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(Draft--9/8/75)

Box 349

The "Executive Action" Capability

Along with the question of authorization for actual assas-

sination attempts, the Committee considered the extent and nature

of authorization for a CIA project which included, as one element,

the development of an assassination capability.

(a) Introduction

Sometime in early 1961, Richard Bissell (Deputy Director

of Plans) instructed William Harvey, who was at that time the

Chief of one of CIA's Foreign Intelligence staffs, to establish

an "executive action capability" which included research into a

capability to assassinate foreign leaders. (Bissell 6/9/75, p. 51;

Harvey. 6/25/75, PP. 36-37.) At some time within the same period,

Bissell and McGeorge Bundy (Special Assistant to the President for

National Security Affairs) had a conversation about the matter.

Bissell, Harvey and Helms all agreed

that the "generalized"

capability was never used"' (Bissell 6/9/75, p. 87; Harvey 6125/75

..:p. 45; Helms 6/13/75, p. 52).

"Executive action" is a

CIA euphemism, defined by the

testimony before the Committee as a project for research into

developing means for overthrowing foreign political leaders, includ-

ing a "capability to perform assassinations". (Harvey 6/25/75,

P. 34.) Bissell indicated that executive action covered a "wide

spectrum of actions" to "eliminate the effectiveness" of foreign

leaders, with assassination as the "most extreme" action on the

spectrum (Bissell, 7/22/75; P. 32). The Inspector General's Report

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described executive action as a "general stand-by capability" to :

carry out assassination when required (I.G., p. 37). The project

was given the code name ZR/RIFLE by the CIA.*

A single agent ("asset"), given the cryptonym QJ/WIN, . •

was placed under Harvey's supervision for the ZR/RIFLE project,

but never used in connection with any actual assassination efforts.

Richard Helms

described. QJ/WIN's "capability":

"If you needed somebody to carry out murder, I guess you

had a man who might be prepared to carry it out." (Helms,

6/13/75, p.: 53) .

Harvey did use agent QJ/WIN, however, to spot "individuals

with criminal and underworld connections in Europe for possible

multi-purpose use" (Harvey, 6/25/75, P. 50). For example, QJ/WIN;

reported that a potential asset in the Middle East was "the leader

of a gambling syndicate" with "an available pool of assassins"

(CIA file, ZR/RIFLE/Personality Sketches) .

However, Harvey testified that:

"during the entire existence of the entire ZRRIFLE project

no agent was recruited for the purpose of assassina-

tion; and no even tentative targeting of target list was

ever drawn." (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 45.)

Project ZR/RIFLE involved, generally, assessing the

problems and requirements of assassination and developing a stand-

* ZR/RIFLE was a cryptonym relating to two programs:

One was.

the executive action assassination capability.

The other was

another program which is not part of the subject matter of this

report: (William Harvey had been in charge of the CIA section

with general responsibility for such programs. This second

program was genuine, but it was also to provide a cover. for any

executive action operation: (Harvey, 6/25/75, p: 49.)

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by assassination capability; more specifically, it involved

"spotting" potential agents and "researching" assassination:

techniques that might be used (Bissell, 7/17/75, P. I1 and 6/9/75,

p. 73; Harvey, 6/25/75, PP. 37-A, 45). Bissell characterized

Project ZR/RIFLE as "internal and purely preparatory" (Bissell,

7/22/75, P. 32). The I.G. Report of 1967 found "no indication

in the file that the Executive Action Capability of ZR/RIFLE-

QJ/WIN was ever used", but said that "after Harvey took over the

Castro operation, he ran it as one aspect of ZR/RIFLE". (I.G.

pp. 40-41.)*

(b)

The Question of White House Initiation, Authorization,

or Knowledge of the Executive Action Project

There is general agreement on one fact: at some point in

early 1961 Bissell discussed the executive action capability with

Bundy. The timing of that conversation and whether "the White

House" urged that a capability be created were matters on which

the evidence varied widely.

Harvey testified that Bissell had told him that "the

White

House" had twice urged the creation of such a capability

and the Inspector General's Report quoted notes of Harvey's (no

longer in existence) to that effect. Bissell did not recall any

specific conversation with the "White House". However, his initial

testimony assumed the correctness of Harvey's notes, and stated

* A discussion of whether. ZR/RIFLE was related to the actual

assassination efforts against Castro is found at Section (d),

infra.

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that, while he could have created the capability on his own, any

urgings would have come from Bundy or Walt Rostow. In a later

appearance, however, Bissell said he merely informed Bundy of

the capability and that the context was a briefing by hin and

not urging by Bundy. Bundy said he received a briefing and

gave no urging, though he raised no objections. Rostow said he

never heard of the project.

William Harvey testified that he was "almost certain"

that on January 25 and 26, 1961, he met with CIA officials Sidney

Gottlieb, the new Chief of CIA's Technical Services Division, and

Arnold Silver, a CIA recruiting officer, to discuss the feasibility

of creating a capability within the Agency for "executive action".

(Harvey, 6/25/75, P. 52). After reviewing his notes of those

meetings,* Harvey testified that they took place after

his initial

* As to the date of these notes, Harvey was asked whether his no-

tations "25/1-Sid G" and "26/1-AS"

indicate that he spoke to Sidney

Gottlieb and Arnold Silver in 1961, as opposed to 1962. Harvey testi-

fied as follows:

Q: And is it your judgment that that is January 26, 1961 and

is about the subject of Executive Action?

Harvey: Yes, it is.

And it followed

you have recounted?

your conversation with Mi. Bissell that,

Harvey:

Well, when I first looked at this, I thought

this,

well, this has

got to be

'62, but I am almost certain

nOW

that it is not.

If this is true, this might place the.

cirst discussion that I had with Dick Bissell in early

January and this is difficult to pinpoint because there were

several

such discussions in varying degrees öf detail during

the

period in the spring, and very early in

'61 to the fall

of '61 period, but I did find.out fairly early on that silver

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discussion of executive action with Bissell, which, he said,

might have transpired in "early January" (Harvey, 6/25/75, p.

52): When Bissell was shown these notes, he agreed with Harvey

about the timing of their initial discussion (Bissell, 7/17/75,

p. 10) .

had -or that Bissell had discussed the question of assassi-

nation with Arnold Silver,

and this discussion, at the very

Icast, had to take place after I know Bissell already had

discussed the matter with Silver. (Harvey, 6/25/75, P. 52).

=

Harvey had also testified that, after receiving Bissell's initial in-

• structions to establish an executive action capability:

the first thing I did.:

• was discuss in theoretical,

terms with a few officers whom I trusted quite implicitly

the whole subject. of assassination, 'our possible assels;

ur posture, going back,

it you will, even to the funda-

nontal questions of A, is assassination

a proper weapon

of an American intelligence service, and B, even if you

assune that it is, is it within our capability within

the framework of this government to do it effectively.

properly,

securely and discreetly: (Harvey, 6/25/75,

pp. 37-4, 38) .

The Inspector General's Report connected Silver and Gottlieb to the

early stages. of the executive action project as follows:

Harvey says that Bissell had already discussed certain

aspects of the problem with Arnold Silver and with Sidney

Gottlieb. Since Silver was already cut in, llarvey used

him in developing the Executive Action Capability....

Harvey's mention of him [Gottliebl in this connection

may explain a notation by Dr. Gunn that Harvey instructed

Gunn to discuss techniques with Gottlieb without associa-.

ting the discussion with the Castro operation. (I.G.

Report, PP. 37-38) .

It is evident from the testimony of Harvey and Bissell that the turn-

over to Harvey of the Roselli contact in November 1961 was discussed

as part of ZRRIFLE (see Section (d), infra).

thus, their initiat

discussion of executive action can,

at the least, be dated before

November 1961 and the "25/1" and "26/1" notations would have to .

refer to: January, 1961.

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Harvey testified that the "executive action" capability.

was intended to include assassinations (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 35). :

His cryptic handwritten notes of the January 25/26 meetings, pre-

served at the CIA, contain phrases which suggest a discussion of :

assassination--and Harvey confirmed this interpretation: "last

resort beyond last resort and a confession of weakness", "the

magic button"

, and "never mention word assassination!'. (Harvey,

Ex. 1,.6/25/75):*

The Inspector General's Report did not mention these

notes, or their dates. However, in describing Richard Bissell's

initial assignment of

the "executive action" project to Harvey,

it referred to another set

of Harvey's notes, which were destroyed

after the preparation of the Report. The excerpt from these notes

quoted Bissell as saying to Harvey, "The White House had twice

urged me to créate such a capability"' (I.G:, P. 37). Harvey also:

testified that this "urging" was mentioned in his initial dis-

cussion of "executive action" with Bissell (Harvey, 6/25/75, P. 37).

However, the testimony from Bissell and White House aides in the

•Kennedy and Eisenhower Administrations is in conflict with Harvey's

testimony as to whether such "urging" had in fact been given to

Bissell.

*Harvey's notes also contained a phrase which suggests his con-

cern that any U.S. assassination attempts might brced retaliation

from other governments :

"dangers of RiS (Kussian Intelligence

Service) counter-action and monitor if they are blamed."

(Harvey,

Ex. 1, 6/25/75; Bissell, Ex. 1, 7/17/75).

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The following testimony regarding the relationship

between "the White House" and the executive action capability

was obtained by the Committee:

Harvey: Harvey testified that his missing notes indica-

ted that Bissell mentioned White House urgings to develop an execu-

tive action capability (Harvey, 6/25/75, P. 37). Harvey said that

he "particularly rememberled]" that Bissell said that he received

"more than one" urging from the White House (Harvey, 6/25/75,

pp. 36-37; 1111/75, p..59). However, he had no direct evidence

that Bissell actually had any such discussion with "the White House."

No specific individual in the White House was named to liarvey

(Harvey, 6/25/75, P. 31). Moreover, he said that it would have been.

"improper" for him to have asked Bissell who he had talked to and'

"grossly improper" for Bissell to have volunteered that name

(Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 37).

Bissell: Bissell specifically. recalied assigning Haricy

to investigate the capability (Bissell, 6/9/75, P. 51). However,

Bissell did not recall "a

specific conversation with anybody in

the White House as the origin" of his instruction to. Harvey (Bissell,

6/9/75, p. 51) .

During the course of several appearances before the

Committee, Bissell's testimony varied as to

whether or not he had

been urged by the White House to develop an executive action

capability.

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In his

initial appearances before the Committee on June 9 and

11, 1975, Bissell made statements that

tended to indicate that White

House authorization had been given. In response to the

"twice urged"

quotation of llaivey's notes in the Inspector General's Report,

Bissell said, "I have no reason to believe that lárvey's quote is

wrong." (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 51). Bissell accordingly said in

his

initial testimony that as far as he knew, it was true that he was

asked by the White House

to create a general stand-by assassination

capability. (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 49) .

Based again upon llarvey's missing notes ("White House urging").

and his initial statement that he had no reason to challenge their

accuracy, Bissell initially gave the opinion that icGeorge Bundy

(Id., 6/9/75, p. 49); Special Assistant to President Kennedy for

National Security Affairs, and Walt Rostow (Id., P. 51), Deputy

Assistant to President. Kennedy during 1961, were the two people from

whom such a request was most likely to have come (Id., p: 53) because

they were. "the two members of the White House staff who were closest

to CIA operations." . (Id., p. 54) :.

.

At another point in his initial testimony, Bissell. said that !

the creation of the capability "may have been initiated within the

Agency"' (Id., P. 81). And still later he said: "there is little ;

doubt in my mind that Project RIFLE was discussed with Rostow and

possibly Bundy" (Bissell, 6/11/75, P. 46) .

When Bissell returned to the Committee on July 17 and 22, his

testimony, given in light of information gained since his earlier

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appearances, was that there was no White llouse

urging. for the creation

of the executive action project, although tacit approval for the

"research"

project was probably given by Bundy after it was established.

First, he was shown the llarvey notes which had been preserved

and which, without any

mention of the White House, indicated larvey

had received his assignment prior to January 25/26, 1961. Those

dates -- just S days after the change of administration -- made

Bissell conclude that it was "very unlikely that that assignment

to (Harvey) was taken as a result of White House urging or consul-

tation' (Bissell, 7/17/75, P. 10). Bissell said that Bundy. did

not have any influence on the performance of his Agency duties before

the Presidential inauguration

(Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 23): Bissell

added that he did not remember meeting with anyone in the new ad-

ministration on matters prior to the inauguration (Bissell,: 7/22/75,

p: 23) . .

Second, when he returned in July, Bissell also said he was con-

vinced by telephone conversations with Rostow and Bundy that based

upon Rostow's duties. -- which, in 1961, had nothing to do with

covert action - he "'never discussed"- executive action with Rostow

(Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 10; 7/27/75, p. 22) .

As for Bundy; Bissell's final testimony (after telephone con-

tact with Bundy) was that he believed that he had informed Bundy

about the capability after it had been created (Bissell, 7/17/75,

pp. 10-11; 7/22/75, PP. 21-22) But Bissell confirmed his original

testimony (6/9/75, PP.

) that he did not brief Bundy on the

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actual assassination plots against Castro already undertaken by the

CIA (Bissell, 6/11/75, P. 47;.7/22/75, p. 31). Bissell was "quite

certain" that he would not have expected Bundy to mention the

executive action capability to the President. (Bissell, 7/22/75.

p. 35). •Bissell testified:

Q. Would you think the development of a capability to

kill foreign leaders was a matter of sufficient impor

tance to bring to the attention of the President?

Bissell: In that context and at that time and given the

limited scope of activities within that project, I would

not." (Bissell,. 7/22/75, p. 35) .

Bissell said that he and Bundy spoke about an untargeted

"capability" rather than the plan or approval for an assassination.

operation (Bissell, 7/17/75, P. 11). Bissell said that although :

he does not have a specific recollection, he "might have" nencioned

Castro, Lunumba, and Trujillo in the course of a discussion of

executive action "because these were the sorts of individuals at

that noment in history against whom such a capability might possibly

have been employed." (Bissell, 6/11/75, pP. 50-51).

Bissell said his impression was that Bundy, in addition to ex-

pressing no unfavorable reaction, to the project, might have actually

given a more affirmative reaction (Bissell, 7/22/75, pp. 25, 28):

Bissell testified that he might have interpreted Bundy's reaction

as approval for the executive action concept (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 30) .

=_3

I think the testimony of this witness is going

further in saying what you received from (Bundy) was,

in your view, tantamount to approval?

Bissell: I,. at least, interpreted it as you, can call

it approval, or you could say no objection. He (Bundy)

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was briefed on something that was being done, as I now

believe, on the initiative of the Agency. His (Lundy's)

comment is that he made no objection to it. I suspect

that hi's reaction was somewhat more favorable than that,

but this is a matter that probably someone Listening to

the conversation on which such a person could have had

differing interpretations. (Bissell, 7/22/75, P. 33).

Bissell's testimony on any conversation with Bundy regarding

executive action was speculative reconstruction from first appearance

to last because he had no "clear recollection" of the events (Bissell,

7/22/75; PP. 29, 36). But Bissell maintained that more "formal and

specific and explicit approval would have been required" before any

"actual overt steps in use of the capability." (Bissell, 7122/75,

p. 31) .

Bissell said that llarvey's notation about White House urgings

to develop an executive

action capability may have been a slightly

confused account of a conversation subsequent to the initiation of !

the project in which Bissell relayed Bundy's reaction to larvey !

(Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 25) .

Bissell testified that the development of an executive action

capability was "undoubtedly" initiated within the Agency (Bissell,

7122/75, p. 22).. He had acknowledged on his first day of testimony

that this would not have been unusual:

it was the normal practice in the Agency and an impor-

cant part of its mission to create various kinds of

capability long before there was any reason to be certain

whether those would be used or where or how or for what

purpose. The whole ongoing job of

..: a secret intelli

gence service of recruiting agents is of that character....

So it would not be particularly surprising to me if the

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decision to create ... this capability had been taken

without an outside request.

(Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 67-68).*

Bunds: icGeorge Bundy also testified that he had a conversation

with Bissell, during which the executive action capability was dis-

cussed (Bundy, pp. 4-5).

Bundy's testimony comports with

Bissell's on the fact that they spoke about an untargeted capability,

rather than an assassination operation (Bundy, pp. 4-5). But Bundy

said that the capability included "killing the individual" (Bundy,

p. 5) I Bundy's impression was that the CIA was "testing my reaction,"

not "sceking authority"' (Bundy, p. 15) " Bundy sunmarized his testi-

mony by saying:

I an sure I gave no instruction. But it is only fair to

add that I do not recall that I offered any impediment

either. (Bundy, p. 10)

Bundy said that he did not take steps to halt the development of

the executive action capability or "pursue the matter at all. (Bundy,

p. 19) because he was satisfied

that this was not an operational activity, and would not

become such without two conditions: first, that there

be a desire or a request or a guidance that there should :.

be planning against some specific individual; and second,

that there should be a decision to move against the indi-

vidual. (Bundy, p. 7) :

* For example, Bissell testified that on his own initiative, he

had requested a CIA officer to go to. the Congo to "nake plans and

develop the capability" for an assassination attempt against Lunumba;

if ordered (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 55).

*i Bundy also testified that he had

a vague recollection of hearing

about poison in relation to Cuba, but he did not connect this to the

• conversation about executive action. (See footnote, p. 6, Kennedy :

Pre-Bay of Pigs section, supra.)

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Bundy testified that he believed that neither of these conditions

had

been fulfilled (Bundy, p. 7) .

Bundy recalled the conversation as taking place "sonetime in

early months of 1961." (Bundy, P. 4). When questioned about the:

dates in Harvey's notes, Bundy rated the chance that the conversation

about executive action took place before January 25 -- when Harvey

was already discussing the project at the CIA pursuant to Bissell's

directive -- as "near zero"' because the new Administration had been

in office less than a week and he had been preoccupied with other

problems, including the Berlin crisis and reorganizing the National

Security staff (Bundy, P. 9).

Bundy testified that he did not brief the President on the

executive action project:

Chairnan: And you have testified that you did not take

the matter to the President?

Bundy: As fat as I can recall, Mr.. Chairman.

(Bundy, P: 16)

Bundy explained that the division of responsibility for national

security affairs excluded Rostow from jurisdiction over covert opera-

tions, making it unlikely that Rostow would be briefed on a project:

Like ZRRIFLE (Bundy, P. 11; Rostow, P. 11) .

Postow: Rostow testified that he was "morally certain" thati

during his entire tenure in government, he never heard a reference

to executive action or "such a capability or such an intention to

act by the U.S." (Rostow, PP. 10, 13) :

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Goodpaster and Gray: The responsibility for national security

affairs during the latter part of the Eisenhower Administration was

borne by Andrew Goodpaster and Gordon Gray. However, there was no

evidence which raised the name of either man in connection with the

develöpment of an

executive action capability. Both Goodpaster and

Gray testified to having no knowledge of it. (Goodpaster, p. 11;

Gray, p:. 56.)

(c)

Authorization or Knowledge of Executive Action Project

Бу DCI

"Richard Bissell said he was "quite certain" that Allen

Dulles had full knowledge of the executive action project for two

reasons: first, it "would have come to the DCI's attention" at the

time of the transfer of William Harvey between components of the :

Agency to work on Cuban operations;* and second, Bissell "would

imagine" it was mentioned to Dulles at the initiation of the project

(Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 35). Bissell and larvey briefed Richard Helms

on Project ZRRIfLE when he became DDP (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 53; Harvey,

7/11/75, p. 63). But Bissell did not recall briefing John McCone!

about the project when McCone took over as DCI (Bissell, 7/17/75,:

p. Il). McCone testified that he had no knowledge of such a project

(McCone, P. 43).

William Harvey said it was assumed that

the project was

within the paraneters

permitted by the DCI. But llarvey testified

that officially advising the DCI of the existence of the project

* Harvey's

late in 1961

transfer to Cuban operations was not completed until

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"a bridge we did not cross" and would not have crossed until

"there was either specific targeting or a specific operation or a

specific recruitment.". (liarvey, 6/25/75, p. 59):

(d)

The Question of Whether Project ZARifLe was Connected

to Any Actual Assassination Plots

The Conmittee has sought to determine whether the CIA de-

velopment of an executive action capability was related in any way to

the actual assassination efforts. One question raised by this

inquiry is whether the participants in the assassination operations

might have perceived the executive action capability as in some way

lending legitimacy to the actual assassination efforts:

(1) Conversation Between Bissell and Bundy

In his early testimony, Bissell said he did not have

a recollection of whether he discussed the names of Castro, Lumumba,

and Trujillo with anyone in the White House in the course of discussing

the project to develop an executive action capability (Bissell, 16/11/75,

.P. 51). However, Bissell testified that it was "perfectly plausible

that I would have used examples" (Bissell; 6/11/75; p. 51). He con-

- tinued:

in such a discussion of a capability, I might well have

used the three names that I just gave, because these were

the sorts of individuals

at that moment in history against

whom such a capability might possibly have been employed."

(Bissell; 6/11/75, p. 51) .

Bissell and Bundy both testified, however, that

their discussion of the development of the capability for assassina-

tion did not involve any mention of actual assassination plans or

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attempts (see detailed treatment al Section (b), supra). There

is no testimony to the contrary. The account of this conversa-

tion raises a question as to whether Bissell acted properly.in

withholding from Bundy the fact that assassination efforts

against Castro had already been mounted and were moving forward.

Bundy was responsible to a new President for national security

affairs and Bissell was his principal source of information about.

covert operations at the CIA.

(ii)

Bissell's Instruction to Take Over Responsibility

for Underworld Contact: November 1961

Both Bissell and Harvey recall a meeting in November

1961 in which Harvey was instructed to take over the contact with

John Roselli (Bissell, 6/11/75, PP. 19, 47; Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 86;

and 6/11/75, p. 19) --which had been used for the initial poison pill

plot as part of Project ZR/RIFLE: Harvey's notes placed the meeting

on November 15, 1961. (I.G., p. 39), during the period in which Harvey

was freed from his duties on another Agency staff to take over

direction of Task Force W, the locus of CIA activity against the !

Castro regime.

According to Bissell and Harvey, the November meeting

involved only. the planning and research of a capability rather than

a targeted operation against Castro (Bissell, 7/17/75, P. 13;

Harvey, 7/11/75, p. 60). But Bissell acknowledged that the purpose

of the Roselli contact had been to assassinate Castro, and that "it:

is a fair inference that there would

have been no reason to maintain

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it (the contact] unless there was some possibility of reactivating

that operation'' (Bissell, 6/11/75, P. 19). Bissell stated that

because the assassination plot against Castro involving the syndicate

had been stood down after the Bay of Pigs ... and there

WaS

no authorization to pursue it actively….

• the re-

sponsibility that was given to him (Harveyl was that of

taking over

an inactive contact."

(Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 14)

Bissell said that he had, in effect, asked Harvey to stand watch over

the contact in case any action should be required and further testi-

fied that it was never required:

The Inspector General's Report stated: "After

Harvey took over the Castro operation, he ran it as one aspect

Of ZRRIFLE." (I.G., p. 40). Harvey recalled that during a dis- :

cussion with Bissell of the creation of an executive action capability,

Bissell advised him of "a then going: operation" involving the names

of Maheu and

possibly Roselli and Giancana, "which was a part of the

Agency's effort to develop... . a capability for executive action."

- (Marvey, 7/11/75, PP. 55, 61). Harvey said that at the time of :

this discussion, the operation had been "in train" for "approxi-

mately two years or perhaps 18 months." (Harvey, 7/11/75, p. 54):

Although his "net impression" was that both the

"exploratory project" and the"specific operation" were "fully

authorized and

approved"

, Harvey

said he could not testify that

"specific White llouse authority for this given operation was implied

or stated"

• (Harvey, 7/11/75, P: 54.) Bisscll does not recall

telling anyone in the White House that something had been done to

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bring a CIA officer together with the criminal syndicate (Bissell:

6/11/75, PP. 19-20). Harvey did not recall any mention of the •

White House of any higher authority than the DDP in his November

meeting with Bissell (Harvey, 7/11/75, pp. 60-61).

Although Richard Helms was briefed and given

administrative responsibility (as DDP) for Project ZR/RIFLE three

months later, he did not recall that ZR/RIFLE was ever contemplated

as a capability to assassinate Castro (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 55) .

Asked whether the actual assassination efforts against Castro were

related to ZR/RIFLE (executive action), Helms testified: "In my.

mind those lines never crossed"' (Helms, 6/13/75, P: 52). However,

Bissell's testimony leaves more ambiguity: "the contact with the

syndicate which had Castro as its target. . . folded into the

ZR/RIFLE project. . . and they became one" (Bissell, 6/11/75,

p. 47). When asked by Senator Baker whether the executive action:

"capability... for assassination" was "used against Castro",

Bissell replied that it was

"in the later phase". (Bissell, 6/11/75,

p. 47). The instruction Exom Bissell to Harvey on November 15,

- 1961, however, preceded the reactivation of the CIA-syndicate assas!

ination operation against Castro by approximately five months.

(iii) Use of Agent QJ/WIN in Africa

QJ/WIN was a foreign citizen with a criminal back-

ground who had been recruited by the CIA for certain

sensitive

programs involving surreptitious entries which pre-dated Project

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ZR/RIFLE. Harvey testified that QJ/WIN's function after the advent

of Project ZR/RIFLE in 1961 was restricted to the "spotting" of.

potential assets for "multi-purpose" covert use.

However, in the Fall of 1960--before Harvey was

assigned to create Project ZR/RIFLE by Richard Bissell--agent.

QJ/WIN had been dispatched to the Congo by Arnold Silver, his

supervising CIA case officer in Europe. William Harvey, as the

Chief of the CIA Foreign Intelligence staff on which Silver worked,

had ordered QJ/WIN's mission to the Congo (CIA Dispatch AUDW-147,

11/2/60) and arranged the financial accounting for the mission

afterward (Memorandum to Finance Division from William K. Harvey,,

1/11/61). (QJ/WIN's activities in the Congo are treated in

detail

in the discussion of the Lumumba case; see Section —, supra:]

There are two factors which may raise a question as

to whether QJ/WIN was being used in an ad hoc capacity to develop"

an assassination capability before ZR/RIFLE was formally initiated.

- First, there is a similarity in the cast of characters: Harvey,

QJ/WIN, Silver, and Gottlieb were connected with the Lumumba matter

- and reappear in connection with the subsequent development of

"ZR/RIFLE, Second, Bissell

informed Harvey that the development of

an assassination capability had already been discussed with Silver

and Gottlieb before Harvey's assignment to ZR/RIFLE (Harvey, 6/25475,

p. 52; I.G. Report, pp. 37-38):

. Nevertheless, there does not appear to be any firm

evidence of a connection between QJ/WIN and the plot to assassinate

Lumumba.

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EINAL

DRAFT

Summary

TRUJILIO

R948

Agreed to by drafting

subcommittee on

August 28, 1975*

Rafael Trujillo was assassinated by a group of Dominican dissidents on

May 30, 1961.

Trujillo was a brutal dictator, and both the Eisenhower and

Kennedy Administrations encouraged the overthrow of his regime by Dominican

dissidents. Toward that end the highest policy levels of both Administrations

approved or condoned supplying aims to the dissidents. Although there is no

evidence that the United States instigated any assassination activity, certain

evidence tends to link United States officials to the assassination

plans.

Material support, consisting of three pistols and three carbines, was

supplied to various dissidents. While United States' officials knew that the

dissidents intended to overthrow Trujillo, probably by assassination, there

is no direct evidence that the weapons which were passed were used in the .

assassination. The evidence is inconclusive as to how high in the two

Adninistrations information about the dissidents' assassination plots

had been passed prior to the spring of 1961.

Beginning in March of 1961, the dissidents began asking United States

officials for machine guns. By the time four M-3 machine guns were shipped to

the CIA Station Chief in the Dominican capitol in April, it was well known

that the dissidents wanted them for use in connection with the assassination.

Thereafter, however, permission to deliver the machine guns to the dissidents

was denied, and the guns were never passed. Two days before the assassination,

President Kennedy personally authorized a cable to. the U.S. Consul General

a ..

* The second paragraph under V.A.3.c. and the paragraph under VII.C. were

drafted pursuant to the directions of the Subcommittee but have not been

reviewed by, the Subcommittee.

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in the Dominican Republic stating that the United States government, as a

matter of general principle, could not condone political assassinations, but

at the same time indicating the United States continued to support the dissi-

dents"and stood ready to recognize them in the event they were successful

in their endeavor to overthrow Trujillo.

'...

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I .

Background

Rafael Trujillo came to power in the Dominican Republic

in 1930. For most of his tenure, the United States government

supported him and he was regarded throughout much of the

Caribbean

and Latin America as a protege of the United States.

Trujillo's rule, always harsh and dictatorial, became more

arbitrary during the 1950's. As a result, the United States

States' image

was

increasingly tarnished in the eyes of many

Latin Americans.

Increasing American awareness of Trujillo's brutality.

and fear that it would lead to a Castro-type revolution caused

U.S. officials to consider various plans to hasten his abdi-

cation or downfall.

• As early as

February 1960 the Eisenhower administration

gave high level consideration to a program of covert aid to

Dominican dissidents.

(Special Group minutes, 2/10/60) .

In April 1960 President Eisenhower approved a contingency plan

for the Dominican Republic which provided, in part, that if the

situation deteriorated still further:

...the United States would immediately take political action to

remove Trujillo from the 'Dominican Republic as soon

a suitable

successor regime can be induced to take over

with the assurance of U.s. political, economic, and

-- if necessary . military support.

(Memo. from

Secretary of State Herter

to the President, 4/14/60;

Presidential

approval indicated in Herter letter to

Secretary of Defense Gates, 4/21/60.)

Simultaneously, the United States was trying to organize

hemispheric opposition to the Castro regime in Cuba..

Latin*

we twaded

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American leaders,

such as President Betancourt of Venezuela,

pressed the United States to take affirmative action against

Trujillo to dispel criticism that the U.s. opposed dictator-

ships of the left only. A belief that Castro's road to power

was paved by the excesses of Batista led to concern that the

Dominican Republic might also eventually fall victim to a

Castro-style Communist regime. (Rusk, PP. 8,9)

II. Initial Contact with Dissidents and Request for Arms

During the spring of 1960, the O.S. ambassador to the

Dominican Republic, Joseph Farland, made initial contact with

dissidents who sought to free their country from Irujillo's

grasp.

They asked for sniper rifles. Although documentary

evidence indicates that a recommendation to provide these

rifles was approved both within the State Department and the

CIA, the rifles were never provided.

A. Dissident Contacts

Ambassador Farland established contact with a group of

dissidents regarded as moderate, pro-u.s. and desirous of

establishing a democratic form of government.* (Farland

affidavit) Prior to his final departure fron the Dominican

Republic in May 1960, the Ambassador introduced his Deputy-Chief-

of-Mission, Henry Dearborn, to the dissident leaders, indicating that

* This loosely-organized group, with which contact was

es-

tablished, was referred to in cables, correspondence, and

memoranda

"the dissidents" and is

so referenced herein.

A Wi

1. 005 A

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- 3 -

Dearborn could be trusted. Then on June 16, 1960, CIA

Headquarters* cabled

a request that Dearborn become the "communi-

cations link" between the dissidents and CIA. The cable stated/

that Dearborn's role had the "unofficial approval of /Assistant

Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Roy R.T Rubottom"

(Emphasis in original.) (HQS to Station cable 6/16/60) .

Dearborn, agreed. He requested, however, that the CIA

confirm the arrangement with the dissidents as being that the

U.S. would "clandestinely" assist the opposition to "develop

effective force to accomplish Trujillo overthrow," but would

not "undertake any overt action itself against Trujillo

government while it is in full control of Dominican Republic"

(Station to HQS cable. 6/17/60). CIA Headqaurters confirmed

Dearborn's understanding of the arrangement (HQS to Station

cable 6/19/60) •

B. The Sniper Rifles

During the course of a cocktail party in the Dominican

Republic, a leading dissident made a specific request to Ambas-

sador Farland for a limited number of rifles with telescopic

sights.

The Ambassador promised to pass on the request (Farland

affidavit). He apparently did so after returning to Washington

in May 1960 (CIA memorandum for the record, 6/7/61).

* As used herein "Ileadquarters" refers to leadquarters of the

Central Intelligency Agency; "Department" indicates the

Department of State.

W1

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Documents

indicate that consideration was given within

the CIA to

airdropping rifles into the Dominican Republic.

At a June 21, 1960, meeting with Ned Holman of the CIA

Western Hemisphere Division, Ambassador Farland reportedly

suggested possible sites for the drops.

(CIA memo,

6/21/60)

Documents

also indicate that a meeting was held

around the end of June 1960 between

Assistant Secretary

• of State for Inter-American Affairs Roy R. Rubottom and

Col. J. C. King, Chief of CIA's Western Hemisphere

Division.

Apparently King sought to learn the Assistant Secretary's view

regarding "To what extent will the U.S. government participate

in the overthrow of Trujillo." A number of questions were

raised by King, among them:

"c.

Would it provide a small number of sniper rifles

or other devices for the removal of key Trujillo people

from the scene?"

• King's handwritten notes indicate that Rubottom's response to

that question was "yes" (CIA memo Of 6/28/60; King affidavit)

On July 1, 1960, a memorandum directed to General Cabell, the Acting

Director of Central Intelligence, was prepared for Colonel King's

signature and, in his absence, signed by his principal deputy,

Rudy Gomez (I.G. Report, P. 26). The memorandum stated that

a principal leader of the anti-trujillo opposition had asked

Ambassador Farland for a limited number of arms to precipitate

Trujillo's overthrow, and recognized that such arins

* Neither King nor Rubottom recalls such a meeting, nor does

either recall

any proposal for supplying sniper rifles.

