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157-10011-10093

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

Date: 10/06/93

Page: 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA

RECORD NUMBER : 157-10011-10093

RECORDS SERIES:

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION

FROM : ROETHE, JAMES, N.

TO : FILE

TITLE :

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW WITH PAPICH, SAM J.

DATE : 03/05/75

PAGES : 18

SUBJECTS :

PAPICH, SAM J. (INTERVIEW)

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION : S

RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED

CURRENT STATUS : P

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/29/93

Ready

to all.

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :

SSCI Box 294, Folder 15

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

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During this period Papich developed a good relationship with Jim Angleton

of Counterintelligence and found that he could work effectively with Angleton.

It the early 1950's the relationship between the two agencies vas probably

the best that it ever got. While some flaps continued to occur, both

agencies seemed to be making an effort to learn the responsibilities and

jurisdiction of the other.

Relationships. Between 1965 and 1970

During the Johnson Administration there was a deterioration or a cut in

the number of projects directed towards the Soviets.

Hoover's desire to

become engaged in extensive counterintelligence work lessened. Many of

the FBI's prograns to identify iliegal aliens attempting to penetrate

the U. S.

Goverment broke down.

hoover became extremely cautious and

conservative in the area of counterintelligence, which greatly disturbed

Papich, who felt strongly about the Soviet threat and who was convinced

that

strong counter-measures were necessary.

For example, Papich tried

to promote consideration for the recruitment of & top-level Soviet official,

as a CIA agent.

This was to be a joint CIA-FBI operation, but it was siapped

down by Hoover.

or ther,

a proposed joint operation invoiving. sensitive

electronic coverage of suspected Soviet lactivittes was rejected.

During 1967 and early 1968 Papich saw no signs from Hoover that the

pro-

grams and projects that Papich felt so necessary would be reinstituted.

Papich was receiving the message that his relationship with Hoover was

coming to an end. Papich was physically and mentally worn out trying to

keep the two agencies working together. In 1968 Papich wrote a polite

letter to Hoover expressing his concern with what was happening in the

area of counterintelligence. He appealed to Hoover to reinitiate some

While Hoover was extremely angry at Papich for writing such a letter, he

Hoover to reinstate programs were of no avail. From that point on, the

relationship between Papich and Hoover chilled and any idea that Papich

brought to Hoover from the CIA concerning joint counterintelligence efforts

was generally rejected and accompanied by a critical remark.

While Papich's 1968 letter had brought no change in Hoover's attitude,

Hoover did keep Papich on as liaison. In the Fall of 1969 Papich con-

fided to his wife that he was

seriously considering retiring in the Spring

of 1970. By the first of the year he realized that his career was effec-

tively at an end and that he could no longer effectively accomplish his

responsibilities as liaison between FBI and CIA. He decided to submit his

letter of resignation, to be effective

in early April of 1970.

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EFFORTS TO IMPROVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CIA AND FBI

Efforts by Papich

Under Hoover there was little exchange of ideas at the highest levels

of the CIA and FBI. This was merely Hoover's style. Papich vas able

to get people exchanging ideas at the working level and this was done

with Hoover's approval.

Papich supported CIA innovative approaches to targets of mutual interest

to both agencies and frequently became involved in conflicts with Hoover.

for such interest and action.

When any CIA promoted projects were ap-

proved, the responsibility was placed on Papich to assure that there

would not be any invasion of FBI jurisdiction or violation of agreements.

For instance, the CIA.

through the Domestic Operations Division (now the

Foreign Resources Division) was always looking for foreigners in the

United States to recruit as ugents abroad!

The Ill also halt an interest.

innthese foreign ofticials if it was discovered that the oficial was.

working for an opposition service. In the 1960's the CIA came to Papich

to see how the Dosestic Operations Division could recruit without con-

flicting with the Bureau.

Papich set up a program and sent it to Hoover

recommending approval, but floover indicated that he was concerned with

possible CIA invasion of

_the FBI's jurisdiction

It was thererone agreed

betveen the CiA and the FBI that

ciA could continue to recrutt foreigners

in the Inited States if they would innediately contact the iBI upon re-

cruiting an individal and furnish Papich with all information obrained

fron that individun? which pertained to internal affairs. Purther, the

individual was to be made available to the fBI it he possessed substan-

tial

infornation vithin the FBI's jurisdiction.

This progran culminated

Iqwary Z, 1966. The program apparently worked well and much valuable in

formation was given to the FBI which satisfied Hoover.

Perhaps more

importantly, new CIA/FBI relations at the field level were developed.

However, Papich was well aware at the time the program was set up that

if it flapped, Hoover could innediately kill the project.

Papich also advocated the exchange of lecturers between CIA and FBI to

give the two agencies some understanding of what the other agency was

doing. Such an exchange of lecturers and training facilities did not

come about until about the time that Papich retired.

1B

Papich also suggested an actual trade of personnel for short periods of

time so that personnel from one agency could become familiar with the

various problems that faced personnel from the other agency on the working

level. This suggestion was never approved while Papich worked for the FBI.

Papich reiterated the fact that he had

a very good working relationship

with Jim Angleton.

He feels that this relationship was probably respon-

sible for the FBI's arrest of the Russian spy Rudolph Abel. Apparently a Soviet

agent came to the CIA with information on Able. The FBI sas contacted

concerning the debriefing of this agent, but Hoover wanted nothing to do

with it.

Papich cooperated with Angleton, and the information obtained

led to Able's arrest and conviction.

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The following gray areas were delineated by Papich:

1. The question of whether the FBI should recruit agents in the United

States for use by the CIA overseas or whether this should be left

to the CIA.

2

Activities with respect to defectors and the debrieting of defectors

in the United States.

