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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA

RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10221

RECORD SERIES : National Security Files:William H. Brubeck

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR :

FROM :

TO :

TITLE : John F. Kennedy document Control Record

DATE : 10/1/1963

PAGES: 7*43

SUBJECTS :

DOCUMENT TYPE :

CLASSIFICATION :

RESTRICTIONS :

CURRENT STATUS :

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 383: Disarmament, 7/63-10/63. Box 4.

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CONSIDERATIONS

INVOLVED IN A SEPARABLE FIRST STAGE

DISARMAMENT AGREEMENT

I October 7.953

I

INTRODUCTION

The discussion within the Administration concerning a Separable Ist

Stage Disarmament Agreement (hereafter referred to as SFSDA) has been unsatisfac-

tory because the parties to the debate have started from divergent positions.

One school has tended to l00k at the problem primarily fron the standpoint

of what appears to be negotiable with the soviets judged primarily in the context

of the Geneva negotiations or, if not negotiable, of what would have favorable

propaganda implications fos the United States.

Another school has become

convinced that none of the Separable lst Stage proposals 50 far suggested are

to the U.S. interest but has tried to accommodate (within the limit that no

such SFSDA be actually agreed to) to the propaganda demands of our situation at

Geneva. A third school has held that the USG should seek out and analyze

the substantive elements of potentially desirable SESDAs, ones the U.S. could

live with, before considering the tactical and propaganda issues of negotiation

(whether at Geneva or in other forums).

This paper endeavors to continue

the evaluations of the latter school. It

deals first with certain basic considerations, second with the four main

substantive elements: strategic systems, conventional forces, tactical systems,

and concurrent political developments and only indirectly with the tactics of

negotiation.

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INTERVALS: NOT AUTOMATICALLY

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II

BASIC CONSIDERATIONS

The fact without which the entire disarmament effort would have

collapsed long ago, is that control and reduction of armaments can benefit

both sides, that it is not entirely a zero sun game. But in part it is a

zero

sum game; what improves the relative position of one side, harms the

relative position of the other. The Soviets will certainly attempt to

optimize their relative position. Not only must we attempt to optimize ours

as an ofiset to their attenot, but also to offset a very real asyumetry in

the position of the two blocs: We proclaim, and are, a defensive alliance;

they proclaim and are an offensive alliance, in which the debate is only as

to the level of violence to be used in pursuing the aims of the alliance.

Our task in devising & SFSDA Is therefore complex. It involves fully ex-

ploiting the potential of the non-zero sum aspects of arms control (those

which benefit both the USSR and ourselves) while preserving or improving

the relative Western position in the zero sum aspects.

Principal U.S. interests are: (1) the maintenance of our ability

to contain Soviet or Chinese expansion; (2) a

reduction in the risk of

nuclear war, either from escalation of undeterred Soviet or Chinese

expansionism under (1) above or in the form of a direct nuclear attack on

the U.S. or 1ts allies, and (3) a reduction in the destructiveness of nuclear

war should it nevertheless occur, and (4) continuation of the prospect that

US (nuclear

and other) forces surviving a nuclear war would be able to ensure

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a settlement of hostilities lavorable to the United States.

Principal Soviet interests are: (1) a reduction in the prospect that the

U.S. might escalate to general nuclear war a local confrontation resulting

from what the Soviet leadership would consider the inevitable expansion

of the area of Communism; (2) a reduction In the prospect that U. S. military

forces surviving a nuclear war would allow the US to dictate terms of

settlement of hostilities and (3) a reduction in the destructiveness of

nuclear war should it nevertheless occur. From the Soviet standpoint very

substantial cold war gains could occur if we failed to preserve our objective

(1) while they succeeded in achieving their objective (1). In such a situation

they could expect a rapid dissolution of NATO and a loosening of the ties

holding together the forces standing in the way of clear Communist domination

of the European-Asia land mass.

They could then concentrate their full effort

on

securing their primacy over their Chinese "partners".

III

THE FOUR SUBSTANTIVE ELEMENTS OF THE PROBLEM

A. The Strategic Nuclear Relationship

1. Present Trends

Projections through 1968 of programmed U.S. strategic forces, on the

one

hand, and NIE estimates of Soviet forces,

on the other, Indicate that

without arms control the U.S. should be able to maintain a 2 to 3-fold

superiority in numbers of intercontinental alert weapons, and a superiority

in the average survivability lactor of those forces. The megatonnage of

the Soviet

strategic forces may, however, come to exceed those

of the U.S.

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forces and under all but the most favorable circumstances the percentage

0f the U.S. population expected to be casualties after a nuclear exchange might

exceed that of the USSR. Under no

foreseeable circumstances, however, could the USSR

even if It struck first, have high confidence in ending the initial exchanges

with a superiority in surviving strategic forces.

In the absence of aims control the U.S. should therefore be able, at

least through 1968, to maintain a very credible deterrent, a deterrent adequate,

not only to protect the U.S. ageinst a premeditated nuclear atteck (Class I

Deterrence), but also to keep low the risks of escalation the Soviets could

prudently face in bringing pressure against Europe or in support of their

pollcy in other areas vital to the

West (Class II Deterrence). The sacrifice

Of this advantage in any SFSDA would have to be weighed against US non-zero

sun and other zero-sum gains.

2. Objectives

In considering the strategic nuclear delivery vehicle part of a SFSDA

the following U.S. objectives come to mind:

a. To reduce the size, weight, and likelihood of success of a

Soviet strike against the US or its allies.

b. While doing so, insure against unacceptable risk to our security,

or to that of our allies, through cheating, Including withholding of un-

declared weapons, clandestine production, or improvement of weapons, and

abrogation with the purpose of gaining a significant time advantage in

rearmament.

Discussion

Il both sides reduce the size and weight of their strategic attack

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capabilities, it should be possible to retain and even enhance Type I Deterrence.

As the strategic forces are brought under control, major instabilities resulting

from the psychology of the arms race should diminish. Decreased concern on

either

side about the survival of its rataliatory force should remove lingering

incentives toward, or fears of, premeditated attack against one another.

The same course could seriously damage Western deterrence in Type II :

situations to the extent it is based on quantitative superiority. Compensations

would have to be sought in arrangements either contained in the disarmament

treaty or pernissible under the treaty. These might involve (1) a full

spectrum of deterrence below the strategic level, and/or (2) capabilities for

deliberate, selective, controlled response.

None of the reductions contemplated would reduce the possible destruct-

Iveness. of an all-out war, if it occurs, even close to the levels known through

World War II. Since it takes relatively lew missiles to target the major cities

on either side, and since substantial fractions of each side's missiles are

tergetted on each other's strategic forces mutually agreed rednetions in

their number could proceed with little effect

on the number of cities which

night be at risk to residual forces. The casualties experienced in any actual

war perhaps would be reduced somewhat because of (1) reduction in collateral

damage with diminished counterforce exchange, and (2) decreased number of

nuclear detonations in any one area resulting from lower damage expectancies

because of smaller force levels. In other words, the number of nuclear hostages

might be better controlled at roughly the level considered necessary for ef-

fective deterrence. The level of prospective own damage (in terms of percentages

of population casualties or of Industrial destruction) at which the USSR would

certainly be deterred is an arguable figure. It is probably higher for the USSR

than for the US.

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3; Other Variables

Importent variables in analyzing the optimim solutions to these objectives

are the assumptions as to the general political contexi including the possible

impact of arms control measures on our turopean allies, the provisions of

other portions of the SFSDA and the degree of inspection which is considered

desirable or negotiable. This paper assumes that a SESDA will not come into

being except after, or concurrently with, a comprehensive test ban agreement, a

comprehensive non-diffusion agreement, some improvement in the Berlin-German

Reunification situation and other points of immediate high risk. The variables

in other parts of the SESDA will be taken up as they appear pertinent. Different

solutions will be proposed fos a high inspection case, a medium inspection case

and a low inspection case.

