A REVIEW OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE LITERATURE, 1975-1992.
Agency: CIA
Originator: CIA
To: CLEVELAND C. CRAM
Document date: 5/1/92
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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TITLE : A REVIEW OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE LITERATURE,

1975-1992.

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NOSENKO

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DRAFT

May 1992

A REVIEW OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE LITERATURE.

By Cleveland C. Cram

1975 - 1992

NOTE: Final version will have proper

page breaks, etc.

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Introduction

The Year 1974 was a watershed in literature about the

Retorte

prior to that time there had been yet few books

critical of the Agency and they had been by outsiders,

usually professional journalists such as Wise and Ross.

Most books had been Ather neutral or even positive,

especially those written by former Agency officials such as

Allen Dulles and Lyman Kirkpatrick. But in 1974

disgruntled former Agency employee, Philip Agee, published

his highly critical book, Inside the Company: CIA Diary.

He was followed by others in quick succession: J. B. Smith,

John Stockwell, Victor Marchetti (with J. D. Marks), and R.

w. McGehee--placing highly confidential information in the

ublic domain.,

that Mise au thoms usually made their disclosures

about subjectsVof which they had special knowledge fr

interest, but the cumulative effect was to breach the walls

That

of confidentiality which had protected Agency operations and

personnel. Although the net effect was damaging, especially

in the case of Agee where his efforts were directed at

revealing the identities of officers

serving abroad under

cover, this general scatter shot approach, while

distressing, did not reveal information about the most

sensitive operations, namely, those directed

against the

main target--the Soviet Union and its intelligence organs.

In the mid-seventies this changed with the publication

of a series of magazine articles authored mainly by Edward

J. Epstein, a New York writer, which culminated with the

publication of his book in 1978 called Legend. The

articles, but especially the book, publicized for the first

time a series of clashes within the Agency fboth the CI

staff and the soviet Divisions concerning the bona fides of

a defector from the KGB named Yuriy Nosenko. Epstein's

articles and his book contained so much detailed information

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ABI.

v.

about sensitive operations by the CIA and the FBI that it

was generally agreed Epstein had a willing and knowledgeable

source, either a serving officer (which was thought

doubtful) or a retired person ofla sufficiently senior

position that he had wide knowledge of operations against

the soviet, target both overseas and in the "u.s."

Although

ringing

stat

from

about 1978 onward Epstein admitted

on occasion he spoke

with James Angleton, the retired former Chief of the CI

but

Staff,

he never admitted Angleton was his source. In fact,

Epstein, wisely perhaps, never sourced his articles nor his

book, leaving the reader in the dark as to how he came upon

such rare nuggets of sensitive information. Then in 1988,

with Angleton dead, Epstein in

a new book called Deception

admitted that from 1977 onward he had obtained large amounts

of highly classified information from Angleton; N.S. Miler,

Tennent H. Bagley and others who shared Angleton's

beliefs.

дрі

When Angleton

was dismissed by

DCI William Colby in

late 1974, he had no thought of what he would do in his

indefit

retirement. For the following six months he spent part of

his time at Langley, assisting the new CI Staff by

introducing them to such persons as his defector friend,

Anatole Golitsyn. After a few months it became clear to

Angleton that he really had been dismissed and his future

with CIA was finished. The whole matter was a terrible.

blow; he became embittered and at first withdrew into

alcohol. But quite

soon people began

to seek him out and he

began to formulate some ideas about the future.

As he got

more attention from media people, he began

to cultivate a

method of playing them off one against another, planting an

idea here and there amongst them. He changed his luncheon

venue from a local restaurant to the more politically

congenial atmosphere of the Army-Navy club.

one. idea

Angleton developed i as to fam

developa counterattack on the

Agency and, in particular, the new CI Staff by which he

would prove they wrongs their new approach and indict them

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for negligence of duty. This task was given to his loyal

aide, N.S. Miler. Miler took on the job but found he was

his own researcher as well as secretary. Foreseeing a dim

future of virtual servitude, he took his family and withdrew

to remote New Mexico.

Angleton's activities in this period, while not

neglecting the idea of KGB penetration, focused more

immediately on his strong belief in the threat from the KGB

of deception and disinformation. To support this thesis he

continually raised the issue of Nosenko. It Was an idea hurl

thât caught fire amongst some of his supporters

and led to a

sort of cottage industry in which many academics and think

tank specialists propagated the theory. Oddly, however,

Angleton's allies in Great Britain took a different line.

