COMMENTS ON DRAFT REPORT OF SSC SUBCOMMITTEE AND INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY SUPPORT TO WC.
Originator: CIA
From: BRECKINRIDGE, SCOTT D., DEPUTY,  IG
To: MILLER, WILLIAM, D/SCSGO (SENATE)
Document date: 06/10/1976
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

TS 185247/1

CopylO of1o

10 June 1976

Mr. William G. Miller

Staff Director

Select Committee to Study Governmental

Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities

Room G-308

Dirksen Senate Office Building

Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Bill:

Forwarded herewith are comments on the draft report of

the Senate Select Committee's subcommittee on the question of

support by the intelligence agencies for the Warren Commission

inquiry.. These comments have been prepared under a tight

deadline, which has limited the ability to research all the questions

raised in the draft report.

The attachments to this letter are in two sections. The first

is a summary of considerations relating to the relationship between

CIA and AMLASH/1 prior to the assassination of President Kennedy

on 22 November 1963. The point is that the record of what was said

to AMLASH/1, and specific reporting of what he understood, makes

it clear that there were no grounds for him to believe, and he did

not believe, that he had CIA support for an assassination plot against

Castro in the period preceding President Kennedy's death. The

second attachment is an item-by-item series of comments, ranging

from minor editorial notations and comments; to factual corrections

and security points.

As there is a basic difference between the interpretation of

facts in the draft report, and the facts as we know them, it would be

appreciated if there could be an opportunity to address the question

with the members of the Subcommittee. It is my opinion that it would

be a disservice to the public to issue the report as now written.

Sincerely,

S. D. Breckinridge

Deputy Inspector. General

Attachments:

As stated

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1578-1976

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TS 185247 - Tab 1

Copyl of 10

AMLASH Operation

The objective of the AMLASH operation throughout its

existence was the formation of a nucleus within Cuba to organize

an internal coup to replace the Castro regime. AMLASH/1 held

a position high in the Cuban government. He was disillusioned

with the Castro regime and was considered as a possible political

action asset. The Agency had a series of meetings with him

during the 1961-62 period, the last of which was in August 1962

prior to bie departure for Hayana. He was never a fully zecruited

In September 1963 AMLASH/1 was met in Brazil, the first

time since the August 1962 meetings. During the September 1963

meeting with AMLASH/1, he said that there were two ways to

effect a coup; through an outside invasion (which he recognized

was out of the question at that time) or through an "inside job"

(i.e. internal coup via military overthrow). He indicated that

he was waiting for a plan of action from the United States

Government.

By this he meant high-level assurances of support

for a successful coup. The same cable which reported the results

of the meeting also indicated that AMLASH/1 "will always be a

control problem."

AMLASH/1 then went to Paris, France, where he was met

again. Meetings with AMLASH/1 in October 1963 consisted of

exploration as to what he might do, and requests by him for

U.S. support. In response to his seeking high-level assurances

of U.S. support, Desmond FitzGerald met with him on

29 October 1963. The plan for that meeting is described in

writing in the filè as follows:

"FitzGerald will represent self as personal

representative of Robert F. Kennedy who

traveled Paris for specific purpose meeting

(AMLASH/1) and giving him assurances of

full U.S. support if there is change of the

present government in Cuba." (Emphasis added).

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A memorandum for the record of that meeting, dated

13 November 1963, contained the following summary:

"FitzGerald informed (AMLASH/1 that the

United States is prepared to render all

necessary assistance to any anti-communist

Cuban group which succeeds in neutralizing

the present Cuban leadership and assumes

sufficient control to invite the United States

to render the assistance it is prepared to

give. It was emphasized that the above

support will be forthcoming only after a

real coup has been effected and the group

involved is in a position to request U.S.

(probably under O'AS auspices) recognition

and support. It was made clear that the U.S.

was not prepared to commit itself to support-

ing an isolated uprising, as such an uprising

can be extinguished in a matter of hours if

the present government is still in control in

Havana. As for the post-coup period, the

U.S. does not desire that the political clock be

turned back but will support the necessary economic

and political reforms which will benefit the mass of

the Cuban people. " (Emphasis added).

