Document date: 00/00/0000

## Page 1

File #:

66-SE-2894

Serial Scope:

thru 34

DO NOT

DESTROY

FOIPA#.

+ -

Rereaned ander one wear E. Kerredi Gaaaaazrasier Reccada

BaaeE 15215825 Babe: FEEB-2055

NW 2$262

TAN ENCEL SHE SUPERE

Lage-

---

## Page 2

OMGON IMMENTATE 1/29/75 G4S

TO ALL. CACS

FPOM DIRECTOR

NECTRUCTTAN DE FITLE FILES AVE RECORDS.

TY ACCORRANCE WITH PROPOSED INUESTIGATION AND

CTLY DE GOUFDUMEUT OPFPATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLI-

CENCE AGTIVITIES, CONGDESSTONAL LEADERS HAVE ROUESTED

THE BUREAU NOT TO DESTROY, REMOVE FRÓM OUR POSSESSION

OR CONTROL, OR OTHERWISE DISPOSE OR PERMIT DISPOSAL OF

ANY RECOPAS OR NOCHMENTS WHICH AJGHT HAVE 1 BEARING ON

SUBJECTS UNDER NURSERCATION: ACCOPRINGLY, UPO! RECRIPT

OF THIS COMMUNIÇATION, RECIPIENTS ARE INSTRUCTED TO HOLD

IN ABFYANCE ANY RECORNS DESTRUCTION PROGRAM PREVIOUSLY

APPROVE BY STATUIE OR REGULATIONS. FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS

I" TUIC MATTER WILL BE ISSUED UPON RECEIPT.

ALL LEGATS ANVISED SEPTRATELY.

HOLD

all clertes

66-2894-1

tot 130313

SEARCHED......

JAN2 9 1975

FBI - SEATTLE

AWx 5526

a0e

---

## Page 3

RAAG WA CONF

?:?2PM MITEL 3-24-75 DEB

TO ALL-SACS

FROM DIRECIOR

SENA

CFLECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGÉNCE ACTIVITIES

SENATOR FRANK CHURCH, CHAIRMAN OF THE SENTE SELECT

COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES HAS MADE AN INITIAL REQUESI FOR INFORMATION

FROM THE FBI. AMONG IHE ITEMS REQUESTED IS A BREAKDOWN OF

FIFLO AGFUT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND

COUNTERTWTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

ACCORDINGLY, WITHIN FOUR EIGHT HOURS EACH SAC SHOULD SUTEL

TO FBIYA, ATTENIION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNIING SECTION, SETTING FORTH

SFPARATTLY THE NUMBER OF SACS, ASAÇS, SUPERVISORS AND AGENTS ASSIGNED

•TO INTEPHAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. PERCENIAGES

OF AN AGENT'S TIME, WHEN NOT ASSIGNED FULL-TIME IO THESE ACTIVITIES,

SHOULD BE USED IF APPROPRIATE, PARTICULARLY IN THE SUPERVISORY.

CATEGORIES. THIS INFORMATION SHOULD BE BROKEN DOWN SEPARATELY

BETWEEN INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

YOUR RESPONSE SHOULD

BE LIMITED TO AGENT PERSONNEL ONLY:

CCO FBI SFATILE BICH ONE

Ill ANN OUR

fues

1=

1-

SA

66.2894-2

SEÁRCHED.

LINDEXED. P

SERIALIZED,

......FILED. ›

MAR2 4 1975

Watch

55267 DocId: 32989833

Page 3

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## Page 4

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

Transmit the following in

Via

TELETYPE

FBI

Date:

CODED

(Type in plaintext or code?

NITEL

(Priority)

3/25/75

TO:

FROM:

DIRECIOR, FBI

SAC, SEATTLE

SENATE SELECT COMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU NITEL, MARCH 24, 1975.

SEATTLE DIVISION HAS THE FOLLOWING ASSIGAMENTS TO INTERNAL SECURITY

MATTERS:

ONE SUPERVISOR - FULLTIME; FIVE AGENTS - FULLTIME; THREE AGENTS -

85% OF THEIR TIME.

SEATTLE DIVISION HAS THE FOLLOWING ASSICAMENTS TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

MATTERS:

ONE SUPERVISOR - 80% OF TIME; SEVEN AGENTS - FULLTIME.

FAW:kn

#4.128974-3

Approved: 1/°c:)

WW 55267 Docta 329838gigl Agent in Charge

-

Sent

U.S.Government Printing Office: 1972 - 455-574

---

## Page 5

MRA74 MA CONF

1932PM MITEL 5-2-75 MSF

TO ALL SACS

FROM DIRECTOR

(63-116395)

jade

to

PERSONAL ATTI

AMIT TOM

O'SENSTUNY 75

CAPTIONED MATTER PERTAINS TO BUREAU'S HANDLING OF REQUESTS

FROM CEMATE AND HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEES TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL

OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. IN CONNEC

TION WITH WORK OF THESE COMMITTEES, STAFF MEMBERS MAY SEEK

TO INTERVIF! CURRENT AND FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES.

RECENTLY, THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) STAFF HAS

INTERVIEWED SEVERAL FORMER EMPLOYEES AND IT IS ANTICIPATED

THAT MANY MORE SUCH PERSONNEL WILL BE CONTACTED.

THE FBI HAS PLEDGED FULL COOPERATION WITH THE COMMITTEE

AND WE WISH TO ASSIST AND FACILIIATE ANY INVESTIGATIONS UNDER-

TAKEN BY THE COMMITTEE WITH RESPECT TO THE FBI. HOWEVER, WE

DO HAVE AM OBLIGATION TO INSURE THAT SENSITIVE SOURCES AND

METORS AND ONGOING SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIONS ARE FULLY

FilESTRIPPED

MAY 2 0 1975

SAC...

ASAC.

55 SuP

F4 200

BE35.

GC

S: Cruce

-66-294-4

NW 55267 DocId: 32989833 Page 5

MANT 1075

SK

(LAT)

---

## Page 6

PAGE, TWO

PROTECTEN. CHOULD AMY FORMER EMPLOYEE CONTACT YOUR OFFICE AND

HAVE ANY QUESTION REGARDING HIS OBLIGATION NOT TO DIVULGE INFOR-

MATION OBTAINED BY VIRTUE OF HIS PAST FBI EMPLOYMENT, HE SHOULD

BE INSTRUCTED TO CONTACI LEGAL COUNSEL, FBIMO, BY COLLECI CALL.

YOUR CONVEPCATIONS WITY FORMER EMPLOYEES MUST BE IN KEEPING WITH

OUR PLEDAR. IT IS BELIEVED SUCH A PROCEDURE WOULD INSURE PROPER

PROTECTION AND ALSO FACILITATE THE WORK OF THE SSC.

THE ABOVE PROCEDURE ALSO APPLIES TO CURRENT EMPLOYEES

OF YOUR OFFICE. HOWEVER, CONTACT WITH THE LEGAL COUNSEL SHOULD

BE HANDLED THROUGH THE SAC.

40LN

NW 55267

Doold: 32989833

Page

6

---

## Page 7

MRABE WA COME

5:45PM MITEL 5-29-75 PAHI

TO ALL SACS

FROM DIRFCIOR (62-116395)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

ElSTUDY -75-86-2594-44

REBUTEL. MAY ?, 1975.

IN CONNECTION WITH WORK OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE SELECT

COMMITTEES, ITS REPRESENTATIVES MAY CONTAC YOUR OFFICE FÓR

THFORMATION.

TA DUE RECENT INSTANCE, A REPRESENTATIVE. OF THE SENATE

SELECT. COMMITTEE IELEPHONICALLY INQUIPED AS TO IDENTITY OF SAC

IN A PARIICULAR OFFICE DURING 1979.

IN HANDLING SUCH INQUIRIES INSURE ESTABLISHING BONA FIDES

OF RFPRESENTATIVE BY SHOW OF GREDENTIALS ON PERSONAL CONTACT OR,

IF TELEPHONIC CONTACI, BY TELEPHONING BACK TO COMMIITEE.

JULESS INFORMATION IS OF A PUBLIC NATURE, AS IN THE INSTANCE

CITED ABOVE, OBIAIN FBIHO CLEARANCE PRIOR IO SUPPLYING ANY

INFOPMATION. FBIHO MUST BE EXPEDITIOUSLY ADVISED OF ALL

TNTORMATION FURNISHED.

END

SLA FBI SFATTLE CLP

A'D THS ;

asae

SAC.

ASAC

443

Sun

912*

Gups.

Stone

NW 55267

DocId: 32989833

Page 7

-AFTEr 6-9,75

66-2894-5

SSEARCHED....

LộG INTER

FRANZES P

...FILED..

MAY 2 0 1975

SEATTLE

SAC

PAST,

---

## Page 8

VRA?2 WA CODE

1:55PM. NITEL. 6-13-75 VLU

IO ALL' SACS

FROM DIRECTOR: 162-116464)

PERSOVAL ATTENTION

HOUST UDY iS.

REBUTELS MAY 2, 29, 1975, "SENSTUDY iS."

BUFILE 52-116464, AND CODE NAME "HOUSTUDY 75" DESIGNATED

FOR ALL MATTERS RELATING IO HOUSE SELECI. COMMITTEE IO STUDY

GOVERMMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

'AND BUREAU'S HANDLING OF MAITERS PERTAINING THERETO. USE

THIS FILE NUMBER AND CAPTION FOR MATTERS RELATING TO HOUSE

•COMMITTEE AS SEPARATE FROM SENSTUDY, 75 FOR MATTERS RELATING

TO SENATE COMMITTEE.

END.,

SLA FBI SEATTLE CLR

дії

66-0894-6

BEARCHED

PANDEXED

SERIALIZED.

I FILED I

JUN 1 3 1975

FBI - SEATTLE

Suga.

S-Steno..

NW 55267 DocId: 32989833 • Page 8

---

## Page 9

NR748 WA CODE

4:38PM IMMEDIATE 6/18/75 GHS

TO MEW YORK

BOSTON

MIAMI

SAN FRANCISCO

DETROIT

LOS ANGELES

, SEATTLE

UFO

DOWNGRADED TO

SECRET

FROM DIRECTOR

Per_ C98W51p2a

SECRET

Date

6/22

2016

SEASTUDY 1975; BUDED: JUNE 2,4, 19:75.

IKE FOLLOWING REQUEST FOR INFORMATION HAS BEEN ADDRESSED

TO THE ATTORMEY GENERAL AND FROM THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO FBIHO

FROM THE SENATE SELECT .COMMITTEE. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL

OPERATIONS MITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES: ". •

THE FOLLOWING REQUESTS PERTAINING TO THE TECHNIQUE REFERRED TO

AS MAIL SURVEILLANCE, INCLUDING MAIL COVERS AND OPENING MAIL.

AVID THE UTILIZATION OF THIS TECHNIQUE •IN INTERNAL SECURITY,

INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION, AND/OR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS,

OPERATIONS, OR ACTIVITIES:" (1) FOR ALL INCIDENIS OF MAIL

OPENING ELMAIL INTERCEPT BY OR ON BEHALF OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU

OF INVESIIEATION FROM JANUARY 19 196D, UNIIL THE PRESENT, PLEASE

Tie mare for

6/23

Fish

NW 35267 Doold: 32909833

Lage 9

ESEARCHED...

ISERIALIZED..

JUN 1 8 1975

FBIE SEATLE

---

## Page 10

PAGE IWO

-SECRET

STATE THE PHYSICAL LOCATION WHERE THE OPENING OR INTERCEPT WAS:

CONDUCTED, THE NAMES. OF THE INDIVIDUALS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE

OPENING OR INTERCEPT, THE TYPE OF MAIL OPENED OR INTERCEPTED,

AND THE PURPOSE OF IHE, OPENING OR INTERCEPT. (O) FOR ALL

INCIDENTS OF MAIL COVERS THAT WERE PHYSICALLY CONDUCTED BY FBI

EMPLOYEES, WHETHER ALONE OR IN COOPERATION WITH POSTAL SERVICE

EMPLOYEES, FROM JANUARY I, 1960, UNTIL THE PRESENT, PLEASE SIATE

THE PHYSICAL LOCATION WHERE THE COVER WAS CONDUCIED, THE NAMES

OF THE INDIVIDUALS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE COVER, THE TYPE OF

MAIL COVERED: AND THE PURPOSE OF THE COVER. (3) PLEASE PROVIDE

ALL DOCUMENTS AND MEMORANDA WHICH DISCUSS, REFER, OR PELATE TO

THE ORIGINS, AUTHORIZATIONS, CONDUCT AND TERMINATION OF, AND

POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR, THE MAIL OPENINGS, INTERCEPTS, AND

COVERS IDENIIFIED ABOVE."

EACH OFFICE SHOULD IMMEDIATELY

, REVIEW IIS FILES FOR ALL

INFORMATION REQUESTED BY THE SENATE COMMIITEE. NEW YORK, BOSTON,

DETROII, LOS ANGELES, SEATTLE, AND UFO SHOULD FURNISH INFOR-

MATION CONCERVING SAM SURVEY CHEN YORK, DETROIT, AND SAN

FRANCISCO SHOULD FURVISH INFORMATION CONCERNING GUS SURVEY.

NEW YORK AND WFO SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING Z COVERAGE.

NW .55267 DocId: 32989833 Page 10

---

## Page 11

PASE THREE

SECRET

SAN FRAMCISCO SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING CHIPROP

AND CHICLET.

MIAMI SHOULD ADVISE IF THE INFORMATION RECEIVED

FROM MM SOO-S RESULTED FROM INTERCEPT OF MAIL AND IF SO

APPROPRIATE INFORMATION SHOULD BE FURNISHED. RESULTS SHOULD BE

SUBMITTED BY TELETYPE, ATTENTION OF SAI. O• CREGAR, AND SHOULD

• REACH THE BUREAU BY JUNE 24, 1975.

CLASSIFIED BY. 3676, XGDS ? AND

3, INDEFINITE.

END

NW 55267

DocId: 32989833 Page 11

---

## Page 12

FD-36 (Rev. S-22-64)

Transmit the following in

Via

TELETYPE

FBI

Date: 6/23/75

CODE

(Type in plaintext or code)

NITEL

(Priority)

TO

: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM

: SAC, SEATTLE (66-2894) (RUC)

ATTENTION:

SAW. O. CREGAR, DIVISION FIVE

ara

.13.2

SENSTUDY 1975.

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO NEW YORK, JUNE 18, 1975.

SAM SURVEY, INSTITUTED AT SEATTLE, SEPTEMBER 8, 1961,

AND DISCONTINUED FEBRUARY 8, 1963. DURING ENTIRE PERIOD

AIRMAIL

SURVEY CONDUCTED AT AIRMAI FACILITY, SEATTLE-TACOMA INTER-

NATIONAL AIRPORT. ANY MAIL MEETING CRITERIA WAS TRANSPORTED

TO THE SEATTLE OFFICE FOR PROCESSING.

THE FOLLOWING SPECIAL AGENTS INVOLVED IN SURVEY, ALTHOUGH

A REVIEW OF FILE DOES NOT INDICATE EXACT DATES OF INVOLVEMENT,

SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS, OR SUPERVISORY RESPONSIBILITY:

JOHN J. WACHTER, REESE H. CHIPMAN, LAMBERT G. ZANDER,

ROBERT H. McCARTHY, LYLE J. THEISEN, JOHN CARL NETTER,

W. H. WILLIAMS, II,

CHARLES W. PEASINGER,

CMS : sra/đlm!

(1)

END PAGE ONE

I Approved: L

DOWNGRADED TO

SECRET

I C984)57072

Date,

Sent

12%/(V15

16-2394 -8

SA

GPO: 1970 0 - 402-735

Special Agent in Charge

NW 55267 DocId:32989833 Page 12

---

## Page 13

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

Transmit the following in

Via

FBI

Date:

(Type in plaintext or code)

(Priority)

PAGE 2 (SE 66-2894)

DWIGHT M. WELLS AND OLIVER W. LEHTINEN.

ALL MAIL INTERCEPTED WAS AIRMAIL ADDRESSED TO VARIOUS

ADDRESSES IN JAPAN. THESE ADDRESSES WERE KNOWN TO BE MAIL

DROPS USED BY SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SERVICES (SIS). IN OTHER

CASES THE ENVELOPES CONTAINED CERTAIN CHARACTERISTICS

USED BY SIS FOR ILLEGAL SUPPORT MAIL. THE PURPOSE WAS TO

PROVIDE MAIL COVER ON ALL KNOWN MAIL DROPS USED BY SIS AND

TO LOCATE ADDITIONAL DROPS.

SEATTLE HAS NO CONTROL FILE FOR MAIL COVERS CONDUCTED

DURING THE PERIOD AND THERE IS NO WAY OF REVIEWING ANY

THAT MAY HAVE BEEN MAINTAINED AT SEATTLE.

A REVIEW OF SEATTLE FILE 65-3663, CAPTIONED SAM

SURVEY REFLECTED BUREAU IS IN POSSESSION OF ALI SERIALS

REGARDING AUTHORITIY, POLICY AND PROCEDURES FOR THE

SURVEY. A REVIEW SHOWED THE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC INCIDENTS OF

ADDITIONAL ACTIVITY AND INVESTIGATION CONCERNING LETTERS

LOCATED DURING SURVEY:

LETTER ADDRESSED TO MR. B. COHEN, TOKYO, JAPAN FROM GERRY

END PAGE TWO

Approved:

Special Agent in Charge

NW 55267 DocId: 32989833 Page 13

- Sent

_M

Per.

GPO: 1970 0 - 102-735

---

## Page 14

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

Transmit the following in

Via

FBI

Date:

(Type in plaintext or code)

(Priority)

PAGE 3 (SE 66-2894)

OBERLIN OF TOLEDO, OHIO, SENT TO BUREAU BY LETTER DATED

FEBRUARY 23, 1962, TRANSLATION IN SEATTLE FIEE 65-3663,

SERIAL 43•

LETTER ADDRESSED TO C. TROUTSCHEFF, HONSCHU, JAPAN,

FROM N. LOGUNOW, SPRINGFIELD, MASSACHUSETTS, ORIGINAL SENT

TO BUREAU BY SEATTLE LETTER DATED MARCH 23, 1962, TRANSLATION

IN SEATTLE FILE 65-3663, SERIAL 44.

LETTER FROM VERS POKROVSK, SOUTH LINCOLN, MASSACHUSETTS

TO S. TOIDZUMI, TOKYO, JAPAN, ORIGINAL, SENT TO BUREAU

BY SEATTLE LETTER DATED MARCH 1, 1962, TRANSLATION IN SEATTLE

FILE 65-3663, SERIAL 47.

LETTER FROM N.L., 633 I2TH AVENUE EAST, SEATTLE TO

MRS. SHIFZBLATT, TOKYO, JAPAN, SENT IO BUREAU BY SEATTLE

LETTER DATED APRIL 30, 1962, SEATTLE FILE 65-3663, SERIAL

60, TRANSLATION IN SEATTLE FILE.

LETTER FROM INDIVIDUAL IN SEATTLE TO ADDRESS IN JAPAN,

SENT TO BUREAU BY SEATTLE LETTER DATED OCTOBER 2, 1962,

FOR TRANSDATION FROM RUSSIAN, SEATTLE FILE 65-3663, SERIAL 104.

END PAGE THREE

Approved:

Special Agent in Charge

NW 55267 DocId: 32989833

Page 14

- Sent

_M

Per

GPO: 1970 0 - 402-735

---

## Page 15

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

Transmit the following in

Via

FBI

Date:

(Type in plaintext or code)

(Priority)

PAGE 4 (SE 66-2894)

LETTER FROM V. SHANNON, LEVITTOWN, NEW JERSEY, TO ADDRESS

NOT CLEARLY LEGIBLE, SENT TO BUREAU BY SEATTLE LETTER DATED

OCTOBER 2, 1962 FOR TRANSLATION, SEATTLE FILE 65-3663,

SERIAL 105.

LETTER FROM LINA KLEIN, MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN TO UNKNOWN

INDIVIDUAL IN USSR, SENT TO BUREAU BY SEATTLE LETTER DATED

DECEMBER 7, 1962, TRANSLATION IN SEATTLE FILE 65-3663,

SERIAL 120.

FOR INFORMATION OF BUREAU, ALI ORIGINAL EXHIBITS WERE

7/6/71

DESTROYED AT SEATTLE DURENS F9ZE.

CLASSIFIED BY 1493, EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION

SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY

2 & 3, AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON INDEFINITE.

END.

Approved:

Special Agent in Charge

NW 55267 DocId: 32989833 Page 15

Sent

_ M

Per

GPO: 1970 0 - 402-735

---

## Page 16

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

Transmit the following in

Via

TELETYPE

FBI

Date: 7/8/75

CODE

(Type in plaintext or code)

NITEL

(Priority)

TO:

FROM:

DIRECTOR, FBI

ATTN: SA W. CREGAR, DIVISION 5

SAC, SEATTLE (66-2894)

SENSTUDY 1975.

RE BUREAU PHONE CALL, JULY 7, 1975.

FOR INFORMATION OF BUREAU ON JULY E, 1975, USA STAN

PITKIN, WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON, SEATTLE, ADVISED ABOUT

TWO WEEKS AGO A FEMALE LAWYER IN MID-20'S, WHOSE NAME HE DOES

NOT RECALL, PERSONALLY CONTACTED HIM IN SEATTLE STATING SHE

WAS FROM CHURCH COMMITTEE AND WAS IN NORTHWEST ON A PRELIMINARY

INQUIRY AND DESIRED TO DISCUSS IN GENERAL THE FOLLOWING

NUMBERED MATTERS. HE TOLD HER WHAT HE RECALLED ABOUT EACH

MATTER BUT TOLD HER THE CASES WERE IN THE ARCHIVES OF THE

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND HE WOULD HAVE TO REVIEW THEM TO

OBTAIN DETAILED FACTS. SHE SAID SHE WOULD WRITE HIM A LETTER

AT A LATER DATE AND POINT OUT SPECIFICALLY WHAT SHE WANTED

ANSWERED.

I. DID FBI HAVE A SOURCE IN THE DEFENSE COMMUNE

OF THE SEATTLE 7 CASE? THIS REFERS TO "MICHAEL VICTOR ABELES,

ET AL, DGP - CONSPIRACY; ARI - CONSPIRACY", BUFILE 176-2125,

SEFILE 176-66.

EK: CmE

(1)

666-2894-19

Approved:

Sent

pecial Agent in Charge

t 55257 Docid:3299633 Page 16

SAC

ПРО : 197010 - 102-735

---

## Page 17

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

Transmit the following in

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FBI

Date:

(Type in plaintext or code)

(Priority)

PAGE TWO

2. ASKED ABOUT SANNES CASE BUT DID NOT APPEAR TOO

INTERESTED IN THIS MATTER. REFERS TO "PROPOSED BROADCAST ON

NATIONAL EDUCATIONAL TELEVISION OF ALLEGATIONS AGAINST FBI

BY DAVID SANNES, CHARLES GRIMM AND JEFF PAUL DESMOND", BUFILE

94-52524, SEFILE 100-31336. ALSO SEE BUFILE 100-468240

CAPTIONED "DAVID RICHARD SANNES, SM - REVACT", SEFILE 100-31205.

3. INTERESTED IN VAN VERDANE CASE. TELS REFERS

TO "JEFFREY PAUL DESMOND, AKA; MICHAEL, STEVEN REED; JAN DAVID

TISSOT; JOHN EDWARD VAN VEENDAAL, AKA, BM". SEE SEATTLE AIRTEL

TO BUREAU, MARCH 4, 1970, REGARDING THIS CAPTION, SEFILE 174-325.

ALSO SEE SEATTLE AIRTEL TO BUREAU, AUGUST 18, 1970, CAPTIONED,

"JEFFREY PAUL DESMOND - BM" AND SEATTLE AIRTEL TO BUREAU,

JANUARY 21, 1972, CAPTIONED "JEFFREY PAUL DESMOND, AKA,

INFORMATION CONCERNING".

4. ILLEGAL UTILIZATION OF GRAND JURIES BY GOVERNMENT

IN GENERAL TO OBTAIN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION. IN THIS DISCUSSED

LESLIE BACON. INDICATED COMMITTEE PLANNED TO SUBPOENA.

DEPARTMENTAL ATTORNEY GUY GOODWIN REGARDING THESE MATTERS.

THIS REFERS TO CASE "CAPBOM", BUFILE 174-1891, AND "LESLIE

ANN BACON, SM - ANA (EXTREMIST), BUFILE 100-464151.

Approved: -

Special Agent in Charge

NW 55267 DocId: 32989833 Page 17

Sent

M

Per

GPO: 19700-402-735

---

## Page 18

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

Transmit the following in

Via

FBI

Date:

(Type in plaintext or code)

(Priority)

PAGE THREE

5. INTERESTED IN LARRY WARD CASE. THIS REFERS TO

SEATTLE CASE "JOHN HANNAH; LARRY WARD - VICTIM, CR", SEFILE

44-446, BUFILE UNKNOWN.

USA PITKIN STATED HE PROBABLY WILL BE SUBPOENAED

TO TESTIFY ABOUT THESE MATTERS, HOWEVER, WHEN THE WOMAN

LAWYER LEFT HE FELT SHE HAD PROBABLY BEEN TALKING TO SOMEONE

IN THE RADICAL COMMUNITY WHERE THESE MATTERS WERE BROUGHT UP AND

AFTER TALKING TO PITKIN DID NOT APPEAR TO BE TOO INTERESTED IN

THE NORTHWEST AREA. PITKIN WILL MAKE AVAILABLE INFORMATION

DESIRED IN FUTURE BY THIS INDIVIDUAL.

Approved:

Special Agent in Charge

NW 55267 DocId: 32989833 Page 18

Sent

_M

Per

GPO: 1970 0 - 402-735

---

## Page 19

7D-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

Transmit the following in

TELETYPE

Via

FBI

Date: 7/16/75

CODE

(Type in plaintext or code)

NITEL

(Priority)

TO :

DIRECTOR, FBI

ATTN: INTD, SA W. CREGAR

FROM:

SAC, SEATTLE (66-2894)

SENSTUDY 1975.

RE SEATTLE TEL, JULY 8, 1975.

ON JULY 16, 1975, USA STAN PITKIN, WESTERN DISTRICT

OF WASHINGTON, SEATTLE, ADVISED HE RECENTLY RECEIVED LETTER FROM

BARBARA ANN BANOFF ON U.S. SENATE LETTERHEAD WITH THE CAPTION

"SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT

TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, FRANK CHURCH CHAIRMAN". IN THE

LETTER BANOFF REQUESTED PITKIN TO FURNISH THE FOLLOWING:

1. ANY AVAILABLE INFORMATION OF COUNTY GRAND JURY

INVESTIGATION REGARDING LARRY WARD SHOOTING INCLUDING IDENTITY

OF WITNESSES. ALSO INFORMATION REGARDING INQUEST AND CIVIL ERIAL

IN WARD MATTER.

2. INFO ON FEDERAL GRAND JURY WHICH INDICTED

"SEATTLE 7". WANTED COPY OF INDICTMENT AND IF AVAILABLE

COPY OF TRANSCRIPT OF TRIAL. ALSO NAMES OF FOUR FBI INFORMANTS

IN THIS CASE. IN ADDITION ANY: INFORMATION ON DEFENDANT IN THIS

CASE WHO WAS OVERHEARD ON A TELEPHONE TAP: DESIRED TRANSCRIPT

GK : cmf

66-2894-10

(1) an

Approved: -

ESP

- Sent/H!25P

Perse.

Special Agent in Charge

NW 55267 DocId: 32989833 Page 19

GPO: 1370 0 - 402-735

---

## Page 20

FD-36 TRev. 5-22-64)

Transmit the following in

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FBI

Date:

(Type in plaintext or code)

(Priority)

PAGE TWO

OF PROCEEDINGS WHICH WOULD SHOW THIS OVERHEAR.

3. ANY INFORMATION REGARDING JEFFREY PAUL DESMOND

INCLUDING A CITATION TO THE COUNTY GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS

WHERE DESMOND TESTIFIED.

PITKIN ADVISED HE WOULD ANSWER THESE QUESTIONS BY

WORKING THROUGH A LIAISON MAN AT THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

WASHINGTON, D.C.

Approved: -

Special Agent in Charge

NW 55267 DocId: 32989833 Page 20

Sent

_M

Per

GPO: 1970 0 - 402-735

---

## Page 21

MR956 WA CODE

11:R4PM JITEL 7/17/75 PLD

TO SAM DIEGO

SAN FRANCISCO

SEATTLE

FROM DIRECTOR (62-116395)

SENSTUDY 75

REBUTEL MAY 2, 1975.

INQUIRIES MADE OF BUREAU BY SENATE SELECI COMMITTEE (SSC)

CO"CERNING BELOW-LISTED FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES SUGGESTS THAT THEY

MAY BE INTERVIEVED BY SSO STAFF. INTERVIENS WILL CONCERN

COINTELPRO ACTIVITIES DIRECTED AGAINST THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY

IN THE LATE 1960'S AND EARLY 1970'5 BY THE SAN DIEGO,

SAN FRANCISCO AND SEATTLE OFFICES. SET OUT BELOW ARE LAST

KNOWN ADDRESSES OF THESE FORMER BUREAU EMPLOYEES.

EACH OF THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES IS TO BE IMMEDIATELY

CONTACTED AND ALERTED THAT HE MIGHT BE APPROACHED BY THE SSC

STAFF. THEY SHOULD BE TOLD THAT IN THE EVENT THEY ARE INTER-

VIEWED AND DURING THE COURSE OF SAME, QUESTIONS ARE ASKED WHICH

RELATE TO SENSITIVE BUREAU OPERATIONS (SOURCES, METHODS.,

66-2894-11

: P6P

F6P.

JUL 1 / 1975

NW 55267

Docid: 32989833

Page 21

---

## Page 22

PAGE TWO

TECHNIQUES, THIRD AGENCY RULE AND ONGOING INVESTIGATIONS),

THEY MAY REQUEST AN FBI AGENT BE PRESENT. BUREAU WILL PROVIDE

AGENT ON REQUESI OF INTERVIEWEE. AGENT WILL NOT BE PRESENT AT

INTERVIEW IISELF BUT MERELY AVAILABLE NEARBY FOR CONSULTATION

PURPOSES. AS A PRELUDE TO INTERVIEW, THE FORMER EMPLOYEE MAY, .

AFTER BEING CONTACTED BY SSC STAFF,, CONTACI BUREAU'S LEGAL

COUNSEL DIVISION BY COLLECI CALL FOR FULL INFORMATION TO ASSISI

HIM, INCLUDING OBLIGATIONS AS TO CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION

ACHUIRED AS FBI EMPLOYEE. IT

IS EMPHASIZEN THAI BUREAU•S OFFER

OF ASSISTANCE IS NOT INTENDED TO IMPEDE SSC WORK BUT IS DONE

AS COOPERATIVE GESTURE AND TO SAFEGUARD SENSITIVE BUREAU

INFORMATION. CONTACTS WITH THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES TO BE

HANDLED PERSONALLY BY SAC OR ASAC. IN EVENT THIS NOT FEASIBLE

FOR JUST CAUSE, TO BE HANDLED BY A SENIOR SUPERVISOR.

BUREAU SHOULD BE ADVISED BY TELETYPE AFTER THE FORMER

EMPLOYEES HAVE BEEN CONTACTED IN LINE WITH THE ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS.

IF A. FORMER EMPLOYEE NO LONGER IN YOUR TERRITORY OR TEMPORARILY

AWÀY, SET OUT LEAD TO OTHER OFFICE IMMEDIATELY WITH COPY TO

FBI HEADQUARTERS •

SAM DIEGO: ROBERT S. BAKER, 4268 HORTENSIA, SAN DIEGO,

NW 55267 DocId: 32989833 Page 22

---

## Page 23

PAGE THPEE

CALTFORNIA 92193.

SAM FRANCISCO: ALBERI P. CLARK, 66 ELM AVENUE, LARKSPUR,

CALIFORMIA 94939. WILLIAM COMENDET, 1557 BALBOA MAY,

BURLINGAME, CALIFORNIA 94215.

SEATTLE: LFROY MI. SHEETS, 5705 TOND STREET, V.E.,

MARYSVILLE, WASHINGTON 98279.

END

GUI FBI SE ACK FOR ONE TEL CLR TKS

4 isi Leip, alen. "'.5

bett o/,0,

ston fun ani

parent che

MID OCT.

NW 55267 DocId: 32989833 Page 23

---

## Page 24

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

Transmit the following in

Via

TELETYPE

FBI

Date:

CODED

(Type in plaintext or code)

NITEL

(Priority)

7/21/75

TO:

FROM:

DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)

SAC, SEATTLE (66-2894)

SENSTUDY 75.

RE BUREAU NITEL, JULY 17, 1975.

FORMER EMPLOYEE, LEROY W. SHEETS NO LONGER MAINTAINS

RESIDENCE AT MARYSVILLE, WASHINGTON. HE HAS PURCHASED AN

AIRSTREAM TRAILER AND ON JUNE 10, 1975, HE AND HIS WIFE LEFT

THE AREA FOR AN EXTENDED FOUR-MONTHS CROSSCOUNTRY TRIP. PRIOR

TO LEAVING, SHEETS ADVISED SRA JOHN E. CONNOR, EVERETT, WASH-

INGTON THAT HE WOULD BE TRAVELING CONTINUOUSLY UNTIL MID-

OCTOBER, 1975, WHEN HE WOULD RETURN TO THE MARYSVILLE, WASH-

INGTON AREA. CURRENT LOCATION OF SHEETS IS UNKNOWN.

SHEETS IS BELIEVED TO STILL HAVE A MARRIED STEPDAUGHTER,

NAME UNKNOWN, IN THE MARYSVILLE, WASHINGTON AREA. SHE MAY

HAVE AN ITINERARY FOR SHEETS THAT COULD LOCATE HIM FOR A

POSSIBLE INTERVIEW. IF BUREAU DESIRES HER CONTACTED, A

REVIEW OF PERSONNEL FILE OF SHEETS AT HEADQUARTERS SHOULD

PROVIDE HER NAME AND ADDRESS.

FAW: kn

(1) 1:

660-2894-12

Approved:

Nopecial Agent in Charge

NW 55267 DocId: 32989833 Page 24

-

Sent -

45%p

msy

- M

Per

Sai

GPO: 1970 0 - 402-735

---

## Page 25

MR. 131

MA CONF

6:45PM WITEL 9/5/75 PM.J

TO ALEXANRIA

BALTIMORE

BOSTON

CHICAGO

DALLAS

'EL PASO

JACKSON

JACKSONVILLE

LOS ANGELES

NEW YORK. •

MEMPHIS

OKLAHOMA CITY

PHILADELPHIA

¡CAM DIEGO

PHOENIX

SẠN FRANCISCO

BIRMINGHAM

CINCINNATI

INDIANAPOLIS

LOUISVILLE

MIAMI

OMAHA

ST. LOUIS

SAVANNAH

SEATTLE

FROM DIRECTOR (63-116395)

DEPCONAL ATTENTION

SENST UNY 75

PEBUTELS MAY ?, 1975, AND SEPTEMBER 4, 1975.