(Rubottom affidavit

4.512

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5

so daddo

"presumably would be used against key members of the Trujillo

regime." The memorandum recommended that the arms be provided,

since the fall of the Trujillo regime appeared inevitable,

and therefore U.S. relations with the opposition should be as

close as possible. "Providing the arms as requested would

contribute significantly toward this end."

(CIA memo, 7/1/60)

Specifically, the recommendation was to deliver to dissidents

in the Dominican Republic 12 sterile*

rifles with teles-

copic sights, together with 500 rounds of ammunition.

Paragraph 4 of the memorandum stated:

"4. Approval for delivery of these arms has

been given by Assistant Secretary of State

Roy Rubottom, who requests that the arms be

placed in hands of the opposition at the earliest

possible moment." (Id.)

Gomez's recormendation was concurred in by Richard

Helms, as Acting DDP, and approved by General Cabell,

(I.G. Report, p. 26) .

The kind of arms approved, sterile rifles with

telescopic sights, together with the statement that they would

be presumably used against key members of the Trujillo regime

clearly indicated the "targeted use" for which the weapons were

intended. (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 77).

On July 1, 1960, a cable was sent to Dearborn by CIA

Headquarters informing him of the plan to airdrop 12

telescopically-sighted rifles into the Dominican Republic. The

*"Sterile" rifles are "untraceable" rifles.

(Bissell, 7122/75, F.69)

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cable inquired whether the dissidents had the capability to

realign

the sights if thrown off by the drop. On July 14,

1960, Dearborn replied that the dissident leaders were against

any

further action in the Dominican Republic until after re-

solution by the OAS of a Venezuelan complaint then pending

against Trujillo. The dissidents reportedly believed that

sufficiently strong

action by the OAS could bring Trujillo's

downfall without further effort on their part. (Station to

HQS cable, 7/14/60) The 12 sniper rifles were never furnished

to the dissidents.

On August 26, 1960, Dearborn cabled Deputy Assistant

Secretary of State

Lester Mallory reporting on a meeting between

a dissident leader and John Barfield, the Consulate's political

officer.

The dissident leader was reported to have lost

enthusiasm for an assassination attempt and was then speaking

of an invasion from Venezuela. However, by September 1, 1960,

- dissidents were again speaking about the possible provision to

them of arms. This time the request was for 200 rifles. For

the next several months, consideration centered on providing

200 to 300 guns.

II. Sunmer and Fall of 1960

In August 1960, the United States

severed diplomatic

relations with the Dominican Republic and recalled most of its

personnel. Dearborn was left as Consul General and de facto

CIA Chief of Station. Consideration was given both to providing

D6d S65d

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107 S

7.-

arms and explosive devices and to the use of high level

emissaries to persuade Trujillo to abdicate. By the end of

the year, a broad plan of general support to anti-Irujillo

forces, both within and without the country, was approved.

A.

Diplomatic Development --

Withdrawal of U.S. Personnel

Events occurring during the summer of 1960 further in-

tensified hemispheric opposition to the Irujillo regime. In

June agents of Trujillo tried to assassinate Venezuelan Presi-

dent Betancourt. As a result, the OAs censured the Trujillo

government. At the same time, in August 1960, the United

States broke interupted diplomatic relations with the Dominican

Republic and imposed economic sanctions.

With the severance of diplomatic relations, the United

States closed its Embassy. Most American personnel, including

the CIA Chief of Station, left the Dominican Republic. With

the departure. of the CIA Chief of Station, Dearborn became

de facto CIA Chief of Station and was recognized as such by

both CIA and the State Department. - Although on January 20,

1961, a new CIA Chief of Station came to the Dominican Republic,

Dearborn continued to serve as a link to the dissidents.

B.

Dearborn Reports Assassination May be Only

Way to Overthrow Trujillo Regime

Dearborn came to believe that no effort to overthrow the

1233

+*.

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ND

PICOTOST

Trujillo government could be successful unless it involved

Trujillo's assassination.

He communicated this opinion to both the State Department and

the CIA. In July 1960, he advised Assistant Secretary Rubottom

that the dissidents were

"... in no way ready to carry on any type of revolutionary

activity

in the foreseeable future except the

assassination of their principal enèmy."

(Dearborn to Rubottam letter, 7/14/60)

It is uncertain what portion of the information provided

by Dearborn to State was passed above the Assistant Secretary

level. Through August of 1960, only Assistant Secretary Rubottom,

his Deputy, Lester Mallory, and Staff Assistant Frank Devine,

were, within the Latin American Division of the Department,

aware of Dearborn's "current projects." (Devine to Dearborn

Letter, 8/15/601*

By September 1960, Thomas Mann had replaced Roy Rubottom

as Assistant Secretary for Inter-Anerican Affairs, and Frank

Devine had become a

Special Assistant to Mr. Mann. While

serving as Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary, Devine

reportedly spent ninety percent of his time coordinating State

activities in Latin America.

It was in this capacity that

Devine maintained almost daily communication with Ned Holman

and other officials of the CIA's Western Hemisphere Division

(Devine, p.7)

*Dearborn's candid reporting to State during the surmer of 1960

raised concern with the Department and he was advised that dertain

specific information should more appropriately come through "the

other channel" (presumably, CIA communications). Dearborn was

advised that his cables to State were distributed to at least 19

different recipient offices.. (Id.)

1: 18

113

1C 1

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So Link bion in

Mann solicited Dearborn's comments concerning plans.

under discussion for forcing Irujillo from power. Dearborn

replied in a detailed letter which concluded:

"One further point which I should probably not even

make.

From a purely practical standpoint, it will

be best for us, for the OAS, and for the Dominican

Republic if the Dominicans put an end to Trujillo

before

he leaves this island. If he has his millions

and is a free agent, he will devote his life from

exile to preventing

stable government in the D.P.., to

overturning democratic governments and establishing

dictatorships in

and to assassinating

his enemies. If I were a Dominican, which thank

heaven I am

not, I would favor destroying Trujillo as

being the first

necessary step in the salvation of

my country

and I would regard this, in fact, as my

Christian duty. If you recall Dracula, you will

remember it was necessary to drive a stake through

his heart to prevent a continuation of his crimes.

I believe

sudden death would be more humane than

the solution of the Nuncio who once told me he thought

he should pray that Trujillo would have a long and

lingering illness."

(Dearborn to Mann letter, 10/27/60)

c. Efforts to Convince Trujillo to Abdicate

Throughout the fall of 1960, efforts were made on both the

diplomatic and economic fronts aimed at pressuring Trujillo

• into relinquishing control, and ideally, leaving the Dominican

Republic. The use of high level emissaries, both from within

and without the ranks of government, was considered. • (Special

Group Minutes, 9/8/60; Mann to Dearborn corres., 10/10/60)

None of the efforts proved successful, and at the end of 1960

Trujillo was still in absolute control.

D. CIA Plans of October 1960

A CIA internal memorandum dated October 3, 1960 entitled.

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÷ 10

S

"Plans of the Dominican Internal Opposition and Dominican

Desk for Overthrow of the Trujillo Government" set forth plans

which "have been developed on a tentative basis which appear

feasible and which might be carried out..covertly by CIA with

a minimal risk of exposure." These plans provided, in part,

for the following:

"a. Delivery of approximately 300 rifles and pistols,

together with ammunition and a supply of grenades, to

secure cache on the South shore of the island, about

14 miles East of Ciudad Trujillo.

"b. Delivery to the same cache described above, of an

electronic detonating device with remote control

features, which could be planted by the dissidents in

such manner as to eliminate certain key Trujillo

henchmen.

This might necessitate training and intro-

ducing into the country by illegal entry, a trained

technician to set the bomo and detonator.'

(Emphasis

added) (CIA Memorandum, 10/3/60)

E. December 1960 Special Group Plan of Covert Action

On December 29, 1960, the Special Group considered and

approved a broad plan of covert support to anti-Trujillo forces.

The plan, presented by Bissell, envisioned support to both

Dominican exile groups and internal dissidents.. The

exile

groups were to be furnished money to organize and under-

take anti-frujillo propaganda efforts and to refurbish a yacht

for use in paramilitary activities. Bissell emphasized

vandedand

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V02 LanChE

to the Special Group that "the proposed actions would not,

of themselves, bring about the desired result in the near

future, lacking some decisive stroke against Trujillo himself."

(Special Group Minutes, 12/29/60)

IV. January 12, 1961 Special Group Approval of "Limited

Supplies of Small Arms and Other Material"

On January 12, 1961, with all members present,

the

Special Group met and, according to its Minutes, took the

following action with respect to the Dominican Republic:

"Mr. Merchant explained the feeling of the Department

of State that limited supplies of small arms and

other

material should be made available for dissidents in-

side the Dominican Republic.

Mr. Parrott said that we

believe this can be managed securely by CIA, and that

the plan would call for final transportation into the

country being provided by the dissidents thenselves.

The Group approved the project." (Special Group Minutes, 1/12/61)

A. Memoranda Underlying the Special Group Action

On January 12, 1961, Thomas Mann sent a memorandum to

Under. Secretary Livingston Merchant. The memorandun, sent

• through Joseph Scott, Merchant's Special Assistant, reported

on the disillusionment of Dominican dissidents with the United

States for its failure to furnish them with any tangible or

concrete assistance. Further, it reported:

Opposition clements have consistently asked us to supply

them with '"hardware"' of various types.

This has included

quantities of conventional arms and also, rather persis-

tently,

they have asked

for some of the more exotic items

and devices which they associate with revolutationary

effort.

(Mann to Merchant memo of 1/12/61)

The members of the Special Group were at the time: Livingston

Merchant, Under Secretary of State for Politicäl Affairs; Gordon

Gray, Advisor to the President for National Security Affairs:

John N. Irwin, Deputy Secretary of Defense; and Allen Dulles,

Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

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12

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Mann suggested for Merchant's consideration and, if

he

approved, for discussion by the Special Group, the provision

of token quantities of selected items desired by the dissidents.

Mann specifically mentioned small explosive devices which would

place some "sabotage potential" in the

hands of dissident

elements, but

stated that there "would be no thought of

toppling the GODR (Government of Dominican Republic)

by any such minor measure." (Mann to Merchant memo, 1/12/61)

This memorandúm was drafted on January 11 by Mann's Special

Assistant for CIA liaison, Frank Devine.

coveriny memorandum from Scott to Merchant, forwarding

Mann's memo, was apparently taken by Merchant to the Special

Group meeting.

Merchant's handwritten notations indicate that

• the Special Group "agreed in terms of Tom Mann's memo"

and that the Secretary of State was informed of that

decision by late afternoon on January 12, 1961. (Scott

to Merchant memo, 1/12/61)

There is no evidence that any member of the Special Group,

other than Allen Dulles, knew that the dissidents had clearly.

and repeatedly expressed a desire for arms and explosives to

be used by them in

assassination efforts.* While it is, of

course, possible that such information was passed orally to

some or all of the

members of the Special Group, and perhaps

even discussed by them on January 12, 1961, there is no

*Various CIA

cables, including those dealing with the sniper

rifles,

indicate that copies were sent to the DCI, Allen Dulles.

270.

Jadl

HIH

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documentary evidence of which the Comnittee is aware which

would establish this to be the case.

On January 19, 1961, the last day of the Eisenhower

administration, Consul General Dearborn was advised that

approval had been given for supplying arms

and other material

to the Dominican dissidents (HUS to Station cable, 1/19/61) .

Shortly thereafter, Dearborn informed Devine that the

dissidents were "delighted" about the decision to deliver

"exotic equipment." (Dearborn to Devine cable, 1/31/61)

v.

January 20, 1961 - April 17, 1961

(the kennedy Administration Through the Bay Of Pigs)

On January 20, 1961, the Kennedy administration took

office. Three of the four members of the Special Group (all

except Allen Dulles) retired.

Prior to the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion on April

17, 1961, a number of significant events occurred. These

events included meetings with Dominican dissidents in

which specific assassination plans were discussed, re-

quests by dissidents for explosive devices, the passage by

U.S. officials of pistols and carbines to dissidents inside

the Dominican Republic, and the pouching to the Dominican.

Republic of machine guns which had been requested by the.

dissidents for use in connection with an assassination attempt.*

*As indicated in the post-Bay of Piys section, infra, permission

to pass

passed.

those machine guns was denied and the guns were never

club 15 d

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These events are discussed below under subheading A.

Evidence reflecting the degree of knowledge of those events

possessed by senior American officials is treated

thereafter.

As used herein, "senior American officials" means individuals

in the White House or serving as members of the Special Group.

A.

Specific Events Indirectly Linking U.S.

to Dissidents' Assassination Plans

1. Assassination Discussione and Requests for Explosives

At meetings held with dissident leaders in New York City •

on February 10 and 15, 1961, CIA Officials were told repeatedly

by dissident leaders that "the key to the success of the plot

[to overthrow the Trujillo regimel would be the assassination of

Trujillo. "

(CIA memo for the record, 2/13/61) Among the requests

made of the CIA by dissident

leaders were the following:

(a) EX-FBI agents who would plan and execute

the death of Trujillo.

(b) Cameras and other items that could be used

to fire projectiles.

(c) A slow-working chemical that could be rubbed on the palm

of one's hand and transferred to Trujillo in

a handshake, causing delayed lethal results.

(d) Silencers for rifles that could kill fron a

distance of several miles. (Id.)

Other methods of assassinating Trujillo proposed by dissidents

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at the February 10 or February 15 meetings included poisoning

Trujillo's

food or medicines, ambushing his automobile, and

attacking him with firearms and grenades. (CIA memo for the

record, 2/13/61; 2/16/61)*

The dissidents' "latest plot", as described in the February

CIA memoranda, was said to involve the planting of a powerful

bomb, which could be detonated from a nearby electric device,

along the route of Trujillo's evening walk. (Id.)

On March 13, 1961, a dissident in the Dominican Republic

asked for

fragmentation grenades "for use during the next week

or so." This request was communicated to CIA Headquarters

on March 14, 1961, and was followed the next day by an additional

request for 50 fragmentation grenades, 5 rapid-fire weapons,

and 10 64 mn anti-tank rockets. Inis furtner request was also

passed on to CIA leadquarters. (Station to. HQS cable, 3/15/61)

There is no evidence that any of these arms were supplied

to

• the dissidents.

The documentary record makes clear that Frank. Devine at

the State Department was also advised of related developments

in a March 16, 1961, "picnic" letter from Dearborn who complained

that his spirits were in the doldrums because:

the members of our club are now prepared

- in their minds. to have a picnic but do not have

the ingredients for the salad.

Lately they have

developed a plan for the picnic, which just might

work if they could find the proper food.

They

* There is no record that the CIA responded affirmatively to

any of these requests and the CIA officer who drafted the

February 13 memorandum stated the view that some of the ques-

tions raised by the dissidents did not require an ansver.

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have asked us for a few sandwiches, hardly

more, and we are not prepared to make them

available.

Last week we were asked to furnish

three or four pineapples for a party in the

near future, but I could remember nothing in my in-

structions that would have

allowed me to contri-

bute this ingredient.

Don't think I wasn't

tempted.

I have rather specific guidelines

to the effect that salad ingredients will be

delivered outside the picnic grounds and will

be brought to the area by another club.

(Dearborn letter to Devine, 3/16/61)

After reviewing his "picnic" letter, together with the requests

in the March 14 and 15 cables discusser above, Dearborn con-

cluded during his testimony before the Committee that the

"pineapples" were probably the requested fragmentation

grenades and the restriction on delivering salad ingredients

outside of the picnic grounds was, almost certainly, meant to

refer to the requirements of the January 12 Special Group

order that arms be delivered outside the Doninican Republic.

(Dearborn 7/29, PP. 25-27).

2. The Passage of Pistols

a. Pouching to the Dominican Republic

In a March 15, 1961 cable, Chief of Station Owen reported

that Dearborn had asked for three .38 caliber pistols for issue

to several dissidents. In reply, Headquarters cabled: "Regret

no authorization exists to suspend pouch regulations against

shipment of arms" and indicated that their reply had been coor-

dinated with State. (HQS to Station cable, 3/17/61) The

Station Chief then asked Headquarters to seek the necessary

authorization and noted that at his last two posts, he had

received pistols via the pouch for "worthy purposes" and,

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-47512.3

therefore, he knew it could be done: (Station to Has cable,

3/21/61)

Two days later, Headquarters cabled that the pistols

and ammunition were being pouched. However, the Station

Chief was instructed not to advise Dearborn. (Hqs. to Station

cable, 3/24/61)*

b.

Reason for the CIA Instruction

Not to Tell Dearborn

Owen testified that he believed the "don't tell Dear-

born the pistol is being pouched" language simply meant that

the sending of firearms through the diplomatic pouch was not

something to be unnecessarily discussed. (Owen, pp. 78,79)

Dearborn said he never doubted the pouch was used, since he knew

Owen had no other means of receiving weapons. (Dearborn,

7/29, p. 33)

c. Were the Pistols Related to Assassination?

Dearborn testified that he had asked for a single pistol

for purposes completely unrelated to any

assassination con-

sideration. (Dearborn, 7/29, pp. 29-31) He said he had been

approached by a Dominican contact-who lived in a remote area

and was concerned for the safety of his. family in the event

of political reprisals. Dearborn testified that he had believed

* The Inspector General's Report, issued in connection with

a review of these events, concludes that:

"There is no indication in the EMDEED operational files

that the pistols were actually pouched.

The request

for pistols appears to have been overtaken by a sub-

seguent request for submachine guns."

(I.G. Report, P* 60)

This conclusion is difficult to understand in light of the March

24, 1961, Headquarters to Station cable; which provides:

• i!

"C. Pouching, revolvers and ammo requested TRUJ 0462

(in 20040) on 28 March.

Do not advise (name Dearborn deleted)

this material being pouched. Explanation follows."

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What U

the man's fears were well-founded and had promised to seek a

pistol.*

Although there is no direct evidence linking any of these

pistols to the assassination of Trujillo, a June 7, 1961, CIA

memorandum, unsigned

and with no attribution as to source,

states

that two of the three pistols were passed by Owen to

Lorenzo "Wimpy" Berry, a United States citizen who was in direct

contact with the action element of the dissident group. It

should also be noted that the assassination was apparently con-

ducted with almost complete reliance upon hand weapons. Whether

one or more of these .38 caliber Smith & Wesson pistols

eventually came into the hands of the assassins

and, if so, whether they were used in connection with the

assassination, remain open questions.

Both Dearborn and Owen testified that they regarded the pistols

as weapons for self-defense purposes and they never

considered them in any way connected with the then-current

assassination plans. (Dearborn 7/29, p.70; Owen, PP. 38,73)

-----

However, none of the Headquarters cables inquired as to the

purpose for which the handguns were sought and Owen's cable

stated only that Dearborn wanted them for passage to dissidents.

(Station to HOS cable, 3/15/61) Indeed, the March 24, 1961,

*Dearborn is clear in his recollection that he asked Owen to

request only one pistol.

(Dearborn,

7/29, PP. 30,31) Owen,

on the other hand, testified that if his cables

requested three

pistols for Dearborn then Dearborn must have asked for three

pistols.

(Owen, p.72)

The pistols were, however, apparently sent in one package

(HUS to Station cables, 3/27/61 and 3/24/61) and Dearborn testi-

tled that, what he believed to be the one gun, came

"wrapped

up" and that he passed it. ..: (Dearborn, -7/29,p.30)

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cable advising that the pistols were being pouched is the

very cable which was sent in response to a request by the

dissidents for machine guns to be used in an assassination

effort which had been previously described to Headquarters.

As with the carbines discussed below, it appears that little,

if any, concern was expressed within the Agency over passing these

weapons to would be assassins.

3. Passing of the Carbines

a. Request by Owen and Dearborn and Approval by CIA

In a March 26, 1961 cable to CIA Headquarters, Owen asked

for permission to pass to the dissidents three 30

caliber MI

carbines. The guns had been left behind in the Consulate by

Navy personnel after the U.S. broke formal diplomatic relations

in August 1960. Dearborn testified that he knew of and concurred

in the proposal to supply the carbines to the dissidents.

(Dearborn 7/29, pp. 42,43) On March 31, 1961 CIA Headquarters

cabled approval of the request to pass the carbines. (Hgs to

Station cable, 3/31/61)

b. Were the Carbines Related to Assassination?

The carbines were passed to the action group contact, wimpy Berry, on April 7,

1961. (Station to HQS cable, 4/8/61) Eventually, they found

their way into the hands of one of the assassins, Antonio

de la Maza. (Station to HQS cable, 4/26/61; I.G. Report

pp. 46, 49) Both Dearborn and Owen testified that the

carbines were atl

air,times viewed as

strictly a token show

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of support,

indicating U.S. support of the dissidents' efforts

to overthrow Trujillo. (Dearborn 7/29, pp. 46-48; Owen p. 39)

c. Failure to Disclose to State Department

Officials in Washington

• There is no indication that the request or the passage

of the carbines was disclosed to State Department officials in

Washington until several weeks after the passage. In fact, on

April 5, Headquarters requested its Station to ask Dearborn

not to comment in correspondence with State that the carbines

and ammunition were being passed to the dissidents. This cable

was sent while Owen was in washington, and it indicated that

upon his return to the Dominican Republic, he would explain

the request.

The Station replied that Dearborn had not com-

mented on the carbines and ammunition in his correspondence

with State and he realized the necessity not to do so. (Station

.

to HQS cable, 4/6/61)

Dearborn testified, however, that he believed, at the

time of his April-6 cable, that someone in the State De-

partment had been consulted in advance and had approved the

passage of the carbines (Dearborn 7/29, p. 44)

=..

3

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3. Requests For and Pouching of the Machine Guns

a. Owen Requests Machine Guns for Use

in Assassination

The Station Chief suggested that Headquarters consider

pouching an M3 machine gun on February 10, 1961 (Owen, pp. 63,64;

Station to HQS cable, 3/15/61). The request was raised again

in March but no action was taken. On March 20, 1961, Owen cabled

a dissident request for five M3 or comparable machine guns

specifying their wish that the arms be sent via the diplomatic

pouch or similar means. The dissidents were said to feel that

delivery by air drop or transfer at sea would overly-tax their

resources. (Station to HQS cablé, 3/20/61)

The machine guns sought by the dissidents were clearly

identified, in Owen's cable, as being sought for use in connec-

tion with an attempt to assassinate Trujillo. This plan was to

kill Trujillo in the apartment of his mistress and, according

to Owen's cable:

"4. To do they need five M3 or comparable machine-

guns. and 1500 rounds ammo for personal detense in

event fire fight. Will use quiet weapons for basic

job." (Id.)

In essence, _CIA's response was that the timing for an

assassination was wrong. Owen was told that precipitious or

uncoordinated action could lead to the emergence of a leftist,

Castro-type regime and the "mere disposal of Trujillo may create

more problems than solutions." It was Headquarters' position

that:

...we should attempt to avoid precipitous action

by the internal dissidents until opposition group

and HQS are better prepared to support [assassination/*,

effect a change in the regime, and cope with the alter-

math." (HQS to Station cable,

3/24/61)

* Word supplied by CIA in previously sanitized cable.

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The cable also stated that Headquarters was prepared

to deliver machine guns and ammunition to the dissidents when

they developed a capability to received them, but that security

considerations precluded use of U.S. facilities as a carrier.*

Soon, thereafter, on April 6, 1961, while Owen was in Washington

for consultation with Headquarters, he reported on events in

the Dominican Republic and

"especially on the insistence of the EMOTHl (dissident]

leaders that they be provided with a limited number

of small arms for their own protection (specifi-

cally, five M3 caliber .45 SMG's)."

for the record, 4/11/61)

9/1061)

(CIA memo

b.

Pouching the Machine Guns is Approved

by Bissell

Accordingly, on April 7, 1961, a Pouch Restriction Waiver

Request and Certification was submitted seeking permission to

pouch "four M3 machine guns and 240 rounds of ammunition on a

priority basis for issuance to a small action group to be used

for self protection." (Pouch Restriction Waiver Request 4/7/61)

The reguest,

submitted on behalf of the Chief, Western

Hemisphere Division, further provided:

A determination has been made that the issuance

of this equipment to the action group is desirable

if for no other reason than to assure this important

group's continued cooperation with and confidence in

this Agency's determination to live up to its earlier

commitments to the group. These commitments took

* This same cable of March 24, 1961, is the one which advised

that the revolvers and ammunition were being pouched.

TOP

Nobita

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TOP CECREA

the form of advising the group

in January

1961 that we would provide limited arms

and assistance to them provided they develop

the capability to receive it. Operational

circumstances have prevented this group from

developing the assets capable of receiving

the above equipment through normal clandestine

channels such as air drops or sea infiltra-

tion. "

The Waiver Request was approved by Richard Bissell, as Deputy

Director (Plans), on April 10, 1961. (Id.)

The machine guns were pouched to the Dominican Republic and

were received by the station on April 19, 1961.* (I.G. Report,

p. 42; Station to Headquarters cable, 4/19/61) •

On April 10, Walter Elder, Assistant to the Director, had issued

a memorandum which stated:

"MI. Dulles wants no action on drops of leaflets

in the Dominican Republic taken without

his approval." (Elder memorandum of 4/10/61) •

The Elder memorandum suggests

that Dulles did not know that an

air drop of arms was regarded as unfeasible and that pouching

had been approved.

B.

Knowleage of Senior American Officials (pre-Bay of Pigs)

On February 14, 1961, prior to the passage of weapons,

but a month after the generalized approval of the passage

of arms by the prior administration, a meeting of

the Special Group was held with Messrs. McNamara, Gilpatric,

Bowles, Bundy, Dulles, Bissell, and General Cabell in attendance.

* Permission to pass the machine, guns was never obtained and the guns

never passed into the hands of the dissidents. The matter is discussed

in detail beginning at page

* Elder testified that this note, sent the weekend before the Bay of Pigs

invasion of Cuba, was intended to make sure that there were no unusual

planes shot down or any unnecessary noise in the Dominican Republic"

prior to the Cuba invasion. (Elder, p. 51)

HH 50955 DooId:32423525 Page 46

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1OP.

The minutes state that:

"Mr. Dulles, assisted by Mr. Bissell, then summarized

for the benefit of the new members of the Special

Group the specific actions taken by the predecessor

group during the past year, and also a list of signi-

ficant projects which

antedate the beginning of 1960

and which it is planned to

continue." (Special Group Minutes

of 2/14/61)

In the course of the discussion, the following point, among

others, was

made:

"(a) Dominican Republic -- Mr. Bundy asked that a

memorandum be prepared for higher authority on the

subject of what plans can be made for a successor

government to Trujillo." (Id.)

The request attributed to Bundy suggests that the Domini-

can Republic had been one of the matters on which Dulles and

Bissell briefed

the new members.

What is unclear from the February 14 minutes (just as

it is unclear from the January 12 minutes) is the degree to

which the Special Group was informed concerning the means by

which the dissidents planned to accomplish the overthrow of

the Trujillo regime.

Specifically, it is not

known if

the new members of the Special Group were told that the

dissident group had expressed the desire to assassinate

Trujillo. Nor is it known if the Special Group was

r:

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advised that

the State Department representative in the

Dominican Republic had made the assessment that the Dominican

government could not be overthrown without the assassination

of trujillo.

Bissell testified that he had no clear recollection

of the details of the February 14 briefing and he was unable

to say whether or not the method of overthrow to be attempted

by the dissidents was discussed. (Bissell, 7/22, pp. 101, 102)

Robert

Mcivamara, one of the new members of the Special Group

in attendance for the briefing, has no recollection as to the

specificity in which the Dominican Republic was discussed at the

February 14 meeting. He does

not recall any mention by eitner

Dulles or Bissell of dissident plans to assassinate trujillo.

(McNamara affidavit).

February Memoranda

The Secretary of State sent the President a memorandum

on February 15, 1961, in response to a request concerning pro-

gress to assure an orderly takeover "should Trujillo fall."

The memorandum advised that:

"Our representatives in the Dominican Republic

nave, at considerable risk to those involved,

established contacts with numerous

leaders of the

underground opposition

.. /and7.. • the CIA

.,has recently been authorized to arrange for delivery

to them outside the Dominican Republic of small arms

and sabotage equipment."

This reference to recent authorization for delivery of

arms indicates that Secretary Rusk had received

some briefing

concerning events in the Dominican Republic and

the January 1961

TOP

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20 B-

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Special Group decision to provide arms to anti-Trujillo

elements. Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs,

Thomas Mann; Deputy Assistant Secretary William Coerr; and

Special Assistant Frank Devine continued in their respective

positions throughout the transition period. The Comnittee has

been furnished no documents indicating that Secretary Rusk or

Under Secretary Bowles were specifically advised as to the

intentions of the Dominican dissidents to kill Trujillo; intentions

of which the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs certainly

had knowledge. Indeed, Secretary Rusk testified that he was not

personally so advised. (Rusk, 7/10, pp. 41,12)

on February 17, 1961, Richard Bissell sent a briefing paper

on the Dominican Republic to MeGeorge Bundy, President Kennedy's

National Security Advisor. The paper made note of the out-

standing Special Group approval for the provision of arms and

equipment to Dominican dissidents and stated that the dissidents

had been informed that the U.S. was prepared to provide such

arms and equipment as soon as they developed the capability to

receive them.

The briefing paper also indicated that dissident leaders

had informed CIA of "their plan of action which they felt could

be implemented if they were provided with arms. for 300 men,

explosives, and remote control detonation devices." Various

witnesses have testified, however, that supplying arms for 300

men would, standing alone, indicate a "non-targeted" use for the

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70024441

arms

.li.e., a paramilitary or revolutionary implementation as

opposed to a specifically targeted assassination use). (Bissell,

7/29, p.30),

Concerning the briefing paper, Bissell testified that:

... it is perfectly clear that I was aware at the

time

of the memorandum to Mr. Bundy that these

dissident groups were, and had for a long time,

been hoping they could accomplish the assassination

of Trujillo. As a matter of fact, the requests since

Fruitions

some seven or eight months earlier was a perfectly

clear indication of that,

so that fact was not new

•knowledge." (Bissell 7/22, P.102)

When asked why the memorandun did not include the fact that

the dissidents intended the assassination of Trujillo, Bissell

replied:

"I cannot tell you, Mr. Chairman. I do not

remember what considerations moved me. I don't

know whether it was because this was common

Knowledge and it seemed to me unnecessary to

include it, or as you are implyiny, there was

an element of concealment here. I would be very

surprised

if it were the latter, in this case."

(Bissell, 7/22, p. 101)

In response to questions concerning the lack of information

in the February 17, 1961 briefing paper concerning the uses to

which the requested arms might likely be put by the dissidents,

Bissell stated:

I would say that the Agency's failure,

if there be a failure here was [not] (sic) to state

in writing that the plans of the dissidents

-would include assassination attempts."

(Bissell, 7/22, p.99)

Bissell's briefing paper for Bundy concluded with the

assessment that a violent clash might soon occur between Trujillo

0 ton

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and the internal opposition, "which will end either with the

liquidation of Trujillo and his cohorts or with a complete

roll up of the internal opposition." In this regard, the fear

was expressed that existing schedules for the delivery of

weapons to

the internal opposition might not be sufficientiv

timely, and it was therefore recommended that consideration be

given to caching the requested arms and other materials.

(Bissell to Bundy memo, 2/17/61)

Thus, by the middle of february 1961, the senior

members of the new administration, and in view of the "for

higher authority" nature of Bundy's request, presumably

President Kennedy himself, were aware of the outstanding Special

Group approval for the passage of

arms and other materials to

opposition elements within the Dominican Republic. There was

no modification or recision of the "inherited" Special Group

approval

and. it would

seem fair, therefore, to regard the

approval as having

been at least acquiesced in by the new

administration.

During March and early April1961, operational levels

within both the CIA and the State Department learned of in-

creasingly detailed plans by the dissidents to assassinate

Trujillo. There is no evidence that this information was

passed to the White House or to any member of the Special Group,

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50A0C -29-

iri

-5 k

except Allen Dulles:*

Similarly, there is no evidence that

the passage of the pistols or the carbines or the pouching

of the machine guns to the Dominican Republic was disclosed

**

anyone outside of the CIA during this period.

VI.

April 17, 1961 - May 31. 1961

(Bay of Pigs Through Irujillo Assassination)

Following the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion, attempts

were made by State and CIA representatives in the Dominican

Republic to dissuade the dissidents from a precipitous assassina-

tion attempt. These efforts to halt

the assassination of Trujillo

were the result of instructions from CIA Headquarters and were

prompted by concern over filling the power vacuum which would

result from Trujillo's death.

The machine guns arrived in the Dominican Republic but

permission to pass them to the dissidents was never given and

the guns never left the Consulate.

Dearborn returned to Washington for consultation and a

contingency plan for the Dominican Republic was drafted.

Two days before Trujillo's assassination, Dearborn received

a cable of instructions and guidance from President Kennedy.

The cable advised that the u.s, must not run the risk of associ-

ation with political assassination, since the U.s.,

as a matter

of general policy, could not condone assassination. The cable

* Copies of CIA cables, including the March 20, 1961 cable

describing the plan to

assassinate Trujillo in the apartment

of his mistress

were apparently sent to the office.

of the Director of Central Intelligence.

** Although a copy of the CIA cable advising that the pistols

vere being pouched was sent to the Director's office, Dulles

apparently did not receive copies of the cables approving

WH 50955 DocId:32423525 Page 52

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SL. 11a

further advised Dearborn to continue to hold open offers of

material assistance to the dissidents and to advise them of

u.s.

support for them if they were successful in overthrowing

the Trujillo government. The cable also reconfirmed

the

decision not to pass the machine guns.

