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2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

19 December 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with the President on Cuba at 1100 on

19 December 1963

IA

Nated bey

Del.

Wilder

1. Included in the meeting were Acting Secretary of State

Ball, Acting Secretary of Defense Gilpatric, Secretary Cyrus

Vance, Secretary Douglas Dillon, Ambassador Thompson,

General Wheeler, Mr. Donald Wilson, Mr. McGeorge Bundy,

Mr. Bromley Smith, Mr. Edwin Martin, Mr. Ted Sorensen,

Mr. John Crimins, Mr. Gordon Chase, Mr. George Ready,

Mr. Bill Moyers, General Carter, Mr. Helms, and Mr. Fitz-

Gerald.

2. The President, after full discussion, postponed any

sizable operations by FitzGerald, primarily to avoid any possible

embarrassment to our OAS negotiations on the Venezuelan arms

cache.

We are authorized to continue to put forward proposals

for operations and also to continue preparations for air ops. The

main thrust was to greatly increase political action with Canada,

Britain, Spain, Italy, and others in an effort to promote greater

economic blockade.

3. Mr. Bundy later stated that his analysis of the meeting

was that the President would continue to approve smaller

FitzGerald-type operations even though they would be relatively

unrewarding if they would assist in keeping up the morale of the

troops on shore, of our agents, and otherwise help in keeping the

ball rolling.

Marshall S. Carter

Lieutenant General, USA

Acting Director

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GA 12S MO CUSSTION 7O

DECLASSITCATION ARC/OR

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AS SANITIZED

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT:

Meeting at the White House 19 December 1963

PRESENT:

The President

The State Department: Under Secretary George W.

Ball, Deputy Under Secretary U. Alexis Johnson,

Ambassador at Large Llewellyn Thompson,

Assistant Secretary for Inter-American

Affairs Edwin Martin, Coordinator of Cuban

Affairs John H. Crimmins.

The Defense Department: Deputy Secretary Roswell

Gilpatric, Secretary of the Army Cyrus Vance.

Joint Chiefs of Staff: General Wheeler.

USIA: Deputy Director Donald M. Wilson.

The Treasury Department: Secretary Douglas Dillon.

The White House Staff: Executive Assistant to the

President McGeorge

Bundy, Messrs. George Reedy

and Williams Moyers.and Gordon Chase.

CIA: General Marshall S. Carter, Messrs. Richard

Helms and Desmond FitzGerald.

mare it it te

The President arrived at the meeting approximately

five minutes early - prior to the arrival of several

nembers of the group including Mr. Bundy.

Without a formal

introduction I commenced the scheduled briefing on the Agency

Cuban program at the urging of the President and despite the

activities of the Presidential photographer.

2.

The President appeared interested in the number of

agents inside Cuba but made no particular conment concerning

the program until the subject of economic denial was intro-

He asked to be told what additional measures could

be taken to step up the denial program. I said that the

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2

principal soft spots among free world countries appeared

at the present time to be Canada, the U.K. and Spain.

The

President requested a memorandum setting forth specifics

concerning leaks of economically strategic items from these

three countries together with recommendations as to what

could be done to stop these leaks. He requested Under

Secretary Ball to prepare to make demarches to the govern-

ments of these three countries as well as any others

engaged in the Cuba trade contrary to our interests.

He

appeared particularly interested in the subject of econo-

mic denial and returned to it several times.

3. After hearing a brief description of our progress

in connection with promoting disaffection among the Cuban

military, the President said that it did not seem to him

that we had gone very far along this line and that one

would have to ace the grand ten domest man

(of domestic public

opinion) to account for our progress in our attempts to

find a solution to the Cuban situation.

I pointed out

that

the program being presented was, with the exception

of the economic denial item,

entirely a covert program and,

clandestine

services

and tensor gate cover to bound taken, they

would have to be within the overt field.

40

After a brief description of the sabotage and

harassment program the subject of the proposed Matanzas

raid

was discussed. After hearing the pros and cons the

President stated that he did not feel that the present time

was a good

one to conduct an operation of this magnitude

which carried a less than 50 percent chance of success.

He

said that he felt that such an operation, if pinned directly

on the U.so, might cause the soviets to move in the wrong

direction

with respect to Cuba, 1.e, increase their econo-

mic ald or their military presence.

Recognizing that a

cessation of raids

would have a bad morale effect within

cuba, he agreed that low risk operations, with admittedly

lower economic and psychological impact,

should be con-

ducted.

He further stated that planning for such opera-

tions as Matanzas

should be continued. General Wheeler

raised the possibility of air strikes against major targets

oy autonomous groups.

This was discussed and it was agreed

that in view of the fact that preparations would take at

least three months, these preparations should proceed and

the question re-examined at the time that capabilities have

been perfected.

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5.

On the question of autonomous groups the President

asked the cost of these operations (five million dollars).

He also asked the cost of cuban operations for the current

year (21 or 2 million dollars) and the total Agency budget.

6. The intelligence summary concerning Cuba prepared

by General Carter for the meeting was examined.

7.

Mr. Bundy then reviewed current U.S. policy vis-a-vis

Cuba.

