COMMENTS ON BOOK V, SSC FINAL REPORT, THE INVESTIGATION OF THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY: PERFORMANCE OF THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES.
Originator: CIA
Document date: 08/30/1977
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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104-10103-10360

2022 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

CONFIDENTAI

I6 Subject - Digescat

INSPECTOR CBI:

22-1908

8 0 AUG 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM

: S. D. Breckinridga

Deputy Inspector General

SUBJECT

: Comments on Book V, SSC Final Report, The

Investigation of the Assassination of President

Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies

1. Forwarded herewith is the report of a review that Mr.

Knoche

requested last fall.

The undersigned was designated

chairman or coordinator of an Agency working group that was to

conduct the study. It proved a more ambitious undertaking than

had been anticipated.

The extensive files of CI Staff on the

Warren Commission inquiry into President Kennedy's assassination

were reviewed in detail, as were the very large file holdings of

LA Division on its Cuban operations during the period preceding

and following the death of President Kennedy. The most pains-

taking review and analysis was required, and the files proved to

be so extensive that the research became

a major task.

The files

of the Office of Security and the Office of the Inspector General

presented a less formidable problem.

2.

The attached report, with its annexes, is the formal

resuft of the effort.

If the attachments seem

bulky, it is

noted that additional back-up materials are being held for the

record in the event of future inquiry. These papers represent

the result of a conscientious and painstaking effort, conducted

with high standards of review and testing kept foremost in mind.

We believe that there is little likelihood of oversight or omission

in coverage; the work was so extensive and carefully done that we

feel there is small chance of surprises remaining in CIA files on

this subject.

In brief, we found that many of the presentations of

Book V of the Final Report of the Senate Select Committee were

based on incomplete information or distorted perceptions. While

the record of CIA was not perfect, the performance at the time,

under the understanding of the period, seems reasonable.

The fact

remains that evidence of a Castro conspiracy to assassinate President

Kennedy still has not been discovered. The Warren Commission and

JUNETTENTIA!

RETURN TO CIA

i. Background Use Only c:

so an one

Do Not Reproduce...

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CIA could well have perceived the usefulness of inquiring into

specific sources of possible provocation of Castro at the time of

the 1964 investigation; it is clear that the general consideration

was recognized by all concerned, and pursued, but the concept of

specific possible provocations was not.

A review into such possi-

bilities has now been conducted, with essentially negative results.

4. The report is not to be considered a report of the

Inspector General, as such, being the result of a representative

working group.

However, the report should be considered as being

for internal CIA consumption only.

It contains third agency reports,

liaison reports, and involves sources and methods materials, as well

as evaluation and comment of a nature that is advisory to manage-

Any release of this report and its annexes outside the Agency,

even in classified form, would require considerable sanitization.

It is recommended that this report be held against future inquiries,

•providing a basis for appropriate responses, and that it not be

volunteered at this time.

S. D. Breckinridge

Attachment:

As Stated

DIG/S.D. Breckinridge:js (23 Aug 1977)

Distribution:

" Addressee w/Copy +1 of Att. sutd

1 - SA/DCI (Robert D. Williams) w/Copy #2 of Att.

- ADDO w/Copy #4 of Att.

Asst. Public Affairs (Mr. Hetu) w/Copy #5 of Att. Destd 81/80

Chief, LA w/Copy #6 of Att.

- Chief, CI Staff w/Copy #7 of Att.

D/OS w/Copy #8 of Att.

IG (J.L. Leader) w/Copy #9 of Att.

1 - IG Subject w/Original Copy of Att. (UNNUMBERED)

+2 -

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ENFIDENTIAL

Table of Contents

Summary of Findings

Tab A. Organization for and Conduct of the Review

Tab B. CIA Performance on the Inquiries

Tab C. CIA Operations Against Cuba

Tab D. AMLASH Operation

Tab E.

Materials Forwarded to Warren Commission and FBI

Tab F. Mexico City Coverage of Oswald Visit

Tab G.

Selected Newspaper Stories with Comments

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SUBJECT: Comments on Book V of the Final Report of the U.S. Senate

Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with

Respect to Intelligence Activities

1.

Book V of the SSC Final Report, titled The Investigation

of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the

Intelligence Agencies, presents a number of issues that address themselves

to the conscience of the Agency. The criticisms of CIA are based on a

series of presentations of how various investigative leads were handled,

and on the non-reporting of various Agency operational activities that

the SSC Final Report judges to have been relevant to the Warren

Commission inquiry.

2.

A stated thesis of the SSC Final Report is that the operations

of the intelligence agencies against Cuba exercised a negative influence

on the quality of their support for the Warren Commission investigation.

The following statements appear in the Report:

"It (the SSC Report) places particular

emphasis on the effect their Cuban opera-

tions seemed to have on the investigation."

Page 2.

"They (senior CIA officials) should have

realized that CIA operations against Cuba,

particularly operations involving the

assassination of Castro, needed to be con-

sidered in the investigation. Yet, they

directed their subordinates to conduct

an investigation without telling them of

these vital facts." Page 7.

sendin

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The significance of these statements, to the authors of the SSC

Report, is highlighted as follows:

"Certainly, concern with public reputation,

problems of coordination between agencies,

possible bureaucratic failure and embarrassment,

and the extreme compartmentation of knowledge

of sensitive operations may have contributed to

these shortcomings. But the possibility

exists that senior officials in both agencies

made conscious decisions not to disclose

potentially important information." Page 7.

A central feature of the rationale is the concept that if Castro

had learned of these activities it would have provoked him into

retaliation against President Kennedy. The SSC Final Report makes

it clear that it feels this theory should have been perceived and

accepted at the time by the intelligence agencies (not to mention

the Warren Commission) leading to a review of the various anti-Castro

programs to see what it might reveal.

The provocation theory, in the specific form postulated by the

SSC Final Report and the press, is of more recent vintage than the

perceptions that prevailed in 1964 when the Warren Commission was con-

ducting its investigation. There was a general concern in 1964 that

the USSR or Cuba might be behind the assassination of President

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ONHDENTIAL

Kennedy.

This was based on a more broadly recognized understanding

of the tensions that existed between the Kennedy administration and the

Soviet and Cuban regimes. The Bay of Pigs in 1961 and the Cuban

Missile Crisis in 1962 must have appeared remarkably provocative to

Fidel Castro, along with the array of American anti-Cuban programs.

The humiliation of the USSR in having to retreat in the Cuban Missile

Crisis cannot be dismissed completely as to how it might have been

perceived by a foreign power as a provocation. To note these events

serves only to remind the reader of the tensions well recognized at

the time.

The SSC Final Report has elected to emphasize instead CIA

operational activity against Cuba as requiring specific attention.

This emphasis on CIA's Cuban operations as a possible source of

provocation of Castro represents the result of an evolution in percep-

tions.

In response to it we undertook an extensive review of the

various operational

activities against Cuba and Castro.

Organization for the Review

As there are no persons now in CIA who were directly involved

at a senior level in the investigation of 1964, it was felt necessary

to organize a fresh approach to the matter. The persons who, in 1963

and 1964, knew the details of the various operational activities are

no longer available, for the most part, to provide the current and

detailed factual familiarity that existed at the time of the investi-

gations.

Primary reliance had to be placed instead on the records for

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the period preceding President Kennedy's death and the period following

it.

It was determined that a special research effort would be mounted

to review those Agency files that might relate to this problem. The

organization for this research is summarized at Tab A of this paper.

It required not only the meticulous review of all Cuban operations,

it necessitated careful analysis of the content and nature of the oper-

ations with special attention to their security. Files relating to the

Warren Commission inquiry were reviewed as well as those relating to

plotting against Castro.

The results of the efforts of those assigned to the task are

contained in this covering report and in the separate annexes to it,

Tabs B through G.

CIA has now conducted such a review -- looking at "the other end"

of a possible chain of evidence, where things theoretically could have

started. This has produced no new evidence bearing on the assassination,

although it has produced the basis for new lines of speculation. In

fact, the review sometimes seemed to become a futile exercise in trying

to fit facts to the provocation theory rather than being able to

identify evidence actually bearing on the assassination of President

Kennedy.

The emphasis sometimes became one of asking if this activity

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(whichever was under review) could have provoked Castro to order the

assassination of President Kennedy, had he (Castro) learned of it.

The SSC, in its Final Report, fell into this very trap, trying to make

the AMLASH operation actually fit the theory for which the SSC's

presentation seemed to be tailored. (See Tab D.)

We have looked at other operational activities with the SSC's

theory in mind, but have been unable to provide tangible substance

in support of the theory. In the final analysis the reviewer is

compelled to fall back on the evidence. A wide variety of theories

can be--as they have been--advanced in strident and challenging tones.

Not all of them are susceptible to conclusive answers; the primary

possibility of finding such answers was lost with the death of Lee

Harvey Oswald. The fact is that the Warren Commission considered the

possibility of Cuban or Soviet involvement, but could not find evi-

dence of it. Were it known at the time of the Warren Commission, it

would have been reported and dealt with then; that it was not is a

simple reflection of the fact that it did not exist at that time in

the minds of Americans knowledgeable on the subject. To hold dif-

ferently would be to accept uncritically a social paranoia often

prevalent today, which would hold that a significant number of

government employees could engage in such a well-disciplined con-

spiracy to

suppress evidence.

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CONRIOENTAL

Operations Against Castro

The AMTRUNK Operation, starting in 1963, sought to develop a

capability to join dissident elements among the Cuban leadership into

a group that could oust the Castro regime.

It was conceived by Cuban

exiles and sold to the Kennedy Administration, which assigned it to

CIA. The program was very slow in developing substance and momentum,

with little concrete progress during President Kennedy's life. At a

later date, in 1965, it was believed to be compromised and CIA withdrew

from its association; the key members were arrested later and tried in

Cuba. There are basic questions about the security of the activity

from its inception, due to the involvement of personalities who are

suspected of having pro-Cuban sympathies, including possibly having

been foreign agents.

While the suspicions cannot be verified, the

reservations are sufficiently basic to consider the possibility that

Castro knew of the operation from its earliest days. Its long range

objectives--the overthrow of Castro and his regime--would have been an

irritant to Castro; its inability to develop any substance and momentum

until long after President Kennedy's death suggests that it is unlikely

that it, of itself, would have moved him at that time to resort to

assassination in retaliation. This is discussed at Tab C.

Operation AMLASH centered on a high-level Cuban official, AMLASH/1,

who had expressed his opposition to Castro and to the Castro regime.

The SSC Final Report undertakes to demonstrate that the operation planned

Castro's

assassination during the period preceding the murder of

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President Kennedy; to the contrary, a full review of the operation

shows that prior to the President's assassination not only had CIA

not agreed to give any support to AMLASH/1, but had rejected his

proposals to assassinate Castro. When evidence supporting this view

was offered the drafters of Book V of the SSC Final Report, it was

dismissed out of hand as false, despite confirming evidence. The SSC

Report, instead, having asserted that assassination was the character

of the operation at that time, then undertook to show that AMLASH/1

was at least indiscreet in his conduct, risking exposure of the plot.

Alternatively, it suggested that he may have been acting for Castro

as a provocateur, to lead the United States into a plot against

Castro's life which in turn was then to provide Castro with the

justification to order President Kennedy's assassination. In either

event, had Castro learned about the relationship between AMLASH/1 and

CIA he would have known only that there was an inconclusive association

that certainly had not progressed to the point that it constituted the

basis for the postulated provocation. This is discussed in some detail

at Tab D of this paper.

The SSC Final Report discounts (at page 68) the possibility that

actual plotting by CIA with the criminal syndicate served as a source

for provocation for Castro to have President Kennedy murdered. There

are new considerations that developed in the course of the present

review that throw more light on the role of the criminal syndicate,

but they do not provide a basis. for taking issue with the judgment of

the SSC Final Report, which dismissed the activity as having provided

Castro with the postulated provocation. This is discussed at Tab C.

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Items Selected by the SSC for Critical Comment

The SSC Final Report picked out a number of selected subjects for

treatment in support of its criticism of the thoroughness of the in-

vestigation by the intelligence agencies. One of these had to do with

the allegations in Mexico City by a man designated as "D". These al-

legations were demonstrated conclusively by the Warren Commission to

have been false; why they are discussed at all in the SSC Final Report

is a question in itself. In another instance, reference is made to a

reported five-hour delay of a Cubana flight from Mexico City, awaiting

arrival of a private aircraft with a mysterious passenger; not only

was the Cubana flight on the ground for four hours (in contrast to the

alleged five hour delay in departure) it departed an hour before the

alleged arrival of the private aircraft. After CIA reported on a

Cuban-American who departed on another Cubana flight, the FBI investi-

gated the man extensively, as is revealed by the information available

for use in the SSC Final Report; a single report that caused him to be

dramatized is so full of errors as to be highly suspect, essentially

being placed in doubt by other evidence in the record. In another

instance considerable emphasis was given by the SSC Final Report to a

cable from the Mexico City Station, replying to a 23 November 1963 in-

quiry from CIA headquarters asking for reports on contacts with certain

named Soviets.

The true name of AMLASH/1 was given in the Mexico City

reply, but not as having had contact with the Soviets -- which was the

purpose of the inquiry -- but as the subject of a meeting in December

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1960 between a functionary of the Cuban embassy with a Soviet, concern-

ing a press conference to be held in Mexico City by AMLASH/l in February

and March 1961. AMLASH/l's name could have been omitted from the cable

altogether, so far as its having any relevance to the inquiry about

persons having contact with Soviets is concerned. In any event, the

meeting in December 1960 was prior to President Kennedy's inauguration,

which removes it yet further from any possible relevance to the subject

matter. It really is not difficult to understand why the reference to

AMLASH/l's name did not lead to detailed research about him. This is

discussed further at Tab D.

Conclusions

Basically, the research effort for the present paper produced two

general conclusions. First, the SSC Final Report contains numerous

factual errors, both in the extensive treatment of a selected opera-

tion (AMLASH) and in a number of separate incidents that it presents.

Second, while one can make the point in principle that the Warren

Commission could well have broadened its review to include the anti-

Cuban programs of the U.S. Government, in trying to make the case for

that concept Book V of the SSC Final Report went to such lengths in its

treatment as to detract from the point at hand. It is difficult to

characterize it more generously.

In a very real sense, the SSC Final Report has compounded the

problem of public perception.

On a flawed presentation it has accused

the intelligence agencies of derelictions and worse. While it has

reinforced the public sense of unfinished business yet to be done, it

has so badly beclouded the issue as to have done a disservice to

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future attempts at objective and dispassionate inquiry.

While one can understand today why the Warren Commission limited

its inquiry to normal avenues of investigation, it would have served

to reinforce the credibility of its effort had it taken a broader

view of the matter. CIA, too, could have considered in specific

terms what most saw then in general terms--the possibility of Soviet

or Cuban involvement in the assassination because of tensions of

the time. It is not enough to be able to point out erroneous

criticisms made today. The Agency should have taken broader -

initiatives then, as well. That CIA employees at the time felt--as

they obviously did--that the activities about which they knew had

no relevance to the Warren Commission inquiry does not take the place

of a record of conscious review. The present research effort has

undertaken to conduct such a review; it is noted that the findings

are essentially negative. However, it must be recognized that CIA

cannot be as confident of a cold trail in 1977 as it could have

been in 1964; this apparent fact will be noted by the critics of

the Agency, and by those who have found a career in the questions

already asked and yet to be asked about the assassination of

President Kennedy.

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Tab A i

ORGANIZATION FOR AND CONDUCT OF REVIEW

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Organization for and Conduct of the Review

1. Many years have passed since the inquiry by the Warren Com-

mission. The persons who were most familiar with the activities

of the Agency during the period preceding the death of President

Kennedy, and during the investigation of the Warren Commission, are

no longer in place in the same work. Some of the employees have

retired or have been transferred to other work. Some have died.

2. To respond to the questions raised in Book V of the SSC

Final Report, it was necessary to review old files and to assign to

this undertaking personnel not really familiar with the activities

of the Agency during a period of a dozen or more years before. A

study group was established to consider the size of the problem and

to develop a plan for conducting the review. Chaired by a repre-

sentative from the Office of the Inspector General, the group also

consisted of members from CI Staff, LA Division, and the Office of

Security. Terms of Reference for the review were agreed upon in

early August 1976. Points emphasized for the review, because of the

thrust of Book V of the SSC Final Report, were (1) to conduct a full

review of information and operations on the Cuban target to identify

any activity that might relate to the assassination of President Kennedy,

and (2) to review the possibility that CIA activities against Cuba

did, by their nature, cause Castro to order the assassination of

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President Kennedy. A copy of the Terms of Reference is attached.

3. The two main holdings of files for the period in question

were in LA Division and CI Staff, of the Directorate of Operations,

with less voluminous files being held in the Office of Security and

the Office of the Inspector General. The organization for the review

of those files is described below.

4. LA Division: LA Division was the repository of the files

for Agency operations conducted against Cuba. These files were known

to be extensive. Under the Terms of Reference those files for the

period 1 January 1961 to 1 January 1965 were selected for review,

covering a three-year period prior to the death of President Kennedy

and the following year. A research group was formed composed of

five full-time researchers, a group leader and a task force supervisor.

An additional four researchers participated in different phases of

the research, which continued to mid-May 1977.

5. Reference to material for this research was obtained from

the LA Division registry, the Cuba Desk machine runs, and a special

comprehensive file listing prepared for this purpose by Information

Services Staff (ISS). On the basis of this it was originally believed

that material pertinent to the search would number approximately 900

operational

folders, plus numerous related 201-files. It was later

determined, however, that a thorough review should include additional

operational and subject files which brought the total to well over

two thousand files.

In view of the date of the material, much of it,

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both

operational and subject, had been retired to Archives at

Warrenton, Virginia, The remainder is held at Headquarters in the

files

or archival material of Information Processing Group. This

material is easily retrievable through the use of specific job

numbers and file reference numbers recorded and retained in the

LA Division research group files (too numerous to cite herein).

6. Following is a breakdown of the types and numbers of files

reviewed, criteria employed in the research, the findings, and

organization of the material:

a. Types and Number of Files Reviewed

(1) Operational

1,729

(601 with findings and 1,128

with no findings)

(2) Subject Files

547

(186 with findings and 361

with no findings)

(3) Cuba Policy Files

101

(4) Chief, WH Division Chrono Files

(Task Force W Chronos)

(5)

Official 201 Dossiers

Total

37

100-plus

2,514

Criteria Used in the Research

As a guide the research group followed the Terms of

Reference referred to above. In addition to the Terms of

Reference, the group remained alert to other items of interest

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brought to its attention by the IG Staff, on an ad hoc basis,

and to additional questions raised in the course of the

study. A name trace was always run, and/or the 201-file was

reviewed, if available, on any individual allegedly involved

in an assassination plot against President Kennedy or Fidel

Castro. This task was made somewhat easier as the result of

a memorandum prepared by the Cuba Desk, in August 1975,

based on traces of the names in the so-called Black Book -

that Fidel Castro passed to Senator McGovern, which dealt

with individuals the Cubans alleged were involved in assassi-

nation attempts against Castro.

c. Findings and Organization of the Findings

Each researcher submitted a draft paper noting the

subject of the folder(s) reviewed, a brief description of the

activity, and a copy of those documents) or findings which

contained information believed to be pertinent to the review.

Also included were job numbers, official file numbers,

inclusive dates of material researched, and the number of

volumes reviewed. Beginning in January 1977, at the request

of the IG Staff, the researchers also began noting FBI and/or

other government agencies knowledge of information, to the

extent recorded in Agency files.

Separate finished memoranda

were prepared, on the basis of these data, including the

heading Findings. This heading lists the specific document

number(s) and other pertinent data, and a few lines providing

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the gist of the documents) for purpose of easy and quick

reference. These memoranda, with a copy of the document (s)

attached, are filed in alphabetical order, by project and

subject, in hard-back green folders as part of the official

LA Division research group files under the official classi-

fication number 019-604-001 (Volumes XI through XX). Also

included in the records are two folders (Volumes IX and X)

containing 1,439 draft memoranda with negative findings. -

These records are restricted in LA Division.

7. The LA Division research effort proved to be far more

complex than originally estimated. Research continued to lead to new

files, and the requirements for meticulous analysis and correlation

of material

further extended the time required to complete the under-

taking. By completing this exhaustive review of files the Agency

can speak with considerable confidence as to what the records of

Cuban operations show, so far as they relate to the question of the

death of President Kennedy.

8. CI Staff: CI Staff assigned one senior officer to review

its files on Lee Harvey Oswald, working under the general Terms of

Reference referred to above, and also to generate papers on points

not covered by the guidelines but pertinent to the general subject.

9.

Since December 1963, the CI Staff has served as the point

of record for all questions relating to Lee Harvey Oswald and the

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Agency's role in the investigation conducted by the Warren Com-

mission. The so-called "Oswald File" now fills 57 volumes comprising

some 142 file folders and portfolios. In addition, the Staff has

accumulated some 50 supplemental files including the master copy

of those documents released under provisions of the FOIA to the public

in March 1976 (first series) and those documents (second series)

released in September 1976 and March 1977.

10.

By necessity the documents in the file are held in chrono-

logical order; however, the file has become much more than just a

chronological file on Lee Harvey Oswald. It has now become the

Agency's central repository for information and documentation that

it holds on:

a. The life of Harvey Oswald;

b. The Agency's role in the investigation conducted

by the Warren Commission, 1963--1964;

c.

The testimony by various Agency officers before

the several commissions and committees set up to review

the validity of previous investigations.

(NB:

It should

be pointed out that this portion of this file is not

complete; and

d.

The point of record for Agency action taken

in

response to requests submitted to the Agency under pro-

visions of the Freedom of Information Act.

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11. In order to come to grips with the voluminous material in

the Oswald files, it soon became obvious that, in' order to be in

a position to respond effectively and expeditiously to the Terms of

Reference and to allegations and accusations in Book V of the SSC

Final Report, it would be necessary to copy much of the file and to

place these copies in folders set up according to general and specific

subjects.

In order to check charges that this Agency had withheld

information from the FBI and the Warren Commission, and that there

was "no evidence that the FBI asked the Agency to conduct an investi-

gation or gather information," the following files were set up:

a.

Correspondence from the Warren Commission;

b.

Correspondence from the Agency to the Warren

Commission;

Agency disseminations to the Intelligence Community,

particularly the FBI;

d. Correspondence from the FBI to the Agency requesting

assistance and information;

e. Chronological summary of information on and actions

taken relating to Silvia Tirado de DURAN; and

f. Chronological summary of information on and actions

taken relating to Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte.

These files provided a basis for checking statements included in the

SSC Final Report and to determine what the Agency actually did do

in relation to the Warren Commission

inquiry.

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12. The approach to the problem at hand was to assemble by

chronological and statistical compilations the Agency's record on

the matter, (a) its initiation of collection requirements for infor-

mation, and the papers it originated on various aspects of the

investigation for passage to the Intelligence Community, particularly

the FBI and the Warren Commission, and (b) its response to require-

ments and requests levied upon it by the Intelligence Community and

the Warren Commission. Certain parts of the record were summarized

to record what actually happened in those instances in which it

differs from representations in the SSC Report.

13. Office of Security: The Office of Security assigned one

officer to identify material in its records believed to have some

possible relation to the Kennedy assassination. During the course of

this review, approximately fifty subject files were identified as

containing material of some relevance. This material amounted to

the equivalent of approximately two safe drawers. The files reviewed

included volumes on Lee Harvey Oswald, AMLASH, various individuals

connected with the Criminal Underworld Plot, and a collection of

files containing the results of name traces conducted at the time

of the "Garrison Investigation."

14.

Office of the Inspector General: The Office of the Inspector

General held the report that it produced in 1967 on plotting against

Castro,

as well

as related materials accumulated subsequently. It

also received files developed in 1973 in response to a 9 May 1973

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request by the DCI to Agency employees concerning questionable

activities.

Two members of the Inspection Staff were assigned to

the project, responsible for overall coordination of the research

effort. Additionally, because of the emphasis given to events in

Mexico by Book V of the SSC Final Report, the Office of the Inspector

General

employed on contract a retired employee who had served as

a special case officer in Mexico City during the period preceding

President Kennedy's death and during the investigation afterwards.

The retired employee recalled for this task conducted an extensive

review of

all Mexico City files and materials held in Headquarters

or retired to Archives. The result of her research is found in

Tabs B and F.

15. The file holdings in the Office of the Inpsector General

are less than one safe drawer. However, the AMLASH file, held by

LA Division/Directorate of Operations, was reviewed by a member of

the Office of the Inspector General, as were parts of the AMTRUNK

file, also held by LA Division. These two activities are discussed

in Annexes D and C, respectively.

16.

There were a limited number of interviews to clarify

specific points.

********

Detailed records of the research undertaken are held in the

respective components participating in this effort. Selected back-

up material for the final report is also held in the Office of the

Inspector General.

CONFIDENTIAL

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".:

SECRET

1 AUG 1978

TERMS OF REFERENCE

FOR REVIEW OF

ISSUES RAISED IN

BOOK

• V, SENATE SELECI COMMIITEE

FINAL REPORT

1. The Schweiker Subcommittee has two basic theses--

(1) the general idea that the intelligence community--primarily

CIA and FBI--did not undertake a full review of the possibility

of Cuban involvement in the assassination of President Kennedy,

and (2) the idea that CIA activities against Cuba were provocative

and may have led to the assassination of President Kennedy. The

former by itself is not too difficult a problem to address.

Either

there was or there was not an extensive intelligence collection

program to ascertain all possible information on the subject.

Either there was or there was not an exhaustive review of all

information in the Agency that might in some way relate to this

question. Either the Agency did or did not report what it had

to the Warren Commission for further inquiry and review.

2. The second portion of the Subcommittee's presentation

is somewhat more diffuse and complex. By way of general back-

ground it summarizes Agency and U.S. operations against Castro's

Cuba.

There is an inference--almost subliminal--that these

general activities were provocative. More specific, however,

is the detailed treatment of the AMLASH operation as an activity

that the report suggests could have provoked Castro into retaliatory

action against President Kennedy. The failure of CIA to report

this to the Warren Commission, in the context of the provocation

theory, is advanced as a failure to report relevant information.

Detailed treatment of the operation is given in the report in

support of the thesis.

$83221

Z want an arted.

Lamar same:

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SECRET

3. The issue of operational activity that could have provoked

a retaliatory strike by Castro against President Kennedy cannot

be restricted to the AMLASH operation. In itself it may be one of

the poorer examples of something that might have proven so pro-

vocative as to stimulate a retaliatory strike by Castro ägainst

President Kennedy. There were other operations with the un

qualified objective of killing Castro. These contrast with the

AMLASH affair in which the agreed purpose was not so clear and

in which the sequence of events throws considerable doubt on the

Subcommittee's treatment of the activity in this respect.

a. The following questions are intended to serve as

a guide in a records review of the extent of the Agency's

investigation prior to the end of the Warren Commission.

(1) What collection requirements were issued to

the field with regard to Kennedy's assassination?

(2) What follow-up of these requirements was

there during 1964?

(3) What form did the follow-up take?

(4) Identify and describe the records with regard

to this activity.

response V Headquing was lure ron the field in

(6) What dissemination and review was this

reporting given?

(7) Was dissemination made on this reporting to

the CI Staff?

(8) Was this reporting given to the Warren Commission?

(9) What review of Headquarters' material was

ordered through 1964?

-2-

SEBAST

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!

SECRET

(10) What were the parameters of these instructions?

(11) What responses were there and where are they?

(12) What evidence is there that the "provocation"

theory was considered during the Warren Commission

enquiries, either in CIA or the Warren Commission?

(13) What action was taken with reference to this

concept as a basis for reviewing relating Agency programs?

(14) What records are there on this and where are they?

(15) Were there any efforts made to develop an

Oswald/ Cuban connection?

(16) What form did they take?

(17) What exchanges were there with the FBI on this

subject?

(18)

What action developed from these exchanges?

(19) What records are there on these exchanges and

where are they?

(20) To what extent were elements of the Agency

other than the CI Staff and LA Division involved in in-

vestigating the assassination during the Warren Commission

tenure?

(21) What is the total CIA information on the two

flights from Mexico City to Havana?

(22) What was done at the time to develop further

information on this matter?

(23)

Can further information be acquired on this

matter now?

- 3 -

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## Page 27

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;

(

(24)

What is the total CIA information on "D"?

(25) Is further information on "D" needed in view

of the SSC Subcommittee reference to it?

(26) What information does CIA have on Oswald

FPCC relations?

(27) What does CIA know about the New Orleans

training activity and was anything provided on this to

the Warren Commission?

(28)

What is the total CIA information on "A"?

(29) Who is the man photographed in Mexico City?

(30) What is the CIA information on the 4 December

1963 report of an agent meeting Oswald in Cuba?

(31) What is the total CIA information on Cuban

assassination policies and programs up to November 22,

1963?

(32) What is the total CIA information on Castro's

7 September 1963 statements re retribution?

(33) Does the testimony before the SSC of CIA

employees contain anything on the abové questions?

If so, what?

b. On the subject of possible provocation for the

assassination plots against Castro, each of the known activities

should be reviewed to the extent possible in order to determine

any additional relevant information on this plot.

(1) What is the total information on the plots involving

the criminal syndicates?

(2) Who was witting of the planning for the syndicate

operation?

- 4 -

STONET

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SECRET .

(

(3) Are there current considerations on the syndicate

operation not faced previously (e.g., a former Office

of Security officer may have knowledge that was not

surfaced in the interviews with him with the SSC or

Agency personnel. Additionally, a former LA Division

career agent may have some insights that could throw

light on one of the operations).

(4) There are a couple of cases based on agent

traffic (reported to the SSC during the study of alleged

-

information on these

(5) What is the significance on the subject of

provocation in the book given Senator McGovern by

Castro?

(6) While the AMLASH operation is subject to fairly

detailed reconstruction from a very complete record,

there are points that should be addressed particularly,

because of their treatment in the SSC Subcommittee report.

For instance, is there significance in the fact that CIA

contacted AMLASH/1 in September 1963 after such a

long time? Or was it simply that this was the first time

the opportunity had presented itself since earlier meetings?

(7) Just what did the case officer tell AMLASH/1

when making plans for the 22 November meeting?

(8) What was the security of the relationship with

AMLASH/1 during the period preceding the assassination

of President Kennedy?

(9) In what time frame was Fitzgerald's Executive

Officer speaking when he stated his judgment that the

AMLASH/1 operation was an assassination plot?

- 5 -

SENSI

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SEGRET

c.

What other action might CIA have taken in connection

with the investigation? An effort should be made to list

these, including consultation with surviving officials to

determine not only what they considered the requirement.

at the time, but what was omitted and why.

1. In conclusion, these "Terms of Reference" undertake

to address the entire question of possible provocation of U.S.

policy and CIA programs in the period preceding the assassination

of President Kennedy. An aspect of this is the SSC Subcommittee's

apparent view that CIA assassination plotting could have instigated

a retaliatory strike by Castro against President Kennedy, which,

therefore, should have been reported to the Warren Commission.

Just as importantly, the final paper should reflect findings in the

area of what the Agency did in response to Warren Commission

requirements (both stated by the Warren Commission and those

that could have been conceived by the Agency), and how it pursued

these lines of action and reported them to the Commission. This

will include consideration of specific new and unanswered questions

raised in the Schweiker report.

7 Buchanty

S. D. Breckinridge

O/Inspector General

Robert Wall

CI Staff

A Sedat

William Sturbitts

LA Division

astori

for Ramsecurity don

O/Security

- 6 -

SEBRET

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Tab B

CIA

PERFORMANCE ON THE INQUIRIES

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-CONFIDENTIAL

CIA's Performance on the Inquiries

Book V of the SSC Final Report challenges the performance of the

intelligence agencies during the Warren Conmission inquiry, empha-

sizing things that it feels should have been done but which it asserts

were not.

It is correct to say that CIA has not produced evidence or

analysis that addresses every theory that has been advanced over the

years. A record of the volume of CIA reporting to the FBI and the

Warren Commission is at Tab E. As a practical consideration, every

theoretical question that can be conceived cannot be answered con-

clusively; there simply may be no evidence at all, or if there is

evidence somewhere it may not be accessible. The issue is what the

intelligence agencies did -- in the present instance, what was the

performance of CIA -- with Book V of the SSC Final Report portraying

a patternof neglect or avoidance that is not supported by the record.

The SSC Final Report offers a number of separate subjects in

support of its case:

a.

It refers to an allegation by a person identified as

"D" (pages 28-30, 41-42 and 102-103) that he overheard and

saw Oswald being handed money in Mexico City for the purpose

of assassinating President Kennedy; this was proven false, both

by polygraph and by determining that Oswald was in New Orleans

instead of Mexico City at the time the incident was supposed to

have occurred.

This subject is treated in a confusing and in-

conclusive manner in the SSC Final Report.

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONTIDENTIAL

b. A considerable portion of the Report is given to the

AMLASH operation.

The operation is described inaccurately.

The Report assigns it characteristics that it did not have during

the period preceding the assassination of President Kennedy, in

order to support the SSc view that it should have been reported

to the Warren Commission. This is treated in some detail at Tab D

of this report.

c. Space is devoted to two aircraft flights from Mexico

City to Havana, on 22 November and 27 November (see pages 60-

63). The first of these flights, as described in the SSC Report,

is based on an inaccurate report about a delay of the 22 November

flight to meet a mysterious private aircraft; the correct story

removes the basis for the inferences of the SSC version. The

second of these flights had to do with a man whose significance

arises from a patently erroneous report; the FBI investigated him

thoroughly, as is apparent from the condensed summary in the SSC

Final Report.

These examples illustrate the problem of commenting on the SSC Final

Report, the question becoming that of how to deal with Congressional

criticism presented on the basis of inaccurate factual perceptions.

To treat the problem it was felt necessary to review the record in-depth

and to report the findings, whatever they are.

Recognizing the possibility of error or oversight in 1964--both

on the part of CIA and the Warren Commission--consideration was given

to courses of action CIA might have taken to throw some light on the

2

CONFIDENTIAL

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## Page 33

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questions as understood at the time, as well as considering those

questions that have developed since then. What would be the areas of

inquiry? Oswald was an obvious subject of investigation.

Oswald was known to have been out of the country twice subsequent

to his return to private life from the Marine Corps in September 1959.

These overseas adventures were appropriate for CIA attention. The

first of these overseas trips was when he went to the Soviet Union in

October 1959 from which he returned in June 1962. The second of these

trips was when he went to Mexico City in late September 1963, from

which he returned in early October 1963.

In addition to these two areas of obvious specific inquiry for CIA,

there is the problem of general foreign intelligence collection that

might in some way produce information on the subject. The SSC Final

Report adds to these considerations operations being conducted by CIA

as part of a general U.S. program against the Castro regime. These

four general areas of inquiry are covered below.

1. Travel to and from the USSR 1959-1962

On 26 November 1963 a cable was sent to Paris, Rome, Madrid,

14-6

[Copenhagen, oslo, Helsinki, Brussels, The Hague, London, and Ottawa

giving biographic information on Lee Harvey Oswald. It noted his

discharge from the Marine Corps in September 1959 and his travel to

the Soviet Union in October 1959, including sketchy details as to his

employment and marriage while in the USSR. The cable requested:

"any scrap information which bears on President's

assassination...."

3

CONDENHAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

On 27 November the various addressee stations replied, with

(Helsinki)and London providing additional details on the travel of

Oswald to the USSR. Additionally, London reported that a British

journalist claimed that during his own imprisonment in Cuba in 1959

there was a U.S. gangster there by the name of Santos, who was living

in luxury in jail because he could not return to the U.S.; the source

stated that Santos was "visited frequently by another American

gangster named 'Ruby'." (See pages 24--25, Tab C.)

Also on 27 November Ottawa reported the "delight" of the Cuban

Embassy staff over the assassination of President Kennedy although

the staff was instructed to "cease looking happy in public," in

conformance with instructions from Cuba to "govern their actions by

official attitude of Gout to which they accredited." Costol on the

same date, reported that the Soviets were shocked, blaming the

assassination on extreme right-wing elements. Otherwise, the initial

responses produced no other information.

On 29 November The Hague and Frankfurt were queried about Oswald's

travel back from the USSR. This query was followed on 2 December by

a similar cable to Berlin, Frankfurt, Bonn and The Hague. Various

reporting produced details about the travel of Oswald and his wife

from the USSR through Germany and the Netherlands enroute to the

United States in June 1962.

The other

•stations involved in these inquiries had no traces or

information on Oswald; liaison services were also queried without

4

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detailed results

although there were some technical operations that

produced peripheral information about the reactions of various groups

under intelligence surveillance. Considerable exchanges were held

with the Warren Commission on Oswald's Soviet record and its possible

significance.

No evidence was found tying the Soviet Union to Oswald's

assassination of President Kennedy. Book V of the SSC Final Report,

in not criticising the Agency's performance in this aspect of the

investigation, seems to have accepted it as adequate, and it will

not be detailed here.

II. Oswald Mexico Visit -- September-October 1963

The visit by Oswald to Mexico City, in his attempt to get

visas for travel to the Soviet Union and Cuba, has received extensive

attention. The details concerning the coverage of Oswald's visit to

Mexico is treated in another annex to this paper (Tab F): The concern

felt by all initially for the possible significance of Oswald's visit,

and his contacts with the Cuban and Soviet embassies, was obvious at

the time. The following statement is in a cable to Mexico City on

28 November 1963:

"We have by no means excluded the possibility

that other as yet unknown persons may have

been involved or even that other powers may

have played a role. Please continue all your

coverage of Soviet and Cuban installations

and your liaison with Mexicans."

GONE SARILAL

5

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CONSIDE

TrIDENIAL

The allegations made by "D," about having seen Oswald taking money

from Cubans in the Cuban embassy in Mexico City, received intensive

attention from CIA and the FBI, working together closely on the matter,

and with the Mexican authorities. This was demonstrated conclusively

to have been a false allegation. Oswald was in New Orleans at the

time of the reported incident, and the person making the allegations

was demonstrated by polygraph to have been lying. After the allegations

by "D" had been demonstrated to be false, Headquarters made the following

statement to the Mexico City Station on 1 December 1963:

"Pls continue to follow all leads and tips.

The question of whether Oswald acted solely

on his own has still not been finally resolved."

Again, on 13 December 1963 the Mexico City Station was cabled as

follows:

"Plse continue watch for Soviet or Cuban reaction

to investigation of assassination, evidence

of their complicity, signs they putting out

propaganda about case. FYI only, Soviet Intel

in India had letters

sent to [U.S. Government]

leaders demanding full investigation of case."

On 17 December 1963 Headquarters forwarded a dispatch to the Mexico

City Station stated as follows:

"...Mexico City has been the only major

overseas reporter in the case.

While this

partly dictated by the facts of Lee Oswald's

6

CONFIDENTIAL

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life, we have not overlooked the really out-

standing performance of Mexico City's major

assets and the speed, precision, and perception

with which the data was forwarded.

Here it was

relayed within minutes to the White House,

[Department of State] and [the FBI].

"Your LIENVOY data, the statements of Silvia

DURAN, and your analyses were major factors in

the quick clarification of the case, blanking

out the really ominous spectre of foreign backing."~

Essentially, Oswald's visit to Mexico City was investigated as

thoroughly as possible, producing no evidence there of Soviet or

Cuban complicity in the assassination of President Kennedy. If anything,

events during Oswald's visit there are more subject to being seen as

counter to such a possibility, given his troubles with both Cubans

and Soviets. We do not offer this thought as the final word, but more

simply that if it bears on the subject at all it is inconsistent with

speculation that he had some special relationship with either nation.

It is noted that various allegations have been made in the press

in connection with the House Select Committee on Assassinations

inquiry concerning CIA information regarding Oswald's Mexico visit;

these are commented on at Tab G.

Ill.

General Collection Requirements

On 22 November 1963 all CIA stations abroad received a cable

from Headquarters with the following statement:

CONFIDENTIAL

7

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CONFIRE T

"Tragic death of President Kennedy requires all

of us to look sharp for any unusual intelligence

developments. Although we have no reason to

expect anything of a particular military nature,

all hands should be on the quick alert at least

for the next few days while the new President

takes over the reins."

It is appropriate at this point to observe the general reaction

to be expected from such a communication. Without any leads, other

than those arising from Oswald's identification, the requirements to

field stations were necessarily general. General reporting can be

stimulated by general requests, if there is something to report, and

this is what was undertaken. In addition, in any event, intelligence

assets and liaison services overseas are quick to realize the signifi-

cance of important information and will report it on their own initiative.

It is significant, in the light of these considerations, that there has

been the most limited reporting on the subject. Were there relevant

or significant information on the subject it would have been reported

either in responses to the expression of general interest, or

spontaneously, if such information was known to Agency sources.

If one believes that there was a conspiracy, with Oswald involved,

one must accept the likelihood that his fellow conspirators would not

have shared their knowledge beyond the narrow circle of thase directly

involved.

Conversely, if there were no conspiracy, there obviousty

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIOENTAL

would be nothing to report in the first place. The absence of concrete

reporting seems to serve, regardless of which is the case, as the basis

for the apparent SSC view that no collection effort was undertaken.

As has been noted above, there were initial CIA collection re-

quirements to the field. What they could be realistically expected to

produce must be related to whether there was any information to collect

at all, and if so whether it was accessible. The requirements were issued,

but in retrospect it is doubtful that they could produce much of the who-

what-where-when-how information that typifies intelligence collection

reporting. A reflection of the basic nature of the problem is found in

the Headquarters cable to Mexico City on 17 December 1963 (note above)

which contains the following comment about the limited reporting from

other stations:

"... this partly dictated by the facts of Lee

Oswald's life. .

."

The SSC Final Report speaks in rather unqualified terms at page 10

about the resources of the intelligence agencies, including a description

of "an extensive intelligence network in Cuba," suggesting that it was

only necessary to ask to get. It is correct to say that there were

sources in Cuba able to report on events, such as troop movements, but

there were no penetrations of Castro's inner circle, where any infor-

mation on the subject in question would exist. The distinction apparently

was missed -- or ignored -- by the authors of the SSC Final Report. As

stated by the Miami Chief of Station, quoted at page 58 of the SSC Report:

"Now if you are referring to our capability to conduct

an investigation in Cuba, I would have to say it was

limited."

This does not mean that such assets as there were did not have reporting

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CONHIUENIIRL

requirements levied on them, in fact, there was considerable activity

in this respect. In the course of the present review a number of case

officers at the Station during that period have described the frenetic

activity in this respect. The characterization by the Chief of Station

as to passive collection by CIA inside the United States should not be

extended to apply to what was done with reporting assets outside the

United States, as the SSC Final Report attempts to do at the bottom of

page 58.

The SSC Final Report has undertaken to paint this in very_different

terms than the record supports. The extensive reporting to the FBI

and the Warren Commission provides a truer reflection of the level of

activity by CIA (see Tab E), even if its sources did not bear on every

question that has been conceived since then.

