigned to Moscow,

one to handle special as mist

sion . ..

Surveillance of Langelle in Moscow

then led the KGB to Popov.

Nosenko,

for his part,

said much the same thing

but added that the KGB had

been led to Langelle

through their surveillance of

in Moscow, George Winters.

purported to mean.

Under Golitsyn's influence,

sis doubts concerning Nosenko's bona fides led

to

the use of an analytical technique that he described

as trying "to read the case through a mirror to

find

its implications if it is bad •

• 1.

By the time

this June 1962 memorandum was written, the principal

case officer had decided that the story of the Popov

compromise given by Nosenko was the primary area to

determine whether CIA itself had been penetrated by

the KGB.

dinat desert

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Golitsyn's 1962 reporting on how Popov

was compromised, i.e.

identified by name

through KGB

surveillance of Langelle in Moscow

in 1959, varied from Nosenko's story only in the

the officer surveilled.

The Golltsyn

report was actually completely omitted from a

17 April 1963 memorandum.

(Why this omission

passed unnoticed is not explained in any records

in this case.

Yet when Golitsyn gave a com-

pletely different story of the compromise in June

read all the Popov case

materials,

this story became the Golitsyn gospel

and has remained so to this day in Golitsyn's

argumentation.

We shall come to Golitsyn's 1964

version

Shortly,

but first some additional back-

around is needed.

Since Nosenko had said that Popov was com-

promised through KGB surveillance of winters, the

"mirror" technique indicated that this was not

the case.

The mental leap from this postulate

was that if surveillance of Winters was not the

compromise,

then recruitment of Winters

by the KGB was the logical possibility to be ex-

George Winters had met a Soviet known to him

as Vladimir Komarov,

who had spent nearly a year

assigned to the Soviet embassy in

Washington,

Winters, reported meeting this Soviet in Moscow.

The man called Komarov was known to Golitsyn

and to Nosenko as Vyacheslav Kovshuk, a Second Chief

Directorate case officer who was chief of the sec-

tion working against the American embassy, Moscow.

Winters' documented association with Komarov/

Kovshuk came to light immediately when name traces

were run on the Soviet.

The same reporting docu-

mented his one-time meeting with a friend of Konarov/

Kovshuk's--a TASS correspondent just returned from

Washington named Aleksandr Kislov.

Kislov, Nosenko had told CIA in 1962, was his

friend in the Soviet Disarmament Delegation in

Geneva with whom

Nosenko had gotten drunk on several

occasions.

Asked if Kislov was also a KGB officer,

Nosenko specifically denied that he was.

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A review of FBI reporting on Komarov/Kovshuk's

ToY in Washington brought to light a close regular

association with Kislov, in company with a number

of identified KGB officers, leading to a strong

circumstantial case that, contrary to Nosenko's

denial, Kislov probably was a KGB officer.

contact with Geor

sy Komarov/Kovshade Winters

a coincidence but:

We cannot find a convenient explanation

for Kislov's role in

this theory, but

it appears

significant ...

A further twist concerned Golitsyn's and

Nosenko's reporting

on Konarov/Kovshuk's TDY to

Washington.

sources agreed that it was re-

lated to recruitment of an

American who had earlier

served in

the Moscow embassy (speculation by

Golitsyn)

or reactivation of an American al:eady recruited

In Moscow also Golitsyn speculation; but state-

nent of fact by Nosenko, supplemented

with specific

details that would eventually lead to identifica-

tion of the agent).

Nosenko said Kovshuk came to Washington to

reactivate a code machine mechanic,

KGB code name

"ANDREY," who had been recruited and had worked in

Moscow in the early fifties.

In the first Geneva

in the principal case officer's

nenoranda, and throughout the second case officer's

"transcripts" of 1962, this agent was consistently

in test abbays callarage mechade achthe ne hasenko

machine mechanic.

Thanks to this major error

in notes and transcription,

the FBI was hindered in its invéstigation of this

lead until Nosenko corrected our misconception in

January 1964.

The

FBI already had located the one

possible candidate for this lead but could not

actively pursue the investigation until this con-

fusion was cleared up.

By December 1965, they

finally succeeded in obtaining a

limited

confession

from a code machine mechanic who had been at the

American embassy, Moscow,

from 1952 to 1954, and

this confirmed the essentials of Nosenko!s reporting

of 1962.

РУДЗАТЧІМ

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Impact of Penkovskiy's Arrest on "Popov Compromise

Theory"

Without our going into details on the Penkovskiy

it is important to know that in October 1962,

case' four months after the first Nosenko meetings,

the KGB dramatically announced the arrest of another

Penkovskiy's arrest heightened the suspicions

within CIA--especially

Soviet Russian Division--

that there

must be a KGB penetration of CIA for

two such calamities

to have occurred within three

years.

When in April 1963 a KGB officer, working

within the KGB as a Western agent, reported that

Penkovskiy (like Popov) had been

as proof of KGB disinformation designed to conceal

KGB penetration of CIA.

4. Golitsyn's 1964 Story

In June 1964, while commenting on Nosenko's

version of the Popov compromise,'

Golitsyn stated

that the KGB report he had referred to in 1962

stated

that the KGB

did not consider running Popor

as a double because he could not be trusted.

He

then went on to give a completely new story of the

Popov compromise,

diametrically opposite to his

original information.

Golitsyn stated then that a certain Kotov

(first name not given), who had been in the KGB

in Vienna during the period Popov was there,

pected Popov of being a Western

agent and made

known his suspicions.

no action was

taken by Kotov's superiors.

ever, when the KGB received similar information

another source, Kotov was sent to Germany be-

cause he knew Popov and was familiar with his back-

(Contrary to his

1962 report, Golitsyn here

.. astories.

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by the KGB as a CIA agent in Berlin in 1957

or 1954 .)

Golitsyn's 1964 story must be evaluated

within the framework of the facts that follow.

On 21 November 1963, Chief, SR recorded the

passage to Golitsy CIA by Popov,

through the CI Staff, of all

materials passed to

including

English language transcripts of all operational

meetings held with Popov in Vienna in 1953-1955

and all operational meetings held with him in

Berlin 1957-1958.

by the time Golitsyn

was commenting on Nosenko's version of the Popov

compromise in June 1964, he had become aware of

everything Popov had told CIA, specifically what

was going on in Berlin in 1957

and 1958.

This

included Popov's mention of a KGB officer named

Kotov, who arrived a week or two before Popov

was

recalled to Moscow,

and another KGB officer

named Zhukov, who had worked against the Yugoslav

target at the same

time that Popov worked on this

target for the GRU in Vienna.

In view of the fact

that Golitsyn's story in June 1964 varied drastically

from that he had told in March 1962, it is legitimate

to suspect that he had recreated a story of Popov's

compromise based

on deductions he had made after

reading the Popov transcripts.

Thus, the 1964

decision must be thrown out of court.

The Hypothesis that CIA was Penetrated

Unfortunately for the course of events in the

Nosenko case, it was Golitsyn's 1962 version that

was ignored in favor of his

"facts" of 1964, which

condemned Nosenko's story as strongly as his 1962

version had supported Nosenko.

The reason for this

is obvious.

The Popov compromise hypothesis had

been feeding on itself for so long that it had come

to be treated as fac, with the result that the sub-

ject of Popov's compromise became a kind of litmus

paper test of every

Soviet source.

If a Soviet

source reporting to CIA on Popov

agreed with Nosenko

that KGB

rather than a KGB agent--

a penetration of ClA--had compromised Popov, then

that Soviet source was held to be a part of an ever-

growing massive KGB conspiracy to protect penetration (s)

of CIA.

By further extension, Nosenko's failure to

produce evidence that Popov and Penkovskiy had been

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compromised by a KGB penetration of CIA was

interpreted as proof that indeed such a penetra-

tion must exist.

The acceptance of Golitsyn's story in turn

guaranteed not only that Nosenko could never be

seen

as

sources

bona fide, but also that

all other Soviet

must be considered suspect if they supported

The overall result was to distor

seriously for

number of years the ability of the

Soviet Bloc Division accurately to evaluate the bona

fides of any defector or agent.

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CHAPTER VI

Dezinformatsiya: Origins of the Concept and

Application in the Nosenko Case

roi:

There can be liifle doubt that the handling Nosenko

telligence practice known as dezintormatsiya.

Furthermore,

the timing of Nosenko's defection,

some months after that of

Golitsyn,

the fact that losenko provided information on some

of the same or similar persons or leads as had Golitsyn, and

Golitsyn's conclusion

that Nosenko had been dispatched by the

IGB specifically to discredit him (Golitsyn) as part of :

lezinformatsiva operation--all these factors combined te

preclude "normal" professional treatment of Nosenko.

As a

defector, Nosenko's bona fides should have been established,

or not established,

on ine basis of careful and sound

analysis

and investigation of the information he provided

under standard interrogation procedures.

in actuality, he

came under suspicion as a KGB-controlled agent long before

he presented himself as a defector, and his handling was

therefore based upon

this prejudgment.

long

dezinformatsiya is a Soviet concept and practice of

standing

that has been defined or

described dy numerous

sources through the years. Two representative definitions

are as follows:

Petr Deryabin: Dezinformatsiya is the

deliberate and purposeful dissemination of false

information regarding accomplished facts and/or

intentions, plans of action, etc., for the pur-

pose of misleading the enemy.

Such disseminations

nay be accomplished by means of the press, radio

operations,

fornation itself.

Anatoliy Golitsyn: In Soviet parlance, the

term dezintormatsiya is used to denote false, in-

complete,

misleading information passed, fed or

confirmed

to opposition services for the purpose

of causing these

(and their governnents)

to reach

erroneous conclusions regarding the USSR

or inducing them to undertake action beneficial to

the USSR.

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By means of dezinformatsiya, again according to

Golitsyn,

the Soviet government hopes

ensure that the

policy decisions of a gien country will be based on a false

impression of the USSR's domestic or military posture.

Specific measures taken to achieve this end might be designed

to induce a foreign country to engage in costly and useless

research projects, to create a misconception about or adversely

affect the stature of another country in the eyes of the world,

o remove by nonviolent neans,

as publicly discrediting,

individuals who are considered a threat to the national

interests of the USSR, or to weaken

or dissolve, create of

strengthen certain political parties.

With regard to the definitions quoted above,

Deryabin,

colitsyn and others have spoken from knowledge gained

as Soviet

state

security officers.

However,

implicit in all definitions

the he fast t are desinformatine security stivity thatsis

always been carried out as a matter of government policy, as

an activity that at times nay involve the security organs.

Before 1959, there was no separate dezinformatsiya de-

partment within

the KGB (or its predecessor organizations),

although establishment of such a unit had been discussed from

time

to

time.

Each

geographic component handling foreign

intelligence

operations was responsible for dezinformatsiya

work within its own sphere of activity.

All such work was

carried out with the approval of higher authorities within:

the KGb'Affairs and Defense,

frequently in consultation with the Ministries of

Foreign

and even in many instances with

the specific approval of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

It was not until 1959 that responsibility for dezinformatsiya

insofar as it was to be the concern of the First (foreign

intelligence) Chief Directorate of the KGB was centralized

within that unit,

and not until 1961

that the concept of

dezinformatsiya played any significant role in the thinking

of CIA counterintelligence officers.

The dezinformatsiya concept was first highlighted for

CIA by the senior Polish UB officer, Michal Goleniewski, who

initially provided information by anonymous correspondence

starting in 1958 and later while under

interrogation follow-

ing his defection in January 1961.

