Agency: SSCIA
Originator: SSCIA
Document date: 07/00/1975
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

## Page 1

JFK Assassination System

Identification Form

Agency Information

Date:

7/7/2015

AGENCY :

SSCIA

RECORD NUMBER :

157-10014-10155

RECORD SERIES :

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE

07-M-60

Document Information

ORIGINATOR:

FROM:

TO :

TITLE:

SSCIA

DATE: 07/00/1975

PAGES:

39

SUBJECTS :

ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES

GRAY, GORDON

SSCSGO, HEARINGS

ORGANIZED CRIME

LANSDALE, EDWARD G.

DOCUMENT TYPE: MEMORANDUM

CLASSIFICATION: Declassified

RESTRICTIONS: 1B; IC

CURRENT STATUS: Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 03/21/2000

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS:

CCBOX 437

v9.1

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Date :

08/07/95

Page :

1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY :

SSCIA

RECORD NUMBER

157-10014-10155

RECORDS

MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR :

SSCIA

FROM

TO

TITLE :

DATE: 07/00/75

PAGES

: 39

SUBJECTS : SSCSGO, HEARINGS

LANSDALE, EDWARD

G.

GRAY, GORDON

ORGANIZED CRIME

ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES

DOCUMENT TYPE : MEMORANDUM

CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET

RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED

CURRENT STATUS : POSTPONED IN FULL

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 01/08/99

OPENING CRITERIA

COMMENTS : CCBOX 437

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

DoCId: 32423343

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cion in onis file is to be read oniy.

It is not to be extracted,

paraphrased, or discussed with another person without specific

you have a question

or ?

requirement, speat to the Control

nave you access to this file.

OF TERSON TAVING ACCESS T WROM

TO T

TSSOID BY

SECURED BY TINE

R: 423'

Box 437

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....

MOMORANDUM FOR DESIGNEES

Assassination hearings

Annexed are the following

which relate to this week's hearings.

(This material should be treated with extreme sensitivity.)

(1) Schedule of Full Committee Witnesses;*

(2) Draft of Summary Chronology and issues/questions

concerning General Lansdale (a witness for July 8);*

(3) The same for Gordon Gray (a witness for July 9); and

(4)

Summary Chronology of the actions taken in connection

with Castro.

%

The Senators will be receiving similar material for all this

week's witnesses.

Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr.

Curtis Smothers

*He will be taking, in addition,

some proof from middle level

personnel related to the Trujillo case.

This will be summarized in

writing for the Comnittee.

Copies to Willian G. Miller

David Aaron

William Bader

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July 7, 1975

EXPECTED SCHEDULE OF MEETINGS OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGANCE ACTIVITIES

FOR THE WEEK OF JUIX 7 - 11,-1975

ROOM

5-407

S-407

S-128

5-407

DATE & HOUR

July 8

July 9

July 10

July 11

10:00 a.m.

2:00 p.m.

10:00 a.m.

2:00 p.m.

10:00 a.m.

2:00 p.m.

• 8:30a.m.

2:00 p.m.

TO HEAR TESTIMONY BY

Roswell GILPATRIC

/ General E. G. LANSDALE

Walt ROSTOW

General Maxwell TAYLOR

Gordon GRAY

Thomas PARROTT

Dean RUSK

!

Richard GOODWIN

Willian HARVEY

Robert MC NAMARA

McGeorge BUNDY

This schedule is subject to change on very short notice

This is NOT for public announcement

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TO :

FROM:

DATTE:

SUBJECT:

Fritz O Schwarz and Curt Smothers

Joseph E. Digenova

July o,

Brig. Gen. Edward G. Lansdale Summary Chronology

Biographical

Background

TOP SECRET

1941-

1945

U.S. Air Force

1945-1963

Eisenhower

Administra-

tion

Became regular officer in the Air Force (ultimately retired as Major General)

Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

(Secretary Thomas Gates)

1960-1961

In Vietnam doing a survey for the Secretary of Defense.

1961

1965

Assistant to the

Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

(Secretary Robert McNamara)

Sedgel Assistant to the United stares Ambassador to south Vietnam

Chronology of Events

1960

November 3

QUESTIONS AND ISSUES

Lansdale present at Special Group meeting when Merchant

(SG Minutes)

Cabell said that kind of program not practical and group

decides not to adopt sucha plan.

Yet CIA had already made contact

with the Mafia.

Was Cabell not

informed or was he being dis -

ingenuous?

1961

Oct 6

November 3

SGA told by Parrott of 2 "other contingency plans in

connection with possible removal of Castro from the

Cuban scene..."

(Minutes of SGA).

Lansdale memo discusses major sabotage action.

Indica-

tes that present means NOT likely to cause overthrow

of Cuban regime.

Before the Rockefeller Commission

Lansdale denies that he was in-

volved in sabotage and said that

he and JFK and RFK tried to stop

sabotage. Clearly not the case.

R42:

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November 31

December 1

December 8

1962

January 18

January 20

January 24

- 2-

TOP SECRET

President Kennedy in memo to Special

Group

summarizes

major decisions re Cuba Project and appoints General

Lansdale as acting Chief of Operations.

Presidenty tess sethat gher authoritiet and cansdale

President has

given priority to

is to develop long range plan to be reviewed by SG and

submitted to higher authority for approval.

Lansdale presents outline of program designed to overthrow

Castro regime.

Uses Cubans as nucleus.

Lansdale sends R. Kennedy a copy of his program review of

same day and notes on an attached paper:

"My review does

not include the sensitive work I have reported to you.

felt that you preferred informing the President privately.

QUESTIONS AND ISSUES

Lansdale memo reflecting on 1/19/62 meeting with AG.

Reflects L's own view of the severity and the importance

of the remarks of the AG re pushing forward vigorously with

we a probeen siven fuse command."

"We are in a combat situation -- where

Lansdale memo for Special Group notes it is difficult to

control indigenous nationals if the movement develops

its own impetus.

What was the nature of this sensi-

tive work?

All plans were supposed

to go to the SG-2hy not these?