Decision Not to Pass the Machine Guns and Unsuccess-

• ful U.S. Attempt to Stop Assassination Effort

By April 17, 1961, the Bay of Pigs invasion had

Loperation was a failed/....As a result, there developed a general

realization that precipitous action should be avoided in the

Dominican Republic until Washington was able to give further

consideration to the consequences of a Trujillo overthrow and

the power vacuum which would be created. (Bissell, 6/11,

p.113) A cable from ileadquarters to the Station, on April 17,

1961, advised that

it was most important that the machine yuns

not be passed without additionäl Headquarters approval.

The machine guns arrived in the Dominican Republic on April

19, 1961, and Headquarters was so advised. The earlier

ad-

monition that the machine guns should be held in Station custody

until further notice was repeated in a second cable from Ilead-

quarters, sent April 20, 1961. This decision was said to have

been "based on judgment that filling a vacuum created by assas-

sination Now bigger question than ever view unsettled conditions

in Caribbean area."

(HOs. to Station cable, 4/20/G1)

The dissidents continued to press for the release of the

nachine

guns and their requests were passed on to leadquarters

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tx dis la

in cables from Dearborn and Uwen. (Station to HUS cables

4/25/61)

On April 25, 1961, Owen advised Ileadquarters that

Wimpy Berry had informed him that Antonio de la Maza was

going to attempt the assassination between April 29 and May 2.

Owen also reported that this attempt would use the three

carbines passed from the American Consulate, together with

whatever else was available. (Id.)

In response to the April 26 cable,. Headquarters restated

that there was no approval to pass any additional arms to the

dissidents and requested Owen to advise the dissidents that the

United States was simply not prepared at that time to cope with

the

aftermath of the assassination. (See C/S comments,

Station to HUS cable, 4/27/61). The following day, April 27,

1961, Owen replied that, based upon further discussions with

the dissidents, "We doubt statement U.s. government not now

prepared to cope with aftermath will dissuade them from

• • attempt." (Station to HQS cable, 4/27/61)

Dearborn recalls receiving instructions that

an effort be made to turn off the assassination attempt and

testified that

efforts. to carry out the instructions were

unsuccessful:

In effect, the dissidents informed him that

this was their affair and it could not be turned off to suit

the convenience of the U.S. government.

(Dearborn, 7/29, p. 52)

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Met suit.

On April 30, 1961, Dearborn advised Headquarters that

the dissidents had reported to him the assassination attempt

was going to take place during the first week of May. The

action

group was

reported to have in its possession three carbines,

four to six 12-gauge shotguns and other small arms. Although

they reportedly still wanted the machine guns, Dearborn advised

Headquarters that the group was going to go ahead with what they

had, whether the U.S. wanted them to or not. (Station to HQS

cable, 4/30/61)

Dearborn's cable set forth the argument of the action

group that, since the U.S. had already assisted the group to

some extent and was therefore implicated, the additional assistance

of releasing the machine guns would not change the basic re-

lationship.

The cable concluded:

'Owing to far-reaching political implications

involved in release or non release of re-

quested items, Headquarters

may wish discuss fore-

going with State Department." (Id.)

B. Further Consideration of Passing Machine Guns

In reponse, a cable was drafted at CIA Headquarters authori-

zing passage of the machine guns.

The cable which was sent

to Allen Dulles, with Bissell's recommendation for its dispatch,

provided:

""Since it appears that opposition group has

committed itself to action with or without

' !!

**:

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additional support, coupled with fact ref.

C items [the carbines] already made available

to them for personal defense; station authori-

zed pass ref. A items (the machine guns] to

opposition member for their additional pro

tection on their proposed endeavor." (Draft of HOS

to Station cable, 5/2/61).

The cable was never sent.

In his testimony before the Committee, Bissell characteri-

zed his reasoning for recommending release of the machine guns

as :

• . . having made already a considerable

investment in this dissident group and its

plans that we might as well make the addi-

tional investment." (Bissell, 7/22, p.127)

The following day, May 3, 1961, Ray Herbert, Deputy Chief

of the western Hemisphere Division of CIA, who frequently acted

as liaison with the State Department in matters concerning

covert operations in the Dominican Republic, met with Adolph

Berle, Chairman of the State

Department's Interagency Task Force

on Latin America.

A Berle memorandum of the meeting states that Herbert

informed Berle that a local yroup in the Dominican Republic

wished to overthrow frujillo and sought arms for that purpose.

The memorandum continued:

"On

cross examination it developed that the

real plan was to assassinate Trujillo and they •

-wanted guns for that purpose.

flerbert wanted

to know what the policy should be.

"I told him I could not care less for Trujillo

and that this was the general sentiment.

But

we did not wish to have any thing

to do with any

assassination plots anywhere, any time. Herbert

said he felt the same way."

(Berle, Meno of

Conversation, 5/3/61)

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Copies of Berle's memorandum were sent to Wymberly Coerr;

the Acting Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs,

and to Special Assistant Frank Devine.

Both Herbert and Devine, who had been in almost daily

contact

with each other since. August of 1960, had been advised.

of the assassination plans of the dissident group. In fact,

Herbert, along with Bissell, had signed off on the proposed

cable of May 2, releasing the nachine guns for passage.

C. Special Group Meetings Of May 1 and May 18, 1961

On the day following the Berle-llerbert meeting, the

Special Group met

and, according to the minutes:

"The DCI referred to recent reports of a new

anti-Trujillo plot.

He said we never know if

one of these is going to work or not, and asked

what is the status of contingency planning

should

the plot come off. Mr. Bundy said that this point

is covered in the Cuba paper which will be discussed

at a high level in the very near future." (Special

Group Minutes, 5/4/61)

Once ajain, the cryptic reporting of Special Group Minutes

makes subsequent analysis as to

the scope of matters discussed

speculative.. It is not known to what extent and in what detail

Allen Dulles referred to "recent reports" of a new anti-Trujillo

plot.

Certainly, the most recent report of

such a plot was

Dearborn's April 30 cable -- disclosing an imminent assassination

attempt potentially utilizing U.s.-supplied weapons.

On May 18, 1961, the Special Group again considered the

situation in the Dominican Republic and,. according to the

!

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minutes:

" Cabell [Deputy DCI] noted that the

internal dissidents were pressing for the

release to them of certain small arms now in

U.S. hands in the Dominican Republic. He

inquired whether the feeling of

the

Group remained that these arms

should not be

passed.

The members showed no inclination to

ake a contrary position at this time.

Emphasis supplied. (Special

Group Minutes,

5/18/61)

D.

Final Requests by Dissidents for Machine Guns

On May 16, 1961, Dearborn cabled the State Department,

attention Acting Assistant Secretary Coerr, with an urgent

request from the dissidents for the machine guns. The cable

advised that the assassination attenpt was scheduled for the

night of May l0 and that, while the chances of success were

50 percent, provision of the machine guns would reduce the

possibility of failure. The dissidents

reportedly stressed

to Dearborn that if the effort failed, due to U.S. refusal to

supply the machine guns, the U.s. would be held responsible

and would never be forgiven. Dearborn reported that he had

informed the dissidents that, based on his recent conversations

in Washington, he was reasonably certain that

authorization

could not be obtained for handing over machine guns. (Dearborn

to State cable, 5/16/61)

A return cable from the State Department to Dearborn, sent

the same day, confirmed Dearborn's judgment. It instructed him

* There was no meeting of the Special Group at which the Domini-

can Republic was discussed between May 4 and May 18. The language

attributed to General Cabell as to whether the feeling of the

Group

remained not to pass the arms, tends to suggest that the

question of passing these arns must have been raised prior to

the May 18 Group meeting, Perhaps at the lay 1, 1961 meeting.

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N 01

366

to continue to take the same line until he received contrary

instructions which clearly indicated they had been cleared in

avance by the State Department itself. This cable from State was

approved by Under Secretary Bowles. (Department to Dearborn, 5/16/61)

Ray Herbert referred to Dearborn's May 16 request in a

memorandum he sent to Devine on the same date and asked to be

advised as to the Department's policy concerning passage of

the machine guns.

Herbert noted that when this request was

last taken to the Department, Berle made the decision that the

weapons not be passed. (Memo to ARA

from CIA, 5/15/61)

Devine responded to Herbert's memorandum on the same day,

advising Herbert that the Department's policy continued to be

negative on the matter of passing the machine guns.*

Herbert's

attention was directed to the January 12, 1961 Special Group

limitation concerning the passage of arms outside of the

Dominican Republic.

A copy of Devine's memorandum to Herbert

was forwarded to the Office of the Under Secretary of State,

to the attention of his personal assistant, Joseph Scott.

-

(Devine tö fierbert memo, 5/16/61)

E. Dearborn in Washington for Consultation --

Drafting of Contingency Plans

At a meeting of the National Security Council on May 5, 1961,

the question of U.S. policy toward the Dominican Republic was

considered and it was:

"Agreed that the Task Force on Cuba would

prepare promptly both emergency and long-

range plans for anti-communist intervention

• In the event of crises in Haiti or the

BY May 27, 1961 Dearborn was

advising the State Department that

the roup was no longer requesting the arms and had accepted the

fact that it must make do with what it had. (Dearborn to State

cable, 5/27/61)

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w.i".

Dominican Republic. Noted the President's

that the United States should not

initiate the overthrow of frujillo before

we knew what government would succeed him,

and that any action against Trujillo should

be multilateral."

(Record

of Actions

bv

National Security Council, 5/5/61)

(Approved by the President, 5/16/61)

Although the precise dates are uncertain, Dearborn was

recalled to Washington to participate in drafting of these

contingency plans and recommendations. Dearborn was in washing-

ton at least from May 10 through May 13, 1961.

While in Washington, Dearborn met with State

Department personnel and with Richard Goodwin and Arthur

Schlesinger of the White House staff. When testifying before

the Committee, he was unable to recall the substance of

his discussions with Goodwin and Schlesinger, aside from his

general assumption that the current situation in the Dominican

Republic was discussed. He aid not recall any discussion with

Goodwin or Schlesinger concerning arms, either those which had

been passed to the dissidents or those which were being sought.

(Dearborn, 7/29, Py. 58-61) Dearborn left the meeting at the

White House, however, with the firm impression that Goodwin nad been

reviewing cable traffic between Washington and the Dominican

Republic and was very familiar with events as they then stood.

(Dearborn, 7/29, p. 62)

TOD

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•On May 11, 1961, Dearborn prepared a two-page draft

document which set forth ways in which the U.s. could overtly

aid and

encourage the opposition to Trujillo. The drait noted

that means of stepping up the covert program were considered

in separate papers. (Dearborn draft document of May 11, 1961)

This Dearborn draft of May 11, 1961, was apparently used

as a

basis for portions of the "Dominican Republic -- Contingency

Paper" discussed below.

Two documents entitled, 'Progran of Covert Action for the

Dominican Republic" were provided to the Connittee staff from

State Department files. Each appears to be a draft of the

covert activities paper described in Dearborn's May 11, 1961

memorandum. One draft recommended an expanded U.S. offer to

deliver small explosive devices and arms. (Document indicating

it was attached to "Dominican Republic - Contingency," dated

5/12/61 and bearing Nos. 306-308). The other draft is very

similar except that it concludes that delivery of arms within

the Dominican Republic to members of the underground is not

recommended. (Document from State Dept. files bearing No. 310) .

Attached to the second draft was a one-page document which

Frank Devine believes he wrote.

It listed eight numbered

points including the following:

"1.

The USG

should not lend itself to direct

political assassination.

"2.

US

moral posture can ill afford further

tarnishing in the eyes of the world.

TOV

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"3.

We would be encouraging the action, supplying

the weapons, effecting the delivery, and then

turning over only the final execution to

(unskilled) local triggermen.

"4.

So far we have seen no real evidence oi action

capability. Should we entrust ourselves and

our reputation to this extent in the absence

thereof?

11.

Can we afford a precedent which may convince

the world that our diplomatic pouches are used

to deliver assassination weapons?" (Document

from State Department files bearing No. 313)

The other points raised in document No. 313 related to the

likelihood that any such involvement by the U.s. would ultimately

be revealed.

On May 15, 1961, Acting Assistant Secretary Coerr sent to

Under Secretary Bowles a document entitled "Covert Action Pro-

grams Authorized With Respect to the-Dominican Republic"

• That

document outlined the existing Special Group approvals for covert

assistance to Dominican dissidents and, while making no recommen-

dation as to further policy, suggested that the Special Group

review the outstanding approvals and communicate to interested

agencies the status of such authorizations. (State Dept. document

from Coerr to Bowles, 5/15/61)

During this period a document dated May 13, 1961, was

x1s5L

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prepared at the request of Richard Goodwin and was thereafter

circulated

within the State Department.*

This document,

entitled "Program of Covert Action for the Dominican Republic"

reported:

-.

"CIA has had in the direct custody of its Station

in Ciudad

Trujillo, a very limited

supply of

weapons and grenades. In response to the urgent

requestsfrom the internal opposition leaders

for

personal

defense weapons attendant to their

projected efforts to neutralize TRUJILLO, three

(3) 38 Cal

revolvers and three (3) carbines with

accompanying ammunition have been passed by secure.

means to the opposition.

The recipients have

repeatedly requested additional armed support."

This memorandum is the first direct evidence of disclosure to

anyone on the White House staff of the fact that arms had been

passed to dissidents in the Dominican Republic.

The original ribbon copy of the memorandum has the above

quoted material circled in pencil and the word "neutralize"

is underscored. Goodwin testified before the Conmittee that

he circled the above paragraph when first reading the memorandum

because the information concerning passage of the arms was new.

to him and struck him as significant. (Goodwin 7/18, pP. 48,49)

Under the heading of "Possible Covert Actions Which Require

Additional Authorization," the memorandum to Goodwin indicated

that the CIA had a

supply of four 45 caliber machine guns and

a small number. of grenades currently in the direct custody of

the Station in Ciudad Trujillo and that a secure means of passing

these weapons to the internal opposition "for their use in =

* See Scott to Bowles memorandum of May 19, 1961, enclosing copy

of Goodwin

memorandum.

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57.:

41

Cond

personal defense attendant to their projected efforts to re-

move Trujillo" could be developed by the Station.

The memo-

randum

made no recommendation to approve or disapprove passage

of these weapons. (Id.)

On May 15, 1961, Bundy forwarded to Goodwin another

memorandum. This one, entitled "The Current Situation in and

Contingency Plans for the Dominican Republic," had been received

by Bundy from the State Department. Attached was an under-

lying document which began:

"Recent reports indicate that the internal

Dominican dissidents are becoming increasingly

determined to oust Trunillo by any means, and

their plans in this regard are well advanced."

The May 15 memorandum stressed that it was highly desirable

for the U.S. to be identified with and to support the elements

seeking to overthrow Trujillo. The attachment

recommended that Consul General Dearborn inform the dissidents

that if they

succeed "at their own initiative and on their own

responsibility in forming an acceptable provisional government

they can be assured that any reasonable request for assistance

from the U.S. will be promptly and favorably answered." (Documents

from State Dept. files bearing Nos. 279-286) .

Drafts Leading to and Final Cable of May 29, 1961

A COpy of Dearborn's cable of May 16, 1961, requesting

urgent State Department guidance, was forwarded to Richard

Goodwin.

At the

specific request of Goodwin,

the State Department replied to Dearborn on May 17,

SECULI

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and advised him to keep in mind the President's view, as

expressed at the May 5 National Security Council Meeting, that

the United States should not initiate the overthrow. of Trujillo

before knowing what government would succeed him. (Depart-

ment to Dearborn,

5/17/61)

Dearborn responded on May 21, 1961, pointing out that

for over a year State Department representatives in the

Dominican Republic had been nurturing the effort

to overthrow frujillo and had assisted the dissidents in

numerous ways, all of which were known to the Department. It

was, Dearborn stated, "too late to consider whether United

States will

initiate overthrow of Irujillo." Dearborn invited

further guidance from State.

In response to Dearborn's reguest for guidance, the State

Department drafted a reply on May 24. The draft discussed a

-...

conflict between two objectives:

" (1)

" (2)

To be so associated with removal Trujillo

regime as to derive credit among DR dissidents

and liberal elements throughout Latin America;

To disassociate US

from any obvious inter

vention in Dominican Republic

and even more so

from any political assassination which might

occur."

TOP

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It was said to be the Department's considered opinion that

"former objective cannot, reyeat not, easily override latter."

(State Dept. to Dearborn cable, 5/24/61 - not sent)

This State Department draft was forwarded to Under Secretary

Bowles with the comment

that Goodwin considered it "too negative"

and that he would try his hand on a draft "for Bundy to present

tomorrow norning." (Memo from Achilles to Bowles, 5/24/61)

A May 26, 1961, memorandum from Bowles to Bundy begins:

"Following up on our discussion of the Dominican

Republic at yesterday's meeting of the Special

Group, I

am forwarding you a draft telegram which

we would like to send to Henry Dearborn, our Consul

General in Cludad Trujillo, supplementing the

guidance he will be receiving on the recently

approved contingency plans."

Minutes. of the Special Group meeting on May 25, 1961 do not,

however, reflect

any discussion of the Dominican Republic.

If, as Bowles'

menorandum suggests, a discussion concerning

the Dominican Republic did occur at the May 25 meeting, it is

not known what the discussion involved or what decisions,

if any, were made..

Richard Goodwin personally prepared alternate drafts to

the proposed State Department cable to Dearborn. Goodwin testi-

fied that it was his intent in revising the cable to communicate

to Dearborn, President Kennedy's personal belief that the United

States:

NW 50955

.. didn't want to do anything that would

involve us further, the United States

further,

in any effort to assassinate Trujillo."

(Goodwin, 7/10, p.32)

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At the same time, Goodwin's draft raised the issue of

further covert action

and transfer of arms to

the dissidents

and advised Dearborn to hold out the arms as being available

to the dissidents pending their ability to receive them.

It was the twofold intent of the cable as revised by

Goodwin, (1) to express the desire to remain in the good graces

of the dissidents who, it was believed, would constitute the

new government following Trujillo's assassination, and (2)

to avoid any action which might further involve the United

States in the anticipated assassination. This dual purpose

is clearly evident in the cable which advised:

• . . we must not run risk of U.S. association

with political assassination, since U.S. as matter

of general policy cannot condone assassination.

This last principal is overriding and must prevail

in doubtful situation." (Emphasis added)

*******

"Continue to inform dissident elements of u.S.

support for their position."

According to Goodwin, the underscored material was inserted in

the cable at the specific direction of President Kennedy.

(Goodwin, 7/10, PP. 22, 23).

With respect to the four machine guns which were in the

Consulate and which had been repeatedly requested by the

dissidents, the cable advised Dearborn that the U.S. was unable

to transfer these arms to the dissidents.

Dearborn was

instructed to:

=x

"Tell them that this is because of our suspicion

that method of transfer may be

unsafe.

In

actual

4aa1

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45-11

fact, we feel that the transfer of arms would

serve very little purpose and expose the United

States to great danger of association with

assassination attempt."

The cable, as revised by Goodwin and approved by President

Kenneäy, was sent to Dearborn on May 29, 1961. (State Dept.

to Dearborn cable, 5/29/61)

VII:

May 30, 1961 and Immediately Thereafter:

A. Trujillo Assassinated

Late in the evening of May 30, 1961, Trujillo was ambushed

and assassinated near San Cristobal, Dominican Republic. The

assassination closely paralleled the plan disclosed by the

action group to American representatives in the Dominican Republic

and passed on to officials in Washington at both the CIA and

the State Department. (Dearborn cable to State, 5/30/61) The

assassination was conducted by members of the action group, to

whom the American carbines had been passed, and such sketchy

• information as is available indicates that one or more of the

carbines were in the possession of the assassination group when

Trujillo was killed. (I. G. Report, pp. 60-61). This evidence indicate

however, that the actual assassination was accomplished by

(I.G. Report, P. 61)

handguns and shotguns.

B.. Cables to Washington

After receiving the May 29 cable from Washington, both Consul

General Dearborn and Station Chief Owen sent replies.

According

to Dearborn's testimony, he did not regard the May 29 cable

as a change in U.s. policy concerning support for assassinations.

(Dearborn 7/29/75/ p. 74).

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He interpreted the May 29 cable as saying:

11

...we don't care if the Dominicans assassinate

Trujillo, that is all right.

But we don't want

anything

to pin this on us, because we aren't

doing it, it is

the Dominicans who are doing

it. "

(Dearborn, 7/29, p. 104)

Dearborn testified that this accorded with what he said had

always been his personal belief; thae the U.S. should not be

involved in an assassination and that if an assassination

occurred it would be strictly a Dominican affair. (Dearborn

7/29, pp. 100, 101)

In contrast the CIA Station Chief, Owen, did regard the

cable as manifesting a change in U.S. policy, particularly. on

the questionof supplying arms. (Owen p. 120) He believed the

May 29 cable was the final word in U.s. policy on this

matter

and consequently felt that the government had retreated from

its prior position; of offering material support to the dissi

dents, and had adopted a new position of withholding such sunnort.

Owen's

responsive

cable to Headquarters stated:

"HQS aware extent to which U.S. government already

associated

with assassination.

If we are to at least

cover up tracks, CIA personnel directly involved in

assassination preparation must be withdrawn."

(Station to HQS cable, 5/30/61)

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Immediately following the assassination, all

. CIA

personnel in the Dominican Republic were removed from the

country and within a few days Consul General Dearborn was

back in Washington. The State Department cabled the CIA station

in the Dominican Republic to destroy

all records concerning

contacts with dissidents and any related matters, except not to

destroy the contingency plans or the May 29, 1961 cable to Dear-

born. (IQS to Station cable, 5/31/61.

C. Immediate Post-Assassination Period

The U.S. Consulate in the Dominican Republic was quick

to dispatch its early reports that Trujillo had been assassinated,

and the U.S. communications network transmitted the report to

President Kennedy in Paris. The President's Press Secretary,

Pierre Salinger, made the first public announcement of the

assassination, preceeding by several hours release of the news

in the Dominican Republic. Secretary of State Rusk testified

that when he learned of Salinger's announcement he was most con-

cerned. Rusk said that Trujillo's son Ramfis was also in Paris

and

he was afraid that Ramfis, upon first learning of his

father's death from the press secretary to the President of the

U.s

might try to retaliate against President Kennedy. (Rusk,

32, 33.)

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SCHNEIDER REPORT

Reviewed and Agreed to by

Drafting Subcommittee on

August 27, 1975

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SCHNEIDER REPORT

:

I.

Summary

II.

The President's Initial General Instruction

and Background

A. September 15 White House Meeting

B. Background: Tracks I and II

C.: CIA Views of Difficulty of Project

III. CIA's Implementation of Track II

A. Evolution of CIA Strategy

1. The "Constitutional Coup" Approach

2. Military Solution

'B. The Chile Task Force

C. The Use of the Army Attache and Interagency

Relations

D. The False Flag Base

E. Chief of Station

IV. CIA Efforts to Promote a Coup

A. The Chilean Conspirators

B. Contacts Prior to October 15

C. October 15 Decision

-...

D. Coup Planning and Attempts After October 15

E. The Killing of General Schneider

F. Post October 22 Events

..V. CIA/Whate House Communication During Track II

A.. September

B. October

C. December

D. Did Track II End?

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1

6

6

8

15

17

17

17

18

19

20

26

27

29

29

30

34

36

39

41

43

45

46 1114/1

54

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SCHNEIDER REPORT

- .

I.

Summary

On September 4, 1970, Dr. Salvador Allende Gossens won a plurality

in Chile's Presidential election.*

Since no candidate had received a

majority of the popular vote, the Chilean constitution required that

a joint session of its Congress decide between the first and second place

finishers.

This

constitutional requirement had, in the past, been pro-

forma.

The Congress had always selected the candidate who received

highest popular vote.

The date set for the Congressional joint session

was October 24, 1970.

On September 15, 1970, President Richard Nixon informed CIA Director

Richard Helms that an Allende regime in Chile would not be acceptable to

the United States. The CIA was instructed by President Nixon to play a

direct role in organizing a military coup d'etat in Chile to prevent

Allende's accession to the presidency, The Agency was to take this action

without coordination with the Departments of State or Defense and without

informing the U.S. Ambassador in Chile. While coup possibilities in

general and other means of seeking to prevent Allende's accession to

power were explored by the 40 Committee throughout this period, the 40

Committee was never informed of this direct CIA role. Nor did it ever

approve that role. The only institution to which the Agency was to re-

port, both for informational and approval purposes, was the White House.

*DI. Allende, a long-time Senator and founder of the Socialist party in

Chile, was a

candidate of Popular Unity Coalition.

The Coalition was made

up of Communists, Socialists, Social Democrats, Radicals, and dissident

Christian Democrats. Allende was a self-proclaimed Marxist and was making

his fourth try for the presidency.

His opponents were Radomire Tomic Romero,

candidate of the ruling Christian Democratic Party, and Jorge Alessandri

Rodriquez, candidate of the right-wing National Party.

Dr. Allende won

36.3% of the popular vote; Alessandri was second

with 35.3% of the vote.

DI. Allende's margin of victory was 39,000 votes out of a total of 3 mil-

lion votes cast in the election.

The incumbent President, Eduardo Frei

Montalvo, a Christian Democrat, was ineligible for re-election. Chilean

law prohibits Presidents from succeeding themselves.

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practice, this

meant that the CIA was to keep the President's Assis-

tant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, informed of its

activities.

Between October

5 and October 20, 1970, the CIA made 21 contacts

with key military and Carabinero (police) officials in Chile. Those

Chileans who were inclined to stage a coup were given assurances of

strong support at the highest levels

of the U.S. Government, both be

fore and after a coup.

One of the major obstacles faced by all the military conspirators

in Chile was the strong opposition to a coup by the Commander-in-Chief

of the Army, General Rene Schneider, who insisted the constitutional

process be followed. As a result of his strong constitutional stand,

the removal of General Schneider became a necessary ingredient in the

coup plans of all the Chilean conspirators. Unable to have General

Schneider retired or

reassigned, the conspirators decided to kidnap

him. An unsuccessful abduction attempt was made on October 19, 1970,

by a

group

of Chilean military officers whom the CIA was actively sup-

porting. A second kidnap

attempt was made the following day, again in-

successfully. In the early morning hours of October 22, 1970, machine

guns

and

ammunition were passed by the CIA to the group that had failed

on October 19! That same day General Schneider was mortally

wounded in an attempted kidnap on his way to work. The attempted

kidnap and the shooting was apparently conducted by conspira-

tors other than those to whom the CIA had provided weapons earlier.

in the day.

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Fi-*

A Chilean

military

court found that high-ranking military officers,

both active and retired, conspired to bring about a military coup and

to kidnap General Schneider.

Several of the officers whom the CIA had

contacted and encouraged in their coup conspiracy were convicted of con-

spiring to kidnap General Schneider.

Those convicted of carrying out

the actual kidnap attempt and the killing of General Schneider were assoc-

iates of retired General Roberto Viaux, who had initially been thought by

the CIA to be the best hope. However, later the CIA discouraged General

Viaux because the Agency felt other officers, such as General Camilo

Valenzuela, were not sufficiently involved. General Viaux was convicted by the

military court and received a twenty-year prison sentence for being

the "intellectal author" of the Schneider kidnap attempt. General

Valenzuela was sentenced by the military court to three years in exile

for taking part in the conspiracy to prevent Allende's assumption of

office.

The military court found that the two Generals had been in

contact throughout the coup plotting.

The principal facts leading up to the death of General Schneider (all

of which

are discussed in more detail below) are as follows:

I. By the end of September 1970, it appeared that the only feasible

way for the CIA to implement the Presidential order to prevent Allende from

coming to power was to foment

a coup

d'etat.

2. All of the known coup plots developed within the Chilean mili-

• tary entailed the removal of General Schneider by one means or another.

3. United States officials continued

to encourage and support Chilean..

plans for a coup after it became known that the first step would be to

kidnap General Schneider.

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:

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4. Two unsuccessful kidnap attempts were made, one on October 19,

the other on October 20.

Following these attempts, and with knowledge

of their failure, the CIA passed three submachine guns and ammunition

to Chilean officers who still planned to kidnap General Schneider.

5. In a third kidnap

attempt on October 22, apparently conducted

by Chileans other than those to whom weapons had been supplied, General

Schneider was shot and subsequently died. The guns used in the abor-

tive kidnapping of General Schneider were, in all probability, not those

supplied by

the CIA to the conspirators. The Chilean military court

which investigated the Schneider killing determined that Schneider had

been murdered by handguns,

although one machine gun was at the scene of

the killing.*

6. While there is no question that the CIA received a direct.

instruction from the President on September 15th to attempt to foment

a coup, the Committee received sharply conflicting testimony about

whether the White House was kept informed of, and authorized, the

coup efforts in Chile after October 15. On one side of the conflict

is the testimony of Henry Kissinger and General Alexander Haig; on the

other, that of CIA officials. Kissinger testified that the White House

stood down CIA efforts to promote a military coup d'etat in Chile on

October 15, 1970. After that date, Kissinger testified--and Haig. agreed-

that the White House neither knew of, nor specifically approved, CIA

coup activities in Chile. CIA officials, on the other hand, have testi-

fied that their activities in Chile after October 15 were known to and

* The Committee has not been able to determine whether or not

the machine gun at the scene of the Schneider killing was one of the

three supplied by the CIA.

ять

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thus authorized by the White House.

This conflict in testimony, which the Conmittee has been unable

to resolve through its hearings or the documentary record, leaves un-

answered the most serious question

of whether the CIA was acting

pursuant to higher authority (the CIA's view) or was pursuing coup

activities

in Chile without sufficient commnication (the Kissinger/

Haig

view).

r. :

*

The basic issue is whether or not the CIA-informed the White House of

its activities. In context, informing was tantamount to being authorized.

No one who testified believed that the CIA was required to seek step-by-

step authorization for its activities; rather the burden was on the White

House to object if a line of activity being pursued by the CIA seemed

unwise. Both Kissinger and Haig agreed that if the CIA had proposed a persua-

sive plan to them, it almost certainly would have been approved.

did not believe it

needed

specific White House authorization to

transfer wea-

pons to the Chileans; in fact, CIA Deputy Director (Plans) Thomas

Karamessines testified that he did not formally approve the transfer,

but rather that in the context of the project it was clear that the

Agency had the authority to transfer weapons and that it was clear to

Karamessines' subordinates that he would approve their decision to do

sO.

He believed he probably was informed before the weapons actually m

.. -

were sent.

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The President's Initial General Instruction and Background

A.

September 15 White House Meeting

On September 15, 1970, President Nixon met with his Assistant for

National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, CIA Director Richard Helms,

and

Attorney General John Mitchell at the White House. The topic was

Chile.

Handwritten notes taken by Director Helms at that meeting re-

flect both its tenor and the President's instructions:

1 in 10 chance perhaps, but save Chile!

worth spending

not concerned risks involved

no involvement of Embassy

$10,000,000 available, more if necessary

full-time job--best men we have

game plan

make the economy scream

48 hours

for plan of action

In his testimony before the Select Committee, Director Helms recalled

coming away from the meeting on September 15 with:

... (the) impression...that the President came down

very hard that he wanted something done, and he

didn't much care how and that he was prepared to

make money available....This was a pretty all-

inclusive order....If I ever carried a marshall's

baton in my knapsack out of the Oval Office, it

was that day. *

(Helms testimony, July 15, pp. 6,10,11)

*

Director Helms also testified that the September 15th meeting with

President Nixon may have been triggered by the presence of Augustin

Edwards, the publisher of the Santiago daily El Mercurio, in Washing-

ton.

That morning, at the request of Donald Kendall, President of

Pepsi Cola, Henry Kissinger and John Mitchell had met for breakfast

with Kendall and Edwards. (Mitchell calendar) The topic of conversa-

tion was the political situation in Chile and the plight of El Mercurio

and other anti-Allende forces. • According to Mr. Helms:

-I recall that prior to this meeting (with the President)

the editor of El Mercurio had come to Washington. and

I had been asked to go and talk to. him at one of the

hotels here, this having been arranged through Don

Kendall, the head

of the Pepsi Cola Company....I have

this impression that the President called this meeting

where I have my handwritten notes because of Edwards'

presence in Washington and what he heard from Kendall

about what Edwards was saying about conditions in

Chile and what was happening there.

(Helms testimony, July 15, pp. 4-5)

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However, none of the CIA officers believed that assassination was within

i the guidelines Helms had been given.

Senator Hart of Colorado.

...did the kind of carte

blanche mandate you carried, the marshall's baton

that you carried out in

a knapsack, to stop Allende

from

assuming office, include physical elimination?

Mr. Helms.

Well, not in my mind, because when I be-

came Director, I had already made up my mind that we

weren't going to have any of that business when I was

Director, and I had made that clear to my fellows, and

I think they will tell you this.

The following day, September 16, Director Helms called a meeting

at the CIA to discuss the Chilean situation. At this meeting, he re-

lated to his colleagues his understanding of the President's instruc-

tions:

2. The Director told the group that President

Nixon had decided that an Allende regime in Chile

was unacceptable to the United States. The Presi-

dent asked the Agency to prevent Allende from com-

ing to power or to unseat him. The President

authorized $10,000,000 for this purpose, if needed.

Further, the Agency is to carry out this mission

without coordination with the Departments of State

or Defense.