IV "Unpursued Leads"

At pages 60-67, in Book V of the SSC Final Report, there is a section

that addresses leads that were felt to not have been followed by the

intelligence agencies. This follows the section on CIA's Performance

on the Inquiries. This section first addresses two Cubana flights to

Havana from Mexico City on 22 November (the date of President Kennedy's

murder) and 27 November 1963, raising questions about passengers reported

to be aboard those flights.

By way of background it is noted that during that period Cubana

flights traveled on a round trip basis between Havana and Mexico

City every other day. More specifically, there were flights at this

time on 22 November, 25 November and 27 November. The flights on

10

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CONHIDENTIAL

22 and 25 November to Havana were passenger flights, while the one

on 27 November appears to have been essentially a cargo flight, with

one passenger, the man referred to in the SSC discussion. All flights

to Havana apparently carried some freight.

CIA conducted regular surveillance of Cubana flights, filing cable

reports to Headquarters. There was one Unilateral CIA surveillance

team (LIFIRE) that observed arrivals and departures of Cubana flights,

reporting any unusual incidents and providing copies of flight manifests.

The Mexican authorities) also had a surveillance team of its own at the

airport, which provided photographs of passports and also provided copies

of passenger lists. Additionally, a telephone tap operation (LIENVOY)

against the Cuban embassy provided transcripts of conversations with

the Cubana office and the Mexican Airport Control Office.

The 22 November 1963 Flight

At pages 30, 60, 61 and 103 of Book V of the SSC Final Report,

reference is made to a reported five-hour delay of a Cubana flight from

Mexico City to Havana the evening of President Kennedy's assassination,

22 November 1963.

The SSC Report describes the delay as being from

6:00 P.M. EST to 11:00 P.M. EST. The especially intriguing aspect

of the report was that the reported delay was to await arrival at

10:30 P.M. EST of a private twin-engined aircraft, which deposited

an unidentified passenger who boarded the Cubana aircraft without customs

clearance and traveled to Havana in the pilot's cabin. The SSC Final

Report emphasized CIA's apparent failure to follow up by inquiring

further into the matter.

11

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Book V of the SSC Final Report states that CIA could not explain,

at the time of the writing of the SSC Report, why there was no record

of a follow-up. In fact, the SSC was advised that the Mexican authori-

ties were asked about the reported flight delay, although there was no

recorded response. The current review revealed additional information

from the surveillance noted above, which bears directly on the subject.

In reviewing that information below, it is noted that the conversion

of Mexico City time to Eastern Standard Time (EST) in the SSC Final

Report tends to distort the time perspective somewhat. Mexico_City

times are used in the following discussion.

The LIENVOY transcripts record a series of discussions about the

status of the 22 November flight--when it was to arrive and when it

departed. These records show that the flight arrived at the platform

at the airport at 1620 hours Mexico City time; presumably it landed

a few minutes earlier. At one point prior to arrival of the aircraft,

one person speaking on the telephone stated that the aircraft was due

at 1630 hours and "it will go" at 1730, suggesting a quick turnaround

that would have reduced unloading and loading time, as well as

servicing, to a relatively short period. However, the key report on

the departure of the aircraft was a statement at 2040 hours that the

aircraft had taken off five minutes earlier, i.e., 2035 hours.

The following facts stand out, in contrast to the presentation in

the SSC Final Report:

1. The Cubana flight was on the ground in Mexico City

for

a total of four hours and about ten minutes. It was not

12

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CONFIDENTVAL

delayed five hours, as alleged.

2. The Cubana flight took off at 2035 hours Mexico City

time, 55 minutes ahead of the alleged arrival at 2130 of a

private flight with a secret passenger. This also contrasts

further with the alleged departure time of the Cubana flight.

which the report stated to be 2200. Actual departure preceded

substantially the reported arrival of the aircraft for which it

allegedly was delayed.

In view of the surveillance coverage of the Cubana flight, it is

very doubtful that the alleged activity involving the private twin-

engined aircraft and passenger would have gone unnoticed or unreported

had it occurred. Personnel in Mexico City at the time were aware of

these sources and probably knew the above facts, feeling no need to

follow further.

The report in question was in error, and misled the SSC in its

summary of the matter.

The Passenger on the 27 November 1963 Flight

At pages 61-63 and 104, the SSC Final Report describes in con-

siderable detail information concerning a Cuban-American who came to

the attention of the CIA and the FBI in the period following the

assassination of President Kennedy. The introductory comments of the

SSC Final Report state that:

"

•. • one source alleged that the Cuban-American

was 'involved' in the assassination."

CONFIDENTIAL

13

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CONFIDENVilL

The SSC Report states that the CIA reported the case to the FBI, "almost

immediately," but that the Bureau did not conduct a follow-up investi-

gation "as part of (its) work for the Warren Commission." Further

down the same page the SSC Report states that "(t)he FBI did investi-

gate this individual after receiving the CIA report of his unusual

travel." At page 63 the SSC Report observes that "...the suspicious

travel of this individual coupled with the possibility that Oswald had

contacted the Tampa chapter (of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee--FPCC)

certainly should have prompted a far more thorough and timely investi-

gation than the FBI conducted..." We do not know just what the Bureau

did in this respect, nor have we tried to resolve the apparent incon-

sistencies in the SSC Report noted above, but the SSC Final Report

contains considerable detail about the man, presumably reflecting the

results of FBI inquiries.

While this section of the SSC Report is directed primarily at the

FBI, we reviewed the reporting because of CIA's initial role in reporting.

about the man. There is also one implicit criticism of CIA, which will

be noted.

Book V of the SSC Final Report has the following summary statement

at page 104, in the chronology section:

"December 5 - Mexico Station cables that someone who

saw the Cuban-American board the aircraft to Havana

on November 27 reported that he 'looked suspicious'

..."

At page 61 it states that there

"is no indication that CIA followed-

up on this report (that the man was "involved in the assassination"),

14

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CONFIDENTIAL

except to ask a Cuban defector about his knowledge of the Cuban

American's activities."

The presentation of this matter in the SSC Report contains some

inaccuracies.

First, the Mexico City Station did not cable Washington

that the man "looked suspicious."

There was a cable, dated 5 December

1963, but it reported that the man had "crossed at Laredo, Texas on

23 November," that he registered at a certain hotel in Mexico City at

a certain time on 25 November, that he checked out of the hotel at a

certain time and departed for Havana "as only passenger on Cubana

flight on night 27 November," and that there was a good photograph of

him taken at the airport. This was followed by a dispatch the same

date, repeating the basic information in the cable, enclosing the photo-

graph, and containing the following cryptic statement:

"Source states the timing and circumstances surrounding

Subject's travel through Mexico and departure for Havana

are suspicious."

This comment is cryptic, at least, and--given that dramatic moment in

history--doubtless reflects a preliminary comment of a person who

was on the alert at that time for anything that might be construed as

possibly unusual. The above quotation was the Station's actual report

of the observation by the source, and is what was reported to the FBI;

it differs from the quotation in the SSC Report. There was an internal

memo in

the Station that was even more cryptic, but which was in the

nature of an informal reminder, which stated that the man was reported

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CONFIDENTLL

to have "looked suspicious"; but this formulation never found its way

into the more careful statements that usually characterize official

reporting. The point is that the observation was cryptic and impres-

sionistic, rather than constituting a tangible basis for dramatic

activity or final conclusions.

There is one piece of reporting that could confuse those reviewing

the record, but which is essentially resolved when considered in the

context of known facts. On 19 March 1964, Monterrey Base cabled

that a source of a local (Monterrey) "agent of the federal judicial

police" had information on a man; the description seems to have the

same Cuban-American in mind. The following should be noted about the

report:

it misspelled the man's name; it offered a bare statement

that he "was involved in Kennedy assassination"; it states that he

entered Mexico "on foot" from Laredo, Texas (according to the SSC Final

Report, the FBI concluded that he entered by automobile); it asserts

that he stayed at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City (while the dates and .

times of his registration and check-out at a specific hotel in Mexico

City, where he stayed, were known); it gave an incorrect number for his

passport; and, it stated that his Mexican tourist card was issued

in Nuevo Laredo (when it was known to have been issued in Tampa,

Florida). The report, on its face, was factually incorrect on a number

of known points. The source patently was extensively misinformed, the

hard facts of his report being in error. The Chief of Base at the time,

when queried about the report in the course of the present review, could

not recall it.

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CONST

There is one additional aspect of the matter, in which the

record is confused.

If we are to comment negatively on the pre-

sentation by the SSC in its emphasis on report, we must point out

that the Mexico City Station's response to the Monterrey report

contributes to such confusion as may exist on the matter.

When

Mexico City received the Monterrey cable the Deputy Chief of

Station replied that the information in the report "jibes fully

with that provided Station by (Mexico City source) 4 December 63."

-

It did not jibe in most respects, other than the date and place of

entry into Mexico. The mistake of that cable cannot be explained

today, but wrong it obviously was. It does, however, serve to

highlight the basic unreliability of the report and indicate how

it should be considered responsibly.

Implicit criticism of CIA's not collecting more information

on the man is not well founded. It had no real sources with access

to information concerning him; when a defector from Cuba became

available with such information he was queried and the results

were

provided

the authorities.

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Tab C

CIA OPERATIONS AGAINST CUBA

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CIA Operations Against Cuba

The SSC Final Report speaks of operations against Cuba and the

Castro regime,

and contends that they should have been reported in

detail to the Warren Commission as part of the subject matter that

it consciously took into consideration. A case can be made for

specific considerations of these various activities by the Warren

Commission, at least as part of the unique background of the times;

it might have provided it additional investigative leads. However,

to advance the general thought is not to discard the usual tests of

evidence that must still control how the findings are treated.

It should be noted that at the time of the Warren Commission

inquiry there was no secret about the tensions between the Kennedy

Administration and the Castro regime. Book V of the SSC Final

Report refers briefly to some of the more dramatic events, such as

the Bay of Pigs in April 1961 and the Missile Crisis in October 1962

(see pages 2, 3, 10 and 11). In fact, the totality of American

policy and practice must have appeared threatening to the Castro

regime, and most certainly must have been considered by it as pro-

vocative.

Additional U. S. policies and programs that could have been

viewed negatively by Castro were the breaking of diplomatic relations,

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economic and political sanctions, paramilitary operations (which re-

ceived recurring publicity in the press), as well as a variety of

covert operations that were not known publicly. On 18 November 1963

President Kennedy -- four days before his death -- delivered a major

policy address in Miami, accusing Castro of having betrayed the Cuban

revolution; at the time the press, reportedly on the basis of what

"White House sources" said about it, viewed it as a call for the Cuban

people to overthrow the Castro regime.

The United States provided a haven and base for Cuban exiles, who

conducted their independent operations against the Castro government.

Some of these exiles had the support of CIA, as well as from other

elements of the U.S. Government, and still others had support from

private sources. With or without official U.s. support these exiles

spoke in forceful Latin terms about what they hoped to do. The Cuban

intelligence services had agents in the exile community in America

and it is likely that what they reported back to Havana assigned to

CIA responsibility for many of the activities under consideration,

whether CIA was involved or not.

We do not know the extent to which the Warren Commission took

what might be characterized as "judicial notice" of the tensions

between the two governments and their leaders; it certainly was in

the public domain. That consideration was given the possibility of

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Cuban or Soviet involvement in the assassination is no secret, clearly,

reflecting a recognition of the question at the time. That a request

was not made by the Warren Commission, nor volunteered by. the intel-

ligence agencies, for extensive review of all Cuban operations is being

faulted today. Yet, in the light of understandings at that time, it

could well have appeared to members of the Warren Commission and its

staff as not directly relevant, in fact, to the specific issue of the

murder of the President. In the absence of evidence to the contrary

a case could still be made for that view, although the evolution of

public perceptions probably would not accept it without reservation.

The SSC Final Report has fixed on the Cuban operations of the

intelligence agencies--primarily those of CIA--for special attention

in considering the question. Implicitly it accepts the theory that

there could well have been conspiracy in the murder of President

Kennedy, and that Castro could have been behind it, having been pro-

voked by depredations against Cuba or plotting against his own life.

However, in advancing its thesis, the SSC Report cautioned that it

had "seen no evidence that Fidel Castro or others in the Cuban govern-

ment plotted President Kennedy's assassination in retaliation for U.S.

operations against Cuba."

In response to this perception, conveyed in Book V of the SSC

Final Report, we have conducted a major review of Agency files (the

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organization of that effort is discussed at Tab A of this report). This

was for the express purpose of identifying any separate activities that

could have provoked Castro to order the assassination of President

Kennedy had he learned of them, and to evaluate their security.

Today, in 1977, it is difficult to reconstruct exactly everything

that did and did not occur in the course of the Warren Commission in-

quiries in 1964. Not all that happened is a matter of record. For

instance, in CIA at that time there were many individuals assigned to

various aspects of Cuban operations. They were familiar in detail with

those activities, with what they were and with their strengths and

weaknesses. They doubtless made numerous conscious but unrecorded

judgments about what seemed relevant or irrelevant to the considera-

tions of the Warren Commission. Had they been aware of any aspects of

those activities that may have related to the assassination of the

President it is safe to say it would have been surfaced in some way.

While CIA produced considerable material for the investigation (see

Tab E) that more was not reported is a meaningful indication of what

was known then by those actually involved, as distinguished from what

might be hypothesized at a later date. To contend to the contrary --

which has been suggested by some -- would require a unanimous con-

spiracy of many American citizens, employees of CIA, many of whom

knew aspects of even the most closely guarded activities.

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Today, the knowledge of the persons involved directly in the

various Cuban operations in the period preceding President Kennedy's

death cannot be recaptured in the form that it existed then. Those

persons are scattered, their memories are blurred by time, and some

are dead. The SSC, for instance -- in its attempt to capture ele-

ments of the past -- seems to have led some employees into expressing

opinions on subject matter they did not know in 1964, apparently in

response to representations by SSC staff members as to the facts; this

illustrates at best the difficulties in resolving hypothetical issues,

today, on a responsible basis.

The SSC Final Report devotes considerable time to the so-called

AMLASH operation, which centered on a high Cuban official who was

dissatisfied with the Castro regime. The Agency had only a tentative

relationship with this man during President Kennedy's life, although

the SSC Final Report -- in trying to prove its thesis -- has attempted

to present it differently. Because the case is discussed so exten-

sively in the SSC Final Report, it is treated in a separate annex in

this paper, at Tab D. The key point is that prior to President

Kennedy's death the relationship with AMLASH/1 was amorphous and

without substance. Had Castro learned of it he could learn only that

there was a contact that had not developed to the point of an under-

taking. This will not be treated further in this section of this

discussion.

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SEGEZI

In the face of the hypotheses advanced by the SSC Final Report,

it has been felt necessary to review in depth all records of Cuban

operations conducted by CIA during the period in question, 1961-1964.

The organization of the review is described at Tab A. It was not

possible to predict the form that information turned up by this

inquiry might take, and special care had to be exercised in the effort.

In doing this the "provocation concept" of the SSC Report was kept in

mind. In the months that it took to complete this extensive review,

it is significant to observe that three areas of specific operational

activity were found that either might meet some of the requirements

of the provocation theory, or throw some further light on issues

already considered. To report this conclusion is not to dismiss the

original questions that faced the Warren Commission as to whether

there might have been Cuban or Soviet connections with Oswald. That

such possibilities remain unresolved in some minds is apparent, but

that the records of CIA, in such a review, do not add significantly

to evidence on the subject, is the conclusion of the present inquiry.

The

areas of operational activity noted above can be described

briefly as follows:

1. Operations directed against the Cuban leadership (AMTRUNK).

2. Operations involving the criminal underworld.

3. Other reports of plans to assassinate Castro.

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Operation AMTRUNK

There is one other general activity that was considered in the

course of the present research, which is discussed below.

This

activity, AMTRUNK, was to develop a capability for splitting the

leadership of the Castro regime and eventually overthrowing it. It

never reached the point of implementation; however, because it suffered

possible security vulnerabilities, it is treated here even though it

never materialized. In our professional judgment this activity,

because of its failure to ever develop substance, is not really rele-

vant to the question. It is included simply because it might be viewed,

by virtue of its security vulnerabilities, as fitting in part the

hypothesis of the SSC Final Report; it seemed better to include it than

try and explain at some later date why it was omitted, although the

reasoning should be apparent. If its inclusion in this report is subject

to question because of its lack of substance, perhaps it serves some

purpose in indicating how little turned up in the course of this

research to meet any of the rather loosely formulated provocation thesis

of the SSC Report.

In early 1963 there were Cuban exiles who wished to change the

direction that events seemed to have taken in Cuba. Two of them, Nestor

Antonio Moreno Lopez and Enrique Cayardo Robera, developed an oper-

ational concept to overthrow the Castro government, which came to be

known as the Leonardo Plan. Cayardo had been a public figure in Cuba,

who had no apparent role in the activity following original inception

of the plan. Moreno was the son of a Cuban senator and Minister of Public

Works; as a lawyer in Cuba he had been involved in only a minor way in

the anti-Batista movement.

38802A

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Moreno defected to the United States in April 1961, settling

in Miami where he associated with anti-Castro exiles. Among his

associates was Jorge Ajbuszy Volsky, a Cuban citizen of Polish origin.

Volsky had been in prison in the USSR in the 1940's, and enlisted in

the Polish Air Force during WWII under the British Air Command. After

WWII he married a Cuban national, and for a period operated his own

business in Havana. Although avidly pro-Castro he reportedly was

imprisoned for a few weeks following the Bay of Pigs invasion. As

he held a valid U.S. visa, he left Cuba, arriving in Miami in May 1961.

Cayardo and Moreno discussed the Leonardo Plan with Volsky. He,

in turn, discussed it with Tadeus (Tad) Witold Szulc, a reporter with

the New York Times. Szulc had reported on Cuban activities for the

New York Times prior to the fall of Batista, during which time he had

developed a wide acquaintance among Cubans. He was transferred to

the Times Washington Bureau in April 1961, where he claimed to have

an entree to the White House through his uncle, Ambassador John C.

Wiley. He also claimed to have a standing invitation for direct con-

tact with President Kennedy, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, and

McGeorge Bundy on matters concerning Cuba. While the actual nature of

this entree is not known to CIA, it is through his intercession that

the Leonardo Plan gained government-level support and approval.

In early 1963 Szulc arranged an interview in Washington with

Mr. Richard Goodwin, a White House advisor. Volsky and Szulc then met

with Robert Hurwitch, a senior official in the Department of State,

who presented the concept to the CIA with Department approval. CIA

assigned it to its Miami Station, where it became known as AMTRUNK.

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AMTRUNK was conceived as first identifying disaffected key per-

sonnel in the Cuban armed forces with the long range objective of

uniting them against the Castro regime. On 4 April 1963 CIA cabled

certain stations and bases orders to identify Cubans who might be

used in the activity. During that period the CIA Chief of Station

in Miami questioned CIA control of the operation. Noting uncertain

security considerations, he felt it best to fund the operation gen-

erously in order for it to proceed independently:

On 17 April 1963 Szulc informed Hurwitch that the Miami Station

had given Volsky responsibility for the decision of whether or not

the operation was to proceed; this was not consistent with CIA

intentions:

In August 1963 things still had not progressed very far. A

Headquarters cable on 5 August 1963 to certain stations and bases

complained about the absence of responses to the 4 April cable. It

emphasized that activity to penetrate the Cuba armed forces was a

high priority objective. In early September 1963 AMTRUNK had three

intelligence sources in Cuba: Miguel A. Diaz Isalgue, Ramon Guin

Hector Robello, and Modesto Orozco Basulto. One of these sources,

Guin, was reportedly close to AMLASH/1, a man with whom CIA was

dealing separately through a Headquarters case officer -- but at

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that time unsuccessfully -- in trying to develop an operational ap-

proach similar in some respects to AMTRUNK. The AMLASH operation is

discussed at Tab D.

It was decided at the end of October 1963 that Moreno should be

separated from the operational details of the AMTRUNK operation be-

cause of numerous indiscretions and poor security practice. Arrange-

ments were made to involve him in a radio program to be used in con-

nection with the Rebel Army that eventually it was hoped would arise

against Castro. Moreno threatened to appeal this decision through

Volsky and Szulc to the President.

In November 1963 the program was still trying to develop leads

into higher echelons of the military and civilian leadership. The

operation moved slowly, with preliminary infiltrations designed to

set up infiltration/exfiltration routes. Although it had success-

fully recruited some persons during 1963 in Cuba, it had made prac-

tically no progress in establishing an organization or any capability

for action. At a much later date as its numbers increased its secur-

ity became less certain. In 1965 its security was believed to have

been seriously compromised and the decision was taken to cut off re-

lations with it.

Various figures were arrested, including Guin, Diaz

and AMLASH/1.

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The reason for selecting this operation for discussion here is

just not its denouement in 1965, but possible security weaknesses

from the beginning. Szulc and Volsky are considered to be highly

suspect and they are discussed below, with another person who became

involved in the activity.

a. Tad Szulc. Szulc has been suspect since 1948 when

the FBI recorded reports that he was a communist. Re-

portedly he was in frequent contact with communist party

-

leaders and functionaries throughout Latin America. Sus-

picions about his motives or possible connections with

V.

foreign intelligence services: have never been proven.

Nicole Szulc, daughter of Tad Szulc, is reportedly an avid

communist. Philip Agee's Inside the Company: A CIA Diary

credits Nicole Szulc with having "obtained vital research

materials in New York and Washington, D.C." She is be-

lieved to be an agent of the Cuban DGI. Doubts about Tad

Szulc arè unconfirmed but remain alive. Of Polish origin

Szulc became a U.S. citizen in 1954 by a special bill of

Congress.

origin.

b. Jorge Ajbuszyc Volsky. Like Szulc, he is of Polish

He and Szulc became acquainted in 1959-1960 in

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Cuba. A Cl Study of Volsky, dated 24 August 1964, prepared

by a JMWAVE analyst, makes the following statement: "Volsky's

knowledge of clandestine methods of operation, together with

his Russian prison background and his ingenuity as a middleman

in U.S. Government/CIA activities, made him an excellent

candidate for a communist penetration agent and that the pos-

sibility existed that he might be a singleton, sleeper or

stringer for the RIS." There has been no confirmation of

these suspicions.

Volsky became a naturalized U.S. citizen

on 10 April 1969.

c. Jose Ricardo RABEL Nunez. Born in Cuba, he was the

son of a native born American citizen. He was educated both

in Cuba and in the States and later (1940) enlisted in the

U.S. Army. After discharge he returned to Cuba but kept

moving back and forth between the U.S. and Cuba. Viewed in

retrospect, his career presents a patter of changing alle-

giances.

He enjoined the anti-Batista forces in March 1952

first with the Cuban exiles in the United States and later

from inside Cuba. He joined the Cuban Army under Batista

and was the Cuban liaison officer with the U.S. Army mis-

sion in

Cuba from November 1954 until 1956. During his

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entire period in the Cuban Army, he was involved with

dissident army elements. RABEL was arrested in April 1956 when

he participated in an attempted coup. After a short imprison-

ment he returned to the U.S. and worked with one of his brothers.

In October 1957, he returned to Cuba and became involved with

the 26th of July Movement and later with the Cienfuegos Group.

Shortly after the Castro victory, Castro called upon RABEL to

set up a Cuban Marine Corps, a job he held until 1960, at which

time he was appointed Chief of Viviendos Campesinas (Rural

Housing). Approached by CIA, he refused to work in place but

was willing to defect, which he did in December 1962, being

recruited by JMWAVE Station where he was used in AMTRUNK

activities. He returned to Cuba on his own in 1965, reportedly

to attempt the exfiltration of his family. Upon return to Cuba

he was arrested and sentenced to 30 years imprisonment but was

set free in July or August 1967. There were accusations that

RABEL was a Cuban agent as early as July 1963. The accusations

were never proven.

In view of the later roll-up of the AMTRUNK operation the

tentative opinion has been offered that the operation could have

been an ingenious plan by the Cubans from the beginning, using access

at high levels in the U.S. Government to learn the identities of

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individuals in the Cuban hierarchy who were disloyal to the regime.

Whatever the later penetrations by Cuban intelligence, the role of

Szulc and Volsky, in the early phase of the operation, could have

exposed both its members and eventual objectives to Cuban intelli-

gence.

Accepting the possibility of vital security flaws in the

operation, it must be observed that there was very little progress

and no concrete planning during the life of President Kennedy. The

eventual objective was to develop sufficient support and organization

to overthrow the Cuban regime. It never made much progress,

although it did lay down caches and conducted some infiltrations

and exfiltrations in 1964 and 1965.

An attempt to build support that might eventually have the

capability to attempt a coup against the Castro regime obviously

would have been irritating to Castro. That it never really prog-

ressed very far during the life of President Kennedy is a relevant

consideration to whether or not the tentative beginnings would have

provoked Castro to order the assassination of President Kennedy.

New Considerations on the Syndicate Operation

In the course of the present review a by-line story by Paul

Meskil in the New York Daily News attracted special attention because

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of one statement that it contained. One of a series of stories

printed 20-25 April 1975, it quoted Frank Sturgis as follows:

"The third (assassination) scheme involved

planting a bomb in Castro's office. 'I had

access to the Prime Minister's office,' Sturgis

said.

'I knew Fidel's private secretary Juan

Orta.

I recruited him to work with the embassy

(American Embassy in Havana). '"

Sturgis has been something of a soldier of fortune over the

years, having served in different branches of the U.S. military

and having been in the anti-Batista movement prior to Castro's

takeover.

Sturgis stayed on in Cuba until mid-1959, during which

time he reportedly had some role in the Castro regime's control

of the gambling interests. He came to the United States in 1959.

Sturgis gained notoriety when arrested on 17 June 1972 in the Water-

gate break-in.

He has claimed on a number of occasions to have been

an employee of CIA, although there is no record of any such relation-

ship.

He was in contact with some of the CIA Cuban employees in the

Miami area, but had no direct relationships with the Agency.

The particular feature in the above excerpt from the newspaper

story is that it constitutes the first public reference to Juan

Orta in the role of an assassin in plans against Castro. Orta was,

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in fact, the first man who reportedly was to have been used in the

operation that CIA had, with the criminal syndicate, to kill Castro.

Orta was the director of the Office of the Prime Minister, which

gave him the access that would make it possible for him to poison

Castro. The plan failed because Orta lost his position, and with

it his access, in late January 1961. This was prior to delivery

of the poison pills to him in late February or early March 1961.

Orta's role in this connection was over when he took refuge in the

Venezuelan Embassy in Havana in April 1961. He was allowed to leave

Cuba in October 1964 and settled in Miami in February 1965. As for

Sturgis' assertion that he recruited Orta to work with the embassy,

CIA files have no record that Orta was recruited for CIA by anyone

during the period there was an embassy in Cuba. While Orta was

reported in early 1961 as being used in the CIA-syndicate attempt

against Castro, CIA had no direct relationships with him until he

left Cuba, at which time he was used as a source of information on

the Cuban leadership.

The fact remains that Orta did at one time have the role of

intended assassin.

Sturgis' identification of Orta in this capacity,

prior to its becoming known to external investigators in 1975, raised

the question of just what Sturgis had known, and whether he could

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have been a source of information on the subject whereby Castro

could have learned of CIA's earlier plan against his life.

Newspaper stories are not necessarily reliable sources of

information.

However, because the statement by Sturgis in 1975

indicated a familiarity with Orta's availability to play the role

of assassin in 1960, additional attention was given the statement

in the press to see how it might fit in with other things that are

known. What follows is subject to reservations that must attach

to the reliability of newspaper stories.

The New York Daily News stories (20-25 April 1975), and another

story by the same author on 13 June 1976, refer to possible relation-

ships between Sturgis and Trafficante, also mentioning a Norman

Rothman as a gambling partner of Trafficante. The Office of Security

wrote a memorandum in 1975, in conjunction with the first set of New

York Daily News stories, noting that there was a connection between

Sturgis and Rothman in 1960, citing FBI reports. It is pertinent

to note here that in addition to the role Sturgis is reported to

have had with the Castro government in relation to the gambling

activities, Juan Orta's availability for the assassination assignment

was understood to be due to his having lost payoffs that he had once

received from the gambling interests. One can deduce that Sturgis

and Orta could have known one another because of their connections

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with the gambling activities as well as having contacts with

the men heading the gambling organizations.

The New York Daily News story of 1976 also reports a claim by a

Marie Lorenz that she acted in 1960 in behalf of Sturgis, in an

attempt to assassinate Castro. She had also been mentioned in the

1975 stories. Ms. Lorenz reportedly was Castro's mistress at one

point, and her access, so the story indicates, was used as a means

for getting to him. The 1976 news story concludes that "soon after

her murder mission failed the CIA recruited Mafia mobsters . . . to

kill Castro..."

In the news story she claimed that the plan

involved the

use of poison pills which she concealed in a jar of face

cream; they dissolved and could not be used.

On page 79 of the SSC Interim Report on Alleged Assassination

Plots the following is extracted from an 18 October 1960 memorandum

from the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to the CIA

Deputy Director for Plans:

"During recent conversations with several

friends, (Sam) Giancana stated that Fidel

Castro was to be done away with very shortly.

When doubt was expressed regarding this state-

ment, Giancana reportedly assured those

present that Castro's assassination would occur

in November.

Moreover, he allegedly indicated

that he had already met with the assassin-to-be

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on three occasions .

• • Giancana claimed that *

everything has been perfected for the killing

of Castro, and that the 'assassin' had arranged

with a girl, not further described, to drop a 'pill'

in some drink or food of Castro."

This seems to confirm some plot involving a woman to kill Castro

with poison.

However, the dating of events does not fit the time

frame known to CIA. While consideration had been given to various

schemes, there were no CIA pills for delivery until February J961.

It suggests that the syndicate may have been moving ahead on its own.

Following collapse of CIA's access to Castro through Orta,

Johnny Roselli, the man who had served as the Agency's original inter-

mediary with the syndicate, stated that he knew a Cuban exile leader

who might participate. This man, Tony Varona, headed the Democratic

Revolutionary Front, one of the exile groups that also received

support from CIA as part of the larger Cuban operation. Varona was

dissatisfied with the nature and extent of that support; Miami Station

suspected that he was not keeping his bargain with the Agency. In

fact, it is possible that Varona

already was involved in independent

operations with the criminal syndicate when first approached prior to

the Bay of Pigs in March 1961 to carry out the Castro assassination.

The 1967 IG Report refers to two FBI reports that bear on this.

One of them,

on 21 December 1960, indicates support by the criminal

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002. 51i

underworld for some of the Cuban exiles. The other report, on

18 January 1961, suggests that Varona was one of those receiving

that support, although this was not confirmed. As a matter of

interest, as late as 10 June 1964 there was a report that gangster

elements in the Miami area were offering $150,000 for anyone who

would kill Castro (an amount mentioned to the syndicate repre-

sentatives by CIA case officers at an earlier date). These bits

of information, fitted together, could provide the basis for an

explanation of why Varona was so readily available when approached

by Roselli. It also may throw light on a question noted in the

1967 IG Report. The operation with the syndicate had been called

off following the Bay of Pigs in April 1961; yet, when it was

reactivated in April 1962 the case officer felt there was something

already ongoing in spite of the fact that the operation had been

terminated a year earlier. It is possible that CIA simply found itself :

involved in providing additional resources for independent operations

that the syndicate already had under way. The criminal syndicate

had important interests in Cuba, and to recover them may well have

sought on its own to eliminate Castro. In a sense CIA may have been

piggy-backing on the syndicate and in addition to its material contri-

butions was

also supplying an aura of official sanction.

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What do these various considerations suggest? It is obvious

that many lines of speculation can be developed, not the least of

which is that the Agency did not know the full extent of syndicate

activities.

Clearly, the Agency's case officers felt that they were

initiating a new activity that had the sole purpose of accomplishing

the elimination of Castro. The additional considerations can be

listed as follows:

1. The criminal syndicate may well have had some inde-

pendent activities of its own underway prior to CIA involve-

ment in late 1960. These operations could well have con-

tinued after the CIA standdown following the Bay of Pigs,

being ongoing in some form when CIA reactivated the plan

in April 1962.

b. The syndicate operations could have activities such

as those that are reported in the New York Daily News

stories in 1975 and 1976.

3. Frank Sturgis seems to have had contacts with the

criminal syndicate, although from outward appearances he

was not a member of it. He could well have been used by

the syndicate in its activities.

4. Sturgis has not been a reliable source, so his

statements are treated with considerable reserve. He

probably did know Juan Orta when both of them were in Cuba.

He was outside of Cuba, however, when Orta was given the

SECRET.

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::.

'SEGRET

role of assassin. Whatever he knew at that time--and

his knowledge may be of a much later date--could have been

in the form reported fifteen years later in the 1975

newspaper stories. If there was such an operation it

was not CIA's; it could have been an earlier operation

of the syndicate. While Sturgis could have known of

or have been involved in earlier activity by the syndicate,

whatever its form, he may also have had no part in any

of it; he may merely have fabricated a story from bits -

and pieces learned by him from gossip in the Miami

community after Orta settled there in 1965.

5. If the syndicate was conducting its own operations,

that would tend to reinforce the thought that the details

of its operations would have been characterized by discre-

tion--or security--despite the FBI report in October 1960.

The authors of Book V of the SSC Final Report felt that the

operation seeking to employ the resources of the criminal syndicate

would not have provided Castro the clear provocation that was hypothe-

sized

for the AMLASH operation. At page 68 the Report stated:

..

• it is unlikely that Castro could have

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22

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C521

distinguished the CIA plots with the underworld

from those plots not backed by CIA. In fact,

the methods the CIA used in these attempts were

designed to prevent the Cuban government from

attributing them to the CIA."

In a

sense

the SSC made a conscious judgment, in the context of its

provocation theory, that was made less consciously and in a different

context in 1964 by the few CIA employees who knew of the operations

with the syndicate -- that they bore no relation to the assassination

of President Kennedy.

Possible Ruby--Trafficante Contact

There are fragments of unevaluated reports that leave one aspect

of the involvement of the criminal syndicate as a question. This can

only be noted here, as the means for resolving it one way or another

are not within the Agency's capabilities.

As noted earlier (see Tab B: page 4), a 27 November 1963

report records statements by a British journalist that during his own

imprisonment in Cuba in 1959 he knew of a gangster type named "Santos"

who was in jail where he was visited by another American gangster type

named "Ruby." Current speculation has considered the possibility that

"Santos" was Santos Trafficante who may have been in jail there in

1959. An FBI report of 14 August 1964 recorded a statement by a person

jailed in Cuba that he shared a cell with Trafficante.

23

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If the "Santos" in the British report was Trafficante, the

British and FBI reports tend to support one another on the narrow

point of his imprisonment in Cuba in 1959. This is a material

consideration, as there are reservations about both sources.

It may be that the FBI has more information on this point, but

there is no further known relevant information

in the Agency

on the matter.

The significance of this is that if Trafficante was in

jail in Cuba in 1959, he could have been available for a visit

by Jack Ruby if such visits were allowed. Ruby, in fact, did visit

Cuba in 1959. The long time gap between 1959 and November 1963

removes the two incidents from candidacy for consideration as

evidence of conspiracy against President Kennedy. However, if

Ruby was running an errand for someone in 1959, it would provide

an interesting lead for those inquiring into the possible signi-

ficance of past assocations or contacts.

Both the British report and the confirmation of Ruby's

1959 visit were known to the Warren Commission, and Ruby

reportedly spoke at length about his visit when questioned.

24

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However, Ruby is dead and Trafficante has declined to testify *

at all. A later allegation of a

visit by Ruby to Cuba in late

1962 or early 1963 is believed not to be true.

Other Reported Assassination Proposals

There were other references to possible assassination plots

against Castro that seem not to have been addressed in the Interim

Report of the SSC on Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign

Leaders. They are summarized briefly below:

In May 1975 a Cuban exile who came to be a contract employee

stated that in February 1961 he was given a rifle and the mission

to enter Cuba to assassinate Castro. He claimed to have tried to

enter Cuba three times, but failed each time in gaining entry to

Cuba. Agency files have no further records on this matter.

As a result of a column by Jack Anderson in May 1977, a check

was made of Agency files referring to an Antonio Veciana, cited

by Anderson as a CIA employee. The man was never an employee of the

Agency, but he was connected with ALPHA-66, a Cuban exile movement.

On three separate occasions (December 1960, July 1962, April 1966)

he proposed to CIA employees the assassination of Fidel Castro.

He was rebuffed on each occasion. Again in 1970 there was a report

of his making a similar proposal while an AID employee at an overseas

post. The details of his actual role is unknown to the Agency,

although the FBI may have more details on him. This is touched on in

Tab G, which comments on selected newspaper stories published in the

course of this research effort.

SECRET.

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SEGREI

Agent Messages in 1961 Mentioning Plans to Kill Castro

1.

During the investigations in 1975 five agent messages were

identified that made reference to plans to kill Castro, or proposing

such action. Three of these messages related to the same operation,

the other two relating to separate proposals; there is no indication

that any of these proposals was the result of CIA initiative. The

existence of these messages was mentioned during Mr. Colby's testimony

before the Church Committee. In response to a request from the Deputy

Inspector General, LA Division prepared a summary of the messages

and on 8 August 1975 forwarded it to the Review Staff, then charged

with serving as an interface with the congressional committees.

Records of the Review Staff do not show how this paper was handled.

The subject was not covered in the Church Committee's interim report

on Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders and is

summarized again below.

I

2. Three of the messages involved the same group of agents,

and seem to relate to the same plan. The first message, dated

27 March 1961 (prior to the Bay of Pigs) was sent by an Agency

asset, AMBRONC/5. The message requested the Agency's opinion on

a proposed sabotage of the electric company in Havana, stating that

this could be coordinated "with attempt against Fidel in public

appearance (at) Sports Palace." The cable expressed the view that

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an "attempt against Fidel (is) in accordance with general plan."

There is no record that this message was answered. Two days later,

on 29 March 1961, possibly because of the absence of a reply, the

same agent sent another message. This stated that the plan was

scheduled for 9 April. Castro was to speak at the Palace, and an

"assassination attempt at said place (will be) followed by a general

shutting off of main electric plants in Havana." General anti-regime

developments to follow this were then outlined. This message was

answered on 30 March agreeing that a "major effort should be launched

Havana on date you selected." It recommended contacting other named

persons, looking to a more general uprising. The message addressed

the general issue, making no comment on the proposal to kill Castro.

A third message, on 5 April 1961, presumably from the same agent,

reported that the persons he had been directed to contact had arms

for only 50 men. While stating that the sabotage of the electric

company and "possibly attempt on Fidel" would be carried out 9 April,

he emphasized that to do so would make it impossible to maintain a

clandestine organization in Cuba; "your military aid is decisive. If it

does not come that date we are lost." There is no indication that

this message was answered. No further reference to this plan has

been found.

3. We have reviewed the files of the persons identified in the

cables, and have interviewed a case officer who was responsible for

one of them, in an attempt to learn more about the matter. The

four agents in question are commented on briefly below:

27

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a. AMBRONC/5 is the agent who sent the messages out-

lining the proposed sabotage effort and attempt against

Castro.

(1) 201 file opened 15 July 1960. A POA was

not issued until 18 December 1961, and an OA on

31 January 1962. A debriefing of him in November

1960, prior to the Kennedy Administration, revealed

that he had been in touch with people who had

plotted the assassination of Fidel Castro, and claimed

to have tried himself to make similar plans. He was

infiltrated on 9 December 1960, exfiltrating 15 February

1961.

(2) AMBRONC/5 was infiltrated again 3 March

1961 and exfiltrated again 19 June 1961. This

covered the period of his messages and the Bay of

Pigs.

His sole mission was to organize resistance

groups.

(3) AMBRONC/5 was infiltrated again on 19 December

1961, exfiltrating 29 March 1962, again with the same

mission.

(4) AMBRONC/5 was infiltrated finally 2 May

1962, was arrested 29 May 1962, and was executed

30 August 1962. He has been reported as never admitting

that he was a CIA agent. His name is not one of those

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in the book given Senator, McGovern by Castro, listing

those claimed by Castro to have plotted attempts against

his life.

b. AMCOAX/I was one of those AMBRONC/5 was told to

contact for his general plan for April 1961.

(1)

POA on 5 January 1961. His mission was to

organize paramilitary activities in Cuba. He in-

filtrated in February 1961 and exfiltrated in July

1961 following the Bay of Pigs. This period covered

the above messages.

(2) Re-infiltrated 29 July 1961, with the same

organizing mission, he was arrested on 17 August 1961,

and is serving a thirty year term. His name appears

in the book given Senator McGovern.

c. AMPUG/1 was another of those AMBRONC/5 was told to

contact for his general plan in April 1961.

(1) Recruited in September 1960, he was in-

filtrated that month, receiving airdrops in December

1960. He returned to the U.S. 15 May 1961, following

the Bay of Pigs.

(2) Infiltrated again on 29 June 1961, with the

mission to organize resistance groups and conduct

sabotage operations, he was arrested in July 1961, and

is serving a thirty year term. His name is among those

in the book given Senator McGovern by Castro.

29

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d. AMPANIC/7 was another of those that AMBRONG/5 was

told to contact for his general plan in April 1961.

(1) This man was a "walk-in" 15 April 1960,

a POA being issued 30 January 1961 (although there was

a MOC since 12 July 1960). He was to organize resistance

groups in the Havana and Pinar del Rio areas.

(2)

Infiltrated 3 March 1961, he was arrested

23 April 1961, and is serving a thirty year term. His

name is among those in the book given Senator McGovern

by Castro.

(3) Records relating to this man mention his in-

filtration into Cuba in August 1960 and exfiltration

in November 1960 (prior to his being issued a POA).

His

"mission" during that period is mentioned tersely

as being "to organize resistance groups... for

mounting sabotage operations . . . and assassination

of prominent Cuban Communist members in the Castro

entourage..." The records refer to "his own

personal objectives" during this period and criticizes

how he functioned during his stay in Cuba from August

to November 1960. The record then specifies how he is

to conduct himself and focus his efforts on his return,

which was to develop sabotage operations. We were able

to contact one of his two case officers, who has retired

30

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(the other had died), to ascertain his recollections;

Stating that at the time the focus was on developing

organizations for operations, he stated that an

assassination mission, such as attributed to AMPANIC/7

on his earlier time in Cuba, not only was not authorized,

but would have compromised the effort to organize.

Any such assassination mission, the case officer states,

would have been at AMPANIC/7's own initiative.

4. It is clear that AMBRONC/5 envisioned a general uprising

in Cuba, to commence with sabotage of the electric plant in Havana

and an attempt on Castro's life. The third of his messages reflected

pessimism, and the fact is that the operation did not come off.

While the man had no express mission from the Agency to mount an

operation against Castro personally, it is clear that no specific

objection was recorded to his statement of intentions. The one

recorded reply addresses the concept of general action and makes

no reference to the proposal to make an attempt on Castro.

