Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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176-10036-10346

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA

RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10346

RECORD SERIES : National Security Files: William H. Brubeck

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : NUFK

FROM :

TO :

TITLE : John F. Kennedy document Control Record

DATE: 12/13/1963

PAGES : X9

SUBJECTS :

DOCUMENT TYPE :

CLASSIFICATION :

RESTRICTIONS :

CURRENT STATUS :

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000

OPENING CRITERIA

COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 382: Congo 12/62. Box 3.

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SECRET

+44-03-92-91701

Doeenbes 13.

HEMORAHDUM FOR THE PRRSIDENT

SUEJEGY: New Polsey on the Congg

868808 A.

EB INPASSE

He ass seekiag to provent as increase in Conmaist influenco

¿a tho Congo, to relatograte the ltanga, and to strengthen and mintala

e moderato goveranent in Leopoldrille that can 19 fact rus the

comatry.

"ithout sofaulgoration, on present polley casnot aollove

these onds.

Tahabp Is getting atronges and continuas to maneuver fer ea

independent katanga.

¿ Is an epparent peralyais in leopoldville and Adoula La

mablo, with a hostile Perliannt around his nock, to take steps

necessary for reconeillation and reintegiation.

A Conímmlat blos prosance In Loopolduillo la non a diatine:

possibsllty.. But hou mash initlative the Soviats take will be

drootly rolatod to thadr assesernt of ou will to not in Central

Aftlaa. risis disadvanteges. In trying to operate la Contral Afrioa

Eno so sroat that thoy ulll not sovo mions it appaara ve ast diso

Is Untted Mations, ulth linited financial resourced and probably

easly nithdrawale of Indien troops, cannot renain ja the Congo mol

longer as an effestavo force..

have

Socause United States and Ul polloy/for all praotioal purposes.

toon andsatinguishable, the Organisation's Pallure In the Congo

would bo a major failure of this Administration's polley and rould

seriouly undermine the peacekesping sole of tho united llations.

The Hood

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The Need for a Her Polley

The basde asaumption of our present Congo polloy &s that

we conld get Katanga reintegrated into the Jongo and an eSSeetsve

moderate goveramant established and funetioning in Loopoldville,

by persuasion and diplomaoy. backed up by threats of econonio astien.

Tais assumption bas turned out to bé tong. It is wrong bacause

Thsombe and his supporters are clearly not going to reintograte unles.

they have to and nothing up have done convinces falcabe shag, in the

last analysla, he will be forced to 1t..

It ls also vring bocause va ara not building an essestive Coatra

Government In Loopoldville. A largely Seresponsible Parllamins and

« Flabby administration at not good enough an a politioal servori

Adoula is the best leader on the horizon, but we should be helping

to develop other political leadership.

no situation this hool

Aftes much international oonversation, Foreign Miniator Spaal.

has sent a private emlasasy to Tahonbe to got him to nosept a elago

In the mathod by waich wik malms Its payweats.

The decision to make

the paymenta to the Central Govormant Inatsad of to Isherbo aheada

have boon taken without toging to "clear it" with Inhonhe, lat

spaak olected to consult Tahambe fire

He do not yot know on want

toras Tahombe vill ascopt Spaal's proposal. He do know from

experience that

88 1t requiros any aetion on his part to carsy.out

the detail, that aotion ull? not be tales.

Shut ting

SETS

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Assica, end probably Iproparable damage to the UN as a

peacelsepers

(D) Turning tha matter over to the Africang. Tho

Afrioans samnot handle 1t, and this sould open tha Congo

to ewentual Coummist taksover;

(e) BUYSAR LoOpOldesIo!s asguloscenco to Iahombo'e

see: a loopold t 1 man me me me me me man men

alternetive of Soviet ald; and

(d) Racising Ishombs asthe inister of the Congy. He see

no prospect that Tahonbe could win enough support throughout

the Congo to male this a reallatio posalblllty.

Tho Centsal Problems U.S. Pollor and U.S, U122.

