CONNECTION BETWEEN AMLASH AND INVESTIGATION OF JFK ASSASSINATION
Agency: SSCIA
Originator: SSCIA
From: SENATOR HART
To: JOHNSTON/DWYER/GREISSING
Document date: 01/27/1976
Document type: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

## Page 1

Date: 09/07/94

Page: 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA

RECORD NUMBER : 157-10004-10292

RECORDS SERIES :

MEMORANDUM

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : R 2255

Released under the John

F. kennedy

assassination Records

Collection Act of 1992

i44 USC 2107 Notel.

CaseR:NO 53244 Date

06-13-201

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA

FROM : JOHNSTON/DWYER/GREISSING

TO : SENATOR HART

TITLE :

CONNECTION BETWEEN AMLASH AND INVESTIGATION OF JFK ASSASSINATION

DATE: 01/27/76

PAGES : 6

SUBJECTS :

AMLASH

INVESTIGATION OF JFK ASSASSINATION

CASTRO

CUBA

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

KOSTION AND/OR

INS DOCUMENT,

sanitize?

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION : U

RESTRICTIONS : 1A, 1B, 1C, DONOR REST., REFERRED

CURRENT STATUS : X

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 09/07/94

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :

[R] - ITEM

IS RESTRICTED

HH 53244

DocId: 32202181

Page 1

---

## Page 2

K2255

ME MORAN DUM

TO :

FROM:

SECRET

Tas #

CIA HAS NO OBJECTIONTO

senior hare (colorsia) did Senacor sonnete 715348

Jim Johnston

•CIAHAS NO OBJECTION TO

Dan Dwyer

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

Ed Greissing

RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

AS SANITIZED

January 27, 1976

- 14 vul.14

Connection Between Amlash Operation and Investigation

of JFK Assassination

DATE :

SUBJ:

Background

The staff's memorandum of January 5, 1976, postulated that the

Amlash operation might have had some effect on CIA's response to

the investigation of President Kennedy's assassination.

On January

9, 1976, the staff asked for access to the Amlash file at CIA; and

after a delay which was not explained, the staff was permitted to

review the file on January 23 and 26.

• Summary of Amlash File

Amlash initially contacted by CIA in 1961 met occasionally with

case officers through August 1962, at which time he was given instruc-

ion in secret writing and explosives. Interest in Amlash continued

after the August meetings, but there was no further direct contact by CIA

agents until mid-1963.

Why there was a year lapse in contact with Am-

lash cannot be determined; the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962

undoubtedly made CIA cautious in dealing with Amlash.

In any event, DIR 4819g*

to Rome of 19 June 1963 states that

Auwhip,

a Cuban exile who assisted CIA, had sent a letter as part of

an "activation effort to reluctant dragon." Presumably, Amlash was

"reluctant dragon" and was, by this letter, asked to recontact CIA.

In late August, Amlash traveled with a large contingent of Cuban

officials and athletes to Porto Alegre, Brazil.

He cabled Auwhip

about his arrival on August 29. This cable apparently was the signal

that he was prepared to meet Anwhip in Porto Alegre.

Amwhip and two CIA case officers met with Amlash in Porto Alegre

between September 5 and 8. The two case officers have testified to

the Committee about their understanding of events at this series of

meetings which they viewed essentially as a get acquainted session.

CIA messages tell a different story. Porto Alegse 0704 to DUR Of 7

September stated that Amlash told Amwhip he felt there were only two

ways of

getting rid of Castro. The first was an invasion by U.S.

forces which Amlash knew was out of the question and the second was

an "inside job."

Amlash indicated he was awaiting a U.S. plan of action.

