## Page 1

1104-10333-10014

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

Assassination Records Review Board

600 E Street NW - 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530

(202) 724-0088-Fax: (202) 724-0457

June 9, 1997

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION

Stewart F. Aly

IN THIS DOCUMEN olonel James R. Moore, Jr., U.S.A.

Associate Deputy General Counsel

Information Management Officer,

Office of General Counsel

DCSPER (DAPA-ZXI)

Department of Defense

300 Army Pentagon, Room 2D749

1600 Defense Pentagon

Washington, DC 20310-0300

Washington, DC 20301-1600

Re:

Proposal for a Multi-Agency Declassification Review of Joseph Califano's Army

Papers under the JFK Act

Gentlemen:

The Assassination Records Review Board would like to make arrangements with you to

declassify six boxes of Army records from the files of Joseph Califano. The files date

rincipally from the period 1962-63, during which Mr. Califano served as Army Gener

ounsel and as Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Army. The records had bee

ACT

REM

Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department, the United States Information

Agency, and others.

Deadlines

Due to the volume of the records, and the Review Board's current sunset date of

September 30, 1997, it is important that we proceed expeditiously in our review of the

records.' We have slated the Califano papers for review by the Board at its August 5-6, 1997

meeting. The Review Board staff is prepared to assist you in making arrangements for a

prompt and efficient review of the Califano papers.

be able to revisit the schedule proposed below.

BoARD MEnuERS: John R. Tunheim, Chair • Henry f. Graff - Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce - Anna K. Nelson

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: David G. Marwell

---

## Page 2

13-00000

Messrs. Aly and Moore

June 9, 1997

Page 2

Preliminary Review of Calijano Papers

The Review Board staff has conducted an initial review of the records and has

tentatively reached the following conclusions: first, the records are very similar in

subject manner to many other records that already are a part of the JFK Collection;

second, although the vast majority of the records technically remain classified, there is

little remaining sensitivity due to the passage of time and to the release of much of the

information in other contexts; and third, the Califano papers contain equities of

numerous military and non-military agencies, which, under the standard referral

process, would be very difficult and time-consuming? Thus, the logistical problem in

declassifying the records is not the continued sensitivity of the records, but the number

of agencies that will need to review their own equities in the records. For this reason,

and for the short time-line on which we are now operating, we believe that there is an

urgent need to make acceptable arrangements for the review and referral of records.

Proposal

each other and quickly to resolve questions.

is. lon Bowie, of the Army Declassification Activity, spent three day

eviewing some of the records and making recommendations for referrals to othe

gencies both within and outside of the military. Although Ms. Bowie worke

nergetically for three days, it was our sense afterwards that, if we continue at the same

pace, the agencies with equities will likely not be able to complete their reviews before

the August deadline arrives.

---

## Page 3

13-00000

Messrs. Aly and Moore

June 9, 1997

Page 3

Department of Defense are agreeable to such an arrangement, the Review Board will

take the responsibility for contacting all non-military agencies with equities in the

records while Army and DoD make arrangements for all appropriate military entities to

be present.

We are, of course, very willing to consider other ideas or suggestions that you might

have. However, because the clock is ticking, it is important that we promptly develop a

plan that will provide all agencies with equities in the Califano papers to have an

opportunity to review and declassify their equities.

I look forward to discussing this issue with you.

Attachment

CC:

Steven D. Tilley, NARA

J. Barry Harrelson, CLA

Nina Noring, State

Richard S. Werksman, USIA

William Leary, NSC

Carol Keeley, FBI

---

## Page 4

13-00000

JOSEPH CALIFANO PAPERS (6 boxes)

identified by Steve Tilley at NARA, these 6 boxes of papers, almost exclusively fron

1962-63, were either generated by, or addressed to Joseph Califano, who at this tim

was Department of the Army General Counsel and Special Assistant to the Secretary of

the Army. Most of the documents are short summaries of proposed policy positions, or

letters of transmittal, with voluminous appendices attached. Each of the 6 boxes

contains approximately 1500-2000 pages of material.

Representative Topics:

(1)

ICCCA (Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs-the

"Cottrell Committee") meetings on future U.S. policy toward Cuba. Thes

documents are generally background papers prepared prior to meetings

minutes of meetings, or follow-on discussion of action items assigned at

meetings of the ICCCA.

(2)

Contingency plans for Cuban invasion by the U.S. military in the event of

a Cuban uprising.

(3)

(4)

Psychological warfare against Cuba.

Diplomatic initiatives intended to increase isolation of Cuba.

(5)

Biographies, and evaluations of Cuban exile leaders.

(6)

(7)

Intelligence reports and estimates on reported events inside Cuba.

Summaries of clandestine paramilitary actions taken against Cuba, and

suggestions for possible future actions.

Apparent Equities:

Ninety-five per cent of the documents appear to have multiple-agency equities,

usually 4 to 6 agencies per document. Based upon staff review, it is estimated

that 80% of the documents have State equities, 60% Joint Staff or OSD, 60% NSC,

60% CIA, 15% Army, Navy or Air Force, perhaps 10% DIA, and a small

percentage of USIA, Justice, Treasury and FBI.

Horne e: wp-docs \Califano. wpd

File: 4.0.4

---

## Page 5

13-00000

JOINT STAFF PAPERS (147 documents)

Using broad topic guidelines provided previously.by ARRB staff, the Joint Staff at the

Pentagon has reviewed 40 boxes of records of Joint Chiefs Chairmen Lyman Lemnitzer,

Maxwell Taylor, and Barle Wheeler for 1961-1964, as well as JCS central files for 1962

and 1963, and has flagged 147 documents which will enhance the historical

understanding of the Kennedy administration, and which some scholars will believe

may be relevant to the assassination.

Topics:

(1) ICCC (Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs)

meetings regarding future U.S. policy toward Cuba.

(2)

Special Group (5412 committee) meetings and decisions; and covert

paramilitary operations against Cuba.

(3) • Cuban coup planning.

(1)

(5)

Vietnam coup planning, and discussion of Diem and Nhu.

OPLAN 34A (covert actions against North Vietnam).

U.S. military strength levels in Vietnam.

Apparent Bquities:

Multiple agency equities appear to apply to virtually every document-usually

State, OSD and/or NSC. The Joint Staff has stated in writing that it is prepare

o expeditiously process these documents for declassification in collaboratio

with agencies which have equities, and then accession the declassified

documents to NARA. Currently the Joint Staff is awaiting guidance from ARRE

staff on which of the tabbed folders we desire to have placed in the collection;

upon receipt of that guidarice, they will commence declassification review.

Horne e: \wp-docs \Jointstaff.wpd

File: 4.0.4

---

## Page 6

13-00000

TION

Assassination Records Review Board

600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530

(202) 724-0088 - Fax: (202) 724-0457

C.A RAs i:) OSIECTION TO

June 9, 1997

DECLASSIFICATON AND/OR

RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION

iN THIS DOCUMENT

Stewart F. Aly

Associate Deputy General Counsel

Office of General Counsel

Department of Defense

1600 Defense Pentagon

Washington, DC 20301-1600

Mr. Edmund McBride

Chief, Information Management

Division

Joint Secretariat

Joint Staff

The Pentagon, Room 2B917

Washington, DC 20318-0100

Re: Proposal for a Multi-Agency Declassification Review of Selected Papers of JCS

Chairmen Lemnitzer, Taylor and Wheeler, and Selected JC Central Files

under the JEK. Act

Gentlemen:

The Assassination Records Review Board would like to make arrangements with you to

declassify approximately 147 records previously flagged by the Joint Staff from both t

CS Central Files, and the papers of JCS Chairmen Lemnitzer, Taylor and Wheeler. T

files date principally from the period 1961-64. The records were flagged during

searches directed by Mr. Edmurd McBride (Chief, Information Management Division;

Joint Staff) at the request of the ARRB staff. With one exception, ARRB staff feels that

all records flagged by Mr. McBride's working group are relevant to the historical

understanding or context of the assassination of President Kennedy. A description of

the records, which primarily pertain to U.S. activities related to Cuba, or to Vietnam

polite ou tacher ente We have paperiled what a cut to of to enguin eligence

Agency, the State Department, the National Security Council, and others.

Deadlines

'The Review Board is seeking from Congress a one-year, one-time extension to

September 30, 1998. Congressman Dan Burton is sponsoring a bill to extend the life of

the Review Board. Should the Review Board receive the proposed extension, we may

BOARD MemBERs: John R. Tunheim, Chair • Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce • Anna K. Nelson

ExECUTIVE DIREcTOR: David G. Marwell

---

## Page 7

13-00000

Messrs. Aly and McBride

June 9, 1997

Page 2

The Review Board staff is prepared to assist you in making arrangements for a prompt

and efficient review of these selected papers of Joint Chiefs Lemnitzer, Taylor, and

Wheeler, and the Joint Staff Central Files?

Preliminary Review of Papers of JCS Chairmen and Joint Staff Central Files

tentatively reached the following conclusions: first, the records are very similar in

subject manner to many other records that already are a part of the JFK Collection;

ill need to review their own equities in the records. For this reason, and for the sho

me-line on which we are now operating, we believe that there is an urgent need 1

make acceptable arrangements for the review and referral of records.

Proposal

In order to expedite the process and make it more efficient, we would like to propose an

alternate arrangement for declassification of records that we previously have found

rective. We suggest the holding of a multi

ifective. Wesest the holding of a melt gene concurrent freeze of these paper

schedule a single session at our offices, on or before July 23, 1997, where all agencies

with equities in these JCS/Joint Staff papers be concurrently present for a

declassification review. At such a session, agencies would be able to review their own

be able to revisit the schedule proposed below.

"The Joint Staff's Initial Statement of Compliance to the Review Board, dated

February 6, 1997, identified in detail the process by which these records were located-

namely, which files were searched, and who participated in the searches. Mr. Edmund

McBride, Chief of the Joint Staff Information Management Division, indicated in this

statement that the Joint Staff was standing by to expeditiously process these records for

declassification in collaboration with other agencies when the ARRB was ready. ARRB

staff has only recently completed its initial review of these records, which constitute

selectively flagged folders within 40 boxes of JCS and Joint Staff records.

---

## Page 8

13-00000

Messrs. Aly and McBride

June 9, 1997

Page 3

equities in the records, declassify them, and simply hand them across the table to other

agencies for their review. It has been our own experience that sessions of this sort

greatly simply the review process by giving agencies the opportunity to speak with

each other and quickly to resolve questions.

Because these papers will need to be reviewed by the Board at its August 5-6 meeting,

we believe that an arrangement such as is proposed above will provide all agencies

with a full opportunity to identify their equities in the records and to make

determinations regarding the need for continued classification, If the Joint Staff and the

Department of Defense are agreeable to such an arrangement, the Review Board will

take the responsibility for contacting all non-military agencies with equities in the

records while the Joint Staff and DoD make arrangements for all appropriate military.

entities to be present.

We are, of course, very willing to consider other ideas or suggestions that you might

have. However, because the clock is ticking, it is important that we promptly develop a

plan that will provide all agencies with equities in these Joint Staff/JCS papers to have

an opportunity to review and declassify their equities.

Ilook forward to discussing this issue with you.

Sincerely,

T. Jerendy Gant

General Counse

Attachment

CC.

Steven D. Tilley, NARA

J. Barry Harrelson, CIA

Nina Noring, State

William Leary, NSC

---

## Page 9

13-00000

JOINT STAFF PAPERS (147 documents)

Using broad topic guidelines provided previously by ARRB staff, the Joint Staff at the

Pentagon has reviewed 40 boxes of records of Joint Chiefs Chairmen Lyman Lemnitzer,

Maxwell Taylor, and Earle Wheeler for 1961-1964, as well as JCS central files for 1962

and 1963, and has flagged 147 documents which will enhance the historical

understanding of the Kennedy administration, and which some scholars will believe

may be relevant to the assassination.

Topics:

(1)

ICCCA (Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs)

meetings regarding future U.S. policy toward Cuba.

(2)

Special Group (5412 committee) meetings and decisions; and covert

paramilitary operations against Cuba.

(3) • Cuban coup planning.

(4) Vietnam coup planning, and discussion of Diem and Nhu.

(5)

OPLAN 34A (covert actions against North Vietnam).

(6)

U.S. military strength levels in Vietnam.

Apparent Equities:

Multiple agency equities appear to apply to virtually every document-usually

State, OSD and / or NSC. The Joint Staff has stated in writing that it is prepared

staff on which of the tabbed folders we desire to have placed in the collection;

upon receipt of that guidance, they will commence declassification review.

Horne e: \wp-docs \Jointstaff.wpd

File: 4.0,4

---

## Page 10

13-00000

•NED 17:08 PAS 202 781 0437

ARRB_

0 001

Assassination Records Review Board

600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530

(202) 724-0088-Fax: (202) 724-0457

MEMORANDUM

Via Facsimile

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION

IN THIS DOCUMENT

July 2, 1997

TO:

Mr. J. Barry Harrelson, Central Intelligence Agency HRG

FROM:

Doug Home, Assassination Records Revlew Board Bu

SUBJECT: Declassification Session for Califano Papers and Joint Staff/JCS Records

1. The joint declassification session mentioned in our letters to the Army (re: the Joseph

Califano Papers) and to the Joint Secretariat (re: Selected Papers of JCS Chairmen

Lemnitzer, Taylor, and Wheeler, and selected JCS Central Files) of June 9, 1997 is

scheduled to take place during the four day window Monday, July zl-Thursday, July

24, inclusive. The first session will commence at 9:00 A.M. Monday morning, July 21, at

the ARRB offices in room 207 of the Bicentennial Building, located at 600 E Street, NW

(at the corner of ฿ Street NW and 6th Street).

2 Our offices are located equidistant from the following three Metro stations:

Archives/Navy Memorlal (Yellow Line); Judiclary Square (Red Line); and Gallery Place

(Red Line). Parking Garages are located in the basement of the Bicentennial Building,

and also across the street from us in the basement of the ARRP building.

3. Please fax the names, SSNs, and clearance inforination for CIA attendees to Tracy

Shycoff on our staff at fax number (202) 724-0457 prior to close-of-business on

Wednesday, July 16, 1997. Please indicate an your visit request that the period of the

visit is through the end of calendar year 1997, since it is anticipated that our efforts to

expedite declassification of these documents will take more than one session to

accomplish.

4. We look forward to working cooperatively with all of our partners in this enterprise.

Boano MeNsERs: John R. Tunhaim, Chair • Honry F. Graff • Kermit L. Mall - Willlam L. Joyce • Anne Ki Nelson

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: David G. Morwall

---

## Page 11

13-00000

!::!

Confidential

18 July 1997

Memorandum For: David G Marwell

Executive Director

Assassination Records Review Board

Subject:

CIA Reviewers - Clearance Certifications

1. The CIA review team for the joint declassification

session for Califano Papers and Joint Staff/JCS records

scheduled for July 21-24

is composed of the following

individuals:

Charles A. Briggs

IC/DCI/CSI/HRG

SSN /161-22-9115

Kathleen Puchnick

IC/DCI/CSI/HRG

SSN /161-26-1452 /

Richard D. Kovar

IC/DCI/CSI/HRG

LEilëen M.

Wukitch

S/DO/IMS

SSN 194-22-0138

SSN 178-36-7636

(Mary V. Amoia

IC/DO/IMS

SSN /579-42-8195

William Perkins

IC/DO/IMS.

SSN

082-30-4664

2. The Agency reviewers listed above have the

appropriate clearances to review Joseph Califano's Army

Papers and the selected JCS records and files.

Official

certification of the individuals' clearances

will follow.

If you have any questions concerning clearances in my

absence, please contact (Barbara Standley), 703-613-1806%

Barry

Project Officer,

CIA JFK Review

CL BY :

611637/

CL REASON: 1.5 (c)

DECL ON:

X1

DRV FROM: COV 2-82

Baclara

Confidential

---

## Page 12

13-00000

1 08/05/87 TUE 17:24 FAJ 202 724 0457

ARRB

Assassination Records Review Board

600 E Street NW - 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530

(202) 724-0088-Fax: (202) 724-0457

MEMORANDUM

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION

Via Facsimile

IN THIS DOCUMENT

August 5, 1997

TO:

FROM:

Mr. J. Barsy Harrelson, Central Intelligence Agency HRG

Doug Home, Assassination Records Review Board Mu

SUBJECT: Invitation to Next Declassification Session for Califano Papers and JCS

Records

I. I am writing to notify you that the next working session for joint declassification

review of subject records in accordance with the standards of the JFK Act is scheduled

for Tuesday, October 7 through Thursday, October 9, Inclusive, in the ARRB conference

room in our second floor offices at 600 E Street, N.W.

2. Our goals for this second session are to complete joint review of the JCS papers, and

to open up for review two more boxes in the Califano collection. This session will also

allow selected agencies (which were not able to complete review of documents available

at the first session) an opportunity to catch up.

3. We see a need for representatives of the CIA to continue to attend these sessions

until they are completed.

4: Names and clearances need to be faxed to us only if the CIA attendees for this

October session are different from those clearances passed to Akki in July. Our point-

of-contact and fax number for clearances is Tracy Shycoff, at (202) 724-0457.

5. For planning purposes, following this October session, our plans are to host one

session per month, of 2 to 3 days duration each time, until the declassification review of

the selected JCS papers and the Calitano collection is completed. Agencies which

require more time are welcome to make individual appointments to review these

documents in-between the monthly, group sessions.

BOAND MEMBERS: JOhn R. Tunhelm, Chair • Henry F. Graff • Kormit L. Hall • William L. Joyce • Anna K. Nolson

ExecuTive DInneron: David G. Marwell

---

## Page 13

13-00000

Assassination Records Review Board

600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530

(202) 724-0088- Fax: (202) 724-0457

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

NEWS RELEASE

RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION

IN THIS DOCUMENT

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

CONTACT: EILEEN SULLIVAN

NOVEMBER 18, 1997

(202) 724-0088, EXT. 253

JFK ASSASSINATION RECORDS REVIEW BOARD RELEASES MILITARY

RECORDS RELATED TO U.S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA FROM 1962-64

The Assassination Records Review Board, an independent federal agency overseeing

the identification, review, and release of records related to the assassination of President

John F. Kennedy, today released approximately 1,500 pages of previously classified

military records from 1962-64 that relate to U.S. policy toward Cuba.

considered and debated at the highest levels of the military services."

context.

The Review Board worked cooperatively with representatives from the Department of

Defense (DOD) and the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) to

Thate rund are rat VAR A that met the definition of sing" as ineral Counted

The documents are from the fille

the Secretary of the Army, the files of Join Chels of Stäff Chairmen Lemnitzer, Taylor

and Wheeler, and the central files of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The records have been transferred to NARA for inclusion in the JFK Collection, which is

housed at the NARA facility in College Park, Maryland. These documents are now

available to researchers.

Copies of selected documents are available from the Assassination Records Review

Board, 600 E Street, NW, Second Floor, Washington, DC 20530; telephone number: (202)

724-0088.

-more

BOARD MEMBERs: JOhn R. Tunheim, Chair • Henry F. Graff • Kormit L. Hall • William L. Joyce • Anna K. Nelson

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: T. Jeremy Gunn • DEPUTY DIRECTOR: Thomas E. Samoluk

---

## Page 14

13-00000

2

The Assassination Records Review Board was established by the JFK Act, which was

signea into law by President George Bush. The five members of the Board were

appointed by President Clinton, confirmed by the U.S. Senate, and sworn in on April

11, 1994. The law gives the Review Board the mandate and the authority to identify,

secure, and make available all records related to the assassination of President

Kennedy. It is the responsibility of the Board to determine which records are to be

made public immediately and which ones will have postponed release dates.

The Review Board consists of the following members:

Honorable John R. Tunheim, Chair; U.S. District Court Judge, District of Minnesota.

Dr. Henry F. Graff; Professor Emeritus of History at Columbia University.

Dr. Kermit L. Hall; Dean, College of Humanities, and Professor of History at The Ohio

State University.

Dr. William L. Joyce; Associate University Librarian for Rare Books and Special

Collections at Princeton University.

Dr. Anna K. Nelson; Distinguished Adjunct Historian in Residence at The American

University.

-30-

---

## Page 15

13-00000

Assassination Records Review Board

600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530

(202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457

ASSASSINATION RECORDS REVIEW BOARD RECORDS RELEASE

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

CONTACT: BILBEN SULLIVAN

NOVEMBER 18,1997

(202) 724-0088, EXT. 253

SELECTED DOCUMENTS FROM MILITARY RECORDS ON U.S. POLICY

TOWARD CUBA FROM 1962-64

Attached are six selected documents from approximately 1,500 pages of military

records that relate to U.S. policy toward Cuba from 1962-64. The records are being

released today by the Assassination Records Review Board. Sections of the documents

that may be of particular interest to the reader are marked by arrows in the margin on

the right side of the relevant pages.

List of Selected Documents

1, Excerpts from 198-10004-10020

Note: The Record Information Form (document cover sheet) for the compilation of

documents in this group is dated 3/1/63, but the excerpted documents are from

February 1962.

"Possible Actions To Provoke, Harass, Or Disrupt Cuba"

2. Exoerpts from 202-10002-10104

February 7, 1962, March 9, 1962, March 12, 1962, March 13, 1962, April 10, 1962

"Northwoods" documents

3. Excerpts from 202-10002-10018

May 1, 1963

"Courses of Action Related to Cuba"

4. Excerpts from 198-10004-10011

December 11, 1963

Memo to Joseph Califano, General Counsel, Secretary of the Army - "Training of

Cuban Refugees in Nicaragua"

5. Excerpts from 202-10002-10010

December 19, 1963

"Meeting with President on Cuba"

BOARO MeMBERs: John R. Tunheim, Chair • Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce • Anna K. Nelson

ExEcuTIve DIREcTOR: T. Jeremy Gunn • DeputY DIRectoR: Thomas E. Samoluk

---

## Page 16

13-00000

6.. Excerpts from 202-10002-10117

January 31, 1964

"A Contingency Plan for a Coup in Cuba"

---

## Page 17

13-00000

Cuba Selected Documents

#1

AGENCY

RECORD

NUMBER

RECORDS

SERIES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

:: ARMY

198-10004-10020

CALIFANO PAPERS

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : MULTIPLE

FROM

TO

TITLE

DATE

03/01/63

PAGES

: 135

SUBJECTS: PLANNING AND POLICY, CUBA

POLICY OBJECTIVES, CUBA

CONTINGENCY PLANNING, CUBA

LATIN AMERICA SECURITY

ACTIONS TO IMPEDE MOVEMENT OF SUBVERSIVES

CARIBBEAN SURVEILLANCE

U.S. MILITARY INTERVENTION, CUBA

OPERATION MONGOOSE

BLOCKADE OF CUBA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

RESTRICTIONS

: OPEN IN FULL

CURRENT STATUS

: OPEN

TE OF LAST REVIEW

: 10/07/97

OPENING CRITERIA

COMMENTS

actions to

and potential

-: •

[R]

- FPEM IS

RESTRICTED

---

## Page 18

13-00000

;

CUMs

10.0938 tal

POSSIBLE ACTIONS TO PROVOKE, HARRASS, OR DISRUPT

•-CUBA-

1. Operation SMASHER:

a. Objective: The objective is to disrupt/disable military and

commercial communications facilities in Cuba.

Concept: This to be accomplished by the clandestine introduction of

a "special" vacuum tube into selected communications equipment. The tube,

which is available, is virtually undetectable inasmuch as its effectiveness is

due to the insertion of a chemical compound in the base of the tube. The

chemical, when heated becomes a conductor, when cool a non-conductor.

2. Operation FREE RIDE:

.?.

a. Objective: The objective is to create unrest and dissension amongst

the Cuban people.

b. Concept: This to be accomplished by airdropping valid Pan American

or KLM one-way airline tickets good for passage to Mexico City, Caracas,

etc. (none to the U.S.). Tickets could be intermixed with other leaflets

planned to be dropped.

The number of tickets dropped could be increased

The validity of the tickets would have to be restricted to a time period

3. Operation TURN ABOUT:

a. Objective: The objective is to create indications to Fidel Castro that

his value to the revplutionary cause has diminished to the point where plans are?

being made for his "removal".

b. Concept: This to be accomplished by the use of intelligence means the

crecendo increasing until it culminates in Castro's discovery of the mechanism

or hardware.

OMASTER

Roproduction of this document la phala

poralssios of tho issuens oratoo.

2uet.5%

Special Handling of this rager is requested.

Access should be linised to indiricuals requiring

he information horoin in orde: ic derry out theis

off¿cial duties.

A SEE the dour does or

-- pages.

Ư copys.

---

## Page 19

13-00000

TOP SECRET

4.

Operation DEFECTOR:

Objective: To induce elements or individuals of the Cuban military to

defect with equipment.

b. Concept: This activity when properly planned and implemented has the

effect of decreasing military capability. In a totalitarian system the immediate

reaction is increased security accompanied by decreased activity. It also

creates havoc in security and intelligence agencies. Could be accomplished

by intelligence means and promise of rewards.

•5. Operation BREAK-UP:

Objective: To clandestinely introduce corrosive materials to cause

aircraft, vehicle or boat accidents.

b. Concept: This activity, if possible should be aimed primarily toward the Eer:

Soviet-provided aircraft. I properly accomplished it would degrade confidence

in the equipment, increase supply and maintenance problems and seriously

affect combat capability.

6. Operation COVER-UP:

a. Objective: The objective is to convince the Communist government of

Cuba that Naval Forces ostensibly assigned to the MERCURY project is merely

b. Concept: It should not be revealed as to what the cover is--this should

be left to conjecture. This could tie in with Operation DIRTY TRICK.

7. Operation DIRTY IRICK:

a. Objective: The objective is to provide irrevocable proof that, should

the MERCURY manned orbit flight fail, the fault lies with the Communists

et al Cuba.

b. Concept: This to be accomplished by manufacturing various pieces of

evidence which would prove electronic interference on the part of the. Cubans.

8: Operation FULL-UP:

Objective: The objective is to destroy confidence in fuel supplied by the

Soviet Bloc by indicating it is contaminated.

Inct 5/2

IP SECHE+

UNCLASSIO

---

## Page 20

13-00000

FAR SEGRET

"Concept: This to be accomplished by introducing a known biological

agent into jet fuel storage facilities. This agent flourishes in jet fuel and

grows until it consumes all the space inside the tank.

9. Operation PHANTOM:

a. Objective: The objective is to convince the Castro Government that

clandestine penetration and resupply of agents is being regularly conducted.

b. Concept: This to be accomplished by use of BJ, UDT, AND JJ capa-

bilities to create the impression that landings have been made on beaches

and air drops have been made in other areas.

10. Operation BINGO:

a. Objective: The objective in to create an incident which has the appeazanceun:

of an attack on U.S. facilities (GMO) in Cuba, thus providing the excuse for

use of U.S. military might to overthrow the current government of Cuba.

b. Concept: This to be accomplished by the use of SNAKES outside the

confines of the Guantanamo Base. SNAKES simulate an actual fire-fight and

upon hearing such a sound it is entirely feasible that the immediate reaction

on G'Mo would be that the base is being attacked. This would, with proper

preparation,

until other forces, which had been previously alerted, could attack in other

areas. It is envisaged that a schedule of operations similar to the following

would overwhelm the Cuban military and cause its defeat:

(1) Simulated attack on Guantanamo.

(2) Word flashed to the President..

(3) President orders counterattack to include:

(a) Immediate launch of alerted aircraft whose targets are Cuban airfields.

(b) Immediate launch of counterattack down strategic lines in communi-

cation in Cuba.

(c) Fleet force standing by on alert would make way toward pre-selected

targets/landing areas.

(d) Immediate embarkation of airborne troops previously alerted to

pre-selected targets.

(e) Launch of additional combat aircraft to clear drop areas and

further interdict lines of communication.

(f) Ships and aircraft would land/airdrop troops and secure airfields,

road/rail terminals, etc.

3

Inal S/3

. SOP SEGRE

..'

---

## Page 21

13-00000

#.2210

15814

(g) Resupply and replacement activities.

Properly executed, the above could overthrow the Cuban Government in a

matter of hours, providing the plan is implemented within the next six months.

11. Operation GOOD TIMES:

Objective: To disillusion the Cuban population with Castro image by

distribution of fake photographic material.

b. Concept: Prepare a desired photograph, such as an obese Castro

with two beauties in any situation desired, ostensibly within a room in the -

Castro residence, lavishly furnished, and a table briming over with the most

delectable Cuban food with an underlying caption (appropriately Cuban) such as

I'My ration is different. " Make as many prints as desired on sterile paper and

then distribute over the countryside by air drops or agents. This should put

even a Commie Dictator in the proper perspective with the underprivileged

12. Operation HEAT IS ON:

• a. Objective: To create the impression with Castro Government that

certain dyed-in-tbe-wool Red pilots are planning to defect, thus causing a

detrimental tightening of security.

b. Concept:. It is known that many Cuban refugee pilots are personally

acquainted with many of the present CRAF pilots. Accordingly, by utilizing

all sources available, determine by name those pilots considered to be dedicated

Castro Reds. Then by use of agents, communications, etc. inject into the

Castro intelligence system the fact that these pre-designated Reds are planning

to defect for monetary and/or ideological reasons. Security crackdowa should

help destroy Castro image and also impose unacceptable restrictions on

routine training activities.

Grel 5/4

BIR SEGRET

---

## Page 22

13-00000

SLOIT

here hated

19474/41

ÓPERATION: Invisible Bomb

OBJECTIVE:

1. To create the impression that isolated bombings are taking place

in Cuba thus maximizing harrassment and confusion of the Castro govern-

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS:

The Air Force can utilize the operational characteristics of F-101

or other Century series aircraft to create the impression that anti-Castro

opposition is continuing. The aircraft operational characteristic to be

exploited is the "sonic-boom. "

3. The "sonic-boom" can be employed in several different ways such

as an individual boom at selected spots or a continuous boom and performed

t either high or low altitudes. It will cause not only apprehension bu

arying degrees of malicious damage as well, i.e. break all the window

on a street in Havana.

4. The "sonic-hoom" effect can be maximized by planning missions

5. The directional aspects of the "sonic-boom" also make it feasible

Co an lan inauating U.S. Naval gua-fire in the immediate vicinity of the

6. This operation is considered relatively safe and leaves no tangible

vidence. It can be planned and executed with a minimum of effort an

expense.

PEN AGE

Spacial Hendling of this payor is requested.

aproduction of this document in rola

or in pari is prohibitan eleant vith

permission of the issuing office.

ThIs dope cous1t5 3 Cosy5

1.. rasas.

---

## Page 23

13-00000

for start

Operation "HORN SWOGGLE"

Objective:

1. To crash or force down Cuban MIG aircraft with an all weather

intercept capability by communications intrusion.

Concept of Operations:

2. Closely monitor MIG air/ground communications for the purpose

of determining frequency and terminology usage for practice or real GGI -

operations.

3. By use of overriding transmitters and either a decoy aircraft or

solid weather conditlons, override Cuban controller and have Cuban refugee

pilot issue instructions: which tun MIG out of fuel or towards Florida,

Puerto Rico, Jamaica,

a carrier, ete.

Special Handling. of

this rarer is corrested.

Acoess should

be licitad E.

alriduals raguiring

the inforcion heroin in chaos do dr mre their

orizoiai ducios.

eproduciion of this document in shole

or in purt,

permission

prohibited

crept with

of

the

issuing office.

