MEMORANDUM FOR THE JCS - SOUTHEAST ASIA SITUATION REPORT
Originator: JCS
From: C. M. MOUNT, JR.
To: JCS
Document date: 12/23/1963
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

## Page 1

Date

Page

07/27/98

1

JEK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS

RECORD NUMBER

RECORDS SERIES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

202-10002-10162

: NARA RG 218 JCS

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : JCS

FROM : C. M. MOUNT, JR.

TO : JCS

TITLE : MEMORANDUM FOR THE JCS - SOUTHEAST ASIA SITUATION

REPORT

DATE : 12/23/63

PAGES : 59

SUBJECTS : SITUATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION : SECRET

RESTRICTIONS : 1B, 1C

CURRENT STATUS: RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 04/08/98

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : NARA RG 218 JCS. Memo from Mount, JI. to JCS re:

attached Southeast Asia Situation Report Number 52-63.

51-63, 50-63 and 49-63.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

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202-10082-10162

Declassification Review/Postponement Form

Originator: -

JCS

Date: _

Starting 26 DeC 63

Subject: _

southeast Aisq Reports December

Original Level of Classification:

Third Agency Equities:

DIA

Thel

C/A

NSA

Remarks:

Page # of Postponement

Doc # 134,

• рд

Reason for Postponement IAW Section 6 of JFK Act

6(11 10)

The Department of State has no objection to the

release or declassification of this document in full

under the provisions of the JFK Assassination Flecords

Collection Act of 1992 (PL102-526)

Reviewed on 7/21

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION ANDIOR

PLEASE OF THIS DO CURE PT

accor with DIA paS

postponmuits

dais

417198

No DID objection to declessitinties

and rilere silent to

1) socitizution at blue Tol

3) NSA pollen at follow Tab

3) CA ravion of all pages.

for latel 98

PLEASE PROTECT THE SORE YeLLOW

HIGHLIGHTED INFORMATION BY

POSTPONEMENT (1) (B) FOI

NSA, 25/21 Ape 98

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130

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE

JOINT STAFF

Washington 25, D. C.

26 December 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Southeast Asia Situation Report (U)

Attached hereto is the Southeast Asia Situation Report

Number 52-63 covering the period from 180800 to 250800 December

1963.

FOR THE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS:

B. Midd

M. MOUNT,

JR.

Colonel

Chief,

Pacific Diviston

Operations Directorate

GROUP 1

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC

DOWNGRADING &

DECLASSIFICALION

13818

SECRET

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED

NOT RELEA

SABLE

TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

OFFICIAL FILE COPY

JCS RGRA BR

Rib

20

940

Speo

to Foreign Nationals

40d

is it

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SECFET

demonstrates that the US Government will give protection to

the "so-called Malaysia" and that the US, with the approval

of the Indian Government, is Inviting danger to Southeast

Asia.

(2) On 24 December, a Communist-led youth demonstration

was conducted in the square across from the US Embassy to

protest the US 7th Fleet extension into the Indian Ocean.

(3) The Indonesian Navy and Air Force may replace their

Western trar spont and ASW aircraft with Soviet equipment.

Defense Minister General Nasution reportedly bought six

Soviet AN-12, 02b cransports during his recent trip to Moscow.

He allegeily also said when he was in Washington that the

Navy would repiace its ASW-configured Fairey Gannets with

Soviet Bloc ASW-aircraft. Indonesia is said to claim that

It can get out of the AN-12 contract if allowed to purchase

five more Lockheed C-130 s. This suggests that any deal

with the Soviets is tentative. The acquisition of AN-12 s

and ASW counterparts of Indonesia's 14 Gannets would require

additional Soviet technicians to provide local maintenance.

(4) The Indonesian Air Force (AURI) visualizes only a

limited role in the event of an open conflict with British

and Malaysian forces; operations would mainly consist of

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SECRET

air drop of troops, equipment, and supplies. Despite this

judgment, the Army has requested that the AURI be

prepared

to furnish air support to the ground troops in Borneo -- a

request which it is reported, has angered the AURI. Lacking

suitable airfields in Indonesian Borneo (Kalimantan) from

which to mount jet fighter escort missions, the AURI 1s

extremely reluctant to make unescorted IU-16/Badger strikes

against Malaysian Borneo targets.

c. Malaysia/New Zealand/Australia. The Malaysian Government

asked the New Zealand Government, on 19 December, for aid in

training Its Army and for assistance in Sarawak and Sabah, to

include special service units, AAA units and assist at airfields

New Zealand is prepared to allow its transport aircraft now at

Singapore, and perhaps others, to be used for ferrying to and

within Sarawak and Sabah, to commit a naval frigate and make

one battalion avallable if the situation In Borneo deteriorates.

However, the New Zealand Government, like the Australian, 1s

reluctant to commit forces directly in defense of Malaysian

Borneo. Both belleve that such involvement would reduce greatly

or destroy their political influence with Indonesia and perhaps

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SECREL

d. Cambodia

(1) Prince Sihanouk apparently has reached the stage

where he is preparing to cut all ties with the west, except

France, and to align Cambodia more closely with the Communist

Bloc. His recent directives reportedly are spreading con-

sternation, even among Cambodia's royal family. On 22 Decem-

ber, a wealthy Cambodian, Songsaka Kitchpanich, president of

the Banque de Phnom Penh, landed in South Vietnam and asked

for political asylum.

(2) On 22 December, the Cambodian Government announced

the signing of a civil air agreement with North Vietnam.

Both countries announced that an airline would link Phnom

Penh witn Hanoi.

d. Thalland. The Thais have already stated that any US action

to agree with the reconvening of the Geneva Conference to discus

Cambodian neutrality would be a critical phase in US/Thai rela-

tions and cause the Thais to re-evaluate their foreign policy

commitments.

e. Republic of Vietnam (RVN)

(1) As many as 29,000 Viet Cong (VC) may have entered the

Republic of Vietnam from North Vietnam in the last four years

according to a CINCPAC recapitulation. From 1960 through 1962

-SECRET

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confirmed Viet Cong infiltrators numbered 10,397. The 1963

figure is low but is expected to catch up with last year's

4,247, as more evidence comes in. CINCPAC estimates that

twice as many Viet Cong infiltrate as are eventually confirme

(2) MACV reports no change in VC capabi: *les in the past

week. In view of the Viet Cong "National Resistance

Day" holiday on 19 December and the annirsery of the forma-

tion of the National Liberation Front on 20 December, both

falling under favorable weather conditions for guerrilla

activities, an increase in Ve action can le expected in the

near futia:: I propaganda now centers air: id neutralism as

the soluti. or saving the country.

2. OPERATIONS

a. 1a05

(1) Patheü Lao forces, bolstered by No:.: Vietnamese,

that recaptured Lak Sao on 16 December, i::: also re-occupied

Khan Keut. The advance apparently was rere against negligibl

opposition from the Royal Lao (FAR) defenders.

(2) On 22 December, Communist artillery shelled the air-

field at Mong Kheung for the first time. The airfield was

being utilized by FAR forces to airlift the FAR 6th Infantry

Battalion to Muong Kheung to replace the 24th Infantry

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Battalion. The replacement was halted when half completed

because of the Communist shell fire.

b. Republic of Vietnam (RVN)

(1) A comparison of the Viet Cong and RINAF activities

for the period 11-16 December and the pietous period of 4-11

December follows:

4-11 Dec

11-18 Dec

Change

• Viet Cong

Incidents

Armed Atracks

Casualties

(KIA)

Defectione

Weapons lot

403

59

475.

