Originator: HSCA
From: CIA
Document date: 00/00/0000
Document type: REPORT

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180-10142-10038

2022 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

Berk-Write-Ups

22

7 20

Item 1-A

ME NO 200100

DACTACLE

AS REDACTED

I. Purpose and Scope of Study

The Central Intelligence Agency's performance

in its role of support to the Warren Commission

has been a source of controversy since the

inception of the Warren Commission. Critics

have repeatedly charged that the CIA participated

in a conspiracy designed to suppress information

relevant to the assassination of President Kennedy.

During 1976 the critic's

assertions were the subject of official inquiry

by the Senate Select Committee to Study

Governmental Operations (hereinafter SSC). The

SSC, in its report regarding "The Investigation

of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy:

Performance of the Intelligence Agencies" reached

the following conclusion:

The Committee emphasizes that it has

not uncovered any evidence sufficient

to justify a conclusion that there was

a conspiracy to assassinate President

Kennedy.

The Committee has, however, developed

evidence which impeaches the process

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

AS SANITIZED

10142-10038

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by which, the intelligence agencies

arrived at their own conclusions

about the assassination, and by

which

they provided information

to the Warren Commission.

evidence indicates that the

investigation of the assassina-

tion was deficient and that facts

which might have substantially

affected the course of the inves-

tigation were not provided the

Warren Commission or those

individuals within the FBI and

the CIA, as well as other agencies

of Government, who were charged

with investigating the assassina-

tion. (SSC, BookI, po)

This Committee has sought to examine in

greater detail the general findings of the SSC.

The Committee has particularly focused its attention

on the specific issue of whether the CIA or any

employee or former employee of the CIA misinformed,

or withheld information relevant to the assassina-

tion of President Kennedy from the Warren

Commission. In addition, the Committee has

attempted to determine whether, if the warren

Commission was misinformed or not made privy to

information relevant to its investigation,

whether the misinforming or withholding of

evidence from the Warren Commission was

the

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result of a conscious intent to do so by the

Agency or its employees.

The Committee has sought to examine the

issue detailed above in both an objective

and disciplined manner.

In order to accomplish

this goal the Committee has utilized a 1977

Report by the CIA's Inspector General (hereinafter

77 IGR). This Report was highly critical of

the SSC findings and asserted that the SSC

Final Report conveyed an impression of limited

effort by the CIA to assist the Warren Commission

in its work. The 77 IGR was in fundamental

disagreement with this characterization of the

SSC findings and noted that "CIA did seek and

collect information in support of the Warren

Commission. Additionally, it conducted

studies

and submitted special analyses and reports."

(77 IGR, Introduction to Tab E.)

In order to demonstrate further the scope

of support provided by the CIA to the Warren

Commission, the 77 IGR contained a comprehensive

listing of CIA generated material made available

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to both the U.S. Intelligence Community and

the Warren Commission

regarding the assassina-

tion of President Kennedy.

In this respect,

the Committee agrees with the 77 IGR wherein

it is

stated that "This compiliation (of

CIA generated material) is appropriate to

consideration of the extent of the CIA effort,

to the extent that it reveals something of

the results of that effort." (77 IGR, Introduction

to Tab E)

In examining the Agency's comprehensive

listing of CIA generated material referenced above,

the Committee has paralled its review to the

structure given to these material by the 77

IGR.

In this regard the 77 IGR detail four inter-

related compilations of Kennedy assassination

material. These four compilations are:

1) Agency dissemination of information

to the Intelligence Community (Formal

and Informal Disseminations)

2) Dissemination of material to the

• Warren Commission

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3)

Agency dissemination to the FBI et al

regarding

rumors and allegations

regarding President Kennedy's

assassination

4)

Memorandum

submitted by CIA to the

Warren Commission on Rumors and

Allegations Relating to the President's

Assassination (77 IGR, Introduction

to Tab E.)

These compilations were reviewed by a staff

member of the Committee who focused upon those

CIA materials which the 77 IGR documented as having

made available in written form to the Warren

Commission.

During the course of this study, additional

Agency files have been reviewed.

These files

have

been examined in an effort to resolve certain

issues

created by the review of the Agency's

compilations discussed in this report.

Where

apparent gaps existed in the written record,

files have been requested and reviewed in an effort

to resolve these

gaps.

Where significant substantive

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issues have arisen related to the kind and

quality of information provided the Warren

Commission, files have also been requested and

reviewed in an effort to resolve these

issues.

As a

result, approximately thirty files, comprising

an approximate total of ninety volumes of

material have been examined and analyzed by a

staff member of this Committee in preparation

of this report.

The findings set forth herein are subject

to modification due to the following considera-

tions.

During the course of the past fifteen

years, the CIA has generated massive amounts of

information related to the assassination of

President Kennedy. In spite of the Agency's

sophisticated document retrieval system, certain

documents requested by this Committee for study

and analysis have not been located.

Whether these

documents merely have been filed incorrectly or

destroyed, gaps in the written record still do

exist.

Secondly, due to dissimilar

standards of

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relevancy adopted by the CIA and this Committee,

certain files requested by the Committee for

review have either not been made available to

the Committee or have been made available to

the Committee in a santized fashion. Therefore,

to the degree reflected by the Agency's denial

of access and/or santization of certain materials,

this study's conclusions are based upon the

best evidence available to the Committee though

this may not be all relevant evidence to which

the Agency has access.

One must, moreover, give due consideration

to the role that oral discussions, oral briefings,

and meetings of Warren Commission and CIA

representatives may have played in the supply of

assassination-related information by the CIA to

the Warren Commission. The subject and substance

of these discussions, briefings, and meetings

may not always be reflected by the written

record made the

subject of this study.

Therefore, the Committee has conducted interviews,

depositions and executive session hearings with

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key Warren Commission staff and members

and

former or present CIA representatives in an

effort to resolve questions that are not

addressed by the written record.

The results

of the Committee's efforts to chronicle this

aspect of the working relationship between the

Warren Commission and the CIA will be a subject

for discussion herein.

Warren Commission Relationship With CIA Regarding

Information Made Available By CIA To Warren

Commission

The Committee has contacted both representatives of

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the Warren Commission staff and those representatives of

the CIA who played significant roles in providing CIA

generated information to the Warren Commission. The

general consensus of these representatives is that the

Warren Commission and the CIA enjoyed a successful working

relationship during the course of the Commission's investi-

gation.

(HSCA Class. Depo. of R. Rocca 7/17/78, p. 18.)

(See also Exec. Sess. Test. of Richard Helms, 8/9/78,

p. 24.) William Coleman, a senior staff counsel for the

Warren Commission, who worked closely with Warren Commission

staff counsel W. David Slawson on matters which utilized

the CIA's resources, characterized the CIA representatives

with whom he dealt as highly competent, cooperative, and

intelligent.. (See HSCA staff interview of William Coleman,

8/2/78. Mr. Slawson expressed a similar opinion regarding

the Agency's cooperation and quality of work. (Executive

Session Testimony of W. David Slawson, 11/15/77, p. 17,.

see also JFK exh, 23.)

J. Lee Rankin, General Counsel for the Warren Com-

mission, testified that the Warren Commission and its

staff were assured that the Agency would cooperate in the Commissio

work.

(HSCA Class. Depo. of J. Lee Rankin, 8/7/78, p. 4.)

John McCone, Director of Central Intelligence at

the time of President Kennedy's assassination and during

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the Warren Commission investigation, supported Mr. Rankin's

testimony in this regard by characterizing the CIA's

work

vis a vis the Warren Commission as both responsive and

comprehensive. (HSCA Class. Depo. of John McCone, 8/17/78,

p. 5.)

Mr. McCone was responsible for ensuring that all

relevant matters were conveyed by the CIA to the Warren

Commission. (Ibid. pp. 5-6.) In this regara MI. McCone

testified that:

The policy of the CIA was to give the Warren

Commission

everything that we had. I person-

ally asked Chief Justice Warren to come to my

office and took him down to the vault of our

building where our information is microfilmed

and stored and showed him the procedures that

we were following and the extent to which we

were giving him--giving his staff everything

that we had, and

I think he was quite satis-

fied. (Ibid. p. 9.)

Mr. Raymond Rocca, one of the CIA's key representa-

tives to the Warren Commission during its investigation,

also characterized the Agency's role as one of full sup-

port to the Warren Commission. Mr. Rocca, who served as

the Chief of the Research and Analysis Division for the

Counter-Intelligence Staff of the CIA,recalled under oath

that Richard Helms had given the following directive:

All material bearing in any way that could be

of assistance to the Warren Commission should

be seen by CIA staff and R and A and marked

for us.

He issued very, very strictly worded

indications--they were verbal in so far as I

know--that we were to leave no stone unturned.

(HSCA Class. Depo, of Raymond Rocca, 7/17/78,

p. 24)

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MI.

Rocca added that, to his knowledge, Mr. Helms'

orders were followed to the letter by all CIA employees.

(Ibid. p. 24.) Mr. Rocca concluded that on this basis:

"the CIA was to turn over and to develop any information

bearing on the assassination that could be of assistance

to the Warren Commission." (Ibia., p. 26.)

A different view of the CIA's role regarding the

supply of CIA's information to the Warren Commission was

propounded by Richard Helms. Mr. Helms, who served as

the CIA's Deputy Director for Plans during the Warren

Commission investigation, was directly responsible for the

CIA's investigation of President Kennedy's assassination

(Ibid., p. 23.) He testified to the Committee that the

CIA made every effort to be as responsive as possible to

Warren Commission requests. (Exec. Sess. Text. of Richard

Helms, 8/9/78, p.

10.) Mr. Helms added further testimony

regarding the manner in which the CIA provided its infor-

mation to the Warren Commission. He stated:

An inquiry would come over (from the Warren Com-

mission).

We would attempt to respond to it.

But these

inquiries came in individual bits and

pieces or as individual items...Each individual

item that came along we took care of as best we

could.

(Ibia., pp. 10-11.)

However, it was Mr. Helms' recollection that the CIA

provided information to the Warren Commission primarily

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on the basis of the Commission's specific requests. Under

oath he supported this proposition:

Mr. Goldsmith:

In summary, is it your position that

the Agency gave the Warren Commission

information only in response to speci-

fic requests by the Warren Commission?

Mr. Helms:

That is correct.

I want to modify that by saying that

temes or circastances ener which somen

There may have been

thing different might have occured, but

my recollection is that we were attempting

to be responsive and supportive to the

FBI and the Warren Commission. When

they asked for something we gave it to

them.

As far as our volunteering information

is concerned, I have no recollection of

whether we volunteered it or not.

(Ibia., p. 34.)

Mr. Helms' characterization of fulfilling Warren

Commission requests on a case basis rather than uniformly

volunteering relevant information to the Warren Commission

stands in direct opposition to J. Lee Rankin's

perception

of the CIA's investigative responsibility. Mr. Rankin was

asked by Committee Counsel whether he worked under the

impression that the Agency's responsibility was simply to

respond to questions that were addressed to CIA by the

Warren Commission. In response, Mr. Rankin testified as

follows:

Not at all and if anybody had told me that I

would have insisted that the Commission com-

municate with the President and get a different

arrangement because we might not ask the right

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questions and then we would not have the

information and that would be absurd.

(HSCA Class. Depo. of J. Lee Rankin,

8/17/78, p. 4)

Mr. Slawson added support to Rankin's position

testifying that Warren Commission requests to the CIA

were rarely specific. "The request was made initially

that they give us all information pertinent to the

assassination investigation." (Exec. Sess. Test. of W.

