Agency: SSCIA
Originator: SSCIA
Document date: 00/00/1976
Document type: REPORT

## Page 1

JFK Assassination System

Identification Form

Agency Information

Date:

717/2015

AGENCY :

RECORD NUMBER :

SSCIA

157-10014-10234

RECORD SERIES :

MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M-139

ORIGINATOR:

FROM:

TO :

TITLE:

SSCIA

Released under the John

Document Int. Kennedy

Assassination Records

Collection Act of 1992

i44 USC 2107 Notel.

Case#:NU 54653 Date:

DATE: 00/00/1976

PAGES:

34

SUBJECTS :

ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES

OSWALD, LEE, POST RUSSIAN PERIOD, TRAVEL, TRIP TO

MEXICO

FPCC

DOCUMENT TYPE: REPORT

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

RESTRICTIONS: 1B; IC

CURRENT STATUS: Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 03/17/2000

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :

v9.1

HH 54653

DooId: 32423622

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Date :

08/08/95

Page

1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION

FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA

RECORD NUMBER

: 157-10014-10234

RECORDS SERIES

:MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M-139

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR

SSCIA

FROM

TO

TITLE

DATE

: 00/00/76

PAGES

:

34

SUBJECTS

OSWALD, LEE, POST RUSSIAN PERIOD, TRAVEL, TRIP TO

MEXICO

FPCC

ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES

DOCUMENT TYPE : REPORT

CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED

RESTRICTIONS: REFERRED

BEER PTED

CURRENT STATUS : POSTPONED

IN FULL

DATE OF LAST REVIEW

: 01/21/99

OPENING CRITERIA

COMMENTS

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

54653 DocId: 32423622

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## Page 3

Book

v, p.

12-13

The cast of characters surrounding

the seizure of anti-Castro

hardware as outlined on these pages

is particularly interesting.

The raw material cited in the

footnote is attached. Note

reference to Briniuer and Oswald.

Below that McLaney brothers and

Victor Espinosa and Frank Sturgis.

Not attached is a critical New

Orleans field office memo to

FBI headquarters linking Briniuer

to the McClaney/Sturgis operation.

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## Page 4

Yew Orleang

tion a photo-

Orleans, La.,

* given to a

record, given

•1o the same,

•idel Castro,

cht to invade

'iteg will do

right.

ly friend to

•d this after

that conver-

'n my friend

lere and he

le Fair Play

horitles, be-

nowledge of

ront of Ed

sonally as a traitor if he doing something wrong in the debate.

guidebook for Marines, he smiled to me, and he told me, "Well, listen, Carlos,

don't try to do un invasion with that guidebook for Marines, because that is an

old one and that will be a failure."

That was his Joke in that moment.

After that we went to the debate, and I think that you have the whole history

of the debate, you have the transcription and everything, [so] that I don't have

to go inside that, because

that is subjective, not objective. You have the ob-

jective, and that is the debate.

Mr. LIEseLfR. That is rigbt. We do have a transcript and we listened to it on

the tape last night over at the television station too.

Nir. BrInguIer. And there is something that I want to show you too. I told

to you about the training camp that were across the Lake Pontchartrain.

Mr. LIEBELER. Yes.

NIr. BRINGUIER. [Producing newspaper.] At the beginning of August in the

Diario Las Americas from Miami for September 4

Mr. LIEBELER. For September 4, 1063?

Mr. BrInguIer. That is right.

[Indicating photograph.] This is the spy

who was inside the training camp.

The Christian Democratic Morement turned

bin over to the FBI, and the FBI was questioning him in Miami.

The Christian

Democratic Movement found a letter, according to this information, from this

guy directed to Carlos Lechuga, former Cuban Ambassador to Mexico and now

Cuban Ambassador to the United Nations in New York.

In that letter the spy,

Fernando Fernandez, was warning. Lechuga that they have to be alert from that

date to August 8, and the day that Oswald came trying to infiltrate my orga-

This sounds for me strange in all this matter.

[Indicating.] Here is another interview fróm Fernandez here 3 days later.

NIr. LIEBELER. You are referring to a copy of the same nem'spaper but for the

date of September 6, 1963, on the front page of which—

Mr. BRINGUIeR. [Indicating.] Here.

"Fernando Fernandez is in favor of

coexistence with the Communist regime of Castro." That is the

, Council of

friend and

itler all the

hit Oswald

swald bad

l'e gave all

", somebody

lobate.

day of the

¡he time of

Hill Stuckey

indicate to

take bands

mat Stuckey

relieve that

: t0 Oswald

to him ag

•t one Com-

ommunism,

hat I don't

:ic way.

communist,

hat if any

• something

me to me,

ve nothing

" answered

the wrong

it moment.

lebook for

jill happen

* bim per-

Mr. LIEBELER. Let me see If I can understand what you are saying. You say

that Fernandez wrote a letter to Lechuga?

Mr. BRINGUIER. Fernandez wrote a letter to Lechuga in Mexico.

Mr. LIFßELER. Lechuga is a member of the Castro government?

Mr. BRINGUIER. Right.

MIr. LIFELER. He is now Ambassador to the United Nations?

Mr. BRINGUIER. In New York; right.

NIr. LebeLer. Fernandez is the person who was the Castro spy who had in-

filtrated the training camp in Louisiana?

aIr. BRINGUIER. For the Christian Democratic Movement here in Louisiana.

LIEBELER. Now the Christian Democratic Movement is-what? Pro-

Mr. BRINGUIER. Anti-Castro.

