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Date: 09/20/94

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AGENCY

RECORD NUMBER : 135-10001-1028

RECORDS SERIES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

JER ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION IQ

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION

ANTHIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED

8/20/98

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : ROCK

FROM

: WEIDNER, JAMES B

TO : FILE

TITLE :

DATE: 03/18/75

PAGES

8

SUBJECTS :

INTERVIEW WITH JOHN STEIN.

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION

RESTRICTIONS

CURRENT

STATUS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW

05/20/94

OPENING CRITERIA

COMMENTS

Contained in file entitled, "John Stëin" "B-W (VII-K) " "(3)"

2u25 Release under the Presiden

lohn F. Kennedy Assassination

Gecords Collection Act of 1992

- ITEM IS RESTRICTED

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COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES

Washington, DC 20500

March 18, 1975

Nelson A. Rockefeller,

Chairman

John T. Connor

C. Douglas Dillon

Erwin N. Griswold

Lane Kirkland

Lyman L. Lemnitzer

Ronald Reagan

Edgar F. Shannon, Jr.

David W. Belin,

Executive Director

SECRET - SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR: File

FROM:

SUBJECT:

James B. Weidne f

Interview with John Stein

1 interviewed Mr. Stein in his office at the CIA Headquarters, Langley,

Virginia on March 18, 1975.

The interview commenced at 11:10 a.m. and

continued until approximately 1:20 p.m. No one else was present.

the outset of the interview, Mr. Stein signed an Advice and Waiver which

is annexed hereto.

Mr. Stein,

along with several other Deputies, were assigned to an Ad Hoc

Committee to review various alleged domestic activities of the CIA.

Stein's particular area was the counter-intelligence staff, except for

the activities of that staff relating to the CI/SO project and to the mail

intercept project.

Stein said that, after his review, he concluded that the job of the CI

staff was essentially to "horse" the FBI into doing something.

according

to Stein, once you eliminate CI/SO and the mail intercept

project from the CI staff, their activities were benign insofar as the

scope of this Commission's scope of inquiry was concerned. He said

that, unless you conclude that keeping records relating to Americans,

per se, is improper, the CI staff files contained little of interest.

(a) Action-oriented Matters

I asked Stein whether he had found any evidence of domestic breaking

and entering directed by the CI staff. Stein said that he had found no

such activities, with one possible exception.

Stein stated that, if such

activities seemed appropriate, the CI staff would inform the Bureau

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION 10

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF THIS DOGUMENT

AS SANITIZED

16-8-94 le

(1) (B)

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SECRET

- SENSITIVE

which would accomplish the activities.

This was because,

if anything

were discovered by virtue of the action which would lead to a prosecution,

the action should be taken by the FBI,

since the Department of Justice

would have responsibility for the prosecution.

The only possible exception to the absence of any "breaking and

entering"

by the CI staff was the Tofti case.

Tofti was a long term employee

the Agency, who put his house up for rent.

Coincidently, another Agency

employee went to look at the house for possible rental.

In the cour se of so

• doing, the second employee found that there were quite a number of

classified documents on the third floor of the house.

The employee then

reported what he found to the Agency, which sent personnel over to recover

the documents.

(The documents related to world-wide proprietaries of

the Agency with which Tofti had been involved. Ultimately, Tofti explained

that he intended to write a book about these matters and that was why the

records were in his home.) The Agency undoubtedly did not have time

to advise the Bureau much in advance (if at all) of the Agency's effort to

recover the subject documents. Stein also noted that this incident did not,

in fact, involve "breaking

and entering" since the house was already opened

to allow prospective renters to examine it.

Stein said that he had found no instances of physical surveillance done by

the CI staff, although the staff would probably have been aware of

surveillance

accomplished by other agency components or by the Bureau. Stein cited

as an example an instance where a female Agency employee was found to

be living with a man who could well have been working for a foreign

Government.

The Office of Security, therefore, put a surveillance on her house

for approximately three weeks.

Discussions were also had with an informant

within the Agency concerning this employee. (Files on this case would be

maintained by the Office of Security).

Stein found no evidence of any electronic surveillance or telephoné taps

accomplished domestically by the CI staff.

The staff had no personnel

who could actually take any action. The staff, in this regard, would

have had an advisory capacity, if it participated at all. The CI staff

would simply advise the Bureau or other components of the Agency such

as the Office of Security or the Office of Technical Services. In such

instances the CI staff would not hold the file, except perhaps a memorandum

relating to the particular case, but Stein found no such memoranda.

SECRET

SENSITIVE

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SECRET

As a digression,

Stein commented that, to the extent that CI staff may

have gotten into

"gray" areas, this may well have been as a result of

an effort to restrict knowledge of a particular incident to the smallest

possible number of people.

Thus, rather than going to the Bureau, where

control over the dissimilation of the subject information would not be

possible, the staff might go to another Agency component such as the

Office of Security.

Similarly, where an investigation proved fruitless,

conti-

qued maintenance of relevant files by the CI staff, rather than by the Agency

or the Bureau generally, constituted part of an effort to avoid prejudicing

the particular subject of the investigation.

