Originator: SSCIA
Document date: 06/00/1975
Document type: REPORT

## Page 1

157-10014-10228

2023 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK Assassination System

Identification Form

Agency Information

AGENCY :

RECORD NUMBER :

RECORD SERIES :

SSCIA

157-10014-10228

MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M-133

Document Information

ORIGINATOR:

FROM:

TO :

TITLE:

SSCIA

DATE: 06/00/1975

PAGES:

81

SUBJECTS :

BISSELL, RICHARD

LUMUMBA, ASSASSINATION

CIA

DOCUMENT TYPE: REPORT

CLASSIFICATION: Declassified

RESTRICTIONS: 1B; 1C

CURRENT STATUS : Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 03/31/2000

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS: CC Box 133

v9.1

NW 50955

DooId: 32423616

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## Page 2

Date : 08/08/95

Page

1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY:

RECORD NUMBER

RECORDS SERIES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

SSCIA

157-10014-10228

MISCELLANEOUS. RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE

07-M-133

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR:

SSCIA

FROM

TO

TITLE :

DATE: 06/00/75

PAGES

SUBJACTS : LUMUMBA, ASSASSINATION

CIA

BISSELL, RICHARD

DOCUMENT TYPE : REPORT

CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET

RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED

DATE BiTE CRIES

CURRENT STATUS : POSTPONED

• IN FULL

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 01/20/99

COMMENTS : CC Box 133

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

NW 50955

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Bot, 33

CONGO

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3

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## Page 4

DATES:

BLARVEY, William

@'DONNELL, Justin

BISSELL. Richard

CATEGORIES:

LUMUMBA /

Do

OCCURRENCE:

HArver testified that he worked with a man called JUSTIN O'DONNELL iN

1. ca

that O'DONNELL came to him and said that he had been approached by RICHARD BISSELL, who

Was then the Deputy Director of Plans (DD/P) to undertake an operation in the Congo, one

of the objectives of which was the elimination of PATRICE LUMUMBA: HARVEY testified that

@'DONNELL, told him that he had declined to undertake this assignment.

HARVEY testified that he subsequently had a conversation with BISSELL, in which BISSELL

Stated that he had requested O'DONNELI, to undertake such an operation. (9-10)

HARVEY testified that he did not know about any steps undertaken on behalf of the Agency

in connection with any proposals to eliminate LUMUMBA. (10)

SOURCE:

HARVEY TESTIMONY, June 25, 1975 (pp. 9-10)

STAFF:

Rhea

FILE:

DATE:

30.6.75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

Dillon

Lamumba

Congo

OCCURRENCE:

On May 21, 1975 in an affidavit to the Rockefeller Commission Mr. Douglas Dillon stated

that in late July or early August of 1960 in attended a meeting in the Pentagon in which

the overall Congo problem was discussed.

He state:

"During the discussion, which covered

a great variety of matters, my recollection is that a question regarding a possibility of

an assassination attempt against Lamumba was briefly raised. The CIA representative indi-

cated

that the agency did not undertake this sort of operation. This ended consideration

of this subject. With this one exception I never heard any discussion of assassination

attempts against anyone."

SOURCE:

Affidavit dated May 21, 1975 of Mr. C. Douglas Dillon to the

RoEkefeller Comnission

ION SEPTEY

STAFF:

DATE:

Kelley

June 30, 1975

---

## Page 5

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--

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

BISSELL, Richard

ROSTOW, Walt

O'DONNELL

LUMUMBA

DATES:

1960(.)

CATEGORIES: TOP SECRI

CONGO

OCCURRENCE:

BISSELL testified that he told WALT ROSTOW that he had taken the initiative to instruct

O'DONNELL to plan for the assassination of LUMUMBA (55) •

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

FILE:

BISSELL, II

STAFF:

DATE:

Baron

28.6.75

BISSELL, Richard

DATES:

9601

CATEGORIES:

O'DONNELL, Justin

CONGOL

LUMUMBA

GOTILIEB, Sidney

OCCURRENCE:

BISSELL testified that he asked JUSTIN O'DONNELL to investigate the possibility of

killing LUMUMBA. (54) BISSELL, does not remember the date.

IUT SECRET

BISSELL told this to O'DONNELL in connection with making plans to see SIDNEY GOTTLIEB.

to see GoriLtin or anoit, it as impossible to tell whether these were BISSElL's plans

SOURCE: BISSELL, II, p.54

TOP SECRET

STAFF

Baron

FILE:

DATE: 28.6.75

---

## Page 6

3ISSELL, Richard

'DONNELL

JUMUMBA, Patrice

VHTTE HOUSE

UHIDO:

1960(?)

CONGO - Authorization for Assassinatio

Plotting Against LUMUMBAV

OCCURRENCE:

BIsselL testified that no one authorized him to tell O'DONNELL to take steps toward as-

sassinating LUMUMBA.

(54) He did not inform the WHITE HOUSE and, to the best of his

knowledge,

no one informed the WHITE HOUSE that this assignment had been made.

(54).

BISSELL said that the initiative probably came from himself. (55) BISSELL emphasizes

that he did not "seek to assassinate" (55) LUMUMBA, but rather "told a member of the

Clandestine Service to make plans and develop the capability so to do if it were au-

proved and ordered." (55)

He recognized that it would have to "have approval at the

highest level of government" (55),

SOURCE:

BISSELLII

FILE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

BISSELL, Richard

O'DONNELL

LUMUMBA

TOP SECRET

STAFF: BARON

DATE: 1/2/15

DATES:

1960(?)

CATEGORIES:

'TOP SECRET

CONGO V

OCCURRENCE:

BISSELL testified that O'DONNELL told him that he did not want to investigate the possi-

bility of assassinating LUMUMBA and said,

"that he thought it was an inappropriate action,

and that the desired object could be accomplished better in other ways." (54)

TAP SECRET

SOURCE:

BISSELL, II, p. 54

FILE:

STAFF: Baron

DATE: 28.6.75

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## Page 7

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

PRESIDENT EISENHOWER

DATES:

August 25, 1960

CATEGORIES:

MR. GRAY

MR. DULLES

Lamumba

Special Group

Presidential Authorization

LAMUMBA

OCCURRENCE:

On August 25, 1960 the Special Group heard an outline of "three operational lines

that we are following and mounting an anti-Lamumba campaign in the Congo." These

lines included various political efforts

and "The group agreed that the action

contemplated is very much in order.'

There was also discussion which might be construed to refer to an assassination

attempt:

"Mr. Gray commented, however, that his associates /The President?/

expressed extremely strong feelings on the necessity for very

straightforward action in this situation, and he wondered whether the

plans as outlined would be sufficient to accomplish this.

Mr. Dulles

replied that he had taken the comments referred to seriously and

SOURCE:

I (CONTINUES FEE

Minutes of Spec

roup meeting August 25,

M1960

STAFF:

Bob Kelley

FILE:

Cage

DATE: June 29, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

August 25, 196)

CATEGORIES:

Lamumba

Special Group

Presidential Authorization

OCCURRENCE:

CARD 2

and had every intention of proceeding as vigorously as the situation

ermits or requires, but added that he must necessarily put himsel

n a position of interpretine instructions of this kind within th

ounds of necessity and capability. It was finally agreed that plannins

or the Congo would not necessarily rule out 'consideration' of an

particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of

Lamunba." (emphasis added)

SOURCE:

Minute

FILE:

Cage

pecial crous meet

HANDE

TaIn THA

Aügift 25, 1960

STAFF Bob Kelley

DATE:

June 29, 1975

50955

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## Page 8

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Bissell

O'Donnell

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

Fall 1960

V CONGO

EXECUTIVE ACTION

BISSELL tostified that he "very definitely" (p. 75) asked

O'DONNELL to investigate the possibility of killing

LUMUMBA.

BISSELL said that this could be an example of Executive

Action capability but when pressed

on the contradiction

between the dates of late 1960 for his conversation with

O'DONNELL and May 1961 (or early 1961) for his establishment

of the Executive Action capability, he said that he did not

remember whether his assignment to

O'DONNELL was part of the

Executive Action program. (p. 70).

SOURCE:

I DIARY:

DATE:

FILE:

Germ

11115

Bisseel testrian, SSCI

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

KASAYUBU

GON. HARRIMAN

PULLES, J.F.

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

September 1,

1960

Lamumba

special group

OCCURRENCE:

On September 1, 1960 the Special Group discussed the suggestion to provide

PRESIDENT KSAVUBU with an airplane superior to the one provided by the Soviets.

MR. DULLES expressed a number of objections to the proposal.

"Mr. Merchant noted that the question of whether Governor Harriman should offer

to find an advisor for Lamunba has been put up to the Secretary General of the

U.N., for the decision would have to be made in the first instance."

SOURCE:

STAFF

Minutee of Snarial Gram maptino Santanhar 1

196n

Roh Kollar

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## Page 9

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

MR. PARROTT

MADAME BLOUIN

DATES:

October

20, 1960 CONGO

Special Group

CATEGORIES:

OCCURRENCE:

On October 20, 1960, the Special Group heard a report by MR. PARROTT "about

the operation in connection with Madame Blouin, noting that her appearance

in Switzerland could receive some publicity for next week's meeting."

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: Minutes of Special Group meeting Oct. 20, 1960

FILE:

Cage

STAFE: Bob Kelley

DATE:

June 29, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

MR. GRAY

DATES:

Sept. 8, 1960

MR. MERCHANT

MR. DOUGLAS

CATEGORIES:

Special Group

Presidential Authorization

Congo t

MR. DULLES

LAMUMBA

OCCURRENCE:

On September 8, 1960 at a Special Group meeting the minutes recorded the follow-

"There was a brief discussion of developments in the Congo and the

possibilities of effective action there. Mr. Gray said that he hoped

that Agency people in the field are fully aware of the top-level feeling

in Washington that vigorous action would not be amiss."

No other material on the CONGO appeared in the minutes other than the above

quotation.

SOURCE:

TOP SECRET

Minutes nf Serial from meetine Seot.

8. 1960

TSIAFE: BOb KelleY

Bob Kellev

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## Page 10

LENNUND/ENITTLES:

KASAVUBU

HAMMARSKIOLD

DATES:

October 27, 1960

CATEGORIES:

Special Group

Congov

LAMURBA

MERCHANT

OCCURRENCE:

On October 27, 1960 the Special Group read a paper outlining " the proposal

to aid Colonel Mobutu in working toward the eventual formation of a moderate

government...

The Special Group approved the proposal with the understanding that the program

envisages complete recognition of Kasavub as the legitimate head of state and

that Mobutu would remain in the background."

Mr. Merchant reported on discussions with Hammarskjold: "He has swung away

from a feeling that Lamumba must be removed, to a feeling that is the legitimate

prime minister and that we much live with him although acknowledging that his

title is somewhat clouded.

SOURCE:

STAFF:

Minutes of Special Group, meeting Octoher

1960

FILE:

Cage

Bob Kelley

DATE: June 29, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

BISSELL

DULLES

LAMUMBA

DATES:

Nov. 10, 1960

Special

Congo

CATEGORIES:

Group

OCCURRENCE:

On November 10, 1960, at the Special Group meeting 'Mr. Bissell mentioned briefly

that we are making certain contingency plans for the Congo against the possibility

of a pro-Soviet Lanumba government,

Katanga independence movement"..!Mr. Dulles said that he had discussed the Congo

with MI-o during his recent visit to London. The British had told him that

they would have arns available for a contingency of this kind, and he said that

SOURCE:

TOP SECHEI

STAFF:

Minutes of Special Group meeting, Nov. 10, 1960

FILE:

Cage

Bob Kelley

DATE: Tims on

1n9r

-

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PERSONS/ENTITIES:

BISSELL, Richard

TWEEDY, Bronson •

WIROGUE

DATES:

late 1960

CATEGORIES: TOP SECRET

EXECUTIVE ACTION/ ZRRIFLE

GENERAL THEMES

CONDON

OCCURRENCE:

BISSELL said that the philosophy described by the Chief of the CIA Africa Division, probably

BRONSON TWEEDY, in a memorandum in late 1960, was probably applicable to matters within the

scope of Project ZRRIFLE. The memorandum recommended the agent WIROGUE in these terms:

"He is indeed aware of the precepts of right and wrong, but if he Is given an assignment,

which may be morally wrong in the eyes of the world, but necessary because his case officer

ordered him to carry it out, then it is right, and he will dutifully undertake appropriate

action for its execution without pangs of conscience. In a word, he can rationalize all

actions" (59).

TOP SE

SOURCE: BISSELL, II

FILE:

STAFF: Baron

DATE:

28.6.75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

O'Dounell

Bissell

OCCURRENCE:

DATES:

1961

CATEGORIES:

Canyo

"My judgment is that before Mr. O'DONNELL ever got there,

the assassination plan had been decided to be inappropriate

and unnecessary and had been dropped."

(D. 79)

This is BISSELL'S reason for saying that he was surprised

that the virus appeared in vicw of Mr. O'DONNELL's position

of refusing to assassinate a leader.

SOURCE:

Bissell Testwag, s5rT

STAFF

Bours

HW 50955 DocId:32423616 Page 11

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## Page 12

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

1961

Bissell

OCCURRENCE:

CATEGORIES:

Congo

BISSELL testifies that he does not remember ordering any

virus

sent down to the Congo, nor does he remember any

conversations with the person in charge of producing virus

capability in relation

to the Congo (p. 77).