(Memorandum/Genesis of the Project, 16 Sept. 1970)

Henry Kissinger's recollection of the September 15 meeting with

President Nixon is in accord with that of Richard Helms.*

Although

Dr. Kissinger did not recall the President's instructions to be as

precise

those related by Director Helms, he did testify that:

..the primary thrust of the September 15th meeting

was to urge Helms to do whatever he could to prevent

Allende from being seated. (Kissinger testimony, p. 13)

* * *

The documents, and the officials from whom the Committee has heard

testimony, are

in substantial agreement about what President Nixon

authorized on September 15, namely CIA involvement in promoting a

military coup

d'etat in Chile.

There is not, however, agreement

about what was communicated between the CIA and

the White House--

and hence what was authorized by the latter--in the week. between

October 15 and the death of General Schneider, October 22.

This

matter will be discussed in Part V of this report on the Schneider

killing.

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"It is clear that President Nixon wanted him (Helms)

to encourage the Chilean military to cooperate or

to take the initiative in preventing Allende from

taking office.

(Kissinger testimony, p. 12)

Operationally, the CIA set the President's instructions into motion

on September 21.

On that day two cables were sent from CIA Headquarters

to Santiago informing the CIA Chief of Station (COS) of his new directive:

3..

Purpose of exercise is to prevent Allende as-

sumption of power.

Parliamentary legerdemain has

been discarded.

Military solution is objective.

(Hqs. to Stn. 236, 21 September 1970)

***

B. (Track Two) -This is authority granted to CIA

only, to work toward a military solution to problem.

As part of authority we were explicitly told that

40 Committee, State, Ambassador and Embassy were

not to be told

of this Track Two nor involved in any

(Hqs. to Stn. 240, 21 September 1970)

B. Background: Tracks I and II

United States Government concern over an Allende regime in Chile

did not begin with President Nixon's September 15 instruction to the

CIA. " For more than a year, Chile had been on the 40 Committee's agenda.

At an April 15, 1969, meeting of the 303 Committee (the predecessor of

.. " the 40 Committee) the question arose as to whether anything should be

done with regard to the September 1970 Presidential election in Chile.

At that time, Director Helms pointed out that "an election operation will

N7

i...

Covert U.S. Government involvement in large-scale political action

programs in Chile began

with the 1964 Presidential election.

As in

1970, this was

in response to the perceived threat of Salvadore

Allende.

Over $3 million was spent by the CIA in the 1964 effort.

(Colby testimony, July 14, 1975, p. 5)

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*

not be effective unless an early enough start is made.

On March 25,

1970, the 40 Committee approved a joint Embassy/CIA proposal recom-

mending that "spoiling" operations--propaganda and other activities--

be undertaken by the CIA in an effort to prevent an election victory

by Allende's Popular Unity (UP) Coalition. A total of $135,000 was

authorized by the 40 Committee for this anti-Allende activity. On

June 18, 1970, the U.S. Ambassador to Chile, Edward Korry, submitted a

two-phase proposal to the Department of State and the CIA for review.

The first phase involved an increase in support to the anti-Allende :

campaign.. The second was a contingency plan to make "a $500,000 effort

in Congress to persuade certain shifts in voting on 24 October 1970."

Phase II was, stated simply, a proposal to bribe Chilean Congressmen to

vote against Allende should he win a plurality in the September 4 elec-

tion. On June 27, 1970, the 40 Committee increased funding for the

anti-Allende "spoiling" operation to $390,000. A decision on Ambassador

Korry's bribe proposal was deferred pending the results of the September 4

election.

The 40 Committee met twice between the time Allende received a plural-

ity of the popular vote on September 4 and President Nixon issued his

instruction to Director Helms on September 15** At both these meetings the :

question of U.s. involvement in a military coup against Allende was raised.

Kissinger stressed the importance of these

meetings when he 'testified be-

fore the Select Committee:

*This and other references to 40 Committee discussions and

actions regard-

ing Chile are contained in a memorandum provided to the Committee by the

CIA entitled "Policy Decisions Related. to Our Covert

Action Involvement

in the September. 1970 Chilean Presidential Election," dated Octobér 9, 1970.

On August 25, 1975, we subpoenaed all White House/National Security Council

documents and records relating to the effort by the United States Govern-

ment to

prevent Salvadore Allende from assuming office.

On September 4, the

Committee received.

14o documents from the white, ouse relating to Chile cover-

ing the period September

to Octobet, 14, 1970.4

**See Page 9a.

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**Following the September 4 election, the CIA's Directorate. of Intelli-

gence circulated an intelligence community assessment of the impact of

an Allende government on U.S. national interests.

That assessment,

dated September 7, 1970, stated:

Regarding threats to U.S. interests, we conclude that:

1.. The U.S, has no vital national interests within Chile.

There would, however, be tangible economic losses.

2. The world military balance of power would not be sig-

nificantly altered by an Allende government.

3. An Allende victory would, however, create consider-

able. political and psychological costs:

Hemispheric cohesion would be threatened by

the challenge that an Allende government.

would pose to the OAS, and by the reactions

that it would create in other countries.

We do not see, however,

any likely threat

to the peace

of the region.

b. An Allende victory would represent a defin-

ite psychological set-back to the U.S. and

a definite psychological advance for the

Marxist idea. (Intelligence Memorandum/

"Situation Following the Chilean Presidential

Election," CIA's Directorate of Intelligence,

7 September 1970)

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I. think the meeting of September 15th has to be

seen in the context of two previous meetings of

the 40 Committee on September 8th and September

14th in which the 40 Committee was asked to look

at the pros and cons and the problems and pros-

pects of a Chilean military coup to be organized

with United States

assistance.

(Kissinger testimony, P. 5)

According to the summary of the 40 Committee meeting on September

8, the following was discussed:

...all concerned

realized that previous plans for

a Phase II would have

to be drastically redrawn....

The DCI made the point, however, that congressional

action against Allende

was not likely to succeed

and that once Allende was in office the Chilean

opposition to him would disintegrate and collapse

rapidly. While not advocating a

specific course

of action, the Director further observed that a

military golpe against Allende would have very

little chance of success unless undertaken soon.

Both the Chairman and the Attorney Ceneral supported

this view....At the close of the...meeting

the

Chairman directed the Embassy to prepare a "cold-

blooded assessment" of:

1) the

pros and cons and problems

and pros-

pects involved should a Chilean military

coup

be organized now with U.S. assistance,

and

2) the pros and cons and problems and pros-

pects involved in organizing an effective

future Chilean opposition to Allende.

(CIA Memorandum/Policy Decision Related to Our

Covert Action Involvement in the September 1970

Chilean Presidential Election, 9 October 1970)

Ambassador Korry responded to the 40 Committée's request for a

"cold-blooded assessment" on September 12. He stated that "We /the

Embassy/ believe it now clear that Chilean military will not, repeat

not, move to prevent Allende's accession, barring unlikely situation

of national chaos and widespread violence." The Ambassador went on to

say that "Our own military people lare/ unanimous in rejecting possi-

SECRET

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bility of meaningful military intervention in political situation."

He concluded by stating:

"What we are saying in this 'cold-blooded

assessment' is that opportunities for further significant USG action

with the Chilean military are nonexistent." (Memorandum/Ambassador's

Response to Request for. Analysis of Military Option in Present Chilean

Situation, 12 September 1970)

The. CIA's response was in the same vein. Viron Vaky, Kissinger's

• assistant. for Latin American affairs. on the NSC staff, summarized the:

CIA's "cold-blooded assessment" in a memo to his boss: "Military ac-

tion is impossible; the military is incapable and unwilling to seize

power. We have no capability to motivate or instigate a coup." (Memo-

randum

for Dr. Kissinger/Chile--40 Committee Meeting, Monday--September 14,

September 14, Viron P. Vaky)

On September 14, the 40 Committee met to discuss these reports and

what action was to be taken:

Particular attention was devoted to a CIA prepared

review of political and military options in the

Chilean electoral situation based on the Embassy'

and Station's "cold-blooded assessment." The Com-

mittee focused on the so-called "Rube Goldberg"

gambit which would see Alessandri elected by the

Congress on October 24th, resigning thereafter to

leave Frei constitutionally free-to

run in a second

election for the presidency.

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;

Ambassador Korry was asked to go directly to President

"Frei to see if he would be willing to commit himself to

this line of action.

A contingency of $250,000 was

approved for "covert support of

his trusted team deem important, "rojects which Frei of

It was further agreed

that a propaganda campaign be undertaken by the Agency

to focus on the damage of an Allende takeover....

(CIA Memorandum/Policy Decision Related to Our

Covert Action Involvement in the September 1970

Chilean Presidential Election, 9 October 1970)

Following the September 14

Forty Committee meeting and President

Nixon's September 15 instruction to

the CIA, U.S. Government efforts

to prevent Allende from assuming office proceeded on two tracks. Track

I comprised all covert activities approved by the 40 Committee,

cluding the $250,000 contingency fund to bribe Chilean congressmen as

well as propaganda and economic activities. These activities were

designed to induce the opponents to Allende in Chile to prevent his

assumption of power, either through political or military means. Track

*The terms Track I and Track II were known only to CIA and White House

officials who were knowledgeable about the President's September 15 order

to the CIA. The Committee sent letters to various senior officials in-

quiring if they were, in fact, not knowledgeable of the Track II activities.

Those letters were sent to Secretary of State William Rogers, Secretary of

Defense Melvin Laird, Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard, Under-

secretary of State for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson, Chairman of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Thomas Moorer, NSC Staff Member For

Latin America Viron

P. Vaky, Director of the State Department's Bureau:

of Intelligence and Research Ray S. Cline, and the Deputy Chief of Mission

in Santiago Marry W. Shlaudeman.

Thus far the Committee has received

written responses

from Messrs. Moorer, Johnson, Vaky, Shlaudeman and Cline.

All except Cline have indicated that they had no knowledge of the Track II

activity at the time; Cline indicated he heard of the activities in a

general way, from his subordinate who handled 40 Committee work and from

former associates

at the CIA. In oral communications with

Committee

staff members, Secretaries Rogers and Laird have indicated they were unaware

•of Track I1.

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II activities in Chile were undertaken in response to President Nixon's

September 15 order and were directed towards actively promoting and

encouraging the Chilean military to move against Allende. In his testimony

before the Committee, Kissinger stressed the links between Tracks

I and II:

...There was work by all of the agencies to try to

prevent Allende from being seated, and there was

work by all of the agencies on the so-called Track

I to encourage the military to move against Allende

•.. the difference between the September 15th meet-

ing and what was being done in general within the

government was that President Nixon was encouraging

é more direct role for the CIA in actually organiz-

ing such a coup.

(Kissinger testimony, p. 13)

Tracks I and II did, in fact, move together in the month after

September.

15. The authorization to Ambassador Korry, who was formally

excluded from Track II, to encourage a military coup became broader and

broader.

In the 40 Committee meeting on September 14, he and other

"appropriate members of the Embassy Mission" were authorized to inten-

sify their contacts with Chilean military officers

to assess their

willingness to support the "Frei gambit"--a voluntary turn-over of

power to the military by Frei, who would then have been eligible to

run for President in new elections. (Memorandum/Policy Decisions Related

to Our Covert Action Involvement in the September 1970 Chilean Presiden-

tial Election, 9 October 1970)

In a situation report to Dr. Kissinger and Assistant Secretary

Charles Meyer on September 21, Ambassador Korry indicated that in order

to make the Frei gambit work, "if necessary, General Schneider would

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to be neutralized, by displacement if necessary."* (Korry to

Meyer and Kissinger/Situation Report, 21 September 1970) In testifying,

Kissinger felt the Korry

report indicated "the degree to which Track

I and Track Il were merging, that is to say, that individuals on Track

I were working on exactly the same problem as the CIA was working on

Irack II." (Kissinger testimony, p. 21)

Ambassador Korry's activites in Chile between September 4 and

October 24 support Kissinger's view that the line separating Track I

and Track II often became blurred. For example, the Ambassador was

authorized to make his contacts in the Chilean military aware that if

Allende were

seated, the military could expect no further military

assistance (MAP) from the United States. Later, in response to his own

recommendation, Korry

was authorized to inform the Chilean military that

all MAP and military sales were being held in abeyance pending the outcome

of the Congressional election on October 24. On October 7, Ambassador

Korry received the following cable from Kissinger and Under Secretary

*

In this same situation report, Ambassador Korry related a message that

he had sent to President Frei through his Defense Minister indicating

the economic pressures that would be brought to bear on Chile should

Allende assume office.

should know that

not a nut or bolt will be

allowed to reach Chile under Allende.

Allende comes to power we shall do all within

our power to condemn Chile and the Chileans to

utmost deprivation and poverty, a policy designed

for a long time to come to accelerate the hard

features of a Communist society

in Chile.

Hences

for Frei to believe that there will be much of

an alternative to utter misery, such

as seeing

Chile muddle through, would be

strictly illusory.

The use of economic instruments as levers on Frei

and the Chilean

military was a persistent subject of White House/CIA discussions

and of instructions to the field.

Helms'

notes: from the September

15 meeting with the President and Kissinger included the notation

"make the economy scream."

Economic leverage was the primary

topic of a September 18 White House meeting

involving Kissinger,

Helms and Karamessines.

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of State

U.nAlexis

Johnson:

...you are now authorized to inform discreetly

the Chilean'

military through the channels available

to you that if a successful effort is made to block

Allende from taking office, we would reconsider the

cuts we have thus

forced to make in Chilean

MAP and otherwise increase our presently programmed

MAP for the Chilean Armed Forces....

If any steps

the military should take should result in civil dis

order, we would also be prepared promptly to deliver

support and material that might be immediately re-

quired.

(Hqs. to Stn. 075517, 7 October 1970)

The essential difference between Tracks I and II, as evidenced by

instructions to Ambassador Korry during this period, was not that Track

II was coup-oriented and Track I was not. Both had this objective in

mind. The difference between the two tracks was, simply, that the CIA's

direct contacts

with

the Chilean military, and its active promotion and

support for a coup, were to be known only to a small group of individuals

in the White House and the CIA. Kissinger testified that Track II

matters were to be reported directly to the White House "for reasons

of security." (Kissinger testimony, p. 14)

Thomas Karamessines, the

CIA's Deputy Director for Plans at the time and the principal CIA

contact with the White House on Track II matters, testified on his

understanding of why State, Defense, the 40 Committee and Ambassador

• Korry were excluded from Track II:

That was not a decision that we made.

But the

best I can do is suggest that there

was concern

about two things.

Number one, that there might

be serious objections lodged, for example, by

the State Department particularly if Track 2

were to be laid out at a Forty Committee meeting.

"And the only other thing I can contribute to that

is that it was felt that the security of the

activity would be better protected if knowledge

of it were limited. (Karamessines testimony, p. 122)

TOR

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C.

CIA Views of Difficulty of Project

On one point the testimony of CIA officials who were involved in

Track II is unanimous: they all said they thought Track II was unlikely

to succeed. That view ran from the working levels of the Agency to the

top. They all said they felt they were being asked to do the impossible,

that the risks and potential costs of the project were too great.

At

the same time, they felt they had been given an explicit Presidential

order, and they tried to execute that order.

A few

excerpts from the testimony follow:

Richard Helms, CIA Director -

...my heart sank over this meeting, because...the

possibility of bringing off something like this

seemed to me at that time to be just as remote as

anything could be.

In practical terms, the Army

vas constitutionalist....And when you look here at

the time frame in which the man was suddenly asking

you to accomplish something, it seemed really almost

inconceivable....

What I came away from the meeting with

the distinct impression that we were being

asked to do almost the impossible and trying

to indicate this was going to be pretty tough....

(Helms testimony, July 15, 1975, PP. 6-7)

David Phillips, Chief, Chile Task Force -

...it is my feeling that the odds are unaccept-

able, it is something that is not going to work,

and we are going to be burned "ifwe get into it

...what are the chances of pulling off a coup

successfully, or in any way stopping Allende from

assuming the presidency?...we never even got to

two chances out of 20. (Phillips testimony, p. 16)

...I assure you that those

people that I

was in touch with at the Agency just about univers-

ally said, my God, why are we

given this assignment?

(Phillips testimony, p. 53).

James Flannery, Deputy Chief, Western Hemisphere Division -

There was just no question that we had to make

this effort, no matter what the odds were.

And

I think that most people felt that the odds were

just pretty long. (Flannety testimony, p. 20)

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Further, CIA officials believed their judgment of the endeavor's

difficulty was known to the White House.

Helms commented on the Septem-

ber 15th meeting:

"So realizing all of these things, I'm relatively

certain

that day that I

pointed out this is going to be awfully tough."

(Helms testimony, July 15, 1975, p. 16) Karamessines recalled pointing

out to the President that "the Chilean military seemed to be disorganized

and unwilling to do anything. And without their wanting to do something,

there did not seem to be much hope." (Karamessines testimony, p. 10)

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III

CIALS Implementation of Track II

A.

Evolution of CIA Strategy

The President's instruction to the CIA on September 15 to prevent

Allende's assumption of power was given in the context of a broad U.s.

Government effort to achieve that end. The September 15 instruction

to the CIA involved from the beginning the promotion of a military coup

d'etat in Chile. Although there was talk of a coup in Chilean military

circles, there was little indication that it would actually take place

without active U.s. encouragement and support.

There was much talk among Chilean officers about

the possibility of some kind of coup...but this

was not the kind of talk that was being backed by,

you know, serious organizational planning.

(Karamessines testimony, Aug. 6, 1963, p. 32)

1. The "Constitutional Coup" Approach

Although efforts to achieve a political solution to the Allende

victory continued

simultaneous with Track II, the Agency premised its

activities on the assumption that the political avenue was a dead end.

On September 21, CIA Headquarters cabled its Station in Santiago:

Purpose of exercise is to prevent Allende assump

tion of power.

Paramilitary legerdemain has been

discarded.

Military solution is objective.

(Hqs. 236, Sept. 21, 1970, para. 3)

The initial strategy attempted. to enlist President Frei in promoting

a coup to perpetuate his presidency for six more years.

The Agency

decided to promise "help in any election which was an outgrowth of a

successful military takeover." (Nov. 18, 1970 Helms memo to Kissinger)

Under this plan Frei would invite the military to take over, dissolve the

Congress, and proclaim

a new election. A private U.S. citizen who had

been a conduit for CIA funds to Frei's 1964 campaign was sent to see him

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with this message

on! September 24. (Task Force Log, September 23)

• Thomas Karamessines, the Deputy Director for Plans, testified:

So this was in a sense not Track II, but in a

sense another aspect of a quiet and hopefully

non-violent military coup.... This was abandoned

when the military were reluctant to push Frei

publicly...and, number two, Frei was reluctant

to leave on his own in the

absence of pressure

from the military.... There was left as the only

chance of success a straight military coup.

(Karamessines testimony, Aug. 6, 1975, p. 6)

At the same time, the Station in Santiago reported:

Strong reasons for thinking neither Frei nor

Schneider will act. For that reason any scenario

in which either has to play an active role now

appears utterly unrealistic. Overtures to lower

echelon officers (e.g, Valenzuela) can of course

be made. This involves promoting Army split.

(Stn. to Hqs. 424, September 23, 1970)

2. Military Solution

President Frei's failure even to attempt to persuade his own party

convention on October 3-4 from reaching a compromise with Allende ended

all hope of using him to prevent an Allende presidency. (November 18

memo, Helms to Kissinger, page 16) Thus, by the beginning of October,

it was clear that a vehicle for a military solution would have to be

found in the second echelon of Chilean officers, and that the top leader-

ship of the Armed Services, particularly General Rene Schneider, consti-

tuted a stumbling block. (Santiago 424, September 23, 1970; Santiago 439,

September 30, 1970) The Agency's task was to cause a coup in a highly

unpromising situation and to overcome the formidable obstacles represented

by Frei's

inaction, Schneider's strong constitutionalism, and the absence

of organization and enthusiasm among those officers who were interested

in a coup.

A shree-old prosa voa set into motion: i ACCO e

7.?

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:.

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a

Collect intelligence on coup-minded officers;

: Create a coup climate by propaganda, disinformation,

and terrorist

activities intended to provoke the left to

give a pretext for a coup;*(Hqs. 611, October 7, 1970)

c. Inform those

coup-minded officers:that the U.S. Govern-

ment would give them full support in a coup short of direct

U.S. military

intervention. (Hqs. 762, October 14, 1970)

•B. The Chile Task Force

Because of the highly sensitive nature of the operation, a special

task force was created in the CIA's Western Hemisphere Division to manage it.

The task force was placed under the daily direction of the

Deputy Direc-

tor for Plans, Thomas Karamessines, and a group of the Agency's most

experienced

and skilled operators were detailed to the task force.

.. i

1:

*A cable

sent from CIA Headquarters to Santiago on October 19 focused

on creating an appropriate justification for a coup. The cable stated:

1. It still appears that Ref A coup has no pretext or justification

that it can offer to make it acceptable in Chile or Latin America. It

therefore would seem necessary to create one to bolster what will prob

ably be their claim to a coup to save Chile from communism... You may

wish include variety of themes in justification of coup to military for

their use. These could include but are not limited to: A) Firm intel.

that Cubans planned to reorganize all intelligence services along

Soviet/Cuban mold thus creating structure for police state.... B) Economic

situation collapsing....C)By quick recognition of Cuba and Communist

countries Allende assumed U.S. would cut off material assistance to

Armed Forces thus weakening them as constitutional barriers. Would then

empty armories to Communist Peoples Militia with task to run campaign of

terror based on alleged labor and

economic sabotage (Use

some quotes

from Allende on this.)

2. Station has written

some excellent prop guidances.

Using themes

at hand and which best known to you we are now asking you to prepare

intel report based on some well known facts and some fiction to justify

coup, split opposition, and gain adherents for military group. With

appropriate military contact can determine how to "discover" intel' report

which could even be planted during raids planned by Carabineros.

3.

We urge you to get this idea and some concrete suggestions to plot-.i.ter

ters as soon

as you can. Coup should have a justification to prosper.

(Headquarters 882, 19 October 1970)

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• David A. Phillips, Chief of Station in Rio de Janeiro, was summoned

back to Washington to head the operation. With the exception of the

Division Chief, William Broe, his deputy

James Flannery and the head

of the Chile Branch, no other officers in the Division were aware of the

task force's activities, not even those officers who normally had respon-

sibility for Chile. The task force had a special communications channel to

Santiago and Buenos Aires to compartment cable traffic about Track II.

(November 18, 1970, Helms to Kissinger memo, page 3) Most of the

significant operational decisions were made by Phillips, Broe and

Karamessines, who met on a daily basis.

It should be noted that all those involved with the task force des-

cribed the pressure from the White House

as intense. Indeed, Karamessines

has said that Kissinger "left no doubt in my mind that he was under the

heaviest of pressure to get this accomplished, and he in turn was

plac-

ing us under the heaviest of pressures to get it accomplished." (Kara-

messines testimony, August 6, 1975, page 7) The Deputy Chief of the

Western Hemisphere Division, James Flannery, testified that pressure was

"as tough as I ever saw it in my time there, extreme." (Flannery testi-

mony, July 15, 1975, page 20) Broe testified that "I have never gone

through a period as we did on the Chilean thing. I mean it was just

constant, constant....Just continual pressure....It was coming from the

White House."

(Broe testimony, August 4, 1975, page 55)

C. The Use of the Army Attache and Interagency Relations

The CIA Station in Santiago had inadequate contacts within the

Chilean military to carry out its task.

However, the U.S. Army At-

tache in Santiago, Colonel Paul Wimert, knew the Chilean military

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is--

17

"""

very well duento his five years of service there and his broad personal

contacts among the Chilean officers. Following a proposal by the Chief

of Station, the CIA decided to enlist Colonel Wimert in collecting in-

telligence concerning the possibility of a coup and to use him as a

channel to let the interested Chilean military know of U. S. support

for a coup. Karamessines described this procedure for the Committee:

We also needed contact with a wider segment of the military,

the senior military which we had not maintained and did not

have, but which we felt confident that our military represen-

tative in Chile had.... And we got the approval of the DIA to

enlist the cooperation of Colonel Wimert in our effort to pro-

cure intelligence.

(Karamessines

testimony, August 6, 1975, p. 6)

To obtain Wimert's services, CIA officials prepared a suggested

mes-

sage for the Director of DIA to send to the Army Attache in Santiago

through CIA communications channels. Because the DIA Director, General

Donald V. Bennett, was in Europe on official business, the Deputy

Director of Central Intelligence, General Cushman, invited DIA Deputy

Director Lt. General Jammie M. Philpott to his office on September 28,

1970.*

During that meeting, General Cushman requested the assistance of

the Army Attache, and General Philpott signed a letter which authorized

transmission of a message directing the Army Attache:

...to work closely with the CAS chief, or in his absence,

his deputy, in contacting and advising-the principal mili-

tary figures who might play a decisive role in any move which

might, eventually, deny the presidency to Allende.

Do not, repeat not, advise the Ambassador or the Defense At-

tache of this message, or give them any indication of its

portent. In the course of your routine activities, act in

accordance with the Ambassador's instructions.

Simultaneously,

I wish--and now authorize you--to act in a concerted fashion

with the CAS chief.

*

General Bennett returned to the United States on the evening

of October

10, 1970. General Philpott

was Acting Director in Bennett's absence.

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This message is for your eyes only, and should not be dis-

cussed with any person other than those CAS officers who will

be knowledgeable.

CAS will identify them.

(Headquarters 380

to Santiago)

For this and all subsequent messages intended for the Army Attache,

the secret CIA communications channel was used.

Both General Philpott and Thomas Karamessines testified that ini-

tially the Army Attache would be used only to "obtain or procure" in-

telligence on Chilean military officers.*

(Philpott, P. 11; Karamessines,

p. 6) The September 28, 1970 message to the Army Attache, however, did

in fact trigger his deep involvement in the coup attempt.

According to

the Attache's testimony, he received day-to-day instructions from the

Chief of Station, and

on occasion, the COS would show him messages

ostensibly from Generals Bennett and/or Philpott, directing him to

take certain

actions.

The COS also transmitted messages from the Army

Attache to these Generals.

General Bennett testified that he never had knowledge of Track II

and that he never received any communication relating thereto, nor did

he ever authorize the transmission of any messages to the Army Attache.

• • General Philpott also

testified that he had no recollection of anything

connected with Track II after his initial meeting with General Cushman

on September 28. (Philpott, p. 16)

U. S. Army Colonel Robert C. Roth, who in September and October 1970

was the Chief of the Human Resources Division, Director of Collection, DIA,

-

In this connection it should be noted that when questioned about

this letter, General Philpott testified that he

recalled signing

an authorization such as that contained in the first paragraph of

Headquarters 380 but that he did not recall the

authorizations and

instructions in paragraphs twofand

three.

as

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testified that he recalled working for Generals Bennett and Philpott on

"a priority requirement to identify Chilean personalities who might be

helpful in preventing the election of Allende as President of Chile."

(Roth, Vol. I, P. 6) Though Roth recalls no mention of Track II as such,

the goal of this mission is identical to that described in the message

of September 28 bearing Philpott's signature.

Beginning on October 15, Roth kept a chronology of his activities:

connected with Chile. This chronology reflects that there was a meeting

on October 21 regarding the preparation of biographic material on Chilean

generals which focused on their willingness to participate in a military

coup. Generals Bennett, Philpott, and a CIA representative attended.

The chronology also shows that on October 21, Roth delivered a message to

Mr. Broe to be sent by CIA channels.* A message was sent to Col. Wimert

that same day, ostensibly from General Bennett, which authorized:

FYI:. Suspension temporarily imposed

on MAP and FMS has

been rescinded.

This action does not repeat not imply

change in our

estimate of situation.

On the contrary,

it is intended to place us in a posture in which we can

formally cut off assistance if Allende elected and situa-

tion develops as we anticipate.

Request up. date on situa-.

tion.. (Santiago 446; Ref: Headquarters 762)

(Headquarters

934, 21 October 1970)

Roth testified that this DIA project ended on October 23 when he

followed Philpott's instructions to deliver biographic information on

Chilean figures to Mr. Broe at CIA.. Philpott also instructed him

that

Roth believes that General Philpott directed him to deliver this

message and also pressed him on several occasions to seek a re-

sponse from Broe to an earlier message to Colonel Wimert.

(Roth,

Vol. II, P.

TOP SEGRET

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"any further action on the subject would henceforth be the responsibility

of the CIA and

that DIA would perform normal support functions." (Roth,

p. 8) *

Both Bennett and Philpott testified that the activities described

by Roth were routine DIA activities.

However, Colonel. Roth testified:

I believe my impression at the time, or my recollection, is

that I was informed

that there was concern at the highest

U.S. Governmental level over the possible election of Allende,

that DIA then had

a priority responsibility of coming up with

the identities of key Chilean personalities that would be help-

ful, and

so forth. I have nothing specific as to the nature of

the instructions or the channels through which they came.

Q. It was your

sense at the time that you were working on a

project that if it had not been initiated by, at least had

the attention

of or concern of,

the highest level?

*

Roth's chronology also indicates

that Philpott had asked that Broe

be queried on two or three occasions regarding a report from Wimert

and that Philpott instructed

that only he (Philpott) would communi-

cate with Cushman if the need arose.

(Roth, p. 11) Roth also testi-

fied that Philpott advised him that communications with Wimert would

be by CIA channels.

(Roth, p.

41)

TOP SECRET

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Colonel Roth. That was my impression at the time.

Q. You understand from your work in the Defense Department

that the highest level of

government usually indicated the

President of the United States?

Colonel Roth. I would assume that.

• The CIA produced copies of several messages which identify

Genérals Bennett and

Philpott as either the sender or recipient. Among

these documents is a message relating to Track II which bears Philpott's

purported signature. (Undated message. ca.. 14 October 1970) General

Philpott admitted that the signature appears to be his but doubted that

it was and he could not recall signing it, or having seen it. (Philpott,

) CIA also produced messages of October 14 (Headquarters 762)

and October 21 (Headquarters 934) conveying instructions from General

Bennett to the Army Attache. General Bennett testified he did. not

authorize these messages:

It is beyond the responsibilities which I had in the military

assistance

area. It goes beyond the responsibility which I

had in terms that I would have to get the authority or the

approval of the Secretary through the Chairman for covert

action of this magnitude.

This message would not have been

signed by me. (Bennett testimony, p. 21)

• According to Karamessines, only the White House had the authority to

issue the directives contained in those messages (Karamessines testi-

mony, p. 84)

The Department of Defense was unable to provide any documents bear=

ing on the issue of Wimert's Track II instructions or responses. A

DOD file search under the direction of General Daniel 0. Graham, the

present Director of DIA, produced no copies of communication documents

for the September-October 1970 period. (Graham, P. 6) However, Roth

testified that detailed memoranda for

the record which he prepared on

his activities are

missing from the files: (Roth, Vol: II, p. )

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*CIA officials maintain that they acted faithfully in transmitting.

messages

to Generals Bennett and/or Philpott and in never sending a

message without proper authorization. Mr. Karamessines was particularly

forceful in this regard:

...I can recall no instance in my experience at the Central

Intelligence Agency in which a message was received for an

individual, an officer of the government anywhere, in what-

ever department, which was not faithfully, directly, promptly

and fully and

accurately delivered to that officer, or to his

duly authorized representative.

(Karamessines

testimony, p. 79)

We may have

played tricks overseas, but it stopped at the

water's edge, and we didn't play tricks among ourselves or.

among our colleagues within the Agency or in other agencies.

(Karamessines testimony, p. 79)

We could not remain in business for a day...if this had been

the practice of the Agency. It would have been no time at

all before we would have been found out, a single instance

of the kind of thing you are suggesting might have taken

place would have put us out of business.

(Karamessines testimony, p. 80)

DI. Kissinger denied he was ever informed of the Army Attache's

role or that he authorized any messages to be sent to the Army Attache.

(Kissinger testimony, P. 22)

The investigation to date has not resolved the conflict between the

statements of the senior CIA, DIA and White House officials. There are

four possibilities that could explain the conflict. First, Generals

Bennett and Philpott were cognizant of Track II and communicated their

general instructions to the Army Attache. This possibility would be

contrary

to: their sworn testimony.

Second, General Bennett was not aware

of Track'

II but General Philpott was and communicated general instructions to •

the Army Attache. This possibility is supported by Roth's testimony

but would be contrary to Philpott's sworn testimony and his duty to

keep General Bennett informed. Third, the CIA acted on its own, and,

after receiving initial

authority from General Philpott, co-opted and ordered

118 A

к..

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the Army Attache without further informing any member of the Department

of Defense of the White House. This possibility would be contrary to

the sworn testimony of David Phillips, William Broe, Thomas Karamessines,

and William Colby. Fourth, members of the White House staff authorized

the CIA to convey orders to the Army Attache on the basis of high or

highest government authority. Further, that the White House staff

directed

that the Army Attache's superiors

in the Pentagon not be in-.

formed. This possibility would contradict the sworn testimony of Dr.

Kissinger and General Alexander Haig.

D. The False Flag Base

In order to minimize the risks of making contact with the dissident

Chilean officers, the task force decided in late September to set up a

"False Flag Base," i.e., to send four staff officers to Chile posing as

nationals of other countries to supplement Colonel Wimert's contacts

"with Chilean military officers.* Given the limitations of the Station's

resources and Colonel Wimert's visibility, Headquarters felt the use of

"False Flag Officers" was necessary because "We don't want to miss a

chance." One of these officers posed

as a Brazilian intelligence officer

so that "any flap would be a Brazilian one." (Headquarters 363,

September, 27, 1970)

jet.

Lt.

!

*The use of "False Flag Officers" is not, according to David Phillips,..

"an unusual practice,"

either by the CIA

or foreige. intelligence

services.