Another general area mentioned by Stein was that involving the use by

CI staff of people having an historical relationship with the staff.

The se

persons would be used against clearly foreign targets in the United States.

As an example, Stein said that such persons might be used to [obtain access

to codes or the like in this country.]

Stein mentioned the allegations relating to the reported breaking and entering

into the Chilian Embassy. I told him that we had already reviewed this

instance, and, therefore, there was no need for him to review it any detail.

(b) Files on Americans.

The major source of files on Americans maintained by CI staff was the

"American Targets Program" (ATP). This program involved

informa-

tion received by CI staff from Agency sources, from the State Department,

and from the Military. Information might also be received from the FBI.

The

purpose of AIP was to collate all contacts between any American and any

foreign intelligence officers, particularly those from the USSR.

The concept

of the program was that all such contacts would be reported to CI staff,

which would index them for future reference.

although the State Department actually had a formal regu-

lation requiring that all contacts with Soviets be reportea, it was extremely

difficult to convince State officers so to report.

Stein spent a substantial

amount of time overseas under State cover. He said that, as a result of

that experience, he knows that State officers are reluctant to report this kind

of information.

(A State officer probably will not achieve promotion by his

contact with Soviet personnel.) As a result of this reluctance, the informa-

tion obtained by the CI staff generally originated with the State Department's

Office of Security.

SECRET - SENSITIV

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SEC

The ATP program for filing was simply that when a name was reported

to CI staff,

it was mechanically processed by personnel who exercised

no judgment in recording the name. The names of both the Soviet and the

American people involved in the contact would be recorded. As a result of this

process, the ATP file index was able to develop a great deal of information

on Soviet contacts with Americans. If, as a result of information obtained,

CI staff had reason to believe that a a prticular person had been recruited

by the Soviets, that information would be forwarded to the Office of Security

for the Agency, if any Agency officer were involved, or to EBI, if an American

outside the Agency was involved.

'Stein explained that this program was conducted by CI staff instead of by

the FBI or State, because the program might well contain information

which would be relevant to CIA purposes, but not relevant to the purposes

of the other Agencies. Thus, the files might well contain infor mation

concerning known KGB Agents. That information, in turn could have

derived from a sensitive source, the identity of which CIA would not want

to have revealed. Accordingly, the information was stored by the Agency

rather than the other possible Governmental components. Information

relevant to those components, however, was made available to them from

the ATP project.

The information utilized by ATP could have been derived,as noted, from

reports of other Governmental components or from infa mation provided

by any American. This would be information provided voluntarily, either

by a person actually having a contact with a foreign intelligence officer

or by persons with knowledge that someone else had had such a contact.

The information could be particularly useful, not only to the CLA, but to

other Governmental components.

For example, the State Department's

Office of Security might report that a State officer had had a contact over

a long period with a Soviet.

The CI staff could check all its information

on that Soviet and confirm whether they had reason to believe that the

Soviet was in fact an agent.

Another source of files on Americans held by CI staff might be the product

of code-breaking by NSA.

Thus, in reading codes, names

of Americans

may appear. Some of these may be innocuous, and some may be spies.

, all these names are also indexed, although the index is

separate from AIP, because of the Sensitivity of the NSA programlas well

as the information derived therefrom.

SECRET

• SENSIT

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The information plugged into the indexing system will not become an

actual file until there is some

reason for opening a file on a particular

person. At that point (for example, a file search requested by another

Agency) all information relating to a particular person will be collated

in one place.

This, in turn will be developed into a separate file (a

personality file). If the information on a particular person is requested

by a CIA field office, the collation process would occur and the field would

be told how the particular person had come to the attention of the Agency

in the first instance and would also be told any derogatory information which

the field station would want to know.

Other CI files derived from on-going cases.

Part of these files emanate

from information provided to the Agency by defectors.

For example, one

element of this information is designated "Soviet leads." This is because the

CI staff learned from a defector that all Soviet women employed in the United

States Embassy in the USSR during a certain

period were Soviet agents.

Some of these women,

in turn, married

Americans, and, as a result, now

live in the United States.

The FBI is advised of the identity of all these

Women] The CI staff, under official cover, occasionally goes out to inter-

view these (vomen, in an effort to convince them to reveal what they know

about KGB operations. The effort was first to determine whether the

¡vomen continue to be KGB agents,

and, if not, to gather information from

them.

The general modus operandi would be to tell the women that we know

that at one time they were KGB agents and, while we did not intend to take

any action against them, to request them to reveal information that they

may have learned at that time concerning KGB operations.

Generally,

the women would agree to do so. It they did not, thencontract would,

at

Teast temporarily, be dropped.

These women are/used a's "defectors who

did not defect".

Other examples of going cases are: a journalist who had private contact

with George Blake, a former KGB agent in England; an American who

Ivas tied into the Able case (in this instance, the actions are taken by

the Bureau, but guidance/given by CI staff); and a journalist who the KGB,

on three occasions, attempted unsuccessfully to recruit.*

Other files may relate to actions begun because of some kind of counter-

intelligence implication in a particular situation.