(370)

23

138

402

66

348*

(277)

24

96

-127

(- 93)

1

-

42

RVN

Initiates actions

Bn or larger

Small Unit:

Contact

No contact

Toïal Actions

Casualties

(KIA)

51

135

4,420

4,606

396

89)

53

7

214

4.105

4,577

1907

20

21

-

15

- 29

(+ 1)

+115 :

Weapons Lost

115

230

* RVN and VC personnel and weapon losses ¿e for the period

10 - 16 December

SECRET

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(2) Viet Cong-initiated Incidents for the week of 11-18

December were at the same level as the previous week. How-

ever, activity in the important delta area declined. The

II Corps Tactical Zone had a 25 per cc.r :se in insurgency

incidents, with the coastal Binh Dinh rovince bearing the

brunt of the actions. VC attacks on strategic hamlets in

that province have increased sharply since the 9th RVN Army

Division denloyed to the delta area last September. The one

company-size autack during the week was the first large-scale

operation in December, as compared to 17 in November and a

1963 monthly a'urage of 12. In this assault of two strategic

hamleü: in Phaci Thanh Province on 14 December, the governmer

forces surfered ohe killed, 2 woundea, and 13 missing in acti

Also lost were 27 weapons and radios. No enemy casualties

were reported. There is no indication that the VC stepped ur

their efforts in connection with National Resistance Day on

19 December.

(3) Military control of two critical provinces has been

shifted to strengthen antiguerrilla operations in the delta

area as follows:

The 7th Division, III Corps, took over tire

Rien Hoa sector from the 9th Division, IV Corps on 16 Decembe

At the same time, the VC-Infested Long An Province was remove

-SECRET

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SECR

from the 7th Division control and made a special sector

under the Airborne Brigade which reports directly to the

III Corps Commander.

(4) Three US Army aircraft crashes during the week took

the lives of 10 US personnel. In IV CTZ on 12 December, a

CH-37 was hit by VC ground fire while evacuating a downed

OV-1. Although the pilot jettisoned the sling-loaded plane,

he sould not control the CH-37 and it plunged to the ground

burning on Impact. In another incident, three US personnel

were killed and one is missing and presumed dead as a result

of a U-lA crashing into the side of a mountain approximately

200 miles northeast of Saigon. On 14 December, a UH-1B

crashed into the sea about one-half mile off the shore of

the Binh Dinh Province. The co-pilot swam to shore but the

remaining crew members drowned. Causes of the latter two

accidents have not been determined.

(5) In order to meet requirements for additional artillery

In the delta area, certain 105-mm howitzer batteries have

been increased from 4 to 6 tubes each. Forty-two additional

105-mm howitzers were airlifted to South Vietnam by 22 December

to meet this requirement.

SECRET

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c. Indonesia

(1) Evidence continues to suggest siat Indonesia intends

to pursue its confrontation policy with Malaysia while

attempting to stay clear of overt military exchanges with

British forcos. However, serving to heighten the already

tense situation was the shooting down of a British aircraft

on 18 December. A British Auster liaison aircraft on a mail

drop missis in the Sarawak-Borneo border area was hit by

automatic weapons small arms fire and crash landed in Sarawak.

The pilot was injured and a passenger, an RAF chaplain, was

killed. On 13 äud 15 December, PAR helicopters were hit,

by smail arms fire.

(2) Indonesian Air Force I-130 aircraft have been observed

carrying out airdrop operations on the Kalimantan/Sarawak

border on 10 and 15 December. Paratroopers and supplies were

observed in the operation.

(3) Air raid warning drills are currently being conducted :

Surabaja. Attempts

are made to black-out the whole city. duri:

the drills. In addition, preparations for war are being made

such as deploying 57-mm AA guns around key areas and airfield:

SECRET

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d. Cambodia

(1) Prince Sihanouk has asked for the speedy withdrawal

of Us ald missions but nonetheless he nad expected that US

aid in the pipeline would arrive and is reported annoyed to

learn that it had heen diverted. All US MAAG personnel ana

dependents will depart Cambodia not later than 31 December

except for a small clean-up detail which will depart by

15 January 1964.

(2) The US mapping program In Cambodia has been declared

part of the US military and technical aid by a Cambodian

official and the official states that the mapping program

must be terminated.

e. Burma. The FY 64 training of Burmese military personnel

has been reduced from 118 to 22. The cancellation of projected

training reaches 90 per cent for Army, 93 per cent for Air Force

and 44 per cent for the Navy. The explanation of this reduction

1s given that personnel are required for a planned major offens1

against insurgents.

f. Pacific Area. On 21 December, a Soviet Intercontinental

Ballistic Missile (probably an SS-7) was fired into the 6,500

nautical mile Pacific Impact area. The missile was tracked by

Alaskan BMEWS and re-entry was observed by US facilities in

the

Impact area.

SECRET

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SECRER

•E. Republic of ClIna (GRC). Joint GRO-US Amphibious

Exercise BIG DIIPER ended with all units satisfied that their

training objectives had been accomplished. All units proved

that they are capable of conducting combined arms. exercises

involving air, naval gunfire, artillery, tanks and other ground

weapons in a team effort.

SECRET

13

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SOUTHEAST ASIA SITUATION

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

mmunis!

China

dy North Viet-Nam

Burma

Bon Houei S

Tha o

• Muong Sai

MRI

hooang

FORCES

FRIENDLY

FAR,

REGULARS

AUTO DEFENSE

KONG LE

KHAMOUANE

57, 000

• 25, 000

7, 000

1, 500

90, 500

PATHET LAO

NORTH VIETNAMESE

DISSIDENT NEUTRALISTS

8.500

84000

27,950

Hainan

MR I

eatiane

Savannakhe

Thailand

REPUBLIC

OF

VIE

FRIENDLY

ARMED

FORCES (RVNAF)

CIVIL GUARD (CG)

SELF DEFENSE CORPS (SDC)

JUNK FORCE

•NAM

215, 789

84, 788

103, 013

9, 200°

406, 790 l

LEGEND

А. 111

Pathet Lao/

No. Vietnamese Areas

Viet Cong Concentration

QUESTIONABLE CONTROL

MR WI

• Konti

Republic

і іл

Viet-Nam

•• FAR/Kong Le Military

Region Boundaries

26 DEC 63

50 5,00

CMR

4ENEMY

MAIN FORCE

LOCAL GUERRILLAS

(VIET CONG):

21,000 23,000

60,000 - 80,000

DIA-CHC

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

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130

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE

JOINT STAFF

Washington 25, D. C.

18 December 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Southeast Asia Situation Report (U)

Attached hereto is the Southeast Asia Situation Report

Number 51-63 covering the period from 110800 to 180800 December

1963.

FOR THE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS:

Chief

Operations Directorate

GROUP 1

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC

DOWNGRADING & DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

39/25

A/sa

ng Required

30 Nationals

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DISTRIBUTION

CJCS

Dir,

J-1

DIT,

J-3

Dir, J-4

Dir, J-5

D1I, J-6

SA/MAA

SA/P&B

SACSA

Secy, JSSC

DJS

Secy, JCS

CSA

CNO

CMC

CSAF

AFCIN

AFSMS

OSD

NIC

AF CP

DIA

WH Sit. Rm

M/ A to President

DIr, CIA

S/A Pres., NSAFF

The Attorney General

Ag. for Int.

Dev.

US Del.,

MSC UN

Dir, NSA

ANMCC

State FE Aff.

RR&:A

SECRET

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.....

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE

JOINT STAFF

Washington 25, D. C.

