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1704-10400-10316

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SECRET

SECURITY

FOR COMMITTEES

11 March 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Mr. James M. Potts

Chief, Africa Division

Mr. Richard S. Sampson

Chief, Europe Division

Mr.. Alan D. Wolfe

Chief, Near East Division

Mr. Richard F. Stolz

Chief, Soviet/East European Division

FROM

SUBJECT

:

John D. Walker

0/SA/DO/0

Guidelines for Providing Information

to the House Appropriations Committee

Surveys and Investigations Staff

Concerning Foreign Intelligence and

Security Services

Kars

muckie.

for

1.

Since members of the S&I Staff will be

talking with your Divisions in the near. future,

it may be worthwhile to review the guidelines as

to what may be said concerning relationships with

foreign liaison services.

In the broad sense,

liaison

services constitute both a source and

method.

2. We are prepared to discuss the following:

a.

The identification and responsibili-

ties

of the liaison services. in a particular

area

to the extent

that we can draw on

sources other than information derived

through

the established liaison relationship, i.e.

overt information or information from penetra-

tions

which will not endanger the source.

b.

In further describing the liaison

services, we can provide information on the.

objectives, key personnel, strength, budget

E2 IMPDET

CL BY 012860

SECRET

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SECHET

and methods of operations of services, provided

that such data will be drawn from open sources

or penetrations and not from details of liaison

arrangements with the services themselves.

C .

Agency manhours and funds devoted to

liaison with the foreign services.

In the case of SIGINT liaison, further

details on such arrangements, including the

scope of funds and equipment

provided

1. to such

foreign services.

d. We are prepared to provide general

comments on the degree of operational coopera-

tion with the Station. If technical support,

tor example, provides

a usetul input, we can

state that the liaison service provides

technical support, using a qualifying adjective

to define, such as excellent, limited, etc.

3.

We have no objection to the provision of

foreign intelligence reports based on liaison with

such

services.

Source descriptions should be those

used

in the disseminated report.

4.. We will not make available details on

liaison arrangements, information on sources and

methods of such services which have been obtained

through liaison or jointly controlled sources or

other information which would reveal Agency sources

and methods or violate

the trust

on which the

official liaison relationship is based.

5.

The S&I Staff

approves close liaison

relationships and believes that these relationships

are cost effective.

John D!.,

Walker

0/ SA/ DO/0 :JDWalker: kaw

Distribution

Original - C/AF

1

- C/EUR

1

- C/NE

1

2

- C/SE

- SA/DO/0

(1542)

SECRET

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Guidelines for Providing Information

to Congressional Oversight Comnittees on

Foreign

Intelligence and Sccurity Services

These guidelines

take into account the fact that

foreign intelligence and security services, when acting

in connection with the Agency's official liaison

with

them, constitute both a source and a method and thus

require the statutory protection accorded any other

intelligence source or method: The guidelines also

recognize that the duly constituted oversight bodies of

the Congress have expressed an interest in such services

and in

the general scope, nature and extent of the Agency's

relationships with them. The purpose of these guidelines

is to provide a formula for dealing with those two

• sometimes conflicting objectives.

The Agency is prepared to provide, upon specific

request, appropriately classified and sanitized information

to oversight committees on the following aspects of

foreign intelligence and security services:

a. The identification of the governments with

whose services ClA has liaison arrangements;

b. Agency man

hours and funds devoted to

liaison with foreign sorvices;..

c .

I n

the case of SIGINT liaison, further

details on such arrangements, including the scope of

S32257

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funds and equipment provided to such foreign services;

d. Information on the objectives, key personnel,

strength, budget and methods of operation of such services,

provided that such data will be drawn from open sources or

penetrations and not from the details of liaison

arrangements with the services themselves;

e.

Where relevant, foreign intelligence reports

based on liaison with such services.

The Agency will not make available to the oversight

conmittees the details of liaison

arrangements with

foreign services, information on sources and methods of..

such services obtained through liaison or jointly

controlled

sources, or other information which would

• reveal Agency sources or methods .or violate the trust on

which these official liaison relationships is necessarily

based.

In the event of substantial allegations of improper

activities conducted by foreign intelligence or security

services with which the Agency is presumed to maintain

liaison, every effort will be made to provide all relevant

facts

which

bear on such allegations. Where

this would

involve departure from the above guidelines, the Director

will be prepared

to meet with the Chairman or Vice-Chairman

of the committoo to seck a satisfactory resolution of such

problems.

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HSC MAT FUR

REVIEW STAFF

75-2014

24 July 1975

SECURITY

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

MI. Colby, Mitch Rogovin and Mr. Knoche met with

Chairman Otis Pike at 9:30, 7/24 in Chairman Pike's office

to discuss groundrules, etc. for the House Select Committee

on Intelligence.

Mr. Colby left the following material with Pike:

1. 16 June 1975 Letter to the Honorable Elmer B. Staats

Comptroller General of the United States, Signed by

Mr. Colby. The letter deals with the GAO's audit

of the Central Intelligence Agency. (Attached).

2. Guide to Central Intelligence Agency Statutes and Law

dated September 1970 (without the Ryan Amendment

on Foreign Intelligence). (Filed in 6D0120)

3. Three Groudrules papers: (Attached)

•-Agreements To Be SouthtBy the DCI With Chairmer

of the Select Committees

--Secrecy Agreement

--Guides for Protection of Classified Information

*And Documents Furnished The Select Committee.

4.

11 March 1975 Letter from Colby to Senator Church.

(Attached)

Rosemarie R. Hesterberg

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SECRET

Checklist for DCI Discussion with HSC

1. Your intent to be cooperative and forthcoming.

2. Your responsibility to protect S&M: Will need HSC understanding

of particularly sensitive matters:'

--names of agents and sources..

--names of cooperating American organizations and

contacts to whom we have pledged confidentiality.

--material from foreign liaison.

--sensitive intelligence methods and techniques of collection.

3.. Will need to work out security groundrules.

--Chairman of USIB Security Committee and CIA Director

of Security available to help work out custodial arrangements,

compartmented clearances, etc.

4. Importance of secrecy agreements. Your willingness to suspend

them to permit testimony by current and ex-employees.

5. Will confirm with a letter and an employee bulletin which

can be used by HSC in dealing with Agency witnesses and

interviews.

• e.45

24 July 1975

SECRET

Classified by -

014359

Exompt from genoral

doclassification schedule of F.O. 11652

exemption schedule 5B (1), (2), (3)

Automatically declassilied on

Dato Impossible lo Detormino

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AGREEMENTS TO BE SOUGHT BY THE DCI WITH

CHAIRMEN OF THE SELECT COMMITTEES

1, It would be desirable if the DCI could secure agréement

with the Chairmen of the Select Committees, as has been customary

in other Congressional proceedings regarding sensitive matters, that:

(a) Departments and agencies shall have the right

to request that testimony be givenionly in executive session,

that in some instances testimony be "off-the-record" and

that certain testimony be heard only by members and in

some cases

¡only by the Chairman and Vice Chairman.

(b) Witnesses be afforded an opportunity to review

and comment on and/or correct the record of their testimony.

prior to any publication of it.

(c) When questioned about intelligence matters that

come under the purview of another organization, witnesses

should be permitted to state that a response to the question

is not properly within their authority and to respectfully

suggest that the appropriate party be called to testify ou

such matters.

2, It would also be desirable if the DCI could secure agreement

with the Chairmen of the Select Committees that those agencies

furnishing documerits to the committees be authorized to excise from

those documents, prior to presentation, the names of their personnel

under cover or whose personal safety might be jeopardized as well as

those of other individuals whoge safety or individual privacy. may be

jeopardized by disclosure. Also excised should be names of sources,

operations. specific details of technical devices and systems main-

tained in compartmented channels and names of organizations

cooperating on a highly confidential basis.

3. In view of their susceptibility to foreign countermeasures,

it would be desirable if the DCI could obtain agreement with the

Chairmen of the Select Committees not to require presentation of details

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of the technology of the technical collection programs..

It would also

be desirable if the Select Committces adopted. the use of Compart-

mented Control Systems to protect documents on these programs

and cleared only those staff personnel with an absolute need-to-knaw.

The responsible departments and agencies would be glad to advise

and assist in any arrangements the Chairmen would desire in this

compartmented area.

4. Further,' it would be desträble if the DCI attempt to

secure an agreement with the Chairmen of the Select Committees

that they vill entertain and consider security principles and guide-

lines which will be provided.

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SECRECY AGREEMENT

Ig.

, in accepting employment

or assignment with the Select Committee to Study Governmental

Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, recognize the

special trust and confidence placed in me to protect classified infor-

mation from unauthorized disclosure.

I hereby agree to accept the

specific obligations set forth

below as a condition precedent of my employment or assignment with .

the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect

to Intelligence Activities, established by the Senate of the United

States, Resolution 21, agreed to on January 27, 1975, hereinafter

referred to as the Select Committee.

•It is my understanding that in the course of my employment

or assignment with the Select .Committee I will be given access to

information from departments and agencies of the Government which

is classified in accordance with the stardards set forth in Executive

Order 11652 of March 8, 1972, as amended. All classified information

so acquired by me in the course of my employment remains the

property of the United States of America and I further agree to

surrender upon demand by the Chairman of the Select Committee

or his designee(s) or upon my separation from the Select Committee,

any classified material which has come into my possession as a

result of my employment or assignment with the Select Committee.

I hereby agree that the burden is on me to determine if

information is classified and that I will never divulge, publish or

reveal by word, writing, conduct or otherwise any classified

information which has come to my knowledge as a result of my

employment or assignment with the Select Committee without prior

written consent of the Chairman or the President of the Senate or

their duly authorized representative.