4. How many?

Some number of permitted U.S. strategic delivery vehicles between

100 and 1000, should assure the U.S. a high order of counter city, Class I

Daterrence, provided the number permitted the Soviets were smaller or, at

least, no greater,

Iet us assume no controls over Ant1-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Systems,

Do control over civil defense programs, no control over nuclear materials or

warheads and a low level of permitted inspection. At the upper range of the

suggested numerical limit, say 1000 weapons, It should still be possible

for us to create a mix of super-hardened, dispersed, large, multiple-warhead

missiles, plus Polaris submarines plus dispersed or air-borne planes with

improved air-to-surface missiles which would be able adequately to survive any

• conceivable Soviet attack. Such a Soviet attack must be assumed to include the

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permitted Soviet vehicles, plus vehicles which could escape detection plus

vehicles which could be produced and deployed during any time gap in rearmament

by clandestine Soviet preperation for abrogation.

Us forces should be able to

survive in sufficient volume to penetrate to at least 50 Soviet cities with

sufficient weight to wreak very great destruction on these cities and cause

casualties of at least 10% of the soviet population.

Such a solution would not, however, make any substantial contribution

to the objective stated in III A 2 a. above of significantly reducing the

possible size and weight of a Soviet attack below what is now projected

without a SFSDA.

The USSR could theoretically opt for missiles of 100 MI

or larger size up to its full permitted number il only numbers are to be

limited. Within any plausible ratio of Soviet numbers to US numbers, say 50%

of the US permitted figure, the weight of & Soviet attack could be virtually

totally devastating. Therefore, more complex solutions must be

considered.

Two measures which would greatly increase the certainty of effective

US retaliation within lower numbers would be measures prohibiting the deploy-

ment of ABM Systems or prohibiting the construction of elaborate civil defense

shelters. (Of these two categories prohibition of ABM Systems would have less.

problems since it is psychologically more difficult for a nation to deny its

citizens the basic individual security of civil defense.)

Both of these measures

could be reasonably well monitored through unilateral surveillance and intel-

ligence.

The cost of a strategically significant ABM system would be of the

order of magnitude of at least 10 to 20 billion dollars. A significant shelter

construction program would also be costly. Both would probably be necessary sub-

startially to reduce the destruction and casualties to be expected even from two or

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three hundred multiple-warhead weapons on target.

No such large scale programs

could be clandestinely executed.

Il one did not have to

be concerned with substantial AEM and civil defense

programs, it would be possible to assure unacceptable damage without hardened

multiple or multi-negaton warheads. 150 one-megaton warheads (of say 500 lbs

weight) on target would certainly be able to demolish the fifty leading

industrial and population centers of the USSR and leave a reserve for contin-

gencies.

Soviet

cities are, of course, only one part of the target structure as

presently understood. Other main components, and their implications for

disarmament, are as follows:

The Soviet Nuclear Threat. In present war plars, Soviet bombers

and missiles and their supporting bases are the highest priority class of

tsrgets. If strategic forces are stabilized at anything approaching parity,

counterforce targetting probably will be less and less remunerative. Depending

on vulnerability of the opposing forces, some reduction of enemy capabilities

may continue to be attractive as a first-strike objective; but the level of

reduction achieved probably. could not be decisive. To make strategic bases

less compelling second-strike targets, missile refire or bomber recycle capa-

b121ties might be controlled.

D. Other Military Capabilities. Certain tactical airfields and general

military targets in Europe are now targetted by SAC. These could just as well

be covered by European theater

forces, If survivable weapons systems were

provided SACEUR, A consistent set of categories would have to be corstructed for

the disarmament agreement in order to prevent strategic force limitations from

Injuring the position of NATO vis-a-vis the Warsaw Pact countries.

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The conclusion here seems to be that, provided theater forces are

considered separately, one altemative would be to relate the number of strategic

weapons more or less directly to the urban-industrial (second-strike retaliatory)

target structure.

What number of permitted strategic delivery vehicles, then, would be necessary

to assure the ability to detonate 150 warheads on target? The answer is a

function of the

survivability of the vehicles and their reliability. If one

assumes a reliability of .66 lin other words, two out of three surviving

vehicles could be expected to reach target with adequate accuracy), we would

then have a requirement that 225 of our vehicles be able to survive acy counter-

force attack the Soviets could aspire to mount with (a) their permitted vehicles,

(b) vehicles not declared, vehicles clandestinely produced, and vehicles con-

verted from civil aircraft, etc., and (c) vehicles produced during any time gap

achieved by preparation for hostile abrogation. No precise computation of the

starting number of U.S. vehicles required is possible; too many variables are

involved. 500 vehicles would, however, not seem to be an unreasonable figure.

If both sides were limited to pernitted dellvery vehicles with a lifting

capacity sufficient only for one megaton warheads, a fantastic improvement in

present day standards of accuracy and reliability would be needed to give the

Soviets confidence in taking out one of our hardened missiles without devoting

at least three to the task. (A 1 MT weapon with a CEP Of ¼ NM would have 72%

chance of severely damaging a 400 PSI S11o). Il a method coula be devised to

limit guidance systems to a CEP no less than one mile at inter-continentel range,

they would have to devote about 30 missiles to take out one of ours. In any case,

such of our missiles as were in Polaris submarines at sea would be comparatively

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invulnerable to this form of attack, as would air-to-surface nissiles in air-borne

alert aircraft. Moreover, in the evolution oi weapons mixes under any such agree-

ment the US might make major shifts away Irom hardened, fixed strategic missiles

in favor of mobile land end sea based types.

The magnitude of effort required to supplement the permitted system with

covert delivery means sufficient for a counter-force attack erfective against the

opposing strategic delivery system (considered as a whole) seems so great as to make

the attempt haraly worthwhile. Even if one were to assume a clandestine force as

large as the permitted force, and a force created during the time gap alter

hostile abrogation of equal size again, this would give the Soviets only a three

fold superiority in numbers which, assuming present day reliability and accuracy

factors, would not be adequate to assure a high level of destruction even of the

fixed base portion of our permitted systems. Future improvements could, of course,

change this estimate.

In sumary, it appears that something of the order of 500 permitted vehieles

would be adequate to protect against the risks of deception provided, (a) ARM

systems were prohibited, (b) major civil defense shelter construction were

prohibited, and (c) the lift capacity of permitted systems were limited to one

megaton warheads, (a) no great improvement in accuracy to the order of ¼ NM CEP, i

were in prospect.

The most sensitive varlable in arriving at this judgment is that CEPs of

less than a 1,000 It. at inter-continental range will not be within the state of

the art until the 1970's.

Thought should be given to prohibitions

and controls

over terminal guidance, etc., designed to make such super accuracy impossible.

The increasing yield and decreasing CEP of the attacking weapon can be offset

to a degree by hardening the target.

5. Larger and Smaller Yields

It is generally agreed that

a very.

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easy to control, is a launching facility for an Inter-continental missile.

It cannot, however, be demonstrated that 1i mould be impossible, assuming the

necessary effort, to conceal individual launchers.

That it would be possible

to hide hundreds of such launch facilities becomes less credible.

Io check on the lift (payload) capacity of a system is nore difficult;

the necessary assurance world probably require on-site inspection or the vehicle.

Io check on the accuracy of the system will be still nore difficult.

It would require: 1) mitual observation of strategic missile test firings

of the other side to observe accuracy plus sufficient inspection of emplaced

missiles to be sure they were the same design as those tested; 2) construction

of strategic delivery vehicles by a third state (e.g. Sweden) for both sides;

0r 3) other radical inspection procedures.

