SUBCOMMITTEE ON CASTRO-COMMUNIST SUBVERSION
Originator: ICCCA
To: JOSEPH CALIFANO
Document date: 00/00/0000
Document type: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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198-10007-10049

2023 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK Assassination Sysiens

6/24/201

Identification Form

Agency Information

AGENCY :

RECORD NUMBER :

RECORD SERIES :

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ARMY

198-10007-10049

CALIFANO PAPERS

Document Information

ORIGINATOR: ICCCA

FROM:

TO: JOSEPH CALIFANO

TITLE: SUBCOMMITTEE ON CASTRO-COMMUNIST SUBVERSION

DATE: 00/00/0000

PAGES: 84

SUBJECTS :

CONTROL OF THE MOVEMENT OF FUNDS

CONTROL OF THE MOVEMENT OF PROPAGANDA

CONTROL OF THE MOVEMENT OF ARMS

CONTROL OF TRAVEL BY SUBVERSIVES

TRAINING OF LATIN AMERICANS IN THE UNITED STATES

EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE

SURVEILLANCE OF THE CARIBBEAN

DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION: Secret

RESTRICTIONS: IB; IC

CURRENT STATUS: Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 02/06/1998

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS:

Califano Papers, Box 3, Folder 13. Collection of papers produced by the Subcommittee on

Castro-Communist Subversion.

JFK ReueJ

repartment of the Army EO 1352

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• Exclude

• Exempt

Authority -

NO STATE OBJECTION

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I Gosph Californs, with thanks

for patient help in a high

" pressure person.

zurse usue

SUBCOMMITTEE ON

CASTRO-COMMUNIST SUBVERSION

PAPERS ON

CONTROL OF TRAVEL BY SUBVERSIVES

CONTROL OF THE MOVEMENT OF FUNDS

CONTROL OF THE MOVEMENT OF PROPAGANDA

CONTROL OF THE MOVEMENT OF ARMS

SURVEILLANCE OF THE CARIBBEAN.

EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE

TRAINING OF LATIN AMERICANS IN THE UNITED STATES

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GROUP-1

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC

DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

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The papers included herein embody a series

of action programs

designed to impede the

Castro-Communist subversive effort in Latin

America. They were developed by an inter-

departmental group which included represen-

tation from the White House, Department of

State, Department of Defense, Department of

Justice, Treasury Department, Central Intel-

ligence Agency and United States Information

Agency.

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1÷A V Qu

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CUBA

THE MOVEMENT OF SUBVERSIVES

AND SUBVERSIVE TRAINEES

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.

Il.

III.

IV.

PAGE

Introduction

Nature and Scope of the Problem

The Attitudes of the Latin American Nations

Actions Concerning Legitimate Travel

1. Immediate Impact Actions

a. Administrative Actions

b. Intelligence Actions

c. Actions Related to Common Carriers

d. Propaganda Actions

2. Longer Range Actions

a. Political Actions

b. Intelligence Actions:

c. Administrative Actions

1

2

6

8

9

10

10

10

11

11

12

d. Actions Related to Common Carriers !:

1:12

e. Propaganda Actions

13

3. Organization of American States (OAS) Actions 13

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Actions Concerning Illegal Travel

1. Immediate Impact Actions

a. Intelligence Actions

b. Surveillance and Reporting Actions

2. Longer Range Actions

a. Surveillance Actions

b. U.S. Military Assistance Actions

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CUBA

THE MOVEMENT OF SUBVERSIVES AND SUBVERSIVE TRAINEES

I. Introduction

The actions proposed herein are designed to impede

the flow of subversives between Cuba and other Latin

American countries.

Execution of any one or more of

the enumerated actions will ameliorate the situation;

execution of them all will not completely solve it.

The practical problems involved are too numerous and

complex.

With respect to diminishing legal travel to Cuba,

we face multiple problems in

the policies and attitudes

of those Latin American countries through which the

subversive traveller must pass.

From the viewpoint of

these nations the direct actions required have strong

political and sometimes legal implications - 1mp11-

cations which cannot be overcome easily, even when

the leaders of these countries choose to do so.

In the matter of clandestine travel, we are

confronted not only with the great depth of communist

guile, born of two generations of experience in the

international movement of subversives, but with the

inexperience,

ineptitude and lack of awareness in

these same matters on the part of the Latin American

community.

In spite of this, the advantages do not all reside

with the communists.

Cuba's insular character imposes

certain sharp limitations upon personal movement.

Cuba has no frontiers with other states; everyone

who enters the country must do so either by water,.

There can be no slipping through the

barbed wire.

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On the other hand, this

same geographic situation

makes clandestine entry and exit reasonably simple.

There are 3,825 linear miles of essentially unpa-

trolled Central American coastline, within 175 to

850 miles from Cuba.

There are at least 93 airfields,

other than ours, within 700 miles of the island, and

the ships and craft indigenous to the Caribbean, and

capable of supporting the subversive ebb and flow,

number

well into the thousands.

Even in the face of these unfavorable factors;

program of direct restraints, selected from among

the actions enumerated herein, can have favorable

effects Under the proposed steps some travel would

be stopped completely.

More - probably much more -

would be rendered difficult.

Some hitherto legal

movement would be driven underground. Previous

clandestine movement would be impeded, complicated

and harassed to the

point where it becomes more

costly, more uncertain, more hazardous and thus,

hopefully, less extensive.

II. Nature and Scope of the Problem

We do not know enough about the movement of

subversive trainees, into Cuba and - more important -

out of Cuba.

We do not know enough about the volume

of travel, or the media employed.

This is par-

ticularly true in the area of illicit traffic,

where

our knowledge is extremely limited.

Regarding legal travel to Cuba, CIA presents the

following estimate:

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Legal Travel Into Cuba

Country No. of Legal Travellers Country: No. of Legal Travellers

1962

Jan-Feb

1963

1962

Jan-Feb

1963

Mexico

4912*

969.

Argentina

500

Unk

Guatemala

80

Unk

Uruguay

115

Unk

El Salvador 100

8

Paraguay

60

Unk

Nicaragua

50

Unk

Brazil

400

•Unk

Costa Rica

216

10

Honduras

92

21

Venezuela

200

Unk

Colombia

400

Unk

British

Guiana

Panama

40

Unk

56

Ecuador

208

Unk

Trinidad

Unk

Unk

Peru

181

Unk

Jamaica

593

Unk

Bolivia

500

Unk

Chile

551

85

Dominican

Republic

Haiti

None

Unk

Unk

Unk

* In transit, including about 300 Mexicans

While some of these travellers proceeded to Cuba by

other routes, the great majority passed through Mexico.

On the most conservative basis,

then, It will be seen

that there cannot have been fewer than 4,912 travellers

to cuba during 1962, while the average monthly number

passing

through Mexico for the first two months of

1963 is even higher than the 1962 monthly average.

Of the total number visiting Cuba, the Central

Intelligence Agency estimates that at least 1,500, and

perhaps as many as 2, 000, have received ideological

indoctrination or guerrilla warfare training. Many

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of these are still in Cuba. Others have returned to

their homelands; some by legal means; some probably

There is no reason to presume,

moreover, that the travel to cuba of the remaining

3, 000-3,500 was entirely consistent with the best

interests of the hemisphere.

Prior to the October crisis, Latin Americans

travelling to Cuba usually moved by regular commercial

airlines or, on occasion, by specially chartered

Cubana flights.

Some travelled to Trinidad or

Curacao and thence by regularly scheduled Cubana or

KIM flights to Havana.

Others travelled to Mexico,

and from there by Mexicana or Cubana commercial

flights to Havana.

With the cessation of service

to Cuba by Pan American, KIM, Mexicana, and Iberia

airlines in October, the regular Cubana

service

between Mexico City and Havana remained the sole

direct and regular airline connection between Cuba

and the remainder of Latin America.

The Cubana service between Havana and Mexico is

scheduled to operate twice weekly, but sometimes only

a single flight is completed

per week. Aircraft now

employed are British Britannias - an obsolescent model.

Cubana has requested, but has not yet received,

Mexican approval to

substitute Soviet II-18 transports

for the old Britannias. Delay by the Mexicans in

granting this approval

can have the favorable effect

of impeding travel, as the Britannias are now in

poor condition. If, in addition, the British and

Canadians can be induced to suspend delivery of

spare parts, the planes will soon become inoperative.

Iberia airlines resumed its regular twice-monthly

flights from Madrid to Havana on Il February.

This

flight makes one stop, in the Azores, before reaching

Havana®

KIM has not yet resumed its regular flights to Cuba

from the Netherlands Antilles.

However, it is now con-

sidering doing so.

In this regard it is concluded that

resumption of scheduled flights by a United States

carrier could serve as

an encouragement to KIM and

others to do the same.

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Soviet and Czech airlines serving Cuba do not stop

regularly at any other Latin American country, though

the soviet Aeroflot line has occasionally sought and

received permission from Brazil to land at Recife,

enroute to Cuba.

Some Latin Americans may have

travelled to Cuba on these infrequent flights and,

should Brazil permit this arrangement to become

regularized, the movement of subversives could

achieve a new order of magnitude.

A Canadian non-scheduled. line has operated a few

flights from Canada to Havana and return, carrying

both material and personnel..

The Canadians have been

unresponsive to our efforts to obtain identification

of the passengers.

There are no regularly scheduled sea carriers

operating between Latin America and Cuba.

However,

a number of trainees from British Guiana

travelled to Cuba aboard unscheduled Cuban merchant

vessels engaged in transporting rice from Guiana to

Clandestine sources report that transit of Latin

Americans through Mexico to Cuba often involves illicit

procedures.

The Cuban embassy in Mexico City provides

the travellers, whom they identify as tourists, with

special Cuban entry papers; no entry is made in their

passports, and they

are given pseudonyms for travel

out of and into Mexico. This procedure is obviously

designed to impede any effort by the other

American governments subsequently to identify the

travellers and to exercise surveillance over their

activities upon their return.

Evidence at hand portrays a substantial flow of

travel by legal means.

This must be countered

directly. Beyond this, and perhaps of greater

Importance, is the problem of 1llicit movement both

Into and out of cuba, which will undoubtedly assume

growing proportions as legal travel is curtailed;

and about which our intelligence is at present most

Imited Elimination of this intelligence vold must

be accorded high priority.

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III, The Attitudes of the Latin American Nations

Success of many of the overt actions proposed in

the sections to follow will turn upon the attitudes

of the Latin American nations within whose borders

the restraining actions must take place.

briefly below is an estimate of what can be expected

from the various sectors of Latin America in terms

of participation in a coordinated program of travel

control.

As a general matter, the imposition of controls

on travel is not popular with the public in any Latin

American country

This, coupled with their current

lack of full awareness of the danger represented by

Cuba's training of subversives, will diminish the

willingness of some governments to impose controls

unilaterally.

This is especially true since they

recognize that unilateral restraints will have little

effect on curbing the travel of their nationals to

Cuba, if supporting multilateral action is not also

taken.

It 1s likely, however, that most of the

Latin American countries would respond favorably --

albeit in varying degrees -- to US leadership in

seeking to reduce the flow of persons to Cuba for

ideological or subversive

training.

The Central American countries are more acutely

aware of the danger posed by Cuban-inspired sub-

version than is Latin America at large, and can be

expected to react favorably to proposals for re-

ducing travel to Cuba which President Kennedy might

present at the san Jose Presidential meeting.

However, their ability to carry out commitments which

they may make will be limited by domestic legal

and political considerations, as well as by their

countries' technical

incompetence in such matters.

Since Mexico is

currently the principal

hemisphere transit point for legal travel of sub-

versives to and from Cuba, its attitude 1s of great

importance.

Mexico, to date, has taken several

significant steps with respect to travel between

Mexican cities and Cuba.

It has Instituted close

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surveillance over travellers, to include stamping.

passports to evidence travel to Cuba. In addition,.

the Mexicans now photograph, covertly, all persons

arriving from or departing for Cuba, and have given

tacit approval to suspension of Cuban service by

Compania Mexicana de Aviacion (CMA) • These actions

all suggest that Mexico might be induced to take even

further cooperative steps, particularly on an un-

publicized, bi-lateral basis, wherein the political

hazards of

taking a public lAs position are not

Involved. In this regard, the Central American

Presidents would probably.

agree individually to seek

the participation of President Lopez Mateos of Mexico

In specific cooperative moves to restrict the flow

ol persons to cuba through that country:

Peru now has regulations which actually prohibit

travel to Cuba, but the regulations have engendered

public resistance, and are not enforced. The

Dominican Republic prohibits such travel. Haiti

has no established policy, but passports and exit

permits are reportedly issued. only on the personal

approval of President Duvalier.