The information he provided

was of major significance, as he had dealt with the KGB on the

subject of dezinfornatsiya

as early as 1953.and was in

fact not only a ranking Polish intelligence officer but also

a KGB agent.

While Goleniewski was not the first source to

refer to dezinformatsiya, he was the first to bring it to

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clA consciousness as a technique to be reckoned with in our

analysis of the USSR's foreign policy.

It was his clain

that the Soviet intelligence

counterintelligence ser-

vices played a major role in the implementation of such

policies.

Goleniewski stated that one of the many objectives of KGB

dezinformatsiya was the protection

of action designed to mislead lestern security services.

listed among specific objectives and types of dezinformatsiya

operations those designed to confirm unimportant true

informa-

tion, thus establishing in the eyes of the

of a channel through which the

KGB passes mislead-

ing information to anti-Soviet governments.

Conversely,

another type of dezinformatsiya operation

might be designed to discredit accurate information of

signi-

ficance received by the opposition through sources not under

Soviet control, e.g., defectors, thus casting doubt on

the

veracity of the

source or sources of this true intormation.

Goleniewski stated further that the information passed

through dezinformatsiya channels could be based on analysis

of what was already known about any sensitive items, i.e.,

could stem from defector damage assessments.

One means

obviously might be the channeling of information at variance

with that provided by the defector.

Another means might

be

the provision of "give away"

material,

which neither added

o information already in the hands of the opposition nor,

by the same token,

did any particular damage to the KGB.

In extreme cases,

the KGB would be willing to sacrifice some

of their own agent assets in the interest of enhancing the

reputation of an agent penetration of one of the anti-Communist

intelligence services.

(That this latter technique was used

to advantage by the KGB in building Heinz Felfe as

a pene-

tration agent within the German Intelligence Service has been

assumed in most analyses of that case.

Felfe was a KGB agent

for all of the ten years he worked for the German Intelli-

gence Service,

from 1951 until his arrest in 1961.

During

this period Felfe was able to work his way up to the position

of chief of the Soviet Section of the German

counterintelli-

gence staff.

It has been postulated that Felfe's rise in the

German intelligence ranks was assisted by the KGB, which was

willing to sacrifice less important agent assets to enhance

Felfe's

reputation and position as their long-term penetration

agent.

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In all its essentials, the information provided by

Goleniewski was

confirmed

and elaborated upon by colitsyn,

who defected in December 1961 and who was the first significant

Soviet or Soviet Bloc defector to come into CIA hands after

Goleniewski.

In addition to the

general definition of

Jezinformatsiya quoted above, Golitsyn said that a KGB (or

GRU) defector's file would be sent to the KGB dezinformatsiya

unit; the latter would search i.

opportunities to exploit

the situation, after review of the probable areas of informa-

tion revealed to the opposition by the defector.

He indicated

in this connection that the

Disinformation Department of the

KGB maintained extensive files organized on a topical basis,

containing all information on a given topic that was known

(from the debriefing of defectors to the Soviets, double

agents, captured agents, etc.) to be in the hands of opposi-

tion intelligence services.

For example, a KGB officer

assigned to Beirut to work

against the American embassy who

defected to CIA would

be assumed by the KGb Department of

Disinformation to have told CIA e erything he

knew about

KGB operations against the embassy and embassy personnel.

By reference to their files on Beirut operations,

the Depart-

ment of Disinformation would be able to determine the extent

to which KGB operations in that area had been compromised to

CIA.

On the basis of the foregoing information, it might be

assumed that the Golitsyn and Nosenko defections would have

received similar handling by the KGB Department of Disinforma-

tion and by CIA upon their arrival as defectors to the West.

However, the two men were not similarly received by CIA when

they presented themselves as defectors; they received com-

pletely different handling,

based

on quite different assess-

ment of the information they provided and their motives for

defecting.

Golitsyn was accepted as a bona fide defector in

relatively short order, while Nosenko was speedily rejected

as a bona fide defector, as explained below.

Golitsyn, an officer of the First Chief Directorate of

the KGB,

defected to CIA

in Helsinki in mid-December 1961.

Information that he provided relating to the organization

and structure of the KGB was accepted

as factual and true,

at least in part because there was relatively little record

information against which it could be compared, but also

because the information appeared to be logical

and reasonable.

In addition, he provided voluminous and valuable information

on KGB personalities; available CIA

file holdings were

limited, but the information provided by Golitsyn proved to

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be accurate to the extent it could be checked against these

holdings.

Finally, he provided a cheory of KGB operations

that was not only accepted at face value but received with

outright

enthusiasm.

Given the value of his information,

plus his apparent motivation for defecting, which included

an obsession with the evil inherent in the KGB and

an

emphatically-stated wish to "fight against the KGB," his bona

fides was accepted in March 1962.

The reception accorded Nosenko, after he defected in

1964, has already been recorded in

letail.

That Nosenko did

not receive standard treatment as a defector whose bona fides

would be determined on the basis of the information he pro-

vided under interrogation after defection inevitably involves

reference to Golitsyn.

As explained in Chapter III,

Golitsyn

himself played a curious role in that, as

a result of the

trust placed in his judgment, he was actually encouraged to

label Nosenko as a deception agent.

This situation arose as follows:

During initial contacts

with CIA in 1962, Nosenko provided information on personalities

that was similar

to that provided a few months earlier by

Golitsyn.

Because ClA counterintelligence officers had been

warned by Goleniewski that they should not be "taken in" by

false information fed to them through no matter what channels,

the "duplication" or "overlapping" information given by Nosenko

was viewed with extreme suspicion.

This original doubt led

to information provided by Nosenko being shown to Golitsyn

soon after the former's

defection.

The paranoid Golitsyn

immediately saw Nosenko as a person sent out to discredit or

even assassinate him.

Thereafter, the desire of CIA counterintelligence offi-

cers not to be outwitted by the KGB led them to apply an ana-

lytical technique that has been referred to variously as "double

think" or "mirror reading."

This "analysis" led to the con-

clusion that Nosenko, as a dispatched agent, was feeding us

what the KGB wanted

us to believe.

said had to be "interpreted."

he susa ehat the kG had

everything Nosenko

been unable

to recruit any Americans serving at the US embassy

in Moscow during a given period, this meant that the KGB had

been quite successful in doing so.

If he provided information

on a given topic that we had already received from another

source, this meant that the KGB wanted us to believe that

particular piece of information hence the other source un-

doubtedly was

a KGB agent

And so on.

Facts were

discarded or ignored when they did not fit the hypothesis

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that Nosenko was a dispatched agent.

Any other sources

whose information confirmed

tended to confirm, or dealt

with any of the

topics mentioned by Nosenko were regarded

- that is to say, they were considered

part of the same dezinformatsiya plot in which Nosenko

figured.

Golitsyn played a major role in this "analytical pro-

cess."

As soon as Nosenko's defection became public

Golitsyn asked whether he could participate

in Nosenko's

interrogation. should be brought into the operation and

As of 20 February 1964 the Dip had agreed

that Golitsyn

given full access to the "Nosenko material."

The reasoning

at this time, given Golitsyn's identification of Nosenko's

function

as

a

false defector, was that the Nosenko operation

was

"the reverse of the Golitsyn coin" and thus that Golitsyn's

assistance was required to pursue it properly.

Accordingly, •

over the next several months Golitsyn was provided with

material from the 1962 and 1964 meetings with Nosenko and at

his request was supplied with all available biographic data

on Nosenko to assist him in "analyzing" the operation.

on 29 June 1964 Golitsyn was interviewed by Chief The

Staff, Deputy Chief, CI Staff and Chief,

SR Division.

following is quoted

from the transcripts of this meeting:

Golitsyn: I have made a study of the docu-

ments and information which was provided to

me about Nosenko and his interrogations.

would like now to make known my

conclusions

• my conclusion is that he is not a

bona fide defector.

He is a provocateur,

Who is on a mission for the KGB

... to

mislead, chief in the field of investiga-

on Soviet penetrations made

mainly by (thel Second Chief Directorate

to Moscow :

for that mission?

Why did they choose Nosenko

In my opinion, Nosenko was

recommended by Churanov, kovshuk

for the mission.

and

Guk*

Nosenko could have been

*Vladimir Aleksandrovich Churanov, Vladislav Mikhaylovich

Kovshuk and Yuriy Ivanovich Guk.

Churanov and Kovshuk were

colleagues and good friends of Nosenko's in the Second Chief

Directorate.

Guk,

also a close friend

of Nosenko's, was a

one-time officer of the Second Chief Directorate; he trans-

ferred to the First Chief Directorate and was posted at the

Soviet Mission to the European Office of the United Nations

in Geneva at the time of Nosenko's temporary duty there in

1962.

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named or recommended by them and the KGB

gave these people a chance.

very

energetic--all of them.

And, of

course

discuss things among themselves.

Many of them had made mistakes--they had

told too nuch. They were,

therefore, in

the damage report (on my defection) and

for then

the only way to act was to

suggest

an operation against me in order to save

their face, to save the situation.

It can be argued that Golitsyn had two interests:

(a)

to discredit Nosenko in order to maintain a position of pre-

eminence as advisor to CIA (and other lestern intelligence

services) on Soviet intelligence matters, and (b) to pronote

his contentions as to how the West was being deceived by the

Soviet Union

and thus

to enhance his position

as advisor to governments on overall

Soviet political matters.

Golitsyn clearly had a high opinion of himself. When

he defected, he brought with him some 23 classified

docu-

ments from

the Soviet embassy in Helsinki, which he made

clear he wished to discuss with President

Kennedy and the

Director of Central Intelligence personally, to alert them

to what was going on and to measures needing to be taken.

Moreover, his willingness to cooperate with CIA and other

US government agencies underwent changes fron time to time,

depending upon whether his demands for access to and inter-

views with specified ranking officials of those organizations

were granted.

Golitsyn's chosen role as interpreter of Soviet policy

and anti-Western actions was threatened by the arrival of

His response was to gain access to virtually all

of ClA's files on Nosenko for purposes of providing ClA with

an "interpretation'"of the latter's role.

In any event, the

idea took hold within CIA as a result of

Golitsyn's hanner-

ing away at this theme that we

were being "had" by the

SovieT KGB counterintelligence operations, and that Nosenko

particularly by being penetrated

had to be "broken" at all costs; his "confession" would make

clear to us the details and dimensions of the Soviet

machinations.

Further,

with

efforts

it was deemed expedient not only to proceed

to "break" Nosenko but also to study past

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operations known to have been Soviet-controlled to see what

could be learned from these cases about how the Soviet in-

telligence services had carried

out their activities against

the West through the years.

This study of historic Soviet

cases

designed not to explore a hypothesis but to prove an

already-accepted thesis,

some

"enemy,

cunning an Produced information about an awe-

complex, lavishing money and man-

power on operations that were almost invariably successful.

many of these cases were primarily of historic

interest, undertaken at a particular time to take advantage

of or exploit a particular situation that no longer obtained

or had little or no pertinence to Nosenko's defection, appears

to have been discounted. On the contrary, since the cases

included in the study were considered to have been hugely

successful in duping or deluding the hestern intelligence

services and governments, it was concluded that we were con-

tinuing to be deluded and duped.

It was reasoned that, as

CIA and other lestern intelligence services becane increas-

ingly aware of and inforned on the Soviet operational tech-

niques being used against them and changed their operational

tactics accordingly, the KGB simply adjusted to the new

situation and continued to outwit us.

