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Released under the John F. Kennedy

Assassination Records Collection Act of

1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW

R860% Dater 03-18-2025

The Senate Select Committee (SSC) letter of

July 14, 1975, to K. William O'Connor, Esq., requested

a response to Item #3.

Item #3 is set forth as follows:

"All memoranda and any other materials which

relate to or reflect discussions about the Ku Klux Klan

at the Executive Conference held on October 1, 1958, and

all memoranda and any other materials which relate to or

reflect recommendations, proposals, and decisions made

either prior to or following said

conference."

A diligent, extensive; exhaustive search was

conducted in an effort to obtain a copy of the minutes

of the Executive Conference held on October 1, 1958.

However, this search disclosed no memorandum reflecting

an Executive Conference being held on October 1, 1958.

Executive Conference memoranda for the year 1958 were

reviewed. This review did not disclose any memorandum

which related to discussions about the Ku Klux Klan.

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 1

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The Senate Select Committee (SSC) letter of

July 14, 1975, to K. William O'Connor, Esq-, requested

a response to Item #3.

Item #3 1s set forth as follows:

"All memoranda and any other materials which

relate to or reflect discussions about the Ku Klux Klan

at the Executive Conference held on October 1, 1958, and

all memoranda and any other materials which relate to or

reflect recommendations, proposals, and decisions made

either prior to or following said conference."

A diligent, extensive, exhaustive search was

. conducted in an effort to obtain a copy of the minutes

of the Executive Conference held on October 1, 1958.

However, this search disclosed no memorandum reflecting

an Executive Conference being held on October 1, 1958.

Executive Conference memoranda for the year 1958 were

reviewed. This review did not disclose any memorandum

which related to discussions about the Ku Klux Klan.

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 2

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INITED STATES GOS

AMENT

Memorandum

DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE:

9/23/64

Faoy/

SAC, JACKSONVILLS

SUajECT:

COUNTERINTELEICENCI DECORAM

INTERNAL, SECURITY

DISPURTION OF HATE GROUPS.

(TWO-HAY RADIO UNITS)

ReBulet 9/15/54.

The Jacksonville Office has carezully noted the

obvious latent of rebulet and agrees that there is a real

strong possibility

for taking soue counter-intelligence

action agaiasi the Klan through this medium.

navas re-contacted and be stated at the

prosent time tiere is no additional information concerning

the use of two-way radios nor has the local

Klan in Jacisor-

ville formulated any code. This would indicate that at the

present time, while a nunber of local klansmen have radios,

shore is no opportunity to introduce deceptive iransnissions

as the tian has no "missions" on the planning board.

The

aiove informant has reportod that it is anticipated

addi-

sional Klansmen will purchase zore two-way radio equipment

which vould be indicative of an expansion in plans of the

Klen to use this method of communication.

To date there

has

boen no operation of the Klan where two-way radio communica-

tions have played an integral pazi.

This office through its informants, particularly

Lus will renain alert and will pronptly advise the

Buzed HoeneVer IRIOLmaTION 1S LECEiVed indicating the Klan

has a sizeable "mission" in the planning stages wherein

radios will play an inportant part.

Depending upon the

purpose of the "mission"

plans could be formulated for some

deceptiva attacks on the Klan itseli.

. *

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MITED STARES GOT

IMENT

illemorandum

tria mat

DIRECTO?, FBI

DATE:

9/23/64

SAC, GACZSONVELZS

SUBJECT:

COLNTER IMAELI ICENCE- BROORALI

INTERNAL SECURITY

DISRUPTION OF FARE GROUPS.

(27O-AY RADIO UNITS)

ReBulet 9/15/64,

The Jacksonville Office has carefully noted the

obvious intent of reBulei and agrees that there is a real

strong possibility for taking some counter-intelligence

action againsi the klan througo this medium.

JE 1132 vas re-contacted and he stated at the

present time there is no additional information concerning

the use of ino-way radios nor has the local Klan in Jackson

ville formulated any code,

This would indicate that at the

prosent tire, while a number of local Klansmen have radios,

there is no opportunity to introduce deceptive transmissions

as the Klan has no "missions" on the planning board.

above informant has reported that it is anticipated

The

addi-

tional Klansen will purchase nore ino-yay radio equipment

which mould be indicative of an expansion in plans of the

Klan to use this method of communication. To date there has

* to the noot ves

been no operation of the klan where two-way radio communica-

tions have played an integral part.

This office through its informants, particularly

1135, vill semain alert and will promptly

advise the

Bureau weenever information is received indicating the Klan

has a sizeable "mission" in the planning stages wherein

radios will play an important part.

Depending upon the

purpose of the

"mission" plans could be formulated for some

decaptive attacks on the klan itseli..

1

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 4

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Frov

SURJECT:

CHUTED STATES GOVE VENT

i/emorandum

:DIRECTOR,

FBI

DATE:

10-15-54

SAC, JACKSON

COUNTERINTELLICENCE PROGRAM,

INTERNAL SECURITY,

DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS

Re Bureau letter to Atlanta dated 9-2-64.

Io implement a counterintelligence program as

outlined in referenced lettes,

this office has been and will

continue to penetrate klan and hate organizations with

continued informant coverage. This is the first step to leam

the complete organizational structure, members, their activities,

sympathizers and followers, action they plan, including actions

of violence and distruction of property.

Once their

activities, etc., are determined through

irormant coverage proper action

i can be taken to disrupt and

neutralize their activities and efforts can be directed to

frustrate their plans. In addition, those specifically

responsible for unlawful actions are determined through informant

coverage.

Informant coverage will be specifically concentrated

on the White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan since this is the

largest and most important of the klan groups in Mississippi.

Othes pertinent organizations considered for counterintelligence

action are:

Mississippi Knights of the Ku Klux Klan.

United Klans of America, Inc.,

Knights of the Ku Klux Klan.

Americans for the Preservation of the White Race.

NW 88608 Docld:32989629• Page 5

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The pertinent individuals to first consider are the

state officers of the White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan. They

are:

SAMUEE BOWERS, Laurel, Mississippi, Imperial Wizara

JULIUS HARPER; Crystal Springs,

Mississippi," Grand

- Dragon

BILLY BUCKLES, Roxie, Mississippi, Grand Giant

A.-Cu HARRINGTON, Ruth, Mississippi, State Organizar

note Kas Brookhaven, Kississipt, Chiel of

-Bureau of Investigation (KBI)

PAUE FOSTER, Natchez, Mississippi, State Chaplain

ACE WEATHERS, Hattiesburg, Mississippi, Contact

Leader. for the County and Secretary

Informant coverage will be supplemented by technical

installations where practical. Specifically, it has been

learned through an informant that a klan group holds meetings

in a building especially built for this purpose in topiah

County.

These meetings are held on a weekly basis. The

building is in a rural area several miles from the nearest town

and has access by only one road, During meetings guards are

placed at strategic points outside the building to insure

complete privacy. An appropriate survey is being made to

determine the feasibility of a technical installation in this

building. The Bureau will be advised by separate communication

regarding this. Other logical points are being determined for

this type of coverage.

COUNTERINTELLICENCE ACTION

1.

Liaison is established with the governor's office

to bring pressure to bear on local officials, such as mayors,

chiefs of police,

sheriffs, etc., to solve recent bombings,.

church burnings, and other

acts of violence.

2

NW-88608-Dold:32989629 Page 6

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EXZ2L0:

Jackson teletype to the Bureau Cuteû 10-12-21

captioned UNSUBS; EXPLOSION ON LAWN OF RESIDENCE OF MOR

JOMY NOSSER--NATCHEZ--MESSISSIPPI, 9-25-64, stated that an

Investigator of the Mississippi Highway Safety Patrol (MIS?)

advised he was instructed by Covernor PAUL B. JOHNSON to

infoim Adams-County Sheriff ODELL ANDERS that the governor

was seriously considering sending the National Guard into

Adams County to close down all gambling and liquor activity

in the county. Sheriff ANDERS advised he is in the process

of contacting all gambling and liquor establishments in Adams

County to inform operators that if pertinent information regarding

Matchez bombings are not 'in his possession by October

15 he

will close all such establishments on October 16..

The Jackson Office will, in each instant, that presents

Itseli in other localities and counties, arrange for similar

action and follow through on each.

2. Repeated contacts and constant interviews of

known and

suspected klan members are being conducted each

Saturday. This has been done since July, 1964, and is being

continued. This has a three fold purpose. It lets the klansmen

know the FBI is interested and will be around. It also enables

FBI to know their whereabouts on that day, become better

acquainted with their habits and gain more background information

regarding the person being interviewed. In several instances

during such interviews it has been possible to convert certain

klansmen into informants.

During interviews of klansmen who

are complately unco-operative and who want to know how we got

their name and why they are being interviewed we can flip

through the cards and pick out a name of another klansman

who

is completely, unco-operative. This is a disruptive tactic

which can breed suspicion among themselves.

3

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3. Consideration is being gien to invite the £=c=e

Police to make raids at Inown llan meetingo, tao jeein arci

of course, will not be invited to particine scee city ..:.

most likely in on the klan reetings. MIS? Investigators at

NicComb have indicated they seemed interested in this sot of

thing and it is believed this will have the backing of the

governor since he has indicated such to them. This type of

thing, of course, will be used at places where technical

installations are not feasible or productive.

4. Will participate with the governor in press

releases on the arrests of klansmen when appropriate. This

has been done in the recent arrests in McComb, Mississippi,.

in connection with recent bombings in that area.

5. Information has been developed through an informant

that a faction of the klan is interested in putting another

man in office rather: than the present person. More information

is being obtained on this so as to exploit all possibilities.

and create dissention among the leaders, and by doing so the

opportunity may present itself to have the informant put in a

high office.

The above is some of the potential counterintelligence

action contemplated by this office. It is being studied on a

day to day basis. The Bureau will be furnished with complete

details on all the above plans as the opportunities are made •

and present themselves, prior to any specific action being

taken by this office.

ACTION GROUPS

were for the most past believed to be carsied out by an

Recent actions of violence ia kelon, ississipaction

gIoup". As a result of an intensive investigation and informant

coverage, Il men were arrasted. One had a membership caid in

the xu Klux klan and another a card ior membership in the

"Americans for the Preservation of the White Race"

Some

4

NW 88608_Docld:32989629 Page 8

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acts of violence such is bombings are, decorat? t.::":

planned with great secrecy by saall Sauces to mini

determine which ones do the job. Often cuámira

ochers not cificially under kian orders, pretend to represent

the klan as a cover for acts of violence.

Recommendations for specific counterintelligence

action will be subnitted by separate communications and the

status letter required will ba submitted beginning 1-1-65.

5

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 9-

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Memorandum

TO

DIRECTOR, FBI

SAC, CHARLOTTE.

SUBJECT:

-COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

INTERNAL SECURITY

DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS

DATE: 10,72/54

ReBulet 9/2/64 to Atlanta and other offices.

It is noted this letter lists as one of the target organizations,

as No. T on page 2, the Independent Klavern, Fountain Inn, S. C."

Since this organization is no longer active or in existence,

it

is suggested it be deleted from this list.

Since the major organization in Charlotte Division

is the United Klans of America, Inc., Of wnich Birmingham is

origin, a copy of this letter is being designated to Birmingham

fo= infosmation.

The following represents the consensus of Charlotte

Agents

{anilias with Klan activity:

1. Disruptive activity should not be undertaken at

= particular Klavern; as a general rule, unless there is

• sufficient well established informant coverage to be able so

•tell the effect of the action when instituted. Such action

¡would probably serve to "tighten up" the organization ana maxe

it more difficult to get an informant in thereafter.

2. It is considered douotful that newspaper publicity,

jof caly a generally unfavorable nature against the klan organi-

zation, is effective in reducing new applicants or causing any

large zumbar of present menders to drop out. The "Chazlotte

Observer," which has wide aistribution throughoui North and

south Casolina, published in August and September, 1964, a series

os asticles, copies of which were sent the Bureau by Chaslotte

letter of 9/15/64.

These artifiles ridiculed the united Klans

NW 38608 Doc/d:32989629 Page 10-

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of America, Inc., in North Carolina, and published both photos

and names of a number of members. So far as has been learned

fsom informants, this had very little adverse effect upon the

organization.

It was alleged that two to five members weze

discharged from their jobs, of warned about continuing member-

ship, but the identities of these alleged parsons is not known,

Woeth carolina Grand Dragon JaNas Ro/UONES has stated, oth

publicly and privately to informants, that this publicity was

very valuable to the growth of the organization.

One informant

reported that the day after the articles published his name as

= Local leader, three peisons contacted him and applied for

membership, stating they had not previously known whom to contact.

It is considered that publicity of this type generally

deters from joining only those persons who would not be

interested in joining in the first place. It is believed that

a lasge proportion of those parsons who are potential members

are seeking status and recognition, and publicity is no deterrent

to them; it makes them feel important and members of an important

gEoup.

The major apparent effect of the series of newspaper

articles referred to has been a tightening up of security, and

Iefusal of leaders to allow newspaper photos of individual

Klansmen to be taken at public rallies.

3. Distuptive

activity, wherever possible, should be of

nature which does not expose

the fact that the Bureau, of the

"Federal Government", is behind the activity. It is believed

that open action, to a large extent, can backfire and create

resentment and sympathy.

It must be remembered that Klan

membership, in many sections, does not by any means carry the

odaum that alleged Communist membership

or sympathy does in

almost any section of society.

4. Along this same line, there is probably no point in

trying disruptive activity, at least not at this stage, on a

local Klan group which is small, inactive, and peaceful. Any

such activity which is not completely discreet and concealed

would likely have the effect of stirring it up.

By letter of 9/25/54, Charlotta furnished the Bureau

a sample of a lapel pin which was adopted at the ipecial.

2"

NW 88608 Docid:32989629 Page 11

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.. .

Klonvocation of United Klans of America at Birmingham on

9/5-5/54. This is to be sold to members for $2 each and

there is apparently considerable demand for it. Since it is

not apparent to the mitiated that it has anything to do

with "the klan," it is expacted that memoers will wear it.

openly as a secrat recognition signal. If it does bacome

widely adopted and worn, consideration should then be given to

giving widespread puolicity to tha fact of what it lepresents.

This should have the result of discouraging some persons who

do not want thair Klan membership publicly known.

6. It is considered that possibly the most effective

way of discouraging membership, of causing existing membars

to withdraw, is to establish that someone in the organization

is gatting rich off it, or embezzling the proceeds.. Charlotte

is endeavoring to develop information along thesa lines, but

nothing specific has yet been develoged.

7, The following are suggested tactics that appear

useful on a selected basis against individual Klansmen,

particularly those whose employeis might doject to their Klan

membership:

a. Anonymous letter or phone call to the employer

telling of the Klan membership.

b. Enter on behalf of the memoer a subscription to

the "Fiasy Cross," United Klans of America publication, and have

it mailed to his employment.

c. When a particular member is away from home at a

Klavern meeting, have a female phone his home and indicate he

was to meet her and is late.

This night have the effect of

making it difficult for him to get away from home at night

thereafter. This should be limited to particular individuals

who are considered potential ones to stir up trovole in a Klavern,

3 .

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8. ROBERT ECHOES-SEOGGINS, Aka., Charlotte Eile 105-991,

Buseau F21 157=1530, is South-Carolina Grand Dragon-Of United

Klans of America.

Charlotte repoits by sa JohN ALDEN MuNd,

1/31/54 and 3/27/64, show that he is receiving over $300 per

month. from the veterans Administration as a per percent

dissored veteran he the Sama"time he operates a plumbing

ousiness and "is active in United Klans of America, making

public speeches, etc.

Charlotte furnished extra copies of

those reports to the Bureau, with the suggestion furnishing

them to VA be considered.

It is suggested consideration be given to asking the

NA to re-evaluate his disability rating, in viaw of his employment

and activities.

It is believed this should be done on a SOc

level, to reduce the possibility of-SCOGGINS learning that sucn•

a suggestion came from the FBI.

9 .

"Action crouos."

No particular such groups, given

to violence, are known within klan organizations in Charlotte

territory.

As the Bureau is aware, United Klans of America has

instituted what it calls

"Security Guards," who waar military

type uniforms and have military ranks. These function at

public callies for the purpose of keeping order, watching for

"spies," etc.

It is expected that if violence is undartaken,

thesa will probably be the ones to do it, but no such under-

takings have been learned.

Spacific individual recommendations for counter-

intelligence action will be submitted by subsequent letters

developed.

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 13

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SULJECT:

UNITED STATES GOVERNNEYI

* Memorandum

DIRECTOR, 231

DATE:

10/13/61

& SAC, LITTLE ROCK

, COINTELPRO

ReBulet to Atlanta and Other Gificas, 9/2/5÷:

Set out below ara an analysis and recommendations

under captioned program.

NATIONAL SIATES RICHTS PARDY (NSRP)

The Arkansas branch of NSRP has been inactive

in the State of Arkansas for the past year with the excep

zion of placing on the Arkansas ballot candidates for

President and Vice President of the united States,

It is

not reconmended that any action

be taken against this group

at this time.

ASSCCIATION OF ARKANSAS KIANS

OF THE KU KLUK KEAN

(AAK)

The AAK in Arkansas is nade un of three klaverns

Iocated at Llttle Rock,

Tezarkana, and Pine Bluff; and

has no affiliation with any national klan group.

There

ara no "action" groups within any of these three klaverns.

The

three flaverns do not own or lease any propsity for

meeting places.

The four Little Rock members usually

meet in the home of a mencer.

The Texarkana Klavern has

not held any klavern meetings as such in several nonths.

Ine

• Pine

Bluff Klavern meetings vary from residences to

business places of flavern members.

State meetings are held at irregular intervais

on an averaga of about once per month or less. There is

no regular neeting place for

the siate meetings, which are

there are no klaverns, The state meetings are attended

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 14

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by fron one to five mergers of each of the

three

klaverns and are nell covered by informants.

The State

Crane Dragon BILb ILLiNS has continually

cautioned

nehbers against vioience and any type of illegai costitios.

Ñone oi the klaverns have engaged in vioiarce....

1. LITTLI ROCK MLAVERN

Of the four members who atiend weekl: neetings

For Naila, who is considered tho

head o

draws"à pension iron the Eodesr:

Government and, according to informants, is airaid to

engage in any illegal activity or to let his name be usec

in connection with the klan for fear of losing his pension.

The two informants maintain the iull confidence of the

other two menbers..

In recent months the klavern ran a

series of small ads in a little Rock daily newspaper in

an effoct to renew interest and gain new nempers.

The

klavern received a number of responses, but no action

whatsoever has been taken by the klavern to take

in any

now members.

The: klavern has no organized activity other

than the weekly meetings described by informants as

being

"bull sessions" with the principal topic being

politics.

....i

No racommendation for counterintelligence is

being made concerning the little Rock Klavern.

2. TEXARKANA KLAVERN :

This klavern has not held any klavern meetings

as such in several months, and it appears that the

principal reason for the lack of meetings ns the inter-

view of

mambers and leaders concerning the assassination

Of President KENNEDY. Klavern representatives regularly.

attend state meetings, one reason being that Stretand

Dragon Biut linithis,

who officiates at state meetings,

is a member of the Texarkana Klavern. Of the five or

six members who iron time to time attend state meetings,

two zie informants.

On 10/1/64 Enadvised that the

Grand Dragon had stated that hareaiter Texarkana Klavern

menbars will neet with the Bivins - Milde, Texas,

Klavern of the AAK.

- 2-

NW 88608-Docld:32989629-Page-15

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Grand Dragon FIllass, according to informants,

is active in politics in sowle County, Texas, i5 a loraex

member of tha Board ci Regents of Texariana dubior College,

Lesarkanag Panes, and in recané noads and some darns"

for piection to the Board of Regents of insi college und

defaated as a candidate for the City Council of Fexarbara.

- Tezas.

He cannot aiford to becone involved in any illegal

activities beczuse of his activities in legitimate enter-

prises.

he has continually cautioned Texarkana Klavern

mezbers as nell as nembers of other klaverns attending

state

meetings against any violence and/on illegai

actvities.

No recommendation is being made for counterintel-

ligence against the Texackana Klavern except as it is

effecied by a recommendation set out hereaiter under the

. 3. PINE SLUFF KLAVERN

The Pine Bluif Klavern has a membership of approxi-

mately trenty to twenty-five.

It meets once a week in

Zillerent business Locations o1 Its members, and average

weekly aiterdance is

twelve.

Among the twelve, one.or

two inforuants meet with them and turnish full

coverage

of their activities.

The klavern's main activity has been to dis

courage integration by legal neans and to get members

electea to school boaid positions.

The klavern collected

the funds and donated the money los the campaign ezpense

of iwo of its senbers who ran for a position on the Pine

Bluff School Board and the Dollarway School Board.

These

two members nade a miserable showing andiere defeated.

The Elevern was behind and organized the National

Patriots League (SPL) to further its non-integration

progran puslicly.

The Excited Cyclops, or president,.of

Klavera is chairnan of the NPi.

The iPi actually is

Lont organization los the slavern.

The main activity

of the Nei les to organize a private country club, which

is known as the Butzan Country Club. The purpose of the

-3-

NW 88608 Docld:32989629-PagE 1G

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club was to build a swinning pooi for vite oni

construction of the pool itsals nas corpictus but not

in Butian Country Club is 925.

mentars are not

aware of the fact thai the klavern was

behind its organization. Menbership in the Butcan Countzy

Club was easily obtained as the public pool for whites

and public pool for Negroes were both closed during the

summer oi 1934 when Negroes attempted to integrate the

white pool.

This left no public pool open in Pine Bluff.

Signpad, vice president of the klavern, donated the

land for the

• 3utran Country Club; as he owns lana sur-

rounding the club, ha will beneiit financially from the

sale of this land

for bailding lots.

The NPL has also

distributed a limited

number of leaflets publicly dis-

couraging peope iron patronizing certain restaurants and

businesses which hadhired or served Negroes.

Bembers of the klavern were responsible for

forming a John Birch Society Chapter in Pine Bluff, and

a klavern ember is leader of this chapter.

Approximately

eight to ten people attend the monthly nestings of the

john Birch Society Chapter; and of the men who atterd,

all are klavern members with the exception oi one man.

Menbers of the klavern completely control and dominate

the john Birch Society Chapter in Pine Bluff.

They,

however, only conduct john Biich Society business.

Like-

wise, tha members of the klavern furthes the John Birch

Society program through the klavern.

Menbers of the klavern are working individually

in politics for the re-election of Governor ORVAL-I.

FAUBUS and for the election oi BARRY GOLDWATER:

The klavern has not advocated any violence but

on occasion has cautioned its members against violence.

As an example

aycy iron Ray?

klavern members were cautioned to stay.

s Truck Stop, a location which Negroes were

attempting io integzate, in the spring of 1954 so that

no violence would occur.

Members of the klavern recently distributad a

Ku Klux Klan (KKK) leaflet seeking new members and

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statira recuasis for applications be directed to P. O.

BOX

3182, Pine Siuff.

In this leaflet it was pointed

out thet

the ink was striving ior a lamêui settlement

of the difficulties broughi on by the National issocia-

tion foI the lavancement of Colored People (NAAC) 220

that it

This leaflet fusther

set

Ioria that this was a chartered, legalized movement and

it is no z0re illegal to be & member of it than to be a.

member of other organizations.

At various tines in the past the klavern has

attempted to organize "action" groups within the klavern,.

but of each occasion the projact has died from lack of

interest.

In line with Bureau policy of dissemination of

information,

the main activities regarding the Pine Bluff

Klavern have been dissaminated confidentially to Chief

-OF POLICE NORUAN.D. YOUNG, DinE BIER, (NA)

on a regular

basis.

Chief YOUNG-has exerted every eflost to keep down

the possiblity of violence.

Through his confidential

scuices

he is also well

aware of the identities of the

Klavein nonbers and their activities. He personally

warned particus klavern members

against any violence

and has stated they will be net with immediate arrest

1s any violence come me me can come in man

advised

through his onn confidential source of the time

and location of the klavers neeting on the nighi of

October 5, 1954.

Chieferre sent a lieutenant of his

department

in uniform to check the location, record

license nunbers, and to be seen checking the meeting so

thas the klavern sembers would know that he was checking

on then.

This has had a strong influence on making the

Flavern

1o11on a line of legal activity. It has also

resulted in the nore responsible leading citizens of the

community being made añare of certain klavern nembers,

causing

these klavern menbers to be discredited in the

eyes of the public.

This was borne out in the recent

school board

election on 9/29/61 when two klavern members,

One Of thON is tc,E.-BUlRAu, were niserably defeated.

The klaverr has during the past few months

ungod its rembars to solicit and obtain nen nembers.

The inefiectiveness of their program is shown by the

-5-

NW 88608 Docld:32989629-Page 18

---

## Page 19

fact that only one new menber vas initiated.

menuer is a non-organiz cional ramati

anana co

Rost Division.

minenise, as a gesult of the

23t Loit-

lets distributed encouraging people to write toz appri-

cations they have received only two letters; and neither

of the witers have become a member.

The leaflet has

met with complete failure in its effort to build up its

mencership.

At this time the following are the only specific

counterintelligence action being recommended:

An anonymous letter be nailed so the National

Offica of john

Birch Society Chapter in Pine Blufi. In this letter

i to on the Lotte on.

specifically mention the name of one or two of the more

Leading dian rembers who are also leading tha John Birch

2.

an anonyhous letter be mailed to CHARLES D:

CUTHBERTSON, Enanted Cyclops-of the Pina Bluff Klavern,

aad a copy mailed to BILI WILLIAnS, State Grand Dragon,

with the leiters to be nailed to the Post Difice Box in

Pine. Bluii and in Texarkana, Arkansas, of the sAk.

letter snould be a complaining letter

from a mencer who

was active in the past and who recently found one of the

KKi leaflets in his automobile which leaflet encouraged

nonbership.

The letter would let then know why he has

not rejoined; it would point out that he dropped out

because of such leadership as i BUrRAM, who has used

the kian for personal gain as Burkisi had a residence on

his property remodeled at klavern expense and then made

the kiavern stop holding meetings there; that BUTRal

has now donated land io the Butzan Country Club so that

he can sell his surrounding land for building lots at

an ezorbitant price.

The letter should also set forth

the lact he heard suarad was discharged from the Army

Ior mental deficiency (noron). This letter should be

mailed fron Little Rock.

Interviers of klan members and leaders in the

pasi (for example, at the time of the assassination of

President KENNEDy

and on particular bombing matter cases)

-6.0

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 19

---

## Page 20

have nad deterring effect on the kian,

For example,

the Desatana Mayeen has not held a lavern neeting

that time.

One Little Rock member has

accoraing to an informant, this menber is a "changec

nen," neaning that he is not as radical as previously.

In interviews with members of the Pine Bluis Klavern,

¡agents have not net with any hostility and have been

treated cordially and with respect.

during these interviews have indiced they are opposed

to violence and advocate proceeding in a legal manner.

A number of the members have said that through political

pressure and voting

•are the only ways any change can

be made.

However, they have stated they are still avid

segregationists and do not condone race mixing in any

manner.

When and if it appears that interest may be

renewing in the AAK in Arkansas, consideration will be

given to another interview progran. it is noted, that

particular klan members are interviewed on a spasmodic

basis in regard to leads fron surrounding field offices

on bonbing matter cases, and this has had a tendency to

deter any violent activity on the part of klavern members.

---

## Page 21

and onto

UNITED DENTES GOVERNMEN

illemorandum

DIRIOTOS, EBI

DATE:

10/13/51

i--

SCEJECT:

, COINTELPRO

ReBulet to Atlanta and Other Offices,

9/2/64

Set out belon are an analysis and recommendations

under captioned program.

NATIONAL STATES RIGHTS PARTY (NSRD)

The Arkansas branch of NSRP has been inactive

in the State of Arkansas for the past year with the excep-

tion oi placing on the Arkansas ballot candidates for

President and Vice President of the United States.

not recommended that any action be taken against this group

at this time.

ASSCCIATION OF ARKANSAS KLANS

OF THE KU KLUX KLAN

(AAK)

The AsK in Arkansas is nade up of three klaverns

Iccated at Little Rock, Texarkana,

and Pine Bluff; and

it has no affiliation with any national kian group There

are no "action" groups within any of these three klaverns.

The three klaverns do not own or lease any property for

meeting places.

The four little Rock members usually

meet in the home of a member.

The Texarkana Klavern has

not held any klavern neetings as such in several nonths.

The Pine Bluff Klavern meetings vary from residences to

business places of Flavern members.

State neetings are held at irregulax intervals

average of about once per month or less.

no regular meeting place los the state meetings, which axe

heid in various Arkansas tonns including towns in which

no klaverns. The state neetings are attended

2423

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 21

---

## Page 22

by for one to five nesbers of each of the three

klaverns and are nell covered by informants.

The state

EaneDragon BIE ILLIaNS has continually cautioned

members against violence and any type of illegal cocarities.

None of the klaverns have engaged in violence.

-n-

I. LITTLE ROCK KI.AVERN -

• Of the four nembers who attend weekl: meetings

two are informants. Jer warneR, who is considered

head of this small group, craws a pension iron the

Goveinment and, according

is afraid to

•engage in any illegal activity or to let his name be used

in connection with the klan for fear of losing his pension.

The two informants maintain the full confidence of the

other two members a.

In recent months the klavern ran a

series of small ads in a Little Rock daily newspaper in

an affort to renew interest and gain new members.

The

klavern received a number of responses, but no action

whatsoever has been

taken by the klavern to take in any

now members.

The: klavern has no organized activity other

than the weekly meetings described by informants as

being "bull sessions" with the principal topic being.

politics.

No raconmendation for counterintelligence is

being made concerning the Little Rock Klavern.

2O TEXARKANA KLAVERN •

This klavern has not held any klavern meetings

as such in several months, and it appears that the

principal reason for the lack of meetings ns the inter-

view of members and leaders concerning the assassination

of President KENNEDY. Klavern representativesregularly.

attend state meetings, one reason being that state Gane

Dragon BiLi MILitaS,

who officiates at state meetings,

is a member of the Texarkana Klavern.

Of the five or

six members who from time to time attend state meetings,

imo are informants.

On 10/1/64 #R-57Fmadvised that the

Grand Dragon had stated that hereaiter Texarkana Klavern

nenbers will neat with the Bivins - Kildare, Texas,

Klavern of the AAR.

-2-

NW 88608-Docld:32989629-Page-22-

---

## Page 23

Grand Dragon frIltians, according to informants,

is active in politics

In sowle County, texas, is & l0222

member of the

Board 01 Regents of texankana tunion College

Rexarkana, Fexas, and in recent noadas ins time in.

or election to the Board of Regents of thai college and

defeated

as a candidate for the City Council of Texariana

texas.

He cannot afforâ to become involved in any illegal

activities because o his activities in legitimate enter

prises.

He has continually cautioned Texarkana Klaveza

menbers as well as menbers of other klaverns attending

state meetings against any violence and/or illegal

activities.

No recommendation is being made for counterintel-

ligence against the Texackana Klavern except as it is

effected by a recommendation set out hereafter under the

Pine Bluff Klavern.

. 3o PINE BLUFF KLAVERN

The Pine Bluff Klavern has a membership of approxi-

mately: twenty to twenty-five.

It meets once a week in

different business locations of its members, and average

weekly attendance is iwelve. Among the twelve, one or

two informants neet

, with them and turnish full

coverage

of their activities.

The klavern's main activity has been to dis-

courage integration by legal means and to get members

elected to school board positions.

The klavern

collected

the. funds and donated the money for the campaign expense

of two of its members who ran for a position on the Pine

Bluff School Board and the Dollarway School Board, These

two members made a miserable showing andwere defeated.

The klavern was behind and organized the National

Patriots League (NPL) to Iurther lis non-IntegratiOn

program publicly.

The Exaited Cyclops; or president,.of

Klavern is chairman of

the NPl, The Npl actually is

a front organization for the klavern. The main activity

of the NpL los to organize a private country club, which

is known as the Butran Country Club. The purpose of the

-3-

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 23-

---

## Page 24

club was to build a sainming pool for white or?.

construction of the pool itself nas compic but not

sufficiently to place it in use this seco

In Butram Country Club IS 120.

tho majority oi the

members are noi aware of the fact the the clavern was

Hembership in the Butram Countzy

Club ras easily obtained as the public pool for whites

and public pool for Negroes were both closed during the

summer of 1964 when Negroes attempted to integrate the.

white pool.

This left no public pool open in Pine Bluff.

SiBil, vice president of the klavern, donated the

land for the Butram Country Club; as he owns land sur-

rounding the club, he will cenefit financially from the

sale of this land for

bailding lots.

The NPL has also

distributed a limited

number of leaflets publicly dis-

couraging peopa iron patronizing certain restauxants and

businesses which hadhired or served Negroes.

lembers of the klavern were responsible fox

forming a John Birch Society Chapter in Pine Bluff, and

a klavern menber is leader of this chapter.

Approxinately

eight to ten people attend the monthly meetings of the

John Birch Society Chapter; and of the men who attend,

all are klavern members with the exception of one man.

Menbers of the klavern completely control and dominate

the John Birch Society Chapter in Pine Bluff.

They,

however, only conduct john Birch Society business.

Like-

wise, the members of the klavesn further the john

Birch

Society program through the klavern.

Members of the klavern are working individually

in politics for the re-election of Goveznor-ORVALE.

FAUBUS and for the election Of BARRE GOLDWATER:

The klavern has not advocated any violence but

on occasion has cautioned its members against violence.

klavern members were cautioned to stay.

aray tea Lays truck stop, a location whion Negroes were.

attempting to integzate, in

the spring of 1964 so that

no violence would occus.

Members of the klavern recently distributed a

Ku Klux Klan (KKK) leaflet seeking new zenbers and

NW 88608-Docld:92989629-Rage 24-

---

## Page 25

stating requests for applications be directed top. 0.

BOX

1182, Pine Siuit.

In this leailet it was pointed

out that

the KKK was striving for a laviul settlement

of the difficulties broughi on by the National Associa-

cion for the Advancement of Colored People (NAIC) and

that it is opposed to violence.

This leaflet further set

forth that this was

a chartered, legalized movement and

it is no more, illegal

.. to be a member of it than to be a

member of other organizations.

At various times in

the past the klavern has

attempted to organize "action" groups within the klavern,

but on each occasion the project has died from lack of

interest.

÷

In line with Bureau policy of dissemination of

infornation,

the main activities regarding the Pine Bluff

Klavern have been disseminated confidentially to Chief

of: 201ice NORMAN.D. YOUNG; Pine: Bluff, (NA) on a regular

Chief. YOunG-has exerted every effort to keep down

the possibility of violence.

Through his confidential

sources he is also well aware of the identities of the

klavern members and their activities. He personally

has warned particula klavern members against any violence

and has stated they will be met with inmediate arrest

11 any violence occurs. As an example, Chie YOUNG was

advised through his own confidential source of the time

and location of the klavern meeting on the night of

October 5, 1954 Chief yOunG sent a lieutenant of his

department in uniform to check the location; record

license numbers, and to be seen checking the meeting

SO

that the klavern members would know that he was checking

on then.

This has had a strong influence on making the

Klavern follow a line of legal activity. It has also

resulted in the more responsible leading citizens of the

community being made aware of certain klavern members,

causing these klavern members to be discredited in the

eyas of the public.

This was borne out in the recent

school board election on 9/29/64 when two klavern members,

one of whom is JaI: BUTRAl, were miserably defeated.

The klavern has during the past few months

urgod its members to solicit and obtain new members.

The inerfectiveness of their program is shown by the

-5-

NW 88608-Docld:32989629-Page-25

---

## Page 26

fact that only one saw menber

moncer

is a non-organizational i-sorts:

Rocù Division, Liberise, as a result of the

Leis distributed encouraging peopie to vite

Ios appli-

cations they baye

received only two

letters;

and neither

oI the wrlters nave become a memper.

The leaflet has

met with complete failure in its effort to build up its

mencership.

at this time the following are the only specific

counterintelligence action

being recommended:

an anonymous letter be mailed to the National

OIIICe OI dOnn BIICh SOCIeTY, Belmont, Massachusetts,

pointing out that the KKK is

in full control of the John

Birch Sóciety Chapter in Pine Bluff. In this letter

specifically mention the name of one or two of the more

leading klan nembers who are also leading the John Birch

2.

An anonymous letter be mailed to CHARGES Di

CUSHBIRTSON,

with the letters

to be mailed to the Post Office Box in

Pine. Bluff and in Texarkana, Arkansas, of the AAR. The

letter should be a complaining letter

from & member who

was active in the past and who recently found one of the

Kik leaflets in his automobile which leaflet encouraged

membership.

The letter would let them know why he has

not rejoined; it would point out that he dropped out

bocause of such leadership as fI Burktil, who has used

the klan for personal gain as BypRial had a residence on

his property remodeled

at klavern expense and then made.

the klavern stop holding meetings there; that BurRAVi

has not donated land for the Butram Country Club so that

he can sell his surrounding land for building lots at

an exorbitant price.

The letter should also set forth

tre fact he heard Bupray was discharged from the Army

for mental deficiency (moron). This letter should be

nailed fron Litile Rock.

Interviers of kian members and leaders in the

past (for example, at the time of the assassination of

President KENNEDY

and on particular combing matter cases)

- 5-

NW 88608 Docld:32989629

Page 26

---

## Page 27

have nad deterring effect on the kian.

For example,

the Texarkana Klavern has not held a klavern meating

as such since that time.

One Little Rock member has

dropped out as a

result of being inconvioned, aid,

according to an informant, this member is a "changed

nan, " meaning that he is not as radical as previously.

In interviews with members of the Pine Bluff Klavern,

agents have not net with any hostility and have been

treated cordially and with respect.

Individual members

during these interviews have indicaed they are opposed

to violence and advocate proceeding in a legal manner.

A number of the members have said that through political

pressure and voting are the only ways any change can

be made.

However,

they have stated they are still avid

segregationists and do not condone race mixing in any

manner.

When and if it appears that interest may be

renewing in the AAK in Arkansas, consideration will be

given to another interview program.

It is noted that

particular klan members are interviewed on a spasmodic

basis in regard to leads from surrounding field offices

on bombing matter cases, and this has had a tendency to

deter any violent activity on the part of klavern members.

- NW-88608-Docld:32989629 Page 2L

---

## Page 28

Memorandum

=0

Director, FBI

DATE: 10/13/54

=3012

5gD20, Birmingham

SÜBJECT:

COUNTER INTZLLIGENCE PROGRAM

INTERNAL SECURITI

DISRUPIION OP EATE GROUPS

Re Bulet to Atlanta 9/2/64

The Klan-type and hate organizations operating in

Birmingham territory and nhich are potential objects of a

counterintelligence program are the United Klans of

America,

InCe;

Knights of the Ku Klux Klan and tha National

States Rights

Party,

Recently MI. VINCENT TOWNSEND; Vice-President and

Assistant Publisher, Birmingham-news; and SAE Contact;

advised SAC EVERETT J. INGRAM that he read a story in

the

Chicago Daily-News concerning Klan activity in Mississippi

and felt the story could not have been prepared without

"BI cooperation.

He nas impressed with this and has indicated

a strong interest in similar material for the Birmingham

News.

He promised to protect the Bureauys interest in

any such endeavor.

He is a well known civic leader in

Birmingham. A review of the files in the Birmingham Office

is being made for suitable information in this connection.

Bureau instructed in referenced letter that

specific mention be made of "Action GIoups" in Klan

organizations.

At the present time the weekly meetings of

Eastview Klavern No, 13, which bas been the leading Klavern in

United Klans of Anerica, Inc.,

In this terrory, have been

poorly attended, The principal members of the

"Action GrOUD"

-NW-88608-Doeld 32989629-Page 28.

---

## Page 29

in this Klavera are HARRY HALKER, CECIL HENSON, EUGENE

REEVES,

and RONNIE FIDELE.

Elloits are being made to

SECUrE

intomation suitable for disruption purposes in

connection with this group,

Investigation is being conducted concerning

ROBIET MARTIN SASSION.

The Atlanta Office has been

requested to ascertain uhy Eat, ZHARDS, n07 deceased,

ousted SaLIm iron his then position oi Gzand Dragon of

the U. So Klans,

A copy of the article appearing in

entitlad "SHELTON

oussed from klan post," has been obtained.

The article did

not disclose the exact nature of the charges against

Records of the Alabana Secretary Oi State reflect

thet sualtoy was dropped as the Klan's authorizad agent

and sas raplaced by Rey, ALVR+ ZORN of Talzadega,

Alabana,

Ent HARES, Inperial fizard, U. S. Klans, Knights of

the Ku Klux Klan, #as quoted as saying "We had to have

2 grand dragon in Alabama and me didn't bave one in

ROBERT M. SHELFON,"

He told reporters that SHELTON

735

replaced as grand dragon and agent of the "Klen" in

Alabama "for conduct unbeconing a

Klansman and attenpting

¿o usa the organization for salfish purposes," The

article said EDIARDS did zot elaborate on what is considered

conduct unbeconing a Klansaan.

Informants are being contacted for any information

of a derogatory nature concerning SARLTON.. Discreet inquiries

are being made in Tuscaloosa concerning his financial status.

In vien of recent infornation iron the Bureau no request is

being made for a mail coves on Shelton of the Uniied Klans.

The inforDation On LOn-ROGERS 2ad VILLlAid.HOUI,mR

will be afforded picapt attention.

2

-NW_88608_Docld:32989629 Page 29

---

## Page 30

As the Bureau is aware, some few months ago several

individuals,

"no had been active

officials and/or dedicated

members of the National States Rights Party (NSRD), leit

the NSRP. They are trying to form and make a going party.

01 the American States Rights Party (ASRP) with its head-

quarters in Birmingham.

the ASRP and NSRD leaders have been belittling,

Since the seous pulled out of the MoRe raties

and making extremely derogatory remarks concerning eaca

other.

Both groups are using the same bailing list,

(tbe NSRP's list), which the ASRP group obtained. before

pulling out of the NSRP, and they disseminate their

derogatory remarks in the literature they distributes

The Bureau has also

been advised that-GEORGE.

LINCOLN ROCKTELL, American Mazi Party (ANP) leader has

receatly filed a $550,000,00 libel suit in the U, S.

Districi Court, Birminghat, Alabama, against DE, EDYARDR.

Information Director of the NSRP, and others

connected with

the NSRP,

Birminghan contemplates furnishing certain items,

on a confidential basis to a few trusted, reliable newsmen

and the AMP for the purpose of possibly causing

further

disruption of any unified actions or working arrangements

between these groups. Such newsmen nay be used to contact

the leaders of one group to inquire about or confirm something of

a derogatory pature reportedly made by some leader of one oi

the other groups.

Birminghan also contemplates working closely

wita other lay enforcement agencies to see that any

considered descrable, the group will be made cogaizzai

that their activity is known,

3

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 30

---

## Page 31

Bimingham also is considering having some

racial

informants drop remarks to or for the benefit of the

leaders

that will tend to sausa the leaders of

one group to Italiate in like manner against the other

It the Bureau has any naterial on disruptive

tactics or results of eiforts, which is not already in

a11 field offices, Birmingham

would be glad to receive

4

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 31

---

## Page 32

TO

2AD4

SLEJECT:

60676%07

UNITED STATES GI ERNMENT

inemorandur

=2RE020?, E3I

SEE, LAYORK

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

INTERNAL SECURITY

DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS.

DATE: 10/14/64

REBULEt, y14/04.

"Y has case files on the following organizations

which were listed in relet:

INEZICAN NAZI PARTY (AN?)

(52-157 73)

DO:PH

Available information reflects that there is

currently to iNP activity in the NYC area ad the organization

appears to be defunct.

ZIGADING ERICAN NAZIONALISIS (FAN) (14-157-195)

09: BA

Available information seflects that FAN has ceased

to exist as & separate organization and is merely a name used

on sacasion by the American Nazi Party.

NATIONAL RENAISSANCE PARTY NR?) NXx105-6X2)

00:257

The NRP is now defunct in NYC and available

information makes it appear unlikely that it will be

reactivated.

NW 88608-Doeld:32989629-Rage-32

---

## Page 33

MATICAL ST-CES RICHES PARTY (ASAP)

20:3.:.

The aste in vic is operated by witness,

a self-identified as the ivy

sacke Dicestos of the NSR?.

This is a one man organization

in 1Y0 with no nembership other than Hoer who utilizes

20130412435 GRamoothy JulY, as his NSPP mailing

address. Because of this there are no meetings of this

organization in NYC.

WRITE YOURE CORES (WIC):

00:C3

"o infomation has been developed by NY

indicating the WYC exists in NY.

Rocommendations

In tea of she above, MY has no specific recommenda-

tions at the present time. Logical persons handling above

captioned and releted natters are alert to captioned

program, and in the event infornation is developed which

Would make some counterintelligence activity feasible,

the Bureau will

be advised.

BY will again review the above files so that

a letter will reach the Bureau on or before 1/1/65.

- 2-

-NW-88608_Docld:32989629_Page 33

---

## Page 34

SUBJECT:

it tE not.

CITED STATES GI ERNMENT

Memorandum.

DIRECTOR, EBI

SAC, NEW YORK

COUNTERINTELLICENGE PROGRAM

INTERNAL SECURITY

DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS.

DATE: 10/14/64

rebulet, y/4/04.

Ny has case files on the following organizations

which were listed in relet:

AMERICAN NAZI- PARTY (ANP) (NY- 757-23)

00: RH

Available information reflects that there is

currently no AN? activity in the NYC area ad the organization

appears to be defunct.

FIGETING AMERICAN NATIONALISTS (FAN) (1757-795)

03: BA

Available information reflects that FAN has ceased

to exist as a separate organization and is merely a name used

on occasion by the American Nazi Party.

NATEONAL RENAISSANCE PARTY (NRP) (N5x105-6J12)

00: NY

The NRP is now defunct in NYC and available

information makes it appear unlikely that it will be

reactivated.

------

NW-88608-Đocld:32989629-Page 34-

---

## Page 35

LATIONAL STATES RICHES PARTY (NSRP)

00: B2+

The NSle in NYC is operated by flin

an self-identified as the 1*

senterpiractor- of the NSRe.

This is a one man organization

in NYC with no membership other than Hort who utilizes

20uB0x-1243 6Barootctytey, as his NSRP mailing

address. Because of this there are no meetings of this

organization in NYC.

WHITE YOUTH CORPS (WYC) •

00: CC

No information has been developed by NY

indicating the WYC exists in NY.

Raconmandations

In view of the above, NY has no specific recommenda-

tions at the presont time. Logical persons handling above

captioned and related matters are alert to captioned

program, and in the event information is developed which

would make some counterintelligence activity feasible,

ine Bureau will

• be advised.

Ny will again review the above files so that

= letter will reach the Bureau on or before 1/1/65.

- 2-

_ NW-88608_Docid:32989629_Page.35

---

## Page 36

fransan the toloring

FBI

Date:

10/14/64

Type in plain sexi or code)

(Priority)

TO :

DIRECTOR, IBI

FROM: A SAC, PRIS

SUBJECT: COUNTER INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

INTERNAL SECURITY

DISALITION OF HATE GROUPS

Relet Bureau to. Atlanta, copies Memphis, 9/2/64.

The emphis Division

has carefully reviewed

the

including the list of organizations

None of these organizations are currently active

in

the territory covered by the Memphis EBI Division.

Similarly, there are no so-called "action groups"

Known to exist or to have

existed in this territory.

This office will continue to be alert foc

possibilities and methods of inplementation of this program.

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 36

---

## Page 37

Transmit the iollowing in

FBI

Date:

10/14/54

(Type in picin text or code)

(Priority)

TO:

DIRECTOR,

FBI

FROM: з

SAC, BRIPTIS®

SUBJECT : COUNTERINTZLLIGENCE PROCRAM

INTERNAL SECURITY

DISRUFTION OF HATE GROUES

$

Relet Bureau to. Atlanta, copies Memphis, 9/2/64.

The Memphis Division has carefully reviewed the

designated

for action pursuant to this program.

None of these organizations are currently active

in the territory covered by the Memphis FBI Division.

Similarly, there are no so-called "action groups"

Known to exist or to have existed in this territory.

Ihis office will continue to be alert for

possibilities and methods of implementation of this program.

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 37

---

## Page 38

UNTIRD STATES & ERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

DIRECTOR,

DATZ:

10/14/54

FROM

SAC,

SUBJECT:

COUNEERINTELLIGENOS PROGRAI

/INTIRNAI SECUPITE

DISRUPPION OF RATE CROUPS..

Re Bureau letter to Itlanta, 9/2/64.

The folloring news media can be utilized in tbe.,

Cointelpro upon confirnation of any action group forming

in Miami and It. Lauderdale, Florida (Dade and Broward

Counties):

newspapers

"Miami Herald"

À morning Miami, Florida, daily newspaper

"The Kiand News"

An evening

local Mani, Florida, newspaper

FABLINS CABACES, IdItOr (SAC Contact).

"The It. Lauderdale Jews"

A daily Broward County newspaper

WILCON FELTE, EditOr

TY Stations

FCKT-TV, Chánnel 7, NBC

VLSJ-T7, Channel 10, A3C

CARLES FAJODHILLER; Gezeral anager. (SAC. Contact)

CERIES ATTRYS, Tationa Sales Director-

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 38

---

## Page 39

Radio Stations.

IOD, JAMES EE CAPS

At Sebring, Florida

(nighlands County)

United Florida KU Kluz Klan

Sebring Klavern

Through recent information furnished by

it is noted that the Sebring Klavern is apparently dying

out.

Attendance at the weekly meetings has been very poor

with a maxizun of 3 to

¿in attendance. On the last two

Scared day as a mes present take too

In view of the above, the Sebring Klavern will

probably become inactive in the very near future.

felt that any counterintelligence move at the present time

would possibly result in a renewed interest and regrouping

by the members rather than the dasized results.

Should the Sebring Klavern noi disband in the near

Sebring, as to time,

cate and location of the xu diux Klan

meetings.

Sheriff's Department patrol cars could patrol the

area

in an obvious fashion in order to disrupt the meetings

and cause concern among trose in attendance.

Sheriza CoReR has been very cooperative and has

reflected a distuste for any Ku Klux Klan activity in his

county.

It is not falt that

sertet-Cenar- mould in any

way reveal the Bureau's interest of betray our confidence.

It is felt that counterintelligence contact vita

the Sebring press would be unmise.

- 2-

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 39

---

## Page 40

Reported Attempts to Organize Klavern

of United Florida Xu Klu: Klaz in

Sebastiaz, Florida Indian Raver Couzzy)

It is reconnended that immediately upon confirmation

Can atened organization of a ku Xi klaa tavern le

• River County, that counterintelligence steps be taken

: to discourage saze.

The Ft. Pierce Neys Tribune," a daily newspaper

Wt 12 ulation includine indian diver County, could be

1E. CHARDESMILEY, Edition, is: aE-SAE contace of

the miani Division and aas proven reliable and cooperative

in past dealings.

Through information furnished to hast,

the attent at organizing the iu Klux klan in Sebastian,

could be exposed to the conmunity.

Comnunity leaders

would then likely take steys to counteract the formation of

this organization.

It is not felt thai i. MiLey would in any way

reveal the Sureau's interest of betray our confidence.

It is also reconmended that ISl-BRUNEY, Chief

Dapuit, Indian River County Sheriff's Office be jurnisea

information regarding the attenpted ku Xlux Klan organization

in Sebastian.

Dayatta could arrange for patrol cars to cover

the Ku Klux Alan meetings in an obvious fashion. This would

likely discourage attendance ara cause concern.

Chief-Deputy-BRUHLEY is a National Academy graduate

and has been completely cooperative with contacting agents.

It is not felt that BRoilY would in any may reveal the

Bureau's interest or betray our confidence.

- 3 -

NW 88608-Docld:32989629-Page 40

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## Page 41

At West Palm Beach,

(Palm Beach County)

FICILES

Council For Staterood

West Palm Beach, Florida

The Council for Statehood has been found to

be not an action group but rather a mailing facility

for the mritings of lazy DAViSoN.

These writings

are cissominaied to local and national legislators and

all are filed with the library of Congress in Wasnington.

The dissemination of writings by this group has now become

practically negligible.

The group is said to have

political overtones as a republican group.

It is not reco-ended that any positive"

harassront activities

be undertaken with regard to this

group at this time, since such action, in all probability,

would entance the activities of this group rather than

accomplish the desired effect.

United Irse Hea

West Palm Beach, Florida

This organization is now defunct.

At the present time there are no known "action

groups" within the lizmi Division.

SUGCESTIONS FOR COINTELPRO

(1) Many bate groups send literature, to

individuals on their mailing lists, which nas been

distorted or is out of context, regarding individuals aud

organizations.

The literature is intended to promote a

hostile and unavorable inage of the organization and/or

incivicual.

Favorite targess is this zegare aze

the Jaitea

ravions and U.S. Suppera Court justice EARITARBaN..

- 4 -

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 41

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## Page 42

It is noted the Unitea Nations las cossiderablo

literatura setting forth favorable intormation egarding

accomplishments and the desirability of having a United

Nations.

It mould appear appropriate to offsed the

literature sent out by the hate groups, by sending out

favorable infornation concerning the organization or

individual under attack.

(2)

Any hate organizations tend to disguise

their true identity under the pretent of being a religious

study group.

using such a disguise, they find it easy

and inexpensive to obtzin the facilities of an established

church to hold special or organizational meetings.

By using an appropriate pretext, such as a

/iree lance reporter for the local paper, or through a

reliable news conzac, the individual responsible for the

inclilty coula be contacied shortly prior to the planned

meeting.

At this time, the true identity of the bate

organization could be exposed, resulting in considerable

disruptIon,

especially if the use of the facilities are

canceled at the last moment.

In September, 1962, and December, 1963, STOVER

spent several veels ia Jlorida, including visiis to liami

and vero seach, florida, attenpting to organize and proote

the isRe.

lo cate the doit bas failed to gain aay "zooi

hoid" within the biani Division.

It is not mom is this

anticle vas responsible to sees caizara, jowever, 10

does represont i type of counterintelligence.

~5 .

NW-88608-Doeld 32989620-Page-42

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## Page 43

3010-1:8

UNITED STATES ( ERIVENT

iiemorandem

TO

DIRICTOR, ISI

DATZ:

10/14/54

FROM

SAC, ZIANI'

SUBJECT:

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAII

INTIRNAL SECURITY

DISRUPTION OF HATE CROUPS ..

Re Bureau letter to Atlanca, 9/2/64.

The folloving news nedia can be utilized in the

in iiani and It. Lauderdale, Florida (Dade and Broward

Counties) :

Newspapers

"Miani Herald"

à morning Miami, Florida, daily newspaper

GIOREZ/ARESE, Lanaging-sAitOr (SAC Contaet)

"The

rieni Nevs"

An evening local Mioni, Florida, newspaper

FAELIAN C BAGES, Iuitor-fSaC Contacè)

"The

Ft. Lauderdale Nezs"

A daily Broward County newspaper

areroryentr, sditor

Ty Stations

WCKT-TV, Channel 7, NBC

CITE STRUHI ÑEWS. DirECtOE.

VLSH-TY, Channel, 10, A30

CHARLES ByNODTILLIR; General Hanager. (SAC Contact)

---

CEARIES MATTHTYS, Fationaz Sales Directos

NW 88608_Docld:32989629 Page 43

---

## Page 44

Radio Stations

WEBS, BOBARIIN, HeWS.

At Sebring, Florida

(Highlands County)

United Florida Ku Klux Klan

Sebring Klavern

Through recent information furnished by

it is noted that the Sebring Klavern is apparently dying

out.

Attendance at the weekly meetings has been very poor

with a maximum of 3 to 4 in attendance. On the last two

scheauled meeting dates,

the only ones present were the

exalted Cyclops, CHARLES PRITE- and

In view of the above,

the Sebring Klavern will

probably become inactive in the very neas future. It is

felt that any counterintelligence move at the present time

would possibly result in a renewed interest and regrouping

by the members rather than the desired results.

Should the Sebring Klavern not disband in the near

it is then ielt that information could ba confi-

dentally furnishad to aishlands County Shexits BROHARD COXER.

sebring, as to time, date and location of the Ku Klux Klan

meetings. Sheriff's Depariment patrol cars could patrol the

area in

an obvious fashion in order to disrupt the meetings

and cause concern among those

in attendance.

Sheriza CoreR bas been very cooperative and has

reflected a distaste for aby Iu Klux Klan activity in his

county.

It is not felt that short Cour would in any

way reveal the Bureau's interest of betray our confidence.

It is felt that counterintelligence contact visa

tho Sebring press mould be unmise.

_2 -

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 44

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## Page 45

Reported Attempts to Organize

• Xlavezn

of United

Florida Ku Klux Klan in

Sebastiaz, Florida (Indian River County)

It is recommended that immediately upon confirmation

of the attempted organization of a Ku Klux Klan Klavern in

Indian River County, that

counterintelligence steps be taken

to discourage same.

The 't. Pierce News Tribune," a daily newspaper

with circulation including Indian River County, could be

rutilized.

LIC. CHARLESSLEY, Editor, is anSAC contact of

the liani Division and has proven reliable and cooperative

in past dealings.

Through information furnished to they,

the attempt at organizing the Ku Klux Klan in Sebastian,

Florida, could be exposed to the community. Community leaders

would then likely take steps to counteract the formation of

this organization.

It is not felt that He. MiLaY mould in any way

reveal the bureau's interest or betray our confidence.

It is also reconmended

• that LEt BRUNLEY, Chief"

Deplist,

Indian River County Sheriff's Difice be furnished

information regarding the attempted Ku Klux Klan organization

in Sebastian.

Enancey could arrange for patrol cars to cover

the Ku Klux Klan meetings in an obvious fashion. This would

likely discourage attendance and cause concern.

Erref-Deputy BRUMLEY is a National Academy graduate

and has been completely cooperative with contacting Agents.

It is not felt that BRUMaY would in any way reveal the

Sureau's interest or

• betray ous confidence.

- 3 -

NW-88608_Docld:32989629_Page 45

---

## Page 46

At Test Palm Beach, FlO-¿Ga

(Palm Beach County)

Council For Statehood

West Paln Beach, Florida

The Council for Statehood has been found to

be not an action group but rather a mailing facility

for the writings of War DAVISON. These writings

are disseminated to local and national legislators and

21l are filed with the Library of Congress in Washington.

The dissenination of writings by this group has now become

practically negligible. The group is said to have

political overtones as a republican group.

It is not reconnended that any positive"

harassment activities be undertaken with regard to this

group at this time, since such action, in all probability,

would enhance the activities of this group rather than

accomplish the desired effect.

United Frse Men

West Palm Beach, Florida

This organization is now defunct.

At the present time there are no known "action

groups" within the liani Division.

SUGGISTIONS FOR COINTELPRO

(1) Many hate groups send literature, to

individuals on their mailing lists, which has been

distorted or is out of contest,

regarding individuals

and

organizations,

The literature is intended to promote a

hostile and unfavorable inage of the organization. and/01

incividual.

Favorite trIgets in this regard are the Unite.

rations and U.S. Suppere Cours justice RARE RARE-WARRBN.-

-

NW 88608 Docld: 32989629 Page 46

---

## Page 47

It is noted the United Nations has considerable

"litorature setting forth favorable intornation regarcing

accomplishments and the desirability of having a united

Nations.

It would aypear appropriate to oiset the

literature sent out by the hate groups, by sending out

favorable infornation concerning the organization or

individual under attack.

(2) Any hate orgarizations tend to disguise

their true identity under the pretext of being a zeligious

study group.

Using such a disguise, they find it easy

and inexpensive to obtain the facilities of an established

church to hold special or organizational meetings.

By using an appropriate pretext, such as a

/iree lance reporter for the local paper,

or through a

reliable news contact, the individual rasponsible for the

facility could be contacted shortly prior to the planned

meeting.

At this time, the true identity of the bate:

organization could be exposed, resulting in considerable

disruption, especially if the

use of the facilities are

canceled at the last nonent.

the Bureau is one copy of the

prepared

Federation of Labor News," dated

na distributed by

SFU

for many years until

he was

discontinued rove

1951,

in veroi, continuing

evidence of indiscretion are

of poor judgment.

*regarding

che

Hatsonal-

dates Rights Pariy (NSRP) antie

• 3.

ASTONER."

This ant

eas prepared and distributed by

• Of

his pra vorrtion, as a neans of leeping the NSRP out of

south Florida.

In September, 1962, and December, 1953, STENER

spent several veeks in Ilorida, including visiis to Miami

and vero seach, florida,

attempting to organize and promote

the NSRD.

To date the suit has failed to gain any "foot

hold" within the iliami Division.

it is not inor. in this

article was responsible for Sants failure, however, it

does reprosont a type of counterinteïligence.

- 5 -

NW 88608-Docld:32989629-Page-47

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## Page 48

"3010-101

UNITED STATES ( ERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

DIRICTOR, IBI

DATE:

10/14/54

FROM

SAC,_

MOLAME I

SUBJECT:

COUNT BRINÌ ELLIGENCE PROCRAN

INTIRNAL SECURITY

DISRUPIION OF HATI GROUPS.

Re Bureau letter to Atlanta, 9/2/64.

The collowing news media can be utilized in the

Cointeloro upon confirmation of any action group forming;

in lliami and It. Lauderdale, Florida (Dade and Broward

Counties) :

Newspapers

"Miami Herald"

A morning Miami, Florida, daily newspaper

GIORCIBERBE Managing saitor (SAC Contaet).

"The

'Wiami News"

An evening.

"The

It. Lauderdale News"

A daily Broward County newspaper

MILTON KELLE, Editor

Tv Stations

VLSI-TV, Channel 10, ABC

CHARLES STOPILER,

-General tanager (SAC Contact)

CHARLES MATHEWS, Nationa] Sales Director.

NW 88608_Docld:32989629 Page 48

---

## Page 49

Radio Stations

WIOD, JAMES CarE

At Sebring, Florida

(Highlands County)

United Florida Ku Klux Klan

Sebring Klavern

Through recent infornation furnished by mr ozen,

it is noted that the Sebring Klavern is apparently dying

out.

Attendance at the:weekly

meetings has been vesy poor

with a maximum of 3 to 4 in attendance. On the last two

the only ones present were the

In view of the above, the Sebring Klavern 7111

probably become inactive in the very rear future. It is

felt that any counterintelligence move at the present time

would possibly result in a renewed interest and regrouping

by the members rather than the desired results.

dentially furnished to Highlands County Sheriff BROWARD: COKER,

meetings. Sheriff's Department patrol cars could patrol the

area in an oovious fashion in order to disrupt the meetings

and cause concern among those

in attendance.

Sherit Cosen has been very cooperative and has

reflected a distaste for any Ku Klux Klan activity in his

county.

It is not felt that sharismcosEr-nould in any

way reveal the Sureau's interest or betray our confidence.

It is felt that counterintelligence contact wi

the Sebring press mould be unmise.

- 2 -

:

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 49

---

## Page 50

Reporied Attempts

to Organize Klavern

of United Florida Ku Xlux KIan 13

Sebastian,

Florida (Indian River County)

It is recommended that immediately upon confirnation

of the attempted organization of a Ku Klux Klan Klavern in

• Indian River County, that

nounterintelligence steps be taken

: to discourage same.

The 'Tt. Pierce Neys Tribune," a daily newspaper

Mil cerculation including ladian River County, could be

NIC. CRARLES GULEY,

Editor;-isar-SAE contact 0i

the tiami Division and has proven reliable and cooperative

in past dealings.

Through information furnished to restr,

the attempt at organizing the Ku Klux Klan in Sebastian,

Florida, could be exposed to the community. Community leaders

would then likely take steps to counteract the formation of

this organization.

It is not felt that Mr.- they would in any way

reveal the Bureau's interest or betray our confidence.

It is also recommended that IL BRUMEly Chief

Depity,

Indian River County Sheriit's Office be furnished

infornation regarding the attempted ku Klux Klan organization

in Sebastian.

SRUMSEY could arrange for patrol cars to cover

the Ku Klux Klan meetings in an oovious fashion.

This vould

likely discourage attendance and cause concern.

Chief-Deputy-BRUMLEY is a National Academy graduate

and has been completely cooperative with contacting Agents.

It is not felt that BRucEY would in any way reveal the

Bureau's, interest of betray our confidence.

=3 -

-NW_88608_Docld:32989629 Page 50

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## Page 51

At West Palm Beach,

(Pain Beach County)

Council For Statehood

West Paln Beach, Florida

The Council for Statehood has been found to

be not an action group but rather a mailing facility.

for the writings of ManY DAWSON. These writings

are disseminated to local and national legislators and

all are filed with the library of Congress in Washington.

The dissemination of writings by this group has now become

practicaily negligible. The group is said to have

political overtones as a republican group.

It is not recommended that any positive".

harassment activities be undertaken with regard to this

group at

this time, since such action, in all probability,

would enhance the activities of this group rather than

accomplish the desired effect.

United Free Men

Hest Palm Seach; Florida

This organization is now defunct.

At the present time there are no known "action

groups: within the Miami Division.

SUGGESTIONS FOR COINTELPRO

(I) Many hate groups send litesature, to

individuals on their mailing lists, which has been

distorted or is out of contere,

regarding individuals

and

organizations.

The literature is intended to promote

hostile and unfavorable image of the organization-and/or

individual.

Favorite targets in this regas are the unites

Nations and U, S. Supreme Couri justice ZARE WARREN.

-4-

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 51

---

## Page 52

It is noted the United Nations has considerablo

literature setting forth favorable intornation regarding

accomplishments and the desirability of having a United

Nations.

It would appear appropriate to offset the

literature sent out by the hate groups, by sending out

favorable information concerning the organization or

individual under attack.

(2) Any hate organizations tend to disguise

their true identity under the pretext of being a religious

study group.

Using such a disguise, they find it easy

and inexpensive to obtain the facilities of an established

church to hold special or organizational meetings.

By using an appropriate pretext, such as a

free lance reporter for the. local paper, or through a

reliable news contact, the individual responsible for the

¡acillty could be contacted shortly prior to the planned

meeting.

At this time, the true identity of the bate

organization could be exposed, resulting in considerable

dIsruption, especIalLy II

the use of the facilities

canceled at the last moment.

(3) Enclosed for the Bureau is one copy of the

National Federation of Labor News," dated Septembex, 1963,

prepared

and distributed by WILLIAN SOMERSETT, focmerIT

IG1 607-C: (RAC), Bureau file 66-16458. It is noted that

SOMERSErT waS formerly a Bureau informant for many years until

he was discontinued November, 1961, in view of continuing

evidonce of indiscretion and use of poor judgment

Page 3

of this paper sets forth an articie by SOMERSETIregardin

the National States Rights Party (NSRP) and J. B ASTONEl

This article was prepared and distributed by SoMerSETt oi

his own volition, as a means of keeping the NSRD out of

south Florida.

In September, 1962, and December, 1953, STORA

spent several veeks in Florida, including visits

to Miani

and Vero Beach, Florida, attempting to organise and promote

the NSRP.

To date the NSRe has failed to gain any "foot

hold" within the Miami Division.

It is not racon i^ this

article vas responsible ior stomas failura,

however, 1t

does represent a type of counterintelligence.

~5-

NW-88608-Docld:32989629_Page 52

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## Page 53

idemorandur

DINSCROR, FEI

DITT:

2AC, CAICACO

COINTILPRO

Ra Bureau letter to SIC, Atlanta 9/2/5:.

Referenced communication advises tau colloving

nate organizations operating within tra Careroo Division

as included in this program:

American Nazi Party (Origin: Rich=ons)

White Youth Corps (Origin: Chicago) .

Regarding the White Youth Corps it is notco

confidential informants of this division save advised

that

the thite Youth cops in Chicago did not, in lact,

rather

withia the structure vi ito

unerican Mazi arty

at Chicago, illircis.

111 oparations

of this unit

were subsequently consined with those of the

unerican dazi Party and mere carried on undu? tuat nanc

only:

The Waite Youta Corps was determinud io no longer

exisi in any way in Chicago and no infornation aas developed

to indicate the possible reorganization of chis group.

on october 12, 1951, concicantlal InfOrmaats

Eurnised

reliable inforzation in ise pasi, adilocd that

the Thite Youth Corps no longez exisis in any capacity

in Chicago.

To sources' knowledge the malto douch corps

does not operate as an organization in any otter locale

known to then.

These sources Zurther advioud tint as of

this date no information is available to linicaiu possible

interest in georganizing the libita scuel Corno.

Numbers

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 33

---

## Page 54

=

En view of the above, Chicago

further inquiry regarding use

and in that

the Thite Youth Corps is 30

it will not be considered in connection

Witz this Progran.

Regarding Chicago's proposed plan to expose,

aisiuot and otherwise neutralize the american nazi party

in Chicago, Illinois, the following is subaitted for the

Bureau's consideration:

I. Proposal = To increase Financial Burden

of the american Nazi Party

Brief Resume Of Current

Economic Problems

The principal realness in the Chicago unit of the

American Nazi Party exists

in their lack of sunds to operate.

This lact aiona nas forestalled all lie particisation o Eùē

Chicago organization in public demonstrations and other

activities in that sufficient zonies are not available to

provide necessary bonds ard/or fines should members be

arrested during the course of such activity.

Further, the Chicago American Nazi Party bas

recently purchased

a building which they utilize as a

headquarters.

The building is old and in dire need of

repair..

Mortgage payments and mainterance alone absorb

the bulk of all funds wich the Chicago unit collects.

Proposed Plan of Approach

In that it is the desire of the local American

Hazi Party to "hold onto" their headquarters building at

all cosis, it is apparent that the first linc of approach

to increase the organization's financial burden is to

direct our efforts

at the beadquarters building Itself.

