TAPE OF ROBERT MC NAMARA AND GENERAL TAYLOR
Originator: ROCK
Document date: 00/00/1975
Document type: SOUND RECORDING

## Page 1

Date : 02/06/97

Page:

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : ROCKCOM

RECORD NUMBER: 178-10002-10337

RECORDS SERIES : ASSASSINATION FILE

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : A-I (I) INTERVIEWS RE ASSASSINATIONS

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION

FROM : BELIN, DAVID

TO: THE FILE

TITLE : INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL MAXWELL TAYLOR

DATE: 05/16/75

PAGES

: 6

SUBJECTS : TAYLOR, MAXWELL

ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES

CIA

BAY OF PIGS

ASSASSINATIONS, FOREIGN LEADERS

KENNEDY, ROBERT

DULLES, ALLEN

BURKE, ARLEIGH

EXECUTIVE ACTION CAPABILITY

OPERATION MONGOOSE

CUBAN EXILES

MIAMI

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION

I : UNCLASSIFIED

RESTRICTIONS: OPEN IN FULI

CURRENT STATUS : OPEN

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 02/06/97

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

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•

Date: 07/10/93

Page: 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : ROCKCOM

RECORD NUMBER: 1781000210337

RECORDS SERIES :

ASSASSINATION FILE

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : A-I (I) INTERVIEWS RE ASSASSINATIONS

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION

FROM : BELIN, DAVIL

CO : THE FILE

TITLE :

INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL MAXWELL TAYLOR

DATE : 05/16/73

PAGES:

SUBJECTS

TAYLOR, MAXWELL

ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES

CIA

BAY OF PIGS

ASSASSINATIONS, FOREIGN LEADERS

KENNEDY, ROBERT

DULLES, ALLEN

BURKE, ARLEIGH

EXECUTIVE ACTION CAPABILITY

OPERATION MONGOOSE

CUBAN EXILES

MIAMI

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION : U

RESTRICTIONS: REFERRED

CURRENT STATUS : P

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/09/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

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110203

COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES

Washington, DC 20500

MEMORANDUM

TO

: The File

FROM

: David W. Belin

SUBJECT : Interview with General Maxwell Taylor

Belin:

General Taylor, we're here on the loth day of may

1975 at the offices of the CIA Commission in Washington

and I have had an opportunity to review with you certain mat-

ters relating to your participation during the Kennedy Adminis-

tration in matters involving Cuba, and I've asked you a number

of questions and we've talked informally and now what I would

like to do is to have it in question and answer form. Is that

correct?

Taylor: Right.

B:

All right. First of all, you might tell me when you

came down

: to Washington

to first serve with the Kennedy

Administration in 1961.

T:

I came down at the end of April at the invitation of

the President to chair a group of four in the investi-

gation of the Bay of Pigs--to analyze the causes of its failure

and why it failed and whatever lessons that we decided the Presi-

dent--should be called to the President's attention.. My collea-

gues were Bob Kennedy, Allen Dulles and Arleigh Burke.

We worked

on that report from the--the end--through the end of April and

May--as I recall they got a final report to the President some-

what after the middle of June.

B:

date which it was done.

check to see if it's recording and then I'll be right back down.

I'm going to continue now, General Taylor, and according to the

notes I have you report--your memory is very good, by the way,

for events that took place nearly fourteen years ago--your re-

port was dated June 13, 1961 by way of a letter sent to Presi-

dent Kennedy, and it refers to an April 22, 1961 letter from

President Kennedy to you directing you, together with Robert

Kennedy, Admiral Arley, Burke, and Allen Duiles as Director of

DECLASSIFIED

Jet Assace. Rec. Collection Act of 1092

LA and NGE PassiMi

NARA date 216197 By KBK

K.

FUKU

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central Intelligence, to undertake a study with regard to the

Bay of Pigs, and also certain recommendations.

According to

this document, President-elect Kennedy--or President Kennedy--

first learned

about the existence of plans for the overthrow

of the Castro Government because of the call on him at Palm

Beach by Allen Dulles and Richard Bissell, who was the Deputy

Director of Plans of the CIA and who had overall coordinating

supervision of the Bay of Pigs operation, and according to

your--the document that you prepared which I assume was based

upon your study of the facts, that the first formal briefing

of President Kennedy was on January 28, 1961 with Vice Presi-

dent Lyndon Johnson, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of

Defense, Director of Central Intelligence, Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff and others present at that briefing.

Does that sound like perhaps it might be accurate so far as

to what the events were?

T:

It sounds correct. Obviously I đon't recall speci-

Ically the details you mentioned.

B:

I also noted that one section which I happened to note

had language along the lines of this. It said "We also

feel that the occasion offers the President the opportunity to

express to his principal assistants and advisers his sense of

the need of a changed attitude on the part of the Government

and of the people toward the emergency which confronts us.

The

first requirement of such a charge is to recognize that we are

in a life-death struggle which we may be losing and will lose

CHUNI INE VLKALU

unless we change our way and marshall our resources with an in-

In the pas?)fa't read my own writing here) intensity associated

times of war."

And then the remaining part of

the paragraph it said the Director of Central Intelligence had

not participated in it says "To effect this change we must give

KU

immediate consideration to taking such measures as announcement

of a limited national emergency, the review of any treaties or

TT

international agreements which restrain the full use of our re-

sources in the cold war and the determination to seck the respect

of our neighbors without the criterion of international popularity

and the policy being taken into account the proportioning of

foreign

aid to the attitudes shown us by our neighbors.

