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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

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NW 88608 Docld:32401332 Page 1

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NW 88608 Docld:32401332 Page 2

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TOP SECRET.

the she degra Era begine

For most employeos of the Federal government, work

continues unchanged when a new man moves into the White House.

Employees of the Bureau of Reclamation, the Labor-Management Services

Administration, or the Commodity Exchange Authority

11--

all go about their jobs in their accustened ways, rory though changes of

administration policy can ultimately have an effect. /he pattern of

most intelligence work--collection and the production af finished Intelligence

undisturbed.

for a considerable number of officials--remains unlitt

=. But for

those who are turning out intelligence specifically for the President,

so in age the lion chees secure deal dese

His 5, 4175

How wide-ranging will be the new President's

be

oreign countries and in international relations

nterest in trogans

Batessles How muchy intelligence? vll

will greet

be. order

appetite will de have for

and trequent servinge, or modest portions only as absolutely sitt

Will he want Ode facts, or facts plus interprotation and analysis?

NW-88608-Đocld:32401332-Page 3

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Separated or homogenized? Is he willing to read a regular intelligence

document, or does he prefer to be briefed?

In each of the previous administiations, OCI had establhahed

a satisfactory channel directly to the President. However, the system to

had never carried over from one incumbent to the next. Eisenhower did not

want the personal weekly briefing fron the Director that Iruman had

receded; the preferred to be brelesed in the setting of weekly meetings

not

of the National Security Council. Kennedy did/like to use the NSC

with any regularity. Instead he found just what he wanted in the

Checklist

personal, daily intelligence isaa devised for him five months after

he entered office.

The Checklist system worked so well with Kennedy that

OCI and the Director naturally hoped to continue it with Lyndon Joyason,

especially as it became apparent that Johnson, like his predecessor,

was not going to have regular NSC meetings.

Eventually OCI succeeded;

but days aster many months of frustration. It was only when conte

NW-88608 Docld:32401332 Page 4

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3

he had a firm hold of his adminidtration and when certain

foreign situations forced themselves upon his attention that President

Johnson discovered the usefulness of a daily current intelligence

document.

!

President

For a few days after the assassination of stus Kennedy,

Kotostuct R. J. Smith took the Checklist to M& McCone at East Building

at 8:30x doll. The Director then held a staff meeting, after which R.J.

personally

Smith/took the Checklist to Bromley Smith and Gen. Clifton in the White

The briefing of President Johnson from the Checklist, however,

House•

Faaneboutthres-woelt.eltap.tbo.ebrript-churgeufaaninidbratioss

was done by Mclone, who saw the President daily for about three weeks

after the assassination. y

Although OCI had provided more detail and background

Information tor than wual in its first intelligence books for President

on 24 November

Johnson, Mo one passed the word through I cline that see as t

see möre but shorter items. (Ive wooke Lator bruntey snatis wes outtl

raghug that our leave out the background dates

McCone said the fresident

expected that topics appearing in the Checklist would be followed up

1n later issues, therefore, OCI should make even negative reports.

NW 88608 Docld:32401332 Page 5

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Cline, presumably reflecting the Director's wishes, said that the

theckhst that day should cover military activity in South Vietnam,

the fighting in Laos, tan Soviet ICBM developments, and problems. in the Berlin

air corridors and to Venezuela.

Around the middle of December, in montere i the Wite

Housen starwing the Check istantried-to petersalu Intelligence

when McCone stopped seeing the President daily, the White House staff

the Presideat

tried to get tie to read the Checklist, Themere Jargoly unsuccessiul,

although MoGeorge Bundy wao able to do it some oral briefing, Checklist in

hand.

hand. On 16 ocember, lon. clifton told elites john Heiden, ink

"If we can't penetrate this sort, of wall today of tomorrow, we'll just

have to try something else." In this elpudy atmosphere, the sun came out

occasionally. On the l8th, Clifton said that the staff had finally managed

to get the President to read th "the books"--probably two or three issues.