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I hercby agree that any information learned during my

employment of assignment with the Select Committce which is related

to intelligence and prepared for publication by me will be submitted to

the Chairman or the President of the Senate or their duly authorized

representative prior to discussing with or showing to any publisher,

editor or literary agent for the purpose of determining whether said

material contains any classified information as defined in Executive

Order 11652. I agyce that the Chairman of the Select Committee,

• President of the Senate or their duly authorized representative has

the authority to make the final determination as to whether information

is classified and thus should be deleted from the material submitted.

I have been informed of the provisions of 18 U.S. C. 793, 794,

798 and 952; and 50 U:S. C. 783 (b); and 42 U.S.C. 2274; and Executive

Order 11652, all of which relate to the protection of classified infor--

nation, and understand their meaning:

Further, I agree to abide by such rules and procedures as the

Select Committee shall institute for the protection of classified material.

I understand that any breach of any part of the obligations in this agree-

ment could subject me to legal and/or administrative action.

I further agree that all the conditions and obligations imposed

on 'me with respect to the protection of classified information by this

agreement and applicable security regulations apply during my employ-

ment or assignment and continue after that relationship has terminated.

I take the obligations set forth above freely and without any

mental reservations or purpose of evasion.

n0.2.

Signature

Date

WITNESS:

Signature

Date

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:)

GUIDES FOR PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

AND DOCUMENTS FURNISHED THE SELECT COMMITTEES

1. Personnel Security Clearances

(a) Background Investigation

It would be desirable for the Select Committees to stipulate

that no staff personnel is to be given access to any classified material,

testimony or information received or generated by the committees.

tithout prior receipt of a security clearance based on a full field

investigation.

(b) Secrecy Agreement

It would be desirable for the Select Committees to require a

signed secrecy agreement of employees or individuals assigned to

the committees' staffs. The agreement should include provisions:

1) That acceptance of committee secrecy regulations

is a condition precedent of employment or assignment;

2) Recognizing US Government property rights to

classified information;

3) Requiring prior written consent before divulgence

of classified information;

4) For recognition that breach of the secrecy rules

and obligations contained in the agreement could subject

the signer to administrative and/or legal action under

appropriate statutes;

5) That there is no time limit on the terms of the

agreement.

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2. Physical and Document Security

The Select Committees should adopt rules to insure that the

secrecy of any sensitive information received or generated by it be

preserved. These rules should be made known to the individuals

and agencies who will be called upon to present testimony or

materials. Among these should be rules in physical security and

document security.

• (a) Physical Security

• It would be desirable if the Select Committees adopt the following

rules related to physical security:

1) All classified material will be stored in safes for

safekeeping in the registry of the Joint Committee on Atomic

Energy or similar facility and handled in accordance with

the regulations of this registry for classified material.

2), Twenty-four-hour guard protection, supplemented

by anti-intrusion alarms, should be required on the storage

area.

18. i.

• 3) Areas selected for use in closed session should

be guarded against entry by unauthorized persons.

4) The committees should arrange for the conduct of

audio countermeasures to preclude the possibility of

unauthorized use of transmitters and/or recording devices.

It should be noted that a foreign clandestine transmitter was

located in the Rayburn House Office Building on 12 February

1973.

5) At the end of each session of the Select Committees,

the hearing room should be examined by a cleared staff.

• officer who will secure any misplaced classified material

or waste..

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6) Areas should be designated in which classified

material can be reviewed. These arcas should be secure

against access by unauthorized personnel.. Material should

not be removed from these areas for the sake of convenience

except when necessary for the work of the committees and

should not be transported overnight lo the office or residence

of personnel of the committees.

(b) Document Security

1) Committees should seleci and identify a single

location and specific personnel authorized to sign acknow-

ledgement of receipt of classified materials provided to

the committees.

: 2) A system of document control should be established

to permit control of glassified documents to provide for

accountability.

• 3) Duplication of documents should be controlled so

as to require a record of the dogument reproduced, the

number of copies reproduced and the custodian or receiving

personnel. Reproduced classified documents should be

subject to the same controls as the original.

4) Appropriate arrangements should be made for

the destruction of classified waste.

5) Transcripts. The committees should give

consideration io the necessity of providing appropriate

security in the transcription of testimony by committee

transcribers.

The committees may desire to charge each

agency presenting testimony with this responsibility. In

some, if not all cases, this might include escort of

materials to the place of transcription, the securing of

carbons, waste and notes and the return of the transcribed

testimony to the committee for safekeeping in accordance

with cominittee rules.

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6) Early agreement should be reached on the

disposition of classified materials such as storage

under seal in the National Archives. The question of

access should be determined by the President of the

Senate or the Speaker of the House.

Compartmented Information

There is some extremely sensitive information in the intelligence

community which is disseminated only to those who have a very strict

"need to know" in order to build, perfect, operate or handle the

material produced by extremely sensitive foreign intelligence collection

programs.. The sensitivity of these programs rests upon the vulner-

ability to countermeasures which a foreign government could easily

institute if details of the means of collection became known. Thus,

even individuals cleared for Top Secret information do not have access

to compartmented information unless they are required to have such

knowledge in the performance of their duties. This information is

handled in Compartmented Control Systems.

It would be desirable

if the Chairmen would adopt the Compartmented Control Systems on

these extremely sensitive collection efforts and clear only those

staff personnel with an absolute "need to know" about such systems,

and that documents related to such systems be handled in a compart-

mented fashion by the Select Committee. The responsible departments

and agencies would be glad to advise and assist in any arrangements.

the Chairmen would desire in this compartmented area.

4o. Security Officer

It would be desirable if the committees appointed a security

officer with the responsibility of discharging the security rules adopted

by the committee and of serving as a point of contact with the depart-

ments and agencies of interest to the committee. It would also be

desirable if the committee rules required each agency of interest to

identily a single point of contact to facilitate provisions of security

support required by the committee.

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ENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGEN

MASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

75-2289/0

1.6 JUN 1975

Honorable Elmer B. Staats

Comptroller General of the United States

General Accounting Office

441 G Sireet

Washington, D. C.

20548

Dear Mr. Staats:

My attention has been directed to a letter from Mr. Keller, General

Accounting Office, to the Honorable William Proxmire dated May 10, 1974,

which was placed in the Congressional Record by Senator Proxmire on

February II, 1975. The letter deals with the intelligence community and

reviews the General Accounting Office's right to audit and obtain information

from the Central Intelligence Agency-

6665201027:

Inasmuch ás Mr. Keller has treated a subject basic to this Agency's

capability; to carry out work mandated by Congress, I believe it sould serve

a usefal purpose to review some of the background concerning the use of

confidential funds and their relationship to the audit of CIA over the years.

Mr. Keller notes in his letter that there are "a fairly substantial number

of instances where expenditures are accounted for solely upon a certification.

by the head of the department or establishment involved." The need is clear

in the case of this Agency. The necessity to safeguard certain truly vital

foreign intelligence secrets has been recognized by the Congress in its

direction to the Director of Central Intelligence to protect intelligence sources

and methods from unauthorized disclosure. This responsibility was complemented

by authorizing certain expenditures "for objects of a confidential, extraordinary,

or emergency nature," to be accounted for solely on the certificate of the Director

of Central Intelligence. Such espenditures would apply, for example, to a

secret agent operating abroad in a hostile climate whose identity must be pro-.

tected not only so that he can continue supplying the intelligence involved, but

also because his freedom and.on occasion his life- weighs in the balance.

Other intelligence activities do not have such obvious security require

ments, but are, nonetheless, within the sources and methods concept. Liaison

with foreign intelligence and security agencies is extremely important in fields of

both positive intelligence and counterintelligence. Such liaisons to be effective

depend on the confidence of each service that the other will protect not only the

mere fact of the relationships, but also its'sources and methods and sensitive

information.

Compromise of any of these brings not only protests from the foreign

liaison service, but in some cases a lessening or even cessation of its cooperation.

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Even overt activities

have their own security problems.

Thus, many U. S.

citizens and others are willing to provide sensitive information to overt intelligence

units only on condition that their cooperation in this respect be absolutely protected.

This need for the special protection of intelligence sources and methods has

been well recognized by officials in the executive, judicial, and legislative

branches of our Government. Vir. Lindsay C. Warren, then Comptroller General

of the United States, in a letter dated March 12, 1948, to the Director, Bureau of

the Budget, addressed the provision granting the Director of Central Intelligence

the power to certify the expenditure of confidential funds by stating that while it

provided "for the granting of much wider authority than I would ordinarily

recommend for Government agencies, generally; the purposes sought to be

obtained in the establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency are believed to

be of such paramount importance as to justify the extraordinary measures pro-

posed therein.". He went on to say that the "necessity for secrecy in such matters

is apparent and the Congress apparently recognized this fully in that it provided

a in section. I02(d)(3) of Public Law 253, that the Director of Central Intelligence

shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from

"4..

unauthorized disclosure." Under these conditions; he stated, "I do not feel

called upon to object to the proposals advanced..

".9.

It has been and it remains the policy of CIA to rely upon vouchered funds

wherever possible. (Vouchered furids are those which can be accounted for and

audited in conformance with the laws that apply to other Government agencies

and with standard Government regulations and procedures.) Currently more

than half of the Agency's appropriations are disbursed as vouchered funds.

The confidential funds certification authority referred to by Mr. Warren in his

March 12, 1948 letter is reserved for "objects of a confidential, extraordinary,

or emergency nature."

From the beginning of CIA records for all'vouchered fund expenditures

svere made available to and were subject to a voucher audit by the GAO. Use of

the voucher audit procedure allowed the GAO to examine expenditure and

collection vouchers and related documents to determine whether expenditures

were made legally and solely for the objects for which appropriations were made.

