Originator: SSCIA
From: WALLACH, PAUL
To: SMOTHERS, CURT
Document date: 07/16/1975
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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157-10014-10238

JFK Assassination System

Identification Form

Agency Information

Date:

7/7/2015

AGENCY : SSCIA

RECORD NUMBER: 157-10014-10238

RECORD SERIES: MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M-143

Document Information

ORIGINATOR: SSCIA

FROM: WALLACH, PAUL

TO: SMOTHERS, CURT

TITLE :

DATE: 07/16/1975

PAGES:

296

SUBJECTS :

CIA

OPERATION MONGOOSE

LANSDALE, EDWARD

GILPATRIC, ROSWELL

DOCUMENT TYPE: REPORT

CLASSIFICATION: Declassified

RESTRICTIONS: IB; 1C

CURRENT STATUS: Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/17/2000

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS :

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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA

RECORD NUMBER

157-10014-10238

RECORDS SERIES

MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

07-M-143

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR

SSCIA

FROM

WALLACH, PAUL

TO

:

SMOTHERS, CURT

TITLE

DATE: 07/16/75

PAGES

: 296

SUBJECTS

: GILPATRIC, ROSWELL

OPERATION MONGOOSE

CIA

LANSDALE, EDWARD

DOCUMENT TYPE : REPORT

CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET

RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED

CURRENT STATUS : POSTPONED IN FULL

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 01/21/99

OPENING CRITERIA

COMMENTS :

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

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July 16, 1975

TO :

From:

Re:

Curt Smothers

Paul Wallach

Roswell Gilpatric:

Comparison of Staff Interview

(7/7/75) and Sworn

Testimony

(7/8/75)

Set forth below are certain observations and

comments based upon our July 7, 1975, interview of

Roswell Gilpatric and his sworn testimony I took the

very next day.

Our initial questioning revealed that Gilpatric

literally has no present recollection of Operation Mongoose

or, for that matter, any U. S./Cuban operations undertaken

during his tenure as Under Secretary of Defense with the

exception of a vague recollection of sabotage operations

targeted against Cuba. Indeed, Gilpatric did not recall

either that there was a Chief of Operations for Cuba or

that his old friend Lansdale "directed" Cuban operations

for the SGA.

My notes indicate that during the course of our

July 7, 1975, interview, Gilpatric indicated that he had

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no present recollection of:*

1. Gen. Lansdale playing any role whatsoever

in U.S. /Cuban operations during his tenure as Under Secre-

tary of Defense. (Gilpatric restated this under oath on

July 8; see Testimony, p. 23.) After reviewing numerous

documents which demonstrated Lansdale's participation,

Gilpatric surmised that his lack of "Lansdale recollection"

stemmed from Lansdale's "low profile" at Special Group

(Augmented] meetings and Gilpatric's preoccupation with

other matters;

2. Gilpatric has

no recollection whatsoever

of the term "Mongoose";

3. Gilpatric could not

attribute any special

meaning to the Special Group [Augmented]. However, he did

recall that there were certain Special Group meetings

where Robert Kennedy was in attendance.

Despite our reviewing certain relevant documents

with Gilpatric, his recollection was not substantially

refreshed. After some two hours we reached the determina-

tion that in view of his "diminished recollection" his

r...

* It is instructive to note that Gilpatric's recollection

coincided with that reflected in the Rockefeller Commis-

sion's interview

summary dated June 3, 1975.

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testimony would be of little, if any, value to the Com-

mittee. However, in order to ensure that Mr. Gilpatric's

recollection (or lack thereof) was made a matter of record,

we scheduled single Senator testimony for the morning of

July 8, 1975.

As I mentioned yesterday, Mr. Gilpatric's

recollection of certain of the aforementioned topics was

substantially greater at his July 8th deposition. Indeed,

Mr. Gilpatric recalled a great deal about Gen. Lansdale's

participation in Cuban operations (i.e., Mongoose) and

numerous details relating to Special Group (Augmented]

activities.

Surprisingly enough, Gilpatric's recollection

was refreshed as to matters that were neither discussed

during the prior day's interview nor set forth or reflected

in the documents we reviewed with him during the interview.

For example, Gilpatric testified in detail as

to operational

aspects of the Special Group (Augmented], the implementation

and various stages of Operation Mongoose, and Administration

pressure to "do something about Castro". However, what

looms even larger is

that Gilpatric -- who only a day prior

to his sworn testimony told us that he did not recall Gen.

Lansdale being involved at all in Cuban operations -- was

able to testify to, inter alia, the following:

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Page 23, line 4.

Mr: Wallach. Mr. Gilpatric,

going back to the conversations that you had

with Mr. Smothers yesterday, is it correct

that before we actually showed you documents

and

refreshed your recollection that you really

had no recollection that Gen. Lansdale was in-

volved with any Cuban operations.

Mr. Gilpatric. That is right.

I had lost track in my own memory of the fact that

after he finished up the vietnam job for me in the

spring of 1961, and left off that assignment, that

he was later on brought back and made Chief of

Operations.

Page 24, line 16. Mr. Wallach.

Was it really,

then, the function of the Special Group [Augmented]

to come up with ideas or to receive ideas from the

Agency and to consider them?

Mr. Gilpatric. It was generally

to stimulate a more vigorous course of action than

Director had a large part in stimulating thinking

among the group and the ideas that were sent out

to the Agency for further study and work.

Page 27, line l.

Mr. Wallach.

Do. you recall if

Gen. Lansdale had his own staff?

Mr. Gilpatric. He had an office

with a number of assistants.

I don't recall any

names except the name HAND which came up yesterday

and came back to my mind as a result.

Mr. Wallach. Do you recall how

large the staff was?

Mr. Gilpatric. It couldn't have

been more than half a dozen, because he drew on

the resources of the various elements in the Pentagon,

including the Joint Staff or the Air Force if he need-

ed more assistance.

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28, line 24.

Mr. Wallach. Do you recall

what

Gen. Lansdale's relationship was with the CIA

when he worked on the Cuban operation?

Mr. Gilpatric. I never detected

any friction or any difficulty between them.

It

certainly didn't exist in the Agency, the same sort

of distrust or question about Lansdale as expressed

in the State Department, as I explained earlier.

Despite our questioning and document review, it

is difficult for me to understand Mr. Gilpatric's immensely

increased recollection. Apparently Gilpatric did discuss

certain of these matters with McNamara over dinner on Mon-

day evening. It would also appear that they reviewed

McCone's 1967 memorandum. However, based upon MCNamara's

present recollection, and upon the length of time McNamara

and Gilpatric spent together Monday evening, I would not

think that the dramatic change in Mr. Gilpatric's recollec-

tion can be attributed to an evening with McNamara.

•..!

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Senator Baker. MI. McNamara, tell us who those people

were that told you who Lansdale worked for and who they claimed

he worked for.

Mr. McNamara. I talked to Max Taylor or Roswell Gil-

patric and to Ed Lansdale himself. The three of them, before

I called the AP, and the reason I did, I was going to ask

the

newspapers to correct my statement, what I thought was a mis-

statement.

Senator Baker.

Who did they say he worked for?

Mr. McNamara. Well, I would rather leave it that they

said he didn't work for me.

Senator Baker.

No, no.

Mr. McNamara. Max Taylor tole me he worked for him.

don't want to draw Max Taylor into this.

The Chairman. General Taylor told us the same thing.

Mr. McNamara. All right.

Senator Schweiker. He has been here.

The Chairman. He told us that.

MI. McNamara. I am not trying to broaden the net. I

don't want to blacken anybody.

Senator Baker. We don't want to blacken anybody. Who

else, if anybody?

Mr. McNamara, Well, all I can tell you, Max Told me that

Lansdale worked for him at the time. Ros Gilpatric told me

that it was his understanding he worked for Max at the time.

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program. I don't know whether the memo referred to it as

such and I am sure, therefore,

that the program in the sense

of the original structure and action to consider what could

be done to weaken the Cuban regime was

authorized by the

President. I don't wish to imply that whatever actions we

took, and I have lost recollection what they were -- I

don't want to imply every one of those individual actions

was authorized by the President. I doubt it very much.

Mr. Schwarz. Was a program to overthrow the Castro

regime authorized?

Mr. McNamara. I think one would phrase it somewhat

definitely. I think a program to weaken the Castro regime

with the hope that it would be overthrown was authorized.

I think that was the objective.

I tried to recall as best I can what the objective was

and I think that is the best expression of it.

Mr. Schwarz. There is a memorandum which is dated

April 13, '62, it in the Taylor Book generally here or not?

Senator Morgan. No.

Mr. Schwarz. I can read the whole thing into the record.

