STAFF REPORT ON ASSASSINATIONS: AUTHORITY AND CONTROL
Originator: SSCIA
From: MILLER, WILLIAM
To: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE
Document date: 07/09/1975
Document type: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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157-10008-10252

2023 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK Assassination System

Identification I orm

Agency Inform tion

Date:

2/23/201

AGENCY: SSCIA

RECORD NUMBER: 157-10008-10252

RECORD SERIES: REPORT W/COVER MEMORANI UM

AGENCY FILE NUMBER:

Document Info nation

ORIGINATOR: SSCIA

FROM: MILLER, WILLIAM

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTE!

TITLE: STAFF REPORT ON ASSASSINA FIONS: AUTHORITY AND CONTROL

DATE: 07/09/1975

PAGES:

73

SUBJECTS:

CIA AUTHORITY

INDERFURTH, RICK

LEGAL AUTHORITY

MILLER, WILLIAM

PRELIMINARY STAFF PAPER

"ASSASSINATIONS:AUTHORIT"' & CONTROL"

SPECIAL GROUP

DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

RESTRICTIONS:

CURRENT STATUS :

Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 08/08/1994

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS:

BOX 439-2'"

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Castro's life. The following exchange w: th Richard Helms makes this

point:

Senator Hart of Michigan. You tell us that it is your

impression that nothing done with respect to Castro by

the Agency was done without authority.

Do I understand that correctly

Mr. Helms. It was done within the guidelines of ap-

propriate authority. In other words, we felt that we

were operating as we were supp sed to operate, that

these things if not specifical y authorized at least

were authorized in general terris. (Helms testimony, p. 61)

Senator Baker. Was it in your view the general policy of

the government of the United Sates as proposed to be

implemented by the CIA to. kill Fidel Castro?

Mr. Helms. I believe it was tle policy at the time to

get rid of Castro and if killig him was one of the things

that was to be done in this cornection, that was within

what was expected.

Another witness, Samuel Halpern, re ated to the Committee a dis-

cussion he had had with Richard Bissell, who was then Deputy Director

Plans, concerning a meeting Bissell had ittended in the Cabinet Room

of the White House:

Mr. Halpern. Mr. Bissell said he had recently--and he didn't

specify the date or the time--ile had recently been chewed

out in the Cabinet Room of the White House by both the Presi-

dent and the Attorney General or, as he put it, sitting on

his ass and not doing anything about getting rid of Castro

and the Castro regime. His or.ers to both Mr. Zogbey and to

me were to plan for an operation to accomplish that end.

Mr. Schwarz. Was any content out into the term "get rid of,"

or was that the term that was ised, and only that term?

Mr. Halpern. To the best of m recollection, that was it.

There was no limitation of any kind. Nothing was forbidden,

and nothing was withheld. And the objective was to remove

Castro and his regime. (Halpe n testimony, p. 8)

It is clear that the U.S. Governmen: wanted to see the removal of

the Castro regime from Cuba and that the CIA took steps, including

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Chairman Church. Deputy Diree or for Plans.

Your record shows that Helms hid knowledge of the ZRRIFLE

operation, which, among other

hings, was to develop an

executive capability--whatever that means.

Presumably

that means a capability to conuct an assassination if

and when authorized by proper uthority?

Mr. Breckinridge. That is my inderstanding.

Chairman Church. Is that your understanding?

Mr. Breckinridge. Yes, sir.

Chairman Church. Do your reco: ds show that, or is that

based upon what has been revea. ed through your interroga-

tion?

Mr. Breckinridge. First, let lie go back and clarify,

then I will answer this questin, if I may.

Mr. Helms approved ZRRIFLE, which the record shows has

the responsibility of stealing codes, essentially.

My understanding, from my intes views, is that ZRRIFLE

had also the responsibility fo executive action capability.

That is a difficult phrase.

The record does not show that ir. Helms knew when he

approved the project that it hid this dual role.

(Colby testimony, pp. 66-67, 64-70)

William Harvey confirmed the fact tat he had been given the responsibility

of developing the ZRRIFLE project by Mr. Bissell.

Mr. Harvey. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. In any event, sone time in early '61?

Mr. Harvey. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. What did Mr. Bissell ask you to do?