With Shelepin and

succeeding chiefs of the KGB as members of the Central Com-

mittee,

it was assumed that those KGB operations that could

be (or

were) classed as dezinformatsija were not only

important per se but took on added importance inasmuch as

the sub, through its chief, was involved in the policy making

body of the Soviet Union.

Consequently, any operation as

important as the one that involved sending a senior KGB

let state bore a lot eat hot gets ho prove a a

involving high-

leel staff coordination.

Any other agents

confirmatory information

or whose information could in any

way be regarded as suspiciously coincidental had to be part

of the overall operation.

Given the importance of the opera-

tion, Chairman Khrushchev was undoubtedly directing the

whole thing himself.

No attention was paid to the fact that, despite the

assertions of Goleniewski and Golitsyn, there was no known

case of a KGB officer's ever having been sent to discredit a

previous defector

the eyes of a lestern intelligence

After brief consideration of the notion that

Nosenko might not even be a member of the KGB at all,

decided that the KGB had dispatched him to counter Golitsyn.

12 is sin

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Conclusions

in retrospect, it seems worthwhile to point out that

(a) in the years since Nosenko's first contact and subsequent

defection, no information has ever been developed to sub-

stantiate

the charges made against him either by Golitsyn

or by the "mirror-readers"; (b) Golitsyn's information with

respect to dezinformatsiya has not been internally consistent;

and (c) Golitsyn himself as the architect and sponsor of

theories presented has not been able to support his claims,

despite the wealth of information made available to him for

analysis.

The following

is quoted

from

an unsigned paper,

dated 10 September 1968, in summation of Golitsyn's claims:

Golitsyn's overall thesis, that the Soviet

leadership in 1959 developed a "New Policy"

(peaceful coexistence, non-violent tactics,

united

front,

etc.) is

perfectly

as a statement of

the "Right"

acceptable

strategy

developed during the mid- and late-fifties

and enshrined in the November 1960 Moscow

• Manifesto.

Golitsyn's depiction of this

policy as, in toto, a "misinformation"

operation

rests upon his extremely broad

use of that term:

"special deliberate

efforis

of the communist governments to

mislead Western

studies and to direct them

in wrong directions" by means of official

Soviet speeches and Party documents, offi-

cial press and propaganda outlets,

travel

controls, diplonatic

His vocabulary and general handling of this

new Bloc

policy gives the strategy a con-

spiratorial quality not justified by its

essentially open and public character.

The role of the KGB in the execution and

coordination of this policy is constantly

alluded to, but no evidence is provided to

define the

precise nature of its role and

no actual "covert" disinformation operations

are cited for the years from 1959 to the

present.

Golitsyn provided factual evidence

for "politicalization" of the KGB in 1959,

but its new role may also be interpreted to

cover routine operations of covert propa-

ganda, political action, recruitment of

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..

Tree.

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agents of influence and specific "disinforma-

tion" operations without involving the KGB

(or the Bloc intelligence services) in any

broader

role.

- ...?..

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CHAPTER VII

Golitsyn Vs. Nosenko: ' A Comparison

of Their Handling By CIA

The purpose of this chapter is to describe the differ-

ences in

handling by ClA of the two

•KGB defectors, Anatoliy

Golitsyn and Yuriy Nosenko.

Comparison is material to this

study, since it was Golitsyn's "confirmation" of certain

theories regarding Nosenko

as a dispatched agent that helped

to establish

the standards by which CIA judged Nosenko when

he walked in some months after Golitsyn.

It is also material,

since Golitsyn played a role in CIA efforts

to "break" Nosenko.

Brief discussion of the treatment given the two men follows.

Interrogation

The defections of folitsyn and Nosenko cannot be con-

since some five meetings were

defection.

There had been no similar contact with Golitsyn

before his defection. However, the following statements can

be made.

Golitsyn was brought to this country within days of his

defection

in Helsinki

Standard interroga-

tion procedures were initiated

in December 196 included his systematic

which

lebriefing regarding his own biographic data, family back-

ground and career, and his knowledge of the structure, organiza-

tion,

personalities and operations of the KGB.

What he said

was checked against CIA files and formed the basis for his

acceptance within weeks of arrival in the United States as a

bona fide defector.

In Nosenko's case, he cannot be said to have been inter-

rogated at all, in

the strict sense of the word, during

nitial contacts with him in Geneva in June 1962. For one

thing, he evinced no desire to defect at that time but simply

offered certain pieces of information that he thought would

be of interest to CIA,

in exchange for a specified

money that he claimed

to need.

Also, time with hin was

limited.

When Nosenko actually defected in February 1964, he

was interrogated in a manner that contrasted sharply with that

applied in Golitsyn's case. In the interim between initial

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contacts in 1962 and his defection in 1964, as previously

explained luminous papers had been written during this

it had been concluded that he was a dispatched

period "proving" that such was the case, and because of

the accumulated "evidence" it was decided to attempt to

"break" him as soon as possible.

Accordingly, and because

it was also belicved imperative

to act quickly, Nosenko's

interrogation took place in

various pre-planned stages of

phases, ranging from ostensibly friendly to hostile.

In Nosenko's case,

then, the entire effort was to force

him to admit to CIA's accusations rather than to obtain in-

formation from him in any logical or systematic fashion.

Efforts were made to "trap" him or "throw him off balance,"

by indicating that CIA had "proof" that he was lying, that

his only option was to "confess" that he had been sent by

the KGB, etc.

His denials of charges or

refusals to "con-

fess" only resulted in increasingly hostile treatment. While

his statements did contain inconsistencies, and there were

questions for which he gave no adequate or

consistent and

logical answers,

the manner in which he was questioned was

in no way that afforded the usual defector.

Moreover, the

pressures put upon Nosenko contributed to

the creation

of

a cilmate not conducive to proper

interrogation.

It was not

until October 1967, in fact, that he received a proper in-

terrogation.

Polygraph Examination

As with other phases of their respective handling, the

account of Nosenko's polygraph examinations is in marked con-

trast with that of Golitsyn.

and 28 March 1962, by a polygraph operator of the.

security.

sides that were established miser mean e

on 16 March 1962 between Deputy Chief, SR Division, and Deputy

Office of Security.

agreed at that time

Phae Colitsyn was to see regarded asas aspecial case, has

"flap potential" was regarded as high, because high US

government officials were

aware of

' Golitsyn's allegations

that the US government and CIA were penetrated at a high

level, CIA without reservations.

and these allegations had been accepted to that

pod reacted adversety es the idea of taking a poly rams

Golitsyn himself

exanination and had

consented only after it had been brought

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home to him that the test was an absolute requirement for

reccipt of resident alien status in the United States.

The unusual manner in which the tests were conducted

is illustrated in the following quotations from

the report

later submitted by the polygraph operator:

The undersigned had a series of prepolygraph

conferences with (Chief], SR/CI [a] CI Staff

fficer, and lan officer of the Office of

Security.

The general consensus of the

interested parties regarding what areas

should and

should not be covered during

polygraph testing all reflected the fact

that Subject (Golitsyn] should be disturbed

as little as possible by the questions asked

during the polygraph test so that he would

not feel personally offended and as a result

become "sour," unmanageable or uncooperative.

Furthermore,

that no indication by given to

(Golitsyn] during testing that there were

any doubts as to his reliability or defection

motivation.

(Polygraph) coverage was to deal with

questions pertaining to whether [Golitsyn]

was a

dispatched KGB agent, if (Golitsyn]

had a mission in connection with his defec-

tion, if (Golitsyn) was intentionally mis-

forming his (American intelligence] inter-

viewer, whether he had any secret prearranged

neans of contact with Soviet officials, if

he had a concrete plan to return to the USSR,

as well as questions dealing with his motiva-

tion (the latter to be asked as discreetly

as possible so as not to disturb).

the pre-polygraph conferences

gardless

cally,

even if there were consistent specific

indications of deception to the questions,

under no circunstances should "Golitsyn be

made aware of the fact that (wel had conclu-

sive polygraph evidence which reflected that

Golitsyn] was attempting deception to the

pertinent questions.

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Although the operator was fluent in Russian, the test

as given to Golitsyn on 21 March 1962 in English: Russia

as used only when Golitsyn failed to comprehens

the full

and accurate meaning of a question.

Golitsyn raised no

objections to any questions asked, but the operator did nor

consider the day's testing conclusive,

Ficulties that had arisen oning to Golitsyn's poor compre-

hension of English plus a malfunctioning polygraph.

A second test was therefore given the following day,

28 March, in the Russian language, during the course of

which Golitsyn was asked the same

questions as on the previ-

ous day.

Before

the test could be initiated, however,

Golitsyn again had to be convinced of the necessity for

taking it.

He stated that he had thought over the ques-

tions he had been asked the previous day, and he considered

them "insulting." He resented having been asked whether he

had been sent by the KGB, whether he had a mission connected

with his defection having to do with misinformation,

his

notivation for defecting,

etc.

in the operator's words, he

resented "all in all, any and every

question which may have

reflected that he was not accepted 100 percent on the basis

of only his own explanations and assurances."

Nevetheless,

the test was finally conducted.

Upon its completion

the

operator informed Golitsyn that he (the operator) had con-

cluded that Golitsyn was

substantially truthful in his

answers and that,

as far as the operator was concerned, the

results were favorable.

Six months later,

the Office of Security reviewed the

polygraph charts, as well as the questions that had beer

posed, the transcriptions of the interviews, and the final

report.

On 19 Septeaber 1962, a memorandun

was prepared for

the chief of the Interrogation and Research Division

Office of Security.

The report contained the following

initial statements:

A review of (the operator's report on the

testing of Golitsyn] reflects everything

except a clear-cut statement of whether

or not Golitsyn lied or did not lie to

any or all of the questions.

The report

states that the first day's testing was

inconclusive.

The results of the second

day's testing is not set forth.

The re-

port is rather remarkable for this reason.

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This review indicates that the first day's charts

showed that Golitsyn

that day, but considerably less so on the second.

was very ner us during testing partic-

ular interpretation was placed on this lessened apprehension,

other than to note that Golitsyn knew what to expect in the

way of questions and procedures on the second day, and also

that on the second day he was tested in Russian rather than

English. Of more interest is the reviewer's conclusion that,

while the charts for 28 March show no noticeable reactions

no noticeable reactions

the reviewer was unable to determine

questions were designed

to be "hot"

contral questions that could provoke a response indicative

of deception; thus, the reviewer concluded that the questions

In addition, it was noted that

Golitsyn was not asked any detailed questions on his personal

biography that might have indicated whether he was withhold-

ing information.

The ultimate conclusion was that the charts,

with the limitations noted above,

did not show reactions in-

dicating that Golitsyn was a dispatched Soviet agent.

How-

ever, the

report also contained the following conclusion:

This should not be considered any definitive

(polygraph examination).

The conditions and

limitations placed on the (polygraph] offi-

cer as reflected in the body of the report

imposed a set of conditions that preclude

and make impossible any

unequivocal state-

ment that a conclusive (polygraph examination]

was conducted.

The use of the polygraph in Nosenko's case contrasts

sharply with the way it was used on Golitsyn.

We shall not

go into detail here, because Nosenko's polygraph examinations

Access to Classified Information

With respect to their relative access to classified

information, the cases of Golitsyn and Nosenko could not

stand in greater contrast.

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Practically from the moment of his arrival in this

country, Colitsyn began to demand access to CIA files.

He largely achieved his ends and was soon being given

transcripts of his own debricfing sessions as well as

what has been described as a

Starting

in November 1963, voluminous

information was made available

to him, including:

A. Thirty-two documents concerning the

Penkovskiy case.