Discreet inquiry and observation has shown the

building has numerous building code violations, some oi

- 2 .

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 54

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## Page 55

nich nate the building mainly unirnabitablo until suns

violations are rectillad such is elecuricad Wrig 2au

plumping.

It is recognized that building coùe suchorities

will alion such deficiencies to exist for a reasonbole

period of time and during such time habiation on the

premises is parniitea. Violations such as those montioned

2ue knoon to be costiy io eliminate and are of the type

that cannot of should not be

"do-it-yourseli" projects

since repairs nade are subject to inspection by juilding

authorities.

In that the american Nazi pasty has in the past

and still leveis

its attacis ai persons of the Jewish faith,

Chicago Jewish organizations are most desirabic of accumulating

information which

can serve to initiate an atiack by these

organizations agzinsi the American isai

among such crganizations are the Jewisa

party.

Prominent

"ar Vetcians and

ühe Anti-Defanation League B'nai S'rita.

The Chicago Division, either by direct approach

to established sources in these organizations, or through

use of suitable pretexi, can make arailzole to copropriate

officials incornation establisning the fact that such building

code violations do eñist.

There is no doubt that should

such information become available to proper individuals within

these organizations, great pressure will be brought to bear

•to insist that these building code violations sio corrected

and the possibility strongly ezists that court action may

follow and fines may be levied.

As an alternative, a direct approach can be made

to established contacts within the city coveramant to bring

such buildies code violations to the itcation o appropriate

authorities.

Inticipated Results

= penetzating analysis of tic present econozic

situation of the American Nazi Party S-rongly Indicates

-3 -

NW -88608-Đocld:32969629-Rage-55-

---

## Page 56

as by finary increasing the financial

burdea sa this

the following results are cezzaza

I.

2.

erica Nazi party public

activity will be

held to tre barest minimum due to fear oi

sible arrest resulting in further economic

hardship.

Funds will not ba available to bring about:

necessary repairs on the neadquarters chiLding

3.

Funds for the printing and distribution oi

literature locally for recruiting purposes

would not be

available

4.

5

Morale of the organization in Chicago, wich

is non at low eos would be further lessened

thus creating feelings of dissatisfaction among

the menbersalo

As a direci result of items above the attractivenes:

of. the. American lazi party to possible recruits

would be bald ai a minimun

II. Proposal -

Divide Loyalty of lembership

Against Present Leaders

Brief Resume of Leadership

Problems

At the present time the Chicago American Nazi Party

has no established leaders.. One of the? members, JOHN MALiCE,

Tas appointed by cauca incolniceah, the groups cationai

commander,

however, Rides has failed to undertalie the

responsibilities of lescershis and

as a result certain dis-

satisfaction enists anong tempers.

is z

result of tactions failure curront activities

of the organization

are being cirected by Christories

woo is operating without authority of the nationai

headquarters.

-4-

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 56

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## Page 57

Escause of the inactivity and the failure of,

, the

Chicago organzzation tO demonstate Drogress Cri Ci-gaLà06

"nazà core" of the membership nave zaisid aumerous quebcioas

in tie

recent past challenging the aceguacy ana capabilacy

of miSi and instic to head their organization in Chicago.

Proposed Plan of approach

It is anticipated that through establissed sources

a1l of whom are curzent nambers of the Antricin ad Botty

in Chicago, leelings of disconient can be initrasod. durünes,

communications which nould indicato a thorough and substancial

Inowledge of the Chicago organization could ba directed at

the wation commenter C203Cs- TiNOiN LOcKleiT either anonymously

in disagreement with local leadership and practices.

Anticipated Results

By concentrating:the eliores of this program in a

firm but careiully concealed manner it is strongly believed

• that the following results will be obtained:

Loyalties of the membership will be divided

and dissansion mill be created

2.

The national headquarters of the American Nazi

Party will have sufficient reason to question

the adequacy and capabilities of local leadership

3 .

Through established sources progrras proposed by

those in leadership capacities can be sabotaged

tereby the confidence of both the rational

headquacters and the local membership will be

shattered

It is recognized that the burezu considers it vital

that the functions and mamberszig o thase organizations be

brought into the "public spotlight". Chiezzo cous sot deem

-5 -

NW-88608-Deeld:32989629-Page-57

---

## Page 58

such an approack appropriate at this time due

informants of 10ag standiag.

prossure to bear at this particular time could jeopardize

the position of the three informants who furrish valuzble

infornation to this Bureau concerning the nenbership and

activities of the American Nazi Party at Chicago.

It is raquested that the Bureau consider the above

detailed approaches in connection with this program and anthorize

their institution in Caicago.

:

6

-NW-88608_Docld:32989629 Page 58

---

## Page 59

720.1

.::9. 27

UNITED STATES & ERONENT

Memorandum

DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE:

10/15/54

SAC, CHICAGO

COINTELDEO

Ra Bureau letter to SAO, atlanta 9/2/61.

Referenced communication advises the following

hate organizations operating within the Chicago Division.

as included in this program:

American Nazi Party (Origin: Richmord)

White Youth Corps (Origin: Chicago).

Regarding the White Youth Corps it is noted

confidential informants of this division have advised

that the white Youth Corps in Chicago did soi, in tact,

Anezican

Nazi Party at Chicago, Illinois.

All operations

of this unit were subsequently combined with those of

the

nerican Nazi Pariy and were carried on undér that name

Youth Corps was determined to no longer

exist in any way in Chicago and no information has developed

to indicate ine possible reorganization of this group.

in Chicago. Is sources' inowledge the White Youth Corps

does not operate as an organization in any other locale

known to them.

These

further advised that as of

¿ate no information is available to indicate possible

interest in georganizing the White Youth Corps:

NW 88608-Docld:32989629-Page-59

---

## Page 60

1n view of the above, Chicago coconparter ra

further inquisy regarding the turos Your 141

in that tha White Youth Corps is Do L02g0d ¿n SatSidE,

it will not be considered in connection vith this progran.

Regarding Chicago's proposed plan to expose,

disiupt and otherwise neutralize the American Nazi Party

In Chicago, Illinois, the following is submitted for the

• Bureau's consideration:

I. Proposal -i To Increase Financial Burden

0Ễ the American Nazi Party

Brieî Resume of Current

Economic Problems

The principal weainess in the Chicago unit of the

American Nazi Party exists

in their lack of funds to operate.

This fact alone has forestalled all the participation of the

Chicago organization in public demonstrations and other

activities in that sufficient ronies are not available to

provide necessary bonds and/or lines should members be

arrested during the course of such activity.

Further, the Chicago American Nazi Party has

recently purchased

a building which they utilize as a

headquarters. The building is old and in dire need of

repair..

Morigage payments and maintenance alone absorb

the bull of all lunds wich the Chicago unit collects.

Proposed Plan of Approach

In that it is the desire of the local American

Hazi Party to "hold onto" their headquarters building àt

211

cosis, it is apparent that the first line of appcoach

to increase the organization's financial burden is to

direct our efforts at the beacquarters building itseli.

Discreet inquiny and observation has shown the

building has

numerous building code viclations, some of

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 60

---

## Page 61

vich make thè building nainly uninbabitable until suck

riolations

are rectifiad such as alecirical vizing and

plumping.

It is recognized that building code authorities

will allow such deficiencies to exist for a reasonabla

Doziod of time and during such time habitation on the

premises is permitted.

Violations such as those mentioned

are inown to be costly to eliminate and are of the type

that cannot or should not be

"do-it-yourself" projects

since repairs made are subject to inspection by building

authorities.

In that the American Nazi Party has in the past

and still levels its

attacks at persons of the Jewish faith,

Chicago Jewish organizations are most desirable of accumulating

information which

can serve to initiate an aitack by these

organizations against the Anerican Nazi Party.

Prominent

among such organizations are the Jewish War Veterans and

tha Anti-Defamation

League S'nai B'rith

The Chicago Division, either by direct approach

to established sources in these organizations, of through

use c suitable pretext, can make available to appropriata

officials information establishing the fact thai

such building

code violations do exist.

There is no doubt that should

such infornation become available to prope individuals within

these organizations, great

pressure will be brought to bear

to insist that these building code violations are corrected

and the possibility strongly exists that court action may

£011o" and lines may be levied.

As an alternative,

direct approach can be made

to established contacts within the city government to bring

such building code violations to the attention of appropriate

autnozities.

Anticipated Results

•A penetrating analysis of the present econonic

situation oi the American Nazi Party scrongly indicates

- 3

•

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 61

---

## Page 62

that by liamly increasing the financial burden of this

gious the following results are certaia:

1.

American Nazi Party public activity will ba

held to the barest minimum due io fear of

essible arrest resulting in further economic

hardship.

2. Funds will not be available to bring about.

necessary repairs on the headquarters building

3.

Funds for the printing and distribution of

literature locally for recrulting puiposes

would not be

available

4.

Morale of the organization in Chicago, which

is now at 107

epb would be further lessened

thus creating

¿feelings of dissatisfaction among

the menbership

5.

is a direct result of items above the attractivenes

0].

the American Nazi party to possible recruits

would be held at a mininum

II. Proposal -

Divide Loyalty of Membership

Against Present Leaders

Brief Resume of Leadershio

problems

At the prasent tine the Chicago American Nazi Party

has no established leaders

One of the menbers, JOn AllACe.

ras appointed by capacincollocssi, the group's nationat

Fames has failed to undertake the

espons sores a leadership and as a result certain dis-

satisiaction crists among rembers.

As a result of Wisntor's failure current activities

of the organization are being directed by omiseczian.

VaTICa, who is operating without authority of the national

headquarters.

-4=

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 62

---

## Page 63

teasedan

Because of the inactivity and the failure of the

Chicago organization to demonsirate progress tho so-ouzzod

"hard core" of the membership have raised numezous questioas

in the recent

past challenging the adequacy and capability

of milaid and tastica to bead their organization in Chicago.

Proposed Plan of Approach

It is anticipated that through established sources

all of whom are current members of the American dart verty

in Chicago, feelings of discontont can be initiated. gurucez:

communications which would indiczie a tho-ough and substantial

inovledge o the Chicago organization could be directed at

the racione Comander CHORCE INCOLN ROCKWELL either anonymously

or under the signature or a likely member who is known to ba

in Cisagreement with local leadership and practices.

Anticipated Results

•By concentrating:the efforts of this program in a

firm but carefully concealed manner it is strongly believed

that

the following results will be obtained:

1. Loyalties of the membership will be divided

and dissension will be created

2. The national headquarters of the American Nazi

Party will have suiiicient reason to question

• the adequacy and capabilities of local leadership

3.

Through established sources prograns proposed by

• those in leadership capacities can be sabotaged

whereby the confidence of both the national

headquarters and the local membership will be

shattered

It is recognized that the Bureau

considers it vital

thai the functions and membership of these organizations be

brought into the "public spotlight". Chicago does not deen

-

-NW 88608_Doeld:32989629 Page 63

---

## Page 64

such an approach appropriate at this time due to the saall

menbership which at this time consists of three establisted

informants of long standing.

ACtiVIty to brIng bUbiIc

pressure to bear at this particulas time could jeopardize

the position of the three infornants who furnish valuable

information to this Bureau concerning the membership and

activities of the American Nazi Party at Chicago.

It is requested that the Bureau consider the above

detailed approaches in connection with this program and authorize

their institution in Chicago.

- NW 88608 Docid: 32989629 Page 64

---

## Page 65

TO

FROM

io. ÷

• UNITED STATES & ERYMENT

Memorandum

DIRECTOR, FBI

SAC, CHICAGO

COINTEIPRO

DATE:

10/15/51

Re Bureau letter to SAC, Atlanta 9/2/61.

Referenced conmunication advises the followina

haie ozganizations operating within the Chicago Division

as included in this program:

American Nazi Party (Origin: Richnond)

White Youth Corps (Origin: Chicago).

Regarding the White Youth Corps it is noted

confidential informants of this division have advised

that the Thite Youth Corps in Chicago did not, in fact,

exist

as a organization

per se but was considered rather

a "level of aifiliation" within the siructure of the

American dozi Party at Chicago, Illinois.

All operations

of this unit were subsequently combined with those of the

american Nazi Party and were carzied on under that name

only.

The White Youth Corps was determined to no longer

exist in iny way in Chicago and no information nas developed

to indicate the possible reorganization of this group.

03 02 40205 12

furnished reliabie information in the pasi, advised

that

the white Youth corps no longer exists in any capacity

in Chicago.

To sources' knowledge the White Youth Corps

does not operate as an organization in any other locale

Known to them.

These sources further advised that as of

this cate no information is available to indicate possible

interest in georganizing the White Youth Corps:

NW 88608 Docid:32989629 Page 65

---

## Page 66

In view of the above, Chicazo co coralane. *

further inquiry regarding ine

made tend ten.

and in that the White Youth Corps is Iu longes in cadetoreo,

it will

be considezad in connection wiüh this program.

Regarding Chicago's proposed plan to expose,

aisrupt and otherwise neutralize the American Nazi Party

in Chicago, Illinois, the following is suitted for the

• Bureau's consideration:

1. Proposal - To Increase Financial Burden

Of the American Nazi Party

Brief Resume Of Current

Economic Problems

The principal weainess in the Chicago unit of the

American Nazi Party exists in their lack of funds to operate.

This

fact alone has

forestalled all the participation of the

Chicago organization in public demonstrations and other

activities in that sufficient nonies are not available to

provide necessary bonds and/or fines should members be

arrested during the course of such activity.

Further, the Chicago Anerican Nazi Party has

recently purchased a building wich they utilize as a

headquarters. The building is old and in dise need of

repair.

Mortgage payments and maintenance alone absorb

the bull of all funds which the Chicago unit collects.

Proposed Plan of Approach

In that it is the desire of the local American

Nazi Party to "hold onto" their headquarters building at

all costs, lt is appazent that the first line of aoproach

to increasa the organization's financial burden is to

direct our efforis at the headquarters building itseli.

Discreet inquiry and observation has shown the

building has numerous building code violations, some o1

- 2

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 66

---

## Page 67

vhici maire the building nainly uninhabitable until suck

violations are rectified such as electrical vizing anc

pLumping.

It is recognized that building code authorities

will allow such deficiencies to exist for a reasonabla

peziod of time and during such time habitation on the

premises is permitted.

Violations such as those mentioned

are inown to be costly to eliminate and are of the type

that cannot or should not be

"do-it-yourself" projects

since repairs made are subject to inspaction by building

authorities.

In that the American Nazi Party has in the past

and still levels its attaces at porsons of the Jewish faith,

Chicago

jewish organisations are nost desirable of accumulating

information which can serve to initiate an attack by these

organizations againsi the American Mass Party.

Prominent

among such organizations are

the Jewis. War Veterans and

the Anti-Defamation

League B'nai B'rita...

The Chicago Division, either by direct approach

to established sources in these crganizations, or through

use ci suitable pretexo, can make available to appropriate

officials infornation establishing the fact thai such building

code violations do exisi.

There is no doubt that snould

such information becone

available to proper individuals nithin

these organizations, great pressure will be brought to bear

to insist that

these building code violations are corrected

and the possibility strongly exists that court action may

#01l0? and fines may be levied.

As an alternative,

a direct approach can be made

to established contacts

within the city government to bring

such building code violations to the attention of appropriate

authorities.

Anticioated Results

•A penetrating analysis of the present economic

situation of the American Nazi Party strongly indicates

3

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 67

---

## Page 68

thot by firmly increasing the financial burden of this

group the following results are certain:

•.

1. American Nazi Party public activity will ba

held to the barest minimum due to fear of

essible arrest resulting in further economic

hardshio.

2. Iunds will dot de available to bring about.

necessary repairs on the headquarters building

3.

Funds for the printing and distribution of

literature locally for recruiting purposes

would not be available

Morale of the organization in Chicago, which

is now at low ebb would be further lessened

trus

creating feelings of dissatisfaction anong

the membershio

5.

As a direci

result of liens above the attractivenes

of, the American Nazi Party to possible recruits

would be held at a minimum

II.

Proposal -

Divide Loyalty of Membership

Against Present Leaders

Briel Resume of Leadershio

Probiens

At the prasent tine the Chicago American Nazi Party

has no established leaders.

One of the members, JOnAlIAGE,

TaS appointed by CORCE INCOROCKIE, the grOup's nationa

сормалает; пошеуєт,

Times has failed to undertake the

responsibilities of leadership and

as a result certain dis-

satisiaction exists

among

members.

As a resuli of maico's failure current activities

of the organization are being directed by ChrISTOPHaR

Vanautton, who is operating without authority of the national

headquarters.

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 68

---

## Page 69

Likesa

Because of the inactivity and the failure of the

Chicago organization to demonsizate progress the so-cazzed

"hard core" of the membership have raised numerous questioas

in the recent past challenging the adequacy and capability

o sist and-Kittion to read their organization in Chicago.

Prozosed Plan of Approach

It is anticionted that through established sources

all o÷ whon are curzent narbers of the American Naci Berty

2л ССедо,

keelings on discontent can be santiated. faceces,

communications which would indiczie a tho-ough and sustancial

knowledge of the Chicago organization could be directed at

the racionan commander elones tincoln rockWant either anonymously

or under the signature of a likely member who is known to ba

in disagreement with local leadership and practices.

Anticipated Results

•By concentrating: the efforts of this program in a

firm but carefully concealed

manner it is strongly believed

that the following results vill be obtained:

1. Loyalties of the membership vill be

and dissension will be created

divided

2.

The national headquarters of the American Nazi

Party will have sufficient reason to question

• the acequacy and capabilities of local leadership

Through established sources prograns proposed by

those in leadership capacities can be sabotaged

whereby the confidence of both the national

headquarters and the local membership will be

shattered

It is recognized that the Bureau considers it vital

that the functions and membership of these organizations be

22Z0

the "public spotlight". Chicago does not deen

- 5 -

NW-88608-Đocld:32989629-Page-69-

---

## Page 70

such an approach appropriate at this time due to the saall

menbershis which at this time consists of three establistod

intormants of long standing.

Activity to bring pubiic

pressure. to bear at this particular time could jeopazdize

the position of the three informants mo furnish valuable

information io this Eureau concerning the membership and

activitias

of the American Nazi Party at Chicago.

It is requested that the Bureau consider the above

detailed approaches in connection with this program and anthorize

their institution in Chicago.

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 70

---

## Page 71

TO

FROM

SUBTECT

ww, 1.0.27

CITED STATES GOI \MEVT

ilemorandum

DIRICTOR, FBI I

SAC, DOXVILLE

COUNTERINTELLIGENCI PROGRAM

INTERNAL SECURITY

DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS

DATE:

--

10/15/64

ReBulet to Atlanta 9/2/54

In compliance with referenced letter, the Knoxville

Office has opened an active control file captioned as above

and has assigned this matter to an Agent who is experienced

in the investigation oi hate and racist-type organizations.

The Knoxville Office currently has under investigation

two klan organizations, 'The Dixie Klans, Knights of the Ku

Klux Klan, Inc, (DK, KKKK) has its national headquarters in

Chattanooga, Tennessee, and presently has one

chapter active

"in that area. Information reflects that the weekly meetings

of the chapter of this organization are attended by approxi-

under investigation in this division is the United Klans of

America, Inc., Knights of the Ku Klux Klan (UKA, KKKK).

The

national headquarters of this organization is located within

the Birmingham Division.

The organization has active

chapters

within the Knosville territory at Harriman,.

. Maryville, Knox-

ville and Sevierville.

The Maryville chapter has approximately

127

members and the

other three chapters have less than 30

members.

Investigation and information obtained from informants

disclose no information that there are any "Action groups"

within either of the two klan organizations.

Informants have

been continually reminded to be alert for any members within

the groups who might organize strong-arm groups to engage in

any violent actions and they have repogted no information of

this nature.

-NW.88608_Docld:32989629 Page 71

---

## Page 72

In considering various cisruptive actions wer

se exercised against these grouge via, ci

Le sace de datini ni

tint neither the dk, KaK nor tre

on the Attorney General's list wader 20 23260.

Knozville territory does not lie within the traditionali

deep South, there is, of course, some sympathy for organizations

such as the klans within the territory as evidenced by the

increased growth and activity of these organizations in recent

Within the Knoxville territory there have been no acts.

of violence within recent years which were attributable to the

Although there may not be any public sympathy for the

Khan in this area, there is certainly no antagonism toward

"the organization and many persons have a passive feeling

toward its membership and activities.

In some instances,

politicians have solicited the support of the klan in local

elections.

Just recently, one of the informants of the Knoxville

Office, who is a high official in the UKA, KKKK, reported that

one of

the candidates for U. S. Congress running from the

Knoxville district had contacted him and

solicited the support

of kian members on his behalf.

Because of such

factors as the above, it is not believed

trat the cooperation of

individuals can be utilized for plans

of disruptive action such as migat be available if the targets

were Communist front organizations or related groups.

In this

regard, although news media are very cooperative with the

in this territory, it is not believed that in a program

such

as this ias, it would be leasible, to utilize news media

in any counterintelligence operation in this area.

This matter has been discussed with Agents handling.

investigations of the klan organizations in the Knoxville

-Division and the following plans have been suggested as feasible

for operation against the Dk, KKKK and UKA, Kikk in this terri-

It is suggested that anonymous telephone calls be made

to employers of klan members inferring to the employer that

his company or business must be following a racist policy in

view of the fact that he has an employee (giving his identity)

• - 2-

L NW 88608_Docld:32989629 Page 72

---

## Page 73

no is a nerver of the klan organization.

be inited to those instances where the klan member is a-c.

by some large company or leading business who would possisit

Do concerned about the picture they present to the public con-

cerning racial matters.

In view of the previously expressed desires of the

officials of the Knoxville Police Depariment to maintain

facial

harmony in knoxville, it is believed that arrangaments coula

be made with the Chief of Police to have one or more squad cars

visible in the vicinity of the meeting hall of the Knoxville

lavern on the nights of their

meetings.

It is believed that

if the members saw these squad cars parked in the vicinity on

a continuing basis, it would cause them some apprehension

and would act as a

deterrent to their activities, as well as

possible recruitment of new members.

The UKA,

KKKK often holds public meetings on private

property leased for that burpose.

At these meetings, officials

make speeches and invite spectators to make application for

nembership.

Informants report that the actual purpose of such

= meeting is to publicize the klan and secure new members.

in a few instances, informants have reporied that some members

arriving at the meetings nave intentionally covered their

license plate with a confederate flag metal insignia or with

a facsimile.

On occasions, both the rear and front license

plates have

been obscured or usually only the front license

obscured. It is believed through the cooperation of the High-

• Patrol on a command level, that patrolmen might be assigned

to the area where the meeting is held so that if

the klan

mombers leaving the meeting continue to have their license plate

obscwred,

they may be arrested fos violation of the state law

prohibiting such.

In connection with the informant program of the Knoxville

Office, certain persons are interviewed to ascertain their

cooperation and their potentials as a possible informant.

It is believed that in such cases where antagonism is shown

to the Agents' contact, that a later anonymous call might be

made to other menbers accusing the person contacted by the

- 3-

-NW 88608_Docld:32989629_ Page 73

---

## Page 74

FBi, as being an informant.

This would cause a disruptive in

iluence anong the sank and file and would arouse suspicios and

aistrust,

This same plan could be pursued further and cruis

be made to members even though tney had not actually been con

tacted by an Agent in connection with the informant program.

Additional ideas and tactics were discussed but were

not considered feasible.

because it was

believed

Many of the ideas were discarded

that other actions proposed would

greatly jeopardize our present informant coverage.

As the

Bureau is aware, this office has informant coverage in these

a very high level and we have been able to

secure detailed information on membership rolls and appli-

cations, as well as detailed information on personal activities

• of members, as well as detailed activity of the membership as

a grow.

The bureau has previously been advised that the program

0f

interviewing klan members at the time of the assassination

of Presideni KENNEDY and later in connection with the bombings

in Birmingham tended to jeopardize our informant coverage,

due to their high-level positions and the fact that some. of

the klan nembers felt that the information in the possession

• the IBI could only have been obtained from some high official

source in the klan.

Agent personnel responsible for the klan investigations

are continuing to give this program thought and attention, and

as the investigations progress, expect that additional ideas

will be submitted to the Bureau in connection with the status.

reports.

The implementation of any of the above-listed plans,

of course, will not be put into effect without Bureau approval.

and beneiit of Bureau suggestions.

-NW-88G08~Đoeld:32989629-Page-74

---

## Page 75

-ROK

SUBIECT

¡NITED STATES GOI. \MENT

Memorandum

DIRECTOR, FBI I

SAC, STORMILIE

COUNTERINTELLICENCE PROGRE

INTERNAL SECURITY

DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS

DATE:

10/15/64

ReBulet to Atlanta 9/2/64

In compliance with referenced letter, the Knoxville

Office has opened an active control file captioned as above

and has assigned this matter to an Agent who is experienced

in the investigation of hate and racist-type oxganizations.

The Knoxville Office currently has under investigation

two klan organizztions.

The Dixie Klans, Knights of the iu

aux Klan, Inc. (Di, KKKK has its national headquarters in

Chattanooga, Tennessee, and presently has one

chapter active

in that area. Infornation reflects that the weekly meetings

of the chapter of this organization are attended by approxi-

nately 25 members, although the actual membership is reported

to be approxinately 45 menbers.

The other klan organization

under investigation in this civision is the United Klans of

America, Inc., Knights of the Ku Klux Klan (UKA, KKKK). ' The

national headquarters of this organization is located within

the. Birmingham Division.

The organization has active chapters

within the knoxville territory at Harriman, Maryville, Knox-

ville and Sevierville.

The Maryville chapter has approximately

• 127 members and the other three chapters have less than 30

menbers.

Investigation and information obtained from informants

disclose

no information that there are any "Action groups"

within either of the two kian organizations. Informants have

been continually reminded to be alert for any members within

the

groups who might organize strong-arm groups to engage in

any violent actions and they have repoited no information of

this nature.

-MW_88608_Docld:32989629 Page 75

---

## Page 76

In considering various ciscuntive aotions or " :

on the Aitorney General's list under 20 "û÷50.

Knoxville terrltony does not dle within the tracitiona.

deep South,

there is, of course, some sympathy for organizations

such as the klans within the territory as evidenced by the

increased growth and activity of these organizations in recent

Within the Knoxville territory there have been no acts.

of violence within recent years which were attributable to. the

kian. Although there may not be any public sympathy for the

Kian in this area, there is certainly no antagonism toward

"the organization and many persons have a passive feeling

toward its membership and activities.

In some instances,.

politicians have solicited the support of the klan in local

elections.

Just secently,.. one of the informants of the Knoxville

Office, who is a high official in the UKA, KKKK, reported that

one of

the candidates for U. S.. Congress running from the

Knoxville districi had contacted him and

solicited the support

of klan members on his behalf.

Secause of such factors as the above, it is not believed

that the cooperation of individuals can be utilized for plans

of disruptive action such as might be available if the targets

were Conmunist front organizations or related groups.

In this

regard,

although news media are very cooperative with the

Bureau in this territory, it is not believed that in a program

such as this ias, it would be ieasible, to utilize news media

in any counterintelligence operation in this area.

This matter has been discussed with Agents handling

investigations of the klan organizations in the Knoxville

- Division and the following plans have been suggested as feasible

for operation against the DK, KKKK and UKA, KKKK in this terri-

tory:

It is suggested that anonymous telephone calls be madé

to employers of klan members inferring to the employer that

his company or business must be following a racist policy in

view of the fact that he has an employee (giving his identity)

-2 -

-NV 88608_Docld:32989629_ Page 76

---

## Page 77

who is a nenber of the kian organization.

These calis voi

be linited to those instances where the klan member is w. mi

by some large company of leading business who would possiaiy

be concerned about the picture they present to the public con-

cerning racial matters.

In view of the previously expressed desires of the

Dificials of the Knoxville Police Department to maintain sacial

harmony in Knoxville, it is believed that arrangements could

be made with the Chief of Police to have one or more squad cars

visible in the vicinity of the meeting hall of the Knoxville

ilavern on the nights of their

meetings.

It is believed that

if the menbers saw these squad cars parked in the vicinity on

a continuing basis, it would cause them some apprehension

and would act as a

deterrent

to their activities, as well as

possible recruitment of new

members.

The UKA,

KiKk often holds public meetings on private

property leased for that purpose. At these meetings, officials

make speeches and inviie spectators to make application ior

nembership.

Informants report thai the actual purpose of such

a meeting

is to publicize the klan and secure new members.

In a few instances, informants have reported that some members

arriving at the meetings have intentionally covered their

license plate with a confederate flag metal insignia or with

a facsimile.

On occasions, both the rear and front license

plates have been obscured or usually only the front license

obscured. It is believed through the cooperation of the High-

way

Patrol on a command level, that patrolmen might be assigned

to the area where the meeting is held so that if the klan

meners leaving the meeting continue to have their license plate

poscured,

they may be arrested for violation of the state law

prohibiting such.

in connection with the informant program of the Knoxville

Office, certain persons are interviewed to ascertain their

cooperation and

their potentials as a possible informant..

It is believed that in

such cases where antagonism is shown

to the Agents' contact, that a later anonymous call might be

made to other member's

accusing the person contacted by the

- 3-

-V-88608-Docid: 32982629 Page 7L

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## Page 78

I3i as being an informent.

This would cause a disruptive in-

fluence among the sank and file and would arouse suspicion and

distrust.

This same plan could be pursued lucinei doù

be made to members even though they had not actually been con

tacted by an Agent in connection with the informant progcan.

Additional ideas and tactics were discussed but were

not considered feasible.

Jany of the ideas were discarded

because it was believed

that other actions proposed would

greatly jeopardize our present informant coverage.

Bureau is aware, this office has informant coverage in these

organizations on a very high level and we have been able to

secure detailed information on membership rolls and appli

cations, as well as detailed information on personal activities

of members, as well as detailed activity of the membership as

a group.

The Bureau has previously been advised that the program

interviewing klan members at the time of the assassination

of Presideni KINODY and later in connection with the bombings

in Birmingham tended to jeopardize our informant coverage,

cue to their high-level positions and the fact that some of

the klan members felt that the information in the possession

of the IBI could only haye been obtained from some high official

source in the klan.

..

Agent personnel responsible for the klan investigations

22a continuing to give this program thought and attention, and

as the investigations progress, expect that additional ideas

will be submitted to the Bureau in connection with the status.

reports.

The implementation of any of the above-listed plans,

of course, will not be put into effect without sureau approval.

and benefit of Bureau suggestions.

-NW-88608-Đocld:32989629-Page-78-

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## Page 79

THOM

EGA set Rando. 2i

• CAITED STATES GO KIMEVT

Memorandum

DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE:

10/15/64

SEC, RICHMOND

COUNTERINTELLICENCE PROGRAM

INTERNAL SECURITY

DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS.

•ReSulet to Atlanta, dated 9/2/64.

The following is an analysis of potential counter-

intelligence action against the American Nazi Parsy (AN?),

the only hate or Klan organization currently active in the

Richmond territory.

The ANP is-headed-Dy-GEORGE-LINCOLN ROCKWELL,

---

a sinite American citizen, who resides with his "Army" at

6150 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, Va. Headquarters of ANP

1s located at 928 North 'Randolph St., Arlingion, Va.

• The ANP "Army" consists of about fifteen nondescript

individuals from all parts of the country who have no place to

80g

They are between the ages of 18 to 40.

ANP also has

members throughout the country, totaling about 200.

GEORGE LINCOEN ROCKWELL has many personal idio-

syncrasies or weaknesses which make him vulnerable for attack.

He cannot stand criticism; he is afraid for his own personal

safety; he continually believes that he has been infiltrated

by the

Anti-Defamation League,

the FBI and hate groups.

He is

suspicious of all members, believing they will be potential

assassins of himself or spies within his group.

In view of these characteristics, it is suggested

that consideration be given for a carerul campaign of corres-

pondence to be sent to ReCitest Isom unnamed individuals

to wann him concerning

a new member who plans to ao bodily.

harm

to him.

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 79

---

## Page 80

in this connection, correspondence

ChOuld bE ciReCted to ROCKELE to plant the

concerning new members, identifying them as

inüi-Defamation League

on hate groups such as the National

states Rights Party (NSR2).

It is noted that both buildings leasea by the ene

From "symoathizers"

are in poor condition and would be,

most

LIKelys

in violation of local law. It is suggested that con-

sideration be given to contacting officials of the Arlington

County Board of Health and the Arlington County Fire Depart

ment for an official investigation of ANP premises.

Furthermore, in this regard it is believed that if

reliable news sources were apprised of the investigation,

nore would De an expose of the

true conditions of the ANP,

rasulting in public criticism o rookiebE. Also, the publicity

would tena to frustrate efforts to recruit new and youthul

adherents who hold any grandeus of ANP when apprised of the

true picture.

ROCKWeLL maintains a printing press at ANP Head-

quarters, 928 2.

Randoiph

St.,

and without this

printing

press, AnP activities woula be greatly impairea.

This printing

press

is astrally oured by a former member,.

CHRESTOPER--AVERY

• BAllEy, who leased the printing press to RockiEtItor Sio

pen year.

has expressed interest in getting back his printing press.

It is suggested that consideration be given to approaching

BAtERY, through a third party, to seek the return of the

printing press and possibly entertainment of a law suit which

seeks the return of the printing press. BAILEY is presently

residins in she Washington, D.C. area.

EDwARD RUlE is noted animosity exists between ROCKWELL and

KIELDS-BEd OF NSEP, Furthermore, It Is notea

that ROCkiEld recently brought suit against FIELDS for slander

in a letter written to a third party.

It is suggested that

thás

relationship could be further antogonized by inflammatory

correspordence, ostensibly sent to ROCkwElL by NSRP officials

In Sinningnan; Alabama.

It is thought such correspondence might

also result in disruptive action of NSRP.

- 2 -

NW 88606-Dold 32989629-Page 80

---

## Page 81

It is recommended that consideration be given

co the poential counterintelligence actions against ANP

and if the Bureau approves, specific recommendations will

be immeciately submitted.

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 81

---

## Page 82

TRON:

SESJECT:

.2, 0J.37

• CITED STATES GO RUMENT

Memorandum

DIRECIOR, IBI

DATE:

10/15/64

SEC,

RICHMOND

COUNTERINTELLICENCE PROGRAM

INCEPNAL SECURITY

DISRUZTION OF HATE GROUPS:

ReBulet to Atlanta, dated 9/2/64.

The following is

an analysis of potential counter-

intelligence action against the American Nazi Party (ANP),

the only hate or kian organization currently active in the

Richmond territory.

The ANP iS-headed by CEORGE "LINCOEN. ROCKWELL,

¿ waite american citizer, wno resides with his "Army" at

6150 wilson Boulevard,

is located at 928 North 'Randolph St., Arlington, va.

Arlington, Va. Headquarters of ANP

The ANP "Army" consists of about fifteen nondescript

rembers throughout the.

country, totaling about 200.

GEORCE LINCOLN ROCKNEEL has many personal idio-

syncrasies or weaknesses which nake him vulnerable for attack.

Re cannot stand criticisn; he. is afraid for his own personal

safety; he continually believes that he has been infiltrated

by the

Anti-Defamation League,

the FBI and nate groups. He is

suspicious of all members, believing they will be potential

assassins of himself or spies within his group.

In view of these characteristics, it is suggested

that consideration be given for a careful campaign of corres:

pondence to be sent to recueLt irom unnamed individuals

to warn nim

concerning a new member who plans to do bodily

narm

2am,

NW 88608 Docid:32989629 Page 82

---

## Page 83

Puncher,

in this connection, correspondence

enould de directed to Rockett to piant the

seed of

suspicion

concerning new members, identifying them as

"spies" or the

Anti-Defamation League

•or hate groups such as the National

States Rights Party (NSRP).

It is noted that boch bulldings leasea by the ANe

from "sympathizers"

are in poor condition and would be, mosi

LIKeLy,

in violation of local law. It is suggested that con-

sideration be given to contacting officials of the Arlingtor

County Board of Health and the Arlington County Fire Depart-

ment for an official investigation of ANP premises.

Furthermore, in this regard it is believed that li

sellable news sources were apprised of the investigation,

there would be an expose of the true conditions of the ANP,

resulting in public criticism oi Roommat Also,

the publicity

would tend to frustrate efforts to recruit new and youthful

adherents who hold any grandeur of ANP when apprised of the

true picture.

ROCKWELL maintains a printing press at ANP Head-

quarters, 928 N. Randolph

St.,

and without this printing

press, ANP activities would be greatly impaired.

This printing

Press

is actually

owned by a former member.

CHRISTOPER-AVERY

-BArLEY, who leased the printing press to ROCkETI IOISO

per year.

Information recently received indicates that BAJay

has expressed interest in getting back his printing press.

It is suggested that consideration be given to approaching

BAILEY, through a thira party, to seek ine return of the

printing press and possibly entertainment of a law suit which

seeks the return of the printing press. BATLEY is presently

residing in the washington, Dond. area.

It is noted animosity exists between ROCKWAEL an

EDHARD" RAPELDS head

that Poet recent brought curthermore, it is noted

suit against FIELDS for slander

in a letter written to a third party.

It is suggested that

this

relationship could be further antogonized by inflammatory

correspondence, ostensibly sent to ROCKiEDE by NSRP Officials

in Birmingnam,

Alabama.

It is thought such correspondence might

also resuli in disruptive action of NSRP.

- 2 -

NW 88608-Docld:32989629 Page 83

---

## Page 84

=ù is reconnended unat consideration be given

to the potential

counterintelligence actions

against ANP

and 1i

she sureau approves, specilic recommeraations

will

be immediately submitted.

3

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 84

---

## Page 85

220.:

SUBJECT:

UNITED STATES & ERNMENT

Illemorandum

DIRECTOR, 33I

DATE:

=.;

SAC, SAY.

COUNTER INTELLIGENCE POGRAM

INTERNAL SECURITY

DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS

ReBulet to Atlanta, 9/2/64.

The Savannah Office has the following klan, gagani -

• zations

currently under active investigation.

1.

Association of Georgia Klans

This klan nas. only one klavern,

Klavern #2A:

located in Savannah, Georgia.

It has recently

been attenpiing to organize a klavern in

Brunswick,: Georgia,

but has not met with any

success: I

CHARLES-ELADDO, the Jeader of this group,

is ineffeciive in that he talks a great deal

about what they should do and what the oificers

and menbers should do, but does not take any

specific action.

2.

association of South Carolina Klans, KKKK

This klan aow has only one active klavern within

the Savannah Division and that is Klavern $335

in liest Columbia, S. C.

This klan has conducted

several rallies in South Carolina for the purpose.

of building up their klavern and starting new

Haverns, and may

have a new klavern in

Hemingway, s. C.

The active leader of unis klan group appears te

Columbia.:

5: -

co. although he carries the title

only or seczecary.

There have been recent

indications that members of the Board of Association

of South Carolina Klans feel HODGES is usurping.

their authority and makine decisions without

consulting then.

NW 88608 Docid:32989629 • Page 85

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## Page 86

3.

nized Klans of America, Inc., TAKK

This kian

group has the folloving active Ilavoras

located within the Savannan Division:

a .

Klavern #4, Olanta, S. C.

This Flavern moved about a year ago from

Iflinghan to Olanta in anticipation of

attracting nore members; but still attracts

a maximum of 9 members to its meetings.

b.

Kavern #41,. Savannah, Georgia.

The attendants at the meetings of this klavern

have

fallen .off to usually a maximum of 6.

It did sponsor one rally in the summer of

1964 which was considered a failure.

c.

Klavern #314, Swainsboro, Georgia.

This Ilavern is one of the most active, but

meets only once a month. lanynembers- also

neet with Klavern #310,

Waynesboro, Georgia,

but neither klavern has engaged in any activity

other then one street walk held in Waynesboro

this past summer.

The active membership has

fallen off apparently due to lack of activity

during the past year.

d.

Klavern #310,

Waynesboro, Georgia

This klavern has only 8 to 10 members in

attendance at their monthly meetings and has

lost membership during the past year.

e. Klavern #301, Vashington, Georgia.

This klavern has reportedly been in a doubtful

state for the past two years.

The klavern

was torn by dissension over financial matters

about swo years ago and has rarely had sufficiant

members in attendance since that time to hola

a meeting.

-2-

NW 88608 Docid:32989629 Page 86

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## Page 87

Altamaha Ken's Club #72, Baxley, Ga.

......

This lavern is the newest active klavern

and has about so members, of which about

are active.

They ousted one axalted

Cyclops who indicated he favored aggressive

action, and several members have quit because

of the views of this Exalted Cyclops.

This

is the only klavern in the Savannah Division

believed to have an "action" group within

the klavern.

meeting ln 7/27/64, the Inalted Cyclops

advised thom to start a military unit.

plan to have this unit trained in a secret

type of training. It was indicated that in

the event the Conmunists and Negroes attempt

to take: over public facilities,

that the klan

would tale over operation of the railroads.

At a meeting on 8/11/64, ji was decided the

nilitary unit would be called the "Brothers

of Patriots and that they have a bank account

A fee is charged to join, and they

are going to teach the members judo.

The nost effective disruptive action taken against the

Ilan so far was the interviewing of klan members in connection

with the "Bapborb" case.

•It is believed the most effective counterintelligence

progran would be a program that would reveal to the members

of this organization that their identities are known to the

IBI.

This vould include a program of harassment by setting up

"not too discreet" stake out of the meeting places or roads

leading to meeting places to obtain license numbers, interview

of the klan members, neighborhood investigations and

inquiry

at their places of

employrent concerning the members' activity.

in the Ilan.

It is further believed that efforts should be made

curing the course of these inquiries to obtain knowledge

concerning the individual member's personal life which might

- 3-

NW 88608-Docld: 32989629_ Page 87

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## Page 88

irrish incoanation that couid be used in a campaign of

anonymous teiagnone calls or notes to his family or employes.

Luring interviers of merbers, inferences or slight

ants could be cropped indicating another specific member

sz the zlavern as the source of information.

03 9/25/54, ChieF STROM (NA) , South

Carolina

Lav Bacorcement Division (SCLED), Colunbia, S. C., advised

his organization had arresied five persons

from the vicinity

0j Test Colunbia,.S. C., in connection with the burning of a

cross on the grounds of the Governor's Mansion, Columbia,

s. C.

These persons acmitted they are members of a recently

loined group of the tnited Klans of America, Inc., at

West

Columbia, s. C.

Chief STROl said he desires to call in several

responsible nerspapermen fron throughout South Carolina, and

as thon to publish articles in the leading South Carolina

nowspapers, pointing out to the pablic how membership in a klan

organization nay buri an individual, his family or his children

12 later Life.

Gres stoM zeauested that the fBI assist him

in sathead lose setion concerning this matter such as how.

atec the omportunity. for the klan member

or Mencors o-nis fanily =

in obtaining employment with the

U.S: Covernment:

In addition, some klan informants are in a position

to take the side of dissident groups within the klaberns and

. •

neip to create of increase dissension..

It is requested that

the Bureau give consideration

to helping

Chies naustRol of the SOLeD in connection ith

his request for information as ta how klan membership may

provent employsent by klan menbers or members of their families

-the

Mederal

Government

:""

It is also suggested that the Atlanta Office ascertain

applicable state laws that could be used in the State of

Georgiu

in discouraging klan nembership,

particularly on the

part of state or local enployees or appointeés.

-4-

-NW 83608-Docld 32989629 Page 88

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## Page 89

TO

22041

SUBJECT:

io. 27

(NITED STATES & ERVMENT

Iviemorandum.

DIRECTOR, IBI

DATE:

101.

SAC, SAVANAU

COUNTER INTELLIGENCE PROCRAM -

INTERNAT SECURITY

DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS -

= tomor

ReBulet to Atlanta, 9/2/64,

The Savannah Office has the following klan, orgáni-

Zations currently under active investigation..

1.

Association of Georgia Klans

• =

«size arca

This klan has. only one klavern,

Klavern #2A

located in Savannah, Georgia.

It has recently

been attempting to organize a klavern in

Brunswick, Georgia, but has rot met with any

success: J

CHARISS HADDOX, the leader of this group,

is ineffective in that

talks a great deal

about what they should do and what the officers

and members should do, but does not take any

specziic action.

2.

Association of South Carolina Klons, KKKK

This klan now has only one active klavern within

the Savannah Division and that is Klavern #335

in West

Columbia, S. C.

This klan has conducted

several rallies in South Carolina for the purpose:

of building up their klavern and starting new

klaverns, and may have a new klavern in

Hemingway, s. C.

The active leades of unis klan group appears tc

ta post o ice emptoyee in

columbza..

S: C.. although he carries the title

only of secretary.

There have been recent

indications that

members of the Board of Association

of South Carolina Klans {eel HODGES. is usurping

their authority and makine decisions without

consulting them.

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 89

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## Page 90

3.

=

Lasted Klans of America, Inc., KiKK

This kian group

has the folloving cotive lIararas

located within the Savannan Division:

• a.

Klavern #4, Clanta, S. C.

This klavern moved about a year ago from

Effingham to Olanta in anticipation of

attracting more members; but still attracts

a maximum of s members to its meetings.

b.

Klavern #41,. Savannah, Georgia.

The attendants at the meetings of this klavern

have fallen off to usually a maximum of 6.

It did sponsor one rally in the summer of

1954 which was considered a failure.

c. Klavern 311, Swainsboro, Georgia.

This klavern is one of the most active, but

meets only once a month.

Many nembers also

meet with Ilavern #310,

Waynesboro, Georgia,

but neither klavern has engaged in any activity

Other than one street walk held in laynesboro

this past summer.

The active nembership has

fallen off apparently due to lack of activity

during the pasi year.

à.

Klavesn *310,

raynesboro, Georgia

This Klavern has only 8 to 10 members in

attendance at their monthly meetings

and has

lost nembership during the past year.

e. Kavern $301, lashingion, Georgia.

This klavern

has reportedly been in a doubtful

state for the past two years

The klavern

was torn by dissension over financial matters

about two years ago and has rarely had

suficient

members in attendance since that time to hold

& meeting.

-2.-

NW 88608 Docid:32989629 Page 90

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## Page 91

_itamaba ton's Club 172, Baxley, Cr.

Iris klavern is the newest active klavern

and has about 10 members, of which about

They ousted one Ixalted

Cyclops who indicated he favored aggressive

aCTIOn, and several members have quit because

of the views of this Exalted Cyclops.

This

is the only, klavern in the Savannah Division

believed to have an "action" group within

the klavern.

At a meeting a 7/27/54, the Balted Cyclops

advised thiom

¿o start a military

unit.

They

plan to have

this unit trained in a secret

type of training. It was indicated that in

the

event the Conmunists and Negroes attempt

1o take: over public facilities,

that the klan

voule tale over operation of the railroads.

it a meeting on 8/11/64, it was dacided the

military unit rould be called the "Brothers

0 patriots" and that they have a bank account

as such.

A fee is charged to join, and they

are going io teach

1 the members judo.

The nost effective disruptive action taken against the

lan so far was the interviewing of klan members in connection

with the "Bagbonb"

case.

•It is believed the most effective counterintelligence

prograr would be a progras that would reveal to the members

of this organization thai their identities are known to the

ГЗІ.

This would include a program of harassment by setting up

"not too discreet" stake out of the meeting places or roads

lcading to meeting

places to obtain license numbers, interview

of the klan cambers, neighborhood investigations and inquiry

at thoir places of employment concerning the members' activity.

It is further believed that efforts should be made

curing the course of these inquiries to obtain knowledge

concerning the individual menber's personal life wich might

-3-

NW 88608-Doeld:32989629-Page-91.

---

## Page 92

ticisa incoration that couid be used in a campaign of

aronymous telephone calls or

notes to his family or employer.

During interviews of members, inierences or slight

incis could be dropped indicating another spocific momber

on the klavern as the source of information.

On 9/25/64, CHOE WESTION (NA), South Carolina

Lar Dazorcement Division

(SCLED), Colunbia, S. C., advisea

his organization had' arrested live persons

from the vicinity

of esi Columbia, S. C., in connection with the burning of a

cross on the grounds of the Governor's Mansion, Columbia,

S. C.

These persons admitted they are members of a recently

romed group of the United klans of America, Inc., at West

Columbia; S. C.

Chiet SPRo said he desires to call in several

responsible newspapermen from throughout south Carolina, and

asi thea to publish articles in the leading South Carolina

nowspapers, pointing out to the public how membership in a klan

organization may hurt an individual, his family or his children

in lator life.

GueS SIROM sequested that the FBI assist him

in gathering

information concerning this macter such as how

an membership

or menbers of nis family in

D. S, Government:

In addition, some klan informants are in a position

io tale the side of dissident groups within the klaberns and

:help to create or increase dissension.

It is requested that the Bureau give consideration

-77

connection with

kis request. for. information. as. 4o. how klan membership MY

reynt employment py klan menbers menbers their amiries

the

¿ Zederal

Government

It is also suggested thai the Atlanta Office ascertain

applicable state laws that could be used in the State of

Georgia in discouraging klan membership, particularly on the

part of state or local enployees or appointees.

NW-88608-Đoeld:32989629-Rage 92

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## Page 93

ROM :

SCEJECT:

Memorandum

DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: October 15, 1964

SAC, BALTIMORE

COUNTER INTELT IGENCE PROGRAM

INTERNAL SECURITY

DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS

Reference Bureau letter to Atlanta dated

September 2, 1964.

A review of Baltimore files reflects that there are

presently no Klan organizations operating within the territory

covered oÿ the Baltimore Offica.

Baltimore files reflect that there

are several alleged members of

the American Nazi Party (ANº)

living in the Baltimore area.

However these individuals are

associated with the ANP located in the territory covered by the

Richmond Office and there are no ANP groups in the Baltimore

territory.

The Fighting American Nationalists (FAN)

organization in the Baltimore area is defunct.

The National States Rights Party (NSRP) was to some

extent active on the Eastern Shore of Maryland during the Spring

and early Summer of 1964 but there has been no reported..

activity there in recent months.

The only evidence of current

activity by the NSRP in the Baltimore area are news stories which

appeared in the saptember 20 and September 30, 1964, editions of

the

(Baltimose Evening Sun,

which reflected that two Baltimore County

Councilmen received letters Irom WILLIAM BREGSFORD, organizer

of the iSre, threatening to "paper" their districts

derogatory

pamphlets if they voted for a proposed civil rights

bill in Baltimore Gounty.

Information was also received that

a Leerled put out by the

NSRP entitled "A Stab in the Back" was

being distributed in the Towson, Maryland, area. of Baltimore

In view of the current lack of activity by Klan and

nate groups within the Baltimora Division territory, the Baltimore

Oifice is not in a position at this time to make any specific

recommendations for counterintelligence action.

:

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 93

---

## Page 94

The Baltimore Office will be alert for any

opportunities for potential counterintelligence action against

pertinent organizations or individuals active within the

Baltimore Office territory.

- 2-

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 94

---

## Page 95

..itemorandum

DIRECTOR, FBI

D.ATE:

Oci

0:

15, 1954

10M

SAC, BALTIIORE

EBJECT:

COUNTER INTANT IGENCE, PROGRAM

INTERNAL SECURITY

DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS

Reference Bureau letter to Atlanta

datad

Septenber 2, 1964.

A review of Baltimore files reflects that there are

presently no klan organizations operating within the territory

covered oy the Baltimore Office.

Baltimore files reflect ühat

there

are several alleged members of the American Nazi Party (ANP)

living in the Baltimore erea. However these individuals are

associated with the ANP located in the territory covered by the

Richmona Office and there are no iNP groups in the Baltimore

cerritory.

Fighting American Nationalists

• (PAT)

organization in the Baltinore area is defunct.

The Nationel States Rights Party (NSRP) was to some

extent active on the Eastern Shore of Maryland during the Spring

early Summer of 196- cut there has been no reported

activity there in recent zonths.

the only evidance of current

activity by the NSRP in the Baltimore area are news stories which

appeared in the Saptember 23 and September 30, 1904, editions of tre

Baltimore Evening Sun,

nich reflectea tha two Baltinore County

Councilmen received letters fron WIlLIAn BrAILSFOrD, organizer

of the diSRe, threatening to

"paper" their districts with

derogatory

panphlets if they voted for a proposed civil rights

bill in Baltinore County. • Information was also received that

la leaflet put out by the aSRe entitled "A Stab in the Back" was

paLa distributed in the Tensos, Maryland, area of Baltimera"

In view of the current lack oi activity by Klan and

nate groups within

the balticore Division territory, the Baltimore

Office is not in a position at this time to make any specific

recommendations for counterintelligence ection.

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 95

---

## Page 96

Ene Ealtimore Defice mill be alert soslany

opportunities fo= potential counterintelligance action against

bertinent organizations o indiviauals active within the

Baltimore Office territory.

_NW 88608-Docld:32989629_Page 96

---

## Page 97

-2021

SUPJECT:

LX:7ED STARES GOT WVENT

i'lemorandum

DIRZOTOR, FEE

DATO:

=0/12u1.

TRIE

... .

¿COUNCE IN BLIGENCE PROCRAM

INCEPNAL SECURICY

• DISPUPRION OF FARE GROUPS

Re Bureau letter to Atlanta, 9/2/64.

Analysis of Potential CI Action Against

organizations and Personnel of United

Kians o Arerica,

Improved order of the

Ins. (ICUSK) ;

Pianos Party (ASRP)

and the Alabama States

ines on captioned organizations have been reviewed

it the roozze Office to

äiscover any information or the

aro trich would prevent a potential for effective CI

206.0k.

Dais ravier:

=1les includes the files of the

orcanizations tierselves and of individuals known to be

oradoens and nancers of ins organization.

It is the under-

standing c this office that this information would consist

infomation seglecting immorality, particularly sexual

10R0221255,

on the pact o one of more members, cossibly

one wire on tates oi other mempers; of consisting

generally si infornation of a nighly unfavorable or embarrass.-

ing nature pertaining to a member or group oi members which

would be not imon, and she exposure of which could produce

citable conflicts.

A minimum of such information' is con-

rained in Mockie files pertaining to Klan and States Rights

20atr personnel.

There

rave been conflicts between individuals

those conflicts

have

aIready matured and have already

pro-

avoce the division and animosity of which the situations

Done cagaste.

Unieke personnel of /Communist organizations:

NW 00608-Đoeld:32989629-Page 97

---

## Page 98

o: the sout of & Klansman, although infomante who furnasa

icenacion pertaining to these individuals are faily well

sained with many of them. Approximately two years ago,

Manshen did become jealous when a single Klan member

(unmarried) flirted with

nis wife at a

social function.

however, the married

member is no longer active, and there

is not known so have been any further development of that

situacion.

Pertinant to this analysis is the following

osservation:

within the past ?0 days, Montgomery, Ala.,

where activity of UkA and

ASRP are centralized, has

experienced desegregation of

restaurants, hotels, motels,

Civil Rights

court at honogonery. Lalcially, particularly on T/4

and

3/0/0÷3 1011owing he passage of the 1904 Civil Rights

дой,

spiro for the purpose of interforing with the desegregation

of novie theaters and restaurants in downtown Montgomery.

Forover, Robile inforants furnished infornation vell

in

curance

of the actual proposed action, enabling Mobile to

posity the Monügomery Police Department. The Police Depart-

went acted very promptly and efzactively, disbursing Klansmen

wo cad gathered in the danger area, and

making it quise

creas that no unzanful activity of interference with the

anconcement of the 1954 Civil Rights Act would be tolerated.

Join the fact that the information was leaked to authorities

and the fact tnat the authorities took effective action

ware highly demoralizing to the Klan bersonnel (who are

a150 the only significant personnal of the ASP).

The

damoralization was so complete that when Montgomery public

scrools were desegregated, Klansten did not even appear in

une vicinitias of the schools and took no action of any

inas either at the schools or in any other place, in any

accort to interfere wich the desegregation.

It is therefore fully evident that the purposes

sought by the CI program, that is the demoralization and

the rendering inerrective of such organizations, was

accompiished by direct investigation and Police

action.

is implication is intended

that the work of the Mobile

02220e has been finally done pertaining to these organizations,

2.

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 98

---

## Page 99

in tous, the curront program of the Mobile Office is

beauty und mare nore erensiva the infomant cover-

aje 0=

pertirent organizations.

These informants will be

particularly alert for personal information of the lind

which night be suitable for the

institution of CI action

in. the

rusure,

and such information will be diligently

sought by Agents

conducting investigation concerning these

organizations and individuals. Mobile will also continue

to be alert fog any opportunity to utilize the system which

has been effective in the past, that of cooperating with

Local law enforcoment. co take the kind of action which dis

courages unlamiul action on the part of the klan groups.

Recommendation

The Mobile Office has no recommendation for any

logical immediate CI action at this time.

Mobile racial informants have furnished the

irontrized of nost individuals within the UKA and ASRP who

aro considered the most. likely to commit acús of violence

or ancchicasion.

Rost of these

persons have been under

invescigation for some

time, and in many instances Summary

reports have been furnished

the Bureau pertaining to them.

In sace of the instances of bombings in the vicinity of

recons weeks,

Agents have interviewed neighbors and employers

chase individuals and have made visual checks, particularly.

3a6a a0

night, in efforts

to ascertain whether os not the

pessons

themselves were home of whethes or not their auto-

nobiles were a wed at their residences. In many cases,

and probably in most cases,

these Kian personnel become

exora of these inquiries and on several situations it is

inown that they observed Agents checking their cars and

oüverving their residences at night. These persons are

therefore under the impression that

Bureau. Agents have them

under virtualty constant surveillance.

They remarked to

aael: other in the presence of informants on occasion that

ünor foel that their telephones are tapped and they have

also empucosed the fear that their meeting places are

siegacuad to microphone devices. It is believed that this:

lone on dacia tart constitutes a

very effective deterrent,

and may vory well be a principe. reason for their lailure

to sate on vlarfui rasues in connection with the racial

3

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 99

---

## Page 100

so. 1 co.

E cacion sa this ange vitren necent weeks: hrough in-

crabs and through observations of license tags of auto-

mes paried at neeting piaces, Mobile Office is corssaably

sarning of the identities

of new persons who cave sore

•Joshcian in violence.

sooned on that indiviâval,

In all ouch cases,

a case file 15

his identity being established

and his background being

mada co

obtained.

No particular effost is

leep chose investigations so discreet that the Klans-.

man will not learn that the FBI is inquiring about him.

practice

is deemed to be effective with respect to .

these individuals.

As set fortn herainbefore, Mobile will intensify

its efforts to discover information. which can be usea in

the CI program.

Pertaining to the possibility of exposure of

Ken and klan-type activities through reliable news

media,

-ü caouid be

ouserved that it is the firm policy of news

aw. an ine nonogotory, Alas, area to completely ignore

woe kian soups, and to give them no publicity at all.

....

: coconi montes, UM has beld several public rallies,

and even one

" paid spot radio advertisement.

They have

raced the press to attend nose rallies,

hoping to secure

choy from chem.

Again, it is believed that the

sorior of the press to ignore these groups has had the

nost desirable affect, both in frustraving them in their

Such for publiciwy,

and

in avoiding advertising them

in done,

night saily more persons to the Klan cause

and result in

their increasing their membership.

Because

of these considerations, it is believed that at least in

chio crea, the curment press policy of ignoring the Klan

effective than would be a policy of exposure of

tina

evils

of the organizations.

4

-NIW 88608_Docld:32989629 Page.100

---

## Page 101

Attached hereto is the response to Item #2 in

the Snot See et Cony to 1955. Letter 0 € 7$111am

as follows:

"All memoranda and any other materials which

contain or reflect studies of 'counterintelligence and

disruption tactics' and the making of 'appropriate

recommendation' as mentioned in approved Recommendation #3

on page 5 of the July 30, 1964 memorandum captioned

'Investigation of Ku Klux Klan and Other Hate Groups'

from J. H. Gale to Mr. Tolson."

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 101

---

## Page 102

Attached hereto is the response to Item #2 in

the Senate Select Committee (SSC) letter to Mr. K. William

O'Connor, Esq. on July 14, 1975. Item 12 1s set forth

as follows:

ontain or tet met sad an a tenter ges en and

disruption tactics' and the making of 'appropriate

recommendation' as mentioned in approved Recommendation #3

on page 5 of the July 30, 1964 memorandum captioned

'Investigation of Ku Klux Klan and Other Hate Groups'

from J. H. Gale to Mr. Tolson."

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 102

---

## Page 103

OPTIONAL

Доли но. 10

5010-106

MAT IfAZEDITION

OSA GEN. IRtO. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GC

RNMENT

Memorandum

Quan

Mohr

" Contad

Delfonch

TO

FROM

:

MR. TOLSON

J. HI. GALEN

DATE: July3, 1964

Suitevant.

Tavel

Trotter

Tele. Room

Holmes

SUBJECT:

INVESTIGATION OF KU KLUX KLAN AND OTHER HATE *

GROUPS

Mir. Sullivan has proposed that the development of informants in the Ku Klus

Klan (KKK) and other hate groups as weil as tne investigation and penetration of these

organizations from an intelligence standpoint be transferred from the General

Investigative Division to the Domestic Intelligence Division (DID). He bases his

recommendations on the premise that organizations like the Krk and supporting

groups are essentially subversive in that they hold principles and recommend courses

of action that are inimical to the Constitution as are the viewpoints of the Communist

Party. He does not maintain that the actions of the hate groups constitute the same

menace as the Communist Party inasmuch as they are not controlled by a foreign

power. (unterintelligene, Prograin- Disruption oF HaTe Grasp, -601

He feels that the DID over the years has developed wide experience in the

penetration of subversive organizations through informants, anonymous sources,

sophisticated microphone and technical surveillances, interview programs of

a highly specialized nature, etc., and that his division could put this experience

to excellent use in penetrating the Klan and other hate groups.

Mr. Sullivan feels that the DID would be in a position to launch a

disruptive counter-intelligence program against the Klan and other hate groups

with the same effectiveness that they are now doing insofar as the Communist Party

Vis concerned. He also proposes an immediate series of regional conferences to

{ instruct pertinent field personnel and to devise imaginative, aggressive and highly

specialized programs to carry out the responsibilities in question. He states the

Communist Party is increasing its activities in the field of racial matters and

civil rights, directing more and more of its fire against the KKK and similar

organizations to confuse the issue. He feels that because of the stepped up

activities of the Communist Party in this area it would help prevent marked confusion

from developing in the areas of activities being handled by the General Investigative

and Domestic Intelligence Divisions if the DID assumes these responsibilities.

The functions in question were formerly handled by the DID, up until 1958

when they were transferred to the General Investigative Division. , This matter was =•

considered by the Executives Conference 10/1/58 and the transfer recommended.

1 - Mr. Rosen 1 - Mr. Sullivan

RÉC 30

112-2

1 - Mr. Belmont 1 - Mr. Mohr

JHG Wmaj (7)

Enclosure ze:08

Tust 28 154

SENT DIRECTOR

- 7-31-64

95108

SEP 28 iyE

NW 88008~Docld:029896295₽age•1Q3<,

ĐN 40094

---

## Page 104

Memo fox Mr. Tolson

Re: Investigation of Ku Klux Klan and Other Hate Groups

One of the prime factors in the decision to transfer these responsibilities from the

DID in 1958 was the almost complete absence of Communist Party activity in the

racial area although at that time the Communist Party sought to capitalize on such

incidents after their occurrence.

Mr. Rosen was opposed to the transfer of the functions in question to the

General Investigative Division in 1958 and his present position is consistent in that

he maintains that the development of informants and the penetration of the Klan

and other hate groups are primarily intelligence functions which should be handled

by the DD as suggested by Mir. Sullivan, Dir, Reson feois tet the Durace sen

best keep abreast of the whole field by having all angles of the racial field united

in one division as suggested by Mr. Sullivan. Mr. Rosen points out that the

development, supervision and administrative handling of racial and security

informants are analogous.

Mr. Rosen feels that there is a tendency toward oversimplification

in blaming all racial murders on Klansmen and hate groups. He points out that the

murders of Medgar Evers, Postman Moore and even the assassination of President

Kennedy were initially and generally attributed to Klan and hate gio up members

whereas investigation showed that the individuals charged with the murders of

Evers and Moore were without organization affiliation and the President was

slain by an avowed Marxist who was active in the Fair Play for Cuba Committee.

Mr. Rosen and Mr. Sullivan both agree that the investigation of individual

cases, i.e. bombings, murders, police brutality, etc., should be handled by the

General Investigative Division. Mr. Rosen feels that whether subject or victims

No. he ben tality +

are Klan members, Communist Party members or completely without organizational

affiliation has no more bearing on our supervision of the substantive civil rights

violation than it would have if the violation involved were Theft from Interstate Shipment,

Bank Robbery or White Slave Traffic Act.

Mr. Belmont disagrees with Messrs. Rosen and Sullivan and feels

that while the proposed transfer of functions from the General Investigative

to the Domestic Intelligence Division is theoretically appealing, it is not a

practical answer to our problem.. He states that at the time of the 1958 transfer

of functions in question the basis was the close inter-relationship between the

activities of the Klan and hate groups and the entire civil rights field of investigation.

He feels this argument has even more strength today than in 1958, because, over-

whelmingly, our interest in Klan and hate groups today is their relationship with

integration and civil rights. Vir. Belmont believes the transfer of functions would

create an undesirable division of authority and responsibility; that our best chance

to break major civil rights cases such as bombings, murders, etc., is through

I information developed from the inside as a result of coverage established in the

-2 -

NW 88608 Docld:32989629. Page 104.

---

## Page 105

Memo for Mr. Tolson

Re: Investigation of Ku Klux Klan and Other Hate Groups

community where the crime occurred; i.e. informants and sources in the Klan, hate

groups, suoversive organizations, but also sources not connected with any group,

who will report potential violence and individuals prone to violence. We are following

the policy of aggressively seeking out persons addicted to violence even though they

have not violated a Federal law as yet. He feels that the Division that is going to

investigate these cases should forge the necessary tools to use for this purpose.

Mr. Belmont does not feel that the transfer of this responsibility will be helpful to the

Bureau from an investigative stanapoint nor in meeting the heavy-responsibilities we no

have in this area.

VIEWS OF THE INSPECTION DIVISION:

Inspector feels there is certainly some merit and logic in Mr. Belmont's

reasoning and it is felt instant issue is not one that is completely black or white.

Under the present setup there is coordination and daily exchange of

information between Domestic Intelligence and General Investigative Divisions

in that both Divisions insure that communications and other matters of information

are brought to the attention of each other as they arise from matters for which

each Division is primarily responsible. However, it seems the real issue loday

just as in 1958, is where does the weight of the interest lie in the racial question.

In 1958 it clearly lay in the General Investigative Division because, according to

information available to the Bureau at that time, in practically no instances had

racial incidents been caused or inspired by Communist Party elements although

the Party naturally sought to capitalize on incidents after they occurred. Also,

lin 1958, it was felt that consolidation would streamline certain operations.

Today it seems clear from information developed by Domestic

Intelligence, Division that the Communist Party now has evidenced a definite interest

in the racial problem, is becoming deeply enmeshed therein, and appears to be

exploiting it to an ever-increasing extent. Although prosecution for civil rights

and other criminal violations is still an ultimate objective, there is definite

need for an intelligence type penetration of these racial and hate groups so as

to keep abreast of and ahead of their plans and activities. This seems more

properly the function of the Domestic Intelligence Division.

Analysis was made by Inspector relative to coverage of the Klan and other

hate groups. The General Investigative Division has been putting a great deal of

pressure on the field to increase informant coverage. They have recently instructed

the field to conduct surveys relative to instituting technical coverage on certain key

Klan figures, have interviewed at least once all known Klan members, all Klan

leaders have been investigated from intelligence standpoint and recommendations

have been made that intelligence type cases be opened on each Klan memer. A

weekly progress airtel is being obtained from field concerning informant development.

However, undoubtedly additional coverage is needed particularly in the Klaverns

that have been formed since the civil rights bill passed. There is no question about

NW 88608 Docid:&2989629 Page 105

---

## Page 106

Memo for Mr. Tolson

Re: Investigation of Ku Klux Klan and Other Hate Groups

the fact that the DID has had broad experience in the penetration of si oversive

organizations and has achieved noteworthy results in infiltrating the ‹ ommunist

Party and Soviet intelligence operations. It is felt that unquestionably this

experience and know-how could be put to good advantage in penetrating the Klan

and other hate groups.

The Inspection Division feels that the advantages in having the

direction of all informant and intelligence matters in the racial field in one division

as outlined by 1ãa. Sullivan incide docea cabroiga his acranges di taring te

hate group informants and intelligence functions with the substantive civil rights cases.

1 Under the proposed transfer of phases of the racial problem to Domestic Intelligence

Division there will still be definite responsibility in both divisions, Mr. Rosen

to retain responsibility for supervision of substantive civil rights violations and

other criminal violations. This dual responsibility, however, should pose no

problem because there are numerous examples of it successfully being handled

in the Bureau today.

In this regard it will be noted that the administrative handling

of the entire criminal informant program is handled by the Special Investigative

Division which includes the informants being utilized on General Investigative

Division cases. It will also be noted that the Special Investigative Division handles

the informant and intelligence aspects of organized crime. However, the General

Investigative Division handles key substantive violations such as Bankruptcy,

Extortion, Assaulting a Federal Officer, and Theft from Interstate Shipment

violations committed by members of the organized criminal syndicate utilizing

Criminal Intelligence informants. It is understood that there have been no in-

soluble problems in this regard and it is felt that there should be no insoluble

problems in the coordination of racial intelligence and informant information

between the General Investigative Division and the DID.