David Slawson, 11/15/77, p. 29)

Effect of CIA Information Supply Policy on Warren

Commission knowledge of any access to CIA supported

operations.

The unfortunate consequences of not asking the

CIA the right questions were graphically illustrated by

the subsequent exposure of the CIA's anti-Castro

assassination plots ISSC Book V) see also (Alleged Assassination

Plots

Involving Foreign Leaders, Interim Report, SSC,

11/20/75].

: Paradoxically, even if the Warren

Commission had requested information on such plots, the

Agency would have been able to plausibly deny the plots'

existence.

As Mr. Rocca's testimony reveals, he had

no knowledge at the time of the Warren Commission investi-

gation of Agency efforts to assassinate Fidel Castro.

(HSCA Class. Depo. of Raymond Rocca, 7/17/78, p. 50.)

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Had Rocca, as the CIA's working level representative

to the Warren Commission, been requested by the

Commission to research and report on any and all

CIA anti-Castro assassination operations, Rocca's

efforts would have produced no substantive informa-

tion. (Ibid., p. 49)

The record also reflects that the CIA desk

officer who was initially given the responsibility

by Mr. Helms to investigate for the CIA Lee Harvey

Oswald, and the assassination of President Kennedy

had no knowledge of such plots during his investi-

gation. (HSCA Class. Depo. of John Scelso, 5/16/78,

pp. 73, 111-112) Mr. Scelso testified that had he

known of such

assassination plots the following

action would have been taken:

"We would have gone at that hot and heavy.

We would have queried the agent (AMLASH)

about it in great detail. I would have

had him polygraphed by the best operative

security had to see if he had (sic) been

a double-agent, informing Castro about

our poison pen things, and so on. I

would have had all our Cuban sources

queried about it."

(Ibia., p. 166)

As the record reflects, these plots were known

by few within the CIA. Mr. Helms' testimony regarding

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these plots reveals that the Agency compromised

its promise to supply all relevant information to

the Warren Commission. The following exchange

between Committee Counsel and Mr. Helms illustrates

the acute laxity of the Agency's compromise:

Mr. Goldsmith:

Mr. Helms :

Mr. Goldsmith:

Mr. Helms:

Mr. Goldsmith:

Mr. Helms, I take it from your

testimony that your position is

that the anti-Castro plots, in

fact, were relevant to the

Warren Commission's work; and,

in light of that, the Committee

would like to be informed as to

why the Warren Commission was

not told by you of the anti-

Castro assassination plots.

I have never been asked to testify

before the Warren Commission about

our operations.

If the Warren Commission did not

know of the operation, it certainly

was not in a position to ask you

about it.

Is that not true?

Yes, but how do you know they did

not know about it?

How do you

know Mr. Dulles had not told them?

on hen.

How was I to know that? And besides,

I was not the Director of the Agency

and in the CIA, you did not go

traipsing around to the Warren Com-

mission or to Congressional Committees

or to anyplace else without the

Director's permission.

Did you ever discuss with the Director

whether the Warren Commission

should be informed of the anti-Castro

assassination plots?

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Mr.

Helms:

I did not, as far as I recall.

(HSCA Exec. Sess. Test. of Richard

Helms, 8/9/78, pp. 30-31.)

Mr. McCone testifed that he first became aware

of the CIA's anti-Castro assassination plots

involving CIA-Mafia ties during August 1963. He

stated that upon learning of these plots he directed

that the Agency cease all such activities. (HSCA

Class. Depo. of John McCone, 8/17/78, p. 13)

When asked whether the CIA desired to withold informa-

tion from the Warren Commission about the Agency anti-

Castro assassination plots to avoid embarrassing the

Agency or causing an international crises he gave

the following response:

"I cannot answer that since they (CIA

employees knowledgeable of the

continuance of such plots) withheld

the information from me.

I cannot

answer that question.

I have never

been satisfied as to why they with-

held the information from me. (Ibid.i

p. 16)

Regarding the relevancy of such plots to the

Warren Commission's work, Warren Commission counsels

Rankin, Slawson and Spector were in agreement that

such information should have been reported to the

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Warren Commission. (Exec. Sess. Test. of W.

David Slawson, 11/15/77, p. 27; Exec. Sess. Test.

of Arlen Spector 11/8/77, pp. 45-46; CF, Exec.

Sess. Test. of Wesley Liebeler, 11/15/77, p. 71

where he states that possible witholding of

information by CIA about Agency attempts to

assassinate Castro did not significantly affect

Warren Commission investigation)

From the CIA's perspective, Mr. Rocca

testified that had he known of the anti-Castro

assassination plots his efforts to explore the

possibility of a retaliatory assassination against

President Kennedy by Castro would have been intensi-

fied.

He stated that: " a completely different

procedural approach probably would and should have

been taken." (HSCA Class. Depo. of Raymond Rocca

7/17/78, p. 45)

John Scelso, the above-cited CIA desk officer

who ran the CIA's initial investigation of President

Kennedy's assassination until that responsibility

was given to the CIA's counterintelligence staff,

offered a highly critical appraisal of Helms'

non-disclosure to the Warren Commission:

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Mr. Goldsmith:

Mr. Scelso:

Do you think Mr. Helms was

acting properly when he failed

to tell the Warren Commission

about the assassination plots?

No, I think that was a morally

highly reprehensible act, which

he cannot possibly justify under

his oath of office, or any

other standard of professional

public service.

(HSCA Class.

Depo. of John Scelso, 5/16/78)

III. Introductory Section/Agency Concern for the Sanctity

of Sensitive Sources and Methods

The length of time required by the CIA to

respond to the Warren Commission's requests for

information was dependent upon 1) the availability

of information; and 2) the complexity of the issues

presented by the reguest and 3) the extent to which

the relevant information touched upon sensitive CIA

sources and methods. On the first two points, Mr.

Helms testified that when CIA had been able to

satisfy a Commission request, the CIA would then send

a reply back:

"and some of these inquiries obviously

took longer than others.

For example, some might involve

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checking a file which was in Washington.

Other inquiries might involve trying to

see.

if we could locate somebody in

some

overseas country.

Obviously, one takes longer to per-

form than the other.

(Exec. Sess. Test.

of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, p. 25)

At times the CIA's concern for protecting its

sensitive sources and methods caused the Warren

Commission

to experience greater difficulty in

getting relevant information than when the protec-

tion of such sources and methods was not at issue.

J. Lee Rankin expressed the opinion that the Agency's

effort to protect its sensitive sources and methods

did effect the quality of the information to which

the Warren Commission and its staff were given

access.

(HSCA Class. Depo. of J. Lee Rankin 8/17/78,

p. 23) As a result of the CIA's concern, in some instances

the Agency made the unilaterial decision to

limit access to CIA materials by the Commission.

(HSCA Class. Depo. of John Scelso, 5/16/78, p. 158)

The Committee has identified two areas of

concern in which the Agency's desire to protect its

sensitive sources and methods impeded the Warren

Commission's investigation.

These are:

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1) Witholding information from the Warren

Commission

pertaining to the photo-

surveillance and telephonic surveillance

operations of the CIA's Mexico City Station

2) As a related consideration, the Agency's

reticence to reveal the origin of the photograph

now referred to as that of the "Mexico

City Mystery Man"

Each of these concerns will be examined

herein.

The CIA's concern for revealing the existence

of sensitive technical operations, as outlined above,

was evident from the inception of the Warren Commission.

Mr. Scelso commented that "we were not authorized

at first to reveal all

our technical operations."

(Ibid., p. 158) But Scelso did testify that:

We were going to give them intelligence

reports which derived from all our sources,

including technical sources, including the

telephone intercept and the information

gotten from the interrogation of Silvia

Duran, for example, which corresponded

almost exactly with the information from

the telephone intercepts.

Mr. Scelsco's characterization is supported by

examination of the background to the first major CIA

report furnished the Warren Commission regarding

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Lee Harvey Oswald's trip to Mexico City. (CIA

DOC. FOIA #509-803, 1/31/64, Memorandum for J.

Lee Rankin from Richard Helms) Much of the

information provided to the Warren Commission

in this report was based upon sensitive sources

and methods, identification of which had been

deleted completely from the report.

The CIA policy limiting Warren Commission.

knowledge of CIA sources and methods was articu

lated as early as December 20, 1963,

at which

time a cable was sent from CIA headquarters to

the Mexico City Station which stated:

Our present plan in passing information

to the Warren Commission is to eliminate

mention of telephone taps, in order to

protect your continuing ops.

will rely

instead on statements of Silvia Duran

and on contents of Soviet Consular file

which Soviets gave ODACID (CIA DOC. FOIA.

#420-757, 12/20/63, Dir 90466)

The basic policy articulated in the December

20, 1963 cable is also set forthfas it specifically

concerned the CIA's relations with the FBI

in a

+----

CIA memorandum of December 10, 1963. (CIA Memorandum

for File, 12/20/63, Birch O'Neal, included in with Soft

file materials) In that memorandum, Birch O'Neal

of the CIA Counter intelligence/Special Investigations

Group Staff wrote that he had been advised by Sam

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Papich, FBI liaison to the CIA, that the FBI was

anticipating a request from the Warren Commission

for copies of the FBI's materials which supported

or complimented the FBI's five volume report of

December 9, 1963 that had been submitted to the

Warren Commission. Papich provided O'Neal with

this report which indicated that some United

States Agency was tapping telephones in Mexico

and asked him whether the FBI could supply the

Warren Commission with the source of the telephone

taps. O'Neal's memorandum shows that he discussed

this matter with Scelso. After a discussion

with Helms, Scelso was directed by Helms to prepare

CIA material to be passed to the Warren Commission.

O'Neal wrote:

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He (Scelso) was quite sure it was not

the Agency's desire to make available

to the Commission at least in this

manner--via the FBI sensitive informa-

tion which could relate to telephone

taps, (CIA Memo for File, 12/20/63, by

Birch O'Neal, included in Soft File materials)*

The opinion expressed by Bcelso as of December

20, 1963 was set forth on January 14, 1964 in a

formalized fashion.

When Helms expressed his

concern regarding exposure by the FBI of Agency

sources to the Warren Commission. Helms wrote

that the CIA had become aware that the FBI had

already:

called to the attention of the

Commission, through its attorney,

that we have information (as deter-

mined from Agency sources) coinciding

with the date when Oswald was in Mexico

City and which may have some bearing

on his activities while in that area.

(CIA dissemination to FBI, 1/14/64,

CIA # CSCI-3/779/510.

Mr. Helms further indicated that the CIA might

be called upon to provide additional information

acquired from checks of CIA records and agency

sources. He suggested that certain policies be

employed to enable CIA to work cooperatively

with the Commission in a manner which would

protect CIA information, sources and methods.

Among the policies articulated were two which

Helms claimed would enable the Agency to control

the flow of Agency originated information. In

this way the CIA could check the possibility of

revealing its sources and methods inadvertantly.

The policies articulated were:

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CIA HAS NO CRIEGHONTO

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

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The CIA policy of eliminating reference to Agency

sensitive sources and methods is further revealed

by examination of an Agency cable, dated January 29,

1964, sent from CIA Headquarters to the CIA Mexico

City Station. (CIA DOC. FOIA #398-204, 1/29/64,

DIR 97829) This cable indicated that knowledge of

Agency sources and techniques was still being with-

held from the Warren Commission, and stated that on

Saturday, February 1, 1964, the CIA was to present

a report on Oswald's Mexico City activities to the

Warren Commission which would be in a form

protective of the CIA's Mexico City Station's

sources and techniques (Ibid.) (See also Angleton

Deposition.

