Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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176-10036-10076

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA

RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10076

RECORD SERIES : National Security Files

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA

FROM :

TO :

TITLE : Indian Role in Vietnam

DATE : 7/12/1961

PAGES : 4

SUBJECTS :

DOCUMENT TYPE :

CLASSIFICATION :

RESTRICTIONS :

CURRENT STATUS :

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000

OPENING CRITERIA :

• COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 193: Vietnam General 7/27/1961-

7/31/1961. Box 1

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O

STONEST

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Office.of Current Intelligence

27 July 1961

MEMORANDUM

INDIAN ROLE IN VIETNAM

1. Two concepts color Indian thinking on divided

Vietnam: colonialism and balance of power. While New

Delhi has modified its outlook considerably since it

became directly involved in the Indochina problem in

1954, these old preoccupations

still strongly influence

Indian views.

2. The Saigon and Hanoi regimes have little sub-

stance in Indian eyes; they are regarded as instruments

of the Cold War powers. New Delhi finds it difficult to

accept South Vietnam as a bona fide member of the inde-

pendent Asian community, viewing US influence--no matter

how well-meaning-as a vestige of Western imperialism.

Moreover, Dien is not progressive enough for Indian tastes.

Ho Chih Minh was long regarded as more representative of

the mainstream of Vietnamese nationalism, but in recent

years New Delhi has come to regard North Vietnam also as

subject to colonial control--in the form of a new Chinese

imperialism.

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3.

Of more immediate importance in Indian policy-

making is New Delbi's assessment of Vietnam as a Cold War

battleground where a local war could quickly involve all

of Asia. As in the case of Laos and the Congo, the Indian

Government relates conditions and developments in Vietnam

to the East West struggle and generally responds in accord-

ance with its overriding objective of reducing world tension.

The result is a kind of balancing act, in which Indian

representatives attempt arbitrarily to maintain an equilib-

rium between the opposing sides by preventing either from

gaining a decisive advantage over the other.

4. Nowhere is this policy better illustrated than in

the performance of Indian chairmen of the ICC for Vietnam,

on which Canada and Poland are also represented. India's

action, or more often inaction, in connection with in-

spection and control of violations of the 1954 Geneva accords

is often viewed as support of the Communist position. It

would be more accurate to describe Indian policy as support

for neither side, but aid offered alternately as needed to

keep the scales in balance. It is probably a futile exercise

to try to find logic in the Indian chairman's fuzzy arguments

and phony explanations. The present representative, Gopala

Menon, an unimpressive functionary who is long on promises

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and short on performance, is probably more interested in

following Indian policy than in making sense. Frequently

it is assumed, probably erroneously, that Indian representa-

tives who act this way lack specific instructions from

New Delhi and are free-wheeling.. Nehru does give a few

individuals considerable latitude, as in the case of

Krishna Menon, but they appear to be exceptions.

According

to the Indochina desk officer in the Indian Ministry of

External Affairs, the government keeps in close touch with

its ICC representatives to reduce free-wheeling; the chair-

man in Vietnam once told his Canadian colleagues that every

decision he made had the consent of Nehru. New Delhi is

neither naive nor uninformed on these matters, although

there is some evidence it is sometimes misinformed by

representatives trying to justify their actions.

5. The key to understanding Indian behavior in Vietnam

lies in New Delhi's interpretation of its role as ICC chair-

man. By their own admission, ministry officials see the

Indian representative's mission as one of reconciliation, not

participation as an active third party ruling solely on the

facts as he sees them. These officials are equally frank to

admit their belief that both the Hestern and Communist parties

try to use the ICC to advance their own aims. Furthermore,

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the Indians consider that in the absence of sanctions

the ICC is powerless to accomplish anything without the

full cooperation of both sides.

6.

The recent adoption by Indian officials of a nore

cooperative attitude toward problems in Vietnam suggests

that New Delhi may be taking a less detached and--from our

viewpoint-more realistic approach to a deteriorating

situation. While this could be intended merely to re-

dress the balance upset by recent bloc gains, there is

little question that Chinese Communist pressure along

India's own frontier has greatly sharpened New Delhi's

appreciation of Peiping's ambitions. Indians fully share

the US objective of securing genuine independence for the

nations of Southeast Asia, but, convinced that freedom

cannot be "imposed from outside," they expect serious dif-

ferences to arise over tactics. As long as India sits on

the ICC between two firmly "aligned" powers, it seems

unlikely to forsake its accustomed mediatory role despite

a growing realization of the long-run threat to Indian

interests in Southeast Asia.

SECRET

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