At Christmastime, the President went to his Texas sach

ranch and shortly after Christnas had Chancellor Erhard as a visitor for

several days. The PICL was cabled to the ranch each day... The report

NW-88608-Docld:32401332 Page 6

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5

was limited to notes covering important developments and any information

that might be useful in the talks with Erhard. The President returned

to Washington on 5 January, and the next day Gen. Clifton, who had been

at the ranch, sott told Heidemann that he had been able to get the

Checklist to the President with some regularity once Erhard had gone.

On 8 Januaty, however, Clifton was having difficulties

not

again--the President had/read the intelligence document since leaving Texas.

li tHe

clifton thought there would be a ket-up in the press of business after

what was endantly happening- the that-the Prestdent found time for

that day's state of the Unton speech. He

ths Cheklist only when there dan't a press-of other business, Ulifton

asked Philip Kennedy for a special report, briefly treating important

and still-current

WHISKENEX

problems that were covered in them books the President

lengen onuthe-problem of the Preslaaat

In fact, that

not ettag ido-roudhis dona Glifton thought it would be good to try o

the system of giving the President a summary of significant intelligence

trice a week.

NW 88608 Docld:32401332 Page 7

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6

OfI quiokly put togather an experimental President's

covering the period 4-9 January. This was taken by

Intelligence Review, /duack Richard Lehman, tes Asshstant for Special

projects, taunaxto Gen. Clifton on 9 January.

Clifton thought the

Review was the best solution to the problem of the President's intelligence

were

reading. He and Bundy agreed that the President would not accept a

daily intelligence briefing. The President had instructed Clifton that

the DCI was to see him whenever he wished but that otherwise the President

relied on Bundy and Clifton to stay on top of the intelligence. Because

with no warning

wurd

the President was likely to ask them/for the latest intelligenco, the daily

• Checklist had to continue. Clifton agened receptive to Out"s propocat ta

send the Checkliat te once addit can

woo suggested that

the Checklist periodically Include a special blue-s or green-bordered page

containing an operational report.

The next morning Gen. Clifton called Lehman to report that

into no wanted, continued.

the White House was very pleased with the Review, /It had been the tried on

the President at breakfast and it had "worked like a charm." 3/

NW 88608 Docld:32401332 Page 8

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7

Because the President was not reading the Checklist every day,

it sent

few more

sta cuntento trom topene

cham

DCI McCone wanted togetdr seter/high-level officials to non afaiter

of ter-sensitin

fontents bey end

the small circle of readers in Kennedy's time--the

Secretaries of State and Defense, McGeorge Bundy at the White House, and

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. Therefore he obtained permission in

abditionel

February to extend the dissemination to four novo top officials in the

State Department, tro more In Defense, me on the Joint chlets stars, suthe

Secretary of the Ireasury and the Attorney-General. 4/

Besides

Som; weekly Rener and the Pick, Oll was

tis baddo of sheilad Otto produation of the neu

writing memoranda

* bit iotate, antonel reading on on daise

Del melone. was

Ghand lasting somebodkanst eo briefingy de the President fron time to

• The Checklist writers still took the publication to

Branley Smith and Gen. Clifton each morning and received their comments,

plus occasional playback from the President. When arcador musually

in the PIOL

interesting items/caught his eye, Clifton would make a point of bringing

them to the President's attention. On 21 January, for example, he

NW 88608 Docld:32401332 Page 9

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8

reacted immeditely to the "quotable Khrushchey" item and said he would

get right to the President with this. A few days later he instructed

OCI to keep the White House "up to the minute" on Cyprus developments.

"Hours will make the difference," he said.

Insert *

from

Gen. Clifton told James Hanrahan on 28 January that

he had talked with the President about the frostient Intelligence

Revder and tr. Johnson had Bald it Joust Fine He Find it a very

valuable supplement to his occasional briefings from the DEI and he wanted

It continued without change.

Early in 1964, the President drew his aides Bill Moyers and

Jack Valenti into the intelligence picture. He wanted one of them present

when he read the Review at breakfast and he was reported occasionally as

discussing Checklist items with them. Although the Bat PICL, writers

continued to meet and talk with Bromley Smith and Gen. Clifton, 1t began to

NW 88608 Docld:32401332 Page 10

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9

look as though Moyers and Velent1 were dobray taking the documents to

the President.