SENATE SELFCI COMMITTEE (SSCS HAS REQUESTED HEREABOUTS

OF A NUMBER OF FORMER FBI EMPLOYFES INDICATING THEY MAY. BE

INTERUTEUED-BY THE SSO STAFF: LISTER BELOW, BY FIELD OFFICE

TERRITORY, ARE THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES AND THEIR LAST KNOWN

ADDRESSES AS CONTAINED IN BUREAU FILES.

66: 2894-14

SEARCHED:

BINNITE

ESSRIALIZED

SEP 5 1975

NW 55267 DocId: 32989833

Page, 25

---

## Page 26

PAGE THO

INFORMATION FROM SSC INDICATES NAMES OF FORMER SA•S

LITRENTO AND STEWARI DEVELOPED AS HAVING BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR

SUPERVISING COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE FBI

CONCERNING

MATL OPFVING ACIIVITIES.

ALL OTHEPS IN LIST BELOW WERE EITHER

SAC, ASAC, OR BOTH; DURING PERIOD 1959 - 1966 IN ONE OR MORE.

.OF THE FOLLOWING OFFICES: BOSTON, DETROIT, LOS ANGELES, MIAMI,

NEW YORK, SAN FRANCISCO, SEATTLE, AND WASHINGION FIELD. THEY

'PRESUMABLY ARE ALSO KNOWLEDGEABLE CONCERNING. MAIL'OPENINGS.

EACH OF THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES:IS TO BE IMMEDIATELY

CONTACTED AND ALERTED THAI HE MIGHT BE APPROACHED BY THE SSC

STAFF FOR INTERVIEW. THE FORMER EMPLOYE MAY, AFTEP BEING

CONTACTED BY SSO STAFF, CONTACT BUREAU'S LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION

BY COLLECI CALL FOR FULL INFORMATION TO ASSIST HIM INCLUDING

OBLTCATIONS AS TO CONFIDENIIALITY OF INFORMATION ACQUIRED AS

FBI EMPLOYER. IT IS IMPHASIZEN THAT BUREAU'S OFFER OF

ASCISTANCE IS NOT INTENDED TO IMPEDE SSE WORK, BUI IS DONE

AS

COOPEPATIVE SESTURE AND TO SAFEGUARD SENSITIVE BUREAU

INFORMATION.

JEK Act 6. (1) (B)

NW 55267

DocId

9833

Page

26

---

## Page 27

PAGE TUPEE

CONTACTS WITH THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES TO BE HANDLED

DERSOMALLY BY SAC OR ASAC.. IN. EVENT THIS IS NOT

FEASIBLE

FOR JUST CAUSE, TO BE HANDLED BY 'A SENIOR SUPERVISOR:

* IMMEDIATELY AFTER CONTACT,, RESULTS SHOULD BE FURNISHED

BUREAU BY NITEL IN ABOVE CAPTION, BRIEFLY INCLUDING REACTION

OF FORMER EMPLOYRES CONTACTED. IF A FORMER EMPLOYEE NO

LONGER IM YOUR TERRITORY OR TEMPORARILY AWAY, SET OUT LEAD IO

OTHEP OFFICE IMMEDIATELY WITH. COPY TO FBIHO.

ALEXANDRIA:

W. DONALD STEWART, CRYSTAL HOUSE I, APARIMENI DO?,

APLINGION,

VIRGINIA.

JAMES HO GALE, 3397 ROCKY MOUNT ROAD, FAIRFAX, VIRGINIA

THOMAS E BISHOP, S800 STARK ROAD, ANNANDALE, VIRGINIA

BALI TMORE:

ANTHONY P. LIIPENIO, 2818 STONYBROOK DRIVE,, BOWIE, MARYLAND

PAUL O'CONNELL, JR., S417 STRATION DRIVE, POTOMAC, MARYLAND

DONALD E. RONEY, 131 CAMBRIDGE DRIVE, WINDSOR HILLS,

I! ILMINGTON, DELAWARE

VICTOR TURY!, 2645 TURF VALLEY ROAD, ELLICOTI CITY,

MARYLAND •

DONALD. M. MOPLEY, BOX 222, NEW MARKET, MARYLAND

NW 55267 Docid: 32989833 Page 27

---

## Page 28

PAGE FOUR

BIRMINGHAM:

JOHN DOVID POPE, JRO, 021 REMINGION ROAR, BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA

BOSTON:

LEO LO LAUGHLIN, 9 EVERETT AVENUE, WINCHESTER, MASSACHUSETIS

EDWARD J. POWERS, 1O COLONIAL DRIVE, BEDFORD, NEM HAMPSHIRE

J.F. DESMOND, 185 FRANKLIN. STREET, BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS

CHICAGO:

MARLIM WO JOHNSON, CANTEEN CORPORATION, THE MERCHANDISE

MART, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

HARVEY SO FOSTER, 1912 SOUTH. HAMLIN, PARK RIDGE, ILLINOIS

CINCINNATI:

PAUL FIELDS, 2677 CYCLOPAMA DRIVE, CINCINNATI, OHIO

HARRY J. MORGAN, 5314 ELMOREST LANE, CINCINNATI, OHIO

DALLAS:

PAUL H. STODDARD, 3014 CHATTERION DRIVE, SAN ANGELO, TEXAS

KENNETH E. COMMONS, 2458 DOUGLAS DRIVE, SAN ANGELO, TEXAS

EL: PA.SO:

KARL W. DISSLY, POSI OFFICE BOX 9762, EL PASO, TEXAS

INDIANAPOLIS:

'DILLARD W. HOWELL, 6413. CARDINAL LANE, INDIANAPOLIS,

INDIANA

ALLAN GILLIES, 8228 HOOVER LANE, INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA

JACKSON:

WILLIAMS W'. BURKE, IR.?

1847 AZTEC DRIVE, JACKSON',

MISSISSIPDT

NW 55267 DocId: 32989833 , Page 28

---

## Page 29

PAGE FIVE

JACKSONVILLE:

NONALR K. BROWN, 826 BROOKMONT AVENUE, EAST. JACKSONVILLE,

FLORIDA

FLORIDA

WILLIAM M. ALEXANDEP., 4857 MATER DAN LANE, MACHSONVILLE,

LOUISVILLE:

KENTUCKY

BERNARD C. BROWN, 2301 NEWMARKET DRIVE, N.E., LOUISVILLE,

LOS ANGELES:

CALTFORNIA

WILLIAM G, SIMON, D97S LOMBARDY ROAD, SAN MARINO,

WESLEY G. GRAPP

42.40 BON HOMME ROAD, WOODLAND HILLS,

• CALIFORMIA

ARNOLD C. LARSON,

4232 ABBINGTON. COURI, WESTLAKE VILLAGE,

CALTFORVIA

JOSEPH K. PONDER, 3719 CARRIAGE HOUSE COURT, ALEXANDRIA,

VIRGINIA.. BUSINESS ADDRESS: 3030 .SOUTH RED HILL AVENUE,

SANTA ANA, CALIFORNIA

MEMPHIS:

E HUGO WINTERROWD, 1550 NORTH PARKWAY,

MEMPHIS, IENNESSEE

MIAMI:

FLORIDA

THOMAS MC ANDRENS, 324

NEAPOLITAN WAY, NAPLES, FLORIDA:

FREDRICK F. FOX, 11450 W. BISCAYNE

CANAL ROAD, MIAMI,

NW 55267 DocId: 32989833 Page 29

---

## Page 30

PACE CIX

MEW YORK:

JOSFPH L. SCHMIT, 656 HUNT LANE, MANHASSET, NEW YORK

HENRY A. FITZGIBBON, 76 EASTON ROAD, BRONXVILLE, NEW YORK.

•OKLAHOMA CITY:

JAMES T. MORELAND; 198 FERN DRIVE, POTEAU, OKLAHOMA

•'LEE O, TEAGUE, 2591 N.W. 1PISI STREET, OKLAHOMA CITY,

- OKAHOMA

OMAHA:

JOHN F. CALLAGHAN, IOWA LAW ENFORCEMENT ACADEMY,

CAMPI DONGT, POST OFFICE BOX 130, JOHNSION, IOWA

PHILADELPHIA:

RICHARD J. BAKER;

¿ Di9 JEFFREY LANE, NEWTON SQUARE!

DEMACYLVANIA

JOHN FO MALONE, 25 GARFIELD AVENUE, CARBONDALE, PENNSYLVANIA

PHOENIX:

PALMER M.

BAKEM!, JR.,

3832 EAST YUCCA STREET, PHOENIX,

ARIZONA

ST: LOUIS:

MISSOURI

THOMAS J. GEARTY, 6630 CLAYION ROAD NR. 1D5, RICHMOND 'HEIGHTS,

WESLEY I

WHALEY, 286 GREEN TRAILS DRIVE, CHESTERFIELD,

MISSOURI

•NW 55267 DocId: 32989839

Page 30

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## Page 31

PAGE SEVEM

SAN MIEGO :

SAM FRANCISCO:

CALTFORMIA

CALTFORITA

FRANK•L. PRICE, 2795 TOKALON STREET, SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA

CURTIS O. LYNUM, 644 EAST HILLSDALE BOULEVARD, SAN MATEO,

HAROLD E. MELBORN, 13067 LA: VISIA COURT, SARATOGA,

CAHAMMAH:

TROY COLEMAN

, 36 CROMWELL ROAD, WILMINGTON PARK, SAVANNAH,

GEORGIA

JOSEPH D. PURVIS, 721. DANCY AVENUE, SAVANNAH, GEORGIA

SEATTLE :.

LALAND V. BOARDMAN, ROUTE 3, BOX 268, SEQUIM, WASHINGTON

RICHARD D. AUERBACH, P.O. BOX 1768, SEATTLE, WASHINGION

JAMES E, MILIES, 4317 - S0TH AVENUE, N.E., SEATILE,

WASHINGTON

PAUL R. BIBLER, 15134 - 38TH AVENUE,

N.E., SEATTLE,

WASHINGTOM

PLS HOLD FOR ONE MORE

NW 55267, DocId: 32989833 Page 31

---

## Page 32

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 9/6/75

Transmit the following in

Via

Teletype

(Type in plaintext or codel

Nitel

(Priority)

TO:

DIRECTOR (62-116395) 3:24 Pm (GHS)

SAC, PHOENIX

ALB AND PRI

FROM:

SEATTLE (66-2894)

Personal Attention: Senstudy 75

RE BUTEL 9/5/75

Paul Bibler currently resides at route 1, Box 743, Parkdale,

Oregon, telephone number 503-352-4043. L. V. Boddman presently

resides at 10133 Pineaire Drive, Sun City, Arizona, 85351.

Portland division has been advised by separate communication

RE BUTEL, AND UF BIBLER'S PRESENT RESIPENCE.

SAC, Seattle contacted Auerbach and Milnes, both expressed

appreciation and both advised that prior to furnishing any

SSC

statements to

#s staff member they will contact Bureau Legal

counsel.

Auerbach requests advise if possible as to type and extent of

questions being asked those who have been contacted by SFC staff

member concerning this matter.

Phoenix at Sun City, Arizona handle in accordance with

Bureau = instructiongin RE teletype.

RLM/1jW

Approved: -

PRIM

read to SAL, 1/0/5

+66-2894-15

NW 55267 DocId: 32586855 Agagein Charge

---

## Page 33

FD-36 (Rey §=22-64)

2

Transmit the following in

TELETYPE

Via

FBI

Date: 9/6/75

(Type in plaintext or code)

URGENT

(Priority)

TO:

FROM:

SAC, PORTLAND

SAC, SEATTLE (66-2894)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

SENSTUDY 75

RE BUTEL 9/5/75 AND SEATTLE TEL CALL TO SA STEVEN HANCOCK,

PORTLAND DIVIDION 9/6/75.

FOR THE INFORMATION OF PORTLAND DIVISION RE BUTEL ADVISES

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) HAS REQUESTED WHEREABOUTS OF A

NUKBER OF FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES INDICATING THEY MAY BE INTERVIEHED

BY THE SSC STAFF. LISTED BELOH, BY FIELD OFFICE TERRITORY, ARE

THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES AND THEIR LAST KNOWN ASDRESSES AS CONTAINED

IN BUREAU FILES.

INFORMATION FROM SSC INDICATES NAMES OF FORMER SA'S LITRENTO

AND STEWART DEVELOPED AS HAVING BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR SUPERVISING

COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE FBI

CONCERNING MAIL OPENING Act

ACTIVITIES. ALL OTHERS IN LIST BELOW WERE EITHER SAC, ASAC. OR

BOTH, DURING PERIOD EXXX 1959 - 1966 IN ONE OR MORE OF THE

FOLLOWING OFFICES: BOSTON, DETROIT, LOS ANGELES, MIAMI, NEW

YORK, SAN FRANCISCO, SEATTLE, AND WASHINGTON FIELD. THEY

PRESUMABLY ARE ALSO KNOWLEDGEABLE CONCERNING MAIL OPENINGS.

PTB

Read te SAC,

JAH.

1/0/5

66-2844-16

Approved: -

Rum

Sent 3:4 ti

NW 55267 DocId: 32589833 Arage§hary€

Fert

:U.S. Government Printing Oftice: 1972-455-71

(1) (B)

---

## Page 34

FD-36 (Rev- 5-22-64)

Transmit the following in

Via

FBI

Date:

(Type in plaintext or codel

(Priority)

PAGE @ 2

SE 66-2894

Each of these FORMER EMPLOYEES IS TO BE ILLEDIATELY CONTACTED

AND ALEREED THAT HE MIGHT BE APPROACHED BY THE SSC STAFF FOR

INTERVIEN, THE FORTER EMPLOYEE LAY, AFTER BEINGOONIACTED BY SSC

STAFF, CONTACT BUREAU'S LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION BY COLLECT CALL

FOR FULL INFORLATION TO ASSIST HILI INCLUDING OBLIGATIONS AS TO

CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORNATION ACQUIRED AS FBI EMPLOYEE. IT IS

RE EMPHASIZED THAT BUREAU'S OFFER OF ASSISTANCE IS NOT INTENDED

TO IMPEDE SSC WORK, BUT IS DOS AS COOPERATIVE GESTURE AND TO

INFORMATION,

SAFEGUARD SENSITIVE BUREAU

PEONTACTS VITH THESE FORNER ENPLOYEES

TO BE HANDLED PERSONALLY BY SAC OR ASAC. IN EVENT THIS IS NOT

FEASIBLE FOR JUST CAUSE, TO BE HANDLED BY A SENIOR SUPERVISOR.

IMLEDIATELY AFTER CONTACT, RESULIS SHODD BE FURNISHED BUREAU

BY NITEL IN ABOVE CAPTION, BRIEFLY INCLUDING REACTION OF FORNER

EMPLOYEES CONTACTED. IF A FORMER EMPLOYEE NO LONGER IN YOUR

TERRITORY OR TEMPORARILY AWAY, SET OUT LEAD TO OTHER OFFICE

IMMEDIATELY WITH COPY TO FBIHQ.

ONE OF THE NAMES LISTED IS PAUL BIBLER THO PRESENTLY RESIDES

AT ROUTE 1, BOX 743, PARKDALE, OREGON, TELEPHONE NUMBER IS

503-352-4043.

Approved: -

NW 55267 DocId: 3298079ig1 Agage in Charge

-

Sent

. M

Per -

#U.S.Government Printing Office: 1972 - 455-574

---

## Page 35

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

Transmit the following in

Via

FBI

Date:

(Type in plaintext or code)

(Priority)

page

SE 66-2894

A PORTLAND DIVISION AT PARKDALE, OREGON, CONTACT BIBLER IN

ACCORDANCE WITH BUREAU INSTRUCTIONS.

RLM/1jw

Approved: -

NW 55267 DocId: 325803igl Awagt issCharge

Sent

_ M

Per

#U.S.Government Printing Office: 1972 - 455-574

---

## Page 36

9÷5 9 PM.

NITEL

SEPTEMBER 6, 19.75.

т0 :

PD PLAIN

BUREAU

HHM

FROM:

SEATTLE (66-2894)

PORILAND

SE"STUDY 75

RE BUTEL SEPTEMBER 5, 1975 AND SEATTLE TELEIYPE TO PORTLAND,

SEPTEMBER 6, 1975.

•PAUL BIBLER, FORMER ASAC, SEATTLE, WAS CONTACTED. IN. ACCORDANCE

WITH INSTRUCTIONS IN REBUTEL ON SEPTEMBER 60. 1975, AT HIS

RECTRENCE AT RI. 1 BOX 143, PARKDALE, OREGON. BIBLER STATED

HE CAN"T RECALL PARTICIPATING IN "MAIL. OPENING ACTIVITIES"

WATLE TV FBI. HE ADVISED HE WOULD NOTIFY PORTLAND OFFICE IF HE

IS CONTACTEN. BY SSÒ STAFF AND, SHOULD THIS OCCUR, PORTLAND WILL

THEREAFTER AQUISE FBIHO.

FAID

FBI 'SE ACK FOR ONE TEL CLR IKS

66-2894-1

SEARCHED....

SERIALIZEO.

SEP

€ 1975

FB! - SEATTLE

NW 55267 Docid: 32989833 Page 36•

---

## Page 37

1RA2. PX PLAIN

6:0OPM SEPTEMBER 6, 1975 NITEL TGO

TO

DIRECTOR (63-116395)

SEATTLE (66-2394)

FROM

PHOENIX (67-2933)

PERSONAL ATTENTION: SENSTUDY, 75

'RE BUREAU MITEL 9/5175 AND SEATILE. NITEL 9/6/75:

LELAND V. BOARDMAN CONTACTED SEPTEMBER 6, 1975 PER

INSTRUCTIONS IN RE TELS.

BOARDMAN STATED HE RETIRED FROM FBI

• SERVICE IN 1959 AND HIS RECOLLECTION OF OFFICIAL MATTERS IS

LIMITED BY 16 YEARS OF SEPARATION FROM THE BUREAU. HE OPINED

THAT IF ESC WISHES INFO FROM HIM, SSO WILL HAVE TO PAY HIS MAY

BACK TO WASHINGION M.C. WHERE HE COULD REFRESH HIS MEMORY FROM

BUFILES CONCERNING MATTERS UNDER INQUIRY. BOARDMAN STATED HE

HAS NOT BEEN CONTACTED BY SSC IO DATE BUI WILL CALL LEGAL

COUNCEL DIVISION, FBIHA, IF CONTACTED.

aND

§JW FBI SE ACK FOR OMF TEL CLR TKS

66-2894-

SEARCHED..

IGERIALIZES..

SEP

G 1975

•FBI - SEATTLE

• NW 55267 DocId: 32989833

Page 37

---

## Page 38

MRA33 NA CONE

5:49PM 9/4/75 NITEL' AJN

TO ALL SACS

FROV DIRECTOR: (62-116395)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

SENSTUDY: 75

REBUTEL. MAY :?, 1975.

PURDOSTS OF INSTANT TELETYPE APF.TO (1) RESTERATE THAT

_FBI YAS, PLENGED FULL COOPERATION WITH THE SENATE SELECT

COMMITTEE (SSO) AUD WISHES TO ASSIST AND FMCILITATE ANY

INVECT TFATTOS UNDERTAKEN BY IHE SSCINITY RESPECT TO THE FBI;

AMD. (?) SET FORTH NEW PROCEDUPE PELATING TO SSC STAFF:

IVTERUTEUS OF CURRENT AND FORMER FBI EMPLOYFES.

FOR INFORMATION OF THOSE OFFICES WHICH HAVE NOI PREVIOUSLY

VAR CURPENT OR FORMER EMPLOYEES IN ITS TERRITOY INTFRVIEWED

BY TYR SCC, THE BUREAU FREQUENTLY LEARNS FROM THE SSC. OR

OTHERWICE TUAT FORMER, EMPLOYFES ARE BEING CONSIDERED FOR

TUTEPITEM BY THE SSC STAFF. INSTRUCTIONS ARF ISSUED FOR THÉ

FIELD OFFICE TO COUTACI THE FORMER, EMPLOYEE TO ALERT HIM AS

TO

DOSSIBLE INTFRIIEW, REMIND HIM OF HIS CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT

WITY TUT BURTAU AND SUGGEST THAT IF HE IS,

CONTACTED FOR

ASHC

WARPINT

1.

66-28941-19

SEARCHED ..W

.. INDEXED.

..~AILED....

SEP. 4 1975

SEATILE

NW 55267 DocId:32989833. Page 38

STRA

---

## Page 39

DARF THO -

T"TFRUTEW; 4T MAY CONTACT THE LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION BY

COLLECT CALL FOR FURTHER INFORMATION. IN THE USUAL CASE,

AS CIRCUMSTANCES UNFOLD, THE FORMER EMPLOYEE IS TOLM(1)

THAT: WE HAS A RIGHT TO LEGAL COUNSEL, BUT THAT THE BUPEAU

CANNOT PROVIDE SAME; (2) THAT-THE BUREAU HAS WAIVED THE

CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT FOR THE INTERVIEW WITHIN SPECIFIED

PARAMFTERS; A"M (3) THAI THERE APE FOUR PRIVILEGED AREAS IN

WHICH HE

TS NOT REQUIRED TO ANSWER QUESTION.' THESE AREAS

ARE RELATING TO INFORMATION WHICH MAY CAS IDENTIFY BUREAU

SOURCES; (B) REVEAL SENSITIVE METHODS /TECHNIQUES;: (C) REVEAL

IDENTITTFS OF THIRD ÄGENCIES, INCLUDING FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE

- AGENCIES, OR INFORMATION EPOM SUCH AGENCIES; AND (D) ADVERSELY

AFFECT ONGOING BUREAU INVESTIGATIONS..

HERETOFORE, BUREAU HAS OFFEPED INTERVIEVRES CONSULTATION

PRIVILEGES WHEREBY A BÜREAU SUPERVISOR WOULD BE AVAILABLE

NEORBY, ALTHOUGH NOT ACTUALLY AT INTERVIEN, SO INTERVIENEE

MIGHT CONSULT WITH HIM SHOULD QUESTIONS ARISE AS TO PARAMETERS

OF INTERVIEW OR PRIVILEGED AREAS. THE CONSULIANT DID- NOT ACT

AS A LEGAL ADVISOR.

FFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY, BURFAU WILL NO LONGER PROVIDE

NW 55267 DoeId: 32989833

Page 39

---

## Page 40

PACE TURFE

ON TUF-SCENE PEPSONNEL FOR CONSULTATION PURPOSES TO ASSIST

TITHER CURRENT OF FORMER EMPLOYEES. PROSPECIIVE INTERVIENEES

SHOULD BE: TOLD THAT, IF THEY DESIRE ASSISTANCE OF THIS NATURE

DIRING AM INTERVIEW, THRY MAY CONTACT EIIYER PERSONALLY CIF

TUTERUIEM IS IN WASHINGTON, D. C.) OR BY COLLECT CALL, THE

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, MR., M. P.:

IVANMALL, OR, IN HIS ABSENCE, SECTION CHIEF I. O. GREGAR.

THIS CHANGE IN PROCEDURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED AS

LESSENING THE ASSISIANGE ME ARE FURNISHING IO CURRENT AND

FOPMER EMPLOYERS.

FOR YOUR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION, I AM WORKING WITH THE

DEPARIMENT IN EXPLORING AVENUES TO ARRANGE LEGAL REPRESENTATION,

WHEN NECESSARY, FOR CURRENT AND FORMER EMPLOYRES WITHOUT

TXPFNSE, TO THEM. YOU WILL BE KEPT ADVISED OF DEVELOPMENIS

IN THIS REGARD.

FID

40LN

NW 55267

Docid: 32939833

Eage 40

---

## Page 41

1957 PM MITEL 9/17/75 MEB

TO ALEXANNRIA

JACKSONVILLE

NEN YORK

ATLANTA

KNOXVILLE

RICHMOND

BOSTON

LOS ANGELES

MEMPHIS

JACKSON

NEWARK

ST. LOUIS

SAN DIEGO

SEATTLE

FROM STRECTOR (63-116395)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

SENSTUNY 75

REBUTELE MAY 2, 1975, AND SEPTEMBER 4, 1975, TO

ALL OFFICES AND BUTELS SEPTEMBER 3, 1975, IO SELECIED OFFICES

INFORMING LATTER THAT SEMATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) HAD

RERUFSTEN INFNTITIES OF ALL SUPERVISORS AND COORDINATORS FOR

COIMTELPROS IM SELECTED OFFICES FOR (IS NEW LEFT AND BLACK

FXTREMIST, 1967 THROUGH 1971, AND (9) FOR WHITE HATE, 1964

THROUG4 1971.

SSC ALCO REQUESTEN LOCATIONS OF PERSONS NAMED IN FIELD

RESPONSES TO REFERENCED SEPTEMBER 3, 1975, TELETYPES, AND

LATEST TAFORMATION IN FBIHO FILES HAS BEEN FURNISHED TO SSC.

SAC BASHER ARUISED 9/17 JU

66-2894-20

i

NW 55267 DocId: 32989833 Page 41

---

## Page 42

PAGE TWO

SSC STAFF MAY CONTACI CURRENT AND/OR FORMER EMPLOYEES NAMED,

TO INTERVIFT THEM CONCERNING THEIR KNOWLEDGE OF COINTELPROS

TY WHICH THEY HAN SUPERVISORY OR COORDINATING RESPONSIBILITIES.

FACH OF THE FOLLOWING FORMER EMPLOYEES EXCEPT MESSRS.

CROKE AND MOMANUS IS TO BE CONTACTED IMMEDIATELY AND ALERTED

THAT HE MIGHT BE APPROACHED BY THE SSO STAFF FOR INTERVIEN.

THE FORMER EMPLOYFE MAY, AFTER BEING CONTACTED BY SSE STAFF,

CONTACI BUREAU'S LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION BY COLLECT CALL FOR

FULL: TAFORMATION TO ASSIST HIM INCLUDING OBLIGATIONS AS TO

COIFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION ACQUIRED AS FBI EMPLOYEE. IT

IC EMPHASITEN THAT BUREAU'S OFFER OF ASSISTANCE IS NOT

TATENDER TO IMPERE SSC WORK, BUT IS DONE AS COOPERATIVE

GESTURE AND TO CAFEGUARD SENSITIVE BUREAU INFORMATION.

CONTACTS WITH THESE FORMER EMPLOYFFS TO BF. HANDLEN

PERSONALLY BY SAC OR ASAG. IN EVENT THIS IS NOT FEASIBLE

FOR JUSI CAUSE, TO BE HANDLED BY A SENIOR SUPERVISOR.

REGARDING FORMER SAS CROKE AND MCMANUS, SSC HAS BEEN

INFORMED OF THEIR POOR PHYSICAL CONDITION AND REQUESTED TO

TAKE THIS INTO CONSIDERATION IN ANY ACTION CONTEMPLATEN BY

SCC CONCERMING

TrEM.

WIF DO NOI, HOWEVER, KNOW THAI SSC WILL

NW 55267

DocId: 32989833 Page 42

---

## Page 43

• PAGE THRFE

NOT CONTACT THEM. NEW YORK OFFICE, IN COORDINATION WITH

MEWARK SHOULD ARRANGE TO HAVE CONTACI MADE WITH CROKE AND

MCMA"US BY A FORMER ASSOCIATE TO MAKE FRIENDLY IMQUIRY AS TO

TUFIR CURRENT CONDITION. IT IS BEING LEFT TO DISCRETION OF

CAS NEW YORK AND NEWARK, BASED ON RESULTS OF SUCH INQUIRY,

WUE TUER CROKE AND MCMANUS SHOULD BE INFORMED REGARDING

POSCIBLE CONTACT OF THEM BY SSC. FBIYO DOES NOT DESIRE

THAT THEY BE UNDULY ALARMED, BUT WOULD NOT WANT THEM SURPRISED

BY CONTACT OF CSO STAFF IF THIS COULD IMPAIR THEIR HEALTH.

IMMERIATELY AFTER CONTACT, RESULIS SHOULD BE FURNISHED

BUREAU BY "ITEL IN ABOVE CAPTION, AITENTION INTO, ". O. CREGAR,

BRIEFLY INCLUDING REACTION OF FORMER EMPLOYEES CONTACTED. IF

A FORMER EMPLOYEE NO LONGER IN YOUR TERRITORY OR TEMPORARILY

AWAY, SET OUT LEAD TO OTHER OFFICE IMMEDIATELY WITH COPY TO

ALEXAMORIA:

ATLANTA:

SETH F. FIKEMBERRY, 5367 SUMMIT DRIVE, FAIRFAX, VIRGINIA

JESSE C. HALL, JR., 4535 EATEN PLACE, ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA

CARLE. CLAIBORNE, 1866 MARY LOU LANF, S."

', ATLANTA,

NW 55267 DocId: 32989833 Page 43

---

## Page 44

PAGE FOUR

GEORGIA

GEORGTA

RICHARD HO MAVIS, 1147 WILD CREEK TRAIL, ATLANIA, GEORGIA

CHARLES S. HARDING, 2243 PINECLIFF DRIVE, N. E., ATLANIA,

MASSACHUCETTS

MASSACHUSETTS

MASSACHUSFTTS

DETROIT:

JACKSON:

JACKSONVILLE:

FLORIDA

KNOXVILLE:

RICHARD H. BLASSER, 129 ACADEMY AVENUE, MFYMOUTH,

FREDERICK M. CONNORS, 15 LONGFELLOW ROAD, MELROSE,

MICHAEL J. MCNONAGH, 28 SPRINGVALE ROAD, NORWOOD,

JOHN F. MOONAN, 122 VERNOM ROAD, SCITUATE, MASSACHUSETIS

ROBERT F. O'NEILL, 2551 IRONUOIS, DETPOIT, MICHIGAN

ROY X. MOORE, 197 SWALLOW DRIVE, BRANDON, MISSISSIPPI

W. HERSHEL CAVER, 3714 NORTHWEST 40TH STREFT, GAINESVILLE,

NW 55267 DocId: 32989833 Page 44

---

## Page 45

PAGE FIVF

IRVING R. A"DERSON, 1929 PERCH DRIVE, CONCORD, TENNESSEE

LOS ANGELES:

JOHM KFARNEY, 4149 MAYFIELD SIREET, NEWBURY PARK,

CALIFORMIA

RICHARD J. STILLING, 11648 AMESTOY STREET, GRANADA HILLS,

CALIFORMIA

MEMPHIS:

JOHM S. TEMOLE, 2145 GRENADIER, SAN PEDRO, CALIFORNIA

PHILIP S. ENDRES, 22 SOUTH SECOND STREET, MEMPHIS,

TRUMES SFF

NEWARK:

BENJAMIN P. MCMANUS, 9,5 MICHAEL SIREET, FORDS, NEM .IERSEY

NEW YORK:

NEW YORK

THOMAS d. CROKE, IR, 15 HOFSTRA DRIVE, GREENLAUN, NEW YORK

JOHN J. DUNLFAVY, ID SOUTHVIEW CT., CARLE. PLACE, NEM YORK

JOSEPH H. GAMBLE, 2,4 GREYSTONE ROAD, ROCKVILLE CENTRE,

RECHMOND:

CHARLES F. HEINER, 25 THIN LAKE LANE, RICHMOND, VIRGINIA

RANPOLPH F. TROM, 1790 RANCH DRIVE, RICHMOND, VIRGINIA

NW 55267 DocId: 32989833 Page 45

---

## Page 46

PAGE SIX

SAINT LOUIS:

MI CCOURI

SAM MIFGO:

STATTLE:

WASHING TON

END

GJ!

JOYN H. WAGNER, 8220 BARNINGHAM ROAD, RICHMOND, VIRGINIA

JOH" J. BUCKLEY, 9469 HAPALD DRIVE, MOORSON TERRACE,

FAMUND C. "ELTON, 805.

, DEANDELL COURT, FERGUSON, MISSOURI

ROBERT C. BAKER, 4263 HORTENSIA, SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA

LEROY !!. CHEFTS, 577,5 TOND STREET, N. E., MARYSVILLE,

FBI SF ACK FOR FOUR TELS CLR IKS

NW 55267 DocId: 32989833

Page 46

---

## Page 47

FD-33 (Rev. S-22-64)

Transmit the following in

Via

TELETYPE

FBI

Date: 9/18/75

CODE

(Type in plaintext or code)

"MMEDTATE

Priority.

9

TO

: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)

SAC, MINNEAPOLIS

FROM: SAC, SEATTLE (66-2894)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

ATTENTION: INTD, W. O. CREGAR

SENSTUDY 75

RE BUTELS MAY 2, 1975, AND SEPTEMBER 4, 1975 TO ALL

OFFICES AND BUTELS SEPTEMBER 3, 1975, TO SELECTED OFFICES

INFORMING LATTER THAT SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) HAD

REQUESTED IDENTITIES OF ALL SUPERVISORS AND COORDINATORS FOR

COINTELPROS IN SELECTED OFFICES FOR (1) NEW LEFT AND BLACK

EXTREMIST, 1967 THROUGH 1971, AND (2) FOR WHITE HATE, 1964

THROUGH 1971.

SSC ALSO REQUESTED LOCATIONS OF PERSONS NAMED IN FIELD

RESPONSES TO REFERENCED SEPTEMBER 3, 1975, TELETYPES AND

LATEST INFORMATION IN FBIHO FILES HAS BEEN FURNISHED TO SSC.

SSC STAFF MAY CONTACT CURRENT AND/OR FORMER EMPLOYEES NAMED,

TO INTERVIEW THEM CONCERNING THEIR KNOWLEDGE OF COINTELPROS

IN WHICH THEY HAD SUPERVISORY OR COORDINATING RESPONSIBILITIES.