In 1967 the Inspector General of CIA conducted an investi-

gation of the AMLASH operation, and interviewed Mr. FitzGerald

and his exècutive officer (who had been kept thoroughly familiar

with developments). FitzGerald recalled that AMLASH/1 spoke of

the need for an assassination weapon, particularly a high powered

rifle with telescopic sights or some other weapon which could

be used to kill Castro from a distance. FitzGerald rebuffed

this request and instructed the case officer who served as an

interpreter to tell AMLASH/1 that the U.S. simply did not do

such things. FitzGerald's executive officer, though not pre-

sent, had the same recollection.

Mr. FitzGerald assured

AMLASH/1 of full U.S. support "if there is a change of the

present leadership."

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The 13 November memorandum also stated that:

"Nothing of an operational nature was discussed

at the FitzGerald meeting. After the meeting

(AMLASH/1) stated that he was satisfied with

the policy discussion but now desired to know

what technical support we could provide him."

On 14 November 1963 a Cuban exile in New York (the source

of the original introduction to AMLASH/1) stated to a CIA case

officer that AMLASH/1, while: "... satisfied... as far as policy

was concerned,.. was not at all happy with the fact that he

still was not given the technical assistance for the operational

plan as he saw it... He could not understand why he was denied

certain small pieces of equipment which permitted a final

solution to the problem, while, on the other hand, the U.S.

Government gave much equipment and money to exile groups for

their ineffective excusions..." The report of that meeting

also stated: "... if he does not get advice and material from a

U.S. Government technician, he will probably become fed-up

again and we will lose whatever progress we have made to date. "

On 19 November 1963 a CIA memorandum records FitzGerald's

approval of a cache for AMLASH/1 inside Cuba, with high-powered

rifles and scopes. During the period following 19 November,

and prior to a meeting in Paris on 22 November, a ballpoint pen

was rigged as a hypodermic syringe with which AMLASH/1 could

administer a poison.

The case officer arrived in Paris on

22 November 1963 and met with AMLASH/1 on that date. AMLASH/1

was shown the ballpoint pen device but did not accept it. He also

was told of the arms cache he would be provided.

The record is quite clear that AMLASH/1 had no grounds,

prior to 22 November 1963, to believe that he had any support

from the United States for operations involving the assassin-

ation of Fidel Castro. In fact, he had no advance support for

a coup, however he might attempt it. This is emphasized by

his recorded complaints on the subject, clearly reflecting his

understanding that such was the case. His complaint on 14

November 1963, as reported through an intermediary, may have

led to the decision on 19 November 1963 to provide him with

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token support that he could interpret as the support he had

been requesting unsuccessfully. That decision was taken

19 November 1963 inside CIA Headquarters by FitzGerald and

formalized by a memorandum written the same date.

Prior to 22 November 1963 CIA had refused to give

AMLASH/1 any support prior to a successful coup in Cuba.

That he recognized that this specifically included a refusal to

participate in the assassination of Castro is reflected in the

description of a July 1964 report by the FBI, quoted in the SSC

Subcommittee draft, in which AMLASH/1 stated that Robert F.

Kennedy had refused support for the assassination of Castro.

As the 29 October meeting with FitzGerald is the one at which

he understood he was meeting with a representative of Robert F.

Kennedy, it confirms the description in the 1967 IG Report.

Whatever the relationship with AMLASH/1 after 22 November,

the evidence is unequivocal that AMLASH/1 had no grounds prior

to that for believing that he had CIA support for his vaguely defined

course of action. He knew nothing that, had it leaked, would have

served to motivate a Cuban retaliatory strike against President

Kennedy.

Finally, it is significant that the transcripts of AMLASH/I's

1966 trial contain no reference to his activities prior to 1964; i.e.,

before President Kennedy's assassination. The transcripts suggest

that, to the Cubans' knowledge, AMLASH/1 was not in touch with CIA

before November 1964. Nor did the book which Castro provided to

Senator McGovern in 1975, which purported to be an inventory of all

known plots against Castro's life, contain any allegation of AMLASH/1

anti-Castro activity prior to late 1964. The book mentions travel by

AMLASH/1 to Madrid "where he was recruited by CIA agents." This

travel occurred in November 1964. The above two instances strongly

suggest that Castro was not aware that AMLASH/1 had any contact

with CIA prior to November 1964; i.e., one year after President

Kennedy's death.