There has therefore been a tendency, in considering SESDA's to

concentrate on number of launch vehicles rather than on yield or accuracy.

With sufficient yeld, accuracy and reliability, 1t 1s possible to approach a

one-for-one kill probability against

even super-hardened dispersed launch

sites.

With multiple, guided warheads it might at some future time be possible to

reduce the exchange-ratio to less than unity, but this is not within reach of

present technology. Furthermore, the destructiveness of even 50 100-megaton

warheads is such as to fail to meet the

objective 1n III A 2A, while less than

a hundred permitted delivery vehicles would seem to present fer too great a risk

of successful elimination through counterforce or covert attack. Control

over super-weapons, therefore, seems indicated. One possible alternative

would be to prohibit all intercontinental land-based missile launching

facilities, relying solely upon sea or airborne vehicles. But 25,000 lb. warheads

can also be carried by plane and probably sub-based missiles coula be devised

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to launch such weights. Substantial inadequacies therefore would appear to

inhere in any SISDA which provides only for control over nunbers of lunch

vehicles.

If controls over lift capacity and accuracy are to be included in a

SESDA, then the question becomes pertinent as to wether limitation of war-

head weight and yield below one megaton might not be advisable. Against most

Soviet unprotected industrial and population centers, 100 KT would be adequate

for destruction; againsi large Industrial areas such as Moscow end Leningrad,

5 to 8 such weapons would be adequate. An adequate

surviving U.S. deterrent

force of 100 KI delivery systems, therefore, might be 300-350 as opposed to

the 225 one-megaton vehicles suggested in the previous section. If the Soviets

are similarly limited to 100 IT weapons, the number of weapons they would have

to allocate to insure killing one of ours would be three times that necessary

with one-megaton weapons. No significant increase above 500 in the permitted

number of delivery vehicles would therefore seem required even if lift

capacity is limited to 100 KI warheads (say 150 Ibs.)• A crucial question,

however, is whether the weight carrying capacity of a given system can be

accurately enough controlled to guard against substantial deviations in the

vield of warhead which could be delivered.. All existing ICBM systems would

have to be scrapped and new ones meeting precise criteria substituted. The

closer

both sides come to the practical limits of improvement of yield-to-

reight ratios, the more feasible weight limitations would be since the margin

for clandestine yield/weight improvements would be narrowed.

6. Other Possible Controls

In the above light, a suggestion worth exploring is the prohibition of

all inter-continental delivery systems except for submarine-based missiles.

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This could be coupled with limitations on the number, size, range and deploy-

ment of such submarines and missiles. Let us assure that each side is limited

to 100 missile-carrying subnarines, each submarine being limited to four launch

tubes capable of lifting & 200 Ibs. warhead 2,500 miles, with no weight allowance

fos inflight course correction equipment. Peacetime deployment of these submarines

within 3,000 miles of the other's territory would be prohibited and monitored.

There might also be a limitation on the number and

range of attack submarines and

a prohibition against deep

sea mining. Under such an arrangement it is aifficult

to see how a counterforce attack would be conceivable. (An alternative woula be

to limit all intercontinental missiles to hardened land-based sites. The 1 MI

jield limitation would make a counterforce attack extremely unlikely. The need

for monitoring submarine deployments would be unnecessary and the expense would

be less:)

The principal difficulty with such arrangements is that the principle of

a mix of retaliatory systems is sacrificed. It may be that this difficulty is

less than that of allowing a mix of systems, some of which, particularly bombers,

seem to be inherently uncontrollable as to precise small scale lift capability.

A further possible control is over nuclear materials and warheads. As will

be seen, later, some such controls may be required in the tactical nuclear field.

The confidence which one can have in such controls is not, however, adequate to

give much assistance in the strategic field where the number of warheads is small

and the amount of fissionable material required to produce major changes in

capabilities insignificant. It would be reasonable to back up controls over

numbers, lift capacity, accuracy, range, etc. with production controls to guard

against clandestine Improvement in numbers or characteristics. The elaborateness

required in controls over production would vary with the sensitivity of the ar-

rangements to detect cheating.

7. Optimum Solutions Varying with

the Degree of Inspection which can be

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a. Low Inspection

On site inspection is probably not required to control an

agreenent prohibiting the deployment of All systems, or an elaborate shelter

construction program. It also would be difficult clandestinely to deploy

large numbers of intercontinental missiles with large weight lifting capacity.

Clandestine production and deployment of large numbers of submarines or heavy

bombers would also appear difficult.

Il little o2-site inspection can be negotiated, weight yield,

range and accuracy limitations would be imossible. Nubers limitation, which

would not be critically upset from a counterforce viewpoint by clandestine

deployment of several hundred weapons, would be possible.

If ABM and substantial

shelter construction are prohibited, numbers approximating 500 would seem

appropriate. If there is no prohibition on AM's and shelter construction,

numbers approximating 1,000 would seem appropriate. Particularly in the latter

case, we would have to assume the Soviets would be striving for large yield,

hardened multiple warheads, etc., etc. We would therefore have to compete

strenuously in the same direction as well as deploying an ABM system and

engaging in a substantial shelter construction

program.

In either of these cases the Class II Deterrent effect of our

strategic nuclear capability would be small and would be seen to be

small by our allies. There would be no credibility in our adopting a counter-

force strategy and a city-busting strategy would be clearly and totally ruinous.

The

same would apply equally to the Soviet Union. The correlation of forces in

the conventional and tactical nuclear fields would then become even more

significant to both sides.

b.. Medium Inspection

If it were possible to negotiate a declaration of retained and

replacement delivery vehicles, plus periodic inspection of such vehicles, plus

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a reasonable program oi random inspections to provide a check against clandes-

tine production or deployment, a nore useful arrangement should be possible.

In addition to prohibition of ABM systems, and shelter construction

and a limitation on numbers, it would then be possible to control weight lifting

capacity, range, and possible accuracy 1f observation of test firings or

physical inspection of miesiles were permitted. Whereas under a above, there

could be no assurance by either side that the other mould not build un to a

megatonnage in excess of 10 or 20 thousand, under this alternative one could

have reasonable assurance that megatonnage of permitted systems could be kept

below

one thousand for each side and could perhaps be reduced below one

hundred.

With no control over nuclear materials, warhead production or

warhead stockpiles, there would, however, always be the threat of the deploy-

ment of large weapons in ships, civil air craft, etc. While such deployment

would be unlikely to have significant counter-force potentials, It would

continue as an unsettling and suspicion arousing possibility.

c. Optimum solutions with high degree of inspection

If In addition to the controls suggested under b ebove, it were

possible to negotiate controls over nuclear materials, warhead production, and

warhead stockpiles, further possibilities of designing a system maximizing

the non-zero sum advantages to both sides might, over time, become possible.

There seems to be no scientific way in which one could have high confidence that

nuclear materials or warheads had not been secreted in some remote or subtly

concealed storage area, in magnitudes perhaps as great as ten or twenty per cent

of existing Soviet stockpiles. Security in the United States is not such that we

could have confidence in executing such an operation ourselves. It is possible,

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should the soviet leaders desire to do so, that ways could be found to give us

confiderce that they also were no longer in a position to do so. Iransitional

arrangements would undoubtealy be necessary to cover the period during which

such confidence was being established. Even such transitional steps would,

however, seem useful in getting on toward the objectives stated In III A 2 a.

A possible transitional step wight permit stockpiles of warneads

sulficient to supply the permitted systems with a reserve, plus concinuously

inspected additional stochpiles in some state of remoteness fron delivery

systems or in some stage of incomplete fabrication so that there would be a

time delay in their availability sufficient to make them useless in a counter-

force role, but short enough to make clandestine withholding or concealment

of little value to the other side.

