TESTIMONY RE: CUBAN OPERATION
Originator: SSCIA
Document date: 08/01/1975
Document type: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT/TRANSCRIPT

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DATE : 08/01/75

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TESTIMONY AND EXHIBITS BY MR. WEATHERBY

EXHIBITS 1-5

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Vol. 3 of 3

Ohr Inited Statra Sruate

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NATIONAL

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R681

5/26/77

AY.

Report of Proceedings

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Hearing held before SCI BOX

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August 1, 1975

Washington, D.C.

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AS SANITIZED

En 9 Mar 94

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over

to the Coumittee for destruction)

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CONIENTS

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TESTIMONY OF

MI. Weatherby

EXHIBITS

Exhibit No. 1

Exhibit No. 2

Exhibit No. 3

Exhibit No. 4

Exhibit No. 5

117ssin

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MH 50955 DOCI0252402418 Page 4

United States Senate,

Select Committee to Study Governmental

Operations With Respect to

Intelligence Activities,

Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:15 o'clock pim.

in Room 608, The Carroll Arms, Senator Morgan presiding.

Present: Senator Morgan (presiding)

'Also present; Frederick Baron, Robert Kelley, and John

Bayly, Professional

Staff Members.

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PROSEEDITGE

Mr. Baron. Mr. Weatherby, before we start there are

a few procedural matters that we should discuss.

First, is it true that you are testifying here under

alias today?

Mr. Weatherby. That is correct.

Mr. Baron. And is it not also true that we have made an

agreement that you have signed to indicate your true identity

and to indicate the fact that your true identity will be on

file at the CIA available to the Committee if it needs to

verify it for some reason or other?

MI. Weatherby. That is also correct.

Mr. Baron. And is it your understanding that we also have

an agreement that we will refer to agent AMLASH by his cryptonym

rather than by his true name to preserve his true identity?

Mr. Weatherby. Yes, that is understood.

Mr. Baron. Okay.

You understand that you have the right to counsel here

today?

Mr. Weatherby. I do.

Mr. Baron. And you are appearing voluntarily without

counsel?

Mr. Weatherby. I am.

Mr. Baron. Are you aware of the fact that you can stop

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with counsel?

Mr. Weatherby. Yes, I do.

Mr. Baron. And are you also aware that you have all of

your Constitutional rights intact before this Committee,

including your Fifth Amendment right to remain silent in the

face of a question that you might find incriminating for some

reason?

MI. Weatherby.

I am.

Mr. Baron. Before we bagin with the specifics related to

Project AMLASH, I would just like to ask a few general questions

about your background in the Agency.

Can you explain at what point you joined Project AMLASH?

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TESTIMONY OF MR. WEATHERBY

Mr. Weatherby. I, joined Project AMLASH upon returning

from an overseas assignment.

It was a directed assignment into

the general operation of which AMLASH was a part.

Mr. Baron. So -

Mr. Weatherby. It was essentially in June, 1962.

MI. Baron. That general assignment was in relation to

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Cuba?

Mr. Weatherby. That is correct.

Mr. Baron. And for how long had you been working in the

Agency On Cuban affairs?

Mr. Weatherby. Never before.

Mr. Baron. Since what time, in other words, when did you

begin working on Cuban affairs?

MI. Weatherby. In June, 1962.

Mr. Baron. I see.

So your previous overséas assignment was completaly unre-

lated to Cuba?

Mr. Weatherby. Yes, sir.

Mr. Baron. How long had you been in the Agency?

Mr. Weatherby. Since 1956.

Mr. Baron. Did you have any other assigmments that

related to Latin American affairs?

Mr. Weatherby. None whatsoever.

HH 50955

DOCRS: 72202118 MayBaron. Did you have any assignments in Vietnam?

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Mr. Weatherby. I have, yes.

MI. Baron. And did you have any assignments in the Congo?

Mr. Weatherby. I did.

MI. Baron. Let us go off the record a second.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Baron. Let's go back on the record.

Could you tell us what time you were assigned to Vietnam

and the Congo?

Mr. Weatherby. Yes.

I was assigned to Vietnam Erom August, 1970 involved in

affairs through August, 1974. I was involved with Congo

affairs at the Headquarters level and affairs at the Headquar-

ters level and on several TDY's during the period of approxi-

mately May. 1965 to the fall of 1968.

Mr. Baron. Did you ever work on Dominican Republic

affairs?

Mr. Weatherby. I have not.

...

Mr. Baron. Drawing your attention now to the period of

time when you were working on Cuban affairs, in what office of

the CIA were you doing this work?

Mr. Weatherby. I was working for the Task Force West,

which was the original name of the unit.

Mr. Baron. Known as Task Force W?

MI. Weatherby. Yes.

NN 50955 DOÇ15 32202118 Mayeßaron. Under whose direction was that?

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Mr. Weatherby. Desmond FitzGerald and also William

Harvey who preceeded Desmond FitzGerald.

Mr. Baron. When did FitzGerald take over from Harvey?

Mr. Weatherby. I believe it was in the late spring of

1963. I am not certain.

Mr. Baron. And can you describe the structure of Task

Force Wat the time that you joined it under larvey's direction?

Mr. Weatherby. I could tell you only about the unit in

which I belonged to.

Mr. Baron. What unit was that?

Mr. Weatherby. That was Third Country operations, which

concered obviously operations against Cubans in countries other

than Cuba or the United States.

Mr. BAron. Did that unit have a cryptonym?

MI. Weatherby. It did not.

Mr. Baron. What was it known as in Agency jargon?

Mr. Weatherby. I do not remember. It was an operational

section, but the exact nomenclature I do not recall.

Mr Baron. And its purpose was to work in relation to

Cubans or Cuban affairs in countries other than the United

States or Cuba?

Mr. Weatherby. That is correct.

Mr. Baron. Do you know how many such sections there were

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within Task Force W?

NW 50955 Doc26: 02202418 MEageWeatherby. I do not recall.

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Mr. Baron. And who was the head of the Third Country

Operations section?

MI. Weatherby. During my time it was the late Mr. Maurelius

Mr. Baron. And how do you spell that?

Mr. Weatherby.

M-a-u--e-1-i-u-5.

Mr. Baron. What was his first name?

Mx. Weatherby. Edward.

Mr. Baron. Did you work directly under him?

Mr. Weatherby. I did.

MI. Baron. So that in your operational capacity as a

case officer you would report directly to Mr. Maurelius?

Mr. Weatherby. That is correct, or Mr. FitzGerald, or

Mr. Harvey upon request.

Mr. Baron. Did the Chief of Task Force W; namely FitzGerald

or Harvey sit directly above Maurelius in the chain of command

within Task Force W?

Mr. Weatherby. He had a Deputy, but this particular unit

was the . was a senior echelon operational entity.

MI. Baron. What does that mean?

Mr. Weatherby. That means there was no other chain of

command between it and the Executive Head of the Task Force.

MI. Baron. So that Mr. Maurelius would have reported

directly to the Chief of Task Force W?

Mr. Weatherby. Or his Deputy.

WW 50955 DoRS: 72202448 MayeBigOn. Or his Deputy.

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Who was Deputy Chief of Task Force W under William Harvey?

Mr. Weatherby.

That was -- go off the record a minute.

Mr. Baron. Yes.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Baron. Go ahead.

Mr. Weatherby.

Let me say during my period of time there,

which was some thirteen years ago, there were a number of

• -=

Deputies and they have slipped my recall. If I do recall it,

I will pass it to the record.

Mr. Baron. Have you had a chance to refresh your recol-

lection, generally about your activities on Task Force I?

Mr. Weatherby. I have not. I was informed of this

interview yesterday afternoon, late.

Mr. Baron. Did you have a chance to read the IG Report

before you came here today?

Mr. Weatherby. I did read that this morning.

Mr. Baron. And what sections of the If Report did you

Lead?

Mr. Weatherby. I read only those portions that concerned

my activitias with AMLASH.

MI. Baron. About how many pages would that have been?

Mr. Weatherby. I think about six to ten.

Mr. Baron. And did you discuss your coming here today to

answer questions before the Committee with anyone who is not

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Mr. Weatherby.

I have not.

Mr. Baron. And have you discussed it with anyone at the

CIA?

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Mr. Weatherby. I have.

Mr. Baron. Could you tell us who that was?

Mr. Weatherby. I discussed it with the General Counsel's

Office, and I discussed it generally with --

Mr. Baron. Off the record a minute.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Baron. Let's go back on the record.

With the AMLASH Case Officer who followed you on Task

Force W?

Mr. Weatherby. That's correct.

MI. Baron. And can you relate to us the major points that

you discussed with the case officer who has testified before

us recently?

Mr. Weatherby: Yes, I can. I purposefully did not

discuss my portion of the operation with him on advice of the

Office of General Counsel. I talked to him in general terms

about, frankly, you fellows and your personalities, what I

could expect, and we related at lunch today old times since we

have not seen each other for probably at least six or seven

years. But I should like to reiterate we did not discuss each

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NW 50955 DocDE: 32206118Y Hagstimony.

other's part of the operation in order to preserve the integrity

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Mr. Baron. At any point, did anyone at the CIA tell you

what to say here today?

Mr. Weatherby.

Absolutely. not. In fact, if I might

add, they cautioned me, they told me they were not going to

say because that is against the rules. They made a very strong

point of that.

Mr. Baron. So we have then the understanding of the

fact that you have been asked to testify on very short notice

and that your recollection might not be pinpoint precise as

far as names and dates go?

Mr. Weatherby. Thanks, that is correct.

Mr. Baron. But we will try to do as much as we can to

refresh your recollection as we move through the events we are

discussing.

MI. Weatherby. Yes.

I should like to point out for the record that I have. not

worked in Latin American Affairs before nor afterwards, and that

it has been some thirteen years since I delved into this

material, so, therefore, please bear with me, if my answers

are not as complete perhaps as you wish. I shall do my best.

Mr. Baron. Turning back to the subject of the structure

of Task Force W, you were unable to recall the name of the

Deputy to work under Harvey. Do you recall who took over as

the Deputy under FitzGerald?

Docks 17202118 Mrauweatherby. No. It was the same man.

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Mr.

Baron.

Would that have been Samuel Halpern?

Mr. Weatherby.

Samuel Halpern was an Executive Officer,

I do believe, who was

essentially divorced from operations.

Mr. Baron. Would it have been Bruce Cheever?

Mr. Weatherby •

That:is correct.

Mr. Baron. And Bruce Cheever was the Deputy Chief of

Task Force W during the

entire period that you served on Task

Force W?