__--1220S-

heel 3

Copy # -

---

## Page 24

13-00000

M3E15

WAG RORE

Operation TRUE BLUE

1. Objective: To degrade Castro and his government in the eyes of the

Cuban peoplf by communications intrusion.

Concept of Operations:

2. By utilizing high powered transmitters in the vicinity of Cuba

(Florida, Inagwa, Jamaica,

aboard Naval ship) which have the capability of

overriding commercial Cubay radio and TV stations, periodically degrade

Castro and other government figures in the minds of the Cuban people.

3. The technique of communications intrusion could be exploited by pre-

taping or live broadcasts of anti-communist and anti-Castro propaganda at

station breaka, Castro speeches, etc. This idea envisions the u8e of a

Cuban refugee to make such broadcasts and naturally would require close

monitoring of stations to be worked. Any number of thoughts could be

injected such as:

a.

"Cuba Si, Russia No."

Communism exploits the masses.

c. Communism is ruthless totalitarianism.

d. Castro and henchment feast off the land while we are rationed.

e. Castro and his reign of terror.

Castro is a lunatic and should be put away.

Castro is the cause of all our troubles.

h. Rise up against the pig Castro, etc. etc.

4. If approved this operation could become a continuous project, perhaps

under control of USIA.

n020006

Special Fandling of this paper is raguastea.

Access should be liuitor

t: lividals requirins

the information horoin in cuis: to car:, wi thoi,

official dutios.

produciion of this cocucas la molo

51n part is prohibitea dooji sit!

pornission of tho ianita: oriloo.

Duct 2

1_ pasoo.

his document. consist of

---

## Page 25

13-00000

IT SECHLY SPECIAL HANGZINO

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

2 February 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR Brigadier General Edward G. Lansdale, USAF,

Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

Subject: Ideas in Support of Project

The enclosed ideas are submitted for your consideration and

possible use in furtherance of the objectives of the Cuba

Project. I think some of them have promise and should you

desire our group to develop any of them in more detail, we

will do so.

Сіну в із

Caribbean Survey Group

6 encis

1.

Operation

2. Operation

Smasher (2Pages) (TS)

%: Operation

5. Possible

disrupt (4Pages) (TS)

Actions to Provide, Harass, or

6.. Operation Invisible Bomb (IPage) (TS)

MAP. -SECRET

SPECIAL HANDLING

EXCLUDED FRON AUTOMATIC

REGRADING: DOD DIB 5200.10

DOES NOT APPLY

CSGWG _0#19

---

## Page 26

13-00000

1290944.

Operation "NO LOVE LOST"

1. Objective: To confuse and harrass Castro Cuban Pilota by use of

radio conversations.

2. Concept of Operations: Fly Cuban refugee pilot in sterile aircraft

in proximity of Cuba at periodic intervals while communication monitoring

Cuban air/ground frequencies utilized for airdrome control. Cuban refugee

pilot in sterile aircraft would personally know many of the pilots still flying

for Castro. Refugee pilot would get into argument with Castro pilots over

radio thus distracting confusing, etc. Would be real trouble for Castro

pilots in actual weather conditions. Argument could go, "I'll get you you

Red son-of-a-gun, " and call by name it appropriate.

22.8

Until

Lati

Social Hendling of this parer 1a travested.

Aezeso shorid in

the incorvation heroin in cides ic carry out their

afficial duties.

Feprodiction:

C 16a3 2112111 10 111è9

or. in par. 1s

persissics

Gruck if

This documont consists r5ga reges.

Copy #-f-a-of .

---

## Page 27

13-00000

AN OLENCI

ONE SAID

I. Operation SMASHER.

1. Objective: Disrupt or disable military and commercial communications

facilities in Cuba.

2. Technical Requirements:

a. Detailed information on both commercial and military communi-

cations facilities and capabilities, to include inside and outside plant

construction, system networks, equipment details (i.e. circuitry, tubes, etc.)

location and type of repeator stations. This information is required to

construct a refined device.

b. A vacuum tube modified in such a manner as to cause a short

circuit.

This is possible by inducing silicon carbide (?) into the base of the

tube.

When the tube becomes hot the silicon carbide liquifies and becomes

a conductor; when the tube cools the matter returns to a solid non-conductive

state. Such a device (vacuum tube) is available.

3. Targets:

2. Cuban Telephone Company. The company provides local and long

distance telephone service throughout Cuba and also international telepbone

service.

b. Radio Corporation of Cuba Avenida Carlos. The company provides

radiotelephone service to American and European countries. It also provides

radiotelegraph service and includes leased teleprinter channels. In conjunc-

tion with AT&T the company inaugurated over-the-horizon microwave radio

service between Cuba and Florida in 1957. This latter made available two-way

TV channels.

C. Cuban American Telephone and Telegraph Company. Founded by

IT&T and AT&T, providing six (6) submarine cables linking Havana and Key

West. Facility operates in conjunction with microwave link.

d. Commercial Radio and Television Stations.

• Military Radio and Land-line Facilities. These include point-to

point command and administrative systems, air/ground facilities, navigationa

aids. Obviously certain commercial facilities provide service to the military

therefore disrupting or disabling commercial facilities will affect militar;

communications capabilities.

production of this document in whole

- in part is prohibited excopt with

official duties:

poraission of the issuing office.

Onel t11

E-SEORET

has document consist 053

2 pesos.

- 3...

---

## Page 28

13-00000

•!

4.

Concept of Operation:

126002

a. The tube must be introduced clandestinely into appropriate

equipments...

• b. Introduction can be accomplished through the use of known assets

either directly or by contact with an employee of a company who would have

access and who would receive proper remuneration.

.2

2ne 12

---

## Page 29

13-00000

Cuba Selected Documents

#2

AGENCY

RECORD NUMBER

RECORDS SERIES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

.......

AGENCY INFORMATION

: JCS

: 202-10002-10104

JCS CENTRAL, FILES 1962

3360 (7 FEB 62)

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR

FROM

TO

TITLE

DATE

PAGES

SUBJECTS

JCS

:

NORTHWOODS

00/00/62

197

U.S. MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA .

CONTINGENCY PLANNING, CUBA

OPERATION MONGOOSE

UPRISINGS IN CUBA

COVERT OPERATIONS, CUBA

SOVIET BASE IN CUBA

CARIBBEAN SECURITY

PATROL POSTS

INVASION OF CUBA

JUSTIFICATION FOR:U: S. MILITARY INTERVENTION

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER,

TEXTUAL: DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED

RESTRICTIONS : 1C

CURRENT STATUS

ITE

OF LAST REVIEW

RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

: 10/07/97

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS

:JCS Central Files 1962, Box 29. JCS Record Case, Code

Name Northwoods;

containing JCS Papers related

to JCS

recommendation to invade Cuba and pretexts to justify

US military intervention.

[R]

- ITEM IS

RESTRICTED

---

## Page 30

13-00000

JOS 1969/303

I February 1962

Page 2144:

UNCLASSIFIED

COPY NO.

- SPECIAL, DISTRIBUTION

NOTE BY THE SECREIARIES

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:

NORUEWOODS (S)

A reports on the above subject la subnitted for considera-

tion by the Joint Chiefs of StarS.

P. J. BLOUIN

N. J. INGELIDO

Joint Secretariat

* Not reprödüded; on file in Joint Secretariat

ASTORE

JOS 1969/303

EXCLUDED FROM GDS

2144

UNCLASSIFIED

---

## Page 31

13-00000

UNCLASSIFIED

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED

NOTORN

BILINED DISTRIBUTION

APPENDIX 1 TO ENCLOSURE A

DRAFT

MEMORANCUM FOR BRIGADIER GENERAL E.

G. LANSDALE,

chief of operations, fuba

project

Subject: Cuba Project:

Peference:

Menorandum front Your Office

BrigGen w.

H.: Craig,

USA,

for

Bubj:

"Special Projeot",

dated 17 Jan 62

• L. As requested in referenced memorandun, the position of.

the Department of Defense, with respect to the military stake

and vale in the removal of the Communist regime in Cuba, has

beer duisitined baged upon the following factors:

¿. National seourity Polloy, determined by the ISC during

to icuting of 9 May 1961.

b. Current Intelligence estimates of the situation in

c: sporation: agalnst the Castro regime x1ll be covert,

et leâit Initially.

d. Time favors the Castro government.

?. The baals milltary Implications of Castro's Communist

JOVEInme:": re as fOllOws:

a, it exposes the Western Hemisphere to an Increasingly

serious threat to its security. This increases our national

vilnerability and defense costs as forces are developed.

or shifted to meet this threat.

b. It provides the Soviet Union with the most effective

base they have ever had for spreading Communiam throughout

the Western Hemisphere. This in turn greatly Increases the

possibility that additional Latin American countries will

come under Communist control. Elimination of this base would

demonstrate to the other nations of the world that the United

States will not tolerate such intrusions. Communist

control of additional countries would or could result In:

HOP CRET

UNCLASSIHLU

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRE

FORTON

MMED PERSECRET

---

## Page 32

13-00000

(1) Increased Conmunist capability-for

UEELASSIFIEO

other nations of the Wéstern Hemisphere.

(2) Increased Communist capability for spreading

Communiem throughout Latin America.

(3) The loss of existing and/or potential bases,

training areas, facilities and rights, as well as sources

of itrategic materials necessary to our military

capability.

(4) An Increased threat to Us usage and control

of the Panama Canal through subversion and sabotage..

3. The urgency of

the requirement to remove the Communist

government from Cuba 1s made apparent by Castro's constantly

Increasing capabilities. for attacking other nations of the

western Hemisphere and for spreading Connunism throughout the

hemisphere.

This sense of urgency 1s greatly Increased 1f

courses of action within the capability of the communists

are considered:

a. The Soviete could establish land, sea and/or air

bases in Cuba.

•D. The soviets could provide Castro with a number of

ballistic missiles with nuolear warheads; or they could

furnish the missiles and maintain Joint control of the

nuclear warheads.

4. In view of the factors set forth above, the Department of

Defense holds that the Communist regime In Cuba 18 Incompatible

with the minimum security requirements of the western

Hemisphere. The Department of Defense 18 prepared to overtly

support any popular movement inside Cuba to the extent of

ousting the Cormunist regime and installing a government

acceptable to the United States. While the possibility of

Conmunist Bloc rcactions in areas other than in Cuba 18

recognized, 1

it 1s belleved that this can be accomplished without

precipitating general war, and without serious effect on

world public opinion if the following conditions prevail:

UNCLASSIFIED

Appe:d1x 1 €0

Snolosure A

TAP SECRET SPECIAL HAND

---

## Page 33

13-00000

UNCLASSIFIED

SPROIAL HANDLING REQUIRET

NOTORN

DENIED DISTRIBUTION

a. It the impression is created that there 18 an urgent,

huzanitarian requirement to restore order In Cuba and/or the

Unitoú States 18 respording to an appeal for assistance fror

a government

representative of the Cuban people.

i: it it is announced incident to the overt military

action that the United States and/or members of the OAS are

maring into Cuba for the purpose of restarting order and holding

free eleations, and that they will Immediately withdraw as soon

as the new governnent advises that they have the capability

to maintali order without further assistance from the OAS

nations.

o. it tho milltary operation, is conducted as allckly

as ocanible and nith suifloient force to that the Communist

Blos's ability to take effective counter-medures in support

oi the Castro regine is reduced to a minimum.

c. i: It the luban regine commits hostile acts egainst

Us forces or property which would serve as an incident upon

which to base overt US intervention. In this event, applicable

portione e? a, b, and c above apply.

5. The Department of Defense 18 also prepared to covertly

provide support to CIA or State, or any US approved popular

movement inside Cuba, in terns of supplies, transportation,.

personnel and babes.

MAS PEO

3

Appendix I to

Enolosure A

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED

NOPORN

DINTED DISTRIBUTION

THE SECREA

---

## Page 34

13-00000

UNCLASSIFIED

JCS 1969/321

22 March 1962

Page 2165

COPY NO.

SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION

NOTE BY THE SECRETARTES

to the

JOIN CHINE ON SITATE

NORTHHOODS (S)

A reports on the above subject is submitted for consider-

ation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

F. J. BLOUIN

M. J. INCREIDO

Joint Secretariat

. "i

Not reproduced herewith; on file in Joint Secretariat

505 1969/321

REGRADING; DOD DIRECTIVE

$200.10 DOES NOT APPLS

2165

UNCLASSIFIED

---

## Page 35

13-00000

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF.

WASHINGTON IS, DIG.

UNCLASSIFIED

• 13 March 1962.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SEORETARY OF DEFENSE

subject:

JustifIcation for US. Milftary Intervention

1n Cuba (T8)

б: •

1. The Joint Chiefs

of Staff have considered

the attached

Memorandun for the Chief of Operations,

Cuba Projeot,

which

responda to ä-request of that offloe for brief but precise

desoription of pretexts which would provide justziloation

for US milltary Intervention In Cuba.

2.

the doint Chiefs of staff recommend that the

proposed memorandum be forwarded as a preliminary

submission

suitable for planning purposes.

It 18 assumed that there

will be similar submisaions from other agencies and that

these Inputs will be used as a basia for developing a

time-phased pian.

considered on a case-by-case basis.

3. Further, It 18 assumed that a single agenoy will be

given the primary responsibility for developing milltary

and para-military aspects of the basio plan..

It 18

recommended that this respons1bility.for both overt and

• covert military operations be assigned the Joint Chiefs.of

Staff.

BYE on Pay 24

BY ICS ON _

CLASSIFICATION. CONTINUED

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

R. L. Benite

LEMNITZER

Chairman

Joint chiefs of St

1 Inclosure

Memo for Chief of Operations, Cuba Project.

EXCLUDED. FROM GDS

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC

ASCRATES DOT OF 00. 20

_СБеРЕТ СОБОИ

UNCLASSIFIED

---

## Page 36

13-00000

UNCLASSIFED

#0 19641338

ТОї кУ

NUFORN

SPECIAL HANDLING

J08M-272-12

10 April 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

subjeots

Cuba

The Joint Chlofs of Staff bellove' that the Cuban

Further,

they

see no prospect of early success in overthrowing the present

communist regime osther as a result of Internal uprisings.

ox external political,

economlo or psychologioal pressures.

Aocordingly they bollove that military. Intaryantion by

the

united states will be roguired to overthron the present

communist

regime.

2. Ine United States cannot tolerate permanent extatenco

of a communist govertment in the Westein Hemlaphere.

the

présent ragins 1n

Cuba

provides conmunten with

& base

of

operationa for esplonage.

sabotago and subversion against

Iatin Anarica.

ins stability of sons governuents in Latin

America 15 already threatened by the overt and covert aotions

of the Cuban government.

Continued exdatance.of

Bore oter as a 2 za to ta 709 i to the one on a

nore other nations in Intin AmerIca N111

or communist doninated.

ints will greatly Inorease the

problers

currently fasing the United States and the Organiza

of Amarican

porsphery.

Establlahment of such bases would inorgase US

dofenso.

the

costs as forces vere developed or shiftod.to neet

threat.

3. Muo favors the Cuban regimo and the commentat blao.

They ara provided with the opportunity to continue with

their subversive effarta in Latin Amerioa.

Increasing

Intornal security measures by palloo stato methods deareaso

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOSATIC

REGRADING: DOD DIR 5200.10

DOES HOT APPLY

HOP SH

OFECIAL

Maram

MADLING

EXCLUDED FROM GOS

BY. JOS: ON

UNCLASSINIED

---

## Page 37

13-00000

TOP SEMITTE

SHEN

UNGLASSIMEN

the

posalbility of Intormal uprisings within cuba.

Tho

steady: improvement in miiitary defenses strengthons the.

reslatance uhich must be overcoms in the event of Us

mIlItary Intervention and could lengthen the tina roquired

to socure control of the goverzuent and tha. 18land.

contiming Indootrination of the Cuban joúth creatas a

STONINg THOlOUB

for a cowunist underground after the

alimination of the present government.

Lais areates &

problem for the future which ln steadily snoreasing In.

magnstude.

rlak of conoral nar..

rit

that the Intervention

ForceD

of

Cuba.

5. In vlon of the Inoreasing milltary and subveraive

threat to the United States and the nations of the lestors

Hemisphore posed by the

communist regime 1n Cuba,

the Joint

of early

the United

States.

undertaken as soon as possiblo and prefarably. boforo the

SOloaRe of National Card and Baserve. forCas presentis

on sative duty.

For tha Joint Chlors of Staffs

Is. I. LEMNITZAIR

Cha 1rman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECHAT MO

SPEA

WANDLIN

2

UNCLASSIMED

Tragerdost

---

## Page 38

13-00000

9 March 1962

VINE TANOLINA

COPY

COPIES

SPECTAT DESURESUFTON

UNCLASSIFIED:

REPORT BY THE DEPARZURNT OF DEFENSE AND

JOINT CHIERS OF STAPP REPRESENTAIIVE ON THE

CARIBERAN SURVEY GROUP

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

CUBA PROJECT (IS)

The cales of Operations, Cube Projoct, has requested

that he be furnished the vlows of the Joint Chiefs of starr

on this matter by 13 March 1962.

i i

-2.

EXCLUDED FROM GDS

UNCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET SPECTAL HANDLINE MAFARM

---

## Page 39

13-00000

NOFORN

UNCLASSIFIED

• JUSTIFICATION POR US MILITARY INTERVANTION IN CUBA (TS)

THE PROBLEM

1. As requested by Chief of Operations, Cuba Projeot; thie:

Joint Chlefs of Staff are to Indicate brief but preoise.

description

of pretextawhich they consider would provide;

JustlfloatIon for US military Intervention In Cuba.

PACTS EBARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. It is recognized that any action which beoomes pretext

for US military intervention In Cuba w1ll lead to a polltioal

deoiaion which then would lead to military aotion.

3. Cognizande has been taken of a suggested course of

aotion proposed** by the US Navy relating to generated

Instanoes In the Quantanano area.

4. For additional faots see Enolosure B.

DISCUSSION

5. The suggeated coursegof action appended to Enolosure A

are based on the premise that US nilitary Intervention will

result from a perlod of heightened US-Cuban tensions which

place the United States In the position of suffering Justir-

lable grievanoes.

Horld option, and the United Nations

carm should be favorably affected by developing the inter-

national Image of the Cuban government as fash and Irresponsible,

and as an alarming and unprediotable threat to the peace of

the western femisphere.

6. While the foregoing premise can be utilized at the

present time it will contime to hold good only as long as

there can be reasonable certainty that US military Intervention

In Cuba would not directly involve the soviet Unlon. There 18

Thief of Natal Operationg,

"on file In General Oraig's offloe.

URCLASSIFTED

_TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLINA NASADN

---

## Page 40

13-00000

as yet no bilateral mutual support agreement binding the USSR

to the defense of Cuba, Cuba has not yet becone a member of the

Warraw Pact, not have the Sovlets established Soviet bases

In Cuba In the pattern of US bases in Western Europe. Therefore,

since time appears to be an important factor in resolution of

the Cuba problem, all projects are suggested within the time

frame of the next few months.

CONCLUSION

..7. The suggested courses of action appended to Enclosure A

satisfactorily respond to the statement of the problem. However,

these suggestions-should be forwarded as a preliminary submisaion

suitable fof planning purposes, and together with similar inputs

from other agencies, provide a basis for development of a single,

Integrated, time-phased plan to focus all efforts on the

objective, of Justification for US military Intervention in Cuba.

RECOMMENDATIONS

8. It is recommended that:

a. Baclosure A together with 1ts attachments should be

forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for approval and

transmittal to the Calof of Operat10n8, Guba Projecte

...-..b- This paper NOT ba, forwarded to commanders of unified

or specified commande.

c. This paper NOT be forwarded to us officers assigned

to NATO activities.

d. This paper NOT be lorwarded to the Chairman, Us

Delegation, Unlted Nations Military Staff Committee.

3

UNCLASSINEN

TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOTARN

---

## Page 41

13-00000

ANNEX TO APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE

UNCLASSI MED

PRETEXTS TO JUSTLY US MILITARY INIERVENTION IN CUBA

(Note: The courses of aotion which follow are a preliminary

submission suitable only for planning purposes. They are

arranged neither chronologically nor in ascending order.

Together with similar inputs from other agenoles, they are

Intended to provide a point of departure for the development

of a singlo, Integrated, time-phased plan. suah a plan would

permit the evaluation of Individual projeots within the context

of oumulative, correlated aotions designed to lead Inexorably

to the objeotive of adequate justifloation for US mllltary

Intervention in Cuba).

1. since 1t would seem desirablo to use legitimate

provocation: as the basis for US milltary Intervention In Cuba

a cover and deception plan, to Inolude requisite preliminary

aotions guch as has been developed in response to Task 33 o,

could be executed as an Initial affort to provoke Cuban

reactions. Harassment plus deceptive aotions to convinoe the

Cubans of imminent invasion would be emphasized. Our military

posture throughout exeoution of the plan will allow a rapid.

change from exercise to Intervention 1f Cuban response justifies.

2.'A sertes of hell coordinated inaldents will be planned

to take place in and around Guantanamo 'to give gemuine

appearance of being done by hostile Cuban forces.

a. Inoldents to establish a crodible attack (not in

ahronological order):

(1), start rumore (many). Use olandestine radio.

(2). Land frlendly Cubans in uniform "over-the-fence"

. to stage attack on base.

(3) Capture Cuban (friendly) saboteurs inside the

base.

(4) Start riots near the base main gate (friendly

Cubans).

M

tone to appenda

UNCLASSIRED

FAR SFERFI COICLAL MAMALIA

ricisis: 48045484555675

.:.

'!?'

---

## Page 42

13-00000

TUTUNN

CASS HEN

(5) Blow up ammunstion Inalde the base, start fires.

(6) Burn alroraft on air bage (sabotage).

(7) Lob mortar shells from outside of base into base.

Some damage to installations.

(8) Capture assault teams approaching from the sea

or vlainity of Guantanamo City.

(9) Capture n1l1t1a group which storms the base.

(10) Sabotage ship In harbor; large fires -- napthalene.

(11) 810k ship near harbor entrance. Conduct funerals

for mock-vlotime (may be Ileu of (10)).

b. United States would respond by executing offensive

operations to secure water and power supplles, destroying

artillery and mortar emplacements which threaten the base.

0. Commence large scale United States military operations.

3. A "Remember the Maine" Inoident could be arranged In

several forms:

a. He could blow up a US ahip In Guantanamo Bay and

blame Cuba.

b. We oould blow up a drone (urmanned) vessel anywhere

In the Cuban waters. We could arrange

to oause auce inaldent.

In the vicinity of Havana or Santiago as a spectacular result

of Cuban attack from the air of sea, or both. The presence

of Cuban planes 'or ahips merely Investigating the intent of

the vessel could be fairly compelling evidencs that the ship

was talen under attack. The nearnels to lavana or santiago

would add oredibility espeolally to those people that might

have heard the blast or have seen the fire. The Us could

follow up with an air/sea resoue operation covered by Us

lIghtera to "evaouate" remaining members of the non-existent

orew. Cacualty Ilete In US newspapers would cause a helpful

wave of national Indignation.

4. We could develop a commist Cuban terror ampalgn In

the Miant ared, in other Florida olties and even In Washington.

Annex to Appendis

co Enclosure A

UNCLASSIFIED

INP SECRE..

Deal healthat

катя.

!

...

---

## Page 43

13-00000

UTUKH*

cuban rafugees seeking

haven In the United states. We could sink a boatload of Cubans

enroute to Florida-(real or simulated). We could foster attempts

on lives of Cuban refugees in the United States even to the

extent of wounding in Instances to be widely publloized.

Exploding a few plastio bombs in carefully chosen spota, the

arrest if cuban agents and the release of prepared documents

substantiating Cuban Involvement also would be helpful in

projecting the idea of an irresponsible goveryment.

5. A "Cuban-based, Castro-supported" I1llbuster coula be

similated against & neighboring Caribbean nation (in the vein

of the. 14th of June Invasion of the Dominioan. Republjo). We

know that Castro ly backing subveraive efforte clandestinely".

against Falt1, Dominioan Republlo, Guatemala, and Nicaragua at

present and possible others. These efforts can be magnified and

additional ones contrived for exposure. For example, advantege

can be taken of the sensitivity of the Dominican Alr Force to

Intrusions within their national air space.

"Cuban" B-26 or

0-46 type atroraft could make cane-burning raids at. night.

Soviet B100 InOandlarIes could be found. Ints dould bo coupled

With "Cuban" messages to the Coumunist underground 1n the

Dominican Republio and "Cuban" shipments of arma which mould

be found, or Intercepted, on the beach. i

6. Use of MId type airoraft by US pllots could provide

additional provocation. Harasiment of 01v1l alr, attacks on

surface shipping and destruction of US military drone airoraft

by MIG type planes would be useful as complementary aotlons..

An F-86 properly painted would convince aff passengers that they

saw a Cuban MIQ, especlally if the pilot of the transport were

to announce such faot. The primary drawback to this suggestion

appears to be the seourity risk inherent in obtaining or modify-

Ing an aircraft. However, reasonable copies of the MIG could

be produced from US resources in about three months.

9

UNCLASSIMED

ANCCANEI

:....

---

## Page 44

13-00000

'"NUTURK"

UNCLASSIL..

7. H1ja0king attempti against oivil air and surface oraft

should appear to continue as harassing measures condoned by the

government of Cuba. Concurrently, genuine defections of Cuban

civIl and military alr and surfaos craft should be encouraged.

8. It 18 possible to create an Inoident which will demonstrate

convincingly that a cuban alroraft has attacked and shot down

a chartered alvil airliner encoute from the united States to

Jamaloa, Guatemala, Panana or Venezuela: The destination would

be ohosen only to cause the flight plan route to cross cuba.

The passengers could be a group of college atudente off on a

hollday or any grouping of persons with a coumon interest to

support chartering a non-soheduled flight.

a. An atroraft at Eglin AFB would be painted and •

numbered as an exact duplicate for a o1v1l registered

afrcraft belonging to a CIA proprietary organization in the

Miami area. At a designated time the duplicate would be

substituted for the aotual o1vil airoralt and rould be

loaded with the seleted passengers, all boarded under

carefully prepared alfases. The actual registered

alroraft would be converted to a drone.

b. Take off times of the drone airoraft and the actual

e1rozait all be sohouled to allon" rendezvore south of

Plorida. From the rendezvous point the passenger-carrying

ajraraft will descend to minimun altitude and go directly

Into ap auxtllary field at Eglin AlB shere arrangements will

have been made to evacuate the passengars and retur the

alroraft to 1ta original status. The drone atroraft

meanhile will continue to sly the filed flight plan. When

over Cuba. the drone will being transmitting on the inter-

• national distress frequency a "MAY DAY" message stating he

18 under attack by Ouban MIC aircraft. The transmission

w1ll be Interrupted by destruation of the atroraft whlch will

be triggered by radio aignal. Thia will allow ICAo radio

10

Annex to Appendix

to Enölosure A

UNCLASSINED

------

:.

---

## Page 45

13-00000

NUTUNN

stations in the Western

KANG, ASSIE

tell the US what

has happened to the afreraft Instead of the US trying to

"sell" the inoident.

9. It 18 possible to oreate an inoident which will make 1t

appear that Communiet Cuban MIGB have destroyed a USAR airoraft

over international waters in an unprovoked attaok.

a. Approximately 4 or 5 P-101 aircraft will be dispatohed

In tra1l Aron Homestead AFB, FloMãs, to the violnlty of cuba.

Their mission will be to reverse course and simulate fakin

atroraft for an air defense exeroise in southern Florida.

These airoraft would conduot varlations of these flights at

frequent intervals. Crens rould be briefed to remain at

least 12 miles off the Cuban coast; however, they would be

required to carry live ammunition in the event that hostile

actions were taken by the Cuban MIce.

D. on one such flight, a pre-briefed pilot would sly

tall-end Charley at considerable Interval between airoraft.

While near tha Cuban Ioland this pilot rould broadoast that

he had been Jumped by Mids and was going down. No other

oalls would be made: The pilot would then fly directly

west at extremely low altitude and land at a

seoure base, an

Eglin axlllary. The atroraft would be met by the proper

people, quickly stared and given a new tall number. The

pilot who had performed the mission under an allas, would

resume his proper identity and return to his normal plaos

of business. The pilot and airoraft would then have

disappeared.

o. At precisely the same time that the aircraft was

presumably shot down a submarine or small surface craft

would disburse F-101 parts, parachute, eto., at approximately

15 to 20 miles off the Cuban coast and depart. The pilots

returning to Homestead would have a true story as far as

they knew. search ships and aircraft could be dispatched

and parts of airoraft found.

UNCLASSIFED

11

Annex to Appendix

to Enclosure A

MR FATET

•=!.

---

## Page 46

13-00000

GLORITE OUAL HANULIKE HOFBAN

ENCLOSURE B

URGLASSIRIE

FACIS ERARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. The Joint OhleSs of Staff have previously stated"

that US unflateral military Intervention in Cuba san be

undertaken in the event that the Cuban regime commits hostile

aots against US forces or property winloh would serve as an

incident upon' which to base overt intervention.

2. The need for positive aotion in the event that ourrent

covert efforts to foster an internal Cuban rebellion are

unsuccessful was indicated*" by the Joint Chiefs of Staff

on 7 March 1962, as fOllOWE:

" _ - - determination that a credible Internal

revolt is impossible of attairment during the next

9-10 monthe w1ll require a decision by the United States

to develop a Cuban "provocation" as Justification for

positive US military aotion."

3. It 1s understood that the Department of State also 18

preparing

suggested courses of action to develop justification

for US military intervention In Cuba.

* JCS 1969/30

* JCS 1969/31

12

UNCLASSIFED

Enolosure B

---

## Page 47

13-00000

Cuba Selected Documents

#3

AGENCY

RECORD NUMBER

RECORDS SERIES

AGENCY FILE

NUMBER

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

JCS

202-10002-10018

JCS CENTRAL FILE 1963

JCS 2304/189

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR

FROM

JCS

J-5

TO

JOINT CHIEFS OF

TITLE

DATE

COURSES OF ACTION RELATED TO CUBA (CASE II)

05/01/63

PAGES

36

SUBJECTS :

POLICY, CUBA

REVOLT IN CUBA

COVERT OPERATIONS, CUBA

OPLAN 312

OPLAN 316

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL, DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION

UNCLASSIFIED

RESTRICTIONS

: OPEN IN FULL

CURRENT STATUS

: OPEN

CE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/23/97

OPENING COMMENTS JCS Central Files 1963, Box 4. Report to Joint Chiefs

and Joint Staff

Cuba.

discussing courses of action toward

(R]

- ITEM IS RESTRICTED

---

## Page 48

13-00000

e ancia conoter

DASILIBLIAONA

CeAr

(CS

180.54

Choup

NOES

Gen

fiLho 0y3S

EXCLUDER

BORORIDI

DEC

.pompeia die. .....1

torne dica :-klime..

---

## Page 49

13-00000

ERSES OF ACTIONA

1: In response to a

enters or stars, to pro

concernins the requirenen

fomenting a revolt in

engineering

FACTS BE

2. The: Charman, Joint

25 March 1963%; requested

ments to plan and Incite a

part therein, "In vow of pas

agents into cuba and of obta

Cubạ; 1t, will always be ex

timed ip raing id propert

"constae

dine an ancians

nvolving*.many Cubans

3. CINCLANT has for

revoltavell conceived

by us miltary forces

Cuban naplonels.