5. The fact is that the 9 April 1961 operation did not come

off, and AMBRONC/5 has not been identified as an Agency asset.

Nor was his name included in the book given Senator McGovern

by Castro.

The other men, none of whom had a mission of assassi-

nation from the Agency, are now serving thirty year terms. That

their names were included in the list given Senator McGovern by

Castro may be an attempt on Castro's part to enlarge on the facts

31

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rather than to report what he truly believes. They were not

executed, a consideration that may support this view.

6. The records are incomplete on the events identified by

the three messages. The time in question predates the Bay of Pigs.

The men mentioned above had more specific missions, other than

that of assassination. They exfiltrated subsequent to the event

described in the messages, and were arrested during subsequent

infiltrations into Cuba. There is no record that any of them had

a mission from CIA to kill Castro. The person who proposed the

act in 1961 -- AMBRONC/5 -- never acknowledged that he was a CIA

agent, and is not listed among those Castro reportedly believes

had the mission of his assassination.

II

7. Another agent message dated 4 June 1961 asked about a

man who had identified himself as Moratori of the Italian Embassy,

who claimed to work for U.S. intelligence and to be in touch with

one Martin Elena and others (none identifiable), who "have plans

for an invasion within 30 days, after the killing of Fidel." A

reply, dated 6 June, stated that the information was untrue and

that Moratori

was not known and should not be trusted.

(Insofar

as CIA records show, there was an Italian diplomat of that name

in Cuba at that time. Little is known about him.) The originator

of the agent message cannot be identified from present records.

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III

8. Another agent message dated 3 May 1961 from a member of

the Revolutionary Recovery Movement in Cuba said "will try to kill

Fidel today." A reply to this message dated 4 May told the agent

and his companions to "lay low" for the time being, and "will

advise when operations can resume." There were no follow-up

messages on this subject in the records. The agent who sent the

message possibly was AMPUG/1, but as noted earlier his mission did

not include instructions to kill Fidel. His companions have not

been

identified.

33

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AMLASH OPERATION

Tab D

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## Page 83

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SECRET

I. AMLASH OPERATION

Comment on the AMLASH operation, in the context of its presenta-

tion in Book V of the Final Report of the SSC, is complicated by the

treatment given it in the Report. Rather than being treated in a

unified way, reference and discussion is found throughout the Report.*

The actual nature and the significance of the AMLASH operation

differs materially from that presented in the SSC Report. The Report

leaves the inference that AMLASH/1 was perhaps an agent of Castro, with

the mission of provoking a plot against Castro (pages 3, 74 and 79),

which in turn provided Castro with the justification for launching

Lee Harvey Oswald against President Kennedy in retaliation. Alternatively,

the Report suggests that AMLASH/1 was so insecure in the conduct of his

activities that the details of his plotting could have become known to

Castro, thereby providing the same basic motivation (pages 74 and 75).

Whichever of these alternatives, so the reasoning would be, the AMLASH

operation should have been reported to the Warren Commission. We believe

that neither thesis applies. The character of the relationship between

CIA and AMLASH/1, prior to Oswald's assassination of President Kennedy,

was so insubstantial and inconclusive that it provided no basis for

of the eight-page chronology following the text.

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AMLASH/ to feel that he had any tangible CIA support for plotting

against Castro. Whether one is inclined to see AMLASH/l as either a

double agent or provocateur, or simply as a man who carelessly revealed

what he was doing, there was little for him to report or to leak.

* * * * * * * * * * * **

In preparing the current comment on the AMLASH operation, as

treated in the SSC Report, it was judged best to approach it in two

ways. A sequential summary of the AMLASH operation is intended to

present the Agency's understanding of the true nature of the activity.

Following that, selected points made in the SSC Report are addressed.

It is hoped that this presentation will help establish a clearer per-

spective for judging the actual substance of the operation.

******** * * * **

As early as March 1959, AMLASH/1 was reported as expressing

directly to Castro his dissatisfaction with the situation in Cuba.

At that time he also was reported as expressing his disillusionment

and that if he "

...did not get out of the country soon, he would kill

Castro himself."

Two years later, in March 1961, AMLASH/1 was met in Mexico City

by a CIA case officer stationed there. The occasion was AMLASH/l's

presence at the leftist-sponsored Latin America Conference on National

Sovereignty, Emancipation, and Peace. The meeting was arranged by

AMWHIP/1, a long-time friend of AMLASH/1. A dispatch in July 1961,

giving a general round-up on operational activity against Cubans in

2

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Mexico City, described the meeting (along with others) as follows:

...the Station made an unsuccessful 'approach'

to (AMLASH/1)...the 'approach' consisted of a

'friendly' talk between a case officer, a mutual

friend of (AMLASH/1) and (AMLASH/1) when he last

was visiting in Mexico. While (AMLASH/1) did not

pick up the opportunity at that time, he apparently

did not report the incident to his superiors and

the ground work may have been laid for a similar action

in the future."

Later in March there was a report that AMLASH/1 and another Cuban wanted

to defect and needed help in escaping. Consideration of their exfil-

tration ended with a report that the Cuban police were aware of AMLASH/1's

intention and plans.

In August 1961 AMWHIP/1 reported plans by AMLASH/1 to attend the

French National Student Union Cultural Festival, and that AMLASH/1

wanted to meet with a "friend" of the Mexico City case officer's. The

files do not reveal that such a contact actually occurred.

In June 1962 there was a report that AMLASH/1 would be travelling

via Praque to the World Youth Festival in Helsinki. AMLASH/1 was

reported as wanting to defect, and also that on his return from Helsinki

he would pass through Paris where he hoped to meet AMWHIP/1. The FBI,

which was aware of CIA's association with AMWHIP/1, met with AMWHIP/1

in Miami and took steps for him to be referred to CIA if he should

contact the Paris Legal Attache.

3

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1=3.4

vandal

In July 1962 CIA contacted AMWHIP/1, who made known his dis-

satisfaction with the way CIA handled AMLASH/l's "planned defection" in

Paris in August 1961. Plans were made for a CIA case officer and

AMWHIP/1 to travel to Helsinki and anywhere else necessary in an attempt

to bring about AMLASH/l's defection.

The first of a series of meetings with AMLASH/1 was held in

Helsinki on 1 August 1962. The original objective of his defection

became one of recruiting him in place. AMLASH/l was reported as feeling

that if he could "do something really significant for the creation of a

new Cuba, he was interested in returning to carry on the fight there."

AMLASH/1 spoke of sabotage of an oil refinery and the execution of a

top ranking Castro subordinate, of the Soviet Ambassador and of Castro

himself. The case officer's report stated:

"While we were making no commitments or plans,

we pointed out to [AMLASH/1] that schemes like

he envisioned certainly had their place, but that

a lot of coordination, planning, information-

collection, etc., were necessary prerequisites to

ensure the value and success of such plans."

(Emphasis in original).

The security hazard of too frequent meetings in Helsinki led to

further meetings in Stockholm and Copenhagen. AMLASH/1 was next

met on 16 and 17 August in Paris where AMWHIP/1 and the case officer

were joined by another case officer. AMLASH/1 was given SW training

and supplies.

On 20 August he was taken to the south of France for

4

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a demolition demonstration. He refused to be polygraphed.

The case

officer reported on 17 August:

"Have no intention give [AMLASH/1] physical

elimination mission as requirement but recognize

this something he could or might try to carry

out on his own initiative."

The Headquarters cabled reply the next day stated:

"Strongly concur that no physical elimination

missions be given [AMLASH/1]."

-

On 29 August 1962 AMLASH/1 left Prague by air for Havana. This was

the last time that he was met until he next left Cuba in September

1963.

COMMENT:

It is noted at this point that AMLASH/1 was not a

recruited agent at that time--nor was he ever for that

matter, as Operational Approval was never granted for

this purpose. By the end of August 1962 the CIA rela-

tionship with AMLASH/1 had made no real progress,

although he was viewed as an operational contact with

potential. Over a year passed between August 1962 and

September 1963 when he was next contacted by CIA.

In terms of the relationship that he had with CIA the

critical period, for purposes of this paper, is there-

fore between 5 September and 22 November 1963.

AMLASH/1 attended the Collegiate Games in Porto Alegre, Brazil

from 5 through & September 1963, as a representative of the Cuban

5

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Government. He was met there by AMWHIP/1, and by the CIA case

officer who was to take over the relationship with him. AMLASH/1

said that he had written two SW messages (only one had been received).

He expressed his reluctance to use this form of communications because

of Cuban postal censorship.

It is pertinent to what followed to note where the relationship

between AMLASH/1 and CIA stood at that time. At page 13 of Book V

of the SSC Final Report the following statement appears:

"

• the CIA took steps to renew its contact

with a high-level Cuban official named AMLASH. -The

CIA's previous contact with him had been sporadic;

he had not been in contact with the CIA since

before the missile crisis of October 1962. The

exact purpose the CIA had for renewing contact is

not known, but there is no evidence the CIA intended

at this time to use AMLASH in an assassination

operation." •

The reason for there having been no contact since August 1962 was

simply that AMLASH/1 did not leave Cuba after that until September

1963.

If it is narrowly correct to state that the "exact purpose"

for renewing contact was not known to the authors of the SSC Report,

it nevertheless is quite clear why he was met. He was an important

potential asset whose usefulness remained to be explored. At this

point, not only was there "no evidence (that) . . . an assassination

operation" was intended, it is quite clear that it was not under

consideration. The problem at the time was how to deal with the man.

At page 14 of the SSC Report it is stated that the first meeting

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in September 1963:

" . . . may have been to gain intelligence and to"

cultivate him as an asset for covert operations . . ."

A 7 September cable, cited on another point in the SSC Report,

provides an insight as to how AMLASH/l was assessed at the time, as

well as emphasizing the uncertainty in the minds of the case officers

of how to deal with him in the future:

"AMLASH cocky totally spoiled brat who will always

be a control problem. . (he) will not take time or

have patience prepare or receive constant strean S/W

messages, let alone OWVL. AMLASH also needs strong

confidant inside who will push and serve as chaplain ..."

CIA headquarters replied on 9 September, saying in part:

• . . Based on what little feel we here have for

subject however appears he is hopeless as intell

performer and is best approached as a chief con-

spirator allowed to recruit his own cohorts among

whom we may then find persons susceptible to long

distance and covert disciplines. . .

The cable then went on to spell out long-range requirements prior to

any action based on such internal organization as AMLASH/1 may put

together.

Clearly, at that point, while AMLASH/1 was viewed as potentially

important,

he also was viewed as a person of uncertain capabilities,

requiring careful but long-range development for whatever course of

action that might later ensue.

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SEGRET

Page 14 of the SSC Final Report cites the 7 September 1963

cable reporting the first 1963 meeting with AMLASH/1 as follows:

"AMLASH was interested primarily in getting the

United States to invade Cuba, or in attempting an

'inside job' against Castro, and that he was awaiting

a U.S. plan of action." (Empahsis added).

This suggests a plan of action targetted specifically against Castro

himself. That may have seemed implicit to the authors of the SSC

Report, but the actual language of the cable states it somewhat differently:

-

"AMLASH still feels there only two ways accomplish

change either inside job or invasion he realistic

enough realize latter out of question. According

AMWHIP, AMLASH still awaiting for US reveal plan of

action."

COMMENT:

At this point, after a year out of touch with a

man with whom there had been no working understanding,

AMLASH/T's views were of interest, but were very general,

as might be expected after such a long time. The actual

reference to an "inside job" did not specify Castro,

as suggested in the SSC Report, but was directed towards

the more general question of how to bring about change.

It was offered alternatively, in the context of con-

sidering both external and internal action, and not with

the specific connotation provided by the SSC presentation.

8

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SECHET

The point is, as stated in the SSC Report, that it left

AMLASH/1 "awaiting a U.S. plan of action." There was

nothing substantive or conclusive. To the contrary, things

were left very much up in the air.

Footnote 17 on page 14 of the SSC Report states that

"characterization of this phase of the AMLASH operation

is disputed." (Emphasis added). The footnote observes

that the SSC Interim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots

concluded that the AMLASH operation was an assassination

operation, which begs the question of what it was for "this

phase" of the matter. In fact, the SSC Interim Report on

Alleged Assassination Plots notes specifically that "From

the first contact with AMLASH until the latter part of 1963,

it was uncertain whether he would defect or remain in Cuba."

(Page 86).

The point is that the SSC Final Report, Book V,

itself describes the very general nature of the approach

by AMLASH/1, and the absence of a U.S. response (supra).

Any dispute over how to characterize the operation at that

time arises from the presentation of it in Book V of the

SSC Report.

Reference to the dispute may reflect views

expressed by CIA representatives on reviewing the draft of the

SSC Final Report.

The next paragraph in the SSC Report, Book V, presents

in inferential sequence, an interview Castro held

with an AP reporter, Daniel Harker, in which Castro inveighed

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against anti-Cuban terrorist plans of U.S. leaders.

The intended inference, as is known from discussions with

SSC staff members, was that AMLASH/1 may have reported (or

leaked to Castro what the authors of the report elected

to see then as assassination plotting. This characteri-

zation is even more explicit at pages 3-4 of the Summary

and Findings of the SSC Report, presenting the inter-

pretation as categorically as though it were fact.

The fact remains that whatever views AMLASH/1 may have

expressed, he had no response from his CIA contacts of

any support for his proposals at that time. Whatever

may have been the cause for Castro's remarks at that time

they could not have stemmed from anything said to

AMLASH/1 by CIA officers as they proposed nothing and

undertook nothing.

AMLASH/1 flew to Paris on 14 September, ostensibly to attend a

meeting of the Alliance Francaise. The trip actually was for an

extended vacation, which AMLASH/1 intended to report to Castro

after the fact.

On 16 September he wrote AMWHIP/l that he did not

"intend to see (be interviewed by) your friend again" referring to

the CIA case officer.

On 3 October 1963 the case officer nevertheless

arrived in Paris to meet with AMLASH/1. Station officers were already

in contact with him, two of whom participated in meetings that followed.

On 11 October the case officer cabled Headquarters reporting that

AMLASH/1 claimed to have the "necessary people and equipment inside

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SECREI

[Cuba] to accomplish overthrow without [U.S.] assistance." AMLASH/1

was reported as wishing a meeting with a senior U.S. official,

preferably Robert F. Kennedy, for assurance of "moral support" for

any action AMLASH/1 undertook in Cuba. The cable recommended that

the request for a meeting:

"be given highest and profound consideration as

feeling drawn by all who in contact AMLASH is that

he determined attempt op against [Castro] with or

without [U.S.] support."

A 21 October cable to Washington reported a 17 October meeting with

AMLASH/1 --"Basically he wants assurance that [U.S.] will support him

if his enterprise is successful." (Emphasis added).

Desmond Fitzgerald, then Chief of the Special Affairs Staff,

was going to Paris on other business and undertook to meet with AMLASH/1.

The plan for the meeting, written in advance, was outlined as follows:

"Fitzgerald will represent self as personal

representative of Robert F. Kennedy who traveled

to Paris for specific purpose of meeting [AMLASH/1]

and giving him assurances of full U.s. support if

there is change of the present government in Cuba."

(Emphasis added) .

On 29 October Fitzgerald met with AMLASH/1 in Paris, representing

himself as

a spokesman of Attorney General Kennedy. The third person

at the meeting was the case officer, who served as an interpreter.

11

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AEd

On 13 November the case officer wrote a memorandum summarizing high-

lights of the meeting. It reads in part as follows:

"Fitzgerald informed [AMLASH/1] that the United

States is prepared to render all necessary

assistance to any anti-communist Cuban group which

succeeds in neutralizing the present Cuban leader-

ship and assumes sufficient control to invite the

United States to render the assistance it is

prepared to give. It was emphasized that the

above support will be forthcoming only after a

real coup has been effected and the group involved

is in a position to request U.S. (probably under

DAS auspices) recognition and support. (Emphasis

added). It was made clear that the U.S. was not

prepared to commit itself to supporting an isolated

uprising, as such an uprising can be extinguished

in a matter of hours if the present government is

still in control in Havana. As for the post-coup

period, the U.S. does not desire that the political

clock be turned back but will support the necessary

economic and political reforms which will benefit

the mass of the Cuban people."

At the time of the CIA Inspector General's report on the subject

in 1967, additional details were elicited from Fitzgerald, who re-

12

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called that AMLASH/1 spoke repeatedly of the need for an assassination

weapon. He wanted a high-power rifle with telescopic sights, or some

other weapon that could be used to kill Castro from a distance. Fitzgerald

stated that he rejected this request. Fitzgerald's Executive Officer,

although not present at the meeting, was kept posted by Fitzgerald and

had a recollection the same as the one noted above. The case officer

is reported as not recalling the exchange on the weapon. His memorandum

stated that:

"Nothing of an operational nature was discussed at

the Fitzgerald meeting. After the meeting [AMLASH/1] stated

that he was satisfied with the policy discussion but now

desired to know what technical support we could provide him."

On 14 November 1963 AMWHIP/1 was met in New York City. He reported

on AMLASH/l's reaction to the 29 October meeting in Paris. The contact

report on what AMLASH/1 understood, as relayed by AMWHIP/1, is as

follows:

"The visit with Fitzgerald, who acted in the

capacity of a representative of high levels of

the Government concerned with the Cuban problem

satisfied [AMLASH/1] as far as policy was con-

cerned, but he was not at all happy with the fact

that he still was not given the technical assistance

for the operational plan as he saw it. [AMWHIP/1]

said that [AMLASH/1] dwelt constantly on this point.

13

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He could not understand why he was denied certain

small pieces of equipment which promised a final

solution to the problem, while, on the other hand,

the U.S. Government gave much equipment and money

to exile groups for their ineffective excursions

against Cuban coastal targets. According to

[AMWHIP/1], [AMLASH/1] feels strongly on this point,

and if he does not get advice and materials from a

U.S. Government technician, he will probably become

fed up again, and we will lose whatever progress we

have made to date."

COMMENT:

At this point it is important to note that Agency

documents summarize what AMLASH/1 was to be told,

and what he was told, which matches a later report

of what he understood. In essence he was told there

would be no U.S. support until after the fact, and then

only if he was successful. While that may not seem a

very realistic way in which to bring about the overthrow

a government, it is directly relevant to the question

of what AMLASH/l was told and what he understood. It is

contrary to the statement in the SSC Final Report (page 18)

to the effect that it was not clear how AMLASH/1 inter-

preted the put-off by Fitzgerald.

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Interesting confirmation of AMLASH/l's understanding

is provided by a July 1964 FBI report (mentioned variously

at pages 35, 72 and 74 of Book V of the SSC Report). This

report was from an FBI informant who stated that AMLASH/1

was unhappy with the CIA response and that Attorney General

Kennedy had refused to support the plan. Given the substance

of this aspect of the report it is apparent that although the

date of the report is June 1964, this particular information

dates back to 29 October 1963 when AMLASH/1 was told by

Fitzgerald, representing himself as speaking for Robert F.

Kennedy, that he would not be given support in this opera-

tion. While this is not the reason the FBI report was cited

in Book V of the SSC Final Report, it provides additional

clear confirmation that AMLASH/1 understood that he had

been turned down at the 29 October meeting.

Following the 14 November meeting with AMWHIP/1 CIA reviewed what

could be done to maintain the contact with AMLASH/1. On 19 November 1963

Fitzgerald "approved telling AMLASH/1 he would be given a cache inside

Cuba.

The cache could, if he requested it, include …..high-power

rifles w/scope..."

On 19 November AMLASH/1 told a CIA officer that he planned to

return to Cuba.

On 20 November Headquarters cabled Paris requesting

that AMLASH/1 "delay departure... (to) permit one more meeting which

AMLASH/1 requested."

On the same day (20 November) in response to

15

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a telephonic request, AMLASH/1 agreed to delay his departure "if it

is something interesting." The case officer told him that "he could not

assure it interesting but that it was to be a meeting which AMLASH

had requested."

The cable reporting this exchange noted that it was

a "rapid conversation" inhibited by the presence of a second person

in the room.

The SSC Final Report (page 19) attempts to expand this brief

and cryptic telephone conversation into the "first indication that he

might receive the specific support he requested." More factually, and

quite significantly,: the Report acknowledges that no specific support

had been offered up to then. Beyond that it is at best a piece of

highly speculative analysis, not supported by the evidence.

The case officer from Washington arrived in Paris the morning of

22 November and met with AMLASH/1 late that afternoon. As they left

the meeting they learned of President Kennedy's assassination. They

probably were meeting when President Kennedy was shot.

Whatever the relationship with AMLASH/1 following the death of

President Kennedy, there is every indication that during President

Kennedy's life AMLASH/l had no basis for believing that he had CIA

support for much of anything. Were he a provocateur reporting to Castro,

or if he was merely careless and leaked what he knew, he had no

factual basis for leaking or reporting any actual CIA plot directed

against Castro.

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SEGRET

II. SPECIFIC SECTIONS OF THE SSC REPORT

Section 1, B

This section of the SSC Final Report, the Summary, states that "it

places particular emphasis on the effect their (the intelligence agencies)

Cuban operations seemed to have on their investigation." It states

that the report "details these operations to illustrate why they were

relevant to the investigation." It states that presentation of the

AMLASH operation is to illustrate why that operation should have been

examined by the Warren Commission.

The view of the Subcommittee, as to why the AMLASH operation

warranted such review, is summarized at page 5 of the Report as

follows:

"The AMLASH plot was more relevant to the Warren

Commission's work than the early CIA assassination

plots with the underworld. Unlike those earlier

plots the AMLASH operation was in progress at the

time of the assassination; unlike the earlier plots,

the AMLASH operation could clearly be traced to CIA;

and unlike the earlier plots, the CIA had endorsed

AMLASH's proposal for a coup, the first step to him

being Castro's assassination, despite Castro's threat

of retaliation for such plotting."

As stated in the preceeding discussion the AMLASH operation was

without substance prior to President Kennedy's death; it is particularly

17

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## Page 100

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unsuited to make the Subcommittee's intended point. It is literally

accurate to note a coincidence in time, of the contacts with AMLASH/1

prior to the death of president Kennedy, but that is all. It is incorrect

to say that "CIA had endorsed AMLASH's proposal." There was no agree-

ment with AMLASH/1, or commitment to him, and even had Castro learned

of the contacts with him there was nothing to learn beyond the fact

of the contact.

The relationship was most tenuous and without any

support promised to him for whatever he planned. Castro's "threat"

--as noted above--must be considered irrelevant to the substantive

nature of the AMLASH relationship at that time.

This viewpoint was conveyed to the Subcommittee prior to publica-

tion of the report. At the same time it was observed that theoretically

there was greater possibility of leaks from the earlier operations

involving the criminal underworld, although there was no known evidence

of such leaks. While general rather than specific, this could have

provided more reasonable support for the Subcommittee's view that there

were CIA operations that should have been reported to the warren Commission.

The SSC Subcommittee saw otherwise, outlining its position at page 68

as follows:

"...it is unlikely that Castro could have

distinguished the CIA plots with the underworld

from those plots not backed by CIA. In fact,

the methods the CIA used in these attempts were

designed to prevent the Cuban government from

attributing them to the CIA."

18

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The result this has on the present comment on the SSC Final

Report may seem anomalous. It places CIA in the position of con-

testing the interpretation given the AMLASH operation in the SSC

Final Report,

and to that extent the thesis that the presentation

was supposed to support. At the same time, however, we are

inclined to acknowledge in principle the possibility--not seriously

considered as a likelihood during the Warren Commission inquiry--

that other operations could have suffered the defects attributed

to the AMLASH operation by the SSC Report. In protesting the

presentation in one instance, and the specific conclusions it seeks

to support, the effect is to disagree with a substantial portion

of the report as written. On the other hand we tend to not contest

a general thesis that more specific attention could have been given

by the Warren Commission to the anti-Castro programs of the U.s.

Government, including CIA activities.

********** * * *

At page 4 of the SSC Final Report Desmond Fitzgerald, in a

meeting with AMLASH/1, is quoted as having:

"stated the United States would support a coup."

Again, at page 19, the report states that Fitzgerald:

"also gave general assurances that the United

States would help in bringing about the coup."

The last version is attributed to the case officer who was present at

the meeting in

1963, in his testimony before the SSC in 1975. This

presentation of the case officer's statements in 1975 does not match

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Melia

the report of the meeting in 1963, which was written by him at the time.

In considering the processes by which this version came into being, it

is noted that the following statement appears at page 87 of the SSC

Interim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots:

"Fitzgerald met AMLASH/1 in late fall 1963 and

promised him that the United States would support

a coup against Castro,"

citing testimony by the case officer who was present at the meeting.

An interesting footnote (#3) on that page reads as follows:

"3.

The contact plan for the proposed meeting

stated: 'Fitzgerald will represent self as personal

representative of Robert F. Kennedy who travelled to

(foreign city) for specific purpose meeting AMLASH/1

and giving him assurances of full support with

a change of the present government in Cuba.'"

(Emphasis added).

The underscored portion--the word "with"--in fact read in the actual

document "if there is." This substitution of language in a purported

quotation may seem only a matter of nuance, but it treats with what

Fitzgerald planned to say, which takes on special significance when

matched with the expressly limited statements that he actually made

(as discussed at pages 11 and 12 of this annex) and what AMLASH/1

understood (as discussed at pages 13-15).

***** * * * **

At page 5 the SSC Final Report quotes officers in CIA responsible

L&SORET,

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for the investigation at the time of the Warren Commission as stating

to the SSC that had they known about the AMLASH operation in 1,963 it

would have affected the investigation. It is only noted that it is

likely that views elicited from CIA employees in 1975 probably were

responsive to representations by SSC staff members as to what the

operation involved, as distinguished from what it actually was.

********* * * * *

At page 24 the SSC Final Report contains the following

statement:

"According to the 1967 Inspector General Report,

CIA Headquarters cabled the AMLASH case officer on

the morning of November 23, and ordered him to break

contact with AMLASH due to the President's assassi-

nation and to return to Headquarters."

This statement is at least a literary extension of the statement of

the IG report, which was in its entirety as follows:

"[The case officer] states that he received an

OPIM cable from Fitzgerald that night or early

the next morning telling him that everything was

off. "

The SSC was unable to get the case officer to support its expansion on

the reference in the 1967 IG report.

His testimony is cited,

apparently despite suggestive prompting, that:

"

.. . he recalled receiving such a cable, but

could not recall whether it made specific mention

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1i.e.21:1

of the President's assassination as the reason for

breaking contact .

1."

It is noted that the cable was never found; it may never have been

sent, being a misrecollection of the case officer. In any event,

the two sources cited in the SSC Report do not support its version.

* * * * * * * * * *

Footnote 30 on page 17 treats the question of the security of the

AMLASH operation. As noted in the above review of the AMLASH operation,

AMLASH/1 was on the record as expressing his disenchantment with the

Castro regime. He had told colleagues of his meetings with AMWHIP/1.

Through sensitive sources we know that other Cubans were aware of his

fulminations against the Castro regime. We do not know, beyond these

generalized statements, what he actually conveyed at that time to what

persons. We do know how little substance there was to his relationships

with CIA during this period, and how little he had to tell others were

he inclined to do so.

Assuming that AMLASH/1 was to attempt to organize a coup, he

obviously had to try and associate himself with people of a like mind.

To crystallize their support he might have felt constrained to convey

assurances of external support. To the extent that he may have, we

do not know whether he would have claimed to have been promised things

that in fact had been denied him. It was not until much later that the

question of security--always a consideration, especially when more than

one person is involved--became a point of sufficient concern for CIA

to break relations with him.

SAT

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SEGRET

Some have speculated that AMLASH/1 was, in some way, Castro's

provocateur. Such a possibility is always a proper subject for

consideration. There are questions that feed the theory, but the

issue remains debatable.

We do not offer an opinion here, although

we do note that he was rewarded strangely if he was. When finally

arrested he served ten years of a thirty-year term. His public trial

did not mention his Agency associations for the period March 1961 to

November 1964. An interesting consideration is that when Castro pro-

vided Senator McGovern with a list of persons the Cubans claimed had the

mission of his assassination, although AMLASH/1 was among those

included, the reported period for his activity also omitted this

earlier period.

********* * * **

At page 26 of the SSC Final Report it is stated that on 24 November

the Mexico Station responded to a Headquarters request for the names

of known contacts of certain Soviet personnel in Mexico City. The SSC

Report acknowledges that the purpose of obtaining these names was to

determine the significance of Oswald's contact with Soviets and to.

assess their activities.

The SSC Report states that:

"AMLASH's real name was included in the list

of names on the Mexico Station cable."

This is used as a basis for a discussion in the SSC Final Report of why

the inclusion of that name in the cable did not lead to the identification

of the AMLASH operation.

The treatment of this point in the SSC Final Report seems to rest

on a misconception of the context in which the name of AMLASH/1 was

mentioned.

The reference had to do with a contact between a member of

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the Soviet embassy and a Cuban cultural attache -- in December 1960 --

about a press conference planned for AMLASH/1 in Mexico City" in

February and March 1961. It was not a report of a contact between

AMLASH/1 and the Soviet, which was the subject of the inquiry; the

name of AMLASH/1 could well have been omitted from the cable. In

any event, the December 1960 date preceded the inauguration of

President Kennedy, which further removes the question from any

relevance to the subject. There was no reason to check the name.

The presentation in the SSC Final Report is confusing and mislead-

ing on this point.

-

* * *

*

* * * **

Page 72 of the SSC Report refers to a July 1964 FBI report con-

cerning a CIA meeting with AMLASH. The SSC Report states "that the

purpose of those meetings had been to plan the assassination of

Castro." This is the same FBI report that helped confirm the

earlier turn-down of AMLASH/1 at the 29 October 1963 meeting (pages

14 and 15, this paper). While it stated that "there is now under

discussion some plan to kill Fidel Castro" (July 1964) it badly

mixes times and events. In any event, this aspect of the report

substantially post-dates the death of President Kennedy, and is

not directly relevant to the Warren Commission inquiry.

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******* * * * * * *

At page 75, the SSC Final Report quotes the testimony of the Chief,

SAS Counterintelligence. His recollections are very uncertain. He

is quoted specifically as saying that he could not recall the exact

time frame, which is central to analysis of the operation, and speaks

of his "vague recollections" that the Fitzgerald meeting was related

to an assassination plot against Castro. The SSC Report nevertheless

gives this opinion

full play despite the extensive qualification as to

its reliability.

******* * * * * * *

At pages 68-75 of Book V of the SSC Final Report, consideration

is given to what was known of the AMLASH operation by certain CIA

employees, how they understood it, and what conclusions they could or

should have drawn from what they knew. The treatment seems to accept

as a premise that the relationship was an assassination plot throughout,

and overlooks the basically inchoate quality of the relationship with

AMLASH/l during the period in question.

There will always be uncertainties in the developing relationship

with political action assets; that such was the case with AMLASH/1 is

noted in the discussion above.

In the present instance the uncertainties

were recognized and clearly recorded, as well as the limits placed on

positions that would be and were taken with AMLASH/1. It is important

to keep this in mind in considering the testimony of witnesses, as

presented in the SSC Final Report.

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Different witnesses before the SSC would obviously view the AMLASH

affair in different lights, the basis for their understanding relating

to different levels of knowledge at different periods in time.

what

did they know in 1963, and what more did they learn under what circum-

stances at a later date? What they testified to in 1975--perhaps

on the basis of representations by SSC staff members as to what it

was--required quite a clear and precise treatment. The SSC Final

Report did not accord the subject that treatment.

***** * * * * *

At pages 78, 79 and 105 of the SSC Final Report reference is made

to a Cuban exile designated as "A," who informed the FBI and CIA in

mid-1965 of activities of AMLASH/1 in Cuba to eliminate Castro, and

of his involvement with CIA. A careful reading of the SSC Report made

it clear that "A" was unaware of AMLASH/l's 1963 associations with CIA.

This information, reported in the context of the badly blurred

time frame of the SSC Final Report, was given a significance that it

did not otherwise have. First, the information was a year and a half

after the death of President Kennedy. Further, the informant had no

knowledge of the earlier period of CIA-AMLASH/1 relationships. When

this is placed alongside the clear record of the inconclusive nature

of the relationships in the 1963 period, it becomes something of an

irrelevancy.

It is noted that a footnote in the SSC Report, at this

point, records the fact that the book of material given to Senator

McGovern by Castro on persons who allegedly had plotted his

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assassination also contained no reference to that period, although

AMLASH/l's later activities were cited.

********** * * * *.

It is useful to recap the sequence of events. The record shows

that initially there was uncertainty as to what AMLASH/1 represented

as a potential asset. There was early consideration of his defection,

which changed to his possible use for intelligence purposes. As his

self-discipline was assessed as being inadequate for this task it was

determined that it was best for him to go it alone, developing his

own organization for whatever followed. The reservations that were

held concerning his qualities were reflected in the specifically

conditional arms-length position taken with him during the period

preceding President Kennedy's death. He had to succeed with his

own program before he could expect support from the U.s.

Eventually -- but not until after the death of President

Kennedy -- firmer indications of support were offered. Even then

the volume of equipment promised was not large, especially to a

man who claimed to have the "necessary people and equipment inside

[Cuba] to accomplish (the) overthrow ..." The nature of the

relationship never did firm up. As late as the fall of 1964

(page 77, Book V of the SSC Final Report) CIA was telling AMLASH/1

that it could not be associated with his concept of the first step

of a coup, which he viewed as requiring the death of Castro. While

one can reason that any association with AMLASH/1 included

association with all his plans, it nevertheless appears that those

directly involved structured their thinking differently.

91732 1

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BIOMEI

The Inspector General's report in 1967 treated the AMLASH

operation in its study of assassination, as did the SSC Interim

Report on Alleged Assassination Plots. At the time of the 1967 IG

report there was no issue of how to characterize the operation at

different times, and the question was not addressed. Facing that

question now, it is clear that however the operational relationship

developed after the death of President Kennedy, it was unformed and

without substance during his life. During that time it was not an

assassination plot. The treatment of this question in the SSC

Report is both imprecise and misleading.

28

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MATERIALS FORWARDED TO WARREN COMMISSION AND

-

FBI

m

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## Page 112

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Volume V of the SSC Final Report conveys an impression of

limited effort by CIA in the course of the Warren Commission

inquiry. As is noted in other annexes to the present report,

CIA did seek and collect information in support of the efforts

of the Warren Commission. Additionally, it conducted studies and

submitted special analyses and reports.

The following pages list reports and other papers submitted

to the FBI (which had primary responsibility for the investigation)

and to the Warren Commission. It is felt that this compilation

is appropriate to consideration of the extent of the CIA effort,

to the extent that it reveals something of the results of that

effort.

The lists fall into the following sections:

E.l Dissemination to the Intelligence Community

E.2 Dissemination of Information to the Warren Commission

E.3 Disseminations to the FBI on Rumors and Allegations

E.4 Memoranda to Warren Commission

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AGENCY SUPPORT TO THE FBI AND THE WARREN COMMISSION

2223311

AGENCY DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION TO THE INTELLIGENCE

COMMUNITY (FORMAL AND INFORMAL DISSEMINATIONS)

I

II

#10 October 1963

DIR 74673

III

(WH/3/Mexico)

"On 1 October 1963, a reliable and sensitive source

Recipients: FBI, I&NS, Navy, State. [Warren Com-

*24 October 1963

DIR 77978

(WH/3/Mexico)

_ Request for two copies of most recent photograph of

Lee Harvey OSWALD

Recipients: Navy.

[Warren Commission]

23 November 1963

DIR 34915

(WH/3)

Information relating to telephone call on 28 Sep-

tember 1963 to Soviet Embassy in Mexico City.

Recipient: FBI

I

- Document Date

- Document Number

III - Originating Office

- An asterisk indicates that the document was also made available

to the Warren Commission.

SECRET

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SECRET

24 November 1963

TDCS-3/565,829

Subject: Cuban Precautions following Assassination of

President Kennedy.

Recipients: State/INR, State/DIR, DIA, Army/ACSI, Navy,

Air, JCS,

SECDEF, NSA, NIC, AID, USIA, OCI, ONE, OCR,

ORR, 00, EXO.

25 November 1963

DIR 84950

(WH/3/Mexico)

Subject: Silvia T. DURAN, Mexican Employee of the

Cuban Embassy [sic - Consulate, in Mexico City;

Contact with Lee Harvey OSWALD.

Recipient: FBI.

25 November 1963

DIR 84951

(CI/SIG)

Agency requests information relating to OSWALD's

Activities in Mexico City.

Recipient: FBI

26 November 1963

CSCI-

(WE/BC)

Subject: Reported Anonymous Telephone Message.

Recipient:

FBI.

26 November 1963

(WH/3)

CSCI-3/778,826

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD, Suspected Assassin of

3 October 1963.

Recipient: FBI.

26 November 1963

CSCI-3/778,829

(WH/3)

Lee Harvey OSWALD, Suspected Assassin of

President Kennedy.

(Encloses transcripts of tele-

phone calls made by OSWALD or concerning OSWALD

between 27 September and 3 October 1963).

This dissemination may be identical with

CSCI-3/778,826. The above CSCI number appears

be the correct one, according to a copy of the

Recipient in F8/SIG file No. 568.

Recipient:

2

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26 November 1963

DIR 85069

(WH/3)

Subject: Travel of Pro-Communist Costa Rican Congress-

man to Texas on 26 November 1963.

Recipient: FBI

*26 November 1963

DIR 85089

(C/WH/3)

Gilberto ALVARADO, a professed Castroite Nicaraguan,

stated to U.S. Embassy in Mexico City on 26 November

1963 that "on 18 September 1963 he saw Lee Harvey

OSWALD receive six thousand five hundred dollars ir

Receiven on: are, ant so on Secre Service

26 November 1963

DIR 85176

(WH/3)

Subject: Marina Nikolaeva OSWALD (information volun-

teered on Marina OSWALD by Moroccan student Mohamed

REGGAB studying in West Germany).

FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

=

26 November 1963

DIR 85177

(WH/3/Mexico)

Subject: Telephone communication between Cuban President

DORTICOS and Joaquin HERNANDEZ Armas, Cuban Ambassadro to

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service re-

ceived copy.

26 November 1963

Unnumbered

(CI/SIG)

Subject: HUNTER Report No. 10815.

Recipient: FBI.

26 November 1963

Unnumbered

(CI/SIG)

Subject: HUNTER Report No. 10816.

Recipient:

FBI.

3

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SEGRET

27 November 1963

CSCI-3/778,881

(WH/3/Mexico)

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD, Soviet Activities in

Mexico City, 18 - 24 November 1963.

Recipient:

*27 November 1963

DIR 85182

(WH/3/Mexico)

receive copy ren come trouse; secret service

27 November 1963

DIR 85195

(C/WH/3)

United States Ambassador to Mexico requests passage

of message to Secretary of State RUSK, Mr. MCCONE:

and Mr. HOOVER.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy.

27 November 1963

DIR 85196

(C/WH/3)

According to information from Nicaraguan Security

service, Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte was a Nicaragua

intelligence source from 1962 to August 1963

Recipients:

FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy.

*27 November 1963

DIR 85199

(WH/3/Mexico)

Information solicited from Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte.

Recipients:

tS: FBI, State, Commissiouse; Secret Service

27 November 1963

DIR 85222

(WH/3/Mexico)

Subject:

Suban Embassy isic - ConsuMeet in Mexico of the

contact of Lee Harvey OSWALD.

Recipient:

FBI.

4

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27 November 1963

DIR 85246

(WH/3)

Dr. Jose GUILLERMO Aguirre of Mexico reports information

State, White House; Secret Service

Receiven So, State layed to see picted Sere Fel

received copy.

by CI Staff on 27 November 1963.)

27 November 1963

DIR 85471

(C/WH/3)

Subject: Rearrest of Silvia DURAN.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House.

27 November 1963

DIR 85573

(WH/3/Mexico)

Information from U.S. Ambassador MANN for Secretary

of State RUSK regarding Ambassador HERNANDEZ, Cuban

Ambassador to Mexico, and Gilberto ALVARADO.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House.

27 November 1963

Unnumbered

(CI/SIG)

Information on Ernesto RODRIGUEZ relayed by tele-

phone to S. PAPICH.

Recipient: FBI.

27 November 1963

Unnumbered

(CI/SIG)

Information regarding photographic coverage of

Cuban and Soviet Embassies in Mexico City passed

to S. PAPICH of the FBI.

Recipient: FBI.

27 November 1963

Unnumbered

(CI/SIG)

Telephone contact with S. PAPICH with regard to

OSWALD's presence in New Orleans in September 1963.

Recipient:

28 November 1963

DIR 85657

(C/WH/3)

On 26 November 1963 a British journalist named John

WILSON-HUDSON gave information to the American Em-

bassy in London indicating that an "American gangster-

type named RUBY" visited Cuba around 1959.

Recipients:

FBI, State, White House.

5

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*28 November 1963

DIR 85662

(C/WH/3)

Further interrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte.

Recipients:

Commission]

FBI, State, White House.

[Warren

*28 November 1963

DIR 85665

(C/WH/3)

State, White House; Secret Servic

eceived copy. [Warren Commission]

29 November 1963

CSCI-3/778,893

(WH/3/Mexico)

Subject: Interrogation of Silvia Tirado de DURAN

and Horacio DURAN Navarro.

Recipient: FBI.

*29 November 1963

DIR 85666

interrogation and investigation.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House. [Warren Com-

mission]

29 November 1963

DIR 85668

(WH/3/Mexico)

Highlights from interrogation of Horacio DURAN Navarro

and his wife, Silvia Tirado de DURAN.

FBI, State, White House-

*29 November 1963

DIR 85670

(C/WH/3)

Sensitive sources... have reported that when the

23 November arrest of Silvia DURAN became known to

the personnel of the Cuban Embassy there was a

great deal of discussion.

FBI, State, White House.

[Warren

ommission

6

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SECRET.

29 November 1963

DIR 85676

(WH/3/Mexico)

Subject: Travel of Soviet diplomatic couriers.

Recipient: FBI.

*29 November 1963

DIR 85691

(C/WH/3)

Se hang else to ape boat out pot to o

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy.

29 November 1963

DIR 85714

(C/WH/3)

Release of Silvia DURAN for second time on

8 November.

lecipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Servic

received copy.

*29 November 1963

DIR 85715

(WH/3/Mexico)

Subject: Travel of Lee Harvey OSWALD (October 1959

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy.

29 November 1963

DIR 85744

(C/WH/3)

Interrogation of Gilbert ALVARADO Ugrate.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy.

*29 November 1963

DIR 85758

(WH/3/Mexico)

Translation of interrogation of Silvia DURAN and

Horacio DURAN Navarro.

ecipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Servic

received copy.

y. State, hits touse Secret Service

7

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*29 November 1963

DIR 85770

(C/WH/3)

Series of incidents which have produced a report alleging

advance information on assassination.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service re-

ceived copy. [Warren Commission]

29 November 1963

Unnumbered Memorandum

(CI/SIG)

Telephone contact with S. PAPICH concerning rumor that

Oswald had made a bank deposit.