Colombia could

legally impose restrictions by executive decree,

but has shown no inclination to do so..

countries, such as

• Venezuela, Chile, and the Central

American nations, plead the existence of legal or

constitutional barriers which preclude the pro-

hibition of travel to cuba, but thus far, they

have made little effort to remove these barriers.

Five Latin American countries (Brazil, Chile,

Uruguay, Mexico, and Bolivia) now maintain diplomatic

relations with Cuba.

Brazil continues its drift tọ

the left and gives little evidence of modifying its

tolerant attitude toward the Castro government.

Chile, with a legal Communist Party, exercises no

restraints on travel to cuba, either direct or

via third country.

The elimination of all legitimate passenger

service to Cuba from Latin America could be

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achieved through invocation of the Rio Treaty, but it

is unlikely that the hemisphere countries would agree

to do so in the absence of some major crisis similar:

to that involving the Soviet missiles or a

case of

direct Cuban intervention in another Latin American

country. Nevertheless, a campaign on our part to

develop a full awareness of the danger represented

by the flow of Castro-trained subversives would

probably create a growing willingness to take action

oriented in this direction.

In this connection,

however, it is concluded that resumption of regular

passenger service to Cuba by United States companies

would render more difficult our efforts to persuade

Latin American and other free world countries to

take

agrave view of the situation, and to partici-

so to person-

pate in dynamic action.

Virtually, all the Latin American countries would

be willing to move against Cuban-trained subversives

upon their return to home countries,

once they put

their new training to use.

The efforts of these

nations will not be dramatically effective, however,

since, in the area of internal security, all of them

suffer from deficiencies in technical skill,

training,

equipment and sometimes from a lack of a sense of

urgency

The United States can provide essential

leadership in eliminating all of these deficiencies.

IV. Actions Concerning Legitimate Travel

Listed below are specific actions contemplated to

impede legitimately executed travel, to and from Cuba.

Legitimate travel is characterized, for this purpose,

as travel on recognized public carriers, openly

arranged and involving travel documents which are

presumed to be in proper order. Certain of the

actions, it will be noted, are partially in effect.

to the OAS - wholly or in

part - by its Special Consultative Committee

on

Security.

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1. Immediate Impact Actions

The following actions offer promise of producing

early, visible and effective results.

a. Administrative Actions

(1) Both through the OAS and bilaterally, Induce

each Western Hemisphere country to:

(a) Stamp passports or other travel

documents issued to

for travel to Cuba , own nationals "not valid

(b) Refuse exit permits for Cuba to any.

national of a third country who cannot produce

a valid permit issued by his own country for

travel to Cuba.

(c) Refuse to honor any visa for Cuba which

is not

an integral, non-detachable part of the

travel document issued by the country of which

the traveller is a citizen.

(d) Require accurate manifests of all carriers

departing for or arriving from Cuba, and furnish

copies of these manifests to diplomatic missions

of other Western Hemisphere countries which are

affected.

(2) Persuade Mexico to fingerprint, in addition

to photographing, all persons leaving for or

arriving from cuba, and to provide data to the par

ent country of the

nationals involved.

(3) Make covert arrangements with police and

other security and administrative officials in

countries now being used for legal transit to Cuba

to impose administrative impediments and harassment

on suspicious Cuba-bound travellers,

in order to

increase the difficulty of travel and thus dis

courage prospective travellers.

b. Intelligence Actions

(1) Intensify U.S. intelligence efforts in

each country

to identify persons who have travelled,

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or intend to travel, to Cuba, and report selected

Information promptly to the host government, as

consistent with our own intelligence pro

gram, and the

requirement to protect our sources.

(2) Intensify current efforts to introduce

covert, U.s. - controlled agents from each country

into the Cuban training program.

c. Actions Related to Common Carriers

(1) Prohibit resumption of air service to

Cuba by U.s. carriers, in order to provide a

favorable example to other nations.

(2) Expand current restrictions on foreign

shipping engaging in commerce with Cuba by

closing United States ports to ail ships of

any shipping line which continues to send any

ships to Cuban ports.

(3) Both through the AS and bilaterally, request

Latin American countries to prohibit ships arriving

from or departing for Cuba from embarking or disem-

barking passengers in their ports.

(4) Both through the OAS and bilaterally,

request Latin American countries to deny their

ports

to ships of Cuban registry.

d. Propaganda Actions

Pursue a hemisphere-wide publicity campaign

to expose the scope and purpose of Cuban training

of the nationals of other countries for sub-

versive purposes, in order to discourage pro-

spective trainees and impress the governments

and the peoples concerned with the urgent

need to halt the travel of Latin American

nationals to Cuba.:

2. Longer Range Actions

The following actions should also be undertaken

without delay. Their ultimate results may be

of far

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reaching importance, but probably will be longer in

realization.

a. Political Actions

(1) Renew and intensify bilateral negotiations

with

the five Latin American governments which

have not done so to sever diplomatic relations with

Cuba.

(2) Through bilateral negotiations press countries

with inadequate legal restrictions on travel to

Cuba to adopt laws enabling the prohibition of such

travel and providing severe penalties for evasion.

Recommend that rewards be offered for identification

of evaders

(3) In separate diplomatic approaches to each

country, reiterate the need for full and effective

cooperation with appropriate AS bodies, and b1-

laterally among the several states, in

the inter-

change of information concerning travel of persons

to Cuba and other Castro-Communist subversive:

activities.

(4) Propose periodic regional or sub-regional

meetings of ministers of Government of the

American Republics to review the implementation

of steps taken by them to combat movement of

subversives in the Caribbean.

(5) Urge other Latin American nations to

negotiate separately and/or collectively with Mexico

Uruguay, Brazil, Bolivia and Chile in order to en-

list cooperation in adopting specific measures to

prevent the movement through their countries of

third country personnel to and from Cuba.

b. Intelligence Actions

Intensify our action in making available to each

country selected intelligence concerning the

extent,

nature, and insidious implications,

of Cuban sub

versive activities, as consistent with the require-

ment to protect our own intelligence program.

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reaching importance, but probably will be longer in

realization.

a. Political Actions

(1) Renew and intensify bilateral negotiations

with the five Latin American governments which

have not done so to sever diplomatic relations with

Cuba.

(2) Through bilateral negotiations press countries

with inadequate legal restrictions on travel to

Cuba to adopt laws enabling the prohibition of such

travel and providing severe penalties for evasion.

Recommend that rewards be offered for identification

of evaders.

(3) In separate diplomatic approaches to each

country, reiterate the need for full and effective

cooperation with appropriate OAS bodies, and bi

laterally among the several states, in the Inter-

change of information concerning travel of persons

to Cuba and other Castro-Communist subversive

activities.

(4) Propose periodic regional or sub-regional

meetings of ministers of Government of the

American Republics to review the implementation

of steps taken by them to combat movement of

subversives

in the Caribbean.

(5) Urge other Latin American nations to

negotiate separately and/or collectively with Mexico

Uruguay, Brazil, Bolivia and Chile in order to en-

list cooperation in adopting specific measures to

prevent the movement through their countries of

third country personnel to and from Cuba.

b. Intelligence Actions

Intensify our action in making available to each

country selected intelligence concerning the extent,

nature, and insidious implications, of Cuban sub-

versive activities, as consistent with the require-

ment to protect our own intelligence program.

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c. Administrative Actions

(1) Encourage Latin American governments to 1nst1-

tute administrative procedures, such as exhaustive:

examination of manifests, air-worthiness

checks of

alrcraft,

baggage inspection and inspection of health

and other documents, all designed deliberately to

delay and otherwise make difficult the carrying of

passengers to Cuba.

(2) Request governments of Latin Américan countries

which persist in maintaining diplomatic relations

with Cuba to expose the falsification of travel doou-

ments by Cuban

embassies or consulates, and take

punitive measures, such as the expulsion of Cuban

quested.

(3) Intensify technical assistance to Latin

American countries in improving immigration ano

customs controls.

d. Actions Related to Common Carriers

(1) Persuade Mexico to halt Cubana Airlines

service.

If unable to do so,

seek to persuade

Mexico to refuse the introduction of Soviet-made air-

craft in the Havana-Mexico City route on technical

grounds.

This will create an obstacle to Cubana,

since the Britannia aircraft now used are falling

into disrepair.

(2) Request again of Great Britain, Canada, and

any other potential supplier that they cut off the

supply of spare parts for Cuba's Britannia aircraft.

(3) Conduct negotiations with the Netherlands,

Mexico, Calada

and Spain to persuade those countries

to stop, or refrain from reestablishing, commercial

air flights to Cuba.

Enlist the cooperation of

other Western Hemisphere countries normally pro-

viding terminal service for any of the airlines in-

volved, such as Venezuela and Trinidad, in applying

pressure.

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e, Propaganda Actions

(1) Intensify USIA and CIA Input of propaganda

in Latin American public information media discredit

Ing the Cuban training effort, exposing the hazard

which it holds for Latin American tranquility, and

discrediting persons who have undergone subversive

training, in order to discourage possible volunteers

and develop popular opposition to such activities.

(2) Identify returned trainees

who are dis-

satisfied with their Cuban training experience and

exploit their capabilities for provision of intelli-

gence and propaganda material for exposing and

discrediting Castro-Communist subversive activities.

(3) Initiate a publicity campaign throughout

Latin America, not attributable to the United States,

which focuses unfavorably on the use of Mexican,

Uruguayan, Brazilian, and Chilean transit facilities

for movement of persons of other. countries

to and

from Cuba for subversive purposes.

3. Organization of American States (OAS) Actions

In view of the important political, psychological,

and, hopefully, material benefits to be derivea from

any success achieved through the OAS in combatting

Cuban subversive activity, the following measures

should be undertaken by the United States in that body,

at times and under circumstances which give regard to

the need to preserve hemispheric solidarity, and give

recognition to the fact that progress will probably

be slow.?

a. Pursue adoption by the OAS of a resolution

calling upon all member states to sever diplomatic

relations with Cuba, thus impeding the travel of

subversives to Cuba by legal means, and at the same

time, creating serious obstacles to other related

Cuban subversive activities..

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b. Propose recommendations by the OAS to member

governments of a program of

steps, on both the

national and international levels, to control

travel by their nationals to Cuba, utilizing the

proposals in the report by the Special Consultative

Committee on Security (SCCS) as well as the specific

recommendations set forth herein.

C= Once the initial comprehensive program in

bo above is undertaken, utilize the appropriate

DAs bodies to follow up on implementation through

such means as multilateral exchange of information,

meeting of experts, and utilization by Individual

countries of the services of the Special Consulta-

tive. Committee on Security.

¿. Propose adoption by the lAs of a resolution,

binding upon all member states, to terminate

regular air and

maritime carrier traffic with

Cuba.

V. Actions Concerning Illegal Travel

As the actions outlined in the preceding sections

become effective, one of the results will be to force

the hitherto legal travel into clandestine channels.

It may.

therefore, be expected that measures to

impede illegal movement will acquire steadily in-

creasing importance.

The steps proposed herein are listed, as in the

preceding section, in terms of immediate impact pro-

jects which promise early and visible results, and

longer range projects which, while of great importance;

cannot be expected to mature as rapidly.'

1, Immediate Impact Actions

a. Intelligence Actions

(1) Increase greatly our penetration and

other intelligence efforts to identify persons

engaging in illegal travel to Cuba, and

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determine routes and methods employed.: Report

selected information, consistent with the

requirement for protecting our own intelligence

program, to host government.

(2) Utilize US intelligence capabilities to

determine the nature and extent of clandestine

aircraft and small boat traffic between Cuba

and

other countries in the Caribbean area, with

special attention to Mexico, Honduras, Jamaica,

Haiti and

the Dominican Republic.

Use evidence

obtained to persuade governments concerned to

institute surveillance and other control measures.