Use of the voucher audit procedure also allowed CIA to protect those activities of

a confidential, extraordinary, or emergency nature, i.e., intelligence sources

and methods

-Subsequent to the enactment of the CIA legislation, GAO adopted a

"compreherisive audit approach;" and raised ivith the CIA Subcommittee of the

House Aried Services Committee the desirability of an expanded audit of Agency

activities. The Comptroller General stated by letter dated May 29, 1959 to

Subcommittee Chairman Kilday that he did "not recommend any change in section 10

(now section 8) of the Central Intelligence Act" and that "any broadening of our

audit activities should not include an evaluation of the intelligence activities of

the Agency."

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Mr. Allen Dulles, th

Director of Central Intelligenc

agreed that GAO

should expand its current audit activities in a letter to the Comptroller dated

October 16, 1959, cautioning, however, that the comprehensive audit would have :

to be limited so as to remain outside the area of sensitive security operations for

which by law the Director's certificate must be deemed a sufficient voucher.

"The results of the trial period of comprehensive audit from 1959 to 1961

were made known to the ClA Subcommittee in a letter of May 16, 1961 from the

Comptroller General in which he said the GAO planned to discontinue the audit

Of CLÀ activities. He acknowledged that various steps were taken by the CIA "to

place the General Accounting Office in a position to make a comprehensive audit

of the overt activities of CIA." Nevertheless, he stated that GAO "cannot effectively

review and evaluate activities of the Support Component because the confidential

and overt activities of this .component are integrpted to such an extent that we

cannot make reasonably comprehensive audits." He further stated "we have been .

given sufficient access to make reasonably comprehensive reviews of the overt

Le productive ignitican velaron because camor feastly eat lie no

estent to which needed overt information is available for collection or determine

the need for the intelligence information selected for collation and use in the pro-

duction of intelligence reports.". In short, the Comptroller General was recognizing

the conflict between the philosophy underlying a "comprehensive audit approach"

and the Director's statutory responsibility and authority to protect intelligence

sources and methods.

Both the Director and Chaifman Vinson, of the House Committee on Armed

Services, requested that the Compfroller General continue to audit Agency affairs

on a limited basis, but after another trial period the Comptroller General reiterated

his earlier view. In a letter to Chairman Vinson dated June 21, 1962, tHe Comptrolle:

General stated his belief that for maximum effectiveness "it would be necessary

for our GAO audit staff to have nearly completè access to CIA activities; " and

that even to perform reasonably comprehensive reviews would require "complete

access to the administrative activities ... that are performed in support of both

sensitive and nonsensitive operations of CIA."

Chairman Vinson replied to the Comptroller General on July 18, 1962,

stating that, "the restrictions you met within the Central Intelligence Agency

are necessary; I believe, for the proper protection of its intelligence activities

and should be maintained." The Chairman agreed, however, that in view of

the Comptroller General's opinion that a continued audit was not a worthwhile

effort, GAO might withdraw from further audit activities in the Central Intelligence

Agency:

In summary, I believe that several-points are deserving of emphasis in

assessing the nature and history of GAO's audit activities with respect to this

Agency:

3

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(a) Cha coope;

wed fully in all respects in exter

administrative support and in granting security clearances

•and access to information related to vouchered fund activities.

(b) The Chairman of the interested oversight committee

in the House of Representatives was fully informed of the nature

and status of the activity :

(c) This Agency encouraged GAO to conduct and to

continue to conduct its activities consistent with the operational

and statutory requirements imposed upon this Agency.

(d) The decision to discontinue the audit activities.

was made solely by GAO and was approvel-by the Chairman

of the House Armed Services Committee:

Sincerely,

1p..

W. E. Colby

Director

Distribution:

Orig - Addressee

1 - DCI

II - DDCI

1 - ER

1:- OGC

•1 - DDA

1 - Compt

1 - OF

-OS

1 - OLC Subject (GAO) a w/basic?

] - OLC Proxmire file

—]: -OLC Chrono

OLC: WPY: cg (13 Jun 75) -

JUN 17

I| 09 Mr! '75

.

ER

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

25.3465

DET

REVIEW STAFF

75-3051

28 JUL 1375

HSc Pee furn

securiti

The Honorable Otis G. Pike, Chairman

Select Committee on Intelligence

House of Representatives

Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In our conversation on Friday you asked for the statutory

basis for the compartmentation principle. I wish first to

respond to your inquiry and then suggest a manner in which your

staff can receive access to the sensitive material protected

by special compartmentation systens.

The current basis for the U.S. Government security

information.

There are numerous statutory recognitions of

the importance of national security information, e.g., the

Freedom of Information Act... Consequently, much

foreign

intelligence is classified CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET OF TOP

SECRET according to specifications set forth in the Order.

Not 'all foreign intelligence, however, is classified national

security information under the provisions of the Executive

Order (e.g, an American source providing foreign information

or assistance).

Also, the potential risks attendant with

the compromise of a foreign intelligence source or method

differ

substantially from the risks attendant with much

classified defense information.

Section 102(d) (3) of the National Security Act of 1941,

as amended, provides:

"That the Director of Central Intel-

•ligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence

sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure:"

recognition of this responsibility, National Security

Council Intelligence Directive No. 1 (17 February 1972)

instructs the Director of Central Intelligence to,

-develop and review security standards and practices as

they relate to the protection of intelligence and of

intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure."

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=2-

Since the National Security Act did not provide for an authority

corresponding with the DCI's responsibility in this area,.

the Directive provides that the Members of the U.S. Intelligence

Board are

responsible for: "The supervision of the dissemination

and security of intelligence material.". The Director of CertFal

Intelligence, acting with the advice of the U.S. Intelligence

Board, has promulgated a number of directives, regulations

and security manuals,

related to the protection of foreign

intelligence and foreign intelligence sources and methods,

and applicable to the overall U.S. intelligence community:

The fundamental security principle involved in the pro-

tection of foreign intelligence and of its sources.and. methods

is a strict application of "need to know"--a principle

referred to in Executive Order 11652, Section 6(A)- This

applies the simple mathenatical premise that the fewer the

ỉso chao the tenet th

number of individuals made privy to a secret, the less likely

that it will be disclosed. The security principle of

"compartmentation" involving special access and information

dissemination controls is designed to ensure that only those

individuals whose "need to know" has been specifically

approved by some higher authority, who have been specially

indoctrinated, and who undertake special commitments to

protect it are provided actess to à particularly sensitive

category of foreign intelligence sources and methods.

Compartmentation assists in the application of the "need-to-

know" principle by ensuring that individuals are provided

access to only that information clearly essential to the

performance. of their duties.

Compartmentation was undoubtedly a major contributing

factor involved in the nation's secret development of the

atomic bomb during World War II, and the principle is still

implicit in security procedures related to ERDA'S "RESTRICTED

DATA" as reflected in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

In the

U-2 reconnaissance program. One of the major foreign

intelligence categories of activities using formalized com-

partmentation procedures today involves the matter of

foreign signals intercept for intelligence purposes, i.e.,

communications intelligence. Title 18 of the U.S. Code

Section 798 recognizes the special character of this .

material by providing specifically for prosecution for the

unauthorized disclosure of information concerning any

communications activities of the United States

without the

---

## Page 21

13-00000

- 3 -

necessity to show intent to harm the United States.

• The

reason for the application of strict compartmentation pro-

cedures to communications intelligence and other foreign

intelligence activities reflects the extreme vulnerability

of the sources. Once an opposition becomes aware of which

of its communications we are intercepting, it can take swift

remedial action, and the source can be forever lost.

On Friday afternoon;

copies of the secrecy oath used

by the executive branch with respect to three compartmented

access control systems were made aváilable to you along with

the revised forms developed for and executed by certain members

of the staff of the Senate Select Committee to Study Intelligence

Activities. I would hope that the enclosed agreement modified

for the House Select Committee, combining all three

compartments into one document, would neet your particular

concerns.

For your information,

in addition to the Senate Select

Committee's use of the modified secrecy oath dealing with

compartmented access, the following House and Senate committees

have obtained compartmented access for their staffs, which

was granted after the normal briefings and signing of the

secrecy oati:

Armed Services Comnittee

Appropriations Committee

Aeronautical and Space Sciences Connittee

May. I reiterate the points I made on Friday:

.

No material is being withheld from members of

the Committee.

!

We are prepared to and did brief the staff of the

Committee on noncompartmented matters, based upon your

certification of their security clearance and the fact

that they entered into an appropriate secrecy agreement

with you, a copy of which you provided.

c.

The compartmentation procedures of the

Intelligence Community have been established pursuant

to statute and National Security Council Intelligence

Directives.

The simplest way for the staff to obtain

access to this compartmented material would be to

accept the normal secrecy arrangements as modifled

in the enclosed.

This would ensure against difficulties

in access to such compartmented material throughout the

---

## Page 22

13-00000

Intelligence Community. It is clear that

the

obligations assumed here would run between the staff

member and the Committee and in no way would provide

any control or influence over them by me or any

element of the Intelligence Community-

•d.. It would undoubtedly be feasible to develop

another procedure to ensure special protection of the

sensitive matters currently included in the compart-

mented systems, but this would involve review and

discussions with various interested parties which

would undoubtedly take some time and delay your

investigations.

I hope you will agree that this is the simplest and

easiest manner of solving a practical matter so that we can

proceed with the substance of your investigations.

Sincerely,

W. E. Colby

---

## Page 23

13-00000 •

Distribution:

1- DCI

1-DDCI

1- IG

1-OLC

1-E.H. Knocke

I-SC/DCI

White House Distribution:

1- Rod Hills n

I-Phil Buchen

I-Jay French

---

## Page 24

13-00000 '

CONFIDENTIAL

COMPARTMENTED INTELLIGENCE INDOCTRINATION

I have been inforned that pursuant to law (Sectiors 792,

793,

794, 795, 797 and 798 of Title 18, United States Code) I

am not to discuss. with or disciose to any person any infornation

relating directly or indirectly to the below identified compart-

mented Programs, unless such person is currently authorized

• ta

discuss or receive such informa ion or material of the particular

category involved I an avare that the responsibility of

ascertaining that such an authorization for another person is

valid and current, rests with me.

acknowledge that it is my responsibility to inform

myself of the contents of the above mentioned sections of

ItLe 1o, U.S. Code, as. they pertain to performance of my

duties..