Mr. Harvey. He brought up the question of Executive

He said he was concerred about it--about not

only our capabilities, if any, to perform it, but the

basic questions of protections, methods, techniques,

decisions, judgment as to its alvisability in any given

case, and

this whole sort of panoply of--again, pardon

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Lumumba

The Select Committee has not been al le to determine any direct

link between the CIA and the death of Pa: rice Lumumba. It has, how-

ever, heard testimony to the effect that an official within the CIA

directed a subordinate to investigate thr possibility of assassinating

Lumumba; that a lethal virus was transfe: red to the Congo (now Zaire)

apparently for the purpose of killing Lu umba; that a foreigner was

recruited for a mission in the Congo, wish assassination being originally

part of this mission; and that President Eisenhower may have ordered,

at least indirectly, an attempt to be mare on the life of Lumumba.

Investigating the Prissibility

The CIA official directly involved: n investigating the possibility

of assassinating Lumumba was Richard Bis: ell, who was, at that time,

Deputy Director Plans. The following exchange refers to a discussion

Mr. Bissell had with Justin O'Donnell, ten Deputy Chief of Staff. in

the DDP.

Mr. Schwarz. Did you ask him: n words or substance to

kill Mr. Lumumba?

Mr. Bissell. I asked him to i vestigate the possibility

and to make explanation for so doing.

Mr. Schwarz. When did you do l hat?

Mr. Bissell. I don't remember the date of that. I may

have it on a chronology here, lut I image that is a

matter of record, or that he his testified to that date.

I don't remember the date.

Mr. Schwarz. Did you tell him this connection with

making plans to go see the pas:er of the poison,

Mr. Gottlieb?

Mr. Bissell. I think I probably did.

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Mr. Schwarz. Did he tell you lie wouldn't do it?

Mr. Bissell. Later he told me that he didn't want

to do it.

But he also said thit he thought it was

an inappropriate action, and tlat the desired object

could be accomplished better i other ways.

Mr. Schwarz. Who authorized you to tell Mr. O'Donnell

to take steps to move toward a: sassinating Mr. Lumumba?

Mr. Bissell. Nobody.

Mr. Schwarz. Did you inform tie White House of that?

Mr. Bissell. No.

Mr. Schwarz. To the best of your knowledge, did any.

body inform the White House of that'

Mr. Bissell. Io the best of mi knowledge, no.

Mr. Schwarz. Why did you seek to assassinate Mr.

Lumumba?

Mr. Bissell. I didn't seek to assassinate him. I told

a member of the clandestine se vice to make plans and

develop the capability to do su if it were approved and

ordered.

Senator Goldwater. Approved b: whom?

Mr. Bissell. It would have thin had to have approval

at the highest level of governient.

The Chairman. Where did the is ea come from?

Mr. Bissell. I don't remember Mr. Chairman. It could

possibly have been mine.

The Chairman. It could possib. y have been yours?

Mr. Schwarz. Did you tell Rosiow that was your initiative?

Mr. Bissell. I told him that the instruction as to O'Donnell

was my initiative.

Senator Baker. How many other: did you plan on, just as

a contingency?

How many other people did you nstruct to draw up plans

to assassinate?

Mr. Bissell. I don't believe I here were any others which

went to the point of instructiig that a man be prepared.

(Bissell testimony, June 11, P1.54-55)

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In his testimony before the Select committee, Mr. O'Donnell

confirmed Mr. Bissell's account.

Mr. O'Donnell. And so he callid me in and he told

me he wanted me to go down to

Former Belgian Congo, and to e iminate Lumumba

he Belgian congo, the

vould also like to add the cau ion that any remark.

I may make about Mr. Bissell o anybody else that it

is all indirect discourse.

When I say, Mr. Bissell

said go to the Congo, please du not include quotation

marks, go to the Congo.

It's .11 Mr. Bissell said,

that he wanted me to go to the Congo.

Mr. Wides. What did you under. tand him to mean by

eliminate?

Mr. O'Donnell. To kill him an. thereby eliminate his

influence.

Mr. Wides. What did you say to him?

Mr. O'Donnell. I told him tha: I would absolutely

not have any part of killing L'imumba. He said, I

want you to go over and talk t, Sidney Gottlieb--

And I went over--he was Dr. Bo tlieb at the time and

since--and he told me, I told im I had been sent

by Mr. Bissell, and he told me that there were four

or five--and I use the word four or five advisedly,

I'm not just saying three or four, as I recall one

of the methods was a virus and the others included

poison.