8. Relationship of control among strategic, conventional, and

tactical systens

a. General

Control over strategic weapons increases the importance of tactical

nuclear weapons to deterrence of the use of conventional forces while at the

same time the problem of control in the tactical nuclear and conventional force

area get more complicated.

b. Strategic and Tactical Nuclear Systems

In surveying the controls of strategic nuclear weapons, which

have been discussed under the low, medium, and high inspection cases, it

becomes apparent that the more stringent the limits and controls under this

category of weapons, the greater would be the degree of control required over

tactical nuclear forces. The reason for this correlation is that the more

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stringent the limits and controls over strategic weapons the greater would be

the pay-oif to a potential aggressor in "pocket bactleship" developments within

the tactical category. Moreover, the more stringent the limits over strategic

weapons,

the more destabilizing would be the disparities in tactical nuclear

weapons which would be possible without controls.

c. Relationship of Convertional to Nuclear Forces

The greater the degree of control over strategic and tactical

nuclear forces, the greater the importance of conventional forces and

therefore the greater the need for controls over these conventional forces

which would assure that negotiated balances are not violated. The history

of cenventional arms races needs no recounting. The achievement of agreements

for controls over nuclear weapons is most likely to be observed if both sides

are able to achieve a non-zero sum agreement on their conventional forces which

achieves

certain political objectives for each. (This in turn implies a degree

of political settlement which will be discussed later).

B. Conventional Weapons

1. Area Considerations

a. NATO-Warsaw Pact Relationship

This is the key area of the world. The vital interests of both blocs

confront here. For that reason it is here that it is most difficult and most

important to achieve a non-zero sum settlement. Until the political environment

has changed appreciably (such as might eventuate if FEC integration continues

or if the European satellites achieve significant disorientation from the USSR)

the best hope for a balance of conventional forces in this area is a limited

rapproachment and disengagement as part of a broader arms control package.. For

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exarcole, should the U.S. give up its preponderance of strategic weapons with

Its concomitant Class II deterrence, the USSR IRB™ threat to Furope would have

to be eliminated, aña some conventional balance would have to be

negotiated. This coulê not be a simple numerical, parityi. Te interior,

continental

lines along which the USSR lorces operate (as opposed to the sea lanes over

which the U.S. must support Furope) are an advantage which would reguire

compensation in a stable settlement. This might be achieved by permitting

appropriately larger NATO land forces in Europe, than the Warsaw nations would

be allowed to have West of the Bug River or west of a Leningrad-Swolensk-Odessa

line. Alternatively, a formula might be worked out which allowed the NATO

powers to continue to have larger tactical air forces while the Warsaw-NATO

nations had parity of land armies within a defined area in Europe. St1l1

acother alternative, or an added element of security, might be to negate offensive

opportunities for conventional forces by creating a "nuclearized" zone -- a

jointly planted, jointly policed, jointly controlled ADM zone, half of which

either side could set off at will.. The balance to be sought is that the.

advantage should lie with the defending forces regardless of which side Initiates

the offensive. The higher the controls over the strategic and tactical

nuclear forces, the more critical the European conventional balance becomes.

b. China

Here both superpowers have potential problems.

(1) The U.S. relationship

It is difficult to visualize the lineup of U.S. conventional

forces which could handle the problem of China in Asia. While U.S. seapower

could insure the defense of Japan, Formosa, the Philippines and other

Pacific Islands, and, with land forces, could make a creditable defense 10

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the forean peninsula, the problem of Southeast Asia would have to be net:

a, by depending on superior US conventional airpower

and the manpower of allies;

b) by resort to a retained superiority in tactical nucleer weapons; c) by

Increasing the size of U.S. conventional forces by an amount which night be

difficult to sustain, politically; d) by relinquishing Southeast Asia to the

Chinese Communist (India, with US support, and given adequate Indian notivation

might still be defensible); e) by insisting upon a reduction in the land and

air forces of China. Of these possibilities, the retention of tactical nuclear

weapons seems to be the most feasible alternative for the foreseeable iuture.

2) The USSR relationship

The increasing preoccupation of the Soviet leadership with the

problem of China and the differential in manpower resources give evidence of

a similar need for the USSR to retain tactical nuclear weapons to redress the

potential imbalance in conventional forces.

3) US-USSR Non-Zero Sum

Both superpowers have

a mutual interest not only in redressing

potential manpower imbalances vis-a-vis China, with tactical nuclear

weapons but also would gain advantage by maintaining mechanized land forces of

greatly superior mobility and firepower to the Chinese. The tactical air forces

of the USSR, deployed well eastward to honor & European settlement, and the

Pacific sea forces of the U.S. would be indirectly supporting a common mission.

In many respects. More important, any detente in Europe, with force levels

reduced within European geographical limits, would free land forces from both

sides to be deployed against the threat of China.

over the long haul, the milltary facts of life might persuade the

Chinese Communists to ease their burden by joining in a second generation series

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of aims control measures but this could only come if those measures negotiated

in the first generation had permitted a good margin for containment of China's

aspirations.

4) The Zero Sum Aspect

The great hazard of Comminist China to the U.S. is the poten-

tiality that would exist for the USSR and Chinese Commmists to patch up

ideological differences and jointly concert against U.S. security interests.

c. Middle East-Africa-Iatin America

The conventional forces of these areas are relatively insignificant

in comparison to the forces of the major powers. With the exception of the

Israeli-Arab strife, the peacekeeping record of the overt forces of the nations

of these areas in recent years is a reasonably enlightened one. Within this

framework, a reduction in indigenous forces would be llkely to retain present

pover balances and to free increasing proportions of limited national incomes

for economic improvement. If properly monttored, such reductions should not

increase political instability. Thus, arms control constraints on the con-

ventional forces of the superpowers would have an important relationshiy to

the power balance in these areas. Ideally the reductions to be negotiated

should be calculated to make it less likely that USSR land forces could become

engaged in these areas, thus producing a zero sum advantage to the U. S. in

the

increasing

degree to which these areas would be dependent on sea lines of

communication. A settlement on conventional forces which merely resulted in

European deployment constraints, and which left sizeable forces in the USSR

strategic reserve, would make it possible for the USSR to deploy into the

Middle East or Africa unless the U.S. retained a preponderance of conventional

sea forces and equality of strategic reserve land and conventional air forces.

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a. US-USSR relationships

Beyond the discussion of the US-USSR relationship in Europe, China,

Middle last-Africa-Latin America, there remains to be discussed their respective

capabilities as the heartland bases of conventional weapons and forces.

Given

the achievement of a balanced power situation around these to nuclei, and given

a European mainiand in which the advantage would lie with the defense, che

resulting overell advantage would lie with the US on three counts. First, the

power balance would contribute, by the neutralization of military forces as a

t001 of aggression, to the US strategy of maintenance of a relatively stable."

world order in which orderly changes can occur, and would be in contraposition

to that required for the commist concept of the destruction and reordering of

political patterns. Second, the U.S. for the foreseeable future would retain

the greater industrial carability with which to be able to mass produce to

regain a larger power plateau - conventional or nuclear -- should that become

necessary for such fundamental reasons as Communist abrogation of arms control

agreements or restoration of military cooperation between the USSR and China.

The third reason Lollows.

e. Freedom of the seas

The stability postulated in a lineup of forces along the foregoing

lines, depends on the tying together of the remaining forces of the U.s. and

her allies throughout the world. This binding together of conventional forces

of the Free World, in contrasosition to the retained forces of a potentially

united continental Communisa can only be aflected by insuring the freedom of

the

seas. T'be present preponderance in seapower is a function of superior naval

forces and possession of adequate bases within the sea community of the Free Worla.