4..

For, discussion,

83:6:

21

22

* Enclosure to JCS 2304/176÷

** Attachment to JCS

***. Attachment to

2304/17.

JCS

2304/168

FLASTE

TOP SORE - SENSITIVE

JCS 2304/189

(Rev: 5/13/63)

2203:

SECRE

---

## Page 50

13-00000

the. Uni

muent.

and ability to

norei

6. The

united stately

and could (g) engineer

perpetrated by

the

Cuba.:

7. ingineered provocations

In control, timing, simplicies an

and seci

Hould

fomented revolt. It would: bert

wIdespread effective revolt.

montaires

generate

*However,.

the

staging of a loçal

uprising as a contrived incident shourd

pre

cluded.

8. The Unlted States should:

a. Initiate a coordina

for overt us militais

b.

support of

effort to build cuban

with the intensificatior

Ing

sabotage: in Cuba, anä the

guerrilla activity.

c. At a propitious

aotton to remove thei

9. It would appear ned

zatton be given the pri

national pla

development of this nat.

1]. The broad concepts here

rews of the

• Joint

Chiefs of Staff should be: forwarded; to the: Special Group (5412

29

30

Committee) for consideration under the provisions of NSAM 57:* -31

* Enclosure to JCS 1969/227

CS 2304/18

REV•: 5/73/63)

AUIELASIFIED

SECRET

16

17

19

sittingsin 4-5419730raise

---

## Page 51

13-00000

Se to soconmens edienai

amnnora rur enpuntouem arue

N1p29reute003

2io er eopcilot danso roroenurdiane

ispeath narobsins

Reäulpedio neteassbile veraren

bagi:

Pae wenonenouarphicadlos.ue B

no crol oida tonesu rg rueo

vea sontes bedpanassde

Cauan ta cEYOSaS

De monwardedgbe

iculoa officeue

Rewedenan

Donveusanetgon

Coloneg

Ana new

PBrane

MásanMalaeatelotooed.. i..

49222

.wasikreisisistsesa@hisitiesio.se

cahge Cfia

swuikia..

..rs.

ii"radi

.. .

.ccisee dree .

---

## Page 52

13-00000

ENGLES THE

DI32-11

VIS VORANDUM BOR WE, SEERSISE OF THE MERUY

the Joint chiere or shur tave consider sa ere collaon

beera to you a one can city as recutive Ageuros un

accus

EXCLUDED

ICKNGRAD

ROV

AUTOMA

ANDA DEGE

(Revzi5/13/63)

TOP SECRET

---

## Page 53

13-00000

SECRET - 8E

UNGLASSIFIED

APPENDIX

FOR SECRET

DISCUSSION

INTRODUCTION

1. Purpose. This report is in response to a request from

the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staif, to consider the desira-

bility and reguirements of a fomented revolt in Cuba. It

includes an examination of engineering an incident or a series

of incidents as, a cause for invasion and consideration of

pertinent comments received froM CINCLANT.

2. Summary. Study of the desirability and the requirements

of a fomented revolt in Cuba and of the advantages of

engineering an incident of a series of incidents rather than

trying to generate and coordinate action from inside Involving

many Cubans of doubtful reliability leads to the conclusions

that:

a. It 1s unlikely that an effective spontaneous revolt

will occur in the near future.

b. Any uprising without US overt. support is likely to

be short-lived because of the improved Cuban/Soviet •

military capabilities presently in Cuba and Castro's.

Increasingly efficient internal security operations.

c. There appears to be little likelihood that the Castro

communist regime will risk a direct provocation that

could be used as a pretext for US intervention.

d. Unless the United States Intervenes militarily, the

Castro government will become more firmly entrenched and Its

efforts and ability to spread international communism s1ll

increase.

e. The Unlted States should Intervene militarily in

Cuba and could (a) engineer provocative incidents ostensibly

URCLASSINED

Appendix

TOR SECRET - SENSITIVE

(Rev. 5/13/63)

MAH SHORET

peralesmania:

---

## Page 54

13-00000

144-01542 - SENSELEKK

perpetrated by the castro regime to serve as the cause of

Invasion or (b) foment a revolt within Cuba which would

call for Us military intervention.

s. Engineered provocation would provide greater advantages

In control, timing, simplicity, and security than would a

fomented revolt. It would be most difficult to generate a

widespread effective revolt. However, the staging of a local

uprising as a contrived incident should not be precluded.

g. The United States should:

(1) Initiate a coordinated program to create a pre-

text for US military Intervention in Cuba.

(2) In support of the above, undertake a flezibly

phased effort to büild Cuban resistance potential, com-

menairg with the;intensification of intelligence collec-

tion and sabotage in Cuba, and the creation of a frame-

work for guerrilla activity.

(3) At a propitious time, launch appropriate military

aotion to remove the Castro communiat government.

h. Implementation of the above would involve many

agenoles of the United States Government.

It would appear

necessary that one governmental organization should. be

given the primary responsibility for developing such a

national plan. The Joint Chiefs of Staff should participate

in the development of this national plan.

1. The broad concepts herein and the views of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff should be forwarded to the Speciai Group

(5412 Comnittee) for consideration under the provisions of

NSAM 57.

J. CINCLANT's concept for fomenting a revolt in Cuba

while containing much merit, should be re-examined both

for 1ts tining and for the large-scale guerrilla activity

1t envisages.

TOP GERBT - SENEITTEE

(Rev. 5/13/63)

2

Appendix

WKCLASSIFIED

TON SECRET

---

## Page 55

13-00000

СИЛОВОМПАЛ

UNCLASSIFED

b. Conduct physical and psychological military harassuent

of the Cuban regime and covert and clandestine operations as

directed.

c. Undertake military action in Cuba In accordance with

contingency plans approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and.

directed by the President. The primary purpose of the Us

milItary Intervention would be to assure the overthron of

the castro communist government and to assist in the establish.

ment of a new, non-communist government acceptable to the

United States.

20. The Implementation of any of the suggested courses of

action 1, this study would Involve many agencies of the United

States Government. It would appear necessary, therefore, that

one single governmental. organization be given the primary

responsibillty for developing a national plan.

21.. Beause of the extensive military operations involved,

the Joint Chiefs of Staff should participate in the development

of this national plan.

In addition, for a contrived revolt,

they should be assigned the specific responsibility for develop-

ing the milltary and paramilitary aspects of the plan. Ih1s

would require the Joint Chiefs of Staff to seek a determination

under NSAM 57 when a revolt contrived by the United States were

an operation large enough to warrant control of covert forces

by the Department of Defense and that CINCLANT be designated as

the DOD agent. In this connection, CINCIANT has developed a

вpec1f1c concept for political and milltary action in Cuba.

CINCLANT CONCEPT

22. The CINCLANT concept provides for inciting a revolt in

Cuba, followed by overt, large-scale US military operations.

The proposed timing of operations permits completion in 15-18

months. Supporting operations by CIA, State, and USIA will

be required.

BOR SECRET - SENSEFEVE

(Rev. 5/13/63)

12

UNCLASSIFIED a penet

"OR SECRET

---

## Page 56

13-00000

UNCLASSE

FECRET

23. Preliminary operations require the introduction by CIA

as soon as practicable of assets into Cuba for thè development

of Intelligence, the organization by State of a Free Cuban

Government (FCQ), the development of a propaganda plan by USIA, and

the development of a suitable cover plan.

24. Actual operations would commence with the execution by

CINCLANT of OPIAN 380-63 about 15 January 1964. This plan calls

for Infiltrating of UN forces into Cuba for area assessment,

establishing guerrilla bases, developing military units,

establishing escape and evasion nets and conducting subversion.

On about 15 June 1964, UW forces would be augmented and would

accelerate subversive operations to create conditions favorable

for establishing a Free Cuban Government on Cuban soil and for

employnent of conventional forces.

25. CINCIANT then proposed that on about 15 July mobilization

of forces for US conventional operations would begin. Exeaution of

•CINCLANT. OPLAN 312 would comnence on 26 July 1964 followed by

D-Iay OPIAN 316; about 3 Auguot 19€4..

26. Although the foregoing schedule is approximate, it should

be noted that the Free Cuban Government would be required to

exist at least for 18 days in the face of the Castro government's

excellent counterguerrilla ability. This time requirement appears

to be excessive, but. it could be shortened.. The criteria for

United States recognition of a new government could be met in

this period. The Free Cuban Government could claim it:

a. Has in actual possession of the governmental machinery.

b. Mas administering it with general acceptance by the

population; and,

c. Was prepared to honor international obligations:

TOP SBERET SENSITIVE

(Rov. 5/13/63)

13

UFCLASSIFED

Appendix

FOr SICKET

---

## Page 57

13-00000

SECRET

27. The UW forces required for CINCLANT OPLAN 380-63 are

approximatelys

(1) Headquarters, Joint

6 0ff

Unconventional Warfare

parole Attentio a Taak

(2) Ow Operating Base

(3) Support Units

(4) Special Forces

42 EM

36

off

482 BM

15

Off

331 EM

1 Group Headquarter

(reinf.)

2 Companies (reini.

2

• (5) Submarines

(6) APD

(7) SEAL Teams

(8) Ali Commandos

1

150 Personnel

20 Aircraft

4 Air Control Teams

(9) CIA Forces

Internal and Bisternal

assets as required by

CINCIANT.

28. CINCIANT does not have UW forces assigned at this time,

however, a nucleus JUWTFA staff 1s Included within the CINCLANT

staff and has the capability for preparing UW plans for normal

contingencies. Planning or conducting Uh operations of the

magnitude envisaged in CINCLANT's concept in this plan is beyond

current capabilities.

29. At an appropriate time in preliminary operations the

• activation of the JUWTFA as a separate organization and the

assignment to it of full wartime beadquarters complement of

• 48 officers, 56 enlisted men, and five civilians would be

required.

Approval of any concept in principle or for

planning purposes, hovever, would not necessitate the

—TOP SECREI - SENSITIVE

(RaT. 5/13/63)

• 14

Appendix

CRET

---

## Page 58

13-00000

TOP SECREE - SENSTEIVE

UNCLASSIFIDT OR

SECRET

activation of a separate headquarters. In this case, CINCIANT

would re-evaluate his staff capabilities and submit appropriate

recommendations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

30. CINCIANT In a related outline concept recommended, con-

cerning the use of Cuban nationals in UW operations, that "AB

practical, the Military Services should Initially form their

Cuban nationals Into Integral, all Cuban units...". It 1s

considered that the oreation of a "Cuban Expeditionary Force" In

antioipation of 1ts employment in the execution of OPIAN 316 18

& risk nich cannot be Justifled and should not be undertaken.

There appears to be no reason, however, why Cubans could not be

formed Into small teams for use In Ul activities. It 18 estimated

that from two to four hundred carefully selected Cubans could be

used In this role. It rould be appropriate for the CIA In a

supporting role to select and train'the individuals forming them

Into teams of appropriate alze to be made avallable for joint use

by CINCLANT or by CIA, as necessary.

31. For other details of training Cuban nationals, see

JCSM-350-63:

32. The force levela in CINCIANI OPIANS 312 and 316 are adequate

to cope with the Improved Cuban nilltary capability and the

presence of Soviet troops on the Island.

33. The experience of the JUWIFA during the Cuban crials In

October 1962, Indicates that the present military supply system

In the CONUS w1ll be unable Immediately to provide equipment and

supplies In the required configuration for projected Ul operations

In Cuba. The Army 1s currently studying prestockage of UW equip-

• ment and will submit proposala for approval and financing.

UNGLI

.: (Rev. 5/13,163)

15

Appendix

---

## Page 59

13-00000

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

- SENSILVE

34. The conceptual outline submitted by CINCLANT does not.

provide an exact plan in detail for contriving a revolt in

Cuba. However, his general concept rould provide for:

"a. Incremental steps in replacing the present communist

donnated government of Cuba by infiltration, subversion,

unconventional warfare, limited conventional actions and

finally full-scale invasior in that order, if necessary.

b. The capability of US to withdraw at any point. in the

process 11 unfavorable international reactions or pressures

require it; or .1I the Cuban people thewselves, in a successful

revolt, overthrow the present regime and form a government

lavorable to US Interests.

c. An ambiguous atmosphere during the critical phases

In its development which would not present the Sovlets with

a direct. confrontation of power until events would preclude

timely action on their part to prevent our intended result

in Cuba.

d. Utilization of the OAS Form and support without being

dependent upon DAS approval or disapproval for the necessary

Intermediate steps leading up to OAS recognition of a Cuban

Government in exile and the final, decisive military action.

e. Maximum utilization of the Cuban refugee elements

in the US for political and military support without

depending upon their effectiveness for the ultimate success

of the plan.

I. No maldeployment of US forces, affecting the over-all

US military posture, until the final decisive stages of

the plan are ready for execution, thus reducing maldeployment

time.

g. The most economical use of US resources to accomplish

the defeat of Castro communism.

ho A definite tiue scale of events culminating in the

defeat of Castro's communist government and establishing

the groundwork for the Installation of a government compatible

with the alms of the OAS and friendly to the US by 1 October

1964."

FOR SECRET

- SENSIBIVE

---

## Page 60

13-00000

Cuba Selected Documents

#4

AGENCY

RECORD NUMBER

RECORDS

SERIES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

: ARMY

198-10004-10011

CALIFANO PAPERS

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : ARMY

FROM

TO

TITLE

DATE

• PAGES

SUBJECTS

D. ALBRO

OFFICE, SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

TRAINING OF CUBAN REFUGEES IN NICARAGUA

12/11/63

11

ANTI'-CASTRO CUBANS

ARTIME, MANUEL

CUBAN BRIGADE

KENNEDY, ROBERT

CUBAN EXILE TRAINING IN NICARAGUA

DOCUMENT TYPE

: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

RESTRICTIONS

: OPEN IN FULL

CURRENT STATUS

TE OF LAST REVIEW

OPEN

10/07/97

OPENING

CRITERIA

COMMENTS

training

in Nicaragua,

of Manuel Artime, meeting

Kennedy, and Cubang in US

.........

[R]

- FTEN IS REETRI

---

## Page 61

13-00000

SECREF

20310

•AC8Z-C2

11 DEC 196,3

OF THE ARKY

AR. JOSEPH CALIFANO, GENERAL COUMBBI,

**gees LA NicarAgus (8)

1: 19 Movi 63, above subjeet, do office,

Protocat be

Puerto Cabetes and

les (0), From USARA, BIcaragus

oTt 92870009365, 31 Oct 63, Subjects

Cuban Officer TaP fan 6C1oa, 1 Nor 63, 112ch IT Op, Subject:

Cuban Brigade Momen is or Record, ACST-CA, 19 Jov 63, Subjeet:

2.

Ben largered ate be east of your office, ed tod

Indicattop

Chiét hi u

24 Da McPba11,: 0-30613; U8A. Retired, the former

refuge

nanyway Involved la the tratatng of Cuban

co. to need in

{).t

in laguisy, the USARMA, Manages called attention

e had furnished (references lb., and le above)

repox ting Ideat

quent on the visit of exiled Cuban refugge

leadera DI- Mank

38, DI. CArlOS PRIO SOCAIIAO, DI. lianuel

AntOnLo DE VARONA

ACO FERNANDEZ PLA, DI. LOUIEANO BATISTA, DI.

Orlando RUiNIES, Rt.

B ABOH, and Roberto RODRIGiEZ to illcaragua

during July and hugual

The USARMA's counent on the nerspaper

speculation and runora

ncerning this visit was that he "does pot have

any fim Information es Indicatore that ant1-Castro forCes are belag trained

In Nicaragua:"

TEL ASSIFIED BY ARMY

OSA. ASG. CONTROT NO 2813 B

WARNING NOTICE

DECLASSIFICATION ACTIVITY

-BENOITE SOURCES MND MEMORE HYDETO

Ase

DUNINGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS:

NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIEP

GÒD DiR 5200.18

DATE: 205:17 948-440-63

---

## Page 62

13-00000

SECRET

8 1 DEC 1963

SUBJECI: Irainlag of Cuben Refugees 1u Nicaragua (8).

enco 1d, fron the 1. C. of so. Cal,. jourtaany reporta

van alass to got i

ltionary cemp la iscaragui. A copy as cala

{8

for your inforestion. CONARC, fourch Army and Std

ted to contione to report on tha alleged rectaleías

servin

for you

Нахітка

BAN &

They wa

22 Rarem!

vas present.

• reports informarion recelved.

Elgade menbet, 2nd It Josie Baull

1l Convales,

Do Vislt Hashlastony. D. Ae on 1B Boy 63 to

the Attorney: Den

X ta

at he had set ulth It. OlIvd.

the actual

Ing 1a sot knows. A copy of caference la, La Laclosed

Mo-Robert Bemedy did confer on 17. How. 53 ulth

SAN BOKAS, and Marigue Jona BuT KUlllen' Altert.

I to sees vith ti; Robert sennedy on alther 21 or

18 so lodication that ft. Molabled acadent VARONA

Tula office has no laformation whether MI. Lannedy lo avare

The inforpation la paragraphe 3

through 5 abova, and the laclosures heieto, are Euralahed in the event

that they way be of sono pertinence to your laquiry regarding Colonel

NePhall, reference la, above.

2: Tael

88

DEE CHIEL RA 2IUKE

WARNING NOTICE

BECEINER

LENCHHIE SOURGES AHO HETORS 1HYSETE0

ISga) R. D. Albro, Col; 6S.

B. D. ALBRO

ColoRal, es

Director of Farelga Intelligence

THE UHHA

15 6N .83

ZECUELYSA

-SEORET

PONNGRADED AT 12 YES; INTERVI

NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIE

DOD DIR 5200.10

---

## Page 63

13-00000

Cuba Selected Documents

#5

AGENCY

RECORD NUMBER

RECORDS SERIES

GENCY FILE

NUMBER

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

: JCS

202-10002-10010

: TAYLOR PAPERS

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR

FROM

TO

TITLE

DATE

PAGES

SUBJECTS

: JCS

EARLE G. WHEELER

MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ON CUBA, 1100 HRS, 19 DEC 1963

12/19/63

3

: POLICY AND PLANNING, CUBA

OPERATIONS, CUBA

DOCUMENT TYPE

CLASSIFICATION

....

PAPER,

UNCLASSIFIED

TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

RESTRICTIONS

: OPEN IN

CURRENT STATUS : OPEN

FULL

E OF LAST REVIEW : 07/31/97

SPENING

CRITERIA

COMMENTS

Wheeler,

Box 193. Memorandum reporting

President on

meeting with

Cuba.

1 Document.

(R)

MYEM IS RESTRICTED

---

## Page 64

13-00000

19 December 1963

MEL ORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBISCT: Meeting with President on Cuba, 1100 hra, 19 Dec 1963

1. The following persons weis present at the meeting:

White House:

State:

Defease:.

CIA:...

Treacury:...•

USIA:

.. • The President

Mi. McGeorge Bundy.

MI. Smith

•... Mr. Thompson

Mr. Ball

MI. Johns0n

MI. Martin

Mr. Crimmins

..Mã. Gilpatric

AdI. Vance

General Wheeler

... General Carter

1x. FitzGerald

Mr. Helins

.. MI. Dillon

...Mr. Wilson

2. Mr. FitzGerald briefed the President on Agency operations

covezing the following areas:

a. Collection of intelligence.

b. Propaganda activities.

c. Economic denial actions.

d. Exploitation of Cuban military disaffection.

e. Sabotage and harrassment activities.

f. Support of autonomous anti-Castro groups.

¡CLUDEO FROM UTOMATIC REGRADING

090 DIR 52001. 20": NOT ApPIY

WRONGE

SENSITIVE

---

## Page 65

13-00000

initiatin times.

3.

a. The President was must intercuted in economic dental

actiong.

Lie was informed that tallis would ba undertaken in the

iinmediate future with represchiztives of the Canadian and Britich

governments relative to the cupply of spare parts and critical materials

by Canadian and British firms to Cubi. It vas stated that Spanioh firme

-re likewine activo in this area, as well as a number of essentially

ily-by-night firs located in a number of foreign countries. No

.:putable inexican firms arc ergagce in supplying Cuba and, in fact.

rave been halpul in proventing their foreign affillates from engaging

i this craific.

Apparently, Stats regaids the Canadian, the Britich

and the Spanish efforts as being the real trouble spots.

The President.

firecteó that State undertake talks, as appropriate, with the governmente

us firma concerned to disuade them from this practice.

b. Under questioning. Mi. FitzGerald stated that exploitation

of Cuban military disaffectlod in a long term undortaking. While there

aro disaffected Cuban military men in important pouts, they have not.

to date, made any contacts with each other nor formed any sort of group.

However, Mr. FitzGerald considers that any successful operation tu

overthrow Castro emanating from within Cuba will have to be supported

by the Cuban military if it is to have any real likelihood of succesa.

c. During the discussion on sabotage and harrassment, the

-rosicient expressed his reluctance to undertake high risk actiong at

this time for two reasons:

(1) Current attarapto to get OAS agreement to various

ations directed against Cuba might be jeopardized; and

(2) The soviets secm to be watching closely the new

administration's policies toward Cuba, and it might influence unfavorably

the sucuess of vur efforte to achieve further reductions in Soviet military

personnel in Cuba..

1. Mr. Helms briefed on the significance of the arms cache.

discovered in Venezuela. Mr. Martin briefed upon the activities of

¿he OAS survey group now in Venezuela and the results, to dato, of

neir survey. He stated that the group apparently had accopted that

ite arris had been introduced for subversive purposos, but that the

survey group was asking of the Venezuclan government further informa-

tion regarding propaganda activities directed against the Vonezuelan

government; itc. He does not expect that the commission will report

AT SuSTE

2

---

## Page 66

13-00000

so the diná prior to 10 January 1961. In the meantime, our effort

is devited to asceitaining the maxirium that the DAd is prepared

to do as a rosult of the Venezuela affair. They are hopeful that the

CAs will suppost an increared surveillance system. He thinks it is

too carly to espoct a complete break in cconomic and travel relations

between dis countries and Cuba.

5. There was some discussion of further actions we migit

take to increase prossures and harrassments at an appropriate time.

dinong other itemo mentionad were the effect of low lovel reconnaissance

flighio from time to tire and the desirability of executing such flighte

at intervals to maintain the viability oi our "right" to do so. While the

President dd not express disapprobation, seither did he expreso

In fact, no real decisions were talian at this mecting which

must be regarded, I think, as being an important orientation session.

Sigued - Larle G. Wheelor

EARLS G. WHEELER

Goreral, Unitod States Army

Chief of Staff

COFIES TO:

Chairman, JCS #1

06A7 #3

CNO # 4

CNiC 45

Director Jt Staff (Atta: SACSA) #L

Army General Counsel # 7

URELASSIRED

FORSE SATANE

---

## Page 67

13-00000

Cuba Selected Documents

#6

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY

RECORD NUMBER

RECORDS

SERIES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

: JCS

202-10002-10117

: JCS CENTRAL FILES 1963

JCSM-77-64

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR

FROM

TO

TITLE

DATE

PAGES

SUBJECTS

JCS

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

: A CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR A COUP IN CUBA

: 01/31/64

58

POLICY AND PLANNING, CUBA

COUP IN CUBA

CONTINGENCY PLANNING, CUBA

CLASSIFICATION

LASSMENATION PACTASSIFIED

PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

RESTRICTIONS

: OPEN IN FULL

CURRENT

STATUS

OPEN

PATE OF LAST REVIEW

: 10/07/97

OPENING CRITERIA

COMMENTS

JCS Central Files 1963, Box 4. Memo for Chairman, Jes

regarding

contingency plans in the

Cuba.

coup in

(R)

- ITEM IS

REGFRICTED -

---

## Page 68

13-00000

BERET-SEASTERD

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAF

MABHIMOTOM 28, G.E.

UNCLASSIFIED

SV, - 161-64

31 January 1964

MEMOR ANDUM FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, ATLANTIC

Subject: A Contingency Plan for a Coup in Cuba (S)

1. Transmitted herewith is a conceptual proposal, subject as above,

which has been developed jointly by the Department of State, the Depart

ment of Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency.

2. This concept envisions a coup occurring in Cuba which may, if

supported by the United States, achieve US national objectives by the

elimination of the. communist regime and establishment of a. Cuban

government acceptable to the United States.

3. The proposal provides for US military intervention in a flexible

manner covering a spectrum ranging from provision of logistic support

to full execution of OPLANS 312, and:316. Conditions under which military

intervention at a level LESS than that of OPLAN 316 might be undertaken

are generally in consonance with those described in JCS Message 89,70:

.DTG: 0701552 March 1963.

4. It is desired that CINCLANT prepare a separate contingency plan

to support a coup in Cuba within the context of conditions. described in

the attachment hereto.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

If angelido

MUJ. INGELID

Brig Gen, USAF

Secretary

Attachment

URGLASSIFTED

GROUP 1

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC

DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

TOP

ET-SENSITIVE

Copy I1 or 22 copies, each of l page, Series A

i resty and seid is delica

SYSTEIATICALLY REVIEWED

BY SES ON 1.9 ACT. 1989

CIASIFICATION CONTINUED

---

## Page 69

13-00000

12.10

TOP SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

ENSITIVE

UNCLASSIFIED

DECE? 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR TID CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHINES OF STAFF

SUBJECT: • A Contingency Plan for a Coup in Cuba (S)

Reference:

JESM 809-63,"Subject as above, dated October 21,

1963

Enclosed herewith are three coples of the plan on the above

subject which has been prepared jointly on a restricted basis by

representatives of the hepartments 01 State and Defense in coordina-

•Hon with the Central intelgence Agency. The plan, which has been

revised to reflect generally the vlews of the Jotnt Chiefs of Staff

contained in reference, provides a conceptual basis for US response

to a Cuban military coup and has been approved by the Secretaries

of State: and Defense: and the Ditectat, Gentral Intelligence Agency as

a basis for appropriate detalled planning. MI. McGeorge Bundy har

been. adyised. of the foregoing and requested to inform the President

of the existence of the plan on a suitable occasion. It is anticipated

that the Secretaries of State and Defense may subsequently be

requested. to brief the. President on its outline.

In accordance with the recommendations contained in paragraph.

8c, page 22 of the plan, it is requested that current CINCLANT plans

be revised as necessary to reflect the concept of military operations

described in the plan and that you advise me when this has been accom-

•plished.

In accoxdance

• Рагадтар

Do page 22.of the plan,

representativea of the

entral Intelligence Agency in coordination with

representatives of the Departments of State: and-Defense will develop a

plan for the introduction of the "Special Team" into Cuba which will

subsequently be circulated for appropriate action and further detailed

planning by agencies concerned.

* Enclosure A to JCS 2304/205-

** Appendix to Enclosure B to

JCS: 2304/205-2

супами Vance

auce

Secretary of the Army

ReState 13 eye SY JES ONLY FEET 1989.

SENSITIVE

As Stated

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING

CLASSIFIED 27X

---

## Page 70

13-00000

TOP SECRET-SSIVE

UNCLASSIFILED

A CONTINGENCY PLAN. FOR A COUP IN CUBA

1. Problem. To provide planning guidance for US response to a coup in

Cuba In'order to assure that US intervention, 1f undertaken, results 1n

replacement of the Communist goverment with one acceptable to the United

States:

2. Assumptions.

a. The leaders of the coup may of may not be aware, from previous

contact with CIA, that 1f they agree to and appear capable of meeting

certain specified conditions (see paragraph 2.d, below), their revolt

will be supported by the US 1f a Us "special team" (see paragraph 3.b. (1)

below) confirms that the criteria for support have been adequately met.

Thus, the coup could be triggered in one of two ways: The leaders, in

secure radio contact with CIA, implement their plan with US concurrence

and establish a Provisional Goverrment In full expectation of forthcoming

Us support barring a complete and immediate crushing of the uprising; or,

less acceptably, the lcaders, in the belief that they can meet probable

criteria for US aupport, Initiate the coup without consulting with or

obtaining the concurrence of the US but establish & Provisional Govern-.

ment, hoping that the US will intervene.

b. If the US had prior knowledge of the coup, up to forty-eight

hours would be required after Initiation of the action to introduce into

Cuba and receive reports from a "special team" which would obtain in-

formation to assist in maling a decision to support the insurgents; 1f the

US did not have prior knowledge, a longer time would be required.

SYSTEMATICALY, REVIEY 1989

Tate document coon 22 pages.

BY ICS ON ---

CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED

Series

DS%, 258 Control NoT/S 0354

TOP SECRET EINSTFIVE-

le 2304/205-3

UNCLASSIFIED

r.

---

## Page 71

13-00000

TOP SECRET ASTIVE-

c. US intervention would be based on:

URELASSIRED

(1) A pre-arranged call for help from a Provisional Government

set up by the insurrectionists (preferably to the OAS, although US action

would not await formal OAS approval), or

(2) A call for help from the incurrectionists after a coup had

started uithout prior US concurrence, if the US determined that the in-

surgents met generally the criteria for support, or

• (3)

Intervention by local Soviet farces.

d. A coup should meet the following criteria to be supportable,

recognizing that specific

criteria will depend upon the situation exist-

ent at the time:

(1). Have some pover base in the Cuban army of militia 1n order

to survive.

(2) Be prepared to establish a Provisional Goveriment, however

rudimentary, with some sort of public claim to political viability to

provide an adequate political basis for overt US action (not required 1f

Soviet troops were clearly fighting Cuban patriots).

(3) Neutralize the top echelon of Cuban leadership.

(4) Seize and hold a significant piece of territory, preferably

Including favana, long enough to permit the US plausibly to extend support

and some form of recognition to the Provisional Government.

e. Policy Considerations. For purposes of this paper, US policy al-

fecting US support to a revolt in Cuba is surmarized below.

(1) The US does not contemplate either a premeditated full scale.

invasion of Cuba (except in the case of Soviet intervention or the re-

introduction of offensive weapons) or the contrivance of a provocation

UNCLASSIFIED

---

## Page 72

13-00000

TOP SECRET SeVE

which could be used as

a pretext for such action.

UNGLASSIFID

• (2) By the same token, it 1s not US policy to encourage un-

organized and uncoordinated mass uprisings since these would be too

easily crushed by indigenous Cuban military forces. The likelthood of

any spontaneous uprising surviving long enough to receive adequate US

aid is small unless it is a part of, or followed immediately by, a

planned and coordinated revolt led by a significant element of the Cuban

military forces.

(3) Once a revolt begins, the involvement of Soviet forces,

either itactical formations or troops manning air defense installations,

would result in Immediate implementation of OPIANS 312 and 316.

3. Sequence: Of Operations. The concept of operations set forth in this

paper 18 based on the following general sequence of events:

a. Upon receipt of word that the dissident leaders have agreed to

and appear capable of meeting the criteria for US support, approval

would be given to commence the coup at the earliest practicable time.

(In theevent that a coup were initiated without prior Us knowledge,

the US tould proceed as described below but introduction of the special

team into Cuba would probably be delayed and its task of gathering in-

formation nade more difficult. Consequently, it might not be possible

for the US to make a decision to support the coup in time to commit

forces needed to sustain it.)

b. Upon receiving word that a coup had been initiated, either on

a pre-arranged la 81s with CIA or as a surprise to the US Government, the

US would:

3

URGASSIE-TOP SECRET SENSE

---

## Page 73

13-00000

1AS2 -

TOP SECRET

(1) Introduce into Cuba a "special teem" is obtain information

which would assist in making a decision to support the insurgents.

