INTEL MEMO: CUBAN SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA SINCE JUNE 1964
Originator: CIA
From: WITHHELD
To: NONE
Document date: 01/11/1965
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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2023 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

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CENTRAL

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11 January 1965

OCI No. 0746/65

Copy No.

278

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

CUBAN SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA

SINCE JUNE 1964

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

Office of Current Intelligence

GROUP

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OCI No. 0746/65

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Office of Current Intelligence

I1 January 1965

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Cuban Subversion in Latin America

Since June 1964

1. Clandestine reporting, as well as recent

statements by Cuban leaders, leaves no doubt that

"export of the revolution" continues to be a key

policy of the castro regime.

A former Cuban in-

telligence officer reports the Castro regime has

in operation a highly professional espionage and

subversion agency, the General Directorate of In-

telligence (DGI),

one of whose main tasks is the

support

of revolutionaries in Latin America.

2.

Nevertheless, several reverses for Castro-

supported groups and individuals in Latin America

during the last year, combined with a possible tac-

tical realignment of priorities in Havana, appear

to have led Fidel Castro to be less sanguine about

prospects for achieving any quick revolutionary

successes.

The July OAs resolutions condemning

Cuba's past activities in Venezuela may also have

caused Havana to adopt a more cautious subversion

policy.

In addition, the subsequent severance of

diplomatic relations

with Havana by Bolivia,

uruguay,

and Chile deprived Cuba of three important

diplomatic posts which could be used to facilitate

subversive activity in southern South America.

3.

Confronted with such additional obstacles

to the promotion and spread of violent revolutionary

activity, the Cuban leadership seems to be focusing

its subversive efforts today largely on three coun-

tries--Venezuela, Guatemala, and Colombia--Where

guerrilla-terrorist organizations have been operat-

ing for some time.

Castro probably does not have

much hope of full-scale revolution in the near

future even in these countries; he probably does

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regard them as the best bets over the longer run.

This does not mean that Cuba will cut out

other

subversive effoits, but that it is now nore Likely

to concentrate on targets of opportunity in the

other Latin American countries.

4.

Fidel Castro stated to a Western corres-

pondent in Havana in late October that the contin-

uance of the Cuban revolution depends on "other

Cubas" succeeding on the continent. Castro ex-

pressed this thought again in his public address

on 2 January in which he said that the US will ul-

timately be forced to come to terms with Cuba

when it has to deal also with "several" other

revolutionary regimes.

On 30 November, Che Guevara

made the most militant public statement on the

"anti-imperialist struggle" in Latin America to

be delivered by a ranking Cuban official for some

months.

He hailed what he called the growing

strength of the Latin American "liberation move-

ment," and called for greater efforts by the revo-

lutionaries in the hemisphere.

Guevara made special

reference to the progress of the revolution in

Venezuela, Guatemala, and

while in New York to

Colombia.

On 13 December,

address the UN General Assembly

session, Guevara said that "bullets not ballots"

will bring revolution to Latin America.

He candidly

admitted that Cuba has heloed the "fleedom fighters"

of Venezuela "acquire nilitary =nowledge."

He once

again singled out revolutionaries in Venezuela,

Guatemala, and Colombia for special praise.

5. Cuba's principal agency for subversion,

the DGI, was formed in late 1961, and is advised

by at least five Soviet intelligence experts.

the largest of

has three operational departments, national libera-

which is concerned with promoting

tion" in Latin America.

This is the department

charged with selecting other Latin Americans for

The DGI's methods of

selecting,

training, and assigning espionage agents

and guerrilla warfare specialists reveal a high

degree of professionalism. Moreover, the DGI has

developed complex travel arrangements designed to

hide the fact that Latin Americans coming to Cuba

to receive training have actually been in Cuba.

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6.

The number of DGI agents now operating on

the continent may well total several hundred.