Mr. LIEBELER. It is an anti-Castro organization?

Mr. BRINGUIER. Yes; they were training Cubans over here to make a com-

mando action against Castro, but they find out that there was a Castro spy

inside the truining camp, and they went back to Miami with the people and with

him, and they turn him over to the FBI.

I think that after that the leader

for the Christinn Democratic Movement—or that the FBI didn't found nothing,

because was not against the law to spy inside an anti-Castro organization.

was against the law to spy inside the U.S. Government but not inside the anti-

Castro organization.

And my feeling-and this is the question that I am asking

myself-in New Orleans we are about 900 miles from Miami. In Miami is wbere

the headquarters of all the anti-Castro groups.

I cond not find any reason

for Oswald to come to me and offer me his service to train Cubans in guerrilla

warfare at the same moment when there was a secret anti-Castro training camp

in New Orleans and a Castro spy was inside that training camp.

is- because, if he was willing to infiltrate one active organization, he will go

directly to Minmi and he will offer his service over there in Miami, but not in

New Orleans where it is not publicly known thit here was something going on

at that moment. I believe that that was the only time here in New Orleans that

HH 54653 DocId: 32423622 Page

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## Page 5

there was something like that, and It was a coincidence.

coincidence too for me, and that is that when Oswald left the city he went to

Mexico, and the letter from Fernandez that was Intercepted bere was to. Mexico

too, and Oswald visit the Cuban consulate In Mexico, and the Fernandez letter

was to the Cuban Ambassador to Mexico. For me, that is a big doubt.

Mr. LIEBELER. Go ahead.

Mr. BrInGUIeR. You see, after the debate, the same night of the debate, I

went to the radio station here in New Orleans and the local papers and the

United Press International office, and I gave a press release.

If you want a

copy, I could give you a copy. I gave a copy to the Secret Service.

The most interesting thing is the four things that I asked to the Secret

Service of New Orleans. I think that this is the second one where I said,

"Write to your Congressman

asking for a full Investigation of Mr. Lee H.

Ostald, a confessed Marxist" [producing document]. And that wag 3 months

before the assassination.

Mr. LIEBELEB. Do you have another copy of this?

. Mr. BrInguier. I have the original of that. You can have that.

Mr. BRINGUIER. No, August 21.

Mr. LIEBELER. August 21, 1983?

Mr. BRINGUlEE. August 21, the night of the debate.

Mr. LIBELEs. I mark it as "Exhibit No. 3" to your deposition, and I have

initialed it. Would you initial it?

[The witness complied.]

Mr. LIEBELER. Let me

go over some of this testimony that you have just

given to see if I understand.

Fernandez wrote to Mr. Lechuga a letter

in which Fernandez said that we meaning the Castro people?

Mr. BRINGUIER. Yes.

Mr. LIEBELER. Must be on guard up until August 8?

MIr. BRINGUIER. August 8, that is right.

NIr. LIEBELEB. Of 1963?

NIr. BRINGUIER. That is right.

Mr. LIEBELER. You indicated that Oswald had come to your store or offices

on August 5, 1983?

NIr. BRInGUIER. That is right.

Mr. LIEBELER. Oswald came to you offering to assist in the military training

of Cubans?

Mr. BRINgUIER. That is right.

Mr. LIEBELER. At that time, there was, in fact, a training camp near New

Mr. BRIngUIeR. That is right.

Mr. LIEBELER. For the training of people for milltary action against Castro?

Mr. BRINGUIFe. Right.

Mr. LIEBELER. And that was not public knowledge at that time?

AIr. BRInGUIER. That is right.

Mr. LIebeLer. So you are tying this up in your mind by considering the pos-

sibility that Oswald was, in fact, a Castro agent?

NIr. BRINGUIER. That is right.

Mr. LIeBeLer. And did know about the existence of this training camp, be

cause Mr. Fernandez had already himself infiltrated that training camp?

Mr. BRINgUIER. That is right.

Mr. LIebeLeR. And that Fernandez had told Oswald about the existence of this

camp and had asked Oswald himself to try to infiltrate that camp for your

organization?

Mr. BRINGUIEE. Excuse me.

Mr. LIEBELER. Is that correct?

Mr. BRINGuIER. Well, the only thing that I don't believe is that Fernandez

had told directly to Oswald.

What I believe is that Fernandez had informed

some people outside the United States, and these people had informed Oswald and

had gare to Oswald the order to try to infiltrate the Cuban group here in New

44

HH 54653 DocId: 32423622 Page 5

Mr. LTEnELER. And Mr. Fernand

arare of approximately the time

for, Indiented to Lechugu that 1

discovered as an attempted Infltra

Mr. BRInGuIer. I beg pardon? 1

Mr. LIEBELEk. As I understand,

Intes to the fact that Fernandez:

will be In danger,"-up until abo:

ansthing to do with Oswald?

Mr. BRINGUIER. Well, what I this

on August 5 Oswald came to me o

enme perlod of time. Sometbin;

Orlenns, that there was a secret .

of the Fair Play for Cuba Comn:

Now Orleans.

Those are the fact

not sure about. I just want to si

connection.

Mr. LEBELER. Now it doesn't sees

handing out literature in the stre

to infltrate the anti-Castro movem

Mr. BRInGUIeR. Remember that

after I told him that I don't hav

that here there is nothing, and thi

sent openly to do that before ti

he went openly to do that after he "

MIr. LIEBELER. Do you know of i

In the pro-Castro movement and

Information to Oswald-conducted i

Mr. BRInGUIEk. No.

