Originator: HSCA
From: CIA
Document date: 00/00/0000
Document type: NOTES

# DOCID-32271360

## Page 1

Date :

06/11/95

Page

1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA

RECORD NUMBER: 180-10142-10,056

RECORDS SERIES

: CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

: 22-22-01

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA

FROM

: CIA

TO

TITLE

DATE : 00/00/00

PAGES

62

SUBJECTS

:WC

CALDERON, LUISA

CIA,

FILES

Released under the John F.

ase#: Nw 56000 Date

11-04.202

prigina copy redacted

DOCUMENT TYPE : NOTES

CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED

RESTRICTIONS

: 1A, 1B

CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 08/07/95

OPENING CRITERIA

:

COMMENTS

: BoX 11

WITH DELETIONS

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

NW 66000

Docld:32271360 Page 1

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## Page 2

CIA MAS NO OBJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

FIELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

of the U.S. Intelligence Community.*

as redacted

As a visual aid to the analysis of the materials

contained in the four compilations discussed above.. a

chart has been prepared which illustrates the flow of

written information from the CIA to the Warren Commission

and the U.S. Intelligence Community concerning President

Kennedy's assassination. This chart sets forth the C IA's

designation for each document listed and lists the subject

matter of each document and the date of each

document's

dissemination. The chart also indicates whether the document

was made available to the Warren Commission, the U.s.

Intelligence community

or both. A secondary purpose of

, this chart is to indicate for selected subjects the volume

of information provided to the U.S. Intelligence Community

as opposed to the Warren Commission.

During the course of this study, additional Agency

files have been reviewed. These files have been examined

in an effort to resolve certain issues created by the re-

view of the Agency's compilations discussed herein. Where

apparent gaps existed in the written record, files have

been requested and reviewed in an effort to resolve these

gaps.

Where significant substantive

issues have arisen

related to the kind and quality of information provided

the Warren Commission,

files have also been requested and

NW 66000

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## Page 3

- 11 -

Mr. Rocca added that, to his knowledge, Mr. Helms'

orders were followed to the letter by all CIA employees.

(Ibid. p. 24.) Mr. Rocca concluded that on this basis:

"the CIA was to turn over and to develop any information

bearing on the assassination that could be of assistance

to the Warren Commission." (Ibid., p. 26.)

A different view of the CIA's role regarding the

supply of CIA's information to the Warren Commission was

propounded by Richard Helms. Mr. Helms, who served as

the CIA's Deputy Director for Plans during the Warren

Commission investigation was directly responsible for the

CIA's investigation of President Kennedy's assassination

(Ibia. p. 23.) He testified to the Committee that the

CIA made every effort to be as responsive as possible to

Warren Commission requests. (Exec. Sess. Text. of Richard

Helms, 8/9/78, p. 10.) Mr. Helms added further testimony

regarding the manner in which the CIA provided its infor-

mation to the Warren Commission. He stated:

An inquiry would come over (from the Warren

Commission). We would attempt to respond

to it. But

these inquiries came in indivi-

dual items...Each individual item that came

along we took care of as best we could.

(Ibid., pp. 10-11.)

However, it was Mr. Helms' recollection that the

CIA provided information to the Warren Commission primarily

on the basis of the Commission's specific requests. Under

NW 66000

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## Page 4

Certesufánkin

M. Festimary)

- 14-

effect.

The following exchange between Committee Counsel

and Mr. Helms illustrates the acutedlaxity the Agency's

compromise:

Mr. Goldsmith:

Mr. Haems, I take it from your testi-

mony that your position is that the

anti-Castro plots, in fact, were rele-

vant to the Warren Commission's work;

and, in light of that, the Committee

would like to be informed as to why

the Warren Commission was not told by

you of the anti-Castro assassination

plots.

Mr. Helms:

I have never been asked to testify before

the Warren Commission about our operations.

Mr. Goldsmith:

If the Warren Commission did not know

of the operation, it certainly was not

in a position to ask you about it.

Is that not true?

Mr. Helms:

Yes, but how do you know they did not know

about it? How do you know Mr. Dulles had

not told them? How was I to know that?

And besides, I was not the Director of

the. Agency and in the CIA, you did not go

traipsing around. to the Warren Commission

or to Congressional Committees to to any-

place else without the Director's permis-

sion.

Mr. Goldsmith: Did you ever discuss with the Director whe-

ther the Warren Commission should be in-

formed of the anti-Castro assassination

plots?

Mr. Helms:

I did not, as far as I recall.

Mr. McCone testified that he first

became aware of the CIA's anti-Castro assassination plots

involving CIA-Mafia ties during August 1963. He stated

that upon learning of these plots, he directed that the

Agency cease all such activities. (McCone deposition, p.13)

NW 66000

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## Page 5

- 15-

noneves, then asked

whether

the CIA desired to withhold information from the Warren

Commission about the Agency anti-Castro assassination plots

to avoid

embarassing the Agency or causing an international

crises he responded:

"I cannot answer that. since they (CIA employees

knowledgeable of the continuance of such plots)

withheld the information from me.

I cannot an-

swer that question. I have never been satisfied

as to why they withheld the information from me.

(McCone deposition, p.16)

Thus, the evidence indicates that

haa

Helms bohem

approached McCone

to discuss informing the

→ Warren Commission

of past and engana-clA

anti-Castro assassina-

tion plots' might have got Helms

Todoso would have meant

his job.

sis informingmocone that plots were still being

considered by the Agency& But seeHelms testimony - I

Regarding the darren commish not the pies

laussonand

Commission's work,

S ресто

t

were in agreement (Slawson dep., p.275 that

such information should have been reported to the Warren

Commission. See also Spector

Fromthe clA's perspeltina. 46) (But see Liebeler, depo.

3.174)

Mr. Rocca testified that had he known of the anti-

Castro assassination plots, his efforts to explore the pos-

sibility of a retaliatory assassination against President

Kennedy by Castro would have been intensified. He stated:

...in light of what has happened a completely

different procedural approach probably would

and should have been taken.

I mean, there

are any number of things that one can say in

NW 66000

Docld:32271360 Page 5

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## Page 6

- 16 -

the light of history.

What I can't

accept is that leads were

deliberately or otherwise ignored. (Rocca dep.,

p.45)

John Scelso, the above-cited CIA desk officer

who ran the CIA's

initial investigation of President Ken-

nedy's assassination until that responsibility was given

to the CIA's counterintelligence staff, offered a highly

critical appraisal of Helms' non-disclosure to the Warren

Commission:

Mr. Goldsmith: Do you think Mr. Helms was acting properly

when

he failed

to tell the Warren Commission

about the assassination plots?

Mr.

Scelso:

No, I think that was a morally highly re-

prehensible act, which he cannot possibly

justify under his oath of office, or any

other standard of professional public service.

(Scelso dep., p.153)

III. Introductory Section/SS+M

The length of time required by the CIA to respond

to the Warren Commission's requests for information has

been shown to have been dependent upon I) the availability

of information, and 2) the complexity of the issues pre-

sented by the request. On this point, Mr. Helms testified

that when CIA had been able to satisfy a Commission re-

quest, the CIA would then send a reply back:

"and some of these inquiries obviously took

longer than others.

For example, some might involve

checking a file which was in Washington.

Other inquiries might involve trying to see

if we could locate somebody in some overseas

country.

Obviously, one takes longer to per-

form than the other. (Helms Exec. Session

hearing, p.25)

NW 66000

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## Page 7

GPTION TO

- 17 -

KON AND/OR

SOLENSE

IS GUDENT

as redacted

Mr. Rocca, as the day to day CIA working level

contact with the Warren Commission stated that on the

average it took less than one week for the CIA to transmit

-

its information to the Warren Commission, after such in-

formation had been processed by the Agency. (Rocca dep.,

pp. 66-67) (Add the opinion of WC staffers.)

at time's

However,

woes,

concern for protecting its

the CIA's senstivel sources and methods, caused

the Warren Commission to experience greater difficulty

relevant

in getting

information than when the protection of

such sources and methods was not at issue.

J. Lee Rankin

expressed the opinion that the Agency's,

eftost

to pro-

tect its sensitive sources and methods did

effect on the quality of the information to

which

the Warren Commission and its staff

(Rankin at p.23) in some instance

Agency

made

she

* unilateral decisions

accesstoC/A

"materials+

werE

en access.

As a result the

swithholdor limit

ale-

the Commission. (Scelso dep.

p. 158)

Docld:32271360

NVV 66000

Thes Committee has dentif

areas of concern in which t/s A.

aeme

-to protect its sensitive saurees am

method is

impreded the warren commissioninvesti

Page 7

These tore!

Two

e in which

source

methods

the

Ten

Comp

sIon

invest

im-

peded the

warren Cormiss

zon

1 inv

investigation to some degree:

1)

wwthholdinganormnot.om

from ten

pertains tothe photosurveillance and

the CIA's

Mexicot City Station

eflectsof the

As a related

consideration, the controversy

sur-

Consmission Stati

---

## Page 8

3CGS43

2R- C80GN/090R

MELMES OR TIG

as rediated

- 18 -

the

rounding photograph now referred to as that

of the "Mexico City Mystery Man"

Each of these concerns will be examined

herein.