D. Surveillance and Reporting Actions

(1) Continue current US sea and air sur-

veillance of the Caribbean area contiguous to

Cuba®

(2) Continue the development, at high

priority, of US communications in Latin America,

in order

to improve alerting, reporting and

control capabilities.

(3) Establish intelligence centers at

Caribbean Command and Caribbean Sea Frontier

Headquarters for rapid processing and dissemi-

nation to countries concerned via the American

Ambassadors, of intelligence on the movement

of subversives.

2. Longer Range Actions

a. Surveillance Actions

(1) Establish a coordinated Caribbean sur

veillance system involving:

(a) Continued close-in surveillance.of

Cuba by US forces.

(b) A US military alerting system, by

which intelligence of subversive movement will

be rapidly transmitted to the American

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Ambassadors to countries concerned through

intelligence centers at Caribbean Command

and Caribbean Sea Frontier Headquarters of

the Atlantic Command.

(c) A unilateral surveillance and inter-

ception effort by each country in its own

territorial waters.

(d) US assistance in final interception

in territorial waters, upon request by the

country concerned.

b. US Military Assistance Actions

(1) Establish Military Assistance objectives

and planning guidance to provide selected

countries, especially in the Caribbean and

Central American area, with the necessary small

patrol craft,

training and logistical support,

including fuel for operations if required,. to

enable these countries to establish an effective

patrol of their own coasts.

Provide necessary

funds in addition to present programs.

(2) Provide US Navy, Air Force and Coast

Guard training assistance, as required, to

develop or improve coastal patrol capabilities

of Latin American military forces.: This may

take the form of a Canal Zone training activity,

employment of mobile training teams, or a com-

bination of both.

(3): Urge the accelerated improvement of

internal security forces and police forces in

Latin American countries and the intensification

of patrol and intelligence activities aimed at

preventing clandestine departures and apprehending

returned trainees,

Provide equipment, training

and advice as required.

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FUNDS

CUBA

CONTROLS ON THE MOVEMENT OF FUNDS

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

I.

Introduction

II.

Nature and Scope of the Problem

1. General Methods of Transferring Convertible

Currency

2. Introduction by Individual Travellers

3. Transfers through Banking Institutiong

4. Transfers by Diplomatic Personnel

5. Transfers through Trade Subterfuge

6. Relative Importance of Transfer Methods

III."Actions Recommended

2

3

4

5

5

6

6

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CUBA

DIRECT CONTROLS ON THE MOVEMENT OF FUNDS TO AND

I.

Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to recommend measures

which will impose direct controls upon the flow of funds

from Cuba to and

within other Latin American countries.

We possess evidence that Cuba is providing financial

support to subversive campaigns in other Latin American

countries, but the full dimensions of the problem, in

terms of

amounts involved and methods used, are not

We need more information. The difficulty with

which this information is procured underscores the prob-

lems of counter-measures, since funds can be transferred

internationally or acquired locally in many ways, all

difficult to detect and harder to prevent. While we

be able to diminish the flow through some channels

and increase the difficulty of Castro's subversive

financial operations in others, we cannot hope to suc

ceed in stopping them altogether, and even if this were

feasible, the possibility of financial support of

subversion by the USSR

and other Bloc nations

would remain.

Nevertheless, it should not be concluded that

the impediments recommended herein are of insufficient

importance to warrant their imposition. Impediments

to the movement of funds can be imposed at relatively

little cost to the United states, and they will have

some effect in interfering with Castro's pursuit, through

subversion, of his basic objective of gaining communist

allies in Latin America. This effect could be very

significant when added to others that we hope to achieve

through our over-all anti-subversion program.

In examining this problem, 1t quickly became

evident that the most effective countermeasures are to

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be found in the area of reducing the capability of

Cuba to acquire reserves of free world convertible

currencies, such as U.S. dollars, Canadian dollars,

rounds sterling, swiss francs, etc. Cuban pesos are

usable only in Cuba. They are not convertible to any

other currency and

are therefore of little if any value

elsewhere in the world. Cuba's reserves of foreign

exchange, moreover, have been steadily diminishing

now estimated to stand at not more than $25

million to $50 million.

If we are willing to intensify

our efforts to weaken the Cuban economy, these foreign

exchange reserves can be reduced further. However, it

must notobe overlooked that: the soviet Union can provide

foreign exchange for Cuban use.

While of transcendent importance, this question

of diminishing Cuba's foreign exchange through economic

measures is properly related to the larger objective of

weakening the economic position of Castro-Communist

Cuba, and thus advancing further toward the goal of

causing

the downfall of the Communist government. As

progress

1s realized in this broad endeavor,. there wit

se a reduction in Castro's ability to finance subver

sive

operations in the Hemisphere.

The matter of intensifying our economic warfare

against cuba is regarded, however, as beyond the

purview of this committee. Therefore, the program of

actions recommended in this paper has

been directed

to the transfer of funds. This includes physical

transfers, transfers through bank transactions and

transfers by subterfuge in connection with trade.

IT.

Nature and Scope of the Problem

1. The Castro regime may transfer convertible

currency

to subversives in other Latin American

countries by four general methods:

a. Introduction by hand; by legal or 1llegal

travellers.

b. Transfers through international banking

institutions.

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c. Introduction by Cuban or Bloc diplomatic

personnel, including couriers.

d. The practice of subterfuge in connection with

International business transactions.

These methods are discussed in following paragraphs, along

with steps which might be undertaken to diminish the

effectiveness of each.

2. Introduction of Funds, by Hand, by Individual

Travellers

This is the least convenient and least dependable

method in terms of the hazard of theft, loss, misappropria-

tion, confiscation or extortion. Nevertheless, we have

evidence that this technique is employed.

Funds. can be

introduced by legal travellers, where there are no effec-

tive controls, or they can be introduced by smuggling.

With respect

to smuggled funds, it is noted that the

measures previously approved for control of illegal

travel will likewise be effective in impeding the illegal

movement of funds by such persons. In like manner, the

measures previously approved for control of legal travel

will affect the movement of funds by persons in that

category.

Additional restrictions on the introduction of

tunds py legal travellers might be adopted by Latin

American countries, in the form of limitations on amounts

or administrative requirements for declaration of sums

in hand. However, recommendation on our part to

institute such controls would be contrary to our estab-

lished policy of encouraging the Latin American nations

to maintain free exchange systems. These countries

need foreign exchange, and would consequently be hesi-

tant to adopt any actions which would limit their means

of acquiring it.

Additionally, the adoption of controls

on the importation of foreign exchange by Latin American

nations would impose an undesirable burden on legiti-

mate business and other travel from the United States,

as well as from other friendly nations.

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ravellers, it is concluded that little more should be.

done at this time than is currently in motion.

3. Transfers through Banking Institutions

In adaition to physical transfers of currency,

Cuba can transfer funds

to subversives in Latin America

through banking institutions, either by cable or by mail.

Cuba's reserves of foreign exchange are held principally..

in the State Bank of Russia, the Moscow Narodny Bank in

London, the banque Comerciale pour 1/Europe du Nord

(a Communist owned institution) in Paris, the Bank Intra

of Switzerland, the Bank of Montreal and the Royal Bank

of Canada.

Funds from these deposits are transmitted

on order of the National Bank of Cuba, which controls

all of the accounts.

U.S. dollars are the principal currency used in

Latin America. The transfer of dollars from these

overseas accounts to subversives in Latin American

countries can be impeded, in

a significant degree,

through

the Institution by the United States of blocking controls

against Cuba, under section 5(b) of the Trading with the

Enemy Act.

This blocking action would prohibit all

transactions with Cuba by persons or institutions sub-

ject to the jurisdiction of the United States, and

would effectively interrupt Cuban movement of U.S.

dollars

to Latin America through any U.S. bạnk.

Movement by Cuba of dollars through banks of

third countries would also be greatly diminished by this

action.

It is known and generally accepted in inter-

national banking circles, that it 1s standing U.S. policy

that any foreign bank which transfers dollars through

U.S. banks in behalf of a blocked country is subject

to having its own U.S. accounts blocked.

Because of

the

importance of U.S. banks in international trade, foreign

banks cannot afford such a restriction.

This policy

has been effective in the past, having deterred foreign

banks, even those of communist countries, from engaging

in dollar transactions on behalf of Communist, China,

which have been blocked by the U.S. for over twelve

years.

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Nith U.s. dollar channels blocked, other, less

lesirable, avenues would remain open to cuba for bank

transfer of convertible currencies such as Sterling,

Swiss francs, Canadian dollars, etc. If the British

and Canadians could be persuaded to prohibit remit-

tances

in their currencies in behalf of Cuba, the

latter's capability to move funds through banking

channels would be further curtailed, and transfers in

ther currencies, such as swiss francs, would be

relatively easy to detect and monitor.

While it is

unlikely that British and Canadian cooperation would be

forthcoming in this degree, these countries could still

make a valuable contribution to the campaign against

Castro-Communist subversion by providing intelligence

concerning major transactions in their currencies by

Cuba.

4. Transfers by Diplomatic Personnel

We know that convertible currencies have been

carried to Latin American countries illegally by

diplomatic representatives and couriers of both Cuba

and the Bloc countries, under the protection of their

diplomatic immunity. This form of transfer can be

diminished through the rupture of diplomatic relations

with cuba by those countries in Latin America which

have not already taken such action. However, the

diplomatic facilities of other Bloc countries would

probably remain available to Cuba in some Latin American

nations.

5. Transfers Through Trade Subterfuge

An effective method of disguising transfers of

funds for subversive purposes is to give such transfers

the appearance of legitimate payments for items received

in trade.

In one technique, goods may be sent to a

Cuban addressee by a subversive in the export-import

business in a Latin American country bearing an erroneous

invoice.

A shipment having an actual value of $10,000

can be invoiced and paid for at $12,000; thus achieving

a direct transfer of $2,000 from Cuba to the Latin

American country whence

the shipment originated. Such

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transfers of funds could be eliminated only by the

interruption of all trade between Cuba and other Latin

American countries. And even if this were achieved,

the same

technique

could be used, although at greater

cost and with much more difficulty, to transfer Cuban

funds to latin America via France, for example, through

a third party French Communist import-export firm.

Another commercial technique for transferring

funds from Cuba directly to Latin America, through trade,

is by means of uncompensated exports:

an example, a

Cuban

source might send $5,000 worth of Cuban publica-

tions to a leftist bookstore in Chile.

The bookstore

would not pay cuba for the publication, but instead

would use the proceeds of the sale for subversive pur-

poses.

This method also could be fully controlled

only by an interruption of trade with Cuba.

6. Relative Importance of Transfer Methods

All of the above mechanisms are usable, and pro-

bably all are employed now.

However, since large sums

can now be transferred readily through banking institutions,

with small risk of loss or exposure, this methoa is

considered to be the most significant and is deserving

of the greatest attention in an action program. Next

in importance probably is the transfer of currencies

by diplomatic personnel - a procedure involving small

risk of loss or exposure.

Transfers by legal or

illegal travellers are considered to be less important

in view of the risks involved, the physical limitations

on amounts which can be carried by individuals and the

availability of other means.

Trade subterfuge would

presently appear to be of least significance an any

such arrangements involve more difficulties

of the other available methods.

III.

Actions Recommended

1. The actions

proposed herein, when added to those

already proposed for controlling

the movement of

sub-

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versive persons, propaganda and arms, will serve to

Inhibit directly Cuba's effectiveness in financing sub-

version in Latin America.

It must be acknowledged how-

ever, that Cuba's efforts to provide convertible currency

to subversives in other Latin American countries

cannot

be rendered wholly ineffective by these measures alone.

Complementary steps designed to reduce the ability of

cuba to acquire foreign exchange will also be required

to constitute a

full attack on the problem.

2. The following actions are recommended as

promising to have some

significant effect:

a. Establish regulations blocking

(1) the unlicensed transfer of U.S. dollars

to Cuba;

(2) the unlicensed transfer of U.S. dollars

directly or indirectly from Cuban accounts to

free world countries; and

(3) a11 other unlicensed transactions

with cuba or cuban nationals, or transactions

involving property in which there is a Cuban:

interest.