There they concentrated on KGB penetration largely because

events threw up some exceptional examples, such

sir

Anthony Blunt.

Because of the so-called Cambridge "Ring of

Five," public attention

was more easily caught by the idea

of moles in Her Majesty's government. This eventually led

to much embarrassment for the Thatcher government,

culminating in the "Spycatcher" trial in Australia in 1986.

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endeavor, Angleton was on surer ground.

For starters, he

had the support of the large number of

FBI retirees as well

as many from CIA. This was the period when the Pike and

church committees in the Congress were in full cry and a

number of ex-intelligence people who believed Congress had

gone too far were rallying a defense. (David Phillips was

also starting the Association of Former Intelligence

officers.) The drive by Angleton was very successful; over

$600,000 was raised and six months after its founding SIF

was reported to have more than 17,000 members. Angleton was

made chairman with his friends in senior positions.

But

yers soon after, the US Attorney General decided not to

pursue the prosecution of the FBI men and the reason for SIF

moxe or less evaporated. Movever, Angleton converted it

into a forum by which he spread information about what he

saw as various forms of Soviet deception

and it continued

into the next decade until, after Angelton's death and the

coming of glasnost, it withered away.

NBR

The publication of Legend in 1978 provided

enormous

stimulus to the deception idea by suggesting the Soviet

defector, Yuriy Nosenko, had been sent by the KGB to provide

a cover story for Oswald. Epstein had made

a small

reputation with an earlier book on the Warren Commission

called Inquest, which was generally well received because it

pointed out some obvious inadequacies in the Warren

commission report. In Legend, Epstein wrote what in effect

were two books: one focused on Oswald's Marine career in

Japan, his time in Russia and then his return to America,

while the second portrayed Nosenko as playing a key role in

a major KGB deception operation intended to provide cover

for Oswald (and the Soviet government) as well as to negate

the effects of Golitsyn's revelations. As so much

classified information could only have come from a person or

persons with intimate knowledge of the Nosenko case, blame

for the leakage naturally focused on Angleton and his

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supporters. It came as no surprise when ten years later

(and after Angleton's death). Epstein admitted his sources

to

have been Angleton, Bagley, Miler, and other supporters.

Despite some negative reviews such as George Lardner's in

The Washington Post, which denounced the book as

"essentially dishonest," the book sold well and was very

important in spreading Angleton's ideas of a super KGB

manipulating American society and politics via its

sophisticated deception apparatus.

The theme of Legend is extended in a novel which

appeared in 1980 called The Spike by Arnaud

de Borchgrave

and Robert Moss. De Borchgrave, soon to be editor of the

new Washington Times and Moss, then editor of "The Blue

Economist," were close friends and admirers of Angleton,

whose conspiracy theories largely jibed with their own.

Moss had been spreading bogus Angleton propaganda in his

sheet for some time, an example being his claim Golitsyn had

provided the lead to Philby. This caught the eye of then

DCI Turner, who inquired of the CI Staff. The latter

replied from solid knowledge that Golitsyn could only be

credited for

an assist on Vassal and none

on Philby or

Blunt.

NBI

The low quality and general crudeness of theme in The

Spike exceeds that even of the Latham novel. Briefly, it

told the story of

a young liberal taken in by leftists who

came to realize his error thanks to timely guidance received

from an elderly former CIA counterintelligence officer who

had been fired by a Director obviously acting on the

Kremlin's directions. Moscow's secret designs are revealed

by a KGB high level defector whose escape is managed by MI-6

because the CIA is so penetrated it could not be trusted

with the mission. The KGB defector then uncovers the Soviet

agents in the White House, CIA and elsewhere and the wise

old counterintelligence chief, obviously meant to be

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but instead he lend it impetus by suggesting the Mounties

consult Golitsyn. That sealed Bennett's doom and brought

his dismissal from the service although no substantial

evidence existed against him and he passed his polygraph

tests.. The case tore the Mounties apart and furthermore

gave ammunition to those who arguedly.

the security service

should be removed from the RCMP. Within a few years Canada

had a civilian security service. Sawatsky's book drew

considerable attention in Canada but little in America.