The CIA's concern for revealing the existence of

sensitive technical operations, as outlined above, was

evident from the

iception of the warren Commission.

Mr.

Scelso commented that "we were not authorized at first

to reveal all our technical operations." (Scelso dep.

p.158) Scelso further testified:

We were going to give them intelligence re-

ports which derived from all our sources,, in-

(

cluding 'errira

sources, including the

and the information gotten

from the interrogation of Silvia Duran, for

example, which corresponded almost exactly

with

the intormation from the

(

(Ext to Scelso quote, all of p.5

)

)

Mr. Scelso's characterization is supported by

examination of the background to the first major CIA

report furnished

l. the Warren Commission regarding Lee Harvey

31 Janmemo

oswald's trip to Mexico City. (cite.) Much of the informa-

tion provided to the Warren Commission in this report was

based upon sensitive sources and methods, identification

of which had been deleted completely from the report.

The C10

policy

• limiting Warren Commission know-

ledge of CIA sources and methods was articulated as early

as December 20, 1963, at which time a cable was sent from

CIA headquarters to the Mexico City Station which stated:

Our present plan in passing information to

the

Warren Commission is to eliminate mention

)

NW 66000

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## Page 9

CI. NAS NO COMESTION TO

DSOLASSIFI

TOM AM0/02

HE CASES

de redacted

A CUMENT

-19 -

in order to protect your contin-

uing ops

Will rely instead on statements

of Silvia Duran and on contents of sovierstate

'onsular file which Soviets cave

(CIA Cable DIR 97829 FOlA 498-204, 29Jan1964) -

The basic policy articulated in the December 20,

1963 cable is also set forth in a CIA memorandum of

December 17, 1963. In that memorandum, Birch O'Neal

/Special Investigations Group-

of the CIA Counter intelligence/Staff wrote that he had

been advised by Sam Papich, FBI liaison mon to the CIA,

that the FBI was anticipating a request from the Warren

Commission for copies of the FBI's materials which sup-

ported or complimented the FBI's five volume report of

Decmeber 9, 1963 submitted to the Warren Commission.

Papich provided O'Neal with this report which indicated

that some United States Agency

in Mexico. Papich queried O'Neal whether the FBI could

supply the Warren Commission with source

(The FBI had knowledge of CIA

in Mexico City, see CIA S@CI-3/779/510)

O'Neal's memorandum

showt

Su that he discussed this matter

with Scelso who in turn, after a discussion

I with Helms,

was directed by Helms to prepare CIA material to be passed

to the Warren Commission. O'Neal wrote:

He (Scelso) was quite sure it was not the

Agency's desire to make available to the Com-

mission at least in this manner--via the FBI-

sensitave into matron on Neal, Memo tor file,

20 Dec 63, Subj: Lee Harvey Oswald)

NW 66000

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## Page 10

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

- 20 -

O'Head memor

sandits character Ization

The opinion expressed by Scelso as of December 17,

1963 was set forth on January 14, 1964 in a formalized

fashion,

all information

emmed signifacant as reeerved

by CIA (or

id in CIA files, irrespeetive of

the nat

sensitivi

or reliability of sources,

there

was prom

ry relayes to your bureau.

Jan,

196.4v

1Á dissem to FBI, CSC1-3/779/510)

when Helms,

expressed his

concern regarding exposur of Agency sources

by the FBI

to the Warren Commission. Helms wrote that the CIA had

become aware that the FBI had already:

called to the atten

ation of the Commission,

through its attorney, that we have informa-

tion (as determined from Agency sources) coin-

ciding with the date when Oswald was in Mexico

City and which may have some bearing on

his

activities while in that area. (CSCI-3/779/510)

ming

Mr. Helms further indicated that the CIA

be

called upon to provide additional information acquired

from checks of CIA records and agency sources. He the

suggestedthat certain policies be employed to enable CIA

to work with the Commission and with the Commission's

cooperation protect CIA information, sources and methods.

were

Among the policies articulated

• two which :

Helms claimed would

enablan the Agency to control the flow of information

the ciA could

originated by it.a

In this way check the possibility of

revealing its sources and methods inadvertantly. The poli-

cies articulated were:

NW 66000

Docld:32271360 Page 10

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## Page 11

- 21 -

•1) Your Bureau not. disseminati

information re-

ceived from this Agency without prior concur-

rence

2) In instances in which this Agency has provided

information to your Bureau and you consider

that information is pertinent to the Commission's

interest, and/or compliments or otherwise

is

pertinent to information developed or received

by your Bureau through other sources. and is being

provided by you to the Commission, you refer

the Commission to this Agency. . In such cases

it will be appreciated if you will advise us

of such referral in order that we may anticipate

the possible further interest of the Commission

(?)

and initiate certain preparatory to meeting its

needs. (CSCI -3/559/710)

CIA

Thes policy

eliminating

reference to

Agency sensitive sources and methods is further revealed

by examination

of an Agency cable, dated January 29, 1964,

sent from CIA Headquarters to the CIA Mexico City Station.

That cable indicated that knowledge of Agency sources and

techniques was on that date still being withheld from the

Warren Commission.

Therein, it dosstated that on Saturday,

February 1, 1964, CIA beSto present a report on Oswald's

Mexico City activities to the Warren Commission. However,

NW 66000

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## Page 12

AZES NO OXIGORON TO

AGOLASSIFICATION ANDOR

a relucted

- 22 -

was to bern aform that would

the form of this presentation da

asse pro-

tect the CIA's Mexico City Station's sources and techniques.

(CIA Cable Dir. 90466, FOIA 420-757, 20 Dec 63)

Jand Photo surveillance

Mr. Helms offered testimony regarding the CIA's

reticence to inform the Warren Commission, at least during

the initial stage of the CIA

veillance operations in Mexico City,

land photo sur-

sinclabine

• Helms testified:

and surveillance was not only be-

(

It would have caused very bad feel-

ings between

Mexico and the United States,

and that was the reason.

(Helms Exec Session

hearing, pp.51-52,

Nevertheless, the CIA had provided information to

the FBI regarding the Mexico City surveillance operations

prior to the assassination

period

ang the pose sassination

Furthermon

as

of November 28, 1963 the White House, through information

made available by DCI. McCone to National Security Council3

had beermade

Director McGeorge Bundy,

awace that the cIn

" against the Cuban and Soviet Em-

bassy/Consulatesand that through these

oswald's pre-

sence in Mexico City prior to the assassination had been

corroborated. Ecite Me Cone Man Fin Me Geog Burdy,

NW 66000

Docld:32271360 Page 12

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## Page 13

CIA HAS T

041A70 At

Ga.3/SS or

as reacted

- 23 -

unwillingness

The CIA'S

- to inform the Warren Commission

of the above-described surveillance operations,

in

the early stages

of

(

vestigation:

thou dasane

ard

the

I1.S

is a source

of concern

It is indicative of an

tude

LeciA felt unconfortable

substance seen yenterteed information

* provideng

the Warren Commission. (see Scelso deß.T

This process

might well have hampered the Commission's ability to pro-

ceed in its investigation with all the facts before it,

even those wit

which might have meant exposing certain sensi-

tive operations to the Commission.

As noted previously, on January 31, 1964, the CIA

provided the Warren Commission with a memorandum that

chronicled Lee Harvey Oswald's Mexico City visity during

September 26, 1963 - October 3, 1963. That memorandum

tha

= normention e

Oswald's various conver-

sations with the cuban and soubts embassy/consulateshad +

And subsequently transcribed. Furthermore,

that memorandum

des

• notmention m

see that the CIA

and transcribed conversations between Cuban

Embassy employee Sylvia Duran and Soviet officials at

the Soviet Embassy/Consulate nor was

mention made of the

conversations between: Cuban President Dorticos and Cuban

Armas

Ambassador to Mexico which

transcribed.

NW 66000

Docld:32271360 Page 13

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## Page 14

CANADNO ORISTEN TO.

DSCLACOMICATRAN ABDION

RESEASE OST

BOSCUMENT

- 24-

On February 1, 1964 Helms appeared before the

Commission (see above) and likely discussed the memoran-

dum of January 3i , 1964. On Feburary 10, 1964, J. Lee

Rankin wrote Helms in regard to the CIA memorandum of

January 31. A review of Rankin's letter indicates that

his wooting.

the Warren Commission

had no substantive knowledge

0f

for the production die.

the tapes and trans-

cripts, from that operation. Rankin inquired in the Feb-

ruary 10, 1964 letter whether Oswald's direct communica-

tion with employees of the Soviet Embassy (as stated in

of the January 31 memorandum) had been facilitated

by telephone or interview.

mission had been informed o

Manifestly, if the Warren Com-

oswald this inquiry

by Rankin would not have been made.