SOUTHEAST ASIA SITUATION

REPORT NUMBER 51-63

18 December 1963

I. INTELLIGENCE

a. Laos:

(1) Royal Lao Army (FAR) forces have taken Lak Sao, an.

Important road junction on Route 8, main Communist supply

line to central Laos from North Vietnam.-

(2) In the north, FAR, Neutralist and Meo leaders have

been planning a coordinated effort against Xing Khouang and

Tha Lin No1. Although this operation was planned for 8

December, there has been nothing to indicate the attack had

begun.

(3) The Pathet Lao have yet to manifest a strong reaction

to recent FAR successes. However, they are unlikely to

allow many positions of the caliber of Lak Sao and Xieng

Khouang to be lost without reacting.

b. Republic of Vietnam (RVN)

(I) COMUSMACV has added the 310th Battalion to his Viet

Cong (VC) order of battle, with a strength of 380 men thereby

raising the number of confirmed VC battalions in South Vietnam

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to 38. COMUSMACV has also accepted another group of 40 in-

filtrators from North Vietnam; this brings the confirmed 1963

Infiltration total to 954. This unit was formed last January,

worked its way south through Laos, and entered Quang Ngai

Province last May. Seven members fater formed part of a 57-mm

recoilless rifle platoon to provide fire support for rifle

elements of the 310th Battalion.

(2) DIA estimates that in spite of an increase in number of

RVN offensive operations, the government has been unable to

reduce the strength of the VC to any appreciable extent. :-

Available evidence indicates that while the VC have not made

spectacular gains, they have prevented the government from

gaining effective control over much of the countryside. It is

apparent that the VC are maximizing their present capabilities,

aided substantially by resources captured from the government.

It is further evident that the VC have sustained, and. In: some

instances, improved their combat capabilities despite RVN

advantages in firepower, armor, mobility, communication and

airborne operations. The VC have demonstrated extensive

capability to exploit the provisional government's preoccupa-

tion with 1ts political reorganization.

(3) The provisional government of the RVN replaced its

air force and marine brigade commanders recently in another

SECRET

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SECRE!

move to sack politically unreliable commanders and assign

potential troublemakers to desk jobs abroad. Colonel Nguyen

Cao Ky is the new commander of the Vietnamese Air Force and

succeeds Colonel Do Khac Mai who is the military attache

designated to Bonn. Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Ba Lien, the

former chief of staff and deputy commander of the marine

brigade, has stepped up to the top job as commander to replace

Colonel Le Nguyen Khang.

c. Indonesia:

(1) The US Air Attache in Djakarta states that the Indone-

sian Air Force neither confirms nor denies the press-reported

shootdown of British aircraft over Indonesian territory. UK

Government spokesmen have officially denied Indonesian claims

of four British aircraft shot down. The Air Attache in

Djakarta considers that, had the shootdown occurred, the

Indonesians would have publicized it extensively.

(2) Indonesia is reportedly planning to step up its efforts

against some 2,000-3,000 rebels on Celebes. The 17 infantry

battalions and one mountain artillery unit on the island have

been reinforced by eight mobile brigade police battalions;

security forces there now total about 18,000.

Rebel activity

in Celebes could interfere somewhat with the campaign against

Malaysia by tying down considerable Indonesian strength.

SECRET

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(3) Pro-Communists are to receive their first ministerial

posts in the cabinet

as Minister of Justice and Minister of

State; the latter is assigned to the cabinet presidium which

consists of three Vice Prime Ministers. This will be a blow

to the ant!-Communist army. President Sukarno, however, will

continue his longstanding practice of maintaining his dominant

position by playing the army and the Communist Party against

each other.

a. Malaysia:

(1) The British plan to augment their ground forces in

Malaysia by one battalion.

(2) London plans to recall a 70-man Special Air Services

Squadron from Malaysia in late December and replace it by a

similar unit from England. The marine commando battalion now

on Sarawak will be relieved by a Gurkha infantry battalion in

January; the commandos there now will return to Singapore.

The 8th Battalion, Royal Malay Regiment, will leave for the

Borneo territories within the next few weeks. This unit was

activated only last January but is well trained and fully

operational.

(3) The Australian Government is reluctant to send its

forces to Sabah and Sarawak since it believes that the current

situation does not warrant such a course of action and that

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SECRUI

good relations with the Indonesians are desirable. Relations

between Indonesia and Australia seem normal. Australian

aircraft regularly overfly Indonesia, and some troops land

at Djakarta while en route to the Butterworth base in Malaysia.

(4) British officials are deeply concerned over Indonesia's

potential to sponsor terrorism in Singapore and Malaya and the

inability of local police to cope with the threat. Singapore

authorities recently arrested the Malayan leader of a saboteur

group which had been trained in the nearby Indonesian Riau

Islands. He admitted that he was accompanied by seven others

and revealed the location of a cache of explosives near the

residence of the British High Commissioner in Singapore. The

bombing of an automobile in Singapore on 9 December was prob-

ably a "trial run" by Indonesian-sponsored saboteurs as yet

incapable of hitting a military target.

e. Cambodia:

Prince Sihanouk continues irrationally to isolate

Cambodia from its Free World contacts and to move closer toward

Communist China. At the same time, however, he is seeking

expanded aid Irom France and he continues to press for an

international conference to "guarantee" Cambodia's neutrality.

Both France and Communist China have responded only cautiously

to Sihanouk's appeals for aid although Peiping has promised

SECRET

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SECRET

all necessary help should Cambodia be "attacked." Meanwhile,

the Soviet Union has indicated its support of a new conference

but the principal Western powers are reluctant to agree hastily.

Thailand and the Republic of Vietnam continue adamantly to

oppose Sihnnouk's conference.

-SECRET

8

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2. OPERATIONS:

a. Republic of Vietnam (RVN):

(1) A comparison of the Viet Cong (VC) and RVNAF

activities for the period 4 - 11 December 1963 and the

previnus period of 27 November - 4 December 1963 follows:

27 Nov -

4 Dec

4 Dec -

11 Dec

Change

Viet Conk:

Incidents

Armed Attacks

Casualties:

(KIA)

Defections

Weapons Lost

RVN :

518

84

662

(533)

23

88

403

59

475*

(370)

23

138

-115

-25

-187

(-153)

+50

Initiated Actions:

Bn or Larger

Small Unit:

Contact

No Contact

63

51

-12

1+6

3,850

Total Actions

4,059

Casualties:

598

(KIA)

(135)

Weapons Lost

374

135

4,420

4,606

396*

(89)

115

-11

+570

+547

- 20c

(-46)

-259

*RVN and VC personnel and weapons lost are for period

3 - 9 December 1953.

(2) In Phuoc Tuy Province on 3-4 December, the VC

attacked and inflicted 80 per cent damage on a strategic

hamlet, in the face of government airstrikes. Five hundred

-SECRET

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hamlet residents were reported missing. In Binh Duong

Province, the VC entered several hamlets within a three

mile radius and kidnapped about 100 young men employed

on a nearby rubber plantation. According to COMUSMACV,

all but 20 had returned to their hamlets by 10 December.

Kidnappings were heavy throughout the country, accounting

for more than half the total incidents in each corps area.

(3) VC activity, however, continued to decline. There

were a total of 403 incidents reported, of which 59 were

attacks. All categories of incidents have returned to

normal pre-coup levels except terrorism which continues

to run at nearly twice the level established during the

summer and fall. There were no battalion or company-sized

attacks for this period, in fact, none so far this nonth.

