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Date

Page

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07/14/98

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY

RECORD NUMBER

RECORDS SERIES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

NSC

145-10001-10261

54

Released under the John

assassination Records

Collection Act of 1992

144 USC 2107 Note) :

Case#:NU 54214 Date:

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR

FROM

TO

TITLE : POSSIBLE FURTHER UNILATERAL AND BILATERAL ACTIONS TO

INCREASE PRESSURE ON CUBA

DATE : 00/00/00

PAGES : 10

SUBJECTS

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION

RESTRICTIONS : 1B

CURRENT STATUS

: RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW

: 02/17/98

OPENING CRITERIA

COMMENTS

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

54214

DocId: 32977084

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SECRET-SENSITIVE

4 le

POSSIBLE FURTHER UNILATERAL AND BILATERAL

ACTIONS TO INCREASE PRESSURE ON CUBA

(SHORT OF USE OF FORCE)

I. Unilateral

A.

Air attacks against carefully selected, important

economic installations by autonomous Cuban exile

group(s) operating from bases outside the United

States.

(Capability to be provided to autonomous group (s)

by CIÀ on "plausible denial" basis. Authorization

for such operations has been requested in past but

not granted.)

1. Advantages

- Possible substantial direct economic effects

- Indirect economic effects (maintenance of

military alert with consequent partial tying up

of labor force)

- Positive effects on morale of anti-Castro ele-'.

ments and waverers within Cuba

.. Clear demonstration to Castro of determination

of opposition

.:

-.--

2. Disadvantages

СОРУ

SECRES SI

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2

2. Disadvantages

- Technical difficulties and cost of:

providing capability

- Uncertainty of successful execution

- Risk of attributability

- Direct conflict with our well-known, public

opposition to air attacks

. - Marked raising of noise level

- Possible Soviet reaction, including negative

effect on troop withdrawals

- Possible reaction against air surveillance

B. Selective covert relaxation of U.S. controls against

Cuban exile groups in Florida wishing to undertake

sabotage and infiltration activities.

(Involves discreet neutralization of obstacles to

the operations of such groups established by United

States enforcement agencies).

1. Advantages

•- Possible additional (but minor) direct economic

damage

- Possible indirect economic effects

- Provision of some screen for CIA's own

operations

COPY

Possible

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• 3 .

- Possible dilution of Cuban defenses of benefit

to CIA operations

- Positive effects on Cuban exile morale

- Some positive effects on morale of anti-Castro

elements and waverers within Cuba

- Method of signalling to Castro change to

"harder" U.S. policy

2. Disadvantages

- U:S: acquiescence quite evident

- Direct conflict with our statements and actions

concerning U.S.-based exile raids

- Uncertainty of control over choice of targets

(e.g., Soviet vessels)

- Raising of noise level

- Possible negative effects on Soviet withdrawal

of military personnel

C. Military Feints

(Movement of U.S. air and surface units over and in

international waters near Cuba in manner designed

to keep Cuban military force in state of alert and

uncertainty. To be effective, movements would have

to be extended over time)

COPY

1. Advantares

SENSITIVE

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1. Advantages

- Indirect economic effects of maintenance of

military alert

- Psychological harassment of Castro and other

leaders

- Opportunities for escalation, if desired

2. Disadvantages

- Risk of reaction by Castro, with consequent

danger of escalation

- Investment of U.S. forces over time in essen-

tially psychological exercise

- Possible negative effects on morale of anti-

_Castro elements and waverers within Cuba when

nothing substantial happens

- Possible negative effects on Soviet withdrawal

-.=

of military personnel

D. Occasional, selected low-level "reconnaissance"

overflights by U.S. aircraft

(Flight paths would be designed to reduce to a

minimum the possibility of effective Cuban

counter-action against aircraft)

1. Advantages

PY

SECRET SENSITIVE

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- 5 -

1. Advantages

- Most emphatic method of signalling a change

to "harder" policy

- Possible tie-in to need for Intelligence on

Cuban capabilities for delivering arms to Latin

America

- Possible beneficial intelligence side effects.

2. Disadvantages

- Risk of escalation (Cubans on formal record

concerning reaction to low-level flights)

- Possible reaction against high-level flights

- Possible negative effects on Soviet withdrawal

of military personnel

- Possible raising of public and Congressional

apprehension that offensive weapons systems have

been reintroduced

E. Free-world shipping

(Examples: extension of NSAM 220 to cover all ships

owned or controlled by a firm with ships in the Cuban

trade; denial of coumercial, as well as U.S.-financed

cargoes in U.S. ports to ships in Cuban trade)

--.