In any event there will certainly be no lessening of pressure and.

supervision on the field if these functions are transferred. The same Agents

in the field will be working the cases and developing the informants. However,

it is felt that the DID should be given a chance to demonstrate whether their

broad knowledge of and experience in penetration techniques and infiltration

tactics can possibly increase our penetration of these hate groups. It is felt

that a study of counter-intelligence and disruption tactics against the Klan certainly

merits further consideration. It is also felt that the proposed series of field con-

I ferences on this problem should be favorably considered.

• NW 88608 Docld:32989629_ Page 106

---

## Page 107

Memo for Mr. Tolson

Re: Investigation of Ku Klux Klan and Other Hate Groups

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the responsibility for development of informants and

gathering of intelligence on the KKK and other hate groups be transferred from

the General Investigative Division to the DID. (If approved, appropriate memorandum

will be submitted by Inspection Division concerning realignment and distribution

of personnel from the General Investigative Division to the DID.)

для

OK.

2. That a series of regional field conferences be held by appropriate

Bureau official to instruct personnel and attempt to develop further imaginative and

aggrescive highly specialized programs to carry out desired penetration. (I

approved, to be coordinated by Mr. Belmont.)

Дря

3. That counter-intelligence and disruption tactics be given further

study by DID and appropriate recommendations made.

chi

5

-.

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 107

---

## Page 108

5010-106

A 1962 EDITION

•GEN. 12G. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GC

RNMENT

Memorandum

Trison

Not 17

(APPETITIE

*Conrad

Delpach :

TO

FROM

MR. TOLSON

J. I. GALETS

DATE:

Julys,

1964

Sutgven t

T'avel

Trotter

Tele. Room

Hölmes

Beaney

SUBJECT

INVESTIGATION OF KU KLUX KLAN AND OTHER HATE

GROUPS

Mir. Sullivan has proposed that the development of informants in the Ku Klus

Klan (KKK) and other hate groups as well as the investigation and penetration of these

organizations from an intelligence standpoint be transferred from the General

Investigative Division to the Domestic Intelligence Division (DID). He bases his

recommendations on the premise that organizations like the KK& and supporting

groups are essentially subversive in that they hold principles and recommend courses

of action that are inimical to the Constitution as are the viewpoints of the Communist

Party. He does not maintain that the actions of the hate groups constitute the same

menace as the Communist Party inasmuch as they are not controlled by a foreign

power. @unTerintelligere Program- Disruption oF H-Te Grasp, -Ery

He feels that the DID over the years has developed wide experience in the

penetration of subversive organizations through informants, anonymous sources,

sophisticated microphone and technical surveillances, interview programs of

a highly specialized nature, etc., and that his division could put this experience

to excellent use in penetrating the Klan and other hate groups.

Mr. Sullivan feels that the DID would be in a position to launch a

disruptive counter-intelligence program against the Klan and other hate groups

with the same effectiveness that they are now doing insofar as the Communist Party

lis concerned. He also proposes an immediate series of regional conferences to

I instruct pertinent field personnel and to devise imaginative, aggressive and highly

specialized programs to carry out the responsibilities in question. He states the

Communist Party is increasing its activities in the field of racial matters and

civil rights, directing more and more of its fire against the KK& and similar

organizations to confuse the issue.

He feels that because of the stepped up

activities of the Communist Party in this area it would help prevent maried confusion

from developing in the areas of activities being handled by the General Investigative

and Domestic Intelligence Divisions if the DID assumes these responsibilities.

The functions in question were formerly handled by the DID, up until 1958

when they were transferred to the General Investigative Division. This matter was =

considered by the Executives Conference 10/1/ 58 and the transfer recommenced.

1 - Mr. Rosen'

1 - Mr. Sullivan

ÉC 30

d - Mr. Belmont 1 - Mr. Mohr

-

JHG wmj (7)

Enclosurese.ox

52 19.

FoSEP 28 154

SENT DIRECTOR

1-31-64

EX-108

SEP 28 1y64

NW/88608vDoeld:32989629SPage-108

---

## Page 109

Memo foil Mr. Tolson

Re: Investigation of Ku Klux Klan and Other Hate Groups

One of the prime factors in the decision to transfer these rèsponsibilities from the

DID in 1958 was the almost complete absence of Communist Party activity in the

racial area although at that time the Communist Party sought to capitalize on such

incidents after their occurrence.

Mr. Rosen was opposed to the transfer of the functions in question to the

General Investigative Division in 1958 and his present position is consistent in that

he maintains that the development of informants and the penetration of the Klan

and other hate groups are primarily intelligence functions which should be handled

by the DID as suggested by fir. Sullivan, Tir, Reson fecisit at the Turban son

best keep abreast of the whole field by having all angles of the racial field united

in one division as suggested by Mr. Sullivan. Mr. Rosen points out that the

development, supervision and administrative handling of racial and security

informants are analogous.

Mr. Rosen feels that there is a tendency toward oversimplification

in blaming all racial murders on Klansmen and hate groups. He points out that the

murders of Medgar Evers, Postman Moore and even the assassination of President

Kennedy were initially and generally attributed to Klan and hate gro up members

whereas investigation showed that the individuals charged with the murders of

Evers and Moore were without organization affiliation and the Pres dent was

slain by an avowed Marxist who was active in the Fair Play for Cuba Committee.

Mr. Rosen and Mr. Sullivan both agree that the investigation of individual

cases, i.e. bombings, murders, police brutality, etc., should be handled by the

General Investigative Division.

Mr. Rosen feels that whether subject or victims

are Klan members, Communist Party members or completely without organizational

affiliation has no more bearing on our supervision of the substantive civil rights

violation than it would have if the violation involved were Theft from Interstate Shipment,

| Bank Robbery or White Slave Traffic Act.

Mr. Belmont disagrees with Messrs. Rosen and Sullivan and feels

that while the proposed transfer of functions from the General Investigative

to the Domestic Inteligence Division is theoretically appealing, it is not a

practical answer to our problem.. He states that at the time of the 1958 transfer

of functions in question the basis was the close inter-relationship between the

activities of the Klan and hate groups and the entire civil rights field of investigation.

He feels this argument has even more strength today than in 1958, because, over-

whelmingly, our interest in Klan and hate groups today is their relationship with

integration and civil rights. Mr. Belmont believes the transfer of functions would

create an undesirable division of authority and responsibility; that our best chance

to break major civil rights cases such as bombings, murders, etc., is through

information developed from the inside as a result of coverage established in the

2 -

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 - Page 109

---

## Page 110

Memo for Mr. Tolson

Re: Investigation of Ku Klux Klan and Other Hate Groups

community where the crime occurred; ile. informants and sources in tie ISlan, hate

groups, subversive organizations, but also sources not connected with ny group,

who will report potential violence and individuals prone to violence. (W are following

the policy of aggressively seeking out persons addicted to violence ever though they

have not violated a Federal law as yet. He feels that the Division that is going to

investigate these cases should forge the necessary tools to use for this purpose.

Mr. Belmont does not feel that the transfer of this responsibility will be helpful to the

Bureau from an investigative stancpoint nor in meeting the heavy responsibilities we now

have in this area.

VIEWS OF THE INSPECTION DIVISION:

Inspector feels there is certainly some merit and logic in Mr. Belmont's

reasoning and it is felt instant issue is not one that is completely black or white.

Under the present setup there is coordination and daily exchange of

information between Domestic Intelligence and General Investigative Divisions

in that both Divisions insure that communications and other matters of information

are brought to the attention of each other as they arise from matters for which

each Division is primarily responsible. However, ii seems ine real issue today

just as in 1958, is where does the weight of the interest lie in the racial question.

In 1958 it clearly lay in the General Investigative Division because, accoraing to

information available to the Bureau at that time, in practically no instances had

racial incidents been caused or inspired by Communist Party elements although

Ithe Party naturally sought to capitalize on incidents after they occurred. Also,

lin 1958, it was felt that consolidation would streamline certain operations.

Today it seems clear from information developed by Domestic

Intelligence Division that the Communist Party now has evidenced a definite interest

in the racial problem, is becoming deeply enmeshed therein, and appears to be

exploiting it to an ever-increasing extent. Although prosecution for civil rights

and other criminal violations is still an ultimate objective, there is definite

need for an intelligence type penetration of these racial and hate groups so as

to keep abreast of and ahead of their plans and activities. This seems more

properly the function of the Domestic Intelligence Division.

Analysis was made by Inspector relative to coverage of the Klan and other

hate groups. The General Investigative Division has been putting a great deal of

pressure on the field to increase informant coverage. They have recently instructed

the field to conduct surveys relative to instituting technical coverage on certain key

Kan figures, la ve interviewed at least once all known Klan members, all Klan .

leaders have been investigated from intelligence standpoint and recommendations

have been made that intelligence type cases be opened on each Klan member. A

weekly progress airtel is being obtained from field concerning informant development.

However, undoubtedly additional coverage is needed particularly in the Klaverns

hat have been formed since the civil rights bill passed. There is no question about

none..

VW 88608/Bold 32989629 Bage Mained

these Enin ad fees done anti.

sa too coveras.

---

## Page 111

Memo for Mr. Tolson

RE:

Investigation of Ku Klux Klan and Other Hate Groups

the fact that the DID has had broad experience in the penetration of subversive

organizations and has achieved noteworthy results in infiltrating the Communist

Party and Soviet intelligence operations. It is felt that unquestionably this

experience and know-how could be put to good advantage in penetrating the. Klan

and other hate groups.

The Inspection Division feels that the advantages in having the

direction of all informant and intelligence matters in the racial field in one division

I hate group informants and intelligence functions with the substantive civil rights cases.

1 Under the proposed transfer of phases of the racial problem to Domestic Intelligence

Division there will still be definite responsibility in both divisions, Mr. Rosen

to retain responsibility for supervision of substantive civil rights violations and

other criminal violations.

This dual responsibility, however, should pose no

problem because there are numerous examples of it successfully being handled

in the Bureau today. In this regard it will be noted that the administrative handling

of the entire criminal informant program is handled by the Special Investigative

Division which includes the informants being utilized on General Investigative

Division cases. It will also be noted that the Special Investigative Division handles

the infurmant and intelligence aspects of organized crime. However, the General

Investigative Division handles key substantive violations such as Bankruptcy,

Extortion, Assaulting a Federal Officer, and Theft from Interstate Shipment

violations committed by members of the organized criminal syndicate utilizing

Criminal Intelligence informants. It is understood that there have been no in-

soluble problems in this regard and it is felt that there should be no insoluble

problems in the coordination of racial intelligence and informant information

(between the General Investigative Division and the DID.

In any event there will certainly be no lessening of pressure and.

supervision on the field if these functions are transferred. The same Agents

in the field will be working the cases and developing the informants. However,

it is felt that the DID should be given a chance to demonstrate whether their

broad knowledge of and experience in penetration techniques and infiltration

tactics can possibly increase our penetration of these hate groups. It is felt

that a study of counter-intelligence and disruption tactics against the Klan certainly

merits further consideration.

It is also felt that the proposed series of field con-

I terences on this problem should be favorably considered.

- 4 -

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 111

---

## Page 112

Memo for Mr. Tolson

Re: Investigation of Ku Klux Klan and Other Hate Groups

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the responsibility for development of informants and

gathering of intelligence on the KKk and other hate groups be transferred from

the General Investigative Division to the DID. (If approved, appropriate memorandum

will be submitted by Inspection Division concerning realignment and distribution

of personnel from the General Investigative Division to the DID.)

g/s.

2. That a series of regional field conferences be held by appropriate

Bureau official to instruct personnel and attempt to develop further imaginative and

aggressive highly specialized programs to carry out desired penetration. (If

approved, to be coordinated by Mr. Belmont.)

011•

3. That counter-intelligence and disruption tactics be given further

study by DID and appropriate recommendations made.

- 5 - :

NW 98608 Docld:32989629 Page 112

---

## Page 113

BAC, Atlanta

Septenberj2, 1964

Director, FBI (157-9-Ha10)

COURTERINTETIGENCE PENAARAM..

ILLEMAL SECURITY

DISTORTIC. 0T HAD CODUPS --

fund fond food ford ford

8801

his.

PERSONAL AND COUTICRHTISI

Mr. Belmont

Hr .

Sullivan

Baungardner

Gray

Frainor

I - Er. Ejzn .

і -іт6

Atlective irmediately, the Bureau is instituting

& CoDIGInated Counterintelligence Progran (Cointelpro)

directed against slan type and bate organizations.

OffiCeS

receiving copies of this letier are instructed to imediately

open an active contral file, captioned as above, and to

assign responsibility for this progzan to an esperienced

and inaginative Special agent who is vell versed in

investigation of bate and racist-type organizations and

their nembership.

and

The purpose of this progran is to expose, disrupi

otherwise ncutralize the activities oi the verious blaus

and hate organisations, their leadership and acerents.

The activities of tuese groups must be followed on a

contimous basis so ve nay take advantage of all oppor

tunities for counterintelligence and also inspire action

In instances where circusstances varrant.

The devious

maneuvers and duplicity of these groups must be exposed

to public scrutiny through the cooperation of reliable

sews media sourcas, both locally and at the seat of

ride Hd 45

Government.

We must frustrate any elsort of the groups

to consolidate their forces or to recruit new or youthiul

acherents.

Is every instance.

consideration should be

given to disrupting the organized activity of these groups

and no opportunity siould be missed to capitalize upon

organizational and personal conflicis of their leadership:

RES

2 - Baltinore

• BirDingüRm

MAILED &

21 - Henphis

2

Hianil

• Charlotte

SER 3/.

< 19642

-

Booile

SEP 411964

- Chicazo

Tolson

- jacksonville

COMM-FBI

₴

Hew York

Belmont

Mohr -

- Jackson "

Richcond

Casper

- Kzosville

Savannan

Callahan

Conrad

2 - Little Focu

• 2

- Tampa

DeLoach

Evans

Gale®.

Rosed

1 - 100-3-10f-lajn (CPUSA, Cointelpro)

Sultan 2.

Tavel.

Trotter

-NOTE:

See meno Baunzarder to Sullivan, 8/27/61, Same caption,

DR: bec

Riệ

2-812RB

NW 38608-Doc/d 32989629-Page-115-

---

## Page 114

Letter to Atlanta

RE: COUNTTERINTELLIGELCE PROGRAM

INTERNAL SECURITY

DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS

157-9-1210

The following Bian organisations, curremily

under actize isreadicausea,

siould be considared for

counterinielligonce action:

do Association of Arkansas Klans of the

200i

Knights of the Ku Klux Klan.

Association of Ceorgia Klans.

3.

Association of South Carolina Klans,

Knights of the Ku Klux Klan.

4 Christian Knights of the fu flux Klan,

Hinton, West Virginia.

5. Dixie Klans, Knights of

the fu Klux

Slan, Inc.

6. Improved Order of the U. S. Klans,

Knights of the Eu Klus Klan, Inc.

7.

Independent Blavern, Fountain

• Into

8.

Independent Klan Unit, St. Augustine,

Florida.

Knights of the Ku Blux Klan, Aka.

10.

Mississippi Knights of the Ku Klux Klan.

11.

National Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc.

12.

13.

Original Knights of the ku klur adan.

Pioneer Club, Orlando, Florida.

14.

Unitad FlOrIda KU KLuX Lian.

15.

United Klans of America, Inc., Knights

of the Bu Klux Klan.

16. D. S. Klans, Knights of the fu klux

Klan, Inc.

17.

White Knights of the fu Klu Kien oi

kississippi.

The following hate organizations currently being

afforded active investigation are included in this program.

Alabana States Rights Party (Origin: Mobile)

Auerican Nazi Party (Origin: Richmond)

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 114

---

## Page 115

Letter to Atlanta

FIE:

COUIFNENINTELLIGTICE PROGRAMI

INTERNAL SECURITY

DISPUPIION OF HATE GROUPS

157-9-Mia

3. Council for Statehood, als, Freemen

(Origin): Minnd)

4 e

5.

6.

I19J02U3 AROLICRA 201201447549

162:13: 13104710)

Macional Said Ligion Farty

(Crigin: Birminghan)

National. Renaissance Party

(Origin: New YOr's)

:

United Frconon (Origin: Miani)

8.

Viking Youth of Anerica (Origin: Tampa)

9. White Youth Corps (Origins Chicago)

On or before 10/15/04, participating offices

ase instructed to submit to tho Bureau & cotailed analysis

of potential counterintelligence action against pertinent

organizations and individuais activa vithin tueir rospactive

territories and specific recommendations should be luciuded

for any lojical irnediate counterintolligence action.

Rocorrendations submitted under this progran nust include

all nocessary facts to enable the Bureau to intelligently

pass upon the feasibillüy of the proposed action.

[13

Instances where a ralinble and cooperative nous uodia

representative or other source quiside the surosu is to

be contactod or utilized in connection with a proposed

countorintelligence operation, it will be incunbent upon

the recomending offica to furnish assurances the source

WIll not roveal the Bureau's interest or betray our

confidence.

offices participating in this program who have

Investigative responsibility 101 ilan organizations snould

specifically coument in the initial loston so the Bureau

regarding "Action Groups." As these officos are avare,

these groups have bech doscribod as the sclatively fow

Individuals in each organization who use stion?-am tactics

and violont actions to achiove thoir ends. Often these

Exoups act without the appioval of the klan organization

Pur.

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 115

---

## Page 116

Letter to Atlanta

FE: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

INTERNAL SECURITY

DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS

•157-9-H31n

or nembership. The Bureau considers it vital that we

expose the icontities and activitles of such groups and

where possilie disaunt their citorto. Thobe grougs should

be subjeciod iù dozin

No counterintelligence action may be initiated

by the field without spectic Jureal autorization.

Commencing 1/1/05 and every 3 ronths thereafter,

each participating office should submit to the Bureau a

status letter covering the prior 3-month period, Including

comments under the following captions:

1. Potential Counterintelligence Action

2 Pending Counterintelligence Action

3. Tangible Results

If necessary, a 4th caption "'iscellaneous"

may be utilized for additional comuents.

Recommendations for counterintelligence action

should not be included in 90-day status letters to the

Bureau but following the initial analysis due 10/15/64,

should be subnitted individually by separate letter.

All Special Agent personnel responsible for

the investigation of Klas-type and hate organizations

and their nenbership should be alerted to our counter-

Intelligence plans relating to these groups. Counter-

Intelligence action, directed at those grouns is intended to

complenent and stimulate our accelerated intelligence

Investigations. Each investigative Agent has a responsi

bility to call

coordinator suggestions and possibilities for inplerenting

the prograi. You are cautioned that the nature of this

new endeavor is such that under no circunstances should

the existence of the program be made known outside the

Bureau and appropriate within-office security should be

aflorded this sensitive operation.

-"NW88608 Docid:32989629-Page-116-

---

## Page 117

Letter to Atlanta

BE :

COTNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

IRTERCIAL SECURITY

DISPUPTION OF LATE GROUPS

157-9-Main

The Bureau is pleased with past successes

achieved by our counterintelligence efforts in other

phases of out investicative moronsibilities.

To

1nSHN0 0111 D100033 1n 6118 106 C06627049

whom the progran is assigned in each oitice muse have

& detailed knowledge of the activities of the racist

groups in the territory and that knowledge must be

coupled with interest, initiative and inagination.

The Agent must be alert for information which has &

disruptive potential.

This information will not cone

to hin - - he must looks for it The nost effective

way of being assured of keeping on top of the situation

1s to maintain close contact with those Agents who handle

the investigation of the racial and nate groups sad leir

membership and also to periodically review relevant files.

Is an enthusiastic approach is made to this

new endeavor, there is no reason why the results

achieved under this program will not equal or surpass

our achievenents in sinilar-type progians directed

against subversives.

-NV-18608 Docld: 32489629 Page 117

---

## Page 118

• OPAL TORA NO. 10

190Z EDITION

9010-104

GEN. REO. NO, 27

UNITED STATES GC., ERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: August 27, 1964

FROM :

Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

selmos

"Mohr .

Casper

Callahen

oach?

(Gale

"Rosen

Sullivar

Tavern,

Trotter

Tele. Room

Holmes -

Gandy

1

SUBJECT:

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAN. "

INTERNAL SECURITY

DISRUFTION OF HATE GROUPS

-

Mr. Belmont

MI•I

Sullivan

wX .

Baumgardner

Gray

Mr.

Trainor

- Mx.

Ryan

Memorandum from Mr. J. H. Gale to Mr'. Tolson dated 7/30/64

captioned "Investigation of Ku Klux Klan

and other Hate Groups" was

approved by the Director authorizing the Domestic Intelligence

Division to give consideration to the application of counterintel-

ligence and disruptive tactics to hate groups and to thereafter

make appropriate recommendations. It is our reconmendation that C

we immediately initiate a hard-hitting closely supervised,

coordinated

l counterintelligence program to

expose, disrupt and

Otherwise neutralize the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) and specified other

nate groups.

This new counterintelligence effort will take advantage

of our experience with a variety of sophisticated techniques

successfully applied against the Communist Party, Usa, and related

organizations since 1956.

Primarily, we intend to expose to public

scrutiny the devious maneuvers and duplicity of the hate groups;

te frustrate anyefforts or plans they may have to consolidate

their forces; to discourage their recruitment of new or youthful

adherents; and to disrupt or eliminate their efforts to circumvent

or violate the law.

Our counterintelligence efforts against hate

groups will be closely supervised and coordinated to complement

our expanded intelligence investigations directed at these

organizations.

He are furnishing general instructions to 17 field

of 17 Klan groups and 6 hate organizations, and New Yorls, Chicago

and Baltimore, who have active investigative responsibilities

for one hate organization each) relating to the administration

and prompt enactment of this new counterintelligence program.

Briefly,

these instructions require the 17 participating offices

to submit to the Bureau on or before 10/15/64 an analysis of

possible counterintelligence operations, including any specific

recommendations for action.

Thereafter (conmencing 1/1/65) the

participating offices will

submit a 90-day status letter setting

15%=

EncReut 9-3-64

S0I-X3

REC 20

157-9-Main

1 - 100-3-104-liain (CPUSA, Cointelpro)

SEP 271004

DR: bEC &B)L SEP 3 0 1964 CONTINUED - OVER

NW 88608-Docld 32989629-Page-118-

---

## Page 119

Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan

RE:

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

INTERNAL SECURITY

DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS

157-9-Main

forth a summary of current, possible, and successfully achieved

counterintelligence activity during the prior S-wonth period.

investigation relating to this program and to assign a Special

Agent on a part-time basis as the program coordinator responsible

for following and initiating counterintelligence action.

As is the instance in our established counterintelligence

іб.

→ program against the Communist Party, USA, land in our current 90-day

trial counterintelligence program directed against Soviet-Satellite

Nintelligence Tall recommended counterintelligence action against

(Klan-type and hate organizations will be required

l to be approved

the seat of Government.

This new counterintelligence program directed at Klan

and hate organizations will

be supervised at the Seat of Government

by the Special Agent supervisor responsible for our similar prograns

directed against the communist party, Usa, and soviet-satellite

Intelligence His efforts will be closely coordinated with

supervisory personnel responsible for the intelligence investigations

of, the Klans and hate organizations and their membership.

memorandum justifying continuance of the program will be submitted

and the participating field offices will be periodically apprised

of techniques which have been found to be most successful. At

additional recommendations relating to manpower or other adninistrative

requirements.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the Domestic Intelligence Division be authorized

to inmediately initiate a coordinated counterintelligence progran

directed at exposing, disrupting and otherwise neutralizing the

17 active Klan organizations and 9 active racial hate organizations.

> Portion in brackete

classile Fishes

By 77183

5/1/14 p.

- NW 88608 •Docld:32989629- Page 1-19

2

over

---

## Page 120

Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan

COUNTERINTELLIGINCE PROGRAM

INTERNAL SECURITY

DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS

157-9-Main

2.

That the attached letter be forwarded to the 17

field offices slated to particicate in this new counterintelligence

program setting orch instrucions dor me alministracion and

immediate enactment of the program.

ag

NW«88608_Docld:32989629 Page 120

---

## Page 121

OPTIONAL

AM NO. 10

5010-106

ATION

254 GRN. Io. NO. 37

UNITED STATES GC. / ERNMENT

Memorandum

()

TO

Mr. F. C. Sullivan

FROM

Mr. Fo 5. Baumgardner fig

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM -

INTERNAL SECURITY

DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS

DATE: August 27,

1964

1

-

Toisón

Selmon

Mohi

Casper

Callahan

Coolad

¿Gale

"Rosen

Sullivan

Tavefisass

Trotter

Tele. Room

Holmes -

Gandy'.

1

1

-

hiT.

Mr.

Mir.

Mi •

NT.

Belmont

Sullivan

Baumgardner

Gray

Trainor n

Memorandum from Mr. J. H. Gale to Mr. Tolson dated 7/30/64

captioned "Investigation of Ku Klux Klan and other Hate Groups" was

approved by the Director authorizing the Domestic Intelligence

Division to give consideration to the application of counterintel-

ligence and disruptive tactics to hate groups and to thereafter

make appropriate reconmendations:

coordinated

counterintelligence program_to

it 15 dose to sumendation that el

hate groups •

This new counterintelligence effort will take advantage

of our experience with a variety of sophisticated techniques

successiully applied against the Communist Party, UsA, and related

organizations since 1956. Primarily, we intena to expose to pubLic

scrutiny the devious maneuvers and duplicity of the hate groups;

to frustrate any efforts or plans they may have to consolidate

their forces; to discourage their recruitment of new or youthful

adherents; and to disrupt or eliminate their efforts to circumvent

or violate the law.

Our counterintelligence efforts against hate

groups vill be closely supervised and coordinated to complement

our expanded intelligence investigations airected at these

organizations.

We are furnishing general instructions to 17 field

offices (14 Southern offices responsible for active investigation

of 17 Klan groups and 6 hate organizations, and New York, Chicago

and Baltimore, who nave active investigative responsibilities

for one hate organization each) relating to the administration

and prompt enactment of this new counterintelligence program.

Briefly, these instructions require the 17 participating offices

• to submit to the Bureau on or beiore 10/15/04 an analysis oI

possible counterintelligence operations, including any specific

recommendations for action.

Thereafter

(commencing 1/1/65) the

partzipating offices vill

subnit a 90-day status letter setting

15%=

Enceut 9-3-64

CGT-X3 REC 20

157-9-Hain

1 - 100-3-104-Hain (CPUSA, Cointelpro)

SEP 271004

DR: bSC F82L SEP 3 0 1964 CONTINUED - OVIR

NW 88608-Doeld+ 2080620 Rage 121

---

## Page 122

Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan

RE:

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

¡ INTERNAL SECURITY

DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS

157-9-Hain

forth a sunmary of current, possible, and successfully achieved

counterintelligence activity during

the prior s-month period.

investigation relating to this program and to assign a special

Agent on a part-time basis as the program coordinator responsible

for following and initiating counterintelligence action.

As is the instance in our established counterintelligence

program against the Communist Party, USA, land in our current 90-day

trial counterintelligence program directed against Soviet-Satellite

Lintelligence

all recommended

counterintelligence action against

¿Klan-type and hate organizations will be required to be approved

the seat of Government.

This new counterintelligence program directed at Klan

and hate organizations will be supervised at the Seat of Government

by the Special Agent supervisor responsible for our similar programs

directed against the Communist Party, USA, and Soviet-Satellite

intelligence His efforts will be closely coordinated with

supervisory personnel responsible for the intelligence investigations

of, the Klans and hate organizations and their membership. An annual

memorandum justifying continuance of the program will be submitted

and the participating field offices will be periodically apprised

of techniques which have been found to be most successful. At

such time as the program is considered to be successfully under

way, a status memorandum will be submitted which will include any

additional recommendations relating to manpover of other administrative

requirements.

RECOM ENDATIONS :

1.

That the Domestic Intelligence Division be authorized

to inmediately initiate a coordinated counterintelligence progran

directed at exposing, disrupting and otherwise neutralizing the

17 active Klan organizations and 9 active racial hate organizations.

@ Portion on brachel

hailin S45967

by 77183

- NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 122

- 2=

over

---

## Page 123

Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan

RE:

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

INTERNAL SECURITY

DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS

157-9-Main

2. That the attached letter be forwarded to the 17

field offices slated to particinate in this new counterintelligence

program setting 10rch inscruciions or te administration and

immediate enactment of the program.

wel:

as

3

mN 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 123

---

## Page 124

•KOM

SUBJECT:

'A 41417.

EXITED STATES @ "RIMENT

Lemorandum

DIRECTOR, IB1.

TAMPA

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAI

INTERNAL SECURITY

DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS

DATE:

9/9/54

Re Bureau letter dated 9/2/64 captioned as

above.

On Page 3 Bureau listed the Viking Youth of

America, Tampa Origin, as one of the hate groups currently

being afforded

active

investigation and included in

captioned.grogram.

Reference is now made to Tampa letter to the

Bureau dated 5/5/51 which made reference in turn to

Jacksonville letter dated 4/30/64 wherein CEORSE DRAIN

NanCamos stated that the Viking Youth of America never

became organized in

the United States and that he never

made

an actual active attenot to recruit members in this

organization.

The lampa file in this matter is closed.

We

have.not been able to deternine that any active chapters

of this

group are in existence or that any menbers were

recruited for the group. It is thereiore felt that there

would be no point in our attempting any disruptive tactics

in connection with this group..

The Bureau is requested to advise lampa whether

it would be satisfactory not to initiate

any action on

the viking Youth of America and to substitute some other

organization

for this purpose.

NW 88608 Docid:32989629• Page 124

---

## Page 125

"EXITED STATES& RUMENT

ilemorandum

DIRECTOR, E3I

DATE:

9/9/54

- -1031

SUBJECT:-

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRÄLI

INTERNAL SECURITY

DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS

Re Bureau letter dated 9/2/54 captioned as

above.

On Page 3 Bureau listed the Viking Youth of

America, lampa origin, as one of the hate groups currently

being afforded active

investigation

and included in

captioned program.

Peference is.nou made to Tampa letter to the

Bureau dated 5/6/54 which made reference in turn to

Jacksonville letter dated 4/30/64 wherein CEORGRANN

NERGEILOS Stated that the Viking Youth of America never

became organized in

the United States and that he never

nade

an actual active attempt to recruit members in this

organization.

We

The Tampa file in this matter is closed.

nave not been able to determine that any active chapters

of this

group are in existence or that any members were

recruited for the group. It is therefore felt that there

would be no point in our attempting any disruptive tactics

in connection with this group.

The Bureau is requested to advise Tampa whether

it would be satisfactory not to initiate, any action on

the Viking Youth of America and to substitute some, other

organization for

this purpose.

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 • Page 125

---

## Page 126

INTED STATES GO RIMENT

Hercorandum

Director, I3I

SiC, des Calesas

DATE:

9/9/64

SUBJECT:

INTERNAL SECURITY

DISRUPTION OF EATE GROUPS

ReBulet to Atlanta and interested offices 9/2/54.

1) Fotential Countarintelligence Actioa

The majority

•Of'nembers of klan-type organi

rations in the her Oriears

araa are located in zural areas and;

in small communities.

In order to effectively expose the

icentities and

activities of individuals in these groups,

individual cases are being opened on members and a background :

type of investigation is being instituted by the New Orleans

office on these inciviaual members.

These incividual investigations of course, will

come known through contact with various individuals in the

The sere isnowledge that their

identiciss are

known to the fBI will have disruptive force or

the indivicual's activities.

To highlight and further cause consternation,

interviers of one of two specifically hand-picked members will

be conducted by Agents in these

areas, after which background

investigations will be instituted immediately on other known

members in the particular community.

The individuals to be intervieved will be members.

"wrecking crets"

The mere fact of these investigations

will plant the seads of sistrusi among the members

leader-

shie

• in the particular community.

Bureau

asthority is requested to immediately

initiate tre

apove cousterintelligence activity.

"3)

Pending Counterintelligence Action

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 126

---

## Page 127

Surveys are being conducted at Monroe,

, West

Torcoe, Alexandria

and Bogalusa, louisiana, pursuans 10 Bureau

asthority by airtel dated 9/4/64.

Tangible Resulis

Tangible results of such potential and pending

counterintelligence action will be furnished the

Bureau alio:

inauguration

of the

above.

Miscellaneous.

A completed initial

analysis will reach the

Jureau

on 10/25/64

concerning this matter.

2÷

NW. 88608_Docid:32989629 Page 127

---

## Page 128

SUBJECT:

FT0.

LATTED STATES GO RUMENT

ilizmorandur

Director, FBI

SAC, New Orleans

L COUNTARINABILIGRNCA PACG

INTERNAL SECURITY

DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS

DATE:

9/9/64

ReBulet to Atlanta and interested offices 9/2/54.

1) Potential Counterintelligence Action

The najority

zations in the New Orieans, members of klan-type organi-

area are located in rural areas and;

in small communities.

In order to effectively expose the

identities and activities of individuals in these groups,

individual cases are being opened on members and a backgroundi

type of investigation is being instituted by the New Orleans

office on these individual members.

These individual investigations of course, will

Jecome now through contact with various individuals in the

developing of background.

The mere knowledge that their

identities are known to the FBI will have disruptive sorce on

the individual's activities.

Io highlight and further cause consternation,

interviews of one or two specifically hand-picked members will

be conducted by Agents in these areas, after which background

investigations will be instituted immediately on other known •

menbers in the particular community.

The indiviauals to be interviewed will be members.

"wrecking crews"

The mere fact of these investigations

will plant the seeds of mistrust among the members and leader-

ship

in the particular community.

Bureau authority is requested to immediately

initiate

the above counterintelligence activity.

Pending Counterintelligence Action

NW 88608-Docld:32989629-Page-128

---

## Page 129

Surveys are being conducted at Monroe,

West

sorroe,

Alexandria and Bogalusa,

Louisiana, pursuant to Bureau

chorIty by airtal dared 9/4/54.

3) Pangible Results

Tangible results of such potential and pending

counterintelligence action will be furnissed the Sureau aito:

inauguration

of the

above:

Miscellaneous.

A

completed initial analysis will reach the

Sureau on 10/15/54 concerning this matter.

2÷

NW 88608_Docld:32989629 Page 129

---

## Page 130

FROM

SUBJECT:

TIONAL FORM NO, 10

5010-106-03

AY 15G2 EDITION

SA GEN. REG. NO. 27

JUNITED STATES GC iRNMENT

Memorandum

DIRECTOR, FBI (157-9-Main)

(SAC, ATLANTA' (157-826) (P)

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

INTERNAL SECURITY

DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS

(UNITED KLANS OF AMERICA, INC.,

KNIGHTS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN)

DATE:

9/16/64

ReBulet 9/2/64.

In 1960, a comparatively small group of

Klansmen pulled out of U.s. klans, knights of the

Ku Klux Klan, Inc., and formed a new Klan group called

Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc.

The Imperial Wizard of this new group was

ROBERT IRING OF JUnesborO, Georgia.

In the Summet

of 1961,

PoMowing a meeting vetween BING and officials

held at Birmingham, Alabama, 9/5-6/64.

At this meeting,

a and J. D.XJOHNWON, a Georgia State Klar

Officer

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 130

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## Page 131

FRÖMS

SUBJECT:

ATIONAL FORM NO, 10

3010-105-03

AY 1882 EDITION

SA GEN. REG. NO. 17

UNITED STATES G/ iRNMENT

Memorandum

DIRECTOR, FBI (157-9-Main)

DATE:

9/16/64

(SAC, ATLANTA' (157-826) (P)

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

INTERNAL SECURITY

DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS

(UNITED KLANS OF AMBRICA,

INC.,

KNIGHTS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN

ReBulet 9/2/64.

In 1960,

a comparatively small group of

Klansmen pulled out of U. S. Klans, Knights of the

Ku KLux Klan, Inc.,

and formed a new Klan group called

mights of the ku klux klan, Inc.

The Imperial Wizard of this new group was

ROBERT LAGING I JUnesboro, Georgia.

In the Summer

of 1961, Iollowing a meeting verween BING and officials

oi united klans of America, Inc.: Knights of the Ku

Klux Klan (United Klans),

the knights of the Ku Klux

nan, inc., were merged into united klans and BING was

given the posicion of Imperial Klokard of United Klans

held at Birmingham, Alabama, 9/5-5/64. At this meeting,

BIN Mes opposed for election as impertal flokand by

is and J. D. JOHNWON, a Georgia State Klan

Officer

--

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 131-

---

## Page 132

FRÖM

SUBJECT

PTI

FORM NO. 10

5010-108-03

MAY .

EDITION

GSÀ GENI REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES G/ IRNMENT

Memorandum

DIRECTOR, FBI (157-9-Main)

DATE:

9/16/64

(SAC, ATLANTA (157-826) (P)

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

INTERNAL SECURITY

DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS

(UNTIED ALAND OF AMERICA, INC.,

KNIGHTS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN

ReBulet 9/2/64.

In 1960, a comparatively small group of

Klansmen pulled out of U. S. Klans, Knights of the

Ku Klux Klan, Inc., and formed a new Klan group called

knights of the Ku Klux klan, Inc.

The Imperial Wizard of this new group was

ROBERT LABING UI JUnESNULU, GeOrgia. In the Summei

of 1961,

IoNowing a meeting Decween BING and officials

of United Klans of America, Inc., Knights of the ku

Klux Klan (United Klans),

the Knights of the Ku Klux

Klan, Inc., were merged into united lans and BING. was

given the position of Imperial Klokard of United Klans

held at Birmingham, Alabama, 9/5-6/64. At this meeting,

BING was opposed for election as Imperial Klokard by

AT 1705-R and J. Do/JOHNWON, a Georgia State Klan

Officer.

CALVIN CRAIG, "Grand Dragon for Georgia of

United Klans, through his support and Intluence t

•AT I705-R*AT 1705-R was elected Imperial Klokard.

AT 1652-R, AT 1705-R, AT 1700-R, AT 1720-R,

and

TAT 1761-R have all reported

that BING is extremely bitter,

particularly at CRAIG, over his defeat.

Symbol

Number

Grand Dragon for Georgia.

DAVIDSON did not commit himself

but told BING he would think it over and notify him when he-

had reached a decision

_NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 132-

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## Page 133

ROBERT LEE DAVIDSON, JRo, is a racial informant

of the Atlanta Office

He was formerly Imperial Wizard

of first U. S. Klans (

Nighus of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc.,

and later of United Klans.

He is presently not a member

of any Klan group; however, he has

considerable influence

and contacts among many of

the members of United Klans.

This situation appears to offer an opportunity to

capitalize upon the personal conflict of two Klan leaders.

We propose the following action:

Instruct Racial Informant ROBERT LEE DAVIDSON,

JR., to agree to help BING oust CRAIG as Grand Dragon for

Géorgia and instruct DAVIDSON to actively work with BING

to achieve CRAIG's ouster.

BING has considerable following, particulariy

in the rural area south of Atlanta. DAVIDSON has contacts

in the Klan throughout Georgia.

We believe that with

DAVIDSON's assistance, BING could disrupt much of the

United Klans' organization in Georgias

The Bureau is requested to authorize the above

action.

In forManti

Mame

2

-

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 133

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## Page 134

FINITED STATES GOT NMENT

Memorandum

DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE:

9/23/64

raoy/

SAC, JACISONVILLS

SUBJECT:

COUNTERINTELLICENCE PROGRAM

INTERNAL SICURITY

DISPUPCION OF_EATA GROUPS.

(TVO-WAY RADIO UNITS)

ReBulet 9/15/64.

The Jacksonville Cifice has carezully noted the

obvious intent of rebulet and agrees that there is a real

strong possibility for taking sone counter-intelligence

action agains the kian through this medium.

twas ra-contacted and ne stated at the

present time theré is no additional information concerning

the use of two-way radios nor has the local Klan in Jackson-

ville formulated any coda.

This would incicate that at the

present tine, while a number of local klansmen bave radios,

thore is no opportunity to introduce

deceptive transnissions

as the Klan has no "missions" on the planning board. The

above informant has reported

that it is anticipated

addi-

sional Klanszen will purchase zore

two-way radio equipment

which would be indicative of an expansion in plans of the

Klan to use this nethod of communication.

To date there

boen no operation of the Klan where two-way radio communica-

tions have played an integral pazt.

This office through its informants, particularly

i will renain alert and mill promotly advise the

Buzeud whenever infozmation iS received indicaring the Klan

has a sizeable "mission" in the

planning stages wherein

radios will play an iapoctant part.

Depending upon the

purpose of the "mission" clans could be formulated for some

deceptive attacks

on the Klan

itseli.

-NW 88608-Doc|d+32989629-Page 134

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## Page 135

20

SUBjECT:

CITED STATES GOT NMENT

I/lemorandum

DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 10/12, 104

So, BORITS

"COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROCRAM

INDERNAL SECURITY

• DISRUPILON OF HATE GROUPS

Re Bureau letter to Atlanta, 9/2/54.

Analysis of Potential CI Action Against

Organizations and Personnel of United

Klans of America,

KKKK (VIKA);

Improved Order of the

Inc.

(IOUSK,;

and che ALabama states

Rights Party (ASRP.

-

Piles on captioned organizations have been reviewed

=ü the Mobila Office to discover any information of the

-ind which would prevent a potential for effective CI

This review

of files includes the files of the

sive catiocs themselves and of individuals_known to be

of the organization.

It is the under-

standing of this office that this information would consist

o1 situatiors involving potential friction between individual

members on between pival organizations; or would consist of

intonation reflecting immorality, particularly sexual

armoralloy, on the part oi one or

more members, possibly

invoiving

the wire of wives or other memoers; or consisting

generally of information of a nighly uniavorable or emcarrass.-

ing nature pertaining to a membes or group of members which

would be not own, and the exposure of which could produce

suitacle conflicts.

A minimum of such information is con-

caired in Mobile files pertaining to Klan and States Rights

2306r personnel.

There

have been conflicts between individuals

win groups and between members of different groups, but

chose

conflicts have already natured and have already pro-

duced the division

and animosity of which the situations

vane japable.

Unlike personnel of Communist organizations:

NW 88608-Doeld 32080629-Bage 135

---

## Page 136

motto true cagarh2052005 ane not parierly pagea

ducting pronsority on the part of a Cans ang Ma2 64

we cows on a klansmar, although inforants who furnare

to thase individuals are laidy well

Rug canced tier many of them.

Approximately two years ago,

020 1120a.0n did

secone jealous when a single Klan member

(umanied) prinued with his mize at a social function.

However, the rancied

member is no longer active, and there

is not choim so rave been any further development of that

situacion.

Festinant to this analysis is the following

observatior:

the poor ng,

more actinit of OKa and

ASRE are centralized, has

experienced desegregation of restauranus, hotels, motels,

and public scroois, pressant

50 the 1904

Civil Rights

Act and sunstant to orders of the United States District

Солой 26 2оrоgomery.

Lastially

7/6/54,

snare was ar attenpt by Klansmen to gather and con-

spire boa Bre

aurpose of interfering with the desegregation

so wonde cheetees and gestauranes in downtown Montgomery.

..ovever:

Facile endoenants furnished information well

aurance do tie astual groposed action, enabling Mobile to

90612y 50e

tearsomert EcilCe Lecasument, Lne tollce lepari

kent

acted

Terr

acctru and eizectively, disbursing Klansmen

who had garrerad

in the danger area, ana

making i quite

clear that no marcus activity or interference with the

enforcerant cs the 196÷ Civil Pights Act would be toleratea.

3052 02a 2205 Thes

ühe infoznation was leaked to authorities

and the fact that the authorities took effective action

were high descrazizing to the Klan pessonnel (who are

aiso she caiu significant personnel of the ASRP).

demoralization vas so complose that when Monigomery public

schools vene decegregated, larsten did not even appear in.

the schools and took no action of any

linds. either at the schools of in any othes place, in any

ancond to inuerfere witn the desegregation.

It is therefore fully evident that the purposes

cought or tre.

i program, that is the demoralization and

we cancentag irstrective of such organizations, was

i direct investigation and Police

action.

No 1n2-z0a610r 13 intended that the work of the Mobile

denies has

baon finasay done pertaining to these organizations,

2

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 136

---

## Page 137

15 22025225

tn esot, the eareste boogran of the Mobile Office is

and nate robe extensive the inforant cover-

age 02 pestinant

organisations

These informants will

be

2026d0u1021g 22326

"or personal information of the una

whick might

ce suitable for tie

institution or CI action

1r 663

zuture, and suon information will de diligently

soügit du agents

conducting investigation concerning these

organigations and individuals.

mobile will also continue

to be alert fos any opportunity to utilize the system which

has beon effective in üne

past, that of cooperating with

-ocai lan enfoncerent. to take

the kind of action which dis-

ourages unlariul action on the part of the klan groups.

Rasommandation

The

robile Office has no secommendation for any

10gicaI immediate CI action at this time.

Action Groups:

rucile rasial informants have furnisned the

nost

inasriouals wathin the Una and ASRP who

ene constagres

ine most. likely so commit acts of violence

o= these

persons have been under

investigation sos soma tire, and in many instances Summary

Fessair

Hear Eurnaered

to the Bureau pertaining to them.

ins instances of bordings in the vicinity of

12n0g0no23, Alạ.:

inciusing the combings in Mississippi in

2900R5 weecs,

have interviewed neighbors and employers

oi chose indercavals and cave made visual checis, particularly

Zate aù

night;

in efforts to ascertain wnether or not the

2223029

thensettes vere come of thether or not their auto-

couches were mires aù shels residences. In rany cases,

a zost cases,

these Klan personnel decome

2:020 02

these inquiries and on several situations it is

21012

inat cher deserves agents

checking theis cars and

residences au night.

The se persons axe

303232020

undes the improssion that Bureau Agents have thèm

mdon varsucili constant surveillance.

They renarked to

2s3à oural sa the presence oi incormants on occasion that

2195

trein berenhones are tapped and they have

trat theis meeting places are

saugected so ricroprone davices.

Ii is believed that this

"ans constatutes a

very effective deterrent,

anais.

- reason for their lailure

2=21 maasures in connection with the racial

3

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 137

---

## Page 138

aiitian en sais aooe tithen sacant weeles:

Inrough in-

cumrô Craoorn Ocgeerations of license tagg of auto-

•Doiiùg taricd sü neeuing biaces, Locile Viiice is concuanily

saprins 02 she aduntisies of now persons wao suve eoae

:062x02a1 1o rEozonce.

juch cases,

& case file is

seoned on trat individual, his

identity being estaolished

320

^"3

baskground being obtained.

No particular efiort is

màâo io

investigations so discreet that the Klans-

man will nou learn that the FEI is inquiring about him.

Phis

pracinee is atemed to be effecuive with respect to

thase indirzauels.

As s0b forun careinbefore, Mobile will intensify

its elfonts to discover inforration, which can be used in

the CI progran.

zesbainirg to the possibility of exposure of

K1an1 :25 12ea-57pe actirities through

reliable news media,

Lù srounù be ousentad ghat it is the

:3â1s ¿a

firm policy of news

tao tonogonary, Ala., area to completely ignore

theos kier spoups, aind to sive them no publicity at all.

125138

waoone tontrs,

uc ras meld several public rallies,

MH:SlalRg COS

on leachet sistribution and even one

23C.0d3 5.

= aaia spot radio advertisement. They have

invired tne paees to aubera crosa rallies, noping to secure

90Saec2e

Sa0:: Crow.

Again, it is belleved that the

polie 0f uhe pregs

50 ignore

these groups has had the

destaable erfect, both in frustrating them in their

sennca Eor aublleity

zhiohs

and in aroiding advertising them

sê cone,

n2giù

rally more persons to the Klan cause

end mesuze 2n

thein increasing

their membership. Because

of thase consibesations, it is believed that

least in

of tne organizations.

4

MW 88608-Docld:32989629_Page 138

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## Page 139

Memoranaum

TO

DIRECTOR, EBI

SAC, C35510773

SUBJECT:

-COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

INTERVAL SECURITY

DISRUPTIOY OF RATE GROUPS

DATE: 10/12/54

ReBulet 9/2/64 to Atlanta and other offices,

It is noted inis letter lists as one of the target organizations,

as No. Y on page 2, the Independent Klavern, Fountain Inn, S. C.

Since this organization is no longer active or in existence, it

is suggested it be deleted fron this list.

Since the major organization in Charlotte Division

is the United Klans of America, Inc., Of which Birmingham is

origin, a copy of this letter is being designated to Bimingham.

fo= information.

Ine following represents the consensus of* Charlotte

Agento fanilies with klan activity:

1. Disruptive activity should not be undertaken at

= particular Klavern, as a general rule, unless there is

sufficient vell established informant coverage to be able to

tell the effest of the action when instituted.

such action

would probzoly serve to "tighten up" the organization and make

it more difficult to get an infomant in thereafter.

2. It is considered douoiful that newspaper publicity,

of only a generally unfavorable nature against the Klan organi-

zation, is effective in sesucing new applicants or causing any

large number of present members to drop out. The

"Charlotte

Observer," wich has wide distribution throughout Nosth and

south carolina, published in August and September, 1964, a series

of articles, copies of which were sent the Bureau oy Charlotte

letter of 3/13/54.

Tese ariegles ridiculed the united kians

NW 88608-Đoeld:32989629-Page-130.

---

## Page 140

Of America, Inc., in North Carolina, and published both photos

and names of a number of members.

So far as has been learned

from informants, this had very little adverse effect upon the

organization.

It was alleged that two to five members weza

discharged from their jobs, or warned about continuing member-

ship, buc the identities of these alleged persons is not known,

doin carolina Grand Dragen JAMES Ro/JoNEs has stated, both

publicly and privately to informants, that this publicity was

very valuable to the growth of the organization.

One informant

reported that the day after the articles published his name as

a local leader, three persons contacted him and applied for

membership, stating they had not previouslv known whom to contact.

It is considered that publicity of this type generally

deters from joining only those persons who would not be

interested in joining in the fist place. It is believed that

lasge proportion of those parsons who are potential membezs

are seeking status and recognition, and publicity is no deterrent

to them; it makes them feal important and members of an important

group.

The major apparent effect of the series of newspapez

articles referred to has been a tightening up of security, and

refusal of leadars to allow newspaper photos of individual

Klansmen to be taken at public rallies.

3. Disruptive

activity, wherever possible, should be of

a nature which does not expose the fact that the Bureau, or the

"Federal Government", is behind the activity. It is believed

that open action, to a laige extent, can backfire and create

resentment and sympathy. It must be remembered that Klan

membership, in many sections, does not by any means cazzy the

odium that alleged Communist membership of sympathy does in

almost any section of society.

# Along this same line, there is probably no point in

trying disruptive activity, at least not at this stage, on a

local

Klan group which is small, inactive, and peaceful. Any

such activity nhich is not completely discreet and concealed

would likaly have the effect of stirring it up.

5.

sy letter of 9/25/54, Charlotte furnished the Sureau

sample of a lapel pin which was adopted at the Ergarial

2.

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 • Page 140

---

## Page 141

Klonvocation of United Klans of America at Birmingham on

7/5-5/64. This is to be sold to members for $2 each and

there is apparently considerable demand for it.

Since it is

not apparent to the unitiated that it has anything to do

with "the Klan," it is axpected that memoers will wear it

openly as a secret recognition signal. If it does become

widely adopted and worn, consideration should then be given to

giving widespread publicity to the fact of what it represents.

This should have the result of discouraging some persons who

do not want their Klan membership publicly known.

6, It is considered that possibly the most effective

way of discouraging membership, or causing existing members

to withdraw, is to establish that someone in the organization

is getting rich off it, or embezzling the proceeds. Charlotte

is endeavoring to develop information along thesa

lines, but

nothing specific has yet been developed.

7. The following are suggested tactics that appear

useful on a selected basis against individual Klansmen,

particularly those whose employers might doject to their Klan

membership:

Anonymous letter of phone call to the employer

felling of the Klan membership.

b. Enter on behalf of the memoer a subscription to

the "Fiery Cross," United Klans of America publication, and have

it mailed to his employment.

c. When a particular memoer is away from home at a

Klavein meeting, have

a female phone his home and indicate he

was to meet her and is late.

This might have the effect of

making it difficult for aim

to get away from home at night

thereafter. This should be limited to particular individuals

who are considered potential onas to stir up trouble in a Klavern.

3 .

NW 88608_Docld:32989629 Page 141

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## Page 142

8. ROBERT ECHOES SCOGEINS, Aka., Charlotte Eila-105-991

BureaL ELle 157=1530, is South-Carolina Grand Dragon Of United

Klans of America.

Charlotte repotts bY SA JOll ALDEN MUNNy

1/31/54 and 3/27/64, show that he is receiving over $300 per

month. from the Veterans Administration as a -100 per cont

disaoted vateran..

At the same time he operates a plumbing

, business and is active in United klans of America, making

public speeches, etc. Charlotte furnished extra copies of

those reports to the Bureau, with the suggestion furnishing

them to VA be considered.

It is suggested consideration be given to asking the

JA to re-evaluate his disability rating, in viaw of his employment

and activities. It is believed this should be done on a SOG

level, to reduce the possibility of SCOGGINS learning that such

a suggestion came from the FBI.

9 .

"Action Grouos."

•" No particular such groups, given

to violence, are known within klan organizations in Charlotte

territory.

As the Bureau is aware, United Klans of America has

instituted what it calls

"Security Guaras," who wear military

type uniforms and have military ranks. These function at

public rallies for the purpose of keeping order, watching for

"spies," etc. It is expected that if violence is undertaken,

these will probably be the ones to do it, but no such under-

takings have been learned.

Spacific individual recommendations for counter

intelligence action will be suomitted by subsequent letters as

developed.

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 172

---

## Page 143

TO

FROM

SÜBJECT:

Memorandum

Director, FBI

DATE:

10/13/64-

A SAC, Birmingham

COUNTER INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

INTERNAL SECURITY

DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS

Re Bulet to Atlanta 9/2/64

The Klan-type and bate organizations operating in

Birmingham territory and which are potential objects of a

counterintelligence program are the United Klans oi

America,

Inc., Knights of the Ku Rluz Rlen and tha National

States Rights

PaIty»

Recently Mr. VINCENT TOWNSEND; Vice-President and

Assistant Publisher, Birmingham-news, and SAC Contact;

advised SAC EVERETT 3. INGRAM that he read a story in

the

Chicago Daily-News concerning Klan activity in Mississippi

and delt the story could not have been prepared mithout

FBI cooperation.

He was impressed with this and has indicated

a sizong interest in similar material for the Birmingham

News.

He promised to protect the Bureau,s interest in

any such endeavor.

He is a well knoyn civic leader in

Bizmingham. A review of the files in the Birmingham Office

is being made for suitable information in this connection.

Bureau instructed in referenced letter that

specific mention be made of "Action Groups" in Klan

organizations. At the present time the weekly meetings of

Eastview Klavern No, 13, which has been the leading Klavern in

United Klans of America,

InCo,

in this terrory, have been

poorly attended. The principal members of the "Action Group"

-NW 88608-Dold:32989629-Page_143_

---

## Page 144

in this Klavern are HARRY WALKER, CECIL HENSON, EUGENE.

REBYES,

30d RONNIE TIDELUS

Eflorts are being

made to

information suitable for disruption purposes in

connection with this group.

Inzestigation is being conducted concerning

ROBERT LASTIL SHELTON.

The Atlanta Office bas been

requested to ascertain why HoL BHARDS, now deceased,

ousted StaLiot iron his then position of Grend-Dragon of

the J. S. Klans.

A copy of the article appearing in

the "Bizningban-News" for April-30, 1950, entitlad "SHELTON:

ousted from Klan Post," bas been obtained.

The article did

not disclose the exact nature oi the charges against.

Records of the Alabama Secretary of State reflect

that Saaltoy-was dropped as the Klan's authorized ageat

and sas replaced by Rey-ALVIHORY of Tarzadega,

Alabana,

the Ku Klux KleD, was quoted as saying "ye had to have

= grand dragon in Alabana and we didn'* have one in

ROBERT I SHELTON," He told reporters

thai SHEBION

#35

Ieplaced

as grand dragon and agent of the "Klan" in

Alabada "for conduct unbeconing a

Klansman and attenpting

to use the organization for selfish purposes," The

article said IDYARDS did not elaborate on what is considered

conduct unbecoming a Klansman,

Informants are being

contacted or any information

of a derogatory nature concerning SaabtoN..

Discreet inquiries

being made in Tuscaloosa concerning his financial status.

In viey of recent information fron the Bureau no request is

baing nade for a mail cover on

Shelton or the Jaited Klans,

The information on left rociRs. and wIllied hOLE,

will be afforded prompt attention.

2

NW-88608_Docld:32989629_Page_144

---

## Page 145

As ta Bureau is aware, some few montos ago several

individuals, who bad been active

officials and/or dedicated

members of the National States Rights Pazty (NSAP), leit

the NSR?.

They are trying to form and make a going party

0¿ the American States Rights Party (ASRP) with its head-

quarters in Birmingham,

the

ASRP and NSRP leaders have been belittling,

Since the gaoup pulled cue of the want battes

and making extremely derogatory remarks concerning each

other.

Both groups are using the same mailing list,

(the NSRP's list), which the ASRP group obtained beiore

pulling out of the NSRD, and they disseminate their

derogatory remarks in the literatura they distribute

-

1en.

The Bursau has also

been advised that GEORGE.

LINCOLN ROCKEL, American Nazi Party (ANP) leader has

recently filed a $550,000,00 Libel suit in the U, 5.

Districi Court, Birmingham,-Alabama,, against Dr: EDWARD 2:

Eniormation-Director of the

NSRP, and others

connected with

• the NSRP,

Birminghan contemplates furnishing certaia items,

on a confidential basis to a few trusted, reliable newsnen

(established SAC contacts), concerning the NSRP, • the ASRP

and the AMP for the purpose of possibly causing

further

disruption of any unifiad actions or working arrangenents

betreen these groups. Such newsuen may be used to contact

the leaders of one gioup to inquire about

or confirm something of

2 Cerogatory nature reporiadly made by some leader of one of

the other groups,

Birminghan also contemplates working closely

with othar law enforcement agencies to see that any

activity of such groups are known, covered and where.

considered desirable,

the group will be made cognizant

that

their activity is knowa,

3

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 • Page 145

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## Page 146

Bimingham also is considering having some

racial

informants drop remarks to of for the benerit of the leaders

OI the NSRP.

IC..

that vili tend to causa the leaders of

one group to

rataliate in like manner sonins; the other

groups;

I? the Bureau has any baterial on disruptive

tactics or results of eliorts, which is not already in

a11 field offices, Biruingnam

Fould be glad to eceive

-

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 146

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## Page 147

SUbjECT:

libre

UNITED STATES GOVERWIENT

Memorandum

DIRECTOE, I3I

SA SEC, LINES ROGE

, COINTELPRO

DATE:

10/13/64

ReBulet to Atlanta and Other Cificas, 9/2/5%.

Set out below are an analysis and recommendations

under captioned program.

NATIONAL STATES RICHES PARTY (NSED)

The Arkansas branch of NSRP has been inactive

in the State of Arkansas for

the past year with the excep

tion of placing on the Arkansas ballot candidates for

President and Vice President of the United States,

It is

not recommended that any action be taken against this group

at this time.

ASSCCIATION OF ARKANSAS KLANS

OF THE KU KLUK KLAN

(AAK)

The AAK in Arkansas is made up of three Klaverns

Located 2E ilitle ROOk,

Texarkana, and Pine Bluff; and

¡i has no affiliation wich any national blan group.

are no "action", groups within any of these three klaverns.

The three laverns do not own or lease any propsity for

meeting places. The four Little Rock nembers usually

meet in the home of a menber.

The Texarkana Klavern has

not held any klavern meetings as such in several nonths.

The Pine Bluff Klavern neetings vary irom residences to

•business places of klavern members.

State meetings are held at irregular intervais

an average of about once per month or less.

There is

no regular neeting place for

the siate neetings, which are:

held in various Arkansas towns including towns in which

there

are no klaverns, The state weetings are attended

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 147

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## Page 148

by froz one to five nonbers of each oi the three

klaverns and are nell covered by informants.

The State

Enané Dragon Birb milLials has continually cautioned

mensers

against vibience and any type of illegal ioü714205

Ñore of the klaverns have engaged in violence...

I. LITTLE ROCK MLAVERN -

Of the four members who attend weekl: meetings

see marate, who is considered tho

head ci

This sault group, dravis a pension from the

Rodene.

Government and, according to informants, is afraid to

-

•engage in any illegal activity or to let his pune ba usse

in connection with the klan for fear of losing his pension..

The two informants maintain the full considence of the

other two members.

In recent months the klavern ran a

series of snall ads in a Little Rock daily newspaper in

an effort to renew interest and gain new members.

The

klavern received a number of responses, but no action

whatsoever has bean takon by the klavern to take in any

new member's.

The: Flavern has no ciganized activity. other

than the weekly meetings described by informants as

boing "bull sessions" with the principal topic being.

politics.

...a.

No racommendation for counterintelligence is

being made concerning the Little Rock Klavern.

20 TEXARKANA KLAVERN

This klavern has not held any klavern meetings.

as such in several months, and it appears that the

principal reason for the lack of meetings is the inter-

view of

monbers and leaders concerning the

assassination

•I Presideni KANNEDY. Klavern representatives regularly.

attend state meetings, one reason being that State Grand

Dragon Bial tintits,

who officiates aù state

meetings,

is a member of the Texariana Klavern. Of the

five or

sis members who from time to time attend state meetings,

two are informants. On 10/1/61 manadvised that the

Grand Dragon had

stated that hareafter Texarkana Klavern

members will neet with the Bivins - Kildare, Texas,

Klavern of the anto

-2-

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Guard bragon Fishtus, according to informants,

is active in politics in Bowie County, Iexas, 15 a forger

menber of tha board of Regants of Texariana durion College,

Tesarkanay Peyes, and in recent contes cas ore carinas

election to tae Board of Begants of that college ura

defaated as a candidate

for the City Council o1 rexarbat

-Tezas.

He cannot afford to become involved in any illegal

activities because of his activities in legitimate enter

prises.

He has continually cautioned Tesarkaza Alavera

members as nell as nonbars of other klaverns attending

state

meetings against any violence and/or illegai

activities.

No raconmendation is being nade for counterintel-

ligence against the Texarkana Klavern except as it is

effecied by a recommendation set out hereaiter under the

Pine Bluff Klavern.

. 3. PINE BLUEZ KLAVERN

The Pine Bluff Klavern has a membership of approxi-

nately trenty to twenty-five.

It meets once a week in

LIErEnT DuSInESS LOCatiOnS oi itS nembers, and average

weekly attendance is twelve.

Among the twelve, one. O1

two inforzants seat with them and turnish full

coverage

of their activities.

The klavern's main

activity has been to dis-

courage integration by legal neans and to get members

elected to school board positions.

The klavern

collected

the funds and donated the money for the campaign expense

of two of its renbers who ran foi

a position on the bine

Bluff School Board and the Dollarway School Board.

These

two members nade a miserable showing andere defeated.

The klavern was behind and organized the National

Patriots League (NPL) to further its non-integration

progran publicly.

The Exeitea Cyclops, or president, of

the Klavern is chairnan of the Nei.

-The NIL actually is

a front organization for the flavern.

The main activity

o the Npi los to organize a drivate country club, which

is known as the Buiran Country Ciub. The purpose of the

-3-

NW 88608-Docld:32989629-Page-149

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club was to build a swimming pool for white onli

construction of the pool itsell was compics but not

sulliciently to blace it in use this sc.o.:

For:

in Butian Country Club is $25.

The Magority oi tie

menDers are not aware of the

Lact tie the klavern was

behind its organization.

Henbership in the Butran Countzy

Club was easily obtained as the public pool for whites

and public pool for Negzoes were both closed during the

sunner of 1954 when Negroes attempted to integrate the

white pool.

This left no public pool open in Pine Blufi.

steppi, vice president of the klavern, donated the

land for the

Butram Country Club; as he owns land sur-

rounding the club, he will beneiit financially from the

sale of this land

for building lots.

The NPL has also

distributed a limited number of leaflets publicly dis-

couraging peope rom patronizing certain restaurants and

businesses which hadhired or served Negroes.

"Jenbers of the klavern were responsible for

forming a John Birch Society Chapter in Pine Bluff,

and

a klavern nember is leader of this chapter.

Approximately

eighi to ten people attend the monthly meetings of the

john Birch Society Chapter; and of the men who atterd,

all are Elavern members with the exception of one man.

Menbers of the klavern completely control and dominate

the sonn Birch Society Chapter in Pine Bluil.

They,

however, only conduct john

Birch Society business.

Like-

wise, the members of the klavern further the john

Birch

Society program through the klavern.

Members of the klavern are vorking individually

in politics for the re-election of Goveznor ORVALE.

FA-UBUS

and for the election of BarRy GoldwaTER:

The klavern has not advocated any violence but

on occasion has cautioned its members against violence.

klavern nembers were cautioned to stay.

s Truck Stop, a location which Negroes were

attempting to integzate, in

the spring of 1954 so that

no violence would occa.

Blenbers of the klavern recently distributed a

Ku Klux Klan (KKK) leaflet seeking new zencers and

-4-

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## Page 151

stating requesis ior applications be directed to e. O.

3o:: 1182, Pine SIuf1.

in this leailer 1t was pointed

out trat

the as nas

striving for.a lawâul settlement

of the difficulties broughi on by the National issocia-

thai di is orposed to violance.

This leaflet further sei

that this was & chartered, legalized movement and

1t is no nore illegal to ba a member of ii than to be a

membor of other organizations.

At various tines in the past the klavern has

attempted to organiza "action" groups within the klavera,.

but of

each occasion the project has died from lack of

interest.

In line with Bureau policy of dissemination of

infoimation,

the nain activities regarding the Pine Bluff

Klavern nave been disseninated confidentially to Chief

_OÊ POLiCE SORUAM.D. YOUNC, Pire Bluil, (NA) On a regular

bas15.

Chiei: YOuNG has exerted every

elfort to keep down

the possibiity of violence.

Through his confidential

sources he is also well

aware of the identities of the

Liavern noners and their activities. He personally

rarned particu klavern members

against any violence

2nd

nas

sicied they will be net with immediate arrest

1l any violence occurs. As an example, ChrenzOUNE was

savised

through his onn confidential source of the time

and location of the klavera neeting on the night of

Cotober 5, 195€.

Chieryeost sent a lieutenant oi his

depariment in uniform io check the location, recoid

license numbers, and to be seen checking the meeting so

that the klavern nembers would know that he was checking

on ther.

This has had a strong influence on making the

X12V022

follow a line of legal activity. It has also

resulted in the nore responsible leading citizens of the

comunity being made arare of certain klavern members,

causing

these klavern menbers

to se discredited in the

eyes of the public.

This was borne out in the recent

school board

election on 9/29/64 when two klavern members,

one o thOI is " F.-BUIRAl, were miserably defeated.

Tha klaverr has during the past few nonths

ungod its zenbers to solicit and obtain new members.

The ineffectiveness of their program is shown by the

-5-

NW 88608-Docld:32989629-Page-151

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fact that only one new zember

was initiated. tr

member is a non-organiz-cional iracing

^..

. . . . .

Fock Division,

Likewise,

lets distributed encouraging people to wite of appii-

cations they have received only two leiters; and neither

of the writers nave become a member.

The leaflet has

met with complete failure in its effort to build up its

mencership.

At this time the following are the only specific

counterintelligence action being recommended:

1. An anonynous letter be nailed to the razional

OfIIce oi john. SlIch SocieTy, Belmont, Massachusetts,

pointing out that the KKK is

in full control o1 the John

Biich Society Chapter

in Pine Bluff. In this letter

specifically mention the name of one or two of the more

leading kian members who are also leading the John Birch

Society in Pine Bluii.

2. "an anoninous letter be mailed to CHRisSD:!

CUTHBERISON, ExaLted. Eyelops-of the Pina Bluff Klavern,

and

a copy mailed to BILL MILLIMiS, State Grand Dragon,

with the letters to be mailed to the Post Difice Box in

Pine. BLuI and In lexarkara, Arkansas, ol the san.

The

letter should be a complaining letter

Ixom a member who

was active in the past

and uno recently found one of the

KKK leaflets in his automobile which leaflet encouraged

Henbership.

The letter would let them know why he has

not rejoined; it would point out that he dropped out

because of such leadership as i EmBUrRAM, who has used

the kian for personal gain as Burnishad a residence on

his

property remodeled at klavern expense and then made

the klavern stop holding meetings these; that BUTRA

has

now donated land for the Butram Country Club so that

he can sell his surrounding land for building lots at

an exorbitant price.

The letter should also set forth

the fact he heard surpad was discharged from the Army

10z mental deficiency (moron). This letter should be

mailed fron Little Rock.

Interviers of klan members and leaders in the

pasi (for example, at the time of the assassination of

Fresident KENNEDY and on particular bombing matter cases)

-6.

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 152

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have had deterring effect on the kian,

For example,

the Tenantiana

Klavern has not held a Flavern neeting

as such

since

that

time.

One Little Rock member has

dropped oui as a result of bales neces

according to an infornant, this menber is a

" meaning ina

he is not as radical as previously.

in interviems with membars of the Pine Bluff Klavera,

¡agents have not net with any hostility and have been

trezied cordially and vith respect.

Individual members

during these interviens have indiced they are opposed

advocate proceeding in a legal manner..

A number of the nembers have said that through political

pressure and voting are the only ways any change can

However, they have stated they are still avid

segregationists and do not condone race mixing in any

When and if it appears that interest may be

renewing in the AAR in arkansas, consideration will be

given to another interview program. It is noted. that

particular klan members are interviewed on a spasmodic

basis in regard to leads iron surrounding field offices

on bonbing matter cases, and this has had a tendency to

deter any violeni activity on the part of klavern members.