LEROY W. SHEETS, FORMER EMPLOYEE, IS TO BE CONTACTED

IMMEDIATELY AND ALERTED THAT HE MIGHT BE APPROACHED BY THE

SSC STAFF FOR INTERVIEW. MR. SHEETS MAY, AFTER BEING CONTACTED

PTB: set

(1)

66-2194-21

WA 7:10A (STP)

Approved:

NW 55267 DocId: 329&B8ial Aggt in Charge

-

Sent me coulocal Per

U.S. Government Printing Office: 1972 - 455-574

---

## Page 48

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-61)

Transmit the following in

Via

FBI

Date:

(Type in plaintext or code)

(Priority)

PAGE TWO

BY SSC STAFF CONTACT BUREAU'S LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION BY

COLLECT CALL FOR FULL INFORMATION TO ASSIST HIM, INCLUDING

OBLIGATIONS AS TO CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION ACQUIRED

AS FBI EMPLOYEE. IT IS EMPHASIZED THAT BUREAU'S OFFER OF

ASSISTANCE IS NOT INTENDED TO IMPEDE SSC WORK BUT IS DONE

AS A COOPERATIVE GESTURE AND TO SAFEGUARD SENSITIVE BUREAU

INFORMATION.

CONTACT WITH MR. SHEETS TO BE HANDLED PERSONALLY BY

SAC OR ASAC. IN EVENT THIS IS NOT FEASIBLE FOR JUST CAUSE,

TO BE HANDLED BY A SENIOR SUPERVISOR.

IMMEDIATELY AFTER CONTACT, RESULTS SHOULD BE FURNISHED

BUREAU BY NITEL IN ABOVE CAPTION, ATTENTION INTD, W. O.

CREGAR, BRIEFLY INCLUDING REACTION OF FORMER EMPLOYEE

CONTACTED. IF A FORMER EMPLOYEE NO LONGER IN YOUR TERRITORY

OR TEMPORARILY AWAY, SET OUT LEAD TO OTHER OFFICE IMMEDIATELY

WITH COPY TO FBIHQ.

INVESTIGATION SEATTLE DIVISION DETERMINED LEROY W.

SHEETS CURRENTLY IN TRAVEL STATUS THROUGHOUT THE US. HIS

STEPDAUGHTER PAMELA WEIHEMULLER, MARYSVILLE, WASHINGTON,

ADVISED ON SEPTEMBER 18, 1975, THAT SHE DETERMINED ON

Approved:

- Sent

NW 55267 DocId: 329&Becial Agage in Charge

_M Per

U.S.Government Printing Office: 1972 - 455-574

---

## Page 49

FD-35 (Rev. 5-22-64)

Transmit the following in

Via

FBI

Date:

(Type in plaintext or code)

(Priority)

PAGE THREE

SEPTEMBER 17, 1975, FROM MR. SHEETS THAI HE WOULD BE IN

RED WING, MINNESOTA FROM EVENING HOURS SEPTEMBER 18, 1975

THROUGH SEPTEMBER 23, 1975.

MR. SHEETS CAN BE CONTACTED AT

ONLY TRAILER COURT IN RED WING WHICH IS LOCATED ON BANK OF

RIVER OR THROUGH GAY REITAN, 753 EAST 7TH, RED WING,

MINNESOTA. END.

Approved: -

NW 55267 DocId: 3298B8gigl Agege in Charge

Sent

_M

Per

U.S. Government Printing Office: 1972 - 455-574

---

## Page 50

NRO11 UP CODED

11:50P.| WITEL SEPTENBER 19, 1975

TO

DIRECTOR (62-115395)

DO

FROM MINNEAPOLIS (65-3619)

ATTENTION: INTD, W. O. CAESAR.

PERSOUAL ATTENTION

SENSTUDY 75

RE SEATTLE TELETYPE TO BUREAU DATED SEPTEMDER 18, 1975.

MR. LEROY W. SHEETS, WAS PERGOHALLY CONTACTED THIS DATE, 1T

ISLAND CAMP GROUNDS, RED WINGS MINNESOTA, BY.

ASAO WILLIAM D. NEUMANN. MR. SHEETS REACTED AFFIRNATIVOLY AND EXPRESSED

HIS APPRECIATION FOR BEING CONTACTED BY THE FBI IN A SUPPORTIVE POLE.

MR, SHODIS STATED HIS INTENTION TO CALL THE LEGAL COUNSEL DIVICION

IN THE EVENT HE IS COUTACTED BY THE SSC.

END

LER ACK FOR ONE FBINO CLR

66-36.10

[SEARCHED

.. INDEXED

SERIALIZED.......FILED.

SEP 1 8 1975

FBI -- MINNEAPOLIS

66-2894-22

: NW 55267 DocId: 32989833 Page 50

---

## Page 51

Routing Slip

FR-4 (Ray. 3-1-73)

To 3l Director

Att.:

9/19/75

Date

FILE

[ SAC.

ASAC

7 Supv. -

Agent.

ISE -

I SC-

ICG-

1 Steno

Clerk

SEATTLE

Title

RE:

SENSTUDY 75

] Acknowledge

] Assign

_ Reassign _

) Bring file

• Call me

Correct

| Deadline

Deadline passed

] Delinquent

| Discontinue

/ Expedite

→ File

• For information

• Handle

1 Rotor #:

ACTION DESIRED

Open Case

66-2894

• Prepare lead cards

→ Prepare tickler

Return assignment card

Return file

• Search and return

→ See me

I Serial #

I Post

• Send to

• Submit new charge out

• Submit report by .

• Type

• Recharge

7 Return

• Initial & return

• Leads need attention

• Return with explanation or notation as to action taken.

Attached hereto is Xerox copy of Minneapolis

Nitel to FBIHQ dated 9/18/75.

Enc. - 1

NW 55267

SAC

WILLIAM A. MEINCKE

. See reverse side

Office -

MINNEAPOLIS UM LaT

DocId: 329898358P0 1272626320

---

## Page 52

NIRAN5 WA PLAIN

142DM 9-?7-75 PM. MITFL 9-26-75 LXS

TO ALL SACS

FROM DIRECTOP

LECAL ADVICE FOR PRESENT OR, FORMER BUREAU EMPLOYEES

IN RESPONSE TO DUR REQUEST, THE ATTORNEY.

GENERAL ARVISED THAI LEGAL REPPESENTATION FOR EMPLOYEES WOULD

BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR PRELIMIVARY ADVICE: SHOULD CASES ARISE

WUTRE A FORMER. OR PRESENT EMPLOYET PEQUIRES MORE PROTRACTED

AND SUBSTANTIAL LEGAL REPRESENTATION, IT IS THE POSITION OF THE

DEPARTMENT THAT SPECIAL COUNSEL MAY BE RETAINER FOR SUCH

EMPLOYEES AT DEPARIMENT EXPENSE. IGUIDELINES ARE BEING

DRAWM BY THE DEPARIMENT TO GOVERN IHESE MATTERS:

HOWEVER, SHOULD THE DEPARIMENT SUBSEQUENTLY CONCLUDE THAT

SUCH

CASES INVOLVE MATTERS OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF A PRESENT OR

FORMER. EMPLOYEF'S DUTIES, OTHER CONSIDEPATIONS WOULD APPLY.

ALL LEGATS ADVISED SEPARATELY.

END.

HOLD

• SE-

Arts

Arr

READ

DorF.

9/50/75

66-2894-23

SEARCHED.

SERIALIZED B

...INDEXED

FILED B

SEP2 7 1975

FBI - SEATTLE

NW 55267 DocId: 32989833 Page 52

---

## Page 53

VRASA DA PLAIN

7:25PM NITEL 12/19/75 B45

TO ALL SACS

FROM DIRECTOR

DIRECTOR'S APPEARANCE BEFORE SENATE SELECI COMMITTEE

ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, DECEMBER 19, 1975

A COPY OF THE STATEMENT. I DELIVERED BEFORE THE SENATE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACIIVITIES TODAY HAS BEEN

SENT ALL OFFICES.: FOR YOUP INFORMATION, THERE FOLLOWS A

SYNOP SIZED ACCOUNI OF THE MAJOR AREAS OF THE COMMITTEE"S

QUESTIONS TO ME, TOGETHER WITH MY RESPONSES:

(1) REGARDING FBI INFORMANTS, QUESTIONS WERE ASKED

WHETHER COUPT APPROVAL SHOULD BE REQUIPES FOR FBI USE OF

INTORMANTS IN INVESTIGATIONS OF ORGANIZATIONS MY RESPONSE

VAS THAI THE CONTROLS WHICH EXIST TODAY OVER USE OF INFORMANIS

ARE SATISFACTORY; HOW CAN FBI KEEP INFORMANTS OPERATING

WITHIN PROPER LIMITS SO THEY. DO NOT INVADE RIGHTS OF OTHER

•PERSONS: (MY RESPONSE WAS THAT RELIANCE MUST BE PLACED ON THE

INDIVIDUAL AGENTS HANDLING INFORMANTS' AND THOSE SUPERVISING

THE AGENTS" WORK, THAT INFORMANIS W4O VIOLATE THE LAW CAN BE

66-82894-24

CEO 1 0 1975

ASHe

NU 55267

DocId: 32989833 Page 53

---

## Page 54

PAGE THO

PROSECUTED - AS CAN ANY AGENT WHO COUNSELS AN INFORMANI TO

COMMIT. VIOLATIONS); AND DID FORMER KLAN INFORMANT GARY ROWE

TESITFY ACCURATELY WHEN HE TOLD THE COMMITTEE ON DECEMBER 2

THAT. HE INFORMED FBI OF PLANNED ACTS OF VIOLENCE BUT FBI

DID NOT ACT TO

PREVENT THEM MY RESPONSE WAS THAT ROWE'S.

TESTIMONY WAS NOT ACCURATE).

(2) : IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS REGARDING IMPROPER

CONDUCT BY FBI EMPLOYEES, I STATED THAT ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF

LAW BY FBI PERSONNEL SHOULD BE INVESTIGATED BY THE FBI OR

OTHER APPROPRIATE AGENCY; THAT THE INSPECTION DIVISION HAS

CONDUCTER INQUIRIES REGARDING ALLEGATIONS. OF MISCONDUCT.;

THAT AN OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY HAS JUSI

BEEN ESTABLISHTD IN THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT, AND ME WILL ADVISE

THAT OFFICE OF OUR MAJOR INVESTISATIONS OF NEPARTMENTAL PERSONNEL,

INCLUDING FBI EMPLOYEES, FOR ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF LAW, REGULATIONS,

OR STANDARDS DE CONDUCI; THAT I WOULD RESERVE COMMENT

REGARDING POSSIBLE CREATION OF A NATIONAL INSPECTOR GENERAL

TO CONSIDER MAITERS OF MISCONDUCI BY EMPLOYEES OF ANY FEDERAL

AGENCY.

NW 55267 DocId: 32989833 Page 54

---

## Page 55

PAGE THREE

(3) IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS CONCERNING HARASSMENT OF

MART IN LUTHER KING, JR., I STATED THAT THE PERSONS WHO ISSUED

THE ORDERS WHICH RESULTED IN SUCH HARASSMENT SHOULD FACE. THE

RESPONSIBILITY FOR. II, RATHER THAN THOSE UNDER THEM WHO CARRIED

OUT SUCH ORDERS IN GOOD FAITH; THAT THE FBI STILL HAS RECORDINGS

RESULTING FROM ELECIRONIC SURVÈILLONCES OF KING; THAI WE RETAIN

RECORDINGS FOR IEN. YEARS BUT WE ALSO HAVE AGREED TO A REQUEST

FROM THE SENATE NOT TO DESTROY INFORMATION IN OUR FILES WHILE

CONGRESSIPNAL INQUIRIES ARE BEING CONDUCTED; THAT I HAVE NOT

REVIFUEN THE KING TAPES: THAT IF THE COMMITTEE REQUESTED 10

REUTEW THE XING TAPES, THE REQUEST WOULD BE REFERRED TO THE

AITORNEY GENERAL.

(4)

IN. RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS REGARDING WHETHER'IT MOULD

BE• ADVANIAGFOUS TO SEPARATE THE FBI CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE

RESPONSIBILITIES AND OUR INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS, I STATED

THAT VE HAVE FOUND THE TWO AREAS TO BE COMPATIBLE, AND I

• FEEL THE FBI IS DOING A SPLENDID. JOB IN BOTH AREAS.

(5). IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE ADEQUACY

OF CONTPOLS ON REQUESTS. FROM THE WHITE HOUSE AND FROM OTHER

GOVEPNMENT AGENCIES FOR FBI INVESTIGATIONS OR FOR INFORMATION

NW 55267 DocId:32989833 Page 55

---

## Page 56

PAGF FOUR

FROM OUR FILES, I STATED IHAT WHEN SUCH REQUESTS ARE MADE.

ORALLY, THEY SHOULD BE CONFIRMED IN WRITING; THAI WE WOULD

WELCOME ANY LEGISLATIVE GUIDELINES THE CONGRESS FEELS MOULD

PROTECT THE FBI FROM THE POSSIBILITY OF PARTISAN MISUSE.

A FULL TRANSCRIPT OF THE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, WILL BE

FURNISHED ID FACH OFFICE AS SOON AS IT IS AVAILABLE

ALI: LEGAIS ADVISED SEPARATELY

END

POP. FBI SE

CLR. FOR OVE' INS

NN 00267

DocId: 32989833

Page 56

---

## Page 57

Routing Slip

0-7 (Rev. 12-17-1

TO: 5 AC:

Albany

Albuquerque

Alexandria

Anchorage

Atlanta

Baltimore

Birmingham

Boston

Buffalo

Butle

Charlotte

Chicago

Cincinnati

Cleveland

Columbia

Dallas

Denver

Detroit

El Paso

Honolulu

(Copies to Offices Checked)

Houston

Indianapolis

Jackson

Jacksonville

Kansas City

Knoxville

Las Vegas

Little Rock

Los Angeles

Louisville

Memphis

Miami

Milwaukee

Minneapolis

Mobile

Newark

New Haven

New Orleans

New York City

Norfolk

• Oklahoma City

7 Omaha

] Philadelphia

J Phocnix

] Pittsburgh

J Portland

1 Richmond

3 St. Louis

Sacramento

/ Salt Lake City

San Antonio

7 San Diego

1 San Francisco

San Juan

Savannah

3 seattle

7 Springfield

Tampa

J

Washington Field

1 Quantico

TO LEGAT:

• Beirut

Bern

Bonu

Brasilia

Buenos Aires

Caracas

Hong Kong

London

Madrid

Manila

Mexico City

Ottawa

Paris

Rome

| Singapore

Tel Aviv

_ Tokyo

December 5, 1975

REHESTIMONY OF ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR-=

DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR_JAMES B. ADAMS

BEFORE THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON

12/2/75

Retention

For appropriate

• For information ~ optional

action

• Surep, by

Thie enclosed is for your information. If used in a future report,

conceal all

sources, • paraphrase contents.

Enclosed are corrected pages from report of SA.

dated

Remarks:

Re Bureau R/S of 12/4/75 and 12/5/75 which

provided unedited transcripts of Mr. Adams'

testimony:

=Maintained trim.@alunet

Attached! for your information and retention

are

four video tape cassettes of Mr. Adams'

above-referenced testimony which you may wish

to show to

your employees.

These tapes are for

the exclusive viewing of FBI personnel only,

due to restrictions imposed on their use oy

the

Public Broadcasting Corporation, Washing con,

Enc.

DoES

Bufile

1

1075

Urfile

NW 55267 DocId: 32989833 Page 57.-*

66-2894-25

---

## Page 58

Routing Slip.

0-7 (Rev. 7-11-

TC: SAC:

Albany

Albuquerque

Alexandria

Anchorage

Allanta

Baltimore

Birminghan

Boston

Buffalo

Butte

Charlotte

Chicago

Cincinnati

Cleveland

Columbia

Dallas

Denver

Detroit

El Paso

Honolulu

(Copies ta, Officos Checked)

train.

1. Housion

ludianapolis

ejackson

Jacksonville

Kansas City

Knoxville

Las Vegas

Little Rock

Los Angeles

Louisville

Memphis

Miami

Milwaukee

Minneapolis

Nobile

Newark

New Haven

New Orleans

New York City

Norfolk

Oklahoma City

Omaha

Philadelphia

Plionis

Pittsburgh

Portland

Richmond •

Sacramento

St. Louis

Salt Lake City

San Antonio

San Diego

San Francisco

San Juan

Savannah

Seattle

TO LEGAT:

Bem

Bonn

Brasilia

Buenos Aires

Caracas

Hong Kong

London

Madrid

Manila

Mexico City

Ottawa

Paris

Rome

Tel Aviv

Tokyo

Springfield

Tanpa

Washington Field

Quantico

RE:

Date December 5, 1975

TESTIMONY OF ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR®

DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR JAMES B. ADAMS

BEFORE THE SENATE SELECI COMMITTEE ON

12/2/75

Retention

For appropriate

• For information EJ Optional l

I action

Cy Surep, by

1 The enclosed is for your information. If used in a future report, (J conceal ail

sources, L

7 paraphrase contents.

I Enclosed are corrected pages from report of SA

dated

Remarks:

Re Bureau R/S of 12/4/75 which provided

excerpts of Mr. Adams' testimony.

Attached for your information and

assistance, is the complete transcript.of

above-referenced testimony.sto.

ASAC

SEARCHED:

_INDEXED.

SERIALIZED.

_FILED

$3

BUnI.

DEC 8

1975

75

Supr

Enc.

I- SEATTLE

GG.

Sure.

I-Steno.

fourte lust Unedited

Transcript

NW 55267 DocId: 32989833 Page 586-2894-26

---

## Page 59

Vol. 15

Ohe Quiten Statre Senate

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Saleci Committoo to Study Governmental. Operations

#ith Respect to Intelligence Activities

INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATION

Tuesday, Dacember 2, 1975

• Washington, D. C

WARD & PAUL

410 FIRST STREET, S. E:

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003

(202) 544-6000

-NW 55267-DocId: 32989833 Page 59

---

## Page 60

.#

Senator Tower.. The next witnesses to appear before the

12

13

14

Committee are

16

17

18

19

20

21

.22

23

24

25

JFK Act 6 (4)

Mr. W.

Raymond Wannall, Assistant

Director, Intélligence Division, responsible for internal

security and foreign counterintelligence investigations; Mr.

John A. Mintz, Assistant Director, Legal Counsel Division;

Joseph G. Deegan, Section Chief, extremist investigations;

MI. Robert I. Schackelford, Section Chief, subversive

investigations; Mr. Homer A. Newman, JI., Assistant to Section

Chief, supervises extremist informants; Mr. Edward P. Grigall:

Unit Chief, supervises subversive informants; Joseph G. Inlier,

Assistant Section Chief, Civil Rights Section, Gener. In."l:-

gative Division.

Gentlemen, will you all rise and be sworn.

NW 55267 DocId: 32989833 Page 60

---

## Page 61

smir 16

1901

1

3

4

5

6

WARD & PAUL

Stri

S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

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Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give

before this Committee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing

but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Adams. I do.

Mr. Wannall. I do.

Mr. Mintz.

I do.

Mr. Deegan. I do.

Mr. Schackelford. I do.

Mr. Newman. I do.

Mr. Grigalus. I do.

Mr. Kelley. I do.

Senator Tower. It is intended that. Mr. Wannall will be

the principal witness, and we will call on others as questioning

might require, and I would direct each of you when you do

respond, to identify yourselves, please, for the record.

I think that we will spend just a few more minutes to allow

the members of the Committee to return from the floor.

(A brief recess was taken.)

Senator Tower. The Committee will come to order.

Mr. Wannall, according to data, informants provide '83

percent of your intelligence information.

Now, will you provide the Committee with some information

on the critoria for the selection of informants?

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TESTIMONY OF W. RAYMOND WANNAIL, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR,

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION •

ACCOMPANIED BY: JAMES B. ADAMS, ASSISTANT TO THE

DIRECTOR-DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR (INVESTIGATION) :

JOHN A. MINTZ, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, LEGAL COUNSEL

DIVISION; JOSEPH G. DEEGAN, SECTION CHIEF; ROBERT I.

SCHACKELFORD, SECTION CHIEF; HOMER A. NEWMAN, JR.,

ASSISTANT TO SECTION CHIEF; EDVARD P. GRIGALUS, UNIT

CHIEF;. AND JOSEPH G. KELLEY, ASSISTANT SECTION CHIEF,

CIVIL RIGITS SECTION, GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

Mr. Wannall. Mr. Chairman, that is not FBI data that you

have quoted. That was prepared by the General Accounting

Office.

Senator Tower.

That is

• GAO.

Mr. Wannall. Based on a sampling of about 93 cases.

Senator Tower.

Would that appear to be a fairly accurate

figure.

Mr. Wannall. I have not seen any survey which the FBI

itself has conducted that would confirm that, but I think that

we do get the principal portion of our information from live

sources.

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senator Tower. It would be a relatively high percenl.".

then?

Mr. Wannall. I would say yes. And your quest'.. •

criteria?

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Senator Tower.

What criteria do you use in the selection

of informants?

Mr. Wannall. Well, the criteria vary with the needs. In

our cases relating to extremist matters, surely in, order to get

an informant who can meld into a group which is engaged in a

criminal type activity, you're going to have a different set

of criteria. If you're talking about our internal security

matters, I think we set rather high standards. We do reguire

that a preliminary inquiry be conducted which would consist

principally of checks of our headquarters indices, our field

office indices, checks with other informants who are operating

in the same area, and in various established sources such as

local police departments.

Following this, if it appears that the person is the type

who has credibility, can be depended upon to be reliable, we

would interview the individual in order to make a determination

as to whether or not he will be willing to assist the FBI

in discharging its responsibilities. in that. field.

Following that, assuming that the answer is positive, we

would conduct a rather in depth investigation for the purpose

of. further attempting to establish credibility and. reliability.

Senator. Tower. How. does the. Bureau. distinguish between

the use of informants for law enforcement as opposed to

intelligence. collection?

Is the guidance different, or is it the same, or what?

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Mr. Wannall. Well, Mr. Adams can probably best address

the use of informants on criminal matters since he is over

the operational division on that.

Mr. Adams. You do have somewhat of a difference in the fact

that a criminal informant in a law enforcement function, you

are trying to develop evidence which will be admissible in

court for prosecution, whereas with intelligence, the informant

alone, your purpose could either be prosecution or it could be

just for purposes of pure intelligence.

The difficulty in both is retaining the confidentiality

of the individual and protecting the individual, and trying to,

through use of the informant, obtain evidence which could be

used independently of the testimony of the informant so that

he can continue operating as a criminal informant.

Senator Tower. Are these informants ever authorized to

function as provocateurs?

Mr. Adams. No, sir, they're not. We have strict regula-

tions against using informants as provocateurs. This gets

into that delicate area of entrapment which has been

addressed

by the courts on many occasions and has been concluded by the

courts that providing an individual has a willingness to engage

in an activity, the governmen't has the right to provide him the

opportunity. This does not mean, of course, that mistakes don't

occur in this area, but we take whatever steps we can to

avoid this. Even the law has recognized that informants can

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engage in criminal activity, and the courts have held that,

especially the

supreme Court in the Newark County Case, that

the very difficulty of penetrating an ongoing operation, that

an informant himself can engage in criminal activity, but

because there is lacking this criminal intent to violate a

law, we stay away from that. Our regulations

fall short of that.

If we have a situation where we felt that an informant

has to become involved in some activity in order to protect

or conceal his use as an informant, we go right to the United.

States Attorney or to the Attorney General to try to make sure

we are not stepping out of bounds insofar as the use of our

informants.

Senator Tower. But you do use these informants and do

instruct them to spread dissension among certain groups that

they are informing on, do you not?

Mr. Adams. We did when we had the COINTELPRO programs,

which were discontinued in 1971, and I think the Klan is probably

one of the best examples of a situation where the law was

in effect at the time.

We heard the term States Rights used

much more then than we hear it today. We saw in the Little

Rock situation the President of the United States, in sending

in the troops, pointing

out the necessity to use local law

enforcement.

We must have local law enforcement, to use the

troops only as a last resort.

And then you have a situation like this where you do try .

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to preserve the respective roles in law enforcement. You have

historical problems with the Klan coming along. We had

situations where the FBI and the Federal Government was almost

powerless to act. We had local law enforcement officers in

some areas participating in Klan violence.

The instances mentioned by Mr. Rowe, every one of those,

he saw them from the lowest level of the informant. He didn't

see what action was taken with that information, as he pointed

out in his testimony. Our files show that this information was

reported to the police departments in every instance. We

also knew that in certain instances the information, upon being

received, was not being acted upon. We also disseminated

simultaneously through letterhead memoranda to the Department

of Justice the problem, and here, here we were, the FBI, in a

position where we had no authority in the absence of instruction

from the Department of Justice, to make an arrest.

Sections 241 and 242 don't cover it because you don't have

evidence of a conspiracy, and it ultimately resulted in

a situation where the Department called in United States

Marshals who do have authority similar to local law enforcement

officials.

So, historically, in those days, we were just as frus-

trated as anyone else was, and when we got information from

someone like Mr. Rowe, good information, reliable information,

and it was passed on to those who had the responsibility to

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do something about it, it was not always acted upon, as he

indicated.

Senator Tower. None of these cases, then, there was

adeguate evidence of conspiracy to give you jurisdiction to

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Mi: Adams. The Departmental rules at that. time, and still

require Departmental approval where you have a conspiracy.

Under 241, it takes two or more persons acting together.. You

can have a mob scene, and you can have blacks and whites

belting each other, but unless you can show that those that

initiated the action acted in concert in a conspiracy, you have.

no violation.

Congress recognized this, and 'it wasn't until 1968

that they came along and added Section 245 to the civil rights

statute, which added punitive measures against an individual

that didn't have to be a conspiracy. But this was a problem

that the whole country was grappling with: the President of

the United States, Attorney General. We were in a situation

where we had rank lawlessness taking place, as you know from

a memorandum we sent you that we sent to the Attorney General.

The accomplishments we were able to obtain in preventing

violence, and in neutralizing the Klan - and that was one

of the reasons.

Senator Tower. What was the Bureau's purpose in con-

tinuing or urging the continued surveillance of the Vietnam

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Veterans Against the War?

Was there a legitimate law enforcement purpose, or was the

intent to halter political expression?

Mr. Adams. We had information on the Vietnam Veterans

Against the War that indicated that there were subversive

groups involved. They were going to North Vietnam and meeting.

with the Communist forces. They were going to Paris, attending

meetings paid for and sponsored by the Communist Party, the

International Comnunist Party. We feel that we had a very valid

basis to direct our attention to the VAW.

It started out, of course, with Gus Hall in 1967, who was

head of the Communist Party, USA, and the comments he made,

and what it finally boiled down to was a situation where it

split off into the Revolutionary Union, which was a Maost

group, and the hard-line Communist group, and at that point

factionalism developed in many of the chapters, and they closed

those chapters because there was no longer any intent to follow

the national organization.

But we had a valid basis for investigating it, and we

investigated chapters to determine if there was affiliation

and subservience to the national office.

Senator Tower. Mr. Ilart?

Senator Hart of Michigan. But in the process of chasing

after the Veterans Against the War, you got a lot of information

that clearly has no relationship to any Federal criminal

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statute.

Mr. Adams. I agree, Senator.

Senator Hart of Michigan. Why don't you try to shut that

stuff off by simply telling the agent, or your informant?

Mr. Adams.

Here is the problem that you have with that.

When you're looking at an organization, do you report only the

violent statements made by the group or do you also show that

you may have one or two violent individuals, but you have

some of these church groups that were mentioned, and others,

that the whole intent of the group is not in violation of the

statutes. You have to report the good, the favorable along

with the unfavorable, and this is a problem. We wind up with

information in our files. We are accused of being vacuum

cleaners, and you are a vacuum cleaner. If you want to know the

real purpose of

an organization, do you only report the

violent statements made and the fact that it is by. a small

minority, or do you also show the broad base of the organization

and what it really is?

And within that is where we have to have the guidelines

we have talked about before. We have to narrow down, because

we recognize that we do wind up with too much information in

our files.

• Senator llart of Michigan. But in that vacuuming process:

you are feeding into Departmental files the names of people

who are, who have been engaged in basic First Amendment

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exercises, and this is what hangs some of us up.

Mr. Adams. It hangs me up. But in the same files I

imagine every one of you has been interviewed by the FBI, either

asking you about the qualifications of some other Senator

being considered for a Presidential appointment, being inter-

viewed concerning some friend who is applying for a job.

Were you embarrassed to have that in the files of the

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FBI?

Now, someone can say, as reported at our last session, that

this is an indication, the mere fact that we have a name in our

files has an onerous impression, a chilling effect. I agree.

It can have, if someone wants to distort what we have in our

files, but if they recognize that we interviewed you because

of considering. a man for the Supreme Court of the United

States, and that isn't distorted or improperly used, I don't

see. where any harm is served by having that in our files.

'Senator Hart. of Michigan. But if. I am. Reverend. Smith

and, the vacuum. cleaner. picked up the fact.that.I. was.helping

the veterans,. Vietnam Veterans Against. the War, and two years

later a name check. is. asked. on Reverend Smith and. all your

file shows. is that he was associated. two years ago. with a group

that was sufficient enough, held sufficient doubtful. patriotism

to justify turning loose a lot of your energy in pursuit on

them --

Mi. Adams. This is a problem.

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Senator Hart of Michigan. This is what should require

us to rethink this whole

business.

Mr. Adams. Absolutely.

And this is what I hope the guidelines committees as well

as the Congressional input are going to address themselves to.

Senator Hart of Michigan. We've talked about a wide range

of groups which the Bureau can and has had informant penetration

and report on. Your manual, the Bureau manual's definition

of when an extremist or security investigation may be under-

taken refers to groups whose activity either involves violation

of certain specified laws, or which may result in the violation

of such law, and when such an investigation is opened, then

informants may be used.

Another guideline says that domestic intelligence

investigations now must be predicated on criminal violations.

The agent need only cite a statute suggesting an investigation

relevant to a potential violation. Even now, with an improved,

upgraded effort to avoid some of these problems, we are back

again in a world of possible violations or activities which

may result in illegal acts.

:

Now, any constitutionally protected exercise of the

right to demonstrate, to assemble, to protest, to petition,

conceivably may result in violonce of disruption of a local

town meeting, when a controversial social issue might result

in disruption. It might be by hecklers rather than those holding

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the meeting.

Does this mean that the Bureau should investigate all

groups organizing or participating in such a meeting because

they may result in

violence, disruption?

Mr. Adams.

No, sir.

Senator Hart of Michigan.

Isn't that how you justify

spying on almost every aspect of the peace

movement?

Mr. Adams.

No, sir. When we monitor demonstrations, we

monitor demonstrations where we have an indication that the

demonstration itself is sponsored by a group that we have an

investigative interest in, a valid investigative interest in,

ot where members of one of these groups are participating where

there is a potential that they might change the peaceful

nature of the demonstration.

But this is our closest question of trying to draw

guidelines to avoid getting into an area of infringing on the

First Amendment rights of people, yet at the same time being

aware of groups such as we have had in greater numbers in the

past than we do at the present time, But we have had periods

where the demonstrations have been rather severe, and the

courts have said that the FBI has a right, and indeed a duty,

to keep itself informed with respect to the possible commission

of crime. It is not obliged to wear blinders until it may be

too late for prevention.

And that's a good statement if applied in a clearcut

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case. Our problem is where we have a demonstration and we have

to make a judgment call as to whether it is one that clearly

fits the criteria of enabling us to monitor the activities, and

that's where I think most of our disagreements fail.

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Schator llart of lichigan. Let's assume that the rule

for opening an investigation on a group is narrowly drawn. The

Bureau manual states that informants investigating a subversive

organization should not only report on what that group is

doing but should lo0k at and report on activities in which

the group is participating.

There is a Section 87B3 dealing with reporting. on

connections with other groups. That section says that the

field office shall "determine and report on any significant

connection or cooperation with non-subversive groups." Any

significant connection or cooperation with non-subversive

groups.

Now let's look at this in practice. In the spring of

1969 there was a rather heated national debate over the

installation of the anti-ballistic missile system. Some of us

remember that. An FBI informant and two FBI confidential

sources reported on the plan's participants and activities

of the Washington Area Citizens Coalition Against the ABM,

particularly in open public debate in'a high school auditorium,

which included speakers from the Defense Department for the

ABM and a scientist and defense analyst against the ABM.

The informants reported on the planning for the meeting,

the distribution of materials to churches and schools,..

participation by local clergy, plans to seek resolution on i

ABM from nearby town councils. There was also informat:.

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plans for a subsequent town meeting in Washington with the

names of local political leaders who would attend.

Now the information, the informant information came as

part of an investigation of an allegedly subversive. group • :

participating in that coalition. Yet the infornation dealt

with all aspects and all participants. The reports on the

plans for the meeting and on the meeting itself were disseminated

to the State Department, to military intelligence, and to the

White House.

How do we get into all of that?

Mr. Adams. Well

Senator Hart of Michigan.

Or if you were to rerun it;

would you do it again?

Mr. Adams.

Well, not in 1975, compared to what 1969

was.

The problem we had at the time was where we had an

informant who had reported that this group, this meeting was

going to take place and it was going to bethe Daily World,.

which was the east coast communist newspaper that made conments

about it. They formed an organizational meeting. We took

a quick look at it. The case apparently was opened in May .28,

1969 and closed June 5 saying there was no problem with this

organization.

Now the problem we get into is if we take a quick 100k

and get.out, fine. We've had cases, though, where we have

stayed in too long. When you're dealing with security i is

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Soviet espionage where they can put one person in this country

and they supported him with total resources of the soviet

Union, false identification, all the money he needs, comnuni-

cations networks, satellite assistance, and everything, and

you're working with a paucity of information.

The same problem exists to a certain extent in domestic

security. You don't have a lot of black and white situations.

So someone reports something to you which you feel, you take

a quick look at and there's nothing to it, and I think that's

what they did.

Senator: Hart of Michigan. You said that was '69. Let

me bring you up to date, closer. to current, a current place

on the calendar.

This one is the fall of last year, 1975. President

Ford announced his new program with respect to amnesty, as

he described it, for draft resistors. Following that there

were several national conferences involving all the groups

and individuals interested in unconditional amnesty.

Now parenthetically, while unconditional amnesty is

not against - while unconditional amnesty is not yet the law,

we agreed that advocating it is not against the law either.

Mr. Adams. That's right.

Sonator llart of richigan. Some of the sponsors var

umbrella organizations involving about 50 diverse groups

the country. FBI informants provided advance i..!is

til

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plans for the meeting and apparently attended and reported on

the conference.

The Bureau's own reports described the

participants as having. represented diverse'perspectives.on

the issue of amnesty, including civil liberties and human

rights groups, G.I. rights spokesmen, parents of men killed

in Vietnam, wives of ex-patriates in Canada, experts on draft

counselling, religious groups interested in peace issues,

delegates from student organizations, and aides of House and

Senate members, drafting legislation on amnesty.

The informant apparently was attending in his role as

a member of a group under investigation as allegedly subversive

and it described the topics of the workshop.

Ionically, the Bureau office report before them noted

that in view of the location of the conference at a theological

seminary, the FBI would use restraint and limit its coverage.

to informant reports.