Mr. Weatherby. That is correct. I believe he had a

short tenure as Chief until Mr. Hart took over, John Hart.

Mr. Baron. When did John Hart take over as Chief of

Task Force W?

Mr. Weatherby. It was quite near the end of my time on

it, so I would say approximately in early spring 1965.

Mr. Baron. For how much of this time did you work on

Project AMLASH?

Mr. Weatherby. I worked on that project shortly after I

came aboard on the assignment, which would have been June.

1962, through turning it over to the previously mentioned

AMLASH Case Officar in September, 1963.

Mr. Baron. This case officer is the man who testified

here under the alias of Garmire?

Mr. Weatherby. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Baron. What were your duties on Task Force W after

WW 50955 DOc1353020948 1@atePfoject AMLASH?

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Mr. Weatherby. I continued to handle Third Country

Operations, excluding this particular operation, in a support

capacity.

Mr. Baron.

With whom did you work on those operations?

Mr. Weatherby.

We worked, we were a focal point in a,

and a coordination point with, the various desks of the

countries involved. I cannot recall the people on the desks

at that time.

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MI. Baron. Were you responsible for operations, or was

this simply support activities?

Mr. Weatherby. It was, in the bureaucratic structure

that we have I was responsible for providing guidance for

operations which were run by the individual country desks in

their countries.

Mr. Baron. Did you work out of CIA headquarters at

Langley?

Mr. Weatherby. That is correct.

MI. Baron. Wereyou at any time stationed in Florida?

Mr. Weatherby. I was not.

Mr. Baron. During the period of time that you worked on

Project AMLASH, were there any other CIA officers who worked

closely with you?

MI. Weatherby. Not at that time, with the exception of

Mr. Maurelius who provided guidance, and subordinate officers

MY 50955 Docks p2PA9Yidi48 information such as file checks and background and

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information of that nature that contributed for a batter

knowledge of the operation.

Mr. Baron. Would you assume generally that Mr.

Maurelius would be intimately familiar with any operation that

you were running under Project AMLASH?:

Mr. Weatherby. I do not think I would -- I would ask you

to clarify the term "intimate."

Mr. Baron. Would he be aware of the major-contacts you

were making and any significant support to those contacts?

Mr. Weatherby. I should say at the time, yes, any major

aspect of it. It would be difficult for him to follow every

operation of every officer

in complete detail.

Mr. Baron. But he would generally be aware of any

significant development of your activities on Project AMLASH

and in your relationships with your contacts inside Cuba?

Mr. Weatherby. Yes, sir.

Mr. Baron. Would he in turn have made the Chief of Task

Force W aware of any such significant developments?

Mr. Weatherby. Of significant developments, yes.

Mr. Baron. And was it a frequent practice for you to

report directly to the Chief of Task Force i and to his

Deputy and bypass Mr. Maurelius?

Mr. Weatherby. As a matter of course, no. In answer to

general questions of a

professional interest, how I was doing,

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and how the operation was going, I could be called in on an

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Mr. Baron. Do you remember any occasions in relation to

Project AMLASH when either William Harvey. or DesmondiFitzGerald

asked you for a report directly?

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Mr. Weatherby. No, not -- I cannot remember now.

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MI. Baron. Where is Mr. Maurelius now?

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Mr. Weatherby. Mr. Maurelius is deceased. He died three

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days ago.

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Mr. Baron. And do you know where. Mr. Cheever is now?

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Mr. Weatherby. I do not. I think he may be someplace

in the Southwest. He: is retired.

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Mr. Baron. I would like to review with you a few events

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that occurred before you joined Project AMLASH, but about which

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you may have become knowledgeable after you joined the Project.

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Starting in March of 1961, the IG report indicates that back

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Stewart, who was a CIA officer assigned to Mexico City, met

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agent AMLASH in Mexico City to sound him out generally on his

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views about the Cuban situation.

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Do you recall anything that you learned about contacts

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between Jack Stewant and AMLASH in Mexico City?

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Mr. Weatherby. No, I do not, other than what appears in

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the paper which you have just quoted from or referred to.

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Mr. Baron. Were you aware of the reasons why that contact

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took place?

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Doebe 72202118 Mayewlätherhv. At the time t wae.

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Mr.

Baron. Do you recall now?

Mr. Weatherby. I, do not, but I presume it was to. discuss

defection or dissatisfaction with the Cuban regime.

Mr. Baron. Do you remember ever learning about the source

of the initiation for that meeting? Did it come, in other

words, from (Jack Stewar

or from AMLASH or from an intermediary?

Mr. Weatherby. To the best of my recollection, from an

intermediary.

Mr. Baron. Would that have been a man whose cryptonym

became AMWHIP? I am referring now to Carlos Tepedino.

MI. Weatherby. Yes.

MI. Baron. Do you know whether the CIA had contact with

Carlos Tepedino prior to the time they came into contact with

AMLASH?

Mr. Weatherby. I don't - I do not think it was on a

professional basis. He may have known people in Havana Station!

on a social basis.

MI. Baron. Do you recall being briefed about the state

of contacts with agent AMIASH at the time that you took over as

operational officer?

Mr. Weatherby: Would you repeat the question, please?

Mr. BAron. Do you recall being briefad?

Mr. Weatherby. Yes.

Mr. Barnn. At the time you took over?

Mage"eatherby. I read a file rather than being briefed,

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as I recall.

Mr. Baron. Do you have any recollection of meeting with

(Jack Stewart) to be briefed at the time you joined Project

AMLASH?

MI. Weatherby.

I cannot recall.

Mr. Baron. 'What was the nature of the file that you read

at that time?

Mr. Weatherby. Well, it was either a file started on

AMLASH or a file on an intermediary that began the contact, or

the attempted contact, with LASH.

Mr. Baron. Would that intermediary have been Tepedino?

Mr. Weatherby. I do not think so. I'm sorry. I do not

recall accurately at this point.

Mr. Baron. Would you assume the name of that intermediary

would appear in the AMLASH file today?

Mr. Weatherby. Certainly.

Mr. Baron. At the point when you reviewed the file to

brief yourself on Project AMLASH, do you recall reading a

CS information report that referred to AMLASH's expression of

disgust with Castro to the point where AMLASH indicated that

he would be willing to kill Castro?

MI. Weatherby. I remember reading that in the IG Report.

I should - as I have stated earlier, I have not read the

official 201 file on the whole case before appearing before you!

Docia5sz202hla huge 15 recall that from the IG Report.

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Mr. Baron. Do you have any independent recollection of

learning from any source about AMLASH's emotional state at the

time that you took over the project?

Mx. Weatherby. No, I never knew the man until I actually

met him, in sufficient detail for me to form an opinion, and

having never worked with latins before and mostly with

Germanic types, I prefered to form my own conclusions.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall, however, being made aware by

any source before you came in contact with AMLASH that he had

a propensity to assassinate Castro or any leanings in that

direction.

Mr. Weatherby. I recall only that he perhaps had said or

made statements that he was totally dissatisfied with Castro

and. I do not recall from my own memory if he used the word

assassinate as you did.

Mr. Baron. Whether or not he used the word assassinate,

at the time you took over the contact with AMLASH, would you

have assumed that this was someone who was at least capable

of doing that sort of thing?

Mr. Weatherby. I think if I can recall correctly that

my impression of the man was that he was quite mercurial and

I did not understand him well enough to know whether that was

whiskey talk or an expression or a Latin exaggeration. I

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remember saying that I had got to see the man and talk to him

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Mr. Baron. The whiskey tälk you are referring to is talk

that you picked up from the file?

Mr. Weatherby. No, it would be that someone had said that

he heard him say that I am mad at Castro and I would like to

eliminate him. To me that is hearsay, and I put no stock in

that whatsoever.

Mr. Baron. And do you recall your initial contact with

agent AMLASH?

Mr. Weatherby.

I do.

Mr: Baron. Where was that?

Mr. Weatherby. It took place in Helsinki.

Mr. BAron. Before we pick up on that contact, I would

like to ask a couple of other questions about events prior

to that time.

Do you have any recollection of the development of

project: MHAPRON?

MI. Weatherby... I do.

Mr. Baron. What was that program about?

Mr. Weatherby. That program was an effort to penetrate

the Cuban military to encourage either defections or an attempt

to produce information from dissidents, or perhaps even to

forming a group which would be capable of replacing the then

present government in Cuba.

Mr. Baron. Was that operation already mounted at the

HH 50955

Dockes putime when you joined project AMLASH?

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MI. Weatherby. I think the program was in effect, or it

was concurrently started. I do not recall honestly.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall whether your assignment to work

with AMLASH was for the purpose of maintaining his participation

in the project MHAPRON, or did it have some independent purpose?

Mr. Weatherby. The original purpose, to the best of

my recollection, was to oversee his defection, and to monitor

him through northern Europe, with which I was familiar, and to

help in a planned dafection speech, et cetera, in some

Western

European country.

Mr. Kelley. The word "defection", can that have more than

one meaning? The meaning, the obvious meaning, is that the

person leaves his country and comes to another one. Is there

another meaning that he becomes disaffected from the government

or the country in which he resides but stays there?

MI. Weatherby. That is correct.

There is two, there are two defections, which means he

defects from their ranks and becomes overtly an imigre from

his country, and the other term would be to defect in place

which is in effect means he becomas a recruited agent.

Mt. Kelley. And in your later testimony, would you keep

those two meanings in mind and tell us if you use the word

"defect," which one we are talking about?

Mr. Weatherby. Yes, sir.

HH 50955

DocIys3p202418 Magekulley. At the time that we are speaking dout now,

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the original purpose of the AMLASH operation, you used the

word defect. What was, the meaning at this time?

Mr. Weatherby.

The original, the original intent when he

was sent to Helsinki vas to aid in the defection, meaning for

the man to leave Cuba and Fidel Castro's ranks and come to the

West in the classic sense.

Mr. Baron. One more question on project MHAPRON.

Do you recall whether one of the goals of that project

would have been to support an attempt by high Cuban military

officars to initiate a coup against the Castro regime by killing

the leadership?

Mr. Weatherby. I would say no. The killing of the

leadership was never a prerequisite for replacement of the

government.

Mr. Baron. Whether or not it was a prerequisite, would

it have been one acceptable means of initiating a coup?

Mr. Weatherby. I would say not.

Mr. Baron. Why not?

Mr. Weatherby. Because that was not, as far as I know in

any paper I had ever read, or any directive I had ever seen.