(At present the FBI generaily lets CIA do the

"debriefing as long as the FBI is given access to the man within a

reasonable tine.

On occasion the bone fides of defectors have been

disputed by CIA and the PBI.)

3

the question

of who is

responsible for continued supervision over

defectors once they have been resettled in the United States.

FBI

doesn't really have the manpover to monitor the many defectors press

ently in the United States,

Papich feels that these individuals

could go sow and should ho watched by some one.

4. The question of who should provide cover in the United States for

CIA operations overseas.

5. The handling of agents suspected by CIA to be Conmunist agents over-

seas who travel to the United States.

6. Inadequate communication between the tro agencies in resolving

bona fides of defectors of interest to both agencies.

7.. See the subheadings below.

Papich believes that in fairness to the men in the field a more clear-cut

delineation of jurisdiction is needed. He did state that from time to

time documents were put forth by Hoover concerning the FBI's jurisdiction in

particular areas.

Generally such a guideline would be issued following

a particular flap in an operation involving both the FBI and the CIA.

Papich could not point to any specific document but suggested that we

ask Kelley for this type of information.

Papich did feel that there were some areas of jurisdiction that were clear-

cut.

For instance, CIA is not to investigate violations of the law in the

United States.

However, it is

not Papich's opinion that the determining

factor of jurisdiction is a strictly geographic one. (At least it shouldn't

be.)

Espionage Matters

Papich felt strongly that the FBI had the responsibility to investigate

any possible violations of the espionage laws.

He could point to no case

where the FBI refused to undertake this responsibility where reasonable

evidence of espionage existed, even if the suspect was an employee of the

CIA. In some instances, the CIA might cone to the FBI with information

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Ober's Operation: (continued)

had the personnel, and the FBI would have become aware of such acti-

vity on a massive

scale. However, Papich did receive a continuing

supply of information from Ober.

Most of this information related

to the relationship between domestic and foreign groups.

Inciden-

tally, informacion pertinent to internal security may have been

picked up and passed on to the CIA.

Papich is also aware that some

of Ober's recruits were gathering information in the United States

as well as overseas on occasions when the student's travels ended

and he or she returned to the States. This information

was also

passed on to Papich. Papich acknowledged that on occasion the FBI

would provide CIA with an introduction to a sympathetic student in

a dissident group.

2. PrOjace poetico of securier (S)

Papich knows almost nothing of efforts to penetrate dissident groups

by the Office of Security.

He feels that if such a project had been

extensive, the FBI would have become aware of it, as FBI had a large

Washington Field Office and was very interested in the dissident

groups and constantly monitoring them. Papich could not recall an

incident where a CIA asset working for Women's Strike for Peace was

turned over to the FBI. He did recall occasions when Ober's group

turned over assets to the FBI when the asset returned from overseas

and no longer wished to work abroad.

Papich believes that only a

small amount of information on dissidents was ever sent to the FBI

from the Office of Security.

Papich states that during this entire period of the dissidents, the atmos-

phere was such that something had to be done by someone to learn what the

more militant of these dissident groups were planning. Riots, bombings,

and destruction of property were rampant. Citizens and newspapers were

screaming for action to bring this unrest to an end. It was a difficult

time for all Federal agencies.

Criminal Cases

Papich is not aware of any instances when the CIA has undertaken law en-

forcement tasks in the United States. This does not mean that there was

not some cooperation between the FBI and CIA in criminal cases. For

instance, Angleton's overseas agents would frequently obtain information

connecting Americans with criminal activities in the U.S.

contact the FBI and together Papich and Angleton would develop the CIA's

source of information to assist the FBI.

A good example of this led to

the arrest and conviction of a New York

City official during the Lindsay

Administration.

(1) (B)

per

CIA

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Penetration of Enbessies in the United States

Papich has no knowledge of any CIA efforts to obtain positive intelli-

sence by penetzaring foreign embassies in the United States, although

they did on occasion attempt to recruit Embassy personnel for activities

overseas, pursuant to the rbI/ CA Nemoraneun of Understanding of Feb. 7/

1966-Papich believes that if the ClA attempted to gain positive in

cigence inforation shroud be and a this was an improper S

action which should have been performed by the FBI.

Information Obtained From Tax Returns

Papich is unaware of any instance where CIA has made use of tax returns

to obtain information on Americans.

PAPICH'S PHILOSOPHY AND MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS

It is Papich's belief that while the intelligence services of the United

States presently obtain great amounts of information through new techno-

logical developments, they are still unable to read the minds of the

leaders of foreign countries.

Consequently, they must attempt to pene-

trate through clandestine efforts.

The only way to successfully penetrate

is to permit those conducting the operation to go about their business

unburdened by numerous reporting requirements.

Papich's philosophy is

"If you want the job done right, give me X number of men and leave me

alone."

He questions whether this philosophy can be adopted in the United

States

in 1975, as faith in the leadership is an essential factor. He be-

lieves that such operations can be controlled and overseen by the Director .

of the CIA, the Director of the FBI, and the President.

Papich indicated that the differences between Hoover and Sullivan have

nothing to do with CIA. Hoover was convinced that all dissident groups

were directed by the Communist Party, whereas Sullivan disagreed.

differences affected the Hoover-Sullivan relationship only after Papich

retired.

Papich believes that the FBI lost stability when A. H. Belmont (the No. 3

man at the tine) retired in 1967. He presently resides in Palo Alto,

California. Belmont was loyal to Hoover, but he had excellent rapport

with the agents

and could put things in their proper perspective. In

fact, Belmont was most useful in resolving differences between CIA and Hoover.

Belmont's

successors (DeLoach and Sullivan) could not measure up.

JNR/vmr

CC: D. Belin

Senior Counsels

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