(Footnote cont'd from pg. 23.)

1) Your Bureau not disseminate information re-

ceived from this Agency without prior concur-

rence

2) In instances in which this Agency has provided

information to your Bureau and you consider

that information is pertinent to the Commission's

interest, and/or compliments (sic) or otherwise

is pertinent to information developed or

received by your Bureau through other sources

and is being provided by you to the Commission,

In

such cases it will be appreciated if you will

advise us of such referral in order that we may

anticipate the possible future interest of the

Commission and initiate certain preparatory to

meeting its needs.. (Ibid.)

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IV.

Telephone Taps

Mr. Helms offered testimony regarding the CIA's

reticence to inform the Warren Commission, at least

during the initial stage of the Commission's work,

of the CIA's telephonic and photo surveillance

operations in Mexico City.

The reason for the sensitivity of these

telephone taps and surveillance was not

only becuase it was sensitive from the

Agency's standpoint, but the telephone

taps were running in conjunction

the L

Jand therefore,

if this had become public knowledge,

it would have caused very bad feelings

between Mexico and the United States,

and that was the reason.

(Exec. Sess.

Test. of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, pp. 51-52)

The CIA's unwillingness to inform the Warren

Commission in the early stages of its investigation

of the above-described surveillance operations is

•a source of concern to this Committee. It is

indicative of an Agency policy designed to skew

in its favor the form and substance of information

the CIA felt uncomfortable providing the Warren

Commission.

(HSCA Class. Depo. of John Scelso,

5/6/78, p. 158) This process might well have

hampered the Commission's ability to proceed in

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its investigation with all the facts before it:

As noted previously, on January 31, 1964,

the CIA provided the Warren Commission with a

memorandum that chronicled Lee Harvey Oswald's

Mexico City visit during September 26, 1963 -

October 3, 1963X CIA DOC. FOIA #509-803 1/31/64)

That memorandum did not mention

that Oswald's various conversations with the Cuban

and Soviet Embassy/Consulates had been tapped and

by the Agency's Mexico City Station

subsequently transcribed.

Furthermore, that memo-

randum did not mention that the CIA had tapped

and transcribed conversations between Cuban Embassy

employee Sylvia Duran and Soviet officials at the

Soviet Embassy/Consulate nor was mention made of

the conversations between Cuban President Dorticos

and Cuban Ambassador to Mexico Armas which the CIA

had also tapped and transcribed.

On February 1, 1964, Helms appeared before the

Commission and likely discussed the memorandum of

January 31, 1964.

(CIA DOC: FOIA #498-204, 1/29/64,

DIR 97829) On February 10, 1964, J. Lee Rankin wrote

Helms in regard to the CIA memorandum of January 31.

(JFK

Doc. No. 3872

A review of Rankin's letter

---

## Page 27

- 27 -

indicates that as of his writing, the Warren

Commission had no substantive knowledge of the

telephonic surveillance operation or the production

i.e., the tapes

and transcripts from that operation.

Rankin inquired in the February 10, 1964 letter

whether Oswald's direct communication with employees

of the Soviet Embassy (as stated in Paragraph 1

of January 31 memorandum) had been facilitated by

telephone or interview. Manifestly, had the Warren

Commission

been informed of the telephonic

surveillance operation and its success in tapping

Oswald this inquiry by Rankin would not have been

made.

Raymond Rocca's testimony tends to support

this conclusion. It was Rocca's recollection that

between

the time period of January 1964 - April 1964,

Warren Commission's representatives had visited the

CIA'S

headquarters in Langley, Virginia and had

been shown various transcripts resulting from the

CIA's telephonic surveillance operations in Mexico

City. (HSCA Class. Depo. Of Raymond Rocca, 7/17/78,

p. 89)

However, Mr. Rocca did not personally make

---

## Page 28

- 28 -

this material available to Commission representa-

tives and was not able to state under oath

precisely the point in time at which the Warren

• Commission first learned of these operations. (Ibid.)

On February 19, 1964 the CIA responded to

Rankin's inquiry of February 10. The Agency

response did indicate that Oswald had phoned the

Soviet Consulate and was also interviewed at the

neither revealed

Consulate.

However, the Agency

the source of this information in its response to

the Commission nor indicated that this source

would be revealed by other means (e.g. by oral

briefing) .

(Ibid.)

IV. A Warren Commission Knowledge of CIA Telephonic Surveillance

During the period of March - April 1964,

David Slawson drafted a series of memoranda which

among other issues concerned Warren Commission know-

ledge of and access to the production material

derived from the CIA telephonic surveillance operations

in Mexico City. A review of these memoranda tends

to support the Committee's belief that the Warren

Commission, through Mssrs. Slawson, Coleman, and

---

## Page 29

- 29 -

and Willens did not obtain access to CIA telephonic

surveillance materials until April 9, 1964.

On

that date, Coleman, Slawson and Willens met with

Win Scott, the CIA's Chief of Station in Mexico

City, who provided them with various transcripts

and translations derived from CIA telephone taps

of the Cuban and Soviet Embassy/Consulates. (Slawson

Memorandum of April 22, 1964, Subject: Trip to

Mexico City)

Prior to April 9, it appears doubtful that

the Commission had been given even partial access

to the referenced material. Nevertheless, by March

12, 1964, the record indicates that the warren

Commission had at least become aware that the CIA

did maintain telephonic surveillance of the Cuban

(Slawson memorandum, March 12,

Embassy/Consulate.

1964, Subj: meeting with CIA representatives).

Slawson's memorandum of March 12 reveals that the Warren

Commission had learned that the CIA possessed tran-.

scripts of conversations between the Cuban Ambassador

to Mexico, Armas, and the Cuban President Dorticos.

Dorticos-Armas conversations, requested by the Warren

The

---

## Page 30

= 30 -

CIA HAS NO OBJECTIOA TO

DECLASSIEICAFION ANDIOR

BELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT -

Commission representatives at a meeting with

CIA officials, including Richard Helms, concerned

Silvia

Duran's arrest and interrogation by the

Mexican Federal Police. (Slawson Memorandum of

April 22, 1964, pp. 3, 19, 45-46) Helms responded

to the Commission's request for access, stating

that he would attempt to arrange for the Warren

Commission's representatives to review this

material.

(Slawson Memorandum of March 12, 1964, p. 6)

Another Slawson memorandum, dated March 25,

1964 concerned Oswald's trip to Mexico. In that memo

Slawson wrote that the tentative conclusions

he had reached concerning Oswald's Mexico trip,

were derived from CIA memoranda of January 31, 1964

and February 19, 1964, (Slawson Memorandum of March

25, 1964, p. 20) and, in addition, a Mexican federal

police sunmary of interrogationsconducted shortly

after the assassination (with certain Cuban Embassy.

employees

Slawson wrote:

A large part of it (the summary report)

is simply a

summation of what the Mexican

police learned when they interrogated Mrs.

Silvia Duran, an employee of the Cuban

Consulate in Mexico City, and is there-

fore only as accurate as

Mrs. Duran's

testimony to the police. (Ibia.)

---

## Page 31

- 31 -

These comments indicate that Slawson placed

qualified

reliance upon the Mexican police summary.

Moreover, there is no indication that Slawson had

been provided the Duran telephonic intercept tran-

scripts. In fact, by virtue of Slawson's comments

concerning the Mexican police report, it would

appear that the warren Commission, as of March 25,.

had been provided little substantive information

pertaining to Silvia Duran. As Slawson reveals,

the Commission had been forced to rely upon the two

memoranda that did not make reference to the surveil-

lance operations, and a summary report issued by

the Mexican Federal Police. Thus, the Agency had

been successful for over three months in not exposing

the surveillance operations to the review of the

concerned Warren Commission staff members. As was

stated in the CIA cable of December 20, 1964 to its

Mexico City Station:

Our present plan in passing information

to the Warren Commission is to eliminate

mention of telephone taps, in order to

protect your continuing operations.

will

rely instead on statements of Silvia

Duran and on contents of Soviet consular

file which Soviets gave ODACID here.

(CIA DOC. FOIA #420-757, Dec. 20, 1964,

CIA p. 2144, DIR 90466)

---

## Page 32

- 32 -

The Committee's belief that Slawson had

not been given access to the Duran transcripts

is

further supported by reference to his memorandum

of March 27, 1964 (CD 692) wherein he states his

conclusion that Oswald had visited the Cuban

Embassy on three occasions..

(Ibid, p. 2) This

again

conclusion, he wrote, was based upon an analysis of

Silvia Duran's testimony before the Mexican police.

This memorandum bears no indication that he had

reviewed any of the Duran transcripts. Furthermore,

had Slawson been given access to these transcripts,

certainly their substance would have been incorporated

into his analysis and accordingly noted for this

purpose. His analysis would have reflected the fact

of his review either by its corroboration or

criticism of the above cited Mexican police summary report.

Logically, access to the CIA's telephonic

surveillance production would have clarified some

ambiguities.

For example, on September 27, at 4:05 p.m.

(Slawson Memorandum of April 21, 1964, Subj: Intercepts

from Soviet and Cuban Embassies in Mexico, p. 2)

---

## Page 33

- 33 -

Silvia Duran telephoned the Soviet Embassy, and

stated that an American was presently at the

Cuban Embassy requesting an in-transit visit to

Cuba. This American was later determined by CIA analysts

to be Oswald. Again on September 28, at 11:51 a.m.

Duran telephoned the Soviet Consulate stating that

an American, subsequently identified by CIA analysts

as Oswald was at the Cuban Embassy. (Ibid. p. 4)

Had this: information been made available to Slawson,

his calculations of Oswald's activities in Mexico

City would have been more firmly established than

they were as of March 27, 1964.

The record supports the Committee's finding

that as of April 2, 1964 the Warren Commission had

still not been given access to the above-referenced

series of telephonic intercepts. In a memorandum of

that date by Coleman

and Slawson, they posed one

question to the CIA and made two requestsfor information

from the Agency. (Slawson - Coleman Memorandum of

April 2, 1964, Subj: Questions Raised by the Ambassador

Mann File) Coleman and Slawson wrote:

1) What is the information source referred

to in the November 28 telegram that

---

## Page 34

34=

Oswald intended to settle down in

Odessa;

2) We would like to see copies of the

transcripts of the intercepts, translated

if possible, in all cases where the

intercepts refer to the assassination

or related subjects;

3) We would especially like to see the

intercept in which the allegation that

money was passed at the Cuban Embassy

is discussed (Ibid.)

The question initially posed by (Item I) in

the above-referenced memorandum of April 2 concerns

the CIA telephonic intercept of September 27, 1963

at 10:37 a.m.

(Slawson Memorandum of April 21,

1964, P. 1) Obviously, if Slawson found it necessary

to request the source of the information, he had

not as yet been provided access to the original

material by the CIA.

Item Number Two of the above listing tends to show

that the Conmission had not been giving access to the intercep!

concerning the assassination.

---

## Page 35

35 -

Item number

three of the above listing

reveals that the intercept of the Dorticos-Armas

conversation of November 22, 1964, in which the

passing of monies was discussed had not as of April

2 been provided to the Commission. The Commission

had specifically requested the Dorticos-Armas

transcripts at a March 12, 1964 meeting between

Commission representatives and Agency representatives.