Was

there a separate secret plan that

only Lansdale, the President, and

AG and a few others knew of?

Was

this a manner of avoiding a

"reporting" requirement?

Did this reflect the pressure that

Helms testified to that created

what he called a feeling that

"anything goes?" Yet McCone

continually complained not enough

being done, Why?

Was there concern that these

nationals if armed would assassi-

nate Cuban leaders?

Were they

concerned that they could unleash

something they could not control?

Was this dangerous becasue we

couldn't control what followed

assassination?

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Jan.

24

- 2A -

TOP SECRET

QUESTIONS AND ISSUES

Lansdale briefs the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Memo for

says "From the

outset,

General Lansdale has

emphasized paramilitary oeprations in connection with

this project."

These are inconsistent with his

claim to Rockefeller Commission

that he tried to stop sabotage

operations.

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January 27

January 30

February 20

March 2

March 5

- 3 -

Lansdale Memo to AG stating need for strong decisions and evidence

re cuba pal still teel that we

Efforts of Agency so far have

accomplished goal

might uncork the

touchdown

play independently of the institutional program we are spurring."

(emphasis added)

Lansdale memo Craig re "Operation Bounty" which establishès

system

of financial reward comensurate wiht position and stature of victim,

for killing or delivering alive known Communists in Cuba.

Lansdale program review.

Proposed plans for September will include

"an attack on the cadre

of the regime including key leaders.

Gangster

elements might provide the best recruitment potential for actions

against police -- G2 officials...CW agents should be fully considered."

Lansdale memo to SGA wiht basic plan of action notes "any inference

that this plan ere to cellace the President of the United States

authspet ric approval. "

Rusk notes that "once the agents are within

the country they cannot be effectively controlled from the U.s."

Taylor guidelines for Mongoose sent to Lansdale in 'draft form.

"Are responsible for performance : through normal command channels

President."

(The word President" is crossed out and "higher

authority" is put in its place.)

QUESTIONS AND ISSUES

Was this genuine concen

for lack of control? Was

what Harvey had done a

known example?

(poison

pills) Was what Harvey

did inconsistent with

control

Is this another example

of attempts to isolate

the President on the

record from the project?

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March 5

March 12

March 13

March 16

April 5

- 4 -

TOP SECRE ESTIONS AND 18SUES

Lansdale memo to Goodwin asking for alternate tracks Rusk sees

Is this part of

open to achieve Cuban objectives; plus list of pretexts Rusk

"plausible deniability"

sees as desirable in connection with any direct military inter-

vention.

Lansdale tells SGA CIA urgently needs policy determination

supplying of arms and equipment to deserving Cuban

guerrillas, as they are located, assessed, and request help.

Such requests are starting to surface...there 1s a need

for defining the limits of arming guerrillas (for self

defense, for training, for purposes shor of open actions in

resignated operation officers judgment to be used by

What were the guns

to be used for?

Were the limits" con-

cerned with control

of what was done with

or with the

timing of their delivers

(CIA was setting up

new contacts with

Mafia in late March)

Lansdale memo to SGA says many agents infiltrated into Cuba

"will be trained for paramilitary skills as well as intelligence

contie cho they the ot has notedled ententively dueside

once the agents

Craig reports to SGA that use of BW/CW to incapacitate Cuban

sugar workers "infeasible and it was cancelled."

Taylor memo re meeting of SGA with President discussing Taylor's

Isolating the President once

guidelines notes "General Lansdale and the Special Group (Augmented) again?

Plausible deniability?

were given tacit authorization to proceed in accordance with the

If so why such a clumsy

guidelines."

Footnote says: "...group was unanimous in feeling

attempt?

that no authorization,

either tacit or otherwise was given by

higher authority."

Footnote added one week later.

SGA meeting.

McCone impatient.

Group consensus is that time

has come to

reexamine basic philosophy of project with particular

reference to the possibility of finding a pretext for early

overt intervention.

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April 10

April 11

April 12

May 3

May 7

- 5 -

TOP SECRET TONS AND ISSUES

Harvey memo to McCone. Cites need for less restrictive

and less stultifying

controls by SGA.

Harvey

considers

Lansdale insistence to be given details improper.

At SGA meeting McCone urges speed-up of covert action

schedule.

"General Lansdale

said it would be useful

to have

approval

to go further with infiltrated agents!

than restricing them to intelligence missions."

Does MoCone's statement show

pressure or lack of it?

Lans -

dale's comments are inconsistent

with his Rockefeller testimony.

Three pages marked alternatives I, II, III,

with no

governet erote bribery and related gangi and the

attribution note:

our covert

activities should

(00270-00272)

the

Lansdale tells Taylor "Under revised plan for Operation

Mongoose, proposal for supplying arms and equipment to

(one team in place plus 7 local groups identified)

will be submitted to the SG for decision, ad hoc.

proposals have been received."

SGA meeting. Harvey reports on his infiltration teams.

Three are in place.

Lansdale memo to SGA complains of breakdown of communi-

cation with Chief of Operations.

He requests that "all

plans and actions with operational aspects hereafter

be made known to the Chief of Operations...."

is not done,

"we invite the danger of matters falling

between the

chairs."

Did Harvey mention the poison

pills,

and other attempts on

the life of Castro? If he did

not why would Taylor make a

special report to the President

on May 7 of Harvey's report?

Was this an allusion to recent

discovery of unknown Harvey

activities?

Or was it complaint

that Harvey had

simply not kept

him informed in greater detail?

Did it have to do with Harvey at

all?

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May 7

June 20

July 11

July 23

July 24.

August 8

August s

- 6 -

Taylor reports to President on Harvey's report to the Special

tro posting due the vory Tired proger ena has besto

Harvey memo to Lansdale requesting permission trom sliA

for aerial resupply of infiltrated agents.

TIPS

SEE NESTIONS AND ISSUES

What limited projects?

Was this an allusion to

assassination?

Parrott memo to a superior re air resupply operations.

"Exactly what supplies is it intended to provide?...This

sort of thing gets us pretty close to the moment of

truth."