(4) RVNAF ground operations employing forces of

battalion-size or larger decreased by 12, from 63 to 51.

This is four below the weekly average of 55 operations

per week for the preceding 12 weeks. Battalion days of

operation increased from 401 to 425, the third consecutive

week over 400.

(5) In summary, the continuing decline in the over-all

number of incidents was expected, although the unusually

high percentage of terrorism incidents to the total

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actor y

SECRET

(68 per cent) was not. The yearly over-all percentage

is 51. This is a period of re-supply, training and

preparation for a new campaign. A fresh surge of attacks

is anticipated by COMUSMACV on or about 19 December to

celebrate the founding of the National Liberation Front

for South Vietnam (NLFSVN). VC weapons losses of 138

compared with RVN weapons losses of 115 mark the first

time that VC losses have exceeded the RVN since initiation

of Phase II of the National Campaign Plan on 1 July of

this year.

(6) COMUSMACV reports that, effective on 16 December,

Kien Hoa Province was transferred to control of 7th

Division, III Corps from 9th Division, IV Corps. Addi-

tionally, Long An Province was removed from control of

7th Division and became a special sector reporting directly

to the Commander, III Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) .

b. Cambodia:

(1) As a result of Prince Sihanouk's outburst of

12 December, the Cambodian Government (RKG) has recalled

its ambassador to the US. The US, on 13 December, directed

Its ambassador to Cambodia to return to Washington for

consultation.

SECRET

11

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SECRET

42224

(2) The Cambodians terminated negotiations for the

• liquidation of US aid on 13 December and requested US AID,

MAAG and Information Services personnel to depart not

later than 15 January 1964 to prevent possible incidents

against Americans. The RKG will insure protection of

American personnel and facilities only until 15 January.

(3) In response to a RKG request, all Cambodian

military students attending MAP supported courses in

CONUS will be returned to Cambodia immediately.

c. Thailand:

Following the death of Prime Minister Sarit on

8 December, there has been an apparently orderly takeover

of the government by General Thanom KIttikachorn, formerly

the Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister. Rumors

of coups have abated because of the rapid moves by Thanom

to consolidate his position. The cabinet appointed by

Thanom is basically the same as Sarit's; however, major

changes have been made in military commanders. Thanom

assumed the position if Supreme Commander of the Armed

Forces and Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Thai Army.

General Praphat is the new Deputy Supreme Commander and

Deputy CINC of the Thai Army. Thanom's chief potential

political rival, General Chitti Nawisathern, was relegated

SECRET

12

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!

SECRIE

to the powerless position of Assistant Supreme Commander and

1s slated to be named to a cabinet position. The new govern-

ment remains pro-west oriented

and friendly to the US. No

changes in military policy are expected as a result of the

military command changes.

a. Indian Ocean Task Force:

Detailed revised guidance for scheduling a US Naval

Task Force to the Indian Ocean area has not yet been received

from State/Defense. As soon as received, CINCPAC will be re-

quested to resubmit a schedule for the first deployment. It

has been indicated unofficially that DESTATE guidance

will

have the initial deployment begin sometime after 1 March and

that it will include Naval Task Force support for a Pakistan/US

combined exercise to be conducted concurrently with a US/Iranian

exercise presently scheduled for the period 5 - 30 April.

e. Pacific Area:

On 11 December, the Soviets fired an ICBM 6,500 nautical

miles to the mid-Pacific Impact area. This is the first such

firing in the current series which they announced would con-

tinue until 25 January 1964. The limited telemetry detected

during the missile's flight suggests that the firing probably

was for troop training and limited research and development,

rather than for testing a new missile. This was the twentieth

ICBM fired to the Pacific area that has been observed.

- SECRET

13'

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SECRET

I. SEATO:

• Pote Sarasin resigned as Secretary General of SEATO on

13 December in order to assume new ministerial duties in the

Thailand cabinet.

For the present, SEATO Deputy Secretary

General Worth will assume Pote's SEATO duties. The Thailand

Government continues to hold the strong position that the next

Secretary General should again be a Thai, and Konthi Suphamongkhon.

present Thai SEATO Council representative, has been indicated

as Thailand's choice. The US Ambassador to Thailand comments:

"Although Konthi may not be ideal for the position, there is

no other Thai candidate at hand with appreciably better quali-

fications, and Konthi is believed to be much superior to

Ambassador Ingles, who was the Philippines contender for the

position of Secretary General the last time.

g. Operation HIGH TAIL:

The movement of 9 US Army Caribou aircraft from the

Republic of Vietnam to CONUS is proceeding on schedule. The

aircraft departed Moron, Spain, 18 December, for the Azores,

with crew rest scheduled for both the Azores and Argentia;

ETA at McGuire AFB is 21 December.

3. LOGISTICS

a. Republic. of China: OSD (ISA) has approved a plan to pro-

vide the GRC with a five year supply of World War II vehicle

SECRENT

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SECRES

repair parts from the MAP Depot at Tokorozawa. The GRC

Is the only country in PACOM requiring World War II vehicle

parts other than a token amount for Laos. Execution of the

plan will reduce the flow of gold to Japan by reducing

overhead and maintenance expense at the MAP depot.

b. Republic of Vietnam: The Air Force Logistics Command

(AFLC) has been authorized

to proceed with the Engine Over-

haul programs for Vietnam. In addition, AFLC has been

authorized to exchange 7 each R-1300-3 engines from available

USAF stocks and to exchange 0-470-11 and R-830-90 D service-

able engines if these engines are available in stock...

SECRET

15

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SOUTHEAST ASIA SITUATION

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

00md1017

Barmer

MR I

•Ban Houdi

Luang Probang

Chin

Foly North Viet-Nam

MR.

AOTIAN

FORCES

FRIENDLY

FAR,

REGULARS

AUTO DEFENSE

KONG LE

KHAMOUANE

57, 000

25,000

7,000

1,500

90, 500

RATHET LAO,

, 500

NORTH VIETNAMESE

50. 500

DISSIDENT NEUTRALISTS V

Hainan

MR I

¡entiane

Savannakhet

Thailand

REPUBLIC

OF

VIET-NAM

FRIENDLY

ARMED FORCES (RVNAF)

CIVIL GUARD (CG)

SELF DEFENSE CORPS (SDC)

JUNK

FORCE

215, 789

84, 788

103,013

3-200

406, 790 1

LEGEND

Pathet Lao/

No. Vietnamese Areas

Viet Cong Concentration

QUESTIONABLE CONTROL

•.• FAR/Kong Le Military.

Rogion Boundaries

50

100

18 DEC 63

MR Ill eTche

Republic

(1

iẹt Nam

xXX

CMR

***•

4 ENEMY.

(VIET CONG):

MAIN FORCE

21, 000/- 23,000

LOCAL GUERRILLAS 60, 000

= 80, đ 0

DIA-CHIC,

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

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30

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SECRET

130

THE JOINT CHEFS OF STAFF

OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE

JOINT STAFF

Washington 25, D. C.

11 December 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Southeast Asia Situation Report (U)

Attached hereto is the Southeast Asia Situation Report

Number 50-63 covering the period from 040800 to 110800 December

, 1963.

FOR THE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS:

11904

Operations Direcucrate

GROUP 1

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC

DOWNGRADING & DECLASSIFICATION

37/List

y39/List

SECRET

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONAIS

son Nateling Required

Not Reloasabie

to Foreign Nationals

DocId: 32425040

Page

31

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## Page 32

DISTUBUTICE

Dir,

J-1

Dir:

4-3

j-4

Dir, J-5

Dir,

J-6

SA/MAA

SA/P&D

SACSA

Secy:

JSSC

DJS

Secy,

JCS

CCA

CNO

CMC

CSAF

AFCIN

AFSMS

OSD

NIC

AFCP

DIA

WH Sit. Rin

M/A to President

Dir,

CIA

S/A

Fres.,

NSAFF

To Attorney GeneraJ.