29 November 1963

Unnumbered Memorandum

(CI/SIG)

Suggestio that few check all ba reacounts and sector's

deposit records in New Orleans, Fort Worth, and Dallas.-

30 November 1963

CSCI-3/778/894

*30 November 1963

DIR 86063

(C/WH/3)

elberto ALVARADo Starte ahmies his storar fa commissi

I Warren Commission

3 December 1963

DIR 86496

(C/WH/3)

nformation relating to OSWALD's presence in Mexico

ecipient: FBI

*4 December 1963

DIR 86702

(C/WH/3)

Travel information regarding OSWALD and his wife,

June 1962.

recipients: B state Commissiouse; Secret Service

received copy.

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5 December 1963

DIR 87189

(C/WH/3)

Known Soviet intelligence officer in New Delhi

emanding full probe into assassination

ecipients: FBI. State. White House

*6 December 1963

DIR 87520

(C/WH/3)

Correction of DIR 87502.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy. [Warren Commission]

*7 December 1963

DIR 87667

(C/WH/3/)

Reinterrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO concluded.

Recipient: FBI. Warren Commission)

9 December 1963

DIR 87731

(WH/ 3/Mexico)

Richard BEYMER, American movie actor, in touch with

Cuban Embassy,

Mexico City.

Recipient: FBI.

*9 December 1963

DIR 87796

(WH/3)

Letter mailed in Stockholm on 25 November 1963

alleging assassination arranged by Communist

Chinese.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy. [Warren Commission]

9 December 1963

Unnumbered Memorandum (CI/SIG)

Telephone contact with S. PAPICH regarding identity

of a source who claims plot to assassinate Kennedy

prepared and executed jointly by the Communist

Chinese and Cubans through intermediaries.

(See

JMWAVE 8658 IN 75902) .

Recipient:

FBI.

11 December 1963

TDCSDB 3/658,408

Subject: Comments of Soviet official regarding

(a) Moscow views on international situation

following death of President Kennedy, and (b)

resumption of disarmament talks.

Recipients: General distribution.

9

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12 December 1963

CSCI-3/779,048

(C/WH/3)

subject: WILSON, Carlos John (also: HILSON-HUDSON

lohn; WILSON, John Hudson.

Recipient: FBI.

*12 December 1963

DIR 88643

Subject: Letter Relative to Assassination of Presi-

dent Kennedy Sent to United States Embassy in Costa

mistrents: F81, State, White Hause, Earren Com

12 December 1963

DIR 88682

(C/WH/3)

Cuban Ambassador to France received instructions not

to comment upon the assassination.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House.

12 December 1963

DIR 88747

(C/WH/3)

Subject: Second Interrogation of Silvia DURAN.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House.

*73 December 1963

CSCI-3/779,136

(C/WH/3)

Subject: Mexican Interrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO.

Recipient: FBI. [Warren Commission]

16 December 1963

CSCI-3/779,135

(C/WH/3)

Subject: Peter DERYABIN's Comments on Kennedy

Assassination.

Recipient: FBI.

*18 December 1963

DIR 89970

(C/WH/3)

Further information on Richard Thomas GIBSON.

ecipients: FBI

received copy.

state, comite house; Secret Service

10

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*18 December 1963

DIR 89980

Subject: Actions of Silvia DURAN after her first

interrogation.

Recipien sopy. atree Contes House; Secret Service

19 December 1963

CSCI-3/779,225

Subject: Nomenclature of Weapon Possibly Owned by

Lee Harvey OSWALD.

Recipient: FBI.

19 December 1963

CSDB-3/658,870

(WH/Reports)

Subject: a.

Disagreements between Fidel CASTRO and -

Rauo ROA y Garcia.

Probable Future Plan of Action for

Carlos RAFAEL Rodriguez.

Recipients: State (Miami) and others (not identified.

27 December 1963

CSCI-3/779,297

Subject: Assassination of President Kennedy (arranged

by the Cuban Government and the Communist Chinese).

Recipient: FBI.

3 January 1964

Unnumbered Memorandum (CI/SIG)

Telephone contact with S. PAPICH on 3 January 1964

regarding newspaper article appearing in El Caribe

on 27 November 1963 and possible connection with

ALVARADO's interview in the U.S. Embassy on 26 November.

Recipient: FBI.

*10

January 1964

CSCI-3/779,482

(WH/3/Mexico)

Subject:

Second Mexican Interrogation of Silvia DURAN.

Recipient: FBI.

[Warren Commission]

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## Page 124

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14 January 1964

CSCI-3/779,510

(CI/SIG)

ubject: Assassination of President John F. Kennedy

Regarding liaison with FBI and latter's handling o

information from CIA.)

27 January 1964

CSCI-3/779,729

(CI/SIG)

Subject:

Possible Relatives of Marina Nikolayevna

Recipient: FBI.

30 January 1964

CSCI-3/779,814

(CI/SIG)

Subject: Jack L. RUBY, Lee Harvey OSWALD.

Recipient: FBI.

4 February 1964

CSCI-3/779,817

(SR/CI/R)

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. (Information on names,

addresses, and telephone numbers relating to the

Recipient: FBI.

18 February 1964

DDP 4-0860

Memorandum for the Director, Federal Bureau of

Investigation. Subject: Assassination of John F.

Kennedy.

Recipient: FBI. [Copy to Warren Commission]

18 February 1964

DDP 4-0861

Memorandum for the Director, Federal Bureau of

Investigation.

Subject: Assassination of

President John F. Kennedy.

Recipient:

FBI.

[Copy to Warren Commission]

18 February 1964

DDP 4-0862

Memorandum

Service.

subrethe hisassinatio softer secret

Subject:

12

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John F. Kennedy. (Verification of entry in "Historic "

Diary" relating to OSWALD's attempted suicide.)

Recipient: Secret Service. [Copy to Warren Commission]

18 February 1964

DDP 4-0864

Memorandum for Mr. Thomas L. Hughes, The Director of

Intelligence and Research, Department of State.

subject: Assas nation of preorte Darn F. Kennedy -

"Historic Diary'

Recipient: State. [Copy to Warren Commission]

20 February 1964

CSCI-3/779,988

(SR/CI/R)

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. (Information regarding

SETYAEVA and RAHM.)

Recipient: FBI.

22 February 1964

DIR 03101

(C/WH/3)

Subject: Further Information Provided by Moroccan

Student Mohamed REGGAB.

Recipient: White House attention Secret Service.

11 March 1964

CSCI-3/780,344

ubject: Summary of Findings in Regard to Allegatior

y Mohamed REGGAB Relative to Marina OSWALD

Recipient: FBI.

20 March 1964

CSCI-3/780,612

(SR/CI/R)

(botograph sassinandivid President desembi Kennedy.

OSWALD).

Recipient:

16 April 1964

CSCI-3/780,996

(SR/CI/R)

Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO.

Recipient: FBI.

20 April 1964

CSDB-3/660,704

Subject: Plans by British and French to Publish

BUCHANAN Articles on Assassination.

Recipient: FBI (?)

13

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SECT

22 April 1964

CSCI -3/780,881

(SR/CI /R)

Subject: Assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

(Information regarding Lydia DYMITRUK.)

Recipient:

FBI.

30 April 1964

Unnumbered Memorandum

(CI /SIG)

lelephone Contact with S

of Security for information.

8 May 1964

11 May 1964

13 May 1964

15 May 1964

DDP 4-2351

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

Marina OSWALD's Notebook.

Recipient:

Copy of attachment forwarded to FBI.

CSCI -3/781,172

-

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD.

Traces on Soviet names,

addresses, and telephone numbers from an address book

belonging to Marina OSWALD.)

Recipient: FBI.

CSCI -3/781,282

(SR/CI /R)

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD: (Identification

of photographs sent to ClA by FBl.)

Recipient: FBI.

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Role of Cuban Intelligence Service in

Processing Visa Applicants; Reaction of that service

to the Assassination of President Kennedy.

14

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13 May 1964

CSCI-3/781,351

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD's Access to Classified

Information about the U-2.

Recipient: FBI. [Warren Commission - DDP 4-2444]

19 May 1964

CSCI-3/781,386

Subject: Paul DIMITRIK (aka Pavel DIMITRUK).

Recipient: Navy.

5 June 1964

CSCI-3/781,543

(CI/R&A)

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. (Use of Machine Colla-

tion Program to Check Out Cubans Mentioned in Letter

of 27 November 1963 from Mario del ROASRIA Milina.

(CI/R&A)

10 June 1964

29 June 1964

CSCI-3/781,841

Subject: Information Concerning Jack Ruby.

Recipient: FBI.

2 July 1964

6 July 1964

CSCI-3/782,058

lemorandum from Richard HELMS

in Tangier, Morocco.

Recipient:

FBI. [Warren Commission]

DDP 4-3401

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD.

Recipient: Copy to FBI.

DDP 4-3470

Recipient: Copy to FBI.

15

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27 August 1964

CSCI-316/00856-64

Subject: No Indication of Subject's Defection Having

Been Used for Propaganda by the Soviet Union.

Recipient: FBI.

3 September 1964

DDP 4-4600

1 October 1964

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: OSWALD Documents Supplied by the Cuban

сіртеле: Сору to гел

DDP 4-5110

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Joachim JOESTEN.

Recipient: Copy to FBI.

6 October 1964

CSCI-316/01446-64

suaret: On seven Photographs romerten bey die itis

Recipient: FBI.

23 October 1964

CSCI-316/01709-64

Subject: Raymond F. FRIESECKE.

Recipient:

FBI.

2 November 1964

CSCI-316/01779-64

Subject: Testimony in the Warren Commission Report in

the Assassination of President Kennedy.

Recipient:

FBI.

23 December 1964

CSCI-316/02545-64

Subject: Allegation of Unidentified

Scientist of

Cuban Involvement in Assassination.

Recipient:

FBI.

16

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SECRET

2 March 1965

CSCI-316/00925-65

Subject: Marvin KANTOR, Possible Connection with Investi-

gation of Lee Harvy and Marina OSWALD.

8 April 1965

CSCI-316/01398-65

Subject:

Correspondence to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico

keipient: FBI. [Copy to Secret Servicel

30 June 1965

CSCI-316/02654-65

Subject: Silvia DURAN.

Recipient: FBI.

2 September 1966

CSCI-316/04482-66

Subject: Rima ZMITROOK, Lee Harvey OSWALD's Intourist

Guide in Moscow.

Recipient: FBI.

9 May 1967

CSCI-316/02153-67

possession.

Recipient: FBI.

14 June 1967

CSCI-316/02669-67

Allegations of Unidentified Woman Regarding

Recipient:

17

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24 July 1967

CSCI-316/03243-67

Subject: Allegation of Oscar COUNTRERAS, Mexican newsman,

hat OSWALD visited UNAM Campus shortly after the Cuba

mbassy refused him a visa to visit Cuba. CONTRERAS

statement of dubious credibility; information passed to

Mexican authorities.

Recipient:

FBI.

7 May 1968

CSCI-316/01678-68

Subassina Pro conspiracy era tir written ind the Alleged

Joachim JOESTEN in Support of District Attorney Jim

GARRISON's Allegations.

Recipient: FBI.

16 September 1969

CSCI-316/03323-69

Subject: Charles William THOMAS.

Recipient: FBI.

DISSEMINATION OF REPORTS TO CI STAFF

Since CI Staff held the Agency's official file on OSWALD,

all cable traffic (theoretically) including disseminations by

cable was sent to the Staff for filing in the official file. Ad-

ditionally, cables disseminations were released by cl/Liaison.

Copies were, therefore, available to the Staff.

Since CI Staff released all long-form CSCI's, coordinated

on short-form CSCI's, and maintained the CSCI log, the CI Staff

received copies of all CSCI's.

13 December 1963

DISSEMINATION OF MATERIAL TO THE WARREN COMMISSION

[Commission Document No. 100]

Memorandum

Subject: Analysis of World Reaction to President

Kennedy's Assassination.

(Supplied by A. W. DULLES.)

18

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21 January 1964

[Commission Document No. 300]

Note men Richard Helen Soviet statements IN.

Lee Harvey OSWALD.

b. FBIS-28 on OSWALD case.

21 January 1964

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

ubject: Draft Questions for Submiss10

to the

overnment of the Soviet Union

22 January 1964

[Commission Document No. 691]

25 January 1964

[Commission Document No. 321]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Chronology of Lee Harvey OSWALD's Stay in

Alphabetical List of Persons in the Soviet

Union Who Were Known to or Mentioned by

Lee Harvey OSWALD or His Wife.

31 January 1964

[Commission Document No. 347]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Information Developed by CIA on the Activity

of Lee Harvey OSWALD in Mexico City, 28 September - 3

5 February 1964

5 February 1964

Note from Thomas H. KARAMESSINES to J. Lee RANKIN.

Fourteen attachments including recent Soviet State-

ments on Lee Harvey OSWALD (as of 5 February 1964).

[Commission Document No. 361]

a summary biography of Mrs. OSWALD and her relatives.

19

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8 February 1964

[Commission Docjment No. 1182]

Letter from Thomas H. KARAMESSINES, ADDP, to J. Lee

RANKIN regarding Soviet weapon mentioned in one of

Lee Harvey OSWALD's documents.

[Information passed to FBI.]

18 February 1964

Memorandum for the Director, Federal Bureau of Investi-

gation, attention Mr. S. J. PAPICH. Subject: Assassi-

nation of President John F. Kennedy. (Request for

information which might be helpful in interpreting

available materials relating to OSWALD's activities

abroad.)

[Copy to Warren Commission.]

18 February 1964

DDP 4-0860

Memorandum for the Director, Federal Bureau of Investi-

Pati to sui erect a act do roma toss -

18 February 1964

DDP 4-0861

yaran untent on irector, Alderal Sureact: Assassi -

• S. J. PAPICH. Subject: Assassi-

nation of President John F. Kennedy.

of 47 photographs found among the effects of Lee Harvey

OSWALD.)

[Copy to Warren Commission.]

18 February 1964

DDP 4-0862

Memorandum for the Chief, United States Secret Service;

suicide.

[Copies

to Warren Commission and the FBI.]

20

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18 February 1964

DDP 4-0864

Memorandum for Mr. Thomas L. HUGHES, The Director of

Intelligence and Research,

Department of State.

Subject: Assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

(Verification of Entry in "Historic Diary".)

[Copies to Warren Commission and the FBI.]

19 February 1964

[Commission Document No. 384]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

(TS No. 187908.)

Subject:

Information Developed by

ClAy, serencervie to flee Hay, SALO in Mexico

19 February 1964

DDP 4-4581

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Cuban Consulate and Embassy in Mexico City.

*21 February 1964

DDP 4-0940 [Commission Document No. 426]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Translations of Interrogations

Reports of

Silvia DURAN.

Attachments: OUT Telegram No. 85758, 29 November 1963.

Transiation of Interrogation of silvia

DIRAN and Horacio DURAN Navarro.

CSCI-3/779,482 of 10 January 1964. Trans-

lation of Official Mexican Polic Report

on the Second Interrogation of Silvia

DURAN.

5 March 1964

DDP 4-1171

[Commission Document No. 448]

*6 March 1964

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Sybject med REGGAR Relative so MaRena d tALA!

• in Reaard to Alledations

DDP 4-1224

[Commission Document No. 692]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Lee Harvey OSwALD Prior to November 22, 1963.

Information in CIA's Possession Regarding

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18 March 1964

DDP 4-1423

[Commission Document No. 528]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Article Alleging that OSWALD was Interviewed

by CIA in Moscow.

24 March 1964

DDP 4-1555

[Commission Document No. 674]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Information Disseminated to the Secret

Service but not yet made available to the President's

*24 March 1964

DDP 4-1554

[Commission Document No. 631]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. -

Subject: CIA Dissemination of Information on Lee

Harvey OSWALD, Dated 10 October 1963.

Attachments: OUT Message No. 74673, dated 10 October

1963.

OUT Message No. 77978, dated 23 October

1963.

25 March 1964

DDP 4-1576

Note from Richard HELMS to J. Lee RANKIN.

Attachment: Five copies of "Rumors about Lee Harvey

OSWALD", dated 23 March 1964.

27 March 1964

DDP 4-1606

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to Thomas L. HUGHES,

Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of

Sarge, Su artin Confication of ere i

Verification of Entry in "Historic

*31 March 1964

DDP 4-16,55

[Commission Document No. 698]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Reports on Activities and Travel of Lee

Harvey OSWALD and Marina Nikolevna OSWALD.

Attachments: OUT Message No. 86702, 4 December 1963,

22

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to the White House, the Department of State, and the

Federal Bureau of Investigation, with copy to the

Secret Service.

OUT Message No. 97520, dated 6 December

1963, to the White House, the Department of State,

and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with copy to

the Secret Service.

OUT Message No. 85715, dated 29 November

1963, to the White House, the Department of State, and

the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with copy to the

Secret Service.

OUT Message No. 85182, dated 22 November

1963, to the White House, the Department of State, and

the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with copy to the -

Secret Service.

OUT Message No. 85665, dated 28 November

1963, to the White House, the Department of State, and

the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with copy to the

Secret Service.

*3 April 1964

DDP 4-1699 [Commission Document No. 710]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Richard Thomas GIBSON.

Attachment: OUT Message No. 89970, dated 18 December

1963, to White House, Department of State, and the

Federal Bureau of Investigation, with a copy to the

Secret Service.

6 April 1964

DDP 4-1739 [Commission Document No. 708]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

randent dated ly tahitians Contataid questions Pos

"Certain Questions Posed

by the State Department Files")

7 April 1964

DDP 4-1787

[Commission Document No. 726]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Actions of Silvia DURAN After Her First

Interrogation.

23

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7 April 1964

DDP 4-1786

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Mohammed REGGAB.

20 April 1964

DDP 4-1997

[Commission Document No. 817]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: BND Report Pertaining to Allegations Con-

cerning Anton ERDINGER.

21 April 1964

BUCHANAN Articles on Assassination of President

-

Kennedy.)

24 April 1964

DDP 4-2099 [Commission Document No. 844]

29 April 1964

4 May 1964

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN:

Subject: Lydia DIMYTRUK; Acquaintance of Marina OSWALD.

DDP 4-2160 [Commission Document No. 871]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

SUBJECT: Photograph of Lee Harvey OSWALD.

DDP 4-2256

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, tO J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Additional Information on Lee Harvey OSWALD.

6 May 1964

DDP 4-2296

[Commission Document No. 902]

8 May 1964

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Criteria for Dissemination of Information to

the Secret Service; Recommendations of the central

Intelligence Agency Relative to Presidential Protection.

[Commission Document No. 911]

DDP 4-2351

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Marina OSWALD's Notebook.

24

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13 May 1964

DDP 4-2444

[Commission Document No.* 931]

Memorandum for the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD's Access to Classified Informa-

tion about the U-2.

[CSCI-3/781,351 - copy to Warren Commission]

15 May 1964

[Commission Document No. 935]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Role of the Cuban Intelligence

• Service in

Processing Visa Applicants; Reaction of that Service

to the Assassination of President Kennedy.

[Copy to FBI]

19 May 1964

DDP 4-2533

[Commission Document No. 944]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Hours of Work at Cuban and Soviet Consulates;

Procedures and Regulations for Issuance of Cuban Visas;

Mexican Control of U.S. Citizens' Travel to and from

Cuba.

*19 May 1964

DDP 4-2534 [Commission Document No. 943]

Memorandum from Rixhard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Allegations of Pfc. Eugene B. DINKIN, U.S.

Army, Relative to Assassination Plot Against Presi-

Attachment: OUT Message No. 85770, dated 29 November

1963, to the White House, State Department, and the

Federal Bureau of Investigation, with a copy to the

*22 May 1964

DDP 4-2624

[Commission Document No. 971]

Subject:

Attachment: of Presage to. 3e9Y: dated 29 November

to the White House, Department of State, and

the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with a copy to

the Secret Service.

25

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27 May 1964

DDP 4-2688

[Commission Document No." 985]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Letter Accusing the Chinese Communists of

Plotting the Assassination of President Kennedy.

Attachment: OUT Message No. 87796, dated 9 December

to the White House, Department of State, anc

the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with a copy to

the Secret Service.

27 May 1964

DDP 4-2692

[Commission Document No. 990]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Discussion between Chairman KHRUSHCHEV and

Mr. Drew PEARSON Regarding Lee Harvey OSWALD.

1 June 1964

DDP 4-2747 [Commission Document No. 1000]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte.

Attachments: OUT Message No. 85089, dated 26 November

1963, relative to Gilberto ALVARADO.

OUT Message No. 85199, dated 27 November

1963; subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD.

OUT Message No. 85662, dated 28 November

1963, relative to Gilberto ALVARADO.

OUT Message No. 86063, dated 30 November

1963, relative to Gilberto ALVARADO.

OUT Message No. 85666, dated 28 November

1963, relative to Gilberto ALVARADO.

OUT Message No. 87667, dated 7 December

1963; subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD

Memorandum, dated 12 December 1963

subject: Mexican Interrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO.

3 June 1964

DDP 4-2764

[Commission Document No. 1001]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Documents on Lee Harvey OSWALD Furnished by

the Soviet Government.

3 June 1964

DDP 4-2770

[Commission Document No. 1012]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject. George and Jeanne de MOHRENSCHILDT.

26

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4 June 1964

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Information Developed on

the Activity of Lee

Harvey OSWALD in Mexico City.

5 June 1964

10 June 1964

DDP 4-2844

[Commission Document No. 1041]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Allegations Regarding Intelligence Training

School in Minsk, USSR.

DDP 4-2922 [Commission Document No. 1054]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Information Concerning Jack RUBY (aka Jack

RUBENSTEIN) and His Associates.

-

#12 June 1964

DDP 4-2988 [Commission Document No. 1089]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Letter Relative to Assassination of President

Kennedy Sent to United States Embassy in Costa Rica.

Attachment: OUT Message No. 88643, dated 12 December

rede, to the white vest, ationtment of State, and the

19 June 1964

DDP 4-3169 [Commission Document No. 1131]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS,_ DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

Soviet Brainwashing

Techniques.

26 June 1964

DDP 4-3366

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

Soviet Brainwashing Techniques

29 June 1964

DDP 4-3347

[Commission Document No. 1188]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP: to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Investigation of Allegation that OSWALD was

in Tangier, Morocco.

[Copy to the FBI.]

27

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1 July 1964

2 July 1964

6 July 1964

DDP 4-3389

[Commission Document No." 1201]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD's Arrival Time in Helsinki

on 10 October 1959.

DDP 4-3401

[Commission Document No. 1216]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD (Remarks by Soviet Consul

Pavel Antonovich YATSKOV).

[Copy to the FBI.]

DDP 4-3470 [Commission Document No. 1222]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. *

and the Assassination of President Kennedy.

22 July 1964

DDP 4-3712 [Commission Document No. 1273]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

subject: Apparent Inconsistencle.

in Material Fur-

lished the Commission by CIA and the Department o

State.

23 July 1964

DDP 4-3769 [Commission Document No. 1287]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD.

Attachment: Affidavit respecting origin and circum-

stances of a photograph of an unknown individual

furnished by this Agency to the FBI on 22 November

23 July 1964

DDP 4-3770

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD.

Attachments:

Translation (original documents included.)

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31 July 1964

7 August 1964

28 August 1964

31 August 1964

3 September 1964

DDP 4-3916 [Commission Document No." 1358]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Length of Time Required for Obtaining Soviet

Tourist Visas in Helsinki and Stockholm, 1964.

DDP 4-4037 [Commission Document No. 1356]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Soviet Hunting Societies.

DDP 4-4479 [Conmission Document No. 1443]

Memorandum from Thomas H. KARAMESSINES, ADDP, to J.

Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Konstantin Petrovich SERGIEVSKY.

-

DDP 4-4581

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Cuban Consulate and

Embassy in Mexico City.

DDP 4-4600 [Document No. 50, List 2]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: OSWALD Documents Supplies by the Cuban Government.

[Copy to the FBI]

14 September 1964

DDP 4-4775 [Commission Document No. 1483]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Length of Time Required for Obtaining Soviet

Tourist Visas in Wester Europe in 1964.

11 September 1964

DDP 4-4793

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Publication of Documents Furnished to the

Commission by the Central Intelligence Agency.

11 September 1964

DDP 4-4794

[Commission Document No. 14791

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Certain Questions Posed by the State Depart-

ment Files.

(Revised)

(Attachment to CD No. 1479)

29

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11 September 1964

DDP 4-4795

[Commission Document No." 1479]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Soviet Hunting Societies. (Revised)

(Attachment to CD No. 1479.)

11 September 1964

DDP 4-4796

[Commission Document No. 1479]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN

Subject: Length of Time Required for Obtaining Soviet

Tourist Visas in Helsinki and Stockholm, 1964.

15 September 1964

DDP 4-4801

[Commission Document N

10. 1493

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Information Concerning Jack RUBY (aka Jack

RUBENSTEIN) and His Associates.

17 September 1964

DDP 4-4823

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Hours of Work at Cuban and Soviet Consulates;

Procedure and Regulations for Issuance of Cuban Visas;

Mexican Control of U.S. Citizens' Travel to and from

17 September 1964

DDP 4-4838

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: State Department Files.

17 September 1964

DDP 4-4893

17 September 1964

DDP 4-4847

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

30

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18 September 1964

DDP 4-4847

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: COmmunications from the Department of State.

18 September 1964

DDP 4-4848

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Departure from the USSR of Soviet Citizens

Married to Foreigners.

18 September 1964

DDP 4-4850

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Passport and Visa Office.

18 September 1964

DDP 4-4873

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Intourist Hotels in Moscow.

18 September 1964

DDP 4-4882

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Technical Examination of Photographs of Lee

Harvey OSWALD's Application for a Cuban Visa.

18 September 1964

DDP 4-4886

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Resettlement of U.S. Defectors in the Ussk.

22 September 1964

DDP 4-4921

subject: Silvia Tirado BaLes e DURAN. . Lee RANKIN.

17 September 1964

DDP 4-4922

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject:

Eusebio AZQUE [sic - AZCUE] - Former Cuban

Consul, Mexico City.

31

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SECRET.

18 September 1964

DDP 4-4952

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWLAD.

(Information regarding

OSWALD's stay in Helsinki.)

18 September 1964

DDP 4-4953

1 October 1964

DDP 4-5110

[Commission Document No. 1532]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Joachim JOESTEN.

[Copies to FBI, I&NS, State]

13 October 1964

DDP 4-5275

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Publication of Documents Furnished to the

Commission by the Central Intelligence Agency.

16 October 1964

DDP 4-5334/1

Memorandum for The President's Committee on the Warren

Commission Report.

CIA's Role in the Support of Presidential

Foreign Travel.

20 October 1964

DDP 4-5341

[Commission Document No. 1545]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Information Developed on the Activity of Lee

Harvey OSWALD in Mexico City.

29 October 1964

DDP 4-5558

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Transmittal of OCR Publication: "Foreign

Press Reaction to the Warren Report", and Follow-Up

Report, dated 22 October 1964.

32

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ALE ONS NATIONS TO SHEE ET AL REGARDING RUMORS AND

10 October 1963

DIR 74673

Lee Harvey OSWALD, Contact with Soviet Embassy, Mexico

City, I October 1963.

Recipients: FBI, I&NS, State, White House.

23 November 1963

DIR 84915

into ta son et atiass ineMexico cay! on 28 September

Recipient: FBI.

25 November 1963

DIR 84950

Subject: Silvia T. DURAN, Mexican Employee of the

Cuban Embassy [sic - Consulate] in Mexico City;

Contact with Lee Harvey OSWALD.

Recipient: FBI.

25 November 1963

DIR 84951

CIA requests information relating to OSWALD's ac-

tivities in Mexico City (from FBI interrogation

of OSWALD).

Recipient: FBI.

26 November 1963

Subject: Reported Anonymous Telephone Message.

Recipient: FBI.

26 November 1963

CSCI-3/778,826

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD, Suspected Assassin of

President Kennedy.

Encloses transcripts of tele-

phone calls made on 27 and 28 September and 1 and

Recipient: FBI.

33

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26 November 1963

CSCI-3/778,829

(Comment: This dissemination may be identical with

CSCI-3/778,826.

The above CSCI number appears to

me the ersit file no. ding to a copy of the docu-

Recipient: FBI.

26 November 1963

DIR 85069

Subject: Travel of Pro-Communist Costa Rican Congress-

man to Texas on 26 November 1963.

Representatives of this Agency in Costa Rica suspect

that Julio SUNOL Leal, pro-Conmunist, pro-Castro deputy

to the Costa Rican National Assembly, will try to

gather data in Texas to use in pro-communist-pro-Castro

propaganda in connection with the assassination of

Recipient: FBI.

26 November 1963

DIR 85089

Gilberto ALVARADO, a professed Castroite Nicaraguan,

stated to U.S. Embassy in Mexico City on 26 November

1963 [sic - 25 November 1963] that "on 18 September

1963 he saw Lee Harvey OSWALD receive six thousand

five hundred dollars in a meeting inside the Cuban

Embassy in Mexico City."

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received a copy.

[Warren Commission]

26 November 1963

DIR 85176

Subject: Marina Nikolaevna OSWALD (information volun-

eered on Marina OSWALD by Moroccan student Mohamed

REGGAB studying in West Germany).

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy.

26 November 1963

DIR 85177

Subject: Telephone Communication between Duban Presi-

dent DORTICOS and Joaquin HERNANDEZ Armas, Cuban Am-

bassador to Mexico.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

34

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26 November 1963

Unnumbered

Subject: HUNTER Report No. 10815.

Recipient:

FBI.

26 November 1963

Unnumbered

Subject: HUNTER Report No. 10816.

Recipient: FBI.

26 November 1963

Unnumbered

Subject: Passage of IN 68291 from Mexico City to the

(OSWALD's reported presence in Mexico

City on 18 September 1963.)

FBI.

27 November 1963

CSCI-3/778,881

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD, Soviet Activities in

Mexico City, 18 - 24 November 1963.

Recipient:

FBI.

27 November 1963

DIR 85182

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD.

latter to a close triend in

Recipients:

FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy. [Warren Commission]

27 November 1963

DIR 85196

According to information from Nicaraguan Security

Service, Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte was a Nicaraguan

intelligence source from 1962 to August 1963.

Recipients:

FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy.

27 November 1963

DIR 85199

Information solicited from Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte.

Recipients warren Commissions

State, White House; Secret Service

received copy.

35

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27 November 1963

DIR 85222

Subject:

. Silvia T. DURAN, Mexican Employee of the Cuban

Embassy [sic - Consulate] in Mexico City, contact with

Lee Harvey OSWALD.

Recipient: FBl.

26 November 1963

DIR 85246

Dr. Jose GUILLERMO Aguirre of Mexico reports information

regarding Lee Harvey OSWALD.

ceived copy.

CI Staff on 27 November 1963.)

27 November 1963

DIR 85471

Subject: Rearrest of Silvia DURAN.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House.

27 November 1963

DIR 85573

Information from U.S. Ambassador MANN for Secretary of

State RUSK regarding Ambassador HERNANDEZ, Cuban Am-

bassador to Mexico, and Gilberto ALVARADO.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House.

27 November 1963

Unnumbered

Information on Arnesto RODRIGUEZ relayed by telephone

to S. PAPICH.

Recipient: FBI.

27 November 1963

Unnumbered

Information regarding photographic coverage of Cuban

and Soviet Embassies in Mexico City passed to S. PAPICH

of the FBI.

Recipient:

FBI.

28 November 1963

DIR 85657

on 26 November a British journalist named John WILSON-

HUDSON gave information to the American Embassy in

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London indicating that an "American gangster type named

RUBY" visited Cuba around 1959.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House.

28 November 1963

DIR 85662

Further interrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte.

Recipients:

FBI, State, White House. [Warren Commission]

28 November 1963

DIR 85665

The Hague Station reports that on 23 November 1963,

a local Castroite named Maria SNETHLAGE talked to

Third Secretary Ricardo SANTOS of the Cuban Embassy.

SNETHLAGE claimed she knew the Mr. Lee [sic] who

murdered President Kennedy.

Recipien spy are, Commissions

State, White House; Secret Service -

29 November 1963

CSCI-3/778,893

Subject: Interrogation of Silvia Tirado de DURAN and

Horacio DURAN Navarro.

Recipient: FBI.

29 November 1963

DIR 85666

Acting upon an FBI request, the Agency requests ALVARADO

be turned over to Mexican authorities for additional

interrogation.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House. [Warren Commission

29 November 1963

DIR 85668

Highlights from the interrogation of Horacio DURAN Navarro

and his wife, Silvia Tirado de DURAN.

Recipients:

FBI, State, White House.

29 November 1963

DIR 85670

• have reported that when the

23 November

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the personnel of the Cuban Embassy there was a great dea

f discussion

Recipients: FBI, State, White House. [Warren Commission

29 November 1963

DIR 85691

Series of anonymous telephone calls to the office of the

29 November 1963

DIR 85714

Release of Silvia DURAN for second time on 28 November._

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy.

29 November 1963

DIR 85744

Interrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte.

Recipients: FBl, State, White House; Secret Service

29 November 1963

DIR 85758

Translation of interrogation of Silvia DURAN and

Horacio DURAN Navarro.

received Sopy. warren Commissions

State, White House; Secret Service

29 November 1963

DIR 85770

Series of incidents which have produced a report

alleging advance information on assassination.

Recipients: FB [warren Commission]

State, White House; Secret Service

received copy.

29 November 1963

Unnumbered memorandum

Telephone contact with S. PAPICH concerning rumor

that OSWALD had made a bank deposit.

Recipient:

FBI.

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30 November 1963

CSCI-3/778,894

Subject: Article in 29 November 1963 issue of Washington

Rest suggesting two men involved in assassination.

30 November 1963

DIR 86063

Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte Admits his story a fabrication.

recipients: FBI, State, White House.

[Warren Commission]

3 December 1963

DIR 86496

nformation relating to ushalu's presence in Mexic

ecipient: FBI

7 December 1963

DIR 87667

Re-interrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO concluded.

Recipient: FBI. [Warren Commission]

9 December 1963

DIR 87731

Richard BEYMER, American movie actor, in touch with

Cuban Embassy, Mexico City.

Recipient: FBI.

9 December 1963

DIR 87796

Letter mailed in Stockholm on 25 November 1963 alleging

ree ten on are one out heret service

9 December 1963

Unnumbered Memorandum

Telephone contact with S. PAPICH regarding identity of

a source who claims plot to assassinate Kennedy prepared

and executed jointly by the Communist Chinese and Cubans

through intermediaries.

(See UMWAVE 8658, IN 75902.)

Recipient:

12 December 1963

CSCI-3/779,048

Subject:

WILSON, Carlos John (also:

John; WILSON, John Hudson.)

Recipient:

WILSON-HUDSON,

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• .

SECRET

12 December 1963

DIR

88643

Subject: Letter Relative to Assassination of President

Kennedy Sent to United States Embassy in Costa Rica

Recipients: FBI, State, White House. [Warren Commission]

12 December 1963

DIR 88682

Cuban Ambassador to France received instructions not

to comment upon the assassination.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House.

12 December 1963

DIR 88747

Subject: Second Interrogation of Silvia DURAN.

Recipients: FBI, State, White House.

13 December 1963

CSCI-3/779,136

Subject: Mexican Interrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO

Recipient: FBI. Warren Commission

16 December 1963

CSCI-3/779,135

Subject: Peter DERYABIN's Comments on Kennedy Assassination.

Recipient: FBI.

18 December 1963

DIR 89970

Further Information on Richard Thomas GIBSON.

Recipients:

Received Sop arate Commissious

State, White House; Secret Service

18 December 1963

DIR 89980

Subject: Actions of Silvia DURAN after her first

Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service

received copy. [Warren Commission]

27 December 1963

CSCI-3/779,297

Subject: Assassination of President Kennedy (arranged

by the Cuban Government and the Communist Chinese).

Recipient:

FBI.

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3 January 1964

Unnumbered Memorandum

Telephone contact with S. PAPICH on 3 January 1964

Med: rete in the 0e asy on 25 %-

venipient:

10 January 1964

CSCI-3/779,482

Subject:

Second Mexican Interrogation of Silvia

DURAN.

Recipient: FBI. [Warren Commission]

27 January 1964

CSCI-3/779,729

Subject: Possible Relatives of Marina Nikolayevna

OSWALD.

Recipient: FBI.

30 January 1964

CSCI-3/778,814

subtee ack L. RUBY, Lee Harvey OSKALD.

4 February 1964

CSCI-3/779,817

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. (Information on names,

addresses, and telephone numbers relating to the

18 February 1964

DDP 4-0860

Memorandum for the Director, Federal Bureau of

Investigation.

Subject: Assassination of John F. Kennedy.

("In connection with our efforts to assist the

President's Commission on the Assassination of

President Kennedy by providing information which

might be helpful in interpreting available ma-

terials relating to OSWALD's activities abroad,

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we have considered the entry with regard to attempted

We consider this entry as being of consider-

able importance and one which might be subject to

verification.")

Recipient:

FBI.

[Copy to Warren Commission]

18 February 1964

DDP 4-0861

Memorandum for the Director, Federal Bureau of

Investigation.

Subject:

Assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

• 4/ photographs which were among the effects of

Lee Harvey OSWALD,

the photographs were taken in the USSR and depict

Suvie. "Contacts of OSWALD or scenes in the Soviet

Recipient: FBI. [Copy to Warren Commission]

18 February 1964

DDP 4-0862

Memorandum for the Chief, United States Secret Service.

swer fia Assass entry to resoric tary relating to

OSWALD's attempted suicide.

Recipient: Secret Service. [Copy to Warren Commission]

18 February 1964

DDP 4-0864

Memorandum for Mr. Thomas L. Hughes, The Director of

Intelligence and Research, Department of State.

Subject:

Assassination of President John F. Kennedy -

Verification of Entry in "Historic Diary"

Recipient: State.

[Copy to Warren Commission]

20 February 1964

CSCI -3/779,988

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. (Information regarding

Annette SETYAEVNA and Lillie May RAHM.)

Recipient:

FBI.

22 February 1964

DIR 03101

Subject: Further Information Provided by Moroccan

Student Mohamed REGGAB.

Recipient:

White House (attention Secret Service.)

42

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. SECRET,

11 March 1964

CSCI-3/780,344

subject: Summary of Findings in Regard to Allegation

sy Mohamed REGGAB Relative to Marina OSWALD

Recipient: FBI.

20 March 1964

CSCI-3/780,612

Subject: Assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

(Photograph of an individual closely resembling

OSWALD.)

Recipient: FBI.

16 April 1964

CSCI-3/780,881

Subject: Assassination of President John F. Kennedy. -

(Information regarding Lydia DYMITRUK. )

Recipient:

FBI.

8 May 1964

DDP 4-2351

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

Subject: Marina OSWALD's Notebook.

Recipient: Copy of attachment forwarded to FBI.

11 May 1964

CSCI-3/781,172

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD.

lIraces on soviet names

ddresses, and telephone numbers from an address boo

belonging to Marina OSWALD.)

Recipient: FBI.

13 May 1964

CSCI-3/781,282

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. (Identification of

photographs sent to CIA by FBl.)

Recipient:

FBI.

15 May 1964

Recipient: FBl.

43

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SECRET.

5 June 1964

CSCI-3/781,543

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. (Use of Machine Colla-

tion Program to Check Out Cubans Mentioned in Letter

of 27 November 1963 from Mario del ROSARIA Milina.)

Recipient: FBI.

10 June 1964

CSCI-3/781,841

Subject: Information Concerning Jack RUBY.

Recipient: FBI.

29 June 1964

CSCI-3/782,085

in Tangier, Morocco.

Recipient:

2 July 1964

DDP 4-3401

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.

(Remarks made by Soviet Consul Pavel Antonovich YATSKOV.)

FBI. [Warren Conmission]

27 August 1964

CSCI-316/00856-64

Subject: No Indication of Subject's Defection Having

Been Used for Propaganda by the Cuban Government.

Recipient: FBI. [Warren Commission]

3 September 1964

DDP 4-4600

Government.

Recipient:

FBI. [Warren Commission]

6 October 1964

CSCI-316/01446-64

Subject: VIADUCT Interview on 9 September 1964; His

Comments on Seven

Photographs Forwarded by the FBI.

Recipient: FBI.

44

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14.00000

SECRET

23 December 1964

CSCI-316/02545-64

Subject: Allegation of Unidentified Scientist of

Cuban Involvement in Assassination.

Recipient: FBI.

2 March 1965

CSCI-316/00925-65

30 June 1965

CSCI-316/02654-65

Subject:

Recipient:

2 September 1966

Silvia DURAN.

FBI.

CSC1-316/04482-66

Subject: Rima ZMITROOK, Lee Harvey OSWALD's In-

tourist Guide in Moscow.

Recipient: FBI.

14 June 1967

CSCI-316/03243-67

Subject: Allegation of Oscar COUNTRERAS, Mexican

Newsman, That OSWALD Visited UNAM Campus Shortly

After the Cuban Embassy Refused Him a Visa to

Visit Cuba. CONTRERAS' Statement of Dubious

Credibility; Information Passed to Mexican au-

thorities.

MEMORANDUM SUBMITTED BY CIA TO THE WARREN

COMMISSION ON RUMORS AND ALLEGATIONS RE-

LATING TO THE PRESIDENT'S ASSASSINATION

31 January 1964

Subject: Information Developed by CIA on the

Activity of Lee Harvey OSWALD in Mexico City,

28 September - 3 October 1963.

45

"SECRET

---

## Page 158

14.00000

SECRET

5 March 1964

Sy doct SEe Fative arenad to Allegations

18 March 1964

Subject: Article Alleging that OSWALD was interviewed

by CIA in Moscow.

31 March 1964

DDP 4-1655

Subject: Reports on Activities and Travel of Lee Harvey

3 April 1964

DDP 4-1699

Subject: Richard Thomas GIBSON.

7 April 1964

4 May 1964

DDP 4-1784

Subject: Mohammed REGGAB.

DDP 4-2256

Subject: Additional Information on Lee Harvey OSWALD.

8 May 1964

DDP 4-2351

Subject: Marina OSWALD's Notebook.

(Compilation of traces on what appear to be Soviet

lames, addresses, and telephone numbers from an ad.

Iress book identified by Marina OSWALD as belongin

to her.)

46

SECRET,

---

## Page 159

4-00000

SECRET

15 May 1964

19 May 1964

22 May 1964

27 May 1964

1 June 1964

3 June 1964

4 June 1964

Subject: Role of the Cuban Intelligence Service in

Processing Visa Applicants; Reaction of that Service

to the Assassination of President Kennedy.

DDP 4-2534

Subject: Allegations of PFC Eugene B. DINKIN, U.S.

Army, Relative to Assassination Plot Against Presi-

dent Kennedy.