Insert

0 8

plans to spend a weekend

On 25 March the President's poquotatinsoka

in Texas

comment

stochoosened prompted Gen. Clifton to say that Mr. Johnan readf his

was up and

intelligence while kade at the ranchs he be often

8:15 8.m.

Masking for it

was

But it, jo hard to catch him in Washington.

The next day Clifton said that it was not necessary for the OCI representa-

tires to meet him at 9130 d.Ml.;

The book did not nove upstairs that fast.

He fr asked that the meetings take place at 10 in the future.

Janes Co Graham, Actang AD/CI, took up wath/ray Chine

Elmong

the possibility of has inviting. Moyers to CIA headquarters for lunch

first

and a briefing. Cline wanted Bout to

discuss the White House problem

with Mecono, but sit raka file memorandum on how thangs were going. 59

OCT titan drew up a statement for Cline making the principal points that

it was meeting

Laced had no way of knowing whether it was mess the prosident is

needs because is had no feedback from him, in contrast to the situation

under Kennedy. The reason for this was that of contacts at the white House

NW 88608 Docld:32401332 Page 11

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• -

10

dia Lot deal directly with the President on intelligence matters.

OCI wondered how it could establish close links to the President's

Immediato staff. 6/

1. =.

wher thes

Melo

Died

yers ceme

red

NW 88608 Docld:32401332 Page 12

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11

Things remained in en mprodiotablo state for the

only

next few months, with/occasional indications that OCI's presidential

publications had hit the mark. Clifton soment in May that the Review

was the boot mans of renching the President, althoren no POl rostolored

at times when Valenti was Interested in an item. one day when the

PICh was heavy on the side of bad news, Clifton said, "It's no wonder the

President doesn't want to read this stuff--it annoys you." There were

days when the president read and initialed both the Review and the PICL.

From midayear on, theodk Mr. Johnson made frequent callid? trips around

the country. Clifton, who was usually with him, said he had more luck

getting the President to read his intelligence on the return flights than

on the way out, when Mr. Johnson was reviewing his speeches.

As the election neared, Secretary of State Rusk

expressed some concern to Moone about the security of the Checklist

and seemed to prefer that dissemination be linited to the President,

Secretary of Defense Molamara and himsel. The in ariel the sad dan

NW 88608 Docld:32401332 Page 13

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12

• ..

and also conveyed

his

-Ho

on the matter set netinformed tincta thur at the sale time that Mucone 5

feeling

fort that the President should read the Checklist dally, at or have it read to

hin, and should not depend on the semi weekly Review. !!

4 Ab/el Ro J. Smith responded in a memorandum of 5 November 196l, to

belleved

the DO thronger ho BRia Suit He Tott that the Agency would have a graceful

readers

way af dropping some of ths the Checklist adsoother 1f the publication

were to undergo a transformatian in which It would acludre a new name, a

new cover, and a new format. It would become President Johnson's publication,

specifically designed to meet his needs. To increase the pussoor chances

of its being read by the Chief Executive, It would be indooret produced

and wouldne

to conform to the President's working habits by being delivered in

for late afternoon dotterses that it outt bo port a his evening roadaisy

Smith noted that the Review, which Mr. Johnson "usually reads," was

potions outsachutes or his evening pornogle snath a100 noted

the importance of finding a way to establish direct contact with the

President so that OI could get feedback and thus one mistien

a vacuull.

