Agency: JCS
Originator: OSD
Document date: 03/21/1962
Document type: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

## Page 1

Date

Page

08/04/98

1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY

RECORD

NUMBER

RECORDS

SERIES

AGENCY FILE

NUMBER

JCS

202-10001-10173

FOIA SERIES

DOC 174

Released

under the John

F. Kennedy

hasassination Necord.

Collection Act of 1992

144 USC 2107 Notel.

Case#:NW 54214 Date:

09-13-2017

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR

OSD

FROM

TO

TITLE

DATE : 03/21/62

PAGES

: 9

SUBJECTS

: MONGOOSE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION

I : TOP SECRET

RESTRICTIONS : 1B

CURRENT STATUS

RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW

: 07/30/98

OPENING CRITERIA

COMMENTS : Bracketed portions withheld by Joint Staff.

by CIA, State,

OSD.

Reviewed

EXEMPT PER E.O. 13526

SEC 3.3(b) 5QxS

MAR

2016

DATE EXEMPTED:

JS RE-REVIEW DATE: 31 TEL 243>

CLAYTO RELEASE AS TREDATEO WICIA CONCURRENICE

NO JOINT STAFF OBJECTION.

TO DECLASCIFICATION

RI HUMICS GONGUARENCE OF

-MAR

→ 2016

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

HH 54214 DocId: 32424904

Page 1

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## Page 2

• 21 March 1552

The Department of State has no objection to the

release or declassification of this document in'full

under the provisions of the JFK Assassination Records

Collection Act of 1992 (PL102-526)

Reviewed on

30/48 10p.

821104

37 MOR.155

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

AS AN

23 JUNE98 MilL

OSO: NO OBJECTION

25 JUN98

HH 54214

DocId: 32424904 Page 2

HENCRANDUM POR RECORD:

Following are the minutes of the caribbean Survey Group

held in the National Operations Room 23 913, 21 larch 1552.

114

Foilowing was the attendance at the seeting:

The Attorney General

Mr. Hand

I's.

G1lpatr1c

Gen Lansdale

tir.

Helas

Gen Craig

Harvey

Col Patchell

Pir. Goodwin

Mr. Ryan.

At "en Lansdale's request, fir. Harvey opened the meeting by

ElVIng a general operational status report. Fe discussed tears,

ete., In some detall, Indicating thatthe aissions of tre teams

was Intelligence collection, controls and the development of

latent resistant areas. The quallty of the Opa Locka Interrogatic

Center - reports have been good. 150 are coming in per week on

an average

of possible intelligence reports. Very little of high

level political intelligence has been avallable. However, tremen-

dous amounts of counter-intelligence 1s being received. Informa-

tion on 300 Cuban agents per week, for example. ligthing so far

uncovered in the intelligence area changes the basic conclusions

nade originally by cis; at the outset of this task. However,

con

for the most part, conclusions häio been firned by further 1nform

tion. Generally sabotage 1s decreasing in Cubà. The operational

problems of putting in agents are getting tougher and tougher.

The controls by the Communists in Cuba are getting tighter and

tighter and will slow down the operation. Agents must have

documents, to get docurents you must register, wten you register

the Bloc Informer checks on you periodically. Inis makes 1t

tough to get ration cards. Some few cuban agenis have been comin

In through the Opalocka Center. Mir. Kennedy asled hoir abut the

backlog of refugees - sore 75,000 peopie coning in through Opa

Locha in the Miami area prior to beginning of this operations

intelligence center there. How about a progran to assure that

these 75,000 sourses are exploited. Is. Harvey indicated CiA

had a plan to est this don, to date they have been unable to hit

a bia part or the bachloe, but in cortain spocial cases tave beer.

Ecttino information fron then, that they have a plan for this

and will hardle 1t when they cet the personnel available.

CiGLUEED i:SM. 50S

apP

Doc #

174-

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• 7

1, 22

A's. Kennedy brought up the possibility of using Indigration

Departaent people, especially the broader patrol types dho car.

speak: Spanish. MI. Gilpatile indicated that Senator l'art's

Coilttee has recommended an additionüa sereoning Center tor

cubans, possibly in the ley Orleans area.

his. Kennedy aslied CIA what the vote

üld ba in Dubs as

betrieen the Cagtro and the anti-Castro

Kennedy asked what

are the chances of kidrapping sone of tie key people of the

1,2

Communist regine?