He then went down a check list of

possible new courses

of action taken

from the Department of State paper prepared

for the December 13 Standing Group meeting Unilateral

actions presented were:

(1) Air attacks by our autonomous groups. No

further discussion.

(2)

Selective relaxation of U.S. controls against

exile groups in florida.

No comment on

Mr. Bundy's generally unfavorable presentation.

(3)

Military feints. No comment on generally

unfavorable presentation.

(4)

Low-level reconnaissance flights. Comment by

Assistant Secretary Martin concerning the

value of keeping open the franchise for low-

level flights.

Acknowledgement of certain

value to the intelligence community. No

decision requested.

(5)

Extension of efforts to eliminate free world

shipping from the Cuba trade. No decision

requested.

(6) Presidential declaration concerning U.S.

policy on Cuba designed to stimulate anti-

Castro dissidence in the armed forces.

Mr. Bundy's comments indicated that there

was room for a stronger statement than that

made by President Kennedy in Miami.

(7)

Talks with the Soviets and the Cubans. Not

elaborated

and no comment.

(8)

Other forms of covert actions. Not specified

or elaborated.

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8.

In connection with bilateral and multilateral

actions involving the cooperation of the OAS and nations

of the Caribbean, Mr. Bundy stated that the nature and

import of the recently discovered arms cache in Venezuela

constitutes a point of departure for such actions as search

seizure on the high seas or an OAS-sponsored quarantine

against arms shipments. Mr. Helms then briefly described

the nature of the arms cache and the plans involving those

arms as set forth in captured Venezuelan communist documents.

Mr. Helms showed a map prepared from those documents indi-

to tie up the city of Caracas during the recent election.

to the arms cache.

by the OAS to investigate had called for additional

evidence from the Venezuelan government which would take

two to three weeks to assemble.

He said that he felt that

the OAs report would be out in mid-January although the

question of Cuban defense against the Venezuelan charges

had not yet been resolved.

Mr. Bundy referred to the

efforts being made to increase

the effectiveness of sur-

veillance of

arms smugglers in Central America and referred

to the possibility of an OAS-sponsored

search and seizure

on the high seas.

9.

Under Secretary Ball stated that the Department of

Justice has warned that a number of students, some of more

respectable stripe than the last group which visited Cuba,

were planning to try to visit Cuba during the Christmas

vacation and that there is evidence of larger numbers

planning to do the same thing during the summer.

that the Attorney General was bothered by this and had

suggested the relaxation of present rules concerning travel

to Cuba.

Mr. Ball said that the Department of State is

tentatively opposed to such relaxation particularly because

of its effect on Latin American countries.

strongly concurred with the Department of State position.

He said that he did not propose to change or relax present

regulations.

Chief, Special Affairs Staff

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coast

F6

13 December 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussion with the President, 13 December - 9:30 a.m.

1. Introduced General Carter but was unable to explain his

responsibilities.

2. Introduced, Peer de Silva. The President spoke briefly of

what he expects of the Station and the representatives of the Governmert

in the Saigon community.

3.

Reviewed the Checklist. I emphasized (a) the dangers of the

hostages in Bolivia, stating however that while 21 lives are extremely

important, nevertheless, we must avoid a policy decision the conse -

quence of which might mean the lives of an undertermined thousands

of people in the future. In fact I was saying we must not give the

Communists the upper hand in this argument. I explained the critical

location of the prisoners, and (b) I called the President's attention to

the international oil situation and the deadlock between OPEC and the

international oil companies and the opening that this is affording the

Italians and possibly the French.

4. Noted Item C in the notes, stating we felt, from sensitive

Spinelli's observation was incorrect but there was a possibility

of a sufficient withdrawal by the Egyptians to make a favorable demon-

stration of intentions by which we could persuade Fiasal to withhold

military aid to the Royalists for an extended period of several months.]

NOTE: Carter and de Silva left the room at this time.

5.[I told the President that subject to Rusk's approval, I intended

to issue a series of articles on the weakness of the Soviet economy,

drainage on their gold supply, over-commitments on foreign aid, etc.

for the political figures who are wavering between leaning on the

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Soviets or the West, such as Sukarno and certain South American

Countries, so that they will understand they are not leaning on very

much when they lean on the Soviets.

6. Explained that I had given a complete briefing to General

Eisenhower and conveyed to the President General Eisenhower's

expression of friendship and support.

7. Discussed briefly my talk with Robert Kennedy and urged

the President to send a message to Kennedy but not to see him until

after the first of the year. I asked for the President's approval to

invite Kennedy to accompany me to Saigon.

NOTE: This invitation has been extended but Kennedy

felt it was untimely because of personal family commitments,

responsibilities to Jackie, concern on the part of his wife,

Mrs. Kennedy, and for other reasons.

8.

Mr. Bundy joined in part of these discussions. The President

asked what the Attorney General intended to do, that is, stay on or leave.