NW 88608 Docld:32401332 Page 14

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13

Smith's proposal for a new publication was accepted

and was rapidly put into effect. The last Checklist was dated 30

November, and the next day the first Issue of the president's Daily Brief (PDB)

was delivered to the White House. In substance it resembled the PICL,

but it had a fresh appearance, and it nax came out late in the afternoon

in the

instead of this early, morning. Jack Valenti sent this first issue back

to MeGeorge Bundy saying that the President read it, Liked it, and wanted

It continued. Dissenination was cut back, so that the only persons

the

receiving the PDB outside the White House were/Secretary & and Under

Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary, and

one Assistant Secretary, the Ineasury Secretary, and the Chairman of

the Joint Chiefs and Gen. Carroll.

i..-

click, this

The semi-weekly Review was dropped, but by 16 December

Weak asant

ac/'s

the DCI ordered that the sumary setic of the Current Intelligence

Weekly Review be Included for each Friday's PDB. The gunmary, titled

leha, go of the week, Lasted only until 26 February 1965, shauna.

NW 88608 Docld:32401332 Page 15

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Ile

failed to arouse presidential interest.

In the ensuing weeks and months, OCI was naturally

watching for indications of the success or failure of the restyled

PDB writer

daily for the President. On 13 January, Thomas Patton oo BRoody

coiner

noted that Bromley Smith wrote "The President" In the upper right, of

Copy No. 1. Patton asked whether Smith would like OCI to type this on.

Muxsatabasuit's No, Bald Smith, futting It on in long-hand gave it a human

touch.

On 19 january, the format of the Brief was changed as a

result of discussions between MeGeorge Bundy and Ray Cline. Bronley Smith

discle old he-ser liked the new format and he thous" the South Yietnan item

was "exactly right," The President was not interestad in the namen ar

generals and idnisters and didn't follow such details.

page size

Further experiments in format followed a talk McCone had

But nothis

erome

of them.

with the Presidents There was even a sample Brief that the President could

put in his pocket, though the thought of having sensitive material handled

this way made Bromley Smith groan.

NW 88608 Docld:32401332 Page 16

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15

In mid-February, Bromley Smith said that the

Vietnam Situation Report, which OCI had begun sending to the White House

daily at 8 a,m., was proving to be very useful; it was going up to the

President every morning.

it should not be imagined Sinate

with Bramily Smith

5 pos writers do me always transacted their business

Sock mally great dortan amount of commotion ter

whon-te-putters-wery-there

around border Smith's offico/because of people coming and going to

different meetings in the White House. One day Smith closed his door,

explaining that xindutyktx

Bundy might be able to work this way with all the

Indians charging in all the time, but I ban't, espec-

1ally since I was here till after ll last night

waiting for the President to leave.

_one day

• Smith unburdened himself/about abomb

A po line and the Agenty, Ons of them vas the occasional flou de rat

clandestine information directly to the President, who "eats, up informa-

tion" and has

controlled by/se

"city editor" somewhere who could make a/package of ally the many types of

to PDBer Joseph O. Matthews

information, including the operational.

At another time, he reiterated how

short the reaction i times had become at the White House.

He also

19.000

NW 88608 Docld:32401332 Page 17

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the Impact of Santo Domigo.

On 24 April 1965 events took place that resulted in

an improvement in the standing of OCI publications in the White House.

On that day an uprising ses began against the proviaional govortment of the

Dominican Republtc. The US fear that Communists might seize control of the

cpuntry led to the prompt dispatch of Marines to Santo Domingo. •President

--28 April--

y coincidence, tit the day they landed/was also the dai

Johan waster

Tor blastatelligener

that Admiral William Raborn was sworn in as DCI, sücceeding John McCone.

Dominican

President Hohns on sardst could hardly get enough intelligence on the Remiax

situation, and Admiral Raborn was determined to provide the best serrice

the establishment of a

possible. the day after he took office, the Admiral ordered/a CIA task force

on the Vominican Hepublio under E. Drexel Godfrey, chief of OCI's Western Area.

As directed, It provided "complete and around-the-clock CIA Intelligence support

Its first task each day was to brief Raborn to

•him

to the White Hoise," / sa put thuceton readinese to deal with th calle from the

White House Macabopodi Periodically throughout the day and night it issued

round-up

/situation reports, and when neceasary, apot reporta of particular developments.

