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Date

Page

09/24/98

1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY

RECORD NUMBER

RECORDS SERIES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

PFIAB

206-10001-10008

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR

FROM

TO

TITLE

PFIAB

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD AGENDA

FOR MEETINGS OF DECEMBER 27-28, 1962

DATE :

12/27/62

PAGES

9

SUBJECTS : AGENDA FOR DECEMBER 27 AND 28, 1962 MEETING

SUMMARY OF DECEMBER 27 AND 28, 1962 MEETING

DOCUMENT TYPE :

PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION

TOP SECRET

RESTRICTIONS

1B, 1C

CURRENT STATUS

RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW

OPENING CRITERIA

00106/98-08/01/2024

COMMENTS

pu2a Release under the Fresident John F

Kennedy Assassination Records Collection

Ect of 1992

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

NW 88132

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1206-10001-10008

2025 Release under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of

1992

Dea,

2728

1/02

40810001- 19000

V.186

ocld 2498.

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PRESIDENT'S PORCION INTELLIOONCE ADVEGORY BOARD

AGENDA FOR MISBRINGS OF DECINDER 27 - 26, 7962

SUBJECT

22238

9:00 - 9:30

9:30 - 10:00

10:00 = 12:15

22:15

1:00 - 2:30

2:30 - 3:30

3:30 - Dad of

Day

T:50 p.M.

9:00 - 9:30

3:30 - 1:00

December 27th

The Chairman's Time

Revien of Doorato Draft Interin Repont

40

Ene

President

Revien si Draft Report on Intelligence

Communit

Amirittes Relatins to

the

Cran

Arne Aulidup

(Raceted From DOI

0,7 December 26, 1962)

Depart for mmobi

Lunch - The laverdene noce-

(Guesto of Dr.

Langer)

Revden of the World

BL2926720

Fire.

a Decusy: Director/ Intelagence,

GEN

Recame Router of Heport on Subar Armis

Dinner at Residence of Mr.

John decons

Northwest,

D.

December 25t

The Chadonan ls line.

Discussion of Report on the Cuban Arms

Buildup with the Following Key Intelli

Gence Community Officiala:

a..

2: 30-10:30-Mr. john. Nocone

b. 10:30-11:00 1b. Goneral r.. Carter,

Donntr Directol, Cut

:11:00-11:30 Sit. General G

Flake,

12:00 123.5 Pligolor, MGA

do 12:30-12:000Mr. Tonas Hughes, Deputiy

Director,

Intelligence

and

12.204:00

Regeorch, Depertment of Stat

C. 12:00-1:00: VIt.

Gerieved Joseph Carroll,

Director, DIA

IDENTIAT

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HONEYDENT

(Decontoor 200h - Continued)

11.

12.

TIME

--22: 30

1:9 3:15)

2:30 - 3:30

Building

3: 30 - 16ND

Status of Dantomentatton:01Pror-Board

12-70a021-1-40h-

Resume Dlocussion of Report on ine Cisen

has Buildup and compiete Freparation ol

Report to the Fresident.

CONFIRM

1118

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## Page 5

HOP SECRE

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

This recalent nostales abomation

IDEALIST,

CORONA

'OXCART

MEMORANDUM TOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Board Meeting of December 27 - 28, 1.962

The Eoard convened at 9:00 a.m. on December 27. * Those

press bore de, Paan chator a me a murphy,

Dr. Killian

suggested that Board members read the draft

report which had been furnisned to the Board on the preceding

day by Mr. McCone, the Director of Central Intelligonce, setting

of the all-source review which the Board had

requested concerning U.S. intelligence conmunity activities with

respect to the soviet military buildup in Cuba during the 6-months

preceding October 22, 1962.

The Chairman asked that Board members

make note of any comments and questions

they might wish to raise

Ior discussion during this two-day meeting.

DI. Killian saia

he ivas not sure the DCI's report had the approval of the intelli

gerice community at this point, for he understood that Mr. McCone

was at that moment reviewing

the uraft report in seattle, and 1t

was possible that some of the conclusions and ractual details

might not have yet received final approval by the agencies which

contributed to the preparation of the report (CIA, DIA, State ano

According..y,

the Chairnan noted the Importance of the

discussions which

the Board would have on the following day with

heads of the intelligence agencies.:

The Chairnan also thought

that the Board should aim for the preparation of

to the President at the close of hi's 2-day meeting.

r. Killian said that he had very recently talked to Mr.