I told the President the Attorney General intended to stay on as Attorney

General, but it was not clear to what extent the President wished him to

become involved in the activities outside the area of the Office of the

Attorney General, such as, intelligence work, NSC problems, counter

insurgency matters, etc. I explained to the President that I had told

Bobby he could not bring back the intimacy of relationship with the

President which he had had with his brother because that was a blood

relationship, not an official relationship. A type of relationship which

is seldom found between brothers and never found between officials,

either in business or government.

9. I gave the President a copy of the memorandum on Soviet

Foreign Aid.

JAM:mcm

Ime

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• . .

6 December 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with The President - 9:45 - 6 December 1963

The first part of the meeting involved a discussion with Rusk,

McNamara, Rostow, William Bundy and McGeorge Bundy concerning

the procedures on MLF.

Rusk requested, and received, approval to brief General

Eisenhower and will arrange to have Amb. Merchant, Admiral Ricketts

and General Goodpastor present at the briefing. Rusk reported that a

group of "young Republicans" opposed the MLF.

Rusk also received approval to brief certain Congressional

leaders in small groups, but to intimate that no government, including

the United States Government, is committed to the MLF program.

Rusk gave an optimistic report on progress and stated the

most important objectives of the MLF was to give the Germans a sense

of participation in nuclear weapons planning and operations under a

scheme providing adequate control by other Allied nations, including

the United States:

(McNamara stated that Me" von Hassel had advised him that the

MLF was a "must"' or else the Germans would undoubtedly pursue an

independent course in developing their own national nuclear weapons

resources. Rusk indicated that failure to proceed with the MLE might

force a German-French arrangement on nuclear weapons. McNamara

stated there was no military requirement for the MLF but the force

will have a military (?) utility

and will permit a reduction in

planned United States national capabilities and hence the cost, which is

considerable, is not really an additional U.S. military cost.]

The President then suggested a briefing of Congressional

leaders, both Democratic and Republican, Senate and House, substantially

along the lines of the NSC briefing of yesterday afternoon. L I brought up

the question of security and pointed out the dangers. The President

98

asked that I develop a 10 or 15 minute briefing on Soviet strategic

capabilities, Soviet defense and Soviet economy, going just as far as I

possibly could without endangering sources and methods.

ACTION: Discuss with Cline, et al.

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The meeting then continued with the President, McGeorge

Bundy and McCone. I discussed the foreign aid figures as included

in the 6 December memorandum and the special report on Soviet

Foreign Economics Programs of 25 October, and stated that I

would prepare for the President some special graphics which would

show Soviet foreign, economic and military aid, both extensions and

draw-downs, to non-Communist countries and Cuba.

NOTE: Mr. Rostow raised the question earlier

as to the validity of comparing our aid figures with

USSR's aid figures because the latter did not include

aid to satellites. His position is that since we include

aid to NATO countries, particularly Turkey, Greece,

South Korea, etc., we should examine USSR aid to their

satellites in addition to Cuba. This should be examined.

I do not know whether the figures are available.

The President reviewed the Checklist and I made the following

comments:

1. [I expect the USSR to expand the test ban agreement to cover

underground tests and it was quite possible they would soon make claims

for vast improvements in seismology. I mentioned the recent informa-

tion on the LASER beam.]

2. I pointed out the seriousness of the Cambodian situation

stating the fact that the Khmer Serei clandestine radio had been located

in Southeast Thailand and that my information was that the Thais were

not inclined to put it out of business because the Cambodians were

broadcasting unfavorably against them!

3. [I noted the additional indicators of possible conflict over

Malaysia.]

I then explained to the President the source of our information

that the Soviet Intelligence Service, on orders from Moscow, was

attempting to stimulate communications from India to him, Chief Justice

Warren and the Attorney General, urging a full probe into the

assassination of the President. I stated that this report comes from a

very reliable penetration and we evaluate it quite highly.

We then discussed the assignment of Peer de Silva to Saigon.

I stated that the staff had made such recommendation to me, but that

I felt it was only a good move if he was to remove Ambassador Lodge.

He felt that to do this would have political repercussions and would be

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tantamount to a vote of no confidence in the military junta, that it

would indicate President Johnson's support of Diem rather than the

present authorities. Therefore he stated he could not move to remove

Lodge but hoped that Lodge would remove himself and become a

candidate for the Republican nomination for the Presidency and would

be the nominee. (Note: I told the President he wanted things too

easy). I told the President that Lodge would destroy de Silva if he

opposed his assignment or did not like him, or wished to get rid of him.

The President said he would communicate most emphatically with

Lodge in this regard and asked Bundy to write an appropriate communi-.

cation. I told the President this would do no good, that Lodge was

absolutely unconscionable in matters of this kind and he had resorted

to trickery time and time again during the Eisenhower administration

and that he never failed to use the newspapers in order to expose an

individual or block an action. I therefore could only conclude that if he

was going to keep Lodge on that it would be better to stay with David

Smith as Chief of Station, who is a most competent officer but young

and not fully experienced, but this proposal did not meet his request

that the best and most experienced man we can find be placed on the

job. The President said he would exercise the full power of his

office to keep Lodge in line and felt our responsibilities in South

Vietnam are so great that CIA should have a "four-star man" on the job and

that is what he wanted.