Mr. Baron. What kinds of directives did you have as to

the means that should be used by contacts established through

MHAPRON for the overthrow of Castro?

Mr. Weatherby. I do not recall if there was a - that a

NH 50955 Docts ap paper ragedescription of the project ever spelt that out. In

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other words, the means to be used. I think before that is

going to be even addressed, you have got to look at the people

and assets you have, and determine what course of action might

be taken.

Mr. Baron. So that you would tailor a course of action

against Castro to the specific characteristics and capabilities

of the contacts with whom you were dealing, is that correct?

Mx. Weatherby. One could do that:.

Mr. Baron. Would that have been a normal operating

procedure for you at that time?

Mr. Weatherby. I would think that, that that follows

from my previous statement that any activity would have to be

looked at in the context of the people who might be available

and willing to do it.

Mr. BAron. So that you are saying certainly a major

factor in determining what kind of operation to arrange with

a Cuban contact would be the character and capability of that

contact?

Mr. Weatherby. I would think that that is an accurate

statement.

Mr. Baron. Did you carry on projects MHAPRON at the

point when you joined Task Force W, did you have operational

responsibility for that project?

Mr. Weatherby. I did not. That was an overall project,

ww 50955 DocIdS offs past by capacity, did not run that program.

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Mr. Baron.

Was Project AMLASH considered a sub-unit of

MHAPRON, a subproject?.

Mr. Weatherby. It fell into that broad category, but to

the best of my knowledge it was not an integral part of that

program which in itself was really a mechanism for looking at

the problem, and AMIASH was a separate entity at the concept -

pardon me, at the inception, of course, it was a defection

=

operation.

Mr. Baron. In relation to just one man?

Mr. Weatherby. Yes.

Mr. Baron. And Project AMLASH throughout related

essentially to the use of just one high-ranking Cuban military

officer, is that correct?

Mr. Weatherby. That's correct, as the principal person

involved.

Mr. BAron. In your attempts to aid the defection of

AMIASH, did you ever come in contact with a man named Juan

Orta?

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Mr. Weatherby. I did not.

Mr. BAron. Do you have any recollection of Juan Orta

from any connection?

Mr. Weatherby. The name is familiar, but I cannot recall

the details. I do know, however, I did not meet him.

Mx. Baron. Do you recall working with a CIA officer

NY 50955 Doc2532202Medpdamas O'Connell in relation to Cuban affairs at any

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point?

Mr. Weatherby. I, do not recall that name.

MI. Baron. Do you know Jim O'Connell?

Mr. Weatherby. I do not.

Mr. Baron. Would it refresh your recollection if I tell

you that he was in the Office of Sacurity working as a case

officer with some special responsibility in late 1960 and into

1961 for an operation directed against Fidel Castro?

Mr. Weatherby. That was before my time, and it would not

refresh my memory.

Mr. Baron. Did you have any contact with Robert Maheu in

relation to any Cuban affair or operation?

Mr. Weatherby. None whatsoever, sir.

Mr. Baron. Have you had any direct working relationship

with Robert Maheu?

Mr. Weatherby. I have not, sir.

Mr. Baron. Did you ever have any direct contact or

working relationship with John Roselli in relation with Cuban

affairs?

Mr. Weatherby. No, sir.

Mr. Baron. Do you know John Roselli?

Mr. Weatherby. I do not.

Mr. BAron. Do you know Santos Trafficante?

Mr. Weatherby. No, sir.

HW 50955 Doc1a53ß202118. MayeBaFOn. Do You recall Mr. Trafficante's role in Cuba

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in the early '60's?

MI. Weatherby. I do not, sir.

Mr. Baron. Do you have any recollection of Mr. Trafficante'

business?

Mr. Weatherby.

No, sir, I don't, because until I

returned from Europe, Cuban was a non sequitur to me.

Mr. Baron. Let me

represent to you that Santos Trafficante

to the best of our knowledge, had gambling contacts inside

Cuba, and, in fact, ran some casinos in Havana. Does that

refresh your recollection at all as to any relation he may

have had to any operation of the CIA against Fidel Castro?

MI. Weatherby. No. I think now that you mention it, I

have seen something in the papers perhaps.

Mr. Baron. Recently?

Mr. Weatherby. Yes, sir. But I had absolutely no

knowledge of that at the time.

Mr. Baron. Did you have any knowledge at the time, at

any point in the early 1960's of any connection between Sam

Giancana and the CIA?

MI. Weatherby. None whatsoever, sir.

Mr. BAron. Did you ever have contact with a Cuban named

Tony Varona?

MI. Weatherby. I did not, sir. I did not, sir.

24

Mr. Baron. Do you know of Tony Varona?

NN 50955 Docp5:32202418 MayeWeatherby. I know of the name, yes.

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Mr. Baron. Do you have any recollection of who he was,

or any contact between him and the CIA?

Mr. Weatherby.

No, sir.

Mr. Baron. When you joined Task Force W, what was the

nature of your relationship to William Harvey?

MI. Weatherby. At the time I was an employee of his.

Mr. BAron. Did William Harvey give you orders directly

=

in relation to any operation?

Mr. Weatherby. No, sir.

MI. BAron. Any orders from Harvey would have come through

Mr. Maurelius to you, is that correct?

Mx. Weatherby.

Yes, sir.

Mr. Baron. Do you have any recollection of an operation

to assassinate Fidel Castro that was run by William Harvey?

Mr. Weatherby.

No, sir.

MI. Baron. Do you recall ever hearing about a plot to

assassinate Castro by placing poison in his food?

Mr. Weatherby. No, sir.

Mr. Baron. This was never mentioned to you by anyone in

Task Force W?

Mr. Weatherby. Absolutely not. I would like to point

out at that time I was GS-11 and GS-ll's are not told a great

deal.

Mr. Baron.

For the record, what is a GS-ll?

WW 50955 DocId53P202446 MageWsatherby. That is a

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Mr. Baron. Civil Service rank?

Mr. Weatherby. Yes, sir.

MI. Baron. How would you have characterized Mr. Harvey's

style of leadership and operations at that time?

Mr. Weatherby.

took care of his troops.

Mr. Harvey was flamboyant, a hard charger.

Mr. Baron. In what way was he flamboyant?

Mr. Weatherby. Well, I think he had a good lifestyle.

He was a large man, and perhaps flamboyant is not the correct

word. But he was - colorful might be a batter choice of words.

Mr. Baron. Was he a man that you would describe as

strong-willed and independent minded?

Mr. Weatherby. I think we can safely say that, sir.

Mr. Baron. Would you say that if william Harvey determined

in his own mind that a course of action was the correct one,

or the most effective operationally, that ha would do everything

in his power to carry it out?

Mr. Weatherby. I couldn't answer that, sir. It would

be pure conjecture on my part.

MI. BAron. Did you ever have any contact with Bruce

Cheever in relation to any operation targetted against the

life of Fidel Castro?

Mr. Weatherby. None whatsoever, sir.

24

Mr. Baron. Did you ever discuss assassination techniques

wH 50955 Doc2@30204 distin from means of initiating a coup with Desmond

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FitzGerald?

Mr. Weatherby. I, did not, sir.

Mr. Baron. Did Desmond FitzGerald ever raise with you

the idea of placing an exploding sea shell in an area where

Fidel Castro might be skin-diving?

Mr. Weatherby. No, sir.

MI. Baron. Did he ever raise with you, or did anyone

ever raise with you, the idea of sending a diving suit to

Fidel Castro as a present which would be contaminated with

bacteria?'

MI. Weatherby. Absolutely not, sir.

This was the first time I have ever heard of it.

Mr. Baron. Did anyone in Task Force W or in the Technical

Services Division ever discuss with you the development of

any poisóns that could be used for assassinations?

Mr. Weatherby. No, sir.

Mr. Baron. Turning now to your first contact with AMLASH,

during that period of time would you place that contact?

Mr. Weatherby.

The first contact, sir, that should have

been roughly, roughly about the thirty day period from maybe

the 26th of July, 1962 through maybe 18 August 1962.

Mr. Baron. Do you remember how you first learned that

AMLASH was going to Helsinki?

Mr. Weatherby. That was brought to our attention by an

NW

50955

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New York.

Mr. Baron. And what was the purpose of your trip to

Helsinki?

Mr. Weatherby.

The purpose of my trip to Helsinki was to

ascertain if AMLASH was prepared to defect, and if so, to

assist him in doing so and to gain as much mileage for us from

information of a defector from a high-level Cuban official as

possible.

Mr. Baron. This would be a highly publicized defection

from the country parhaps having AMLASH come to the United

States?

Mr. Weatherby.

That had not been detemined, but a

defection announcement in a major city is always useful.

Mr. Baron. Were you aware of any contact between Carlos

Tepedino, who operated then under the cryptonym of AMWHIP in

the FBI?

Mr. Weatherby.

Yes, sir.

Mr. Baron. What was the nature of that contact?

MI. Weatherby. I believe, and again my recollection is

hazy, but he had been reporting, I believe, to an FBI asset

who turned the information to us through the normal course of

events.

Mr. Baron. Was he reporting to an FBI employee?

MI. Weatherby. I'm not sure of the background of that

WH 50955 Docial 30202418 Page 31

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MI. Baron. Does it refresh your recollection if I

represent to you that the IG Report indicates that Tepedino

was disgruntled with the CIA over their lack of vigor in

providing support to AMLASH in his attempt to defect?

Mr. Weatherby.

I recall that from the report, sir.

Mx. Baron. But you do not have any independent recollectior

for Tepedino's contact with the FBI?

Mr. Weatherby. No, sir. I do not, sir. I have no

independent recollection.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall receiving reports regularly

from the FBI on information regarding AMLASH that was coming

to you through Tepedino or to them through Tepedino?

Mr. Weatherby. I believe there may have been some

initially, but I don't racall, as a matter of fact, today.

Mr. Baron. Did you have face to face meetings with the

FBI at any point on this project?

Mr. Weatherby. I don't recall, sir. I think not.

Mr. Baron. Would the FBI have been aware generally of

the purpose of Project AMLASH?

Mr. Weatherby. No, sir, not to my knowledge.

Mr. Baron. Did you meet with Tepedino in New York City

in mid-July, approximately July 13, 14 1962 to discuss your

trip to Helsinki?

Mr. Weatherby. I made initial contact with him either

NN 50955

Doclassj2olthe Pageyly for that purpose, sir, in New York.

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Mr. Baron. And what was Tepedino's occupation at that

time?

Mr. Weatherby.

a brewery manufacturing firm.