NW 88608-Docld:32989629_Page-153.

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## Page 154

62-116395-551'

30

EUL: 1Mb 8/8/75

The Atcorney General

U.S. SENATE SELECT. COMMITTE

/ : ON INTELE ACTVIS (SSC)

Re 7/28/75 superseding req fos FBI materials recd

that date fron SSC. Enclsd is mend for forwarding

to Committee which responds to reg identified as

Roman numerals set frth below. As indicated in

mend, V. G.

is being delivered by separate comm

nicain 8/8/75. Also encisd for ur records is ec

of memo prepared for Committee.

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 154

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## Page 155

Attached hereto is the response to Item #1 in

the Senate Select Committee (SSC) letter to Mr. K. William

O'Connor, Esq. on July 14, 1975. Item #1 is set forth

as follows:

"All memoranda and any other materials prepared

in or by the General Investigative Division, the Domestic

Intelligence Division, and the Inspection Division, which

relate to, are referred to, or alluded to in, or portions

of which are summarized or described in, the

July 30, 1964,

memorandum captioned 'Investigation of Ku Klux Klan and

Other Hate Groups' from J. H. Gale to Mr. Tolson.

(See

attachment to your letter of June 17, 1975.)"

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 155

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## Page 156

July 24, 1964

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

2.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

thank you

very much for your letter of July 17, 1964--

I have been giving this racial problem constant

thought,

Paren-

thetically, I aid what i could yesterday in New York to get khal

0212ee moving taster ano more ellectively in this waved

You asked for suggestions and this is what I now offer

you for whatever little value it has.

(1) After writing you I recommended to the

Inspection Division that a study be made

"*..

relative to whether or not the Domestic

Intelligence Division can better handle

1 :

certain aspects of the Civil Rights-Facial

problem.

Hr. Gale is very much in favor

of this

inquiry and is moving promptly in

this matter.

I think the sesulis of his

inquiry will be most helpful in evaluating

the situation.

(2)

What I have in mina basically is this:

You may want to, in light of

his inquiry,

consider transierring the responsibility

for the development of informants in the

Blu Klux Klan

White Citizens Council and

related "hate" organizations to the Division

while leaving

the responsibility for

investigating bombings, killings, and so

forth where it now is.

My idea is:

This

Division can bring to

bear all the techniques,

skills, and procedures which it has used;'

to successfully penetrate the Communist Party

and espionage organizations to now penetrate

these hate organizations causing us so much

trouble.

(In talking to Mr. Tolson this

norning I mentioned this briefly to him.)

1f

(3)/ my idea is operationally sound, and if this

1s done,

I would

immediately hold some

regional conferences in zreas where the

racial issue is acute and get under way

these oilices, special ano

aggressive

prograns to carry

out this high level quality

informant development.

You aff completely

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 156

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## Page 157

right when you say that informant develop

ment of the righi kind is essentially the

solution to our current problem. The number

of informants per se as we both know, are oi

no significance.

• What we must have is the

right kind of informants on the right level.

The old saying "The proof of the pudding is

in the eating" is relevant here because if

we had this kind of informant penetration,

we wouldn't have some of these unsolved cases now

causing us so much concern.

hard, stubborn fact we cannot theorize away.

(4) Further, we should expand our informant

penetration to cover some of these legitimate

but extremist organizations which we have up

to now ignored in this respect.

they often

are "supporting" forces for such as the f.k.k.

etc. and we ought to be on the inside of thei.

This then is my response to your letter for now.

I have said,

the Inspection Division is making the inquiry to

ascertain the operational facts and the leasibility of what i

suggest.

Cordially,

Bill fillion

W.111am

Sullivan

Expedits

- 2 -

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 157

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## Page 158

OPTIONAL FORM NO, 10

5010-106

MAY 1962 EDITION

•ESA GEN, RIG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES EC • RNMENT

/ * Memorandum

TO

Mr. Belmont Wits

Toison

Belmont

Mohr

Casper

Callahan

Conrad

DeLoach

Evans

Gale

DATE: July 27, 1964

Rosen

Sullivan

Tavel

1 - Mr. Mohr

Trotter

Tele. Room

FROM : A. Rosen fud

I - Mr. Gale

Holmes -

1 - Mr. Belmont

Gandy-

SUBJECT: RACIAL MATTERS

I - Mr. Rosen

1 - Mr. Malley

1 - Mr. McGowan

Certainly, the items mentioned by Mr. Sullivan are

such as to be handled by the Bureau on an intelligence basis. The

racial field is a most fertile field for Communist Party and other

subversive groups. There are indications of this such as in the

cases of Martin Luther King and Michael Schwerner, one of the

missing civil rights workers from Philadelphia, Mississippi, and

other situations. Also there are reports of foreign funds being used

to support the current actions of Malcolm X. The racial strife and

disorder are of such major significance as to have international

aspects and this is tailor-made for the disruptive tactics of subversive

elements both right and left.

We cannot afford to divorce the national racial program from

its possible international aspects. The devices and tactics presently

in use in the security field should be utilized to the fullest in

developing intelligence information regarding national as well as

international developments in the racial strife. The tense racial

potential in major cities is a fertile field for subversive activities

both right and left.

We have seen from the killings in the South, for example,

the killing of Medgar Evers, that such appear to be isolated incidents

usually carried out by one man or a small unattached group occurring

on the spur-of-the-moment, such as the killing of the Lieutenant Colonel

near Colbert, Georgia, and the assaulting of a minister in the streets

in Hattiesburg, Mississippi.

REC-9/: 1-284

The investigation of the Klan and hate groups as well as the

development of informants in such organizations must, out ofnêcêssity,

1304

be handled as a whole. The following of the informants cannot be isolated

from the over-all investigation of the organizations just as the informants

in the Communist Party cannot be isolated from the organizations they are

connected with.

CLM/nkr

(7)

& SEP

21664

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 158

*in letter to the Director dated 7/24/64

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## Page 159

Memorandum to Mr. Belmont

RE: RACIAL MATTERS

Of course, any specific offenses such as, for example,

the case of the three missing civil rights workers in Philadelphia,

Mississippi, "or cases involving brutality, bombings or any other

violations these individual investigations should be handled by the

appropriate substantive desks such as the Civil Rights Desk.

The over-all racial field is specifically an intelligence operation

for the Bureau.

It can best be organized when all facets are followed

and directed by one Division. The communist potential for activities

in this field would seem to be a major factor as evidenced by the doings

of Martin Luther King and his associates. The Bureau can best keep

abreast of the whole field by having all angles of the racial field united

in one Division utilizing the tactics which Mr. Sullivan has suggested

as being effective.

- 2 -

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 159

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## Page 160

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

5010-106

MAY 1962 EDITION

GOA GEN, RS, NO. 27

UNITED STAFES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

MR. TOLSON

TO

FROM

SUBJECT:

DATE:

August 4, 1964

l'olson

Belmont

asper

allaha

Conso

DeLgse

Evans

Gale

Sullivan -

Tavel -

Trotter -

Tele. Room

Hoing

PERSONNEL TRANSFERS TO EFFECT PROPOSED

REASSIGNMENT OF SUPERVISORY RESPONSIBILITIES

IN RACIAL MATTERS AND RACIAL INFORMANTS:

By memorandum J. H. Gale to Mr. Tolson 7/30/64 it was recommended, and

now approved by the Director, that supervisory responsibility over Racial Matters

Jand Racial Informants be transferred from the General Investigative Division to the

Domestic Intelligence Division, In accordance with this approval, proposed realignment

and distribution oi personnel from the General Investigative Division to the Domestic

Intelligence Division are being submitted.

Inasmuch as approximatel y 75% of the work of this Unit is now represented in

the categories being transferred to Division 5, appropriate personnel transfers

consistent therewith should be made:

Category

Racial Matters

Racial Informants

Bombing Matters

Federal Train Wreck

Statute

Destruction of Aircraft or

Motor Vehicles .

Caseload, June, 1964

870

481

183

80

Percent

51. 5%

.. 28.5

10.8 •

:

4.7 •

74

4.5

14/7000-2946X

38

38

Total

REC-143

1,688

100. 0%

The current supervisory responsibility among the seven Agent Supervisors in this

Unit, including Supervisor in Charge Joseph C. Trainor, is as follows:

• SA J. C. Trainor supervises classifications (other than racial, informants

• and organizations) for Atlantic Seaboard offices north of Virginia,

13 SEP 244SE4

SAd. G. Deegan has responsibility for racial intormants for all field

ices a generases other classifications for the Virginia ard Florida,

3X8-19-1563m

1 - Mr. •Catlahan

- Mr. Rosen

1 - Mr. Mohr

1 - Mr. Belmont:

1 - Mr. Sullivan

NW 886,08 Docld:32989629 Page 160

SEE NEXT PAGE

1. 246 235:109

PERS, REC. UNIT

SENT DIRECTOR

5-5-64

37€

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## Page 161

Memo for Mr. Tolson

Re:

Personnel Transfers to Effèct Proposed

Reassignment of Supervisory Responsibilities

in Racial Matters and Racial Informants

SA F. H. Freund has responsibility for Klan organizations for all

field divisions and Supervises other classifications for ll western and

midwestern offices. •

SA L. A. Giovanetti has alternate responsibility for Klan organizations

for all field divisions and supervises other classifications for Atlanta,

Little Rock, Savannah and 4 other midwestern offices.

SA C. A. Parkis has responsibility for other hate organizations (8

currently active) for all field divisions and supervises other classifications

for Birmingham, Mobile, Cleveland and the 4 Texas offices.

SA F. P. Smith supervises classifications (other than racial informants

and organizations) for New Orleans, Memphis, Knoxville and 7 western

offices, and special cases.

SA H. E. Trent supervises classifications (other than racial informants

and organizations) for Charlotte, Savannah, Baltimore, Washington Field

office, Louisville and 2 midwestern offices.

Based on the distribution of work, Inspector's analysis reflects that it would

take 5 of the 7 men assigned to the Organizations Unit to handle racial matters and

racial informants under the approved change of responsibilities. There are 7 clerical

employees assigned to the Organizations Unit of the Civil Rights Section and it is

felt that 5 of these clerical employees who generally handie the work being transferred

from the General Investigative Division to the Done stic Intelligence Division be

transferred along with the supervisors. Assistant Directors Rosen and Sullivan are

in accord that the proposed personnel changes are equitable, consistent and correspond

with the transfer of responsibilities.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That Supervisor in Charge Joseph C. Trainor and Agent Supervisors

Deegan, Freund, Giovanetti and Parkis be transferred to Division 5 (Domestic Intelligence

Division) concomitant to the transfer to that Division of sipervisory responsibility over

racial matters and racial informants (if approved to be handled by Vir. Mohr's Office).

tarted destina 29t

8114/6%

prep

- 27

SEE NEXT PAGE

9-18-64

1. NW 38608 Docld:32989629

Page 161

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## Page 162

Memo for Mr. Tolson

Re: Personnel Transfers to Effect Proposed

Reassignment of Supervisory Responsiki lities

in Racial Matters and Racial Informants

2. That the remaining Agent Supervisors, Smith and Trent, be retained in

the Civil Rights Section to supervise bombing matters, Destruction of Aircraft

or Motor Vehicles, Federal Train Wreck Statute, and special cases.

3. That the following clerical employees be transferred (presently assigned

to the Organizations Unit) to the Domestic Intelligence Division if approved, to be

hanaled by the Administrative Division):

May A. Cammann - stenographer

B.A. 1. to handite

Kathryn T. Chernitsky - stenographer

Sue E. Waller - stenographer

Carol Ann Hancock - clerk

Wilbur Lane Perkins - clerk

. Wa

Employees

9-17-64

б.

mr. miner

51m0/5044)

Mr.

vist).

Dinis, o

ADDENDUM:

(WCS: jad, 8-5-64)

The personnel changes as recommended are acceptable

to this Division at this time.

Contingent upon our thorough

analysis of this situation and upon developments which will

take place in the coming months, the personnel requirements

may be either reduced of increased depending upon the volume

of work and related ramifications.

Wes

dei

- 3 -

* NW 88608 Docld:32989629

Page 162

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## Page 163

ORTIONAL FORM, NO, 10

3010-106

"CRAT 1962 EDITIÓN

GSA GEN. MEG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GC RNMENT

Memorandum

TO

FROM

Tolson

Belmont

Mohr

Casper

Callahan

Conrad

van

Gale

Rosen

Sullgran

Tavél

Trotter

Tele. Room

Holmes

Gandy

SUBJECT:

Mr. Belmont

DATE:

August 17, 1964

W. C. Sullivan

Rosen

1 - Mr. Gale

1 - Mr. Sullivan

1 - Mr. Belmont

AGREEMENT REACHED IN CONNECTION WITH

THE PROPOSED REASSIGNMENT OF. SUPERVISORY

RESPONSIBILITIES INVOLVING THE KU KLUX KLAN

OTHER HATE GROUPS, AND RACIAL MATTERS

1 - Mr. Rosen

Reference is made to the memoranda of Mr. Gale to y

Mr. Tolson dated July 30, 1964, and August 4, 1964.

PURPOSE:

The purpase of this memorandum is to set forth the

responsibilities of the Comestic Intelligence Division and the veneral

Investigative Division following the reassignment of supervisory

responsibilities involving the Ku Klux Klan, other hate groups,

and racial matters. To clarify this matter, it is set forth in two

parts. Part I will set forth the responsibilities of the Domestic

Intelligence Division. Part Il will define the responsibilities of

the General Investigative Division.

LUtY FILED IN

-.--

PART I

8- NUD-23 004

I. The Domestic Intelligence Division will-be responsible for

the investigation of all Klan and hate-type organizations and

their members on a selective basis.

" Several inquiries are presently pending in the field

regarding additional organizations to determine whether

such organizations are, in fact, hate groups.

II. The Domestic Intelligence Division will assume the responsibility

for the development of quality intormants in all such organizations.

#: 1864-1855-511482

SEP

WCS&AR: hw

XEROX) 5(

1964.

CONTINUED - OVER

X631964

SEP

1964

I-XERAX FOER.B

NW.88608 -Docld:32989629 Page-163

---

## Page 164

Memorandum to Mr. Belmont

RE: AGREEMENT REACHED IN CONNECTION WITH

THE PROPOSED REASSIGNMENT OF SUPERVISORY

RESPONSIBILITY INVOLVING THE KU KLUX KLAN,

OTHER HATE GROUPS, AND RACIAL MATTERS

III. The Domestic Intelligence Division will assume the responsibility

for formulating and carrying out disruptive counterintelligence

programs against such organizations.

IV. The Domestic Intelligence Division, in addition, is willing to go

beyond the recommendations approved by the Director related to

the above and will, with Bureau approval, develop highly placed,

quality informants in certain legitimate organizations whose

activities generally relate to racial matters, such as

National Association for the Advancement of Colored

People (NAACP)

Congress of Racial Equality (CORE)

Student Nonviolence Coordinating Committee (SNCC)

Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) - headed

by Martin Luther King

White Citizens Council

(Each one, of course, will be handled on a carefully selected

basis and the action approved individually by the Bureau.)

V. Similarly, the Domestic Intelligence Division is willing to go beyond

what was originally approved and will, with Bureau authorization,

proceed to establish informants and sources in Negro communities

throughout the Nation for the purpose of developing intelligence

information relating to the degree of racial tension; the possibility

of violence erupting in theform of riots, etc.; and will disseminate

this material to all interested persons inside and outside the Bureau.

The organizations and objectives as set forth in paragraphs IV and V

above are being made the subject of a separate memorandum inasmueh

as this involves a matter of policy and will have to be acted on

separately subject to approval by the Director.

- 2 -

CONTINUED - OVER

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 164

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## Page 165

Memorandum to Mr. selmont

RE: AGREEMENT REACHED IN CONNECTION WITH

THE PROPOSED REASSIGNMENT OF SUPERVISORY

RESPONSIBILITY INVOLVING THE KU KLUX KLAN,

OTHER HATE GROUPS, AND RACIAL MATTERS

VI.

The Domestic Intelligence Division will follow and disseminate

information concerning demonstrations, picketing activities,

racial disturbances, riots and incidents relating to matters of

a racial nature. Any violations of a local nature which occur

during the above and are not Federal violations should be

disseminated by the Domestic Intelligence Division.

(However, if during the course of any of theabove situations,

a Federal violation is indicated, this should be immediately

referred to the General Investigative Division. It will be

the responsibility of the General Investigative Division

to conduct any necessary investigation of the specific

Federal violation which occurs. It will also have the

responsibility of disseminating such information to

persons entitled to receive same. Where special cases arise

which are not Federal violations and an investigation is requested

at that time,

PARt the pertinent

Division has the responsibility gn

I. The General Investigative Division will have the responsibility for

the Bureau's supervision relative to the enforcement of all Civil

Rights legislation. It will also have the responsibility for the

supervision, accumulation of information, and dissemination of

material relating to civil actions being undertaken to enforce

compliance with the various elements of the Civil Rights laws.

II. The General Investigative Division will have the responsibility for

investigating bombings, police brutality and all other Federal

violations now assigned to the General Investigative Division.

II. The daily racial matters memorandum disseminated to the White

House, the Attorney General, etc., which is coordinated by a

representative of Mr. DeLoach's Office, will be prepared in

Headquarters building. This requires the use of a stenographer

who reports on duty at midnight each night in order to complete

the memorandum by 8:00 a.m., in the morning. This duty should

be alternated, a week at a time, between Division 5 and Division 6.

R WEd.

- 3 -

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 165

---

## Page 166

TO

FROM

SUBJECT:

CATIONAL FORM NO, 10

3010-106

MAY TAE EDITION

REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

MR. BELMON NOr

A ROSEN C

Toison

Casper.

DATE:

8/18/64

'te.

DeLoach

Evans

Gale -

Rosen

Sullivan

Tavel .

Trotter -

Tele. Room.

Holmes -

Gandy.

PERSONNEL TRANSFERS TO EFFECT PROPOSED

REASSIGNMENT OF SUPERVISORY RESPONSIBILIU ES

IN RACIAL MATTERS AND RACIAL INFORMANTS

Pursuant to diss Gale's menondure ot 8/9/81, to Mr. Too nee

in the above'-captioned matter, the personnel on the attached list will //

be transferred from the Civil Rights Section, General Investigative

Division, effective 9 a. mo, 8/19/64, to the Domestic Intelligence

Division.

Enclosure

AR: WW

: (12)

1 - Mr: Belmont

I * MI. ROSEn

1 - Mr.. Malley

1 - Mr. McGowan

1 - Mr. Callahan - Att: Movement

1 - Mr. Callahan - Att: Voucher Statistical Section, Rm. 6221 IB

• 1 - Mr. Mohr

'1 - Mr. Evans

-] - Mr. DeLoach

att

4- Mr. Sulliv

. - Mr. Sullivan

#ken 819-6-533

187-49000-2960

35

REC-143

28

SARA SEROX

1964

OCT

minds do

9-21-44-5574

REMOVED BY SRD

84139

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 166

---

## Page 167

=*..

NAME

Joseph G

seegan.

Frederick H

Freund,

, Jr.

Louis A

• Giovanetti

Charles

An/ Parkis, Jr.

Joseph e

STrainor.

Mary A

• Cammann

Hairyn squamite

• Sue i, Waller

Carol Ann

Hancock

Wilbur Land perkins

":..

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 167

TITLE

Special Agent

Special Agent (A)

Special Agent

Special Agent (A)

Special Agent

Clerk-Stenographer

Clerk-Stenographer

Clerk-Stenographer

Clerk

Clerk

GRADE

GS-13

GS-14

GS-14

SiS-14

GS-14

GS-5

GS-A/ 5

GS-5

GS-4

GS-4

SALARY

$13, 26513, 755

15, 415 16, 130

11, 515 15, 150

11, 515 15, 150

15, 115 16, 130

4690 5000

42154480 500(

4690 5000 :

47755080

4915- 5230

---

## Page 168

Captan

Excised Copy

KN S8K0

189649 l8ngre 168

---

## Page 169

April.

29

1966

LHE KUNS OF INO IDI IN CLANCESTINE CONDICA

INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION IN THE UNITED STATES

NW 88608-Doeld 32989629-Page 169

---

## Page 170

18190=10113

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 170

---

## Page 171

TABLE OF

CONTENTS

Page

A.'

PURPOSE AND SCOPE.

B. INTELLIGENCE TERMINOLOGY.

c.

THE HISTORY OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

IN THE UNITED STATES..

1.

Prior to World War II...

2.

During World War iI (1941 - 1945).

3.

National Intelligence Authority (NIA) •

4. Responsibilities of CIA.............

2.

The National Security Act

of 1947.

b.

National Security Council Intelligence

Directive...

c...

Director of Central Intelligence

Directives.....

•...

a. Dulles Committee, 1949.

e.

Hoover Commission, 1948 and 1955

I.

The Doolittie Committee, 1954...

The Joint Study Group on Foreign

Intelligence Activities of the

5.

United States Government..•

Responsibilities of the FBI

a.

Laws and Directives....

b.

Requests From Other

Agencies

c. FBI's. Role in the United States

Intelligence Board........

d.

The President's Foreign Intelligence

Advisory Board (PFIAB)..........

......

The Director's Stand Over the Years...•

Di: THE NEED AND THE POTENTIAL FOR

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE IN THE U. S.

E!

CURRENT CAPABILITIES OF CIA IN TRE FOREIGN

INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION FIELD IN THE

UNITED STATES.

8';

15

20

20

22

26

29

33

39

41

44

44

45

46

48

50

55.

59

NWL 88608.

-Docld:32989629

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## Page 172

TABLE

CONTENTS

CURRENT CAPABILITIES OF THE FBI

1

2

Manpower Being Devoted.....

Number of Microphone and Telephone

Surveillances With Evaluation of Product

3.

Live Sources With Evaluation.

Anagram Program, 00••

5.

Double Agents and Informants

6. Additional Potential..

G: ARIAS OF CONFLICT, FBI - CIA

H. . CURRENT AGREEMENTS BETWEEN FBI AND CIA

Io'

ETFECT ON THE FBI OF FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR

COLLECTION OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE IN THE

UNITED STATES

i, Overi Coiioction Activities.

2. Clandestine Gathering Activities

J. GENERAL FINDINGS...

K. RECOMMENDED PLAN OF ACTION.

Authorszation....0.

Selection of vargets..

Technical Surveillance

of Targets

Technical Surveillance Controls.

Anagram Program.

Live Sources...

Training of Personnel.

Reporting Procedures..

Language Capabilities..

Relations With Other Agencies

Administrative Reorganization

ALTERNATIVES... o

847-

Page

64

64

65

66

67

67

68

69

74

77

79

82

86

99

..

.90,

• 11

629. Page-1

---

## Page 173

iAo

PURPOSE AND SCOPE

The purpose of this study is to define

a new role for the Bureau in the field of clandestine

COlleCtiOn O1 FOXOLEn INtOLlIgONCE in the U. S.

This action is necessary and most timely because

of our Government's vital need for increased foreign

intolligence and because of CIA's expanding intorests

in the United States.

There is a decided neod for

a new Bureau concept, the implementation of which

could greatly increase our effectiveness and could deter

CIA from becoming a threat to our operational interests.

The study encompasses a review of history

as it relates to foreign intelligence collection in

the U.S.

Analysis is made of

the need and the

potential for such intelligence; the capabilities of

the Bureau and CIA in this field; and the responsibilities

of over-all (overt and covert) collection of foreiga

Intelligence in the U. S.

lindings, and we recommend We have submitted our general

a plan of action for a new

Bureau role.

This study was not designed to eliminate once

and for all the many problems relating to collection

of foreign intelligence in the U. S.

It would have been

a Utopian objective to recommend a plan which would

produce maximum intelligence collection, remove existing

defects within the U. S. intelligence community, and

establish complete harmony among interested agencies.

We did not go

that far.

Careful and exhaustive analysis

dictated that we endeavor to reach a reasonable goal

consistent with prudent planning and sound operational

implementation.

We feel

that the recommended plan

meets such guidelines, that it is a decidedly major step

forward for the Bureau, and it strongly conforms with

the national security needs.

It should be noted that this document does

wcr.not deal with our law enforcement or internal security

functions, although it is fully recognized that

Internal security and clandestine collection of foreign

intelligence are closely linised.

Any plan on our part

to produce foreigu intelligence will affect our

capabilities in the field of counterintelligence.

NW-88608-Docid?

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## Page 174

INTELLIGENCE TERMINOLOGY

People who do not speak and understand à common

language have difficulty in communicating their ideas.

Even

in a country such as ours where English is the common language,

words take on different meanings in different geographical

zocalos and in different

social, political, and economic

environments. Likewise, in professional fields, varying

backgrounds and experiences have conveyed different meanings

to terms in the professional vocabulary.

In the field of security, intelligence, and counter-

intelligence operations, certain professional terminology has

developed ostensibly to

assist in the exchange of ideas by

persons in this field. However, as progress is made in a

field or a special segment of the field, new horizons develop

which require additional

n evalua

terminology or cause an evolution in

existing terminology.

This development or evolution in security

and intelligence terminology, coupled with individualistic usage,

brings further problems in meaning which we also face in the

broader aspects of the English language. We have all noted

that our dictionaries do not always provide a single meaning

and we must be careful in daily conversation that we are not

misunderstood when merely using a conversational vocabulary.

Te face d similai problem in the use of professional terminol

.ogy in security and intelligence matters as this terminology

takes on new meaning with additional experience and takes on

varying meanings to different persons.

An additional factor to consider in understanding

the

meaning of terminology is the context in which a term is

used.

For example, the term "intelligence" may be vague and

confusing without the knowledge of the context in which it is

used.

It can, as a generic term, pertain to the whole field

of activities undertaken by a governmentin the collection of

information;

the protection of its institutions, and the con-

duct of nonattributable activities to facilitate the formation

and implementation of government policy. Also, it can relate

to the

organization devoted to the collection and production

of information necessary to the government. In addition,

it may pertain to the whole body of theory and practice on

the basis.of which an intelligence organization operates.

i let te an end may be utilized to mean

The following definitions do not include all possible

meanings that have been utilized but,

instead, are designed

to assist the reader in digesting this study.

• so 2 s

:?::

*NM 88608-00

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## Page 175

BASIC INTELLIGENCE. is that factual intelligence which results

from the collation of encyclopedia information of a fundamental

and more or less permanent nature and which, as a result of

evaluation and interpretation, is determined to be the best

availablo.

BIOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE is intelligence concerning individuals.

CLANDESTINE COLLECTION A coordinated complex of collection

activities designed to accomplish an intelligence, counter-

intelligence, or other similar purpose, sponsored

and conducted

by a governmental department or agency, or jointly by two ox

more such entities, in such a way, as to assure secrecy or

concealment.

COMBAT INTELLIGENCE' iS military intelligence for use in combat

-situations. This is commonly referred to as tactical.

COUNTERESPIUNAGE is identifying, penetrating, nanipulating

or repressing inimical espionage organizations.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE is defined as that intelligence activity,

with its resultant product, which is devoted to destroying the

effectiveness of inimical foreign intelligence activities and

which is undertaken to protect the security of the nation,

and its personnel, information, and installations against

espionage, sabotage, and subversion.

Counterintelligence

includes the process of procuring, developing, recording, and

disseminating information concerning hostile clandestine

activity and of penetrating, manipulating, or repressing

Individuals, groups, or organizations conducting or capable

of conducting such activity.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE, is that intelligence of all types and forms

of immediate interest which is usually disseminated without

the delays incident to complete evaluation or interpretation.

DEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE iS that intelligence which any

department or agency requires to execute its

own mission.

NW 88608 Docd 32989629 Page 125

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## Page 176

DOMESTIC INTELIIGENCE Concerns information and investigation

of espionage, counterespionage, etc., which pertains to the

internal security of the U.S. and, therefore, is in subject

matter pertinent to the internal

altairs of the U.S.

ECONOMIC INTELIIGENCE concerns the potentialities, utilization,

and vulnerabilities of a nation's

natural and human resources.

ESPIONAGE is defined as that intelligence activity which is

directed toward the acquisition of information through clandestine

operations.

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE pertains to foreign alfairs and subject

matters pertinent to foreign countries.

The word "foreign"

as used here denotes the target of the

intelligence and is

distinct from the geographic location of the source providing

the information.

Ior example, refugees, defectors,

and immigrants

from target countries (such as the Soviet Union) have the

potential for surrlying intelligence regarding their countries

to United States authorities.

Although physically located in

-the United States, they are potential foreign intelligence sources.

GEOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE concerns the meterology, hydrography,

topography, and basic natural resources of an area.

INTELLIGINCE is the product derived from information collected

for the formulation and execution of Government policy and for

safeguarding the national welfare.

• .....

INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION is information collected for intelli

gence purposes that has not been evaluated by comparison with

the existing body of knowledge on the subject reported on; the

raw material of intelligence.

INTERDEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE is integrated departmental

intelligence which is required by departments and agencies

of the Government for the execution of their missions,

but

which transcends the exclusive competence of

& single

departm

ment or agency to produce.

00o

NW 88608 Docld:32989629-Page 176-

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## Page 177

INTERNAL SECURITY relates to the defense and protection within

the United States and its territories and possessions of the

people, the government, the institutions, and the installations

of critical importance

from all hostile

or destructive action.

INVESTIGATION means systematic and direct inquiries or pro-

ceduros (such as physical or tochnical surveillancos or noighbor

hood inquiries) aiming at developing information concerning an

individual's activities or background; investigation does not

include the acceptance or the development of information through

social contacts or contacts normally made by CIA agents in

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE:

Intelligence.

See Combat Intelligence and Strategic

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

is that intelligence which is required

for the formulation oi national security policy, concerns more

than one dopartment or agency: and transcends the exclusive

competence of a single department or agency.

OVERT COLLECTION iS COlleCtion activities conducted in such

a manner that they may be attributed to or acknowledged by the

sponsoring government.

POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE Concerns foreign and domestic policies

of governments and the activities of political movements.

POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE may be described as a comprehensive

product resulting from collection, evaluation, collation, analysis,

and interpretation of all available information relating to

national

security and co. cerning other countries where such

information is significant to our Government's development and

execution of plans, policies, and courses of action.

Such

intelligence can be divided into various categories, such as

basic, biographic, combat, current, departmental, economic,

geographic, interdepartmental, military, national, political,

scientific,

sociological, strategic, tactical, and technical.

Perhaps the most simple

definition would be that positive

intelligence is all the things you should know

in advance of

initiating a course of action.

- 5.

NW 88608-Doeld:32989629-Page-177**

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## Page 178

There appears to be much confusion in professional

.;.

circles regarding the use of the term "positive intelligence."

Some professionals use the term

' "positive intelligence"

synonymousty

with tho torm

usage,

"positive Intelligence"

"Lorolen intolifend "antelligence"

In still 2n0th02

are uscc

interchangeably.

In another useage, which is closely related

to the definition utilized in this study, "positive intelli

gence" Is described as what

is left of the entire field aiter

"security intelligence" has been subtracted. This source

continues that both "positive intelligence"

and "security

inteïligence" can be against domestic targets, as well as

against foreign targets.

Ior example, the Department of State,

in connection with its

formulation of

foreign policy, encounters

• a large number of organizations of Americans whose parents came

from foreign countries.

Many of these organizations--the Poles

for example-have strong views on what United States policy

should be toward Poland.

The views of these organizations

regarding our foreign policy is likely to be a matter of some

importance to the Department of State in its policy formula.

tion.

The knowledge of what these organizations

think and

do can be a very significant phase of what might be called

"domestic positive intelligence."

In addition, the connections

which these organizations may have with the foreign country

such as Poland sometimes provide a source of "foreign positive

intelligence."

SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE pertains to the progress of scientific

research and development and usually this intelligence is

within the framework of how it affects military or economic

potential of a nation.

SECURITY INTELLIGENCE iS basically the intelligence behind the

police function to protect the nation and its members from

those working to our national and individual detriment. For

example, this would include intelligence regarding clandestine

agents sent to the United States by à foreign power.

SOCIOLOGICAL INTELLIGENCE pertains to the social, cultural,

psychological, or ethnic structure and characteristics of a

people.

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE is the intelligence required for broad

and usually long range planning; especially with regard to

military operations.

6

_NW_88608_DÖcld:32989629 Page 178

---

## Page 179

TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE See Combat Intelligence.

TECHNICAL INTCLLIGENCE

concerns dovices,

equipmont,

SpOCÍaI pIOCOSSOS. 'ThiS 1s XOlatod tO SCIeNtIIIC INt0l11-

gence, but tends to be dilferentiated from it as practice

differs from theory.

. *,

,;'k-

---

## Page 180

C.

THE HISTORY OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION IN THE

UNTTED STATES

1.. Priox to World War II

A study of the history and progress of foreign

intelligence collection in the United States reveals that

prior to World War II such collection efforts were incidental

and in direct proportion to the intensity of the coverage

maintained in the counterintelligence field. Accordingly,

the history of foreign intelligence collection in the

United States prior to World War II is primarily a history of

counterintelligence and internal security coverage, of which

foreign intelligence was a by-product. Historical

highlights

of the developments in this field are

as follows:

(a) In August, 1914, when German espionage agents

Count Johann Von Bernstorff and Di. Heinrich Albert of the

German Embassy, Washington, D. C., arrived in the

Tuite States with $150, 000, on in German treasury notes to

finance the first foreign espionage and sabotage apparatus

to be organized in this country, United States Government

intelligence worl was handled for the most part by five

small organizations (Bureau of Investigation of the

Department of Justice, Secret Service, Army, State and Navy),

all operating on their own with small

staffs and without

coordination and sufficient delineation of responsibilities.

(b) On April 6, 1917, Congress declared

war against

Germany and President Woodrow Wilson gave the Bureau of

Investigation the task of enforcing his proclamation

governing the conduct of enemy aliens.

The Bureau at the time

had 300 Agents but shortly after the outbreak of the war

the staff was increased to 400.

(c)

As result of a rash of bombings believed

executed by Bolsheviks, Attorney General Palmer appointed

+ Francis: P. Garvan of New Jork as Assistant: Attorney. General

to deal with the problem. He created a General Intelligence

Division under command of J. Edgar Hoover and Mr. Hoover vas

instructed to make a study of subversive activities in the

United States to determine their scope and

the potential

for prosecution.

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 180

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## Page 181

(d) On May 9, 1934, President Roosevelt called

a White House conference attended by the Attorney General,

secrotary of Treasury, Secretary of Labor, Director o1 FBI

and Chief of United States Secret Service

to deal with

the problem of growth of fascist organizations in the

United States.

The conference agreed that there should be

an invostigation of these groups and their activities for

intelligence purposes. Since the only federal law believed

applicable at the time was the Immigration Law, the President

decided that the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization

Service would confer with the Chief of Secret Service and the

Director of the FBI to work out details of the investigation:

MI. Hoover immediately issued orders to FBI

personnel

to conduct an intensive and confidential investi

gation of the Nazi movement.

This was the first general

intelligence investigation made by the Government into

fascist activities in this country.

(e) As a result of President Franklin Roosevelt's

concern over activities of the communists and other subversive

gruuys, & sorios of conferenoes was moid

in the Iatter part

of August and carly September, 1936, participated in by the

Presidont, the Secretary of State and the Director of the FBI.

As a rosult of his concern over the international character

of communism and fascism, the President stated the FBI shoula

conduct necessary investigations and coordinate infurtation

upon thoSe maitETS

in the possession of the Military

Elus agence Division, the Naval Intelligence Division and

the State Department.

It is noteworthy that it was specified the

investigation was to be for intelligence purposes only.

The Presidential Order was implemented by the

Director in a letter to all Special Agents in Charge,

September 5, 1936.

(1)

As a result of opposition primarily by the

State Department against accepting the IBI as the coordinating

agency in the investigations of all subversive activities in

the United States, President Roosevelt, on June 26, 1939, issued

a confidential directive to Cabinet members which established an

Interdepartmental Intelligence Coordinating Committee composed

of the FBI and the Intelligence Divisions of the War Department

and the Navy.

He named the FBI as the coordinating agency to

receive all reports on subversive activities.

NW 88608-Docld:32989629_Page 181

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## Page 182

(g)

President Roosevelt publicly designated the FBI

to investigate matters relating to espionage, sabotage and

violations of the neutrality regulations by Presidential

Directive datod September 6, 1939.

(h) On May 21, 1940, President Roosevelt in a

memorandum to the then Attorney General, Robort H. Jackson,

such cases

he might approve to authorize the use of listening devices

directed to the conversations or other communications oi

persons suspected of subversive activity against the Government

of the United States, including suspected spies.

Pursuant to

such authorization,

commencing on June 1,

1940, technical surveillances were installed on diplomatic

establishments throughout the United States of such countries

as Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia and France.

installations in

addition to providing counterintelligence

Information of value produced a substantial quantity of foreign

intelligence information.

Although lines of responsibility were established

for domestic intelligence work in connection with the September 6,

1939, Presidential Directive, there were no cleaxly defined areas

of responsibility of overseas intelligence operations and as

time passed the need for decisions in that field grew more evident.

As a result, the Special Intelligence Service (SIS)

came into being.

Presidential Directive June 24, 1940,

President Franklin D. Roosevelt set forth lines of responsibility

in the operations of United States intelligence agencies in the

foreign field.

This Directive grew out of a series of meetings

involving representatives of State Department, Army and Navy

intelligence and the FBI wherein it was agreed that the SIs wouid

act as a service agency, furnishing the State Department, the

military, the FBI and other governmental agencies with information

having to do with financial, economic, political and subversive

activities detrimental to

the security of the United States.

The

June 24th Directive placed the responsibility for nonmilitary

intelligence coverage in the Western Hemisphere on the FBI.

than thirty days therealter the FBI had organized an SIS operation.

Through World War II and until approximately March 31,

1947, the FBI continued its SIS operations.

The culmination of

our activities in this field came about as

a result of the

the responsibility of

collecting foreign intelligence abroad.

•10 .

---

## Page 183

2. During World Var II (1941 - 1945)

2. The FBI's Role

During World War Il, as prior to the war, loreigu

intelligence collection in this country was goared to and

principally a product of our intensive efforts in the counter-

intelligence field.

It is also significant to note that a

steady stream of foreign intelligence continued to be developed

from our technical coverage of diplomatic establishments of

enemy-bloc countries, as well as other sensitive countries

such as Russia, Argentina, Portugal and Spain.

In line with the Presidential Directive of

September 6, 1939, the FBI continued to be in charge of all

investigative work in matters pertaining to espionage, sabotage,

counterespionage, subversive activities and violations of the

neutrality laws.

On January 8, 1943,

the President issued another

Directive

in which he reiterated the previous Directive of

September 6, 1939.

In ordering the FBI to take charge in the oregoing

areas,

President Roosevelt did not define the various types of

• intelligence involved but placed the entire intelligence and

internal security responsibilities involved under the

jurisdiction of the FBI.

As a matter of fact, in carrying out

these responsibilities we did produce foreign intelligence in

substantial quantity especially through our technical coverage

of foreign diplomatic establishments.

b. Office of Strategic Services

The position of Colonel William J. Donovan as

Coordinator of Information (COI) was created by Presidential

Directive dated July 11, 1941. On July 14, 1941, President

was created,

the Government for the analysis of information and data which ..

bears upon national security. . . ."

The President described

Donovan's duties as

"assist me and the various Departments and

agencies

of the Government in

assembling and correlating

information which may be useful in the formulation of basic

plans for the defense of the nation."

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In the letter President Roosevelt clearly limited

Donovan's jurisdiction with the following statement:

"I

should like to emphasize that Colonel Donovan's work is not

intended to supersode or duplicate or Involve any direction

of the activities of established agencies already obtaining

and interpreting defense information."

rhe Presidential order dated September 11, 1941,

established the position of col with clear cut authority to

collect and analyze information bearing on national security;

correlate and make such information available to the President

and other Government officials as the President may determine.

Cot was finally authorized to carry out, when requested by

the President, supplementary activities as might facilitate

the securing of information not then available to the

Government.

Donovan, in a memorandum captioned "MEMORANDUM OF

-ESTABLISHMENT OF SERVICE OF STRATEGIC INFORMATION," expanded

on the President's directive in general terms. Under his

plan for procedure there was a Coordinator of Strategic

Information responsible directly io the President.

(NUÊG

this same organizational set up was later adopted by the

Director of Central Intelligence. Donovan noted, however,

in his memorandum, "The proposed centralized unit will

neither displace nor encroach upon the FBI, Army and Navy

Intelligence, or any other Department of the Government."

(62-64427, serials 23 and X3.)

Our file on the Office of Strategic Services (OSS)

reveals that that organization continued its organizational,

training, and operational activities in this country based

on Donovan's premise that he was the central clearing point

for anti-Axis espionage and counterespionage. An interesting

insight into OSS operations in this country is provided in

the nonfiction work "The Scarlet Thread" by former OSS agent

Donald Downes. Downes noted that he was a former British

intelligence agent serving for that organization in New York

when he was recruited. by OSS immediately after Pearl Harbor.

He tells of his recruitment by Allan Dulles, his association

With Donovan, and his work in the counterespionage field in

New York City and Washington, D. C., with other OSS agents,

including the current United

noted states ambassador to are

United Nations, Arthur Goldberg. Downes detailed attempts

by him and other Oss agents to steal diplomatic codes irom

124 8

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"friendly" or "neutral" country embassies in Washington in

the early 1940's and frequently referred to the fact that

this was being done by OSS with knowledge that its juris

diction in this country was based only on the thoory that

a foreign Embassy is not American soil and 1s technically

outside the jurisdiction of the rBl, which had full juris-

diction lor counterintelligence in tho nestors homisphero.

Our file on the OSS is replete with incidents

indicating OSS recruitment and counterespionage activities

in this country during the early 1940's.

By memorandum dated May 22, 1945, Stanley J. Tracey,

advised of a conversation overheard between two high-ranking

State Department officials. The conversation dealt with OSS

attempts to take over Bureau SIS operations in Latin America

with one of the State Depariment officials, Aura Warren,

stating that officials oi oSS felt that organization was

to handle work than FBl personnel attached

to various American Embassies in South America. In response

to this attempt of oss

to take over our duties, the Director

commented: "I would like lo snow hei Warren goto this.

According to. Ladd our contacts in State Department have no

knowledge of such OSs efforts.

Also Tracey should point

out it is State Department duty to initiate it as we would

'service it' and the State Department in fact started

the

SIS project. H" (62-64427-1059.)

An interesting evaluation of OSS operations is

provided in a report prepared by Colonel Richard Park of

the War Department as a result of a survey of OSS operations

made as a special and confidential mission for the President

in 1944 and 1945. Colonel Park commented: "Without going

into details I was everywhere left with the same impression

of utter incompetency on the part of OSS leadership....

"Everywhere that the subject of OSS. Came up,

unsolicited remarks clearly brought out the very well

known

amateurish nature

the organization.

"The OSS has been restricted from active operations

in South America by Presidential directive..

Despite the absence of any jurisdiction in or:

responsibility for counterintelligence operations in the

western hemisphere, an pilicer of OsS was reported to have

• 13 .

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attempted to obtain cover.for an OSS agent in South America

under guise of employment by an organization doing business

in South America.

A closing paragraph of Colonel Park's report

commented on observations made by an olficial of OSS as

follows:

"This official of OSS added that it was the policy

of his agency not to give any more intormation than necessary

to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

He pointed out that

OSS instructors in their school in the United States had

discussed the FBi in an unfavorable light and had painted

the picture of OSS replacing the Federal Bureau of

Investigation not only outside the United States but in

the domestic rield.

The pubiicity campaign referred to

was

to be one of the means adopted to accomplish this

purpose."

24

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3. National Intelligence Authority (NIA)

on January 44, 1946, President Harry S. Trumar

adressed a Directive to the secretary of state, the vecretary

of lar, and the Secretary of the Navy stating, in part, "I

hereby designate you, together with another person to be named

by me as my personal

representative, as the National Intelli

gence Authority. •

• "

The Directive provided that each of these

three Secretaries

would from time to time assign personnel and

facilities from their respective departments "which persons

shall collectively form a Central Intelligence Group' (CIG)

under a Director of Central Intelligence. It was provided that

the latter would be responsible to the NIA.

President Truman then stated that subject to the

existing law the Director of Central Intelligence should

accomplish the corre.?tion and evaluation of intelligence

and the appropriate dissemination wichin the Government of the

results; (b) plan for the coordination of such activities of

the intelligence agencies of the three departments involved as

raleted to the national security; (c) perform such services of

common concern as the NIA determined could be more effectively

accomplished centrally; and (d) perform such other functions

and duties related to intelligence as the President and the

NIA might from time to time direct.

The Presidential Directive said that no police, law

enforcement or internal security functions should be exercised

under the Directive; that certain intelligence should be freely

available to the Director of

Central Intelligence "for correlation,

evaluation or dissemination"; and that "the existing intelligence

agencies of your departments shall continue to collect, evaluate,

correlate and disseminate departmental intelligence."

The ninth

provision of the Directive stated, "Nothing herein shall be

• construed to authorize the making of investigations inside the

continental limits of the United States and its possessions,

except as provided by law and Presidential directives."

A series of communications between the Bureau and

Lieutenant General Hoyt S. Vandenberg; who was designated as

Director of the Central Intelligence Group, then followed. On

June 21, 1946, a memorandum analyzed a communication from

Vandenberg which submitted a proposed memorandum to the NiA and

a proposed Directive to be issued by NiA extending the powers

and duties of the Director of Central Intelligence.

provided, in essence,

the following additional functions and

powers for the Director of Central Intelligence:

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(1) Undertake such basic research and analysis of

intelligence and counterintelligence as may in his opinion be

required.

(2) Act as the executivo agent of this authority

NIA, In coordinating and in suporvising all federal foreign

intelligence activities.

(3) Periorm the following services of common concern:

(a) conduct all federal espionage and counterespionage operations

fox the collection of foreign intelligence; (b) conduct all

Federal monitoring of press and propaganda

broadcasts of foreign

powers for the collection of

intelligence information.

In discussing this Directive which Vandenberg desired

issued, the memorandum stated the Directive did not conform

with the original plan proposed by the President or which was

envisioned by the discussions occurring prior to the time the

President issued his Directive.

The original plan, insofar as

the Bureau was advised, contemplated the setting up of solely

a coordinating agency which was

given the pover to perform certain

functions which it would be determined could more adequately and

economically be performed centrally for the benefit of all

Government agencies.

The memorandum noted that "undoubtedly if

this Directive is approved and the Central Intelligence Group

is successful in setting up complete foreign coverage,

Bureau would undoubtedly be pushed into a 'second rate'

position

insofar as purely intelligence functions are concerned in the

It is inevitable that the Central Intelli-

gence Group must enter into the domestic field picture insolar

as intelligence is concerned because of the sources of foreign

intelligence existing in that lield.

Also, it is impossible to

separate entirely foreign intelligence and

the domestic functions

performed by the Bureau."*

In reply to the Directive proposed by General Vandenberg,

a letter was sent to him June 25, 1946, which stated that the

Directive was approved with certain changes suggested "{or

clarilication purposes only."

The Director suggested that to

the item relating to the Director of Central Intelligence acting

*

***

* * $

* With respect to this last quoted statement, Mr. E. A. Tamm and

Mr. C. A. Tolson noted an exception by placing an addendum on the

memorandum. The Director's comments were set forth, This is

more fully reported below under the heading, "Director's Comments."

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as the executive agent of National Intelligence Authority

in coordinating and supervising all foreign intelligence

activitios there should bo addod "performod outsido the

United States and its possessions relating to the national

security in accordance with the overall policies and objectives

established by this Authority." With respect to the proposal

that the Director of Central Intelligence direct all espionage

and counterespionage operations for the collection of foreign

intelligence, it was proposed that the phrase "outside the

United States and its possessions" also be inserted in this

provision.

On July 29, 1946, General Vandenberg sent over

a memorandum on the subject "Exploitation of American

Business Concerns With Connections Abroad as Sources of

Foreign Intelligence Information."

Directive.

He added & proposed

The Director replied by letter August 6, 1946,

"I should like to comment that there appears to have been

an addition to the field encompassed by CIG Directive #1l

calling for a survey of the exploitation of American business

concerns. I note that in your report and in the proposed

NIA Directive, you refer not only to American business con-

cerns but to other private groups with connections abroad.

This latter phrase, in my opinion, is extremely broad and

could be taken to include all types of organizations,

including Foreign Nationality Groups.

In fact, i feel that

the report and proposed Directive should confine themselves to

the discussion of American business concerns and that no

references at all should be made to 'private groups'

•I feel that at a later date the question of exploitation of

these

private groups by CIG representatives might be worked

out by discussing them individually with the FBI when their

identities are deternined." This matter remained unresolved.

On August 22, 1946, General Vandenberg submitted

another proposed Directive concerning exploitation of American

business concerns, nongovernmental groups, and individuals (in

the United States) with connections abroad

as sources of foreign

intelligence information.

A memorandum analyzing this on

August 22, 1946, pointed out the new Directive was even more

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obnoxious than the one originally proposed. The Directive

noted, in part, "CIG field representatives

will establish

and maintain liaison with the intelligence officers of local

•Army and Navy headquarters and Air forco headquarters, if

present, through the medium of local interagoncy offices."

The analyzing memorandum ointed out, "Il this means the

CIG is going to maintain field representatives

a cores atative donothie the and

Statos or establish oifices, it cortainly is somothing new and

a provision that ve did not understand was intended in the

President's Directive. • •

Attached to the proposed Directive

is a discussion which is more or less the same as was attached

to the original proposed Directive. It, however, makes the

rollowing statement which the Bureau cannot subscribe to and

it would seem must oppose, that is, 'Foreign Intelligence

information related to the national security, althougs it may

be collected from sources whose headquarters are within the

Limits of the United states and its possessions, is definitely

a part of the national intelligence mission, the coordination

-Of which is specifically a function of the National Intelli

gence Authority under the provisions of the President's letter

o1 22 January 1946.'"

diration

is now involved in this Directive

the fundamental question

of just what rights the Central Intelligence Group has with

reference to operations within the United States. Carrying

to a logical conclusion the statements set forth above contained

in the discussion, they could cover all foreign embassies in

the United States, take charge of double agents we are operating

because essentially these operations engaged in by the Bureau

do not directly involve enforcement of the laws but rather are

concerned with obtaining information in the nature of foreign

intelligence which, of course, is related to internal security

as is all foreign intelligence.

Essentially, the Bureau's

domestic operations in intelligence involve the determining

of the aims, intentions, and activities of foreign countries

of their representatives."

•i?•"

.::.

"The memorandum of analysis stated that our position.

would bo the Burenu would not consent to any provisions except

thóso rolatad to Amorican businoss concorns with connections

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"";:

"!!

abroad.

Gonoral Vandenborg stating

vandAugust 23 194 a tet at al they tho

proposed Directive does not incorporate the changes suggested

in my letter of august o, 1940, and 1, theretore, cannot

approve it.

Ibis new directive also includes provisions

and statements In which I cannot concur and, in fact, must

oppose.",

The strong stand of the Director obviously led to

a conference between General Vandenberg and the Director

which was reported in a memorandum of September 13, 1946,

which the Director prepared. As stated in the Director's

memorandum the conference concerned CIG's desire to gather

contacts

among "nongovernmental groups and individuals with

connections abroad."

The entire conference was on this subject

matter and did not enter into collection of foreign intelli-

gence from

foreign embassies or from foreign officials or,

in fact, from any other source. The Director wrote, "I told

the General that I could well

appreciate that there would be

cases in which his organicaiion would be desirus of making

contacts in the United States for the purpose of obtaining

information from abroad nd that the Bureau was not interested

in such contacts except in those situations wherein the individual

or the group might be engaged in activities within the United

States that were either under investigation by the Bureau or

might possibly be the medium of obtaining information con

•cerning the activities of a

subversive character being carried

on within the United States.

I told the General that I would

be perfectly agreeable to his suggestion, with the added

provision that if CIG was desirous of contacting any

individuals of the character that he had indicated, before

doing so it would check with the FBI."

The foregoing has been set forth rather extensively

since it shows the strong stand the Bureau took against CIG's

operating in the United States. Actually, as will be reported

permitting CIG to collect

positive intelligence in this country by contacting United:

States citizens, American businessmen, allens (with prior

FBI approval) through the foreign language press and In later

years through contacts with United States governmental personnel.

• 19

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## Page 192

Responsibilities of CIA

The National Security Act of 1947

This Act, which is reported In 50 USC 401 et seg.,

established the National Security Council (NSC) and under 1t

tho Contral Intolligence Agency. It providod that whon the

Director of Contral Intelligence was appointed the NIA should

cease to exist.

There was much discussion concerning the powers and

authorities to be vested in the Director of Central Intelli-

gence. Many individuals, especially in Congress, expressed

fears that CIA could develop into a gestapo it permitted to

become operational in the United States. The following two

excerpts, Of interest in this connection, are from a

Congressional publication related to hearings prior to passage

of the National Security Act of 1947. The publication is

entitled "Hearings Before the Committee on Expenditures in the

Executive Departments, House of Representatives, 80th Congress,

Ist Session on H. R.

Page 127 - During testimony concerning authority for

and scope of CIA, James forrestal, then Secretary of the Navy,

stated:

"The purposesof the Central Intelligence Authority

axe limited definitely to purposes outside of this

country, except the collation of information gathered

by other government agencies.

"Regarding domestic operations, the Federal Bureau

of Investigation is working at all times in collaboration

with General Vandenberg. He relles upon them for domestic

activities."

Page 438 - Congressman Clarence J.. Brown oi Obio in

speaking about the National Security Act of 1947, which was

under scrutiny before passage, stated:

....

"I want to write a loi of other safeguards into the

section thai deals with. the Central Intelligence Agency.

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## Page 193

"I want to mako certain that the activities and the -

functions of the Central Intelligence Agency were care-

rully confined to international mattexs, to military

matters, and to matters of national security. We have

enough people now running around butting into ovarybody

else's business in this country without establishing

another agency to do so..

"What we ought to do is to eliminate 90 percent of

the present snoopers instead of adding to them.

"I do not think it would be the Central Intelligence

gency's right, authority, or responsibility to check or

the ordinary domestic activities of the averago American

The National Security Act of 1947 was approved

7/26/47.

It provided that for the purpose of coordinating the

intelligence activities of the several Government departments

and agencies in the interest of national security, the Agency

under the direction of the NSC was:

(1) To advise NSC in matters concerning such

intelligence activities of the Government departments

and agencies of the Government as relate to the

national security,

(2) To make recommendations to the NSC for the

coordination of such activities,

(3) To correlato and evaluate intelligence relating

to national security and provide for its appropriate

dissemination within the Government: Provided, That the

Agency shall have no police, subpoena,.

Law enforcement

powers, or internal security responsibilities,

(4) To perform such additional services of common

concern as the NSC determines can be more efficiently

accomplished. coatracted@a/addictio

(5) To periorm such other functions and dutles

related to intalligence allecting national security. as.the.

NSC may from time to time direct.

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There is tacit acknowledgement in Section 403 (e)

of the National Security Act of 1947 that the IBI gathers

information allecting the national security. This section

provides:

(e) To the extent recommended by the NSC and approved

by the President, such intelligence of the departments and

agencies of the Government, except as hereinalter providod,

relating to tho national security shall be open to

inspection of the Director of Central Intelligence, and

such intelligence as relates to the national security and

is possessed by such departments and other agencies of

the Government, except as hereinatter provided, shall

be made available to the Dicector of Central Intelligence

fox correlation, evaluation, and dissemination: Provided,

however, That upon the written request of the Director

ot Central Intelligence, the Director Of the FBI shall

make available to the Director of Central Intelligence

such information for correlation, evaluation, and

dissemination as may be essential to the national security.

ora rat, acon boati

b.

National Security Council Intelligence Directives

To implement the authority granted to it unuer iue

National Security Act of 1947, the National Security Council

has issued a series of "National Security Council Intelligence

"onscids"" usually referred to as NSCiD's and commonly called

The first of these was issued December 12, 1947, and

provided for the establishing of the intelligence Advisory

Committee to maintain the relationship necessary for a fully

eifective integration of the national intelligence effort. By

Directive dated September 15, 1958, the U.S. Intelligence Board

(USIB) was formally created

as successor to the Intelligence Advisory

Committee and a counterpart known as the U.S. Communications

Intelligence Board.

NSCID No. I provided that the Director of Central

Intelligence should coordinate the foreign intelligence activities

of the United States, such coordination to include both special

and other forms of intelligence.

The USIB under this Directive

shall "advise and assist the Director of Central Intelligence as

he may require in the discharge of his statutory responsi-

bilities."

It is the Board which is empowered to establish

policies, deline intelligence objectives, make recommendations

to appropriate U.S. officials, develop standards for protection

of intelligence, and formulate

policies with respect to arrange-

ments with foreign goverments.

The Director of Central

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## Page 195

1.

Intelligence is designated as Chairman of this Board and in -

this capacity is distinguished from the director of the

Central Intelligence Agency. A more complete discussion with

regard to the Bureau's role in this over-all setup is set loith

heroinaltor undor tho caption "FBI, Rolations With tho

National Security Council Intelligence DIrectivo

No. I, originally issued 12/12/47, delines the various types

of intelligence in Section 4.

(a) National Intelligence is that intelligence

• which is required for the formulation of national security

pOlICy, concerns more than one deparcment or agency,

and transcends the exclusive competence of a single

department or agency. The Director of Central Intelli-

gence shall produce; national intelligence with the

support of the U.S. Intelligence Board.

(b) Departmental Intelligence is that intelligence

which any department or agency requires to execute its own

miasion.

(c) Interdepartmental Intelligence is integrated

departmental intelligence which is required by departments

and agencies of the Government for the execution of their

missions, but which transcends the exclusive competence

of a single department or agency to produce.

The

subcommittee structure of the U. S. Incelligence Board

may be utilized for the production and dissemination of

interdepartmental intelligence.

Director of Central Intelligence is then authorized

to disseminate national intelligence and interdepartmental

intelligence provided it is done consistent with statutes and

Presidential policy, and provided further "that any disclosure

Of FBI intelligence information shall be cleared with that

agency prior to dissemination."

.?This acknowledges that FBI Information includes both

national and interdepartmental intelligence.

-.i÷

*A footnote here states:

"By "produce' is meant 'to correlate

and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security as

provided in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended;

Section 102. (a) (3)."

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## Page 196

NSCID No. 2 isued 1/13/48, relates to coordination.

of foreign intelligence collection activities "not covered

by other NSC Directives."

The Director of Central Intolligonco has responsi

bility for planning to assure there is no undesirable

duplication and that coverage is adequate.

Responsibilitles are then assigned as follows:

(1) The Department of State shall have primary

responsibility for, and shall perform as a service of

common concers, the collection abroad (i.e., outside

the U.S. and its possessions, of political, socrological,

economic,

i scientitic and technical information.

(2) The Department of Defense shall have primary

responsibility for, and shall periorm

as a service of

common concern, the collection of military intelligence

information.

Owing to the importance of scientilic and

technical intelligence to the Department of Defense

and the military services, this collection responsibility

shail include scientific

and technical, as vell as aconomic:

information directly pertinent to Department of Defense

missions.

ment primary responsibility was limited by the phrase

"the collection abroad," there was no such limitation

on the. Department of Defense in its responsibility.)

(3) The Central Intelligence Agency may collect

abroad intelligence information in support of assigned lunc

tions or as a byproduct of assigned functions: Provided,

that this collection involves no undesirable duplication

of any of the specific assignments to State and Defense

Departments, and Provided, that any such overt collection

is coordinated with the Department of state or with the

.. Senior U. S. Representative.

In Section 7 of NSCID No: 2 there is delegated to

CIA responsibility for overt collection of foreign intelligence

In the u.s.'as follows"""

"The Central Intelligence Agency, as a service of

common concern,

shall be responsible for the selective

exploitation within the United States of non-governmental

organizations and individuals as sources of loreign

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## Page 197

intelligence information, in accordance with policies,

procedures and practices established as provided in

paragraph 3a of NSCID No. I, by the Director of Central

Intelligence with the concurrences of the U. S. Intelli

gence Board. "

for intelligence purposes, as appropriate,

as a service of

common concern.

When this luaction is carried out in the U. so,

this also constitutes overt collection of foreign intelligence

by that Agency in this country.

It may be worthy to note at this point that NSCID

No. 's I and 2 were discussed, approved, and issued in their

original forms prior to 7/7/49 when the FBI was designated a

member of the Intelligence Advisory Committee.

NSCID No. 3 on Coordination of Intelligence Production

contains definitions of various types of intelligence including

those defined in NSCID No. 1) and then delineates primary

responsibilities for "producing" intelligence among various

agencies, stating with respeci io ClA:

"The Central Intelligence Agency shall produce

economic intelligence on the Sino-soviet Bloc and

scientific and technical intelligence as a service of

common concern.

Agency may produce such other intelligence as may be

To co chi can hang

Further, the Central Intelligence

necessary to discharge the statutory responsibilities

of the Director of Central Intelligence."

Since, as noted hereinbefore, "collection" activities

are deiined in NSCID No. 2; it would seem to follow that the

word "produce" as used in NSCID No. 3 has the same definition

as set out in a footnote to NSCID No. 1, paragraph 4, 1.e., "to

correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national

security."

Thus, NSCID No. 3 would not appear to extend CIA's

jurisdiction

to collect intelligence or be operational in any way.

The remaining NSCID's appear to havo no bearing on

the subject matter of foreign intelligence collection in the

United States.

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c. Director of Central Intelligence Directives

To implement the National Security Act of 1947 as

amendod and the various National Socurity Council Intelligonco

Directives issued pursuant thereto, the Director of Centrai

Intelligence has issued uumerous Directives (DCID's), The

first of these having a direct bearing on jurisdictional matters

is DCID No. 2/3, captioned "Domestic Exploitation of

Nongovernmental Organizations and Individuals."

NSCID NO. 2,

paragraph 7, states that CIA shall be responsible for the

selective exploitation within the U.S. of such organizations

and individuals as sources of foreign intelligence information.

We, therefore, have avoided, and should avoid, any operations

among nongovernmental organizations and individuals designed

solely to produce foreign intelligence without CIA prior

approval or nullification of these provisions.

DCID No. 2/3 provides for exploitation of nongovernmental

•U. S. citizens by CIA domestic field offices

and states, "In

cases where the Federal Bureau of Investigation has indicated

an

operational interest in a U.S. citizen, Central Intelligence

Agency will coordinate with that agency prior to further contact."

This DCID also provides for exploitation by CIA

domestic field offices of aliens,

following a prior name check

with FBI so our statutory obligations may be properly met without

CIA interference.

It is of possible interest to note that in dealing with

these two matters, DCID No. 2/3 refers to nongovernmental U. S.

citizens but only

to aliens (without the restrictive adjective).

The NSCID on which it is based refers to nongrovernmental

individuals without distinguishing between citizens and aliens.

thus, there appears to have been an intention to confine CIA's

intelligence exploitation functions within the U.s. A review

of our file on CIA (62-80750) indicates this might well have

been a concession to the Bureau since we went on record opposing

U.S. to CIA in letters to Lieutenant General Hoyt S. Vandenberg

(then Director of Central Intelligence Group) on June 25, 1946,

(Serial 96), August 6, 19460, (Serial 138), and August 23, 1946,

(Serial 224), which have peen aiscussed more quily under the

heading "National Intelligence Authority."

• 26 .

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DCID No. 2/8 is captioned "Domestic

Exploitation of

U. S. Government Organizations and Officials." It begins in

very general terms, "Pursuant to the provisions of NSCID No. I

and NSCID No. 2.

Agency shall coordinate and have the

It provides, "The Contral Intolligonce

primary responsibility for

exploitation of the foreign intelligence potential of non-USIB

organizations and officials

to moet community neods as a

service of common concern."

As set forth

above, there seems to be no basis for

such CIA jurisdiction in NSCID No. I and No. 2.

Paragraph 7

Of NSCID No. 2 specifically restricts CIA in this area of

operations to nongovernmental organizations and individuals.

A review of our U. S. Intelligence Board (USIB) file,

62-90718, shows following apropos this matter:

The Draft Minutes of the 3/21/61 USIB

meeting report that the Board approved the

draft of a DCID on "Domestic Exploitation of

U. S. Government Organizations and Officials,"

which would be issued as DCID No. 2/8, tilectiva

3/21/61. Mx. Belmont was present at this USIB

meeting

as the FBI representative.

(unnumbered

serial between serials 1131 & 1132, USIB file)

Tracing this subject matter back through

the USIB file it was learned that it apparently

was first considered at the meeting held 2/23/60

at which the Bureau was represented by Fred A.

Frohbose.

The minutes for that meeting reported

the Board agreed in principle that a directive on

Intelligence Exploitation of U. S. Governmental

officials would be desirable. However, the

matter was referred to the Committee on Domestic

Exploitation for further study and the submission

of a revised draft for Board consideration.

(unnumbered serial between serials 1040 & 1041,

USIB file)

From the foregoing it would appear that the Bureau

concurred in the issuance of

this particular Directive and thus

to an extension of CIA's overt collection activities in the

U: S. It: this should, in fact, be interpreted as an extension.

DCID 4/1 provides for the establishment of the

Interagency Defector Committee.

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DCID's 4/2 and 4/3 relate to the Defector Program

abroad and domestically, respectively.

The latter one dwells on

division of responsibilities

between

FBI and CIA in the handling

of defectors within the continental limits of the United Statos.

It piovidos that exploitation of such defoctors shall be conducted:

I. To obtain internal security information or other

data required by IBI

in view of its statutory responsibilitios

in the internal security field.

2. To

obtain foreign intolligence information required

in the interests of national security by the member agencies of

the UsIß.

3. For such other purposes as are deemed to be in the

interests of national security.

The very next sentence then gives the implication that

exploitation of the defector for foreign intelligence purposes is

• the principal responsibility of CIA, for it reads, "Decision as

to the relative importance of internal

security exploitation by

FBI and foreign intelligence exploitation by the Central

Intelligence

Agency (CiA) shall be made jointly by representatives oi

CIA and FBI."

There then follows a listing of nine specific FBI

responsibilities, one of which

is to make available to CIA foreign

intelligence information resulting from the initial exploitation

of defectors.

There is no subsequent specific delineation of CIA

responsibility over foreign intelligence exploitation until there

is a transfer of respons-bility for handling a defector from FBI

to CIA after FBI interests nave been fully satisfied.

There is a

general assignment of such responsibility to CIA in the

terms,

"CIA shall be responsible foi:

Coordinating the activities of.

other departments and agencies concerned with defector matters,

except those responsibilities assigned exclusively to FBI . ..."

As a matter of practice, if it is determined there is

Ittle or no importance from an internal security standpoint in

connection with a particular defection, we do not take over but in

effect give clearance to CIA to proceed from a foreign intelli

gence standpoint.

DCID's in the 5/ series (numbers one through five) were

issued principally to implement NSCID Number 5 which deals with

U. S. espionage and clandestine counterintelligence activities

abroad.

There appears to be no conflict with FBI jurisdiction in

this series.

All other DCID's relate to Elint Critical Intelligence

and other matters. which appear to have no bearing on possible

conflicts between CIA and FBI responsibilities.

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a. Dulles committee.

1942

The Dulles Committee was appanted February 3, 1948,

by the National Security Council (NSC) to make a "comprohensivo,

Impartial and objectivo survey of the organization, activitles

and personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)." The

Committee was instructed to report its findings and recommendations

on the following natters:

(a) The adequacy and eflectiveness of the

organization structure oi CIA.

(b) The value and efficiency of existing CIA activities.

(c) The relationship of

these activitiesto those of

other departments and agencies.

(d). The utilization and qualifications of CIA personnel.

The Committee's scope was extended on March 17, 1948,

to include the following provisions:

"This survey vill comprise

primarily & through und compichensiva examination of the

structure, administration, activities and inter-agency relations

ships of the CIA as outlined in the resolution of the National

Security Council. It will also include an examination oi such

intelligence activities of other Government departments and

agencies as relate to the national security, in order to make

recommendations for their effective operation und overall

coordination. . ."

This report, which is dated January 1, 1949, for the

most part concerned itself with administrative matters alfecting

CIA and the necessity for reorganization within that Agency.

notes, however, that the National Security Act, as implemented

•by directives of the NSC, imposed upon CiA responsibility ior

carrying out three essential functions:

(1) The coordination of intelligence activities.

• (2) The correlation and evaluation of intelligence

relating to the national security, which has been interpreted

by directive as meaning the production of national intelligence.

*

-.

See definition of "produce" in footnote to. NSCID No. 1, Section

4b as "correlate and evaluate," the reverse of connotation given

here.

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(3) The performance centrally, subject to NSC

direction, of certain intelligence and related functions of

common concern to various departments of the Government.

The report noted that Section 102 of the National

Security Act of 1947 established a Iramework for a sound

intelligence system and no amendment to that

Section of the

Act was deemed necessary.

Although the coordination of intelligence activitles

of the several departments and agencies concerned with national

security was a primary reason ior establishing Cin, the report

noted the National security Act does not give cle independent

authority to coordinate intelligence activities, as final

responsibility to establish policies

was vested

in the NSC.

The statutory limitations upon the authority of CIA

to coordinate intelligene activities without the approval of

the NSC were, according to the report, obviously designed to

protect the autonomy and internal arrangements of the various

departments

and agencies performing intelligence functions.

