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The

Attorney General

ZALM

ALL INFORISATION CONTAIN

DATE NO YOU 5750

DATE LO

Director, FBI

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

(Mr. J. B. Hotis)

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

June 239

1 - Mr.

W.

0. Cregar

1-

Mr.

R.

I. Moore

19750

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COLMITTHE

ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVIJIES (SSC)

By loiter dated lay 14, 1975, vith attached appendices,

the SSC requested certain information and documents from the

FBI.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the

Conmittee are the original of a menorandum and enclosures which

serve as a response to tuo of the SSC requests.

A copy of this memorandum with enclosures is being i

furnished for your records.

It is to be noted that the memorandum of J. Edgar Hoover

dated July 21, 1971, the letter to the President from Ir. Hoover,

September 20,

1971, and the letters from Mr. Hoover to Secretary of

State William P. Rogers, Septenber 20, 19/Lg and to Dr Henry

Kissinger, September 21, 1971, all contain infornation witt

reference to contacts between I'S. Hoover and the President of the

United States at that time.

The December 20, 1971, letter E

J. Edgar Hoover fron John N. Irvin II, classified Confidential,

was written in ir. Irtin's capacity as Chairman, National security

Council Under Secretaries Committee. In accordance with the

request of K. William O'Connor, we are deferring to him any action

necessary to obtain appropriate clearance from the White House to

furnish these documents to the Cormittee.

Enclosures

(48)

REC 88

Assoc. Dir. -

Dep. AD Adm. _62-116395

Dep. AD Inv. _

Asst. Dir.:

2 - ENCLOSURE

385

Admin. -

I - The Deputy Attorney General

102.1113799

Comp. Syst. -

Attention:

K. William O'Connor

Ext. Affoirs _

Files & Com. -

Special Counsel for

Gen. Inv. _

Intolligence Coordination & JUL 21 1975

Ident.

Inspection RIM:mam

Intell.

Laboratory

Plan. & Eval. -

Spec. Inv.=

Training -

PLY

Legal Coun. _

Telephone Rm. _

CODE

IT MATERIAL ATTACHED

MAIL, ROOM

P3SGI Bo811072989615

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62-716395

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

(Mr. J. B. Hotis)

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

June 23: 1975

- Mr. R.

L. Moore

UHITED SOADS DONATE SELJOT COM ITINE (SSO)

TO STUDE COVERNEINEAY OPLNATIONS

WITH RESPRO 70 INTELLICENCE ACRIVILIDS

RE: FURTELI DOCULEIS PEREAINIUC TO THE

FBI AND DEFANDENT OF JUSTICE

ORGATERATICIT, CTRUCTURE, AND JURISDICIIOI

. INFORMATION CONTAINED

IZNICLASSIFIED

DATE

Reference is rade to SOC lottor dated lay 14,

1975, with attached appendices, requesting certain

documonts and other information Iron the FBI.

Fursuont to your requect in ippendix B, Itors

13 and I4, for all conorands and other ratorials roflecting

ceotings and contacts during 1971 betwoon the Frosivent

the Diroctor of the ass and berwoon orricials or the

and ofticials of the deportres of state on the subject

of "legal attachei," enclosed

are coplos of 23 cocurents.

Enclosuros (23)

1 - The Attorney General

RIM :mam

(8) PRINT ORIGINAI AND ONE COPY TO AG

NOTE:

The Senate Committee request is understood to be a

request for contacts with reference to the legal attaches as a

group and therefore contacts between officials of the FBI and

officials of the State Department pertaining to any one partic-

Assoc. Dir. _Ular legal attache, such as Iel Aviv, haye not been included.

Dep. ADAm In the enclosures there is reference to State 'dragging its

Dep. AD Inv. -

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

ractinformation that/fugutsations with the State Department the

feet,"

that collection of political intelligence was the primary

Ex. Sirs purpose for the expansion of legal attaches was concealed from

Files & Com_the State Department. The enclosures also contain information

Gen. Inv. -

Ident.

that there are a large number of

JFK.

Act 6 1-

JEK Act

Inspection

Intell.

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE TWO

Laboratory -

Plan. & Eval. -

Spoc. Inv. -

Training -

CORE AT LORI ARRAO CAN

Legal Coun. -

Telephone Rm. -

Director Sec'y -

MAIL ROOM L

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ENCLOSURE 385PL

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UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH

RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: FURTHER DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO

THE FBI AND DEPARIMENT OF JUSTICE

NOTE CONTINUED:

The Confidential material attached includes Wannall

to Miller memorandum, 11/4/71; Miller to Rosen memorandum,

11/26/71; Wannall to Miller memorandum, 12/9/71; and letter

from the Undersecretary of State, John N. Irwin II to Mr. Hoover

dated 12/20/71. The Bureau memoranda were classified on 6/5/75

since disclosure of the fact that the 1971 expansion of the FBI's

foreign liaison program was for the purpose of collecting foreign

political intelligence could damage existing diplomatic relations

between the United States and foreign countries involved.

Further

it could seriously damage existing cooperative relationships with

foreign police and intelligence agencies.

- 2 -

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5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee:

Senate Select Committee

OLHM Memo Report dated 6/23/75

gether to put or opera one to Peace.

Department of Justice; Organization, Structure,

Delivered by:

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

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All perorands and other natezlals

Icilecting Lectings and contrets

during I971 botween the Fresicont

and the Director of the FBI on the

subject

of "legal attaches"

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COPY - RETYPED FOR REASON OF LEGIBILITY

_- JULY 21, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. SULLIVAN

I have given very careful consideration to your memoranda of

June ?, 1971, and June 16, 1911, together with the memorandum of

to the President

September 22, 1970; Mr. Brennan's memorandum of September 21, 1970,

initialled by you; and also Mr. Child's memorandum of May 23,

analyzing the work and the accomplishments of our various foraien liaison

oflices and the problems incident thereto, together with the recommendations

of Messrs.

Dalbey, Felt, and Beaver upon the recommendation made in your

memorandum of June 7, 1971, suggesting the closing down of a number of

the foreign liaison offices, some of them recently established last December

with your approval.

First and foremost, I want to clarify a point you have raised in

your memoranda, namely that our Ioreign lalson viiices

I Mexico City, are not operational and that we cannot develo hara, hish

quality, positive intelligence by sending men to these countries only in a

liaison

capacity." We do not have the legal right to establish any foreign

offices on an operational basis.

The law specifically limits foreign intelli

gence operations to coverage by the Cla, and, therefore, we have known

all along that our offices in loreign countries could not be in an operational

status.

I cannot agree that establishing liaison offices in foreign coun-

tries without being operational prevents us from developing hard, high quality;

and positive intelligence. Certainly in all memoranda prior to your memo-

randum of June 7, 1971, you did not indicate any such reservation and, in

fact, you specifically initialled the memorandum of Mr. Brennan addressed

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREINIS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 1012.00 BY 502044 C

HH 55035

This document is prepared in response to jour request and is not for dissemi

nation outside your Commütee.

Its use is bannieu to offaeral proceedings oy

your committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized person

nel without the express approval of the FBI .

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July 2l, 1071

kK.

AULLIVAN

I havo siren veng casalal consideratios to your memersmia of

June F. 1973, Bud dare 18,

1971, together with tus mamorandum et

3r. Seorall of Eby no, 19T1, allot was laftlalied by you; air. Wannail's

meriorandaci of May 20, 1081, Iidalled by you; my lettor to the Iresident

dated rentember 21,

1010, initialled by goo; your memorandura of

hepterabar sa, 1070; we. Dronan's memorandura of toptamber a1, 1070,

Andtalled by son; and also Nir. Child's momorandum of biay as, 1909,

andysing the for sod the accomplalons of our various foreign liaisou

offices and the probiors noteem therebo, together with the recoemendations

of Mosars, Dalber, Fai, and bearer tpoa the accomenattion made in yous

mamarandors of dera 7, 1091

the foreign italoon pideed, come of thoms recemly estacliebod luet recenter

mite your approral.

First and foremos, I maat to clarity a potat sou have raised in

your memoranch, namely thas our foreign liaison alliest, with the sacoptioa

0f healco City, are so% operational and that we cannot daveler "hard, bigh

gunny, boritive faeligence sy contac mon to khoac countries outy in a

lisson capacity, * Me do not have the loyal right to establish any forela

oincos on an operational banta. The lor apreltically limits forelen intolli-

sanes operationa in coverage by the Che, and, tharetoro, me bave kaom

all along that ear pifices la foreiga countries edald not be in an eparational

1 donast agree that Gatoblishing Mninon ottiece in foreign sonmiries

whoat being operational prevarts es from developing hard, bish quality.

'and ponitiro insalligance, Cortainly so all acorands prior to your beemo

mandam of Jeos 7, 1971, you did sos lodicato ang such reserpation and, jo

tact, you apoelically Initialled too memorandum el Mir. Eronnan addrcanca

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 10/12/00 BY SPHALAC

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi.

nation outside your Committee.

Its use is limited to official proceedings or

your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized person.

nel without the express, approvat of;

• the EBl .

HH 55035 DocId:32989615 Page 8

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Memorandum for Mr, Sullivan

July 21, 1971

.3

to you under date of depteater ä1, 1070, upon which I predicated my letter

to the President of September 21, 1970.

At that time I believed that by

reaion of your approval ot the various memoranda dealing with the foreign

liaison operatione, you were in accord with the procedures which the bureau

had followed and, in fact, approved the establishment of additional liaison

ofticas which I lated in my letter to the Fresldent of Sertember 21, 1970,

and which 1 Indicated was prectezted upon Mr. Erennan's memorandum of

September 21, 1970.

I want to also point out that at no time, either in September os

moro recently, did l ever suggest to the President the idea that we should

expand our foreiga linison operatione. It was the President's idea expressed

to me la keptember, 1970, that such expansion should tase place, ard, as

a result thereol, I aubmitted my letter to him of september 81, 1970.

The

President i inow in my presence directed Mis. Haldeman to present my

lotter to the Fresident to the Eccretary of State for procant and immediate

_ Consurrence, Several months passed, and it was not until December, 1970,

that Di. Elasinger inquired of me as to what had tappened to the expansion

of our forelen liaison witch the Fresident had approved being expanded in

Cepternber, 1970. Whon I told De. Kissinger that thia matter had been

delayed in the State Department and that I had been awaiting word tor approval

of the same by the Seoretary of State, De. Klesinger stated he mould personally

take this matter up with the Presidont and that 1 would raceive in a few days

the Etate Dapartment's approval ol the expansion of our foretgn liaison.

beveral days later In December, 1970, & received a telepbono call from

Boeretary of State Rogers statlag that the Precident had spolen to him about

tho espanaion of our forciga Enisoa oparations and that he was ia full accord

with the same with the excaption of the opening of an office at Helsinki in

viow of the ponding negotistions to be carried on there by representatives

of tho Rasaian Government aud the Einited States Goverment concerning

the limdation of arzas. As 1 have previously indicated in my memoraséura

to you, I concurred mith the suggestion of the secretary of state and countered

with tho reconmendation that instesd of opening an office at Belsinki, we open

an ollico at Copenhagen, with which the secretary agreed.

I I heard notling more about the expanston of foreien llaison from fie

Fresident os ür. Iüssinger until June, 1971, when la a conference with the

•2=

'W

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Memorandas for Mix. Eullivaa

July 21, 1971

Prestont, ha exprescod his desire that we again expand our fortigu liaisos

Is vier of tho valuable information which bad bean procured by the Erureza in

its operations sarcas. I Indicated to Do Presidant thai i sour conter vati

DI. Kissinger vrea he vocid be railabia about this matter as to oatala any

suggeslions be right kare. In the interim, the Presidest left for San Clemento,

Californda, and Dr. Missinger idit on a vorlévide trip and both of thera bave

Just retard mittn the last dow toys too fan Clanente, Calforti,

I outliund the preceding to give you a chrenologieal picture of what

bas tanen place is tols fold. I do not anderatand the comewhat sudden change

la your atitude to tie valve and imparience of oar fozelgo liaison operatioas

in tier of your coneurrence ot ta expanion in Decorates, 1930, and the

various memorada of My. Brenna end Mr. Wensali, who are la direct

contact with the operations of the loreign laison aituation.

Therefore, in view of the tbat I consider objectire forter by

Mesars, Felt, Melbey, and Heaver logother with the many lotters and oral

excresions from De. Missinger sa to tse vahe of cur foreiga liaison program,

I camot agree with your mamorandum of Zune 1, 197l.

Thás racening I received Andoor memorsaian frora you tronomittieg

a tarasrendura ol tar°Ramall upou the statintical secomplatmento in the

forcin laisea program in which you reach the conclusion that by jugaling

statiaties, you ean Dento alsoat angthing. I do not share tula view, though

I do think that sentistles alone do not sirays prove or disprove s partiealar

situstion.

I kave personally over the years sontowed all of! the motorial which

10 have transmitted to Ur. Fussinger and much of the material artich se have

transmitted to tho Etose Department sad ocher Covarament ageorice sogeerzing

out foreign liaieon program, und I holieva that are bave made, as expressed

by the Freoldent nad Dr. flosinger, a very valuable couribation ta the necessary

kaowledge of the Presidori and ir. Kissingar in kno foreiga field, This bes

been accorplished wittout "operational" functions, which, I hare previonaly

Indicated in thia momorandam, to canot embarts ayon la vied of the lat.

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Menorandum for Mr. Pullivan

daly 21, 1971

Ins order that I may bo kept sbreast of the operations of our foreign

lialsou posts, l hava instructed Assistant Director Fonder ta charge of

inspections to arrange for an inspeetion of all of our F'DI foreign liaison

posts as s00a as possible and to make such evaluntions of ther as are

marranted.

Very truly yours,

J.JEEDGAR HOOVER

John Edgar Boover

Director

NW 55035 DocId: 32989615 Page 11

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ORICK US THIS DIRECTON

UNITED STATES DEPARTVENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASBINGTON, D.C. 20535

September 20, 1971

BY LIAISON

The President

The White House

Washingion, D.

Dear Mr. President:

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED.

DATE DO 12.00 BY SPAM Y

In confirmation of our discussion this morning, I am

proceeding to make the necessary arrangements for the opening of

additional liaison offices at Manila, Philippines; Rio de Janeiro,

Brazil; Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic; Canberra, Australia;

Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia; and New Delhi, India. Each of these offices

will be staffed by one Special Agent and one clerical employee, which

will result in an increase in our overseas personnel from the present.

ceiling of 88 to a total of 100.

We consider that the new offices will be in a position to

provide additional coverage in the important South Pacific and

Southeast Asian areas as well as to strengthen our operations in

Latin America.

I have today asked the Secretary of State to secure the

necessary clearances, both for the increase in our personnel ceiling

and for the opening of the new posts. I will inform you promptly when

this has been accomplished.

Sincerely yours,

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemin

nation oritside your Committee: Its use is limited to official proceedings by

your Committee and the content may nut be disclosed to unauthorized person

nel without the express approval of the FBi.

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September 21, 1971

BY LIAISON

Honorable Henry A. Kissinger

• Assistant to the Fresident

for National Security Affairs.

The White House

Washington, D. C.

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

Attached is a copy of my letter of September 20; 1971,

to the President in confirmation of my discussion with the President

on that date.

I felt you shouia be informed vi our readiness to establish

six additional liaison posts as indicated therein.

Sincerely yours,

-..

•J. Edgar Hoover

'??"

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi-

.. nation outside your Committee.

your Committee and the content may not e disclos to o inor toried ines by

nel without the express approval of the FBI.

WH 55035 DocId: 32989615 Page 13.

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so seeines

October 14,.1971

BY LIAISON

. i

Honorable Henry A. Kissinger

-....i

Assistant to the President

for National Security Aifairs

The White House

Washington, D. C.

Dear Di. Kissinger:

Ou October 12, 1971, Ambassador Wymberley Coerr,

Deputy Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research,

Department of State, and Mi. R. Glynn ilays, also of the

Department of State

but assigned to the National Security

Council Under Secretaries Committee, requested additional

infornation with reference to my letter of Septenber 20, 1971,

to Secretary Rogers requesting clearance for six new liaison

hosts abroad.

The State representatives explained that

various questions had been raised by the imbassadors ii

biE

countries concerned, particularly in view of the current

five percent reduction being eifected by the Department of

State in United states

personnel overseas.

A copy of my letter of October 14, 1971, to

Under Secretary of State John N. Irvin II is attached for

your information. You will note that it sets forth general

information concerning our activitles abroad and our reasona

for selection of the six proposed new posts.

The Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney General

have also been furnished a copy of this letter.

Sincerely yours,

ALLINFORMATION CONTAINED

•HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 10/12,00 BY SPRAIMED

J. Edgar Hoover .

"The document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi-

nation outside your Committee.

lits use is limited to official proceedings by

Your committee and the content may nut be disclosed to unauthorized person-

55035

nel without the express approval of the FBl.

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111 recorande und othor notorials

roflecting neetings and contacta

auring 1971 botueen officials of

the FBI and officials of tho

Dorartient of State on the subject

of "logal attaches"

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

SATE 10/14,00

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September 13, 1971

BY. COURIER SERVICE

Er. G. Marvin Gentile

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security

Department of State

washington, D. C.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

Dear lic. Gentile:

This is to inform you of several changes which

are being made in IBI personnel assigned overseas.

Legal Liaison Officer Daniel A. Grove, who has

been assigned to Hung Kong, British Crown Colony, is

returning to the United states for domestic assigment and

#11l be replaced by Ir. Roderick V. Prechtl, Ji., presently

serving as Assistant Legal attache at fokyo, Japan.

it'. Raymond N. Byers, concerning whom you will be further

informed and who is presently assigned to the domestic field,

is being

transferred to Tobyo, Japan, to replace ir. Prechtl.

Mr. James A. Miller, Legal Attache, Managua,

Nicaragua, is returning to the domestic field for further

assignment. Mr. Armand A. Cannarota, presently Assistant'

Legal Attache at Managua, is being named Acting Legal Attache.

Mr. Miller is not being rcplaced at the present time.

Hiss Grace 1. Isloi, presently assigned in lexico City, Mezico,

is returning to the

domestic field for further assignment and

is not being replaced.

By letter dated September 3, 1971, we informed

Br. Thomas Stern, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for

Organization and

Nanagement, of our desire to increase the

stafi of the Office of the Legal Attache, London, England,

by an additional Assistant Legal Attache

and of our intention

to offset this increase by a decrease in the number of employees

HW 55035

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi

nation outside your Committee.

'Its use is limited to official proceedings by

your committee and the content may nut be disclosed to unauthorized person

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.G. Maryin Gentale

assigned to the Legal Attache Office in Buenos Aires,

Argentina. Upon concurrence, it is ou intention to

transfer Assistant Legal Attache Robert W. Scherrer frOM

Buenos fires to London in ordor to accomplich this.

pending changes.

Sincerely yours,

Edgar Ecover

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BY COURIER SERVICE

Date:

To:

September 14; 1971

Presidential Appointments Staff

Department of State

Fxom:

Subject:

Attention:

Miss Betty L. Groves

Chief, Title and Bank

John Edgar Hoover, Director

FBI PERSONNEL IN TOKYO, JAPAN, AND

HONG KONG, BRITISH CROWN COLONY

Kir. Raymond N. Byers, who has been employed by

this Bureau since January 21, 1952, is being assigned to

the United States

Enbassy at

Tokyo, Japan, as an Assistant

Legal Attache. He is replacing Assistant Legal Attache

Roderick V. Prechtl, Jr., who is being assigned to the

American Consulate Generas at long kong, british Crown

Colony®

as Legal Liaison Officer.

Air. Prechtl is replacing

Ar. Daniel A. Grove, the Legal Liaison Officer mRoug koygy

who is returning to the United

states on domestic assicanent

F

Mr. Byers, who is serving in GS-14, was born on

January 1, 1921,

at Franklin, Indiana.

He was graduated'

from the University of Indiana at Bloomington, Indiana, in

1951 and received a Bachelor of Science degree. He will

be accompanied by his wife, Mildred, on this assignment and

expects to depart for Tolyo on or before September 30, 1971.

ur: Precht, who was born on July 11, 1926, at

almira, New Xork, has been employed by this Bureau since

November 16, 1953. He is currently serving in GS-15. He is

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 10/13,00 BY SPAAMI

This document is prepared in

response to your request and is not for dissemi-

nation outside your Committee.

Its use is limited to official proceedings by

your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized person

HH 55035

DooId:32989615

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Presidential ?

Appointments Si

Department of State

..

& graduate of Georgetown Unversity and of Georgetown Law.

School; Washington; D: C: He will be accompanied to Hong Kong

by his wife, Sharon, and his three daughters, Kimberly Marte,

aged 12; Kelly Ans,

aged 9; and Kiernan Kathleen, aged 3.

Ar. Prechtl and his family plan to arrive in Hong Kong in

early October, 1971.

The foregoing is furnished for your official use.

You may wish to advise the Embassy of the United States

in Tokyo and the American Consulate General in Hong Kong

of this change in personnel. It will not be necessary to

have anyone meet Nr. Byers or Mr. Prechtl when they arrive

at their new posts since these arrangements will be handled

by my representatives in Hong Kong and Tokyo.

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we area cosit

'BY COJRISE SERVICE

Date:

Senternber 17, 1071

To:

Dir. Thomas Stern

Deputy Assistant Secrotary

for Orcanisation aad Management

Departmicat of Sote

Fooz. 7818

New Stale Department Fatting

Hashingtos, D. Co 20530

John Eopar Hoover, Director

Subject:

OFFICE OF LECAS, ATTACHE

BARRICO CITY, MEXICO;

ROPENING OF IRE NESIDENT AGENCE

AT HERMOSILZOS SONORA

In order to headle the increased rolame ol work in the

Office of the legal Attachs, merico City, Liesteo, in a prougt and

siliclent manaut, I have approved the repunion oi a Resident Agency

la Mermosillo, Sonorse Iblo will involvo ao increase ot personaed

and the positica will be filled by an employeo abroady ausigned to the

Are of the Lozal Alacho, Menico saty, Miesiee»

Accordingly, gour concurrence la requested and yor

eart attontion to this matter vill be appreciaied.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi-

nation outside your Committee.

Its use is limited to official proceedings by

your Committee and the content may nut be disclosed to unauthorized person

H# 55035 DocId: 32989615

329 without the express approval of the FBI.

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## Page 21

SETICE DE THE DIRECTOR

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

September 20, 1971

BY COURIER SERVICE.

Honorable William P. Rogers

The Secretary of State

Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The President has today instructed me to increase further.

our liaison operations abroad, and I have indicated that we could

station representatives at Manila, Philippines; Rio de Janeiro, Brazil;

Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic; Canberra, Australia; Kuala Lumpur,

Nialaysia; and New Delhi, India. I propose to station one Special Agent

and one clerical employee in each of these posts, representing an

increase of 12 in our present overseas personnel celling of 80.

In view of the President's instructions, it would be appreciated

if the necessary arrangements could be made, both for the increase in

our personnel ceiling and for the requisite clearances with the Ambassadors

concerned. If you feel it desirable, one of my representatives will be

available to discuss this matter in further detail with the appropriate

official of your Depariment.

Sincerely yours,

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

вУдрадіно

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi

nation outside your Committee.

Its use is limited to official proceedings. by

your. Committee ind the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized person

nel without the express approval of the FBI

32989615 Page 21-

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## Page 22

OPTIONAL FORM NO, 10

3010-106

By MAY 1902 FOITION

FE GSA GEN, RZU. NO, 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

: Memorandum

TO":

•MI°

'A. Rosen

DATE : 10/12/71

FROM

E. S. Millex

SUBJECT: • EXPANSION OF FOREIGN LIAISON.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREINIS, UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 1013.00 BY 502ALM el

On 10/12/71 I met, at their request, with (Ämbassador

Wymberley Coerr, Deputy Director of the Bureau of Intelligence

and Research, Department of State, and R. Glynn Mays, also

of the Department of State but assigned to the National security

Council, Under Secretaries Committee. Also present was SA

Graham A. Day of this Division.

The State representatives advised that the Director's

letter of 9/20/71 to Secretary Rogers requesting clearance for

six new liaison posts

abroad had been referred to the Committee

for clearance. As part of their normal procedure, the views of

the affected Ambassadors were solicited with the result that a

number of questions were raised.