Rie-

liable sources continue to report Latin Anericans

traveling to Cuba for guerrilla warfare training or

However, the number of

Latin Americans being trained in Cuba apparently

is considerably below the 1962 level. Most of these

are trained under DGI auspices, and are capable of

exploiting local resentments and stimulating activi-

ties which could develop into difficult internal

security problems in several Latin American countries.

Perhaps more importantly, these activists usually

impart their knowledge to local militants--at little

expense or risk to Havana--to increase the revolu-

tionary potential in their countries.

7. Providing guerrilla warfare iraining and

political indoctrination remains the najor form of

Cuban support for Latin American revolutionaries.

and other Cuban leaders

Fidel Castro, Che Guevars' "Cuba's example" is the

continue to proclaim that

most important "support" they give to Latin Ameri-

can revolutionaries.

Ilavana also continues to give

relntively nodest sums of money to some Castroist

groups.

Propaganda support from Cuba: press ana

radio media is still a major Cuban means for reach-

ing pro-Cuban groups on the continent. There is

still no firm evidence to support the nany reports

alleging that Havana is now sending arns or Cuban

guerrilla experts to other Latin American countries,

although the

3-ton Cuban aims cache found in Vene-

zuela in November 1963 clearly reveals Havana's

capability for giving naterial support to atin

American revolutionaries.

8.

number of clandestine reports have stated

that Algeria is cooperating with Cuba in support o=

"national liberation" movements in Latin America.

Sone have

mentioned that training canps for latin

Americans are located in Algeria. High level Cuban

leaders such as President Dorticos and Che Guevara

make fairly frequent trips to Algiers

where Presi-

dent Ben Bella joins them in endorsing liberation

movements in Latin America as vell as in Africa.

It nay well be that a "nutual-assistance' arrange-

being worled out--Cuba to provide some

clandestine help for Algerian activities in Africa,

and Algeria to reciprocate by supporting certain

Cuban operations in Latin America.

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9. In focusing on Venezuela, Havana is prob-

ably most encouraged by the well-established Commu-

nist-terrorist apparatus with which it can work.

Recent reliable clandestine reports state the Vene-

zuelan Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN)

can draw upon some 1,800 supporters--several hun-

dred of whom are full-time activists--spread through-

out the country.

The FALN is well-organized,

reasonably well-financed, and most importantly--in

Havana's eyes--willing to take action against the

Venezuelan Government. The FALN stepped up its

activity considerably beginning in late September,

although it has since had to curtail its urban

terrorist activity and concentrate on operations in

the countryside. Havana's propaganda support rose

accordingly, nearly reaching the level it achieved

in the autumn of 1963 when the FALN was making a

determined effort to bring down the administration

of former president Betancourt.

Among Cuban gestures

in 1964 were: participation of Cuban officials in

the launching of a new "solidarity with Venezuela

committee"; launching of a new domestic radio pro-

gram specializing in reports on Venezuela; and an

islandwide "solidarity" celebration held from 14 to

22 November, which included the opening of an FALN

mission office in Havana, elaborate ceremonies,

speeches, and interviews

with FALN leaders.

10.

Recent information strongly suggests

Havana is basing its hopes for the struggle against

"imperialists" in Colombia on a relatively new or-

ganization, the Army of National Liberation (ELN).

The ELN is

Colombian Liberal Revolutionary Youth Movement.

(JMRL), and is called the country's "number one ter-

rorist

group" by the US Embassy. Fabio Vasquez,

probably the most influential ELN leader and the

group's new chief of guerrilla activities, is be-

lieved to have returned to Colombia in late Novem-

ber after having gone to Cuba the previous month

seeking new funds. insanent

#soment told embassy officials in November that

active guerrilla operations probably would begin

early in 1965 if Vasquez succeeded in obtaining

additional funds from Cuba.

The ELN had previously

received US $25,000 from Havana, according to the

source.