In spite of these calculated limitalions uù the authority of

CIA, the report noted, it was clear the Agency was expected to

provide the initiative and leadership in developing a coordinated

intelligence system. In practice, the NSC has almost without

exception approved the recommendations submitted to it by CIA

for the coordination of intelligence activities.

The National Security Act does not define the

"intelligence activities" which were to be coordinated by CIA

under the direction of the NSC or specify the departments

whose activities were covered.

Presumably; according to the

report, all intelligence activities relating to the national

security were included, from collecting information in the first

instance to. the preparation and dissemination of finished

intelligence reports and estimates.. "The criterion," which the

report noted was a very broad one, was "such intelligence

activities... as relate to the national security and not

the identity of the departments concerned or the nature or

locale of the intelligence activity."

Thus, the report noted,

practically no limitations are set upon the scope of the intelli-

gence activities with which the Central Intelligence Agency is

to concern itsell.

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The report noted another broad field requiring

coordination is that of foreign intelligence derived Irom

domestic sources and the allied field of domestic counter-

intelligence.

This includes tho oxploitation of intolligonce

Irom United

states business firms, travellers, etc., exploitation

of the intelligence possibilities of groups and individuals of

foreign nationality in the United States, the rolating oi

domostic counterintolligenco to foreign intelligence and the

coordination of domestic counterespionage

abroad.

Except for the exploitation of private sources of

foreign intelligence in the United States which is centralized

in the Office of Operations, CIA, responsibility for other

activities is scattered among the State Department, the armed

services, the FBI and CIA.

The FBI, which has primary security and law enforce-

ment responsibilities, is concerned in fact with an important

area of intelligence.

This includes domestic counterespionage

nand countersabotage,

control of communist and other subversive

activities and surveillances of alien individuals and groups.

All of these functions, according to the report, are closely

reialeù io the cumparable activities abroud of the cIA.

The report noted the FBI was not part of the then

l existing machinery for courdination of intelligence through

•ithe Intelligence Advisory Committee and there was no continuing

manner whereby domestic intelligence and counterintelligence

were related to overall national intelligence in order to serve

the general purpose set forth in the National Security Act,

which was set forth as "of coordinating the intelligence activities

of the several Government departments and agencies in the interest

of national security."

It was the opinion of the authors of the Dulles Report

that CIA had the duty under the Act to concern itself with the

problem of coordinating those phases of domestic intelligence

and counterintelligence which relate to the national security.

and CIA should submit recommendations on this subject to the

-NSC. The report noted this was not inconsistent with the

stipulation of the National Security Act that CIA "shall have no

police, subpoena,

law enforcement powers or internal security

functions."

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The Dulles Commission recommended that the FBI

should be made a member of the Intelligence Advisory Committee

to improve coordination of domestic intelligence and

countOr.

Intelligence Insofar as these matters related to the

national

security.

While discussing the production of National

intelligence Estimates by ciA, the report noted,

"There is

no systematic way oi tapping that domestic intelligence

information, which should be chiefly in the hands of the FBI,

having a bearing on broader intelligence issues and there

is no regular and agreed arrangement for participation by the

FBI and lor the use of intelligence from domestic sources in

a national estimate."

National Security Council Intelligence Directive

Number 7 provided that CIA shall be responsible for the

exploitation, on a highly selective basis, within the United

states of business concerns, other non-Governmental organizations

and individuals as sources of loreign intelligence information.

The report concluded the amount of foreign intelligence which

can be obtained through the exploitation oi nur Guverniental

sources in the United States is considerable and its quality

could be very high it appropriate arrangements were made and

discrimination was employed. It was felt the vast number of

organizations, institutions

and individuals

having foreign

interests and

knowledge represented a potential source of

intelligence that in many ways was

superior to any other,

as it was felt that they were in a

position to provide

information obtained from their loreign contacts and from the

findings on their own people abroad.

A further important source of information, the

exploitation for intelligence purposes of foreign individuals

and groups in the United States was also being developed.

The

report noted that these individuals and groups as well as

political refugees and former foreign government officials

were often engaged in political activity with significant

international implications.

exploitation of intellisence in this important field.

The FBi,

according to the report; had a major interest in foreign

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individuals and groups in the United States because of

possible security implications.

The report indicated the

FBI possessed considerable intormation concorning many

individuals and groups but this information had boen obtained

primarily with security ither than intelligence considerations

in mind and was not normally given the kind of Interpretation

or dissemination that intelligence required it it was to be

properly used.

It was also noted the FBi was, in cases phere

it had a security interest, reluctant on security grounds to

have intelligence exploitation by outside agencies. The general

result of this situation, according to the report, was that an

important source of intelligence was not being fully exploited.

The report noted that the question of the

exploitation for intelligence purposes of loreign groups and

individuals in the United States was a clear exanple where

the Intelligence Advisory Committee, with the FBI being added

-as a member, should establish principles and rules lor

coordination..

In discussing the edministrative handling of

espionage and counterespionage matters within the CIA, the

report noted the FBI was charged with all counterespionage

responsibilities in the United States except those affecting

personnel of the armed services. The Dulles Comnission

recommended the counterespionage activities of CIA should be

increased in scope and emphasis and that closer Ilaison in

this lield should be established with the FBI.

The only effect the Dulles Report had on the FBI

was its inclusion as a member of the Intelligence Advisory

Committee by amendment to HSCID Number I dated July 7, 1949.

e. Hoover Commission, 1948 and 1955

Task forces of the Commission on Organization of the

Executive Branch of the Government (Hoover Commission)

conducted surveys of CIA operations from 1947 to 1949 (under F.

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missions of coordination, correlation, evaluation,

dissemination of the intelligence product of other Government

agencies and departments.

The Commission examined agency

activity in light of the CIA primary mission of advising

NSC and performing services and duties rolatod to

intelligence and national security as the NSC directed.

(la) Eberstadt Task Force Report

The results of the first examination of CIA by the

and its

direction of the Agency.

The report pointed out, however,

that CIA and its parent, NSC, had had little time to actually

implement the coordination necessary for leadership in the

field.

The Task force clearly defined its understanding of

•the CiA mission as:

of Federal agencies concerned with national security."

The duties of CIA were listed as:

1.

Advise National

Security Council on national

security intelligence activities of Federal departments and

agencies:

2.

Recommend necessary coordination of such

activities to National Security Council.

3.

Correlate, evaluate and disseminate national

security intelligence.

4. Render intelligence services for other Federal

'departments and agencies." (62-88575-3 enclosure behind file.)

In discussing the duties of the CIA the Task Force

noted, "Under the statute CiA is entrusted with the performance

of such services of common concern as the National Security

At present these include, apart irom

scientific Intelligence, which is discussed separately: (a)

maintenance of central indexes of report, records, and documents

having intelligence value; (b)

from which intelligence material is

extracted and disseminated;

(c) maintenance of central map facilities; (d) monitoring of

foreign

broadcasts; and (e)

collection of the information by

clandestine means and counterespionage abroad."

• 34

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In evaluating the operations and location of CIA

counterespionage the Task force commented as follows:

"The counterespionage activities of CIA abroad appear

properly integrated with CIA's other clandestine operations.

Although arguments have been made in favor of extending CIA's

authority to include responsibility for counterespionage in this

Country, such

an

extension of jurisdiction does not a present

appear justified.

For one thing, concentration of power over

counterespionage activities at home in the hands of a Director

of Central Intelligence responsible for espionage abroad might

justifiably arouse public suspicion and opposition.

Conceivably

it could form the basis for a charge that a gestapo is in

process of creating even though the pover to arrest were

specifically withheld. To transier responsibility for domestic

counterespionage from the FBI, which has an established

organization and long tradition,

to CIA, which is not equipped

Iox the assignment, would probably create more problems than it

would solve.

It is doubtful whether the logical benefit of

having one agency responsible for counterespionage throughout

the world would justify the dislocation and confusion that such

à transfer would inevitably occasion."

"CIA representatives have indicated that their present

working liaison with FBI is satisiactory, but the Committee

doubts that FBI-CIA relationships are conpletely adequate.

The

Director of FBI declined the Committee's invitation to appear

before it to discuss the CIA with the committee or its

representatives on the ground that he knew too little of its

activities."

The groundwork for CIA acceptance was laid by the

Committee recommendation and finding:

"CIA is not now properly

organized. Co-equal improvement in G-2, IBI, ONI, State

Department, and other Government intelligence services is also

essential.

Spirit of teamwork must govern interagency

intelligence relationships.

CIA deserves and must have greater

degree of acceptance aud support from old-line intelligence

services than it has had in the past."

A pitch was made for a single agency controlling

internal security in the Committee's finding:

"The committee

believes that responsibility for internal security policies.

should be immediately locused in one agency.

A more thorough

interagency frictions must be

committee commented elsewhere in its report:

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"Detailed study of organization and activities of

intelligence divisions of the Government, including CIA, is

being made by a committee consisting of Messrs. Allen Dulles,

W31Liam H. Jackson,

and Mathias Corron, assisted by & stall

of lour directed by Mr. Robert Blum of

the Office of

Secretary of Deiense."

With this statement it may be assumed

the Task Force excused omissions it may have made with the

observation that the Dulles group was conducting almost the

same survey carried on in the Roover Commission so far as

CIA was involved.

(1b) Clark Task Force Report

The Task Force headed by. General Mark Clark

submitted a Top Secret report dated in May, 1955, setting

forth results of the second Hoover Commission survey of the

organization of CIA.

The report pointed out the survey

was of departments and agencies with entire or prime

responsibility in the fiold of positive foreign intelligence

as it pertains to national defense and security. It

qualified this survey when speaking of the FBI, noting

survey was limited to survey of Bureau only to the extent

that it dealt in security intelligence.

Again the Hoover Commission through its Task

Force pinned CIA jurisdiction down to the areas defined by statute,

and emphasized the Agency was subordinate only to the National

Security Council in its coordination, correlation, dissemination

and collection o1 intelligence data.

The Task Force noted

that since CIA is charged with the

over-all responsibility

for coordinating the output of all intelligence forces, the

Task Force was giving special attention to the work oi

that.

Agency.

In the Task Force Report a review of the FBI

functions in the intelligence community was set forth.

The

committee noted that the FBI had only limited activities in the

positive intelligence field but noted additionally that FBI

functions in the current intelligence offori were of interest

In order to fill out the intelligence picture.

- 36.

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The FBI was cited as one of the four members of

the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC), created

by the NSC, approved by the President 3/23/49, to coordinate

"the investigation of all domestic espionage,

counterospionazo,

sabotago, subversion, and other related matters affecting

internal

security."

It was noted that the IIC charter did not disturb

responsibilities of its member agencies but made mandatory

action by those agencies deemed necessary to insure complete

investigative coverage in compliance with the needs of the

IIC, which had full responsibility for coordination of the

et cetera, allecting internal security.

The Committee stated, "The Central Intelligence

Agency is, by law, excluded from duplicating the internal

security functions of the BI. However, the CIA does develop

within and without the U. S., sources for foreign (positive)

intelligence, and incidental

thereto may develop leads as to

subversive activities within this country. In such cases

CiA ilough liaison fives its information to

the FBI."

A Task force survey revealed,

"Through the Central

Intelligence Agency's domestic field offices, contacts are

made on a highly selective basis with business concerns and

other nongovernmental agencies, as well as with previously

cleared individuals who travel

abroad

Under the

provisions of DCID 7/1, each member of the Intelligence

Advisory Committee is required to establish in Washington

a focal oifice for the purpose of interviewing nongovernment

visitors..

Any visitors to these offices demonstrating

good intelligence potential are

referred to the CIA for iurther

exploitation."

The Task Force noted that as far back as 1939

President Roosevelt by executive order directed the FBI to

coordinate and conduct domestic counterintelligence activities.

In 1949, according to the Committee's survey, the IIC was.

formalized and by charter restricted to coordinating investi-

gations. in Intelligence matters domestically.

;:.

.. • 37 as

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Is commenting on the role of the FBI the Committee

further noted, "The federal Bureau of Investigation, however,

Is the recognized center of the domestic aspect of internal

socurity including countorIntollIgenco within the Unitod States

and Lis possessions. "

With regard to the use and surfacing of sources,

the Committee noted that CIA was not bound to disclose its

sources; however, It commented on the excellent liaison

system of the FBI which had overcome this restriction so far

as internal security within the U.S. is concerned.

"Now,

as a matter of practice he CIA usually refers domestic sources

to the FBI, the only exception being where the source is to be

used in foreign Intelligence work by the CIA." In the area

of defectors within this country, the Committee noted that

the FBI will receive from CIA or

by a direct interrogation or

a CIA-controlled defector information which the defector may

have concerning internal security. Persons who defect within

this country, on the other hand,

were found to be under the

cognizance of the FBI.

Then the reverse of the above situation

comes into play and CIA has access to the deiector for developing

jeads in the loreign intelligence field. The Committee

commented, "It is the duty of the

FBi to conduct investigations

of all cases

involving f reign nationals in the United States

as set forth in the Delimitations Agreenent."

A review of the Commission report lends one important

fact to our study of this subject matter. This was pointed

up by the membership of the various groups at the disposal

of the National Security Council within the field of national

intelligence.

Ten subcommittees or working groups with member.

ship from separate departments or interested agencies acted

in advisory capacities to the IAC parent committee.

of these subcommittees the chairman was a representative of

the Director of CIA and the working groups were individually

serviced by a secretariat furnished by CIA. From the top-

heavy alignment of CIA personnel in IAC and its working groups

it was obvious in which direction advisory opinions would ba

slanted when dissenting matters were presented by the IAC and

CIA tO the NSC.

• 38 c

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I. The Doolittle Committee, 1954

In July, 1951, ve received information from the

White House that

the President had appointed Lieutenant

General James H. Doolittle to study in collaboration with

the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) certain aspects of

the national intelligence effort.

By letter dated

July 2o, 1954, sherman Adams, the Assistant to the presidenü,

requested that the Bureau briel General Doolittle's group

concerning the relationship that existed between the Bureau

and CIA. We subsequently learned that at approximately che

same time a survey

would be conducted by the Hoover

Commission under the chaiimanship of General Mark Clark.

We learned from Allen W. Dulles, Director of CIA, that the

President strongly believed that General Clark should not

permit the survey to get into CIA covert operations,

particularly in the field of political and psycholagical

warfare.

The President had told Dulles that he was selecting

General

Doolittle to study CIA's covert operations.

• General Doolittle's group was briefed on

August 25, 1954, at which time the Bureau's position in

the intelligence field was described and the manner in

which the Bureau transacted business with CIA was explained.

In addition, certain constructive criticism concerning

problems and conflicts experienced in dealing with CIA was

furnished General Doolittle's group. The following salient

features of the criticism appear to bear on the current study:

We were critical of a policy of the Office of

Operations, CIA, which precluded that Division from

identifying any of its sources in the United States when

such sources possessed information bearing on the internal

security of the United States.

The Office of Operations as

01 1954 collected foreign intelligence information in the

United States irom aliens, businessmen, and others, and

periodically would receive information

of interest

to the

Bureau. Instances arose where the Bureau desired to interview

the original source but was prevented from getting to the

39 0.

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source by CIA policy. We were of the opinion that CIA's

policy could be modified to allow us direct accoss to

the sourco in the United States when such was necessary..

As of 1954, CIA had Intorost in various

organizations such as Radio Free Europe and others and

from time to time the Bureau would get involved in

investigation of organizations only to learn they vere

being supported or guided by CIA.

Our opinion was that

if we had been appropriately notilled of CIA's interest

considerable investigative time and manpower could have

been saved and in addition we would have been in a position

to notily CIA when anything of interest came to our

attention.

Concerning CIA investigations in the United

States, we readily acknowledged CIA's right to investi-

gate its own applicants or consultants. We did object

to CIA's undertaking any investigation in this country

when the facts indicated the case was clearly within

Bureau jurisdiction and pointed out that the Bureau had

recently become involved in investigating an individual

suspected of espionage activity. We were in contact wich

CIA and bad. solicited its help concerning certain aspects

in the case but it was a few weeks beiore we learned CIA

had conducted a very close investigation of this same

individual. We made the observations that close and open

cooperation between the Bureau and CIA was vital to the

proper handling of espionage cases.

The Bureau pointed out that as of 1954 it had

received little or no signilicant intoration concerning

espionage or sabotage agents coming to the United States.

We excluded diplonatic personnel in this matter but clearly

indicated that CIA should be in a position to give us some

viadvance notitication wher spies were coming to this country.

• 40 -

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Possibly this latter was the strongest criticism

we had since we did not feel CIA with its resources and

overseas contacts was periorming one of its prime functions

in the intelligence liold; that is, identilying forolen

illegals who aro en routo to the United States.

briefing of

General Doolittle's group, we described the

Bureau's collection o1 intelligence information ior the

Interested Government agencies as a major operation.

discharge of our intelligence operation concerning the

Communist

Party and Soviet and Satellite diplomats was

explained in detail to the satisfaction of all personnel

attending the briefing.

General Doolittle asked for recommendations as to

what could be done to improve CIA so the Bureau would get

better service.

It was suggested that corrective action be

taken on the matters which had been criticized constructively;

CIA should establish adequate coverage (although not

specifically noted, this obviously regarded advance notice

of foreign intelligence personnel coming to the United States);

and linally CIA should transmit information developed

in an

empedite Lashion.

Prior to submitting the report to the President,

General Doolittle expressed

a desire to see

Mr. Hoover, whom

he regarded

as the outstanding intelligence authority in the

world.

The General visited the Director on October 5, 1954,

during which visit CIA's operations were discussed and

generally the points of the previous meeting were reiterated.

General Doolittle felt the ideal solution would be to wipe out

•CIA entirely and start all over again, but since this was

impractical his committee would point out certain neaknesses

and make certain recommendations and suggestions to the

President for the correction of these weaknesses.

•We do not have the contents of General Doolittle's

report and there is nothing to indicate an executive order

was issued from it which in any way delineated the respective

•jurisdiction of the Bureau or of CIA.

The Joint. Study Group on Foreign Intelligence Activities

of the United states Government

Captioned report was prepared by the Study Group

and issued 12/15/60. The Group was under the chairmanship of

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## Page 214

Lyman B. Kirtkpatrick, Inspector General, Central Intelligence

Agency (CIA), acting as a representative of the Director o1

Central Intelligence (DCI).

The other four members of the

Study Group represented the Department of State, Secrotary of

Defonse, Buronu of the Budget, and the National

security.

Council (NSC) •

The stated targots of examination by the Group were

organizational and management aspects within the intelligence

efiort relating to all aspects of foreign intelligence.

In

the confines of these objectives the Bureau was not considered

for examination by the Group in view of the Bureau's lack of

operational jurisdiction in matters outside of this country.

Mr. Belmont, acting for the Bureau, gave a briefing before

the

Group on 7/29/60 regarding the Bureau's relations with other

United States intelligence agencies.

There was no mention

•made of the Bureau in

the report except in one of its

recommendations relative to reorganization of the membership

•Of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) whick will be.

dealt with in more detail later.

The 141 page report submitted by the Group appeared

to be apologetic in tone for any shortcomings of CIA. The

reader obtains the definite impression the report was used as

a sounding board for differences of opinion as to methods and

administration for collection of loreign intelligence (overt

and covert) abroad.

The main basis for conclusions and recommendations

made by the Group rested in delineation of duties of DCI as

coordinator of intelligence as opposed to DCI secondary

responsibility as head of CIA. The Group recognized service

jealousies apparently resulting from refusal to accept the

fact that DCI could control and coordinate intelligence effort

without affording preferential treatment to CIA which was his

operational.

and administrative arm.

There is no reference in the report to a clear

definition of CIA operational responsibilities. or

jurisdiction

within continental United States.

"The Group lound that DCI through heads of missions

abroad

and designated DCI representatives in foreign countries

had principal responsibility for control and coordination of

joreign collection efforts.

The. CIA's operations abroad were

recognized in almost all' 43.01 the Group's recommendations.

. - 42 m

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Recommendation number 17 emphasized that CIA

should place emphasis on the establishment of unofiicial

cover throughout the world; recommendation number 20 was

that CIA should Increase intelligence support to uniliod and

component commanders by direct dissomination from portinent

iield stations.

report noted that CIA's main requirements

problem related to clandestine collection and concerned

the great number of requirements served on the Agency. ••

The main tone of the report was that greater

cooperation was required between the joint Chiefs of Stali

JCS), Department of state, and ClA in carrying out tOlelga

intelligence collection missions. The recommendations os

the Group were all directed toward this end and had no

bearing on internal espionage or counterespionage activities

within the United States.

In commenting on the coordination duties of the

DCI, the Group pointed out that USIB had been officially

directed to "establish policies and develop programs for

the guidance of all departments and agencies concerned, the

DCI is authorized to make such surveys oi departmental

intelligence activities or the various departments and

agencies as he may deem necessary in connection with bis

duty to advise the NSC and coordinate the intelligence cilort

of the United States."

directions to indicate that USIB should assume a greater

proportion of the actual direction and control of the

intelligence community of which the Bureau was noted to be

a member.

should be reduced to four members who should be the DCI

(chairman) and representatives of Secretary of State, Secretary

of Defense,

and joint Chiefs of Staff.

The FBI and the Atomic

Energy Commission would be relegated to ad hoc representation

on the Board.

43

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It should be noted in considering the proposed

change of USIB membership that the Bureau was a member of

six of the twenty-six subcommittees which formed the committee

make-up of the USIB.

Memorandum January 10, 1961, Mr: Belmont to

Mr. Parsons outlined the proposed USIB membership change

for the Director.

It recommended that Bureau make no issue

of the proposed recommendation.

The Director underlined

a passage of the memorandum which stated "In one sense ot

The Director approved the recommendation of the memorandum

with the following notation:

"O.K. but I am not enthusiastic

about the change of our status. H." Our status, however, was

not changed and the Bureau has continued to hold full member

ship on the Board.

In brief, the Joint Study Group Report noted that

the majority of the recommendations of the Study Group had

boon favorably received by the intelligence community in

that positive action had been taken to place most of them

in effect. Many of the recommendations of the Group were

felt to have been met by the creation of the Deiense

Intelligence Agency (DIA) which acted as a coordinator and

overseer of the intelligence effort of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff.

There is no comment made in this report which

would bear on our present survey of CIA jurisaiction or

activities within

the United States in contlict with our own

jurisdictional and investigative interests.

The only

reference to the Bureau in this latter report was as

previously mentioned in the comment relative to reorganization

of the membership of the USIB.

5. •

Responsibilities of the FBI

&.

Laws and Directives.

No information has been developed with

respect to

any laws passed or directives issued specifically delegating

to the FBI responsibilities for the positive acquisition oi

foreign intelligence in the United States. As has been set

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forth above under the caption, "The History of Foreign Intelligence

Collection in the United States - Prior to World War II,"

President Roosevelt conducted certain conferences following

which he issued instructions with regard to investigations of

Lascist and communist activitios in the United States.

Those

investigations were to be for intelligence purposes.

For the

most part, they took on a counterintelligence aspect; however,

during the course of them foreign intelligence Information was

developed either as an outgrowth of investigative activity or

through the conducting of technical surveillances.

We found no record regarding the designation of the

FBI as the agency responsible for collection of foreign intelligence

information in the United States as of the time the Office of

Coordinator of Information was created on 7/11/41.

Neither did

we find any record indicating such responsibility had been

delegated to any other agency.

b. Requests From Other Agencies

Fron time to time the Bureau has received specific

requesis fiom othor agoncias based upon which we have undertaken

the collection of loreign intelligence information in the

United States in a clandestine fashion.

Two instances of this

nature were based on requests from the

Department of State and

the White House.

(1)

Department of State Request - Recognizing & gay

in our intelligence coverage of friendly governments, on

10/21/55 we discussed with the then Deputy Undersecretary of

State, Robert Murphy, the question of instituting limited

•discreet technical surveillances on official establishments of

selected foreign nations, principally those located in world

trouble areas.

We pointed out that the FBi stood ready to

institute such coverage as might be desired by the Department

oi state.

Mr. Murphy was quite receptive to this idea, stating

• that limited

coverage sufficiently flexible to change

with

changing world conditions might be highly desirable,

After

funher discussions it was agreed that a program; "progressive"

in nature, would be instituted.

By this, Mr.

Murphy explained

that he did not feel at that time that all desirable coverage

should be instituted at a given date, but rather that coverage

should be placed on one country at a time as moving events abroad

might dictate. On this basis this typa coverage was instituted

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based on a specific request from Mr. Murphy on 12/5/55 that we -

place technical surveillances on all Egyptian establishments

in the United States.

Since then, technical surveillances have

been placed on

numerous establishments of foreign countries

Ior oither extended or limitod portoda of tine, depending upon

developments on the international scene.

(2) White House Request - In May, '1965, President

Johnson advised the Director he wanted the

rBI tO set up a

group in the Dominican Republic for the purpose of taking charge

of cleaning out communists in the Dominican Government and advising

the Government of those who might try to infiltrate Government

ranks. This was the basis for opening our Santo Domingo Offico,

which has continued operation since, 5/21/65.

As a result of maintaining our Dominican Office and

assisting in its mission, we have instituted various technical

surveillances and developed numerous live sources in the

United States from which we regularly acquire foreign intelligence

information.

Since the President has relied on the Bureau to

¿keep him apprised of developments from an intelligence standpoint

as well as developments with respect to communist influence,

these sources art regularly cuntactod for infornetion which.

Iits within the terms of foreign intelligence data.

C.

FBI's Role in the United States Intelligence Board

The predecessor to the United States Intelligence

Board (USIB) was the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC).

the IAC was established by National Security Council Intelligence

Directive (NSCID) number 1 dated 12/12/47. By amendment to

this Directive dated 7/7/49, the Bureau was designated a

member of the fAC

. for the purpose of coordinating domestic

intelligence with foreign intelligence.

NSCID I has been

revised several times. Subsequent to a revision dated 4/21/58,

the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board merged the

IAC and the U. S. Communications Intelligence Board into one

body known as

the United "tates Intelligence Board. National

Security Council Directive dated 9/15/58, approved by the

President, formally created the United States intelligence

Board

to

as successor to the

the LAC.

and the U.S, Communications Intelligence

Board.

The USIB in its present form is chaired by the

Director of Central Intelligence.

The. Director. of Central

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Intelligence is distinguished from the Director of Central

Intelligence Agency (CIA) in that the Director of Central

Intelligence as Chairman of the United States Intelligence

Board is considered the President's principal advisor on

toregn intolligenco.

Mombershlp on

tho Unitod Statos

Intelligence Board consists of the Director of Intelligence

and Research, Department of State; the Deputy Director of CIA;

the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency; the Director

of the National Security Agency; the Assistant General Manager

Ior Administration, Atomic Energy Conmission,

and the Assistant

Director of the FBI. The primary responsibility of the USIB

is the coordination of intelligence activities. In this

regard, USIB's major effort is concerned with the preparation

and approval of National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) for use

by policy makers.

As a rule, the Bureau does not participate in the

preparation of NIE's inasmuch as the subject matter is usually

outside the jurisdiction of this Bureau.

We have in the past.

participated in some selective NIE's such as certain estimates

on Cuba, world communism, the clandestine introduction of

240193r

weapons

Into thA

Taited States and on the Dominican

Republic.

As part of its stalfing procedure, USIB has

created numerous committees in some of which the Bureau

maintains membership.

The USIB committees on which the

Bureau has representation are the Technical Surveillance

Countermeasures Committee, the signal Intelligence Committee,

the Interagency Defector Committee, the Watch Committee, the

Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, the Guided Missile

Astronautics Intelligence Committee, the Security Committee,

and the Committee on Documentation.

As a general rule,

attendance at Committee sessions is handled by the Liaison

Section.

Attendance at meetings is in the main restricted to

the Interagency Detector Committee, the Watch Committee, the

Security Committee, the Technical Surveillance Countermeasures

Committee and the Committee on Documentation::

The Bureau has

a primary interest in the business of these five committees.

All decisions made by these committees, which are subsequently

approved by the USIB, are the subject of individual nemoranda:

submitted to the Director for his

approVaL.

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Over the years, consideration has been given to

the Bureau's withdrawing its membership from USIB. On each

occasion the Director has chosen to have the Bureau retain

its nembership on the Board. The last such occasion occurred

In 1964 during the period when John McCone was Chairman of

the United States Intelligence Board. At that time, the military

services were removed from membership on the Board and replaced

by the Defense Intelligence Agency.

. At the time, Mr. Belmont,

then Assistant to the Director, orally discussed with the

Director the possibility of the Bureau's withdrawing from the

OSIB.

The Director's comments were that we would not request

removal from membership on the Board but would withdraw our

membership only if so requested by the Director of Central

Intelligence in his role as Chairman of the USIB. The Bureau's

witharawal would, of course, require action on the part of

the National Security Council.

• d. The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB)

This group was originally organized in January, 1956,

as the president's Buard of Consultants on Forcign Intelligence

Activity.

Its primary function at that time was to revlew

periodically the Government's foreign intelligence efforts

with specific emphasis on the operations of the Central

Intelligence Agency.

It was established as a result of

recommendations by the Hoover Commission.

In the later years

of the Eisenhower Administration the activity of the group

fell off and it was re-organized in its present form with the

advent of the Kennedy Administration.

Our relationship with this Board has historically

been one of informal liaison in view of the fact that the

primary function of the Board is concerned with foreign

intelligence.

There have been occasions where representatives

of the Bureau briefed individual members and/or panels of

the Board concerning our jurisdiction, techniques and

accomplishments in the intelligence field. These briefings

i have been received with a receptive and sympathetic attitude.

Our main concern in following the activities of this Board

has been

to assure that the Central Intelligence Agency: does

not encroach upon our j'risdiction and upon the functions of

the

various intelligence communities in which we hold menbership.

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The case involving Army Sergeant Jack E. Dunlap,

a former employee of the National Security Agency who was

soviet espionage agent, was thoroughly reviewed by the

present PrIAB IN VieW OL

the most serious ramifications 1t

presented.

This case concerned the penetration by the

Soviets of the National Security Agency.

The report which

emanated from the PFIAB

study included proposals which atroct

the responsibilitios and activities of several agencies vithin

the intelligence community. All of the twenty-one recommendations.

of the Board dealt with various aspects of achieving a

strengthened counterintelligence capability to guard against

penetration of our security establishments by hostile intelli

gence agencies. Nineteen of the recommendations of the Board

were approved by the President and three of these related

directly to Bureau activity. They are as follows:

#18: "That steps be taken to assure that the

Federal Bureau of Investigation has adequate

agent resources to effect the required domestic

counterintelligence coverage of both bloc and

nonbloc official installations and personnel who

may be engaged in intelligence and clated

activities inimical to the national security."

#19: "That the policies of the Department of

State with respect to authorizing technical

coverage (use of wiretapping and listening

devices) by the Federal Bureau of Investigation

of foreign official: installations and personnel

in this country be re-examined with a view to

liberalization to the extent necessary to provide

the counterintelligence coverage required in the

interest of national security."

#20:

"That, in future, when consideration is

given to exchanging detected Soviet-bloc intelli-

gence agents for imprisoned American personnel in

bloc countries, advance consultations be hold with

Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau

of Investigation to assure that adequate attention

is given all intelligence aspects of such proposed

exchanges in the interest of the national security,

weighed against the political gains

to be achieved."

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e. The Director's Stand Over the Years

The Director's stand over the years with respect

to jurisdiction concorning foreign intelligence matters

within the United States is reflected in numerous comments

he has made dating back to the days when the Central

IntellIgence GrOUP. (CIG) was being formed.

In June, 1946, General Vandenberg, then head of

CIG, sent a memorandum to the Director proposing that the.

National Intelligence Authority issue a directive extending

the powers and duties of the Director of Central Intelligence,

which position General Vandenberg occupied.

The memorandum

was analyzed on June 21, 1946, in a memorandum from C. H.

Carson to D. M. Ladd in which it was pointed out that it

was inevitable that CIG must enter into the domestic

picture because of sources of foreign intelligence in that

field.

An addendum was placed on the memorandum by Mr. Edward A.

Tamm and Mr. C. A. Tolson which was followed by comments by

the Director which is most pertinent to the subject matter

inget discussiOn.

The andontum read:

"Mr. Tolson and Mr. Tamm do not concur with

the conclusion expressed in this memorandum that

'It is inevitable that the Central Intelligence

Group must enter into the domestic field picture

insofar as intelligence' is concerned because of

the sources of foreign intelligence existing in

that field.' They feel that a coordinated pro-

gram for the exchange of information between the

Central Intelligence Authority and the FBI,

permitting a free and comprehensive exchange of

information in matters of mutual interest, will

enable the Bureau to work in the domestic field

without interference from the Central Intelligence

Authority in the same manner that the Bureau works,

for example, with local police departments or other

governmental agencies within defined jurisdictional

Lines.

We believe that the attached letter to

General Vandenberg is satisfactory."

The Director commented as follows:

"I am

not as optimistic as are Tolson & Tamm.

I think it is inevitable that there will be a

collision with CIG over our domestic jurisdiction

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or rather their expansion into it on intelligence

matters.

It ought not occur but this new memo

of ciG shows how grocdy it is.

It. 1s tho

DOnOVan Plan alMOSt In

toto & 1s boIng slyly

put over.

It means we must zealously guard our

domestic jurisdiction & not yield an inch& be

ever aleft to resist any encroachment."

On March 27, 1953, the Director testilled before the

Senate Subcommittee on Appropriations.

In response to a question

from Senator McCarran concerning liaison between FBI and CIA,

the Director stated:

"There is close liaison. CIA has

exclusive jurisdiction abroad for intelligence. We have

exclusive jurisdiction within the United States. We maintain

continuous liaison with CIA Headquarters in Washington through

a liaison representative of our Bureau in order to facilitate

the transmission of material from them to us and from our

service to them."

In October, 1958, CIA approached us requesting

üur concurrence in CIA's estahlishing physical and technical

surveillance in the United States on the

CIA had an operational interest in

this individual. By memorandum it was recommended that the

Bureau not become involved in this CIA operation and that CIA

be informed that this would not establish a precedent tor

approval of future CIA activities in the United States.

Responsive to continuing to present problems, the Director

noted:

"This, is an understatement particularly if we are

going to adopt a macaroni backbone attitude instead of standing

up forthrightly for our rights and jurisdiction."

CIA, in April, 1959, advised us that one of its

sources would be visiting the United States, and

requested our concurrence in CIA's establishing coverage

including technical surveillance.

It was recommended we stay

out of this matter and inform CIA that this was not to be

construed as a precedent for approval of luture CIA counter

intelligence activity in the United States. • The Director

commented on the memorandum: "The trend has gone so far we

have become nothing but & rubber stamp for CIA yet they won't

even allow us to perform liaison functions abroad much less

operational ones."

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In January, 1960, CIA agreed to comply with

conditions imposed by the Bureau with rogard to developing

positive intelligence information through contacts between

U. S. residents and visitors from Iron Curtain countrios.

CiA agrocd to contact us liIsi belore promoting such

associations. In March, 1960, CIA inquired if it might obtain

Bureau clearance at the licia

level for such contacts in the

intorost of axpodioney.

Mx. Tolson noted: "Moro and moro wo

are agreeing to CIA operations in the U. S. I am opposed

to this relaxation.

We can exercise better control here than

through our field offices."

The Director added: "I share

•Tolson's views."

CIA was advised clearance was to be obtained

through Bureau headquarters.

A source.

furnished information alleging

penetration of American intelligence.

One Serge Kaxlow, a

CIA officer, was developed as a suspect.

On 2/9/62, we took

• over the investigation.

On 2/26/62, Sheffield Edwards, ther

CIA Director of security, admitted CIA had had technical

coverage on Karlow from February, 1961 to 2/9/62. Edwards':

Jinined his reluctance to tell us

of this situation earlier

because of obvious possible jeopardy to prosecution, plus

embarrassment to his Agency

should the Bureau raise an

obiection to CIA's maintaining such coverage.

The Director

noted: "I only wish we would eventually realize CIA can

never be depended upon to deal forthrightly with us.

Certainly

my skepticism isn't based on prejudice nor suspicion but on

specific instances all too many in number. Xet there exists

wistful belief that 'the leopard has changed his spots'."

In April, 1962, we received information on

strictly confidential basis from Jay Sourwine of the senate

Internal Security Subcommittee to the effect that an

unidentified CIA representative had talised to Senator Eastland

concerning an alleged move to place CIA in charge of all

intelligence-gathering operations for the Government -- to

include Soviet espionage in the U. S. The Director noted:

"I am not surprised at the above alleged effort. There is no

doubt in many quarters a desire to eliminate the FBi in

dealing with espionage and subversion for we are a

thorn not

only in the side of communists but also the ADA and Fabian

Socialists. CIA which lailed again and again to know what

is actually going on abroad could be counted upon to blunder

the same way in the USA."

• 52 ..

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In April, 1963, we received Information indicating

that CIA Director John McCone was considering expansion of

CIA operations in the United States - specifically intelligence

coverage and the development of sources in this country unclone

Director made a note on the memorandum recording this:

is trying to do another 'Donovan.? It he injects himself into

the U. S., the FBI gets out. Too many cooks spoil the broth."

In December, 1963, the Director inquired as to the

nature and extent of intelligence operations wherein CIA had

established contact with a diplomat, operated him in the U.S.

with our coordination, and continued to operate him upon his

having departed this country. rour such cases vere cited.

On

the memorandum, the Director noted: "I have little confidence

in CIA abiding

•by agreements if it serves its purpose better

not to do so."

In January, 1964, CIA advised us It had reorganized

Its activities in the U. S.

The Domestic Operations Division,

CIA, had established field offices in this country under

appropriate cover.

A memorandum was prepared describing the

history of CiA operativis lu the t. f. and recommonding action

designed to protect our interests.

A letter went to CIA with

ground rules which the Bureau expected CIA to Lollow in all

matters requiring coordination.

The Director noted: "OK, but

I hope you are not being taken

I can't Lorget CIA

withholding the French espionage

activities in the U. S. nor

the lalse story concerning Oswald's trip to Mexico City, only

to mention two of their instances of double dealing."

The New York Office, by letter 2/14/64, set forth

its observations concerning a briefing given that office on the

matter of CIA operations in the U. S.

The Director commented:

"I think this domestic operations expansion of CIA is very

dangerous and will inevitably "muddy' the waters."

In May, 1964, the Bureau reconsidered its stand

with respect to permitting CIA to approach sources at foreign

establishments in the United states for intelligence purposes.

The following policy was proposed and subsequently approved:

(i) Where there was no indication a source would

be leaving the United states, we would deny ClA Clearaace

fox contact until we had fully explored the person's

potential for our own purposes..!

If we decided we had io

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..

interest and CIA contact would not jeopardize any FBI

investigations, we would grant CIA approval to proceed

with its contact with proviso we be kept informed of

information developed of possible interest

• to us.

(2) Where it appeared source would be returning

to a foreign country shortly we would normally grant

CIA clearance for preliminary contact with proviso we

be kept informed of results.

We reserved the right to

take direct access to the source as our needs required.

(3) Where there was an overlapping of interests

and source expected to continue in United States for

fairly extended period of time, in those instances where

CIA had entree and no Bureau investigation would be

jeopardized we would permit CIA to explore matter and

make preliminary contact keeping us advised of progress

and getting our specific clearance before a direct

recruitment approach; however, where factors indicated

it would be to best Bureau interests to operate source,

we would undertake the recruitment and keep CIA advised

Of information of interest to that Agency.

When these matters were submitted for approval

Mr. Tolson commented, "Looks okay, but we will have to watch

this very closely."

The Director concurred in Mr. Tolson's

remark.

1222:

.. i.

. "

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Do

THE NEED AND THE POTENTIAL FOR

FOREIGN INTELLIGINCE IN THE U.S.

In 1941, the U.S. allegedly had in its

possession practically all of the toroign intelligence

it needed regarding military and strategic targets in

Japan.

The informavion was scattered among various

individuals who had personal knowledge or was located

In libraries, various Govornment agoncies, private

business firms, institutions, et cetera.

TragicaLly,

the U. S. Government did not

have any mechanism to

collect, record and evaluate such information.

Intelligence was badly needed in 1941, and we

dearly in lives and financial resources to accomplish

certain missions because the information was, not

readily available.

Today, the need for loreign intelligence is

greater than ever. The stakes of foreign policy have

never been higher. The U. S., being a dominating world

power, has assumed vast responsibilities enmeshed in

delicate political situations throughout the world.

The ever-existing threat of an atomic war with communist

countries demands a continuing acquirement e? inoulanga

so thatpolicies and courses of action can be designed

in the most effective manner possible. The information

needed applies to numerous fields of activity, a major

area being scientific research and development. In this

connection, the revolutionary break-throughs in the :

scientific category are occurring with unusually high

Irequency, and if the U. S. is to remain in the

forefront, it is absolutely necessary that we obtain

an accurate evaluation of the enemy's capabilities ano

intentions.

He have been fortunate to collect high.

quality positive intelligence through sophisticated

collection methods, i.e high altitude photography and

research in this area is proceeding at an accelerated

pace. Nevertheless, electronic gadgets and machines

The individual talks and volunteers Information. He talks

and his statements are intercepted. All of this produces

valuable increments of intelligence. The individual

still provide badly needed data either through his

,can

voluntary contribution or through his unwitting divulging

55

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of intolligence.

The importance of the individual

is further onphasized when we realize that'

as each

sophisticated collection technique is introducod,

science also introduces newly designod countortochniquos

Of COVOLInE, SCOTCCEING, and CamOUllaBInE important

assets:

In essonce,

technology eventually hits an

inpenotrable or leveling-off depth.

Foreign intelligence is not geographically

restricted. Information regarding Chinese Communists

can bo obtained anywhere in the world, and even if it

is of a fragmentary nature, the data can be of

signilicant value.

The demand for information is

heavy and is sought by every agency in the Government.

Because of this, it has been necessary for the

U. S. Government to may

a program of collection..

a priority basis.

This has been done through the

creation oi a committee which is attached to the "

U.S. Intelligence Board. The committee maintains

• List of priorities on a current basis.

A reCent

list of guidelines for the collection of foreign

intelligence pertaining to scientific affairs in

Communist China included approxinately 170. items,

i.0:

In the U.S. proper, the sources of foreign

intelligence are voluminous.

Most of these sources

overtly provide information through newspapers,

scientific publications, libraries, tourists,

visiting

professors and students, journalists, and immigrants.

The compilation, collation, analysis, and reporting

of such information involves an extensive program

and, needless to say, the U: S. today does not have

the

capability of tapping all available sources on

a current basis.

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For the purpose of this paper, we are

thinking about the search for knowledge considered

•vital for national survival. One could suggest

that clandestine collection of intelligence is

ovoremphasizod and that our Govornment could 10ad11}

protect its interests through overt collection and

the employment of our best analysts and evaluators.

It we take this approach, we may as well discount

the importance.or

the Bureau's activities in the

counterintelligence Lield, which essentially are

of a clandestine nature and which have produced time

and again vital intelligence. "e, therefore, must

move on the assumption that the clandestine

collection of foreign intelligence is very definitely

a most necessary element of our over all intelligence

capabilities.

In addition to the overt sources, there

exists a rich potential in the U.S. among

the foreiga

diplomatic establishments including the U. No, the

officials o1 foreign governments, and visitors such

as students, professors, and scientists.

A certain

amount of inivimation from such sources

san. he

obtained in an overt fashion, but the high quality

data is normally acquired through clandestine means.

This can be done through technical monitoring,

development of live sources, access to recoras,

files, ei cetera.

There are approximately 10,000

foreign officials in the U.S. assigned to embassies,

consulates, trade missions, U. N., and other

international organizations.

This excludes

dependents.

During the fiscal year ending June 30,

1965, 38,544 foreign goverment officials visited

the U. S.; about 1500 of these came from communist-bloc

countries.

During the fiscal year endiag June 30, 1965,

approximately 50,000 foreign students came to the

U.S.;

733 of these came from the communist bloc.

During the

sane fiscal year, there were 2,075,967 visitors fxom

all countries.

Everyone of the foregoing is a potential

¡source of loreign intelligence. As can be readily

accepted, the U. S. Government does not have a capa.

bility. of assessing each and every one of these sources

for foreign intelligence. We can say at this point

that the FBI and CIA are just scraiching the surface.

It is recognized that a program desigued to assess

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or attempt. to recruit each potential source would be

out of the question.

such a massive undertaking would

not be compatible with U.S. Government foreign policy.

Thore' is so question that there must be saloctivity of

a judicious and prudent nuture.

Since the U.S. is such a major power,

Washington, D. C. is the

center or diplomatic activity

Involving practically all foreign nations. The location.

or the u.

N. in New York City presents us with another

area of intensified activity. Most countries send their

most able diplomats to the U. S. so we are confronted

with hundreds of highly talented people. The day-to-day

activities in diplomatic establishments, conferences,

meetings, negotiations,

Ilaison between countries, all

create a tremendous reservoir of foreign intelligence

potential.

58°

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CURRENT CAPABILITIES OF CIA IN

THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

FIELD IN THE UNITED STATES

In order that thore may not be any

misunderstanding regarding CIA's capabilities to

collect foreign intelligence in the United States,

we should first clailly that one of the components

of tho Agency which has offices in the United States

does not engage in this particular activity.

personnel and physical

security, maintains severa

Treasury Department cover.

Personnel of this

office conduct investigations of applicants, firms

or individuals who may be utilized by CIA on

a contract basis to support intelligence operations

overseas.

The overt collection of intelligence by

CIA is handled by the Domestic Contact Service (DCS)

(formerly called Contact Division). CIA estimates

that DOs has a capability of tapping approximately

15 per cent of the total potential of intelligence in

the U.S.

This Division has 18 field offices

16 resident agencies in the United States, and each

office is openly identified as being connected with

Personnel totaling approximately 140 carry CIA

credentials.

The Division regularly has a number of

Officers from the various military services who are

assigned to this Division on a temporary basis:

These military officers concentrate on the collection

of that foreign intelligence which relates to the

immediate United States military needs.

The personnel

01 DOS intervier aliens,

tourists, Officials of

import-export firms, students, scientists, and the

information collected covers a very broad

spectrum in

the positive intelligence category. DOS. claims to have

contact with about 7200 organizations, institutions, or

businesses and has approximately 60,000 contacts or

sources of information.

The information is reported in

the forn of "Infornation Reports," which is disseminated

throughout the intelligence community. During 1965,

59

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Des disseminated 26,000 such

reports.

DCS does not

havo any responsibilities in the clandestine coLLection

of intelligence, and in that sense it is very

specitically not operational..

Des definitely cannot

engage in any activity oí an intornal security natuxe,

and within CIA it is clearly understood that DOS is

not to be operational under any circumstances.

DCS has boon tho subjoct of some controvorsy within

There is one school of thought which maintalns

that DCS should be an appendage of the Deputy Director

oi Plans, who is responsible lor all clandestine

The other school which has prevailed

holds to the line that DOS should be separate and..

continue under the supervision of the Deputy Director ..

of Intelligence (DDI).

This situation not only has

caused headaches {or CIA but also for the Bureau because

of situations which arise where the "leit hand does not

know what the right hand is doing.".

DCs is essentially carrying out CIA's

responsibilities emanating from National Security Council

Intelligence Directive (NSCID) No. 2 which has its roots

in a simisar airective issued under cho National

Intelligence Authority in 1946.

It has been la business

for approximately twenty years.

Per agreement, DOS

cannot interview an alien without first clearing with

the Bureau.. This is done on a daily basis.

With regard

to American citizens, Bureau approval is not required

unless the Bureau has indicated a prior interest in the

individual; hovever, DCS nevertheless submits name

checks on Americans, and if it so happens that the

subject of such an inquiry is a Bureau source or

involved in a Bureau investigation, we are in a position

to move to protect our interests.

It should be noted

that although. Dos is engaged primarily in positive

intolligonco collection, it is requirod to be on the

anort for sources who possibly might be useful to CIA's

clandestine operations.

For example, if. DOS encounters

an alien who can be utilized in an overseas operation,

the lead is passed on to the appropriate division.

At the present time, DCS alerts the newly created

Domestic Operations

Division (explained below) regarding

potential sources.

Our current controls with regard to DOS are

unctioning efficiently. He regularly examine the

acad

60 .

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status of this relationship, and we periodically

make adjustments in order to make certain there

is no "freewheoling" and to take advantage of the

Information which DCS gains. and which is of interost

to the Buroal.

For. oxample, we are currently workiag

out arrangements where our fiold offices can contact

the lOCal DCS Offices concerning Chinese aliens who

might be of interost to us either as subjocus for

investigation or as potential. informants.

This 1121801

at the field level vas deemed

desirable so that we

could got information at the "horse's mouth" rathor

than wait for a reply from CIA headquarters, which is

often prolonged

and, when transmitted, is sometimes

Stripped of pieCeS Oi IntOrmatIon. this occurs

because of the involved and sometimes complicated

maze of bureaucratic compartmentation within CIA:

In the latter part of 1963, CIA created its

Domestic Operations Division (DOD), which was to be

responsible for any clandestine development of sources

in the United States.

Prior to the establishment of

this Division, CIA activity in this fleld was managed

Iron each individual area division at Mashington

headquarters.

sources, coupled with the recognition of the vast

potential in the United States, prompted CIA to creato

a new division which would be responsible for a11 of

the area division interests. DOD has headquarters

at Washington, D. C., and currently has field offices

at New York City, Boston, Chicago, San Irancisco,

Los Angeles, Honolulu, and Washington, D. C., proper.

Approximately 40 intelligence officers are assigned to

the task of engaging in assessment and/or recruitment

of positive intelligence sources, primarily in the

diplonatic field.

Some of the personnel are assigned

to the handling of firms or organizations which may

be supporting certain CIA operations abroad. DOD personnel

in the field operati under authorized Department of Defense

The heads of these field offices are known to us,

and we have established a satisfactory liaison area at

the field level.

DOD is also responsible lor the handling of

CIA agents (informants) who have been recruited abroad

and who come to the United States for assignments either

on a temporary basis or for the duration of & normal.

diplomatic assignment.

• 61 -

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...'.

The creation of DOD within CIA was and still

is a somewhat controversial Agency subject. DOS saw

DOD as an interfering element. The area desks were

reluctant to havo a new division to take ovor thoir

azonts.

Some oi tha DOD porsonnol aro vory capable

and seasoned intelligence officers. Many of them are

considered of mediocre capability, and there is

a frequent rumor that other CIA divisions send their

misfits to DOD.

From ClA's standpoint there appears

to be a detinite need for & much stronger team within doD.

Theoretically, DOD is required to be on the

alert for all potential

sources who can be used by CIA

in its intelligence operations, and the approach is

basically one of a long-range

nature. DOD is required

to make use of all leads emanating from fellow employees

Who may have developed social contacts or associations

with foreigners abroad or who might meet potential

sources in the United states.

Since CIA personnel

operate under diplomatic cover when abroad, they do get

the opportunity to move in diplomatic circles.

undercover agents of CIA traveling throughout

also make contacts which offer potential exploitation 11

and when the target stops in the United States.

Since January, 1964, when DOD actually began

moving, it has recruited

approximately ten individuals

in the diplomatic field. Most of these were in the

noncommunist-bloc area.

All of those recruited appear

to have been in a fairly low-level category. All of them

were career diplomats, and there was no evidence that

the individuals were connected with any intelligence

service.

In addition to the activities of DOS and DOD,

there is a certain amount of CIA operational movements

which do not fall under either of the foregoing divisions.

not fall undox o

One example is the CiA base in Miami which was set up

for CIA's operations directed against the Cuban Governmenü.

This base is used for the training and dispatching of

agents into Cuba and to some extent into other countries

in che Caribbean, particularly the Dominican Republic.

This base is directly responsible to the Western

Hemisphere Division of CIA, which could be called the

Latin American Division.

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CIA also becomes involved in political and

psychological varfare type of programs directed against

targets in foreign countries.

The Agency broadly reiers

to this activity as "covert action."

Tho

prograns axe

ossontially dosignod to Intluence individuals, oxganizat102&

or governments through various news media, and this will

include the utilization of "agents of iniluence." This

activity ialls unacr the Interuational Organizations

DiVISIOn (1OD) Of CIA, which has no responsibility to

collect information.

IOD does use people in the

United States to helo implement the overseas programs.

Quite often the Agency uses cutouts or covers for such

an operation.

Altho igh IOD does not engage in intelligence

collection, it is a CIA division which should be kept in

mind, since its activities quite often will be tangent to

matters of interest to the Bureau.

For example, IOD

objective is to neutralize communist influence. We, of

course, nave had an interest in the Festival because of the

Americans, including members of the CPUsA.

Theoretically, LoD Is required to coordinate closely with

other appropriate components of CIA.

that this coordination has been eflective enough.

There is no doubt that there are individuals

in CIA who aspire to broaden the Agency's operational

activities in the United States.

such individuals would

like to see an arrangement similar to one currently in

force

in England where MI-G has a free hand to assess and

recruit all ioreigners, including diplomats, where there

is no evidence that they are engaged in intelligence

•activity.

If such evidence is obtained, MI-6 is required

to coordinate with MI-5. There are people in CIA who

would like to see similar machinery and in addition would

want the freedom to conduct certain investigations and

maybe even institute technical surveillances.

In summary, CIA so far has

; a very limited

capability to recruit foreign diplomatic sources in the

United States, but the Agency appears to have done fairly

well with a relatively small stafi; however, it can be

anticipated that this capability will increase.

CIA's

oilectiveness will probably be adversely allected for

some time to come because of the Agency's well-known

deficiencies, such as lack of discipline, loose admin-.

istration, and lack of skilled and talented personnel.

= 63 .

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F.

CURRENT CAPABILITIES OF THE FBI

I. Manpower Being Devoted

•It is most dillicult to sive any specific figures as to

how much manpower the fBi is currently devoting strictly to

forcign intelligenco colloction, separate and apart from the

Bureau's internal security ind counterintelligence functions.

Much of the foreign intelligence developed by the Buroau is an

outgrowth of our internal socurity invostigations and cannot be

neatly separated, in terns of manpower or time:

A substantial amount of our foreign intelligence activity

is concentrated in two offices where mosi of the diplomatic

establishments in the united siates are located; namely, New York

and Washington Field. Both offices were requested to furnish

estimates as to how much manpower is being allocated to loreign

matters, including both live sources developed and

technical coverage.

In both cases, the estimates provided were

highly tentative and both cifices stress that manpower commitments

in this area fluctuate widely from week to week depending on

international

politics and other unpredictable faciors. for

instance, during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, both offices

greatly increased their normal manpower commitment to the develop

ment oI current foreign intelligence.

he present vominican crisis

which involves production of foreign intelligence to a large extent

represents another "abnormal" situation.

However,

for what it is worth, WO and New York have

estimated that

at the present time they are allocating approxi-

mately 35 Agents and 20 clerical employees to the full time task

Virtually all of the clerical

time and about 40,per cent of the Agent time is related to

technical coverage and the balance is aimed at the development of

live sources.

In addition, of course, all of the other offices, including

our Legal Attaches abroad, have devoted manpower to foreign

intelligence collection in varying degrees.

operations

conducted in diiferent field oifices have involved the assignment

of as many as 10 or 12 Agents for temporary periods. In connection

with its responsibilities in the Cuban and Latin-American fields,

the Miami and San Juan offices have devoted considerable manpower

to the development of foreign intelligence in recent years. The

Chicago Office in connection with its handling of our

informant has devoted manpower to the development of foreign

intelligence. These represent only a few examples.

On an overall basis and bearing in mind the difficulty in

citing any precise figures, it is estimated that the Bureau probably

averages approximately so to 1o agents and 25 to 30 clerks assignod

primarily to foreign intelligence work.

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2.

Number of Microphone and Telephone Surveillances with

Evaluation of Product

At present, Bureau has only one microphone surveillance in

forcign.

intelligence field and this is in connection with a special

National Security Agency project directed against

coded

communications.

Concerning cochnical survoillancos, wo aro now

operating about 70 foreign intelligence installations on various

diplonatic establishments in this couniry. The majority of these

are in Washington Field and New York with

scattered installationg

in Chicago, Miani

, Pittsburgh, san francisco and san Juan.

curcent bureau pölicy, we are

limited to 80 foreign intelligence

technical surveillances and no nicrophone surveillances with the

exception of one on the

In addition, during recent years, we have maintained

approximately 50 so-called "telex" surveillances on the teletype

facilities of various

foreign establishments.

This has been done

at

the specific request of the National Security Agency, in

connection with its eiforts to break foreign codes and to read

foreign government communications.

We have had excellent sesults from these technical

installations. Any compilation of items of value to the U:S.

Inieiiigence community and policy-making officials developed

through this coverage would run many hundreds.of

The results

have ranged from information regarding plans and activities of

key foreign countries in the diplomatic field to information

regarding

intelligence, political, economic and military develop-

ments in the countries

concerned.

In many instances, we have been

able to forewarn the White House, the State Department and other

interested agencies of impending developments and to furnish data

giving an insight

into the thinking and strategy of key foreign

officials and governments.

This coverage has proved specially

valuable during crisis periods such as the Cuban nissile crisis of

• 1962 and during the tense negotiations involving the Panama Canal

in 1964. On many occasions,

top-ranking United States officials

have commented on the effectiveness of this data.

The particular

importance of this information has

been its timeliness to current

events as well as the fact that it represents a penetition of

foreign diplomatic circles which is only infrequently available

through live sources...

..c. 4 .:96110111

In some

instances; of course, this type coverage on a

particular foreign establishment or official has not para 01I.

We have had cases where this technique has been unproductive for

sustained periods of time on a particular country. This is to be

expected and we bave sought to overcome this by rotating our

installations, correlating our technical oporations with

shifting

international developments and putting coverage on those countries

which appear to offer the most promise for worthwhile intelligence.

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 237

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3. Live Sources With Evaluation

At present ve are making active efforts to develop live

informant coverage in the diplomatic establishments of 37 non-

Soviet bloc countries. This list of so-called "target countries"

varies from time to time but essentially we are seeking informant

coverago in countrios considorod critical Irom an intolligence

stanapoint such as those leaning towards the Soviet bloc or

countries in which the United

States has paramount political or

military intorosts or which are otherwise of primary concora.

The

curient iist includes

number of Middle last countries, and scattered

l countries throughout

Africa and the far last.

Our program was initiated in the early 1950s, and

we

are now using some 50 sources ('I'his number Iluctuates due to

transfers, resignations, etc.)..

In each case, we cleac with

State Department prior to designating any country as a "target"

and we also clear with State prior to conducting interviews with

employees at the "target"

establishment. In a number of

E instances,

Including most Latin-American countries, State has asked us to

restrict our eiforts to American citizens. This, of course, is

a highly limiting factor.

Over the years this live informant coverage has on many

occasions produced foreign intelligence of re value.

Our sources

have irequently provided data regarding proposed political,

diplomatic or economic action by the countries concerned, on

occasion in advance of other lorewarning to U.S. intelligence.

They have also been able to furnish a considerable amount of

information regarding the whereabouts, background and general

activities of individual

foreign officials of security interest,

thereby saving investigative time.

These sources have been

especially valuable in connection with the

Program and

other sophisticated attacks on foreign establishments, providing

us with data regarding the physical security, location of code

rooms, eic., of the various foreign establishments.

In addition to so-called "target" countries which are

In the non-soviet bloc area, the Bureau has developed a number of

• informants and defectors-in-place in Soviet-bloc establishments

who have been able to furnish a substantial amount of foreign

intelligence.

In the Soviet-bloc field, we have also developed

a number of sources in quasi-official establishments, such as

trade missions, who have produced valuable foreign intelligence.

In the soviet-bloc field, of course, our live informant development

has been ained essentially at internal security and counterintelli-

gence needs of the Bureau.

66 m

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It is significant that we have been ablo to operato for

many years in the development of live sources in foreign diplomatic

estanishments, both sovict bloc and non-bloc, without encountering

any serious incidents embarrassing to the FBI or the United States

Government.

In assessing tho produci of such liva sources in a numbor

of instances in no non-sor..et ticla, state Department has

requested that

we restrict our efforts to Ancrican citizens To

a consiaciablo derico, this nas tinitod the elicctiveness of oux

progsam in the ton-soviet lield since U.S. employees of foreign

establishments will normally nor have access to top-grade data.

especially in the non-soviet bloc lield we are not tapping

full potential which exists for high-levol foreign intelligence.

This can only be realized through the developnent of high quality

sources.

4.

This material, which is a peculiarly sensitive foreign

intelligence

to be arranged by the

operatidcounsel to the president)

will be covered in a briefing

5.

Double Agents and Informants

..

In a number of instances,

Bureau double agents and informants,

developed to assist us in connection with our internal security and

counterintelligence responsibilities, have been able to provide

significant high-level information of foreign intelligence value.

For example, in the soviet field, we have developed a

number of top-level sources such as

who have

provided current intelligence regarding the organizational structure,

personnel, and operations of the KGB and GRU, both in the Soviet

Union and

abroad; a description oî various technical equipment used

by Soviet intelligence; data regarding current relations between

the

Soviet Union and Conmunist China; and data regarding Soviet foreign

policy, political and military developments, eic.

Similar informa-

tion of ioreign intelligence value has been developed through rBi

informants, double agents and defectors-in-place oporating against

-67 -

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out Siste states one oathe conset occasions,

countries.

FBI informants have been able to develop high-level or current

both in the U.S. and abroad.

Through our coverage of the Communist Party, USA, and

• related organizations we have also frequently produced foreign

intelligenco, ulthough to a lossca exicnt than in our operations in.

the foreign nationality field.

One of our bost sources of foreign

intelligence in

the domestic area is our so-called

wherein we have informants acting in a

capacity between the

Communist Party, USA, and LOreIgn ConmuniSt grOUpS, Including Enc

We have doveloned information

through this operation regarding the Sino-soviet dispute,

social

and political conditions in various coutries, both in and outside

the soviet bloc, and tactics of the laternational communist movement.

6. Additional Potential

the Bureau is

through covert moans, much of it of a significant nature. lost of

Ins anta as an ouigiorin vi infurmanis, iccliiai curorago and

Investigative prograns targeted primarily to fullill our internal

security and counterintelligence objectives and relatively speaking,

we have committed only a small percentage ol our assets exclusivoly

in the direction of loreign intelligence.

It is believed that the Bureau possesses considerable

potential for the development of foreign intelligence which coula

be realized with a fairly modost ependiture of manpower and costs

if we vere to make foreign intelligence collection a primary aim.

For example, with existing equipment and facilities, we could

expand our technical coverage oi foreign establishments to includo

additional 30 to 40 foreign establishments provided ve could assigo

about 25 additional personnel to this field. Yich the assignnent

of an additional 75 to 100 Agonis, ve could greatly intensify our

foreign intelligence collection through live informants, primarily

through the development and exploitation of additional sources at

•foreign diplomatic establishments.:Ne.could place more stress on.

foreign intelligence collection in our training programs and

conferences to make nore cifoctive use o1 our already availablo ass

We could, for example, add specialized classes on foreign intellig

collection to our In-Service schedules or designate selected Burea-

personnel to attend training sessions operated by other U.S. agenc

regarding this subject.

- 68 -

*identifles a peculiarly sensitive foreign

counterintelligence operation.

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 240

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G. AREAS OF CONTLICT, FBI - CIA

.

Any differences betwean FBI and CIA are first

related to a basic problem exisling in any country among

the major powers,

namely. "How does & law enforcement

agency coordinate its internal security functions with an

intelligence organization which must operate as a clandestine

The very nature of thin functions of the two

organizations immediately introducos potential areas af

conflict. One essentially opciales overtly and the other

covertly.

This alone is enough to create an atmosphere.

Because each

differ, there naturally will ba conflicting approaches to

national security objectives. Hor example, in the field

of intelligence the Bureau is basically

a counterintelligence

CIA, to the contrary, has a much broader responsibility

in intelligence, which includes collection of foreign

intelligence, political and psychological warfare, inter-

agency coordinating, evaluation, research, etc. Counter-

intelligence within CIA is actually a relatively small

component of the agency.

Personnel in the two organizations

is rectuited indei different crlierza and standards.

Training is likewise at variance, In a final analysis,

the experienced IBI Agent and the seasoned CIA intelligence

officer are not of the same mold but certainly are tailored

We

should bear in mind that little lins been done to introduce

truLy substante Cross lertIliation of outlook, approach

and operational philosophy petwarn the two agencies.

12.13

could be advocated irom a Utopian point of view, but it

•also could be argued that there are distinct advantages to

maintaining sound compartmentatlon.

separate from the above basic and fundamental

situation, the dilierences between FBI and CIA also relate

to other factors such as:

1) FBI was first on the scene and was well

established long belore CIA came to life.

This led to a

conception in the early years that CIA was an intruder.

2) The seed oi CIA lan the Office oi Strategic

Services (OSS), an organization whose personnel, activities

and tree-wheeling were the sources of numerous

cOnfliCtS

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## Page 242

with the Bureau during World War II. It was during

these years that an atmosphere of mistrust and lack of

confidence was created.

CIA was established as our first over-all,

worldwide intelligence agency. The events and che

maneuvering which led to this certainly did not bring

with them a harmonious relationship.

4) Uniortunately, CIA grew big and grew fast,

particularly because of an unsettled atomic world and

developments such as the Korean War. The Agency did not

jell effectively as an organization, and with this came

numerous diîliculties, many of which exist to this day.

5) Each organization has lacked adequate

knowledge of the other's operational machinery, objectives,

and "ways and means of doing things."

6) An element of rivalry actually developed over

the years, and this, when not tempered with prudence and

sound judgment, creates unhealthy situations.

7) A growing tendency on the part of cIA to

expand its operational activities not originally contemplated

•in the formation of that agency.

It can be recognized that with this background it

has not been an easy matter to establish a good working

relationship with CIA vithout frequent conflicts, and

sometimes agonizing negotiations.

It could be suggested

that the ideal situation would be to remove Cla fron the •

U.S. with the understanding that we would assume respon-

sibility for any and all activity in the intelligence field.

As described in snothes section of this report, such a

move would be highly infeasible for the Bureau.

It is to our credit that despite the problems of

the past there have been some highly constructive develop-

ments in FBI-CIA-relations, particularly as they aifect

activities in the U. S.

Several years ago arrangements

were made whereby CIA's Office of Security could conduct

applicant investigations without infringing upon our juris-

diction.

For several years we have been permitting CIA to

interview aliens for foreign intelligence intormation under

ground rules which have been very successful. our

Liaison

'' 70.∞

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## Page 243

mechanism has been functioning effectively. He have

Irequent conierences.

Bureau personnel lectures before

CIA OiLiCErS.

Dissemination oi intormation is excellent.

The atmosphere for negotiating and discussing unusually

complicatod probions is vory good.

Persondol can work in

the same area with a minimum of problens, as evidenced in

the Dominican Republic. We attend USIB meetings and are

activoly engaged in tho work of soveral committees attached

to USIB.

All of this is commendable progress and certainly

benericial to national security.

All of the foregoing was set lorth in the way of

background in order to better understand the current source

of differences with CIA,

namely the Agency's desire to assess

and recruit foreign intelligence sources in the U.S. in the

foreign diplomatic establishments, including United Nations,

and to some extent among foxeign visitors.

CIA fully

acknowledges our internal security and counterintelligence

responsibilities. This is clear-cut and iree of any

debatable question; nowever, chA teeis that we have nor

legally-established responsibility in loreign intelligence

collection and that somebody (in this case, CIA) should

be fully exploiting the foreign intelligence potential in

the United States,

bearing in mind that there are approxi-

mately 10,000 foreign officials and employees in this country

Cia argues that a foreign diplomat can be recruited anywhere

in the world but maintains that there is no better place

than the United States for assessment, recruitment, training

and orientation of an informant.

lurther maintains that

if the Agency moves on a target, such as an Argentine

diplomat who may be a career officer not connected with a

foreign intelligence service, there should not be any con-

flict because the activity is in no way related to the

internal security junctions of the Bureau.

CIA has also

expressed the attitude that in the communist-bloc rield

CIA should be permitted to assess and recruit those

individuals not connected with an intelligence or internal

security service.

There are some people in CIA who are of the

opinion that in the field of loreign intelligence the Bureau.

should be exerting more efiort to actually assist CIA in

spotting sources and, when needed, give ClA support in

developing an individual through such means as surveillances,

neighborhood investigations, otc.. When CIA is permittaa to

i..:

• 71 -

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## Page 244

recruit a source in the U.S., the Agency takes the

position that il the source can be oi help to the Bureau

we should levy requirements on CIA and not ask for access

to the source unless it clearly appears that only through

accoss wo can properly dischargo our cosponsibilitloa.

CIA takes a very strong view that once a source is

developed it is basically unsound to introduce another

agency into the colationship.

The developing agoncy

may have used techniques peculiar to its own organization

and may have developed a relationship under varied cir-

cumstances, and then a new agency is introduced this

relationship with the source could be unlavorably disturbed.

CIA does not dispute the fact that intormant and Agent

turnovers sometines are absolutely necessary.

CIA maintains that ii the Bureau is given access

to a CIA source we would be responsible for the counter-

intelligence aspects,

but it the source produces foreign

Intelligence CIA should be responsible for handling this

Information, including the dissemination. CIA's position

is that it 1s better qualified to evaluate the information

and correlate it with the foreign intelligence being

developed abroad. For example, il a NigArian source or CIA:

also available to the Bureau, furnishes infornation regarding

the Nigerian Foreign Office,

CIA claims that it can better

handle the report and dissemination.

Discussions and agreements with CIA, including

the actions stemming from meetings with the representatives

of thai agency in November 1965, have resulted in a greatly

improved coordinating nachinery.

There still are areas of

potential conflict which will necessitate improvement.

