CUBA: THE MOVEMENT OF SUBVERSIVES AND SUBVERSIVE TRAINEES
Agency: ARMY
Originator: JCS
To: MR. VANCE
Document date: 03/00/1963
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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198-10007-10028

JFK Assassination System

Identification Form

Agency Information

Date:

6/24/201

AGENCY:

ARMY

RECORD NUMBER :

198-10007-10028

RECORD SERIES :

CALIFANO PAPERS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER:

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :

FROM:

TO :

TITLE:

JCS

MR. VANCE

CUBA: THE MOVEMENT OF SUBVERSIVES AND SUBVERSIVE TRAINEES

DATE: 03/00/1963

PAGES: 19

SUBJECTS:

CUBAN SUBVERSIVES - IMPEDIMENT TO TRAVEL

DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION: Secret

RESTRICTIONS: 1B; 4

CURRENT STATUS : Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 04/09/1998

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS: Califano Papers, Box 3, Folder 11. Report entitled, "Cuba: the Movement of Subversives and

Subversive Trainees.

JFKRavian

Department of the Army EO 13528

Da Declassity E Exclude = Exempt

Authority_

• Refer To -

Review Date/S/U615 Bille

v9.1

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Au. Varu

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reflect meeting

with pres, on Much 8)

CUBA

THE MOVEMENT OF SUBVERSIVES

AND SUBVERSIVE TRAINEES

APPROVED BY THE PRESIDENT

ON 8 MAR 63, (SEE STATUS

OF IMPLEMENTATION TAB B)

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Introduction

II. Nature and Scope of the Problem.

III. The Attitudes of the Latin American Nations---

IV. Actions Concerning Legitimate Travel---

1. Immediate Impact Actions-

a.. Administrative Actions-

b. Intelligence Actions

c. Actions

Related to Common Carriers-

a. Propaganda Actions--

2. Longer Range Actions-

a: Political Actions-

b. Intelligence Actions

c. Administrative Actions

d. Actions Related to Common Carriers-

e: Propaganda Actions-

3. Organization of American States (OAS) Actions-

V. Actions Concerning Illegal Travel---

1. Immediate Impact Actions-

a. Intelligence Actions-

b. Surveillance and Reporting Actions-

2. Longer Range Actions-

a. Surveillance Actions-

b. US Military Assistance Actions

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CUBA

THE MOVEMENT OF SUBVERSIVES AND SUBVERSIVE TRAINEES

I. Introduction

The actions proposed herein are designed to impede

the flow of subversives between Cuba and other Latin

American countries.

Execution of any one or more of

the enumerated actions will ameliorate the situation;

execution of them all will not completely solve it;

The practical problems involved are too numerous and

complex.

With respect to diminishing legal travel to Cuba,

face multiple problems in the policies and attitudes

those Latin American countries through which the

subversive traveller must pass.

From the viewpoint of

these nations the direct actions required have strong

political and sometimes legal implications - impli-

cations

which cannot be overcome easily, even when

the leaders of these countries choose to do so.

In the matter of clandestine travel, we are

confronted not only with the great depth of communist

guile, born of two generations of experience in the

international movement of subversives, but with the

inexperience, ineptitude and lack of awareness in

these same matters on the part of the Latin American

community.

In spite of this, the advantages do not all reside

with the communists Cuba's insular character imposes

certain sharp limitations upon personal movement.

Cuba has no frontiers with other states; everyone

who enters the country must do so either by water:

or air.

There can be no slipping through the

barbed wire.

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On the other hand, this same geographic situation

makes clandestine entry and exit reasonably simple.

There are 3,825 linear miles of essentially unpa-

trolled Central American coastline, within 175 to

850 miles from Cuba.

There are at

least 93 airfields,

other than ours, within 700 miles of the island, and

the ships and craft indigenous to the Caribbean, and

capable of supporting the subversive ebb and flow,

number well into the thousands.

Even in the face of these unfavorable factors, a

program of direct restraints, selected from among

the actions enumerated herein, can have favorable

effects.

Under the proposed

steps some travel would

be stopped completely.