State is currently in the process

of effecting a five per cent reduction in U.S. personnel overseas

and

each Ambassador was

concerned with the proposed increase in

the personnel complement with which he is charged. Several

Ambassadors asked what information might be given

to the host

government and others inquired as to why their post had been

selected.

NW 55035

Both Coerr and Mays appeared to be genuinely cooperative

and indicated that they merely wanted our assistance: in preparing

brief material which might be forwarded to the Ambassadors 'as'

a general response to their inquiries.

They were pleased to

learn that a number of the new posts will be, in effect, acting

•as regional offices, covering more than one country. No question

was raised, and of course no comment was made, concerning the

* dévelopment of high-level intelligence and it was explained that,

as in the case with our other posts, our representatives will be

establishing and maintaining liaison with the police and other

investigative agencies of the countries visited in order to

expedite and insure the thorough handling of leads abroad arising

from the Bureau's domestic investigations.

-.

It was explained that three of the new posts (Manila,

Rio de Janeiro and Santo Domingo, represent a reopening of

offices formerly in existence and that only one post (New

"Delhi)

will be in a country not previously covered.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi-

.. nation outside your Committee.

Its use is limited to official proceedings by

your Committee and the content may not be disclosed. to unauthorzed person

net without the express approval of the FBI •

CONTINUED - OVER

DocId: 32989615 Page 22.

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## Page 23

Memorandum E. S. Miller to Mr. A. Rosen

RE:

EXPANSION OF FOREIGN LIAISON

Both Coerx and Mays indicated that there was

some

pressure to resolve the problem and prepare a response to

the Director's inquiry.

They did not, however, indicate::

how much time this might involve.

• In response to their inquiry we have prepared a

letter, addressed to the Under secretary oi state at their.

request, noting the general objectives of our foreign liaison

posts and explaining in general terms why each of the six

new locations was chosen.

We have also indicated the territory

to be covered by each and have furnished general statistics

concerning the substantial increase in the results obtained

by our foreign offices during the past five years.

ACTION:

Attached for approval is the letter discussed above.

daf

7 55035

DocId:32989615

Page 23

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## Page 24

ALL INFÓRMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT

WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

October 14, 1971

BY COURIER SERVICE

Honorable John N. Irwin Il

Under Secretary of State

Department of State

Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Irwin:

Ambassador Hymberley Coerr and Mr. R. Glynn Mays:

of your Department have asked for additional details with

reference to my letter of September 20, 1971, to Secretary

Rogers. Specific questions were raised concerning the

location of the proposed new posts and concerning our

method of operation when they are established.

In general, our need for additional liaison

abroad stems from the constantly increasing travel abroad

of United States citizens under investigation in this

country.

for example, jusi five

a total of 653 persons wanted in the United States were

CLASSIFIED B

DECLASSIFY O

through requests initiatea by our Legal Attaches.

In fiscal 1971, 2369 such persons were located. In fiscal

L9oe, slightly more than $300,000 in property stolen in the

United States was located abroad; while in fiscal 1971,..

nearly $1,500,000 of such property was so located.

In

nesponse to earlier programs aimed at reducing United states

personnel abroad, I closed our posts at llanila, Rio de Janeiro

and Santo Domingo and endeavored to cover those areas by

road trip fron other posts.

This has resulted in inevitable

_delays and in materially increased travel costs. As a

result, when the President asked that I increase our liaison

activities abroad, I suggested the reopening of these three

posts.

Our method of operation at each post will continue,

as in the past, to include the developent and maintenance

of a close, cooperative relationship with the police and

This document is prepared in rèsponse to your request and is not for dissemi-

nation outside your Committee.

Its use is limited to official proceedings by

your Committee and the content may nut be disclosed to unauthorized person

AH 55035

Doc Ided without theageprets approval of the FBI

---

## Page 25

SECRET

Honorable John N

Irwin.

• II

other investigative agencies of the countries visited for

the purpose of expediting and insuring the thorough coverage

conducted by the TBI

Co lecte by ta 13 vs in te anted stations by repren

sentatives

are not

operational, will conduct no investigations,

and will secure the information and assistance they need by

direct request of the appropriate foreign agency in the

country concerned. As a matter of reciprocity, my repre

sentatives will accept requests from those agencies for

information or assistance in the United States.

Specific

comments concerning the six proposed new offices follow:

CANBERRA, AUSTRALIA Australia and New Zealand

were originally covered by road trip from

Manila and subsequently, following the close

of our post in Manila,

from Hong Kong.

The

volume of work,

particularly in Australia,

has increased

to the point that it can no

longer be handled efficiently at such a

distance, and it is expected that the

establishment of a representative in Canberra

will provido for the more rapid handling of

In addition to the Commonwealth

Police and the Australlan Security Intelligence

organization, liaison would also be maintained

With the stato and territorial police agencies(s)

KUALA LUMPUR, MALAYSIA

The Agent stationed

here would be responsible for liaison in

would initiate coverage in Indonesia.

Kuala Lumpur was chosen as a central location

for the coverage of this large area which is

increasingly visited by persons of interest to

the FEi.

My representatives in Hong Kong have

been unable to visit this area with sufficient

frequency to insure the prompt handling of our

WOrk.

SECRET

NN 55035 DocId: 32989615 Page 25

- 2.

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## Page 26

Scht

Honorable John N. Irwin II

MANILA, PHILIPPINES

Our liaison post was

originally opened In Manila in August,

1961, and was closed on August 31, 1969,

in an effort to reduce overseas.costs.

Although relatively close to Hong Kong,

from which the area has since been covered,

the volume of our work in the Philippines is

such that it can best be handled by a man

on the scene as we have encountered numerous

delays in our efforts to secure infornation

at long distance.

The continued United States

military presence in the Philippines, coupled

with the large nunber of Philippine nationals

who have become involved in dirficulties in

the United States and then returned to their

home, has resulted in the continuation o1 a

relatively large work load in this area.

NEW DELHI, INDIA. This is an area in which

have not previously had regular coverage,

and 1t has been necessary on & number of

eccasions to despatch representatives from

Rome or Hong Kong to handle problens arising

there. It is planned that our representative

in New Delhi will cover not only India but also

East and West Pakistan and Nepal. It is possible

that additional territory may be assigned to

this office in the future.

It is noted that

there are nine graduates of the FBI National

Academy located in this area.

RIO DE JANEIRO, BRAZIL, This office, which was

In operation from 1941 to 1957, was consolidated

with our post in Buenos Aires, Argentina, as an

economy measure. During the more than tour years

that it has been closed, it has become increasingly

apparent that the loss in prompt and effective

coverage is greater than the small saving justifies.

A number of individuals of interest to the FBi

have either moved or traveled to Brazil, and 1t

- 3 ..

HH 55035 DocId:32989615 Page 26

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## Page 27

SECKL

-Honorable John N. Irwla II

has become apparent that prompt coverage

can only be secured through direct and

continuing liaison with the investigative

agencies of this huge country.

SANTO DOMINGO, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

This office, originally opened hay 21,

1965, was closed larch 18, 1969, as an

economy measure and coverage has been

maintained by Agents assigned to the

• FBI

office in San Juan, Puerto Rico. It 18

proposed that the Agent assigned to

Santo Domingo will initiate coverage in

Haiti. There is a considerable population

of Dominican exiles residing in the

United States who continue to be involved

with the various poiiiicai factions in the

Dominican Republic, thereby creating

problens of IBI interest in connection with

the Neutrality Act, the Foreign Agents

Registration Act and other matters alfecting

internal security interests.

To a smaller

extent,

this is also true of Haiti.

Although my request for this limited expansion

vas made at the specific instruction of the President, I

know that he would not sanction an operation which was not

economically worthwhile.

You way be assured that, as in

the past, these new posts will be carefully supervised and

prompt action taken should it be determined either that

their continued existence is not warranted or that additional

assistance is necessary.

I hope that it will be possible

for you to secure the requisite clearances in the near future.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

SECRET

HH 55035 DocId:32989615 Page 27

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## Page 28

TO

FROM

• SUBJECT:

OPTIONAL PORM NO, 10.

5010-106

GSA GEN. REG.

03X 096-200. N0. 27

• UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Mr: Rosen.:

DATE: 11/2/71,

: E. S. Millen

EXPANSION OF FOREIGN LIAISO

* ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 1213 00: BY SpaALME

•On 11/2/71 we called Mr. R. Glynn Mays, who is

assigned by the Department of State to the National Security

Council Under Secretaries Committee, and inquired concerning

when we could expect a response to our letters of 9/20/71

and 10/14/71 regarding the opening of six additional foreign

liaison posts.

Mays stated that Bureau letter 9/20/71 had been

referred to the National Security Council Under Secretaries.

Committee as that group is responsible for the establishment

and alteration of overseas personnel ceilings.

Inasmuch as

leach U. S. Ambassador is a

personal representative of the

President and is not subservient to the Department of State,

inquiries were sent to the six affected Ambassadors regarding

their concurrence in our proposal.

Each of the Ambassadors

responded by raising various questions concerning such

matters as what information might be given to the host

government, FBI methods of operation overseas, and reasons

as to why their particular post had been chosen.

These

inquiries resulted in the visit of Ambassador Wymberley Coerr,

Deputy Director of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research;

and Mr. Mays to the Bureau on 10/12/71 as reported in my

memorandum of that date.

As a result of that memorandum,

a detailed letter dated 10/14/71 was forwarded to Under

Secretary of State John N. Irwin II furnishing specifics,

concerning our overseas operations and our reasons for

selection of the posts involvea..

Mays stated that upon receipt of the second letter,

individual responses were prepared and forwarded to each of

the six Ambassadors who had raised questions. Replies are

still pending, and Mays said he knew no way of hurrying the

Ambassadors short of telephoning them. It was pointed out

to him that nearly a month and a half had elapsed since the

original request, which had been made at the instruction of

the President.

He was asked to communicate our concern at

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi-

nation outside your committee.

Its use is limited to official proceedings by

your Committee ind the

content may nut be disclosed to unauthorized person

IH 55035 DocId: 32986Without the, gapress approval of the FBI.

---

## Page 29

7021Hm6

E. S. Miller to Mr. Rosen

Re: EXPANSION OF FOREIGN LIAISON

the delay. to whatever level in the Department of state that

might be necessary in order to produce action.

ACTION:

State, as usual, is dragging its feet, and we are

making no progress at the working level. If approved, the

attached letter will communicate our concern to Secretary

Rogers.

-977

17H 55035 DocId: 32989615 Page 29•

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## Page 30

...

November 3, 1971

BY COURIER SERVICE

trated he

Honorable William P. Rogers

The Secretary of State

Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Reference is made to my letter of September 20,

1971, reguesting clearance for six additional liaison posts

abroad.

As a result of specific inquiries received from

the Ambassadors concerned, further details were furnished

by letter of October 14, 1971, to Under Secretary John N.

Inwin II.

As it has been some time since the President

requested

this increase,

I would appreciate an indication

trom you as to when we can complete the necessary arrangements.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE D/3)OO BYSPALARS

'This document. is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi

nation outside your Committee.

Its use is limited to official proceedings by

your Committee and the content may nut be disclosed to unauthorized person

ha 55035 DocImeztthout therepress approval of the FBI.

---

## Page 31

OPTIONÁL FORM NO. 10

5010-108

AXY 1942 EDITION

GSA GEN. REU. NO. 21

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

CONNBENTIAL

...

•TO

E. s. Miller

ACE DATE: 11/4/70 2901141

FROM

W. R. Wannall

SUBJECT! EXPANSION OF FOREIGN LTAISON

ON 10/13/00

R. Glynn Mays of the Department of State who has

been handling, on a working level, our request to expand our

foreign liaison telephoned 11/4/71. He stated that the

affected Ambassadors had been canvassed again for their

concurrence and each had raised a number of additional questions."

He explained that basically, the Ambassadors were chafing

at a request for expansion

at a time when the Government is

in the throes of additional contraction in its overseas posts,

and he indicated that a number of the Ambassadors had pointed

out that there are existing arrangements under which FBI

leads can be handled in their territory and they do not under

stand, based on the small volume of work they have witnessed

in the past, why FBI wishes to station a man in the territory

full time.

With reference to our request to open in Kuala

Lumpur, Malaysia, he said he would like us to authorize him

to saplori the possibility of opening in Singapore as ar

alternative.

He stated

an overwhelming percentage of the

personnel in the American Embassy at Kuala Lumpur are actually

Central Intelligence

agency representatives,.

and the Ambassador.

relt there should de no Iurther addition oI security repre

sentatives.

Mays said that Ambassador Coerr, who had visited

the Bureau with Mays 10/12/71 to discuss our request, had

• suggested that there be a further discussion at which the

numerous questions raised by the Ambassadors could be dis-

cussed. Mays asked whether Assistant Director Miller and/or

another Bureau representative could come to the Department.

of State on 11/8/71 so that other interested State officials

could participate in the discussion.

Mays was told that the

request we had made was, as he has previously been informed,

a Presidential instruction and that it fad already been a:

Classified b

6283

Exempt fron

CDS, Categpry_

Date of Dedlassification Indefinite

GỚI

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure

Subject to

Criminal Sanctions

#H 55035 DocId: 32989615 Page 31

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## Page 32

CONSENTAL

IRN

Memorandum W. R. Wannall to Mr. E. S. Miller

Re:

EXPANSTON OF FORETEN LYATSOY

4 19 49

month and a half without action.

He was told that we felt

no useful purpose would be served by further discussion of

operational details but that if the Department of State

had questions it desired answered, it should address them

to us in writing

and we would deal with them in an appropriate

manner.

We made

no comment concerning the proposal to

exchange Singapore for Kuala Lumpur (actually, the two points

Jare very close and we see no objection to the change).

Mays said he understood our position and would

relay it promptly to his superiors.

He indicated that the

United Nations Chinese problem and the Congressional action

concerning foreign aid had occupied the full time of the

top personnel at State with the result that they are not

familiar with the latest developments surrounding our

request.

It is quite apparent that unless we call a halt

as we have done in our discussion with Mays today, we could

and discussions endlessly without

achieving our objective. With reference to the implied

co go the

questioning of the volume of FBI work in the new areas,

it

should be noted that our selection of the locations for the

new posts was based not on work load but on potential for

production of high level intelligence of interest to the

White House.

This has not, of course, been included in

either our letters to State or our discussion with its

representatives.

- Miami.

ACTION:

For information. We will promptly analyze and

make recommendations concerning any request received fron

State in writing.

Property handled

HH 55035 Do0Id:32989615 Page 32

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## Page 33

OPTIONAL PORM NO, 10

3079-108

MAY 196Z COITION

OSA GErS,

REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

* TO

Mr. RosEn.

DATE:: 11-22-71/

FROM

E._S. Miller

SUBJECT EXPANSION OF. FOREIGN

LIAISON.

In response to the telephone call to the Director this

morning from Undersecretary of State John N. Irwin II, Irwin was

promptly contacted in order to arrange the meeting he had requested.

As a result of pressing congressional comnitments, Mr. Irwin had

no time available either today or tomorrow but arranged an

¡appointment for 3:30 p.Ml., Wednesday, November 24, 1971.

Mc. Irwin stated that the meeting would be held in the

office of William B. Macomber, Jr., Deputy Undersecretary of

State for Management, but that he,

Irwin, would also be present.

It should be noted that it was Mr. Macomber with whom we dealt

in arranging our 1970 expansion and it is under his direction

that State participates in the National Security Council

Undersecretaries Committee which must pass on all increases in?

U.S.

personnel stationed abroad.

ACTION:

As instructed, I will attend the meeting scheduled

for 3:30 p.m., 11/24/71, and will take with me SA Graham A. Day

of this Division.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 101200 BY SADALMan

This document is prepared in, response to your request and is not for dissemi

nation outside your Committee.

''Its use is limited to official proceedings br

your Committee and the content may nut be disclosed to unauthorized person

wW 55035 DocId: 18685thout thereexpress approval of the FBI .

---

## Page 34

COFY - RETYPED FOR REASON OF LEGIBILITY

10:50 AM

November 22, 1971

MEHORANDUM FOR MP. FOLSON

FELT.

TR.

ROSEN

Mia

NE. BISHOF

Honorable John N. Insin, II,

Under Secretary of State, called.

He said he was calling about the positions abroad (Legal Attaches) that I

talled to the president about and the Prestdent authorized to be done, and

fix. Intiin said they, of course, want to work out how to do this. Mir. Irwin

continued that after getting my letter in October they sent 1t to the embasslee

to get some comments back and they wanted to talk about these and how was

the best way partly because of the situation overseas and a good part because

of the recent Fresidential order in connection vith the ney econonfe policy

of reducing 5% overseas and this ralses, fron an internal point of view,

problems as to how they take this and where and the amount of support

they have to give overseas to the veriety of agencies they support over and

beyond themselves. Mr. Irwin said it would be helpful 1f they could talk about

these with ne of whomever I night designate. ir. Irula continued that he

thought they had talked once and then the FBI officer said he would Ilke to

have 1t In writing rather than further discussion.

Mr. Irvin said he talked to secretary of State t1lllan P, Rogers.

and it, Rogers thought it would be helpful 1f they could, rather than going

back and forth in writing, try and work it out because they know this 1s what

the Fresident requested be done. I commented that the President is anxlous.

fry. Irwin said they do. want to try to fit 1t In With the ulscellaneous pol1t1-

cal and administrative problons that exist rather than to just nove uithout.

the opportunity for further discussion.

was convenient for him, I could check with fr. luller.

Ir. Irin asted if they

should call r. Miller direct,and I told him I would coll fir.. Miler and tell

him that kr. Irin would be in touch with him. Ir. Insin thanied me.

Very: trily yours,

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 10/91L

John Bagar Hoover

Director

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi-

Its use is limited to official proceedings bi

-your. Committee and the content may nut be disclosed to unauthorized person

nel without the express approval: of the FBl. •

H# 55035

DocId: 32989615. Page 34

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## Page 35

25059o,

10:50 AMI

November 32, 1971

1. *

MEMORANDUM FUR MR, TOLON

NA. FELT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

MR, ROSEN

HEREIN IS, UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 10/13, 02 BY 5p2 molj

MR. MILLER

MR. BISHOP

Honorable John 1.

win, II, Under Secretary of State, called.

He said he was calling about the positions abroad (Legal Attaches) that I

talked to the Fresident about and the Freaident authorized to be done, and

Mr. Irwin said they, of course, want to wors out how to do this. fir. Irwin

continued that alter getting my letter in cctober they sent it to the embassies

to get some comments back and they wanted to talk about these and how vas

the best way partly because of the situation overseas and a good part cecause

of the recent residential order in connection with the new economic policy

oi reducing a, overseas and this raises, Ion an iteral pois oi vien,

nontoms as to how chey mus this and where and tha amount oi simon.

they have to give overseas to the variety of arencies they support over and

beyond themselves, ar. Irwin said it would be raipui it ney could tal nious

these mith me or rhomever 1 might cosignate. ar. Irwin continued thet he

thought they had talked once and then the FBi ofticer said be would lise to have

it in writing rather than further discussion.

Me. Irwin said he talked to ¿ecretary of state Villan

rogers

and Mi. Rogers thought it woud be helpful it they could, rather than going

back and forth in writior, try and work it out because they now this is what

the President requested be done. I cornmented that the Fresident le arious.

Mr. Irwin said they do want to try to at it in with the miscellandous political

and administrative problems that exist rather than to just mave without the .

opportunity for further discuszion.

I told iir. IradnI trought tr. Miller, assistant Eirector in chaade

of the domestic Istalligence Division and under thora tue Lorai Ltiaches ogerate,

would be the one to talk to and ti he, tir. Irwin, would tell me what time was

convenient for him, coald check with fir. iller. Mr. Trwin asked it they

should call vir. Miller drect; and 1 told him I mould call tr. liller and tell

him that sir. win pould be in touch with him Mr. Irmin thanked me.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for

vest and is. not for dissemi

nation outside, youn Committee.

•Its use is limited to official proceedings oy

your Committee and the content may nut be disclosed to unauthorized person.

nel without the express approval of the FBI. John Edgar Hoover

• Director

TH 55035 DocId:32989615 Page 35.

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## Page 36

OPTIONAL FORM NO, 10

3010-106

GSA GEN. REG, NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

"TAL

TO

Mr. ROSEn

DATE: 11/26/71

FROM

E. S. Miller

DECLASSIFTED BESRZALMCN

10/13/00

SUBjECT: EXPANSION OF (FOREIGN/LIAISON

..

As instructed, I met on il/24/71 with State Under

Secretary John N. Irwin II; Deputy Under Secretary William

B. Macomber, Jr.; his Executive Assistant, Samuel R. Gammon;

Wymberley Coerr, Deputy Director, Bureau of Intelligence and

Research; and R. Glynn Mays of State's Methods and Systems

Staff.

I was accompanied by SA Graham A. Day of this Division:

Mr. Irwin, who was unable to stay for the entire meeting,

stated he

was most appreciative of the Director's rapid and

cooperative response to his request for further discussion.

He pointed out that he has a tremendous respect for the Director

and for the organization which he has built and has instructed

his personnel at State to do everything in their power to

fulfill the TBl request.

He noted that the request did, however,

represent a substantial

problem for State and that he had

asked for discussion because of the difficulties which State

had encountered.

State is fully aware of President Nixon's instruction

that FBI liaison activities be expanded.

The President has

also, however, instructed that the official profile of the

United States

be lowered abroad and that a five percent

across-the-board reduction in United States overseas personnel

be made.

Coming as it does on the heels of President Johnson's

fifteen percent reduction and President Nixon's earlier ten

percent reduction, this has created serious staffing problems

its

in each U.S. Embassy,

As the Ambassador's concurrence is

necessary before any new personnel can be sent abroad, each

•- of those potentially affected by our expansion was consulted

by State and each one raised serious objections.

some,

as

will be indicated below, questioned the necessity for an Agent

to be stationed in their countries and several, pointing to

the current expansion of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous

Drugs, which is also being strongly resisted, asked why one

Justice representative could not represent both agencies.

As a result, both Mr. Irwin and

Mr. Macomber asked that we

take a hard

1o0k at

our proposals to see if some adjustments

could be made which would result in a smaller overall increase

in our overseas-personnel.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Classifie

628-3

Exempt fr

T.DS, Category 3

Date of Dec

lastication Indefinite

Unauthorized Disclosure

ENiAl Subject to Criminal Sanctions

}

55035 DooId:32989615 Page 36.

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## Page 37

KAML

Memorandum E. S. Miller to Mr. Rosen

Re: EXPANSION OF FOREIGN LIAISON

I pointed out that there would be no possibility

of our "doubling up" with Narcotics investigators, explaining

that our functions and methods of operation are totally

different and would actually be incompatible in some areas.

I noted that our modest request had actually been scaled

down before it was forwarded to State and that we had limited

each office to a single Agent with only one Clerk-Stenographer.

I referred to the detailed explanation for our request which

had been furnished in our letter of 10/14/71 to Mr. Irwin

and

stated that we would not have made the request if we

shad not felt it fully justified and responsive to the

President's instruction. I

said that we would, however,

carefully consider each

part of the request once more to

see if there was any way in which the total number of personnel

involved might be reduced.

It was agreed that following this

review, we would meet again for further discussion during

the week of November 29, 1971. Comments and recommendations

concerning

the specific areas

follow:

Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

The Agency for International Development Mission

here has been withdrawn in the face of local criticism of

U.S. efforts to influence the Brazilian Police. We have

been covering this enormous country from our office in

Argentina on a 2,500 mile round trip basis. No criticism

has been made of our liaison contacts with

the Brazilian

Police or other agencies, and we feel we should insist on

reopening our office here. By reducing our staff in

Buenos Aires by one

Agent and one clerk which we intended

to do anyway), reopening this office will result in no

increase in personnel.

Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

TH 55035

ÜEK Act 6 (1) (B)

and the addition of another investigative

agency is

feared by the Ambassador as objectionable to the Malaysian

Government which is endeavoring to maintain a neutral position.

State asks that we let them explore the possibility of opening

in Singapore

instead of Kuala Lumpur.. Singapore is extremely

close and is actually a better location from

the standpoint

of travelers both east and west as Singapore is a normal

international aviation stop.

We believe Singapore would be

Kuala Lumpur and recommend that

State be asked to make

as good a location he necessary arrangements without

further delay.

