Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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176-10036-10081

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA

RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10081

RECORD SERIES : National Security Files

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : WH

FROM : Rostow

TO : Bundy, McGeorge

TITLE :

DATE: 11/15/1961

PAGES : 2

SUBJECTS:

DOCUMENT TYPE :

CLASSIFICATION :

RESTRICTIONS :

CURRENT STATUS :

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 195: Vietnam, 11/14/61-11/15/61. Box 2

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SANITIZED IN UD: SEC. 2101

-this

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

November 15, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

FROM:

SUBJECT: Comment on TDCS-3/492, 958.

Whatever instructions President Diem issued it is evident that

the military and civil officials concerned with the war spared us no

details in emphasizing (or over-emphasizing) the seriousness of the

situation.

With specific reference to the highland area of Central Viet-

Nam, not only was the Taylor Mission informed of the situation, but

Mr. Joseph Alsop as well. The problem there is that the officer

commanding has at his disposal perhaps 7, 000 troops to protect the

Kontum-Pleilu area; and these troops are stretched thin in support

of the civil guard on passive protective missions. He lacks a sub-

stantial reserve force in case the infiltrators of recent months into

that area should form up and attempt to seize and hold one or both

of the provincial capitals in the plateau.

It was partly to provide directly and indirectly against that

contingency, among others, that the Taylor Mission urged that some

U.S. forces be on hand in Viet- Nam.

As we pointed out in our report, there is no reliable estimate

of the scale of forces now in the forests above the plateau which might

be assembled for a strike. When briefed by General Don, the Corps

Commander in the area, we were given an estimate as high as 16, 000

for the scale of VC forces on both sides of the Laos border opposite

the plateau. The commander on the spot gave Dez Fitzgerald (and

Alsop) a more conservative estimate of 4-5, 000. If that force could

be assembled, however, it might make grave difficulties if it should

strike, given the lack of a local reserve and the time required to

move up a reserve force from elsewhere.

CONFIDENTIAL

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22_

• CONFIDENTIAL

- 2-

Beyond this specific area, it was the judgment of our mission

that the "regime had lost control of the security situation' only in

the sense that its existing forces were stretched so thin that it lacked

the mobile reserve (as well as the intelligence, command structure

and mobility) to go on to the offensive. The mission concurred in the

view that it would be wise to introduce some friendly foreign forces in

order to raise the "morale of the VNA and encourage the population at

large. "

CONFIDENTIAL

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