DDP 4-2624

Subject: Anonymous Telephone Calls to United States

Embassy in Canberra, Australia; Relative to Planned

Assassination of President Kennedy.

DDP 4-2688

Subject: Letter Accusing the Chinese Communists of

(Comment: Letter received at U.S. Embassy, Stockholm.)

DDP 4-2747

Subject: Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte.

Out Teletype No. 85089, 26 November 1963.

Out Teletype No. 85199, 27 November 1963.

Out Teletype No.

85662, 28 November 1963.

Out Teletype No. 85666, 28 November 1963.

Out Teletype No. 86063,

30 November 1963.

Out Teletype No. 87667, 7 December 1963.

Memorandum, 12 December 1963, Interroga-

tion of Gilberto ALVARADO.

DDP 4-2769

Subject:

Documents on Lee Harvey OSWALD Furnished by

Soviet Government.

DDP

Subject:

Information Developed on the Activity of

Lee Harvey OSWALD in Mexico City.

47

SECRET.

---

## Page 160

14-00000

(SECRET

10 June 1964

Subject: Information Concerning Jack RUBY (aka Jack

RUBENSTEIN) and His Associates.

12 June 1964

Subject: Letter Relative to Assassination of

President Kennedy sent to United States Embassy

in Costa Rica.

29 June 1964

DDP 4-3347

Subject: Investigation of Allegation that OSWALD

was in Tangier, Morocco.

2 July 1964

DDP 4-3401

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD.

28 August 1964

DDP 4-4479

Subject: Konstantin Petrovich SERGIEVSKY.

15 September 1964

DDP 4-4808

Subject: Information Concerning Jack RUBY (aka Jack

RUBENSTEIN) and His Associates.

17 September 1964

DDP 4-4839

Subject: Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV.

17 September 1964

DDP 4-4922

Subject:

Eusebio AZQUE - Former Cuban Consul, Mexico City.

18 September 1964

DDP 4-4953

Subject: Identification of Persons Appearing in FBI

Photograph No. D 33-46 (Commission Exhibit No. 2625).

48

„SECRET

---

## Page 161

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MEXICO CITY COVERAGE OF OSWALD VISIT

---

## Page 162

4-00000

SEGRET SERSIT

Intelligence Sources on Oswald's Visit

to Mexico City in 1963

1. furt itera] Coverage:

From the time the Mexico Station was opened in April

1947 Juntil the arrival of Mr. Win Scott as Chief of Station(inº9

1955, the Station had developed a support apparatus to exploit

leads from the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. This umbrella

type project (LIPSTICK) consisted of multi-line phone taps, three

photographic sites, a mobile surveillance team and a mail inter-

cept operation.

Telephone taps (LIFEAT) were placed by lan employee of

the local telephone company who was handled by a Station case

officer.

The number of lines tapped was limited only by the avail-

ability of a listening post nearby and the availability of language

(English, Spanish, Soviet, Polish, Czech, etc.) transcribers.

Generally, these were Mexican or Mexican-American recruited agents.

Three photographic sites were handled by a Station case

officer assisted by technicians on TDY from Headquarters who

advised the Station on the best types of cameras, films, and con-

cealment devices.

These operations had sub-crypts under project

LIPSTICK (namely: LIMITED, LILYRIC and LICALLA). LIMITED was a

fixed site directly opposite the Soviet Embassy (across the

street) which had both a vehicle and a pedestrian entrance. The

E2 IMPDET

CL BY 004645

SECRET SENSITIVE

IM/4

---

## Page 163

14-00000

gate to the Soviet Embassy was on the northwest corner of the

Soviet compound and the LIMITED site was diagonally across a

double laned street on the southeast corner of that block (See

attached diagram). LIMITED was the first photo base and opera-

ted strictly on an experimental basis in the early stages. This

base, however, was closed when the Station received word that the

photograph of the "unidentified man" was being released by the

Warren Commission. LILYRIC was an alternate photographic base.

It was located in an upper story of an apartment building on the

same side of the street as the LIMITED site but in the middle of

the block south.

It had a planted view of the front gate of the

Soviet Embassy. LICALLA, the third photographic site, was located

in one of a row of four houses on the south side of the Soviet

Embassy compound. This site overlooked the back garden of the

Soviet Embassy compound. The purpose of this operation was to get

good identification photographs of Soviet personnel. The three

photographic sites were managed by a recruited agent who was a

Mexican citizen, the son of an American mother and Mexican father

(deceased).

This agent collected the film from the LIMITED and

LILYRIC sites three times a week. The film was then devleoped and

printed into 8 x 10 contact print strips. LICALLA film was ori-

ginally processed in the Station but in early 1959, due to the

resignation of a technician, this film like that of LIMITED and

LILYRIC was processed on the outside by a recruited agent.

2

STOLES/ SERBITIVE

---

## Page 164

14-00000

SECRET

SENSITHE

Mobile surveillance was conducted by two American

staff officers.

These two officers organized a surveillance

team of six recruited agents which used late model cars and a

panel truck for surveillance.

The team could be activated by

radio from the LIMITED site whenever someone of interest left

the gate of the Soviet Embassy.

These agents were aware of

the LIMITED site since they had been issued LIMITED photographs

for identification purposes.

The Station also conducted a [unilateral mail intercept

operation, LIBIGHT, which was handled by an American case officer.

LA recruited Mexican agent, Who had a semi-official status, obtained

selected letters from a sub-agent employed by the Mexican postal

system.]

2. (Liaison]Coverage:

Liaison coverage was unreliable and insecure as charac-

terized by the nature of the Mexican Services at that time. The

Mexican Direction of Federal Security (DFS), with which we con-

ducted liaison, was a hip-pocket group run out of the Mexican

Ministry of Government. This Ministry was principally occupied

with political investigations and control of foreigners.

Their

agents were cruel and corrupt. A Station officer trained a number

of them in name tracing and travel control. J

[In 1958, at the instigation of a Mexican official, a

joint telephone tap operation came into existence. The operation,

.. **--

.....

SECRET 3 SENSITIVE

IM/9

---

## Page 165

4-00000

... ..

—•-

[which became known as LENvor, was run by a Mexican officery

The listening post had 30 lines connected at one time. The

transcription room was staffed by Mexican Army officers. In

1961, [because of mismanagement

' by the Mexican principals.

the Station Chief, himself, became the project case officer.

A Station officer assisted him in the daily supervision of the

listening post and in picking up the transcripts and the tapes.

There was also an American technician inside the listening post.

3. Oswald Coverage:

-

In mid-1962, [the Mexican officer in' charge of LIENVOY

(the joint tap operation) asked the American officer at the

LIENVOY listening) post for the telephone numbers of the Soviet,

Cuban

and Satellite Embassies infanticipation of possible cover-

age.] The Station immediately disconnected all of the anylateral

telephone taps on these Embassies so that they would not be dis-

covered when the Mexicans hooked up their taps. The Mexicans

soon thereafter connected five Cuban lines, five Soviet lines,

three Czech lines, two Polish lines, and one Yugoslav line. At

the listening post, a live monitor made short summaries of con-

versations of interest which were then included in a daily re-

sume for the Chief of Station. Later, when a reel was completely

recorded, full transcripts were typed and passed to the Station;

however, there was usually a time lag of a day or two.

Reels

which contained Russian or a language other than Spanish or

4

....

IM/b

---

## Page 166

4-00000

SECRET / SENSITIVE

English were taken to another location for translation and

typing.

Mr. Boris Tarasoff did the Russian translations but

because of the volume of Russian conversations, the trans-

lations usually ran about a week behind the date of the con-

versation.

All transcripts were made in either Spanish or

English since the Chief of Station could read only these two

languages and because he personally screened the transcripts

for operational leads.

As soon as the Station learned that an American iden-

tifying himself as Lee Oswald phoned the Soviet Embassy, Miss

Ann Goodpasture of the Station started screening all photographs.

However, here again, there was a backlog because the photographs

were picked up three times a week, but those picked up were usually

for dates a few days before since the technician who was proces-

sing the film did so on a night-time basis. Further, photographs

were not made initially until a complete roll of film was used.

Later this was changed and the operator cleared the camera at the

end of each day regardless of amount of unused film remaining.

The instructions were to cover the entire work day (office hours)

and to photograph all Soviets, their families, all foreigners,

and cars with foreign license plates. Human error did occur but

generally the agents were conscientious. The Cuban Embassy cover-

age had more sophisticated equipment using a pulse camera which

frequently developed mechanical difficulties.

SEGRET / SENSITIVE

---

## Page 167

4-00000

SECRET SENSITIVE

Oswald came to the attention of the listening post

operators from a tap of the Soviet line. It was picked up and

taken to Mr. Boris Tarasoff for translation because the caller

was trying to speak in Russian.

There was some delay because

Station personnel waited to review the photographs coincidentally

with the typed transcript.

4.

Airport Coverage:

This is discussed

at Tab B.

SECRET 6 CYNSITIVE

---

## Page 168

4-00000

SELECTED NEWSPAPER STORIES WITH COMMENTS

: Tab G

---

## Page 169

14-00000

In the course of the research effort leading to this general

report, there were newspaper stories relating to the assassination

of President Kennedy and to CIA. Some of these appear to have been

based on specially designed stories emanating from the House Select

Committee on Assassinations. At the time of their appearance they

were the subject of comments prepared in CIA. These newspaper

stories and the comments are attached.

The following newspaper stories and comments are listed below:

Tab G.1 Jack Anderson column on 6 May 1977 alleging

CIA activity in Dallas, Texas in 1963.

"ab G.2 Jack Anderson column on 20 January 1971

alleging that ClA 1s tied to a talse Uswal

story.

Tab G.3 Milenge that cia withheld dana on azald.

Tab G.4 Clare Booth Luce involvement with Cuban exiles.

Tab G.5 Ronald Kessler story on 26 November 1976

alleging CIA withheld details of Oswald tele-

phone calls, with report on handling of documents.

Tab G.6 John Goshko story on 13 November 1976 alleging

that Oswald told the Cubans of his plan to kill

Kennedy.

Tab G.7 Tabloid Midnight story on 2 August 1976

regarding CIA and Castro.

Tab G.8

Washington Post story on 1 October 1976 concerning

CIA consideration of possibly interviewing

Lee Harvey Oswald in 1960.

---

## Page 170

4-00000

COMGOENMAL

77-9451

10 Hay 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA

FROM

: Deputy Director of Central

intelligence

: John H. Waller

Inspector General

SUBJECT

: Jack Anderson 6 May 1977 Column Entitled

"Odd CIA Activity in Dallas in 1963"

REFERENCE

: OLC Memorandum for Director of Central

Intelligence - OLC 77-1816 (attached)

-

1. Action Requested: None, for information only.

Background: The attached Jack Anderson column

mixture of some

fact and error.

At least portions of it seein

to have been leaked by someone connected with the House Select

Committee on Assassinations.

3. Factual information on matters covered in the article

follows:

a. Alpha 65 was an anti-Castro Cuban Exile

Organization.

Antonio Veciana was one of its

founders. Veciana contacted the Agency on three

occasions for assistance in an assassination plot

against Castro (December 1960; July 1962 and April

1966) •

On each

occasion he was turned down.

The

Agency had no responsibility for or sponsorship of

Alpha 66.

b.

Veciana was registered in the Inter-Service

Registry by the U.S. Army for the period Novenber

1962 to July 1966 at which time he was terminated

without prejudice.

c. Veclana reportedly collaborated with à Cuban

Government Intelligence Officer, Guillermo Ruiz, in

connection with Alpha 56 activities. Ruiz is married

to a cousin or vectana.

• .:

---

## Page 171

4-00000

CONFIDENTIAL '

d. Anderson attemots io conneci one Morris

Bishop with CIA in Dallas; newspapers in Dallas

have tried to identify Bishop with our DCD repre-

sentative in Dallas, Mr. J. Walton Moore.

cording to our records, no Agency officers ever

used the name of Morris Bishop as an alias.

one named Morris Bishop was ever employed by the

Agency.

e. The FBI identified the three men who

visited Mrs. Odio. Lee Harvey Oswald was not.

one of them. The Warren Commission was satis-

fied that Oswald could not have been in Dallas

at the time of the visit.

Son H. WaT

• Waller

Attachment - 1

Distribution:

Original - Director of Central Intelligence w/att.

1 - Deputy Director of Central Intelligence w/att.

1 - Assistant to the Director (Public Affairs) i/att.

1 - Office of Legislative Counsel w/att.

1 - Office of General Counsel w/att.

1 - Executive Registry w/att

1 - IG Subject watt.

1 - IG Chirono w/att.

1 - J.L. Leader Chrono w/att..

OIG/J.L.Leader:aal

2

---

## Page 172

. THE WASHINGTON POST

$s.99334856÷978

Jack Anderson and Les Whitten

Odd CIA Activity in Dallas in 1963

'The secret files of the House Assas ceived irom his CLA Contact aitar Koa-

sinations Committee contain reports of

had been a mix-up but never cleared

nedy was killer.

the natter up."

strange CLA activities in Dallas on the

The CLA man, Morris Bishop, asked

A CiA vitness has told commities ta-

eve of the Jons 1. Kennedy assassina-

Veciana to contact his cousin, Buil

vestivators, seanwhile, that the Cla';

larno Ruiez, who worked for the Cuban

monitering camera happened to areas

Credible witnesses have contirmed

embassy in Mexico City. Relates a con-

down on the day that Oswald allegedy

our past reports that the accused assas. fidentlal report: "Veciana was to relay

visited the Soviet Embassy. But the

sin, Lae Harvey Oswald, was in touch:

Bishop's ofter to pay Ruiez and his

ClA tap on the Soviet Embassy's phone

with anti-Castro Cubans in Dallas One

wite to say that they had met with Cs produced an alleged telephone cail

contidential report statey that "in 1953,.

wald in Mexico City."

from someone who Identified himself

Oswald was seen leaving the Dallas of fr

fice of Alpha 66." This was a Cuban

This not only would have placed Os

35 "Lee Heary Oswaid..,

wald out of Dallas but would havs

The ClA viness claimed that ine iê-

commando group trained by the CLA

thrown suspicion on the Castro gov-

tual voice recording of the telephone

A Cuban Cly operative, Antonio Ve

ernment The ruse was later called off.

ciana, also told investigators that he.

Instead, the ClA cited secret tapes and

had been summoned to Dallas in Au

photographs as evidence tuat eswald

gust. 1983, by his ClA contact a myste

had been in touch with both the Cuban

rious man who went by the uame of

and Soviet embassies in Mexico City.

Morris Sisnop. States a coulideatial

summary: "When (Veciana) arrived;

'The CIA kept tapes of all phone calls

Bishop was accompanied hy another.

going in and out of the two embassies.

man. Lee Haryey Oswall."":

P'hotograpas wera also taxen di every-

Another witness who impressed the .

one entering and leaving these embas

investigators, Sylvia Odio, toid them

sies. On Oct.. 1, 1953, the ClA notified

that two anti-Castro Cubans had intro

other U.S. embassies that "an Ameri-

duced her to an American by the name

cau male, who identled biased 23

Lee Oswald, contacted the Soviet Em-

of Leon Oswald. She was told that Os

wald was trying

bassy in Mexico City."

Castro Cuban groups. to kill resi-

Oswald was describen in the cable as

dent Kennedy.

"approximately 35 years old, with an

tine destruction procedures approxi

rately one week after it was ra.

ceived." Yet more than seven weeks

later, the aBl claimed to have beard

the telephone conversation that the

CLA said hail been destroyed.

FiSt's judgment was that the voice dud

not belong to Oswald.

Wrote the late aBI director J. Bagar

Heover on Nov. 23, 1963. "The Central

Intelligence Agency advised toak on

Oct. 1, 1963, an extremely senslisre

sourte had reporter that an individual

lodentified aimsell as Lee Oswall,

who contacted toe Sovie: Embassy in

Mexico City inquiring as to any massa-

tion, she recognized this American as

ataketic buld, about six feet tall, with

Lee Harvey Oswald.

i receding bairline.". The committee

The House investigators don't reaily

files note that this "in no way physi

believe that the CLA had any part li

cally resembles the lea Harvey Os

the murder of Presidert Kennedy.

nore likely, they suspect ine Cla may

ent kennedy."' assasinating Presi-

have tried to cover up soine embar-

The ClA sougat photographs icon

rassing contacts with Oswald in Dallas.

the navy to compare with

Is any case, the CLA took pains to

tographs of Oswald at the Sovies cma-

give top impression toat Oswald was in.

bassy. Declares a committee report:

Mexico City at the time that witnesses

"These photograpas, thongu obviously

claimed he vas dealing with the ClA-

not ol the correct Lea Hrvey Oswaid,

guided Cubans in Dallas. Veriana, ior

became te Warren Commission's sx-

example, told of a strange call he re

hibit 227. The CiA admitted that tuare

"Special agents of this bureau, who

have conversal with Oswald in Dallas,

observes photograpis of

toe individuai referred to above and

have listened to a recording oi his

voice. These special agents are of the

cuinion tuat the aboveselerred to in

dividual was not her Harvey Orwaid"

The slouse investigators are Deyul-

ning t wonder whetber the Cil con-

cocted ine whole Oswald adventur: it

Mexico City in an attempt to concari

his real activine in Dallas.

---

## Page 173

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. =

21a

Antinio.

veccasia

.-.-.

2110 01

11/6:06/021-77

MENORANDUM FOR:

FROM

SUBJECTS

Deputy Director for Operations

Raymond 1.

Warren

Chief, Latin America Division

A.

Jack Anderson 20 January 1977 Column

Titled "CIA Tied

to False Oswald Story"

B. Identification of the Mi. X in the

Anderson Column

1. The attached column, citing the testimony of a Mr. X,

alleges that a CIA agent tried to link Oswald to Cuban intelli-

gence officers in Mexico.

There is, of course, no substance to

the column's allegations.

The

column identifies the source as

ir. X because of attempts on his lite, but subsequently gives

enough information on Mr. X to establish his identity.

2.

According to the Anderson column, Mi. A was

first met

by his CIA contact in Havana before relations with U.S./Cuba were

severed.

Mr. X had helped to organize bank accountants to em-

bezzle Cuban

government funds to finance anti-Castro causes.

Mr. X was reportedly recruited by a Morris Bishop (CIA contact),

to "plan an attempt on Castro's life.

bazooka from

ing one of his marathon speeches. According to the Anderson

at mea oy apartment builder hi

The plan was to fire a

a nearby apartment building while Castro was deliver-

colunn, the plot was discovered by Castro's police and Mr.

escaped to Miami.

Castro in Chile in 1971 in league with the Venezuelan Luis Posada

Carriles, who is now being detained in Caracas for the 6 October

Cubana airline bombing.

no ch na nan be an e

Mr. X also reportedly tried to assassinate

The Anderson column ends with

the report

that Mr.

X worked for CIA until 1973 for expenses, but was paid

$253,000 in cash by Morris Bishop when he vas

terminated.

WARNING NOTICE

SENSITIVE INTELIIGENCE SOURCES AND NETIIONS INVOLVED

•SECRET

E2 IMPDET

CL BY 025251

21-1421

...

Differ?.

i 31.996:

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## Page 174

SECRET

3.

Fron the above description of Me. X, it is reasonably

clear that Mr. * is

Antonjo Carlos VECIANA Blanch (201-312906).

VECIANA, an assistant bank manager and past president of a public

in becomber 1960 when he

accountants association in lavana, first contacted CAn 031

asked the cos, at that time

to help in an assassination plot against Castro.

VECTANd asked

for visas for ten

relatives of the

four men assigned to kill Castro,

and also requested four MI rifles with adapters for grenades plus

eight grenades.

The COS did not encourage VECIANA and subsequently

checked

with an Embassy officer

who reported that VECIANA had made

similar "wild eyed" proposals to him.

On 23 November 196l thc

Miami News published a report of an unsuccessful attempt by Antonio

VECIANA to

kill Castro.

reportedly had arranged to

assassinate Castro and Cuban President Osvaldo Vorticos on 5 October

in Havana, but the bazooka he was using failed to firo.

4.

There has been no Agency relationship with VECIANA. A

POA, which was granted for his use in para-military affairs in

January 1962, expired in November 1962.

VECIANA was born on

4 October 1935 in Havana.

He was a member of the People's Revo-

lutionary Movement, an anti-Castro group in Cuba during 1960-61, and

was one of the founders of Alpha-66.

A certified public accountant

by trade, VECIANA was with A.I.D: in La Paz in 1968-72.

VECIANA

was registered in ISK to the U.S. Army in November 1962 and he

was terminated without prejudice in July 1966.

On 23 July 1962

VECIANA was interviewed, at his request, by Mr. Harry

• Real from

the DCD New York office.

VECIANA asked Real to arrange a meeting

with a senior CIA officer to discuss Alpha-66's plans to assassinate

Castro and

to request CIA's assistance (U.S. $100,000; 10,000 Cuban

pesos; 48 hand

grenades).

There is no indication that this request

was ever acted upon by CIA.

03

" 5.

In April 1966 a LA Division officer, John R. Lucy, using

the alias John Livingston, met VECIANA in New

meeting was arranged by a retired naval officer,

Tor kames Cogswell,

who had

intormed Chiet

concerning Cuba.

hien defariven th dew got city for the meeting,

he was introduced by Cogswell

to VECIANA.

He imnediately launched

a discussion of the Cuban political situation and noted his strong

eeling that the only solutio

was

the assassination of Castro.

Lucradvised VECIANA that he wa:

in no position to provide him with

assistance or encourage him in an assassination attempt and was only

interested

in yathering information which he thought was the purpose

of the mceting. VICIANA subsequently said that his roommate lielix

SECRET

2

Im-,

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## Page 175

14-00000

SECRET

PECTANA suggested this $50,000

would be needed to got his

• activities oll the around.

LadyJindicated to VICIONA that"he

could look inio the

pala matter and would probably arrange lor

ZABALA to be

6. There is no indication in the file that any Agency officer

in contact with VECIANA ever used an alias Morris Bishop.

There is

no Morris Bishop listed in true name in the DDO

never any contractual relationship with viciAnd and he was not

There was

paid CIA funds.

7.

On 11 January 1977 a sanitized copy of VECIANA'S 201 file

was made available to staffers from the Senate Select Committee on

Intelligence.

-

sisaed

Raymoad A. Warren

Raymond A. Warren

Attachment

DDO/C/LA/COG/OPS:WJDevineSis (9229) (21 January 1977)

Distribution:

Orig &

Addressee

1

-

ADDO

1 - LA/COG/Chrono

C/LAD

- 201-312966

1 - hold

I1H0PS

!. " ASST.

IM-2

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## Page 176

THE WASHINGTON POST

Wednesday, January 19,1977

B15

Jack Anderson and Les Whitten

Mystery Witness in JK Inquiry

i A mystery witness has sworn to con-

anti-Castro

might have

how Kennedy would die. Then the rab

gressional investigators that a Central

cruited Oswald, a known, pro-Castro

ble rouser added knowingiy that Ken-

Intelligence Agency agent introduced

activist 10 kill Kennedy.

nedy "knows he is a marked man."

bim to Lee Harvey Oswald in Dallas

"The motive on this," states the me

Milteer later admitted to the FBI

three months before Oswald gunned

mo, "would of course be the expecta.

that he had been in Dallas in June,

down President Joan F. Keanedy.:

tion that aiter the fresideht was

1963, but denied having any knowl-

• The witness, whom we have agreed

killed, Oswald would be caught or at

edge

of the Kencedy assasssination.

to identify only as Mr. X because of at-

least his identity ascertained; the law

However, the incormant told the FBI.

tempts of his life, is the founder pi a

enlorcement authorities and the pub

that he asked Miltzer after the saooi:

" lie would then blame the assassination

Cuban terrorist group

that worked

'ing whether he had known about it in

closely with the ClA

on the Castro government; and the call

advance or had merely been guessing.

for a forcetul overthrow would be irre-

The group held secret meetings at

"I don't do any guessing," replied Mil-

3126 Hollandale in Dallas before the as

sistible."

sassination. Not long after Kennedy

i-But Hoover abruptly blocked this

teer...i."

But the most explosive development

was shot, a Dallas deputy saeriff was

line of inquiry by notifying the War-

is Mr. X's statement that he met Os

told by an informant that Oswaid had

ren Commission on Sept. 21, 1964, that

wald in the company of a CIA agent.

been associating with some Cubans at

the FBI had Iccated and identified

Congressional investigators questioned:

"3123 Harlendale."

Odio's callers. He named them as

the mystery witness closely on three

Loran Hall, Lawrence Howard and

i Mr. X's dramatic testimony. casts

separate occasions. They finally con

William Seymour,

all anti-Castroites.

new light on the story Sylvia Caio, Hoover even suggested that Odio could

cluded that "his credibility is strengts-

daughter of a wealthy opponent of Cu-

ened by toe details'he provides consist-

- ban Premier Fidel Castro, told to the

have confused the names "Loran Ha)l"

ent with what he told us before. Signif-

FBL Two morths before the Kenredy

and "Leon Cswald."

'icantly, he remains very strong on the

killing, she related, she was visited in

Now the congressional investigators

Oswald sighting."

her Dallas apartment by three men

have uncovered evidence that all three :

The encounter occurred in a down-

who identifted themselves as friends

denied visiting the Odio apartment

town Dallas building, where Mr. X had

and that the fBI had obtained their

• of her father.

an appointment with his CIA contact

denia's before Hoover wrote his letter

The agent was accompanied by a man

One was introduced to her as "Leon

to the Warren Commission.

whom Mr. & later recognized-as Ken-'

Oswald." When she saw the picture in

The investigators have also obtained

nedy's siller.

the newspapers of the man who had

the tape ot a fascinating conversation,

"When he saw it was Oswald that

spot Kennedy, she fainted from snock.

predicting two weeks in advance that

killed Kennedy,

" the investigators re-

It was the same Oswald, she was cer-

Kennedy would be shot "from an oit-

ported in a contidential memo,

"lie

tain, who had visited her apartment.

ice building with a bigh-powered ri-

nearly freaked out, but he never said

Congressional investigatory

have

fle." The prediction was made by the

anything."

• now learned that the late J. Edgar

late Joseph Milteer, a right-ving rab-

The investigators tried to pin down.

• Hoover deliberately misled the War-

ble rouser, who also happened to have

• Mr. X on how he could be sure that

ren Commission about Odio's mysteri-

man was Oswald. Mr. & replied, ac-:

ous visitors. She was such a persuasive

cording to the memo, that he had,

• witness that the commission staft was

* The conversation was taped on Nov.

learned "how to retain the character-,

preparing to investigate ber story

9, 1963, in Miami by an FBI informant

ics of a person; he had trained himsel?"

thoroughly.

named Willie Somersett, who turned

to do that And it it wasn't Oswald, it •

Stait members even speculated, ac-

the tape over to the FBI the next day.

was someone who was exactly like Ca

cording to one internal memo, that the

Milteer is beard on the tape describing

wald, his exact double.

---

## Page 177

400000

---

## Page 178

14-00000

SECRET

10 January 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM

SUBJECT

Chief, Counterintelligence Staff

Russell B. Holmes

CI Operations Group

: Article by Norman Kempster Appearing in

the Los Angeles Times of 1 January 1977

and Entitled "CIA Withheld Data on Oswald"

(copy attached)

In light of the inaccurate and misleading statements

attributed by Kempster to Sprague, the following comments are

offered in rebuttal.

"The CIA withheld from the FBI for almost

two months in 1963 information that Lee Harvey Oswald

had talked with Cuban and Soviet officials about his

desire to visit those countries . .

Comment: Oswald's name did not surface in Mexico City until

l October 1963 when a hitherto unknown male telephoned the

Soviet Embassy. During this telephone call, the caller identi

fied himself as "Lee Oswald." On 8 October 1963, the Mexico

City Station cabled to Headquarters the highlights of the

transcript of the conversation.

Kostikov.

regarding a telegram to Washington. Obyedkov upon

checking said nothing had been received yet, but

the request had been sent.

Mexico Station said it had photographs of

a male who appeared to be an American entering the

Soviet Embassy at 1216 hours, leaving at 1222 on

1 October. His apparent age was 35, athletic

build, about six feet, receding hairline, balding

Wore khakis and sport shirt.

---

## Page 179

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-- 2--

(3) No local dissemination was being made by

the Station. [MEXI 6453 (IN 36017), 8 October.]

(Note: Cablese has been rendered here into readable English,

without substantive changes or omissions.

Cryptonyms and

pseudonyms have been omitted or put into clear text.)

The above information was received in Headquarters on

9 October; the following day Headquarters incorporated this

information in an electrical dissemination to the Federal Bureau

of Investigation, the Department of State, the Department of

the Navy, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

(1) On 1 October 1963 a reliable and sensitive

source in Mexico reported that an American male

who identifled himself as Lee Oswald, contacted the -

Soviet Embassy in Mexico City inquiring whether the

Embassy had received any news concerning a telegram

which had been sent to Washington. The American

was described as approximately 35 years old, with an

athletic build, about six feet tall, with a

"receding"

hairline.

(2) It is believed that Oswald may be identical

to Lee Henry [sic) Oswald, born on 18 October 1939

in New Orleans, Louisiana, a former U.S. Marine who

defected to the Soviet Union in October 1959 and later

made arrangements through the United States Embassy

in Moscow to return to the United States with his

Russian-born wife, Marina Nikolaevna Pusakova [sic]

and their child.

(3) The information in paragraph (1) is being

disseminated to your representatives in Mexico City.

Any further information received on this subject

will be furnished you. This information is being

made available to the Immigration and Naturalization

Service. [DIRECTOR 74673, 10 October 1963.]

(Note: It should be pointed out that for some unknown reason

the Headquarters desk responsible for making the dissemination

neglected to include the information that Oswald had visited the

Soviet Embassy on 28 September 1963.)

It was not until 22 November 1963, when the Station initiated

a review of all transcripts of telephone calls to the Soviet Embassy

...

---

## Page 180

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L RUNS!

-- 3--

that the Station learned that Oswald's call to the Soviet Embassy

on 1 October 1963 was in connection with his request for a visa

to the USSR.

Because he wanted to travel to the USSR by way of

Cota, said allowing sited transit a imbassy in an attempt to

Inasmuch as Oswald was not an investigative responsibility

of the CIA and because the Agency had not received an official

request from those agencies having investigative responsibility

requesting the Agency to obtain further information, the Station

did nothing other than ask Headquarters on 15 October 1963 for

a photograph of Oswald.

[MEXI 6534 (IN 40357), 15 October 1963.]

On 25 October 1963, Headquarters sent a request to the Department

of the Navy for a photograph of Oswald. [DIRECTOR 77978,

24 October 1963.] It was not until 26 November 1963, however,

that the Navy Department apparently responded to this request by

sending directly to the Mexico City Station a photograph of Oswald.

In response to a question from the Warren Commission, the

Federal Bureau of Investigation, on 6 April 1963 stated that:

'The investigation of Oswald in 1963 prior to receipt

of the Central Intelligence Agency communication

dated 10 October 1963 was directed toward the primary

objective of ascertaining the nature of Oswald's

sympathies for, and connection with, the FPCC (Fair

Play for Cuba Committee or subversive elements. The

Central Intelligence Agency communication which

reported that a man, tentatively identified as Oswald,

had inquired at the

Soviet Embassy concerning a

telegram which had been sent to Washington did not

specity the nature of the telegram.

This contact

with the Soviet Embassy interjected a new aspect into

the investigation and raised the obvious questions of

why he was in Mexico and exactly what were his

relations with the soviets. However,

the information

available was not such that any additional conclusions

ould be drawn as to Oswald's sympathies, intention:

or activities at that time.

Thus, one of the obiectives

of the continuing investigation was to ascertain the

nature of his relations with the Soviets considering

the possibility that he could have been recruited by

the Soviet Intelligence Services.

The Central

Intelligence Agency commmication, dated 10 October 1963,

stated that any further information received concerning

Oswald would be furnished and that our liaison repre-

sentatives in Mexico City were being advised.

---

## Page 181

4-00000

•

-- 4 --

18 October 1963, one of our FBI liaison repre-

sentatives in Mexico City was furnished this infor-

mation by Central Intelligence Agency and he arranged

follow-up with Central Intelligence Agency in Mexico

City for further information and started a check to

establish Oswald's entry into Mexico. Subsequent to

the assassination, Central Intelligence Agency also

advised us of Oswald's contact with the Cuban Embassy

in Mexico City at the time of his visit there."

[Commission Exhibit No. 833 (FBI Letter to J. Lee Rankin,

dated 6 April 1964).]

b. "Chief Counsel Richard A. Sprague said that the

committee staff had learned that a CIA message des-

cribing Oswald's activities in Mexico to federal

agencies such as the FBI had been rewritten to elimi - -

nate any mention of his request for Cuban and Soviet

visas.

The message was sent in October, more than a month

before the November 22,1963 assassination."

Comment: It is not CIA practice to disseminate raw information in

the form it is received from the field.

Field reports are received

in Headquarters where they are first reviewed by the action desk.

The information is then written in a form suitable for dissemination

to the intelligence community, including additional information,

if available, from the Agency's central counterintelligence files

to make the report more meaningful to the recipient (s).

Upon learning that on 1 October 1963 an American identifying

himself as Lee Oswald had telephoned the soviet Embassy, the Mexico

City Station cabled to Headquarters on 8 October 1963 the highlights of

time did not know that Oswald was Lee Harvey Oswald and that he had

come to Mexico to apply for visas to the Soviet Union and Cuba, the

Station reported only that information obtained through telephone

tap operation against the Soviet Embassy.

On 10 October 1963, the day after it received the information

relating to Lee Oswald and his contact with the Soviet Embassy,

Headquarters incorporated this information in an electrical dissemi-

nation to the community and included a brief sunmary of biographic

information obtained from central counterintelligence files on the

possible identity of Lee Oswald. Since Headquarters had no indi-

cation before 22 November that Oswald had gone to Mexico to apply

for Cuban and Soviet visas, there was no question of eliminating any

---

## Page 182

14-00000

-- 5 --

mention of Oswald's request for such visas.

Within its limitations and capabilities, Mexico Station hac

complied with the Agency regulations pertaining to reporting on

Americans abroad.

The Station had informed Headquarters which in

turn had alerted those agencies with an investigative or policy

interest in Oswald as an American in the United States. Headquarters

also instructed the field station to inform the local representatives

of those agencies.

As mentioned above, the action desk in Headquarters neglected,

for unknown reasons, to include the fact that Oswald had visited

the Soviet Embassy on 28 September 1963. Had this information been

included it would have indicated to recipients of the report that

Oswald had more than a fleeting reason to be in contact with the

Embassy; however, as already stated, the reason for the 28 September

contact and the subject of the telegram to Washington were, at that

time, unknown.

"The CIA's decision to withhold information

was reversed shortly after Kennedy was killed."

Comment: This statement is patently false and misleading. It is

totally incompatible with Sprague's remarks to Agency representatives

in Headquarters on 24 November 1976, i.e., "he will not prejudge the

Agency for any sins of 'omission or commission'."

impossible with were depress to ence ty the was

had censored its own message."

Comment: It Sprague needed more information, why did he not ask

the Agency for an explanation, instead of making it appear to the

public that the Agency has been dishonest in its dealings with the

e. "But he said the incident raised two interesting

considered pertinent enough to be put in an initial

draft of the message?' "

Comment: As already mentioned, the Agency did not know initially

why Oswald was in contact with

the Soviet Embassy in October 1963.

---

## Page 183

14-00000

-- 6 - -

It was only after the news of the assassination had reached the

Station that the Station initiated a review of its holdings.

a result of this review, the Station learned that Oswald had also

visited the Cuban Embassy and that Oswald's contacts with the two

embassies were in connection with his desire to travel to the

Soviet Union by way of Cuba.

As to what "other agencies" might have done had they had more

information, attention is drawn to the FBI's comment in response

to the Warren Commission's question. According to the FBI's

response, some investigation had been initiated on or about

18 October in Mexico.

By the 25th of October, FBI headquarters had

informed its field office in New Orleans "that another Agency had

determined that Lee Oswald was in contact with the Soviet Embassy

in Mexico City in the early part of October 1963.'

The New Orleans

field office in turn intormed the Dallas office which had juris-

diction over Oswald's place of residence.

(For further detail, see

IV H 447 and 459.) There was, however, no request, official or

otherwise, from any of the responsible departments and agencies in

Washington for further details as to Oswald's presence in Mexico

and his reasons for contacting the Soviet Embassy.

"The committee said its staff investigators

had recently questioned a former CIA agent who had

'personal knowledge' of Oswald's visits to the Soviet

and Cuban embassies in Mexico.

As a result of that

interview, the report said, staff members were sent to

Mexico, where they found and questioned additional

witnesses.

Comment: Sprague's characterization "a former CIA agent"' is probably

in reference to David Phillips.

The latter's "revelations" to staff

investigators (and also to Ronald Kessler) were unfortunate to say

the least, in that they were inaccurate, so far as we know. There

is no indication in the Oswald files that Oswald wanted to make a

deal with the Soviets in return for a free trip to the USSR.

The

"additional witnesses" in Mexico, it is believed, are Boris Tarasol

and his wife, both of whom had been under contract with the Agency

sprague what have ips bed he tarass filiathy st thenvest, sators.

"'These witnesses had never been sought out

before by any investigative body, notwithstanding the

fact that they had important information concerning

statements by Lee Harvey Oswald in Mexico within 60

days of the assassination of President Kennedy,' the

report said."

C929T

---

## Page 184

4-00000

-- 7 --

Comment: If "these witnesses"' include people other than the Tarasovs

it would be impossible, at this time, to make an appropriate comment.

that if Sprague had obtained additional

details, he should hold such information and not make it public

until the Agency has had a chance to review it and comment. There

are many examples in the Oswald files of statements made by people

claiming to have knowledge of Lee Harvey Oswald which have been

proven to be fabrications. One such person was Gilberto Nolasco

Alvarado Ugarte who, on 26 November 1963, came to the U.s.

Embassy in Mexico City. He claimed he had been in the Cuban

Consulate in Mexico City on 18 September 1963 when a man he later

recognized to be Lee Harvey Oswald received $6,500 in cash to kill

an important person in the United States.

After thorough investi-

gation by Mexican authorities, the Mexico City Station, and the FBI,

it was concluded that Alvarado had completely fabricated his story

about Oswald.

-

Russell B. Holmes

Attachment

---

## Page 185

CIA Withheld

Dala on Oswald

Assassinations Panel-

Issues Report to House

BY NORMAN KENIPSTER

SO Times san were les

" WASHINGTON-The CIA" with-

held: from: the FBI for almost two

months in 1933 information that Lee

Harvey Oswald had talked with Cu-

ban and Soviet officials about his de-

sire to visit those countries, a House

committee reported Friday. /tart

: The Select Committee on Assassin-

rations indicated in a report to the full

House that its investigation or the

murder of President John F. Kennedy

would iccus early in 1977 on a trip

Oswald had made to Mexico City in

¿October; 1953: 39.

a Chief Counsel Richard A. Sprague

said",that the committee staff had

clearned that a CIA message describ-

Jing: Oswald's activities in Mexico to

federal agencies such. as the FBI häd

been rewritten to eliminate any men-

-tion of his request for Cubari and So-

¿viet-visas. The message was sent in

Ociober, more than a month betore

§the Nov. 22, 1963, assassination.

The CLA discovered Oswald's. pre-

sence :althe embassies: through its

§routine surveillance.of those facilities.

¿Because Oswald had once delected to

¿the Soviet Union, the CLA and FBI

that been interested in his activities

Tered beiore the Kennedy: assassina-

A cas decision. to Mithold ni

00823

focation was reversed shortly aiter:

"ernedy wes killed. The agency.re-

• ported Oswald's efforts to visit Cuba

¿andite somet Union both to the FBI

THE LOS ANGELES TIMES

1 January 1977

* District of Columbia's congressional dels

and to the Warren Commission, which cor-"* gate and the chairman of tre King subcom-

cluded that Oswald was the assassia and

mittee' said thai no decision had been made

Had acted alone.

on accepting Ray's offer.

Sprague told a press conference that it

However, Sprague indicaled that it prob.

vas impossible without more information

ably would be accepted.

o know why the CLA had censored its own

"Any and all people who have relevant

message.

information will be interrogated," Sprague

But he said the incident raised two inter-

said.

asiing, questions:, what might the iher

•In a personal statement issued.jn con

igencies have done differently if they had

junction with the report, Rep. Henry'33

seen more fully informed and why did the

Gonzalez (D-Tex), who is to become com:-

CIA decide to remove "information. that " mittee chairman in the new year, said a

was considered pertinent enough to be put

thorough investigation was needed to a-

in an initial draft of the message?'

" swer hundreds ai pressing questons

There were no firm conclusions in the

"Gonzalez said that the committee liops?

report, which the 12-member committee

- to discover whether former FBI Director J

prepared after the first three months of its

•Edgar Hoover's now. well-known animasi

investigation inta the murders of Kennedy

ty toward King had afiected the FBI's?

and civil rights. leader. Dr. Martin Luther

•Testigation of the assassination.

mughad sipesty cabadaas However, Gonzalez said, the commiller's

Technically, the committee goes out of work could go well heyond. the killings ci

business Tuesday. with the end of the ses-

sion of Congress in which it was .formed.

I the omie can shed night on tre

The purpose of the year-end report was to

larger issue of political murder and yi

urge the new Congress to reestablish the : olence,

" Gonzalez said. "We should no!

committee and to give it $6.5 million to pay

forget, that President Ford had his own

• for the fist year of what could be a two-

narrow escapes; no member of the Hous

indiran o

year investigation

220 Monstrget that the Capitol Building

WAS

In the three months since its establish-

spbombed.,.

t. He said the committee's ultimate task

ment, the committee has initiated prelim-

inary investigations into new and pre-

was"to find out not just what happened

,vicusly unpursued leads in both assassina-

but way.

tions,

" the report said.

see wan

The committee said its stalf investigators

had recently questioned a former CIA

agent. who had "personal knowledge". of

Oswalds unis to the Soviet and Cuban

embassies in mexico. As a result of that in-

tervier, the recore said, staff members

were sent to Mexico, Finere they found and

questioned addinonal minesses. can

"These witresses had never been sought

out before by any investigalive cooy, not

svithstanding the fact that they had impor-

tant information concerning statements bs

• Lee Harvey. Oswald in Mexico within-6

days of the assassination of President Ken-

nedy," the report said.:

1/3-2

The report said also that the committee

staff had interviewed a person who assert-

'ed that he had discussed the King murder

with James Larl Hay, who pleaded guilt

to the crime. The unidentlied witness sai

that Ray had told him about contacting an

associale in Europe to receive further in-

structions. The story, whick was told to re-

•porters by a committee member several

weeks ago, has not been veritied fa

.:In a letter to New York Times columnist

Anthony Lewis, Ray offered this week to

testliz under oath at a committee hearing.