: 1

JAM/ mcm

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3 December 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussion with the President at his residence on Sunday, Dec. 1 -

10:00 o'clock - about 30 minutes. No one was in attendance.

1. Reviewed a series of reports. There was no Checklist.

2. The President asked about news from Venezuela, particularly

concerned about Chenault.

3. Briefly reviewed a clandestine report from Bonn as a means

of indicating sources to CIA not available to others.

4. Reported to the President that the UN Commission to Saigon

felt a bit critical towards the U.S. presence; however we are in some doubt

as to whether they will include

such criticism in their public report

5. Briefly reviewed the final report on the Alvarado case in

Mexico City.

6. The President then brought up the question of men in government.

Emphasized the need for men, particularly young men. I urged the President

to discuss this matter with the Business Council and with the AFL-CIO group.

He said that meetings would be arranged this coming week.

7. [I advised the President that I was to meet with Halaby to

pursue the SST problem

98

8. L requested the President to instruct Bundy that Memorandums of

Conversation with Heads of State should be distributed to me automatically.

Also that the State Department be instructed to send such Memorandums to

me. The President agreed.

NOTE: This should be followed up by Mr. Cline.

Bundy will apparently discuss this matter later

with the President who agreed that such distri-

bution should be automatic except in very special

circumstances in which he wished distribution

held to his own personal files for reasons of

his own choice. I could take no exception to this

decision.

9. We should contact Hoover concerning identification of people

sending in ads and letters to the Dallas newspapers.

NOTE: I should call Hoover concerning this.

JAM/mfb (tape)

Shac

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NOP SECIET

a2

2 December 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

EYES ONLY --NO DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: Discussion with the President, 30 November 1963

Throughout the conversation the President mentioned a

number of very personal problems and asked my help and also

asked that Bundy and I act as a team in trying to help him solve

some of his problems.

1. He indicated that there must be some Cabinet changes.

By inference he made reference to the Attorney General, but not by

direct statement. Apparently he is waiting for the Attorney General

to decide what role, if any, he wishes to play in the Johnson Adminis-

tration.

2. He stated that Secretary Celebrezze is very anxious for

a judgeship and that he, Johnson, was extremely favorably impressed

with Sargent Shriver and thou ght he would be an excellent Secretary

of H. E. W. This was enthusiastically endorsed by both Bundy and

myself.]

3. He raised the question of whether Mrs. Kennedy might

be a very able ambassador.

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4. LHe was deeply critical of the handling of Ayub. He questioned

whether Ball was the proper man to have gone forward to negotiate

with Ayub. He felt that we needed a new ambassador and he asked for

recommendations, the name of an ambassador who could handle that

Embassy, and more particularly handle Ayub. At this point he asked

that Bundy and I work together in searching out names of individuals

who might be helpful in a number of critical areas. I protested his

criticism of Ball, stating that I felt that Ball had done a very good job

in his mission to Pakistan. The President expressed the highest regard

for Ayub.]

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5. He then turned to a discussion of Latin America. Expressed

criticism of the Alliance for Progress. Stated that Moscoso was not

the man to handle it and he should be replaced and asked who could be

his replacement.

He also stated that we had not handled the OAS

positively enough. He was very critical of our ambassador to the OAS,

Acting Ambassador Ward Allen, and asked for recommendations for

a replacement.

Throughout the conversation it appeared that President

Johnson is not going to be satisfied with the organization as it is

now composed and that he will make changes, and at the same time

he does not intend to make changes just for the sake of change nor

does he intend to move in the "hangers-on of the last 20 years. "

Apparently he has had a vast number of approaches from people who

he termed to be political hacks and said he didn't want any part of

any of them.

JAM:mcm

(tape)

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2 December 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with the President, 11:00 a.m., November 30th,

in attendance Mr. Bundy, meeting lasted approximately

1 1/2 hours

.98

• Reviewed the Checklist. The President immediatel,

raised the question of what we were doing about Colonel Chennault

He expects most serious public reaction and has a feeling that we

are "drifting" on this situation. I assured him we and the Venezuelan

government were doing all that was possible.

However, he requested

more positive action on a report on the actions being taken.

NOTE: Wish a full report from the station for Sunday

morning briefing.

2. No other Checklist items raised any serious questions.

3. The President again raised the question of what we were

going to do in Cuba. Bundy advised that a policy meeting was scheduled

for Monday, time not set, to discuss Cuban policy. I pointed out to

the President the statements of President Kennedy on September 5th,

September 13th, and November 20th, 1962 and then I showed the evidence

that proved absolutely that arms had been imported into Venezuela from

Cuba. I stated that most positive efforts should be made immediately

to secure complete OAS agreement on a course of action which would

involve a series of steps ranging from economic denial through blockade

and even to possible invasion, but that it must be OAS action, otherwise

it would involve confrontation with Khrushchev. I stated that if the

action was a Hemispheric action I didn't see that the USSR could do

much about it. The President agreed but decided to await the policy

meeting on Monday.

NOTE: DD/P and WH should prepare full recommendations

for positive actions which might be taken unilaterally with

the Caribbean states or with the OAS. for my use in the

policy meeting.

