CUBA: THE EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE CONCERNING COMMUNIST SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES
Originator: CIA
Document date: 00/00/0000
Document type: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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198-10007-10005

2023 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK Assassination System

Date:

6/24/201

Agency Information

AGENCY:

RECORD NUMBER :

RECORD SERIES :

AGENCY FILE NUMBER:

ARMY

198-10007-10005

CALIFANO PAPERS

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :

FROM:

TO :

TITLE :

CIA

CUBA: THE EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE CONCERNING COMMUNIST SUBVERSIVE

ACTIVITIES

DATE: 00/00/0000

PAGES:

7

SUBJECTS :

COMMUNIST SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES

INTELLIGENCE SHARING, LATIN AMERICA

DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION: Secret

RESTRICTIONS: IB

CURRENT STATUS: Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 02/10/1998

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS:

Califano Papers, Box 3, Folder 10. Paper re: the exchange of intelligence concerning Cuban

subversive activities.

JFK Raview

Separiment of the Army EO 1352

• Declassify = Exclude

• Exempt

Authority_

• Refer To_

Review Date AUGS Byweetal

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CUBA

THE EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE

CONCERNING COMMUNIST SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES

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CUBA

THE EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE

CONCERNING COMMUNIST SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES

I. Introduction

In combatting Castro-Communist eubversion through-

out Latin America,

there is a fundamental requirement

for intelligence - a requirement which involves the

timely acquisition and proceesing of information ae

well as 1te rapid dissemination, on a selective basie,

to countries concerned.

While efforts are now being

made by CIA, AID, and

the US Military Services to

Improve Latin American Intelligence sentine to ce done.

thue far has been limited, and much remains

It 18 not with this broad

problem, however, that this

paper 1s primarily concerned, but rather with the

narrower matter of the need for a stronger program of

exchanging essential Information regarding Communist

subversion in Latin America among those who need to

know it.

II. The Nature and Scope of the Problem

1 Limiting Factorg

a. There are many inhibitions which tend to

discourage the exchange of intelligence on an

international basis, even among allies. National

privacy with regard

to the inner workings of an

intelligence system must be preserved.

Com-

pounding the problem further, where Latin America

is concerned, 1s the divisive influence of the

long history of rivalries, wars, Jealousies and

disputes which have characterized relations among

the nations

concerned. The wounds of past conflicts

among pairs and groupings of nations are not com-

pletely healed.

There 1s lingering hostility

between Peru and Ecuador deriving from their

boundary war. Chile and Bolivia continue at

odds over the Rio Lauca and the question of

Bolivian access to the sea, and, even now,

Nicaraguan insurgents are harbored within

the

borders of both Costa Rica and Honduras. It

could hardly be expected that these countries

would be eager to exchange intelligence on a full

and frank basis.

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Do Beyond this, Latin America is not a homo-

geneous entity in social, political, or economic

terms,

and attitudes toward the castro-Communist

subversive menace vary widely.

A completely

unified approach toward exchange of intelligence

concerning this menace, therefore, cannot be

regarded

as attainable.

c. Additional Impediments to intelligence ex-

change are the generally low level of competence

of most Latin American intelligence services, their

lack of rapid, secure means of communication, the

absence of adequate security systems, and the lack

of security consciousness.

security safeguards must necessarily limit the

exchange of intelligence obtained covertly by any

of the

nations Involved, and particularly the

United

States, which has the most sophisticated

system

and hence the greatest need for protection.

d. These defects promise to persist, since the

governments of

some countries have little desire to

develop a competent career security service.

There

is a fear that the existence of an efficient service

would constitute a threat to further activities of

members of the existing governments at such time

as they might find themselves out of power. More-

over, many Latin American intelligence services

to label as "subversives" those of their own

nationals resident in other countries who are

opposed to the existing government.

e. These realities all underscore the fact that

multilateral

intelligence exchange must be

approached on a most circumscribed basis. It

should not be concluded, however that nothing

of value can be accomplished multilaterally.

With proper definition, limiting the problem

of exchange to matters

directly related to communist

subversive activities, such as the movement to and

from Cuba of subversives, the production and

movement of propaganda materials which threaten

internal stability, the movement of arms,

and the

movement of funds, It should be practicable to

marshal a useful measure of cooperation.

