MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD: AMWHIP/1 MEETING, NEW YORK CITY THURSDAY, 14 NOVEMBER 1963
Originator: CIA
From: SAS/EOB C/O
To: MFR
Document date: 11/20/1963
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

## Page 1

4-00000

104-10183-10006

1400000

2022 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SECRET

20 November 1963

MEMORANDOM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT

: AMNLIP/I Meeting, New York City

Thursday, 14 November 1963

Meoting Tlue/l'lace.

This meeting was laid on

by phone fron Washington on 13 Noveuber.

It took plaoe ab

scheduled using an office/work-roon in A/l's Jenolty saotory-

showroom at 31 W. 17th st., New York.

2.

Purposes of deeting.

neeting was soheduled

1n order to obtain

information and identificationg from A/l

revelant to the APRASIl Operation.

Fe mere particularly

Interested in detoruining AllASH's present attitude tonard

the Operation and any details of or rames of likely

confederates which he may have discussed with A/l after

Ontrich'a departure from the scene.

"He were also intereated

in using A/l an a oheck against the list of litely AMLASHl

confederates which had been couplled by the MlAPRON grOup.

Finances.

The undersigned was prepared to

surficient funds to cover his expesses and

those of AMASIl during the reoent three-weck sojourn in

Europo which A/l nade at our request.

However, A/l refused

to acoept any remuneration whatsoever, stating that the

zoney we had given hin for his round-trip-tickot- ($950,00)

conservatively of for the record, represente an outley

some $1200 to $1500 by A/l from his ou

pocket on KUBARK behalf, not to vention the lost time from

his own business.

Te belleve this gouture should bo

romembared in luture dealingas with A/1.

General.

All was feeling poorly as the result

He stated that he mould not

have come in at all were it not for our soheduled meeting.

Neverthelesa, he spent willingly saveral hours with us,

zoing over the points in which we were interested. The

meeting terainated at 1530 with no inoldents of a seourity

nature noted.

Detalls of Meeting.

Collecting' Information

Por the AMLASh operation constituted the prinelpal of

dinoussions during this meeting, and may be found as

attachment A to this report.

oopy is filed also in the

AMLASH 201.

W11l1an E. Walnuxight.

SAS/BOB, C/0

Gaw 1

SECRET

massintens

201-152234

---

## Page 2

14-00000

1499000

An lie,

SECRET

ATTACHMINT A TO:

AMHIP HEMO OF MEETING OF 1& NOV 1963

The sollowing Information and observations more obtained

from A/l during the above nesting:

1. ARASI Secretary: Ernestini ACOSTA Gonzalez

(nickname:

Ene) calle 25 - 4526 Apt 8 (presumably cur 25th

No. 526.... Vodado - Tr lephone 303865.

(Note AIRASIl has considorable confidance in lis secretary,

suggeatod

that letters or

there on a one or tro-shot deal," packagos could be sent

In response to the question of whos AMLASH

sight turn to In order to carry out his plans, ANHIP

sentioned the following persons:

Vose AÉER Yara, ca. 33 yrs old, tha 18 functionary.

In lavana muniolpal

or moorich descents ovs

Has wide

circle of acquaintances in Havana.

RamOn GUIN

JUAn ALMIIDA

Athe NitUsS brothera

usto

himsel

of the above. A/l folt that GUIN, UCEF, The NIEVES, NARANJO

and ALMENEIlAS-Moro the most dependable.

The degree to

valol Juan ALMEIDA could be trusted as questloned by A/i.

In addition

to the above names which all volunteered

aSKed abOUt MAjOr DIAZ-ARGUELLES, MAJOr TODY CASTEL and

Major Fauro CHOMON.

A/l stated that he felt DIAZ-AGULLLES

and his brother "Iin-Tin" could be used and were trustrorthy;

on the other hand, would not be utilized

• the inttlal efforto by AlASH, but, 11 his elforts were

BuoceaBill, thoy could be counted on to support LASH in th

period which followed. They would never be taken intöi the

"inhor-sanctua"

When aaked about Sajors Pedro

and MIRET,

Yao griendly with LAST, could not be trusted as his primary

lovalty Has to FIDEL CASTRo.

12A1

SECRET

0701-2522341

---

## Page 3

14-00000

14.00000

SECRET

Pego 2 of Attach. A

Viotor nORDON Machado,

Concorning Majors William GALVEZ Rodriguez

Crescendle PEnt (Mentang?), and

AntOnIO LUSSON (LUZONEY BALLLO, A/I stated that he did

not know these types

well and therofore had little to say

regarding them. He did say that he did not cure lor (CALyZ

personally and that he mas a little "psycho"; BORCON was

OK; (PEREZ was an older man, ca. 60 years, mho was e

nonentity who had his rank because he had guided the GRANA

group into the bills at the boginning of the light againat

Batista:

LUSSON Mas provably too loyal to Raul CASTHO to be

considered for any initial aotion.

Of MAJOr ARIETRA queestonod about the Identitles Of followere

All stated that it would be botter to

refer to AMLASH, 88 he (A/1) could only give Inforaation that

was three yeara

old and hence not very accurate.

We did not

press the question, nor suggost names,

as it was ovident

that he felt that bis anamore mould siuply not givo a true,

current ploture.

