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2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

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ach

COmICEy

Suz25: 02 Initial Missiona

I- the period from 20 June to 10 July 1956 the Soriei Bloc zir defense

syster 175 subjecued to eight penetrations of an unprecedented nature, seven

oscaring rithin a period of only eight days. It must be renerbered that

complarorides the only basis of judging the performance of the Soriet

This is inportant because it is clear from REcaL raterial that !

considerable air defense business is conducted over landlines and thus not

obserica by COMINI. However, some tentetive conclusions nay be drama frou

these initial flights and these are indicated as follows:

In spite of the fact thet these missions coe as a surprise,

zone of them went undetrated.

This is clear evidence that their

madar corerage extends above: 72,000 feet.

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2. By 5 July 1956, the fourth flizht, the USSR was aware

purpose of the missions and were taking counter action.

one positive action was the standown of civil flights while the

=ission aircraft was over the USSR, and a second action wich is

believed related is the moving of MIG-19 aircraît into Eest

terrany and Peland on 7 July 1956. Also MIG-19's were noved

into Jungary at about this time.

3. The performance of the Soviet systen on the 5 July mission,

was indeed curious.

while the action evident iron COMIN

is not clear an explanation which appears to lit the known facts

is offered as follows:

As a, result oi the previous nissions, the

Soviets had concluded the essential facts concerning the missions,

1.e., that they were for reconcaissance,

that they flew above 65,000

leet, and that a panetration as deep as loscow was possible. They

probably surnised that the 5 July mission was headed for boscow wher

te track appeared on a northeastarly heading. The loss of the

target when it entered Soviet territory was probably deliberate and

the "red herring" track returning to the wast was eitker a dodge

or a convenience to avoid brozacasting a track for all the system

to ses that a "hostile or intruder" was coning over Moscow with no

cans available to stop it.

This idea is supported by the use

of a raid nunber assigned in the region just beyond the point

were the track had been "lost".

In addition, the track tas not

Labeled "costile or intruder" when it ras broadcast ziter it

had sassed beyond Moscow. The reporting of the track when it did

appear was only by Moscow and it has been suggested that other

seations had been instructed not to broadcast the track. Further, It my

cr ay not be a coincidence that the heignt brcadcast was almost

exactly half of the true altitude of the mission aircraft, but on

tze sext missions, four days later, the altitude reporting vas

consistently above 50,000 feet.

4. By 9 July 1956, in addition to the evident recogrition of

ize great height of the mission flights,

tracking was better and

in general the performance of the warning system was much improved.

The next day, 10 July 1956, the Soviet air defense warning)

systal closed a 3000 mile track with only two short periods of

confusion or track loss.

Altitude reporting was over 60,000 feet

ron one plot passed 68, 800 which was only 100 feet off target.

The first cight missions proved that the air defense warning

sisten is deplojed in depth.

This was evident fron both the continuity

o2 track and most forcefully from the ELIT date collected.

Sone 1461

inbercepts of Soviet Bloc radars operating in the 3000 mc/s band were

corained by project ErIll as follows: IOKEM-1331, WATFT-37, GAGE-26,

PAZDY CAKE-37, Other 30.

These numbars cannot be

equated to in-

cranel radar sets since the same rader ray be intercepted more than

610 TOKEN sites were located, including 213 new sites. Some

343 zaditional TOKEN signals vere identified out available information

ires tot pernit determination of location so that it must be con-

luded that these signals include both known and new sites. Because

cê the Limitation ne ELINT to the 3000 mc/s band and the Soviet

practice of collocating radars on differant irequencies the total

nuber of rajars may be expected to be at least double the number

c= aites.

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7. Confusion and track loss seemed to be related to the

prosance of large numbers oi fighters although the saturation point

has not been determined because of insulricient date.

8. The question of radars for heigat finding, the capabilities

of take in this role, the introduction de ROCK CAkEs and later

Of ROCK CAKES.

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