DRAFT PAPER:"WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF CASTRO DIED?"
Agency: CIA
Originator: CIA
From: CHIEF, WH/4
To: C/WH/4/INTEL
Document date: 10/6/61
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY: CIA

RECORD NUMBER: 104-10315-10006

RECORD SERIES JEK

AGENCY FILE NUMBER LA DIV WORK FILE

Released under the John F. Kennedy

Assassination Recorda Collection

Act of 1992 144 USC 2107 Note):

ased:NU 53320 Date: :06-27-2017

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

AGENCY ORIGINATOR: CIA

FROM

*C/WH/4/INTEL

TO : CHIEF, WH/4

TITLE

DRAFT PAPER: "WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF CASTRO DIED?"

DATE

10/06/1961

PAGES

:: 9

SUBJECTS : CASTRO DEATH

DOCUMENT TYPE PAPER

CLASSIFICATION : SECRET

RESTRICTIONS : 1A

CURRENT STATUS: RELEASED IN PART PUBLIC : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 01/27/99

COMMENTS: JEK-WF05: F1: 1999.01.27.14:11:16:950120

[R) ITEM IS RESTRICTED

.. 104-1031510006

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6 October 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/4

SUBJECT:

Preparation of Draft Paper on Castro

In compliance with your request of 5 Oeteber 1961

o prepare a paper on the subject of "What Would Happen If

Castro Died?", subject paper 1e attached herewith.

2.

This paper was prepared utilizing contributions

from VH/4/PA-PROP, WH/4/INTEL/REPORIS, WH/4/FI-CL and this

section. In addition, a conference was held on 5 October

1961 with representatives of OCI, who have been following

the Cuban developments, and their thoughts and expressions

are included in the attachment.

ALBERT C. DAVIES

c/vн/4/Intel.

SEGRET

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SECRET

6 October 1961

MENORANDOM POR: Mr. Park I. Rollan

SUBJECT:

What Would Esppen If Castro Died?

The attached peper, subject an abeve, le forwarded in

response to your request of 5 October 1961.

art

RAFORD W. HERBERI

1 Attackment

DDR/WH/4/Intel/ACDavles;new (6 Oct 61)

Distribution:

Orig & 1 - Addressee

1 - AC/WHD

- AC/wH/4

- wH/4/Exeс

- c/wH/4/Intel

1 - WH/4/PA-PROP

- WH/4/FI-CI

- WH/4/PM

- WH/4/Tatel/Reporta

SET

150- 6/

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6 October 1961

SUBJECT: What vould happen 1f Castro died?

1. Introduction.

The Impact of Fidel Castro's sudden death would ob-

Vously have cone Internal repereuenlons on ble Cosmunlet

doninated regime. Hovever, it vould be wishful thinklag to

belleve that the Cuben people vould lamediataly slee up and

overthrow the regime, now that Castxo had departed the

ecene. In view of the tremendous stzides made during the

last five months toward the organization of Cuba Into a

complete police state and the lack of any unified anti-

Castro opposition, there can be little doubt that the de-

aire of Fidel Castro, whether by naturel causes of assass-

Ination, would offer little opportunity for the Ilberation

of Cuba

fron Couumist and Sovlet Blos control, To belleve

ine 0189 01 88

sassination, Instead of natural arises, the factor of bie

nartydon to the Cuben masses vould further stzengthen tha

pover of the present regime in malatalaing control. Also,

it la probable that the Sovlet Blos would react to such an

eveat with greatly incrossed econonle ald in order to serure

aniatenence of thair establlehed beechheed on the hotttem

continent. Although it la possible to antlelpete the la-

nodiate results of the death by assassination of Pidal Castro.

the end result of such an astion would depand to a groat or

tent on the respoctive effectiveness of the verk of the poltee,

the Connaists, the nilitary, and the ents-Castro groupe.

2. Ildel Cantrole sues

It would appear that Cestro's successor would enasge

fron the following choices:

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Raul Cestro, Minieter of Armed Forces

"Che" Guevare, Minister of Industry

Nunez Jimenes, Director INRA

Foure Chomon, Ambassador to USSR

Early in 1961, Reul Cestro was appointed Vice-President

and principal executive officer of the Central Plenning Com-

mittee.

