CIA OPERATIONS AGAINST CUBA PRIOR TO THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ON 23 NOVEMBER 1963.
Originator: CIA
Document date: 2000-01-01 00:00:00
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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Date: 01/19/05

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION

FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CIA

RECORD NUMBER

: 104-10103-10068

RECORD

SERIES

JFK

AGENCY

FILE

NUMBER

80T01357A

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

AGENCY ORIGINATOR : CIA

FROM

: CIA OPERATIONS AGAINST CUBA PRIOR TO THE ASSASSINATION

OF PRESIDENT JOHN E. KENNEDY ON 23 NOVEMBER 1963.

DATE : 01/01/1900

SUBJECTS : BAY OF PIGS

CUBA

PRESIDENT KENNEDY

ASSASSINATION

CASTRO, FIDEL

DOCUMENT TYPE

: PAPER

CLASSIFICATION

: SECREI

RESTRICTIONS

1B

CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED IN PART PUBLIC - RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW

: 07/21/93

COMMENTS : JFK36 : F16: 1993.07.21.17:24:23:680470 : REPORT

Released under the John F. Kennedy

Assassination Records Collection Act of

1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW

55924 Date: 10-25-2021

[R]

- ITEM IS RESTRICTED

104-10103-10068

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CIA OPERATIONS AGAINST CUBA PRIOR TO THE ASSASSINATION

OF PRESIDENT JOHN F.

KENNEDY ON 23 NOVEMBER 1963

A.

INTRODUCTION

1. Agency planning and operations directed at Cuba during the latter

part of 1959, 1960 and early 1961 were almost totally devoted to the

development of the paramilitary operation which culminated in the Bay of

Pigs invasion on 17 April 1961. During this period, major efforts were

devoted to training a paramilitary force, formation of a Cuban exile

organization in Miami to direct opposition activities and to provide

future Cuban leadership and a propaganda campaign designed to rally op-

position to Castro in Cuba and elsewhere in Latin America.

2. Some of the actions initiated during 1960-61 continued following

the defeat of the Agency supported Cuban brigade. For example, prior to

the break in diplomatic relations between Cuba and the U.S. on 3 January

1961, CIA maintained a Station in Havana. This Station recruited and

trained intelligence agents and procured and cached communications

equipment to form a staybehind net to provide intelligence on Cuba

following the break in diplomatic relations. Following the Bay of Pigs

defeat, this net continued to function providing information on Cuba

via radio communication and Latin American diplomatic pouches. Radio

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Swan is another example of an operation which continued after the Bay of

Pigs. It was established in the Spring of 1960 as a component of the

anti-Castro propaganda campaign. It continued in this role until its

termination in 1968.

3. Following the Bay of Pigs and in response to administration

urgings to do something about Castro, CIA established a large Station

in Miami in September 1961 to continue operations against Cuba. The

operations described below were developed and run by the Miami Station;

many of them were still in the developmental stage at the time of

President Kennedy's assassination.

4. The Station initiated three major classes of activities:

intelligence collection/ espionage, covert action/propaganda, and

infiltration/exfiltration

actions. It should be noted that there was

no clear delineation between these activities, e.g., an exile organi-

zation primarily engaged in propaganda on the Agency's behalf might

also provide positive intelligence information from interrogation of

an exile or provide candidates for an infiltration team to perform

sabotage. It should also be noted that infiltration/exfiltration ac-

tions were undertaken for a variety of purposes such as espionage,

sabotage and to assist defectors.

Aside from intelligence collection,

all of the remaining activities would constitute forms of covert action.

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B. COVERT ACTION/PROPAGANDA

1. Agency Supported Cuban Exile Organizations:

CIA provided monetary support and guidance to a number of Cuban

exile organizations in the Miami area who disseminated anti-Castro propa-

ganda.

Some of these organizations came into existence through Cuban

exile initiative, but they became largely dependent on CIA to carry on

their activities.

a.