Raymond Rocca's testimony tends to support this

conclusion. It was Rocca's recollection that between

the time period of January 1964 - April 1964, Warren Com-

mission's representatives had visited the CIA's headquar-

ters in Langley, Virginia and had been shown various trans-

cripts resulting from the CIA

Mexico City. (Rocca dep. p.89) However,

Mr. Rocca did not personally make this material available

to Commission representatives and was not able to state

under oath precisely the point in time at which the Warren

Commission learned of these operations.

- NW 66000

Docld:32271360 Page 14

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## Page 15

DS0LAGOE

CAROM ANDICA

Met ENe Or

re relacte

- 25.-

On February 19, 1964 the CIA responded to Rankin's

inquiry of February 10. The Agency response did indi-

cate that Oswald had phoned the Soviet Consulate and was

also interviewed at the Consulate. However, the Agency did

not reveal

the source of this information in its response

to the connission or indicate that it would be revealed

by other means (e.g. by oral briefing).

v.

During the period of March - April 1964, David

Slawson drafted a series of memoranda which among other

issues concerned Warren Commission knowledge of and access

to the production material derived from the CIn

Mexico City. A review of

these memoranda tends to support the Committee's belief

that the Warren Commission, through Mssrs. Slawson, Coleman,

and Willens did not obtain access to CI

terials until April 9, 1964. At that time, Coleman,

Sfalwson and Willens met with win scott, the CIA's Chief

Scott

of Station in Mexico City n provided them with various

transcripts and translations derived from

C.

pf the Cuban and Soviet Embassy/Consulates.

(Slawson

memorandum of April 22, 1964, subject: -

Homerer, Brior to April. 9.

• it appears doubtful

that the Commission had been given even partial access

to the referenced material. Nevertheless, by March 12,

NW 66000

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## Page 16

CIA MARNIO ORGOTONTO

Beans 0o

- 26 -

1964, the record indicates that the Warren Commission

had at least become aware that the CIA did maintain

the Cuban Embassy/Consulatē.

(Slawson memorandum, March 12, 1964, Subj: meeting with

CIA representatives). Slawson's memorandum reveals

berk. the Warren Commission had learned that CIA barn tes

possessed transcripts of conversations between the Cuban

Ambassador to Mexico, Armas, and the Cuban President Dorticos.

Porticos-Armass

The conversations, requested by the Warren Commission

representatives at a meeting with CIA officials, including

Richard Helms,

concerned Silvia

Dugha's arrest and interrogation by the Mexican Federal

nano

Police (cite?).

mission's request for access,

Helms responded to the Com-

statics

my that he would

attempt to arrange for the Warren Commission representatives'

to review

this material. (Slawson memo, March 12, 1964)

It shouldbe noted that the records reviewed do not

reveal the manner in which the Commission learned of the

Dorticos-Armas

• As detailed above, both the FBI

and

White House (through McGeorge Bundy) were aware of the

CIA'

in Mexico City.

Cite

One or the other could well have provided the war-

ren Commission with this information. Nevertheless, Ray-

mond Rodas' testimony as cited herein (Rocca dep.

)

lends some support to the position that the Commission had

been informed of the Dorticos-Armas conversations through

the CIA's initiative.

NW 66000

Docld:32271360 Page 16

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## Page 17

DE: MARCO CRISONOTO

OROLAE ARCARON AMOOR

MELISS OF TO DO0UMENT

Ae reducted.

- 27 -

Another Slawson memorandum, dated March 25, 1964

concerned Oswald's trip to Mexico. Slawson therein stated

that the tentative conclusions concerous oswald's

Mexico trip,

that he had reacher

were derived from CIA

memorandad of January 31, 1964 and February 19, 1964,

and in addition a Mexican federal police summary

*of

interrogations conducted shortly after the assassination

with certain Cuban Embassy employees. Slawson wrote:

A large part of it (the summary report) is

simply a summation of what the Mexican police

rate as Mrs. Duran's testimony to the police.

These comments indicate that salison placed limited

reliance upon the Mexican police summary. Moreover, there

is no indication that salwson had been provided the Duran

•transeripts. In fact, by virtue of

Slawson's comments

conerning the Mejican police report,

it would appear that the Warren Commission as of March 251

had been provided little substantive information pertaining

to Sylvia Duran.

Insert P 28

The Committee's belief that Slawson had not been

given access to the Duran transcripts is further supported

by reference to his memorandum of March 27, 1964 (Cite)

wherein he states his conclusion that Oswald had visited

the Cuban Embassy on three occasions. This conclusion

Weste wa based upon an analysis of sylvia Duran's testi-

mony before the Mexican police. Ihis merrandumberos

NW 66000

Docld:32271360 Page 17

---

## Page 18

ANDIOR

NA 71G CO

As Redicter

- 28

indication that he had reviewed any of the Duran

transcripts. Furthermore,

Slawson

had been given access

to these transcript:, certainly their substance would have

been incorporated into his analysis and accordingly noted

Insert

front

for this purpose. His analysis @bould have reflected

the fact of this recited ther by its corroboration or

criticism of the mexican police summary report. # Insetpag

March 25, 1964, the record danstates that

the Warren Con

sion win its

Forts te

restigaite

Oswal

activities

sico citses sat bree gents,

a sess to the Duran transcripts.

vihe Commission had been

forced to rely upon the two memoranda that did not make

susped ofa

reference to she surveillance operal

,and

• a summarya po-

lice report. Thus, the Agency had been successful for

over three months in not exposing the surveillance opera-

tions to the review of the concerned Warren Commission

staff members.

As was stated in the CIA cable of Decem-

ber 20, 1964 to its Mexico City Station:

Our present plan in passing information to

Warren Commission is to eliminate mention

in order to protect your

continuing operations.

Will rely instead

on statements of Silvia Duran and on contents

pf Soviet consular file which Soviets gave

sTate

(CIA

i cable,

DIR 90466, FOIA 420-757, Dec. 20,

1964 CIA p. 2144)

On Mai

on 27, 196481awson

wrote that

deter-

mined that

Oswam

had visite

an Embassy

three

NW 66000

Docld:32271360 Page 18

---

## Page 19

CLA. HAS NO DEJEC

Caes

at resticted esmes.

review of Silv

- 29 -

He stated that this conclusion was based upon his

a Duran's test

mony to

the Mexican

(Slawson menorandum, March

427

19640

CIA p. 1812)

Howe

er,

Slawson

des not stat

that his

conclusion

were also

drawn

from review of any

of the pr

duction from the Mexico City

station

surveillince operacions.

shawson does

ndicate,

however

that

his reasoning

imbiguous regarding swald's

visit to the Cuban Embassy.

'Logically, access to the

production would have clarified sone

ambiguities. For example, on September 27, at 4:05 p.m.

Silvia Duran telephoned the Soviet Embassy and stated

that an American was

presently at the Cuban Embassy, re-

questing an in-transit visit to Cuba. This American was

determined by CIA analysts to be Oswald. Again on Septem-

ber 28, at 11:51 a.m. Duran telephoned the Soviet Consulate

stating that an American, identified by CIA analysts as

Oswald

An at the Cuban Embassy. Thus, the Cit had twice

definitively established that Oswald had

visited the Cuban Embassy on at least two occasions.

Moreover, the specific datesand exact times of his presence

were

in the Cuban Embassy

• established as the result of the

Had this information been made

available to Slawson, his calcuations of Oswald's activities

in Mexico City would have been more firmly established

than they were as of March 27, 1964. These transcripts

NW 66000

Docld:32271360 Page 19

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## Page 20

SUMENT

MELEASE OP 10164

- 30 -

could have been made available to the Warren Commission

at

its

danception but as

the record indicates they were

not then made available:

-

The record supports the Committee's finding that

as of April 2, 1964 the Warren Commission had still not

been given access to the above-referenced series

In a memorandum of that date by Coleman

and Slawson, they articulatedone question to the CIA and

two requests for information from the Agency, (Ambassador

sya firemente(pril 2, 1964, CIA p. 1975) (my notes?) Colemanana

1) What is the information source referred to in

the November 28 telegram that Oswald intended

to settle down in Odessa;

2) We would like to see copies of the transcripts

translated if possible, in

refer

all cases where ti

• to

the

assassination or related subjects;

3) We would especially like to see

in which the allegation that money was passed

at the Cuban Embassy is discussed

(ItenI)

The question

initially posed in the above-referenced

memorandum of April 2 concerns the CH

of September 27, 1963 at 10:37 a.m. (Slawson memo, April

22, 1964, CIA p. 3223). Necessarily, if Slawson

= Foundst

necessarytorguest

the source of the information, he had not been

NW 66000

Docld:32271360 Page 20

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## Page 21

CLAMS NO ChECTON IO

MASBIFICANICN AND/ONI

31

toy the CIt

provided that source

which

The first Coleman-Slawson request

that

the commission

had

notbeen

given access,

concerning the assassination as

radiates the dammistion has nyt

BEAS

get copter

Lay intend

enquestion

Set for

shabou

areover

attring.

ACHARES

wAterpre

equest

can cowe.

mean that ey had not been

given a

resenteamy

ensubject

austerials.