All these reports were teletyped to the white llouse, and they were read by the

Mr. Johnson, who was described by Bromley Smith as a prox President who eats

NW 88608 Docid:32401332 Page 18

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17

up informadion." 00I, s090 of courso, continued do pus out 100 ragulas

Dominican

publications. It was during the star crisis that wordx way receited that

the President's Daily Brief had taken firm root in the White House. Exer

on 21 May that

B1ll Moyers said/the President read it "avidly." 2/

Chief

The increased tempo of intelligence service to the stick

route

Hence Executive prompted further consideration of the proper stocut to

Kim.

mandatason.

land ODI Ray Clie

extromand DDCI Richard Helms agreed that

a "greased channel" through #

Pauperge Bundy should be established for the PDB

and any other reports the DCI wants to be sure the President sees. 10/

on 20 May

AD/CI Jack Smith conmented/that a "greased channel" already appeared to exist

for the PDB. 11/

the NSC Staff (MaKerrge Bundy,

White Itruse Situation Keam

should be the place of entry for intelligence sor Tea forden, although informa-

Helms and Cline said tha

copies could be sent to Moyers and Valenti.

NW 88608- Docld:32401332 Page 19

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18

hectic

The tockkes atinosphere in the spring of 1965, with the

Dominican situation coming on top of growinge difficulties in Vietnam,

caused the men in the White House to ask mote of Intelligence and to

tanded ta pacinos sharper narction hi the hite House to Interrigence and-ta

react to it more sharply. Bronley Smith said the President has a "very short

ed) first from official sources and not from the press

reaction fuse." He wants to hear/about major evelopments, lux so rapid

1o onination o sental i also warned that OCI would soon be asked to repont

on every coup and to cover all present and potential trogble spots with high

precision. He said that in the fax future, OCI's reports would not say that

the Valencia regime is shaky, but that "Valencia is going to be overthrown

by a coup on

the umpteenth July by X in Ioonerville."

Since this would be asking

the impossible in most cases, Richard Lehman, OCI'& Assistant for Special

Projects, went to see Bill Moyers. He explained that it so purebto zor OCI

could

To write 50 pages of intelligence warnings a day, thereby taking out insurance

against any possible contingency, but that the office did not believe that this

would really serve the President. Lehman said OCI tried to be highly selective

In varning of kia coups and the like. Moyers expressed understanding of mu

NW 88608 Docld:32401332 Page 20

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19

OCI's difficulties, and the fire died down.

11

This episode had

an amusing sequel about eight months later when Bromley Smith pondered

the series of army coups in the republics of West Africa. He said he didnt

think the President wanted or needed to be informed in advance of every

threatened coup. "Otherwise," he said, "you could fill the book with that

sart of thing."

- INSERT tom page below laser

Insert

OCI

was fairly confident that the PDB was being read regularly by the President,

writers on the

the/PDB team nostdass

and reactions,

and/i* received uneful suggestions, mut criticions usually from Bromley smith,

they

when to delivered the publitation each day!

G'one day in June 1965 tiches

first parageaph of the

Aead Item in the PDB said "Accurulating information suggests that Hanol is

bringing North Vietnan to a state of semi-mobilisation,"

The second paragraph

explainied

Said that Hanol's action was far short of classic mobilization for offensive

operations; tuscorn OCI sax considered the move defensive and was therefore

British expert

inclined top discount the view of one Briter who thought a large-scale attack

and Gen. Clifton

would soon ba made across the 17th parallel. President Johnson/at the time

NW 88608 Docld:32401332 Page 21

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## Page 22

desert mp.19

The system for supplying current intelligence to tur

Johnson

President/was now working better than at previously. tex dockster bobs retur

@cimmantatrtyconftiunt.that-the lcocidentiaasreadtng.tha.aar.cegukar1te

To be sure,

son the Presidential

be sure die he es CE did not boners tran the stet page syste

18001074797

had enjoyed fron John Kennedy, It did not, in factoraceive the directe

reactione of the men reyare and latentina terestorest to Mr Johao on

"On the other hand, toother Oll was fairly contident that the President

was reading the PDB regularly, and the writers on the PDB tean received

useful fuggestions, criticians, and reactions--usually from Brumley Smith--

when they delivered the publication each day.