Directorio Magisterial Revolucionario (DMR):

An exile teachers organization in which CIA became interested

in early 1967. DMR produced a bulletin (Magisterio Cubano Libre) which

was mailed to 18 Latin American countries, to DMR members and to press and

radio organizations in the U.S. Radio programs directed at Cuba were pre-

pared and broadcast over station WMIE in Miami. Copies of these programs

were sent to various Latin American countries and were broadcast over 88

different stations. The DMR also produced seven TV programs which were

broadcast over Channel 2 in Miami. The theme of DMR propaganda was the

destruction of the Cuban educational system by Castro. The head of DMR

attended the National Education Association meeting in 1962, gave a talk

at the meeting and was instrumental in having a resolution approved con-

demning the Castro regime. By the end of 1962, the DMR was mailing out.

350,000 booklets and pamphlets a year to various Latin countries and

France.

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b. ¡ Union Deportiva de Cuba Libre (UDCL2:

A sports oriented organization established by CIA in October

1962. Led by a well known Cuban sports figure and a prominent Cubar

sports writer. Purpose of UDCL was to expose Cuban abuse of international

sporting events for political propaganda purposes. UDCL leaders attended

the IX Central American and Caribbean Games at Kingston, Jamaica in August

1962, disseminated anti-Castro propaganda and were in part responsible for

the defection of ten Cuban athletes. A similar operation was launched at

the II Ibero-American Games at Madrid in October 1962 with less success.

Propaganda was distributed and two defections were induced.

Pamphlets

were also distributed at the IV Panamerican Games at Sao Paulo, Brazil in

January 1963. No defections were induced. In 1963, the UDCL is credited

with obtaining a temporary suspension of Cuba from Olympic competition

and changing the site of the XVI Amateur Baseball World Championship from

Cuba to another country.

c. Comite DeOrganizaceones Juveniles Cubanas in el Exilio (COUCE):

A youth organization headed by a former Cuban Boy Scout leader.

CIA began support to this organization in December 1962. Starting in July

1963, COUCE published a monthly bulletin with a distribution of several

thousand copies to Latin American and European youth contacts. Purpose of

bulletin was to furnish information on the effect of Castro-Communist

policies on Cuban youth.

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d. Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE):

Led by several former Cuban student leaders. ClA support to

the DRE started prior to the Bay of Pigs. The DRE was primarily a para-

military organization and prior to April 1961, 21 DRE members were trained

and infiltrated into Cuba to create resistance and guerrilla units. This

DRE apparatus was destroyed in the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs. Subse-

quent paramilitary operations also ended in failure and CIA withdrew its

paramilitary support in December 1961. In January 1962, the DRE turned

to hemispheric propaganda operations. DRE sponsored students were placed

in Latin American universities where they carried on anti-Castro activi-

ties. This so-called student project also engaged in such activities as

drumming up support. for the U.S. position at the 1962 Punto del. Este Con-

ference and carrying out successful operations at the Helsinki Youth

Festival in May 1962. Starting in 1962, the DRE began broadcasts over

*NY shortwave radio station WRUL six days a week and Miami radio station

WMIE once a week. The DRE also published an international bulletin which

was mailed to contacts throughout the hemisphere and a pony edition of

4,800 copies was mailed into Cuba.

e.

Frente Obero Revolucionario Democratico Cubano (FORDC):

Established by CIA in October 1960 as a rallying point for

middle and upper echelon trade unionists in exile. Led by former Cuban

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labor leaders, FORDC published a weekly circular letter which was mailed

to labor organizations throughout Latin America. Prior to 1961, FORDC

sponsored a daily program over Radio Americas (Radio Swan). Starting in

December 1961, FORDC broadcast a daily program over station WMIE. In

addition to published and radio propaganda, groups of FORDC leaders were

sent on trips throughout Latin America to maintain contact with hemi-

sphere labor leaders and to sample attitudes toward Castro. FORDC also

maintained contact with international labor organizations.

f. Unidad Revolucionaria (UR):

Originally established in Cuba in December 1960 as a clan-

destine resistance movement. Its leadership was largely put to death or

imprisoned as a result of the Bay of Pigs. The organization was re-

established in Miami in August 1962 with CIA support. A paramilitary

arm was established in April 1963, but no effective paramilitary action

was ever carried out. Starting in March 1963, UR sponsored a daily

radio program over WMIE targetted at Cuban farmers and another daily

program exposing Cuban internal security service activities. In July

1963, UR initiated a shortwave broadcast from station WRUL, New York.