What la urong with the ploture la the absenco of a U.S.

declalon as to what us would do, in the final analyaie, to prevent

caaos, larguoscale masanoros, and/or a major sorlet prosence called

In by radioal suedesaors to Adoula. "Il se continue to pissro

precont polloles, they uill rosuit in hardoning the Sahebe secession,

further walening the poaition of Adoula (beenuse of his laability to

solo the satuage problou, the dne big modernostyle political isau

a Congo polities). Is in/dows abis soad, sa may avantually bavo to

so Unlted States, and perhaps osher rostera forces to clean up

a very masy state of affairs.

It wo as clear now that in the ultimate case ue would use ou

om poser ly Contsal Afrios, then anything short of that that will

provent a breakdown in the longo la prefusble to waiting too long

and than baving to go in with too mob.

Ho therefore

BECR52

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• = 5 =

rocomord that the united Stetes Governont sals

It as a mejor cojective to devolop a modera and moderate Central

Coverenant in the Congo, to

got Katanga solutegrated Into te

Congo and to provent a Soviet prosonca in tun Congo.

le recarmend

immediate steps both to move sapidly tonard these objestives and

to demonstato that to have in faet talen tass decision and asa

prepared to baos 1t with the sull wight of united states pour.

A Democraey cannot bluff mleas it means It. 18 ve mean 16,

ad 18 dE la el0as to all concorned that ta man 17, to cas use the

possibility o8 our fallor intervention later to accomplied ou

pusposes. uith leos Intervention now.

Baoormanded Approach

He recommad three klade of stape to move ahead, on the

assumption that so really men its

(a) The du forces du the longe should be built up

to the point there it would clearly be ridieulous for

Schonhe"s Katengan forces to cuallenge them.

(D) Convince Adoula to prorogus the Parliarent,

to govern with a backing of a pro-lantern group headed by

Modutu, and to establish moss offootive adminiatration with

D, U.S. and Dolgion asslatence.

(o). Continuo to pursue vigoronaly the most feasiblo

olomats of the theat Plan, notably the airlaion of seventos

(without surther ocasultation with Tabembo, 18 nadesaary)

She Central Coverinant's anasty, ia MilItasy standatill

in North satani, and an attempt to force an agroed

diviolen

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division of powers and the beginnings of military integration

between the Central Government and the Katanga.

In those cireunstances, ve recommend three major steps:

1. M1lstary Stops to be Taken..

At the present time, our assessment is that, with the new

Indonesian battalion (one of then supposedly a paratrooper battalion)

and the relatively good security situation in the rest of the country.

the UN has enough ground forces to bandle any challonge from Katanganese

gendarmerle if it is not eballenged fron the air.

The problem 1s, therefore, to make sure that no present

or conceivablo Katanga air capability bas a chanco to operate against

the UN foroes. This means three thinee;

1., Changing the present rules of engugement of unoc

Air Force

•to permit the destruction in the

alr or on the ground of Katangese air force planes with combat

oapability, 1f any of these planes engages in a hostile act.

Tale mould involve due justification and publio warning bufore

such action was undertaken. Tshembe would be told that, 18 any

of his planos 1a positively identifiod as engaging in hostile

action in North Katanga or South Katanga, UNOC would consider

Itself justified not only in attacking the plane in question,

but In attacking and destroying on the ground, after due warning

so as to limit civilian casualtios, all Katangan air force

planes ilth combat capability.

2. Pollowing

S30R3L

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SECRET

•ba®

2. Following through

on:all of the prosent arrangements

to beef up the UN air forces in the area with Swedish, Itallan,

Iranian, and Etbopian equipment and personnel..

3. Placing In the conse to back un the Ul fesses an

American fighter unit.

It would be a departure from the original Harmarsk jold polfey

for the United Nations-to accept an American unit as a part of the

regular UNOC Force, which has been made up of contributions from

countries uno are not pormanent members of the Security Council.