This'

tear, composed of several persons

representing DOD, State, and CIA, would

meke contact with the coup leaders ulthin twenty-four hours of the start

of the coup if the US had prior knowledge

of the plan, probably later if

not. The report ofthe findings

should be received by CIA within twenty-

four hours after the team's arrival on the island but this might not be

possible without prior knowledge of the insurgents' plans. In any event,

American

reliable reports from trained observers in Cuba Hould be of great value

to making a decision to intervene in

order that the Us would not commit

its prestige to the support of an uprising which might collapse prior to

the point at which Us help has become effective enough to sustain and.

expand it. (The special team, augmented as appropriete by CINCLANT,

would remain in Cuba as a liaison element with the Provisional Govern-

ment if the US Intervened and would be directed to report immediately

to CINCLANT for operational control at the time the decision was made

to intervene.) .

(2) Order forces needed to establish an air and sea blockade

of Cuba to take assiened stations in preparation for Implementing the

blockade; commence generating and positioning forces required for the

implementation of CINCLANT OPIANS 312 and 316.

c. A recommendation to intervene, based on a multiple source in-

telligence assessment including the special team's report, would be

made to the President. This would be the critical. decision because,

once made, certain actions would ensue inmediately and, henceforth,

4

URCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET saNItE

---

## Page 74

13-00000

TOP SECRET HYs

the US would be cormitted to the ultimate success of the coup.

These ac-

tlong would Include:

(1) The assumption by CINCIANT of conmand of all military

and para military operations in Cuba.

(2) Prompt introduction of small groups of personnel: for the

purposes of intelligence, reconnaissance, communications and liaison

with the Insurgents, and provision of unattributable logistic support

by airdrop or submarine. In the event that the US delayed public an-

nouncement of the decision to support the coup, this assistance would

be provided in such a manner as to minimize public knowledge of active

US involvement In Cuba.

(3) When authorized by the President, direct the special team

to have the coup leaders proclaim a Provisional Goverment, 11 one has

not already been established, and request US and OAS assistance in order

to provide justification for a blockade and consultation within the oAs.

As soon as the request for belp is received, the President would announce

publicly that the US will isolate Cuba by means of an air and sea blockade

to become effective at (time, date). The justification for this unilateral,

interim action would be based on Paragraph 3 of Resolution 2 of the Punta

del Esta meeting of Foreign Ministers until such time as the COAS/OC es-

tablished a collective basis for the blockade, as well as to insure that

support for either side is not provided from external sources. Actually,

the announcement would be designed to immobilize the Cuban Navy and Air

Force, encourage indigenous support for the insurgents, and reinforce a

warning to the Soviet Union not to intervene. (See Paragraph H.a. below).

UNCLASIFD TOP SECRET SIN

---

## Page 75

13-00000

UNGLASHE TOP SECRETS

ISITIVE

(4) Complete positioning, of forces

for implementation of por-

tions or all of CINCLANT OPLANS 312 and 316.

d. The US uculd have the ontion of replying to a formal call for

help by either publicly announcing immediately its intention to support

the Provisional Goveriment and initiating overt military operations, or

responding by establishing a blockade without admitting other support

for the coup. In the latter case, the US would, between the time of the

Presidential announcement of the blockede and public announcement of the

other forms of support, employ small groups of intelligence and recon-

naissance units, thereby providing visible evidence to the insurgents

that support is forthcoming and yet providing a facade of non-uitervention

while the US consults with its allies to gain their political support.

At the same time, the US would be generating and positioning forces re-

quired for significant overt illitary operations: Upon publicly announc-

ing US intent

to support the Provisional Government, the US would initiate

overt logistical and air support to the insurgents. There 1s a possibility

that this level

of assistance and demonstrated US intent would be suffi-

cient to bring down the Castro restme, if the coup carted with it a

significant element of the Cuban armed forces.. However, It le probable

that the US would have to introduce conventional forces incrementally as

required to sustain the uprising and should be prepared to and would im-

plement portions or all of CINCIANI OPLANS 312 and 316, as required.

4. Facts Bearing on the Problem.

a. The Situation in Cuba. The Government has an excellent surveil-

lance network, both internally and with respect tot he air and sea

6

---

## Page 76

13-00000

T 10430

---

## Page 77

13-00000

/:

SECRET SECIAL HANDLING MOFORN

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

...:

13 MaA ChA SI96 DEJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, CUBA PROME#S DOCUMENT

Subject: Justification for US Military Intervention

In Cuba (TS)

1. Reference is made to memorandum from Chief of Opera-

MONGOOSE",

for General Craig,

which requested brief but

Too door on or protote who ere gone chore or.

"Operation

Staff consider would provide justification for US military

intervention in Cuba.

2. The projects listed in the enclosure hereto are for.

varded as a preliminary submission suitable for plannin

It is assumed that there will be similar sub-

missions from other agencies and that these inputs will be

used as a basis for developing a time-phased plan.

individual projects can then be considered on a case-by-

case basis.

3.

This plan,

incorporating projects selected from the

attached suggestions,

or from other sources, should be

¡eveloped to focus all efforts on a specific ultimate

objective which would provide adequate justification for

US military

Intervention.

Such a plan would enable a

logical build-up

of incidents to be combined with other

seemingly unrelated events to camouflage the ultimate

objective and create the necessary impression of Cuban

rashness and irresponsibility on a large scale, directed

at other countries as well as the United States.

The plan

would also properly integrate and time phase the courses

of action to be pursued.

The desired resultant from the

execution of this plan would be to place the United States

in the apparent position of suffering defensible grievances

from a rash and irresponsible government of Cuba ana to

develop an international image of a Cuban threat to peace

in the Western Hemisphere.

4. Time is an important factor in resolution of the

Cuban problem.

the plan should be so time-

phased that projects would be operable within the next few

months.

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC

REGRADING: DOD DIR 5200.10

DOES NOT APPLY

HIP-SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORM

---

## Page 78

13-00000

P-SECRET SPECIAL • HANDLING HOFORN

5. Inasmuch as the ultimate objective is overt military

Intervention, it 1s recommeded that primary responsibility

or developing military and para-military aspects of the

plan for both overt and covert military operations be as-

signed the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Within Ahaiy

Brig General,

USA

DOD/JCS Representative

Caribbean Survey Group

Enclosure

Pretexts to Justify

Military Intervention

in Cuba

0T3

BETTE

SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORM

---

## Page 79

13-00000

JOY SECRET & SPECIAL HANDLINO

HOFORK®

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF OPPRATIONS, CUBA PROJECT

Subject:

Justilloation for us milltary interventio

cba

1. Reference 1s made to memorandum from Chief of Operations,

Cuba Project, for deneral Craig, subjeat: "Operation MONGOOSE",

dated 5 March 1962, which requested brief but preoise

desoription of pretexts which the Joint Chiefs of Staff

consider would provide justification for US milltary Inter-

vention in Cuba.

2. The projeots listed In the enolosure hereto are forwarded

as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes.

It 18 assumed that there will be similar submissions from .

other agenoles and that these inputs will be used as a basie

for developing a time-phased plan: The Individual projeots

can then be considered on a cabe-by-daße basis.

3. This plan, Inoorporating projects seleoted from the

attached suggestions, or from other souroes, should be

developed to foous all efforts on a speolfio ultimate

objective which would provide adequate justification for

US military Intervention, such a plan would enable a 10g10al

bulld-up of Inoldents to be combined with other seemingly

unrelated events to camouflage the ultimate objective and

oreate the necessary Impression of Cuban rashness and

Irresponslbillty on a large soale, directed at other

countries as well as the United States. The plan would also

properly integrate and time phase the courses of action to

be pursued. The desired resultant from the execution of

this plan would be to place the United States In the apparent

position of suffering defensible grievanoes from a rash and

Irresponsible government of Cuba and to develop an Inter-.

national Image of a Cuban threat to peace in the Western

Hemisphere.

-SECRELS SPECIAL HANDLING

NOFORM

---

## Page 80

13-00000

TOP SECRET & SPECIAL HANDLING

NUFORN

4. Time 18 an important faotor. In resolution of the cuban

problem. Therefore, the plan should be so time-phased that

projects would be operable within the next few monthe.

' 5. Inasmuch as the ultimate objective 1s overt milltary

Intervention, It 18 recomnended that primary responsibllity

for developing military and para-nilitary aspeats of the plan

for both overt and covert milltary operations be assigned the

Joint Chiefs of Staff.

EnClOsUre

Pretexts to: Justify Military Intervention

• In Cuba

FOR SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORA

---

## Page 81

13-00000

TOP SECRET & SPECIAL HANDLINO

NOFORK

ENCLOSURE

PRETEXTS TO JUSTIFY US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA

(Note: The courses of astion which follow are a preliminary.

submission suitable only for planning purposes. They are

arranged neither chronologically nor in ascending order.

Together with similar Inputs from other agenoles, they are

Intended to provide a point of departure for the development

of a single, Integrated, time-phased plan. Such a plan would

permit the evaluation of Individual projeots within the context

of oumulative, correlated aotions designed to lead Inexorably

to the objective of adequate justifloation for US ullltary

Intervention in Cuba).

1. Since it would seem desirable to use legitimate

provocation as the basis for US military Intervention in Cuba

a cover and deception plan, to Inolude requisite preliminary

aotions such as has been developed. in response to Task 33 0,

could be executed as an 1n1t1al effort to provoke Cuban

reactions. Harassment plus deceptive aotions to convinoe the

Cubans of imminent invasion would be emphasized. Our milltary

posture throughout execution of the plan will allow a rapid

change from exercise to intervention 1f Cuban response justifles.

2. A series of well coordinated incidents will be planned

to take place in and around Guantanamo to give genuine

appearance of being done by hostile Cuban forces.

a. Incidents to establish a credible attack (not in

chronological order);

(1) Start rumors (many). Use clandestine radio.

(2) Land friendly Cubans in uniform "over-the-fence"

to stage attaok on base.

(3) Capture Cuban (friendly) saboteurs Inside the

base.

(4) Start riots near the base main gate (friendly

Cubans).

3

SECRET

SPECIAL HANULING

NUFORN

---

## Page 82

13-00000

.. "

TOP SECRET S SPECIAL HANDLINO

NOFORN

(5) Blow up ammunition Inside the base; start fires.

(6) Burn airoraft on air base (sabotage).

(7) Lob mortar shells from outside of base Into base.

Some damage to installations.

(8) Capture assault teams approaching from the sea

or vioinity of Guantanamo City.

(9) Capture militia group which storms the base.

(10) Sabotage ship In harbor; large fires -- napthalene.

(11) S1nk ship near harbor entrance. Conduot funerals

for nook-vlotims (may be lleu of (10)).

b. United States would respond by executing offensive

operations to secure water and power supples, destroying

artillery and mortar emplacements which threaten the base.

o. Commence large soale United States military operations.

3. A "Remember the Maine" Incident could be arranged in

several forms:

a. We could blow up a Us ship in Guantanamo Bay and

blame Cuba.

b. We could blow up a drone (umanned) vessel anywhere

In the Cuban waters. We could arrange to cause such Incident

in the violnlty of Havana or Santiago as a spectacular result

of cuban attack from the alr or sea, or both. The presence

of cuban planes or ships merely Investigating the Intent of

the

vessel could be fairly compelling evidence that the ship

was taken under attack. The nearness. to Havana or Santiago

would add credibility especially to those people that might

have heard the blast or have seen the fire. The US could

follon up with an aix/sea resoue operation covered by Us

fighters to "evacuate" remaining members of the non-existent

orew. Casualty lists In US newspapers would cause a helpful

wave of national indignation.

4. We could develop a Communist Cuban terror campaign in

the Miami area, In other Florida oities and even in Washington.

4

SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING

NOFORN

---

## Page 83

13-00000

TOP SEGRET • SPECIAL HANDLIN® NOFORK.

The terror campaign could be pointed at Cuban refugees seeking

haven In the United States. We could sink a boatload of Cubans

enroute to Florida (real or simulated). We could foster attempte

on lives of Cuban refugees In the United States even to the

extent of mounding In Instances to be widely publiolzed.

Exploding a few plastio bombs In carefully chosen spots, the

arrest of Cuban agents and the release of prepared documents

substantiating Cuban Involvement also would be helpful in

projacting the idea of an Irresponslble goverrment.

5. A "Cuban-based, Castro-supported" f1llbuster could be

simulated against a neighboring Caribbean nation (1n the vein

of the 14th of June InVaBion of the Dominican Republic). We

know that Castro 18 backing subversive efforts clandestinely

against Halt1, Dominican Republlo, Guatemala, and Nicaragua at

present and possible others. These efforts can be magnified and

additional ones contrived for exposure. For example, advantage

oan be taken of the sensitivity of the Dominican A1r Force to

Intrus10ns within their national alr space. "Cuban" B-26 ox

0-46 type airoraft could make cane-burning raids at night.

Soviet Bloo Inoendiarles could be found. This could be coupled

with "Cuban" messages to the Communist underground in the

Dominiian Repüblio and "Cuban" shipments of arms which would

be found, or Intercepted, on the beach.

6. Use of MIG type airoralt by US pilots ovuld provido

additional provocation. Harassment of o1v1l air, attaoks on

surface shipping and destruction of US military drone aircraft

by mit type planes would be useful as complementary aotions.

An F-86 properly painted would convince alr passengers that they

saw a Cuban MIC, especially 1f the pllot of the transport were

to announce such fact. The primary drawbaok to this suggestion

appears to be the security risk inherent in obtaining or modify-

Ing an aircraft. However, reasonable coples of the MIa could

be produced from US resources In about three months.

5

---

## Page 84

13-00000

TOP SECRET I SPECIAL HANDLINE NOFARA-

T. Hijacking attempts against o1vil air and surface oraft

should appear to continue as harassing measures condoned by the

government of cuba. Concurrently, genuine defections of Cuban

o1v11 and milltary alr and surface craft should be encouraged.

8. It is possible to create an Inoident which will demonstrate

convincingly that a Cuban atroraft has attaoked and shot down

a chartered o1v1l airliner enroute from the united states to

Jamaloa, Guatemala, Panama or Venezuela. The destination would

be chosen only to cause the flight plan

route to cross Cuba.

The passengers could be a group of college students off on a

holiday or any grouping of persons with a common Interest to

support chartering a non-soheduled flight.

a. An airoraft at Eglin AFB would be painted and

numbered as an exaot duplicate for a civil registered

airoraft belonging to a CIA proprietary organization in the

Miami area. At a designated time the duploate would be

substituted for the aotual olvll airoraft and would be

loaded with the selected passengers, all boarded under

carefully prepared allases. The actual registered

alroraft would be converted to a drone.

D. Take off times of the drone alporaft and the aotual

alroraft will be scheduled to allow a rendezvous south of

Florida. From the rendezvous point the passenger-carrying

aircraft will descend to minimum altitude and go direotly

Into an auxillary fleld at Eglin AFB where arrangements w111

have been made to evacuate the passengers and return the

alroraft to 1ts original status. The drone airoraft

meanwhile will contime to fly the filed flight plan. When

over cubs the drone will being transmitting on the Inter-

national distress frequency a "MAY DAY" message stating he

is under attack by Cuban MIQ airoraft. The transmission

will be interrupted by destruction of the airoraft which will

be trisgered by radio signal.. This will allow ICAO radio

6

•:.!

HER SECRET SPECIAL HANBLING

-NOFOR#

---

## Page 85

13-00000

IOP_SFERET - SPECIAL HANDLING NOFARI-

stations in the Western Hemisphere to tell the US what

has happened to the aircraft instead of the us trying to .

"sell" the inoident.

9. It Is possible to create an Inoident which will make 1t

appear that Communist Cuban

MIGs have destroyed a USAF alroraft

over International waters in an unprovoked attaok.

a. Approximately 4 or 5 F-101 atroraft will be dispatohed

1n tra1l from Homestead AFB, Florida, to the violnity of Cuba.

Their mission,will be to reverse course and simulate fakir

alroraft for an air defense exercise in southern Florida.

These airorart would conduct varlations of these flights at

frequent intervals. Crens would be briefed to remain at

least 12 miles off the Cuban coast; however, they would be

required to oarry live ammunition in the event that hostile

actions were taken by the Cuban MiGs.

• b. On one such flight, a pre-briefed pilot would fly

tall-end Charley at considerable Interval between atroraft.

While near the Cuban Island this pilot would broadoast that

he had been jumped by MIds and was going down. No other

calls would be made. The pilot would then fly direotly

west at extremely low altitude and land at a secure base, an

Eglin auxillary. The airoraft would be met by the proper

people, quiokly stored and given a new tall number. The

pilot who had performed the mission under an allas, would

resume his proper identity and return to his normal place

of business. The pllot and airoraft would then have

disappeared.

o. At precisely the same time that the aircraft was'

presumably shot down a submarine or small surface craft

would disburse F-101 parts, parachute, eto., at approximately

15 to 20 miles off the Cuban coast and depart. The pilots

returning to Homestead would have a true story as far as

they knew, Search ships and arcraft could be dispatched

and parts of atroraft found.

.т.

P-SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING

NOFORN-

---

## Page 86

13-00000

TOP-SECRETS SPECIAL HANDLIKE

9 March 1962

NOFORK

COPY

COPIES

SOCIAL DESURTEUFTON

-

REPORT BY THE DEPARIVENT OF DEFENSE AND

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF REPRESENTATIVE ON THE

CARIBBEAN SURVEY GROUP

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

CUBA PROJECT (IS)

The Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, has requested

that he be furnished the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

on this matter by 13 March 1962.

EXCLUDED FROM GDS

TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING

NOFORN

---

## Page 87

13-00000

ESPECIAL HANDHE

NOFORN

JUSTIFICATION FOR US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA (IS)

THE PROBLEM

1. As requested* by Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, the

Jo1nt Chiefs of Staff are to Indioate brief but preoise

description of pretextawhich they consider would provide

justifloation for US milltary Intervention In Cuba.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. It is recognized that any aotion which becomes pretext

for US milItary Intervention in Cuba will lead to a polltical

decision which then would lead to military aotion.

3. Cognizande has been taken of a suggested course of

action proposed** by the US Navy relating to generated

Instanoes In the Guantanamo area.

4. For additional facts see Enolosure B.

DISCUSSION

.5. The suggested coursegof action appended to Enolosure A

are based on the premise that US military Intervention will

result from a perlod of heightened US-Cuban tensions which

place the united States in the position of suffering justif-

lable grievances. World opinion, and the United. Nations

forum should be favorably affected by developing the inter-

national image of the Cuban goverrment as rash and Irresponsible,

and as an alarming and unprediotable threat to the peace of

the western Hemisphere.

6. While the foregoing premise can be utilized at the

present time 1t will continue to hold good only as long as

there can be reasonable certainty that US milltary Intervention

In Cuba would not directly Involve the Soviet Union. There 18

* Memorandum for General Cralg from Chlef of Operations,

Cuba Project, subjeot:

"Operation MONACOSE"

dated

5 March 1962, on f1le in deneral Craig's office.

** Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, from

oner of lavas operations, subjeot:

ProVOKe Military Actions In Cuba (IS)", dated 8 March 1962,

on file in General Craig's office.

2

TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING - NOFORK

---

## Page 88

13-00000

IOP SEGRET = SPECIAL HANDLIN^ NOFORN

as yet no bilateral mutual support agreement binding the USSR

to the defense of Cuba, Cuba has not yet become a member of the

Warsaw Pact, nor have the Soviets established Soviet bases

In Cuba in the pattern of US bases in Western Europe. Therefore,

since time appears to be an important factor in resolution of

the Cuba problen, all projects are suggested within the time

frame of the next few months.

CONCLUSION

7. The suggested courses of action appended to Enclosure A

satisfactorily respond to the statement of the problem. However,

these suggestions-should be forwarded as a preliminary subnission

suitable for planning purposes, and together with sinilar inputs

from other agencles, provide a basis for development of a single,

Integrated, time-phased plan to focus all eiforts on the

objective of justification for US military Intervention in Cuba.

RECOMMENDAT IONS

8. It is recommended that:

a. Enclosure A together with its attachments should be

forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for approval and

transmittal to the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project.

b. This paper NOT be forwarded to commanders of unified

or specified commands.

c. This paper NOT be forwarded to US officers assigned

to NATO activities.

d. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US

Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee.

3

TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING

HOFORN

---

## Page 89

13-00000

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

subjeot: Justifloation for US Military Intervention

1n Cuba (IS)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the attached

Memorandum for the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, which

responde to a request* of that office for brief but precise

description of pretexts which would provide justifloation

for Us milltary Intervention in Cuba.

2. The Joint Chieft of Staff recommend that the proposed

memorandum be forkarded as a preliminary submission suitable

for planning purposes. It 1s assumed that there w1ll be

similar submissions from other agenoles and that these inputs

will be used as a basis for developing a time-phased plan.

Individual projects can then be considered on a case-by-case

basis.

D

3. Further, It 1B assumed that a single agency will be

given the primary responsibility for developing military and

para-nilitary aspects of the basio plan. It 1s reconmended

that this responsibility for both overt and covert military

operations be assigned the Joint Ohlefs of Staff.

cuba

• Projeot, subjoot,

, dated 5 Haron

1962, on 111e 1n den Craig's office

---

---

## Page 90

13-00000

JU% SECRETE SPECIAL HANDLIK: NOFORN

APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE A

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, CUBA. PROJEOT

subject: Justification for US Military Intervention

In Cuba (TS)

1. Reference 1s made to memorandun from Chief of Operations,

Cuba Projeat, for General Craig, subjeot: "OperatIon MONGOOSE",

dated 5 March 1962, which requested brief but precise

desaription of pretests which the Joint Chiefs of Staff

consider would provide justification for US milltary Inter-

vention 1n Cuba.

2. The projects listed in the enclosure hereto are forwarded

as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes.

It is assumed that there will be similar submissions from

other agenoles and that these Impute will be used as a basis

for developing à time-phased plan. The individual projeote

can then be considered on a case-by-caße basis.

XillD

3. This plan, Inoorporating projects seleoted from the

attached suggestions, or from other sources, should be

developed to foous all efforts on a spoolflo ultimate

objective which would provide adequate justification for

Us military intervention. such a plan projild enable a 10gical

bulld-up of Inoidents to be combined with other seemingly

unrelated events to camouflage the ultimate objective and

areate the necessary Impression of Cuban rashness and

Irresponsibillty on a large soale, directed at other

cuntrles as well as the united States. The plan would almo

properly Integrate and time phase the courses of action to

be pursued. The desired resultant from the exeoution.of

this plan would be to place the United States in the apparent

position of suffering defensible grievances from a rash and

Irresponsible government of luba and to develop an inter-

national Image of & Cuban threat to peace in the Western

Hemisphere.

5

Appendix to

Enclosure A

TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANBLING NAFORN

---

## Page 91

13-00000

TOP < SECRET & SPECIAL HANDLIN? NOFORN

4. Time 1s an Important faotor in resolution of the Cuban

problem. Therefore, the plan should be so time-phased that

projeots would be operable within the next few montha.

5. Inasmuch as the ultimate objective 18 overt military

Intervention, It 18 recommended that primary responsibility

for developing military and para-milltary aspects of the plan

for both overt and covert military operations be assigned the

Joint Chiefa of Staff.

6

Appendix to

Enolosure A •

TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING -NOFARN -

---

## Page 92

13-00000

TOP SECRETO SPECIAL HANDLINS NOFORN

ANNEX TO APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE A

PRETEXTS TO JUSTIFY US NILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA

(Note: The courses of action which follow are a preliminary

submission suitable only for planning purposes. They are

arranged neither chronologioally nor in ascending order.

Together with simllar inputs frow other agencies, they are

Intended to provide a point of departure for the development

of a singlo, Integrated, time-phased plan, such a plan would

permit the evaluation of Individual projects within the context

of ormulative, correlated sotions designed to lead inexorably

to the objective of adequate justifloation for US milltary

Intervention in Cuba).

I. Since 1t would seem desirable to use legitimate

provocation as the basis for US military intervention 10 Cuba

a cover and deception plan, to 1nolude requialte preliminary

aotiong such as has been developed in response to Task 33 c,

aould be executed as an Initial effort to provoke cuban

reactions. Harassment plus deceptive aotions to convince the

• Cubans of Immanent Invasion would be emphasized.. Our military

posture throughout execution of the plan will allow a rapid

change from exeroise to Intervention 11 Cuban response justifles.

2.' A series af-Well ooordinated Inoldente wlll be planned

to take place 1n and around Guantanamo tô givo semitne.

appearance of being done by hostile Cuban forces.

8. Inoldents to establish a credible attaok (not in

chronolog10el order):

(1) Start rumors (many). Use clandestine radio.

(2) Land friendly Cubans In uniform "over-the-fence"

to stage attack on base.

(3) Capture Cuban (friendly) saboteurs inside the

baBe.

(4) Start riots near the base main gate (Irlendly

Cubans).

Annex to Appendi

to Enolosure 1

-TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING

NOFORM

Mi

---

## Page 93

13-00000

IOP SECRET © SPECIAL HANDLINS NOFORN

(5) Blow up ammunition inside the base; start fires.

(6) Burn aroraft on alr base (sabotage).

(7) Lob mortar shells from outside of base into base.

Some damage to Installations.

(8) Capture assault teams approaching from the sea

or violnity of Guantanamo Clty.

(9) Capture militia group which storms the base.

(10) Sabotage ship In harbor; large fires - napthalene.

(11) 315k

ship near harbor entrance. Conduot funerale

for mook-vlotime (may be lieu of (10))..

b. United States would respond by executing offensive

operations to secure water and power supplies, destroying

artillery and mortar emplacements whish threaten the base.

o. Commence large scale United States milltary operations.

3. A "Remember the Marne" Inoident could be arranged in

several forms:

8. We could blow up a Us ship in Guantanamo Bay and

blame Cuba..

b. We could blow up a drone (unmanned) vessel anywhere

In the cuban waters. We could arrange to onuse such incident

In the vicinity of Havana or Santiago as a spectacular result

of Cuban attack frow the alt of sea, or both. The presence

of cuban planes or ships merely inveiligating the intent of

the vessel could be fairly compolling evidence that the ship

was taken under attaok. The nearness to Havana or Santlago

would add credibillty especlally to those people that might

have heard the blast of have seen the fire. The US could

follow up with an air/sea resous operation covered by Us

fighters to "evacuate" remaining members of the non-existent

orew. Casualty llets In US newspapers would cause a helpful

wave of national Indignation.

4. We could develop a Commist Cuban terror campaign 1n

the Mlant ares, in other Florlda olties and even 1n Washington.

8

Annex to Appendix

to Enclosure A

TOP SEGRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN

---

## Page 94

13-00000

:

The terror campaign could be pointed at Cuban refugees seeking

haven in the United States. We could sink a boatload of Cubans

enroute to Florida (real or simulated). We could foster attempts

on LIVes of luban refugees in the United States even to the

extent of wounding in instances to be widely publloized.

Exploding a few plastio bombs in carefully chosen spots; the

arrest of luban agents and the release of prepared documents

substantiating Cuban Involvement also would be helpful in

profeating the 1dea of an Irresponsible goverrment.

5. A "Cuban-based, Castro-supported" f111buster could be

simulated against & neighboring Caribbean nation (in the vein

of the 14th of June Invasion of the Dominican Republio). We

know that Castro 18 backing subversive efforts clandestinely

against Ea1t1, Dominioan Republio, Guatemala, and Nicaragua at

present and possible others. These efforts can be magnified and

additional onès contrived for exposure. For example, advantage

can be taken of the sensitivity of the Dominican Air Faroe to

Intrusions within their national air space. "Cuban" B-26 or

C-46 type airoraft oould make cane-burning raids at night.

Soviet Bloo Indendiarles could be found. This could be coupled

with "Cuban" messages to the Coumunist underground in the

Dominioan Republid and "Cuban" shipments of arms which would

be sound, or Intercepted, on the beaol.""

6. Use of MIG type airoralt by US pilote could provide

additional provocation. Harassment of c1v1l alI, attacks on

surface shipping and destruction of US milltary drone afroraft

by MIc type planes would be useful as complementary aotions.

An F-86 properly painted would convince aft passengers that they

saw & Cuban MIG, especially If the pilot of the transport were

to announce such faot.

The primary drawback to this suggestion

appears to be the security risk inherent in obtaining or modify-

ing an airoraft.

However, reasonable copies of the MId could

be produced from US resources in about three months.

9

nnex to Appendi

• Enclosure.

TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING HAFARN

---

## Page 95

13-00000

TOP SECRETE SPECIAL HANDLINS NOFORN

T. H1jaoking attempte against civil air and surface craft

should appear to continue as harassing measures condoned by the

goverment of Cuba. Concurrently, genuine defections of Cuban

oivil and military air and surface craft should be encouraged.

8. It Is possible to areate an Inoident which will demonstrate

convincingly that a Cuban airoraft has attaoked and shot down

& ohartered olull airliner encoute from the United States to

Janaloa, Guatemala, Panana or Venezuela. The destination would

be chosen only to cause the flight plan route to aross cuba.

The passengers could be a group of college students off on a

holiday of any grouping of persons with a common interest to

support chartering a non-scheduled flight.

8. An airoraft at Eglin AFB would be painted and

numbered as an exact duplicate for a 01vll registered

atroraft belonging to a CIA proprietary organization in the

Miami area. At a designated time the duploate would be

substituted for the aotual o1v11 airoraft and would be

loaded with the selected passengers, all boarded under

carefully prepared allases. The actual registered

alroraft would be converted to a drone.

b. Take off times of the drone airaraft and the actual

alroraft will be soheduled to allow a rendezvous south of

FlorIda. From the rendesvous point the passenger-carrying

atroraft will descend to minimum altitude and go direstly

Into an aux11lary f1eld at Eglin AFB where arrangements n111

have been made to evacuate the passengers and return the

aroraft to 1ts original status. The drone atroraft

meannhile will continue to fly the filed flight plan. When

over cuba the drone will being transmitting on the Inter-

national distress frequency & "MAY DAY" message stating he

18 under attaok by Ouban NIG alroraft. The transmission

will be Interrupted by destruotion of the atroraft which will

be triggered by radio signal. This wIll allow ICAO radio

10

Annex to Appendix

to Enölosure A

TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING HAFARN

---

## Page 96

13-00000

TOP SECRETO SPECiAL HANDLIKE NOFORN

stations in the Western Hemisphere to tell the US what

has happened to the airoraft instead of the Us trying to

"se11" the Inoident.

9. It 1s possible to create an inoident which w1ll make 1t

appear that Commnist Cuban MIGs have destroyed a USAY aroraft

over International waters in an unprovoked attaok.

8. Appraximately 4 or 5 B-101 airoraft w1ll be dispatched

1n trall fxOll Homestead AFB, Florida, to the vlolnity of Cuba.

Their mission w1ll be to reverse course and simulate faldr

alraraft for an air defense exeroise in southern Florida. "

These aircraft would conduot variations of these flights at

frequent Intervals. Crews would be briefed to remain at

least 12 miles off the cuban coast; however, they would be

required to carry llve ammunition In the event that hostile

aotions were taken by the Cuban MIGs.

D. On one such fight, a pre-briefed pilot would sly

tall-and Charley at considerable Interval between aircraft.