More - probably much more -

would be rendered difficult. Some hitherto legal

movement would be driven underground. Previous

clandestine movement would be impeded, complicated

and harassed to the point where it becomes more

costly, more uncertain, more hazardous and thus,

hopefully, less extensive.

II. Nature and Scope of the Problem

We do not know enough about the movement of

subversive trainees, into Cuba and - more important -

out of cuba.

not know enough about the volume

of travel, or the media employed

This is par-

ticularly true in the area of illicit traffic, where

our knowledge is extremely limited.

Regarding legal travel to Cuba, CIA presents the

following estimate:

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Legal Travel Into Cuba

Country No. of Legal Travellers

Country No.

of Legal Travellers

1962

Mexico

Jan-Feb

1963

969

1962

Jan-Feb

1963

4912*

80

Argentina

500

Unk

Guatemala

El Salvador 100

Unk.

Uruguay

8

Paraguay

115

60

Unk

Unk

Nicaragua

Costa Rica

50

216

Unk

Brazil

400

Unk.

Venezuela

200

10

Unk

Honduras

92

40

21

Colombia

400

Unk

British

Guiana

Panama

Unk

56

Ecuador

208

Unk

Trinidad

Unk

Unk

Peru

181

Unk

Jamaica

593

Unk

Bolivia

500

Unk

Chile

551

85

Dominican

Republic

Haiti

None

Unk

Unk

Unk

* In transit, including about 300 Mexicans

While some of these travellers proceeded to Cuba by

other routes, the great majority passed through Mexico,

to some one nee

On the most conservative basis, then, it will be seen

that there cannot have been fewer than 4,912 travellers

to Cuba during 1962, while the average monthly number

passing through Mexico for the first two months of

1963 is even higher than the 1962 monthly average.

Of the total number visiting cuba,

the Central

Intelligence Agency estimates

that at least 1,500, and

perhaps as many as 2,000, have received ideological

indoctrination or guerrilla warfare training.

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of these are still in Cuba.

Others have returned to

their homelands; some by legal means; some probably

by illicit means,. There is no reason to presume,.

moreover, that the travel to cuba of the remaining

3,000-3,500 was entirely consistent with the best

interests of the hemisphere.

Prior to the October crisis, Latin Americans

travelling to Cuba usually moved by regular commercial

airlines or, on occasion, by specially chartered

Cubana flights, Some travelled to Trinidad or

Curacao and thence by regularly scheduled Cubana or

KIM flights to Havana. Others travelled to Mexico,

and from there by Mexicana or Cubana commercial

flights to Havana.

With the cessation of service

to Cuba by Pan American, KIM, Mexicana, and Iberia

airlines in October, the regular Cubana service

between Mexico City and Havana remained the sole

direct and regular airline connection between Cuba

and the remainder of Latin America,

The Cubana service between Havana and Mexico 1s

scheduled to operate twice weekly, but sometimes only

a single flight is completed per week. Aircraft now

employed are British Britannias - an obsolescent model.

Cubana has requested, but has not yet received,

Mexican approval to

substitute Soviet IL-18 transports

for the old Britannias:

Delay by the Mexicans in

granting this approval can have the favorable effect

of impeding travel, as the Britannias are now in

poor condition.

If, in addition, the British and

' Canadians can be induced to suspend delivery of

spare parts, the planes will soon become inoperative.

Iberia airlines

resumed its regular twice-monthly

flights from Madrid to Havana on 11 February.

This

flight makes one stop, in the Azores, before reaching

Havana.

KIM has not yet resumed its regular flights to Cuba

from the Netherlands Antilles. However, it is now con

sidering doing so. In this regard it 1s concluded

that

resumption of scheduled flights by a United States

carrier could serve as an encouragement to KIM and

others to do the same.

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Soviet and Czech airlines serving Cuba do not stop

regularly at any other Latin American country, though

the Soviet Aeroflot line has occasionally sought and

received permission from Brazil to land at Recife,

enroute to Cuba

travelled to Cuba on these infrequent flights and,

should Brazil permit this arrangement to become

regularized, the movement of subversives could

achieve a new order of magnitude.

