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1704-10431-10006

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SECRET/SENSITIVE

laud caried to Fecy's

Mice i Fer 15

31 January 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of Defense

James R. Schlesinger

SUBJECT

Analysis of Soviet Policy towards the United States

by an ex-Member of the KGB

1: Several weeks ago I talked to Bill Nelson, DDO,*

regarding a more thoughtful use of our Soviet KGB Source's knowl-

edge of fundamental Soviet Bloc policy. The information relates

to the clandestine programs of the KGB

sponsored by the

Central Committee in its reorientation in May of 1959 against the

United States as the "main enemy."

My suggestion was to submit a

number of your speeches and solicit Source's critique as seen

through the eyes of an ex-KGB officer.

Mr. Nelson stated that he

had no objection as long as there was a description of the

Source with a statement that his study did not necessarily repre-

sent the views of CIA.. I should add that the FBI and other serv-

ices are on record to the effect that they have never been able

to disprove Source's factual information although they do not

necessarily agree with his hypotheses (see Attachment A).

2. Attachment B sets forth the highlights and chronology of

his professional career in the KGB. This alone does not convey the

true significance of his defection to the Agency in December 1961.

From 1953 until 1961 various circumstances and events led to his

disaffection with the system and hardened his determination to

defect should his family be reunited. His concern was for his

*Bill has taken sick leave for the next ten days and has not 054519

seen this letter.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

Impossible to Determine

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2

young. daughter who lived with her grandparents in Russia. In

1961 she was permitted to visit Source and his wife abroad,

and this triggered his defection.

Overall, the case is one

where we unwittingly had an agent in place

breaking down Soviet compartmentation of the KGB, both in the

First and in the Second Chief Directorate. His purpose was

to obtain information of great value to the West should he

have the opportunity to defect.

3. By way of special talents, he is essentially an

analyst and historian. He was frequently called upon by senior

members of the service to study and make recommendations where

there were conflicts over cases affecting more than one depart-

ment.

In his drive to gain more knowledge outside of his par-

ticular sphere, he managed on one occasion to be appointed to

the Inspector General's team which gave him access to the logs

of KGB production indicating the overall espionage production

obtained by the KGB.

The investigation was initiated by the

Politburo who complained of the delay in receiving the product

derived from espionage, such as British Admiralty, Cables and

Plans, NATO documents, etc.

This gave Source freedom to in-

spect the processing of secret information and to trace its

handling from the moment it arrived in Moscow, the translation of

the product and its preparation for the Politburo. Unfortunately,

the names of agents were not indicated, but it enabled Source,

after his defection, to identify the actual documents which were

identified by Western services on the basis of his description.

This; in turn, led to investigative action and important counter-

intelligence successes in the West.

4. Source has cooperated with some nine intelligence and

security services under our aegis.

He has imparted first-hand

knowledge of major covert political programs from the days of

This knowledge was acquired from reading deeply

into the archives is recordse a she activi fes or soviet intelli-

gence services beginning with the Revolution. Equally important

was his long tenure in the Higher Counterintelligence School

where he was able to milk KGB officers from many departments of

the Service abroad who were brought back for short periods of .

retraining.

5. Because the Administration, the State Department and

the Agency, in part, appear to be firmly entrenched in their

views regarding the policy of Detente, I believe that a prelimi-

pipes of Dete

nary unofficial reading of these materials by an expert in your

Department might generate an interest in the Source and his views.

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This could lead to a symposium in which he would be invited to

participate and respond to adversary views. His reaction to

such a proposal

is unknown... He has always resisted control in

the sense of being an agent of any given country. Further, he

does make demands for classified information and position papers

including the nature of the sources before addressing himself to

any particular problem. Nevertheless, his paper on your speeches

were obtained from him using only unclassified information.

6.

His production has run into several thousands of pages

of transcripts of interviews including meetings which he had

with other foreign intelligence and security services.

The

range of his information is so vast and detailed that we are

hard put to use it as an overlay for interpreting current Soviet

events.

We have learned from experience that if we give him a

problem with an adequate data base, he will computerize and re-

arrange his basic information to support his analysis of any new

subject.

This approach has been fruitful because in supporting

his thesis, he often reveals new information of value.

7. Attachment C is a sensitive report received from our

Israeli liaison; Attachment D is an assessment regarding the

activities, role, modus operandi and reason for

Ambassador DOBRYNIN's success vis-a-vis the United States (which

is incomplete wherever an asterisk is indicated); and

Attachment E is a rough draft of his review of the following

books - SOVIET STRATEGY FOR THE SEVENTIES, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

AS AN INSTRUMENT OF SOVIET POLICY and CONVERGENCE OF COMMUNISM

AND CAPITALISM - A SOVIET VIEW - submitted to us during your

tenure in the Agency by Mr. Don Cotter.

We intend to follow up

on this at some future date. This, and other attachments, are

partly drawn from a draft manuscript which he has in his posses-

sion.

The manuscript. runs to over two thousand pages.

He guards

it jealously and is reluctant to publish it at this time.

He

has permitted me to read several chapters, and they are of unique

interest because of the classified information (based on documents)

which he read in Moscow.

8.

By way of digression, a bird's eye view is set forth

below of Source's theme.

9. The major reorganization (which produced the KGB

Department of Disinformation) and the gradual reorientation of the

KGB and GRU was completed at the end of 1958 when SHELEPIN suc-

ceeded General SEROV as the chairman of the KGB. (General SEROV,

who worked with KHRUSHCHEV in the Ukraine, was downgraded to head

the GRU). This development climaxed two years of inspection by a

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4

special committee headed by SHELEPIN who worked under the

Central Committee to investigate activities and policies of the

KGB and GRU.

They concluded that the Intelligence Services had

not carried out deStalinization which required that the services

follow the Leninist concepts of intelligence and its role in

political action.

By way of explanation, the OGPU and Cheka were

credited under LENIN with having saved the Revolution. This was

accomplished by suppressing enemies at home, mounting successful

penetration operations into western governments, the manipulation

of agents of influence and conducting massive disinformation pro-

grams by feeding deception to the West through their intelligence

services. Under STALIN the services degenerated into instruments

of personal. terror to preserve his cult of personality and lost

sight of the overall political, economic, and military objectives

of the Soviets.

10. Before STALIN's death, there were anti-Stalinist ele-

ments who were uncovered and repressed, but their cause to find

a Leninist solution to post-war problems continued after his

death. For example, MALENKOV began serious investigations into

the KGB and other police organizations by enlisting the talents

of the Leninist/Marxist Institute. It was his objective to have

the investigation culminate in open revelations regarding the

crimes of STALIN and the activities of the police state.

course which was set would have ultimately led to the trials of

KHRUSHCHEV and many members in the leadership who were prominent

in advancing the Stalinist regime as syncophants and "boot-

lickers.

11.