Now this isn't five or ten years ago. This is last

fall. And this is a conference of people who have the point

of view that I share, that the sooner we have unconditional

20.

amnesty, the better for the soul of the country.

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Bureau files.

Is this what we want?

Mr. Adams. I'll let Mr. Wannall address himself to this.

He is particular knowledgeable as to this operation.

Mr. Wannall. Senator lart, that was a case that was

opened on November 14 and closed November 20, and the information

which caused us to be interested in it were really two particular

items.

one was that a member of the steering committee there,

was a three man steering committee, and one of those members

of the national conference was in fact a national officer

of the VAW in whom we had suggested before we did have a

legitimate investigative interest

Senator Hart of Michigan. Hell, I would almost say so what

at that point.

Mr. Wannall. The second report we had was that the

VVAW would actively participate in an attempt to pack the

conference to take it over. And the third report we had --

Senator. Hart of Michigan. And incidentally, all of the

information that your Buffalo informant had given you with

respect to the goals and aims of the VAW gave you a list of

goals which were completely within Constitutionally protected

objectives. There wasn't a single

item out of that VAl that

jeopardizes the security of this country at all.

Mr. Wannall. Well, of course, we did not rely entirely

on the Buffalo informant, but even there we did recej.

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from that informant information which I considered to be

significant.

The Buffalo chapter of the VVAW was the regional office.

covering New York and northern New Jersey: It was one of the

five most active VVAW chapters in the country and at a

national conference, or at the regional conference, this

informant reported information back to us that an attendee

at the conference announced that he had run guns into Cuba

prior to the Castro take-over. He himself said that he during

the Cuban crisis had been under 24 hour suveillance. There

was also discussion at the conference of subjugating the

WAW to the revolutionary union. There were some individuals

in the chapter or the regional conference who were not in

agreenent with us, but Mr. Adams has addressed himself to the

interest of the revolutionary union.

So all of the information that we had on the VAN dia

not come from that source but even that particular source did

give us information which we considered to be of some

significance in our appraisal of the need for continuing the

investigation of that particular chapter of the VAW.

Senator Hart of Michigan.

But does it sive you the

right or does it create the need to go to a conference, even

if it is a conference that might be taken over by the VAW

when the subject matter is how and by what means shall we

seck to achieve unconditional amnesty? What threat?

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Mr. Wannall. Our interest, of course, was the VAl

influence on a particular meeting, if you ever happened to be

holding a meeting, or whatever subject it was.

Senator Hart of Michigan. What if it was

a meeting to

seek to make more effective the food stamp system in this

country?

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WannalI.

Well, of course there

had been some

organizations.

Senator Hart of Michigan. Would the same logic follow?

Mr. Wannail. I think that if we found that if the

Comnunist Party USA was going to take over the meeting. and

use it as a front for its own purposes, there would be a logic

in doing that. You

have a whole scope here and it's

a matter.

of where you do and where you don't, and hopefully, as we've

said before, we will have

some guidance, not only from this

committee but from the guidelines that are being developed.

But within the rationale of what we're doing today, I was

explaining to you our interest not in going to this thing and

not gathering everything there was about it.

In fact, only one individual attended and reported to us,

and that was the person who had, who was not developed for

this reason; an informant who had been reporting on other

matters for some period of time.

And as

soon as we got the report of the outrore at thr

meeting and the fact that in the period of some . ?:.

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discontinued any further interest.

Senator Hart of Michigan. Hell, my time has expired

but even this brief exchange, I think, indicates that if we

really want to control the dangers to our society of using

informants to gather domestic political intelligence, we have

to restrict sharply domestic intelligence investigations. And

that gets us into what I would like to raise with you when

my turn comes around again, and that's the use of warrants,

obliging the Bureau to obtain a warrant before a full-fledged

informant can be directed by the Bureau against a group or

individuals.

I know you have objections to that and I would like. to

review that with you.

Senator Mondale, Pursue that question.

Senator, Hart of Michigan. I am talking now about an

obligation to obtain a warrant before you turn joose a full-

fledged informant. I'm not talking about tipsters that run

into you or you run into, or who walk in as information sources!

The Bureau has raised some objections in this memorandum to the

Committee. The Bureau

argues

that such a warrant requirement

might be unconstitutional because it would violate the First

Amendment rights of FBI informants to communicate with their

government.

Now that's a concern for First Amendment rights that

ought to

• hearten all the civil libertarians.

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But why would that vary, why would a warrant requirement

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Mr. Adams. Well, for one thing it's the practicability

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of

it or the impacticability of getting a warrant which:

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ordinarily involves probable cause to show that a crime has

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been or is about to be committed.

In the intelligence field we are not dealing necessarily

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such as with the Socialist Workers Party, which we have

discussed before, where they say publicly we're not to engage

1] in any violent activity today, but we guarantee you we still

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subscribe to the tenets of communism and that when the time

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is ripe, we're going to rise up and help overthrow the United

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Well, now, you can't show probable cause if they're about

to do it because they're telling you they're not going to do it

and you know they're not going to do it at this particular

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It's just the mixture somewhat of trying to mix in a

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criminal procedure with an intelligence gathering function, and

21 we can't find any practical way of doing it. We have a particular

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organization. We may have an informant that not only belongs

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to the Communist Party, but belongs to several other organization:

24 and as part of his function he may be sent out by the Communist

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We don't have probable cause for him to target

against

that organization, but yet we should be able to receive informa-

tion from him that he as

a Communist Party member, even

though in an informant status, is going to that organization

and don't worry about it. We're making no headway on it.

It's just from our standpoint the possibility of informants,

the Supreme Court has held that informants per se do not

violate the first, Fourth, or Fifth Amendments. They have

recognized the necessity that the government has to have

individuals who will assist them in carrying out their

governmental duties.

Senator Hart of Michigan. I'm not sure I've heard anything

yet in response to the constitutional question, the very

practical question that you addressed.

Quickly, you are right that the court has said that the

use of the informant per se is not a violation of constitutional

rights of the subject under investigation. But Congress

can prescribe sone safeguards, some rules and some standards,

just as we have with respect to your use of electronic

surveillance, and could do it with respect to informants.

That's quite different from saying that the warrant

procedure itself would be unconstitutional.

But with respect to the fact that you couldn't show

probable cause, and therefore; you couldn't get a warrant,

therefore you oppose the proposal to require you to get a

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warrant. It seems to beg the question.

Assuming that you say that since we use informants and

investigate groups which may only engage in lawful activities

but which might engage in activities that can result in

violence or illegal acts, and you can't use the warrant, but

Congress could say that the use of informants is subject to

such abuse and poses such a threat to legitimate activity,

including the willingness of people to assemble and discuss

the anti-ballistic missilé system, and we don't want you to

use them unless you have indication of criminal activity or

unless you present your request to a magistrate in the same.

fashion as you are required to do with respect to, in most

cases, to wiretap.

This is an option available to Congress:

Senator Tower. Senator Schweiker.

Senator Schweiker. Thank you very much.

Mr. Wannall, what's the difference between a potential

security informant and a security informant?

Mr. Wannall. I mentioned earlier, Senator Schweiker,

•that in developing an informant we do a preliminary check on

him before talking with him and then we do a further in-depth

background check.

A potential security informant is someone who is under

consideration before

he is approved by headquarters for use as

an informant. He is someone who is under current consideration.

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On some occasions that person will have been developed to a

point where he is in fact furnishing information and we are

engaged in checking upon his reliability.

In some instances he may be paid for information furnished

but it has not gotten to the point yet where we have satisfied

ourselves that he meets all of our criteria. When he does,.

the field must submit its recommendations to headquarters, and

headquarters will pass upon whether that individual is an

approved FBI informant.

Senator Schweiker. So it's really the first step

of.

being an informant, I guess.

MI. Wannall. It is a preliminary step,

one of.the

preliminary steps.

Senator Schweiker. In the Rowe case, in the Rowe

testimony that we just heard, what was the rationale again

for not intervening when violence was known?

I know we asked you several times but I'm still having

trouble understanding what the rationale, Mr. Wannall, was

in not intervening in the Rowe situation when violence was

known.

Mr. Wannall. Senator Schiveiker, Mr. Adams did address

himself to that. If you have no objection, I'll ask him to

answer that.

Senator Schweiker. All. right.

Mr. Adams.

The problem we had at the time, and it's the

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problem today, we are an investigative agency. We do not

have police powers like the United States marshalls do.

About 1795, I guess, or some period like that, marshalls have

had the authority that almost. borders on what a sheriff. has.

We are the investigative agency of the Department of Justice

and during these times the Department of Justice had us maintain

the role of an investigative agency. We were to report on

activities to furnish the information to the local police,

who had an obligation to act. We furnished it to the Department

of Justice.

In those areas where the local police did not act, it

resulted finally in the Attorney General sending 500 United

States marshalls down to guarantee the safety of people who

were trying to march in protest

of their civil rights.

This was an extraordinary measure because it came at

time of civil righs versus federal rights, and yet there was

a breakdown in law enforcement in certain areas of the country.

This doesn't mean to indict all law enforcement agencies

in itself at the time either because many of them did act

upon the information that was furnished to them. But we

have no authority to make an arrest on the spot because we

would not have had evidence that there was a.conspiracy

available. We can do absolutely nothing in that regard.

In Little Rock, the decision was made, for instance, that

if any arrests need to be made, the Army should make them and

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next to the Army, the United

States marshalls should make them,

not the FBI, even though we developed the violations.

And over the years, as you know, at the time there were many

questions raised.

"why doesn't the FBI stop this? why don't

you do something about it?.

Well, we took the other route and effectively destroyed

the Klan as far as committing acts of violence, and of course

we exceeded statutory guidelines in that area.

Senator Schweiker. What would be wrong, just following

up your point there, Mr. Adams, with setting up a program

since it's obvious to me that a lot of informers are going to

have pre-knowledge of violence of using U.s. marshalls on some

kind of a long-range basis to prevent violence?

Mx. Adams. We do. We have them in Boston in connection

with the busing incident. We are investigating the violations

under the Civil Rights Act. But the narshalls are in Boston,

they are in Louisville, I believe at the same time, and this

is the approach, that the Federal government finally recognized,

was the solution to the problem where you had to have added

Federal import.

Senator Schweiker. But instead of waiting until it

gets to a Boston state, which is obviously a pretty advanced

confrontation, shouldn't we have som

tere a coordinated program

that when you go up the ladder of crand in the FBI, that

on an innediate'and fairly contemporary basis, that kind of

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help can be sought instantly as opposed to waiting until it

gets

to a Boston state?

I realize it's a departture from the past. I'm not

saying it isn't. But it seems. to me we need a better remedy

than we have.

Mr. Adams.

Well, fortunately we're at a time where

conditions have subsided in the country, even from the '60s

and the '70s and periods -- or '50s and '60s. We report to the

Department of Justice on potential troublespots around the

country as we learn of them

so that the Department will be

aware of them. The planning for Boston, for instance, took

place a year in advance with state officials, city officials,

the Department of Justice and the FBI sitting down together

saying, how are we going to protect the situation in Boston?

I think we've learned a lot from the days back in the

early '60s. But the government had no mechanics which protected

people at that time.

Senator Schweiker. I'd like to go, if I may, to the

Robert Hardy case. I know he is not a witness but he

was a witness before the llouse. But since this affects my

state, I'd like to ask Mr. Wannall. Mr. Hardy, of course, was

the FBI informer who ultimately led and planned and organized

a raid on the Camden draft board. An' according to Mr. Hardy's

testimony before our Committee, he s..: that in advance of the

raid someone in the Departnent had even acknowledged the fact

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Why, Mr. Wannall, was this true?

Mr. Wannall. Well, I can answer that based only on the

material that I have reviewed, Senator Schweiker. It was not

a case handled in my division but I think I can answer your

question.

There was, in fact, a representative of the Department

of Justice on the spot counselling and advising continuously

as that case progressed as to what point the arrest should be

made and we were being guided by those to our mentors, the

ones who are responsible for making decisions of that sort..

So I. think that Mr. Hardy's statement to the effect that

there was someone in the Department there is perfectly true.

Senator Schweiker. That responsibility rests with who

under your procedures?

Mr. Wannall. We investigate decisions on making arrests,

when they should be made, and decisions with regard to

prosecutions are made either by the United States attorneys

or by Federals in the Department.

Mr. Adams. At this time that particular case did have

departmental attorney on the scene Mause there are questions

conspiracy.

conspiracy is a tough siolation to prove and

sometimes a question of do you have the added value of catching

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someone in the commission of the crime as further proof,

rather than relying on one informant and some circumstantial

evidence to prove the violation.

Senator Schweiker. Well, in this case, though, they

even had a dry run. • They could have arrested them on the

dry run.

That's getting pretty close to conspiracy, it seems to

me. They had a dry run and they could have arrested them on

the dry run.

I'd like to know why they didn't arrest them on the dry

run. Who was this Department of Justice official who made

that decision?

Mx. Adams. Guy Goodwin was the Department official.

Senator Schweiker. Next I'd like to ask back in 1965,

during the height of the effort to destroy the Klan, as you

put it a few moments ago, I believe the FBi has released

figures that we had something like 2,000 informers of some

kind or another infiltrating the klan out of roughly 10,000

estimated membership.

I believe these are either FBI figures or estimates.

That would mean that one out of every five members of the Klan

at that point was an informant paid by the government.

And I believe the figure goes or to indicate that 70

percent of the new members of the Kla:. that year were FBI

informants.

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Isn't this an awfully overwhelming quantity of people.

to put in an effort such as that? I'm not criticizing that

you shouldn't have informants in

the Klan and know what's

going on for violence, but it seems to me that this is the

tail wagging the dog.

For example, today we supposedly have only 1594 total

informants

for both domestic informants and potential informants

and that here we had 2,000 just in the klan alone.

MI, Adams. Well, this number 2,000 did include all

racial matters, informants at that particular time, and I

think the figures we tried to reconstruct as to the actual

number of Klan informants in relation to Klan members was around

6 percent, I think, after we had read some of the testimony.

Now the problem we had on the Klan is the Klan had a

group called the Action Group. This was the group that you

remember from Mr. Rowe's testimony, that he was left af-

ter the meeting.

He attended the open meetings and heard

all of the hurrahs and this type of thing from information,

but he never knew what was going on because each one had an

action group that went out and considered themselves in the

missionary field.

Theirs was the violence.

In order to penetrate those, it takes, you have to direct

as many informants as you possibly can against it. Bear in

mind that I think the newspapers, the President and Congress and

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everyone is concerned about the murder of the civil rights

workers, the Linio Kent sase, the Viola Liuzzo case, the

bombings of the church in Birmingham. We were faced with one

tremendous problem at that time.

Senator Schweiker.

I acknowledge that.

Mr. Adams.

Our only approach was through informants

and through the use of informants we solved these cases, the

ones that were solved. Some of the bombing cases we have

never solved. They are extremely difficult.

These informants, as we told the Attorney General, and

as we told the President, that we had moved informants like

Mr. Rowe up to the top leadership. He was the bodyguard to the

head man. He was in a position where he could forewarn us

of violence, could help us on cases that had transpired, and

yet we knew and conceived that this could continue forever

unless we can create enough disruption that these members

will

realize that if I go out and murder three civil rights workers,

even though the sheriff and other law enforcement officers are

in on it, if that were the case and with some of them it was

the case, that I would be caught. And that's what we did and

that's why violence stopped, was because the Klan was insecure

and just like you say, 20

percent, they thought 50 percent of

their members ultimately were Klan members and they didn't

dare engage in these acts of violence because they knew they

couldn't control the conspiracy any longer.

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Senator Schweiker. My time is expired. I just have

one quick question..

Is it correct that in 1971 we're using around 6500

informers for black ghetto situations?

Mr. Adams. I'm not sure if that's the year.

We did

have one year where we had a number like that which probably

had been around 6000, and that was the time when the cities

were being burned, Detroit,

Washington, areas like this. We

were given a mandate to know what the situation is, where is

violence going to break out, what next?

They weren't informants like an individual penetrating

an organization. They were listening posts in the community

that would help tell us that we have a group here that's getting

ready to start another fire-fight or something.

Senator Tower. At this point, there are three more

Senators remaining for questioning. If we can try to get

everything in in the first round, we will not have a second

round and I think we can finish around 1:00, and we can. go

on and terminate the proceedings.

However, If anyone feels that they have another question

that they want to return to, we can come back here by 2:00.

Senator Mondale?

Senator Mondale. Mr. Adams, it seems to me that the

record is now fairly clear that when the FBI operates in the

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organization of its kind in the world. And when the FBI acts

in the field of political ideas, it has bungled its job, it

has interfered with the civil liberties, and finally, in the

last month or two, through its public disclosures, heaped

shame upon itself and really led toward an undermining of

the crucial public confidence in an essential. law enforcement

agency of this country..

In a real sense, history has repeated itself because it

was precisely that problem that led to the creation of the

FBI

in 1921.

In World War I, the Bureau of Investigation strayed from

its law enforcement functions and became an arbiter and

protector of political ideas. And through the interference

of civil liberties and Palmer Raids and

the rest, the public

became so offended that later through Mr. Justice Stone and •

Mr. Hoover, the FBI was created. And the first statement

by Mr. Stone was that never again will this Justice Department

get involved in political ideas.

And yet here we are again looking at a record where with

Martin Luther King, with anti-war resistors, with - we even

had testimony this morning of meetings with the Council of

Churches. Secretly we are investigating this vague, ill-defined,

impossible to define idea of investigating dangerous ideas.

It seems to be the basis of the strategy that people

can't protect themselves, that you somehow need to use the

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tools of law enforcement to protect people from subversive

or dangerous: ideas, which I find strange and quite profoundly

at odds with the philosophy of American government.

I started in politics years ago and the first thing we

had to do was to get the communists out of our parts and out.

of the union. We did a very fine job. As far as I know, and

I'm beginning to wonder, but as far as I know, we had no help

from the FBI or the CIA. We just rammed them out of the meetings

on the grounds that they weren't Democrats and they weren't

good union leaders when we didn't want anything to do with them.

And yet, we see time and time again that we're going to

protect the blacks from Martin Luther King because he's

dangerous, that we've going to protect veterans fxom whatever

it is, and we're going to protect the Council of Churches

from the veterans, and so on, and it just gets so gummy and

confused and ill-defined and dangerous, that don't you agree

with me that we have to control this, to restrain it, so that

precisely what is expected of the FBI is known by you, by the

public, and that you can justify your actions when we ask

you?

Mr. Adams. I agree with that, Senator, and I would like,

to point out that when

the Attorney General made his statement

Mr. Hoover subscribes to it, we follied that policy for about

ten years until the President of the ..ited States said that

we should investigate the Nazi Parti.

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I for one feel that we should investigate the Nazi Party.

I feel that our investigation of the Nazi Party resulted in

the fact that in World War II, as contrasted with World War I,

there wasn't one single incident of foreign directed sabotage

which took place in the United States.

Senator Mondale.

And under the criminal law you could

have investigated these issues of sabotage.

Isn't sabotage a crime?

Mr. Adams. Sabotage is a crime.

Senator Mondale. Could you have investigated that?

Mr. Adams. After it happened.

Senator Mondale. You see, every time we get involved

in political ideas, you defend yourself on the basis of

crimes that could have been connitted. It's very interesting.

In my opinion, you have to stand here if you're going to

continue what you're now doing and as. I understand it, you

still insist that you did the right thing with the Vietnam

Veterans Against the War, and investigating the Council of

Churches, and this can still go on. This can still go on under

your interpretation of your present powers, what you try to

justify on the grounds of your law enforcement activitics

in terms of criminal matters.

Mr. Adams.

The law does not say we have to vait. until

we have been murdored before we can --

Senator Mondale. Absolutely, but that's the field of

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law again. You're. trying to defend apples with oranges.

That's

the law. You can do that.

Mr. Adams. That's right, but how do you find out which

of the 20,000 Bund members might have been a saboteur. You

don't have probable cause to investigate anyone, but you can

direct an intelligence operation against the German-American

Bund, the same thing ve did after Congress said --

Senator Mondale: Couldn't you get a warrant for that?

Why did you object to going to court for authority for that?.

Mr. Adams.

Because we don't have probable cause to

go against an individual and the law doesn't provide for

probable cause to investigate an organization.

There were activities which did take place, like one time

they outlined the Conmunist Party --

Senator Mondale. What I don't understand is why it

wouldn't be better for the FBI for us to define authority

that you could use in the kind of Bonn situation where under

court authority you can investigate where there is probable

cause or reasonable cause to suspect sabotage and the rest.

Wouldn't that make a lot more sense than just making these

decisions on your own?

Mr. Adams. We have expressed complete concurrence in

that. We feel that we're going to gist beat to death in the

next 100 years, you're damned if you is, and damned if you

don't

if wa don't have a delineation of our responsibility

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in this area.

But I won't agree with you, senator, that we

have bungled

the intelligence operations in the United States.

I agree with you that we have made some mistakes.

Mr. Kelley

has set a pattern of being

as forthright as any Director of the

FBI in acknowledging mistakes that. had been made, but I think

that as you said, and I believe Senator Tower said, and

Senator Church, that we have to watch these hearings because

of the necessity that we

must

concentrate on these areas of

abuse. We must not lose sight of the

overall law enforcement and intelligence community, and I

still feel that this is the freest country in the world.

I've travelled much, as I'm

sure you have, and I know we have

made some mistakes, but I feel that the people in the United

States are less chilled by the mistakes we have made than they

are by the fact that there are 20,000 murders a year in the

United States and they can't walk out of their houses at night

and feel safe.

Senator Mondale. That's correct, and isn't that an

argument then, Mr. Adams, for

strengthening our powers to go

after those who commit crimes rather than strengthening or

continuing a policy which we now see undermines the public

confidence you need to do your job.

Mr. Adams. Absolutely.

The mistakes we have made are

what have brought on this embarrassment to us.

I'm not blaming the Committee.

I'm saying we made some

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mistakes and in doing so this is what has hurt the FBI. But

at the same time I don't feel that a balanced picture comes

out, as you have

said yourselves, because of the necessity

of zercing in on abuses:

I think that we have done one tremendous job. I think

the accomplishments in the Klan was the finest hour of the

FBI and yet, I'm sure in dealing with the Klan that we made

Some mistakes. But I just don't agree with bungling.

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Senator Mondale. I don't want to argue over terms, but

I think I sense an agreement that the FBI has gotten into trouble

over it in the political idea trouble, and that that's where we

need to have new legal standards.

Mr. Adams. Yes, I agree with that.

Senator Tower. Senator Huddleston.

Senator Huddleston.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Adams, these two instances we have studied at some

length seems to have been an inclination on the part of

the Bureau to establish

1. a notion about an individual or a group

which seems to be very hard to ever change or dislodge. In

the case of DI. King, where the supposition was that he was

being influenced by Communist individuals, extensive investi-

gation was made, surveillance, reports came back indicating that

this in fact was untrue, and directions continued to go out

to intensify the investigation. There never seemed to be a

willingness on the part of the Bureau to accept its own facts.

Ms. Cook testified this morning that something similar

to that happened with the Vietnam Veterans Against the War, that

every piece of information that she supplied to the Bureau

seemed to indicate that the Bureau was. not correct in its

assumption that this organization planned to commit violence,

or that it was being manipulated, and yet you seemed to insist

that this investigation go on, and this information was used

against the individuals.

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Now, are there instances where the Bureau has admitted that

its first assumptions were wrong and they have changed their

course?

Mr. Adams: We have admitted that. We have also shown

from one of the cases that Sénator Hart brought up, that after

five days we closed the case.

We were told something by an

individual that there was a concern of an adverse influence

in it, and we looked into it. On the Martin Luther King

situation there was no testimony to the effect that we just

dragged on and on, or admitted that we dragged on and on and

on, ad infinitum. The wiretaps on Martin Luther King were

all approved by the Attorney General. Microphones on Martin

Luther King were approved by another Attorney General. This

wasn't the FBI, and the reason they were approved was that

there was a basis to continue the investigation up to a point.

What I testified to was that we were improper in discreditir

Di. King, but it's just like --

Senator Hudaleston. The Committee has before it memoranda

written by high officials of the Bureau indicating that the

information they were receiving from the field, from these

surveillance methods, did not confirm what their supposition

was.

Mr. Adams. That, memorandum was rot on Di. King. That

was on another individual that I thi:. somehow got mixed up

in the discussion, one where the issus was can we make people

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prove they aren't a Communist before we will agree not to

investigate them.

But the young lady appearing this morning making the

comment that she never knew of anything she told us that

she considers herself a true member of the VVAW-WSO inasmuch

as she feels in general agreement of the principles of it, and

agreed to cooperate with the FBI in providing information regard-

ing the organization to aid in preventing violent individuals

from associating themselves with the VVAW-WSO. She is most

concerned about efforts.by the Revolutionary Union to take over

the VVAW-WSO, and she is working actively to prevent this..

I think that we have a basis for investigating the VAW-

WSO in certain areas today. In other areas we have stopped

the investigation. They don't agree with these principles

laid down by the --

Senator Huddleston. That report was the basis of your

continuing to pay informants and continuing to utilize that

information against members who certainly had not been involved

in violence, and apparently to get them fired from their job

or whatever?

Mr. Adams. It all gets back to the fact that even in the

criminal law field, you have to detect crime, and you have to

prevent crime, and you can't wait until something happens.. The

Attorney General has clearly spoken : that area, and even our

statutory jurisdiction provides that we don't --

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Senator Huddleston.. Well, of course we've had considerable

evidence this morning where no attempt was made to prevent

crime, when you had information that it was going to occur.

But I'm sure there are instances where you have.

Mr. Adams. We disseminated every single item which he

reported to us.

Senator Huddleston.

To a police department which you

knew was an accomplice to the crime.

Mr. Adams. Not necessarily.

Senator Huddleston. Your informant had told you that,

hadn't he?

Mr. Adams. Well, the informant is on one level.

We have

other informants, and we have other information.

Senator Huddleston.

Yes, but you were aware that he

had worked with certain members of the Birmingham police in

order to -

MI. Adams. Yes. He furnished many other instances also.

Senator Huddleston. So you weren't really doing a whole

lot to prevent that incident by telling the people who were

already part of it.

Mr. Adams. We were doing everything we could lawfully

do at the time, and finally the situation was corrected, so that

when the Department, agreeing that we had no further. juris-

diction, could sent the United States Marshal down to perform.

certain law enforcement functions.

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Senator Huddleston. Now, the Committee has received

documents which indicated that in one situation the FBI assisted

an informant who had been

established in a white hate group

to establish a rival white hate group, and that the Bureau paid

his expenses in setting up this rival organization.

Now, does this not put the Bureau in a position of being

responsible for what actions the rival white hate group might

have undertaken?

Mr. Adams. I'd like to see if one of the other gentlemen

knows that specific case, because I don't think we set up a

specific group.

This is Joe Deegan.

Mr. Deegan. Senator, it's my understanding that the

informant we're talking about decided to break off from the

group he was with. He was with the Macon Klan group of

the United Klans of America, and he decided to break off.

was in compliance with our regulations. His breaking off,

we did not pay him to set up the organization. He did it

This

on his own. We paid him for the information he furnished

us concerning the operation. We did not sponsor the organiza-

tion.

Senator Huddleston. Concerning the new organization that

he set up, he continued to advise you of the activities of that

organization?

Mr. Deegan.. He continued to advi:: us of that organization

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and other organizations. He would advise us of planned

activities.

Senator Huddleston. The new organization that he formed,

did it operate in a very similar manner to the previous one?

Mr. Deegan. No, it did not, and it did not last that

long..

Senator Huddleston. There's also evidence of an FBI

informant in the Black Panther Party who had a position of

responsibility within the Party with the knowledge of his

FBI contact of supplying members with weapons and instructing

them in how to use those weapons. Presumably this was in the

knowledge of the Bureau, and he later became - came in contact

with the group that was contracting for murder, and he partici-

pated in this group with the knowledge of the FBI agent, and

this group did in fact stalk a victim who was later killed with

the weapon supplied by this individual, presumably all in the

knowledge of the FBI.

How does this square with your enforcement and crime

prevention responsibilities.

Mr. Deegan.. Senator, I'm not familiar with that particular

case. It does not square with our policy in all respects, and

I would have to look at that particular case you're talking

about to give you an answer.

Senator Huddleston. I don't have the documentation on that

particular case, but it brings up the point as to what kind of

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control you exercised over this kind of informant in this kind

of an organization and to what extent an effort is made to

prevent these informants. from engaging in the kind of thing

that you

are

supposedly trying to prevent.

MI. Adams. A good example of this was MI. Rowe, who became

active in an action group, and we told him to get out or

we would no longer use him as an informant, in spite of the

information he had furnished in the past.

We have had cases, Senator, where we have had --

Senator Huddleston. But you also told him to participaté

in violent activities.

Mr. Adams. We did not tell him to participate in violent

activities.

Senator Huddleston.

That's what he said.

Mr. Adams. I know that's what he said. But. that's what

lawsuits are. all about, is that there. are. two sides to the

issue, and our agents. handling. this have. advised. us, and I

believe have advised. your staff, that at no time did they

advise him to engage. in violence.

Senator. Huddleston. Just to. do what was necessary to

get the information, I believe maybe might have been his

instructions.

Mr. Adams. I don't think they made any such statement

to him along that line, and we have informants, we have

informants who have gotten involved in the violation of the law,

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and we have immediately converted their status from an informant

to the subject, and have prosecuted I would say, offhand, I

can think of around 20 informants that we have prosecuted for

violating the laws, once it came to our attention, and even

to show you our policy of disseminating information on violence

in this case, during the review of the matter, the agents told

me that they found one case where their agent had been working

24 hours a day, and he was a little late in disseminating the

information to the police department. No violence occurred,

but it showed up in a file review, and he was censured for

his delay in properly notifying local authorities.

So we not only have a policy, I feel that we do follow

reasonable safeguards..in order to carry it out, including periodic

review of all informant. files.

Senator Huddleston. Well, Mr. Rowe's statement is

substantiated to some extent with the acknowledgement by the

agent in charge that if you're going to be a Klansman and you

happen to be with someone and they decide to do something, that

he couldn't be an angel. These were the words of the agent,.

and be a good informant. He wouldn't take the lead; but the

implication is that he would have to go along and would have

to be involved if he was going to maintain his credibility.

Mr. Adams.. There's no question but that an informant at

times. will have to be present during demonstrations, riots,

fistfights that take place, but I believe his statement was

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to the effect that - and I was sitting in the back of the

room and I don't recall it exactly, but some of them were

beat with

chains, and I didn't hear whether he said he beat

someone with a chain or not, but I rather doubt that he did

because it's one thing being present, and it's another thing

taking an active part in criminal actions.

Senator Huddleston.. He was close enough to get his

throat cut.

How does the gathering of information -

Senator Tower. Senator Mathias is here, and I think that

we probably should recess a few minutes.

Could we have Senator Mathias' questions and then should

we convene this afternoon?

Senator Huddleston. I'm finished. I just had one more

question.

Senator Tower. Go ahead.

Senator Huddleston. I wanted to ask how the selection of

information about an individual's personal life, social, sex

life and becoming involved in that sex life or social life

is a requirement for law enforcement or crime prevention.

Mr. Adams. Our agent handlers have advised us on Mr.

Rowe, that they gave him no such instruction, they had no

such knowledge concerning it, and I can': see where it would

be.of any value whatsoever.

Senator Huddleston. You aren't aware of any case where

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these instructions were given to an agent or an informant?

Mr. Adams. To get involved in sexual activity? No, sir..

Senator Huddleston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Tower. Senator Mathias.

Senator Mathias.

Thank you, Mi. Chairman.

I would like to come back very briefly to the Fourth

Amendment considerations in connection with the use of informants

and in posing these questions we're not thinking of the one

time volunteer who walks in to an FBI office and says I have

a story I want to tell you and that's the only time that you

may see him. I'm thinking of the kind of situations in which

there is a more extended relationship which could be of varying

degrees. It might be in one case that the same individual

will' have some usefulness in a number of situations. But when

the FBI orders a regular agent to engage in a search, the first

test is a judicial warrant, and what I would like

to explore

with you is the difference between a one time search which

requires a warrant, and which you get when you make that

search, and a continuous search which uses an informant. or

the case of a continuous search which uses a regular undercover

agent, someone who is totally under your control, and is in a

slightly different category than an informant.

Mr. Adams. Well, we get there into the fact that the

Supreme Court has still held that the use of informants does

not invade any of these constitutionally protected areas, ,and

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if a person wants

to tell an informant something that isn't

protected by the Supreme Court.

An actual search for legal evidence, that is a protected

item, but information and

the use of informants have been

consistently held as not posing any constitutional problens.

Senator Mathias. I would agree, if you're talking about

the fellow who walks in off the street, as I said earlier,

but is it true that under existing procedures informants are

given background checks?

Mr. Adams. Yes, sir.

Senator Mathias. And they are subject to a testing period.

Mr. Adams. That's right, to verify and make sure they

are providing to us reliable information.

Senator Mathias. And during the period that the relation-

ship continues, they are rather closely controlled by the

handling agents.

• Mr. Adams. That's true.

Senator Mathias. So in effect they can come in a very

practical way agents themselves to the FBI.

Mr. Adams:. They can do nothing --

Senator Mathias. Certainly agents in the common law use

of the word.

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Mr. Adams. That's right, they can do nothing, and we

instruct our agents that an informant can do nothing that the

agent himself cannot do, and if the agent can work himself into

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an organization in an undercover capacity, he can sit there and

glean all the information that he wants, and that is not in the

Constitution as a protected area. But we do have this problem.

Senator Mathias. But if a regular agent who is a nember

of the FBI attempted to enter these premises, he would require

a warrant?

Mr. Adams. No, sir, if a regular -- it depends on the

purpose for which he is entering. If a regular agent by

concealing his identity, by -- was admitted as a member of the

Communist Party, he can attend Communist Party meetings, and he

can enter the premises, he can enter the building, and there's

no constitutionally invaded area there. .

Senator Mathias. And so you feel that anyone who has

a less formal relationship with the Bureau than a regular

agent, who can undertake a continuous surveillance operation

as an undercover.agent.or as an informant.--

Mr. Adams. As long as he commits no illegal acts.

Senator Mathias. Let me ask you.why you feel that it is

impractical to. require.a. warrant. since,.as I understand it,

headquarters must approve the use of an informant. Is that

degree of formal action required?

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Mr. Adams. The main difficulty is the particularity

which has to be shown in obtaining a search warrant. You

have to go after particular evidence. You have to specify

what you're going after, and an informant operates in an

area that you just cannot specify. He doesn't know what's

• going. to be discussed at that meeting. It may be a plot to

blow up the Capitol again or it may be a plot to blow up the

State Department building..