The second request, item number three of the above

listingy reveals that

the Dorticos-Arman

conversation of November 22, 1964, in which the passing

of monies des discussed had not as of April 2 been provided

to the Commission. The Commission had specifically requested

the Dorticos-Armas transcripts CAt the March 12, 1964

meeting between Commission representatives and Agency re-

presentatives. (Cite.)

On April 3, 1964, Coleman and Slawson articulated

their concern for receiving complete access to all materials

relevant to Oswald's Mexico City trip. They wrote:

The most probable final result of the entire

investigation of Oswald's activities in Mexico is

a conclusion that he went there for the purpose

of trying to reach Cuba and that no bribes, con-

spiracies, etc. took place.

NW 66000

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## Page 22

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

- 32 -

...In order to make such a judgment (that all reasonable

lines of investigation that might have uncovered other

motivations or possible conspiracies have been followed

through with negative results), we must become familiar

with the details of what both the American and Mexican

investigatory agencies there have done. This means

reading their reports, after translation, if necessary,

and in some cases talking with the investigators

themselves:

The thoroughness of investigation which Coleman and

Slawson articulated as a vital concern to the Commission's

work had been

thwarted by the CIA's

5 concern

n sources and methods

relevant

ee exposene, cons, derin

to the Commission's investigation, the limited number of persons

engaged in an

cance unprecedented in this nation's history,

anvestigation of a gravity and stir materie

Frontle were Commissionstafe uas inexcusable.

On April 9, David Slawson, Howard Willens, and

William Coleman flew to Mexico City, Mexico to meet with the

representatives of the State Department, FBI, CIA, and the

Government of Mexico. Prior to their departure, they met with

the

Thomas Mann,

U.S. Ambassador to Mexico during Oswald's visit

to Mexico City and at the time of President Kennedy's

assassination. Ambassador Mann inestole

wthe Warren

commission representativesthat the CIA's Mexico city Station

was actively engaged in photosurveillance operations against

the Soviet and Cuban Embassy/Consulates (Slawson memo,

NW 66000

Docld:32271360 Page 22

2, 1964, p.

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## Page 23

CIA HAS NO ORESOTE

CUMENT

RELEASE OF

as sedated

33

Upon the group's arrival in Mexico City, they were met

by U.S. Ambassador Freeman, Claire Boonstra of the State

Department, Clarke Anderson of the FBI, and Winston Scott of

the CIA.

That same day during a meeting between the Commission

representatives and Win Scott, Scott made available to the

group actual transeripts of that

operations and English translations of the same. In addition,

he provided the group with reels of photographs for the

time period covered by Oswald's visit that had resulted from

photosurveillance of the Cuban and Soviet Embassy entrances

David Slawson wrote:

"...Mr. Scott stated at the beginning of his narrative

that he intended to make a complete disclosure of all

facts, including the sources of his information, and

that he understood that all three of us had been cleared

for TOP SECRET and that we would not disclose beyond

the confines of the Commission and its immediate staff

the information we obtained through him without first

clearing it with his superiors in Washington.

We

agreed to this." (Slawson memo, April 22, 1964, p. 22)

Mr. Scott described to the Commission representatives

the CIA's course of action immediately following the assassination.

scott indicated that his staff ammediately

began to compile

dossiers on Oswald, Duran, and everyone else throughout Mexico

whom the CIA knew had had some contact with Oswald (p. 22).

scott revealed all known Cuban and Russian intelligence agents.

had immediately been put under surveillance following the

assassination

Mexican officials,

particularly Luis Echevarria, Acting Minister of the

Mexican Gobernacion (pp. 23-24). Slawson then concluded e

NW 66000

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## Page 24

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

- 34 -

"Scott's narrative plus the material we were shown dis-

closed immediately how incorrect our previous

information had been in Oswald's contacts with the

Soviet and Mexican Embassies.

Apparently the

distortions and omissions to which our information had

been subjected had entered some place in Washington,

because the CIA information that we were shown by Scott

was unambiguous on almost all the crucial points. We

had previously planned to show Scott, Slawson's

reconstruction of Oswald's probable activities at the

embassies to get scott's opinion, but once we saw how

badly distorted our information was

we realized that

this would be useless. Therefore, instead, we decided

to take as close note as possible from the original

source materials at some later time during our visit."

(p. 24)

Slawson's memorandum of April 21, 1964 records the results

of the notetaking from original source materials that he did

following Scott's disclosures. These notes dealtexclusively

with the telephonic interceptspertaining lo, respectively,

totne

Duran and Oswald conversations Gorithe period-Sept a7-Out1, 1963.

It is evident from slawson's record that the Agency's

denial of original source materials, in this case the telephonic

surveillance intercepts, seriously impaired the Commission's

accurately rensored

ability to draw'conclusions regarding Oswald's sojourn in Mexic

City,

avai

It meant that as

of April 10, 1964, nearing the halfway point of the Warren

Commission investigation, the Commission was forced to retrace

the factual path by which it had structured Oswald's activities

in Mexico City. It further revealed that the Agency had

provided ambiguous information to the Commission when, in fact

"on almost all the crucial points" significantly more precise

could have bees made

materials were available for analysis by the Commission.

NW 66000

Docld:32271360 Page 24

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## Page 25

- 35 -

Thus, the Agency's early policy of not providing the Commission

with

vitally relevant information derived from certain

sensitive sources and methods had seriously undermined the

investigation and possibly foreclosed lines of investigation

that might have been more seriously considered had this

material been expeditiously provided; (e.g., Cuban involvement

VI. Mexico City Mystery Man

On November 23, 1963, Marguerite Oswald was shown by

FBI Special Agent Odum a photograph of a man bearing no

physical resemblance to her son. Thai photograph had been

supplied to the FBI on November 22 by the CIA's Mexico City

Station after Agency representatives had searched their files

in an effort to locate information on Oswald. ' This photograph

was one in a series

resulting from the CIA's photosurveillance

operations against the Soviet and Cuban Embassy/Consulates

Wit

had been linked by the Mexico City Station Brior to the

assassination

poLee Harvey Oswald.: Richard Helms, in a sworn

affidavit before the Warren Commission, stated that the

photograph shown to Marguerite Oswald had been taken on October 4,

1963 in Mexico City and mistakenly linked at that time to

oswala. (entecHals affidenit in cR)

On February 10, 1964, Marguerite Oswald testified before

the Warren Commission and recounted the circumstances under

which she was shown the photograph. Mrs. Oswald testified that

WERII?

she believed this photograph to have been of Jack Ruby. (p. 153)

NW 66000

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## Page 26

CIA VICE RIO CRECTION TO

OROLAGOS

NORTION ANDIOR

RELE/SEOP

INS DOCUMENT

as redacted

-

36 -

Thereafter, on February 12, 1964, J. Lee Rankin wrote

Thomas Karramesmies Assistant P.DP

to t

astes, site

circumstances

at, regarding the

westernte

sy this photograph by the

Central Intelligence Agency.

tal de

Rankin &

# reques ted that

the Commission be

the identity of the individual

depicted in the photograph if that information was available.

On that same day, in a separate letter to DCI McCone,

Rankin wrote that the Commission had been informed by the Secret.

since Novembe 22,1963

Service: that the CIA had disseminated several reports or

communications concerning the assassination to the Secret

Service sim

amba: 220

These mankial requested copies of these

reports and other materials. Three ElA cables tie

which

concerned win the photograph of the individual

originallyident. fict

Oswald and subsequently shown to Oswald's mother.

A:

tesson, lamong the materials

bytraLIA

disseminated to the Secret Service was a November 26

dissemination (DIR85177), a eopyne which verstransmitted to

ticos

thendeeret service.

That cable concerned the Dories-Armas

conversations and disclosed the existence of CIt

I'n Mexico City at the time of the

assassination and Oswald's earlier visit.

John Scelso testified regarding the circumstances

surrounding the eventual explanation given to the Commission

of the origin of the photograph in question. Scelso stated:

NWV 66000

Docld:32271360 Page 26

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## Page 27

CAMAS NO OSEXOTION TO

DECLISCIGOAION AND/OR

2192501

as dicted

- 37-

"We did not initially disclose to the Warren

Commission all of our technical operations.

In other

words, we did not initially disclose to them that we

had photosurveillance because the November photo we had

(of MMM) was not of Oswald. Therefore it did

not mean

anything, you see?"

Mr. Goldsmith:

...So the Agency was making a unilateral

decision that this was not relevant to the Warren

Commission.

Scelso: Right, we were not authorized, at first, to reveal

all our technical operations.

(Scelso deposition,

p. 150)

Raving

Ferocery 151 19610

unknowingly

requested

makesh the Warren

Commission

access to

production' (as discussed in the

preceding section), the

of the photosurveillance operations,

asto cause concern within

the Agency.

On March 5, 1967, Raymond Rocca wrote in an internal

memorandum to Richard Helms that "we have a problem here for

your determination. " Rocca outlined Angleton's desire not to

respond directly to Rankin's request of February 12 regarding

CIA material forwarded to the Secret Service since November 23,

1964. Rocca then stated:

"Unless you feel otherwise, Jim would prefer

to wait out the Commission on the matter covered by

paragraph 2 (of the above-referenced February 12

letter).