NBAS

In 1988, one year after Angleton's death, Epstein

produced his book called Deception. In the years between

Legend and Deception Epstein had become something

of a

specialist on the subject of soviet disinformation and

deception. These twin subjects, along with "active

measures" (to which they are related), much occupied a

number of scholars

and writers during the 1980s. In this

they were assisted by the testimony of several

Soviet

defectors, including the indefatigable Golitsyn who added

his own volume to the field called New Lies for old, whose

turgid prose had to be endlessly rewritten before it was

rendered readable.

Epstein's book Deception, like its predecessor, is

really in two parts. The second part in which he describes

various deceptions practiced through the centuries can be

ignored as it says nothing new. It is the first 105 pages

that are of interest, wherein he repeats the old theories

about Nosenko, and then in the section "Acknowledgments"

names all his sources for the years past: Angleton, Bagley,

Miler, Sullivan, etc. He also indicates in this part that

his informants understood clearly they were providing him

with classified information. It is an astonishing set of

revelations.

It is difficult to avoid the feeling that this

book is Epstein's last hurrah, at least in the world of

intelligence. He senses with glasnost the days of the

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various reasons, it remains a highly restricted issue.

Despite this minor misconception, for which the author

cannot be blamed, the wise book is otherwise factually

correct and is another cautionary tale management should

bear in mind.

NBIR

Legend: The Secret world of Lee Harvey Oswald by Edward

Jay Epstein; The Reader's Digest Press/McGraw-Hill Book

Company (New York, N.Y.), 1978--382 pages

epstein is a to bright and able writer who took his

MA at Cornell and his doctorate in government

at

Harvard

(1972). He had made a name for himself with his book

Inquest: The Warren Commission and the Establishment of

Iruth, done as his master's thesis at Cornell. As one of

the first serious works to expose the shortcomings of the

Commission, it sold well and made Epstein momentarily well

known. Epstein became aware of the Nosenko case through the

Reader's Digest, from which he became acquainted with James

Angleton. Their association flourished and Angleton became

Epstein's major source on Nosenko and the issues surrounding

him. Eventually The Reader's Digest sponsored Epstein's

research to the tune of $500,000. The book was a best

seller, projecting Epstein into the forefront of those who

were popular exponents of the ideas of Angleton.

Following

the publication of Legend, Epstein wrote numerous articles

for New York magazine, Commentary,

and

other publications,

mostly--though not always--supportive of the Angleton

theories.

Legend is in fact two books: the first is about

Nosenko and the Angleton belief that he was

part of a KGB

deception operation while the

second

is about

oswald's

service in the Marine Corps in Japan where it is suggested

he acquired information

about the u-z flights flown from the

airfield on which he was stationed as well as his later

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sojourn in the Soviet Union. In brief, Epstein accepted

Angleton's conclusion that "Nosenko was a Soviet

intelligence agent dispatched by the KGB expressly for the

purpose of delivering disinformation to the CIA, FBI and

Warren Commission." In this scheme of things, oswald, the

supposed lone assassin of President Kennedy, likely was

working for the KGB; Nosenko said this was not true, but,

therefore, by the logic in Legend--it is. Oswald the ex-

Marine who defected to the USSR in 1959 and returned three

years later, had been living a "legend," a false biography

concocted for him by the KGB. Amongst these two stories is

a central theme, carefully stated but always present, which

is that. the highest level of the intelligence community, and

certainly the CIA, is penetrated by a "mole" working for the

KGB. Although by

1978 this "mole" had not been found, the

best proof that he existed rested in the assertion of

Nosenko that he knew of no penetration, which contradicted

statements made to the contrary by a "MI. Stone," who proves

to be Anatole Golitsyn. Epstein thus promoted the Angleton

twin beliefs of deception and

penetration by the KGB which

was enshrined in his concept which came to be derisively

fize

called "The Monster Plot.") For CIA officers who wish to

R-IC/2121

learn the full story of the Nosenko case, it is recommended

they read the Fieldhouse/Snowdon study on Nosenko

commissioned by then DCI Casey in 1981.

inclusion

In his source notes, Epstein is quite frank in stating

that his work is based on interviews with Nosenko and

retired CIA officers. He then lists a number including

Gordon Stewart, Admiral Turner, Richard Helms, James

Angleton

and members of his CI Staff, William Sullivan and

Sam Papich of the FBI, and others connected with the

Golitsyn and

Nosenko cases.