A Canadian non-scheduled line has operated a few

flights from Canada to Havana and return, carrying

both material and personnel. The Canadians have been

unresponsive to our efforts to obtain identification

of the passengers.

There are no regularly scheduled sea carriers

operating between Latin America and Cuba. However,

a number of trainees from British Guiana have

travelled to Cuba aboard unscheduled Cuban merchant

vessels engaged in transporting rice from Guiana to

Cuba.

Clandestine sources report that transit of Latin

Americans through Mexico to Cuba often involves 1llicit

procedures.

The Cuban embassy in Mexico City provides

the travellers, whom they identify as tourists, with

special Cuban entry papers; no entry is made in their

passports, and they are given pseudonyms for travel

out of and into Mexico.

This procedure is obviously

designed to impede any effort by the other Latin

American governments subsequently to identify the

travellers and to exercise surveillance over their

activities upon their return

Evidence at hand portrays a substantial flow of

travel by legal means.

This must be countered

directly. Beyond this, and perhaps of greater

importance, is the problem of 1llic1t movement both

into and out of Cuba, which will undoubtedly assume

growing proportions

as legal travel is curtailed,

and about which our intelligence is at present most

limited.

Elimination of this intelligence void must

be accorded high priority.

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I11. The Attitudes of the Latin American Nations

Success of many of the overt actions proposed in

the sections to follow will turn upon the attitudes

of the Latin American nations within whose borders

the restraining actions must take place.

Presented

briefly below is an estimate of what can be expected

from the various sectors of latin America in terms

of participation in a coordinated program of travel

control

As a general matter, the imposition of controls

on travel is not popular with the public in any Latin

American country

This, coupled with their current

lack of full awareness of the danger represented by

Cuba's training of subversives, will diminish the

willingness of some governments to impose controls

unilaterally. This is especially true since they

recognize that unilateral restraints will have little

effect on curbing the travel of their nationals to

Cuba, if supporting multilateral action is not also

taken. It is likely, however;

that most of the

Latin American countries would respond favorably --

albeit in varying degrees -- to US leadership In

seeking to reduce the flow of persons to Cuba for

ideological or subversive training.

The Central American countries are more acutely

aware of the danger posed by Cuban-inspired sub-

version than is Iatin America at large, and can be

ducing travel to Cuba which President Kennedy might

present at the San Jose Presidential meeting.

However, their ability to carry out commitments which

they may make will be limited by domestic legal

and political considerations, as well as by their

countries' technical incompetence in such matters.

Since Mexico is currently the principal

hemisphere transit point for legal travel of sub-

versives to and from Cuba, its attitude 1s of great

importance Mexico, to date, has taken several

significant steps with respect to travel between

Mexican cities and Cuba. It has instituted close

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surveillance over travellers, to include stamping.

passports to evidence travel

to Cuba. In addition,

the Mexicans now photograph, covertly, all persons

arriving from or departing for Cuba, and have given

tacit approval to suspension of Cuban service by

Compania Mexicana de Aviacion (CMA) •

These actions

all suggest that Mexico might be induced to take even

further cooperative steps, particularly on an un-

publicized, bi-lateral basis, wherein the political

hazards of taking a public OAS position are not

involved. In this regard, the

• Central American

Presidents would probably agree individually to seek

the participation of President Lopez Mateos of Mexico

In specific cooperative moves to restrict the flow

of persons to Cuba through that country.

Peru now has regulations which actually prohibit

travel to Cuba, but the regulations have engendered

public resistance, and are not enforced.

Dominican Republic prohibits such travel. Haiti

has no established policy, but passports and exit

permits are reportedly issued only on the personal

approval of President Duvalier, Colombia could

legally impose restrictions by executive decree,

but has shown no inclination to do so.

countries, such as Venezuela, Chile, and the Central

American

nations, plead the existence of legal or

constitutional barriers which preclude the pro-

hibition of travel to cuba, but thus far, they

have made little effort to remove these barriers.