DocId: 32989615

Page 37

CONTINIED - OVER

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## Page 38

Memorandum E. S. Miller to Mr. Rosen

Re: EXPANSION OF FOREIGN LIAISON

Manila, Philippines

Although the Ambassador here has voiced objection,

There are a numbero

There area mer of nation me meet me to ta

Academy graduates in the

Philippines, and we have a ready reservoir of good will

which we can tap both in our regular work and in our search

for political intelligence.

Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic

The Ambassador here was most specific in pointing

out that the present coverage from our office in nearby

San Juan seemed to be fully adequate. He added that the

precarious political situation could

be worsened by the

addition of U. S. law enforcement personnel. We believe

we coula.torgo.reopening.ranto..comng.

with no loss "The

Agent in

San Juan now covering

the area (and who was

scheduled to reopen the office) can be fully briefed con=

cerning the collection of political intelligence and, by

stepping up the frequency of his visits, can not only cover

Dominican Republic but also establish liaison in Haiti

and jamaica.

New Delhi, India

It was pointed out that, whereas we had planned

to cover last and West Pakistan from this point, the current

sostilities would make this unfeasible. India itseli, however,

is a huge country with an enormous

population and is of great

potential political significance.

For the present, we could

establish liaison from here with Iran and could await the

• resumption of better relations between India and Pakistan

before visiting the latter.

We feel we should insist upon

opening this office.

..:.

- 3.

CONTINUED - OVER

HN 55035 DocId:32989615 Page 38

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## Page 39

Memorandum E. S. Miller to Mr. Rosen

Re: EXPANSION OF FOREIGN LIAISON

Canberra, Australia

We believe we could forgo

opening an office here

at this time as, of

the various offices

considered, this

wouTa pröbäbly be the least productive of political intelli-

gence since it has a stable government and enjoys friendly

relations with the U.S.

From a cost standpoint, this would

¡probably be the most

expensive post to open merely because

of the great distance and high transportation costs.

ACTION:

It is recommended that we inform State we have

very caretully reconsidered our request and, in an eltort

to be tully cooperative, we have altered our

request with

the result that only six additional positions abroad will be

lyneeded rather than the tveive originally requested. We will

ask to open at Rio de Janeiro, Manila, New Delhi and singapore,

making other arrangements for

the coverage we had requested

from Santo Domingo and Canberra.

We will press for an

early meeting for the consideration of this proposal and

ask that we be permitted to proceed at the earliest possible

moment as there has already been so much delay.

* 3 Agentsa 3clertea

4

WW 55035 Dold: 32989615 Page

39

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## Page 40

OPTIONAL FORM NO, 10

5010-106

MAY 1902 ADITION

GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

-Memorandum

TO

: Mx. Rosen

DATE: 11/29/71

FROM : E. S. Miller

SUBJECT: EXPANSION OF FORÉIGN LIAISON

As approved" by the Director, we have pressed State

for an early meeting at which we can present our altered

proposal for expansion of our foreign liaison. Deputy Under

Secretary of State William B. Macomber, Jr.,

Масов 1,3200

that 3:30 p.m. tuesday-0/11, Is the earliest moment

We will, therefore, meet with State at

that time and will urge that our proposal be approved

promptly.

ACTION:

For information.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED. *-

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

OK.

HH 55035 DocId:329896151

Page

• 40

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## Page 41

OPTIONAL PORM NO. 10

MO 190% EDITION

5010-106

OSS, GEN. REG. NO. 31

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

"TO

Mr: Rösen:

•?ін

•DATE: 12/1/71:4

FROM

E. S. Millex

SUBJECT EXPANSION OF POREIG LIATSON

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 10 13, 00 - 8Y 50444) C

As indicated in memorandum 11/29/7i, we had an

appointment to discuss

our expansion

further with Deputy

Under Secretary of State Macomber at 3:30 p.m., 11/30/71.

At noon on 11/30/71, Mr. Macomber's office advised that he

had been unexpectedly summoned by the Secretary of State

to a meeting which would occupy the balance of the afternoon,

and we were asked to postpone our discussion until 12/2/71.

I stated that I was quite anxious to resolve this matter

without further delay and asked to meet with other State

representatives to discuss our proposal as originally planned.

Accordingly, we met with Ambassador Wymberley Coerr, Deputy

Director. of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research;

Samuel R. Gammon, Executive Assistant to Mr. Macomber; and

R. Glynn Mays of State's Methods and Systems Staff. I was

accompanied

by SA Graham Day of this Division.

• I stated that the staffing problems encountered

by State had been explained to the Director and that, in

an effort to cooperate, he had authorized us to materially

reduce our initial request. I said that we would agree to

Singapore in place of Kuala Lumpur as suggested by State,

and we would cancel our request to open offices in Canberra

and Santo Domingo. I pointed out that we would staff our

office in Rio de Janeiro by reducing our present staff in

Buenos Aires and that we were therefore requesting, in effect,

only six additional positions abroad(3 Agents, 3 clerks) in

ox Kuala Lumpur.

Ambassador Coer, said that he greatly appreciates

the Director's cooperation and asked that his thanks be (.

conveyed to the Director for this. He instructed Mr.. Mays

to immediately wire the Ambassador in Singapore to explore

the possibility of our opening there in place of Kuala Lumpur.

He then stated that our choice of Manila was especially

troublesome because, at Presidential direction, a special

reduction in U. S. personnel had been made there over and

"This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi

nation outside your Committee.

Its use is limited to official proceedings by

your Committee and the content may nut be disclosed to unauthorized person

nel without the express approval of the FBI.

WH 55035

DooId: 32989615. Page 41.

---

## Page 42

lemorandum E. s.. Miller to Mr. rosen • :

Re:"

EXPANSION OF FOREIGN LIAISON.

above all of the over-all percentage decreases made in other

posts.

He said that the situation in Manila was so critical

that he would ask that we discuss it further with the Director

In addition, Mr. Mays said that the Ambassador in New Delhi.

had. expressed .doubt.whether-there.was.sufficient FBI. work.in.

India to justify stationing a man there. Mays asked for

figures which State could use to support our request.

I stated that we were faced with a situation in

which the President had, on September 20, 1971, asked the

• Director to expand his liaison operations abroad and that

here we were more than two months later without having

taken

a single action in direct response to the President's instruction.

I pointed out that it seemed to me that the President's instruction

should take precedence over any Ambassadorial question and

that I saw no point in becoming involved in quibbling with

individual Ambassadors in efforts to justify doing what the

President had asked. Ambassador Coerr said that he understood

our position perfectly and State would proceed to correspond

with the Ambassadors further.

He did ask that we present

the special problem of Manila for determination by the Director.

With respect to Manila, we have a fair volume of

work there now which we do not have in Australia. Further,

we do not feel it would be feasible to cover Manila from

Australia because of the distance involved, and we want to

leave our office in Hong Kong tree to concentrate on the

greatly enlarged Chinese problem. We feel, therefore, that

despite the Ambassador's objection, we should insist upon

reopening our office in Manila.

ACTION: If approved, we will inform Ambassador Coerr that

his proposal that Canberra be substituted for Manila has been

reviewed by the Director and that he feels, as he did when-

he approved the reduced proposal, that it is essential for

•us to reopen our office in Manila. We will also tell

Ambassador Coerr again that too much time has already elapsed

and that this matter should be resolved promptly.

.:.

HH 55035 DocId:32989615 Page 42

-2 -

ACTION-CONTINUED OVER

---

## Page 43

Memorandum E: S. Miller to Mr. Rosen

"Re:: EXPANSION OF FOREIGN LIAISON. 2440/066695124

(2) We have considered a status letter to

:Dr. Kissinger concerning:this.but believe. that this would

be premature inasmuch as State Under Secretary Irwin has

indicated his desire to cooperate and it

state is about to authorize part, if not appears

appe route

Our

once, .?

amended request.

We will watch

this situation very closely,

however, and will submit a proposed letter to Dr. Kissinger

1f it appears that State is continuing to drag its feet.

NW 55035

DocId:32989615

Page

43

---

## Page 44

ям NO. 10

5010-106

MION

ine, NO. 27

UN.

ED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO

Mr. Rosent' C4/

DATE:

12/3;

FROM

: E. S. Miller

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

BY PAMMY

StBJEcT: EXPANSION

GREIGN LIAISON

As approved by the Diréctor, Ambassador Wymberley

Coerr, Deputy Director of State's Bureau of Intelligence and

Research, was advised 12/3/71 that we could not accept Canberra,

Australia, as a substitute for Manila, Philippines, and that

we felt that we had already done everything in our power to

cooperate by reducing our request for additional positions

overseas from 12 to 6 (3 Agents, 3 clerks).

We pointed out

that we made our original request on September 20, 1971, and

that two and one half months have elapsed without

action.

Ambassador Coerr said he understood our position perfectly

and that he expected to have some definite word for us in

the very near future.

....

Within five minutes, Ambassador Coerr

telephoned

and said that he had been able to secure approval for us

go ahead with the four offices which

office 12-1-71.

as Los dof got had we had discussed in his

final respouse from

the Ämbassador in Singapore, however, so he could not state

whether our new post will be in Kuala

• Lumpur or Singapore,

We have approval, however, to open new legal Attache offices,

Rio de Janeiro,, and in either

or Kuala Lumpis:

imbassador Coer said he expected to taore

able to advise us which of the latter twolwould be approved

Within a very short time..

ACTION: (1) The Administrative Division' should notify the

Agent and clerical personnel selected for Rio de Janeiro,, Manila

and New Delhi that State Department clearance has been granted

"and they should proceed to apply for their passports and/or

visas at once. The Administrative Division will be notified

immediately as soon as we receive the final clearance for

Singapore or Kuala Lumpur. Previously approved transfers of personnel

to Santo Domingo and Canberra, Australia, are being cancelled.

HH 55035

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi-

nation outside your Committee.

Its use as limited to official proceedings by

your Committee and the content. may nut be disclosed to unauthorized person

nel without the express approval of the FBI.

DocId:32989615 Page

44.

---

## Page 45

Memorandum Miller to Rosen

Re:

EXPANSION OF FOREIGN LIAISON

•*. 76 205.61

(2)

The Files and Communications, Laboratory and

Administrative Divisions should be prepared

to furnish the

necessary communications equipment and supplies.

(3) A letter of confirmation addressed to Secretary

Rogers is being prepared and will be submitted separately.

(4) Letters informing the Attorney General and

Dr. Kissinger will be promptly prepared

as soon as we hear

from State regarding whether our office will be in Singapore

or. Kuala Lumpur.

marry:

et,.

AH 55035 DocId: 32989615

Page

45.

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## Page 46

D3C6DbQr 6, 1971

SY COURIER SERVICE

ana taim=1

Honorabia Wililan D. Rogers

The socrotary da suare

Nashingion, D. C.

Deas Ah. Secretary:

Fellowing my Letter of Novonbor 1, 1071, Wich

Inquired concerning que toqudst for & additoual dIAbO

posts abroad, my ropresentatives set on tro occastona

with offiolals of your Departsede.

IB Order tO COOperatE

our sequest mas rocuced so thet instoad ot ia Ecaitiou

pREdonaol, only o vould ba seguirco.

on Peconbor &, 10dl, Ambasaador Wynbezxey Coera

Deputs Dirsotor of the Burcas De Intellitence and Rescarch,

adrisod that cloaranco vas boing eranted for our reduced

request.

This will noaD thar osa liaison posta vila be

established st How Dolbs, Indla; Manila, Phallppinca;

Ro do Janoiro, Brachl; and 2n elther Singapore, Rapubile

os singapore, or Budia Luspur, Kalayela.

Tour cooparation and

assistance, which have enabled

us te respond to the

Prosident's request, are indeed appreciatod.

Sinceroly jouass

J. Edgar Hoover

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED .

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 1013100 BYSpALMel

HH

55035

'his document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi

nation outside your committee.

Its use is limited to official proceedings o?

your Committee and the content. may nut be disclosed to unauthorized person-

nel without the express approval. of the FBI .

DooId:32989615 Page 46

• {e

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## Page 47

FROM

• SUBJECT.

2.1-

OPTIONAL FORM NO, 10

5010-108

MAY

1902 EDITION

GSA GEN. REG.,NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

CORDEN MA!

Mr:

E.

s. Millet

DATE: 12/9/71:

W. R. Wannall.

ON 10 1160

EXPANSION OF FOREIGN ITAISON

We are recommending that opening of our mew office

at New Delhi, India, be temporarily postponed in view of the

present situation.

War was declared on India by Pakistan the same dày.".

that clearance was received from state for our office there.

'We have been watching the situation closely and it has

deteriorated to the point where we believe it would be futile

for us to station a

man there right now. All commercial

airplane flights to New Delhi have been cancelled by the

Indian Government and State has advised us that they are

considering the possibility of evacuation of American

Inationals as is currently being done in Pakistan.

Our

Legats are dependent upon developing friendly relations with

the investigative agencies of the host country. Recent

statements by Prosident Nixon, Secretary Pogers and

Ambassador Bush have tended to

blame India for escalation

• ''

of the situation with

the result that considerable hostility

has been developed in India against the United States.

A

very recent demonstration around the United States Embassy

This is just not the

time for a new Legat to introduce himself as a United States

representative to Indian agencies.

We checked with State on this and Glynn Mays, with

whom we have dealt in connection with the expansion, said

the situation is such that the Indian Government might even

"decline to issue a visa to our representative although he

cannot say for sure. As our purpose in sending@ manlEol 971

India is to have him secure political intelligence items

from his contacts, it would seem that he would be unable to

do this until the

situation eases and a less hostile attitude

prevails.

ACTION:

It is recommended that we hold up on sending our

personnel to New Delhi for a period of 30 days, on the

expiration of which the situation will be reassessed and a

further recommendation made for

•the Director's consideration.

Classified ey

6283°

NATIONÄE SECURITY INFORMATION

Exempt front GDS; Category, 3

SENDINL

Unauthorized Disclosure

Subject tol Criminal Sanctions

---

## Page 48

• Dien

kir. =.

3. Hiller

12/87/1:

F. 1. Wannall

EXPANSION OR FOREIGN WALSON

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEROIN IS SACLASSIFIEL

DATE 10/L2)00

We have bean pushias Glyny laya, who is handling

our exuaacion on the vorting levol s utate for & finui

destsion on vother na can open an oilies la Singagore o

Burle Lunpui

on 12/27/71 he advised that soarly ail the

arrangesouis have been conpleted wilch rall enable us to

Snapore Governone hus not SOS Loen socoLed.

die statod

that ho is saliag every eifort, taroups the U.S. Anbassador

Einpapore, to exporite chla

matter and that he will infor

un at once whos the

word is received.

With respect to our bor oifico at Rio de Janeiro.

Banzads days noted that the t.s. Bahassy had boch formally

moved dron alo to Brasilia about one month ago.

This 15

i move which has been under zay during the pass four yodas

and ine anticipated ly our Legal attuche in buenos Aires

who advised that our

say ortize should to opened in

Rio de Japelzo nevertheless as the bull of our bork is i3

no and adjacent SA5

Paulo.

The D. S. diplomatic establlahuens

13 RIO WilL honceirTh ba known as the Consulate General,

and Maya indicated that, as in the case of the Consulate

GORGiAl at Hong Kong, ous reprosentatire would be known &s the

LOgAL LALEOn CLIiCeE, because ao attache Litle is uDed 13

* COnsulate feberal.

le anticipate no drificulty with this as ro have

had none la Mong Koag..

Que roprasentative vill continue

to ho linore paibia tha Bureau

and the

title

H00H

Legal

Isaison osficer will la used only by our lati

in addressior pouches io bie.

Wund use tiss

•?..

attached for cuproval is a cable raniading

tho

Aires, of

the charre in status of slie u. S.

in to do Jassiro and that

ELide Legal Liaison Officer there.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi

nation outside your Committee.

Its use is limited. to official proceedings by

your Committee and the content may nut be disclosed to unauthorized person

net without the press upproval of the B

HH 55035 DocId: 32989615 Page 48

---

## Page 49

CONFIDENTIAL

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

NSC UNDER SECRETARIES •COMMITTEE

wicsn'"

??owd:

December 20,

1971

Dear Mr. Hoover:

On behalf of Secretary Rogers, I wish to thank

-you for your letter of. December.6. .I share your

satisfaction that, since our conversation of a few

weeks ago, our staffs have reached agreement on

increasing the FBI's liaison activities in certain

loverseas areas. I am particularly gratified that

this has been accomplished so as to meet the

President's general instruction to you and his earli-

er directives to the Under Secretaries Committee to

keep a tight control on all overseas personnel, and

to our ambassadors overseas to monitor and direct the

operations Of alt elements assigned to theit missions.

We have recently instructed our Ambassadors in

Brasilia, Manila, and Singapore to consult with their :

respective host governments on this subject, and we

expect to hear from them shortly. Once we receive

formal clearance from those host governments and have

resolved the remaining technical and administrative

questions; your agents will be able to assume their

Inew responsibilities in those areas.

wg@rpistargiaabir.jiigdi@iguegjedfetaomgccreidi.cegeGeed@ndsxsehyd42gwtesd2sgr.crgci

Because of the current situation in South Asia,

however, this is not the propitious moment to establish

an office in New Delhi.

We will keep in touch both

with our Embassy and with your staff to defermine when

best to proceed.

-'!s,

20.47

n:c'gäii-

Mduádani

"=?.'7

The Honorable

ALL: TST INEORMATION CONTAINID

HAREIN 13 UINCLAESITTRE :

DATEdE paSpALnel

J. Edgar Hoover,

Director,

'lera i !'a".

lero Godd Glodtgcäde

Federal Bureau of Investigation.

':.

liigegtrois,

CONFIDENTIAL 10100

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure

iiigni:

Subject to Criminäl Sanctions

HH 55035 DocId:32989615 Page 19

---

## Page 50

CONF IDENTIAL

-2-

I particularly appreciate your strong personal

interest and assistance in helping our two depart-

ments respond to Presidential guidance and direction.

I am confident that through continued close effort,

four respective staffs will shortly resolve the

remaining questions at hand.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

ni I

Chairman

wi. lci?ww@rliensaisctsg@osco@c@o@oiwa.doelleer.ceigkphidicosisd@eldwnsonncises5.l00t2dssssadtlylci-gasisunas.0965r0900002x5584052949t.distouc3saiee

•on?" 1 5

solgo ldonpo oi dogdie oe ie .

.tdmo Foo'c

wcce.lldd d Gaciode Gl Cie ddee dne 10

CONFIDENTIAL

-cctcnetdadd6d9! ded e deddld.ddd dll d.

a? meotld dgedldo"0 00°

HH 55035 DocId:32989615 Page 50

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## Page 51

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

BEFORE COMPLETING.

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

FROM:

TO:

Intelligence Community Staff

ATTN: Central Index

FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

If a document was made available

for review

* DOCUMENT

note.)

BRIEFING

INTERVIEW

TESTIMONY

OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

6/23/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check

appropriate

term; add specific names if appropriate)

SSC

HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents;

give name or identification number of briefer,

interviewee, testifier and subject)

Memorandum and enclosure

3 Wise sponse ep alise date and james, mitiative, esposa, formal request, other.

ise state verbal

SSC letter 5/14/75, Appendix B, Items 13 and 14

6. CLASSIFICATION OF

INFORMATION (enter

TS or

*

7. KEy "unde font for emppropriate key words from

the list provided separately; if key words not listed are

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

Liaison, foreign

HERENISUNCLASSIPIEO

DATE 12113,00 BYSPAMAS

8. SUMMARY (see reverse side before completiné this

item)

Memoranda, and other materials reflecting meetings and

contacts during 1971 between the President and the Director of FBI

and between officials of the FBI and officials of the

Department of State on the subject of "legal atcaches".

62-116395

FMK; fmk

(4)

TREAT AS YELLOW

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX

IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.

379 | (6-75)

H# 55035

DocId:32989615 Page 5h

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

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## Page 52

INSTRUCTIONS

• Type or print clearly in ink.

• Indicate classification of the

abstract top and bottom.

.

"FROM"' entry should clearly identify the organization providing the

information.

• If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to

HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a

copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing

substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community

matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests

should be noted.

Commitments made to supply additional information should be

noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here,

e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether

interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actùal document or transcript

is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is, required. Additional

pages may be attached if necessary.

WW 55035 DocId: 32989615

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TO

SUBJECT:

OPTIONAL FORA NO, 100

MAY 1952 SITION

GSA FFAIR (41 CFR 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.

Dep. AD Admi

Dep Apay

Assi. Di

Admin

Mr. J. B. Adams

Legal Counsel Give

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HERE NOT LIC

¡CLASSIFIE

AN iMPATE:

Comp. ISyst. -

Ext. Affairs

7/3/75

Filos & Com. _

Gon. Inv.

Ident.

inspectign

thral.

I - Mr. Wannall

1 - Mr. Mintz

Laboratory

Legal Coun.

Plan. & Eval. -

COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES

Spec.Inv.-

Training -

WITHIN THE UNITED STATES

Scrated,

Talephone Rm. -

- 75

Diroctor Sac'y.

On July 1, 1975, Doug-Marvin, - Special Assistant to the

Attorney General, telephonically advised me that the Attorney General

desired the Bureau's views on a letter to be addressed to the President

by the Attorney General commenting on the recommendations of the

captioned Commission in its final report.

At 3:21 p.m. on July 1, 1975, he furnished me a copy of the

proposed letter to the President and a copy of its enclosure, "Comments

on Recommendations of the Commission on CIA Activities Within the

United States. " I took the material immediately to Mr. Wannall and

following our review, we discussed our suggestions with Mr. Callahan

and Mr. Jenkins and

then telephonically advised Mr. Marvin of the

proposed changes. Mr. Marvin adopted all of the proposed changes

except our suggestion that the paragraph regarding Recommendation 30

should include a comment that any agreement between the CIA and the FBI

should not be undertaken until we have more information concerning possible

/ legislation which may be enacted following the conclusion of the inquiries

being made by the Senate Select Committee.

On July 2, 1975, I received from Mr. Marvin a copy of the final

draft which was transmitted to the White House and discussed with him the

absence of any change in the paragraph regarding Recommendation 30.

Mr. Marvin explained that while they concurred in our reservations about

attempting to draft an agreement without considering the possibility of new

legislation, they felt that the cover letter to the President indicated

sufficiently that the comments were preliminary observations and that

considerable additional work would be necessary.

Attached is a

copy of the

final letter to the President dated-7/1/75 and its

enelosure.

95.

RECOMMENDATION

62-116395

NOT RECORDED

46 jUL21 1975-00

30115X

EncLosuitor information.

Inuosure

JAM:mfd

Put SUL 1519%

#o: 1947204016 yease

8

55055

5010-105

- DocId: 32989644 WaySayings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

---

## Page 54

Office uf the Attarey Genreal

Washington, A. 0. 20530

7-1-75

The President

The White House

ALL FBI INTORMATION CONTAININ

BIMRITT IS UNCLAPSWED

Dear Mr. President:

In your memorandum of June Ilth you requested our

comments on the recommendations of the Commission on

CIA activities within the United States (The Ro kefeller

Commission).

Many of the recommendations bear directly

on the operations of this Department, since a change in

the charter of the Central Intelligence Agency will often

carry

with it implications with respect to the responsi-

bilities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

I am enclosing a memorandum which consists of

preliminary observations on the recommendations. The

•basic purpose of the memorandum is to point out those

recommendations which may require some modification

before they are implemented.

The observations are preliminary in nature because

the development of guidelines in this

area requires a

• considerable amount of work and a great deal of consulta-

tion with other agencies of the goternment as well as

with the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

We have already

begun this process and are moving as quickly as possible.

I will, of course, keep you informed on the progress

of the Department in developing guidelines with respect

to the relationship of the Department, including the FBI"

the CIA.

Sincerely,

BrancH. Fire

Edward H. Levi

Attorney General

Enclosure

sent di

wade.cocte

HH 55035 DocId:32989615 Page 54

ENGLUSURA

KENE SURE

1163.951

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## Page 55

MEMORANDUM

COMMENTS ON RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMISSION ON CIA

ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES

The comments of the Department of Justice on

the recommendations of the Commission are as follows:

Recommendation 2, suggests an Executive Order

spelling out the CIA's jurisdiction for collecting in-

formation about the domestic activities of U.S.

citizens. The functions of the FBI in domestic intelli-

gence investigations and counterintelligence investiga-

tions within the United States ought to be kept quite

separate from the functions of the CIA. The problem is

more than "proper coordination with the FBI"

as the

recommendation seems to suggest.