Although Epstein is careful to

camouflage his sources by never quoting them verbatim or

it

is

clear that a number of CIA officers had

directly,

provided

an immense amount of classified information to

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Epstein. This was leakage about hitherto most sensitive

Soviet cases on a scale the CIA had not before experienced.

However, because Epstein so cleverly refrained

from pin

point sourcing, It was impossible to say exactly which cIA

and/or FBI officers had leaked what. In 1989 the mystery

was resolved with the publication of a second book by

Epstein called Deception which dealt with the contentious

old cases, including Nosenko and Golitsyn again. But now

with his major source, Angleton, dead, Epstein

revealed

in

detail who his informants had been. This will be reviewed

in detail in the summary on Deception. Although the

presentation of these hitherto highly classified cases

shocked most observers, within a year the entire Nosenko

case was to be revealed to the public in detail via the u.s.

House Select Committee on Assassinations.

Legend sold better than might have been expected, and

the conspiracy buffs found it a welcome addition to the

growing literature on the Kennedy assassination. Many,

however, found the book confusing and its claims extravagant

and unsupported by factual evidence. One of

the chief

critics was George Lardner of The Washington Post who wrote,

"What Epstein has written...is a fascinating, important, and

essentially dishonest book. Fascinating because it offers

new information about oswald, about the KGB, and about the

CIA. Dishonest because it pretends to be objective, because

it is saddled with demonstrative errors and inexcusable

omissions, because it

assumes the KGB always knows what it

is doing while the CIA does not. It is paranoid. It is

naive."

However,

there is no question but that Legend set the

tone for the debate which was to ensue in the media about

the Nosenko affair. It gave the Angleton and Bagley forces

an advantage by putting their argument adroitly if

dishonestly before

the public. It was not until Davia

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DECEPTION: The Invisible War Between the KGB and the CIA by

Edward J. Epstein; Simon and Schuster (New York, N.Y.),

1989--335 pages

It is ironic that Edward J. Epstein should have

published his book called Deception in mid-1989 just as the

Soviet Union was undergoing massive changes, which would by

autumn 1991 result in its total demise. So also has its

major intelligence arm, the KGB, vanished, which according

to Epstein and his principal source, James Angleton, was

responsible

for many mind-boggling feats of deception.

little heralded result of these events has been the

disappearance almost overnight of what once was a burgeoning

cottage industry employing hundreds of academics and self-

appointed experts around in the country in universities and

think tanks devoted to the study of Soviet deception,

disinformation, active measures and subversion. This

already antique fiéld of academic endeavor now has, like

Epstein's book, the smell of attic dust.

becaus

war

This book, rather like its predecessor legend, is

really two books; the first book in 105 pages explains

Angleton's theories developed largely from the defector,

Anatole Golitsyn. The second part--the remainder of the

book--is devoted to various forms of deception.

As this

subject has been better covered in other works!

It is of no

concern

here except to note that one chapter is devoted to

the Soviet defector, Vitali Yurchenko, designated by Epstein

as an obvious KGB provocation similar to Nosenko. Epstein

concludes the book with a long chapter on glasnost, which he

dismisses

as simply

another massive KGB deception.

The most arresting information imparted in Deception is

Epstein's confession regarding his sources for both Legend

and this book.

With Angleton now dead, Epstein apparently

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feels free to admit the former chief of CIA

• counterintelligence was his major source since 1976 when

they first met. It-was Angleton who passed Epstein on to

his assistants, Miler and Rocca, as wall as provialito.

introductions to William Hood (as FBI officers william

Sullivan and Sam Papich. Angleton sent Epstein to Europe to

see Stephen de Mowbray, the former MI-6 officer and a

devoted disciple of Golitsyn, in England and to Tennent

("Pete") Bagley in Belgium. That the latter understood he

was passing on classified information is revealed by

Epstein's amusing description of the clandestine

circumstances under which they met. All down the, years,

Angleton remained a constant and prolific source for

Epstein; the latter showed his appreciation by taking

Angleton

with

him to Israel when he went there in 1982 to do

research on his book about the diamond trade (later

published as The Rise and Fall of Diamonds). Although it

was obvious to most astute observers that Angleton was

leaking classified

information to Epstein and others,

nothing was done to caution him. On the other hand, when it

was agreed Clare E. Petty had been leaking classified

material to the press, he was sent an official warning

find chi, crie

letter by CIA. Thus, in retirement, as when he was a CIA liu

official,, Angleton enjoyed a protected and special status.