Ag. ior Inc.

DEV.

US Del., MSC UN

Dir, MSA

ANMCC

State FE Aif.

P.R&i4

SECREC

….....сскй-

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SECRET

wariness.

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE

JOINT STAFF

Washington 25, D. C.

SOUTHEAST ASIA SITUATION

REPORT NUMBER 50-63

11 Decenuer 1963

1. INTELLIGENCE

3. Republic of Vietnam (RVN):

(1) Since the initial intense outburst follcwing the 1

November coup, over-all Viet Cong (VC) activity has cold lnued

Its slow decline. It did, however, remain at a relatively

righ level during the perlod 28 November through 5 Decenter

when corpared to pre-coup activity levels. There were 518

enen, Iritiated incidents reported, of which only &it were

armed atracks, the lowest number since rif-October. Mi other

categories of Vi actions declined except that propagardà

incidents continued at a relatively high rate, inccat.

perhaps a possible change of VC emphasis on the type of

sutivity to be conducted. The decline of Conmunist artivity

In recent weeks is reflected principally in the arano decrease

in the number of armed attacks and ute of sabutage. Terror-

1sm - assassination, kidnappinge, an harassirg fire - although

decilning, ramained at a relatively high level. Most or the .

Communist activity continues to be centered in the neita

region. There was a sharp drop of VC activities in 3à Corps

3

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3A504

cassis

12016

SECRET

Tactical Zone (CIz) and a slight decline In 2d CTZ. The lst

CT remained at the same level as the previous week.

• (2) Maj. Gen. Tran Van Don, Minister of Defense, saili the

recently planned change in corps commanders was not impe-

mented because the generals did not want to give the impression

of yielding to pressure from Buddhists and students who want

Maj. Gen. Do Cao Tri replaced as Commander of Ist Corps.

(3) Elements of the Government's 7th Division on 3 I ember

captured a 75-mm recoilless rifle in Dinh Tuong Province,

south of saigon. CONUSMACY J-2 technical Intelligence says

the weapon is of Chinese

Communist origin. The first ve

weapon of this type was captured in the same general are:

about a month ago.

(4) COMUSMACV's acceptance of the reported infiltration in

july of 130 men into the RVN from North Vietnam via Laus and

Cambodia, brings the 1963 total of confirmed infiltrators to

914. .

The July entrants were reportedly to form the nuclets

of a main force battalion in Phuoc Iuy Province. COMUSMACV

also says that although 984 more reported Infiltrators cannot

be confirmed in Vietnam, he strongly suspects many of them

are there.

(5) At least 400 "corrupt" Vietnamese officers, Including

many with good combat records, are to be purged from the

SECRET

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SECRET

military rolls. This represents approximately 2.4 per cent

of the total 16,443 officers. Some of the alleged wrong-

doings include falsification of official records and embezzle-

ment of pay.

(6) The Vietnamese Government apparently wants to exploit

the experience of the Philippines in Its successful fight

against the Conmunist Hukbalahap. Maj. Geng. Duong Van Minh,

Chief of State, and Tran Van Don, in talks with Philippine

Ambassador Farolan In Saigon on 30 November, discussed sending

a high-level Vietnamese delegation to Manila to ask the

Philippines to help out in the Vietnamese counterinsurgency

effort. The two generals hope that a group of Filipino

officers experienced in tactics and techniques will be sent

to Vietnam. Ambassador Farolan has recommended favorable con-

sideration to his government.

b. Indonesia/Malaysia:

(1) An Indonesian TU-16/Badger jet medium bomber circled

over Kuching on 6 December and another "buzzed" Tawau on the

7th, according to the Us Army Attache In Singapore. These

flights are probably for reconnaissance; TU-15s have pre-

viously been noted in this role. Reported crossings of the

Sarawak border by Indonesian helicopters on 8 and 9 December

may also have been to reconnoiter troop dispositions of

Sarawak security forces. British and Malaysian forces are

not known to have reacted to any of the flights.

AT TRET

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SECRET

•29464.

200C

(2) British fordes in Singabore are being augnanted by

she deployment of one squadron of eight VICTOR jet median

bombers, one of which is photo reconnaissance equipped, from

the RAF V-bomber force. The temporary transfer of these

bombers, which can carry nuclear bombs or air-to-surface

missiles but can also be employed in a conventional role, 1s

delieved to be a contingency measure against a possibie show-

down with Indonesia as well as a psychological deterreni.

British Canberra bombers already based in this area camot

reach all targets on Java and are limited to low-jevej. attacks.

(3) Some senior staff officers of the British Far Bast

Command are becoming more convinced. that a major militory

action with Indonesia i1s likely despite Djakarta's arparent

intentions to avoid open conflict. Indonesia is cortinuing

to build up its forces on Borneo and its violations ri Sarawak's

airspace could provoke an incident and British retaliation.

The British Far East Air Force's upgrading of strike plins and

targeting materials is emphasizing aircraft and airfields.

(4) The Malaysian Government has turned down Fresident

Sukarno's proposal for a second UN survey of the Bordeo terri-

tories in the belief that it 1s not a sincere attenot at re-

conciliation and would not affect Indonesia's comrontation

policy.

TINI

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SECRET

15! Chinest Communist Vice Premier Marshal Ho Lung, as

personal represehtative of chief of State Liu Shao-chi,

reportedly informed President Sukarno of the Chinese Govern-

ment's 100 per cent support of Indonesia's opposition to

Malaysia. He is said to have promised that Pelping would

provide Indonesia all moral or material assistance "within its

power." Ho Lung had several personal contacts with sukarno

while In Djakarta as head of the Chinese delegation to he

GANEFO games. Such assurances, while providing a psycholog-

•ical boost to Sukarno, must be viewed in the light of the

rasic Indonesian anti-Chirese bias as well

as Pelping's ability

ro provide material assistance.

c. Laos:

(1) hoyal Lao Army (FAR) and Neutralist, units have taken

Khan Keut, a Cormunist-held position alung Route 8. Lah Sao,

adjacent to the junction of Route 8 also held by the Communists,

has reportedly also fallen. The Pathet Lao (PL) have thus far

evidenced little strong reaction to the friendly thrust. A

coordinated FAR, Neutralist, Meo drive In the Xieng Khouang

area has been planned but there has been no evidence of its

implementation. The PL are unlikely to remain passive l'or 600

ling in the face of friendly gains, particularly of the caliber

of Xieng Khouang and Lak Sao.

sport

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SECRET

(2) The assassination of Col. Leuang on 5 December has had

an impact oh Neutralists and has given rise to accusations

and increased tehsion both among Neutralist ranks and between

Neutralists and the rightist element. No one group has been

Iinked to the death. Leuang was widely disliked and dis-

trusted because of his involvement with various interests.