Gen Crale was asted to report on DOs participation.

He

CIrst discussed CIA support In general, that during the first

phase of the operation, DoD's prinary role could be to support

State-CIA and US.. in the Intelligence gathering these and in

the Interim period to be prepared at a moment's notico to Inter-

vene in Cuba to prevent a Fungarian tom cuerather or to exploit

any possible opportunities that night occurs

The results of the

eraluation of the risk

prolved In USAP sheep-dipped crews and

w1th sanitived aircraft naking supply drops to agents and to

Cuban guerrilla

las discussed

The A1r Force's general con-

clusions were read to the Gulpmith the Indication that operatio:

Instially would possibly be much more successrui dua" those In.

the latter phases, Inasnuch as they would be accomplished with

surprise and before the cubans had an opportunity to figure the

nodus operandi, etc., and build up a guard against it. Sub-

sequently, they might produce nore effective counter-actions but

that on-balarce,

megally speaking, such operations had a good

chance of success

the fact that Gen Lelay and the Joint Chiefs

consider this type of operation to involve more of a rist: than

the Avon Park Training Boject for cuban Infiltrees would have

entailed was emphasized

Se sanitizing of 2 alrerart and sacep.

dipping of 2 aircraft crems by the hir Perce was discussed. Tre

assistance by the lavy to CIA 1n 5-all boat amration and 1r •

reneral maritim assistance was digouseed, Avor. Park, suitable

nary commander for gnall boats, the beach

'unner testine, ?T

boats, were discussed as specitic prolee

It has brought cut

that the follerina policy Matiers a-0r.".

ere included

ag

IPS

CHL MING

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1,74

5

Major policy decision that must he rade 1n Er0r1d126

adediate

DiD support to cia: questions co non-attribution

tre artant

to which t's

es and facilities shouid bo wailined dos tre rins

tie exunt to which arned icarog personnel N11l

cuban refugees

be enplogedi

antan Survey Croup projects, to what extent Us

arned forces personal dill ba esployed within the territorial

boundsries of cuba, to what extent over-flights of cuba, lor

purposes

of leaflet drops, resupply and diversion, to what extent

w111 Guantanaino ba usedas a bage far agents, Ilke black rl1she3

and black: broadcasts

what extent will the use of Brit19a, con,

troiled ard other föreignaress for staging areas be pernittedle

• and finally, ihat is the priesliy of speration Mongoose as

pared to other proi-its and operations such as South Vietnam and

Berlin at the currant tira. In the latter cornection, that 1s, the

question of pilority of Morizoogs, 1t vias emphasized to tie Attorne

General that to data ie had not had particular trouble in this

area but that irevitaoly ko rould run into trouble areas, par-

ticularly in revard to logistics ratters, that to date: this had

been handled through the corrend charnels, for example, fen

Decker who had a little trouble in this area in gettire, stockpile:

and supplies aid equipment, 10g13t1c 21ft sor the Arnü led handier

1t by waking decisions through command chernels without designati:

a priority and that the darty to date the preparation and plarain.

rad buen doine foriard sabothly, but chat the time would coma

when the decision would ba sade ag to which would set the artorit:

for example, rouid good, equipaant, ete, carnaried for virtnan an

Dariin and move to stoarpilin, greas to those could they be used

or would

• 1n a. Cuvan operation?, or would Cuba take priority itti ethers

take prlority? "n. Cllpatric Indicated he would like to try to

solve tiis poble at coronas level without referrino 1t to

anyone t1,ha5. to sched shat he be kept incarned of th13

situation as it darolors into a real problen area. Have Col

¡nicht leap me inscund en thie situation go tat ve could 10t

=iaper the ice then the time compa trat

Ten discussed mazetion tines en Plan 31

tien timis. Eirdicated to the Groun

he should do

13:5, Coie: 01a

ID SIO

HH 54214 DocId: 32424904 Page 4

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crane tas currently engaged in rarmal channels aid tarlous

sars includtro grootpillro, redisperitionina, ete. In order

to

rejuce reaction t1a33 a0d were currently taking us a reaction

tue ladder beginnino at d'ainus 13 days and going up to a so

t:at at any partleclar ilme 11 would be sossible to crient the

I'l1tary situation w1th the polltisal situation In terrao!

