MEMORANDUM FOR THE STANDING GROUP OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
Agency: JCS
Originator: JCS
Document date: 7/9/63
Document type: MEMORANDUM

## Page 1

Date: 08/04/98

Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS

RECORD

• NUMBER

: 202-10001-10254

RECORDS SERIES : JFK LIBRARY SERIES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

MOC EX SERIES

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

Released under the John

• Kennedy

Assassination Records

Collection Act of 1992

144 USC 2107 Notel.

Case#:NW 54214 Date:

09-13-2017

ORIGINATOR : JCS

FROM

TO

TITLE : MEMORANDUM FOR THE STANDING GROUP OF THE NATIONAL

SECURITY COUNCIL

DATE : 07/09/63

PAGES

: 3

SUBJECTS : CUBA PLANNING

DOCUMENT TYPE : MEMORANDUM

CLASSIFICATION

': TOP SECRET

RESTRICTIONS : 1B, 1C

CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/30/98

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : Bracketed portions withheld by Joint Staff.

by OSD, CIA and State.

Reviewed

NO JOINT STAFF OBJECTION

TO DEGLASSIFICATION

MAR

2016

DATE:

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

NW 54214

DooId: 32424985

Page 1

---

## Page 2

IOP SECRET

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

SENSITIVE

9 July 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE STANDING GROUP OF THE NATIONAL

SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Cuban Attacks on Reconnaissance Flights -- Contingency

Plan (submitted 28 May 1963)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed this plan, and offer

the general and specific comments and recommendations set forth below.

2. General

a. The proposals in the plan are considered only a segment

of the spectrum of possible provocative measures that could be

taken to incite the Castro-Communist regime to take actions which

would justify U.S. reprisals aimed at the elimination of the Castro

regime. It is understood that other provocative measures may be

considered which would provide an equally just and credible frame-

work for overt military action on the part of the U.S. to achieve

the same end result.

The Department of state has no objection to the

release or declassification of this document in full

under the provisions of the JFK Assassination Records

Collection Act of 1992 (PL102-526)

b. It must be recognized as probable that there would be a

requirement for CINCLANT Op Plans 312 and 316 to insure the

elimination of the Castro-Communist regime.

3. Specific

a. Subparagraphs 2d, 4a, and 7b(1); the Joint Chiefs of Staff

disagree with these provisions for medium altitude overflights.

They consider that the military feasibility of such flights is a

matter which should be evaluated at the time.

Reviewed on

b. Subparagraph 3a: while the Joint Chiefs of Staff agree

that response to Cuban provocation is the "most feasible" means

of action, they would not rule out unilateral actions without

provocation should circumstances so indicate.

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

6/23/98

OSD: NO OBJECTION

AS REDACTEO

2310N598

REPRODUCTION OF THIS DOCUMENT

IN WHOLE OR IN PART IS PROHIBITED

EXCEPT WITH PERMISSION OF THE

ISSUING OFFICE

NH 54214

DocId:32424985 Page 2

GROUP -1

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC

DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SENSITIVE

TOP SECRET

Copy --

SERIES

Page 1

_ of

- Copies

3

Pages

D0C 2 55

---

## Page 3

TOP SECRET

LINSITIVE

c. Subparagraph 4a: the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend

that this paragraph be revised to indicate timing, i.e., how soon

after the incident occurs the actions described in subparagraph 4a

are to be taken. (Comments 3a and 3f of this memorandum also apply.)

d. Subparagraph 4c: the parenthetical phrase "(DEFCON 3

for SAC)" should be deleted, as all U.S. forces would be placed in

i about be deleted,

appropriate states of readiness.

e. Subparagraphs 6b(5) and 6c(2): in connection with these

subparagraphs, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the paper

should be expanded to include consideration of the possibility of

building up in advance a potential for revolt within Cuba.

f. Subparagraph 6c(1): the Joint Chiefs of Staff disagree with

the provisions for intensification of reconnaissance as a provocative

measure as contemplated in this subparagraph. In this connection,

the exclusive use of reconnaissance flights to this end is not considered

the optimum use of this resource. Other methods of provocation,

involving aerial (e. g., armed flights flown under the facade of

"reconnaissance") and perhaps other operations, which do not unduly

place into jeopardy American lives and highly classified equipment,

should be considered. Reconnaissance should be intensified only if

such flights can be justified by operational requirements for military

intelligence.

g. Subparagraphs 7b(1) and (2): the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider

that these subparagraphs should be clarified to indicate whether the

actions contemplated are intended to be taken before an incident occurs

or at the time the incident occurs. If the former, they believe that the

proposal should be reconsidered in light of the costs and disruptive

effects that would result, and that, in any event, the nature, timing,

and duration of the prepositioning envisaged by the proposal should

be indicated.

h. In order to avoid any implication that the consideration of

reconnaissance flights for other purposes connotes a reduced need

for their intelligence contribution, a statement should be made at

an appropriate point reemphasizing the requirement to conduct

aerial reconnaissance for the purpose of insuring an adequate flow

of information for intelligence purposes.

REPRODUCTION OF THIS DOCUMENT

IN WHOLE OR IN PART IS PROHIBITED

EXCEPT WITH

PERMISSION OF THE

ISSUING OFFICE.

54214 DocId: 32121985 Page 3

SENSITIVE

IOP SECRET

Copy

Page

of

of

3

Copies

Pages

---

## Page 4

TOP SECRET

CENSITIVE

i. In view of the gravity of the matter, more detailed analysis

should be made of the question of U.S. -U.S.S. R. confrontations

likely to result from the proposal in Cuba and elsewhere, the impact

of possible Soviet reactions upon the time phasing proposed, the

possibility of escalation, and the capability of U.S. forces to cope

with simultaneous crises.

4. It is recommended that the Contingency Plan be revised in

accordance with the foregoing, and made available for further review

when revised.

Assister

Major General, USA

Spec. Asst. to Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

REPRODUCTION OF THIS DOCUMENT

IN WHOLE OR IN PART IS PROHIBITED

EXCING OFFICE PERMISSION OF THE

SENSITiVE

IOP SECRET

Copy

of

Page ...

3

- of..

3

Copies

Pages

HH 54214

DocId: 32424985 Page 4

---