It is a memorandum from Maxwell D. Taylor for the record

April 13, '62.

Subject: Operation MONGOOSE, and it refers

to you, Mr. Secretary, and I would like to ask you to explain,

if you can, what you understand the position attributed to you

to be after it had been read into the record.

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Mr. McNamara.

I can't refresh my memory any more than

I have as to what Gilpatric said.

MI. Smothers.

Let's not make it a tradeoff. My

concern is that, going back to that 30 May conversation, you

recall you said this guy Lansdale, who did he work for.

Mr. McNamara. That is right.

Mr. Smothers. And again Mr. Gilpatric said to you what,

as best you can recall?

Mr. MCNamara. I will refer to my notes again. I

would like to be precise on this. Gilpatric said that in

August of '62 Lansdale was not working for either Gilpatric

or McNamara, he was working for a committee that had something

to do with MONGOOSE, Or what I know called MONGOOSE. He

said I think Cuba covert action. •

Mr. Smothers. Cuba covert action?

MI. McNamara. Covert operation, something like that.

MI. Smothers. You had also testified earlier that you

had had a conversation with several other persons in

an

effort to put together the circumstances surrounding this

August affair?

Mr. McNamara. That is correct.

Mr. Smothers. And you mentioned General Taylor, Mr.

Bundy, and Mr. Rusk. Again recognizing the purpose is not to

have you testify or reveal any confidence, I wonder if you

25

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This is, as I see it, quite a little different approach.

Mr. McNamara. Let me both refer to what I said half

an hour ago and if you don't think I am referring to it

correctly check the record, then also let me refer to this.

A half hour

ago I don't believe we were talking about the

President. What I was discussing was the control by senior of-

Ificials of the Administration of the CIA and I stated that

I believed that there were no major actions undertaken by

CIA that, were not properly authorized by senior officials.

Now, I did not mean to imply by that every major

action taken by CIA was authorized by the President. I think

I very carefully used the term senior officials, and I meant

particularly the members of the 54/12 committee, and through

them I meant myself and Secretary Rusk.

I did not mean to imply the President himself parti-

cipated in a review of or authorization of major actions

of CIA.

Now, I state then that, having said that, I was faced

with a dilemma of the kind you are when you tell me that

assassination attempts have been carried out by CIA, and I

said I have no knowledge of it because I believed that I

would have had knowledge of that kind of event carried out by

CIA, and I believe I would not have only had knowledge, I

believe it would not have been carried out without my author-

ization or the authorization of senior officials reporting to

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Tab 1

Tab 2

Tab 3

Tab 4

7/8/75

7/8/75

10/5/61

undated

Tab 5

Tab 6

Tab 7

Tab 8

Tab 9

1/25/62

3/5/62

3/6/62

3/12/62

3/13/62

INDEX TO GILPATRIC DOCUMENTS

Gilpatric testimony, pp. 5,5-49.

Gilpatric testimony, pp. 77-100

NSAM #100 to Sec. of State from Bundy re

"Contingency Planning for .Cuba."

Memo to Lansdale re "Cuba Project" with reference

to "Memorandum from your Office for Brig. Gen. W. H.

Craig, USA; subj.:

"Special Project," dated 17

January 1962. "

Memorandum for the Record re "Minutes of Special

Group Meeting, 25 January 1962.

Memorandum for the Record re "Minutes of Special

Grou (Augmented) on Project Mongoose, 5 March 1962.

Memo to Dep. Sec. Def. from Craig re "Comments on

the Guidelines for Operation Mongoose."

Tab 10

3/13/62

Tab 11

3/13/62

Tab 12

3/13/62

Tab 13

Tab 14

4/5/62

4/12/62

Memorandum for the Record re "Minutes of the Special

Group (Augmented) Meeting on Project Mongoose, 13

Memo to Dep. Sec. Def. from Craig re "Comments on

CIA's Recommended Changes to the Guidelines for

Operation Mongoose."

Memorandum for the Record re "Minutes of Special

Group (Augmented) Meeting on Project Mongoose,

13 March 1962."

Memo to the Special Group (Augmented) re "Consolidated

sea us Report and pere eatives, caribean Sur-

Memo to Lansdale from Gilpatric re ". meeting of a

Mongoose group next Wednesday afternoon."

Memorandum for the Record re "Minutes of Meeting of

Special Group (Augmented) on Operation Mongoose,

12 April 1962."

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Tab 15

Tab 16

Tab 17

Tab 18

Tab 19

Tab 20

6/14/62

7/31/62

8/3/62

undated

8/10/62

8/13/62

Tab 21

10/4/62

Tab 22

10/26/62

Tab 23

10/31/62

Tab 24

10/31/62

Tab 25

Tab 26

Tab 27

12/3/62

9/6/63

4/14/67

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Memo to Martin, Craig, Harvey, Wilson from Lansdale

"Spontaneous Revolts in Cuba, Contingency Planning."

Memo to Chief of Operations, Mongoose from Harris

"U.S. Contingency Plan No. 2, Cuba (S)."

re

DOD Task #69, "Ideas to beefto course of action B

Unidentified document removed from DOD files.

Minutes of Meeting Special Group (Augmented) on

Operation Mongoose, August 10, 1962.

Memorandum from Gen. Lansdale to William Harvey,

Robert Hurwitch, Gen. Harris, Don Wilson, 8/13/62,

re "Alternate Course B."

Memorandum for the Record re "Minutes of Meeting of

the Special Group (Augmented) on Operation Mongoose,

4 October 1962."

Memorandum for the Record re "Minutes of Meeting of

the Special Group (Augmented) on Operation Mongoose,

26 October 1962.

Memo for the Record by Lansdale re "Outline of Covert

Operations (describing Gilpatric request for outline

negotiations re Cuba)

perations

ceiving task)

Memorandum for the Record by Helms re "Talk with

General Lansdale."

Memo to Bundy from Chase re "Exile Raids - Extent

of Knowledge Within the Executive Branch."

Memo to the Director from McCone.

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TO :

Messrs. Smothers and Wallach

Re:

Roswell Gilpatric -- Short Summary

Date:

July 16, 1975

Gilpatric was

appointed Assistant Secretary of

the Air Force for Materiel in August of 1951 and Under

Secretary of the Air Force in December of 1951. In May of

1953 he returned to private practice in New York, where he

remained until January of 1961 when he was appointed Deputy

Secretary of Defense. He held that office from January 20,

1961, until January 20, 1964, at which time he then return-

ed to private practice in New York City.

As Under Secretary he served as Defense's repre-

sentative on the Special Group and Special Group [Augment-

ed]. The documents establish that Gilpatric was the most

•frequent attendee at the SG and SGA meetings during the

period of "Cuban operations"

Gilpatric also worked closely with Lansdale prior

to the latter's Mongoose involvement. In February, March,

and April of 1961, Lansdale served as Gilpatric's deputy on

his "Vietnam Task Force". It was Gilpatric who at this

time brought Lansdale to the Kennedys' attention.

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Gilpatric's examination should encompass the fol-.

löwing questions and areas:*

The operational structure of the Special Group

and Special Group [Augmentedl, and the Defense's

role in Cuban operations.

Was the policy/approval structure employed by

the Special Group [Augmented] such that the

operational people had authority, albeit implicit,

to formulate and/or initiate plans to assassinate

To what extent were the Special Group (Augmented]

Mongoose plans and/or operations authorized by

or made known to President Kennedy?

The extent of the military's involvement in

Operation Mongoose.

What, if any, plans existed

-- contingency or otherwise - for the invasion

•of: Cuba by U. S. military forces?

Did the Special Group, Special Group

[Augmented],

or any other person or

entity entertain or

approve plans to assassinate Castro or members

of Castro's entourage?

Pertinent Relationships:

General Lansdale

Robert McNamara

Gilpatric was one of the

first Kennedy Administra-

tion people exposed to

Lansdale.

Gilpatric will

testify that he recommended

Lansdale highly to the

Kennedys.

As the Under Secretary of

Defense, Gilpatric worked

closely with Secretary

MCNamara.

Also,. close

relationship still exists,

as exemplified by recent

discussions.

* See Comparison of Gilpatric's Staff Interview (7/7/75)

and Sworn Testimony (7/8/75) enclosed herewith.

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Generals Harris

and Craig

These were the DOD/JCS

representatives to the

Special Group [Augmented].

They also worked out of

the Pentagon and frequently

reported to Gilpatric.

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SECRET - SENSITIVE

COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES

Washington, DC 20500

3

June 1975

Nelson A. Rockefeller,

Chairman

John T. Connor

C. Douglas Dillon

Erwin N. Griswold

Lane Kirkland

Lyman L. Lemnitzer

Ronald Reagan

Edgar F. Shannon, Jr.

