MEMORANDUM FOR: YURIY IVANOVICH NOSENKO
Originator: CIA
Document date: 2000-01-01 00:00:00
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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. Date: 03/04/05

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CIA

RECORD NUMBER : 104-10418-10019

RECORD

SERIES

: JFK

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

RUSS HOLMES WORK FILE

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

: CIA

AGENCY ORIGINATOR

FROM

TO

TITLE

DATE

PAGES

MEMORANDUM FOR: YURIY IVANOVICH NOSENKO

01/01/1900

15

SUBJECTS : NOSENKO

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

RESTRICTIONS

CURRENT STATUS

RELEASED IN PART PUBLIC - RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW

08/13/98

COMMENTS:

JFK-RH09: F161: 1998.08.13.09:12:01:873128

Heleased under the John F. Kennedy

Assassination Records Collection Act of

1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW

65990 Date: 11-01-2021

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

104-10418-10019

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO

In early or mid-1967, the Agency General Counsel was

provided a summary of the Nosenko case.

The memorandum

sought an advisory opinion from the General Counsel on the

Agency's legal basis for its handling of Nosenko through

that date and on the legal aspects on the eventual disposi-

tion of Nosenko. Shortly subsequent to this memorandum to

the General Counsel, Nosenko took up residence in October 1967

in an apartment in the Washington area and was reminded that

should he wish, he could travel freely anywhere at anytime.

He gradually created a new life for himself in the United

States and has indicated on several occasions that he holds

no ill feeling about his handling by the Agency at anytime.

Background

Nosenko voluntarily established contact with CIA repre-

sentatives in Geneva in 1962. He identified himself as

staff officer of the KGB's internal security directorate and.

offered to sell counterintelligence information. This offer

was accepted and he was recruited as an agent in place and

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debriefed on counterintelligence matters during five meetings

in Geneva. He then returned to. the USSR. He came to Geneva

again in January 1964 as the security officer for the Soviet

disarmament delegation. After a number of meetings with his

CIA handlers

he defected on 4 February 1964 and was secretly

taken to Frankfurt, Germany, crossing the Swiss-German border

on the night of 4/5 February with alias U.S. Army identity)

documents. In Geneva and again upon arrival in Frankfurt,

Nosenko wrote out an asylum request, requesting political

asylum from the U.S. Government.

Because serious doubts about Nosenko's bona fides had

arisen on the basis of the information he had provided both

in 1962 and in the meetings in Geneva in 1964, it was orig-

inally planned to do a detailed bona fides debriefing and

assessment in Germany before making any decision about moving

Nosenko to the United States. However, unprecedented action

by the Soviet Government in respect to the defection of one

of its citizens forced a change of plans. On 9 February,

unidentified Soviet sources in Geneva leaked the news to the

press

that Nosenko, described as an "expert attached to the

Soviet Delegation to the Disarmament Conference" had dis-

appeared, and that it

was presumed that he had defected.

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Because of mounting pressure from the press, which included

much speculation that Nosenko was a high level scientist or

disarmament expert, it was decided that the State Department

would make à brief announcement acknowledging Nosenko's

request for asylum in the U.S. and identifying him as a

member of the KGB. This was done on 10 February. On 11 Feb-

ruary, the Soviet Government delivered a note to the American

Embassy in

Moscow asking how Nosenko left Switzerland and

requesting an

immediate interview with him and his release.

On 12 February, Soviet Ambassador to the Disarmament Confer-

ence TSARAPKIN held a press conference in Geneva in which he

accused the Swiss Government of failure to cooperate in

locating Nosenko. Although the Swiss categorically rejected

these charges, the American Ambassador to Switzerland recom-

mended that Swiss. authorities be allowed to interview

Nosenko

to convince themselves that Nosenko had left Switzerland of

his own free will.