Senator Mathias. If it were a crininal investigation,

you would have little difficulty with probable cause, wouldn't

you?

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Mr. Adams. We would have difficulty in a warrant to

use someone as an informant in that area because the same

difficulty of particularity exists. We can't specify.

Senator Mathias. I understand the problem because it's

very similar to one that we discussed earlier in connection

say wiretaps on a national security problem.

Mr. Adams.

That's it, and there we face the problem of

where the Soviet, an individual identified as a Soviet spy

in a friendly country and they tell us he's been a Soviet spy

there and now he's coming to the United States, and if we can't

show under a probable cause warrant, if we couldn't show that

he was actually engaging in espionage in the United States,

we couldn't get a wiretap under

the probable cause requirements

which have been discussed, If the good fairy didn't drop the

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evidence in our hands that this individual is here conducting

espionage, we again would fall short of this, and that's

why

we're still groping with it;

Senator Mathias. When you say fall short, you really,

you would be falling short of the requirements of the Fourth

Amendment.

Mr. Adams. That's right, except for the fact that the

President, under this Constitutional povers, to protect this

nation and make sure that it survives first, first of all

national survival, and these are the areas that not only the

President but the Attorney General are concerned in and we're

all hoping that somehow we can reach a legislative middle

ground in here.

Senator Mathias. Which we discussed in the other national

security area as to curtailling a warrant to that particular

need.

Mr. Adams. And if you could get away from probable

cause and get some degree of reasonable cause and get some

method of sealing indefinitely your interest, say, in an

ongoing espionage case and can work out those difficulties,

we may get their yet.

Senator Mathias. And you don't despair of finding that

middle ground?

Mr. Adams. I don't

because I think that today there's

more of an open mind between Congress and the Executive Branch

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and the rBI and everyone concerning the need to get these

areas resolved.

Senator Mathias.

And you believe that the Department,

if we could come together, would support, would agree to that

kind of a warrant requirement if we could agree on the language?

Mr. Adams.

If we can work out problems and the Attorney

General is personally interested in that also.

Senator Mathias. Do you think that this agreement night

extend to some of those other areas. that we talked about?

Mr. Adams. I think'

that that would be a nuch greater

difficulty in an area of domestic intelligence informant who

reports on many different operations and different types of

activities that might come up rather than say in a Soviet

espionage or a foreign espionage case where you do have a little

more degree of specificity to deal with.

Senator Mathias. I suggest that we arrange to get

together and try out some drafts with each other, but in the

meantime, of course, there's another alternative and that

would be the use of wiretap procedure by which the Attorney

General must approve a wiretap before it is placed, and the

same general process could be used for informants, since

you come to headquarters any way. :

Mr. Adams.

That could be an altositive. I think it

would be a very burdensome alternative

id I think at some

point after we attack the major abuses, or what are considered

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major abuses of Congress and get over this hurdle, I think

we're still going to have to recognize that heads of agencies

have to accept the responsibility for managing that agency

and we can't just keep pushing every operational problem up

to the top because there just aren't enough hours in the day.

Senator Mathias. But the reason that parallel suggests

itself is of course the fact that the wiretap deals generally

with one level of information in one sense of gathering

information. You hear what you hear from the tap.

Mr. Adams. But you're dealing in a much smaller number

First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

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also.

Senator Mathias. Smaller nunber, but that's all the

more reason. When an informant goes in, he has all of his

senses. He's gathering all of the information a human being

can acquire from a situation and has access to more information

than the average wiretap.

And it would seen to me that for that reason a parallel

process might be useful and in order.

Mr. Adams. Mr. Mintz pointed out one other main

distinction. to me which I had overlooked fron our prior

discussions, which is the fact that with an informant he is

more in the position of being a concentral monitor in that one

of the two parties to the conversation agrees, such as like

concentral monitoring of telephones and microphones and

anything else versus the wiretap itself where the individual

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whose telephone is being tapped is not aware and there is,

and neither of the two parties talking had agreed that their

conversation could be monitored.

Senator Mathias. I find

that one difficult to accept.

If I'm the third party overhearing a conversation that is taking

place in a room where I am, and my true character isn't perceived

by the two people who are talking, in effect they haven't

consented to my overhearing my conversation. Then they consent

if they believe that I am their friend or their, a partisan

of theirs.

But if they knew in fact that I was an informant for

someone else, they wouldn't be consenting.

Mr. Adams. Well, that's like I believe Senator llart

raised earlier, that the courts thus far have made this

distinction with no difficulty, but that doesn't mean that

there may not be some legislative compromise which might be

addressed.

Senator Mathias. Well, I particularly appreciate your

attitude in being willing to work on these problems because

I think that's the most important thing that can evolve from

these hearings,

so that we can actually look at the fourth

Anendment as the standard that we have t: achieve. But the

way we get there is obviously going to i, lot easier if we

can work toward them together.

I just have one final question, 'is. Chairman, and that

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deals with whether we shouldn't impose a standard of probable

cause that a crime has been committed as a means of controlling

the use of informants and the kind of information that they

collect.

Do you feel that this would be too restrictive?

Mr. Adams. Yes, sir, I do.

When I look at informants and I see that each year

informants provide us, locate 5000 dangerous fugitives, they

provide subjects in 2000 more cases, they recover $86 million

in stolen property and contraband, and that's irrespective

of what we give the local law enforcement and other federal

agencies, which is almost a comparable figure, we have almost

reached a point in the criminal law where we don't have much

left. And in the intelligence field we still, I think when

we carve all of the problems away, we still have to make sure

that we have the means to gather

information which will permit

us to be aware of the identity of individuals and organizations

that are

acting to overthrow the government of the United

States.

And I think we still'have some areas to look hard

at as we have discussed, but I think informants are here to.

stay. They are absolutely essential to law enforcement.

Everyone uses informants. The press has informants, Congress

has informants, you have individuals in your connunity that

you rely on, not for ulterior purposes, but to let you know

what's the fecl of the people, am I serving them properly,

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am I carrying out this?

It's here to say. It's been here throughout history

and there will always be informants. And the thing we want to

avoid is abuses. like provocateurs, criminal activities, and

to ensure that we have safeguards that will prevent that.

But we do need informants.

Senator lower. Senator liart, do you have any further

questions?

Senator llart of Michigan. Yes. I ask unanimous request

perhaps with a view to giving balance to the record, the

groups that we have discussed this morning into which the

Bureau has put informants, in popular language, our liberal

groups - I would ask unanimous consent that . be printed in

the record, the summary of the opening of the headquarters

file by the Bureau of Dr. Carl McIntyre when he announced

that he was organizing a group to counter the American Civil

Liberties Union and other "liberal and communist groups,"

is not a left only pre-occupation.

Senator Tower. Without objection, so ordered.

• (The material referied to follows:)

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Senator Tower.. Any more questions?

Then the Committee will have an Executive Session this .

afternoon in Room 3110 in the Dirksen Building at 3:00, and

I hope everyone will be in attendance.

Tomorrow morning we will 'hear from Courtney Evans,

Cartha DeLoach. Tomorrow afternoon, former Attorneys General

Ramsey Clark and Edward Katzenbach.

The Committee, the hearings are recessed until 10:00

a.m. tomorrow morning.

(whereupon, at 1:10 o'clock p.m., the hearing in the

above mentioned matter was concluded, to reconvene on Wednesday

December 3rd, 1975, at 10:00 o'clock a.nn.)

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nouting Slip

0-7 (868,%-11-75)

*TO: SAC:

EJ Albary

Albuquerque

[J Alexandria

Anchorage

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Ballimore

Binningham

Boston

Buffalo

Butte

Charlotte

Chi cngo

Cincinnati

Clevel and

Columbia

Dallas

Denver

Detroit

El Paso

→ Honolulu

(Copies 11

Houston

Incianapolis

diCk sion

Jacksonville

Kansas City

Knoxville

Las Vegas

Little Rock

Los Angeles

Louisville

Memphis

Miami

Milwaukee

Minneapolis

Mobile

Newark

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New Orleans

New York City

Norfolk

Vices Checked,

1 Okiahoma City

Omaha

Philadelphia

= Phoenix

Piitsburgh

1 Portland

Richmond

Sacramento

St. Louis

Salt Lake City

San Antonio

San Diego

San Fracisco

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TO LEGAT:

Bern

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Buenos Aires

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Hong Kong

London

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RE:

Dato December 4. 1975

HEARINGS BEFORE THE SENATE

SELECT COMMITTEE

Retention

For appropriate

For intonation

I optional

1 action

[ Surep, by

The enclosed is for your information. If used in a future report,

sources, Cy paraphrase contents.

Enclosed are corrected pages from report of SA

dated

Remarks:

conceal all

For your assistance in responding to

local press inquiries, attached is a copy of

unedited excerpted remarks by Assistant to the

Director--Deputy Associate Director James B.

Adams while testifying before the Senate Select

Committee on 12/2/75, concerning anti-FBI

allegations made by Gary Rowe, Former FBI

informant.

INDEXED.

SEARCHED

FILED S

SERIALIZED>

DEC 8

1975

FBI - SEATTLE

Enc. (1)

Bufile

Urfile

LUN

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EXCERPTS OF REMARKS MADE BY

ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR --

DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR JAMES B. ADAMS

TESTIFYING BEFORE THE

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

PERTAINING TO THE KU KLUX KLAN,

GARY ROWE, FORMER FBI INFORMANT, AND

PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS OF THE FBI

TO PREVENT VIOLENCE

DECEMBER 2, 1975

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QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

....You do use informants and do instruct them to

spread dissention among certain groups that they are

informing on, do you not?

We did when we had the COINTEL programs which were

discontinued in 1971, and I think the klan is probably one

of the best examples of a situation where the law was

ineffective at the time. We heard the term, State's Rights

used much more than we hear today. We saw with the

Little Rock situation the President of the United States

sending in the troops pointing out the necessity to use

local law enforcement. We must have local law enforcement

use the troops only as a last resort. When you have a

situation like this where you do try to preserve the

respective roles in law enforcement, you have historical

problems.

With the Klan coming along, we had situations where

the FBI and the Federal Government was almost powerless

to act. We had local law enforcement officers in some

areas participating in Klan violence. The incidents

mentioned by Mr. Rowe--everyone of those he saw them from the

lowest level--the informant. He didn't see what action

was taken with that information as he pointed out during

his testimony. Our files show that this information was

reported to the police departments in every instance.

We also know that in certain instances the infor-

mation upon being received was not being acted upon. We

also disseminated simultaneously through letterhead

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QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

memorandum to the Department of Justice the problem.

And here we were--the FBI--in a position where we had no

authority in the absence of an instruction from the

Department of Justice to make an arrest. Section 241

anã 242 don't cover it because you don't have evidence

of a conspiracy. It ultimately resulted in a situation

where the Department called in U. S. Marshals who do have

authority similar to local law enforcement officials.

So historically, in those days, we were just as

frustrated as anyone else was, that when we got information

from someone like Mr. Rowe--good information, reliable

information--and it was passed on to those who had the

responsibility to do something about it, it was not always

acted upon as he indicated.

In none of these cases, then, there was adequate

evidence of conspiracy to give you jurisdiction to act.

The Departmental rules at that time, and still do,

require Departmental approval where you have a conspiracy.

Under 241, it takes two or more persons acting together.

You can have a mob scene and you can have blacks and whites

belting each other, but unless you can show that those that

initiated the action acted in concert, in a conspiracy, you

have no violation.

Congress recognized this and it wasn't until 1968

that they came along and added Section 245 to the Civil

Rights Statute which added punitive measures against an

-2 -

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QUESTION:

MR ADAMS:

QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

individual. There didn't have to be a conspiracy. This

was a problem that the whole country was grappling with--

the President of the United States, Attorneys General--we

were in a situation where we had rank lawlessness taking

place. As you know from the memorandum we sent you that

we sent to the Attorney General the accomplishments we were

able to obtain in preventing violence and in neutralizing

the Klan and that was one of the reasons.

....A local town meeting on a controversial social

issue might result in disruption. It might be by hecklers

rather than by those holding the meeting. Does this

mean that the Bureau should investigate all groups

organizing or participating in such meetings because

they may result in violent government disruption?

No sir, and we don't....

Isn't that how you justify spying on almost every

aspect of the peace movement?

No sir. When we monitor demonstrations, we monitor

demonstrations where we have an indication that the

demonstration itself is sponsored by a group that we have

an investigative interest in, a valid investigative

interest in, or where members of one of these groups are

participating where there is a potential that they might

change the peaceful nature of the demonstration.

This is our closest question of trying to draw

guidelines to avoid getting into an area of infringing

on the Ist Amendment right, yet at the same time, being

- 3-

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aware of groups such as we have had in greater numbers

in the past than we do at the present time. We have had

periods where the demonstrations have been rather severe

and the courts have said that the FBI has the right,

and indeed the duty, to keep itself informed with respect

to the possible commission of crime. It is not obliged

to wear blinders until it may be too late for prevention.

Now that's a good statement if applied in a clear-cut

case.

QUESTION:

MR. WANNALI:

MR. ADAMS:

Our problem is where we have a demonstration and

we have to make a judgment call as to whether it is one

that clearly fits the criteria of enabling us to monitor

the activities. That's where I think most of our disagree-

ments fall.

In the Rowe Case, in the Rowe testimony that we just

heard, what was the rationale again for not intervening when

violence was known about. I know we have asked this several

times--I'm still having trouble understanding what the

rationale, Mr. Wannall, was in not intervening in the Rowe

situation when violence was known.

Senator Schweiker, Mr. Adams did address himself to

that and if you have no objections, I'll ask that he be

the one to answer the question.

The problem we had at the time, and it is the problem

today, we are an investigative agency; we do not have

police powers even like the U. S. Marshals do. The Marshals

- 4 -

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since about 1795 I guess, or some period like that, had

authorities that almost border on what a sheriff has. We

are the investigative agency of the Department of Justice,

and during these times the Department of Justice had us

maintain the role of an investigative agency.

We were to report on activities. We furnished the

information to the local police who had an obligation to

act. We furnished it to the Department of Justice in those

areas where the local police did not act. It resulted

finally in the Attorney General sending 500 U. S. Marshals

down to guarantee the safety of people who were trying to

march in protest of their civil rights.

This was an extraordinary measure because it came at

a time of Civil Rights versus Federal Rights and yet there

was a breakdown in law enforcement in certain areas of the

country. This doesn't mean to indict all law enforcement

agencies in the South at the time either, because many of

them did act upon the information that was furnished to

them. But we have no authority to make an arrest on the

spot because we would not have had evidence that was a

conspiracy available. We could do absolutely nothing in

that regard. In Little Rock the decision was made, for

instance, that if any arrests need to be made, the Army

should make them. And next to the Army, the U. S. Marshals

should make them--not the FBI, even though we developed

the violations. We have over the years as you know at the

- 5 -

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QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

QUESTION:

MR ADAMS:

Time there were many questions raised. Why doesn't the

FBI stop this? Why don't you do something about it? well,

we took the other route and effectively destroyed the Klan

as far as committing acts of violence and, of course, we

exceeded statutory guidelines in that area.

What would be wrong, just following up on your point

there, Mr. Adams, with setting up a program since it is

obvious to me that a lot of our informers are going to

have preknowledge of violence of using U. S. Marshals on

some kind of long-range basis to prevent violence?

We do. We have them in Boston in connection with

the busing incident. We are investigating the violations

under the Civil Rights Act, but the Marshals are in

Boston. They are in Louisville, I believe, at the same

time and this is the approach that the Federal Government

finally recognized.

On an immediate and fairly contemporary basis that

kind of help can be sought instantly as opposed to waiting

till it gets to a Boston state. I realize a departure from

the past and not saying it isn't, but it seems

to me we need

a better remedy than we have.

Well, fortunately we are at a time where conditions have

subsided in the country even from the 60's and the 70's, or

50's and 60's. We report to the Department of Justice on

potential trouble spots around the country as we learn of them

so that the Department will be aware of them. The planning

-6-

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QUESTION:

for Boston, for instance, took place a year in advance, with

state officials, city officials, the Department of Justice

and the FBI sitting down together saying "How are we going to

protect the situation in Boston"? I think we have learned a

lot from the days back in the early 60's. But, the Government

had no mechanics which protected people at that time.

Next I would like to ask, back in 1965, I guess during

the height of the effort to destroy the Klans as you put it

a few moments ago, I believe the FBI has released figures that

we had something like 2,000 informers of some kind or another

infiltrating the Klan out of roughly 10,000 estimated member-

ship.

MR. ADAMS:

QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

That's right.

I believe these are FBI figures or estimates. That would

mean that I out of every 5 members of the Klan at that point

was an informant paid by the Government and I believe the

figure goes on to indicate that 70 percent of the new members

in the Klan that year were FBI informants. Isn't that an

awful overwhelming quantity of people to put in an effort such

as that? I'm not criticizing that we shouldn't have informants

in the Klan and know what

is going on to revert violence but it

just seems to me that the tail is sort of wagging the dog. For

example today we supposedly have only 1594 total informants,

both domestic informants and potential informants. Yet, here

we have 2,000 in just the Klan alone.

Well, this number of 2,000 did include all racial matters

and informants at that particular time and I think the figures

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QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

we tried to reconstruct as to the actual number of Klan

informants in relaton to Klan members was around 6 percent, I

think after we had read some of the testimony on it. Isn't that

right, Bill? Now the problem we had on the Klan is the Klan

had a group called the Action Group. This was the group if you

remember from Mr. Rowe's testimony that he was left out of in

the beginning. He attended the open meetings and heard all the

hoorahs and this type of information but he never knew what was

going on because each one had an Action Group that went out and

considered themselves in the missionary field. Theirs was the

violence. In order to penetrate those you have to direct as

many informants as you possibly can against it. Bear in mind

that I think the newspapers, the President, Congress, everyone,

was concerned about the murder of the three civil rights

workers, the Lemul Penn case, the Violet Liuzzo case, the

bombings of the church in Birmingham. We were faced with one

tremendous problem at that time.

I acknowledge that.

Our only approach was through informants. Through the

use of informants we solved these cases.

The ones that were

solved. There were some of the bombing cases we never solved.

They're extremely difficult, but, these informants as we told

the Attorney General and as we told the President, we moved

informants like Mr. Rowe up to the top leadership.

He was the

bodyguard to the head man. He was in a position where he

could see that this could continue forever unless we could

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QUESTION:

MR ADAMS:

QUESTION:

create enough disruption that these members will realize that

if I go out and murder three civil rights, even though the

Sheriff and other law enforcement officers are in on it, if

that were the case, and in some of that was the case, that I

will be caught, and that's what we did, and that's why violence

stopped because the Klan was insecure and just like you say

20 percent, they thought 50 percent of their members ultimately

were klan members, and they didn't dare engage in these acts of

violence because they knew they couldn't control the conspiracy

any longer.

I just have one quick question. Is it correct that in

1971 we were using around 6500 informers for a black ghetto

situation?

I'm not sure if that's the year. We did have a year

where we had a number like that of around 6000 and that was

the time when the cities were being burned. Detroit, Washington,

areas like this, we were given a mandate to know what the

situation is, where is violence going to break out next. They

weren't informants like an individual that is penetrating an

organization. They were listening posts in the community that

would help tell us that we have another group here that is

getting ready to start another fire fight or something.

... Without going into that subject further of course we

have had considerable evidence this morning where no attempt

was made to prevent crime when you had information that it

was going to occur. I am sure there were instances where

you have.

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MR. ADAMS:

QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

QUESTION:

We disseminated every single item which he reported to us.

To a police department which you knew was an accomplice to

the crime.

Not necessarily knew.

Your informant told you that, hadn't he?

The informant is on one level. We have other informants

and we have other information.

You were aware that he had worked with certain members

of

the Birmingham Police in order...

That's right. He furnished many other instances also.

So you really weren't doing a whole lot to prevent that

incident by telling the people who were already a part of it.

We were doing everything we could lawfully do at the

time and finally the situation was corrected when the Department

agreeing that we had no further jurisdiction, sent the U.s.

Marshals down to perform certain law enforcement functions.

... This brings up the point as to what kind of control

you can exercise over this kind of informant and to this

kind of organization and to what extent an effort is made to

prevent these informants from engaging in the kind of thing

that you were supposedly trying to prevent.

A good example of this was Mr. Rowe who became active in

an Action Group and we told him to get out or we were no longer

using him as an informant in spite of the information he had

furnished in the past. We have cases, Senator where we have had

But you also told him to participate in violent activities

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MR. ADAMS:

QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

QUESTION:

We did not tell him to participate in violent activities.

That's what he said.

I know that's what he says, but that's what lawsuits

are all about is that there are two sides to issues and our

Agent handlers have advised us, and I believe have advised your

staff members, that at no time did they advise him to engage

in violence.

Just to do what was necessary to get the information.

I do not think they made any such statement to him

along that line either and we have informants who have gotten

involved in the violation of a law and we have immediately

converted their status from an informant to the subject and

have prosecuted I would say off hand, I can think of around

20 informants that we have prosecuted for violating the laws

once it came to our attention and even to show you our policy

of disseminating information on violence in this case during

the review of the matter the Agents have told me that they

found one case where an Agent had been working 24 hours a

day and he was a little late in disseminating the information

to the police department. No violence occurred but it showed

up in a file review and he was censured for his delay in

properly notifying local authorities. So we not only

have a policy, I feel that we do follow reasonable safeguards

in order to carry it out, including periodic review of all

informant files.

Mr. Rowe's statement is substantiated to some extent with

an acknowledgment by the Agent in Charge that if he were going

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MR. ADAMS:

QUESTION:

QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

to be a Klansman and he happened to be with someone and they

decided to do something, he couldn't be an angel. These are

words of the Agent. And be a good informant. He wouldn't

take the lead but the implication is that he would have

to go along or would have to be involved if he was going

to maintain his liability as a ---

There is no question that an informant at times will

have to be present during demonstrations, riots, fistfights

that take place but I believe his statement was to the

effect that, and I was sitting in the back of the room and I do

not recall it exactly, but that some of them were beat with

chains and I did not hear whether he said he beat someone with

a chain or not but I rather doubt that he did, because it is

one thing being present, it is another thing taking an

active part in a criminal action.

It's true. He was close enought to get his throat cut

apparently.

How does the collection of information about an

individual's personal life, social, sex life and becoming

involved in that sex life or social life is a requirement for

law enforcement or crime prevention.

Our Agent handlers have advised us on Mr. Rowe that

they gave him no such instruction, they had no such knowledge

concerning it and I can't see where it would be of any

value whatsoever.

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QUESTION:

MR. ADAMS:

You don't know of any such case where these instructions

were given to an Agent or an informant?

To get involved in sexual activity? No Sir.

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OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

FOR RELEASE

10 A.M., EST

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 10, 1975

STATEMENT OF

CLARENCE M. KELLEY

DIRECTOR

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

U. S. SENATE

WASHINGTON, D. C.

DECEMBER 10, 1975

66-2894-28

80-2-686

SEARCHED. TELED

SERIALIZED

DEC 12 1975

SARLESEATLE

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I welcome the interest which this Committee

has shown in the FBI and most particularly in our

operations in the intelligence and internal security

fields.

I share your high regard for the rights

guaranteed by the Constitution and laws of the United

States. Throughout my 35-year career in law enforcement

you will find the same insistence, as has been expressed

by this Committee, upon programs of law enforcement that.

are themselves fully consistent with law.

I also have strongly supported the concept of

legislative oversight. In fact, at the time my appointment

as Director of the FBI was being considered by the Senate

Judiciary Committee two and one-half years ago, I told

the members of that Committee of my firm belief in

Congressional oversight.

This Committee has completed the most

exhaustive study of our intelligence and security

operations that has ever been undertaken by anyone

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outside the FBI other than the present Attorney General.

At the outset, we pledged our fullest cooperation and

promised to be as candid and forthright as possible in

responding to your questions and complying with your

requests.

I believe we have lived up to those promises.

The members and staff of this Committee have

had unprecedented access to FBI information.

You have talked to the personnel who conduct

security-type investigations and who are personally involved

in every facet of our day-to-day intelligence operations.

You have attended numerous briefings by FBI

officials who have sought to familiarize the Committee

and its staff with all major areas of our activities

and operations in the national security and intelligence

fields.

In brief, you have had a firsthand examination of

these matters that is unmatched at any time in the history

of the Congress.

As this Committee has stated, these hearings

have, of necessity, focused largely on certain errors

and abuses. I credit this Committee for its forthright

recognition that the hearings do not give a full or

balanced account of the FBI's record of performance.

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It is, perhaps, in the nature of such hearings

to focus on abuses to the exclusion of positive accomplishments

of the organization.

The Counterintelligence Programs which have

received the lion's share of public attention and critical

comment constituted an infinitesimal portion of our over-

all work.

A Justice Department Committee which was formed

last year to conduct a thorough study of the FBI's

Counterintelligence Programs has reported that in the

five basic ones it found 3,247 Counterintelligence proposals

were submitted to FBI Headquarters from 1956 to 1971. Of this

total, 2,370 - less than three-fourths - were approved.

I repeat, the vast majority of those 3,247

proposals were being devised, considered, and many were

rejected, in an era when the FBI was handling an average

of 700,000 investigative matters per year.

Nonetheless, the criticism which has been

expressed regarding the Counterintelligence Programs

is most legitimate and understandable.

The question might well be asked what I had

in mind when I stated last year that for the FBI to have

done less than it did under the circumstances then existing

would have been an abdication of its responsibilities

to the American people.

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What I said then -- in 1974 - and what I believe

today, is that the FBI employees involved in these programs

did what they felt was expected of them by the President,

the Attorney General, the Congress, and the people of

the United States.

Bomb explosions rocked public and private

offices and buildings; rioters led by revolutionary

extremists laid siege to military, industrial, and

educational facilities; and killings, maimings, and

other atrocities accompanied such acts of violence

from New England to California.

The victims of these acts were human beings --

men, women, and children. As is the case in time of peril --

whether real or perceived -- they looked to their Government,

their elected and appointed leadership, and to the FBI and

other law enforcement agencies to protect their lives, their

property, and their rights.

There were many calls for action from Members

of Congress and others, but few guidelines were furnished.

The FBI and other law enforcement agencies were besieged

by demands... impatient demands...for immediate action.

FBI employees recognized the danger; felt

they had a responsibility to respond; and, in good faith,

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initiated actions designed to counter conspiratorial

efforts of self-proclaimed revolutionary groups, and

to neutralize violent activities.

In the development and execution of these programs,

mistakes of judgment admittedly were made.

Our concern over whatever abuses occurred

in the Counterintelligence Programs -- and there were

some substantial ones -- should not obscure the underlying

purpose of those programs.

We must recognize that situations have occurred

in the past and will arise in the future where the

Government may well be expected to depart from its

traditional role -- in the FBI's case, as an investi-

gative and intelligence-gathering agency -- and take

affirmative steps which are needed to meet

an imminent

threat to human life or property.

In short, if we learn a murder or bombing is to

be carried out NOW, can we truly meet our responsibilities

by investigating only after the crime has occurred, or

should we have the ability to prevent? I refer to those

instances where there is a strong sense of urgency because

of an imminent threat to human life.

Where there exists the potential to penetrate

and disrupt, the Congress must consider the question of

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whether or not such preventive action should be available

to the FBI.

These matters are currently being addressed

by a task force in the Justice Department, including the

FBI, and I am confident that Departmental guidelines and

controls can be developed in cooperation with pertinent

Committees of Congress to insure that such measures are

used in an entirely responsible manner.

Probably the most important question here

today is what assurances can I give that the errors

and abuses which arose under the Counterintelligence

Programs will not occur again?

First, let me assure the Committee that some

very substantial changes have been made in key areas of the

FBI's methods of operations since I took the oath of

office as Director on July 9, 1973.

Today we place a high premium on openness --

openness both within and without the service.

I have instituted a program of open, frank

discussion in the decision-making process which

insures that no future program or major policy decision

will ever be adopted without a full and critical review

of its propriety.

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Participatory management has become a fact

in the FBI.

I have made it known throughout our Headquarters

and Field Divisions that I welcome all employees, regardless

of position or degree of experience, to contribute their

thoughts and suggestions, and to voice whatever criticisms

or reservations they may have concerning any area of our

operations.

The ultimate decisions in the Bureau are mine,

and I take full responsibility for them. My goal is to

achieve maximum critical analysis among our personnel without

in any manner weakening or undermining our basic command

structure.

The results of this program have been most

beneficial...to me personally...to the FBI's disciplined

performance...and to the morale of our employees.

In addition, since some of the mistakes of the

past were occasioned by direct orders from higher authorities

outside the FBI, we have welcomed Attorney General Edward

Levi's guidance, counsel, and his continuous availability --

in his own words - "as a 'lightning rod' to deflect improper

requests."

Within days after taking office, Attorney General

Levi instructed that I immediately

• report to him any

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requests or practices which, in my judgment, were improper

or which, considering the context of the request, I believed

presented the appearance of impropriety.

I am pleased to report to this Committee as I

have to the Attorney General that during my nearly two

and one-half years as Director under two Presidents and

three Attorneys General, no one has approached me or

made overtures -- directly or otherwise - to use the

FBI for partisan political or other improper purposes.

I can assure you that I would not for a moment

consider honoring any such request.

I can assure you, too, in my administration of

the FBI I routinely bring to the attention of the Attorney

General and the Deputy Attorney General major policy questions,

including those which arise in my continuing review of our

operations and practices. These are discussed openly and

candidly in order that the Attorney General can exercise

his responsibilities over the FBI.

I am convinced that the basic structure of the

FBI today is sound. But it would be a mistake to think

that integrity can be assured only through institutional

means.

Integrity is a human quality. It depends upon

the character of the person who occupies the office of

Director and every member of the FBI under him.

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I am proud of the 19,000 men and women with

whom it is my honor to serve today.

Their dedication,

their professionalism, their standards, and the self-

discipline which they personally demand of themselves

and expect of their associates are the Nation's ultimate

assurance of proper and responsible conduct at all times

by the FBI.

The Congress and the members of this Committee

in particular have gained a great insight into the problems

confronting the FBI in the security and intelligence fields -

problems which all too often we have been left to resolve

without sufficient guidance from the Executive Branch or

the Congress itself.

As in all human endeavors, errors of judgment

have been made. But no one who is looking for the cause

of our

failures should confine

his search solely to the

FBI, or even

to the Executive Branch.

The Congress itself has long possessed the

mechanism for FBI oversight; yet, seldom has it been

exercised.

An initial step was taken in the Senate in

1973 when the Committee on the Judiciary established

a Subcommittee on FBI Oversight. Hearings had been

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commenced, and we were fully committed to maximum

participation with the members of that Subcommittee.

I laud their efforts. However, those efforts

are of very recent origin in terms of the FBI's history.

One of the greatest benefits of the study

this Committee has made is the expert knowledge you have

gained of the complex problems confronting the FBI. But

I respectfully submit that those benefits are wasted if

they do not lead to the next step -- a step that I believe

is absolutely essential - a legislative charter, expressing

Congressional determination of intelligence jurisdiction for

the FBI.

Action to resolve the problems confronting us

in the security and intelligence fields is urgently needed;

and it must be undertaken in a forthright manner. Neither

the Congress nor the public can afford to look the other

way, leaving it to the FBI to do what must be done, as

too often has occurred in the past.

This means too that Congress must assume a

continuing role, not in the initial decision-making

process but in the review of our performance.

I would caution against a too-ready reliance

upon the Courts to do our tough thinking for us. Some

proposals that have been advanced during these hearings

would extend the role of the Courts into the early stages

NW 55267 DocId: 32989833 Page 145

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of the investigative process and, thereby, would take

over what historically have been Executive Branch decisions.

I frankly feel that such a trend, if unchecked,

would seriously undermine the independence of the Judiciary

and cast them in a role not contemplated by the authors

of our Constitution.

Judicial review cannot be a

substitute for Congressional oversight or Executive

decision.

The FBI urgently needs a clear and workable

determination of our jurisdiction in the intelligence

field, a jurisdictional statement that the Congress finds

to be responsive to both the will and the needs of the

American people.

Senators, first and foremost, I am a police

officer -- a career police officer. In my police experience,

the most frustrating of all problems that I have discovered

facing

law enforcement in this country -- Federal,

state, or

local -- is when demands are made of them to perform

their traditional role as protector of life and property

without clear and understandable legal bases to do so.

I recognize that the formulation of such a

legislative charter will be a most precise and demanding

task.

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It must be sufficiently flexible that it

does:not stifle FBI effectiveness in combating the

growing incidence of crime and violence across the

United States.

That charter must clearly address the

demonstrated problems of the past; yet, it must amply

recognize the fact that times change and so also do

the nature and thrust of our criminal and subversive

challenges.

The fact that the Department of Justice has

commenced the formulation of operational guidelines

governing our intelligence activities does not in any

manner diminish the need for legislation. The responsibility

for conferring jurisdiction resides with the Congress.

In this regard, I am troubled by some proposals

which question the need for intelligence gathering, suggesting

that information needed for the prevention of violence can

be acquired in the normal course of criminal investigations.

As a practical matter, the line between intelligence

work and regular criminal investigations is often difficult

to describe. What begins as an intelligence investigation

may well end in arrest and prosecution of the subject.

But

there are some fundamental differences between these

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investigations that should be recognized - differences

in scope, in objective and in the time of initiation.

In

the usual criminal case, a crime has occurred and it

remains only for the Government to identify the perpetrator

and to collect sufficient evidence for prosecution.. Since

the investigation normally follows the elements of the

crime, the scope of the inquiry is limited and fairly

well defined.

By contrast, intelligence work involves

the gathering of information, not necessarily evidence.

The purpose may well be not to prosecute, but rather

to thwart crime or to insure that the Government has

enough information to meet any future crisis or emergency.

The inquiry is necessarily broad because it must tell

us not only the nature of the threat, but also whether

the threat is imminent, the persons involved, and the

means by which the threat will be carried out. The ability

of the Government to prevent criminal acts is dependent

on our anticipation of those unlawful acts. Anticipation,

in turn, is dependent on advance information -- that

is intelligence.

these issues.

Certainly, reasonable people can differ on

Given the opportunity, I am confident

that the continuing need for intelligence work can be

documented to the full satisfaction of the Congress.

We

NW 55267 DocId:32989833 Page 148

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recognize that what is at stake here is not the interests

of the FBI, but rather the interests of every citizen

of this country. We recognize also that the resolution

of these matters will demand extensive and thoughtful

deliberation by the Congress.

To this end, I pledge the

complete cooperation of the Bureau with this Committee

or its successor in this important task.

In any event, you have my unqualified assurance

as Director that we will carry out both the letter and

the spirit of such legislation as the Congress may enact.