McGeorge Bundy who hopes that the Board will take the time it need

to produce a solid report on the handling given by U.S. Intelli-

i gence agencies to the soviet military bullaup in cuna.

Mr. Bundy

assured that the President will undersiand that the Board is going

Into the subject deeply and objectively. About 10 days ago, the

Chairman related, he had received a telephone call from Mi. Bundy

who said that he had seen

an early draft of the Dol's report (from

a confidential source) and was concerned because the report ald not

get to the basic. Issues, and Mr. Bundy expressed an

taik to Mr. Mccone about this.' Dr. Killian stated that he had an

appointment to see Mr. Bundy later in the morning at which time ne

would ask Mr. Bundy to meet with the Board during the course of

Board members Baker and Land were unable to attend.

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24-day stay in Cuba, and our Government 13 equally In the dark

arout Soviet and Cuban plans for further activities involving

other countries. in this Hemisphere..lso we are lacking Intel

ligence on: Cuba/Communist China discussions. Mr. Murphy reiterated

his concern that our lack of information on such matters as theser

indicates the absence of an adequate intelligence capability to

keep our Government informed about developments in Cuba at the pre-

sent time and in the future.

Dr. Killian at this point reported to the Board on the con-

versation which he had just had with Mr. Bundy

According to

A Bus Ye rePresente curat ate that Boad tanas

The President wants

an objective report from a group of citizens who have no axe to

grind,

and he is placing great store on this effort of the Board.

The Chairman said

that Mr. Bundy was obviously concerned about

the prospect that the Congress mill make inquiries into the cuba

matter. Hovever, Mr. Bundy reels there is a bare possibility that

Congressional investigators will be more hesitant to

raise hypo

hotical questions if they learn of the existence of astudy having

been made by a group such as the Board. It is Mr. Bundy's hope

that the Board will coefully consider the preparation of a sant-

tined version of the report,

but if the Board and the President feel

that this cannot be done then the Board should try to prepane a

report which could be used in executive session of a Committee of

the Congress.

Dr. Killian went on to report other matters which had been

covered in hig discussion with tr. Bundy.

He said that Mr. Bundy

had expressed concern over the failure of the DoI to accept the

suggestion that there be submitted a more adequate report than the

DOI forwarded to the Board on December 26. Mr. Bundy

noted in this connection that the doIls report assigns to policy.

makers prime responsibility for any fartures with respect to

intelligence handling.

purposes of the Boardis study,

on the cuestion of avoid gent to or spectar group records for

Bundy infomed the Chairman

that certainly. the Board,

shoula examine such records and that for

they could be cotatned pron Mr. Parrott. (Mr. Dundy commented that

the boardis the only group which can have this kind of access).

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HOP SECRI

- 12 -

16.00 the Board's study, Mir. Bundy boid On. Kildan Shat

the Board should

include 1n

its norter discuanions with the

Socrobertes

State and Defense andrthe Chattan of the J00nt

Caledo. of

Start

Mr.

Bundy inducating that the Secretary of

Defense

has particuler rescivationg about the Doils coport.

Anothch matter montioned bint. Bundy was hid belier that

the morale of

the intelligance.commandty as a bole stando 60

sutron in the absence of a carefuily done aurion and neport

Which ta botng dapected from the Board.

With regard

to the intortm report rich the Board has tides

it's

Wundu

in corned the

Chadamn that the report could

delinered

to his on it.

could be poccented. to the

masadent darectits

2111

Fire

13r303

Prontoche

wir poldor.

ore. other matter discaooed woo

Board's

comerh about

my intell tence let-down th.ore

moles of the Outs

0110109

to being w

Bundy'o belted that no each Zoe-dead is in

prospect i progent direcares and dracussiono ou the gloject have

any effect in doveinmenü.

(i the conolusion of tae Continen's.

coobuntrod His 0152166100

with tr. Bunde

tire

board. iceconod

482:30 P.00,

the Doard was prefed on tie tonid oituation vy

Comed: boutor

senior indelligence offloor in CIAg Office od

anbeta igonce (ur. jay cline, Doputy DOI/Intelligence

w?TRO0M0X/180/8

and nee

availabde to be present at this

2001d

mecting) .