On 12 February 1964, on the instructions of the Director,

Nosenko was brought to the United States. He travelled by

• commercial

air, again using alias U.S. Army identification,

and was

admitted to the country at New York City (in true

name) on parole under the provisions of Section 212 (d) (5)

of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

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On 13 February, representatives of the Swiss and Soviet

Embassies in Washington advised the State Department that

they desired interviews

with Nosenko. On 14 February, in

Moscow, Soviet Foreign Minister GROMYKO called in Ambassador

KOHLER and protested "impermissable activities" on the part

of the U.S. in Nosenko's case. Soviet press spokesmen took

an even harder line to Western correspondents, and accused

the U.S. of kidnapping Nosenko. On the afternoon of 14 Sep-

tember, at two separate interviews, he spoke first to Swiss

Embassy and then to Soviet Embassy representatives. At

these interviews, which were also attended by State Department

and INS officials, Nosenko confirmed that he left Switzerland

of his own free will to seek asylum in the U.S. In addition,

he replied to questions of the Soviet Embassy representative

to the effect that he was renouncing his Soviet citizenship.

On the evening of 14 February, the U.S. State Department made

a brief formal reply to the Soviet protest, then issued a

brief statement to the press noting that the interviews had

been held and that Nosenko had confirmed his desire to remain

in this country.

From the time of his arrival to 4 April 1964, Nosenko

was housed in the Washington area. During this period, reg-

ular systematic debriefing was commenced, and Nosenko was

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made available to representatives of the FBI for debriefing

on matters affecting their responsibilities. Although allowed

out for evening and week-end excursions, Nosenko was at all

times accompanied by O/S personnel. In addition, he took a

two-week vacation to Hawaii, again accompanied by case offi-

cers and security guards.

Evidence continued to mount that

he was a KGB plant, and at the same time it became obvious

that it would be impossible to proceed further to resolve

the many suspicious points and contradictions that had arisen

without changing the conditions in which he was being held.

Nosenko was growing increasingly uncooperative, especially

when sensitive areas were touched upon, and constantly pressed

for the legalization of his status in the U.S. and the issuance

of an alien registration card. At the same time, Nosenko's

heavy drinking and other unruly personal habits were causing

increasing difficulties to the security personnel charged with

keeping him under control and out of trouble at all times in

accordance with Agency local responsibility. It was clear

that it was only a matter of time before he created a public

scandal. More importantly, he was in a position to communi-

cate with the KGB since physical control could not be absolute.

On 4 April 1964, Nosenko voluntarily underwent a polygraph

examination. The results of this examination indicated deception

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on a number of critical points indicating that he was sent

by the KGB to perform one or more missions which also involved

his penetration of the Agency and its operations. It was

decided, therefore, that the physical circumstances of Nosenko's

stay in this country would have to be drastically changed if

the Agency were to carry out its counterintelligence responsi-

bilities and adhere to the terms of the parole agreement. As

a result, he was moved to quarters where his movements could

be more easily controlled, and his outing privileges were

suspended pending resolution of bona fides.

It is worth noting that had we not taken the above action

but accepted

Nosenko at face value, it is quite possible that

we

would have proceeded with a series of operational actions

on the basis of his information. The results of some of these

actions could have been very embarrassing to the U.S. Government

politically and damaging to U.S. national security. For exam-

ple, his chief operational proposal at the time, and one that

he was most insistent that we should proceed with immediately,

involved the compromise of a very senior Soviet official.

Bona Fides

Beginning in April 1964, hundreds of hours were devoted

to interrogations of Nosenko (in which he willingly cooperated)

and a great deal of time was spent on exhaustive collateral

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investigations.

We concluded that it hao been established

beyond reasonable doubt that Nosenko was a KGB agent who

established contact with CIA, subsequently defected on KGB

instructions, and

that he came to the United States on a

deception mission. The implications of this mission had a

grave and direct bearing on U.S. national security. Although

our findings were supported by the results of two polygraph

examinations, the nature of the evidence was inadmissable in

a court of law. In any case, it is clear that Nosenko had

not been in a position to perform any overt act of transgres-

sion of U.S. espionage laws since 4 April 1964 when he was

placed in a restricted area and deprived of any conceivable

means of communication with the KGB.