IDOD working group tells Lansdale electronic intelligence

should improve and provide increases intormation in areas

"plots against prominent figures."

Harvey memo to Lansdale outlining CIA participation

in at author as on on ten too ones b

Lansdale memo to SGA states "the major difference from

one of Operation Mongoose would be in removing

the restriction, in the 14 March policy guidelines,

which kept our

actions 'short of those reasonably

calculated to inspire a revolt within the target

Were arms involved in the request?

What is the moment of truth?

Why such concern

for the nature

of the supplies?

Where does DOD get this idea?

What plots are they referring

to?

Was Harvey frustration put into

action by disobeying orders?

Lansdale memo to SGA concerning Harvey request for

authority for major sabotage against

industry and public

utilities.

Lansdale requested this stepped-up plan from

Harvey.

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August 10

August 13

August 14

August

20

- 7 -

TOP SECRE

Special group meeting at which McNamara raises

issue of

What was the extent of the dis-

assassination of Castro.

Lansdale is present.

cussion?

Were people told to

present plans?

Lansdale understood from August

10 meeting that plans were

to be

mission.

Papers required from individuals for Tuesday

include 'Mr.

Harvey:

Intelligence, Political

(splitting the regime, liquidation of leaders)'"

prepared.

Did everyone else get

this

impression?

McCone calls McNamara after receiving Lansdale memo insis-

ting that it be withdrawn because no decision had been

made on the subject of liquidation and Lansdale was out

of order in asking CIA to consider

the matter.

testified that McNamara agreed memo should be withdrawn.

Harvey memo to McCone moting he called Lansdale's office and

told Frank Hand of the "stupidity"

of including in the

Lansdale memo as a topic to be considered "liquidation

of leaders."

CIA would not participate in preparation

of such documents pertaining to liquidation and urged

that Hand recommend to Lansdale that phrase be excised.

Lansdale called back to say that it had been done.

Harvey memo to DDP (CIA) notes that matter of assassi-

nation brought up in Rusk's office by McNamara.

"I took

careful note

from the comments...and the SGA is not

expecting any written comments or study on this point."

Taylor memo to SGA received by Lansdale which notes

"attached papers were read and approved by higher

authority today."

Papers were Taylor guidelines for

phase two.

President told SGA favors more aggressive

program.

Sabotage

was to be employed on selective

basis under

guidelines.

Was this the first time McNamara

was

aware of the Lansdale memo?

Had he himself made an effort to

have Lansdale withdraw the memo

independent of McCone's request?

Why was Harvey so concerned?

He had carried out full-scale

operation against Castro in

April of 1962.

Was it simply

the fear of having something in

writing?

Were they expecting unwritten

comments or studies on this point?

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August 30

September 6

October 4

October 11

October 26

October 30

November 21

- 8 -

TOP SECRET

QUESTIONS AND ISSUES

SGA requests CIA to submit list of possible sabotage

targets.

"The group by reacting to

this list could de-

fine the limits

within which the Agency could operate

on its own initiative."

Was this an abdication of

control?

At SGA meeting where Lansdale was present Bundy notes

re agricultural sabotage

that release of chemicals

must be avoided unless it could be completely covered

up.

''more direct action"

is not indicated.

AG says

President dissatisfied with lack of action in the

sabotage field.

Lansdale recommends early approval of CIA plans for

sabotaging Cuban shipping vessels.

Lansdale disavows any responsibility or support for

proposed infiltration of 9 teams into Cuba.

"Mr. Harvey's defense of the plan was not conclusive."

teams were to be withheld.

This is the Matahambre

copper mine

sabotage operation.

Was Lansdale kept in the dark

about these operations?.

Numerous

Harvey memos have marked as a

footnote on them re Matahambre

"not in Lansdale's memo."

What

does this mean?

McCone tells Lansdale President has decided to hold

back Operation Mongoose during negotiations on

Soviet missile crisis. No more sabotage of any

form.

Harvey memo says that Lansdale's statement that

Operation Mongoose "had had no information on this

opeation (Matahambre) since early October was patently

false."

This was part of an escalating

debate over how much Lansdale

either knew or did not know about

that operation. Was Harvey cover-

ing his tracks?

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1975

May 16

May

May 31

July 3

- 9 -

TOP SECRET

QUESTIONS AND

Lansdale tells Rockefeller Commission he tried to stop

sabotage.

however, that there were discussions

in the SGA concerning the possibility of plans to assassi-

nate foreign leaders.

He denies,

however, that any such

plans were ever actually formuated.

Washington Post story says Lansdale "Hinted strongly,

but refused

to confirm,

that the orders to draw up

plans (that may have included Fidel Castro's assassina-

tion)

came from the late Attorney General Robert F.

Kennedy." Lansdale insisted however, that "neither

President Kennedy or any other Kennedy ever gave me

any orders to plan the assassination of Castro."

In a New York Times story Horrock reports that "yesterday

General Lansdale said that in November, 1961, AG Robert

F. Kennedy ordered him to prepare a secret contingency

plan to depose Mr. Castro.

General Lansdale confirmed

that Robert Kennedy was acting on behalf of President

Kennedy."

Assassination may have been considered as one

of the mans of removing Castro.

He never redeived specific

orders from JFK or RFK to prepare a plan to assassinate

Castro.

Washington Star story by O'Leary reports that Lansdale

"has named Robert F. Kennedy as the Administration

official who ordered him in 1962 to launch a CIA project

to work out all feasible plans for 'getting rid of'

Prime Minister Fidel Castro."

The word assassination was

never used by anyone Lansdale said, but there was no doubt

that

the

plans

envisioned this as one of the means. Lansdale

relayed the orders directly to William Harvey.

Lansdale gives statement to Select Committee stating that

Washington Star story is a distortion of his remarks.

"I can say that I never did receive any order from President

Kennedy or from the Attorney Genral...no order about taking

action against Castro personally."

ISSUES

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Comments

GAMBLING SYNDICATE: UNDERWORLD CONTACTS ESTABLISHED

Early September, 1960

EDWARDS contacted MAHEU, who agreed to contact

the

gambling syndicate under the guise of representing

international business interests opposed to Castro.

