REPORT: COMMENTS ON HSCA DRAFTS.
Originator: CIA
Document date: 02/25/1979
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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- 2022 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 -

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OLC 79-0113/5

25 January 1979

SUBJECT: Comments on HSCA: Drafts

I. Miscellaneous Issues - HTLINGUAL Index Cards

Page 2. Names of Egerter, O'Neal, Rocca (C)

Page 3. Names of Hartman and Egerter (C)

Page 6. Egerter's name (C)

II. Miscellaneous Issues - Lee Harvey Oswald's 201 Opening Sheet - "AG"

This draft reflects the insistence of HSCA investigators in

than making a formal request to the Agency.

i pret i in genes i

rather

They asked

of people who would not have had the working-level technical

knowledge with which to answer this question. When a request

was finally made to the Agency, the answer was forthcoming.

"AG" is computer language for American defector to the East. (C)

The only reason that this was ever worth considering (not

that an answer was not officially available) was the working thesis

that "AG" meant Agent. Having wasted so much time in pursuing the

question in a furtive and groping fashion, they now feel it necessary

to spend 5 1/2 pages discussing it further. What "AG" means is clear

and accurate; exactly when this particular piece of computer language

was developed is the subject of disagreement, but that is of no

real significance. (U)

Page 1. Rocca's name (C)

Page 2. Rocca's and Egerter's names (C)

Pages 3-6. Hartman's name (C)

III.

ZRRIFLE

The assertions of. Harvey's "known" antagonism and

hatred of "the Kennedy's" are at least dubious, if not seriously

distorted.

For the purposes of perspective, Harvey came to the Cuban

operation late in

the game.

The point is he was not involved in

the

Bay of Pigs operation and any personal attitude he held

on that

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activity was removed in time from the actual event.

In fact, he was

the second man to run the Cuban Task Force subsequent to the

Bay of

Pigs.

Harvey was a tough, blunt man.

He called things the way

he saw them.

This characteristic possibly was

responsible for his

reassignment from the Cuban program, but more

importantly, he would

have had no illusions on that score.

Reportedly, he did feel that the

Administration was uncertain in what it wanted to do against Cuba; he

reportedly believed that it lacked determination and fortitude.

finally told the Attorney General that they (Robert Kennedy and

General Lansdale had to make up their minds: they wanted dramatic

operations against Cuba, but without the publicity that such activities

inevitably would generate.

told them that they wanted "to do it with mirrors."

This appears

to have led to his replacement at the personal request of the

Attorney General. (U)

It is safe to assume resentment on Harvey's part.

he was a realistic and experienced government employee, and does not

exactly fit the fantasies that inexperienced persons may wish to

weave about him.

He was a man more likely to particularize in such

matters, and such resentment as he would have felt would have been

directed at the Attorney General rather than as suggested in the draft

report,

"the Kennedy's." (U)

Harvey was a man who uniquely kept his own counsel. There

would be very few who would truly have been privy to his views.. It

is doubted that the Committee has competent evidence on this score,

whatever the generalized descriptions that it might have received.

Assertions of what is "known" about Harvey's general attitude

towards "the Kennedy's" may provide a convenient hook for ascribing to

him the motive that would serve as the basis for looking at RIFLE as

a possible instrument of the President's association.

ZRRIFLE, because

of Harvey's involvement in plotting against Castro is a proper subject

for attention by the Committee, but the basis for this speculative

point of departure serves more to distort the record than to illuminate

At the bottom of page 2 a statement is made that the CIA made the

ZRRIFLE file available only after

"repeated requests."

request for this information that was made to

the office that provided

it came from the HSCA investigator working the problem.

churlish manner received the direct response it merited, which may explain

why he never approached that office again. The material was requested in

January and was made available in January.

The information was made

available at once, but languished for weeks before he took advantage of it.

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This was not unusual on the part of the investigators; large

quantities

of material assembled and made available for review was never

reviewed.

The treatment of ZRRIFLE emphasizes considerations during the

initial period when ZRRIFLE was being studied.