Moreover, It raises the question of the command relationship of the

Us unit to iOC. Under existing State-JCS arrangements the Usat

transport siroraft flying in support of UNOC, the CINCUR representative

in Leopolduille retains operational control. The Indian, Ethiopian

and Swedish air units are, of course, under direct UNoC command. The

SYC would find it easier to accept a US unit if Its command relation.

ship with UNOC was the same as the air contingents of other nations:

From the political standpoint, we belleve tais would be in the us

interest, but the views of the Secretary of Defense and the JCs

should be sought on this point.

Our willingness

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midason os lal protocting ous tansport planes unleare operats,

the interier

os tas Conzo es bobal:

of the mers (b) baokiag up

the UN Parces; and (o) trainlag and devolontag an adequat

national

eir force for the Central dovernment

os tae coago.

Our willingness. to do this would be vosy sell sacoited by

a great majoraty of the

UN mambers, and espoelally by mambers of the

Congo Altisory Camittee. To the Secretary Genesal, Li lould symboliso

and demonstrate in a practical uny our earnest resolve to see this

thing through and avoid a major fallure by the UN In Its largost

peacekeeping attempt.

Neadless to say, the presence of V.3. forces o or even the

olear imotledge that U.s, farces vero available for this purposo

would be a signifleant prassure cn Tshombe and his associates. Thombe

conld intesprot this deession in no other way thin as proof that

any resiatance on his part to the Ml, of ey attampt to destroy

Buropean facilties in Katanga, would be not by a devastating

counter' blow.

Wo are sungasting a build up al U.s. military forces under

a UN imbrolla, for the pipose ol arolding the uns of force. to roo

Integrate the Katangs. The idea 18 not that the United States of

the vil would tel a nilitary initiative to destroy Ishambo's

goverment. But the Ull, with Vos. badilag, sould be placed in a

position where the alternative of military resistance was no longer

opon to Ishambe, and political nogotiation loading toward

recene llation

SSCAST

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• 8•

reconolllation and reintegratson, would be

the oly sational

choice. left to tim.

Strongthening the Contral Coveremont.

Tho steps raquired to strengthon the Contral Coveramant

and set Sorth fa TAB Co.

¿a general, Hallo Adenla le not an ideal choice, la ballavo

he he the best indiridual available to hold the solas of gereramont

In Lecpoldulllo end, evan ulth Erliament alanased, he sould enjoy

the virtue of having talan offsee logitimataly. The quest an

of malataining a "cap" group In porer Mould lEvolve the CIA tO

a certain extent. for obrious rascas, to would prater to beep

the entise operation as overt as possible, and the feet that lasavuba

can legally prosague Parliament for thirty days faodlitates this.

In bato countioa, us rould aspect adoula to ostablial a nore

effective exesntive branel. Unsle to heve considared giving.

addlesonal assitanod to the COC in establishing les as air capability,

talo soquironent rould, for the tino boing, do seduadant ie view

os the absonishonses al tha li als fores, Tolo, too, senla

seduce the need fur us to espand our covert operations with the

constant risk of exposure.

Begonellalfge end Rolato ration.

The dotelled agenda of staps roguired le avallable - indoed,

do all too familias. But in a new atmosphore produond by a new

demonstration that up moan 16, sone of the stops roguired ofuld bo

Caban

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•: 9

talon inndlately.

Adoula could order the standatlil with minimum difficulty

18 assurad of this more fortheoning us/un support. Moreover,

although the will is now negotiating the subject with rahambe,

wash it 18 faeed ulth Us detaination to end secession, this nigat

stimlate then to turn over immediately their taxes and foreign

arohangs to the Monetary Cowoll with os without Takambe's

agreement. Working out the agreed dhision of powar between the

Central dovernment and the Katanga and arrangements for milltary

integration would be a more complex task.

We think this could

best be achieved by having " Thant personally fly to the Congo and

negotiate a final settlement with Adoule and lahombe on these questions.

Both aides would' do given to understand that we would tolorate

Do nonsense la firming up speciflo arrangements based upon

the negotiations that have alroady been bold.

I0 :UNP:SisCo/Buffum

IO:Eclovelandsmto

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