While near the luban Island this pilot would broadoast that

he had been jumped by MIds and was going down. No other

calls would be made. The pilot would then fly directly

west at extremely low altitude and land at a secure base, an

Eglin auxillary. The

"atroraft would be met by the proper

people, gulakely stored and given a per ta1l mmber. The

pilot wbo had performed the mission under an allas, would

resume his proper identity and return to his normal place

of business. The pilot and alroraft would then have

disappeared.

o. At precisely the same time that the airoraft was

presumably shot down a submarine or small surface craft

would disburse F-101 parts, parachute, eto., at approximately

15 to 20 miles off the cuban coast and depart. The pilots

returning to Homestead would have a true story as far as

they knew. search ships and atroraft could be dispatched

and parts of airoraft found.

11

Annex to Appendix

to Enclosure A

TOP-SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING - NAFORM

---

## Page 97

13-00000

TOP SECRETS SPECIAL HANDLIKE NOFORN

ENCLOSURE B

FACTS ERARING ON IHE PROBLEM

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have previously stated*

that US unilateral military intervention in Cuba can be

undertaken in the event that the Cuban regime commits hostile

aota against US forces or property which would serve as an

Incident upon' which to base overt intervention.

2. The need for positive astion in the event that current

covert efforts to foster an internal Cuban rebellion are

unsuccessful was indioated** by the Joint Chiefs of Staff

on 7 March 1962, as fOllOWs:

" - - - determination that a credible internal

revolt is impossible of attaiment during the next

9-10 months will require a decision by the Unted States

to develop a Cuban "provocation" as justification for

positive US military action."

3. It 1s understood that the Department of State also 1s

preparing suggested courses of action to develop justifloation

for US military intervention in Cuba.

Fire

JCS

• 1969/303

** JCS

1969/313

12

Enclosure B

TOP-SECRET SPECIAL HANDUNE -NAFADH

---

## Page 98

13-00000

;.

TOP. SECRET

JOS 1969/321

12 March 1962

Page 2165

IOr SECRET

COPY NO. _ 1

SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION

4. :

NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

to the

JOINT CHIERS OF STAFF

on

NORTHWOODS (S)

A report* on the above subject is submitted for consider-

ation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

P. J. BLOUIN

M. J. INGELIDO

Joint Secretariat

• "s

* Not reproduoed herewith; on file in Joint Secretariat

EXCLUDED FROM GDS

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC

REGRADING: DOD DIRECTIVE

5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

2165

CON SECRET

---

## Page 99

13-00000

Helen

Preded trangle

---

## Page 100

13-00000

"DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

WASHINGTON, D.C.

Helen-

Tame are

hese - Ther

are are ashut

20-25 Fil:

Please dr

the bet to then

/ 4.

---

## Page 101

13-00000

COMBATTINO COMMUNISI BUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA

1. Introchotles

Welle were le not tutel

altoirt to arport sabrerstan

marles, trans and tharugh Cabe, these

la ag500100nt as the logot, that the progtara erbodies preva potential

lineerdo for the tristallity el the Hecalephere, Beyond tale, there in also

gonoral remontedgoment that the it

rosalon pirobtava la sat a sion ons.

that that Goss

assist

and Mended Olly have bara.

DSP9500

sonIcas al infaction to uruca of lia

tin Asserica tox turo decades as 1a0te.

Finally, those le ovidease that the U. 8. approclator those reálitios, as

whibited in the dopth al astrgalag I. A, programa da all of Lulla America,

almed at blunting tho Commantes sabreratre taranto deto the continens.

• The questlas creatad by the President's underacoring al the probleza 1s

"hother or not our affarts in this aror sta adoquato . as to scopo,. as to

coordination, and an to latenaity. It le the vler of the Gorastree that they

are not, Further, Il la the vlow ol die Committee thee nteps almed solely es.

Impedlag the flon of studerts aid subversives to and tram Caba will not, of

themselves, greatly abato the problem. Thero mast do companlos efforta

designod bots to degrado tha banto expabilty for Cabatiberad sabreratos, so

tell as efforts to develop a more eftective ronlatarice capaelty among the

Latle Asaesteas stares. The soctione to fallow are doslgned with these too

sequirements la mind,:

. 48.

---

## Page 102

13-00000

FORET

Iras, with respect to proventing the export of Commendat sabresaton

by os carough Cabs, thare la a summary of what we are dotag som, and what

ma cars do ta thra futuro.

Anitad de Lato American natose to societ

tho Impact of Communalol sabrarelos, there da s suzmary ol dis cattent

praguezan and a llatlay al spoolle additional talags tbteb mei cas dos la otbar

words, a treatment ol the suvereivo question tram to polite of view ..

thorapy no regarde Cabli prophylazle au regarde Latta Aasles el large.

It AC

mint Subnacion By and Throat?

Garba

L. Programs Nor la Motos.

The fallendog exteting programs ato all having some advarao alloct.

on the beale cryabititlas of the Communeto to organiso, trala, toach, equip.

understite and export sabreralve strength lato Latis America from Cabe:

1. Rocotinatenance and Survelllanca aotivition, mhleh unite to

provide lalaszantion and to rajrosent a continalag datessat to nabrezalve

All Plebet Ahip patrol al the Windward Passage. :

Tula setlos contribatas to the sentrleton of Illlelt Gaban sea

trafile to Flattl and Dominicas Popable esca.

(2) Alreralt patral ligato out o1 Crantasarco.

Thoso Dighto, angranting surface surveillance, keep warca 10x

sall craft, Bahday and merebnn ablpping operating ia tho Carbhara drath

ol Caba; and mitors adjacent to and sorth al Jamalca.

---

## Page 103

13-00000

(3) U.S. Milltaty axecutlot of spooltle courtar

oratatue trade.

on tires to ronporado to spoiattle nondo, as

daising to 1962 attempte to

duerton so Ce

• There were countated, and probably abariad, by the presence af U.S. Navy

matroy patrolling the entital atone al Canta flitti int the raphant of the

14) anaralese

Althoad primarily dudgnod to eterne ana to do canon

changes in Cubas sallitazy crpabllitton, Phone flghle derva dn a resatador af

H. B, viglarice and datarzi

All of the above aro supported by and strea a seana of

direction from the grost volime al satatial prortand through tho facilites

of the Coxamundantion Intolityanos vyurana.

bi PropAtands « Badlo und Telerlalas.

(1 Tha Voles el Mustnton ian candezte 2-1/1 banta al abort taro

broadcasts ra. Cuba dally, Thats narra, ln nose degras, to axposs to the

Cabar people the subvereire activittan al the Castro regitio.

13) Asad Foxces tadio nad talerialos broadenato tida tao Guentanamo

Novel Bane nock dally to enratar the sproad ol Comunlon by the orlentallon

of thats prograzsa.

in "espectart":

---

## Page 104

13-00000

TOP SECRET

(1) Ill 004,, (additiona on fbls rubfore abould be provtded by tALA).

c. Intelligenes Collection.

A) Thravo la cost

one lateltiyance callostion on sabreratva

lopod, la the Casatasesso taval sero

(2) 51

# M

do The F987m 0f MariA Opiston

* of Subs frous Hen

ophero orgastrattons sohlbites

the posal!

mas pressive se

sulty to bat salgatching states.

→ du real date sents karees

proddelta la that thay contine the pressise on the lSHR, ded

Qui Cabana, dad taep tha niblues al rabrazelon belore the volita

6, Current Political Altons Almand el Impeding Travel Into and out 01

states

2. Bre

leh. Met he Undertakon.

It la clopr that hans astritter which relate to the doalal of agent

y to export moralitos from Cabe it lo soonery,

horterat. to non

splate othor notions vibica, vallo lans direatly relatad to

cabraridas, still surro so marker Caba and la Cosmantos elstaforelip,

and thas to odstazro tan probleia at 1t8 surrea, It da tox falo sasson that

shaxo la prosented hareta a spretrum al artlona seletad directly to Cita.

Wallo 14 la date his pope pontes bored may asceed the harless of.

tonnisdity, la lasma: of reppa, throx, or the roguitemente of interrational

relationa, 18 lo novarthelorn i Stake, sacensary that they bo not farta la

---

## Page 105

13-00000

inde entirety, In ardex tha

aptiaras.

A. Intend Sarvalllence of Cube and the Cutbai

) Inteselvely monitos, observe and !!

traaaportation .. both schadaled arid son-éche

Commander on la the cart

malet-antlomal polttico millary programs pron

cooperative ladri Amarican atate of enogecio,

He torettortal warass.

(2) Explott tally the intelligence

of laterrupting the oystem for security reason.

b. Intensity Paychological Ae

11). Arento problema los the Gual

programa by antitanilled paychologleal dia

and alrborne TV emphasining the hardehip.

by the Gampertaas while subrezaive trat

(8) Dablicine the contrest betr

58 maid those of the Cabas per

(3) Increare greatly do i

to Gabe, and Intonally empharle on the

In the Caban peaplo by tho Caniso dal

14) Conduot alrborao televiator

peoplo and Latta American stadento In Cu

Castro-seabrezalva allorto aro delta

Horalophero:

---

## Page 106

13-00000

c. Internhly Thyalral Intattiganne Enthusing Eltarko.

Ill fly parratattatable sants in liabans and flad conatry.

4 ta engulse mash mate hard latallterace on the natass

allanat

and sea

08 94

¡Azanti smittliarexal and bitteral polteles) arrangements with

marley natas, cist to inspede the movemens al partine tito end

• 149

anand by statato

and: Econorite Capablty al Castro Cabs

It to orderit this ready toads, in conutderable guantity, are

ragulzad to conducte dabrazalve trajalay progtant 201 to ripeas of other

contly factore → 18me, demolidone, foal, food, propazanda, ets. spectele

antons alaed as reduclag the Orberto resources will than here a etroat

ofleet upor thats ability sa pittar thelt prograse of nobverstos, mill sasse

Ahous to tara 10 1

anto onta lateral problems and unti tiro the fanatina passe

do to the eliden

puriting's program which to contly ind marglually

produntiva, Likailas, ovary solla siles contributor to tatabality, unrest.

apprahenaton und diancasion betiries Bunalas and Entas d11l soduze

correspondingly both thete ablity and thide opportuntty to ditro forward on

a progran al situatalto trining and exportation, The tollottag astions

Ter SECRET

---

## Page 107

13-00000

SECRET

в: 8890

tan as parceed, airerat

cottons should extend

(a3

of lut

lo pottons againas potzavera

deary depride. Thate

pot doptization ta sabotaso

Man ol rareless aid otosage.

so lodictions filterate digiato,

forces to atta centrinity al blet alert lovel and the to cáneo exppllea

whild coald athorilar be dediosted to mabretatra tralstag.

(8) Diatrina Sakar Haazetal resontees.

(4) Goneldes latroduction el countertolt currency les

larajo quantitles, is distant tha Cabas Arenadas pasture, and to

underto canalezco.

(a) create very

intan bettriot. Outana and

Erastans.

---

## Page 108

13-00000

....

SEORET,

de Progearan noite la badngi

Is appiralatai the prognasas waleh.

NIO RON IS PROgIONSII IN AOCBRAATY

19000×80

mury hais not yet axcelezatad po

aads tall phruent

a all tagothos, they liave certabaly nit sortttled

niar winon ts tha

alat rohaxa nutraraton dan be eaid ta ba undat fail contral.

d. D0 NNA5y filforte

Tolted BlAtan mlllasy tozcos NTe don partlelp

Hng thin brotd

Pu di

ty and e

Muạ duhu

ali ot

uátca contelbaro to atrengthentas the ablilty al the patutiles to exposo ead pit.

dora ninbrazaire artlilly. Ol thane, tha prinelpal asas

A) Coi

ntrimigeaty, antlipubvasalos dnd prychalagtcal eperaltona

ralaloig Ehrozes the suodtrn al milltary ndarlons asd scobtle tratulry teazar.

(2) Firardalos el opalpradat and sastartel on abors notice 1or uao.

Is tho lace al mubveraton os sabrezelre ibreats.

(7) This condact al omexgasty tralaluy programa ts sob and tlot

(4) Prostolon al fasmed consntertutarganty edacallon ton Luetts

Arseilças pfioare und mnllitod son ln tuiltod States Bartlas seboate and

sasceralaa.

(5) Pirovlelon of elvie detlos tralning nod castotaace.

(6) Aselllary solllzary ettorta almod as ritrongthendng the ablllty

of Latti Amerteta psastilae: sa testat vabrozaloss..

(a) Undtod ftatos pronlaton of matntonanso nopporit arid

salntance fox Latle Asericas saval sal aets undle

KoY DLeDEl

---

## Page 109

13-00000

SHOREL

(ol Officer exchange programs.

(o) Langriago tralaing los latin Amartian sallianty studento.

(d) Intortational ArzAy, Navy and AlI Forso Dalense Contoxences.

(7) Iroop Intorsantlans

Thn United Bisten sallitary lu erabestod on 1 progran diszad at sea

tho Latia Amazionn mulitary amara as the realites of tianimunaxa sod

communes retrorates, Tada trotsalons

(e) Travalation into Be

lah Had printlag al 50. 000 vote os the

sorlos oí ten pampilate entitlod, "Disnacey varous Commun, on. "

10) Development of an andlo/roun Am atrip basad an she

"Demonsacy verous Communir pamphisto for the illiterate Latin Asnerican

onlinted rack. Gne Hundred and righty of theso filras and recordo hava boas

BOn! tO CINCARIA lO% fartha distribution to the Latta ArresteRn servicos.

18) Thirteen hundrad coplan al the USLA pamphlet "Tactioes y

DAToalURs Contra lA FATta COmmAnovAl ate bilag procured tor distilbation

among the sats dimentcan nailitary.

D. Ta Polittco Economle Ellart (to da supplied by Stato).

c. The Propaganda Effoxt (to ba suppilod by VELA).

d. Tho latalllgonor and Nos-ath ilbatable Elfortolto be supplied by (A).

2. Programas Whlch Mey Be laltlared!

An la the cano of Seetlon Il, the programs outlined balow are within

tansonable techiloal and prasticl

depen: However, do they cross the

---

## Page 110

13-00000

IN C

BRET

angleto sportsun of setions, Il la realtuad thas bozza may to fossad

manuttable, on palítical as ottos grossados

a surestin

Al Establlah & Carbhain ses and casatal nurvelliance program

ubles prontdas los saltlateral orchlago al intananton nnd malilataras

partietpation la an alastlag ayeroza, rach constay to be seaponalblo tox

patratling 11h.0479 o090t,

ayater and peronide reluctive exchange al intelligence botrans rabeeribar

sattoras

1s) Condian ta droponocatas or 88 commissa da Lalla

Amarlos, at blah perlartty, to contributo is the eltectivenese of the alerting.

вукоатя.

Balpado los dittopratti trinebert latta Annica to combat the elteria al

sabrenatos: sunt a piraposal, mado at tbla liras, would arbibit the eclara

dotarsalaation al the lA. tà support rigoronely ns doll sabacoloss program.

c. Tratulas and Ostentation.

Provide ton a grastly expanded outral duustry training and

intation prograna for tory ogmenta al each Lallo Assarloss constery'o

---

## Page 111

13-00000

"4.32a6 d

Malus u

() Enliated and otteer military perroniel to bo achoaled in

Passina and/ax the tadteid states.

(7) Palts personnet to ba

todds Pisses as the thiend states.

(3) Nonapaper parsonaal so be nobsclad utthin tha talted states.

14) Narrao fubto and tensele) to bo fredrad la tha Maltad Stator.

(8) Cartilia cochololena to be traliad da tuttiso alaros triatatoes

заbоaіы.:

The thirst of tres an espreded tralalar prothere, tatter placeta.

the talkad Stator, Is not just to onhancs thie ablil and urducatton level at the

propio toyalved best, evas mara, to exporto the Latter to tS tinenio, to slow

them our conntry, to parorado thom by close adcactaitin that out vier la

corront, and thus to stiflen thais rosalve to combar mubraratos in any faxs

d. Txoop Informattos Profiam

Expend greatly the durrent Latla Amarlenn troup tatarzatlas

program la oreles to adverte tha Latin Anarican dervicement land thais

drillar content

a. Nors and Propaganda

All Undorantte, ss Besessary, and produit as tatarsation

peroztem solübln exch cottiry ta hatha Amarhes authy there thereris

la) As expanition al lucto on mattreetro stadilige movement os

rebrexalves and senoral sabrasairo progresas.

16). Opacitras al the Commentate Me ra centry.

---

## Page 112

13-00000

GRET

(d) Jacto on luo deeroeno da lubs atandardo withta Caba stace

the stoo of Castra.

(a) Fasts on tarror and *

10tora 12 Cabin

(2): Develops Pea

anne Prans

try batter sarat

тыках рараха.

aron the natl-communlar 0100.

sanders nud dinaty

alat racing, Elseklation

tainlally tatarad by low pilaas and madareditan by

ds some cantrol la druns to sonray tha truta to the batta uno, Ike tha Amasicas

ballotes what he rasad.

Boota and pumplitato, la large tnabara, exposing phe xeesary.

ol communlon shoutd be priated la spartal and Portuguero and distributed

1, Travel Dontrala (ta bai faceleted by Stasa).

8. Joprove Die Cont

ungoney fragrinio

No ahould acroterito and broades sonatarinturgency programo la

each country al luntis Arettes, detring tos a tonitatte Interaal Delores Plan"

los onary conntry and ungtas batta Amationa contitrtos to ank los US conater-

tourgency tralidng andatiacs; for milltary, paxamilitary and paldea forces.

Beyond ible ve shorld placo apacitle anaphialo upon developlug erdo action

programon in the irons of susatest rend,

---

## Page 113

13-00000

1. Nonnattributable sottons

Al Instigato and stage solootad tarrartor inatdents in liatia

Amarters countatos, denignad to impliesto Enstra.

"(7) Aritango fos raches al davier Grech are to be "ducerared"

1n nelorted Late American contries, astonalbly arugsted la froza Caba.

TV. Consteles

It lo the balled of the Commaltico thas the actors outlined la the

procoding paottono compitas a vertes al stepa uhica te roma arado vill stema

and de othars attret the propram ol Caba-bered Caniminint aptestatin in Jatta

Americe, Each individor! sotion embodies sosto element of usabaladas la.

Itoell, and any comblmattor as antloan may gerati carrarpenglandy favorable

ropelto. There lo so protound relationahlo viatel demanda the semblatas. of

any upectic sot of actions.

It do jacaramandod, therefore, that as assly delectles be mado of thoro

antons listed above bose exocution lo compatibia with sational obligators

dad dodleations in other areas and hich are mithl, U1-D, capabilitles, and

that they bo put qutelly tito ellect atare the longer the inbrarette buttrences

l din Hematophere ass peranited to matare, the saese deliult will be that,

ultitante elination.

And finally, recogalring the direros asters il the Gold War sottultar

involved, it la strongiy resommended that a alaglo palal la the Govaramait

be despanted and dasigned resposalbilty for isperiaing exacution of the

catal piration.

---

## Page 114

13-00000

SECRET

While we generally concur with the paper prepared by the

Department of State, we do not belleve that the proposals contained

therein present a sufficiently wide spectrum of options of activities

to Impede and stop Castro/Communist subversion in Latin America.

Specifically, we recommend the following additional actions:

(1)

Measures to attrit Cuban resOurces:

(a) Purchase the defection of personnel,

aircraft, ships, boats and other valuable items.

(b) Conduct non-attributable actiong against

petroleum resources, upon which much of Cuba's economy depends.

These actions should extend all the way from direct destruction to

sabotage through chemical and bacterial contamination of carriers

and storage.

(c) By means of intelligence indications (aircraft

flights, agents, clear radio transmission, beach jumpers) cause Cuban

military forces to stand continually at high alert level and thus: to

consume supplies which could otherwise be dedicated to subversive

training.

(d) Consider introduction of counterfelt currency

in large quantities, to distort the Cuban financial posture, ánd to

undermine confidence.

---

## Page 115

13-00000

SO SECRET

(2)

The designation of a single point in the Govern-

ment to be held responsible for supervising the execution of the total

program.

(3)

program, including the following:

An intensified and broadened news and propaganda

(a) Underwrite, as necessary, and conduct

an information program within each country in Latin America using

those themes:

"is'

1. An exposition of acts on subversive

training, movement of subversives and general subversive programs.

2. Objectives of the Communists within

each country.

massicica

3. Communist methods of operation.

1. Facts on the decrease in living standards

within Cuba since the rise of Castro.

5. Facts on terror and repression in Cuba.

(b) Develop a Pro-American Anti-Communist Press

Many Latin American papers, even the anti-

communist ones, are infiltrated by communist agents and many of their

columnists, proof-readers and linotypers are bought with communist

money. Circulation of these papers is artificially inflated by low prices

and underwritten by communist funds. The United States must match

tale Enaclal lavestment la, a Coltrol la ordor to coavey the truta

i":"

---

## Page 116

13-00000

270P

to the Latin who, like the American, believes what he reade:

(c) Distribute Anti-Communist Literature

Booke and pamphlete, in large numbers,

exposing the reality of communiem should be printed in Spanish and

Portugnose and distributed through inexpensive commercial sale.

(1)

Greatly expanded trajing and orientation in the

Undted States for key segments of each Latin American country's

population, such as:

(a) Enlisted as well as officer military personnel

to be schoaled in Panama and/or the United States.

(b) Police personnel to be schooled in Panama

or in the United States.

(c) Newspaper personnel to be schooled within

the United States.

(d) Nurses (male and female) to be trained in the

United States.

(e) Civillan technicians to be trained in United

Stater training schools.

The thrust of such an expanded training program,

taking place in the United States, is not just to enhance the slall and

education level of the people invalved but, even more, to expose the

Latins to US induence, to show them our country, to persuade them by

NOT SENT

'''"'

---

## Page 117

13-00000

TOp

SECDET

1.

close association that our view is correct, and thus to stiffen their

resolve to combat subversion in any form.

SEORFT,

---

## Page 118

13-00000

COMB

AN ACHETEN PROGRAM

& COMMUNISE SUEVERBION IN LALIN AMERIDA

1.

se Is not total ferorment on tbe magristude

О БВ

# effort to expert subversion to Iatta

and thorouga Onia, there ds agreemens, at the

least,

m embottes srave potential tazards for

the 378

a Hendophers, Beyond this, there 10

8130. 8en8

askoenitodgemiat that the sabversian problem

is sot a ñan one, that the a

manitat belugenesds la

Montersdeo and lordoo olty laye been sources of safection

to won at tatin Anerlad fos

HO docades of moxe. Finally,

there 1s: 4t

sense thet the U,S, AppragLEtes these realltles,

as exhibltes in the depth of do-going V.8, prograns in all

of LatIn Amörios, atmed at blunting the Communiat subvereive

•thrusts into the continent.

The jupition areated by the President's undessoosing

of the probles lo wether os not our efforte in this area

are adequate - as to Boops, as to soordination, and as to

Intensity. It Is the vien ofithis domlitre that they are

not. Further, it do the wlew of the remittee thas steps

aimed solar at impeding the their es students ard inbyersiped

to and iraida vill not, of themselves; ereatly abste the

Siere must be compenter efforts dentened both to

degrade the

asto sagebtitty ser Cuben-besed subversion, an

well as et

ter to develop a more estestive seslatense

caproity amdng the latin Amertaan states. The sections to

follon are designed with these tho requirements in ulnd.

F1sat, with respect to preyenting the export of commu-

slat subteraton by or through daba, there 1e a suimary of

What Me are doing no, and what ne can do 1r the future.

8E0R

---

## Page 119

13-00000

seerid, With respect to assisting the latin Amerdoen

nations to sentat the impass of cosmintst subversion,. thare

Is a sumäsy. or our ourrent programs and a listing of

spootsse saditionel things ublah se aun da, in other monds,

a treatueat os the subtezairo question srom the poless of

Tien - therapy as regards Oubls prophylarts as regards Iatin

Amorson at Large.

I7. Measures to Impede th

simmatet Subtersion

Ez end Montait C30s

1. Programa lois in sotton.

The following extating programs ars all having some

sevesse offiat on the basse depabiltties os the Cominists

to arganties trats, beach, equip, undesterite and expert

BUbYeTaSTe strength Into IntlA Anestes Shem Cubal

sonatepanoe and bevelliardo 20t1v1t108, mblos

waste to provido inforsattien and to represent a contimilne

(2) Fiabit ship patral of the Mindrase Passage.

shis dstina contributes to the restrlotion

as 1a1a1t duben sea traffto to Halied and Dentitcan

Repuallo ares.

(8) Afronett patrol silents out of duentinino.

thess flights, hugmenting surface suryelllanet

lony mitch for tall arift, slahing and merchant

shippdog aparating in the Carthbean south of Ouba,

and Waters dajacent to and north of Jamaloa.

(v.s. Mitesy croution os speoleso countere

subversive tarlos.

---

## Page 120

13-00000

Ints InVOITER Betton takEn In JESDONSe tO

speelflo needs, as diring the 1958 attenata to e3500t

Caban revolutions as to cential suerior, Tarse

Mere opuitored, and probably aberted, boy tise presence

et costa iton et the sequet of the sovertment of

that anuates.

Although starthy dondened to dinerve and

these flishta derre is a tendides al 8.8. Tielle08

and determit

(5) 00000

as Intelligenae.

AII et the suore are supported by nod given

A sease of direction fron the great volume of

naterial provided tar

cough the faollstles of the

ammmlenttons Intolligense systen.

Di Propaganda - riddo and Telertaion.

(1) The Vodse of Anarion not contents 2-3/4 hours

el shortuare brandasts to Cuba delty, These seave,

In seme degree, to expose to the tuben people the

sabratitre activlites os the castro segine.

(1) 15ned Faroés sadlo nal televisten tiresdaants

teen the disat

Haval DuBt sook sadiy to oombat

the spread be to

mustem by the ortantation es these

13). Et sier.y

lodedtions on this subjest sporta

intel

gensio

(1) ThErs to

Inteliteme collectien

(2) Et sed.

sole

hetuld de sappsted by (IA. )

3

---

## Page 121

13-00000

a. The soren of Morta Opdrdon.

(1), 179idnation 05 dube Son Henlapheza arzund-

Entions exhibits the penalty for conductive subveratvo

satiritty in ber salekboring states.

(2) 0.3, -80v5et tatias regarding remoral of soviet

anbut faroes from tibe are radiotive in that thes

contine the pressure on the ISSE end the Cubans,

and knep the subfect of sabrerston before the wortal.

do Gurrent Political Aotions Almud it Impeding Trevel

(This to be prattled by State)

ann Hitch Hey

t Io clear that thot

so sottrities unsch relato to

the dental of agent momentat and the suppereassion of peopa

and save atreatly to dina

nish the commist espabllit

to export rubverasion trem Cube, It 1a DoGGERNEy, boneves,

to conterplate other aotlone ihlob, while lets direatly

related to cobresalon, still iserve to menien Cuba and its

commented ilotatoraida, end thas to alimate the perablen

at ito sette. It 1 for this sentes that there to

presented hereta & ill erotinm at dottions selled atreatly

to Cuba,. Idle 11 10 elear that sone satsons Isted mary .....

exseed the horizons of fensititIlty, la texts of boope, visas.

so the repitrementi of Intonational relatlous, 1t la novies

theless onsidered neceansay that they be set forth in thett

attroty, in arter that the Pressi

dent may contemplate the un

Or any of options.

ALianes of cuba and the caribbeRn

s tramportatton - doth sabotaled und ni

th Foso Horld And 0

animtet - Is the disea

es odottgada

an suspected o

Kee Iatin Amer

a sts territory os

---

## Page 122

13-00000

:(2) Cox

Uts, at & time phan the eritlesllty

As or acantia and maternato es subverson

о РНУ.

(1) Greate pare

Sta sebreraive yo

load effort empti

tito tastro regima and.

te the bartendps and

viciniva salades ure riven levered treatient.

(2) Fublsatan the distrast betaser Ilving son

Atlous of IsSill Instinutors and thate of the Euball

stas

(3) Interim dotty the emmant or Vol broad-

do the decredetitos end suiterbis treeht on the

Caban people ly the Carto intressite essert.

(4) centrat sorborne telendatons broadcusts anda

the Caban people and latin Muriosa utadenta 101

mething on the theme that fasters subversive

a contend to destroy the tranpatlity es

3aal IntellIgene bathering Efforts.

(1) 8y 100-2

intebte seans - Cabana and third

Pause

Wif Tach wore hard interts

penne on the nature and seose of sabrezalve trelplie

dnduieted in Cuba and unthods of exportation.

do Movement al Festoriel.

Thungh mittlettal and bilateral political

agements tith tatia American states, deat to

lupeda the uprimit el persons into and out of Guba.

(Jaso to bo expedied by State.)

•M N7797:77

179:1

---

## Page 123

13-00000

or Castle a to la eni so to sode cage 4t

It 1s evident that sendy sands, su consoereble

quantity; are regained to sonduet a subveralta tralaing

Dropsi, not to spunk or otter castly fastera - draso

demotions, fuel, toot, pestpagenda, ete, spoolsto

uns hervis a dinest effent upos taedo sallity to perrace

those poogsas as antiveratos, 1311 denna then to toura

to sheto ora taternal philtens and 1111 Eive. the tetens

atetbatto so tetabizity, anest, epper

inton botareen Monasan 2ud Guben W111

hoth thads ability ant their

d os a bragtan as subvezedira

The 20110N2A5 nOtiONs will

119 Expe

site to this end

(1)

* itiese

to seme at sinspioles in the duste

(a) sate

our niny all inexpensito sabote

Atta listo the

they moard wante waite

tention of the restse

soon it strai

(1) Interiori

any 200ge

pansive find

B and B

mambers of sua11

nion Inta tha

190227

Etie and anting the

nevitably, in coatty s

961805. B4d

---

## Page 124

13-00000

(2) Atitorit tittta resouppeR.

(2) Peratise the dalestion of personal, ste

arafts ships, boats and other valuable items.

enoriony dependa, Those sottons shoulel extend all

the way then dIfest dentrustion to sabotagi

throngh element and basterdel contaminstion or

(o) 10 menin of Intelligense Intsentsona

at a high alert lovel me thus to contine eupplten

ported be dedtented to subversite.

tressing:

(3) bind stah Cubin Finasalal rescurces.

(al and i cores cursi is las

ratities, to duitart the taben Fininetal presaro,

and to radi

mutua confidence.

+7876551

uers-+1-599k-501208

(7) Create ausplaton and Blanenston betseein Gubens

and sanstant.

since the turntans are doubtlone a riefer tiati

a trides

17

mịện đi

with thats taster

the sabras

Te tradedsis cape

(a) Ind

some as madlende

the Estatans to

10, and then

enrage program bennet

* Button Isaberta

111ahad, undertake to caus

ta passpose of, velodo

mplat by thess presen

---

## Page 125

13-00000

•"*:

at the presence of the fed Art to

Grates by

wins a wedge butseen the sovlet soldler

Instatiotons

and the cabea population,. Beforts to

attate this obtantive neuba pholude the use of

Live sortite agenta, planed sumors, inoldents

aseated to 8004-117a

sargents, and sropagands

dentgand to Identlly the hasdahly or the peasant

with the sorter sabranton.:

(a) Derreas ation sees Son Claus Do Wedney,

bent, through élndertiro souroes, tor distraation

Eatin personnel.

aristo tasettle en

adiet by other agenates, In their

Eried to Enhay

308. 129 0873

stes 5011

mizant Subrerater

i appradatas the yrogram midas are son Ill pirostess

It is nocentary to reflect thist, extenuine though they 8xe,

many have not get accelerated to their full thrust and, taken

a1l tosather, they have vestataly not fertified der allies to

the poses uhere mutuaton onn be pata to be under fall derbrol.