He had a, he was in a partnership with

Mr. Baron. And did he receive money from the CIA at any

point during your contact with him?

Mr. Weatherby. As a salary, sir?

Mr. Baron. Ahy money in any form for any purpose.

Mr: Weatherby. He received money, he received money for

tickets when he did any missions, if you will, for us, but

there was never any compensation in terms of any monthly

salary or a bonus.

Mr. Kelley. You paid his axpenses, in other words?

Mr. Weatherby. He would often not take that. He would

take a ticket. He was a very well-to-do man, and he was

patriotically motivated to freeing Cuba. That was his

contribution.

Mr. Baron: Did Tepedino ever offer to perform an

operation directly in Cuba?

Mr. Weatherby. No, sir, not to my knowledge.

Mr. BAron. He simply served as an intermediary to AMLASH?

Mr. Weatherby. Yes, sir.

Mr. Baron. Do: you recall the circumstances of your first

face-to-face meeting with AMLASH?

MW 50955 Docks 3p202148 Magelgatherby. You are going back a long way, sir.

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believe I contacted him in New York and invited him to lunch.

Mr. Baron. I am referring now to AMLASH and not to

Tepedino.

Mr. Weatherby. I'm sorry.

Would you please rephrase

the question again for me?

Mr. Baron. Yes.

Do you recall the circumstances of your first face-to-

face meeting with AMLASH?

Mr. Weatherby. You mean how it was arranged?

Mr. Baron. No, the circumstances of the meeting itself;

where it took place.

MI. Weatherby. Yes, sir.

Mr. Baron. And what transpired and the approximate

date?

Mr. Weatherby. It took place in Helsinki in a hotel in

the latter part of July or during the Helsinki Youth Festival

of 1962.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall what transpired at that meeting?

Mx. Weatherby. Not any longer, sir.

Mr. Baron. Do you have any independent recollection of

any subject that was discussed at that meeting?

Mr. Weatherby. Well, at that meeting it would naturally

have been discussed, his desires for dafection, his plans,

what he wanted to see us about.

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meeting as intent on defection as he was when he went into the

meeting?

Mr. Weatherby. I can't recall that meeting specifically,

I could give you a general feeling of the period of time in

Helsinki.

MI. Baron. All right. Please do.

Mr. Kelley. Could I just ask a question first?

Mr. Weatherby. Yes.

Mr. Kelley. Did you have other cases that you were

working on at this time?

MI. Weatherby. Yes, sir.

MI. Kelley. How many others, more or less?

Mr. Weatherby. Maybe thirty.

Mr. Kelley. And these all involved individuals, people

you would meet like you met AMLASH?

Mr. Weatherby. In some cases, yes. . In others, I was

a supporting officer, meaning I maintained a file, maintainad

the traffic, offered advice, wrote cables, talked to different

officers about handling the different individuals.

Mr. Kelley. So this was one of some thirty different

cases that you would be involved in?

Mr. Weatherby. Yes, sir. At the time, I had a number of

countries under my responsibility, and in each country were a

number of cases which had many threads not unsimilar to this.

NN 50955 Doc1853/202448 #guse me -

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Mr. Kelley. Where would you rank the AMLASH case in terms

of time you spent on it among this thirty?

Mr. Weatherby. I would think it was certainly one of the

most promising and one in which I put the most time, but it

was the kind of a case which was on again, off again. When

the man was out and we could talk to him, it was a full-time

job. And then it would just almost go into abeyance for months

at a time.

Mr. Baron. Despite the amount of time that you put in

on the project, would it have been on the top of your priority

list at that time?

Mr. Weatherby. If a davelopment took place which required

my attention, it would be, if that answers your question, sir.

Mr. Kelley. Where would you rank the AMLASH case among

these thirty in terms of your own personal interest?

Mr. Weatherby. I think it was probably the best case, it

it could ever jell.

Mr. Baron. Did your superiors in Task Force W feel the

same way about it?

Mr. Weatherby. I think they thought it was a good case,

but it was in the all-over spectrum one of a number. I cannot

recall how they would rank it in terms of --

Mr. Baron. But was it clearly a case though that

Maurelius and Harvey would take a personal interest in, and

WN 50955 DocI&S 20later fuetsberald?

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Mr. Weatherby. Yes, SIT.

Mr. Baron. Was it also a case that was important enough

to be subject to inquiries from the DDP?

Mr. Weatherby. I would think so.

Mr. Baron. But you don't have any direct recollection of

inguiries by the DDP, or do you?

Mr. Weatherby. I do not have any direct -- I am sure

there was interest shown because of the potential it showed.

After all, the man was probably number four in the government

at that time.

Mr. Kelley. That's the way you conceived of him, you

realized that he was number four?

Mr. Weatherby. Yes.

Mr. Kelley. You treated him, in other words, you were

conscious of the fact that you were dealing with the number

four man?

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MI. Weatherby. I thought he was. I think most people

did.

Mr. Kelley. This meant that after Fidel, Raul and Che,

then came AMLASH.

Mr. Weatehrby. I believe so, in terms of personalities

that you would focus upon. You have the . Prime Minister, you

have the Foreign Minister, you have a number of others in there

but they weren't of prime concern to us.

MW 50955 Doc1A53p202148 MayeBron. Do you recall any specific instances where you

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discussed the AMLASH project with Richard Helms?

MI. Weatherby. No, I did not.

Mr. Baron. Or with anyone else in the DDP above the

Chief of Task Force: W?

Mr. Weatherby. I may have gone - again, I don't recall

myself, but I certainly may have gone along with Desmond

Fitzgerald - well, but I don't recall specifically now.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall being asked by Mr. Maurelius

or the Chief of Task Force N to prepare a report, reports

that were specifically to go up to the DDP?

Mr. Weatherby. I don't honestly recall.

Mr. Kelley. We are on the verge of talking about what

transpired at the first meeting. As you told us, this meeting

is with a person that you conceived of as the fourth most

important or prominent personality in the Cuban regime?

Mr. Weatherby. To us.

Mr. Kelley. All right.

Mr. Weatherby. As an operational target, perhaps.

Mr. Kelley. To the CIA?

Mr. Weatherby. Or operational interest.

Mr. Kellay. But at any rate, a very important person

even in Cuba, in Castro's -- a prominent member of Castro's

entourage?

Mr. Weatherby. I can't speak for Castro. He was ar

Nw 50955 Docizumpertant person at the time of the revolution and the overthrow

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of Batista, but he certainly didn't figure prominently in

Castro's cabinet. Obviously, he didn't hold much of a position,

but he was kind of an old boy who had gone a little astray and

a dissident, unhappy, but a member of the contributing guerrilla

movement which eventually overthrew Batista and, therefore, was

always welcomed in most of their circles.

Mr. Kelley. My question is, then, when you would meet him

in Helsinki or wherever, did you take any precautions to insure

that your meeting was not observed by members of Castro's:

intelligence force who might be following this man?

Mr. Weatherby. We would have countersurveillance.

Mr. Kelley. And did that ever indicate that you were

followed or being observed?

Mr. Weatherby. No, sir.

Mr. Kelley. Did you meat in out of the way places, or --

Mr. Weatherby. Hotel rooms, sometimes in a car.

Mr. Kelley. These would be safe house-type hotel rooms,

or would he come to your room?

Mr. Weatherby. Probably go to Tepedino's. I don't recall

the exact details of that. It would not be in the parlance of

a sate house.

MI. Kelley. Uh-huh. Okay.

Mr. Baron. You were going to describe the general ..

impression you had of the series of meetings that took place

ww so95s Dockssezbaty-shutoyfself and AMIASH

in late July and early August of

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1962 in Helsinki?

Mr. Weatherby. Yes.

The purpose, the initial purpose of my: going over, as has

been pointed out, was to arrange for the defection of a

prominent Cuban revolutionary with maximum publicity for the

West.

In talking to him - and again, we are stretching back

over thirteen years from memory - he was still-very much

interested in that. He was fed up with the sale of the

revolution by Castro to the Russians, and it didn't represent.

what he thought he had been fighting for with the old DR at

the time they overthrew Batista.

He had a thread throughout his thinking though that he

would, he would rather, if there was a reason, he would rather

stay and change events in Cuba, if he possibly, if this

possibly. could be done.. In other words, to put the revolution

back in its proportions as he had contributed to it and he

imagined it should have been. But he didn't have a real plan

and he didn't, he wasn't sure how to accomplish this. The

purpose became then to keep him in place rather than defect

him, because an agent in place is always worth a qreat deal

more than one who defects.

As you probably have heard, you get a debriefing of what

he knows, you get a little Press play, and that's the end of

it with the man normally except the contacts he might have and

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so forth, but an agent in place is worth a great deal more.

This then became my assignment, was to convince him to

stay in place and to report to us.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall what kind of proposals he may

have made or prospects he may have raised about operations

that would have been significant enough to merit his staying

inside Cuba instead of defecting?

Mr. Weatherby. Well, he wanted to overthrow Castro, he

wanted to change the regime, or at the very least bring Castro

around to his concept of the revolution.

Mr. Baron. Did he ever mention that as a realistic

possibility, bringing Castro around to his concept?

Mr. Weatherby. Not really. He discussed it, but I don't

think he really beliaved it.

Mr. Baron. And how likely did he feel at the time the

prospect was of leading a widespread coup against Castro?

Mr. Weatherby. You know, I don't think he even thought

that far.

He was - it was

interesting. He was mercurial

at times, thoughtful, and methodical in turn. He had a great

many things avolving in his mind, none of which were practical,

none of which he could tie down. One of the interesting parts

of meeting him was to attempt to sort out what the man really

wanted and what he wanted to do, what he could do, and possibly

what his friends could do. And this was the thrust of the

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Mr. Baron. Do you recall his expressing such a vehement

intention to overthrow. Castro that it involved a willingness

to kill Castro if the opportunity arose?

Mr. Weatherby. He mentioned, or he talked about this in

generalities, but my impression was that it was a manifestation

of intensity of feeling rather than really ever doing anything

to that degree.

Mr. Baron. "But he did in one way or other discuss his

willingness to do something like assassinate Castro?

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He never used that term. He didn't. like

it.

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Mr. Baron. The term "assassinate"?

Mr. Weatherby. Yes.

Mr. Baron. What terms would he use?

Mr. Weatherby. "Eliminate."

Mr. Baron. Or other euphemisms that clearly had the

same import?

"-.

Mr. Weatherby. I like to think he meant to get rid of

in one way of another, either exile or in a coup in which

obviously blood will be shed on both sides.