If they come back on this point he feels

that you, or someone from here, should be prepared to

go over to show the Commission the material rather than

pass them to them in copy. Incidentally, none of these

items are of new substantive interest.

We have either

passed the material in substance to the Commission in

response to earlier levies on the items on the items

refer to aborted leads, for example, the famous sex

(Rocca memo 5 March 64, FOIA 579-250)

NW 66000

Docld:32271360 Page 27

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## Page 28

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

- 38 -

On March 12, 1964, representatives of the Warren

Commission and the CIA confered regarding the February 12

request for the materials forwarded to the Secret Service by

the Agency. (See Rankin letter of March 16, 1964 and Slawson

memo, March 12, 1964)

The record indicates that the Commission at the March 12

meeting pressed for access to the Secret Service materials.

Rankin wrote to Helms on March 16 that it was

his understanding

that the CIA would supply the Commission with a paraphrase of

each report or communication pertaining to the Secret Service

materials "with all indications of your confidential communica-

tions techniques and confidential sources deleted. You will

also afford members of our staff working in this area an

opportunity to review the actual file so that they may give

assurance that the paraphrase are complete." (Rankin letter of

March 16, 1964, #2)

Rankin further indicated that the same procedure

to

be followed regarding any material in the possession of the

CIA prior to November 22, 1963 which had: not yet been furnished

because it immi

sensitive sources and methods. (Rankin

letter of March 16, #3)

Helms responded to Rankin's March 16 letter on March 24

(DDP4-1554, CD631 and DDP4-1555, CD 674) by two separate

communications. CD631 provided the Commission with a copy of

the October 10, 1963 CIA dissemination to FBI, State Dept.,

INS and Navy Dept. (SS on 22 Nov.) regarding Lee Harvey Oswald

and his presence at the Soviet Consulate in Mexico City. The

NW 66000

further revealed that on October 23, 1964, CIA had

Docld:32271360 Page 28

---

## Page 29

- 39 -

requested two copies of the most recent photograph of Oswald in

order to check the identity of the person believed to be

Oswald in Mexico City. Furthermore, the CIA stated that it

had determined that the photograph shown to Marguerite

oswald on November 22, 1963 did not refer to Lee Harvey Oswald, This

was dow by checking the photograph against the press photographs of

Oswald generally available on November 23, 1963.

CD 674 reveals that on November 22, 1963, immediately

following the assassination, and on November 23, 1963, three

cabled reports were received at CIA headquarters from the CIA

Mexico City Station regarding photographs of an unidentified man

who had visited the Cuban and Soviet Embassies during October

and November 1963.

Paraphrases of these cables, not revealing

sensitive sources and methods, were attached to CD 674. The

Agency further stated that the subject of the photo referenced

in these cables was not Oswald. It

further stated that:

"In response to our meeting of 12 March and your memo

of 16 March, Stern and Willens will review at Langley

the regional copies of these 3 disseminations to the

Secret Service and the cables on which they were based, as

well as the photos of the unidentified man." (CIA,

p. 116444 of notes)

On March 26, William Coleman wrote in a memorandum for

the record:

"The CIA directed a memorandum to J. Lee Rankin on March 24,1964

(Commission Document No. 631) in which it set forth the

dissemination of the information on Lee Harvey Oswald.

I realize that this memorandum is only a partial answer

to our inquiry to the CIA dated March 16, 1964 and I hope

that the complete answers will give us the additional

information we requested."

NW 66000

Docld:32271360 Page 29

---

## Page 30

= 40 -

Coleman went on to state:

"As you know, we are still trying to get an

explanation of the photograph which the FBI showed

Marguerite Oswald soon after the assassination. I

hope that paragraph 4 of the memorandum of March 24,

1964

(CD 631) sent Mr. Rankin by the CIA is not the

answer which the CIA intends to give us as to this

inquiry."

The following day, as agreed by Warren Commission and

Agency: representatives, Samuel Stern of the Commission visited

CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia.

¡terns' memorandum reveals that he reviewed Oswald'.

file with Raymond Rocca. Stern indicated that Oswald's file

contained those materials furnished previously to the Warren

Commission by the CIA. The file also contained:

Cable reports of November 22 and November 23 from

the CIA's Mexico City Station relating to the photo-

graph of the unidentified individual mistakenly

believed to be Lee Harvey Oswald and the reports on

those cables furnished on November 23, 1963 to

the Secret Service by the CIA.

Stern noted that these messages were accurately para-

phrased in the attachments to CD 674 provided the Warren

Commission on March 24, 1964.

Stern also reviewed

the October 10, 1963 cable from

CIA's Mexico City Station to the CIA headquarters

reporting Oswald's contact with the Soviet Embassy

in Mexico City. He also reviewed the October 10,

1963 cable from CIA headquarters. to the Mexico City

Station reporting background information on Oswald.

NW 66000

Docld:32271360 Page 30

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## Page 31

- 41 -

Stern noted: that these messages were also paraphrased

set fore

accurately as aspsten in the CIA's January 31 memo to the

Warren Commission reporting Oswald's Mexico City trip.

Lastly, Stern noted that Rocca provided him for his

review a computer printout of the references to Oswaldrelated

documents located in the Agency's electronic data storage

system. He stated "there is no item listed on the printout

which the Warren Commission has not been given either in full

text or paraphrased."

Thus, by the 27th of March, a Warren Commission representa-

tive had been apprised of the circumstances surrounding the

mysterious photograph.

VII.

Allan Dulles' Role vis-a-vis the CIA-Warren Commission

Relationship

It has been alleged that Allan Dulles, former Director

of Central Intelligence, and one of the seven members of the

Warren Commission, concealed crucial information from the Warren

Commission. Specifically, the Senate Select Committee

concluded:

"With the exception of Allan Dulles, it is unlikely

that anyone on the Warren Commission knew of CIA

assassination efforts...Allan Dulles, who had been

Director of Central Intelligence until November 1961,

was a member of the Warren Commission and knew of the

CIA plots with underworld figures which had taken place

during his tenure at the Agency." (SSC, Book V, pp. 67-68)

However, the SSC did not explore further the relationship and

allegiancesof Dulles as a Warren Commission member and Dulles

as a former DCI of the CIA.. The Committee has consequently

NW 66000

¿ files maintained by the CIA related to Mr. Dulles'

Docld:32271360 Page 31

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## Page 32

- 41 -

service on the Warren Commission. In the course of this review,

memorandum was uncovered which indicates Dulles

provid

information to the CIA regarding Warren Commission

activities and investigative policies.

atleastone

+ ...

that Dulles acted as an informant on*occasion for the CIA.

Tolen remart

emind ear concerned i

the contro-

versial case of the Russian defector Nosenko. The memorandum

was written by David Murphy, Chief of the Soviet Russia Division

who was Pantinary: concerned mitte

casey

"pa

Nosenta's

sessior's interrogation.

David Murphy's memorandum of July 8, 1964 concerned

about

his discussions with Allan Dulles I

gNosenko's knowledge

of Oswald. This memorandum was prepared for DDP Helms.

Murphy wrote:

"Mr. Dulles, with whom I spoke today recalled his

earlier conversation with you on this subject and

said

that there were still some members of the Commission who

were concerned lest they suppress the Nosenko information

now only to have it surface at a future date.

They

expressed concern that this could possibly prejudice

the entire Warren Commission Report."

Murphy responded to Dulles' statement by stating that

the Commission's concern was understandable but that the Agency

felt the Commission's final report should make no mention of

Nosenko's information. Murphy indicated that a possible

alternative would be to use language "which would allude to

the existence of other, unverified information on the Oswald

case." This language, Murphy contended, would permit the

Warren Commission to state, if challenged on this point at a

future time, that it had given consideration to the Nosenko

NW 66000

Docld:32271366 Pageation.

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## Page 33

- 42 -

Murphy continued:

"It was agreed an effort would be made to find such

language if Mr. Dulles is again unsuccessful in

persuading his colleagues to eliminate any reference

to the Nosenko information from the report.

To attempt

this, however, we would have to know precisely in what

context the Warren Commission intended to make use of

the Nosenko information. This, Mr. Dulles will have to

determine from Mr. Rankin. He will do this as soon as

possible. He knows that I am leaving this week and

therefore, will contact you as

soon as he has the informa-

tion he needs from Mr. Rankin."

Whether by design or as an unintended result, the

quoted language indicates that Mr. Dulles, as a member of the

Warren Commission, was prepared to compromise his position

with the Commission in order to supply the CIA, specifically

about

Murphy and Richard Helms, with sensitive information

the Commission's attitudes towards the Nosenko case. It also

appears that the AGency had communicated te Pilles the information

it desired regarding t

Commission position on Nosenko, and

that Dulle

asmprepared to act in this regard as a high level

and very well placed informant for the CIA.

Murphy prepared a second memorandum dated 28. July 1964.

