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2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

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7/26118

Date: 10/07/93

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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA

RECORD NUMBER : 157-10008-10241

RECORDS SERIES :

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : R602

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION

IN THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED

60/12198

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA

FROM :

TO :

TITLE :

INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY

DATE : 07/24/75

PAGES : 7

SUBJECTS :

INTERVIEW WITH BRUCE CHEEVER

ASSASSINATION INQUIRY

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION

RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED

CURRENT STATUS : P

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/07/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :

santage

BOX 438-3

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438-3

A TERVIEW AD MEETING SUITARY

R602

INTERVIEW WITH:

REGARDING:

Bruce Cheever

Assassination Inquiry

SSCI CO

SSCI BOX. "

43

8-3

438-3

10841

DATE TIME-LOCATION:

PRESENT:

July 24, 1975

Paul WALLACH and Joe DiGenova

HAS OR SHOULD BE DIGESTED:

FOLLOW UP REQUIRED:

MATERIAL SUBMITTED BY INTERVIEWEE(S) :

EXECUTIVE SESSION:

_YES

_ito

(*

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F.,00

INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY

TOP

This morning Joe DiGenova and I interviewed

Bruce Cheever at the Carroll Arms.

We focused on

Cheever's tenure as deputy director of Task Force

W.

Background:

1938-43

1943-44

1944-46

1950-53

Marine Corps

OSS Parachute School

Marine Corps

Office Police Coordination; headed

Divis Section for Western European

Division

1953-56

1956-60

1960-3/62

3/62-65

1965-71

1971

3/64-2/65

ance on Stationa (skedon)

Deputy Chief, European Division

Headguarters, U. S. European Command

(U. S. representative)

Deputy Director: Task Force W

chief of stationa souen Africa, 12-12

Retired from Agency

Deputy Chief, Special Operations

Branch (developing paramilitary

capabilities for Agency)

Apparently selected for Task Force W because

of extensive paramilitary background. Not sure

whether slotted by Harvey or Helms.

Prior to his Task Force Wassignment, Harvey

was known to Cheever by reputation only.

He des

cribed Harvey as one of the finest operatives the

Agency ever had, citing

Harvey's Berlin tunnel.

Cheever understood that Task Force W was

Mongoose's instrument to get rid of the Castro

regime; that the Cuban operations had White House

backing; and that the Agency had been given an

operational carte blanche, with the caveat that

each operation had to receive explicit SGA approval

prior to getting off the drawing board.

Cheever told us:

"You don't pull in fast-rising

men like [Ted] Schakley unless you have solid back-

ing."

Cheever

believes that Lansdale was REK's

representative and that Task Force W would not

suggest aggressive covert action to the SGA with-

out Lansdale's approval.

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INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY

TOD

Cheever confirmed what we'knew about Harvey.

Although Cheever worked closely with Harvey, he

told us that Harvey was a loner and most surely

would not inform him of operations unless he had

a "must need to know". In Cheever's opinion,

Harvey was one of the great believers in compart-

mentalization; Cheever "complained that Harvey

turned him into his staff man" (as compared to an

operational extension).

Cheever also told us that

Harvey was a two martini man at lunch with thyroid

problems; this often "led to problems for Harvey

at early afternoon meetings".

Cheever believes he attended at least ten SGA

meetings.

However the does not recall RFK, only

recalls briefing Bundy.

(Maybe Cheever attended

other than SGA meetings - the minutes do not re-

flect his attendance.)

Cheever met weekly with designees of the SGA

principals in Lansdale's office (Messrs. Califano,

Haig, Hurwitch, Craig, and Johnson). Cheever woul

brief these designees

on proposed operational

plans; discussion of the details would ensue.

Subsequent to the staff meetings, the principals

would meet

and decide

not the particular

plan would be approved. Cheever did state that the

Group often rejected proposals.

In one instance,

Max Taylor vetoed the maritime

infiltration of a

small team. Taylor felt that the chances of success

were small and attributability great. (Cheever

agreed with Taylor -- "but it was one of Lansdale's

brain childs.")

Cheever told us that "around the Task Force W

it was known that the Kennedys wanted to get

rid of the Castro regime.

In order to get this

"the Kennedys built a fire under the Agency's

and installed Lansdale as Chief of Operations"

According to Cheever, Lansdale and the SGA were

"geared to keeping the Kennedys informed as to what

was happening".

However, after the Cuban missile crisis, Cuban

operations were not pursued with the same sense of

urgency.

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