And I just felt at the time thit with Gottlieb, don't

argue with him.

Mr. Wides. He told you there were four or five what?

What did he say to you?

Mr. O'Donnell. Let me say lethal means of disposing

Lumumba.

•I then left his o fice and I went back

to Mr. Bissell's office and I old him in no way

I have any part in the a sassination of Lumumba.

MI. Wides. Before you go on ay further, did you or

he mention whether there was any higher authority than

Mr. Bissell for this operation either Mr. Dulles or

outside of the CIA at the Pres dential level?

Mr. O'Donnell.

No, sir, in no way. I felt--again,

this has to be tenuous--but I ertainly would not

have done it if I thought Mr. julles was opposed to

it.

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Mr. Wides. You assumed--

Mr. O'Donnell. I assumed that he had authority from

r. Dulles in such an importan: issue, but it was no

iscussed, nor did he purport :o have higher authorit

to do it.

Mr. Wides. Did you then, afte: speaking to Mr. Bissell,

speak to anyone else that even.ng about this request and

Mr.: O'Donnell. Yes, sir. An! I went into Mr. Helms'

proposed to

conditions do it, and Helms sad you're absolutely

right.

Yow, again, indirect discours

He told me that I was

absolutely right. And I felt hat then I had a senio

man who was on record as far a; my position was concerned.

(0'Donnell Donnell testimony, June p. p.. 11-16)

The Lethal Vi us

Shortly after his conversation with Mr. Bissell, Mr. O'Donnell

went to the Congo. Upon his arrival, he discovered that a virus had,

in fact, arrived in the Congo and was in the possession of the CIA

Station Chief.

Mr. Wings, Shortly after that did you, in sact, go to

Mr. O'Donnell. I went, I woul guess, within 48 hours.

Mr. Wides. You were there for about three months, the

last quarter of 1960, approximi tely?

Mr. O'Donnell. Yes, that is correct.

Mr. Wides. The Station Chief vas who at that time?

Mr. O'Donnell.

Mr. Larry Devlin, a very fine, dedicated

person.

Mr. Devliu indicated 1o me that there was a

virus in the safe.

Mr. Wides. Did he indicate it was a lethal virus?

Mr. O'Donnell. He did not, bur I knew it wasn't for

somebody to get his polio shot up to date.

(0'Donnelli Donnell testimony, June 9, 1. 16)

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The Select Comnittee has been unabl: to determine how the virus

found its way to the Congo and for what ise it was intended. The

Committee has reason to believe the viru; was ultimately returned to

Agency headquarters in Washington.

A Clue to Presidential Involvement

The discussion between Mr. Bissell ind Mr. O'Donnell, as well as

the arrival of the lethal virus in the Congo, occurred during the fall

of 1960. The Select Committee has heard the testimony of one witness

who remembered a National Security Counc 1 meeting in the summer of

1960 in which President Eisenhower made eference to his desire to see

Lumumba eliminated. This witness, Rober: Johnson, made it clear to the

Committee that what he had heard at this meeting should be considered

"a clue, rather than precise evidence of Presidential involvement."

Mr. Johnson. What I am going o tell you should be

understood clearly for what it is--a clue, rather

than precise evidence of Presiv ential involvement

in decision making with respec: to assassinations.

I would be extremely concerned if I felt that this

information were to be the bas s in itself for

conclusions by this committee or if it were other-

wise to be made public.

As a member of the NSC staff during the Eisenhower

Administration, I sometimes at ended meetings of

the National Security Council o take notes on the

discussion.

I attended one such NSC meetin;; in the summer of

1960.

I should note parenthet cally that I have

refreshed my memory as to the

jrobable time of

the meeting by checking the hi: torical record of

international developments.

A

that meeting, there

was a discussion of developmen s of what was then

the Congo, now Zaire.

At some time during that discu: sion President Eisen-

hower said something--I can no longer remember his

words--that came across to me is an order for the

assassination of Lumumba who wis then at the center

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of political conflict and controversy in the Congo.

There was no discussion; the meeting simply moved on.

I remember my sense of that monent quite clearly

because the President's statement came as a great

shock to me. I cannot, however, reconstruct the

moment more specifically. (Rotert Johnson testimony,

June 18, pp. 5-6)

Concluding Remark

In his testimony before the Select (ommittee, Director Colby had

this to say about U.S. involvement in the death of Patrice Lumumba:

Mr. Colby. There are a series of other charges,

Mr. Chairman, about assassination that have been

made about CIA in the past,

of Mr. Lumumba. There

is no question about it that at one point there

was a low level discussion that maybe that would

be something that should be dore.