The subject of this memorandum cone

red use of Nosenko's

information in the Warren Commission's report. Participants

in the discussion upon which the memorandum was based included

Allan Dulles,

Lee Rankin, David Slawson of the Commission,

and Richard Helms,

David Murphy and Tennant Bagley of the CIA.

NW 66000

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## Page 34

CH MAG NO OSJROTON TO

DEO 4898:04:06/040X07

RELEASE OF THIS DO

a redacted

VIII.

- 43

Luisa Calderon

Approximately five hours after President Kennedy's

assassination, a Cuban government employee in Mexico City named

"Luisa" received a telephone call from an unidentified man

speaking Spanish.

•(MEXI 7105, 27 Nov. 63, FOIA 173-615, attach-

ment) this call had been

oy the CIA's

Mexico City Station as the result of its

operation. (op cit) The Mexico City Station identified the

Luisa of the conversation as Luisa Calderon, who was then

employed in the Commercial Attache's office at the Cuban

Consulate.

During the course of the conversation, the unidentified

caller asked Luisa if she had heard the latest news. Luisa

replied in a joking tone:

"Yes, of course, I knew almost before Kennedy."

The callerwent on to tell Luisa that the person

apprehended for Kennedy's slaying was the "President of one of

the Committees of the Fair Play for Cuba." Luisa replied that

she knew this also.

Luisa inquired whether the person being

held for the killing was a gringo.

The unidentified caller

replied, "yes."

Luisa told her caller that she had learned

nothing else about the assassination that she had learned

about the assassination only a little while ago.

The

unidentified caller commented:

NW 66000

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## Page 35

DECUSEF CATION ANDIOR

-44=

WEN:

BE 2A5C5

as related

We think that if it had been or had

seemed... public or had been one. of the

segregationists or against intergration

who had killed Kennedy, then there was,

let's say, the possibility that a sort

of civil war would arise in the United

States; that contradictions would be

sharpened.. who knows

Luisa responded:

Imagine, one, two, three and now, that makes

three. (She laughs.)

Raymond Rocca, fd

A06 KS

for

2086242

¿ in response to

a 1975 Rockefeller Commission request for information on

a possible Cuban conspiracy to assassinate President

Kennedy wrote regarding Calderon's comments:

Latin hyperbole? Boastful ex post facto

suggestion

cubine and soviet as ge a co

that contains the suggestion of foreknow-

ledge or expectation. (Rocca memo for DC/OPS,

23 MaY 1975, p. 15)

Standing by itself, Luisa Calderon's cryptic com-

ments do not merit serious attention. Her words may in-

deed indicate foreknowledge of the assassination but may

also-

#y be interpreted without such a sinister impli-

cation.

Nevertheless, as will be discussed herein, the

Committee has determined that Luisa Calderon's case did

merit serious attention in the months following the assas-

sination.

However, Calderon's comments were not reported

to the Warren Commission, apparently an agency oversight.

NW 66000

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CIA HAS NO OBJECTION T

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

- 45 -

In connection with the assassination, Luisa Calderon's

name first surfaced on November 27, 1964 in a cable sent

by

requesteri

WH, FBI

and CIA)

the Stad

t walt

Information was reported to the CIA during May 196%2

from a Cuban defector, tying Luisa Calderon to the Cuban

Intelligence apparatus. The defector, AMMUG-1, was him-

self a Cuban Intelligence Officer who supplied valuable

and highly reliable information to the CIA regarding

450

C

Cuban Intelligence operations. Calderon's ties to Cuban

Intelligence were reported to the warren Commission on duness, 91...

Tate,

-emo

(Did the State Department supply the cable to the Warren

the Committee has determined that the CIA did not provide

Calderon's conversation to the Warren Commissione

although

eyen thought the warren Commission was aWare that Calderon

had connections to intelligence work, as did other Cuban

Embassy officers, the vital link between her background

Asaresult

and her comments was never established for the Warren Com-

mission by the CIA. The Agency's oversight in this re-

gard may have forecased the Commission from actively

pursing a lead of great significance.

• In that cable Mann stated:

•..Washington should urgently consider feasi-

bility of requesting Mexican authorities to

arrest for interrogation: Eusebio Azcue,

Luisa Calderon and Alfredo Mirabal. The two

men are Cuban national and Cuban consular

officers. Luisa Calderon is a secretary in Cuban

NW 66000

Docld:32271360 Page 36

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## Page 37

- 46

Consulate here.

This cable does: not state the basis for arresting

Calderon. However, the CIA's copy of this cable bears a

handwritten notation on its routing page. That notation

states: "Info from Amb Mann fer See Rush re: ... persons

involved with Oswald in Cuban Embassy.

Mann went on to state in urgent terms:

"They may quickly be returned to Havana in order

to eliminate any possibility that Mexican govern-

ment could use them as witnesses."

According to CIA files, Calderon returned to

Havana

on December 16, 1963, less than four weeks after the as-

sassination.

Calderon, Azcue and Mirabal were not arrested nor

detained for questioning by the Mexican federal police.

However, Silvia Duran, a friend and associate of Calderon's

and the one person believed to have had repeated contact

with Oswald while he was in Mexico City; was arrested and

questioned by the Mexican police on two separate occasions

(Cites). During her reinterrogation, Duran was questioned

regarding masset his interthy calderon.

No abasision is

given in this report for the questions concerning Calderon

(Cites). The information regarding Duran's interrogation

was passed to the Warren Commission on February 21, 1964

(DDP4-0940), more than two months after Calderon had re-

turned to Cuba.

NW 66000

Docld:32271360 Page 37

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## Page 38

DIA HABNO ORSEXTON TO

- 47-

as redacted

Calderon's 201 file reveals that she arrived in

Mexico City from Havana on January 16, 1964, carrying

Cuban Passport E/63/7. Her date of birth was believed

to be 1940 (Dispatch,

21612) Calderon's presence in

Mexico City was first reported by the CIA on July 15,

1963 in a dispatch from the CIA's Miami field office to

the CIA's Mexico City station and to the Chief of the CIA's

Special Affairs Staff (for Cuban operations). That dis-

patch had attached to it a report containg biographic data

on personnel then assigned to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico

City. At page three of the attached report Luisa Calderon

was listed as Secretary of the Cuban Embassy's Commercial

office.

The notation indicated that a report was pending

on Calderon. The Agency has attempted, without success,

to locate the report.

On September 1, 1963, a dispatch was sent

from

the Chief

the special Affairs Staff to

Chief of

insertt

we statson in Mexieo Citt

(Dispater

111935).

Luisa Calderon's

association with the Cuban DGI

was

¿ the CIA on May 5, 1964. At that

time

Josph largor Chief of Counterintelligence for the

special Affairs staff, repate the results of his de-

briefing of the Cuban defector, AMMUG-1. The memorandum

stated that AMMUG|had no direct knowledge of Lee Harvey

Oswald or his activities but was able to provide items

of interest based upon the comments of certain Cuban In-

I this dispaste.

NW 66000

Docld:32271360 Page 38

---

## Page 39

C/ MENO 0S.

130

RELEASE OF

as eclacted:

DUTIENT

- 48 -

was

telligence Service officers. Specifically, AMMUG-1 Te

asked if Oswald was known to the Cuban intelligence

services before November 23, 1963.

AMMUG-J. told

ty 5 memorentum that "Prior to October

1963, Oswald visited the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City on

two or three occasions. Before, during and after these

visits, Oswald was in contact with the Direccion General

De Intelligencia (DGI), specifically with Luisa Calderon,

Manuel Vega Perez, and Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez.

"(cite Mays mens)

Langosch

thereafter wrote that Calderon's precise

relationship to the DGI was not clear. As a comment to

this statement he set forth the CIA cable and dispatch

during January 1963

traffic which recorded her arrival in Mexico and departure, i

for Cuba shortly after the assassination (eitemaimens)

On May 7, 1964, c

recorded additional informa-

tion he had elicited

from AMMUG-1 regarding Oswald's

possible.contact with the DGI. Paragraph 3 of this memoran-

dum stated in part:

"a. Luisa Calderon, since she returned to

Cuba, has been paid a regular salary

by the DGI even

though she has not

per-

formed any services.

Her home is in

the Vedado section where the rents are

high.

•b. Source (AMMUG) has known Calderon for

several years.

Before going to Mexico,

she worked in the Ministry of Exterior

Commerce in the department which was

known as the "Empress Transimport."

Her title was Secretary General of the

Communist Youth in the department named

in the previous sentence.

NW 66000

Docld:32271360 Page 39

---

## Page 40

01A H033006

0M 79

SS/06206

RELEASE OF

As rebacted

- 49-

mangosch

on May 8f

further disclosed AMMUG's know-

Ledge of the Oswald case.

haroses

paraphrased AMMUG"s

knowledge of Calderon as follows:

I thought that Luisa Calderon might have

had contact with Oswald because I learned about

17 March 1964, shortly before I made a trip to

Mexico, that she had been involved with an

American in

Mexico. The information to which

I refer was told to me by a DGI case officer...

I had commented to (him) that it seemed strange

that Luisa Calderon was receiving a salary from

the DGI althought she apparently did not do any

work for the Service.