In these instances CI

would maintain the files because of the particular sensitivity of the matter,

even though action may be taken by another Agency component.

*Stein noted that the decision as to whether to utilize someone as a double agent is

made by the ClA.

If the decision is affirmative, the double agent would be handled by the

Agency (It he is abroad) or by the FBI (if he is in this country).

The only exceptions to

this pattern would be where the double Agent is in the United States for only a brief time

or where he has a special relationship with a particular CIA officer.

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SECRET

GNSITH

Other files are maintained

concerninglthe Soviet Embassy. CIA's position

on this matter is that this is a State case which the Agency is running on

behalf of State.

There is also a file on Vesco held by the CI Staff.

The Agency became

involved in

this situation because John Dean of the White House called and

stated that President Nixon's brother had obtained a job with IOS. He

wanted to know what IOS was all about. CIA, in fact, had a file on IOS,

because it was known that the Soviets had been attempting to penetrate that

institution as a vehicle for getting agents into this country or at least

allowing them to learn of economic matters relating to the United States.

Stein

to have an account of everything which had been said about Vesco over

South American radio channels. The Agency refused this request, stating

that it was beyond its charter.

(c) Defectors

There are four sorts of defectors handled by the CI Staff.

The first

group are those under low level cover which are being used to scan Soviet

publications and to extract anything relating to Soviet intelligence which

they, in light of their expertise, may recognize. The second group of

defectors are those with "talents".

This group are former KGB agents

who, as a result, have special knowledge.

They may be used from time

to time to go and talk with (either in the United States or abroad) USSR

citizens. Another sort of defector is one from Czechoslovakia.

particular person is highly knowledgable in Maxist-Leninist matters.

Accordingly, he is used to write propaganda which is disseminated abroad.

The last category of defectors are those who are no longer in regular

contact with the agent.

These particular persons are seen from time to

time for some particular reason which could simply be an administrative

matter concerning their pensions, etc.

The . CI Staff also maintains a file on defectors from

America

to some other country (such as the Soviet Union, Cuba and others).

These names are recorded because the

persons involved

may eventually

end up in the United States once again or in some country other

Soviet Bloc.

This would not necessarily mean that that person is a spy,

but it does mean that he would be of counter-intelligence interest,

approximately the time of the Kennedy assassination the Secret Service

and the FBI became particularly interested in potential defectors from

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SECRET SENSITIVE

the United States. (Recall that Oswald had had connections with Russia).

This was an operation which the CIA did not particularly want to under-

take. Nonetheless the Agency did trace the names which the Bureau and

Secret Service provided in this regard. The number of these names was

perhaps 2, 000 including crackpots who may haveas an off hand comment,

suggested that they intended to defect to, for example, Russia.

The CIA

attempted to turn the program over to the Secret Service for the Bureau, but they

would not take it.

The CIA ultimately

stopped the project and cleared all the

files out. This would have been approximately three years ago.

Stein noted

that although the files had been eliminated, it was possible that some of

the names provided to the Agency had made it into the Central Agency files,

and would not have been eliminated therefrom

I briefly discussed the NOSENKO Case with Stein.

Nosenko had defected

to the United States and was admitted to this country as a "parolee".

That

is, the Immigration and Naturalization Bureau have a quota of persons

which the Agency can bring into the country without regular immigration

papers.

These persons are the responsibility of the Agency.

There was

some initial doubt, as to whether, in fact, Nosenko had been sent to the

United States by the KGB. Information obtained from another defector

tended to confirm this suspicion.

The question then was what to do with

Nosenko.

It was decided for a variety of reasons, that it would be unwise to

attempt to deport him; as a result he was kept in the United States in isolation.

After several years it was determined that Nosenko was, in fact, not an

attempted double agent.

He was thereafter rehabilitated and now lives

happily in the United States.

Although the CI had an interest in this case,

it was actually run by the Office of Security.

As one aspect of the Agency's duty to help in services of common concern

to all Governmental agencies, the CIA recorded in computer form at the

request of the FAA, all information relating to hijackers, Stein thinks that

this was probably because the CIA had the only equipment which could

handle the needed material in the proper fashion.

The information so

provided would, for example, include names of all those who were on board

hijacked planes. Approximately two years ago the CIA tried to give this

program to the FAA.

That Agency, however, would not accept the program,

and, therefore it was terminated by ClAS

SECRET - SENSITIVE

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ADVICE AND WATVER

Place piu,

Date

Time

3/10/21

Before you make any statement to, or answer any questions fion,

the Commission or its investigators, you should understand that

you have the right to remain silent. If you dioose to answer,

anything you say can be used against you in court.

You may consult a lawyer for advice before any questions are put,

you may have a lawyer with you during questioning.

If YOU

cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed

for you before

questioning if you wish.

If you decide to answer questions without:

lawyer present, you still have the right to stop answering at any

time; or you may defer your answer until you tall to a lawyer.

WAIVER

I have read and understand the foregoing advice.

Ian willing

to make a statement and answer questions with 7 without_

a lawyer at this time.

No promises or threats have been made

me, and

no pressure or coercion of any kind has been used against

Signed

Witness:

Witness:

Witness:

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