MINUTES OF SPECIAL GROUP MEETING, 3 NOVEMBER 1960
Agency: SSCIA
Originator: WHITE HOUSE
From: PARROTT, THOMAS
Document date: 11/3/60
Document type: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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JFK Assassination System

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9/22/201

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AGENCY FILE NUMBER:

SSCIA

157-10002-10154

MEMORANDUM

Released under the John

F. Kennedy

Assassination Records

Collection

Act of 1992

144 USC 2107 Notel.

Case#:NW 54545 Date:

10-12-2017

Document Information

ORIGINATOR:

FROM

TO:

WHITE HOUSE

PARROTT, THOMAS

TILE:

MINUTES OF SPECIAL GROUP MEETING, 3 NOVEMBER 1960

DA BE :

PAGES:

SUBJECTS:

11/03/1960

6:

DOCUMENT TYPE :

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DATE OF LAST REVIEW:

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS :

GRAY, GORDON

ZRRIFLE

CUBA

CASTRO

AMLASH

PAPER TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

Unclassified

Consulted; TA: Donor Restricted

Redact

03/01/1994

Box 256Folder 5Exhibit 1 to testimony of Tliomas Parrott. 7/40/75

W.]

07

54545

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Released under the John

. kennedy

issassination Records

Collection Act of 1992

144 05C 2101 Notel.

Case#:NW 54545 Date:

10-12-2017

3 November 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

E5CL1

Pary M EX 1

7/10/75

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 3 November 1960

PRESENT: Messis. Merchant, Mouglas, Gray, Gen. Cabell,

Gen. Lansdale

PROPERTY !!:

THE WHITE HUGE WiT

1.

Cuba

MI. Gray inquired once more as to the status of planning for

problems which would arise post-Castro.

Mi. Merchant said he

would check into the progress of the State Department group which

has been charged with developing recommendations on this matter.

From this the Group launched into a far-ranging discussion of

the entire concept of U.S. efforts against Castro. Mr. Douglas,

supported by Mi. Gray and Mi. Merchant, expounded the idea that

perhaps things have now progressed to a point where covert activities

of the type originally envisaged for ClA to undertake wili not be effective.

MI. Douglas referred to the extensive program of the militia, Mr. Gray

cited the matter of arms from the Soviet bloc, and Mr. Merchant dwelt

on the increasing effectiveness of Castro's measures to control the

population in ways wiich the Communists have developed so well. The

latter said

that he and others in the State Department had originally

thought that a popular rebellion would develop within Cuba and that

this could be augmented by the comparatively small-scale efforts of

exiles under CLA control.

Now the same peopie are beginning to feel

more and more that despite the numerous defections and the economic

deprivations being experienced by the middle and upper classes, time

is actually working on Castro's side.

Mr. Merchant said that he

foresaw that there would occur a point in time beyond which covert

intervention would not do the job.

Mr. Gray expressed the opinion that we will never be able to

"clean up" the situation without the use of overt U.S. military force.

He suggested the possibility of using the ClA-backed exiles to mount a

simulated attack on Guantanamo in order to offer an excuse for overt

IS CHORED IS

A SONG.

KICE

FiT10. 270

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intervention. This led to an involved discussion, the general conclusion

of which was that such action on our part would not be desirable, but

that should Castro be foolish enough actually to attack Guantanamo

this would almost certainly mean war. Mr. Gray said that he had had

the subject of Cuba inscribed on the NSC agenda for next Monday in

order to be able to arrive at a top-level decision on this very point.

He thought it essential that the policy of the U.S. should be completely

understood by responsible officials, so that any overt Cuban act would

be met. with a previously-agreed-on response.

MI. Merchant stated thai, apart from any attack on Guantanamo,

he thought that some of the previous argumentation in today's meeting

was faulty, in that we could not have it both ways. By this he meant

thit it is not logical to conclude that an indigenous uprising is impossible

and yet that it is feasible for the U.S. to go in overtly and "clean up

the mess. " He pointed out that if Castro's support were such that an

uprising was out of the question then an open invasion by the U.S. would

be mot by a hostile population and we would be plunged into a situation

Like Algeria.