C.. Voluminous documents pertaining to the

Popov case, including secret writing nessages,

meeting transcripts and contact reports.

D. Copies of the first four substantive cables

from Geneva relating to the circumstances of

Nosenko's contact with CIA in Geneva in 1962. The

cables included details

of the first meeting with

a US Foreign Service Officer.

E.

Transcriptions of all meetings with Nosenko

in Geneva in 1962 following those noted in the :

cables described above.

Transcriptions of meetings I through 13

with Nosenko in Geneva in 1964.

G.

with his "work on the Nosenko case":

MaDer on ree essen cases crapection

information provided by Nosenko before he underwent

hostile interrogation; a copy of the documents and

handwritten notes that Nosenko brought out with

him; a resume of the first week's hostile interro-

gation of Nosenko; Nosenko's comments on Yuriy

Krotkov's manuscript entitled Fear (Krotkov was a

writer and KGB agent who defected in London in 1963);

and a nearly complete collection of photo identifica-

tions made by Nosenko as of that date.

H.

Sanitized copy of a cable summary of

Nosenko's reactions

to Yuriy Krotkov.

:

:

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1.

Biographic sketch of a US citizen and

cIA staff officer at one time stationed in Moscow,

vith a list of operations in which he was involved.

J.

Biographic sketch of a US citizen and

former CIA staff

officer

at one time stationed in

Moscow, with

a list of operations in which he had

been involved.

focus ficer er the dericane serv

•Biographic sketch of a US citizen and

Foreign Service Officer who cooperated with CIA

during the period of his assignment to the

American embassy in Moscow, plus a list of opera-

tional actions carried out

by him for CIA.

Biographic sketch of a US citizen and

Foreign Service Officer who cooperated with CIA

during the period of his assignment to the

American embassy in Moscow, with a list of opera-

tional actions carried out

by him for CIA.

Biographic sketch of a US citizen and

Foreign Service Officer assigned to the American

embassy in Moscow at one time.

He had no CIA

affiliation.

Biographic sketch of a US citizen and

Foreign Service Officer assigned to the American

embassy in Moscow at one time.

He had no CIA

affiliation.

Golitsyn was provided with a copy

agency affiliation).

Biographic sketch of a US citizen and

Foreign Service Officer assigned to the American

embassy in Moscow at one time. He had no CIA

affiliation.

Biographic sketch of a Us citizen and

CIA staff officer at one time assigned to Moscow.

Information on a Russian-born American

citizen employed as an interpreter by the United

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Nations in Geneva who was the object of a KGB

recruitment attempt while on loan to

UNESCO for

conference work in Tbilisi in 1968.

S.

Biographic infornation on CIA-connected

personnel mentioned in

the Cherepanoy papers.

This information was additional to sketches on

the same persons given to Golitsyn with the tran-

script for Meeting No. 12 with Nosenko in Geneva

in 1964.

A nine-page summary of the status of

including information on

results of Nosenko's 1964 polygraph exanination,

on his confrontation and subsequent interrogation,

on his life history, on CIA conclusions ("daily

support for our conviction that Nosenko was sent

on a KGB mission"), on CIA plans for future

handling o^ Nosenko (continued interrogation),

and on Nosenko's circunstances (confinement under

observation, without cigarettes or reading

material).

copies of two reports on the subject of

KGB audio-technical operations

one prepared on

the basis of information provided by Golitsyn

in 1962 and one prepared on the basis of

information brought out by Nosenko in 1964. witl

notation for Golitsyn that recent sweeping oper-

ations in the American embassy in Moscow had

located all the microphones identified by Nosenko

and a number not mentioned by Nosenko.

involved with Krotkov.

w.

A list of questions that Krotkov had

suggested be put to Nosenko to confirm and clarify

information given by Krotkov.

Biographic sketches on Vladimir Kovshuk,

Yuriy Guk, Aleksandr Feklisov alias Fomin,

Igor Ivanov.

Kovshuk and Guk were KGB officers

known to both Golitsyn and Nosenko; with Vladimir

Churanov, they were credited by Golitsyn as having

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recommended to the KGB that Nosenko be sent to

the West to discredit Golitsyn in the eyes of CIA

and other western intelligence services.

Feklisov

vas a KGB ufficer who visited the United States as

part of Khrushchev's party in 1959 and later

(1960-1964) served as Counselor of the Soviet

embassy in Washington, DC.

by the FBI in 1963 in connection with the case of

John w. Butenko, an electronics engineer who was

arrested as a KGB agent.

to Golitsyn as his request.

Y. A chronology of the case of Boris Belitskiy,

Golitsyn had asked to

're-read" the file on Belitskiy

whose status vis-

-vis the KGB was first reported

to CIA by Nosenko.

solitsyn was also given a background sketch of

Befitsky and transcripts of "all four contact

2. File summary of the case of Mikhail

Fedorov alias Razin, a GRU colonel who served as

AA. Case descriptions of two operations ser-

viced by CIA personnel in Moscow.

Both were KGB

couriers dispatched on emigre

operations into West

Germany, where they were apprehended, agreed to

work for American intelligence, and later returned

to the USSR.

BB:

Responses by Nosenko to questions drafted

by Golitsyn on:

recruitable Soviets (by nane and

background); American double

agents; the Popov case;

recruitment of US intelligence personnel; KGB

operations against US

embassy (Moscow) personnel;

surveys or studies done by the KGB Second Chief

Directorate about arrested American spies (including

Popov and Penkovskiy); KGB awards

(including those

given to persons who participated in the investi-

gation of Penkovskiy, Popov, Stashinskiy); the

Penkovskiy case; Golitsyn.

CC. Charts indicating what Nosenko had reported

on KGB operational interest in specific persons

(i.e., operational "leads"'), and what CIA had been

able to develop on them through investigation, with

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CIA comments as appropriate; an outline of infor-

mation provided by Nosenko on the structure and

By contrast, the CIA position with regard to revelation

of information to Nosenko is indicated by the following state-

ment taken from a memorandum for the DDP prepared by Chief,

SR Division, dated 30 March 1964:

• • I think we should make absolutely

sure that Subject (Nosenko) does not learn

a single thing fron us that we do not want

him (and eventually the KGB) to know.

think CIA has to take a very firm position

on this issue, otherwise the FBI might urge

• delay in confrontation while they present

case after case to

(Nosenko] in an effort

to learn more fron him.

For information on Nosenko's deprivation of reading matter of

any sort for long periods of time, much less intelligence

files of the sort given to Golitsyn, see Chapter III.

Physical Confinement

Golitsyn cannot be said to have been physically confined

at any time.

custody afforded him and his reaction to any type of control

is quoted from the 1976 Counterintelligence Staff Study

(No. 3) on Golitsyn:

Golitsyn always felt the need for protection

against possible KGB retaliation,

but quite

obviously believed he alone was

the best

judge of what this

entailed.

He wanted

guards around, but not underfoot.

The record

is replete with his complaints against the

guards and his attempts to isolate them.

This became a key issue in the adoption of

the codicil to the Statement of Agreement

when Golitsyn moved into his

in July 1 and was given complete personal

own house

control of the guards,

their hours of duty

and their responsibilities.

From that point

on, Golitsyn was essentially unguarded.

His

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wife also railed against her "companions"

in the early days.

She made frequent trir:

into hashington to shop or attend

movies,

theater or ballet.

At

these times, she

would dismiss her chauffeur for lengthy

periods.

On two occasions she took the bus

alone to New York for the day, and Golitsyn

also visited New York in November 1962, at

which tine he roamed the city unescorted.

Golitsyn's behavior from that time on followed a sinilar

pattern.

suddenly left the United States for the United

Kingdon

in December 1962, and while in England he lived where

he wished and had no security protection.

Golitsyn to keep his whereabouts to hinself, not to stay in

one hotel for any length of time, and to call when he wanted

to meet.

According to the study

quoted above, this loose

method of dealing with Golitsyn probably helped in maintain-

ing a cooperative attituce on his part; it also apparently

set a precedent for his attitude toward

in which

he would live

upon his return to the United States in July

Upon his return here,

to set his on pretern of living as working, fellowing the

British example.

He obtained his own residence in New York,

moved several tines, developed the concept that he was the

best judge of his own security,

and at times lived "alnost

under the eaves of the Soviet Mission" in New York while

simultaneously refusing to talk to CIA officers because CIA

was "penetrated."

Nosenko's physical confinement and deprivation of even

minor amenities fron the time of his defection in early 1964

until late October 1967 stand in stark contrast to the treat-

ment afforded Golitsyn.

This matter has been covered so

fully in Chapter IlI that it requires no further connent.

Conclusions

If summation is needed, the following can be stated with

respect to the five areas dealt with above:

A.

Golitsyn controlled his own interrogation,

withholding information if he chose, refusing to

Most at not at it i do covet tasked

to for long stretches of time), much less properly

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interrogated,

for several years after the date of

his defection.

B.

Golitsyn was given a signed agreement

covering the conditions of his cooperation with

in the ground that an orat as on ten anerace,

"bureaucratically correct" manner of handling his

relationship with the US government, until five

years after his defection (1969).

C.

Golitsyn's polygraph examination was admin-

istered under ground rules

imposed by SR Division.

These rules produced inconclusive test results,

but full assurances were given Golitsyn that he

had passed his examination.

No further attempt

was made to establish Golitsyn's bona fides.

Nosenko, on the other hand, underwent three separate

series of polygraph tests.

Two of the three were

conducted in such a manner as to prejudice the re-

sults. against Nosenko; under the ground rules im-

posed by the SR Division officers on the polygrapi

operator,

the latter was under instructions to

"find" evidences of deception in the polygraph

charts, whether they were there or not.

• with respect to access to information.

olitsyn was provided with literally safes-full of

classified documents, including files on cases

that were regarded

as highly sensitive within CIA

and to which only a very small number of ClA staff

officers had access.

Nosenko not only did not see

any intelligence material but was denied access to

newspapers, books, rad1o, of even personal contact

with other

human beings.

E. As to physical confinement,

simply never confined; the thought of confining

him did not even arise.

Nosenko spent virtually

all of his first five years in this country as

a prisoner, given fewer amenities than he would

have received in most jails or prisons within

the United States, or in some form of protective

custody.

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It seems self-evident that these two defectors should

as the other unte contreatment

that one was as suspect

all appropriate processing

aimed at determining bona fides.

tradi

÷5.

in

Prenti

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CHAPTER VIII

Use of the Polygraph in the Nosenko Case

series of six tests.

somewhat unorthodox is indicated by the following quotations

from the report of the polygraph operator:

During the pre-polygraph conferences with

representatives of SR Division, the under-

Signed was informed that the polygraph

interview was part of an

overald plan to

help

break (Nosenko] and elicit the truth

from him.

SR Division's instructions were

that, regardless of whether (Nosenko]

passed his polygraph test or not, he was

to be informed at the termination of his

interview that he was lying, and

had not passed his polygraph interview.

The question of [Nosenko's] willingness to

participate in the polygraph test was one of

ninor consideration, since he had, on previ-

us occasions, agreed that he would take the

test.

However, whether [Nosenko] would con-

tinue with the polygraph

testing, if he was

confronted

with attempted deception after

ал

initial

test run, was one of the considered

problems.

Consequently, in order to preclude

the possibility of (Nosenko's] terminating the

test prior to its completion,.

it was decided

that a minor deviation from

the accepted

polygraph technique would be used during the

posygraph resting,

specifically to ensure that

3 polygraph record of (Nosenko's] reactions

to all the pertinent questions be obtained

prior to challenging

any significant

polygraph deception

indications his charts

might reflect.