I an anare further that if a change in my status

renders it no longer necessary for me to receive compartrented

intelligence, my name will be removed from the list of persons

authorized to receive such material.

signed below.

I acknowledge that I have been briefed on the following

• comparimented systens or programs:

OATH OF SECRECY

I do solemnly swear that I will not discuss with or

disclose to any person,

regardless of his official position

or status, any information relating directly or indirectly to

Compartmented Intelligence, any information derived therefrom,

of the nature of the sources of such intelligence, until i

nave ascertained that such person has been authorized to discuss

CONFIDENTIAL

E-2 IMPDET

CL BY •

---

## Page 25

13-00000 •

CONFIDENTIAL

and handle this material, and that his authorization has not

been révoked, except in the performance of my official duties

on the staff of the House Select Committee on Intelligence and

in accordance with the requirements set forth in the rules of

such Committee.

Signature

Witness

Date

CONFIDENTIAL

-..

---

## Page 26

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CE RAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C, 20505

HSC MAT. FURN

Review Staff: 75/2563

20 August 1975

Mr. A. Searle Field

Staff Director

Select Committee on Intelligence

Room 232

Cannon House Office Building

Washington D.C.

20515

HSC SECURITY

Dir ols approval

Dear MI. Field:

Around the end of July, Mr. Roeder, obviously impressed

by your admonitions about the need for security, asked if I

could work up a package of guidance on how to handle classified

documents. Our Office of Security put this together, and while

I think Mr. Roeder had in mind something more applicable to

an individual than to an office, I thought I would pass this on to

you for whatever use you care to make of it.

Incidentally, we have not yet carried out the physical survey

of your quarters which you requested on 29 July. I have been

in touch with Ms. Hess, and our Office of Security will conduct

one as soon as she is ready. We may have some other recom-

mendations for your consideration when that is done.

Sincerely,

Jerrold B.

Brown

Assistant to the Director

Attachment: a/s

Cc: D/OS

ATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure Subicci do

Criminal Sanctions.

CONFIDENTIAL

Classified b9 N0.31L1

Exemp: from Contal Deseus:::y

Schedula of E.O. 11022, Brane:

Caegory: 33 (1 (), 13: 8 10)

ENNIAL

1776-1078

Duelasslice only ca ipproval of tire

Directer of Central Intelligenco

---

## Page 27

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CONFIDENTIAL

14 AUG 1975

MENORANDUM FOR: The Review Staff

ATTENTION

: Mr. Jerrold B. BrOWn

VIA

: Acting Deputy Director for Administration

SUBJECT®

: House Select Committee on Intelligence -

Protection of Classified Materials

REFERENCE

:

Memo did 31 Jul 75 to D/Sec from Jerrola

B. Brown, subject: Request for Security

Aids

In accordance with the raquest in the raferenced

memorandun for a "package" to be used by the House Select.

Committee on Intelligence for the protection of classifiad

material, the attached suggestions are provided for your

assistance.

In view of the lack of a comprehensive phys-

ical security survey of the area which will be used to

store the Committee's classified material, specific rec-

onnendations must be deferred.

In this connection, we

plan to have Mr. Edward J. McGrath of the Physical

Sacurity

Rayburn Building.

For your information, Mr. Searle Field,

Staff Director of the House Select Committee on Intelligence,

requested such a survey on 29 July 1975.

Pending the re-

sults of this survey and its recomendations, the attached •

general physical sacurity neasures are recommended in an

effort to provide the requisite protection for the Con-

mittee's classified material.

Robert W. Gambino

Director of Security

Atts.

Distribution:

Orig & 2 - Adse

1 - ADD/A

B3. IMPDET

CL BY 056966

OS 5 12 065

CONFIDENTIAL

---

## Page 28

13-00000

ATTACHMEN

---

## Page 29

13-00000 •

CONFIDENTIAL

GENERAL SUGGESTIONS

FOR THE

PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL

1.

Designate a Conmittee member as the Security

Officer responsible for the overall control

handling and protection of the classified

material.

2.

Establish and maintain a register of all

Conmittee personnel who are authorized to

review classified material and insure that

no unauthorized personnel will have access

the material.

3.

Establish a central document control systein

whereby all classified documents are properly

logged

upon receipt and annotated as to

disposition.

4.

Designate a Document Control Clerk who will

bo specifically responsible for the logging

and control of all classified material.

Appropriate records should be established

to reflect that all classified material is

properly logged in and out, by date and time,

to authorized members of the Committee.

5.

In the event material is designated as being

of a codeword or compartmented nature, special

physical security features as enunciated by

the Ad Hoc Security Committee of the Unitad

States Intelligence Board and later adopted

as policy should be adhered to.

regarding these requirements will be provided

in the course of the pending survey.

6.

7.

priate socurity clearances.

It teasible,

a reading room should be es-

tablished within the designated storage

aTe?

CONFIDENTIAL

---

## Page 30

13-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

for the Committee's classified material, and

all research and revier activities of the

material should be restricted to this area.

In those instances where the Committes neets

in Executive session, every effort should

be made to insure that the site being used has

been subjected to a technical security inspec-

tion to negate the possibility of unauthorized

transmitiing or recording devices.

This area

of concern could pose serious

security deficien-

cies in the event the same area would' be used

initially in public session and then closed for

the Exscutive session without such an inspection

being made.

Adequata safoguards should be utilized in the

transmission of classified material under the

cognizance of the Committee fion one area to

another.

Reproduction of any portion of the Cormittee's

classified material should be prohibited

without the express approval of the Staff

Director. In this instance, notes, extracts,

summaries, etc., made fron classified material

must also

be provided the same degree of

protection as

that provided to the source

material.

Access controls to the storage and reten-

tion area should be established to insure that

only authorized personnel are allowed entrance.

Storage of all classified material should be

within the designated area as opposed to any

areas or outside offices.

Security protection should be provided to

all Conmittee transcripts during the tran-

scription process as well as during the

periods while they are in transit.

• security check procedure should be estab.

ished to inspect the areas where the Com-

mittee meets at the termination of each

session to insure that no classified material

2

CONFIDENTIA!

---

## Page 31

13-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

or notos, etc., are inadvertently left un-

secured.

(Attached are examples of Security

Chock Sheets.)

15.

_Arrangements should be nade to insure that

there ara adequate facilities for the

destruction of classified wasto material.

In this instance, such wasto naterial should

be provided protection until its final

destruction.

16.

Only approved classifiod material destruc-

tion nethods should be utilized. (Details

regarding this can be obtained in the course

of tha pending survey.)

17. All Committee personnel granted access to

classified material by the Staff Director

should be briefed on their obligations and

responsibilities regarding the unauthorized

disclosure of such material.

18.

Specific physical security recommendations

applicable to the proposed storage area for the

Committae's classified material, consistent

with sound security principles, must be deferred

until the completion of the survey.

This would

also include recommendations relative to the

type of storage containers which the Connittee

proposes to use.

19.

Pending the completion of a security survey at

the new storage site, it is suggested that the

protective measures currently in effect at the

temporary storage facility in Room 232, Cannon

Building, not be changed.

CONFIDENTIAL

---

## Page 32

13-00000

ATTACHMENT

---

## Page 33

13-00000

SECURITY CHECK SHE<T

TO

Office of

Security

THRU:

Component Security Officer

TO LOCK

ROTATE DIAL FOUR CONSECUTIVE TURNS IN ONE DIRECTION

SAFES: DEPRESS CONTROL DRAWER LATCH WHILE DEPRESSING

EACH DRAWER LATCH AND PULL OUT BOTH DRAWERS. ON

"HERRING-HALL-MARVIN" SAFES TURN DRAWER HANDLE TO RIGHT

(on new typo, raine latch) AND PULL DRAWERS OUTWARD.

VAULTS AND DOOR SAFES: TURN HANDLE BACK AND FORTH

WHILE PULLING DOOR OUTWARD.

ALARM SWITCHES: TURN TO "NIGHT" POSITION

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY,

BY MY INITIALS BELOW, THAT I HAVE OPENED OR

PROPERLY SECURED THIS VAULT, SAFE OR CABINET AND ALARM

MONTH(S)

OPENED BY

CLOSED BY

CHECKED BY | GUARD CHECK

E INITIALS TIME INSTIALS TIME INITIALS TIME INITIALS TIME

FORM 108 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECUS/TY CHECK SHEET

ROOM NO.

FROM:

BUILDING

SAFE NO.

TO LOCK

ROTATE DIAL FOUR CONSECUTIVE TURNS IN ONE DIRECTION

SAFES: DEPRESS CONTROL DRAWER LATCH WHILE DEPRESSING

EACH DRAWER LATCH AND PULL OUT BOTH DRAWERS. ON

"HERRINO-HALL-MAHVIN" SAFES TURN DRAWER HANDLE TO RIGHT

(on nam typo, salao latch) AND PULL DRAWERS OUTWARD.

VAULTS AND DOOR SAFES: TURN HANDLE BACK AND FORTH

WHILE PULLING DOOR OUTWARD.

ALARM SWITCHES: TURN TO "NIGHT" POSITIÓN

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY, BY MY INITIALS BELOW, THAT I HAVE OPENED OF

PROPERLY SECURED THIS VAULT, SAFE OR CABINET AND ALARM

MONTH(S)

REVERSE FOLD FOR FULL USE

OF BOTH SIDES - FOLD HERE

OPENED BY

CLOSED BY | CHECKEDBY GUARD CHECK

E.

