MEMO: COMPARISON OF ARRB AND DO MEMORANDA RE TREATMENT OF CIA OFFICER NAMES IN JFK COLLECTION
Originator: CIA
From: GARY M. BRENEMAN, IC
Document date: 02/11/1997
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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AAAAR

1104-10331-10142

2023 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

prcbarc.de

11 February 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM: Gary M. Breneman, IC

SUBJECT: Comparison of ARRB and DO Memoranda re

Treatment of CIA Officer Names in JEK

Collection

1. This memorandum is in response to an assignment to

compare a 20 March 1996 ARRB memorandum written by T. Jeremy

Gunn and The Directorate of Operations response dated 20

July 1966, authored by Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr. Both deal

with the treatment of CIA officer true names which appear in

the JFK collection -- when they will be postponed and when

they will be released.

2. First the ARRB Memorandum Gunn describes in legal

terms the Board's position on the postponement or release of

CIA officers' true names. He makes a proffer which states

that there is a presumption in favor of releasé akin to a

legal evidentuary rule which causes a burden to shift to the

other party (CIA) to prove something. In this instance, it

is factual evidence/proof sufficient to shift the burden not

only back to neutral but to the other side of neutral which

permits postponement.

3.

The Gunn memorandum then sets out the criteria

required to meet the burden

under several situations.

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A. For officers who are still alive he states that the

proofs required to postpone release of a name are three in

number and all three must be met :

i. The officer must be living outside of the U.s.

OR,

(R)easonably be expected to travel outside of

the US in the foreseeable future;

AND,

ii. The officer is either working ... (presumably

a current staff officer, contract employee,

or independent contractor) ... or is retired

under cover;

AND,

iii. The officer objects to the release of his or

her true name.

COMMENT: Mr. Gunn's criteria are a little confusing

and reach beyond the Board's authority. First, note again

that the three elements are joined by an & AND$

meaning all

elements must be met to satisfy a postponement. Second, the

first requirement of living or traveling outside of the U.s.

is not tied to # cover.& Many officers who do not work

under cover all of the time are, in fact, provided cover

for overseas TDY's. Thus, any officer who might

# reasonably' be expected to travel outside of the U.S.

would warrant postponement of his true name. This would

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seem to include every CIA employee, contract employee and

independent contractor past and present.

With respect to the third element, Mr. Gunn and the

Board are simply in error. To my knowledge they have no

authority to require that an individual be consulted

concerning his or her wishes to maintain cover, thus having

his or her true name postponed, or to give up his cover,

thus having the name released. This decision does not lie

in the first instance with the individual but is an

institutional decision which lies solely within the purview

of the Agency and the executive branch of the government.

CIA as an executive

agency charged with the creation,

maintenance, and dissolution of cover mechanisms is the only

entity competent to make such a decision. It alone knows if

release of an officer's true name will compromise an

existing cover mechanism which will, in turn, expose others

who share or have shared the same cover. It alone knows if

release of an officer's name will expose CIA sponsorship (a

cover entity) of a sensitive activity. It alone knows if

release of an officer's name will violate a promise of

confidentiality to a commercial cover sponsor which could

cause both embarrassment and possibly, financial hardship to

the sponsor and, in turn, substantially hinder the Agency's

ability to secure subsequent commercial cover sponsors.

Turning next to the wishes of a particular officer

(either current or retired) vis a vis staying with his or

her cover, these thoughts come to mind. For current

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employees, the decision is again not entirely theirs. If,

after careful review, the Agency does not have a strong

position on the employee maintaining the cover, the officer

should be permitted to decide. He or she should be

counseled however, that an action to remove cover could have

an adverse impact on future assignments or TDYs. With

respect to retirees, if, after careful review, the Agency

does not object to the removal from cover, the individual

should be permitted to decide. Note, that the responses

to

this inquiry will be mixed. As a historical note, the

Agency over the years has been on an ever-swinging pendulum

with respect to & cover into retirement,&

cover for

life,& etc. There will be officers who petitioned hard

unsuccessfully to have their cover removed when they retired

and will gladly consent to lifting the cover. There will be

those officers who do not want their cover lifted under any

circumstance.

By way of summary, it is CIA not the Board and not the

individual officer who makes the initial decision concerning

the maintenance or lifting of cover.

B.

Former officers, status unknown. While the

heading to this section would seem to suggest the CIA does

not know the cover/non-cover status of some of its former

officers, the

section does not rally deal with this issue.