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Ams Control settlements which negotiated parity of military seapower as between

the continental landpowes of the USSR and the sea community of the U.S. and NATO

would result in a basic reduction in the relative balance of power by denying

redeployment of the U.S. strategic reserve land forces and denying logistic

support to any point under pressure fran Communist lower order conflict.

This

vital need of the U.S. to setain a preponderance of surface seapower and air power

may sequire us, in equity, to concede the right of the USSR to a ret superiority

of ground forces under suitable deployment constraints. In a world in which the

threat of nuclear war had been tamped down, the power advantage to the US, in

such circumstances, could be considerable, depending upon the relative balance

strick. The extent to which an overall preponderance in Soviet ground forces

could be counter balanced by preponderance of U.S. conventional air and seapower

would require careful calculation and would be difficult to define since two

very different things would have to be balanced. The imbalance must be sufficient

to provide security to the continents of the Western Hemisphere, Africa, and

Australia, but not so great as to prevent the necessary US support of NATO land

armies and occasional support of US allies in South and Southeast Asia.

2. Control Considerations

a. For Tactical, Air. As mentioned earlier, the two superpowers, if they

are to maintain their power positions vis-a-vis Communist China, and other nations,

require superiority over these nations in conventional tactical air forces. This

superiority is one of the vital factors which would make 1t possible for both

the US and USSR to match the conventional land power of Communist China and for

the US to meet cormitments in several areas of the world similtaneously with

small land forces. First, the same vehicles used for conventional tactical air

support are susceptible of use as tactical nuclear delivery vehicles. This

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problem will be discussed in another section but the need of these vehicles

fos conventional power prevents their elimination as the solution to the nuclear

threat.

This dichotomy can

be lessened by deployment constrainis discussed

in

a later section,

The tactical air force requirements lOs NATO in furope are, as elsewhere,

related to the Army levels negotiated. I parity of NATO Warsaw

forces in

Europe, west of the Eus, or if percentage reductions of current. European

force balance were negotiated, NATO would

still require & superiority of tactical

air to counterbalance the inferiority of exierior sea lines of reinforcement

over Soviet landlines of commication. The protection against rapid re-

deployment of USSR tactical air forces from the USSR to Europe would have to

rest on US capability to redeploy rapidly from the US mainland.. This in turn

would require approximate parity of tactical air forces in the two heartlands.

Beyond this, the US would require additional tactical air forces (perhaps

naval air) to maintain a favorable balance of power against the Chinese

Communist threat in the Pacific. This means that the overall balance of tactical

airpower would have to rest with the West:

some superiority in Europe;

equality within the two mainlands (for this purpose the USSR mainland shoula

be defined as USSR east of the line Leningrad-Smolensk-Odessa) and superiority

in the Pacific. This requirement for a favorable balance of tactical air

forces could be legitimized in several ways: 1) by insisting on percentage

reductions in current levels of tactical air forces, including naval air, 2) by

having the European powers provide a large portion of European NATO tactical

air forces, while granting parity of US and Soviet tactical air forces excluding

naval air; 3) by winning acceptance of the right to superior US tactical air

forces as well as sea forces to compensate for superior Soviet land armies.

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b. For Tactical Ais Defense. The stabilizing aspects oi tectical

air defense forces, especially SAMs are: I) these expensive installations

are a protection to the conventional forces of each large power against

the crude nuclear assault of smaller Nth powers; 2) they are stabilizing

to the defense, against surprise attack by air lorces of the other superpower;

3) they would,

to some extent, reduce the advantage one supergomer might gain

by clandestine retention of tactical nuclear weapons for use in tactical air

assault.

The destabilizing aspects are: 1) the superpower which builds

heavy tactical air defenses is in a better position to launch its own air attack

with

• less

concern for enemy retaliation in kind; 2) any allowed superiority

of tactical air is partially negated by opposing air defenses. In this case

stabilizing aspects appear to be controlling. It the US were able to.

negotlate an arrangement which permitted tactical air superiority, substantial

air defenses would still appear to be the desired situation.

c. Manpower. Notwithstanding the fact that the US might have to

be prepared to grant higher manpower levels to the USSR to achieve the

necessary preponderance in other conventional areas, sticky problems of con-

trol would remain.

Within any agreed force levels there would be complicated

problems of definition. We would need to be sure that both sides interpreted

force levels

as applicable to all personnel engaged in agreed military chores.

The use of civilians by one side to increase the virtual effectiveness of the

uniformed personnel could not be unilateral. Similarly, there would have to

be commonality of definition of reserve forces although not necessarily parity.

It force levels were defined in terms of divisional strength there would have

to be some agreed definition of what a division and division slice coula be.

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In the manpower area these problens would require a high degree of

inspection in order to achieve assurance against cheating. With lesser degrees :

of inspection, only very rough manpower controls would appear feasible.

a. Mobility and Firepower. It is necessary for both the US and

USSR to retain a high degree of nobility and fireyower in their conventional

forces if they are to retain their power superiority over other potential rivals.

Yet the equipment which makes this possible represents

a threat to the opposing

superyower by making it possible to overcome, suddenly, deployment constraints.

Furthermore, such equipment is more easily produced clandestinely or cached

than is the case with strategic weapons. The control over these categories of

weapons which is feasible is directly related to the amount of inspection

germitted.. And since it is mobility and firepower which could be most

dangerous during aggression in an arms control environment, the greater the

limitations at the nuclear end of the spectrum of weaponry, the greater the

control we would require over weapons providing conventional mobility and

firepower to insure that negotiated balances are not overcome.

e. Bases. Bases

have correctly been identified by the USSR as

the Achilles heel of the US in arms control negotiations, because of a two-

fold, distinct asymmetry In the US-USSR relationship: 1) As a continental

land power the USSR does not need overseas bases to protect vital national

interests with conventional power; 2) as an aggressive ideology Communism

uses

subversion and indirect aggression rather than the overt forces and

bases required by the more defensive free world. Elimination of US bases in any

overseas area tends to sever that sea lane in the military sense. Under mejor

reductions

of conventional forces of thinning out in an area, some bases

might be given up or reduced in strength but this would have to be the follow

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on of and not the substance of an arms control agreement.. If, subject to the

foregoing, the USSR insisted on a listing of the beses to be liquidated, the

Us should insist on a similar reckoning of bases within the satellite and

Soviet areas which were being rolled up and should require inspection to make

sure that such areas remained, in effect, demilitarized.

I. Deployment. The non-zero sun gains resulting from controls on

deployment are: 1) the two blocs could reduce the extent of the confrontation

in Europe, yet; 2) this could be done without decreasing and even while increas

ing conventional commitments elsewhere. As suggested earlies, overall US

security could be enhanced if a "thin-out" of conventional forces in Europe,

both NATO and Warsaw Pact forces, resulted in a better relative balance for the

West in Europe, an increased strategic reserve of troops in the US, and/or some

greater deployment into the Pacific. II disarmament negotiations developed in

such fashion that an overall reduction in the armed forces were essential to get

an otherwise intelligent agreement, deployment constraints in Europe which per-

mited stability at lover levels there probably would be mandatory. Whatever

the approach, thinning out in Europe would surely require the US to retain super-

iority of tactical air forces and naval forces, together with sufficient airlift

and stockpiling of additional sets of protected division equipment, to provide

rapid response to a major Soviet conventional thrust in Europe.

Deployment constraints might be policed: by a border AIM field;

by construction of a broad commercially useful canal along the border in

the German plains; by stationing of fixed ground post observers at road and

rail junctions and sea and air ports; by exchange of military missions between

NATO and Warsaw headquarters units, and by reciprocal aerial surveillance.

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Other variations of deployment consisaints could be considerea.