MALENKOV was. unfortunately outmaneuverd by the collec-

tive which voted against him on issues, particularly regarding

Germany. Even in victory, KHRUSHCHEV could not stem the tide

let loose by MALENKOV; therefore, in order to survive, he had

to "steal"

ENoV: herefore, in °

the process of de-stalinization and shape it to his

own ends and the survival of himself and his friends. This led

eventually to the "secret speech"

regarding STALIN's crimes in

which he twisted the facts to exonerate himself and his followers.

This led to unrest in the Bloc and the Hungarian Revolution which

forced KHRUSHCHEV and his cohorts to initiate plans and programs

which represented a return to LENIN.

12. In May 1959, a secret, six-day series of meetings was

held for Government bureaucrats possessing a COMINT security

clearance. It was attended by approximately two thousand members

from different parts of the Government. The purpose was to hand

in kating to the dest in zeton of the intel -

gence services and to set forth policies which would result in

their reorganization and reorientation.

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13. The principal speaker was SHELEPIN who was supported by

General GRIBANOV of the Second Chief Directorate as well as many

other senior officials of the Government and Services.

SHELEPIN

gave a broad analysis of the world situation stressing that the

USSR and the USA had reached

an atomic stalemate.

Accepting this

to be a fact, he stated that all plans for war such as stay-

behind net-workers should be abandoned. He outlined programs and

reforms for the Intelligence Services which were accomplished

under LENIN and which required the intelligence potential to be

in harness with all other departments of the Government. He

stressed that each intelligence operation should be designed to

help achieve broad political objectives. Noting that the letter

"p" (Politika) had been obliterated from OGPU by STALIN,

SHELEPIN announced the creation of the Department of Disinformation

within the KGB but subject to the control and direction of the

Central Committee. The Department's task was to use all organs

of Government to implement strategic disinformation in accordance

with directives.

This was meant to include all channels to the

West; namely, diplomatic, press, military, cultural and economic.

This was in addition to the use of double agents and provocateurs.

14. In discussing the various objectives, SHELEPIN expounded

on the wisdom of pursuing peaceful coexistence in the developed

countries and wars of national liberation in the underdeveloped

countries, noting that these courses of action were not contra-

dictory.

15. Shortly thereafter, the Central Committee charged the

KGB with the recruitment of

two thousand additional S&T staff

officers in order to exploit on a broad basis the opening to the

West.

The purpose for this increase was to gain Western technology

as well as to effect the recruitment of agents and agents of in-

fluence in the Western scientific world.

It should be noted that

one of the more efficient and productive elements of the KGB and

GRU had always been

their successful acquisition of scientific

secrets and R&D from the West. SHELEPIN noted that the change

of balance of military power. could only be achieved through this

additional strength of acquiring the technological and strategic

secrets of the West.. This would also strike at the USA and hasten

its isolation.

16. According to the Source, he learned in 1961 that the KGB

had acquired approximately one thousand new staff officers for

S&T in accordance with the Central Committee directive and that

about one thousand slots remained to be filled. In 1961 he and

some six hundred KGB officers attended an important lecture given

by a senior general of the Defense Ministry. The lecture was to

outline the S&T tasks which the KGB would be expected to undertake.

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He stressed that the objective of the Soviet and the Bloc was

not only to achieve parity with the West but to overtake the

United States and swing the balance of military power to the

Soviets.

17. The general stated that the USSR was fourteen years

behind

the United States in electronic technology but that the

gap would be remedied by coordinated action in the following

fields:

A greatly increased espionage effort

because of the addition of one thousand staff

officers to the S&T of the KGB and the Academy

of Sciences;

b.

Disinformation, i.e., programs to mis-

lead the United States and the West regarding

Soviet technology which would lead the Western

scientific community into expensive and time-

wasting blind alleys of R&D;

c.. To acquire new technology through

trade agreements; and

d.. To make treaties and other diplomatic

arrangements by which the Soviets and Bloc would

acquire information and which would permit Soviet

scientists to gain access to the United States

scientific community for the purpose of spotting

potentials for the KGB and GRU.

Most important,

he said, was that treaties could be used to

block the natural technological growth of the

Western powers, in particular, the United states.

18. As noted above, the lecture on shortcomings of Soviet

technology in electronics was delivered in 1961. Attachment F

is a National Intelligence Bulletin (TOP SECRET UMBRA) dated

16 July 1974, which has a direct bearing on Source's information

regarding the aforementioned lecture. The National Intelligence

Bulletin begins with the following:

"Leading officials of the Soviet electronics

industry have told visiting US experts that the

Soviet Union is four or five years behind the

United States in integrated circuit technology.

The US experts, who tested Soviet equipment. in

this field, have confirmed the Soviet judgment.

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Integrated circuits are needed to meet the size,

weight, power, and reliability of modern military

equipment as well as the needs of many civil

electronic systems."

Admittedly, the question of electronics covers only one phase of the

question of military power, and we have not been able to pursue this

question of technology further, given our ever-shrinking assets.

19. Since my days are numbered here, I do feel an obligation to

dispatch these papers for analysis and comment by your expert before

my time runs out.

20.

As previously noted, this package represents a unique dis-

semination, unofficial in character. It is requested that this

exercise be tightly held and that we consider modalities for the

future exploitation and/or discussions of the product and the Source.

We and our allies regard Source to be the most valuable Soviet

defector since World War II.

At your convenience I would appreciate a short acknowledge-

ment of the above and a reaction from your reader. In the event that

these papers do not stimulate any worthwhile interest, I would ap-

preciate their return for the use of my successor.

Kindest personal regards from,

Ta Culerton

James. Anyte ton

Attachments:

as stated

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J.S.S.R.

Report No.

1-6444

Subject:

MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION

Source:

. Born 1938 in RIGA, has an academic education and is a

sociologist by profession.

He acquired his academic

training in Moscow and Baku. In 1962 he worked for

about six months with the M.V.D. In Baku and after that;

until 1963, he worked as a lecturer in philosophy in

Baku. In 1966-1967 he did his doctoral work at the

University of Moscoir. From 1967 until December 1973

when he left the U.S.S.R., he worked in Yaroslav!

and in Baku. He was a member of the Sociology Asso-

ciation of the U.S.S.R. From 1964 he was an active

member of the Communist Party in Azerbaydzhan and was

a member of its central Committee. He was closely

associated with the First Secretary of the Azerbaydzhanl

Party. He cooperated willingly and made the impression

of being a highly intelligent and educated man with

analytical ability, good perception and excellent memory.

Validity of Information: November 1973

Reliability: B/2-3

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58

U.S.S.R

Subject:

THE U.S.S.R. AND CHINA

1. On this subject, Source can report on the opinions of people like

KHALIPOV, ALIYEV, SUKHODEYEV, GVISHYANI (KOSYGIN'S SOn-in-law), OSIPOV

and Polkovnik-General BYCHENKO (FNU? (Commander of the P.V.O. in the

BAKU Area). The following is a gist of the main ideas:

a. The danger of war with China is not taken seriously in official

circles of the U.s.s.R. and

particularly in military circles.

General KHALIPOV said more than once that common interests

outweigh the differences between the two Communist countries.