Nosenko did not admit that he defected on KGB orders

or that he came to

the U.s. on

a KGB mission. He has admitted,

however, that he made numerous lies about his personal history

and about the details of his KGB service to U.S. officials,

both before and after arriving in the United States.

Coordination with Other U.S. Government Agencies

USIB Members. In accordance with the DDCI's ruling

relating to a defector who has been a member of a hostile

intelligence service, Nosenko's status and handling was dis-

cussed at an executive session of USIB and decided on an

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ad hoc basis. Nosenko defected on 4 February 1964, and the

Secretary of State, the Attorney General,, the Special Assis-

tant to the President on National Security Affairs, McGeorge

Bundy, General Carroll, Director of the Defense Intelligence

Agency and the FBI were all notified immediately. On 5 Febru-

ary 1964, General Carter reported the defection to an executive

session of USIB and followed this up with formal statements to

USIB members on 11 and 19 February 1964, which stated that.

Nosenko's bona fides.

had not yet been established. It was

agreed that no DS number would be issued to Nosenko, and that

he would be handled on

a special basis by this Agency. In

fact, normal USIB interest in Nosenko as a defector dropped

off drastically as it became quickly apparent that he had no

positive intelligence interest of value to any part of the

community.

The President

was informed of the full extent of our

suspicions about Nosenko's bona fides by the then Director,

Mr. Mccone, on 11 February 1964. Mr. Patrick Coyne, Executive

Secretary of the PFIAB, was given

a similar briefing by

Mr. Helms on 19 February 1964.

Generals Carroll. and Fitch of DIA were also subsequently

informed of the problems about Nosenko's bona fides.

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The Secretary of State, Ambassador Thompson, and other

senior officials in the Department of State were informed of

our reservations about Nosenko's bona fides and our fears that

he might be a dispatched KGB

agent. In discussions about the

possibility of Nosenko's eventual deportation, the Secretary

of State expressed serious concern about the adverse reaction

that such a move might have on other potential defectors.

The Director of Security, State Department, was informed

of the bona fides problem at an early date. We have worked

closely with this office since then on the problem of eval-

uating the significance of Nosenko's information as it affects

the security interests of the State Department.

Because so much of

Nosenko's information affected U.S.

internal security matters for which the FBI bears primary

responsibility, and because the possibility that Nosenko was

a KGB plant had a direct bearing on the validity of certain

FBI operations, the FBI was kept fully informed on our views

about Nosenko's bona fides and our progress in interrogating

and investigating him from the moment of his defection.

The

FBI liaison officer was told of our reservations on Nosenko's

bona fides as early as

5 February 1964. The Director of the

FBI and his deputy for Internal Security, William Sullivan,

were kept completely up to date, and we coordinated all major

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aspects of our handling Nosenko with them. After a long

meeting with Sullivan and other FBI representatives to review

Nosenko's case. on 1 April 1964, the FBI interposed no objec-

tions to our proposal to restrict Nosenko's movements and

commence hostile interrogation. Subsequently, the FBI for-

mally agreed with our findings on Nosenko, at least to the

extent that "On considering carefully the results of your

interrogations of Yuriy Nosenko and your analysis of his

statements

and activities, it does appear he is not what he

purports to be.

While this Bureau is not in a position to

draw any conclusion in this case, we do recognize it is

possible that Nosenko could be a Soviet plant or agent pro-

vocateur."

The then Acting Attorney General Mr. Nicholas Katzenbach

(and several members of his

staff) were apprised of our res-

ervations about Nosenko on 2 April 1964 and an opinion was

sought from him both as to interpretation of the exclusion

and parole agreement, and as to how we should proceed in the

event that it proved

necessary to deport Nosenko from this

country.

Efforts to Keep the KGB from Learning of Our Awareness of

Nosenko's True Status

From the time we learned that Nosenko had been sent to

this country on a KGB mission it was obvious that if we were

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to have the time to analyze and resolve this case, and to

plan and execute appropriate countermeasures, it was essential

that we attempt to keep the KGB from learning of our awareness

of Nosenko's true status. Consequently, detailed knowledge

of the depth and scope of our suspicions about Nosenko, and

the implications thereof, was restricted to a very few people

in the Agency and the intelligence community. Nonetheless,

we did advise key policy echelons and principals in the intel-

ligence community, even though this carried the inevitable

risk of leakage.