(The case officer) told

me that hers was a peculiar case and that he

himself believed that

she had been recruited

in

Mexico by the Central Intelligence Agency al-

though Manuel Pineiro,

the Head of the DGI, did

not agree.

As I recall, (the case officer) had

investigated Luisa Calderon.

This was because,

during the time she was in Mexico, the DGI had

intercepted

a letter to her by an American who

signed his name OWER (phonetic) or something

similar.

As you know,

the pronunciation of

Anglo-Saxon names is

difficult in Spanish so

I am not sure of how the name mentioned by Hernan-

dez should be spelled.

It could have been "Howard"

or something different.

As I understand the matter,

the letter from the American was a love letter

but indicated that there was a clandestine-

professional relationship between the writer

and

Luisa Calderon.

also understand from (the

case officer) that after the interception of

the letter she had been followed and seen in the

company of an American.. I do not know if this

could have been Oswald...

On May 11, Raymond Rocca wrote a memorandum

to virotos eschard leins regarding tho information.

had elicited from AMMUG. Rocca proposed that "the DDP

in person or via a designee, preferably the former, dis-

cuss the AMMUG/]. sitaltion on a very restricted basis

with Mr. Rankin at his earliest convenience either at

the Agency or at the Commission headquarters. Until this

NVV 66000

Docld:32271360 Page 40

---

## Page 41

O% RAS NO 0.310

1ITO

- 50 -

DEGUS

NG CASE DI

Ar redactes: takes place, it is

not desirable to put anything in writ-

ing•

(11 May 64, Rocca memo, FOIA687-295 with/4 attachments).

On May 15, 1964, Helms wrote Rankin regarding

AMMUG's information about the DGI, indicating its sensi-

tivity and operational significance. Attached to Helms'

argosch

comunication was a paraphrased accounting of

May 5 memorandum. (Helm's memo, May 15, 1964, FOIA 697-294) .

In that attachment the intelligence associations of

Manuel Vega Perez and Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez ara set

forth. However, that attachment flahes no reference what-

soever to Luisa Calderon.

Howard Willens of the Warren Commission, requested

accest fo

as a follow-up to the May 15 memorandum, mutastret the

Lagosch

questions used in

interrogation of AMMUG. (DOOleY

memo to Rocca, 19 June 1964 FOIA 739-310). On June 18,

1964 Arthur Dooley of Rocca's Counterintelligence Research

and fanalysis group took the questions and AMMUG's responses

to the Warren Commission's officers for Willen's review.

willens sauf

anochit

• May 5 memorandum. The only mention

of Cideron was as follows: "The precise relationship of

Luisa Calderon to the DGI is not clear. She spent about

six months in Mexico from which she returned to Cuba early

Langosc

in 1964.

However, Willens was not shown the

memoran-

dum of May 7 and May 8, 1964 which contained much more

detailed information on Luisa Calderon, including her possible

NW 66000

Docld:32271360 Page 41

---

## Page 42

CIA HAS NỞ OBJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

- 51 -

association with Lee Harvey Oswald and/or American intel-

ligence.

(cite Dooles man) #

fin.

It should be noted that these memoranda of May 5,

7,1

8, 11 and June 19 with attachments, are not referenced

in the Calderon 201 file. Their existence was determined

by the Committee's independent review of other agency

files.

The warren commission Ma as of Is June 64, had

little if no reason to pursue the Luisa Calderon lead.

It had effectively been denied significant background

the commission's

information unth eny have impeded or prevented

pur-

suit of Calderon's potential relationship to Oswald and

the assassination of President Kennedy. But

even

if the Warren Com-

mission had been apprised of Calderon's background and

has-becom

possible contact with Oswald it still

denied the one

significant piece of information that might have ambases

its interestin calderona

peratelater conquet you thereaft.

5 to a more serious level. The

Warren Commission

was told about Calderon's conver-

testimony of fRankin, slawson; give section

possible

motive for not telling ef detailed information on Luisa

(mentions CIA association; site the dispatch close out with

Rankin guotes.)

Committee start

RIVV 66000

lücçld:32271360 Page 42

---

## Page 43

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

as redacted

Scelos trotipian that Delmo

Lid not des

articular

indeegative Kenis

ciliam with a set percatere,

Aswing the latte, half, decembe,

Sular soner a seemany repart

when describer Oscals actintes

m deptate, 1903-

008 3, 1963.

L. CIA DOc. Report by John Scelso to 6/C1,24 Dec(3)

Scels describert the Cmmittes

the manse in coheid he conducted

the Agenigs nostigatin:

...practicall my whole Branch

participated in the thing. We

NW 66000

Docld:32271360 Page 43

---

## Page 44

en train nam

Ne woes..

raffis, with regnt, auge

things had to be checked

out We wee checkng ou

just dizen and does n pape

alette time. L HS A Clasi. Pee=

of Joha Scelso, 5/16/10, p131.3

Secle teatiped Juntte that Cin

fill stations ure alater to 21

agenis instigaten and Cheker

case, maty whisk chephing. We

Led not sent out indictim, sayins.

congbos, participate in the crostagion.

havers, that during his tinies

coordinater fithe ageng no slegation,

NW 66000

Docld:32271360 Page 44

---

## Page 45

the meis ly Station was the

of CIA field stitin Quectly noodles

in investigates activitia relate to

President Densedis assortion.

{Ibidp133}

cruse the Agenegs coveligation lease

work the F Bl was hindled fathe

CIA by Buck Ones.

M: Orel, afrans

was Chis, Special Snortigation

agent

Aimpy the CIA A Crinternellgene.

M. Ones charaderged Le finiton

a,.

fallous:

I knew that we (at CrA) ded not

Have the basic responsibilit

prinostagating the soni-

ration , the Presdant. of the

NW 66000

Docld:32271360 Page 45

---

## Page 46

was a crime committed in the

mega does, ats)

aged to the FBI.

Dregaged Chit it was

m ropmoldi, to jur thafel

lest cooperatim to the FB

and to protect the agen

with regend to any copert

2 or operatine, you tenthstand,

them coperation Jus

was in cloe antact with

O'rel nate that is offee a

at

Ge direction, he Chief , Cuntentellegeno, gence,

(61/516) became the central point

at whea information to bernade

availabli to the FBI c crelecter.

CIA's investigation s Preches Dennerg

NW 66000

Docld:32271360 Page 46

---

## Page 47

CIA HAS NO OBJE

DRCLASBIROATION AND/OR

DY THIS DOCUMENT:

te redacted

> the ageng Initial Inostigatio

uffats. §HSCA Class, Depo o(John Scelso, pin-

112 , Exec Session Testimong of RichardHelns, 819/78,

p107. Sceloo norter that a coas chun.

worth the no tigatin dA fir

experiene in conducting Pin

most

Lad bee

y recent ener

n Melia, lz ciA suveillance,

mead scleratime Cmcern. (sScBookI, p25,

5/16/78/PP11l-112J#

Ramid Rica, Chafi Research

a Anulzao fu the CIA's Chinterniellaga

carmilaze

→ Suelso responsibiles

notasa.

amandate

= to nostinte but to "crorden

traffic (code faceletiten, telegram i

telegraphis encedenten fa working

with the DDI with respectto whit

was being dome over the whole world..."

[HSCA Class. Depo of R. Rocca, 7/12/28, p9)

---

## Page 48

the a

¡IssC, BookI, part. at that

time

Stema placed Phnocees,

Danca Chef fa CIA operatimo in gico,

-, and Parama, in change

1the agenzo intial inostigatie

infinto. E HSCA C/ass. Depo of John Scelsä}mp,

sepperiore in conducting ti

inve

Rad

tons and secondly, bouals

recenti serve

n Melic z cIA auveilland,

Raymond Ricca, Chef, Reseanch

a segno for il Cita Entinellaga

= charactenze

no

1a

traffre (codefacelititin, telegram a

telegraphi.emoedentem)fr.conkeng.

with the DDI with respectto whit

NW 66000

Docid:32271360 'P'age 48^ ~ /

was being done aver the whle wald..!

---

## Page 49

CIA HAS NO OSIOTION TO

DECLASSIFICATON A00/07

RELEASE OF THE DOCUMENT

as redacted

мірт Рав с, / пр8, рі5

shift in rapachlit, cas a logia

develpment because de invitegate

Lad begin to til an errade tone:

I Exec SessisTestiman of Richer Helns, 8/9/26,

p14, su also 'HSCA Class. Depo of JohnScelso,

5/14/28, p. 138)

Raymond Roces expandern) tele

renoming when he testified behe the

Commutte that the shift in respinablis

un partial arises the solable

y the Warren Commiaion I HSCA CISS.