SOURCE:

FILE:

Bissell I

STAFF:

Baron

DATE:

PERSONS/ENTITIFS:

HELMS, RICHARD

O'DONNELL, JUSTIN

BISSELL

LAMUMBA

DATES:

1961:

CATEGORIES:

LAMUMBA

OCCURRENCE: HELMS was told by the conmittee that O'DONNELL had testified that

he had come to HELMS' office and told HELMS that BISSELL had asked him to kill LAMUMBA

but that he wasn't going to do it and that HELMS had agreed that he should not do it.

HELMS testified that he did not recall the conversation at all (155). At that time

HELMS was serving as BISSELL's number two man, Chief of Operations.

HEIMS testified that

he would not necessarily have known about the poison if it had been sent to the Congo

because the Deputy Director could have made his own arrangements without going through

his underlings (150).

SECHE

SOURCE:

STAFF:

Helms Testimony, 0/13/75

G. Rhea

ЯТТП.

DATE:

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12

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## Page 13

ILHOUND/ENTITLES:

Bundy

Bowles

Parrott

DATES:

June 21, 1961

CATEGORIES:

Congo

OCCURRENCE:

On June 21, 1961, Thomas Parrott wrote a memorandum for the record, subject: "Covert

Action in the Congo."

The memorandum stated "the Congo paper was presented at

the Special Group June 8 and deferred because of the request for an overall

briefing on political action. On June 10, Mr. Bissell obtained approval for Mr.

Bundy for part of the program, i.e., an expenditure of $20-30,000 for support

of Bulikango (equateur) and Bomboko. Memorandum also notes that the "parliament

program" was given "full approval by Mr. Bundy and "at the Special Group meeting

on June 22, Mr. Bundy stated that the Congo paper had been personally approved

by the President."

SOURCE: Memorandum for the record by Thomas

Ad Parrott k

dated June 21, 1961,

FILE:

STAFF: Bob Kelley

DATE: June 29, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

§SELL, Richara

VIN

IVEY

DATES:

Feb, 1961

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION

CONGO

TOP SECRET

RIFLE

OCCURRENCE:

SELI testified that he did not have any personal recollection of who WIN was, although

says that he probably was informed at the time if HARVEY recruited him for ZRRIFLE (58) .

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

FILE:

BISSELL, II

STAFF:

Baron

DATE:

28.6.75

HH

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## Page 14

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

CONGO

QJWIN

LUMUMBA, Patrice

DATES:

2/61

LEADS

CATEGORIES: TOP SECRET

BRECKENRIDGE, Scott

HELMS,

Richard &

Congo ~

OCCURRENCE:

CONGO: In discussing the recruitment of the agent QJWIN by the EXECUTIVE ACTION program "for

use in a special operation in the Congo (the assassination of PATRICE LUMUMBA)" (38), the

ribbon copy, which is the only copy in existence

has the phrase "(the assassination of PATRIC

LUMUMBA)" scratched out.

SCOrT BREcKENRIDGE indicated to the Committee that this was done by

RICHARD HELMS when he read the report.

Why?

TOP SHAYAT

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, p. 38

STAFF: Baron

FILE:

DATE:

28.6.75.

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HELMS, RICHARD

O'DONNELL, JUSTIN

LAMUMBA

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

LAMUMBA

2/61

o'Donnell

OCCURRENCE:

HELMS testified, that he knew a CIA agent named JUSTIN O'DONNELL,

HELMS stated that he did not recall/having been involved in assassination attempts against

LAMUMBA but he thought he might very well have been (154). HElMs did not know why

LAMUMBA might have been slated for assassination, although he did remember that when

LAMMA was alive many of his followers were opposed to the CIA and that after his death

allegations were widespread in the black community that the ClA had killed LAMUMBA (154) •

HELMS testified that at the time of publicity about possible CIA involvement in LAMUNBA's

death he recalled making inquiries to find out if there was even a remote relationship and

was told there was not (155).

NOW SECRET

SOURCE:

Helms Testimony, 6/13/75

STAFF:

G. Rhea

FILE:

DATE:

6/29/75

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14

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## Page 15

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

BISSELL, Richard

HARVEY, William

SILVER, Arnold

LUMUMBA,

Patrice

OCCURRENCE:

DATES:

O'DONNELL, Justin

BRECKENRIDGE, S.

HELMS, Richard

'QJWIN

FER.

#any 1961

CATEGORIES: IOP SECRET

EXECUTIVE ACTION/ZRRIFLÉ

The EXECUTIVE ACTION program authorized by BISSELL and run by WILLIAM HARVEY "came to be known

as Inkiele. Its principal asset was an agent, QUWIN, who had been recruited earlier by ARNOLI

SILVeR for use in a special operation in the Congo (the assassination of PATRICE LUMUMBA) to be

run by JUSTIN O'DONNELL. (O'DONNELL made a survey of the scene, decided he wanted no part in

that assassination attempt, and asked to be released - which BISSELL granted.)" (38)

NOTE:

In the copy of the I.G. REPORT provided to the Cormittee, which was, according, to

EARMAN's cover memorandum the ribbon copy, which was the only text of the report in existence, th

phrase in the above paragraph "(the assassination of PATRICE LUMUMBA)" was crossed out. Se

BRECKENRIDGE indicated to the Cormittee that this phrase was crossed out by RICHARD HELMS when

he read the report. Why?

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, p. 38

STAFF: Baron

FILE:

DATE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

ZPRIF

QJWIN

O'DONNELL, Justin

BISSELL, Richard

SILVER, Arnold

LUMUMBA, Patrice

DATES:

May 1961

February-19, 1962

Feb., 196c1

28.6.75

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION

RRIFLZ

UMUMBA V

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

"The project name, ZRRIFLE, first appears in the files in May 1961, although the first re-

corded approval is dated 19 February 1962." (38)

"The EXECUTIVE ACTION them program came to be known as ZRRIFLE. Its principal asset was

an agent, WIN, who had been recruited earlier by ARNOLD SILVER for use in a special opera-

tion in the Congo (the assassination of PATRICE LUMUMBA), to be run by JUSTIN O'DONNELL,

(O'DONNELL made a survey of the scene, decided he wanted

no part in that assassination

attenipt, and asked to be released - which BISSELL granted)." (38)

TOP SECRE

SOURCE: • I.G. REPORT 1967, p. 38

STAFF: Baron

TIF.

DATE: 28.6.75

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15

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## Page 16

LENSUNS/ENTITIES:

BISSELL, Richard

GOTTLIEB, Sidney

HARVEY

WHITE HOUSE

SILVER, Arnold

DATES:

February 1961

(HARVEY's roughi

estimate)

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION ERRIFLE

CASTRO

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

BISSELL assims to HARVEY / developing of "an EXECUTIVE ACTION capability;

a general stand-by capability to carry out assassinations when required.

i.e.s

(37)

"HARVEY's notes quote BISSELI, as saying, 'The WHITE HOUSE has twice urged me to create such

a capability.' BISSELL recalls discussing the question of developing a general capability

with HARVEY. " (37)

capability

"HARVEY says that BISSELL, had already discussed certain aspects of the problem with ARNOLD

SILVER and with SIDNEY GOTTLIEB." (37-38).

(continued)

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, pp. 37-38

STAFF:

citril 10f z

Baron

FILE:

DATE:

28.6.75

TOP

SANDE

SL982 aLva

LN02S dOL

50955

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## Page 17

--==

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Lumumba

Colby

DATES:

2/12/61

CATEGORIES:

OJ WIN

Luminba

OCCURRENCE:

Colby testified:

Q. J. Win was

which never took place (Ir. 108)

asset who was considered for effort to assassinate Lunumba,

TOP

SOURCE:

STAFF:

Testimony of Im. Colby, 5/23/75

FILE:

DATE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

ZRRIFLE,

O'DONNELL, Justin

QJWIN

BISSELL, Richard

SILVER, Arnold

LUMUMBA, Patrice

DATES:

May 1261

February 19, 196

Feb., Fiel

John Bayly

-- 712/75

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION

ZRRIFLE

TOP SECREI

OCCURRENCE:

LUMUMBA V

"The project name, ZRRIFLE, first appears in the files in May 1961, although the first re-

corded approval is dated 19 February 1962." (38)

"The EXECUTIVE ACTION these program came to be known as ZRRIFLE. Its principal asset was

an agent, QWIN, who had been recruited earlier by ARNOLD SILVER for use in a special opera-

tion in the Congo (the assassination of PATRICE LUMUMBA), to be run by JUSTIN O'DONNELL,

(0' DONNELl made a survey of the scene, decided he wanted no part in that assassination

in that aaron pera-

TOP SECRE

P.У

1. ..

SOURCE:

I.G. REPORT 1967, p. 38

STAFF: Baron

Page

---

## Page 18

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Bowles

Gilpatrick

Bundy

Dulles

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

June 29, 1961

Congo

Special Group

OCCURRENCE:

On June 29, 1961, the minutes of the Special Group state: "Mr. Dulles said that

we feel Gizenga will probably not come to the parliamentary session in Leopoldville

unless he is sure that his forces will win. He commented that this raises a policy

question as to whether an attempt should be made to stop the assembly. Mr. Bowles

said that Mr. Bissell had raised this with him yesterday and that appropriate of-

ficials in the department are considering the matter."

SOURCE: Minutes of Special Group meeting June 29, 1961.

FILE:

STAFF: Bob Kelley

DATE: June 29, 1975

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## Page 19

APPROVAL

HW 50955

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-RESIDENTIAL

---

## Page 20

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

PRESIDENT EISENHOWER

DATES:

August 25, 1960

CATEGORIES:

MR. GRAY

Lamumba

Special Group

Presidential Authorization

MR. DULLES

LAMUMBA

OCCURRENCE:

On August 25, 1960 the Special Group heard an outline of "three operational lines

that we are following and mounting an anti-Lamumba campaign in the Congo." These

lines included various political efforts

and "The group agreed that the action

contemplated is very much in order."

There was also discussion which might be construed to refer to an assassination

attempt:

"Mr. Gray commented, however, that his associates /The President?/

lad expressed extremely strong feelings on the necessity for very

straightforward action in this situation, and he wondered whether the

plans as outlined would be sufficient to accomplish this. Mr. Dulles

replied that he had taken the comments referred to seriously and

SOURCE:

Minutes of

Sper

gup

• meeting August, 25,

$1960

STAFF:

Bob Kelley

FILE:

Cage

DATE: June 29, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

August 25, 1960

CATEGORIES:

Lamumba

Special Group

Presidential Authorization

OCCURRENCE:

CARD 2

and had every intention of proceeding as vigorously as the situation

permits or requires, but added that he must necessarily put himself

in a position of interpreting instructions of this kind within the

bounds of necessity and capability.

It was finally agreed that planning

for the Congo would not necessarily rule out 'consideration' of any

particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of

Lamumba." (emphasis added)

SOURCE:

Minutes

FILE:

Cage

TATIONS

AuguSt

25, 1960

STATE Bob Kelley

DATE:

June 29, 1975

50955

DocId: 32423616

Page

20

---

## Page 21

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

MR. GRAY

DATES:

Sept. 8, 1960

MR. MERCHANT

MR. DOUGLAS

CATEGORIES:

Special Group

Presidential Authorization

Congo

MR. DULLES

LAMUMBA

OCCURRENCE:

On September 8, 1960 at a Special Group meeting the minutes recorded the follow-

"There was a brief discussion of developments in the Congo and the

possibilities of effective action there. Mr. Gray said that he hoped

that Agency people in the field are fully aware of the top-level feeling

in Washington that vigorous action would not be amiss."

No other material on the CONGO appeared in the minutes other than the above

- quotation.

SOURCE:

Minutes of Special Group meeting Septi. 8, 1960

FILE:

Cage

STAFF:

Bob Kelley

DATE:

June 29, 1975

HH 50955 DocId: 32423616 Page 21

---

## Page 22

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

PRESIDENT EISENHOWER

ALLEN DULLES

GOODPASTER, GEN.

DATES:

Sept 29, 1960

CATEGORIES:

MONGOOSE

Special Group

Presidential Authorization

Cand

3

OCCURRENCE:

On September 29, 1960 the Special Group discussed a proposal for U-2 airplane

coverage of Cuba.

GENERAL GOODPASTER "told the group that the President wishes

to reserve himself any decision which involves violation of the borders of a

foreign country by an element of the military establishment."

After a great deal of discussion "all members of the group expressed some skepti-

cism as to the complete justification for U-2 coverage based on agency requirements!

There was also discussion of a proposal to permit exploration of / certain foreign

intelligence services of recruitment of limited numbers of foreign nationals to

bolster the Cuban paramilitary force and the proposal of using Americans as well.

SOURCE:

Minutes:

of:

Special Coup Meeting Sept, 29, 1960

FILE:

Cage

6Ub1

STAFF:

Bob Kelley

DATE: June 29, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

Oct 6, 1960

MR. GRAY

MR. GEHLEN

CATEGORIES:

Special Group

MONGOOSE

Presidential Authorization

Cand

3

OCCURRENCE:

On October 6, 1960 the Special Group discussed relating to CUBA:

(1) Explanation by MR. DULLES of the "abortive supply drop to resistance

elements" in Cuba.

(2) MR. DULLES' proposal for U-2 coverage of CUBA "All the members of the group said

that they were in favor of proceeding with the coverage." Mr. Gray asked to have

the memorandums on which Mr. Dulles had based his presentation forwarded to him

for use in getting the required decision.