(Phillips testimony, pp. 47-48)

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The False Flaggers were compartmented from each other and reported

separately on their contacts

to

a "deep cover" CIA officer

in Santiago

who in turn reported to the Station. According to the testimony of the

Chief

of Station, they received

their instructions from Washington and

not from him.

(Chief of Station testimony (Felix), August 1, 1975, p. 27)

"E. Chief of Station

Although most of the Station officers in Santiago did not know of

Track II, the Chief and Deputy Chief of Station were knowledgeable and

the Chief of Station initiated contacts on his own with Chilean officers.

The COS has testified that he regarded Track II as unrealistic:

I had left no doubt in the mindsef my colleagues

and superiors that I did not consider any kind of

intervention in those constitutional processes

desirable....And one of the reasons certainly for my

last recall. (to Washington) was to be read the riot

act--which was done in a very pleasant, but very

intelligible manner.

Specifically, I was told at

that time that the Agency was not too interested in

continuously being told by me that certain proposals

which had been made could not be executed, or would

be counterproductive.

(Chief of Station

(Felix)

testimony, August 1, 1975, p. 10)

The Chief of Station's objection to Track II did not go unnoticed.

The following instruction to the COS was sent on October 7: "Report

should

not contain analysis and argumentation but simply report on

action taken." (Headquarters 612, 7 October) Very simply, Headquarters

wanted

the Station to take orders quietly as was the Agency itself.

TOP CBOPK

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Three

examples of the Chief of Station's reporting bear out his

claim to have dissented:

Bear in mind that parameter of action is exceed-

ingly narrow and available options are quite

limited and relatively simple.

(Santiago 424, September 23, 1970)

Feel necessary to caution against any false optimism.

essential that we not become victims of our

own propaganda. , (Santiago 441, October 1, 1970)

Urge you do not convey impression that Station has

sure-fire method of halting, let alone triggering

coup attempts.

(Santiago 477, October 7, 1970, p.2)

1. 008

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61.9

CIA Efforts to Promote a Coup

A. The Chilean Conspirators

Anti-Allende coup plotting in Chile centered around several key

individuals. One of these was retired General Roberto Viaux, the General

who had led the "Tacnazo" insurrection a year before.

*

Following the

"Taenazo" revolt, and his dismissal from the Army, Viaux retained the

support of many non-commissioned and junior officers as well as. being

the recognized leader of several right-wing civilian groups.

(CIA

Briefing Paper, "Special Mandate from the President on Chile," July

15, 1975)

Another individual around which plotting centered was General Camilo

Valenzuela, Commander of the Santiago Garrison. General Valenzuela was

in league with several other active duty officers, including Admiral

Hugo Tirado, Navy Commander in Chief; General Vicente Huerta, Director

General of the Carabinero (police) Corps; General Canales, Director of

the Military Academy; and General Joaquin Garcia,

second in command,

Air Force.

(CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, November 18,

1970) All of these officers, with the possible exception of Canales,

were

in contact with Viaux as well.

**

*This revolt was engineered by Viaux ostensibly for the purposes of drama-

tizing the military's demand for higher pay, but was widely interpreted as

an abortive coup.

**The record of meetings between Viaux and the active duty military officers

is incomplete.

The record does show, however, that Viaux met with General

Huerta aroupd October 7. (Chile Task Force Log, October 7). On October 12

Viaux met with General Valenzuela (Chile Task Force Log, 14 October).

One

cable from Santiago indicates that Admiral Tirado may have been a member

of Viaux's inner circle of conspirators. (Station 545, 16 October 1970),

At the very least, Tirado was in contact with Viaux.

Although a distinction can be made between the Viaux and Valenzuela groups,

as CIA witnesses did throughout their testimony before the Committee, the

principal distinction between the two was that the latter was led by

active duty

military officers.

The two groups were in contact with each other. The

record also indicates that they worked together in at least two of the three

Schneider kidnap attempts.

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There was considerable communication among the various plotting

elements.

As Thomas Karamessines testified:

...I might add here that it seemed that a good

dozen or more, maybe 20 Chilean senior officers

were privy to what was going on in addition to

President Frei and they were all talking to one

another exchanging views and trying to see how

best to mount the kind of coup that they wanted

to see take place. (Karamessines testimony, p. 10)

B. Contacts Prior to October 15

The CIA's initial task in Chile was to assess the potential within

the Chilean military to stage a coup. It recognized quickly that anti-

Allende currents did exist in the military and the Carabineros (police),

but were immobilized by "the tradition of military respect for the

Constitution' and "the public and private stance of General Schneider,

Commander in Chief of the Army, who advocated strict adherence to the

Constitution." (CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, 18 Novem

ber 1970, p. 17) The Agency's task, then, was to overcome "the apolitical,

constitutional-oriented

inertia of the Chilean military." (Ibid, p. 2)

Since the very top of the Chilean military, embodied by General.

Schneider and his second-in-command, General Prat, were hostile to the

idea of a coup against Allende, discreet approaches were made to the

second level of general officers. They were to be informed that the u.s.

Government would support a coup both before and after it took place.*

(Headquarters to Station 611, 7 October 1970) This effort began in

earnest on October 5 when Colonel Winert informed both an Army General

("Station's priority contact") an an Air Force General of the pro-coup

presenten

The military officers were told, for example, that should Allende be

prevented from taking office, "The Chilean military will not be ostra

cized, but rather can continue to count on us for MAP support and main-

tenance of our close relationship." (Hqs. 075517, 7 October 1970)

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U:Si policy. (Santiago 469, October

S; Santiago 473, October 6)*

Three days

later the Chief of Station told General Huerta, Commander

of the Carabineros that "the U.S. Government favors a military solu

tion and is willing to support it in any manner short of outright

military intervention." (Task Force Log, 9 October) General Huerta

informed the COS that there was no chance of a coup by the Chilean

Army high command. (Task Force Log, 10 October)

On October 7, Colonel Wimert approached members of the War Academy

in Santiago who in turn asked him to provide light weapons. This was

Colonel Wimert's first contact with the Army Lt. Colonel to whom he

would ultimately pass three submachine guns.on October 22.

At this

meeting, the Lt. Colonel told Colonel Wimert that he and his colleagues

were

rying to exert force on Frei to eliminate

sen. Schneider to either replace him, send

him out of the country. They had even stud-

ied plans to kidnap him. Schneider is the

main barrier to all plans for the military

to take over the government to prevent an

Allende presidency. (Santiago 483, 8 October)

'According to the CIA's wrap-up report on Track II, between October 5

and October 20, the CIA Station and the Army Attache--for the most part

the latter--made 21 contacts with key military and Carabinero officials.

(CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, 8 November 1970)

**In his testimony, Colonel Wimert indicated that the It. Colonel was

affiliated with General Canales.

(Wimert testimony, p. 52)

In a cable

sent to Headquarters on October 18, in which the Lt. Colonel's request

for three submachine guns was made, the Station indicated that Wimert

believed the Army officer, and his companion, a Navy Captain, were in

league with-Admiral Tirado.

(Station 562, October 18) At another point

in his testimony, Wimert stated, "There was Valenzuela here and the Navy

Captain and the Army bt. Colonel and the Air Forçe General over here.'

(Wimert testimony, p. 107) The Committee has been unable to determine

the exact affiliation of the Army It. Colonel. However, as previously

stated, both General Canales and Admiral Tirado were affiliated with

General Valenzuela and Admiral Tirado was in contact with General Viaux.

HH

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The next day, October 8, Headquarters cabled the Station in response

to the Winert-Lt. Colonel meeting.

Headquarters took note of Schneider's

resistance to coup plans and stated:

.. This would make it more important than

ever to remove him and to bring this new

state of events... anything we or Station

can do to effect

removal of Schneider? We

know this rhetorical question, but wish

inspire thought on both ends on this matter.

(Hqs. 628, 8 October)

During

the first week of intensive efforts chances of success

looked unusually bleak. The Chile Task Force Log commented:

President Frei and the highest levels of the

armed forces unable to pull themselves together

to block Allende. The Chilean mPlitary's tradi-

tion of non-intervention, Frei's reluctance to

tarnish his historical image, General Schneider's

firm constitutional stand, and most importantly,

the lack of leadership within the government and

military are working against a military takeover.

(Task Force Log, 8 October)

The following day the Station made reference to the "rapid (ly) waning

chances for success." (Santiago 487, 9 October) This pessimism was not

dispelled by their simultaneous judgment: "Station has arrived at Viaux

solution by process of elimination." (Santiago 504, 10 October) Three

days later the Task Force agreed: "We continue to focus our attention

on General Viaux who now appears to be the only military leader willing

to block Allende." (Task Force Log, 13 October)

If Viaux was the CIA's only hope of staging a coup, things were bleak

indeed.

His own colleagues, Generals Huerta and Valenzuela described him

• as "a Generäl without ari

army." (Santiago 495, 9 October) Yet in the

first two weeks of October he came to be regarded as the best hope for =

carrying out the CIA's Track II mandate.

"t''..

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Although Colonel Wimert was instructed not to involve himself with

Viaux because of the high risk involved (Santiago 461, 5 October), he

served initially as a contact to Viaux through an Argentine military

Attache. The Argentine reported on October 5 that Viaux wanted several

hundred paralyzing gas grenades to launch a coup on October 9. (Santiago

476; 6 October) Headquarters turned down the request, concluding that

a "mini-coup at this juncture would be counterproductive" and Viaux

should postpone his plans, "while encouraging him in a suitable manner

to maintain his posture so that he may, join larger movement later if

it materializes." (Headquarters 585, 6 October)

The primary

purpose of the "False Flag Base" was to contact Viaux,

and it very rapidly relieved Wimert and the Argentine Attache of that

task. Viaux reiterated his demand for an air drop of weapons to the

"False Flagger," and again the response was the same: reject the demand

for arms, but encourage him to keep planning. In essence the Agency

was buying time with Viaux:

"We wish to encourage Viaux to expand and

refine his coup planning.

Gain some influence over his actions."

(Headquarters 689, 10 October) To achieve this latter purpose, Head-

quarters

authorized passing

$20,000 in cash and a promise of $250,000

in life insurance to. Viaux

and his associates, as a demonstration of

U.S. support. (Headquarters

729, 13 October)

On October 13, Headquarters again indicated its concern over Schneider

by asking:

"What is to keep Schneider from making statement in early

hours which will freeze those military leaders who might otherwise join

Viaux?" (Headquarters 729, 13 October) The Station's response later that

same day was "Viaux intends to kidnap Generals Schneider and Prats within

the next 48 hours in order to precipitate a coup.":

(Santiago 527,

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{3 October) * This Viaux kidnapping of Schneider was reported by the Sta-

tion "as part of a coup that included Valenzuela." (Station 529, 13 October)

'At about this time the Station began to receive encouragement from its

other contacts.

On October 14, ten days before the Chilean Congress was

to vote, the Task Force Log concluded:

Now we are beginning to see signs of increasing

coup activity from other military quarters,

specifically, an Army General

(name deleted),

Admiral Tirado, the forces in Concepcion and

Valdivis and perhaps even Frei and Ossa.

(Task Force Log, 14 October)

C. October 15 Decision

To summarize, by October 15, General Viaux had advertised to his con-

tact a desire to proceed with a coup, had iñdicated he would deal with

the Schneider obstacle by kidnapping him, had met at least once with Gen-

exals Huerta and Valenzuela and had once postponed his coup plans.*

On October 15 Thomas Karamessines met Henry Kissinger and Alexander

Haig at the White House to discuss the situation in Chile. According

to the Agency's record of this meeting, Karamessines "provided

a run-

down on Viaux, the Canales meeting with Tirado, and, in some detail,

the general situation in Chile from the coup-possibility viewpoint."

(Memorandum of Conversation/Kissinger, Karamessines, and Haig, 15 October

1970) A decision was made at the meeting "to de-fuse the Viaux coup plot,

at least temporarily:"

* The reason for Viaux postponing his coup plans was the subject of a cable

from Santiago to Headquarters:

We discount Viaux's statement that he had called off his coup at-

tempt bécause of False Flag Officer's impending visit. Other re-

porting indicated Viaux probably not able or intending move this

weekend. (Santiago 499, 10 October)

There is also reason to believe that General Valenzuela was instrumental

in persuading Viaux to postpone. According to the Chile. Task Force Log*

Station reported that on 12 October General Valenzuela met

with General Viaux and attempted to persuade him not to at-

tempt a coup."

(Chile Task Force Log, 14 October)

F**

?...

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It

was decided by those present that the Agency

must get a message to Viaux warning him against

any precipitate

action.

In essence the message

should state:

"We have reviewed your plans and

based on your information and ours, we come to

the conclusion that your plans for a coup at

this time cannot

succeed.

Failing, they may re-

duce your capabilities in the future. Preserve

your

assets.

We will stay in touch.

The time

will come when you with all your other friends

can do something. You will continue to have

our

support." (15 October Memorandum of Conver-

sation, Kissinger, Karamessines, Haig)

The

meeting concluded, according to the Agency's record, "on Dr.

Kissinger's note that the Agency should continue keeping the pressure

on every Allende weak spot in sight--now, after the 24th of October,

after 5 November, and into the future until such time as new marching

orders are given. Mr. Karamessines stated that the Agency would comply. "*

The following day CIA Headquarters cabled the results of the White

House meeting to the Station in Santiago:

2. It is firm and continuing policy that Allende

be overthrown by a coup....We

are to continue to

generate maximum pressure toward this end utiliz-

ing every appropriate resource.

3. After the most careful consideration it was

• determined that a Viaux coup attempt carried out

by him alone with

the forces now at his disposal

would fail.

Thus it would be counterproductive

to our Track Two objectives. It was decided that

CIA get a message to Viaux warning him against

precipitate action. (Headquarters 802, 16 Octo

ber)

The message was supplemented by orders to "continue to encourage him

(Viaux) to amplify his planning; encourage him to join forces with other

coup planners." (Headquarters 802, 16 October) The message concluded:

-.?

"There is great and continuing interest in the actívities of Tirado,.

Canales, Valenzuela

et al and we wish them optimum good fortune." (Ibid.)

Secretary Kissinger's recollection of the October 15 meeting is not

in accord with that of Mr. Karamessines or the cable (Headquarters 802)

that was sent the following day to the Station in Santiago. This mat-

ter will be discussed in Part V of this report.

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r.:

D.

Coup Planning and Attempts After October 15

The decision to "de-fuse" General Viaux was passed to Viaux's

father-in-law on October 17. The in-law responded that it did not

matter because they had decided to proceed with the coup in any case.

(Santiago 533, 17 October) At the final meeting of the CIA "False

Flägger" and Viaux's father-in-law on October 18, the Agency was in-

formed that the coup would proceed on October 22, "and that the abduc-

tion of General Schneider is first link in chain of events to come."

(Santiago 568, 19 October) An "emergency channel" of communication

with Viaux was maintained. (Report on CIA Chilean Task Force Activities,

18 November 1970, page 21)

As previously

stated, by mid-October things suddenly looked brighter

for a coup being mounted by the high-level Chilean military contacts.

As a CIA overview statement in Track II stated:

Coup possibilities afforded by the active

duty military group led by General Valenzuela

and Admiral Tirado had always seemed more

promising than the capabilities of the Viaux

These military officers had the abil-

ity and resources to act providing they de-

cided to move and

organized themselves ac-

cordingly.

(CIA Briefing Paper, "Special Mandate from

the President on Chile," July 15, 1975, p. 5)

By mid-October those military officers appeared to be moving in

this direction.

On the evening of October 17, Colonel Wimert met with the Army Lt.

Colonel and the Navy Captain. They requested 8 to 10 tear gas grenades,

*Two coup plotters, Generals Canales and Garin, made one last attempt to

persuade Ceneral Schneider to change his anti-coup position on October 15. ?

The Station reported that the meeting turned out: to be a "complete fiasço.

Schneider refused to listen to General Canales'

eloquent presentation of

Communist action in Chile...and adament in maintaining his

stance."

non-involvement

(Santiago 548, 16 October)

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{three

*45-caliber machine guns and 500 rounds of ammunition. The Navy

Captain said he had three machine guns himself "but can be identified

by serial numbers as having been issued to him. Therefore unable to

use them." (Santiago 562, 18 October) Colonel Wimert and the Chief

of Station have testified that the officers wanted the machine guns

for self-protection. The question, of course, is whether the arms were

• intended for use, or were used, in the kidnapping of General Schneider.

The fact that the weapons were provided the Lt. Colonel and the Navy

Captain and that Viaux associates

were convicted of the Schneider killing

suggests

that the guns were

not involved.

The machine guns and ammunition were seat from Washington by diplo-

matic pouch on the morning of October 19, although Headquarters was

puzzled

about their purpose: "Will continue make effort provide them

but find our credulity stretched by Navy Captain leading his troops

with sterile guns.

What is special purpose for these guns? We will

try send them whether you can provide explanation or not." (Headquarters

854, 18 October) The first installment was delivered to the Army Lt.

Colonel

and the Navy Captain late in the evening of October 18 and con-

sisted of the six

tear gas grenades intended originally.for Viaux.*

* As previously stated, after October 1S CIA efforts

to promote a coup in

Chile focussed on the active duty military officers--Valenzuela, et. al.--

rather than Viaux.

An example of this shift in focus was the decision to

provide the Army Lt. Colonel

and the Army Captain the tear gas grenades

originally intended for Viaux. A cable from Santiago explained the purpose of

this

action:

"Station plans give six tear gas grenades to

Colonel Wimert for delivery to Armed Forces

officers (deletion) instead

of having False

Flag Officer deliver them to Viaux group.

Our reasoning is that Wimert dealing with

active duty officers. Also False Flagger

leaving evening 18 October, and will not be

replaced but Wimert will stay here.

important that Wimert credibility with Armed

Forces officers be strengthened.

(Santiago 562, 18 October)

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Piral.

That same day, General Valenzuela informed Colonel Winert that he,

General Huerta, Admiral Tirado and an Air Force General were prepared

to sponsor a coup. (CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities,

18

November 1970) Their plan was to begin with the kidnapping of General

Schneider on the following evening, October 19, at a military

dinner being given for Schneider,* after which Schneider would be flown

to Argentina, Frei would resign and leave Chile, Admiral Tirado would

head the military junta, and dissolve Congress. With respect to the

kidnapping of Schneider, the cable reports:

General Viaux knowledgeable of above operation

but not directly involved.

He has been sent to

Vina to stay with prominent physician. Will be

seen in public places during 19 and 20 October

to demonstrate fact that above operation not his

doing.

Will be allowed to return to Santiago at

end of week.

Military will not admit involve-

ment in Schneider's abduction which is to be

blamed on leftists. (Santiago 566, 19 October)*

The kidnapping of the evening of October 19 failed because General Schneider

left in a private vehicle, rather than in his official car, and his police guard

failed to be withdrawn, but the Army Lt. Colonel assured Colonel Wimert that an-

other attempt would be made on October 20. (Santiago 582, 20 October)

Colonel Wimert was authorized to pay Valenzuela $50,000 "which was the price

agreed upon between the plotters and the unidentified team of abductors!"

* The "False Flag Officer" who was in contact with Viaux at the time

the Valenzuela plan was given to Colonel Wimert apparently understood

that Viaux was involved

in the October 19 attempt.

Q. Were you told any of the details of how

the (Viaux) kidnapping would be carried out?

Mr. Sarno. They indicated it was going to be

at some sort of a banquet which the General:

(Schneider) would be attending.

(Sarno testimony, p. 37)

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Wimert insisted that the kidnapping be completed before he paid the

money.

(Task Force Log, 20 October) At the same time General Valenzuela

assured Colonel Wimert that the military was now prepared to move.

(Task

Force Log, 20 October) The second abduction attempt on the 20th also

failed and the Task Force concluded

Since Valenzuela's group is apparently having

considerable difficulty executing

even the first

step of its coup plan, the prospects for a coup

succeeding or even occurring before 24 October

now appears remote.

(Task Force Log, 22 October)

E. The Killing of General Schneider

In the early morning hours of October 22 (2 am), Colonel Wimert

delivered the three submachine guns with ammunition to the Army Lt.

Colonel in an isolated section of Santiago.*

"Although Colonel Wimert's testimony and the cable traffic do not

clearly establish the identity of the group to which the Lt. Colonel

was affiliated (see page 31) two CIA statements on Track II tie the

weapons, and therefore the Lt. Colonel, to the Valenzuela group:

...The only assistance requested by Valenzuela

to set the plan Lof October 19/ into motion

through Schneider's abduction was several sub-

machine guns, ammunition, a few tear gas grenades

and gas masks (all of which were provided) plus

$50,000 for expenses (which was to be passed upon

(CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities,

18 November 1970, p. 22)

•..Three sub-machine guns, together with six gas

cannisters and

masks, were passed to the Valen-

zuela group

at 2 am on 22 October. The reason

why chey still wanted the weapons was because

there were two days remaining before the Congress

decided the Presidential election and the Valen-

zuela group maintained some hope they could still

carry out their plans.

(CIA Briefing Paper,

"Special Mandate from the

President on Chile,

p. 7, July 15, 1975)

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'At about:? am that day the group that intended to kidnap General

Schneider met to discuss last-minute instructions. According to the

findings of the Chilean Military Court which investigated the Schneider

killing, neither the Army It. Colonel nor the Navy Captain were there.

Shortly after & am, General Schneider's car was intercepted, on his

way to work, by the abductorsand he was mortally wounded when he drew

his handgun in self-defense. The Military Court determined that hand

guns had been used to kill General Schneider, although it also found

that one unloaded machine gun was at the scene of the killing.

The first Station reports following the Schneider shooting said

"Military Mission sources claim General Schneider machine gunned on

way

to work"

(Santiago 587, 22 October) and "Assailants used grease

guns." (Santiago 589, 22 October) The submachine guns had previously

been described as "grease guns." Thus the initial reaction of the Station

was that Schneider had been

shot with the same kind of weapons delivered

several hours earlier to the

Army Lt. Colonel. Santiago then informed

Headquarters "Station has instructed Col. Wimert to hand over $50,000

if Gen. Valenzuela

requests " (Santiago 592, 22 October), thus indicating

that the Station thought the kidnapping had been accomplished by Valen-

zuela's

paid abductors.

Later that day, the Station cabled Headquarters:

* The Military Court determined that those who participated in the

shooting of General Schneider on October 22 were

part of the

Viaux-led

conspiracy? The Court also found that this same group had participated

in the October 19 and 20 kidnap attempts.

In June 1972 General Viaux was convicted for complicity in the plot

culminating in the death of General Schneider.

He received a 20-year

prison sentence for being "author of the crime of kidnapping which re-

sulted in serious injury to the victim," and a five-year exile for con-

spiring to cause a military coup.

Also convicted on the latter charge

were Generals Valenzuela and Tirado. They received sentences of three

years in exile.

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Station unaware if assassination was pré-

meditated or whether it constituted bungled

abduction attempt.

In any case, it important

to bear in mind that move against Schneider

was conceived by and executed at behest of

senior Armed Forces officers. We know that

General Valenzuela was involved. We also

near certain that Admiral Tirado, Army Lt.

Colonel and Navy Captain witting and involved.

We have reason for believeing that General

Viaux and numerous associates fully clued in,

but cannot prove or disprove that execution

elements linked with Viaux. Important factor

to bear in mind is that Armed Forces, and not

retired officers or extreme rightests, set

Schneider up for execution or abduction....

All we can say is that attempt against Schneider

is affording Armed Forces one last opportunity

to prevent Allende's election if they are willing

to follow Valenzuela's ago arl, 22 October)

I. Post October 22 Events

The shooting of General Schneider resulted immediately in a declara-

tion of martial law, the appointment of General Prats to succeed Schneider

as Commander in Chief, and the appointment of General Valenzuela as chief

of Santiago province.

These measures, and others taken, caused the Chile

Task Force to make the following initial judgment:

With only 24 hours remaining before the Congressional

runoff, a coup climate exists in Chile....The attack

on General Schneider has produced developments which

closely

• follow Valenzuela's plan.... Consequently the

plotters'

positions have been. enhanced.

(Chile Task Force Log, 22 October)

On October 23, Director Helms reviewed and discussed Track II:

It was agreed...that a maximum effort has been achieved,

and that now only the Chileans themselves can manage a

-successful coup. The Chileans have been guided to a

point where a military solution is at least open to

them.

(Task Force 10g,- 24: October)!

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Although it

was not inmediately clear to CIA observers, the Station's

prediction of October 9 that the shooting of Schneider (as a result of

an abduction

attempt) would "rally the Army firmly behind the flag of

constitutionalism" was correct.

(Santiago 495, 9 October) On October 24

Di. Allende was confirmed by the Chilean Congress.

General Schneider

died the next day.

2283284289

posterson

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V.

CIA/White House Communication During Track II

The testimony given to the Conmittee by Henry Kissinger and General

Haig conflicts with that given by CIA officials.

Kissinger and Haig testified that on October 15, 1970, the White

House stood downCIA efforts to promote a military coup d'etat in Chile.

Both testified that after that date they

were neither informed of, nor

authorized, CIA Track II activities, including the kidnap plans of

General Schneider and the passage of weapons to the military plotters.

By contrast, CIA officials testified that they operated before and

after October 15 with the knowledge and approval of the White House.

The conflict pertains directly

to the period after October 15, but

it bears on the degree of communication between the White House and the

CIA in the earlier period as well. For instance, Henry Kissinger testi-

fied that he was informed of no coup plan

which began with the abduction

of General Schneider. He was aware of General Viaux's plan--which he

and Karamessines decided on October 15 to try to forestall--but did not

know that it was to begin with Schneider's abduction.

CIA officials, especially Thomas Karamessines, stated that there was

close consultation throughout Track II between the Agency and the White

House. Karamessines testified that he met with Kissinger some six to

ten

times during the five weeks of Track II (Karamessines testimony,

page 66); and that he kept Kissinger generally informed of developments.

(Ibid., page 56) The Committee has records of two meetings between

Karamessines and Kissinger and of one telephone conversation between

Karamessines

and Kissinger's deputy, General Alexander Haig. Karamessines'

daily calendar indicates that three other meetings with General Hafß

ok place-but does not establish with certain that the

that the topic was

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Track It!

The calendarilalso suggests that Karamessines and Kissinger

met on three other occasions and so might have had the opportunity to

discuss Track II.

Henry Kissinger's testimony before the Committee differs

from Karamessines in

two respects: He believed Track II was "turned off"

on October 15; and, after that date, he was informed neither of the coup

plans of the Chilean conspirators nor of the passage of weapons to them.

He said that Track II was

in the nature of a probe and not in the nature of

a plan,...no plan for a coup was ever submitted to

the White House.

So my recollection of events,

this was a request by President Nixon for Track II

which led to two or three meetings which then on.

October I5th led to being turned off by the White

House, after which Track II was dead as far as my

office was concerned; and we never received another

report on the subject. (Kissinger testimony, p. 15)

***

In my mind Track II was finished on October 15th

and I never received any further CIA information

after October 15th on the basis of any records that

I have been

able to find. (Ibid., p. 59)

General Haig's testimony generally coincided with Kissinger's

recollection:

I left (the October 15th meeting) with the distinct

impression that there was nothing that could be

done in this covert area that offered promise or

hope for success.

I had the distinct impression

that was Dr. Kissinger's conclusion, and that in

effect these things--and I wasn't even really

familiar with what these two groups were to do and

how they were to do it, but they were to cease and

desist. (Haig testimony, PP. 26-27)

***

-My recollection would be that we had no hope for a

viable, covert plan of action.

That is the impres-

sion I got. (Ibid., p. 29)

The following pages

present the Committee's record of communication

between the White House and the CIA from September. 18 through December 2:

..::

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PEARFT

A. September

September 18

Helms and Karamessines met with Kissinger at the White House. As

Helms' notes of the September 15 meeting indicate, Kissinger wanted a

plan within 48 hours.

In the meeting on the 18th, according to CIA

records, there was little discussion of a military coup. Rather the

conversation focused on "what economic leverage could be exercised in

the Chilean situation...." (Memorandum/Meeting with DDP, 18 September)

The efficacy of economic pressure continued to be a subject of con-

cern during the last days of September. Apparently that pressure was

viewed as another inducement to Frei to opt for the "Frei gambit."

September 21

The 40 Committee met.

The Select Committee has no confirmation

that Chile was on the agenda at this meeting. Karamessines' calendar

confirms that he attended; presumably Kissinger, the 40 Committee chair-

man,

also attended, although the Committee has not been able to review

his calendar. All that can be said about this meeting--and the meetings

of the Senior Review Group, which Kissinger also chaired-is that the

meetings afforded Karamessines and Kissinger an opportunity to meet

privately and discuss Track II if they desired. In all these instances

save the 4Ö Conmittee meeting on September 22, the Committee has no

evidence to confirm that such a private Kissinger/Karamessines meeting

actually took place.

That the CIA prepared a memorandum of conversa-

tion for the private meeting on the

22nd but has been able to find none

for other meetings may provide some support for the argument that no

other such private meetings occurred.

September 22

Kissinger asked Karamessines

to stay

behind

aft

tte

meeting called to discuss Track I.

The two

cussed track

"TI

especially the contacts with then-Chilean-President Frei. According to

actions,

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Kissinger told Karamessines that "our

handling of the problem during the

earlier meeting had been perfect

and he added we were doing fine and keep it up."

(Memorandum for

the Record/Chile, 22 September 1970, by Thomas Karamessines)

B. October

October 5

A cable sent to Santiago, released by Karamessines, requested a

report on how the Station planned to contact the three Chilean Generals

-Prats, Valenzuela and Huerta--named in a cable of September 30.

(Headquarters 449) The October 5 cable indicated that the report was

needed for a discussion with Kissinger on October 6. (Santiago 556,

5 October 1970) Karamessines presumed such a meeting had taken place,

although he had no specific memory of it. (Karamessines testimony,

pp. 69-70) His calendar for October 6 indicates that he attended a 40

Committee meeting on Chile. (Karamessines calendar) Kissinger

chaired the 40 Committee.

October 6

The Station reported that General Viaux was "ready to launch golpe

evening 9 October, or morning 10 October." (Santiago 472, 6 October

1970) In response, CIA Headquarters labeled the prospective coup one

"with scant chance of success which will vitiate any further more seri-

ous action."

The Station was directed to try to "stop ill-considered

action at this time." (Headquarters 585, 6 October 1970)

Kissinger testified he had not been informed of the Viaux plan,

supporting his recollection with the fact that the CIA memorandum of

an October

10 conversation between Karanessines and Haig (see below)

makes no mention of any previous plots.

(Kissinger testimony, p. 24)

, sait

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A A similarly:

Kissinger did

not remember having been informed that the

CIA had called off a coup it regarded as premature. He stated:

My perception at that period was that if they

had a coup they would

come...back to us before

triggering it...at no time during the period

did they,

in fact, tell us... that they had a

coup that might be ready to go.

And, indeed,

they generally told us the opposite..

(Kissinger testimony, pp. 25-26)

As Karamessines' calendar indicated, there was a 40 Committee meet-

ing on October 6. He attended this meeting, along with Richard Helms!

and William Broe of the CIA. According to the minutes. of that meeting,

CIA efforts to promote

a military coup in Chile were not discussed.

However, in an exchange with Charles Meyer, who was then the State De-

partment's Assistant Secretary for Latin. American Affairs, Dr. Kissinger

stressed

the desire of "higher authority" (President Nixon) to prevent

Allende's assumption of office. According to the minutes:

Mr. Meyer pointed to the need to determine a post-Allende

an early NSC meeting was desirable on that subject. Mr..

Kissinger said this presumed total acceptance of a fait

accompli and higher authority had no intention of conced-

ing before the 24th; on the contrary, he wanted no stone

left unturned.

(Memorandum for the Record/Minutes of the

Meeting of the. 40 Committee,. 6 October 1970, 7 October

1970)

October 8

Karamessines met for lunch with General Haig. (Karamessines calendar)

In his testimony, Haig recalled being aware that the CIA was in touch

with two differenct groups of military plotters. He believed there must

have been another meeting

in which the CIA informed him of its on-going

contacts.

Lathe all fal

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It seems

to me, although the records don't re-

flect it, that there was a meeting in September,

a very brief one, in which I must have been

told

that there was

specific program going

underway.. That probably would have been by

Henry (Kissinger) and perhaps with Karamessines

there. I am

not sure. (Haig testimony, p. 12)

October 10

Karamessines discussed the Chilean situation by telephone with General

Haig. He indicated that the Station had "made direct contact with a number

of the senior military officers, especially those who had been reportedly

very activist-minded and had received pessimistic reactions from all." "

(Memorandum/FUBELT, by William Broe, 10 October 1970)

Haig recalled the telephone conversation with Karamessines on the 10th.

His recollection accords with the CIA memorandum of conversation.

I do know,

and I know that from looking at the

record this morning, that Karamessines made a

telephone call to me in which he gave a progress

report. I recall that.

It was in effect a nega-

tive progress report, that they were just not com-

ing up with it. (Haig testimony, p. 12)

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A00A4У

Haig indicated

to the Committee that he would have passed along the

substance of that conversation to Kissinger, and that in general his

role at the time was one of a conduit to Kissinger:

I am quite confident that, given my own concep-

tion of my role at that time, that I would have

conveyed that information to Henry,...

(Haig testimony, P. 13)

***

Q. If Mr. Karamessines was unable to see Dr.

Kissinger, and

talked to you, what degree of

latitude did you have concerning what you would

pass on to Dr. Kissinger?