Mr. Baron. Was it not clear that whether or not he at

that time had a specific plan or a specific intention to

proceed to eliminate Castro by taking his life, he was interested

in the prospect of having support for such an operation if

it could be mounted?

Mr. Weatherby. He was interested in, as he put it, and

again we are talking over 13 years, in getting rid of the man's

regime, and he didn't limit himself to any particular method,

nor did he dwell on assassination as such.

Mr. Baron. But was

assassination, though perhaps mentioned

by other names, one means that was acceptable to him of

getting rid of Castro?

Mr. Weatherby. I never took him seriously. I think in

a fire-fight, in other words, if you are storming the palace

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and the man loses his life, so be it. I mean, I might lose

mine was his attitude..

MI. Baron. Whether or not you took him seriously, was

he meaning the prospect of assassinating Castro --

Mr. Weatherby. I think --

MI. Baron.

Or the desirability to assassinate Castro?

Mr. Weatherby. To eliminate him in theory, I think, or

he might have discussed it. I don't recall today precisely

the exact terms or the exact seriousness of the man to do an

act like that.

Mr. Baron. But the way that you recall that series of

meetings, is it likely that he did express the desirability

of eliminating Castro by assassination?

Mr. Weatherby. I think as a possibility, not as a

desirability.

Mr. Bayly. Perhaps you have been asked this, but I

would like to ask you myself if you have not been to offer what

you understand to be the meaning of the term "assassinate," or

"assassination"?

Mr. Weatherby. I'm sorry. Nould you --

Mr. Bayly.. What is the meaning, what is your interpretation

of it, or what do you understand the term "assassinate" to

mean?

Mr. Weatherby. Well, I take that to mean deliberate taking

wo suoss Dobra partne pagela with the intent --

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NW 50955 DocId 32202448 Page 15

Mr. Bayly..

Well, is it' --

Mr. Baron.

Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Senator Morgan. Do you

solemnly swear that the testimony

you have given this afternoon to this Committee and the

testimony that you will give is the truth, the whole truth,

and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Weatherby. I do, sir.

=

Senator Morgan. I will sit in for a little while, if

you don't mind.

Mr. Baron. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. SayLY... I had one question pending, Senator.

Mr. Baron. Mr. Weatherby, isn't it true that we have

been talking for awhile now using your alias, Weatherby, and

that we have an agreement that we mentioned before that your

true identity will be on file at the CIA?

Mr. Weatherby. That's correct, sir.

Mr. Baron. And I would like to introduce as Weatherby.

• Exhibit I a statement regarding testimony in alias and ask you

if this is an accurate statement of your true identity?

(The document referred to was

marked Weatherby Exhibit No. 1

for identification.)

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Mr. Baron. And you have signed that statement and I have

signed it as a witness, is that correct?

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MI. Weatherby. That is correct, sir.

MI. Baron. And it is your understanding that we will

attach this statement as an exhibit to your transcript in

sanitized form, leaving out your true identity?

Mr. Weatherby. That is my understanding, sir.

Mr. Baron. Is it also true that all of the answers to

questions that you have given up until this point in our

examination are true to the best of your knowledge, and

you are willing to swear to the truth under oath now?

Mx. Weatherby. Absolutely, sir.

Mr. Baron. Thank you.

Why don't you proceed with your question?

Mr. Bayly. You have already dealt with the matter of

counsel?:

MI. Baron. We have.

You understand now that you are under oath and you still

have the right to counsel and can stop at any point to request

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counsel if you desire?

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Mr. Weatherby. Yes, sir.

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Mr. Baron. And you are voluntarily appearing here today

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without counsel?

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NW 50955 DocId 32202448Mradleatherby. That is correct, sir.

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Mr. Baron. And you understand that your Fifth Amendment

rights are intact before this Committee?

Mr. Weatherby. Yes, sir.

MI. Bayly:. My question, sir, if you recall is what you

understood assassination to mean, the term?

Mr. Weatherby. I said the deliberate taking of another

man's life.

Mr. Bayly. Well, then, how would you distinguish it from

murder?

Mr. Weatherby.

Usually it has a political connotation.

Mr. Bayly.. In other words, it is a singling out of

a political leader for a political purpose?

Mr. Weatherby.

Yes, with the intent of eliminating that

particular person.

Mr. Bayly..

So as to alter or effect a political change?

Mr. Weatherby. Possibly. Maybe vengeance. It could

be a number of reasons.

Mr. Bayly. But it is the purpose in the act, is that

not correct, I mean shooting Mr. Castro? To steal his wallet

or avenge yourself on him because of some suspected adultery

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is not really the same thing, is it?

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Mr. Weatherby. No. I think you are describing murder

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perhaps more closely there. I am not a lawyer, sir, so I

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cannot get into these fine points.

DocId:32202418MPayBayly. The reason I ask you these questions is so that

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the Committee would have a better understanding of what went

through your mind when you spoke about, for instance, AMLASH.

What did you understand him to mean when he used the term

assassination when an infrequent --

Mr. Weatherby. He didn't use the term, as I recall.

Mr. Bayly..

He never did.

Mr. Weatherby. No, sir. He abhorred that and preferred,

as I believe I said, and I think I recall whether it was

eliminate or to get rid of.

MI. Bayly.. And did you yourself in your dealing with him

ever use the word "assassinate"?

Mr. Weatherby.

I discussed that with him when I was trying

to find out what he meant.

Mr. Bayly.. And did you explain to him what you meant?

Mr. Weatherby. He knew. I mean, I think it may have been

a question of languages or a question of semantics at the time,

but I think he understood that.

Mr. Bayly.. Did you ever use the word "kill"?

Mr. Weatherby. I do not recall, sir. It has been 13 years

Mx. Bayly.. I understand that. How about the word

"murder" or any similar word?

MI. Weatherby. No, sir.

Mr. Bayly:. So your understanding of those terms is

drawn from the sense of what occurred rather than from the

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MI. Weatherby. Yes,

sir.

Mr. Bayly.

Thank you..

That's all I have.

Mr. Kelley. Did you speak through an interpreter with

AMLASH?

Mr. Weatherby.

Sometimes

yes, sometimes no.

He had

limited English.

Mr. Kelley. Do you speak Spanish?

Mr. Weatherby. I do not.

Mr. Kelley. And he had limited English?

Mr. Weatherby. Correct, sir.

Mr. Kelley. Who would serve as the interpreter in

Helsinki?

Mr. Weatherby. AMWHIP did.

Mr. Baron. Mr. Weatherby, I would like to show you a

piece of paper that we

will mark weatherby Exhibit 2, which

is an excerpt from the I.G. report that includes remarks said

to have been in your contact report of your first meeting with

AMLASH during the period of July 30 to August 6, 1962.

(The document referred to

was marked Weatherby

Exhibit No. 2 for

identification.)

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(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Baron. Does this document refresh your recollection

enough so that you recall whether or not you wrote it or

whether you wrote those excerpts?

MI. Weatherby. If it came from the file, sir, I am

sure I did.

Mr. Baron. And do you have any independent recollection

of writing this document or of the events referred to in it?

Mr. Weatherby. I don't have a personal recollection of

these subjects in a discussion with him until I have seen

the paper again.

Mr. Baron. Now that you are looking at this excerpt

from your contact report, do you recall that AMLASH felt that

he would be interested in returning to Cuba and in risking his

life by doing so, "if he could be given a really large part

to play"?

Mr. Weatherby. Yes.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall --

Mr.. Weatherby. May I interrupt, sir?

Mr. Baron. Yes.

Mr. Weatherby. I don't remember the precise langauge,

but the thought, I certainly, I certainly do.

Mr. Baron. And do you recall AMLASH expressing generally

to you the feeling that "he wanted to plan the execution of

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Soviet Ambassador, and also to eliminate Fidel by execution,

if necessary."

Do you recall his expressing that feeling to you?

Mr. Weatherby. I do not recall today his expressing the

feeling in the words in the exhibit. However, I believe that

that represents at least a portion of his thoughts at the time,

only as an idea or an expression of the degree to which he

felt he wanted to do something and was totally frustrated

doing it. I mean, just look at the large list he has, and --

MI. Baron. What large list are you referring to?

MI: Weatherby. The one there in which he talks about

Podriguez and the Ambassador and Fidel. I mean there is

no - as I say, I believe that represented a feeling he had

that he has to get rid of these people in some manner.

MI. Baron.

Do you really characterize this list of three

people that appear to be carefully selected as a large list

of targets, or doesn't it appear to be, as I said, a fairly

careful selection of key people

whose elimination would

seriously affect the stability of the Cuban government?

Mr. Weatherby. No, I don't feel that way. If I may digress

a little for the record, I think it is an expression of his

frustration simply because it isn't a diabolical scheme the

man is talking about if, in fact, he talked about these people

because he's probably upset with the Soviets there. Therefore,

DocId 32202gatspayedsof the Soviet Ambassador. Well, they put a new

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one in, and that doesn't do anything to the stability there.

And if you get rid of Carlos Rodriguez, Rodriguez didn't have

a great following of his own, he was somebody that was probably

a principal that came to his mind and, of course, Fidel as

the head of state represents something to him that he would

like to have changed.

In other words, I'm trying to say that when you deal with

a man like this and you have not met him very much, you have

to let the man express himself, you have got to find out

by questioning what he really means, what's really bothering

him, what does he really want to do. Does he have any plans,

how deep is his thinking, is he just an emotional type?

Mr. Baron. But isn't it significant in some way that --

strike that.

Wouldn't his desire to plan the execution of Fidel Castro

have appeared to you at that time significant in light of the

fact that you included it in your contact report?

Mr. Weatherby. His statement there represents to me again!

as I have said before, the degree of emotion that he felt

about the problem in Cuba and the Cuban situation politically

as it turned out. A contact report, which is a piece of paper

basically to refresh the case officer's mind about what took

place, I wouldn't, I wouldn't read into it too much.

Mr. Baron. Nonetheless, didn't you see his expression of

this desire to eliminate Fidel by execution, if necessary.

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significant enough so that there should be some record of it?

Mr. Weatherby. I thought that it certainly should be

a matter of record to indicate his degree of concern, certainly.

And it also became a point for me to dissuade him of at that

time.

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Mr. Baron. In the same contact report you indicated that

you were "making no commitments or plans," but that you were

pointing out to AMASH "that schemes like he envisions certainly

had their place, but that a lot of coordination, planning,

information collection, etcetera were necessary prerequisites

to ensure the value and success of such plans."