Mr. Dulles' proposal for use of American volunteers and foreign nationals in

the Cuban operation. The group agreed Mr. Dulles could begin screening lists

of potential candidates.

Dulles "added that there might be a possibility of

SOURCE:

(continued)

STAFF:

Minutes of

Special Group meeting October

1960

Bob Kelley

FILE:

DEDH

Cage

DATE: June 29, 1975

50955

DocId: 32423616

Page

---

## Page 23

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

Oct.

6, 1960

CATEGORIES:

Special Group

MONGOOSE

Presidential Authorization

OCCURRENCE: (cont.)

including some Germans in this group and that we would talk informally

to General Gehlen about it.

He emphasized that he was asking for no

special Group approval at this time in

this specific connection."

0P

SECRET

SOURCE:

FILE:

Minutes of Special Group meeting October 6, 1960

Cage

STAFF:

DATE: Bob Kelley

June 29, 1975

HH 50955 DocId: 32123616 Page 23

---

## Page 24

PERSONS/ENTITIFS:

PRESDIENT KENNEDY BUNDY

ROBERT KENNEDY

• MCNAMARA

HELMS

RUSK

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

Nov. 12,1963

MONGOOSE

PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL

OCCURRENCE:

At the meeting on November 12, 1963, with the President, FITZGERALD in response to a

question as to what decisions remain to be made stated that "we were looking for a

reaffirmation of the program as presented, Including sabatoge and harrassment."

After outlinging a number of large scale sabatoge operations "the concensus was

that the CIA should proceed with its planning for this type of activity looking

toward January."

TOP SECRE

SOURCE:

Memorandum for record dated Nove. 12, 1963

"Cuban Operations"

FILE:

STAFF:

DATE:

Kelley

6/28/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

JOHNSON

KILPATRICK

MCCONE

PRESIDENT KENNEDY

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

Nov. 6,1963

MONGOOSE

SPECIAL GROUP

PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL

OCCURRENCE:

On November 6, 1963, higher authority (PRESIDENT KENNEDY) "aisapproved all Cuban

Operations scheduled to be run into Cuba before NOvember 12.

Two operations

dated November 8 and 10 are therefore disapproved. "

TOP SECRE

SOURCE:

STAFF:

K07701

HH

50955

DooId:32423616

Page 24

---

## Page 25

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Julle, Alar

Cabell, General

Bissell, Mr.

DATES:

May 24, 1961

CATEGORIES:

SPECIAL GROUP

PRESIDENTIAL. AUTHORIZATION

OCCURRENCE:

he was quite concerned about the way essentially 5412 projects are being handled and

stated CIA is totally unprotected if we do not follow established procedures in discussing

and obtaining approval of these projects before implementation."...a discussion ensued re-

garding the special groups relationship with the various task forces appointed on a

Iran, Vietnam, Korea, and other areas together with the special groups connection with NSC

actions. The Director agreed that this was a problem for the special group and asked Mr.

Bissell to prepare"' a memorandum for the special group meeting on May 25.

SOURCE:

Memorandum dated May 24, 1901 titled

"Deputys Meeting" (00737)

STArE:

Kelley

FILE:

DATE:

July 1, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Bundy

President Kennedy

TAYLOR

OCCURRENCE:

(RFKJ

[RUSKJ

(MCNAMARA)

DATES:

Aug 23, 1962

CATEGORIES:

MONGOOSE

Presidential Authorization

On August 23, 1962, McGeorge Bundy sent a memorandum titled "National Security Action

Memorandum #181"' to the Secretary of State, Defense, Attorney General, CIA Acting Director

and General Taylor stating the President had directed 8 studies and actions "to be under-

taken in the light of evidence of new Bloc activity in Cuba." The memorandun included the

President's direction that "The line of activity projected for Operation MONGOOSE Plan B

plus should be developed with all possible speed. Action: General Taylor." Also listed

for study were various military alternatives to execute a decision to eliminate any in-

stallations in Cuba capable of launching nuclear attack on the U.S. and "the advantages

and disadvantages of action to liberate Cuba by blockage or invasion or other action beyons

MONGOOSE B plus, in the context of an agravated Berlin crisis."

SOURCE:

National Security Memorandw

FILE:

18

Aug

23

SECRET

STAFF:

Cage

DATE:

Kelley

June 30. 1975

DocId: 32423616

Page

---

## Page 26

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

PRESIDENT KENNEDY

ROBERT KENNEDY

HEIMS

RUSK

BUNDY

MCNAMARA

DATES:

Nov. 12, 1963

CATEGORIES:

MONGOOSE

PRESIDENTIAL, APPROVAL

OCCURRENCE:

On November 12, 1963 FITZGERALD reported to the President at a meeting on

disaffections in the military in Cuba, stating that while the military is loyal

there are indications that some leaders might break with the regime but lack

courage and opportunity. The principal aim of the U.S. is to "get military leaders

who have become disenchanted with the CASTRO regime to dare to talk and plot

CASTRO's downfall with each other."

SOURCE:

STAFF:

FILE:

Memorandum for record dated Nov. 12, 1963

"Cuban Operations"

DATE:

Kelley

6/28/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

PRESIDENT KENNEDY

ROBERT KENNEDY

HELMS

RUSK

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

BUNDY

MCNAMARA

Nov. 12,1963

MONGOOSE

PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL

OCCURRENCE:

On November 12, 1963 mr. FITZGERALD briefed President KENNEDY on sabatage and

harrassment in operationsin Cuba describing successful operations against four

installations and the belief that these operations have raised the moral of the

people in Cuba and continues to keep pressure on CASIRO adding to the growing

economic problems facing the country.

TOP SECT

SOURCE:

Memorandum for record dated Nov. 12, 1963

FILE: "Cuban Operations"

STAFF:

Kelley

DATE:

6/28/75

HH 50955

DocId:32423616

Page

26

---

## Page 27

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

PRESIDENT KENNEDY

BUNDY

ROBERT KENNEDY

MCNAMARA

HELMS

RUSK

DATES:

Nov. 12, 19631

CATEGORIES:

MONGOOSE

PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL

On NOv. 12, 1963, Mr. Fitsgerald reported to the President that the United State

economic denial program is contributing to Cuba's declining economy, but would be

more effective if the Canadians would be willing to cooperate.

TON SEEKEN

SOURCE

FILE:

Memorandum for record dated Nov. 12, 1963

"Cuban Operations"

STAFE:

DATE:

Kelley

6/28/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

PRESIDENT KENNEDY BUNDY

ROBERT KENNEDY

HELMS

Nov. 12, 1963

RUSK

MONGOOSE

PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL

MCNAMARA

OCCURRENCE:

On NOvember 12, 1963 a meeting on "Cuban Operations" was held with "Higher Authority"

(President Kennedy). Present were Mr. RUSK, Mr. MCNAMARA, Mr. ROBERT KENNEDY,

Mr. BUNDY, Mr. MCCONE, Mr. JOHNSON, Mr. KILPAGRICK, Mr. VaNCE, Mr. HELMS, Mr.

FITZGERALD, MR. CHIEVER, Mr. STEAKLEY. Mr. MCCONE gave a brief summary of recent

developments inside Cuba and Mr. Fitzgerald reported on Cuban operations under six

main headings.

separate cards.)

(Mr. FITZGERALD's discussions of these headings is contained In

SOURCE:

TOP

Memorandum for the record dated Nov. 12. 1963

STAFF:

nATE. Kelley

HW 50955

DooId: 32423616

Page 27

---

## Page 28

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

PRESIDENT KENNEDY

CATEGORIES:

BUNDY

ROBERT KENNEDY

HELMS

Nov. 12, 1963

RUSK

MONGOOSE

PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL

MCNAVAR CCURRENCE:

On Nov. 12, 1963, at a meeting with President KENNEDY and others, Mr. FITZGERALD

discussed covert collection in Cuban operations, pointing out that CIA had three

kinds of agents activities inside Cuba: (1) "Singleton" operations (2) Collection

nets. (3) agents involvedin black net operations.

Some 25 agents had been either

captured or killed in the past year.

There is increasing effectiveness of CASTRO's

Internal security forces, accounting for the loss of agents.

N02 Subad

SOURCE:

Memorandum for the record dated Nov. 12, 1963

FILE:

"Cuban Operations"

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

RESIDENT KENNEDY

ROBERT KENNEDY

BUNDY

MCNAMARA

HELMS

RUSK

DATES:

STAFF:

Kelley

DATE:

6/23/75.-

CATEGORIES:

MONGOOSE

PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL

Nov. 12, 1963

OCCURRENCE:

On NOvember 12, 1963 FITZGERALD briefed the President on CIA probaganda activities

in Cuba.

He said some "30,000 to 40,000 leaflets per month had been mailed and

during the day there are 32 hours of programs from seven different stations."

TOP SECLET-

SOURCE:

FILE:

Memorandum for record dated Nov. 12, 1963

"Cuban Operations"

STAFF:

DATE:

Kelley

6/28/75

HH 50955 DocId: 32423616

Page 28

---

## Page 29

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

PRESIDENT KENNEDY

SECRETARY RUSK

SECRETARY MCNAMARA

SPECIAL GROUP MEMBERS

OCCURRENCE:

DATES:

May 28,1963

CATEGORIES:

MONGOOSE

SPECIAL, GROUP

TOP

REPRET

SOURCE:

STAFF:

Memorandum of record dated May 28, 1963, "Iow level

FILE:

reconnonaisance of Cuba"

DATE:

Kelley

6/28/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

PRESIDENT KENNEDY

SECRETARY MCNAMARA

MCCONE

BUNDY

HARRIMAN

FIYZGERALD

OCCURRENCE:

DATES:

June 19, 1963

CATEGORIES:

MONGOOSE

SPECIAL GROUP

PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL

On June 19, 1963 the meeting was held with "higher authority" at which a program

for "external sabatoge" for Cuba was approved with the understanding that operations

will not begin until mid-July.

The program was to be directed at four major

segments of the Cuban economy: (a) electric power (b) petroleum refineries and

storage facilties (c) railroad and highway transportation (d) production and

manufacturing." The purpose of this and other programs is to "nourish a spirit

of resistance and disaffection which could lead to significant defections and

other by-products of unrest." :

TOP SEC

SOURCE:

STAFF:

FILE:

Memorandum for the Special Group dated June 19,1963

"Sabatoge Program Cuba'

Kelley

DATE:

HH 50955

DocId: 32423616

Page 29

---

## Page 30

_JENERAL THEMES

50955

DocId: 32423616

Page

30

---

## Page 31

LANe DATES:

CATEGORIES:

General Themes.

"The device or the doctrine of plausible deniability" (5) was explained by

Bissell: for any covert operation that was likely to have a visable consequence

one objective was to carry out such operations

"in such a way that they could

R2.

be plausibly disclaimed by the U.S. government." (5)

Pi, PRESIDENTIAL DLNIABILITY: "To protect the President" (5) Allen Dulles would

have attempted "to have indicated to the two successive presidents the general

--objective of the operation that was contemplated, to make that sufficiently

i, just as little information about it as possible beyond an understanding of

its general purpose.

Such an approach to the President would have had

purpose to leave him in the position to deny knowledge of the operation if

should surface." (5-6) Bissell believed, based on "my knowledge of commandit."

• relationship, of Allen Dulles as an individual, and of his mode of operations--

"p- is that authorization was obtained by him in the manner that I have indicated"

(6); i.e., "eircumlocut.inns" (5)

kissell uses this theory of plausible deniability as his explanation for the ?

rcason that neither he nor anyone else in the Agency would have discussed an

assassination operation on their own initiative with members of the White

House Staff.

"The effort would have been to hold to the absolute minimum

the nunber of people who knew that the President had been consulted, had been

notiflea, and had given, perhaps only tacitly, his authorization." (6)

SCURCE:

BissilL 11

STATE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Bisseel

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

general Themes

OCCURRENCE:

BISSELL testif

..that the Russians have made extensive use

of assassination though he was not referring to assassination

of leads of state. BISSELL had no knowledge of Russian

assassinations of heads of state by the KGB. (p. 84)

SOURCE:

BIsSeL I

STAFF:

HH 50955 DooId:32423616

Page 31

---

## Page 32

FENSUNS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

PARVEY, William

TOP SECRE

CATEGORIES:

GENERAL THEMES

(Assassination)

CARD 1 of 2

OCCURRENCE:

HARVEY testified that he could envision two circumstances in which

assassinations would be

justifled. First, on proper orders from the proper highest authorities in cases of utter

necessity to eliminate a threat to the security of this country. (22) As an example, he

mentioned that it might be necessary to eliminate a Cuban leader to protect the United States

arainst possible attacks by Soviet missiles. (22-23)

HARVEY also

believed that assassination would be proper in the case of treason, where

not eliminating the person might lead to the loss of many lives or of a life more important

than that of the person to be sacrificed. (23) He clarified that these were solely his

personal opinions and have nothing to do with the policy of the Agency. (23)

HARVEY testified that he believed authorization for assassinations should come from

SOURCE: HARVEY TESTIMONY, June 25, 1975, pp. 22-26

STAFF:

Rhea

FILE:

DATE:

30.6.75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

HE

CARD 2 of 2

OCCURRENCE:

the President. (2'1) He was less certain as to whether Presidential approval was necessary

for the assassination of treasonness persons, such as key agents within the Soviet Union

on, whose information the CIA was dependent for ils onn security. (25)

-FATTEN

HARVEY emphasized that in the case of threats to national security, assassinations

should always be authorized by the President. In the case of assassinations necessary to

protect the resources of the Agency, he felt that authority might better be derived fron

parties other than the President to

keep the President in a "credibly deniable position." (26)

SOURCE:

FILE:

STAFF:

DATE:

DooId: 32423616

Page

---

## Page 33

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HARVEY, William

DUNLOP, Set.