In the

light of the

strained situation in Laos and the potential crisis

building up over Berlin, we should consider at once affirmative

programs to cope with the threat in both areas.

I don't know

if you remember that that might have been part of it at all

or not?

T:

Well, yes.

but I would

Again, I don't recall the specific language,

say that was rather consistent with our

frame of mind.

This was not the height--at least one of the high

points--in the Cold War and the Khruschev threat on Berlin was

very much on our minds, the question of whether Castro and the

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activities in the Caribbean were related in any way to the

pressure being placed on Berlin. All these things were in our

mind, plus the fact that we had

demonstrated in the Bay of Pigs

operations that here in Washington we just had never thought

through the problem of utilizing resources from numer--several

departments for purposes such as this--the Cold War purposes.

B:

Now, during the time that you prepared this paper,

were you aware of any assassination plots against

the lives of Castro or anyone else that might have been under-

taken by the CIA?

1':

• •I was not.

B:

Were you ever aware of the existence of any plans to

assassinate Castro?

T:

B:

I was not.

Did you ever have any discussions with either the

President or the Attorney General or the Director

of Central Intelligence, concerning the possibility or the

existence of plans to assassinate Castro--either the possi

bility or the existance?

T:

certainly not with the President. Now in the case of

Bob Kennedy and Allen Dulles we talked about so many

things during the Bay of Pigs as one sits around the table, ]

couldn't say that--that the desirability of the disappearance

• of Castro or what would happen if he were assassinated in Cuba

--that was not raised, I don't recall.

B:

You don't recall any specific conversation one way

or the other?

T:

B:

No.

TATAST

JUT.

Did you ever have any conversations with McGeorge Bundy

or Walt Rostow about it?

T:

No. None of those officials. Again, under the same

terms as I indicated in the

case of Bob and Allen Dulles,

that they - in the course of the daily work, we see men constantly

and you're

thinking so much about the Cuba problem,

I couldn't

say that assassination in the abstract--"Wouldn't it be a nice

thing if someone bumped Castro off"--that could well have been

said, but I just don't recall it.

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B:

Do you recall the existence of any approval to have

the CIA undertake such a --

Never!

T:

B:

of

-

Did you ever hear the phrase "executive action

capability" which was defined as a standby capability

assassinating

foreign leaders. Did you ever hear

T:

B:

--that's a code phrase, meaning like you indicate?

well, a phrase called and which refers to the capability

of assassinating foreign leaders?

T:

No.

B:

Now, you also told me that you attended a meeting of

the Special Group (Augmented) that occurred on or

about August 10, 1962 at the Department of State.

I assumed that I did. I don't specifically remember

that date or what the agenda might be, but by looking

at the documents you have shown me I was the Chairman of the

Mongoose aspect of the Special Group and I assume I was there.

B:

' T:

General Lansdale worked with you?

He did.

B:

In what capacity?

T':

He was in charge of putting together a feasible programs

We were very much concerned whether in

the ebullience of victory at the Bay of Pigs he might not intan-

SILY a campaign already begun as a matter of fact, to infiltrate

agents in Latin America, as the saying was, to export Communisi

to Latin America, so we were thinking of ways and means and pro.

rams that might be devised to prevent that

B: .

Do you have any recollection of what might have been

of 1962?

said at a meeting that might have occurred in August

T:

I couldn't recall any specific meeting. If you

had the minutes or something I'm sure it might suggest

GERALD K.

TIT

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B:

Do you have any recollection as to whether or not

someone at that meeting might have raised the possi-

bility of the liquidation of Castro?

T:

Well, as you say, it might have possibly occurred, it

might possibly have occurred, but if it did, I don't

recall it.

B:

Do you recall any conversations that might have occurred

at any such meeting?

. T:

No. Again with the minutes, if you have them, I'm sure mi

stimulate my memory.

B:

How long did you stay in Washington in your service

with the Kennedy Administration?

T:

B:

T:

B:

Well I stayed in the White House as the Military

Representative of the President in which capacity I

was generally his alter ego if you will for military and intel-

ligence matters. On October 1, 1962 he designated me to become

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and moved out of the

White House and gave up the White House-related position.

You took over from General Lemnitzer?

Yes.

And then you remained as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of staff until when?

I:

B:

Until July 1964 when I went to Vietnam as Ambassador.

Do you have any information that you think might in

any way be relevant to the investigation of this Com-

mission so far as possible unlawful domestic activities of the

CIA is concerned?

No, I really don't, except as I mentioned to you before

we started to tape this that there was a mass of Cubans

and would be--would have been very happy to collaborate with

getting him that way.

Whether or not, conceivably low-level CIA

agents, as is sometimes the case, overzealous subordinates ever

encouraged any or talked to them or made any propositions to them,

I don't know, but clearly it's a possibility. But I certainly

never saw anything in my relations with the senior CIA officials

to suggest that they this as a proposition, as something they

this

were recommending or supporting or advising the President to do.'

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-б-

B:

T:

B:

Anything else you can think of that might be relevant?

No, I don't think--I don't.

Any information that you think might be relevant so far.

as the assassination of President Kennedy is concerned

that you don't think is public information now.

T:

No. Absolutely nothing on it.

B:

well, we thank you very much for coming down. If you

want--if we want to send a copy of the transcript to

you for you to see and perhaps initial, to where should we mail

it?

I:

B:

T:

2500 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Apartment 1.

And is there a zip code on that?

20008

B:

T:

B:

And do you have a phone number there?

183-5050.

All right.

And thank you very much for your cooperation

Sir, and I had better check to see if this actually re-

corded here.

i.

(END OF TAPE)

FORU

LIBPARY

7903

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