David W. Belin,

Executive Director

C-v1-3

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES

SUBJECT:

Operation Mongoose; Interview with Roswell Leavitt

Gilpatrick

On Thursday, May 29, 1975 at 2:30 P.M., I met with

Roswell Leavitt Gilpatrick in his office at Cravat,.. Swaine

and Moore, 1 Chase Manhattan Plaza, New York, New York.

for Materiel in 1951.

Deputy Secretary of Defense.

1. I asked

him whether he could recall any discussions about

actions to be taken against Cuban leaders during the period

he was Deputy Secretary of Defense in 1961 and 1962.

He

answered that he had participated in a number of discussions

with Attorney General Robert Kennedy and Defense Secretary

McNamara after the Bay of Pigs failure.

He also participated

in the discussions held by the 54-12 group. Gilpatrick

recalls discussing plans to disrupt the economy of Cuba

and other ideas about weakening the Cuban government.

The

CIA submitted

the plans to the 54-12 group and the group woüld

approve or reject them.

At no time Gilpatrick said was

any discussion or planning held in his presence concerning

no in a.

an assassination of Castro or other Cuban leaders. Gilpatrick

was very definite about this.

2. I asked Gilpatrick if he recognized the term "Special

Group Augmented."

He said he did not and when I explained

to him that the

"augmented" probably referred to the addition

DI Robert Kennedy to an interligence planning group, he

said that did not help his recollection. Gilpatrick said Kennedy

came to the Pentagon frequently and discussed Latin American

affairs; particularly freeing the prisoners from the Bay of

Pigs.

Gilpatrick said Robert Kennedy did meet occasionally

with the 54-12 group to listen to CIA suggested projects.

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3. I asked Gilpatrick if he recalled a meeting in Secretary

Rusk's office on August 10, 1962 at which Secretary McNamara,

McGeorge Bundy and General Lansdale were present.

Gilpatrick

did not remember such

a meeting. He sent out to have his

secretary locate his diary from the period when he was Deputy

Secretary of Defense to see if the meeting was listed in his

diary.

He discovered the diary had been sent to the Kennedy

Library.

Cuban

I asked Gilpatrick if the overall planning against

leaders included possible liquidation of those leaders.

He said it did not and

moreover, he did not think General

Lansdale ever participated in any discussions concerning Cuba.

Gilpatrick said Lansdale was his Assistant as head of a

Special Task Force on Vietnam and that in Gilpatrick's

recollection Lansdale had no participation in Cuban matters.

Mr. Gilpatrick did not recognize the term "Executive

Action Capability"

and he said he had never heard of Operation

Mongoose.

4. I asked Mr. Gilpatrick if he was familiar with a plan to

make an attempt on Fidel Castro's life at the Sports Palace

in Havana,

Cuba on April 9, 1961? Gilpatrick said he

had never

heard of such

an attempt or a plan for such an

attempt.

To Gilpatrick's knowledge the Department of Defense

was not

involved in such a plan.

Gilpatrick said that he

was in charge of the 54-12 matters for the Department of

Defense and was under instruction from McNamara to be sure

the CIA didn't involve itself in any plan beyond its capabilities.

Gilpatrick said McNamara was especially sensitive to that

after the Bay of Pigs failure.

Gilpatrick also recalled

he found himself in dispute with the CIA over who would run

the reconnaissance over Cuba during the missile crisis.

Gilpatrick said that the reconnaissance operations were beyond

the capability of the CIA and Gilpatrick insisted the Department

of Defense conduct the operations.

that

5. Gilpatrick commented to me/the press had been calling up

asking questions about possible involvement in assassination

plans against Castro and that he had tried to refresh his

memory and think back over that period of time.

Of course,

Gilpatrick had no files or contemporaneous documents to help

him refresh his memory.

PROPERTY OF

THE WHITE HOUSE OFFIGE

Harold A1

fake

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¡ I returned to private practice in New York City.

And

in. January of 1961 I was appointed Deputy Secretary of Defense.

And I held that office from January 20, 1961 until January

20, 1964.

Mr. Wallach. I think you may have misspoken when you

said 1973. You meant --

Mr. Gilpatric. You mean after --

Mr. Wallach. In any event, you held that until 1964.

And then in 1964 you returned to private practice?

Mr. Gilpatric.

Private practice. And the only position

of any governmental nature I have today is, I am Chairman

of

the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

Mr. Wallach. What was the exact date, Mr. Gilpatric,

that you came on board as Undersecretary of Defense?

Mr. Gilpatric. I was sworn in on January 20, 1961.

Mr. Wallach. I take it, then, the only experience that

you had with the military prior to that was as Secretary of

Materiel for the Air Force?

Mr. Gilpatric. Undersecretary and Assistant Secretary

during the Korean War.

Mr. Wallach. Was Mr. McNamara Secretary of Defense at

that time?

Mr. Gilpatric. He was, and through the time that I

served as his deputy.

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January or early February of 1961, did you have any occasion

to serve on what was known as the Special Group or the 5412

Committee?

Mr. Gilpatric. Yes.

The Committee to which you refer

had been set up in structure during the preceeding Eisenhower

Administration. And when I took office, by virtue of being

the Deputy Secretary of Defense, I was the Defense Representative

on that Committee. And I remained so during the period I

was in office.

MI. Wallach. Was that by Mr. McNamara's own choosing that

he decided to have you do that, or was that a matter of

custom that preexisted?

Mr. Gilpatric. The President decided to continue the

practice inaugurated during the preceeding administration of

having the Special Advisor on Security Affairs, Mr. Bundy,

and the Undersecretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of

Defense, and the Director of the CIA comprise that group.

And that was accepted by the principals, namely, the Secretary

of State and the Secretary of Defense. And later on the group

was expanded to include the principals, namely, the Secretary

of State and the Secretary of Defense, and the Attorney General.

Mr. Wallach. Did you recall why the group was expanded

to include those three people?

Mr. Gilpatric. The President and the Attorney General

felt that by including the principles the focus on Cuba and

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after the Bay of Pigs would be more sharply focused. And

as I recall, it was largely at the instigation of the Attorney

General that the principals were brought into what had

previously been just the deputies.

Mr. Wallach. Do you know if that is what has been -

referred to as the Special Group Augmented?

Mr. Gilpatric. Having had my recollection refreshed

yesterday through the curtesy of Mr. Wallach, I do recall

that name as having been applied to this expanded group.

Mr. Wallach. I would like to state for the record, since

you mentioned that, Mr. Gilpatric, that yesterday Mr. Smother

and I met with Mr. Gilpatric for about two and a half house

and discussed the issues we were going to cover here with

him today, and also showed

him a variety of documents. And

at that time Mr. Smothers and I talked together, and Mr.

Smothers made the decision that we take Mr. Gilpatric's

testimony in Executive Session here today instead of before

the full committee.

Mr. Gilpatric, were you involved in any way in planning

for the Bay of Pigs?

Mr. Gilpatric. Only peripherally. I was brought in only

in sessions that were held in the Pentagon when some of the

paramilitary aspects of that operation were being discussed.

Certain members of the military were detailed to review the

planning of the Central Intelligence Agency. And when they

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came back to report to Mr. McNamara and the Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs, then General Lemnitzer, I sat in on those meetings.

I did not attend any meetings outside of the Pentagon relating

to the Bay of Pigs. And my only knowledge of it other than

those meetings came through what Mr. McNamara told me.

Mr. Wallach. Did you remember the substance of the report?

Was it a recommendation to go ahead or not to go ahead?

Mr. Gilpatric. The decision as to whether to go ahead or

not to go ahead was taken either at the White House or the State

Department. And I was not party to those proceedings.

Mr. Wallach. Specifically I am talking about what you

remember the military recommending as to the operation.

Mr. Gilpatric. Well, the military had a number of

reservations about the way in which the agency was setting up

to do this, and the amount of cover, the amount of equipment,

the resources generally that were being applied. And some

of those points came up in those discussions that I heard.

And they were ultimately communicated back to the President

and to the other top officials, either Mr. McNamara or the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. There were no decisions reached

at these briefing sessions which I attended.

Mr. Wallach. How do you know that Joint Chiefs or Mr.

McNamara communicated that to the President.

MI. Gilpatric. Mr. McNamara told me that he was attending

other sessions. And it was my assumption that he and General

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Lemnitzer expressed the views that they expressed at the

meeting. But I have no direct knowledge because I was not

at the meetings.

Mr. Wallach. Did the military people who sort of reported

on this to you and Mr. McNamara give you any prognosis or

suggestions in terms

of percentage or anything like that?