Because of the extenuating

(sic] circumstances of the case, this plan

was followed throughout the polygraph inter-

When (Nosenko] arrived for his test,

ithe fact that he had been drinking) was

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evident both to [the operator) and the

examining physician who checked [Nosenko]

prior to (Nosenko's] po-ygraph testing

Although (Nosenko) had used both alcohoi and

some unknown drug prior to testing, there is

no question, based both on

analysis of

[Nosenko's] polygraph charts as well as

personal observation during the interview,

that [Nosenko] has attempted deliberate

deception in the specific pertinent areas

(on which he was questioned).

iccording to the pre-agreed upon plan, the

different phases involving various pertinent

areas were covered with [Nosenko] polygraph-

ically.

Challenge of (Nosenko's] reactions

was indirect and

"soft."

• . . Subject was

told that he was lying

to numerous pertinent

questions and was accused of being a dis-

patched agent.

After completion of the interview

presentative at the safesite was informed,

in front of (Nosenko,, of (the operator's)

opinion that (Nosenko] was lying and was a

dispatched Soviet agent.

(Nosenko) was taken

into protective custody and escorted to his

new place of residence.

A second series of polygraph tests were administered to

Nosenko between 18 and 25 October 1966.

Although by this

time the operator had transferred from

the Office of Security

to SR Division, it was desired by SR that he conduct the new

polygraph tests.

He was allowed by the Office of Security

exception to the rule that all polygraph

to do sobe performed by Security personnel, on the basis of

Chief, SR's statement that,

for Nosenko's polygraphing, use

of a person ofhis "temperament" was essential.

The following is quoted from an interim report dated

24 October 1966 (i.e., before completion of the new polygraph

series), which was

attached to a memorandum from Chief, SR

to the DCI.

Our aims in this phase of the interrogation

have been limited:

in view of the possibility

of losing access to Nosenko, we have sought

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(a) to strengthen

preparation,

at test his repy unter,

clarifying points

of confusion and reveal-

ing new contradictions, and by polygraph

examinations in key

areas,

1b to lead

toward his eventual confession by directly

exploiting our hypotheses

about the true

background of Nosenko and this KGB opera-

tion,

to convey to Nosenko the impression

that we know more than betore.

that we

possess irrefutable proof of his guilt and

that he has no prospects for release.

refrained from doing this in

We

earlier phases

of the interrogation, but at this point

there seems little to lose.

•

(Regarding his identity): Nosenko was

questioned

extensively

on

the polygraph con-

cerning his identity

He was also given

a series of tests asking for the first letter

of his given name.

The

whole alphabet was

covered, and the polygraph charts show that

culminating

at the letter S

he became increasingly tenses, on both runs.

While we recognize that testing of this sort

may not give valid results, it certainly

gets over to Nosenko the degree of our doubt

and may even help us determine who he really

is.

Nosenko's becoming "increasingly tense" during this

1966 polygraph examination must be evaluated in the light of

certain facts that were not brought out in this report.

us begin by giving a schedule of

the hours during which he

was under continuous polygraph interrogation:

Date and Times

Hours and Minutes

19 October

1330 - 1530

2

20 October

1930 : 1215

1911

3:45 •

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Date and Times

21 October

930 - 124

645 - 181

25 October

1350 - 1545

1630 - 1805

26 October

1000 - 1320

1755 - 1925

27 October

1020 - 1345

1700 - 1913

28 October

0955 - 1020

1024 - 1125

Total hours of continuous

polygraph examination

Hours and Minutes

1:25

1:55

1:30

2:13

1:05

28:29

as artifactitious reactions.

sults of a polygraph examination conducted under such condi-

tions are not dependable.

cause when he was not being polygraphed he was being intensively

interrogated.

The record shows that in addition to the

approximately 28 hours of polygraphing, he was subjected to

1s hours of straight interrogation. The

dividing line between

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polygraphing and hostile interrogation is not always clear

participated in

part cited id home example a pony paph the typed

record reads:

be crate or to so let his cathe

It is also probable that Nosenko's physical movements

were restricted

for long periods of time during this whole

period.

In a report he wrote on 16 November 1967, the

Director of Security stated:

• [Nosenko) was left strapped in a chair

between periods

of interrogation for

as long

as.four or five hours at

time.

As you

know, the role of this Office in

the Nosenko

case during the past three years has been one

exclusively of support under the direction

• of SB Division personnel.

None the less, 1

have consistently instructed my personnel

who were guarding him

that I would not con-

done or support any treatment involving

physical abuse.

I have confirmed this one

example of what I consider to be physical

abuse and regret that it was not brought to

my attention.

Nosenko's final

polygraph examination, conducted under

the direction of the Office of Security, was quite at

variance with the first two.

Initiated on 2 August 1968,

it concluded on 6 August 1968.

The tests took place after

approximately 7,000 pages of transcripts and relaied materials

had been compiled during the course of Nosenko's new interro-

tion undertaken in late October 1967. About 60 questions of

a pertinent nature were covered in the interview.

Nosenko

was completely cooperative, no problems were encountered,

and the conclusion of the polygraph operator was that Nosenko

had been substantially truthful in answering all relevant

questions put to him.

In the course of the present investigation, the Office

of Security was requested

to make a further reevaluation of

the Nosenko polygraph charts of April 1964, October 1966,

and August 1968.

The resultant report,

dated 30 September

1976 and signed by the Director of Security, states:

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This memorandum is in response to your

reques: for a review of the polygraph

charts of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko obtained

during polygraph

1964 and October

interrogations

in April

1966 . • • (and] in August

1968 . ..

After a thorough review of the charts

obtained in April 1964, it is our opinion

that the polygraph charts obtained do not

contain sufficient technical data on which

Ma n hich

to base a conclusion of deception or to

support that Mr. Nosenko was a dispatched

agent of the KGB . . .

Finally, the polygraph patterns produced

to pertinent questions during the August

1968 polygraph examination substantiate

that Mr. Nosenko

had not given

was

truthful and that he

false information to his CIA

debriefing officers.

It is our opinion

that the examiner in that testing was

correct in his chart analysis.

wanias

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CHAPTER IX

Psychological and Medical Findings

A small, but nevertheless key role was played by two

Agency specialists, respectively

psychiatrist,

a psychologist and a

in the handling of Nosenko.

Like so much

else that occurred in this case, this aspect is edifying

nainly in the negative sense of demonstrating how the ser-

vices of such professionals ought not to be exploited.

In

sum, the psychologist and psychiatrist principally involved

in this case were given

enough misinformation about Nosenko's

bona fides to prejudice seriously any chance of an accurate

personality assessment.

We now examine in some detail the roles played by the

psychologist-and the psychiatrist.

In doing so, we have

very nuch

in mind the fact that both these gentlemen are

members of organized

professions, both

of which imposi

explicit standards of conduct upon their members.

We must

therefore look for possible conflict between demands the

Agency made of these professionals on one hand, and their

professional standards on the other.

A. The Role of the Psychologist

The psychologist's role will be dealt with first

because,

to judge by the written record, he was the

first to assess Nosenko from the psychological point

of view, by means of a brief interview and

test administered

on 23 June 1964.

His initial report is dated 9 July 1964.

In addition, he interviewed Nosenko at length in 14 ses-

sions during the period 3-21 May 1965.

He then wrote a

chronicle of Nosenko's life and

an

overall psychological

evaluation based on these interviews.

By way of background, it should be said that the

psychologist is an extremely insightful person with

clinical experience acquired both before joining CIA

as well as during his CIA service.

He has developed

his own system of interpreting the Wechsler intelligence

tests (Wechsler-Bellevue and Wechsler Adult Intelligence

Scale), which ne calls the Personality Assessment Systen

(PAS) .

It is PAS that, for over two decades, has been

the main resource used

by the Clandestine Service in the

assessment of personality for operational purposes.

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Like any other scientific practitioner, however,

basis of valid data.

a psychologist can on If you put a

function properly on the

cube of ice in a

patient's mouth before

inserting the thermometer, you

do not get an accurate

temperature reading.

If you

provide an examining psychologist or psychiatrist

with erroneous data regarding a defector, the findings

of his examination will inevitably be in part erroneous.

also have

Pers tait assessions stry yes resules shat

their linitations.

should be read only as statements of the statistical

probability of the presence of a given personality

predisposition or characteristic.

In other words, the

results

give the psychologist a suggestion as to what

to look for in a person, as

he collects further data.

In the case here under

consideration.

the personality

Fornula that the psychologist derived from his administra-

tion of the PAS test io Nosenko suggested that Nosenko

might have the characteristics of a sociopath.

The

psychologist's task was

then to evaluate this

datum

within a framework that included the following elements:

His judgment of the validity of his

test results.

Note that he depended on a

single, English-language measurement instru-

ment when he examined Nosenko on 23 June 1964.

Personal interviews.

He had time for

only a limited interview at the time of

and it was conducted without benefit of

inginterpreter in English, a language Nosenko

spoke with

far from idionatic fluency.

interviews were conducted later, in

May 1965, long after the original diagnosis

made. They also were conducted in

Collateral data, obtained from senior

SR officers, which were

uniformly prejudicial

to Nosenko.

The latter was described as one

who lied and changed his story

constantly, and

who had been sent to the United States on a

for the Kob.

Doubt was even expressed

as to whether Nosenko was the person he professed

to be.

not sus it to in eit

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Subsequent events have revealed that Nosenko's

falsehoods were in fast minor ones.

But the psychologist

did not know. all this; told that Nosenko lied constantly

and knowing that manipulative lying

is part of the

psychopathic syndrome, he diagnosed Nosenko as a psycho-

path.

The term "psychopath" (another term used inter-

changeably is "sociopath") itself deserved a word of

explanation, because its connotation is misleading.

Like so many psychological terms, it evolved out of the

fact that psychologists tend to be involved primarily

with people in trouble, very often with those who end up

in prisons and mental institutions.

A survey of psycho-

one quintessential criterion of a psychopath

is habitually given to criminal or delinquent behavior.

The critéria that psychologists

use in distinguishing

between psychopaths

and non-psychopaths have been

developed almost entirely from studies of juvenile

delinquents, criminals and mental patients, and thus the

term is really only applicable with any certainty to in-

dividuals belonging to one or another of those groups.

Despite this tact, testing of many people who are not

delinquent or criminal may yield a score or profile

of scores suggesting psychopathy. To illustrate the

point, let us take an example.

On the Minnesota

Multiphasic Personality Inventory (one of the most widely

used clinical testing instruments in this country), the

profile that suggests psychopathy has also been generated

In testing persons who turned out to be good WACs in

forld War Il

and others who have been predicted as

likely to succeed in the life insurance business.. Yet,

good WACs and life insurance agents are obviously not

"roychopath." We so the fact that you have a pre

the fact that you have a predis-

position to psychopathy does not mean that you necessarily

ecome one: the psychopathic profile on either the MoPI

or the PAS

test is merely a warning signal of what you

might do under certain adverse circumstances.

When he tested Nosenko, the psychologist was not

fully aware of all the pressures under which this defector

was functioning.

He was unaware of the manner of his

sudden confinement after glowing promises had been made

of rewards for defection; of the falsified polygraph

results, and the fact that Nosenko had been informed

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that the examination showed him guilty of deception;

or of the fact that the principal case officer had

told Nosenko that the latter's information (later to

prove of great value) was all "crap."