NW 88608 Docld:32401332 Page 22/

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## Page 23

' 20

were at the LBJ ranch. Late in the afternoon, the PDB received a phone call

from Bromley Smith, who said that Gen. Clifton had called from the ranch.

Ho had bean shaker by the

I first sentance of the Vietnamese Itemytatabakan A ton horror sion

was concerned about the whole piece.

The President was out on the lake at

and was not expected back for several hours. Clifton at first felt he should

sunmon the President to shore. Shith discussed the matter with the PDB writer,

Thomas Patton, and there was further conversation with Clifton, who decided

thutakes simply to add the word "but" after the first sentence and continue with

vas a vivid

the second somewhat reassuring second sentence. The casd Illustrati gen

of the potentiality of the PDB for causing excitement in the White House Ladlyx

entourage.

Foreign developments often snund provoked atarwesbom

spirited reactions from thuodicka Bronley Smith, but It was not often that

na fare of the

he expressed surprise rebukratkar at the kind of Intelligence he was reading,

substance apart. One such occasion, however, came when the PDB ran an item

about dissension between Rumania and the Soviet Union. An intercept revealed

NW 88608 Docld:32401332 Page 23

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## Page 24

21

!

that Ceausescu and Maurer had complained to Shelepin that the USSR acts on

the international scene without congulting its allies, just as in Stalin's time.

The Rumantans oited the 1962 missilo adventure in Cube and Soviet positions

on disarmament. Shelepin agreed that more coordination was needed. Smith was

particularly interested in this item and remarked thatckborocklaxbrotestor

to PDB writer Archer C. Bush that it was "fantastic" that we could get this

kind of information.

Bromley Smith now and than modified or rewrote items when

he felt that they might confuse or unduly alarm the President. In December

1965, for examplo, President Johnson ordered a halt in the bombing of trucks

Vietnam to in the hope of getting negotiations started. A PDB 1tem reported

that Hanol had proadoast a tough restatement of its position, making no referenco

this would be

to the pause in air str1k08. Smth, terrothes airald that timbrestatorte

taken

interiader as a rebuff to the President's efforts, reworked the text to

avoid this interpretation since the

a fally

emplosiohododockhexbrodeast did not constitute set official government statement.

NW 88608 Docld:32401332 Page 24

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22

It was glear at various loimes that tiere mase...

Quite clearly, the White House staff cringed at bad news

from Vietnam. When the PDB reported in April 1966 that "the political situation

averred

appears to be rapidly worsening" In South Vietnany and Rainiast that Ky

might soon have to take drastic measures to restoro authority or make major

concessions to the Buddhists, Swith remarked that the article was pessimistic

and that

Moaadet he had later information. It, was, of course, one of the perild of the

PDB operation that the White House sometimes had tacter fresher reports from the

field. Smith handed John Heidemann cables reporting that Ky was going to

formulate a new constitution and that the State Departuent looked upon this

hopeful. Heidemann agredd that OCI had written in ignorance of this information,

but added that offhand he would not be optimistic.

A few days later Smith read that "There was no real improve-

ment in the situation today..." and said "You're going to break the President's

whole

heart; he thinks things are much better today." When he fintshed the/dis -

heartening

takessons report, he tobsed the book in the air, whistled, and sald, "we'll

NW 88608 Docld:32401332 Page 25

---

## Page 26

23

have fun tonight. But that's no reason for not writing it as you see 1t."

Smith had cause for unhappiness again when the DB had

to repert that/Pakistan officials felt that his country was sexicanty rif

_temporariay, drifting apart from the Us and would probably establish closer

PDB writer

relationships with the Soviet Union. Smith told/Allen Valpey that this article

was a "shocker" and that Walt Rostow would be disturbed by it. (Rostow

had replaced McGeorge Burdy a in April 1966.)

white itiuse

Although #x Jogn McCone had not taken up a/suggestion

_in Hornerato timo

that the President's daily give occasional coverage to CIA activities, Kit

Admiral Raborn as DCI did adopt this practice. Bromley Smith reacted

negatively to these reports, however, apparently believing that President Johnson

did not like them. He particularly objected in 7966 to a PDB Annex explaining

Tobin: 957646114

^ how CIA used a portable ultra-violet light device In Vietnam to detect

guerrillas who sexu had recently handled weapons before mingling trouserty

vith inno-ent villagers. Smith did not want the Heeney to

He bellered ther if

"advertise" m th ADIS,>

the Presider shoule be

informed of some CiA activitres, the Del should

sad him a memorand um.