6Au0C0

the handling of cumcnt intelligonce matter,

the sclection

mo arabe-us of ourment antoinegenoe alens (e.to in tha

ere and in

menoradda

the

Whate Houser,. and

the proporation or internal in-

"ої'

use it

20701 .

Dendor

that his dubles were in the areds of analysis

not the collection,

of

interlagence.

Mis briefing co

the board deluded the folioning stegece batedro:

L9SL/92:200.222213.006 :

Reppinanattons neticon the USSR and

Communist:

0h:52

groates!

the history of their dispute,

aid an open break in party relationo is most

Likely noor.

The. ÜSSR 15

presently

reapprodoing ile foreigo.

posted pocisions in the dishe of the Cuba cassie artemath

1928/EST 222:

mo vesp 16rab a diplomatio doondotall do bewily

and th

ceceable to. to Ussa/Chicon nift.

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The Chairman asked the DCI. whether the HOMGOOSE activity

presonted any particular intelligence problem in

the

Cuba

Situation.

tir. Mecone said. that it had not.

He said

that

in the MONGoosE activity the Spéclai. Group and the

Attorney

General had given a great deal of consideration co

üne need

jon sneezligence conloction with respect to cuba.

out

the

incoltrence needed was crimarily for covert accron rather

than

ouber purpoces.

nevertheless,

the MONGOOSE activity

contributed to the over-all.

Intelligence

collection effort

0n Cuiva.

Hit.

NeGone recailed that there

was d. n12003

In the

collection of intelligence

on Cuba. after the Bay of Figs in-

and when he took office in Movember 1961 Mr: licCono

surprised to

icarn that no interrogation oi cuban refugees

2k102

thereafter,

following discussions with

Chie

President

and

the Attorney Gehoral they sot the refugee

interrogations under woy.

hit.

Murphy wondored why thore hod been & tet-jowm.th

inberlinence catherine

after the

Bayrof Pigs incident.

10C0n9

cand chat

Than.

book ince befere its time.

but ne

that. the

moosong ind to do mon discouragement and

other perchodogical rectora:

In redponse to De. Millien's

ducation

to

nether another Intelligence let-down was in

abor?

tho

rare

there

KaS

1n

fact

of the Cuba crisis, No. lecone said that

a great danger oi

auch a development following

Mhot come

officials consider

was

an

"intelligence

vietony"

cor the united

States:

licCone, noting

that-the soviet

SArd's remain

in Cube, oatd he hod brought this up foresfully

¿ weele AG0 1

HiS Executave Conitose meeting.

and the

President

had

agrood bo get vord to the UsSA that any inter-

Lerance

with

oill

207022 1000maisones. 02 Cube would be

sonardered

26 DOL14

Mont Grove

Stevencon have pasoedLids word to Kucnetsar.

added

chor whare con-level reccareddoance Alachbe have beco

suspended,

cDou!d

antoninous.development coour. 16wll be

obtain Procidonidad approvator the resumption

of lon-level flights

Hi?. Face

inaudred a6. 60 woether there here cnx.0r0h201610ng

on thirdonduct of interligence operationa with regard to Cuba.

Mir. Heone said yes;

it is desired to rollon a more aggressivo

pattorn de agent infiltration into Ouba.

ite would like torsee

63/02 % month effort directed

totard, the obtaining of straigit

intelligonce on Cubal lin iley of polltioni warfare: for exampis)

to actormine. the.ursnd.of

Sovlet

plans: in Ouse.

The ICI noted

that the covlets may quictly get. out or creas or thoy. mayin

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fact tale one step back and tno steps. forward, and hold on to

the Cuba real

estate. as a propaganda and insurgency base,

as a means of keeping Castro under control,

in order to

retain a carability for quicio restoration. of a Soviet offensive

capability.

The kind of concerted intelligence action which

the DOI had in mind

would include (1) penetration of the Castro

sovernment regine, (2) the placement of additional agent toams

in Cuba,

(3) the continuation of efforts

to obtain the assistance

French and German representatives in Cuba, (4) the

poscible coraining of userut intelligence from the attorney,

Donovan, who is negotiating prisoner reicases, and (5) possibly

the obtaining of userul information from the captain of the

"African Pilot

whe had a 3-hour talk with Castro and who

yesterday asked to see a u.S. intelligence officer.