Given these

factors, we would have to conclude a priori that the

• resultant PAS personality profile was likely to be

partly spurious.

The exact extent to which the psychologist's test

results were inexact cannot be determined, but one

example is illustrative of the possibilities.

of the profile suggested that Nosenko was endowed with

a well-below average memory.

functioning at less than average level at the time he

took the test cannot be doubted; but it has already

been made clear that he was functioning under extrenely

adverse conditions, and, since the Wechsler subtest that

measures

memory span has been experimentally shown to be

vulnerable to

temporary) anxiety,*

this

aspect of

the persontaity profile musra be considered

spurious.

From Nosenko's performance during extensive

debriefings since he was released from confinement and

began to receive normally humane treatment we can only

we know that

his memory is in fact exceptionally good.

conclude that, if it functioned badly at the time of test-

ing, this was

largely owing to anxiety induced by treat-

ment received at the hands of CIA.

As to the psychologist's characterization of

Nosenko as a psychopath,

the limitations of such a

diagnosis have already been made clear.

Since his re-

lease

from incarceration,

although he has certainly shown

himself to be an

winning and charming

when he wants to

emphathic pers shown any of the unde-

be, he has

sirable traits associated with psychopathy..

Quite to

the contrary, as of this time at least, he has since

1969 comported himself with both dignity and discretion.

The psychologist's evaluation contained a section

entitled "Vulnerabilities" that was, once again, clearly

based on the premise that Nosenko was dissembling, when

he denied being under continued KGB control. The psychologist

MIOte:

*Matarazzo, J. D., Measurement and Appraisal of Adult Intelli-

gence.

Baltimore:

Williams and Wilkins, 1972.

Page 444.

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Under prolonged pressure he will admit almost

anything to get relief.

Another vulnerability

is that he will "break" in order to get relief.

Care should be taken to continue pressure for

sone time after an initial break

is secured

to allow for vacillation and

nodification.

Long periods of isolation after these breaks

may be useful in evaluating the reliability

of his infornation.

In general, it is better

to give him slight rewards (e.g., cigarettes,

bit she peo of cooperation than to

The psychologist's last major involvement in the

case

appears to have been

the series of debriefings having

to do with Nosenko's personal history, conducted during

the period 3-21 May 1965.

These led the psychologist to

the following conclusions and rucommendations:

Nosenko's story was

consistent with

the previous diagnosis of a "bright sociopath"

(i.e., psychopath).

2.

The psychologist was "totally at a

loss to even attempt to rationalize why a

story with this much pathology would be used

as a legend.

Nothing could be served other

than to discredit the man to whon it was as-

signed.

3.

New approaches were necessary, as

described in the following paragraph:

- have few specific reconnendations.

The first is to consider a pentothal

sodiun (sic] interview

he can be hit with a hostile, or a

Second,

better tern would be a needling, in-

terrogation on his psychological

weaknesses.

His reaction to my mild

needle on hin running away from a bad

situation suggests he may be highly

vulnerable in this area.

Third, some

consideration could be given to turn-

ing him back to the Soviets.

The

publication of his life story with

- societ 1

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the proper editorial changes--

emphasizing the class distinctions

and privileges in a

classless society

could

be most humiliating to the

Soviets.

In

addition, we could take

the gamble of demonstrating that de-

fection is an honorable act of moti-

vated men.

The US has no room for

the misfits and failures of the Soviet

system.

The above findings were still insufficient for some

of the SR Division personnel, who then drafted a series

of very specific questions to be put to the psychologist.

Of these the first three will be quoted, together with

the psychologist's answers:

1.

This man's story is full of denon-

strable lies.

Often these lies

seem point-

less--no matter from what point of view

they are studied.

when challenged, he will

sometimes retreat from one of his

stories;

in other instances, he will cling adamantly

to one even when it is clear to all that he

is lying and even when he has an easy way

out.

In other words, his lies, distortions

and rationalizations

are harder to under-

stand than those of most "normal" people.

In your opinion, when he lies, does he do so:

a. because he is a compulsive

liar;

(Answer: No.)

b. because he seeks to bolster

his stature and ego for his own reasons;

Answer:

Essentially yes.)

c.

because the KGB told him to.

(Answer: Perhaps.)

2.

Do the incidence and nature of his in-

accuracies and distortions add up to a behavior

pattern that might reasonably be called "normal"?

If not, how can it be described in layman's

terms?

(Answer: Not a "normal" personality but legally

normal and not hospitalizeable.)

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3.

If his behavior pattern is not

"normal," could it be counterfeit, either

for personal reasons or because he was

briefed to comport himself this way?

Could he play such a role over a considerable

period of time?

(Answer: Absolutely not.)

When at long last,

concluded its ate see the one ca

the

findings of the psychologist were included in the

following abbreviated form:

Nosenko is a rationalizer, a distorter, and

an evasive person clearly

capable of dis-

sembling for personal reasons.

He is not

a compulsive liar.

He is inclined to relate

what he thinks he

is expected to say rather

than to tell

the truth as he knows

it.

lies by

design as well as for effect,

however,

and he does not always embroider just to

bolster his ego.

He is neither "insane" nor

psychotic, and he suffers from no "delusions."

Nosenko's

rationalizations are not the pro-

duct of derangement.

The most notable quality of this summary is its

selectivity.

For example:

1. The sumnary nowhere mentioned the

diagnosis of Nosenko as a psychopath/sociopath.

The fact that psychopaths generally try to

evade the penalties of their misbehavior by

adaptive

role-playing (e.g, sudden religious

"conversions"

to win sympathy

and "prove" they

are changing their ways) could' have served

dangerously

to undercut the thesis that

Nosenko was sufficiently dedicated to persist

in carrying out a long-term KGB plot in face

of the sort of treatment he had received

since 4 April 1964.

to establish a dichotomy between the

By the above-cited omission' insane"

or "psychotic," who suffer "delusions,". and

"normal" people, who tell the truth.

carefully skirted the existence of a middle

interior hundouse

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+1.01

ground between normality and psychoticisn

in which people do not behave

but are not insane.

not have

"normally"

Yet this distinc-

tion had been

drawn

specifically in" answer

o one of the

SR Division questioned quoted

Enough has been said to make clear that the psycholo-

gist was put in an impossible position.

On the basis of

the "facts" provided him,

ne was

Nosenko could have been

volving extended dissimulation.

The psychologist was not sure enough of his ground

to stick to his guns.

previously with

a number of

great degree of insight.

that he did not have all the facts,

had specifically told him so.

insisht is of very little

use when not based on adequate data.

Helms tried to help.

When told by the psychologist

that the latter did not

have all the facts necessary

make a judgment about Nosenko, Helms called Chief, SR

and instructed him that

the psychologist should be fully

informed. This instruction appears to have been disre-

We can only conclude that the psychologist did what

could legitimately be expected of him, within the con-

straints of the Agency's comnand structure." The weak-

nesses that in retrospect we can perceive in the

psychologist's diagnosis and recommendations can be as-

cribed

directly to

his being asked

to make professional

judgments based on inadequate knowledge.

The propriet)

•f the Agency's employing a professional in this manner

should be carefully reviewed.

B. The Role of the Psychiatrist

The psychiatrist's role in the Nosenko operation

was more extensive and of longer duration than the

psychologist's.

In addition to physical examinations,

it included giving advice on how Nosenko should be treated

while in confinement, advice on special interrogation

techniques such as

the use of sodium pentothal, and an

assessment of Nosenko's personality.

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The psychiatrist has stated (in discussions

with the senior author of this report) that he had

been told when he was first assigned to the case that

Nosenko was concealing information of great importance

to the US government.

That he worked throughout th

case under this assumption is evident from the total

context of his reporting.

On the other hand, there

is no evidence that either SR Division or CI

Staff

shared the reasons for their suspicions with him to a

sufficient extent for him to

have evaluated their

claim, even had he been qualified by professional

background to make such an evaluation.

He knew and

accepted his limitations in the latter regard; for

example, ih a report dated 23 February 1965,

after

he had

spent an hour observing an interrogation, he

remarked:

(Nosenko] comes off (in) his responses to

questions

(at least when I saw him) in the

same fashion as always though I am not

competent to judge the content of what he

says.

Underlining added.J

tions offieven according

even though the psychiatrist was not an "opera-

to normal Agency Criteria,

luring his long association with this case (which included

34 examinations of Nosenko in the year 1964 alone) he

Icted in more than a purely medical Capacity.

Not only

did he check on Nosenko's

realth and endeavor to safeguar

it, he also advised the operational component of the

gency on certain aspects of their own specializec

activities to which

his medical and psychiatric knowledge

appeared relevant.

In this latter capacity, the psychi-

atrist's name was invoked frequently in operational

generally without his knowledge; for

corresponde a 27 November 1964 memorandum to thé DDP,

concerning arrangements for forthcoming interrogations,

Chief, SR stated:

Given

the assessment by both [the psychi-

atristi and [the psychologist] that subject

a compulsive talker, we are hopeful that we will

make some progress.

By implication, this and other similar references evoked

the recondite

expertise of the psychiatric and psycholog-

ical professionals to bolster claims of impending success.

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It should be made clear that throughout the

the psychlatrist was entitled to

feel that hu as act pay property was line of duty.

His component, the Office of Medical

Services/

Operational Services Division, was specifically

charged with providing assistance to the operational

components of the Agency.

It had long been Agency

practice, both at Headquarters and in

the field,

for medical doctors to function in a partly opera-

tional capacity, even though they were not neces-

sarily cognizant of all aspects of the operations

in which they became involved.

The assumption was

that senior operations officers knew what they were

about and

that, within rather vaguely defined

limits,

a doctor of medicine could

accept their

authority as guaranty of the rightness of what he

did to assist them.

Thus, it was only natural that the psychiatrist,

having been told by senior Agency officials that

Nosenko was consistently lying about his true mis-

sion, should accept their views.

Unlike the psycholo-

gist, he did not even have the

advantage of having

systematically debriefed Nosenko on his life history;

had he done so, he might have shared the psycholo-

gist's suspicions that the SR Division opinion of

Nosenko was not beyond legitimate challenge.

Nevertheless,

the anomalous situation in which

the psychiatrist was placed had two unfortunate

consequences:

Because he was led to assume that

Nosenko was systematically lying, his

diagnosis was somewhat distorted.

2. The same assumption led him to

play a quasioperational role in the handling

of Nosenko.

Let us look in greater depth at the first consequence.

In so doing, it is not our purpose to second-guess a

qualified psychiatrist; rather, it is our purpose to

ascertain whether this particular professional, well

to his colleagues for his devotion to duty, was

in fact given a fair opportunity to make an honest

evaluation.

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The psychiatrist's diagnosis of Nosenko, which

he labeled

"Psychiatric Impressions," was dated 20

December 1964.

It read in part:

Psychiatric impression is that of an individual

who shows an

above

average intelligence capacity,

is shrewd and perceptive.

While he claims to

have desired to cooperate and work with US

officials, his antisocial behavior was destruc-

tive and self-defeating to the aims he claimed

to pursue.

paramount

importance to a and sees ipeates

those around him without regard to consequence

in order to satisfy his needs.

As such he tends

to be selfish, ungrateful, narcissistic and

exhibitionistic.

In satisfying his own desires

there is no concern for the feelings or interests

of others.

There has been no evidence of a

sense of honor or of shame.