But Sprague and Walter F. Fauntroy, the

=

-

---

## Page 186

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7AR

77-0701

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA

FROM

: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

: John H. Waller

Inspector General

SUBJECT

:

President Kennedy Assassination - Mrs. Luce Story

1. Action Required: None; for information only.

Background: In 1975, Mrs. Clare Boothe Luce telephonically

informed Director William Colby of support she had rendered to certain

Cubans who were conducting their own independent operations against

the Castro Government in 1961 and 1962.

Mrs. Luce stated that she and

Mr. William Pawley, an American financier long associated with the

Dominican Republic, helped finance a motorboat for three Cubans. The

three Cubans, concurrently, were members of a ClA supported Cuban

exile organization. After the 1962 missile crisis, all resistance

groups against Castro were ordered to cease operations. At this time,

Mrs. Luce and Mr. Pawley also ceased their financial support.

1963, very shortly after the assassination of President Kennedy, the

Cuban captain of the motorboat, which Mrs. Luce helped to subsidize,

phoned Mrs. Luce to inform her that "Oswald was a hired gun".

She, in

turn, informed him to tell all to the FBI. At the behest of Director

Colby, Mrs. Luce passed the story on to Senator Richard Schweiker,

chairman of the subcommittee investigating the Warren Commission Report.

A version of the information was given to columnist Betty

Beale and was published in the Washington Star on 16 November 1975

(attached) •

A staff member of the Senate Select Committee, on 10

December

1975,

inquired

to what the Agency thought of the story.

The Agency oral response was that it had nothing

to add to the news-

paper story and that since this query involved U.S. resident Cuban

refugees, the FBI would be the proper agency to contact.

---

## Page 187

14-0000

The transcripts were received by CIA's Inspector General

on 22 December 1976 from Mr. Colby's secretary.

At the suggestion

of the Inspector General, the Office of Security sent copies of the

transcripts and a background note to: the Federal Bureau of Investi-

gation in January 1977.

We do not know whether the FBI passed this

information to the House Select Committee on Assassinations.

This story is summarized here for your background in the

event that it should be replayed by the press as a result of releases

which may be made by the House Assassination Subcommittee. While it is

not a new story, the actual CIA transcript of Mrs. Luce's conversation

with Mr. Colby could be considered newsworthy and could be presented

in a manner detrimental to CIA.

John

Attachment:

a/s

CC:

Asst. for Public Affairs w/att

Mr. H. Hetu

Distribution:

Original - Addressee w/att.

• - DDCI w/att.

1 - Asst. for PA/Mr. Hetu w/att.

1 - ER w/att.

-T - IG Subject (Task Force) w/att.

1 - IG Chrono w/o att.

1 - J.L. Leader Chrono w/o att.

0IG/J.L. Leader:aal

---

## Page 188

Clare Buothe Luce Weav

Fascinating Tale

One day in the latter part of October, Clare Luce re-

ceived a call from Sen. Richard Schweiker, R.-Pa.,

Betty Beale

chairman of the subcommittee investigating the War-

en Commission Report. He wanted her to persuade

some Cubans she had known - Cubans who had known

Lee Harvey Oswald - to testify before his commaittee.

VIrs. Luce's efforts to locate the Cubans led to a some-

what bloodcurdling warning. But let her tell the story

irom the beginning.

"The

a year of

rauma

she began her naracion to recent discer

quests in her aqua-colored Watergate apartment.

nad a friend named Bill Pawley who was brought up in

Cuba and who was Truman's ambassador to Peru and

Brazil. I got to know Bill very well in India and China

where he had built up a voluntary outfit called The

Flying Tigers. Bill was also called in by the CIA to re-

cruit Cubans for the Bay of Pigs operation. Afterwards

he was a very unhapoy man.

"One day he called me up and said, How would you

like to get in on the Cuban Flying Tiger operation?' He

had in mind a fleet of motorcoats subsidized by Ameri-

cans and manned by Cubans who had been in the Bay

of Pigs operation - all these young kids who had been

stranded after the Bay of Pigs.

"I said,

'Fine.' So I helped to finance a motorboat

The three lads who manned mina came up to see me

several times. They would leave the coast of Florida

and land in Cuba and come out with information. The

incormation they came out with was remarkably accu-

rate — thet the Russians were building missile sites in

Cuba. I was told that the information was eventually

fed to Sen. Ken Keating and was passed on to the i

White House. You remember what an impression it

made and how accurate it was.

"THEN CAME THE MISSILE showdown. Soon after

the showdown I got a telephore call from Allen Dulles

saying the Neutrality Act had been invoked and all

Americans must cease and desist in any turther entoris

iuards the liberation of Cuba. Of course, we desist-

Two years later she and her husband Harry (Henry)

lace were sitting in their New York apartment listen-

ing to the televised reports of President Kennedy's

risessination when around midnight she received a !

• phone call from New Orlears. "It was the captain of

my motorboat," said Clarz,

"A young man not more

Want to elon ou we e said, Mrs. Luce!

"He said that immediately alter the 1961

missile

showdown, FBI men had come to Miami and told the

Cubans to break up all resistance groups and disperse.

He and the other two members of his crew had moved

to New Orleans where they staried another

"Free

Cuba" group. They had been there a year and a hali

when who made contact with them bat Oswald!

"The Cubans all thought he was a kook. Oswald

bragged about having been in Russia and said he was

an ex-Marine. He said he could shoot anybody and he

would be happy to shoot Castro. He had no money, he

was living with his wife in New Orleans and it loaked

like he was presenting himself as a hired gun. They

didn't like the cut of his jib so they turned him off. But

they followed him and found he was in a Fair Play for

Cuba Communist cell to ribose members he was giv-

ing the same line

"And I remember this from the telephone conversa-

tion — Oswald was telling the cell that he could shoot

anyone, including the secretary of the Navy. The Fres

Cubans continued to tail him and found that suddenly

he had money, and he siarted going to Mexico City. He

made several trips. They continued their penetration

of the Cuban Communist cell. He said they made tape

recordings of some of Oswald's meetings and they had

taken photographs of him distriouting handbills for the

Fair Play unit. The next thing they knew President

Kennedy was shot.

"THE YOUNG CUBAN WHO called ma," continued

former Ambassador Luce,

"said that there was a

Cuban Communist assassination team working some

where - in Dallas, New. Orleans or wherever ~ I don't

remember, and that Oswald was their hired gun. Os-

wald, he said, had tried to report the Communist plans

to the FBI some time before the assassination. But be-

cause he was out for the dough they didn't beliave him.

continued'

---

## Page 189

14-00000

I suppose that the FBI must hear from a thousand

In any event, on the telephone my young friend told

me that they had these tape recordings of Oswald and

photographs and what should they do? I said, 'Go to

the FBi and tell them everything you know.' That hay-

ing been said I put the whole thing out of my mind.

Comes the Warren Commission and says Oswald alone

was responsible and I forgot the whole matter.

"Then, in 1967, a fellow named Jim Garrison, dis-

trict attorney in New Orleans, hit the headlines charg-

ing that the assassination was a conspiracy. At that

moment i was reminded oi the information i had re-

ceived and I began to wonder whether or not the

Warren Commission had got all the facts. I couldn't

remember the names of the Cubans but I finally locat-

ed one crewman who was living in Miami again and I.

asked him what happened aiter he went to the FBI.

"He said, 'We turned over copies of everything. We

were then told. to keep our traps shut and tnat we

would be deported if we said anything publicly.' He

said one of the crew sas deported to Guatemala, and

One was murdered - stabbed in front of a siore.

"THEIR INFORMATION, HE SAID, never appear-

ed in the Warren Commission report. He said,

marned now, I live in Miami and I don't want to get

involved in it ever again.''

• When Sen. Schweiker made his request of Clare

• Luce less than three weeks ago, she telephoned anoth-

er Cuban friend to see if he could locate and persuade

the young man to testify behind closed doors. Replied

the oider Cuban, if the testimony was behind 13 closed

doors it would still become public.

"Americans think they are playing games," he told

her. "They don't know they are involved in a life or

death business. No, I won't tell you where he can be

found. The people working for a free Cuba would lose

their lives. A lot of them have already. They are not

interested in making political headlines for politicians.

You think the Bay of Pigs, the nuclear missiles, the

assassination of the president was the end of the story?

I tell you it is just the beginning. What you Americans

don't understand is, there are trained Communist ter-

rorists, assassination, kidnapping, bombing and sabo-

tage teams all over the country and the world."

- Wide Horid Pholas

Clare Boothe Luce

"A year of great American trauma."

The very day after that conversation, observed

Clare gravely, combs went oil at the Stale Depart-

ment here, at the U.S.-U.N. mission and four banks in

New York and at three places in Chicago. And close to:

the same hour she was recounting the whole fascinat-

ing story to her guesis,

Cuban, anti-Communist

leader was exploded into bits in his car in Miami.

---

## Page 190

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UNUIASSITILU

USE ONLY

LI CUMTIUENIIAL

LIDELITI

I UTING AND RECORD St. .T

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

Inspector General

2 E 24 Has.

buildingficer designation, room number, and

10.49

OLC

ATTN: Lyle Miller

DATE

EXTENSION

6565

R-1252

OFFICER':

INITIALS

RECEIVED

%

FORWARDED

16

2.

4.

Director of Security

NO.

DATE

6 January 1977

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whon

a whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.

SUBJECT: Attached Transcripts

The OLC and the IG concur that

the attached transcripts should

be provided to the FBI. A blind

memo is also attached.

It is requested that the O/S

pass the package to the FBI.

→. B

John H. Waller

7.

8.

Litt

the Clear!

Accity

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

L

FORM

3-62

05-74010

610 USEDPREMOUS

EDITIONS

SECRET

• CONFIDENTIAL

INTERNAL

USE ONLY

• UNCLASSIFIED

---

## Page 191

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6 January 1977

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT:

Transcripts of October 1975 Telephone Conversations

Between Director Colby, Mrs. Clare Boothe Luce and

Mr. Justin McCarthy

1. Attached herewith are transcripts of two telephone conversations

between Director William Colby and Mrs. Clare Boothe Luce, and one between

Director William Colby and Mr. Justin McCarthy.

The conversations took

place in October 1975 and discuss Mrs. Luce's concern that certain infor-

mation, from a former boat captain, a Cuban refugee, regardinghite thes

dent Kennedy assassination, reached the proper authorities.

information in these transcripts have been provided to investigating

authorities, they may be of some assistance to the House Select Committee

on Assassinations as it investigates various allegations.

2. The transcripts were received by the Agency Inspector General on

22 December 1976. The transcript of the 25 October 1975 conversation was

typed by Ms. Barbara Pindar on the same day. The other two transcripts

were typed by Ms. Pindar on 21 December 1976 from her stenographic records

while clearing out the remainder of Director Colby's files.

Ms. Pindar

was Mr. Colby's secretary during his Directorship.

3. A version of the telephone conversation transcript was published

in the Washington Star on 16 November 1975 (attached). A staff member of

the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, on 10 December 1975, inquired

as to what the Agency thought of the story. The Agency oral response was

that it had nothing to add to the newspaper story and that since this

query involved U.S. resident Cuban

refugees, the FBI would be the proper

agency to contact.

---

## Page 192

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The attached transcripts indicate that the matter was brought to

the attention of Senator Schweiker and The Federal Bureau of Investigation.

(Telephone conversation between Director Colby and Mrs. Clare Boothe Luce

on 25 October 1975, pages 2 and 3).

Attachments:

a/s

2

---

## Page 193

4-00000

Review Staff:

75/3637

Date

10 December 7975

TO

: CIA Task Force

FROM

: The Review Staff,

SUBJECT : SSC/HSC Request

RECEIVED: Date

Walter Elder

Time

trees

Paul Wallach, SSC staff, asks what we think of the

actached. He is not writing a formal request and will

be satisfied with an oral reply.

Comments:

Action

Info

SC/DCI

A/DDA

A/DDI

A/ DDO

A/DDS&T

OGC

OLC

IG

B. Evans

X

---

## Page 194

14-00000

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FORM

5.75 101

BLP

Filo with Mrs CBC

talk.-.

She passed

Ter

to do so to Sa Scluele

Date

112/15/15

:p0r-9-1

---

## Page 195

14-00000

Telephone Conversation B. veen Mr. Colby and Mrs. Cla

Boothe Luce

at 12:40 on Saturday, 25 October 1975 (from steno notes of Barbara Pindar

transcribed the same day)

Mrs. Luce:

I have a big problem, a case in conscience. I got rather

deeply involved during and after the Bay of Pigs, and up to the time of

the missile crisis, with a group called the (Directorate Revolutionario

Estudiante; Note: the spelling of that is just a guess), the DRE. Whether

you know this or not, it was me who fed the missile stuff to Keating. I

knew a number of these leaders well; they were going in and out of Cuba,

and I paid for one of the motor boats. Bill Pawley did too. We thought we

were doing another Flying Tiger. The missile crisis came, and I got a

telephone call from Allen telling me that the Secrets Act had gone into

effect and that henceforth there would be no voluntary American efforts.

That ended that, and I don't know what I was doing -- maybe I went back

to Arizona, or whatever. Then came the assassination. The night of the

assassination, right after Oswald was caught, one of my boys telephoned

me from New Orleans. Didn't I ever tell you this?

Mr. Colby: No.

Mrs. Luce:

It was the captain of my boat. It seems that after the missile

crisis -- a period of about a year had gone by -- he said that all the young

Cubans involved profoundly in all of this had been told to scatter and

scram, that he and two of my other lads --

Mr. Colby:

When, after the crisis?

Mrs. Luce:

(Yes.) (were told) to leave Miami.

Mr. Colby:

In 1962?

Mrs. Luce:

Yes. They were to stop their efforts to free Cuba; and if they

did not, they would be deported. It has a very interesting end involving you.

In any event, this one had been told to leave Miami after the missile crisis

was over, and he had opened a cell in New Orleans. He telephoned me to

tell me that Oswald was -- I am telling you what his view was -- was a

hired gun; Oswald had tried to penetrate their little cell; that they turned

around and did a counterpenetration job on Oswald; all of this was done

several months before the assassination. He said,-telling me on the phone,

he was terribly excited -- he said"you see he had no money, all of a sudden

he began to get money, so we checked him and he had a little "Communists

be Free" or 'Be Fair to Cuba"' group going in New Orleans." He said "We

---

## Page 196

4-00000

- 2-

had tape recordings of what he was telling his group. " It was a co unter-

penetration they went on. He said, "We have photographs of Oswald.

passing out handbills on the street, 'Be Fair to Cuba.''' He said, "We

are absolutely certain that Oswald was simply one of three assassination

teams, that they were working out of Mexico City (or funded in Mexico

City) by Castro." He said there were three assassination teams. Then

he said, "We have these recordings, these tapes, and we have these

photos, what should we do? " These fellows always trusted me. I said,

"The first thing you do, the minute you hang up this phone, you telephone

to the FBI, give them everything you have got. " Working in New York

with these Cubans is an extraordinary fellow, one of the most puzzling

characters I have every met; he is a devout Catholic -- Justin McCarthy.

Justin is the American patron -- although he has no money, nevei had

money -- of all these free Cubans in America. He never worked at CIA,

although CIA tried to pick his brains. He tried to help the FBI. I knew

Justin McCarthy, and he used to send me bulletins; he said he had been

sending them to me for the past six months, and I had never received one

of them. Out comes the Warren Report. I have many other things to do,

and I assumemy lads had reported what they knew, and maybe it had been

discounted, but I had taken the Warren Report at face value without poring

over it -- and I forgot the whole darn thing.

Then, this must be nine

years ago, up turns a guy named Lloyd Garrison*

-- what was he, a sheriff:

or something? (* she means Tim Garrison)

Mr. Colby:

District Attorney.

• Mrs. Luce:

And he hit the headlines that the assassination had been a con-

spiracy. Then it all flooded back into my mind that I had never been quite

satisfied with what the Warren Report had brought out. Basically, I was

troubled by the whole thing, so I said I thought I would call Garrison.

In order to call him, I had to have the names of the Cubans, which had

gone out of my bean. So I called Justin McCarthy. He, said one of them

was now, my lad, was in Miami. I got him on the phone, my fellow, and

I said, "You remember your midnight call to me about the assassination

of the President, I want to know what happened after that." He said, "We

went at once to the FBI, they took all the tapes and photos and all our

information and told us to keep our mouths shut, and shortly after that they

informed us that if any of us talked to the press or anyone, dire things

would happen." He said one of the fellows on the boat was deported to

Guatemala or Chile, and one of them was murdered. He said, "I am a

lawyer, have two children, I am making my way in Miami, and I never

want to hear a damn word about the assassination of Kennedy because you

Americans really do not want to know the truth. " He said, "We waited,

expecting the Warren Committee would want to have us, and wenever heard

a word." He said, "I want no part of it." Then the Garrison thing died

---

## Page 197

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- 3 -

down, and I am a busy woman, and I forgot about it.. Three days ago,

a reporter was in here -- a gal*

^- asking about my life style and

said, in passing, "What do you think of the investigation of the

assassination of the President? " I am afraid I hit the roof" I said,

"I think everyone must be absolutely off their rockers. What possible

motive would the CIA have for murdering their own President? " I

said, "Even to assume such a thing is beyond belief because where

there is a murder or assassination, there is a motive, and there could

be no motive." I said, "Who had the motive was Castro; but perhaps

not even Castro, possibly just a bunch of Communist Cubans or plain

Communists." I said, "They always had a motive for that sort of

thing. " Schweitker called me up yesterday -- when the reporter said

to me, "What is the name of the young Cuban?", I said, "Well, let's

call him Julio Fernandez." The Senator said to me "that is a fascinating

story." (& I missed the fact that the sird reponter was

with knight Newspagers)

Mr. Colby: You told the story to Schweiker?

Mrs. Luce: He read it in the Knight paper.

Mr. Colby: You told the story to the Knight people?

Mrs. Luce: Not in the detail I told you. Schweiker asked if I could locate

any of these men involved for him, and I said I would try. That was

yesterday. I used that opportunity to say, "I do not know what you are

doing on the Hill." I said, "You are in the process?) for headlines and

destroying this country's security." He said, "If you have this informa-

tion and you can get your hands on it, it would be a good thing to lay

this story to rest. " He said, "If you can find me these people, I assure

you they will be listened to in closed session." Now comes the big

thing. Justin McCarthy runs an animal farm in Nyack: telephone

number is 914; 647-8596. I have known him to be a man of complete

integrity. He is a devout Catholic. He may or may not be a fanatic.

What makes one think he is is what he tells you is just so terribly

alarming; as he was the one, along with Bill Pawley, who involved me

with these Cubans, I tracked him down and had a two-hour conversation

on the phone with him this morning that was really staggering. When I

said to him, "Would you tell these things in the closed session in the

Senate?", he said, "I would find it more expedient and to shorten the

process to hire loud speakers and put them on top of the Empire State

Building." He said, "You don't know, Clare, the Cubans have not lost

their desire to free their country, and there are plenty of them working

---

## Page 198

14-00000

thes

-4-

feder

at it, and they trust me, and I trust them, and they all trust me. "

He said, "All these fellows on the Hill give a damn about is a big

headline and political attention, and if this should involve my testi-

fying and some of my fellows got bumped off, or their apparat shut

down, I could not live with myself, no I will not testify." I said,

"You

know, Justin, if they send for you, you might have to. " He

said, 'They are not likely to send for me unless you tell them. " He

said, "They do not know who to ask for anyway, " (It doesn't appear

in my notes, but my memory is that he added that the reason the Hill

doesn't get to the truth is that they never know who to ask for.) He

told me a story about working once with CIA. He said, "We did this --

DRE did one operation with CIA, as a result of which all the Cubans

involved were caught and killed, and I do not want any part with the

CIA. " He said, "It too can be a sieve." I said, "You have me really

over a barrel." I said, "Justin, I have to tell someone, is there

anyone you trust? " He said, "There is only one man in this whole

country whose word at this point I would take." I said, "Who is that?"

and he said, "Bill Colby." He said, "He is a daily communicant" --

Mr. Colby: No, no.

Mrs. Luce: I did not disillusion him. In any event, if only to put my own

mind at rest since -- he always says, which is fascinating if true,

that my lads in New Orleans, yes, they did turn over the tapes to the

FBI but they kept copies.

Mr. Colby: Really?

Mrs. Luce: So he says. If so, you are possibly, if -- I think you should

get hold of Justin and give him a couple of hours because he has plenty

to say. If what he says is true -- he also told me, which I had forgotten --

that during the time of the missile crisis, and I was the one he came to,

and naturally the one I went to was Harry (note: this is first mention of

à 'Harry'' maybe I misunderstood; could she have said ''Allen''?) because

I could trust him. In a way, Justin McCarthy supplied a lot of background

material on the Cubans to (note: could not hear what she said). He said

a few days ago -- Time is planning to do a (take-out) issue on the

assassination of Kennedy. He said that, going back through their files,

they came across my name as an informant, and he said "they tracked me

down too." He said, then he told me -- I mentioned in passing that there

rame-plain

informanti

-basing her nam

ilenny Lace?

listen. at an.

---

## Page 199

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- 5

-

..

was a wonderful girl on Time that knows more about the Cubans

almost than anyone in CIA, Priscilla Badger. He said the Time

people are now trying to get information. He said, "I will talk to

no one because there are lives at stake" -- except you. For my

own sake, if you have a go at him, I would be very happy to know how

serious it is.

Mr. Colby: I will report back to you by all means. Let me do a little home-

work on just where this (looks). You do not remember the name of the

Cubans in Miami?

Mrs. Luce: There are so many names; he talked to me so fast. He kept

saying "Chilo." I asked who "Chilo" is, and he said that was his code

name.

Jose Antonio La Nuza (Note: That last name may be all one word;

she said it means "the nut. ")

Luis Fernandez Rocha

One of those fellows was the Director of the DRE. Then he also reminded

me of a guy who used to come to see me -- Cardona. (He had been told

by the American Government to get out of Miami) and he died, having

• become the President of a university in Puerto Rico. These fellows

were scattered all over the place.. As I mentioned that to Justin, he said,

"'I know where they all are." The thing that alarmed me is that -- he

does not talk in an excited voice, but the statements are -- he said

"People think of the Bay of Pigs and the nuclear showdown and the

assassination of Kennedy as the end of the story, it is only the beginning."

He said, "If you knew what is being laid on for the U. S.," and he talks

like that. I asked him, "What do you think happened?" He said, "Oswald

went to the FBI." He said, "I know that, he was selling them information,

and they did not believe him." I said, "That is incredible." He said, "I

do not know how much you know about the FBI, but no day goes by without

desks being loaded with letters saying something will be blown up."

(Note: I missed a little bit here due to something else happening in the

office.) I said, "What happened?" and he said, "The FBI got the word

from on top 'Destroy the letters."'

Mr. Colby: From on top?

Mrs. Luce: From the President, who was Johnson. I contended that if at

that point the FBI had proven that Castro had in mind assassinating the

President, we would have been in war with Cuba. It might have been

---

## Page 200

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:.

= 6 -

an act of State to shut up about it. If I had been the President, I

would have had (Note: missed more due to outside interference).

What is hideous about this is that the CIA is being accused or

Kennedy is being accused -- anyone except the people who probably

were involved.

If putting it at rest in a secret session will work,

if such evidence does exist, you are the man to present it.

Mr. Colby: Schweker does not know about McCarthy?

Mrs. Luce: He only knows this -- I said there is one man I know who

might be able to tell you where the se Cubans are, and that is a fellow

named Justin McCarthy. He said, "Where is he?", and I said, "I do

not know, I have lost track of him." He said, "If you find him, let me

know. " After talking with Justin McCarthy, I do not want him to talk

to Schweiker. I do not know what to say if he calls again.- Knowing the

Senator, I may never hear from him. I leave it with you.

NOTE: Mrs. Luce closed the conversation by referring to a CIA paper

entitled "Restless Youth"' and asked if it had been declassified. Mr. Colby

said he would check on it, and Mrs. Luce said she would like to have a copy

if it has been declassified.

---

## Page 201

4-00000

• .

Telephone Conversation Between Mr. Colby and Justin McCarthy at 3:45

on Tuesday, 28 October 1975 (this transcript was typed on 21 December 1976.

from steno notes of Barbara Pindar

Mr. McCarthy: I am glad to know you, even if it is over the phone.

Mr. Colby: Mrs. Luce talked to me yesterday (sic). She gave me a capsule

version of some of her chat with you.

It puts me in a bit of a jam,

obviously, because there are some things that really hold some

potential for being very important in these days (of) post-mortems

of everything. I wondered if maybe we should chat about it some-

time, or, quite frankly, one of the main things I would suggest is

that you might want to go to this Senate Committee looking into this.

Mr. McCarthy: No. There are several reasons why not. I am sure we do

not need to discuss them, but there are many reasons. Over the

period of time there have been so many things. We were theonly

ones who had the information about the missiles in Cuba for many

months, and we beat our brains out trying. to get someone to do

something (or believe?) and regrettably (in) Washington there are

too many political (opportunists?), but there are too many lives at

stake. We risked our neck for all these years. We are interested

in doing the right thing.

Mr. Colby: I wondered if you could (slice?) off that New Odeans thing (and

not go any further than that?)

Mr. McCarthy: As I said to her -- (can't read the next few words). For me

to be seen in Washington, it is (can't read the next few words). We

do not trust anyone. We did so many operations for so long, and

we were entirely successful and never lost a man, and then one day

we did an operation for the Government and lost 22 men. Lives

depend on it. Someone sent a Top Secret memo, and the one he

sent it to left it on his desk and someone came in and read (it) and

the men were arrested. She asked, "Would you talk to Bill?" I

said I would. We think it would be a good idea - - for me to go down --

I do not want to blow my cover, but I would like very much to chat with

you and tell you.

Mr. Colby: My problem is then I get information, and then what are my

obligations.

Mi. McCarthy: From the point of view of (seeing?) how to do it through persons

other than me - to get the end result.

---

## Page 202

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2

Mr. Colby: It might be that one of your fellows aware of some of the things

(would not mind telling Schweiker?) under some protection and

assurances of anonymity. That would be enough of a (can't read the

next word) to get started.

Mr. McCarthy: There is plenty to get started on.

Mr. Colby: Then (he?) could cut your people aut as

a source.

Mr. McCarthy: She said it wo uld be aclosed-door hea ring. I said there (would? )

still be someone come out of the meeting and (can't read next word)

their names in the press. You see Jack Anderson's column on Monday.

I am concerned about what it ties into -- it is all the same ball of wax.

We sat on the information about the missiles. This has been going on

for a good twenty years, and we have accumulated an awful lot of

information. We are more concerned today than when we had the

missile information. It is appalling, and it is frightening, and people

do not want to believe it. Last night I enlightened people about some of

the things that are going to happen. We feel the time has come that

some of this should come to light.

It is necessary and essential to go

back and bring out some of these things that need to be brought out, but

not at the expense of (next word missing). We have done this on our

own and at our own expense. One of the reasons my people trust me is --

I am thinking of a book -- we did not want to do a book before. The

American public wants to know.

It is all part of what went on then.

I think it should be clarified and straightened out what went on then.

But I am so terribly wary. I went to everyone, including the President,

about the missiles. We had evidence -- what ships they were on,

where they (docked?), and a few days later they came back and said

there is no credibility of what you say.

Mr. Colby: The only thing that bothers me is the story about the existence of

some records (you?) still hold. The important part of that is that

indicates some (part?) of a failure, or possibly even worse -- that

is the kind of thing that does need investigation or (correction? ) --

protecting your people that are in on it. The other possibility would

be to ask Schweker or one of his men to go and talk to you or one of

your people who would have factual knowledge of it.

Mr. McCarthy: When (Dorothy) told me about you over a period of time --

(Dorothy) said we have been through this so many times -- I took

this to editors of Life. That was the time when the guy sent the

Note: I am not positive about the "Dorothy" above, but don't know what else,

coula be. I had written in long-hand, "Doroth." My only guess at this point is

Dorothy Farmer, Mrs. Luce's secretary.

---

## Page 203

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3

Top Secret memo and it got left on a desk in Miami and we lost a

lot of people on that. Inadvertently so many things happen. We

work so carefully. We have information now that no one else has

because it has come to the point where so many of the people I work

with find they cannot trust people because of the opportunists. I

have never met such overbearing and obnoxious (can't read next

word). We sat on this year in and year out -- we never know when

we might get calls. I was up all night long the night before last.

Time is doing a big cover story on the thing -- the next issue --

the Today Show is bugging me. Washington is a funny place. If I --

by and large, when your life is on the line -- one of (our?) guys hung

himself after one of the escapades we went through. He committed

suicide because he felt guilty about it.

Up here it is terrific because

I am an animal nut. A lot of the guys divulging some of this stuff

that they would not normally do.

Mr. Colby: Let me talk with Clare again as to how we handle this. The main

thing is not so much the overall stuff about Cuba -- the main thing

is the story about records, about Oswald. That comes at a time

when that is a serious subject of study here by the Congress. If we

could in some way shake that information loose without putting the

finger on any of your friends, I think we are sort of obliged to do this

in terms of clarifying the record against the (facts?) -- this is a very

key aspect of it and a very serious problem that if it was suppressed

at the time.

Mr. McCarthy: That is not all that was suppressed.

Mr. Colby: That is the thing. They are looking into it. Let me talk to Clare

again and see if I can figure out some way in which we could talk to

you (maybe?) and if you could in the meantime think of a way of

(can't read the next word) out or (can't read the next word) out this

(feature?) of it so that you give the (final result?) but not the sourcing,

and let the investigators (find their own source later on?), we would

have done our duty. My problem is that I really cannot sit on it with

my obligations. I can be reasonable about protecting other people,

and I have to be, but I also have to have the responsibility for responding

to proper investigations of things that really should be looked into.

Mr. McCarthy: Let me (can't read next word) this in. Some of our guys (can't

read next several words).

Mr. Colby:' That is what she said.

---

## Page 204

4-100000

Mr. McCarthy: They and I are scared to death. I was Executive Producer

of TV programs for years -- I cannot make -- T have earned the

respect and confidence of these people över the years. The other

night I talked all night long. If I try to push my guys -- Clare said

it needs to be laid to rest, and it does. I would like to see it get

laid to rest, but my people --

Mr. Colby: I can assure you I am as interested (as) you in protecting that

part of it if there were some way of having part of the cake and

eating part of it, so that you do not lose the one or the other but to

work out some vehicle -- a way in getting the substantive information

loose but protecting people involved. There may be ways to do that if

we put our minds to it. Let me talk to Clare and see what really -

I will not do anything except with her without your permission.

NOTE: Mr. Colby tried to call Mrs. Luce on 29 October, but could not reach

her. He contacted her on 31 October (see separate notes)

---

## Page 205

14-00000

Telephone Conversation Between Mr. Colby and Clare Boothe Luce at 4:07

on Friday, 31 October 1975 (this transcript was typed on 22 December 1976

from steno notes of Barbara Pindar)

. 2.

Mr. Colby: I got the Restless Youth for you. And I called Justin McCarthy.

We had a long chat. He does not want me to do anything about it,

but I said you put me in an awful position. (Note: The "you'' there

refers, I believe, to McCarthy.) I understand what you mean about

his strong manner of talking. I think both of us are (hung?) with a

rather tantalizing story.

Mrs. Luce: If I had not known the guy for 25 years, I would take him much

less seriously.

Mr. Colby: The only real point is the thing about the tapes and the photos and

the allegation about the FBI. I tried to (argue?) him into figuring out

some way in getting rid of those but keeping himself out of the act.

Mrs. Luce: He called me back and said he talked with you and that you left

him in a box, and I think he feels now that there is some kind of a

question of conscience involved. He said, "I am going to let you and

Bill Colby decide what is best to do. "

Mr. Colby: I said I would be in touch with you and try to figure out something

sensible.

Mrs. Luce: Why don't we suggest that he bring you or me -- perhaps he feels

safer with me -- the tapes and photos if he has copies of them.

Mr. Colby: And then you pass them over to Schweiker.

Mrs. Luce: And let them decide, and I will maintain his cover -- he keeps

saying it is not worth it to him after all these years to blowthat --

the paradox, he tells me he is going to have to write a book (and

whether he is indeed going to?) so that he is not altogether a crackpot.

On the other hand, what he is doing is sufficiently crackpot. He is

taking care of broken-down animals from his entire area. However, --

Mr. Colby: I think that is a good idea.

You say that you and I have talked, and

we are all in a kind of box at this point, and we really in conscience

cannot sit on this stuff -- all these charges that there is remaining

evidence that (can't read next word) was held back and disappeared

---

## Page 206

14-00000

into the FBI, and maybe the way to do it is for him to provide it to

you, and you to Schweiker, and then I would just as soon drop out --

it does not really have much to do with me -- and in that way you

would protect him from Schweiker, and you would say you got it from

a friend -- and the source is whatever he and you agree on.

Mrs. Luce: I will do that.

Mr. Colby: I think that is the best thing to do. If he does not buy that, I do not

know what we do about Schweiker.

Mrs. Luce:

(I am going to ignore it if Schweiker comes to me. )

NOTE: The conversation continued, but it did not pertain to this subject.

---

## Page 207

14-00000

SECRE

T

Pettis

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT

:

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

Request, to the Deputy Director for

Operations

770è proper ticle:

This dier da cognis t let die..

Attached, in response to the Senate Select Committee

request of 27 October 1975, are separate memoranda on the

DRE and several Cuban exiles.

03

Richard S. Sampson

Chief

Latin America Division

Attachments

DCI Brife:

ly

• 220

101128/25-

SECRET

EZ IMPDET

С.Л. RY 025231

YBR

---

## Page 208

14-00000

SUBJECT:

Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE, Students'

Revolutionary Directorate)

The DRE was founded by a group of students at Habana

University in 1954 as an instrument of opposition to the regime

of President Fulgencio BATISTA.

The original members of this

group were also members of the Habana University Student Federa-

(FEU).

Several leading members of the DRE were killed by

Cuban authorities during and following the attack on

Presidential Palace, Habana, in

March 1957. The remaining DRE

leaders, as of 1958, were in exile.

The DRE worked as a secret

underground organization in Cuba,

generally in Habana, laying

plans

and making preparations.

The theory of the DRE

that

success of the revolution depended on quick and efficient

elimination of BATISTA which Fidel CASTRO's forces at that time

could not achieve alone.

The DRE finally turned against CASTRO

on the issue of communism.

As of March 1962 the DRE was receiving $9,000 a month from

the Agency for salaries of 55 assets in Miami, Florida, and

$2,000 a month for

overhead

costs.

The DRE'S

program

(AMBARB's) at that time received

$12,400 a month from the Agency.

Agency support to the DRE was terminated by mid-1967.

---

## Page 209

Julio FERNANDEZ Molino

(No crypt)

DPOB:

23 March 1934, Havana

201-752511

Subject was of interest to AMWORLD program as

• a radio

operator in 1964.

A PRQ Part I was submitted to Headquarters

by JMWAVEe had previously be in

but there was no follow-up, and Subject was not

hired.

associated clandestinely with

RESCATE (anti-CASTRO) group in Cuba.

He came to U.S. as

exile in

• May 1964. In 1966, he lived at 430 SW 11th Ave., Miami.

Julio FERNANDEZ Bencomo

(No crypt)

DPOB: 10 April 1917, Havana

201-742497

Received POA 14 January 1964, which cancelled 24 February

1964, because he was not interested in employment with CIA

since salary was insufficient.

He signed secrecy agreement

He took SGSWIRL 10

and was terminated with but he had told his wife and one

January 1964.

No derog,

CaTIOS MARQUEZ that he would be working for ClA.

He was

originally recruited for AMWORLD by one Pedro BLANCO, and was

to be used as PM asset on a CIA vessel.

Julio FERNANDEZ Gonzalez

(AMOT -99)

DPOB: 10 May 1935, Havana

201-299222

He was employed by the Intelligence and Security Commission

of the Frente Revolucionario Democratico (AMIRON/ AMBRUSH) for

bout two months in 1961.

He was brought into it by Julio

PASCUAL Abril.

le stated in a letter to Hernan HENRIOUEZ

Lorca, anti-CASTRO Cuban in Madrid who informed the FBI (who

told us in memo dated 2 November 1961) that he "was about to

take a trip to Cuba to take material to anti-CASTRO elements,

trip being financed by CIA."

He received POA 10 May 1961 for

use as member of AMOT Admin Staff. File does not say who dropped

From it, but when last contacted was working tor Dixie Lily

Products Company (a wholesale grocery outfit) as an accountant

at $50 weekly in December 1961.

POA cancelled 24 July 1962.

---

## Page 210

1400009, a

Clindin.

Luis FERNANDEZ-ROCHA Rodriguez

(Formerly AMTOPIC-2,

Nod it 53)

DPOB :

3 May 1939, Havana

201-316766

POA granted 18 April 1962.

According to file, he quit

his job as Secretary General of the Directorio Revolucionario

Estudiantel (DRE) in July 1964 to pursue his medical studies.

He was paid his final salary payment of $425 on 1 September

1964 under the DRE project.

He was to do some unwitting work

for JMHOPE, Swan Island propaganda broadcasting, and WIBALDA.

There is no further indication in file that he was terminated,

no quit claim, no OA or POA cancellation. However, there is no

information on

his use since 1964. Per document dated 7 June

1965, he was studying at University of Miami and working as

switchboard operator for Cuban Catholic Children's program in

Miami. According to Cuban Families Yearbook of 1974, Dr. Luis

FERNANDEZ Rocha living at 6021 W. 14th Lane, Hialeah, Florida,

33012 with wife and four children. He became naturalized U.S.

citizen on 15 September 1967.

Julio FERNANDEZ Travejo

(No crypt)

DPOB:

10

August 1934, Havana

201-297828

POA requested for use as PM trainee 21 March 1961. POA

cancelled 4 April 1962.

FBI memo dated 14 December 1961 notes

that he told FBI of CIA financial support to Frente Revolucionario

Democratico (FRD) and to Antonio VARONA, one of its leaders, to

the tune of "Six million dollars."

subtect told

belonged to

group

led by rolando MASFERRER which NOt getting

CIA

support.

subject visited FBI 21 November 1960 after

incident in

which

some paramilitary trainees of MASFERRER'S

group on No Name Key in Florida had come to FBI's attention.

That group was

called

"Ejercito Nacional Cubano."

---

## Page 211

14-00000

S8227

Jose Antonio LANUZA

One Jose LANUSA was a

leader of the DRE, residing in

At that time, he was

" an anti-CASTRO organization. Not clear

whether he is identified with the following LANUZA.

Jose Antonio LANUZA

(on microfiche)

201-339258

Only information in file is that Subject is a Cuban

citizen who in 1962 was living at 1705 SW 3rd Ave

He is

the Subject of Inter-Source Registry No. 95i8 Miami.

ISD 10658 1S

and any additional

Source Registry."

A note in the file also said that there was

no present contact with Subject, dated 29 October 1962.

No traces Justin MacCarthy

---

## Page 212

14-00000

""?!

30 November 1976

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT:

Comments on Ronald KESSLER's Article:

"CIA

Withheld Details of OSWALD Call," which Appeared

in the Washington Post of 26 November 1976

The following comments are keyed to the attached Washington

Post article, i.e., the paragraph numbers below correspond to the

paragraphs as numbered in the margin of the xerox of the article:

1. COMMENT: While CIA knew that a man identifying him-

self as Lee OSWALD had been in touch with the Soviet Embassy by

telephone on 1 October 1963, this information had no unusual

significance until 22 November 1963 when President Kennedy's

assassination occurred. At that time an intensive review was

made by the Mexico City Station of conversation transcripts pre-

pared on the basis of the l October telephone intercept.

transcripts had been reported to Headquarters and disseminated to

the interested members of the intelligence community (as a former

Marine, OSWALD was a Navy and FBI case, and potentially of inter-

the Department of State). This

review turned up "matches"

i.e., similar materials intercepted on 27 and 28 September 1963.

These were reported by cable to Headquarters on 23 November 1963.

There is no indication in the transcripts that Lee Harvey OSWALD

tried to make any "deal" with the Soviet Embassy as claimed in ..•

the Washington Post article.

Analysis based upon actual voice comparison could not

be made because the tapes, in accordance with the normal practice,

had been erased for re-use. The monitor was able to recall some-

thing of the voice characteristics from memory, however. He could

recall the very poor Russian spoken by OSWALD, for example.

files.

COMMENT: This statement is not substantiated by our

COMMENT: The information regarding the 1 October 1963

contact with the Soviet Embassy - received in Headquarters on

9 October -- was disseminated on 10 October 1963 to the Department

---

## Page 213

14-00000

of State, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department

A copy of the 10 October 1963 dissemination was made available

to the Warren Commission on 24 March 1964. (See Memorandum

for J. Lee RANKIN, dated 24 March 1964, from Richard HELMS,

Deputy Director for Plans; Subject: CIA Dissemination of In-

formation on Lee Harvey OSWALD, dated 10 October 1963. On

16 October 1963, our Chief of Station sent a memorandun to the

American ambassador on the subject of Lee OSWALD's contact with

the Soviet Embassy.

The original of this memorandum was routed

to the ambassador, the minister, the counselor for political

affairs, the regional security officer.

A copy was sent to the

legal attache, naval attache, and the I&NS.

In April 1964, Messrs. COLEMAN, SLAWSON and WILLENS,

staff representatives of the Warren Commission, visited the U.s.

embassy in Mexico City. Our Station then indicated that the

three men already knew

"all about" the telephone conversations

OSWALD had.

According to the Memorandum for the Record of 11

April 1964, the three men reviewed the product from the tele:

shone tap operation for the days 27, 28 September and 1 October

1963 when Lee OSWALD contacted and visited the cuban and soviet

Embassies.

They made a "schedule" of OSWALD's activities as far

as possible for these days from this source. Note: They were

shown English translations of the product, or "take"

, as it was

(HMMA 23249, 14 April 1964.

This document, in a sani-

tized and declassified version was made available to the public

under provisions of the FOIA in March 1964 as Document Number

274 and in September 1976 as Document Number 658) See follow-

ing:

Memorandum for J. Lee RANKIN, dated 31

January 1964, from Richard HELMS, Deputy Director

for Plans; Subject: Information Developed by CIA

on the Activity of Lee Harvey OSWALD in Mexico

b. Letter to Richard HELMS, Deputy Director

for Plans, dated 10 February 1964, from J. Lee

RANKIN, General Counsel.

Memorandum for J. Lee RANKIN, dated 19

February 1964, from Richard HELMS, Deputy Director

for Plans: Subject: Information Developed by ClA

on the Activity of Lee Harvey OSWALD in Mexico

City, September 28 to October 3, 1963.

2.

---

## Page 214

4-00000

4. COMMENT: See comments in Paragraph 3, above.

COMMENT: The Agency disseminated the information

concerning OSWALD's contact with the Soviet Embassy on 1 Octo

ber to the Department of State, the Federal Bureau of Investi-

gation, the department of the Navy, and the immigration and

Vaturalization Service on 10 October 1903.

