AMWHIP/1 MEETING, NEW YORK CITY, 14 NOVEMBER 1963
Originator: CIA
From: WITHHELD
To: MFR
Document date: 11/20/1963
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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$104-10103-1001

2022 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SEGNET

20 Novenbor 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR BIG ABCOND:

AWRIP/1 Meeting, Ner York City

Thursday, 14 November

1953

This necting was laid on

by phone from Washligion on 18 Roveaber.

It took place as

scheduled wing an ofsice/work room in A/l"s jewelry factory-

shovroon at 3l. Arts ot., New fork.

1222809 COStAG:

This neeting was scheduled

in order so abe?

incormation and identitications tron A/

rovelant do the intos Operation.

We were particularly

interosted in dotemining Allusil's present alvitude toward

the Oporation and any dotails of or nancs of lilcly

confederates which he nay have discussed with a/1 after

Onérich's departare from the.

soone.

We were also interested

in using A/1 as a checs against the list of litely AMASH

confoderates which had been compilod by the MAPRON Eroup.

Finences.

The undersigned was prepared. to

stillicioni funds to cover hig expenses and

those of AMASH during the recent three-week mojoum in

Europe which A/1 made at our request.

However, A/1 refused

to accept any reaucration motsoever, stating that the

money ve had given hid for his round-trip ticket ($950,00)

was enouga. This, for the record, represents an outlay

conservatively of

some 51400 to 51000 by A/1 iron his of

pocket on KUBARk behold, not to nention the lost time fron

hig own business.

We bolteve this gesture should be

remembered in future dealings: with A/1.

General. A/1 was feeling poorly as the result

of a flu-type coid ween we met.

He stated that be would not

have come in at all were it not for our schedulen neeting.

Nevertheless, he spent willingly neveral hours with us,

going over the points in which we vere interested.

The

meeting terminated at 1530 with no incidents of a security

nature noted.

5.

Details of Meeting.

Collecting irformation

for the Nish operation constituted the principal of

discussions during this noeting, and may be found as

attaciment A to this report.

A copy is tilod also in tho

ANuas 201.

03 •

Brilian 6.

Hel wcight

340/208, 9/0

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reaucration

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08

H/I

1ilo

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ATTACINENT A TO: ANTIP NEMO OF MEETING OF 14 NOV 1963

The following Information and observatione wore obtained

Al during the above

meeting:

ALASH Secretary:

Ernostina ACOSTA Gonzalez

(nickname: Ene) calle 25 - #526 Apt 8 (presumably our 25th

St., No. 526.... Vedado - Tolephone 303865.

(Note AMLASH has considerable confidance in his secretary,

and has suggested that letters or packages could be sent

thore on a one or two-shot deal.)*

In response to the question of whoa. AlliSIl

might turn to in order to carry out his plans, AHIP

mentioned

the

following persons:

06

Jose neEp Yard,

ca. 33 Jis old; nho is functionary

O An Havana aunteipal gort. He is

06

Ods moorish descent]

Has wide.

circle of acquaintances in Havana.

Major ALI RITASI

Hamos GUIN

Quan ALMIDA 06

"The NIEVES brothers"]06

0f

06,06

the above 9°A/1

felt that GUIN, ACE) The (NIEVES, NARANJO

and BuLlAS verg, the most dependable... The degree to

which Juan ALMiBIDA

could be trusted was questioned by A/1.

In addition to the above names which A/1 volunteered

jasked about MaJor DIAZ-ARGUELLES, Major Tony CASTEL, Jand 06,06

Major paure CHOMON. A/1 statod that he felt DIAZ-ARGUELLES 06,06

tie

Ca the indoor by shes, bag

would not be uttlized

, If nis eltorts were

himsel)7

successful,

they

could be counted on to support LASH in the

period which followed.

They would never be taken into the

cursing

"inter-sanetun", however.

When asked about Majors redro 06,06

nicklingue

MIRET,

Rodiles PLANAS, and Earique BONDONET Gomez. 1/1

it

stated that PLANA] could neger be utiltzed, CoRoNet would 6

Yin-Tin

fit into the CASTEL CHOrON category, and Minty, though 0b

friendly with LASh,

could not be trusted as his primary

loyalty was

to FIDEL. CASTRO.

suk.

2318R

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tago 2 of. Attach. A

Millan GALVid Rodriguez 06, 06,06

Moantonio LUSSON (352049) Batila, A/1 stated that he did

not know those typee well and therefore had little to

regaring then. He did say that he did not care for (CALler 06

i personaily onu

that he was a little "paycho"; (BORDON was 06

do ok; Poled vas an older bet,

ca. 80 years, no was

nonentity who had his rank

because he had guided the GRANA 0Y

grouplinto the hills at the beginning of the fight against

Batista:06 Russol] was probably too loyal to laul CASINO to be

considered lor any initial action.

when questioned about the identities of follovers

MEerS, A/l stated that it would be better to

reler to mish, as he (A/1) could only give information that

was three years

old and hence not vory accurate. We did

10t

press the question, nor suggest, panes, as 1t was evident

that he felt that his answers mould aluply not give a true,

current picture.