Mr. Gilpatric. I don't recall anything other than a general

attitude of skepticism, which was. not unusual when the Agency

was mounting a paramilitary operation. The natural tendency

of the military was to sort of second guess and question the

judgment of the people in the Agency. That happened at

subsequent times, but I think it was also, as I recall it,

expressed at that time. The specifics about the reservations

I could not say.

Mr. Wallach. Did you remember if there were any comments

along the line of, it was much too big an operation for the

CIA to handle?

Mr. Gilpatric. I

don't recall those particular words.

But certainly there was doubt among the military as to whether

the Agency could mount this kind of an exercise without draw-

ing more on the expertise that the military felt that they

had, and that was their principal line of business.

Mr. Wallach. Were there contingency plans drawn up to

follow up the CIA sending in the Cubans?

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Mr. Gilpatric. The word at the time I took office and the

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9.

word continually throughout the period of my services as

Deputy Secretary was contingency plans for every conceivable

eventuality, including the possibility of an invasion of Cuba.

Now, those plans existed before we came in, and these were

constantly being revised and brought up for review at the

meetings that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had with the Secretary

of Defense and myself. I don't recall any particular changes

in those plans that were made in conjunction with this Bay of

Pigs operation. But the plans were in existence with the

Joint Chiefs and the Joint staff.

Mr. Wallach. Prior to the Bay of Pigs, sir, were you

aware of any other on-going operations that were being targeted

toward Cuba?

Mr. Gilpatric. No.

Mr. Wallach. Were you specifically aware of any other

sabotage operation. or anything of that nature?

MI. Gilpatric. Not prior to the Bay of Pigs.

MI. Wallach. After the Bay of Pigs was there any sort of

change in the structure of the Special Group or change in the

emphasis of the Special Group?

Mr. Gilpatric.

The change - and there was a change -

occurred, as I recall it, gradually over a priod of months follow-

ing the spring of 1961. I don't recall exactly when this

expanded Special Group augmented was set up. My best

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was set up, namely, the CIA would come up with a particular

project or proposal to infiltrate some people into Cuba,

either intelligence gathering, or sabotage, and that would be

reviewed before the 5412 Committee, and either sent back to

the Agency, or changed, or disapproved,. or if it were approved,

it would be passed through Mr. Bundy to the President. Some-

time during those months that followed the Bay of Pigs the

Attorney General felt that more emphasis, more focus, more

high level attention should be given to those efforts to

weaken the Castro regime and to prevent it from exporting its

subversion to neighboring countries like the Dominican

Republic and Venezuela. And as a result, the principals,

namely, the Attorney General himself, and the Secretary of

State and the Secretary of

Defense were added to the group,

and he had a larger body of people who passed on what the

Agency was doing, and also tended to press the Agency for

more efforts in this regard.

Mr. Wallach. If we could just sort of focus in or a

moment on what you described as the Attorny General's emphasis,

or the Administration pressure, did you at that time feel that

there was Administration pressure really being put on you, for

example, to get something done with respect to Cuba?

Mr. Gilpatric.

Not on me, because the Defense Department

wasn't the focal point. We were treated as a supporting

agency to the Central Intelligence Agency. And obviously if

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nothing went wrong with an Agency operation, the military

might be involved. Ad you say, we had contingency plans in

that event.

But the focal point was on the Agency itself,

which after the Bay of Pigs was a rather shaken organization,

and changes were in process. The director left. In due

course the director of operations, Mr. Bissell, left. So

the whole thrust of the effort initiated by the administration

was to strengthen, beefup and otherwise try to make the Agency's

efforts in this regard more effective. But the actual

operational activities were to be carried on by the Agency of

by its personnel, not by anybody in the Defense Department.

Mr. Wallach. Do you know Mr. McCone?

MI. Gilpatric. Very well.

Mr. Wallach. Would you say that the administration put

pressure on Mr. McCone to get something done with respect to

Cuba?

Mr. Gilpatric. It was understood from the beginning when

he came in

-- and I don't recall the exact date in 1961 when

he took over - it was certainly made clear to him in my

presence at least, on some occasions that that was one of the

first orders of business, to see to it that the Agency came

up with more imaginative and hopefully more effective measures

to cope with the Castro regime.

MI. Wallach. Do you know if there were any limitations

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have come up with?

Mr. Gilpatric.

Only through this mechanism. But no

plan or procedural could be put into effect unless it had the

approval of the President, and it had to go through the channel

of this 5412 Group expanded,

as we have discussed, by having

the principals sit in as well as the deputies.

Mr. Wallach. Mr. Gilpatric, did the planning for the

Bay of Pigs go through the 5412 Group?

Mr. Gilpatric.

No, not during my time.

Mr. Wallach. Do you know if it went through the 5412

prior to your time?

MI. Gilpatric. No. I don't know whether that was hived

off of the 5412 Group or it was under the jurisdiction of that

Group, but it was a separate operation at the time the

Kennedy Administration took office in January of 1961.

Mr. Wallach. Do you know why the Bay of Pigs operation

was not put through the 5412 mechanism?

Mr. Gilpatric. No.

Mr. Wallach. Do you know whether or not there were any

other operations targeted at Cuba or any other country that

were not put through 5412?

: Mr. Gilpatric. No. And I don't say that it wasn't put

through, I said I didn't know for a fact whether it was or was

not put through. I just know it was handled separately at the

time that MI. McNamara and I and the others in the Kennedy

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Administration came in. It was treated as a much more

secure, sensitive project with a much smaller circle of need-

to-know people by January and early February of 1961.

Mr. Wallach. I take it that the Committee you have been

talking about, the one

that has expanded after the Bay of

Pigs with Mr. Robert Kennedy and Mr. McNamara and the Secretary

of State, amounted to a fairly large group?

Mr. Gilpatric. With their aids. You always had the

military, you had General Taylor there, either as special

assistant to the President or later on when he became Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs, he was always involved in this group. And

General Lemnitzer before that. And they usually had deputies.

Mr. Wallach. I would like to note that at approximately

10:18 Senator Huddleston left to go to the full committee

hearing.

I take it, then, we were talking about a group that could

have amounted to 15 or 20 people at some meetings.

Mr. Gilpatric. Certainly more than a dozen, possibly

as many as 15.

Mr. Wallach. Do you know whether of not there were any

highly secret operations that were not put through this group

of more than a dozen people during the time that you were

there?

MI. Gilpatric. As I recall it, this group was concerned

exclusively with Cuba. And we didn't have any other operations

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in the expanded group.

Now, 5412 kept functions as a smaller

group on various exercises and projects that came up from the

Agency involving other countries. But the expanded group

concentrated on Cuba. And I don't recall'any other

activities that came before that expanded group.

Mr. Wallach. Basically at least some of the people who

were in 5412 were also in the Special Group Augmented, is

that correct?

Mr. Gilpatric. That is correct.

Mr. Wallach. And did there come a point in time when the

Special Group Agumented was created for the purpose of focusing

on Cuba?

Mr. Gilpatric. Right.

Mr. Wallach. Getting back to what we talked

about

before as administration pressure, were you aware of any

instances where either President Kennedy or Robert Kennedy

made requests for actions that circumvented the normal channels?

Mr. Gilpatric. That was certainly true in the case of the

counterinsurgency planning activities in Southeast Asia.

They were handled out of the usual channels of intergovernmental

actions. And there was another special group, socalled

counterinsurgency group, set up again as the instance of the

Attorney General, and of which he was a member, and which

tried to pull together all the planning and initiation of

steps to resist the Communist inroads in Laos, Thailand, and

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South Vietnam patricularly.

Mr. Wallach. I am trying to get a flavor from you

really as to how the President and the Attorney General

operated at that time. Would you say it would have been

unusual for them to pick up the phone and make a request

for some action from Mr. McCone?

MI. Gilpatric. They believed very much in direct

approaches to people at whatever level they happen to be in

the Executive Branch structure, without going always through

the head of the particular agency. And in the case of the

Defense Department, that was fully understood and accepted

by MI. McNamara and myself. And the request might come through

to me, to MI. McNamara, or sometimes to Mr. Lemnitzer who

was

Secretary of Security for International Affairs, or Mr.

Vance, who was Secretary of the Army. And that was accepted

as sort of not unusual procedure during that period of the

Kennedy Administration.

Mr. Wallach. Mr. Gilpatric, do you know a General Edward

Lansdale?

Mr. Gilpatric. I do.

Mr. Wallach. When was the first occasion that you recall

meeting General Lansdale?