Doesn't that indicate that his mention of eliminating

Fidel and other key figures in Cuba at that time were at least

considered by you to have had a place in future contacts with

AMLASH?

Mx. Weatherby. Absolutely not, in that case. What you

have got to do with a man like this who may have thoughts of

that intensity, or even register thoughts of that intensity

is not disabuse him immediately of his thinking because if

I want him for something else I can't make a -- I would be --

it would be poor planning to alienate the man right away if

I immediately turn off the idea he has.. And this is all in

one meeting, don't forget, as best as I recall. I have got

to attempt to blunt that and eventually change his thinking,

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like that it takes, if someone is going to do anything it

takes coordination and planning and etcetera. And you have

got to gradually take the man from an intense thought and

perhaps mold it into something that can work, or something

that is acceptable.

In other words, I wouldn't.

Mr. Baron. Doesn't the language here, though, indicate

that although you may have wanted to mold his desires into a

workable plan, the fact that he had mentioned desire: to eliminate

Castro by execution, if necessary, wasn't something that was

rejected out of hand, that it might be something that you

would want to work into a usable plan.

Mr. Weatherby. Well, I think we are a little out of

context by looking at just this excerpt. I think you have to

look at Castro to see how it develops and what is said in a

few words in a contact report, which is not verbatim, you

would acknowledge should not be taken absolutely literally.

Mr. Baron. You have mentioned that these events were

a long time ago.

Mr. Weatherby. Uh huh.

Mr. Baron. And that your recollection is not crystal

clear about them.

Do you have a very clear recollection of the context in

which this contact report was written?

DocId:02202418 faylleytherby. No, I don't remember every, you know

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every point of conversation and every place we visited during

this period of time.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall with great clarity what you

may have said in response to AMLASH when he expressed this

desire to assassinate Castro?

Mr. Weatherby. I would not remember verbatim what I

had said 13 years ago, sir.

Mr. Baron. What would the purpose of a contact report

have been?

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Mr. Weatherby. Contact or contact reports in general,

sir?

Mr. Baron. Yes.

Mr. Heatherby. Contact reports are reports produced

by operations officers for the record to remind them of what

transpired at some future date and for other officers who

may assume a case in the future, so that memorandum for the

record is what it is.

Mr. Baron. To whom would a contact report be submitted?

Mr. Weatherby. Depending on it, depending on the nature

of the case and the level of the officer, it would probably

go to his innediate superior, or could remain in the file.

Mr. Baron. Would your contact reports on your meetings

in Helsinki have been reviewed by Mr. Maurelius?

MI. Weatherby. I would hope they would have been when I

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as you may know. These are hand written or type-written and

entered in the file as a matter or record.

Mr. Baron. Would they have been reviewed by William

Harvey?

Mr. Weatherby. I doubt --

Mr. Baron. Or his deputy?

Mr. Weatherby. I doubt that.

Mr. Baron. And Harvey was Chief of Task Force W at that

time.

Is that correct?

Mr. Weatherby. Yes, sir.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall relaying to Mr. Maurelius

or to William Harvey or his Deputy at this time any sense

of the importance of these sentiments that AMIASIl had expressed

to you in Helsinki upon your return from that trip?

MI. Weatherby. I am sure I did. I don't recall precisely,

but I do recall a cable which I wrote in which I expressed

some concern about the man's mercurial temperament and

disposition, and then asked for, I believe, a Spanish-speaking

case officer because I thought that that would be -- there

was more accuracy to be relayed in communicating than communi-

cating directly with someone.

Mr. Baron. And so you asked for a Spanish-speaking case

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officer to take over the operation from you?

so355

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Mr. Baron. Did you receive that assistance?

Mr. Weatherby. I did.

Mr. Baron. And was that the man who testified here the

other day?

MI. Weatherby.

No, sir.

Oh --

Mr. Baron. Under the alias of Garmeyer, being referred

to generally as AMLASH case officer?

Mr. Weatherby. No, sir. That was another gentleman whom

I met in Paris.

Mr. Baron. And what was his name, or was he the Spanish-

speaking case officer from Madrid?

Mr. Weatherby. Yes, sir. I believe you have that in the

excerpt there.

Mr. Baron. Whose name is mentioned in the I.G. report?

Mr. Weatherby. Yes, correct, sir.

Mr. Baron. As a participant in meetings that you held

with AMLASH and Tepedino in Paris in mid-August of '62?

Mr. Weatherby. That would be correct, sir.

MI. Baron. You did return to headquarters in Langley

from your meeting in Helsinki.

Is that correct?

Mr. Weatherby. No. I went directly to Paris. I did

not directly. I went through Stockholm and I believe Copenhagen

and then down to Paris.

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other than the mercurial temperament of AMLASH, anything else

in relation to your meetings with him in Helsinki?

MI. Weatherby. I don't remember precisely, but I would

have sent some type electrical transmission summarizing the

meeting and how it went, and any problems of security that

might have occurred, and probably some initial impressions.

MI. Baron. And that would be a cable that we should find

in the AMLASH file?

-=

Mr. Weatherby. Yes, sir.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall meeting with AMLASH in.

Copenhagen around August 10 or 11, 1962, for further discussions

with him?

Mr. Weatherby. I met him at approximately that date.

MI. Baron. Do you recall what transpired in those .

discussions?

Mr. Weatherby. I do not, sir, but I would think nothing

of great substance.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall any discussions involving the

word "assassination"?

Mr. Weatherby. I do not, sir. That's in Copenhagen?

Mr. Baron. Correct. Was Carlos Tepedino present at that

meeting?

First Street, s

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Mr. Weatherby. Yes, he should have been.

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Mr. Baron. I am showing to you now a document marked

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wrote on your meeting in Copenhagen on August 10 and 11, 1962,

and it is excerpted from the I.G. report at page 58.

(The document referred to

was marked Weatherby Exhibit

No. 3 for identification.)

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(Pause)

Mr. Weatherby. Okay, I read it.

MI. Baron. Does this document refresh your recollection

about the substance of your meeting with AMLASH in Copenhagen?

Mr. Weatherby. It is not enough to refresh my recollection

of the meeting in Copenhagen per se, but I think in earlier

testimony I discussed the use of the term in talking to him,

"assassinate," and indicated that he was opposed to a term

of that nature.

I think it would show that I perhaps was not sure where

that particular discussion took place, Stockholm or Copenhagen

or in Helsinki.

MI. Baron. In referring to the portion of this excerpt

from. your contact report that says "We used the term 'assassinate.

The use

of this term we later learned from Tepedino and from

AMLASH himself was most objectionable to the latter, and

he was visibly upset. It was not the act he objected to,

but rather merely the choice of the word used to describe it.

'Eliminate' was acceptable."

Does that generally desribe your recollection of AMLASIl's

attitude toward the use of the word "assassinate"?

Mr. Weatherby. To the best of my recollection, yes.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall reporting directly to anyone

in Task Force W about AMLASH's attitude toward assassination?

DoEra 32202148MPactherby. I think, I don't recall it precisely, sir,

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but I would wager I must have.

MI. Baron. Do you recall a subsequent meeting in Paris

between yourself and AMLASH and AMLASH and Tepedino and

a Spanish-speaking case officer from Madrid?

Mr. Weatherby. Yes,

sir.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall this involved actually a series

of meetings between August 24th and August 23, 1962,

as

indicated by the I.G. report?

Mr. Weatherby. That's correct.

Mr. Baron. Was AMLASH given secret writing training

and issued secret writing supplies shortly after that meeting?

Mr. Weatherby. Yes, sir.

Mr. Baron. Was he also taken to the south of France for

a demolition demonstration?

Mr. Weatherby. Yes, sir.

Mr. Baron. Why was this done?

Mr. Weatherby. That was done to show him we were willing

to give consideration to his desire for some sort of support

from us if he went back and undertook to establish a net, if

you will, of dissidents.

Mr. Baron. Was this training more than a mere gesture

of support, but actually intended as preparation for AMLASH

to enable him to perform an operation inside Cuba?

Mr. Weatherby. Quite to the contrary, sir. It was given

NW 50955

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as I recall he prepared. one small charge himself, which does

not entitle a man to do anything, and was allowed to set it

off. And the several charges which, if I recall correctly,

we demonstrated to him were done by a technician who was

accomplished in the use of explosives. But he was, he could

not possibly have used that, at least safely, had he returned

to Cuba, because that was not the intent.

Mr. Baron. Was there any intention of assessing his

suitability for performing operations of this sort during

this period of time?

Mr. Weatherby. No, sir, not in the use of explosives.

MI. Baron. So it was merely a gesture of support for

him and a means of encouraging him to return to Cuba and

continue with other operations?

Mr. Weatherby. That's correct, sir.

Mr. Baron. What was his primary mission as far as you

were concerned at that point?

Mr. Weatherby. His mission primarily was to go back and

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• report to us any ability he might have to get into contact

with his old friends from the D.R. movement or other dissidents

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to Castro and attempt to unite them and to build some sort of

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a workable net with them. We also wanted any kind of general

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Mr. Baron. Was it clear to you at that time that AMLASH

had direct personal access to Castro?

Mr. Weatherby •

He had direct personal access to him as

far as we knew in the company of others.

Mr. Baron. Did he clearly have no access to Castro in

any one-on-one setting?

Mr. Weatherby. I have no idea of that, sir. I might say

that Castro was constantly surrounded by an entourage and

you would have to be awfully friendly with Castro to ever get

into that situation with him.

MI. Baron. It was true, though, was it not, that AMLASH

was personally friendly with Castro and had a long history

of personal relationship with him?

Mt. Weatherby. He was no longer friendly with him since

his movement was eased out of control of Cuba. They had

a relationship probably as one conspirator against Batista

to another.

He had a degree of accessability and was still,

I am sure, held in some respect by Castro, but the degree

of friendship, I don't think you could say it was very deep.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall anything that occurred in

these meetings in mid-August in Paris that would have contributed

further to the belief that AMLASH had a propensity to carry

out an assassination mission?

Mr. Weatherby. He may have discussed it again. I don't

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still maintained an intensity of feelings against the Castro

regime, but we had hoped by that time that he was prepared to

go back and become a reporting asset and perhaps an organizer

of a collection of an INTEL network and not pursue or even

attempt to pursue any other activities.

Mr. Baron. Let me show you the document that we will

mark Weatherby Exhibit 4, which is an excerpt from a cable

from the Spanish-speaking case officer located in Madrid, whose

name appears in the I.G. report at page 85, presumably back

to headquarters issued on August 17, 1962.