There is an in-

dication that a foreigner was recruited to go down

there, but our records very clearly indicate that

his function turned entirely irto other activities

of trying to penetrate a code room, and things of

that nature, and there is no irdication of any

attempt by us to engage in an assassination of

Mr. Lumumba.

Congolese forces.

Clear, that we have absolutely

nothing to do with, so the Lumumba case I think we

can absolutely say we had nothing to do with the

Lumumba case. (Colby testimony, May 15, p. 65)

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October 6, 1961: McCone Cable legarding Assassination

Mr. Kirbow.

The record before the Committee indicates

that Smith reported that he hal recommended to Ambas-

sador Lodge that "We do not se: ourselves irrevocably

against the assassination plot since the other two

alternatives mean either a blodbath in Saigon or :

protracted struggle which could rip the army and the

Mr. McCone directed by cable t, Saigon of 6 October--

"McCone directs that you withd aw recommendation to

mbassador concerning assassinition plan under McCon

nstructions as we cannot be i, position actively con

doning such course of action

responsibility therefor."

Senator Schweiker. Would you 'xplain what that means?

Mr. Colby. What that means? it means we don't want

to have anything to do with an assassination plan.

Senator Huddleston. You are e iminating that as an

alternative?

Mr. Colby. That is part of ou: concept of what to do.

Senator Schweiker. Didn't tha: contradict what you

were saying a few minutes ago?

Didn't you say we

were in essence--

Mr. Colby. We were looking to the overthrow of the

government.

Senator Schweiker. I see what you are saying.

Mr. Colby. But not the assass nation in this case of

the brothers Nhu and Kahn.

Senator Schweiker.

The other "ent forward?

Mr. Colby.

The other program ontinued, yes.

(Colby testimony, June 20, pp. 12-14)

U.S. Involvem nt

President Diem was assassinates. November 2, 1961. The CIA

was not involved in the actual murder. Hireçtor McCone's directive

against participation in any assassinatin attempts or plots, sent to

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Mr. Colby. This is a memorandim written after a

debriefing of our Ambassador tere.

And the de-

briefing apparently covered th conversation, which

indicated that the dissidents lid need guns and

ammunition from the U.S., and ¡articularly they

needed a small number of high-owered rifles with

telescopic lenses.

The Ambassador said he saw no

I roblem in the pur-

chase and delivery clandestine y of the arms for

the dissidents, but he said, o: course, this raises

the question of whether the U.!. Government wants

to engage in this activity.

if this is the group we want tw support.

Mr. Schwarz. In June of 1960, id the government

state that policy decision, an. state that the

government of the U.S. was prepared to participate

in the overthrow of the Irujilo regime to the

following extent:

"To provide

small number of niper rifles or

ther devices for the removal t key Trujillo

eople from the scene?"

Mr. Colby. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. And who made tha. decision on behalf

of the U.S. Government?

Mr. Colby. Well, we have a me lorandum that in-

dicates that that was told to he Chief of our

Western Hemisphere Division by thestrate

Secretary of State for Latin Aerfcar Affates.

Mr. Schwarz. Who was then Had Rakattom?

Mr. Colby Mie Rubottom.

Mr. Schwarz.- In July of 1960 lid General Cabell,

the Acting DCI, accept the rec mmendation made by

the CIA staff and concurred in by Mr. Richard Helms,

that 12 T.S. rifles, model 1903, with telescopic

sights, be sent to underground opposition forces

in the Dominican Republic?

Mr. Colby.

Yes.

The proposal was to procure

and deliver them by air, parac luting them into

the country.

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If they could not be delivered by air, they were

planning for a way in which th 'se weapons could

be delivered by sea.

And ther: was a considerable

discussion of ways to get it i.

Mr. Breckinridge. There was no delivery.

Mr. Colby. And there was neve a delivery of those

particular weapons.

Mr. Schwarz. Going back to th reference to the

Issistant Secretary Ofestate wo authorized th

lelivery of the rifles on beha. f of the U.S. Govern

ment, who authorized his makin;, that statement?

Mr. Colby. I don't think we krow.