Mr. Gilpatric. I met him early on after my installation

in office, probably by late February of March, when I was

assigned by President Kennedy to head up the first task force

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looking to what might be done to strengthen the Diem govern-

ment in South Vietnam. General Lansdale, who was then

colonel in the Air Force, and on active duty in the Pentagon,

was assigned to me because of his prior experience during

the Eisenhower Administration in Indo-China generally and

the Philippines, particularly in South Vietnam. And from

that time on until sometime in May or June of 1961 General

Lansdale, or Colonel Lansdale as he then was, in effect

served as my special assistant in regard to the planning for

South Vietnam.

Mr. Wallach. Who else was on this Vietnam Task Force

that you described to us?

Mr. Gilpatric. There were representatives of the National

Security Council, I believe Mr. Rostow. There were repre-

sentatives from the Department of State. I believe it was

Alexis Johnson, although I may not recall some of the names

directly. And there was a representative from the Central

Intelligence Agency. I think it was Desmond Fitzgerald. And

there were representatives from the Joint Staff of the Services.

I don't recall the names of the various officers. There was

a group of about 15 or 20 who met regularly for two or three

weeks in the Pentagon, and ultimately came up with a series

of recommendations which were presented to the President, as

I recall, in April of 1961. And at that time Colonel Lansdale,

as my assistant, I believe was present at that meeting with the

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President. And the Attorney

General was there.

Mr. Wallach. Had Colonel Lansdale been recommended to

you as an expert on Asian affairs?

Mr. Gilpatric.

Yes. He was proffered by the -- whether

it was General Lemnitzer or General White, the Chief of Staff

of the Air Force -- by one of the principal military advisors,

Lansdale was put forward as a man who would be useful for this

kind of exercise for which I was put in charge.

Mr. Wallach. How in your mind was Lansdale useful to

you are your deputy?

Mr. Gilpatric. Well, he had had a vast amount of exper-

ience in sort of quasi military, at times clandestine,

operations, dealing with governments and factions through this

area.

He worked in the Philippines with Macapagal in handling

guerrilla problems there. He had been in Vietnam a number of

times.

He had formed a personal relationship with the

President Diem of South Vietnam. And he was held out, and found

by me, to be a very knowledgeable person in the conditions that

then existed in South Vietnam, the different faction and

sects that were presenting problems for the Government of

South Vietnam.

Mr. Wallach. My knowledge of history is not the greatest.

but wasn't it difficult at that time for Americans to get

close to the President of South Vietnam?

Mr. Gilpatric. I don't know, because I never met him.

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Lansdale obviously was an unusual type of military officer

who succeeded in establishing relations with other nationals,

and gaining their confidence, and if you will, working his

way into organizations of other nationals. And he thereby

gained a considerable insight into, say, the South Vietnamese

character which I for one and most of those in the Kennedy

Administration lacked entirely.

MI. Wallach. Did General Lansdale ever have a direct

command assignment where he had men under him that you are

aware of?

MI. Gilpatric. I don't recall. He was primarily a

staff officer.

MI. Wallach. Do you know who he reported to at that

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time?

Mr. Gilpatric. I think he reported to either the Chief

or the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force. He was always

on a special duty. He didn't have a regular slot in the

hierarchy of the Air Force during the time I knew him.

Mr. Wallach. I think you said before that at least he

had a reputation for being involved in quasi-clandestine activit-

ies. Did you recall any more specifics about that reputation?

Mr. Gilpatric. No, not the specifics, at least I don't

recall them now after 14 years. I was just aware of his

general experience and background and the knowledge and facility

that he displayed in inventing, coming up with ideas of

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counterinsurgency and antiguerrilla activities, as well as

intelligence and counterintelligence type of activities.

Mr. Wallach. And he had, for example, a thorough

knowledge of guerrilla warfare?

Mr. Gilpatric.

Yes.

Mr. Wallach. Do you know whether or not Mr. Fitzgerald

had known General Lansdale and had worked with him prior to

working with him on your committee?

Mr. Gilpatric. No, I don't.

Mr. Wallach. I take it during the time that the

Vietnamese Task Force we were talking about was in session

you did have occasion to meet with either the President or

the Attorney General to discuss the essence of what you were

working on?

Mr. Gilpatric. Yes. There were at least two sessions

with the President, and because of the increasing rather

ominous prospects in Vietnam, the President brought in the

Attorney General as well as the Vice President for those

sessions. So that they had an opportunity to hear directly

from me, assisted by Lansdale, what we were recommending and

why we were recommending it, and the discussions that went

on before the President finally, reached the conclusion on

those recommendations.

Mr. Wallach. I take it, then, that General Lansdale was

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Kennedy and the Attorney General?

MI. Gilpatric. At least some of the times, certainly two

or more.

Mr. Wallach. Do you know whether or not the President

and the Attorney General had known of Mr. Lansdale prior to

his coming on board with you?

Mr. Gilpatric.

No, I don't.

Mr. Wallach. Did you make any comments to them about

Mr. Lansdale?

Mr. Gilpatric.. I commended the work he had done as

my assistant to this group for whom we made the recommen-

dations, including the President, and the Attorney General,

because I found him to be extremely helpful. And he was

at that stage very tactful in his dealings with other

agencies involved, the White House Staff, the CIA, and the

State Department. And I found him to be in that assignment

very effective, and I said so.

Mr. Wallach. Did either the President or the Attorney

General express any opinion to you about Mr. Lansdale?

Mr. Gilpatric.

NO.

Mr. Wallach. Do you know when in fact he was promoted

to General?

Mr. Gilpatric. Both Secretary McNamara and I recommended

him for promotion thereafter. Whether this was the summer of

Fall of 1961 I don't recall. But we did, on the basis of our

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experience, particularly my experience with him on the South

Vietnamese Task Force, endorse his promotion to General.

Mr. Wallach. Did part of the recommendation that you made

as a result of that report suggestion that General Lansdale

go over to South Vietnam, or Colonel Lansdale?

Mr. Gilpatric. I don't recall any specific suggestion

to that effect, although it was discussed, and we learned that

there were certain elements in the State Department which did

not favor General Lansdale': going out there, on the basis

that he had a special relationship with Diem which, if renewed,

would go sort of out of channels as far as the State Depart-

ment was concerned. And

so there was a reluctance on the

part of the State Department to see him go back to Vietnam

at that time. Later on Ambassador Lodge did take him out

there as his own assistant. But that was after I left the

government.

Mr. Wallach. I think you said before that both yourself

and Mr. McNamara recommended General Lansdale for a promotion.

Did MI. McNamara ever express to you his feeling about

General Lansdale?

Mr. Gilpatric. No. We saw very little of Lansdale at

that time, other than that Lansdale accompanied me and

assisted me in presenting our Task Force recommendations.

And I think he felt that Lansdale had done a good job.

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recommending him.

But at that stage Lansdale had very little

contact directly with McNamara.

Mr. Wallach. Did Mr. McNamara at any time ever tell you

that he did not think Mr. Lansdale was very straightforward

or up front or readable?

Mr. Gilpatric. Not at that stage, because he hadn't

had the contact which would form the foundation for that

kind of belief. I recall some doubts that McNamara expressed

later on when he dealt with Lansdale more closely. And as a

result, he, McNamara, never used Lansdale himself as an aid

or assistant.

Mr. Wallach. Did Mr. McNamara express the nature of

those doubts to you?

Mr. Gilpatric. No, not specifically. He just indicated

that he wasn't comfortable with having Lansdale as his own

personal assistant. He didn't give him any task or assignment

to my knowledge.

Mr. Wallach. When did McNamara have further contact with

General Lansdale.

Mr. Gilpatric. That arose after Lansdale became the

Chief of Operations for this Augmented Special Group. As you

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that Special Group Augmented, beginning, I guess, sometime

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Mr. Wallach. Mr. Gilpatric, going back to the conver-

sations that you had with Mr. Smothers yesterday, is it correct

that before we actually showed you documents and refreshed

your recollection, that you really had no recollection that

General Lansdale was involved with any Cuban operations?

Mr. Gilpatric. That is right. I had lost track in my

rown memory of the fact that after he finished up the Vietnam

job for me in the spring of 1961, and left off that assignment,

that he was later on brought back and made Chief of Operations.

I had forgotten that until you showed me the documents which

make that very plane. It just had not stayed with my memory.

Mr. Wallach. Turning again to the Special Group Augmented,

which is the group that was set up after the Bay of Pigs, can

you relate to us the substance of the meetings as they took

place?

Mr. Gilpatric. The general tenor of the activities in

the group was to discuss in a general way the types of actions

that might be taken to weaken or destabilize the Castro regime

with a view toward preventing it from being effective outside

of its own borders, particularly, as I said earlier, vis-a-vis

other countries. And I remember being specifically concerned

about Venezuela and the Dominican Republic, and a whole range

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of possible actions to that end were discussed, and then

referred to the Agency to investigate and come up with some

specific programs, project or proposals which the Group would

then consider anew after they had been staffed out by the

Agency.