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4. I reviewed the report from Mexico City station, 27 November,

advising the number of Soviets in Cuba, indicating that this report which

we thought was quite responsible more or less verified our own current

estimates.

5. Reference the Oswald matter, reviewed with the President

CAS Mexico City 7127 reporting on the interrogation of Alvarado. We

briefly discussed the composition of the Review Board announced by

the President on the 29th.

Discussion of the Oswald situation was

inconclusive and no action required.

98

6. The President then brought up the question of Pakistan

and I reviewed briefly the intelligence community's feeling of concern

and their view that our Pakistan relationship was of the greatest

importance. Bundy mentioned the forthcoming December meeting

between Ayub and General Taylor. The President made no comment

but seemed to feel that Taylor should remain in the United States

because of serious Defense budget problems. Bundy reviewed the

great number of commitments we have made to Pakistan and that we

would come to their defense if India should use our arms to attack

Pakistan.

The President expressed the greatest of confidence in

Ayub and a feeling that we had not been forceful enough with him, had

not given him a feeling of confidence in our motives and that he had

drifted into the thought that we would abandon him in favor of India.

He stated that he wished this corrected in a most positive manner.

7. I reviewed our Cuban overflight program advising the

President of the USIB criteria and the extent to which flights were

being carried on.

98

8. Reviewed briefly the TACKLE China overlight and stated

these had been stood down since the loss of the last plane but we intended

to resume which the President thought was proper.

ACTION: I wish flight plans to meet COMOR priority in

targets for at least two flights for submission to the

Special Group next Thursday.

9. advised the President that the ChiCom-India border flights

had been completed and that we now planned to brief the Indians, Thailand

and very possibly Pakistan.

I stated the equipment had been withdrawn

from Takhli.]

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10. I advised the President that the CORONA mission was up

and would be brought down on Monday. Also suggested that at an

early opportunity I brief him on the CORONA program.)

11. [Reviewed the Venezuela overflight plan as outlined in

memorandum for the Special Group and President approved.

NOTE: I have communicated this approval to General

Carter and instructed him to proceed.]

JAM:mcm

(tape)

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• --

• :

TEN SOIR

29 November 1963

Late developmenta awat active City invatigation of

z.

3.

4.

Results of the first interrogation of Silvia Duran have been received.

Reveals nothing other than confirmation of Oswald's effort to secure

authority to enter USSR via Havana. His requests were refused.

Result of second interrogation of Silvia Duran has not as yet been

received.

FBI dispatched a man from Washington to Mexico City at the request

of Ambassador Mann.

The Nicaraguan, Alvarado, has been turned over to the Mexican

authorities for questioning, by the CIA station at the specific request

of the FBI.

NOTE: CIA Headquarters refused this turn-over until

FBI request received because F Blis in control of the

investigation.

:=.,5." Alvarado's story becoming increaslngly questionable because of a

public statement carried by Mexico City radio and press prior to

Alvarado's entering the picture, to the effect that Oswald had

received $5, 000 from the Cuban Embassy.

To be used by DCI in meeting with the President at 10:30 on 29 November 1963

with Secty. McNamara and Bundy.

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29 November 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting at his residence with President Johnson

10:00 a.m. - Thursday - November 28th.

for approximately 30 minutes

1. The President reviewed the Checklist and made the following

comments:

98

a. Are we doing all possible to keep Venezuelan

authorities informed? I reviewed briefly our penetrations

and our activities

b. What is the real future in South Vietnam? The

President expressed the desire for an objective appraisal

and any recommendations that I might have for modification

of policy, changes of personnel and draw up a rough estimate

of what is the outlook. The President continues to be

concerned over public reaction and Congressional reaction

against our activities in South Vietnam. The President is

obviously opposed to Lodge (his opposition goes back to

conflicts in the Senate). He asked for recommendations as

to who would be a good man and who could run the American

team.

He noted Item b. in the Check list and I pointed out

the press exaggeration and distortion which appeared in the

New York Times. He asked that I personally meet with the

head of the Times in New York, pointing out how such distorted

reports seriously damage the American interests. I stated

that I would do this.

We discussed Item 2.f. having to do with the high level of

communications traffic and I stated that this could be considered as an

unfavorable indicator.

The President noted without comment report on Israel, USSR,

India military aid and Burma

c. The President asked what the outlook was with Greece, I told

him that we expected that Karamanlis would eventually be restored to

power.

The President stated that he had vigorously opposed our

noted

Doct a tite at and

...1

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SOP SEONEY

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withdrawal of assistance to Karamanlis, which he felt had a great deal

to do with his loss of office.

d. I pointed o

out to the President that we could expect some

trouble in Brazil.]

.. Ethe President asked about the future of Prime Minister Inonu

of Turkey. I stated that we expected that his government would fall

and that he would lose office soon after his return.

f. I repeated to the President briefly my meeting with President

Macapagal which is covered in a separate memorandum prepared by

Mr. Colby J

8: Also I raised the question of the importance of our taking

iniative in the Indonesia matter by working with Macapagal. We might bring

Indonesia round and also straighten out the Malayasia problem.