The majority in those circles are of the opinion that the

spreading of warnings about war with China is a deliberate

piece of dis-information by the soviet authorities in order

to justify the keeping of a large mobilized force. It was

often sald that neither China nor the Soviet Union fear an

attack by the other side. China needs anti-Soviet propaganda

for her own internal purposes and the U.s.s.R., in order to

keep millions of mobilized soldiers.

b.. In those circles it is thought that war with China is impossible

for the following reasons:

(1) Even given the use of nuclear weapons, it would take a

tremendous effort to destroy just the military potential

of China. KHALIPOV mentioned a figure: 200 atomic bombs.

..l..

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(2) War with China would in fact be a war of mutual attrition

and even in the case of a formal Soviet victory and a

change-over in Chinese leadership - the U.s.s.R. will be

unable to feed the hungry masses

of China. According to

GISHYANI, there are a hundred million hungry people in

China, and in the U.s.S.R. there is not enough food for

the population. A soviet victory would thus double the

needs of the Soviet Union in this respect and would put

too great a strain on her economy.

?. From some conversations mainly with KHALIPOV, Source concluded that

83e Soviet Union is preparing for war with Western Europe rather than

with China;

here are his. reasons:

a. The substitution of old weapons for new ones takes place first and

foremost in

the western parts of the Soviet Union, and not on the

border with China, except in the VLADIVOSTOK area, and this not be-

cause it is near to China, but, mainly, because it is near to the

U.S.A.

ba. According to KHALIPOV, two or three days will be enough for the

Soviet Army to conquer Western Europe and he elaborated:

England has about 920 tanks and 1500 planes;

France - about 900 tanks and about 1500 planes;

Germany - about 500 tanks and about 1000 planes;

All this put together is but about a sixth of what the U.s.s.R.

can put in the field against the west within 2 or 3 days; and

until the West decides on counter-measures it will be too late.

3 According to source, who bases his opinion on his conversations with the

8in people, not only is the Soviet Union in no fear of a war with China, but

we even thinks China will inin her in a war anzinct this blant

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V.S.S.R.

Subject:

ANDROPOV, GRECHKO AND GROMYKO AS MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO

l. Many Soviet personalities, close to Government circles, are of the

opinion that ANDROPOV's, GRECHKO's and GROMYKO's inclusion in the Polit-

buro should be examined against the backgroun of two tendencies current

within Soviet ruling circles with regard to U.s.s.R. policy towards China

and. the U.S.A.

a.. A policy of detente with china is supported, according to these

personalities, by SUSLOV and SHELEPIN. These two think that the

Soviet Union should strive for closer relations with China by

adopting a tough policy towards the capitalist countries;

policy of detente with the West weakens the

Soviet position in

the International Conmunist Movement and at the same time strengthens

the ideological attitudes of China.

b. A policy of detente with the llest

BREZHNEV, KOSYGIN, GROMYKO, GRECHKO, ANDROPOV and particularly

KIRILENKO - on the other hand - support a policy of detente with

the lest in general and with the U.S.A. In particular. This group

stresses the need for the modernization of Soviet production pro-

cesses. After this vital objective is achieved, the U.S.S.R. should

adopt an even tougher policy towards the lest than in the past.

3. Thus the menbership of the three in the Politburo is designed to

sirengthen BREZHNEV's position..

It should be remembered that these three

Ois a personal debt to BREZHNEV: it was BREZHNEV who made them what they

are noir. It should also be kept In mind that the membership in the

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rolltburo of the Minister of lar, the Head of the K.f.B. and of the Foreign

Ninister, has a special significance; it is an indication that BREZHNEV is

asout to make most important decisions and needs the support of the Armed

forces, the K. f.B. and of the Foreign Office.

The general opinion in circles of the Intelligentzia, and particularly in

scientific circles, is that a war against the lest is being planned.

Iccording to this opinion, BREZHNEV's admission of these three Ministers

do the Politburo is a very unusual act in the history of the Soviet Union.

& similar step was taken only once before, when STALIN admitted VOROSHILOV,

soLotOy and BERIA to the Politburo - about two months hefore the outbreak

of war between the U.S.S.R. and Germany.

neiter!

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Potorti

DEVELOPMENTAL AND RECRUITNENT APPROACIIES TO AMERICANS

THE SOVIET SECURITY THREAT IN THE DETENTE PERIOD

1.. The aura of detente in the Soviet and Bloc relations dur-

ing the last year

and a half, we belleve, has created a favorable

climate

for recruitment and penetration in the west.

This paper

deals with the problems as we see them.

There are related counter-

intelligence issues which involve internal security: the leakage

and exchange of economic, scientific and political information;

the sale of technological information; and the impact of disinfor-

mation and agents of influence on American policy.

noted in our previous forums, since 1961 when KAGO brought us

documentary evidence* that Soviet intelTigence had launched

a full-

scale penetration effort agamst the "Hain Enemy," we have seen a

Detente has done nothing to blunt this effort.

KRUSHCHEY Was the first to label "Detente.", BREZHNEV has made the

word the criche of the moment. It has been clear to Soviet intel-

ligence, as it has been apparent to Western counterintelligence,

that Soviet policy designed to exploit Western technology and,

hopefully, change the balance of military power has created new

opportunities

for Soviet espionage.

2. These new opportunities may be characterized as a plethora

of choices:

a harvest almost unprecedented since the New Economic

Policy (N.E.P.) period and the 1958 Central Committee decision to

assign to the KGB a new vital role in the policy to exploit the

West by returning to the principles of LENiN...

to the

now finds more Americans, both official and unofficial:

a. Anxious to exchange all types of information;

b. Willing to discuss virtually any subject;

c. Inclined to believe there is truly a latent and

potentially viable dissident movement in the USSR which can

be influenced if only the American people-to-people concept

could prevail;

#Referred to and quoted in Attachment A.

02926

SERDIT

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JELD

:2

d.

Convinced that there is a bonanza for the American

businessman in the USSR and that "business' can alter the

Soviet lifestyle and reduce governmental, i.e., CP control;

e. Believing that the Cold War was a myth created by

America;

f.:

Anxious to atone for the "sins" of Vietnam and

interventionist policies;

g. Anxious about China and nuclear weapons;

h.

Believing there is more merit to direct USSR-USA

negotiation if America attempts to negotiate in tanden with

its Western allies of other nations;

i.

Soviet citizens, particularly the young

who are willing

to cooperate with the West to advance free-

dom for the

• Russians;

Ignorant about Soviet ideological consistency and

purpose.

3.

Addressing ourselves only to manifestations of the Soviet

security threat outside the U.S., we are concerned that the climate

for penetration, particularly. for the recruitment of Americans, has

become too permissive.: The attitudes outlined have not only made

America more vulnerable but have made the counterintelligence job

more difficult. Not only has. Soviet-American contact increased in

geometric proportions, but there is also increasing evidence that

the always relatively loose security check rein on official Ameri-

cans has lengthened even more. As discussed elsewhere, it is ap-

parent the Soviet-inspired attacks on Western intelligence, when

coupled with

domestic attacks of whatever origin against Anerican

intelligence and security organs, have had a direct bearing on

opportunities for Soviet intelligence to attempt to develop and

recruit Americans.