Dego of Regnant Racca, pP12-12), Rocea

addedtotineaming:.

it wor entre, appropriat cithe

have that respondlet for the legen,

(nosegate). But itemenute

you has a Commson set up

outaide the live obvinid had te

(ant

NW 66000

Docld:32271360 Page 49

---

## Page 50

NW 66000

Docld:32271360 Page 50

---

## Page 51

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

"DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

In heb tastemms befae thei Consaitlee,

Ruhard )elma, the CIl'a Deput aDcieita

fa Pland during 1963 deacrber the

51A'D role dn the caoelegatinng

Preaedent Kennedgs asbasdentin de

follons:

Y his crime ies comettada tenited

States roil: Thayne, as farad

the 7ederal government was cn-

cerned, the preinng unosti-

,would rave bees

bu tekrnl Rurens, Qnvstiyton

wettnnt any quastion, Therole

q tke C.A wonld have been entineg

euppntive and it wooud have been

supprtive in the senceg wht

material weare abletoacquire

outoide the linet file

United

State woerk referene tithe

nostigatiom.

the agng eato podezaa

role

miside the Victer Stats

t all. So when I wod leth

wnd "suppntie," O meant the

in the libral senoe of ithe tam.

We aro (Sic) trizing to suppatta

FB) and suppert th warsen,

NW 66000

Docld:32271360 Page 51

---

## Page 52

mimicsin and be ropenaive to tree

requet, but wecohe not initiate

recalletin, core we evs ardar ta. It

Kession Tes

imong of Richard Helms, 8/I/18,

PP. 17-187

NW 66000

Docld:32271360 Page 52

---

## Page 53

-DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

wthe a

condany effut to gaid and

e caparration

velater to the

Onecta, Deput Directa

appisach

and case fficers

varse

Commissim

merat craprecenel

faccion tiu

a pornong.

rences andato arred duplication

ped. EH5C

pp 76-71, secalso HSCA Class. Depost Raymon

Cocca, 8/17/78 p23] # scattarastar

Research and Cralgoi fa C/Stf6.

of Ragnand Rocca, 8/17/29, PI, ISCA C/sO Dep.

of James Angleton, 10/5/78,p17) p17). TReRTA

сти

ame,!

molt all rende a sta

, cade

з обся дило сні знатт

7 cona

bens papp

the enture PDPoperatimal con

anet;

NW 66000

Docld:32271360 Page 53

AngletenDes p 27

---

## Page 54

M. Roccas Copp

testified

that a point, contact with th

Common, Information generated

cas to dre

(hi fomation cai Ten revreded

Included T720 7 has stall, soret

Expert, Paul Mantrand geneafresench

Emmers an mango the deane

to C, A fum Me FBI

yeas pun to

the aboaddratin

Rocca pill Arenastati

LA Hall, Hartman and

pooly wore the perom Wits Market

you coverned during the canoes

i Warren ammon rostgatin

That produced substentive pomate

valive to the acrobinatin (Ibidi

Hwas, Mr. Roces testified

What con Ung CIPRIA cus

,M. Xelms with the ware

Immoden. (Roca pia) ina de

NW 66000

Docld:32271360 Page 54

---

## Page 55

Purposes

To evaluate diA's Scope Iquality

of support to the cod

A. Review of written recod preparent

C/A for passage to CC (visaris assass)

B. Review of written record prepared.

By ciA for passageto Intell Community

(vis a virassass)

c. Comparison of 61 A Materials.

In Items AKB Ko determine if

relevant into not passed or inexpeditions;

passer tocc

1 Determination of senses motive or

other ciriumstances resalting in

nor-passage of material

To invertigate and evaluate developins

informat, on derived fron

evaluation

sterdy

A. Determine relevares to ISCA invertiza-

tian le

Record results of itsert follow-up

B. Determine relevane to we investiga-

tion

1. Evaluate substance of into reffect

if nonpassage

NW 66000

Docld:32271360 Page 55

---

## Page 56

S

I stits.

droplas the relation, the sacéi

Dion in the peror, saved

Murphy, Chief, theSe dont

Mes arouslant, Tennant Daley with

Ratta Pocco Characterged the

negangation q iths second phase

y investigatin do a decentialia

approach. (Rocca p/o, Anglem 3 75,823

see also CiA Doc RoccaMeno, 1 Aprel1920

salj: Conversat.

and genitis

as Pocean direct super during the

crag the Warren Concasin

involgalia, Ledinst patricipate

ma regula bas a it agencie 2p

NW 66000

Docld:32271360 Page 56

---

## Page 57

infiniten to the warre Consor

un ded he deal n a derect bras

stave

Angler leprate Le

itinet consollaten wet Porca

developmenta the indelatin proposal.

on certai save y particula senatio

act a ite

B Rocca dad not permitted to sordin

that Sarass cmpartmalatio

was saved, nothere danding the phet

that Dwa the working level forty

Colait. (Roccap 18) Rocca Citer

NW 66000

Docld:32271360 Page 57

---

## Page 58

lugs example ith Mento apie

Pocca was not cleared frithe Nocks

Cras. The did mat attend any, the

not disciom that pertained

I dre came (Rocca pio) Ritka,

In this insane Daved Murph,

chef y sR during, a resperabe.

IN the warsen Comesins Kanolege

on the matte,

Rocca aho cited the Cistro

mail intercept pa, HILINGUAR..

varsitte

e nad no knige no imput (Rocrappit-sa

A da handled the parties

mathial (Cite Angletan tO nardgas)

NW 66000

Docld:32271360 Page 58

---

## Page 59

C/A information

The coonoornaten

9 1 redent Kennedy the concentra-

a emphasi too expenating osuad;

o the warren Commissio coas

to follar-up in soretless:

mitte armptin that a peron

Who spend, for yent

in the

undati cercum.

stares, has to bey specoi

nterest to Sorelt Slate sem -

its ankither collateral authentes

[Rocca,PP. 32-33)

the saret:

berna the people rewadin

touch within Meico had Crack,.

pria trees, as 1KGB pege.

They are unde code core and

ovind, conde have been doing and

we indie tea, doing a coolar

job is the endie chia, p 33)

NW 66000

Docld:32271360 Page 59

---

## Page 60

(16)

nfluence on Coval (pil). He date

Atred, a proble Culm intolerat

Interan on bale terrie

ded met harr the capabilitie

to escome to an aqudecain

(pite Cuban aspet): Idn't

Think the capabdites re

tae (Angleton, 793)

NW 66000

Docld:32271360 Page 60

---

## Page 61

Immedictepeessons and comports

eporting t to dora

Requirements

B. Resultsi.n

Advent. f Wet cIAorg visavis

# HIms defigration

Role of snel Thalegourd

Rever - Hartman

Nosentio

Li Erdivision,

E.

Cuban Ops.

1. Lack of Reportisto wC

NW 66000

Docld:32271360 Page 61

---

## Page 62

AFEMUG/1

po lawyerly

As cited with regard

to Luisa Calderon, a detec-

tor from the Cuban Intelligence Services provided the

CIA with significant information about Lee Harvey Oswald's -

contacts with the DGI in Mexico City. This defector

was assigned the CIA cryptonym AMMUG-1 (A-1 hereinafter).*

CIA files reveal that A-l defected from the DGI

on April 21, 1964

• when

he defected, A-l possessed a number of DGI documents which

were subsequently turned over to the CIA

IN 68894.

24 April 64) Following his defection, a

CIA officer,

Joseph H. Langosch, went

/ to meet A-1, debrief

him, and arrange for A-l's

"into the United States.

OSC

(See supra cite.) On May 1, 1964, 22 reels of Langzash's

debriefing of A-l were forwarded to the Chief of the CIA's

special Affairs Stars from the chief of station in

Effective on May 1, A-1 was under contract with

the CIA for operational purposes. (Contract Approving Of-

ficer memo, 6 May 64) By June 23, 1964, Langosch was

convinced that A-l would be of great value to the Agency.

He stated:

There is no question in my mind that AMMUG-1

*It is now known that A-l did provide significant leads to

the CIA regarding Luisa Calderon.

It is further apparent

that little of this information was made available by the

CIA to the Warren Commission.

Therefore, the possibility

exists that A-l had provided

other information to the CIA

that was relevant to the Warren Commission's work but that which

was not properly reported to the Commission.

NW 66000

Docld:32271360 Page 62

---

## Page 63

.. BARKER, page 3

but found he was inclined to indiscretion because of

a "belligerent" pro-Americanism.

Another CIA officer, David Morales, did not put

it so delicately. He described

Barker as a "loudmouth"

who Morales recommended terminating in 1962. Morales

was concerned that as a result of Barker's Watergate

involvement, he would "tell the authorities everything

he knows. "

Indeed, Barker tended to broadcast his affiliation

with the CIA to the members of the Cuban exile community.

While this was tolerable prior to the Bay of Pigs when

his assignment as liaison between the FRD and the CIA

was overt, post-Bay of Pugs activites required a more

covert approach, according to CIA documentation.

Barker was told to strengthen his cover as a prize

fight manager and use "cut-outs" in his attempts.to

gather information about the activities of the exile

groups. Gradually, he was to cease all direct contact

with the exiles. For a man who had a "love of the

game," and an even greater affinity for the more overt

techniques of investigation and interview, it became

increasingly difficult for Barker to find a niche

in Miami CIA activities.

By the time he was terminated from CIA employment

in 1966, Barker had been involved less and less with

NW 66000

Docld:32271360 Page 63

---