(Slawson memorandum, March 12, 1964, Subj: Conference

with CIA on March 12, 1964)

On April 3, 1964, Coleman and Slawson expressed

their concern for receiving complete access to all

materials relevant to

Oswald's Mexico City trip:

The most probable final result of the

entire investigation of Oswald's activities

in Mexico is a conclusion that he went

there for the purpose of trying to reach

Cuba and that no bribes, conspiracies,

etc. took place:

In order to make such a judgment (that

all reasonable lines of investigation that

might have uncovered other motivations or

---

## Page 36

- 36 -

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION 7O

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

possible conspiracies have been followed

through with negative results), we must

become familiar with the details of what

both the American and Mexican investi-

gatory agencies there have done. This

means reading their reports, after trans-

lation, if necessary, and in some cases

talking with the investigators themselves.

(Slawson and Coleman Memorandum, April

13, 1964, Subj: Additional lines of

Investigation in Mexico Which May Prove

Worthwhile, p. 11.)

Manifestly, Coleman's and Slawson's desire

for a thorough investigation had been thwarted by

the CIA's concern lest its sources and methods,

however relevant to the Commission's investigation,

be exposed. Considering the gravity and signi-

ficance of the Warren Commission's investigation

• the

Agency's witholding of material from the

Commission staff was clearly improper.

---

## Page 37

- 37 -

1964

On April 8, David Slawson, Howard Willens,

and William Coleman flew to Mexico City, Mexico

to meet with the representatives of the State

Department, FBI, CIA, and the Government of Mexico.

(Slawson Memorandum, April 22, 1964, Subj: Trip

to Mexico City, p. l) Prior to their departure,

they met with Thomas Mann, the U.S. Ambassador to

Mexico during Oswald's visit to Mexico City and at

the time of President Kennedy's assassination. (Ibid.)

Ambassador Mann told the Warren Commission representa-

tives that the CIA's Mexico City Station was actively

engaged in photosurveillance operations against the

Soviet and Cuban Embassy/Consulates (Ibia., P• 3)

Upon the group's arrival in Mexico City, they

were met by U.S. Ambassador Freeman, Claire Boonstra

of the State Department, Clarke Anderson of the FBI,

and Winston Scott of the CIA (Ibid. pp. 9-10)

That same day, during a meeting between the

Commission representatives and Win Scott, Scott made

available to the group actual transcripts of the CIA's

telephonic surveillance operations

accompanied with

English translations of the transcripts. In addition,

---

## Page 38

AC NO OBJECHION

DEGLASOGIOSTION ANDOR

SE OF THIS DOOLA SUI

- 38 -

he provided the group with reels of photographs

for the time period covered by Oswald's visit

that had resulted from photosurveillance of the

Cuban and Soviet Embassy entrances. David Slawson

wrote:

"...Mr. Scott stated at the beginning

of his narrative that he intended to make

a complete disclosure of all facts,

including the sources of his information,

and that he understood that all three of

us had been cleared for TOP SECRET and

that we would not disclose beyond the

confines of the Commission and its

immediate staff.

the information we obtain-

ed through him without first clearing it

with his superiors in Washington. We

agreed to this."

(Ibid.)

Mr. Scott described to the Commission repre-

sentatives the CIA's course of action immediately

following

the assassination, indicating that his

staff immediately began to compile dossiers on

Oswald, Duran, and everyone else throughout Mexico

whom the CIA knew had had some contact with Oswald

(Ibid.) Scott revealed that all known Cuban and Russian

intelligence agents

had quickly . been put under

surveillance following the assassination. Slawson

concluded :

"Scott's narrative plus the material we

were shown disclosed immediately how

incorrect our previous information had

been in Oswald's contacts with the soviet

and Mexican Embassies. Apparently the

---

## Page 39

-39-

distortions and omissions to which our

information had been subjected had

entered

some place in Washington,

because the CIA information that we

were shown by Scott was unambiguous on

almost all the crucial points.

We had

previously planned to show Scott, Slawson's

reconstruction of Oswald's probable

activities at the embassies to get Scott's

opinion, but

once we saw how badly distorted

our information was we realized that this

would be useless.

Therefore,

decided to take as close notes as possible

from the original source materials at some

later time during our visit."

(Ibia, p. 24)*

A separate Slawson memorandum of April 21, 1964 records

the results of the notetaking from original source

materials that he did following Scott's disclosures.

These notes

dealt exclusively with the telephonic

intercepts pertaining to the Duran and Oswald conver-

sations for the period Sept. 27 - Oct. 1, 1963.

(Slawson

Memorandum, April 21, 1964 Subj: Intercepts

from the Soviet and Cuban Embassies in Mexico City.

It is evident from Slawson's record that the

Agency's denial of original source materials, in this

case the telephonic surveillance intercepts, seriously

impaired the Commission's ability to draw accurately

reasoned conclusions regarding Oswald's sojourn in

• Mexico City. It meant that as of April 10, 1964,

---

## Page 40

- 40 -

nearing the halfway point of the Warren Commission

investigation, the Commission was forced to retrace

the factual path by which it had structured Oswald's

activities in Mexico City. It further revealed that

the Agency had provided ambiguous information to

the Commission when, in fact "on almost all the

crucial points" significantly more precise materials

• could have been made available for analysis by the

Commission. (Ibid.) Thus, the Agency's early policy

of not providing the Commission with vitally relevant

information derived from certain sensitive sources

and methods had seriously undermined the investigation

and possibly foreclosed lines of investigation e.g.,

Cuban involvement, that might have been more seriously

considered had this material been expeditiously

provided.

VI. Mexico City Mystery Man*

On November 23, 1963, FBI Special Agent Odúm:

showed Marguerite Oswald a photograph of a man

bearing no physical resemblance to her son (Warren

---

## Page 41

- 41 -

Commission Report p. 364) This photograph had been

supplied to the FBI on November 22 by the CIA's

Mexico City Station after Agency representatives

had searched their files in an effort to locate

Ibia.

information on Oswald. (CIA Doc. DDP4-1555, 3/25/64,

Warren Commission Doc. 67)P This photograph which was one

in a series resulting from the CIA's photosurveillance

operations against the Soviet

and Cuban Embassy/Consulates.

Prior to the assassination,

had been linked by

the Mexico City Station to Lee Harvey Oswald. (Ibid.)

Richard Helms, in a sworn affidavit before the Warren

Commission, stated that the photograph shown to

Marguerite Oswald had been taken on October 4, 1963

in Mexico City and mistakenly linked at that time to

Oswald. (Warren Commission Affidavit of Richard Helms

8/7/64, Vol. XI, pp. 469-470)

On February 10, 1964, Marguerite Oswald testified

before the Warren Commission and recounted the cir-

cumstances under which she was shown the photograph.

(Warren Commission Report Vol I 153)Mrs. Oswald testified

that she believed this photograph to have been of Jack

Ruby. (Ibid., Vol. I)

---

## Page 42

- 42 -

Thereafter, on February 12, 1964, J. Lee

Rankin wrote to Thomas Karramesines, Assistant DDP

requesting both the identity of the individual

depicted in the photograph and an explanation of

the circumstances by which this photograph was

obtained by the Central Intelligence Agency.

(Letter of J. Lee Rankin, Feb. 12, 1964, JFK DoC.

#3872)

-

On that same day, in a separate letter,

Rankin wrote to DCI McCone regarding materials

that

the CIA had disseminated since November 22,

1963 to the Secret Service but not to the Warren

Commission.

Rankin requested copies of these

materials which included three CIA cables. The

cables concerned the photograph subsequently shown

by the FBI to Oswald's mother of the individual

originally identified by the Mexico City Station

as Lee Harvey Oswald. "(Letter of J. Lee Rankin

Feb. 12, 1964, JFK DoC. #3872)

Among the materials disseminated by the CIA

to the Secret Service was

a November 26 dissemination.

(CIA DOC DIR 85177, 11/26/64) That cable concerned

---

## Page 43

-343

the Dorticos-Armas conversations and disclosed the

existence of CIA telephonic surveillance operations

in Mexico City at the time of the assassination

and Oswald's earlier visit.

As a result the CIA was

reluctant to make the material disseminated to

the Secret Service available to the Warren Commission

for in so doing the Agency would have necessarily exposed its

telephonic surveillance operationsto the Commission.

John Scelso testified regarding the circumstances

surrounding the eventual explanation given to the

Commission recounting the origion of the photograph in

question. Scelso stated:

"We did not initially disclose to the

Warren Commission all of our technical

operations.

In other words, we did not

initially disclose to them that we had

photosurveillance because the November

photo we had (of MMM) was not of Oswald.

Therefore it did not mean anything, you

Mr. Goldsmith:

.. So the Agency was making a unilateral

decision that this was not relevant to the Warren

Commission.

Scelso:

Right, we were not authorized, at first,

to reveal all our technical operations.

(HSCA Class. Depo. of John Scelso 5/16/78,

p.150)

In sumary the records shows that

By February 12, 1964 the Warren Commission had

inadvertantly requested access

to telephonic surveillance

production,a cause for concern within the

---

## Page 44

CIA HAS NO OBJECILON TO

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENE

- 44÷

due to the sensitivity of Agency sources and methods.

Similarly

the disclosure of the photosurveillance operations

to the Warren Commission had also begun to cause

concern within the Agency.

On March 5, 1967, Raymond Rocca wrote in an

internal memorandum to Richard Helms that "we have

a problem here for your determination." Rocca

outlined Angleton's desire not to respond directly

to Rankin's request of February 12 regarding the CIA

material forwarded to the Secret

_Service since

November 23, 1964. Rocca then stated:

"Unless you feel otherwise, Jim would

prefer to wait out the Commission on the

matter covered by paragraph 2 (of the

above-referenced February 12 letter to McCone requesting

JFK Doc. 3982) If they come back on

this point he feels that you, or someone

from here, should be prepared to go over

to show the Commission the material rather

than pass them to them in copy. Incidentally,

none of these items are of new

' substantive

interest. We have either passed the material

in substance to the Commission in response to

earlier levies or the items refer to aborted

leads, for example, the famous six photographs

which

are not of Oswald..."

(CIA DOC. FOIA

#579-250, 3/5/64)

access.to

CIA reports

provided the

Secret Ser-

vice after

NOV. 22,

1963,

---

## Page 45

- 45 -

On March 12, 1964, representatives of the

Warren Commission and the CIA confered regarding.

the February 12 request for the materials forwarded

to the Secret Service by the Agency. (Letter of

J. Lee Rankin March 16, 1964, JFK Doc. # 3872, Slawson

Memorandum, March 12, 1964)

The record indicates that the Commission at

the March 12 meeting

pressed for access to the

Secret Service materials. Rankin wrote to Helms

on March 16 that it was his understanding that the

CIA would supply the Commission with a paraphrase of

each report or communication pertaining to the Secret

Service materials "with all indications of your

confidential communications techniques and confidential

sources deleted. You will also afford members of

- our staff working in this area an opportunity to

review the actual file so that they may give assurance

that the paraphrases are complete." (Letter of J. Lee

Rankin, March 16, 1964, paragraph 2, JFK Doc. No. 3872)

Rankin further indicated that the same

procedure was

to be followed regarding any material

in the possession of the CIA prior to November 22,

---

## Page 46

- 46 -

1963 which had not as yet been furnished because

it concerned sensitive sources and methods. (Ibid.,

par. 3)

Helms responded to Rankin's March 16 letter

on March 24 (FOIA # 622-258) by two separate

communications. (CIA Doc. DDP4-1554, hereinafter CD 631,

3/24/64, CIA Doc., DDP4-1555, 3/24/64, CD 674 hereinafter)

CD 631 provided the Commission with a copy of the

October 10, 1963 CIA dissemination to FBI, State Dept.,

INS and Navy Dept. (and to the Secret Service on

22 Nov.) regarding Lee Harvey Oswald and his presence

at the Soviet Consulate in Mexico City. The response

further revealed that on October 23, 1964, CIA had

Exam the Navy

requested two copies of the most recent photograph

of Oswald in order to check the identity of the person

believed to be Oswald in Mexico City. Furthermore,

the CIA stated, though it did not indicate when, that

it had determined that the photograph shown to Marguerite

Oswald on November 22, 1963 did not refer to Lee

Harvey Oswald. The Agency explained that it had checked the

photograph:

against the press photographs of Oswald generally

available on November 23, 1963*

CD 674 reveals that on Nov. 22, 1963 immediately followin!