This Increased authority and his contimuing pover as

Minister of the Armed Forces rank him second only to the Prime

Minister.

It 18 felt that Ernesto "Cha" Guevara would not be ec-

ceptable to the Cuban people as ha le not Cuben bora. He ep-

perre destined to wiald tremendous power but not as the rank-

lag euthority,

Nunez Jimenes, the Director of the Institute of Agrerten

Refora lost a good portion of hia Indastrial eupire to "Che"

Quevera during past reorgentration and consequently relingulahed

considerable prestige asong the present leedership.

vas generally conceded that, at the tine, Castro was ridding

hinself of a potentially dangerous rival.

Of the four individuale aforementioned, none of then have

the pereonal megnetten or populas support of Fidel Castro. On

the other hand, Reul Castro, Guevara and all the top Commaleta

togather have strength and control which could not posalbly be

would be leelined to walt too long to set affectively.

+ 2 =

SHET

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$

3. Reection Anons the MIlitasy and Security Forces.

The military lesders, under the direction of Reul Castro,

would undoubtedly call for incedlate increased use of police

state nethods, walch would inèlude nase erreats, tightening

of all types of controle, Incesse of vigilence and informant

reporting, and elimination, at least by arrest if not more

violent action, of any entl-Castro figures of influence or

strength.

4. Caneral Reaction of the Cubea popalace.

Once dead, the firet resction should be a stunned shoek

and blad of ruspended animation anons the Cuben popalace, while

the security forces nove la to tighten the lld still further.

Raul Castro conceivably could take over and, supported by Che

Guevara, Initiate overwhelming prepeganda about saving the

revolutiou and trying to tidy Fidel up into an acceptable martys.

Iidel Castro is the one who has always had the magle hold on

the people, been able to hypnotize then with hla speeches and

it le to fidel that the arben and rucal poor bave always looked

do A kind of "Greas White Father", a symbol of Invocation that

la looked to, to rigat the wrongs done to thea, The evile done

are still not assoclated with hin as such as with bis subordia-

ates and Fidal la the lest court of appeal. The poorer elasses

feel that 11 his ear can only be galnad, he will still nake

things right. Tidel'» volce la that covers the naked power of

the repressive osgans and cas et11l eppoal. When be le out of

the way, there will be no syth to elleg to and so voice to lull.

S. Baection Among Antl-CAntTo Individuals and Groupe.

After the first shoak, partloularly of Castro'a death, le

neecap Lahed sufficiently Ignoniasously (sose st111 belleve be

la parsonally lacorruptable) there should be an incrasse of

If the some restrletions on

enations loadiag people to flea into exile vi1l be directad

peoplo. The would be the tion for mall vell-tralned, vell-

SECRI

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SECRE

supplied guerrilla groups to appear in the mountains. This

would give heart to whatever may be left of the undergrouad,

elve those who want to fight somewhere to go, privide a base

for urben sabotage end greatly fecilitate the overthrow of

Fidel'a unpopulez halra end thalI bloc supporters.

If by sone fluke such an assassination attempt should be

successful, the only opposition group in any position at

present to take advantage of wresting contzol from the Con-

unists la the right-wing novement forning under PRIO. This

groups' plans reportedly include use of a re-activated BATISTA

army, now called the "Er-Constitutional Aruy", shich has an

external militant organization cosposed of upuarde of 5000

men fer cosbet and a maber el intersal factione the have en-

gaged in limited sebotage and resistance ectivity agalant the

Castro regima. It also ineludes the CTC in Exile, headed by

Eusebto MUJAL, and composed of a large number of expertenced

labor leaders. The resmption of pover by this exoup vould

probably result in en early renoval of civil war and an even-

cual retura to pover of the Consulate.

6. Reaction Among Neutze

VRessive Orbang-

There are still a number of Cubene uto support the cause

of the soclallat revolation, uho revere Tidel Cestro, sad vho

st11l xemain la Cuba, but sho do not support the cause.of Cos-

prinertly of the middle eless, the have lost sose of their

proclous wealth and positles, and others who have becoma die-

satisfled with increased state control and economle shortages.