The reported AMLASH/1 notoriety in the Miami Cuban exile

community did not occur prior to President Kennedy's death. This

developed after the 1966 trial and to some degree after AMLASH/1

met with Cuban exile leaders in Madrid in late 1964 and early 1965.

This was after AMLASH/1 was informed in 1964 that the U.S.

Government had severed its relationship with him.

The most recent information available indicates that AMLASH/1

is still in jail, where he is serving a thirty year sentence.

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TS 185247 - Tab 2

Copy 1 of

10

Page 2.

Page 7.

Page 8.

Page 9.

Item Comments on Draft Report of SSC Subcommittee

Line 1l. The word "agents" may describe FBI

employees, but it is not a term ordinarily applied

to CIA staff employees.

2nd complete paragraph, 2d line. The phrase

"backed by CIA, " in describing the Bay of Pigs

operation, is imprecise. CIA was the government

instrument for conducting the operation, but there

was considerable other participation in what was

an operation "backed" by the U.S. government.

The statement that the FBI knew about these plots

by at least May 1962 needs some elaboration.

These plots (assassination) did not involve AMLASH/1

at that time, and what the FBI knew may have been

about aspects of contacts, the nature of which it did

not know. (Need this be reconciled with the state-

ment at page 12 giving the date of FBI's learning

whatever it learned it July 1964?)

2nd and 3d paragraphs. It is noted that operational

activity in June 1963--the date given--was that there was

no /activity with the criminal Syndicate (this having

been ended several months earlier.), and there had

been no contact with AMLASH/1 since August 1962.

Statements by Castro about "terrorists" had to apply

to other activities.

Paragraph at bottom of page (continuing over to

page 9). References by Castro (12 September 1963)

to "'covert activities" undoubtedly referred to not-

so-covert activity of MONGOOSE.

Bottom of page, speaking of 29 October 1963 meeting

between AMLASH/1 and Fitzgerald, the draft report

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Page 10.

Page 12.

Page 14.

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says "... within weeks of this meeting CIA escalated

the level of its covert operations, telling AMLASH

the United States supported his plan."

This misrepresents what AMLASH/1 was told

at the 20 October 1963 meeting, which was that

he would receive no support unless he was

successful in a coup of his own. There is no

planning relationship between the inconclusive

status of the understanding with AMLASH/1 and

what was going on under MONGOOSE.

"Oswald contacted a known KGB agent" with the Soviet

Embassy in Mexico. While it is known that Oswald

contacted the Vice Consul at the Soviet Embassy in

Mexico City, it is believed that it was for the purpose

of obtaining a visa for the Soviet Union.

The fact that

the Vice Consul happened to be a KGB officer complicates

the matter but there is no evidence that Oswald knew

this Soviet was KGB. Therefore, recommend this

sentence be modified accordingly.

"Hoover and other senior officials first learned of

plots to assassinate Castro in July 1964. " Did they?

"Moreover, there is evidence that CIA's investigators

made requests for files which should have given

knowledge of the AMLASH operation, but for some

reason they did not acquire that knowledge."

A quick review of CI Staff files, in the time

available for this review, disclose no requests

that, of themselves, would produce information

on the AMLASH operation.

The draft report raises the question of what was

furnished investigators, which raises the question of

what was requested, by whom? (See comment on item

on page 14).

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• .

Page 21.

Of course, the reference to especial relevance

of the AMLASH operation in this context is

questioned.

Draft report states that President Kennedy did "admit

that the Bay of Pigs invasion was in fact an operation

sponsored by the CIA. " Our impression was that he

accepted this responsibility as his, for a government

program. How and in what forum was the stated

admission?

Page 27.

(numbered 29)

Speaking of renewal of contact with AMLASH/1 the

draft says "... the exact purpose the CLA had for

renewing contact is not known, but there is no evidence

that CIA intended at this time to use AMLASH in an

assassination operation.

When AMLASH came out of Cuba in September

1963, it was the first chance since August 1962

to see him. Recontact needed no mysterious

"exact purpose." It is correct to state that

there was"no evidence of intent to use him as an

assassination operation; rather, the circum-

stances that followed suggest just the opposite.

Footnote: The case officer did not say, as stated

in the draft, that the basis for meeting with AMLASH

was the belief of AMLASH that the first step of any

coup was assassination. While AMLASH's views were

known, as shown by the evidence his views were

rejected at least during the critical period.