INITIALS' TIME INITIALS TIME INITIALS TIME INITIALS TIME

(9)

---

## Page 34

13-00000 .

Area Security Check Sheet

Items to be Checked

Desks (Including Drawers)

Tables (Including Drawers)

Chairs

Floor

Window Ledges

Typewriters

Stenotype Machines

Reproduction Equipment

Trash

Receptacles

Charts, Exhibits,

Chalkboards

Notebooks, Paper Pads, etc.

(Check

to insure that

imprints of classified

notes

not present)

Checker

---

## Page 35

13-00000 '

UNCLASSIFiED

Usc

OMLY CONFIDENTIAL

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

CONFI. NTIAL

SECRET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

House Select Committee on Intelligence -

Protection of Classified Materials

FROM:

EXTENSION

Director of Security

6777

File with 75-2563 20 A0G 75

DATE

14 AUG 1975

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and

building)

DATE

FFICER'

NITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each

comment to

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

1.

2.

Edward Ryan

PP/2,, Radinator

ADD/A

7D-26, Has.

3.

4.

6.

7.

The Review

Staff

6D-0120

5. Attn: Mr. Jerrold B. Brown

Seymour S5

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

114.

15.

FORM

3-02

610 USE

PREVIOUS

EDITIONS

SECRET

COCONE BEN THAT

INTERNAL

USE ONLY

UNCLASSIFIED

---

## Page 36

13-00000

CONFIBENTIA!

1 4 AUG 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Review Staff

ATTENTION

: Mr. Jerrold B. Brown

VIA

: Acting Deputy Director for Administration

SUBJECT

: House Select Committee on Intelligence -

Protection of Classified Materials

REFERENCE

:

Memo dtd 31 Jul 75 to D/Sec from Jerrold

AidBrown, subject: Request for Security

In accordance with the request in the referenced

nemorandum for a "package" to be used by the House Select

Committee on Intelligence for the protection of classified

material, the

attached suggestions

are provided for your

assistance.

In view of the lack of a comprehensive

phys-

ical security survey of the

area which will be used

store the Committee's classified material, specific rec-

ommendations must be deferred.

In this connection, we

plan to have Mr. Edward J. McGrath of the Physical Security

Division (extension 3494)

meet with appropriate represent-

atives of

the Committee for the specific purpose of con-

ducting a

security survey of the proposed quarters in the

Building.

Mr. Searle Field,

Stabu Rector the House sete canttee on Intelligence,

requested such a survey on 29 July 1975.

Pending the re-

sults. of this survey and its recommendations, the attached

general physical security measures are recommended in an

effort to provide the requisite protection for the Com-

mittee's classified material.

Robert W.

Gambino

Director of Security

Atts.

Distribution:

Orig &

2 - Adse

1

-

ADD/A

E3 IMPDET

CL BY 056966

OS 5 12 065

CONFIDENTIAL

---

## Page 37

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SECRET

TePuld Brown

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

Intelligence Community Staff

DCI/IC 75 - 2620

2 September 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

SUBJECT

: House Select Committee on Intelligence

Attached is a paper from the Chairman, USIB Security

• Committee, outlining security arrangements made by the House

Select Committee

on Intelligence.

Wich Thoma.

ack E. thoma:

Major General, USAF (Ret.)

Chief, Coordination Staff, ICS

Attachment

This Document May Be Downgraded

to Unclassified When Removed From

Attachment

CLASSIFIED ST -

356793

EXCHET FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATIO!

SCHEDULE CP E. O. 11550, EXEMPTION CATEGORY

5811: 69. (31 or 11) Geiscle one or mor

JUMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED U

Date Impossible to Determine

(unless iposcible, insert dale ur event)

SECRET

---

## Page 38

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SECRET

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SECURITY COMMITTEE

SECOM-D-105

2 September 1975.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Coordination Staff, ICS

SUBJECT

: House Select Committee on Intelligence

On 29 August 1975, Mr. Robert Gambino, Director of

Security/CIA; Mr. William H. Standiford, Deputy Chief, Physical

'Security Division, Office of Security/CIA; and I viewed the

permanent space of the staff of the House Select Committee on

Intelligence at the invitation of Mr. A. Searle Field, Staff Director

of the Committee.

We believe the security arrangements made

and being made are satisfactory for the storage of compartmented

…::.

information." Attached is a memorandum outlining the security

arrangements.

Monad E. Moore

Chairman

Attachment

This Document May Be Downgraded

to Unclassified When Removed From

Attachment

CLASSIFIED EX-

350733

EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION

SCHEDULE CE E. O. 11352, EXEMPTION CATEGORY:

§ 5E(1;, (Q, (3) or i4) (circle one or more)

AGTOINATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON

Date Impossible to Determine

(unless impossible, insert date or event)

SECRET

---

## Page 39

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SLUNLI

2 September 1975

House Select Committee on Intelligence

1. The House Select Committee staff is now located in its

permanent space, B-316, Rayburn Building.

Ms. Jacqueline Hess

is the Security Officer, telephone number 225-9696.

2. The only entrance is through B-316 and the space consists

of several adjoining offices all served by an inner walkway. A member

of the Capitol Police is stationed at a guard desk inside the door and

admits only authorized individuals. Visitors must sign in with the

guard, who calls the appropriate staff employee and visitors are

allowed access to the space only in the company of staff employees.

Interview rooms are located in the staff area but separated from the

work area. During non-work hours two guards are on duty in the

space.

3. All classified material is kept in a secure area at the...

rear of the space with one entrance to the secure room.

This room

is to be locked at all times when specified employees are not on

duty in the room. At the present time, Ms. Hess is the only one

who will be able to open the secure area and unless circumstances

• change this arrangement will continue.

4. All classified material is kept in this secure area, and

stored in approved safes with three-way combination locks.

At

present, Ms. Hess is the only person who possesses the combination

to these,safes. . . :.::"

5.

Reading of classified documents is to be in a reading area,

consisting of several tables,

in the secure area.

A staff employee

desiring access to a classified document must make a request for

it, Ms. Hess then obtains it, the employee reads it in the secure

area and it is then returned to Ms. Hess for return to the safe

cabinet. Staff employees have been advised that notes taken from

classified documents and material prepared from such notes or the

documents must respect the original classification and receive

corresponding security. Copying of classified documents is to be

strictly controlled, is to be done only on a copying device located

in staff space, and copies are to receive the same security protection

as the original.

CLASSIFIED ET -

356793

EXEMPT FROM GERERAL DECLASSIFICATION

SCHEDULE 0B E. O. 11352, EXEMPTION CATECORY:

§ SEll: iled, (8) de (4) (eirelo one or more)

AJIUAATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON

SECRET

Date Impossible to Determing

(unless impossile, insert date or arint)

---

## Page 40

13-00000

SECREI

6. The entire space has been swept and plans call for

additional periodic sweeping. There is a motion detector in the

secure area which rings at the guard desk in the staff area and

also at the main office of the Capitol Police in the Rayburn Building.

Tests have been made of this device and the response by the Capitol

Police was immediate. Two doors which normally serve as access

to the secure area from space occupied by other House Committees

have been secured from the inside and alarms are to be installed

on these doors.

7. Mr. A. Searle Field, Staff Director, and Ms. Hess

advised that staff employees have been alerted to telephone security

and this will be continually stressed. Also they have tried to instill

strong security consciousness among all the staff..

Mr. Field

indicated that at present it is not expected the staff will total more

than 35.

•?:'

SECRET

---

## Page 41

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ARM STRATINE INTERNAL USE OF Y

House Armed Services

Subcommittee on

Intelligence

and Military Application of Nuclear Energy

The Subcommittee on Intelligence and. Military Application of Nuclear

Energy is newly established and the successor to the Special Subcommittee

on Intelligence Chaired by Representative Lucien N. Nedzi.

The new Sub-

committee has picked up the responsibility of the soon to be abolished

Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and is expanding its staff accordingly.

Representative Melvin Price's Chairmanship is due to his long years of

membership on the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. There will be an ever-

increasing involvement by the Subcommittee in military application of

nuclear energy and we undoubtedly will be called upon to provide required

foreign intelligence.

• Members of the Subcommittee are as follows:

Melvin Price (D., Ill.), Chairman

Charles H. Wilson (D., Calif.)

Jack Brinkley (D., Ga.)

Dan Daniel (D., Va.)

G. V. Montgomery (D., Miss.)

• Ronald V. Dellums (D., Calif.)

Bob Carr (D., Mich.)

Charles E. Bennett (D., Fla.)

Samuel S. Stratton (D., N.Y.)

Bob Wilson (R., Calif.)

William L. Dickinson (R., Ala.)

Marjorie S. Holt (R., Md.)

Robert W. Daniel, JI. (R., Va.)

Staff of the Subcommittee are as follows:

John Ford, Staff Director

William H. Hogan, Counsel

Adam J. Klein, Professional

Mr. Ford is Staff Director of the full Committee and replaced

Mr. Frank Slatinshek, former Chief Counsel, who retired.

Mr. Hogan Is

Counsel of the Subconmittee and will be the principal staff man on Agency

matters.

Adam Klein is a

• specialist in atomic energy matters.

ADMENISTRATRE INTERNAL OSE ORLA

---

## Page 42

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ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY

PROBLEMS

A.

House Subcommittee on Intelligence and Military Application of

Nuclear Energy

Former Chairman Lucien N. Nedzi fully exercised his perogatives

as Chairman of the Subcommittee on Intelligence and we could look to

him for support in any problems developing with other committees and

other members of the House not on the Subcommittee. Based on the

reactions of Chairman Melvin Price in the few instances that we have

approached him in this Congress for assistance, it is quite evident

that he is not the dominant personality as was Chairman Nedzi and will

not stick his neck out to defend the Agency. Nor does it appear that

the new staff director will be of the forceful personality as was

Frank Slatinshek who was very helpful in a number of problems.