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

GENERAL THEMES

(General Assassination Policy)

OCCURRENCE:

HARVEY testified that he had no knowledge of American assassinations of a defected ament 19}

either a defected American agent, or defected agents who were third-country nationals.

He further knew of no instance of the United States' assassinating any person who was a non-

political leader. (19-20)

HARVEY testified that he knew of nazate

to assassinate SGT. DUNLOP. (20)

ON SECRE

SOURCE: HARVEY TESTIMONY, June 25, 1975, pp. 19-20

FILE:

STAFF: Rhea

DATE:

30.6.75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Chou En Laid

COLBY

DATES:

=====

CATEGORIES:

' 55

50)

Castro

General The mes 1

OCCURRENCE:

Choly testified said 50 in 1vn2ht with 2 reported attempts to assassinate

SOURCE:

Testimony of In. C. Colby on 5/25/75

START: John Bayly

7/2/75

HH

50955

DooId: 32423616

Page

33

---

## Page 34

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

BISSELL, Richard

TWEEDY, Bronson

WIROGUE

DATES:

late 1960

CATEGORIES: TOP SECRET

EXECUTIVE ACTION/ ZRRIFLE

GENERAL THEMES V

CONGO

OCCURRENCE:

BISSELL said that the philosophy described by the Chief of the CIA Africa Division, probably

BRONSON TWEEDY, in a memorandum in late 1960, was probably applicable to matters within the

scope of Project ZRRIFLE.

The memorandum reconmended the agent WIROGUE in these terms:

"He is indeed aware of the precepts of right and wrong, but if he is given an assignment,

which may be morally wrong in the eyes of the world, but necessary because his case officer

ordered him to carry it out, then it is right, and he will dutifully undertake appropriate

action for its execution without pangs of conscience. In a word, he can rationalize all

actions" (59).

TOP

SECRET

SOURCE: BISSELI, II

FILE:

STAFF: Baron

DATE:

28.6.75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Dulles

Bissell

DATES:

9/60

OCCURRENCE:

In response to a question about whether the use of

circumlocutions to describe an assassination opera-

tion resulted from a malaise of conscience, BISSELL

replied, "I don't think it grated against my

conscience. I think it may have been a feeling that

the Director LALLEN DULLES? preferred the use of the

sort of language that is described in the IG Report."

(25).

CATEGORIES:

Iqueral Themes

--.

SOURCE:

FILE:

BISseUI

init

STAFF:

DATE:

H# 50955

DocId: 32423616

Page 34

---

## Page 35

DATES:

breckinnie

CATEGORIES:

lite

iftl

Generat then so fauth)

Castra

(terminition at Fläst

Breckinridge testified that as far as Phase I was concerned he had no

evidence that the CIA had been acting as an instrument of policy. (33)

NOTE: This phrase "instrument of policy" is taken from the end of the

IG REPORT on page 132.

It seems to indicate that, based on his research

for the IG REPORT,

tion outside the CIA for the Phase A

BRECKINRIDGE concluded that there was no authoriza-

assassination plot against CASTRO.

BRECKINRIDGE said that "no specific instruction" (33) was given.

Specifically in responce to a question from Sen. BAKER, BRECKINRIDGE

said that the Inspector General has no record of any authorization

for the Phase I gambling-syndicate assassination plot by the white

House, the President, or the Department of Defense (33) •

SOURCE:

FILE:

Breckinridge

Testimany

STAFF:

Birren

DATE:

11AGONS/1212108:

7/3/15

Breckinridge

DATES:

April 1962

CATEGORIES.

CASTRO

Castro-

MONGOOSE

CIA Mafina

SGA

Phase II

GENERAL THEMES (authoriza

- OCCURRENCE:

-tion)

BRECKINRIDGE testified that in preparing the Inspector General's report

of 1967, he found no evidence of specific authorization for Phase II

for the CIA-Mafia plot against CASTRO from outside the CIA. (43-44)

-

1001

SOURCE:

Breckinridge Testimony

HTIE:

STAFF:

ПАТЕ.

Baron

7/3/75

50955

DocId: 32423616

Page

35

---

## Page 36

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

ROSELLI

DATES:

1963

CATEGORIES:

CASTRO

GENERAL THEME

OCCURRENCE:

ROSELLI testified that there was never any suggestion from the CIA that what he

was doing was illegal nor that if he

it would be taken care

of. (65)

TOP

SOURCE: ROSELLI TESTIMONY

FILE:

STAFF: Baron

DATE:

7/2/75

HW

50955

DooId: 32423616

Page

36

---

## Page 37

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

Jit HISON

March 1963

EDWARD MORGAN

ROSELLI

CASTRO

JFK ASSASSINATION

GENERAL THEMES

JIM O'CONNELL

KENNEDY

Jahn F.

OCCURRENCE:

P. Tor?

The I.G. Report of 1967 indicated that JIM GARRISON, EDWARD MORGAN, and JOHN ROSELLI

were all in Las Vegas at the same time in March of 1960. According to JIM O'CONNELL,

"Garrison was in touch with Roselli"

• (120)

The I.G. Report commented:

TOP SECKET

"The Roselli-Garrison contact in Las Vegas in March is particularly disturbing.

It lends substance to reports that CASTRO had something to do with the KENNEDY

assassination in retaliation for U.S. attempts on Castro's life.

We do not know

that CASTRO actually tried to retaliate, but we do know that there were such

Plots against Castro. Unhappily, it now appears that Garrison may also know this." (120

SOURCE:

I.G. Report 1967

STAFF:

Baron

DATE:

FILE:

7/2/75

========

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

OCCURRENCE:

Discovery Leads

TOP SEONG

P. 2 of 2

1. Did the CIA ever disclose this line of reasoning to the Warren Commission or

to anyone outside the CIA?

2.

Should Garrison be interviewed or Roselli questioned about this contact?

(ATTENTION: DAVID AARON)

3.

(ATTENTION: RICK INDERFRUTH) Whether or not this line of reasoning can be

substantiated, demonstrates the CIA's general awareness that American assassina-

tion plotting may breed assassination attempts against American leasers.

(GENERAL THEMES)

TAMARA

H₩ 50955

DocId: 32423616

Paye

37

---

## Page 38

PERSUNS/ENTLIIES:

Breckinridge

IG RERORT

DATES:

5/23/67

24/25/6,70

CATEGORIES:

CASTRO

GENERAL THEMES

OCCURRENCE:

BRECKINRIDGE said that the introductory memorandum to the IG REPORT

of 1967, which was dated April 25, 1967, implicitly reached the

conclusion that assassination was

"not desireable". (19) He points

to the statement:

"Elimination "of the

dominate figure in a government, -..

even when loyalties are held to him personally rather than to the

government as a body will not necessarily cause the downfall of the

government. " (4)

Second, the memorandum made the point that

"There is

always the risk that the

participants will resort to assassination" (5)

In a covert action to bring about the fall of a government, implying

that assassination is not desirable.

SOURCE:

STAFF:

FILE:

Breckinridge Testimony

TOO PENET

DATE:

Baron

7/3/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

J=O BARMAN

SAM PAPICH

HARVEY

ROSELLI

GIANCANA

OCCURRENCE:

DATES:

May 3, 1967

CATEGORIES:

CASTRO

GENERAL THEMES i

TOP SECRE

P. 1 of

With regard to the FBI's knowledge of the gambliny syndicate assassination plot,

the I.G. Report of 1967 noted:

"They should by now have concluded that CIA

plotted the assassination of CASTRO and used U.S. gangster elements in the

operation." (131)

On May 3, 1967 J. S. EARMAN, Inspector General of the CIA, met with SAM PAPICH

of the FBI and told PAPICH of an expected meeting betweer ROSELLI and HARVEY.

PAPICH commented "that ROSELLI and GIANCANA have CIA 'over a barrel' because

of 'that operation'.

He said that he doubted that the FBI would be able to do

att about either"POSE o CLAN because of their previoys netnueties

Sounds people

ge Report 1967

STAFF: Baron

HH

50955

DocId: 32423616

Page

38

---

## Page 39

Breckinridge

IG REPORT

DATES:

5/23/67.

4/25/67

CATEGORIES:

CASTRO

GENERAL THEMES - -

OCCURRENCE:

BRECKINRIDGE

said that the introductory memorandum to the IG REPORT

of 1967, which was dated April 25, 1967, implicitly reached the

conclusion that assassination was

"not desireable". (19) He points

to the statement:

"Elimination öf the dominate figure in a government, -

even when loyalties are held to him personally rather than to the

government

as a body will not necessarily cause the downfall of the

government. " (4)

always the

risk that the participants will resort to assassination" (5)

In a covert action to bring about the fall of a government, implying

that assassination is not desirable.

SOURCE:

STAFF:

Breckinridge Testimony

Baron

FILE:

DATE:

7/3/75

TOM

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

READET

DATES:

May 23, 1967

CATEGORIES:

GENERAL THEMES

OCCURRENCE:

TOP SECREI

The I.G. Report of 1967 acknowledges that there is an inherent incompleteness to

CIA internal investigation of CIA operations involving personnel outside the

Agency:

could learn everything that we have learned. Such an investigation

probably would uncover details unknown to us, because it would have

access to the non-CIA participants." (132)

Discovery Leads

ATTENTION: RICK INDERFURTH

SOURCE: I.G. Report 1967

FILE:

STAFF:

DATE:

Baron

7/2/75

50955

DocId: 32423616

Page

39

---

## Page 40

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

May 23, 1967

CATEGORIES:

CASTRO

GENERAL THEMES

OCCURRENCE:

TOP

OCAT

0.14

In the conclusion to the I.G. Report of 196T, the following action alternatives

were considered:

1. "Try to silence those who are talking or might later talk."(128)

2.

"Plausibly deny that we plotted with gangster elements to assassinate Castro"

(131)

3. "State or imply that it (CIAl was merely an instrument of policy" (132)

In this case each of the alternatives was rejected. But the format seems to

indicate that such alternatives are considered frequently by the CIA in dealing

with the disclosure or potential disclosure of a covert operation.

(Continued)

SOURCE:

I.G. Report of 1967

FILE:

STAFF: Baron

DATE:

7/2/75

50955

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40

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## Page 41

ZRRIFLE.

•.•...

50955

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Page

411

---

## Page 42

FENSUNS/ ENTITIES:

"ARVEY, William

SILVER, Arnold

BISSELL, Richard

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

• 26 Jan. 1967

EXECUTIVE ACTION

OCCURRENCE:

¡ARVEY testified that he had a conversation with ARNOLD SILVER about the EXECUTIVE ACTION

project on January 26, 1961, after HARVEY and BISSELL had already discussed the matter.

¡ARVEY testified that he learned early in the operation that BISSELL had discussed the ques-

(52): .

tion of assassination with ARNOLD SILVER. (52)

-

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: HARVEY TESTIMONY, June 25, 1975, p. 52

FILE:

STAFF:

DATE:

Rhea

30.6.75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

ARVEY, William

HELMS, Richard

3ISSELL, Richard

DATES:

Spring 1961

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION Y

OCCURRENCE:

HARVEY testified that after he had examined the possibility of the CIA's carrying out

assassinations, he reported his conclusions to HEIMS and BISSELL. He testified that he

liscussed the matter with HELMS shortly after he had been given the assignment of looking,

into the assassination matter and that, they talked about HARVEY's grave doubts, reserva-

tions, and problems concerning, this kind of operation. (42)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

HARVEY TESTIMONY, June 25, 1975, p. 42

STAFF:

DATF:

Rhea

HW

50955

DocId: 32423616

Page

---

## Page 43

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

Bissell

5/61

Cuba

-Executive Action

Referring to the White House rcquests for establishing

an Executive Action program, Bissell said:

"What they

contemplated is action that

would be conducted through

the

clandestine service in the regular channel. What they

meant by an Executive Action capability, of course, embraced

a great deal more than assassination.

It embraced means of

discrediting a political leader, possibly means of physically

incapacitating him, but without permanent injury, possibly

assassination as last resort." (p. 57).

Bissell indicated, however, that this was not said directly

to him in those terms and was an assumption on his part

- (p. 58) : Bissell 1

STAFE: Baron

FILE:

sila

DATE:

# WIL?

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Greer

Bissell

White House

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

' 62-1

5-9-73

Castro

ZP. Riflel

OCCURRENCE:

Colby tostified Ex. A, Project ZR Rifle, The "Ken Greer Document," (Tr. 85) ,

is correct in its statement that "the White House urged Richard Bissell

to create an exccutive action capability," (Tr. S6) and that one of its

purposes was a general standby capability to carry out assassinations."(Tr. 80)

his lini wan

Matin VC

SOURCE:

Testimony of Im. Colby, 5/23/75

STAFF:

John Bayly

DATE: 7/2/75

HH 50955 DocId: 32423616

Page 43

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## Page 44

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Bissell

Bundy

Rostow

OCCURRENCE:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

5/61

Cuba

ZR/RIFLEN

In reference to the initial White House requests for

establishment of an assassination capability to be known

as Executive Action, Bissell testified

of those two /Bundy or Roston? or both

"Very probably one

staff members would have discussed it with me."

of those White House

(p. 54).