---

## Page 47

- 47-

the assassination, and on November 23, 1963, three

cabled reports were received at CIA headquarters

from the CIA Mexico City Station regarding photographs

of an unidentified man who had visited the Cuban and

Soviet Embassies during October and

November 1963.

Paraphrases of these cables, not revealing sensitive

sources and methods, were attached to CD 674. The

Agency wrote that the subject of the photo referenced

in these cables was not Oswald. It was further

stated that:

"In response to our meeting of 12 March and

your memo of 16 March, Stern and Willens

will review at Langley the original copies

of these 3 disseminations to the Secret

Service and the cables on which they were

based,..as

well as the photos of the unidenti-

fied man."

(CIA Doc. DDP4-1555 CD634,24

March 1964)

On March 26, William Coleman wrote in a memorandum

for the record:

"The CIA directed a memorandum to J. Lee Rankin

on March 24, 196

(Commission Document No. 631)

in which it set forth the dissemination of

the information on Lee Harvey Oswald. I realize

that this memorandum is only a partial answer

to our inquiry to the CIA dated March 16, 1964

and I hope that the complete answers will give

us the additional information we requested.

(Memorandum of William Coleman, March 24, 1964)

Coleman went on to state:

"As you know, we are still trying to get an

explanation of the photograph which the FBI

showed Marguerite Oswald soon after the

---

## Page 48

- 48 -

assassination.

I hope that paragraph 4

of the memorandum of March 24, 1964

(CD 631) sent Mr. Rankin by the CIA

is not the answer which the CIA intends

to give us as to this inquiry. " (Ibid.)

The following day, as agreed by Warren Commission

and Agency representatives, Samuel Stern of the

Commission visited CIA headquarters in Langley,

Virginia.

Sterns' memorandum of his visit reveals that.

he reviewed Oswald's file with Raymond Rocca. Stern

indicated that Oswald's file contained those materials

furnished previously to the Warren Commission by

the CIA. The file also contained:

"Cable reports of November 22 and November

23 from the CIA's Mexico City Station

relating to the photograph of the unidenti-

fied individual mistakenly believed to be

Lee Harvey Oswald and the reports on those

cables furnished on November 23, 1963 to

the Secret Service by the CIA." (Memorandum

of Samuel

Stern, March 27, 1964)

Stern noted that these messages were accurately

paraphrased in the attachments to CD 674 provided the

---

## Page 49

- 49 -

Warren Commission on March 24, 1964. He also

reviewed the October 10, 1963 cable from CIA's

Mexico City Station to

CIA headquarters

reporting Oswald's contact with the Soviet Embassy

in Mexico. City. In addition, Stern examined the

October 10, 1963 cable from CIA headquarters to

the Mexico City Station reporting background infor-

mation on Oswald." (Ibid.) Stern recorded

that. these

messages

were

paraphrased

accurately as set forth in the CIA's January

31 memo to the

Warren Commission reporting Oswald's

Mexico City trip.

Lastly, Stern noted that Rocca provided him

for his review a computer printout of the references

to Oswald-related documents located in the Agency's

electronic data storage system. He stated "there is

no item listed on the printout which the Warren Com-

mission has not been given either in full text or

paraphrased." (Ibid.)*

Thus, by the 27th of March, a Warren Commission

representative had been apprised of the circumstances

surrounding the mysterious photograph.

---

## Page 50

VII.

- 50 -

Allan Dulles' Role vis-a-vis the CIA-Warren Commission

Relationship

It has been alleged that Allan Dulles, former

Director of Central Intelligence and one of the seven

members of the Warren Commission, did not report

crucial information to the warren Commission.

Specifically, the Senate Select Committee concluded:

"With the exception of Allan Dulles, it

is unlikely that anyone on the Warren

Commission knew of CIA assassination

ertorts... Allan Dulles, who had been

Director of Central Intelligence until

November 1961, was a member of the Warren

Commission and knew of the CIA plots

with underworld figures which had taken

place during his tenure at the Agency."

(SCC, Book V, PP. 67-68)

However, the SSC did not explore further the

relationship and allegiances of Dulles as a Warren

Commission member and Dulles as a former Director of the

CIA.

The Committee has consequently reviewed files

maintained by the CIA related to Mr. Dulles' service

on the Warren Commission. In the course of this

review, a memorandum was uncovered which suggests that

on at leastone occassion

Dulles provided information to the CIA regarding

Warren Commission activities and investigative policies.

---

## Page 51

- 51 -

This memorandum which was written by David Murphy,

Chief of the Soviet Russia Division, concerned the

controversial case of the Russian defector Nosenko.

David Murphy's memorandum of July 8, 1964

"prepared for DDP Helms concerned Murphy's

discussions with Allan Dulles about Nosenko's

knowledge of Oswald. In relevant part Murphy wrote:

"Mr. Dulles, with whom I spoke today

recalled his earlier conversation with

you on this subject and said that there

were still some members of the Commission

who were concerned lest they suppress

the Nosenko information now only to have

it surface at a future date.

They expressed

concern

that this could possibly prejudice

the entire Warren Commission Report. " (CIA

Doc. Memorandum of David Murphy of July 8,

1964, Subj: Discussion with Dulles re

Nosenko, p. 3)

Murphy responded to Dulles' statement by stating

that the Commission's concern was understandable but

that the Agency felt the Commission's final report

should make no mention of Nosenko's information.

Murphy indicated that a possible alternative would

be to use language "which would allude to the existence

---

## Page 52

- 52 -

of other, unverified

information on the Oswald case."

• (Ibid.) This language, Murphy contended, would

permit the Warren Commission to state, if challenged

on this point at a future time, that it had given

consideration to the Nosenko information.

Murphy continued:

"It was agreed an effort would be made to

find such language if Mr. Dulles is again

unsuccessful in persuading his colleagues

to eliminate any reference to the Nosenko

information from the report. To attempt

this, however, we would have to know pre-

cisely in what context the Warren Commission

intended to make use of the Nosenko informa-

tion.

This, Mr. Dulles will have to deter-

mine from Mr. Rankin. He will do this as

soon as possible. He knows that I am

leaving this week and therefore, will contact

you as soon as he has the information he

needs from Mr. Rankin. (Ibid., p. 2)

Whether by design or as an unintended result,

the quoted language indicates that Mr. Dulles, as

a member of the Warren Commission, at the very least

contemplated compromising his position with the

Commission in order to supply the CIA, specifically

Murphy and Richard Helms, with sensitive information

about the Commission's attitudes towards the Nosenko

case.. (Add short section giving Helms and Angleton's

views)

---

## Page 53

VIII.

= 53 ÷

Luisa Calderon

Approximately five hours after President

Kennedy's assassination a Cuban government employee

in Mexico City named "Luisa" received a telephone

call from an unidentified man speaking Spanish.

(CIA DOC. FOIA TEXI 7105, 11/27/63, 173-615, attachment)

This call had been intercepted and recorded by the

CIA's Mexico City Station as the result of its

LIENVOY (tel. tap) operation. (Ibid.) The Mexico

City Stationas subsequently reported to CIA

headquarters, identified the Luisa of the conversa-

tion as Luisa Calderon, who was then employed in

the Commercial Attache's office at the Cuban Consu-

late. (Ibia.)

During the course of the conversation, the

unidentified

caller asked Luisa if she had heard

(of the assassination)

the latest news:

Luisa replied in a joking tone:

"Yes, of course, I knew almost before Kennedy."

(Ibid.)

CIA's

Paraphrasing the telephone intercept transcript,

it states that the caller told Luisa

the person

---

## Page 54

r57.

CHESSEN

- 54-

apprehended for Kennedy's slaying was the

"President of one of the Committees of the Fair

Play for Cuba." Luisa replied that she also knew

this. Luisa inquired whether the person

being

held for the killing was a "gringo." The unidenti-

fied caller replied, "yes." Luisa told her caller

that she had learned nothing else about the assassina-

tion and that she had learned about the assassination

only a little while ago. The unidentified caller

commented:

We think that if it had been or had

seemed... public or had been one of

the segregationists or against

intergration who had killed Kennedy,

then there was, let's say, the

possibility that a sort of civil

war would arise in the United States;

that contradictions would be sharpened...

who knows

Luisa responded:

Imagine, one, two, three and now, that

makes three. (She laughs.) (Ibia, p. 2)

Raymond Rocca, in response to a 1975 Rocke-

feller Commission request for information on a

possible Cuban conspiracy to assassinate President

Kennedy wrote regarding Calderon's comments:

---

## Page 55

- 55 -

Latin hyperbole? Boastful ex post facto

suggestion of foreknowledge.

This is the

only item in the intercept coverage of

the Cubans and Soviets after the assassina-

tion that contains the suggestion of fore-

knowledge or expectation.

(CIA DOC.,

Memorandum of Raymond Rocca for DC/OPS,

5/23/75, p. 15)

Standing by itself, Luisa Calderon's cryptic

comments do not merit serious attention. Her words

may indeed indicate foreknowledge of the assassina-

tion but may equally be interpreted without such a

sinister implication. Nevertheless, the Committee

has determined that Luisa Calderon's case did merit

serious attention in the months following the assas-

sination.

In connection with the assassination, Luisa

Calderon's name first surfaced on November 27, 1964

in a cable sent by then Ambassador Mann to the State

Department (CIA Doc. DIR 85573 11/27/63)

In. that cable Mann stated:

•..Washington should urgently consider

feasibility of requesting Mexican

authorities to arrest for interrogation:

Eusebio Azcue, Luisa Calderon and Alfredo

Mirabal. The

two men are Cuban national

and Cuban consular officers.

Luisa Calderon

is a secretary in Cuban Consulate here."

(Ibid.)

---

## Page 56

- 56 -

This cable does not state the basis for

arresting Calderon. However, the CIA's copy of this

cable bears a handwritten notation on its routing

page. That notation

states:

"Info from Amb Mann

for Sec Rusk re:...persons involved with Oswald

in Cuban Embassy. Mann went on to state in urgent

terms: "They may quickly be returned to Havana in

order to eliminate any possibility that Mexican govern-

ment could use them as witnesses." (Ibid.)

According to CIA files, Calderon made reserva-

tions to return to Havana on Cubana Airlines on

December 11, 1963, less than four weeks after the

assassination. (CIA Doc. CSCI-316/01783-65, 4/26/63)

Calderon, Azcue and Mirabal were not arrested

nor detained for questioning by the Mexican federal

police. However, Silvia Duran, a friend and associate

of Calderon's and the one person believed to have

had repeated contact with Oswald while he was in

Mexico City, was arrested and questioned by the Mexican

police on two separate occasions. (CIA Doc. DIR 84950,

11/23/63, CIA DOC. DIR 85471, 11/27/63)

---

## Page 57

- 57-

During her reinterrogation, Duran was

questioned regarding her association with Calderon.

accountine

There is no indication in this report for the

questioning-Duran about Calderon.

(CIA DOC. DDP4-0940, 2/21/64) The information

regarding Duran's interrogation was passed to the

Warren Commission on February 21, 1964

more than two months after Calderon had returned.

to Cuba. (Ibid.)