A few

Involving Representative Donald M. Fraser by going to Speaker O'Neill.

This may have been his indication to us that we may have to look to

House leadership to resolve problems. Mr. Nedzi also suggested that we

contact someone in the White House on a problem.

We may be faced with

needed White House support on a problem before we approach the leader-

ship•

B. House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control

The extent of Chairman Lester I. Wolff's oversight of the Agency

in its narcotics collection activities still remains a looming problem.

As indicated by the request for the seal, Mr. Wolff intends to extend

the Agency's activities to where there is maximum effective collection

of foreign intelligence on narcotics trafficking leading to arrest and

conviction without regard to the Agency's statutory prohibitions.

The

only solution rests with the Attorney General and the White House giving

the Agency clear and precise guidelines to operate in this area which

the Agency can then point to in any disputes that may arise with the

Select Committee as

to what the Agency's role should be.

ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY

---

## Page 43

13-00000

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATION!

House of Representatives

'DEMOCRATS

(95th Congress, Ist Session)

GEORGE H. MAHON, Texas, Chairman

Republicans

JAMIE L. WHITTEN, Mississippi

ELFORD A. CEDERBERG, Michigan

ROBERT L. F. SIKES, Florida

ROBERT H. MICHEL, Illinois

EDWARD P. BOLAND, Massachusetts

SILVIO O. CONTE,

Massachusetts

WILLIAM H. NATCHER, Kentucky

JOSEPH M. MCDADE, Pennsylvania

DANIEL J. FLOOD, Pennsylvania

MARK ANDREWS, North Dakota

TOM STEED, Oklahoma

JACK EDWARDS, Alabama

GEORGE E. SHIPLEY, Illinois

ROBERT C. MCEWEN, New York

JOHN M. SLACK, West Virginia

JOHN T. MYERS, Indiana

JOHN J. FLYNT, Jr., Georgia

J. KENNETH ROBINSON, Virginia

NEAL SMITH, Lowa

CLARENCE E. MILLER, Ohio

ROBERT N. GIAIMO, Connecticut

LAWRENCE COUGHLIN, Pennsylvania

JOSEPH P. ADDABBO, New York

C. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida

JOHN J. MCFALL, California

JACK F. KEMP, New York

EDWARD J. PATTEN, New Jersey

WILLIAM L. ARMSTRONG, Colorado

CLARENCE D. LONG, Maryland

RALPH S. REGULA, Ohio

SIDNEY R. YATES, Illinois

CLAIR W. BURGENER, California

FRANK E. EVANS, Colorado

GEORGE M. O'BRIEN, Illinois

DAVID R. OBEY, Wisconsin

VIRGINIA SMITH, Nebraska

EDWARD R. ROYBAL, California

LOUIS STOKES, Ohio

GUNN MCKAY, Utah

KEITH F. MAINLAND

Clerk and Staff Director

TOM BEVILL, Alabama

BILL CHAPPELL, Florida

BILL D. BURLISON, Missouri

BILL ALEXANDER, Arkansas

EDWARD I. KOCH, New York

YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, California

JOHN P. MURTHA, Pennsylvania

BOB TRAXLER, Michigan.

ROBERT DUNCAN, Oregon

JOSEPH D. EARLY, Massachusetts

MAX BAUCUS, Montana

CHARLES WILSON, Texas

LINDY (MRS. HALE) BOGGS, Louisiana

ADAM BENJAMIN, Jr., Indiana

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington

AGRICULTURE & RELATED

AGENCIES

DEFENSE

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

FOREIGN OPERATIONS

HUD-INDEPENDENT AGENCIES

INTERIOR

LABOR-HEALTH, EDUCATION &

WELFARE

LEGISLATIVE

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

PUBLIC WORKS

STATE, JUSTICE, COMMERCE

& JUDICIARY

TRANSPORTATION

TREASURY-POSTAL SERVICE-

GENERAL GOVERNMENT

NOTE: Mr. Mahon,

OTO

88-238-b

Subcommittees

Whiteh, Eyans, Burlison, Baucus, Traxler, Alexander, Silkes,

Andrews, Robinson, Myers

Mauris Sikes, Flood, Addabbo, McFall, Flynt, Giaimo, Chappell,

Edwards, Robinson, Kemp

Yatcher, Giaimo, Wilson, McKay, Burke, Benjami

urgener, Kem

Long, Obey, Koch, Wilson, Yates, Burke, Roybal, Stoke

loung, Conte, Smit

Boland, Traxler, Baucus,

Stokes, Bevill, Boggs,

Burlison,

Alexander

Coughlin, McDade, Young

Tates, McKay, Long, Evans, Murtha, Duncan, Dicks, Whitte

IcDade, Regula, Armstron

Miche, Watcher Smith, Patten, Obey, Roybal, Stokes, Early

Shipley, endominin, mo, Necall, Murtha, Traxler

MoKay, Sires, Murtha, Steed, Long, Chappell

Eyeil, Flage, whiten, Slack, Bogs, Dicks, Shipley, Chappell

Sad, Sm, , Flew, Aiyarder, Burke, Early

Mote!, Sted, , Oh, Puncan, Benjamin, Smith, Addabbo, Evans

Sister, 12 bo, Roybal, Patten, Boland, Miyat

---

## Page 44

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House Appropriations Committee team:

Room 2 D 0117.

Telephones:

Telephones: 5848, 5849 (B) and 1570 (R) 8801 (gray.

Leonard M. (Bucky) WALTERS

Badge:

blue House Committée

Clearances: SI, TK, ' BYECOM

Charles B.

(Chuck) HAYNES

Badge:

green no-escort

Clearances: SI, TK, BYECOM

Badge:

Clearanees: SI, TK, BYECOM

George C. BAIRD (Carter)

Badge: blue House Committee

Clearances:

SI, TK, BYECOM

Leon F. (Frank) SCHWARTZ

Badge:

blue House Committee

John LAYTON

Supervisory officials of HAC Surveys & Investigations Staff

not to be stationed at Has bldg, but may visit from time to

time) :

Cornelius R. (Lefty) ANDERSON, Chief

•Badge:

green no-escort

MarionS. RAMEY, Deputy Chief

Badge:

blue House Committee

OX 7-9371

James Brian HYLAND

Badge:

mong blue House Committee

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## Page 45

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;Skep

2 August 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Initial Meeting with House Appropriations

Committee

Survey Group

1.

An initial

session was held on 30 July 1976 of

about one and a half hours with

six persons from the Surveys

and Investigations Staff of the House Appropriations

Committee, to discuss the purpose of their survey of the

Directorate of Operations and to propose some arrangements

to govern their access to Agency personnel and documents.

The following attended:

Mr. Cornelius (Lefty) Anderson, Chief of

Surveys and Investigations Staff

Mr. Marion Ramey, Deputy

Mr. Leonard (Bucky) Walters, who will head the

team inspecting the Directorate of Operations

Mr. Charles (Chuck) Havnes, team member

Mr. Eugene Wilhelm, team member (former

Agency employee)

Mr. George C. Baird, team member

Attending for the Agency were:

Mr. Theodore Shackley, who

chaired the meeting

Mr. Robert Gambino

Mr.

Lyle Miller

Mr.

Thomas B. Abernathy

Mr. Richard Point

Mr. Philip F. Fendig

2.

The meeting followed

reasonably well the attached

agenda, which was made available to all at the beginning of

the meeting.

The following paragraphs summarize the

important points covered.

3.

Scope: Mr. Shackley asked the group to define its

mission, noting some of the topics mentioned in recent

conversations with Mr. Snodgrass suggested particular

interests whereas the Committee's report on the FY 77 budget

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## Page 46

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had suggested a different orientation. Mr. Anderson,

characterizing the enterprise as a survey rather than an

investigation, stated that his instructions were from the

Chairman of the Committee: they called for a detailed

review of the operation of the Directorate in its entirety.

Mr. Walters would mention certain particular interests,

noted below, but that did not set limits to the ultimate

scope of the survey. Mr. Walters then took over:

- a.

the manate ix ana

He expects to do a complete review, from

the managerial and substantive standpoint,

of the

Directorate. His initial interests indicated an

auditor's approach to these questions - how budgets

are compiled, examination of accounting procedures

for regular and

special funds, cost systems and

the like.

b.

He went on, however, to the management

aspects which they

would also pursue to

determine the results of the Directorate's

operations - the value of intelligence produced

versus the costs involved in procuring it, and

of possible overlap in collection with

c. Specific areas which would be explored,

given, as examples, included contingency reserves,

the "special retirement fund" (presumably

referring to MHMUTUAL), the procedures for

reimbursing the State Department for cover and

support, proprietaries how created, their

justification, value and effectiveness), safe-

houses and. "CA cadres."

Mr. Anderson reluctantly agreed to Mr. Shackley's request

for a memorandum spelling out these objectives in sufficient

...detail so that we could take the managerial steps necessary

to resolve any conflicts in the priority of the time of our

managers and senior operations officers who would be

involved in current operations as well as overlapping

inquirles trom other groups concurrently overseeing the

Directorate.

Mr. Anderson also asked for any ongoing studies

which the Directorate might have which would aid the team

in its work.

SEGST

2

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## Page 47

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2000T

4. Duration: The team's first obiective will be to

render an interim report to the Committee by 1 January 1977,

in order to meet the mandate that the survey be used in.

considering the Agency's FY 1978 budget.

The team wishes

to start work immediately and will consist of either six or

seven memhers who will occupy.

and presumably do most of their work here; it was brought

out intelligence and other collectors.

however, that the team would also interview users of

There was ambiguity

in the projection of the total length

of the survey; I

interpreted Mr. Anderson's remarks to indicate that he

expected the team to be with us for most of calendar year

1977.