It mighü be possible some day, if the satellites continue present political

trends, to negotiate demilitarization oi East Germany in exchange for an

Austro-Fungary type "real-union" of the two Germanies which naistained two

sovereign administrative sysiens and which kept FRG security forces out of the

East Germen territory. Or a denuclearized zone extending a specified distance

on either side of the iron curtain might improve the stability of the conventional

force lineup, provided the zone were not so wide as to prevent stationing of

tactical nuclear weapons in Euorge for rapid re-entry into the zone il required.

A variant which would appear to have marked disadvantages would be to create

a demilitarized zone-shorn of conventional as well as nuclear forces -- on both

sides of the present iron curtain border. In general, for the foreseeable

future,

the West would have greater difficulty in sweeping back into a demilitar-

ized zone with conventional forces than would the USSR, particularly if there.

is a debilitating effect on the NATO allies of a withdrawal of forces to their

homelands.

g. Production Controls. The non-zero sum gains from controls on

production would be: halting the expense and destabilizing effect of the

conventional arms race; while preserving the supericrity of both super-

powers over other possible rivals. Curtailment of expenses and stabilization of

the race could be accomplished by: prohibition of production of all armaments

except agreed categories (such as are in the US GCD Ireaty Outline) in which in-

ventories would have to be reduced by specified amounts; replacement of weapons

on a ose-for-one basis; prohibition of testing and production of new types of

armaments; prohibition of equipping or construction of new production facilities

or expansion of existing ones. Preserving the superiority of the big two requires:

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setting inventories fos these two at a level superior to any combination of

rivals in which one superpower does not join; authorizing one-for-one replace-

ment within category so that old production lines would not have to be re-

started and so that each

side could gradually improve the quality of its force

to the maximm state of the art at the time RaD were halted.

A disadvantage to the US in any reduction of active inventories

Is the superiority of the reserve stocks of corventional Soviet equipment,

especially tanks. To minimize this fact the US should try to negotiate a

corcelation between personnel and inventories on a TO&E basis.

h. Budget Controls. The openness of the US society and the basic

elements of the capitalistic system insure that budgetary control on US defense

spending would be largely effective. In the USSR, the extent of secrecy of its

closed society would present very real inspection obstacles. More significantly,

the artificiality of the UsSR's pricing system, in which unit prices may be set

much lower than actual cost and the shortage made up by overpricing in other

areas, and other "Socialist" strategems could result in grossly higher production

of military hardware than a true budget would permit. This control is therefore

a zero sum disadvantage and should ba avoided unless

it car be effectively

coupled with other controls which are effective.

3 Possible Solutions

ao. Low Inspection. A low inspection case might consist of Soviet

willingness to permit observers to witness bonfires of equipment, declared but

uninspected Inventories and perhaps an exchange of fixed ground observation points.

Under such circumstances the US could place reasonable assurance, using unilateral

Reans, On USSR compliance with controls on: Inventories of tactical air forces,

tactical air defense and surface naval vessels, utilization of bases limited

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confidence could be placed on Soviet compliance iith controls on deployment.

Controls on total manpower, production, and budget would not be high confidence

measures. This would make negotiated reductions in army strength dangerous.

And in view of the need lor the Free World Community to rely on superior air

and sea strength, any reductions in these forces without inspected reductions

in armies, could be dangerous and destabilizing.

b. Medium Inscection.

This case might include (in addition to those

elements o the low inspection case) inspection: of conventional production by

stabioning of resident inspectors in all plants declared to be engaged in final

assembly oi agreed armaments; plus a limited quota of inspections at plants not

so declared, to check againsi clandestine production; plus some areas open to

Inspection by roving USMIM type patrols; plus aerial inspection of all oi Europe,

Western USSR and Eastern US. Under such criteria, and coupled with unilateral

intelligence, the US could place reasonable confidence in controls on tactical

air forces, tactical air defenses, naval forces, utilization of bases, deployment,

and fair confidence in inventories

of conventional army weapons and equipment.

This woula make some reductions in army (and possible naval) strength acceptable

and equivalent reductions in tactical air forces could therefore be risked.

c. High Inspection Case. In this case, to the elements of the two

inspection cases above, we might add: inspection of declared inventories;

stationing of resident inspectors at factories producing sub-assemblies for

finished agreed armaments; a large quota of random inspections at undeclared

factories suspected of clandestine production; relatively unlimited areas open

to roving USMIM type patrols; and unrestricted aerial inspection. Access to

production and budget data night in this case be of additional assistance. Under

this rigorous inspection system the US could safely afford to negotiate major

reductions in and deployment constraints upon all aspects of its conventional

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force, subject to the caveats discussed concerning area and eierior IOC problems.

C. Tactical Nuclear Weapons

1. Context - Discussion of these weapons has to be treated in the light of

a world thich, in order to control the awivl aspects of its strategic weapons,

must arbitrate controls over conventional forces and tactical nuclear weapons:

Consideration of control over tactical nuclear weapons subsumes that there has

been a comprehensive test ban treaty, a non-diffusion pact, some degree oi

control over strategic weapons, and sufficient political settlement between

the superpowers to reduce tension at such pressure points as Laos, Berlin and

Cuba.

The problem of Communist China would be a major factor in such

considerations.

2. General Considerations

a. What Can Contribute to Stability?

The overriding complexity introduced into a SFSDA by the considera-

tion of tactical nuclear weapons is that modern conventional delivery systems

(tactical air, artillery, rockets, mortars etc.) are capable of being nuclearized.

This fact presents the greatest difficulty in constructing suitable controls over

tactical weapons systems except with relatively intense inspection procedures.

It seems necessary to require some degree of control over both the range and

deployment of conventional delivery systems in order to limit the range and

impact area which would be arfected by their surreptitious converstion to nuclear

use.

An important difficulty in the discussion of tactical nuclear

weapons is the sematics problem as to what is meant by a "tactical nuclear system."

As we consider stringent controls over a reduction of what are commonly accepted

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as sirategic weapons, those delivery systems which have cormonly been considered

tactical culd increasingly become the logical instruments of clandestine strategic

surprise attack. Moreover, weapons which might not be considered, even after

reduction in Sivs, to be strategic, by the US, might very well be considered

strategic by our European allies who would see a reduced strategic umbrella

In the US mainland and weo also night see large nunbers of delivery vehicles

in the Eastern Europe capable of reaching Western European targets. It may be

necessany, in order to win allied support for arms control agreements limiting

SDVs, to adopt as the definition of tactical nuclare delivery systems, those

systems wich are capacle of attacking

the urban-industrial complexes of any

Nato-Warsaw

nation from outside of its national boundories.

These factors require consideration both under the strategic weapons

analyses, discussed earlier, and also in this section.

Whatever the resolution of the peculiar sematics question, it

seems basic to the consideration

of the tactical nuclear weapons that the

existence of nuclear warheads capable of being used by traditionally conventional

delivery vehicles is stabilizing in two ways:

(1) Their existence dampens the temptation to imitlade

conventional attack;

(2) They reinforce the overall power of the nuclear nations as

opposed to that of the non-nuclear nations. Here again, the non-zero sum factors

point to a retention of some tactical nuclear karheads. But the zero sun

lactors point toward a controlled situation in which effort is made to limit.

the

runbers of such warheads, and/or the numbers of conventional delivery vehicles

capable of firing then, and/or surprise offensive opportunties.

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bo

Rules or Assumptions. of Engagement and Escalation.