2. The President then turned to Cuba. He asked how effective our

policy was and what was the future of Cuba. He asked how effective the

economic denial program was and how we planned to dispose of Castro.

He said he did not wish any repetition of any fiasco of 1961, but he felt that

the Cuban situation was one that we could not live with and we had to

evolve more aggressive policies. He looks to us for firm recommendations.

In this connection we should prepare a briefing and also we should study

carefully various courses of action.

3.

The President then raised the question of the deal between the

Rumanian government and the Ferguson company for the procurement

of a steel mill and asked whether I thought this was a good thing. I

replied affirmatively, stating that in my opinion economic relations with

the satellites would tend to break down the closemess of ties between

the satellites in Moscow and this should be a very definite policy

effort on our part. I noted that Moscow had discouraged the Rumanian

steel mill because it did not fit into their pattern of economic integration

of the satellites and the Soviet Union.

The President then stated that he

agreed that we should attempt to pull the satellites away. He then brought

up the question of Tito and asked if I could give him the name of the best

man who could serve as Ambassador to Yugoslavia who would be able to

"win the girl away from Khrushchev." He said that in his opinion this man

should be an experienced, able man, perhaps in his 50's and preferably a

Republican, who could carry the confidence of the Republicans and a

personality who could win Tito's confidence and allegiance.

I responded by

stating that I would prepare a list of competent people who I felt could

- 2 -

Sinc

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## Page 20

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98

serve in this capacity and also in others. In this connection, the

President stated that he was not satisfied with the Ambassador-elect

to Yugoslavia and had therefore held up the appointment. His request

for help and the suggestion of names in connection with Yugoslavia and

the satellites is along the same line as to who would be a good

representative in South Vietnam.]

1. The President asked concerning our relationships on the Hill.

I said that they were excellent. The only problem was a continual

• harangue for a Joint Committee on Intelligence. I said that I felt that if

Senator Russell would expand his Committee to include Fulbright and

Hickenlooper, and Vinson expand his Committee to include two members

of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, that the issue would be put to

rest.

The President said he thought this was a good idea and that he would

speak to both Fulbright and Russell about it.

5. LIthen reviewed the brochure on the OXCART by giving the

President a broad picture of this development. I explained that surfacing

of it was a problem which had been under consideration by Defense and

CIA which I had discussed with President Kennedy. I said that McNamara

was pressing for a rather early release but that President Kennedy

felt that the timing of the surfacing was of very great importance. I said

that I felt that the timing was even of greater importance now and I had

some reservations about surfacing this vehicle in the first few days of

President Johnson's administration. The President seemed to agree and

suggested that McNamara, Rusk, Bundy and I meet with him on Friday for

a discussion of this problem.]

No arrangements were made as to the time of Friday morning's

briefing.

JAM/ mfb (tape)

3

Zhoc

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## Page 21

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in*.

".!"

26 November 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with The President - 25 November and 26 November

1. On Monday, November 25th, there"was no briefing of the President,

although there was a short visit with him at the State reception on Monday

evening. The President then expressed regret that events of the day

prevented a briefing and asked if there was any development requiring his

attention. I replied there was none and would call him if any developments

came to my attention.

2. On Tuesday, the 26th, I briefed the President, reviewing all

items on the Check List and the world reaction summary contained in the

Bulletin. Briefing and discussion on other matters consumed about

15 or 20 minutes.

3. The President asked if our entire applicable resources had been

made available to the FBI in connection with their report, which he had

ordered. I replied affirmatively.

NOTE: I should call J. Edgar Hoover concerning this.

(DCI did this at 1l:20 on 11/26/63)

4. The President asked my appraisal of the situation in Vietnam.

I replied that I was less optimistic than was the report received from

Ambassador Lodge.

5. Mr. Bundy stated the first order of business was to assist

State and assign a Deputy Chief of Mission capable of running the Country

Team and the American official community. Bundy recommended

Ar. Sullivan, Harriman's deputy. The President plans to have a man ir

osition not later than January first

6. McCone stated that there remained a number of individuals in

Saigon who continued to be troublemakers and should be removed.

Bundy confirmed this and stated actions were to be taken. No names

were mentioned.

NOTE: Apparently the President's appointment

secretary will be. a Mr. Moyrs. We

should get to know him.

---

## Page 22

7. The President noted with some considerable contempt the

fact that certain people in the Department of Justice had suggested

to him on Saturday that an independent investigation of the President's

assassination should be conducted by a high level group of attorneys

and jurists, probably headed by Governor Dewey. President Johnson

rejected this idea, and then heard that the identical plan was to be

advanced in a lead editorial in the Washington Post. The President

felt this was a deliberate plant and he was exceedingly critical. He

personally intervened, but failed with Mr. Al Friendly and finally

"killed" the editorial with Mrs. Graham.

JAM/ TMLee/ mfb

---

## Page 23

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'SEP 22 ' 98

B1:46PM

'..'..