Five Latin American countries (Brazil, Chile,

Uruguay, Mexico, and Bolivia) now maintain diplomatic

relations with Cuba. Brazil continues its drift to

the: left and gives little evidence of modifying its

tolerant attitude toward the Castro government.

Chile, with a legal Communist Party, exercises no

restraints on travel to Cuba, either direct or

The elimination of all legitimate passenger

service to Cuba from

Latin America could be

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achieved through invocation of the Rio Treaty, but it

is unlikely that the hemisphere countries would agree

to do so in the absence of

some

major crisis similar

to that involving the Soviet missiles or a case of

direct Cuban intervention in another Latin American

country. Nevertheless, a campaign on our part to

develop a full awareness of the danger represented

by the flow of Castro-trained subversives would

probably create a growing willingness to take action

oriented in this direction.

In this connection,

however, it is concluded that resumption of regular

passenger service to Cuba by United States companies

would render more difficult our efforts to persuade

Latin American and other free world countries to

take a grave view of the situation, and to partici-

pate in dynamic action.

Virtually, all the Latin American countries would

be willing to move against Cuban-trained subversives

upon their return to home countries, once they put

their new training to use.

The efforts of these

nations will not be dramatically effective, however,

since, in the area of internal security, all of them

from deficiencies in technical skill, training,

equipment and sometimes from a lack of a sense of

urgency

these deficiencies.

IV. Actions Concerning Legitimate Travel

Listed below are specific actions contemplated to

impede legitimately executed travel, to and from Cuba.

Legitimate travel is characterized, for this purpose,

as travel on recognized public carriers, openly

arranged and involving travel documents which are

presumed to be in proper order. Certain of the

actions, it will be noted, are partially in effect.

Others have been proposed

to the OAS - wholly or in

part - by its Special Consultative Committee on

Security.

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1. Immediate Impact Actions

The following actions offer promise of producing

early, visible and effective results.

a. Administrative Actions

(1) Both through the OAS and bilaterally, induce

each

Western Hemisphere country to:

(a) Stamp passports or other travel

documents issued to

for travel

to Cuba. " Own nationals

"not valid

(b) Refuse exit permits for Cuba to any

national of a third country who cannot produce

a valid permit issued by his own country for

travel to Cuba.

(c) Refuse to honor any visa for Cuba which

is not an integral, non-detachable part of the

travel document issued by the country of which

the traveller is a citizen.

(d) Require accurate manifests of all carriers

departing for or arriving from Cuba, and furnish

copies of these manifests to diplomatic missions

of other Western Hemisphere countries which are

affected.

(2) Persuade Mexico to fingerprint, in addition

to photographing, all persons leaving for or

arriving from Cuba, and to provide data to the par-

ent country of the nationals involved.

(3) Make covert arrangements with police and

other

security and administrative officials in

countries now being used for legal transit to Cuba

to impose administrative impediments and harassment

on suspicious Cuba-bound travellers, in order to

increase the difficulty of travel and thus dis-

courage prospective

travellers.

b. Intelligence Actions

(1) Intensify U.S. intelligence efforts in

each

country to identify persons who have travelled,

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or intend to travel, to Cuba, and report selected.

information promptly to the host government, as

consistent with our own intelligence pro-

gram, and the requirement to protect our sources.

(2) Intensify current efforts to introduce

Inter the cuban training program.

U.S. - controlled agents from each country

c.. Actions Related to Common Carriers

(2) Expand current restrictions on foreign

shipping engaging in commerce with Cuba by

losing United States ports to all snips of

any shipping line which continyes to send any

ships to Cuban ports.

(3) Both through the OAs and bilateratly, request

atin American countries to prohibit ships arrivir

rom or departing for tuba from embarking or disem-

barking passengers in their ports.