(The document referred to was

marked weatherby Exhibit No. 4

for identification.)

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(Pause)

MI. Weatherby. I have read that.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall learning from this CIA case

officer that such a cable was sent? ~

Mr. Weatherby. I am sure I knew at that time, or was

informed about the content of that cable, and perhaps the

discussions that the Spanish-speaking case officer had with

AMLASH. I may have not been at the meeting as they conducted

it in Spanish, and I do believe they had several meetings in

which I was not in attendance. Of that I am not certain.

Mr. Baron. Do you have a general recollection of AMLASH

making statements or behaving in such a way to indicate that

he "could or might try to carry out on his own initiative"

a "physical elimination mission"?

Mr. Weatherby. He may have continued to discuss it, but

I didn't feel thät he really meant what he said.

Mr. Baron. Would he have been discussing a physical

elimination mission against Castro?

MI. Weatherby. With this Spanish-speaking case officer?

Mr. Baron. Yes, or in

the content of these general

meetings?

Mr. Weatherby. He could have been. That I don't recall

precisely. It is one thing to have a man perhaps thinking or

expressing feelings in these terms, and you are never sure

when you have put that aside.

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Mr. Baron. Was AMLASH being assessed during this period

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of time as a potential asset for involvement in any way in

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any kind of an assassination mission against Castro?

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Mr. Weatherby. Absolutely not by us.

Mr. Baron. Nould you consider the initiation of a coup

by means of eliminating the leadership of Cuba an assassination

attempt?

(Pause)

Mr. Weatherby. I would think that anytime you attempted --

well, would you state the question again, please?

Mr. Baron. Would you read the question back, please?

(The reporter read back prior question.)

Mr. Weatherby. By the elimination of the --

Mr. Baron. In other words, do you draw a distinction

in your mind when you use the word "assassination" between

killing an individual political leader out of any motive on

the one hand, and on the other hand attempting to kill a

political leader or a circle of political leaders as a means

of initiating a coup to overthrow an entire governmental

• regime?

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Mr. Weatherby. I think that would be assassination in

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any case if you target it against the individuals.

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That's something that bears thought. I mean, if you blew

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up a building, for example, to cause a distraction, and people

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Mr. Baron.

Was any thought given during the period of

your-involvement with Project AMLASH to utilizing AMLASH to

initiate a coup by any means?

Mr. Weatherby. Well, certainly not by assassination.

But

if he could overthrow the government, or take power, or divide

it, that of course was

an objective.

MI. Baron. If he could have done, if he could have

accomplished that objective by means of physical elimination

of leadership of Cuba, that would not have been objectionable

to you and to others in Task Force W involved in Project

AMLASH at that point, would it?

Mr. Weatherby. I really can't answer that question.

don't know what they think and I --

Mr. Baron. Speaking for yourself then, would it have been

an objectionable means: -

Mr. Weatherby. To me it would have been.

Mr. Baron. -- to overthrow the government?

MI. Weatherby. To me it would have been.

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MI. Baron. Are you personally opposed as a matter of

morality to assassinations?

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MI. Weatherby. Absolutely.

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Mr. Baron. Why?

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Mr. Weatherby. I don't believe in taking human life,

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period in that manner. If you are in a fire fight, or somebody

WW 50955 Docid 32282fhootang6at you and you are shooting at them, then that's

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a different story. In other words, I draw a distinction between

assassination of an individual, individuals, and those who

lose their life in a battlefield, whether it is in a building

or on a battlefield.

Mr. Baron. What about killing the sentry who is guarding

the door to the palace?

Mr. Weatherby. Well, that's --

Mr. Baron. As a means of initiating an attäck.

MI. Weatherby. That's sort of like asking me when I

stopped beating my wife, sir. I would rather not comment on

that.

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Mr. Baron. I am simply trying to point out that or to

ask you whether there is not some middle ground between a

combat situation and an individual murder where it might have

been acceptable to you at the time for our government to be

involved in targeted elimination of political leaders in

a regime that we found unacceptable.

Mr. Weatherby. I had not really thought about that, and

it is a rather philosophical question, sir.

Mr. Baron. All right. Enough philosophy.

Let me show you an excerpt from a cable of August 18th

from CIA headquarters to presumably the Spanish-speaking case

officer that sent a cable to headguarters on August 17th.

We will mark this Weatherby Exhibit 5 and reflect that

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(The document referred to

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marked Weatherby Exhibit

No.

5 for identification.)

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Mr. Baron.

can you tell me first whether you have an

independent recollection of such a directive reaching you

in Paris;

namely, a directly "strongly concur that no physical

elimination missions be given AMLASH"?

Mr. Weatherby.

Well, I can believe this as an exhibit.

Mr. Baron. In other words it is credible to you but

you don't have any independent recollection of receiving such

a directive?

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Mr. Weatherby. No. But it is within keeping with my

directions at all times, so, therefore, it seems to be

perfectly logical.

Mr. Baron. Why would such a directive have been sent at

that point?

Mr. Weatherby. Probably only to reinforce a case officer's

judgement in the field that he's not about to condone such

activity, and they are going on record, as in the bureaucracy,

saying you are absolutely right.

Mr. Baxon. Can you tell me of any significant developments

in Project AMLASH that occurred between the time of these

meetings in August of 1962 and your departure from Project

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AMLASH in late 1963?

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Mr. Weatherby. Well, we had attempted on a number of

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occasions to get him to come out again and talk to him and

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we learned that he was coming out to Porto Alegre in Brazil,

and we made arrangements to visit with him.

That's the other AMLASH case officer and myself.

Mr. Baron. What transpired when you met with AMLASH in

Porto Alegre?

Mr. Weatherby.

That was essentially a turnover meeting.

We met him and he was debriefed in a safe house by the other

case officer in Spanish, and I was posted as a lookout, and

did not actually participate in the substance of the discussions.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall that AMLASI was told to assist

a Cuban military officer who operated under the cryptonym of

AMTRUNK 10 in intelligence assignments for the CIA?

Mr. Weatherby. I do not recall that. That may be after

the turnover. I am not sure.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall --

Mx. Weatherby. I certainly didn't.

Mr. Baron.

-- the nature of any assignments given to

AMTRUNK 10?

Mr. Weatherby. No, I don't.

Mr. Baron. How soon after this meeting in Porto Alegre

did you leave Project AMLASH?

Mr. Weatherby. Well, normally when you turn the case over

you leave it immediately, for compartmentation's sake. I

believe I may have heard or seen Tepedino once or twice after

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Mr. Baron. Were you present at any further meetings in

Paris with AMLASH?

Mr. Weatherby. No, sir.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall briefing the succeeding AMLASH

case officer at the time that he took over?

Mx. Weatherby. I had to have.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall briefing him on AMLASH's

propensity for assassination?

-=

Mr. Weatherby. His propensity to discuss it, I am sure,

was common knowledge.

Mr. Baron. But not his propensity for carrying out the

act itself?

Mr. Weatherby. Correct.

Mr. Baron. Did you mention to the new case officer

AMLASH'S, AMLASH's willingness to carry out such an act?

Mr. Weatherby. I would never - I don't recall having

mentioned that precisely, but I would not have said his

willingness, but his tendency to talk about it, because I

personally didn't believe that the man ever really meant to

do that physically.

Mr. Baron. Were you aware of any meetings that took place

in October of 1963 at which Desmond FitzGerald met AMLASH

in Paris at Red Stent's house and discussed the kind of

support that AMLASH could expect from the United States

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government?

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Mr. Weatherby. I knew he went because it was very

soon after, I think, I had last seen him but I wasn't invited

for any operational guidance bu. then.

Mr. Baron. You weren't invited to brief FitzGerald at

that point?

Mr. Weatherby. I don't recall. I may have briefed him

or talked to him with the other AMLASH case officer. about the

man, what kind of an animal he was -- can we strike that?

-1=

What kind of a man he was, and maybe so. And of course his

idiosyncrasies, that's normal procedure.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall any discussion with anyone at

CIA at that point about the need to meet AMLASH's request

for assurances that a high U.S. official was willing to

stand behind his operations in Cuba, preferably Robert F.

Kennedy?

Mr. Heatherby. I heard, probably without invitation,

or by the by that FitzGerald would go over there, but I didn't

know the details. I knew --

Mr. Baron. Did you know that FitzGerald would go over

there to make a representation to AMLASH that people higher

in the government than FitzGerald would stand behind AMLASH?

Mr. Weatherby. Yes, I remember that. To the best of

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the trip obviously he was preparing for it and

Mr. Baron. Do you remember Richard Helms being involved

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in any of those discussions prior to FitzGerald's trip to

Paris?

Mr. Weatherby. Not specifically. He may have been.

MI. Baron. And do you recall any contact with Robert

Kennedy between the time that this assurance was requested

by AMLASH and the time that FitzGerald went to Paris?

Mr. Weatherby. I have no direct knowledge of that.

MI. Baron. Do you have any recollection of any contact

between anyone and Task Force I and Robert Kennedy?

Mr. Weatherby. Oh, I think Mr. Harvey had seen him. I

am sure they did. I simply don't know for a fact.

Mr. Baron. You don't remember any specific instances

where Robert Kennedy met face to face with members of Task

Force Wor called them on the phone or received phone calls

from them in relation to Project AMLASH?

Mr. Weatherby. Not in direct relation to that, no. I

knew they were obviously interested in the whole program,

but again, I wasn't at that level.

Mx. Baron. Did you have any sense of the closeness of

• the relationship between Robert Kennedy and Desmond FitzGerald?

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Mr. Weatherby. No, sir.

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Mr. Baron. Did you have a sense of the kind of relationship

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that existed between Robert Kennedy and William Harvey?

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Mr. Weatherby. No, except I think it was common knowledge

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Mr. Baron.

Did you have any sense of the relationship

that existed between Robert Kennedy and Richard Helms?

Mr. Weatherby.

No, sir.

Mx. Baron. Do you have any recollection of drops into

Cuba of caches of arms

intended for AMLASH?

Mr. Weatherby. No, sir.

Mr. Baron. Do you

recall any planning for such drops

or even the discussion of such drops?

Mr. Weatherby. I may have heard it. I didn't participate

and I don't know any details.

Mr. Baron.

Do you recall any discussion of dropping arms

to AlLASH or people associated with him during your period

of operational control of the AMLASH Project?

Mr. Weatherby. No. It may well have been discussed at

that point, but nothing during my tenure was ever done like

that. The man didn't communicate. It would be pretty hard

to drop anything to him at that point.