Mr. LIEBELER. Would you have a

as a result of your anti-Castro ar:

person as this, do you think you

Mr. BRInGUIER. Beg your pardon

Mr. LIEBELER. If there were sur:

Castro movement who had been r:

would have had access to that in

And out about it?

MIr. BRINGUIER. You see, that Is

have a lot of persons.

There ar

who are anti-Castro.

Even amus.

agents here in the city and you r

But there is something else: Th

18 located in 117 Decatur Street, j

the owner of the Havana Bar Is .

over there, gave the information

before-that Oswald went to the

leinonade. He was with one Mexi.

drinking the lemonade, he start lo

to be a Cuban capitalistic, and tha

He was telling that that was too in

moment, Oswald feel bad at that:

out to the sidewalk to vomit outsid.

• the Ilavana Bar told me that the ;

the same one that one time the FBI

immediately because that was a pir

August 15 and August 30 was th

because I start to find out all thess.

beíore, because before I did not

nothing of this before to me.

BI"!

the owner of the Havana Bar cam.

cause he already saw one automol.

one of them the one who had ber

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## Page 6

• "I THI

5 doube

if the debate, I

papers and the

If you

want a

d to the Secret

•e where I said,

of Mr. Lee H.

it was 3 months

istributed to the

ust 16, 1963-

lion, and I have

t you

have just

lechuga a letter

i store or offices

cilitary training

camp near New

against Castro?

sidering the pos-

aining camp, be

ing camp?

• existence of this

t camp for your

• that Fernandez

oz had informed

ined Oswald and

öup bere in New

Nr. LIEBEleR. And Mr. Fernandez was, on this theory, aware of that and was

aware of approximately the time Oswald would make this attempt, and, there-

fore, indicated to Lechuga that there would be some danger of Oswald being

discovered as an attempted infiltrator?

Mr. BRINGUIER, I beg pardon?

I don't understand the words.

Mr. LIBeLeR. As I understand, part of the hypothesis here, the theory, re-

Intes to the fact that Fernandez said to Lechuga,

"We must be careful, or we

will be in danger,"-up until about August 8. Now does that statement have

anything to do with Oswald?

Mr. BaNGuIer. Well, what I think is this: He send that letter to Lechuga, and

on August 5 Oswald came to me offering his service to train Cubans, all in the

same period of time.

Something that

was happening here in New

Orleans, that there was a secret anti-Castro training camp, and the chairman

of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee trying to join the Cuban group bere in

New Orleans. Those are the facts.

I don't want to tell something that I ain

not sure about. I just want to show you that tremendous coincidence or that

Mr. LiebElEr. Now it doesn't seem likely, does it, that Oswald would go around

handing out literature in the streets like be did if he was actually attempting

to infiltrate the anti-Castro movement?

Mr. BRInguIER. Remember that that was after I turned down his offer and

after I told him that I don't have nothing to do with military activities and

that here there is nothing, and that I turned down completely him.

went openly to do that before the attempt to infiltrate the training camp;

he went openly to do that after he was turned down.

Mr. LIBELER. Do you know of any conceivable association between anybody

in the pro-Castro movement and Oswald that could have acted as a source of

Information to Oswald-conducted the orders to him?

Mr. BRInGUIEk. No.

Mr. LiebeLeR. Would you have any way of obtaining information of that sort

as a result of your anti-Castro activities and contacts?

If there were such a

person as this, do you think you would be likely to know about it?

Mr. BRINGUIER. Beg your pardon?

Mr. LIEBeLeR. If there were such a person, that is to say, some agent of the

Castro movement who had been working with Oswald, do you think that you

would have had access to that information or you would have been likely to

Mr. BRINGUIER. You see, that is a hard question, because here in the city you

hare a lot of persons.

There are some who are pro-Castro, there are many

who are anti-Castro.

Even among the Cubans you could have some Castro

agents here in the city and you could not have control of everybody.

But there is something else: The owner of the Havana Bar-the Havana Bar

is located in 117 Decatur Street, just two door or three door from my store

the owner of the Havana Bar is a Cuban,

and he and one of the employees

over there, gave the information to ine after Kennedy's assassination-not

before-that Oswald went to the Havana Bar one time.

lemonade. He was with one Mexican at that moment, and when Oswald was

drinking the lemonade, be start to say that, sure, the owner of that place liad

to be a Cuban capitalistic, and that he argue about the price of the lemonade.

He was telling that that was too much for a lemonade, and he feel bad at that

moment, Oswald feel bad at that moment-he had some

out to the sidewalk to vomit outside on the sidewalk.

These persons here from

the Haraua Bar told me that the guy, the Mexican, who was with Oswald, was

the same one that one time the F'BI told them that if they will see him, call them

immediately because that was a pro-Communist.

I remember that was between

August 15 and August 30 was that period of time.

I could not locate that

because I start to find out all these things after the Kennedy assassination, not

before, because before I did not found

They did not told

nothing of this before to me.

Between the l5th and the 30th the brother of

the owner of the Havana Bar came to my store asking me to call the FBI, be-

cause he already saw one automobile passing by the street with two Mexicans,

one who had been withwald in the bar, and be told me

NH 54653 DocId: 32123622

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!1

1.