4.

In an attempt to cope. with the problem of Soviet and Bloc

recruitments and penetrations, we have - since August 1965 -

collected statistics and case

data on a governnent-wide basis of

recruitment attempts made against American personnel abroad and

foreign employees of the United States Government.

Our objective

has been to collect, record, collate and analyze such information

in order to:

Identify officers and agents of Soviet, Bloc, Cuban

and Chinese Communist services;

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3

b.

Identify U.S. Government employees who are being

targetted by these

adversary services;

c. " Determine the scope of activity of these adversary

services by area, date and modus operandi;

d..

Determine the scope of targetting against any

specific U.S. Government agency;

e.

Help us

understand the extent of foreign intelligence

efforts against the U.S. Government and to obtain other per-

spectives about possible disinformation and deception

operations;

f. Facilitate management of double agent cases;

Furnish counterintelligence and operational guidance

to our field stations in their efforts to mount aggressive

operations against the adversary;

-h.

Provide the Agency and other U.S. Government agencies,

as

appropriate, information about the scope and type of pene-

tration efforts being made against U.S. Government installa-

tions abroad.

Chinese Communist services are as follows:

1965.

1966

1967

1968.

1969

1970

1971

1972

1973

-

Total

742, = !

2 solid

un will

*The unit in these and the other statistics in this review is

the single case of penetration or the recruitment incident as es-

tablished by evaluation of confirmed reports, unconfirned

or cir-

cumstantial information, and other specific reporting and informa-

tion.

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Over the whole period the penetration and recruitment ef-

forts have been fairly stably distributed by service as follows:

Soviet

58% of the cases

Bloc

37%

Cuban

4%

Chicom.:

1%

• Over the range of cases,

recruitment and penetration ef-

forts have been directed at U.S. officer personnel in 30% of the

cases, other staff in 5%, comnunications personnel in 5%, enlisted

ranks in 9%, local employees in 309** others in 22% of the cases.

a geola part

Looking more particularly at our information on Soviet

and associated recruitment and penetration efforts for the Detente

period--the past four years--there is the following distribution

of adversary service case effort:

-Yearly

Totals

Soviet

BLOC

Cub an

CPP

1970

1971

1972

1973

-141

'"32

cars

47

131

29

•21

=28

12

3

3

60 g

5620

378:0

451

9 .

It is clear that Soviet

penetration and recruitment opera-

tions,

up to and including the last year, against U.S. Government

installations and representatives abroad

have not been materially

affected or inhibited by "Detente."

Some representative cases

since 1968 are cited in Attachment B.

The cases have been sani-

tized to protect the innocent.

They are included solely to suggest

the range; precision and persistence of

the Soviet, Bloc, Cuban and

Chinese Communist penetrations effort.

10 •

This is not the end of the problem.

Our data consists es

sentially of information on approaches and pitches voluntarily

reported by American personnel. The 1973 case figures (and those

for 1974, thus far) hold up very well as valid indicators of the

persistence of Soviet and Bloc penetration efforts in spite of, or

because of, Detente permissiveness. However we acknowledge that

we have no way yet of judging exactly the impact of Detente on the

reporting mood of the official Americans who are being targetted.

*This covers only local employees outside of Iron Curtain in-

stallations. Local employees in U.S. installations behind the Iron

Curtain are regarded as actually or potentially under the control

of their respective security services and are therefore not con-

sidered in

this calculation.

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5

Soviet Bloc modus operandi--the operational techniques

used against Americans--Include all the known gambits and have

changed little over the past decade? There have been slight tacti-

cal shifts both abroad and in the Soviet Bloc to take advantage of

the "spirit of Detente," for example, but the basic No remains

what it was in

the 1920's and 1930's.

12.

In addition to diplomatic and official access to U.S.

officials, Soviet Bloc intelligence officers frequent the places--

bars, restaurants, clubs and other international, national and

local organizations--that provide them with opportunities to meet

American personnel or U.S. Government employees.

In their recruit-

ment efforts, Soviet Bloc intelligence officers have utilized the

theme of peace, friendship, and mutual cooperation and they have

offered the bait of exchanging information to develop "common"

interests and cooperation to obtain information. They have utilized

the ploy of professional advancement or business interests for one

or both parties when attempting to gain cooperation or buy informa-

tion to try to remove the stigma of espionage in their development

negotiations as well as in some recruitment attempts. They con-

tinue in their efforts to obtain access to both American and in-

digenous female employees throughout the world by using officers or

local indigenous male and female agents to cultivate these target

personalities.

Recently they have used the language lesson gambit-

even with CIA personnel. Local personnel, ranging from servants to

targetted either to ob-

tain employment with Americans or to develop personal as well as

official access to American officials.. They have attempted to

recruit foreign local employees to report about the interests

activities of their American employers.: They employ sex and

and

financial remuneration as bait, use personal compromise as a threat,

seek out personal weaknesses to utilize as operational opportuni-

ties, make direct recruitment approaches based on compassionate or

nationalistic grounds, utilize audio and other technical mechanisms,

13.

This summary examination of the recent case evidence of

the essentially unchanged Soviet and Bloc recruitment effort

against official Americans abroad is not the whole Detente story.

There is also

• a great interest by the Soviets

in recruiting U.S.

students abroad.

The primary objective of that recruitment effort

is to guide the

student eventually to obtain employment with the

U.S. Government. Such efforts are only indicative of the fact that

the Soviets view their penetration of the U.S. Governnent, via

students, as a continuing and long-range program.

14. A recent additional dimension to the problem of Soviet

and Bloc recruitment of Americans has been the access the Soviets

have developed to American businessmen--many of whom are privy to

SECRET

---

## Page 18

13-00000

6

U.S. Government secrets through defense-related contracts--who

travel to the USSR and entertain Soviet trade delegations in the

U.s.

The concern we have previously expressed about the role of

Lt. General Yevgeniy N. PITOVRANOV and the Soviet intelligence

officers in the foreign trade business was well founded and, in

fact, we believe was

somewhat understated. It is now evident that

PITOVRANOV controls most if not all of the activities going on

where American business encounters Soviet trade officials

in the

International Trade Center to be built in Moscow, in exhibits in

the USSR and abroad, in the patents and licensing agreements, in

the

supervision of the travel of trade delegations to the U.s.

and

the like.

15.

Reports which reveal that the KGB is active among American

businessmen are beginning to surface.

Not too surprisingly, these

reports indicate that their techniques are both subtle and blatant.

One of the most blatant approaches to American business involves

Igor ARTENYEV, who is attached to the Soviet Embassy in Washington.

ARTEMYEV claims to be a student in the U.S. to study relationships

between U.S. companies and their foreign subsidiaries and licensing

agreements between U.S. and foreign companies.