(3) A Laotian official has reported a Chinese Communist

proposal for a commercial air link between Communist China

and Laos. The route would be via Nanning, Hano1, Xleng

Khouang, Vientiane and return. The 2 December proposal re-

quested a Laotian delegation to Pelping and reportedly pointed

out that the air link would "strengthen friendly relations

between the two countries." The Laotian response to the pro-

posal is unknown.

d. Thailand:

(1) The sucoession problem following the death of Field

Marshal Sarit on 8 December has thus far been handled very

smoothly and Bangkok remains quiet. General Thanom KItt1-

kachorn, first Deputy Premier and Defense Minister, has been

named Premier and has stated he will name a new Cabinet this

week. Major changes are not anticipated and General Praphat

and Air Chief Marshal Dawee will very likely retain key posi-

tions. Deputy Army Commander Chitti will probably be named

SECRET

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SECRET

Army Commander while Thanom will probably retain the Defense

Ministry himself. There will be no shift in the Government's

strong pro-West orientation.

(2) Possible diffibulty may arise from the fact that

Thanom, Praphat and Dawee hold no direct command of troops.

General Krit Sivara, however, who has frequently been mentioned

in coup plots, presently commands the key Bangkok lst Army

Area. Krit, as well as Army Commander Chitti, will have to

ve considered carefully in the new governmental organization.

50T:

r90ter

422221

44492)

SECRET

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2. OPERATIONS

a. Republic of Vietnam (RVN):

(1) A comparison of the Viet Cong (VC) and RVNAF activities

for the period 27 November - 4 December and the previous

perica ot 20 - 27 November follows:

20-27 Nov 27 Nov - 4 Dec

Change

Viet Cong:

incidrits

anded attacks

Casualties

(KIA)

Derecti0:15

weapons Lost

666

106

929*

(746)

64

85*

518

84

662**

(533)

88**

-148

- 22

-267

(-213)

+3

RVN:

Initiated Actions:

Bn or Larger

62

63

+1

Small Unit:

Contact

No Contact

137

146

+9

3502

3850

+348

Total Actions

3701

4059

+358

Casualties

696*

598

- 98

(KIA)

(156)

(135)

(÷21)

Weapons Lost

312*

374**

$62

* Casualties and weapon losses are for period 19-25 November.

** Casualties

and weapon losses are for period 26. November -

2 December.

(2) Government forces conducted a total of 63 battalion-

size or larger operations during the reporting period and

a total of 3,996 small-scale operations. This represents

SECRET

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SUCKE.

an increase over last week. The number of small units

actions irring contact with the VC rose slightly from last

week (from 137 to 146).

(3) There were two company-size and one battalion-size

attacks by the VC reported during the pasi week. this

brings the number of VC large-scale attacks for November

to 14 (3 battalion and 11 company) which is only slightly

above the 1963 monthly average of 12. According to

COMUSMACV, VC large-scale attacks mounted towards the

end of November were generally more effective from the

communist point of : view than those conducted immediately

following the coup. Of particular significance, was.

the VC departure from their normal practice of breaking

off their attacks at sunrise and when confronted with

equal or superior forces. Recently there were two good

examples of this. In the 30 November battalion-size

attack against the Bau Co Civil Guard post in Tay Ninh

Province, the VC did not break off the attack when

Illuminated by air-dropped flares or after daylight.

VE willingness to stand and fight under unfavorable

conditions was also apparent on the 24 November attack

against the Hiep Hoa Special Forces training camp in

Hau Nghia Province. In recent weeks, there has been a

slight but noticeable increase of a tendency

• by the

VC to conduct attacks during daylight hours.

SECRET

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SECRET

(4) The weapon loss tatio contirues to show a wide 2'..

dispariu; and continues to favor the VC. In this past week,

the VC lost 89 weapons to goverhment forces, while the

latter lost 374 weapons. Thus far this year, ervernment

forces have a net loss of nearly 2,400 weapons, roighly

enoligh to equip six VC main force battalions. This illus-

tri: ive comparimon is based on a 4CC-man VC bettalion and

on a one-veapon per man basis.

(5) The US bir Attache in Saigon reports that Col Ky May

is scheduled to replace Col Mai as commander of the Viet-

namese Air Force (VNAF). The change of command reportedly

will take place 16 December with Col Mai being giver the

military attache post in Germany. The reasons given the

attache for the change are Mai's lack of operational ex-

verience and his former association with the Car Lao party.

This former VNAF political group was identifiec with the

Diem regime and it has now been abolished.

b. Laos/Thailand:

CINCPAC has directed Chief JUSMAG, Thailand, 1:1

coordination with the US Embassy Bangkok, to deternine

if the thais would be agreeable to the release of w

I-28s to Laos in order to replace the two lest there since

september, with the understanding that these two, and the

original six provided Laos last summer, will be replaced

in Tune 1964.

SECRET

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F.

c. Cambodia:

The US Army Attache Phnom Penh reported that on

6 December, a two-seater MIG 15 with Cambodian Insignia

completed it that rights the elight was or anout ten

minutes duration and the attache believes the pilot was

a Russian.

d. PACOM Strategic Mobility Exercise and Exercise QUICK

RELEASE:

Tentative plans for the conduct during March 1264,

uf a FY 64 strategic mobility exercise to Korea have been

cunselled. Rescheduling will be considered at the joint/

combined exercise scheduling conference to be held 21-24

January 1964. In the interim, CINCPAC has deen directed

to recommend a date for exercise QUICK RELEASE, the object

of which will be to test the concept of the "forward Floating

Depo'". i brigade task force airlifted from Hawaii to

Okinawa, and utilizing equipment prestocked in three com-

mercial type ships now

stationed at Subic Bay, will parti-

cipate in a three day field training exercise on Urina.

Jpon termination of the exercise, the three ships will

relod and return to the Philippines.

The brigade vill

return to Hawaii by air.

SECRER

13

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SOUTHEAST ASIA SITUATION

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

ommunist

China

Phone Saly North Viet-Nam

Burma

• Moong Sai

MR I

¿Bon Horei

Probon

MR I

Khooong

IAN

FORCES

FRIENDLY

FAR,

REGULARS

AUTO DEFENSE

KONG LE

KHAMOUANE

57,000

25,000

7, 000

1, 500

90, 500

PATHET LAO

NORTH VIETNAMESE

DISSIDENT NEUTRALIS

19, 500

8, 000

450

27,950

Hainan

MR Y

lentione

Thailand sanathe

REPUBLIC

OF

VIET-NAM

FRIENDLY

ARMED FORCES (RVNAF)

•CIVIL GUARD (CG)

SELF DEFENSE CORPS (SDC)

JUNK FORCE

215, 789

84,788

103, 013

9,200

406, 790 l

LEGEND

It 1

Potber Lao/

No.Vietnamese Areas

Viet Cong Concentration

QUESTIONABLE CONTROL

...

FAR/Kong Le Military

Rogion Boundaries

11 DEC 1963

MR II redd

vone

MAR N'

• Kont

ệt- Nam

XXX

50

100

MiLAr

VENEMY:

(VIET CONG)

MAIN FORCE

21:000

LE LOCAL GUERRILLAS

60,000

- 23, 000

80, 000/

DIA-CIC

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

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SECRET

134

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE

Washington 25, D. c.

4 December 1963

2906524;

-192

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Southeast Asia Situation Report (U)

Attached hereto is the Southeast Asia Situation Report

Number 49-63 covering the period from 270800 November to

040800 December 1963.

FOR THE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS:

auntin

C. M. MOUNT,

Colonel, USAT

chief,

Division

Operations Directorate

•39/

GROUP 1

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC

DOWNGRADING & DECLASSIFICATION

•SECRET

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

Special Handling Required

Not Releasable

to Foreign Nationals

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•"*+

"SECRET

DISTRIBUTION

careers;

CJCS

Dir,

J-1

DiT,

DIr,

J-3

J-4

Dir:

3-5

Dir, J-6

SA MAA

SA/P&B

SACSA

Secy, JSSC

DJ S

Secy, JCS

CSA

CNO

CMC

CSAF

AFCIN

AFSMS

OSD

NIC

AFCP

DIA

WH Sit. Rm

M/A to President

Dir, CIA

S/A Pres., NSAFF

The Attorney General

Ag. for Int.