1L

Fair Play for Cuba Committee materials on one uneventful oc-

casion in Dallas sometime during the period April 6-24, 1963,316

Oswald's first public identification with that cause was in New Or-

leans. There, in late May and early June of 1963, under the name

Lee Osborne, he had printed a handbill headed in lurge letters "Flands

Off Cuba," an application form for, and a membership card in, the

New Orleans branch of tie Fair Play for Cuba Committee.317

first distributed his handbills and other material uneventfully in the

vicinity of the U.S.S. Wasp, which was berthed at the Dumaine Street

wharf in New Orleans, on June 16, 1963.318 Fle distributed literature

in downtown New Orleans on August 9, 1963, and was arrested because

of a dispute with three anti-Castro Cuban exiles, and again on August

16, 1963.310 Following his arrest, he was interviewed by the police, and

at his own request, by an agent of the F'BI3 On August 17, 19633, he

appeared briefly on a radio program 321 and on August 21, 1963, he

debated over radio station WDSU, New Orleans, with Carlos Brin-

quier, one of the Cuban exiles who had been arrested with him on

August 9,322 Bringuier claimed that on August 5, 1963, Oswald had

attempted to infiltrate an anti-Castro organization with which he was

associated, 323

While Oswald publicly engaged in the activities described above,

his "organization" was i product of his imagination. a The imaginary

president of the, nonexistent chapter was named A. J. Hidell,as the

name that Oswald used when he purchased the assassination weapon. 326

Marina Oswald said she signed that name, apparently chosen because

it rhymed with "Fidel," 32? to her husband's membership card in the

New Orleans chapter.

She testified that he threatened to beat her if

she did not do so.328

The chapter had never. been chartered by the

national FPCC organization, 32 It appears to have been a solitary

operation on Oswald's part in spite of his misstatements to the New

Orleans police that it had 35 members, 5 of which were usually present

at meetings which were held once a month. 330

Oswald's Fair Play for Cuba activities may be viewed as a very

shrewd political operation in which one man single handedly created

publicity for his cause or for himself. It is also evidence of Oswald's

reluctance to describe events accurately and of his need to present

himself to others as well as to himself in a light more favorable than

was justified by reality. This is suggested by his misleading and some-

time untruthful statements in his letters to Mr. V. T. Lee, then

national director of FPCC. In one of those letters, dated August 1.

1963, Oswald wrote that an office which he had previously claimed to

have rented for FI'CC activities had been "promply closed 3 days

later for some obsure reasons by the renters, they

said something

about remodeling ect., I'm sure you understand." ast He wrote that

"thousands of circulars were distrubed" a2 and that he continued to

receive inquiries

through his post office box which he endeavored

"to keep ansevering to the best of my ability?" sa

In his letter to

V. T. Lee, he stated that he was then alone in his efforts on behalf

of FPCC, but he attributed his lack of support to in attack by Cuban

407

HH 54653 DocId:32423622 Page 7

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## Page 8

exiles in a street demonstration and being "officialy cautioned" by the

police, events which "robbed me of what support I had leaving me

alone." 33+

In spite of those clains, the Commission has not been able to un-

cover any evidence that anyone ever attacked any street demonstration

in which Oswald was involved, except for the Bringuier incident men-

tioned above, which occurred 8 days after Oswald wrote the above

letter to V.T. Lee.335

Bringuier, who seemed to be familiar with many

anti-Castro activities in New Orleans, was not aware of any such

incident, 3 Police reports also fuil to reflect any activity on Oswald's

part prior to August 9, 1963, except for the uneventful distribution of

literature at the Dumaine Street wharf in June.337

Furthermore, the

general tenor of Oswald's next letter to V. T. Lee, in which he sup

ported his report on the Bringuier incident with a copy of the charges

made against him and a newspaper elipping reporting the event, sug-

gests that his previous story of an attack by Cuban exiles was at least

greatly exaggerated. 38

While the legend "FPCC 541 Camp St. NEW

ORLEANS, LA." was stamped on some literature that Oswald had

in his possession at the time of his arrest in New Orleans, extensive

investigation was not able to connect Oswald with that address, al.

though it did develop the fact that an anti-Castro organization had

maintained offices there for a period ending early in 1962330 The

Commission has not been able to find any other indication that Oswald

had rented an office in New Orleans.

In view of the limited amount

of public activity on Oswald's part before August 9, 1063, there also

seems to be no basis for his claim that he had distributed "thousands"

of circulars, especially since he had claimed to have printed only 2,000

and actually had only 1,000 printed. In addition, there is no evidence

that he received any substantial amount of materials from the na-

tional headquarters.30

In another letter to V. T. Lee, dated August 17, 1963, Oswald wrote

that he had appeared on Mr. William Stuckey's 15-minute television

program over WDSU-TV called "Latin American Focus" as a result

of which he was "flooded with callers and invitations to debate's ect.

as well as people interested in joining the F.P.C.C. New Orleans

branch." 341

WDSU has no program of any kind called "Latin Ameri-

can Focus." 942 Stuckey had a radio program called "Latin Listening

Post," on which Oswald was heard for less than 5 minutes on Angust

17, 1963.343 It appears that Oswald had only one caller in response to

all of his FPCC activities, an agent of Bringuier's attempting to leurn

nore about the true nature of the alleged FPCC "organization" in

New Orleans. 344

Oswald's statements suggest that he hoped to be flooded with callers

and invitations to debate.

This would have made him a real center of

attention as he must have been when he first arrived in the Soviet Union

and as he was to some extent when he returned to the United States.