On 23 November 1963

the Agency disseminated to the FBI the transcripts of the tele-

November 1963, the Agency disseminated to the Be information

relating to OSWALD's contacts with the Cuban and Soviet Embas-

sies in Mexico City.

6. COMMENT: OSWALD's alleged offer of information and

suggestion that the Russians pay his way to the Soviet Union

does not appear in Agency transcripts of OSWALD's telephone.

conversations with the Cuban and Soviet Embassies.

7.

COMMENT: OSWALD was in no sense "under investiga-

tion" (before 22 November 1963). None of the facts of his trip

to and stay in the USSR and return to the United States, 1959-

1962, were known to the Mexico Station before 10 October 1963,

when

the bare bones of his biography were forwarded by Headquar-

ters to it in response to a Station cabled report of 8 October

1963 which forwarded, on a routine basis, what appeared to be

a contact by an American for a visa to Cuba in transit to the

USSR. It should be pointed out that the voice intercept cover-

age was not processed in "real time"

The means of acquisi-

tion and the volume of the information precluded anything but

the spot reporting of items judged by the monitor to be of more.

than ordinary interest. Full texts of selected items required

a full transcription and full translation. One of the "trig-

gers" that normally operated to focus and accelerate more speedy

review and reporting of this kind of raw intelligence was the

This was what occurred in the second of two

conversations on 1 October with the Soviet Embassy, during which

the speaker said he was "Lee OSWALD". This was the first time

that the name OSWALD appeared in the intercepts and was report-

ed by the Station to Headquarters (8 October 1963).

Had,

at any time, a person telephoned the soviet

embassy, identified himself, and offered information

in ex-

change for a trip to the Soviet Union, it would have triggered

3

---

## Page 215

14-00000

= :

an immediate reaction by the monitor and the Station --

tirst, to identify the speaker; second, to report the infor

mation to Headquarters; and third, to step up technical and

photographic surveillance.

8. COMMENT: No comment.

9.

COMMENT: Tapes were not "routinely destroyed".

Tapes were erased

after transcription had been made and re-

used.

Full transcripts of calls made on 28 September 1963

and 1 October 1963 were forwarded to Headquarters on 23 Novem-

ber.. The person who processed the transcripts was identified

in the cable.

There is no indication in the transcripts that

OSWALD offered information or that any omissions were made which

might have contained that information.

10. COMMENT: No comment.

11. COMMENT: Files do not support this statement.

12. COMMENT: Files do not support this statement.

13. COMMENT: The information "given by DURAN" is sup-

ported by her interrogations.

COMMENT: "OSWALD later referred in a letter to

'meetings' he had in the Soviet Embassy."

Although KESSLER

chooses not to give details, this statement is in reference

to a letter OSWALD wrote on

9 November 1963 to the Consular

Division of the Soviet Embassy in Washington. (Commission

Exhibit No. 15, Vol. XVI of the Hearings before the President's

Commission

on the Assassination of President Kennedy:)

15. COMMENT: No additional comment.

COMMENT: With regard to the press statement that

"CIA claimed it did not know of most of OSWALD's activities ir

Mexico City until after the assassination": this is true, Cl

ild not know of his activities, other than those revealed ir

the intercepts.

It should be noted that after the dissemination

on 10 October 1963 of the 1 October 1963 contact, no requests

were received from the dissemination customers for further in-

formation or follow-up. Without some customer interest being

expressed, particularly from the Navy, the FBI or the Department

---

## Page 216

14-00000

of State, who had the greatest interest in OSWALD at the time,

there would have been little motivation for the Station to in-

dependently pursue such a tenuous CE lead.

them by reporters.

No further comment seems relevant, beyond

those comments made earlier.

18. COMMENT: Is BELIN here referring to Gilberto

ALVARADO Urgate?

If so, information regarding OSWALD provided

by ALVARADO was passed to the Warren Commission as attachments

to a memorandum for J. Lee RANKIN, dated 1 June 1964, from

Richard HELMS, Deputy Director for Plans.

(See also Memorandum for J. Lee RANKIN, dated 4 June

1964, from Richard HELMS; Subject: Information Developed on the

Activity of Lee Harvey OSWALD in Mexico City. This memorandum

became Commission Exhibit No. 3152 contained

in Vol. XXVI of

Warren Commission report.)

19. COMMENT: We do not know what BELIN actually said to

the reporters, when, or in response to what. We believe, how-

ever, this may be referring to BELIN's letter of 15 April 1975

to E. Henry KNOCHE of CIA. BELIN at that time was Executive

Director of the Commission on CIA Activities within the United

States (Rockefeller Commission). In his letter, BELIN refers to

the photograph of an American male and the question whether or

not this male was Lee Harvey OSWALD. He continues:

"The CIA and the Warren Commission both

determined that the picture was not of Lee

Harvey OSWALD and that the picture was taken

after

• OSWALD left Mexico City.

"Although portions of this record have

been released to the public, other portions

have remained classified because of concerns

by the CIA at the time that a release of the

full picture might disclose sources and

methods which the CIA felt were not in the

national interest to disclose at that time.

In light

of the

false allegations about the

assassination of President Kennedy and the

5

---

## Page 217

14-00000

false allegations of CIA involvement, I

feel that it would be appropriate to re-

consider whether or not the entire matter

can be fully disclosed at this time."

An interim reply was forwarded on 23 April 1975 by

E. Henry KNoChk, Assistant to the Director, CiA. On < May

1975 a review was completed of Agency holdings regarding the

photograph of the unidentified individual in Mexico City pub-

lished by the Warren Commission.

This review also included

knowledge of OSWALD's contacts with the Cuban and Soviet Embas-

sies obtained from telephone tap information and interrogations

of Silvia DURAN, a Mexican employee of the Cuban Embassy.

13 May 1975 two summaries of the above review, one classified

and one unclassified, were forwarded to BELIN by the Agency.

-.

Attachment:

Article

---

## Page 218

CIA Withheld Details on Oswald Cal

Bj Tonald Kessier

Washine'on Dost Seat! lirle:

transcript to either the FBI or the

So, with the full cooperation of the

Warren Commission,

Moxican government,

CIA

virctays

September, 1963-cight

Instond, the Cly gave the rBI in

were installed en teicphone lines ko..

the assassination

Oclober, 19c3, only a brief report say.

Iresident Kemnedy-ise Harvey

Of Eno Oswald had inade contuct will

ing into both embassios.

The ClA

was especially intrrested

telephoned the Serict embassin

a this Russians.1 It gave the Warren

in U.S. citizens. who made contact

Medeo City and tried to maic a

Commission a transcript of the taped

with the embassies.

conversation but for unexplained ca-

Thus, when Oswald showed ip in

exchenge for unspecifica infori

sons failed to irclude in the transeript

110%, he manted a irce trip to 6 Osinid's offor or information and his

Moxico City in Inlo Septemher andi

Iciephoned the Russian cinbassy,

his

suggestion that the Russians would

conversation was picked we from the

His conversation. was intercested:!

want to yay his way. to the Sovlet

wirctar. A transcript was made an!

and macarded by

the Contral

Intel

Unior.

circulated in the CIA pificos in the

¡ironme Agency at the timo. But it was

The Post has:also delermined that

Amarican embassy in Moxico City.

•The station chict at that time was

turned

the CIA, for unexplained reasons, told

over to the EBril the Warren Commission that

the Inle Winston M. Scolt, who per-

sonally reviowed all 'transcripts ema-

: learned of most of Oswald's activitics

¿no possible sales, and it was not 7 in Mexico City only atter the assas-

mating from

turned ever io the Warren

Com-

wiretaps on Sovict bloc

installations.

sination.

The fact is, however,

that

sion curing its investigation of the.

The Oswald transcript, according to

the CIA monitored and tarc-recorded

-ia01.

a CIA lanstalon

who worked

with

his conversation

with both the Rus.

tie unanswered question

is why

•sian and Cuban embassies in lickico

Scott, aroused a lot of interent:

"o!?

City in the fall of 1993, before Kon-

"They usually ricked un the trans.

Due existence ei the CIA telephone

cripts the next day," ho said.. "This

redy's death.

they warled right away."

marcent of Oswald's conversation in

It was the CIA's belief that the to

Want that transcript

contained is

rexico cus ad the contents of the l. embassies were heavily involvea in 9a matior of some dispute, and the CIA

si-secret transcribt have been veri: g

the spy business and that, speciti

Lica by the il'ashington

Post. The

says it routinely destroyed the tape

, cally, they were oscrational bases for

Fore ins siso verified that die CIA

• intelligence activities directed at tha

¡ bofore the assassination. But sonie

failed to turn ovc" the

complete

United States.

SCe OSTVALD, AT, COl. 1

..dinsai.

LEE HARVEY OSWALD

•. lolanhonca Sorict ombass:

THE WASHINGTU:

POSI

26 November 1975.

---

## Page 219

4-00000

OSTYATE, FrOm A1. i

ec-ile Who saw the transcript

Monra me tope before the assassina.

ten rooall that Oswald was lying to

One of thom is David 1. Phillips, &

iormer CIA officer, who now heads

die Asseclation oi Retired Intelligence

Oineers and is a Icading dciender

of CIA activitics. Phililos was sta-

Sionca 19 Mexico City at the time,

The transcript revealed, Phillips re.

called, that Oswald told

"I have" Information

would be intercated in, and I know

actlvities. And lts teletyped report

made no montion of Oswald's offer

of intorrintion in excha: to tor a irce

Irap to Russia or of his attempts to

travel to Cuba and Russia, "On Oc.

tober 1, 1903," the teletype message

"a reliable and ansitive source

in Mexico reported that an American

male, sho identifica limsell as Le2

Oswald, contacted the Soviet Enicassy

in Mexico City Inquiring whetter

the embassy had received

conceining a telegram which had bcen

sent to lVashington."

That was strictly a routine handling

of the matter, and similar. to

standara roports made to the bBl 2.

Sicars stationce ct the time to 16301

City said the dis inaust

rciationship

souzint to coneral. The cil ira.a

David W. Eatin, tie was in :

sistant counsai to the Terror 5u

mission and inter executive tita

al tho Rockoicile: commission':

Of the Cirl, said that if too

Commission hed Arowd d: D=i

conversations and ether now

mation, it modid nore boor is

thai the ascencinaton test:

01 2 10r0ien concotrer

Sor, Richard S. S0tn2i17

you can pey my way" to Russia.

The stonogropher who typed up the

communists by American citizens in

transcript and the translator who pie-

said that trottin ton went

pared in had similar reconcctions.

Even after Kennedy's assassination,

"Ho said he had soire information

the CIA failed to tuin over to the

to idll them," the typist said in an

Warren Commission the full trans.

interview in Mexico.

"Fris main con.

cript of the telephone intercept it had

coar was notting to one of the two

made in Mexico City. Osivala's offer

countries Russia or Cubal and he

of information 1o the Russinas in ex-

consercasions.

In interviews sotta The Fost

Who documantca Do Clint:

wanted their to gay for it. He said

change for passage was omitted from

ins zad to mect thom."

ice CiA claimod

Iia WVerren Commission iater con•

claced the Russians and Cubans were

SILVIA DURAT

... rocalls talk milia Curala

it diu not know of most of Oscid's

activities in Mexico City until aite:

not much impressed by Oswaid, This

the assassination.

report irom an cror

now is supported by Sylvia Deran

would take three to four months to

The significance of the CIA actions.

maching in lexice Cur

= Mexicar citizen whe worked in the

is difficult to assess. The FBI in the"

vald and Cubon intolurrea

Cuoon cmoossy at the time of 'Os.

process. Informed of this, Duran said,

fail of 1903 was already snowing ir-

At lho time, Cucan 150n5 es

termittent interest in Oswaid

wald's visit. She talked to Oswald on

rated their more important ad

He was gesticulating? Duran said sho

Sept, 27, 1963, and recalls the mect.

might or might not have intensified

ivila arents of the K0D. tir 5o:

hnd to call for heip from the Cusan

ing in somo detail,

that intorest it it inad been toid of

intolligence service.

corsal iho sot into a shouting matei

Oswald's conversations,

In a Joine interview in mexico City

Dolin called en the DiA is

with Oswald and told him to got out.

in this reportor. and cost soccial

Duran said she never saw him again.

•Whether the new intormation would • sui disciosure co its anoradae

correspondent Marlise Simmons, Duran

nave affoeica the Waren Commis

Oswale and

nia contects i

nd Caraid lot he- that ne wanied.

However, Duran's story coverca onli 7

sion's deliberations is aiso an opon

Cubans and Russiona

o ta to cuba and muscia end dis.14 the nest say ei Osmalas liveday

question.

Solin, a slauren

stay in Mexico City. Ossaid lalor re-

riaird documonts to

gated the possibility ef a icroigr. con.

" jicried in a lotter to "meatings"' inc

Taron Commission's coro

oite Check revolulion.

spiraey. and concluded there iras 10

mong ones things, no cirimes to be

had in the Sorict Embassy.

mamoor of the dincrican Commu

liow. interestedi

venals of a iorcign power.

wise Party.

Ostyald's dealings

Nevertheless, there is vet no ch

Duran said she informed Oswald

planation for the CIA's hondling of

tant in order to travel to Russia he

The translator and trpist sco aan.

Oswald's conversations, The CIA i.

would have to obtain permission fron

ded the transcript of ine intercepteci

dav refuses

is coiment, saring it

the soviets. Oswald wont off and ver

conversation recallca

that ine levci

wowd not be appropriate in the light

wer later in the dies to informl5of interest was

high. But the Cil's

of an imponding investigation by tie

Duti that be hi obinined tho nec.

own actions load to a dricront con.

House Sclect. Commitice on

Riled Tenneer,

the Cid's conecer.

=a? d..1:

secret soireca mad interizonas

Bitake said

tonal internet maul be sorred

disclosing the trut

A CiA spondemn special

to scenarchd art

cocard barmiscion. Dura said

called the Goriet cobraar and

The agency walice until

1063, to notio the ae7 di Oswald's

When asked it they could

tao agencys actions, some CIA ot

mit such soonite

---

## Page 220

GIA Withheld

Data on Oswald

Assassinations Panel

Issues Report to House

• BY NORMAN KEMPSTER

2 Times stewer aP

MASHINGTON_ TLe CIA. Miti-

held. from: the FBI for almost tro

months in 1963 information that Lee

'Haryey Oswald had talked with Cu-

, ban and Soviet officials about his de-

sire to visit those countries, a House

committee reported friday. sergi?

The Select Committee on Assassin-

rations indicated in a report to the full:

House that its investigation.ofthe

murder of President John F. Kennedy

would focus early in 1977 on a trip

Oswald had made to Mexico City in

3 October; 1953. 108

arring sa?

ia Chiet Counsel Richard A. Sprague

said", that the committee staff had

learned that a CIA message describ-

Fing Oswald's activities in Mexico 10

federal agencies such. as the FBI had

been reivritten to eliminate.any men-

- tion of his request for Cuban and So-

The CLa discovered Oswald's.pre-

sence: at,the embassies through its

routine surveillance.of those facilities.

A Because Oswald had once delected to

¿the Soviet Union, the CLA and FBI

ched been interested in his activities

Lever before the Kennedy assassina-

EE ECLA's decision to Withhold in

foruation tas reversed shortly aiter

Thennedy, was killed. The agency re-

ported Oswald's efforts to visit Cuba

and the Soviet Union, both to toe FBI

THE LOS ANGELES TIMES

1 January: 1977

" District of Columbia's congressional dels

and to the Warren Commission, nich con-

gate and the chairman of the King subcom

cluded that Ostrald was the assassia and

mittee' said thai no decision bad been mad

Had acted alone.

on accepting Ray's offer.

Sprague told a press conference that it

However, Sprague indicaled that il prot

• vas impossible without more information

ably would be accepted.

o know why the CLA had censored its oisn

"Any and all people tho have relevan

message.

information will be interrogated," Spragu:

But he said the incident raised two inter-

said.

siing. questions:, what might the winer

• In a personal statement issued in co

gencies have done differently if they had

junction with the report, Rep. Henry 13.

Jeen more fully informed and why aid the

Gonzalez (D-Tex.), who is to become com-

ClA decide to remove "information that * mittee chairman in the new yeer, said i

was considered pertinent enough to be put thorouga investigation vias needed to au

in an initial draft of the message?/

"I swer hundreds a pressing questons

- There were no firm conclusions in the

Gonzalez said that the commiltee Jiopea

report, which the 12-member committee

• to discover whether former FBI Director Y

prepared after the first three months of its

Edgar Hoover's now well-known animosi-

investigation into the murders of Kennedy

ty toward King had afiected the FBI's in-

•and civil rights. leader. Dr. Ufartin Luther Yestigation of the assassination.:,

10906857563

Xc However, Gonzalez said, the commilled's

" Technicaly, the corate. goes out of work coud go well heyond the killings cl

business Tuesday with the end of the ses-

Kennedy and King. so

sion of Congress in which it was formed.

"The committee can'shed light on tre

The purpose of the year-end report was to

larger issue of political murder and vi-

urge the new Congress to reestablish the : olence,

" Gonzalez said. "We should re!

committee and to give it $6.5 million to pay

forget, that President Ford had his fin

for the fist year of what could be a two-

"narrow escapes; no member of the licuse

year investigation.

i tri for.

.?::

In the three months since its establish-Aibombed.,

Akari,

ment, the committee has initiated prelim-

" He said the committee's ultimate las:

inary investigations into new and pre-

-wäs."to find out not just what happened

vicusly unpursued leads in both assassina-

but widy."

16446

tions," the report said

The committee said its staff investigators

had recently questioned a former CIA:

agent. who had "personal knowledge. of

Oswald's visits to the Soviet and Cuban

embassies in alexico: As a result of that in-

tervier; the" recort said, staff members

were sent to Mexico, where they found and

guestioned additional witnesses.

These witnesses had never been sought:

out beiore by any investig. ive body, not-

sithstanding the fact that iney had impor-

ant Iniormation concerning staiements hi

se Harvey: Oswald in Mexico within 6

days ol the assassination of Presiden: Ken-

nedy,

," the report said

The report said also that the commiltee

stair had interviewed a person who assert-

ed that he had discussed the king murder

with James carl Ray, who pleaded guilty

to the crime. The unidentlied witness said

that Ray had told him about contacting an

associale in Europe to receive further in-

"structions. The story, whick was told to ra-

posters by a committee member retar

Weeks ago, has not been verified,

Anthony Lewis, Ray ofiered this week to

resty under oath at a committee hearing.:

But Sprague and Walter F. Fauntroy, the.

=

-

---

## Page 221

14-00000

GONFDENDEL

• Inspector ca. 222.

17-3320

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM

SUBJECT

: John H. Waller

Inspector General

: Washington Post Story of 13 November

1976 "Oswald Reportedly Told Cubans

of Plan to Kill JFK"

1. The Post story on Saturday states that a J. Edgar Hoover

memorandum reported that Lee Harvey Oswald told Cubans in

advance of his plan to kill President Kennedy. The attached

package was prepared by Russ Holmes of CI Staff. It is for-

warded for your information.

2. A copy of the Washington Post story has been added

to the package.

John H. Waller

Attachments: a/s

SDBreckinridge:js (16 Nov "76)

Distribution:

Original - Addressee w/atts

1 - IG Chrono

1 - IG Subject (Task Force File)

A- SDe Chrono

w/atts in above file

1 - Seymour Bolten w/atts

1 - John Waller

w/atts

1 - Andrew Talkiewicz w/atts

1 - Dave Grinwis w/arts

1 feetaines 111.31.

---

## Page 222

14-00000

--772

!

(SECRET

13 November

1976

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Chief, CI Staff

FROM

: Russell B. Holmes

SUBJECT

: "Oswald Reportedly Told Cubans of Plan

to Kill JFK"' by John M. Goshko, Washington

• Post, 13 November 1976.

1. The memorandum".. by the late FBI Director

J. Edgar Hoover saying that Lee Harvey Oswald reportedly

told Cuban officials in advance of President Kennedy's

assassination that he intended to kill the President"

is cited in Commission Exhibit No. 3152, Volume XXVI,

of the Hearings Before the President's Commission on

the

Assassination of President Kennedy pp. 154-157 (See lab A).

CE No. 3152 is cited in support of statements made by the

Warren Commission in it's Report on pages 307-308 (see

lab B).

This memorandum is based upon information which

the Agency had passed to FBI Headquarters and it's repre-

sentative in Mexico City.

2.

On 26 November 1963, the Mexico City Station

reported to Headquarters that a Nicaraguan named Gilberto

ALVARADO Ugarte (referred to as "D" in the Warren Report)

came to the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City. He claimed he

had been in the

Cuban Consulate in Mexico City on 18

September 1963 when a man he later recognized to be Lee

Harvey Oswald received $6,500 in cash to kill an importani

person in the United States.

(See Tab A for complete

memorandum.)

The information obtained from ALVARADO was passed

SEORET

---

## Page 223

14-00000

..

SACH

A short dissemination (DIR 85744) alerting custons agencies

to ALVARADO's allegation, was made on 29 November 1963

to the White House, the Federal Bureau of Investigation,

and the Department

of State (see Tab D).

A second dis

semination (DIR 87667) was made on 7 December 1963 (see

Tab E) .

In the latter dissemination,

mention was

made that a representative of the FBI participated in the

interrogation of ALVARADO.)

On 13 December 1963, the Agency forwarded under

escl 3/119, 150 a translation ot the Mexican poLICE

interrogation report on Gilbarto ALVARADO Ugarte (see

Tab F) -

5.

In summary, the Agency and the FBI knew of

ALVARADO's allegations concerning Oswald, which were

sub-

sequently retracted by ALVARADO himselt as being false.

In addition,

the FBI was able to prove that Oswald was

still in New Orleans at the time ALVARADO claimed he saw

Oswald in the Cuban Embassy

in Mexico City.

The information

was forwarded to the Warren Commission by the Agency and the

as evidenced by its inclusion in the Warren Commission

Report and accompanying exhibits.

Bitine

Russell B. Holmes

SECRET

---

## Page 224

WISIINGHTON

13 NOVIC

Oswald Reportedly Pold

Cubans of Plan to Kill JFK

By John M. Goshko:

l-sa'naton Post Stil Wrl.co

The

Justice Department

has discovered a 1964 memo

• randum by the late FBI Di-

wester i. Edgar Hoover say.

ing that Lee Harvey Oswald

• reportedly. told Cuban offic

ials in advance of President

Kennedy's assassination that

he intended to kill the Presi-

dent.

Informed sources said yes

terday that Hoover, in the

memo, attributed this infor-

mation to a highly reliable

Informant

uno claimed to

have been told it personally

by. Cuban Prime Minister

Fidel Castro. ....:

Castro, according to the

• JEE HARYEI OSTYAID

• Hoover memo found

memo, reportedly said he

had been advised by officials

of: the Cuban embassy in

. The assertions reported in

• Mexico City. that they had .. the Fioover memo go further

met with Oswald before the

Noy. 22, 1963,

assassination

i than any information cur-

rently on the record. con-

of •Kennedy in Dallas and

cerning alleged statements

that Oswald informed them

made by Oswald in. a prey-

•of his intentions.

lously disclosed visit to the

Cubar embassy in Mexico

City prior to the murder of

Kennedy.

There has been persistent

surmise about a possible in-

volvement of the Castro.gov.

ernment in. the murder of

Kennedy, possibly as a coun-

ter stroke against. CIA ef

forts to assassinate the

Cuban leader..

There has also been spec.

ulation that the assassina-

tion may have been the work

of Cuban - exile

terrorists.

• However, all of these reports

have been fourth-or fifth-

hand

accounts

originating

with informants of doubtful

reliability:

The:

Hoover

memo

waS

described by the sources as

having been addressed to the.

Warren

Coinmission,

ap.

pointed by former President

Johnson to investigate the

assassination.

But former

commission staffers said yes.

.terday that. they. had

recollection ot ever having

See OSWALD, A9; Col. I

---

## Page 225

Memo Cit Informant

On Oswold Cuban Linte

i OSWALD, From AL

sald though that they believed "as an

educated guess" that it was Rolando

received such a memo or having bean

Cubela, a high Cuban official and Cas-

told by Hoover or other FBI officials

tro intimate whom the CIA recruited

of the information in it.

•..Officials of the Justice Department

• In 1961 and who later figured in ClA

plans to kill Castro.

and the FBI refused any comment on

In the Senate intelligence commit-

the memo's existence or its contents,

tee investigation last jear it was dis-

and other sources familiar with the

closed that the ClA employed a highly

assassination investigation said they

placed Castro government. official

had no knowledge of whether it act-

with the cryptonym AMLASH in ef-

ually was sent to the Warren Commis. "

'forts to assassinate the Cuban leader.

sion,

• Cubela and AMLASH were publicly

Those sources who told The Wash-

reported to have been the same man.

ington Post about the document said:

• The sources also were unable to say

its existence apparently had been un-

how Hoover came, into possession

of

known until recently. It was discov-

information from an informant inside

ered, the sources said, as the result of

information that came to the atten.

Cuba, since foreign intelligence is a

CIA rather than an FBI function.

tior of the Justice Department and

, Some said they thought the informa:

-that prompted Attorney. General Ed-

tion had first been given to the CIA,

ward H. Levi to order a search of FBI. which then turned it over to Hoover.

files.

.. After • the

memo was found,

the

However, John McCone, who was

CIA director at the time, said in a tel.

ephone interview yesterday that the

sources added: Levi put a tight clamp: information reportedly in the Hoover

of secrecy on the matter, and only a

small number of persons in the Jus

memo was "unknown to me."

tice Department and FBI know about…. "It's the first I've ever heard of it,"

the document's existence. ..:

McCone said. "It's hard for me to be.

-As a result, the Sources said,

they

lieve that such a memorandum ex-

are unable to alswer such quastions

isted without it being known to me

as why the memo apparently.

never.

and to the staff of the Warren' Com•

reached

the Warren

Commission, - raission."

whether the information was accurate

.?. The same point was made by David

and, if so, whether Castro; was in-

W. Belin, who served as one of the.

formed about Oswald's Intentions' bei

Warren Commission's legal counsels.

fore or after Kennedy was killed!

He said, in a telephone interview, "T

Documents released recently by the

have absolutely

no

recollection

CIA inder the Freedom of Informa-

such a memo. If such a document did

tion Act establish that Oswald visited

exist-I'm sure that we never saw it."

"Mexico City less tinan two months be:

• Other documents that have been

fore the assassination and met taere

made public recently Indicate that

witk officials of the Cuban emuassy. it- Hoover and top FBI officials. knew-

One of these CIA documents, dated while the, bureau was investigating

the Kennedy assassination — that the

May 5, 1964, states that prior to Octo

ber,, 1963, Oswald visited the Cuban: CIA was exploring

the possibility

of.

embassy in two or three occasions

having Castro killed. However; Hoover

and was in contact with three alleged

"; never. informed the Warren Com-

Cuban Intelligence agents identitled

Thission of the CIA'S plotting against

as • Luisa Calderon. •Vanuel. •Vegas

Castro.

• Perez and Rogelio Fogriquez Lopez.

He also is. known to have talked

with an embassy official named Siliva

Duran. She reportedly has sid that

she dealt with Oswald only about his

unsuccessful.attempts to obtain a visa

to visit Cuba.

The sources were unable to identily

the informant described in the Hoover

• Inemo as having obtalned the informa-

don from Castro. Some of the sources

---

## Page 226

14-00000

0010-11727131

ISRASE, ONZIYY

3:90rt to asko an appolataone for 12

toорого sunbor

X5. 11024557

I1110018,

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schnorledged that 2b01?

stated

boon knows In the

QUISO bURSNORE SA GUIDaTO Undor the IsLo

ISVOLVING SEX NUEZNSTEIS

SORRITZ BERted that hO YOULd nOt didCuOS The MAttOX

IT.

danted

по рать

Thats0oyes 01

HORNITE TOLUTOd tO SAXO

this

1st0ry10r end statod ho alchod ba bed

AUDENSTEIX SANY

nOVOr

acknowledged having

3E0 Then RUBENSTEIX lIvad dE

Chicago,

TONGITI

statod DUDENSTIIN

DIO SUd DO LILO DOIDINE DOSETASAE DIE.

+ 249/89-0-01602 tnn no 8-16-023

1_SA PILARS SO DRODRICED La Dela correl 2632100

COMMISSION ExaBIr No, 3151-Continued

657

CENTRAL INTELLIOT

луниатом, D.I. 2030.

8 Juno 1968

SUBIICTI

Mr, s, Lae Restor

Coneral Counsel

President's Commiesion on the

Annasalnation of Prosident Kannady

Informalion Doveloped on the Acurity

Of LES HATrOY OSWALD I Mexico GiLY

So Or 26 Hovember 1965 a yourg Lutis American, relersod

so herala as "D", camo to the U,S, Embrary la lexico Cly, He

claimed he had been in the Cuban Corrulale In Mexico City on

18 Sepiember 1963 when a man he later recognized to be Lee Herray

OSWALD secelved $6,500 in eash to kill an importare person la tha

United States.

"D" described the elrcumstances as followas Whlio searding

by a bathrooms door about noon he save a group ol three parsons cono

versing on a pallo a low foet away,

One was a tall, thin Negro witis

reddiah hair, abriouely dyed, who spoke replely la boch Spandeh and

Engleho He had prominent check bones and a noticeable scar on tha

lowes right slde of his chin.

The second war a white person whom

the subject had seen prevlouely in a walling room carrying a Caradias

passport.

The wilte parson had green eyer, blondieh hair, with a

pompadour hairdo, and dark sycglasses.

The third perton allegedly

'HE LEO PETVOY OSWALD,

"D" mas coinpletely convinced of shia

Irom pubilahed photor al OSlYALD following the escarinallon,

OSWALD WA WeSTlag a black aporE coat, buttoned-up masto shire

with shore collar taos, no die, dark gray pants, end 610ar dyesteroa.

COMMISSION ExHIBIT NO, 3162

---

## Page 227

14-00000

858

He ted e ssees paraport la his pocket, sore a trial matsa till e

yollor band, and eppeared to baro a pistol la a shouldar hoister.

A tall Cuban lolnad lo grous momanially and passad Amorican

currency to tha Negro, Tha Negro then allegedly said to OSHAID

In English, 1I V80E 10 k14 to 5023.4

OSWALD replied,

Myou're

Iot mar enough, ¿ can do is," The Negro then said In Spanieb,

"I easy yo rich you,

I have a lot to do." OSHALD replied,

"The people aro

walling for me back lhast," The Negro thea

SaVE OSWALD $6,500 IN LI

denomirallon U.S, Blis, sayine,

his lent mues. "

Aner hearing this conversation, "D" guid

Azze be teles

oned the U.S, Embaady In Mexico City several limes

on 20 September before the assa a bination in an attempt to report

He beller las somaone Important In the Undled State a deo to ba

killed, due was liselly told by sorneone a? the Embassy lo stop

1, "D' t3s knows to this ArEnCy as a dormes informars ol

a Latin American docurity sergico.

Ala rellability uso considered

auesllonable by U.S, authoritica although he bad not bees wholly

discredited,

"D' cialmed ho seso la tiexico Clty working againa?

lise Cuban Communiste for Mle serolee,

She sorrica, coworer,

ho denied that ho was acting on Its behall, Walle Investigation

Ya the United Stales showed thai OSWALD could not porsibly boro

been ln Mexico Glly on 16 Septembor toe wao known to tava beco

19 New Oricans on boss 1i end 19 Septembar), Laiorslya laberrogation

¿siled to erate "D'al story.

• f.

On I8 November 1963 the Mericas pollee isterrinaed him.

de Best up perelated in lla story bul os 30 Novembos ho semitiod

is a algred statement that hia shodo eccount aboul OSWALD tas

tia admilited ho led nos ssen LoN OSWALD as all and that

he dad sot seen arybody palú maray in the Cubas Imbassy, Ha

also admited ho had not tried repeatedly to phone a marring lo

she U.S, Embarry la dexico Clly on 20 September 20 he had

•Tarloualy chelmad.

Instend ho hod light contsetad the U.5, Emo

Isray ands the desasolnatica.

"g's aald shet to moline in tolling

1h5s sales atory mas to belo got Almaell admitted into lão Ualsed

Stien 00 let do could carticiparo in ecilon agaiant ildal Casiro.

He said that ha bated Castro sad thought sher ble story abous osWala.

Is dollerad, mould help canna lão Ualtad Surro 10 texo action agalare

castro,

{'IN945 XHUT ND. 3152-Cuntinuod

3.

Followine the abour intorrogation,

"D'" promptly

rotracted the contesalon ho had made to the Merican suthoritigo

2s80r11a2 let 1l bed dera extaried Isom him andor pressure.

He wat then

machine.

a gorationed by U.5, authorilies saing & polyzraph

roluntarily consented to tho one of this sausoo

menta

Durine the questionina it usa pointed out to him that as

wee noi balag trulhi, according to the polygraph, in idantisine.

pholozsaphs ol OSWALD as the person ha daw la the Cuban

Consularo.

Ho replied that he had full laith is the polygrapt.

that ho mould 1o1 attempt to reluto the sexulio, dad ilal be

"must haro ders mistaken, "'

Is addition ho chanzed dia story

regarding the day ho riulted the Cuban Consulato, Anally de-

aíding si 80ok place on Juanday, 17 Septembor, li mer concluded

STom lho sonalte of to polygraph lost phas "D" bed debricates 210

un' san olnEs boas deported by

Richerd Fisimo

DePUsY DiSACtOr SOr PlerO

COMMISSION EXHIBIT NO. 3152-Continued

---

## Page 228

14-00000

SO ALLOCATIOS IT I-32

tasted state symber 86o, 53 at comes at to

3011071931

Tag2 ontorod Lossco

S110FaL2Y

24728829, 1003,

travolod to Moxico,

D.

and sUbBacuantiy

zado coatset osts a lieuracuss concundst rosiding da

Loxiao

tO SFOYRS

C1t7.

To study

40

rieft the

CUbIS

Consuleto 1ª Loxico, D.

SLOTOES

Cbs by rural punt lise sacasticates pagera de a kexican

He stated thet on

Soptonber lus

she CubIa Consulato, and

1063,

He Mant tO

sittiny

vesting

I20 & SOUP.

EUSEDIO

• діл та

ELICIDE NI LICUS'E

door to di

ho doticod thioo son,

StOrala.

reddiat halt!

tho socond y1s

& ILA PhOM

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the

800%

BABYEY ASYALD.

joinod tho abova

I0 S01I0N1DE COAYOTGITLON DOTTEOR thO MOTTO SI

STARO 918 oyertuerd by source

OSTALO: YOU TO 501 RES ORCHEI, I 020 dO 1tO

- 1380

COMMISSION EXITIBIT No. 3152-Continued

НАБРО (10 SРAN1EN)І & САП'! ХО

*its y00.

§ пято

& 10t to dr.

OsThIDe the pooplo aro talline sor un heek there.

jay? seatod thet the Morro

then savo 057110)

8R,900 19

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al ferro

ПОПОВіЛЛЕДОПО,

unfing?

tilA MIR,

31,000 TAA

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axpans08.

ThE dOTTO SIDO SAYO

OSYAID about

200 Hosscan peror.

in a later Satorrion, noures Rtsted that tho

Unstod Statos bard notos

ToO In a Ball

pack

sbout ona fcurst

thick thO MOsTO

кд "дбувава рвувоог,

lost stated that Osrald had

a platos la

but hn don not suro of tols

stated thet osTaLs

RhoOs

and

u1th & yol

bande

decordion

tO MOUrcO,

OSXAIN

apposrod to ba complotoly at linno at tha consulase and to knot

sad to do knora by Cubea Consulato pernonnal.

suthorstsas an Xorosbor 20,

And a copy of tho interro

3atd0n report by tho dozicas authorillra torealod the follousagi

st cho outoot sourco's story

thee rocorded

No ropeatod to tho Healcan authoritler

sho dotallo of tho scono do

viich do nay tho Xegro,

Canadlen and tho

AnDrican convorning

togothor,

tha

thE dOllYOTY

об tho

BOnDy tO the daerican by the desrO, und tho contoruathos

be overboard,

Tag? adriadd the intoralering Doxican 011101a1s

chat upon goodne tho photograph of OSTALO in the nosexpors

10s10r1n8 the

PrOdIdOnE dOMA J, XEINEDi, dO

JOCOZNIZOd OSTALO RE TUA LISTICRO DO hAS 8001 dE

the Cuora

Consulate,

cutiorsesse,

NOXICIO

ТААЗДАТВА ЕХОВ ДРАПіДЬ, ІД по ЗОДЙОТУ,

GONIVTSSION ExHIBIT No. 3152-Continued

---

## Page 229

14-00000

860

rennaidarina ho

AMAN Ran

101711

he

denirca to minto

tha

that

Ray tho

18th

body

of

onpterbo

thin

had a corin

about

sixby per

sent

tho

Presi

aftor

140.

tO GHN SANYXY

OUTALD

of tho Und

That

дВадмадірИ

the

19.815l04*

•jer on

SurRihing Yoralong RuCh as those

for

provoking

roaction from tha pulledeni

ol

part of the unders

tentra

inories

Forunone ol yinel, CArao Buz and

had

satiro ollier

lan the profound

hatred i

he foo18

cormundlin.

TaRt &11

1110

had dedicated bluenlt

to combatiny

ho

this ananne not haring

accornished 148 004c6470

tho 8c1109

of causin.

a rancidon

Decause

tho fact that nubarquont to artin? tha

bora-oationad suetenent to lesdean xuthoritica, sourca

cladacó that he

changod his

statonont becauso of joar.

G,

WAD

astarvicued at

conniderable lonth on Deceaber s and.

1807, dA MORICO,

Д.8.

After

crazinatdon

ho

ta tha Cubra Consulatain

OSXALD,

p-97 vas afforded

1D0J.

DUrINg thE COUTED

MIn thIn tha SOO-leNn yuu BEN

At the tiao ho

she shana photographs

rsaponded,

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157

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## Page 230

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Mexico City in early Sepiember to receive money and orders for the

assassination, ss that he had been flown to a secret airfeld somewhere in

or near the Yucatan Peninsula, that he might have mada contacts in

Mexico City trith a Communist from the United States shortly

before the assassination, and that Ostrald assassinated the Presi-

dent at the direction of a particular Cuban agent who met with him in

the United States ind paid him $7,000.3?0

A letter mas received from

someone in Cuba alleging the riter had attended a-meeting where

the assassination had been discussed as part of a plan which would

soon include the death of other non-Communist leaders in the Ameri

cas," The charge was made in a Cuban expatriate publication that in

& speech ha delivered 5 days after the assassination, while he was under

the infuence of liquor, Fidel Castro made a slip of the tongue and said,

"The first time Ostyald was in Cuba," thereby giving away the

fact that Ossyald had made one or more surreptitious trips to that

country.73

Some stories linked the assassination to anti-Castro groups who

allegedly were engaged in obtaining illicit firearms in the United

States, one such claim being that these groups killed the President as

part of a bargain with some illicit organizations who would then

supply them with firearms as payment. Other rumors placed

Oswald in Miami, Fla, at various times, allegedly in pro-Cuban ac

•tivities there. The assassination was claimed to have been carried

out by Chinese Communists operating jointly with the Cubans,5ts

Oswald tras also alleged to have inet with the Cuban Ambassador in

- & Mexico City restaurant and to have driven off in the Ambassador's

car for a private tale. Castro himself, it was alleged, 2 days after

the assassination called for the files relating to Oswald's dealings with

tro members of the Cuban diplomatic mission in the Soviet Union;

the inference drawn was that the "dealings" had occurred and had

established & secret subversive relationship which continued through

Oswald's life. Without exception, the rumors and allegations of

$ conspiratorial contact were shown to be without any factual basis,

in some cases the product of mistaken identification.

2. Illustrative of the attention given to the most serious allegations.

is the case of "D," & young Latin American secret agent who ap-

¡ proached U.S. authorities in Mexico shortly after the assassination

nad declared that he saw Lee Harvey Oswald receiving $6,500 to kill

the President. Among other details, "D" said that at about noon on

September 18, waiting to conduct some business at the Cuban con-

sulate, he say & group of three persons conversing in a patio a few

feet away.

One was a tall, thin Negro with reddish hair, obviously

- dyed, who spoke rapidly in both Spanish and English, and nother

Tas a man he said was Lee Harvey Oswald. A tall Cuban joined the

group momentarily and passed some currency to the Negro. The

Negro then allegedly said to Oswald in English, "X mant to kill the

man." Oswald replied, "You're not man enough, I can do it." The

Negro then said in Spanish, "I can't go with you, I have a lot to do."

Ostrald replied, "The people are waiting for me back there." The

30T

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Negro then gave Oswald 95,500 in large-denomination American billa

saying, "This isn't much."

Atter hearing this conversation, "D" said

that ho telephoned the American Embassy in Mexico City several

times prior to the assassination in an attempt to report his belief that

someone important in the United States was to be killed, but tas

finally told by someona at the Embassy to stop wasting his time.

"I" and his allegations were immediately subjected to intensive

investigation. His former employment as an agent for a Latin Ameri

can country was confirmed, although his superiors had no knowledge

of his presence in Mexico or the assignment described by "D." Four

days after "D" first appeared the U.S. Government tras inforned by

tha Mexican authorities that "D" had admitted in writing that his

Thole narrative about Oswald was false. He said that he had never

seen Oswald anyplace, and that he had not seen anybody paid monar

in the Cuban Embassy. He also admitted that he never tried to tele-

phone the American Embassy in September and that his first call to

the Embassy way after the assassination. "D" said that his motive in

fabricating the story was to help get himself admitted into the United

States so that he could there participate in action against Fidel Castro.

Ho said that he hated Castro and hoped that the story he made up

would be believed and would cause the United States to "take action"

against him.

Still later, when questioned by American authorities, "D" claimed

that he had been pressured into retracting his statement by the Mex-

ican police and that the retraction, rather than his first statement,

.. was false. A portion of the American questioning was carried on

with the use of a polygraph machine, with the consent of "D." When

told that the machine indicated that he was probably lying, "" said

words to the effect that he "must be mistaken." Investigation in the

meantime had disclosed that the Embassy extension number "D" said

he had called would not have given him the person he said ha spobe

to, and that no ons at the Embassy clerks, secretaries, or officers.

had any recollection of ais calls. in addition, Oswald spoke little, it

any, Spanish. That he could have carried on the alleged conversation

with the red-headed Negro in the Cuban Embassy, part of which tras

supposed to have been in Spanish, was therefore doubtfal. "D" now

said that he was uncertain as to the date when he saw someone tho

looked like Oswald" at the Cuban Embassy, and upon reconsideration,

ho now thought it was on a Tuesday, September 17, rather than Sep-

tember 18. On September 17, however, Oswald visited the Louisiana

State Unemployment Commission in New Orleans and also cashed a

check from the Texas Employment Commission at the Winn-Disie

Store No. 1425 in New Orleans. On the basis of the retractions made

by "I" when he heard the results of the polygraph examination, and

on the basis of discrepancies which appeared in his story, it was

concluded that "D" was lying 578

The investigation of the Commission has thus produced no evidence

that Oswald's trip to Mexico was in any way connected with the assas-

sination of President Kennedy, nor has it uncovered evidence that the

308

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## Page 232

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(

53036T

2) Hoverber 1953

533-1

SUBJECT

: Winston it. Scott

. Gilberto Nolasco ALYARADO garte

1.. On the morning of 26 November an olficer of this Section,

accompanied by ivI. Plambeck of the Security Office, interviewed

Subject in a parked car on tha south edge of tha city. The following

atatements, walesa otharwise noted, are those of the Subject:

Subject was born 31 January 1940 in Ciudad Rama,

Departamento Zelaya, Nicaragua, He entered Mexico by

bus on 27 August 1963 on his way to Cuba to study guerrilla darfara

tactics. Ha was to wait is Mexico until false documentation

as a Mexican citizen could be arranged through the Gubau

Consulate ia Mexico. The real purpose bahini his travel

involved a penetration mission or the Nicaraguan Secret Service.