The UR utilized nonobjective, lurid propaganda themes. The UR was also

a prolific producer of propaganda pamphlets. During 1963-64, 1,442,500

items were mailed to Cuba and other Latin American countries.

On a

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weekly basis the UR published a list of free world ships visiting Cuba.

This was consistently picked up by the Associated Press and Agence

France Presse. Throughout its history, the UR was wracked with internal

bickerings and power grabs which detracted from its

impact.

2. Agency Supported Individuals:

Aside from utilizing various exile organizations for propaganda

purposes, CIA also supported several prominent exiles who prepared propa-

ganda materials. Zig Zag Libre was a successful satire magazine in Cuba

prior to the Castro regime. The Agency supported its former editor who

published an edition for mailing into Cuba.

In the 1963 period it was

considered an effective weapon for ridiculing Castro. CIA also supported

a former prominent student leader, and one of the former directors of

Prensa Libre, a leading Havana newspaper. These individuals produced

daily radio programs for Radio Swan and prepared propaganda materials

for publication. These individual efforts tended to be more effective

and to receive better audience response from Cuba than the organizational

broadcasts described above.

3. Agencia de Informaciones Periodesticas (AIP):

AIP was a news information service financed by CIA. Agency

sponsorship was an open secret. It was designed to fill the gap in

coverage by the regular news media. It was accepted in the hemisphere

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as an accurate and objective reporter of events. It prepared four news

bulletins a week which were distributed to 1200 Latin American news

outlets and prepared radio tapes based on the bulletins which were dis-

tributed to hemisphere radio stations.

4. Radio Americas (Radio Swan):

An Agency-financed radio station; the transmitter was located on

Swan Island with broadcast studios in New York initially and later Miami.

Started broadcasting in mid-1960 with entertainment programs purchased

from Pan American Broadcasting interspersed with news programs and propa-

ganda. CIA sponsorship was an open secret. Its image and credibility

was smudged considerably as a result of its use in the Bay of Pigs opera-

tion.

Most audience response was received from Caribbean countries out-

side of Cuba.

5.

Mailing Operation:

Most propaganda mailing operations were directed to Latin American

countries outside of Cuba. This project, initiated in 1963, was designed

as a mass mailing operation into Cuba to encourage subtle sabotage, re-

sistance and harassment. Utilizing names and addresses from Cuban tele-

phone books, letters with fictitious return addresses were mailed to

Cuba from various Latin American countries and by insertion into inter-

national mail transiting the U.S. From refugee debriefings, it is known

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that some of this mail was delivered, but like most of the operations de-

scribed in this section, it is unknown if the program was effective in

increasing Cuban resistance...

C. INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION/ESPIONAGE

1. Refugee and Defector Exploitation:

Cuban refugees were entering the United States at the rate of 1700

per week during 1961-62. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (I&NS)

recorded basic biographic data on all incoming refugees. Cards, containing

this data, were provided to the Miami Station to conduct a file check for

counterintelligence purposes. In reviewing the cards, the Station identi-

fied refugees who might be used for operational purposes and arranged

interviews which, frequently, also provided positive intelligence infor-

mation.

CIA's Domestic Contact Division (DCD) had primary responsibility

for obtaining positive intelligence information from refugees. DCD inter-

viewed refugees of positive intelligence interest at the Caribbean Admis-

sions Center (CAC) in Opa-Locka. These interviews were documented in

Preliminary Information Reports (PIRs) which were provided to the Intel-

Tigence Conmunity and to the Miami Station for review to obtain opera-

tional leads.

Prior to the Cuban Missile crisis in October 1962, the flow of

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refugees was large, and it was relatively easy to obtain information on

current events in Cuba and Cuban exiles that could be utilized opera-

tionally. Following the crisis, the flow of refugees decreased signifi-

cantly. As a result, the Station established a section to exploit

refugees more intensively, to centralize files on refugees, and to pre-

pare studies on exile groups operating in the U.s.

