MILITARY
Agency: JCS
Originator: OSD
Document date: 9/7/62
Document type: MEMORANDUM

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Date: 08/28/98

Page : 7

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS

RECORD

NUMBER

: 202-10001-10191

RECORDS SERIES : FOIA SERIES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER: DOC 192

Released under the Johr

F. Kennedy

Assassination Records

Collection Act of 1992

144 USC 2107 Note) .

Case#:NW 54214 Date:

09-13-2017 -----2

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR

OSD

FROM

TO

TITLE

MILITARY

DATE

: 09/07/62

PAGES : 3

SUBJECTS : MONGOOSE

DOCUMENT TYPE: MEMORANDUM

CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET

RESTRICTIONS

* 1C

CURRENT STATUS

RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 07/30/98

OPENING CRITERIA

COMMENTS: Reviewed by JCS, OSD, State, CIA.

NO JOINT STAFF OBJECTION

TO DECLASSIFICATION

MAR

2016

DATE:..

[R] * ITEM IS RESTRICTED

HH 54214 DooId:32424922

Page 1

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52

(437)

TOP

RET

CASP(CA) DEDISR

TOP SECREL CONTROL

7 August 1962

Case No-

T.S- No.

1-T5-39

Document No. 2l

MILITARY

General Benjamin T. Harris, DOD/JCS Representative for

Operation Mongoose, states:

1.

Support: Within its capabilities DOD is prepared to provide

all required support to CIA, State and USIA necessary to the accomplish-

ment of the objectives of Operation Mongoose.

2.:

Military Readiness: If there is a decision to use U.S. military

force, execution of our military contingency plans for Cuba will be under-

taken as rapidly as the posture of our forces will allow at the time the

decision is made.

With no prior warning and with 18 days of preparation a

coordinated airborne /amphibious assault could be executed which, it is

anticipated, would gain control of key military installations and the

principal centers of population of Cuba within I0 day and result in

minimum US and Cuban casualties. This plan provides for confronting

Cuban forces with sufficient strength to be clearly beyond Cuban capability

to resist, to enduce early capitulation of their units and to avoid needless

loss of life.

CAl

A requirement to reduce significantly the pre-assault period

would necessitate incremental commitment of US forces as they could be

assembled and employed Under this plan the time required to gain essential

US military control of Cuba could be appreciably extended. However,

reduction of US military reaction time may be of overriding importance.

In such case, air and naval forces could attack with little delay from the

time the decision is made

An air assault could be initiated within 8

hours; an airborne assault could be initiated within 5 days; and a Navy/

Marine amphibious force could be committed 3 days later with a build up

of the full scale effort to follow.

c. In concept, initial military operations commence with an

air and naval blockade, concentrated air strikes, and coordinated naval

gunfire to effect destruction of enemy airpower and to neutralize and

lestroy as much as possible of the enemy armor. artille dectinto

capability.

he Department of state nas

OSA; NO OBJECTION

25JDN 98

release or declassification of this document mulair

under the provisions of the JFK Assassination Records

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

3т 6/23/98

MH 54214

DocId: 32121922

Page 2

TOP SECRE on.

(DOC 13)

Дос +

- 19R I4PP

Release

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## Page 3

TOP

SECRET

52

(437)

CASD(PA) DROISR

TOP SECREL CONTROL

7 August 1962

COFF NO.

Case NO..

418707-0336

T.S. No.

L-TS-

Document No. 3l6

MILITARY

General Benjamin T. Harris, DOD/JCS Representative for

Operation Mongoose, states:

1.

Support: Within its capabilities DOD is prepared to provide

all required support to CIA, State and USIA necessary to the accomplish-

ment of the objectives of Operation Mongoose.

2. Military Readiness: If there is a decision to use U.S. military

force, execution of our military contingency plans for Cuba will be under -

taken as rapidly as the posture of our forces will allow at the time the

decision is made.

With no prior warning and with 18 days of preparation a

coordinated airborne /amphibious assault could be executed which, it is

anticipated, would gain control of key military installations and the

principal centers of population of Cuba within 10 days and result in

minimum US and Cuban casualties. This plan provides for confronting

Cuban forces with sufficient strength to be clearly beyond Cuban capability

to resist, to enduce early capitulation of their units and to avoid needless

loss of life.

CAl

Under this plan the time required to gain essential

Us military control of Cuba could be appreciably extended. However,

reduction of US military reaction time may be of overriding importance.

In such case, air and naval forces could attack with little delay from the

time the decision is made, An air assault could be initiated

an airborne assault could be initiated

Marine amphibious force could be committe

and a Navy/

with a build up

of the full scale effort to follow.

c. In concept, initial military operations commence with an

air and naval blockade, concentrated air strikes, and coordinated naval

gunfire to effect destruction of enemy airpower and to neutralize and

capability.

depray at anuch a poutie of the enemy nan are enter i

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

OSA, NO OBJECTION

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

25J0N98

release or declassification of this document in

under the provisions of the JFK Assassination Records

RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

Collection Aft of 1092 (PL102-526)

Sm 6/23/98

TOP SECRE

HH 54214

DocId: 32424922 Page 3

(DOC 13)

Doc + 192, 4PP

Release:

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