5.

Security: Mr. Anderson explained the arrangement

by which the Committee limits access by even the members of

the Subcommittee to the reports of his group; they must be

reviewed in a specified area and they are stored, in very

limited numbers, in the tower of the Capitol in the special

facilities there for the Joint Atomic Energy Committee of

Congress.

Mr. Gambino explained the arrangements for badges,

certification of clearances,

and provided for the team's

consideration a copy of the

"non-disclosure agreement" which

we would like members to sign. There was considerable

discussion, and some objection, to the issuance of blue

badges which will provide access to virtually all parts of

the building but which must be turned in and picked up at

the entrance each day.

This arrangement was reluctantly

accepted but it was made clear

at lunch and in later

discussion with the team and with Mr. Anderson they are

unhappy with this slight infringement on their convenience

and physical access to the building.

6.

Access: Of more concern was the Agency position

that the SA/DO7O would serve

as a control point for the

team's further access to individuals and documents in the

Directorate.

The requirement was explained in terms of the

"need to record, against later requirements such as in fact

now in progress stemming from another investigation, the

names, subject matter and

general content of matters discussed

The requirement to

as an effort to keep this type of

record, rather than to impose a third party from the office

of SA/DO/0 on all interviews; the latter was clearly

considered by the team to be

an unreasonable intrusion.

It

was agreed after some discussion that we would proceed with

SHEET

3

---

## Page 48

13-00000.

system outlined in the attached agenda, and that we would

reconsider procedures later if they seemed clearly to be

inwieldy. We anticipated, however, that once the toan

groups as is planned, and pursues

particular areas of inquiry, it will be possible to evolve

a workable system which meets

the objectives of both parties.

Other: There appears to be no difficulty in

protecting identities of

sources, providing documents in

sanitized form, maintaining notes only in this building and

at the appropriate security level and introducing some

officers under cover in alias where necessary; all these

points were noted and none was objected to. Space and

other facilities may be cramped but it appears to be possible

to provide adequate space adjacent to the

SA/D0/0 offices.

Mr. Anderson began by noting the outstanding cooperation on

the Angola and COMINT surveys done in the building (in which

relatively free access to personnel and files had been

afforded his team), and ended by stating that the coming

survey was not a witch hunt nor an investigation of abuses

and that therefore he believed that such access could have

very beneficial results tor the Agency.

It was agreed to

begin the

survey formally with a briefing by the DDO or

ADDO on 3 or 4 August 1976. Mr. Walters with several

team

members will, however, set up shop on 2 August to review

such

general

briefing

papers

as Mr. Fendig can make

available to

them at that time.

(signed)

Philip F. Fendig

Philip F. Fendig

SA/DO/0: PFFendig:j1 (7368/1398)

Distribution: (all w/att)

Orig &

- DDO

1

- ADDO

- OLC (Mr. Miller)

D/SEC

(Mr. Gambino)

COMPT (Mr. Point)

- SSA/ DDO

1

4

- SA/DDCI (Mr. Bolten)

- SA/ DO/0

E2 IMPDET

CL BY 012860

4

•....

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## Page 49

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SECRET

- 7

AGENDA FOR MEETING WITH

HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE STAF

30 JULY 1976

Insatte

A. Request statement from Committee representatives

scope, duration and proposed procedure to be

followed by Committee

investigators.

B. Discussion of arrangements for investigation:

1.

Facilities: DDO will provide office space,

telephones and secure storage facilities for

investigators.

Parking spaces and

cafeteria

priveleges will also be provided.

2.

Security:

a .

Badges allowing unescorted access to

Headquarters building will be issued,

to be picked up and left with

receptionist.

Agreement to be signed

when badge issued, per current

procedures governing all Congressional

staffs.

b.

Clearances through necessary level to

be obtained prior to commencement of

briefings or interviews, level to be

determined on basis of first meeting..

3.

Access.:

a.

Orientation briefings on Directorate

and its subdivisions to be offered.

b.

C .

Access to personnel and documents withir

Agency to be controlled by office of

SA/DỌ/O. which will maintain record of

all interviews and of documents provided

Documents to be provided upon specific

request for study within building.

They will be sanitized to protect sources

and methods using guidelines previously

established for HSC and SSC

of

1:

---

## Page 50

13-00000

d. Documents to be examined by the

investigation team within Headquarters

building.

If copies of documents are

desired, investigators will request

them from SA/DO/O who will see that

they are provided promptly in

appropriate classified and sanitized

If required by the Committee

(outside Headquarters building), same

procedure will be followed but will

be subject to review by SA/DO/O.

e.

and full context so that most

complete and pertinent answers can

be provided.

f. SA/DO/O to monitor all interviews.

g. Discussion of note-taking and reports:

(1) Maintenance of proper security

and classification

(2)

Notes to retain same level of

security classification as

documents or interviews on which

they based.

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## Page 51

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ADMI STRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONI*

This notice expires 31 January 1978

DDO NOTICE

NO. 5-218

DON 5-218

GENERAL

4 August 1976

SURVEY BY MEMBERS OF

THE HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE STAFF

1.

GENERAL

Members of the staff of the House Appropriations Com-

mittee began an extensive examination of the Directo

rate of Operations beginning the week of 2 August 1976.

They expect that it will take approximately 17 months

to complete this study. They state their activities

are necessary to better understand the appropriations

process. They emphasize that their objective is not

to dig out evidence of wrongdoing or improper activi-

ties.

The staff members' activities will be coordi-

nated through SA/Do/0. The following paragraphs

attempt to anticipate the procedures necessary to

exercise orderly control over the staff's activities.

These procedures may be subject to modification as

future experience may dictate.

2. LOCATION

3.

Members of this Congressional staff have been issued

blue badges bearing the words "House Committee" which

permit unescorted access to all non-specially controlled

areas of the building, including the main cafeteria.

The staff will be provided suitable private office

space in Room 2 D 0117, adjacent to the office of the

SA/DO/0, which will be relocated in Room 2 D 0109 as

of 6 August 1976. It is expected that they will initi-

ally have a greater interest in interviews than they

do in documents.

Since they will have adequate office

space, interviews should be conducted within their

premises.

CONTROL OF DOCUMENTS

a..

The staff is expected to make any requests for

documentation to the SA/DO/0. Individual officers

ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY

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## Page 52

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ADMIN*-TRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY

DDO NOTICE

NO. 5-218

DON 5-218

GENERAL

4 August 1976

b.

c.

who receive requests from staff members for docu-

ments should ask that the request be put to the

SA/DO/0. All documents provided to the SA/DO/O

for transmittal to the staff will be logged in by

the SA/DO/O and logged back to the component after

the staff has completed its study. The SA/DO/o

will not, as a matter of routine procedure, retain

a copy of the document concerned.

All documents will be properly sanitized to protect

sources and methods.

The staff has indicated that

it does not anticipate any need for such detail

and accepts the principle of sanitization.

Any

questions concerning the degree of sanitization

should be referred to the SA/DO/0. Ground rules

for sanitization are similar to those applied

during the activities of the Select Committees•

General guidelines will be provided separately.

On receipt of a document back from the SA/DO/O

the recipient should indicate the date received,

and that it had been made available to the staff.

The document should be retained by the recipient

in the form in which it was provided to the staff

for possible further reference; the record copy

of the document should also reflect the fact that

a sanitized copy was provided to the staff. Any

further copies of documents requested by the staff

will be made only by the office of the SA/DO/0.

4. INTERVIEWS

a.

A representative from the office of the SA/DO/0

will not necessarily be present during interviews.

All interviews should be requested by the staff

through the SA/DO/0. The SA/D0/0 will maintain

a record of the date of interview; the name of

the person interviewed, and by whom; the alias

if one is used; and the subjects discussed. A

form will be provided to the interviewee to record

2

ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY

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## Page 53

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ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONIY

DDO NOTICE

NO. 5-218

DON 5-218

GENERAL

4 August 1976

the essential facts. He should retain one copy

for possible future reference and one copy should

be forwarded to the SA/DO/0.

b. It is recognized that the badge access and the

length of the stay in the building by the staff

members may lead to unscheduled contacts..

. If

such contacts are connected with the official

duties of the staff, then appropriate comments

should be forwarded to SA/D0/0 on the form cited

above. Officers should be careful not to allow

conversations to drift to areas of interest not

covered by official interviews. If this does take

place, however, we shall rely on the officer

concerned to inform the SA/Do/0 of these develop-

ments.

5. SECURITY

The blue badge should be sufficient to indicate that

staff members should be treated as visitors in the

presence of persons not connected with their official

duties. Persons introduced under alias should be

careful that the alias is protected if a chance

meeting takes place in the presence of other col-

leagues.

In this connection, persons interviewed

should be careful not to expose associates who have

not been interviewed.

William W. Wells

Deputy Director for Operations

cy: A/D001 (Du. Buttin) 18 Quy 76

3

ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY

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## Page 54

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CONFIDENTIAL

27 August 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chiefs of Divisions and Staffs

FROM

: Philip F. Fendig

SA/DO/0

SUBJECT

Guidance for Interviews with House

Appropriations Committee Staff

REFERENCE

: DON 5-218, 4 August 1976

1. You have been scheduled at the time indicated on

the cover sheet of this memorandum for a briefing to be

given to the five members of the Surveys and Investigations

Staff team from the House Appropriations Committee.

The

subjects which the team would like you to cover are contained

in the memorandum distributed prior to the DDO staff meeting

on 25 August 1976 and discussed at that meeting.

I have

explained

to the Surveys and Investigations

team that topic e

(personnel policy and practices) will be discussed at a

separate briefing to be given by the Chief, Career Management

Group•

You should touch

on the other topics suggested in the

memorandum mentioned

above.

