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• 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992*90

SECRET

15 October 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

Assassination Records Review

Board

John F. Pereira

Chief, Historical Review Group

Foreign Government Information

(Australia)

(We request that this memorandum be returned to CIA once the

Board has completed its deliberations on the issues discussed

below.)

1. (S) Issue: This memorandum will address CIA's position

on the review and declassification of foreign government

information that appears in the JFK collection. This issue has

come to CIA's attention because of the recent review by the JEK

Board of Australian Jiaison documents.

The Agency believes it is

important to address this issue at this time because this is the

first instance that this type of foreign liaison document has

been reviewed by the Board and it is possible that such

information will appear again in CIA's collection.

This

will, therefore, focus on the larger issue of a United States

Government (USG) agency's legal obligations in the dissemination

ralso address the specific issue of the six "Australian

{100-32-10081- 201-11007-10222- 2012-0009-10224-10012-10080

2. (S) Conclusion: CIA does not object to the release of the

information in these six documents, but is only concerned about

protecting foreign government information. Therefore, the Agency

does not object to the release of the four CIA documents in the

redacted form proposed by the Board. With regards to the two?

Australian letters, the Agency has no authority to unilaterally

agree to their release in any form. Pursuant to its legal

obligations, CIA ordinarily seeks the consent of the foreign

government prior to declassifying their information. However,

(for reasons described herein, it is not possible to even seek the)

consent of the Australians at this time, nor would it be likely

that the Australians would give it. Rather than going to the..

Australians against its better judgment or requesting the

CL BY: 12224130

CL REASON: 1.5 (d)

DECL ON: X5

DRV FM: LIA 3-82

SECREM

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SECRET

SUBJECT: Foreign Government Information

(Australia

President to agree to the unilateral declassification of foreign

government information, CIA proposes that the release of the

"Australian documents be either postponed for a short time or that

a substitution be made

3. (U) Legal Authorities: The procedures governing the

declassification and dissemination of foreign government

information are set out in Executive Order 12958, as well as

Director of Central Intelligence Directives (DCIDs). Executive

Order 12958 defines foreign government information as including

(1) information provided by a foreign government, or any element

thereot, with the expectation, expressed of implied, that the

information and/or the source of the information, are to be held

in confidence; or (2) information produced by the United States

pursuant to or as a result of a joint arrangements with a foreign

government, or any element thereof, requiring that the

information, the arrangements, or both, are to be held in

confidence. Id., at §1.1(d)

4. (U)

Foreign government information is subject to a

classification determination under E.O. 12958, section 1.5(c).

When so classified, U.S. government agencies are obligated to

protect that information from unauthorized disclosure.

The E.O.

requires

that foreign government information shall either retain

its original classification or be assigned a U.S. classification

that shall ensure a degree of protection at least equivalent to

required by the entity that furnished the information. Id.,

at 1.7(e). Furthermore, agencies are required to safeguard

foreign government information under standards that provide a

degree of protection at least equivalent to that required by the •

originating government. Id., at 4.2(g) .

5: (U) Pursuant to his authority as head of the

Interigence community to protect all classified information fro

inauthorized disclosure, the Director of Central Intelligence ha:

issued Directives (that is, DCIDs) setting out the procedures for

the declassification and dissemination of foreign government

information.

from a

Intelligence obtained from another government of

combined effort with another government, may not be

released or authorized

for release without its

consent. DCID 5/6

attachment & C.3. Furthermore, the release of intelligence that

would be contrary to agreements between the U.S. and foreign

countries is expressly prohibited. Id., at § C.5.

6. (U) Finally, the very

fact of intelligence cooperation

between the U.s. and

specifically named foreign countries and

government components is classified SECRET unless a different

classification is mutually agreed upon.

DCID 1/10-1. Such

information may be declassified only with the mutual consent of

the U.S. and the foreign government whose interests are involved.

DCID 1/10-1.

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SECRET

SUBJECT: Foreign Government Information

(Australia

the U.S. and the foreign government whose interests are involved.

DCID 1/10-1.

7

• (U) National Security Considerations: The importance of

such coordination with foreign governments prior to the release

of their information cannot be overemphasized.

Should CIA, or

for that matter any (USG) agency fail to coordinate where

required, not only would it be a violation of the aforementioned

E.0. and

directives, but it would chill relationships it has

developed with foreign services over the years.

