MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
Agency: KISS/SCOW
Originator: WH
Document date: 3/5/75
Document type: MEMORANDUM

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JFK Assassination System

Identification Form

Agency Information

Date:

8/27/201

AGENCY :

RECORD NUMBER:

RECORD SERIES:

AGENCY FILE NUMBER:

KISS/SCOW

178-10004-10295

SCOWCROFT MEMCONS

MARCH 5, 1975

Document Information

ORIGINATOR:

FROM:

TO :

TITLE:

WH

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE :

PAGES:

SUBJECTS:

03/05/1975

4

ASSASSINATIONS, FOREIGN LEADERS

COLBY, WILLIAM E.

FORD, GERALD R.

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

SCOWCROFT. BRENT

DOCUMENT TYPE: MEMORANDUM

CLASSIFICATION: Secret

RESTRICTIONS: IC

CURRENT STATUS: Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 08/12/1993

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS :

Memorandum of conversation, participants: Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft.

v9.1

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MEMORANDUM

SECRET /NODIS/XeDS

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

178-10004-10295

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

DATE & TIME:

PLACE:

The President

Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and

Assistant to the President for National Security

Affairs

It. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant

to the President for National Security Affairs

Wednesday - March 5, 1975

9:17 - 10:02 a.m.

The Oval Office

President: The Iranian deal played well.

Kissinger: It was so screwed up -- but it did appear well.

On the 40 Committee on Portugal. State thinks it is a mistake, on the

ground that the risk is out of proportion to gain. I don't see a hell of a

lot to gain by $500, 000. We could wind up with the worst possible

situation. Colby indicated he wouldn't spend it. What do you think,

Brent?

Scowcroft: The advantage is the press is Communist-controlled and the

press of the moderate party is asking for the money.

President: How can any one object to helping a democratic press?

Kissinger: That is what we did in Chile.

President: If it is defensible, why shouldn't we?

Kissinger: It will leak and hurt the parties.

President: That is a different case.

SEERET/NODIS/XEDS

Henry A. issingeir

EXAM: FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION

SCHEDI: CE PIECUTIVE ORDER 11652

EXACTOR CATEGORY 510 13

AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON DETE

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Kissinger: I would tell Colby to do what he can in the package without

spending the money.

President: Should I talk to Church?

Kissinger: I would tell him the dangers are that our intelligence will be

paralyzed; we have to protect sensitive data. Colby is now blackmailing

me on the assassination stories. Nixon and I asked Helms to look into

possibilities of a coup in Chile in 1970. Helms said it wouldn't work.

Then later the people who it was discussed with tried to kidnap Schneider

and killed him.

The OPEC summit came out interestingly. He said OPEC had to behave

responsibly and Algeria would agree to a price cut if its development

budget was protected. Our policy is working. They are no longer jumping

at the consumer-producer conference.

President: What is happening in IEA?

Kissinger: We are telling the British and Dutch we won't accept an invita-

tion to a preparatory conference until we get alternative sources nailed

down. I think the OPEC evolution is very encouraging.

President: Some of the smart people in Europe must see we are making

the producers need income.

Kissinger: That is right. One way would be raise the price. But to do

that, they would have to cut production. They can't agree on how to

allocate the cuts. If we were free with the Saudis, we could get at least

a deal not to cut production. That is why this discrimination campaign

of the Jews is outrageous.

Ethiopia: My recommendation is to send them $7 million and encourage

negotiations. Kenya has aksed for military assistance.

President: What do they want? What kind of attitude do they have to us?

Kie dingerinfavor it. They are friendly and they have some neighbors who

I am uneasy about the Israelis. They haven't asked for compensation for

the oil fields, but there has not been even a study group.

GECRET/NODIS/AGDS

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If necessary, I would like a letter from you saying you can't accept a

stalemate, and if we go to Geneva you will put forward a modification

of the Rogers Plan -- which means the 1967 borders. I think we just

can't go to Geneva as the lawyer for Israel.

President: The toughest position needed to get them to act is what I favor.

Kissinger: Asad has even indicated he would take a limited agreement and

would sign a peace treaty; he was willing to dump the PLO. Now he is

enlisting the PLO to stymie things. We can't bring Asad in -- even

though if I tried, he would be so obnoxious that it would go slower than

Egypt -- and then we could move it to Geneva after Egypt settled. But

that is too tricky.. I would rather tell him the truth privately -- that we

would make an effort as soon as an Egypt-Israel deal is finished.

President: That is my preference.

Kissinger: The big issue is will you take on Israel for another Syrian

move.

President: If we are honest with him and go through Geneva -- which

will fail -- then Asad would come to us.

Kissinger: I think Asad will want something before Geneva. The other

would be ideal.

President: Can't you tell him we will try to get something before Geneva?

Kissinger: Yes, but you have to know that would be bloody with the

Israelis.

If we could get five or ten kilometers on the Golan, we would

be in good shape. Israel will claim it destroys their defensive cabability.

It is important whether I can tell Asad we will make a major effort. We

will have to move into open opposition to the Israelis.

President: If you think that is the best way to get progress, I am for it.

Kissinger: We will be driven to a Syrian move, either before or after.

President: Suppose the Israelis say let's go to Geneva, the Soviet Union

does...

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Kissinger: We can go to Geneva. What happens will depend on Syria.

Sadat won't want Geneva. He will want to rest, and come here for a big

triumph. Israel will want to avoid a Syrian negotiation so Syria won't

want to.

So only Israel and the Soviet Union will want to go to Geneva.

President: Can't we commit ourselves to a good faith effort?

Kissinger: A good faith effort is bound to fail. It won't even get off the

ground.

Israel won't look at it.

President: A good faith effort to me is one where we put the screws on.

Kissinger: Okay. If I see an opening to get us

to Geneva -- maybe the

Soviet Union will carry the can to get everyone to Geneva -- that would

be fine.

I have given you the Schmidt letter.

SEGRE

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