B' US MITitaTy StIONts.

Undted States silltary forces are son partlo1-

Lins in a broad apatrun ol military and extra- 111taz)

¡sors 1a Jatin Anestos, all al ubtea contributo to

misthendug the abilaty of the edintrdes to expose

and put down subure

ve sotivity. 'pe there, the

spal ates

---

## Page 126

13-00000

Jesty, anti-subversion and pay-

abblossors opezatt

some trustns through the medtem

as nattery witnestons and mobile training teams.

(2) Provisten ot egutment and entertal on short.

mottoe sor kus ta ton tooe of subversion on subvereite

threate.

(S) The cendent at energeney training prosten 1a

sob and shot portral

(4) Brontadon of tinhl countertasurgeny eduel

tton tos Isttn inestora bitteens and enlisted sen in

Untted Staten Sextice Echoeis and sendenter.

(5) providon of cluto potson trutrings and

assistance.

sag the abillty of latin Amorican countrtes to restst

(5) Jolted Stated snovistas de maintesense

suppert and asslitance 80T INtIn AnorIOAn NATel

and ate waits.

(6) Jonguage tradates fos tatia suertoi

Itary starents.

(d) Internat

tesse Confe

ces.

(e) Coperative mapping operations.

(7) Trodp taformababa:

The salted States nilitary In enbribed on a

migrain aimed at making the IstIn American nIlItary

mare of the realitter of coman and commudet

beratos. Thie Instaless

---

## Page 127

13-00000

(a) 370818495n Into spentst and printing of

50, 000 Bets of this serles of tes pamphlete

entitled, "Demoniay versus Commien".

(D) Develoymeit of sn autto/1130a1 fIlm strID

baned on the "Dendency versus Chamundn" pamphlets

Ior the tiliterate latta Ancodora entiated met.

Dae-hundred and elshity el thare r17sus ind recorde

have been sent bo t

to the Jatin decedenis pestices.

(o) Tasters

undred coples of the ISA pasphiet

is contra la Jesse Coumndati"

ed for atstributten muns the

Latti Anerdoen. Id

Do The collAtoo toonato Errort lta be supplled by

stato).

i the Propaganda Sent, (to be supplied by tSA).

1. The Intolligence and Hen-attalbatable Reforti

(to be supplied by ozA).

2. Papere inch lity se battlated.

An is the ouse of Soothen It, the DrugTs outitned

bedon are Mithto ressinable teshntell snd practiont competence.

towever, let they arous the

implete spectarm al satiess, 19.

1o restlied that expe me

mustitable, on politiaal

os othes Excuadas

harrelliances

755 Batebaten a cla

bbean see send ootatal survell.

g505r9n stdoh prorides for mittiateral exchens

armatter and mitillateral pertlaspation in ea

as systems each bountey to bo semporatble 809

Ito dia ocent.

padre a Us sitilisgene imput into the

*tentias eaves and pertubde fos esshanetag

s betteen

sister ratibanas.

€ 1.

---

## Page 128

13-00000

'(3) Containe the Laprey

it of US comestaations

In Intta AnaxIon, ot bigh pr

ety, to contribute

to the effectiveness of the

alerting system.

b. Hnlt129t10n81 Count

it or opening as 098

Countertarus

assey Intende tos emplement throughout

Intin duester to combat the etfects ol sabveratoss.

Such a psep00a), mide at this the, toild exhiblt the

sestoni determiation ol the les, to support visorousty

o. Tretring and Orderitatten.

Irousdo for a EreBtly expended out-of-derantry

mating and artentar

in bodes tos lay segments of

each Jatin Anerton conitayta popalation such ass

(1) Baltated and drsl0e7 stiltary personnel to be

rebeared 1a Pastmis and/er the Indted States.

(2) Holide persentli to be schooled lia Feist e

the Chatted Btases.

(3) Benpopes perspired to he sobsoled vathta the

Witted states.

1(4) Motos (solo and female) to so toretaed ta

te Undted Stated.

15) cavitan tectatedan to be tralned tai Valtod

states trending schadio.

+ at sat an expended trainias prograts.

the

.... •

ted stetes, 1s not just to era.

bon lored of the people Impersied

the lathas to IS influence,

rusods them by alone

THEN 18

root, and thup to stitten

to contr

---

## Page 129

13-00000

d. 1700p Infortution Brogri.

Expend greatly the darrent latta Anertoes troop

intoration progren ta order to educate the lette:!!

to the strentre desper they faces,

(1) Dadersatto, un neverty, and decadet a

Infosmatiora pree

mutats ench country in Itta

Aiterses notze these tiesess

3.

(8) An expositien of seoto on nutresstro tota

1ng, moremant an AnDversITes, and general sat.

verature purograms.

(D) Boseottried of the Commundsts ulthin encha

022373

(o) commintat tothods of operatsog,

(d) Jeets on the decrease in 11ving standards

a1thtn Gaba dince the stae of caatro.

(0) Jeots on t6570r dad reprenadon ta caba.

(2) Derelep a Pro-knerdern Antl-Crudat PresE

Here Intin haadona papert, oners the anti-

cindet ones, are inflitrated by commist agente

and many of thets colmists, proat-renders and

Itnotypes are bought with commidat money. Gircu

lation os there pegi

Undted States mat inton this Financial Investment 1e

sems contral in order to couriery the tinto to the

satis no, Itti the huerica, belleres vast he reade.

tobits mid priphtets, In large sunbers. expostu

asso at con its abrida be printial i spainti

brenna ana

trioutad through trespenalte

1₴

---

## Page 130

13-00000

I. Trevel centreate

To he fame patte

to and frau Call. Il imable to seidore a majorsto

decluton Is the l1S li should purero the matter on a

allateral baits, dutiate es the tremenork of the 06s,

and inject these baonn toola

streat asteran into

acceptange requirements os

(2) He should tottle

te measures agatest Cuba

apronted at prevenths latin Americass Fren entertag

uhs or returatry to thieds em countolen and prevent

he travel of Cabla pissinal and goods to other

att

¡ De rised us a terer, adding these routineate.

the acceptabditty arttesta.

(3) No should poente arrangements which perit

sadition at tadiy

dunks who are obergod with sub

ätre sottrhtti

Se tipprove dir Counterthungendy Bragm

He should nocelerate and broaden countertaraigenty

and wing Intta lardon comtutes to ast for US counter

trathtas analstanca, for 1121t077, Deiramllstony

2net

rosses.

I. Lund and Ratitloal Refari

Entatin Aberdos 1n order

to sadise the sunceptibititles as the "have rots" to

met subversion.

typest Labor Bad Youth Refere

and grouti

jitabes, a to a matter et-

I so tos a pattor as astontat

---

## Page 131

13-00000

SPERSE

Unless suffIcient refoia 13 made to BatiaSy the aspir-

ations as the Laborers and unless suittalent erscenoo

them, Centre val sentime to siral a fertilla dod fore

kito seeds.

) Enough thitre parties, soak and destres

seats, rest senores, and subvers

tho

+ LAbor sad youth.

ages countates.

st the appAzatis.

ISIVe DiARs and 27

ment antiprity.

tast

oted terrarist

interdos, destessed 80

for.

tod sotte tentess countriess,

magled in froa tabe.

---

## Page 132

13-00000

in tune cilar ind atem

what t and in ther

attach ra program

It 15 do Cello es the comestice that the ations

outhiand in the procoding sun

some songrase a ente

offere prunite of mueting

est of tube tered Communist at

invarsian in latin Anestea.

Each Indtriduel aotten embodles some element of uneralness

Masty retarablo senalto. Tuese lo no profound se

Intlonship hten demands the sombining os any speolite sot

of sottonsi

It to gooded, therefore, that as early selection

be made of thess nations Ileted above those execation. is

ocupatible nith nestonel obitiation and dedlestions in .

perndtted pa mature, the more Elestealt alll be their altie

nato estates

And:

Spelty, recogaitine the diverse nature of the

Gold Nex

ITstles Involvedi

18 8

acmanded that a

single

In the Gayer

designated and assigued

88886051

Jen as the total pro-

matingutt

---

## Page 133

13-00000

Originating Agency:

Subject:

Date:

Cub/ atonger Penis

7/1/63

Other Agency Equities (Check those that apply;)

DIA

Navy

ONI

OSD

Joint Staff

USAF

NSC

CIA

Other

(Please specify beloro)

CLA

The Department of State has no abjection to the

release or declassilication of this document in full

under the provisions ol the JFK Assassination Frecorda

Collection Actol 1988 (PL102-525)

---

## Page 134

13-00000

I SE

Far:

siir!

OsDI

Captain Zumwalt/DRAFT # 2

March 11, 1963

IX.A.3.d.: Ceneral Pressures to Create a Contingency

In order to accomplish the overthrow or reorientation of the Cuban

regime without harming the United States Image and with minimm distortion

of bilaterel US-USSR relationships, there must be careful coordination and

phasing of our future actions and demeanor. There must be a plan capable

Of getting us from where we are now to where we want to go, by gradually

Increasing pressures until the objective 1s achieved. These pressures

should be desigoed to create opportunities and contingency situations

for further exploitation, along the way.

The optimm orchestration of such e Cuban program mist obviously be

developed as the future unfolde. But in order to provide overall guidance

within this Government, a plan tracing the mainstreams of effort 1s required.

This plan Is divided Into eight headings with a gradually increasing level

of effort described under each of these headings. The progress through

the various phases 1s visualized as taking place in a coordinated but not

necessarily symmetrical manner. In other words, we may be in the most

vigorous phase of propagands while not yet baving reached the final phase

with regard to subversion but nonetheless the decision to proceed to the

respective phase in either category would be coordinated as ipart of an

overall govermental orchestration.

A program scenario capable of producing a decisive change or

exploitable contingency over an 18-month period follows.

Us Posture - - Initlally the US image should be that of willingness

to do all that is necessary to keep Castro's military threat nil end his

subversive threat to the lestern Hemisphere at an acceptably low level.

It should be characterized as one during which the USG, baving beez.

19909

---

## Page 135

13-00000

extrenely reasonable despite Castro's Intransigence, 1s walting for signs

of more favorable change In Cuba.

• Inter the US Image should change to one in which the US 1s being .

"Zed" by the majority of the DAS Into OAS Initiated and sponsored

pressures against Cuba. These would consist of meisures less than those

certain to overthrow Castro but going beyond the earlier measures, 1n

the expectation that resulting internal pressures might eliminate Castro

or provide an occasion for decisive ection. Pressures would be applied

In such fashion as to represent both a carrot to the Cuban people to get

rid of Castro regime and a stick toward the present regime. Still later

the US stance should become publicly, "at last" to join the OAS majority

In seeking vigorous pressures on the Castro regime without yet Irrevocably

committing US prestige to decisive action.

FInally, If and when the orchestration and circumstances have

brought the US position to such a point that decisive action 1s possible,

be an Invasion by US forces and could be re-imposition of total blockade

or & disarming airstrike, dependent on the circumstances.

OAS Action - - The UBG will need to devote major attention to the

strengthening of the solidarity of the OAS as a source of regional

opposition to the Castro regime. These efforts should go forward openly

along several lines, quite apert from the covert effort to organize the

majority on specifle Issues. This effori to achieve solidarity should

consist of frequent brieflngs of the OAS nations through all appropriate

channels, Consultative Meetings of Foreign Ministers of the CAS, efforts

to set up an OAS milltary organization with occasional commitment of troops

- 2 -

---

## Page 136

13-00000

ille

usi

for training, and all other feasible developments of regional themes, such

as Intensive efforts to build up the counterinsurgency capabilities of the

regdon.. It 1s very necessary, in view of the general LA situation to

continue all measures necessary to isolate Castro.

Initial DAS action should be the enlargement of the bases for the

Invocation of the ido Ireaty, This broadening should be against the con-

timed presence of Soviet troops (unless negotiations with the USSR indicete

that this aspect should be deferred) and/or against Castro's continued

subversive activity. Concondtantly, the recent study of the Special

Consultative Committee on Security should be given uide publicity and

the US should press for Implementation of its recommendations,

The OAS, In the near future, probably after publication of the results

of the foregoing study and energement of the basis for Involong the Rio

Treaty to include subversion, should again formally vara Gube against

promotion of any more subversive activities. The OAS should formally

..state that should Cuben subversive activities rise above some (unspecified)

level, & "new condition" would exist which voild justify decisive action

agatnet Cuba. All episodes of subversion or sabotage which could be

attributed to Castro should be highly publicized. The majority DAS support

should be organized to neutralize the Brazilian co-existence theme.

Bilateral approaches and econome quid pro quos should be used to win

Brazil to the U.S. view within nas.

St1ll later, at an appropriate time, the DAS should make an official

finding, from Its studies Initiated earller, that the Castro regime has

continued, despite warnings, to conduct aggressive and subversive ections

1n Latin America. A summary publication of subversive activities or

---

## Page 137

13-00000

Wiste Paper should be promulgated througa the DAS. Later a "new condition"

should be found fornally to exist, following which the US would state

that the earlier US-USSR modus vivendi regarding Cuba has come to an end.

Following the above, an OAS vote should call for the remaining. LA natiöns

to sever diplomatic relations with Cuba and for all members to restrict

their nationals from travel to Cuba. Castro should be officially labeled

as a major threat to the hendsphere and to the objective of the Alliance

for Progress.

The QAS might then declare that Castro's subversive activity constitutes

warlike activity and proclaim a prohibition against any varlike activity

being conducted by Cuba within an ocean and lend area around the entire IA

continental and Caribbean area. Intervention of aircraft and ships

carrying arus, subversive egents, propaganda materials, eto, could be

uthorized.

Is World Actinte

St111 later at an appropriate time the OAS should vote, under the

Rio Pact, to punish Castro's aggression. This action could take the

forn of a resolution for all members to take such action Including the

use of force as individually considered appropriate or to endorse any

specific decisive action to which the members had agreed.

The USG should brief its Allies on the views of the lAS and warn that

the sitiation may get worse, Inter, as & result of "OAS Insistence" the

Free Horla should be urged to extend or re-affira trade embargos to all

Items except food stuffs, medicines, and medical supplies; to apply shipping

restrictions; NATO should be persuaded to Include Cuba on the l1st of

countries to which shipment of COCOM List (strategde) items 18 prohibited;

free vorld industrial nations should be dissuaded from shipping to Cuba

- 4 -

---

## Page 138

13-00000

crucial spare parts and equiyment which are not on the cocal list.

St1ll later the US should Increase the vigor with which she seeks,

through briefings, pressures, etc., to increase the effectiveness of all

economie measures and should seek to persuade all non-bloc nations to

Limit their airline services to Cuba and to withhold transit rights to

Soviet aircraft serving Cuba.

At an approprlate point in the orchestration,

food stuffs should be added to the prohibited trade list, with US using.

Its Influence to estend this embargo throughout the Free World. .

The ultimate extension of economic actions, would be the application

of a blockade to Cuba.. This could be a phased weapon consisting or a:

blockade on POL, with the prospect of total blockade to follow.

Survelllence over Cube -- Unt11 It becomes apparent that the Soviet

Union has no intention of removing any additional militery personnel,

Beral survelllance should be limited to appropolate biga altitude

coverage with low level survelllance avoided except for thoroughly

suspicious Indications.

Later, at a suiteble point 1n the orchestration, occasional low

altitude surveillance of "suspicious" areas should be undertaken in such

fashion as to be clearly visible to the Cuben people; while avolding

AA defenses:

$t11] later, sultably timed, the Unlted States/DAS should initiate

very frequent low altitude surveillance. This should be Increased in

Intenelty to the point at which our aircraft would literally seek out

AA defense sites In search of provocative nots or, in the absence of

Cuban reaction, to deflate Castro's image.

In any decisive action at the end of the road, surveillance should

be at saturation levels.

- 5

---

## Page 139

13-00000

Regional Surveillance - The DAS or the Caribbean nations should take

the Initlative in organizing, as a part of a Carlbbean security arrange-

rent, a-surface ship and aeriel surveillance of the coastal and offshore

waters of the Caribbean nations. These patrols should be progressively

moved out from the shore's of the nations being protected into the Caribbean

approsches to Cuba, tying In with an OAS proclaimed zone In which novement

of subversive agents, materials, forces, or arms is prohibited. Towerd the

end of the crescendo, they should operate close to the shores of Cube.

There should be Increasing surveillance and control of land boundaries.

There should be improved systematic exchange of Intelligence on subiersive.

activity.

Propaganda - There should be established Immediately a redio station

(Radio Free Cuba), probably In Florida, using covert funds, with

regularly scheduled Cuban broadcasts available to all Cuban political

groups. Its content should be the middle converse between van and

Radio stan.

Initially, through public statements, VOA, etc., maintain the

theme of the U.S. "watchful welting" for change in the Castro regime.

Maintain the currently enhanced VOA wave facility beaned to Cila: B182-

I1ght positive results In latin America of the Alliance for Progress. He

should warn Cuba unofficially through the suggested Radio Free Cuba of the

consequences of continued subversion and of Castro's present track. St1ll

later, priloi to any decisive action, 11 taken, this theme should go out

officially over VOA and lin announcements of public officials.

Initiate and organize clandestine newspapers and leaflet operations.

Infiltrate Cuban extle publications. Play up, on all media, the threat

- 6W

---

## Page 140

13-00000

of Castro to the regines of the lestern Hemisphere. and the objectives

Of Alliance for Progress. Remind the Cuban people that Castro came to

power or-a pledge to provide political freedom. Remind them of the social

goals he held up while he destroyed that freedom. Contrast their present

economic chaos with those economic goals of land and housing reform..

Remind them that he preached nationalism while delivering their country

to the Soviet military occupation. Point out how each shift of goal was

accompanied by the destruction of earlier ones. Ask what Castro has left

to offer. Conclude that only the mitual fear of retribution among

his elite remilns to hold them in pover. Use slogans such as "I, 64""

(Liberty 10 '64), etc.

St111 Later Intiato throuch publia broadcast, training in the

rudiments of seditions activity.

Still later urge the many small revolutionary-cells to make contact

with neighboring groups. Wern and threaten the Castro regime through

all media; exhort the people to organize to :j01n enlarged resistance groups;

Beex to build up resistance heroes. Indeavor to dellate Castro through

these broadcasts: Stress the freedom of the Cuban people, post-Castro, to

choose their ora political and social structure.

Subversion - There should be an initial perlod of no Increase In

subversiva efforts by the U.S.; until the bilateral phase of the Cuban

affair 1s completed and 1t 1s clear that the Soviet Union Wit remove

no additional military personnel.

After that time minimal covert contects should be established within

Cuba for the distribution of newspapers and leaflets. Minimal acts of

deflance and sabotage should be initlated.. For example, exhort groups

-7 -

---

## Page 141

13-00000

059257

Of 3 or 4 Iriends, uithout establishing external rebel affiliation, to

-paint I'64, etc., on valle or to codit isolated acts Of sabotage. The

purpose. rould be to establish rebel connotation and to generate leadership.

this would lead to the establishment of rudimentary cellular training

In seditious activity. Minimal supply of critical Items should be initiated

to subversive groups within Cuba on a case-by-case basis. Potential leaders.

abould be 1dentifled.. Contingency planning, covert and unilateral, should

continue. The mumber of Cuban exiles taken into the United States Armed

Forces for training and formation of reserve units should be significently

Increased. A aimilar progran for "reedom floatera los Cube" should be

undertaken for volunteers fron other IA nations. At a later polat in the

crescendo, departures from the Cuban armed forces in organized units should

be encouraged. All covert effort should be exerted toward coordinating

the cells, pockets, and groups resisting. Castro, Inside and outside Cuba.

This would be a transition period frau sporadio acts 1n Isolation into

organized subversion. Fuel and food supplies should be sabotaged. An

organized supply systen should be put into effect with lerge numbers of

fishing craft situated around the Island to make both scheduled supply.

of deliveries aid deliveries of opportunity. As various groups are identi-

fled 1n revalt, they should be worked into the supply system. New In and

Cuban fighters training outside. Cube, should be introduced in the seme way

Into there organized movements within Cube. There should be frequent

Joats of planed US Invasion and appropriate dentals to frustrate tie

suspicious Castro. fleet and air "training" demonstrations should be

scheduled off Cuba. At the ane time it should be made clear to rebel

leaders that an externally launched invasion 1s not to be expected until

a revolution has come from within, tith external logistio assistance.

-8-

---

## Page 142

13-00000

It should se emphasized to the rei.el leacess that the U.S. does not expect

the clock to be turned back with refard to social conditions.

Still later & complete orchestretion should be woven together,

coming to a crescendo through the optimal exploitation of all the min-

streatis discussed in the categories above. Propagenda should reach the

maximun denunciation of the regime, exhorting to revolt, holding up the

prospect of peace and a better life should the Cuban people join their

resistance leaders. Subversion should be stepped up by introduction of

all avallable externally trained sesistense fighters, provision of maximmm

logistic support, etc. At the sy "opiict: ime, 11 this resistance novement

needs the assistance of external jorces there should be an AS structured

alr strike, related to an appropriete Castro mis-step, to diserm Cuban:

offensive and defensive pover and to destroy all POL, storage. This attack

should be coordinated with all-out sabotege.

An Invasion force should be kept in readiness for use, 11 re-

quired to save the resistance, once the all-out internel resistance

efforts has been initiated.

Criteria -- The pressures discussed in all categories sbove should

. be appropriately coordinated. The period of moderation should end aîter

one or two months when it is apperent that no further Soviet nilitary

personnel are to be removed. Moderate pressures should then commence,

lasting for a perfod of two to three months, until some episode of

escalation by Castro or ober appropriate event, nakes further pressures

feasible. If such an event is not forthcoming, OlS major Insistence should

lead to escalation of pressures. After enother short period, again pre-

Perable triggered by an appropriate Castro episode or alternatively by e

majority OAS vote still more vigorous pressures should be initiated.

-9 .

---

## Page 143

13-00000

• Il Castro has Initiated a suitable 'ar-llke act, such as firIng

on survelllance aircraft, pressures should be escalated to the marimm

Imediately rather than gradually.

the so

---

## Page 144

13-00000

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONE

WABHINGTON 23, D.C.

Op-613C/sg

Ser 000950P61

Sceret

MAR 1. 1963

SLORER

-Doungraded to CONF upon removal of enclosúres

MEMORANDUM FOR MB. Je :A.

CALIFANO, SPECIAL ASSISTANI IO THE

SECRETARY. OF THE ARMY

Subj:

ratercepartmental coordinating Committee on Cuba

AffalIs:

ubcommittee on Cuban Subversion (U

Ref: (a) Your Memo No. 13 01 28 FEB 1963

Enols (1) through (8) Proposed actions (IS)

1.

As requested by reference (a), specifie, and direct actions ..!."

designed to resolve probleus of Cuban subversion are sub-

mitted herewith as enclosures (l) through (8).

THAT. Chench

W.F A WENDT -

Director, State Plans Dialo.

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DONNGRADINO

DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES HOT APPLY

PAGE NO 1_OF_1 PAGES

COPY NO. 1_ OF 10 COPIES

Reproduction of this Isument in

whole or in part is f-oiibited

ccept with permissic. of th

suing office or higiner authorit

3 Samet

---

## Page 145

13-00000

Tep Sture?

COBBLES

A.

B.

c.

D.

'E.

PROPOSED ACTIONS WHICH MIGHT

BE -TAKEN UNILATERALLY BY THE US• 1O

BILATERALLY, OR THROUGH THE OAS.

IMPEDE THE MOVEMENT OF SUBVERSIVE

TRAINEES TO AND FROM CUBA

:

Institute effective procedures to insure that U.S.

citizens

do not travel to and from Cuba (unilateral U.S.

action).

Continue U.S.

restriction against U.S. airline service

to Cuba.

(This is important to avold giving other air- -

lines an excuse to reestablish air service) (unilateral

U.S. action).

Thoroughly examine Latin American constitutions and laws

to determine the legal, capability or impediment to controi

of travel of their citizens to and from Cuba (unilateral

U.S. action).

Arrange for adverse publicity on indiriduals uno are

known

to have undergone subversive training in Cuba (uni-

lateral U.S. sotion).

¡Spread rumors of epidemies in Cuba (unilateral U.S. action).

Sabotage aircraft proceeding to and from Cuba (unilateral

US. action).

G.

Increase U.S. efforts to establish identity of all Latin

Americans travelling to and from Cuba (unilateral U.S.

action).

H. Encourage Latin American countries to pass new legislation,

or enforce

existing legislation, restricting the

travel

of their oftizens to and from Cuba (unflateral U.S. action).

Persuade Latin American governments to prevent re-entry.

to their country of persons suspected to have been

trained in subversion in Cuba (unilateral U.S. action).

3. Persuade LA countries to tighten border security measures

by

appropriate authority (unilateral U.S. action). Supply

equipment and POL for patrol and surveillance. See

enClOsure (6);

cooper britant recting derate Cula 30t 5

Reproduction of this document in

EXCLUTED FROM AUTONATIC D'ININGRADINA

whole. or in part is prohibited

except with permission of the

DOO DIR $200.10 DOES NOT APPY,

issuing office or higher authority, ' *1

ENCLOSURE (/) to CNO Ser/Mena 0l0 250P6/

SECRETI

Secret

standin are

---

## Page 146

13-00000

Top Staret

TOT SECRET

Lo

seek Mexican

concurrence in using new equipment (IL-18)

the Havana-Mexico City route.

We should persuade

Mexico to refuse

the new airoraft on grounds of safety,

facilities, or other reasons:

He should also encourage

Great Britain of other sources to cut off spare parts

(unilateral U.S. action).

ncourage hemispheric countries to deny unscheduled

raffic stops to Cubana airlines (unilateral U.S. action.

M.

Persuade Iriendly governments in LA and elsewhere to

harass ships and atroraft traveling to Cuba with admini- =

strative delays (minute examination of air northiness

certificates, customs, documents, ete.)

(unilateral U.S.

action).

N.

Seek arrangement whereby other Latin American countries.

would cooperate with lexican efforts to deny travel their

nationals to and from Cuba via Mexico (see Mexico CIty

Tel 2221)

(bilateral U.S. action).

.::

DON SECRET

Secret

---

## Page 147

13-00000

Fons1t1vo,

PRET®

*а С01. J. Ki Patchell - X7571

8 Aaril 191

COVERT

INTRODUCTION

The paspose a!

Imitations, a usefuln

and covert actlan

toward Cable

ED LOANST CUB

='is to provide, withle security

the conaldoration of clandestine

sure projection of U. 5: Hetto

The papor to dario sa to be ta objactive a posalia valet

The study

MIA

not to prediet the future

Thie dlacunilon of the factore conditloalag U. S. pollay la

the realm of the clandestine and covert may seem elementasy and

somewhat philosophical; homeres, thens factors provide the general

parameters within which iasare sctions can be considered. Any.

attempt to determins the proportonate influence of any particular

conditioner would ta spacalative.

MAJOR. COND

TONING FACTORS

onlos conditiona

ad past 0. Si polley lath

clandestine aud

This le not an exhaustive Ubt, but

it describes orlady a ree or the elemente wilch must be cannidored

In the process of making valid and conclusive determinations:

a. Oblestive.

Reporters alice

It lo most dealrable to determine the U. S.

objective la procles terms. When the objective 1o clarified and

gue estate dis Car.

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADE

DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES HOT APFIX

---

## Page 148

13-00000

understood, astions can be developed to schlove that objoctive.

The

artent of the U. S, cormitment, de sallacied by the deterzalsation

o1 the objectivo, la an inportas

commitment of U. Si fe

e factor no deterata to at the

bat the exestion of a real

ng in Caba probably enviragos

каВАї во

altuet sallitary ictlon.

Thexs.CAn

a as the socarlty of machins

ako upon the ultimate outeam

lation: Carrent Intalligence:

ander tho altontlas

an ultimato U. S. C0

be no advanced goss

tOs, R0r di th

which misy be punc

Antimated ladicate

alt without

LA deport a for tas ana to ovat o. 8. of man eral dead.

those dIo goneral misodim

one and cortain gravo sluks inherent

(n (a) neckleg a nolation

Gaba dilerams whally by diendestine

08: 00v08t nas

0: 06):19l0

oportionate xellence on clandestiné

yn spire dandasties or covert act.ons la

¡alidion of os digalaca

y advanãe 01 4. S palloy; and (al develop.

lag actions for the acke of action alona or la ordos to capitallze o1

some latriguing glmmalckesy..

Obvionaly, the determination of U. Se objectives le

beyond the realm of the claridestine and covert and cannot be can-

eldered la the context ol Cube itons. Bertone judgmento munt be

mado la salatios to the broad world suvironmont, Notions againat

Gabi may be detatmental to. the B, altas by canning intonalfled security

snest Cake

vetloma clearhes s.: as the unnadassasy

Blake

A good "rule of thumb" with, respect so clendestine

os covert autonò le that the slake entulled are la direct proportion

ra the krafulnean of the operations.

Go.

Attibuttos, and Derliblity.

or covers nos

%. S, loadorably wall always be concerned wich

right

5940659

IN SHORET

---

## Page 149

13-00000

CRET

It do saasonable to

fat the time of Cubi

watch taoy desire.

bility tax

hat Cabs will attribate to the U. &

3) May actloas, seal os masalectar

that the

•d material,

to, whan carriad

at the oporatios..

In

subjecrod to judgmanti

laclading the car

Livalramaste.

& PeRsonablo balan

exampis in which few

intrative os sacuxity.pr

that Itsell) and tersonal

U. S. implicatios canno

nation of derablity la

rezelntencei of accuracy of t

da nate done al

Men us

отрх

It should be

loat that as a rosalt of !. 8.

scopted compliety in c Alents and the Bay of 5ge operato

Do d. So de la a sleptai

nily more sensitive position with reopes

to clandestine and tover

V, si adraleetone tend to give

12249

---

## Page 150

13-00000

greator credibility to the accusatione of the Castro or Stro/Sorlot

Bloc and alert out anerades to the possibility that the U, S. may

undertake actions of a less conventional naturo.

di Vtold

It sany be desirable to undertake actione which

achieve little press coverage (viaibility or nolse leval), It la

#i cult to dorarmine with any scouracy beforehand the estant of

the publloity to ba schlived. The Castro Roglme gonerally can

contral the timbag and magnitude as pubilo releasa.

The waste.

preta for the most part lo not mubject to d. Su control except ne

the U.S. may achieve success through counter propagande.

atleally knoreniod salte lovel may be acceptable when sccomplited

by algalilcant (bendline) overt Itema which serve to dotzaot the

attantlas of the pablle..

o. Morallty and Selectivity.

There lo a natural reluctance to undartako

clandostins os covert setlona which result in the death or serious

injury to innocent Cubans. Meaningful actlons will certainly

cause harm lo certali elements, but some of the destructive actiona

which could be undertaken may be counterproductive in that they

strike at the wrong targete. Unlortunately, 1l la diffleuit to achieve

the desired dogres of selectivity in uncontrolled operations, imple-

manted la secrecy.

The erastion of-lood, clothing and modical shortages

'and the nabotago of storage os diatribation facillies undoubtedly may

hurt the sconomy but those committed to the Castro Regime may

suller relatively little. Such actoria may do little but weakar an

insetive or apathetle populace while increasing the Internal security

mochanana.