The limited notoriety that Oswald received as a result of the street.

fracas and in the subsequent radio debate was apparently not enough

to satisfy him. He exaggerated in his letters to V. T. Lee in in appar-

408

OSWALD DISTRIBUTING FAIR

ORLEANS, AUGUST 16, 1963--

BILLS ON WHICH HE HAD ST

COMMISSION EXHIBIT 2966 A

HANDS

CUBA!

Join the Fair Play for

in Cuba Committeo

NEW ORLEANS CHARTER

MEMBER BRANCH

Fros Lilerature, Lectures

LOCATION: L

EVERYONE

WELCOME

GARNER DEI

730-900 0-64-28

NN 54653 DooId:32423622 Page 8

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## Page 9

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---

## Page 10

10/3/63

Ralet 2. Quager

Report

MIS 105-1742

information concerning the Conandus Hambises or cheir

spokesman, RAZALL MARCIEZ PIPO, Who made a

sistenear.

Guatonala claiming credit for the August 17, 1953 attack.

BOSCH ataced that the MIR? will promose other

attacks in the future,

a. opportunicies and avallability

of equipment permit, without compromising the united

Stares.

V. MISCELIANSOUS

On June 14, 1953, Information wea received that

a group of Cuban exiles had a plan to bomb the Shell refinery

in Cubes.

On June le 1969, United Maces Crabeae Agents

seized a twin Beechoraft airplane on the outskirts of

Miami, Florids, along with a quantity of explosives.

MIGUEL ALVAREZ, EVELIO ALPIZAR, RENE ESPINOSA,

VICTOR ESPINOSA aNd CARLOS HERMANDEZ, alOng With American

SAM BENTON, were involved and detalned, but not arcesced,

by United States Customs Agenüs. It was ascercained

that MICHEL NO LANEY supplied

I the money and explosives

for this operation. ME LANY is well known as a former

INTERNAL SECURITY

DIVISION

NOV

1.1967

On July 19, 1963, ACELO PEDROSO advised there

was another plan to bob Cuba, using bomb casings and

dynamite located on the outskirts of New Orleang, Louisiana.

On July 31, 1963, the Federal Bureau of

Ir: stigation (EBI)

at New

Orleans, Louldiano, obtsined a

35.

ur 7 1976

00J

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## Page 11

MM 105-1742

search warrant and seized 2,400 pounds of dynamite and

20 bomb casings dear Incuba, Louislana. This material

was located on the property of WILLIAM I. MO LANY,

brother of MICAL J. HC LANEY, a liami Beach gambler and

forner operator of a casino in the Nacional dotel, Ravana,

Cuba.

Investigation determined that thir dynamite was

purchased al Collinsville, Illinois, by RICh LADOn for

VICTOR ESPINOSA, who was involved in the June l4, 1963

solaures at idomi. ESPINOSA transported the dynamice to

New Orlans in a rented trailer. Also Involved in

this

bomb plotiara CARLOS HERIANEZ, MIGUEL ALVAREZ and SAil

BENTON, a liami, Florida private detective.

IM T-3, Who is personally acquainted with SAM

BENION and RICH

LAUGHLI, advired that SAM BRION 12a

been involved, in the past, with Cuban revolutionary

groups in plans to sink yachts to obtain insurance,

arms deals and collection of funds for personal use.

MM I-3 advisedon June 14, 1963, RICU ALBERT

IAUCHLI of Collinsville, Illinois recently arrived in

Miami, Florida in a Ford

station wagon with a load of

rins for sale.

Americanadventurers and mercenaries, GERALD

rifle to the SNrE, a

japanese machine gun to American

mercenary BILL GARIAN, Lwo aucomatic rifles

and two French

guns to RAMON FONT of Comandos L, and

miscellaneous

other equipnent to other organizations.

MM T-3 explained that when LAUCHLI arrived in

Milant in June of 1963, his stationgon consained .50 caliber

RECEIVED FROM

36.

MAY 7 1918

DOJ

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## Page 12

MN 105-1742

machine guss, nine sub-machine guns, automatic rifles

and a number of foreign made weapons.

lAUCHLI sold

nearly all of these arms, and

at rtasonable prices.

IN T-3 explained that IAUCHLI is more interested

in uma sales as a gun dealer, and lias no emotional feeling

about the cubon exile cause of trying to overchcos the

present Covernment in Cuba.

37°

fit...

1913

DOJ

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## Page 13

Book V, p. 10

FBI informant during missile crisis

suggested that Castro could be

assassinated through underworld channels

and that the informant would

fund this if U.S. government would

assure such endeavor would not adversely

effect the national security.

See

attached Hoover memo. We need to identify

and interview informant.

54653

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## Page 14

¿uti

0622000

s the Accornog Conore:

Sion: Elzector, IDI

29,

2262

ÖFFicE OF

Ÿ;

RECE!V31

22? 1962

SUNJECT: FIDES CASTRO

_NTERNAL SECURITY - CUBI

We have an informant who furnishes data concerning

criminal matters and who is close to high officials of the

Teamsters Union. He has many contacts with hoodlun and

gambling elcments throughout the United States. He is most

concerned that his relationship with the Tri not be revealid

since he feels cortain that, if his cooperation becomes

known, he will be killed innediately.