2. General guidelines are contained in reference

notice.

The following may be helpful,

however, in preparing

your briefing.

Our general intention

is to be as forth-

coming as possible while drawing the line clearly at any

information which would lead to the identification of a

specific source, intelligence method, cooperating person of

roup with which the, Agency has a relationship of

confidence,

or confidential matter involving a

cooperating foreign

intelligence service. The fact of liaison with foreign

services can in most

cases be acknowledged, but details of

the relationship and the subject matter of joint or shared

operations should not be disclosed.

3. In the briefing contemplated on management policies

and practices, most of the above sensitive areas would not

appear to arise, but you may find that questions will tend

to bring out some more sensitive areas and these should be

deferred with an agreement of looking into the possibility of

providing further information later.

The staff has already

had access to basic budgetary material, including funds and

CONFIDENTIAL

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## Page 55

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CUNHUENIIAL

personnel strengths broken down by component,

and a listing

by cryptonyms and funding levels of all OPACTS.

They have

been given a briefing on the current organization of the

Directorate of Operations and are aware that its staff

elements will shortly be reorganized.

They have a listing

of all overseas stations and bases.

If you have further

questions on material already provided to the Committee,

please check with this office.

4. Most of the briefings are scheduled to take place

in room z D 0117; it possible, a member of my staff will be

present.

We would appreciate, however, a short Memorandum

for the Record, using the attached "Interview Form"

Space is somewhat limited, but you should

bring any supporting personnel you desire to have participate

The Surveys and Investigations team is

aware that aliases may be used by those with solid cover

status; please advise this office if any persons intend to

alias during these briefing sessions.

5. We will be happy to assist in any way, including

follow-up matters which may be developed in the course of

these briefings.

PhilipF. Fendig

att

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CONFIDENTIAL

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## Page 56

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r.

C...

August 18, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR,

Mr. Philip F. Fendig

SA/DO/0

FROM

L. M. Walters, Staff Member

House Appropriations Committee

Surveys and Investigations Staff

Request arrangement for comprehensive briefings with

appropriate officials regarding the subjects outlined below

be provided to HAC S&I Staff members George C. Baird and

Leon F. Schwartz.

1. Paramilitary Covert Action Cadre

Provide in this briefing data relating to the

organization, utilization and cost data for this activity

and FY 78.

equipment levels for the aforementioned periods.

2. Reorganization of the Directorate of Operations

Briefing should include rationale behind the proposed

reorganization and manpower and dollar savings

to be effected

by such a change. If additional expenditures in either

dollars or manpower positions are involved, justification

Explain

in detail how the

100 manpower positions, if imposed in the pending Appropriations

Bill.

3. The Special Projects Group

Explain the rationale behind the transfer of Israel

from the Near East

Division and providing it with special

status by placing it directly under DDO.

Additional manpower

and dollar costs accompanying this change should be addressed.

4. Coordination Within the Intelligence Community

Briefing should show the identity and purposes of the

various task

groups established (both within CIA and community-

---

## Page 57

13-00000

C...

wide) which have been specifically established to deal with

the collection vs. analysis problem.

Impacts and changes

brought about or anticipated within

DO as a

result of these

groups' actions should be covered..

5.

Management Policies and Practices of Each DO Staff

not Dinisto to la separate briefing by each) including but

a. Overview of role of staff or division

b. Decision-making processes and how coordinated

in DO, CIA and intelligence community

c. Organizational structure

d. Program development, and execution from

initiation to budgeting to implementation, including

development of annual plans, their flexibility, and degree

of autonomy of case officers, chiefs of stations, desk

officers and division or staff directors.

e.

Personnel policies and practices including

recruitment, training promotion, position classification,

establishment of station complements and rotational policies.

f.

Management and accounting controls to assure

compliance with laws, executive orders, policies and

regulations and assurance that funds and other assets are

properly used, expended and receipted for.

While the order of arranging the presentations is not

presented it is suggested that, if possible, item (1.) be

earliest and that item (5.) be instituted the week

f August 30. Please coordinate with

either Mr. Baird or

nyself for prompt scheduling of these sessions. Also, it

would be appreciated if a copy of charts or other documentary

material used in the presentations could be provided to the

attendees

during each briefing session.

S20227

---

## Page 58

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SECRET

(40)

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## Page 59

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SECRET

- 6

in attempting to be both forthcoming and helpful to him and the

„Committee in understanding the DDO's problems. At the same time

• Mr. Snodgrass pointed out that while he had no quarrel with Mr. Shackley,

he continued to be irritated with the totality of the Arency's attitude toward

providing him with data. Mr. Snodgrass then launched into a long litany

on how the Agency had not been responsive in terms of his needs as he

perceived them in the time frame February to Mav 1976. With that as a

backdrop Mr. Snodgrass then launched into his inquiry as to why the Agency

was not willing to give him full access to Management by Objective doçu-

The dialogue which followed on this topic had a natural ebb and

flow to it, but the key point that emerged from this is that Mr. Snodgrass

continues to feel that unless he can see the Management by Objective

documents he will not be able to have a firm understanding of DDO man-

Il power allocation procedures. Secondly, Mr. Snodgrass claims that CIA'S

position that it will show Management by Objective documents to members

of the Committee and not the Staff is an obstructionist tactic. His point.

being that the members of the Committee do not have the time to look at

such documents and they thus depend on the Committee Staff for this type

of substantive review. According to Mr. Snodgrass this means that if the

Agency will not provide data to the Staff, it is in fact denying information

to the Committee members. Attempts were made by Mr. Shackley to show

how men of good will on both sides of this question could have an honest

difference of opinion on the issue. In this framework Mr. Shackley re-

iterated the DDO position that access to Management by Obiective decu-

ments by Mr. Snodgrass would impact adversely on the whole question of

sources and methods as well as the integrity of the reporting system. As

a followup to this position an effort was made to find out exactly what it

was about the DDO manpower allocation system that Mi. Snodgrass did

not understand and which he thought he might find out about from an

examination of the Management by Objective documents. It was hoped

that through this line of inquiry an alternate approach could be discovered

which would enable us to deal with Mr. Snodgrass' problems. Our probes

in this direction were unsuccessful in clarifying the issue. One can only

conclude that Mr. Snodgrass is committed to finding some sort of a

formula er emuation which will enable him to ted our manpower allocation /

system. We have repeatedly outlined to him the variable factors that go

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SECRET

- 7-

into making judgments on operational deployment of manpower such as

what targets are in a country, what are the great power interests in a

particular country, what is the operational environment in the country

i.e., permissive or not, what are the cover possibilities, what are our

liaison equities, and what are our needs for regional support from a

particular country. These explanations are taken aboard by Mr. Snodgrass,

but he is looking for something else which has less variables in it when,

in fact, there is no magic formula for determining how one gets people to

commit treason. This portion of the meeting ultimately ended on a friendly

note but left unresolved the question of what was it that Mr. Snodgrass

really wanted on the issue of manpower allocations and what could CIA tell

is currently preoccupied with drafting his report on the House Appropria-

tions Committee Mark-up of the DDO FY 77 budget. Once this task is

completed Mr. Chin, OLC, will return to see Mr. Snodgrass and will

to obtain an elaboration of what specifically are the manpower issues that

trouble Mr. Snodgrass. In this context Mr. Chin has been asked to try to

determine if a review, position-by-position, of two or three typical Stations

within the DDO might give Mr. Snodgrass the insight into manpower allo-

cations that he is currently seeking.)

9.

Comment. In net assessment terms one would have to conclude

that the 25 May meeting achieved the optimum that could be expected from

this kind of an encounter. On the one hand the attached briefing book which

was examined by Mi. Snodgrass was accepted by the latter as a first rate

product. For this the A gency gets high marks. On the other hand, the

Management by Objective system, because he can't see the documents,

leaves Mr. Snodgrass frustrated and irritated. This evokes acrimonious

complaints from Mr. Snodgrass with the end result being that the burden

for seeking a solution to a problem created by Mr. Snodgrass is placed on

the Agency. In short, we have ended up where we expected to be. Put

although it is incumbent on us to continue to minimize, to the extent that

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## Page 61

13-00€

MBO

Mr. Mahon.

Would you please provide the Committee staff with

some

samples of these performance reports, sanitized as you think

appropriate?

Mr. Bush. I would be willing to bring some down and discuss them with

the Committee off the record, Mr. Chairman. But I am reluctant to do that,

and I am even more reluctant to provide the documents themselves or to have

their contents described to the Committee by anyone who is not intimately

familiar with espionage, counterintelligence and covert action operations

and with the entire management system used by the Operations Directorate.

There are a number of reasons for my position. One serious concern

revolves around the effects on our internal processes of the sort of inquiry

you propose. One of the primary reasons that our internal management system

is effective is that participation is strictly limited to those immediately

concerned. Given that we are all human beings, there is no escaping the .

fact that knowledge that the reports in question are being read, or may at

some future time be read, by outsiders will lead to their being written

with a view to their possible impact on an extended readership. There will

be a tendency for the managers in the field to slant their discussions of

problems and to exaggerate accomplishments. Inevitably, the net effect

will be to reduce the usefulness of the system.

Another difficulty involves security. To be useful for judging per-

formance, the reports must be very detailed. Thus they discuss recruitments

in terms of numbers, the specific access of agents to information, recruit-

ment techniques, and so forth. By the time all this sensitive material on

sources and methods is removed, any samples are going to consist primarily

of disconnected bits and pieces or of unenlightening generalizations.

And I have a third problem with this request. The reports. themselves

are but one part of a very complex and thorough process we use for internal

management. It takes a detailed familiarity with the process to appreciate

its effectiveness. Thus, I feel strongly that someone from the. Agency who

has that intimate knowledge should be present if and when you want to

consider the reports.

DCI BUSH

TESTIMONY

House appro

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