They are:

1) DOD personnel receives leads or tips pertaining •

This CIA

position that such individuals contacted by CIA are their

"CIA-controlled sources."

If we permitted this to go on

over a period of time, CiA would have a vast network of

sources not directly available to the Bureau.

This is

basically unsound, and there is no reason CIA shouldn't

immediately give us the lead or tip for exploitation.

cantecogne and a concrete ta

might be lavorable to

us and cis ior the agency to bandle

a particular individual, and 11 so, it would be clearly

• 72 .

NW 88608 .Docld:32989629 Page 244

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## Page 245

coordinated. This would be most important it the

i

individual in any way was connected with or associated

with an intelligence service.

2) DOD is anzious

to have freedom to assess

and recruit Bloc diplomats noü known to be engaged in

InteLLIgEnCe actIvity.

On the surlace, this does not

appoar to present a problem, but realistically speaking

it is impossible for us to know that a soviet diplomat,

not known to be engaged in intelligence activity one

day, appears on the scene the following week as an agent

or coopted agent.

To give CIA wide latitude in this field

could create a truly undesirable mess.

We believe that

11 CIA is permitted to move on such targets it should be

done on a selective basis and with maximum coordination.

3) CIA's organizational and operational

deficiencies, such as lack of discipline, poor internal

coordination, unsatisfactory records, all introduce head.

aches which undoubtedly will continue to exist for many

years.

4)

There continues to be an element of mistrust

and misunderstanding between the two organizations because

of the historical reasons described above..

5) Continuing lack of one agency's appreciation

•for the other's objectives, responsibilities and operational

philosophy.

6) The absence of a clearly delined Bureau policy

and objectives in the lield of foreign intelligence collec-

tiOn.

CIA really does not know the nature and the extent

of our interests, and consequently this lends to confusion

and misunderstanding.

....ig 33.

petter. trades out coul

-73 -

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H. CURRENT AGREEMENTS BETWEEN FBI AND CIA

1. ACCording to SAC Letter 59 dated 5/24/49, ClA and 1B1

nad reached arrecmont wheresy clearance would bereduested or is

bolore CIA conducted an intorviov with an alion in the U.S.

TALE

cloarance would consist of a review of Bureau Liles concerning

individual in question.

According to same SAC letter, agreement had been reached

by the IBI and CIA whereby CIA vas allowed to contact American

businessmen without obtaining clearance iron fBI in oxder to

obtain positive loreign intelligence information and arrange covers

• IoI CIA personnel abroad.

This agreement was based strictly on

collection of foreign intelligence and positively did not allow jor

the formulation of a network of confidential informants for CIA

in the U.s.

Regarding FBI-CIA agreement that CIA would clear with us

prior to interviewing aliens in U.S., following documentation has

been located.

By letter 2/19/48 Directos Of CIA Hillenkoetter

wrote Director and reierred to National Security Council Intelli-

gence Directive No. 1, 2/12/48.

This Directive states in part that

CiA ViJI DE CeSpOnSiDiE IOI EutatiOn On highty SCLECtIVE basiS

within U.S. Of business concerns, other nongovernmental organiza

tions and individuals as sources

of foreign intelligence information.

Hillenkoetter commented that CiA had been interviewing loreign

susinessmen, immigrants and rerugees on small scale, always clearing

natter first with FBI oifice in area concerned.

He

asked Director's

views as to possible expansion of this activity.

By letter 2/26/48 Director replied to Hillenkoetter.

In

part, this letter pointed out BI nad no ObJectIon to cIA Inter-

viewing individuals enumerated above for oreign intelligence

purposes; however, it was suggested that prior to interview such

individual matters be cleared with FBI Headquarters.

2. Bureau letter to CIA 1/16/64 confirmed results of meetings

between CIA and Bureau via liaison in discussing reorganization of

CIA'S Domestic Operations Division (DOD). Letter recognized CIA

needs (recruitment of sources in U.S. who may-be used abroad;

"..

recruitment of diplomats, including UN representatives, who might be

useful to CIA in overseas operations or who might be transferred to

Soviet-bloc countries; training of agents recruited; handling of

agents developed abroad who come to U.S. for a visit or assignment;

and approaches to foreign officials and visitors to

assess. their.

set forth

CIA's operations in order to avoid operational conflicis and

embarzassment:

NW 88608 Dold: 32989629 Page 246

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## Page 247

CIA would not conduct investigation of any foreigu

official in U.S, and i1 CIA felt such investigation warranted, FBI

should be consulted.

b. No loreign official would be approached for recruit-

ment by CIA without its conferring with IBI.

C.

When CIA agent arrives in U.S. for visit or assign-

has its individual peculiarities.

handling of agent in this country, it being rocognized

FBI will be advised and two agencies will conter regarding

each case

d.

Before approaching any foreign official or visitor

recruitment assessment, CIA will clear with IBI.

10r

3.

As result of conference with CIA in January, 1966, the

above "ground rules" were modified and expanded and

agreed upon by

both agencies early this year (Confirmed by letter to Admiral

Raborn 2/7/66). New ground rules in summary are as follows:

CIA will not initiate investigation of any foreign

official in U.S.. without concurrence of FBI. (Comment: This is

essentzally same as (a) In January, 1901, ground rules. only

difference is that wording of this

modification implies moxe

sympathetic IBI attitude towards any proposed lia investigations.)

D.

CIA will seek IBI concurrence before approaching for

recruitment any foreign official or communist bloc visitor in Us.

FBI will concur ii CIA action does not conflict with any BI

operations. (Comment: This is similar to (b) and (c) ground rules

adopted in

January, 1964, with two differences. First, it drops

requirement that CIA clear with us before approaching a non-Soviet

visitor although it must still do so with regard to non-soviet

officials.

Secondly, it specifically commits the FBI to concur 1f

propOSed CIA aCtIOn

does not conflict with FBI operations.)

c. CIA will advise FBI prior to meetings between CIA

assets and foreign officials or communist bloc visitors of interest

to FBI.

(Comment:' This was not included in previous set of

ground rules.

..'''¡d'" Agents of CIA: who come to U.S. will be identified to •

FBI by name or appropriate description depending on national security

interest involved.

e.

When CIA agent arrives in U.S. for a visit or assign-

ment, fBI will be advised and two agencies will conier regaraing

handling agent in u.s. It is recogized each

case will have

:::.

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## Page 248

individual peculiarities

and governing principle vill be positive

intelligence weighed against internal security factors. CIA may,

however, continue its contraciual relationship for purpose of handling

training, procurement of positive foreign intelligence, (under~

lining added) iuliillment of CiA comnitments to the agent and

preparation for next assignment abroad.

I. Where CIA will be handling its agent in U.S., CIA

will service FBI security or counterintelligence requirements and

vill provido IBI all information bearing on counterintelligence or

internal security matters. Where CIA servicing is inadequate fox

IBI internal security interests,

FBI will have direct access to

agent.

(Comment:

RuLes (a),

(e) and (I) represent greatly expanded

and refined version of rule (c) of January, 1964, agreement. Old

ground rules provided considesable latitude with regard to who

would handle CIA source in the U.S. and this has led to some

disagreements with CIA. The current ground rules clearly provide

Ior CIA to retain contact with its agents not only for training,

Iinancing,. etc., but also for "procurement of positive foreign

intelligence."

In addition,

they make it clear that the fBI should

not ask for direct access unless

there. is a specific internal

security need.)

In addition to the above, there is one agreement we have

reached with CIA which is of possible relevance; namely, our recent

agreement relative to treatment of Soviet students in the U.S.

By way of background, there are a number of Soviet exchange

students

currently attending various U.S. universities. Each student, of

course,

is not only a possible Soviet intelligence agent but

also

a potential source for the U.S: aiter he returns to his homeland.

Accordingly, both IBI and CIA have an interest in these students.

Per memo dated 1/14/64 we advised CIA via liaison on 1/20/64

that the Bureau would adopt following procedure relative to Soviet

students here.

FBI will take responsibility for collecting material

regarding each student on expedite basis, furnishing results to

as developed. At logical point FBI will confer with CIA to

decide on case-by-case basis re possible recruitment.

II Bureau

recruits Soviet student, wi will resolve whether we should turn

him over to CIA before he leaves U.S.

Under this procedure, _ CIA

will not make any. inquiries (through its sources in U.S.) unless

-it has some unusual source in a university not available to FBI

who could furnish data on the student.

In latter case, we would

a1I07

CIA

obtain data

and advise us.

...

"•:

The foregoing represent all of the major agreements we

have reached to date with CIA with respect to CiA operations here

- 76

NW 88608 Decld:32989629 Page 248

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I:

EFFECT ON THE FBI OF FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR COLLECTION

OF FOREIGN INTELLICENCE IN THE UNITED STATES

1. Overt Collection Activities

It is evident from the National Security Act of

1947 and the succeeding National Security Council Intelligonce

Directives as well as the directives of the Director of

Central Intelligence thai Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

is charged with major responsibilities in the overt collection

of foreign intelligence in the United States.

In pursuit of

this, CIA exploits non-governmental organizations and

individuals, foreign language publications and aliens. Although

CIA claims to have contacts with about 7, 200 organizations

and businesses as well as about 60,000 sources of information

as a result of its overt activities for this purpose, ClA

estimates it is reaching only 15 per cent of the foreign

intelligence information available in this country.

The question we must consider here is whether the

FBI should take over the overt collection of loreign intelligence

In the United states, ineredy maising CIA opcrational

only in

areas outside the limits of FBI's jurisdiction.

In this

connection, the following would have to be considered:

(a) Reporting:

The Bureau is a fact-finding agency which has

traditionally gathered evidence and presented its findings

without bias or conclusions.

This would not change.

Intelligence developed by the FBI would be evaluated by the

users in the intelligence community.

Our report writing

format might have to be geared to the needs and established

procedures of the United States intelligence community.

•(b) Coordination With Other Government Agencies:

Foreign intelligence is a commodity produced

fOr

the benefit of many. separate agencies.of the United: States...:

Government

Because of this, if the Bureau were to have

full responsibility for

expand our liaison services, not only for dissemination

purposes but to assure that ve are kept fully informed

resarding a11 matters dealing

Math intelligence priorities:

- 77-

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## Page 250

Our role in preparation o1 National Intelligence Estimates

would be more active

as a result of our increased contribution

under this program.

It might be necessary to utilize the

assistance of highly trained

personnel of othor agoncios to

assist us poriodically on iniciviews dealing with complicatod

milItary or scientific matters.

While no manpower requirements can be presently

estimated should we assume full responsibility for overt

foreign intelligence collection, CIA is currently using

employees throughout the United States to

interview individuals in connection with its overt intelligence

gathering activities, and is reaching what it estimates to be

These

available foreign intelligence information.

CIA employees do not include personnel required at

CIA Headquarters to correlate, evaluate and disseninate the

data gathered in the rield.

We would want to more eifectively

exploit this intelligence

potential.

To merely handle the necessary review of the vast

• number of toreign language publications

would require many

aditIonal employees proficient in foreiyn languages anc

with

backgrounds in scientific or technical fields.

(d) Selection and Training of Personnel:

To assume full responsibility for the overi

collection of foreign intelligence in this country, would

require that we vastly broaden our selection and training

procedures.

We would require applicants wich degrees in

the sciences, languages, history, goveriment and economics.

Our basic training and In-Service agenda would have to be

geared to meet our new responsibilities. We would undoubtedly

desire to utilize the services of outstanding lecturers irom

the agencies constituting our intelligence community, and in

turn, we would wish to afford our personnel training at the

War Colleges operated by the Department oi Dejense,

and from

time to time

zurnish them the opportunity of specialized

training and briefings provided by the members of the U. S.

Intelligence Board.

• 78 a

NVC68608 Docld:32989629 Page 250

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## Page 251

(e) Legislation:

CIA currently has the duty to correlate and evaluate

intelligence rolating to the national security and to provido

for appropriate dissemination

Government.

of legislation bui rather of National Security Council Intolligence

Directives which would have to be revised in order to give the

Bureau this authority now lodged with CIA.

(I) Organizational Changes:

To carry out a program committing the Bureau to

the full responsibility for the overt collecting of foreign

intelligence in this country would necessitate a substantial

increase to the headquarters staifs of the Domestic Intelli

gence Division and the Laboratory Divison, as well to the.

personnel assigned to the New York and Washingion Field Offices

where diplomatic establishmenis and international organizations

are mainly located.

In all probability the creation or a new

division at the Seat of Goveriment devoted entiroly to overt

collection responsibilities, would be required.

(g) Observations:

The many responsibilities that would be ours under

a program making the Bureau accountable for the overt collection

of all foreign intelligence in this country would (1) require

an enormous increase in our own personnel, trained in many

specialized fields, or (2) the delegation of varied intelligence

functions to other

governmental agencies and close supervision

of such agencies to insure efficient execution of the tasks

levied upon them. These overt collection responsibilities

would undoubtedly be subject to the scrutiny of many sources,

some of them hostile, and ve would have to face the charges,

unjust though they night be, that the Bureau had ceased to

..perform the duties of which it was originally created and

had developed into

a gigantic bureaucratic octopus.

2.

Clandestine Gathering Acti ities

There are no statutory provisions for the clandestine

gathering o1 foreign intelligence in the United States.

We :

häve in the past produced substantial. foreign intelligence.

while carrying out our present responsibilities.

CiA established is Donestic Operations Division (DOD)

in 1963 and began to clandestinely gather loreign intolligence

in this country. It now has

rield oilicos with approximatoly

- 79 =

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 251.

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## Page 252

intelligence officers assigned to these matters. It is

antiapated that DOD's ellorts will become more extensive.

CIA estimatos thero aro approximatoly 10, 000 employeas

and dependenis assigned to the diplomatic establishments and

international organizations

apposinately 120 foreten atioreeated in this country by

It can roadily bo soon that

wo would havo to establich prioricles and well-delined objectives

in order. to cope errectively vich

the problem presented by the

vast number of persons and establishnents which could be

considered for clandestine coverage.

Today there are approximately 40 nations in addition

to the soviet-bloc countries, whose establishments in this

country ve consider "target"

countries for the purpose of

developing live sources therein.

in the absence of more

precise criteria, our initial eiforts in a progran designed

to expand our clandestine gathering oi foreign intelligence,

could be directed against these "target" nations.

(a) Objectives:

• Under a program confined to the clandestine gathering

of foreign intelligence in this country, and consistent with

the intelligence needs of this Government, we would have as

our objectives:

(1) Increasing substantially the number of live

sources of high quality in diplomatic establishments,

cade missions, consulai oilices or internationa.

rganizations located within the United States

(2) Expanding our present technical and microphone

coverage in such establishments.

(Ihis material, which is a peculiarly sensitive foreign

intelligence operation,

will be covered in a briefing

to be arranged by the counsel to the president.

.:..

r.s3.

-80 =

NW 88608 Docld:32989629" Page 252

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(b) Observations:

While a program limited to the clandestine gathering

of foroign intelligonco would roquiro a substantial increase

in manpower, both in the field

and at the Bureau's headquarters,

as well as

an expansion o. our personnel selection and training

procedures, our liaison responsibilities and our tiling and

data processing lachlities,

however; in none of these phases

would

the increase be nearly as creat as that which would be

required should we assume full responsibility ior the overt

gathering of such foreign intelligence.

-

81

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## Page 254

GENTRAL FINDINGS

The study conducted by the Committee has

produced the following signilicant findings:

(1) There dofinitely is a vast

tor collection of lorein intellence in the U.a?

available through overt and clandestine channols.

Even with the available capabilities of existing

agencies, there is a large reservoir of untapped

sources.

(2) CIA has been authorized by statute

and implementing directives to collect foreign

intelligence in the U.S. through overt methods and

has been involved in such collection since the

This includes review

of foreign language press and interviews vich

seLected individuais such as American businessmen,

aliens, and students.

In aGGIciOn, CIA has established

an elaborate systen of processing,

storing, evaluating,

and disseminating this information.

(3)

such overt collection by CIA does not

present any threat or infringenent on FBi jurisdiction

of operations.

The orpsent bureau controls 1or such

CIA activity are satisiactory.

(A) We concluded that it would be highly

undesicable for the Bureau to become responsible ox

overt collection of loreign intelligence in the U.s.

The necessary reorganization, expansion of facilities

and manpower, and heavy task

of information collection

and processing could place a damaging burden on the

Bureau.

(5) There has never been any statutory of

similar provision for the clandestine development by

CIA of foreign intelligence in the United States.

There are instances where the FBi has received specifiC..

which encompassed foreign intelligence

asi techion in the united states (15 overations coverin

entire Western Henisphere in Worlä War iI; present

operations concerning Dominican Republic). There is

no statute or directive which assigns or confirms

exclusive FBI jurisdiction

a a clanceste deve.

clandestine development

- 82-

NW. 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 254

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## Page 255

• ..

..::

of foreign intelligence in the United States. As a

result of our internal security and counterintelligence

responsibilities, we have produced a volume of foreign

intelligence covercly.

In addition, either at tho

specilic request of other U.S. agencios or on our

own initiative in resyonse to national intelligence

needs, we have produced such intelligence.

We have

dono this on a soicctivo basis and have not assumod

full responsibility in this area.

As indicative of

this, certain

agreements have been made with CIA

peimitting that Agency to assess and recruit after

coordination with the IBi coveri loreign intelligence

sources in the United States (principally lor use

abroad. We have reserved the right to take over

such sources il internal security lactors are paramount.

In the absence ot such faciors, Cis Is permitted to

utilize these sources ior loreign intelligence purposes.

We concluded that the expanded development

of clandestine foreign intelligence sources is essential

il national security interests are to be elfectively

served.

(7) Exploitation o1 foreiga diplomatic targeta

Iortifies our eilorts in the internal security and

counterintelligence fields. Information developed

increases

over-all knowledge and produces leads or ties

to incelligence activity being carried out by foreign

intelligence and security services.

• (8) The U. S. intelligence community currently

does not provide an organization or a mechanism which can

electively exploit the intelligence potential in the foreigu

There have been expressions of concern

and certain limited action taken by IBI and CIA, but there

has not been a well-organized or united effort and most

important of all, there has been a decided lack of leader-

ship directed toward attacking the problem and at the

same time inducing an atmosphere of harmonious application

of all available resources.

•leoni Paisina

(9)Ne concluded there is an excellent

opportunity to the Bureau to assume leadership in this

matter and in so doing, enhance national security and

- 83 -

NW-88608-Doeld:32989629_Page 255

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## Page 256

the capabilities on tir Burch. The time has arrived

for us to adopt and inntomant i new concept toward

foreign intelligenco corteston.

it would be unwise

if the: Bureau did us nove

¿ato a leading role ad

instead appliod porday nd tactics conforming with

a "bolding action."

Thing

an chis opinion, 1s not

consistent with the reputation or a progressivo and

orward Looking arct 04zots

the Darcar duri have talent and

capability to

assumo a normierive role in clandestine

colloation ot toreiga: inichligence.

We have the

potential to handle clandestino colloction of foreign

intelligence in the U.S. in i more effective manner

than any other agency

This can be done in

a constructive

and prudent mannet

(1)

It is recognized that a new approach by

the Bureau will

involve operational risks." if one is

to protess, de must take asia.

We feel that we have

the capabialty to succeod wish & mininum of losses

108

debits.

(12) We teel. that 1d ve do not adopt a new

role characterized with an aggressive approach, a door

is left, open for other sencies such'as CIA to

progressively: introduce prosais designed to fill

the

CIA currency does not. have the capability

to inject a rapid, "taservert ni operational areas:

do feel that such would be accelerated not by CIA's

strength, but by our weaknesses,

(13).

CIA is progressively expanding its

objectives and capasilitios to conduct clandestine

intelligence operaticas sn the U. S..

This presents

a potential for areas o1 conflict between CIA and FBI.

(14)

Te definitoly nust define our role in

the field' of clandestine Loreign intelligence collection

molicy and objectives are clear-cut.. Not only

Out 0113

sonnot bug other agencies including CIA should

know eru

My where va

atand.

(15)

Cia cas be pounitted to develop

clandestard sources pf foreigu intelligence under the

•8%

"NW 88608" Docld:32989629

Page 256

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established ground rules which do protect Bureau

interests.

A ney approach being recommended would

heavily deter CIA from extensive development of

clandestine sources and vould reaily loave the

• Agoncy in a mizor or subordinate s01e.

...:

• ...

85

NW-88008-Docld:32989629 Page 257

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## Page 258

k.

RECOMMENDED PLAN OF ACTION

A penetrative and objective study of the

Bureau's position has led us to cónclude that the Bureau

should play a much more active and intluontial ole in

the clandestine collection oi positive intelligence in the

United States.

We are recommending the implementation of

a plan which will lead to a vnluablo contribution co our

national security efiort and concurrently will improve our

internal security capabilities. This plan presents a

concept o1 an iBL as an igency primarily responsible for

internal security, but supplementing its coverage with a

substantially expanded capability in the clandestine collec-

tion oi positive intelligence. We believe that we have the

capability of developing this new look knowing that at the

same time we can institute a badly needed leadership to

clininate a gap in the acquirement of high-quality intelli-

gence in the United States. The main leatures of this plan

1) Establishment of a list of loreign diplomatic

targets consistent with the needs of the Government.

2) Expansion of our technical surveillance

capabilities with emphasis on misurs.

3) Expansion of live sources characterized with

selectivity and high-quality value.

4) The FBI assuming a role of leadership in the

clandestine exploita' ion of positive intelligence in the

U.s.?

and in so doing making

maximun use of the talent and

capabilities or other appropriate U. S. Agencies.

Authorization

The plan sould be implemented under proper executive

authorization (Presidential) and furthermore would be coordi

nated with the United States Intelligence Board (USIB). A

_letter from the President authorizing the Bureau to expand

its capabilities in clandestine positive intelligence collec

tion, consistent with the needs of the government, would

suflice.

in order to avoid any misunderstanding or confusion

within the intelligence community; USIB would be apprised of

the Presidential authorization. The letter Iron the President

would not require any details regarding the nature and the

scope of the action to be taken by the Bureau but could be

- 86 =

—NW-88608-Docld:32989629~Page 258

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## Page 259

expressed in general torms. This same authorization could.

be rurther defined by the Presidont's Foreign Intelligenco

AdviSOry BORid.

It is realized that lt would be recossary to

discuss this

plen vith the president so that he lully under-

sood the purpose, scope and the controlling leatures.

aIs approval,

plan could also be discussed with tho

TOTEÏEN INTOILIZOnCE AdViSOr BOard.

Selection of Targets

Priority on targets can be established by appil-

•cation of the following criteria:

I) Review oi requests or requirements levied on

us by the President and U. S. Intelligence Agencies.

2) Review of priority listed by the USIB. (This

1s done on a cegular basis.)

5j Qui ova analysis and evaluation ne international

political developments.

This primarily will be done at sch,

but we should be so orgarized that the field would be iree

to subnie recommendations.

As of March, 1966, the following could be set

forth as a tentative list of priority targots in the United

States:

1) USSR

a. Indications of significant changes in

Soviet policies, particularly vith respect to relations

with the fest and with Communist China.

Background information illuminating the

decisions of the 23rd Pariy Congress, especially IndiCatIonS

of policy disputes of politicaL LivaLTies; repercussions

other Conmunist parties.

c.

Developnents 12 Soviet space prograws In

the wake of luna 9.

2)

Viernan Laos cambodis

a.

Chinese Communist,

Soviet and North Viet

sanese cupabilities, latentions, and

actions with respect to

Vietnam/haos and to Us activities in the area.

- 87∞

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 259

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## Page 260

b. Indications oi Soviet deploymeni of surlace-to-

suriace missiles to North Vietnan.

• C.

Changes in the attitudes and policies of intluential

South Vietnamese,

especially Buddhist loadors, toward the

Wai oLioIt or tho Us.

d.

Indications of à major change in Viot Cong/PAVN

and Pathot la0 military capabilitios und tactics.

Intornation pertaining to the locatlon, size, and

types 01 Chinese troop units in Indochina.

Evidence of Viet Cong/PAVN/Chinese Communist use o1

Cambodia as a sanctuary, operating base, or source of supply;

Cambodian Government attitudes toward such uses.

3) Communist China

2.

MIlitary, logistic, transportation, and economic

information bearing on Connunist China's capability to light

a var in Southeasi Asia and indications of Chinese intentions

-capooting dircet involvement in this aren.

b. Movements of Chinese submarines ouc of their normal

bases or operating areas, particularly toward the south China

Sea and the Culi of Tonkin.

c.

increased air defense capability, parcicularly

production and deployaent of advanced iighter/ interceptor

a. Milltary activities in other border areas.

4)

Irance

French ioreign policy, especially concerning NATO,

the Ussa, the war in Vietnam/Laos and estrangement or con-

petition

with the US.

5) The Dominican Republic

2..

the contending parties and factions; their capabilities

and intentions to conduct coups or insurrectionist activities;

their attitudes toward the june elections; capabilitles. of

the Provisional Government to maintain control.

- 88

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## Page 261

6) India-Pakistan

z.,

Developments in Indo-Pakistani relations and

attitudes toward the US, the USSr and Communist China.

• 7) Latin America

a. Evidenco of incroased ontornal Communist assistasco

to Insurgency movements in latin Anerica in the wake or

the January conierences in Havana.

8) Indonesia and Malaysia/ Singapore

2.

Political ains of the Indonesian military; Susarno's

health and political intentions and capabilities; moves to

rebuild a Communist party.

b. Indonesian intentions to continue or reduce the

conflict with malaysia.

C.

Changes in Soviet or Chinese policy coward Indonesia

resulting iron the current internal conilict.

9) Thailand and Burma

''!

a. Communist subversive activity and external support;

government capabilities to oppose subversion.

10) Africa

African and Conmunist support to Southern Rhodesian

black nationalists; nationalist capabilities to act against

the snith regine; white opposition to the Smith regime;

South Airican and Portuguese

assistance to the smith regime.

b. Erfect of recent coups on the stability of other

African states.

11) Yemen

a.

Evidence of intentions and actions of the UAR and

Saudi arabia with respect to the Yemeni situation.

• 89

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## Page 262

Technical Surveillance of Targets

Coverage in this rield will be divided into the

rolloving categories:

1)

2)

3)

Technical Surveillances

Microphone surveillances

Hore sophisticated electronic monitoring,

¿.e. codo machinos.

At the present time we are handling a very limited

number of installations.

With existing capabilities, we

could virtually double our present technical coverage.

Once we have established reasonable priority listing,

it

is believed we should systematically expand our operations.

In this connection, the following should be borne in mind:

1) Heavy emphasis should be placed on microphone

surveillances.

2) Today we are placing greater stress on

coverage of oiricial establishments.

The new program asks

for an expansion of coverage on individuals and/or residences

of individuals.

fere again selectivity vill be a dominating

characteristic.

3) The program should be so flexible that we

would be able to deactivate any installation ior security

reasons of for non-produciivity and whenever possible employ

techniques which would permit easy reactivation.

4) Except ior current intelligence requiring

immediate dissemination, the produci should be handled as

communications intelligence and dissenination would be

subjected to well-established Comint controls of the

National Security Agency (NsA) plus any additional restric-

¡tions the Bureau ¿eli should be imposed.

5) The product would be transmitted to NSA by us

ior dissemination within the intelligence community. NSA

would be responsible for handling any needed translation.

We must recognize that the program will produce voluminous

information and the responsibility for processing the data

should be fixed with an agency which is organized and

equipped to handle the job.

It is believed that if the

Bureau assuned this respons. ality me would be burdened with

a gigantic task of information processing to the point that

this element would adversely allect ocher phases of the

program.

- 90

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6)

Ii the information collected by us suggestea

a potential for the dovelopnent of an operation, i.o.

double agent, the Burezu could assume complete control

of this opcration including tho aissenination of tho

7)

Our involvenent in the "sophisticated"

calogory should bo increasod by expanded roscarch and

developioni boaring in nina we should be utilizing the

mosi productive equipmezi arzilable.

The inportanco or

this field canao bo exaggerated in light of the rapid

developnents in

the scientilic voria.

Technical Surveillance Controls

Under this plan ve could furnish the President

and the Attorney Genoral a listing of technical surveillunce.

targeis and do so on ¿ periodic basis.

This could even

include an annual evcluation of the progran.

(This material, which is à peculiarly sensitive foreign

intelligence operation,

will be covered in a

briefing to be

arranged by the Counsél to the president,

Live Sources

:.

The category of "live sources" when broadly inter-

proted includes every individual iron the casual contact

to the contsolled infornaut to is delivering high quality

information at an obvious risk.

At the present tine, cuI

sources in diplonatic asiablishuents are for the nost pari

Anérican citizens.

"This situation is largely due to 20

Iron the sinie Dapartmeni bofore ne prosecd to recruit any

employee o: officialr of a diplomatic establishnent:

This

placos state in the "ariver's send and that Departma sai

thereiozo, is piscuica"ly controlling oui didoris.

that such an errangement is certainly not coducive to

- 91 -

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•:

..

producing the best results. In our opinion this

can be

removed by the President's

advising the secretary of

State that the FBI is being authorized to develop

penetrations in foreign diplonatic establishmonts without

obtaining clearances Irom state.

I would be understood

that the Burezu would proceed in a discreet and secure

Periodic contact with the secretary of State ox

othor top state officials to discuss gonoral

dovolopmests

and any potertial problems will provido a mechanism {ox

healthy coordination with State.

We secognize that a

source can turn "sour and, therelore, there is the danger

o1 potential embarrassment. However,

it should be noted

that our record in this regard has been outstanding over

the years.

Any efficient investigative agency needs sources

of all categories and we are no exceptios.

Therefore, we

should continue our present program of general source

development, and this would include contacts who can

produce information on an occasional basis or who might

be in a position to be oi assistance in a particular

investigation.

In diplomatic establishments the reception

clert, chaulfeur, the maid, can always be oi assistance.

However, the primary emphasis of this new program

would be directed toward high quality sources, such as:

1)

Code clerks

2) Officials who have access to liles, records,

or communications

3) Oilicials or employees who are in a position

to penetrate communist-bloc circles or establishments

4) Members of foreign intelligence and security

services.

Our existing programs of seeking penetrations in

communist-bloc installations naturally must continue but

will require an increased eftori coward production oi

be done do celating to porsonality data, aad this saoula

a larger number 'öf Individual targets. "We

•realize thai Bloc personnel coes. Ilye 1n a LalIty Insulated

vorla, and elementary invosiizative techniques do not produce

voluminous and highly significant data.

It is therefore

believed that our techniques should become more süphisticated

through additional coverage on the residences of individuals

- 92 ∞

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Such efforts naturally fall in line with ous internal

security responsibilities, but the coverage may also

provide leads ior development of sources in the positive

intelligence lield. Evory Soviet is not a member of KGB

ot GRU, but ho novortholoss could ofles information oi

value, and he could be most useful on a long-range basis.

Our program very derinitely should have this philosophy

In mind, and it is an elchort which must bo inpressed

upon our personnel in our training programs.

In this

regard, we must recognize that at some point it may become

necessary to turn over recruited sources to another agency

such as CIA or one of the military services. Such turnoves

will, of course, depend on the circumstances. The guiding

principle should be the preservation of the source under

the best security.

In the non-communist bloc field we would con-

centrate on development of high-quality sources to meet the

priority needs of the Government.

Iraining Of Personnel

At the present time, our personnel are not properly.

oriented to electively engage in a program as recommended.

To accommodate to a new approach, it will be necessary to:

1) Include in our training classes lectures which

will cover a more detailed picture of U.s. intelligence, its

history, deiinition of terms, lunctions of intelligence

agencies.

2) Include lectures regarding the loreign intel

ligence needs of the U. S. Government.

3, Use outstanding officials of other agencies to

lecture on special intelligence matters. This would include

the critical areas throughout the world..

4) Disseminate a bulletin to the field on a

...

regular basis to emphasize foreign intelligence needs as

they relate to our capabilities.

5) Instisute a special In-Service class (once

of trice per year) which will concentrate on foreign

"Intelligence. This will be designed to develop the: leaders:

or the specialists in the field.

• 93 an

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6) Arrango for attendance of selected Bureau

personnel to schools of other agencies such as State

Depariment, CIA, and the military services.

7) Arrange for attendanco o1 solected porsonnel

at Was Colleges.

8) Expand the training or Agents in the handline

of technical curvaillance isstallations.

Reporting Procedures

This program will not require any basic departure

Irom our present reporting procedures.

The Bureau should

not become involved in evaluating, estinating, etc.

should endeavor to adhere to our

traditional position or

reporting the facts as collected.

We may wish to give

consideration to adding one leature to our regular reporting

on individuals. This could be an annex for "Personality

Data."

The objective vould be to maintain an up-to-date

book on everything collected relating to the subject's

character, habits, family lifA, interests, weaknesses, etc.

Language Capabilities

An expanded program for collection of loreign

intelligence would require increased capability to handle

loreign languages.

As explained above,

the material

collected through technical surveillances should be handled

as communications intelligence, and the major translating

responsibility would, therefore, be placed

1 On NSA.

We do, however, recognize that it is necessary to

maintain a strong foreign language capability in the field

wherever it may be useful to develop live sources.

offices such as New ork City and Washington, D. C., we

should expand the nunber of Agents who are fluent in French,

Russian, Polish, Czech, German, Chinese, and Spanisa.

office which is well equipped with a capability in the

foregoing is generally able to handle most situations which

• 94.

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Relations with Other Agencies

If this program is adopted, other intelligence

agencies would

be orricially apprisod of the Presidontial

authority granted to the IBI to collect foreign intelligence

in the United States. Other agencies would be informed

regarding tho naturo

and tho extont of the auchority boing

delegated to the Bureau.

It would be necossary to make

clear that the Bureau was not assuming responsibility or

the clandestine collection of all foreign intelligence in

the United states, but ve were taking a constructive step

in an effori to increase the production oi foreign intel-

ligence through assets available to us. We would clearly

point out that the IBI was not taking this approach as a

solution to all of the problems relating to foreiga intel-

ligence collection in this country.

We would emphasize

1o out have te understo

would be properly coordinated wherever it was obviously

nECeSSary.

With regard to the handling of the product of

technical surveillances,

it would be necessary to efiect a

working agreement with NSA.

To do this we might be obliged

¿o discuss this at the USiß level so that Nsa could obtain

the required authority to suppori the hiring of additional

personnel and purchase of equioment for the processing of

our product.

Our arrangement with NSA would include ground.

rules for processing, translation, and classification and

dissemination.

Since any announcement that we were in the loreign

intelligence field would prompt unusual interest and very

likely queries, ve should briel CIA regarding the objectives

of our progran.

Our plan vill not abrogate the existing

ground rules which permit CIA to assess and recruit positive

intelligence sources in this country under certain conditions.

Since both Agencies will have. foreign intelligence sources

in the ü.s., we undoubiedly will find it useful to work out

an agreement whoreby one Agency knows that the other has

coverage in a particular area or establishment.

We already

receive the identities of CIA sources.

it would not be

necessary lor us to identily our sources, but ve could.

..-indicato to CIA that me had an asset in a particular area

-NW 88608_Docld:32989629-Page 267

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## Page 268

This vould permit CIA to levy requirements on

For example, it we recruited the thira secretary

the French Embassy, ClA might wish to ask any number

of questions dealing with the french political situation.

Is we holi that the request was roasonable, we could

handle this through our source.

It will be noted that the program doos not

pICClude CIA Irom development of foreign intelligence

sources in the U. S. for fullillment of CIA responsibilitios.

CiA will continue to operate under existing ground rules

which are designed to protect Bureau interests.

We believe thai il the program is implemented

and jells we will be in a position to "spot" sources

required by CIA and other agencies to discharge their

responsibilities.

This would apply to cases where the

target was

in the U. S. for a visit or if he had some

specialized knowledge not related to our internal security

responsibilities.

These would be targets which other

agencies could handle without interfering with our operations

and without making us carry a load for another agency.

This particular concept should include a Bureau attitude

that any and every source handled by another agency in the

U. S. potentially ca be useful to us. We should have an

outlook that all sources should be exploited to the lullest

extent and under secure conditions.

If another agency has

a capability to open a door we should take advantage of the

situation.

In those instances where CIA has a source in the

United States, we should prod that agency to seek information

of interest to the Bureau, and where obviously necessary we •

should arrange access to the ciA source.

The important

leature of this new concept is that we assume the role of

projecting Initialve, leadership and aggressiveness. Our

osition should be such that we sush the other arencies to

use their resources even to the point of healthy irritation.

We have looked at CIA as the "other agency" in

this picture, but we should not neglect. the potential of

agencies such

• 2S ACSI, AIr FOrCe, ONl and state. AlL 01

chem have entree to diplomatic circles.

The day-to-day

contacts which officials of these agencies have with

personnel of foreign governments produce nany "pieces" of

personality data which, then added up over a period of time,

= 95 ∞

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NW• 88608 •Docld:32989629 Page 268

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...

...

san prove to bo extremely useîul. He should confor with

these agencies regarding vays and means of recruitino

sources either to be handled by us jointly or by one of

the intelligence agencies. Here again, the Bureau can

be tho dominant and pushing sourco.

It is believed that if we moved along the lines

described above, the Burcau, over a poriod of time, would

have collected valuable information regarding numerous

personalities and the inner workings of the many diplomacic

establishments.

The acquirement of data of this type

creates operational strength.

it places us in a position

to exploit the development of ner sources, bearing in mind

that in planning our approaches ve will be equipped with

ammunition not gained through casual surveillances and

observations.

With the knowledge that we gain, we can

plan high quality operations.

It is interesting to

that during the past ivo years the information recalvote

from CIA's sources in the United States has been fairly

volunicous and vezy definitely vâluable.

It is a good

illustration of the Bureau's gaining useiul data from

another agency with a minimum of Bureau expense and eliort,

but still

maintaining very effective contiol of our juris-

dictional rights.

Undoubtedly related to the utilization of other

agencies' resources is the considerably vast potential

offered by friendly foreign security services.

If the

services of Great Britain, Germany, france, holland, Italy,

Australza ana Canada provided us information collected in

Washingion, D. C. and New York resulting from contacis with

communist-bloc officials, we would have another valuable

source of information.

We should bear in mind that we do

spend hundreds and thousands of man-nours seeking such

information through other difficult channels.

We should utilize the friendly liaison services

along the lines described above.

Administrative Reorganization

!...

The present acministrative framenork at the Seat

oi Government and in the field would not be adequate to

implenent the recom ended program.

Placing the additional

load on our existing supervisory structure is, of course,

97

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 269

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## Page 270

out of the question. We definitely would require is

increase in supervisory personnel in the Domestic

intelligence division.

In addition, there would be a

need for more manpower in our Laboratory to handlo

oxpansion in tho technical sürveillance

field.

There

would be a need for additional personnel to be assigned

los the development of live sources in the, field.

would bo necessary to have lioid perconnellassignod to

technical surveillance installations on a continued basis

and, of course,

there would be & need for support related

to such activities as preliminary security surveys.

It is outside the scope of this Comnittee's .

competency to outline any specific administrative re

organization and propose what personnel, equipment and

facilities would be needed. We reel that this could be

best handled only after the objectives of the program are

approved.

At that point, officials icon the seat of

Government and the

field

could meet to map out the necessary

reorganization.

The extent of reorganization will hinge on

our decision as to

the pace we should set.

We recommend

thai we proceed at a steady, even pace, making certain that

ve lay solid groundwork for all of our

activity. We should

retrain from becoming involved in a "crash" program unless

national security interests obviously warrant such an

approach.

In connection with any planning lor reorganization,

it would be unwise to proceed without first obtaining a

reliable inventory of our current rescurces.

Such an

inventory would encompass the folloving: (1)

The number

of Agents currently assigned to strictly positive intel

ligence collection; (2)

Our foreign language capabilities;

(3) Our current sources and informants with an objective

assessment of capabilities; (4) Number of supervisors at

the Seat of Government currently handling positive intel-

ligence matters.

In connection with any plans for reorganization,

we snould not negleci to give consideration to the problems

Which

we

will encounter as time goes on in the areas of

incormation storage und retrieval. We, therelore, should

realize that it would ba unwise to excludo research or

study regarding the computerizing of intormation.

98

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 270

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Ir.

ALTERNATIVES

In addition to the recommended plan set orth

preceeding sections, there are several

alternative courses

aCtion we might take:

We could take the position, and seek ways to implement

it, that the entire field of foreign intelligence collection

the U.S., both overt and covert, should be handled by

thO IBI.

Such an across-tho-board approach would exclude

CIA and

other . S agencies from foreign intelligence

collection in this

country and would place exclusive

responsibility and jurisdiction in this field on the FBI.

As indicated in Section I,

this would require a revanping

of. existing legislation and directives and would necessitate

arastic changes in the Bureau's operations, including major

increases in personnel and costs and a substantial expansion

in our recruitment and training programs, and other reorganiza

tiOn. We do not feel this approach is varranted or do we.

believe it would be a practical and sound one.

2.

We could recommend that CIA continue to be

responsible for overt collection

oi foreign intelligence in

this country but that the FBI exclusively handle covert

foreign intolligence collection.

This has several obvious

arawbacks.

First, we would

be assuming a wide range of

heavy and fixed respons-bilities which

in many cases would

be completely divorced icon the Bureau's internal security

and counterintelligence interests.

Second, we would become

to a large extent a service group for other U.s. agencies

and depariments

levied by other agencies.

This vould involve a considerable

commitment of manpower,

conmunication costs, etc. on the part

of the sureau. In addition, such an approach would necessitate

significant changes in our recruitment and training procedures

and vould also place on our shoulders a definite accountability

•in connection with any failures in U.S. intelligence foreign

collection. It is not? alieved that this approach is. as sound

or desirable as our recommended plan of action; namely, that

we expand our foreign intelligence collection efforts but on

a selective basis and without our assuming full responsibility.

— 99

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 271

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so: 015 .

3. We cou

endcavor to vorl out a

_sion of

Iesponsibility and work in this area whorchy the Burcau

and CIA would each have cortain primary arcas of operation.

Foi example, the IDI could make known its willingness to

contrabuie more heavily in support of U. S. forcign inteiligonce

collection efforts and propose this ficid be broken inco

two carogories; namely,

technical coverage (this would include

and live infcumant development anorg

fovoign diplorato.

We could piOposO that tho rBi cOntiuo

to operate exclusiveiy in the linst category (rechnical

covciage with cia contizuing to stay entirely out oi this

riola.

In this regaza, the Bureau is better equipped than

CIA to handle technical surveillances and

operations

by zcason of our long experience and expertise in this area.

With regard to the second category (live sources)

we could propose that CIA conduci no opecations invoiving

countries

where the Bureau's counterintelligence interests

are paramouni or significani.

This would include the Sino

soviet-bloc countrios and could aiso include certain other

countries, such as the doniacar Republic, where ve bave

already developed song capabilities or where there are

unique iactors.

With regard to other countries (nua-biuc), vo

could propose that CIA should assumo primary zesponsibility

for develosing live digiomatic sources. However,

this

would be with the clear proviso that,

in the event the FBI

should develop sigrificant internal security interests, ve

vould have the prerogative of levying requirements on CIA

souices, having direct access to CiA sources when needed,

Ox

as a

final sied, developiag ous ovn sources ii CiA could

not satisily our

needs.

This arenative plan yould not involve as much

manpower or othes expense io the Bureau as our recommended

plan. However, It would iavolve our approval of Cia opera

tions in the live infosmant field and would risk CIA infriag-

ing on IBI Interests. Ii is our consensus that this approach

not be adopied.

"*"4:."We could recommend that the FBI could ithdrar...

entirely iron the field of covert foreign intligence collection

.:.

allowing CiA to handle all aspects, including

and both live and techricui coverage.

We are strongly

opposed io such an approach on the grounds that it would

drasticaily diminion the I3i95 20i0 in tha intelligenca

connunity, would sive ciA caste blanche. to operate in the

U.S., and in Fany

instances vould certainly zesult in CIAs

compronising on internal socuziüy and cousicrintelligezco

OpOrEüIOnS.

- 100 -

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5. Pinally, ve could take no action to change the

current situation and, in effect, adopt a "status quo"

approach. We are opposed to this.

AS

indicated in this

study, U.S. Government needs fos

foreign intelligence

are growing on an almost daily basis and CIA has made

definite efforts to move more activoly into this liold.

II we were to adopt a "siatus quo" attitude, lt is only.

a question of time until this matter comes to a head;

for example, in the U.S. Intelligence Board or the

Prosident'g

TOXCiEn IntOLLICONCO RAViSOLy Board.

when this occurs,

the decision as to the fBi's role would,

of course, be subject to the thinking and aims of people

outside the IBI, possibly including individuals who are

not sympathetic

to our views.

We would not be in a position

to maintain control of developmenta.

10% m

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18/90-10143

NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 274

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Copy identifying excised material

etain care

W 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 275

0/28/15

IR, B

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April

29,

1966

THE RUNE OF THE FOX TY CHANCESTINE FORETEN

INTELLIGENCE COLIECTION IN THE UNITED STATES

Capick Repart

-NW-88608-Đocld:32989

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## Page 277

TABLE OF

CONTENTS

Page

A.'

PURPOSE AND SCOPE.

B.

INTELLIGENCE TERMINOLOGY.

:

THS HISTORY OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

IN THE UNITED STATES..•

1.

2.

Prior to World War II...

During World War II (1941 ~ 1945)

3.

National Intelligence Authority (NIA)

Responsibilities of CIA..........

The National Security Act of 1947

National Security Council Intelligence

Directive....0

c...

Director of Central Intelligence

Directives.....

Dulles Committee, 1949...

Hoover Commission, 1948 and 1955

1.

%.

The Doolittie Committee, 1954...

The Joint Study Group on Foreign

Intelligence Activities of the

United States Government.....

5.

Responsibilities of the FBI.

Laws and Directives...

Requests From Other Agencies.

c. FBI's Role in the United States

• Intelligence Board........

d. The President's Foreign Intelligence

Advisory Board (PFIAB) .....

The Director's Stand Over the Years..

e.

Di: THE NEED AND THE POTENTIAL FOR

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE IN THE U.

S.

. CURRENT CAPABILITIES OF CIA IN THE FOREIGN

INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION FIELD IN THE

UNITED STATES.....

2

8;

15

20

20

22

26

29

33

33

47.

44

44

$5

46

48

50

55

59

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## Page 278

TABLE OF

CONTENTS

CURRENT CAPABILITIES OF THE FBI

Manpower Being Devoted..

2

Number of Microphone and Telephone

Surveillances

• With Evaluation of Product

3.

Live Sources With Evaluation.

5.

Anagram Program. Informants.

Double Agents and

6.

Additional Potential..•

G: AREAS OF CONFLICT, FBI - CIA..

E. CURRENT AGREEMENTS BETWEEN FBI AND CIA

.I.

EFFECT ON THE FBI OF FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR

COLLECTION OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE IN THE

UNITED STATES

i. Overi Colleciion Acrivities.

2. Clandestine Gathering Activities

J. GENERAL FINDINGS.

K.

RECOMMENDED PLAN OF ACTION.

Authorization.........

Selection of Targets..

Technical Surveillance

of Targets

Technical Surveillance Controls.

Anagram Program.

Live Sources...

Training of Personnel.

Reporting Procedures.•

Language Capabilities...

Relations With Other Agencies

Administrative Reorganization,

ALTERNATIVES.

Page

64

64

65

66

67

67

68

69

74

77

77

79

82

86

• 99

11

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Page

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:.i..

():

:A.

PURPOSE AND SCOPE

The purpose of this study is to define

a new role for the Bureau in the field of clandestine

COLlECTION Of LOIOLEN INTOLIIGONCO In the U. S.

This action 15 necessary and most timely because

Of our Government's vital need for increased foreign

Intolligence and becauso of CIA's expanding Incoresta

in the United Statos.

There is a decided neod for

& new Bureau concept, the implementation of which

could greatly increase our effectiveness and could deter

CIA trom becoming a threat to our operational interests.

The study encompasses & review of history

as it relates to Loreign intelligence collection in

the U.S.

Analysis is made of the need and the

potential for such intelligence; the capabilities of

the Bureau and CIA in this field; and the responsibilities

of over-all (overt and covert) collection oi toreign

intelligence in the U. S.

findings, and we reconnend

a plan of action for a new

Bureau role.

This study was not designed to eliminate once

and for all the many problems relating to collection

of foreign intelligence in the U. S.

It would have been

a Utopian objective to recommend a plan which would

produce maximum intelligence collection, remove existing

defects within the U.s. intelligence community, and

establish complete harmony among interested agencies.

We did not go

that far.

Careful and exhaustive analysis

dictated that we endeavor to reach a reasonable goal

consistent with prudent planning and sound operational

implementation.

We feel that the reconmended plan

meets such guidelines, that it is a decidedly major step

forward for the Bureau, and it strongly conforms with

the national security needs.

It should be noted that this document does

not deal with our law enforcement or internal security

functions, although it is fully recognized that

Internal security and clandestine collection of foreign

intelligence are closely linked. Any plan on our part

to produce foreign intelligence will affect our

capabilities in the flold of counterintelligence.

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INTELLIGENCE TERMINOLOGY

People who do not speak and understand a common

language have difficulty in communicating their ideas.

Even

in a country such as ours where English is the common language,

words take on different meanings in different geographical

localos and in diflorent social, political, und economic

environments. Likewise, in professional fields, varying

backgrounds and experiences have conveyed different meanings

to terms in the professional vocabulary.

In the field of security, intelligence, and counter-

intelligence operations, certain professional terminology has

developed ostensibly to

assist in the exchange of ideas by

persons in this field. However, as progress is made in a

field or a special segment of the field, new horizons develop

which require additional terminology or cause an evolution in

This development or evolution in security

l intelligence terminology, coupled with individualistic usage,

brings further problems in meaning which we also face in the

broader aspects of the English language.

We have all noted

that our dictionaries do not always provide a single meaning

and we must be careful in daily conversation that we are not

misunderstood when merely using a conversational vocabulary.

ve face a similai problem in the use of professional terminol

,ogy in security and intelligence matters as this terminology

takes on new

meaning with additional experience and takes on

varying meanings to different persons.

An additional factor to consider in understanding

the meaning of terminology is

the context in which a term is

used.

For example,

the term "intelligence" may be vague and

confusing without

the knowledge of the context in which it is

used.

It can, as a generic term, pertain to the whole field

of activities

undertaken by a governmentin the collection of

•information, the protection of its institutions, and the con

duct of nonattributable activities to facilitate

and implementation of government policy.

Also, it can relate

to the organization devoted to the collection and production

of information necessary to the government. In addition,

it may pertain to the whole body of theory

and practice on

the basis of which an intelligence organization operates.

Finally, the word "intelligence" may be utilized to mean

any part or all of the above.

The following definitions do not include all possible

meanings that have been utilized but,

instead, are

designed

to assist the reader in digesting this study.

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BASIC INTELLIGENCE is that factual intelligence which results

from the collation of encyclopedia information of a fundamental

and more or less permanent nature and which,

as a result of

evaluation and interpretation, is determined to be the best

available.

BIOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE is intelligence concerning individuals.

CLANDESTINE COLLECTION A coordinated complex of collection

activities designed to accomplish an intelligence, counter

intelligence, or other similar purpose, sponsored and conducted

by a governmental department or agency, or jointly by tvo or

more such entities, in such a way. as to assure secrecy or

concealment.

COMBAT INTELLIGENCE iS military intelligence for use in combat

•situations. This is commonly referred to as tactical.

COUNTERESPIONAGE iS identlyIng, penetraiing, manipulating

or repressing inimical espionage organizations.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE is defined as that intelligence activity,

with its resultant product, which is devoted to destroying the

effectiveness of inimical foreign intelligence activities and

which is undertaken to protect the security of the nation,

and its personnel, information, and installations against

espionage, sabotage, and subversion. Counterintelligence

includes the process of procuring, developing, recording, and

disseminating information concerning hostile clandestine

activity and ot penetrating, manipulating, or repressing

Individuals, groups, or organizations conducting or capable

of conducting such activity.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE is that intelligence of all types and forms

of immediate interest which is usually disseminated without

the delays incident to.complete evaluation or interpretation.

DEPARMENTAL INTELLIGENCE is that intelligence which any:

department or agency requires to execute its

own mission.

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DOMESTIC INTELUIGENCE concerns information and investigation

espionage, counterespionage, etc.; which pertains to the

internal security of the U.S. and,

matter pertinent to the internas altairs oi the u.s.

ECONOMIC INTELIIGENCE concerns the potentialities, utilization,

and vulnerabilities of a nation's

natural and human

resources.

ESPIONAGE is defined as that intelligence activity which is

directed toward the acquisition of information through clandestine

operations.

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE pertains to foreign affairs and subject

matters pertinent to foreign countries.

The word

"foreign"

as used here denotes the target of the

intelligence and is

distinct from the geographic location of the source providing

the information.

I'or example, refugees, defectors, and immigrants

from target countries (such as

the Soviet Union) have the

potontial for supplying intelligence regarding their countries

to United States

authorities.

Although physically located in

the United States, they are potential foreign intelligence sources.

•GEOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE concerns the meterology, hydrography,

¡topography, and basic natural resources of an area.

INTELUIGENCE

is the product derived from informatión collected

for the formulation and execution of Government policy and for

safeguarding the national welfare.

INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION is information collected for intelli

gence purposes that has not been evaluated by comparison with

the existing body of knowledge on the subject reported on; the

raw material of intelligence.

INTERDEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE is integrated departmental

intelligence which is required by departments and agencies

of the Government for the execution of their missions; but

which transcends the exclusive competence of a single depart

ment or agency to produce.

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INTERNAL SECURITY relates to the defense and protection within

the United States and its territories and possessions of the

people, the government, the institutions, and the installations

of critical importance from

all hostile or destructive action.

INVESTIGATION means systematic and direct inquiries or pro

coduros (such as physical or tochnical survoillancos or neighbor

hood inquiries) aiming at developing information concerning an

individual's activities or background; investigation does not

include the acceptance or the development of information through

social contacts or contacts normally made by CIA agents in

discharging their cover functions.

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE:

See Combat Intelligence and Strategic

Intelligence.

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE is that intelligence which is required

for the formulation of national security policy, concerns more

tian one department or agency: and transcends the exclusive

competence of a single department or agency.

OVERT COLLECTION is collection activities conducted in such

a manner that they may be attributed to or acknowledged by the

sponsoring government.

POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE Concerns foreign and domestic policies

of governments and the activities of political movements.

POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE may be described as a comprehensive

product resulting from collection, evaluation, collation, analysis,

and interpretation of all available information relating to

national security and co. cerning other countries where such

information is significant to our Government's development and

execution of plans, policies, and courses of action.

Such

intelligence can be divided into various categories,

such as

departmental, economic,

basic, biographic, combat, curreilitary, national, political,

geographic, interdepartmental,

scientific, sociological, strategic, tactical, and technica..

Perhaps the most simple

definition would be that posztive.

Intelligence is all the things you should know, in advance of

initiating a course of action.

i'?:

1; .

© 5.

.

..:

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. .

There appears to be much confusion in professional

circles regarding the use of the term "positive intelligence."

Some professionals use the term "positive intelligence" synonymously

with tho torm

usage,

one cattle eaten tent noti used

interchangeably. In another useage, which is closely related

to the definition utilized in this

"positive

gence" is deserthed as what is left on the entire field alter

"security intelligence" has been subtracted. This source

continues that both "positive intelligence" and "security

intelligence" can be against domestic targets, as well as

against foreign targets. For example, the Department of State,

in connection with its formulation of

foreign policy, encounters

a large number of organizations of Americans whose parents came

from foreign countries. Many of these organizations the Poles

for example--have strong views on what United States policy

should be toward Poland.

The views of these organizations

regarding our foreign policy is likely to be a matter of some

importance to the Department of State in its policy formula

The knowledge of what these organizations think and

do can be a very significant phase of what might be called

"acmestic positive intelligence." In addition, the connections

which these organizations may have with the foreign country

such as Poland

sometimes provide a source of "foreign positive

intelligence."

SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE pertains to the progress of scientific

research and development and usually this intelligence is

within the framevork of how it affects military or economic

potential of a nation.

SECURITY INTELLIGENCEis basically the intelligence behind the

police function to protect the nation and its members ixom

those working to our national and individual detriment.

FOr

example, this would include intelligence regarding clandestine

agents

sent to the United states by a foreign power.

SOCIOLOGICAL INTELLIGENCE pertains to the social, cultural,

psychological, or ethnic structure and characteristics of &

people.

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE is the intelligence required for broad

and usually long range planning; especially with regard to

military

operations.

6

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TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE See Combat Intelligence.

TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE Concerns devices, equipmont,

spocial procossos. 'This is rolatod to scientllic Intelli

gence, but tends to be differentiated from it as practice

differs from theory.

...

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C.

THE HISTORY OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION IN THE

UNITED STATES

I.. Prior to World War II

A study of the history and progress of foreign

intelligence collection in the United States reveals that

priox to World War II such collection efforts were incidental

and in direct proportion to the intensity of the coverage

maintained in the counterintelligence lield. Accordingly,

the history of foreign intelligence collection in the

United States prior to World War II is primarily a history of

counterintelligence and internal security coverage, of which

foreign intelligence was & by-product. Historical

highlights

of the developments in this field are as follows:

(a) In August, 1914, when German espionage agents

Count Johann Von Bernstorff and Dr. Heinrich Albert of the

arrived in the

‚nno in German treasury notes to

finance the first loreign espionage and sabotage apparatus

to be organized in this country, United States Government

intelligence work was handled for the most part by five

small organizations (Bureau of Investigation of the

Department of Justice, Secret Service, Army, State and Navy),

all operating on their own with small

staffs and without

coordination and sufficient delineation oi responsibilities.

(b)

Germany and President Woodrow Wilson gave the Bureau of

Investigation the task of enforcing his proclamation

governing the conduct of enemy aliens. The Bureau at the time

had 300 Agents but shortly after the outbreak of the war

the staff was increased to 400.

(c)

As result of a rash of bombings believed

executed by Bolsheviks, Attorney General Palmer appointed

Francis P. Garvan of New York as Assistant Attorney General

He created a General Intelligence

Division under command of j. Edgar Hoover and Mr. Hoover was

instructed to make a study of subversive activities in the

United States to determine their scope and the potential

IoI prosecution.

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(d) On May 9, 1934, President Roosevelt called

a White House conference

attended by the Attorney General,

the problem of growth of fascist organizations in the

United States.

The conference agreed that there should be

an investigation of these groups and their activities for

intelligence purposes.

Since the only Federal law believed

applicable at the time was the Immigration Law,

the President

decided that the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization

Service would confer with the Chief of Secret Service and the

Director of the FBI to work out details of the investigation:

Nt. Hoover immediately issued orders to FBI

personnel

to conduct an intensive and confidential investi

gation of the Nazi movement.

This was the first general

intelligence investigation made by the Government into

Lascist activities in this country.

(e) As a result of President Franklin Roosevelt's

concern over activities of the communists and other subversive

..gruups, a sories of conforences was held in the Intter

part

of lugust and carly September, 1936, participated in by the

Prosidont, tho Socretary of State and the Director of the FBI.

As a result of his concern over the international character

of communisa and fascism, the President stated the FBI should

conduct necessary investigations and coordinate inforuation

upon those matters in the possession of the Military

Erus=-gense Division, the Naval Intelligence Division and

the State Department.

It is noteworthy that it was specified the

investigation was to be for intelligence purposes only.

The Presidential Order was implemented by the

Director in a letter to all Special Agents in Charge,

September 5, 1936.

(1) As a result of opposition primarily by the

State Department

against accepting the FBI as the coordinating

agency in the investigations of all subversive activities in

a confidential directive to Cabinet members which established an

Interdepartmental Intelligence Coordinating Committee composed

and the Navy.

He named the FBI as the coordinating agency to

receive all reports on subversive activities.

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(g) President Roosevelt publicly designated the FBI

to investigate matters relating to espionage, sabotage and

violations of the neutrality regulations by Presidential

Directive dated September 6, 1939.

h) On May u1, 1940, President Roosevelt in a

memorandum

to the then Attorney General, Robort H. Jackson,

authorized

and directed the Attorney General in

such cases

he might approve to authorize the use of listening devices

directed to the conversations or other communications of

persons suspected of subversive activity against the Government

of the United States, including suspected spies.

Pursuant to such authorization,

commencing on June 1,

1940, technical surveillances were installed on diplomatic

establishments throughout the United States of such countries

as Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia and France.

These

installations in

addition to providing counterintelligence

information of value produced

a substantial quantity of foreign

intelligence information.

(1) Although lines of responsibility were established

for domestic intelligence work in connection with the September 6,

1939, Presidential Directive, there were no clearly defined areas

of responsibility of overseas intelligence operations and as

time passed the need for decisions in that field grew more evident.

As a result, the Special Intelligence Service (SIS)

came into being.

Presidential Directive June 24, 1940,

President Franklin D. Roosevelt set forth lines of responsibility

in the operations of United States intelligence agencies in the

foreign field.

This Directive grew out of a series of meetings

involving representatives of State Department, Army and Navy

intelligence and the FBI wherein it was agreed that the SIS would

act as a service agency, furnishing the State Department, the

military, the FBI and other governmental agencies with Intormatzon

having to do with financial, economic, political and subversive

activities detrimental to the security of the United States.

June 24th Directive placed the responsibility for nonmilitary

Through World War II and until approximately March 31,

1947, the fBI continued its SIS operations. The culmination of

our activities in this field came about as a result of the

January 22, 1946, Presidential Directive establishing the

Central Intelligence Group and giving it the responsibility of

collecting foreign intelligence abroad.

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2. During World War II (1941 - 1945)

a. The FBI's Role

Juring World War II, as prior to the war, foreign

intelligence collection in this countru was rosrod

to and

principally a product of our intensive efforts in the counter

intelligence field.

It is also significant to note that a

steady stream of foreign intelligence continued to be developed

from our technical coverage of diplomatic establishments of

enemy-bloc countries, as well as other sensitive countries

such as Russia, Argentina, Portugal and Spain.

In line with the Presidential Directive of

September 6, 1939, the FBI continued to be in charge of all

investigative work in matters pertaining to espionage, sabotage,

counterespionage, subversive activities and violations of the

neutrality laws.

On January 8, 1943, the President issued another

Directive in which he reiterated tne previous Dixective vi

September 6, 1939.

In ordering the FBI to take charge in the foregoing

President Roosevelt did not define the various types of

intelligence involved but placed the entire intelligence and

internal security responsibilities involved under the

jurisdiction of the FBI. As a matter of fact, in carrying out

these responsibilities we did produce foreign

Intelligence in

substantial quantity especially through our technical coverage

of foreign diplomatic establishments.

D.

Office of Strategic Services

The position of Colonel William J. Donovan as

Coordinator of Information (COI) was created by Presidential

Dixective dated July 11, 1941. On July 14, 1941, President

Roosevelt sent a letter

to the Attorney General stating the

position was created, "in order to provide a central point in

the Government for the analysis of information and data which

bears upon national security.

Donovan's duties as "assist me and"","

The President described

the various Departments and

agencies of the Government in assembling and correlating

information which may be useful in the iormulation of basic

plans for the defense of the nation."

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In the letter President Roosevelt clearly limited

Donovan's jurisdiction with the following statement:

"I

should like to emphasize that Colonel Donovan's work is not

intonded to supersedo or duplicate or involve any direction

•of the activities of established agencies already obtaining

and interpreting delense information."

The Presidentlal order dated September 11, 1941,

established the position of COl with clear cut authority to

collect and analyze information bearing on national security;

correlate and make such information available to the President

and other Government officials as the President may determine.

coI was finally authorized to carry out, when requested by

the president, supplementary activities as mighi facilitate

the securing of information not then available to the

Goverament.

Donovan, in a memorandum captioned "MEMORANDUM OF

-ESTABLISHMENT OF SERVICE OF STRATEGIC INFORMATION," expanded

on the President's directive in general terms. Under his

plan for procedure there was a Coordinator of Strategic

Intormation responsible direcily to the President.

TORE

this same organizational set up was later adopted

by the

Director of Central

Intelligence. Donovan noted, however,

in his memorandum,

"The proposed centralized unit will

neither displace nor encroach upon the FBI, Army and Navy

Intelligence, or any other Department of the Government."

(62-64427, serials 23 and X3.)

Our file on the Office of Strategic Services (OSS)

reveals that that organization continued its organizational:

training, and operational activities in this country based

on Donovan's premise that he was the central clearing point

for anti-Axis espionage and counterespionage. An interesting

insight into OSS operations in this country is provided in

the nonfiction work "The Scarlet Thread" by former OSS agent

Donald Downes. Downes noted that he was

a former British

intelligence agent serving for that organization in New York

when

he was recruited. by OSS immediately

after Pearl Harbor.

He tells of his recruitment by Allan Dulles, his association

with Donovan, and his work in the counterespionage field in

New York City and Washington, D. C., with other OSS agents,

including the current United

States Ambassador to the

United Nations, Arthur Goldberg. Downes detailed attempts

by him and other OSS agents to steal diplomatic codes irom

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"friendly" or "neutral" country embassies in Washington in

the early 1940's and frequently referred to the fact that .

this was being done by OSS with knowledge that its juris

diction in this country was based only on the thoory that

a foreign imbassy is not American soil and is technically

outside the jurisdiction of

the FBI, which had full juris

diction for counterintelligence in the western hemisphere.

Our file on the OSs is replete with incidents

indicating OSS recruitment and counterespionage activities

in this country during the early 1940's.

advised of a conversation overheard between two high-ranking

State Department officials. The conversation dealt with oss

attempts to take over Bureau SIS operations in Latin America

with one of the State Department officials, Aura Warren,

stating that officials of OSS felt that organization was

-better equipped

to handle work than FBI personnel attached

to various American Embassies in South America.

In response

to this attempt of OSs to take over our duties, the Director

commented: "I would like iu know wheie Warren gets this.

According to. Ladd our contacts in State Department have no

knowledge of such OSS efforts. Also Tracey should point

out it is State Department duty to initiate it as we would

'service it' and the State Department in fact started

the

SIS project. H" (62-64427-1059.)

An interesting evaluation of OSS operations is

provided in a report prepared by Colonel Richard Park of

the War Departnent as a result of a survey of OSS operations

made as a special and confidential mission for the President

in 1944 and 1945. Colonel Park commented: "Without going

into details I was everywhere left with the same impression

of utter

incompetency on the part of oss leadership...

"Everywhere that the subject of OSS came up,

unsolicited remarks clearly brought out the very well known

amateurish nature of the organization.

"The OSS has been restricted from active operations

in South America by Presidential directive...."

Despite the absence of any jurisdiction in or

responsibility for counterintelligence operations in the

western hemisphere, an oflicer of OSS was reported to have

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attempted to obtain cover. for an OSS agent in South America

under guise of employment by an organization doing business

in South America.

A closing paragraph of Colonel Park's report

commented on observations made by au official of OSS as

LOlLOWS:

"This official of OSS added that it was the policy

of his agency not to give any more information than necessary

to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

He pointed out that

Oss instructors in their school in the

United States had

discussed the FBI in an unfavorable light and had painted

the picture of OSS replacing the Federal Bureau of

Investigation not only outside the United States but in

the domestic field.

was

to be one of the means adopted to accomplish this

no moanz adopted

campaign referred to

purpose."

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3. National Intelligence Authority (NIA)

On January 22, 1946, President Harry S. Truman

addressed & Directive to the socretary of State,

the Secretary

of war, and the secretary of the Navy stating, in part, "I

hereby designate you, together with another person to be named

by me as my personal.

representative, as the National intelli

gence Authority..."

The Directive provided that each of these

three secretaries would from time to time assign personnel and

facilities from their respective departments "which persons

shall collectively form a Central Intelligence Group" (CIG)

under a Director of Central Intelligence.

It was provided that

the latter would be responsible to the NIA.

President Truman then stated that subject to the

existing law the Director of Central Intelligence should

(a)

accomplish the corre.ition and evaluation of intelligence

and the appropriate dissemination within the Government of the

results; (b) plan for the coordination of such activities of

the intelligence agencies of the three departments involved as

related to the national security; (c) nerform such

services of

common concern as the NIA determined could be more eirectively

accomplished centrally; and (d) perform such other functions

and duties related to intelligence as the President and the

NIA might from time to time direct.

The Presidential Directive said that no police, law

enforcement or internal security functions should be exercised

under the Directive; that certain intelligence should be ireely

available to the Director of Central Intelligence "for correlation,

evaluation or dissemination"; and that "the existing intelligence

agencies of your departments

shall continue to collect, evaluate,

correlate and disseminate departmental intelligence."

The ninth

provision of the Directive stated, "Nothing herein shall be

construed to authorize the making of investigations inside the

continental limits of the United States and its possessions,

except as provided by law and Presidential directives."

??Aserles. of.communications between the Bureau. and..?.n

Lieutenant General Hoyt S. Vandenberg; who was designated as

→ci: Director of the Central Intelligence

June 21, 1946,

Vandenberg which submitted. a proposed memorandum

to the NIA and

a proposed Directive to be issued by NIA

extending the powers

and duties of the Director of Central Intelligence.

The Directive

provided, in essence, the following additional functions and

powers for the Director of Central Intelligence:

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(1) Undertake such basic research and analysis of

intelligence and counterintelligence as may in his opinion be

required.

-

(2) Act as the executive agont of this authority

(NIA) in coordinating and in supervising all Federal foreign

intelligence activities.

(3) PeriOIm the fOllOWiNg sorviCes of common concern:

(a) conduct all Federal espionage and counterespionage operations

for the collection of Loreign intelligence; (b) conduct all

Federal

monitoring of press

and propaganda

broadcasts of foreign

powers for the collection of intelligence information.