He has seen

nothing wrong with his own behavior, being unable

to view this

from another's viewpoint. For most

of his adult life, it is reasonable to expect

that he has operated in this manner--without

conscience, without guilt and has directed his

efforts at

satisfying his own needs. He may

at times

give the impression of being a reliable

and steadfast person, but after gaining security

for himself and the confidence of others, can

Shrug off major obligations easily. As with

nany individuals of this personality makeup,

his disregard

for the truth

is remarkable.

Whether there

is a good chance that he will get.

away with a lie or whether detection is almost

certain, he shows no signs of perturbation and

can coolly maintain his position.

mitting the most serious of perjuries, it is

easy for him to look anyone calmly in the eye.

Alcohol certainly catalyzes his tendency to

uninviting or destructive behavior .

Emotional attachment is shallow.

Although he

may give at times the impression of being

cordial and affectionate, beneath this is an

astonishing callousness.

As a youngster, this man might well have been

looked upon as

a juvenile delinquent with

somed li.

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constant brushes with authority.

As he grew

older this behavior most likely continued

in

the same pattern with occasional brushes with

the law and perhaps some punishment.

But the

effectiveness

of his ability to manipulate

and protect himself by personable appeals may

have kept him in circulation in society on

the fringe, so to speak.

restricted

His reaction to his

sone

some limits imposed by authority while at the

same

time not accepting the seriousness of

their situation and believing that, as in the

past, they can talk their way out.

This man

is capable of playing a role and playing it

effectively.

with ehy hae e cous phase achieved see

it seems

stature as a staff intelligence officer.

He

could, however,

have been effective in various

types

of intelligence operations.

On 1 October 1976, the above evaluation was discussed

with the psychiatrist

unknown to him.

background on the following

on sports ot the sos

tacts previously

Inter alla, he was given (in writing

aspects of the Nosenko case:

1. CIA promises of substantial monetary

rewards and an opportunity for Nosenko to work

with CIA on a salaried basis.

2. The concision of the Director of

Security, as of 30 September 1976, that "Mr.

Nosenko was truthful and that he had not

given false information to his CIA debriefing

officers."

by boểh FB

Acceptance of Nosenko's bona fides

and CIA.

The memorandum of conversation dictated by the

senior author following the above discussion reads in

part:

(The psychiatrist) agreed that his 20 December

1964 memorandum, as well as subsequent psychiatric

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dependent chich he her made were on beachly

he obtained from : epresentatives of the SB

Division.

He agreed that, had he known the

facts as stated in my menorandum, his psychi-

those be aments have differed frou

le actually made.

In connection with some of the specific points

raised. in my memorandum,

(the psychiatrist)

made the following observations:

He was not aware of the

financiai of other promises made to

Nosenko, and perhaps assumed that

Nosenko,

angling

for large

like most defedsors iThe

rewards.

sychiatrist, mentioned Golitsyr

Is among the precedents which he

probably had in mind

...

alleged iying red

In regard to Nosenko's

deception

he was

cotally dependent upon the judgments

of Si Division personnel as well as

that of la polygraph operatori.

(The psychiatrist) stated that, until he read my

1 October 1976 memorandum, he had never known

that Nosenko had contributed valuable informa-

tion.

le had also never received any informa-

ion concerning Nosenko's behavior since his

being released from incarceration . ..

We are thus justified in concluding that, in the

psychiatrist's case as in that of the psychologist,

professional was not given the proper "collateral in-

formation" on the basis of which to render a sound profes-

sional judgment.

More explicitly, because neither the

psychiatrist nor psychologist was accurately

informed

even about such basic aspects of

the case as the promises

made to Nosenko (which could not possibly be considered

to have had sensitive security implications,, neither

nan had an accurate criterion for judging the appropri-

ateness of Nosenko's behavior in seeking better treatment.

matinstmas 01551-85121-

ВАТРАЗТа ВРОСТо ВсКоР

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Given the apparent consensus among the Agency's

leadership that there were good and sufficient reasons

for incarcerating

and trying to

"break" Nosenko, it is

not surprising in

hindsight that the psychiatrist offered

judgments and advice extending well beyond the bounds of

conventional medicine and psychiatry.

Since his quasi-

operational participation in this case has been covered

to some degree in Chapter III, we need only reevoke a

few examples here:

-His judgment of 24 February 1966 that "things

sound to change as far as Nosenko is con-

cerned--he is either going to stop faking or

things will get worse."

--His judgment, reported on 26 April 1966,

that reestablishing contact between Nosenko

and the interrogators would be a serious mis-

take because it would constitute a "relief."

-His opinion, offered after monitoring the

6 July 1966

meeting between the principal

effectively slam shut another psychological

door."

Admittedly, the above comments come to us secondhand,

via memoranda

written by others.

Nonetheless,

they are

consistent with everything

in the psychiatrist's hand-

written reports of his visits to Nosenko in confinement.

It will suffice here to illustrate

our point with one

example, quoted from the psychiatrist's 14 July 1964 re-

port of

a visit to Nosenko:

Subject was seen for (the) first time in over

two weeks.

His general physical condition is

satisfactory

'and his weight is now 170 lbs.

There is evidence however that he is reacting

psychologically to his detention and is show-

ing increased

tension, anxiety and is misin-

terpreting various

stimuli in his environnent.

More significant is his conviction that he is

being constantly photographed in his room and

in the "privacy of his bath."

The latter is

most disturbing to him especially being

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He describes

the sound of movie cameras especially

in the bath

having pictures

(This is the exact word he used.)

were being taken in his room

hod he sut ott the bed, walked over to the

Joor to his room and pointed to pin holes

on each side of the door through which he

was being clandestinely photographed. He

said he

had

taken photographs

people in

compromising positions

for operational use

in (the] KGB and he understood

the reason

for this.

But he did not understand why

the guards continued to take pictures of

him--especially in the bath.

In the guard

log.is a notation last week

about a request

from him that picture taking be stopped.

This sequence, The nebulous

I am conviticed, was not

play acting.

situation he

finds hinself in is beginning to take its

toll.

From the psychiatric standpoint this

is viewed as first sign of disintegration

of personality and loss of contact with

reality.

at this

level.

Ve may progresseresting yre this

first indicator centers around his "privacy,"

being in the

nude and is concerned with

sexual identification and his underlying

concern over this area.

At this juncture

I do not recommend any

changes in his manage-

nent [underlining is ours, other than those

briting material, chair and table in his

reading material,

writing material

He has been given reading material and

I. understand from [the principal case offi-

cerl who is aware of the above visit, that

chair, tablen the next day or so.

and cigarettes in the roon are

forthcoming

Although the psychiatrist later changed his mind

and expressed the conviction that Nosenko had been faking

his

signs of psychological deterioration' least to the

behind his assurance are not evident,

lay mind.

There have been ample studies of the effects

of isolation and sensory deprivation on human beings,

triggered in large measure by the demands of the space

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program. They are only partially relevant to Nosenko's

situation, because no experinenter in the non-Communist

world has ever attempted to impose social isolation or

other forms of deprivation on experimental subjects for

more than a few days at a tide.

(The soviets, who are

bound by fewer restrictions than we, have employed

durations of up to 60 days.)

ous researchers have obtained diverse resuits, there

while vari-

is ample evidence that certain psychological, physiolog-

ical, and behavioral impairments do indeed result

from

severe restrictions being placed on physical activity,

sensory stimulation, and social interaction; and this

generalization seens to apply to Soviets in nuch the

same way as it does to Americans.

The psychiatrist's

judgments were not doubt based in good faith on his

clinical judgment, but the question remains as to

whether the latter was not distorted by his apparent

commitmert to the cause of "breaking" Nosenko.

Thus we

are ied inevitably to the problem of whether such a

commitment is appropriate in the case of a doctor of

medicine.

C. Conclusions

The senior author of this study spent 1972 making

a study of Soviet agents-in-place.

Two of the conclusions

of that study are worth requoting

in part four years

later:

We have not always used our Agency

psychiatrists

and psychologists to best

advantage.

Then we deal with computers

Me know that we have to call on specialists

to help us, but we have a false self-confidence

in dealing

with people.

This Self-confidence

is allowable when we are dealing with people

who are normal, but unfortunately many Soviet

defectors and

willing to serve as an agent-in-place are

not psychologically normal.

require very specialized handling . ..

333

just about any Soviet who is

They therefore

• An operational death wish seemed to

overwhelm us,

as we insisted on ascribing.

every aberration of

the agent(s) to some

sinister design of the enemy. Granted that

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nissio

we must always keep

in mind the possibilit

fan agent's being under opposition coi

i genuine ve shoth ver act him beat he

aware of our suspicions.

some major operational opportunities by

violating this rule.

Car to the one ca a he role de eat ises

charge of the Nosenko case until 1967 sought assistance

of professionals from this field, as they did from

similar people in other fields, only to help shore up

certain conceptions.

paot Boon the man become acus one over tir couta

They had become accustomed over the

years to playing a subordinate support role to the

operators and had developed a "you call--we haul"

attitude that is inconsistent with the independent-

mindedness legitimately to be expected of a professional.

In addition, because of the doctrine of compartmentation,

the knowledge that the Agency's psychological/psychiatric

professionals have had to contribute has, at any given

Lime, been much less than it could and should have been.

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CHAPTER XI

Methodology and Leadership

A. Lack of Counterintelligence MethodologY

We accept without question the necessity for counter-

as a category of the intelligence

concerned with the activities of hostile powers' Provers

and clandestine activities against the United States and

our allies.

But such a discipline, if it is to fulfill

its purposes, must employ an orderly and systematic

methodology.

Unhappily, in the Nosenko case it did no

such thing.

We are forced

to conclude that,

Golitsyn, Nosenko,

chatacted CiA, the plane

Directorate and its Clandestine Service were

intellec-

tually,

A usetic sudy entered CrAl Counterintelligence

procedurally unorepared to handle

Interrogation was published by CIA in July 1963, but the

handling

of Nosenko gives no indication that any of the

Agency personnel directly involved had profited from it,

if indeed they had read it at all.

Insofar as we can

ascertain, in respect to Soviet nationals the Directorate

lacked:

1. Explicit written criteria to be applied

in evaluating the bona fides of a defector or

prospective agent.

2.

Explicit written procedures for the

collection,

analysis, and

evaluation of the

counterintelligence product of

a defector or

prospective agent.

Explicit written procedures for psycho-

logical evaluation of a defector or prospective

agent.

4. Any broadly-based systematic data base

(or systematic written procedures for employing

it, had it existed) regarding the relevant

psychological characteristics of Soviet agents.

exist some psychological data regard-

ing defectors, but they had not been collated

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and analyzed, nor were they objectively

applied to the cases of Nosenko and Golitsyn.

The latter has himself never even t: sted.

B. Influence of Chief, CI on Methodology

field he pre che Agency luend 1975 has oue erin chige ce.

His reputation for expertise rested on his purportedly

unique knowledge of the KGB's worldwide covert political

In truth, no

one could compete with him as an expert

on this subject.

His analyses, based on fragmentary and

often inapplicable data, were more imaginative than

systenatic and therefore neither easily comprehended nor

replicated by his interlocutors.

But unlike the Emperor

and his imaginary clothes, Chief, CI's fantasies were never

vulnerable to objective examination,

simply because he

surrounded such data

as existed with a wall of secrecy.

His "facts" were available in full only to a minimum number

of trusted apostles; to

the rest of the intelligence con-

nunity, both American and foreign, he doled them out

selectively--seldom in written form--to prove whatever

point he was trying to make at the time.

Chief, CI's preference for oral over written communica-

tion is worth enphasizing.