whether or not the protect ins getting hot. This would perait

u8

to have cruCIAn 18 1t did not 1noolve tipping off the operatis

to go to a d minus 10 cordition, for example, that sonewhere alon:

the spactium in the ladder, there would be apoint at which you

could not so further torards preparation lithout tipping off your

hand or take unacceptable risk, that sa would dissover this point

and have this i1':' ur planning chart prepered for use in the

futura.. In the usartime, Defense was berding all efforts to be

ready on the shortest possible notice effect

to prevent a

hungarian type debacle happening to us in Cubai.

en Craig then coverd the organizations

weffing and nodus

operardi of the maribbean Survey Group working Group of DOD of

JOS and firally battry Irdinted that the first Important mission

undertaren by the group as to develop tito DOD/ICS position as to

the mixtary's stake and proposed role 1n the oustina of the

Consurist regio In Cura. Basically, the polley reflected trat

durin:

Dafense till support State-CIA, If recessary, to the treparatory

puase of operation of longoose in ters ci suppli: trarsportation,

personnel and bares, catablishes the point that the niltary belle:

that the continued existence of the Castro Comunistrorine 1s

incompatible with. the mintrun security requirements of the US

and inakes a point that the mistry could intervene in Cuta withou:

ser'ous offenso to national or vorld rublle cotaton under

cle collarine chase conditions:

Pirat - is a moved in response to a humanitarian rogutracont

to regiore orda=.

Second a 19 11 anneuneed irstant to faint th that de lier?

will sinitran dro:: Cuba to spor do the nei rovernmont adrigod

that the bed the Gandalety to mitten Lan and Onder 11t:011

195292

exT.

HH 54214 DocId: 32424904 Page 5

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asgistance fron the OAs ration.

Iteà- In the operation 15 cuiductiù as guéedgüs

Iöstole and inth succacient force do tudü the Condunist t1oe

¿bility to talio

eftactlic contad-inüshius las reducas to a

It was then expliasiced struntj ly den Craig thiät the

JOS were very apprehensive in regard that the soviets tele

capable of taking u page fion vui uoch and estavis: al overseas

wiltary tess or bases in duia. It would creatly Ircrease our

nationa: vulnerability alid our defalse cost as furces would

have to le dererofud or shifted to neet this threst fron the

" South, that the sovleis tid an option on which they could

¡oraclose at any tire in this ideard. Tiey can tale decigion

to establish a -ilitaiy base in duba at thiela will anú pleasure

with as littie ils if ans cose, thai slicuid dils de cole, 1e,

military vase establiolied by the soviets in cuia before me inter-

vone, ve nould likely be wable to renove that by initiating

lorid far Iii, Consequertiy, ve feel it rardatory lie face the

facto squarely now unú determine as caris as possible shother

we can rid cuba of Communise by covert support of Cubars itthin

and

Cuba. It 10 equally laportant fros logistics pierre murraces

that ie have an caris decision as to whother le decinitoig irtend

to use military sorce if the covest neans call. It ins cophasiied

that in the crent the sovicts foreclose the cation ard retablish

bases in Cuba or accupt cuba as the locitinate acidico or tie larsar

Pact that tittier one as these esto ncaid place run diona tri ard

net facts bearing on the protion and inticauced condiderations

which rouid pestione posittie action indchartoly in not proc-ude

sor the foreseeatle future sue elicination so the conniet regime

since to renove the base meht well triadar wored ten Ill.

is, Goodnin indicated to the croup that the time I cherroses

in regard to the cordttlino amer which we could 20 faritiot

causing too much midle consterration and condemnation, and to

DECE ROC

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No JeS

objection

HH 54214

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a political judgment. I Indicated that this was a political-

military judgment, there das no doubt about 15 but thai it

certainly did Involve the Defense and ulS respons1b1litles,

Inasnuch as NSAM No. 55 published last June, the President had

Intorred the Joint Chleis of Staff that he considered tien to

more than nilitary men and should advise hin on such raiters.

when it Involved the security of the United States, that the

JOint Clefs o1 Stail felt obligated to so advise the President.

ihen I made this statenent tir. Kennedy Indicated to the effect

that this was correct, that it was the responsibllity of the JCS

to make recommendations oi this nature.