Domestic counterin-

telligence is within the responsibility of the FBI.

AS

to that part of the recommendation urging the destruction

of information, it should be noted that some of this in-

formation may have found its

way into FBI files where it

may or may not be legitimately retained. Further, the

recommendation suggests that information inconsistent

with the Executive Order be destroyed at the conclusion

of pending congressional investigations or as soon there-

after as permitted by law.

made clear that no files should be destroyed before the

Department of Justice closes its case as to possible

criminal violations by CIA officials or employees.

Recommendation 3, that. Congress establish a

Joint Committee on Intelligence, raise's the question whether

this committee would be yet another oversight committee

for the FBI as well. As the report recognizes, when there

are too many committees assuming an oversight function

conflicts and confusion inevitably arise.

Recommendation 6 concerns the establishment of

guidelanes governing CIA's relationship with the Department

of Justice with respect to allegations of criminal conduct

by CIA or its employees.. It is no longer Department policy,

if it ever was, to defer prosecutorial decisions to CIA,

This Commission recom-

mendation is a gond one, and the guidelines must make clear

that the Department will prosecute. criminal conduct by CIA

or its employees wich the same vigor it would prosecute

any other criminal cordurt.

ALL FBI INTORMATION CONTAINED

LA to spare eng

HARMIT IS UNCLALST

55035 DooId: 32989615 Page 55

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- 2 .

Recimmendation 9(g) suggests that the CIA's

Inspector General Reports - some of which may involve

allegations of criminal activity - should be provided to

the National Security Council and the Executive Oversight

body. for the CIA whose establishment is recommended else-

where in the report.

Such a reporting requirement is un-

objectionable; but it should not be read as putting the

decision whether to bring allegations of criminal conduct

to the attention of the Department of Justice in the

violations by CIA or its employees should be reported

directly and immediately to the Department of Justice by

the CIA Inspector General:

Recommendation 12 calls for guidelines on CIA

employees

conduct.

These guidelines are important and

will not, we suspect, be easy to draft.

The recommendation

also suggest's that the Director of Central Intelligence

should approve all actions raising questions of CIA author-

ity.

If any proposed activity raises the possibility of

criminal violation, the Attorney General should also be

consulted.

Recommendation 13 suggests that the CIA should

be prohibited from engaging in domestic mail openings,

but it leaves open the question, whether the CIA ought to

participate in the opening of theimail of U.S. citizens

abroad. Further, part (b) of the recommendation implies

that the CIA may conduct mail cover examinations in the

United States.

This raises the question whether the CIA

rather than the FBI should be conducting any domestic

activities of this sort.

Recommendation 14 raises serious problems. For

one thing, it suggests the jevelopment of an evaluation

unit within the Department of Justice or the FBI to coordin-

ate intelligence and counterintelligence information. This

could be viewed as an invitation to create a new internal

security organization for the purpose of keeping track of

dissident domestic political groups.

On the other hand,

failure to create such an organization could be seen as

perpetuating some of the difficulties suggested in the

report. The Department

of Justice is studying this recom-

HH 55035 DooId:32989615 Page 56

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## Page 57

- 3 -

mendation to determine the proper solution to this problem.

Recommendation 15 suggests that the President refrain

from directing the CIA to perform what are essentially

internal security tasks. Because of the need for a rather

strict separation of the functions of the CIA and the FBI,

the difficult question of defining an internal security

matter probably ought to be undertaken.

also calls for destruction of certain files of the CHAOS

project. No Illes oI the CHAos project shoura be destroyed

DeLore the department of Justice closes its case as to possible

criminal violations by CIA officials or employees in connection

with the CHAOS files:

Recommendation 16 calls for a written determination

by the Director of Central Intelligence that CIA infiltration

of domestic groups is necessary "to meet a clear danger to

agency facilities, operations, or personnel, and that ade-

quate coverage by

law enforcement agencies

is unavailable."

On the basis of the Commission report, it is not clear under

what circumstances it would ever be necessary and proper

for the CIA to infiltrate domestic groups.

Perhaps a briefing

of officials in the Department would lead to a better under-

standing of the implications of

this policy. In any case,

there should be explicit guidelines defining the Director's

authority to order such infiltration.

Recommendation 17 calls for the destruction of some

CIA files, upon the conclusion of the current congressional

investigations or as soon thereafter as possible.

As indi-

cated earlier, no files should be destroyed until the Justice

Department's investigation is completed.

Recommendation 18 states that the CIA may investigate

individuals affiliated

with it, but that such investigations

"must be coordinated with the FBI" when there is evidence

of espionage or violation of law involved.

If the CIA is to

avoid getting into law enforcement investigations, perhaps it

should simply turn all criminal investigations over to the

Bureau rather than "coordinate" with the FBI or any other

enforcement agency. This problem of separating law enforcement

from foreign intelligence is a mifficult problem. The De-

partment of Justice has the problem under study and will try

to make a more definite statement about it later.

Recommendation 19 would compel the FBI to accept

cases involving allegations of security violations "without

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## Page 58

- 4 -

regard to whether a favorable prosecutive opinion is issued

by the Justice Department." • This could raise serious

-difficulties.

For example, it would have the effect of

putting the FBI in the uncomfortable position of investigating

a matter without reasonable expectation of prosecution.

Recommendation 19(a) could be read

as requiring the Director

of Central Intelligence to refer all serious or continuing

security violations to the Security Committee of USIB for

its determination whether the case should be referred to the

-Department.

The Director should be able to refer these cases

directly without resort to an intermediary.

Recommendation 21 supports legislation making it a /

criminal offense for CIA employees to leak classified infor-

mation.

In general, the recommendation raises controversial

similar to those raised in connection with some of

*the provisions in S.1:

The Department,..of.course; will. work

• with the Central Intelligence Agency in drafting any necessary

-legislation.

-..::

Recommendation 22 suggests that the Director of Central

•Intelligence should approve in writing certain physical sur-

i veillance operations, but again it does not provide the

Director with any clear guidelines as to when and under what

circumstances approval should be given. It is not clear to

what extent, if at all, the CIA should undertake physical sur-

veillance operations within the United States. Moreover, there

Cis the issue of the role of the FBIDin matters such as these.

The issue is under study by the Department.

Recommendation 23 is ambiguous in that it could be read

as meaning that all interceptions of wire or oral communica-

• tions within the United States would require a warrant.

Read

another way, the recommendation could be understood to mean

that the CIA could' conduct warrantless activities in foreign

intelligence matters either within the U.S. or abroad. It has

been the Administration's position that certain national security

surveillances do not require a warrant. Also, the recommenda-.

tion fails to discuss procedures already agreed to by the Direc-

tor of the Central Intelligence Agency regarding the interception

by the CIA of wire or oral communications of American citizens

abroad.

Recommendation 28 suggests that equipment for monitor-

ing conversations should not be tested on unsuspecting persons

HH. 55035 DocId: 32989615 Page 58

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## Page 59

-5 -

living within the United States. Perhaps this recommendation

should also apply to unsuspecting American citizens living abroad

as well.

Recommendation 30 suggests that the Director of Central

Intelligence and the Director of the FBI should draft a de-

tailed agreement setting forth each agency's jurisdiction and

devising procedures for effective liaison between them.

While

it is important that there be cooperation between the CIA and

the FBI, this issue ought not be left solely to an agreement

the two agencies. At the least, if there is to be an

ügreement, representatives of the Attorney General or his De-

partmental designee ought to be involved in its negotiation

and preparation.

HW 55035 DocId:32989615 Page 59

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## Page 60

2

J. A. Mintz

(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)

1 - MT.

w. R. Wannall

1 - Mr. W. 0. Cregar

1

. - Mr.

V. V. Kolombatovic

1 - Mr. T. E. Burns

June 20, 1975

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

HEREIN IS UNGLASSIFIED

DATE 101360 BYSPZALMOLN

By letter dated lay 14, 1975, with attached appendices,

the SSC requested certain information and documents from the rBI.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the

Committee is the original of a memorandum with enclosure which

is in response to one of the Committee's requests.

We have

enclosed a copy of your letter to Mr. Lloyã N. Cutler, May 2,

1975, described within,

since it has a direct bearing on our

response to the Cormittee's request and describes the procedure

necessary to gain access to the sealed portion of the Joseph

Kraft file.

-

A copy of this memorandum with enclosure is being

furnished for your records.

Enclosures

• (4)

7

11-11-

10

62-116395

I - The Deputy Attorney General

Attention: K. William O'ConnoRECl

Special Counsel for

4÷41599

Intelligence Coordination

384

2

TEB: jmn

(10)

3 JUL 21 1975

Assoc. Dir.

Dep. AD Adr

Dep. AD Inv.

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

Comp. Syst.

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com. _

Gen. Inv._

Ident.

Inspection

Intell.

Laboratory

Plan. & Eval

Spec. Inv.

Training

Legal Coun.

Telephone Rm.

SECREF AND FOP SECRET MATERIAL ENCLOSED

WU!"

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

ATE ROOM LA

Y32989615

TELETYPE UNIT

Page

60

GPO: 1975 0 - 569-920

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## Page 61

• .

y..

62-126395

2 - MK.

J. A. Mintz

(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. V. V. Kolombatovic

1. - Mr. T. E. Burns

Junc 20, 1975

UNITED GENIES SENATE SELECI COMITTEE

TO STUDE COVERNLENEAE OPERATIONS

TITH RESPECE TO INTELLIGENCE ACIIVIFIES (SSC)

RE: REQUESI PERTAINING TO FLECIRONIC

SURVEILIRACE

Roference is made to SSC lettor to the Attorney

General dated May 14, 1975, with attachod appendices requesting

certain documents and

other infornation fron the FBI.

HH

Iton number 17 in Appendix D requestod all monoranda

and other materials reflecting urition or oral authorization

and re-authorization by the Attorney General and/or the

Director of the FBI for alectronic surveillance of Josoph Icalt.

A rovier of rEI files, including the unscalod portions

of the BI file containing assorted monorando ecgarding an

cloctronic surveillance on Josoph Kraft has failed to locate

any uritten or oral authorization for such aleccronic surveil

lance as requented in the refarencod cormunication.

We have, however, located in the unsealed portion

of the above file certain memoranda which reveal that a Bureau

official, apparently at the direction of the late Director

of tho FDI, I. Edgar Hoover, traveled to a foreign country

where at the urging of such bureau official the security service

of that nation placed an electronic surveillance on Josoph kraft's

hotol roon for a period os approxinatoly one weck in 1969.

For the Committec's further infomation, it is noted

Assoe. Dir. _

that the Attomey General, Idward I. Levi, by letter dated

Dep. AD Adm. -

Hay

2, 1975, to Lloyd I. Cutler, Isquire, 1666 K Street

Dep. AD Iv. - Horthwest, lashington, D. C.

Asst. Dir.:

a Cutle 20006

20006, as attorney for Joseph

Admin. —

Kraft, set forth the tems of an arrangemont botween it. Cutler

Comp. syst. _ on behalf of his client and the Attorney General concorning

Ext. Affoirs — the disposition of cortain records relating to surveillanco

Filacm-activities directed against Iir, Kraft this agrement precludes

Ident. -

Inspection _ TEB: jmn

111100

Intell..

(9)

ORIGINAL AND ONE TO AGIN

SEE TOTE PAGE 2

Laboratory

TOP SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

wass

Plon. & Eval. -

Spec. Inv. -

Training -

Legal Coun..

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Telephone Rm. -

Director See'y -

MAIL

document

outsider are response to you request and is not for dissemi-

GPO • 1975 0 - 569-920

Its use is limited to official proceedings by

55035 DocId: 3298

Dammitea card the content may not be disclosed to unauthorised person.

---

## Page 62

Request Pertaining to Ilectronic Surveillance

examination of the sealed portion of Mir. Kraft's file except

upon personal approval of the Attorney General subsequent to

his notificiation of Mx. Rraft or his counsel in writing, at

least ten days prior thereto and providing him or them with

an opportunity to discuss the matter porsonally with the

Attorney Ceneral before the granc is made.

The SSC may of course wish to undertake appropriate

steps to secure the Attorney General's approval in accordance

with the arrangement in order to permit access to the sealed.

portions of the file to determine whether any information rela-

tive to your request is located therein.

Enclosed with this memorandum for your information

is a copy of the arrangcment described above.

Inclosure

1 - The Attorney General

NOTE:

RET

See T. J. Smith memorandum to E. S. Miller 6/8/73,

captioned "SPECOV."

The particulars revealed above regarding coverage of

Kraft while in France during 1969 have been the subject'of

detailed testimony by Mr. Kraft 5/10/74 before the United States

Senate Subcommittee on Adminstrative Practices and Procedures,

the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Committee on

the

Judiciary, and the Subcommittee on Surveillance of the Committee

on Foreign Relations.

His testimony appears in the printed records

of the above Committees' proceedings and an earlier public dis-

closure of the surveillance concerning Joseph Kraft appeared in the

9/20/73 issue of the New York Times.

Mr. Kraft had apparently

learned the particulars of the surveillance through adminstration

leaks. We have deleted the identity of the country involved in

the elsur in an attempt to fulfill

the confidential nature of our

relationship with the French security service, the DST, and to

avoid

further embarrassment to them

The French actually conducted

the microphone surveillance in question and have previously formally

protested to us concerning media reports and other public dis-

closure which revealed their involvement in the surveillance.

SEC

REI

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 3

- 2 -

55035 DocId:32989615 Page 62

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## Page 63

Request Pertaining to Electronic Surveillance

NOTE CONTINUED:

We have alluded in the memorandum to the SSC to certain memor-

anda found in the Kraft file in an effort to be completely

candid with the Committee since they are obviously aware of

many details of the electronic survêillance. Our flat denial

of any memoranda regarding authorization or re-authorization with-

out reference to the Sullivan memoranda would raise more questions

than it answers and flies in the face of the Committee's knowledge

of the existence of our elsur file on Kraft. For additional insight

into this matter attached to this note are two memoranda from W. C.

Sullivan to Mr. Hoover which are of the type referred to by us

in the memorandum to the Committee. As a fallback position,

should the Committee rephrase its request and seek to obtain the

assorted memoranda from W. C. Sullivan to Mr. Hoover referred to

above, it is felt we could comply with such request after appro-

priate sanitization of the exchange of correspondence between

W. C. Sullivan and Mr. Hoover.

The sanitization would be under-

taken in order to preserve our interests, particularly protection

of the French DST, and to protect the privacy of the only three

individuals who reportedly had knowledge of the electronic sur-

veillance within the Bureau, #. C. Sullivan, former Paris Legat,

Norman Philcox, and the late J. Edgar Hoover.

This note has been

classified

"Secret" in order to protect the confidentiality of our

relationship with the French security service the disclosure of

which could reasonably be expected to result in serious damage to

national security. Classified by 6283, XGDS 1, Indefinite.

- 3-

HH 55035

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-

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee:

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

ULTR

CX. LHM

• Memo

• Report dated

6/20/75

Senate Select Committee.

KE: Request Pertain-

Caption of Document: ing to Electronic Surveillance. •

Re SSC let to AG 5/14/75 w/attached appendices

requesting certain documnts & other info of FBI.

Originating Office:

FBI

345

I raptor, Date: 7/1/15

Received by:

Hue иник

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

DATE DIE oN Sparel

55035

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## Page 65

Offire of thy Atturmy Genral

Washington, A. C. 20531

May 2, 1975

Lloya N. Cutler, Esquire

Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering

ALL FBI INFO OLATION CONTAINED

1666 K Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C.

20006

Dear Mr. Cutler:

Pursuant to our discussions concerning the disposition of

certain records relating to the surveillance activities

directed at your client, Mr. Joseph Kraft, the Department

is making the following

• temporary arrangements:

I. Pending further Departmental action relating

to the policies which will govern records of the

Lype invulved in tu. Kraft's cuso, all. documentor

recordings, or other recoras of any type Lu he

Departments custody or control which constitute,

summarize, or describe the contents of the over-

hearings obtained as the result of any electronic

surveillance directed against Mr. Kraft and mem-

bers of his family will be placed under seal..

2.

As long as the items described above remain

under seal, no official or employee of the Depart-

ment will have access to them for any purpose, and

no official or employee of the Department will

allow any person outside of the Department to have

any such access, cxcept as described below. The

only material referring to these items will be a

single index cara needed to locate the sealed items.

The index card will bear only Mr. Kraft's name and

a file number.

3. Should some future need which we do not now

foresee require any official or employee of the

Department to obtain of permit access to the

aforesaid

items, the decision on such access shall

be made personally by the Attorney General. The

Attorney General shall not grant any access without

notifying Mr. Kraft or his counsel in writing at

least ten days prior thereto, and providing him or

HH 55035 DocId: 32989615 Page '65

62-116395=384

ENCLOSURE

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## Page 66

8.

-2-

them an opportunity to discuss the matter per-

sonally with the Attorney General before the

grant is made.

The notice shall set forth the

date upon which access will be permitted if it is

granted, and the purpose for which and person by

whon access is sought. The Attorney General will

personally inform Mr. Kraft or his counsel of a

decision to grant access as soon as practicable.

after it is made, but in any event at least five

business days before access occurs.

14.

Although this arrangement is not intendea to

constitute a permanent solution to the questions

you have raised concerning these documents, it

will not be rescinded or modified by the Attorney

General or his

successors unless the Attorney Gen-

eral gives Mr.. Kraft or his counsel ten days'

prior notice and affords him or them an opportun-

ity to discuss the matter personally with the

Attorney General before he rescinds or modifies

the ageconori.

If the attorney Coneral then

decides to rescind or modify this agreement he

shall. personally inform Mr. Kraft or his counsel

of that decision at least five business days before

it is implemented.

As a result of our discussions, I understand that this

temporary arrangement is acceptable to Mr. Kraft, of course

without waiver of any legal rights he may have as a result

of prior surveillances.

now on general policy dcterminations which, we hope, will

offer a permanent solution to the problem this settles temp-

Of course, under the terms of this agreement we

will notify you of any policy determination which would

involve a modification of this agreement.

Until a final policy is determined, this agreement should

any manner so long as they remain under

the seal arrangement.

Sincerely,

0..

Levi

Attorney General

55035

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## Page 67

Mr. Tolson

Air. DeLoach

Mr. Mohr -

Mr. Bishop

Mr. Casper

SECRET

Mr. Callahan

Mr. Conrad

DO NOT

TILE

Mr. Felt

Mr. Gale

Mr. Rosen

Mr. Sullivan

Jupite it

June 30, 1969

Mr. Tavel

Mr. Trotter

Tele. Room

Mr. Hoover:

JUNE

Miss Holmes +

Miss Sards l

Instead of taking up your time giving you a veri

report, I will set out briefly the basic facts in this m

relative to my European trip.

First, I an sure you would want to know how very, very

willing and cooperative this high-ranking official was.

moment I arrived I called for an appointment with him and was

given it immediately.

It was obvious he had to work me in before

others scheduled to see him because they were in his outer office

when I went through. He was too gracious, however, to mention it.

Second, I presented directly the request and predicated

it on my reason

to believe that this person could be in contact

with the soviets and it was necessary to determine one way or

the other.

Giving

it this predication I thought would make our

position much more valid and secure. he loid me they wuuld do

it for us without any hesitation.

Parenthetically, I might add

that such a cover is regarded as illegal.

However, he made no

mention of this and they do it all the time. He pointed out that

if this man is living at a hotel or an apartment where complicated

switchboards are involved, there would be some technical problens.

I told him that I understood this. He assured me that if it is

technically possible to do it, it would be done and if it required

solving a problem, it would be solved if at all possible.

Liter

Third, as it was necessary.for this official to have

this man located, the situation analyzed, and the equipment put

in use, I decided not to stay for a day or so to get a sampling

of the product.

If it could have been put on immediately,

I would,

of course, have stayed around a day to see what it would be like.

"Fourth, 'I instructed our Legat concerning the seasitivity

this matter and made arrangements that the product can be so

handled that:the.girls.inhis. office-will not know about it at all

I also told him he was not, under. any

condition, to ever discuss

this with anyone back here at the Seat of Government.

He is

competent professional and can be relied upon in this matter.

T

P

CRET

"l."

•D

NÖT FILE

DECIASSIFIBD BESPiAL

ON 101210

JUNG 3 1973/11°

HH 55035 Do0Id:32989615

Page

67

NOT RECORDED

JUN 1 3 1973

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## Page 68

CRET

DO NOT FILE

Fiith, the material will be sent directly to me without

any mention of

the individual's name. I will arrange securely

for the translation here and then get the material to you

immediately in order that you will be able to handle it directly

with the gentleman. to whom you alluded in our conversation.

Sixth,

the high-ranking official with whom

• I dealt suggested

that we might want to give consideration at the end of this

operation to listening

to the tape with one of his translators

to see it they had overlooked anything significant, which he

said could happen because they know nothing about this person's

would send the tape over here but this is not possible because

they have an unbreakable rule that the tape can't be taken out of

this clandestine central headquarters where the work is done and

is it were removed; it would cause considerable wonderment and

speculation. However, he said he could safely and securely have

me enter a portion of

this area to listen if I thought it necessary.

I told him this was a decision which could be faced after the

product was examined carefully and that then you would make the

docision.

Respectfully submitted,

William C.

Sullivan

'"::

...

.. *

008 220006/0u96 eccen/o

ACRÊT

NOT FILE

• 2 m

NW 55035 : DosLd:32989615 Paye 68

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## Page 69

F

CRET

DO NOT FILE

July 3, 1969

ThING

Mr. DeLoach .

Nir. Mohr -

Mr. Bishop

Mr. Casper -

Nir. Callahan

Mr. Conrad -

Mr. Felt -

Mr. Gale

Mr. Rosen

Mr. Sullivan

Mr. Tavel

Mr. Trotter

Tele. Room

Miss Holnies

Melands 2:

Dear Mr. Hoover:

This is to advise you that the French

have overcome some

very difficult operational

problems and have installed a microphone in this

fellow's room.

As I mentioned yesterday the

elaborate switchboard prevents using a telephone

surveillance.

Just as soon as they get an adequate

product, it will be sent into me immediately and

I will handle the translation under very secure

conditions.

You will kept promptly advised of

developments.

Respectfully submitted,

Bich

W. C. Sullivan

oN 10/14/60

REG.

rain

H:65/9 404074

1327

NOT RECORDED

JUN I 3 1973?

DO

P

• FILE

E

T

JUN 13.19731n

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## Page 70

TO:

Intelligence Conmunity Staff

ATTN: Central Index

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

FROM:

FRI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOw PROVIDED (check appropriate term.

If a document was made available

for review

transmitted,

X / DOCUMENT

BRIEFING

INTERVIEW

TESTIMONY |

JoTHeR

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)

OTE:

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

BEFORE COMPLETING.

2. DATE PROVIDED

6/20/75

SSC

HSC

1. IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer.

interviewee, testifier and subject)

Memoranduin and enclosure

8. We sPoNse er alise date and jama, miriafive, suppose to formal request, other-

state verbal

SSC letter 5/14/75, Appendix D, Item 17

voRder fine fore pharopriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are

Surveillance, electronic

8. SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)

Memoranda and other materlals reflecting written or oral

authorization and reauthorization by Attorney General and/or

the Directos for electronic surveillance of Joseph Kraft

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 10/13/00 BY SPEARMEn

62-116395

FMK; fmk

(4)

TREAT AS YELLOW

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL, COMMUNITY INDEX

IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

379 1 16-751

NW 55035 DocId: 32989615 Page 70

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Tap!

INSTRUCTIONS

• Type or print clearly

*ink!

• Indicate classification öf the abstract top

and bottom.

• Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

• "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the

information.

• If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to

HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit

copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing

substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community

matters if appropriate.

Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests

should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be

noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here,

e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether

interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript

is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional

pages may be

attached if necessary.

HH 55035

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## Page 72

2 -

J.

A. Mintz

(1 - Mr.

J. B. Hotis)

1 - Mr.

1 - Mr.

W.

R. Wannall

W.

0. Cregar

1 - Mr.

A. F. Watters

June 20, 1975

1=-=

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to memorandur and appendices

thereto from the sse dated May 14, 1975, requesting documents

and other information From the FBI.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the

SSC is the original of a memorandum containing a response

to one of the Committee's requests.

A copy of this memorandum is being furnished for

your records.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General

Attention: K. William O'Connor

Intelligence Coordination

(9)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

115 is

Assoc. Dir.