General Haig. At that time I would consider I

had no degree of latitude, other than to convey

to him what had been given to me. (Ibid., p. 15)

October 14

A cable to Santiago for Colonel Wimert, ostensibly from General

Bennett, authorized Wimert to select two Chilean general officers and

convey to them the following

nessage:

"High authority in Washington

has authorized you to offer material support short of armed interven-

tion to Chilean Armed Forces in any endeavors they may undertake to

prevent the election of Allende on October 24...." (Headquarters to

Station cable 762, October 14, 1970) Karamessines testified that in

this case "high authority" would have been Kissinger or the President,

for no one else could have given Wimert such broad authorization.

Karamessines

presumed that the message had been drafted in, or at

least cleared with, the White House. (Karamessines testimony, p. 91)

Howevet, Kissinger did not recall having authorized the October 14th

cable.

He found the sequence of events puzzling:

having been told on

the l0th that little was happening, he would have expected in the

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meeting on

15th (see below) to have discussed the results of the

October 14th

message. But the CIA record makes no mention of

such discussion. (Kissinger testimony, P. 53)

October 14

The 40 Committee met to discuss, among other topics, Chile. In ad-

ditión to the 40 Committee principals (Kissinger, John Mitchell, David

Packard, Alexis Johnson, Admiral Moorer), the meeting was attended by.

Karamessines, William Broe and General Robert Gushman of the CIA, Charles

Meyer from State, Viron Vaky, and. Ambassador Korry, who had returned to

Washington from Santiago for a short period of consultation.

According to the minutes of that meeting, Kissinger asked Karamessines

to give

a rundown on the latest developments and present situation in Chile.

Karamessines pointed out that "a coup climate does not presently exist."

He noted that "the unpredictable General Viaux is the only individual. seem-

ingly ready to attempt a coup and...his chances of mounting a successful.

one were slight.". Ambassador Korry agreed with Karamessines'

assessment

and stated that "as of now it seemed almost certain that Allende would

be voted into office on October 24th."

Kissinger then observed that

"there presently appeared

to be little the U.S. can do to influence the

Chilean situation one way or another." Other participants at the meet-

ing concurred. (Memorandum for the Record/Minutes of the Meeting of the

40 Committee, 14 October 1970, 16 October

1970)

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8 421

October 15

Karamessines met with Kissinger and Haig at the White House to dis-

cuss Track II. According to the CIA memorandum of conversation, Karamessines

gave a run-down on Viaux, Canales and Tirado and "the general situation in

Chile from the coup-possibility viewpoint." It was concluded that Viaux

did not have more than one chance in twenty--perhaps less--to launch

successful coup. Kissinger ticked off the list of negative repercussions

from an unsuccessful coup. The CIA record of the meeting continues:

5.

It was decided by those present that the

Agency must get a message to Viaux warning him

against any precipitate action.

In essence our

message was to state:

"We have reviewed your

plans, and based on your information and ours,

we come to the conclusion that your plans for a

coup at this time cannot succeed. Failing,

they may reduce your capabilities for the future.

Preserve your assets. We will stay in touch.

The time will come when you with all your other

friends can do something. You will continue to

have our support."

6. After the decision to de-fuse the Viaux coup

plot, at least temporarily, Dr. Kissinger instruc-

ted Mr. Karamessines to preserve Agency assets in

Chile, working clandestinely and securely to main-

tain the capability for Agency operations against

Allende in the future.

8.

The meeting concluded on Dr. Kissinger's note

that the Agency should continue keeping the pres-

sure on every Allende weak spot in sight--now,

after the 24th of October, after 5 November, and

into the future until such

time as new marching

orders are given. Mr. Karamessines stated that

the Agency would comply.

(Memorandum of Conversation/Dr. Kissinger, Mr.

Karamessines, Gen. Haig at the White House, 15

October 1970)

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Kissinger, an his testimony before the Committee, regarded the CIA

Mindini

memorandum of conversation as substantially correct, although somewhat

more

detailed than he would have remembered. (Kissinger testimony, p. 52)

He believed the Agency had been told to "stand down and preserve your

assets."

Kissinger believed that the gist of the October 15th meeting as

recorded in the CIA memorandum was incompatible with the order the CIA

issued

to its Station the next day, an order ostensibly based on the

October 15th meeting. And, he noted, in writing its memorandum of the

meeting of the 15th, the CIA had a "high incentive to preserve the maxi-

mum degree of authority." (Ibid., pp. 55-56) The October l6th order

indicated that Track II had been reviewed at "high USG level" the previous

day, and stated:

2. It is firm and continuing policy that Allende

be overthrown by a coup. It would be much prefer-

able to have this transpire prior to 24 October

but efforts in this regard will continue vigorously

beyond this date....

4. There is great and continuing interest in the

activities of Tirado, Canales, Valenzuela et al

and we wish them optimum good fortune.

(Headquarters 802, 16 October 1970)

Kissinger recalled the October 15th conversation as "turning off

the coup plans rather than giving a new order to do them." (Kissinger

testimony, p. 56) Haig agreed in his testimony.

The conclusions of that meeting were that we had

better not do anything rather than something that

-was not going to succeed....My general feeling

was, I left that meeting with

the impression that

there was nothing

authorized."

(Haig testimony, p. 13)

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October 10-Öctober 22 (approximate)

Karamessines and one or two

others went with Kissinger to speak with

the President, after

larger meeting. Karamessines believed this meeting

took place between October 10 and 24. (Karamessines testimony, p. 89)

According to Karamessines, the "President went out of his way

to impress

all of those there with his conviction that it was absolutely essential

that the election of Mr. Allende to the presidency be thwarted."

As

they were leaving the Oval Office, the President took Karamessines

aside

to reiterate the message. (Karamessines testimony, p. 8)

October 19

Station cabled Headquarters early in the morning, advising that

the tear gas had been passed and outlining the Valenzuela coup plan,

beginning with the kidnap of Schneider. In testimony before the Com-

mittee, Karamessines indicated he certainly would have reported the

Valenzuela plan to Kissinger "very promptly, if for no other reason

than that we didn't have

all that much promising news to report to

the White House...." (Karamessines testimony, p. 72)

And as I say, if for no other reason we would have .

wanted to get this kind

of hopeful report to the

White House as soon as possible, and it would be my

.

best estimate now that that is precisely what we

did. (p. 72)

the afternoon of the 19th, Karamessines met with General Haig

for an hour at the White House. (Karamessines calendar) By then,

Karamessines would have had in hand the cable outlining the Valenzuela

*

If the meeting with the President occurred after October 15, that

would lend credence to the testimony of CIA officials that they were

not directed to end their coup efforts in the October 15th meeting.

Unfortunately, the Committee has not had access to the daily calendars

of President Nixon or Secretary Kissinger, which might pinpoint the

date of the President's conversation with

Karamessines.

Those calen

dars, along with other White House documents bearing on Track II, have

subpoenaed.

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plan, since the cable had arrived that morning.

However, General Haig

had no recollection of the meeting with Karamessines on the 19th. Nor

dId he believe he had been informed of the Valenzuela plan. "This

is all very new to me.

I hadn't seen any of this, and I was not familiar

with this particular plan...or $50,000, or any of the characters that

aré described in here."

(Haig testimony, PP. 38-39)

Similarly, Kissinger testified that he had not been informed of

the Valenzuela plan. He said he "was informed of nothing after October

15th...."

(Kissinger testimony, p. 65) He indicated that, according

to his daily calendar, he had no conversation with either Karamessines

or Helms between the 15th and the 19th. (Ibid., p. 53) He Indicated

that he never knew that the CIA was in the process of passing guns and

tear gas to Chilean military conspirators. He said "...there was no

further

meeting on that subject. In anybody's record, mine of theirs

(the CIA's), none of the information from the l6th on was familiar to me."

(Ibid., p. 62)

Kissinger further testified he did not know that the United States

was dealing with Chilean officers who plotted a coup which involved

the abduction of General Schneider:

• Senator fart of Colorado. I am-not sure that

the record clearly shows you answer to the direct

question of whether you knew or did not know that

we were negotiating with military officers with

regard to a plot that did involve the abduction

of General Schneider.

Secretary Kissinger.

I said I did not know.

(Kissinger testimony, p. 86)

Nor did General Haig believe he had been informed of any abduction

plans before the fact.

# Vian

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A were you

aware during that period of time

of the plans

to kidnap General Schneider?

General Haig. I was aware after, the fact...

Q.

But you were never informed prior to his

attempted abduction?

General Haig.

I don't believe I was at all.

October 20

A cable to the Station indicated that "while awaiting word on whatever

events may have occurred 19 October, please let us know what you can on

interim basis....Headquarters must respond during morning 20 October to

queries from high levels." (Headquarters 883, 20 October 1970) Karamessines

testified that the references to "high levets" in the cable of the 20th

meant White House officials, probably Kissinger. He felt quite certain

that Kissinger would have been briefed in advance about Valenzuela's plan

for the l9th and so would have been expected to ask what happened on the

morning of the 20th. (Karamessines testimony, p. 73) In contrast, Kissinger

interpreted that cable in precisely the opposite light. He felt it indicated

that he had not been informed of the Valenzuela plan in advance. When

news of the Schneider kidnap

reached the White House, Kissinger believed

he would have had "somebody pick up a telephone and say, 'What is this

all about?'" (Kissinger transcript, p. 68)-

October 22

• Karamessines met with Haig at the White House. (Karamessines calendar)

General Haig remembered that word of the shooting of Schneider came as

"a great shock" to him,

and he believed that Karamessines had told him

about it in their meeting on the 22nd. He thought that Kissinger either

was present at the meeting or that he, Haig, had gone immediately in to

Kissinger's office to relate what Karamessines had told him!: (Haig testim

топу, р. 36)

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C. December

December 2

A memorandum,

dated December 2, 1970, from Helms to Kissinger stated

that Helms had

given a recapitulation on Track II to Attorney General

Mitchell, who would deliver it personally to Kissinger. A handwritten

note on the memorandum reads: "sent to Kissinger via DCI (Helms)."

(Helms memorandum for Kissinger, 2 December 1970) The report, which

was dated November 18, 1970, contained a full account of CIA activities

during Track II, including the several plans to kidnap Schneider and

the passage of weapons to the Chilean conspirators. (Report on CIA

Chilean Task Force Activities, 15 September to 3 November 1970, 18

November 1970)

In his testimony to the Comittee, Kissinger did not recall receiv-

ing the report, although he. doubted that he would have read such an

"after action" report in any case.

He testified that he could not find

it in his files, in contrast to his finding a CIA report on Track I,

dated November 19, 1970. Kissinger was puzzled by a number of aspects of..

the memorandum and report: why there were two reports, why the report

of the 18th apparently was only called to his attention on the 2nd of

December,

and why it was to be delivered through Mitchell. (Kissinger

testimony, pp. 71, 74)

D. Did Track II End?

The Committee also received conflicting testimony about whether or

not Track II ever ended, formally or in fact. As noted above, Kissinger indi-

• cated that Track II was supposed to have ended, as far as he was concerned, on

October 15.

It was formally terminated, according to Kissinger, by a new Presi-

dential marching oxder issued prior to the October 24 vote of the Chilean Congress.

TO

.:..

• =

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?.

"The Committee does

not have this new "marching

order" in its possession.

However, CIA officials from whom the Committee took testimony believed

that there had been no such definitive end to Track IT. It merely

tapered off, to be replaced by a longer-term effort to effect a change

of government in Chile. Karamessines'

testimony was most explicit:

Mr. Karamessines. I am

sure that the seeds that

were laid in

that effort in 1970 had their impact

in 1973.

I do not have any question about that

in my mind either.

(Karamessines testimony, p. 26)

*x*

Q. Was Track II ever formally ended? Was there

a specific order ending it?

Mr. Karamessines. As far as I was concerned,

Track II

was really never ended.

What we were

told to do in effect was, well, Allende is now

President.

so Track I1, which sought to prevent

him from becoming President, was

technically out,

it was done. But

what we were told to do was to

continue our efforts. Stay alert, and to do what

we could to contribute to the eventual achieve-

ment of the objectives and

purposes of Track II.

That being the case, I don't think it is proper

to say that Track II was ended.

(Ibid., pp. 128-129)

When informed of Karamessines' testimony that Track II was never

ended, Kissinger testified:

The Chairman. Would you take issue with that,

with the (Karamessines) testimony?

-..

Secretary Kissinger. Totally....It is clear

that...after October 15th that there was no

separate channel by the CIA to the White House

no 40 Committee that

authorized an approach to

"or contact with military people, no plots which

I am familiar with, and all the covert operations

in Chile after Allende's election by the Congress

were

directed towards maintaining the democratic

opposition for the 1976 election. And

..that was

the exclusive thrust, and if there was any further.

contact with military plotting, it was totally"

unauthorized and this is the first that I have

heard of it. (Kissinger testimony, pp. 75-77)

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(Draft--9/8/75)

A. Summary

South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother,

Ngo Dinh Nhu, were

assassinated during a coup by Vietnamese

generals on November 2, 1963. Evidence before the Committee

indicates that the United States Government offered

encourage-.

ment for the coup, but neither desired

nor was involved in the

assassinations.

Rather, Diem's

assassination appears to have

been a spontaneous act by Vietnamese generals, engendered by

anger at Diem for refusing to resign or put himself in the

custody of the leaders of the coup.

On one occasion, General Duong Van Minh ("Big Minh") out -

lined to a CIA officer the possible assassination of Nhu and

another brother, Ngo Dinh Can, as one of three methods being

considered for changing the government in the near future.

Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge and Deputy Chief of Mission William

Trueheart were informed of this possibility by the Saigon Chief

of Station, who recommended that "we do not set ourselves

irrevocably against the assassination. plot, since the other two

alternatives mean either a bloodbath in Saigon or a protracted .

struggle which would rip the Army and the country asunder" (CIA

cable SAIG 1447, Saigon Station to DCI, 10/5/63). Upon being

informed, Director McCone sent two cables. The first stated

"[wle cannot be in the position of stimulating, approving, or

supporting assassination"

, and the second directed that the

recommendation be withdrawn because "we cannot be in position

actively condoning such course of action and thereby engaging

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responsibility therefor"' (CIA cable, DCI to Saigon 10/5/63);

CIA cable DIR 73661, DCI to Saigon, 10/6/63) .

B. The Abortive Coup of August 1963

On May 8, 1963, South Vietnamese troops in the City of Hue

fired on Buddhists protesting against the Diem Government, killing

nine and wounding fourteen. This incident triggered a nationwide

Buddhist protest and a sharp loss of popular confidence in the

Diem regime.*

On May 13, United States Ambassador Frederick E. Molting

met with Diem

and outlined steps. which the United States desired

him to take to rodress the Buddhist grievances and recapture

public confidence. These steps included admitting responsibility

for the lue incident, compensating the victims, and reaffirming

religious equality in the country. (Pentagon Papers, p.208) On

June 3, Madane inu, the wife of Diem's brother, Nhu, publicly

- accused the Buddhists of being infiltrated with Communist agents;

Truehart protested her remarks to Diem and threatened to dis-

associate the United States from any repressive measures against

the Buddhists in the future (Pentagon Papers, p.308).. Shortly

thereafter, Madame thu commented on the self-immolation of Quang

* Senator Gravel Laition, The Pentagon Papers, The Defense Depart-

ment Histoty of United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam, pp.

208, Volume II, Beacon Press, Boston (hereinafter cited

Papers).

Fomer Public Affairs Officer of the U.S. Embassy in

Saigon,

he honk

as Pentagon

John Meclilin), in his book, Mission in Torment, An Intimate

Account of the U.S. Role in

Vietnam, Doubleday and Company, 1965,

(hereinafter cited

as Mecklin, at pages 158-60 described the vul-

- nerability of the Buddhists to Communist infiltration during this

period noting that it'"offered a classic opportunity for a Communist

sleeper ploy."

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Duc and other Buddhist monks by stating that she would like to

furnish mustard for the monks' barbecue. On June 12, Trueheart

told Diem that Quang Duc's suicide had shocked the world and

again warned that the United States would break with his govern-

ment if he did not solve the Buddhist problem. (Pentagon Papers,

p. 208.)

Lucien Conein, a CIA officer in Saigon,* testified that the

Buddhist uprisings were the catalyst that ultimately brought

down the Diem regime (Conein, PP. 42-44). These events led the

United States to apply "direct, relentless, and tablehammering

pressure on Diem such as the United States has seldom before

attempted with a sovereign friendly government." (Mecklin, p. 169)

By July 4, 1963, Generals Minh, Don, Kim, and Khiem had

agreed on the necessity for a coup.**

In his final meeting on August 14 with Ambassador Nolting,

Diem agreed to make a public statement offering concessions to

the Buddhists. This statement took the form of an interview

* Conein testified that he had known the Generals involved

in the coup

"for many years.

Some of them I had known back even in

World War II.

Some of them were in powerful positions,

and I was able to talk to them on a person to person basis,

not

as-a government official

." (Conein, p. 17.)

** Conein's After-Action Report stated that:

"The majority of the officers, including General Minh,

• desired

President Diem to have honorable retirement from

the political scene in South Vietnam and

exile.

As to

Ngo. Dinh Nhu and Ngo Dinh Can, there was never

dissention.

The attitude was that their deaths, along with Madame Ngo

Dinh Nhu, would be welcomed." (Conein After-Action Report,

p. 10.)

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with the columnist, Margurite Higgins, in which Diem asserted

that his policy toward the Buddhists had always been conciliatory .

and

asked for harmony and support of the government.

Shortly after midnight on August 21, 1963, Whu ordered forces

loyal to him

to attack pagodas throughout Vietnam, arresting monks

and

sacking the sacred buildings. Over thirty monks were injured

and 1,400 arrested.

The American Embassy was taken by surprise

and viewed

the

attacks as a shattering repudiation of Diem's

*

promises

to iolting. (rentagon tapers, p.zlu)

On August 24, 1963, the State Department sent a cable

(Deptel 213) to the new ambassador in Vietnam, Henry Cabot Lodge.

The teleyram was prepared by Roger tilsman,.

Assistant Secretary

of State for Far Bastern Affairs, and Under Secretary of State

Averell liarriman, and was approved by President jennedy. (Pentagon

Papers, P.235) Deptel 243 told Lodge to press Diem to take

"prompt dramatic actions" to redress the grievances of the

Buddhists.

"We must at same time also tell key military leaders

that US would find it impossible to continue support

GViN (Vietnamese Government) militarily and economically

unless above steps are taken immediately which we

cecognize requires renoval of the Nhu's from the scene.

We wish give Dien reasonable opportunity to remove Nhu's

but if he remains obdurate, then we are prepared to accept

the obvious implication that we can no longer support

Diem.

You may also tell appropriate military commanders

we will give them direct support in any interim period

of breakdown central government mechanism. •

Con-

...

currently with above, Ambassador and country teams should

urgently examine all possible alternative leadership and

make detailed plans as to how we might bring Diem's

replacement if this should becone necessary . .

• i

Conein testified that the raids might have been timed to occur

when no American Anbassador was in Vietnam (Nolting had left a few

days before and

his replacement, Lodge, had not yet arrived) (Conein,

p.21) .

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In a cable on August 25, CIA Chief of Station John Richardson

reported the result of a conference among himself, Lodge, True-

heart, General Harkins (Commander, Military Assistance Command,

Vietnam (MACV) and General Weede (Chief of Staff, MACV). They

accepted Deptel 243 "as a basic decision from Washington and

would proceed to do their best to carry out instructions"

• (I. G.,

C, PP. 7-8)

but believed that Diem would refuse to remove his

brother from his position in the government.

Early in the morning of August 26, 1963, the Voice of America

in South Vietnam placed the blame on Nhu for the August 21 raids

and absolved the army. The broadcast also reported speculation

that the United States contemplated suspending aid to the South

Vietnamese Government (Pentagon Papers, P. 212).* Later on that

same day, Lodge presented his credentials to Diem. CIA officers

Conein and Spera were told to see Generals Khiem and Khanh,

respectively, and to convey to them the substance of Deptel 243,

but to remind them that "we cannot be of any help during initial

action of assuming power of state. Entirely their own action,

win or lose" (SAIG 0304, 8/26/63).

A message from the White House on August 29 authorized

Harkins to confirm to the Vietnamese Generals that the United

States would support a coup if it had a good chance of succeeding,

but

did not involve United States armed forces. Lodge was autho-

rized to suspend United States aid at his discretion. (Deptel 272,

8/29/63.) A cable from the President to Lodge on the same day stated:

*In a cable to Harriman, Lodge complained that the VOA broadêast

• had "complicated our already difficult problem" by eliminating

"the possibility of the generals' effort achieving surprise."

Lodge further warned that.

"the US must not appear publicly in

the matter, thus giving the 'kiss of death' to its friends"

(Cable, Lodge to Harriman,, 8/26/63) .

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"I have approved all the messages you are receiving from

others today, and I emphasize that everything in these

nessages has my full support.

We will do all that we can

to help you conclude this operations successfully . .

Until the very moment of the go signal for the operation

by the Generals, I must reserve a contingent right to

change course and reverse previous instructions.

While

., fully aware of your assessment of the consequences of

such a reversal, I know from experience that

failure is

more destructive than an appearance of indecision. I

would, of course, accept full responsibility for any such

change as I must

also bear the

full responsibility for this

operation and its consequences." (Cable, 8/29/63) .

In a reply cable, Lodge stated:

"I. I fully understand that you have the right and

responsibility to change course at any time. Of course

I will always respect that right.

2.

Io be successful, this operation must be essentially

a Vietnamese affair with a momentum of.

its own.

Should

this happen you may not be able to control it, i.e.. the

"go signal" may be given by the generals." (Cable, Lodge

to President, 8/30/63)

A cable fron Saigon dated August 31, 1963, stated:

"This particular coup is finished

Generals did

not feel ready and did not have sufficient balance of

forces .

There is little doubt that GWV. (South

Vietnamese Government)

aware US role

and may have con

• siderable detail . ..."

(SAIG 0199, 8/31/63)

Deptel 243 and the VOA broadcast set the tone for later

relations between the United States representatives and the :

generals. Big Minh, who had initial doubts about the strength

of American support, grew in confidence.

C.

The November 1963 Coup

American dissatisfaction with the Diem regime became

increasingly apparent. On September 8, AID Director David Bell,

• in a television interview, stated that Congress might cut aid

South Vietnam if the Diem government did not change its course

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(Pentagon Papers, P. 214). Lodge suggested a study to deter-

mine the most effective methods of cutting aid to topple the

regime (Pentagon Papers, P. 214). On September 12, with White

House approval, Senator Church introduced a resolution in the

Senate

condemning the South Vietnamese Government for its

repressive handling of the Buddhist problem and calling for an

end to United States aid unless the oppressive measures were

curtailed (Pentagon Papers, PP. 214-215) .

In mid-September 1963, two proposals for dealing with Diem

were considered by the Administration. The first contemplated

increasingly severe pressure to bring Diem in line with American

policy; the second involved acquiescing in Diem's actions,

recognizing that Diem and Nhu were inseparable, and attempting

to salvage as much as possible. It was decided to adopt the

first proposal, and to send Secretary of Defense McNamara and

General Taylor on a fact-finding mission to Vietnam. (Pentagon

Papers, p. 215.)

On October 2

, McNamara and Taylor returned to Washington

and presented their findings to the National Security Council.

Their report confirmed that the military effort was progressing

favorably, but warned of

the dangers inherent in the political

turmoil and recommended bringing pressure against Diem. This

pressure would include announcing the withdrawal of 1,000

American troops by the end of the year; ending support for the

forces responsible for the pagoda raids, and continuing Lodge's

policy of remaining aloof from the regime. The report recommended

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against a coup, but sugyested that alternative leadership should be

identified and cultivated. The reconmendations were promptly

approved by the President. (Pentagon Papers, PP.215-]16)

On October 3 Conein contacted Minh. Minh explained that a

coup was being planned, and requested assurances of American •

support if it were successful.

Minh outlined three courses of

action, one of which was the assassination of Dien's brothers,

Nhu and Can (Conein, p.25; cable, Saigon to Director, 10/5/63) .

The Acting Chief of the CIA Station, David R. Smith, cabled on

October 5 that he had recommended to Lodge that "we do not set

ourselves irrevocably against the assassination plot, since the

other two alternatives mean either a blood bath in Saigon or a

protracted struggle" (Cable, Saigon to Director, 10/5/63) .

A cable fron the Director, CIA to Saigon responded that:

"(we certainly cannot be in the position of stimulating,

approving, or

supporting assassination, but on the other

hand, we are in no way

responsible for stopping every

such

threat of which we might receive even partial know

ledge.

we certainly would not favor assassination of Diem.

We believe engaging ourselves by taking position on this

matter opens door too easily for probes of our position

re others, re support of regime, et cetera. Consequently

However, We naturally

interested in intelligence on any such plan.

... .....- -.-

* The other courses of action were the encirclement of Saigon

by various military units and direct confrontation between military

units involved in the coup and loyalist units.

** Colby, who was then Chief, Far Eastern Division, drafted

this cable for McCone.

Colby testified:

"Q: So you were on notice as of that date that the Director

personally opposed any involvement by the CIA in an assas-

sination?

"Colby: I certainly was." (Colby, p. 57)

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McCone testified that he met privately with the President and

the

Attorney General; taking the position that "our role was

to assemble all information on intelligence as to what was

going on and to report it to the appropriate authorities, but

to not attempt to direct it" (McCone, p. 62). He believed

the

United States should maintain a "hands off attitude" (McCone,

P. 62). McCone testified:

"I felt that the President agreed with my position, des-

pite the fact that he had great reservations concerning

Diem and his conduct.

I urged him to try to bring all

the pressure we could on Diem to change his ways, to

encourage more support throughout the country. My precise

words to the President, and I remember them very clearly,

was that Mr. President, if I was manager of a baseball

team, I had one pitcher, I'd keep him in the box whether

he was a good pitcher or not.. By that I was saying that,

if Diem was removed we would have not one coup but

we

would have a succession of coups and political disorder

in Vietnam and it might last several years and indeed

it did."

(McCone, PP. 62-63.)

McCone stated that he did not discuss assassination with

the President, but rather "whether we should let the coup go

'or use our influences not to"

• He left the meeting believing

that

the President

agreed with his "hands off" recommendation

(McCone, pP. 62-63). McCone cabled Smith on October 6:

"McCone directs that you withdraw recommendation to

ambassador (concerning assassination plan) under McCone

instructions, as we cannot be in position actively con-

doning

course of action and thereby engaging our

responsibility therefore" (CIA to Saigon, DIR 73661, 10/6/63) •

In response; the CIA Station in Saigon cabled headquarters:

"Action taken as directed. In addition, since DCM

Trueheart was also present when original recommendation

was made, specific withdrawal of recommendation at Mccone's

instruction was also conveyed to Trueheart.

Ambassador

Lodge cormented that he shares McCone's opinion." (Saigon

to CIA, SAIG 1463, 10/7/63)

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Conein, the CIA official who dealt directly with the Generals,*

testified that he was first told of McCone's response to the

assassination alternative by Ambassador Lodge around October 20

(Conein, p. 35). Conein testified (but did not so indicate in

his detailed After-Actio, Raport) that he then told General Don

that the United States opposed assassination, and that the

General responded, "alright, you don't like it, we won't talk

about it anymore" (Conein, p. 36).

The United States increased pressure on Diem to mend his

ways. On October 17, General Richard Stillwell (MACV J-3)

informed Secretary Thuan that the United States was suspending

aid to the special forces units responsible for the pagoda

raids until they were transferred to the field and placed under

Joint General Staff (JGS) command (Pentagon Papers, p. 217).

On October 27, Lodge traveled to Dalat with Diem, but did

not receive any commitment from Diem to comply with Anerican

requests (Pentagon Papers, P. 219).

On October 28, Conein met with-General Don, who had

received assurance from Lodge that Conein spoke for the United

States. Don said that he would make the plans for the coup

* Coneir described his role as follows:

"My job was to convey the orders from my Ambassador and

the instructions from my Ambassador to the people who

were Planning the coup, to monitor those individuals whe

were

planning the coup,

to get as much information

SO

**

that

our government would not be caught with their pants

down" (Conein, pp. 38-39).

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available to the Ambassador four hours before it took place,

and

suggested that Lodge not change his plans to go to the

United States on October 31. (I.G., C, p. 37; Pentagon Papers,

p. 219.)

On October 30, Lodge reported to Washington that he was

powerless to

stop the coup, and that the matter was entirely

in Vietnamese hands. General-Harkins disagreed and cabled his

opposition to the coup to General Taylor (Pentagon Papers,

p. 220). A cable from Bundy to Lodge dated October 30 expressed

White House concern and stated that "[wle cannot accept conclu-

sion that we have no power to delay or discourage a coup"

(Cable, Bundy to Lodge, 10/30/63). A subsequent cable on that

same day from Washington instructed Lodge to intercede with

the Generals to call off the coup if he did not believe it •

would succeed. The instructions prescribed "strict noninvolve-

ment and somewhat less strict neutrality". (Pentagon Papers,

p. 220.)

Late in the morning of November 1, the first units involved

in the coup began to deploy around Saigon. The Embassy was

given only four minutes' warning before the coup began (MACV

cable to Joint Chiefs of Staff 8512, 11/1/63).. An aide to

Don told Conein to bring all available money to the Joint

General Staff headquarters. Conein brought 3 million piasters

(Approximately $42,000) to the headquarters, which was given

to Don to procure food for his troops and to pay death benefits

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to those killed in the coup (Conein, 6/20., p. 72).*

Conein was at the

Joint General Staff Headquarters during

most of the coup (I.G., C, PD. 41-42). At 1:40 p.m.,. the

Generals

proposed that Dien resign immediately, and guaranteed

him and. Nhu safe departure (Conein After-Action Report, P. 15).

The palace was surrounded shortly afterwards, and at 4:30 p.m.

the Generals announced the coup on the radio and demanded the

resignation of Diem and Nhu. Diem called Lodge and inquired

about the United States' position. Lodge responded that the

United States did not yet have a view, and expressed concern

for Diem's safety (Pentagon Papers, P. 221).

According to Conein's report, Minh told Nhu that if he and

Diem did not resign within five minutes, the palace would be

bombed. Minh

then phoned Diem. Diem refused to talk with him

and Minh ordered the bombing of the palace. Troops moved in

on the palace, but Diem still refused to capitulate. Minh

- offered Diem a second chance to surrender half an hour later,

telling him that if he refused he would be "blasted off of the

earth". Shortly before nightfall an air assault was launched

on the Presidential Guard barracks. (Conein After-Action Report,

pp. 17-18.)

At 6:20 on the morning of November 2, Diem called General

* CIA had apparently considered passing money to the coup

leaders in early October (Colby, 6/20, p. 21).

On October 29,

Lodge calbed that a request for

funds should be anticipated"

(Lodge to State, No. 2040, 10/29/63; and 2063, 10/30/63) -

Conein received the money on October 24, and kept it in a safe

in his house.

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Don at the Joint General Staff headquarters and offered to

surrender if he and Nhu were given safe conduct to an

airport.

Shortly afterwards, Diem offered to surrender unconditionally

and ordered the Presidential Guard to cease firing. According

to Conein, an escort for Diem appeared in front of the palace

at 3:00 a.m., but Diem and Nhu

were not present (Conein After-

Action Report, p. 24).

At 10:30 a.m. the bodies of Diem and Nhu were reported to

be at the Joint General Chiefs' headquarters. Conein declined

•to view the bodies because he

feared that doing so might damage

United States interests (Conein, p. 57).

The details of Diem's and Nhu's deaths are not known.*

- .

* Conein specualted that Diem and Nhu escaped through a tunnel

from the palace and fled to a Catholic Church in Chalon.

He

opined that an informant must have identified them and called the

• General Staff Headquarters (Conein After-Action Report, p. 23).

Another CIA source states that Dien and Nhu had left the palace

the previous evening with a Chinese businessman and arrived at

the church at 8:00 on the morning of November 2.

Ten minutes

later they were

picked up by soldiers and forced into an

vehicle (Cable, Saigon to State, No.

army

Minh originally told

Conein that Diem and Nhu had committed suicide, but Conein

doubted that Catholics would have taken their own lives in a

church (Conein, p. 56) .

The Inspector General's Report states

that on November 16, 1963, a field-grade officer of

unknown

reliability gave the CIA two photographs of the bodies of Diem

and Nhu in which it appeared their hands were tied behind their

backs (I.G., C, PP. 43-44).

The source reported that Diem and

Nhu had been shot and stabbed while being conveyed to the Joint

General Staft headquarters.

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None of the informed sources

give any indication of direct or

indirect involvement of the United States.*

* It must be noted that on October 30, 1963, Ambassador Lodge

notified Washington that there might be

a request by ked leaders

for evacuation, and suggested Saipan as

a point for evacuation

(Saigon Station Cable No. 2036, 10/30/63). Conein was charged

with obraining the airplane. Between 6:00 and 7:00 on the

morning of November 2, Minh and Don asked Conein to procure an

aircraft.

Conein relayed the request to David Smith, Acting

Chiet of Station at the Embassy,

who replied that it would not

se possible to get an aircraft for the next twenty-four hours,

since it would have to be flown from Guam. Conein testified

that Smith told him that Diem could be flown only to

a country

that offered him

asylum and that the plane could not land in

any other country.

There were no aircraft immediately avail-

able that had sufficient range to reach

a potential country

of asylum (Conein, p. 54)..

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R1440

TABLE OF CONTENTS

IV. Findings and Conclusions

• .

• A. Findings Concerning the Plots Themselves

1. Officials of the United States

Government Initiated Plots to

Assassinate Fidel Castro and

Patrice Lumumba . .

....

2..

No Foreign Leaders Were Killed As

A Result of Assassination Plots

Initiated by Officials of the

United States

3.