Turning to the immediate problem before the Group, Gen. Cabell

outlined the general proposal to establish bases in the U.S., with the

Icasons for coming to this conclusion. He cited specifically the

possibility of U. N. investigation in Guatemala and the increased scope

of the program, which has been brought about by the increased strength

of the Castro regine.

All members of the Group expressed serious

doubts as to whether such activity could be kept at all secure. Mi.

Merchant said at one point, that although this does not represent a

final conclusion on his part, he is inclined to think that the proposal

embodies the worst aspect of both worlds; that is, the choice should

rest between continuing our operations entirely on foreign soil of

preparing to make the best possible case for overt intervention.

Mr. Gray suggested that the decision could be put up to his

associates at the same time Tibet is discussed. Mr. Merchant agreed

that this is where it should end up, but asserted that he is not prepared

to move in that cirection until a survey has been made of the possibilities

of keeping opciations in the U.S. unrevcaled.

In this connection Gen. Cabell mentioned the possibility of using

a Icfugee organization - either an existing one or a contrived one - to

backstop the operations.

2

PROPERTY G

THE WHITE MOUTH.

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MI. Douglas said that in any case he would be prepared to have

the Department of Defense investigate the availability of specific

locations that would be suitable.

Finally, Mr. Merchant asked whether any ical planning has been

done for taking direct positive action against Fidel, Raul and Che Guevara.

He said that without these three the Cuban Government would be

lcaderless and probably brainless. He conceded that it would be

necessary to act against all three simultaneously. Gen. Cabell pointed

out that action

of this kind is uncertain of results and highly dangerous

in conception and execution, because the instruments must be Cubans.

He felt that, particularly because of the

necessity of simultaneous

action, it would have to be concluded

that Mr. Merchant's suggestion

is hevand ner canahilities.

16/83

GERT - DES 6NU1

turned

PROPERTY MI

THE WHITE robot birdi

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I% Supply Drops - Cuba

Gen. Cabell explained that the Pinar de Rio supply mission had

not taken place'because of the absence of specified communication

from the DZ, and the Escambray operation had been canceled because

of weather.

He said that these missions are still planned, and assumed

that the Group had no objections. The members so signified..

N5. U-2; Cuba

Gen. Cabell said that the photographic coverage on the first

flight had been only about 50%, because. of cloud cover. He continued

that we are analyzing the exact results on a priority basis and that

some time after the middle of next week we should be in a position to

make recommendations for the missions required to extend the coverage.

Mr. Gray commented somewhat wryly that this was all right with

him since he "would certainly not be available to discuss anything of

this kind before the middle of next week. " The other members appeared

to have the same reaction.

V6. Policy Consideration Re Cuban Exiles

Mr. Gray said that Assistant Attorney Gencral Yeagley had spoken

to him after his meeting with Col. King and Messrs. Esterline and

Holman. He had said that the information given to him by the ClÀ

representatives, and the arrangements for future coordination if

necessary, were entirely satisfactory to him. He had stated, however,

that a problem remains with respect to action the FBI should take;

that is, the FBI needs guidance in its handling of Cuban exile group's

other than those under the direction of CLA.

The Group agreed that the best way to attack this problem would

be to have Mr. Yeagley attend next week's Special Group mecting and

discuss the matter at first hand. Mr. Parrott was asked to make

arrangements for this.

7.

Value. of Cuba to the USSR as a Base Vig-a-vis

Cape Canaveral

MI. Parrolt gave Mr. Merchant the gist of the OSI memorandun

ThE White bed wire.

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on this subject, which bad been discussed with the rest of the Group

on 20 October 1960.

To Parratt

THOMAS A PARROTT

0210%

5

- 823 024

AL Y

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United States Senate

MEMERANDUM

elder/bolton checklist:

1. AMLASHt documents = 24

2. ZRRIFLE documents (need another 100k

territam

+3.

ti Menant

~4. Sign affadavit

15. Isle of Pines source

refer to CIA

6. Doller Pilenda

HH

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