25 November 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: South Vietnam Situation

ATTENDANCE: The President, Secretaries Rusk, McNamara, Ball,

Messro, Bundy and McCone, Ambassador Lodge

Now 24Д -ЗРУ

1. Ambassador Lodge reported that the change in government

had been an improvement, that he was hopeful over the outlook, that

he expected & speedup of the war, he thought by February of March

we would see marked progress. Lodge stated that we were not

involved in the coup, though we put pressures on the South Vietnamese

government to change its course and those pressures, most

particularly on indications of withdrawal by 1965, encouraged the

coup. Lodge stated that there were indications that North Vietnam

might be intereated in arrangements which would be of a nature

satisfactory to us. He did not elaborate. He that that everybody

was very happy after the coup and showed some pictures of the

crowds in Saigos. He mentioned that den. Don would be here and

that those talking with him should influence him to put on all the

pressure he could. He spoke most highly of the Papal delegate and

his intention to ses the Pope on Wednesday. He carried with him a

lotter from the Papal Delegate and also from the bishop of Saigon,

apparently praising the actions in upsetting the Diem government.

Lodgo sald he saw dangers of an anti-Christian move and this was

his purpose la seeing the Pope. He made & point that Bishop Thuc

had engaged in serious persecutions involving the imprisonment of

a great many people, including three Catholic priests. He also made

the point that Can, Diem'e brother, also engaged in a varlety of

activities of persecution and the execution of individuals and that

Can had, on his own premises, a buxial ground for his victims.

Lodge sald that we were in no way responsible for the death of Diem

and Nhu, that had they followed his advice, they would be alive

today. He said that he saved Can from assassination and that

Bishop Thuc was out of Saigon under orders from the Papal

delegate. (Note: I question whether the Papal delegate can order

a Bishop out of a country.) The tone of Ambassador Lodge's

statements were optimistic, hopeful, and left the President with

the impression that we are on the road to victory.

The Departman Or staie has no objection to the

release or declassification of this document in full

under the provisions of the JFK Assassination Records

Collection Act of 1992 (PL102-526)

Revered on _ 9/22/98 1gn

I see me basis

for CHA's efusion

---

## Page 24

57 22'98 01:4799

N.18

At this point McCone stated that out estimate of the

situation /

was somewhat more serious. We had noted a continuing increase

in Viet Cong activity aince the first of November as evidenced by

a larger number of Viet Cong attacke. We also noticed with

considerable concern a high lovel of message volume on the Viet Cong

military and political networke and this might quite possibly reflect

preparationa for further sustained guerrilla proasures. Furthermore

I stated that the military were having considerable trouble in

completing the political organization of the government and were

receiving little il any help from civilian loadership. Indead it seemed

to us that the competent civilians were staying on the sidelines and

continuing their traditional role of critics rather than turning in and

being helpful. I concluded by stating that we could not at this point

or time give a particularly optimiatic appraisal of the future.

The President then stated that he approached the situation with

some misgivings. He noted that a great many people throughout the

country questionad our course of action in supporting the overthrow

of the Diem regime.

He also noted that strong volces in the Congrese

felt we should get out of Vietnam. Both of these facts give the

President considerable concern. He stated that he was not at all aure that

we took the right course in upsetting the Diem regime but this was a

decision that he did not have to make as it was a fait accompli. He

said now that it was done, we have to see that our objectives were

accomplished. (Note: The inferences were that, left to his own

devices, he would not have supported the courses of action which led

to the coup. )

The President then stated he has never been happy with our

operationa in Vietnam. He said there had been serious dissension

and divisions within the American community and he told the

Ambassador that he was in total charge and he wanted the situation

cleaned up. He wanted no more divistons of opinion, no more

bickering and any person that did not conform to policy should be

removed. At this point Mr. Bundy stated that we were searching for

a replacement for Truehart and what we wanted was a capable

administrator who could run the Country Team. The President again

repeated his insistence that the Ambasador was the Number One man and

he, the President, was holding the Ambassador personally responsible.

Secretary McNamara stated that he had examined the economic

situation and that he felt we must give generously of economic ald

and must not ask the South Vietnamese government to do the Impossible

at this particular time.

• 2.

---

## Page 25

N.19

The President then sald that he supported this, but at the same

time he wanted to make it abundantly clear that he did not think we had

to reform every Asian into our own image. He said that he falt all

too often when we engaged in the affalrs of a foreign country we

wanted to immediately transform that country into our image and this,

in his opinion, was a mistake. He was anxious to getdong, win the war -

he didn't want as much effort placed on so-callad social reforme.

Note: I received in this meeting the first "President Johnson tone"

for action as contrasted with the "Kennedy tone". Johnson definitely

feels that we place too much emphasie on social reforma; he has very

little tolerance with our spending so much time being "do-goodera";

and he has no tolerance whatsoever with bickering and quarreling of

the type that has gone on in South Vietnam.

The meeting was followed by a statement to the press which was

given out by bundy to the effect that we would pursue the policies

agreed to in Honolulu adopted by the late President Kennedy. A

picture was taken of the President with Lodge, McNamara, Rusk and

Ball.

JAM (tape)/mfb

References:

1.

2.