Information was reported to the CIA during

May 1964, from a Cuban defector, tying Luisa Calderon

to the Cuban Intelligence apparatus. The defector,

AMMUG-1, was himself a Cuban Intelligence Officer

who supplied valuable and highly reliable information

to the CIA regarding Cuban Intelligence operations.

(CIA DOC., Memorandum of Joseph Langosch to Chief,

Office of Security, 6/23/64) Caldron's ties to

Cuban intelligence were reported to the Warren

Commission on June 18, 1964. (CIA Doc. FOIA #739-319

6/19/64) However the Committee has determined

from its review that the CIA did not provide Calderon's

conversation to the Warren Commission. Consequently,

even though the Warren Commission was aware

that

---

## Page 58

- 58

-

Calderon had connections to intelligence work,

as did other Cuban Embassy officers, the vital

link between her background and her comments

was never established for the Warren Commission

by the CIA. The Agency's oversignt in this

regard may have forclosed the Commission from

actively pursuing a lead of great significance.

Calderon's 201 file reveals that she

arrived in Mexico City from Havana on January 16,

1963, carrying Cuban Passport E/63/7. Her date

of birth was believed to be 1940 (CIA Doc. Dispatch

HMMA21612, no date given) Calderon's presence in

Mexico City was first reported by the CIA on July

15, 1963 in a dispatch from the CIA's Miami field

office to the CIA's Mexico City station and to the

Chief of the CIA's Special Affairs Staff (for Cuban

operations). (CIA Doc. Dispatch JFCA-10095, 7/15/63)

That dispatch had attached to it a report containing

biographic data on personnel then assigned to the

Cuban Embassy in

Mexico City. At page three of the

attached report Luisa Calderon was listed as Secretary

of the Cuban Embassy's commercial office. The

---

## Page 59

- 59 -

notation indicated that a report was pending on

No such report is present:

Calderon.

(Ibid., p. 3 of attachment)

The

in Calderon's

201 File..

Agency has attempted, without success, to locate

the report.

Luisa Calderon's

association with the Cuban

DGI was first recorded by the CIA on May 5, 1964.

(CIA DOC. Blind Memorandum of L

"FOIA

68-290 5/5/61). At that time, Joseph Langosch, :

Chief of Counterintelligence for the Special Affairs

Staff, reported the results of his debriefing of

the Cuban defector, AMMUG-1. The memorandum stated

that AMMUG-1 had no direct knowledge of Lee Harvey

Oswald or his activities but was able to provide

items of interest based upon the comments of certain

Cuban Intelligence Service officers. (Ibid.) Specifically,

AMMUG-1 was asked if Oswald was known to the Cuban

intelligence services before November 23, 1963.

AMMUG-1 told Langosch "Prior to October 1963, Oswald

visited the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City on two or

three occasions. Before, during and after these

visits, Oswald was in contact with the Direccion

---

## Page 60

- 60 -

General De Intelligencia (DGI), specifically

with Luisa Calderon, Manuel Vega Perez, and

Rogelio Rodriguez Iopez." (Ibid.)

Langosch thereafter wrote that Calderon's

precise relationship to the DGI was not clear.

As a comment to this statement he set forth the

CIA cable and dispatch traffic which recorded her

arrival in Mexico during January 1963 and departure

for Cuba within one month after the assassination.

(Ibid.)

On May 7, 1964, Langosch recorded additional

information he had elicited from AMMUG-1 regarding

Oswald's possible contact with the DGI. (CIA DOC

FOIA 687-295, attach. 3, 5/7/64) Paragraph 3 of

this memorandum stated in part:

"a.

•b.

Luisa Calderon, since she returned

to Cuba, has been paid a regular

salary by the DGI even though she

has not performed any services.

Her home is in the Vedado section

where the rents are high..

Source (AMMUG) has known Calderon

for several years.

Before going

to Mexico, she worked in the

Ministry of Exterior Commerce

in the department which was known

as the "Empress Transimport."

Her title was

Secretary General

of the Communist Youth in the

department named in the previous

sentence. (Ibia.)

---

## Page 61

- 61 -

On May & Langosch further disclosed AMMUG'S

knowledge of the Oswald case. (Ibid, attach. 5)

Langosch paraphrased AMMUG's knowledge of Calderon

as follows:

I thought that Luisa Calderon might have

had contact with Oswald because I learned

about 17 March 1964, shortly before I made

a trip to Mexico, that she had been

involved with an American in Mexico.

The

information to which I refer was told to -

me by a DGI case officer... I had commented

to (him) that it seemed strange that Luisa

Calderon was receiving a salary from the

DGI although she apparently did not do

any work for the Service. (The case officer)

told me that hers was a peculiar case and

that he himself believed that she had been

recruited in Mexico by the Central Intelligence

Agency although Manuel Pineiro, the Head

of the DGI, did not agree.

As I recall,

(the case officer) had investigated Luisa

Calderon.

This was because, during the time

she was in Mexico, the DGI had intercepted

a letter to her by an American who signed

his name OWER (phonetic) or something

similar. As you know, the pronunciation

of Anglo-Saxon names is difficult in

Spanish so I am not sure of how the name

mentioned by Hernandez should be spelled.

It could have been "Howard" or something

different.

As I understand the matter,

the letter from the American was a love

letter but indicated that there was a

clandestine professional relationship

between the writer and Luisa Calderon.

I also understand from (the case officer)

that after the interception of the letter

she had been followed and seen in the

company of an American.

I do not know if

this could have been Oswald... (Ibid.)

---

## Page 62

- 62 -

On May 11, Raymond Rocca wrote a memorandum

to Director Richard Helms regarding the information

[ I had elicited from AMMUG (CIA DOC. FOIA 687-295

5/11/64, Rocca Memorandum) Rocca proposed that "the

DDP in person or via a designee, perferably the

former, discuss the AMMUG-1 situation on a very

restricted basis with Mr. Rankin at his earliest

convenience either at the Agency or at the Commission

headguarters. Until this takes place, it is not

desirable to put anything in writing.

(Ibia. p. 2)

On May 15, 1964, Helms wrote Rankin regarding

AMMUG's information about the GI, indicating its

sensitivity and operational significance. (CIA DOC.

FOIA 697-294, 5/15/64, Helms Memorandum) Attached

to Helms' communication was a paraphrased accounting

of Langosch's May 5 memorandum. (Ibia.) In that

attachment the intelligence associations of Manuel

Vega Perez and Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez were set forth.

However, that attachment made no reference whatsoever

to Luisa Calderon.

Howard Willens of the Warren Commission

requested

as a follow-up to the May 15 memorandum,

---

## Page 63

- 63 -

access to the questions used in Langosch's

interrogation of AMUG. (CIA DOC. FOIA 739-316, 6/19/64,

Memorandum) On June 18, 1964 Arthur Dooley of

Rocca's dounterintelligence fesearch and Analysis

Group took the questions and AMMUG's responses to

the Warren Commission's offices for Willen's review.

Willens saw Langosch's May 5 memorandum. The only.

mention of Calderon

was as follows: "The precise

relationship of Luisa Calderon to the DGI is not

clear.

She spent about six months in Mexico from

which she returned to Cuba early in 1964."

(Ibid.)

However, Willens was not shown

Langosch' s

memorand: of May 7 and May 8, 1964 which contained

much more detailed information on Luisa Calderon,

including her possible association with Lee Harvey

Oswald and/or American intelligence. (Ibid.)*

The Warren Commission as of June 19, 1964i

had little if no reason to pursue the Luisa Calderon

lead. It had effectively been denied significant

* It should be noted that these memoranda of May 5,

7, 8, 11 and June 19 with attachments, are not

referenced in the Calderon 201 file.

(See CIA

Computer printout of Calderon 201 file) Their

existence was determined by the Committee's

independent review of other agency files.

---

## Page 64

- 64-

background information. This denial may have

impeded or prevented the Commission's pursuit

of Calderon's popential relationship to Oswald

and the assassination of President Kennedy. But :

even if the Warren Commission had learned

of Calderon's background and possible contact with

Oswald it still had been denied the one significant

piece of information that might haveraised its

ran.

-

interest in Calderon to a

more serious

level. The

Warren Commission was never told about Calderon's

conversation of November 22, 1964.

The Committee has

contacted former Commission

and CIA representatives in an effort to determine

a transcript of the Calderon conversation was

whether

ever shown to the Warren Commission.

The response

has uniformly been that the Calderon

conversation was never made available to the Commission

nor was its existence ever made known to the Commission.

::."

---

## Page 65

- 65 -

HSCA Interview of W. David Slawson, 8/17/78, p.5;

Willens response to letter of HSCA Class. Exec.

Sess. Test. of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, p. 132; CF.

deposition of Raymond Rocca, p. 156 wherein he

states that he is sure the Commission knew of it,)

In addition, the Calderon 201 file bears no

reference to the conversation nor does it indicate

that it was ever made known to or provided the

Warren Commission for its analysis. (CIA Computer

print-out of Calderon 201 file)

In an effort to '

determine the manner in which the Cli

treated the Calderon conversation this Committee

posed the following questions to the CIA:

1. Was the

Warren Commission or any Warren

Commission staff member ever given access

to the transcript of

a telephone conversa-

tion, dated November 22, 1963, between a

female employee of the Cuban Embassy/

Consulate in Mexico City,

identified

as Luisa, and an unidentified male speak-

ing from outside the Cuban Embassy/Con-

sulate? If so, please indicate when

this transcript was provided to the Warren

Commission or its staff, which CIA official

provided it, and which Warren Commission

members or staff reviewed it.

2. Was the Warren Commission or any member

of the Warren Commission or any Warren

Commission staff member ever informed

---

## Page 66

- 65a-

orally or in writing of the substance

Se November

of the above-referenced conversation

of November 22, 1963? If so, please

indicate when and in what form this

information was provided, and which

CIA official provided it.

In a memorandum dated

1978, the

CIA responded:

The available evidence thus supports the

conclusion that the Warren Commission was

never

given the informationnot the opportunity by

which it could evaluate Luisa Calderon's signi-

ficance to the events surrounding. President Kennedy's

assassination. Had the

Commission been expedi-

tiously provided

this evidence of her intelligence

background, association with Silvia Duran, and

her commentary following the assassination, it

may well have given more serious

investigative

consideration to her potential knowledge of Oswald

and the Cuban government's possible involvement in

---

## Page 67

- 66 -

a conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy:

Two difficult issues remain which are raised

by the Committee's finding. First, why didn't

the Agency provide the Calderon conversation to the

Warren Commission; secondly, why didn't the Agency

reveal to the Warren Commission its full knowledge

of Calderon's intelligence background, her possible

knowleage of Oswald and her possible connection to

the CIA or some other American intelligence apparatus.

The first question can be explained in benign

terms. It is reasonably possible that by sheer

oversight the conversation was filed away and

not

recovered or recollected until after the Warren

Commission had completed its investigation and

published its report. (See above CIA explanation)

As for the Agency's withholding of information

concerning Calderon's intelligence background, the

record reflects that the Commission was merely

informed that Calderon may have been a member of

the DGI. (CIA DOC. 5/5/64,L

Memorandum)

The memoranda which provided more extensive examina-

tion of her intelligence background were not

made

---

## Page 68

-

67.-

available for the Commission's review. Significantly

the May 8 memorandum written by Joseph Langosch

following his debriefing of AMMUG-1 indicated that

AMMUG-1 and a second Cuban Intelligence officer

believed Calderon to be a CIA operative. (CIA DOC.