Ihis exoup and those la defiaite oppositton can be subdivided

Inte those uho have shona what aight be tornad a paselva ro-

225535

pposition to the stries polles stara nathode shich would surel

a imposed, Included in both the aforemenstoned grope and t

a certala extent la the goverment foroes, such as the Mllele,

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are those persons wbo, although they do not basically sup-

port the Castro goverment, would walt to see the turn of

events before they would comit thenselves to changing sides.

7. Beestion Among PEe-Cestro CubeRs.

Cextefaly those Cubane who have gained through the changes

brought about by the Castro revolution would continue to sup-

port his cause and to avenge his death. Those peasants vio

have gained materially, the youth who have acquired a new in-

portence and recogaition and who have been thoroughly indoc-

trinated by the sociallet regise, would continue to support

the governest.

8. Communist Party Renetion.

Ibose leaders of the ISP (Pertido Soctalista Popular)

the Cubaa Communiet Party, Nao are already la influential po-

sitloas vould certainly atteupt not only to retain that In-

fluence but to increase it under advantageous aircumstances.

There are feu goverment leadera left in Cuba who are anti-

Communist to the extent that they would oppose the Cosslate.

9. Jaileteral Actions By Latin Anesteen Nationale.

puring the last few yesrs, the Latin Anerteans have in

addiston to overthrowing three vell establlahed polles states ..

Poron, Perez Ilanes, Batlete a vla laternel uprialngs -

oncuated successful assassinations against four chlofa ot

state -- Resoa of Panana, Sonora of Mleacagua, Lentillo Arme

of Guatenala nd 17uj111o of the Bonialcan Republle, There-

fore, the possibility of e assassination ettempt agalnet the

Chen tina to that ring can over on, do a bo la traily

10.

amer of Fidel Castsele Beath.

the effects of Caetro'e deach, partleulerly la the short

run, depend considerably on hou he diea.

Becsuse of the sure

«t111 ellaging to the men la the alade of the redical left of

Latin America, particularly enong student groups, he le sure

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to renata the symbol of "Revolution", Thus, bacause of the

need to undercut this image in the hemisphere es well ee to

destroy the finel vestiges of regard in which he is held

wichtn Cube, it is Iportent that he not become a new martyr.

The condittons surrounding his death must pablically and ir-

recitably be set in one of two alternative situations; Elrat.

he con die ignomalovely and la a situation that vill con-

tribute to besirching his character of second; he can be

eliminated by the Russiens as being unstable end no longer

necessary to their interests.

"the evene of the casta of Castro by natural neens,

atnar then assassination, the lamediate reaction by govern

mant forces witht not be no severe, sinon thay coald not son-

celvably implicate the Untted States la such on eveat.

12. Isobable Sortet Bloe Reeetlong.

The Cuban goverumant vould certainly hope for support

fron their Soviet Bloc friends in the event of any real

risia. To judge the extent to blen this support woul

aterialize la somewhat diffleult. Castataly the Bloe woul

nope to protect their investment la Cabe, but on the other.

hand, the Sovlets would probably hesitate to set in such a

sassar as to add to the already diffloule world situation.

Probably their interest in Cuba 18 not freet enough to chence

loatag out in other strategie erees of the world. As a

Rectiod he tota tool me they at lot to sortet

ta Cuba in order to prevent that country fron joiniag the

raska of free Latin Anerican sattons.

12. Senslasion.

" la fairly certaia that the use of «a assasalaattor

a some of overthrowing the Cuben Commentat rogte

Tomer to me to beaver ed etert at Ta Cal carro, o

Ernesto "Che" Cuevara,

feetive such a program

ganized resistance i

ent capable of providing a simultaseous

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Internal uprising. Recently Reul CHIRAS, MRP leader In exile,

consented that assassination presented the only real prospect

for bringing about an exly change in the Cuban situation.

CHIBAS consented further that even an assassination progres

would not ba a solution unless there was detailed and intell1.

gent planning for setion following the event.

Any hope for the eventual resumption of a denocratic

regine in Cuba lies, not in any anticipeted or irmediate take-

over by opposition forces, but in the possible disagreement,

disorgentration, and fight for control that night result enong

the renaining lesders from the loss of Fidel Castro.

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