SOURCE: Bissell l

FILE:

START: Baron

DATE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

inners.

MARISSELL

I OCCURRENCE:

DATES:

May 1960

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION

"The plan of the capability I could have done on my own

or ordered on my own."

(p. 79).

Note:

Here BISSELl is answering a question about whether

he had the authority to establish such a program without

instructions from the WHITE HOUSE.

SOURCE:

BISSELL i

STAFF:

Baron

HW

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Page

14

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## Page 45

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

BISSELL *

ROSTOW

DATES:

May 1960

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION

OCCURRENCE:

Although BISSEll maintains that he does not remember specific

conversations in which the WHITE HOUSE urged him to create

an Executive Action capability, he has testified: "I believe

that I did have conversations

the creation of a capability?, at least with Mr. ROSTOW about

"In other words, it may have been initiated within the Agency,

it could have been, but I beliove that if sort talked, to him

about it." (p. 81).

SOURCE:

STAFF:

BISSELL I

Baron

FILE:

DATE:

July 3, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Bissell

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

5/61

Cuba

executive@ection

OCCURRENCE:

Bissell testified that the Executive Action project did

not

only represent an

assassination capability but "it is a

capability to secure the removal from office or to

render

powerless or in some other way to frustrate figures,

usually political figures that are considered or whose

activities are considered contrary to the interests of the

United States." (p. 68) .

-

SOURCE:

STAFF:

VISIeRe I

Baron

HH

50955

DocId: 32423616

Page

45

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## Page 46

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

BISSELL

CASTRO

DATES:

May 1961

CATEGORIES:

ZR

RIFLE

EXECUTIVE ACTION

OCCURRENCE:

CARD 1 of 2

Despite Bissell's statement that he does not remember

requests from the White House to set up his ZR/RIFLE

assassination capability, he states later in his testi-

"I interpreted this as a request to develop a

different kind of a capability which would have been

appropriate for the clandestine service and of a wholly

different sort from that being used

in the so-called

First Phase against CASTRO. "

(p. 53).

SOURCE:

STAFF:

IG REPORT, 1967

FILE:

Baron

DATE: July 3, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

CONTINUATION OF IG REPORT

Card 2 of 2

Bissell recalls that this is true (p. 49), but he cannot

remember who in the White House made

request (p. 49).

Bissell places this request in carly 1961. (p. 50).

Bissell

remembers assigning William Harvey the task of developing

the Executive Action program, but he does not remember the

requests from the White House (p. 50). Bissell suggests

that the requests might have come from Bundy (p. 49) or

Walt Rostow (p. 51).

Bissell does not deny the truth of

the quote from Harvey that he, Bissell, stated that he

received two requests from the White House to set up the

ZRRIFLE assassination capability. But he does not remember

specific conversations (p. 51).

HH

50955

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Page

16

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## Page 47

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

BISSELL

BUNDY

ROSTOW

• DATES:

Early 1961

CATEGORIES

EXECUTIVE ACTION

GARD 1 OF 3

OCCURRENCE:

BISSEll said that shortly after the advent of the KENNEDY

ADMINISTRATION there were weekly luncheon meetings in the

STATE DEPARTMENT with BUNDY and

resenting the WHITE HOUSE, BISSELL in attendance from the

CIA, and one or two people from the Departments of STATE

and

DEFENSE, roughly

minutes were

roughly at the Ass.

at the Assistant Secretary level. No

kept.

They were occasions for discussing

without agenda whatever topics were brought out. (p. 81-82).

SOURCE:

BISSELL I

I STAFF:

DATE:

Baron

July 3, 1975

FILE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

CONTINUATION CARD 2 Of 3

* OCCURRENCE:

BISSELL testified that the proposal for an Executive Action

i :.; project at those luncheon meetings was "exactly the sort

of thing that could have happened, and this is the kind of

"place where I think that it probably was proposed." (p. 82).

He said further that assuming there were two requests from

the WHITE HOUSE, they could have come at successive mectings

of this sort. (p. 82).

BISSELL indicated that he might have made reports on the

developments in the Executive Action program

at these luncheon

meetings, but "as i normally operated I would replied more

particularly to ROSTOW in this casc." (P. 82). (Contikued)

HH 50955 DocId: 32423616 Page

47

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## Page 48

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

CONTINUATION CARD 3 of 3

- OCCURRENCE:

.. "?.

BISSELL said that he had the feeling that he did report in

this way to Mr. ROSTOW (p. 83).

Note:

This card contains two discreet subjects: (1)

Formulation of the Executive Action plan, and (2) Reporting

to ROSTOW on the Executive Action program.

SOURCE:

IFILE:

STAFF:

DATE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Helms, Richard

HARYEY

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

1961

Executive Action

Castro

zRRifle

OCCURRENCE: Helms testified that the 2 P Rifle offort to assassinate Castro

the other general efforts to "eliminate Castro or dispose of Castro" were

11y distinctige programs (52) .

lelms testified that the reference td the Id

orts stating that he authorized Harvey to handle the Z R Rifle project on a

C1a1

basis was correct.

such authorization was necessary boc ause of the

aunting system of the

CIA which required an officer's signature for disbursemen

i in

sensitive operations (54).

SOURCE:

STAFF:

Helms 0/13/75

Rhea

FILE:

DATE:

6/28/75

HW

50955

DocId: 32123616

Page

48

---

## Page 49

INDUND/ENILTIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

Helms, Richard

1961

Executive Action

ZR Rifle

OCCURRENCE: lielms testified that

remenbered ZR Rifle.

He particularly.

remembered his dosire earle project and to see it the hit mances to used poin

some other useful way.

icins testified he did not remenher the man's name or his nationality.

eventinly terminated two or three years la chi

not lile the idca and finally phased it out.

sidered z K Rifle a "tiny little thing". (52)

(53) Helms testified that he con-

SOURCE:

Helms 6/13/75

TOP SECRET

STAFF:

DATE:

FILE:

PERSONS/ENTTTIES:

DATES:

Rhica

6/28/75

CATEGORIES:

ins, Richard

1961

Precutive Actiony

caster

zR Rifle

OCCURRENCE: Helms tostiriod that there was no

• doubt that one of the purposes

:IR Rifle was to establish a capability for assassinating

foreign loaders.

11-55) Helms could not recall hearing discussions regarding setting up a capa-.

lity for the assassination of Castro.

He could recall know overlap

¡cen the Castro assassination programs and z R Rifle (55).

SOURCE:

Helms 6/15/75

STAFF:

DATE:

Rhea

50955

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Page

49

---

## Page 50

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Breckinridge

DATES:

' 61

=62

CATEGORIES:

Hielms

Harvey

Castro

ZR Riflee

Bissell

Castro

OCCURRENCE:

Breckinridge testified that Helms "signed off on a project that was originally

initiated by Mr. Bissell called ZR Rifle, and ZR Rifle was a project that

Mr. Bissell was quoted

as saying was at the urgency (sic) of the White Hlouse."

(Tr. 60)

"ZR Rifle was described as an executive action capability, a capability

to permit assassination if someone called for them". (Tr. 66-67) 'Mr. Harvey

was given the responsibility of this by Mr. Bissell and originally it continued

as a separate action from the Castro operation, but Mr. Harvey was also given

that responsibility, and for all intents and purposes they became wedded.

(Ir. 67)

SOURCE:

Testimony of Hm. Colby, 5/23/75

FILE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Breckinridge

Helms

STAFF:

DATEJohn Bayly

DATES:

161-62

CATEGORIES:

Castro

ZR Rifler

OCCURRENCE:

Breckinridge testified that "Mr. Helms was the person who fornally approved

ER Riflo.. (Which) had a dual purpose... to steal codes" and to provide

Lethal executive action capability. (Tr. 67, 09-70) Rifle irant

rifle (gun) and rifle (rummage through files). Did 7]

SOURCE:

Testimony of Im. Colby, 5/23/75

STAFF:

John Bayly

50955

DocId: 32423616

Page

50

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## Page 51

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Mc Coue

Bay of Pigo

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION

1961

OCCURRENCE:

MCCONE Testified that the Executive Action Plan was not called off after the Bay of

Pigs.

He state that this was understandable because this was a planning operation.

It was not an authorized action operation (42)

SOURCE:

FILE:

MCCone Testimony

STAPE:

Rhea

DATE: 6/27/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HARVEY, WILLIAM

BISSELL, RICHARD

DATES:

early 1961

CATEGORIES:

CASTRO

EXECUTIVE ACTION

OCCURRENCE: Harvey testified that the following events led him to believe that

the White House had approved, at least in principle, the operation to assassinate

First, he had a conversation early in 1961 with Bissell, when Bissell

told him that, on one or more occasions, he had been urged by the White llouse to

see that the Agency developer an Executive Action capability. (80) Bissell

referred to the White-louse only in general, and did not name specific individuals.

(81)

larvey testified that he believed that if the White llouse had given a "

"generalized approval, in principle, "then the CIA would have been acting within

its authority to mount a specific operation against Castro!' (82) He further

testified that he could conceive of

situations, including assassinations,

where "no one would want to charge the President, personally, with the complete

dirty-handed details of it." (82)

SATIRER: HARVEY TESTIMONY, Jup

FILE:

TOP

STAFF: Rhea

DATE:

6/30/75

50955

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## Page 52

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HARVEY, William

SILVER, Arnold

QJWIN

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION

OCCURRENCE:

LARVEY testified that QJ. Win was an agent that he considered for possible use and used for a

Limited period through ARNOLD SILVER for the spotting, of individuals with criminal and under-

vorld connections in Europe for possible multipurpose use, none of whom were ever advised of

Or were ever used.

When HARVEY was asked if the multipurpose use included assassination, he stated that if

he had ever been directly ordered to perform an assassination, he would have considered the

neople spotted by d.J.Win as possibilities. (50)

he testified that before someone would have

actually been approached to carry out that operation, there would have been a long, period of

assessment and cross checks. As far as he knew, the particular spotting mechanism

never went

that far.

So far as HARVEY could recallk.J.Win was used only once in connection with an opera-

lion in the Confo, which was not an assassination operation. (51)

SOURCE: HARVEY TESTIN

642025,4

1975, pp. 50-51

FILE:

ACT

STAFE: Rhea

DATE:

30.6.75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HARVEY, William

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION

OCCURRENCE:

HARVEY testified that the EXECUTIVE ACTION PROGRAM was a synonym for assassination. (10)

-

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: HARVEY TESTIMONY, June 25, 1975, p. 10

FILE:

STAFF:

DATE:

Rhea

30.6.75

HH 50955

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## Page 53

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Colby, Wn. E.

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

IX-C-2-b

Executive action r

OCCURRENCE:

In response to a question from Senator Huddleston which asked who was the

lowest ranking official in the CIA who could authorize assassination

attempt and have the ability to have action taken on it and funds supplied,

etc., Colby stated "I doubt that I could give you a formal answer to that,

Senator."

He indicated that it was such a serious matter it could only be

approved at a very high level including the Director.

He further indicated

that he cannot imagine the Director giving this authority without having

some

(37).

(Interrupted by further question, answer

incomplete.)

SOURCE:

STAFF:

SSCI; testimony of Wn. E. Colby, 6/4/75

FILE:

DATE:

Cage

JFD

6/28/75

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

MCCONE

When Authority

1961

OCCURRENCE:

MCCONE was asked whether the Executive Action was an instance of a section of the CIA

below his level acting without his authority or whether in fact there was Presidential

authority authorizing it.and MCCONE had been kept-in-the dark.

MCCONE responded that the actions taken under the authority of the Executive Action

Plan were not under "direction from higher authority" (43)

MCCONE stated that his answer was purely speculation. (43)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

FILE:

McCone Testimony

STAFF:

Rhea

DATE: 6/27/75

HH

50955

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## Page 54

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

MCCONE

HARVEY

DATES:

1961

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION V

CASTRO

OCCURRENCE:

MCCONE testified that he "never knew of the Executive Action Plan (42). In describing

lack of supervision in HARVEY's activities, MCCONE testified "for several months

Mr. HARVEY was in charge of the Executive Action Plan. Just what he did I don't know

but this I am told. I never knew of the Executive Action Plan and was never

breifed on it, I was never told about it to my memory or any record on it.

Mr. HARVEY was moved over in charge of the Cuban operation and I think whatever

action he took - I have hear of two or three, all of which were abortive and in my

opinion stupid - he did it under what he thought was the authority of the Executive

Action Plan but not any — to my knowledge - any direction of higher authority" (42)

MCCONE testified that the Executive Action Plan was a subject on which he could only

speculatOURCE:

STAFF:

NeCone Jestimony,

FILE:

DATE:

Rhea

6/27/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

MCCONE

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION

1961

OCCURRENCE:

MCCONE described the Executive Action Plan as follows: "An Executive Action Plan In

the jargon of the intelligence world means a plan for removal by any means of an

undesirable head of state or senior person in a country.

It doesn't necessarily

mean an assassination. It might mean setting them up onthe Riveira with a blonde

and swiss bank account but getting rid of them." (41)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

McCone Testimony

FILE:

STAFF:

Rhea

namn.