In the course of

his research, ARTEMYEV sends detailed questionnaires

to U.s. com-

questionnaires are the kind required by our Securities

and Exchange Commission.. Uhile some companies do not respond.

there are those that do. ARTEMYEV also visits various companies to

On one occasion he replied to a question

about the level of classification of the meeting by saying it was

"confidential." With that kind of access, who needs to recruit in

16.

PITOVRANOV's people are very evident in various

trade

delegations under their Chamber of Connerce cover,

and they are

applying what appear to be classic assessment techniques.

It has

been our experience to date that they are thinking long-range and

are themselves not interested in the cheap shot or quick pitch,

although these devices are being employed against some American

businessmen who visit Moscow. There are also strong indications

that the Soviets are using recruited agents among the rapidly ex-

panding deni-monde of fixers, many Russian-speaking, who gain

employment as the in-house experts who "know how to deal with the

Russians" and who find employment with Anerican firms as guides

and

advisors accompanying U.S. delegations to lloscow.

Attachments

---

## Page 19

13-00000

The following are highlights of the chronology of Source's (Subject's)

professional

career:

September 1944: Subject was mobilized and sent to the

Frunze Artillery School in Odessa where

1945-1946:

1946-1948:

1948-1950:

he remained until July 1945. At that time

Subject left the Artillery School before

completion of the course and enrolled in a

Counterintelligence School,

Student at the one year course, Military

Counterintelligence School, GUKR/"SMERSH,"

Moscow.

Desk officer, Assistant Operational Case

Officer, assigned to the Eastern Section

(otdeleniye) of the SK (Soviet Colony

security of Soviet officials abroad) Depart-

ment (otdel) of the First Chief (Foreign

Intelligence) Directorate of MGB. Head-

quarters in Moscow.

During the period

November 1947 to September 1948 Subject held

the title of Referent and his office was

designated the Fifth (SK) Department of the

Third (Eastern) Directorate of the KI

(Committee for Information), but his functions

were

unchanged.

Student at the two-year course, Higher

Intelligence School of the KI.

Suhject

studied goneral subjecis and the English

language; he was one of 30 students wha

specialized in counterintelligence during

the second year of the course.

03035

---

## Page 20

13-00000

1950-1951:

Desk officer, Operation Case Officer,

supervising SK activities in China,

assigned to the SK Section, Eastern Depart-

ment, First Directorate of the MGB Head-

quarters in Moscow, the SK functions having

reverted from the KI to the MGB in 1949.

September 1951: At his request Subject was transferred as

a desk officer to the Anglo-American Section,

Counterintelligence Department of the First

Directorate, MGB Headquarters in Moscow.

November 1951:

Subject was promoted to "Senior Operational

Case Officer."

December 1951:

The KI, was dissolved and former state security

elements were returned to the MGB. Subject's

functions continued the same, but, in the

reorganization, he was assigned to the CI

Section of the American Department of the

Anglo-American (First) Directorate of the

First Chief Directorate of the MGB.

March 1952:

Subject and an unidentified young colleague

wrote a joint letter through the Central

Committee of the CPSU to STALIN making

suggestions for a fundamental reorganization of

Soviet foreign intelligence and counter-

intelligence work.

September 1952: While on vacation in the Georgian SSR

Subject was ordered to Moscow for a four hour

meeting, with his friend, with STALIN,

MALENKOV, and BERIYA. STALIN thanked the two

officers for their suggestions, discussed

intelligence matters in detail and asked them

to send him a letter with specific proposals

---

## Page 21

13-00000

March 1953:

October 1953:

August 1954:

for necessary reorganizations, together

with the names of recommended chiefs.

In a subsequent letter they recommended

Sergey Ivanovich OGOLTSOV, then in prison

for "political crimes," and Yevgeniy

Petrovich PITOVRANOV, then chief or deputy

chief of the MGB in the Uzbekistan SSR.

STALIN met Subject and his friend

a second

time.

OGOLTSOV was released from

prison and

appointed Chief of the First Chief Directo-

rate, with PITOVRANOV as his deputy. A

Chief Intelligence Directorate of the MGB

was then formed, containing a Counterintelligence

Department with an Emigre desk and seven geo-

graphical desks. Subject was appointed by

OGOLTSOV as chief of the American Desk,

supervising approximately 15 staff persons.

When STALIN died and BERIYA took over control

of the State Security apparatus, which he

combined with the MVD into a unified MVD, he

replaced OGOLTSOV with one of his own appointees.

Subject was reassigned as deputy chief of the

Russian Emigre Desk of the CI Department of

the Second (new designation for foreign

Intelligence) Chief Directorate, MVD. Subject

supervised activities against emigres in

Austria and Germany.

Subject was assigned to the MVD residency in

Vienna, Austria, as an operational case officer

in the Emigre Operations Group.

Subject was

transferred to the British Sub-

Group of the Anglo-American-French Group of the

KGB residency in Vienna. His duties were of a

counterintelligence nature, i.e. concerned

with penetration of foreign intelligence services.

---

## Page 22

13-00000

1955-1959:

One of 170 students at

..ding the four

year internal security-counterintelligence

course, the KGB Higher School

Juridical

Institute. .

He presented and successfully

defended his thesis on the subject of SK

activities among Soviet delegations and

tourist groups traveling abroad. He re-

ceived his diploma in August 1959. During

his school tour Subject also spent several

weeks in on-the-job training as a student

assigned to pertinent elements of the KGB's

Second (Internal Counterintelligence) Chief

Directorate, with access to operational files

on foreign diplomatic personnel in Moscow

Who were KGB targets.

September 1959: Subject was assigned as a Senior Operational

Case Officer responsible for NATO infornation

within the Treaty Organizations Direction,

Information (Reports) Department, First

(Foreign) Chief, Directorate, KGB Headquarters,

Moscow. His function was to translate, edit

and summarize information reports obtained by

KGB agents abroad

and to disseminate the

pertinent information to the Central Committee

of the CPSU, members of the Presidium, including

KHRUSHCHEV, and, in the case of information

with military aspects, to MALINOVSKIY, the

Minister of Defense. At one time, during a

CP cell meeting, criticism was voiced about

the delays in translation and processing and

Subject was assigned to study the situation.

Thus

he examined registry logs showing the

titles of agent information reports, the place

acquired, the date received

and the date of

dissemination of the finished Russian intelli-

April

1960:

gence reports to the government.

Subject was transferied to the American Section

---

## Page 23

13-00000

August 1960:

15 December 1961:

of the CI Department of the First Chief

Directorate, KGB, to pi-pare for assign-

ment to the KGB residency under Soviet

Embassy cover in Helsinki, Finland, as

the CI officer working against foreign

intelligence services.

Subject was assigned to the KGB residency in

Helsinki, under the name KLIMOV (his true

name was compromised through the 1954

defection of Petr DERYABIN in Vienna), and

with the cover title of Third Secretary:

Subject, with his wife and young daughter

defected to the U.S. Government which granted

them political asylum.