Mr. Wallach. Was it really, then, a function of the

Special Group Augmented to come up with ideas or to receive

ideas from the Agency and consider them?

Mr. Gilpatric. It was generally to stimulate a more

vigorous course of action than had been followed prior to

this augmentation. Whether the ideas came from General

Lansdale as the Chief of Operations, or whether they came

from CIA people, or whether they came from members of the Group

itself just depended on the course of discussion at the particular

meetings. Obviously there was a great range of possibilities

discussed. And Lansdale in his position as Operations Director

had a large part in stimulating thinking among the Group and

the ideas that were sent out to the Agency for further study

and work.

Mr. Wallach. Is this

something

that we refreshed you

as to yesterday, the fact that General Lansdale

actually was

Chief of Operations and came up with ideas himself?

MI. Gilpatric. Yes. I didn't recall who was guiding

focus on the staff level for this enlarged special group.

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level, try to generate projects, programs, and ideas. And

I am clear now, having refreshed my recollection as to the

personalities involved, that the focal point was the

Director of Operations as far as keeping the whole effort

going and stimulating thinking and planning.

Mr. Wallach. Was General Lansdale active at the meetings

himself, do you recall?

Mr. Gilpatric. That was not his nature, to take over

and run a meeting. He would come up with his ideas and feed

them into the appropriate segments of the agencies that were

supposed to staff them out. And he usually in his work

for me -- and now I am referring to the methodology he

employed in connection with Vietnam, because it is clear in my

mind - he would put in writing to his principals, in that

case myself, and then the principal would table the idea, put

it forward, and then would be discussed. But Lansdale himself

did not, as I can recall, in either of those sessions,

either relating to Vietnam or Cuba, act as a discussion

leader, or assume a very active role in the meetings themselves

as opposed to the preparations for them.

Mr. Wallach. Would you describe General Lansdale as a

very cautious man in the sense that he would not go ahead

with an activity unless it was approved by higher authority

or by his superiors?

Mr. Gilpatric. I wouldn't describe him as cautious.

I

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think he was a very calculating man, very deep, very sensitive

to the power structure in which he was working. After all, he

had been working. under the Eisenhower Administration with

an entirely different case of character than the Kennedy

Administration, and he proved himself very adaptable to

that kind of a major change. And he always impressed me

that he knew what he was doing, and he recognized the hazards,

political and otherwise, in how you function in this kind of

a setting, where you had so many presidential appointees, and

where you were working on a project that had a very high

priority in the President's own mind, which was true both

of Vietnam and Cuba.

Mr. Wallach. Did General Lansdale speak generally about

the President's project he was involved with, or was he close-

mouthed about them?

Mr. Gilpatric. Probably reserved. He wasn't an

individual who just spouted forth a stream of ideas and notions.

He would think them out, and when he put them forward, as I

say, they were usually in written form. And we didn't have

what I would call brain-storming sessions with him. He and his

assistants and associates would formulate

a scheme or plan

and then come back with this and lay it out. It was pretty

well put together. It was pretty well put together. It

wasn't done in an extemporary or impromptu fashion. That

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own staff?

Mr. Gilpatric. He had

an office with a number of assist-

nats. I don't recall any names except the name Hand which

came up yesterday and came back to my mind as a result.

MI. Wallach. Do you recall how large the staff was, four

or five people?

Mr. Gilpatric. It couldn't have been more than have

a dozen, because he drew on the resources of the various

elements in the Pentagon, including the Joint Staff or the Air

Force if he needed more assistance.

Mr. Wallach. Do you know if he worked with the various

elements in the Pentagon or operations aside from those that

may have been going on at the CIA?

Mr. Gilpatric. Vietnam

and Cuba, as the result of having

my recollection refreshed, are the only ones that I can recall.

Mr. Wallach. Specifically, Mr. Gilpatric, with reference

to Cuba, do you know whether or not there Lansdale made

specific requests to any of the military agencies to con-

duct operations by themselves, not joint operations with the

CIA?

Mr. Gilpatric. I am pretty sure that never happened,

because the name of the game was to conduct these operations

on a covert, clandestine basis, clearly within the province

of the Central Intelligence Agency, and whatever Defense or

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State of anybody else contributed was purely support rather

than direct participation.

Mr. Wallach. Do you know whether or not General Lansdale

met by himself with the President or the Attorney General?

Mr. Gilpatric. I do not know whether such a meeting

took place.

Mr. Wallach. Do you recall any instances when either the

President or the Attorney General put pressure on General

Lansdale, aside from the pressure that was put on the Group

as a whole, to come out with something on Cuba?

Mx. Gilpatric. My understanding was, I do not know of

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Mr. Wallach. From the time that this Special Group

Augmented was set up, do you recall any basic change in the

operation in terms of the focus, for example, the switch from

intelligence to sabotage?

Mr. Gilpatric. There was a shift from just intelligence

gathering through infiltrating teams to positive efforts to

disrupt the Cuban economy. And these ideas drew in scope from

relatively minor attempts to intercept communications or

disrupt transport to something as major as the

demolition of

a large power plant. That would have to be the most important

project that I can recall that came before the Group in 1962.

Mr. Wallach. Do you recall what General Lansdale's

relationship was with the CIA when he worked on the Cuban

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operation?

Mr. Gilpatric. I never detected any friction or any

difficulties between them. It certainly didn't exist in the

Agency, the same sort of distrust or question about Lansdale

as expressed in the State Department, as I explained earlier.

Mr. Wallach. Do you recall the name that was given to

the Cuban operation?

Mr. Gilpatric. You refreshed my recollection yesterday

as being Project MONGOOSE.

Mr. Wallach. But before yesterday you really didn't recall

the name?

Mr. Gilpatric. It had slipped my mind.

Mr. Wallach. At any time did you become aware of any

project that General Lansdale was working on with respect to

Cuba that were not brought before the Special Group Augmented?

Mr. Gilpatric. No.

Mx. Wallach. Was it your understanding that all operations

that he was conducting had to be brought before the Special

Group for approval first?

Mr. Gilpatric. Yes. The Special Group Expanded or

Augmented was given exclusive jurisdiction as far as any

covert or clandestine actions in regard to Cuba were concerned.

That I am clear enough about in my mind.

Mr. Wallach. I think you testified before, Mr. Gilpatric,

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that you and Mr. McNamara became used to Mr. Kennedy, President

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Kennedy, or the Attorney General, going, I think, to levels

beneath you at the Department of Defense.

Mr. Gilpatric.

On occasion.

MI. Wallach. Would it have surprised you if they went

directly to General Lansdale in this instance without going

through the Special Group Augmented?

Mr. Gilpatric. No.

Mr. Wallach. At any time while you were present at the

meeting of the Special Group Augmented was the topic of

eliminating or assassinating Castro brought up?

MI. Gilpatric. No, at least I did not recall it.

Mr. Wallach. Do you recall any restrictions in negative

terms that one of the considerations could not be the

elimination of Castro?

Mr. Gilpatric. I don't have in my mind any recollection

about that subject at all. I don't recall either any

restrictions put upon the types of projects that were enter-

tained. The discussion was usually over how effective a

particular suggestion would be and how feasible it was. And

my principlè concern, after the experience in the Bay of Pigs,

was as to whether the Agency could successfully carry out some

of these rather grandiose schemes they came up with under

pressure from the Attorney General and the Group. In other

words, I was concerned about the feasibility and durability,

particularly if they involved paramilitary actions. But I

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don't recall any restrictions put on the types of things that

might be laid on the table. And as I say, I have no

recollection of any question being raised about eliminating

Castro as a person, assassinating him or otherwise.

MI. Wallach. Did the intelligence information, if

you can recall -- and I realize that we are talking about a

period that was quite sometime ago -- at that time indicate

that Castro was in control, should I say, by himself, or

that there were other leaders that could readily assume

control if Castro left the scene?

MI. Gilpatric. Our intelligence regarding Cuba was very

deficient. We knew about Che Guevara, or Ortega, and

about Raol Castro and other names. We were aware that there

was a system, an organization which was responsible for the

functioning of the Cuban economy in a pretty effective

fashion, with Soviet help. But one of the problems was, we

didn't know enough about how the Castro system operated to

infiltrate those teams and groups, and they would never come

back, we would never get any playback. And there was a real

dearth of hard intelligence regarding what was happening on

the inside of Cuba that didn't emanate through countries

that were in communications with Cuba directly such as Mexico

and Spain.

MI. Wallach. When you say the agent teams didn't come

back, you mean they were captured or whatever?

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Mr. Gilpatric.

Captured or eliminated.