---

## Page 151

13-00000

There ase obviora moral judgmenta attached to

many of tha proporain 10s sctlons directed againat Guba.. When

the fudgments of varions indluiduals differ, the renalting U. S.

aston probably relectepse leant comman, denominatore, Many

хоровм і тхну во ат

ble bocaine the denlablity factor is

800 хом 05 чав ркорова

may be of a suture that premature com.

mitment and subsequent

¿ disclosure would not la desirable since

the weapon may be worthy of a mose far reachlag improt. There

In na radarstandeble truntration in the U. Bi tenortlag to the api

plication al noptiaticitad clandestine mespons againat a scall

stare which theoretically could be brought to lie kaoes la a relea

tirely shost portod of tline throngh the applicatles of conventional

теарато.

There in an imposing array of latriguing or

imoing "tricke" *Alol are of no real or lasting consequence.

These could subject the U. S. so adverse criticiam on moral

grounde or extend the passmaters of warfaro is new dimdastons:

£i Recrultment and Exile Polltice:

The recrulting problem deseryes consideration

ta any paper considering clandestine and corert actions. Obrdoualy,

the reczultment of a solo individual invalves s system of sereening

which theoretically must not be compromised elther in the process

at sorting or during the subrequent utiliration and poat-utilliation

pasiado..

There ls di marked tandency fos Cubars to talk, to brag:

os to lalex participation in secret operatlone. Indlvlduals personally

nad acores of eidle argenteations are quick to capítalise on the real

os imaginary retivities of their members.

These Caban aidle organ.

tratlons com

its for recogultion; prestige and material sappost

witch they hope will star froin their partle pation in clandestine or

covert actititias.. Thete lo & constant dov of proposals fos actos

and requeats for assistance or offciel recognition, some individuals

and organizationa merely destre to publielo their affiliatione with

some momber of the U. S. Government

---

## Page 152

13-00000

It do not feasible to investigato in detallo all

of the proposal fos action submitted by indlviduals and groupe.,

aper ance are incicated sat genoraly the sulle came ase.

thout comridation and the proponderance of ladly broport, se

not fenelble. An a matter of practice such individiale os groupe

aro not satlolod with i angle rebull, but mako thair offere to lao

dividinlo 1n Cla, the Dapartments of Stato, Dafense and fastice

Ox with mambass. af Congress, the press, end other son-forera.

montal individrala os agences. A spocifle action or proposal

rasy have had merit at one polat, bul from a security standpolat.

the porainterce of this yroposes may have negated the porsatial

of bla proposal and could have compromised an otherwise

woskablo.achame.

tons. Whlle thie many bo paradble, expertence har indirasad i hat

It do not probable, Thone Cabens in the U. S. who bive ascoelated

with U. S, personal and thöre who speak Engleh are generally

marked. Thare whore languago capabilitles and economlo staturo

combine to limit thair social mobility are more likely to tura to.

accept and become involved in the soclal, palltical or cultural

cholaters of Cubana in the U. S..

There are additlonal political and paychological

probloms la seating rectalts from among Cubans Who have d6d

and ganorally dealte to peraain unted with families and irlende..

Their motiration to participate in activitión agalast castro genes

ally can be measured la terms of theis aneirallation and economla

recons in the Ui 8. Experience bas showa that laterzal offpeit!

Late may sosent extoraal Cuban leadexahip. As the exile grdtpo

compete los political prestige and material support, so do tho

roprosentalivea of the interarl roslatance groups.

The problams of adles attempting to determine

tho extent 01 U, S. commitment and associatod security linplicadone

are discussed cloomhere in this paper.

pier 219

---

## Page 153

13-00000

SECRET

Floates

Ordonaly, the succonaful execution al wall.

merit; taolation and training cannot be accompilated lin' & matter of

days, Thore la no standby reservals of multloparpose ageite, The

oporations themselves call for split socond timing and are sablest both

to natate's aloments (meathor,. tdes, moan, sorson) and othar unnatio

cipated and unpredictable elremstances (Cuber slarts; Coatect with

paltale, compromiss if laternal contacts, actions of anti-fastro

ssoups, or othe

roeld eventa).

regurames

Fa

тіль ртоцеть ато сотроно " по петага

od

and the rogultemente los synchroalked action.

More dlectivo operations can be undertaken when

thore la some general contlualty la the program dnd there ll an oppos.

Emity to plas la grantent dotall. From a practical stendpolnto. 18 la.

extromaly dillicult to meintain individual or group mativatton and a18re-

alveness then operations are delayed, aborted, easelled is mbjected to

continual modification,

3.

A88AY13

In considering U. S, sanets for covert and clandestine operations

agalant Cuba, It is well to reviow briefly in an historical contest, the

astration which faces the V. S.

Erlos to Castro's ansmaptlai ol pomer. U, S. oflatte in the fleld

of intelligem

o pid clandestine operitions la Latis Amorics legged beblad

ellasts in

it more immediate problem areas of the world. At the time

Castro ansumed contral in Gabe, there was much opera controversy os the

question al Castro's sabrestlenco to communema, bes generally li was

assumed that the change of government in Gubs see in the well. known

Latin tradition, Latter, It was sealized that the change al government

was not just a charge la personalities, but a ravalutionity cuango in

goveramental oyalem. Al tule port, catty la 1960, plane mose developed

to analet the people of Caba in overthrowing their goveriment. This plan

SECRET

---

## Page 154

13-00000

culminatod in the abastive Bay of Plgo Oparation la lato April 1961.

It has been conceded that the say of Pige Operation conned many die-

During the six month portod which tallowed the events of April

In thas oparation wore vonssigned and little or no ellart was made co

further enderigor any realduel nerete la Cabe walehimy bare varrived

bo Giban incurity oporations of the spalag and suramas de 1961.

1961, nothge eltari wen ose

accou ware valablo tor operation in Coba, 2 malies to due on 11

an lavenrary reviested thes the lon xollable anori li the target ares

Mase arsentially intalligente agents and could not bo spared for cosio

vertion to chandention eparatioas. Gastro bed sonsaltintui his secusity

nectanlena to the polat that by early 1962 lewid o

Le do this taser.

Lost:: The 1A78e

tanarrat of mottvared Gabare uho had jartielpated in the Bay of Pigs

Opaxatios mare alther impilsoned of had lost thair conor. They were

no longos an aveliable source los clandestue operatious. During the

(rot nine santan of 196%, the emphasis was placed on intelligence

fathering father thas elandastino operations or polttical notion in the

198804 a58A.

Bacnase il cortala operational diffleulties most of the spora-

missions indertaken dariag the apolas and prinaries ol' 1962

the jab leapi

the operatonal program to be perlodically discontinued. No attempt

was sade dittng or lamediately aiter the minallo estals to continue

tho progresa.

4

ROLE OF THE DEPARIMENT OF DEFENIE

Tho role of the Department ol Defensa ln clandestino drid covert

areks has born the subject of much controversy both withis the Depart

ment of Delenat and within the Cantrel Intelligence Agerey..

'"i.

JESSORT

---

## Page 155

13-00000

1 0r &

Ly prad

pectac

ple sato and, la

Agrasy,

From "

BaY

Taelse d

wity for the

tas scope of a

ol the Central Intelli

mid Gabs (during

so considerad

O 7 ach

GLA

даія посинів)

beCA

chas such a magnitado that DAD la Sorted t

ibillty. Many argue, with rome protecation, that

: 62

ls' oil l magaltado that tia DAD sat perterint taa

responslbillty, it lo ut this polat ol lasing its savas as dandestine

rappings and DOD may suffer the consequerces.

Excops los participation during World War It, feir indiniduals

In the Department o! Defensa maxe concerned with clandestiae opera-

toms polar ta 1960.

Exportencer of the milltary is darriary, Incos,

Gube, and Plottam

nerved to underine mary of the capabllities and

Imita

8 of the :

intiitary 1s thare delde. Thora are mary smottonal

for of interest

paste lavaluad ta a conalderation

1457 shoul

Oris

a ds that the milltary

а скатаве

To sapportars ol tale

morat in ths p

disto the platis

experience of

ren't It mes, saaay and

Of TA'S APPA

with some tu

100 9Cu.

---

## Page 156

13-00000

30/907

Is any alreable covert

rollact adversaly on li

militasy as a group.

assumo the 308

ponsibl

astare and a pr

anition on moralistle

ilty so maintain security

tion cond subseqaantly:

mont or the pi

led in operations of thie.

g sole to the

Потового

SEY

may alto lattachce military Hewd..

In the pant, the mllitary has played an ennential role la faree

mafOr.cAtofoslas.co.uuaany, men and material.

From the flecal stando

poins, the Departinent of Dafense can pronide vars expanditaran will

relativaly great Headblity.

The vast senources la manpower of the DaD foith sallitary

rechnical and llngulatle abillo, overseas experience, phyaical con-

ton of the individual from the military service. The sapabandes of

Individarl cover, dummy recordo, and the adlolatrative processtag

ds assenti

My so great problem, The difflenition appear in the con-

elderation of!

ambit and milttery associations. It le reintraly easy

to que nY

and "cheap dip" an als exer of samall beat exon

for ovie khar

saton Howeves, tula procons lo wor

wally extended

and covert operations.

The materlal asseti of the Department el Dalease con play a

major role in CLA's overall opetation, DaD can provide cover for

many of (IA's tralning, supply and storage installationa: DOD iB.

lavalved la pervelllance setlritles. The DOD Inventory of aireraft

÷a":

SEORET.

---

## Page 157

13-00000

We SER

a ahips with tralned exome aro adaptable to infliration und extil

Hon salislass.

JaD stocks of atmo, foodstulle and equipment alo

16048

Mty to nantt

packase and ahip los nortal or rentice

To a algidacant zonet.

Thore do a general minunderstanding concerning the bee of

Assay Special FOXCON nnlte. NaTy SEAL teAms, Als Farto Jungle Jina

argintentioni or Merine Carpi spacial unti in conersand clandäntine

operations. While it ln entisely ponsible and loraible to setvert

Indivictiale or unths tox ale

ton os covert operations: the baule

minston of special Foscan.

ly was astanted tomerd the orgutin.

Han of testatinee orens 14.

sabbes

mostons are assentially overt in satero aid there is i lack of expestence :

and doctrina for the commitment of Spocial Farcos ln clandertire os

tasy Servlees. Any maajor !

tor example, the ability of our special Forces to austet in the organisa.

Mon of a restatancs in Cabe is support of a conventional milltary opera.

Mon thare.

3. INTELLIGENCE

It lo satontial to an undoxstanding of the problom to. roslise

thas aince lats 1961, all V, S. Intolligence antimates bave indtested

that there lo little Ilkallbood of an internally sperted Saban realetrace

to be al any signifennes. Ancording to CIA there ls Hille ponsi Mllty

a fating dovas

a tatemation of any uprioing mlihare tide Information

also reachlag ofticlala al the Cantro Rogle. It lo alno estimated that

thoro de lllllo llkallboad that any senatance groupe weald be able to

"Hold out" in uny organized forma for more than a weak or two. Castro

personally la qute amare of the potentlal of a guerrilla resistance and

moves ruthlasily, committing duproportionate lotees to ensure that

the spark doas sot matate.

---

## Page 158

13-00000

SEORET

Thesa has beas s leck of ussfal intelliganco os Cabs.

Thle

bas cansed the l. S. to placo prlizary impostance us alendestine

vaut amounts ol ousrent operatonal intallizence ass rooded.. The

ptiority for this operational type intelligence has bean xalegatei

o « relativaly unmiportant statlos in the spastrusa of ous iatellt.

gence rogeltemente for Cabai Iaie le partleulisiy tras whea tiere

asa tlmiltad.a

ts dad no much pressure to abtala rellabilo laforma.

tion oI coaflsmition an sophlaticated conventtopal wuspons of Sovlet

petiultien. Nosmally, dlfferant methods al oparation ite employa

Is a illaxons phynical aivirosmant fos thoss senllng operationa

lateills

• It should bo polnted out thet the leck of Intalllgance bas been

ned an & erutch ia nat pressing for more clandestine aperatlos

ollone. Thlei vien ces be fastilied, bas so commandet uho comíml

foxcon on the battletlald avas knoma all he tints lo know about hir

anesay, Somevkare ls botheen lles the anowex. Thiaré sines be an

peceptancs ol certals gaps la operational intelligence and consequentl,

somo addttional opatitional sioks, ottoswist, sio maaningiul action.

will ovot bo taban.

PARAMETERS OF HUTURE AGTION

Tido portlos al the peper ls deslgned to indicato la generel

rerms the latitado ol ciandestine and rovert sctlons bazod upos past

exparlance and thast pestinent tsotoze which might sarve to Umit

or modity J. &, sxtion la thass areas. This should not' be Interprated

to lindicero the Mlinlta of futaro actione.

Clandentrs and covert sctlulties prior ta aind during the Bay

of Pigo oparadon eas be characterieed as bold anit far seachlng. The

fatura oxlentation, ol U. S, setluity la this flold in conditloned lixgely

by the fallara af that opesatlos, Clandestine and covart sitioas alnco

Apsil 1961 ean be aummasired as being cautiont., Intormittent, and Low

lavel, The carrent attentlon directed tomerde "thlage Oaban" plades

even mors stringent regulrements on U. S. actlvities in the clandestine

and covert anvitonment.

---

## Page 159

13-00000

a. . Intelligence and Counterintelligence

(1) Interrogation ol refugees.

121 Counterintelllgence Init. S.

(3) Lagal travallers:

14): Glendarina Intolligento Atte

(5) Ale and neval curvollence.

( Caramani

cations survelllence.

17) Intornal cources (here Cats' is repre-

sented offlelally os queal offlelally os there rafagaos and

Exavellars can bo reached).

(8) Intelligence provided by third corrutrles.

(9) Dolectora (naldo or outaldo Caba), It la

Important to note that the nocurity mochantom in Caba sonders

raspected potential delectoys raintively inaccessible. The

dovelopment of a dalestos program roguises vast arounte ol

operational intolllgence which has nor boos avallebie. There

as0 additional problems in soaling defections from among those

Tho bave lamtiler, The Criban security apparatus comblaer

with geography to furthes rastrict altempte ba the part of many

, who might defect ll there was any season to bellove they could

loave Cube,: Thore who have sought asylum in other embenales

ds Havana have batti refusad elt visas 10s such prolonged periodo

that theft informallon, whan Anally reliasad, te practically unclees:

(10) Panatrationo (aalde os outalde Caba). Ixtreme

caution muat be uned to prevent the compromise of suy penetrationa

which can be made. Penatrations in the communet apparatas outo

aldo of Cabe may be ol little utility or Cuban requixements of such

low prlarity an to kimll the scope of such altesapte........

SECRET

---

## Page 160

13-00000

....

SECRET

Do

nde and Psychalople! Operatione

(2) Printed material (mall, alrdrop, os packed

mith other material dantized for Cabe).. Altdrop la severely

Umalted by Cabe's air defense capabilty.

so zulta Amorita "allo and talorieton and preted material

14) Colosersparend

) Remos, threat, or other campalgas nolag a

allable communicatios reseto, to inclade telephon

Propagasde

oald reach the proper target, should be sondetent l@aba verg

box parts of Latla America). Paychologieal actions could dacio

als droppins ol foodstufle and medielso, Roselin langinge broad.

creta, large scale mollliary retione rear Gaba of a deceptión

nature, sumore and "plants" of informatios, ete.

a Political notions

establish a rel a cold aba to la i pro deal trations,

(?). I tornal to luitigate demonstrations agatnat

Cabana.

•(9) Tours ol Cuban endles to talla Amertea and

elsenhere ledettore, Justate, labor londere, women, youts.

'entertainers, sallgious and cultiral groups; sic. I NOTE: Many

of the ebove actors des be recompliabed overtly.

d.

tadoral on i a sage of eric po talented on,

os atorage laallittes.

..:

114:14

---

## Page 161

13-00000

'?."

CRET

Covast operatione to prévent rale of pux.

siste or la de so corto te tom sea polear,

troploals, etc,) NOTE: Siace the finansoret cominitiment to

Cuba la proponderast, a lazgo portion la sol susceptible to U. S.

sotian homevas, the remaining trade with the Fren World,

althorigh colativaly minor, la estileal to. Cuba and providen

the V. Si With 1 inasallve tergar.

(3)

Countertelting, Becante Cube has ententtally

a barter merket and mass dostibation la dillloult, ehls may not

opratent & anon, sottlty. Thite ach othar very far ranchias

malicatone which mant be conaldered anilant a relatively menser

and shore lined gale.

dan Action

graph d aborra).

ver ort matasy ale le a peludo arte

estarto cen milar deste.

(3) Radio os televiaios intruslos or jamming.

a corea en de en reste, balale, araca-

(5)

nabotago al als and saval tratte.

Attack, cosuro, deasch or bartaremont and

(6) Attect, Intimidatlos nnd Larrassment 01 Caben

1.

Paramitasy_Operettone

(1) Raido.

(7): Peleon brante 1112

Tespons cachor.

Recomalesance la force.

DE SECRET

---

## Page 162

13-00000

cassite

SECRETL

Fron

3 or auto pro

operations can be

Contrived

papapat dally,

osteel bandling

many of there real provocations crs be developed lato provoca.

TUTURE OPTIONS

A disemaalon ol future options should ba relatid speciacall)

o the overall objoctivi and should coralder the tectori indicated si

Tiere may be adventiges to taking elandast

otions tot

actlone into alona in order to (a) demonstrate sad publieles contimied

Cuban resistance, (b) keep the resiatance potential allve, (5) secade

to demando fos s spentarales action, (d) indicate » toprias, 10s retlana

by the Cüber Boglad, (e) tant, probe, decelve dr hiat

zad the laternal

security mocherton la Cuba and (1) estabiles a paychological eltriate

fos other overt sations.

So long as Cantto remains the "Davld" and the U. B. somalas

tha "Collath," the U. S, illl have a major problem of liage sorting

In Cabe, Latln Ameris and the waste.

since April J9au there are

indications that the fascination for "Eldellamo" her waned agnitcantly

bat to the Cabins, the Latls Americana and many other somobort states.

Castio de still the "David" and the only Latin who has necessfally

shelted the Mort on a mary a crase eti a reat el.

parti,, solution to thls prottem.

An the economle altuation 11 Cube becomos trase intolerable.

the U.S, mAy expect greztes dlesention and more mantfontations of

entest, to include outbraats of violence. At some polst, the U. s.

cold bo called upon to support openly nuch an oftort Obviorialy, it

would be extremaly embarransing to the U. S. to be analte to respond

betoxe the roslotance io estated completely. In any event, it would be

extremely differit for the U. S, to support nich a roblatanto in a clan-

doris i eat et a go a 1 mont as a low daya. Set nupport could

2402a04

TOM SHORES

---

## Page 163

13-00000

raporaticalito: las most den table event which en

plade manld envisage a major split of Cabai leaderabin lavalvint

rolatively proportionate military and internal socusity lettes.

Is difilialt andes present elicematances to visuallso & Caban leader

part ta vital to hts tenure and no necessary to prevent & countes corp

trona those deriving atrongth from the baary Sina sorlet aconomle

oilertation of the present seglme.

of possibillty is hive Cuban disarted attacks of Cuban military ele-

manti (disgulsed ds onlos or U,S, pexronzel) on soft and emotional

REgUtS li CuiR.: Sues sa setion could serve to Lap cantre tansalcat

internally and to nestoraly embarrase the U. Si Intertarlebally

8.

SUMMARY

17

SECRET

---

## Page 164

13-00000

So long as the Sino Sonal Bloe contimes to subsidina Cube.

the literal economle eltratton will probably nor bosome intolorable

As those coraltled th the Gastro Roglme

in thats support of Crabe.

astro has cautionaly ayolded provocative actlone of sullietes

agnitudo to 1n01r the uhalonale wrath al the U. Si os to provide

juridical basis fos overt intervantion, To Castro'e likling, V. Si Optione

have bees nastomed to.U. S, Inntigared opes contlet adonomle prensurer

or to a timesconsuming and tuntrating multliatosa, approach atillang

the DAS máchaniaza

le bo astorand the oppo

most actions (mah de blockade or othar stringent matsures) Calen

propienning di thie or other actiona la accoripliated delorilland, cavar

astons is support of there overt measures will be lilted ta only those

opportunites upon wilch the U. S. can enaltallse villhi thinnedne at lte

aal at the thras.

F'xom the steridpolnt of the Caban Regimo, there appeara to be

lttle Ilkellhood that any clandestine setlone will be taken directly

Agalnst the U, S. However, the recent aircraft attrake or maralnge

agalant U. S, basts indicatos the poaalbility al uncontrolled notion os

the part of Individuals of the Cantzo Regime.

!?..

---

## Page 165

13-00000

imin DiLE FOR TUS NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

(i=-pared for the lesting of _

-, February → 1963, 4 P.M.)

ERONI:

Coordinator of Cuba Affairs

SUBJECT: Psychological Program in Support of U.S. Poliey on Cuba

Obiectives

The basic program adopted by the Executive Committee on January

25, 1963 sets forth major objectives for our policy toward Cuba. It all

conmits us to "be prepared to increase the political, economic, psycho-

logical and military pressures, as appropriate opportunities present

thenselves. or can be created."

This memorandum outlines a program that will meet the psychologica:

requirements of our overall policy.

Role. of Psychological Operations

A successful psychological campaign cannot be viewed solely as a

propaganda exercise or an informational program. It should cover actios

and statements--all that is said or done solely or primarily for psycho:

logical effect.

This definition sets off psychological activities fron

those actions undertaken primarily for thelz direct value--whather in ti

fields of Intelligence, military, political, or economic action.

One of the tasks of psychological operations is to exploi. other

¿i-vities to maximum advantage, or to seek to minimize any ne ative as.

pects öf such activities. In designing and carrying out action program

irected a Cuba

:, in Cut? 13-S OChell be the tack of the Coordinator and his Group

STORET

---

## Page 166

13-00000

TER CUE

to balance possibly conflicting intarests and to determine which, in any

given circumstance, shall have priority.

Strategy and Tactics

wa must keep in mind constantly the relationship between what happens

in Cuba and the overall struggle between ourselves and the Communisto.

We should seek to insure that the Cuban situation will develop in a way

that will:

a) lead to the collapse or overthrow of the Castro regime;

b) demonstrate to the Cuban people and to the world at large that

communism 1a not a solution for the problems of a developing

country;

c) discredit Castro and his associates and their methods of opera-

tion throughout the Americas;

d) Insure that the burden imposed by Cuba on the Soviet Union and.

the satellites adds substantially to the mounting evidence that

efforts to export communist revolution are unsuccessful and ax-

cessively costly.

Our focus should always be on the first of these objectives--the

end of the commnist regime in Cuba. But pending achievement of inis,

wa can love toward the other objectives. And they, after all, are of

major importance to our overall strategic purposes.

gos sense.

ni:

---

## Page 167

13-00000

Wa have the possibility of insuring that so long as Cuba remains

Conmunist it will serve as an open, bleeding wound that will weaken the

Communist cause generally. This stratagic concept is one which the

Communists have triad to use against us.

Our tactical approach should be designed to fit this overall concept.

It calls for the utllization of every available weapon in our aresenal

and engagement, day-in and day-out, in a multi-faceted struggle at all

levels.

Our inttial aim should be to weaken steadily the capability, con-

fidence and will of the enemy (inside and outside Cuba) and, correspond-

ingly, to strengthen our side. We jeed not, indeed ought not, stake every-

thing on one great effort. Nor should we concentrate on simply building

up our forces and husbanding them "until the right time comes" for a final

showdown..

Instead, our effort should be directed toward achieving an inbroken

series of small successes, encompassing gains on the part of anti-Castro

elements and failures on the part of the regime Itself. Our aim should

be that the end of each day would see the position and prospects of the

Castro regime and little worse than they had been at sunrise.

A factory breakdown because of a shortage of spare parts or sabotage,

an increase in absenteeism, lengthened queues at the food stores, failure

to get a field planted--whether because of neglect or lack of seed,

E3 SPORTE

---

## Page 168

13-00000

..

resort to terrorist methods against the populace, an unexplained fire, .

crestion of suspicion in a minor but key official, the sudden appearance

of antiregime alogans on walls, a defection from the armed forcest-these

and sinilar things, whether major or minor, and over and over azain on

a mounting scale, will have a cumulative impact, In the long run, they

can be equivalent to a major victory.

The important thing is to keep-the pressure on, to never give the

regime a respite, to see that the series of small defeats and setbacks

1a unbroke and unendiage

Ouz purpose is to create a situation in which

the regime and its supporters steadily lose hope and heart, in which thes

coma to accept the certainty of eventual defeat.

Meanwalle, repercussions would be felt throughout the Communist

world. hasistance to the regina would increasingly be regarded as a

"cat hole" operation. The "example of Cuba" would become the reverse of

expactations; fidelismo would become a term of opprobrium.

In short, the goal is to bring about the elimination of the Castro

regime without resort to direct and massive force. We cannot rule out

the possibility that some reliance on force may become necessary to. insw

final victory for anti-Castro forces. But the greater and more effec-

tive is the effort herein outlined, the more we are likely to insure thai

over: force requirements will ve minimal.

---

## Page 169

13-00000

Spacific programs to carry out this kind of approach to the

Cub an

probien are submitted in Annexes A and B.

facilences and Targets

• The psychological program should be directed at the following primary

audiences or target groups:

1) the Cuba people. Our goal should be to encourage dissatisfaction

with the present and hope for the future once Castroism is el1-

ainminated. It should be made clear that the next chapter of Cuba's

history must be written by the Cubans. But they should know that

they will have fxiendly aupport from others.

2) the Castro regime. Our goal should be to create dissension, doubi

and hopelessness inside the ruling clique.

3) Latin Americe. In programs directed at the peoples and govern-

ments of the henisphere, our goal should be to weaken the influ-

ence of the Cuban regims and its propaganda, to encourage solid-

arity within the OAS family, to counter Cuban Influence in key

groups (youth, labor, Intellectuals), to encourage actions that

counteract Cuban programs of subversion and Insurrection.

li) the Soviet Union and other. Conmunist stetes. To picture Cuba

as a steady drain on already limited resources, to insure that 1

Is such a drain, to encourage the Soviets to limit and eventuall

eliminate their involvement in Cuba.

---

## Page 170

13-00000

5) Other countries. To insure understanding of what is involved

in the Cuban situation, to use Cuba to disprove that communism

provides useful answers to the needs of developing countries,

to espose. the continuing danger of communist efforts to export

revolution.

6) the Home Base. To provide the American people and the Congrass

with the full facts of the Cuban situation within the limits of

legitimate security considerations.

issets

The psychological program toward Cuba should utilize the full range

of she Gsvernment's capabilities for action and infornation. These in-

cluda, anong others: a) public statements by the President and other

officials;

b) informational assets such as the public affairs ant

Congressional relations agencies of State,

Defense and other agencies;

c) the Covernment's research and analysia facilities;

d) overseas information programs in all media,

especially the facilities of the U.S. Information

Agency;

e) the diplonatic mechanism for both formal and

informal contacts;

E) capabilities for unattributed programs of action

and information.

---

## Page 171

13-00000

.. *

-

Coordination and Guidance

I: carrying out the kind of many-sided offensive described herein,

it will

ba necessary to provide fox coordinating various programs. We

mist de sure that what wa do in one area reinforces what we do elsewhere.

It will be necessary to provide careful end regular policy guidance to

those responsible for action. This task 1s assignad to the Coordinator

for Cuban Affairs. He should establish the necessary nachinery on an

Inter-departmental basis.

U.S. Posture towerd Cube

The picture we should seek to create 1s one of a confident and de-

cisive United States noving forward in cooperation with Its other fttands,

dealing with the Cuban situation but not exclusively preoccupied with

Castro. We should not appear to be in doubt or confusion, We should take

note of developments in Cuba promptly and react to them quickly. Our

answer to claims, charges or attacks should be swift. Our machinery mist

be gearad' to permit answers to Castro and his herichmen lmediately and

effectively. If he makes a speecin tonight, our reply should be on the

alrwaves tomorrow at the latest.

Cur approach should not be defensive. We should not confine ourselve

to caswering Castro but as much as possible force him onto the defensive.

We could insure that he is required to do the answering, the explaining,

the disagreeing as much as possible.

Attachments: Annex A - Guidelines for Attributable Programs

Annex B - Guidelines for Unattributable Programs, EB ! : 1873

=5-

---

## Page 172

13-00000

:т.

Guidelines for Attributable Programs

Darrent Requirements

I. There should ja & statenent, preferably by the President, ex-

-lairing overall U.S. policy toward the Cuban question. It would provide

cisrification of where we stand on Cuba and how we hope to see the future

develop. It would provide the basis for statements, private and public,

for all other officials concerned. It would inform the Cubans how we re-

gard their future; tell Latin Americans how we see the problem and our

view of their role; underline' to the Soviet bloc our determination to

oppose communism in this hemisphere; further clarify for our own people

the seriousness of the problem and our determination to support the cause

of freedom in Cuba with all feasible means.

The Coordinator should arrange for preparation of such a statement

and submit a draft tö the White House.

2. It 1s our policy to seek elimination, or at least material re-

duction, of the Soviet military presence in Cuba. Efforts now underway

to achieve this end should be given a reasonable chance. If they fail

to produce the desired result within a reasonable time, we should be pre-

pared to nova forward along other lihes. The Coordinator should develop

§ progian to nest this contingency. Meanwhile, the continuing presence

of Soviet forces should be descrited as in exacerbating influence in

East-west relations and a symbol of foreiga domination and control in Cuba.

2211180051

---

## Page 173

13-00000

2

3. Clarification of our position on "non-invasion" would be desira-

b13. Tais could be covered in 1 above. It should be clear that wa do not

sagard invasion of Cuba by the United States as a desirable or useful

couria. But the possibility of such action in given circumstances cannot

bu clininated. The doox should be left open for any action that we and

our allies in the hemisphere may regard as necessary in the future to

counter aggressive moves by the cuban regime.

4. We need to have clearly in mind our position regarding a possi-

bie Intarnal revolt. Ints, too, could be covered in 1 above. We should

evoid statements for the present which could reasonably be expected to

encourage in open revolt. We should avoid for the present anything that

could ba read as a fian pledge to come to the aid of anyone who moves

¿Esinst Castro. We should maice clear, however, that we are prepared to

support and cooperate with any elements. who succeed in ending communist

dominance in Cuba and who are cormitted to establishing in Cuba a free

ard democratic government responsive to. the destres of its own people.

5. We should exploit by available means all evidence of internal

discontent and opposition. Defections from the Cuban regime should be

"exploited extensively and quickly as soon as security considerations are

• nat.

6. The Coordinator. should arange for up-to-date surveys of the

following:

SHERRT

---

## Page 174

13-00000

a) prograns now underway in tha paychological field;

b) U.S. capabilities in this field with a view to exposing any

obvious remediable gaps in our resources for conducting a sigal-

ficant psychological effort against Cuba;

c) Castro's propaganda machine--how does it work? how wich effort

goes into 1t? how can wa weaken it?

ã) major lines of the Cuban propaganda offensive--favorite themes,

techniques, principal targets, etc.;

e) current position of castro and his regime in Latin America--

main areas of influence, by country and by groups.

i) the past record on leaflet drops--how effective, advantages of

plane vs, balloon drops, comparison of delivery by other means,

possibilities of such a program being used to attack us in the

UN or among the Cuban people.