28 December 1961:

Subject met Attorney General Robert KENNEDY

along with Mr. HELMS, DDP.

1962:

Subject was debriefed by CIA Officers,

officials from other US Agencies and teams of

Intelligence Officers from Free World nations.

Subject provided much valuable information on

the KGB, its organization, personnel, operations,

aims and efforts against the Free World.

Subject, however, proved to be a difficult

handling problem, especially as a result of

his personality and his constant

demands for

regular meetings with high-level US officials

such as the President, the Attorney-General,

the Directors of CIA and the FBI and for a

policy role in the US Intelligence Community.

16 February 1962: Subject had another meeting with the

Attorney-General.

2 July 1962:

Subject met again with the Attorney-General

and MI. HELMS.

9 July 1962:

22 August 1962:

Subject had a conversation with Mr. HELMS.

Subject had interview with Mr. SORENSON of the

White House Staff and Mr. Edward R. MURROW,

Director of USIA.

---

## Page 24

13-00000

15 Nov. 1962:

27 Nov. 1962:

An FBI source reported hat the KGB was aware

of Subject's presence in the U.S.A. and ordered

all Soviet IS personnel to report immediately

any information which they may obtain regard-

ing Subject.

Subject met Mr. McCONE, DCI, and protested

treatment by the Agency.

14 December 1962: Subject met again with the DCI.

21 Feb. 1963

Subject and his family left N.Y.C. on

SS Sylvania for England.

Spring 1963:

8 August 1963:

22 August 1963:

23 August 1963:

4 Sept. 1963:

Subject worked with the British.

Subject returned to the U.S.A.

Subject met the Attorney-General again.

Subject met the DCI again..

Subject met the DCI again and stated that he

wanted to become an advisor to the DCI and

the Intelligence Community.

October 1963-

April 1964:

1964/1965:

June 1965:

August 1968:

October 1968:

July 1970

Subject in contact with the Agency mostly in

the N.Y.C. area.. Subject was cooperative to

some extent.

Subject, according to a Dutch official,

visited The Netherlands.

Subject interviewed by the Canadians (RCMP)

in the N.Y.C. area.

Subject in contact with the British regarding

possible publication of his book.

An FBI source indicated that he had no

current information concerning.

the KGB

attitude regarding Subject but the source

stated that if the KGB knew Subject's location

it might undertake to eliminate him.

Subject was in contact with Agency personnel

and visited Florida.

---

## Page 25

13-00000

March 1972:

April 1972:

September 1972

A KGB defector, LYALIN, reported that he knew

that Subject had been sentenced to death

by the KGB. An article regarding this

sentence appeared in The Chekist sometime after

1964.

Subject was in touch with CIA officials.

A KGB defector, OGANESYAN, provided a copy

of the 1969 KGB Alphabetical List of Agents

of Foreign Intelligence Services, Defectors,

Members of Anti-Soviet Organizations, Members of

Punitive Units and Other Criminals under

Search Warrants. In this List the KGB listed

Subject and his wife as under the sentence of

death for revealing Soviet State

secrets.

---

## Page 26

13-00000

The following

are highlights of the chronology of Source's (Subject's)

professional career:

September 1944: Subject was mobilized and sent to the

Frunze Artillery School in Odessa where

he remained until July 1945. At that time

Subject left the Artillery School before

completion of the course and enrolled in a

Counterintelligence School,

1945-1946:

Student at the one year course, Military

Counterintelligence School, GUKR/"SMERSH,"

Moscow.

1946-1948:

Desk officer, Assistant Operational Case

Officer, assigned to the Eastern Section

(otdeleniye) of the SK (Soviet Colony -

security of Soviet officials abroad) Depart-

ment (otdel) of the First Chief (Foreign

Intelligence) Directorate of MGB. Head-

quarters in Moscow. During the period

November 1947 to September 1948 Subject held

the title of Referent and his office was

1948-1950:

designated the Fifth (SK) Department of the

Third (Eastern) Directorate of the KI

(Conmittee for Information), but his functions

were unchanged.

Student at the two-year course, Higher

Intelligence schnol of the KI.. Suhject

studied gencral subjeces and the English

language; he was one of 30 students who

specialized in counterintelligence during

the second year of the course.

03035

---

## Page 27

13-00000

.1950-1951:

- Desk officer, Operation , Case Officer,

supervising SK activities in China,

assigned to the SK Section, Eastern Depart-

ment, First Directorate of the MCB Head-

quarters in Moscow, the SK functions having

reverted from the KI to the MGB in 1949.

September 1951: At his request Subject was transferred as

a desk officer to the Anglo-American Section,

Counterintelligence Department of the First

Directorate, MGB Headquarters in Moscow.

November 1951:

Subject was promoted to "Senior Operational

Case Officer."

December 1951:

The KI;was dissolved and former state security

elements were returned to the MGB. Subject's

functions continued the same, but, in the

reorganization, he was assigned to the CI

Section of the American Department of the

Anglo-American (First) Directorate of the

First Chief Directorate of the MGB.

March 1952:

Subject and an unidentified young colleague

wrote a joint letter through the Central

Committee of the CPSU to STALIN making

suggestions for a fundamental reorganization of

Soviet foreign intelligence and counter-

intelligence work.

September 1952: While on vacation in the Georgian SSR

Subject was ordered to Moscow for a four hour

meeting, with his friend, with STALIN,

MALENKOV, and

BERIYA. STALIN thanked the two

officers for their suggestions, discussed

intelligence

matters in detail and asked them

to send

him a letter with specific proposals

---

## Page 28

13-00000

March 1953:

October 1953:

August 1954:

for necessary reorganizations, together

with the names of recommended chiefs.

In a subsequent letter they recommended

Sergey Ivanovich OGOLTSOV, then in prison

for "political crimes," and Yevgeniy

Petrovich PITOVRANOV, then chief or deputy

chief of the MGB in the Uzbekistan SSR.

STALIN met Subject and his friend a second

time. OGOLTSOV was released from prison and

appointed Chief of the First Chief Directo-

rate, with PITOVRANOV as his deputy. A

Chief Intelligence Directorate of the MGB

was then formed, containing a Counterintelligence

Department with an Emigre desk and seven geo-

graphical desks. Subject was appointed by

OGOLTSOV as chief of the American Desk,

supervising approximately 15 staff persons.

When STALIN died and BERIYA took over control

of the State.

Security apparatus, which he

combined with the MVD into a unified MVD, he.

replaced OGOLTSOV with one of his own appointees.

Subject was reassigned as deputy chief of the

Russian Emigre Desk of the CI Department of

the Second (new designation for foreign

Intelligence) Chief Directorate, MVD. Subject

supervised activities against emigres in

Austria and Germany.

Subject was assigned to the MVD residency in

Vienna, Austria, as an operational case officer

in the Emigre Operations Group.

Subject was transferred to the British Sub-

Group of the Anglo-American-French Group of the

KGB residency in Vienna. His duties were of a

counterintelligence nature, i.e. concerned

with penetration of foreign intelligence services.