Soviet Inspired Inquiries

In 1966 there were several indications that the Soviets

were making a serious effort to find out what happened to

Nosenko and to force him to the surface. The most blatant

and unusual of these was the approach by a Soviet journalist,

Yuriy KOROLEV (a known

KGB agent), to the French magazine

Paris Match with an offer to provide photographs and materials

for an exclusive story of Nosenko and his family. According

to Korolev, Nosenko's wife was considering an

approach to an

international juridicial organization in an effort to obtain

compensation from Nosenko for damages caused.

by his abandon-

ment of her and her children. In responding to this approach

we quoted a statement, purporting to be from Nosenko himself,

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to the effect that Nosenko considers this approach to repre-

sent blatant and cruel manipulation of his family by the KGB

and that he will not lend himself to the scheme by agreeing

to an interview or in any other way.

Nosenko's Status

To recapitulate, Nosenko entered the United States on

12 February 1964 on parole to the Agency under the provisions

of Section 212 (d) (5) of the Immigration and Nationality

Act.

Parole responsibility is delegated to the Agency by

the Attorney. General under the terms of an agreement executed

by the

Attorney General and the DCI on 10 February 1955,

which states:

"After parole of such aliens, the Central Intel-

ligence Agency will assume responsibility for

care, supervison and control of a kind and

degree it believes consistent with

the internal

security needs of the United States during. con-

tinuance of their parole status."

In accordance with our understanding of this agreement, and

because we had reason to believe that Nosenko was a conscious

and willing agent of a hostile intelligence service, we

ensured that he was under our direct observation and control

at all times from

the moment of his arrival in the United

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States. From 12 February to 4 April 1964 it was possible to

keep Nosenko at a location where he could enjoy a certain

amount of movement and of contact with the outside world.

After 4 April 1964, for reasons explained above, it was

necessary to keep him incommunicado at a location which is

known to no one outside of the Agency (and to very few within

it). Authorization for Nosenko to remain in this country

under the Special Agreement Procedures was periodically

extended by the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

Although his freedom of movement had been severely

restricted, Nosenko was not maltreated and he made no com-

plaint about his treatment. On the contrary, we had several

written statements

from him in which he stated that our

handling of him was justified and even beneficial.

Disposal

From the time that Nosenko was brought to this country

we thought about the possibility of his eventual deportation

as a contingency measure. In early 1964, we thought that it

might be possible to mitigate the political and propaganda

drawbacks of a forced deportation by announcing that Nosenko

has confessed his true KGB role.

With the passage of time,

however,

and in view of our much firmer conclusions about his

real role and mission and our clearer understanding of what

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this implied, it was apparent that great practical problems

stood in the way of his deportation to either the USSR or a

third country.

USSR: Nosenko has categorically stated on numerous

occasions that he will never contemplate return to the USSR,

and, although we suspect that he might secretly welcome such

a move, we would expect him to act out his part to the end

with loud protests that he was being shipped to his death,

etc. When the possibility of expulsion was discussed with

Department of State officials in 1964, both the Secretary of

State and Ambassador Thompson expressed their concern for

the adverse effect this might have on other potential defec-

•tors.

Forcible repatriation of political refugees is against

long established U.S. policy, and would be certain to arouse

violent reaction from. ethnic minority groups in the United

States. Under these circumstances an alleged "confession"

by Nosenko would have come under very close scrutiny, and

might have backfired very badly. Another point that had to

be considered was the possibility that the Soviets, again

playing their part, might have refused to accept Nosenko on

the grounds that he has renounced his Soviet citizenship.

Third Country: Although we believed it likely that

Nosenko would accede to deportation to a third country,

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there is certainly no country in the free world on which we

could conceivably have unloaded Nosenko without first inform-

ing them of his true status. Even if we considered this a

desirable objective,

it seemed certain that the Department

of State would veto such a piece of intergovernmental duplic-

ity on the basis of the political risks involved.

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