In

pursuing this effort, It will be important to

draw a sharp distinction between secret intelligence

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gained by covert means and Information obtained

The former Involves the requirement to

protect national secrets both as to sources and

acquisition methods employed. The latter, which

can be of great value, can be exchanged without

fear of compromise.

2. Categories of Exchangeable Intelligence

The following describe generally the categories

of exchangeable matter, and exemplify the types of material

under each:

a. Travel Information - Unevaluated information

devoted solely to rapid reporting of the movement

of individuals between Latin America and Cuba or

Soviet Bloc countries.

Such reports can be

reduced to a few elements such as identification

of the individual, point of departure, date and

time of departure or arrival, destination, and

carrier. When presented in an abbreviated form

such information offers minimum security problems

with respect to exchange with one or more countries.

o. Intelligence information reports - Un-

evaluated information derived from clandestine

collection operations or confidential sources

reporting on plans and activities of Cuban or

communist connected subversive individuals or

groups; on movement of arms, propaganda and funds;

on shipping and air movements and on results. of

surveillance efforts. Because continued receipt

of such Information by the United States 1s dependent

on careful protection of sources and methods of

collection, the exchange of this information with

other countries must be carefully controlled by

the collecting department.

c. Intelligence reports and studies - Evaluated

intelligence in all of the above areas, prepared

by an appropriate element of the US government in

a form which 1s releaseable to other Latin American

countries,

d. Selected overt materials - Articles or news

stories drawn from press, periodical and other

overt publishers. Selected for maximum impact on

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other countries particularly where such information is

not freely avallable to security services, as in the

case of foreign broadcast reports.

3. Current Exchange Arrangements

a. At present there is little organized exchange of

Intelligence among the Latin American nations. There

1s a limited

amount of informal exchange, often on a

basis of personal relationships between government

officials having a community of interest with respect

to a particular matter.

b. The Central Intelligence Agency has established

working liaison arrangements in those Latin American

countries where such relations have been considered to

be in the best interest of the United States.

Most of

the intelligence concerning subversion in Latin America

available to the CIA is derived from covert operations

or through contacts with another intelligence or security

service.

This inhibits the passing of such information

to agencies of a

third country. There 1s, however, a

substantial amount of intelligence available from overt

or non-sensitive sources which can be provided to

other countries. In 1962, CIA received information

reports from 26

services

with which liaison 1s main-

tained in Latin America and released reports

.. to 35

recipients.

Intelligence Items exchanged included

collated studies, weekly intelligence reviews, name

traces and travel reports.

c. The U.S. Army, through 1ts attaches, currently

has an informal arrangement involving bilateral ex-

changes of intelligence with Argentina, Colombia,

Ecuador, Uruguay, Peru, Paraguay and Venezuela.

Infor-

mation provided by the Army has been concerned with

subversive personalities, communist infiltration,

weapons movements and related matters..

Reciprocal 1n-

telligence received has been of small value.

The Army

also provides selected information on subversive acti-

vities to Brazil, Chile, Guatemala and Mexico, without

reciprocation.

The Navy has established a Navy-to-Navy

program for the exchange of Intelligence among nine

South American navies

and the U.S. Navy.

The U.S. Air

Force, through its attache system in Latin America, 11ke-

wise has an exchange program.

This 1s accomplished on

an informal basis

and

Is bilateral in nature.

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d. Exchanges of Information are aleo effected

from time to time through channels of the Depart-

ment of State,

e. As yet, however, the program for the pro-

vision by United States agencies of Information on

subversion to Latin American governments has not

been developed to an adequate degree. Since the

United States possesses the most extensive

acquisition capabilities, as well as the only

secure and reliable means of rapid communication

throughout Latin America (currently in process

of improvement); the development of an Integrated

United States system for bilateral exchange offers

the greatest

possibility of achieving the results

desired.

f. United States experience in the matter of

Intelligence exchange in Latin America, and in

other

areas of the world, has led to the conclusion

that bilateral

arrangements are more fruitful than

multilateral arrangements such as those established

within the framework of NATO, CENTO and

. SEATO.

Nevertheless, this experience has shown also that

multilateral

arrangements can be of some use,

particularly in creating an awareness of the need

for intelligence exchange.

Go The concept of an exchange of information

among members of the OAS with regard to subversive

activities has been put forward at numerous Inter-

American meetings, but has not been implemented,

largely for the reasons set forth in Section II. 1

Under the Punta del Este decisions,

the OAS membera

were urged to cooperate in strengthening their

capacity to counteract threats or acts of aggression,

subversion or other dangers to peace and security.