American Officials Encouraged or

Were Privy to Coup Plots Which

Resulted in the Death of Trujillo,

Diem, and Schneider . ....

4.

The Plots Occurred in a Cold War

Atmosphere Perceived to be of

Crisis Proportions

5.

American Officials Had Exaggerated

Notions About Their Ability to

Control the Actions of Coup Leaders

6.

CIA Officials Made Use of Known Under-

world figures in Assassination

Efforts ....••

B. Conclusions Concerning the Plots Themselves. •

1. The United States Should Not Engage

in Assassination

.......

a.

Distinction Between Targeted

Assassinations Instigated by

the United States and Support

for Dissidents Seeking to

Overthrow Local Governments.

b.

The Setting In Which the Assas-

sination Plots Occurred Explains

But Does Not Justify Them

Page

1

2

3

3

ЗА

4

5

5

5

6

8

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(a)

iii

Page

6.

(b)

Agency Officials Failed On

Several Occasions to Reveal

The Plots To Their Superiors

Or To Do So With Sufficient

Detail and Clarity:

Castro

Trujillo

Schneider.

On Occasion, Administration Officials

Gave Vague Instructions to Sub-

ordinates and Failed to Make Sufficiently

Clear That Assassination Should Be

Excluded From Consideration..

....

Schneider • •

Lumumba . . . .

...:...

Castro . ... ...

..

Practices Current at the Time in Which

The Assassination Plots Occurred Were

Revealed by the Record to Create the

Risk of Confusion, Rashness, and

Irresponsibility in the Very Areas Where

Clarity and Sober Judgment Was Most

Necessary

•...

(a)

The Danger Inherent in Overextending

the Doctrine of Plausible Denial

..

(b)

the Dangers of Using "Circumlocution"

and "Euphemism"

.(c).

(d)

(e)

The Danger of Generalized Instructions.

The Danger of "Floating Authorization"

The Problems. Connected With Creating

New Covert Capabilities

27

27

:34

36

37

38

38

39

46

47

48

49

50

50

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LON

Mote

approved,

Drafting Subcommittee,

10/8/75 (Lumumba sections open

to possible reconsideration)

IV. Findings and Conclusions

In evaluating the evidence and arriving at findings and

conclusions,

the Committee has been guided by the following

standards. We believe these standards to be appropriate to

the constitutional duty of a Congressional committee.

1. The Committee is not a court. Its primary role is

not to determine individual guilt or innocence, but rather

to draw upon the experiences of the past to better propose

guidance for the future.

2. It is necessary to be cautious in reaching conclusions

because of the amount of time that has passed

since the events

reviewed in this report, the inability of three Presidents and

many other key figures to speak for themselves, the conflicting

and ambiguous nature of much of the evidence, and the problems

in assessing the weight to be given to particular documents

and testimony.

3. The Committee has tried to be fair to the persons

involved in the events under examination while at the same

time responding to a need to understand the facts in sufficient

detail

to lay a basis for informed recommendations.

With these standards in mind, the Committee has arrived at

the following findings and conclusions.

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SEGRET

• - 2 -

A. Findings Concerning the Plots. Themselves

1. Officials of the United States Government Initiated

Plots to Assassinate Fidel Castro and Patrice Lumumba

The Committee finds that officials of the United States

Government initiated and participated in plots to assassinate

Patrice Lumumba and Fidel Castro.

The plot to kill Lumumba was conceived in-the latter half

of 1960 by officials of the United States Government, and quick-

ly advanced to the point of sending poisons to the Congo to be

used for the assassination.

• The effort to assassinate Castro began in 1960 and continued

until 1965. The plans to assassinate Castro using poison cigars,

exploding seashells, and a contaminated diving suit did not

advance beyond the laboratory phase. The plot involving under-

world figures reached the stage of producing poison pills,

establishing the contacts necessary to send them into Cuba,

- procuring potential assassins within Cuba, and, according to one

witness, delivering the pills to the island itself. . In the

1960 plot involving a Cuban pilot and in the AM/LASH episode

from 1963-1965, the CIA gave active support and encouragement

• to Cubans whose intent to assassinate Castro was known, and

provided the means for carrying out the assassination.

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No Foreign Leaders Were Killed As a Result of Assas -

sination Plots Initiated by Officials of the United

States

The poisons intended for use against Patrice Lumumba

were never administered to him, and there is no evidence that

the United States was in any way involved in Lumumba's death

at the hands of his Congolese enemies. The effort to assas-

sinate Castro failed.

3. American Officials Encouraged or Were Privy to

Coup Plots Which Resulted in the Death of Trujillo,

Diem, and Schneider

American officials clearly desired the overthrow of

Trujillo, offered both encouragement and guns to local dissi-

dents attempting his overthrow, and supplied them with pistols

and rifles.

American officials offered encouragement to the Vietnamese

generals who plotted Diem's overthrow, and. a CIA official in

Vietnam gave the generals money after the coup had begun.

However, Diem's assassination was neither desired nor suggested

by officials of the United States.

The record reveals that the United States officials

offered encouragement to the Chilean

dissidents who plotted

the kidnapping of General Rene Schneider, but did not desire

or encourage his death. Certain high officials did know that

the dissidents planned to kidnap General Schneider.

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As Director Colby testified before the Committee, the death of

a foreign leader is a risk forseeable in any coup attempt. In

the cases we have considered, the risk of death was known in

varying degrees.

It was widely known that the dissidents in

the Dominican Republic intended to assassinate Trujillo; the

contemplation of coup leaders to assassinate Nhu, President

Diem's brother, was communicated to the upper levels of the

United States Government; while the CIA and perhaps the White

House knew

that the coup leaders

in Chile planned to kidnap

General Schneider, it was not anticipated that he would be killed,

although the possibility of his death should have been recognized

as a forseeable risk of his kidnapping.

4. The Plots Occurred in a Cold War Atmosphere Perceived

to be of Crisis Proportions

The Committee fully appreciates the importance of

evaluating the assassination plots in the historical context

within which

they occurred. In the preface to this report, we

described the perception, generally shared within the United

States during the depths of the Cold War, that the country

faced a monolithic enemy in Communism. That attitude helps

explain the assassination plots which we have reviewed,

although it does not justify them. Those involved neverthe-

less appeared to believe they were advancing the best inter-

ests of their country.

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5.

American Officials Had Exaggerated Notions About

Their Ability to Control the Actions of Coup Leaders

Running throughout the cases considered in this report

was

the expectation of American officials that they could

control the actions of dissident groups which they were support-

ing in foreign countries. Events demonstrated that the United

States had no such power. This point is graphically demonstrated

by cables exchanged shortly before the coup in Vietnam.

Ambassador Lodge cabled Washington on October 30, 1963, that he

was unable to halt a coup; a cable from Bundy in response stated

that "We cannot accept conclusion that we have

no power to delay

or discourage. a coup." The coup took place three days later.

Shortly after the experience of the Bay of Pigs, CIA

headquarters. requested operatives in the Dominican Republic

to tell the dissidents to "turn off" the

assassination attempt,

because the United States was not prepared to "cope with the

aftermath." The dissidents replied that the

assassination

was their affair and that it could not be turned off to suit

the convenience of the United States Government.

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6.

CIA Officials Made Use of Known Underworld Figures

in Assassination Efforts

Officials of the CIA made use of persons associated

with the criminal underworld in attempting to achieve the

assassination of Fidel Castro. These underworld figures were

relied upon because it was believed that they had expertise and

contacts that were not available to law-abiding citizens.

Foreign citizens with criminal backgrounds were also used

by the CIA in two other cases that we have reviewed. In the

development of the Executive Action capability, one foreign

national with a criminal background was used to "spot" other

members of the European underworld who might be used by the CIA

for a variety of purposes, including assassination if the need

should arise. In the Lumumba case, two men with criminal back-

grounds were used as field operatives by CIA officers in a

volatile political situation in the Congo.

B. Conclusions Concerning the Plots Themselves

1. The United. States Should Not Engage in Assassination.

We cannot condone the use of assassination as a tool

of foreign policy. Aside from pragmatic arguments against the

use of assassination supplied to the Committee by witnesses with

extensive experience in covert operations, we find that assas-

sination violates moral precepts fundamental to our way of life.

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2977557

- odds

- 6 -

In

addition to considerations, there were

several

practical reasons advanced for

not assassinating foreign

leaders. These reasons

are discussed in the section of

this report recommending a statute making assassination

a crime.

a .

Distinction Between Targeted Assassinations

Instigated by the United States and Support

for Dissidents Seeking to Overthrow Local

Governments

Two of the five principal cases investigated

by the Committee involved plots to kill foreign leaders

(Lumumba and Castro) that were instigated by American

officials. Three of the cases (Irujillo, Diem, Schneider)

involved killings in the course of coup attempts by local

dissidents. These latter cases differed in the degree to

which assassination was contemplated by the leaders of the

coups and the degree to which United States officials

motivated the coups.

The. Committee concludes that targeted assassinations

instigated by the United States must be prohibited.

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Blocanda

- 7 -

Coups involve

varying degrees of risk of assassination.

The possibility of assassination in coup attempts raises

questions concerning the propriety of United States involve-

ment in coups, particularly in those where the assassination

of a foreign leader is a likely prospect.

This country was created by violent revolt against a

regime believed to be tyrannous, and our founding fathers

(the local dissidents of that era) received aid from foreign

countries. Given that history, we should not today rule

out support for dissident groups seeking to overthrow tyrants.

But passing beyond that principle, there remain serious

questions: for example, whether the national interest of

the United States is genuinely involved; whether any such

support should be overt rather than covert; what tactics

should be used; and how such actions should be authorized

and controlled by the coordinate branches of government.

The Committee believes that its recommendation on the question

of covert actions--in support of coups

must await the Committee's

final report which will be issued after a full review of

covert action in general.

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8

b.

The Setting In Which the Assassination Plots

Occurred Explains, But Does Not Justify Them

The Cold War setting in which the assassination

plots took place does

not change our view that assassination

is unacceptable in our society. In addition to the moral and

practical problems discussed elsewhere, we find two principal

defects in any contention that the tenor of the period justifi-

ed the assassination plots:

First, the assassination plots were not necessitated by

imminent danger to the United States. Among the cases studied,

Castro alone posed a threat to the United States, but then

only during the period of the Cuban missile crisis. Castro's

assassination had been planned by the CIA long before that

crisis, and was not advanced by policymakers as a possible

course of action during the crisis.

Second, we reject

absolutely any notion that the United

States should justify its actions by the standards of totali-

tarians. Our standards must

be higher, and this difference is

what the struggle is all about. Of course, we must defend our

democracy.. But in defending it, we must resist undermining.

the very virtues we are defending.

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R

Two documents which have been supplied to the Committee

graphically demonstrate attitudes which can lead to

tactics that erode and could ultimately destroy the very

ideals we must defend.

•The first was written in 1954 by a special committee form-

ed to advise the President on covert activities.. The United

States may, it said, have to adopt tactics "more ruthless than

[those) employed by the enemy" in order to meet the threat from

hostile nations. The report concluded that "long standing

American concepts of American fair play must be reconsidered. "*

Although those proposals did not involve assassinations,

the attitudes underlying them were, as Director Colby testified,

indicative of the setting within which the assassination plots

were conceived. (Colby, 6/4/75, p. 117)

The full text of the passage is as follows:

another important requirement is an aggressive

covert psychological, political, and paramilitary

organization far more effective, more unique, and,

if necessary, more ruthless than that. employed by the

No one should be permitted to stand in the

vay of the prompt, efficient, and secure accomplish-

nent of this mission.

The second consideration, it is now clear that we

are facing an implacable enemy whose avowed objective

is world domination by whatever means at whatever

cost.

There are no rules in such a game.. Hitherto

acceptable norms of human conduct do not apply.

the U.S. is to survive,

long standing American con-

cepts

of American fair play must be reconsidered.

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We do not think that traditional American notions of

fair play need be abandoned when dealing with our adversaries.

It may well be ourselves that we injure most if we adopt

tactics "more ruthless than the enemy"

A second document which represents an attitude which we

find improper was sent to the Congo in the fall of 1960 when

the assassination of Patrice Lumumba was being considered. The

chief of CIA's Africa Division recommended a particular agent

WIROGUE -- because

He is indeed aware of the precepts of right

and wrong, but if he is given an assignment

which may be morally wrong in the eyes of the

world, but necessary because his case officer

ordered him to carry it out, then it is right,

and he will dutifully undertake appropriate

action for its execution without pangs of con-

science.

In a word, he can rationalize all

actions. (Meno dated

/ 160; Bissell

TI.,

6/11/75, p.

The Committee finds

this philosophy is not in keeping with the

ideals of our nation.

2. The United States Should Not Make Use of Underworld

Figures for Their Criminal Talents

We conclude that agencies of the United States must not

use underworld figures for their criminal talents" in carrying

out their operations. In addition to the corrosive effect

*Pending our investigation of the use of informants by the FBI and

other agencies, we reserve judgment on the use of known criminals

as informants.

We are concerned here only with the use of persons

known to be actively engaged in criminal pursuits for their

expertise in carrying out criminal acts.

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upon our government, the use of underworld figures involves

the following dangers:

a. The use of underworld figures for "dirty business"

gives them the power to blackmail the government and to avoid

prosecution, for past or future crimes.

For example, the

figures involved in the Castro assassination operation used

their involvement with the CIA to avoid prosecution.. The CIA

also contemplated attempting to quash criminal charges against

QJWIN in a foreign tribunal.

b. The use of persons experienced in criminal tech-

niques and prone to criminal behavior increases the likelihood

that criminal acts will occur.. Agents in the field are neces-

sarily given broad discretion. But the risk of improper

activities is increased when persons of criminal background

are used, particularly when they are selected precisely to take

advantage of their criminal skills or contacts.

*The corrosive effect of dealing with underworld figures is

graphically demonstrated by the fact that Attorney General Robert

Kennedy, who had devoted much of his professional life to fight-

ing organized crime, did not issue an order against cooperating

with such persons when he learned in May 1961 that the CIA had

made

use of Sam Giancana in a sensitive operation in Cuba.

In May 1962, when the Attorney General learned that the

operation had involved

assassination, he did, according to

a Cla witness, Inform those briefing him that underworld

figures

should not be used before checking with him first,

but failed to direct that they must never be so used.

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c.

There is the danger that the United States Govern-

ment will' become an unwitting accomplice to criminal acts and

that criminal figures will take advantage. of their associa-

tion with the government to advance their own projects and

interests.

d. There is a fundamental impropriety in selecting

persons because they are skilled at performing deeds which the

laws of our society forbid.

The use of underworld figures by the United States Govern-

ment for their criminal skills raises moral problems comparable

to those recognized by Justice Brandeis in a different context

five decades

ago:

Our government is the potent, the omnipresent

teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the

whole people by its example. Crime is con-

tagious.

If the Government becomes

a law-

breaker, it breeds contempt for law; it in-

vites every man to become a law unto himself.

To declare that in the administration of the

criminal law the end justifies the means --

to declare that the Government may commit

crimes in order to secure the conviction of

the private criminal -- would bring terrible

retribution. Against this pernicious doctrine

this Court should resolutely set its face.

Olmstead v. U. S., 277 U.S: 439, 485 (1927)

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C. Findings and Conclusions Relating to the Issues of Authori-

zation and Control

In the introduction to this report, we set forth in

summary form our major conclusions concerning whether the

assassination plots were authorized. The ensuing discussion

elaborates and explains those conclusions.

The Committee analyzed the question of authorization for

the assassination activities from two perspectives. First,

the Committee examined whether officials in policymaking

positions

authorized or were aware of the assassination

activities. Second, the Committee inquired whether the

officials responsible for the operational details of the

plots perceived that assassination had the approval of

their superiors, or at least was the type of activity that

their superiors would not disapprove.

No doubt, the CIA's general efforts against the regimes

discussed in this report were authorized

at the highest

levels of the government. . But

the record leaves

serious

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doubt concerning whether assassination was authorized by

the Administrations. Even if the plots were not expressly

authorized, it does not follow that the Agency personnel

believed they were acting improperly.

1.

The Command and Control System for Assassina-

tions Was Such That the Plots Could Have

Been Undertaken Without Express Authorization

As emphasized throughout this report, we are

unable to draw firm conclusions concerning responsibility

for the assassination plots. Even after our long investiga-

tion, it is unclear whether the conflicting and inconclusive

state of the evidence is due to the system of plausible

denial and its attendant doctrines, or whether there were.

in fact serious shortcomings in the system of authorization

which made it possible for assassination efforts to have

been undertaken by agencies of the United States Government

without express authority from officials outside of those

agencies.

•Our preeminent finding is that assassination could have

been undertaken by an agency of the United States Government

without it having been uncontrovertibly clear that there was

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explicit authorization from the highest level. The command

and control system revealed by the record made it possible for

the CIA to have engaged in assassination activities without

express authorization by officials outside the Agency.

The ambiguity and imprecision in the record illustrates

the dangers of a "plausible denial" system in which the precise

level of authorization may be difficult to ascertain.

While

there is no evidence that the "plausible denial" system has

succeeded in shielding decision makers in the cases considered

in this report, the possibility that a system exists which

might permit those responsible. for authorizing major operations

to escape responsibility is disturbing. Responsible government

requires that public officials be held accountable for their

decisions.

2. Findings Relating to the Level at Which the Plots Were

Authorized

a. Diem

We find that neither the President nor any other

official in the United States Government authorized the assas-

. sination of Diem and his brother Nhu. Both the DCI and top

State Department officials did know, however, that the death

of Nhu at least at one point had been contemplated by the coup

leaders. To the contrary, when the possibility that the coup

leaders were considering assassination was brought to the

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attention of the DCI, he directed that the United States

would have no part in such activity, and this information

was relayed to the coup leaders.

b. Schneider

We find that neither the President nor any other

official in the United States Government authorized the assas-

sination of General Rene Schneider. The CIA, and perhaps the

White House, did know that coup leaders contemplated kidnap-

ping, which, as it turned out, resulted in Schneider's death.

c. Trujillo

The Presidents and other senior officials in

the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations sought the overthrow

of Trujillo and approved general actions to obtain that end.

The DCI and the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-.

American Affairs knew that the Dominican dissidents intended

to assassinate Trujillo, but the date at which the dissidents'

intent to assassinate was communicated to higher levels of

the government

responsible for formulating policy is less

clear. The record does establish that in the Spring of 1961

senior American officials, including the President, learned

that the dissidents intended to

assassinate Trujillo and that

they desired machine guns for that purpose. The Special

Group

disapproved

passage of those weapons and the President himself,

in a telegram, reaffirmed that decision, indicating that the

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int

United

States "as [a] matter of general policy cannot condone

assassination", although he did state that if the coup succeeded,

the United States would support the plotters.

d. Lumumba

The chain of events revealed by the documents and

testimony is strong enough to permit a reasonable inference

that the assassination plot was authorized by the President.

It is absolutely clear that Allen Dulles authorized the plot.

The juxtaposition of discussions concerning "disposing of"

Lumumba and taking "straightforward action"' against him at NSC

and Special Group meetings with Dulles' cable to the Congo,

Bissell's representation to Gottlieb about "highest authority"

and the delivery of poison to the Congo can be read to support

an inference that the President

and the Special Group urged

the assassination of Lumumba.

Robert Johnson's testimony that he understood the President

• to have ordered Lumumba's assassination at an NSC meeting does,

as he said, offer a "clue" about Presidential authorization

which, however, should be read in light of the uncertain record

of the meetings Johnson attended and the contrary

testimony of

others in

attendance at the meetings, including the President's

national security advisors. The fact that both the Chief of

Station and Gottlieb were under the impression that there was

Presidential authorization for the assassination of Lumumba

is not in itself direct evidence of such authorization because

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this impression was derived solely from Gottlieb's meetings

with Bissell and Tweedy.

Neither Gottlieb nor the Chief of

Station had first-hand knowledge of Allen Dulles' statements

about Presidential authorization. Richard Bissell assumed

that such

authorization had been conveyed to him by Dulles,

but Bissell had no specific recollection of any event when

this occurred.

The evidence leads us to conclude that DDP Bissell

and

DCI Dulles knew about and authorized the plot to assassinate.

Lumumba.

However, we are unable

to make a finding that

President Eisenhower intentionally authorized an

assassination

effort against Lumumba because of the lack of absolute certainty

in the evidence.

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e.

Castro

•There was no evidence from which the Committee

could conclude that Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, or Johnson,

their close advisors, or the Special Group authorized the

assassination of Castro.

We find that the effort against Castro was clearly autho-

rized through the level of DDP. It is not certain whether

Allen Dulles knew about the plots, although Bissell and

Edwards were of the opinion that he did, and the credibility

of their beliefs is buttressed by the fact that Dulles knew

about the Lumumba assassination plot, which was planned and

attempted at the time of the early Castro plots. We can find

no evidence that McCone was aware of the plots which occurred

during his tenure. His DDP, Richard Helms, testified that

he never discussed the subject with McCone and was never

expressly authorized by anyone to assassinate Castro.

The only suggestion of express Presidential authorization

for the plots against Castxo was Richard Bissell's opinion

that Dulles would have circumlocutiously informed Presidents

Eisenhower and Kennedy after the assassination had been plan- .

ned and was underway. The assumptions underlying this opinion

are too attenuated for the Committee to adopt it as a

finding.

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First, it assumes that Dulles himself knew of the plots, a

matter which is not certain. Second, it assumes that Dulles

went privately to the two Presidents--a course of action

which Helms, who had far more covert action experience than

Bissell, testified was precisely what the doctrine of

plausible denial forbade CIA officials from doing. Third,

it necessarily assumes that the Presidents would understand

from a "circumlocutious" description that assassination was

being discussed.

The chain of assumptions is far

too speculative for the

Committee to make findings inplicating Presidents who are not

able

to speak for themselves. Moreover, it is inconsistent

with Bissell's other testimony that "formal and explicit"

approval would be required for assassination,* and contrary

to the testimony of all

the Presidential advisors, the men

closest to both Eisenhower and Kennedy.

* If the evidence concerning President Eisenhower's order

to assassinate Lumumba is. correct, it

should be weighed against

Bissell's téstimony concerning circumlocutious briefings of the

Presidents in the Castro case.

First, the Lumumba case would

imply that President Eisenhower and Dulles did discuss such

matters bluntly and not circumlocutiously.

Second, the Lumumba

example indicates that the President would discuss

such matters

operoached pravately a Chira, it canoe inferred trom Bissell's

approached.privately.

testimony in the Castro case that if President Eisenhower had

Dulles would not have

told Dulles the he char vect Yet Sortideo's testimony in the

told anyone else of

Lumumba case states

that he had been told of Presidential autho-

rization for assassination by Bissell; who in turn assumed he

was told by Dulles.

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Helms and McCone testified that the Presidents under

which they served never asked

them to consider assassination.

There

was no evidence whatsoever that President Jöhnson

knew about or authorized any

assassination activity during his

Presidency.

3. CIA Officials Involved in the Assassination Opera-

tions Perceived Assassination To Have Been A Permis-

sible Course of Action

The CIA officials involved in the targeted assassination

attempts testified that they had believed that their activities

had been fully authorized.*

In the case of the Lumumba assassination operation,

Richard Bissell testified that he had no direct recollection

of authorization, but after having reviewed the cables and

Special Group minutes, testified that authority must have

flowed from Dulles through him to the subordinate levels in

the Agency.

In the case of the assassination effort against Castro,

Bissell and Sheffield Edwards testified they believed

the

operation involving underworld figures had been authorized

by Dulles when they briefed him shortly after the plot had been

initiated. William Harvey testified he believed that the

* The lower level operatives,

such as 0'Connell and the

AM/LASH case officers, are not

discussed in this section, since

they had clear orders

from their immediate superiors.

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plots "were completely authorized at every appropriate level

within and beyond the Agency"

, although he had "no personal

knowledge whatever of the individuals' identities, times,

exact words, or channels through which such authority may

have passed"

• Harvey stated that he had

been told by Richard

Bissell that the effort against Castro had been authorized

"from the highest level", and that Harvey had discussed the

plots with Richard Helms, his immediate superior.

Helms

testified that although he had never discussed assassination

with his superiors, he believed:

.: . that in these actions we were taking against

Cuba and against Fidel Castro's government in Cuba,

. that they were what we had been asked to do. .

other words we had been asked to get rid of Castro.

there were no limitations put on the means,

and we telt we were acting well within the guidelines

that we understood to be in play at this particular

time.

The evidence points to a disturbing situation. Agency

officials perceived the effort to assassinate Castro to have

been within the parameters of

permissible action, but Adminis-

tration officials (including McCone) responsible for formulat-

ing policy were not aware. of the effort and did not authorize

it. The explanation may lie in the fact that orders concerning

overthrowing the Castro regime were stated in broad terms that

were subject to differing interpretations by those responsible

for carrying

out those orders.

The various Presidents and their senior advisors

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strongly opposed the regimes of Castro and Trujillo, the

accession to power of Allende, and the potential influence

of Patrice Lumumba. Orders concerning action against those

foreign leaders were given in vigorous language. For example,

President Nixon's orders to prevent Allende from assuming

power left Helms feeling that "if I ever carried a marshall'

baton in my knapsack out of the oval office, it was

that day."

Similarly, General Lansdale described the Mongoose effort

against Cuba as "a combat situation", and Attorney General

Kennedy emphasized that "a solution to the Cuban problem

today carries top priority". Helms testified that the

pressure to "get rid of (Castro and the Castro regime]" was

intense, and Bissell testified that he had been ordered to

"get off your ass about Cuba"

It is possible that there was a failure of communica-

tion between policymakers and the agency

personnel who were

experienced in secret, and often violent, action. Although

policymakers testified that assassination was not intended

by such words as "get rid of Castro"

, some of their sub-

ordinates in the Agency testified that they perceived that

assassination was desired and that they should proceed with-

out troubling their superiors.

The 1967 Inspector General's Report on

assassinations

appropriately observed:.

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The point is that of frequent resort to synechdoche --

the mention of a part when the whole is to be under-

stood, or vice versa. Thus, we encounter repeated

references to phrases such as "disposing of Castro"

which may be read in the narrow, literal

sense of assas

sinating him, when it is intended that it be read in

figurative sense of dislodging the Castro

regime. Reversing the coin, we find people speaking

vaguely of "doing something about Castro" when it is

clear that what they have specifically in mind is

killing him.

In a situation wherein those speaking

may not have actually meant what they seemed to say or

may

not have said what they actually meant, they should

not be surprised if their oral shorthand is interpreted

differently than was intended.

Differing perceptions between superiors and their sub-

ordinates were graphically illustrated in the Castro context.*

McCone, in a memorandum dated April 14, 1967, reflected as

follows:

terms such as

"dispose of Castro"

"knock off Castro"

reces de vent poet on at tri men the over o

of the Communist government in Cuba and the replacing

of it with a democratic regime. Terms such as the

above appear in many working papers, memoranda for the

record,

etc., and, as stated, all refer to a change in

the Cuban government.

* "Senator Mathias: Let me draw an example from history.

When Thomas A'Beckett was proving to be an annoyance,

as

Castro,

the King said,

'who will rid me of this turbulent

priest?'"

He didn't say, 'go out and murder him'

• He said,

who will rid me of this

man'

, and let it go at that.

"Mr. Helms: That is a warming reference to the problem.

"Senator Mathias: You feel that spans the generations

and

the centuries?

"Mr. Helms: I think it does, sir.

"Senator Mathias: And that is typical of the kind of

thing which might be said, which might be taken by the

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Helms, who had considerable experience as a covert operator,

gave precisely the opposite meaning to the same words, interpret-

ing them as conveying authority for assassination.

Helms

repeatedly testified that he felt

that explicit

authorization was unnecessary for the assassination of

Castro in the early 1960's, but he said he did not construe

the intense pressure from President Nixon in 1970 as pro-

viding authority to assassinate anyone. As Helms testified,

the difference was not that the pressure to prevent Allende

from assuming office was any less than the pressure to remove

the Castro regime, but rather that "I had already made up my

mind that we weren't going to have any of that business when

I was Director."

Certain CIA contemporaries of Helms who were subjected

to similar pressures in the Castro case rejected the thesis

that implicit authority to assassinate Castro derived from

the strong language of the policymakers. Bissell testified

that he had believed that "formal and explicit approval"

would be required for assassination; and McManus testified

-

director or by anybody else as presidential authorization to

80

forward?

"Mr. Helms: That is right. But in answer to that, I

realize that one sort of grows up in tradition of the time

and I think that any of us would have

found it very difficult

to discuss assassinations with a President of the U.S.

just think we all had the feeling that we

were hired out to

keep those things out of the oval office."

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that "it never occurred to me" that the vigorous words of

the Attorney General could be taken as authorizing

assassination. The differing perceptions may have resulted

from their different backgrounds and training.

Neither

Bissell (an academician whose Agency career. for the six years

before he became DDP had been in the field of technology) nor

McManus (who had concentrated on intelligence and staff work)

were experienced in covert operations.*

The perception of certain Agency officials that assas-

sination was within the range of permissible activity was

reinforced by the continuing approval of violent covert actions

against Cuba that were sanctioned at the Presidential level

and by the failure of the successive administrations

to make

clear that

assassination was not permissible. This

point is

one of the subjects considered in the next section.

* Of course, this analysis cannot be carried too far. In

che Lumumba case,

for example, Johnson and Dillon, who were

Administration officials with

no covert operation experience,

construed remarks as urging or permitting assassination, while

other persons who were not in the Agency did not so interpret

them.

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-ME TOME A

4. The Failure In Communication Between Agency Officials

In Charge Of The Assassination Operations And Their Superiors

In The Agency And In The Administration Was Due To:

(a) The Failure of Subordinates To Disclose The

Operations To Their Superiors; and

(b) The Failure of Superiors to Give Frecise Orders

Regarding the Nature of Permissable Operations and to Make

Clear That Assassination Was Precluded in the Climate of

Violence Engendered by the Aggressive Covert Actions

Sanctioned by the Administrations.

While we cannot find that officials responsible for

making policy decisions knew about of authorized the assassina~

• tion attempts (with the possible exception of the Lumumba case),

Agency operatives at least through the level of DDP neverthe-

less

perceived assassination to have been permissible: This

failure in communication was inexcusable in light of the gravity

•of assassination. The Committee finds that the failure of

Agency officials to inform their superiors was reprehensible,

and that the reasons that they offered for having neglected

to inform their superiors

are unacceptable.

The Committee

further finds that Administration officials failed to be

sufficiently precise in their directions to the Agency and

that their attitude toward the possibility of

assassination

was ambiguous in the context of the

violence of other activities

that they did authorize.

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1A207

(a) Agency Officials Failed On Several Occasions To Reveal

The Plots To Their Superiors, Or To Do So With Sufficient

Detail and Clarity

Several of the cases considered in this report raise

questions concerning whether officials of the CIA sufficiently

informed their superiors in the Agency or officials outside the

Agency about their activities.

Castro

The failure of Agency officials to inform their superiors

of the assassination efforts against Castro is particularly

troubling.

Richard Bissell testified that he and Sheffield Edwards

told Allen Dulles only "circumlocutiously" and only after

the project

had begun about the operation which used members

of the underworld. Both Bissell and his successor as DDP,

Richard Helms, testified that they never discussed the opera-

tion with John McCone or any officials outside the CIA. The.

two officials

directly responsible for the operation--Edwards

and William Harvey--testified that they never discussed the

operation with McCone or any Government official above. the

level

of DDP.

McCone testified that he was never consulted about

the operation, and that Dulles never briefed him on its

existence. On the basis of the testimony and documentary

evidence before the Committee, it is uncertain whether Dulles

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was ever made aware of the true nature of the underworld

operation, and virtually certain that it continued into

McCone's term without his or the Administration's knowledge

or approval.

On the occasions when Richard Bissell had the opportunity

to inform his superiors about the

assassination effort against.

Castro, he either failed to inform them or misled them.

Bissell testified that he and Edwards told Dulles and

Cabell about the assassination operation using underworld

figures, but that they did so "circumlocutiously"

', and then

only after contact had been made with the underworld and a

price had been offered for Castro's death.

Bissell further testified that he never raised the issue

of assassination with officials of either the Eisenhower or

Kennedy Administration. His reason was that

since he was under

Dulles in the chain.of command, he would normally have had no

"duty to discuss the matter with the Presidents or other Adminis-

tration officials, and that he assumed that Dulles would have

circumlocutiously spoken with Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy

, about the operation.

These reasons

are insufficient. It was

inexcusable to withhold such information from those

responsible

for formulating policy on the unverified assumption that they

might have been circumlocutiously informed by Dulles, who

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TOP SECRE

himself had not been straight-forwardly told about the operation.*

The failure to either inform those officials

or to make

certain that they had been informed by Dulles

was particularly

reprehensible in light of the fact that there were many occasions

on which Bissell should have informed them, and his failure to

do so was misleading. In the first weeks of the Kennedy Adminis-

tration, Bissell met with Bundy and discussed the development

of an assassination capability within CIA--executive action.

But Bissell did not mention that an actual assassination attempt

was underway. Bissell appeared before the Taylor-Kennedy Board

of Inquiry which was formed to report to the President on the

Bay of Pigs and the Cuban situation, but testified that he did

• not inform the Commission of the assassination operation. As

chief of the CIA directorate concerned with clandestine operations

and the Bay of Pigs, Bissell frequently met with officials in

the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations to discuss Cuban.

operations, and his advice was

frequently sought. He

did not

tell them that the CIA had undertaken an effort to assassinate

Castro, and did not ask if they favored proceeding with the

* Even assuming that Bissell correctly perceived that Dulles

understood the nature of the operation,

it was inexcusable for

Bissell not to have briefed Dulles in plain language.