Mr. Goodwin did not pursue the matter further at this tire.

Mr. Goodwin then queried me in regard to the reactions capabiliti

of the US forces in other countries of iatin Aerica, that if such.

a requirement occurred while we were enzaged in Cuba, this seemed

to be the general tarust of his queries. I indicated to hin that

Gen @'liara was currently comfing up with estirates based on US

reaction for 2 countries to be selected by him in the Caribbean

area. Each one to have plans for a company size unit and a batti

group size unit. fir. Gilpatric then profased to say at this time

that it was the intent of defens

that the ó - 130s renain in t

the Panama Canal Zone to give this capability a quick reaction

fir. Goodwin then was requested to give a briefing on the Stat

situation 1n rejard to tila Caribbean Survey Group. He cegan by

saging thee was no proof of cuban inflitrations into oüner count

of Latin Aurica of Cuban exportation of beapons and guerrillas

and Communisis iros duva to other Latin Ararican countries. He

indicated so las we have been unabli to get any evidence to the

effect that this was being done. Mi. leanedy questioned is.

Goodwin closely on this sleet asline why he could not find

evidence then we knew this to be a fact. in. Goodwin said tia:

everythina possible was being done to turn up this evidence but

without success. Er, iennedy then guarded him as to what kand

of pocale more norine on inig dor jtate, No, lulna intercodid i:

say that it was quustionaule whether distro vas taking such actic.

to the catono no usdd to take thon cut that he fait this trideroy

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## Page 8

to export communisa by nay of guerrillas, arms, etc., lad been

temporarily played in the leir key that CIA 100 had trouble 11

turring up positive evidence since 1t had been unable to do 8o

to date. ir. Goodiln added that sany allegations had been sade

against Castro but no proof of Cuban asgression had been proven

as yet. He indicated the proof of 1t would be a distinet asset

to us at this time. He then said the US should probe harder for

splitting the leadership 1n Cuba. Raul Castro, for example, 13 a

good possibility. We need a way to set next to this man. Ir.

Goodirin then said that there were overtones throughout the us that

the US was planning an invasion of Cubs, that this vas detrimental

,to our relationships world-wide. Mr. Gilpatric and ir. lenredy

Indicated that no natter what was being done, there would be rumors

to this effect and such overtones would be voiced

about the country

that 1t was possibly because we were nearing the anniversary of the

Burpy Road operation. It. Goodrin said the cuban Revolutionary Cou

regaresentative was in lashington and wanted reassurance that the

US planned Eir .help Cuba. Mr. Goodwin indicated that sympathy for

Cuba 1s gaining ground, •ha mentioned Guaterala and Argentina as

examples there Cubans had succeeded & temporary gain in public

opinion and propaganda. Mr. Kennedy then

asked Mr. vrzirin what

the prospects were for the future and Mr. Goodwin said that the

prospects for the next 2 or 3 years are terrible.

Mr. Goodwin Indicated that one of the items on tonorrow's

agenda for the Special Group would be discussion of tractors for

prisoners in Cuba, Ir. Helms brought out the fact that cambero

of congress had been opposed to this and before anything has done

In regard to speriding US noney in this was, congress must be

checked, since they had expressed a desire to be brought into the

picture before such a project was laid on.

15. Goodwin irdicated that the Pist Auto-stive Cempany tas

Indicated to castro that they would provide his with tro tractors

reeded for $10,000,000, no doin paymont, tan jears to pay. so

sar castro had not accopted this crica.

