MEMO: RELEASE OF JFK ASSASSINATION RECORDS- -DIFFERENCES
Agency: CIA
Originator: CIA
From: CHIEF, HISTORICAL REVIEW GROUP
To: THOMAS A. TWETTEN
Document date: 6/9/93
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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JEK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CIA

RECORD NUMBER

:

104-10331-10061

Released under the John

RECORD

SERIES

JFK

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

PROJFILES-CORRESPONDENCE. Kennedy

•--.

Assassination Records

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

Collection Aet of 1992

144 USC 2107 Notel.

AGENCY ORIGINATOR : CIA

Case#:NW 53217 Date:

FROM : THOMAS A. TWETTEN

06-22-2017

TO : CHIEF,

HISTORICAL REVIEW GROUP

TITLE

:MEMO: RELEASE OF JEK ASSASSINATION RECORDS-

-DIFFERENCES

DATE :

06/09/1993

PAGES

4

SUBJECTS :

METHODS

SOURCES

JEK ASSASSINATION

DOCUMENT TYPE

PAPER

CLASSIFICATION : SECRET

RESTRICTIONS : 1A

CURRENT STATUS

RELEASED IN PART PUBLIC - RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW

COMMENTS

04/30/03

JEK-M-16 : F2: 2000.02.08.10:40:03:060054

[R] - ITEM

IS

RESTRICTED

104-10331-10061

NH 53217 DocId: 32404191

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SECRET

DD/073-1455

0 9 JUN 1993

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS

RELEASE IN FULL

2000

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Historical Review Group

FROM:

SUBJECT:

REFERENCE:

Thomas A. Twetten

Deputy Director for Operations

Release of JFK Assassination Records--

Differences

Your Memorandum dated 1 June 1993, Subject:

Release of JFK Assassination Records--Perception

Problem

1. After consulting with key people on the Do team who

are reviewing the JEK records for release, I have learned that

there are some misunderstandings as well as some honest

differences of opinion which are reflected in your Referenced

memo .

2. First, to clear up some points: it was agreed early

on, in July 1992,

that old organizational designators, phone and

room numbers would be released.

It is entirely possible that

this agreement is not applied uniformally among all the

reviewers.

Or that some of the later documents in the 1970's

have more recent data in them. However, I am

in agreement that

old office designations above

the branch chief level and old

phone and room numbers can be released.

3. I also agree that well-known methods such as

telephone taps and surveillance need not be protected per se. I

understand much is being

released about such activities in Mexico

City in the 1963 time period. There are times, however, when

such activity involves liaison equities, and caution would have

to be used to protect liaison's involvement or awareness.

Liaison sensitivity in this regard is universal and never

ceasing.

CL BY 0199835

DECL OADR

DRV COL 1-82

SEGRET

NW 53217 DooId:32404191

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_SECRET

SUBJECT: Release of JFK Assassination Records--Differences

4 .

Document and file numbers are problematical.

understand an early agreement was reached to release Mexico City

and Headquarters numbers, 201 numbers of key players in the JFK

story, as well as old intelligence and DCD reports numbers.

Other cable and dispatch numbers betray station location by their

configuration and abbreviations; indiscriminate release of 201

numbers would be indicative of our operational

or counter-

intelligence interests in the persons involved. All of these

details need to be protected.

5. As for inactive cryptonyms, I can only give partial

approval for their release.

Where the crypt has been blown or

publically exposed in Congressional hearings, there is no

problem. But many inactive crypts still are using a valid

diagraph and while crypts were designed to protect the real

secrets, they themselves are secrets which must be held.

Many of

them interrelate to other projects or activities in a given

location.

Inactivity by itself is not enough reason to release

cryptonyms.

6. Source descriptons on disseminated reports, while

often general or sterile, frequently are descriptive enough for

the knowledgeable reader

to determine the identity; so purely

benign descriptions such as "untested" or "usually reliable" may

be released, others may not.

A disseminated report is still

classified and often the customer is given an accurate, if vague

description in order to establish the credibility of the

information.

We cannot share such

source-identifying

information with the general public.

7. Pseudonyms of former employees cannot be released.

Like cryptonyms, they were designed to protect a secret and have

themselves.

Pseudonyms follow employees through

their careers.

If overseas, the number of different names allows

the researcher to determine the size of a station.

8. Lastly, we are all concerned with the credibility

problem--not only for the Agency but also for this project.

One

will be able to point critics to the vast amount of information

being released that ordinarily would not be--Mexico City Station

activities including photo ops, phone taps and surveillance

capabilities; considerable file

information on Cuban emigres;

2

-SECRET

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.. SECRET

John: What's them

SUBJECT: Release of JFK Assassination Reeords--Differences

contacts such as Tad Szulc and counterintelligence concerns re

bignew Brzezinski, to cite just a few examples.

I understand

numerous staff names are being released which also is not our

normal practice.

9. While there will always be those who say we have not

released enough, we must concern ourselves with those who will

think we have released too much--agents, prospects, liaison

services and employees. Accordingly, I must insist on continuing

to protect that which I consider to be essential to the success

of

ongoing and

future operational activaty.

Mon A betten

THOMAS A. TWETTEN

Thomas A.

Twetten

3

SEGRET

NH 53217 DooId: 32404191

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SECRET

SUBJECT:

Release of JEK Assassination Records--Differences

DO/IRO: K. Stricker x44440 (7 June 93)

Distribution:

Orig - Addressee

1

- D/CSI

1

- DDO

- ADDO

- C/ IMS

1 - DC/ IMS

1 - DO/ IRO

4

SEEREg

1321T

Doc1d:32404191

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