In discussing this Directive which Vandenberg desired

issued, the memorandum stated the Directive did not conform

with the original plan proposed by the President or which was

envisioned by the discussions occurring prior to the time the

President Issued his Directive.

The original plan, insofar as

the Bureau was advised, contemplated the setting up of solely

a coordinating agency which was given the power to perform certain

functions which it would be determined could more adequately and

economically be performed centrally for the benefit of all

Government agencies.

The memorandum noted

that "undoubtedly it

this Directive is approved and the Central Intelligence Group

is successiul in setting up complete foreign coverage,

the

Bureau would undoubtedly be pushed into a 'second rate' position

insolar as purely intelligence functions are concerned in the

domestic field. ..

It is inevitable that the Central Intelli

gence Group must enter into the domestic field picture insofar

as intelligence is concerned because of the sources of foreign

intelligence existing in that field.

Also, it is impossible io

separate entirely foreign intelligence and

the domestic functions

performed by the Bureau."*

In reply to the Directive proposed by General Vandenberg,

a letter was sent to him June 25, 1946, which stated that the

Directive was approved with certain changes suggested "{or

clarification purposes only."

The Director suggested that to

the item relating to the Director of Central Intelligence acting

*

* *

* With respect to this last quoted statement, Mr. E. A. Tamm and

• Mr. C. A. Tolson noted an exception by placing an addendum

memorandun. The Director's conments were set forth. This is the

more lully reported below under the heading, "Director's Comments."

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as the executive agent of National Intelligence Authority

in coordinating and supervising all foreign intelligence

activitios there should be added "performod outsido the

United States and its possessions relating to the national

security in accordance with the overall policies and objectives

established by this Authority." With respect to the proposal

that the Director of Central Intelligence direct all espionage

and counterespionage operations for the collection of foreign

intelligence, it was proposed that the phrase "outside the

United States and its possessions" also be inserted in this

provision.

On July 29, 1946, General Vandenberg sent over

a memorandum on the subject "Exploitation of American

Business Concerns With Connections Abroad as Sources of

Foreign Intelligence Information." He added & proposed

Directive. The Director replied by letter August 6, 1946,

"I should like to comment that there appears to have been

an addition to the field encompassed by CIG Directive #11

calline for a surver of the exploitation of American business

concerns.

I note that in your report and in the proposed

NIA Directive, you refer not only to American business con-

cerns but to other private groups with connections abroad.

This Latter phrase, in my opinion, is extremely broad and

could be taken to include all types of organizations,

including Foreign Nationality Groups.

In fact, i feel that.

the report and proposed Directive should confine themselves to

the discussion of American business concerns and that no

references at all should be made to 'private groups'.

•I feel that at a later date the question of exploitation of

these private groups by CIG representatives might be worked

out by discussing them individually with the FBI when their

identities are determined." This matter remained unresolved.

On August 22, 1946, General Vandenberg submitted

another proposed Directive concerning exploitation of American

ousiness concerns, nongovernmental groups, and individuals (in

"the' United states) with connections abroad as sources. of foreign

intelligence information.

A memorandum analyzing this on

August 22, 1946, pointed out the new directive was even more

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obnoxious than the one originally proposed. The Directive

noted, in part, "CIG field representatives will establish

and maintain liaison with the intelligence officers of local

• Army and Navy headquarters and Air Forco headquarters, 1%

present, through the medium of local Interagoncy offices."

the analyzing memorandum "ointed out, "Il this means the

CIG is going to maintain field representatives in the Unitod

States or establish offices, it cortainly is somothing new and

a provision that we did not understand was intended in the

President's Directive. • Attached to the proposed Directive

is a discussion which is

more or less the same as was attached

to the original proposed Directive. It, however, makes the

following statement which the Bureau cannot subscribe to and

It would seem must oppose, that is, 'Foreign Intelligence

Information related to the national security, although it may

be collected from sources whose headquarters

are within the

Limits of the United States and its possessions, is definitely

a part of the national intelligence mission, the coordination

which is specifically & lunction or the National Intelli

gence Authority under the provisions of the President's letter

oI 22 january 1946.'"

in pointing out the Bureau's objections here

analyzing memoranaun of August 24, 1946, statea,.

is now involved in this Directive

the fundamental question

of just what rights the Central

Intelligence Group has with

reference to operations within the United States. Carrying

to a logical conclusion the statements set forth above contained

in the discussion, they could cover all foreign embassies in

the United states, take charge of double agents we are operating

or radio stations we are operating as double agent set-ups, eic.,

because essentially these operations engaged in by the Bureau

do not directly involve enforcement of the laws but rather are

concerned with obtaining Information in the nature of loreign

intelligence which, of course, is related to internal security

as is all toreign intelligence.

Essentially, the Bureau's

domestic operations in intelligence involve the determining

of the aims, intentions, and activities of loreign countries

or their representatives."

"The memorandum of analysis stated that our position

would be the Bureau would not consent to any provisions except

those. rolatod to Amorican businoss conceins with connections

18

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abroad; On August 23, 1946, the Director sent a letter to

Gonoral Vandenborg stating in part, "I must advise that the

proposed Directive does not incorporate the changes suggested

in my lotter of August 6, 1946, and 1, therefore, cannot

approve it.

This new directive also includes provisions

and statements in which I cannot concur and, In lact, must

oppose.",

The strong stand of the Director obviously led to

a conference between General Vandenberg and the Director

which was reported in a memorandum of September 13, 1946,

which the Director prepared.

As stated in the Director's

memorandum the conference concerned CIG's desire to gather

contacts among "nongovernmental groups and individuals with

connections abroad."

The entire conference was on this subject

matter and did not enter into collection of foreign intelli

gence from foreign embassies or from foreign officials os,

The Director wrote, "I told

the General that I could well appreciate that there

would be

cases in which his organication would be desirus of making

'contacts in the United States for the purpose of obtaining

infornation from abroad nd that the Bureau was not interested

in such contacts except in those situations wherein the individual

or the group might be engaged in activities within the United

States that were either under investigation by the Bureau or

might possibly be the medium of obtaining information con

• cerning the activitles of a subversive character being carried

on within the United States.

I told the General that I would

be perfectly agreeable to his suggestion, with the added

provision that if CIG vas desirous of contacting any

individuals of the character that he had indicated, before

doing so it would check with the FBI."

The foregoing has been set forth rather extensively

since it shows the strong stand the Bureau took against CIG's

operating in the United States.

hereinalter, Directives were adopted permitting CIC to collect

positive intelligence in this country by contacting United . ":

States citizens, American businessmen, aliens (with prior

FBI approval) through the loreign language press. and in later

years through contacts with United States governmental personnel.

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Responsibilities of CIA

The National Security Act of 1947

This Act, which is reported In 50 USC 401 et seg.,

established the National Security Council (NSC) and under it

tho Contral Intelligence Agoney.

I provided that when the

Director of Central Intelligence was appointed the NIA should

cease to exist.

There was much discussion concerning the powers and

authorities to be vested in the Director of Central Intelli-

Many individuals, especially in Congress, expressed

that CIA could develop into a gestapo if permitted to

become operational in the United States.

The following two

excerpts, of interest in this connection, are from a

Congressional publication related to hearings prior to passage

of the National Security Act of 1947.

The publication is

entitled "Hearings Before the Committee on Expenditures in the

Executive Departments, House of Representatives, 80th Congress,

Ist Session on H. R. 2319 (National Security Aci Of 1947)":

Page 127 - During testimony concerning authority 20r

and scope of CIA, James Forrestal, then Secretary of the Navy,

stated:

"The purposesol the Central Intelligence Authority

are limited definitely to purposes outside of this

country, except the collation of information gathered

by other government agencies.

"Regarding domestic operations, the federal Bureau

of Investigation is working at all times in collaboration

with General Vandenberg. He relies upon them lor domestic

activities."

Page 438 - Congressman Clarence J. Brown Of Ohio in

speaking about the National Security Act of 1947, which was

under scrutiny before passage, stated:

"I want to write a loi of other safeguards into the

section that deals with. the Central Intelligence Agency.

— 20

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"I want to make certain that the activities and the -

functions of the Central Intelligence Agency were care-

Lully confined to international matters, to military

matters, and to matters of national security. We have

enough

peopLo noW runnine around Ductine into avcrypody

else's business in this country without

establishing

another agency to do so..

"What we ought to do is to eliminate 90 percent o1

the present snoopers instead of adding to them.

"I do not think it would be the Central Intelligence

Agency's right, authority, or responsibillty to check or

the ordinary domestic activities of the average American

citizen, and yet they could have the power and authority

to do it under this bill as written."

=

The National Security Act of 1947 was approved

7/26/47. It provided that for the purpose of coordinating the

intelligence activities of the several Government departments

and agencies in the interest of national security, the, Agency

under the direction of the NSC was:

otto or bo

(1) To advise NSC in matters concerning such

intelligence activities of the Government departments

and agencies of the Government as relate to the

national security,

(2) To make recommendations to the NSC for the

coordination of such activities,

(3) To correlate and evaluate intelligence relating

to national security and provide for its appropriate

dissemination within the Government: Provided, That the

Agency shall have no police, subpoena, law enforcement

powers, or internal security responsibilitles,

(1) To perform such additional services of common

concern as the NSC determines can be more efficiently

accomplished contrally..rccr

(5) To perform such other functions and duties

related to intelligence aijecting national aocurity as the.

NSC may Iron time to time direct.

= 21 a

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There is tacit acknowledgement in Section 403 (e)

of the National Security Act of 1947 that the FBI gathers

information affecting the national security. This

section

provides:

(e) To the extent recommended by the NSC and approved

by the President, such intelligence of the departments and

agencies of the Government, except as hereinalter provided,

relating to the national socurity shall be open to the

inspection of the Director of Central Intelligence, and

such intelligence as relates to the national security and

is possessed by such departments and other agencies of

the Government,

be made available to the Director of Central Intelligence

fox correlation, evaluation, and dissemination: Provided,

however, That upon the written request of the director

the Director of the FBI shall

make available to the Director of Central Intelligence

such information for correlation, evaluation, and

dissemination as may be essential to the national

b.

National Security Council Intelligence Directives

To implement the authority granted to it under ine

National Security Act of 1947, the National Security Council

has issued a series of "National Security Council Intelligence

Directives," usually referred to as NSCID's and commonly called

"Nonscids." The first of these was issued December 12, 1947, and

provided for the establishing of the intelligence Advisory

Committee to maintain the relationship necessary for a fully

effective integration oi the national intelligence effort. By

Directive dated September 15, 1958, the U. S. Intelligence Board

(USIB) was formally created

as successor to the Intelligence Advisory

Committee and a counterpart known as the U. S. Communications

Intelligence Boara.

NSCID No. I provided that the Director of Central

Intelligence should coordinate the

foreign intelligence activities

of the United States, such coordination to include both special

and other forms of intelligence.

The USIB under this Directive

shall "advise and assist the Director of Central Intelligence as

he may require in the discharge of his

statutory responsi-

bilities."

It is the Board which is empowered to establish

policies, deline intelligence objectives, make recommendations

to appropriate U.S, officials, develop standards for protection

o1 Intelligence, and jormulate

policies with respect to arrange

ments with foreign governments.

The Director of Central

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Intelligence is designated as Chairman of this Board and in

this capacity is distinguished from the Disector of the

Central Intelligence Agency. A more complete discussion with

regard to the Bureau's role in this over-all setup is set forth

horoinaitor undor tho caption "FBI Rolationa Wiüh tho

United States Intelligence Board."

National

Security Council Intelligence Directive

No. I, originally issued 12/12/47, defines the various types

intelligence in Section 4.

(a) National Intelligence is that intelligence

.. which is required for the formulation of national security

policy, concerns more than one department or agency,

and transcends the exclusive competence of a single

department or agency.

The Director of Central Intelli

gence shall produce*

national intelligence with the

support of the U. S. Intelligence Board.

(b) Departmental Intelligence is that intelligence

which any department or agency requires to execute its ora

mission.

(c) Interdepartmental Intelligence is integrated

departmental intelligence which is required by departmenis

and agencies of the Government for the execution of their

missions, but which transcends the exclusive competence

of a single department or agency to produce. The

subcommittee structure of the U. S. Intelligence Board

may be utilized for the production and dissemination of

interdepartmental intelligence.

Director ol Central Intelligence is then authorized

to disseminate national intelligence and interdepartmental

intelligence provided it is done consistent with statutes and

Presidential policy, and provided further "that any disclosure

Of FBI intelligence

information shall be cleared with that

agency prior to dissemination."

*: This acknorledges: that FBI information includes both

national and interdepartmental intelligence.

$ N 8 8 7 77

#A footnote here states: "By 'produce' is meant 'to correlate

and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security' as

provided in the National Security Act or 1947, as amended;

Section 102, (d) (3)."

."

23

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of foreign intelligence

NSCID No. 2 Ibaued 1/23/48, relates to coordination.

collection activities "not covered

by other NSC Directives."

The Director of Central Intolligonco has responsi-

bility for planning to assure there is no undesirable

duplication and that coverage is adequate.

Responsibilities are then assigned as lollows:

(1) The Department of State shall have primary

responsibility tor, and shall periorm as a service o1

commos concern, the collection abroad (1.e, outside

the U. S. and its possessions) of political, sociological,

economic, scientific and technical information.

(2) The Department of Defense shall have primary

responsibility tor, and shall periorm as a service oi

common concern, the collection of military intelligence

information.

Owing to the importance of scientific and

technical intelligence to the Department of Defense

and the military services, this collection responsibility

sirail

incluue scientific and techrical, as well as economic:

Information directly pertinent to Department of Defense

miSSiOns.

(It seems significant that while State Depart

ment primary responsibility was limited by the phrase

"the collection abroad," there was no such limitation

(3)

The Central Intelligence Agency may collect

abroad intelligence information in support of

assigned

func

tions or as a byproduct of assigned functions: Provided,

that this collection involves no undesirable duplication

Of any of the specific assignments to State and Defense

Departments, and Provided, that any such overt collection

is coordinated with the Department of State or with the

Senior U. S. Representative.

In Section 7 of NSCID No: 2 there is delegated to

CIA responsibility for overt collection of foreign intelligence

in the U.S: as follows:

"The Central Intelligence Agency, as a service of

сонной совсети,

shall be responsible for the selective

exploitation within the United States of non-governmental

organizations and individuals as sources of foreign

0 224

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intelligence information, in accordance with policies,

procedures and practices

established as provided in

paragraph 3a of NSCID No. 1, by the Director of Central.

Intelligence with the concurrences of the U. S. Intelli-

BANCe BOLId."

Section 9 of the same Directive provides that CIA

"shall conduct the exploitation of foreign languago publications

for intelligence purposes, as appropriate, as a service of

common concern.

When this function is carried out in the U. S.,

this also constitutes overt collection of foreign intelligence

by that Agency in this country.

It may be worthy to note at this point that NSCID

No. 's I and 2 were discussed, approved, and issued in their

original jorms prior to 7/1/49 when the FBi was designated &

a 50u551/49

member of the Intelligence Advisory Committee.

NSCID No. 3 on Coordination of Intelligence Production

contains definitions of various types of intelligence (including

those defined in NSCID No. 1) and then delineates prinary

responsibilities for "producing" intelligence among various

agencies, stating wita respeci to CiA:

"The Central Intelligence Agency shall produce

economic intelligence on the Sino-Soviot Bloc and

scientific and technical intelligence as a service oi

common concern. Further, the Central Intelligence

Agency may produce such other intelligence as may be

necessary to discharge the statutory responsibilities

Since, as noted hereinbefore, "collection" activities

are defined in NSCID No. 2, It would seem to jollow that the

word "produce" as used in NSCID No. 3 has the same definition

as set out in a footnote to NSCID No. I, paragraph 4, i.e., "to

correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national

security."

Thus, NSCID No. 3 would not appear to extend CIA's

jurisdiction to collect intelligenco or be operational in any vay.

::÷•

The remaining' NSCID's appear to have no bearing on

the subject matter of foreign intelligence collection in the

United States.

• 25 ..

Page 303-

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C. Director of Central Intelligence Directives

To implement the National Security Act of 1917 as

amendod and the various National

Security Council INtellIgONCO

Directives issued pursuant thereto, the Director of Central

Intelligence has issued uumerous Directives (DCID's).

The

first o1 these having a direct bearing on jurisdictional matters

is DCID No. 2/3, captioned "Domestic Exploitation of

Nongovernmental

Organizations and Individuals."

NSCID NO. 2,

paragraph 7, states that CIA shall be responsible fox the

selective exploitation within the U. S. of such organizations

and individuals as sources of foreign intelligence information.

We, therefore, have avoided, and should avoid, any operations

among nongovernmental organizations and individuals designed

solely to produce foreign intelligence without CIA priOr

approval or nullification of these provisions.

DCID No. 2/3 provides for exploitation of nongovernmental

•U. S. citizens by CIA domestic field offices and states, "In

cases where the federal Bureau of Investigation has indicated

operational interest in a U.S. citizen, Central Intelligence

Agency will coordinate with

that agency prior to further contact."

This DCID also provides for exploitation by CIA

domestic field offices of aliens, following a prior name check

• with IBI so our statutory obligations may be properly met without

CIA Interference.

It is of possible interest to note that in dealing with

these two matters, DCID No. 2/3 refers to nongovernmental U. S.

citizens but only

to aliens (without the restrictive adjective).

The NSCID on which it is based refers to nongrovernmental

individuals without distinguishing between citizens and aliens.

Thus, there appears to have been an intention to confine CIA's

intelligence exploitation functions within the U. S. A review

of our file on CIA (62-80750) indicates this might well have

been a concession to the Bureau since we went on record opposing

delegation of any intelligence collection functions within the

U., S. to CIA in letters to Lieutenant General Hoyt S. Vandenberg

(then Director of Central Intelligence Group)

on June 25, 1946,

heading "National Intelligence Authority."

o 26 c

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DCID No. 2/8 is captioned "Domestic Exploitation of

U. S. Government Organizations and Officials." It begins in

very general terms, "Pursuant to the provisions of NSCID No. 1

and NSCID No. 2.

It providos, "Tho Contral Intolligonco

Agency shall

coordinate and have the

primary responsibility for

exploitation of the foreign intelligence potential of non-USIB

organizations and officials to moot community noods as

service of common concern."

As set forth above, there seems to be no basis for

such CIA jurisdiction in NSCID No. 1 and No. 2.

Paragraph 7

of NSCID No. 2 specifically restricts CIA in this area of

operations to nongovernmental organizations

and individuals.

A review of our U. S. Intelligence Board (USIB) file,

62-90718,.

shows following apropos this matter:

The Draft Minutes of the 3/21/61 USIB

meeting report that the Board approved the

draft of a DCID on "Domestic Exploitation of

J. S. Government Organizations and Officials,"

which would be issuea as uciu no. Lio, circcuive

3/21/61. Mr. Belmont was present at this USIB

meeting as the IBI representative.

(unnumbered

serial between serials 1131 & 1132, USIB file)

Tracing this subject

matter back through

the UsiB tile it was learned that it apparently

was first considered at the meeting held 2/23/60-

at which the Bureau was represented by Fred A.

Frohbose. The minutes

for that meeting reported

the Board agreed in principle that a directive on

Intelligence Exploitation of U. S. Governmental

officials would be desirable. However, the

matter was referred to the Committee on Domestic

Exploitation for further study and the submission

of a revised draft for Board consideration.

(unnumbered serial between serials 1040 & 1041,

USIB file)

From the foregoing it would appear that the Bureau

concurred in the issuance of this particular Directive and thus

to an extension of CIA's overt collection activities in the

U:S. if this should, in fact, be interpreted as an extension.

DCID 4/l provides for the establishment of the

• Interagency Defector Committee.

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DCID's 4/2 and 4/3 relate to the Defector Program

abroad and domestically,

respectively.

The latter one dwells on

division of responsibilities between rBl and CIA in the handling

of defectors within the continental limits of the United Statos.

It piovidos that exploitation of such doloctors shall be conducted:

I. To obtain internal security information or other

data required by FBI in view of its statutory responsibilitios

in the internal security field.

2.

To

obtain foreign intelligence information required

in the interests of national security by the member agencies of

the USIB.

3. For such other purposes as are deemed to be in the

• interests of national security.

=

The very next sentence then gives the implication that

exploitation of the defector for foreign intelligence purposes is

• the principal responsibility of CIA, fox it reads, "Decision as

to the relative importance of internal security exploitation by

FBI and foreign intelligence exploitation by the Central

InteLLigencE

Agency (cia, shall be made jointly by representatives of

CIA and FBI."

There then follows a listing of nine specific FBI

responsibilities, one of which is to make available to CIA foreign

intelligence

information resulting from the initial exploitation

of defectors. There is no subsequent specific delineation of CIA

responsibility over foreign intelligence exploitation until there

is a transfer of respons-pility for handling a defector from FBi

to CIA after FBI interests have been fully satisfied.

There is a

general assignment of such responsibility to CIA in the terms,

"CIA shall be responsible for: a.

Coordinating the activities oi.

other departments and agencies concerned with defector matters,

except those responsibilities assigned exclusivaly to FBI . . .."

As a matter of practice, is it is determined there is

little or no importance from an internal security standpoint in

connection with a particular defection, we do not take over but in

effect give clearance to CIA to proceed from a foreign intelli

gence standpoint.

DCID's in the 5/ series (numbers one through five) were

issued principally to implement NSCID Number 5 which deals with

U. S, espionage and clandestine counterintelligence activities

abroad.

There appears to be no conflict with FBI jurisdiction in

this series.

All other DCID's relate to Elint Critical Intelligence

and other matters. which appear to have no bearing on possible

conflicts between CIA and FBI responsibilitios

no 28 a.

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a. Dulles Committee 1949

The Dulles Committee was appanted february 3, 1948,

by the National Security Council (NSC) to male a "comprohensivo,

Impartial and objoctive survey of the organization, activities

and personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)." The

Committee was instructed

to report its lindings and recommendations

on the following matters:

(a) The adequacy and effectiveness of che

organization structure of CIA.

(b) The value and elliciency of existing CIA activities.

(c) The relationship of these activitiesto those of

other departments and agencies.

(d), The utilization and qualifications of CIA personnel.

The Committee's scope was extended on March I7, 1948,

to include the lollowing provisions: "This survey will comprise

nimarily a thorough and comprehensive examination of the

structure, administration, activities and inter agency relation

ships of the CIA as outlined in the resolution of the National

Security Council. It will also include an examination of such

intelligence activities of other Government departments and

agencies as relate to the national security, in order to make

recommendations for their eifective operation and overall

coordination..

This report, which is dated January 1, 1919, for the

most part concerned itsell with administrative matters affecting

CIA and the necessity for reorganization within that Agency.

notes, however,

that the National Security Act, as implemented

by directives of the NSC, imposed upon CIA responsibility for

carrying out three essential functions:

(I)

The coordination of intelligence activities.

(2)

The correlation and evaluation of intelligence

relating to the national security, which has been interpreted

by directive as

moanine

the production* of national intelligence.

"....

-

*. See definition of "produce" in lootnoté to NSCID No. I, Section

4D as "correlate and evaluate," the reverse of connotation given

hẹre.

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(3) The performance centrally, subject to NSC

direction, of certain intelligence and related functions

Of

common concern to various departments of the Government.

The report noted that section 102 of the National

Security Act of 1947 established a framework for a sound

intelligenco system and no amendment to that saction of the

Act was deemed necessary.

Although the coordination of intelligence activities

of the several departments and agencies concerned with national

security was a primary reason for establishing CIA, the report

noted the National Security Act does not give CIA independent

authority to coordinate intelligence activities, as final

responsibility to establish policies was vested

in the NSC.

The statutory limitations upon the authority of CIA

to coordinate intelligene activities without the approval of

the NSC were, according to the report, obviously designed to

protect the autonomy and internal arrangements of the various

departments and agencies periorming intelligence functions.

In spite of these calculated limitations où tia- authorizy of

CIA,

the report noted, it was clear the Agency was expected to

provide the initiative and leadership in developing a coordinated

intelligence system. In practice, the NSC has almost without

exception approved the recommendations submitted to it by CIA

for the coordination of intelligence activities.

The National Security Act does not define the

"intelligence activities" which were to be coordinated by CIA

under the direction of the NSC or specify the departments

whose activities

were covered.

Presumably; according to the

report, all intelligence activities relating to the national

security were included, Irom collecting intormation in the tirst

Instance to. the preparation and dissemination of finished

intelligence reports and estimates.

"The criterion," which the

report noted was a very broad one, was "such intelligence

activities..

as relate to the national security and not

the identity of the departments concerned or the nature or

locale of the intelligence activity."

Thus, the report noted,

practically no limitations are set upon the

scope of the intelli-

gence activities with which the Central Intelligence Agency is

to concern itsell.

∞. 30

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The report noted another broad field requiring

coordination is that of foreign intelligence derived from

domestic sources and the allied field of domestic counter-

intelligence.

This includes the exploitation or intollisonce

from United

states business firms, travellers,

etc.,

exploitation

of the intelligence possibilities

of groups and individuals of

foreign nationality in the United Statos, the rolating of

domostic counterintelligenco to loreign intelligence and

coordination of domestic counterespionage with counterespionage

abroad.

Except for the exploitation of private sources oi

Loreign intelligence in the United States which is centralizod

in the Office of Operations, CIA, responsibility for other

activities is scattered among the State Department, the armed

services, the FBI and CIA.

The FBI, which has primary security and law enforce-

responsibilities, is concerned in fact with an important

area of intelligence.

This includes domestic counterespionage

and countersabotage,

control of communist and other subversive

activities and surveillances of alien individuals and groups.

All of these functions, according to the report, are closely

reidioù iu the cumpaiable activities abroud of the CIA.

The report noted the FBI was not. part of the then

l existing machinery for courdination of intelligence through

ithe

Intelligence Advisory Committee. and there was no continuing

manner whereby domestic intelligence and counterintelligence

were related to overall national intelligence in order to serve

the general purpose set forth in the National Security Act,

which was set forth as "of coordinating the intelligence activities

of the several Government departments and agencies in the interest

01

national security."

It was the opinion of the authors of the Dulles Report

that CIA had the duty under the Act to concern itself with the

problen of coordinating those phases of domestic intelligence

and counterintelligence which relate to the national security.

and CIA should submit recommendations on this. subject to the

NSC. The report noted this was not inconsistent with the

stipulation of the National

Security Act that CIA "shall have no

police, subpoena, law enforcement powers or internal security

с?сё

•functions. "

i: 20. 31-0

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## Page 310

The Dulles Commission recommended that the FBI

should be made a member of the Intelligence Advisory

Committee

to improve coordination of domostic intelligence and countor

Intelligence Insofar as these matters relatod to the national

security.

While discussing the production of National

Intelligence Estimates by CIA, the repoct noted, "There is

no systematic way of tapping

that domestic intelligence

information, which should be chiefly in the hands of the FBI,

having a bearing on broader intelligence issues and there

is no regular and agreed arrangement for participation by the

FBI and Ior the use of intelligence Iron domestic sources in

a national estimate."

National Security Council Intelligence Directive

Number 7 provided that CIA shall be cesponsible for the

exploitation, on a highly selective basis, within the United

States of business concerns,

other non-Governmental organizations

and individuals as sources of foreign intelligence information.

The.

renort concluded the amount of foreign intelligence which

can be obtained through the exploitation of non-tuvernacate

•sources in the United States is considerable and its quality

could be very high if appropriate arrangements were made and

discrimination was employed.

It was felt the vast number oi

organizations, institutions

and individuals having foreig

interests and

knowledge represented a potential source of

intelligence that in many ways was

superior to any other,

as it was felt that they were in a position to provide

information obtained from their foreign contacts and Ixom the

findings on their own people abroad..

A lurther important source of information, the

exploitation for intelligence purposes of loreign individuals

and groups in the United States was also being developed.

The

report noted that these individuals and groups as well as

political refugees and former foreign government officials

were often engaged in political activity with significant

international implications.

CIn and other intelligence agencies had not developed

coordinäted and effective policies and procedures for the.

exploitation of intellijence in this important field. The FBI,

according to the report, had a major interest in foreign

- 32

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## Page 311

individuals and groups in the United States because of

possible security implications: The report indicated the

I'B possessed considerable intormation concerning many

individuals and croups but this information had boen obtained

primarily with security other than intelligence considerations

in mind and was not normally given the kind of interpretation

or dissemination that intelligence required it it was to be

properly used.

It was also noted the fBI was, in cases where

it had a security interest, reluctant on security grounds to

have intelligence exploitation by outside agencies. The general

result of this situation, according to the report, was that an

important source of intelligence was not being fully exploited:

The report noted that the question of the

exploitation for intelligence

purposes of foreign groups and

Individuals in the United States was a clear example where

the Intelligence Advisory Committee, with the FBI being added

-as & member, should establish principles and rules for

cooraination..

In discusoing the raminictrative handling of

espionage and counterespionage matters within the CIA, the

report noted the FBI was charged with all counterespionage

responsibilities in the United States except those aflecting

personnel of the armed services. The Dulles Commission

recommended the counterespionage activities of CIA should be

increased in scope and emphasis and that closer liaison in

this jeld should be established with the FBI.

The only effect the Dulles Report had on the FBI

was its inclusion as a member of the Intelligence Advisory

Conmittee by amendment to HSCID Number 1 dated July.?, 1949.

€.

Hoover Commission, 1948 and 1955

Task forces of the Commission on Organization of the

Executive Branch of the Government (Hoover Commission)

conducted surveys of CIA operations from 1917 to 1949 (under F.

Eberstadt) and from 1953 to 1955 (under General Mark Clark).

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The Commission concerned itself principally with

the efiiciency with which CIA was fulfilling its statutory.

missions of coordination, correlation, evaluation, and

dissemination of the intelligence product of other Government

agencies and departments.

The Commission examined agency

activity in light of the CIA primary mission of advising

NSC and performing, services and duties related to

intelligence and national security as the NSC directed.

(la) Eberstadt Task Force Report

The results of the first examination of CIA by the

Hoover Commission were more or less apologetic in tone o

emphasizing the soundness of directives setting up NSC and its

direction of the Agency.

The report pointed out, however,

that CIA and its parent, NSC, had had little time to actually

implement the coordination necessary for leadership in the

field. The Task Force clearly defined its understanding of

•the CIA mission as:

"....., coordinate intelligence activities

of Federal agencies concerned with national security."

The duties of CIA were listed as:

I.

Advise National Security Council on national

security intelligence activitios of Federal departments and

agencies:

2.

Recommend necessary coordination of such

activities to National Security Council.

3.

Correlate, evaluate and disseminate national

security intelligence.

4. Render intelligence services for other Federal

• departments

and agencies." (62-88575-3 enclosure behind file.)

In discussing the duties of the CIA the Task Force

noted, "Under the statute CIA is entrusted with the performance

of such services of common concern as the National Security

Council shall determine. At present these include, apart from

Scientific Intelligence, which is discussed separately:

(20)

maintenance ot central indexes of report, records, and documents

having intelligence value; (b)

examination of foreign documents

from which intelligence material is extracted and disseminated;

maintenance of central may facilities; (d) monitoring or

foreign broadcasts; and (e)

collection of the information by

clandestine means and counterespionage abroad."

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In evaluating the operations and location of CIA •

counterespionage the Task Force commented as follows:

"The counterespionage activities of CIA abroad appear

properly integrated with CIA's other clandestine operations.

Although arguments have been made in favor of extending CIA's

authority to include responsibility for counterespionage in this

country, such ar

extension of jurisdiction does not a present

appear justitiea.

For one thing, concentration of power over

counterespionage activities at home in the hands of a Director

of Central Intelligence responsible for espionage abroad might

justifiably arouse public suspicion and opposition.

conceivably

it could form the basis for a charge that a gestapo is in

process of creating even though the power to arrest were

specifically withheld. To transier responsibility for domestic

counterespionage from the FBI, which has an established

organization and long tradition, to CiA, which is not equipped

tor the assignment, would probably create more problems than it

would solve.

It is doubtful whether the logical benefit of

having one agency responsible for counterespionage throughout

the world would justify the dislocation and confusion that such

û transfer would inevitablv occasion. "

"CIA representatives have indicated that their present

working liaison with FBI is satisfactory, but the Committee

doubts that IBI-CIA relationships are completely adequate.

The

Director of FBI declined the Committee's invitation to appear

before it to discuss the CIA with the committee or its

representatives on the ground that he knew too little of its

activities."

The groundwork for CIA acceptance was laid by the

Conmittee recommendation and finding:

"CIA is not now properly

organized. Co-equal improvement In Go4, IBI, ONd, state

Department, and other Government intelligence services is also

essential.

Spirit of teamwork must govern interagency

intelligence relationships.

CIA deserves and must have greater

degree of acceptance aud support from old-line intelligence

services than it has had in the past."

A pitch was made for a single agency controlling

internal security in the Committee's finding: "The committee

believes that responsibility for internal security policies

should be immediately focused in one agency.

A more thorough

study of the subject than any yet made must be prosecuted, 'and

interagency frictions must be ended." It is noted that the

committee commented elsewhere in its report:

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"Detailed study of organization and activities of

intelligence divisions of the Government, including CIA, is

being made by a committee consisting of Messrs. Allen Dulles,

WillIan H. Jackson,

of four directed by Mr. Robert Blum of

Secretary of Defense."

With this statement it may be assumed

the Task Force excused omissions it may have made with the

observation that the Dulles

group was conducting almost the

same survey carried on in the Hoover Commission so far as

CIA was involved.

(1b) Clark Task Force Report

The Task Force headed by. General Mark Clark

submitted a Top Secret report dated in May, 1955, setting

forth results of the second Hoover Commission survey of the

organization of CIA. The report pointed out the survey

was of departments and agencies with entire or prime

responsibility in the fiold of positive foreign intelligence

as it pertains to national defense and security. It

mualified this survey when speaking of the FBi, noting

survey vas limited to survey of Bureau only to the exteni

that it dealt in security intelligence.

Again the Hoover Commission through its Task

Force pinned CIA jurisdiction down to the areas defined by statute,

and emphasized the Agency was subordinate only to the National

Security Council in its coordination, correlation, dissemination

and collection of intelligence data.

The Tasks Force noted

that since CIA is charged with the over all responsibility

for coordinating the output of all intelligence forces, the

Task Force was giving special attention to the work oi

that

Agency.

In the Task Force Report a review of the FBi

functions in the intelligence community was set forth.

The

committee noted that the FBI had only limited activities in tho

positive intelligence field but noted additionally that FBI

functions in the current intelligence eilori vere of interest

In order to lill out the intelligence picture.

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The FBI was cited

as one of the four members of

the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC), created

by the NSC, approved by the President 3/23/49, to coordinate

"the investigation of all domestic espionage,

counterospionago,

sabotago, subversion, and other related matters affecting

internal security."

It was noted that the IIc charter did not disturb

responsibilities of its member agencies but made mandatory

action by those agencies deemed necessary to insure complete

investigative coverage in compliance with the needs of the

IIC, which had full responsibility for coordination of the

investigation of all domestic espionage, counterespionage,

ei cetera, allecting internal security.

The Committee stated, "The Central Intelligence

Agency is, by law, excluded from duplicating the internal

security functions of the FBI. However, the CIA does develop

within and without the U.S., sources for foreign (positive)

intelligence, and incidental

thereto may develop leads as to

subversive activities within this country.

In such cases

CiA inrougü liaisou gives its information to the FBI."

A Task Force survey revealed,

"Through the Central

Intelligence Agency's dunestic field offices, contacts are

made on a highly selective basis with business concerns and

other nongovernmental agencies, as well as with previously

cleared individuals who travel

abroad

Under the

provisions of DCID 7/1, each member of

the Intelligence

Advisory Committee is required to establish in Washington

a focal office for the purpose of interviewing nongovernment

visitors.

Any visitors to these offices denonstrating

good intelligence potential are referred to the CIA for further

exploitation."

The Task Force noted that as far back as 1939

President Roosevelt by executive order directed the FBI tO

coordinate and conduct domestic counterintelligence activities.

In 1949, according to the Committee's survey, the IIC was

formalized and by charter restricted to coordinating investi

gations in intelligence matters domestically.

.. ~ 37

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In commenting on the role of the FBI the Committee

further noted, "The Federal Bureau of Investigation, however,

is the recognized center of the domestic aspect of internal

socurIty includIng countorintolligorco wIthin the Unitod States

and its possessions."

With regard to the use and surfacing of sources,

the Committee noted that CIA was

not bound to disclose its

sources; however, it commented on the excellent Ilalson

system of the FBi which had overcome this restriction so tar

as internal security within

the u.S. is concerned.

"Now,

as a matter of practice 'he CIA usually refers domestic sources

to the IBI, the only exception being where the source is to be

used in foreign intelligence work by the CIA." In the area

of defectors within this country, the Committee noted that

the FBI will receive from CIA or

by a direct interrogation of

a CIA-controlled defector information which the defector may

have concerning internal security. Persons who defect within

this country, on the other hand, were found to be under the

cognizance of the FBI.

Then the reverse of the above situation

comes into play and CIA has access to the delector for developing

LEaUs

in thu toroign intelligence ield. The Committee

commented,

"It is the duty of the FBi to conduct investigations

of all cases involving 1 reign nationals in the United States

as set forth in the Delimitations Agreement."

A review of the Commission report lends one important

fact to our study of this subject matter. This was pointed

up by the membership of the various groups at the disposal

of the National Security Council within the field of national

intelligence. Ten subcommittees or working groups with member

ship from separate departments or interested agencies acted

in advisory capacities to the IAC parent committee.

In each

of these subcommittees the chairman was a represeatative of

serviced by a secretariat furnished by CIA. From the top-

heavy alignment of CIA personnel in IAC and its working groups

slanted when dissenting matters were presented by the IAC and

CIA tO the NSC.

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I. .

The Doolittlo Committee, 1954

In July, 1954, we received information from the

White House

that

the President had appointed lieutenant

General James H. Doolittle to study in collaboration with

the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) certain aspects of

By letter dated

July 28, 1954,

Sherman Adams, the Assistant to the crestdent,

requested that the Bureau brief General Doolittle's group

concerning the relationship that existed between the Bureau

and CiA.

We subsequently learned that at approximately the

same time & survey would be conducted by the Hoover

Commission under the chairmanship of General Mark Clark.

We learned from Allen W. Dulles, Director of CIA, that the

President strongly believed that General Clark should not

permit the survey to get into CIA covert operations,

particularly in the field of political and psychológical

warfare.

The President had told Dulles that he was selecting

General

Doolittle to study CIA's covert operations.

General Doolittle's group was briefed on

August 25, 1954, at which time the Bureau's position in

the intelligence field was described and the manner in

which the Bureau transacted business with CIA was explained.

In addition, certain constructive criticism concerning

problems and conflicts

experienced in dealing with CIA was

furnished General Doolittle's group. The Lollowing salient

features of the criticism appear to bear on the current study:

We were critical of a policy of the Office of

Operations, CIA, which precluded that Division from

identifying any of its sources in the United States when

such sources possessed information bearing on the internal

security of the United States.

The Office of Operations

of 1954 collected foreign intelligence information in the

United States from aliens, businessmes, and others, and

periodically would receive information

of interest to .the:

Bureau.

Instances arose where the Bureau desired to Interview

the original source but was prevented from getting to the

...

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source by CIA policy. We were of the opinion that CIA's

policy could bo modified to allow us direct accoss to

the sourco in the united states when such was necessary.

As of 1954, CIA had

Intorost in various

organizations such as Radio Free Europe and others and

from time to time the Bureau vould get involved in

investigation o1 organizations only to learn they vere

being supported or guided by cIA.

Our opinion was that

11 we had been appropriately notilled of CIA's interest

considerable investigative time and manpower could have

been saved and in addition we would have been in a position

to notily CIA when anything of interest came to our

attention.

Concerning CIA investigations in the United

States, we readily acknowledged CIA's right to investi

gate its own applicants or consultants. We did object

to CIA's undertaking any investigation in this country

when the facts indicated the case was clearly within

Bureau jurisdiction and pointed out that the Bureau had

recently become involved in investigating an individual

suspected of espionage activity. We were in contact with

CIA and had solicited its help concerning certain aspects

in the case but it was a few weeks before we learned CIA

had conducted a very close investigation of this same

'individual.

cooperation between the Bureau and CIA was vital to the

proper handling of espionage cases.

The Bureau pointed out that as of 1954 it had

received little or no signilicant information concerning

espionage or sabotage agents coming to the United States.

We excluded diplomatic personnel in this matter but clearly

indicated that CIA should be in a position to give us some

advance notification whes spies were coming to this country.

• 40 ∞

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1.

Possibly this latter was the strongest'

we had since we did not feel CIA with its resources and

overseas contacts was performing one of its prime functions

in the intelligence fiold; that is, identilying foroign

111esals who are en routo to the uniced states.

briefing of

General Dool: ttle's group, we described the

Bureau's collection oi intelligence iniormation for the

Interested Government agencies as a major operation.

Our

discharge of our intelligence operation concerning the

Communist

Party and Soviet and Satellite diplomats was

explained in detail to the satisfaction of all personnel

attending the briefing.

General Doolittle asked for recommendations as to

what could be done to improve CIA so the Bureau would get

better service.

It was suggested that corrective action be

taken on the matters which had been criticized constructively;

CIA should establish adequate coverage (although not

specifically noted, this obviously regarded advance notice

of foreign intelligence personnel coming to the United States) ;.

and finally CIA should transmit information developed

in an

empodite fashion.

Prior to submitting the report to the President,

General Doollitle expressed a desire to see Mr. Hoover, whom

he regarded

as the outstanding intelligence authority in the

world..

The

General visited the Director on October 5, 1954,

during

which visit CIA's operations were discussed and

generally the points of the previous meeting were reicerated.

General Doolittle felt the ideal solution would be to wipe out

•CIA entirely and start all over again, but since this was

impractical his committee would point oui certain neaknesses

and make certain recommendations and suggestions to the

President for the correction of these weaknesses.

•We do not have the contents of General Doolittle's

report and there is nothing to indicate an executive order

was issued from it which in any way delineated the respective

jurisdiction of the Bureau or oi CIA..

The Joint. Study Group on Foreign Intelligence Activities

oi the United States Government

Captioned repost was prepared by the Study Group

and issued 12/15/60. The Group was under the chairmanship of

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Lyman B. Kirtpatrick, Inspector General, Central Intelligence

Agency (CIA), acting as a representative

of the Director o1

Central Intelligence (DCI).

The other four members of the

Study Group represented the Department of Stato, Secrotary o1

Datense, Buroau of the Budget, and the National

security

Council

(NSC)•

examination by the Group were

organizational and management aspects within the intelligence

effort relating to all aspects of foreign intelligence.

the contines of these objectives the Bureau was not considered

those objectives tho

fox examination by the Group in view of the Bureau's lack of

operational jurisdiction in matters outside of this country.

Mr. Belmont, acting for the Bureau, gave a briefing berore the

Group on 7/29/60 regarding the Bureau's relations with other

United States intelligence agencies.

There was no mention

made of the Bureau in the report except in one of its

recommendations relative to reorganization of the membership

„Of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) which will be

dealt with in more detail later.

The 141 page report submitted hy the Group appeared

to be apologetic in tone for any shortcomings of CIA. The

reader obtains the definite impression the report was used as

a sounding board for differences of opinion as to methods and

administration for collection of foreign intelligence (overt

and covert, abroad.

The main

basis for conclusions and recommenaations

made by the Group rested in delineation of duties of DCI as

coordinator of intelligence as opposed to DCI secondary

responsibility as head of CIA.

The Group recognized service

jealousies apparently resulting from refusal to accept the

fact that DCI could control and coordinate intelligence effort

without affording preferential treatment to CIA which was his

operational and administrative aril.

There is no reference in the report to a clear

definition of CIA operational responsibilities or jurisdiction

within continental United States.

The Group found that DCI through heads of missions

abroad and designated DCI representatives in foreign countries

had principal responsibility for control and coordination o1

foreign collection efforts.

The CIA's operations abroad were

recognized in almost all 43 of the Group's recommendations.

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Recommendation number 17 emphasized that CIA

should place emphasis on the establishment of unofficial

cover throughout the world; recommendation number 20 was

thai CIA should increase intelligence support to uniliod and

component commanders by direct dissomination Irom porcinent

idold stations.

The report noted that CIA's main requirements

problem related to clandestine collection and concerned

the great number of requirements served on the Agency. ..

The main tone of the report was that greater

cooperation was required between the Joint Chiois of Stafi

(JCS) ,

Department of State, and CIA in carrying out foreign

intelligence collection missions.

The recommendations of

the Group were all directed toward this end and had no

bearing on internal espionage or counterespionage activities

within the United States.

In commenting on the coordination duties of the

DCI, the Group pointed out that USIB had been officially

directed to "establish policies and develop programs for

the guidance gi ali departments and agencies conceiied, tha

DCI is authorized to make such surveys of departmental

intelligence activities or the various departments and

agencies as he may deem necessary in connection with his

duty to advise the NSC and coordinate the intelligence effort

of the United States."

The report interpreted these official

directions to indicate that USIB should assume a greater

proportion of the actual direction and control of the

intelligence community of which the Bureau was noted to be

a member.

To strengthen USIB position as a director,

should be reduced to four members

who should be the dCi

(chairman) and representatives of Secretary of State, Secretary

of Defense, and Joint Chiefs of Staff. The FBI and the Atomic

Energy Commission would be relegated to ad hoc representation

on the Board.

= 43 «

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It should be noted in considering the proposed

change of USIB membership that the Bureau was a member of

six of the twenty-six subcommittees which formed the committee

make-up of the USIb.

Memorandum January 10, 1961, Mr: Belmont to

Mr. Parsons outlined the proposed USIB membership change

for the Director.

It recommended that Bureau make no issue

of the proposed recommendation.

a passage of the memorandum which stated "In one sense of

the word it could be arbied the FBI would lose prestige

by changing Irom a regular member to an ad hoc member."

The Director approved the recommendation of the memorandum

Our status, however, was

not changed and the Bureau has continued to hold full member-

ship on the Board.

In brief, the Joint study Group Report noted that

the majority of the recommendations of the study Group had

beer fevorably received by the intelligence community In

that positive action had been taken to place most of them

in effect.

Many of the recommendations of the Group were

Ielt to have been met by the creation of the Delense

Intelligence Agency (DIA) which acted as a coordinator and

overseer of the intelligence effort of the Joint Chiefs

•of Stalf.

There is no comment made in this report which

would bear on our present survey of CIA jurisdiction or

activities within the United States in conflict with our own

jurisdictional and investigative interests.

The only

relerence to the Bureau in this latter report was as

previously mentioned in the comment relative to reorganization

of the membership of the USIB.

5. Responsibilities of the FBI

8.

Laws and Directives.

No information has been developed with

respect to

any laws passed or directives issued specifically delegating

to the FBI responsibilities for the positive acquisition of

foreign intelligence in the United States, As has been set

44-

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Iorth above under the caption, "The History of Foreign Intelligence

Collection in the United States • Prior to World War II,"

President Roosevelt conducted certain conferences following

which he issued instructions with regard to Invostigations of

fascist and communist activitios in the Unitod States.

Investigations were to be for intelligence purposes.

For the

most part, they took on a counterintelligence aspect; however,

during the course of them foreign intolligence information was

developed either as an outgrowth of investigative activity or

through the conducting of technical surveillances.

We found no record regarding the designation of the

FBI as the agency responsible for collection of foreign intelligence

information in the United States as of the time the Office of

in era ben a co.

Coordinator of Information was created on 7/11/41.

Neither did

we find any record indicating such responsibility had been

delegated to any other agency.

b.

Requests From Other Agencies

From time to time the Bureau has received specific

requesis fion othet agoncioo based upon which wa have undertaken

the collection of foreign intelligence information in the

United States in a clandestine fashion.

Two instances of this

nature were based on requests irom the

Department of State and

from'.

the white House.

(1) Department of State Request - Recognizing a gap

in our intelligence coverage of friendly governments, on

10/27/55 we discussed with the then Deputy Undersecretary of

State, Robert Murphy, the question of instituting limited

•discreet technical surveillances on official establishments of

selected foreign nations, principally those located in world

crouble areas.

We pointed out that the FBi stood ready to

institute such coverage as might be desired by the Department

of state.

Mr. Murphy was quite receptive to this idea, stating

that limited coverage sufficiently flexible to change

with

changing world conditions might be highly desirable,

After

funer discussions it was agreed that a program. "progressive".

in nature, would be instituted.

that he did. not feel at that time that all desirable coverage

should be instituted at a given date, but rather that coverage

should be placed on one country at a time as moving events abroad

might dictate. On this basts this type coverage was instituted

WW-88608-Docld

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based on a specific request from Mr. Murphy on 12/5/55 that we -

place technical surveillances on all Egyptian establishments

In the United States.

Since then, technical surveillances have

been placed on numerous establishments of foreign countries

for eithor extonded or limitod portods of

time, depending upon

developments on the international scene.

(2) White House Request • ID May,

1965, President

Johnson advised the Director he wanted the

TBI to set up a

group in the Dominican Republic for the purpose of taking charge

of cleaning out communists in the Dominican Government and advising

the Government of those who might try to infiltrate Government

ranks.

This was the basis for opening our Santo Domingo OffIce,

which has continued operation since 5/21/65.

As a result of maintaining our Dominican Office and

assisting

in its mission, we have instituted various technical

surveillances and developed numerous live sources in the

United States from which we regularly acquire foreign intelligence

•information.

Since the President has relied on the Bureau to

¡keep him apprised of developments from an Intelligence standpoint

as well as developments with respect to communist influence,.

these sources aro regulaily contacted for information which

fits within the terms of foreign intelligence data.

c.

FBI's Role in the United States Intelligence Board

The predecessor to the United States Intelligence

Board (USIB) was the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC).

the IAC was established by National Security Council Intelligence

•Directive (NSCID)

number 1 dated 12/12/47.

By amendment to

this Directive dated 7/7/49, the Bureau was designated a

member of the IAC for the purpose of coordinating domestic

intelligence with foreign intelligence.

NSCID 1 has been

revised several times.

Subsequent to a revision dated 4/21/58,

the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board merged the

IAC and the U. S. Communications Intelligence Board into one

body known as the United "tates Intelligence Board. National

Security Council Directive dated 9/15/58, approved by the

President, formally created the United States Intelligence

Board

as successor to

the fAC

and the To S. Communications Intelligence

Board.

The USIB in its present form is chaired by the

Director o1 Central Intelligences

The Director of Central

Tot?

:. -46...

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.?!;

Intelligence is distinguished from the Director of Central

Intelligence Agency (CIA) in that the Director of Central

Intelligence as Chairman of the United States Intelligence

Board is considered the President's principal advisor on

foreign intolligenco.

Membership on

tho Unitod Statos

Intelligence Board consists of the Director of Intelligence

and Research, Department of State; the Deputy Director of CIA;

the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency; the Director

of the National Security Agency; the Assistant General Manager

for Administration, Atomic Energy Commission, and the Assistant

Director of the FBI. The primary responsibility of the USB

is the coordination of intelligence activities.

In this

regard, USIB's major effort is concerned with the preparation

and approval of National Intelligence Estimates (NIL) for use

by policy makers.

• As a rule, the Bureau does not participate in the

preparation of NIE's inasmuch as the subject matter is usually

outside the jurisdiction of this Bureau.

We have in the past.

participated in some selective NIE's such as certain estimates

on Cuba, world communism, the clandestine Introduction of

nuclear

weapons into tha

Tinitad States and on the Dominican

Republic.

As part of its stalfing procedure, USIB has

created numerous committees in some of which the Bureau

maintains membership.

The USIB committees on which the

Bureau has representation are the Technical Surveillance

Countermeasures Committee, the Signal intelligence Committee,

the Interagency Defector Committee, the Watch committee, the

Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, the Guided

• Missile

Astronautics Intelligence Committee, the Security Committee,

and the Committee on Documentation.

As a general rule,

attendance at Committee sessions is handled by the Liaison

Section. Attendance at meetings is in the main restricted to

the Interagency Defector Committee, the Watch Committee, the

Security Committee, the Technical Surveillance Countermeasures

• Committee and the Committee on Documentation:

The Bureau has

.a primary interest in

the business of these five committees.

All decisions made by these committees, which are subsequently

approved by the USIB, are the subject of individusl memoranda.

submitted to the Director for his approval.

• • 47

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Over the years, consideration has been given to

the Bureau's withdrawing its membership from USIB. On each

occasion the Director has chosen to have the Bureau retain

its membership on the Board.

in 1964 during the period when John McCone was Chairman of

period dion"

The last such occaston occurred

the United States Intelligence Board. At that time, the military

services were removed from membership on the Board and replaced

by the Defense Intelligence Agency.

At the time, Mr. Belmont,

then Assistant to the Director, orally discussed with the

Director the possibility of the Bureau's withdrawing from the

USIB.

The Director's comments were that we would not request

Intelligence in his role as Chairman of the USIB. The Bureau's

withdrawal would, of course, require action on the part of

the National Security Council.

d.

The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PETAB)

This group was originally organized in January, 1956,

as the President's Board of Consultants on Fordion intolligance

Activity.

Its primary function at that time was to review

periodically the Government's foreign intelligence efforts

with specilic emphasis on the operations of the Central

Intelligence Agency.

It was established as a result of

recommendations by the Hoover Commission.

In the later years

of the Eisenhower Administration the activity of the group

, fell off and it was re-organized in its present form with the

advent of the

Kennedy Administration.

Our relationship with this Board has historically

been one of informal liaison in view of the fact that the

primary function of the Board is concerned with foreign

intelligence.

There have been occasions where representatives

of the Bureau briefed individual members and/or panels of

the Board concerning our jurisdiction, techniques and

accomplishments in the intelligence field. These briefings

"have been received with a receptive and sympathetic attitude.

Ôur main concern in following the activities of this Board

has been to assure that the Central Intelligence Agency does

not encroach upon our j'risdiction and upon the functions of

the various intelligence communities in which we hold membersalp

• 48

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The case Involving Army Sergeant Jack E. Dunlap,

a former employee of the National Security Agency who was

a soviet espionage agent, was thoroughly reviewed by the

DIOSENt. PIAB In VieW Of

the most serlous ramifications 11

presented.

This case concerned the penetration by the

Soviets of the National Security Agency.

The report which

emanated from the PEIAB study Included proposals which aifect

the responsibilities and activities of several agencies within

the intelligence community. All of the twenty-one recommendations.

of the Board dealt with various aspects of achieving a

strengthened counterintelligence capability to guard against

penetration of our security establishments by hostile intelli

gence agencies. Nineteen of the recommendations of the Board

were approved by the President and three of these related

alrectly to Bureau activity. They are as follows:

#18: "That steps be taken to assure that the

Federal Bureau of Investigation has adequate

agent resources to effect the required domestic

counterintelligence coverage of both bloc and

nonbloc official installations and personnel who

may be engaged in inielligence and related

activities Inimical to the national security."

#19: "That the policies of the Department of

State with respect to authorizing technical

coverage (use of wiretapping and listening

devices) by the Federal Bureau of Investigation

of foreign official: installations and personnel

in this country be re-examined with a view to

liberalization to the extent necessary to provide

the counterintelligence coverage required in the

interest of national security."

#20:

"That, in future, when consideration is

•given to exchanging detected Soviet-bloc intelli-

gence agents for imprisoned American personnel in

bloc countries, advance consultations be held with

*Central. Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau

of Investigation to assure that adequate attention

remote;

weighed against the political gains to be achieved."

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e. The Director's Stand Over the Years

The Director's stand over the yoars with respect

to jurisdiction concerning foreign intelligonce mattors

within the United States is reflected in numerous comments

he has made dating back to the days when the Central

Intelligence Group. (CIG) was being formed.

in June, 1946, General Vandenberg, then nead of

CIG, sent a memorandum to the Director proposing that the.

National Intelligence Authority issue a directive extending

the powers and duties of the Director of Central Intelligence,

which position General Vandenberg occupied.

The memorandum

was analyzed on June 21, 1946, in a memorandum from C. H.

Carson to D. M. Ladd in which it was pointed out that

was inevitable that CIG must enter into the domestic

picture because of sources of foreign Intelligence in that

field.

An addendum was placed on the memorandum by Mr. Edward A.

Tamm and Mr. C. A. Tolson which was followed by comments by

the Director which is most pertinent to the subject matter.

The addendur road:

• ,

"Mr. Tolson and Mr. Tamm do not concur with

the conclusion expressed in this memorandum that

'It is inevitable that the Central Intelligence

Group must enter into the domestic field picture

•insofar as intelligence' is concerned becauso of

the sources

of foreign intelligence existing in

that field.'

They feel that a coordinated pro

gram for the exchange of information between the

Central Intelligence Authority and the rBI,

permitting a free and comprehensive exchange of

information in matters of mutual interest, will

enable the Bureau to work in the domestic field

without interference from the Central Intelligence

Authority in the same manner that the Bureau works,

for example, with local police depariments or other

• governmental agencies within defined jurisdictional

1ines •

We believe that the attached letter to

General Vandenberg is satisfactory."

" The Director commented as follows:

:

"I am not as optimistic as are Tolson & Tamm.

I think it is inevitable that there wiil bes

??:

collision with CIG over our domestic jurisdiction

.".

- 50 ∞

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## Page 329

rather their expansion into it on intelligence

matters.

It ought not occur but this new memo

of CiG shows how greedy it is.

It is the

Donovan plan almost in toto & is boing slyly

put over.

It means we must zealously guard our

domestic jurisdiction & not yield an inch & be

ever alert to resist any encroachment."

On March 27, 1953, the Director testified before the

Senate Subcommittee on Appropriations.

In response to a question

from Senator McCarran concerning liaison between FBI and CIA,

the Director stated: "There is close liaison. CIA has

exclusive jurisdiction abroad for intelligence. We have

exclusive jurisdiction within the United States. We maintain

continuous liaison with CIA Headquarters in Washington through

a liaison representative of our Bureau in order to facilitate

the transmission of material from them to us and from our

service to them."

In October, 1958, CIA approached us requesting

concurrence in CIA's establishing physical and technical

surveillance in the United States on the brother of the then

current ruler of Yemen, CIA had an operational interest in

this individual. By memorandum it was recommended that the

Burezu not become involved in this CIA operation and that CIA

be informed that this would not establish a precedent for

approval of future CIA activities in the United States.

Responsive to continuing to present problems, the Director

noted:

"This is an understatement particularly if we are

going to adopt a macaroni backbone attitude instead of standing

up forthrightly for our rights and jurisdiction."

CIA, in April, 1959, advised us that one of its

Egyptian sources would be visiting the United States, and

requested our concurrence in CIA's establishing coverage

including technical surveillance. It was recommended we stay

out of this matter and inform CIA that this was not to be

construed as a precedent for approval of future CIA counter-

intelligence activity in the United States. • The Director

commented on the memorandum:

"The trend has gone so far we

have become nothing but a rubber stamp for CIA yet they won't

even allow us to perform liaison functions abroad much less

operational ones.!'

WW 88608-Docld

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In January, 1960, CIA agreed to comply with

conditions imposed by the Bureau with regard to developing

positive intelligence information through contacts between

U. S. residents and visitors from Iron Curtain countries.

CiA agrood to contact us first belore promoting such

associations. In March, 1960, CIA inquired if 1t might obtain

Bureau clearance at the

field

level for such contacts in the

interest of expodiency.

Mx. Tolson notod: "More and more we

are agreeing to CIA operations in the U. S. I am opposed

to this relaxation.

We can exercise better control here than

through our field offices." The Director added: "I share

•Tolson's views."

CIA was advised clearance was

to be obtained

through. Bureau headquarters.

in December, 1261

Anatolf sourch, a Soviet, delected in Finland

and furnished information alleging

penetration oi American intelligence.

One serge Karlow, a.

CIA officer, was developed as a suspect.

On 2/9/62, we took

over the investigation.

On 2/26/62, Sheffield Edwards, then

CIA Director of security, admitted ClA had haa technical

coverage on Karlow from February, 1961 to 2/9/62. Edwards'

claimed his sluctance to tell us of this situation earlier

because of obvious possible jeopardy to prosecution, plus

embarrassment to his Agency should the Bureau raise an

objection to CIA's maintaining such coverage. The Director

noted: "I only wish we would eventually realize CIA can

never be depended upon to deal forthrightly with us.

Certainly

my skepticism isn't based on prejudice nor suspicion but on

specific instances all too many in number. Yet there exists

wistful belief that 'the leopard has changed his spots'."

In April, 1962, we received information on a

strictly confidential basis from Jay Sourwine of the Senate

Internal Security Subcommittee to the effect that an

unidentified CIA representative had talked to Senator Eastland

concerning an alleged

move to place CIA in charge of all

intelligence-gathering operations for the Government - to

include Soviet espionage in the U. S. The Director noted:

"I am not surprised at the above alleged effort.

There is no

doubt in many quarters a desire to eliminate the FBI in

dealing with espionage and subversion for we are a thorn not

only in the side of communists but also the ADA and Fabian

Socialists. CIA which failed again and again to know what

•is actually going on abroad could be counted upon

to blunder

the same way in the USA."

co 52 ∞

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In April, 1963, we received information indicating

that CIA Director John McCone was considering expansion of

CIA operations in the United States - specifically Intelligenco

covorage and the development of sourcos in this country" "Mccone

Director made a note on the memorandum recording this:

is trying to do another 'Donoval.? If he injects himself into

the U. S., the IBI gets out. Too many cooks apoll the broth."

In December, 1963, the Director Inquired as to the

nature and extent of intelligence operations wherein CIA had

established contact with a diplomat, operated him in the U.S.

with our coordination, and continued to operate him upon his

having departed this country. Four such cases were cited. On

the memorandum, the Director noted: "I have little confidence

II CIA abiding by agreements if it serves its purpose better

not to do so."

In January, 1964, CIA advised us it had reorganized

Its activities in the U.S. The Domestic Operations Division,

CIA, had established field offices in this country under

appropriate cover.

A memorandum was prepared describing the

nistory vi CiA operations in the U.S. and recommending zation

designed to protect our interests.

A letter went to CIA with

ground rules which the Bureau expected CIA to follow in all

matters requiring coordination.

The Director noted;

"oK, but

I hope you are not being taken

I can't forget CIA

withholding the French espionage

activities in the U. S. nor

the false story concerning Oswald's trip to Mexico City, only

to mention two of their instances of double dealing."

The New York Office, by letter 2/14/64, set forth

its observations concerning a

briefing given that office on the

matter of CIA operations in the U.S.

The Director commented:

"I thiak this domestic operations expansion of CIA is very

dangerous and will inevitably 'muddy' the waters."

In May, 1964, the Bureau reconsidered Its stand

with respect to

permitting CIA to approach sources at foreign

establishments in the United States. for intelligence purposes.

The following policy was proposed and subsequently approved:

(1) Where there was no indication a source would

be leaving the United States, we would deny CIA clearance

for contact until we had fully explored the person's

potential for our own purposes. c

If we decided we had no

NW 88608 0oCE2

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## Page 332

interest and CIA contact would not jeopardize any FBI

investigations, we would grant CIA approval to proceed

with its contact with proviso we be kept informed of

information developed of possible interest

5. to us.

(2) Where it appeared source would be returning

to a foreign country shortly we would normally grant

.CIA clearance for preliminary

contact with proviso we

be kept informed of results.

We reserved the right to

take direct access to the source as our needs required.

(3) Where there was an overlapping of interests

:and source expected to continue in United States for

fairly extended period of time, in those instances where

CIA had entree and no Bureau investigation would be

jeopardized we would permit CIA to explore matter and

make preliminary contact keeping us advised of progress

and getting our specific clearance before & direct

recruitment approach; however, where factors indicateo

it would be to best Bureau interests to operate source.

we would undertake the recruitment and keep CIA advised

of information of interest to that Agency.

When these matters were submitted for approval

Mr. Tolson commented, "Looks okay, but we will have to watch

this very closely."

The Director concurred in Mr. Tolson's

xemark.

• :..

чко

54

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## Page 333

D.

THE NEED AND THE POTENTIAL FOR

FOREIGN INTELLIGINCE IN THE U. S.

In 1941, the U. S. allegedly had in Its

possosSion practically all of the toroign intelligence

it needed regarding military and strategic targets in

Japan.

The informavion was scattered among various

Individuals who had personal knowledge or was located

11 libraries, various Government agencies, private

business firms, institutions, et cetera.

Tragically,

the U. S. Government did not

have any mechanism to

collect, record and evaluate such information.

Intelligence was badly needed in 1941, and we paid

dearly in lives and financial resources to accomplish

certain missions because the information was not

readily available.

Today, the need for foreign intelligence 1s

greater than ever. The stakes of foreign policy have

never been higher. The U. S., being a dominating world

power, has assumed vast responsibilities enmeshed in

delicate political situations throughout the world.

The ever-existing threat of an atomic war with communist

countries demanás a cudinuing acquirenent of knowledge

so thatpolicies and courses of action can be designed

in the most effective manner possible. The information

needed applies to numerous fields oi activity, a major

area being scientific research and development. In this

connection, the revolutionary break-throughs in the :

scientific category are occurring with unusually high

Irequency, and if the U. S. is to remain in the

forefront, it is absolutely necessary that we obtain

an accurate evaluation of the enemy's capabilities and

intentions.

We have been fortunate to collect high

quality positive intelligence through sophisticated

collection methods, i.e high altitude photography and

research in this area is proceeding at an accelerated

pace.. Nevertheless, electronic gadgets and machines

never produce all that is required. He

supplementary coverage on a heavy scale, and still need

the human

being still continues to be a vital source of information.

The individual talks and volunteers information. He talks

and his statements are intercepted. All of this produces

valuable increments of intelligence.

still provide badly needed data either through his

r throne haul, can

voluntary contribution or through his unwitting divulging

55:-

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## Page 334

if

• of intelligence.

The importance of the individual

Is further emphasized when we realize that as each

sophisticated collection technique is introducod,

science also introduces newly designod countertochniques

Of coVorIng, protOCinE, and camoullaging important.

assets.

essence,

technology eventually hits

inpenetrable or leveling-off depth.

Foreign intelligence is not geographically

restricted.

Information regarding Chinese Communists

can be obtained anywhere in the world, and even if it

Is of a fragmentary nature, the data can be of

heavy and is sought by every agency in the Government. :

Because of this, it has been necessary for the

U. S. Government to map a program of collection on

a priority basis. This has been done through the

creation of

a committee which is attached to the

. *.

U. S.

Intelligence Board. The committee maintains

a list of priorities on a current basis. A recent

Iist of guidelines for the collection of foreign

intelligence pertaining to scientilic affairs in

Communist China included approximatoly 17û ivems,

i.oblong-range planning of Communist China in the

nuclear field; nature of research in oceanography;

computer capabilities of shantung University; climate

modification and cloud physics research; development

of meteorological rockets; development of nuclear

weapons; location of uranium refineries; strength

of Naval forces; intentions along the Sino-Indian

border; types of equipment being supplied to Laos

and North Vietnam.

In the U.S. proper, the sources of foreiga

intelligence are voluminous.

Most of these sources

overtly provide information

through newspapers,

scientific publications, libraries,

tourists, visiting

professors and students, journalists, and immigrants.

of such information involves an extensive program

the capability of tapping all available sources on

& current basis.

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For the purpose of this paper, we are

thinking about the

search for knowledge considered

•vital for national survival. One could suggest

that clandestine collection

of intelligence.is

overenphasizod and that our Govarnmont could roadity

protect its interests through overt collection and

the employment of our best analysts and evaluators.

If we take this approach, te may as well discount

tho importance of the Bureau's activities in the

counterintelligence field, which essentially are

of a clandestine nature and which have produced time

and again vital intelligence. Ve, theretore, must

move on the assumption that the clandostine

collection of foreign intelligence is very definitely

a most necessary element of our over all intelligence

capabilities.

In adaition to the overt sources, there

exists a rich potential in the U. S. among

the foreiga

diplomatic establishments including the U. N., the

officials of foreign governments, and visitors such

as students, proiessors, and scientists.

A certain

anount of informativi from such sources

: can be

obtained in an overt fashion, but the high quality

data is normally acquired through clandestine means.

This can be done through technical monitoring,

development oi live sources, access to recoras,

files, et cetera.

There are approximately 10,000

foreign orticials in the U.s. assigned to embassies,

consulates, trade missions, U. N., and other

international organizations.

This excludes

dependents.

During the fiscal year ending June 30,

1965, 38,544 foreign government officials visited

the U. S.; about 1500 oi these came from communist-bloc

countrzes.

Durine the fiscal vete endias tune so s

approximately 50,000 foreign students came to the

733 of these came from the comnunist bloc.

During the

same fiscal year, there were 2,075,967 visitors from

all countries.

the U. S. Government does not have a capa

year la storie

Everyone of the foregoing is a potential

source of ioreign intelligence. As can be readily

accepted,

bility of assessing each and every one of these sources

for foreign intelligence. He can say at this point

that the FBI and CIA are just scratching the suriace.

It is recognized that a program designed

to assess

- • 57 -

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## Page 336

or attempt. to recruit each potential source would be

out of the question. such a massive undertaking would

not be compatible with U. S. Government foreign policy.

There' is no question that there must be selectivity of

a judicious and prudent nature.

Since the U.S. is such a major

power,

Vashington, D. C. is the center of diplomatic activity

involving practically all foreign nations. The location

of the U. N. in New Yorks City presents us with another

area of intensified activity.