SCONEL aS A RE in New tortand

On September 14,

ROSELLI agreed to introduce MAHEU to "SAM GOLD"

(SAM GIANCANA) who could arrange contacts with

syndicate elements in Cuba.

$150,000 was offered

for successful completion of the assination.

ROSELLI declined to accept payment.

GAMBLING SYNDICATE: DULLES BRIEFED ON OPERATION

Mid September, 1960

EDWARDS and BISSELL briefed DCI DULLES and GENERAL

CABELL on the gambling syndicate operation.

EDWARDS

implied that the plan would be put into effect unless

DULLES subsequently told him to stop.

BISSELL left

the meeting certain that DULLES knew the nature of

the operation.

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GAMBLING SYNDICATE: GIANCANA JOINS THE OPERATION

Late September, 1960

During the week of September 24, MAHEU, ROSELL, and

GIANCANA met at the Fontainbleau and Kennilworth

hotels in Miama.

GIANCANA was to be a "contact man"

although ROSELLI did not use GIANCANA to locate Cubans

employed in the operation.

EUs.

• GIANCANA told MAHEU that TRAFFICANTE would serve as

courrier to Cuba and make arrangements there.

O'CONNELL

never met GIANCANA or TRAFFICANTE, but recognized them

as gangsters

from a newspaper article on prominent

Cosa Nostra members, and reported this fact to EDWARDS.

GAMBLING SYNDICAGE: ROWAN WIRETAP

October 1960 (?)

Comments

girlfriend, PHYLLIS MCGUIRE,

with DAN ROWAN, and that GIANCANA wanted MAHEU

ROWAN'S room in Los Vegas.

MAHEU warned that if the

tap were not installed, GIANCANA would leave Miami,

disrupting the operation.

O'CONNELL contacted someone at CIA, presumably EDWARDS,

and received approval for having MAntu arrange a tap

(EDWARDS denies he was consulted).

MAHEU passed the

a private investigator,

install the tap.

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## Page 18

BALLETTI and HARRISON were arrested after a maid

discovered the listening

device.

BALLETTI called

MAHEU, and ROSELLI provided MAHEU with the bail

MAHEU told EDWARDS that the FBI was in-

vestigating his association with ROSELLI and

GIANCANA.

told MAHEU that if he was formally

approached by the FBI, he should refer the FBI to

EDWARDS.

EXECUTIVE ACTION: WHITE HOUSE AUTHORIZATION

January, 1961

BISSELL assumed

the mandate included assassination capability.

EXECUTIVE ACTION: PROGRAM ESTABLISHED

Late January, 1961

In late January, BISSELL asked HARVEY to establish an

executive action

capability.

HARVEY understood the

mandate to include assassination, but no specific

leaders were targeted.

HARVEY expressed doubts about the feasibility of assas-

sinations

to BISSELL and HELMS.

The DCI was not advised

of the program at this time, and it is uncertain whether

he was

ever advised.

Comments

?..

Kin raid

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Comments

On January 26, HARVEY discussed the operation with

The project was named ZRRIFFLE,

and

operated under the cover of procuring code decipher

materials.

Agent QJWIN, who had been recruited

earlier by SILVER for an operation against Lumumba,

was

salaried as the principle agent.

On January 26, HARVEY discussed assassination techni-

ques with SYD GOTTLIEB of the TSD.

GAMBLING SYNDICATE: ORTA OPERATION

January-February, 1961

GIANCANA suggested the use of poison pills.

EDWARDS

and O'CONNELL discussed the pills with TREICHLER of

TSD, and by February 10, the pills had been tested

their effectiveness.

Shortly thereafter they

were supplied to O'CONNELL, who gave them to ROSELLI.

ROSELLI reported that the pills had been delivered

to JUAN ORTA in Cuba.

ORTA kept the pills for a few

weeks, and then returned them.

POISONED CIGARS DELIVERED

February 13, 1961

TREICHLER notes reveal poisoned cigars delivered to

unidentified person on February 13.

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Comments

GAMBLING SYNDICATE: VERONA OPERATION

March-April, 1961

Following ORTA's failure, ROSELLI told O'CONNELL that

TRAFFICANTE had approached TONY VERONA, head of a Cuban

exile movement fronted by the CIA.

VERONA claimed to

have a contact inside Cuba who worked at a restaurant

frequented by Castro.

$10,000 in cash and $1,000 in

communications equipment were delivered to O'CONNELL

to cover operational expenses.

MAHEU, ROSELLI, TRAFFICANTE, and VERONA met at the

Fontainbleau Hotel in Miami, and MAHEU delivered the

cash and capsules to VERONA.

When the operation

failed to materialize, VERONA returned the cash.

AMLASH: INITIAL CONTACT

March 9, 1961

JACK STEWART, Of the Mexico City station of the CIA,

met with AMLASH-1,

a major in the Cuban army who was

disaffected with

in Mexico City on March 9.

AMLASH-1 requested arms

Castro.

Castro' for use in operations against

AMLASH: REQUEST FOR AID IN DEFECTING

March 28, 1961

STEWART.

that Cuban police aware of AMLASH-l's defection plans.

-

-

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Comments

EARLY APRIL ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT

Early April, 1961

CIA cables reveal that

During entitied cuban working with the agency volun-

teered to assassinate Castro, but was unable

to enter

i retire

BAY OF PIGS: APRIL 16-19, 1961

GAMBLING SYNDICATE: OPERATION TERMINATED

Late April, 1961

was terminated, and that even if someone

succeeded in

assassinating Castro, there would be no payoff. The

pills were retrieved

MCCONE BRIEFING RE: ASSASSINATIONS

September, 1961

Between his nomination and confirmation, MCCONE was

briefed about the Cuban operations. He was apparently

not told about any assassination plans, either past

or ongoing, nor about Executive Action or the Gambling

Syndicate operation.