NW 88608 Docld:32401332 Page 26

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## Page 27

85 24

2y this time Ail. Smith mae DDI, E. Drekel Endfray was Dloel

Mad Richard Lahman was DD/OCl. Bromlay Smith me?

with them end the PAß wrikers

Late in July 1966 Bromley Smith said that he had some ideas

about the PDB and would like to get together with all the writers. Ho mot with

the tot105255915

then end to COI/in the Langley building on 3 August. He prefaced his

tonicktar

remarks by sayed hated hiorkschit expressing his satisfaction with the way

He explained, however,

the President was being served, He had no criticisms.

anon>

Husana that while the President "tolerates" arranymous documents, he

18 much mure & responsive to a personalized document. He wondered whether the

now Dal.

Brief could be signed by Mr. Helms, Then tha 1t would become a personal link

between the President and the birector. In regard to content, Smith said the

PDB did not have to alert the President to impending crises over which he would

have no control. Rather, smith thought it the PDB could be most useful

by dese is that serene pt thy Judgments her sluation with which the

President is or will be faced. In Smith said these judgments would be accepted;

OCI did not have to support them with argumentation or evidence. Smith

emphasized that the Brief writers had to be fully up on US policies and should

adequately

read presidential speeches. He felt the President is kept/informed of

NW 88608 Docld:32401332 Page 27 /

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## Page 28

25

Vietnamese military developments by other means; the PDB should carry more

Vietnamese political and economic items. iSnith urged that the Brief

have more coverage of

setbarogunaxalx Europe and said that Panama was another subject

high on the priority list. 13/

OCI promptly set about adopting Smith's suggestions as to

SoOn

content, and Smith, commented that he the noticed the change. I/

→

!

Back to Morning Delivery

alteration

A major change in the PDB system occurred at the end

of February 1967. Seemingly all that was involved was that President Johnson

decided that he would rather get the Brief in the morning than in the evening.

time

However, this change in delivery/forced other changes. The President wanted

the Brief at 6:30 aollo, just before he began reading the newspapers. This meant

that OCI's closing time on the book was 5 a.m. Nonetheless, the PDB had to

NW 88608 Docld:32401332 Page 28 /

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## Page 29

be written in full knowledge of this what was in the morning press.

18/8. Drexel Codirey cormented, the schedule sput "the highest prent un

on making the publication up to the minute. "

15/

Recause the feet had to be delivered to the white House

Situation Room by 6 a mo, the PDR writers seate no langer had a member of

the President's staff up and available to receive the book and comment on 1t.

having

make

This meant that there was no point in/the writers muctry the trip to the

white House. From this time on, the PDB was delivered by couriers. To make

up for the loss of the morning conversations with Bronley Smith, an OCI

staff member would visit him occasionally to check on how things were going,

and there was also communication by phone.

St fo the PDR

chedule,

Shortly after the changeover to the ne

commenting on the Prestdent's reaction;

Bromley Smith, setbodukbras tocktack

said emphatically

that "we are much more certain now that he's reading it."