The assumptions as to the use of tactical nuclear warheads would

vary with the numbers retained, and the deployment limitations, range limitat-

ions, etc. of the related delivery systems. Working backwaras Ircm the

assumptions we would choose in seeking an intelligent SESDA, the optimum con-

trols woula be developed. Firsi, for the foreseeable future, it would seem

unnecessary and unwise to plan to use nuclear weapons in an arms controlled

vorld envirorment againsi the nations of Africa, Latin American and the Middle

Best.

second, both

superpowers would undoubtedly want a reserve of tactical

nuclear weapons los possible use against Communist China. Third, it would

appear to be to the advantage of both superpowers to avoid the use of tactical

nuclear weapons in any confrontation between their forces around the periphery,

although, again, geography may make them essential to the West for defensive pur-

poses in certain areas. Fourth, in Europe there is

a special case in which it

nay be to the benefit of both superpowers to retain the capability to use short

range tactical nuclear weapons. The West might have to do so in order to

retain a credible NATO deterrent after opposing strategic lorces have been

brought into a condition of controlled mutual deterrence. The extent to which

this would be necessary would depend on the extent to which a relaxation of inter-

national tensions, under the political settlements that would be necessary to

achieve a SESDA, had occurred. The assumptions as to the use of tactical nuclear

weapors which both sides might accept, then, would be:

(1) Neither would use tactical nuclear weapons against inferior

non-nuclear nations;

(2) Both would be prepared to use such weapons against major

non nuclear powers - i.e, Communist China;

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(3) Both would be prepared to escalate to the use of such weapons

Il attacied, especially in Furope, and perhaps in other areas, depending upon the

political and military situation: obtaining•

Under these assumptions, the problem of control becomes one of work-

ing out ways to minimize the opportunity for the attacker to use tactical

nuclear weapors in an initial suprise attack, while preserving for the defense

tne capability to use tactical nuclear weapons after the atack has begun.

3. Control Considerations - The complexities of this problem are

the oses on which meaning ful disarmament negotiations are most likely to

founder.

a.

Delivery Vehicles

The primary problem with regard to conventional delivery

probler was mentioned above - i.t., the fungibility of delivery neans. Yet,

the need to retain some tactical nuclear weapons capability requires that

there be a meaningful approach to the control of tactical delivery vehicles.

Restated, the problem is to preserve conventional delivery means for the defense,

to hardicap their use as nuclear delivery vehicles in the offense, yet to

retain the possibility of their use for delivery of tactical nuclear weapons

in the defense.

As suggested above, each super yower would need enough delivery

vehicles to remain superior to non nuclear rivals and to deter super power

stack. For use against Communist China's lanü armies and other sargets,

arurait would appear to be optim delivery vehicles. Ideally both sides

would retain sufficient tactical aircraft, configured for tactical nuclear

weapons (say 500), deployed against China, range-limited to prevent surprise

use against the opposing super power, to suit this need. Ideally the tactical

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alterati reserved for conventional air battle in Europe would be estopped, by

cosfiguration and inspection, fron using tactical nuclear weapons. In keeping

with the concept that Europe should be defense-oriented, in addition to a border

AIM sereen, each side might be authorized surficient (say 500) very short

range (say 10 to 50 1m) tacsical missiles in hardened, immobile positions to

be used against an attacker, buc located far enough behind the border that

they could not serve as offensive tactical weapons. Both sides could

be

allowed to determine for themsalves the accuracy and yield restraints they would

place on such missiles siace their warheads would, of course, explode in owa

territory.

This concept of immobile positions for tactical missiles woula

be optimized by an agreement to provide controls over the deployment of

artillery of ranges larger than 30 miles.

Roving inspectors could be used

to assure that all artillery of greater range remained deployed behina lines

several hundred miles either side of the Iron Curtair. This would provide

maximum utility in the use of immobile tactical nuclear missiles against invasion

and, beyond that, artillery for defense in depth or for reinforcement of the

invaded area.

Another real problem with regard to delivery vehicles is the

possibility of use of commercial vehicles with clandestine warheads for surprise

attack. The extent of this threat is

a direct function of the degree of

inspection allowed.

b. Warheads

If the foregcing ideal situation with regard to delivery vehicles

could be negotiated, constraints on warheads would be less of a proclem.

Warhead controls, as a sole constraint, are infeasible.

Both superpowers have

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produced so much material from which such weapons may be fabricated and have

stocipiled so many tactical nuclear warkeads that it would be difficult to

preclude clandestine assembly and use, without controls over delivery vehicles.

This fact, in addition to those cited above, argues for the ratention by both

sides of a reserve of tactical muclear weapons, to denigrate the importance

of clandestine stockpiling by the other side. This reserve (of say 1000

tactical weapons, in audition to the 500 warheads retained for European fixed

tactical missiles) woula have to be deployed

away fron Europe, in the vicinity

of the 500 aircraft deployed by each side for possible use against China.

Il the ideal situation with regard to

a fixed European tactical

missile were not negotiable, then some form of physical separation of

tectical nuclear weapons from tactical aircrait in Furope would have to be

negotiated together with controls on the numbers, range, and yield of mobile

tactical missiles in that theater. This is inherently less stable than the

ideal situation.

c. Fissile Materials

A significant aspect of assurance against clandestine stockpiling:

of tactical nuclear weapons would be the negotiation of a cutoff of production

of fissionable materials. This would have nther non-zero sum factors. It

would

serve to inhibit the opportunity of other nations to acquire nuclear

weapods, if they signed the agreement before they attained a nuclear capability

and provided controls over peaceful uses of nuclear materials were carefully.

monitored. It would also slacken the strategic weapons race. This is an easily

policed control although the great quantities of fissile material already

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produced would leave important loopholes for clandestine stockpiling of war-

heads. One might adâ that in situations where ARM is legitimate, a costraint

on fissile materials (mainly plutonium) would favor the US -- large numbers of

ARM warheads consuming suostantial amounts of Pu would be necessary for an

"effective" AEM deployment, and here the asymetry in stockpiles would favor us:

4.

Possible Solutions

a. Low Inspection Case

This might be the case inwhich the only "ars cort rol" informa-

tion on the tactical nuclear delivery vehicles of the other side would be the

declaration of inventories of tactical weapons (and therefore of the tactical

aircraft which could

sErVE

as potential tactical nuclear delivery vehicles).

To this published accounting, there might be added the occasional information

as to the novement of potential nuclear delivery vehicles, received from

fixed ground post observers.

With this limited control, very little change in the status quo

regarding tactical nuclear weapons would be feasible - although the

degree

risk acceptable in this area would depend on the strategic force relation-

ship and other force relationships which had been negotiated.

b. Medium Inspection Case

This might be the case in which, In addition to the elements of the

low inspection case, the following controls were achieved: inventories of all

tactical delivery vehicles and warheads were declared; occasional random

inspection of geographical areas (Europe and portions of the US and USSR) were

allowed; resident inspection were permitted at factories producing authorized

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replacement tactical nuclear missiles and aircraft.

In this case,

some control over numbers and deployment, but not

over field, would be feasible. The uncertainties would be such as to require

substantial permitted forces. Reduction in numbers might be on a percentage

basis (of tactical aircrait plus tactical missiles) the extent of which (in

the range of 10% to 50%) would depend on the controls on and the relationship

of ratained strategic and conventional forces. Deployment constraints woula

have to be such that NATO's preponderance of tactical aircrait in Europe was

not destroyed. Removal of or reduction of numbers of tactical nuclear missiles

from Eurore could be feasible.

c. High Inspection Case

In this case, to the elements of the other two cases, we might

ada: cutoff of production of fissionable material (which in any event would

have to have been negotiated for strategic weapons to create the kind of

military relationship in which major constraints on tactical nuclear weapons

would be feasible); controls on numbers of warheads in production and stock-

piles; inspection of declared inventories; resident inspectors

at nuclear

reactors; on-site inspection of suspected clandestine production facilities;

"USMLM-type" roving inspection, on a frequent basis, in all of Europe, and

large parts of the US and USSR; and aerial inspection.