---

## Page 29

13-00000

1955-1959:

-One of 170 students at

jing the four

year internal security-counterintelligence

course, the KGB Higher. School Juridical

Institute. He presented and successfully

defended his thesis on the subject of SK

activities among Soviet delegations and

tourist

groups traveling abroad. He re-

ceived his diploma in August 1959. During

his school tour Subject also spent several

weeks in on-the-job training as a student

assigned to pertinent elements of the KGB's

Second (Internal Counterintelligence) Chief

Directorate, with access to operational files

on foreign diplomatic personnel in Moscow

who were KGB targets.

September 1959: Subject was assigned as a Senior Operational

Case Officer responsible for NATO information

within the Treaty Organizations Direction,

Information (Reports) Department, First

(Foreign) Chief, Directorate, KGB Headquarters,

Moscow. His function was to translate, edit

and summarize information reports obtained by

KGB agents abroad

and to disseminate the

pertinent infornation to the Central Committee

of the CPSU, members of the Presidium, including

KHRUSHCHEV, and, in the case of information

with military aspects, to MALINOVSKIY, the

Minister of Defense. At one time, during a

CP cell meeting, criticism was voiced

about

the delays in translation and processing and

Subject was assigned to study the situation.

Thus he examined registry logs showing the

titles of agent information reports, the place

acquired, the date received and the date of

dissemination of the finished Russian intelli-

gence reports to the government.

April 1960:

Subject was transferied to the American Section

---

## Page 30

13-00000

August 1960:

15 December 1961:

Directorate, KGB, I0 pI-

re for assign-

ment to the KGB residency under Soviet

Embassy cover in Helsinki, Finland, as

the CI officer working against foreign

intelligence services.

Subject was assigned to the KGB residency in

Helsinki, under the name KLIMOV (his true

name was compromised through the 1954

defection of Petr DERYABIN in Vienna), and

with the cover title of Third Secretary.

Subject, with his wife and young daughter

defected to the U.S. Government which granted

them political asylum.

28 December 1961:

Subject met Attorney General Robert KENNEDY

along with Mr. HELMS, DDP.

1962:

Subject was debriefed by CIA Officers,

officials from other US Agencies and

teams of

Intelligence Officers from Free World nations.

Subject provided much valuable information on

the KGB, its organization, personnel, operations,

aims and efforts against the Free World.

Subject, howevei, proved to be a difficult

handling problem, especially as a result of

his personality and his constant demands for

regular meetings with high-level US officials

such as the President, the Attorney-General,

the Directors of CIA and the FBI and for a

policy role in the US Intelligence Community.

16 February 1962: Subject had another meeting with

the

Attorney-General.

2 July 1962:

Subject met again with the Attorney-General

and Mr. HELMS.

9 July 1962:

22 August 1962:

Subject had a conversation with Mr. HELMS.

Subject had interview with Mr. SORENSON of the

White House Staff and Mr. Edward R. MURROW,

Director ot USIA.

---

## Page 31

13-00000

1) Nov. 1962:

27 Nov. 1962:

An FBI source reported :

ant the KGB was aware

of subject's presence in the U.S.A. and ordered

all Soviet IS personnel to report immediately

any information which they may obtain regard-

ing Subject.

Subject met Mr. McCONE, DCI, and protested

treatment by the Agency.

14 December 1962: Subject met again with the DCI.

21 Feb. 1963

Subject and his family left.N.Y.C..on

SS Sylvania for England.

Spring 1963:

8 August 1963:

22 August 1963:

23 August 1963:

4 Sept: 1963:

Subject worked with the British.

Subject returned to the U.S.A.

Subject met the Attorney-General again.

Subject met the DCI again.

Subject met the DCI again and stated that he

wanted to become an advisor to the DCI and

the Intelligence Community.

October 1963-

April 1964:

1964/1965:

June 1965:

August 1968:

October 1968:

July 1970

Subject in contact with the Agency mostly in

the N.Y.C. area.. Subject was cooperative to

some extent.

Subject, according to a Dutch official,

visited The Netherlands.

Subject interviewed by the Canadians (RCMP)

in the N.Y.C. area.

Subject in contact with the British regarding

possible publication of his book.

An FBI source indicated that he had no

current information concerning the KGB

attitude regarding Subject but the source

stated that if the KGB knew Subject's location

it might undertake to eliminate him.

Subject was in contact with Agency personnel

and visited Florida.

---

## Page 32

13-00000

April 1972:

September 1972

that subject had been

sentenced to death

by the KGB. An article regarding this

sentence appeared in The Chekist sometime after

1964.

Subject was in touch with CIA officials.

A KGB defector, OGANESYAN, provided a copy

of the 1969 KGB Alphabetical List of Agents

of Foreign Intelligence Services, Defectors,

Members of Anti-Soviet Organizations, Members of

Punitive Units and Other Criminals under

Search Warrants. In this List the KGB listed

Subject and his wife as under the sentence of

death for revealing

Soviet State secrets.

---

## Page 33

13-00000

The following are highlights of the chronology of Source's (Subject's)

professional career:

September 1944: Subject was mobilized and sent to the

Frunze Artillery School in Odessa where

he remained until July 1945.. At that time

Subject left the Artillery School before

completion of the course and enrolled in a

Counterintelligence School.

1945-1946:

Student at the one year

course, Military

Counterintelligence School, GUKR/"'SMERSH,"

Moscow.

1946-1948:

Desk officer, Assistant Operational Case

Officer, assigned to the Eastern Section

(otdeleniye) of the SK (Soviet Colony -

security of Soviet officials abroad) Depart-

ment (otdel) of the First Chief (Foreign

Intelligence) Directorate of MGB. Head-

quarters in Moscow.

During the period

November 1947 to September 1948 Subject held

the title of Referent and his office was

designated the Fifth (SK) Department of the

Third (Eastern) Directorate of the KI

(Committee for Information), but his functions

were unchanged.

1948-1950:

Student at the two-year course, Higher

Intelligence Schnol of the KI.: Subject

studied goncial subjeces and the English

language; he was one of 30 students who

specialized in counterintelligence during

the second year of the course.

03035

---

## Page 34

13-00000

1950-1951:

Desk officer, Operation Case Officer,

supervising SK activities in China,

assigned to the SK Section, Eastern Depart-

ment, First Directorate of the MGB Head-

quarters in Moscow, the SK functions having

reverted from the KI to the MGB in 1949.

September 1951: At his request Subject was transferred as

a desk officer to the Anglo-American Section,

Counterintelligence Department of the First

Directorate, MGB Headquarters in Moscow.

November 1951:

Subject was promoted to "Senior Operational

Case Officer."

December 1951:

The KI,was dissolved and former state security

elements were returned to the MGB. Subject's

functions continued the same, but, in the

reorganization, he was assigned to the CI

Section of the American Department of the

Anglo-American (First) Directorate of the

First Chief Directorate of the MGB.