He alst made a

point he was to make several times subsequently, which was that he disapproved

off annexes to the Brief. He was afradd that If the Brief were burdendd with

an Annex, the President would put it aside for later reading--and then not

NW 88608 Docld:32401332 Page 29

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## Page 30

27

Smith though it was an excellent idea to the

Briet to shanmarize the conclerious of

"importa do matamal estimates, 161

got back to It. In Bundedboods Smith's vlew, the 'DB should be of a

Longer unich the Prosident oould whip throueh quokay, scient buntente

be better if annex-type reports were sent down separately. minut

Smith continued to admonish OCI writers now and then tor

Jaragustines about the words and phrases they employed in the PDB. He admitted

that thet it was hard to know whefe to draw the line, but he cautioned that

Astsix the staff should be orefat about did not like "hopping mad," nor,n

As a rule of thumb, he said the writers should avoid seeming frivolous or light.

hearted

on another occasion,did he care for a description of India as an "unwilling bride."

At the President's tequest, OCI on 7 September 1967 beget

to attach to the Brief a Special Report on North Vietnam that sendabalack mainly

TE IN WeT

with the effects. of the war.

The only cip to go outside of the Agency was

addressed: "For Bromley Smith - Eyes Only for the President." Beginning with

the issue of 6 October, this Special keptrt carried a new sectiba on North

Vietnamese treatment of political attitudes toward the war, expressed in state-

ments and demonstrations.

NW 88608 Docld:32401332 Page 30

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## Page 31

28

In November DOI Heims talked with Drexel dodfrey and

Richard Lehman about the PDB. Judox The Director expressed greatsatisfaction

the

with both the Brief and/Special Report. He said the latter is was "really

hitting the mark." He urged that OCI try harder to presenta come up with items

on the personalition of men fallar to the Prosident, infe rid ln too

of petsonalities. Helms also asked that the Y'DB give more attention to

coming volts of world VIPs to Washington and to each other.

No major changes in the YDB were made during President

Report a

Johnson's time after the introduction of the Special, North Vietnationa

Hepart. To alla appearances, the Brief had evolved into a document satiafactory

to the president, and it kept serving its purpose throughout the rest of the

administration.

All OCI analysts who have worked on the PDB are familiar

in the White House si

holding

with a photograph of President Johnson sitting/with Lady Bird and/his first

grandson. In his handa is an issue of the President's Daiky brief, silendar

te rearing antond This homey picture epitonized the position

kat oI hoped the bie epithe White House. And perhaps it did.

NW 88608 Docld:32401332 Page 31

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## Page 32

29

i chear

The importance to & President of a steady flow of

first-class intelligence is self-evident. Whatever scope and depth of in-

formation he can obtain from the public media, he still needs the intelli-

gence that comes from the utilization of sensitive technogical means and

clandestine operations. He is entitled to objective appraisals based on all

sources, public and governmental. In planning American positions and actions,

should have

pois. ble and probaste desolopment of

he tpat the most soubdly based estimates of hen foreign situations, are Likedy

CIA and its predecessor, the CIQ, have met these presidential

Intelligence needs. What they have furnished the fresidents has been deterined

by ne interplay between the intelligence organization and the White House.

arn what eac

ho Agency had been parabanad eager to sarkorhadch President wanter

and it has thire

In terms of subject matter, timing, format, /style, for the moet pert, 10

meet these ne

a sed to stee neen so what to wanted, and at bother him with

thing ales At the sue time, hind the intelligeno in the posseasion

CHESTER

• intelligasca

befora the proside

abigated-to see that he receives

the reporte

NW 88608 Docld:32401332 Page 32(

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## Page 33

30

to king

residitis attentio thrus he dirt

staside. a most have.

hamust.bavsgaven.if.à

thas.not.beon-foroseon.and raquasted.

wwnot1allwithtrany-oategory-of-roques.oom

Information.

There has probably never been complete agreement between

CIA and the White House on what the President really needs to know, but

a degree

matticouts of mutual toleration usually prevailst so that a President will

ved sone things he isn't particularly interested in and CIA vill equart

carry on certain lines of reporting simply out of regard for a President's

suppay-@presidant witheorbutn-ropurting

idiosyncracies.

In serving Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and

Johnson, CIA's Office of Current. Intelligence found af

Arreatly

Giot irocutive its message a

to de Chiet tracutive,

then the me that mar

of fine -

Limitig diess

although the method was adjusted to accord with each President's prefetences.

NW 88608 Docld:32401332 Page 33 /

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