Dep. AD Adm. -

Dep. AD Inv. _

/ - ENCLOSURE

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

Comp. Syst,-

Ext. Affairs -

Files & Com. -

Gen. Inv. -

elm

ident. -

Inspection

Intell. -

Laboratory -

Plon. & Evol. -

Spec. Inv. -

Trainingh

Legal Co

Telephone

REC-88

12-18-395

383

3 JUL 21 1975

MAIL13OgM

DocId: 37989616

TELETYPE UNIT

Page 72

GPO: 1975 0 - 569-920

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## Page 73

G2-116395

2 - Mr.

J

A. Mintz

(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

1 - MI. W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. A. F. Watters

June 20, 1975

UNITED STARES SENATE SELECT COMITTEE

TO STUDY GOVERNVENTAL, OPERATIONS

WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACRIVIIIES (SSC)

RE: FURTHER DOCUNENTS PIRTAINING

TO JHE FBI AND DEPARIMENT OF JUSTICE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

TERCIN SANGLASSIFIEL

DATE 10,

By paralel

ORGANIZATION, STRUCTURE, AND

JURISDICTION

Reference is made to SSC lciter dated May 14, 1975,

with attached appendicos, requesting cortain documents

and other

infornation from the FBI.

Appondix B, Part II, Item number 9, of referenced

letter requested all memoranda and other materials pertaining

to the origins, contents, and implementation of National Security

Action Hemorandun 161, dated June 9, 1962-

By menorandun dated March 5, 1964, to J. Edgar Hoover,

Chairman, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference,

the Attorney General, implemented Presidential instructions

contained in National Security Action Memorandum 161. In his

March, 1964, communication to Mr. Hoover, the Attorney General

directed that the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference

should continue to function in accordance with principles

governing its operations previously approved by the Mational

Security Council.

By memorandum dated April 10, 1975, captioned

Assoc. Dir. -

*United States Senate Select Cormittée

• to Study Governmental

Dep. AD Adm. -

Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activitles," the SSC

Asst. Dir.:

Dep. AD in. - was furnished both National Security Notion Memorandun 161 and

Admin. -

the Actorney General's 1964 memorandum. These two docuncats

Comp. Syst. -

were provided to the Committee as supplemental attachments to

Ext. Affairs _

Files & Com. -

an FBI Intelligence Division position paper on jurisdiction

Gen. Inv. _

Ident.

dated February 13, 1975.

Inspection

intell..

Laboratory

Plon. & Eval. -

AFW: jmnymn

(8)

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

Spec.Inv.-

Training.

Pc"

Till

(11

Legal Coun..

Telephone Rm. -

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

383

Director Sec'y _

MAIL ROOM I

HH 55035 DooId:32989615

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ENCLOSURE

Page 73

GPO: 1975 O - 569-920

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## Page 74

Fucther Documonts Pertaining

to the EBi and Deparimont of Justice

Organization, Structure, and Jurisdiction

Any information with respect to the origins of National

Security Action Memorandum 161 would logically bo in the records

of the White Housc, and you may desire to consult with the White

Ilouse regarding this aspect of your request.

1 - The Attorney General

NOTE :

Although memoranda and other documents have been

prepared in the past in connection with the internal

security programs operated by the FBI pursuant to our legal

authority in this field, National Security Action Memorandum 161

simply transferred supervision of these internal security

programs from the National Security Council to the Attorney General.

These were ongoing programs whose essential character was not

altered by National Security Action Memorandum 161. It appears

that no documents were prepared within the FBI in connection

with its implementation. However, we have previously furnished

to the Committee, with Departmental concurrence, copies of the

Attorney General's memorandum of March 5, 1964, and we are

referring the SSC to this document.

.. -.-

H# 55035

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## Page 75

5-10 (Rov. 1-22-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION ORIGINAL

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee:

Senate Select Committee

• Memo

→ Report

6/20/75

Senate

Capig or Donate

Select Committee: Re: Organization,

Appendix B,

Part turetten nImbes

Part I1,

am Jurisdiction

FBI

Paul Velale

_Date: 2-15-75

Delivered by:

Received by:

Titleu

Tach Jere

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HH 55035

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## Page 76

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

BEFORE COMPLETING.

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

FROM:

TO: Intelligence Community Staff

ATTN: Central Index

EBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term.

If a document was made available

for review

not transmitted, so

note.)

DOCUMENT

BRIEFING

| INTERVIEW!

(TESTIMONY

OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

6/20/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)

SSC

4.

HSC

IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; dive name or identification number of briefer,

interviewee, testifier and subject)

Memorandum

5. IN RESPONSE TO (List date and item number

if in response to formal request, other.

vise state verbal request of (name), initiative,

subpoena, etc.)

SSC letter 5/14/75, Appendix B, Part II,

Item 9

7. KEY 'unde finter the ppropriate key words from the list provided separately: if key words not listed are

Operating procedures

8. SUMMARY (see reverse

side before completing this item

Memoranda and other materials pertaining to the origins,

contents and implementation of National Security Action

Memorandum 161, dated 6/9/62

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 10/13/00

62-116395

FMK: Emk

(4)

379| (6-75)

HH 55035

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TREAT AS YELLOW

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX

IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

---

## Page 77

INSTRUCTIONS

• Type or print clearly in"Ink

• Indicate classification

of the

abstract" top

Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

• "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the

information.

• If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to

HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a

copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC. ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing

substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community

matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests

should be noted.

Commitments made to supply additional information should be

noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here,

e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether

interviewee is current or former employee,

etc. If actual document or transcript

is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional

pages may be attached if necessary.

14 55035

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77

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## Page 78

RETAINED

PERSONNEL

RECORDS UNIT

CODE

TELETYPE

TO SACS SAN DIEGO

SAN FRANCISCO

SEATTLE

2 -

J. A. Mintz

Mr. J. B. Hotis)'

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

NITEL

1 - Mr.

W. 0. Cregar

JULY 17, 1975

1 - Mc. S. F. Phillips

PERSONAL, ATTENTION

FROM DIRECIOR FBI (62-116395)

SENSTUDY 75 :

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINEO

DATE 10/2/00

PERS.

INES.

REBUTEL MAY 2, 1975.

INQUIRIES MADE OF BUREAU BY SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC)

CONCERNING BELOW-LISTED FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES SUGGESTS THAT THEY

MAY BE INTERVIEWED BY SSC STAFF. INTERVIEWS WILL CONCERN

COINTELPRO ACTIVITIES DIRECTED AGAINST THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY

IN THE LATE 1960'S AND EARLY 1970'S BY THE SAN DIEGO,

SAN FRANCISCO AND SEATTLE OFFICES. SET OUT BELOW ARE LAST

KNOWN ADDRESSES OF THESE FORMER BUREAU EMPLOYEES.

EACH OF THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES IS TO BE IMMEDIATELY

CONTACTED AND ALERTED THAT HE MICHT BE APPROACHED BY THE SSC

STAFF. THEY SHOULD BE TOLD THAT IN THE EVENT THEY ARE INTER-

VIEWED AND DURING THE COURSE OF SAME, QUESTIONS ARE ASKED WHICH

RELATE TO SENSITIVE BUREAU OPERATIONS (SOURCES, METHODS,

SFP: 1hb |hb

(7)

"ROGAN IN

MIUNICATIONS SECTION

JUD 1'7 1975

SEE NOTE PAGE 3

9621-95-382

-3. JUL 23 1975"

Assoe. Dir. -

Dep. AD Adm. _

Dep. AD Inv. -

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

Comp. Syst.

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com,

Gen. Inv. -

Ident.

Inspection

Intell.

Laboratory

Plon. & Eval. _

Spec. Inv..

Training

Legal Coun. _

Telephone Rm. _

gro SUL 2 2 1975R00M

55035

DooId: 32989615

TELETYPE UNIT

Page

78

vie;

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## Page 79

=

PAGE TWO

62-116395

TECHNIQUES, THIRD AGENCY RULE AND ONGOING INVESLIGATIONS),

THEY MAY REQUEST AN FBI AGENT BE PRESENT. BUREAU WILL PROVIDE

AGENT ON REQUEST OF INTERVILIEE. AGENT WILL NOT BE PRESENT AT

INTERVIEW ITSELF BUT MERELY AVAILABLE NEARBY FOR CONSULIATION

PURPOSES. AS A PRELUDE TO INTERVIEW, THE FORMER EMPLOYEE MAY,

AFTER BEING CONTACTED BY SSC STAFF, CONTACI BUREAU'S LEGAL

COUNSEL DIVISION BY COLLECI CALI FOR FULL, INFORMATION TO ASSIST

HIM, INCLUDING OBLIGATIONS AS TO CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION

ACQUIRED AS FBI EMPLOYEE. IT IS EMPHASIZED THAT BUREAU'S OFFER

OF ASSISTANCE IS NOT INTENDED TO IMPEDE SSC WORK BUT IS DONE

AS COOPERATIVE GESTURE AND TO SAFEGUARD SENSITIVE BUREAU

INFORMATION. CONTACTS WITH THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES TO BE

HANDLED PERSONALIY BY SAC OR ASAC. IN EVENT THIS NOT FEASIBLE

FOR JUST CAUSE, TO BE HANDLED BY A SENIOR SUPERVISOR.

BUREAU SHOULD BE ADVISED BY TELETYPE AFTER THE FORMER

EMPLOYEES HAVE BEEN CONTACTED IN LINE WITH THE ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS.

IF A FORMER EMPLOYEE NO LONGER IN YOUR TERRITORY OR TEMPORARILY

AWAY, SET OUT LEAD TO OTHER OFFICE IMMEDIATELY VITH COPY TO

FBI HEADQUARTERS.

SAN DIEGO: ROBERT S. BAKER, 4268 HORTENSIA, SAN DIEGO,

CALIFORNIA 92103.

NH 55035 DocId: 32989615 Page 79

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## Page 80

pos

PAGE THREE

62-116395

SAN FRANCISCO: ALBERI P. CLARK, 66 EIM AVENUE, LARKSPUR,

CALIFORNIA 94939. WILLIAM COHENDET, 1557 BALBOA WAY,

BURLINGAME, CALIFORNIA 94010.

SEATTLE: LEROY W. SHEETS, 5725 72ND STREET, I.E.,

MARYSVILLE, WASHINGTON 98270.

NOTE:

The referenced Bureau teletype 5/2/75 vas a general

instruction to all SAls concerning the SSC and Bureau's

cooperation with same. We are currently processing a request

from the SSC concerning COINTELPRO-BPP in West Coast offices,

and among the items of information ve are supplying are the

current whereabouts of Agents who worked on COINTELPRO as

Coordinators and Supervisors in the indicated offices.

This

teletype to alert the former Agents is in accordance with the

procedure we have been following.

•HH 55035

DooId:32989615

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80

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## Page 81

FRANK CHURCH.-IOAHO, CHAI

JOHN G. TOVER, TEXAS, VICE CHA

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.

WALTER F. MOMDILE, MINN.

BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.

WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.

CHAMLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.

ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.

RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

GARY HART, COLO.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR

FREDERICA 6. SCHER TIE PRESTOUNSEL

CURTIS R, SMOTHEHS, MINORITY COUNSEL

FBI..

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

EREIN IS UCLASSIFIO

ATE 10/135

Winited Sicies Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO

STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH

RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(PURSUANT TO S. 45S.21, AITH CONGRESS)

WASHINGTO:4,D.C, 20510

June 27, 1975

ДАЕ

Peed fam

The Hönorable Edward H. Levi

Attorney General

U. S. Department of Justice

Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

JU: 311975

OLA

20..5111

i-75

Enclosed with this letter are notifications

concerning certain matters currently under Investigation

by the Select Committee which relate to government entities

under your jurisdiction.

These notifications are submitted pursuant to

an agreement between the Committee, the various intelli-

gence entities, and the White House. Pursuant to that

agreement, the

various entities in the Executive Branch

have agreed not only to make available the pertinent

witnesses, but also to submit in response all information

and material which they possess that is relevant to the

areas and cases which the Committee wishes to investigate.

The response should include all relevant underlying docu-

mentation and other information, including documents

which may not have come to the committee's attention and 5 kg

which the Committee has not specifically requested, and

all material relating to any prior Executive Branch inquiry

into the matter. In addition, we would welcome a current

analysis of the particular questions raised by the Commit-

see ard any other observations on the smoject that vol

believe would be helpful.

OFFICE OF LECISLATIVE AFFAIR

FEDERAL BU

We welcome the promise of cooperation ma furlstes

disclosure that underlies that agreement.

success in ful-

filling the full disclosure policy contained in the agager.

ment is indispensible to the committee analysis and-to

the formulation oi our ultimate landings conglusions

recommendations.

REC.88

D

3 JUI DISG DE LEGISLATNE AFFNE

- ENCLOSURE

8 4 JUL 2 2 1975

HH 55035 DooId: 32989615

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62-116395 FEDERM SU. OF It.

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## Page 82

The Honorable Edward H. Levi

Page Two

June 27, 1975

Within the Committee mandate, contained in

S. Res. 21, there are four broad subjects relating to the

intelligence community which we are required to investi-

gate and study in order to determine the facts and ulti-

mately to decide whether to make recommendations for

legislative or other changes. They are:

I. The structure, performance, and utility of

government operations with respect to intel-

ligence activities.

2.

Whether certain policies or practices are

or are not illegal, unethical, or otherwise

improper.

3. Whether there has or has not been excessive

duplication or inadequate coordination be-

tween and among intelligence agencies and,

more generally, the efficiency of intelli-

gence activities.

4.

Whether there has or has not been adequate

internal and external control and oversight

over the policies and practices of intelli-

gence agencies.

In attempting to find the answers to these funda-

mental questions, the Committee is proceeding in two ways.

First, we are examining intelligence functions broadly as

instruments of government policy, giving attention to the

authority for particular functions, the problems which

intelligence activities are designed to solve, the proce

dures by which intelligence activities are and have been

proposed, approved, executea, evaluated, and terminated,

the range and scope of the activities utilized to achieve

intelligence objectives, and the propriety and utility of

the activities undertaken. Second, we will examine in

depth certain subjects within the broad topics of inves-

tigation. (We would, of course, welcome your suggestion

of other

cases that

would give added insight into intelli-

gence matters under your jurisdiction.) These specific

subjects for investigation are not intended to limit the

scope contained in the more general questions.

HH 55035 DocId: 32989615 Page 82

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## Page 83

The Hónorable Edward H. Levi

Page Three

June 27, 1975

The annexed notifications spell these matters

out in greater detail. In addition, they ask certain

specific questions, set forth certain previously requested

documents not yet received, request additional documents,*

and, in some cases, ask for the names and present addresses

of persons who have held certain positions.

Where appro-

priate, the subject's description indicates that, pursuant

agreed Outline for Inquiry Procedures, the matter

primarily concerns allegations of abuse or other contro-

versial specific matters where there is reason to believe

Improprieties may have occurred.

Finally, the notifications

Indicate the name(s) of the staff member(s) who, in addition

to the Committee's senior staff, will be responsible for the

particular matters.

" The Committee, in the course of the next few

months, will undertake other subjects for investigation

as its

work proceeds and will notify you as appropriate.

We look forward to your cooperation in these

matters.

Sincerely yours:

Frank Church

Chairman

Vice Chairman

evel

These specific requests are not, of course, intended

to limit the agreement to come forward with all rele-

vant information and material, including documents, whether

or not they have

been brought to the Committee's attention

or have been specifically requested by the Comnittee.

H₩ 55035 DocId: 32989615 Page 83

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## Page 84

Tension.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

(Including DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 112.00

Table of Contents

•I. Issues

II. Areas of General Inquiry

A.

Legal Authority for FBI Intelligence and

Counterintelligence Activities

B. Organization and Operation of the FBI

Intelligence Division

•1. FBI Internal Security Intelligence

Operations

2. The FBI and the U. S. Intelligence

- Community

3.

FBI Foreign Counterintelligence

Operations

4. Inspection Division Investigations

5. • FBI Intelligence Activities and State

or Local Law Enforcement Agencies

III.

Case Studies

General Questions

A. Electronic Surveillance

1. Warrantless Electronic Surveillance

2.

warrantless Electronic Surveillance

and "Leaks"

Page

• 3

3

3

4

5

6

7

7

9

9

11

bout 6 345-38!

HW 55035 DocId: 32989615 Page 84

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## Page 85

nii

3. Electronic Surveillance of

Dr. Martin Luther King

4. Electronic Surveillance and the

Democratic National Convention,

Atlantic City, 1964

B.' Surreptitious Entry

C. Mail Covers and Mail Openings

• D. Other Specific Techniques

¿ E. COINTELPRO and Disruptive Activities

F. Clandestine Informant Activities

G. "Notional" Organizations

H. Joint FBI-Police Operations

1. White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan,

Mississippi

2. Black Panther Party, Chicago

I. The "Huston Plan"

J. Alleged Political Misuse of the FBI

IV. Department of Justice

A. The Attorney General

B. The Internal Security Section (formerly

Bivision)

HH 55035 DocId: 32989615 Page 85

Page

13

15

17

18

20

21

24

27

28

28

30 .

32

: 34

36

36

38

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## Page 86

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

(INCLUDING DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE)

I.

Issues

The Committee's inquiry Into the intelligence and

counterintelligence activities of the Federal Bureau

of Investigation is examining fundamental issues which

bear directly on the adequacy of current legislation

and administrative organization and procedure.

The

Committee seeks to determine whether FBI intelligence

on tune in content at the ace eve desi tamone

the basic issues to be addressed are the following:

"A.

That Is the legal authority for FBI Intelligence

and counterintelligence activities?

Should the

FBI's authority be clarified or revised or

incorporated in a comprehensive statutory

charter?

B. What limitations are placed on FBI Intelligence

and counterintelligence activities by the

Constitution and laws of the United States?

Shoulã these limitations be clarified or

revised?

C. What have been the purposes and aims of FBI

intelligence and counterintelligence activities?

Should these ebjéctives be modified?:

D. How have the intelligence and counterintelligence

activities of the FBI been organized and coordinated

with other agencies of government?

Should these

procedures and practices be revised?

E. What have been the procedures for and techniques

of intelligence gathering and dissemination and

counterintelligence operations used by the FBI?

Under what conditions and through what procedures

should these methods and techniques be used in

the future?

F. What have been and should be the mechanisms for

internal and external policy-making, control,

and supervision of FBI Intelligence

and counter-

Intelligence activities?

HH 55035

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## Page 87

= 2.-

As a means of examining the above issues in the

context of actual FBl intelligence operations

the Committee intends to study certain specific

topics, some of which are general in nature, and

others of which involve specific cases, programs

or techniques.

Part II, below, contains descriptions

of the general areas into which the Committee: intends

to inquire.

Part III contains descriptions of the

specific cases mentioned above. The descriptions

specifically indicate

whether the investigation may

concentrate on specific allegations of possible

abuses or other controversial matters where there

1s. reason to believe improprieties may have occurred.

-In addition to the topics described below, additional

areas of inquiry may develop during the course of the

Committee's work.

HH 55035 DocId: 32989615 Page 87

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## Page 88

-3-

II.

Areas of General Inguiry

A.

Legal Authority. for FBI Intelligence and Counter-

intelligence Activities

The Committee is examining the legal basis for FBI

intelligence and counterintelligence activities.

There may be serious question as to the adequacy

of the present legislative framework for the FBI's

functions in these fields. Current statutes

authorize the FBI to perform investigative and law

enforcement functions, but they do not specifically

authorize intelligence or counterintelligence

'activities. Therefore; the Committee seeks to

determine whether

the FBI's authority should be

clarifled, revised, or incorporated in a compre-

hensive statutory charter.

Responsible staff: Senior staff

Task Force leader

Mark Gitenstein

B. Organization and Operation of the FBI Intelli-

gence Division

The Committee is investigating the structure and

operating practices of the FBI Intelligence Divi-

sion.

Proposals have been made that the national

security intelligence and counterintelligence

functions of the FBI should be lodged in a

separate

agency or otherwise separated from the FBI's

criminal investigative activities.

Further recom-

mendations have been advanced for improved coordina-

tion between the FBI and other intelligence agencies,

for strengthened supervision of FBI intelligence and

counterintelligence activities by the Attorney

General or an independent board, and for clearer

standards and procedures for FBI activities in this

area. Therefore, the Committee desires complete

information on the operating practices and proce-

dures of the FBI Intelligence Division and of the

field office activities supervised by the Intelli-

gence Division.

19s.

NW 55035 DocId:32989615 Page 88 •

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## Page 89

4

The Committee's inquiry focuses on the following

specific areas:

1. FBI Internal Security Intelligence Operations

The Committee seeks to determine the nature

and purpose of FBI intelligence operations

directed at foreign intelligence activities

and subversive or extremist activities within

the United States.

the scope of FBI intelligence investigations

is too broad and has extended to legitimate

political activities. Consequently, the Com-

mittee must examine how the FBI's responsibili-.

ties have been defined.

Responsible staff: Senior staff

Task Force leader

Mark Gitenstein

2.

The FBI and the U. S. Intelligence Community

The Committee seeks to determine what have

been the policies and procedures for coordina-

tion between the FBI and other agencies in the

-U: S. intelligence community.

There have been

occasions in the past where friction between

the FBI and other agencies has produced

serious

dissatisfaction within the U. S. intelligence

community.

The purpose of this inquiry is to

evaluate the adequacy of past and present co-

• ordinating mechanisms.

Responsible staff: Senior staff

Task Force leader

Mark Gitenstein

•

HH 55035 DocId:32989615 Page 89

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## Page 90

-5 -

3.

- . .

46

FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Operations

The Committée seeks to determine the nature of

FBI counterintelligence operations directed at

foreign intelligence activities within the

United States of at any other hostile foreign-

related activities within the United States.

Since FBI operations to

"counter" these activi-

ties go beyond intelligence collection, the

Committee must consider whether such practices

require statutory authorization. The impact

of counterintelligence operations on United

States foreign relations will also be considered..

Responsible staff: Senior staff

Task Force leader

Loch Johnson

Barbara Banoff

Inspection Division Investigations

The Committee is examining the relationship

of the FBI Inspection Division to FBI intelli-

gence and counterintelligence activities. This

includes both regular Inspection Division

reviews of Intelligence Division

and

• field

office functions and specific investigations

of allegations of improper conduct in connec-

tion. with FBI intelligence activities.

Responsible staff: Senior staff

Task Force leader

Mark Gitenstein

•..

WW 55035 DocId:32989615 Page 90

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## Page 91

6

5.

FBI Intelligence Activities and State or Local

Law Enforcement Agencies

The Committee seeks to determine the nature of

the relationships between FBI intelligence

• activities and state and local law enforcement

agencies.

This subject involves the delicate

balance between the necessary contralization

of certain law enforcement activities and the

Constitutionally-mandated decentralization of

general law enforcement responsibility. It is

necessary for the Committee to evaluate the

centralizing

; influence of the FBI, as well as

the FBI's role as a check on local law enforce-

ment abuses.

Responsible staff:

}

Senior staff

Task Force leader

Mark Gitenstein

Walter Ricks

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IIT. Case Studies

General Questions

The descriptions which follow of the specific cases the

Committee intends to study are, intended to serve the

dual purpose of notifying the t'BI of the issues the

Committee will explore in connection with each case

and eliciting from the FBI all information and material

ins its possession relating to the questions the Committee

wishes to explore in each case.

In order to avoid

unnecessary repetition of certain questions which will

be basic to the Committee's investigations of each

• case, certain fundamental questions are set forth

below. As to each case described, the Committee

intends to explore these fundamental questions, and

expects that the FBI will, as to each case, provide

all information and material it has relating to these

basic questions even though they are not repeated in

I. What is or has been the legal authority for the

activity?

.2. What have been the purposes of the activity?

3. What techniques have been employed in the activity?

4. What kinds of information have been gathered in

the activity?

5.

How have specilic uses of the activity been initiated

and approved?

6. How have the targets for the activity been selected?

7. What have been the criteria for target selection?

8. How has the intelligence which is collected been

used?

9.

To whom has the intelligence collected been dis-

seminated?

10. What has been the basis for any dissemination with

respect to each recipient?

11. How has the activity been coordinated with other

intefligence agencies?

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12. What have been the effects of this coordination?

13.

To what extent has each of the foregoing been.com-

patible with the legal authority.for and the purposes

of the activity?

14. By what means has the activity been monitored,

controlled and administered?