HH

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## Page 55

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Helms, Richard

HARVEY

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

1961

Executive Action

Castro

zRRifle

OCCURRENCE: Helms testified

that the 1 l Pifle offort to assassinate Castro

ind the other seneral efforts

to "eliminate Castro or dispose of Castro" were

holly distinctige programs (52).

lelms testified that the reference td the IG

on the astro

leports stating that he authorized Harvey to handle the 2 R Rifle projcct on

pecial basis was correct.

such authorization was necessary bec ause of the

recounting system

of the

CIA which required an officer's signature for disbursemen

Ised

in sensitive operations (51).

SOURCE:

STAFF:

Helms 0/13/75

Khea

FILE:

DATE:

6/28/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Helms, Richard

DATES:

1961

CATEGORIES:

Executive Action

IR Rifler

OCCURRENCE: lielms testified that he remembered ZR Rifle.

He particularly.

remembered his desire earthe project and to see if the hit man tabe used toin

some other useful way.

cventually terminated two or three years latel

felns

testified he did not remenber the nan's

ano or his nationality.

not like the idea and finally phased it out.

(53) Helms testificd that he con-

The con

sidered 7 k Rifle a "tiny little thing". (52)

SOURCE:

FILE:

Helms 0/13/75

TOP SECRET

STAFF:

Rhea

DATE:

6/28/75

50955

DooId: 32423616

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---

## Page 56

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Breckinridge

Bissel

Harvey

Mafia

OCCURRENCE:

castra

DATES:

'01 - 6:2

122.

CATEGORLES:

Castro

ZR Rifler

Breckinridge testified that "Bissell. told llarvey to create the executive action

capability" and to take over the Castro assassination attempt, which was

connected with a continuing relationship between the CIA and the Mafia."

(Tr. 71)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

Testimony of Wn. Colby, 5/23/75

FILE:

PERSONS/ENTIRIES:

Harvey

Colby

DATES:

'61-'62

OCCURRENCE:

Colby testified "Mr. Harvey was... very effective..." (Ir. 90)

STAFF:

John Bayly

DATE: 7/2/75

CATEGORIES:

Castro

ZR Rifler

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

Testimony of In. C-lby, 5/23/75

PILE:

STAFF:

John Bayly

DATE: 7/2/75

HH 50955

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## Page 57

silver, Arnold

larvey, William

Bissell, Richard

1/26/61

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION

OCCURRENCE: Harvey testified that he had a conversation with Arnold Silver about the

lixecutive Action Project on January 26, 1901, after Harvey and Bissell had already discussed

26, 1961, after rsation

ready discuss

the matter (52). Harvey testified that he learned early in the operation that Bissell had

liscussed the question of assassination with Arnold Silver (52)

TOP SECRET

-

SOURCE:

FILE:

HARVEY TESTIMONY, June 25, 1975, p. 52

STAFF:

DATE:

Rhea

6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

HARVEY

K. G. WIN

EXECUTIVE ACTION

Jan. 26, 1961

OCCURRENCE:

Harvey's handwritten notes eneitled Project Zrriffle state

TOP SECRET

Rifle

perational Assets:

(1) personnel: K.G. Win is under written contact as a principal agent, with the primary

task of spotting ayent candidates. K.G. Win was first contacted in 1958 to the Chief

of the Luxembourgis by the chief of station, Luxembourg, in connection with illegal

narcotics operation into the United States. For aperiod of a year and a half he was

contacted spareatically by COS, Likembourg, in behalf of the Bureau of Narcotics. Files

of this Bureau reflect an excellent performance by K. G. Win. In October 1960:

K. G. Win annual salary $7,200

Hire of safe houses and other

Travel and OBS expenses for K. G. Win and

automobile expenses $1,000

other agents and agent candidates $2,000

Total $14,700

Fees for services by and standby of agents and agent candidates $2,000

TravesoURcitaff employees engayed in Eriffle $2,000

I STAFF:

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IBANUND ENTITLES:

HARVEY

DATES:

Jan 26, 1961

TOD

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION

zRRifle

OCCURRENCE:

A Ma

,,Harvey's hadwritten notes entitled Project Zrriffle (exhibit l) state "objectives:

The objectives of this project is the procurement of code decipher materials, and

information concerning such materials, in accordance with requirements levied on the

clandestine services, primarily by the NASA security agency.

Since these requirements

are subject to frequent revision, no listing of targets would be valid for the duration

of the project.

Specific operations will be mounted on the basis of need and

opportunity.

The Project will be

divisions and stations as needed.

conducted by division A with assistance from area

(exhibht 1)

Harvey testified that his notes didnot cite assassination or assassination capability as

an Oojective of project Ziriffle. However, assassination was a contemplated purpose of the

project. If an agent had been recruited for assassination he would have been recruited

under the cover of obtaining code and cipher materials. (49)

SOURCE:

STAFF:

Harvey 6/25/75

Rhea

FILE:

DATE:

6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

Jan 26, 1961

HARVEY

OCCURRENCE:

TOP

SECRE

EXECUTIVE ACTION

ZRRIFL

The notes in Harvey's handwriting entitled Project Zrriffle state "3. Background:

In response to the increasing requirements for the operational procurement of foreign

code and cipher materials, division A in 1960 began spotting of agent assets as a

develoymental activity. During the same period reguirements fram NSA became more

refined and in many respects more sentative because most agencies are not equipped

to conduct this type of operation, and because of the desirability to completely centralize

control over this entire effort, it was determined that division d which was the closest

touch with NSA on procurement requirements, could best conduct the activity. The spotting

activity has now advanced far enough to justify removing from the DOA category. (exhibit

1, page 1 - 2)

SOURCE:

STAFF:

Harvey 6/25/75

FILE:

DATE:

Rhea

HH

50955

DocId: 32423616

Page

58

---

## Page 59

BISSELL, Richard

RUWIN

HARVEY

DATES:

Feb, 1961

CATEGORIES: TOP SECRET

EXECUTIVE ACFION L

CONGO

ZRRIFLE

OCCURRENCE:

BISSELL testified that he did not have any personal recollection of who dWIN was, although

he says that he probably was informed at the time if HARVEY recruited him for ZRRIFLE (58).

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

FILE:

BISSELL, II

STAFF: Baron

DATE:

28.6.75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

O'DONNELL, Justin

AJWIN

BISSELL, Richard

SILVER, Arnold

LUMUMBA, Patrice

OCCURRENCE:

DATES:

May 1961

February 19,

1962

Feb., 1960D

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION &

ZRRIFLE

'TOP, SECRET

i an an an appeal the cles in May 1961, although the First re-

"The EXECUTIVE ACTION to program came to be known as ZRRIFLE. Its principal asset was

an agent, QWIN, who had been recruited earlier by ARNOLD SILVER. for use in a special opera-

tion in the Congo (the assassination of PATRICE LUMUMBA), to be run by JUSTIN O'DONNELI,

(O'DONNELL, made a survey of the scene, decided he wanted no part in that assassination

attempt, and asked to be released - which BISSELL granted)." (38)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:: I.G. REPORT 1967, p. 38

STAFF: Baron

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## Page 60

I'LOUND UNILIALS:

BISSELL, Richard

O'DONNELI, Justin

HARVEY,

William

BRECKENRIDGE, S.

HEIMS, Richard

SILVER, Arnold • QJWIN

LUMUMBA,

Patrice

OCCURRENCE:

DATES:

FER.

#ay: 1961

CATEGORIES:. 'TOP SECRET

VEXECUTIVE ACTION/ZRRIFLE

CONGO

(INA

The EXECUTIVE ACTION propram authorized by BISSELL and run by WILLIAM HARVEY "came to be known

as ZRRIFLE. Its principal asset was an agent, QJWIN, who had been recruited earlier by ARNOLD

SILVER for use in a special operation in the Congo (the assassination of PATRICE LUMUMBA) to be

run by JUSTIN O'DONNELL. (O'DONNELL made a survey of the scene, decided he wanted no part in

that assassination attempt, and asked to be released - which BISSELL granted.)" (38)

NOTE: In the copy of the I.G. REPORT provided to the Committee, which was, according, to

he read the report. Why?

SOURCE: : I.G. REPORT 1967, p. 38

STAFF: Baron

FILE:

DATE:

PERSONS/ENTITILS:

DATES:

28.6.75

CATEGORIES:

TOP SECRET

ZRRITEE,

QJWIN

O'DONNELL, Justin

BISSELL, Richard

SILVER, Arnold

LUMUMBA, Patrice

May 1961-

February 19, 1962

Feb., 19601

EXECUTIVE ACTION

ZRRIFLE

LUMUMBA

OCCURRENCE:

"The project name, ZRRIFLE, first appears in the files in May 1961, although the first re-

corded approval is dated 19 February 1962." (38)

"The EXECUTIVE ACTION tap program came to be known as ZRRIFLE. Its principal asset was

an agent, QWIN, who had been recruited earlier by ARNOLD SILVER for use in a special opera-

tion in the Congo (the assassination of PATRICE LUMUMBA), to be run by JUSTIN O'DONNELL

(O'DONElL, made a survey of the scene, decided he wanted no part in that assassination

attempt, and asked to be released - which BIssell granted) .

TOP SECREN

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, p. 38

STAFF: Baron

FTLE:

DATE:

28.6.75

HH

50955

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Page

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## Page 61

BAKER

BISSELL

HARVEY

ROSTOW

OCCURRENCE:

it land.

May 1961

ZR

RIFLE

EXECUTIVE ACTION

Sard Lof 2

Senator Baker asked Bissoll to comment upon the section

of the IG Report of 21 May 1973 which says: "Early in

the KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION, the White House urged Richard

Bissell to create an Executive Action

capability, that

is, a general stand-by capability to carry out assassina-

tions."

(p. 48).

SOURCE:

•1967

PILE:

STAFF

Baron

DATE: July 3, 1975

--=-

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

Cuba

Bissell

ZR/RIFLEN

- "Project named ZR/RIFLE first appears in the files in

May 1901 although the first recorded approval is 19 May 1962."'

(p. 48).

This is a quote from the document entitled Nine Pages from

the Inspector General, 21 May 1973.

Note: Check this quote against the original document. It

is important, to locate the document referred to as "the first

recorded approval" for ZR/RIFLE in order to determine whether

the White House requests for the establishment of an assassina-

tion capability was first made in May 1961, as I have assumed

here, or around May 1962. Note further that all of my

references to the initial White House requests for the

- establishment of ZR/RIFLE have been filed under May 1961.

50955

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## Page 62

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

BAKER

BISSELL

HARVEY

ROSTOW

OCCURRENCE: Card 1 of 2

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

May 1961

ERT

RIFLE

i-EXECUTIVE ACTION

Senator Baker asked Bissell to comment upon the section

of the 1G Report of 21 May 1973 which says: "Early in

the KENNeDy AbMINdSTRATIon,

the White House urged Richard

Bissell to create an Executive Action capability, that

15, a

general

stand-by capability to carry out assassina-

tions.

(p. 48).

SOURCE:

FILE:

IG REPORT

1967

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DulleS

STAPF:

Baron

DATE: July 3, 1975

DATES:

MCCONE

HELMS

CABELL

MAHEU

late 1961

CATEGORIES:

Execiatire RetionN

MONGOOSE CAsTri

OCCURRENCE:

MCCONE testifled that he had no knowledge that at any time prior to his assumption of

the Directorship of the CIA that the CIA had been given authority to be involved

in assassination plots (68) He testifled that he had no knowledge of who had initiated"

the MAHEU operation or carried it out and that he had never known of the Executive

Action Plan.

He also denied knowledge of other abortive assassination attempts

against CASTRO, although he presume-they were carried under the authority of the

Executive Action Plan.

He had never discussed with DULLES or General CABELL or HELMS

whether there had ever been any grant authority to the CIA to plan assassination (68)

SECRET

SOURCE:

FILE:

McCone Testimony

STAFF:

DATE:

Rhea

6/28/75

HH 50955 DocId: 32423616

Page 62

---

## Page 63

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HARVEY

DATES:

May 24, 1961

CATEGORIES:

VER

RIFLES

EXECUTIVE ACTION

OCCURRENCE:

William

K. Harvey, Chief, FI/Division DD,

issued a memorandum

for Cable

Secretariat, the subject of which was

"Distribution --

ZR/RIFLE Traffic," which indicated that two copies of all

cable traffic concerning ZR/RIFLE were to be delivered to

Harvey, and no other distribution was to be made.

....I

SOURCE:

FILE:

IG REPORI, 1967

STAFF:

DATE:

Baron

July 3, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HARVEY

DATES:

May 24, 1961

CATEGORIES:

AR

RIFLE

EXECUTIVE ACTION

OCCURRENCE:

Nilliam K. Harvey, Chief, Fi/Division DD, Issued a memorandum

for Cable

Secretariat,

the subject of which was "Distribution

ZR/RIFLE Traffic," which indicated that two copies of all

cable traffic concerning

ZR/RIFLE were to be delivered to

Harvey, and no other distribution was to be made.