FOIA 687-295, attach 5, 5/8/64) It is possible

that this information was not provided the Warren

Commission either because there was no basis in

fact for the allegation or because the allegation

was of substantive concern to the Agency. If the

allegation were true, the conseguences for the CIA

would have been serious. It would have demonstrated

that a CIA operative, well placed in the Cuban Embassy,

may have possessed information prior to the assassina-

tion regarding Oswald and/or his relationship to the

Cuban Intelligence Service. and that Services

possible involvement in a conspiracy to assassinate

President Kennedy

Regarding Calderon's possible association

with the CIA, Agency files reviewed reveal no

ostensible connection between Calderon and the CIA:

---

## Page 69

- 68 -

However, there are indications that such contact

between Calderon and the Agency was contemplated.

A September 1, 1963 CIA dispatch from the Chief

of the Special Affairs Staff to the CIA's Chief

of Station in Mexico City states in part:

Luisa Calderon has a sister residing

in Reynosa, Texas, married to an American

of Mexican descent. If (CIA asset) can

further identify the sister, our domestic.

exploitation section might be in a posi-

tion to follow up on this lead.. Please

levy the requirement on (CIA asset) at

the next opportunity. (CIA Doc. HMMW-

1935, 9/1/63)

An earlier CIA dispatch from the CIA Chief

of Station in Mexico City to the Chief of the CIA's

Western Hemisphere Division records that:

Wilfredo of the Cuban Consulate, Tampico,

reported that Luisa Calderon has a sister

residing in Reynosa, Texas... Luisa may go

on her moner

up to the border to visit her sister soon--

or her mother may make the trip--details

not clear (CIA Doc. HMMA 21849, July 31,

1965)

At the very least, the above dispatches

evidenced an interest in the activities of Calderon

and

her family. Whether this interest took

the form of a clandestine-agent relationship is

not revealed by Calderon's 201 file.

---

## Page 70

CIA HAS NO OBJECTIONTO

DECLASSIEICATION AND/OR

BELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

- 69 -

The Committee has queried David Ronis, the

author of the above cited dispatch requesting

that

Calderon's sister be contacted by the CIA's

"domestic exploitation section.". (HSCA Class.

Staff Interview of David Ronis, 8/31/78) Ronis

was a member of the CIA's Special Affairs Staff

at the time he wrote the dispatch. He worked

principally at CIA headquarters and was responsible

for recruitment and handling of agents for collection

of intelligence data. Mr.

Ronis, when interviewed

by this Committee, stated that part of his responsi-

bility was to scour the Western Hemisphere division

for operational leads related to the work of the

Special Affairs staff. Ronis recalled that he

normally would send requests to CIA field stations

for information or leads on various persons. Often

he would receive no response to these requests,

which normally indicated that no follow-up had

either been

attempted or successfully conducted.

It was Ronis' recollection that the above-cited

domestic exploitation section was a task force

within the Special Affairs Staff. He also stated

that in 1963 the CIA's Domestic Contacts Division

---

## Page 71

- 70 -

might have been requested to locate Luisa Calderon's

sister.

Ronis told the Committee that he had no

recollection of recruiting any person associated

with the Cuban Intelligence Service. He did recall

that he had recruited women to perform tasks for

the Agency.. However, he did not recall ever recruiting

any employees of the Cuban Embassy/Consulate in

Mexico City. Finally, Mr. Ronis stated that he had

no recollection that Luisa Calderon was associated

with the CIA. (Ibid.)

Various present and former CIA representatives

were queried whether Luisa Calderon had ever been

associated with the CIA. The uniform answer was

that no one recalled such an association. (Cites:

Exec. Sess. Test. of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, P. 136;

HSCA Class. Depo. of Raymond Rocca, 7/17/78, p. 148;.

HSCA Staff Interview of Joseph Langosch, 8/21/78,

Piccolo, Interview of

Thus, the Agency's file on Calderon and the

testimony of former CIA employees have revealed no

connection between Calderon and the CIA. Yet, as

indicated earlier, this file is incomplete:the

---

## Page 72

- 71-

most glaring omission being the absence) from

Calderon

her 201 fileof

cryptic remarks

following the assassination of President Kennedy.

AMMUG-1

This Committee's investigation of Luisa

Calderon has revealed that a defector from the Cuban

Intelligence Services provided the CIA with signi-

ficant information about Lee Harvey Oswald's contacts

with the DGI in Mexico City. This defector was

assigned the CIA cryptonym AMMUG-1 (A-1 hereinafter).*

CIA files

reveal that A-l defected from the

DGI on April 21, 1964 in Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada.

When he defected, A-1 possessed a number of DGI

documents which were subsequently turned over to

the CIA. (CIA DoC. OTTA IN 68894, 4/24/64)

Following his defection, a CIA officer, Joseph H.

Langosch, went to Canada to meet A-1, debrief him,

and arrange for A-l's travel into the United States.

(Ibid.) On May 1, 1964, 22 reels of Langosch's

*It is now known that A-l did provide significant

leads to the CIA regarding Luisa Calderon.

It is

further apparent that little of this information

was made available by the CIA to the Warren Commission.

Therefore, the possibility exists that A-l had

provided other information to the CIA

relevant to the Warren Commission's work which

was not properly reported to the Commission.

---

## Page 73

- 72 -

debriefing of A-l were forwarded to the Chief of

Station in Ottawa, Canada. (CIA Doc: Dispatch OCDA

7763, 5/1/64) Effective on May I, A-I was under

contract with the CIA for operational purposes.

(CIA Doc. Contract Approving Officer Memo, 6/6/64)

By June 23, 1964, Langosch was convinced that A-1

would be of great value to the Agency. He stated:

There is no question in my mind that

AMMUG-1 is a bona fide defector or

that he has furnished us with accurate

and valuable information concerning

Cuban intelligence operations, staffers,

and agents. (CIA Doc. Langosch

Memo to

Director of Security, 6/23/64)

As an officer of the DGI, A-1 from August of

1963 until his defection was assigned to the GI's

Illegal Section B (CIA DOC. OTTA IN 68894 4/24/64)

which was responsible for training agents for

assignment in Latin America. His specific responsi-

bility pertained to handling of agent operations

in El Salvador. (CIA Doc. Personal Record Question-

naire 6/4/64; CIA Doc. Otta In 68894 4/24/64)

A-1 identified for the CIA the Cuban Intelli-

gence officers

assigned to Mexico City. Langosch

described A-l's knowledge of DGI operations in

Mexico as follows:

---

## Page 74

YES AND'OR

SEOF THIS DOORENT

- 73 -

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

DECLASH TORTION AND/OR

PLEASE OF THIS DOCIWENT

In Mexico City, he knows who the

intelligence people are.

One is the

Cuban Consul Alfredo Mirabal. He is

called the Chief of the Centre. That.

is his title but he is actually the

intelligence chief, or at least he

was until the l6th of April at which

time a replacement was sent to Mexico

to take over. This fellow's name is

Manuel Vega.

The source says that

the Commercial attache whose name is

Ricardo Tapia or Concepcion (he is

not sure which is an intelligence

officer) and another one is Rogelio.

( I might say that some of these names

are familiar to me.) (Langosch debriefing

of A-1, 4/30/64, p. 5 Of reel 4, 4/23/64)

Thus, A-l was able to provide the CIA soon

after his defection with accurate information

regarding DGI operations and DGI employees in

Mexico City.

The Committee has reviewed the CIA's files

concerning A-1. This examination was undertaken

to determine: 1) whether A-l had provided any

valuable investigative leads to the CIA pertaining

to the assassination of President Kennedy; and 2)

whether, if such leads were provided, these leads

and/or other significant information were made

available to the Warren Commission.

---

## Page 75

- 74 -

The Committee's initial review of the

materials provided by the CIA to the Warren

Commission did not disclose the existence of the

AMMUG files. However, the Committee did during

the course of its review examine a file containing

material passed to the Rockefeller Commission. That

file made reference to A-1. . Included in this

file was a memorandum of May 5, 1964 written by

Joseph Langosch which concerned information A-1

provided about the Oswald case. (CIA DoC. FOIA 68-290

Langosch Memorandum, 5/5/64) Also contained within

this file were the A-l debriefing memoranda of

MaY

7, and

May 8, 1964 previously cited with regard

to Luisa Calderon. (CIA Doc. FOIA #687-295, attach's

3 and 5) Following review of the memoranda, the

Committee requested access to all CIA files

Or

concerning referring to A-1.

From review of these materials the Committee

has determined that the Warren Commission did learn

during mid-May 1964 that Lee Harvey Oswald probably

had come in contact with DGI officers in Mexico City.

---

## Page 76

- 75 -

Prior to learning of Oswald's probable contact

with DGI officers, James Angleton, Chief of the

CIA's Counter Intelligence Staff passed an internal

memorandum to Raymond Rocca, also of the Counter-

intelligence Staff, which stated that he had been

informed by the DDP, Richard Helms, that J. Lee

Rankin had contacted John McCone to request that

the Director consent to an interview before the .

Warren Commission on May 14, 1964. (J. Edgar

Hoover also appeared before the Commission on

that date prior to McCone's appearance. Warren

Commission Report, $

PR 17-129)(CIA DOC. FOIA 689-298,

Memorandum of James Angleton, 5/12/64) Angleton

also wrote:

I discussed with Mr. Helms the nature of

the recent information which you are

processing which originated with the

sensitive Western Hemisphere source.

informed him that in your view this would

raise a number of new factors with the

Commission, that it should not go to the

Commission prior to the Director's appear-

ance unless we have first had some pre-

liminary reaction or made sure that the

Director is fully aware of the implica-

tions since it could well serve as the

basis for detailed questioning.

The DDP

stated that he would review this care-

fully and made (sic) a decision as to

the question of timing. (Ibid.)

---

## Page 77

- 76 -

Undoubtedly the White House source referred

to in Angleton's memo was A-1. This conclusion is

based in part upon the date of this memo which

was quite close in time to A-l's defection. In

addition, Rocca's staff prepared

prior

to DCI McCone's appearance before the Warren

a "Brief

Commission for Presentation to the Warren Commission

outlining various positions adopted by the CIA vis a

vis its investigative efforts and assistance to the

Commission. (CIA DOC. FOIA 695-302-A, 5/14/64)

At Tab E of this brief it states:

Within

the past week, significant infor-

mation has been developed by the CIA re-

garding the relationship with Oswald of

certain Cuban intelligence personnel in

Mexico City and the reaction in Havana

within the Cuban Intelligence Service

to the news of the assassination of

President Kennedy•

The Commission Staff

is in the course of being briefed on the

Cuban asspect. (Ibid., Tab E)

On May 15, 1964,_ the day of McCone's interview,

the Warren Commission received its first formal

communication regarding A-1. (CIA DOC FOIA 697-294,

5/15/64)

However, the Agency did not at that time

identify A-1 by his real name or cryptonym nor did

the Agency indicate that the source of this information

---

## Page 78

- 77 -

was a defector then residing under secure conditions

in the Washington, D.C. area. (Ibid.) The May 15

communication did

state that the Agency had

established contact "with a well-placed invidivual

who has been in close and prolonged contact with

ranking officers of the Cuban Direccion General de

Intelligencia." (Ibid.)

Attached to the May 15 communication was a

copy of Langosch's above referenced memorandum of

May 5, 1964 regarding knowledge of Oswald's pro-

bable contact with the DGI in Mexico ity. The

attachment made no reference to the source's status

as a defector from the DGI. (Ibid., attachment)

As set forth in the section of this report

concerning Luisa Calderon, on June 18, 1964, Howard

Willens of the Warren Commission reviewed Langosch's

May 5 memo and the questions upon which the informa-

tion set forth in the memo was elicited. Neither the

questions

nor the memo shown to Willens made

reference to the source's status

as a defector col-

laborating with the CIA. (CIA DOC FOIA 739-319,

6/19/64).