15. What are the potential abuses to which the activity

• may lead?

16. To what abuses has the activity led?

17. What steps have been taken to investigate such

abuses?

¿"18. What steps have been taken

to avöid such abuses?

19. What have been the costs and utility of the

activity?

In some instances, the specific questions set forth

below may appear to repeat some of the general questions.

The purpose in such cases is simply to clarify the appli-

cation of. the general question to the specific case.

Except where inapplicable by their terms, all general

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A.

Electronic Surveillance

The Committee is examining all forms of electronic

interception of communications including wiretap-

ping, electronic eavesdropping, consensual elec-

tronic surveillance interception of video and data

communications, local monitoring dovices, and all

other forms of electronic or technical monitoring.

The Committee's general questions apply to each of

* the techniques listed above,

as well as to the

matters

set forth in the following specific cases.

•1.

Warrantless Electronic Surveillance

The Committee seeks to determine whether the

Attorney General should have the authority

to authorize electronic

surveillance for cer

tain purposes without a prior judicial warrant.

This power has been exercised by succeeding

Attorneys General since 1940, upon the explicit

directive of the President.

The Supreme Court

has ruled that this power does not extend to

definedby the supreme Court...

Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI and the

Justice Department address the following specific

• questions:

a. What is the scope and basis of the claim

of. Executive authority to conduct warrant-

less electronic surveillance?

b.

What have been the procedures for considera-

tion and approval of requests for warrantless

electronic surveillance authorized by the

Attorney General?

c.

What are the specific disadvantages of the

judicial

warrant requirement for those

electronic surveillances which have been

authorized by the Attorney General?

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d.

Does the Fourth Amendment permit the

issuance of judicial warrants for elec-

tronic surveillance on grounds other than

ordinary probable cause where national

security intelligence purposes are advanced

to justify the surveillance?

e.

To what extent are the specific procedures

of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control

Act of 1968 inappropriate for electronic

surveillance conducted for national secu-

rity intelligence purposes?

.. •

Documents

The Committee requests the following additional

documents bearing on the questions stated above:

a. All written justifications for the specific

authorizations by the Attorney General for

warrantless electronic surveillance from

January 1, 1960, until the present.

b.

All documents reflecting the denial by the

Attorney General of specific requests for

warrantless electronic surveillance from

January 1, 1960, until the present.

C.

Committee staff access to information con-

tained in the impounded documents, deposi-

tions, and other materials in all

civil suits which involve warrantless

electronic surveillance and in which the

Committee has received the consent of the

plaintiffs for such access.

Responsible staff: Senior staff

Task Force leader

Mike Epstein

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2.

Warrantless Electronic Surveillance and

"Leaks"

The Committee 1s examining several instances of

the use of warrantless electronic surveillance

and other investigative techniques in connection

with "leaks" of classified information. These

cases may involve specific allegations of abuse

or other controversial matters where there is

reason to believe improprieties may have

occurred.

These instances include:

2.

The investigation of alleged "leaks" by or

to 17 Executive officials and newsmen

• between May 1969 and February 1971.

b. The investigation of alleged "leaks" from

a military staff member assigned to the

National Security Council in 1971-72.

c.

The reported investigation of columnist

Joseph Kraft in 1969.

d. The reported Investigation of the activities

of Mrs. Anna Chennault and Vice Presidential

candidate Spiro Agnew in 1968.

e. Any other instances of warrantless electronic

surveillance in connection with the investi-

gation of "leaks" to the press.

• Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI and the

Justice Department address the following specific

questions:

a.

Through what procedures and by whom were.

each of these electronic súrveillances auth-

orized and approved, continued, and terminated?

b. As to each person to whom information was

disseminated, please state:

(1) The nature of the Information.

(2) The basis for the dissemination.

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(3) The date of each dissemination.

(4) The use which was in fact made of the

Information by the recipient.

C.

What evaluations were made of the original

grounds for the surveillance as it progressed?

d. What were the results of the evaluations?

e. Who made them?

f. What are the reasons for use of electronic

surveillance without judicial warrant to

investigate

"leaks" of classified information

to the press?

How does each of the above instances relate

to these reasons?

h. To what extent would requirement of a

warrant interfere with the ability to

detect such leaks?

Responsible staff:

Senior staff

Task Force leader

Mark Gitenstein

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Surveillance of Dr. Martin Luther King

This investigation examines the authorization for,

conduct and termination of, and deliberations

regarding the surveillance of Dr. King. This case

may involve specific allegations of abuses and other

controversial matters where there is reason to be-

lieve improprieties may have occurred.

Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI and the

• Justice Department address the following specific

questions:

a.

Through what procedures and by whom were

wiretaps and electronic bugs of Dr. King

initiated, approved, continued, and termina-

ted?

b.

What were the locations, extent, and

duration of the electonic surveillances

of Dr. King?

What were the grounds of national security,

if any, for the

introduction of the electronic

surveillances of Dr. King?

d. What was the relationship between the information

collected and

each of the purposes of the

surveillance?

e. What evaluations were made of the original

grounds for the

surveillance as it progressed?

I. What were the results of those evaluations?

Who made them?

h.

What periodic evaluations were made of the

relationship between the information being

collected and the original objectives of the

surveillance?

1. What were the results of the evaluations?

j. Who made them?

:

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k. To whom were any results

of the

surveillance disseminated?

1. As to each person to whom information was

aisseminated, please state

(1) The nature of the information.

(2) The basis for the dissemination.

(3) The date of each dissemination.

(4)

The use which was in fact made of

the information.

Responsible staff: Senior staff

Task Force Leader

Mike Epstein

. 18

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Surveillance at the Democratic National.

Convention, Atlantic City, 1964

The Committee is examining the use of

surveillance and other intelligence operations

in Atlantic City, New Jersey, on or about the

time of the Democratic National Convention in

1964.

This case may involve specific allegations

of abuses and other controversial matters where

there is reason to believe improprieties may

have occurred.

Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI and the Justice

Department address the following specific questions:

a. Did the FBI conduct electronic surveillance

and other intelligence operations at this

time and place?

b. Who were the targets?

C.

Through what procedures and by whom were the

decisions made to engage in electronic

surveillance and intelligence operations

at this time and place?

a. What were the nature, extent, and duration

of the electronic surveillance and other

intelligence operations at this time and

place?

e. What was the relationship between each target

selected

and the purpose of the surveillance?

Was the FBI requested to conduct such

surveillance by any person, or organization

outside the FBI?

g. If so, by whom, when, and for what stated

reason?

h. To whom were the results of the surveillance

disseminated?

1. As to each person whom information was

disseminated, please state

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(1) The nature of the information.

(2) The

basis for the dissemination.

(3)

• (4.)

The date of each dissemination. .

The use which was in fact made of

the information.

Responsible staff: Senior Staff

Task Force Leader

Mike Epstein

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Beo.

...

Surreptitious Entry

The purpose of this inquiry is to determine the

extent to which the FBI has used surreptitious

entry as an intelligence technique, either through

Its own operations or through operations by other

agencies and individuals. This case nay involve

allegations of abuse and controversial matters

where there is reason to believe improprieties

, may have occurred.

Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI and the Justice

Department address the following specific questions:

1. What are the scope and basis of the claim of

Executive authority to conduct warrantless

surreptitious entry as asserted by the

Department of Justice in United States v.

Ehrlichman?

2.

What surreptitious entries have been carried

out by the FBI or by another government agency

with the knowledge of the FBI from January 1,

1960, to the present? Please list by date,

place,and target.

3.

As to any instance in which the FBI has refused

to comply with another agency's request for

surreptitious entry, what was

a. The basis for the refusal?

b. The reason given for the request?

4. What procedures were employed to authorize any

surreptitious entry identified under 2, and who

authorized each such entry?

5.

To the extent applicable by their terms, each of

the above questions and the General Questions

will be explored specifically with reference to

any entry or proposed entry at an embassy in

May 1972.

Responsible Staff: Senior Staff

Task Force Leader

Mike. Epstein

Paul Wallach

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C:.

Mail Covers and Mail Openings

The Committee is examining the conduct of mail covers

and mail openings by or on behalf of the FBl and any

instances of mail openings or intercepts which may

have been conducted by or on behalf of the FBI. This

inquiry nay involve allegations of abuse or other

controversial matters where there is reason to

believe improprieties may have occurred.

Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI and the Justice

Department address

the following specific questions:

1.

The specific purposes of all mail covers conducted

in connection with FBI intelligence and counter-

intelligence activities. This includes all

documents pertaining to FBI decisions to request

Postal Service mail covers and lists of all

subjects upon whom mail covers have been placed

as a result of FBI requests since January 1, 1960.

20

The procedures and practices for the dissemination

of information from mail covers requested by the

FBI. This includes a list of all entities to whom

mail cover information has been disseminated since

January 1, 1960.

3. Whether or not FBI personnel may have conducted

mail covers in violation of existing Postal Service

'regulations. For any mail covers which may have

been .conducted by FBI personnel or for the FBI by

persons other than Postal Service employees, from

January 1, 1960, to the present: identify the

location where the mail cover was

conducted, the names of all persons who participated

In and authorized the mail cover, and a briel

explanation of the purpose of the mail cover and

why it was initiated.

НН 55035 Do0Id:32989615

Whether or not the FBI has opened mail or caused

mail to be opened, either with or without the

permission of the

Postal Service. For all

incidents of mail opening which may have been

conducted by FBI employees or by other persons

in cooperation with the FBI, from January 1,

1960, until the present: identify the physical

Location where the mall was opened or Intercepted,

the names of the individuals who participated in

the opening, or intercept, and the purpose of the

regeng or intercept.

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Documents

The Committee requests the following additional

documents bearing on the questions stated above:

1. All documents which discuss, refer to, or

• relate to the origins, authorizations.

conduct, and termination of and procedures

for the mail covers, intercepts, and openings

Identified in 3 and

4 above.

Responsible Staff: Senior Staff

Task Force Leader

Paul Wallach

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= D.

Other Specific Techniques

As to the following techniques, the Committee's

Inquiry will Initially be confined to the General

-Questions.

As the inquiry proceeds, areas of

potential abuse and thus of specific inquiry beyond

the General Questions may develop:

I. Incommunicado detention and interrogation.

42. Photographic and television surveillance.

3. Polygraphs.

4.

including the obtaining of information

false pretext.

under

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E.

COINTELPRO and Disruptive Activities

The Committee is investigating the circumstances

surrounding the origins of, authorization for,

and

Implementation of the FBI program known as COINTEL-

PRO and any similar programs.

This inquiry may

involve allegations of abuse and controversial matters

where there is rcason to belleve improprieties may

have occurred. The scope of this investigation

covers:

I.. COINTELPRO - Communist Party USA;

2. COINTELPRO - Socialist Workers Party;

3. COINTELPRO - White Hate Groups;

4. COINTELPRO - Black Extremists;

5. COINTELPRO - New Left;

6. COINTELPRO - Special Operations (except as

targeted against hostile foreign intelligence

services);

7. - COINTELPRO - Puerto Rican Independence Groups;

8. COINTELPRO - Operation Hoodwink

9. Any other activities of the FBI which have or

have had the purpose and effect of disrupting

domestic groups or discrediting U.S. citizens,

whether or not carried out under a COINTELPRO

program.

Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI

and the Justice

Department address the following specific questions:

I.

Under what circumstances, through what proce

dures, and by whom were these programs initiated,

authorized, and terminated?

Under what circumstances and through what pro-

cedures did the FBI discover and report to the

Attorney General the existence of items 7 and &

identified above and similar disruptive activities

not included in the original review of COINTELPRO

astivities conducted by the Department of Justice

in 1974?

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3.

What were the purposes of each program?

4. In each case, by what means was it intended the

purpose would be accomplished?

5. What internal FBI procedures were adopted for

the consideration and approval of specific dis-

ruptive activities and for determining the

results of such activities?

!

6. As to each operation listed above, and any

others of a fundamentally similar

kind, identify

by type the sources of the information used

against individuals and groups for disruptive

purposes.

As to each instance in which such information

was obtained through electronic surveillance

(a)

What or who was the target of the sur-

veillance?

(b) Was the surveillance legal?

(c)

Was the surveillance conducted pursuant to

warrant?

(2)

What were the dates of the surveillance?

(e) What were the precise means of surveillance?

. (f) Who authorized the surveillance (both ..

within and without the FBI)?

(g) What was the purpose of the surveillance?

8. As to each case listed above and all fundamen-

tally similar cases, what was the legality and

•' propriety of the distruptive activities?

Should

any of the activities referred to in the above

sentence be forbidden by statute, considerec

ror luture use, or otherwise subject to statu-

tory or administrative regulation?

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9..

In what activities has, the FBI engaged since

April 28, 1971, the purpose or effect of which

has been

to disrupt domestic groups or discredit

U.S. citizens or which bear any other similarity

to the purposes or effects of COINTELPRO

activities?

10.

What restrictions, directives, or other measures

have been adopted by the FBI and the Justice

Department to limit or regulate the use of

such disruptive techniques?

The Committee will investigate all COINTELPRO and

• disruptive activities identified above. On the basis

of a review of the summaries of COINTELPRO cases prepared

for the so-called Petersen Committee, as well as other

•sources of information, the Committee will develop

further requests for information and documents.

Responsible Staff: Senior Staff

Task Force Leader

Les Seidel

Mike Epstein

Walter Ricks

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F •

..

Clandestine Informant Activities

The

• Comnittee is examining all aspects of the

FBI's use of informants, sources, and undercover

personnel and the techniques employed by such per

Although informants are the single most

productive source of intelligance information, the

difficulties of controlling their activities nay

increase the possibility of improper conduct. The

use of informants to infiltrate organizations also

may pose dangers to the right of associational pri-

vacy. Consequently, proposals have been made for

the imposition of a judicial warrant requirement

or other safeguards for the use of informants.

The Committee seeks to evaluate such proposals

well as the contributions of informants to the

accomplishment of legitimate objectives.

In addition, the Committee is examining informant

activities with respect to several particular situa-

tions and cases.

This investigation may involve

specific allegations of abuse or controversial

matters where there is reason to believe improprie-

ties may have occurred. The Committee's inquiry

covers the general circumstances surrounding the

following incidents or cases:

a. Wounded Knee;

b. Kent State;

c. • New York v. Stroble (Attica);

d. United States v. Buckalew (Gainesville) ;

e. United States v. Briggs (Camden) ;

I. New York v. Dillon (Hobart College) ;

g• United States v. Marshall (Seattle).

Additional cases may also be examined.

In addition to the above cases, the Committee is

examining the role of FBI informants in providing

information to the FBI concerning members of the

following organizations:

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a. Ku Klux Klan;

b. Students for a Democratic Society;

c. Weathermen;

d. Black Panther Party;

e. Communist Party USA;

f. W.E.B. DuBois Clubs.

Additional studies of informant activities with

respect to members of other organizations may be

formulated.

Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI and the Justice

• Department address the following specific questions:

I. With respect to both categories of cases listed

above,

what allegations, whether unfounded or

not, of improper, illegal, unethical, or provoca-

tive conduct by FBI informants have been made in

-connection with these situations or groups?

2. What measures has the FBI taken to investigate

such allegations of misconduct and to prevent

such alleged misconduct from taking place in the

future?

3. What instructions has the FBI given to its in-

formants with respect to possible improper,

Illegal, unethical, or provocative conduct?

4.

What has been the largest number of informants,

• sources, and undercover personnel in use at any

one time during each year from 1960 until the

present in connection with security, intelli-

gence, and counterintelligence matters, cases,

and programs?

5.

What has been the annual total amount of funds

(including reimbursement for expenses) paid to

informants and sources for each year from 1960

until the present?

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.6.

What limits, if any, have been placed on the

type of information

which informants have been

intrusted to report back to the FBI?

7°

What have been the annual percentage of

potential informants who became paid infor-

mants in connection with security, intelli-

gence, and counterintelligence matters, cases,

and programs from 1960 until the present?

Documents

Please provide a summary of ten cases (for each

of the following categories) where the FBI's use

of informants, sources, or undercover personnel

resulted in:

I. the conviction of an espionage agent of a

foreign government.

2. the prevention of the theft of national secu-

rity information.

3. the prevention of sabotage.

4.

the prevention of an act of violence.

5. the prevention of the carrying out of a con-

spiracy to overthrow the government.

6.. any other successful preventive actions in

furtherance of the FBI's national security

responsibilities.

Responsible staff: Senior staff

Lask force leader

Mike Epstein

Jack Smith

Walter Ricks

Pat Shea

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"Notional" Organizations

The Committee is examining the FBI's alleged

creation of the support for "notional" organizations

for intelligence or counterintelligence purposes.

Although it may rely upon informants and other

clandestine operatives, this alleged practice is

sufficiently novel to require separate attention.

Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI and the Justice

• Department address the following specific questions:

1.

What groups, organizations, movements, or other

associations has the FBI caused directly or

indirectly to be formed or created for intel-

ligence or counterintelligence purposes?

Please

provide a complete list from January 1, 1960,

to the present.

2.

What groups, organizations, movements, or

other associations has the

FBI supported finan-

cially or materially? Please provide a complete

list from

January 1, 1960, to the present.

3. In which cases has the FBI supported or created

such organizations in coordination or coopera-

tion with other agencies?

4.

How have the presence of such "notional" organi-

- zations affected the public's perception of the

movements of which they form a part?

5.

How have any FBI programs for the creation and

support of such groups been coordinated with

any similar programs undertaken by the CIA or

other. U.s. intelligence agencies?

Responsible staff: Senior staff

Task Force leader

Mike Epstein

...

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28-

H.

ins.

Joint FBI-Police Operations

The purpose of this inquiry is to examine certain

allegations

that joint FBI-police operations re-

sulted in misconduct or abuse. • These cases are

complex and involve a variety of techniques.

Nevertheless, they may indicate some of the most

serious problems which may arise in attempting to

deal with potentially violent situations.

1.

The White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan,

Mississippi

• The Committee is inquiring into the relation-

ships between the FBI and other law enforcement

agencies and private organizations in Mississippi

in connection with the White

Knights of the

Ku Klux Klan.

The purpose of the inquiry is to

determine what effect, if any, FBI activities

had on the actions of other law enforcement

agencies

and private individuals with respect

to the White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan in

Mississippi. This investigation may involve

allegations of abuses or other controversial

matters where there is reason to believe impro-

prieties may have occurred.

Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI and the

Justice Department address the following

specific questions:

a. Was this organization a target of FBI

COINTELPRO operations?

b. If so, how and by whom was it selected as

a target?

What were the purposes of any disruptive

operations directed at it?

d.

To what extent were the purposes achieved?

What disruptive techniques, if any, were

employed?

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Over what period of time did the disrup-

tive activities occur?

What evaluations were made of their effects?

h. By whom were they made?

i. What were the results of the evaluations?

j.. Were FBI informants used to infiltrate the

organization?

k.

If so, what kinds of information did the

informants gather?

1.. What activities did the informants engage

in other than information gathering?

m.

Identify by date and names the persons

involved in all contacts the FBI had with

other law enforcement agencies and private

groups and individuals with respect to

alleged Klan bombings of Jewish synagogues

and the homes of Jewish leaders in Meridian,

Mississippi, during May - August 1968.

Responsible staff: Senior staff

Task Force leader

Jack Smith

Les Seidel

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30 --

2.

The Black Panther Party, Chicago

The Committee is inquiring into the relation-

ships between the FBI and other law enforce-

ment agencies in the Chicago area in connec-

tion with the Chicago chapter of the Black

Panther Party. The purpose of the inquiry

is

to determine what effect, if any, FBI activities

had on the actions of other law enforcement and

intelligence agencies with respect to the Black

Panther Party. in the Chicago area. This inves-

son to believe improprieties may have occurred.

Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI and the

Justice Department address the following

specific questions:

a.

Was the Chicago chapter of the Black

Panther Party a target of FBI COINTELPRO

operations?

b.

If so, how

and by whom was it selected as

a target?

What were the purposes of any disruptive

operations directed at it?

_d. To what extent were the purposes achieved?

e. What disruptive techniques, if any, were employed?

I. Over what period of time did the disruptive

activities occur?

g. What evaluations were made of their effects?

h. By whom were they made?

1. If FBI informants were used to infiltrate

the organization, what kinds of information

did the informants gather?

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:.

- 31--

j.

What techniques did the informants employ

to gather the information?

K.

•1.'

m.

Were the techniques used by the informants

all approved and monitored by the FBI? If

not, which were not so approved?

What activities did the informants engage

in other than information gathering?

What other methods and sources did the FBI

use to gather intelligence on the organiza-

tion?

n. If electronic surveillance was used, how

• did the use of such surveillance relate to

each of the general questions?

To what extent was information on persons

and groups not members of or

affiliated

with the Black Panther Party gathered,

stored, or disseminated by the FBI as a

result

of its investigations of the organi-

zation?

Responsible staff: Senior staff

Task Force leader

Walter Ricks

Chris Pyle

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-

I..

The "Huston Plan"

The Committee is examining the FBI's role in the

disposition of the report of the Interagency Com-

mittee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc) in 1970.

This

report as submitted to the President included cer-

tain options which were specifically identified as

• It purported to represent the joint

recommendations of all members of the U. S. intel-

ligence community, but EBI Director J. Edgar

Hoover disagreed in a series of footnotes.

The serious consideration given to such al-.

legedly illegal proposals gives this case

othe utmost significance.for the Committee's under-

standing of the risks of uncontrolled intelligence

activity. This case may involve specific allega-

tions of abuse and controversial matters where

there is reason to believe improprieties may have

occurred.

Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI and the Justice

Department address the following specific questions:

I. What contacts occurred between Tom Charles

Huston and personnel of the FBI and the Depart-

ment of Justice during 1969 and 1970? Identify

by date and names of persons involved.

2. What was the purpose of each

such contact?

3. ° With respect to any assistance provided to the

Interdepartmental Committee on Intelligence

(Ad Hoc) by personnel of the FBI:

a. Who were the FBI participants?

b. What kind of assistance was provided?

What was the role of the FBI in preparing

the various drafts of

the special report

of the Committee?

HH 55035 DocId: 32989615 Page 117.

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4.

5.

6.

What were the specific arguments advanced

for the inclusion of the allegedly illegal

options in the special report submitted for

the President's consideration? Were other

allegedly illegal options considered and

rejected?

Were any measures taken by the FBI to imple-

ment specific elements of the Huston Plan?

This includes both the allegedly "illegal"

aspects and other provisions such as the

expanded recruitment of 18-21 year old infor-

What are the present views of the FBI and

the Department of Justice as

to the legality

and propriety of the various

options included

in the special report?

Responsible staff:

Senior staff

Task Force leader

Barbara Banoff

Loch Johnson

NH 55035 DocId:32989615 Page 118

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Jia.

Alleged Political Misuse of the FBI

The Committee is investigating allegations that

the intelligence and investigative resources of

the FBI have been misused by various Presidents,

Attorneys General, Members of Congress, and FBI

executives themselves.

This subject may involve

specific allegations of abuse and other contro-

versial matters where there is reason to believe

Improprieties may have occurred.

Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI and the Justice

Department address the following specific questions:

1.

Have persons outside the FBI sought the FBI's

assistance for partisan political purposes or

personal advantage?

Please identify each

instance by the name of the person seeking to

so use the FBI, the date, and the nature of the

assistance sought.

2.

In each such case, what has been the response

of the

• FBI?

3.

Have persons inside or outside the FBI sought

to employ the resources of the FBI for purposes

outside the FBI's authority?

Please identify

each instance by the name of the person seeking

to so use the FBI, the date, and the purpose

"for which the person sought to use the FBI.

4.

In each such case, what has been the response

of the FBI?

•5.

What measures has the FBI employed to

a. Respond to critics.

b. Affect the reputation or credibility of or

otherwise discredit critics.

6. What were the nature, purpose, duration, and

results of Project INLET involving preparation

of an intelligence letter for the President

and other Executive officials?

NH 55035 DocId: 32989615 Page 119

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7.

With respect to any so-called "secret files"

maintained within the FBI,

including the

"official and confidential" and"personal and

confidential! files maintained by the executive

assistant to the FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover

on his behalf until the time of his death, the

Committee seeks to establish the contents

of

such files, the circumstances surrounding the

transfer of a portion

of such files within the

Bureau at the time of Director Hoover's death,

the transfer of a portion of such files to

Mr. Hoover's residence, the destruction of any

such Illes, the transier or any such Illes Iron

Mr. Hoover's residence, the use of intormatior

within such files, and their relationship to

the official investigative files of the FBI.