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Comments

MCCONE BECOMES DCI

October, 1961

TASK FORCE W: INCEPTION

October, 1961

In October, SAM HALPERN of the Caribbean Division

attended a meeting with BISSELL and GHOSE ZOGBEY,

Branch Chief

BISSELL stated that he had been repri-

Castro regime.

an operation to get rid of Castro, placing no limita-

tion on the means.

GENERAL LANSDALE.

guidance and reported to him.

EXECUTIVE ACTION: DECISION TO APPLY PROGRAM TO CASTRO

November 15, 1961

On November 15, HARVEY and BISSELL discussed apply-

ing the ZRRIFLE capability against Castro.

BISSELL

also instructed HARVEY to take over EDWARDS' gambling

syndicate operation.

TASK FORCE W: HARVEY TAKES COMMAND

January, 1962

HARVEY was put in charge of Task Force W in January, 1962.

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GAMBLING SYNDICATE: EDWARDS-HARVEY BRIEFING

February 1962

Edwards briefed HARVEY on the gambling syndicate opera-

in February.

Details for his

taking over

operation were worked out during the following month.

HELMS BECOMES DDP AND BRIEFED BY BISSELL

February,

1962

BISSELL,

either himself or through HARVEY,

gambling syndicate assassination

plot, telling him it

had been deactivated.

EXECUTIVE ACTION: AUTHORIZATION BY HELMS

February 19, 1962

On February 19, HELMS issued a memorandum authorizing

HARVEY tO

retain QJWIN and other agents he telt neces-

sary for ZRRIFLE; accounting for funds was to be by

general category by HARVEY's certification.

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10.

Comments

WIRETAP INCIDENT: FBI -CIA DISCUSSIONS

February-April, 1962

Sometime after BALLETTI's arrest, MAHEU informed the

For that the ROWAN wiretap involved februaly gence

operation directed against Cuba.

EDWARDS told PAPICH that the CIA would object to the

use of CIA personnel or information in prosecutions,

and

that the introduction of evidence concerning the

CIA operation would be "embarrassing to the Government."

On March 23, HOOVER sent a letter to MCCONE through

EDWARDS characterizing the ROWAN wiretap as involving

"intelligence information"

forwarded the letter to HOUSTON,

requesting him to in-

form Assistant Attorney General MILLER that the ROWAN

wiretap was related to intelligence operations against

Cuba.

On April 16, HOUSTON requested MILLER to under-

take no prosecutions for the ROWAN wiretap.

HOUSTON

then briefed DDCI CARTER, who said that MCCONE might

be briefed in "due time"

There is no indication

that CARTER was told about the assassination opera-

tion or that MCCONE was briefed by any of the parties.

Early April, 1962

HARVEY requested EDWARDS to put him in touch with ROSELLI.

In early April, O'CONNELL introduced HARVEY to ROSELLI in

HARVEY told ROSELLI to maintain his Cuban contacts,

but not to deal with MAHEU or GIANCANA.

HARVEY briefed

HELMS on the result of this meeting, and thereafter kept

HELMS informed of the status of the operation.

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Comments

GAMBLING SYNDICATE: MEETING IN NEW YORK

April 8-9, 1962

O'CONNELL, and ROSELLI met in New York on

sent.

GAMBLING SYNDICATE: WASHINGTON MEETING

April 14, 1962

HARVEY,

April 14.

ROSELLI was apprehensive about HARVEY

and asked O'CONNELL to stay with operation.

GAMBLING SYNDICATE: DELIVERY OF PILLS TO ROSELLI

April 19-21, 1962

TREICHLER delivered four pills to O'CONNELL on April

18. HARVEY arrived in Miami with the pills on April

GAMBLING SYNDICATE: DELIVERY OF PILLS TO VERONA

April 21, 1962

ROSELLI reestablished contact with VERONA, who claimed

to have an asset in Cuba who could deposit the pills in

Castro's food.

ROSELLI told HARVEY that the asset in-

tended to use

the pills to assassinate Castro, Che

Guevarra, and Raul Castro.

HARVEY approved of the

targets and gave

ROSELLI the pills,

who passed them on

his asset

(Cuban no. 1).

ROSELLI'S assistant was

an Italian-speaking Cuban named MACEO.

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Comments

GAMBLING SYNDICATE: DELIVERY OF ARMS TO VERNONA

Late April, 1962

VERONA requested arms and equipment: HARVEY obtained

detonators

A rEne A Lo use of the assas ration efor

rifles,

radios, and boat radar

and to aid Cuban guerrillas.

HARVEY and SHACKLEY delivered the equipment to a

ing lot in a l-Haul truck rented under an assumed name.

HARVEY gave the keys to ROSELLI, who arranged to have

the truck picked up by an unidentified contact.

GAMBLING SYNDICATE: DELIVERY OF PILLS AND ARMS TO CUBA

May, 1962

ROSELLI kept HARVEY informed of developments.

Sometime

in May ROSELLI reported to HARVEY that the pills had

reached Cuba, and that he believed the guns were inside

Cuba.

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Comments

WIRETAP INCIDENT: RFK BRIEFING

May 7-14, 1962

the operation was continuing; HOUSTON claims EDWARDS

told him the operation had terminated. RFK was told

that the operation had been terminated, and RFK stated

that no operations involving gangsters

should be under-

taken without first notifying him.

EDWARDS did not

notify HARVEY of this order.

RFK briefed HOOVER on May

10, criticizing the use of underworld figures and stating

that it would be difficult to prosecute MAHEU OF GIANCANA

on any charges.

On May 14, EDWARDS and HARVEY met with HELMS and advised

against telling MCCONE of the assassination plot. HELMS

agreed not to brief MCCONE.

On мау 14,

EDWARDS wrote a memorandum for the file stating

that HARVEY had informed him that he was dropping all

plans to use ROSELLI in the future.

According

to HARVEY,

both he and EDWARDS knew that the ROSELLI operation was

continuing.

On May 14, EDWARDS wrote a memorandum for the record, a

copy of which was

sent to RFK, summarizing the May 7

briefing of RFK.