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11. The ELN is said to be planning a two-

pronged

guerrilla-terrorist operation, coordinat-

ing an urban campaign modeled after the familiar

tactics of the Venezuelan FALN with a program of

•rural violence.

On 7 January ELN guerrillas at-

and hero a t0a

town in Santander state, where they

killed three police agents, robbed a local bank,

and herded the townspeople

into the central plaza

for an anti-government, anti-US haranguing.

After

the assault, the ELN band withdrew to the nearby

mountains.

Meanwhile, Cuban propaganda media con-

to emphasize Bogota's "brutal repression" of

the people of the "Independent Republic of Marque-

talia."

Colombia's military has been engaged in

a prolonged operation against Communist bandits in

that department.

12.

Primary advantages from the Cuban point

of view

in the case of Guatemala are the existance

there of an active guerrilla movement led by Marco

Antonio Yon Sosa and the unsettled political situa-

tion in the country. Also potentially advantageous

are Cuba's geographical proximity to Central America

and the large Cuban diplomatic establishment in

neighboring Mexico.

There is no doubt that Yon

Sosa's group receives inspiration and some money

from Havana, and that Fidel considers it the one

organization in Guatemala with the capability to

sustain violent revolutionary activity.

rillas operate over a fairly wide area in Guatemala

in small but highly mobile bands. They harass

military outposts, assassinate certain military of-

ficers or persons unpopular with the peasants, and

raid small businesses.

There are increased indica-

tions of local support for the guerrillas among the

peasants of the area:

PASCE

585454744249

al Amelia reported in mid-December that

TALN-type terrorist actions--some against US tar-

gets--were planned to begin soon in Guatemala and

Honduras to provide new publicity for revolutionar-

ies in both countries. On 31 December, 5 terrorists

burned the US AID garage in Guatemala City,

destroy-

ing it and 23 vehicles. This raid occurred less

than three weeks after Guatemalan authorities cap-

tured large amounts of terrorist equipment and,

they believed the headquarters complex of the sub-

versives in the capital. Yon Sosa's organization's

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militant propaganda organ, "Revolucion Socialista,"

is an unusually well-printed periodical for a clan-

destine insurgency group, and may actually be pro-

duced in Havana.

It is distributed widely in various

parts of the country. This periodical is far su-

perior in layout and

content to the official propa-

ganda published by the Guatemalan Communist party.

Former Guatemalan President Arbenz and

his ex-foreign minister and their families reside

in Havana, and are active in the propaganda effort

directed against the present Guatemalan Government.

here is strong indication that cuban direction

and funds enter Guatemala from MexiCo.

It is also

likely that considerable cooperation exists between

insurgents in Guatemala and neighboring Honduras.

14. Reliable clandestine reporting indicates

that Havana still is in contact with leaders of

extremist wingwor retours

a,. with some of the

with some outpanama sita

Communists,

and with a desigerau

Commitsite youthsgroup and perhaps

herbaradovern

"hard-line" Communist followers o

Ratten borever

The Cubans' attitude toward these and other

revolutionary hopefuls in Latin America seems

to

be :

"We will give you support when you begin the

armed struggle." One of the most frustrating situa-

tions for the Cubans has been the inability of the

Movement of the Revolutionary Left (NIR) in Peru

to initiate anti-government activities. At one

time,

the MIR had over 500 personnel who had re-

ceived training in guerrilla warfare or political

indoctrination in Cuba.

Similarly, Cuba's apparent

lack of

success in promoting a pro-Castro insurgency

effort in Bolivia probably is a disappointment.

15.

In summary, Cuba appears to be concentrat-

ing its

support of Latin American revolutionaries

on those who are willing to fight and have the best

prospects for

success.

much

less

Although Cuba's leaders are

confident than formerly about the quick

emergence of

"new Cubas" in Latin America, there is

little reason to pelleve that rider Castro w111

abandon

the

"revolutionary struggle." He may how-

ever, move cautiously in this regard for tactical

reasons.

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