Б.

A/l provided the full nane of a posgible lead

MEE A LANIZE GONN

which he had discussed earlier with Ontrich:

Pina

*453. Apt 6, Vedado, Havana.

Raudol RUIZ,

(RUI2) 18 an ausistant to

"pireotor of Sporta") for the National Gort

1n

Havana.

6.

In addition to the above information, the

undersignod discussed various aspects of the AlLASll case.

and in particular, questioned A/l about AMLASH's frame of

mind and future plans which he way have revealed to a/1.

aItor Ontrion departod the scena.

A/l made aeveral. points,

which basically bolled down to the fact that AMASIl vas

still not pleased with the support he vas getting Iron the

USa side.

The visit with DAINOLD, who acted in the capaolty

of a representative of high levels of the Gout concerned

with the Cuban probles, satlafled AMLASH as far as pOlloyy

was concerned, but he was not at all happy with the faot

that he still ras not given the tochnical asgistance for

the operational plan as he san 1t. A/l said that AMLASH

dwelt constantly on this point.

Ho could not understand

why he was denled certain suall plecea of equipment which

promised a final solution to the problem, whilo, on the

gave nich equipment and money to exile

groups for

coastal targots.

socording to A/1, AMLASH SeOls strongly

on thie polut, and 11 ho does not got advice and materialo

SECRET

Stani t

EXCITER INNA STANTALi

EXCININTONINA

---

## Page 4

114-00000

1400404

SECRET

Page 3 of Attach.

Irow USG technician, he mill probubly becomo sod-up agala,

and ve mill lone whaterer progress me have made to date.

A/l stated that ALASM now has hla feet net via-a-via

cooporating with USh and has accepted the Inct that he will

work profitably and securely with it.

It is thie that ne

stand to loss with our procrastination.

AHLASH alDo

talkod about going to the french terroriat group, the oas,

In order to got the materials and guidance ho needs.

It

Is bolleved. that he was talked out of this idea, after the

dangers involved mere discussed with AllaSHl.

T. With regard to the rudlo gear, AMLASH stated

tbat he did not feel

that he wanted to take

one in with

him, particularly in vier of the recent arrosts in Cuba

of agents carrying concealed radios.

He was not opposed,

however, at this tino to ha:dog:a radlo cached for him,

to be recovered by him later.

8.

According to Mimilp, 1s there ls any interest

In having AMASll link up with other trustod assets in

Cubá, these names would have to be given to him borore he

returned: otheruise he vould not trust any other means

uned lator insido to get his to initiato or respond to such

contacts.

All stated that AMASHl talked about gotting

aid Iron, or at least discussing his position, with

However, he stated that he questioned whether

this was the best idea, since lI RAY dame to paris while

ho (LASH) was there, people rould conclude that there mas.

Another apot touid be botter,

10. At the time of A/l'8 departure, AMASH

said that he would contact "Jack" (Red Stent, Paris

staffer) upon hia return to paris.

(This ho

subsequently

did on the lith of Noveuber, according to into received

150= Parle-somewhat belatedly).

In Rome and italy, VINEGA

When AMASHI, A/1, and VENEGAS were together

told ALASI that people were

betting that LaSh rould not retura to Cuba.

Song had also

questloned hia nother on this point.

AMASH reportedly

old VENEars to cover all the bets he could as he woulo

be a rich san.

It tas at this time,

according to A/1,

that sHASH seolded that he had better roturn to llavana

SECRET

Elst dil 70.1

---

## Page 5

4-00000

14-90,190

SECRET

Pago 1 of Altaoh. A

a littlo sooner than he intellod, in faot almost as soon

as posBiblA.)

12.

AMASH talked about the two possibilitios

Of re-Eaking

Cuba - eithor thru invasion by US troops, or

bis way.

He also realizod, however, that Invaston ras

not to bo considered serioualy at chla tiuo.

Also, MARASH

talked about his ability to take soud men into the hilla

of Las Villas Provinoo and taking

the small toms of

Trinidad and Topes de Collantos.

Ila said that he and bid

men could last no moro than 15 days in the hills as the

anti-guerrilla fightors now employed by tho Regime vero

BX-GuerIllAs

thensolves and knew the way to fight and

miazin the hills.

Also the Soviet equipment mado the govt

forces much moro

formidable than in Batista's time. ALASH

apparently was discussing these idoas with the impression

that this was the way to sot up a provislonal rebel gout

and thereby Invite and gain US support.

By the way All

salked, It 1s fairly cortain that AMASH realized that

this was not the kind of a plan which could oven remotely

be expected to receive US ald. It is hoped that he

does realize that lavana must I1rat be taken... or falling

that, a truly sizablo piece e: land (aay, almost an '

entire province) which could ba a true rallying point and

staging ground linder complece Rebel control, from which

the rest of the Island could be wrested Iron the fidellatas

and the Communiats.

13.

In sunnary, the talks with A/l lod the

underaignod to bellore that Must is again entering

one of his skeptical woods, one which our actions have

done little to dispel.

Too little and too lato...

End of Report

filllan E. Halnuright

SAS/EOB C/O

SECRET

CROM

ATTAIN! MI

ПРо-ре; ".. "..

→.."...

.....

---