Themes for Infornation Programs

Information nedia should exploit the following themes to the max-

in extent practicable. Hard data supporting these themes should be

spotted on a day-to-day basis and used. Connentaries and discussions

shouid be scilored to take full advantage of these attitudes.

(So Cuban audiences)

1. Castrolen is doomed; it is on the slippery slope to oblivión.

200p.

---

## Page 175

13-00000

" Cuba 1s an unvilling ixsizument of Soviet policy, subject to

the waims and moods of a foreiga power..

3.

Moscow will use Cuba as it sees fit and for its own purposes,

giving nelp aid withdrawing it to suit the Kremlin's dasires.

4o Castro

has isolated his country fron Its traditional friends,

from the hemisphere in wnich its roots of history, culture,

religion, and well-being are.sunk..

5. Commmism has failed to solve the problems of Cuba--has lowered ?

rather than raised its standard of living.

6. The Cuban revolution has been perverted and betrayed.

7. Freadon, ladependence and diversity are the "wave of the future."

(To Latin American audiences)

1. Use the above

as appropriate.

2. Cestro and the Russians are using Cuba as a base for subversion,

espionage and sabotage against neighboring states.

3.. Castrolen promises bloodshed; terror and economic stagnation.

4. The Hemisphere's most promising course is vigorous efforts to

achieve the goals of the Alliance for Progress.

(Io Soviet and Bloc audiences)

1. The zoove as appropriate.

---

## Page 176

13-00000

2. Cuba r-presents a steady drain on already limited Soviet and

slas resources; every shipment to Cuba means things do got appear

on soviet shelves.

3.

Castro really supports the Chinese, not Moscow; he is using

soviet help to promote Castroism not Moscow's policy.

Ira above lists do not pietend to be exhaustive. They are but the

baginning of a catalog of themes we can exploit. in our information and

propaganda offensive.

---

## Page 177

13-00000

It is the judgement of the Coordinator that this annex covering

intalligence and covert actions should be subnitted separately after the

Executiva Comnittea reaches a conclusion on the overall psychological

program and the attributable activities set forth in Amex A.

See par

dore

..: T.S. 00-51

---

## Page 178

13-00000

Suwais

DATE RECEIVED

DATE OF DOCUMENT NUMBER OF COPIES

DÓCURENT RECORD

2-11-63

(AR 380-5)

LOCAL TA CONTROL MUMBER I applicablo)

IS 0051

OFFICE OR HEADQUARTERS OF ORIGINA TOR

TYPE OF DOCUMENT AND ADORESSERLS)

COPY NUMERIS)

none

Ms. Califano

UNCLASSIFIEO SUBJEET OR SHORT TITLE

Draft Memo for NSC Exec. Comte

Psychological Program in Support of U.S. Policy on Cuba

NUMBER ANO DESCRIPTION OF INCLOSURES TÓ DOCUMENT Indiedo addillon ond/ or dolalion al incloturos mill deleo)

Annex A (5 pgs) and Annex B (1 p8)

DISTRIBUTION DATA

AODRESSEE (Print or type)

I copY NO.

DATE OF DISTRIBUTION

AODRESSEE (Print or typo)

FOR:

CHECK

INTRA -OFFICE ROUTING DATA

SUSPENSE DATE

*

DACTION CINFORMATION

TO

Mr. Gattfeno

NAMES OF ALL PERSONS HANDLING ATTACHED DOCUMENT OR WHO HAVE BEEN INFORMED OF ITS CONTENT WILL BE LISTED BELOW

NAME (Prit or typo)

NAME (Print or sypa)

1. Cartor

2=11-63

DA. FM 969

FOITION OF 1 JAN SO IS OBSOLETE.

REORADED UNCLASSIPIED WHEN SEPARATED PROM

CLASSIFIED INCLOSURES

---

## Page 179

13-00000

SECRET

13 may 1163

SUBJECT: Future Cuban Leadership

INTRODUCTION

separately and in advance of the policy study; however, in the

event no pressing requirement exists, it is suggested that this

handled on a closely held basis.

REASON FOR PROPOSAL

Following ate listed a number of indications that the leader-

ship question will be addressed in the near future:

Revolutionary & l to nation of U.9 rest to the Cuban

exile groups in the U.S. and elsewhere will be vying for recogaition

and support in an attempt to fill this void.

b. There has been constant pressure on the U.S.

of this political and psychological pressure.

c. This proposal could serve to reduce the bickering

among exile groups and may serve to resolve some of the problems

of Cuban exile unification.

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING

DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES HOT APPLY

---

## Page 180

13-00000

SECRET

The proposal could emphasize the development

native "David" in opposition to Castro, the Cuban "Goliath. " Th

could serve the U.S. image by making Castro the "Goliath" rather

than the "David" who opposes the "North American Giant. "

making premature The proposal could ere to a ravat da Vie roa

and could be used as a device to test exile response

to control future are pro of could or aroup the a a polita

ideologies).

3. This proposal could permit the U.S. on a progres.

sive basis to influence the idealogies of the resistance and thus to

influence the platform of a future Cuban Government.

The publicity associated with the prolonged existence

of a resistance in Cuba can serve to delay the furtherance of the de

facto recognition of the present Cuban Regime.

OBJECTIVE

To create an imaginary leader of image of resistance in Cuba.

This image would serve as a focal point for resistance directed against

Castro by Cubans or Latin Americans.

DEVELOPMENT

An imaginary name of a resistance leader could be developed

attle age in adar of a terry dean ator, a name a cate with

should typify a person who is friendly to the Cuban people, is anti-

communist, is willing to fight against the Regime, and in little-but

tough.

There is no requirement for a detailed staff study In order

2

---

## Page 181

13-00000

SECRET sonsItIve

to determine this name.

"The Little Bull, " "The Little Worm, "

''The Friendly Worm," "The Fighting Friend," "The Tough Peasant, "

of any such name which is acceptable and meaningful in Spanish

could suffice.. Over a period of several months the name could be

"dropped" or leaked through U.S. officialdom, in diplomatic channele,

in intelligence channels of within the Cuban exile community. Specific

acts against the Regime could be credited to this individual of mem-

bers of his group. Communications could be arranged between thie

individual and his subordinates to be picked up elther by Castro's

censors of by, radio intercept in Cuba or in the U.S.

fter a period of time, all unexplained incidents and action

or which credit has not been seized by some other exile group woul

automatically be ascribed to our imaginary friend. At some point ir

ime it could be leaked that the U.S. is, in fact, supporting thir

imaginary persos. Similarly, other Latin American countries may,

without inducement, publicly follow the U.S. pattern.

During the course of this operation it is quite possible that the

Castro Regime could indicate that the activities of this individual were

terminated, that the individual was captured, that he was being pur -

sued, or that he was an imaginary faker or fraud. Such action would

only serve to further publicize the actions of the individual and so long

as resistance in general continued the fame of our "Cuban Kilroy"

would spread. Humorous antica could be credited to our imaginary

friend and rumors of his exploite of bravery (ala Zoro) could be

circulated.

At some point in time it may be wise to indicate what this

individual stands for.

(It will become obvious that he is opposed to

the Regime in Cuba.) It could be possible to indicate little-by-little

his political platform in very general termas - realizing that the

mistique and the "generalness" connected with his operation is, in

fact, the power behind the operation. Ultimately, Cubans and othera

may demand that be proclaim his complete political views or even

that he present himself physically. Since this is not desirable,

3

CUP SECRET SETTIVE

---

## Page 182

13-00000

arrangements could be made to have selected individuals meet

with bis appointed representative. His instructions and words

could be relayed to the public by many means.

through his disavowals.

While this scheme is replete with gimmickery, it imple-

mentation could be undertaken in a relatively short period of time.

Sensitivity of this scheme is such that the knowledge should be hel

on the tightest basis and if implemented, those proposing shoul

not be informed. In the event the scheme is compromised, (unless

knowledge is widespread) there is little need for plausible deniability;

however, once used and compromised the scheme can hardly be

reinstated. A major advantage in that this image can be created

over a long period of time or developed rapidly without a political

or economic commitment on the part of. the U.S. There may be a

point at which the U.S. could no longer disavow collaboration with

this imaginary person. This point, however, is so distant that

Juring any point in the intervening period it would be possible fo:

he U.S. to disengage easily without suffering embarrassment o

loss of prestige.

---

## Page 183

13-00000

CONCLUSION

Based on a consideration of factors indicated above, it

appears that the U.S. should immediately undertake to implement

this proposal, determining at 30 to 60 day future intervals what

additional action should be taken to improve, reduce, or change

the image during the subsequent 30 or 60 day period.

James. Patree

Lt Colonel,

USA

5

---

## Page 184

13-00000

+ 199590

-з =.

SECRE

22 May 1962

SENSITIVE

MEMOXANRUM FOR GENERAL LANSDAL"

•." -:

From:

Lt. Colonel Patchell

Subject: Psychological Operations Group

Following is a briel "sun-down" of meeting on paychological

operations at State, 21 May 1962. The medtings are normally held

each Monday at 1430, Attendeen inclade: Bob Smith of Kerrait 3rown

(USIA): Seymour Boltoi (CIA): Colonel Wade Robert (DOD); Harvey

Summ (Cuba Desk Olficer - State), Böb Hurwitch, Dick Phillipe (Pablic

Alíairs Advisos of Martin's Bureau of Inter-American Ällaire - State)

and Leon Curtle (Bureau of Intelligence and Reseasch - State).

Subjecte discused included:

(1) Prosities of work - Cubs, Western Hemisphere, U.S.

in that order.

(2) Publication of document on conditions in Caban Univer-

sitles received from Cuban exile group (DRE) - CIA to chock authenticity

and whether document is outdated.

(3) Radio SWAN - CIA studying proposod changes.

(1) USIA reported three commentarios put out on Cuban

Independence Day.

15) On the Axmatrong Circle Theates, USIA atates this

"hung up" for $15, 000 coot of translation. It was decided in meoting to

push on to get it translated - and in the meanwhile to get Miro Cardona's

speech into wido circulation.

(6) State suggested that speeches in Cube (Rodrigues. Castro,

and others) within past week indicated moves away. from collectivization

to free enterptive and mentionad intipathy of people to idea and name of

cooperatives. Usta to puel on this and to prepare releases on it.

SENCITIVE

SECRET

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC

REGRADING: DOD DIR 5200.10

DUES NOT APPLY

---

## Page 185

13-00000

TOR-SECRET

SENSITIVE

(7) CIA to declassify the Sovlet nickel contract with Cuba

which exposes Sovlet colonialism • for wide distribution in Latin America

thröugh Emibsianios and USIA and lor ude by CIA la Cuba.

low key stuff to develop ridicule.

(9) GiA to find out from refugees what appeals best, what

they read, what they llaten to, etc.

(10) USLA and ClA to play up the March UBIA survey which

aboma Cantro's popularity in Latim America on the decline.

(11) On Zoth of July, State suggested cave be used to avoid

discussing. 26th of July movement as Commy - to clearly differentiate

between originel Zoth of July movement and ite prliciples - and the be-

trayal. CIA requested State's guidance on policy and State'& help on

providing material. State provided the attached and indicated that its use

Is within polley (I have noted some particularly hard hitting sfull - lí used

properly).

(12) A number of important events and dates in June and July

were discussed to include Caribbean Games, Peace Festival, Khrushchev

Rocket statement, and Castro'a "Cordillera of the Andes" statement.

USIA and ClA to prepare information on these.

(13) Stato asked CIA to prepare a catalogue of admisalon of

fallures of the Castro Rogime, a liat of production promises, and a report

of bloc people in key positions.

All were asked to bring ideas lato sext

week's meeting to be used to exploit 26th of July to our advantage.

(14) This office will be placed on distribution of sainutes of

the meetings.

2

SENSITIVE

- SECRET

---

## Page 186

13-00000

SERRET

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

1 June 1962

SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL LANEDALE

From:

Lt. Col. Patchell

Subjoct:

Paychological Operations Grqup.

Meeting held at 1430 hours on 28 May 62 with Mr. Hurwitch

and Ms. Simm of State, Bolton of CIA, Smith of USIA, and myself

attending. Tollowlag lo a summary of subjecte discussed!

(1) CIA roked Stato to provido à claritication ol personalities

and groups to be supported - this came up in connection with a die-

CUBBion of CRC and newspaper stories on its change in leaderahip.

(2) The Armstrong Circlo Theater morio has book okayed

for Spanish language publication and distribution.

(3) On the "Eyewitness to History" program of 25 May 62 -

because of the type of movie - USIA to look at carafully and deter-

mine whether useful for replay (1 will be invited to attend).

(1) CIA using theme for farmers not to produce • okayed.

(5) On declassification of Cuba - Soviet trade agreement

CLA has been unable to obtain, but should produce 800n.

(6) CIA guidance now being propared los paychives to liat

priorities as followe: (8) Cuba, (b) Latin America, (6) rest of world.

Draft copies will be brought to next meeting for informal review.

(7) On the DRE publication "White Book on University Problems

in Cuba" - 2,000 copies each are being printed in Chile in English,

French, and Spanish. CIA to take action to make avallable la summary

form for Latin nemspapers and student publications.

(8) On the CRC publication "Cuba Nueva" - presently going

only to exile community.

CIA to look into getting it into Latin America

and Cuba - money appears tó be no problem.

SENSITIVE

IRA-SECRET

---

## Page 187

13-00000

P SEGRET

SENSITIVE

(9) State suggested exploitation by USIA and CIA of iteme

appearing in the FBIS dally summary.

arrangements is put us on distribution, litousing and labor a made

the Alliance For Progross. State indicated that & correction was being

made to show that Moscoso was misquoted.

(11) State suggested that Castro's 11 April speech (which was

not released until May) had many exploitable points - - corruption.

failure to suggest unity - labor - State sent to ClA for research people

to work on.

(12) Item

(13) CIA after looklag at symbole etc, has about dacided that

the "worm" ln preferable to the "leh" and that it has beet popularized

by Castro and we should take advantage of it. Both ClA and USIA will

develop further the worm idea. It. Col. Patchell suggested relating

it to such expresaions as "the worm will tura" - 11 applicable ta Cuba

and associating it will biblical quotations such as "Their worm shall

not die, and their fire sball not be quenched" - lva 6624 or"As a moth

doth by a garment, and a worm by the wood, so the sadness of a man

consumeth the heart" - Prov. 25.20. USIA to take action.

COMMENT!

In the two prevlous mosting. I have developed sulfielent rapport

so that I can now get actions taken willoat too much queation. This

next meeting i propose to introduco a ayatem ol suspense datos so that

the "we are looking into" or "we are conaldering" are replaced by

"we will moet the suspense" -- this may be difficult at first, but feel

it can be managed.

2

SENGITIVE

TOR SECRET

---

## Page 188

13-00000

SECRE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

6 June 1962

BENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL LANSDALE:

From: Ib. Colonel Patchell

Subject: Paychological Operations Group

Meeting held 1430-1450 on 4 June 1962. Attended by Ms.

Hurwitch, Mr. Phillips, MT. Summ, and Mr. Curtle (State),

Ms. Bolton (CLA), Mr. Smith (USIA), and mycelf. Following le

a summary ol discrianion sterio::

(1) USIA will provide advance notice of TV programie

schoduled so Cuba.

(2) Free Cuban Group (DRE) has arranged fos Atrong

representation at African International Student Mesting in Canada

27-28 June.

They will surface coples of report on student conditions

in Cuba. They asked for no advance publieity - then big "follow up"

- - State and CIA coordinating to include preparation of releases

to U.S. press.

(3)

CIA has looked at CRC's mailing lists for vardous types

of info, to include the publication "Cuba Nueva," They find lists

most elaborate,. complete and well organised for each parpose.

(4): USIA reporte they are on top of stosies pointing out

10se al righto by workere la Cuba, USIA provided sample coples ol

theis dally wise output and of weekly mail output for me to look at in

greater detail. (I will report separately on thia.)

(5) Much exploitable info in Castro's speech on housing -

corruption, mavallability etc. USIA and CIA to exploit.

(6) CIA reported that the Latin American edition of Time

Maya a cat ba goa la Time Meet dot anal 0% purpose

of exploiting Blas Roca story.

SENSITIVI

SE GETH

---

## Page 189

13-00000

70R-SECRET

SENSITIVE

(1) Reports of huager strikes etc, at IBle of Pines prison

to be played up by USIA, (Berne'e cable 527).

Copies of cartoon booke and other publications were

requented by bi. Col. Patchell.

(9) USIA reguested to provida into on the public opiaton

poll conducted and schedules for future polls.

Seymour Bolton privately anked me to inform you that subject to

any comment from you, he was using the approach on pay war that

the means of dellvory would not be tied to attribution.

Although 1t

might be more contentent to wosk completely through the CRC, he

bellered that we should reserve lexibility by organising the "plpellies"

and then patting still in from CRC,. or other Cuban organisationt, ae

well as atuff created by the U.S., with of without signatures of attrl-

bution. He feels that such control would beat insure that we sont in

just what was needed and no more or no less.

SENSITIVE

MAR SECRET

---

## Page 190

13-00000

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINOTON 25, D.C.

12 June 1962

SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL LANSDALES

From:

Lt. Col. Patchell !?

Subject: Psychological Operations Group

Meeting held 1430-1600 on 11 June 1962. Attended by Mr.

Hurwitch, Mr. Summ, and Mi. Wells (substituting for Mi. Curtis

from R&l-State); Mr. Bolton (CIA); Mr. Smith (USIA); and Lt. Col.

Patchell. Following is a summary of discussion items.

(1) CLA has translated and declassified Soviet-Cubar

Trade Agreement and passed to Mt. Hurwitch for publication ani

use.

(2) Lt. Col. Patchell pointed out that the Cuban increase

of delegates to 330 to Helsinki Eighth World Youth and Student Festival

"for reasons of an imperative nature" should be acted upon and full

use made of report on student conditions which will be surfaced at the

Canadian regional meeting. Bolton assured me that action was being

aken. NOTE: After the meeting Bolton said the same group of

people were working on both and that "extensive" work was being done

on Helsinki. I asked him to be sure it was on Cubans in Helsinki --

not just Helsinki.

(3) USIA agreed to look at clippings on Cuba with view

to broader distribution in Latin America -- as requested by. Lt. Col.

Patchell.

CIA will present a document next week on guidance.

with respect to Cuba.

and when do we see?

that Havana was going back to horse-drawn trolleys because of motor

transport shortages. Mr. Wells added that previously horse-drawn

transport was not permitted in Havana. All to look into this for possible

exploitation.

SENSITIKE

EXCLUDED FROU AUTOMATIC

REGRADING: DOD DIR 5200.10

DOES NOT APPLY

---

## Page 191

13-00000

FOR SECRET

NOIT IE

(6) Lit. Col. Patchell brought up comparison betweer

Hitler's speech after the wisuccessful Beer Hall Pustch and Castro'e

"History Will Absolve Me Speech" following his abortive attempt.

CIA will look into this - both for research and whether suitable for

propaganda purposes.

(7) Since the title "Doctor" adds some respect to Castro's

name

- all agencies will push toward referring to him primarily as

a name

he Prime Minister or secondarily as Fidel Castro. « WelcigA

of more

pect:

(8) A USIA report indicated that Cuba had increased its

radio propaganda output by 60% over the past few months.

USIA

stated that FBIS (Foreign Broadcast Information Service) has added

Cuba to the list of Bloc Countries, which -- subjects Cuba to periodic

research and analysis reports and broadcast trends. (See FBIS Report,

"Operational Developments in Foreign Broadcasting" Number 355,

dated 6 June 1962.)

(9) CIA reported additional people had been placed in

their research department to make content analyses on Cuba.

(10) State has received two articles from New Delhi written.

by an Indian reporter who visited Cuba in the early months of 1959 and

recently revisited Cuba. These reports are good for the "before" and

"after" content and will be publicized. State asked USIA to look for

others who visited in the early days of the Castro Regime - - who might

be encouraged on a selective basis to return and make a comparison.

Is Craig aware?

complaints against U.S. actions at Guantanamo and it looked as though

DORs

Cuba was building up a case againet the U.S, for future use in the U. N.

Noug

or world opinion medias. State has asked Navy to provide similar

hove

sullaints for possible exploitation.

g information for use by State and will present information to the group (l

3532

what ore.

(12) USIA unable to report on Miro Cardona's speech in

May?

Costa Rica.

ClA reported that it had been carried in papers in Costa

Rica and had been broadcast by the Voice of America and several Miami

Spanish language stations.

19 a vegeta a alete ento teleno!

handling a select number of items.

SENSITIVE

FOR SECRET

---

## Page 192

13-00000

• SECRLT-NOrUiN

"Tiz-hnnbt

ANDLENE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON 25. D.tc

• 18 Jume 1982

SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR CENERAL LANEDALE "

dor deudttnos

From:

Lt. Gol. Patähell

Subject: Paychologienl Oporatlond Giroup

FATEHE

The mestlg held 1430-1600 on 18 June was ättended by Mr.

Hurwltch, Mi, Bast. Wollé, Ms. Samira, and Ms.. Phillipa (Sthte),

Ms. Boltan (CIAno Ms. Bob Bralth (USLA), and It: Ool Petchall.

(1.) ClA diutribarod coplos of a studont booklet (Engliah and

F'rasch voraions attachod): Thirty-thonsand coples mero pristed

I1 SPATIBA, IIMNOL, LNGUBI. ANO FOMNGUBBO. IN. Chilo + BONBOTPC

by a Instin, Amostoan sadent oxganiration, and primatllgidor Latin

sudlendas:

The booklete will be used on tour.of Latins la ATIlA

and ware distributed throughout Iatly Amorica and at intorastlönal

youth and student mastingn ia suabee and Helninkd.. Some coples

will be malled into Cubo.

(2.) CIA presented dralt guldaliaas fos ovexaeza poste se

The group mado some minor changes. The guldolines are PRIMARILY

FORUSE

(3.) stato will pot out a aimllar olrealas to sto posta, and USLA

will considor dolns the samo.

(4.) Ronsdup roposts ol ovorocss statlone on setlono asé due

withln 7 daya after 26 July. They sse to cable sigaliicant'sctlans

immodiataly.

(5.). Haswitah diatsibutad coplos of a draft cablo intoindod to

explalt Cardenas Incident (dopy attached).

(6.) L1. Col. Patchall aakod fall axploitation of Moxloan

defoctos • suggesting ippaatance bolate OAS Committaa.. trip

through Latin Amastea, oto.

EXCLUDED FROS AUTOMAtIC

REGRADING: DOD DIR 5200, 10

DOES HOT APPLY

SENSITIVE

SEORET- NOFORN

SPECIAL HANDLING

This document contains & pages.

вору No... X

_0r 2

coptos. Sap100-

---

## Page 193

13-00000

SPECIAL HANDLING

(7.) The Group was informed that Mr. Grant (St. Loule

Poat-Dlapatah), Tad Saule, and & sumbes of other sewsmen

were attempting to got into Havana for the 26 July colebration.

Depending on the individuel altration, thate people will be

beltsad and dobried

XCLA

(8.) State will obtain coples ol seporte from the Britleb,

Italias, Heat. German and other Allied Embassios In Havana

10x diatributios to members of this group.

(9.) CIA docad to hare Cuben Exabassy sopresentatives in

other Istin American statos confronted With. Gastro promioes

and artod for comment fox publiostion no refusala and "no case.

ments": to bis publleized.

1N849.

40) Ust reported that Cardense seldont played to smos

Saturday evening and four times Suaday over VOA

al GuantanarDo.

11, a proudod flim on Carpentor fleat 10r use on IV

SENDITIVE

...

---

## Page 194

13-00000

*SECRET

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON 23, D.C.

26 June 1962

07 11

182.

SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL LANSDALE

from!

"It. Col. Patchell"

Subject: Paychological Operations Group

Meeting held at 1430 on 25 Juno 1962 was attended by Ms. Hurwitch

(State), Mr. Robert Follested (aubatituting for Harvey Summ-Stato),

Bob Smith (USLA), John Tllton (eubatitating for Seymour Bolton-CIA).

and Lt. Gol. Patchell. Following iteras discuseed:

8. State to seck ant! -Castro press elippinge from othes luatio

American countries for replay.

b. USIA is latribating confidential memorandum, "The Impact

of Castro on Merlean Priblic Opinion and Some Indications, of Attitados

Toward the U.s. and the USIR" (LA-3, Feb 62). This repost, although

dated Feb 62, la just now coming out - it reportedly shows a aignificant

decrease of Castro popularity In Mexico.

.

CIA was asked whether the reports of Cuban communist

interference with other Latin communist parties could be exploited.

d. Deeded to direct propaganda into Cuba which le designed to

destroy the imago of Cuban success throughout the hemlephere. Also to

direct propaganda denigaed to atrors that Cuba le belng "uned", by the USSR.

a. Steto pointed out the value of Preaident'» trip to Mesico talo

woek end to point up US-Mexico solidarity, (Noted thit Hurwitch withdrew

considerably from bla laltial position - Cubs not mentioned as a point of

solidarity).

1. CIA de tranelatlag Theodore Draper's book Into Spasiah 103

dissemination sa a papor back in Latin America.

8. Decided to play back lato Cuba administrative "goofs" by

Cubans on transportation asrangements for youtha of other Lstia countries

to celebrations, (some left penniless and stranded in Carlbbean).

1:

SENSITIVE

TOP SECRET

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC

REGRADING: DOD DIR 5200.10

• DOES HOT APPLY

---

## Page 195

13-00000

HER SECRET

SENGITIVE

I: The Cultural people la State aro solzed with problem of

Jamaican Games. I suggented other athletes for frei Cuba or other

poreonalities. " That we should at least make an laventory to ane

what we have avallable. It la noted that Oubane are out to min" .

What in now being accomplished is not good arough.

1. CIA working with Navy on declaselfleation of USSR-Cuba

Trade Agreement.

SENSITIVE

TOP SECRET.

---

## Page 196

13-00000

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTOM 23, D.C.

3 July 1962

SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL LANSDALE (LAS seCU)

From: It. Col. Patchell CAUS

Subject: Psychological Operations Group

Meeting held from 1100.to. 1300.on 3 July 1962 with the

following in attendance: Bob Smith (USIA), Seymour Bolten (CIA),

Bob,Hurwitch, Bob Fallestad, Al Carter, and Bart. Wells (State)

and It. Col. Patchell: Following are higblights of discussion.

a. State is providing. coples of report from Britiah

Imbassador to Cuba MARCHAND. Report made after absence.o

monthe from his post in Cuba. Copyattached - Me Mellied

b.

State has recelved letters explaining dotalls of

portions

Cardenas incident.- passed to CIA and USIA for action.

c. CIA to obtain more information on outbreak in ALCANO

which is being suppressed by Cuba.

d. CIA provided copies. of study. on promises and fallures

of Castro regime..- it. has been distributed to CIA stations overseas.

State and USIA to look at.with view to providing copies to international

organizations and State and USIA representalven overseas: Cop galludhe

o. In vlew of uncertainty expressed in messages from

Poland, Czechoslovalda, East Germany, and UAR about stability.of

Cuban economy and attempts to collect.funds to assist Cuba - CIA

to play on theme of Cuba as poor investment etc. behind iron curtain.

f. Defector who was formerly, Cuban.economic attache in

Moscow being debriefed - he was held for 16 months in Argentine

Embassy in Havana and for this reason much of. hia information is

dated.

CIA to expedite his assessment.

g. On Cuban economic defector from Mexico - still being .

interrogated and assessed with view to looking.at his ability. to stand

SENSITIVE

TOP SECRET

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC

REGRADING: DOD DIR 5200.10

DOES NOT APPLY

---

## Page 197

13-00000

UP SECRET

SENSITIE

up to cross-examination under OAS. State stressed need to

expedite in order to gain impact. CIA can provide.no estimate

of time when assessment will be completed. In Miami, his press

conference indicated Castro. control.of the Mexican provincial police.

h.. On question of intervention - Mexican papers stating

this is Mexican victory, on Cuban issue - this is being replayed by

U.S. papers - leaves a poor impression.

State said this is being

discussed with President and will be covered by: Lincoln White at

•press.conference.today. CIA and USIA agreed that more should be

done. State could not answer. on Cuban talks.- unknown. how deeply

;Cuba was covered and whether the question of diversion of U.S.

good or movement of people were discussed. Any hint of Mexican

victory will be demoralizing to people in Cuba:- exile community -

and Latin America in general.

1. Following the meeting Mr. Hurwitch indicated that

State and CIA representatives would meet with CAB officials con-

cerning. PAA flights to Havana.

SENSITIVE

HOP SECREL

---

## Page 198

13-00000

HE SECRET -NOF ORN

SPEGIAL HANDLING

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINATON 28, D.Q..

Our Hand sint

ital Patchill -

11 July 1962

SENCITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL LANSDALE

From: It. Col. Patchell

Subject: Psychological Operations Group

Following is brief of meeting held from 1430-1530 ox: 9 July 62

with the following in attendance: Robert Hurwitch, Harvey Summ,

Juan Gurrell, and Al Caxtér (State), Böb Smith (USIA), John Tilton

(CLA), and Lit. Col. Patchell.

Swiss article:

A Swies publication bas a very fine article in

detail on Cuba - by Swiss reporter who spent several months in

Cuba - USIA to replay. .

Clipping service. Good immediate reaction to clipping service

being provided..

26th of July. Group agreed to "jack up" machinery for informa-

tion on activities.and I. A. reaction to 26th of July.

CRC Political Platform. State provided members with copies

of a CRC political platform (attached)

Little publicity has been

attached to document. CIA will check to see if it in a document

for internal or exterpal distribution. (Note: Following the meeting,

I asked Mr. Hutwitch to consider this in connection with his guide-

lines paper, depending upon its validity and usefultess. He stated

he belleved the two were in consonance, but would check:)

Cuban Protests.

Discussion of Cuban protests. Believed that

the publication of protests may be leading up to justification for

receipt of defensive weapons. (Note: This fits.1n. with MI. Bill

Harvey's earlier remarks on the same general subject.) State is

responding to protests. and queries in low key.

EXCLUDED FROM AUTONATIC

REGRADING: DOD DIR $200.10

DOES HOT APPLY

OR SECKET NOFORN

SPECIAL HANDLING

Copy No.

_ooples. Series.

---

## Page 199

13-00000

SECRE

TIMEORIL

FCIAL HANDLING

British Newsman.

Will meet with State representatives. at

1430 on I1 July. Others invited. Thie individual was formerly

. a Communist.

Chinese Opium Technicians. On report of Chinese techni-

cians to assist Cubans in opium growing. Lt. Col. Patchellisug-

gested CIA get declassified and publicized as quickly as possible.

Overall Evaluation. All to take a look at orientation of group -

Its purpose, missions, methods of carrying out tasks to see what

changes are required for period starting l August 1962, of after

new NIE is published.

Note: From the time that I joined the group on 21 May, the

group's orientation has changed from a general Latin American

psychological operations group. to one focused on Cuba, My own

personal objective is now to get the output extended beyond Latia

America - into NATO, the uncommitted areas, eastern Europe,

Japan, etc.

Visit of James B. Donavan.

* Following the meeting, Mr.

Hurwitch gave me the attached memorandum of conversation with

MI. Donovan.

.......

SPECAL HANBLINE

... "

---