---

## Page 79

- 79 -

Based upon review of the Langosch memoranda,

the Committee has determined that significant

information regarding Luisa Calderon, specifically

of Nov. 22

details of her

er conversation andfassöciation with Cuban Intelligence

were withheld from the Warren: Commission.

This

information as described above, was derived from

debriefings of A-1. from

Howevel! the Committee's review

of the A-l file provided by the CIA, the Committee

has not found any credible evidence indicating that

other information provided by A-l to the CIA was

relevant to the work of the Warren Commission. However,

in its review the Committee has determined that a

as

specific document referenced in the A-l file is:

not present in that file.

The missing item is of considerable concern to

the Committee.

It is a debriefing report of A-1

entitled "The Oswald Case.". (CIA DoC Dispatch UFGW-

5035, 3/23/65) On March 23, 1965, a CIA dispatch

records the transmittal of the report, along with

eleven other A-l debriefing reports. (Ibia.) Next to

the listing of the "Oswald Case" debriefing report

is the handwritten notation "SI." A CIA employee

who has worked extensively with the Agency files

---

## Page 80

- 80 -

system told a Committee Staff memebr that this

notation was the symbol for the CIA component

known as Special Intelligence. Other CIA

representatives believed the notation was a

reference to the Counterintelligence component

CI/SIG. In a CIA memorandum dated

, the CIA has adopted the

following position regarding debriefing Report No. 40.

(Quote Barbara's memo.)

The Committee has questiored A-l's case officers

regarding additional information that A-1 may have

supplied about Oswald. Joseph Lanogsch, when

interviewed by the Committee, stated that he did not

have contact with the Warren Commission and does

not know what information derived from A-l's de-

briefings was supplied to the Warren Commission.

(HSCA Staff Interview of Joseph Langosch, 8/21/78; Cite also

Interviews of Hildago& Piccolo) Healso stated that

he does not recall that A-l provided any other information

---

## Page 81

- 81 -

on Oswald's contact with the DGI except for that

set forth in the

Memoranda of May 5, 7, and 8 as

discussed herein. (Ibid.)

In a further effort to clarify the substance

of information that A-l provided to the CIA

regarding Oswald, the Committee has attempted to

locate A-l. The CIA has also attempted to locate

A-l, whose employment with the Agency was terminated

in 197_, but has been unable to determine his

present whereabouts. The CIA's inability to locate

A-1 has been a source of concern to this Committee

particularly in light of his long association with

the Agency.

Thus, gaps do exist regarding information A-1

may have supplied the CIA about Oswald. Howevery with the

exception of the Calderon episode and on the

basis of the CIA's written record it appears that

the CIA provided the Warren Commission with all A-1

information of investigative significance.

A separate question remains however. The

Agency, as noted earlier, did not reveal to the

Warren Commision that A-l was present in the

Washington, D.C. area and, under controlled

---

## Page 82

- 82 -

conditions, accessible to the Commission. Giving

due consideration to the CIA's serious concern

for protecting its sources, the fact that A-l's

status was not disclosed prevented the Warren

Commission from exercising a possible option,

i.e. to take the sworn testimony of A-l as it

concerned Oswald and the Kennedy assassination.

On this issue, as the written record tends to

-

show, the Agency unilaterally rejected the possibility

of exercising this option.

In light of the establishment of A-l's

bona fides, :

, his

proven reliability and his depth of knowledge of

Cuban intelligence activities, this option might

well have been considered by the Warren Commission.

The AMLASH Operation

During 1967, the CIA's

Inspector General

issued a report which

examined CIA supported

assassination plots. Included in this report

was

discussion of the CIA-Mafia plots and an

---

## Page 83

- 83-

Agency project referred to as the AMLASH

operation

(CIA Inspector General Report 1967

pp. 1-74, 78-112). The AMLASH operation involved

a high level Cuban official (assigned the CIA

cryptonym AMLASH/1) who, during 1962 while meeting

with a CIA representative expressed the desire to

assassinate Fidel Castro (Ibid., p. 84). As a

result of AMLASH's expressed objective and the

CIA's desire to find a viable political alternative

to the Castro regime, the Agency subsequently

provided AMLASH with both moral and material

support designed to depose Fidel Castro. (Ibid.,

pp. 80-94). The AMLASH operation was terminated

by the CIA in 1965 as the result of security leaks.

(Ibia. pp. 104-106) During 1965, AMLASH and his

conspirators were brought to trial in Cuba for plotting

against Castro.

AMLASH was sentenced to death, but

at Castro's request the sentence was reduced to

twenty-five years imprisonment. (Ibid. pp. 107-110).

In its examination of the AMLASH operation

the 1967 IGR concluded that the CIA had offered both

direct and indirect support for AMLASH's plotting (Ibid. p. 80)

---

## Page 84

.............

- 84 -

The most striking example of the CIA's direct

offer of support to AMLASH reported by the

1967 IGR

states

"it is likely that at the very

moment President Kennedy was shot a CIA officer

was meeting with a Cuban agent in Paris and giving

him an assassination device for use against CASTRO. "

(Ibid.)

The 1967 IGR offered no firm evidence confirming

or refuting Castro's knowledge of the AMLASH operation

prior to the assassination of President Kennedy. The

1967 IGR did note that in 1965 when AMLASH was

tried in Havana, press reports of Cuban knowledge

of AMLASH's association with the CIA were dated from

November 1964, approximately one year after President

Kennedy's assassination) (Ibid. p. 11l)

The Church Committee in Book V of its Final

Report examined the AMLASH operation in great detail.

(SSC, Book V, pp. 2-7, 67-69) The Church Committee.

concluded:

The AMLASH plot was more relevant to the

Warren Commision work than the early CIA

assassination plots with the underworld.

Unilke those earlier plots, the AMLASH

---

## Page 85

- 85 =

operation was in progress at the time

of the assassination; unlike the earlier

plots, the AMLASH operation could

clearly be traced to the CIA; and

unlike the earlier plots, the CIA had

endorsed AMLASH's proposal for a coup,

the first step to him being Castro's

assassination, despite Castro's threat

to retaliate for such plotting. No one

directly involved in either investigation

(i.e. the CIA and the FBI) was told of

the AMLASH operation. No one investi-

gated a connection between the AMLASH

operation and President Kennedy's

assassination. Although Oswald had been

in contact with pro-Castro and anti-

Castro groups for many

months before the

assassination, the CIA did not conduct

a thorough investigation of questions.

of Cuban government or Cuban exile

involvement in the assassination.

(Ibid. p. 5)

---

## Page 86

- 86 -

In 1977, the CIA issued a second Inspector

General's Report concerning the subject of CIA

sponsored assassination plots. This Report, in

large part, was intended as a rebuttal of the

Church Committee's findings. The 1977 IGR states:

The Report (of the Church Committee)

assigns it (the AMLASH operation)

characteristics that it did not have

during the period preceding the assassina-

tion of JEK in order to support the SSC

view that it should have been reported

to the Warren Commission. (1977 IGR p. 2)

The 1977 IGR concluded that prior to the

assassination of President Kennedy, the AMLASH

operation was not an assassination plot.

Nevertheless, the 1977 IGR did state:

It would have served to reinforce the

credibility of (the Warren Commission)

its efforts had it taken a broader view

of the matter (of normal avenue of

investigation).

The CIA, too, could

have considered in specific terms

what most then saw in general terms--

the possibility of Soviet or Cuban

involvement in the

assassination

because of the tensions of the time.

It is not enough to be able to point

---

## Page 87

= 87 -

to erroneous criticisms made today.

The Agency should have taken broader

initiatives then as well.

That

CIA employees at the time felt--as

they obviously did--that the activities

about which they knew had no relevance

to the Warren Commission inquiry does

not take the place of a record of

conscious review. (Ibid. p. 11)

Richard Helms, as the highest level CIA

employee in contact with the Warren Commission on

a regular basis, testified to the Rockefeller

Commission that he did not believe the AMLASH

operation was relevant to the investigation of

President Kennedy's death. (Rockefeller Commission,

Testimony of Richard Helms, 4/24/75 pp. 389-391,392)

In addition, Mr. Helms testified before this

Committee that the AMLASH operation was not designed

to be an assassination plot (Exec. Sess. Test. of

Richard Helms, 8/9/78, pp. 26-271.

A contrasting view to the testimony of Mr.

Helms was offered by Joseph Langosch who in 1963

was the Chief of Counterintelligence for the CIA's Special

Affair

The Special Affairs Staff was the CIA component

Staff

responsible for CIA operations directed against

the Government of Cuba and the Cuban Intelligence

Services (HSCA Class. Affidavit of Joseph Langosch,

---

## Page 88

- 88 -

Sept. 14, 1978, p. 1) The Special Affairs Staff

was headed by Desmond Fitzgerald and was responsible

for the AMLASH operation (SSC, Book V, pp. 3, 8, 79)

Langosch,as the Chief of Counterintelligence

for the Special Affairs Staff, was responsible for

safeguarding SAS against penetration by foreign

intelligence services, particularly the Cuban

Intelligence Services (HSCA Classified Affidavit

of Joseph Langosh, 9/14/78, p. 3) It was

Langosch's recollection that:

that the AMLASH operation prior to

the assassination of President Kennedy

was characterized by the Special Affairs

staff, Desmond Fitzgerald and other

senior CIA officers as an assassination

operation initiated and sponsored by

the CIA (Ibid. p. 4)

Langosch further recollected that as of 1962

it was highly possible that the Cuban Intelligence

Services were aware of AMLASH and his association

•.-_

with the CIA and that the information upon which

he

based his conclusion that the AMLASH

operation was insecure was available to senior

level CIA officials including Desmond Fitzgerald.

(Ibid., p. 4)

However, the issue before this Committee is

not simply whether the AMLASH operation was an

---

## Page 89

-89 =

assassination plot prior to President Kennedy's

death. The broader and more significant issue,

as the 1977 IGR has identified it, is whether.

the AMLASH operation was of sufficient relevancy

to have been reported to the Warren Commission.

In the case of the AMLASH operation this

determination is a most difficult matter to

resolve.

Reasonable men may differ in their

characterization of the Agency's operational

objectives.

Based upon the presently available evidence

it is the Committee's position that such informa-

tion, if made available to the Warren Commission,

might have stimulated the Commission's investiga-

tive concern for possible Cuban involvement or

complicity in the assassination. As J. Lee Rankin

commented before this Committee:

.-.

...when I read...the Church Committee's

report--it was

an ideal situation for

them to just pick out any way they

wanted to tell the story and fit it

in with the facts that had to be met

and then either blame the rest of it

on somebody else or not tell any more

or polish it off. I don't think that

---

## Page 90

- 90 -

could have happened back in 1964.

I think there would have been a

much better chance of getting to

the heart of it.

It might have

only revealed that we are involved

in it and who approved it and all

that.

But I think that would

have at least come out. (HSCA Class..

Depo. of J. Lee Rankin, 8/17/78, p.91)

The Committee is

in agreement with Mr. Rankin

that had the AMLASH operation been disclosed to

the Warren Commission, the Commission might have

been able to foreclose the speculation and conjecture

that has sourrounded the AMLASH operation during

the past decade. As history now records, the AMLASH

operation remains a footnote to the turbulent

relations between Castro's Cuba and the United States.

---