Page 29.

The opinion expressed in the draft report, in relation

to the Harker interview, about "AMLASH not being

a terrorist, " is correct. Should it be reconciled

with statements on Page 8?

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Page 33.

Page 34.

Page 41.

Page 47.

Page 53.

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The report also says, here, "none of this other

activity would seem to warrant Castro's associating

that activity with U.S. leaders to the extent that he

would threaten the safety of American leaders aiding

the plans." We note without exception.

Footnote * The Cuban Coordinating Committee was

a group for coordinating implementation of established

programs. By memorandum of 22 May 1963, McGeorge.

Bundy, Special Assistant to President Kennedy for

National Security Affairs, designated the State Depart-

ment Coordinator of Cuban Affairs as Chairman of the

Interdepartmental Committee on Cuba with the specific

responsibility for the coordination of day-to-day actions

regarding Cuba. Membership of the Committee con-

sisted of representatives from State, USIA, DOD, CIA,

Justice, Treasury and ad hoc representatives as

necessary.

Footnote **.

This seems to indicate that the FBI

'learned, of CIA's operations on 10 October 1963

(a new date?) and that this led to termination of the

AMLASH operation. Of course, that happened much

later.

"Special Affairs Staff" should read "Special Activities

Staff."

SASICI should read SAS/CI.

Testimony of Karamessines is quoted, in which he 18

asked a hypothetical question about use of AMLASH,

and that he answered hypothetically, but the presentatioh

seems to treat it as fact.

Reference to CIA "technical" collection capability in

Mexico City should be deleted. Simply delete the

word "technical." This small point is a sources-

and-methods question.

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The draft report states that an overseas Station

raised a question of AMLASH security. This is

taken out of context. Consideration had been given

to the possibility of using AMLASH/1 in the recruit-

ment of a prospective agent in another European

country. This prospective agent frequently traveled

to Soviet Bloc countries and recently had returned..

The cable noted that the prospective agent appeared

less recruitable since his return and the Station felt

that the use of AMLASH to recruit the agent might

pose a serious threat to AMLASH's personal security.

It did not, in any manner, reflect on the security of the

AMLASH operation.

Pages56-57.

Page 65.

The 8 December 1963 cable from JMWAVE was in

reply to two cables sent from Headquarters on

7 December 1963 which clarified the reason for the

delay in laying down the cache. AMLASH had been

assured that he would be given time to re-establish

his normal pattern and assess the atmosphere and

feelings among his contacts. He was also told that

there would be no activity until January 1964. Further,

the Standing Group was to meet on 10 December 1963

to discuss US policy toward Cuba and Latin America.

If the Standing Group decided to recommend a change

in then current policy toward Cuba the conduct of

operations that might be counter to any recommended

change in US policy objectives should not be under way.

Did the FBI learn the "details" of the AMLASH operation

in July 1964? They learned of AMLASH's unhappiness

with his failure to get what he asked, but what else did

they learn beyond the fact of the relationship?

Pages 76-78:

This portion of the report makes reference, to use of

the polygraph on 'D" (also revealed in true name at

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Page 79.

Page 104.

Page 113.

page 78) in checking his story. This is considered

a sensitive operational method, and deletion of use

of the polygraph in the interrogation is requested.

It seems interesting that this fabrication, which

proved to be an untrue report, receives so much

attention in the report. It really became a non-

story, although time was required to check it out.

The FBI was not denied access to "D". As the basis

for the statement is not known, it is not known in what

context the understanding developed. The Mexicans

did make "D" available for interrogation, at which the

FBI was present.

The draft report states that CI Staff was not "affiliated

with CIA's Cuban affairs staff," although later in the

piece it refers to SAS' CI people coordinating with

CI Staff. These appear contradictory statements.

Re the case of a man crossing the Mexican border

on 23 November then flying to Cuba. This case was

investigated and pertained to Gilbert Lopez, a U.S.

citizen who had secured a fifteen day Mexican tourist

card at Tampa, Florida, on 20 November 1963. He

entered Mexico on this document at Neuvo Laredo on

23 November 1963. He checked into the Roosevelt

Hotel on 25 November 1963.. On 27 November he

checked out of the hotel and departed for Havana

aboard a regularly scheduled Cubana Flight #465.

ber

according to the manifest, the only passenger.