1r. Gilpatrig who left at unis time, Indicated that he

would be out of toin fron Friday, 23 larch, until 1 April. Tan

IS GRES

WW 54214 DocId:32424904 Page 8

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Taylor would also be out of town. He Indicated I should de31

w1th t'r. Melamara 1f anythine cone up 1n the maantine regulaing

Del secretary's sildanse.

Forever, he said i has free to bring

up anything tomorror mornine, 22 larch, that I culd 11ka 20r 11-

were

to handle before he left. I Indicated there ras several cutstand

Ing pieces of business which I would l1k9 to get his approval on

and signature before he left and arrarged that I nould net him

at 10000, 22 March, In his office. He indicated also he would 11

to have the risk. gaper ready to be referred to the Special Group

on 22 March. I indicated this could be done since JS had alread

approved 1t and 1t was ready for his signature and reference to

Gen Lansdale.

Nr. Ryan of USIA then pregented the follorinz Irio-ratlor.

IIct that agency. They are Increaging the Cuban coverage in

radio to 3 hours a day. No direct jamming has yet been experienc

and tendency to edge in on wave lengths beirg used has been

noticed. He mentioned the refugee children as being a 5ood

propagarda p?ss1b1l1ty, one which me should exploit. There are

8000 children being sirt out of cuba 1n order to avold the Comun

Indoctrination and the hard times canarienced In Cuba non. Th1s

should be exploited. Their conle books are beiny prepared: targe

being the fact that Communiam 18 the enemy of religion. Another

Idea 1s the fact that the Communists have taken over the Pavana

University. This 1s being propagandized.

Another project 13 the defector situation, which USIN 1s

pushing through television coverage. In. Pyan added that US :1ll

be flayed and criticized no matter what she does in this ares in

Latin Anerica, but we should get going kith a counter-fores opera-

t107 to counter such critician. The US seens to tara a built in

resistance 1n Latin Anarica. Peopie just naturally do not 11ks

the US, as far as their verbal renetion to our setions. Thos

consider she US an accreasor verbally. It 13 propor to coiticine

the lis in this area. Horever, a counter-torce con help.

Kost

inten Anericans reallee that the up must do something about Cuis

but thols first reaction, nevertheless, will bole lie do engthing

about, cuba to criticles tha l'S, this 1s the taraor dû due buset.

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Gen ialiscale Indicäied that tie should exploit the elotional

possibilities of the ê000 tuber. children mentioned de l'SIA.

Following comments rade by li. nobert Kennedy: The work

Involved in the last 2 months has helped us to develop the problem

we are up agarst in Cuba, lie non fairly well uidercuird the

steps lie must taie in the future, sone of these steps we do not

11ke but nevertheless, they are inevitable. It is not concelvable

at this time to call for invasion of US forces in Cuja, lonever,

this sumer, fall and neit year ray change all this. in this

Irst phase, ke sust find out the situation in cuua aid maybe

take stops bejord that. lelon more now and ve are teeping our

selves inforaed. lie know what we can do, we bron what 1s required.

It 1s not i1ke the situation was last pril with regard to our

preparedness. The President and his chief advisors consider this

the highest priosity project in the Government. A serious situa-

tIon has been existing in Cuba for several years and it vill bet no:

karaful. The President 1s nost anxious we be aula to do something

about this to change 1t. Gen Lansdale'a leadersip in this project

has puahed forward. Fou are making progress, doing good work.

There is a possisillty that the Beilin ard South last situation

would have an impact on devalopuents in cuba. "d mict le ready

to exploit any change that occurs for us. All of this dork and

effort 1s essential and the President keeps an appraisal on 1t

alost on a dally basis. Tha President is prepared to do "hatever

has to be done, we must use our l-agination. lin. Hennedy expressed

complete satisfaction with the Group working on tre project nor

with Gen Cralg, lis. Harvey and Mr. Heles. He did not mention

antone else repusenting otier departaants, le need push more

effort, iragiration. He feels the Group 18 up with

tho Task

he urged for us toüs on and he indicated in wouid be vutshing

is closaly

On

e daliy basis to see lion we are doing and to help

us if rested.

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