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Comments

GAMBLING SYNDICATE: 3 MAN TEAM SENT TO CUBA

June, 1962

ROSELLI informed HARVEY in June that a three-man team

had been dispatched to Cuba, evidently to either

Castro themselves or to recruit others to do the job.

GAMBLING SYNDICATE: O'CONNELL CUT OUT

June, 1902

O'CONNELL left for an assignment to Japan in June,

1962.

His participation in the Gambling Syndicate

Operation ended at least by this time, and possibly

in May.

AMLASH: RECRUITMENT AS ASSET

July-September, 1962

Meetings were held with AMLASH-1 in early August in

Helsinki,

in which AMLASH-1 expressed a desire to carry

out operations to undermine the Castro regime, includ-

ing the assassination of Castro.

During the weeks of

August 14-23,

AMLASH-1 was met by agents in Paris and

given S/W training.

GAMBLING SYNDICATE: SECOND THREE-MAN TEAM SENT

September 7-11, 1962

HARVEY met ROSELLI in Miami on September 7 and 11.

ROSELLI reported that the pills were still in Cuba,

and that VERONA was preparing to send in another three-

man team assigned to penetrate Castro's bodyguard.

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Comments

HARVEY did not notify MCCONE because he doubted that

the plot would succeed.

GAMBLING SYNDICATE: ROSELLI PLACED IN SAFE HOUSE.

October, 1962

Ro washington, had during ine cuban missil crisis.

TASK FORCE W: FITZGERALD TAKES COMMAND

January, 1963

FITZGERALD replaced HARVEY as commander of Task Force

W in January, 1963, under intense pressure from either

RFK or JFK to "get rid of" Castro.

The Task Force

for the first time considered methods of assassinating

Castro. The Special Group was told of none of these

TASK FORCE W: EXPLODING SEASHELL

January, 1963(?)

FITZGERALD asked HALPERN to investigate the possibility

of rigging

an exotic seashell to explode and placing

it in an

area where Castro went skin diving. The plan

was dropped as impractical.

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TASK FORCE W: CONTAMINATED DIVING SUIT

January, 1963

A plan was devised to have JAMES DONOVAN, who was

negotiating for the release of Bay of Pigs pri-

to present Castro with a diving

soners with Castro, fungus that would produce a dis-

suit dusted with a

abiling skin disease and contaminated with a tubercle

bacilli.

The plan was abandoned because DONOVAN had

already given Castro a diving suit.

GAMBLING SYNDICATE: COLLAPSE OF OPERATION

January 6-16, 1963

HARVEY met with ROSELLI and MACEO in Miami several times

during

the

first half ot January.

The second three-man

team did not embark for Cuba.

ROSELLI told HARVEY that

nothing was happening and that it was doubtful that any-

thing would happen in the future.

GAMBLING SYNDICATE: TERMINATION OF OPERATION

February 11-15,

1963

HARVEY left word for MACEO in Miami that the assassi-

nation program had ended.

On February 15, HARVEY met

with ROSELLI in Los Angeles, where they agreed to call

off the assassination plot.

ROSELLI did not notify

the assets that the plot had been terminated, but

simply refrained from further dealing with them in any

GOET

16

Comments

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Comments

PERSONAL MEETING BETWEEN HARVEY AND ROSELLI

June, 1963

Labeled

HELMS BRIEFS MCCONE ON GAMBLING SYNDICATE OPERATION

August 16, 1963

MCCONE asked HELMS about relations

imminent newspaper articles on the topic.

sent MCCONE a Copy of EDWARDS' May 14, 1962 memo -

randum describing only the first phase of the

operation.

The cover memorandum stated "I assume

"has long since been put to bed."

Articles stating that GIANCANA had been used by

the CIA in an intelligence operation against Cuba

appeared in the Chicago Sun-Times on August 16,

and the Chicago Daily News on August 20.

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Comments

AMLASH: MEETING WITH FITZGERALD

October,

1963

AMLASH-1 insisted on meeting with a senior United

States official for assurances of American support.

FITZGERALD and HELMS agreed that FITZGERALD should

meet AMLASH in Paris and hold himself out as a per-

sonal representative of RFK. HELMS decided that it

was unnecessary to seek approval from RFK because he

believed the operation was consistent with RFK's

general policies toward Cuba.

FITZGERALD met CUBELA on October 29,

and promised

to aid any anti-communist groups which could

neutralize Castro.

rifle with telescopic sights.

that the United States would not take part in an assas-

sination scheme.

AMLASH: DECISION TO PROVIDE RIFLES

November 19, 1963

A memorandum for the record by SANCHEZ dated November

19 states: "C/SAS (FITZGERALD)

approved telling CUBELA

he would be given a cache inside Cuba.

with scopussted it, include . .. high powered rifles

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Comments

AMLASH: PREPARATION OF POISON PEN

November 20, 1963

HALPERN requested GUNN to prepare a pen rigged

with a syringe for injecting a deadly poison,

Blackleaf 40.

HALPERN believed that AMLASH

could use the pen against Castro more effectively

than a rifle.

The SGA was not told about the

operation.

AMLASH: TRANSFER OF POISON PEN

November 22, 1963

niceive.

leaf 40 would be an effective poison.

AMLASH- 1 was

disappointed, and requested that weapons be deposited

at a friend's farm in Cuba.

AMLASH: ARMS DELIVERY

March-June 1964

A cache of arms was delivered to Cuba for AMLASH on

March 17-21; in the week of June 9, another cache con-

taining two FAL automatic rifles was landed in Cuba.

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Comments

AMLASH: ARTIME CONTACT

December, 1964

SANCHEZ met AMLASH-1 in Paris on December 6-7 and

indicated that the United States could not provide

assistance for his assassination attempt.

contrived to put AMLASH-1 in contact with ARTIME

in the hope that ARTIME would provide AMLASH-1 with

a silenced weapon.

On December 30, ARTIME met AMLASH

in Madrid, and ARTIME agreed to furnish a silencer.

AMLASH: WEAPON DELIVERY

February 11, 1965

Both weapons come from U.s. and

now in Madrid."