If such lack of

coordination became known, foreign services would hesitate to

share crucial intelligence information with CIA if they believed

it would be released, in spite of any agreements or U.S. laws to

the contrary, without their consent. Furthermore, the U.s. could

not expect foreign services to safeguard U.S. government

information that it shares with its liaison partners in order to

pursue authorized intelligence and foreign policy objectives.

8. (S) According to its legal obligations described herein,

CIA coordinates the dissemination and/or release of foreign

government information.

Its obligation to do so is similar to

its obligation to coordinate declassification efforts with

another USG agency should the CIA possess any of that agency's

documents. For example, CIA could not declassify and release to

the public FBI information located in CIA files without

coordinating with that agency.

Similarly, CIA has no authority

to unilaterally declassify foreign government documents or

information in its files.

9. (5).

Coordination with Australia;

As two of the documents.

at issue here are

letters from the Australian service (104-100093

10224, 104-10012-100801 CIA is legally obligated by E.O. and

agreement with the Australians, to seek the consent of the

Australiansiprior to their release, even in redacted form.

issue of coordinating with the Australian servicesis a timely

even in redacted a timely

one. In most cases, CIA would not have an objection to going to

the foreign government and seeking their consent for declas-

sification.

classified information.

Based on the incidents described

below, it is CIA's

position that even asking the Australians for

¡¡consent to release would threaten the current relationship.

• Within the last year, a demarche was made by the Australian

government expressing strong concern that u.s. declas-

sification legislation expressly spell out that no information

provided to the USG by the Australian service, be declassified

without its permission.

A copy of this demarche is provided

for the Board's review. (See attached.)

It is worth noting

that-this-demarche_is-not.between-intelligence_services-butr

3

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SECRET

SUBJECT: Foreign Government Information

Australia

rather between governments - it was literally delivered by

the Australian Ambassador to the National Security Council and

to the U.S. Ambassador to Australia.: Ihe

manner in which the

Detection of cated the more don is receiving on priority

in the Australian government and

is not just a concern of

their intelligence community.

On two recent but separate occasions

the Australian service

passed to CIA information indicating that there would be

assassination attempts on two non-u.s. citizens.

CIA

-requested that it pass this information on to the targets, but

the Australians refused.

They argued that the information was

Australians stated that if they believed the information was

useful, they would pass it themselves.

The Australians were

concerned that CIA had even asked to pass, on this information,

and questioned what they perceived as CIA's willingness to

share their information with third parties.

Finally, they

stated that the easiest way to protect their information was

simply not to pass it to CIA anymore.

• Just this month, a senior official of the Australian service

"approached the CIA with accusations that a former Agency

employee allegedly_may have disclosed their classified

information.

The Australians believe that this disclosure

may be related to the loss of all agent reporting sources

in a country of particular interest to them. The DDCI

promised the head of the Australian service to launch an

investigation into the matter.

The Australian service recently expressed grave concern to CIA

about a book published by an American USG official which

alludes to a relationship between the CIA and the Australian

service. Even though this book was not an official CIA

acknowledgment of a liaison relationship,

to the Australians,

this incident called into question the CIA's ability to protect

that relationship.

10. (S)

Under the circumstances, it would be an affront to

the Australians to be asked for their

consent in light of the

above events which have all occurred in the last year. The

Australians would not only be extremely upset with CIA, but would

"certainly deny their consent.

Should the Australians deny their

consent, CIA would have no authority to agree to the release of

the Information and would be obligated to do all it could to

prevent disclosure.

It is crucial not only to CIA's mission but

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SECRET

SUBJECT: Foreign Government Information

< Australia

also to the conduct of US foreign relations that the USG is seen

as abiding by its agreements with foreign services as well as its

own laws on the release of information.

Ff. (S) Finally, the importance of maintaining good

relations with the Australians cannot be overemphasized.

As a

Tesult of our valuable relationship with our Australian liaison

counterparts, the USG receives a large volume of finished

intelligence.

Due to our shrinking resources,

much of this

information would not be available to U.S. policy makers were it

snot provided by the Australians.

Additionally, we work together

with the Australians around the world on joint collection

activities thät cover the full spectrum of USG intelligence

priorities.

there are®

Finally, there are several critical collection

efforts vital to the

USG where we do not have the entrée to

collect intelligence independently. In these cases, we rely

entirely on the continued good will of the Australian services to

provide us with the assistance necessary to meet U.s.

policymakers' needs.