These actions should be taken only following the

development of detailed implementing instructions

by the State and Ireasury Departments and their

final evaluation in light of other considerations

which bear on the matter.

b. Seek opportunities to pursuade Latin American

nations which have not done so to sever diplomatic

relations

with Cuba.

c. Increase intelligence efforts to gain

information concerning:

(1) the size and location of Cuban accounts

in free world banking institutions;

DOD

SUPPORT

(DIA)

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(2) transfers of funds from these accounts

to recipients in Latin America; and

(3) Cuban movement of currencies to other

Latin

American countries by legal and illegal

travellers, including diplomatic personnel.

d. Where locally feasible, encourage Latin

American nations to impound funds of know Castro-

Communist organizations.

e. Encourage Latin American countries to enlist

the cooperation of their financial institutions

in detecting suspicious accounts and in exposing

transfers of funds for subversive purposes.

f. Seek, using appropriate means, to induce

Canada, Great Britain, and other NATO countries

to provide information on the direct or indirect

transfer of significant amounts of their currencies

by Cuba or Cuban nationals to other Latin Américan

countries.

g. As applicable, persuade Latin American

countries to sever all direct or indirect trade

relations with cuba, except those involving sale

to Cuba of foodstuffs and medicines.

h. Encourage Latin American countries to

establish surveillance of known or suspected

Communist controlled businesses to inhibit trans-

fers of funds to subversives through such estab-

lishments.

i. Encourage Latin American countries to ex-.

pose and publicize illegal transfers of funds

for subversive purposes.

DOD

SUPPORT

(OIA)

DOD

SUPPORT

(DIA)

DOD

SUPPORT

(DIA)

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CUBA

THE MOVEMENT OF PROPAGANDA MATERIALS

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Introduction

II. Nature and Scope of the Problem

M1.

Direct Actions to Impede Legal Movement

of Propaganda Materials

1. Political Actions

2. Intelligence Actions

3. Covert Actions

IV.

Direct Actions to Impede Illegal Movement

of Propaganda Materials

1. Intelligence Actions

2. Surveillance and Reporting Action

3. Political Action

4. Technical Assistance Actions

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4

4

5

5

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CUBA

MOVEMENT OF PROPAGANDA MATERIALS

1. Introduction

The actions proposed herein are designed to impede

the movement of Communist propaganda materials from Cuba

to and within Latin American countries. They complement

the basic actions

relating to control of movement of sub-

versive trainees:

to and from Cuba, which actions are

erally applicable in the solution of this problem

Las well.

As in the

companion measures for control of the movement

of subversive trainees, successful execution of the actions

proposed below will reduce the flow of propaganda materials

but

will not eliminate it entirely.

Communist Cuba has many legitimate outlets through

which propaganda materials flow.

As these legitimate

outlets are blocked by the initial steps herein proposed,

it will be necessary for the Cuban propagandists and their

sympathizers elsewhere to turn from the mass exportation

of materials to the production and dissemination of the

same materials in a clandestine environment within the

several Latin American countries. Of the two threats, the

11l1cit production of propaganda materials in each country

will be by far the more difficult to abate.

In combatting these threats; one of the most power

ful factors is the influence of our own information and

counter-propaganda efforts, which USIA and CIA have in-

creased greatly during the

past two years.

This paper,

however, is concerned wholly with direct actions; actions

designed to impede the movement of propaganda materials

to and within Latin America.

II. Nature and Scope of the Problem

While the Castro image has

faded

somewhat in Latin

America, and the attraction of Cuba as a model has dimin

ished, the susceptibility of the Latin American people to

communist propaganda remains high.

The basic social and

economic factors which have made this true in the past

have not greatly altered, and the variety and quantity of

propaganda materials with which the Latin Americans are

now beset are impressive, as exemplified in the many

millions of dollars which the communists

are estimated to

be investing in the project annually. It is a large pro-

gram and it presents a continuing threat to the tran-

quility of Latin America.

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Our efforts to combat the problem, moreover, are

complicated by the fact that freedom of

thought, express-

Ion and press are generally highly regarded in Latin

America, albeit not universally honored, and any proposals

to reduce the flow of Castro-Communist subversive materials

must be influenced by this fact.

Otherwise the United

States may find itself indicted for fostering police-

state methods, a charge which could allenate many of the

Latin Americans we seek to influence.

For the purpose of this paper, propaganda materials

Include radio program scripts, tapes and recordings, printed

materials, (posters, pamphlets, magazines, leaflets, books,

newspapers, news service output), motion pictures,

dup11-

cating or reproducing equipment, electronic communications

equipment, and printing resources, particularly paper stock-

piles.

However, to be complete, "movement of propaganda

materials" must extend also to publications which are hand-

carried Into a country by legal or illegal travellers for

subsequent reproduction.

It must also include materials

transmitted through Cuban and Soviet Bloc diplomatic

channels, shipments via postal channels, quantities intro

duced through smuggling operations; oral

transmission of

propaganda guidance by individual travellers or by Radio

Havana, and the dissemination of communist oriented news

by Prensa Latina, the official Cuban news agency, for re-

Finally to be considered are

thematic guidance, which can be reproduced and exploited

locally by returning trainees, front groups and sympathetic

publications and, in some countries such as Mexico, Argen-

tina and Uruguay, the products of those commercial estab-

lishments which regularly print or broadcast pro-Castro-

Communist materials as a matter of policy or ideological

conviction.

Press

and Publications

There are 326 Communist and pro-Communist newspapers

and periodicals in Latin America, and infiltration of

the

democratic press, coupled with the non-critical attitudes

of some newspapermen, increases greatly the diffusion of

the Cuban propaganda

line.

There are 228 Communist-öriented

publishing houses and bookstores in Latin America, serving

as outlets not only for 30 different Cuban periodicals, but

for a large variety of other Communist printed material:

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Every Latin American country except the Dominican

Republic, Paraguay, Nicaragua, and Venezuela permits

these bookshops to operate.

Many of them offer publi-

cations at very low prices or give away several book.

with the purchase of

one, and

easy credit terms are

available.

Excluding TASS and the New China News Agency (NCNA.),

Prensa Latina is the principal Communist news agency in

Latin

America.

It operates openly, although not entirely

without restriction, In ten countries -- Bolivia, Brazil)

Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Costa Rica, Honduras, Mexico,

Panama and Uruguay. While most users of Prensa Latina

releases are covert or overt Communists, some non-Communist

media make unattributed use of Prensa Latina releases.

This is especially true of radio broadcasts:

All of this publication activity is essentially

overt.

However, decrees banning Communist propaganda

have not prevented the clandestine publications and distri-

bution of periodicals and books in some countries, and

propaganda materials continue to seek entry through the

mails. In Panama, for example, postal and customs authori-

ties destroy an average of 12 tons of Cuban propaganda per

month. Another. ten tons per month is seized and destroyed

in Costa Rica. This suggests the further quantities, per-

haps larger, may be finding

countries.

hay be ronethe their

their way into these and other

Radio

Short wave radio is the principal direct mass audience

medium used by Cuba to carry subversive propaganda to Latin

America. The Castro regime has constantly increased Radio

Havana's short wave broadcasts to Latin America to a current

level of 115:30 hours per week.

Cultural Activities

Penetration under the guise of cultural activities is

a favored Communist propaganda technique in Latin America,

2::1..

where there are now some 64 Cuban binational centers and:

Friendship Societies.

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F1lms

Feature films and short documentaries produced by the

Cuban Institute of Motion Picture Art and Industry play a

direct propaganda role.

These films are shown primarily in

binational centers, pro-Communist labor and student groups,

and in private or clandestine meetings..

It will be seen from this brief review that Latin

America 1s the target of a broad-scale propaganda program,

comprising not only propaganda materials but including

also the ideas, the knowledge and the resources which are

necessary

to make

those materials effective:

III. Direct Actions to Impede the Legal Movement of

Propaganda Materials

Presented below is a summary of actions contemplated

to impede the

legal movement of propaganda materials from

Cuba to and within Latin American countries.. For

the pur-

pose of this paper, legal movement is defined as movement

by recognized private and governmental carriers and communi-

cations, as well as postal systems and diplomatic pouching.

These actions offer promise of achieving early and

effective results in some Latin American countries, but

they do not have universal application, and those which may

be feasible in one country may not be necessary or feasible

in another.

1. Political Actions

a. Induce news media to diminish the utilization of

Prensa Latina.

b. Persuade those governments which receive Cuban

and Bloc diplomatic missions to maintain close

surveillance over the propaganda activities of the

Communist embassies with a view toward prohibiting

abuses of diplomatic privilege for subversive

purposes.

c. As applicable and feasible, Induce Latin

American countries to:

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(1) Adopt adequate internal security legislation

to provide severe penalties for any person engaging

in dissemination of Cuban-Communist propaganda

which inspires terrorism or proposes the overthrow.

of the legal government by force and violence.

(2) Preclude attendance of Cuban delegates at

International meetings held in Latin America.

(Delegates are propaganda disseminators.)

2. Intelligence Actions

a. Continue U.S. intelligence efforts in each

country to identify Individuals, organizations and

facilities involved in propaganda importation,

reproduction and/or dissemination; make avallable to

each country selected Intelligence concerning these

individuals, organizations and their activities.

b. Encourage each country in which the Communist

Party 18 1llegal to offer rewards for information

leading to Interception of Castro-Communist propa-

ganda and, in countries where the Communist party 1s

Legal, for conviction of persons supplying or

disseminating propaganda materials considered dan-

gerous to the country's tranquility.

c. In separate diplomatic approaches to each

country, urge full and effective cooperation, with

the appropriate organs of the OAS and bilaterally

among the several nations; in the interchange of

information

concerning movement of propaganda

materials.

d. Persuade Latin American countries to report

promptly to the diplomatic mission of the country

concerned, the identity of any national of that

country who arrives from Cuba and who is discovered

the dan pron ca

to have been carrying Communist propaganda materials.

3. Covert Actions

a. Disrupt the reproduction and distribution of

propaganda materials, and the procurement and delivery

of related supplies and equipment.

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bo Seek opportunities to induce Latin American

printing craftsmen to deface, destroy, or misprint

Castro-Communist propaganda in the process of re-

production.

c. Digrupt Castro-Communist sponsored labor and

youth congresses, industrial and agricultural

exhibits in Latin American countries.

a. Maintain

of increase pressures on media owners,

local advertising agencies and film producers and/or

distributors who accept Communist materials.

e. Dissuade US and local business firms from

advertising in Latin American media which carry

pro-Communist materials; provide informally to

Us firms, for information, lists of such media

In order to encourage their support of a non-

Communist press.

I. Inhibit the spread of Cuban and Bloc binational

centers and Friendship Societies in Latin America by

an active program to expose their subversive activities

and objectives.

g. Where it can be determined that expenditure

of the funds is clearly justified, provide financial

support to selected non-Communist news media requiring

assistance in

aligned publications which have significant cir

culation or impact.

h. Induce Latin American countries to organize

surveillance over in-country sources of newsprint

and related supplies, and deny or inhibit the use

of these supplies for printing Communist materials.

IV.

Direct Actions to Impede Illegal Movement of

Propaganda Material

Many of the actions outlined in Section III related

to the legal movement of materials will serve also to

restrict 1llegal movement.

Additional measures designed

specifically to impede clandestine traffic are enumerated

below.

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1. Intelligence Actions

a. Use penetration and other Intelligence techniques

to identify efforts to move propaganda materials from

Cuba to and/or within Latin American countries; deter-

mine routes and methods employed; report selected

Information, consistent with requirements for protect-

ing our own

Intelligence program, to the governments

concerned.

b. Utilize the U.S. Intelligence community to

determine the nature and

extent. of clandestine alr

craft and small boat traffic between Cuba and other

countries in the Caribbean and Central American area,:

giving particular attention to Mexico, Honduras,

Jamaica, Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Use the

evidence obtained to induce the governments concerned

to initiate surveillance and other control measures

aimed at interception of propaganda materials.

2. Surveillance and Reporting Action

Exploit the mechanism of the Caribbean surveillance

system, approved by the President in the study on

movement of personnel, for discovering and impeding

the movement of propaganda materials by 11l1c1t means.

3. Political Action

Where legally feasible to do so, induce each Latin

American country to improve its police procedures

designed to expose the subversive Communist propaganda

apparatus in that country, and to detect and eliminate

corrupt officials who

permit 1ll1cit shipment of

propaganda materials.

4. Technical Assistance Actions

a. Provide technical assistance, where requested

to enable Latin American governments to locate

clandestine transmitters.

b.