During his incumbency as its

chief, the cl Staff, though it supposedly had in its

possession information concerning a horrendous hazard to

both the United States

and its allies, never committed to

paper any complete, written, documented report on the sub-

ject.

Therefore, the threat could never be systematically

analyzed and evaluated.

Only when Chief, CI finally departed

did dispassionate analysis of CI Staff's data holdings

finally becone possible,

and these have consistently failed

to support his central claims regarding the KGB's massive

influence in world affairs.

C.

Impact of Faulty Counterintelligence on Positive Intelli-

gence Collection

There is an important interrelationship between coun

terintelligence, as it was conducted in the 1960s,

collection of positive intelligence from human sourcesin

Only if this relationship is spelled out can the full

pact of the events we have been describing be comprehended.

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At the time CIA was established, the primary mission

of what was later to become the Plans Directorate's

Clandestine Service was conceived to be the collection

of strategically-significant intelligence from clandestine

human sources.

How successful was the Clandestine Service

in fulfilling this mission?

Agency claims of success in the human-source col-

lection field have often

been so phrased, whether inten-

tionally of not, as to give the impression that our

achievements stemmed largely from the process called

"development and recruitment."

The inpression that we

"recruited" our best

Soviet and liarsaw Pact sources fol-

lowing a period of orderly development nust be dispelled,

before there can be meaningful discussion of previously

described deficiencies.

In nost major Soviet cases prior

to 1970%developed" the Americans.

it might be more nearly correct to say that the

sources

In the case of

Penkovskiy, to cite an extrene exanple, US officials made

even the latter process so outrageously difficult for him

that he had to write a letter to both the Queen of

England and President Eisenhower in order finally to

achieve a clandestine working relationship with the British

and American intelligence services:

If our most significant positive intelligence and

much of our most significant counterintelligence from

human sources have come from Soviet or other Warsaw Pact

lationals who volunteered their services, why did we

Fail to systematize their handling more fully?

Even more

to the point within the framework of the present study,

why would we not give such persons the benefit of every

reasonable doubt rather than treat then with suspicion

and, in the cases of Nosenko and

inhumanity?

D. What Went Wrong?

Nonetheless,

those one to ge and the settle say he tehe obe

the problen

and permit the fornulation of constructive

recommendations.for future action.

The leaders of the Clandestine Service in its first

quarter century were, for the most part, people who had

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emerged from World War II

than

contemplation.

"Chiet, CI was almost unique in his

interest in long-range analysis.

Within the Clandestine

Service, his generation was in general suspicious of

theory and ill-prepared in most cases to cope with it.

On the other hand, the best of the Service's leaders

--and there were many

good ones--were successful because

they possessed a difficult-to-define quality called com-

mon sense.

Its value should not be underestimated.

For

example

when Penkovskiy was producing strategic intelli-

gence that remains of value to this day, it was the com-

mon sense of these other

leaders that led them

to resist

Chief, CI's

tion

allegation that Penkovskiy was a "disinforma-

agent."

Nevertheless,

senior Clandestine Service supervisors

of the period 1948-1970 had seldom thenselves been trained

in rigorous analytic techniques, and thus they s+1dom

were in a position to demand high standards of analysis

of their subordinates.

Until the massive outflow of

retirees in recent years changed the demography of the

Service, most senior operational supervisors had received

their higher educations before systematized analysis be-

came routine even

in such "soft"

subjects as political

science (for which

knowledge of

inferential statistics

is now required at most universities).

Many, probably

nost, Of these same gentlemen were also educated during a

sort

of interregnum

in academe, when the study of classica

logic had passed from vogue but had not yet been replaced

by emphasis on scientific method.

In the realm of

technology, almost all senior executives in the Clandestine

Service before 1970 had finished college before the first

digital computer,

an invaluable

analytical tool, became

commercially available about 1951.

There also have been, of course, a number of bright

spots.

Some of the Plans

Directorate's divisions and

staffs had subordinate components that specialized in sub-

stantive intelligence and built up great expertise on

specific subjects over the years.

From time to time

there were also bursts of enthusiasm for the use of

psychological evaluation techniques in the assessment

of prospective agents.

But these cases were exceptions;

primary reliance within the Clandestine Service was on

judgments that, though sometimes bolstered by impressive

figures and

arcane terminology, were nevertheless essentially

intuitive and non-systematic.

tige

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Such systems and criteria as did exist were

largely in the heads of various individuals, ana there

is no evidence of any appreciable long-term

consensus

among the latter.

Every defector

case tended to be

subject to the vagaries of the momentary line-up of

CIA leadership.

The existence of an

Interagency

Defector Committee, subordinate to the DDP, introduced

some uniformity of

approach,

but its concerns were

limited for the most part to superficial administrative

and procedural formalities.

Summary

If we seem to have wandered far afield from the

nature and validity of methodology of previous Nosenko

bona fides studies, we have done so because the unfortunate

handling of Nosenko vas not an isolated event. Rather,

it was symptomatic ot some fundamental inadequacies of

Plans Directorate.

What this means

to us is that the

the

long-needed improvement in our conduct of counterintelli-

gence activity, now well underway, must be carried on

within the framework of a searching reexamination of the

analytical techniques employed by the Directorate and its

Clandestine Service.

Whatever the course taken, however, we believe that

the last quarter of this century is going to be

even more

than the past twenty-

exigent, though in a different w the implications of this

five years.

We therefore sum up

chapter by posing a single question:

How can we ensure

that the upcoming generation of Clandestine Service leaders

is better prepared intellectually to meet the challenges

that face them than were those who ran the Service in

the sixties?

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CHAPTER XII

Conclusions and Recommendations

A.

The Letter of Instructions

You are tasked to write an analysis of the

Nosenko case which will address the following

matters:

(1]. The bona fides of Nosenko.

the united Steal Nose soner

ments.

The relationship and

significance o reostion to other

agents and operations.

[4).

The identification of unex-

Informa Nosenko penetration leads and

[5). The nature and validity of

nethodology of previous Nosenko bona

fides studies.

Liberally,

Nay, ecause tee came above sepo sibiliates sather

the Nosenko case have proven more far-reaching than we,

and probably the framers of the above letter,

Nonetheless, we shall commence this concluding chapter

with responses to the matters covered in sub-paragraphs

a. through e.

.1. Bona Fides

Doubts regarding Nosenko's bona fides were of

our own making.

Had the job of initially assessing

him as a person, as well as of gathering and evaluating

the intelligence he had to offer, been handled

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properly, he could have been declared a bona fide

defector

as readily

as have many other Soviet in-

telligence officers.

This is not to say that we can be certain of

the genuineness

any defector.

It will always

remain hypothetically possible

that the Soviet

acting through the KGB or some other

Patient i agent or prospective enor razood

"disinformation

of our government on our doorstep.

But the useful-

ness

of the Soviets' doing

so, in the manner

as-

cribed to them

in the Nosenko

case, is probably as

slight. as

is the feasibility.

Soviet success in

using native-born citizens of other countries to

spy on their own homelands has been considerable.

there is no record of the USSR's suc-

non-Communist power by use of an acknowledged

Soviet citizen,

least of all one whose career has

been spent in a Soviet intelligence or security

service.

We therefore conclude that Nosenko was from

the beginning a

bona fide defector.

2. Value of Nosenko

Nosenko's contribution has been summarized in

Chapter IV.

He has been of great value, but he

probably could have been even more valuable had he

been properly handled.

3. Relationship to Other Agents and Operations

As was made clear in Chapters X and XI, the

Nosenko case, through no fault of the defector him-

self, had a most unfortunate effect on all clandestine

operations in the Soviet field.

4.

Identification of Unexploited Leads

We have not felt that this subject was one we

could feasibly or properly investigate.

To do so

would have meant delving into the past and current

operations of both the SE Division and the CI Staff

to ascertain the extent to which there might have

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been "exploitation" of any of the hundreds of

persons whom Nosenko identified by name.

Time

would not have permitted us to accomplish this

task, nor would our doing so have been consistent

with

the principle of compartmentation.

5. Methodology

It has been made clear in Chapter XI that the

variety of techniques used in handling Nosenko did

tor methodology senerally accepted sense of the

B. Recommended Action

Most of our recommendations for action have been

previously stated or implied.

In the following para-

graphs, we

recapitulate them, with such supplementary

remarks as seem necessary.

1. Examination of the Role of Professionals

We recommend that the role that can properly be

played within the Agency by members of the organized

professions--medicine, psychiatry, psychology, law,

and others--be given careful study, within the con-

text of (a) ensuring that the Agency puts their skills

to the best possible use,

and (b)

refraining from in-

volving them in matters not properly within their

professional purview.

2. Improvement of Intellectual Standards

We recommend that the Operations Directorate,

and its Clandestine Service, take whatever steps

are possible to ensure that

the intellectual caliber

of their personnel is equal to the exigencies of the

We realize that the present personnel selection

system

sets high standards for

those entering on

duty at the professional level, particularly as

regards IQ and education.

But the

standards presently

in force do not by themselves guarantee that future

selections will possess independence of mind, analytical

ability, and objectivity.

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4.

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In the case of personnel already on board,

it should be kept in mind that we live in a

rapidly-evolving, technologically-oriented

civilization.

Knowledge and intellectual

skills adequate at this time may be inadequate

a tew years from now.

For an intelligence or-

ganization, we define "inadequate" as anything

that is less than the best.

We suggest that a board of expert consultants

be established,

drawn primarily from research in-

and the

academic one recommend a proprises screenens

academic world

new entrants and improving the analytical skills

of those already on duty, with the aim of achiev-

ing and maintaining a high level of intellectual

excellence throughout the Operations Directorate.

Detection of Deception

We recommend that high priority be accorded a

program to develop new methods of detecting deception.

Some steps are already underway in this regard,

but they should be extended and given greater

emphasis.

Present methods, based mainly on the use

of the polygraph, are clearly obsolete.

Specific criteria of bona fides will follow

naturally from improved methods of detecting deception.

Psychological Aspects of Defector/Agent Handling and

Personnel Selection

We recommend a multi-track program of psychologi-

cal research, geared specifically to the Operations

Directorate's needs, to develop a new generation of

personality assessment techniques necessary for both

detector/agent handling and selection of DDO person-

nel. This program should be under direct DDO control.

A surprising amount of relevant expertise now

exists within the Agency,

and some valuable research

is underway,

but it is not being geared to DDO's

needs to the extent it could be.

Instead, it is

being handled by another directorate, which currently

accords it a low priority.

mad.

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0082

It is theoretically possible to establish,

within the reasonably near future, certain

reasurable physiological correlates of a numbe

of personality types.

It is also theoretically quite possible,

though not yet demonstrated,

that by establishing

such physiological correlates we could take much

of the guesswork out of personality evaluation.

Ne would thus substantially reduce the threat that

the employment of unstable or anti-social personalities

for the Agency, and particularly for the

• Operations Directorate.

5. Psychological Assessment of Agents and Defectors

We recommend early, systematic psychological

evaluation, by clinical

psychologists using standardized

measurement techniques, of all denied area agents,

as well as defectors from the denied areas.

recommend against dependence on psychiatric examina-

tions, unless the psychiatrists are willing to use

the same standardized instruments as the psychologists

Although few, if any, of the Soviet of Soviet

Bloc agents to whom we have had direct and continuing

access have ever been tested as long as they remained

in agent status, we do not accept as valid the reasons

Implenentation of this recommendation would,

if the other programs above-recommended are also car-

ried out, contribute substantially toward authentica-

tion of agent sources and information.

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