Further,

even if one accepts Bissell's assumption that Dulles told the

Presidents, they would have been told too late, because

Bissell

"guessed" they would have been told that the operation "had

been planned and was being attempted"

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effort. He was present at the

meeting with Dulles and Presi-

dent Kennedy at which the new President was briefed on covert

action in Cuba, but neither Dulles nor Bissell mentioned the

assassination operation that was underway.

The failures to make forthright disclosures to policy-

makers continued during the time that Richard Helms was DDP

Helms' failure to inform McCone about the underworld operation

when it was reactivated under Harvey and poison pills were

sent to Cuba was a grave error in judgment, and Helms' excuses

are unpersuasive. In May of 1962, the Attorney General was

told that the CIA's involvement in an assassination plot had

terminated with the Bay of 'Pigs. Not only did Edwards, who

had briefed the Attorney General, know that the operation had

not been terminated, but Helms did not inform the Attorney

• General that the operation was still active when he learned

that the Attorney General had been misled. Helms did not

inform McCone. of the plot until August 1962, and did so then

in a manner which indicated that the plot had

been terminated

before McCone became Director. Helms' denial that AM/LASH

had been

involved in an assassination attempt in response to

Secretary of State Rusk's inquiries was, as Helms testified,

"not truthful".

When Helms

briefed President Johnson on the Castro plots,

he apparently described the activities that had occurred during

prior administrations

but did not

describe the AM/LASH opera-

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tion which had continued until 1965

Helms also failed to

inform the Warren Commission of the plots because the precise

question was not asked.

Helms told the Committee that he had never raised the

assassination operation with McCone or Kennedy Administration

officials because he had assumed that the project had been

previously authorized, and that the aggressive character of

the Kennedy Administration's program against the Castro regime

made assassination permissible even in the absence of an

express instruction. He added that he had never been convinced

that the operation would succeed, and that he would have told

McCone about it if he had ever believed that it would "go

anyplace"

Helms' reasons for not having told his superiors about

the assassination effort are unacceptable; indeed, many of them

were reasons why he should have sought express authority.

As Helms himself testified, assassination was of a high order

of sensitivity. Administration policymakers, supported by

intelligence estimates furnished by the Agency; had emphasized

on several occasions that successors to Castro might be worse

than Castro himself. In addition, the Special Group Augmented

required that plans for covert actions against Cuba be sub-

mitted in detail for its approval. Although the Administration

was exerting intense pressure on the CIA to do something about

Castro and the Castro regime, it was a serious error to have

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undertaken so drastic an operation without obtaining full and

equivocal permission.

William Harvey, the officer in charge of the CIA's attempt

using underworld figures to assassinate Castro, testified that

he never discussed the plot with McCone or officials of the

Kennedy Administration because he believed

that it had been

fully authorized by the previous Director, because he was

uncertain whether it had a chance of succeeding, and because

he believed that it was Helms'

, not his, duty to inform higher

authorities.

Nonetheless, the Committee believes there were occasions

on which it was incumbent on Harvey to have disclosed the

assassination operation. As head of Task

Force W, the branch

of the CIA responsible for covert operations in Cuba, Harvey

reported directly to General

Lansdale and

the Special Group

Augmented. The Special Group Augmented had made known that

covert operations in Cuba should be first approved by it, both

.. by explicit instruction and by its practice that particular

operations be submitted in "nauseating detail". Yet Harvey

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did not inform either General Lansdale or the Special Group

Augmented of the assassination operation, either when he was

explicitly requested to report to McCone, General Taylor,

and the Special Group on his activities in Miami in April

1962, or when the subject of assassination was raised in the

August 1962 meeting and McCone voiced his disapproval.

The Committee finds that the reasons advanced for not

having informed those responsible for formulating policy

about the assassination operation were inadequate, misleading,

and inconsistent. Some officials viewed assassination as

too important and sensitive to discuss with superiors, while

others considered it not sufficiently important. Harvey

testified that it was premature to tell McCone about the

underworld operation in April 1962, because it was not

sufficiently advanced, but too late to tell him about it in

August 1962, since by that time he had decided to terminate

it. On other occasions, officials thought disclosure was

- someone else's responsibility; Bissell said he thought it was

up

to Dulles, Harvey believed it was up to Helms, but Heims

remarked that Harvey "kept Phase II pretty much in his back

pocket"

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The Committee concludes that the failure clearly to

inform policymakers of the assassination effort against

Castro was grossly improper. The Committee believes that

it should be incumbent upon the DDP to report such

sensitive operation to his superior, the DCI, no matter how

grave his doubts might be about the possible outcome of

the

• operation. It follows that the DCI has the same duty to

accurately inform his superiors.

Trujillo

In the Trujillo case there were several instances in

which it appears that policymakers were not given sufficient

information, or were not informed in a timely fashion.

At a meeting on December 29, 1960, Bissell presented a

plan to the Special Group for supporting Dominican exile groups

and local dissidents, and stated that the plan would not bring

down the regime without "some decisive stroke against Trujillo

'himself". At a meeting on January 12, 1961, the Special Group

authorized the passage of "limited supplies of small arms and

other material" to Dominican dissidents under certain conditions.

At this time, the fact that the dissidents had been contemplating

the assassination of Trujillo had been knowm in the State Department

at the level of the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-

American Affairs, and by senior officials of the CIA, including the DCI.

Yet

the

memorandum supplied to. Under Secretary Merchant, which

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was said to have been the basis upon which the Special Group

agreed to the "limited supply" of small arms, did not mention

assassination. To the contrary, it spoke of "sabotage potential"

and stated

that there "would be no thought of toppling the

(government] by any such minor measure las the supplying of

small arms]."

On February 17, 1961, Richard Bissell sent a memorandum

on the Dominican Republic to

McGeorge Bundy: Bissell knew

that the dissidents planned to assassinate Trujillo, but his

memorandum did not mention assassination. It indicated that

the dissidents'. "plan of action" included arms for 300 men.

Those involved agreed that support of this nature suggested a

non-targeted

paramilitary plan, not an assassination.

The passage of the carbines was approved by CIA head-

• quarters on March 31, 1961. The State Department was apparently

unaware of this passage for several weeks. The pouching of the

. machine guns was not disclosed outside the CIA.

The State Department

official from whom the CIA sought

permission to pass the machine guns stated that on "cross

examination" the CIA official conceded that the purpose was

assassination. The CIA official then agreed the United States

should have nothing to do with

assassination plots "anywhere,

anytime"

, even though the previous day he and Bissell had signed

a draft cable permitting the passage of the machine guns for

use in

connection with a planned assassination.

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Schneider

The issue here is not whether the objectives of the CIA were

contrary to those of the Administration. It is clear that Presi-

dent-Nixon desired to prevent Allende from assuming office, even

if that required fomenting and supporting a coup in Chile. Nor

did White House officials suggest that tactics employed (includ-

ing as a first step to kidnapping General Schneider) would have

been unacceptable as a matter principle. Rather, the issue posed

is whether White House officials were consulted, and thus given

an opportunity to weigh such matters as risk and likelihood of suc-

cess, and to apply policy-making judgments to particular tactics.

The record indicates that up to October 15 they were; after Octo-

ber 15 there is some doubt.

The documentary record with respect to the disputed post-

October 15 period gives rise to conflicting inferences. On the one

hand, Karamessines' calendar shows existence of at least one White

.

House contact in the critical period prior to the kidnapping of

General Schneider en October 22. However, the absence of any sub-

stantive memoranda in CIA files--when contrasted with several such

memoranda describing contacts with the White House between Septem-

ber 15 and October 15--may suggest a lack of significant communi-

cation on the part of the CIA as well

as a lack of careful super-

vision on the part of the White House.

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The standards applied within the CIA itself suggest a

view that action which the Committee believes called for

top-level policy discussion and decision was thought of as

permissible, without any further consultation, on the basis

of the initial instruction to prevent Allende from assuming

power. Machine guns were sent to Chile and delivered to

military figures there on the authority of junior CIA officers

without consultation even with

the CIA officer in charge of

the program. We find no suggestion of bad faith in the action

of the junior officers. But it. necessarily establishes that

there was no advance permission from outside the CIA for the

passage of machine guns. And it also suggests an attitude

within the CIA toward consultation which was unduly lax.

Further, this case demonstrated the problems inherent in giving

*an agency a "blank check" to engage in covert operations

without specifying which actions are and are not permissible,

and without adequately supervising and monitoring these

activities once begun."

(b) On Occasion, Administration Officials Gave Vague.

Instructions to Subordinates and Failed to Make Sufficiently

Clear That Assassination Should Be Excluded From Consideration.

while-we cannot find that high Administration officials

expressly approved of the assassination attempts, we have

noted that certain agency officials nevertheless perceived

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assassination to have been authorized. Although those officials

were remiss in not seeking express authorization for their

activities, their

superiors

were also at fault for giving

vague instructions and for not explicitly ruling out assassina-

tion.

No written order prohibiting assassination was issued

until 1972, and that order was an internal CIA directive issued

by Director Helms.

Schneider

As explained above, there is no evidence that assassina-

tion was ever proposed as a method of carrying out the Presi-

dential order to prevent Allende from assuming office. The

Committee believes, however, that the granting of carte.

blanche authority to the CIA by the Executive in this case

may have contributed to the tragic and unintended death of

General Schneider. This was

also partially due to impositing

an impractical task to be accomplished within an unreasonably

short time. Apart from the question of whether any inter-

vention was justified under the circumstances of this case,

the

committee believes that the Executive in any event should

have defined the limits of permissible

action.

Lumumba

We are unable to make a finding that President

Eisenhower intentionally authorized

an assassination

effort against

Lumumba because of the lack of absolute

certainty in the evidence. However, it appears that the

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strong language used in discussions at the Special Group and

NSC, as reflected in minutes of relevant meetings,

led Dulles to believe that assassination was desired. The

minutes contain language concerning the need to "dispose of"

Lumumba, an "extremely strong feeling about the necessity.

for straight forward action"

, and a refusal to rule out any

activity that might contribute to "getting rid of" Lumumba.

Castro

The effort to assassinate Fidel Castro took place in an

atmosphere of extreme pressure by Eisenhower and Kennedy

Administration officials. to discredit and overthrow the Castro

regime. Richard Helms recalled that:

"I remember vividly (that the pressure) was very

intense.

And therefore, when you go into the record,

you find a lot of nutty

schemes there and those nutty

schemes were borne of the intensity of the pressure.

And we were quite

frustrated."

Bissell recalled that:

"During that entire period, the administration was.

extremely sensitive. about the defeat that had been

afflicted, as they felt, on the U.S. at the Bay of

Pigs,.. and

getting rid of Castro.

perong every out means of or

Another witness, Samuel Halpern, stated that sometime in

the Fall of 1961 Bissell was

"chewed out in the Cabinet Room in the White House by

both the President and the

Attorney General. for, as he

put it, sitting on his ass

and not doing anything about

getting rid of Castro and the Castro Regime.

General Lansdale informed the agencies cooperating in Operation

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Mongoose that "you're in a combat situation where we have

been given full command". Secretary of Defense McNamara

confirmed that "we were hysterical about Castro at the time

of the Bay of Pigs

and thereafter"

Many of the plans that were discussed and often approved

contemplated violent action against Cuba. The operation

which

resulted in the Bay of Pigs was a major paramilitary

onslaught that had the approval of the highest government

officials, including the two Presidents. Thereafter, Attorney

General Kennedy vehemently exhorted the Special Group Aug-

mented that "a solution to the Cuban problem today carried

top priority... no time, money, effort--or manpower is

to be spared."* Subsequently., Operation Mongoose involved

propaganda and sabotage operations aimed toward spurring a

revolt of the Cuban people against Castro. Measures that

were considered by the top policymakers included incapacita-

ting sugar workers during harvest season by the use of

chemicals; blowing up bridges and production plants; sabotaging

merchandise in third countries--even those allied with

the United States--prior to its delivery to Cuba; and arming

insurgents on the island. Programs undertaken at the urging

* The Attorney General himself took a personal interest

in the recruitment and development of assets within Cuba,

on occasion recommending Cubans to the CIA as possible recruits

and meeting in Washington and Florida with Cuban exiles

active in the covert war against the Castro government.

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of the Administration included intensive efforts to recruit

and arm dissidents within Cuba and raids on plants, mines,

and harbors.

Discussions at the Special Group and NSC meetings might

well have contributed to the perception of some CIA officials

that assassination was a permissible tool in the

effort to

overthrow the Castro regime. At a Special Group meeting in

November 1960, Under Secretary Merchant inquired whether

any planning had been undertaken for "direct, positive action"

against Che Guevarra, Raul and Fidel Castro: Cabell replied

that such a capability did not exist, but might well have

left the meeting with the impression that assassination was

not out of bounds. One phase of Lansdale's plans, which

was submitted to the Special Group in January 1962, aimed

at inducing "open revolt and overthrow of the Communist

regime"

, and included in the final phase an "attack on the

cadre of the regime, including key leaders". The proposal

stated that "this should 'be a 'Special Target" operation . . . .

Gangster elements might provide the best recruitment potential

against police.

" Several minutes from Special Group

meetings contain language

such as "possible removal of

Castro from the Cuban scene". Although Lansdale's proposal

*..2

was shelved, the type of aggressive action contemplated was

not ruled out.

On several occasions; the subject of assassination was

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discussed in the presence of senior Administration officials.

While those officials never consented to actual assassina-

tion efforts, they also failed to indicate that assassination

was impermissible as a matter of principle.

In early 1961, McGeorge Bundy was informed of a CIA

project described as the development of a capability to

assassinate.* Bundy raised

no objection and, according to

Bissell, may have been more affirmative. Although Bissell

stated that he did not infer authorization from Bundy's

remarks for the underworld plot against Castro that was then

underway, the fact that he believed that the development

of an assassination capability had been approved by the White

House (which he subsequently told to Harvey) may well have.

contributed to the general perception that assassination was

not prohibited.

Documents indicate that in May 1962, Attorney General

Kennedy was told that the CIA had sought to assassinate

Castro prior to the Bay of Pigs. According to the CIA

officials present at the briefing, the Attorney General

* Bundy, who was National Security Advisor to the President,

had an obligation to tell the President of such a grave

matter, even though it was only a discussion of a capability

to assassinate.

His failure to do so was a serious error:

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'= 43--

indicated his displeasure about the lack of consultation

on the impropriety of the attempt itself.* There is no

evidence that the Attorney General told the CIA that it must

not engage in assassination plots.

At a meeting of the Special Group Augmented in August

1962, well after the assassination efforts were underway,

Robert McNamara is said to have raised the question of

whether the assassination of Cuban leaders should be explored,

and General Lansdale issued an action memorandum assigning

the CIA the task of preparing contingency plans. for the

assassination of Cuban leaders. While McCone testified

that he had immediately made it clear that assassination

was not

to be discussed or condoned, Harvey's testimony

and documents which he wrote after the event indicate that

Harvey may have been confused over whether McCone had

objected to the use of assassination, or whether he was only

concerned that the subject not be put in

writing. In any

* Documents show that the Attorney General, Robert Kennedy,

learned

1, in May of 1961 that the CIA had used underworld

figures

in an operation against Cuba.

The documentary record

further reflects that the Attorney General was not told that

the operation had involved

assassination efforts until May

of 1962, and that the operation was then described to him

as having- been terminated in May 1961.

There is no evidence

that the Attorney General suspected the true nature of the

operation until that briefing, or that he learned that it

had not in fact been terminated.

While it is curious that

the Attorney General would not have inquired further into

the nature of the operation when he discovered.

that Sam

Giancana had been involved in it, there is no evidence that

he did.

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event, McCone went no further. He issued no general order

banning consideration of assassination within the Agency.

One of the programs forwarded to General Lansdale by

the Defense Department in the Mongoose program was entitled

"Operation Bounty" and envisioned dropping leaflets in Cuba

offering rewards for the assassination of Government leaders.

Although the plan was vetoed by Lansdale, it indicates that

persons in agencies other than the CIA perceived that assas-

sination might be permissible.

While the ambivalence of Administration officials does

not excuse the misleading conduct by Agency officials or •

justify their failure to seek explicit permission, it dis-

played an insufficient concern about assassination which

may have contributed to the perception that assassination

was an acceptable tactic in accomplishing the Government's

general objectives.

With the exception of the tight guidelines issued by

the Special Group Augmented concerning Operation Mongoose,

precise limitations were never imposed on the CIA requiring

prior permission for the details of other proposed covert

operations against Cuba. No general policy banning assas-.

sination was

promulgated

until Helms' intra-agency order

in 1972.. In light of the number of times in which the

subject of assassination arose, Administration officials

were remiss in not explicitly forbidding such activity.

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*

*

*

*

The Committee notes that many of the occasions on

which CIA officials should have informed their superiors

of the assassination efforts but failed to do so, or did

so in a misleading manner, were also occasions on which

Administration officials paradoxically may have reinforced

the perception that assassination was permissible.

For example, when Bissell spoke with Bundy about an

executive action capability, Bissell failed to indicate that

an actual assassination operation was underway, but Bundy

failed to rule out assassination as a tactic.

In May of 1962 the Attorney General was misleadingly told

about the effort to assassinate Castro prior to the Bay of Pigs,

but not about the operation that was then going on. The Attorney

General, however, did not state that assassination was improper.

When a senior administration official raised the

question

of whether assassination should be explored at a Special Group

meeting, the assassination operation should have been revealed,

but a firm written order against engaging in assassination should

also have been issued by McCone if, as he testified, he had ex-

hibited strong aversion to assassination.

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6. Practices Current at the Time in Which the Assas-

sination Plots Occurred Were Revealed by the Record to

Create the Risk of Confusion, Rashness, and Irresponsibility

in the Very Areas Where Clarity and Sober Judgment Was

Most Necessary:

Various witnesses described elements of the system

within which the assassination plots were conceived. The

Committee is disturbed by the custom that permitted the

most sensitive matters to be presented to the highest levels

of Government with the least clarity. We find this dis-

turbing, and view the following concepts as particularly

dangerous:

(1) The extension of the doctrine of "plausible denial"

beyond its intended purpose of hiding the involvement of

the United States from other countries to an effort to

shield higher officials from knowledge, and hence, responsi-

bility for certain operations.

(2) The use of circumlocution or euphemism to describe

serious matters--such as assassination--when precise meanings

ought to be made clear.

(3) The theory that general approval of broad covert

action programs is sufficient to justify specific actions

such as assassination or the passage of weapons.

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(4) The theory that authority granted, or assumed to

be granted, by one director or one administration could be

presumed to continue without the necessity for reaffirming

the authority with successor officials.

" (5) The creation of capabilities without careful

review and authorization by policymakers, and the risk that

such capabilities might be used without further authoriza-

tion.

(a) The Danger Inherent in Overextending the Doctrine

of Plausible Denial

The original concept of plausible denial envisioned

implementing covert actions in a manner calculated to conceal

American involvement if the actions were exposed. The

doctrine was

at times a delusion and at times a snare.. It

was naive for policymakers to assume that sponsorship of

actions as big as the Bay of Pigs invasion could be concealed.

The Committee's inquiry into assassination and the public

disclosures which preceded it demonstrate that when the

United States resorted to cloak and dagger tactics, its hand

was ultimately exposed. In addition, the likelihood of

reckless action is substantially increased when policymakers

believe that their decisions will never be

revealed.

Whatever can be said in defense

of the original pur-

pose of plausible denial--a purpose which intends. to conceal

U.S. involvement from the

outside world--the extension of

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the doctrine to the internal decision-making process of

the Government is absurd. Any theory which,

as a matter

of doctrine, places elected officials

on the periphery of

the

decision-making process is an

invitation to error, an

abdication of responsibility, and a perversion of democratic

government.

(b) The Dangers of Using "Circumlocution" and

"Euphemism"

According to Richard Bissell, the extension of plausible

denial to internal decisionmaking required the use of cir-

cumlocution and euphemism in speaking with Presidents and

• other senior officials.

Explaining this concept only heightens its absurdity.

On the one hand, it assumes that senior officials should be

shielded from the truth to enable them to deny knowledge if

the truth comes out. On the other hand, the concept assumes

that senior officials must be told enough, by. way of double

talk, to grasp the subject. As a consequence, the theoiy

fails to accomplish its objective and only increases the

risk of misunderstanding. Subordinate officials should des-

cribe their proposals in clear, precise, and brutally frank

language; busy

superiors are entitled to and should demand

no less.

Euphemism may actually have been preferred-not because

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of plausible denial--but because the persons involved

could not bring themselves to state in plain language what

they intended to do and may. have, in some instances,

assumed,

rightly or wrongly, that the listening superiors did

not

want the issue squarely placed before them.

Assassinate,

murder and kill are words many people do not want to speak

or hear. They describe acts which should not even be pro-

posed, let alone plotted.

Failing

to call dirty business

by its rightful name may have increased the risk of dirty

business being done.

(c) The Danger of Generalized Instructions.

Permitting specific acts to be taken on the basis of

general approvals of broad strategies (e.g, keep Allende

from assuming office, get rid of the Castro regime) blurs

responsibility and accountability. Worse still, it increases

the danger that subordinates may take steps which would

have been disapproved if the policymakers had been informed.

A further danger is that policymakers might intentionally

use loose general instructions to evade responsibility for

embarrassing activities.

In either event, we find that the gap between the

general policy objectives and the specific actions under-

taken to achieve them was far too wide.

It is important that policymakers review the manner in

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which their directives are implemented, particularly when

the activities are sensitive,

secret,

and immune from

public scrutiny.

(d) The Danger of "Floating Authorization"

One justification advanced by Richard Helms and William

Harvey for not informing John McCone about the use of under-

world figures to assassinate Fidel Castro was their assertion

that the project had already been approved by McCone's

predecessor, Allen Dulles, and that further authorization was

unnecessary, at least until the operation had reached a more

advanced

stage.

Similarly, most of the actions taken in the Trujillo

case during the early months of the Kennedy Administration

were authorized by the Special Group on January 12, 1961,

at the end of the Eisenhower Administration.

The idea that authority might continue from one adminis-

tration or director to the next and that there is no duty

to reaffirm authority with successors inhibits responsible

decisionmaking. Circumstances may change or judgments differ.

New officials should be given the opportunity to review

significant programs.

(e)

The Problems Connected with Creating New Covert

Capabilities

The development of a new capability raises numerous

problems. Having a capability. to engage in certain covert

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activity increases the probability that it will occur,

since the capability represents a tool that is

available

for use. There is the further danger that authorizing a

capability may be misunderstood as authorizing its use

without need for obtaining explicit authorization.

Of course, an assassination capability should never

have been created in the first place.

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V.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Approved by

Drafting.

Subcommittee

10/8/75

(with possible reservation

as to language of

statute)

During our long investigation of assassination, a number of vital issues

came into sharp focus.

Above all, stood the question of assassination. Our recommendations on

other

issues

should

await the completion of our continuing investigations

and

our final report. But we need no more information to convince us that a flat

ban against

assassination should be written into law.

We condemn assassination and reject it as an instrument of American

policy. Surprisingly, at present there is no statute making it a crime to assas

• care at

• sinate a foreign official outside the United States. Hence, for the reasons

set forth below, the Committee recommends the prompt enactment of a statute mak--

ing it a Federal crime to commit or attempt an assassination, or to conspire to

do so..

A. General agreement that the United States must not engage in assassina-

tion. Our view that

assassination has no place in America's arsenal is shared by

the Administration,

President Ford, in the

same statement in which he asked this Committee to

deal with the assassination issue, stated:

I am opposed to political assassination. This administration

has, not and will not use such means as instruments of national

policy. Presidential Press Conference, June 9, 1975, Weekly

Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. II, No. 24, p. 611.

The witnesses we examined uniformly condemned

assassination. They denounced

it as immoral, described it as impractical, and reminded us that an open society,

most of all, runs the risk of the assassination of its own leaders. As President

Kennedy was reported to have said: "we can't get into that kind of thing, or we

would all be targets." (Goodwin

7/18/75, p. 4)

The current CIA Director and his two predecessors testified emphatically

that assassination should be banned. Thus, Colby said:

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With

respect to assassination, my position

is clear.

I

just think it is wrong.

And I have said so and made it

very clear to my subordinates. (5/21/75, p. 89)

Colby's predecéssor, Helms, although himself involved in an earlier plot,

said he had concluded assassination should be ruled out for both moral and

practical reasons:

As a result of my experiences through the years, when I be

came Director I had made up my mind that this option...of

killing foreign leaders, was something that I did not want

to happen

on my watch. 'My reasons for this were these:

There are not onlymöral reasons but there are also

some other rather practical reasons.

It is almost impossible in a democracy to keep

any-

thing like that secret. Somebody would

gressman, his Senator, he might go to a newspaper man, what-

ever the case may be, but it just is not a practical alterna-

tive, it seems to me, in our society.

Then there is another consideration...if you are going

to try by this kind of means to remove a foreign leader,

then who is going to take his place running that country,

and are you essentially better off as a matter of practice

over than you were before?

And I can give you I

thỉnk

a very solid example of this

which happened in Vietnam

when President Diem was eliminated from the scene. We then

had a revolving door of prime ministers' after that for quite:

some period of tiem, during which the Vietnamese Government

at a time in its history when it should have been strong was

nothing but a caretaker government....In other

words, that whole exercise turned out to the disadvantage of

the United States.

...there is no sense in my sitting here with all the ex-

perience 1 have had and not sharing with the Committee my

feelings this day. It isn't because I have lost my cool,

or because I have lost my guts, it sinply is because I don't

think It is a viable option in the United States of America these

days.

Chairman Church. Doesn't it also follow, Mr. Helms -- I:

agree with

what

you have said fully ---but doesn't it

also follow on the practical side, apart from the moral side,

that since these secrets are bound to come out, when they do,

they do very grave political damage to the United States in

the world at large? I don't know to what extent the Russians

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Involved themselves in political assassinations, but under

their system they at least have a better prospect of keep-

ing it concealed. Since we do like a free society and

since these secrets are going to come out in due course, the

revelation will then do

serious injury to the good name and

reputation of the United

States,

Would you agree with that?

Mr. Helms.

Yes; I would.

The Chairman. And finally, If we were to reserve to our-

selves the prerogative to assassinate foreign leaders, we may in-

vite reciprocal action from foreign governments who assume

that if it's our prerogative to do so, it is their prero-

gative as. well, and that is another danger that we at least

invite with this kind of action, wouldn't you agree?

Mr. Helms. Yes, sir. (6/13/75, pp. 76-78)

Similarly, John McCone sald he was opposed to assassinations

because:

I didn't think it was proper from the standpoint of the u.s.

Government and the Central Intelligence Agency. (6/6/75, p. 15)

B. CIA Directives Banning Assassination. In 1972 and 1973, Helms

and

then Colby issued internal CIA orders banning assassination. In his order, Helms

said:

It has recently again been alleged in the press that CIA

engages in assassination, As you are well aware, this is not

the case, and Agency policy has long been clear on this issue.

To underline it, however, I direct that no such activity or

operation be undertaken, assisted of suggested by any of our

personnel.... (Memorandum, Helms to Deputy Directors, 3/6/72)

Colby, in one of

a series of orders in August 1973 arising, out of the Ajener's

own review.of prior "questionable activity," issued an order which stated:"

CIA will not engage in assassination nor induce, assist or :

suggest to others that assassination be employed. (Memorandum, Colby

to Deputy Directors, 8/29/73)

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C. The need. for a statute. Commendable and welcome as they are,

these

CIA

directives are not sufficient. Administrations change, CIA directors change,

and someday in the future what was tried in the past may once again become a tempt-

ation. Assassination plots did happen. It would be irresponsible for us not to do

all that we can do to prevent

their happening again. Laws express our society's

values; they deter those

who might be tempted and stiffen the will of those who

want to resist.

The statute we recommend, which is printed as an appendix to this

report,

makes It a criminal offense for persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United

• States 1) to conspire, within or outside the United States, to assassinate a

foreign official; 2) to attempt to assassinate a foreign official, or 3) to assas-

sinate a foreign official.

Present law makes it a crime to kill, or to conspire to kill, a foreign

official or foreign official guest while such a person is in the United States:

18 U.S.C. 1116; 18 U.S.C. 1ll7. However, there is no law which makes it

a crime

to assassinate, or to conspire or attempt to assassinate, a foreign official

while such official is outside the United States. Our proposed statute is thus

designed to close this gap in the law.

Subsection (a) of the proposed statute would punish conspiracies formed

within the United States; subsection (b) punishes conspiracies outside of the

United States. Subsection (b) is necessary to eliminate the loophole which would

otherwise permit persons to simply leave the United States and conspire abroad.

Subsections (c) and

(d), respectively, make it an offense to attempt to kill or

to kill a foreign official outside the United States.

Subsections (a) through (d) specifically apply to any "officer or employee

of the United States" to make clear that the statute punishes conduct by u.s.

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government personnel, as well

as conduct by private citizens having no relation

to the d.S. government: In

addition, subsection (a), dealing with conspiracies

within the United States, applies to "any other person," whether or not a United

States citizen. Noncitizens who conspire within the United States to assassi

nate a foreign official clearly come within the jurisdiction.of U.S. law.

Sub-:

sections (b) through (d), which deal with conduct outside the United States, apply

to U.S. citizens, and to officers or employees of the United States, whether or :

not they are citizens. Criminal liability for conduct outside the United States

of persons who are not U.S. citizens or who do not hold a position as

a officer

or employee of

the United States are matters for the law of the place where such.

conduct takes place.

The term "foreign official" 1s defined in subjection (d) (2). The defini-

tion makes it clear that the offense may be committed even though the official

belongs to an insurgent force, an unrecognized government, or a non-governmental

political party. Our investigation - as well as the reality of international

politics -- has shown that officials in such organizations are potential targets

for

assassination.#/

The offenses are limited to conduct almed at such persons because of their

official duties or status, or their political views, actions, or statements. Thus,

for example, a conspiracy to kill or the killing of a foreign official, which is

not politically motivated would not be punishable under this statute.

•The definition of official in section (d) (2) also provides that

such per-

son must be an

official of a foreign government or movement "with which the

United States Is not at war

or against which the United States Armed Forces have

*/For example, Lumumba was not an official of the Congolese government at the

time of the plots against his life, and Trujillo, though the dictator, held

official governmental position in the latter period of his regime.

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not been introduced into hostilities or situations pursuant to the provisions of

the War Powers Resolution."

This definition makes it clear that, absent a decla-

ration of war or

the introduction of United States Armed Forces pursuant to the :

War Powers Resolution, the killing of foreign officials is a criminal offense.

/insert discussion of paramilitary aspect/

* =*.*

In the course of our hearings, some witnesses, while strongly condemning

assassination, asked whether, as a matter of theory, assassination should absolutely

be ruled out in a time of truly unusual national emergency. Adolf Hitler was

cited as an example. Of course, the cases with which we were concerned were not

of that character.#/ In a

. grave emergency, the President has a limited power to

act, not in violation of the law, but in accord with his own responsibilities

under the Constitution to defend the Nation. As the Supreme Court has declared, the

Constitution "is not a suicide pact." Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144

160 (1963) •

Abraham Lincoln, in an unprecedented emergency, claimed unprecedented

power based on the need to preserve the nation:

..,my oath to preserve the Constitution to the best of

my ability, imposed upon me the duty of preserving, by

every indispensable means, that government -- that

nation - of which that Constitution was the organic law.

Was it possible to lose the nation, and yet preserve the

Constitution?

By general, law life and limb must be pro-

tected; yet often a limb must be amputated to save a life;

but a life is never wisely given to save a limb. I felt

that measures, otherwise unconstitutional, might become

lawful, by becoming indispensable to the preservation of

the Constitution, through the preservation of the nation

.... The Complete Works of Abraham Lincoln, Vol. X,

pp. 65-66 (Nicolay and Hay, Eds. 1894).

*/Indeed, in the only situation of true national crisis -- the Cuban missile

crisis - assassination was not even considered.

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=7.-

Of course, whatever the extent of the President's own constitutional

powers," It 1s a fundamental principle of our constitutional: system that these

powers are checked and limited by the Congress, Including the Congress' power

of impeachment. As a necessary corollary, any action taken by a. President pur-:

suant to his limited inherent powers and in apparent conflict with the law

must be disclosed to the Congress. Only then may the Congress judge whether the ac-

tion truly represented, in Lincoln's phrase, an "indispensable

necessity"

to

the life of the Nation.

As Lincoln explained in submitting his extraordinary actions to the Congress

for ratification;

"In full view of his great responsibility he has, so far,

done what he has deemed his duty. You will now, according to your own judgment,

perform yours."

(Abraham Lincoln, Message to

Congress in Special Session, July 4,

1861):

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Appro

u by Drafting

Subcommittee on 9/9/75

EPILOGUE

We do not believe that the acts which we lave examined represent the

eal American character. They do not reflect the ideals which have given

country and of the world hope for a better, fuller;

the people of this.

fairer life. We regard the assassination

plots as aberrations.

We must not adopt the tactics of the enemy: Means are as important

las ends. Crisis makes it tempting to ignore the wise restraints that make

men free. But each time we do so, each time the means we use are wrong, "

our inner strength, the strength which makes us free, is lessened:

Despite our distaste for what we have seen, we have great faith in

this country:

The story is sad,

but this country has the strength to heat

it and to learn from it.

We must remain a people who confront our mistakes.

and resolve not to repeat them. If we do not, we will decline; but, if we

do, our future will be worthy of the best of our past.

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