He

referred to the

as "too cumbersome" for his purposes.

explosives demonstration CIA gave him a year earlier

ww 53241 DocilIaoaTe meagages sent from Langley. H

11

---

## Page 3

- 2-

At the conclusion of the meetings with Amlash, Headquarters

cabled on 9 September that, based on

what little feel Headquarters

had, Amlash appeared hopeless

as an intelligence performer and should

be approached as a chief conspirator allowed to recruit his own co-

He should be urged to recruit a

few trusted friends to assist

him, initially in "FI and Ops reporting" and then progress to sabotage

and more serious matters

on an orderly basis. (DIR 67110 to Borto.

Alege: JWAVE and Ri

On 11 September, Bosto legse 0708 to DIR summarized the intel-

ligence information Amlash

had given on Soviet units in Cuba, saying

all IRBM and bombers had been removed.

By this time Amlash

Brazil apparently heading for a vacation in Europe.

A document in the file dated 16 September and marked, OFPA 72775

appears to be a transcript of a conversation obtained by covert means.

There is no indication as to where the conversation takes place, but

it probably is tin the Caban Embassy, in Paris.

"Mary: I don't want to imagine things but

this thing of Amlash.

Moreno:

It is either a tremendous secrét or a

top secret matter (unreadable) then the

word "treason" or "reason").

Betty: I believe it is a top secret matter."

and September 16, Amlash stayed in

contact with Anwhip. Pario station apparently was picking up responsi-

bility for Amlash at this

time, since

Paris 0706 to DIR dated 19

September asks for some background material on Amlash.

On 19 September, JMWAVE 4580 to DIR warns that Amlash is part of

an anti-communist group in Cuba and details the membership of his group

as well as a communist group.

The message also notes that Fidel is

allegedly aware of the two groups and acts as moderator between them

in order to maintain cohesion in the Government of Cuba.

Nevertheless, Anwhip is asked to continue to work with Amlash

and is assigned to accompany him around Europe.

According to Parts

109345 to. DIR dated 7 October, Amlash met with case officer O* on s

October.

Case officer O sat and listened permitting Amlash to get

everything off his chest. Amlash seemed to be complaining about the

level espionage matters that had been discussed at the September

meeting in Brazil, implying he had a more valuable role.

Case officer

O "provided necessary assurances his feelings not in fact true and

that his case receiving consideration highest levels. (emphasis added)!''

"With this problem which had undoubtedly been bothering Amlash

*

The files do not accurately identify these case officers.

and I

pis, however, were the principal case officers.

HH 53244

DocId: 32202181 Page 3

---

## Page 4

-3- IT

siderably, off his chest, a much more relaxed Amlash departed restating

his desire return Cuba to undertake 'the big job!""

On October 15, London 5224 to DIR states case officer O met with

Amlash and Anwhip on 13 October.

Although the case officer had been

forewarned by Amwhip, he was not successful in discouraging Amlash's

request for a high level meeting.

"Amlash convinced that if such meet

does not take place at this time it will be almost impossible come out

again and we will be in same situation as last year with no definite

decision: Also finds it difficult to believe why RFK who receives many

Cubans would refuse to see a major" such as Amlash. The message notes

the fact remains that Amlash does "have excellent entree to highest

target level which believe we cannot afford overlook."

This message seemingly moved Headquarters to re-evaluate Amlash's

role.

DIR 75683 to London on 15 October directed case officer O to

return headquarters soonest for discussions of all phases of the case.

The next meeting apparently took place on October 29. One case

officer met Amlash holding himself out as the personal representative

of REK.

He informed Amlash, according to a 13 November MFR, that

the U.S. was prepared to render all necessary assistance to

any anti-

communist Cuban group which succeeded in neutralizing the present Cuban

leadership and which assumed significant control to invite the U.s.

to render assistance. He emphasized that U.S. support could come only

successful coup. Amlash responded by saying that without

Fidel,

he military would break up into 4 or 5 groups and the regime woul

disintegrate.

ne also sald he was satisfied with the policy discussio

but desired to know what technical support he could get.

Since Amwhip was closer to Amlash than the case officers, he was

asked about Amlash's reaction to the

meeting.