DEV.

US Del., MSC UN

Dir,

NSA

ANMCC

State FE Aif.

RR&:A

ЗECRS0

2

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46

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-.

SECRET

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE

JOINT STAFF

Washington 25, D. C.

-

SOUTHEAST ASIA SITUATION

REPORT NUMBER 49-63

4 December 1963

1. INTELLIGENCE

a. Laos:

(1) To date, there has been little Communist military re-

action to strong Royal Lao Army (FAR) and Neutralist thrusts

in the Vang Vieng and Kham Keut areas. The Neutralists have

secured Vang Vieng town and its airfield and reportedly

control Route 13 north to Ban Pha Tang and south to the Nam

Lik river. The opening of Route 13 and Neutralist control of

Vang Vieng airfield should make logistic support of forces in

that area easier.

(2) FAR and Neutralist troops took Kham Keut, near Route 8

in central Laos on 27 November. The friendly forces have

halted their advance halfway to Lak Sao, a vital Pathet Lao

(PL) position astride Route 8 which is one of the PL main

supply routes into central Laos. FAR forces, consisting of a

paratroop battalion plus guerrilla units, have reinforced the

initial assault group. General Amkha, Chief of the Special

Military Cabinet in Vientiane has requested fuzes for 100-1b

-SECRET

3

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4353

SECRET

bombs for use against a Pathet Lao 37-mm gun position at

Lak Sao. Prime Minister Souvanna and Ambassador Unger con-

curred in not releasing the fuzes on the ground that the PL

provocation here is remote and that bombs should be used only

in case of Viet Minh attack, heavy PL action In the Plaine

des Jarres or the like.

b. Republic of Vietnam (RVN) :

(1) Communist military activity in the RVN slackened dur-

ing the week ending 3 December but there has been no real

lessening of the intensity of the war. On 28 November, a

Viet Cong (VC) company attacked a US Special Forces Center at

Chau Lang, An Giang Province, in southwestern Vietnam. On

30 November, an estimated VC battalion attacked a fortified

hamlet at Bau Co, Tay Ninh Province, which is largely. In-

habited by the Cao Dai quasi-religious armed sect.

(2) COMUSMACV has commented on the possible emergence of

a more active VC campaign against US personnel. Propaganda

leaflets now being distributed throughout the RN stress the

anti-American theme. COMUSMACV expects the VC to expand this

campaign with attacks against Special Forces installations,

sabotage, and acts of terrorism to include assassinations.

It is probable that the seven American military prisoners now

in the hands of the VC will be displayed in an attempt to

lower American prestige.

-SECRET

4

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SECRET

../.... -

-Note:der:

(3) COMUSMACV has received additional evidence of Communist

Bloc support to the VC. Vietnamese forces captured two VC

50-callber antiaircraft machine guns, one AA speed sight, two

mounts, and one hand-held lead and range estimation device.

The machine guns were US but the other equipment was similar

to that of soviet manufacture and used by the Chinese Communist

Army. The use of the 50-callber machine guns with the other

equipment provides an effective weapons system against low-

flying aircraft and helicopters.

(4) A Vietnamese military delegation, headed by Major

Generals Minh, Chief of State, and Tran Van Don, Minister of

Defense, plans to visit Bangkok on 9-12 December for talks

with the Thailand military.

c. Cambodia:

(1) Prince Sihanouk is already hinting that certain types

of aid should continue and that perhaps some "new formula"

could be found for a resumption of US assistance. He appeared

to be thinking of a plan under which there would be no large

US missions in Cambodia.

(2) Also, In the

opening session of talks to implement the

termination of US aid, the chief Cambodian negotiator took

the somewhat startling position that his government did not

want the immediate termination of aid but merely to negotiate

the subject. He further argued that Cambodia was entitled to

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have certain important aid projects completed. The US

Ambassador comments that a major Cambodian tactic - apparently

dictated by sihanouk - will be to obtain a continuation of

some aid projects without appearing to ask for such a con-

tinuation.

(3) Meanwhile, both France and the Bloc appear to be drag-

ging their feet on the question of providing new aid to Cam-

bodia while Sihanouk appears to be increasingly frantic in

his efforts to convene a new international conference to

"guarantee" Cambodia's borders.

(4) The US AIr Attache Saigon reports that three Russian

MIG aircraft have been uncrated at Phnom Penh. One of the

aircrait has been run up and reportedly will be flown on

5 December.

d. Indonesia/Malaysia:

(1) Decisions made at a 23 November Malaysian Defense

Council meeting Included the appointment of British Major

General Walker as Director of Operations In Sarawak and

Sabah, the transfer of operations headquarters from Brunei

to. Labuan, and the retention of the intelligence center at

Kuching, Sarawak. Additionally, the Malaysian defense commit-

ment in Sarawak and Sabah will be increased to three battalions

by 15 February 1964, which will then total three infantry

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battalions, two reconnaissance squadrons, and 1-1/2 engineer

squadrons. As Director of Operations, General Walker will

command all Commonwealth and Malaysian armed forces and police

in operations against the guerrillas.

(2) In western Borneo, four P-51s and three B-25s at

Pontianak were observed on 21 November being armed with rockets

and 100-1b bombs, respectively. The P-5ls had four rockets

under each wing; each B-25 had eight rockets under each wing,

a .50 callber machine gun in the tall, twin .50 callber

machine guns and a 20-mm cannon in the nose, and twin .50

caliber machine guns on each side. Also on 21 November, 400-

500 paratroopers were observed in trucks proceeding north

from Pontianak; their destination was said to be north of

Sambas, near the Sarawak border.

(3) The first reported Infiltration of Sarawak by sea was

revealed in the interrogation of six Indonesians who were

captured by Sarawak security forces on 27 November. These

were members of an original group of 14 Indonesians and three

Chinese who had landed at three points presumably along the

west coast of Sarawak to give local sympathizers weapons

training and then return overland to Indonesian Borneo. Appre-

hension of the six at Simanggang who had completed their

mission resulted in the arrest of 9 locals in western Sarawak.

SEGRET

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6010)

SECRET

According to Britishlintelligence sources, there 1s greatly

Increased Indonesian patrol activity along the eastern and

western Sarawak border areas; the number and scope of incur-

sions is therefore expected to increase, particularly on the

8 December anniversary of the abortive Brunel rebellion.

(4) There is continuing evidence that saboteur agents are

being trained in the Riau Islands for infiltration into

Singapore and Malaya to carry out subversive as well as

sabotage activities.

(5) Foreign Minister Subandrio recently told the Australian]

Ambassador in Djakarta that Indonesia could not accept Malay-

sia "as a fact of life" even if it took three or more years

to prove it. He further stated that he recognized the danger

of military incidents and realized that, If 1t came to war

with the British, Indonesia would lose. In his view, however,

this would end British influence in Southeast Asia, which was

Indonesia's ultimate objective.

(6) President Sukarno's trip to Manila appears to be in-

definitely postponed, due to a sudden decision by President

Macapagal to visit Africa, but may still occur during this

month.

A recent unofficial report states that Armed Forces

Chief General Nasution will go to Manila soon for talks with

Macapagal.