Mr. Wallach. So I take it, then, at least in your

mind-- let's take the period from the end of 1961 to the

beginning of 1962 - you did not really have any idea in

terms of exactly how the country was being run and where the

power structure really lay?

Mr. Gilpatric. Not in detail, not in depty. We just

knew the results, which were that the Cuban economy was

surviving, there was no wide scale famine, there was no great

shortage.

The sugar crop was being harvested and exported.

And the general knowledge that we did have -- all of it not

through the Agency at all, but through completely overt

means was -- was that Castro had been pretty effective in

whatever mechanisms he used to run the Cuban system.

Mr. Wallach. Going back to the time of the Bay of Pigs,

had you been given to understand that there was an expectation

that when this Cuban brigade landed on the shore that a

popular uprising would occur in Cuba?

Mr. Gilpatric. Yes, we were told that all along, not just

before the Bay of Pigs, but there were certainly a school of

thought, a certain number of beliefs in the State Department

and the Agency, who felt that there were dissident elements

who, given the occasion and the opportunity, would oppose

Castro. I don't. remember any positive proof of that. And

none of the developments with which I am familiar bore that

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out.

That was just a belief of certain people in our

government.

Mr. Wallach. That school of thought, I take it, contin-

ued even after the Bay of Pigs?

Mr. Gilpatric. Yes.

Whether it was a hope or a solid

conviction I don't recall. But it was always talked about

as a possibility, if we could strike a damaging enough blow

to the Cuban economy it might bring into the open whatever

underlying dissident opposition existed in Cuba to Castro.

Mr. Wallach. Do you recall if the Attorney General

ascribed to that theory that there were dissident elements in

Cuba that were willing to come forward?

Mr. Gilpatric. I never heard him express any views on

that. I don't recall his own personal views as having been

expressed in my presence.

Mr. Wallach. Do you recall who really propounded that

theory, at least while you were present?

Mr. Gilpatric. Well, it certainly didn't come from

the Defense Department, because they didn't profess to have

any knowledge. It was either the intelligence people of

State or in the Agency of both -- it was either State, the

CIA intelligence analysis who advanced those views. It

could have been -- I don't want to speculate -- I know that

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Department in some period of time that we are talking about,

and he may have had

some inputs from contacts he had in

Latin America.

So he might have expressed some such idea.

But those are the only resources I can recall for that kind

of thinking.

Mr. Wallach. Do you recall whether of not there was

any discussion of arming Cubans to go in and get rid of

Castro?

Mr. Gilpatric. No.

Mr. Wallach. Specifically not just to overthrow the

Government?

Mr. Gilpatric. No. A number of those projects involved

inserting armed individuals, whether they were Cubans of

other nationalities, to carry out these specific projects

that the Group approved, principally of a sabotage nature.

There were demolition teams and machine guns and other weapons

to cover the operations, the people to do the demolition work.

But that is the kind of use of arms that I recall as having

been reviewed by particularly those of us from Defense who were

concerned about how effective these things could be without

some combat element involved.

Mr. Wallach. Do you recall the school of thought that

talked about dissident elements in Cuba ever discussing these

dissident elements in relation to the presence or absence of

Castro himself?

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Mr. Gilpatric. No.

Mr. Wallach. Do you recall whether Mr. Harvey from the

CIA ever attended any of these Special Group Augmented

meetings?

Mr. Gilpatric. I did not remember his name until

yesterday. But when I saw the documents it came back to me that

he was detailed by the Agency under a man named Fitzgerald to

be the action officer for the Agency as far as the Group was

concerned. So he was at meetings, certainly some of the

meetings.

Mr. Wallach. Did he come to those meetings with Mr.

McCone?

Mr. Gilpatric. Yes.

Mr. Wallach. Did Harvey have any reputation that

preceded him that you heard either from him or from someone

else?

Mr. Gilpatric. I only recall his having been held out

as having had experience and competence in what might be

called the dirty tricks area. He was an operations man in the

Agency. He was picked, so we were told by MI. McCone, because

he was tough and hard and a good organizer, and was in fact

equipped to carry out the kind of schemes that the Agency was

putting forward. They held him out as a very effective type.

Mx. Wallach. Mr. Gilpatric, I take it you were in

attendance at the Special Group Augmented meetings and involved

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MONGOOSE from the time it really began until the time that

you left in January of 1964?

Mr. Gilpatric. I attended mest of the meetings. I am

not clear at this stage, 10 years later, as to which of the

meetings that I attended were the Augmented Group or the

principals in which were the entire Group, the deputy group,

because sometimes we would meet in one capacity for one form

and sometimes in another. But I recall that up through the

time of the missile crisis

from the period following the Bay

of Pigs I was in on most of the sessions regarding Cuba.

Mr. Wallach. Without really focusing on the period of

the missile crisis, and those discussions there, Mi. Gilpatric,

would it be fair to say that Cuba was not one of your primary

concerns?

Mr. Gilpatric. That is correct. I regarded this whole

effort to undermine the Castro regime as a project for which

the CIA was the principal instrumentality. Obviously, since

it affected foreign affairs very directly, the State Department

was primarily involved. And since it had very high president-

ial priority, the White House was very much involved. But I

felt, and I believe Mr. McNamara felt, that the role of the

military establishment of the Defense Department as such was

secondary. And I had a lot of other things that I was working

on at that stage. So that this did not occupy a major part

of my time or efforts.

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Mr. Wallach. Did it occupy a major part of Mr. McNamara's

time or efforts, if you know?

Mr. Gilpatric. I do not think so. He was in the same

position I was in. He had been asked by the President and

his brother to see that this effort got a lot of public

behind it. We were getting needled from the White House,

particularly from the Attorney General, to get the thing:

going, get the whow on the road.. And so we, along with

the other departments, kept the heat on the Agency. But it

was a sporadic thing with

us, not a day to day kind of

involvement, such as we had in some other principal concerns

of the Defense Department.

Mr. Wallach. When you say kept the heat on the Agency,

could you be more explicit about that?

MI. Gilpatric. Well, after the Bay of Pigs the President

and many of those around him felt that you just couldn't

leave it to the Agency alone. But when it came to a judgment

factor as to how much the Agency could do on its own and how

it owuld do it, it needed to be, if you would, in a word,

second guessed by others. And the President wanted to be

very sure that he didn't have another aborted effort such as

the Bay of Pigs. And he wanted the judgment of not only the

deputies like myself and Alexis Johnson, and before that,

Bowels, but of the principles themselves, the Secretary of

State and the Secretary of Defense. So our role was to

see

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that the moving spirits kept moving, the moving spirits

being basically the Agency and its operatives pushed and

stimulated by the Group.

Mr. Wallach. What was the pressure, Mr. Gilpatric,

that either you or MI. McNamara, as representatives of

Defense, put on the Agency.

Mr. Gilpatric. As I recall it, it was simply questions,

had they considered this, or had they considered that, could

they mount a larger scale effort, and if so, what it would

involve, so that it would have more of an impact. It was

just a question of resorting, persuading, or otherwise trying

to cause the Agency to exert itself to the utmost toward the

accomplishment of the objective, which was to undermine the

Castro regime.

Mr. Wallach. Was there a reluctance on the part of the

Agency to have anything to do with Cuba after the Bay of Pigs?

Mr. Gilpatric. Not a reluctance, but an understandable

caution not to fail again. And with the new head -- John

McCone had been Undersecretary of the Air Force, and my

boss for a while, 10 years before, and he had been head of the

Atomic Energy Commission in the meantime, and he was a hard

headed type, and he wasn't about to let ephemeral, halfbaked

ideas get under way. So he was in a sense resisting the idea

of doing something just for the sake of doing something. And

it was a perfectly healthy understandable attitude. And

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obviously there were a lot of differences of views as to

whether some of those

sabotage projects were really big enough

to be effective if they

succeeded, or if they were too big to

be likely to be feasible, having in mind the capabilities of

any external force such

as the Agency to get into Cuba and

survive and return.

Mr. Wallach. What was the Attorney General really

pushing for at that time?

Mr. Gilpatric.

He wanted to stop Castro from doing any

more damage. I think he thought it woudd hurt his country,

and hurt the administration, because of the Bay of Pigs,

and

he wanted to do everything possible to hamstring, prevent

Castro from continuing what at that point had been a pretty

successful course of action in defense of the U.s.

Mr. Wallach. And in this regard I think you have told

us before that Mr. Kennedy or the Attorney General put

pressure on MI. McCone to get something done.

Mr. Gilpatric. Right.

Mr. Wallach. Did the Attorney General ever take the

position that we had to be very cautious about what we were

going to do with respect to Cuba because of what had happened

with the Bay of Pigs?