The Chairman. Under your procdure, if you receive

an order from the Assistant Ser retary of State to

end rifles into a Latin Ameri, an country, or an

ther foreign country, for the purpose that we hav

discussed that the record disc. oses, is that a suf-

ficient authority on which the CIA would then take

action?

Mr. Colby. No, I don't believ: it is. Certainly .

it is not under our present ru. es. And I think at

that time it is really quite ulikely, in my opinion,

that that approval could have leen given by the

Assistant Secretary acting alore unless he was

acting under a general delegat: on of authority to

approve details of a larger id a that had been dis-

cussed

even orally at the senior levels.

Now, I don't think we have any record of those dis-

cussions.

Mr. Schwarz. Do you have any coubt that the policy

question referred to and the qestion "Whether the

U.S. Government wants to engage in this activity"

refers to the use of such weapons for the purpose

of killing people, assassinatiig people?

Mr. Colby. Killing people, ye:. Assassinating is

another ward, unfortunately.

The Chairman. Killing is the letter word.

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Mr. Colby. Yes. But assassin, tion has a slightly

different meaning. But I thin'. that in particular

quotation of page 22 there is ery clearly reflection

of the thought process that I was explaining, that

the CIA could do it if it had , policy approval to

do it.

And we don't know wher.: that policy approval

actually came, except from the Assistant Secretary.

(Colby testimony, June 4, pp. 17-40)

January, 1961: Special joup Decision

Mr. Schwarz. In 1961, January 12, 1961, did the

Special Group approve

a recommindation made apparently

by the Department of State tha: limited supplies of

the small arms and other materials to be made avail-

able for dissidents inside the Dominican Republic?

Mr. Colby. Our records do indicate a memorandum that

the Special Group did explain, did approve that on

January 12th--

Mr. Schwarz. January 12, 1961, and January 24, 1961

confirmed?

Mr. Colby. The 24th, really, I think it was discussed

on the 12th and--

Mr. Schwarz. They approved it on the 12th and con-

firmed it on the 24th?

Mr. Colby. Right.

The Chairman. The Special Gro ip being--

Mr. Colby. The predecessor of the Forty Committee.

I can't tell you exactly who wis a member at that time.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, recognizing the difficulty you have

been having with respect to whit is an assassination as

opposed to what is help to dissidents, are you capable

from the records here of testiying whether the Special

Group--testifying which branch of that Special Group

thought they were approving?

)r is that something that

you cannot tell from these records?

Mr. Colby.

This record merely

says, limited amounts of

small arms, a limited supply of small arms and related

equipment.

I do not know whet er Mr. Rubottow, for

Instance, attended the Special Group meeting.

the pattern at that time for tie action officer of the

CIA, the Division Chief of the area, and frequently the

Assistant Secretary of that ara, to attend that kind

of a Forty Committee meeting wien a subject in their

area was being discussed.

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Mr. Schwarz. Is it fair to sa' from the written

record as presented in the 196 Report that one

cannot tell, up to this point, whether the Special

Group approved merely the sendong of arms to

dissidents in a sort of genera. fashion, or ap-

proved the sending of arms to lissidents in a

target fashion for use in an a sassination?

Mr. Colby. No, you cannot tel., except by the

knowledge of possibly the Assi tant Secretary :

of State. (Colby testimony, Jine 4, pp. 41-43)

March, 1961: The Purpose of the Weapons

Mr. Schwarz. It is perfectly lear, is it not,

from the written record that a: least by March 17,

1961 that any weapons that wer.: delivered were de-

signed for the purpose of assa sination?

Mr. Colby. That any weapons wiich would be

delivered would probably be usd by the dissident

group in an attack on Trujillo

Mr. Schwarz. And that means the assassination

of Trujillo does it not?

Mr. Colby. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. It is clear, is : t not, looking at

the cable of March 17, that th. t weapon is for the

purpose of an assassination, and the CIA headquarters

was so informed?

Mr. Colby. Yes.

The whole discussion of the va: ious kinds of

weapons was aimed at providing the dissident group

with the weapons that they coud use against Trujillo

and those around him. (Colby

¡estimony, June 4, p. 67)

March, 1961: Weapon: Provided

Mr. Schwarz. Following the in: tial turndown of

delivery by the pouch, did the Agency in fact ship

the revolvers sometime after Mirch 25th and were

authorized by Mr. Bissell to

Mr. Colby. I don't think we slipped the revolvers.

What we shipped, were carbines.

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