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Ohe Wited Statra Sruate

-in Copy5

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Select Comnittee to Study Governmental Operations

With Respect to Intelligence Activities

INTETLIGENCE INVESTIGATION

Wednesday, December 10, 1975

Washington, D. C.

WARD & PAUL

410 FIRST STREET, S. E.

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003

(202) 544-6000

66-2894-29

_ INDEXED,

SERATE A RIED A

JAN 2 1976

FBI - SEATTLE.

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Phono (Aroa 202) 544-6000

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CONTENT

STATEMENT OF:

PAGE

The Honorable Clarence M. Kelley,

Direcotor, Federal Bureau of Inve-

stigation

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WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003*

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INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATION

Wednesday, December 10, 1975

WARD & PAUL

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United States Senate,

Select Committee to Study Governmental

Operations with Respect to

Intelligence Activities,

Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10

o'clock a.m., in Room 318, Russell Senate Office Building,

the honorable Frank Church (Chairman of the Committee)

presiding.

Present: Senators Church (presiding), Hart of Michigan,

Mondale, Huddleston, Hart of Colorado, Baker, Goldwater and

Mathias.

Also present: William G. Miller, Staff Director; Frederick

A. O. Schwarz, JI., Chief Counsel; Curtis R. Smothers, Minority

Counsel; Paul Michel, Joseph diGenova, Barbara Banoff, Frederiok

Baron, Mark Gitenstein, Loch Johnson, David Bushong, Charles

Lombard, John Bayly, Charles Kirbow, Michael Madigan, Bob

Kelley, John Elliff, Elliot Maxwell, Andy Postal, Pat Shea,

Michael Epstein and Burt Wides, Professional Staff. Members.

--

The Chairman. The Committee's witness this morning is

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WARD & PAUL

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the Honorable Clarence M.. Kelley, the Director of the Federal

Bureau of Investigation.

Mr. Kelley was appointed Director in July of 1973 in a

troubled time for the FBI. His experience as an innovative

law enforcement administrator in charge of the Kansas City

Police Department for over ten years, and his previous work as

a Special Agent of the FBI have made him uniquely qualified

to lead the Bureau.

The Select Committee is grateful for the cooperation

extended by Director Kelley in the course of its inquiry over

the past months. The Committee is also impressed by the

openness of the FBI's witnesses before this Committee, and

their willingness to consider the need for legislation to

clarify the Bureau's intelligence responsibility.

It is important to remember from the outset that this

Committee is examining only a small portion of the FBI's

activities. Our hearings have concentrated on FBI domestic

intelligence operations. We have consistently expressed our

admiration and support for the Bureau's criminal investigative

and law enforcement work, and we recognize the vital importance

of counterespionage in the modern world. But domestic

intelligence has raised many difficult questions.

The Committee has also concentrated on the past rather

than on present FBI activities.

The abuses brought to light

in our hearings occurred years and even decades before Director

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Kelley took charge.

The Staff has advised the Committee that under Director

Kelley the FBI has taken significant steps to rethink previous

policies and to establish new safeguards against abuse. The

FBI is now placing greater emphasis on foreign related intelli-

gence operations, and less on purely domestic surveillance.

The FBI is working more closely with the Justice Department in

developing policies and standards for intelligence. These

are welcome developments.

Nevertheless, many important issues remain unresolved.

Therefore, we have invited Director Kelley to share with the

Committee his views on some of the considerations the Congress

should take into account in thinking about the future of

FBI intelligence. Among these issues are whether FBI surveil-

lance should extend beyond the investigation of persons

likely to commit specific crimes; whether there should be

outside supervision or approval before the FBI conducts certain

types of investigations or uses certain surveillance techniques;

whether foreign related intelligence activities should be

strictly separated from the FBI's domestic law enforcement

functions, and what should be done to the information already

in the FBI files and that which may go into those files in

the future.

The Committee looks forward to a constructive exchange

of views with Director Kelley this morning, with Attorney

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General Levi tomorrow, and with both the FBI and the Justice

Department in the next months as the Committee considers

recommendations that will strengthen the American people's

confidence in the Federal Bureau of Investigation. That

confidence is vital for the effective enforcement of Federal

law and for the security of the nation against foreign

espionage.

Director Kelley, we are pleased to welcome you, and if

you would have a prepared statement you would like to lead off

with, please proceed.

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STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CLARENCE M. KELLEY,

DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Mr. Kelley. Thank you very much, Senator Church and

gentlemen.

I welcome the interest which this Committee has shown in

the FBI and most particularly in our operations in the intelli-

gence and internal security fields.

I share your high regard for the rights guaranteed by the

Constitution and laws of the United States. Throughout my

35 year career in law enforcement you will find the same insist

tence, as has been expressed by this Committee, upon programs

of law enforcement that are themselves fully consistent with

law.

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I also have strongly supported the concept of legislative

oversight. In fact, at the time my appointment as Director of

the FBI and was being considered by the Senate Judiciary

Committee two and one half years ago, I told the members of

that Committee of my firm belief in Congressional oversight.

This Committee has completed the most exhaustive study

of our intelligence and security operations that has ever been

undertaken by anyone outside the FBI other than the present

Attorney General. At the outset, we pledged our fullest

cooperation and promised to be as candid and forthright as

possible in responding to your questions and complying with your

requests.

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I believe we have lived up to those promises.

The members and staff of this Committee have had unprece-

dented access to FBI information.

You have talked to the personnel who conduct security-type

investigations and who are personally involved in every facet

of our day-to-day intelligence operations.

You have attended numerous briefings by FBI officials who

have sought to familiarize the Committee and its staff with

all major areas of our activities and operations in the national

security and intelligence fields.

In brief, you have had firsthand examination of these

matters that is unmatched at any time in the history of the

Congress.

As this Committee has stated, these hearings have, of

necessity, forcused largely on certain errors and abuses. I

credit this Committee for its forthright recognition that the

hearings do not give a full or balanced account of the FBI's

record of performance.

It is perhaps in the nature of such hearings to focus

on abuses to the exclusion of positive accomplishments of the

organization.

The Counterintelligence Programs which have received the

lion's share of public attention and critical comment constituted

an infinitesimal portion of our overall work.

A Justice Department Committee which was formed last year

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to conduct a thorough study of the FBI's Counterintelligence

Programs has reported that in the five basic ones it- found

3,247 Counterintelligence Programs were submitted to FBI

Headquarters from 1956 to 1971. Of this total, 2,370,

less than three fourths, were approved.

I repeat, the vast majority of those 3,247 proposals were

being devised, considered, and many were rejected, in an era

when the FBI was handling an average of 700,000 investigative

matters per year.

Nonetheless, the criticism which has been expressed

regarding the Counterintelligence Programs is most legitimate

and understandable.

The question might well be asked what I had in mind when

I stated last year that for the FBI to have done less than it

did under the circumstances then existing would have been an

abdication of its responsibilities to the American people..

What I said then, in 1974, and what I believe today, is

that the FBI employees involved in these programs did what they

felt was expected of them by the President, the Attorney General,

the Congress, and the people of the United States.

Bomb explosions rocked public and private offices and

buildings; rioters led by revolutionary extremists laid seige

to military, industrial, and educational facilities; and

killings, maimings, and other atrocities accompanied such

acts of violence from New England to California.

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The victims of these acts were human beings, men, women,

and children. As is the case in time of peril, whether real or

perceived, they looked to their Government, their elected and

appointed leadership, and to the FBI and other law enforcement

agencies to protect their lives, their property, and their

rights.

There were many calls for action from Members of Congress

and others, but few guidelines were furnished. The FBI and other

law enforcement agencies were besieged by demands, impatient

demands, for immediate action.

FBI employees recognized the danger; felt they had a

responsibility to respond; and in good faith initiated actions

designed to counter conspiratorial efforts of self-proclaimed

revolutionary groups, and to neutralize violent activities.

In the development and execution of these programs,

mistakes of judgment admittedly were made.

Our concern over whatever abuses occurred in the Counter-

intelligence Programs, and there were some substantial ones,

should not obscure the underlying purpose of those programs.

We must recognize that situations have occurred in the

past and will arise in the future where the Government may well

be expected to depart from its traditional role, in the FBI's

case, as an investigative and intelligence-gathering

agency, and take affirmative steps which are needed to meet

an imminent threat to human life or property.

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In short, if we learn a murder or bombing is to be carried

out now, can we truly meet our responsibilities by investigating

only after the crime has occurred, or should we have the

ability to prevent? I refer to those instances where there is

a strong sense of urgency because of an imminent threat to

human life.

Where there exists the potential to penetrate and disrupt,

the Congress must consider the question of whether or not such

preventive action should be available to the FBI.

These matters are currently being addressed by a task

force in the Justice Department, including the FBI,

and I am confident that Departmental guidelines and controls

can

be developed in cooperation with pertinent Committees of Congress

to insure that such measures are used in an entirely responsible

manner.

Probably the most important question here today is what

assurances I can give that the errors and abuses which arose

under the Counterintelligence Programs will not occur again?

First, let me assure the Committee that some very sub-

stantial changes have been made in key areas of the FBI's

methods of operations since I took the oath of office as

Director on July 9, 1973.

Today we place a high premium on openness, openness

both within and without the service.

I have instituted a program of open, frank discussion

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NW 55267 DocId: 32989833 Page 161

in the decision-making process which insures that no future

program or major policy decision will ever be adopted without a

full and critical review of its proprièty.

Participatory management has become a fact in the FBI.

I have made it known throughout our Headquarters and

Field Divisions that I welcome all employees, regardless of

position or degree of experience, to contribute their thoughts

and suggestions, and to voice whatever criticisms of

reservations they may have concerning any area of our operations.

The ultimate decisions in the Bureau are mine, and I take

full responsibility for them. My goal is to achieve maximum

critical analysis among our personnel without in any manner

weakening or undermining our basic command structure.

The results of this program have been most beneficial, to

me personally, to the FBI's disciplined performance, and to

the morale of our employees.

In addition, since some of the mistakes of the past

were occasioned by direct orders from higher authorities outside

the FBI, we have welcomed Attorney General Edward Levi!s

guidance, counsel, and his continuous availability, in his

own words, "as a 'lightning rod' to deflect improper requests."

Within days after taking office, Attorney General Levi

instructed that I imnediately report to him any requests

or practices which, in my judgment, were improper or which,

considering the context of the request, I believed presented

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the appearances of impropriety.

I am pleased to report to this Committee as I have to the

Attorney General that during my nearly two and one half years

as

Director under two Presidents and three Attorneys General, no

one has approached me or made overtures, directly or otherwise,

to use the FBI for partisan political or other improper

purposes.

I can assure you that I would not for a moment consider

honoring any such request.

I can assure you, too, in my administration of the FBI

I routinely bring to the attention of the Attorney General and

the Deputy Attorney General major policy questions, including

those which arise in my continuing review of our operations and

practices. These are discussed openly and candidly in order

that the Attorney General can exercise his responsibilities

over the FBI.

I am convinced that the basic structure of the FBI today

is sound. But it would be a mistake to think that integrity

can be assured only through institutional means.

Integrity is a human quality. It depends upon the

character of the person who occupies the office of the

Director and every member of the FBI under him.

I am proud of the 19,000 men and women with whom it is

my honor to serve today. Their dedication, their professionalism,

their standards, and the self-discipline which they personally

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demand of themselves and expect of their associates are the

nation's ultimate assurance of proper and responsible conduct

at all times by the FBI.

The Congress and the members of this Committee in

particular have gained a great insight into the problems

confronting the FBI in the security and intelligence fields,

problems which all too often we have left to resolve without

sufficient guidance from the Executive Branch or the Congress

itself.

As in all human endeavors, errors of judgment have been

made. But no one who is looking for the cause of our

failures should confine his search solely to the FBI, or even

to the Executive Branch.

The Congress itself has long possessed the mechanism for

FBI oversight; yet, seldom has it been exercised.

An initial step was taken in the Senate in 1973 when the

Committee on the Judiciary established a Subcommittee on FBI

Oversight. Hearings had been commenced, and we were fully

committed to maximum participation with the members of that

Subcommittee.

I laud their efforts. However, those efforts are of very

recent origin in terms of the FBI's history.

One of the greatest benefits of the study this Committee

has made is the expert knowledge you have gained of the complex

problems confronting the FBI. But I respectfully submit that

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those benefits are wasted if they do not lead to the next step,

a step that I believe is absolutely essential, a legislative

charter, expressing Congressional determination of intelligence.

jurisdiction for the FBI.

Action to resolve the problems confronting us in the

security. and intelligence fields is urgently needed; and it

must be undertaken in a forthright manner. Neither the Congress

nor the public can afford to look the other way, leaving it to

the FBI to do what must be done, as too often has occurred in

the past.

This means too that Congress must assume a continuing role

not in the initial decision-making process but in the review of

our performance.

I would caution against a too-ready reliance upon the

courts to do our tough thinking for us. Some proposals that

have been advanced during these hearings would extend the role

of the courts into the early stages of the investigative

process and, thereby, would take over what historically have

been Executive Branch decisions.

I frankly feel that such a trend, if unchecked, would

seriously undermine the independence of the Judiciary and cast

them in a role not contemplated by the authors of our

Constitution. Judicial review cannot be a substitute for Con-

gressional oversight or Executive decision.

The FBI urgently needs a clear and workable determination

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of our jurisdiction in the intelligence field, a jurisdictional

statement that the Congress finds to be responsive to both

the will and the needs of the American people.

Senators, first and foremost, I am a police officer, a

career police officer. In my police experience, the must

frustrating of all problems that I have discovered facing

law enforcement in this country, Federal, state, and local, is

when demands are made of them to perform their traditional

role as protector of life and property without clear and

understandable legal bases to do so.

I recognize that the formulation of such a legislative

charter will be a most precise and demanding task.

It must be sufficiently flexible that it does not stifle

the FBI's effectiveness in combating the growing incidence

of crime and violence across

the United States.

That charter

must clearly address the demonstrated problems of the past;

yet, it must amply recognize the fact that times change and

so also do the nature and thrust of our criminal and subversive

challenges.

The fact that the Department of Justice has commenced

the formulation of operational guidelines governing our

intelligence activities does not in any manner diminish the need

for legislation. The responsibility for conferring juris-

diction resides with the Congress.

In this regard, I am troubled by some proposals which

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question the need for intelligence gathering, suggesting that

information needed for the prevention of violence can be

acquired in the normal course of criminal investigations.

As a practical matter, the line between intelligence

work and regular criminal investigations is often difficult

to describe. What begins as an intelligence investigation may

well end in arrest and prosecution of the subject. But there

are some fundamental differences between these investigations

that should be recognized, differences in scope, in objective

and in the time of initiation. In the usual criminal case, a

crime has occurred and it remains only for the Government to

identify the perpetrator and to collect sufficient evidence

for prosecution. Since the investigation normally follows

the elements of the crime, the scope of the inquiry is

limited and fairly well defined.

By contrast, intelligence work involves the gathering of

information, not necessarily evidence. The purpose may well be

not to prosecute, but to thwart crime or to insure that the

Government: has enough information to meet any future crisis

or emergency. The inquiry is necessarily broad because it

must tell us not only the nature of the threat, but also whether

the threat is imminent, the persons involved, and the

means by which the threat will be carried out. The ability

of the Government to prevent criminal acts is dependent on

our anticipation of those criminal acts. Anticipation,

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in turn, is dependent on advance information, that is, intelli-

gence.

Certainly, reasonable people can differ on these issues.

Given the opportunity, I am confident that the continuing need

for intelligence work can be documented to the full satisfaction

of the Congress. We recognize that what is at stake here is not

the interests of the FBI, but rather the interests of every

citizen of this country. We recognize also that the resolution

of these matters will demand extensive and thoughtful.

deliberation by the Congress. To this end, I pleage the

complete cooperation of the Bureau with this Conmittee or

its successors in this important task.

In any event, you have my unqualified assurance as

Director that we will carry out both the letter and the spirit

of such legislation as the Congress may enact.

That is the substance of my prepared statement.

I would also like to say extemporaneously that I note

that on this panel are some gentlemen who were on the Judiciary

Committee which heard my testimony at the time I was presented

to them for candidacy as Director of the FBI. At that time

I took very seriously the charge which may possibly result

in the deliberation of this Committee and of the full Senate.

I have been well aware of the problems of the FBI since that

time. I have also been well aware of the capabilities of

the FBI to discharge those responsibilities. I don't take

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them lightly. I am of sufficient experience and age that I

have pledged myself to do what is good and proper. I say this

not as a self-serving statement but in order that we might

place in context my position within the FBI. I could seek

sanctuary and perhaps a safe sanctuary by saying during the

period these things occurred I was with the local police

department in Kansas City, Missouri. Prior to that time,

however, I was in the FBI.

During the time I was with the FBI, during the time I

was with the police department, I continued throughout that

period a close acquaintance with and a strong affection for

the FBI.

I only want to point out that based on those years, based

on those observations, we have here a very fine and very

sensitive and a very capable organization. I feel that there

is much that can still be done. I know that we are not without

fault. I know that from those experiences I have had..We

will not be completely without fault in the future. But I

assure you that we look upon this inquiry, we look upon any

mandate which you may feel you have, that you should look at

this is good and proper, and we do not intend -- I only want

to place in your thinking the fact that you have here a

matchless organization, one which I continue to say was

not motivated in some of these instances, and in most of

them, and I cannot justify some, that the motivation was of the

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best. I am not pleading, as does a defense attorney. I am

only putting in your thinking my objective observations as

a citizen who is somewhat concerned about the future of this

organization. It is too precious for us to have it in

a condition of jeopardy.

Thank you very much.

The Chairman. Thank you, Director Kelley.

I want to turn first to Senator Hart who won't be able

to remain through the whole morning. I think he has one

question he would like to ask.

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Senator Hart of Michigan.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Mathias and I have Judiciary Committee hearings at 10:30.

Iahve several questions, and I'm sure they'll be

covered by others, but the ones that I have is a result of

reading your testimony and listening to it this morning, and

it relates to your comment at the foot of page 10 and at the

top of 11.

There you are indicating that you caution us about

extending the court's role in the early stages of investigations

suggesting that this might take us beyound the role comtemplated

for the courts under the Constutution.

Now as you have said, aside from the so-called national

security wiretap problem, the main focus of our discussions

and concern has been on the possibility requiring court

approval for the use of informants, informants directed to

penetrate and report on some group.

And one of the witnesses yesterday, Professor Dorsen,

pointed our that really those informants are the most pervasive

type of an eavesdropping device. It is a human device. It's

really, an informant is really more intrusive on my privacy

than a bug or a tap because he can follow me anywhere. He

can ask me questions to get information the government would

like to have.

Now we certainly involve the courts in approval of the

wiretaps for physical searches with the intent of the drafters

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of the Constitution to have a neutral third party magistrate

screen use of certain investigative techniques. And the

informant is such a technique. He functions sort of like a

general warrant, and I don't see why requiring court approval

would violate the role envisaged for the courts.

And as I leave, I would like to get your reactions to

my feelings.

Mr. Kelley. I do not feel that there is any use of the

informant in intrusion, which is to this extent objectionable.

It has of course been approved, the concept of the informant,

by numerous court decisions.

Let us go down not to the moral connotation of the use

of the informant.

I think, as in many cases, that is a matter of balance.

You have only very few ways of solving crines. You have

basically in the use of the informant, I think, the protectian

of the right of the victim to be victimized. You have within

the Constitution certain grants that are under ordinary

circumstances abrogation of rights. The right of search and

seizure, which, of course, can't be unreasonable, but none-

theless, you have the right.

I think that were we to lose the right of the informant,

we would lose to a great measure our capability of doing our

job.

Now I'm not arguing with you, senator, that it is not an

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unusual procedure. I'm not even going to say that it is not

an intrusion, because it is.

But it has to be one I think

that is by virtue of the benefits must be counted.

We don't like to use it. We don't like the problems that

are attendant. We take great care.

Now you say about the court having possibility taking

jurisdiction over them and guiding. I think that possibly we

could present the matter to the court but what are they going

to do insofar as monitoring their effort? Are they going to

have to follow it all the way through?

Also, there is, of course, urgency in the other contacts.

Must the court be contacted for each and approval of the court

given for each contact?

There are a great many problems insofar as administration

of it.

I frankly feel, and again, all I can do is give you my

idea -- I frankly feel that there is a satisfactory control over

the informants as we now exercise it today. Yes, there are

going to be some who will get beyond our control, but this

is going to happen no matter what you do.

Senator Hart of Michigan. Well, I appreciate your

reaction.

I was not suggesting that there is consideration here to

prohibit informants. I was reflecting a view that I felt and

hold that the use of an informant does require some balance, as

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you yourself said, and I would be more comfortable with a

third party making a judgment as to whether the intrusion is

warranted by the particular circumstance. But I do understand

your position.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Hart.

(Senator Hart leaves the hearing room.)

The Chairman. Senator Baker, do you have questions?

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Mr. Kelley, I have a great respect for you and your

organization and I personally regret that the organization is

in political distress, but we've both got to recognize that

it is, along with other agencies and departments of the

government.

I think you probably would agree with me that even though

that is extraordinarily unpleasant and in many respects

unfortunate, that it also has a plus side. That is, it gives

us an indication of our future direction and the opportunity,

at least, to improve the level of competency and service of

the government itself.

With that hopeful

note, would you be agreeable then to

volunteering for me any suggestions you have on how to improve

the responsiveness of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or

indeed, for any other law enforcement agencies of the government,

to the Congress, to the Attorney General, to the President, and

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beyond that, would you give me any suggestions' you have on

how you would provide the methods, the access, the documents,

the records, the authority, for the Congress to perform its

essential, I believe, essential oversight responsibility to

see that these functions, these delicate functions are being

undertaken properly?

And before you answer, let me tell you two or three things

I am concerned about.

It hasn't been Jong ago that the FBI Director was not

even confirmed by the Senate of the United States. I believe

you are the first one to be confirmed by the Senate of the

United States. I think that is a movement in the right

direction. I think the FBI has taken on a stature that, an

additional importance that requires it to have closer supervision

and scrutiny by us.

At the same time I rather doubt that we can become

involved in the daily relationship between you and the Attorney!

General.

Therefore, I tend to believe that the Attorney General

needs to be more directly involved in the operations of the

FBI.

I would appreciate any comments on that.

Second, I rather believe that major decisions of the

intelligence community and the FBI ought to be in writing, so

that the Congress can, if it needs to in the future, take a

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look at these decisions and the process by which they were

made to decide that you are or you are not performing your

services diligently.

I don't think you can have oversight unless you have

access to records, and in many cases records don't exist

and in some cases the people who made those decisions are now

departed and in other cases you have conflicts.

How would you suggest then that you improve the quality

of service of your agency? How would you propose that you

increase the opportunity for oversight of the Congress of the

United States? What other suggestions do you have for improving

the level of law enforcement in the essential activity that

is required?

Mr. Kelley. I would possibly be repetitious in answering

this Senator, but I get a great deal of pleasure from telling

what I think is necessary and what I hope that I have followed,

one which is beyond my control, but which I think is very

important is that the position of Director, the one to which

great attention should be paid in choosing the man who will

properly acquit himself.

I feel that the Judiciary Committee, at least in going

over me, did a pretty good job. I feel that it is most

necessary that care be taken that his philosophy, his means

of management, his facility to adapt to change, his tendency

toward consulting with other members of the official family,

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that he be willing to, for example, go through oversight with

no reticence, and that I think that he should be chosen very

carefully.

I think further that he should be responsible for those

matters which indicate impropriety or illegality.

Senator Baker. Could you stop for just a second? Who

does he work for? Does the Director, in your view, work for

the President of the United States, for the Attorney General,

for the Justice Department, for

the Executive Branch?

Who does the executive. of the FBI, the Director of the

FBI, be responsible to, who should he be responsible to?

Mr. Kelley. Jurisdictionally, to the Attorney General,

but I think this is such an important field of influence that

it is not at all unlikely that we can expand it to the

judiciary, the legislative, and of course, we are under the

Attorney General.

Senator Baker. Do you have any problems with the idea

of the President of the United States calling the Director of

the FBI and asking for performance of a particular task?

Does that give you any difficulty? Or do you think that

the relationship between the FBI Director and the President

is such that that is desirable, or should it be conduited

through the Attorney General?

Mr. Kelley. I think it should be in the great majority

of the cases conduited through the Attorney General. There

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has been traditionally some acceptance of the fact that if

the President wants to see and talk with the Director, he

may do so, call him directly.

It has been my practice in such an event to thereafter

report to the Attorney

General, whoever it might be, that I

have been called over and I discussed and was told. And this

was revealed in full to them.

Senator Baker. I suppose we could pass a statute that

says the President has to go

through the Attorney General,

although I rather suspect it would be a little presumptuous.

But to go the next step, do you think it is necessary

for the pursuit of effective oversight on the part of the

Congress, to have some sort of document written, or at least

some sort of account of a Presidential order or an order of

the Attorney General given to a Director of the FBI?

Do you think that these things need to be handled in

a more formal way?

Mr. Kelley. Personally, it would be my practice in

the event I receive such

an order, to request that it be

documented. This is a

protection as well as a clarification

as to whether or not it should be placed as part of legislation.

I frankly would like to reserve that for some more considera-

tion.

I don't know whether it would be, but I think that it

can be worked very easily.

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Senator Baker. IIr. Kelley, Attorney General Levi, I

believe, has already established some sort of agency or

function within the Department that is serving as the equivalent,

I suppose, of an Inspector General of the Justice Department,

including the FBI.

Are you familiar with the steps that Mr. Levi has

taken in that respect? I think he calls it the Office of

Professional Responsibility.

Mr. Kelley. Yes, sir, I'm familiar with it.

Senator Baker.

Do you have any comment on that? Will

you give us any observations

as to whether you think that

will be useful, helpful, or whether it will not be useful or

helpful, how it affects the fBI, how you visualize your

relationship to it in the future?

Mr. Kelley. I don't object to this, which is to some

extent an oversight within the Department of Justice under the

Attorney General.

Frankly, it just came out. I have not considered it

completely, but to the general concept, yes, I very definitely

subscribe.

Senator Baker. How would you feel about extending that

concept of government-wide operation, a national Inspector

General who is involved with an oversight of all of the

agencies of government as they interface with the Constitutionally

protected rights of the individual citizen? Would you care

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to comment on that, or would you rather save that for a while?

Mr. Kelley. I would like to reserve that one.

Senator Baker. I'm not surprised. Would you think about

it and let us know what you think about it?

Mr. Kelley. I will..

Senator Baker. All right. Mr. Chairman, thank you very

much.

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The Chairman. Senator Huddleston.

Senator Huddleston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Kelley, you describe on page 4 the conditions that

existed when much of the abuse that we have talked about during

this inquiry occurred, indicating that the people within the

Bureau felt like they were doing what was expected of them

by the President, by the Attorney General, the Congress and

the people of the United States.

Does not this suggest that there has been a reaction

there to prevailing attitudes that might have existed in the

country because of certain circumstances rather than any

clear and specific direct instructions that might have been

received from proper authorities? And if that is the case,

is it possible in developing this charter, this guideline,

to provide for that kind of specific instruction?

Mr. Kelley. I think so, yes. I think that they can

logically be incorporated and that -

Senator Huddleston. You can see there would be a continuing

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danger if any agency is left to simply react to whatever the

attitudes may be.at a specific time in this country because --

Mr. Kelley. Senator; I don't contemplate it might be

a continuing danger, but it certainly would be. a very acceptable

guidepost whereby we can, in the event such a need seems

to arise, know what we can

do.

Senator Huddleston. Well, in pursuing the area which

Senator Hart was discussing, that is whether or not we can

provide sufficient guidelines would replace a decision by the

court in determining what action might be proper and specific -

ally in protecting individual's rights, can't we also

provide the restrictions and guidelines and the various

techniques that might be used?

For instance, supposing we do establish the fact, as

has already been done, that informants are necessary and

desirable. How do we keep that informant operating within the

proper limits so that he in fact is not violating individual

rights?

Mr. Kelley. Well, of course, much of the reliance must

be placed on the agent and the supervision of the FBI to assure

that there is no infringement of rights.

Senator Huddleston. But this is an aware we've gotten

into some difficulty in the past. We have assumed that the

particular action was necessary, that there was a present

threat that some intelligence

programs should be initiated, but

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in many cases it has gone beyond what would appear to have been

necessary to have addressed the original threat.

How do we keep within the proper balance there?

Mr. Kelley. Well, actually, it's just about like any

other offense. It is an invasion of the other individual's

right and it is by an officer and an FBI agent is an officer.

There's the possibility of criminal prosecution against him.

This is one which I think might flow if he counsels

the informant.

Now insofar as his inability to control the informant,

I don't suppose that would warrant prosecution, but there is

still supervisory control over that agent and over that

informant by insisting that control is exercised on a continuing

basis.

Senator Huddleston. It brings up an interesting point

as to whether or not a law enforcement agency ought to be

very alert to any law violations of its own members or anyone

else.

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If a White House official asks the FBI or someone to do

something unlawful, the question seems to me to occur as to

whether or not that is not a violation that should be reported

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Mr. Kelley. I think that any violation which comes to

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Senator Huddleston. But that hasn't been the case in the

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Mr. Kelley. "ell, I don't know what you're referring

to but I would think your statement is proper.

Senator Huadleston. Well, we certainly have evidence

of unlawful activity taking place in various projects that

have been undertaken, which certainly were not brought to

light willingly by the FBI or by other law enforcement agencies!

The question that I'n really concerned about is as

we attempt to draw a guideline and charters that would give

the Agency the best flexibility that they may need, a wide

range of threats, how do we control what happens within each

of those actions to keep them from going beyond what

was intended to begin with?

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Mr. Kelley. You're still speaking of informants.

Senator Huddleston. Not only informants but the agents

themselves as they go into surveillance, wiretaps, or whatever

intelligence gathering techniques.

The original thrust of my question was, even though we

may be able to provide guidelines of a broad nature, how do

we control the techniques that might be used, that int themselves

might be used, that in themselves might be a serious violation

of the rights.

Mr. Kelley. Well, first, I don't know whether it's

germane to your question but I do feel that it should be pointed

out that the association to, the relationship between the

informant and his agent handler is a very confidential one,

and I doubt very seriously whether we could have any guide-

lines, where there might be an extension of any monitors here

because thereby you do have a destruction of that relationship.

Insofar as the activities of agents, informants or others

which may_be illegal, we have on many occasions learned of

violations of the law on the part of informants, and either

prosecuted ourselves, through the reporting of it to the

United States Attorney, or turned it over to the local authority.

We have done this on many a time, many occasions. Insofar

as our own personnel, we have an internal organization, the

Inspection Division, which reviews this type of activity, and

if there be any violation, yes, no question about it, we would

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pursue it to the point of prosecution.

Senator Huddleston. But it could be helped by periodic

review.

MI. Kelley. We do, on an annual basis, review the

activities of our 59 offices through that same Inspection

Division, and they have a clear charge to go over this as well

as other matters.

Senator Huddleston. Mr. Kelley, you pointed. out the

difference in the approaches when gathering intelligence, in

gathering evidence after a crime has been committed.

Would there be any advantage, or would it be feasible to

attempt to separate these functions within the Agency, in the

departments, for instance, with not having a nixing of

gathering intelligence and gathering evidence? Are the techniques

definable and different?:

Mr. Kelley. Senator, I think they are compatible. I

see no objection to the way that they are now being handled

on a management basis. I think, as a matter of fatt, it is

a very fine association whereby the intelligence, stemming as

it does from a substantive violation, is a natural complement.

Senator Huddleston. Now, another area, the FBI furnishes

information to numerous government agencies.

Is this properly restricted and controlled at the present

time in your judgment as to just who can ask the FBI for

information, what kind of information they can ask for, and

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who might also be inclined to call the Director and ask him

to do specific things?

Could there be some clearcut understanding as to whether

or not the Director would be obligated to undertake any such

project, that just anybody at the White House might suggest?

Mr. Kelley. It's very clear to me that any request must

come, from Mr. Buchen's office, and that it be, in any case,

wherein it is a request for action, that it be followed with

a letter so requesting.

This has come up before during the Watergate hearings, as

I think it has been placed very vividly in our minds, in

take care that you just don't follow the request of some

underling who does not truly reflect the desire of the President.

Senator Huddleston. Just one more question about

techniques, aside from the guidelines of authority on broad

projects undertaken.

Would it be feasible from time to time in a Congressional

oversight committee, would be able to discuss with the Department,

with the Bureau various techniques so that they could have

some input as to whether or not these actions are consistent

with the overall guidelines, to start with, and consistent

with the very protections?

Mr. Kelley. Senator, I have already said.to.the

översight committee of the Senate that so far as I can now

see, the only thing that would be withheld is the identity of

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probably even more importantly, what restrictions can be put

on the use of that information once it has been supplied by

the FBI?

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Mr. Kelley. I think so, Senator.

Senator Huddleston. You think there are proper restrictions

now?

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Mr. Kelley. I don't know that we can ourselves juage

in all cases whether of not there is good and sufficient reason

for an Agency to inquiry. I think that there should be a

very close delineation by the agencies as to what they're

going to ask for, but I think that we do have sufficient rules

that at least to us we are satisfied.

Senator Huddleston. You're confident that the information

your agency supplies is not being misused, to the detriment

of the rights of any individuals.

Mr. Kelley. Senator, I'm only confident in what I

do myself. I would say that I am satisfied.

Senator Huddleston. I was wondering whether some

inclusion ought to be made in whatever charter is made as to

who specifically can request, what limits ought to be placed

on what the request, and what they can do with it after they

get it.

Mr. Kelley. Yes.

Senator Huddleston. I have some concern about the fact

that in intelligence gathering, you gather, you are just

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bound to gather a great deal of information about some

individual that is useless as far as the intent of the intelli-

gence gathering is concerned, but might be in some way embarras-

sing or harmful to the individual, whether or not there's any

effort to separate this kind of information out of a person's

file that is really initiated for a purpose, for a specific

purpose unrelated to this information.

Is there any effort, or could any direction be given to

doing that?

Mr. Kelley. We would be very happy to work under the

guidelines or rules or anything else to purge material which

is extraneous, irrelevant, or for any other reason objection-

able.

Senator Huddleston. And how about the length of time

that these files are kept in the agency?

Mr. Kelley. We are willing to work within that framework,

too.

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Senator Huddleston. I think that might be done.

Now, I think in developing the chain of command, so to

speak, it certainly would be very difficult to prevent the

President of the United States from calling up the head of

the FBI or anyone else and discussing any law enforcement

problem he might so desire, and perhaps even give direction

to the agency.

But how about that?

What about White House personnel

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informants. We'll discuss techniques, we'll discuss our

present activities. I think this is the only way that we can

exchange our opinions and get accomplished what you want to

accomplish and what I want to accomplish.