Most countries send their

most able diplomats to the U. S. so we are conironted

with hundreds of highly talented people. The day-to-day

activities in diplomatic establishments, conferences,

meetings, negotiations, liaison between countries, all

create a tremendous reservoir of foreign Intelligence

potential.

...,

* 58

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CURRENT CAPABILITIES OF CIA IN

THE FOREIGN INTELLIGINCE COLLECTION

FIELD IN THE UNITED STATES

In order that there may not be ary

misunderstanding regarding CIA's capabilities to

collect loreign intelligence in the United States,

we should liist clarily that one of the components

of tho Agoncy which has offices in the United states

does not engage in this particular activity.

The Office of Security, which is responsible fox

personnel and physical

security, maintains several

offices in the United States under authorized

Treasury Depariment cover. Personnel of this

office conduct investigations of applicants, firms

or individuals who may be utilized by CIA on

a contract basis to support intelligence operations

overseas.

The overt collection of intelligence by

CIA is handled by the Domestic Contact Service (DCS)

(formerly called Contact Division).'

CIA estimates."

That Dos has a capability of tayping approximately

15 per cent of the total potential of intelligence in .

the U.S.

This Division has 18 field offices and

16 resident agencies in the United States, and each

office is openly identilied as being connected with

CIA. Personnel totaling approximately 140 carry CIA

credentials.

The Division regularly has a number oi

officers from the various military services who are

assigned to this Division on a temporary basis.

These military officers concentrate on the collection

of that foreign intelligence which relates to the

immediate United States military needs.

The personnel

O1 DOs InterVieW aliens, tourists, officials of

import-export firms, students, scientists, and the

information collected covers a very broad spectrum ji

the positive intelligence category. DCS claims to have

contact with about 7200 organizations, institutions, or

businesses and has approximatoly 60,000 contacts or

sources of iniornation.

The information is reported in

the form of "Information Reports," which is disseminated

throughout the intelligence community. During 1965,

• 59 m

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## Page 338

Des aisseminated 26,000 such reports. DCS does not

havo any responsibilities in the clandestine collection

of intelligence, and in that sense it is very

specifically not operational. DOS delinitely cannot

engage in any activity ot an

intornal security nature,

and within CIA 1t 15 clearly understood that DCS is

noï to be operational under any circumstances.

DOS has boen tho subjoct of some controvorsy within

CIA.

There is one school of thought which maintains

that Des should be an appendage of the Deputy Director

01 Plans, who is responsible for all clandestine

operations.

The other school which has prevailed

holds to the line that DOS should be separate and..

continue under the supervision of the Deputy Director

of Intelligence (DDI). This situation not ouly has

caused headachos for CIA but also lor the Bureau because

of situations which arise where the "left hand does not

know what the right hand is doing."

DOs is essentially carrying out CIA's

responsibilities emanating from National Security Council

Intolligence Directive (NSCID, No. 2 which has its roots

in a sinisar airesiive issued under tho National

Intelligence Authority in 1946. It has been in business

for approximately twenty years.

Per agreement, DCS

cannot interview an alien without first clearing with

the Bureau.. This is done on a daily basis.

With regard

to American citizens, Bureau approval is not required

unless

the Bureau has indicated a prior interest in the

individual; however, DCS nevertheless submits name

checks on Americans, and if it so happens that the

subject of such an inquiry is a Bureau source or

involved in a Bureau investigation, we are in a position

to move to protect our interests.

that although. DCS is engaged primarily in positive

intolligonce collection, it is required to be on the

alert for sources who possibly might be useful to CIA's

clandestine operations.

For example, if. DOS encounters

an alien who can be utilized in an overseas operation,

thé lead is passed on to the appropriate div1si0s...

At the present time, Dos alerts the newly created

Domestic Operations Division (explained below) regarding

potential sources.

• Our current controls with regard to DOS are

functioning efficiently.

We regularly examine the

• 60 •

~NW-88608-Doeld:32989629-Page 338-

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## Page 339

status of this relationship, and we periodically

make adjustments in order to make certain there

Is no "freewheeling" and to take advantage of the

Information which DCS gains. and which is of interost

to the Buxoau.

For oxample, we are currontly working

out arrangements where our fiold offices can contact

the local DOS offices concerning Chinese aliens who

might be of interost to us either as subjocts ioc

investigation or as potential. Informants.

This liaison

at the fiold lovel was deemed

dosirable so that we

could got information at the "horse's mouth" rather

than wait for a reply from CIA headquarters, which is

often prolonged and, when transmitted, is sometimes

stripped of pieces or information. This occurs

because of the involved and sometimes complicated

maze of bureaucratic compartmentation within CIA:

In the latter part of 1963, CIA created its

Domestic Operations Division (DOD), which was to be

responsible for any clandestine development of sources

in the United States.

Prior to the establishment of

Mis division, ClA actsuiry in this field was managed

Irom each individual area division at Hashington

headquarters.

The pressing need for more clandestine

sources, coupled with the recognition of the vast

potential in the United States, prompted CIA to create

a new division which would be responsible for all oi

the area division interests. DOD has headquarters

at New Yorks City, Boston, Chicago, dan irancisco,

the task of engaging in assessment and/or recruitment

of positive intelligence sources, primarily in the

diplomatic field.

Some of the personnel are assigned

to the handling of lirns or organizations which may

be supporting certain CIA operations abroad. DOD personnel

in the lield operati under authorized Department of Defense

The heads of these field ofrices are known to us,

and we have established a satisfactory liaison area at

DOD is also responsible for the handling of

CIA agents (iniornants) who have been recruited abroad

and who come to the United States for assignments either

on a temporary basis or ior the duration of a normal

diplomatic assignment.

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The creation of DOD Within CIA was and st121

is a somewhat controversial Agency subject. DCS saw

DOD as an interfering elemont. The area desks wore

reluctant to havo a new division to tale ovor thoir

ABORtS®

Some of tho DOD porsonnel aro vory capablo

and seasoned intelligence ofticers. Many ot them are

considered of mediocre capability, and there is

& Ixequent rumor that other ciA divisions sond their

misitS tO DOD.

From CIA's standpoint there appears

to be a definite need for a much stronger team within doD.

Theoretically, DOD Is required to be on the

alert for all potential

sources who can be used by CIA

in its intelligence operations, and the approach is

basically one of a long-range nature. DOD is required

to make use of all leads emanating from fellow employees

who may have developed social contacts or associations

wich foreigners abroad

or who might meet potential.

sources in the United States.

Since CIA personnel

operate under diplonatic cover when abroad, they ao gei

the opportunity to move in diplonatic ciicles.

Similar]y,

undercover agents of CiA traveliar throuchout the world

also make contacts which offer potential exploitation i1

and when the target stops in the United

States.

Since January, 1964, when DOD actually began

moving, it has recruited approximately ten individuals

in the diplomatic field. Most of these were in the

noncommunisi-bloc area.

All of those recruited appear

to have been in a fairly low level category.

AlI Of them

wore career diplomats, and there was no evidence that

the individuals were connected with any intelligence

service.

In addition to the activitles of DOS and DOD,

there is a certain amount of CIA operational movements

which do not fall under either of the foregoing divisions.

One example is the liA base in Miami which was set up

Ior CIA's operations directed against the Cuban Government.

This base is used for the training and dispatching of

agents into Cuba and to some extent into other countries

in the Caribbean, particularly the Dominican Republic.

This base is directly responsible to the Western

Hemisphere Division of CIA, which could be called the

Latin AmeriCaD DiVISiON.

62

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CIA also becomes involved in political and

psychological variare type of programs directed against

targets in foreign countries.

The Agency broadly refers

to this activity as "covert action."

The programs are

ossontially dosignod to Influence individuals, organizations.

or governments through various news nedia, and this will

include the utilization of "agents of iniluence." This

activity lalls under tho international Organizations

Through various news " influence. I

DIVISIOR (LOD) OI CIA, WHICh hAS nO IESPOnSIDILITY O

IOD does uso people in the

Unitod States to help implement the overseas programs.

Quite often the Agency uses cutouts or covers for such

an operation.

Althoigh iOD does not engage in intelligence

collection, it is a CIA division which should be kept in

mind, since its activities quito often vill be tangent to

matters of interest to the Bureau.

For example, IOD

objective is to neutralize communist influence. We, of

course, have had an interest in the festival because of the

participation oi Americans, Incluaing members oi the CrusA.

Theoretically, IOD is required to coorainate closeLy with

We do not believe

that this coordination has been elective enough.

There is no doubt that there are individuals

in CIA who aspire to broaden the Agency's operational

activities in the United

States.

Such individuals would

like to see an arrangement similar to one currently in

force in England where Mi-6 has a free hand to assess and

recruit all loreigners, including diplomats, where there

is no evidence that they are engaged in intelligence

activity.

If such evidence is obtained, MI-6 is required

to coordinate with MI-5.

There are people in CIA who

would like to see similar machinery and in addition would

want the freedom to conduct certain investigations and

maybe even institute technical surveillances.

in Summary, CIA So Ial nas a very Limited

capability to recruit loreign diplomatic sources in the

United States,' but che Agency appears: to have done fairly..:

well with a relatively small staii; however, it can be

anticipated that this capability will increase.

CIA's

olfectiveness will probably be adversely affected for

some time to come because of the Agency's well-known

deficiencies, such as lack of discipline, loose admina:

istration, and lack of skilled and talented personnel.

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I• CURRENT CAPABILITIES OF THE FBI

I. Manpower Being Devoted

It is most dirlicult to give any specific figures as to

how much manpower the FBI is currently devoting strictly to

foreign intelligence collection, separate and apart irom the

Bureau's internal security ind

counterintelligence functions.

Much of the foreign intelligence developed by the Bureau is an

outgrowth of our internal security investigations and cannot be

neatly separated in terms of manpower or time.

A substantial amount of our foreign intelligence activity

is concentrated in two offices where most of the diplomatic

establishments in the United States are located; namely, New York

and Washingion Field. Both offices were requested to furnish

estimates as to how much manpower is being allocated to foreign

intelligence matters, including both live sources developed and

technical coverage.

In both cases, the estimates provided were

highly tentative and both c'fices stress that manpower commitments

in this area fluctuate widely from week to week depending on

international politics and other unpredictable factors.

FOr

instance, during the Cuban missile crisis of

1962, both offices

greatly increased their normal manpower commitment to the develop

ment or current toreign intelligence.

The present vominican crisis

which involves production of foreign

intelligence to a large extent

represents another "abnormal" situation.

However, for what it is worth, WFO and New York have

estimated that at the present time they are allocating approxi-

mately 35 Agents and 20 clerical employees to the full time task '

Virtually all of the clerical

time and about 40 per cent of the Agent time is related to

technical coverage and the balance is aimed at the development of

live sources.

In addition, of course, all of the other offices, including

our Legal Attaches abroad, have devoted manpower to foreign

intelligence collection in varying degrees.

of as many as 10 or 12 Agents for temporary periods. In connection

with its responsibilities 'in'the Cuban and Latin-American fields,

Miami and San Juan offices have devoted considerable manpower

to the development of foreign intelligence in recent years.

chicago ottice in connection with its handling oi our top-level

Sold informant has devoted manpower to the development of foreig

intelligence These represent onlya lew examples.

On an overall basis and bearing in mind the difficultyiin

citing any precise figures, it is estimated that the Bureau probably

averages approximately 50 to 75 Agents and 25 to 30 clerks assigned

primarily to foreign intelligence work.

..-64 =

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2

Number of Microphone and Telephone Surveillances with

Evaluation of Product

At present, Bureau has only one microphone surveillance in

foreign intelligence field and this is in connection with a special

communications.

operating about 70 foreign intelligence installations on various

diplomatic establishments in this country. The majority of these

are in Washington Field and New York with scattered installations

in Chicago, Miami, Pittsburgh, San Ixancisco and San Juan.

Under

current Bureau policy, we are limited to 80 foreign intelligence

technical surveillances and no microphone surveillances with the

exception of one on the Turkish United Nations Mission]

In addition, during recent years, we have maintained

approximately 50 so-called "telex" surveillances on the teletype

facilities of various

foreign establishments.

This has been

done

at the specific request of the National Security Agency, in

connection with its eiforts to break foreign codes and to read

foreign government communications.

We have had excellent sesults from these technical

installations. Any compilation of items of value to the U.s.

Intelligence Community and policy-making officials developed

through this coverage would run many hundreds of pages.

The results

have ranged from information regarding plans and activities of

key foreign countries in the diplomatic field to information

regarding intelligence, political, economic and military develop-

ments in the countries

concerned.

In many instances, we have been

able to forewarn the White House, the State Department and other

interested agencies of impending developments and to furnish data

giving an insight into the thinking and strategy of key foreign

officials and

governments.

This coverage has proved specially

valuable during crisis periods such as the Cuban missile crisis of

1962 and during the tense negotiations involving the Panama Canal

in 1964.

On many occasions, top-ranking United States officials

have commented on the effectiveness of this data.

The particular

importance oi this information has been its timeliness to current

events as well as the lact that it represents a

penetition of

foreign diplomatic circles which is only infrequently available

through live sources

in some instances, of course, this type coverage on a

particular foreign establishment or official has not paid ofi.

We have had cases where this technique has been unproductive for

sustained periods of time on a particular country.

This is to be

expected and we have sought. to overcome this by rotating our

installations, correlating our technical operations with shifting

international developments and

putting coverage on those countries

which appear to offer the most

promise for worthwhile intelligence.

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3. Live Sources With Evaluation

At present we are maling active efforis to develop live

informant coverage in the diplomatic establishments of 37 non-

Soviet bloc countries. This list of so-called "target countries"

varies from time to time but essentially we are seeking informant

coverago in countrios considerod

critical from an intolligence

standpoint such as those leaning towards the Soviet bloc or

countries in which the United States has paramount political or

military intorests or which aro otherwise of primary concern.

The

current list includes virtually all Latin-American countries,

number of Middle last countries, and scattered countries throughout

Africa and the Far Last.

Our program was initiated in the early 1950s, and we

are now using some 50 sources (This number fluctuates due to

transfers, resignations, etc.).. In each case, we clear with

State Department prior to designating any country as a "target"

and we also clear with State prior to conducting interviews with

employees at the "target" establishment. In a number of

E instances,

including most latin-American countries, State has asked us to

restrict our eiforts to American citizens. This, of course, is

a highly limiting factor.

Over the years this live informant coverage has on many

occasions produced foreign intelligence of re value.

Our sources

have frequently provided data regarding proposed political,

diplomatic or economic action by the countries concerned, on

occasion in advance of other forewarning to U.S. intelligence.

They have

also been able to furnish a considerable amount of

information regarding the whereabouts, background and general

activities of individual foreign officials of security interest,

thereby saving investigative time.

These sources have been

especially valuable in

connection with the Anagram Program and

other sophisticated attacks on foreign establishments, providing

us with data regarding the physical security, location of code

rooms, etc., of the various foreign establishments.

In addition to so-called "target" countries which are

in the non-Soviet bloc area, the Bureau has developed a number of

informants and defectors-in-place in Soviet-bloc establishments

who have been able to furnish a substantial amount of foreign

Intelligence.

In the

• "Soviet-bloc field, ve have also developed

a number of sources in quasi-official establishments, such as

trade missions, who have produced valuable foreign intelligence.

In the Soviet-bloc field, of course, our live informant development

has been aimed essentially at internal security and counterintelli-

gence needs of the Bureau.

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•It is significant that we have been able to operate for

many years in the development of live souxces in foreigs diplomatic

estadishments, both soviet bloc and non-bloc, without encountering

any serious incidents embarrassing to the FBI or the United States

Government.

In assessing

tho product of such live sources in a number

of instances in the non-sor.et field, State Department has

requested that we restrict our efforts to American citizens. To

a considerable degree, this has Limited the electiveness ot oux

program in the ron-soviet field since U.S. employees of toreign

establishments will normally not have access to top-grade data.

Thus,

especially in the non-soviet bloc field we are not tapping

the full potential which exists for high-level foreign intelligence.

This can only be realized through the development of high quality

sources.

4.

Anagram Program

This za al, which a paulo.

Anagram is code word for IBI program to penetrate foreign

diplomatic establishments in U.S. for purpose of securing crypto

graphic material. This material is primarily of value to National

intelligence efforts.

Since inception oi program in 1954, we have conducted Anagram

•operations involving 38 different foreign countries and a total oi

poration so in 35 aurent tore,

57 separate establishments.

Approximately 10 FBI field offices

have participated in the program. Our operations under this

program have resulted in monetory savings to the Government estimated "

at better than $13,000,000 and it has provided data oi incalculable

intelligence value.

While it has been of primary value to NSA, we

have on occasion produced information of primary interest to the

Bureau. For example, in April, 1963, we affected a successful

penetration in the Polish field which produced material disclosing

the activities of Polish Intelligence Sezvice in this country.

5.

Double Agents and Informants

In a number of instances, Bureau double agents and informants,

developed to assist us in connection with our internal security and

counterintelligence responsibilities, have been able to provide

significant high-level information of foreign intelligence value.

For example, in the soviet llela, we nave developed a

number of top-level

sources such as Fedora and Tophat who have

provided current intelligence regarding the organizational structure,

personnel, and operations of the KGB and GRU, both in the soviet

Union and abroad; a description of various technical equipment used •

by soviet intelligence; data regarding current relations between the

soviet Union and Communist China; and data regarding Soviet foreign

policy, political and military developments, etc.

Similar informa-

tion of foreign intelligence value has been developed through FBI

Informants, double agents and defeators-in-place operating against

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Polish, Yugoslav, Czechoslovakian and other communist-bloc

countries.

For instance, in the Cuban field on soveral occasions,

FBI informants have been able to develop high-level or current

intelligence regarding conditions in Cuba, and policies of the

Castro regime through personal contacts with ranking. Cuban officials

both in the U.S. and abroad.

Through our coverage of the Communist Party, USA, and

related organizations we have also frequently produced loreign

intelligence,

although to a lessor extent than in our oporations is.

the foreign

nationality field.

One of our best sourges of foreign

Intelligence in the domestic area is our so-called Solo operation&

wherein we have informants acting in a liaison capacity between the

Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

through this operation regarding the Sino-soviet dispute, social

and political conditions in various countries, both in and outside

the soviet bloc, and tactics of the international communist movement.

6. Additional Potential

As indicated in the foregoing subsections, the Bureau is

currently producing a considerable volume, of foreign intelligence

through covert neans, much of it of a significant nature. Most of

thIs data 15 an OUEgIONin vi LudULMaNUs,

investigative programs targeted primarily to fulfill our internal

security and counterintelligence objectives and relatively speaking,

we have committed only a small percentage of our assets exclusively

in the direction of foreign intelligence.

It is believed that the Bureau possesses considerable

potential for the development of foreign intelligence which could

be realized with a lairly modest expenditure of manpower and costs

if we were to make foreign intelligence collection a primary aim.

For example, with existing equlpment and facilities, we could

expand our technical coverage of foreign establishments to include ai

additional 30 to 40 foreign establishments provided we could assign

about 25 additional personnel to this field. With the assignment

of an additional 75 to 100 Agents, me could greatly intensily our

foreign intelligence collection through live informants, primarily

through the development and exploitation of additional sources at

foreign diplomatic establishments. Ne .could place more stress.on

foreign intelligence collection in our training programs and

conferences to make more effective use of our already available

Ve could, for example, add specialized classes on foreige intellige

collection to our In-Service schedules or designate selected Bureau

personnel to. attend training sessions operated by other U.s. agenci

regarding this subject

- 63 - X identifis partiliaily.

sensiture pregn

intelhieres opration

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AREAS OF CONFLICT, FBI - CIA

Any difierences between FBI and CIA are first

rolated to a basic problem existing in any country among

the major povors, namely. "How does a law enforcement

agency coordinate its internal security functions with

intelligence organization which must operate as a clandostina

service?"

The very nature of the lunctions of the two

organizations immediately introduces potential areas of

conflict. One essentially operates overtly and the other

covertly. This alone is enough to create an atmosphere.

Because each

fraught with contioveisies and confusio. responsibilities

agency was molded differently and because

differ, there naturally will be conflicting approaches to

national security objectives. for example, in the field

o1 intelligence the Bureau is basically a counterintelligence

CIA, to the contrary, has a much broader responsibility

in intelligence, which includes collection of foreign

intelligence, political and psychological warfare, inter

agency coordinating, evaluation, research, etc.

Counter-

intelligence within CIA is actually a relatively small

component of the agency.

Personnel

in the two organizations

is recruited under different citeria aid stauda us.

Training is likewise at variance. In a linal analysis,

the experienced FBI Agent and the seasoned CIA intelligence

officer are not of the same mold but certainly are tailored

as two entirely and distinctly dilferent instruments.

should bear in mind that little has been done to introduce

truly substantive cross-fertilization oI outlook, approaca

and operational philosophy between the two agencies.

could be cavacated tien utopian point of view, but 1t

•also could be argued that there are distinct advantages to

maintaining sound compartmentation.

separate from the above basic and fundamental

situation, the differences between FBI and CIA also relate

to other lactors such as:

1)

FBI was first on the scene and was well

established long before CIA came to lile.: This led to a

conception in the early years that CIA was an intruder.

2) The seed of CIA vas the Ofiice o1 Strategic

Services (OSS), an organization whose personnel, activities

and free-wheeling were the sources of numerous

coRiliCts

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with the Bureau during World War Il. It was during

these year's that an atmosphere of mistrust and lack of

confidence was created.

3)

CiA was established as Our I1i5t OvOI-211,

worldwide intelligence agency. The events and the

maneuvering which led to this certainly. did not bring

with then a harmosious relationship.

4) Unfortunately, CIA grew big and grew fast,

particularly because of an unsettled atomic world and

developments such as the Korean War. The Agency did not

jell electively as an organization, and with this came

numerous diificulties, many of which exist to this day.

5) Each organization has lacked adequate

knowledge of the other's operational machinery; objectives,

and "ways and means of doing things."

6) An element of rivalry actually developed over

the years, and this, when not tempered with prudence and

sound judgment, creates unhealthy situations.

7) A growing tendency on the part of CIA to

expand its operational activities not originally contemplated

• in the formation of that agency.

It can be recognized that with this background it

has not been an easy matter to establish a good working

relationship with CIA vithout frequent conflicts, and

It could be suggested

that the ideal situation would be to remove CIA from the •

U.S. with the understanding that we would assume respon

sibility for any and all activity in the intelligence field.

As described in another section of this report, such a

move would be highly infeasible for the Bureau.

It is to our credit that despite the problems of

the past there have been some highly constructive develop

ments in FBI-CIA: relations, pärticularly as they affect:

activities in the 0. s.

Several years ago arrangements

vere made whereby CIA's Ofjice of Security could conduct

applicant investigations without infringing upon our juris-

diction.

For several years we have been permitting CiA to

interview aliens for foreiga intelligence incormation under

ground rules which have beep

very successful.

Our Liaison

•' - 70.-

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## Page 349

mechanism has been functioning effectively. 'We have

Irequent conierences.

Bureau personnel lectures beforo

CIA OiLiCerS.

Dissemination of information is excellont.

The atmosphere for negotiating and discussing unusually

complicated probiONS is very good. PerSONDOl Can WOrK In

the same area with a minimum of problens, as evidencod ta

the Dominican Republic. We attend USIB meetings and axo

actively engaged in tho work of several committees attachod

tO USIB.

All of this is commendable progress and certainly

benelicial to national security.

All of the foregoing was set lorth in the way of

background in order to better understand the current source

of differences with CIA, namely the Agency's desire to assess

and recruit foreign intelligence sources in the U.S. In the

foreign diplomatic establishments, including United

Nations,

and to some extent among

foreign visitors.

CIA fully

acknowledges our internal security and counterintelliconce

responsibilities. This is clear-cut and Iree of any

debatable question; however,. ClA feels that we have no

legally-established responsibility in foreign intellikonce

onllection and that somebody (in this case, CIA) should

be fully exploiting the foreigo intelligence potentral in

the United States, bearing in mind that there are approxi-

mately 10,000 foreign officials and employees in this country.

CIA argues that a foreign diplomat can be recruited anywhere

in the world but maintains that there is no better place

than the United States for assessment, recruitment, training

and orientation of an informant.

CIA lurther maintains that

if the Agency moves on a target,

such as an Argentino

dipiomat who may be a career officer not connected with a

foreign intelligence service, there should not be any con-

flict because the activity is in no way related to tho

internal security functions of the Bureau.

CIA has also

expressed the attitude that in the communist-bloc fiold

CIA should be permitted to assess and recruit those

individuals not connected with an intelligence or intornal

security service.

There are some people in CIA tho are of tho

opinion that in the field of loreign intelligence tho Bureau.

should be exerting more effort to actually assist CIA In

spotting sources and, when needed, give CIA support In

developing an individual through such means as surveillances,

neighborhood investigations, etc.. When CIA is permittad to

NW 88608- Docld:32989629 Page 349

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## Page 350

recruit a source in the U.S., the Agency takes the

position that il the source can be of help to the Bureau

we should levy requirements on CIA and not ask for access

to the source unless it clearly appears that only through

accoss No can pIOperly dischargo ouI rosponsibilitios.

Cia takes a very strong. view thai once a source is

developed it is basically unsound to introduce another

agency into the relationship.

The developing agency

may have used techniques peculiar to its own organization

and may have developed a relationship under varied cii-

cumstances, and when a new agency is introduced this

relationship with the source could be unfavorably disturbed.

CIA does not dispute the lact that informant and Agent

turnovers sometimes are absolutely necessary.

CIA maintains that 11 the Bureau is given access

to a CIA source we would be responsible for the counter-

intelligence aspects, but if the source produces foreign

intelligence CiA shoula be responsible for handling this

information, including the dissemination. CIA's position

is that it is better qualitied to evaluate the information

and correlate it with the loreign intelligence being

developed abroad. Eor example, il a Nigerian souxce or CIA,

also available to the Bureau,

furnishes infornation regarding

the Nigerian Foreign Office, CIA Claims that It can better

handle the report and dissemination.

Discussions and agreements with CIA, including

the actions stemming from meetings with the representatives

of that agency in November 1965, have resulted in a greatly

improved coordinating nachinery.

There still are areas of

potential conflict which will necessitate improvement.

They are:

1)

DOD personnel receives leads or tips pertaining

to possible access to Soviet-bloc diplomats. This CIA

Division pursues these leads and is inclined to take the

position that such individuals contacted by CIA are their

"CIA-controlled sources." If we permitted this to go on

over a period of time, CIA Mould have a vast network of

sources not directly available to the Bureau. This is

basically unsound, and there is no reason CIA shouldn't

immediately give us the lead or tip for exploitation.

We can recognize that, depending upon circumstances, 1t

might be lavorable to us and CIA for the Agency to handle

a particular individual, and is so, it would be clearly

72 =

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coordinated. This would be most important if the

individual in any way was connected with or associated

with an intelligence

service.

2) DOD is anxious to have Ireedom to assess

and recruit Bloc diplomais not known to be engaged in

intelligence activity.

On the suriace, this does not

appear to prosent a problen, but realistically speaking

it is impossible for us to know that a Soviet diplomat,

not known to be engaged in intelligence activity one

no soone the

day, appears on the scene the following week as an agent

or coopied agent.

To give CIA wide latitude in this field

could create a truly undesirable mess.

We belleve that

1I CIA is permitted to move on such targets it should be

done on a selective basis and with maximum coordination.

3) CIA's organizational and operational

deficiencies, such as lack of discipline, poor internal

coordination, unsatisfactory records, a1l introduce head

aches which undoubtedly will continue to exist for many

years.

4)

There continues to be an element of mistrust

and misunderstanding between the two organizations because

of the historical reasons described above..

5) Continuing lack of one agency's appreciation

Ior the other's objectives, responsibilities and operational

philosophy.

6) The absence of & clearly derined Bureau policy

and objectives in the field oi loreign intelligence collec

tion.

Cia really does not know the nature and the extent

of our interests, and consequently this lends to confusion

and misunderstanding.

•..

...

erase raddle dodore it tradies

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H. CURRENT AGREEMENTS BETWEEN FBI AND CIA

1. According to SAC Letter 59 dated 5/24/49, CIA and IBI

had reached agreement whereby clearance would be requested of FBI

boloro CiA conducted an intorviow with an alion in the U.S.

This

clearanco would consist of a review of Bureau files concerning

individual in question.

According to same SAC letter, agreement had been reached

by the FBI and CIA whereby CIA vas allowed to contact American

businessmen without obtaining clearance txom IBI in order to

Obiain positive toreiga intelligence information and arrangé

• covers

• Ior CIA personnel abroad.

This agreement was based strictly on

collection of foreign intelligence and positively did not allow for

the formulation of a network oi confidential informants for CIA

in the U.s.

Regarding FBI-CIA agreement that CIA would clear with us

prior to interviewing aliens in U.S., following documentation has

been located.

By lettez 2/19/49 Dizector of CIA Millenkoetter

wrOte Director and relerred to National Security Council Intelli-

gence DireCtive No. 1, 4114/40.

This Directive states in pari that

CiA will be responsibio lui crucitation on highly eclective basis

within U.S. of business concerns, other nongovernmental organiza

tions and individuals as sources

of foreign intelligence information.

Hillenkoetter commented that CIA had been interviewing foreign

businessmen, immigrants and refugees on small scale, always clearing

matter first with FBi office in area concerned.

asked Director's

views as to possible expansion of this activity.

By letter 2/26/48 Director replied to Hillenkoetter.

In

part, this letter pointed ou EBI had no ObjectIon to cIA inter.

viewing individuals enumerated above for foreign intelligence

purposes; however, it was suggested that prior to Interview such

individual matters be cleared with FBi headquarters.

2. Bureau letier to CIA 1/16/64 confirmed results of meetings

between CIA and Bureau via liaison in discussing reorganization oi

CIA'S Domestic Operations Division (DOD). Letter recognized CIA

needs(recruitment.of.sources.in U.S; who may be used abroad; +=

recruitment of diplomats, including UN representatives, who might be

useful to CIA in overseas operations or who might be transferred to

Soviet-bloc countries; training of agents recruited; handling of

agents developed abroad who come to U.S. for a visit or assignment;

and approaches to foreign officials and visitors to assess their

Potential

CIA's operations in order to avoid operational conflicts and

embarrassment:

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CIA would not conduct investigation of any foreign

official in U.S. and it CIA felt such investigation warranted, FBI

should be consulted.

b. No Loreign official would be approached for recruit-

ment by CIA without its conferring with rBI.

c .

When CIA agent arrives in U.S. for visit or assign

ment, fBI will be advised and two agencies will conter regarding

handling of agent in this country, lt being recognized each case

has its individual peculiarities.

Before approaching any foreign official or visitor for

recruitment assessment, CIA will clear with rBi.

above "ground rules" were moditied and expanded and

As result of conference with CIA in January, 1966, the

agreed upon by

both agencies early this year (Confirmed by letter to Admiral

Rabors 2/7/66. New ground rules in summary are as follows:

CIA will not initiate investigation of any foreign

official in U.S.. without concurrence of FBI. (Comment: This is

essentially same

as (a) In January, 1964, ground rules. Only

difference is that wording of this

nodification implies more

sympathetic FBI attitude towards any proposed CiA investigations.)

b. CIA will seek FBI concurrence before approaching for

recruitment any foreign official or communist bloc visitor in U.S.

FBI will concur if CIA action does not conflict with any FBI

operations. (Comment: This is similar to (b) and (e) ground rules

adopted in January, 1964, with two differences.

First, it drops

requirement that CIA clear with us before approaching a

non-soviet

visitor although it must still do so with regard to non-soviet

officials.

Secondly, it specifically commits the FBI to concur if

proposed CIA action does not conflict with FBI operations.

c. CIA will advise FBI prior to meetings between CIA

assets and foreign officials or communist bloc visitors of interest

to FBI.

(Comment;' This was not included in previous set of

ground rules.)

.d:**Agents of CIA who come to U.S. will be identified to

fel by name of appropriate desertetion depending sational security

Intérest invoived.

When CIA agent arrives in U.S. for a visit or assign-

ment, FBI will be advised and two agencies will confer regarding

handling oragent In uPsidths recogarted

Loach case want have,

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individual peculiarities

and governing principle will be positive

intelligence weighed against internal security factors. CIA may,

however, continue its contractual relationship for purpose of haadling

training, procurement of positive foreign intelligence, (under-

lining added) fulfillment of CiA commitments to the agent and

preparation for next assignment abroad.

I. Where CIA will be handling its agent in U.S., CIA

will service FBi security or counterintelligence requirements and

will provido IBI all information bearing on counterintelligence or

intornal security matters.

Where CIA servicing is inadequate for

IBI internal security interests,

FBI will have direct access to

agent.

(Comment:

liules (d),

(e) and (f) represent greatly expanded

and refined version oi rule (c) of January, 1904, agreement. Old

•ground rules provided considerable latitude with

regard to who

would handle CIA source in the U.S. and this has led to some

disagreements with CIA. The current ground rules clearly provide

Ior CIA to retain contact with its agents not only for training,

¿inancing, etc., but also for "procurement oi positive foreign

intelligence."

In addition,

they make it clear that the FBI should

not ask for direct access unless

there is a specific internal

security need.)

4.

In addition to the above, there is one agreement we have

reached with CIA which is of possible relevance; namely, our recent

agreement relative to treatment or Soviet students in the U.S.

By way of background, there are a number of soviet exchange

students

currently attending various U.S. universities. Each student, of

course,

is not only a possible Soviet intelligence agent but

also : .

a potential source for the U.S. aiter he returns to his homeland.

Accordingly, both FBI and CIA have an interest in these students.

Per. memo dated 1/14/64 we advised CIA via liaison on 1/20/64

that the Bureau would adopt following procedure relative to soviet

students here. FBI will take responsibility for collecting material

regarding each student on expedite basis, furnishing results to

CIA as developed. At logical point IBI will conter with CIA to

decide on case-by-case basis ce possible recruitment..

If Bureau

recruits soviet student, wi will resolve whether we should turn

him over to CIA before he leaves U.S. Under this procedure, CIA

will not make any inquiries (through its sources in U.S.) unless

it has some unusual source in a university not available to FBI

who could furnish data on the student. In latter case, we woula

•allow CLe

to obtain daca and advise use us

The foregoing represent all of the major agreements we

have reached to date with CIA with respect: to CIA operations here

in foreign intelligence fielar mri

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I:

• sands

EFFECT ON THE FBI OF FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR COLLECTION

OF FOREIGN INTACCIGANCE IN THE UNITED STATES

1. Overt Colloction Activities

It is evident from the National Security Act of

1917 and the succeeding National Security Council Intelligence

Dixectives as well as

the directives of the Director of

Central Intelligence thai Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

is charged with major responsibilities in the overt collection

ot toreign intelligence in the United states.

In pursuit of

this, CiA exploits non-governmental organizations and

Individuals, foreign language publications and aliens.

Although

CIA claims to have contacts with about 1, 200 organizations

and businesses as well as about 60,000 sources of information

as a result or its overt activities for this purpose, ClA

estimates it is reaching only 15 yer cent of the fareign

intelligence information available in this country.

The question we must consider here is whether the

IBI should take over the overt collection of foreign intelligence

in the United siates, therevy maing CiA perationut only in

areas outside the limits of FBI's jurisdiction.

In this

connection, the following would have to be considered:

(a) Reporting:

The Bureau is a fact-finding agency which has

traditionally gathered evidence and presented its findings

without bias or conclusions.

This would not change.

Intelligence developed by the FBI would be evaluated by the

users in the intelligence community.

Our report writing

format might have to be geared to the needs and established

procedures of the United States intelligence community.

(b) Coordination With Other Government Agencies:

Foreign intelligence is a commodity produced for

*the'benefit of many. separate-agencies.of..the United States

Government. • Because of this it the bureau were to nave

full responsibility for the overt collection of foreign

intelligence in this country, we would have to greatly

expand our liaison services, not only for dissemination

purposes but to assure that we are kept fully informed

regayding.all matters dealins with intelligence priorities

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## Page 356

Our role in preparation of National Intelligence Estimates

would be more active as a result of our increased contribution

under this program. It might be necessary to utilize the

assistance of highly trained personnel of other agencios

to

assist us poriodically on interviews dealing with complicated

mIlitary or scientific matters.

(c) Manpower:

While no manpower requirements can be presently

estimated should we assume full responsibility for overt

foreign intelligence collection, ClA is currently using

approximately, 140 employees throughout the United states to

interview individuals in connection with its overt intelligence

gathering activities, and is reaching what it estimates to be

only 15 per cent of available loreign intelligence iaformation.

These LI40 CIA employees do not include personnel required at

CIA Headquarters to correlate, evaluate and disseminate the

data gathered in the field.

We would want to more effectively

exploit this intelligence potential.

To merely handle the necessary review of the vast

• number of foreign language publications wouid require many

additional employees proficient in foreign languages and

with backgrounds in scientific or technical fields.

(d) Selection and Training of Personnel:

To assume full responsibility for the overt

collection of foreign intelligence in this country, would

require that we vastly broaden our selection and training

procedures.

We would require applicants with degrees in

the sciences, languages, history, government and economics.

Our basic training and In-Service agenda would have to be

geared to meet our new responsibilities. We would undoubtedly

desire to utilize the services of outstanding lecturers irom

the agencies constituting our intelligence community, and in

tuxs, we would wish to afford our personnel training at the

War Colleges operated by the Department of Defense, and from

time to time furnish them the opportunity of specialized

training. and briefings provided by the members of

the U.S.

• Intelligence. Board

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(e) Legislation:

CIA currently has the duty to correlate and evaluate

intolligence relating to the national security and to provido

for appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the

Government.

This is set out in Title 50, USC, Section 40v

The overt collection oi foreign intelligence is not the subject

of legislation but rather of National Security Council Intelligence

Directives which would have to be revised in order to give the

Bureau this authority now lodged with CIA.

(1) Organizational Changes:

To carxy out a program committing the Bureau to

the full responsibility for the overt collecting of loreign

intelligence in this country would necessitate a substantial

increase to the headquarters staiis of the Domestic Intelli

gence Division and the Laboratory Divison, as well to the.

personnel

assigned to the New York and Washington Field Offices

where diplomatic establishments and international organizations

are meinly located

In all probability the creation of a new

division at the Seat of Government devoted entirely to overt

collection responsibilities, would be required.

(g) Observations:

The many responsibilities that would be ours under

a program making the Bureau accountable for the overt collection

of all foreign intelligence in this country would (1) require

an enormous increase in our own personnel, trained in many

specialized fields, or (2) the delegation

of varied intelligence

functions to other

governmental agencies and close supervision

of such agencies to insure efficient execution of the tasks

levied upon them. These overt collection responsibilities

would undoubtedly be subject to the scrutiny of many sources,

some of them hostile, and we would have to face the charges,

unjust though they might be, that the Bureau had ceased io

perform the duties for which it was originally created and

had developed into a gigantic bureaucratic octopus.

2. Clandestine Gathering Act ities

There are no statutory provisions for the clandestine

gathering of foreign intelligence in the United States.

We :

have in the past produced substantial foreign intelligence

while carrying out our present responsibilities.

CIA established its Domestic Operations Division (DOD)

in 1963 and began to clandestinely gather foreign intelligence

in this country. It now has Lizziela officos with approximately

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40 intelligence officers assigned to these matters.

It is

antidpated that DOD's efforts will become more extensive.

CIA estimates there are approximatoly 10, 000 employees

and dependents assigned to the diplomatic establishments and

international organizations represented in this country by

approximately 120 foreign nations.

It can readily be seen

that

va would havo to establish priorities and well-defined objectives

in order to cope ellectively with the problem presented by the

vast number of persons and establishments which could be

considered for clandestine coverage.

Today there are approximately 40 nations in addition

to the Soviet-bloc countries, whose establishments in this

country ve consider "target"

countries for the purpose of

developing live sources therein.

In the absence of more

precise criteria, our initial efforts in a program designed

to expand our clandestine gathering oi foreign intelligence,.

could be directed against these "target" nations.

(a) Objectives:

•Under a program confined to the clandestine gathering

of foreign intelligence in this country, and consistent with

the intelligence needs of this Government, we would have

as

our objectives:

(1)

Increasing substantially the number of live

sources of high quality in diplomatic establishments,

trade missions, consular oIlices or internationa.

organizations located within the united states;

(2) Expanding our present technical and microphone

coverage in such establishments.

We would, of course, maintain our "Anagram" program

which has been so successful in the clandestine acquisition o

the cryptographic systems of various foreign nations, as well

as our "Telex" program which is the technical coverage we afford

the teletype lacilities of certain foreign countries.

same wording

as paye 67.

80

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(b) Observations:

While a program limited to the clandestine gathering

of foroign intelligonco would requiro a substantial increase

in manpower, boch in the field

and at the Bureau's headquarters,

as well as an expansion o- our personnel selection and training

procedures, our liaison responsibilities and our tiling azd

data processing facilities, nowevei; in none oi these phases

would

the increase be nearly as great as that which would be

required should we assume lull responsibility for the overt

gathering of such foreign intelligence.

81

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GENERAL FINDINGS

The study conducted by the Committee

bas

produced the following signilicant findings:

(1) There definitely is a vast potential.

Ior collection of loreign intelligence in the U.S.

available through overt and clandestine channols.

Even with the available capabilities of existing

agencies, there is a large reservoir of untapped

sources.

(2) CIA has been authorized by statuto

and implementing directives to collect foreign

intelligence in the U.S. through overt nethods and

has been involved in such coliection since the

establishment of the Agency.

This includes review

of foreign language press and interviews with

selected individuals such as Anerican businessmen,

aliens, and students.

In aGGItIOn, CIA has established

an elaborate system of processing,

storing, evaluating,

and disseminating this information.

(3)

such overt collection by CIA does not

present any threat or infringenent on FBI jurisdiction

or operations.

The present Bureau controls for such

CIA activity are sailsiactory.

(4) We concluded that it would be highly

undesirable for the Bureau to become responsible for

overi collection of loreign intelligence in the u. s.

The necessary reorganization, expansion of facilities

and manpower, and heavy task

oi information collection

and processing could place a damaging burden on the

Bureau.

(5) There has never been any statutory or

similar provision for the clandestine development by

CIA oi foreign intelligence in the United States.

There are instances where the FBi has received specific...

assignments which encompassed foreign intelligence

collection in the United states (sts operations covering

entire Western Henisphere in World War Il; present

operations concerning Dominican Republic.

There is

no statute or directive which assigns or confirms

morezusive, FBI aurisdiction 3R clandestine development

4000300004

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of foreign intelligence in the United States.

As a

result of our internal security and counterintelligence

responsibilities, we have produced a volume of foreign

intelligence covertly.

In addition, either at tho

specific request of other U.s. agencios or on oux

own initiative in response to national intelligence

needs, we have produced such intelligence.

We have

dono

this on a solcctivo basis and have not assumed

full responsibility in this area.

As indicative oi

this, certain agreemenis have been made with CIA

permitting that Agency to assess and recruit aiter

coordination with the IBI covert loreign intelligence

sources in the United states (principally for use

abroad. We have reserved the right to take over

such sources it internal security factors are paramount.

In the absence of such factors, CiA is permitted to

tilize these sources lor iorelen intellirence purposes.

We concluded that the expanded development

of clandestine foreign intelligence sources is essential

if national security interesis are to be erfectively

served.

(7) Exploitation o1 foreiga diplomatic targets

fortifies our efforts in the internal security and

counterintelligence fields. information developed

increases over-all knowledge and produces leads or ties

to intelligence activity being carried out by foreign

intelligence and security services.

(8) The U.S. intelligence community currently

does not provide an organization or a mechanism which can

effectively exploit the intelligence potential in the ioreign

There have been expressions of concern

and certain limited action taken by IBi and CIA, but there

has not been a well-organized or united effort and most

important of all, there has been a decided lack of leader-

ship directed towaid attacking the problem and at the

same time inducing an atmosphere of harmonious application

of all"available resources.

. 70.0.

(9) We concluded theré is an excellent

opportunity for the Bureau to assume leadership in this

matter and in so doing, enhance national security and

- 83

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the capabi

les of the Bureau, The

e has arrived

¿or us to adopt and implement a

new concept toward

foreign intelligence collection. it would be unwise

il the Bureau dia not movo into a leading role and

instead applied policy and tactics conforming with

= "hoiding action."

This,

212 OUT ODZILOR, IS DOU

consistent with the reputation of a progressive and

forward looking organization.

(10) Tho Bureau does have talent and

capability to assume a more active role in clandestine

collection of foreign intelligence. We have the

potential to handle clandestine collection of foreign

intelligence in the U.S. in a more eiiective manner

than any other agency. This can be done in a conscructive

and prudent manner.

(11)

it is recognized that a new approach by

the Bureau will involve operational risks. If one is

to progress, he must take risks.

We feel that we have

the capability to succeed with a minimum or losses

ox debits.

(12) We feel that if we do not adopt a new

role characterized with an aggressive approach, a door

is leit open lor other agencies such as CIA to

progressively introduce programs designed to lill the

vacuUm.

CIA currently does not have the capability

to inject a rapid "take-over" of operational areas.

We do feel that such would be accelerated not by CIA's

strength, but by our weaknesses.

(13) CIA is progressively expanding its

objectives and capabilities to conduct clandestine

intelligence opezations in the U.S. This presents

a potential for areas of conflici between CIA and EBI.

(14) He definitely must define our role in

the field of clandestine loreign intelligence collection

so that policy and objectives are clear-cui.. Not only

our own personnel but other agencies including CIA should

know exactly where we stand.

(15) CIA can be permitted to develop

clandestine sources of loreign intelligence under the

• 84 =

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established

interests.

ground rules which do protect Bureau

A new approach being recommended would

heavily deter CIA 12om extensive development of

clandestine sources and would really leave the

• Agoncy in a minor or subordinato sole.

-

85

¿ag.

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RECOMMENDED PLAN OF ACTION

A penetrative and objective study of the

Bureau's position has led us to conclude that the Bureau

should play a much noto active and intluontial role in

the clandestine colleccion of positive intelligence in the

United States.

We are recommending the Implementation of

a plan which will lead to a valuable contribution to our

national security elfori and concurrently will improve our

internal security capabilities.

This plan presents a

concept of an FBI as an Agency prinasily responsible for

internal security, but supplementing its coverage with a

substantially expanded capability in the clandestine collec

tion oi positive intelligence.

We believe that we have the

capability of developing this

new look knowing that at the

same time we can institute a badly needed lcadership to

eliminate a gap in the acquirement of high-quality intelli

gence in the United States.

The main seatures of this plan

are:

1) Establishment of a list of foreign diplonatic

targets consistent with the needs of the Government.

2) Expansion of our technical surveillance

capabilities wich emphasis on nisurs.

3)

Expansion of live sources characterized with

selectivity and high-quality value.

4) The FBI assuming a role of leadership in the

clandestine exploita' ion of positive intelligence in che

U.s.,

and in so doing making naximum use of the talent and

capabilities of other appropriate U. S. Agencies.

Authorization

The plan would be implemented under proper executive

authorization (Presidential) and furthermore would be coordi

nated with the United States Intelligence Board (USIB). A

letcer from the President authorizing the Bureau to expand

its capabilities in clandestine positive intelligence collec

tion, consistent with the needs of the government, would

suffice.

in order to avoid any misunderstanding or coniusion

within the intelligence community; USIB would be apprised of

the Presidential authorization.

The letter Iron the President

isit

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## Page 365

expressed in general torms. This same authorization could.

be further defined by the President's Foreign Intelligence

Advisory Board.

It is realized that ti would bo

aCCOsSary tO

discuss this plan with the President so that he fully under

stood the purpose, scope and the controlling leatures.

With

plan could also be discussod with tho

Foreign Intelligence advisory BOara.

Selection of Targets

Priority on targeis can be established by appli-

•cation of the following criteria:

1) Review of requests or requirements levied on

us by the President and U. S. Intelligence Agencies.

2)

Review of priority listed by the USIB. (Thia

is done on a regular basis.)

3;

Our ora anangois sad avaluation ne interrational

political developnents.

This primarily will be done aù SCG,

but we should be so organized that the field would be ixee

to submit recommendations.

As of March, 1966, the folLowing could be sec

forth as a tentative list of priority targots in the United

States:

1) USSR

a. Indications of significant changes in

Soviet policies, particularly vith respect to relations

st a ros.

with the lest and with Communist China.

D. Background InTOrmatiOn

illuminating the

decisiOns Ol the 23x0 Party Congress, eSpecIaLly IndiCatIOns

•i policy disputes or political rivalries; repercussions in

other Communist parties.

C.

Developments in Soviet space programs in

the wake of Luna 9.

2) Vietnan/Laos/Cambodia

Chinese Conmunist, Soviet and north Viet-

sanese capabilities, inteations, and actions with respect to

Vietnam/laos and to Us activities in the area.

- 87∞

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b. Indications of Soviet deployment of surface-to-

suriace missiles to North Vietnam.

c.

Changes in the attitudes and policies of influential

south vietnameso.

especially Buddhist leaders, toward tho

TV2X

astort or the US.

d.

Indications of a major change in Viet Cong/PAVN

and Pathot lao military capabilicios and racilos.

e.

Intormation pertaining to the location, size, and

types of Chinese troop units in Indochina.

Evidence oi Viet Cong/PAVN/Chinese

Cambodia as a sanctuary, operating base, or source ta supplyi

Cambodian Government atuitudes cowara such uses.

3) Connunist China

information bearing on Communist China's capability to fight

à war in Southeast Asia and indications of Chinese intentions

respecting discot iavolvement in this aren:

b. Movements of Chinese submarines out of their normal

bases of operating areas, particularly toward the South China

Sea and the Gull o1 Tozkin.

Increased air defense capability, parcicularly

production and deploynent of advanced lighter/interceptor

alICIaLE.

d. Military activities in other border areas.

4)

France

a.

French foreign policy, especially concerning NATO,

the USSR, the war in Vietnam/laos and estrangement or con-

petition

with the US.

5) The Dominican Republic

The character, strengüh, influence and potential of

the contending parties and factions; their capabilities

and intentioas to conduci coups or insurrectionist activities;

their attitudes toward the June elections; capabilitles.ol

the Provisional Government to maintain control.

.....

.:: .

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6)

India-Pakistan

a. Dovelopments in Indo-Pakistani relations and

attitudes toward the US,. the USSk and Communist China.

7) Latin America

2.

Evidence oi incroased oxternal COnmunist aSSIStaRCO

to insurgency movements in Latin America in the vake of

the january conferences in Havana.

8) Indonosia and Malaysia/Singapore

a. Political aims of the Indonesian military; Susarno's

health and political intentions and capabilities; moves to

rebuild a Communist party.

• Indonesian intentions to continue or reduce the

conflict with Malaysia.

Changes in Soviet or Chinese policy toward Indonesia

resulting iron the current internal conflict.

9) Thailand and Burma

a. Communist subversive zotivity and external support;

government capabilities to oppose subversion.

10) Africa.

8.

African and Conmunist suppori to Southern Rhodesian

black nationalists; nationalist capabilities to act against

the smith regime; white opposition to the Smith regime;

South African and Portuguese assistance to the Snich regime.

b.

Erfeci of recent coups on the stability of other

African states.

11) Yemen

2.

Evidence i intentions and actions of the UAR and

Saudi arabia wich respect to the Yemeni situation.

= 89 -

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Technical Surveillance of Targets

Coverage in this field will be divided into the

Lollowing categories:

Technical Surveillances

2)

3)

hicrophone Surveillances

Hore sophisticated electronic monitoring,

i,e, code machinos.

At the present time we are handling a very limited

number of installations. With existing capabilities, ve

Once we have established reasonable priority listing,

could virtually double our present technical coveras 1t

is believed ve should systematically expand our operations.

In this connection, the following should be borne in mind:

1) Heavy emphasis should be placed on microphone

surveillances.

2)

Today we are placing greater stress on

coverage of official establishnents.

The new program asks

or an expansion of coverage on individuals and/or residences

of individuals.

Here again selectivity will be a dominating

characteristic.

3) The program should be so flexible that we

would be able to deactivate any installation for security

reasons of for non-productivity and whenever possible employ

techniques which would permit easy reactivation.

4) Except for current intelligence requiring

immediate dissemination, the product should be handled as

communications intelligence and dissemination would be

subjected to well-established Comint controls of the

National Security Agency (NSA) plus any additional restric-

tions the Bureau feli should be imposed.

5) The product would be transmitted to NSA by us

for dissemination within the intelligence community.

NSA

would be responsible for handling any needed translation.

We must recognize that the program will produce voluminous

information and the responsibility for processing the data

should be lixed with an agency which is organized and

equipped to handle the job.

It is believed that if the

Bureau assuned this responsibility we would be burdened with

a gigantic task of information processing to the point that

this element would adversely aifect other phases oi the

program.

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7

6)

If the information collected by us suggested

a potential for the developaent of an operation, i.e.

double agent, the Bureau could assume complete control

of this operation including the dissemination of táo

intonation.

7) Our involvement in the "sophisticated"

category should be increasod by expanded rescarch and

development bearing in nina we should be utilizing che

most productive equipment available.

The inportance of

this field cannot be exaggerated in

light of the rapid

developments i

the scientific world.

Technical Surveillance Controls

Under this plan we could lurnish the President

and the Attorney Genoral a listing of technical surveillance

targets and do so on a periodic basis. This could even

include an annuai evaluation of the progran.

'Anagram Program (Clandestine collection of cryptographic

material)

This has been one of the more productive programs

handled by the Bureau throughout the years.

We definitely

believe that this piogram should continue and where leasible

we should accelerate.

The produci would continue to be

disseminated to NSA.

Live Sources

The category of "live sources" when broadly inter-

preted includes every individual from the casual contact

to the controlled informant no is delivering high quality

information at an obvious risis. At the present time,

our

sources in diplonatic establishuents are for the most part

This situation is largely due co an

undesirable arrangezent where we must first obialn Clearaace

Iron the sizie department before ve procecd to recruit any

employee or officialr of a diplonatic establishment.

This

places State in the "driver's seat" and that Department,

therefore, is practically controlling our eiloris.

We Leed

that such an arrangement is cectainly.204.concucive. 40up/dat

- 91 a

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## Page 370

producing the best results.

In our opinion this can be

removed by the President's advising the secretary of

State that the fBl is being authorized to develop

penetrations in foreign diplomatic establishments without

obialning clerrances irom state.

that the Burezu would proceed in a discreet and secure

manner. Periodic contact with the Secretary of State or

othor too Stûte officials to discuss goneral dovolopments

and any potential problems will provido a mechanisn or

healthy coordination with state.

We recognize that a

source can turn "sour" and, thereiore, there is the danger

01 potential embarrassment.

However, it should be noted

that our record in this regard has been outstanding over

the years.

Any efficient investigative agency needs sources

of all categories and we are no exception.

Thereiore, ve

should continue our present program of general source

development, and this would include contacts who can

produce infornation on an occasional basis or who might

be in a position to be of assistance in a particular

investigation. In diplomatic establishments the reception

clori, chauffeur, the naid, can always be oi assistance.

However, the prinary emphasis of this new program

would be

directed toward high quality sources, such as:

1) Code clerks

2) Officials tho have access to liles, records,

or communications

3) Oiiicials or employees who are in a position

to penetrate communist-bloc circles or establishments

4) Members of foreign intelligence and security

services.

Our existing progizus of seeking penetrations in

communist bloc installations naturally must continue but

will require an increased effort toward production o1-

information relating to personality dain, and tais sacua

be done on a larger number of individual targets.

We'

realize that Bloc personnel does live in a lairly insulated

norld, and elementary investigative techniques do not produce

voluminous and highly significant data.

It is thererore

belleved that our techniques should become more sophisticated

through additional coverage on the residences of individuals.

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Such efforts naturally fall in line with our internal

security responsibilities, but the coverage may also

provide leads for development of-sources in the positive

intelligence sield.

Evory Soviet is not a member of KGB

or GRU, but ho novorthcless could oiles information or

value, and he could be most useful on a long-range basis.

Our program very deiinitely should have this philosophy

in mind, and it is an elenent which must be impressed

upon our personnel in our training programs.

In this

regard, we must recognize that at some point it may become

necessary to turn over recruited sources to another agency

such as CIA or one of the military services. Such turnover

will, of course,

depend on the circunstances. The guiding

principle should be the preservation of the source under

the best security.

In the non-communist bloc field we would con-

centrate on developmeni of high-quality sources to meet the

priority needs of the Government.

Training o1 Personnel

At the present time, our personnel are not properly.

oriented to eflectively engage in a program as secommended.

To acconnodate to a new approaciz, it will be necessary to:

1) Include in our training classes lectures

which

will cover a more detailed picture of U.s. intelligence, its

history, definition of terms, lusctions of intelligence

agencies.

2)

Include lectures regarding the foreign intel-

ligence needs of the U. S. Government.

3) Use outstanding officials of other agencies to

lecture on special intelligence matters. This would include

the critical areas throughout the world.

4) " Disseminate a bulietin to the field on à

regular basis to emphasize zoreign intelligence needs as

they relate to our capabilitles.

5) Institute a special In-Service class (once

ar twice per year which will concentrate on foreign

"intelligences, This will:be designed to develop the leaders

or the specialists in the field.

• 93 -

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personnel

6) Arrange I0r attendance o1 selected/Bureau

to schools of other agencies such as State

-

Depariment, CIA, and the military services.

7) Arrange for attendanco of selected personnel

at War Colleges.

8) Expand the training of Agents in the handline

of technical survailianco incillations.

Reporting Procedures

This program will not raquire any basic departure

Irom our present reporting procedures.

not become involved in evaluating, estimating, etc. Ve

should endeavor to adhere to our craditional position of

reporting

the facts as collected.

We may wish to give

consideration to adding one feature to our regular reporting

on individuals.

This could be an annex for "Personality

Data."

The objective would be to maintain an up-to-date

book on everything collected relating to the subject's

character, hahits, Lamily life, interests, weaknesses:

etc.

Language Capabilities

An expanded program for collection of loreign

intelligence vould require increased capability to handle

foreign languages. As explained above, the material

collected through technical surveillances should be handled

as comnunications intelligence, and the major translating

responsibility would, therefore, be placed

OI NSA.

We do, hovever, recognize that it is necessary to

maintain a strong foreign language capability in the field

wherever it may be useful to develop live sources. In

offices such as New ork City and Washington, D. C., we

should expand the number of Agents who are fluent in French,

Russian, Polish, Czech, German, Chinese, and Spanish.

office which is' vell equipped with a capability in the

foregoing is generally able to handle most situations which

arise.

•94 -

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Relations with Other Agencies

agencios would be officially apprised ol tho Presidential

authority granted to the IbI to collect foreign intelligence

in the United States. Other agencies would bo informed

rogarding the niture and the extont of the authocity boing

It would be necessary to make

clear that the Bureau was not assuming responsibility for

the clandestine collection of all foreign intelligence in

the United States, but we were taking a constructive step

In an exfort to increase the production of foreign intel

ligence through assets available to us.

We would clearly

point out that the FBI was not taking

this approach as a

solution to all of the problems relating to foreign intel

ligence collection in this country.

We would emphasize

that we would move against targets

In line with established

priorities and that we would do so on

a selective basis.

We would have it understood that operational activities

would be properly coordinated wherever it was obviously

neCessary.

With regard to the handling of the product of

technical surveillances, it rould be necessary to efiect a

working agreement with

• NSA.

To do this we might be obliged

to discuss this at the USIB level so that NSa could obtain

the required authority to support the hiring of additional

personnel and purchase of equipment for the processing ot

ous product. Our arrangement with NSA would include grouzd

rules for processing, translation, and classification and

dissemination.

Since any announcement that we were in the loreign

intelligence field would prompt unusual interest and very

likely queries, we should briel CIA regarding the objectives

of our program.

Our plan vill not abrogate the existing

ground rules which permit Cla to assess and recruit positive

intelligence sources in this country under certain conditions.

Since both Agencies will have. foreign intelligence sources

In the U.N., We undoubtedLy vIll tad lt uselul to work out

an agreenent whoreby one Agency knows that the other has

coverage in a particular area or establishment.

We already

it would not be

necessary los us to identily our sources, but ve could.

indicate to CiA that we had an asset in a particular area.

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## Page 374

us.

This would permit CIA to levy requirenents on

Of

for example, It we recruited the third secrotary

the French Embassy, CIA might wish to ask any number

of questions dealing with the french political situation.

I we folt that the request was zoasonable, we could

handle this through our source.

It will be noted that the proziam doos noc

preClude CIA IrOn development of ioreign intelligence

sources in the U.S. for fulfillment of CIA responsibilities.

CiA will contique to operate under existing ground rules

which are designed to protect Bureau interests.

We believe thai it the program is

and jells we will be in

implemented

a position to "spot" sources

required by CIA and other agencies to discharge their

responsibilities.

This would apply to cases where the

target was in the U.S. for a visit or il he had some

specialized knowledge not related to our internal security

responsibilities.

These would be targets which other

agencies could handle without interfering with our operations

and without making us carry a load for another agency.

This particular concept should include a Bureau atticude

that any and every source handled by anulei agerly in thu

u.s. potentially ca. be useful to us.

We should have an

outlook that all sources should be exploited to

the fullest

extent and under secure conditions.

If another agency has

a capability to open a door we should take advantage of the

situation.

In those instances where CIA has a source in the

United States, ve should prod that agency to seek information

of interest to the Bureau, and where obviously necessary we •

should arrange access to the CIA source.

The important

feature of this new concept is that we assume the role of

projecting initiative, leadership and aggressiveness.

position should be such that we push the other agencies to .

use their resources even to the point of healthy irritation.

We have looked at CIA as the "other agency" in

this picture, buy ve should not neglece. une potentzai 0i

agencies such as ACSI, Air Force, ONI and state.

A11 Of

them have entree to diplomatic circles.

The day-to-cay

contacts which officials of these agencies have with

personnol of foreign goveronents produce many "pieces" of

personality data which, then added up over a period o1 time,

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## Page 375

can prove to be extremely useiul. He should contor wich

these agencies regarding ways and means of recruiting

sources either to be handled by us jointly or by one of

the intelligence agencies.

here again, the Bureau can

bo tho cominant and pushing source.

It is believed that if we moved along the lines

described above, the Bureau, over a poriod ol time, vould

have collected

personalities

valuable information regarding numerous

and the inner worisings of the many diplomatic

establishments.

The acquirement of data of this type

creates operational strength.

it places us in a position

to exploit the development of ner sources, bearing in mind

that in planning our approaches we vill be

equipped with

ammunition not gained through casual surveillances and

observations.

With the knowledge that we gain, ve can

plan high quality opecations.

It is interesting to

That during the past iro years the incornation receivete

Irom CIA's sources in the Unitea States has been fairly

voluminous and vezy definitely valuable. It is a good

illustration of the Bureau's gaining useíul data from

another agency with a mininum of Bureau expense and elfort,

but, still mintaining very effective control of our juris-

dictional rights.

Undoubtedly related to the utilization of other

agencies' resources is the considerably vast potential

offered by friendly foreign security services.

If the

Germany,

France, holland, Italy,

Washington, D. C. and New York resulting from contacts with

communist-bloc officials, we would have another valuable

source or information.

We should bear in mind that ve do

spend hundreds and thousands of nan-nours seeking such

inforation through other dillicult channels.

We should utilize the friendly liaison services

along the lines described above.

Administrative Reorganization

: *

• The present administrative franenork at the Seat

of Government and in the

field would not be adequate to

implement the jecom anded program. Placing the additional

load on our existing supervisory. structure is, of course,

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## Page 376

out oi the question. He definitely would require's

increase in supervisory personnel in the Domestic /

Intelligence Division.

In addition, there would be a

need for more manpower in our Laboratory io handie

ospansion in tho technical surveillance field.

would be a need for additional personnel to be assigned

for the development of live sources in the field.

would bo necessary to have liold perconnel assignod

technical surveillance installations on a continued basis

ana, of course,

there would be a need or support related

to such activities as preliminary security surveys.

..'

It is outside the scope of this Comnittee's .

competency to outline any specific administrative re

organization and propose what personnel, equipment and

facilities would be needed. We feel that this could be

best nanaled only aiter the objectives or the program are

At that point, officials fron the seat of

could meet to map out the necessary

reorganization.

The extent of reorganization will hinge on

our decision as to the pace we should set.

We recommend

that ve proceed ai a steady, even pace, making certain thât

we lay solid groundwork for all of our activity. We should

reirain iron becoming involved in a "crash" program uniess

national security interests obviously warrant such an

approach.

In connection with any planning for reorganization,

It woula be unwise to proceed wichout ilrst obtaining a

reLlable inventOry oi our cuicent resources.

Such an

inventory would encompass the following: (1)

The number

of igents currently assigned to strictly positive intel-

ligence collection; (2)

(3) Our current sources. and informants wich an objective

assessnent of capabilities; (4) Number of supervisors at

the Seat of Government currently handling positive intel

ligence matters.

In connection with any plans for reorganization,

we should not neglect to give consideration to the problems

which we will encounter as time goes on in the areas of

information storage und retrieval. We, therefore, saould

realize that it would be unwise to exclude research or

study regarding the computerizing. of information.

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ALTERNATIVIS

(.:

10: 49.00197

In addition to the recommended plan set forth in

preceeding sections, there are several

alternative courses

action we might take:

• *:

1.

We could take the position, and seek ways to implement

it, that the entire field of foreign intelligence collection

in the U.s., both overt and covect, should be handled by

the IBI.

Such an acrosa-cho-boaid

approach would exclude

CIA and other U.

S agencies fron foreign intelligence

collection in this country and would place exclusive

responsibility and jurisdiction in this field on the FBi.

As indicated in Section I, this would require a revanping

of. existing legislation and directives and would necessitate

arastic changes in the Bureau's operations, including major

increases in personnel and costs and a substantial expansion

in ous recruitment and training programs, and other reorganiza-

tion. We do not feel this approach is warranted nor do we

believe it would be a practical and sound one.

We could recommend that CIA continue to be

responsible for overt collection oi foreign intelligence in

this country but that the FBI exclusively handle covert

tuitign intclligonoe collection.

This has several obvious

drawbacks.

First, we would be assuming a wide range of

heavy and rixed respons-hilities which in many cases would

be completely divorced icon the Bureau's internal security

and counterintelligence interests.

Second, we would become

to a large extent a service group

for other U.s. agencies

and departments (including CiA, state, the military and others)

in the handling of a host of ioreign intelligence cequicements

levied by other agencies.

This would involve a considerable

commitment of manpower,

communication costs, etc. on the part

0f the Bureau. In addition, such an approach would necessitate

significant changes in our recruitment and training procedures

and would also place on our shoulders a definite accountability

in connection with any failures in U.S. intelligence foreign

collection.

It is not? elieved that this approach is. as sound

os desirable as our recommended plan of action: namely, that

we expand our foreign intelligence collection eiforts but on

aselective.basis.and.without our assumi78.1017 responsibiltty

• +e; ом.

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3. We could

endeavor to work out a

division of

responsibility and work in this area hereby the Bureau

and CIA would each have certain primary areas of operation.

For example, the FBI could make known its willingness to

contribute more heavily in support of U.S. foreign intelligence

collection efforts and propose this field be broken into

two categories; namely, technical coverage (chis would include

Anagram operations) and live informant development among

ZOrOLEn diplomato.

We could proposo that the tBi concinuo

to operate exclusively in the lirst category (technical

coverage) with CIA continuing to stay entirely out of this

n this regate, the buieau is better equipped chai

CIA to handle technical

suaveillances and Anagram operation:

by reason of our long experience and expertise in this area.

With regard to the second category (live sources)

we could propose that CIA conduct no operations involving

countries where the Bureau's counterintelligence interests

are paramount or significant.

This would include the Sino-

soviet-bloc countries and could also include certain other

countries, such as the Dominican Republic, where we have

"already developed strong capabilities or where there are

unique factors.

With regard to otner countries (aul Biuu), ve

could propose that CIA should assume primary responsibility

for developing live diplonatic sources.

However, this

would be with the clear proviso that, in the event the FBI

should develop significant internal security interests, we

would have the prerogative of levying requirements on CIA

sources, naving direct

access to CIA sources when needed, 0r

as a fInal siep, developing our own sources ii ciA coulc

not satisily our

needs.

This alternative plan would not involve as much

manpower or other expense to the Bureau as our recommended

plan.

However, it would involve our approval of CIA opera-

tions in the live informant field and vould risk CIA infriag

ing on FBI interests. It is our consensus that this

approach

not be adopted.

4. We coule recommend that the EBI could withdraw

entirely from the field of covezt foeign inteligence collection

• allowing CIA to handle all aspects, including Anagram opeza-

tionstand both live and technical coverage.

We are strongly

opposed to such an approach on the grounds that it would

arastically diminish the Bi's sole in the intelligence

community, would give CIA carte blanche to operate in the

U.S., and in many instances would cortainly sesult in CIAs

compromising on internal security and counterintelligence

operations.

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5.

Finally, ve could take no action to change the

current situation and, in effect, adopt a "status quo"

approach. We are opposed to this.

As indicated in this

study, U.S. Government needs for foreign intelligence

are growing on an almost daily basis and CIA has made

definite efiorts to nove more activoly into this liola.

Il we were to adopt a

"status quo" attitude, it is only.

a question of time until this matter comes io & head;

10r example,.

in the U.S. Intelligence Boardior the

Forcien Intolligenco lavisory Board.

when this occurs,

the decision as to the IBI's role would,

of course, be subject to the thinking and aims of peoplo

outside the rBI, possibly including individuals who are

not sympathetic

tò our views. We would not be in a position

to maintain control of developnente.

• 10%

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