Assist in the accelerated Improvement of the

capabilities of Latin American internal security

forces, especially those patrol and Intelligence

activities whose function is the prevention of clan-

destine propaganda activities. Provide equipment,

training and advice as required.

DOD

SUPPORT

DIA

AND

DOD

SUPPORT

(DIA)

DOD

SUPPORT

DCA)

(DIA

DOD

COSD, TCS,

SveS, DIA,

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CUBA

CONTROL OF THE MOVEMENT OF ARMS

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

1

I..

Introduction

II.

Nature and Scope of the Problem

IÏI.

Actions Concerning Legal Arms Movement 2

1. Intelligence Actions

2. Political and Administrative Actions

IV. Actions Concerning Illegal Arms Traffic

1. Training, Orientation and Indoctrina-

tion of Latin American Personnel

2. Intelligence Actions

3. Political and Administrative Actions

4. Propaganda Actions

5. Military Actions

6. Covert Actions

3

3

3

4

4

5

6

6

6

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CUBA

DIRECT CONTROL OF THE MOVEMENT OF ARMS TO AND

WITHIN LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES

I.

Introduction

There is presented herein an action program aimed

at controlling

the movement of arms to and within Latin

American countries through inhibitions on movement of

and controls over the movement of the critical components

which are essential to the local manufacture of weapons.

Is success 1s to be achieved in reducing theirarms"

for subversive purposes in Latin America, the term

cannot be limited to firearms in the narrow sense.

In

addition, it must include explosives, fuzes, detonators

and demolition equipment; all the weapons of hand-to-

hand combat; grenades and mines; underwater demolition

equipment; lethal gases, chemicals and instruments

for their

projection; undercarriages and transportable

appendages for automatic weapons, mortars and other

heavy weapons; spare parts, special tools and equipment

for maintenance of

weapons; portable radar and fire

control equipment; special

sabotage devices; and printed

instructional material relating to any of the items

listed above,

or relating to techniques for their em-

ployment in sabotage and demolition.

II.

Nature and scope of the Proptem

Our information regarding traffic in arms between

Cuba and the remainder of Latin America is extremely

limited. The Central Intelligence Agency and the

Defense Intelligence Agency both conclude that Cuba is

probably not now sending significant quantities of

weapons to Latin American insurgents. Rather the Cubans

appear thus far to have followed common guerrilla practice

in the matter of firearms supply, instructing the sub-

versive trainees who attend indoctrination in Cuba to

obtain weapons by theft in their own countries, or to

fabricate them locally, rather than to rely upon

supplies provided from Cuba or elsewhere.

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Nevertheless, it would be imprudent to assume that

the Castro government will not or cannot export arms to

Latin America when to do so will serve its purposes.

The very large quantities of US arms furnished to pre-

Castro Cuban governments, those weapons collected from

the Cuban people in 1961, and the sizeable Bloc arms

shipments delivered to Cuba since that time, provide

the Castro regime with large stocks which

are available

for transfer to subversives in other countries, should

a decision be made to do so.

Moreover, Cuba has a con-

siderable air fleet and a large array of small craft.

These unite with Latin America's long, unguarded coasts,

numerous isolated landing fields and inadequate local

security forces, to make the threat of illicit arms

shipment a considerable one.

On the basis of these facts it is concluded that

the immediate problems with respect to arms movement

are twofold:. to prevent internal assembly of illegal

arms and their distribution in and between Latin American

countries, while at the same time improving our

capability to impede the movement of arms to those

countries from Cuba.

It is to be noted that, with respect to a number

of Latin American countries,

national policy decisions

are a

precondition to many of the actions proposed

below.

These countries will have to find the resolution

to deal much more firmly with the general problem of

Castro-Communist subversive activities than they have

in the past if the proposed actions are to be effective.

III. Actions Concerning Legal Arms Movement

For the purpose of this paper, legal arms move-

ment is considered to be the movement of weapons and

other instruments of: violence or the special materials

from which they are made, resulting from overt orders

placed by Latin American governments or private groups,

and then subsequently shipped openly.

Many of the actions, which have previously been

approved with respect to controlling the movement of

subversive personnel, will have a direct application

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•to the arms control problem. Listed below,

in addition,

are proposed courses of action contemplated specifically

co impede legitimate arms traffic to, within and betweer

latin American countries for subversive purposes.

•1. Intelligence Actions

Old supt

a. Intensify US intelligence efforts in each DiASe

Latin American country to determine the final

recipients of legal arms purchases and, consistent

with our own intelligence requirements, make this

information avallable to the host government.

b. Monitor covertly, suspected sources of local

weapons manufacture (machine shôps, metal fabri-

cators, foundries). Report positive findings to

host government, where appropriate.

2. Political and Administrative Actions

a. Persuade each Latin American country to

confirm the accuracy of cargo manifests of all

ships and aircraft departing for or arriving

from Cuba, and to intensify formal inspection of

all cargo, regardless of country or origin, for

munitions

materials.

b. Provide further US technical assistance to

Latin American countries to improve customs pro-

cedures and controls for ports, airfields and

border stations..

c. Through the US diplomatic mission in each

Latin American country, impress upon the appro-

priate ministries the need for ensuring the bona

dealers, brokers,

explosives,

and confirming that they are not communist relay

points.

IV.. Actions Concerning Illegal Arms Traffic

Listed below are proposed actions designed to

impede the illicit fabrication,

transportation and dis

tribution of arms, in the broad connotation of the

term

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as presented in Section I.

By virtue of their specific

nature, the actions do not have universal application,

and those which may be effective in one country may

not be necessary or feasible in another.

1. Training, Orientation; Indoctrination of Latin

American Personnel

Offer US assistance to Latin American nations

in initiating training programs to educate law

enforcement, military, customs, border police,

and other officials in the technical aspects of

101t32n

arms control, to include creation of an awareness

of the characteristics of all mechanisms of

destruction and violence.

2. Intelligence Actions

a. Penetrate subversive elements or groups in

each Latin American country to acquire intelligence

concerning illicit arms manufacture and movement.

Provide the affected governments with this

information, as consistent with the requirement

to protect our own intelligence program. Assist

in disrupting such manufacture and movement by

covert means.

•b. Utilize the resources of the Us intelligence

community to determine the nature and extent of

clandestine aircraft and small boat traffic which

could be used for arms shipment from Cuba and

between other Latin American countries.

c. Propose bilateral arrangements providing for

the exchange of information on arms movement among

the US and Latin American countries, along the same

lines as proposed for.other information relating

to subversive personnel and propaganda movement.

d. Encourage Latin American countries to utilize

their private aircraft in Civil Air Patrol Programs

for the purpose of extending in-country surveillance

of coasts and borders.

DOD

SUPPORT

(DIA)

SUPPORT

DOP.

(DIA + SVES)

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3. Political and Administrative Actions

a. Urge Latin American countries to intensify

application of those internal law enforcement

measures which are designed to impede the illicit

traffic in arms.

Provide Us training and technical

assistance, as requested.

b. Encourage Latin American countries to offer

rewards for information concerning the location.of

arms caches and for positive identification.of

persons engaged in illegal arms manufacture or

traffic.

c .

Induce Latin American countries to expand

and intensify port, airfield and border inspection

of incoming and outgoing cargo for contraband arms.

d.

Request diplomatic missions to bring to the

attention of each Latin American state the necessity

for employing strict physical security measures

and reliable accountability procedures with respect

to all arms and ammunition issued to units of the

forces, militia and law enforcement units.

e. Where applicable, propose bilateral agree-

ments

among neighboring Iatin American countries

concerning establishment of cooperative procedures

to prevent illicit arms traffic.

f. Through bilateral or 0AS mechanisms, as

appropriate, encourage Latin American countries to:

(1) Re-examine and adjust, as necessary,

the licensing qualifications and procedures

for all companies

engaged in the manufacture,

transportation and sale of explosives and

firearms, to provide a ready basis

for con

trolling

their activities.

(2) Establish rigid control procedures for

the disposal of surplus and obsolescent arms

in use by armed forces and police.

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(OSA+JES)

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4. Propaganda Actions

a. Publicize confiscation of communist arms

caches, 1llegal arms movements, apprehension, con-

viction and'punishment of arms smugglers and illicit

arms manufacturers. Utilize news media, UN. and OAS

forums.

b. Continue exposure, in Latin American mass

media, of Castro Cuba as the focal point in the

International

conspiracy to undermine established

Latin

American governments by means of violence,

armed insurgency and terrorism.

S2G1: 73%

5. Military Actions

Exploit the mechanisms of the Caribbean sur-

veillance system, approved by the President ir

the

study on movement of personnel, to impede 1llicit

traffic in arms.

This will be

supported by the

revised military assistance guidance which was also

approved in the study on personnel movement.

6. Covert Actions

a. Where: favorable circumstances arise, provide for

supply to known indigenous communist groups of special-

ly prepared arms. which will malfunction in such a

manner as to cause injury to the user, and thus gene-

rate both doubts and fears among the communist sub-

versives involved.

b. Apply subtle sabotage to intercepted 11legal

arms shipments and permit them to proceed to desti-

nation.

::9°

c. Through agents, attempt to purchase arms from

suspected 1lliçit sources in Latin America, In order

to expose

these sources and to determine facts

concerning their method of delivery.

Also through

agents, attempt, to sedl arms, to expose illicit

purchasers.!.

•11.

:!.

DoD

hut to thie

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CUBA

SURVEILLANCE OF THE CARIBBEAN

ISTR VITT.T. AACT:

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

1.

Introduction

Nature and Scope of the Problem

General Considerations

Special Considerations

a. Detection and Identification

b. Interception

c. Intelligence and Communications

d. Command Arrangements

e. Funding and Logistical Arrangements

Ille

Attitude of the Latin American Nations

IV.: Actions

a. Multinational Actions to Control the

Surveillance Effort

b. Unilateral Surveillance Actions

c. Actions to Establish an Alerting System

d. Actions to Develop Effective Communications

System

1

2

2

3

3

*: 3

4

4

4

6

7

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CUBA

THE ORGANIZATION OF A CARIBBEAN SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM

Introduction

On 8 March 1963 the President approved the estab-

I1shment of a coordinated Caribbean

sea surveillance

system involving:

a.. Continued close-in surveillance of Cuba

by U

•So forces.

b. A U:s, milltary alerting system, by which

intelligence of subversive movement will be

rapidly transmitted to the United States American

Ambassadors to countries concerned, through in-

telligence centers at Caribbean Command and

Caribbean Sea Frontier Headquarters of the Atlantic

Command.

(The feasibility and desirability of

establishing these intelligence centers is being

studied further, on a priority basis.)

c. Seeking initiation of unilateral sur-'

veillance and interception efforts by each country

in its own territorial waters.

d. Vos: assistance in final interception in

territorial waters upon request of the country

concerned.

It is the purpose of this paper to present the

detailed actions required to put this decision into

practical effect, with emphasis particularly upon the

function of United States forces, and giving considera-

tion to the fact that the decision was addressed to

surveillance of surface movement only and not to the

surveillance of air activity.

Nature and Scope of the Problem

General Considerations

The thousands of ships and craft operating in

the Caribbean provide an excellent means for

clandestine movement of personnel, arms, equip-

ment and propaganda materials from Cuba

to the

other countries in the Caribbean, as well as

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between Caribbean countries. The many miles

of essentially unguarded coastline in the

area enhance further the

attractiveness of these

means of disseminating

elements of the Castro-

Communist program.

While our information on

the extent to which this procedure is now ex-

ploited

is meager, there is little question that

it constitutes at least a potential danger, one

that we must be prepared to meet.

The Caribbean surveillance system envisaged

herein must have the capability to:

a. Detect, in Cuban or international waters,

suspicious ships, and small craft, and

b. Identify and track these ships and craft

in international waters, until they can be

apprehended and inspected in the territorial

waters of the state which is the intended

destination or, alternatively, to

C. Detect, in territorial waters of a

Caribbean state, ships or crait bearing sub-

versive cargo,

and apprehend those vessels

prior to their escape into international

waters or into the territorial waters

of

another state.

Development of a program to meet the above

problems will be sharply affected by the fact that

that Central American countries have only limited

capabilities to patrol their own coastal waters

by sea or air. Their intelligence capability is

small and their communications resources are meager.