It ignores the fact

that the Committee has in its possession unrefuted statements, with

references to supporting information, showing

that these various

things were never done. My letter to Blakey (27 Sept 78) outlines

a good bit of this. (U)

This section of the report is rather badly conceived and uncon-

vincingly presented. (U)

IV. Helsinki

Page 4. References to CIA files on the Soviet Consul in

Helsinki raises a sources-and-methods question. References to

"two CIA dispatches from Helsinki" highlights the existence of the

Station there. General references to the name of the Soviet Consul

should be considered to determine if the story can be told without

using that name. (C)

V. Untitled, Hand-Written Draft on Non-Interviewing of Oswald

in the first page, as a matter of organization, the thir

sentence describes CIA's

"claim that no records existed" as stimulatin

speculation that Oswald had some relationship with the Agency.

fact, CIA was not making its "claim" in a vacuum, but was responding

to allegations which already reflected such speculation. (U)

At the top of the second page there is a statement about

a DCI affadavit being in response to a Warren Commission request.

the top of the next page the statement is made that the affadavit

"was partially instigated by a newspaper article."

that the Warren Commission request resulted from the newspaper story, but

it is not customary for CIA to issue affadavits as

a response to newspaper

request: Simply, as stated, it did so in response to the warren commission

On page 6 the crypt KUJUMP is used. (C)

Page 10-13 the names of Halligan (P.?), Tamprelle (P.?),

and Dennis Densyla (sic) (T.?).

Again at pages 20-21 the names of Citrynell, Webster, and

Kiniarelli (T/P?). (C)

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In considering why Oswald was not in fact interviewed

on his return from the U.S.S.R., assuming

that he could have been,

the HSCA draft omits information that it was provided to the effect

that the Soviet Union was allowing large numbers of its citizens to

migrate and that this had flooded the machinery at that time. (U)

VI. Alvarado

The true identity of Alvarado has been protected by the

Warren Commission and the Church Committee; it should be handled in

this report with the "D" identity being used. (C)

It is noted that references are made to the Mexico City

Station at pages 7, 8, 11, 13, 17, 22, and 25. (C)

The name of Birch 0'Neal appears at pages 9 and 16.

Scott appears at page 18.

Alvarado's Nicaraguan case officer, Jerez,

is mentioned at pages 16, 17, and 21. (C)

References to intercepted conversations appear at pages

17, 19, and 26.

se of the polvaraph - It was mentroned. in connectio

with Alvarado in the Warren Commission report.

c 1s mentioned her

at pages 17, 22, and 23. Does it raise a methods question? (C)

At about line 20, page 3, Alvarado's name is used where

apparently Oswald's name was intended. (C)

At page 12 of the draft a statement is made to the effect

that Ambassador Mann's efforts to investigate the possibility of

Cuban complicity were being

"restrained."

The issue is that what

the Ambassador was trying to prove is not necessarily the same

thing as an investigation.

If he was trying to direct certain

findings, then failure to follow his predilections is subject

to a different description. (U)

On page 23, the report states that it is unclear whether

the latitude to be given the polygraph operator implied that Alvarado's

polygraph was designed to prove his story a fabrication. Actually

it is clear from the statement preceding that one that reliable actions

were wanted, the polygraph operator having been instructed that Alvarado

"well-fed, rested, and not in fear of bodily harm."

In other

words, he was to be

in good shape to ensure that his responses were as

reliable as possible.

The observations of the report on this

point are strange. (C)

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The treatment on page 26, of Ambassador Mann's interruption,

is somewhat confused. If the reference to Mann's request "that Cuban

diplomatic personnel be arrested," is intended for Duran there is some

imprecision.

She was a Mexican

citizen, employed by the Consulate,

not to be catagorized as diplomatic personnel. Did he want others

arrested? (U)

On page 28 the draft says that FBI and CIA doubted

Alvarado's veracity.

It is correct to say that they had professional

doubts that were vindicated. (C)

Page 29 talks about uncertain jurisdictional issues, without

reference to the rather close cooperation between the CIA and

Legal Attache's office on the Alvarado matter, while the jurisdictional

matter was being worked out.

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