On October: 22, 1962, the informant volunteered to

our Los Angeles, California, Office that he believes he could

arrange to have ridel Castro assassinated. He explained

that some of his underworld acquaintances, such as layer Lansky,

in the pasi have had close connections/ in Cuba whoroby they

vere able to "buy" practically any Cuban official or to

accomplish almost anything they wanted to do in Cuba. He

believes some of these underworld figures still have channels

inside Cuba through which the assassination of Castro could be

successfully arranged.

no dinari a piracio:

TE COULD SEETEY CONEEDENTIT SOURCE

A4 49998

ic said thai, in the event the

United States Government is intcrested in having the attempt

made, he would raise the necessary money and would want nothing

•from the Goverment except ascurance that such an undertaking

would in no way adverscly affect the national security. He

expressed confidence in his ability to accomplish this mission

without any additional contact with Government representatives

with a minimum of contacts with private

109-539

MAY. " 1976

DOJ

2/10

22

DEPARTRENT OF JUSTICE

JAN ? 1963

KECORDS BRANCH

ATTORNEY GENERAL.

0

54653 Doord: 32425622

Page 11

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## Page 15

Book V,

p. 13

Intelligence files in mid-1963 documenting

series of meetings among major leaders

of anti-Castro movement.

Such a report

is attached. Attention to the cast of

characters: i.e., Artime, Maceo, Somoza,

Carlos Prio.

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M 105-1742

On APigust 23, 1903, ALFREDO BORJAS: Intelligence

Chief of tha Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionario (NRR)

anti-CASTRO organization of MAlUEL ARTINE, advised that the

MRR-ComandoS DE CARLOS BANDIN iS a dissidenE BIOUp. BORJAS

sald chis through his contacts in the laceer orgenimulon,

he lizd sacertained that only about five members of SANDIN's

organduacion Lended in Cuba at the time of the June 20,

1963 invictos 100x.

BORIAS sald the CRC presa releases seres publicity

stunt which backfired and destroyed any credibility and

helped to create.

II. FEE SOMOZA PLAN

Ois JUly 16, 1963, MIGUEL CARCIA, in Charge Of

public relacions for

the CRC, announced that LUIS SOMOZA,

former Presidenò of Nicaragua, had recently baen in

Washingler, D. C.; reportedly conferred with inited States

Goverrment oificials, and about ten days ago arrived in

Miami, Florida

GARCIA said that SOMOZA conducted & serles of

meetings, In which nearly all of the well-known Cubin

exile political and action group leaders autended. A:

these reecions, souozA claimed he had talked to a1l sho

Presidents of the Central American Republics, and there

Presiderts dre willing to help Cuban exiles in the form

of tradados conps, military equipment, and bases of

operation fron which to attack the present government: of

Cubia.

SOMOZA indicated that his meetings wich the

REG

5.

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## Page 17

M4 105-1742

Presidents of the several Central American Republi, - 3

and the leading figures among the Cuban exiles in ilan.:

New York and Hashington, were known to have the sanecion

of the Undted States Governnent. On july 16, 1903,

SOMOZA left Miani and returned to Micaragua.

On July 15, 1963, the "Hilani 'Neug" contained

on artiale staling that there is growing speculation in

Miani that Attorney General RODERI KENNEDY 18 quiC:l]

backing certain Cuban exiles, such as lANUEL ARCINE SUES:

and the so-called SOMOZA Plan. It 15 noced that rawer

ARTINE BUESA iS the head of the HiR, an auti CASTRO

organization.

On July 15, 1963, IN I-3, who has been active

1n Cuban revolucionary matters for

the past. Elva years,

advisad chut the beloa-listed persons are some of the

better-kaown Cuban exile leaders who met with SOMOZA during

his recent visit to the United States:

SANTIAGO ALVAREZ RODRIGUEZ, Conandos L

LAUREANO BATISTA TALLA, Movimiento Democrata

Cristiano (MC)

ANIONIO VECIANA, Alpha 66

SIXTO MESA, MRP

JOSE MORELL ROMERO, Cuban Committee of Liberation

CARLOS PRIO SOCARRAS, former President of Cuba

6:

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## Page 18

119 105-1742

MANUEL ARTIME, MRR

EUSEBIO MUJAL, labor leader

JOSE BOSCH, Cuban industrialist

On July 26, 1963, SANTIACO ALVAREZ RODRICUEZ

advised he had talked with LUIS SOrOm about four hours

while soloza was in liami during the middle of July, 1963.

ALVAREZ said shat it is his opinion sohole mes acting sa

-an intermediury between the United States Government aud

the Cuban exiles.

O3 August 20, 1963, ALVANIZ advised that nothing

has yet. developed concerning the SOMOZA plan; it is now

not clear what soroza is offering, or what the Uniced Scates

Government's position or actitude is in this master. ALReZ

said it 15 obvious SOMOZA cannot afford, either as a private

individul or a representative of the Nicaraguan Govarament,

to back such a military program by Cuban exiles, and will

have to have the backing and support of the UniteiStates

Government to go on with his plan.

On July 30, 1963, FERMIN PLEITES, member of tie

Executive Committee of the

MDC, advised that about a neck

ago, a Nicaraguan Army officer visited the lUC Headquerters,

and in the name of SOMOZA, offercd camps, milicary euuipment

and bases in Nicaragua. This individunl

also offered to

pay the expenses of moving the IDC operations to Nicartgua.

FLEITES explained that the MDC had taken no

positive action concerning this matter, and had adopted a

"wait and see" policy to ascertain what attitude the

Untied States Government would take concerning this matier.