--

= =

HH

50955

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63

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## Page 64

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HARVEY

MCCONE

FITZGERALD, DESMOND

DATES:

1962

CATEGORIES:

CASTRO

EYELUTIVE ACTION'S

OCCURRENCE:

In response to a question as to how HARVEY could have continued the Executive Action

time to

Plan without MCCONE's knowledge, MCCONE replied "I think he was reporting at that

DESMOND FIT&GERALD who

In turn reported to Mr. HELMS." (49)

SOURCE:

McCone Testimony

FILE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

MCCONE

DATES:

STAFF:

Rhea

DATE: 6/27/75

CATEGORIES:

1962

MONGOOSE

CASTRO

EXECUTIVE ACTION

OCCURRENCE:

MCCONE was asked how assassination attempts could have taken place without his

knowledge. He replied that it was very disturbing to him to learn of these

assassination attempts "but I think the reason it went on was it

authority that was granted before I took otrice, Put that is notjan excuse" (47)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

FILE:

McCone Testimony

STAFF:

DATE:

Rhea

HH

50955

DocId: 32423616

Page

64

---

## Page 65

Dittie.

February 1962

BISSELL, Richard

HELMS, Richard

EXECUTIVE ACTION/ ZRRIFLE

OCCURRENCE:

BISSEII, believes that he told HELMS about Project BRRIFLE at the time of HELMS' succession

as DDP.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: BISSELL, II (53)

FILE:

STAFF: Baron

DATE:

28.6.75

PERSONS/ENTITIRS:

ENT'ES:

Cubella

Breckinridge

Castro

T4

' 65

Castro

ZR Rifle:

OCCURRENCE:

Breckinridge testified that "Cubella was a man who was high in the castro

government, he was a man who represented a dissatisfied clement," (Tr. 80)

or so CIA thought. (Tr. 82-83)

In general, in the past, for the CIA,

assassination became a consideration, but assassination had not been

the objective." (Tr. 80)

SOURCE:

nr. Tiln

rollar

6177/75

STAFF:

Mann. John Bavly

HH 50955

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## Page 66

Breckinridge

Castro

Harvey

2-05

Castro

ZR Rifles

OCCURRENCE:

Breckinridge testified that "the Mafia connection from beginning to end was

an attempt to assassinate Castro.

in the Spring, perhaps February of 1905.

The operation was callou off finally

(Tr. 72)

Harvey called off Mafia operation (Tr. 72-73)

SOURCE:

Testimony of Win. Colby, 5/23/75

FILE:

STAFF:

DATE John Bayly

=---

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Dulles

DATES:

6-63

ZR Rifle L

OCCURRENCE:

Colby testified "the indication (is) that Mr. Dulles did know of this act

(ZR Rifles project to carry out assassination) at the time." (June, 1963)

(Tr. 88) (Tr. 87-88)

SOURCE:

Testimony of In. Colby, 5/23/75

TITTM

STAFF

DATE:

HH

50955

DocId: 32423616

Page

66

---

## Page 67

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HARVEY, William

Chief, FI Staff, CIA

QJWIN

DATES:

27 June 1963

CATEGORIES:

TOP SECRE

EXECUTIVE ACTION

OCCURRENCE:

HARVEY writes a memorandum to the Chief, FI Staff, "stating that the original justification

for employing QWIN no longer existed."

(41) - 772+

the rides

Staten.

SOURCE:

I.G. REPORT 1907, p. 41

FILE:

STAFF:

Baron

DATE:

28.6.75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

Cabcila

Fitzgerald

Castro

ZR Rifle ~

Harvey

11-22=65

Artino

2-64

OCCURRENCE:

(2-65)

Breckinridge testified that Orlando Cubella, disaffected Cuban major, talked with

Harvey's (perhaps) successor Fitzgerald about obtaining arms. On 11-22-63, Cubella

offered ball point pen usable as a poison syringe in faris, trance.

In Feb.

He refused

'64 ('65?), Cubella given weapon by Cuban refugee in Madrid

(Artime?) after arns catches put down off Cuban Coast. (Ix. 74, 75, 76, 77, & 78)

SOURCE:

Testinony of In. Colby, 5/23/75

STAFF:

Tohn Doorter

HH 50955

DocId: 32423616

Page

67

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## Page 68

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

Cubella

Breckinridge

•Castro

'05

Castro

ZR Rifle c

OCCURRENCE:

Breckinridge testified that "Cubella was a man who was high in the Castro

assassination became a considoration, but assassination had not been

the objective." (Tr. 30)

L 890

SOURCE:

Testimony of Win. Colby, 5/23/75

FILE:

STAFF:

DATE:John Bayly

7/2/75

PERSONS/ENTIFIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

Cubella

Fitzgerald

Castro

ZR Rifler-

Harvey

Artime

OCCURRENCE:

11-22-63

12-61

(2 05)

Breckinridge testified that Orlando Cubella, disaffected Cuban major, talked with

Harvey's (perhaps) successor Fitzgerald about obtaining arms. On 11-22-63, Cubella

offered ball point pen usable as a poison syringe in Paris, France. He refused

it. In Feb.

'64 ('65?), Cubella given weapon by Cuban refugee in Madrid

(Artime?) after arms catches put down off Cuban Coast: (Ir. 74, 75, 76, 77, & 78)

-

SOURCE:

S26828

I STAFF:

HH 50955 DocId: 32423616

Page

68

---

## Page 69

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

Cubella

Breckinridge

Castro

1'63

Castro

ZR Riflew

OCCURRENCE:

Breckinridge testified that "Cubella was a man who was high in the Castro

government, he was a man who represented a dissatisfied element," (Tr. 80)

or so CIA thought. (Tr. 82-83) In general, in the past, for the CIA,

assassination became a consideration, but

assassination had not been

the objective." (IT. $0)

SOURCE:

Testimony of In. Colby, 5/25/75

FILE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Cubella

Fitzgerald

Harvey

Artime

OCCURRENCE:

DATES:

STAFF:

DATE: John Bayly

7/2/75

CATEGORIES:

Castro

ZR Rifle <

11-22-63

2-54

12-657

Breckinridge testified that Orlando Cubella, disaffected Cuban major, talked with :

Harvey's (perhaps) successor Fitzgerald about obtaining arms. On 11-22-63, Cubella

offered ball point pen usable as a poison syringe in Paris, France. He refusod

it. In Feb.

'64 ('65?), Cubella given weapon by Cuban refugee in Madrid

(Artine?) after arns catches put down off Cuban Coast: (Ir. 74, 75, 76, 77, & 78)

SOURCE:

Testimony of Win roth.

K'bM

STAFF:

таст

HH

50955

DocId: 32423616

Page

69

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## Page 70

WEBUILDO:

Breckinridge

Cubella

6-65

Castro

ZR Rifle

OCCURRENCE:

Breckinridge testified that last contact with Cubella group was 6-65. (Tr. 79)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

Testinony of Win. Colby, 5/23/75

ETLE:

STAPF:

John Bayly

DATE:

7/2/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Breckinridge

Cubella

DARES:

'75

CATEGORIES:

Castro

ZR Rifle

OCCURRENCE:

Breckinridge testified that Cubella now in jail on Isle of Pines. (Ir. 98)

OURCE:

I STAFF:

HH 50955

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Page 70

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## Page 71

PERSONS/ ENTITIES:

HARVEY, William

3ISSELL, Richard

HELMS, Richard

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

Spring 1961

EXECUTIVE ACTION

CARD 1 of 2

OCCURRENCE:

HARVeY surmarized the thrust of BISSELL's conversation with him concerning setting up an

XECUTIVE ACTION CAPABILITY: "I have been charged by the WHITE HOUSE with the development

if and tell me what you can do cout " you please survey it and see what you can do about,

To the best of his knowledre, HEIMS knew nothing about the program. (44) As far as

ARVEY could recall, HiMS did not know about the program until he briefed HEIMS about the

tact that he had been given the assignment by BISSELL.

HARVEY testified that after he reported back to BISSELL, explaining his generally

negative assessment of the EXECUTIVE ACTION CAPABILITY, that he was instructed to continue

and at least make reasonable efforts to see what the CIA had in the way of assets without

cormunicating his objectives outside of a limited circle within the intelligence agency.

Iside from determining, if the CIA had an EXECUTIVE ACTION CAPAE ILIT* (452

he was instructed to

It SOURcEtent to develop a capability for passible stand-by us Alf:

(con't)

FILE:

HEY TOP SECRET

Rhea

DATE:

30.6.75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

CARD 2 Of 2

OCCURRENCE:

HARVEY testified that to the best of his knowledge during the entire EXECUTIVE ACTION

roject, no agent or officer who had not been in on the project at the time of its inception

as told about it: no operation was ever mounted; and no arent was recruited for the purpose

SOURCE:

FILE:

TOP SECRET

STAFF:

DATE:

50955

DocId: 32423616

Page 71

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## Page 72

PERSONS/ ENTITIES:

BRECKINRIDGE, SCOTT

HARVEY, WILLIAT

DATES:

2/61

CATEGORIES:

CASTRO

LEXECUTIVE ACTION/ ZRRIFLE

OCCURRENCE: Breckinridge testified that from his review of the files of Project

ZRRIFLE, the "controlling character" (80) of the Project was to steal codes rather

than to develop the capability for assassination. (30)

Breckeinridge testified that on the face of the docunents relating to Project

cuirls, the project was only directed at stealing codes.

The fact that it related

to developing the capability to assassinate came out in interviers with Willian

Harvey. (81)

i plan seei epina.

SOURCE:

BRECKINRIDGE testimony, 0/2/75

FILE:

STAFF:

WALLACH

DATE:

7/5/75

RSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

ichard

1901

Exccutive Action

Listen

ER Rifle

CURRENCE:

Helms testified that there was

no doubt that one of the purposes

ifle vas to establish a capability for assassinating foreign caders.

liclms

could not recall hearing discussions regarding setting up a capa-

recall know overlay bo-

or the assassination of Castro.

ie Castro

assassination programs and 7 R Rifle (55).

H₩ 50955

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Page 72

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## Page 73

BISSklE, Tichard

GOTTLIEB, Sidney

HARVEY

WHITE HOUSE

DAILS:

February 1961

(HARVEY's roughi

estimate)

SILVER, Arnold

OCCURRENCE:

BISSELL assigns to HARVEY / developing of "an EXECUTIVE ACTION capability;

a general stand-by capability to carry out assassinations when required.!

RXECUYTVE ACTION /ERRIFLEN

CASTRO

i.e.,

(37)

"HARVEY's notes quote BISSELL as saying, 'The WHITE HOUSE has twice urged me to create such

a capability.'

BISSELL recalls discussing the question of developing a general

capability

with HARVEY." (37)

"HARVEY says that BISSELL, had already discussed certain aspects of the problem with ARNOLD

SILVER and with SIDNEY GOTTLIEB." (37-38).

(continued)

citril 10f2

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, pp. 37-38

STAFF: Baron

FILE:

DATE:

28.6.75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HELMS, Richard

0P

CARD 2 of 2

DATES:

feb 61

CATEGORIES: TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE: (continued from card 1)

HARVEY used SILVER in developing the EXECUTIVE ACTION capability (38).

one on i a en he briefed Mr. IS fully on the ner

TOP SECREN

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, pp. 37-38

I STAFE: Baron

HW 50955

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## Page 74

BISSELL, Richard

HARUEY

DATES:

August

1960

CATEGORIES:

CUBA

(Executive Action)

VIKRIFLE

OCCURRENCE:

Bissell testified that he assigned Harvey the task of estab-

lishing an Executive Action project (p. 73).

Bissell said that his initial conversation with Harvey about

establishing the Executive Action program did

not include a

request to direct this program toward Cuba (p. 74).

However, Bissell indicates that Harvey's note is accurate

that on

11/16/61 Harvey discussed with Bissell "application

of ZR/RIFLE to Cuba."

(p. 74).

SOURCE: BISSELL TESTIMONY

STAFF: Baron

"*?

DATE:

7/3/75

FILE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

ЗY

ILL

OCCURRENCE:

DATES:

CATEGORIES

TOP SECRET

EXECUTIVE ACTION

y testified that BISEr, had never specified targets for the Executive Action

am

(133)

BiSSELL

JURCE:

STAFF:

Harvey 6/25/75

LE:

Rhea

HH

50955

DocId: 32423616

Page

74

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## Page 75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HARVEY, William

BISSELL, Richard

WHITE HOUSE

DATES:

Spring, 1961

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION &

OCCURRENCE:

HARVEY testified that during his initial conversation with BISSElL abo

BISSELL stated that the WITTE HOUSE had urged him to develop an EXECUTIVE ACTION CAPABILITY.

(37) On further reflection, he was not certain whether BISSELL had said that the WHITE HOUSE

had urged him personally or whether it had simply urged other persons within the organization

to look into the matter. (37) HARVEY did not know who in the WHITE HOUSE had done the urging.

(37)

HARVEY testified that during that meeting, BISSELL asked him to explore and assess the

field of assassination and the attendant problems and restrictions and requirements, and

implied that the program would continue into an attempt to develop an assassination capability.

(37-A).

SOURCE:

STAFF:

HARVEY TESTIMONY, June 25, 1975, pp. 37 - 37-4

DATE:

Rhea

30.6.75

FILE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HARVEY, Willian

BISSELL, Richard

DATES:

CATEGORIES

Spring, 1961

EXECUTIVE ACTION

Februrry, 1961

OCCURRENCE:

NOP SECKeN

HARVEY testified that he had a conversation with BISSELL in which BISSELI, asked him to

investigate a capability for EXECUTIVE ACTION. He had assumed the conversation took place

in the Spring of 1961, although, after having reviewed materials presented to him by the

Conmittee, he felt that it probably took place in February 1961.