Rather, within the section, Mr. Gunn simply recognizes the

fact the CIA may not be able to find all of its former

officers to ask if they want to be opened up or remain under

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cover. The test required by Mr. Gunn to satisfy the Board

and thus continue postponement until 1 June of this year is

a # good faith showing that reasonable attempts were made

to locate the officer and failed.

The section contains the additional provision which

advises the Board may continue a postponement beyond 1 June

of this year (i.e., until 2010) if the CIA provides

the

board with evidence which satisfies the criteria of either

category 1 or category 3. Such & additional evidences must

be provided by 1 May 1977.

The requirements or tests of this section for the

Agency are not onerous but should be set-out as a series of

uniform actions or check-off's taken in the attempt to

locate each & current status unknowns officer. The record

of these actions could then be presented to the ARRB in

support of a request for continued to postponement. The DO

Memorandum mentions of the possibility of asking the IRs or

*

the OPM for assistance in this regard and this should

probably be done. I recall however, that the Service will

assist, through cleared contacts at the. National Office, but

only to the extent of determining the whereabouts of the

individual and then contacting him and ask that he be in

touch with his former employer.

I have no current knowledge

of cleared contacts at the OPM but they existed in the past

and I assume they continue.

C. Names having effect on current intelligence

interests.

The Gunn letter appears to

subscribe a higher

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level of concern to this section and its criteria than the

previous two, not recognizing the plain fact that the

criteria of all three sections are inextricable.

It sets

out

four separate criteria which, if CIA

satisfies its

burden, i.e. provides sufficient evidence to prove any one

of them, will operate to postpone a true name until the year

2010.

Note again, the criteria required are four separate

ones, each separated by a comma and between numbers 3 and 4

and " OR." They are:

i. The officer must be currently engaged in

clandestine activities; OR,

ii.

The release of the officer's name would

compromise ongoing intelligence operations or operations

with current

intelligence

value (presumably, the latter

permits

review into the officer's past

activities, agent

relationships, and cover positions); OR,

iii.. The release of the officer's true rame would

reasonably be expected to cause significant harm to a living

person (including family members); (read broadly, this

provision would include, the individual, former agents,

anyone who shared the same cover or cover position, tie. a

dedicated Department of State slot within an embassy?; OR,

iv. The release of the officer's name would cause a

significant harm to the national security or the foreign

relations of the U.S. (a criteria which is broad enough to

drive the proverbial Mack truck through) .

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4. In Part II, the Gunn memorandum takes back part of

what it gave in the previous section. It sets up a test of

importance to the assassination story vs. evidence of

harm.&

Essentially, it advises that the Board will weigh

the CIA's evidence but, if within its view, the true name

being considered for postponement is important to the

assassination story, the Board will release it. This means

for those few individuals who may be viewed as & important

to the story,& truly substantial evidence must be brought

to bear.

Absent such evidence, the Board will release, and

the only recourse left to the Agency would be an' appeal to

the President.

5. The Directorate of Operations Memorandum. The

basic concern with the steps for handling names as contained

within the memorandum is as follows. For officers who

retired under cover, the first step will be to contact them

and ask if they want their true name released. . Per the

comments on page three supra, this should be the last step

of the review, not the first.

A. Other Comments. The resources and data bases

which will be researched for each name should be clearly

established and followed in a uniform manner. Deviation

from a set, orderly process will open CIA determinations to

criticism, objections and dismissal, i.e. release of a name

that should be postponed.

B. In addition to the data bases described --

retirement records, annuity pay records, the office of

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• :

security, insurance lists -- consideration might be given

to the Northwest Federal Credit Union, and overt data bases

such as Phonedec. Like the IRS and OPM, the credit union

might not be able from a legal standpoint to provide an

address. However, it would probably be prepared to contact

an individual and ask that he be in touch.

C. A comment must be made about the idea of

universally releasing the true names of overt employees. To

the extent that any current employee, even overt employee,

may be sent overseas on TDY under light cover, the release

of his or her true name via these JFK documents which will

receive widespread review could jeopardize his overseas

mission and possibly, place his life in danger.

6. These thoughts are intended to be talking points as

we commence to sort out the manner in which we will deal

with the true names. Clearly, we need to begin to quickly

identify those names which can be released, those on which

there is some question, and those few on which we really

need to dig in our heals.

6. I would be glad to discuss with you any of the

issues

raised herein.

Gary M.

Breneman

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