CI INFORMATION REPORT ON ANATOLIY MIKHAYLOVICH GOLITSYN.
Originator: CIA
Document date: 06/25/1975
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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C I INFORMATION REPORT

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[PoSTORAGE

SESR-14322

THE FOLLOWING REPORT CONTAINS INFORMATION DERIVED FROM A SENSITIVE

SOURCE AND REJUIRES SPECIAL HANDLING. IT MAY BE SHOWN ONLY TO

PERSONS WITH A NEED TO KNON AND MAY. NOT RECEIVE GENERAL DISTRIBUTION

WITHIN RECIPIENT OFFICES. FURTHER DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION

MUST BE COORDINATED WITH THE ORIGINATING OFFICE.

RETURNTO CIA

Background Use Onty

Do Not Reproduse

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187. 3187

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CUUNTERINTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPONT

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CrOSTRIGE

SBSR - 1652

country: USSK

Subject: Anatoliy Mikhajlovich GOLITSYN

DOl

: 1966

Source: A NGB Officer

Any dissemination of this information to Field

stations or to officers not on

distribution must befoordinated with

"SE/CI/X:-

As a general rule, IDSTORAGE information 1s.

not releasable to

lorcign or domestic liaison

services or to any office outside the dio.

As of 1966, the KGB was attempting to locate former Soviet

in order. to carry

liquidation operations against them.

intelligence officers who had defected defectors so targeted were

Yurly Ivanovich NOSENKO, Anatoliy Mikhaylovich COLITSYNin August

revgenyevich KHOKHLOW, and Petr Sergeyevich DERYABIN.

1966 the KGB Resides? in Washington, D.C. acquired the addresses

of two Soviet defectors.

According to source, the KGB was able to

locate certain of these

individuals by checking city telephone

directories after cbtaining their assumed names from Congressional

where they appeared in connection with the defectors'

acquisition of United States citizenship.

The KGB considered GOLITSYN an average officer.

believed that he probably did not provide American intelligence with

much information, as he was working in the Information Department

before his defection and therefore did not have access to operational

matters and also was assigned to the l4th (Counterintelligence)

Department for only a short study of operations.

In this regard

they considered YOSENTO's defection nuch more damaging to the jus.

Although GOLITSYN knew more about First Chief Directorate matters,

in a position

to provide information on Second Chief

Directorate operations, as well as on the KGB as a whole.

CL BY 011340 .

WARNING MOTICE

SENSITIVE INTELLIGETCE SOURCES

AND METHOOS MINCISED

SECRLT/SO FOREIAY DISSEN

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Source commented that he suspected that both NOSENTO and

GOLITSYN might have been

approached by American intelligence prior

to their actual defections, because GOLITSYN had had problens "with

his Chiefs" and NOSENKO drank. considerably and was involved with

COMMENTS:

1.

With regard to the statement contained in paragraph l above

chat in August 1966 the KGB Residency in Washington, D.C. acquired

the addresses of tro Sovict defectors, source stated that he tnes

that one of the individuals in question was not NOSENKO and that he

was 90 percent certain that one was not GOLITSYN.

The above information is being made available outside DO

to C/OS/Security Analysis Group in EYES

ONLY memorandum forn without

reference to the PISTORAGE стуртопу.

02

25 June 1975

Distribution:

1

C/SE/CI/X

03

2 - S//CR/X (Grimes)

2 - C/CIRA

1 - C/SE/CI/I

2 - SE/CI/R (Young)

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