IN-66988, 23 Nov 63

SC No. 11709/63, 18 Nov 63

Subj: The Milltary Situation in South Vietnam

!

---

## Page 26

14-00000

TOP SECRET DINAR 199

Pee- appreCENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Hopeful

spreed up tae

Feb. Marcle

With mugeng

23 November 1963

People quista cola

conger get ait.

DAILY BRIEF

Ball GausPen-Careta

Carm bie

put on presse

Naw happy with operalics

i recep and *South Vietnam: The accelerated tempo of Viet

win-us.

Cong activity in the post-coup period continues.

crall pressie

dursex, While the 149 Viet Cong attacks recorded during Papai delyati

the week ending 18 November are a drop from the

unde

previous week's record high of 233, the number is

still about 50 percent above normal for this year.

see Pape.

The attacks continue to be on a small scale.

They

Rub persenallare targeted primarily against strategic hamlets

respectale and outposts, with government paramilitary forces

bearing the brunt.

MEN-

24

marie

Their eyesid

Eccremen

Continuing high message volumes on Viet Cong

vid

military and political networks may reflect prepara-

tions, for sustained guerrilla pressures.

doil' ork

impossebe

The Saigon government apparently is proceeding

with a purge of military officers holding high mili-

Per

tary, intelligence, and provincial posts under Diem.

Caltalis que

Can- cura

cementin

On 22 November it announced the suspension of 31

officers. Some of these are under arrest. The

Lerit reforspurges may be partly in response to the demands of

deact of people

student and Buddhist groups seeking revenge against

prominent figures who sided with Diem during the

Buddhist crisis. (TOP SECRET(DINAR))

1

49

TOP SECRET (DINAR

---

## Page 27

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..

?''

....

26 November 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussion with President Johnson - Sunday,

November 24th at 10:00 a.m.

I briefed President Johnson at his residence at 10:00 a.m.

Briefing consumed approximately 20 minutes. Reviewed the

Checklist and I made the following points:

98

1. I explained the space event. Soviet ships are in place

which would indicate a long range ICBM test. However, the ranges

are not up, the area is not cleared and therefore the possibility is

that a planned ICBM or Lunar shot has been deferred.

2. I stated I felt the President showas at an early opportunity,

receive a briefing on Soviet long range detensive capability, their

current air defense capability and the status of the Soviet economy.

3. I referred briefly to our estimate of the Cuban situation,

the condition of their economy and our operational plans against

Cuba.

4. I stated that we are watching Venezuela and Ecuador with

great care. I gave the President a copy of the November 24th Summary

of World Reaction to President Kennedy's Assassination.

JAM:mcm

Inc

---

## Page 28

4-00000

(

25 November 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussion with President Johnson, November 23rd,

about 9:15 a.m. The conversation lasted approxi-

mately 15 minutes.

1. The President entered Mr. Bundy's office alone and

no one was present during the conversation.

2. The President opened the conversation by recalling a

long background of association and friendship with me personally,

his respect for the Agency, the fact that on a number of issues

that had arisen since I took office as DCI he and I had seen eye

to eye, he had complete confidence in me and expressed the wish

that I continue in the future exactly as I have in the past.

3. I confirmed my confidence in him, my desire to help and

support him in every way and my willingness to continue in the

future as I have in recent months.

4.

The President then asked of any world developments. I

reviewed details of the Checklist with him and explained the institution

of the "President's Checklist" with which he was not familiar. I

stated that we would continue the publication of the Checklist in the

future as we had in the past.

5.

It was agreed that for the next few days I would brief the

President in the morning personally and that senior staff officers

would brief the President's staff each morning as I have in the past.

The President asked that any matters of urgent importance be brought

to his attention at any time, day or night. He designated no inter-

mediary.

---

## Page 29

14-00000

6. At 12:30 I went to the President's office in the Executive

Office Building to tell him of the information received from Mexico

City. In attendance was Mr. Bundy. Following this I had a brief

exchange with President Eisenhower who was visiting with President

Johnson at the time.

7. This evening I called Secretary Rusk and reviewed with

him the information received from Mexico City, most particularly

the holding of a Mexican employee of the Cuban Embassy by

Mexican officials for interrogation concerning Lee Oswald. I

explained to Rusk the information that we had transmitted to the

FBI and to the authorities in Dallas. Rusk had not known of these

developments prior to my communication with him.

8. I offered the assistance on the part of Mrs. McCone and

me personally and also the Agency in connection with the appropriate

handling of official visitors arriving from all over the world who

might overwhelm the State Department's capacity. Rusk appreciated

this offer and said he would call on me. He further said that there

may be visitors we would like to meet with and, if so, he would make

appropriate arrangements. He indicated that he intended to avoid

having all incoming visitors appear as guests of the United States.

Each had their own embassy to take care of them, however, he

thought there might be some obligations in which I could be helpful.

He said that following the Arlington service on Monday afternoon

he would hold a reception in the Department which would be in the

form of some kind of a buffet and this would be the extent of any

planned activities. He thought it was quite probable that the President

would meet with several Heads of States at various times on Tuesday

and Wednesday.

JAM:mcm

(tape)

---