Special Considerations

a. Detection and Identification

Detection of suspicious surface travel can

result from visual sighting by air or surface

craft, radar contact or radio intercept. It

may derive from observation only, or may re-

sult from intelligence.

The identification of those surface vessels

which are actually transporting subversive cargo

can only be achieved by intercepting and

2

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searching

all suspicious subjects.

In the

absence of

a political decision permitting

such

operations in the open sea, this must

be accomplished in territorial waters.of

friendly countries, and will prove a costly

and burdensome undertaking.

In any event, effective detection and

identification within the jurisdiction of

friendly power, in the territorial waters or

ashore, will demand the coordinate use of

indigenous resources including naval forces,

air forces, military or paramilitary forces,

fishermen

and the local populace.

These re-

sources must be organized for rapid reaction

• to warnings of impending subversive activity.

b. Interception

suspicious targets which have been detected

and identified in international waters, or

those upon which advance intelligence has

materialized, could be shadowed to the limit

of the capabilities of sea and air forces

available, and the movement reported.

In

the absence of a political decision to auth-

orize visit and search on the high seas,

subsequent action on the high seas would

• be

confined to observation. In territorial

waters interception would be accomplished by

or with the consent of the country in whose

waters the interception occurs.

c. Intelligence ana Communications

The difficulties inherent in timely detection,

identification,

and interception of craft bent

on subversive missions point up the need for

intelligence on prospective movements coupled

with adequate means for rapid interchange.of

this information.

The Department of Defense,

the Department of State and the Central Intelli-

gence Agency have taken action to improve U.S.

communication networks, but the systems of the

Latin American nations

concerned are, in most

cases, unsatisfactory.

SECRET

d. Command Arrangements

An uncomplicated cooperative system is

visualized, based on each nation policing its

3

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own shoreline and

adjacent waters, with its

own

surface and air forces, coupled with

agreements between neighboring countries to

provide mutual information and assistance.

An over-all command structure for the system

as

a whole is neither required nor desirable.

e. Funding and Logistical Arrangements

The operation of a modest surveillance

system, as envisaged herein, would still

entail

operations on a larger scale than

currently in force, with corresponding

additional costs to cover materiel and train-

ing for the Latin American participants.

These financial requirements

should be ful-

filled over and above current programs, and

accomplished through existing channels.

III. Attitude of the Latin American Nations

Given support and encouragement by the U.S., it

is concluded that some of the countries bordering the

Caribbean Sea would be willing to participate in

coordinate surveillance effort.

However, the intense

national pride and the sensitivity of the countries in-

volved makes it by no means certain that any will par-

ticipate to the precise degree or in the exact manner

considered most desirable by the U.S.

Inter-service rivalries, political considerations,

mistrust of the military by their executive branches,

and antagonisms

between indigenous police and armed

forces will all tend to impede the program. However, the

proposals that follow will serve to diminish these impedi-

ments, and to establish goals not only for U.S. planning,

but for U.S. efforts to encourage the Latin American

participants as well.

IV. Actions

Io be effective the coordinated Caribbean Sur-

veillance system will require:

a. Multinational actions to reach agreement on

surveillance, and on the means to control it.

b. Unilateral and cooperative measures to detect,

identify, track

and apprehend clandestine movements

of subversive personnel, arms and equipment.

4

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c. A mechanism which ensures the rapid assembly

and dissemination of the required information to

the responsible agencies of the countries concerned,

i.e., an alerting system.

d. Improved communications facilities in the

area.

These measures can only be effective 1f the partici-

pating Caribbean countries are willing to develop and

improve their counterpart internal security capabilities.

Specifically, there is a requirement for additional

effort on their part in counterguerrilla training, police

operations, intelligence, and air and ground mobility.

Listed hereafter are specific actions designed to

fulfill the foregoing requirements.

a. Multinational Actions to Control the

Surveillance Effort

(1) Consult the Caribbean countries with a

view to requesting the President of one of them

to invite ministers from the other countries,

as appropriate, to meet for the purpose of dis-

cussing implementation of a multinational

surveillance program.

Arrange at this meeting

for the governments of the participating

nations, including the U.S., to issue a joint

declaration that the export by Cuba of subver-

sive personnel and material will call for all

to take the necessary measures to safeguard

the countries concernea.

(2) Encourage arrangements between Caribbean

states for mutual cooperation in coastal sur-

veillance.

(3) Make bilateral arrangements, as necessary,

with each participating nation as to the con-

ditions under which U.S. combatant forces may

enter the waters in which we recognize the par-

ticipating nation's territorial sovereignty.

DOD

SUPPORT

DO D

SUPPORT

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b. Unilateral Surveillance Actions

(1) Continue general U.S, surveillance of Cuba DOD

and los contiguous

waters, reporting all suspi-

clous contacts to the U.s. alerting centers at

Puerto Rico and the Canal Zone.

(2) Maintain a continuing U.S. capability to

respond to requests for interception assistance

from Caribbean countries; this capability to in-

DOD

clude facilities for communication with the U.S.

air and surface units (or headquarters) conducting

close-in surveillance of Cuba, and with the prin-

cipal units and command headquarters of the par-

ticipating Caribbean countries.

(3) Require the U.S. Coast Guard to develop a

program for exploiting the surveillance and re-

porting capability of U.S. commercial, fishing

and pleasure craft in the Caribbean.

(4) Propose that each Caribbean country estab-

lish intensive civilian and military information

programs to motivate civilian and military parti-

cipants in the surveillance program.

(or expand) its Coast Guard type force utilizing

U.S. MAP-provided patrol craft for In-shore patrols. SUPART

15) Propose that each Caribbean country organize DOl

(6) Encourage each participating country to

develop emergency procedures which will provide

for rapid concentration of avallable forces in any SUPPORT

critical area in case of alert.

(7) Request the governments of each Caribbean

country to issue directives requiring that all of

their ships and aircraft on routine operations or

business be alert for and report suspicious con-

tacts, In accordance with a pre-arranged system.

(8) Propose that the Caribbean governments in-

tensify the patrol and intelligence activities of

both military and police forces in border areas,

to include the institution of coast watcher pro-

grams where feasible.

DOD.

SUPPORT

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(9) Propose that the Caribbean governments

augment their military surveillance capability

by arranging for

service, as needed, of local

surface pleasure

and commercial craft,

and

private aircraft;

the service to be patterned

after the Coast Guard Reserve programs

and the

DOD

SUPPORT

Civil Air Patrol in the United States.

C• Actions to Establish an Alerting System

DOD

(1) Complete priority study on establishing

intelligence centers at Caribbean Command and

Caribbean: Sea Frontier Headquarters for rapid.-

processing and dissemination to countries con-

(COMPLETED,

cerned via the United States Ambassadors, of

Castro-Communist subversive movements.

(2) Propose that each Caribbean country

consider the desirability of establishing a

central headquarters authority to coordinate

Its air and surface military and civil

patrols, its coast watching activities. and

its intelligence and alerting procedures,

DOP

SUPPORT

and to serve as a central point of contact

in the surveillance system.

(3) Encourage participating countries to

make maximum use of U,S, mobile intelligence

DO

training.

teams, as well as spaces available

in US. Intelligence training echools.

(BEING

ACCOMPUSHED)

a. Actions to Develop Effective Communications

System

(1) Encourage participating countries to make

DOD

maximum use of U.S, mobile communications train-

ing teams, both

air and surface.

(2) Continue emphasis on improving U.S.

communications in the area and encourage par

ticipating countries to improve their own

communication capabilities.

DOD!

AND

OTTERS

(3) Pending the improvement of indigenous

communication

facilities and capabilities, U.S.

and participating country surveillance head-

quarters exchange contact information on a

priority basis, utilizing U.S. provided facili- DOD

ties described in c.(1) above.

CBEING

AccomPusitED,

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(4) Provide for limited scope combined exer-

cises including U.S: forces and Caribbean country

navy, air force, and coast guard units, together

with the necessary headquarters, to improve

communications and procedures, and to develop a

rapia response capability in

the participating

Caribbean countries.

DOD

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CUBA

EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.

Introduction

II.

The Nature and Scope of the Problem

1. Limiting Factors

2. Categories of Exchangeable Intelligence

3. Current Exchange Arrangements

III. Existing Programs

IV. New Actions Recommended

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CUBA

THE EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE

CONCERNING COMMUNIST, SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES

I.

Introduction

In combatting Castro-Communist subversion through-

out Latin America,

there is a fundamental requirement

for intelligence -- a requirement which involves the

timely acquisition and processing of information as

well as its rapid dissemination, on a selective basis,

to countries concerned.

While

efforts are now being

made by CIA, AID, and

the US Military Services to

improve Latin American intelligence systems, success

thus far has

been limited, and much remains

to be done.

I't is not with this broad

problem, however, that this

paper is primarily concerned, but

rather with the

narrower matter of the need

for a stronger program of

exchanging essential information regarding Communist

subversion in Latin America among those who need to

know it.

• II. The Nature and Scope of the Problem

1. Limiting Factors

a. There are many inhibitions which tend to

discourage the exchange of intelligence on an

international basis, even among allies. National

privacy with

privacy with regard to the inner workings of an

intelligence system must be preserved.

pounding the problem further, where Latin

America

is concerned, is the divisive Influence of the

long history

of rivalries, wars,

jealousies and

disputes which have characterized

relations among

the nations concerned.

The wounds of past conflicts

among pairs and groupings of nations are not com-

pletely healed.

There is lingering hostility

between Peru and Ecuador deriving from their

boundary war. Chile and Bolivia continue at

odds over the Rio Lauca and the question of

Bolivian access to the sea, and, even now,

Nicaraguan insurgents are harbored within

the

borders of both Costa Rica and Honduras.

It

could hardly be expected that these countries

would be eager to exchange intelligence on a full

and frank basis.

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D. Beyond this, Latin America is not a homo-

geneous

entity in sociar, political, or economic

terms, and attitudes toward the Castro-Communist

subversive menace vary widely. A completely

unified approach toward exchange of intelligence

concerning

this

menace,

therefore, cannot be

regarded as attainable.

c. Additional impediments to intelligence ex-

change are the generally low level of competence

•of most Latin American intelligence services, their

lack of rapid, secure means of communication, the

absence of adequate security systems,

and the lack

of security consciousness.

Deficiencies in

security safeguards must necessarily limit

exchange of intelligence obtained covertly by any

the nations involved, and particularly the

United States, which has the most sophisticated

system and

hence the greatest need for protection.

d. These defects promise to persist, since the

governments of some countries have little desire to

develop a competent career security service.

is a fear that the existence of an efficient service

would constitute a threat to further activities of

members of the existing governments at such

as they might find themselves out of power.

many Latin

American intelligence services

to label

"subversives"

those of their own

nationals resident in other countries who are

opposed to the existing government.

multilateral intelligence exchange must be

approached on a most circumscribed basis.

should not be concluded, however, that nothing

of value can be accomplished multilaterally.

With proper definition, limiting the problem

of exchange to matters

directly related to communist

subversive activities, such

as the movement to and

from Cuba of subversives, the production and

movement of propaganda materials which threaten

internal stability, the movement of

arms, and the

movement of funds, it should be practicable to

marshal a useful measure of cooperation.

pursuing this effort, it will be important to

draw a sharp distinction between secret intelligence

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gained by covert means and information obtained

The former involves the requirement to

protect national secrets both as to sources and

acquisition methods employed. The latter, which

can be of great value, can be exchanged without

fear of compromise.

2. Categories of Exchangeable Intelligence

The following describe generally the categories

of exchangeable matter,

and exemplify the types of material

under each:

a. Travel information - Unevaluated information

devoted solely to rapid reporting of the movement

of individuals between Latin America and Cuba or

Soviet Bloc countries:

Such reports can be

reduced to a few elements such as identification

of the individual, point of departure, date ano

time of departure or arrival, destination, and

carrier:

When presented in an abbreviated form

such information offers minimum security problems

with respect to exchange with one or more countries.

b. Intelligence information reports - Un-

evaluated information derived from clandestine

collection operations or confidential sources

reporting on plans and activities of Cuban or

communist connected subversive individuals or

groups; on movement of arms, propaganda and funds;

on shipping and air movements and on results of

surveillance efforts. Because continued receipt

of such information by the United States is dependent

on careful protection of sources and methods of

collection,

the exchange of this information with

other countries must be carefully controlled by

the collecting department.

c. Intelligence reports and studies - Evaluated

intelligence in all of the above areas, prepared

by an appropriate element of the US government in

a form which is releaseable to other Latin American

countries.

d. Selected overt materials - Articles or news

stories

drawn from press, periodical and other

overt publishers.