His reactions

summarized in Attachment A to Amwhip's Memo of Meeting dated 14 Novem-

ber.

Amwhip said Amlash was still not pleased with support from U.s

goverment.

While Amlash was satisfied on policy grounds, he was not

at all happy with the fact that he still was not given the technical

assistance for the operation plan as he saw it. Amlash could not under-

stand why he was denied certain small pieces of equipment which promised

a final solution to the problem, while, on the other hand, the U.S. gave

much equipment and money to exile groups for their ineffective excursions

against Cuban coastal targets.

Amlash had accepted the fact he had to

work with the CIA, but ClA might lose him if it continued to procrastin->

ate. Amlash talked about going to the Trench terrorist

organization,

the OAS, but realized that was not feasible.

The memorandum ends with

what apparently is the author's conclusion:

"It is hoped that he does

realize that Havana must first be taken.

..or failing that, a

truly sizeable piece of land (say, almost an entire province) which

could be true rallying point."

SLUINGI

NH 53244• DocId: 32202181. Page 4

---

## Page 5

SCODE

In a Memo for Record dated 19 November, one case officer summarized

the actions to be taken at the next meeting with Amlash. Amlash

was

be told the U.S. was prepared to give full support to Amlash's coup.

to

he would be shown President Kennedy's speech in Miami of November 18

and told this reaffirmed support for Amlash's proposal. Headquarters

had approved giving Amlash scopes and rifles and other equipment.

The

memo ended by stating that "C/SAS* requested written reports on Amlash

operation be kept to a minimum."

"Pari: 1564

to DIR of 20 November indicated Amlash had been called

on the night of November 20 and had agreed to postpone his return

Cuba in order to see case officer O "if it something interesting.,to

The

CIA officer said he could not assure it was interesting but that it was

to be a meeting which Amlash had requested. (Obviously, CIA wanted to

give Amlash the "technical support" he felt he had not been promised in

the 29 October meeting.)

Case officer O flew from the U.S.. so as to arrive in Paris on the morn-

ing of November 22 for this meeting.

Sto DIR received at Langley at 6:25 a.m. on 23

is the only message in Amlash's file reflecting the fact the

3. November

meeting

had taken place.

It indicated that Amlash was anxious to return to

Cuba and that case officer O was to arrive in Washington at 1810 that

day.

The file contains no outgoing cable to

Ion November 23 or

any other time telling Baris to break contact with Amlash. *-*

On 25 November, a contact report was prepared. There is reason

to question the authenticity of this document which is three pages

The first two pages

have dark type as though prepared on a typewriter with a new ribbon.

typewriter with an old ribbon. Itimade.

The type on the third pare do much liahe no mention of the passing

a poison pen

On November 27, Part 1669/to DIR reports information obtained

in October possibly by clandestinely listening devices.

A source com-

plained bitterly about official (Cuban) visitors to Paris and how they

denigrate the revolution.

The source said she wished she had a con-

cealed tape recorder to record these conversations.

She named Amlash

as one of these visitors.

* Desmond Fitzgerald

** In its 1967 report, the IG stated such a message had been sent

but could not be found.

SECRET

HH 53244 : DocId: 32202181 Page 5

---

## Page 6

- 5 -

On 3 December, Headquarters furnished JMWAVE some details on the

Amlash meeting including the fact that he had been promised "full U.S

supper he is successful in a seal coup against the Castro regime."

He was

also promised arms which will have to be furnished through

JMWAVE's operations.

A series of confusing cables passed between Headquarters and JMWAVE

on December 6, 7, and 8.

Apparently, Headquarters first gave JMWAVE

authority to drop a cache of arms in

Then Headquarters called

off the operation.

In DIR 87615 of ? December, it is noted "major

top level Cuban/Caribbean policy review scheduled early next week which

should provide basis for decision."

--

JWAVE complained about the change in orders in a cable of 8

December.