MAY ÷ 1978

DOJ

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## Page 19

LIM 105-1742

On August 7, 1963, MARIO DEL CAMI, Executive

Secretary of Reacate Democratico Revolucionerio, advised

that when SoroZA was in the Uniced Srates during July

OE 1065, MANUEL ANTONIO DE VARORA, Head of the Recoate

Democrucico levolucionario (RDR), conferred with SOMOZA

In Hisal and lew York. At the inviiation of sonoza.

VAROM lef: for Nicaragua on August 1; 1963, to again confer

with Sowork, and is expected to return

leo Miami in abouc a

week.

On reptember 10, 1963, CAiL advised that

nothing

definite had been established as a resule of aro's

viali to Nicaragua, and that the future of the proposed

SOMOZA Plan is uncertain.

On August 13, 1963, LAUREANO BATISSA FALLA,

militory leader. of the iDe, adviced thas ke had revently

returred from Nicaragua, where he had conferred with

SOMOZA, who nade no connitments or indicated un definica

plan existed.

somoza showed great interest in the Cubon

problem, but offered no positive help or aid in the vay of

aIms or

training camps.

BATISTA FALLA Said that CARLOS PRIO SOCARRAS,

formar President of Cuba, was in Nicaragua at the same

time, conferred with sorozA, but did not receive any

offers of positive aid. BATISTA explained that PRIO

had just previoualy returned from the Dominicon Republic

(DR), and although PRIO and JUAN BOSCH, President of tke

DR, lad been friends for many years, PRIO was unable to

obtain any milicary bases in the DR.

On August 22, 1963, RUBEN DE LEON, former Cubai

Minister of Defense and Co-Ordinator of the anti-üStRO

8.

RECENED FROM

WHY 7 19:6

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## Page 20

MM 105-1742.

organization Armed Forces of Cuba In Brile, stated that

about a month ago, LUIS SOlOZA told BULLIO

NUNEZ PORTIONDO,

former Cabon delegote to the Unitcd Notions (Wl), tis

he (SOlOza) had talked to United States Attorney General (AG)

ROBERT KEINES! •

AG KENNEDY reportedly cal? It was nacessary for

SoMOZA to warl ous the Cuban probicin and to unite Cubaa

exiles. SOMOZA recommended that INNUEL ARTIME BUESA ba

designated as che leader of the Cuban exiles.

DE LEON advised that there was later a meeting in

Kiami at she hone of Nicaraguan Any Captain JOSE ALECREAT

between SOROZA and a number of Cuban exile leaders. At nis

meeting, coroza said there was

a possibility of Nienraguan

support for she Cuban exile anti-CASanO noveneat, bus

first

the exiles would have to accept ANTIlE as their leader.. There

was considerable opposition to this suggestion by the exile

leaders actending the meeting.

On September 12, 1963, PAULINO SIERRA FARTINEZ,

former astorney and textile mill operator la Cuba, edviced

he had recently visited Nicaragua and conferred with Luis

SOMOZA concerning help to Cuban exiles.

SIERRA said there are no training campa in

Nicaragus or Central America for Cuban exiles, and 411 the

proposed sid and backing has progressed no further suan lie

talking suage.

SIERRA

said it seems lo him that everyone

1s waiting for the United States Government to give die

"green light".

pOn September 12, 1963, MM T-3 advised that rearly

all toppolatedal, leaders among Cuban exiles have conferred

with SOHOL

MAY

and now agree that the SoMOzA Plan is too big for

? 1978

DOJ

9.

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## Page 21

MI1 105-1742

SOMOZA and the Central American Republics to put 1nt0

effect without Unlted States military and political

My T-3 said that the different Cuban military

and policieal loaders now feel that SOroZa has

obtained a positive commicment from the United Scates

Government, beenuse after two and a half moathe of

conferences, there are not any Cuban exile militory

troining compn in Central America, and

the SONO&A Plan

has not progroosed beyond the talking stige.

III. ORGANIZATIONS

Comandos L

MM T-J sivised chat Condodos l le one of the leading

anti-aSTRO organisations and action groups.

It is headed by

SANTIAGO ALTARIZ RODRIGUEZ, ANTONIO CUESSA ANd RAVION DONE.

The organizecion maintains no office as such, bus continues

to use Post Office Box 6ó, Riverside Station, Miani, Elosida,

to collect money donations.

On JUly 29, 1963, SANTIAGO ALVAREZ RODRIGUEZ

advised the organisation has had no milliary acuirity

since Msrch of 1953. The leadership is now building che

organization to inercase membership, establisa different

sections, such as a Women's Section, 3 Publletty Sectiong.

and committees to raise funds. The organization recently

put out a thirty-page booklet, setcing forch the aims aud

purposes of the organization, along with informacion

concerning previous military operations of the organization.

ALVAREZ adwitted his group has two boats in the

Miami River®

which will be used

in the future for military

RECEIVED FROM

10.

MAY Y 1975

DOJ

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## Page 22

Book V, p. 25

Helms directed Karamessinis and Angleton

to fully cooperate with the desk officer,

John Whitten, charged with investigating

the assassination.

On November 24,

Mexico City

cabled the names of known

contacts of Soviet personnel in Mexico

City and AMLASH's name (Rolando Cubela)

was

included on that list.

Nonetheless

neither Fitzgerald, Helms, Tom K or

Angleton advised the desk officer of

significance of this name.

1H 54653

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Book V, p. 25

p. 29

HH

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23

On November 23, 1963, the CIA

Headquarters asked the Mexico Station

to stop the planned arrest of Sylvia

Duran.