Selected for maximum impact on

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other countries particularly where such information is

not freely available to security services, as in the

case of foreign broadcast reports.

3. Current Exchange Arrangements

a. At present there is little organized exchange of

intelligence among the Latin American nations.

There

is a limited amout of informal exchange, often on a

basis of personal relationships between

government

ofdicials having a community of interest with respect

to a particular matter.

b. The Central Intelligence Agency has established

working liaison arrangements in those Latin American

countries where such relations have been considered to

be in the best interest of the United States.

Most of

the intelligence concerning subversion in Latin America

available to the CIA is derived from covert operations

or through contacts with another intelligence or security

service.

This inhibits the passing of such information

to agencies of a third country. There is, however, a

substantial amount of intelligence available from overt

or non-sensitive sources which can be provided

other countries. In 1962, CIA received information

reports from 26 services with which liaison is main-

tained in Latin America and released reports to 35

Intelligence items exchanged included

collated studies, weekly intelligence reviews, name

traces and travel

reports.

c. The U.S. Army, through its attaches, currently

has an informal arrangement involving bilateral ex-

changes of intelligence with Argentina, Colombia,

Ecuador, Uruguay, feru, Paraguay and Venezuela. Infor-

mation provided by the

Army has been concerned with

subversive personalities,. communist infiltration,

weapons movements and related matters. Reciprocal in-

telligence received has been of small value.

The Army

also provides selected information on subversive acti-

vities to Brazil, Chile, Guatemala and Mexico, without

The Navy has established a Navy-to-Navy

program for the exchange of intelligence among nine

South American navies and the U.s. Navy.

The U.S. Air

Force,

through its attache system in Latin America, like-

wise has an exchange program. This is accomplished on

an informal basis and is bilateral in nature.

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₫. Exchanges. of information are also effected

from

time to time through channels of the Depart-

ment of State.

e.: As yet, however, the program for the pro-

agencies of information on

subversion to Latin American governments has not

been developed to an adequate degree. Since the

United States possesses the most extensive

acquisition capabilities, as well as the only

secure and reliable means of rapia communication

throughout Latin America (currently in process

of improvement), the development of an integrated

United States sytem for bilateral exchange offers

the greatest

possibility of achieving the results

desired.

I United States

experience in the matter of

intelligence exchange in Latin America, and in

other areas of the world, has led to the conclusion

that bilateral arrangements are more fruitful than

multilateral arrangements such as those established

within the framework of NATO, CENTO and SEATO.

Nevertheless, this experience has shown also

that

multilateral

arrangements can be of some use,

particularly in creating an awareness of the

need

for intelligence exchange.

§. The concept of an exchange of information

among members of the OAS with regard to subversive

activities has been put forward at numerous Inter-

American meetings, but has not been implemented,

largely for the reasons set forth in section Il.1.

Under the Punta del Este decisions, the As mempers

were urged to cooperate in strengthening their

capacity to counteract threats or acts of aggression,

subversion or other dangers to peace and security.

The Council of the OAS is charged with maintaining

vigilance over Castro-communist subversion, ano

Special Consultative Committee on Security (SCCS)"

is established to give technical advice on request

to governments and the Council on matters relating

to subversion. All American governments have been

asked to furnish information on Castro-Communist

activities to serve as the basis for studies and

recommendations by the Council of the OAS on how to

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counteract them.. Since the Punta del Este meeting,

the OAS has been making slow progress in the

countersubversion field, but there has as yet been

no significant exchange. of intelligence through

its machinery.

h. The Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) has

also demonstrated an awareness of the need for

exchanging intelligence regarding communist sub-

Annex 4 of the General Military Plan

prepared by the IADB requests the American States to

report information to the Board and to establish

agreements among themselves for exchanging infor-

mation of collective

Interest. The United States

has approved

the General Military Plan, but similar

action has not been taken by all member countries.

1. This brief summary serves: tò

illustrate that

there is much room for expansion of bilateral

intelligence exchange arrangements among the Latin

American nations themselves, which is now minimal

at best, as well as a need to create an expanded

program for bilateral intelligence exchange between

the United States and individual countries,

IInaLLy:

a requirement to develop the possibilities

of a multilateral approach within the recognize

limitations involved.

III. Existing Programs

Enumerated below are the principal programs now in

progress. They are subject to continuing improvement.

1. Bilateral exchange of intelligence is now being

conducted by CIA, DOD and bther Us agencies with their

Latin American counterparts in instances where it has

been found possible to establish appropriate arrangements

for exchange of selected information consistent with

security requirements.

2. A study is currently underway to evaluate the

feasibility and desirability of establishing military

intelligence centers of the Caribbean Command and the

Caribbean Sea Frontier, Atlantic Command, for further

dissemination of intelligence as appropriate in con-

junction with our Military Alerting System, for rapid

processing and dissemination with appropriate, of

intelligence on subversive activities directly to the

countries concerned through the US Ambassador.

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3. Intelligence is being provided to the Caribbean

Command by CIA and other elements of the U.S. Embassies

in Latin America as well as to CIA Headquarters for further

dissemination as appropriate.

4. Various agencies of the U.S. Government are now

disseminating to Latin American governments unclassified studies:

and

reports and other non-sensitive information concerning

Castro-Communist subversion.

5. U.S. Government communications systems throughout

Latin America are being expanded and improved upon on

high priority basis..

6. Programs now exist under AID, CIA, and DOD for the

training and equipping of Latin American internal security

and intelligence services.

Additional programs

"to be. in

the best interests of the United States and acceptable

to the country concerned.

7. All information received by CIA concerning travel

to and

from Cuba

is put into a computer system capable

of producing lists

of name, by country, by point of travel,

or sorted on various other

bases.

IV. New Actions Recommended

1. Reinforce the present procedures. for bilateral

exchange of intelligence, as described in Section III 1, by now

recommending an Embassy intelligence committee to coordinate

procedures for ensuring timeliness, completeness and freedom

SUPPORT

from duplication or false confirmation in the bilateral exchange

with the host governments. .

2. Encourage. Latin American countries to engage in

bilateral exchange of intelligence on Castro-Communist

subversive activities.

DOL

SUPPORT

3• Arrange for the electrical dissemination to

appropriate Latin American governments of daily summaries

of radio broadcast material as monitored by the FBID of

CIA.

4. Make available to as many countries as security

permits, sanitized results of the extensive travel coverage

obtained by the Central Intelligence Agency, already processed

by machine.. (See paragraph III.7.)

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5• Discourage the employment of intelligence advisors

from nations other

• than the United States except in instances

where the United States can arrange to provide for the

DOD

training and control of any third country intelligence

advisor.

SUPPORT

6. Arrange for the preparation of periodic studies

of Castro-Communist subversion in Latin America which can

DOD

be disseminated to selected Latin American governments.

SUPPORT

7. Undertake

action in the OAS to stimulate governments

to keep the Council and the Socs fully informed on a

- ca then

continuing basis of the nature and incidence of subversive

activities in their respective countries.

8. Encourage Latin American countries to approve the

General Military Plan of the Inter-American Defense

Board (IADB), and, in accordance with Annex

: 4 thereof,

furnish to the IADB intelligence information

and estimates

DOD

concerning Castro-Communist subversive activities.

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CUBA

TRAINING OF LATIN AMERICANS IN THE UNITED STATES

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

1

I.

II.

INI

IV:

Introduction

Existing Programs

1. General

3

2.

Agency for International Development

Programs

3

3. Military Assistance Programs

4

4. Bureau of Educational and Cultural

Affairs

5

5. Training in the Canal Zone

6

6. Cost of Existing Programs

7. Difficulties Encountered in Filling Avail-?

able Military Quotas in the U.S.

Groups Appropriate for Expanded Training

Efforts

Actions Recommended

8

a. Security Personnel

9

b. Personnel Concerned with Operation

11

of Vital Facilities

C. Personnel Working with Youth

212

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TRAINING OF LATIN AMERICANS: IN THE UNITED STATES

Introduction

The fact that 2,000 Latin Americans have recently

been Indoctrinated in Communist ideology and subversive

techniques in Cuba is just cause for concern, and warrants

an energetic response:

Our actions to frustrate this

movement are already beginning to generate momentum, but

it will be idle to conclude that currently programmed

impediments upon the movement of people,

arms and propa-

ganda from Cuba, will diminish decisively the strength

of Castro-Communist inspired subversion in Latin America.

While 1t will be important, so long as the Castro regime

survives; to remove the ability of Latin Americans to

travel to Cuba, 1t will be much more important to remove

their desire to travel there in the first place.

The root causes of this desire are numerous, but

prominent among them are the dissatisfaction of the young

people of Latin America, their impatient hope for better

things and their curiosity about the world at large.

The

younger generation of Latin Americans cannot be expected

to stand

still.

They demand rapid and revolutionary im-

provement and

this is what communism promises: them, how-

ever falsely. We are faced with the challenge, therefore,

of convincing the young and

farmer or labor leader that the progress he desires can

best be achieved through the institutions of a free society.

One of the best means of establishing this conviction is

to show him, at first hand, our own free society in action.

This useful influence is at work now with the Latin

American students who are receiving education and train-

1ng in the United States.

This group - considerably

greater in number than those who visit Cuba or the Bloc

countries - are underwritten by various agencies of the

United States government, private institutions, and, in

many cases, defray their own expenses.

on balance,

these

young people return to their countries with a keener un-

derstanding of what makes the United States function.

While their reaction may not always be completely favor-

able, It must certainly be more accurate - and thus more

favorable - than any picture painted for them by the

Communists at home.

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In any case in terms of the numbers of young Latin

Americans which we might reach in this endeavor, it is

evident that our opportunities are not now being fully

If our efforts can be given stronger direction

and intensified, there is reason to believe that we may

exert a powerful influence on the most impressionable - and

most important - sector of Latin American society, the

younger generation.

That is the purpose of this study - to examine those

U.S. sponsored training and education programs for Latin

Americans which are already in motion, with the objective

of determining what improvements can be made which would

increase our capability for countering subversion. Atten-

tion has been focussed particularly on subsidized training

in police, military and certain other fields, selected on

a basis of their special significance in the

confrontation

with Castro-Communist subversive activities.

It is recognized. that the much broader area of u.s.

secondary school and college level education for Latin

American students 1s also a most fruitful field, which

requires similar examination; however, that study is

viewed as being conditioned upon educational factors

which are beyond the scope of this paper.

Another important field which is complementary to

training In the United States, is the broad variety of

in-country programs, now being carried out by the Department

of State, Peace Corps, AID, USIA, the Armed Forces, private

and religious institutions, and civil educational inst1-

tutions.

Through these, the Latin American is exposed at

home to U.S. citizens who are interested in his welfare,

in terms which provide a direct rub-off of our values.

While it cannot be divorced

completely from 1n-country

training this paper does not concern itself directly with

that sector.

It does, however, recognize the importance

of the in-country effort, and proposes to make use of

the U.S. presence in Latin American as a catalyst to

attract promising young people towards training in the

North, where they can see organized freedom in action and

by gaining confidence in it, become 1ts champions in their

own country.

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II. Existing Programs

1. General

Approximately 15,000 Latin Americans, exclusive

of private business trainees, are instructed annually in

the United States. Of these, about 10,000 are engaged

in undergraduate or graduate

studies, including more than

1,000 Individuals who receive subsidies from the United

States or from their own governments. The remaining 5,000

receive specialized instruction, or are brought to the

VaS. for orientation tours.

Its subsidies principally through the Military. Assistance

Program, the Agency for International Development, and the

Department of State. Also the Inter-Agency Committee on

Youth Affairs is reviewing existing programs affecting

Latin American youth and studying the possibility of

leadership training courses for them.

2. Agency for International Development Programs

During FY 1962, the Agency for International

Development brought 1,594 Latin Americans to the United

States for training, in age groups as follows:

Under 20

25

21 - 25

160

26. - 30

362

31 - 35

36 - 40

41 - 45

46 - 50

392

288

165

118

51 - on

85.