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Page 120.

Page 122.

Page 129.

Page 133.

It is requested that CIA support for DRE, JURE

and the 30th November Movement groups be altered

to a generic description of anti-Castro groups.

Persons identified with them in some circles could

suffer from official confirmation of the connection.

This is still considered as classified. It is noted

that CIA did not have an operational interest in

SNE or Alpha 66.

The Agency effort to obtain FPCC stationery

through a penetration for use in a deception

operation is still classified since it involves

sources and methods.

That the SAS Executive Officer views the AMLASH

operation as having been an assassination plot is

not very helpful, unless the time sequence and

evolution of the relationship with AMLASH/1 is

made a part of that view. His account in 1967

supported FitzGerald's story of what happened

in the 29 October 1963 meeting.

That SAS/CI speaks broadly may not be all that

helpful either, if the extent of his knowledge,

and when he knew what he says he knew, is

fixed in time. That he wrote a memorandum in

1965 on the security of the operation, does not

qualify him to address where things stood in

1963. In fact, he is quoted at page 139 as saying

that he could not recall the time frame.

The draft report states that in October 1963 the

T'Bl knew of the "assassination aspect of the

AMLASH" operation. As is noted earlier,

there was no such characterization that applied

to it then, so how it could have known is subject

to question.

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Page 134.

Comments have been made earlier on the significance

of the FBI's July 1964 report.

Page 135.

It is difficult to see how a "desk officer" who was unaware

of the AMLASH operation at the time, and did not learn

of it until he was told while testifying (as characterized

to him by the questioners), could have a very relevant

understanding of the operation. Yet he is quoted as an

authoritative source.

Page 137.

The opinion of the SAS Executive Officer as to the

irony of the 22 November 1963 meeting does not alter

the relevance of the facts as to what the substantive

sequence of the operational relationship had been.

Page 138. While the point is noted only in passing, that AMLASH/1

may have been a provocateur, it is noted that it would

have been strange logic for Castro to have sent him out

to stimulate an assassination plot against himself and then

used the result of his own provocation as the motive for

dispatching an assassin. And then jail his own provocateur

for what is now some ten years. No evidence supports this thesis.

Page 139.

SAS/CI states he cannot recall the time frame, while the

sequence of events in development of the operational

relationship is a key factor in evaluating the present

issue.

Page 141-145.

The citation of 1964 events that do not specifically relate

back to the critical 1963 period have dubious relevance to

consideration of the problem, or fixing of the sequence of

events. The same seems to apply to 1965 events.

It is observed that "A" did make statements, but that the

polygraph was inconclusive. In any event, the use of the

polygraph should be deleted, because of its use in checking

the credibility of operational contacts. Request that

reference be made to questioning or interrogation, without

this specific identification.

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Page 161. The 1967 IG report did not consider the issue of when

the operational relationship with AMLASH/1 developed

to the point where AMLASH/1 could feel he had CIA

support for his plans. It simply dealt with events as

they unfolded. The report was used as a primary

source for the brief capsulized summary of the AMLASH

operation that preceded this detailed series of comments.

General. It is requested that reference to cables follow the general

practice employed in the SSC report on alleged assassinatior

plots. The date the cable was sent, the quoted portion, and

the country of origin should suffice. Specific reference to

a CIA "Station" should be deleted; specific designation of a

CIA station in a given city çan create undesirable difficulties.

References to IN and OUT numbers, or DIR numbers, and to

the date and time group of a cable, provide information that

is subject to hostile communications analysis and should

be removed. This technique for treating cables permits

the basic story to be told without providing unnecessary and

harmful, from a security point of view, information.

Instances in the draft presenting the question were noted

at pages 41, 46, 49, and 57. In addition, although IMWAVE

has already been identified officially in SSC published reports,

the basic treatment of communications cited in relation to

that Station should otherwise receive similar technical

treatment; see pages 19, 19a, 56, 106 and 138.

Special.

Page 51 cites the CIA Chief of Station reading a cable to

the President of Mexico. CIA relations with the President

of a foreign country -- here, specifically, the President of

Mexico -- is extremely sensitive, both operationally and

politically. The revelation of this relationship could affect

adversely ongoing and 'future operations in Mexico, as well

as being a particularly irritating embarrassment to the

Mexican

Government.

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