The Committee desires all information bearing

on these matters, including the results of

any inquiries conducted within the FBI and

the Department of Justice.

8.

What measures have been taken to ensure that the

intelligence and investigative resources of the

FBI are not misused for political purposes or

personal advantage.

9. What additional measures should be taken?

Responsible Staff: Senior Staff

Task Force Leader

Mark Gitenstein

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IV.

Department of Justice

The Committee is examining activities of divisions of

the Justice Department other than the FBI which perforn.

internal security and intelligence functions. The pur-

pose of these inquiries is to determine whether these

functions have been carried out in conformity with the

rule, of law.

A.

The Attorney General

The Committee is studying the functions of the

Attorney General with respect to the supervision

"of and policy-making for internal security and

a superladon

The Committee seeks to

determine whether his duties are properly defined

and his office properly organized to perform

these functions effectively.

Questions

• The Committee requests that the Justice Department

address the following specific questions:

l. To what extent has the Attorney General been

involved in the consideration or approval of

-the policies and activities of U. S. foreign

and military intelligence agencies?

2. Has the Justice Department made any agree-

ments with the CIA or any other U. S. intelli-

gence agency with regard to the investigation

• or prosecution of agency personnel?

3. Under what circumstances and for what purposes

has the Office of Legal Counsel provided legal

advice to the Attorney General on matters per-

taining to foreign and domestic intelligence

activities?

4.

To what extent has the Attorney General

authorized cooperation, including the exchange

of information and the conduct of joint opera-

tions, between the Drug Enforcement Administra-

tion or its predecessors and the CIA or other

HH 55035

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intelligence agencies with respect to narcotics

intelligence?

5.

What standards and procedures has the Attorney

General adopted for:.

a :

The collection, analysis, use, and dis-

semination of narcotics intelligence.

b.

The collection, analysis, use, and dis-

semination of organized crime

intelligence.

The use of intelligence information by the

Immigration and Naturalization Service.

d.

Law Enforcement Assistance Administration

grants for the support of state or local

police intelligence activities and intel-

ligence data systems.

6.

To what extent have communications between the

White House and the FBI or other agencies

under the jurisdiction of the Attorney General

bypassed the Attorney General?

To what extent

should such communications be channeled through

- the Attorney General?

7°

What have been the policies and procedures of

the Justice Department for evaluating the

budget requests of the FBI for intelligence

and counterintelligence activities?

Responsible staff: Senior staff

Task Force leader

Mark Gitenstein

Barbara Banoff

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B.

The Internal Security Section (formerly Division)

The Committee is examining the activities of the

•Internal Security Section of the Justice Depart-

ment and its predecessor, the Internal Security

' Division.

These entities have supervised the

Department's internal security law enforcement

activities, coordinated certain interdepartmental

intérnal security policies, and engaged in the

collection, analysis, and dissemination if intelli-

gence.

Questions

The Committee requests that the Justice Department

address. the

• following specific questions:

1.

2.

Under what circumstances, if any, has the

Justice Department seriously considered prose-

cutions under the Smith Act and laws pertain-

ing to seditious

conspiracy, rebellion, or

insurrection, or "subversive activities",

since January 1, 1960?

To what extent has FBI intelligence activity

provided valuable evidence for use in the

prosecution of specific federal crimes?

3.

What have been the practices and procedures

for coordination of policy through the Inter-

departmental Committee on Internal Security?

What have been the practices and procedures

Ho for the interdepartmental and interagency

evaluation of domestic intelligence and

domestic collection of foreign intelligence

through the Intelligence Evaluation Committee

and its predecessors?

5. With respect to the Interdivisional Intelli-

gence Unit and the Analysis and Evaluation

Section of the Internal Security Division,

What have been the practices and proce-

dures of the Unit and Section for the

gathering of intelligence?

:

H# 55035 DocId:32989615 Page 123

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*

- 39 -

b.

e.

What type of information has been stored

in readily retrievable form by the Unit

and

Section?

To whom and for what reasons has intelli-

gence information been disseminated by

the Unit and Section?

•₫.

What were the reasons for the submission

of IDIU computer printouts to the CIA, as

reportedly occurred in 1969?

e.

To what extent did the Unit and Section

make specific requests to other agencies

within and outside the Justice Department

for intelligence information?

With respect to the use of grand juries by

the Special Litigation Section of

the Internal

security Division,

a. .

Have any allegations of misuse of the grand

jury process in cases handled by Special

Litigation Section attorneys come to the

attention of the Department? If so,

briefly describe each such allegation and

what, if any, action was taken by the

Department in response to such allegation.

b.

To what extent, if any, did the use of

grand juries in cases

handled by the Special

Litigation Section attorneys differ from the

use of grand juries in cases handled by

other sections of the Justice Department?

c.

To what extent, if any, was information

obtained through the use of grand juries

included in the intelligence files of the

Interdivisional Intelligence. Unit or the

Analysis and Evaluation Section?

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40

'T. What have been the practices and procedures

of the Internal Security Division and the

Departmental Security Office for advising the

Attorney General and other executive agencies

with regard to the Federal Employee Security

Program?

Responsible staff:

Senior staff

Task Force leader

Barbara Banoff

•..

IN 55035 DocId:32989615 Page 125

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## Page 126

FRANK CHUACH, LUNHO CHAL

JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICI CHAI MAN

"HILIP A. BART, MIGH

HAND H, BANER, IN., TENN.

BARK, LOT DIMATER. ARIL

CHLANE'S MCC. MATHIAS. JR., HD.

ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.

пане макт. 1019.

RiCHARD S. SCHWEINER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR

• FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, IR., CHIEF COUNSEL

CURTIS R, SMOTHENS, MINORITY COUNSCL

Г.6

Dinites Biaies

Barrate

SELECT COSMITTEE TO

STUDY GOVERNIENT': OPERATIONS WITH

RESPECT TO INTELI LENCE ACTIVITiES

(PURSUANT TO S. RISE, JITH CONGRESS)

WASHINGTO:i.D.C. 20510

June 27, 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREINIS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE: 10/13/00

BY SPEALM EM

The Honorable Edward H. Levi

Attorney General

U. S. Department of Justice

Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

si:.: :11975.

Gi

Enclosed

with this letter are notifications.

concerning certain

matters currently under investigation

by the Select Comittee which relate to government entities

under your jurisdiction.

These notifications are submitted pürsuant to

an agreement between the committee, the various intel-

gence entities, and the White House. Pursuant to trat

agreement, the

various entivies in the Executive Branch

have agreed not only to make available ine pertinent

witnesses, but also to submit in response all informasion

and

areas and cases which the committee wishes to investigate.

The response should include all relevant underlying docu-

mentation and oiner information, including documents

which may not have come to the committees attention ano

which the committee has not specifically requested, und

all material relating to any prior Executive branch inquiry

into the matter.

In addition, we would nelcome a current

analysis of the particular questions raised by the Commit-

tee and any other observations on the seject that yobusine fall:

believe would be helpful.

DENCE OF LE:

We welcome the promise of cooperation and fut

disclosure that underlies that agreement.

saccess in rui

filling the full disclosure policy contained:in the gree

recommenaations.

3 11 GENICE DE LEGISLATIVE

#: +4159-92975 take trist steel de

it-s: 158

FIDENAL EJ. DE 1:3

55035 DocId: 32989615

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3

The Honorable Edward H. Levi

Page

THO

June 27, 1975

Within the Committee mandate, contained in

S. Res. 21, there are four broad subjects relating to

the

intelligence community which we are required to investi-

gate and study in order to determine tne

facts and ulti-

mately to decide whether to make recommengations for

legislative or other changes. • They are:

1. The structure, performance, and utility of

government operations with

respect to intel-

ligence activities.

2.

3°

Whether certain policies or practices are

or are not illegal, unethical, or otherwise

improper:

Whether there has or has not been excessive

duplication or inadequate coordination be-

tween and among intelligence agencies and,

more generally, the efficiency of intelli

gence activities.

4.

Whether there has or has not been adequate

internal and external control and oversight

over the policies and practices of intelli-

gence agencies.

In attempting to find the answers to these funda-

mental questions, the Committee is proceeding in two ways.

First, we are examining intelligence functions broadly as

instruments of government policy, giving attention to the

authority for particular functions, the problems which

intelligence activitles are designed to solve, the proce-

lures by which intellicence activities are and have been

proposed, approved, executed, evaluated, and terminated,

the range and scope of the activities utilized to achieve

intelligence objectives, and the propriety and utility of

the activities undertaken.

Second, we will examine in

depth certain subjects within the broad topics of inves-

tigation. (We would, of course, welcome your suggestion

cases that would give added insight into intelli-

gence matters under your, jurisaiction.

These specific

subjects for investigation are not intended to limit the

scope contained in the more general questions.

42012

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## Page 128

The Honorable Edward H. Levi

Page Three

tat

June 27, 1975

The annexed notifications spell these matters

out in greater detail. In addition, they ask certain.

specific questions, set forth certain previously requested

documents not yet received, request additional documents,

and, in some cases, ask for the names and present addresses

of persons who have

held certain positions.

Where appro-

priate, the subject's description indicates that, pursuant

primarily concerns allegations of abuse or other contro-

versial specific matters where there is reason to believe

Improprieties may have dçcurrea. Finally, the notifications

Indicate the name(s) of the staff member(s) who, in addition

to the Committee's senior staff, will be responsible for the

particular matters.

The Committee, in the course of the next few

months, will undertake other subjects for investigation

as its work proceeds and will notify you as appropriate.

We look forward to your cooperation in these

matters.

Sincerely yours,

Frank Church

Chairman

Ton Tower

Vice Chairman

evel

These specific requests are not, of course, intended

to limit the agreement to come forward with all rele-

vant information and material, including documents, whether

or not they have been brought

to the committee's attention

or have been specifically requested by the Comnittee.

і інти

HW 55035 DocId:32989615 Page 128

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

(Including DEPARIMENT OF JUSTICE)

Table of Contents

I. Issues

II. Areas of General Inquiry

A.

Legal Authority for FBI Intelligence and

Counterintelligence Activities

B.

Organization and Operation 'of the FBI

intelligence Division

1. FBI Internal Security Intelligence

Operations

2. The FBI and the U. S. Intelligence

Community

3. FBI Foreign Counterintelligence

Operations

4. Inspection Division Investigations

5. • FBI Intelligence Activities and State

or Local Law Enforcement Agencies

III. Case Studies

General Questions

A. Electronic Surveillance

1. Warrantless Electronic Surveillance

Warrantless Electronic Surveillance

and

"Leaks"

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 1013/02 BY SpALsel

#MDR-16

Page

1

3

3

3

4

4

5°

5

7

7

9

9

11

ENGLOSURE

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-ii

3. Electronic Surveillance of

Dr. Martin Luther King

4. Electronic Surveillance and the

Democratic National Convention,

Atlantic City, 1964

B. Surreptitious Entry

C. Mail Covers and Mail Openings

•D. Other Specific Techniques

•E. COINTELPRO and Disruptive Activities

F.

Clandestine Informant Activities

G. "Notional" Organizations

H. Joint EBI-Police, Operations

I. White Knights of the Ku Klux klan,

Mississippi

2. Black Panther Party, Chicago

I. The "Huston Plan"

J. Alleged Political Misuse of the FBI

IV. Department of Justice

A. The Attorney General

B. The Internal Security Section (formerly

Bivision)

1H Man D0eTd 72989615 Page 130.

Page

13

15

17

18

20

21

24

27

28

28

30 •

32.

34

36

36

38

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVES

TIION

(INCLUDING DEPAIIENT ON JUSTICE)

I.

Issues

The Committee's inquiry into the intelligence and

counterintelligence activities of the Federal Bureau

of Investigation

I's examining fundamental issues which

bear directly on

the adequacy of current legislation

and administrative organization and proccoure:

Il:e

Committee seeks to determine whether FBI intelligence

counterintelligence activities achieve legitimate

objectives in conformity with

the rule of law.

Among

the basic issues to be addressed are the following:

A .

B.

What Is the legal authority for FBI intelligence

and counterintelligence activities? Should the

FBI's authority be clarified or revised or

incorporated in a comprehensive statutory

charter?

what limitations are placed on FBI Intelligence

and counterintelligence

activities by the

Constitution and laws of the United States?.

Should these limitations be clarified or

revised?

C.

What have been the purposes and aims of FBI

intelligence

and counterintelligence

activities?

Should these objéctives be modified?

D.

How have the

intelligence and counterintelligence

activities of the FBI been organized and coordinated

with other agencies of government?

Should these

procedures and practices be

revised?

E.

What have been the procedures for and techniques

of intelligence gathering and dissemination and

counterintelligence operations used by the FBI?

Under what conditions and through what procedures

should these methods and techniques

be used in

the future?

F.

What have been and should be the mechanisms

for

internal and external policy-making, control,

and supervision of FBI intelligence

and counter-

Intelligence activities?

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As a means of examining the above issues in the

sontext of actual FBI intelligence operations,

the committee intends to siudy certain specific

topics, some of which are general in nature, and

others of which involve specific cases, programs

or techniques.

Part Il, below, contains

descriptions

of the general areas into which the committee: intonds

to inquire.

zait Ill contains descriptions or ire

specific cases mentioned above.

The descriptions

specifically indicate whether the investigation nay

concentrate on specific allegations of possible

abuses or other controversial matters where there

Is reason to believe improprieties may have occurred.

In addition to the topics described below, additional

areas of inquiry may, develop during the course of the

Committee's work.

2008-26.20

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-3-

-

II. Areas of General inquiry

A.

Legal Authority. for FBI Intelligence and Counter-

intelligence Activities

B.

The Committee is examining the legal basis for FBI

intelligence and cointerintelligence activities.

There may be serious question as to the adequicy

of the present legislative framework for the rol's

functions in these fields. Current statutes

authorize the FBI to perform investigative and law

enforcement functions, but they do not specifically

authorize intelligence

or counterintelligence

'activities.

the committee seeks to

determine whether the FBI's authority should be

clarified, revised, or incorporated in a compre-

hensive

statutory charter.

Responsible staff: Senior staff

Task Force leader

Mark Gitenstein

Organization and Operation of the FBI Intelli-

gence Division

• The Committee is investigating the structure and

operating practices of the FBI Intelligence Divi-

sion.

Proposals have been made that the national

security intelligence and counterintelligence

functions of the FBI should be lodged in a

separate

agency or otherwise separated from the FBI's

criminal investigative activities.

Further recom-

mendations have been advanced for

improved coordina-

tion between the FBI and other intelligence agencies,

for strengthened

supervision of

FBI intelligence and

counterintelligence activities by the Attorney

General or an independent board, and for clearer

standards and procedures for FBI activities in this

area.

Therefore, the Committee desires complete

information on the operating practices and proce-

dures of the FBI Intelligence Division and of the

field office activities supervised by the Intelli-

gence Division.

прo+(749414504th

==12

HH 55035 DocId: 32989615 Page 133

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-4-

The Committee's inquiry

focuses on the folloing

specific areas:

I. FBI Internal Security Intelligence Operations

The Committce

seeks to determine the nature

and purpose of FBI intelligence operations

direcied at foreign intelligence accivities

and subversive or extremist activities within

the United States.

It has been alleged that

the scope of FBI intelligence investigations

is too broad and has extended to legitimate

Consequently, the com-

mittee must examine how the FBI's responsibili

ties have been defined.

Responsible staff: Senior staff

Task Force leader

Mark Gitenstein

2. The FBI and the U.S. Intelligence Community

The Committee seeks to determine what have

been the policies and procedures for coordina-

tion between the FBI and other agencies in the

• U:S. intelligence community.

There have been

past where friction between

the FBI and other agencies has produced serious

dissatisfaction within the U. S. intelligence

community.

The purpose of this

inquiry is to

evaluate the adequacy of past and present co-

•ordinating mechanisms.

Responsible staff: Senior staff

Task Force leader

Mark Gitenstein

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3. FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Operations

• The Committee seeks to determine the nature of

FBI counterintelligence operations directed at

foreign intelligence activities within the

United States or at any other hostile foreign-

related activities ..ithin the United States.

Since FBI operations

to "counter" these activi-

ties go beyond intelligence collection, the

Committee must consider whether such practices

require statutory authorization.

The impact

of counterintelligence operations on United

States foreign relations will also be considered..

48.

Responsible stair: Senior staff

Task Force leader

Loch Johnson

Barbara banoif

Inspection Division Investigations

The Committee is examining the relationship

of the FBI Inspection Division to FBI intelli-

gence and counterintelligence activities.

This

includes both regular Inspection Division

reviews

of. Intelligence Division and field

office functions and specific investigations

of allegations of improper conduct in connec-

tion with FBI intelligence activities.

_Responsible staff: Senior staff

Task Force leader

Mark Gitenstein

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-=6-

5.

FBI Intelligence Activities and State or Local

Law Enforcement Agencies

The Committce seeks to determine the nature of

che relationsnips bauween aBl irtelligence

activities and state and local law enforcement

agencies.

This subject involves the deliate

balance between the necessary contralization

of certain law enforcement activities and che

Constitutionally-mandated decentralization of

general law enforcement responsibility.

necessary for the Committee to evaluate the

centralizing influence of the FBI, as well as

the FBI's role as a check on local law enforce-•

ment abuses.

Responsible

staff: Senior staff

Task Force leader

Mark Gitenstein

walter Ricks

HN 55035 DocLd:32989615 Pade .136

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ITT. Case studies

General Questions

The descriptions which follow of the specific cases the

Committee intends to study are, intended. üo serve the

dual purpose of notifying the tBI of the issues the

Committee will explore in connection with each case

and eliciting from the FBI all information and material

in its possession relating to the questions the Committee

wishes to explore in each case. In order to avoia

unnecessary repetition of certain questions which will

be basic to. the Committee's investigations of each

case, certain fundanental questions are set forth

below. As to each case described, the committee

intends to explore these fundamental questions, and

expects that the FBl will, as to each case, provide

all information and material it has relating to these

basic questions even though they are not repeated

the discussion of each particular area.

I. What is or has been the legal authority for the

activity?

2. What have been the purposes of the activity?

3. What techniques have been employed in the activity?

4. What kinds of information have been gaühered in

the activity?

5. How have specific uses of the activity been initiated

and approved?

6. How have the targets for the activity been selected?

?. What have been the criteria for target selection?

8. How has the intelligence which is collected been

used?

9.

To whom has the intelligence coilected been dis-

seminated?

10. What has been the basis for any dissemination with

respect to each

recipient?

11.

How has the activity been coordinated with other

intefligence agencies?

• Sesa

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-'8

12.

13.

14.

What have been the effects of this coordinat un?

Io what extent has each of the foregoing been com-

patible with the legal authority for and the purposes

of the activity?

By what means has the activity been maiitores,

controlled and administered?

15.

What are the potential abuses to which the activity

• may lead?

16. To what abuses has the activity led?

17.

What steps have

been taken to investigate

such

abuses?

s'18. What

steps have been taken to avoid such abuses?

19. What have been the costs and utility of the

activity?

In some instances, the specific questions set forth

below may appear

to repeat some of the general questions.

The purpose

in such cases is simply to clarily the appli-

cation

of. the

general question to the specific case.

Except where inapplicable by their terms, all general

questions reiate to each specific case.

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--9

A.

Electronic Surveillance

The Committee is examining all forms of electronic

interception of communications including wiretap-

o exam no 323

ping; electronic eavesaropping, consensual elec-

tronic surveillance intercention of. video and iata

communications, local monitoring dcvices, and all

other forms of electronic or technical monitoring.

The Committee's general questions

apply to each of

the techniques listed above, as well as to the

matters

set forth in the following specific cases.

° 1.

Warrantless Electronic Surveillance

The connittee seeks to determine whether the

Attorney General should have the authority

to authorize electronic surveillance for cer-

tain purposes without a prior judicial warrant.

This power

has been exercised by succeeding

Attorneys

General since 1940, upon the explicit

directive of the President.

The Supreme Court

• has ruled that this power does not extena to

purely domestic matters, but the remaining scope

of the

Attorney General's authority remains in-

defined by the supreme court..

Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI and the

Justice Department address the following specific

• questions:

a. What is the scope and basis of the claim

of. Executive authority to conduct warrant-

less electronic surveillance?

b.

What have been the procedures for considera-

tion and approval of requests for warrantless

electronic surveillance authorized by the

Attorney General?

C.

What are the specific disadvantages of

the

judicial

warrant requirement for those

electronic surveillances which have been

authorized by the Attorney General?

+ 779551554

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-10 ..

d.

Does the Fourth Amenament permit the

issuance of judicial warrants for elec-

tronic surveillance on grounds other than

ordinary probable cause where national

security intelligence purposes

are advanced

to justify the surveillance?

e.

To what extent are the specific proccdures

of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control

Act of 1968 inappropriate for electronic

surveillance conducted for national secu-

rity intelligence purposes?

Documents

The Committee requests the following additional

documents bearing on the questions

stated above:

a. All written justifications for the specific

authorizations by the Attorney General for

warrantless electronic surveillance from

January 1, 1960, until the present.

b.

All documents reflecting the derial by the

Attorney General of specific requests for

warrantless electronic surveillance from

January 1, 1960, until the present.

Committee staff access to information con-

tained in the impounded documents, deposi-

tions, and other materials in all

pending

civil

suits which involve warrantless

electronic surveillance and in which the

Committee has received the consent of the

plaintiffs for such access.

Responsible staff:

Senior staff

Task Force leader

Mike Epstein

compromit aida to in

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2.

Warrantless Electronic Surveillance and

"Leaks"

The Committee 1s examining several instances of

the use of warrantless electronic surveillance

and other investigative techniques in connection

with "leaks" of classified informaiion.

These

cases may involve specific allegations of abuse

or other controversial matters where there is

reason to believe inproprieties may have

occurred. These instances include:

a.

The investigation of alleged "leaks" by or

to 17 Executive officials and newsmen

• between May 2969 and February 1971.

b.

The investigation of alleged "leaks" from

a military staff member assigned to the

National Security Council in 1971-72.

C.

The reported investigation of columnist

Joseph Kraft in 1969.

d.

The reported investigation of the activities

of Mrs. Anna Chennault and Vice Presidential

candidate Spiro Agnew in 1968.

e. Any other instances of warrantless electronic

surveillance in connection with the investi-

gation of

"leaks" to the press.

• Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI and the

Justice Department address the following specific

questions:

Through what procedures and by whom were

each of these electronic surveillances auth-

orized and approved, continued, and terminated?

b.

As to each person to whom information was

disseminated, please state:

(1) The nature of the information.

(2) The basis for the dissemination.

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(3) The date of each dissemination.

(4) The use which was in fact made of the

Information by the recipient. .

What evaluations

were made of the original

grounas for the surveillance as it progressea:

d.

e.

What were the results of the evaluations?

Who made them?

What are the reasons

for use of electronic

surveillance without judicial warrant to

Investigate "leaks" of classified information

to the

press?

How does each of the above instances

relate

to these

reasons?

h. To what extent would requirement of a

warrant interfere with the

ability to

detect

such leaks?

Responsible staff: Senior staff

Task Force leader

Mark Gitenstein

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Surveillance of Dr. Martin Luther King

This investigation examines the authorization for,

conduct and termination of, and deliberations

regarding the surveillance of Dr. King.

This case

may involve specific a legations of abuses and other

controversial muters where there is reason to be-

Tieve improprieties may have occurred.

Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI and the

• Justice Department address the

following specific

questions:

Through what procedures and by whom were

wiretaps and electronic bugs of Dr. King

Initiated, approved, continued, and termina-

ted?

What were the locations, extent, and

duration of the electonic surveillances

of Dr. King?

C.

What were the grounds of national security,

I1 any, for the introduction of the electronis

surveillances of Dr. King?

d. What was the relationship between the information

collected and each of the purposes of the

surveillance?

e.

What evaluations were made of the original

grounds for the surveillance as it progressed?

I. What were the results of those evaluatiors?

g. Who made them?

h.

What periodic evaluations were made of the

relationship between the inormation being

collected and the original objectives of the

surveillance?

1. What were the results of the evaluations?

j. Who made them?

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To whom were any results of the

surveillance disseminated?

1.

As toeach person to whom information was

disseminated, please state

' (1) The nature of the information.

(2) The basis for the dissemination.

(3) The date of each dissemination.

(4) The use which was in fact made of

the Information.