Approximately 240 of these trainees matriculated

at a university or school, for undergraduate or graduate

degree work. The remainder engaged in on-the-job or less

formal training, or attended courses apart from a degree

program, for periods varying from three months to a year.

Students

received training in the following fields:

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Agriculture

Industry

249

164

Transportation

Labor

Health

115

338

167

Education

130

Public Administration

157

Public Safety

119

Community Development

Atomic Energy

20

22

Housing

46

Miscellaneous

68.

3. Military Assistance, Programs

At the present time, 2,277 Latin American military.

students are receiving, or are programmed to receive, train-

1ng in the United States under the Milftary Assistance Pro-

gram.

Courses

vary in length from two-week orientation

tours to 83-week flying training courses.

However,

the

majority of instruction is for periods of less than six

months, and is distributed in fields as follows:

Flying Instruction (8-83 weeks) 172

Command, Staff and Operational

748

(direction and control of

armed forces, 4-23 weeks)

Communications/Electronics

66

(6-29 weeks)

Equipment Maintenance and

Repair (5-28 weeks)

Logistics (2-14 weeks)

335

46

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Administration (4-40 weeks)

8

Professional Specialized

(Engineering, Mecical, Legal,

etc., 4-20 weeks)

Orientation (2-3 weeks)

306

596

4. In FY 1962, 1,869 persons from the other American

Republics came to the United States under program of the

Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs of the Depart-

ment of State. This number is broken down as follows:

Students (Academic study,

1 year)

338

Teachers (6-12 months)

277.

Professors/Research Scholars

(1-2 semesters)

84

Leaders and Specialists

• (1-6 months)

299

Educational Travel Grantees

(30 days)

871

The 338 Latin American students were for the

most part at the graduate level, studying for a full

academie year at universities in the United States.

Teachers participated in six-month programs of teacher

development in their special fields, or in teacher edu-

cation workshops in Puerto Rico, with a smaller number

teaching for a full academic year in United States schools.

The 84 professors and research scholars were engaged in

teaching or research from one semester to a full academic

•year, or participated in short-term seminars at U.S.

universities.

Leaders and specialists in all important

fields visited the United States: the former, for

periods of from 30 to 60 days for observation and to

confer with colleagues in their specialties; the latter

for periods varying up to six months for practical study

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and on-the-job training in their special fields (commu-

nications media, community welfare work, etc.). The

871 educational travel grantees, comprising approxi-

mately 45 per cent of the total number of Department

of State sponsored trainees in the United States con-

sisted largely of selected students and student leaders

teachers, who participated individually or in groups in

short-term observation visits relating to their special

fields of interest.

5. Training In the Canal Zone

Additional Latin American personnel undergo

training in Panama Canal Zone

schools of the Caribbean

Command and at the Inter-American Police Academy,

operated by the Agency for International Development.

Additionally, the United States Navy and Coast Guard

are establishing a facility to instruct Latin Americans

in coastal patrol craft operation and surveillance.

While this training does not take place in the United

States proper, the Latin American students involved are

nevertheless exposed to a school environment which is

based on U.S. values.

FEED

past year, the United States Army

Caribbean School trained 1,200 Latin American officers

and men, while the United States Air Force School for

The newly formed

Inter-American Police Academy graduated 90 Latin Ameri-

cans during the same period, and is expanding classes

to reach a planned annual rate of 360 in FY 1964.

6. Cost of Existing Programs

The FY 1963 AID, MAP and State Department pro-

grams provide $21.9 million for training a total of

5,165 Latin Americans in the United States. The per

capita cost of training under civilian programs of the

United States Government is approximately $5,000 for a

full academic year. Military per capita direct costs

average $3,200, with courses usually of less than one

year's duration. It is estimated that the per capita

costs for short courses, (8-16 weeks), both civilian and

military, approximates $1,600.

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In terms of dollars

alone, and apart from the

many benefits received, it will be

seen that training

Is a relatively inexpensive endeavor.

Furthermore, in

contemplating the cost of an intensified program, it is.

degree - without corresponding increases in overhead.

7. Difficulties Encountered in Filling Available

Military Quotas in the United States

The failure of Latin American countries to take

full advantage of military quotas offered has been a

persistent problem.

In 1962, for example, 15 per cent

of the quotas offered were unfilled. This unfavorable

situation derives from many causes.

During the current

fiscal year 18 per cent of unfilled Army quotas have been

due to inability to meet course pre-requisites; 22 per

cent because of lack of sufficient funds and 33 per cent

because of political upheavals. The armed forces of the

average Latin American country are small, and. the avail-

ability of qualified candidates who can be spared for

extended periods of instruction abroad is thus limited.

The short periods of obligated service and. the lack of

professional non-commissioned officer corps also tends

to discourage the training of enlisted men in United

States schools, since there is an understandable lack

enthusiasm for spending large sums from limited budgets

to train enlisted men who will remain in service only a

brief time. Another significant deterrent is the per

diem rates

required by law to be paid by some countries

to service personnel sent outside their homeland. In.

Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and Uruguay, the legal rates

are too high to be support-.

able by defense budgets, while in other countries, such

as Bolivia and Paraguay, the standard rates are too low

to provide a reasonable living for students.

III. Groups Appropriate for Expanded Training Efforts

Three principal groups have been identified

as

meriting special attention in our program of impeding

the growth of Castro-Communist. subversion. These are:

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a. Groups directly responsible for the security

of the country.

Personnel of police, paramilitary

and military organizations should receive particu-

lar attention, with emphasis on junior and inter-

mediate level

personnel involved

in administrative

and supervisory functions.

b. Groups responsible for the operation of vital

facilities.

Communications systems,

public infor-

mation media, utilities, transportation and, in

some countries, industrial Installations are vital

to the orderly functioning of a state.

As a result;

they are prime targets for Communist infiltration

and subversion. U.S.-oriented personnel in these

occupations,

especially at the lower supervisory

levels, are

in a good position to detect, report

on and impede Communist activities.

c. Groups involved in direct supervisory con-

tact with the younger generation.

Labor leaders,

teachers, athletic instructors,

farm advisors,

student leaders, and technical school instructors

all work directly with young people, and thus

play an important role in molding their atti

tudes *

IV•

Actions Recommended

The training actions enumerated below are recom-

mended as promising a useful return in our effort to

develop a stronger base of countersubversive convic-

tion among the groups identified in the preceding para-

graph.

In execution of these actions, priorities should

be established in terms of individual country needs.

While the many variables involved render precise

calculation difficult, it is estimated that a vigorous

pursuit of all of the proposed actions would result in

an increase of directly subsidized U.S- training by

about 60%, or 3,600 people; at an increased expenditure

of roughly $12,000, 000.

The financial support involved

should be provided

grams:

over and above existing agency pro-

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a. Security Personnel

(1) Milltary

(a) Offer expanded opportunities for

Latin American junior officers and non-

commissioned officers in on-the-job

training

programs in units of all U.S. Armed Services.

(b) Improve off-duty programs for the

above Latin American trainees,

to provide

them with a close and favorable view of life

In the United States.

(c) Select a liberal number of the best

qualified graduates from Canal Zone service

schools for further training on a higher

level in U.S. military technical schools,

staff and operations

courses.

Advanced

training should be a continuation of Canal

Zone schooling, concentrating on equipment

and skills required in Latin America.

Quotas should be established for both

junior officers and enlisted ranks:

(d) Expand or establish quotas

for train-

ing of promising young Latin Americans at

Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps basic

training schools, with a view to their pro-

ceeding onward to further training in more

advanced U.s. schools.

(e) In order to enhance understanding

with students, insure that an adequate num-

ber of bilingual personnel, fluent in speak-

ing and writing both English and Spanish,

or English and Portuguese, are assigned to

the faculties of Service schools which pro-

vide instruction to Latin Americans.

(f) Increase the number of students

trained at the U,S. Air Force School for

Latin America, in Panama, and expand

quotas for officers.

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(g) Expand the MAP-sponsored intelligence

training conducted by the U.S. Army at Fort

Holabird, Maryland, to include junior officers

and NCO's.

Increase Latin American quotas

for intelligence training by all Services.

(h) Review all FY 1964 U.S. Service school

quotas for Latin America to determine if in-

creases, consistent with the capabilities of

Latin American countries to absorb, can be

made.

(1) Encourage, through MAAG's and Missions,

increased Latin American participation in

military training programs, exercises, orien-

tation tours and exchange programs.

(j) Through additional MAP funding, ab-

the costs for training Latin American

military personnel in the U.S. and Panama,

including international travel costs. Con-

currently press for elimination of home

country regulations which inhibit filling

of quotas.

(k) In military schools engaged in teach-

ing Latin Americans, indoctrinate U.s. in

structors in the broader political object-

ives the U.S. is seeking to achieve through

training.

(1) Review curricula of military courses

for

Latin Americans with a view toward empha-

sizing constructive participation by their

military forces in political, economic, social

and civil development.

(2) Police

(a) Increase the police training program

of the

Office of Public safety, AlD; to an

in-put of 1,000 for the next 10 months.

(The current program calls for 450 trainees

in Panama and 150 in the U.S. during this

period.) Select candidates who are in pos1-

tions to exert maximum and immediate influence

within their organizations and communities.

(SOME

BEING

AccomplisHe

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(b) Through additional AID funding, absorb

the

training costs for Latin American

public

safety personnel in the U.S, and

Panama In-

cluding international travel costs.

(c) Provide EngIlsh language training to

Latin American candidates for public safety

courses in the U.S. through USIS English

language

training centers located in Latin

American countries.

(3) Customs and Immigration

High priority should be given to security

personnel responsible for customs and Immigra-

tion enforcement, to Include consideration of

establishing a separate training program in

the U,S. for this purpose.

Personnel Concerned with Operation of Vital

Facilities

(1) Initiate a two-phase pilot training pro-

gram, under direction of AID and State, to

bring about 500 students per year, who are

supervisors or potential instructors, to the

United States for short courses in English

training and orientation. Select 100 of these

for further technical training in specialties

such as!

Aircraft operations and airways control

Radio broadcasting, press and television

Commercial communications (telephone,

radio telephone, cable, .etc.)

Harbor terminal and shipping operations

Fuel storage

Urban water, light and power operation

and maintenance

Railroad operations and maintenance

Bus transportation

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(2) Direct: each U.S. Ambassador in Latin

America to develop and propose a detailed

training program for his country to include

specific numbers of students to be trained

in the field of vital facilities.

(3) Initiate programs to persuade U.S.

city administrations to provide training, at

the cities' expense, for selected Latin

Americans in the area of city management,

planning, services

and urbanization.

(4) Initiate programs to persuade US.

state governments to provide training, at

the states' expense, for selected Latin

Americans, in the fleld of province (state)

management and planning

(5) Initiate programs to persuade U.S.

business and industrial organizations and

labor unions, at their own expense, to pro-

vide training, in their particular areas

of interest, for selected Latin Americans.

c. Personnel Working with Youth

(1) Initiate programs to persuade U.S.

colleges and universitites to conduct periodic

seminars in the U.S. for athletic coaches and

persons concerned

with promotion of sports,

for the purpose of indoctrinating Latin American

Instructors in U.S: techniques and coaching

philosophy. Provide financial support as re-

quired.

(2) Expand existing State Department spon-

sored programs which relate to teacher educa-

tion and social weltare.

(3) Expand existing AID programs to encourage

the formation of farm cooperatives and other

agricultural programs by bringing Latin Ameri

can supervisory and instruetor personnel to the

U.S. for training and orientation.

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(4) Conduct seminars on democracy and the

characteristics. of

a free and open society for

Latin American political science students,

labor and youth leaders and young governmental

officials.

The seminars will be supported by

the Department of State in the United States,

and in Latin America by USIS, through selected

indigenous labor, youth and

education organi

zations.

(5) Explore all of the programs utilized by

various government agencies and the check lists

developed by the Inter-Agency Youth Committee

to insure that the programs are designed to

provide visitors with a full and accurate pic-

ture of the U.s., 1ts

society, Its institutions

and objectives.

(6) Expand existing programs under USIA for

working with student unions in Latin American

universities

to insure students receive accurate,

comprehensive and sympathetic information con-

cerning the United States.

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