5.0

A/1 provided the full naue of a possible lead

Unnich he had discussed earlier mitt Outrioh:

Raudol RUIZ,

le 5 457153, Apt 6, Vedado,, Havana!

0 Puld is an assistant to

• "Director of Sports" for the National Govt

in Havana.

6.

In addition to the above information, the

undersigned discussed various aspects of the AlIASI case,

and in particular, guestioned A/1 about A-LASH's frame of

mind and future plans which he may have revealed to A/1

aiter Ontrich departed the scene.

A/l made several points,

which basically boiled down to the fact that AMASH was

still not pleaced with the support he was getting fron the

USG side.

The vistt with DAINOLD, who acted in the capacity

of a representative of high levels of the Govt concernod

with the Cuban problem, satisfied AMASH as far as policyy

was concerned, but he was not at all happy with the fact

that he still was not given the technical assistance for

the operational plan as he saw it. A/1 said that AMLASH

dwelt constantly on this point. He could not understand

why he was denied certain snall pieces of equipsent which

promised a final solution to the problem, while, on the

other hand, the USG gave much equipment and money to exile

groups for

their inflective excursions against Cuban

coastal

targets,

According to A/1, ALASH feels strongly:

on this point, and 1f he does not get advice and materials

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Sailial

Page 3 of Attacb. A

frow USG technician, he will probably bocone Ped-up agals,

and we vill lose whatever progress ve have made to date.

A/1 stated that AMLASI! 207 has his leet wet vis-a-vis:

cooperating with USG and has accepted the fact that he mill

work profitably and accurely with

it. It 1s this that wo

stand to lose with our procrastination.

AMLASH a180

talked about going

to the French terrorist group, the

dAS;

in order to get the naderials and guidance he noeds.

It"

1o belloved that he was talled out of this idoa, after the

dangers involved were discussed with AMLASI.

T, With rocord to the radio gear; AMASI stated

that he did

not feel that he wanted to take one in with

hiu, particularly. In view of the recent arrests in Cuba

oi agents carrying concealed radios. He was not opposed,

however, at this time to having a radio cached for him,

to be recovered by hia later.

8.

According to AMMUIP, if there ls any interest

in having AJASIl link up with other trusted assets in

Cuba, these names would have to be given to him before he

returned; otherwise he gould not trust any other meang

veed later inside to get him to initiate or respond to such

contacts.

9.

A/1 stated that AMASH talked about getting

this was the best idea, since 11 RAY came to Paris while

he (LASH) nas there, people would conclude that there was

sonothing between the tro,. Another spot would be better;

thought AMLiSH.

10. At the time of A/l's departure, AMASH

said that he would contact "Jack" (Red Stent, Paris

statior) upon his return to Paris. (This he subsequently

did on the l5th of November, according to info received

Iron Paris-somewhat belatedly).

11. When AMLASIl, A/l, and VENEGAS were together

in Rome and Italy, VENEGAS

told ANLASH that people were

betting that lashl would not return to Cuba.: Some had also

questioned is wother on this point. AllASh reportedly

told VENEGAS to cover all the bets he could as he would

be a rich nan. (It das at this time, according to A/1,

that AllAst decided that he had better return to lavara

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rage & of Attach. A

a little sooner than he intoled, in fact almost as soon

possible.)

12.

ANLASHl talked

about the tro possibilities

of re-taking Cuba - citaer thru invasion by US troops, or

le also realized, horever,

that invasion was

not to ha onsidered perfously at this tag Also s111251

talked about his ability to take some men trito the

of Las Villas Province and taking the smell towns of

Triniuad and Topes de Collantes.

te said that he and his

men could last no more than 15 days in the hills as the

onti-guerrilla fighters now employed by the Regina were

CX-gN011,183

thondalves and linew. the ray to light and

the hills.

nied the Soviet guipient bade the govt

forces much bore

formidable than in Batista's tine.. AMLASH

apparently was

discussing these ideas with the impression

that this

raa the way to set up a provisional rebel sovt

and thereby invite and gain US support,

By the way A/1

talked, it is fairly certain that AMASH realized that

this was not the kind of a plan walch could even remotely

be expected to receive USG aid. It 1a hoped that he

does realize

that Havana rust firet be taken... or failing

chat, a truely sizablo piece of land (say, almost an '

entire province) which could bo a true rallying point and

staging ground under conplete Rebel control, from which

the rest of the island could be wrested from the Fidelistas

and the Concunists.

In sunnary, the talks with A/l led the

undersigned

to believe. that ANtilSIl is again entering

one of his skeptical

moods, one which our aotions have

done little to dispel.

roo little and too lato.......

End of Report

03

Willtan E. Wainwright

SAS/BOB

C/o

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1/BR

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