In Part One Epstein recites again, as in Legend, the

Angleton belief in the KGB program of deception and

penetration, which

over the years he had absorbed from the

defector Golitsyn and had then embellished further with

special embroidery of his own. These theories came to be

described by Angleton's critics as "The Monster Plot."

As

Epstein never seems to have grasped the real meaning of how

the theory was supposed to have operated, the reader is

advised to read the appropriate section in the CI Staff

official history or the special chapter in the CI Staff

study done by Fieldhouse on the Nosenko ease.

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One of Golitsyn's major claims, made almost immediately

after his defection, was that another defector would soon be

sent by the KGB, as Angleton invariably put it, to

"mutilate" Golitsyn's leads (which

in another oddity of

terminology, Angleton always called "serials"). In 1964

Nosenko detected to the CIA. Angleton, who by

now had

complete. control of Golitsyn, instantly viewed Nosenko as

the predicted plant thereby ensuring that Golitsyn would

maintain his primacy as the CI Staff's resident expert.

When Nosenko did not confess to his role as

false

defector, he was incarcerated for three years under severe

conditions. Epstein blames this action entirely on Soviet

Division management, while portraying the powerful Angelton

as agonizing helplessly on the sidelines.

This rendition is

not only wrong, but patently absurd. Angleton knew all the

legal inquiries concerning such action, was kept informed of

the construction of the prison quarters, and never once

raised an objection. If he had, as Epstein claims,

genuinely opposed Nosenko's imprisonment, one word from

him

to Helms would have been sufficient to stop the program

instantly.

The foregoing is but one of many errors of fact and/or

misinterpretation in this book. Like Legend it is

propaganda for Angleton and is essentially dishonest.

The

errors are too many to document here, but one more example

will give the flavor of this work.

This error tends

to

confirm what an exasperated senior FBI officer wrote to

Director J. Edgar Hoover: "Golitsyn

is not above

fabricating to support his theories." On page 85, Epstein

cites Golitsyn's assertion that, to support the KGB

deception program, it was necessary to divide

Soviet

intelligence into an outer and an inner KGB. Epstein then

explains what Golitsyn allegedly reported about this, but

nothing remotely resembling this can be found in any of

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Golitsyn's debriefings.

It seems likely this fiction was

developed by Golitsyn after his visit to England, when there

is much evidence he began to embroider and fabricate.

The

idea of the two KGBs has never been reported by

any other

Soviet source or defector, including the most senior

defector of modern times, Oleg Gordievsky.

Thus it is

suggested this statement should be treated

with great

reserve. It also suggests that Epstein, who makes

considerable pretensions to scholarship, should have been

more conscientious in checking such stories with

more

responsible sources before labeling them as fact.

11.1c

In summary, this is one of many bad books that appeared

during the period after Angleton's dismissal which were

inspired by him and mostly have no factual

basis. Just as

Angleton gulled the British and Canadians with fake stories

about an alleged highly secret source of his in Moscow who

on occasion produced startling, if mostly historic,

information, so for over fifteen years Angleton and his

cohorts gulled the public via such writers as Epstein with

books like Legend and Deception. It is difficult to believe

that a writer as obviously intelligent as Epstein could

believe the stuff he wrote.

An interview with Epstein in the magazine Vanity Fair

in May 1989 suggests Epstein is having

second thoughts about

Angleton and even about his pet defector, Golitsyn. In the

interview, Epstein admits Angleton's views were shaped by

Golitsyn--but how reliable was he? "Possibly Golitsyn was a

liar," admits Epstein, "but Golitsyn is very interesting

because he is a museum of Angleton's mind. What I believe

happened is that Golitsyn listened to stories Angleton told

him and then repeated

them to British intelligence and vice

versa." This suggests that the great

confidence writers

like Epstein put in Golitsyn is being eroded (witness the

article William Safire wrote in The New York Times after his

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visit with Golitsyn).

And as a result, has Epstein's

confidence in Angleton's veracity been equally eroded? It

appears this may be the

case as Epstein concluded the

interview noted above with the remark:

"Actually, I don't

know whether to believe Angleton at all!"

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• Postscript

Two books concerned with counterintelligence history

have been added to the group reviewed here. They are Robert

Lamphere's The FBI/KGB War: A Special Agent's Story,

published in 1986, and Gordon Brook-Shepherd's The Storm

Birds: Soviet Post-War Defectors, published in 1988.