ARTIME's secretary cable on February 12 reported that

"ARTIME had three packages of special items made up

by his technical people and delivered to CUBELA in

Madrid."

AMLASH: TERMINATION

June, 1965

CIA terminated all contacts with the AMLASH group because

it felt that too many people knew about the AMLASH opera-

tion.

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Comments

AMLASH ARRESTED

March 1, 1966

planning the rests ina war be case and tried for

MEMO FROM HELMS TO RUSK REGARDING AMLASH

March 7,

1966

In response to Havana Presna Latina news release

that the CIA was not involved in a plot with AMLASH-1

to assassinate Castro, and that it never encouraged

AMLASH-1 to attempt such an act.

LONG COMMITTEE INVESTIGATION

May-June, 1966

The Committee headed by Senator LONG investigating

invasions of privacy intended to call MAHEU.

The

Internal Security Division of the Department of

Justice informed

the CIA,

and the CIA's General

Counsel arranged

to have MAHEU excused from testifying.

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Comments

ROSELLI CONTACTS EDWARDS

Week of May 12, 1966

On May 12,

with

EDWARDS.

ROS ROSEELE old EDwARDs that he had been

approached by FBI agents who revealed that they knew

he was in the

under an assumed name by slipping

a picture of him in his youth under his door.

ROSELLI

indicated that he was afraid other gangsters might take

action against him if he

talked to the FBI.

EDWARDS

believed ROSELLI wanted EDWARDS to inform the FBI of

• ROSELLI's concerns.

CIA INFORMS FBI OF ROSELLI DEVELOPMENTS

May 12-18, 1966

OSBORN informed

SAM PAPICH,

and on May 18 briefed HELMS.

to work closely with the FBI and to instruct him if

evidence of a "quid pro quo" developed.

OSBORN admitted

to the FBI that "ROSELLI has CIA in an unusually vulnerable

position and that he would have no qualms about embarras-

sing CIA if it served his own interests."

ROSELLI CONTACTS EDWARDS

Late May, 1966

ROSELLI phoned EDWARDS and explained that the FBI was

trying

to blackmail him.

ROSELLI contends that he did

not request any assistance from HARVEY.

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Comments

CIA PREVENTS EDWARDS FROM TESTIFYING

December 21, 1966

PAPICH informed EDWARDS that ROSELLI was living in

the United States under an assumed name,

and that

the FBI wanted to obtain ROSELLI's cooperation in

an investigation of the Mafia under threat of deporta-

The FBI desired EDWARDS' testimony regarding

receipt of the picture by ROSELLI.

OSBORN informed

PAPICH that the CIA would object to the subpoena of

EDWARDS for this purpose or as an intermediary to

solicit ROSELLI's cooperation. HOUSTON and HELMS

concurred in this position.

INSPECTOR GENERAL'S REPORT

April 25, 1967

HELMS requested the Inspector General to look into

assassination plots against Castro pursuant to an

inquiry by PRESIDENT JOHNSON.

The report was sub-

copy.

The Report concluded that the CIA had been involved

in a plot involving underworld figures to assassinate

Castro.

CIA CONCERN ABOUT ROSELLI PROSECUTION

August-December, 1967

On August 11, PAPICH informed OSBORN that ROSELLI

shortly be arrested on gambling charges, and

that EDWARDS was desired as

objected to EDWARDS'

a witness. The CIA

appearance.

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Comments

On October 22 and 27, ROSELLI requested HARVEY

to serve

"why the agency

MAHEU"

connection with the Long Committee.

(HARVEY was no longer employed by the CIA).

Will maintain his trust

HARVEY reported that "ROSELLI

unless he is convicted

and the threat of deportation arises."

COLBY MEMO ON ASSASSINATION

August, 1969

In August, COLBY issued a memorandum to all

Deputy Directors stating that "the CIA will not

engage in assassinations or

induce, assist or

project to others that assassination be em-

ployed."

SEC

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CASTRO ASSASSINATION PLANS

Comments

EARLY PLANS TO HARASS CASTRO

I & has

March-July, 1960

Discussion of plans to sabotage Castro's speeches by

contaminating

air of radio studio with a substance

resembling LSD and by impregnating Castro's cigars

with a chemical to produce temporary disorientation.

Plan to cause Castro's beard to fall out by placing

thallium salts in his shoes progresses as far as

testing the chemical on animals.

GAMBLING SYNDICATE OPERATION INITIATED

August, 1960

ED ARgus chief of the basice re destrity, to establish

EDWARDS,

contacts with gambling syndicate that was active in

Cuba for the purpose of

exploring capacity for assas-

sinating

Castro.

EDWARDS told the case officer

the operation, JAMES O'CONNELL, to contact ROBERT A.

MAHEU, a private investigator with syndicate con-

nections.

EDWARDS and BISSELL discussed various

forms of poisoning with CORNELIUS ROOSEVELT, Chief

POISON CIGARS

August 16, 1960

EDWARD GUNN, Office of Medical Services, receives

cigars with

orders to contaminate them with lethal

cigars are

TOXin DY RAY TREICHLER, TSD.

contaminated with Botulinum

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July 6, 1975

GORDON GRAY

Chronology and Issues

Biographical Background

1942-1947

U.S. Army (Pvt. to Captain)

1949-50

Department of Army (ultimately Secretary of

the Army)

1950-51

Special Assistant to President TRUMAN

1951

Organized for TRUMAN the Psychological Strategy

Board, which involved close contact with in-

telligence community

1951-55

President, University of North Carolina

1955

Assistant secretary of Defense for International

Security Affairs (ISA)

1958

Director, Office of Defense Mobilization

1958-61

SPECIAL ASSISTANT IO THE PRESIDENT (EISENHOWER)

FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS (Head of NSC)

1961-75

Member, PFIAB (President's Foreign Intelligence

Advisory Board) appointed by JFK

Chronology of Events

1959

November 4

Special Group discusses Allen Dulles' "Cuba

Propaganda Project"

for use of radio trans-

mitters.

GRAY said "he was sure (the project)

would meet with high level approval". provided

it was acceptable to the President of Mexico.