His suparior in Mexico City is Major Roger JEREZ, Nicaraguan

Vilitary Attache, whose office is located at Pagaje Latino,

•Interior 513, talapbona 46-33-37, iviaxico Gity,

On 2 Septemoer Subject reported in Marico City to

Professor Edelberto TORRES, who lives ai Genaral Zuazua,

Number 37, Interior 7. TORRES is a Nicaraguan and is in

charga of Nicaraguan Communist travellars to Cuba. Ha is a

wall-known Communist and has a daughter in Moscow who

travelled thare on false Mexicas papers.

On 2 September Suoject discussed anti-Somoza guarrilla

activities in Depariamento Atlantico, Nicaragua, with TORRES

and the brothers Gustro and Humbarto Jerei Talavara::

Humberto is a teachar in a Mexican femala normal school.

TORRES told Subjeci that he would receive 500 Maxicza peso3

It ways monthly subaistence allowance pendiag the arrangement

-SSE

RECOND COPY

119388

BRE F. (2.9. 4)

17N7236.636

3EEI-1(1)

3223 (3)

1681231

# 6976

7X-1911

29 104. 63

201-2892484-857

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636A8T

-₴-

cá has travel payer 3.

On 19 Sapiamber Subject went to ine Cavan Cousciate to

sura ovar paseport photos to Consul A20uS. While sitting

in the waiting room, he saw a group of approximaraly 3

persona entar the Consulaie and go into AlCUs's olice, but :

he noticed that an uninown person was sitting ai AzoUd's desi.

A Cuban employea of taa Consulata kcowa to Subjaci in

alias as Juan Jose, about 10 years old, mustacha, normal

build, straight bair, emerged from tha offica and asked

Subject to turn over bis protographa. At this point, Suajact

asiced to be sbown the location oi the men's room and va3

directed through a door to a pazaageway leading io a patio.

The door of the patio opens off this passageway.

While standing by tha bathroom door, Subjact saw a

group of 3 persons conversing on the patio a few feet away.

One was a tall; this Nagro with reddish hair whice appeared

to be dyed. Fie had prominent chaakbones and a noticaable

scar on his lower right side of his chin. Ha spois repeatedly

with a Cuban accent and also spoka some anglish. Another .

one was a white man whom Subject had previously sean

holding a Canadian passport in the waiting I00m. This

person.

had green ayes and dark blond hair which was arranged in a

"existantialist" hairdo with a pompadour. He wore glasses of

the type with a mirror-like outer surface. The thied person

was Lee Harvey OSWALD (Subjaci was completaly convincad

from publiahed photos that this was OSWALD). Fle said thara

was noi a shadow of doubt in his mind..

OSWALD was wearing a black sport coat, buttoned up

vaite shirt with short collar tabs, no tie, dark gray pante and

clea: eyeglasgeg. (Subject stuck to this story that he was

wearing eyeglassas despite the fact that they were not present

in publishad protos of OSwALD.)

Subject saw a tall Cuban join the group momcatarily and

pass some American currency to the Megro. This unidentified

Cuban man had apparently come oui di AZCUE's office into the

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326281

2a0, Mo is described ed tali, solidly budi, & racino mis

cudly hai:, wearing a brown sui: and red-atriped bie.

Subject catimated his age as approximataly 37. Subjaci

¿ever say this can afies 13 September.

• sobject overheard the following conversation Setrzen tha

METO aNd OSHALD:

Negro: (in English) I want to kill the mai.

OSWALD: You're not man enough. I can do it..

Negro: (in Spanisa) I can't go with you. I have a lot to do.

OSWALD; The people are waiting for ma back iere.

The Negro then gave OSWALD 5, 500 Joilars in large

depornization U.S. bills saying "this ign'i much". Of this aun,

1, 500 dollars was for extra expansas.

The Negro also gave

OSWALD about 200 Mexican pe903. Later tha Subject saw a

pretty girl beliaved ta ba a Cuban emoloyze of the Consalata

give OSWALD an "abrazo" and tell him that she was living ai

Calle Ivarez #407 in cast he wighed to find her. The girl

aporeated to ba abou 20 years old and hat manner reminded

Subjact of a prostitute. OSWALD, the Negro and tha Canadian

then west upstairs.

Subject lait the Consulate building momentarily to buy a

popsicle at the corner and saw these thraa persong leava by

the Embassy gate near the corner oi lacubaya where thay

entered a paried black car, probably a Chaviolat. Subjact

reentered the Consulata waiting toora and later was approachad

Dy the tall unidentified Cubaa ino came sui a AzCus'a adica

and told Subjact to return the next day at which time his finger-

prints woula be taken and he would complete a form for

obtaining travel docuxents.

Subject returned to the Conaulate on 19 September añ

abort 0315 and filled out the form. He was told at this time

that he would be approached by an Embassy officer io male

un a ciory for his ialse Mexican papars. Many people wara in

the waiting room on the morning of 1j September and the door

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35026T

1a5 liraily closed to keep othars from entering.

Subjact was then told to sonias 203285, 9iaxes203 12

ven: iO TORRES' boRe bu: lORRaS' wife, a Cuatemalan,

told Subjeci that he was ai the Soviat Embard. Sabject want

to ine joviat Embassy about 1130 bui was not allowel io enter

although ha had been there on eatler occasions with IORRES.

At this point, Dr. Noel JARQUIN Toledo, Nicaraguar

Communist, who has bean in ioscow, approached and saw

Subject standing at the gate. Ha asked Subject way ba was

inare and Subject said ha was looking for tORRES. JARQUIN

informad him that TORRES was inside. TORRIS 3000 came

out and accompanied Subject to the Cuban Consulate.

TORRES entered AZCUE's oifice alone and later excarged

telling Subject "you have nothing furthar to do here until I

contact you." At this point, an unidentified girl entared tha

Consulate and greeted TORRES. TORRES replied "not now,

come back tomorrow."

On taa night of 19 Saptember IORRSS presided over a

meeting of about 18 Nicaraguan Communists heid at his home

to discuss a receni guarrilla astachia the Sagavia Region of

Nicaragua. TORRIS announcad that a guarrillas had been

killed and aaid that the nezt year would be a tough one becausa

the U.S. policy might change and the Gommunist migot find

themselves isolaied. TORRES asked Subject it he knew the

Laguna de Parlas arsa of Nicaragua waere the U.S, is training

Cubans. He refarred to it aa "zona gringa". Subject replied

that he was not acquainted with the area.

On 25 Saptember TORRUS sai: Enriqua GUADRA Collado,

an sinoloyse of Carton Envasas de Maxico, Lago de Casala 13,

to sell Subjact that ba should go to tha Cuban Inrifulate, Subjact

want to the Consulate but was told to wait because lae Consul

While waiting for tha Consul, Subject yaw the Canadian:

ezain. The Canadian was amoking a cigarette and wearing a

Rolar wristwaich which a Consulaie employae was tying io buy

from him for 1, 000 pegoa. The Cazadian reludad to soll, saying

SECRET

#6975

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## Page 236

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53682:

-ö-

that no hal purchased the watch in taraco and was tediag it"

come as à souvenir.

ine Canadian carried a canora

aragged stroba hig chast and aloo carried i batua di obacone

anotogerons aich de was snowing to Gonsulaia employess-

The ¿où baired Negro mantioned carlier then come la and look

tha Gaaadian austaira. As he wae laving the vaicing coom,

the Canadia Mashed a large wad oi U.5. collars and said "Im

going. The stiaa ara clouding up and thay'ra ivaiting foa me

at hore. "

it t'aa end of Septarbar Subjeci phoned tha American

Einbassy several times to report his belief thai someon=

important in the U.S. vas to be killed. In making trese calls,

he used tha name Jorge KYNAUT (phonatic) to protect hia -

identity. He was asked il tha cali related to visa matters and

he replied "no, it involvad a political matter, he wishad to

speak with a persos of confidencs. " Hia firat call waa acreenad

by two famales and ha finally apoxe to a mas ino kook Subject'a

phone number (30-19-52) and said he would call back. Tha man

never called. Subject tried repeaiedly to contact the Embassy

by prose but was finally cold "quit wasting our time; we are

working hera and not playiag."

When Subject. saw the photograph of OSWALD in a local newg-

paper, he contacted the Embaasy Sacurity Cilice on 25 November..

2. The officers interviewed Subjeci on 26 November and agised

that ha was a young, quita serious person wao spoke with conviction.

He showad thai he knew enough English to underainad rudimentary

conversation in thai language.

Subject said that he had taran trainiag in ina Panaica Canal

Zona when ha was wita tha Nicaraguan Army and admitted that

Be was still a member of the Nicaraguan Communist Party,

having originally been a convinced Marxist. Latei he became

disiliusioned and for the past four years has worked as a pena-

tration agent for the Nicaraguan Goverament, He said he

expected to enter Cuba within 2 monche.

Subject explaited that he was outraged by the assassination

o1 President Kennedy which ha was "30 perceni surai was a

SECRET

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320101

Consist Dio:

He sai he did not wish to become invoired

in 2ay big pubicity splad and hoged that hia naina wouid o

kept secret, bui taat he sould be willing to do "caterer:

aocabsary." Ai thia time, Subjec, waa living at Dino i73,

Col. Santa Maria de la Ribera, ¡elaphone 41-01-31..

Contact arrangamaata were rada so that he could be picka no zid

interrogated further-

3. On the night of 26 November ha was interrogated by two officers

of tais Saction. His stary remains substantially the game as set forta

above. He recognizad paotograghs of the iollowing Cubax Embassy

personal: Silvia DURAN, FraICiaO LLAGOSTERÀ, Orastas RUII.,

Sarsuel PEREZ, ROgeliO RODRIGUEZ, RaU APARICIO, Rolanda

ESTEVA, HebertO JORAIN, Oscar CONCEPCION, AntONiO GARCIA,.

JOja Ferrardez ROA, AdIaS ARMONA, Joaquin HERNANDEZ, Armas,

"2al", Peraguira ALONSO, LUiSA CALDERON, and Alfreda DURABAL.

He did not know any of thase persona by naraz. bur was adle to giva:

partial descriptiona such as dutias, beight, skia coloring, condition ai

'disposition, acceni, atc. Ha ideatified tha photograpia of Oscar

CONCEPCION as the tall Cuban mentioned above and a photograpa of

IRisa CALDERON as tha pretty girl mentioned above. He also identified

FILIciacO LLAGOSTERA as the mastached Cuban whom ha had knowa

under alias of Juan Jose, This was the same person incidentally who was

trying is buy the watca from the Canadian. Subject quictly identified

the New Orleans mug shot of OSWAld waich bad baen supplied by you.

office.. He said thai he was positive of thase identllications.

*, At this interrogation, Suojact said

OSWALD had carried a green passport in his pociet

and Subject baliaves be saw OSWALD wearing & shouider

solstar pistol. He did not seem io ba too zure oi this

point. His said OSWAID wora long aboas and had a vrist

watch with a yallow metal baad. Hia illustrated OSWALD's.

mannar of slouching in a chair at the Conaulato while in

the waiting room at about noon on 18 September. He said

thai OSTYALD seemed to ba completely at homa and appeared

to know and ba known by Consulate personaal. At one poias

he heard OSWALD use the Maxican slang expression "Cabrar".

SECRET

40976

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## Page 238

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C20181

badly Dr0n51a051.

scene daberibed ebova. His accouat of ta converiasion

was essentally the same as reported, sacept et this time

he bad OSWAlD una the word kill in his first reply to the

Negro; hasce, "'You're not tha man. I cas lill hiz."

He said tai tha UJ.S, bank notea were in a amall

pack abou: 1/4 inch thick bound vith a paper band wich the

Negro brolsa before counting out 1, 500 dollars for extra.

expansas and 5, 000 dollara as "adrance payment."

Subject said that ha is still a sargeaat in the Nicaraguan

Givil Guard and that he entarad Mexico illegally on 29 August

without travel documents, paying a bribe at tha bordar and

having transited Honduras, Guatemala and Il Salvagor en

zoute. He said that ha had been to Mexico in 1961 on a mission

for the Nicaraguan Secrel Service after a contrived escape

iron false arreat in Nicaragua, followed by aperiod of asyluna

in toe Maiican Embassy. He sail that his training raceived

in the Croa! Zoxe took place in Fort Glick in March 1956 (note

Subjeci would havonly bean ló years old at that time).

Subject said that ha had been to the Cuban Consulate on

2 ar 3 September, 15 or 16 September, 19 Saptember;

19 September, 26 September and 25 November.

He admita to having visited the Soviet Embaasy approxi

mataly ó or 7 times; about & times with TORRES. He was

- somewhat fuzzy on reasons for thaya visits and vas not

Pressed for detail at tbia seasion.

5. In ordar to keep Subjact available for further interrogation, ba

was instructed to fiad other living quarters where he should register

in an alias. On the following morning. 27 November, he reported that

na had regisiared as Alberto SANCHEZ, Room 203, Hotel Necasta.

Oa 28 November he was arrested by Vierican police at the hotel. Thig

nifice has zo further contact with Subject.

DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION QUISIDE YOUR OFFICE

SHOULD BE GLEARED WITH CUR HAOCUARTERS IN WASHINGION.

asininesen

1- 8.8595

SECRET

#6976

1. 58-2-1-110.

---

## Page 239

4-00000

13 DEC 1963

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---

## Page 240

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2.

iba: se ma rosalaila, concealun soà for "bai suasoa ibe sojoes

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of the 59 bot, In molome di sie Cubas maury bel Its 9111

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SEGMET

---

## Page 241

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---

## Page 242

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---

## Page 243

14-00000

aija

me 02 10m, 221 10 1011 maa 10 vels 1000l ta bez morias

no: recontasiad ita, sier easin tha sture abatesanto, Mishaado

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ilo assasa1a Do tea tentien di ins thizoù ataras-

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co. The sa hod ma sin 20t1za dan 1h0 der 19256 diates

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LICENS ELIANT I9T1OUE.

SEGRET

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## Page 244

126

ORIG :

UNIT

EXT

D.

Jane I, Taitten

C/77/3

5513

D INDiA

PASSINTO MESSAGE"

SECRET

I NO INDEX

29 For 1953

I FILE IN CS FILE NO.

TILLIS HOLSS

ATT:

IR, NOGSERGS. BURGY

80

FROZAY BURRAU DF INYESTIGANICH

DECRUIT DE SLAVE

FROM:

DIRECTOR

CONF: C/MH 4

3

DCI, D/DCI, DOP,

à,

VR:

03 A277

INFO

x2-G2

HOUTING

5

6

2,9 Hou FL 19 15z

DEER GEN

ROUTINE

TRIEDIAUE

TO

CITE DIR

85744

THE FIRST V

HROCATION

I SKETCHY: REFCI

ERCERESS OF THE MEXICAN OFFICIA.

TIBERTO ALVARADO, NICARAIAN WHOM HAS CLAMED HE SAW TE OSTATO

HE IS TALITIE ESSEN

FE SAME STORI.

ONE DEFERRUCE IS THAT HE PAILRO TO

RECOGNIZIS A PHOTCGRAFA

LITIA DURAN AS AN EMPLOYEE OF THE CUBAN ELASSY, WHEREAS

I DID SO RECITES HER THE TANERRICATES PRESITUSTY BI CIA PERSONEL. THE MEXICAN

DETECTAT DOTAG THE LIZEAROGATION DE ALVARADO SAYS HE "DOUSIS" ALVARADO!S STORY AND

WICE ARGIE WORK TO "ERRAX" INN, THIS INFORJATION HAS RECEIVED IN MEXICO CITY AX

1330 HOURS HASBIENION ITS 29 MOVEMBER 1903-

19553

EHD OF MESSAGE

1-75

C/S COMMENT: * DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT GPFLOOR CABLES.

CLASSIFICATIOY REVIEW

CONDUCTED ON 2& MAY 1976

MIMPDET CLAYD12203

Document Number

for FOlA Review on •

221-645

APR 1976

08 3073

My authority oi

RICEARD HELLS

+ 0: 250-5-41

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER.

201-289248

CROUP I

Exciuded from autonstic

countrading and

declassiticalion

AUTHENTICATI::

OFFICIA

SECREL

• REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Cori

DUFZ

---

## Page 245

210

S: TONAD 1 Mesen

THE 3

D INDEX

BECHEI

5533

D NO INC

E: •

I DECHAR 1953

• DO FILE IN DN FILE NO.

ilSSIEMTO

JUARAE SURBAU LE INSSIECATION RE GUALD.

N: BIESERE CENIRAT INTRLETORTES ACHICY

7 DEC63 17:152

VF:.

DEFERTE, CEM

ROLTINE

.DC| ED/DCI, DDP, C/C1, C/C1/S1, VR

ERTORCIN

INFO

CITE PIR

87697

SUBJECI:

LES. HARYLY OSHAZO CASE

VE INERCCATICS OF CUERNO MURARADO,

IICARACTAI INICIART WHO CLAID

TO HAVE SSE LES OSSATO ERCEITE MONEY TO ASSASSI

TRATE KOSOY, HAS TY CONCIAO

DUR MESCO CE SECATE ADVISES US THAT ALVARADO ALICIO DE DENSE JAVE TEAT

ISTAKSE III SALTHE THAT III SAW OSSALO IN THE CUAY ERIASSY- ATSO, HE HAS,

INCERTATI OF THE LUTE DE WICH ME MICHC HAVE SERA SOMEONE LIRE OSHAID AND

THOUCRI JI MUY HAYS ESTY O A TUSTAY, WHICH HOULD HAVS MANS II LY SEPTENERA

1963-

ALTECOCI TE FINAL REPORT OF THS POLICHAPE INTERVIEN IS NOT YIST

AVATTASIE,

TEIS TI

TAR FINO IS THAT ALVARADO EVIDACIO DECEPTION

REACTICEIS HHEN TATUTIG AEQUI OSHAID.

I IS EXPECTRO THAI ALVARADO MILI, ES IMPORTEO TO NICARAGUA OH 9' IRPIMESA

:1963.

A IEPOSSSSTIANIYS SE YOLA SURBAY PARMICIPANTO IN TIS II

KHROCANTON OF

SISTIRLA SEVARADA"

• c/S COMMENT:

articority of

JEREASTHE OFFICER

END OF MESSAGS

Document Numbei

49-77

SOr FOIA Rayiew on- MAY 1976

*DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT GPFLOOR CABLES

CLASSIFIGATION REVIEW

2d1-279248

CONDUCTED ON 24 M4)

1У/6

ABSTRACt

LASEY

: IMPOST CL BY 012308

63

COORDINATING OFFICERS-

DATÉ 7 Dei

Exclude from autoinalle

downgrading and

carlassifiestion

SEGRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITEDS

• AUTHENTICATINO

OESIGER

Copy No,

aind

IM/z

---

## Page 246

14-00000

•3.

To out knowledge the allegations in Subject article

have

no basis in fact nor did we have any

relationship with

Jack Ruby, Clay Shaw

or Lee Harvey Oswald.

51:200

Raymond A. Warren

Raymond A. Warren

2 Attachments,

a/s

CC:

DDCI

CONCUR:

GeorgeT. Firin

Chief, Counterintelligence Staff

Theodora G. Shachley

for

Deputy Director for Operations

12453

Date

Date

S6289T

---

## Page 247

14-00000

ARMORADOR FOR:

FFOY

SUBJECT

Deputy basector

for fininistration

Lobert i, Carbino

Director of sacurity

Robert Dietr

I. This manozandun is for yous infomation only.

4. r. dagus i. Taserner,

advised that iir.

Fred Blunenthal

telephonically

contacied hin and said that a Robert D.

I book ontitied Berayed, mich was due

For publication in lay 1976.

Mr. Diumentaal adrigod that

he is currently reviering this bood, and that it concaius

50no Critical couments concorning the Agency, cog. the

Agency vas responsible for the 3552551a2tion

of President

John r. Kennedy.

Mr. Blumenthal also stated that Me. Morrow

clains to have

been a CiA contxact Rail.

Mir. Siumenthal

desired to vorisy Mr. Morrow's claimed

association iith

сво аденсу, ало лт.

Tauerner requested that this Office

rovich its

11l05 to ascariain wether Mr.

"orion was

in faci associated with the Agency, and if

so, what infor

nation could ba passed to lir. Blumenthal.

3.

The Office of Security does have a file on

Robor: Dietz Morrow, boru 20 Jazuary 1028 at Pilesburgh,

Penasrirania.

Mr. Morrow, as of June 1352, was Fresident

•I Morro Products, 12c.,

located in Boltinore, Marylane;

and the security scale of the Office of Logistics sos

grantad a Secret contract clearance

for use by the Offica

0% Connunications on 19 Septeader 1902. The Arducy Choa

entered into a contract with dorios Proousts, Iac,, tc

6S 26651510

produce a prointype of an adaptor to be tood vic a radio

receiver mic purportodie would arcadly reduce incor-

i aodel si cho adouter was julivered to tie

6: H0261036 Me 11ơ C260200 13 222125731

16€1288

---

## Page 248

14-00000

SECHET

INSPECTET GENSRAL

74-2482

3

SiS!

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM

VIA

SUBJECT

: Raymond A. Warren

Chief, Latin Anerica Division

:

Deputy Director for Operations

:

Citations from

Robert Dietz Morrow's Bcok,

"Betrayal" in "Midnight," a Weekly Tabloid,

entitled,

"How CIA Plot to Kill Castro

Backfired"

REFERENCE : Memorandum for DCI from C/LA, Subject:

"Possible Accusations Against the CIA,"

Dated 31 July 1976

1. Attached is a copy of Subject article from the

2 August 1976 edition of the tabloid "Midnight."

2. Also attached is a copy of a 24 March 1976 memorandum

for the Deputy Director for Administration from the Director.

of Security relative to Robert Dietz Morrow:

This memo

indicates that Mr. Morrow was granted a Secret contract

clearance in September 1962 for use by the Office of Commu-

nications which contracted with Morrow Products, Baltimore,

Maryland, to produce an adapter which would greatly reduce

interference on radio receivers. The adapter was delivered

in February 1963 and found to be worthless and the contract

was terminated.

Subsequently, Morrow became involved with

MarIO GARCIA Kohly and made the plates from which kohly

produced counterfeit Cuban pesos.

Morrow and his wife,

Cecily, were

arrested along with

Kohly by the Secret Service

on 1 October

At that time

Morrow told the Secret

Service that he had become associated with a "certain agent"

after building a device which he demonstrated to CIA.

WARING NOTICE

SENSIVE INTILLIGENCE SOURCES

ALE ELINDOS INVOLVED

E2 IMPDET

CL BY 9560

980257

---

## Page 249

14-00000

110300700417: 00 4 6.90098 1033, 206 96 50

Zceret

C.-l? 9499091

ACorann dei?e lead?";

Tnaig Coreie

imirt.a

:!i.

Tornoi miid idd iriniis

ia connaciien tian

:3.

2et to dlood Cubn Tach d0d

,GOU.DUs ta couakurxel, Dеsог C0

₫tass

Me Cascis

Fondy ias tho leadez of

ciis Scaene, anile lir, Herzor and DiS vijo vere chasgsé wite

MGIS ChO DiatOS

Lox the countorfeit bill3.

NE. 10.r035,

tàoa interzogased

py the i. f. Sactet sarrico, advised that

Jonly supgliod him viti a counzoroir

20 pos0s biJI

which liro dohly soid mas offored for 5a13

Eo hin sron

agoats dê the

Morrow also statod thet

he nad becone assoriaied vizh a

"ceriain agent" nater

sniluing a devics which ho dononstratod io this ageney.

The Sacret Sorvice was advised in 1905 that tha Agodey

did noc have any interost in $ir. Kohly.

Thare is ao iniomation in this file verisying

V. Kohly's allegation chat he had obcained the councorfaii

bill from agents of tho CiA.

Hix. Thuernor has been advised that he aay tetl

Blunenthal that the Ayency entored

into 3 concract wich

Morzon ProQUEES,

iace, in septenber 14bl theredy vr. vorror

наз. to uvc a plsce Di equipaoae, dut thai the concract

Esrinated in April 3903 after tos proeotyoo si cho

oquipment had been tested and fouad to be unsatisfactory

Rober: N. Gambino

Distribution:

0r1g. & 1

- Adsa

1

D/Sec

1

CD Reading File

I - Subjeci File

OS/PSI/CD/KFCarro14:nF

(18 March 1970)

Retypad:KrCarroll: jm (21

Mlarch

| 1976)

---

## Page 250

14-00000

A 1 JUL iG76

THORATE FOR:

Director de Central Intelligence

FROM

VIA

SUBJECT

:

Raymond A. Warren

Chief,

Latin

America Division

: Deputy Director for Operations

: Possible Accusations Against the CIA

1.

On 30 July 1976 at 1630 hours,

Latin America Division

was

advised

by Mr.

Tom White of the Office of Legislative

Counsel that he had just talked on.

the phone to & staff aide

of Representative Thomas Downing,

Democrat of Virginia. The

staff aide told. White that Representative Downing

had just

received information from a MI. Robert Morrow, author of a

rocent book (Betrayal) on the Jchn F. Kennedy assassination.

Norrow provided this alleged information to the Los angeles

Times,

New York Tines, a Richmond newspaper (Times or Newsieader,

perhays), and others.

According to this information, which

the staff aide said is to appear in the New York Times on

Sunday: 1 August:

a.

President Richard Nixon promised

a Mr.. Mario

GARCIA Kohly that if an invasion of Cuba were successful;

Nixon would arrange that all Cuban leftists outside

Cuba would be killed. The implication was that these

range

killings would be carried out by the CIA.

b. British overflights froin the Bahamas showed

that there were Soviet missiles in Cuba as

early as

1960, and. they were not removed until 1964.

President

Kennedy knew of this information, but withheld it from

the public.

2.

The staff aide said that Representative Downing plans

to call a press conference on Monday, 2

August, to disclose

the above

information, but not necessarily to

attest

to its

accuracy.

• E? IMPD!T

...:

222actohieie

---

## Page 251

14-00000

Vario CARCiA Koal was

Me is a Foruer

croad busamoss-

nbassador to Spada. Since

...d

and the

of foreig.

schanes 10 prithroi Fidel

In pursuii of this goal,

he has used numercus higiriovei dovernment contacts in an

effort to associate hinsois with

the Cla.

In April 1964

Garcia was sentenced to one year in prison for forging Cuban

currency to introduce into Cuba to depress the econony..

clained he did

this with the knowiedge of the ClA and the

U.S. Government.

ClA denied any knoriedge of Garcia.

Agency has had no operational

relationship with Garcia.

Is! George V. Lauder

Raymond

A.

Warren

CC:

DDCI

CONCUR:

Deputy Director

Uperations

30 JUL P:

Date

---

## Page 252

How CIA Plot To Kill Castro Backfired

By HARRY ALTSHULER

MIDNIGHT Staff Writer

The ClA and Fidel Castro were

'Kennedy

both betting on the same agent

- and Castro won+

•Was

The ClA plotted to murder Cas-

tro by using a Cuban agent

code-named

Am/Lash,

who

Trying

agreed folead a coup to overturn

the Castro government.

To Get

But Am/Lash wars a double..gent.

1 longtime faithful pal of Cirlo.

named Rolando Cubelo, he look the

Castro,

ClA smoney-andspilled its plans

into Cistio's car.

But *

In angry retabation, Casin set up

the assissination of President John

F. Kennely.

Castro

That is the story

Anosen in soone Wishongion careles

Got To

- hehund the reopening of the file

on flk's murder.

Him First'

But the wrath may be even more

CIA blamed Kennedy

JOHNSON refused to

comples. Now aformer ClA opera-

for Bay Of Pigs failure.

spill any details.

-LBJ

live. RobertD. Morrow. has spilled

il doven years of secrens into i confessional book, "Be-

triyal,"

published hy the Henry Kegnery Co., Chicago.

ployee, working underorders. He had no idea what it was all

about or where his own actions fitied injo the picture

Lee Harvey Oswald was not the assassin, Morrow is-

sells.

A group inside the CIA itself. working closely with dis

Dowill was just the chunp set up to take the blame, while

gruntled Cuban exiles, plotted she assastination. says#or.

lOw.

the real hollers escaped.

According lo Morrow. Osk.dd was a small-lime ClA cm-

Oswald's boss was another ClA employee, Jack Ruby.

Ruby knew the scope of the plot and wanted no part of it.

But Ruby had a racket of his own on the side, drug-running

from Cuba. It made him vulnerable to blackmil

Ruby was the Dallas nightclub operator who walked up to

ROLANDO CUBELO, almost a Castro lookalike

Oswald and, as the nation watched on TV, shot him at close

with the beard and cigar, wore his arm in a sling

range. Ruby too is now dead. hut his claim was he performed

as a result of wounds he received in the Presi-

the act out of love for the dead President. Morrow says this

dential Palace takeover in Havana on Castro's

is the truth about Ruby:

behalf.

He was ordered to liquidate Oswald, to keep his mouth

shut, and threatened with a jail sentence on a drug charge if

now dead, a New Orleans businessman who was a power in

he hesitated

the CIA. Morrow quotes him as declaring: "The assassina-

What did the CIA cabal have againsLJFK? Morrow ex-

tion of a President may seem a monstrous act, but not if the

plains the ClA group and its Cuban exile friends blamed

alternative is an America under communist rule..."

Kennedy for the Bay of logs invasion failure.

And they

Long afterward,

Shaw was indicted on a conspiracy

chin ged him with playing polities in the Cuban missile crisis.

charge, ind acquilled as innocent.

"If our President and his brother sit on the missile infor.

But meanwhile. as Morrow tells it, the plot went ahead.

mation. he won'tlive through his first term," Morrow heard

Oswald was picked as the fall guy, lo be fed to the police

from an insuler.

while the men who actually fired the shots in Dallas that

The ClA-Cuhan exile plotters regarded JFk as i trantor.

Noy. 33 got away.

They felt he wasn't ready enough lo battle Castro, whom

This part of the story fits in with recent Senate Intell-

they saw as a deadly menace to the U.S.

gence Committee revelations of two Cuba-connected fugi-

Their first plan was to ruin Castro by counterfeiting

tives following the assassination. One fed Texas for Mexico

Cuban currency to smash the economy.

They were running

the same day, and a Cuba-bound airliner was held back till

their counterfeiting operation with U.S. government funds

he scrambled aboard.

and sitlaries, but naturally they had to keep it dark from the

The other reached Mexico the following day. and was

White House.

immediately Nown out to Cuba on an airliner with no other

Their secrecy succeeded ton well — for the Secret Serv-

pussengers.

According to Morrow. these were the men with Mann-

ice broke in and arrested them as ordinary counterfenters.. licher rifles similur to the one Oswald owned. who fired at

Morow himself was handed a two-year sentence, sus-

pended, in connection with the scheme.

the President from hidden vantage points.

The explanation

The insiders felt the White House had interfered with

that there was more than one man firing accounts for the

their last hope — short of violence - of breaking Castro.

puzzling profusion of wounds.

ROBERT MORROW, former CIA man,

holds

Mannlicher rifle he was ordered to buy before the.

assassination. Three men fired at JFK he claims.

"If we can't get Castro because of the President, we'll ge

If the truth was known or suspected in Washingion, why

the President first, so we can get at Castro," one of them

has it been so long coming into the open?

warned Morrow.

The kingpin of the group, his book says, was Clay Shaw.

Current talk in the nation's capital is that the first ones to

realize Castro's involvement had a terrible fear that if he

were upenly accused, it would lead to a confrontation with

his backer, Russia

whole world dreaded.

- possibly the nuclear holocaust the

So they kept quel - even the man in the White House,

Lyndon B..Johnson.

News commentator Howard K. Smith has now revealed a

confidential conversation with Johnson, long ago.

"I'll tell you something ahout Kennedy's murder that will

Johnson confided. "Kennedy was trying to get

Castro, but Castro got to him firss."

Smith admits, "I was rocked all right. I begged for details.

hut he refused, saying it will all come out some diy."

True enough, there have been rumors for years, in MID-

NIGH'T and elsewhere. despite the massive efforts to bury

investigation under the Warren Keport.

The CIA and the FBI were naturally reluctant to let the

workl find out they had been booby-trapped by a double

agent.

They didn't even want to thosk about the truth — that it

was the ( lA plotte ganst Castro that led to the denth of

the Amercem President

That was shy the & I-d nd the I Bl kept secrets fiom the

ROLANDO C'BELO, left: Cuban Police

Chief, Efigenio Amejeiras; Fidel

Castro;

and

Havana University President Juan Marinello, in the early days of the Castro victory.

Waren Commsson and even failed to follow up leads for

fear of what they might leum.

August 2, 1976

---

## Page 253

ANTICLEAIIEM

ONIÁGE

Document Contradicts Testimony

CIA Viewed Oswald

As Information Source

'Associates Prais

Contrary io. sworn lestimony, the

CIA once considered using presiden-

tial assassin Lee Harvey Oswald as a i

source of intelligence. information.

about the Soviet Union, according to

a newly released CIA document..

Ins sworn testimony before, the:

Warren: Commission, former--CIA"

Direcior Richard Helms. said

the .

¿gency never had. "or even

contem-

plated" any contacts with Oswald.

The

newly released document,

written by an unidentified ClA officer

three days after President John F.

Kennedy was killed in Dallas on Noy.

22, 1963, says that "we showed intel-

ligence interest'" in Oswald and "dis-

cussed- the laying on of inter=

views."?:

The unidentitied officer added trar

"I do not know what action developed

thereaiter.".:

• THE MEMO: WAS AMONG hUN-

drecs of pages: of documents. from

tha CIA's file on Lee Harvey Oswald.

The material was,released to The

associated.Press yesierday- under:

the Freedom of Iniormation Act.::'

A second-document •reveals: that:

former CIA: Director Allen Dulles,

while serving as. a member oi the-

Warren Commission, privately. coun-

seled CId oiticials on the best way to

answer questions-from the cormis-

sion about allegations, that Oswald

Dulles

"thought language which

made it clear. that Lee Harvey Os-

wald was never an employe or agent

of CIA would suftice,

an unidenti-

fied CIA ofticer wrote Helms in April

1954.

"I agres with him

that a carefuily

• phrased ricnial of the charges of in-

volvereni with Oswald seemed most

approaciale," the unidentitied oilicer.

added

"When he appeared before the com-

mission in May: 1961, Helms, then

head of. the

agency's. clandestine

• services, testified

_ under oath that

'there's no material in the Central

intelligence.Agency.. either..in

the

records of in the mind of any of the

indiviquals that there was any con-

tact had or even comtemplated with"

Oswald.

THE NOV: 25, 1963, memo explains

that the agency's interest in Oswald

as a potential intelligence source was

due: to his. "unusual behavior in the

UsSR." to which he had defected in

1959.:

"We were particularly interested

in the (deleted) Oswald might pro-.

vide on the Minsk factory in which he

(had been employed, on certain see-

tions.of the city itseil, and of course

we thougn: the usual (deleted) that

might help develop (deleted) person-

'ality dossiers," the memo states.

The memo indicates that Oswald

•was also of interest to the CIA be:

cause of concern that his Russian-

1157302.

born wife, Marina, might have been

part of a trend for Soviet women to

mase foreignese, waver hey entry

serve as spies;

THE MEMO ABOUT the agency's

interest in; Oswald said the discus-

discussed while Oswald and his fami-

ly were en route to our country or if it

was after theirárrival."

---

## Page 254

14-00000

19%

dEt

SIGNAL CENTEN USE ON

coi

ALR

Tre

OMF

0

CLAGINITATION

• CRET

MESSAGE HA VOLING INDICATOR

STAFF

CONF: 2/553

0

DATA TINI GROUP

020046Z

ciTa

DIRECTOR

INFO:

0D03, CS/RF.

GUEL, DDO/DO, CLOSEC?

TO: IMMEDIATE TEHRAN. Y 17

WNINTEL RYBAT

PAGE

11699

MESSAGE RIPSHINCEHUMAGI

922297

DISSEM BY: 415

NO INDEX

RETUANTO

PER

0

IN FILES

AP WIRE STORY IN WASHINGTON STAR ON FOIA RELEASE OF OSWALD'S

MATERIAL MAKES FOLLOWING STATEMENT, WHICH YOU SHOULD BE AUARE,

aCUTE: IN SWORN TESTIMONY BEFORE THE WARREN COMMISSION.

RICHARD HELMS, THEN A BRANCH CHIEF AND LATER CIA'S DIRECTOR,

SAID THE AGENCY NEVER HAD OR EVEN CONTEMPLATED ANY CONTACTS

• WITH. OSWALD..: NEULY RELEASED DOCUMENT, SAYS WE SHOWED IN

TELLIGENCE INTEREST IN OSWALD AND DISCUSSES..• THE LAYING ON

OF INTERVIEWS: END QUOTE. W

MATERIAL

2: ABOVE NISCONSTRUED FROM SANITIZED FOR RELEASED UNDER FOIA?

WRITTEN BY FORMER OFFICER WHO WAS INTERESTED IN POSSIBLE USEFUL IN-

FORMATION OSWALD MIGHT HAVE IN CONTEXT OF SOVIET REALITIES. IN

RESPONSE TO DCI CALL TO ALL HANDS TO RECORD WHATEVER THEY THOUGHT

MIGHT BE RELEVANT TO WARREN COMMISSION INTERESTS, OFFICER WROTE THIS

21EM0

MEHO

N22S

THE GOT DOES RECORD BRANCH LEVEL DISCUSSION BUT STATES THAT

WRITER DOES NOT KNOW WHAT ACTION WAS TAKEN- E-2, IPPET-I

DATE:

ORIO:

UNIT:

EXT:

•J OCT 76

CHAS-BRIGGS: DCM

f/I$S

1,596

CHRONO

DI

COOHDINATISTE DEFICERS"

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIDITED

DLASSINCATION

SECRET

THEODORE GO SHACKLEY. ADDD

E 2

•HIPDET

•CL ĐY:057973

---

## Page 255

14-00000

10100382

00222193

.. . .

INSPECTOR GENERAL

760-3084

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM

: John H. Waller

Inspector General

SUBJECT

: Washington Star Story, 1 October 1976

I. This is for your information only.

2. On 1 October 1976 the Washington Star published a news

story with an Associated Press credit line, headlined CIA

Viewed Oswald As Information Source (copy aitached). The

lead stated:

Contrary to sworn testimony, the CIA once con-

sidered using presidential assassin Lee Harvey

Oswald as a source of intelligence information

about the Soviet Union, according to a newly

released CIA document.

In sworn testimony before the Warren Commission,

former CIA Director Richard Helms said the

Agency never had "or even contemplated" any

contacts with Oswald.

The news story, in another section, made the following

statement:

The November 25, 1963, memo explained that

the Agency's interest in Oswald as a potential

intelligence source was due to his "unusual

behavior in the USSR," to which he had defected

in 1959.

p-...-..

0-0-7

/....

---

## Page 256

14-00000

!..

-anointed tonica"

3.

Tliere was such a memorandum, written by a case

officer then stationed in Paris, recently released under FOIA.

Writing three days after President Kennedy's assassination,

this case officer recalled that there had been intcrest in Oswald.

As soon as I had heard Oswald's name, I recalled

that as Chief of the 6 Branch I had discussed ..

sometime in the summer of 1960 -- with the then

Chief and Deputy Chief of the 6 Research Section

the laying on of interview (s) through KUJUMP or

other suitable channels . ..

I remember that Oswald's unusual behavior in the

USSR had struck me from the moment I had read

the first ODACID dispatch on him, and I told my

subordinates something amounting to "Don't push

too hard to get the information we need, because.

this individual looks odd. "

• I do not know what action developed there-

after . ...

4. The Helms testimony before the Warren Commission

on this subject was as follows:

Mr. Helms. On Mr. McCone's behalf, I had all

our records searched to see if there had been

any contacts at any time prior to President Kennedy's

assassination by anyone in the Central Intelligence

Agency with Lee Harvey Oswald. We checked our

card files and our personal files and all our records.

Now this check turned out to be negative. In addition

I got in touch with those officers who were in positions

of responsibility at the times in question to see if

anybody had any recollection of any contact having

even been suggested with this man. This also turned

out to be negative, so there is no material in the

Central Intelligence Agency, either in the records or

in the mind of any of the individuals, that there was

any contact had or even contemplated with him.

:::+9999 990910-9910199

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5. Mr. Helms did slate exactly the words quoted in the

news story -- "or even contemplated." But the context of ,

those words was what was reported to him as the result of

a search of records and memories. To this day those

familiar with the extensive Oswald records state that there

is no reflection in those records that anyone even undertook

to propose or approve a contact with Oswald. It would have

been natural to do so, but apparently any such thoughts did

not progress to formal action. From the memorandum

quoted, it is apparent that someone at Branch level did think

about it, even if nothing ever came of it. This hardly con-

a responsible or official or serious "contemplation"

of the idea. Mr. Helms' full statement on this point seems

literally correct in the full context of his statement, although

more refined qualifications might have reiterated the basis

for his conclusions. The news story is misleading on this-

point.

6. The news story statement that Oswald was considered

due to his "unusual behavior in the USSR, " is exactly the

opposite of the statements of the quoted memorandum, which

reported the care that should be used if Oswald were approached,

because of his strange conduct.

7. The statement in the news story about Mr. Dulles

consulting with Agency personnel on how to answer questions

is basically true. The interpretation to be placed on this

counselling will depend on the interpreter. The inference of

the news story is that Mr. Dulles was counselling slanted

responses on the Oswald issue, thereby tending to reinforce

the interpretation of deception attributed to Mr. Helms.

Attachment:

As Stated

CC: DDCI w/atts

DIG: SDBreckinridge: js (R 1407) 6 0etober 1976

Distribution:

Orig watts - Addressee'

/ w/atts - DDCI

1 1/atts - ER

1 H/a6ts - IG Chrono

=3=

l watts - SOB Chrono

mainlandisa.

""".

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