In this case, some more significant tactical nuclear arrangement

might be feasible. This could constitute the deployment and number constraints

discussed in III C3. Io achieve the emplaced tactical missile situation in

Europe in which tactical aircraît did not remain a nuclear threat in that area,

inspectors would have to have sufficient access to tactical aircraft to insure

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uhat tactical nuclear weapons were not loaded and sufficient geographical access

to insure that nuclear bonbs were not stored nearby or brought in. In the main-

lands of the USSR (east

01 a leningrad, Smolensi, Cdessa line) and of the US,

tactical airctalt would be subject to different rules. Here, storage of

tactical nuclear bombs in the areas nearby to tactical air bases should be

permitted but subject to the control that observers would be able to note any

deployment of the bomos to the aircrari. Here again, a possible transitional

suep night be to permit stockpiles of warheads surficient to sugply the permitted

systems with

a reserve plus continually inspected additional stockpiles in some

state of remoteness icon delivery systens of in sore state of incomplete

fabrication so that there would be a time delay in their availability sufficient

to make them

useless for surprise attack but short enough to make clandestine

withholding or concealment of little value to the other side.

SHARING OF CONCURRENT FOLITICAL DEVETOFMENTS

L. General.

Renembering that the Commnist bloc is essentially an offensive

alliance while the Free World is a defensive one, the USG must insist on

certain political conditions in conjunction with any major arms control agree-

ment.

Moreover, the USG would have to proceed on the basis that arms control

agreements must not limit US capability to rebuild to and surpass present

armament levels 1f limited political settlements are violated.. Within this

general parameter, the extent to which the US might reduce its arms through

negotiation would be directly related to: the development of political depolar-

ization of the satellites; the threat and extent of the Sino-soviet rift; de-

velopment of effective domestic pressures on the Soviet

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regime for improved standard of living and freedon from fear of war; the extent

to which the offensiva alliance limits its aggression to the sub-limited portion

of the offensive spectrum; and the degree of success which the Free World

experiences in containing that degree of aggression. Arms Conirol agreements

should not be negotiated which would permit the Us to be faced by superior

pover of a re-allied Sino-Soviet bloc or which made possible continuing

conmunist victory in para-military comrontation. In the present time frame,

there are 3 areas of the world in which the pressures of the Communist - Free

World are so critical as to require special mention in connection with arms

control agreements.

2. Southeast Azia

Political developments here, especially in Laos and South Vietnam, have

an important relationshiy to the tactical nuclear and conventional portions

of the arms control spectrm. It is conceivable that the U.S. and the USSR

right acnieve an understanding on controls of strategic weapons without a

resolution of political problems in Southeast Asia. However, It is difficult

to visualize controls at less than the present levels in tactical nuclear and

conventional forces if the Chinese Communists are continuing their direct and

indirect para-military efforts in these regions. One exception could be that

reductions in tactical nuclear and conventional forces in the European area

night result in a net overall reduction for both the U.S. and the USSR rather

than resulting in redeployment against the Chinese Communist.

Iven the achievenent of strategic weapons agreements and certainly the

achievement of agreements in the other two arms control categories would require

satisfaction on the part of the U.S. that the USSR was not cooperating with the

Chinese Communist in the latter's para-military effort in Southeast Asia.

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minimm political reqvirement voon which the US should insist as a prerequisite

to major arms control agreements with the USSR inay of the three categories,

then, would have to be the practical assurance that the USSR had accepted the

steous quo in Southeast Asia.

If the day should come when the Chinese Cormunist were willing to

curtail such para-nilitary efforts, conventional forces and tactical nuclear

forces cuts on

abroader basis could be considered.

3. Cuba

Agreements with the USSR in the strategic weapons category would have to

incorporate

a prohibition against the deployment of such weapons by the USSR

in Cuba, in order to have any possibility of domestic US acceptance. More

important, the achievement

of any major arms control reductions in any category

of forces, would certainly require greater disengagement from Cuba by Soviet

forces than has taken place to date. This is not to say that Castro would have

had to be deposed or that the regime returned to the Western Hemisphere orbit

but merely that USSR forces with the exception of a few scores of military

advisers had been removed. On the other hand, greater likelihood of significant

erms control arrangements would exist if the first major Soviet penetration

of the Western Hemisphere had been repulsed by the elimination of the Castro

regime and severance of the Cuban ties to the USSR. Therefore, US political

efiorts to bring this situation about, provided they are conducted with

sophistication,

are not inconsistent with the arms control negotiations.

4. Berlin and Furope

This pressure point is the most significant of all. Without the agreement

between the two super powers as to the future of Berlin, and indeed, of Germany,

no major political detente is foreseeable and therefore significant arms control

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reductions would be unlikely. The interrelationship of political setilement and

arms control agreements is more readily auparent in this area than any other.

It is particularly important to continue to explore fully with our NAto allies

and the USSR all combinations of political and arms control agreements which

could reduce the dangers of confrontation in Europa.. The achievement of a non

sue settlement, however, in this area is more difficult to foresee

than in any other aspect of US-USSR relations. This means that the break-

througi in the European area may quite likely require a longer welting period

than in any other aspact. It is the long term reorientation of political

relationships --e. go, closer integration in Western Europe and closer

cooperation within the Atlantic Community; greater dis-affiliation within the

Communist satellites; etc. - which offers the best hope for a zero sun

settlement which the USSR would accept. That 1s, it will require a certain

sense of the Inevitability of the development of such political trends in

Europe to penetrate to the Soviet leadership before there will be a willingness

to accept a European settlement also acceptable to the West. Conversely, for

the Us to proceed too rapidly with arms control negotiations could have a

disintegrative effect within the Atlantic community and this in turn could

lead the USSR to exploit arms control negotiations primarily for their

disruptive effect rather than for stabilization and detente.

5.

Reflections

The arms control considerations that have been summarized in this entire

discussion may be considered to be "reduction -- control" at the strategie

end of, the forces spectrun, with primarily "deployment -- use" controls of

one kind or another at the middle and lower ends. of the spectrum . all

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pending the time when political tensions have been resolved enough to make

fuller disarmament possible.

But in a larger perspective the very fact of being able to negotiate

and agree on the rather elaborate arrangements covered in this paper (on

the strategic "reduction" level, and/or the tactical nuclear corventional

force "deployment …'use" level) would imply the achievement of a stage mere

political problems vere in fact being resolved, as regisiered by the

arms control agreements. Whether great pover rivalry is yet quite this

susceptible to amelioration and sublimation - even though the impulse

Ios conmon interest (nos zero sun settlerents) is certainly increasing in the

kind of world we live in - remains noot.

This paper attents to raise the issues, decision on which is necessary

for the conduct of those negotiations required to determine whether that

rivalry can be circurvented. Nothing in this paper should give great

optimism. But the problens delineated should not be a cause for undue

pessimism or abatement of our efforts. The 17 years of apparently.

meaningless propaganda exchanges in the arms control field finally gave birth

to two arms control agreements. The fact that these agreements came about at

a tine when political detente suited the needs of the Soviet leadership

should not obscure the fact that a great body of common language and dogma

in the arms control field made it possible for relatively quick agreement

when the political circumstances were appropriate. A future struggle to

succeed Khrushcher could well result in the seizure of arms control issues

by one of the aspiring lieutenants as a tool for the winning of possible support

necessary to achieve power. Or Increasing problems in the allocation of economic

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resources

or tith the Chinese Conomist could drive the Soviet leadersbig

toward. the acceptance of such packages.

Tre detailed, painstaking, years-

Jong spelling out of the detaile of a nutually acceptable firsi suage agrees

ment with the UssR, to which this docuant attempts to male a contribution;

should continue.

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