Senator Huddleston. I feel that is an important aspect

of it because even though you have a charter which gives broad

direction for all the guidelines and to the types of projects

that enter into it, if we don't get down to specifics, such

things as how intelligence is to be collected, how evidence

is to be collected, what is done after it is collected, this

type of thing, it seems to me we are leaving a wide gap

again for the Bureau to assume that it has total instruction

and total permission to move in a certain direction and go

beyond what is intended or what was authorized.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Director.

The Chairman. Senator Goldwater?

Senator Goldwater. Mr. Kelley, as part of the FBI

electronic surveillance of DI. King, several tapes of

specific conversations, and later, a composite Ring tape were

produced.

Are these tapes still in the possession of the FBI?

Mr. Kelley. Yes, sir.

Senator Goldwater. Have they been reviewed by you?

MI. Kelley. No, sir.

Senator Goldwater. Have they been reviewed by any of your

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staff, to your knowledge?

Mr. Kelley. Senator, I think that they have been reviewed.

I know that at least some have reviewed it within the area of

this particular section. There has been no review of them

since I came to the FBI, I can tell you that.

Senator Goldwater. Would these tapes be available to

the Committee if the Committee felt they would like to hear

them?

Mr. Kelley. This, Senator Goldwater, is a matter which is

of, as I said before, some delicacy, and there would have to

be a discussion of this in an executive session.

The Chairman. I might say in that connection that the

Committee staff gave some consideration to this matter and •

decided that it would compound the original error for the

staff to review the tapes, because that would be a still

further invasion of privacy, and so the staff refrained from

insisting on obtaining the tapes, believing that it was

unnecessary, and quite possibly improper, in order to get at

what we needed to know about the King case.

So the staff did refrain, and for that reason the issue

never came to a head. I just wanted to lay that information

before the Senator.

Senator Goldwater. I realize that's a prerogative of

the staff, but it's also the prerogative of the Committee if,

and I'm not advocating it, if we wanted to hear them to

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ourselves whether Mr. Hoover was off on a wild goose chase

of whether there was, in effect, some reason. Again, I am

not advocating it, I am merely asking a question. They would

be available if the Committee took a vote to hear them and

decided on it.

Mr. Kelley. I don't think it would be within my juris-

diction to respond to this, Senator. It would have to be the

Attorney General.

Senator Goldwater. I see.

Now, are these tapes and other products of surveillance

routinely retained even after an individual ceased to be a

target of inquiry?

Mr. Kelley. They are retained usually for ten years.

Senator Goldwater. Ten years.

Mr. Kelley. Yes, sir.

Senator Goldwater. What is the future value, if any,

to the Bureau of retaining such information?

Mr. Kelley. If there be guidelines that set out a

destruction or erasure, we will abide by it. We will, on those

occasions where we think that matters might come up within

that period of time which may need the retention of them, we

will express our opinion at that time, but other than that

we would be guided by guidelines.

Senator Goldwater. Is it your view that legitimate

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with respect to retention of such information, or do we need

the clear guidelines on the destruction of these materials

when the investigation purposes for which they were collected

have been served?

Mr. Kelley. We feel that there should be a good close

look at the retention of material, and we would of course like

to have an input. But we welcome consideration of this.

Senator Goldwater. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. Thank

you very much.

The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Mondale?

Senator Mondale. Mr. Director, it seems to me that the

most crucial question before the Congress is to accept the

invitation of the FBI to draw Congressionally imposed lines,

limits of authority so the FBI will know clearly what you can

and cannot do, so you will not be subject to later judgments,

and the question is, where should that line be drawn?

As you know, in 1924 when the FBI was created, and

Mr. Stone later became the Chief Justice, he drew the line at

criminal law enforcement. He said that never again will we

go beyond the authority imposed upon us to get into political

ideas. We will stay in the area of law enforcement.

Would you not think it makes a good deal of sense to

draw the guidelines in a way that your activities are

restricted to the enforcement of the law, investigations of

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crime, investigations of conspiracies to commit crime rather

than to leave this very difficult to define and control area

of political ideas?

MI. Kelley. I don't know whether I understand your last

statement of involving the area of political ideas. I say that

I feel that certainly we should be vested and should continue

in the field of criminal investigations as an investigatory

objective. These are conclusions, of course, which are based

on statutes in the so-called security field, national or

foreign.

These are criminal violations. I feel that they should

be in tandem. I feel, having worked many years in this

atmosphere, that you have more ears and eyes and you have

more personnel working together, covering the same fields..

I do not think there should be a separation of the intelligence

matters, because it is a concomitant. It naturally flows

from the investigation of the security matters and the

criminal.

Senator Mondale. Mr. Kelley, what Mr: Stone said was

this, that the Bureau of investigation is not concerned

with political or other opinions of individuals. It is

concerned only with such conduct as is forbidden by the laws

of the United States. When the police system goes beyond

these limits, it is dangerous to proper administration of

justice and human liberty.

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Do you object to that definition?

Mr. Kelley. I think that life has become much more

sophisticated and we have added to the so-called policeman's

area of concern some matters which were probably not as important

at that time. I think that

the fact that the FBI has been in

touch with the security investigations and the gathering of

intelligence is something which has proved to be at times

troublesome and given us great concern, but it is a viable,

productive procedure.

I don't know what Mr. Stone was thinking of entirely

of this course, but I can tell you about the procedure today:

Senator Mondale. You see, I think you recognize, if

that further step is taken, as you're recommending here, that

at that point it becomes so difficult to guarantee, and in

fact, in my opinion, impossible to guarantee that we won't

see a recurrence of some of the abuses that we've seen in

the past, and I don't know how you establish any kind of

meaningful oversight on a function as nebulous as the one

you've just defined.

If the FBI possesses the authority to investigate

ideas that they consider to be threats to this nation's

security, particularly in the light of the record that we have

seen how that definition can be stretched to include practi-

cally everybody, including moderate civil rights leaders,

war dissenters and so on, how on earth can standards be developed

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that would provide any basis for oversight?

How can you, from among other things, be protected from

criticism later on that you exceeded your authority of didn't

do something that some politician tried to pressure you into

doing?

Mr. Kelley. It might well be, Senator, that ten years

from now a Director of the FBI will be seated here and will be

criticized for doing that which today is construed as very

acceptable.

Senator Mondale. Correct. And I have great sympathy

for the predicament the FBI finds itself in.

Mr. Kelley. And the Director.

Senator Mondale. And the Director especially, and that is

why I think it's in the

interest of the FBI to get these lines

as sharply defined as possible, so that when you are pressured

to do things, or when, after the fact, people with good 20/20

hindsight can criticize you or the Bureau, that you can say

well, here are the standards that you gave us, and they specific-

ally say this, and that is your answer. We have to live by

the law. If we don't define it specifically, it seems to me

that these excesses could reoccur, because I don't think it's

possible to define them, and the FBI is inevitably going to

be kicked back and forth, depending on personal notions of what

you should have done.

Don't you fear that?

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Mr. Kelley. Not too much, Senator. I think we learned a

great lesson by virtue of Watergate, the revelations that have

come up as a result of this Committee's inquiries, the fact

that I think that we have a different type of spirit today

in the Bureau, the fact that, as I said before, you came in,

that I think the Bureau is a matchless organization, and they

are eager to do that which is vital and proper, and the fact

that we are getting a number of very fine young people in the

organization, people of the other ethnic backgrounds than we

had years ago. I think there is a greater understanding in

the Bureau today of what is the proper type of conduct.

We may not be able to project this on all occasions,

because we must equate this with the need and with our

experience, but if the precise guidelines be the goal, you're

going to have trouble. If, on the other hand, there be a

flexibility, I think that we can work very well within those

guidelines.

Senator Mondale.

I think, as you know, I don't think

there is a better trained or higher professionally qualified

law enforcement organization in the world than the FBI. I

think we all agree it is superb. But the problem has been,

from time to time, that when you go beyond the area of

enforcing the law into the area of political ideas, that you

are subject to and in fact you leave the criminal field, you

get into politics. And that is where, it seems to me, that the

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great controversy exists, and where you are almost inevitably

going to be subjected to fierce criticism in the future, no

matter how you do it. Once you get into politics, you get

into trouble.

Mr. Kelley. I agree to that, and I point out that in almost

every branch of the government and in every part, as a matter

of fact, every segment of our society, there are some who deviate

from the normal course.

I feel that within the Bureau there is

less likelihood of this to happen, and I think that working

with you we can at least make some achievements that will be

significant.

Now, whether it be lasting, I don't think so, but I

think we've made a good start.

Senator Mondale. In your speech in Montreal on August

9th, you said we must be willing to surrender a small measure

of our liberties to preserve the great bulk of them.

Which liberties did you have in mind?

Mr. Kelley. Well, of course, this speech has been mis-

understood many, many times.

Senator Mondale. Well, I want you to have a chance to

clear it up.

Mr. Kelley. All that was intended here was a restatement

of the approach which the courts historically have used in

resolving most issues of Constitutional importance, and its

recognition that rights are not susceptible to absolute

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protection. It's a matter of balance. Even in the Fourth

Amendment, for example, which protects the right of privacy, it

does not prohibit searches and

seizures.

I mention, it only

refers to those that are unreasonable.

I came from the police fiedd. What is more restrictive

to more people than traffic regulation? But what would be

more chaotic is of you did not have traffic regulation. We

do have to, in order to love in the complexities and

intricacies of today's life, have to give up some of our

rights.

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Some may construe this as an extravagant statement. If it

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is os, I wish to say that I only was pointing out that there

has to be a balance.

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Senator Mondale. So that when you say we have to give

up some liberties, or as you just said, some rights, what you

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mean - let me ask. Let me scratch. that and ask again, you

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have to give up some tights. Which rights would you have us

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give up?

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Mr. Kelly. Well, under the Fourth Amendment you would

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have the right for search and seizure.

Senator Mondale. "You wouldn't give up the Fourth Amend-

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ment right.

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Mr. Kelley. Oh, no not the right.

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Senator Mondale. What right do you have in mind?

Mr. Kelley. The right to be free from search and seizure.

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Senator Mondale.

There's no such right in the Consti-

tution. You can have such seizures, but they must be reasonable,

under court warrant.

, Did you mean to go beyond that?

Mr. Kelley. That's right.

Senator Mondale. That you should be able to go beyond

that?

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MI. Kelley. No, no. I do not mean that we should ever

go beyond a Constitutional right guarantee.

Senator Mondale. Well, would you say, Mr. Kelley, that

that sentence might have been inartful in your speech?

Mr. Kelley. I said that if it was misunderstood, I

made a mistake, because I should never make a statement which

yes, it was inartful.

Senator Mondale. I think I know about your record in

law enforcement well enough to tell you that I think you were

saying something different, that it was taken to mean something

different than I think you intended:

What you are saying is that in the exercise of your law

enforcement powers, the rights of individuals is determined

by the laws and the courts, but the courts, in the handling

of those issues, have to balance rights and other values.

That's what you're essentially saying, is that correct?

Mr. Kelley. Senator, I ought to have you write my

speeches so that I don't have any misunderstandings. I didn't

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understand that to be at the time anything that was unusual.

I have to admit that maybe I made a mistake.

Senator Mondale. What you are saying in effect is that

in effect, the rights: of the American people can be determined

not by the Director of the FBI but by the courts and by the

law.

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Mr. Kelley. Indeed, yes, sir.

Senator Mondale.

All right.

Thank you.

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The Chairman. Senator Hart.

Senator of Colorado. Mr. Kelley, in response to

a question by Senaotr Mondale, one of his first questions about

laying down guidelines, it seems to me what you were saying was

we could work together.

That is to say the Bureau and the

Congress, lay down guidelines that would not unreasonably

hamper you from investigations of crime control in the

country.

But I think implicit in his question was also an area

that you didn't respond to, and that is how do you, what kind

of guidelines do you lay down to protect you and the Bureau

from political pressure, the misuse of the Bureau by political

figures, particularly in the White House?

And we've had indications that at least two of your

predecessors, if not more, obviously were corrupted and Mr.

Gray was under great pressure from the White House to use

the facilities of the Bureau and their capabilities to accomplish

some plititcal end.

Well, it seems to me you were arguing in favor of fewer

restrictions so you could get on with your job, but that is

not what Senator Mondale and the rest of us are interested in.

What kindof restrictions can we lay down to protect you

from political pressures?

I'd be interested in that sign of the

coin, if you would.

Mr. Kelley. I would welcome any guidelines which would

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protect me or any successor from this type of thing. I think

that would be splendid. I have not reviewed the guidelines

as prepared to the present date by the Department. It might

be that they are well defined in there. But I welcome any

consideration of such directives.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Do you think this is a problem?

Mr. Kelley. No, sir, not with me.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Do you think that it has been

a problem for the people that preceded you?

Mr. Kelley. I. think so.

Senator Hart of Colorado. And that's a problem the

Congress ought to address?

Mr. Kelley. I think so.

Senator Hart of Colorado. The Committee received a

letter from the Department of Justice a couple of days, the

Assistant Attorney General asking our cooperation in carrying

out the investigation of their efforts to review the investi-

gation conducted by the FBI into the death of Martin Luther

King, JI., in order to determine whether that investigation

should be re-opened. They asked our cooperation, they asked

for our transcripts, the testimony before the Conmittee, all

material provided to the Committee by the FBI which relates

to DI. King and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

I guess my question is this: Why is the Justice Depart-

ment asking this Comnittee for FBI files?

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Mr. Kelley. I don't think they're asking for files.

I think they're asking for what testimony was given by

witnesses whose testimony has not been given up. I don't know.

Senator Hart of Colorado. I'll quote it. "And all

material provided to the Committee by the FBI which relates

to DI. King and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference."

I repeat the question. Why is the Justice Department

asking this Committee for material provided to us by the

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FBI?

Mr. Kelley. Frankly, I don't know. Do you mind if I

just ask --

(Pause)

Mr. Kelley. I am informed, and I knew this one.

Everything that was sent to you was sent through them. Did

they have a copy also?

Yes, they had a retained copy. I

don't know why.

Senator Hart of Colorado. So there's nothing you

provided us that's not available to the Justice Department?

Mr. Kelley. That's right.

Senator Hart of Colorado. And you can't account for why

an official of the Justice Department would ask this Committee

for your records?

Mr. Kelley. No, sir.

Senator llart of Colorado.

You released a statenent on

November the 18th of '74 regarding the FBI's. counter-intelligence

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program and you said you made a detailed study of COINTELPRO

activities and reached the following conclusions, and I quote:

"The purpose of these counter-intelligence programs was

to prevent dangerously and potentially deadly acts against

individuals, organizations

and institutions both public

and private across the United States."

Now we had an FBI informant in the other day before this

Committee and he stated he told the FBI on a number of

occasions he planned violent acts against black people in

groups. And yet, he said few, if any, instances in which the

FBI actually prevented violence from taking place.

How does his testimony square with your statement that

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I have quoted?

Mr. Kelley. It doesn't, and I don't know if any of

his statements contrary to what we have said is the truth.

We don't subscribe to what he said. We have checked into it

and we know of no instances where,. for example, 15 minutes

and that type of thing has been substantiated.

Senator Hart of Colorado. You're saying the testimony

he gave us under oath was not accurate?

Mr. Kelley. Right.

Senator Hart of Colorado. You also said in that statement,

and I quote: "I want to assure you that Director Hoover did

not conceal from superior authorities the fact that the FBI

was engaged in neutralizing and disruptive tactics against

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revolutionary and violence-prone groups.

Now the Committee has received testimony that the New

Left COINTELPRO programs was not in fact told to higher

authorities, the Attorney Gereral and Congress.

Do you have any information in this regard?

I know in that statement you cite onw or two instances,

but in terms of the bulk of COINTEL programs, the record

seems to date at least to be clear that there was not systematic

information flowing upward through the chain of command to

Director Hoover's superiors:

Mr. Kelley. May I ask that I be given the opportunity

to substantiate that with documentation?

Senator Hart of Colorado. Sure.

Mr.. Kelley: Or respond to it.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Dorector Kelley, just in

passing, do you agree with the statement made by President

Ford that those responsible for harassing and trying to destroy

Dx. King should be brought to justice.

MI. Kelley. Those who directly responsible and upon whose orders

the activities were taken responsible. I don't know if he intended to say

that, but if he did not, I would say that it would be more proper. Insofar

as my own opinion is concerned, that it be centered on those who said

to do it and those who are responsible.

I: took the responsibility for any such program and I

don't expect that those under me would be not acting in

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accordance with what they think is proper and may even have

some reservation, but they do it on my orders. I accept that

responsibility.

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I think that it should rest. on those who instructed that

that be done.

Senator Hart of Colorado. But you agree that the people

who give the orders should be brought to justice.

Mr.. Kelley. I do.

The Chairman. Aren't they all dead?

Mr. Kelley. No.

The Chairman. Not quite?

Mr. Kelley. Not quite.

Senator Hart of Colorado.

That's all, Ir. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.

Director Kelley, in the Connittee's review of the

COINTELPRO program and other political involvements of the

FBI, it seems to me that we have encountered two or three

basic questions.

Since the investigation is over insofar as the Committee

is concerned, we're now turning our attention to remedies for

the future, what I would think would be our constructive

legislative work, it is very important that we focus on what

we learned in that investigation.

And one thing that we have learned is that Presidents of

the United States have fron time to time ordered the FBI to

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obtain for them certain kinds of information by exercising the

necessary surveillance to obtain. and to have a purely

political character, that they simply wanted to have for their

own personal purposes.

I think that you would agree that that is not a proper

function of the FBI,. and you agree.

Yet it's awfully difficult for anyone in the FBI,

including the Director, to turn down a President of the United

States if he receives a direct order from the President. It

is always possible, of course, to say no, and if you insist,

I will resign. But that puts a very hard burden on any man

serving in your position, particularly if the President puts

a good face on the request and makes it sound plausible or

even invents some excuse. It is alvays easy for him to say,

you know, I am considering Senator White for an important

position in my administration, and I need to know more about

his activities, particularly of late. I've had some cause

for concern and I want to be certain that there is nothing in

his record that would later embarrass me, and I just want you

to keep careful track of him and report to me on what he's

been doing lately.

It's difficult for you to say back to the President, ir.

President, that's a very questionable activity for the FBI,

and I frankly don't believe that you've given me the real

reason why you want this man followed. I think his opposition

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to your current policy is politically embarrassing to you and

you want to get something on him.:

I mean, you know,

the Director can hardly talk back that

way, and I'm wondering

what we could do in the way of protecting

your office and the FBI from political exploitation in this

basic charter that we write.

Now, I want your suggestions, but let's begin with one

or two of mine. I would like your response.

If we were to write into the law that any order given you

either by the President or by the Attorney General should be

transmitted in writing and should clearly state the objective

and purpose of the request and that the FBI would maintain

those written orders and that furthermore they would be

available to any oversight committee of the Congress. If the

joint committee on intelligence is established, that committee

would have access to such a file.

So that the committee itself would be satisfied that

orders were not being given to the FBI that were improper or

unlawful.

What would you think of writing a provision of that kind

into a charter for the FBI?

Mr. Kelley. I would say writing into the law any order

issued by. the President that is a request for action by the

Attorney General should be in writing, is certainly, in my

opinion, is a very plausible solution. I'm sure that in

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contemplation of this there would be some that will say yes

or some that will say no, but I think we could define an

area where you are trying to cure the abuses and we could

do that.

Now as to the availability to any oversight committee

of Congress, I would say generally that I certainly would have

no objection to this, but I again, there may be some request

for something of high confidentiality that the President might

put in writing such as

some national or foreign security

matter.

I would like to have such a consideration be given a

great deal of thought and that the oversight committee review

be conditioned with that possibility. I don't think it would

present a problem.

I have said previously that I feel I can discuss every-.

thing except the identity of the informants to the oversight

committee. I welcome that.

The Chairman. Well, that has been of course the way we

proceeded with this Conmittee. It has worked pretty well,

I think.

Now Senator Goldwater brought up a question on the

Martin Luther King tapes. I would like to pursue that question.

If these tapes do not contain any evidence that needs

to be preserved for ongoing criminal investigations, and since

DI. King has long since been violently removed from the scene,

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why are they preserved?

Why aren't they simply destroyed?

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Is there a problen that we can help through new law to enable

the FBI to remove from its files so much of this information

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that is has collected that it is no longer needed or may never

have connected the person with any criminal activity?' And

yet,

all of that information just stays there in the files

year after year.

What can we do? How can a law be changed? If that's

not the problem, then what is? Why are these tapes still down

there at the FBI?

Mr. Kelley. Hell, of course, we do have the rule that

they are maintained ten years. Now why the rule is your

question and why right now are they maintained? Since we

do maintain everything

since the inquiry has started and until

that's lifted, ve can't destroy anything.

I would say that this is a proper area for guidelines

or legislation and again, as I have said, there should be

some flexibility and I know that's a broad statement but there

might be some areas wherein that the subject of the investigation

himself may want them retained because it shows his innocence.

I think you have to deliberate this very carefully, but

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it can he done and we are willing to be guided by those

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The Chairman. Let me ask you this. The FBI is conducting

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thousands of investigations every year on possible appointees

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to Federal positions. As a matter of fact, the only time I

ever see an FBI agent is when he comes around and flashes his

badge and asks me a question or two about what I know of Mr.

so and so, who's being considered for an executive office.

And we have a very brief conversation in which I tell him that

as far as I know, he's a loyal and patriotic citizen, and that

is about the extent of it.

Then when this file is completed and the person involved

is either appointed or not appointed, what happens to that

file? I know it's full of all kinds of gossip because it is

in the nature of the investigation to go out to his old

neighborhoods and talk to everybody who might have known him.

What happens to the file? Is that just retained forever?

Mr. Kelley. We have some capability of destroying some

files anu they are rather lengthy insofar as retention. We

have some archival rules which govern the retention of mateial

and is developed in cases involving certain members of the

Executive Branch of the government.

I see no reason why this would not be a proper area

for consideration of legislation.

The Chairman. Can you give me any idea of how much -

do you have records that would tell us how much time and money

is being spent by the FBI just in conducting these thousands

of routine investigations on possible Presidential appointments

to Federal offices?

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Mr. Kelley. I feel confident we can get it. Ião not

have it now, but if you would Ilke

to have the annual cost

for the investigation of Federal appointees -

The Chairman. Yes.

Plus, you know, plus any other

information that would indicate to us what proportion of the

time and effort of the FBI was absorbed in this kind of

activity.

Mr. Kelley. I can tell you it is relatively small, but

I can get you, I think, the exact amount of time and the

approximate expense.

The Chairman. I wish you would do that because this is

a matter we need more information about. And when you supply

that data to the Cormittee, would you also supply the number

of such investigations each year?

You know, I don't

expect you to go back 20 or 25 years,

but give us a good idea of the last few years.

For example,

enough to give us an idea of how much time and how broad the

reach of these investigations may be.

Mr. Kelley. Through '70?

The Chairman. That would be sufficient, I would think.

The other matter that is connected to this same subject

that I would like your best judgment on is whether these

23 | investigations could not be limited to offices of sensitivity.

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be involved so that there is a reason to make a close check on

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past associations, attitudes and expressions of belief.

I have often wondered whether we couldn't eliminate

routine Federal offices that are not particularly sensitive

in the national security sense from the reach of these FBI

checks.

And so when you respond to the series of questions, I

wish you would include the offices that are now covered by

such checks and give us an idea of how far down into the

Federal bureaucracy this extends.

Could you do that?

Mr. Kelley. Yes, sir.

The Chairnan. Fine.

Now there is a vote. The vote always comes just at

the wrong time, but Mr. Schwarz wants to ask you some additional

questions for the record, and there may be other questions:

too that would be posed by the staff, after which I will as!

Mr. Schwarz to adjourn the hearings. It looks like we're going

to be tied up on the floor with votes.

But before I leave I want to thank you for your testimony,

iir. Kelley, and to express my appreciation to you for the

way you have cooperated with the Committee in the course of

its investigation during the past months.

Mix. Kelley. Thank you.

The Chairman. And I hope, as you do, that as a result

of the work of the Committee we can write a generic law for

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the fEI that will help to remedy many of the problems we'll

encounter in the future.

Thank you.

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Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Kelley, I'll try to be very brief.

On page 5 of your statement --

Mr. Kelley. What?

Mr. Schwarz. On page 5 of your statement, the third

full paragraph, you said the following, and I would like then

to question about what you said. "We must recognize that

situations have occurred in the past and will arise in the

future where the Government may well be expected to depart from

its traditional role, in the FBI's case, as an investigative

and intelligence-gathering agency, and take affirmative steps

which are needed to meet an imminent threat to human life or

property."

Now, by that you mean to take what kind of steps in what

kind of situation?

And can you give some concrete examples under your general

principles statement?

Mr. Kelley. I think that Mr. Adams addressed himself to

that the other day, where you have an extremist who is an

employee at the waterworks, and he makes a statement that he's

going to do something which is devastating to the city, and you

have no way to attack this under the ordinary procedures, and

so therefore you must take some steps to meet that imminent

threat to human life or property.

Mr. Schwarz. So let us take that case as a test of the

principle. You are saying the extremist has said he is going

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to do something to the waterworks, poison it or something, and

he is on the way down there with the poison in his car.

Is that the presumption?

Mr. Kelley. We hadn't gone that far, but all right, you

can extent it.

Mr. Schwarz. All right, now, in that case you have the

traditional law enforcement tool, which is the power of arrest.

MI. Kelley. Not under probable cause where he has not

gone down there. The hypothetical we gave was one where he had

not taken any overt acts in perpetration of this.

Mr. Schwarz. Well, if he hasn't taken any overt acts,

are you then in what you would call in imminent threat of

human life or property?

MI. Kelley. I think so.

Mr. Schwarz. How so? Unless he has taken an overt act

to buy the poison or to get in the car with the poison, there

is not by definition any threat to life or property.

Mr. Kelley. Mr. Schwarz, I've been around in this business.

a long time. I've heard a number of threats which were issued,

and they thereafter materialized into actions. I don't think

take these threats as being empty ones, because so many times

they have been acted upon.

I was criticized one time when there was a threat made to

kill me, and it was said later on, it's not rhetoric, it's

not rhetoric to me, because when they say they're going to

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kill me, that just means one thing.

MI. Schwarz. But I'm not disagreeing with you.

Mr. Kelley. But you are disagreeing with me. You're saying

on the basis of experience that you cannot detect a possible

threat. That's the whole area of concern that we have here, where

we don't lose the capability of doing something. We don't

say we should initiate ourselves. We say that we should go to

the Attorney General. We do not subscribe to the idea that

we should act independently because maybe we don't have the

judicial review, the capability of determining, but we do

think that we should report it and thereafter see what can

be done.

Mr. Schwarz. Well, have you changed in the course of

our discussion the standard on page 5.

On page 5 you're talking about an imminent threat.

Mr. Kelley. Yes.

• Mr. Schwarz. And I hear you now as saying a possible

threat.

Mr. Kelley. An imminent possible threat.

Mr. Schwarz. An imminent possible threat. All right.

Now, would a fair standard for either action, other than

arrest, I don't know what you have in mind, but something to

prevent the person from carrying out his activities, other

than arrest, for instance, what is an example of what you have

in mind?

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Mr. Kelley. Removing him from his position or whatever

is necessary in order to make it impossible or at least as

impossible as possible to perpetuate this thing.

Mr. Schwarz. You mean have him lose his job or --

Mr. Kelley. I don't know what it would be.

Mr. Schwarz. Isolate him in some fashion.

Mr. Kelley. In some fashion perhaps.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, for such activity and for opening

an investigation into a domestic group, could you live with

a standard which said you would have to have an immediate

threat that someone was likely to commit a serious federal

crime involving violence?

Mr. Kelley. I think that this thing could be worked out

so that there could be an adequate basis for an evaluation.

Mr. Schwarz. So those words, without trying to commit

you entirely to them, do not seem to you to depart far from

what you think would be an acceptable standard.

Mr. Kelley. Well, an imminent, immediate threat might

be, by virtue of the word "immediate" that he's going to

do it the next minute. In that case it may be necessary for

you to, not with the presence of the possibility, not able

to do anything except put him under arrest or anything.

Mr. Schwarz. Of course, of course.

And nobody would at all disagree with that kind of action.

Mr. Kelley. I don't think they would either.

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Mr. Schwarz. But on the question, let's take the opening

of an investigation into a domestic group.

Is it basically consistent with practicality to make the

test immediate threat of a serious Federal crime involving

violence?

Mr. Kelley. To open a domestic security case.

Mr. Schwarz. Yes.

Mr. Kelley. It appears to me that this is a terrorist

activity, in effect. We certainly have terrorist activities

under our jurisdiction as a threat against the United States.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, are there other circumstances where

it is justifiable to open an investigation of the domestic

group where you do not have an immediate threat of serious

federal crime involving violence?

Mr. Kelley. Oh, I think there are other criteria, and

they have been well defined as to what is the possible

opening, the basis for a possible opening. We haven't been

discussing that, we have been discussing particular instances,

but there are other criteria that are used, yes.

Mr. Schwarz. What would the other criteria be?

Mr. Kelley. Well, the possible statutory violations

over which we have jurisdiction are, generally speaking, the

most used of thebasis, and then you have, of course,

some

intelligence investigations which should, of course, be of

short duration. If there is no showing of this into action

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or a viable intent.

Mr. Schwarz. So that's what you're looking for in the

intelligence investigation?

Mr. Kelley.. By intelligence investigation, yes, you

are looking to prevent.

Mr. Schwarz. And what you are looking to prevent, and

what you're looking to find is a likelihood of action combined

with an intent to take an issue?

Mr. Kelley. And the capability.

Mr. Schwarz. And the capability.

All right. I just have two other lines, Mr. Kelley, and

I appreciate very much your time.

Mr. Kelley. That's all right.

MI. Schwarz. Assuming a legitimate investigation has •

been started into a domestic intelligence matter, is it legiti-

mate for the FBI, in addition to obtaining information that

relates to what we've just been talking about, the likelihood

of violent action, is it also legitimate for the FBI to

collect, A, retain, B, disseminate, C, information concerning

let's say the sex life of a person on the one hand, and the

political views of a person on the other?

Mr. Kelley. I think, Mr. Schwarz, that this is just what

many of our problems and perhaps the guidelines can define

this type of thing. I think probably you will agree that

within the determination of the deviations possibly of sex

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lives, there might be something that is relevant. I would say

ordinarily it's not. And so far as political views, yes, I

think that this could be, if he is espousing some cause or

some view that advocates violence of the overthrow of the

government.

Mr. Schwarz. Would those be the two limits on political

views?

Mr. Kelley. What?

Mr. Schwarz. Would those be the only limits on political

views that you think are okay to collect, advocants of violence

or advocants of overthrow?

Mr. Kelley. Well, I don't think because he's a Democrat

or a Republican it would be anything that would be damaging,

but it might on the other hand counter the report that he's.

a member of some other organization.

Mr. Schwarz. Is the standard you used on collection of

sex life information, might be relevant? I suppose anything

might be relevant, but don't you think that as a function of

balance, it has to have a high degree of relevance before it's

justifiable to collect that kind of information on American

citizens who are not suspected of having committed crimes?

Mr. Kelley. Insofar as doing it presently, it has been

included in some reports as a result of the requirement that

that is what is required by our rules, that when a person

reports something to us, we do a report of the complaint. Insofar

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as a determination by guidelines that might be prepared later,

I think that we can certainly deliberate on this to see whether

or not this is something we should retain, and we would not

object to anything reasonable in that regara.

Mr. Schwarz. I just have one final question.

Taking the current manual and trying to understand its

applicability laid against the facts in the Martin Luther King

case, under Section 87 there is a - permission is granted to

open investigations of the infiltration of non-subversive

groups, and the first sentence reads: "When information is

received indicating that a subversive group is seeking to

systematically infiltrate and control a non-subversive group

or organization, an investigation can be opened."

Now, I take it that is the same standard that was used

in opening the investigation of the Southern Christian Leadership

Conference in the 1960s, so that invéstigation could still be

open today under the FBI manual, the current FBI manual.

Mr. Kelley. We are interested in the infiltration of

clearly subversive groups into non-subversive groups inasmuch

as this is a ploy that is used many times, and having infil-

trated, they then get control, and they have a self-laundered

organization which they can use, and not, certainly, to the

benefit of the country.

Mr. Schwarz. But is the answer to my question yes, that

under that standard, the SCLC investigation could still be

NW 55267 DocId: 37989833 Page 221

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smng

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

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opened today?

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Mr. Kelley. I think so.

Mr. Schwarz. All right, then, just one final question.

Do you agree that special care needs to be taken not only

of the standards for initially opening an investigation of a

group, but perhaps extra care needs to be taken when the investi-

gation goes beyond the initial target group to individuals

or people who come into contact with it?

Mr. Kelley. I don't know if I agree with that entirely.

If

you mean that we go into the

non-subversive group, that we

then investigate people in that non-subversive group, not the

infiltrators, but the non, that we conduct a lengthy investigation

of them without any basis for doing so other than that they

are in an infiltrated group, I would likely have said -- but

off the top of my head I would say probably that's not necessary.

Mr. Schwarz. Thank you very much.

MI. Smothers. Just a couple of very brief lines of

inquiry, Mr. Kelley.

I think that the questions of the Chief Counsel was

raising is one that goes further into your statement, when you

talk about the difficulty of setting out the line between

intelligence gathering and law enforcement kinds of functions..

Nevertheless, though, I think that you have made an effort,

indeed, the Bureau's organizational scheme reflects , ::.

to distinguish some of this has been made.

NW 55267 DocId:32089833 Page 222

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Putting aside for one moment the counterespionage

effort, and looking strictly at what we have been calling the

Domestic Intelligence, is it your view that the retention of

this function in the Bureau is critical to the Bureau's

law enforcement position?

Mr. Kelley. My personal opinion is that the Bureau does

a splendid job in this area. I feel further that the background

of criminal investigatory activities and experiences which

all counterintelligence people have is very helpful. It is help-

ful not only in gathering knowledge and experience, it also

enters into this field, a person with a broad understanding

of the rights and privileges, and you don't have so much that

spy type, that cloak and dagger, that very, very secret type

of an operation.

I subscribe to the present system heartily.

Mr. Smothers. Would it be of assistance to your mission

if within the Bureau guidelines were established that

effectively limited access or controlled dissemination of

the intelligence product? In other words, if we had a

situation where the intelligence product is critical to assist

the law enforcement effort, I don't think there's any question

that there should be access to it.

Isn't our problem one of controlling the use of that

intelligence product and preventing the kind of murky crossing

of lines there with the information legitimately needed for

NW 55267 DocId: 32989833 Page 223

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law enforcement?