(4) Both through the OAS and bilaterally,

request Latin American countries to deny their

ports to ships of Cuban registry.

d. Propaganda Actions

Pursue a hemisphere wade pullbelty campaign

to expose the scope and purpose of Cuban training

of the nationals of other countries for sub-

versive purposes, in order to discourage pro-

spective trainees and impress the governments

and the peoples concerned with the urgent

need to halt the travel of Latin American

nationals to Cuba.:

2. Longer Range Actions

The following actions should also be undertaken

without delay. Their ultimate results may be of

far-

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reaching importance, but probably will be longer in

realization.

a. Political Actions

(1) Renew and intensify bilateral negotrations

11th the fire Latin American governments whicl

ave got done so to sever diplomatic relavion with

(2) Through bilateral negotiations press countries

with inadequate legal restrictions on travel to

Cuba to adopt laws enabling the prohibition of such

travel and providing severe penalties for evasion.

Recommend that rewards be offered for identification

of evaders.

(3) In separate diplomatic approaches to each

country, reiterate the need for full and effective

cooperation with appropriate OAS bodies, and bi

laterally among the several states, in the inter

change of information concerning travel of persons

to Cuba and other Castro-Communist subversive

activities.

(4) Propose periodic regional or sub-regional

meetings of ministers of Government of the

American Republics to review the implementation

of steps taken by them to combat movement of

subversives in the Caribbean.

(5) Urge other Latin American nations to

negotiate separately and/or collectively with Mexico

Uruguay, Brazil, Bolivia and Chile in order to en-

list cooperation in adopting specific measures to

prevent the movement through their countries of

third country personnel to and from Cuba.

b. Intelligence Actions

Intensify our action in making available to each

country selected intelligence concerning the extent,

nature, and indiaus» implications, of Cuban sub-

versive activities, as consistent with the require-

ment to protect our own intelligence program.

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c. Administrative Actions

(1) Encourage Latin American governments to Insti-

tute administrative procedures, such as exhaustive

examination of manifests, air-worthiness checks of

aircraft, baggage inspection and inspection of health

and other documents, all designed deliberately to

delay and otherwise make difficult the carrying of

passengers to Cuba.

(2) Request governments of Latin American countries

which persist in maintaining diplomatic relations

with Cuba to expose the falsification of travel docu-

ments by Cuban embassies or consulates, and take

punitive measures, such as the expulsion of Cuban

diplomatic personnel, to bring such illegal activity

to a halt. Provide U.S. technical assistance as re-

quested.

(3) Intensify technical assistance to Latin

American countries in improving immigration and

customs controls.

d. Actions Related to Common Carriers

(1) Persuade Mexico to halt Cubana Airlines

service.

If unable to do so, seek to persuade

Mexico to refuse

craft in the Havana-Mexico City route on technical

grounds.

the Havana- Mexico C

the introduction of Soviet-made air-

This will create an obstacle to Cubana,

since the Britannia aircraft now used are falling

into disrepair.

(2) Request again of Great Britain, Canada, and

any other potential suppller that they cut off the

supply of spare parts for Cuba's Britannia aircraft.

(3) Conduct negotiations with the Netherlands,

Mexico, Canada and Spain to persuade those countries

to stop, or refrain from reestablishing, commercial

air flights to Cuba.

Enlist the cooperation of

other Western Hemisphere countries normally pro-

viding terminal service for any of the airlines in-

volved, such as Venezuela and Trinidad, in applying

pressure.

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e. Propaganda Actions

(1) Intensify USIA and CIA input of propaganda

in Latin American public information media discredit-

ing the cuban training effort, exposing the hazard

which it holds for Latin American tranquility, and

aiscrediting persons who have undergone subversive

training, in order to discourage possible volunteers

and develop popular opposition to such

activities

(2) Identify returned trainees who are dis-

satisfied with their Cuban training experience and

exploit their capabilities for provision of intelli-

gence and propaganda material for exposing and

discrediting Castro-Communist subversive activities.

(3) Initiate a publicity campaign throughout

Latin America, not attributable to the United States,

which focuses

unfavorably on the use of Mexican,

Uruguayan, Brazilian, and Chilean transit facilities

for movement of persons of other countries to and

from Cuba for subversive purposes.