Mr. Baron. What do you mean by the fact that he wasn't

communicating?

Mr. Weatherby. Well, as I said earlier, there were

great periods when the man, we didn't know really what he

was doing. We heard second-hand or they had seen him here or

there, and he was well and healthy and so forth, but he

wouldn't communicate with us. It's just simply not, it's not

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assistance to a person with whom we can't communicate, during

my time.

Remember, after we saw him in Paris it was essentially

nothing of significance until we finally found out the man

was going to come out.

That was one of the frustrations of the case, that the

man wouldn't communicate.

Mr. Baron. Going to come out to where?

Mr. Weatherby. To Porto Alegre.

Mr. Baron. Do you have any knowledge from any source

about the development of a pin containing a hypodermic syringe

capable of administering poison?

Mr. Weatherby. No, sir.

Mr. Baron. You don't recall the development of such a

device in relation to the AMLASH case?

Mr. Weatherby. No, I don't.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall discussions with the Technical

Services Division or the Office of Medical Services about

developing any devices capable of, you know, eliminating an

individual Cuban leader?

MI. Weatherby. No.

Mr. Baron. If I told you that a ballpoint pen was developed

at the CIA which contained, a hypodermic syring and was capable

of administering a lethal poison, and that such a device was

offered to AMLASH at a point subsequent to your involvement

IN 50955 DocIaladthshiphyewhat would you make of it?

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NH 50955 DocId 322021481Fpadar@n. Once.

Mr. Weatherby. I wouldn't think it was accurate. I

really don't know.

Mr. Baron. Would it strike you that either the story

is inaccurate, or if it is accurate, that such device would

clearly be designed for offensive use against some individual?

Mr. Weatherby. May I have that question again?

(The reporter read back the prior question.)

Mr. Weatherby. Well, I have no knowledge of it. I think

it is probably inaccurate. However, if it were accurate,

use the conjectural, then obviously it must be used perhaps

in the manner which you describe.

Mr. Baron. Wouldn't it seem unlikely to you that that

kind of device would be designed as a self-defense weapon?

Mr. Weatherby. I don't know. I really, I don't, I am

not getting the train of your questioning now.

Mr. Baron. I am simply asking in the abstract your

opinion as, in effect, an expert, as a case officer with

some operational experience, wouldn't such a device be next

to useless as a self-defense weapon?

Mr. Weatherby. No, I don't think so. No different than

Mr. Baron. Except that this device obviously can only

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Mr. Weatherby.

So can mace.

Mr. Baron. In a tight spot.

Mr. Weatherby. Yeah.

Mr. Baron. Where there could be more than one, you know,

person involved.

Mr. Weatherby. Yeah.

That's such a hypothetical question

that it's difficult to answer. You know, if I vere talking

to you and you were a Russian case officer, and i said I

an not going to do something, and you decided that you were

going to turn me in, all I can do is get rid of you and leave.

If, on the other hand, in a cast of thousands it would not

be worth a whole hell of a lot.

Mr. Baron. If somebody were asking you for a self-defense

weapon, would you supply them with this kind of a device that

I have described?

Mr. Weatherby. Oh, I would have to think about that.

That's fairly -- that would depend entirely on the circumstances.

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Mr. Baron. After you left Project AMLASIl, what was

the nature of the other projects that your pursued on Task

• Force W?

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Mr. Weatherby. I would have to go back on the record on

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that but I would say it was classical FI defections, counter-

intelligence basically.

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Mr. Baron. Were you associated with any aspect, other

NW 50955

Docta stbensintaligence collection, of planning for a coup against

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Castro?

Mr. Weatherby. No,

sir.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall from your experience on Task

Force W plans for or discussions of the supply of weapons

to Cuban dissidents at that point?

Mr. Weatherby. Well, it's a matter of record that it

was done or attempted, but I had nothing to do with the

direct planning, and I have no knowledge of the planning or

execution as such.

Mt. Baron. Did you have any contact with a man named

Artime?

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Mt. Weatherby. No, sir.

MI. Baron. Did you know him?

Mr. Weatherby. I knew who he was but I did not know

him.

Mr. Baron.

Who was he?

MI. Weatherby. He was a Cuban exile leader.

Mr. Baron. Do you know Howard Hunt?

Mx. Weatherby. I know of Howard Hunt. I never met Howard

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

• Hunt.

Mr. Baron. Did you have any contact in any way with Howard,

Hunt in relation to your service on Task Force W?

Mr. Weatherby. No, sir.

Mr. Baron. Throughout the course of this discussion,

ww 50955 DocIal 3220224ye pave,been referring to Task Force V, it is clear in

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your mind that that would also cover any references to SAs,

which was the same organization as Task Force W?

Mr. Weatherby. Absolutely. I am not interested in

subterfuge.

Mr. Baron. Okay. In your intelligence collection

operations on Task Force W or the SAS staff, did you make

any use of members of the gambling syndicate in Havana?

Mr. Weatherby. No, sir.

Mr. Baron.

Were you ever made aware of CIA contact with

members of the gambling syndicate that ran gambling operations

in Cuba for the purpose of intelligence gathering?

Mr. Weatherby. No, sir.

Mr. Baron. Were you aware of any contact with gambling

syndicate members?

Mr. Weatherby. No, sir.

Mr. Baron. "And does that include gambling syndicate.

figures in the United States who may have had an interest in

Cuba?

Mr. Weatherby. Yes, sir.

Mr. Baron. Did you visit the J.M. WAVE station in

Miami as a part of your activities on Task Force l Or SAS?

Mr. Weatherby. No, sir.

MI. Baron. You never visited the j.M.. WAVE station?

Mx. Weatherby. Yes, sir.

Mr. Baron. That's correct?

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Mr. Weatherby. No.

Mr. Baron. Are you saying that --

Mr. Weatherby. That's two separate questions you asked

me. The answer on the first one was no, sir, and the answer

to the second one was no, sir.

Mr. Baron. All of which goes to indicate that you never

visited the J.M. WAVE station at any point?

Mr. Weatherby. During my attachment to the Cuban Task

Force, that is correct.

Mr.. Baron. Did you visit it at some other point, that

Mr. Baron. In connection with what kind of operation?

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Mr. Weatherby. That was procurement of an aircraft.

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Mr. Weatherby. That is correct.

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Mr. Baron. Is that correct?

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Mr. Weatherby. Yes, sir.

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Mr. Baron. When was that?

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Mr. Weatherby. That was about 1967.

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Mr. Baron. For use where?

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Mr. Weatherby. For use - are we on the record?

21.

Mr. Baron. Yes.

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Mr. Weatherby. For use in the Congo.

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Mr. Baron. I simply have one more procedural matter to

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mention to you,

HH 50955 DOCId/32202446 Fade aware that since the time Senator Morgan left

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the room that you were under no obligation to stay here and

continue your testimony?

Mr. Weatherby. Absolutely.

Mr. Baron. But did you voluntarily stay and continue

to testify?

Mr. Weatherby. Yes, sir. Absolutely.

I will stay as

long as you wish.

Mr. Daron. Okay. I think I have no further questions.

Is there anything else that you would like to say or

to add to the record to put our discussion here today into

context?

Mr. Weatherby. I think not.

Mr. Baron. All right. Thank you very much. You have

been extremely cooperative and informative.

Mr. Weatherby. Pleasure.

(Whereupon, at 4:15 o'clock p.m., the hearing in the above-

mentioned matter was

adjourned.)

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## Page 83

STATEMENT REGARDING TESTIMONY IN ALIAS

I,

hereby certify that on

1 August

_, 1975 I testified before Senator

and members of the Senate Select Committee Staff after being duly sworn

under the alias of

William E. Weatherby

True Name

Weatheroy

This statement, marked Exhibit'

of the Review Staff, Central Intelligence Agency.

Fresenia 7 Barr

Witness

- will be retained in the custody

186, 50955 DocId:32202448

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## Page 84

Weatherby-Exhibit 2

HALASH EXI

7/29/15

03

(WAINURIGHPOS/ CONTACT REPORT'OF THE FIRST MEETING WITH CUBELA

(30 July - 6 August 1962)

5:

rcully signiticant cor tho croution of a ner Cuod,

no wus interesic in rotuming so carry on the right there.

de raid ne nes not inserdosed in risking dis life fos day anali

undertaking, out that to he coma be cired a roaliy targe gore

to plug, he voila use riceeti and several obbero in Cuba taca

Fa said ho had Bless do S1or up an oil accinery, do be icio that

une continuizg existence of a serbiance of noraul Zuactioning in

Cuba cepenceú upon e contiauing supply on petrolour, Suppiles ci

malch, as ve snow, are ate crasheer siage today.

Le alco vanteù to pian the execution o2 Carios Rodrigues le top-

ranking Castro subordinate, and the Soviet incassador, anu also

to eliminate fide, oy executiod i secessary.

Mile te vere making no comictanto or plans, re pointed out to

Cubero toat secenes lito de encisioned carisinly heü their piace,

out that a. 105 0% cooriinacion; inaring, incomation colleusioa,

vere necessary prerequisives ie ensure the value und

success or sura Dians.

Cubeia stated many tires during the course ou this and subseguanz

meetings that he vas oaly interosed in involra hiascle to a

plan do significant detoe, cau mies was truly designed it

achiove rapidly sis desire

VIR

80955

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## Page 85

WeaTherly -Exhibit 3 AMLÄSH Exz

7/29175

AAW

AIMURIGIT WROTE IN HIS CONTACT REPORT:

(10-11 August 1962)

at one time men wo

"we'vere discussiag the Various Joceuts of Cubela's future

rola in Cuba, we used the tera 'assessinato." "me use of this.

¡eTI, iê dater Leamed arca Pepedeno and Arca Cubele hisseie,

vas nost cojectionabie to ice leiter, and he nas visibly upset:

It was soù the act se objectoù to, but razoor verely the causcs.

on the word used to dacozite iù.

'Slicinaic sas auceptable."

mottline

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Weatherby -Exhibit 4 AMLASH Ex 3

7129/75

After

03

ENTELL TAMSON CABLED On 17 AUGUST:

(14-23 August 1962)

"Lave no intention dire Cubela paysical eliadration mission

as requirement but recogriza tale something le coula or

might try to comy out oa dis oin initiatira."

-.-.

0955

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Weatherby -Exhibit 5

HEADQUARTERS REPLIED BY CABLE ON 18 AUGUST:

"Strongig concur that no paysical clinication dissions to baven Cubela."

.. . -

HH

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