12.

(S)

In light of all the above, CIA submits the

following two proposals for the Board's consideration. First,

the Board could postpone these two documents from release for a

short period (we propose 10 months) at which time CIA can

reassess its relationship with the Australians.

It is possible

that the relationship with CIA and Australia could change so that

it would be possible to seek their consent for release in full.

However, should we seek the consent of the Australians at a

future date and the Australians object to the release of the

documents, we would ask that the Board seriously consider any

negative reaction from the Australians in its deliberations and

abide by their desires.

A second option would be for CIA to

coordinate with the JFK Staff a substitution or some sort of

such to ta hat the tact

summary-of the Australian documents for immediate release.

This

summary would hide the fact that the letter came from the

Australian service, but would reveal what the subject of the

letter was.

This would avoid the problem of having to go the

Australians to seek their consent, which we would have to do even

in the case of redactions..

22-car a for

13. (U) Should the Board reject these proposals, CIA is

willing to work with the Board to reach another mutually

agreeable solution.

We strongly believe, however, that any

approach which

suggests that the U.S. Government may ignore its

obligations and commitments to foreign governments would

seriously undermine the vigorous and healthy diplomatic as well

as intelligence relationships that we currently enjoy.

314(5

with regard to the remaining four documents 1104-2

10012-10078, 104-10012-10079. 104-10012-10081, 104-10009-10222,

these are CIA documents and with the redactions proposed by the

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SUBJECT: Foreign Government Information

Australia

§government.

As such, CIA consents to the release of these

documents with the redactions proposed by the Board.

(S) Proposal for Future Coordination: With regards to

other foreign government information that may exist in the

files, CIA proposes that it approach its liaison services to

request their consent in the release of their information when it

would be appropriate to do so.

Although recent events with

Australia,make it impossible for CIA to approach them at this

time, this may not be so with other services.

In cases were CIA

believes, because of the nature of the relationship, that it

would not be possible to request the consent of the service, CIA!

proposes that the documents either be postponed from release or

that CIA and Board's staff coordinate a summary.

Film 7 Percia

John F.

Pereira

Attachment

6

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§ Attached is a copy of the Australian Demarche on U.S. legislation on declassification.

This was given to the U.S. Ambassador to Australia, Ambassador Perkins, by Pbilip

Flood tien Director of the Office of National Assessments (ONA), in September 1995.

This demarche was also given to Sandy Berger at the National Security Council by

Australian Ambassador to the United States Don Russell on 4 August 1995.

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• CONFIDENTIAL

AUSTRALIAN COMMENTS ON

EXECUTIVE ORDER 12958 -

CLASSIFIED NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

The Australlan government wishes to register ils concern over the 17 April Exceutive

Order on Classifled Natlonal-Security Information and the apparent omiasion of any

P # explicit provision to protect forsign-sourced informatlon or documentation from

auromatic declassification onco it is over 25 years old.

The Australian government understands and supports the democrate principles and

cuminitment to open goverment which underpir the Bxeoutive Order, Wo too are

improving access to government information, but are maintaining provisions 10

protect foreign-sourced Information - Including U.S, information.

He do not agrce that these principles can be applied by one foreign government to the

information or documentation of another govemment without pror consultation and

clearance. Australan-sourced inforination was and continues to be passed to the U.Sr

goremmens on the understanding that it will be protecied. We adopt procisely the

sanic approach to information that tho U.S. shares with un.

Omission of such consulaton would, in the eyes of the. Australian governient, not

be in keeping with the 1962 U.S.-Australla Gencral Security of Information

agreement or the many other biluteral and mutilaterat tritelligence co- operadon und

information sharing agroanients.

The failure to protect sensitive Austratian-sourced informaton about, for example,

our intelligence operations, could have ramlications for our relations with reglonal

countries and compromise Intelligence sources and meshods (upon which the U.S.

depends in part).

Australian concerns could be addressed If provision for clearance with originalors of 4

foreign-sourced materlal was embodied in the Information Securlty Oversight Office

§ 8 lemplenientation directive to U.S. agencles.

such an approach should not impede or delay the declassification prousa -

Australia is not seeking this. For example, catoguries of sensivity for Australia

could be idendified. A reasonable time limit could be pur on Australian responsc

time after which the U.S, could be tree lo declassify (we have a similar

arrangement with the U.K.):

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