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178-10004-10053

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDEN A SON ON SYNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1922

Identification Form

Agency Information

AGENCY :

RECORD NUMBER :

ROCKCOM

178-10004-10053

RECORD SERIES: ASSASSINATION FILE

AGENCY FILE NUMBER: MISC. ROCKEFELLER COM. AND CIA FILES (3)

Document Information

ORIGINATOR:

FROM:

TO :

TITLE:

CIA

DCI PRESENTATION TO THE PRIAB, 7 DECEMBER 1962

DATE: 12/10/1962

PAGES:

SUBJECTS :

ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES

PFIAB

OPERATION MONGOOSE

MC CONE, JOHN

CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS

DOCUMENT TYPE : MEMORANDUM

CLASSIFICATION: Top Secret

RESTRICTIONS: IB; 1C

CURRENT STATUS : Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 08/03/1993

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS :

v9.1

41

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178-10004-10053

10 December 1962

THE WHITE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD..

SUBJECI: DCI Presentation to the President's Foreign Intelligence

Advisory Board, 7 December 1962

page 3

1. After concluding the discussion on Cuba, the Director told the

Board that he wanted to report on the status of OXCART. He noted that we

were on schedule with the aircraft, and that five would be completed by the

end of December. He said that one had reached MACH 2. 16 at 60, 000 feet.

There had been some trouble with the J-58 engines, but all problems were

soluble. He said the progress on the aircraft was running ahead of that on

the engines, and noted that we had had 75 hours in the air with 18 hours on

the J-58 engine. He said he had been in direct contact with Mr. Horner to

insure that the project was receiving top priority. Dr. Killian asked if Pratt

and Whitney had their first team in and the DCI said yes, but one of the

problems was that Hamilton Standard didn't have access to everything in

Pratt and Whitney unless Horner paved the way.

2. Dr. Baker asked if there had been a solution to the fuel pump

problem and the DCI commented that he believed a solution was being reached.

DI. Killian noted that Bendix was working on an alternative fuel pump. The

DCI concluded by saying that while the radar cross section was not as small

as we had hoped for, it was being worked on.

Photocopy

from

Gerald R. Ford Library

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Ci: TO THEN DOES THEY

734E 3758-6.

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3. Mr. McCone then turned to the budget and noted that some

difficulties had arisen in this connection and in the over all field of coordina-

tion. He reminded the Board that they had wanted him to review the budgets

of the whole intelligence community, and noted that the military intelligence

budget was 90% of the over all effort. He said that he had discussed this with

Secretary McNamara. DI. Killian reiterated that he thought the DCI should

review the whole intelligence budget.. The DCI noted that intelligence in

Defense was going through a transitional period with the development of DIA

and other changes. General Doolittle expressed surprise that CIA was only

10% of the intelligence budget. The DCI pointed out that Defense Was spending

$3,844,000, 000 on intelligence and CIA only $363, 000, 000. " This was an

increase from $2, 250, 000, 000 in the past, but Defense had put all reconnais-

sance of the Navy and Air Force into its intelligence budget. He said he did

not believe this was correct, and thought it should be deleted.

4.: Turning to the CIA budget, the Director said he had instructed the

Agency to keep at the level of last year--this was about $50, 000,000 less than

what had been asked for by the various departments. He said he thought the

Agency had worked hard to keep the budget down, and noted that there had to

be additional funds for operations against Cuba. There was an increase in

NPIC, and as

a result the budget was $425, 000, 000 versus $405, 000, 000.

The Bureau of the Budget had cut this to $381, 000, 000 and taken $20, 000, 000

for Cuban operations to charge to the Reserve. The DCI said he found this

unacceptable, and thought the contingency should be pure. At this point

Photocopy

from

Gerald R. Ford Library

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"MI. Clifford said he had run across the phrase, MONGOOSE, on several

occasions, and asked what this involved. The DCI then explained briefly the

MONGOOSE project and how it was set up. He said that after his discussion

with the President and Attorney General last fall, it had been decided to

utilize all resources to unseat Castro. He went on to mention some of. the

activities of the project.

Mr. McCone then said he did not favor continuing

sabotage and guerilla operations. He noted that he was very disturbed about

the future and felt that there might be a confrontation within the next few days,

and that the Russians might light up the SAM's. He said he had no way of

explaining why the SAM sites were being left there. Di. Langer asked if it

might not be for fear of an invasion; the Director said he did not think so

because our miliary forces could eliminate the SAM sites without much

trouble.

5. Mr. McCone then said he wanted to discuss the NRO agreement.

He said that it had not worked, and the Director of NRO feels that he must

have fiscal control over CIA projects and review programs progressively

week by week and month by month. The DCI said this was wrong because the

appropriation was to CIA and was approved by a different committee of

Congress to whom we were responsible.

He noted that CIA could handle the

project more clandestinely. He had discussed this matter with the Secretary

of Defense but had reached no agreement.

Defense is withholding

$140, 000, 000 and asking CIA to fill out certain forms before they will advance

the money. The Director said that such a decision cannot be made retro-

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Protocopy

from

Gerald R. Ford Library

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