HARVEY testified that during this conversation, BISSELl said that he was concerned

about the CIA's capabilities to perform EXECUTIVE ACTION and about the various protections,

methods, techniques, decisions, and judments as to its advisability.

tion was so clear as to be beyond any misunderstanding.

as he did say that "the implica-.

SOURCE: HARVEY TESTIMONY, June 25, 1975, pp. 34-35

FILE:

STAFF: Rhea

DATE:

30.6.75

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## Page 76

ALMS, Richard

Nov. 15, 1961

• BISSELL, Richard

EDWARDS

CASTRO, Fidel

CIA-Cuba Task Force

CATEGORIES: TOP SCREE

CUBA -- SYNDICATE/PHASE II

EXECUTIVELACTION/ 2 ERIFLE

CHED i of 2

OCCURRENCE:

HARVEY discusses with BISSELL the application of the ZRRIFLE/EXECUTIVE ACTION program to Cuba.

HELMS places HARVEY in charge of the CIA-Cuba Task Force.

"HARVEY has a note that on that date he discussed with BISSELL, the application of the

ZRRIFLE program to Cuba.

HARVEY says that BISSELL instructed him to take over EDWARDS' contact

with the CRIMINAL SYNDICATE and thereafter to run the operation against CASTRO." (39)

HARVEY adds:

"Shortly after this discussion with BISSELL, he was told by HELMS that he was

to be placed in charge of the Agency's Cuba Task Force."

(39)

I Did can lee for the Cuba ChronolORy, It should be used as wett in then

Late 1961-early 1962 HARVEY engages in daily meetings concerning Cuba operations. (39-40)

About this time Cuba overations of the CIA were known as Task Force W tluue." (40) (cont)

SOURCE:

• I.G. REPORT 1967,

STAFF: Baron

FILE:

MA

ADET

DATE:

28.6.75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

CALD 2012

OCCURRENCE:

(continued from card 1)

HARVEY indicated that he ran the CASTRO operation as one aspect of ZRRIFLE, handling

personally and not using, any of the assets being developed in the general ZRRIFLE/ EXECUTIVE

TION program, for which he used agent RUWIN. (40)

IT: Use this entry as well for the heading EXECUTIVE ACTION, as well as CUBA.

SOURCE:

TOP SCAPET

STAFF:

DATE:

FILE:

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## Page 77

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

BISSELL, Richard

HARVEY, William

ZIR/RIFLE

OCCURRENCE:

DATES:

Nov. 16,

1961

CATEGORIES:

CUBA

(Executive Action)

ZARIFLE

BISSELL testifies that HARVEY's note (I don't know the

source at this point) says on 11/16/61 that Harvey discussed

with BISSEL "application of ZR/RIFLE to Cuba."

(p. 74).

SOURCE:

FILE:

BISSELL TESTIMONY

STAPF: Baron

DATE: 7/3/75

CATEGORIES:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

QIVIN

HELMS

ILIGE: HARVEY

19 Feb 1962

ZR

- EXECUTIVE ACTION

OCCURRENCE•

On 19 February 1962, Richard Helms, then DDP issued a

memorandum for William K. Harvey; Subject: Authorization of

ZR/RIFLE Agent Activities.

"For the purpose of ZR/RIFLE activities: you are hereby

authorized to retain the services of Principal Agent QJWIN

and such other principal agents

and sub-agents

as may be

required.

This authorization will continue to be in force

through

31 December 1962, subject to renewal at that time."

"Because of the sensitive nature of this activity, accounting

for funds will be by general category and by your certifi-

cation."

SOURCE:

STAFF:

IG REPORT, 1967

Baron

FILE:

DATE:

71170 & 1975

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## Page 78

TICINS

Harvey

February 19, 1942 EXECUTIVE ACTION/ERRIFLE

VALEUURLES: DUP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

First recorded approval of ZRRIFLE.

New DD/P HELMS authorized HARVEY by a memorandum "to handle the project on a special basis

(38-39) accounting for expenditures would be by general category on HARVEY's certification.

Initial approval: $14,700.

(39)

FOR SECRE

SOURCE:

I.G. REPORT 1967, pp. 38-39

STAFF:

Baron

FILE:

DATE:

28.6.75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

RUWIN

LUXEMBOURG STATION

CATEGORIES:

TOP SECRE

21 April 1964

EXECUTIVE ACTION

ZRRIFIEV

OCCURRENCE:

QWIN was terminated by the IUXEMBOURG STATION tHe up. (41) on 21 Apil 1964.

"There is no indication in the file that the EXECUTIVE ACTION CAPABILITY of ZRRIFLE/QJWIN

was ever used."

(41)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

FILE:

I.G. REPORI' 1967, P. 41

STAFF:

DATE:

Baron

28.6.75

HW

50955

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78

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## Page 79

DATES:

Spring 1961

February, libl

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION -

OCCURRENCE:

TU

HARVEY testified that after his meeting with BISSELL concerning setting up an EXECUTIVE ACTION

PROGRAM, that he discussed, in theoretical terms, with a few officers whom he trusted the whole

subject of assassination, including, whether assassination was a proper weapon of an American

trust A the whole

intelligence service, and whether it was in the CIA's capability to do it effectively and

He concluded that assassinations could be used only rarely, and then under carefully

controlled conditions, and, as a result of the greatest provocation.

several caveats about the technical effectiveness of the CIA in carrying out this type of

operation. (38) His ultimate conclusion was that the CIA did not have the assets.

were no staff officers who were capable of this kind of direct action or to whom he would have

been willing to delegate authority to carry out such action. (39)

and

reported his conclusions to both BISSELL and HELMS.

marted testified that he decided shat assassinations, mere generally impracticable

SOURCE:

HARVEY TESTIMONY, June 25, 1975, pp. 37-A - 40

STAFF:

Rhea

FILE:

DATE:

30.6.75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

QJWIN

O'DONNELL, Justin

BISSELL, Richard

SILVER, Arnold

LUMUMBA, Patrice

DATES:

May 1961

February 19, 1962;

Febi, 196c1

CATEGORIES

TOP SECRIL

EXECUTIVE ACTION

ZRRIFLE

OCCURRENCE:

"The project name, ZRRIfLE, first appears in the files in May 1961, although the first re-

corded approval is dated 19 February 1962." (38)

"The EXECUTIVE ACTION tateme program came to be known as ZRRIFLE. Its principal asset was

an agent, wwiN, who had been recruited earlier by ARNOLD SILVER for use in a special opera-

tion in the Congo (the assassination of PATRICE LUMUMBA), to be run by JUSTIN O'DONNELI,

(O' DONNELL, made a survey of the scene, decided he wanted no part in that assassination

attempt, and asked to be released - which BISSELL granted)." (38)

TOP SECREN

SOURCE: I.G. REPORI 1967, p. 38

STAFF: Baron

FILE:

DATE: 28.6.75

50955

DocId: 32423616

age

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## Page 80

FERDUNS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

HARVEY, WILLIAM

Springs 461

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION

SILVER, ARNOLD.

74841

KUBARK

Man. 36,1961

OCCURRENCE: Marvey was asked about notes written by him and Silver from their

meeting in January of 1961, concerning Executive Action. One portion of the notes

stated,

"Be within KUBARK, one focal point for control, search, training, case

officering, etc. -- GDP authority in this focal point mandatory. DCI officially

advised?" (57)

Harvey testified that he did not know whether the DCI was advised

that he had been asked to create a capability for Executive Action and had taken

certain steps to have an assessment of assets in that connection. (57)

clarified that the wording of the memo probably meant that consideration should be

given to the question of how, whether and under what circumstances the DCI should be

officially advised of his program, "I want to make it clear that this in no way

means he should be advised.

He should not be advised, he should never be advised,

he should always be advised." (59).

Ile testified that this matter would have been

brought up again at any time the rie notion Preiest led to specific targeting

or specific operation or specifig

SOURCE: HARVEY TESTIMONY, June

STAFF: Rhea

FILE:

DATE: 6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Harvev. William

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

Gottlieb, Syd

1/25/61

EXECUTIVE ACTION

Castro

Trujilo Lumumba

OCCURRENCE: Harvey recalled some details of his conversation with Syd Gottlieb

on January 25, 1961. It was a general philosophic discussion of assassination

and assassination and techniques. As Harvey recalled, there was simply a general

discussion of assassination as an intelligence service technique and weapon.

was logical for rottlieb to to present at this discussion, because he had taken over

a new job as Chief of the Technical Services Division of the Clandestine Services.

As such, the ISD would have been responsible for technical support for assassinations.

The notation in larvey's notes from that meeting, stating, "last resort beyond

last resort, a confession of weakness," was, larvey recalled,

"a sort of concept

of operation philosophy which I expressed to Gottlieb.

•" (54-55).

As Harvey recalled,

the logical candidates tor Assassinatio!

were Trujillo, Lumumba, and

They were not bein

but they were three people

that might come to mind inscor

is tion

ation (55).

SOURCE: HARVEY TESTIMONY SUMe 25, 419757

STAFF:

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## Page 81

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HARVEY

DATES:

Jan. 26, 1961

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION

ZR Rifle

OCCURRENCE:

Harvey's handwritten notes entitled Project Zrriffle (exhibht l) state "identification:

the purpose of project Zrriffle is to spot, develop and use agent assets for dividison D

operations. Agents will be spotted in several areas, including the United States but

for operational security reasons will probably not be used in the countries of residence.

Present developmental activity is being conducted in the WE and IE areas but it is

anticipated that this will be extended to other division areas.

The projects will be

operated against third country installations and personel.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

STAFF:

Harvey 6/25/75

DATE:

FILE:

Rhea

6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

Jan 26, 1961

HARVEY

OCCURRENCE:

TOP SECRET

EXECUTIVE ACTION

ZRRIFL

The notes in Harvey's handwriting entitled Project Zrriffle state "3. Background:

In response to the increasing requirements for the operational procurement of foreign

on a in 1060 c

code and cipher materials, division A in 1960 began spotting of agent assets as a

develoymental activity. During the same period requirements from NSA became more

refined and in many respects more sentative because most agencies are not equipped

to conduct this type of operation, and because of the desirability to completely centralize

control over this entire effort, it was determined that division d which was the closest

touch with NSA on procurement requirements, could best conduct the activity. The spotting

activity has now advanced far enough to justify removing from the OOA category. (exhibit

1, page 1 - 2)

SOURCE:

STAPF:

Harvey 6/25/75

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81

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## Page 82

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HARVEY

DATES:

Jan. 26, 1961

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION

ZR Rifle

OCCURRENCE:

Harvey's handwritten notes entitled Project Zrriffle (exhibht l) state "identification:

the purpose of project Zrriffle is to spot, develop and use agent assets for dividison D

operations. Agents will be spotted in several areas, including the United States but

for operational security reasons will probably not be used in the countries of residence.

Present developmental activity is being conducted in the WE and LE areas but it is

anticipated that this will be extended to other division areas.

operated against third contry installations and personel.

The projects will be

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

STAFF:

Harvey 6/25/75

FILE:

DATE:

Rhea

6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

ZRAINLE

FEB.

•Mary 1961

CATEGORIES: IOP SCRET

EXECUTIVE ACTION/ZRRIPLE V

OCCURRENCE:

Cover: "Project ZRRIFLE was covered as an FI/D operation (ostensibly to develop a capability

for entering safes and for kidnapping couriers)." (39)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

I.G. REPORT, p. 39

I STAFF: Baron

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82

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## Page 83

INDUNS/UNITIES:

HARVEY

DATES:

Jan 26, 1961

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION

zRRitte

OCCURRENCE:

¡Harvey's hadwritten notes entitled Project Zrriffle (exhibit l) state "óbjectives"?

The objectives of this project is the procurement of code decipher materials, and

clandestine services, primarily by the NASA security agency.

Since these requirements

are subject to frequent revision, no listing of targets would be valid for the duration

of the project. Specific operations will be mounted on the basis of need and

opportunity. the Project will be

divisions and stations as needed, conducted by division a with assistance from area

(exhibht 1)

Harvey testified that his notes didnot cite assassination or assassination capability as

an objective of project Zrriffle. However, assassination was a contemplated purpose of the

project. If an agent had been recruited for assassination he would have been recruited

under the cover of obtaining code and cipher materials. (49)

SOURCE:

Harvey 6/25/75

STAFF:

Rhea

FILE:

DATE:

6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

HARVEY

K. G. WIN

EXECUTIVE ACTION

Jan. 26, 1961

OCCURRENCE:

Harvey's handwritten notes eneitled Project Zrriffle state

TOP SECRET

e Rifle l

perational Assets:

(1) personnel: k.G. Win is under written contact as a principal agent, with the primary

task of spotting agent candidates. K.G. Win was first contacted in 1958 to the Chief

of the Luxembourgis by the chief of station, Luxembourg, in connection with illegal

narcotics operation into the United States. For aperiod of a year and a half he was

contacted spareatically by COS, Lilsembourg, in behalf of the Bureau of Narcotics.

Files

of this Bureau reflect an excellent performance by K. G. Win. In October 1960:

K. G. Win annual salary $7,200

Hire of safe houses and other •

Travel and OBS expenses for K. G. Win and

automobile expenses $1,000

other agents and agent candidates $2,000

Total $14,700

Fees for services by and standby of agents and agent candidates $2,000

Travelo Ufcitaff employees engayed in Zrriffle $2,000

STAFF

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