Karamessinis speculated that this

was because CIA feared Cuba responsible

for assassination.

Headquarters equally concerned with

Duran on November 27 and warned

Mexico City station chief that U.S.

Ambassador pushing Cuban theory too

hard.

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## Page 24

Book V, p..27

AMLASH's case officer omitted reference

to the poison pen in his November 25

contact report of his November 22 AMLASH

meeting on instruction from Fitzgerald.

HH

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## Page 25

Book V, p.

28

"D" tells his story in Mexico City on

November 25.

On November 26, Mexico

City cables details of "D" interroga-

tion to CIA Headquarters.

On December 1,

CIA Headquarters cables Mexico City that

the White House has been told that D's

story is a fabrication.

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Book V, p. 30

On December 1, 1963, CIA Headquarters

cabled Mexico City that a sensitive

source

) has advised

that a Cubana airlines flight to Havana

was delayed in Mexico City on November 22

co pick up a passenger who rode in the

cockpit without going through customs.

This cable was found in Mexico City

file with no CIA headquarters record

of follow-up being found.

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## Page 27

Book V, p. 35

In December, 1963, Sullivan prepared a

nemo for Hoover's aid in briefing the

President that stated that no evidence

had been developed which would indicate

Oswald's

assassination was inspired or

directed by Pro Castro organizations

or by any foreign country.

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## Page 28

Book V, p.

40-41

FBI Legat in Mexico City cabled

FBI Headquarters on November 24

that U.S. Ambassador felt Cubans

participated in assassination

effort.

"Bureau may desire to

give consideration to polling

all Cuban sources in US in

they so heade rene this

FBI Headquarter's

supervisor determined this was

not desirable and would only

promote rumors.

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## Page 29

Book V; P..58

The CIA investigation reflected a

Soviet orientation, with exhaustive

studies of Oswald's activities in

re Soviet Union.

There is no corres-

ponding CIA analysis of Oswald's con-

tacts with pro and anti Castro groups

in U.S.

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Book V, p. 61- In December, 1963, the CIA Learned

63

that

a Cuban American had crossed the border

from Texas into Mexico,

on November 23

and arrived in Mexico City on November 25.

He stayed in a hotel until the evening of

November 27, when he departed on a

regularly scheduled Cubana airlines flight

to Havana using a Cuban

courtesy visa and

an expired U.S. passport.

He was the only

passenger on the flight. In March, 1964

the Agency received a report from a

source which alleged that the same Cuban

American had received a permit to enter

Mexico City on November 20 in Tampa,

Florida.

The same source said the Cuban

American was somehow involved in the

assassination.

The Agency did not follow up on this

report other than to ask a Cuban

defector about his knowledge of the

Cuban American's activities.

The FBI

did investigate the reported unusual

travel but did not fully report the

results of their investigation to their

Warren Commission.

Their investigation

showed that this individual had lived

in Tampa and Key West and was pro-Castro.

He had

traveled to Cuba in May of 1962

and had a brother in the Cuban military

who was studying

in the Soviet Union.

On November 17, 1963, the Cuban American

was at a get-together at the home of

member of the Tampa chapter of the Fair

Play

for Cuba Committee.

This was

the

same

Fair Play for Cuba Committee that

Oswald had possibly contacted in May of

1963.

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Book V, p. 63-64

In March of 1964, the Warren

Commission requested from Director

Hoover information on certain pro-

Castro and anti-Castro organizations

which were active in the U.S.

including the Fair Play for Cuba

Committee, and Alpha 66, among

others.

The Bureau furnished less

than a full and satisfactory

response and did not disclose the

fact that the CIA had operational

interests in certain of the entities

inquired about.

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Book V, p.

65

The FBI reports on Alpha 66 furnished

the Warren

Commission noted the attack

on the Soviet vessel in March

of 1963

but did not detail that group's

continued activity

' in planning and

carrying out their military operations

against Cuba.

The FBI reports did not

show that Alpha 66 had been involved

with the New Orleans anti-Castro train-

ing camp.

74 54653

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Book V, p.

65

It is known that the CIA took an

interest in the Fair Play for Cuba

Committee with which Oswald was

associated.

According to Bureau

documents, the Agency advised the

Bureau that they were considering

the use of disinformation that might

embarass the Committee in areas where

the Committee had support.

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Book V, p.

72

In late July 1964, an FBI informant

reported that the CIA was meeting with

AMLASH for the purpose of assassinating

Castro.

Informant also reported that

AMLASH was unhappy with the CIA's efforts

and that Attorney General Kennedy had

refused to support the plan but that the

plan had not been completely put to rest..

information was not disseminated

outside the Bureau at the request of the

informant.

But the Bureau notations

indicate that the Bureau was looking

into an underworld plot against Castro

that might be coincidental with the

AMLASH plan.

The Bureau had first been

informed of AMLASH-CIA meetings in

October 1963. That information did not

indicate

assassination involvement.

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Book V, p. 74-75

The AMLASH operation was insecure

prior to the Fitzgerald meeting

with AMLASH, a meeting that

Fitzgerald was urged not to under-

take by several in the Agency.

HH

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Book

V, pp. 77-78

AMLASIE

Individuals outside the CIA had

been brought into thel operation,

and the Agency learned that one

of these individuals was in

clandestine contact with Cuban

intelligence (Cable

from

European station to CIA Head-

quarters, 3/18/65).

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