1. Advantages

COR

SIG

ENSITIVE

..... a

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-5 .

1. Advantages

- Some limited reduction of number of free-world

vessels in Cuban trade

- Heightened appearance of forward movement

because of Congressional and press sensitivity

to shipping question

2. Disadvantages

- Relatively small practical returns

- Political costs with maritime nations

- Possible legal difficulties involved in some

unilateral measures

II: Bilateral

General

Essentially, the effort in the bilateral field

would represent a continuation, sharpening and

intensification of programs already in effect.

Measures of a bilateral nature, outside and within

the Hemisphere, would be strengthened and facilitated

by OAS decisions and recommendations emerging from the

Venezuelan case. Wherever possible, the OAS reso-

lutions would request the cooperation of other

countries.

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COPY

SECRET-SENSITIVE

The basic

::.:

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The basic limiting factor in the intensification

of our political and economic pressure on other

countries bilaterally is, of course, the balance

that must be struck between our interests with respect.

to Cuba and other broad interests at play in our

bilateral relations. For example, Spain's in-

creasing commercial and transportation relations

with Cuba are a matter of concern in terms of our

Cuban policy, yet the political and economic

pressure we can exert on Spain is circumscribed

by the need to safeguard our other political and

military interests in Spain.

B. Economic Denial

This program involves overt and covert, legal

and extra-legal, diplomatic and private, efforts to

deny Cuba access to free-world markets and sources

• of supply for commodities critical or important to

the Cuban economy. A major inhibiting element in

this effort is the short world supply of sugar which

increases Cuban leverage on free-world sugar con-

sumers. In addition, there is a general (but varying)

reluctance on the part of free-world countries to

COPy interfere with trade in tens which are not strateste

SECRET SENSITIVE

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In the internationally accepted sense (COSOM, Battle

Act). This fact puts a premium on direct overt and

covert pressures on the companies involved, as

distinguished from governents.

Progress has been made in our economic denial

program, and effective operations have been carried

out cooperatively by State, Treasury, Comnerce and

CIA. There is, however, considerable additional

effort required, especially because Castro is now

engaged in a major'attempt to broaden trade with

the free-world. No new authority is required at

this time, but rather an intensification of efforts

through the Inter-Departmental Coordinating Con-

mittee on Cuba.

A wore restrictive legal interpretation by the

Executive Branch of the various legislative pro-

• visions on trade with Cuba could have considerable

Impact, if we were prepared to accept the costs to

our other interests in the offending countries and

if we were prepared tacitly to indicate that existing

legal interpretations had been in error.

c.

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|.

SECRET SENSETIVE

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-9.

C. Free-World Shipping. In Cuban Trade

An additional imnediately available step would be

the conclusion of an agreement involving the amend- 06

ment of NSAM 220 with the British shipowner

Mavroleon

to guarantee the withdrawal by early 1965 of all his

ships in return for the progressive removal from

the blacklist of his vessels as they get out of

the trade. This agreenent should have beneficial

effects on other important ship owners.

A selective refusal to exercise the Presidential

waiver of the Cuban shipping provisions of the new

Foreign Aid Authorization act could increase our

diplomatic pressures on the maritime nations, if

we were ready to incur the costs to our broad

interests in the offending countries.

D. Air Service to and from Cuba

Our efforts to reduce, restrict and harass

air services (free-world and Cormunist) to and from

Cuba should be strengthened by the provisions of the

new Foreign Aid Authorization act, if, again, we

are prepared to accept the costs to other interests

In the offending countries. On the other hand, a

US-USSR

SHARAT-SENSITIVE

•..

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:

-dU.

US-USSR civil air agreement could have erosive •

effects on the always precarious barriers we have

established against air services to Cuba.

E. Anti-Subversive Program

Essentially, the problem here is to strengthen

both the will and the capability in Latin America

to take the politically and technically difficult

measures which have been recommended. The basic

lines of the anti-subversive program have been laid

•out, and they are being followed with varying degrees

of success in the different countries. Constant

follow-up, technical advice and assistance, and

training are essential to improvement in the execution

of the program.

FORMS SENATIVE

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