Responsible staff:

Senior staff

Task Force Leader

Mike Epstein

370020.744717

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-15.

4.

Surveillance at the Democratic National-

Convention, Atlantic City, 1964

The Committee is examining the use of

surveillance and other intelligence operations

in Atlantic City, New Jersey, on or about the

time of the Democraiic National Convention in

1964.

This case may involve specirie alterations

of abuses and other controversial matters inere

there is reason to believe improprieties may

have occurred.

Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI and the Justice

Department address the following specific questions:

a. Did the FBI conduct electronic surveillance

and other intelligence operations at this

time and place?

b. Who were the targets?

Through what procedures and by whom were the

decisions made to engage in electronic

surveillance and intelligence operations

at this time and

I place?

d. What were the nature, extent, and duration

of the electronic surveillance and other

intelligence operations at this time and

place?

e. What was the relationship between each target

selected

and

the purpose of the surveillance?

fo Was the

FBI requested to conduct such

surveillance by any person or organization

outside

• the FBI?

g. If.

. so, by whom, when, and for what stated

reason?

h. To whom were the results of the surveillance

disseminated?

I. As to each person whom information was

disseminated, please state

TH 35039 DUCIT-3290

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(1) The nature of the information.

(2) The

basis for the dissemination.

(3) The date of each dissemination..

•14? The use which was in fact made of

the information.

Responsible staff: Senior Staff

Task Force Leader

Mike Epstein

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"Et

Bro

Surreptitious Entry

The purpose of this inquiry is to determine the

extent to which the FBI has

used surreptitious

entry as an intelligence technique, either througn

Its own operations or through operations by ocher

agencies and individuals.

This cose may involve

allegations of abuse and controversial matters

where there is reason to believe improprieties

, may have occurred.

Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI and the Justice

Department address the following specific questions:

I. What are the scope and basis of the claim of

Executive authority to conduct warrantless

surreptitious entry as asserted by the

Department'of Justice in United States v.

Ehrlichman?

2. What surreptitious entries have been carried

out by the FBI or by another government agency

with the knowledge of the FBI from January 1,

no pease

1960, to the present? Please list by date,

place, and target.

3 c

As to any instance in which the FBI has refused .

to comply with another agency's request for

surreptitious entry, what was

a. The basis for the refusal?

b. The reason given for the request?

4. What procedures were employed to authorize any

surreptitious entry identified under 2, and who

authorized each such entry?

5.

To the extent applicable by their terms, each

of

the above questions and the General Questions

will be explored specifically with reference to

any entry or proposed

entry at an embassy in

May 1972...

Responsible Staff:

Senior Starf

Task Force Leader

Mike Epstein

Paul Wallach

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÷18

Mail Covers and liail Openings

The Committee is examining the conduct of mail covers

and mail openings by or on behalf of the FBI and any

instances of mail openings or intercepts which ay

have been conducted by or on behalf of the fBI.

This

inguiry

belleve improprieties may have occurred.

Questions

The Committee requests

that the FBI and the Justice

• Department address the following speciric questions: •

aI. The speciflo purposes of all mail covers conducted

in connection with FBI intelligence and counter-

intelligence activities.

This includes all

documents pertaining to

FBI decisions to request

Postal Service mail covers and lists of all

subjects upon whom mail covers have been placed

as a result of FBI requests since January I, 1960.

2.=

The procedures and practices for the dissemination

of information from mail covers requested cy the

FBI. This includes a list of all entities to nom

mail cover information has been disseminated since

January I, 1960.

30

Whether or not FBI personnel may have conducted

mail covers in violation of existing Postal

Service

regulations.

For any mail covers which may have

been conducted by FBI personnel of for the FBI sy

persons other than Postal Service employees, from

January 1, 1960, to the present: Identify the

physical location where the mail cover was

conducted, the names of all persons who participated

in and authorized the mail cover, and a brier

explanation of the purpose of the

mail cover and

why It was Initiated.

Whether or not the FBI has opened mail or caused

nail to be opened, either with or without the

permission of the Postal Service. For all

incidents of mail opening which may have been

conducted by FBI employees or by other persons

in cooperation with the FBI, from January I,

1960, until the present: identify the physical

Incation where the mail was opened or Intercepted,

the names of the Individuals who participated in

the opening, or intercept, and the

purpose. on the

opening or intercept

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Documents

The Committee requests the following additional

documents bearing on the questions stated above:

1. All documents which discuss, refer to, or

for the

mail covers, intercepts, and openings

Identified in 3 and

4 above.

Responsible Staff: Senior Staff

Task Force Leader

Paul

Wallach

. *

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- 20.

D .

Other Specific Techniques

As to the following techniques, the Committee's

Inquiry will 'initially be confined to the General

Questions.

As the inquiry proceeds, areas of

potential

abuse and thus of specific inquiry beyond

the General Questions may develod:

I. Incommunicado detention and interrogation.

• 2. Photographic and television surveillance.

3. Polygraphs.

1 The obtaining of bank, credit, school, anc

cher peisonal records and information.

Including the obtaining of information

under

false pretext.

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COINTELPRO and Disruptive Activities

The Committee is investigating the circumstances

surrounding the

origins of, authorization for, and

Implementation of the FBI program known as COINIEL-

PRO and any similar programs.

This inquiry may

Involve allegations of abuse

and controversiat

matters

Where there is reason to bellove impropricties nay

have occurred. The scope of this investigation

covers:

2. COINTELPRO - Communist Party USA;

2. COINTELPRO - Socialist Workers Party;

3. COINTELPRO - White Hate Groups;

4. COINTELPRO - Black Extremists;

5%. COINTELPRO":

- New Left;

6. COINTELPRO - Special Operations (except as

targeted

against hostile foreign intelligence

services);

7. COINTELPRO - Puerto Rican Independence Groups;

8. COINTELPRO - Operation Hoodwink

9.

Any other activities of the FBI which have or

have had the purpose and effect of disrupting

domestic groups or discrediting U.s. citizens,

whether or not carried out under a COINTELPRO

program.

Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI

and the Justice

Department address the following specific questions:

I Under what circumstances, through what proce-

dures, and by whom were these programs initiatea,

authorized, and terminated?

Under what circumstances and through what pro-

cedures did the FBI discover and report to the

Attorney General the existence of items 7 and 8

identified above. and similar disruptive activities

not included in

the original review of COINTELPRO

astivities

conducted by the Department of Justice

In 1974?

22222077

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3. What were the purposes of each program?

4.

In each

case, by what means

was it intended cha

purpose would be accomplished?

i .=

5.

What internal FBI procedures were adopted for

the consideration iind approval.of specific dis-

ruptive activities

and for deternining tie

results of such activities?

6.

As to each operation listed above, and any

others of a fundamentally similar

kind, identify

by type the sources of the information used

against individuals and groups for disruptive

purposes.

As to each instance in which such information

was obtained

through electronic surveillance

(a) What, or who was the target of the sur-

veillance?

(b) Was the surveillance legal?

(c) Was the

surveillance conducted pursuant to

warrant?

(a) What were the dates of the surveillance?

(e) What were the precise means of surveillance?

- (f) Who authorized the surveillance (both

within and without the FBI)?

(g) What was the purpose of the surveillance?

8. As to each case listed above and all fundamen-

tally similar cases, what was the legality anc

•propriety of the distruptive activities? should

'of the activities referred to in the above

sentence be lorbidden by statute, considered

ior Iuture use, or otherwise subject to statu-

tory or administrative regulation?

Jin?

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9.

10.

In what activities has the fBi engaged sire

April 28, 1971, the purpose or effect of

'which

has been

to disrupt domestic groups or discredit

U.S. citizens or which bear any other similarity

to the purposes or effects of COINTELPRO

activities?

What restrictions, directives, or other neasures

have

been adopted

by the FBI and the Justica

Department to limit or regulate the use of

such disruptive techniques?

The Committee will investigate all COINTELPRO and

- disruptive activities identified above.

On the basis

of a review of the summaries of COINTELPRO cases prepared.

for the so-called Petersen Committee, as well as other

• * Sources

of information,

the Committee will develop

further

requests for information and documents.

Responsible Staff:, Senior Staff

Task Force Leader

Les Seidel

Mike Epstein

Walter Ricks

1239

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-. 24.

-

Clandestine Informant Activities

The Comnittee is examining all aspects of the

FBI's use of

intormants, sources, and undercover

personnel and

the techniques emploved by such der-

sons.

Although informants are the single most

productive source of intelligence infoonatio.,

The

difficulties of contro-iing their activities t2y

increase the possibility of improper conduct.

The

use of informants to infiltrate organizations also

may pose dangers to the right of associational pii-

Consequently, proposals have been made for

the imposition of a

judicial warrant requirement

or other safeguards for the use of informants.

The committee seeks to evaluate such proposais as

well as the contributions of informants to the

accomplishment of legitimate objectives.

In addition, the Committee. is examining informant

activities with respect to

several particular situa-

tions and cases.

This investigation may involve

specific allegations of abuse or controversial

matters where there is reason to believe improprie-

ties may have occurred.

The Committee's inquiry

covers

the general circumstances surrounding the

following incidents or cases:

a. Wounded Knee;

b. Kent State;

c.: New York v. Stroble (Attica);

d. United States v. Buckalew (Gainesville);

e. United States v. Briggs (Camden) ;

f.

New York v. Dillon (Hobart College);

g. United States v. Marshall (Seattle).

Additional cases may also be examined.

In addition to the above cases, the Committee is

examining the role of FBI informants in providing

information to the FBI concerning members of the

following organizations:

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=25 =

a. Ku Klux Klan;

b. Students for a Democratic Society;

c. Weathermen;

d. Black Panther Party;

e. Communist Party USA;.

I. W.E.B. DuBois Clubs.

Additional studies of informant activities with

respect to

members of other organizations may be

formulated.

Questions

The Committee requests that the fBl and the Justice

• Department address the following specific questions:

I. With

respect to both categories of cases listed

above, what allegations, whether unfounded or

of improper, illegal, unethical, or provoca-

tive conduct by FBI informants have been nade ir

..

connection with these situations or groups?

2. What measures has the FBI taken to investigate

such allegations of misconduct and to prevent

such alleged misconduct from taking place in the

uture?

3. What instructions has the FBI given to its in-

formants with respect to possible improper,

illegal, unethical, or provocative conduct?

4. What has been the largest number of informants,

sources, and undercover personnel in use aù any

one time during each year from 1960 until the

present in connection with security, intelli-

gence, and counterintelligence matters, cases,.

and programs?

5.

What has been the annual total amount of funds

(including reimbursement for expenses) paid to

informants and sources for each year from 1960

until the present?

PREI

242

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= 26=

..

6.

What limits, if any, have been placed on the

type of information

which informants have been

intrusted to report back to the FBI?.

7. What have been the annual percentage of

potential informants who became paid infor-

mants in connection with socurity, inteili-

gence, and counterintelligence-matters, jases,

and programs from 1960 until the present?

Documents

Please provide a summary of ten cases (for each

of the following categories) where the FBI's use

of informants, sources, or undercover personnel

resulted in:

1. the conviction of an espionage agent of a

foreign government.

2.

the prevention of the theft of national secu-

rity information.

3. the prevention of sabotage.

!. the prevention of an act of violence.

5. the prevention of the carrying out of a con-

spiracy to overthrow the government.

6. . any other successful preventive actions in

furtherance of the FBI's national security

responsibilitles.

Senior staff

Responsible staff'. Task Force leader

Mike Epstein

Jack Smith

Walter Ricks

Pat Shea

Sx867

attage.

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G..

"Notional" Organizations

The Committee is examining the FBI's alleged

creation of

the support for "notional" organizations

for intelligence or counterintelligence purposes.

Although it may rely upon informants and other

clandestine opcratives, this alleged practice is

sufficiently novel to require separate attention.

Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI and the Justice

• Department address the following specific questions:

1. What groups; organizations, movements, or other

associations has the FBI caused directly or

indirectly to be formed or created for intel-

ligence or counterintelligence purposes?

Please

provide a.complete list from January 1, 1960,

to the

present.

2. What groups, organizations, movements, or

other associations has the

FBI supported finan-

cially or materially? Please provide a complete

list from January 1, 1960, to the present.

3. In which cases has the FBi supported or created

such organizations in coordination or coopera-

tion with other agencies?

4. How have the presence of such "notional" organi-

- zations affected the public's perception of the

movements of which they form a part?

5.

How have any FBI programs for the creation and'

support of such groups been coordinated with

any similar programs undertaken by the CIA or

other U.S. intelligence agencies?

Responsible staff: Senior staff

Task Force leader

Mike Epstein

==

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H.

Joint FBI-Police Operations

The purpose of this inquiry is to examine certain

allegations that joint FBI-police operations re-

sulted in misconduct or abuse.

These cases are

complex and involve a variety of techniques.:

Nevertheless, they may indicate some of the

serious problons which nay arise in attempting to

deal with potentially violent situations.

• 1.

The White Knights of the ku klux Klan,

Mississippi

The Committee is inquiring into the relation-

ships between the fBI and other law enforcement

agencies and private organizations in MississippI

in connection with the white Knights of the

Ku Klux Klan.

The purpose of the inquiry is

tO

determine what effect, 'if any, FBI activities

had on the. actions oi

other law enforcement

agencies and private individuals with respect

to the White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan in

Mississippi. This investigation may involve

allegations of abuses or oüher controversial

matters where there is reason to believe impro-

prieties may have occurred.

Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI and the

Justice Department address the following

specific questions:

a.

Was this organization a target of FBI

COINTELPRO operations?

b. If so, how and by whom was it selected as

a target?

c.

What were the purposes of any disruptive

operations directed at

•it?

d.

To what extent were the purposes achieved?

e.

What disruptive techniques, if any, were

employed?

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.--.

g.

Over what period of time did the disrup-

tive activities occur?

What 'evaluations were made of their effects?

h. By whom were they made?

1. What were the results of the evaluations?

j.. Were FBI informants used to infiltrate the

organization?

K..

If so, what kinds of information did the

Informarts gather?

1... What activities did the informants engage

in other than information gathering?

m.

Identify by date and names

the persons

involved in all contacts the FBI had with

other law enforcement agencies and private.

groups and individuals with respect to

alleged Klan bombings of Jewish synagogues

and the homes of Jewish leaders in Meridian,

Mississippi, during May - August 1968.

Responsible staff: Senior staff

Task Force leader

Jack Smith

Les Seidel

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The Black Panther Party, Chicago

The Committee is inquiring into the relation-

ships between the fBl and other law enforce-

ment agencies in the Chicago area in connec-

thon with the chicago chapter of the Black

Panther Party.

The purpose of the inquiry is

to determine what effect, if any, IBI activities

had on the

actions of other law enforcement and

intelligence agencies with respect to the black

Panther Party in the Chicago area.

This inves-

tigation may involve allegations of abuses or

other controversial matters where there is rea-

son to believe improprieties may have occurred.

Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI and the

Justice Department

address the following

specific questions:

a.

Was the Chicago chapter of the Black

Panther Party a target of FBI COINTELPRO

operations?

If so, how and by whom was it selected as

a target?

C.

What were the purposes of any disruptive

operations directed at it?

= d.

To what extent were the purposes achieved?

e. What disruptive techniques, if any, were employed?

1. Over what period of time did the disruptive

activities occur?

§. What evaluations were made Of their effects?

h. By whom were they made?

1. If FBI informants were used to infiltrate

the organization, what kinds of information

did the informants gather?

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What techniques did the informants empoy .

to gather the information?

k.

Were

the techniques used by the informants

all approved and monitored by the FBI? If

not, which were not so approved?

•1: What activities did the informants engage

in other than information gathering?

What other methods and sources did the FBI

use to gather intelligence on the organiza-

tion?

n. If electronic surveillance was used, how

• did the use of such surveillance relate to

each of the general questions?

0.

To what extent was information on persons

and groups not members of or:

affiliated

with the Black Panther Party gathered,

stored, or disseminated by the FBI as

result of its investigations of the organi-

zation?

Responsible

staff: Senior staff

Task Force leader

Walter Ricks

Chris Pyle

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I.

The "Huston Plan"

The Committee is examining the FBI's role in the

disposition of the soport of the Interagency Com-

mittee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc) in 1970.

This

report as submitted to the President included cer

tain options which were specifically identified as

"illegal".

It purported to represent the joini

recommendations

of all members of the U.S. intel-

ligence community, but FBI Director J. Edgar

Hoover disagreed in a series of footnotes.

The serious consideration given to such al-

legedly illegal proposals gives this

• the utmost significance for the Committee's under-

standing of the risks of uncontrolled intelligence

activity. This case may involve specific allega-

tions of abuse and controversial matters where

there is reason to believe improprieties may neve

occurred.

Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI and the Justice

Department address the following specific questions:

I. What contacts occurred between Tom Charles

Huston and personnel of the FBI and the Depart-

ment of Justice during 1969 and 197C?

Identiry

by date and nanes of persons invoived.

2. What was the purpose of each such contact?

3. • With respect to any assistance provided to the

Interdeparimental Committee on Intelligence

(Ad Hoc) by personnel of the FBI:

a. Who were the FBI participants?

b. What kind of assistance was provided?

What was the role of the FBI in preparing

the various drafts of the special report

of the Committee?

it s

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4.

5.

What were the specific arguments advancea

for the inclusion of the allegedly illegai

options in the special report submitted for

the President's consideration?

Were other

allegedly illegal options considered and

rejected?

Were any measures taken by the FBI to imple-

ment specific elements of

the Huston Plan?

This includes both the allegedly "illegal"

aspects and other provisions such as the

expanded recruitment of 10-21 year old infor-

mants.

..

6. What are the: present views of the FBI and

the Department of Justice as to the legality

and propriety of the various options included

in the special report?

Responsible staff: Senior staff

Task Force leader

Barbara Banoff

Loch Johnson

....

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J.is

Alleged Political Misuse of the FBI

The Conmittee is investigating allegations thai

the intelligence and investigative resources oi

the FBI have been misused by various Presidents

attorneys Goneral, lenbers of Congress,

and FEI

This subject mey involve

specific allegations of abuse and other contro-

versial matters where there is reason to belleve

•improprieties may have occurred.

Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI and the Justice

Department address the following specific questions:

I. Have persons outside the FBI sought the FBI's

assistance for partisan political

purposes of

personal advantage:

Please identify each

instance by the name of the person seeking to

so use the FBI,

the date, and the nature of the

assistance sought.

20 e

In each such case, what has been the response

of the FBI?

Have persons inside or outside the FBI sought

to employ the resources of the fBI for purposes

outside the FBI's authority?

Please identify

each instance by the name of the person seeking

to so use the fBI, the date, and the purpose

for which the person sought to use the FBI.

4.

5.

In each such case, what has been the response

of the FBI?

What measures has the FBI employed to

a. Respond to critics.

b. Affect the reputation or credibility of or

otherwise discredit critics.

o. What were the nature, purpose, duration, and

results of Project INLET involving preparation

of an intelligence letter for the President

and other Executive officials?

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7.

With respect to any so-called "secret files"

maintained within the FBI,

including the

"official and confidential" and"personal

and

confidential! files maintained by the executive

assistant to the FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover

on his behalf until the time of his death, the

Committee secks to establish the contents

such Illes, the circunstances

surrounding the

transfer of a portion of such riles within she

Bureau at the time of Director Hoover's death,

the transfer of a portion of such files to

Mr. Hoover's residence, the destruction of any

such files, the transier of any such files from

Mr. Hoover's residence, the use of information

within such files, and

their relationship to

the official investigative files of the FBI.

The Committee

desires all information bearing

on these matters,

including the results of

any inquiries conducted within the FBI an

the Department of Justice.

What measures have been taken to ensure that the

intelligence and investigative resources of the

FBi are not misused ior political purposes or

personal advantage.

9. What additional measures should be taken?

Responsible Staff: Senior Staff

Task Force Leader

Mark Gitenstein

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IV

Department of Justice

The Committee is examining activities of divisions of

the Justice Department other than the FBI which perfor

internal security and intelligence functions. The pur-

pose of these inquiries is to determine whether these

functions have been carried out in conformity wich the

rule of law.

A.

The Attorney General

The Committee is

studying the functions of the

Attorney General with respect to the supervision

• of and policy-making for internal security and

intelligence activities.

The Committee seeks

• £0

determine whether his duties are properly defined

and his office properly organized to perform

these functions

effectively.

Questions

The Committee requests that the Justice Department

address the following specific questions:

I. To what extent has the Attorney Genezal been

involved in the consideration or approval of

the policies and activities of U.S. foreign

and military intelligence agencies?

2.

Has the Justice Department made any agree-

ments with the CIA or any other U.S. intelli-

gence agency with

regard to the investigation

• or prosecution of

agency personnel?

30

Under what circumstances and for what purposes

has the Office of Legal Counsel provided legal

advice to the Attorney General on matters

per-

taining

to foreign and domestic intelligence

activities?

4.

To what extent has the Attorney General

authorized cooperation, including the exchange

of information and the conduct of joint opera-

tions, between the Drug Enforcement Administra-

tion

or its predecessors and the CIA or other

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5.

6.

7.

intelligence agencies with respect to rarcotics

intelligence?

What standards and procedures has the Attorney

General adopted for:.

The collection, analysis, use, and dis-

semination of narcoties intelligence.

D.

The collection, analysis, use, and dis-

semination of. organized crime intelligence.

The use of intelligence information by the

Immigration and Naturalization Service.

d. Law Enforcement Assistance Administration •

grants for the support of state or local

police intelligence

activities and intel-

ligence data

systèms.

To what extent have communications between the

White House and the FBI or other agencies

under the jurisdiction of the Attorney General

bypassed the Attorney General? To what extent

should such communications be channeled througn

the Attorney General?

What have been the policies and procedures of

the Justice Department for evaluating the

budget requests of the FBI for intellignce

and counterintelligence activities?

Responsible staff: Senior staff

Task Force leader

Mark Gitenstein

Barbara Banoff

indire

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B.

Ine Internal Security Section (formerly Division)

The Committee is examining the activities of the

Internal Security Section of the Justice Depart-

ment and its predecessor, the Internal Security

Division.

These entities have supervised the

Department's internal security law enforcement

activitics, coordinated certain interdepartmental

internal sccurity poliries, ind engaged in the

collection, analysis, and dissemination - intelli-

Questions

•The Committee requests that the Justice Department

address. the following specific questions:

1. Under what circumstances, if any, has the

Justice Department seriously considered prose-

cutions under the Smith Act and laws pertain-

ing to seditious

conspiracy, rebellion, or

2. To what extent has FBI intelligence activity

provided valuable evidence for use in the

prosecution of specific federal crimes?

3..

What have been the practices and procedures

for coordination of policy through the Inter-

departmental Committee on Internal Security?

What have been the practices and procedures

to for the interdepartmental and interagency

evaluation of domestic intelligence and

domestic collection of foreign intelligence

through the Intelligence Evaluation Committee

and its

predecessors?

5.

With respect to the Interdivisional Intelli-

gence Unit

and the Analysis and Evaluation

Section of the Internal Security Division,

a.

What have been the practices and proce-

dures of the Unit and Section for the

gathering of intelligence?

sir;

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b.

What type of information has been stored

in readily retrievable form by the Unit

and Section?

To whom and for what reasons has intelli-

gence information been disseminated by

the Unit and Section?

What were the reasons for the submission

of IDIU computer printouts to

the CIA, as

reportedly occurred in 1969?

e.

To what extent did the Unit and Section

make specific requests to other agencies

within and outside the Justice Department

for intelligence information?

6. With respect to the use of grand juries by

the Special Litigation Section of the Internal

Security Division,

a.'

Have any allegations of misuse of the

grand

jury process in cases handled by Special

Litigation Section attorneys come to the

attention of the Department?

I: SO,

briefly describe each such allegation and

what, if any, action was taken by the

Department in response to such allegation.

b.

Io what extent, if any, did the use of

grand juries in

cases

handled by the Special

Litigation Section attorneys differ from the

use of grand juries in cases handled by

other sections of the Justice Department?

C.

To what extent, if any, was information

obtained through the use of grand juries

included in the intelligence files of the

Interdivisional Intelligence, Unit or

the

Analysis aná Evaluation Section?

11655

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in

I. What have been the practices and procedures

of the Internal Security Division and the

Departmental Security Office for advising the

Attorney General and other executive agencies

with regard to the Federal Employee Security

Program?

Responsible staff: Senior staff

Task Force leader

Barbara Banoff

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