The Council of the OAS is charged with maintaining

vigilance over Castro-Communist: subversion, anc

Special Consultative Committee on Security (SCOS"

is established to give technical advice on request

to governments and

the Council on matters relating

to subversion.

All American governments have been

asked to furnish information on Castro-Communist

activities to serve as the basis for etudies and

recommendations by the Council of the OAS on

how to

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counteract them. Since the Punta del Este meeting,

the OAS has been making

slow progress in the

countersubversion fleld, but there has as yet been

no significant exchange of intelligence through

its machinery:

h. The Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) has

also demonstrated an

awareness of the need for

exchanging intelligence regarding communist sub-

version.

Annex 4 of the General Military Plan

prepared by the IADB requests the American States

report Information to the Board and to establish

agreements among themselves for exchanging infor-

mation of collective interest. The United

States

has approved the General Military Plan, but similar

action has not been taken by all member countries.

1. This brief summary serves to illustrate that

there is much room for expansion of bilateral

intelligence exchange arrangements among the Latin

merican nations themselves, which is now minimal

at best as well as a need to create an expanded

program

for bilateral Intelligence exchange between

the United States and individual countries, and

finally, a requirement to develop the possibilities

of a multilateral approach within the recognized

11mitations involved.

III. Existing Programs

Enumerated below are the principal programs now

1n

progress.

They are subject to continuing Improvement.

1. Bilateral exchange of intelligence 1s now being

conducted by CIA, DOD, and other US agencies with their

Latin American counterparts in instances where it has

been found possible to establish appropriate arrangements

for exchange of selected information consistent with

security requirements.

2. A study Is currently underway to evaluate the

feasibility and

desirability of establishing military

intelligence centers of the Caribbean Command and the

Caribbean sea Frontier, Atlantic Command, for further

dissemination of intelligence as appropriate in con-

junction with our Milltary Alerting System, for rapid

processing and dissemination when appropriate, of

intelligence on subversive activities directly to the

countries

concerned through the US Ambassador.

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3.

Intelligence is being provided to the Caribbean

Command by CIA and other elements of the U. S. Embassies

in Latin America as well as to CIA Headquarters for further

dissemination as appropriate.

4.

Various agencies of the U. S. Government are now

disseminating to Latin American governments, unclassified studies

and reports and other non-sensitive information concerning

Castro-Communist subversion.

S. U.S. Government communications systems throughout:

Latin America are being expanded and imporved upon on a

high priority basis.

•. Programs now exist under AlD, ClA, and DOD for the

craining and equipping of Latin American internal security

and intelligence services.

Additional programs could be

established in other countries where it is found to be in

the best interests of the United States and acceptable

to the country concerned.

7..

All information received by CIA concerning travel

to and from Cuba 1s put into a computer system capable

of producing lists by name, by country, by point of travel;

or sorted on various other bases.

IV. New Actions Recommended

1. Reinforce the present procedures for bilateral

exchange of intelligence, as described in Section III: 1. by

recommending an Embassy intelligence committee to coordinate

procedures for ensuring timeliness, completeness and freedom

from duplication or false confirmation in the bilateral exchange

with the host governments:

2. Encourage Latin American countries to engage in

bilateral exchange of intelligence on Castro-Communist

subversive activities.

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3. Arrange for the electrical dissemination to

appropriate Latin American governments of daily summaries

of radio broadcast material as monitored by the FBID of

CIA.

4. Make available to as many countries as security permits,

sanitized results of the extensive travel coverage obtained

by the Central Intelligence Agency, already processed by

machine. (See paragraph III. 7.)

5.

Discourage the employment of intelligence advisors

from nations other than the United States except in instances

where the United States can arrange to provide for the

training and control of any third country intelligence

advisor.

6. Arrange for the preparation of periodic studies of

Castro-Communist subversion in Latin America which can be

disseminated to selected Latin American governments.

7. Undertake action in the OAS to stimulate governments

to keep the Council and the SCCS fully informed on a

continuing basis of the nature and incidence of subversive

activities in their respective countries.

8. Encourage Latin American countries to approve the

General Military Plan of the Inter-American Defense

Board (IADB), and, in accordance with Annex 4 thereof,

furnish to the IADB intelligence information and estimates

concerning Castro-Communist subversive activities.

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