Although they appeared in the period when many books dealing

with CIA and British counterintelligence issues focused on

the Golitsyn-Nosenko controversy, these two works concern

themselves entirely with providing an historical account of

the counterintelligence benefits flowing

from

defectors and

from such other exceptional events

as a break

into the KGB

cyphers achieved at the end of World War II.

Lamphere's book concentrates on the FBI's work against

the Soviet

intelligence services' operations in the United

States, which although suspected

for some time was proven

beyond doubt with the defection in Canada of Igor Gouzenko

and in America of

Elizabeth Bentley and others who had been

involved in the Soviet spy apparatus. Their astounding

revelations were in turn supplemented by an unusual

accomplishment in the cryptographic field. Lamphere arrived

in the Washington field office around the time the

cryptographic wizard, Meredith Gardner, had achieved

a break into

the KGB cypher system and had the good fortune

to be assigned to the National Security Agency (NSA) as

Gardner's principal FBI liaison. Using the fragmentary but

very valuable information from this breakthrough, Lamphere

participated in uncovering some of the major Soviet

espionage rings then in operation. His work included

dealing with Philby, the

ace spy for the Soviets, as well iv

interrogating the atomic scientist Klaus Fuchs, pursuing

Harry Gold, assisting in the Judith Coplon trial, and many

other memorable cases

of the immediate post-war period.

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series of conflicts with J. Edgar Hoover led to Lamphere's

early

resignation

from the Bureau. His excellent memory was

supplemented by access

to FBI records, and NSA, after

considerable pressure was brought to bear, gave

Lamphere

permission to describe in elementary detail Gardner's

magnificent achievement

against the KGB cypher system. It

is altogether a gripping story well and accurately told.

Brook-Shepherd's excellent history of the post-war

Soviet defectors also benefited from

assistance given the

author by the British intelligence and security services and

the CIA. As a result, he has produced a highly accurate and

complete story about most of the major Soviet defectors

all

of whom but one (Shevchenko) had served with either the KGB

or GRU.

He has eschewed the controversial issues upon which

many of the other

books in this collection are concerned,

although he devotes

a chapter each to Anatole Golitsyn and

Yuri Nosenko.

Each

of these

men is given objective and fair

consideration.

Brook-Shephard's two summaries are probably

the most

accurate evaluation available to the public and go

far to make the

two men and the issues connected with them

comprehensible.

*

* *

These two histories are largely accurate and together

constitute a mine of important information on the early

defectors, both American and Soviet, as well as detail on

later defectors such as Gordievsky, who provided inside

information at critical

periods in history. The two books

also illustrate how

important the defectors were not only

in

helping the Western intelligence and security services but

also in alerting the public to the Soviet threat. Both

books deserve reading by counterintelligence officers.

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The Storm Birds: Soviet Post-War Defectors by Gordon Brook-

Shepherd; Weidenfeld and Nicolson (London), 1988--303 pages

Gordon Brook-Shepherd, a British foreign correspondent

turned historian, has with publication of this book done the

best work of his long career. As intelligence history

dealing with Soviet post-war defectors, it is not only an

exciting read but is factually accurate in almost every

respect. Compressed within its 303 pages is the story of

how the Western intelligence services, largely denied the

possibility of obtaining information from within the Soviet

Union, came to realize the enormous intelligence value of

those soviets who risked their lives to make the leap to

freedom. More importantly, the author has immersed himself

thoroughly in the voluminous detail about the defectors so

that he comprehends the events which influenced the secret

world of intelligence, with the result his judgments are

objective and fair. The author likely achieved this kind of

professional knowledge partly from work on his earlier book,

The Storm Petrels, which recounted the story of pre-war

defectors from the Soviet Union. With this experience plus

generous help from CIA and the British intelligence

services, Brook-Shepherd has written a fascinating account

of how and why so many senior soviet intelligence officials

defected and their impact on the West.

The author deals with his complex subject in

chronological fashion starting with the first post-war

defector, Igor Gouzenko, in Canada. It is difficult today

to comprehend how little knowledge the west, governments as

well as people, possessed about soviet espionage and

subversive activity prior to Gouzenko's defection in

September 1945. This event and the revelations that flowed

from it stunned both statesmen and the public. It had an

enormous effect in America where it was coupled with

defections of Americans such as Flizabeth Bentley, Louis

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