3. Organization of American States (OAS) Actions

In view of the important political, psychological,

and, hopefully, material benefits to be derived from

any success achieved through the OAs in combatting

Cuban subversive activity, the following measures

should be undertaken by the United States in that body,

at times and under circumstances which give regard to

the need to preserve hemispheric solidarity, and give

recognition to the fact that progress will probably

be slow.)

a. Pursue adoption by the sas of a resolation

and at the game

creating secious obstacles to other related

Cuban subversive activities.

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?

b, Propose recommendations by the OAS to member

governments of a program of steps, on both the

national and international levels, to control

travel by their nationals to Cuba, utilizing the

proposals in the report by the Special Consultative

Committee on Security (SCCS) as well as the specific

recommendations set forth herein.

c. Once the initial comprehensive program in

b, above is undertaken, utilize the appropriate

OAs bodies to follow up on implementation through

such means as multilateral exchange of information,

meeting of experts, and utilization by individual

countries of the services of the Special Consulta-

tive Committee on

security,

da Propose adoption by the OAs of a resolution,

binding upon all member states, to terminate

regular air and maritime carrier traffic with

Cuba:

V. Actions Concerning Illegal Travel

As the actions outlined in the preceding sections

become effective, one of the results will be to force

the hitherto legal travel into clandestine channels i

It may, therefore, be expected that measures to

Impede

11legal movement will acquire steadily 1n-

creasing importance.

The steps proposed herein are listed, as in the

preceding section, in terms of immediate Impact pro-

Jects which promise early and visible results, and

longer range projects which, while of great importance,

cannot be expected to mature as rapidly.

1. Immediate Impact Actions

a. Intelligence Actions

(1) Increase greatly our penetration and

other intelligence efforts to identify persons

engaging in Illegal travel to Cuba, and

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determine routes and methods employed.

Report

selected information, consistent with the

requirement for protecting our own intelligence

program, to host government.

(2) Utilize US intelligence capabilities to

determine the nature and extent of clandestine

aircraft and

small boat traffic between Cuba and

other countries in the Caribbean area, with

special attention to Mexico, Honduras, Jamaica,

Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Use evidence

obtained to persuade governments

concerned to

institute surveillance and other control measures.

bi Surveillance and Reporting Actions

(1) Continue current US sea and air sur-

veillance of the Caribbean area contiguous to

Cuba.,

(2) Continue the development, at high

priority, of us communications in Latin America,

in order to improve alerting, reporting and

control capabilities.

(3) Establish intelligence centers at

STUDY:

Caribbean Command and Caribbean Sea Frontier

FEASIAN Headquarters for rapid processing and dissemi-

Desirablitor subversives.

nation to countries concerned via the American

Ambassadors, of intelligence on the movement

2. Longer Range Actions

a. Surveillance Actions

(1) Establish a coordinated Caribbean sur-

veillance system involving:

(a) Continued close-in surveillance of

Cuba by US forces.

(b) A US military alerting system, by

which intelligence of subversive movement will

be rapidly transmitted to the American

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STUDY

Ambassadors to countries concerned through

intelligence centers at Caribbean Command

and Caribbean Sea Frontier Headquarters of

the Atlantic Commande

(c) A unilateral surveillance and inter-

ception effort by each country in its

territorial waters

(a) US assistance in final interception

in territorial waters, upon request by the

country concerned.

b, US Military Assistance Actions

(1) Establish Military Assistance objectives

and planning guidance to provide selected

countries, especially in the Caribbean and

Central American area, with the necessary small

patred coat, traine and 1051stica suppet

enable these countries to establish an effective

patrol of their own coasts.

Provide necessary

funds in addition to present programs.

(2) Provide US Navy, Air Force and Coast

Guard training assistance, as required,

develop or improve coastal patrol capabilities

of Latin American military forces.: This may:

take the form of a Canal Zone training activity,

employment of mobile training teams, or a com-

bination of both.

(3) Urge the accelerated improvement of

internal security forces and police forces in

Latin American countries and the intensification

of patrol and intelligence activities aimed at

preventing clandestine departures and apprehending

returned trainees.

Provide equipment, training

and advice as required.

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