March 1952:

Subject and an unidentified young colleague

wrote a joint letter through the Central

Committee of the CPSU to STALIN making

suggestions for a fundamental reorganization of

Soviet foreign intelligence and counter-

intelligence work.

September 1952: While on vacation in the Georgian SSR

Subject was ordered to Moscow for a four hour

meeting, with his friend, with STALIN,

MALENKOV, and BERIYA.. STALIN thanked the two

officers for their suggestions, discussed

intelligence matters in detail and asked them

to send him a letter with specific proposals

---

## Page 35

13-00000

March 1953:

October 1953:

August 1954:

for necessary reorganizations, together

with the names of recommended chiefs.

In a subsequent letter they recommended

Sergey Ivanovich OGOLTSOV, then in prison

for "political crimes," and Yevgeniy

Petrovich PITOVRANOV, then chief or deputy

chief of the MGB in the Uzbekistan SSR.

STALIN met Subject and his friend a second

tine. OGOLTSOV was released from prison and

appointed Chief of the First Chief Directo-

rate, with PITOVRANOV as his deputy.

Chief Intelligence Directorate of the MGB

was then formed, containing a Counterintelligence

Department with an Emigre desk and seven geo-

graphical desks. Subject was appointed by

OGOLTSOV as chief of the American Desk,.

supervising approximately 15 staff persons.

When STALIN died and BERIYA took over control

of the State Security apparatus, which he

combined with the MVD into a unified MVD, he

replaced OGOLTSOV with one of his own appointees.

Subject was reassigned as deputy chief of the

Russian Emigre Desk of the CI Department of

the Second (new designation for foreign.

Intelligence) Chief Directorate, MVD. Subject

supervised activities against emigres in

Austria and Germany.

Subject was assigned to the MVD residency in

Vienna, Austria, as an operational case officer

in the Emigre Operations Group.

Subject was transferred to the British Sub-

Group of the Anglo-American-French Group of the

KGB residency in Vienna. His duties were of a

counterintelligence nature, i.e. concerned

with penetration of foreign intelligence services.

---

## Page 36

13-00000

1955-1959:

-One of 170 students at

-ing the four

year internal security-counterintelligence

course, the KGB Higher School Juridical

Institute. He presented and successfully

defended his thesis on the subject of SK

activities among Soviet delegations and

tourist groups traveling abroad. He re-

ceived his diploma in August 1959. During

his school tour Subject also spent several

weeks in on-the-job training as a student

assigned to pertinent elements of the KGB's

Second (Internal Counterintelligence) Chief

Directorate, with access to operational files

on foreign diplomatic personnel in Moscow

who were KGB targets.

September 1959: Subject was assigned as a Senior Operational

Case Officer responsible for NATO information

within the Treaty Organizations Direction;

Information (Reports) Department, First

(Foreign) Chief, Directorate, KGB Headquarters,

Moscow. His function was to translate, edit

and summarize information reports obtained by

KGB agents abroad

and to disseminate the

pertinent information to the Central Committee

of the CPSU, members of the Presidium, including

KHRUSHCHEV, and, in the case of information

with military aspects, to MALINOVSKIY, the

Minister of Defense. At one time, during a

CP cell meeting, criticism was voiced about

the delays in translation and processing and

Subject was assigned to study the situation.

Thus he examined registry logs showing the

titles of agent information reports, the place

acquired, the date received and the date of

dissemination of the finished Russian intelli-

gence reports to the government.

April 1960:

Subject was transferied to the American Section

---

## Page 37

13-00000

August 1960:

15 December 1961:

of Ine Cl Department of the First Chief

Directorate, KGB, to pi-re for assign-

ment to the KGB residency under Soviet

Embassy cover in Helsinki, Finland, as

the CI officer working against foreign

intelligence services.

Subject was assigned to the KGB residency in

Helsinki, under the name KLIMOV (his true

name was compromised through the 1954

defection of Petr DERYABIN in Vienna), and

with the cover title of Third Secretary.

Subject, with his wife and young daughter

defected to the U.S. Government which granted

them political asylum.

28 December 1961:

Subject met Attorney General Robert KENNEDY

along with Mr. HELMS, DDP.

1962:

Subject was debriefed by CIA Officers,

officials from other US Agencies and teams of

Intelligence Officers from Free World nations.

Subject provided much valuable information on

the KGB, its organization, personnel, operations,

aims and efforts against the Free World.

Subject, however, proved toibe a difficult

handling problem, especially as a result of

his personality and his constant demands for

regular meetings with high-level US officials

such as the President, the Attorney-General,

the Directors of CIA and the FBI and for a

policy role in the US Intelligence Community.

16 February 1962:

Subject had another meeting with the

Attorney-General.

2 July 1962:

Subject met again with the Attorney-General

and Mr. HELMS.

9 July 1962:

22 August 1962:

Subject had a conversation with Mr. HELMS.

Subject had interview with Mr. SORENSON of the

White House Staff and MI. Edward R. MURROW,

Director of USIA.

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15 Nov. 1962:

27 Nov. 1962:

An FBI source reported.

it the KGB was aware

of Subject's presence in the U.S.A. and ordered

all Soviet IS personnel to report immediately

any information which they may obtain regard-

ing Subject.

Subject met Mr. McCONE, DCI, and protested

treatment by the Agency.

14 December 1962: Subject met again with the DCI.

21 Feb. 1963

:

Subject and his family left N.Y.C. on

SS Sylvania for England.

Spring 1963:

8 August 1963:

22 August 1963:

23 August 1963:

4 Sept: 1963:

Subject worked with the British.

Subject returned to the U.S.A.

Subject met the Attorney-General again.

Subject met the DCI again.

Subject met the DCI again and stated that he

wanted to become an advisor to the DCI

..and

the Intelligence Community.

October 1963-

April 1964:

1964/1965:

June 1965:

August 1968:

October 1968:

July 1970

Subject in contact with the Agency mostly in

the N.Y.C. area.

Subject was cooperative to

some extent.

Subject, according to a Dutch official,

visited The Netherlands.

Subject interviewed by the Canadians (RCMP)

in the N.Y.C. area.

Subject in contact with the British regarding

possible publication of his book.

An FBI source indicated that he had no

current information concerning the KGB

attitude regarding Subject but the source

stated that if the KGB knew Subject's location

it might undertake to eliminate him.

Subject was in contact with Agency personnel

and visited Florida.

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## Page 39

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March 1972-

April 1972:

September 1972

KGB defector, LYALIN, reported that he knew

that Subject had been sentenced to death

by the KGB. An article regarding this

sentence appeared in The Chekist sometime after

1964.

Subject was in touch with CIA officials.

A KGB defector, OGANESYAN, provided a copy

of the 1969 KGB Alphabetical List of Agents

of Foreign Intelligence Services, Defectors,

Members of Anti-Soviet Organizations, Members of

Punitive Units and Other Criminals under

Search Warrants: In this List the KGB listed

Subject and his wife as under the sentence of

death for revealing Soviet State secrets.

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