Mr. Kelley. There is always

a problem when there is wide

dissemination, because that just numerically increases-the

possibility of misuse, abuse or slander, libel, or anything

of that matter, and I think that it would be well worthwhile

to review the dissemination rules to make them subject to

close guidance in the guidelines that we're speaking of.

MI. Smothers. Let me just raise one final area with you.

We talked a little bit about, or a question was raised about

the investigation now being conducted by the Justice Department

regarding the improper actions on the COINTELPRO, and the

King case in particular.

As we look at allegations of impropriety by your personnel

I think it would be helpful for our record here to have some

insight into the procedure the Bureau would normally follow.

What does the Bureau do when you get an allegation that

an agent or administrative official in the Bureau has behaved

improperly?

Is an investigation conducted internally, or is it

routinely referred to the Justice Department?

Mr. Kelley. There may be a revision in this type of

procedure as a result of the establishment of the Council for

Professional Responsibility. At present it would be in the

great majority of the cases turned over to our Investigative

Division for investigation. There might, on some unusual

NW 55267 DocId:37989833 Page 224

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occasion, be a designation of a special task force made up,

perhaps, of division heads. That is most unlikely, but it is

handled internally at present.

Mr. Smothers. Would these internal determinations be

reviewed by Justice, or do you think that is a necessary

step?

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I guess what we are searching for here is, first of all,

I think you answered that, well, to what extent does the

Bureau police itself; and then secondly, is the Department of

Justice involved in the police determinations?

For instance, what if the Attorney General disagreed with

the assertion that only the higher up officials who ordered

the action against King should be the subject of investigation

and maybe prosecution?

How does the interplay work there between you and Justice?

Mx. Kelley. We do report to the Attorney General those

activities which we construe as improper or possibly illegal.

There is a possibility that the Department, having been advised

of the situation, might take it on their own to do their own

investigating, and this is something that we feel is a

decision to be made only rather rarely, because we feel we

have within our own organization sufficient capability to

handle that. But we do not protest it. It is handled

independently of us.

Mr. Smothers. Thank you.

NW 55267 DocId: 37989833 Page 225

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## Page 226

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That is all I have.

MI. Schwarz. Thank you.

(Whereupon, at 12:12 o'clock p.m., the Committee recessed

subject to the call of the Chair.)

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NW 55267

DocId: 32689833 Page 226

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## Page 227

Routing

0-7 (Ret

-17-73)

TO: SAC:

Albany

Albuquerque

Alexandria

Anchorage

Atlanta

Baltimore

Birmingham

Boston

Buffalo

Butte

Charlotte

Chicago

Cincinnati

Cleveland

Columbia

Dallas

Detroit

El Paso

(Copies to Offices Checked)

Houston

Indianapolis

Jackson

Jacksonville

Kansas City

Knoxville

Las Vegas

Little Rock

Los Angeles

Louisville

Memphis

Miami

Milwaukee

Minneapolis

Mobile

Newark

New Haven

New Orleans

New York City

Norfolk

Oklahoma City

Omaha

Philadelphia

Phoenix

Pittsburgh

Portland

Richiond

Sacramento

St. Louis

Salt Lake City

San Antonio

San Diego

San Francisco

San Juan

Savannah

Seattle

7 Springfield

Tamp a

Washington Field

Quantico

TO LEGAT:

1 Beirul

Ber

Bonn

Brasilia

Buenos Aires

Caracas

Hong Kong

London

Madrid

Manila

Mexico City

Ottawa

Paris

Rome

Singapore

Tel Aviv

Tokyo

12/30/75

RE:

Date

PIRECTORS APPEARANCE BEFORE SENATE SELECT

COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES;

DECEMBER 10, 1975

Retention

For appropriate

[J For information ~ optional

I action

• Surep, by

E] The enclosed is fur. your information. If used in a future report,

sources, I paraphrase contents.

• Enclosed are corrected pages from report of SA

dated

Remarks:

conceal all

ReButel to all SACs and Legats, 12/10/75.

Enclosed for each Office and Legat is

one copy of the transcript of questions which

vere asked Mr. Kelley during captioned appearance,

along with Mr. Kelley's answers

; to those questions.

166-2894-29

SEARCHED..

--_INDEXED.

SERIALIZE S... FILED...

JAN 2 1976

FBI - SEATTLE

Enc. (1)

Bufile

• Urfile

NW 35267 Doold: 32989833

Page 227

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## Page 228

Routing Slip

C-7 iRcv. 18-17-7

TO: SAC:

Albany

Albuquerque

Alexandria

Anchorage

Atlanta

Baltimore

Bimingham

Boston

Buffalo

Butle

(Charlotte

Chicago

Cincinnati

Cleveland

Columbia

Dillus

Denver

Detroit

El Paso

• Honolulu

(Copies to Offices Checked)

TO LEGAT:

Houston

! Indianapolis

Jackson

B

Jacksonville

Kansas City

Knoxville

Las Vegas

Little Rock

Los Angeles

Louisville

Memphis

Miami

Milwaukee

Minnapolis

Mobile

Newark

New Haren

New Orl cans

New York City

Nortolk

• Oklahoma City

100

Omaha

Philadelphia

Phoenix

Pittsburgh

Portland

Richmond

Sacramerto

St. Louis

Salt Lake City

San Antonio

Sar Diego

San Francisco

San Juan

Savannah

Seattle

- Springficld

Tamp a

Washington Field

Quantico

Cy Brasilia

Buenos Aires

Carcas

Hong Kong

London

"andrid

Mania

Mexico City

Ottawa

Paris

Rome

Singapore

Tel Aviv

Tokyo

RE: DIRECTOR'S APPEARANCE

Date

BEFORE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

DECEMBER 10, 1975

1/5/76

Retention

For appiopriate

VI For monation aJ optional El action

_ Surep, by -

The enclosed is for your information. If used in a future report,

conceal all

sources,

→ paraphrase contents.

[.] Enclosed are corrected pages from report of SA

dated

66-2894

-30

Remarks: By routing slip dated

12/30/75 and

captioned as above, all. SACs and Legats were

furnished a copy of the transcript of Mr.

Kelley's 12/10/75 appearance before the

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

Activities.

Although the data contained in

the transcript may be made available to news

media representatives, used

in answering

questions received from citizens, and other-

wise treated as being of a public-source nature,

: the transcript itself should not be reproduced

for, or given to, anyone suERide EhADeß..

SERIALIZED. PIEdI FILED.PCt

Bufile

Urfile

JAN 7 1976

BI-SEATTLE

NW 55267 DocId: 32989898

Page 2252

atmò

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## Page 229

ADAGE MA CONT

9:31DM TTEL D-19-76 MLS

TO PHITTE

MTAMBADDLTO

CEATTLE

FROM MIPECTOR (62-116395)

CEMETIDY 75

DY LETTER MATED FEBRUARY 11, 1976, THE SENATE SELFCT

COMMITTEE (SSO) RENUTSTED THAT ARPANGEMENTS BE MADE FOR SSC

TAFT MEMBERS TO INTERVIEN FBI PERSONNEL WHO AUTHORED CERTAIN

COU"TERINTELLIGENCE, PROGRAM (COINTELPRO) NOCUMFNTS RELATING TO

ALLEAFD FBI TAVOLUTMEMT IN GANG WAR" BETUFEN THE BLACK PANTHER

DARTY (POS) AND TYS US OPGANIZATION.

THESE DERSO"S ARE:

BUTTE DIVICTON - CRECIAL AGFAT (SA) ROY L. BURNS, ASSIGNED TO

BILLTNAC, MONTANA, RESINFAT AGF CY, (DOCUMENTS AUTHORED WHILE

ACCTANEN CAN DIFFO):

ATRAFADALIC DIVISTON - ASCISTANT SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE (ASAC)

HTLL TAM DO YEUMANN, (DOCUMENTS AUTHORED WHILE ASSIGNER FRI

HEANOUARTERS (FBIYA);

CRATTLE DIVICION - SA LEROY I. SUFEIS (RETIRED), LAST

ADDRESC BELITUTO TO BE 5905 - TOMO SIPEFT, ". E.,

ASAC calised 2-14-26

delephonece

Roy sher

ASIC

Contactaby

dust posseble

addise

bysscal counsele

Hig fit?

phor

206-659-6432

'31

NW 55267 DooId: 32989833 Bage 229

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## Page 230

PAOF TRIN

MADY CUTLLE, WASHINGTON, (DOCUMENTS AUTHORED WHILE ASSIGNED

LOS AMAFLES).

BUTTE AIM MTMNFAPOLIS SHOULD ADVISE INCIMBENT EMPLOYEES

ТЧАТ IF CONTACTED BY GEC STAFF FOR INTERVIEW, LEGAL COUNSEL

DIUTETON IS TO BE TMMFDIATELY NOTIFIED THROUGH SAC SO THAT

DELFACE FROM CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT AND ARRANGEMENIS FOR

ІТЕрИТТИ ГА" ВЕ ПЕрЕСТер.

CHATTLE SHOULD CONTACT FORMER SA SHEETS, ALERT HIM TO

ANTTCIPATEN SO STAFF INTERVIEW AND ADVISE HIM TO GONTACT

LESAL GUNSEL DIUTSTON SO THAT HE CAN BE RELFASED FROM

CONFIDENTIALTTY AGREEMENT AND DA RAMETERS OF INTEDVIEN OUTLINED

TO UTM. CONTAC WITY CHEF TO BE MANOLED BY SAC OR ASAC.

TY EUFMT THIS NOT FEASIBLE, FOR LUST CAUSE, TO BE WANDLES BY

A SEMIOR SUPERVICOR. IF SHEETS NO LONGER IN YOUR TERRITORY

OP TEMPORARILY AWAY, SET OUT LEAD TO OTHEP OFFICE IMMENIATELY

Н ТТИ СОРУ ТО ГВІЧА.

FAN

FRT CE ACK FOR TWO TELS

RAA4? 1 96?

CLR

IN 55267 Docid: 32989833 Page 230

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## Page 231

FD-36 (Rev. 2-14-74)

Transmit the following in —

Via

TELETYPE

FBI

Date:

2-20-76

PLAIN

(Type in plaintext or code)

NITEL

(Precedence)

TO

FROM

SENSTUDY 75.

DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)

SAC, SEATTLE

(66-2894)

REBUTEL FEBRUARY 19, 1976.

FORMER SA LEROY W. SHEETS CONTACTED TELEPHONICALLY

BY ASAC J.D. PRINGLE, FEBRUARY 20, 1976 AND ADVISED OF

CONTENTS OF RETEL.

SHEETS STATED HE WILL CONTACT LEGAL COUNSEL

FIRST PART OF WEEK BEGINNING FEBRUARY 23, 1976 TO OBTAIN

DETAILS OF INTERVIEW BY SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE STAFF

MEMBERS.

DP : 10k

1) 1.1

66-2894-32)

Approved:

Special Agent in Charge

NW 55267

DocId: 32989833 Page 231

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## Page 232

0-9 (Rev. 2-14-74)

FBI

Airtel

Transmit in

Via

(Type in plaintext or codel

To:

SAC,

Albany

From: Director,

-

(Precedence)

9-23-76

(Date)

• FBI

BUREAUWIDE INFORMATION PROGRAM, 76-28

SPEECH BY SENATOR DANIEL K. INOUYE

BEFORE THE HAWAII STATE

LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS

ASSOCIATION CONFERENCE

SEPTEMBER 4, 1976, HONOLULU, HAWAII

For information purposes, attached is a copy of

an address supportive of the FBI, which was delivered by

Senator Inouye on September 4, 1976, at the 23rd Conference

of the Hawaii State Law Enforcement Officials Association.

MARGIN.)

Senator Inouye is Chairman of the Senate Select

Committee on Intelligence, and his remarks reflect an

unusual depth of interest in and knowledge concerning the

FBI.

(This line

for

Enclosure

2 - All Field Offices - Enclosure

1 - Each Legat - Enclosure

(Do

not

type BEYOND THIS MARGIN.)

(Do not type below this line.)

I6e-2894-33

SEPS 4 197

TEL-SEATTLE

copy in 66-2869

NW 55267

DocId: 32989833 Page 232

FBI/DOJ

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## Page 233

news from

Senator DANIEL K. INOUYE

topic:

date:

SPEECH BEFORE THE 23RD HAWAII STATE LAW ENFORCEMENT

OFFICIALS ASSOCIATION CONFERENCE

Honolulu, Hawait

release date: September 4, 1976

FBI/DOJ

NW 55263 DocId: 32909333

Page 233

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## Page 234

IN RECENT MONTHS, OUR FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

HAS BEEN THE SUBJECT OF MUCH DISCUSSION AND UNPRECEDENTED.

CRITICISM. ARTICLES AND POLITICAL CARTOONS HAVE SUGGESTED

THAT THE BUREAU HAS BEEN AND IS MANNED BY SUBVERSIVE AND

CORRUPT MEN. THIS EVENING I WISH TO SPEND A FEW MINUTES

SPEAKING TO YOU AS CHAIRMAN OF THE NEW SENATE COMMITTEE,

THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND SHARE WITH

YOU SOME OF MY THOUGHTS ON THE FBI.

THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE IS RESPONSIBLE;

AMONG OTHER THINGS, FOR OVERSEEING THE FBI'S FOREIGN

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES:

NW 55267 DocId:32989833 Page 234

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## Page 235

-2-

THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT SOME OF THE AGENTS OF THE

BUREAU HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN ACTIVITIES THAT ARE AT BEST

QUESTIONABLE AND AT WORST ILLEGAL. THE REVELATIÓN OF

THESE QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES IN THE PRESS

AND MEDIA HAVE SHOCKED MANY AMERICANS, PRIMARILY BECAUSE

MOST AMERICANS OF THIS AND PAST GENERATIONS HAVE LOOKED

UPON THE FBI AS AN INCORRUPTIBLE BASTION AGAINST CRIME AND

AN IMPORTANT PROTECTOR OF OUR NATIONAL WELL-BEING.

I DO NOT WISH TO IN ANY WAY STOP THE CRITICISM BECAUSE

I BELIEVE CRITICISM CAN BE HEALTHY IN OUR DEMOCRACY, PROVIDED

IT IS DIRECTED AT STRENGTHENING THOSE THINGS WHICH ARE GOOD

IN OUR INSTITUTIONS AND CALLING TO OUR ATTENTION THOSE WHICH

ARE BAD.

NW 55267 Docid: 32989833 Page 235

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## Page 236

-3-

CRITICISM WHICH IS PERMITTED TO PROCEED WITHOUT ANY RESPONSE

HOMEVER, CAN BE DESTRUCTIVE. ACCORDINGLY, I BELIEVE THE

TIME HAS COME TO REMIND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE OF THE CENTRAL

ROLE THE BUREAU HAS PLAYED IN EFFECTIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT IN

THIS COUNTRY AND TO REASSURE THEM THAT THE FBI IS AN

• IMPORTANT BASTION AGAINST CRIME INTHE UNITED STATES AND IT

IS IMPORTANT IN PROVIDING SECURITY FOR OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS.

FOR MANY AMERICANS, THE FBI HAS MEANT J. EDGAR HOOVER

AND THE GUNNING DOWN OF JOHN DILLINGER. THIS SHOOT 'EM

UP IMAGE OF THE BUREAU HAS BEEN FOSTERED BY T.V. SHOWS

SUCH AS THE "FBI STORY" AND BOOKS SUCH AS IRVING WALLACE'S

"THE R DOCUMENT", AND PERHAPS EVEN BY THE BUREAU ITSELF.

NW 55267 DocId: 32989833 Page 236

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-4-

PROMINENTLY DISPLAYED FOR THE MILLIONS OF VISITORS TO THE

FBI's HEADQUARTERS IN WASHINGTON, D. C., FOR EXAMPLE IS

A DEATH MASK OF JOHN DILLINGER AND OTHER REMINDERS OF THE

BUREAU'S PAST DAYS OF GLORY.

TODAY, THE FBI, LONG RENOWNED FOR ITS TENACITY IN

INVESTIGATING OTHERS, IS ITSELF THE SUBJECT OF SEARCHING

INVESTIGATIONS. THESE INVESTIGATIONS INVOLVE ALLEGATIONS

OF ILLEGAL OR QUESTIONABLE ACTIVITIES RANGING FROM THE

TAKING AND USE OF GOVERNMENT PROPERTY WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION

TO AND INCLUDING UNLAWFUL BREAKING AND ENTERING:

NW 55267 Docid: 32989833

Page 237

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-5-

A FEW WEEKS AGO, A 28 YEAR VETERAN AND CHIEF OF THE

BUREAU'S EXHIBITS SECTION PLEADED GUILTY IN WASHINGTON, D.C.

TO A CRIMINAL CHARGE OF CONVERTING GOVERNMENT PROPERTY TO HIS

OWN USE.

OTHER AGENTS ARE UNDER INVESTIGATION FOR ALLEGED

INVOLVEMENT IN UNLAWFUL ENTRY ONTO PRIVATE PROPERTY TO GAIN

INFORMATION ON ACTIVITIES OF SUCH ORGANIZATIONS AS THE

"WEATHERMAN UNDERGROUND"

THESE INVESTIGATIONS OF THE BUREAU USURP THE HEADLINES

AND THE NEWS CASTS, CROWDING OFF REPORTS OF THE BUREAU'S

CONTINUING SUCCESSES, THIS IS A REGRETTABLY INEVITABLE PART

OF A FREE PRESS. AS ONE COMMENTATOR HAS PUT IT, "MISDEEDS

ARE NEWS; GOOD DEEDS ARE NOT. "

NW 55267 DocId: 32989833 Page 238

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## Page 239

NW 55267

- 6=

LET ME PUT THESE INVESTIGATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE AND

TELL SOMETHING OF THE OTHER SIDE OF THE STORY: THIS IS

CLEARLY A PERIOD OF CHANGE FOR THE BUREAU. ONE MAN HEADED

THE FBI FOR ALMOST HALF A CENTURY, HOOVER HEADED THE

• BUREAU FOR 48 YEARS -- 1924-1972. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES,

ANY ORGANIZATION RUNS THE RISK OF BECOMING SET IN ITS WAYS,

AND SOME DISRUPTIONS ARE BOUND TO OCCUR WHEN THE LEADERSHIP

CHANGES.. IN THE CASE OF THE FBI, THE CHANGE OCCURRED AT A

PARTICULARLY BAD TIME IN OUR NATIONAL HISTORY, COMING AS IT

DID IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE VIETNAM WAR WHILE SOCIAL TENSIONS

WERE STILL HIGH. MR.. HOOVER WAS FOLLOWED IN SHORT SUCCESSION

BY MR. L. PATRICK GRAY, THEN WILLIAM RUCKELSHAUS THEN

MR. CLARENCE KELLEY, THE FORMER KANSAS CITY POLICY CHIEF

HO NOW HEADS THE BUREAU.

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## Page 240

-7-

DURING THE LAST YEARS OF MR. HOOVER"S CAREER, THE

BUREAU WAS CALLED UPON TO RESPOND TO UNPRECEDENTED DOMESTIC

DISRUPTIONS. TERRORIST BOMBINGS AND HIJACKING BECAME A

WAY OF LIFE IN THIS COUNTRY, I AM CERTAIN THAT MANY

AMERICANS RECALL THE ACTIVITIES OF THE WEATHERMAN UNDERGROUND

FOR EXAMPLE. THIS ORGANIZATION HAS CLAIMED CREDIT FOR

OVER 30 BOMBINGS SINCE 1970, INCLUDING THE U. S. CAPITOL

BUILDING, THE PENTAGON AND THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUILDING

IN WASHINGTON; D.C.

BUT DESPITE THE HEADLINES AND THE LEADERSHIP CHANGES,

LET US NOT FORGET THAT AS OF THE END OF FISCAL 1976, THE

BUREAU HAD SOME 19,990 MEN AND WOMEN ON ITS PAYROLL.

NW 55267 DocId: 32989833 Page 240

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## Page 241

- 8-

OF THIS NUMBER, 8,619 ARE DESIGNATED SPECIAL AGENTS. BOTH

THE AGENTS AND SUPPORT STAFF, RENOWNED FOR THEIR SPECIALIZED

TRAINING, HAVE SHOWN A GREAT LOYALTY TO THE BUREAU DESPITE

THE PUBLIC CRITICISM PRESENTLY DIRECTED AT IT, SOME 48%

OF THE AGENTS AND NEARLY 20% OF THE SUPPORT PERSONNEL, FOR

EXAMPLE, HAD BEEN EMPLOYED BY THE FBI FOR 10 YEARS OR MORE

AS OF THE END OF THE 1976 FISCAL YEAR.

BY CONTRAST, IT APPEARS THAT THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE

INVOLVED IN ALLEGED WRONGDOING IS RELATIVELY SMALL. NO EXACT

FIGURES ARE AVAILABLE, BUT WE DO KNOW THAT DURING THE 15 YEAR

PERIOD FROM 1956-1971, THE BUREAU HANDLED A TOTAL OF SOME

10. MILLION INVESTIGATIONS.

NW 55267 Docid: 32989833 Page 241

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## Page 242

-9-

OF THIS TOTAL ONLY 2,400 INVOLVED THE DOMESTIC COUNTERINTELLIGENC

PROGRAMS WHICH ARE GENERATING SO MUCH CONTROVERSY, ONE WOULD

HAVE TO CONCLUDE THAT A RELATIVELY MINUTE PORTION OF THE

BUREAU'S RESOURCES WAS DEVOTED TO THESE ACTIVITIES.

WHAT I AM TRYING TO SAY AT THIS POINT IS THAT ASSUMING

ALL THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN ACCUSED OR ARE UNDER INVESTIGATION

ARE GUILTY--TECHNICALLY OR OTHERWISE--OF VIOLATING LAWS OF

THE UNITED STATES AND HAMPERING THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, IT

WOULD BE MOST UNFORTUNATE IF SUCH QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL

ACTIVITIES CAUSED AMERICANS TO LOSE CONFIDENCE IN THE

ACTIVITIES OF THE BUREAU.

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IF THIS NECESSARY CONFIDENCE IS FURTHER ERODED, OUR

NATION MAY EXPERIENCE IRRETRIEVABLE DAMAGE FOR MANY DECADES

TO COME. SO I HOPE THOSE WHO WOULD CRITICIZE THE ACTIVITIES

OF THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN ACCUSED DO SO WITHOUT SMEARING THE

WHOLE BUREAU, BECAUSE THE BUREAU CONTINUES TO PROVIDE AN

IMPORTANT SERVICE TO THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES.

OUR COMPLEX, COMPUTER_ORIENTED SOCIETY. HAS CREATED

THE POTENTIAL FOR ENORMOUSLY SUBTLE AND COMPLEX TYPES OF

CRIMINAL ACTIVITY, AND THE BUREAU HAS BEEN CHANGING TO

MEET THESE NEEDS. THE GOOD WORK OF THE BUREAU MAY HAVE

BEEN BLURRED IN THE MIDST OF THE PRESENT CONTROVERSY, THUS,

UNFORTUNATELY, MOST AMERICANS ARE PROBABLY NOT FULLY AWARE

OF THE PRESENT RESPONSIBILITIES AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE BUREAU.

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SO, IF I MAY, I WOULD LIKE TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO

PUT FORTH SOME OF THE NEW OR LESSER KNOWN ROLES THE BUREAU

PLAYS.

ITEM: THE BUREAU HAS ADOPTED A POLICY OF QUALITY

VERSUS QUANTITY IN ITS• INVESTIGATIONS. FOR EXAMPLE,

CONVICTIONS OF SUBJECTS IN FBI CASES REACHED 17,544 DURING

THE FISCAL YEAR 1976, A SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE OF NEAR

11% OVER FISCAL 1975 TOTAL OF 15,750. SURPRISINGLY, THIS

RISE WAS ACHIEVED DESPITE AN OVERALL REDUCTION OF NEARLY

20% IN THE NUMBER OF INVESTIGATIVE MATTERS INITIATED.

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ITEM: THE BUREAU'S DRIVE AGAINST ORGANIZED CRIME

RESULTED IN SOME 1,300 CONVICTIONS LAST FISCAL YEAR, AND

AN ADDITIONAL 1,400 ORGANIZED CRIME FIGURES WERE IN VARIOUS

STAGES OF PROSECUTION AS THE FISCAL YEAR DREW TO A CLOSE.

RECOVERIES AND CONFISCATIONS APPROACHED. AN UNPRECEDENTED

$7,000,000. HAWAII LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS SHOULD BE

PARTICULARLY AWARE OF THIS ASPECT OF THE FBI'S ACTIVITY.

IT WAS JUST OCTOVER 11TH OF LAST YEAR THAT THE BUREAU

PARTICIPATED IN A DRIVE AGAINST AN $11,000,000 PER YEAR

GAMBLING OPERATION CONDUCTED ON THE ISLANDS OF OAHU, KAUAI

AND HAWAII WHICH RESULTED IN THE SEIZURE. OF BOOK-MAKING

RECORDS, GAMBLING PARAPHERNALIA, $68,000 IN CASH, AND 23

WEAPONS.

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ITEM: THE BUREAU HAS NOW GIVEN HIGH PRIORITY TO. THE

INVESTIGATION OF WHITE COLLAR CRIMES. CHARACTERISTICALLY,

THIS IS AN AREA OF EMPHASIS THAT DOES NOT RECEIVE A GREAT

DEAL OF PUBLICITY, PERHAPS BECAUSE OF THE ABSENCE OF VIOLENCE.

WHITE COLLAR CRIMES INVOLVE SUCH THINGS AS DECEIT, DECEPTION,

• CORRUPTION, CONCEALMENT, BREACH OF TRUST AND SUBTERFUGE.

INCLUDED ARE SUCH OFFENSES AS BANK FRAUD AND EMBEZZLEMENT,

BRIBERY, ANTI-TRUST AND FEDERAL HOUSING VIOLATIONS. IN TERMS

OF FINANCIAL LOSSES AND IN INVESTIGATIVE TIME REQUIRED, BANK

FRAUDS AND EMBEZZLEMENT POSE A GREATER PROBLEM THAN BANK

ROBBERIES, AS AN EXAMPLE, LAST YEAR VIOLATIONS OF THE

FEDERAL BANK ROBBERY AND INCIDENTAL CRIMES STATUTES HIT

A RECORD SHATTERING TOTAL OF OVER 5,000 VIOLATIONS.

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IN CONTRAST TO THIS, THE BUREAU DURING THE SAME PERIOD

INVESTIGATED OVER 10,000 CASES INVOLVING WHITE COLLAR. TYPE

VIOLATIONS RELATING TO FEDERALLY INSURED FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.

THE SHORTAGES IN THESE CASES EXCEED 188,7 MILLION DOLLARS,

FOUR TIMES AS MUCH AS TAKEN IN BANK ROBBERIES!

ITEM: THE BUREAU PROVIDES A VARIETY OF COOPERATIVE

SERVICES TO LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES. JUST AS AN

EXAMPLE, 43,521 REQUESTS WERE RECEIVED BY THE FBI LABORATORY

FOR EXAMINATION OF 306,630 SPECIMENS DURING THE LAST

FISCAL YEAR. FINGERPRINT CARDS POUR INTO THE BUREAU AT

THE RATE OF MORE THAN 20,000 CARDS DURING EVERY WORKING DAY.

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ANOTHER COOPERATIVE SERVICE OF PARTICULAR INTEREST TO

LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS IS THE BUREAU'S POLICE

TRAINING PROGRAM. LAST FISCAL YEAR, MORE THAN 8,000 LAW

ENFORCEMENT PERSONS TRAINED AT THE FBI'S ACADEMY AT QUANTICO,

VIRGINIA, RECEIVING TRAINING IN SUCH THINGS AS ORGANIZED

CRIME INVESTIGATION, ACCOUNTING, HOSTAGE NEGOTIATIONS, AND

GAMBLING TECHNOLOGY,

THE STATISTICS COULD GO ON AND ON. I HOPE THAT I HAVE

SAID ENOUGH TO MAKE MY POINT THAT DESPITE THE UPHEAVALS WHICH

THE BUREAU HAS EXPERIENCED, IT REMAINS AN EFFECTIVE LAM

ENFORCEMENT ORGANIZATION WITH A STABLE, HIGHLY TRAINED AND

LOYAL STAFF.

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AT THE SAME TIME, IT HAS BEEN ABLE TO EXPAND INTO NEW

INVESTIGATIVE FIELDS, SUCH AS THOSE ASSOCIATED WITH WHITE

COLLAR CRIME. WHILE SOME HOUSE CLEANING IS IN ORDER,

THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE BUREAU IS SOUND. IF THERE IS

TO BE CRITICISM OF THIS LONG-RENOWNED ORGANIZATION, LET US

MAKE SURE THAT IT IS LIMITED TO AREAS OF LEGITIMATE CONCERN

AND THAT WE GIVE DUE SUPPORT AND RECOGNITION TO THE DEDICATED

MEN AND WOMEN--THE VAST MAJORITY WITHIN THE BUREAU--WHO HAVE

SERVED LOYALLY IN THE HIGHEST TRADITION OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE.

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OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C.

20535

STATEMENT OF

CLARENCE M. KELLEY

DIRECTOR

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

BEFORE THE

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

SEPTEMBER 22, 1976

1- she

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866-2894

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46-2894-34.

SEARCHED..

SEP 2 4 1976

FBI - SEATTLE

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Today marks my first appearance before the Senate

Select Committee on Intelligence.

I want to assure you that

I sincerely welcome the opportunity to work with you.

I believe that we can and must develop a clear

base of understanding between the Executive and Legislative

Branches on the proper role of the FBI in the discharge of

its complex national security responsibilities.

As the Supreme Court so aptly observed in its

Keith Decision in 1972, "Unless Government safeguards its

own capacity to function and to preserve the security of its

people, society itself could become so disordered that all

rights

and liberties would be endangered."

Yet the maintenance of national security is a

hollow victory unless it can be achieved with the least

possible intrusion into the rights and privacy of our citizens.

Balancing these imperatives will require the greatest study

and serious thought.

Together, I feel we can reach a meaningful understanding

which will best serve our country.

Since I became Director in 1973, there has been a

continuous examination of all major aspects of the FBI's

operations. One

such study, initiated in 1974, established

that a quality, rather than a caseload quantity, approach in

the assignment of our manpower and other resources would

produce better results.

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Originally, this quality approach was tried on an

experimental basis in four of our 59 field divisions. It

proved so successful that we implemented it field-wide in 1975.

Today, the quality approach is being applied to all

areas of jurisdiction, including those in the foreign

intelligence and domestic security fields that are of prime

interest to this Committee.

In July, 1973, we had 21,414 domestic security cases.

By March 31, 1976, before the Attorney General's guidelines

took effect, we had--through application of the quality

approach--reduced this caseload to 4,868 investigative matters,

a 78 percent reduction. As of September 20, 1976, this figure

has been further reduced to 626. This includes investigations

of 78 organizations and 548 individuals.

This reduction has been made possible largely because

we have discontinued investigations of rank and file members.

We are confident that the FBI can meet its responsibilities

by focusing our investigations on the activities of organ-

izations and on individuais who are in a policy-making position

in those organizations or who have engaged in activities which

indicate they are likely to use force or violence in violation

of Federal law.

In effecting this reduction, we have kept these

vital principles in mind:

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First, there must be no

sacrifice or compromise

of the essential security needs of the United States.

Second, there must be the least possible intrusion

on the rights and privacy of our citizens, including

their sacred right of legitimate dissent.

Third, although domestic security cases differ in

some respects from ordinary criminal investigations,

these cases should be tied as closely as possible to

actual or potential violations of Federal law. In

furtherance of this objective, last month I transferred

the supervision of all domestic security cases from our

Intelligence Division to our General Investigative

Division, which has responsibility over criminal matters.

In an effort to insure uniform adherence to the

guidelines and laws applicable to these and all other areas

of our jurisdiction, I have combined the Office of Planning

and Evaluation and the Inspection Division. In this new

Division I have created a Professional Responsibility Section.

It will report directly to me.

I have also expanded the role of the Legal Counsel

Division in reviewing all areas of FBI policies and operations.

Legal Counsel will report directly to me and to the Associate

Director.

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The investigations transferred include those

involving domestic organizations oriented toward violence

and individuals affiliated with such groups,

as well as civil

unrest and demonstration matters and basic revolutionary

groups dedicated to the overthrow of the Government.

The

General Investigative Division will also be responsible for

several categories of criminal investigations formerly

administered by the Intelligence Division. These are

bombing

/ matters, sabotage, passport and visa violations,

and protection of foreign officials and official guests

of the United States.

The guidelines which the Attorney General issued

last March set forth standards and procedures for domestic

security investigations. But, the FBI regards these to be

minimum standards. FBI Headquarters has imposed stringent

criteria to insure we use our manpower resources in the most

productive manner.

There are a number of reasons why we have been able

to bring about a major reduction in our domestic security

caseload.

The decade of the 1960's was marked by protests,

often violent, on our Nation's

streets and campuses.

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We entered the 1970s still engaged in an undeclared

conflict in Vietnam which was unpopular with some segments

of our population. Not in recent history had this country been

so divided over an issue, and this division was not limited

to rhetoric but included demonstrations that often erupted

into violence.

There were deliberate criminal acts, including

bombings and sabotage, by persons opposed to our involvement

in Vietnam. The role of the FBI in this confrontation was

clearly to thwart the efforts of those who resorted to

violence as an expression of their opposition.

With the cessation of the Vietnam War in early 1973,

a major cause for divisiveness in this country was eliminated, and

the potential for violence was lessened, but not eliminated.

The FBI began closing thousands of investigations

at that time as determinations were made that certain groups

and individuals no longer were engaged in activities that

were likely to involve violations

of Federal law.

The FBI met the unusual challenges of the 1960s and

early 1970s. The Senate Select Committee has examined these

and other problems in the intelligence field which led

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to the creation of this Oversight Committee; and as the

Committee is aware, the FBI fully cooperated in that review.

You have my absolute assurance that your Committee

will receive the same full cooperation in carrying out its

responsibilities under Senate Resolution 400.

One of the tasks confronting this Committee is the

formulation of a legislative charter defining the FBI's

jurisdiction in the domestic security and intelligence fields.

This will be a most precise and demanding undertaking.

As I remarked to Senator Church's Committee, the

legislative charter must be sufficiently flexible that it does

not stifle the FBI's effectiveness in combating the high

incidence of crime and violence across the United States.

The charter must clearly address the demonstrated problems

of the past; yet, it must amoly recognize the fact that times

change and so also do the nature and thrust of our criminal

and subversive challenges.

The fact that the Department of Justice has

undertaken the formulation of operational guidelines governing

this area of our activities does not in any manner diminish

the need for legislation. The responsibility for conferring

jurisdiction resides with the Congress.

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