Face asked whether Mr. Hecone would favor the use of

Guantanamo Moral Base as a base for launching intelligence and

ciatod operations againat cuba.

Mr. Necone said that he.would

not be in favor of this bocauce if we were caught using Guantanamo.

tor intelligence operation Cactro would obtein Wi and other support

for Coba'o demands for. l.S. evacuation of the Naval Baoc.

Anoworing General Doolittle's question, the DOT stated that:

u'2 overflights of cuna wore going at the rate of tuo a day, re-

sulting in covorage of all targets. once a weei and in coverage of

some imnortant targets (e.d,

harbors) more often.

Ma. Mieone said

tint CoMeR

and UST list the targets and thai he then establishes

flight schedules.

Going back to the subject of Guantanano;

Mr. Pace asiced whether

DOt had made a study of the

espected intelligence return that

would be obtained if intelligence operations were conducted from

the Base-- I?. Pace adding that he thought such & study should be

made before a final polley decialon was reached.

Mr. McCone said

that he had not made such a study..

He added that in August the

"operators"

in CIA had proposed

to the MONGOoSE Group that Guan-

tanamo Base beso used, but this was opposed at the policy level.

Mr: Hecone said that he would not be opposed to a restudy of the

propocal at this time.

anover to dr Kllllar s inquiry, Mr.

Mccone confirmed that we are conducting SIGINT operations at

Guentanamo, and Mr. Kirkpatrick notea that MiSA had only recently

added two more positions there.

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22

E PLUS:

Murphy

asked

the Dot to state the meaning of. "HONGOOSE

Mr.

Mccone

explained that

1n• the MoNGooSE croup l't

W&S

ordginelly.concelved. that

Phase

I would be one of gathering

Intelligence on the possiotties for the orgnihation and supply

of resistance groups within Cuba, but this effort was "only tainly

successful" because

Castro has come: 100,000 informers in piace In

and exereises intornal security controls through. a svatom of

ration cauds,

and therofore;

get as many teams into,

cubans nadinoen hoped.

On August 10, Phase Li was

redohed with

MONG0055 manning fur (a) violont actions (o) a retacely high

level of actions, ou

, and lesser actrono, 05.

"B MINUS"

Mr: Macone said that he had not been prepared to endorse pronosed

"B. PIUS"

actions in the absence of plang fou milttery backing,

becaush of his own spoculation that

the u.s. would be faced with

In any case; the MONGOOSE offort beane divented

by condiderations or Soviet activitieo in Cuba, Mi. Hecone staved.

In answer to a question from Mr. Murchy ag to vo. chairs the

MONGOOSE Group at this

said thnt he did not. imot

whether Me. Bundy or the attoroy deneral wag not serving co

Chaleman.

With roference to the absence of phobogrophie evtdence of Soviet

offensive

missile

deployment prior to. Octoner 24 pirotoranti;

nicond ouid that do one

looks at photocraphy or cuba abernd on.

Sentonver

56 As poseible to spot dridendo of activy at on sur

cristoba MROM alto, but thio activuty cotan hate boen tet ore?

ancientural workers

and

the evidence did not then point to missile

activity.

Dr.

Killian noted

the Board's concorn that Soylet can-a

curlage

operations moy be decedring ua.

Pir'.

MeCone expresced hts.

own great concern that the Sovieto are

deceiving us by conoutage

mechode.

Acinowledging. that.our inteliigence estimates loave &

certein mercin

for erdor, Hi.

LicCone noted that it to nevertheless

Impossiule dor us. to Bay

that we know ald that is going on in the

ussA with roopoct to massile cobivity:

In responce to Dr. killian's

commen't

Vial puoile discuscione seem to indtcato that U. S. missii.

capabtlities are superior to those of the USSR, the DOT considered

that

any suen conclusion 1o erroneous and rangerous and could leadi

to & complassney which might west regule in currarinent of the u.

S.

missile program by an econony-minded Congress. Mr.

toCone added

that. in nis presentations. co

select Connitbeco.of. the Congress he

always expresses reservations conceming u.s. mostle superlority.

Killian wondered wether

the President,

the Secretary. of

Defense, and the Congress understend the

danger of conclusions that:

"nothing is there besauce 1t

cault be seen!"

tir MeCone said that

undoustedly there is a tendency toward heavy dependence upon photo-

Graphie intelligence.

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