2. Anonymous Organization Group:

During 1960-63, this Group consisted of between 50 to 100 Cuban

exiles who constituted a structured intelligence support group for the

Station. It performed a variety of functions for the Station, and it.

was the Station's prime source of information on Cuban exile activities.

It is considered the single most valuable operational activity under-

taken by the Station. In summary, this Group:

a. Infiltrated exile groups and reported on their

activities.

b. Maintained extensive files on Cuban exiles, exile

groups and Cuban Government personalities.

c.. Monitored Cuban radio broadcasts and summarized

content.

d. Produced intelligence. reports and special studies.

e. Debriefed refugees.

f. Recruited infiltration agents.

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3. Intelligence Net:

In mid-1962, the Agency recruited a former Cuban politician to

establish an agent net in Cuba. This individual recruited a member of

the presidential entourage, a Cuban working in a foreign consul, and a

third individual. These individuals recruited an extensive net of 150

subagents and informants which was very productive in reporting informa-

tion of intelligence interest via the diplomatic pouch of the foreign

consul. The high living and immoral behavior of one of the principles.

attracted the attention of the Cuban security service.. This individual

was arrested and interrogated prior to Christmas 1963 resulting in the

arrest and conviction on espionage charges of all of the members of the

net.

4. Juana Castro:

Juana Castro, younger sister of Fidel Castro, was one of the

more significant CIA agent recruitments. She was a strong supporter of

her brother until she realized he had led the revolution not on behalf

of the oppressed Cuban people, but on behalf of the Communist movement.

The wife of a Latin American diplomat, who was working as a CIA agent,

convinced Juana to cooperate with the Agency. She was recruited in

Mexico City by a CIA officer in September 1962, briefed extensively and

trained in intelligence tradecraft. She worked as a resident foreign

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intelligence agent until 1964 when it was determined that she would be

more valuable in a defector role.

D. INFILTRATION/EXFILTRATION OPERATIONS

As noted earlier, infiltration/exfiltration operations, which started

in mid-1962, were undertaken for a variety of purposes, such as:

a. Emplace arms and communications caches for use by agents and

resistance groups.

b. Infiltrate

agents to recruit agents for espionage purposes.

.c. Exfiltrate agents who had completed their missions or for

further training, or to obtain reporting.

d. Exfiltrate significant political defectors.

e. Commit acts of sabotage.

Each of these operations were approved by the Special Group or its succes-

sor, the 303 Committee. They were a major preoccupation of the Miami

Station and large amounts of money and manpower were devoted to them.

They were executed with varying degrees of success and were frequently

aborted because they encountered resistance from Cuban security forces

or rendezvous were missed.

These operations were supported by a small maritime force which, in

1963, consisted of three mother ships and six smaller vessels. During

1963, 88 operations were planned of which 15 were cancelled. Of the

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operations carried out, four involved sabotage and ten others encountered

contact with Cuban forces.. Thus, during 1963, the Castro Government was

aware of at least 14 operations involving infiltration of Cuban coasts and

harbors, and it would be logically assumed that the U.s. had a hand in

these actions.

During 1963, a CIA trained exile paramilitary group committed two acts

of sabotage which inflicted some damage, caused a great deal of commotion

and attracted a lot of publicity. On 31 August 1963, this group attempted

to destroy a POL dump in Casildo Harbor using an 81mm mortar and a 75mm

recoillers rifle. Unknown to the team, the Harbor was under an air de-

fense alert at the time. Shortly after opening fire, the team came under

heavy enemy fire. The team inflicted some damage on the POL dump, and

hastily departed in two small boats. This attack was reported in the

Cuban press.

On 30 September 1963, this group conducted a commando raid against a

large sawmill on the coast of Oriente Province. The sawmill was destroyed

and no enemy opposition was encountered. The mill was a main producer of

railroad ties. Its loss was felt, and noted in a Castro speech, when a

hurricane destroyed most of the railroad's lines in part of Cuba several

weeks later.

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