JMWAVE 8702 pointed out that one Headquarter's message

indicated December infiltration operations were approved by higher author-

ity but a second message indicated a scheduled operation should be de-

Layed and not run in December.

Headquarters responded in DIR 87880. Headquarters procedure

was to present infiltration operation plans to

"higher authority"

even though there is a reasonable chance operation may be postponed

or delayed

as was case with the scheduled operation.

"This procedure

will secure approval for the operation with only telephonic reconfirma-

tion needed when previously relaxed operation finally mounted."

Head-

quarters recommended delay until January after considering and equating

objectives against risk

factors for Amlash and others.

"Believe by

January,, CIA

should be in position better evaluate status of internal

1914

of 13 December, Pagis reported that Amlash left

Paris for Prague on November 27 but did not seek recontact with case

officer. DIR 90966 to JMWAVE of 23 December reported that Havana radio

on 2 December stated Amlash arrived Cuba on 1 December.

The last document in Amlash's file for the period ending December

1963, is a long report on Amlash, but it does not contain information

relevant to the October-November

activities.

Nevertheless, in red pen

, on the cover page

appears:

"Dec 1963 Not to leave this office

on Nesto

(Sanche?) orders." followed by initials that appear to be

"GM. "

One later document in the Amlash file contains more information

about the November 22, 1963 meeting.

I'hat document, a rough draft of

a biographical information sheet on Amlash (no final draft was found)

appears to have been preparediin 1966 at the time of Amlash's arrest

for a later plot against Castro.

It states:

"22 Nov. 63 Mr.

Fitzgerald

Cand Mr Sanchez assured subject that this Agency would give him every-

thing he needed (telescopic sight,

silencer, all the money he wanted).

The situation changed when Mr. Sanchez and Mr. Fitzgerald left the meet-

ing to discover that President Kennedy

had been

assassinated.

of this fact, plans with subject changed and it was decided that this

HH 53244 : DocId:32202181 Page 6

---

## Page 7

COET

Agency could have no part in the assassination of a government leader

(including Castro) and it would not aid subject in his attempt. This

a finger to help subject escape from Cuba should he

• assassinate Castro."

The same document states this message was communicated to Amlash

in November 1964 by Mro Sanchez

Despite this decision, the CIA in fact continued to assist Amlash

through a cut-out until Amlash's arrest in 1966.

Later documents on Amlash are also relevant to the September-

November 1963 Amlash operation.

Several such documents report informa-

tion received to the effect that Fidel Castro had long been aware of

Amlash's plots against him. For example, Amlash's one time Cuban

mistress was believed to be working for

Cuban intelligence and her

brother was known to be with Cuban

intelligence. Parie 8242 to DIR

in December 1964 warns that Amlash's objective may be known to too

many Cubans.

And, one CIA informant reported in 1966 on one known

double agent of Cuban intelligence working for CIA and said the CIA's

Cuban operations had been penetrated at a high level by Cuban intel-

ligence. He identified this latter individual only as one of the Cuban

exiles who was knowledgeable of a number of the most important opera-

tions.

Nevertheless, Amlash's file contains nothing to indicate any

detailed analysis of

these possible penetrations of the CIA's Amlash

operation, although a cryptic handwritten note on at least one re-

port rejects the suggestion that Amlash was himself reporting to Castro.

One other document bears on the testimony Amlash's case officers

gave before the Select Committee to the effect that Amlash was given

a poison pen for self-protection.

That document reports that Amlash,

and other Cuban officials in Paris in 1963, were carrying pistols for

self-protection throughout their travel in Europe.

Finally, although the staff has not reviewed all possible CIA

files to determine what other operations Castro might have been re=

ferring to in his September 7 statement, the Amlash file indicates

that some coastal landings of supplies

in August were the only other

CIA operations conducted against Cuba in this time period.

SECRET

HW 53244 : DocId: 32202181 Page 7

---