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SECREY

e. Burma:

Removal of Brigadier Clift, head of the Burmese Air

Force, on 27 November, completes the "cleaning" of the three

top defense posts by Ne Win. The closing of a part of Rangoon

University and the release of a number of anti-Fascist Peoples

League leaders point up Ne Win's determination to weaken and

eliminate Communist opposition.

2. OPERATIONS

a. Republic of Vietnam (RVN):

(1) A comparison of the Viet Cong (VC) and RVNAF activities

for the period 20-27 November and the previous period of 13-20

November follows:

Viet Cong:

Incidents

Armed Attacks

Casualties

(KIA)

Defections

POWS

Weapons Lost

RVN:

13-20 Nov

795

149

639*

( 458)

124*

20-27 Nov

666

85**

Change

-129

- 43

+200

+288

+33

12

= 39

Initiated Actions:

Bn or Larger

Small Unit:

Contact

No Contacts

Total Actions

SECRET

48

166

3,504

3,718

9

62

137

3,502

3,701

+ 14

- 29

= 2

= 17

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DESTEP

.. ...

Casuaities

(KIA)

Weapons 1096

13-20 Nov

641*

(163)

407*

20-27 Nov

Chance

696**

+55

(155)

312**

= 95

Casualsies and reapon losses are for period 12-15 November.

** Casualties and neapon losses are for perioä 19-25 November.

(2) IC activity declined still further from the level of

the week following the coup, however It is still at a high

level comparea with weekly activity during the previou ten

months of the year. While VC Initiated attacks declined in

number, they increased in Intensity. This trend 1s reflected

by an overwheining attack on the Hiep Hoa Special Forces camp

in the III üorps area and the damage inflicted to 20 aircraft

In one day in the IV Corps area. In addition to RVN losses,

these incidents resulted in two US personnel KIA and four us

personnel captured. Hurther evidence of this intensification

of activity is indicated by the sharp rise in VC casualties.

(3) RVNAF ground operations employing forces of three rifle

company equivalent or larger rose to 62. This is well above

the weekly average of 53 for the preceding 12 week period.

Battalion days of aperation rose irom 356 to 429. As ci

26 November, 64 of the 130 Infartry battalions were conduct-

ing or supporting offensive operations; 35 other battalions

were avaliavie for cuerations on a limited basis, and the re-

maining 31 were engaged in training, security and other

activities.

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SPORE

(4) The 330 Spectal Zone (Lam Dong, Binh thudn and Binh

Tuy Provinces) has been redesignated Binn Lam Spocial Zene.

The Capital Military District is reported as a separate

military command under III Corps. Reports are rendered to,

and orders enanate from the III Corps Tactical Zone Commander.

(5) VNN activity decreased slightly this week. River force

employment showed the most significant decline as fewer boats

were called upon to provide combat support.

(6) The planned reduction in the US military strength in

the RVN ky 1,000 started on schedule 3 December when the first

increments of 300 departea Saigor. The remaining 700 will

have departed Saigon by the end of December. Appropriate

press releases have stressed that the reduction at this time

Is a vote of confidence in the GVN and an indication of the

progress accomplished in the training of Vietnamese military

personnel. The returnees consist mainly of personnel who have

worked themselves out of a job.

b. Japan:

CINCPAc's request for a 90 day extension of the TAC

F-100 squadron on rotation at Itazuke, Japan, has been approvea.

This squadron is covering certain SIOP targets for the 8th

Tactical Fighter Wing which is undergoing conversion to F-105s.

The F-100 squadron is now scheduled to return to CONUS in

March 1964.

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in in it

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c. Soviet Missile Firing:

(1) The Soviets have announced that missile firings into

two areas of the Pacific will be conducted between 2 December

1963 and 25 January 1964. The two areas are generally the

same as those arnounced for previous missile firings. The

southern area is south of Johnson Island, 6,500 nautical miles

from the lyuratan range head, and the northern area is east

of Japan, 4,800 nautical miles from ihe range head. The

three Soviet missile range instrumentation ships have been on

station in the southern impact area since 24 November and have

been ongaged in practice re-entry procedures.

(2) The new Soviet defensive missile displayed in the

7 November Moscow parade has been officially nicknamed

"GRIFFON" by the American, British and Canadian Missile

Committee.

d. Laos:

(1) CINCPAC reports that the MAP supported training of FAR

and Neutralist units at Camp Erawan in Thalland 1s progressing

satisfactorily. Since the training started on 9 September,

the following units have completed prescribed courses of

instruction and returned to Laos:

2 FAR Inf Companies

2 FAR Arty Batterie:

2 FAR 81-mm Mortar Sections

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I FAR Heavy Weapon Platoon

I Neutralist 4.2 In. Mortar Platoon

As of 1 December, the following units were undergoing training:

FAR Inf Companies

FAR 4.2 in. Mortar Platoons

FAR Arty Battery

1

FAR 81-mm Mortar Section

. Neutralist Arty Battery

1 Neutralist 81-mm Mortar Section

(2) Iraining in Thalland of 6 Lao pilots and 8 mechanics

to operate and maintain 3 U-17A commenced on 4 November and

will last for 30 days.

(3) The US Ambassador in Vientiane has reported that Colonel

Ma, the RLAF commander, has Informed the US AID Requirements

Office representative at Savannakhet that he (Col. Ma) has

authorized the Royal Thai Air Force to conduct F-86 recon-

naissance flights over Laos. The Ambassador is attempting to

discourage these flights on the grounds that they might prove

embarrassing to Souvanna.

3. LOGISTICS

a. Thailand:

Negotiations have been completed between the British

and the Royal Thai Governments for construction of a military

logistics airfield at Mukdahan. Public announcement of this

decision will be made at Bangkok and London. The Australian

and New Zealand Governments have been Invited to associate

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27538

24130

Vicentri

15555

SECRET

themselves with this project. Tentative plan and schedule

is to use the period December-March for improving the Ubon-

Mukdahan road and building a construction camp. Work is to

begin on the airfield in April utilizing about two companies

of Royal Engineers.

b. Cambodia:

Numerous problems are arising In regard to the cessa-

tion of the Cambodia Military Assistance Program. Disposition

of materiel, unloaded in Cambodia but not formally turned over

to the country, is presenting the hardest problems which must

be settled by individual case negotiations.

2220

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SOUTHEAST ASIA SITUATION

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

mM1151

Chin

AOTIAN

FORCES

FRIENDLY

I FAR,

REGULARS

AUTO DEFENSE

KONG LE

-KHAMOUANE

oy North Viet-Nam

57, 000

25, 000

7, 000

1, 500

≥ 90, 500

Burma

ENEMY

• Muong Sai

MR I

PATHET LAO

NORTH VIETNAMESE

DISSIDENT NEUTRALISTS

19.500

8.000

1450

7, 950

Hainan.

MR I

atiane

Savannakhet

Thaila

11 d

REPUBLIC

VIET-NAM

FRIENDLY

ARMED FORCES (RVNAF)

CIVIL GUARD

(CG)

SELF

DEFENSE CORPS (SDC)

JUNK

FORCE

217,403

79,500

100, 588

,200

400, 691

IR MY

Kontur

LEGEND

Pathet Lao/

No. Vietnamese Areas

Viet Cong Concentration

QUESTIONABLE CONTROL

C

FAR/Kong Le Military

Region Boundaries

4 DEC 1963

50

100

ENEMY (VIET CONG)

¿ MAIN FORCE

23, 000 - 26,000

LOCAL GUERRILLAS

80, 000 - 100,000 g

"DIA-CHIC

SECRET NO FOREIGN

DISSEMINATION

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