(SG Minutes)

Issues and Questions

Special Group meetings.

Gray represents President EISENHOWER at

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76-70:7.0

1960

February 17

March 9

April 7

April 28

June 30

July 1

July 21

August 12

Chronology

-2-

Special Group approves evaluation of agents for

Cuban sugar mill sabotage. GRAY "discussed

this matter with his associate" (Eisenhower)

and reported two tactical objections. (SG Minutes)

GRAY tells Special Group that any covert action

like sugar mill sabotage should be undertaken only

after overall consideration of "whether and how

the U.S. wishes to move against CASTRO." (SG Minutes)

"GRAY asked the /Special/ Group's views on

what happens after TRUJILLO, specifically how

CASTRO can be kept out of the Dominican Republic."

Acting DCI CABELL recommends U.S. military inter-

vention after TRUJILLO departe. (SG Minutes)

GRAY said "the opinion had been expressed to

him" that DILION should be. "Chief of Staff" for

all Cuba activities. (SG Minutes)

GRAY says "the U.S. has taken publicly about

all that it

can afford to take from the Castro

goverrment." (SG Minutes)

Memo from the Chief of CIA's Western Hemisphere

Division to the Acting DCI recommending delivery

of high-powered rifles with telescopic scopes to

the opponents of TRUJILLO.

The memo said: "approval

for delivery of these arms has been given by ASSISTANT

SECRETARY OF STATE ROY RUBOTTOM.

GRAY said "his associates" would favor the

development of sabotage operations in CUBA.

(SG Minutes)

BISSELL outlines 13.3 million dollar budget for

Cuban operations which was to be laid before

"higher authorities" for decision. (SG Minutes)

Issues and Questions

Did such consideration involve assassination

plotting?

Did US support TRUJILLO's opponents out ofa

desire to keep CASTRO out of the Dominican

Republic?

General atmosphere of vehement opposition to

CASTRO.

Was the Special Group aware of this action?

Was the President aware of the plan?

Purpose of weapons?

"Associate" is the euphemism for Eisen

hower.

Does sabotage imply the further step of

assassination?

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1960

August 16

August 25

August

(approx)

September 8

November 3

UILULULUGY

Di'. Edward GUNN (CIA Office of Medical Services)

receives box of Cuban cigars to be treated with

lethal poison for use against CASTRO. (IG REPORT p.21)

After toe Special Coup approve ented, however,

operations in the Congo,

that his associates had

expressed extremely

strong feelings on the necessity for very

straightforward action in this situation, and

he wondered whether the plans as outlined would

sufficient to accomplish this ... It was

finally agreed that planning for the Congo would

not necessarily rule out 'consideration' of any

particular kind of activity which might con-

tribute to getting rid of LUMUMBA." (SG Minutes;

emphasis added,

BISSELL asks EDWARDS to find underworld contacts

with Cuba to aid in an assassination operation

against CASTRO. (IG REPORT p.14)

During brief discussion of CONGO developments,

"GRAY said that he hoped that Agency people in

the field are fully aware of the top-level feeling

in Washington that vigorous action would not be

amiss."

(SG Minutes; emphasis added)

GRAY, DOUGLAS, and MERCHANT take the view that

events in Cuba,

"have now progressed to a point

where covert activities of the type originally

envisaged for CIA to undertake will not be

effective.

GRAY suggested "using the CIA-

backed exiles to mount a simulated attack on

Guantanamo in order to offer an excuse for

overt intervention."

"MERCHANT asked whether

any real planning has been done for taking direct

positive action against FIDEL, RAUL, and CHE

He said that without these three the

Cuban Government would be leaderless and probably

brainless ... LIt would be necessary to act

against all three simultaneously."

CABELL concluded this operation was highly

dangerous" and "beyond capabilities." (SG Minutes)

1soues dill yuescuno

Were EISENHOWER, GRAY, Or DCI Dulles aware

of this?

Is this a circumlocutious order for assass-

ination from the President? An indicationthal

at the least, assassination was within the

range of acceptable means for "getting rid

of LUMUMBA"'?

Were EISENHOWER, GRAY, or Allen DULLES aware

of this?

Was it authorized by anyone outside

the DDP?

Against LUMUMBA personally?

Was a simultaneous assassination of the three

Cuban leaders ever planned or initiated?

Note that prior to this CIA had already made

the contract with the MAFIA to kill CASTRO.

(1) Was Deputy DCI CABELL excluded from

knowledge?

(ii) Or was he misleading the

Special Group?

109

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1960

November 30

December 28

DEcember 29

1961

January 12

Late Jan.-

Early Feb.

GRAY'S "associates stand ready to deny U.s.

activity based in Guatamala" (training of Cubans).

GRAY'S "friends" want to fodus the organization

of Cuban operations: Ambassador WILLAUER, on

overt side and BARNES, on CIA covert side, vere

chosen. (SG Minutes)

GPAY tells Special Group that "his associates"

want a special meeting on Cuba on January 2.

BISSELL outlines two-pronged covert

activities

plan "directed against the TRUJILLO regime ...

He also emphasized that the proposed actions

would not of themselves bring about the desired

strcke against TRoLLo himseli.

GRAY was present:

Special Group approves the State Department

proposal explained by MERCHAIT "that limited

supplies of small arms and other material

should be made available for dissidents incide

the DOMINICAN REPUBLIC." (SG Minutes; emphasis

added)

DDP BISSELL asks WILLIAM HARVEY to establish an

EXECUTIVE ACTION

capability under project

ZRRIFLE. HARVEY'S notes are quoted as saying

that BISSELI said he had been "twice urged by

the White House" to establish such a capability,

including the capability to assassinate political

Issues ana yuestions

With the President?

Was CIA or the Special Group planning of

supporting an assassination of TRUJILLO?

Were these assassination-type weapons? If

not, was this Special Group action used.as

implict authority for subsequent provision of

weapons for the assassination of TRUJILLO?

Was the EXECUTIVE ACTION project iniated

or authorized during the EISENHOWER Admin-

istration?

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