NOVEMBER 22, 1963 CUBANA FLIGHT
Agency: HSCA
Originator: HSCA
From: CIA
Document date: 03/27/1979
Document type: REPORT

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JFK Assassination System.

Identification Form

Agency Information

Date:

3/23/201

AGENCY :

HSCA

RECORD NUMBER :

180-10142-10485

RECORD SERIES:

CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION

AGENCY FILE NUMBER: 25-40-01

Document Information

ORIGINATOR:

FROM:

TO :

TITLE:

HSCA

CIA

NOVEMBER 22, 1963 CUBANA FLIGHT

Released under the John

Assassination Records

Collection Act of 1992

144 USC 2107 Notel .

Case#:NW 53080 Date:

06-01-2017

DATE: 03/27/1979

PAGES:

5

SUBJECTS :

CUBANA AIRLINES

CIA, METHODOLOGY

DOCUMENT TYPE: REPORT

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

RESTRICTIONS: 1A; 1B

CURRENT STATUS: Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 08/09/1995

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :

Box 16; HSCA #15047

v9.1

HH 53080

DocId: 32271789

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015047

NOVEMBER 22, 1963 CUBANA FLIGHT

Book V of the Senate Intelligence Committee

Report refers to a reported five-hour delay (6:00PM

EST to 11:00 PM EST) of a Cubana flight from Mexico

to Havana the evening of President Kennedy's

assas-

sination, November 22, 1963. (Senate Intelligence

Committee Report, April 23,1976, p.30) The most

intriguing aspect of the report was that the alleged

delay was to await arrival at 10:30 PM EST of a pri-

vate twin-engined aircraft, which deposited an uni-

dentified passenger who boarded the Cubana aircraft

without customs clearance and traveled to Havana

in the pilot's cabin. (ibid ps. 60 -61) The Senate

Intelligence Committee wrote that the Central In-

telligence Agency "had no information indicating

that a followup investigation was conducted to deter-

mine the identity of the passenger and had no fur-

ther information on the passenger, and no explan-

ation for why a followup investigation was not con-

ducted." (ibid p.61)

The Senate Intelligence Committee Report

raises four major Questions:

a)Did the Central Intelligence Agency write the

Senate Intelligence Committee that no investigation

of the November 22, 1963 Cubana flight was conducted?

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p. 2

b) Did the Central Intelligence Agency further inves-

tigate the allegation?

c) What were the results of the Central Intelligence

Agency investigation?

d) Were the results of the Central Intelligence

Agency investigation forwarded to the Senate Intel-

ligence Committee?

In an attempt to answer the questions raised

by the Senate Intelligence Committee Report, the

House Select Committee on Assassinations has done

the following:

a) Conducted an extensive review of the Central Intel-

ligence Agency files that pertain to the November

22, 1963 Cubana flights.

6) Reviewed Tab B of the 1977 Cia Staff Report which

included a section on the November 22, 1963 Cubana

flights.

c) Reviewed the February 4, 1976 Central Intelligence

Agency letter to the Senate Intelligence Committee.

DID THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WRITE THE

SENATE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE THAT NO INVESTIGATION.

OF THE NOVEMBER 22, 1963 CUBANA FLIGHT WAS CONDUCTED?

After a careful review of the February

4, 1976 Central Intelligence Agency letter to the

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Senate Intelligence Committee , the House Select

Committee on Assassinations has determined that the

Senate Intelligence's interpretation of the letter

is misleading. The Central Intelligence Agency wrote

the

Senate Intelligence Committee that the Mexican

authorities were asked about the reported flight

delay, although there was no recorded response. (CIA

letter to Senate Intelligence Committee, 2/4/76)

DID THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY FURTHER INVESTIGATE

THE ALLEGATION?

The Central Intelligence Agency conducted

regular surveillance of Cubana flights, filing cable

reports to Headquarters. (1977 CIA Staff Report, Tab B,

p. 11) There was one unilateral CIA surveillance team

that observed arrivals and departures of Cubana

flights, reporting any unusual incidents and providing

copies of flight manifests. (ibia, p.11) The Mexican

authorities also had

a surveillance team of its own

at the airport which provided the CIA with photo-

graphs of passports and copies of passenger lists.

(ibid p.1l) Additionally, a telephone tap operation

(LIENVOY) against the Cuban Embassy provided trans-

cripts of conversations with the Cubana office and

the Mexican Airport Control office.

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WHAT WERE THE RESULTS OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

AGENCY INVESTIGATION?

The LIENVOY transcripts record a series of

discussions about the status of the November 22, 1963

Cubana flight-- when it arrived and when it departed.

The transcripts show that the flight arrived at the

airport at 1620 hours (All times used will be Mexico

City time to avoid confusion) Mexico City time. (HSCA

Staff Review of November 22, 1963 LIENVOY transcripts)

Prior to the arrival of the aircraft, one person ::

stated that the aircraft was due at 1630 hours and

"it will go" at 1730, suggesting a quick turnaround

that would have reduced unloading and loading time,

as well as servicing to a

relatively short period.

(ibid) However, the key report on the departure of

the aircraft was a statement at 2040 hours that.

the aircraft had departed for Cuba five minutes

earlier, i.e., 2035 hours. (ibia)

DIFFERENCE SENATE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE AND HOUSE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS FINDINGS

The House Select Committee on Assassinations

findings differ from those of the Senate Intelligence

Committee in the following

manner:

a) The Cubana flight was on the ground in Mexico

City for a total of four hours and about ten minutes.

It was not delayed five hours as reported in Book v.

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p..

b) The Cubana flight departed at 2035 hours

Mexico City time, 55 minutes ahead of the alleged

arrival at 2130 of a private flight with

a secret

passenger..

c) The 2035 departure also contrasts

further with

the

Senate Intelligence Committee Report that the Cubana

flight departed at 2200.

No record of a November 22, 1963 twin-engine

aircraft carrying a lone passenger exists. In addition,

no record exists of a passenger traveling to Havana

in the pilot's cabin.: In view of the surveillance

coverage of the Cubana flight, it is doubtful that

the alleged activity involving the private twin-

engined aircraft and passenger would have gone unno-

ticed or unreported had it occurred.

WERE THE RESULTS OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

AGENCY FORWARDED TO THE SENATE INTELLIGENCE

COMMITTEE

The Central Intelligence Agency gave the

Senate Intelligence Committee only the informant

allegations. The Senate Intelligence Committee

did not review the LIFIRE or LIENVOY records. Relying

solely on the informant's

allegations, the Senate

Intelligence Committee could not have reported the

story any differently.

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