Mr. Gilpatric. Yes, he shared the general view that

McNamara, Bundy and others and myself had, that an overt

effort to overthrow Castro, such as by military invasion, would

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have such dire consequences from the standpoint of other

relations, primarily with the Soviet Union, and also with

our own allies in Europe, and that that had to be avoided.

So we never talked about a moment that I can remember employ-

ing any of these contingency plans of a military nature,

which the military always had on file there with the Joint

Staff.

Mr. Wallach. Are you talking specifically about an oper-

ation such as the Bay of Pigs that would be conducted by

the U.S. forces, or an actual invasion of Cuba.

Mr. Gilpatric. That was ruled out for higher policy

reasons. And the kind of actions that were considered were

limited in this sense to covert, clandestine operations,

with which the U.S. could deny attribution.

Mr. Wallach. Did the Attorney General ever tell you

that he wished he could go ahead and mount this sort of

invasion?

Mr. Gilpatric.

No, he was never for invasion, never.

Mr. Wallach. Are you talking about after the Bay of

Pigs?

Mr. Gilpatric. At no time did he ever think that was a

solution.

Mr. Wallach. Di you recall whether or not he voiced

any objection to the landing of the Cubans at the Bay of Pigs?

Mr. Gilpatric. I was not privy to any position he took

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on the Bay of Pigs.

I never heard him discuss it myself.

never heard him invest himself.

Mr. Wallach. Do you recall if General Lansdale ever

talked to you about military invasion of Cuba?

Mr. Gilpatric.

No.

That was not his field. He was

a specialist in concentrated undercover operations, not

direct military actions.

Mr. Wallach. Mr. Gilpatric, did the fact that Castro

held prisoners from the Bay of Pigs in any way effect what

the Special Group Augmented could do with respect to Cuba?

MI. Gilpatric. The matter of obtaining the release of

the prisoners was handled separately. It was handled

primarily through the Department of Justice, and mechanisms

were set up there. And it never came directly into the

discussions, because as I said, the theme was, whatever we

did through the Special Group and the CIA in response to its

approval would be nonattributable, and therfore wouldn't affect

whatever steps were being taken in regard to the prisoners.

It had to be covered and not recognized as a U.S. approved

or a U.S. inspired operation. The two things were on separate

tracts, sabotage to undermine the regime, and the efforts

to

get prisoners back.

Mr. Wallach. Didn't the fact that any operations had to

be first approved by a group that was so large affect the

question of attributability one way or the other?

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Mr. Gilpatric.

Well, what I am talking about is attri-

butions, people get caught and are sent in. Could they be

supplied sufficiently with a cover so that they wouldn't

be directly identified as agents or instrument of the U.S.,

that is the kind of nonattribution we are talking about, not

trying to protect the leak: within the Executive Branch at

that stage.

Mr. Wallach. Were there any suggestions by General

Lansdale or by the CIA that were actually discussed and an

approval given that were not forwarded to the President?

Mr. Gilpatric. No. The general impression was that

it was a reviewing body, but without the power to make

executive decisions, to reject or revise our recommendations

to the President. Every kinf of project, clandestine or of

a cover nature, had to be received before it was implemented

with the Presidential approval.

Mr. Wallach. In other words, the President, if asked

directly, would not be able to deny that he knew about it?

Mr. Gilpatric. Well, unless the Special Group, whether

it was the initial smaller group 5412 or the Augmented Group,

decided to approve and recommend the proposal, the President

might never hear of it. It is possible that the Attorney

General could have told him, or Bundy might have mentioned it.

But he wouldn't be likely to come to grips with a project until

the Special Group had acted on it and referred it to him for

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approval.

And that was a very rare situation.

Mr. Wallach. For example, where specific sabotage

actions were actually approved and planned to be conducted,

those were at least sent to the President for his review?

Mr. Gilpatric. Right.

Mr. Wallach. Would he send back to you approval or.

convey it through Mac Bundy?

Mr: Gilpatric. Mac Bundy - or if the President would

inform him that the President had disapproved of changed, or

whatever his change was in his particular action, we would be

told by Mac Bundy.

Did Mr. Bundy play a very active role in the Special

Group Augmented?

MI. Gilpatric. Well, Bundy was not one to remain

silent or stay out of things. He was a very active partici-

pant. And he was after all the President's principal

advisor as far as the White House was concerned on CIA

matters. In other words, all the contacts between the.

Agency and the President came through Mac Bundy. And you

had the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, but that was

purely a staff operation. And even that I think was under

Mac Bundy. So he was the focal point as far as the staff of

the White House was concerned.

Mr. Wallach. Did he ever put pressure on the Special

Group Augmented to get something done in Cuba?

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Mr. Gilpatric. I don't think he was an instrument of

pressure. I think he was also - he was inclined to

question very closely all aspects of operations, particularly

from a political or foreign relations point of view, whereas

we in Defense, as I said, would question the feasibility

as a practical matter, particularly having in mind the use of

military measures, sending arms as well as demolition teams.

But the chief need-to-know certainly was the Attorney General.

Mr. Wallach. Prior to the time that he became Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs in October of 1962 was General Taylor

on the Special Group Augmented as the White House Represen-

tative?

Mr. Gilpatric. Yes.

Mr. Wallach. Was he actually the Chairman?

Mr. Gilpatric. I don't recall who chaired the meetings.

It was certainly no designated chairman, as I remember.

Obviously the Secretary of State was the highest ranking

officer among the Group, he took precedence over the Secretary

of Defense. And the Secretary of Defense was number two.

And then the rest of us - of course when General Taylor

became Chairman of the Joint Chiefs he was one of those

ranking officers. But I don't recall when any one individ-

ual ever took the chair regularly. Mac Bundy did in the

case of the smaller 5412 group, he in fact ran that group.

But I am talking about the larger group where you had those

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principals present. And there I think they acted as a

Group of peers without anybody beine more equal than the

.. :.

other.

Mr. Wallach. Do you recall if General Taylor had any

specific type of input into the Special Group?

Mr. Gilpatric. Well, General Taylor, whatever he was in,

he had something to contribute. He was an extremely intelli-

gent, able officer. And having been out of the military

for several years before President Kennedy brought him back,

he had a lot of insight and perspective gained since he

retired as the Chief of Staff of the Army. And he was in

the midst of every discussion. He was a very

active partici-

pant at all times, both in the counterinsurgency group and

the Special Group Augmented.

Mr. Wallach. Mr. Gilpatric, when you left your

position in January of 1964, was the Special Group Augmented

still functioning?

Mr. Gilpatric. I don't recall that it functioned after

the Cuban missile crisis actually. I think after the Cuban

missile crisis you had set up a different intent which was

called ExCom. It was something that the President set up

during the missile crisis. And that kept going from the

time, October of 1962, until the President's death in November.

22, 1963. That was a different group, and it had the Secretary

of the Treasury, Vice President, and the Attorney General.

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And it had kind of a moving base. But that was the group

that functioned in the way that the Special Group Augmented

had prior to the missile crisis.

Mr: Wallach. Is MI. McNamara also an ExCom?

Mr. Gilpatric. Yes sir.

Mr. Wallach. Do you recall who also was?

MI. Gilpatric. The Secretary of State and George Ball,

the Assistant Secretary, Governor Harriman, and Mr. Nitze,

the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International

Security Affairs, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Mr.

Taylor, and myself, the Deputy Secretary, and Mr. McCone,

Vice President Johnson, and

Secretary Dillon, those were

the

ones.

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Mr. Wallach. Is it your understanding that whatever

was done with respect to Cuba after the missile crisis was

done through this body, ExCom?

Mr. Gilpatric.

Yes.

Mr. Wallach. And I take it that you did not participate

in the ExCom meetings?

MI. Gilpatric.

Oh, I participated in the ExCom, I was

a member.

MI. Wallach: Do you recall what activities ExCom

really ran with respect to

Mr. Gilpatric. For example, the major effort after

the missile crisis was to get those IL-28 bombers out of Cuba.

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And the ExCom designated George Ball and myself, along with

Jack McCloy, who had formerly been Assistant Secretary of

War, and we went up to New York and we worked on negotiations

with the Russians, participating with Adlai Stevenson, who

was the U.S. Representative to the U.N., in an effort which

finally succeeded in getting the bombers out of there. And

that was all originated by the ExCom under the President's

direction.

Mr. Wallach. Do you recall whether or not ExCom approved

sending in any armed exile groups for raids into Cuba?

Mr. Gilpatric. I have no recollection of any of those

activities after November of 1962. From that point on the

Cuban operation had really been made part of the Soviet Union/

U.S. overall confrontation conflict. And it seems to have

been folded into that very

major international security

problem rather than being treated as it has been heretofore,

that is prior to the missile crisis, as a separate operation.

Mr. Wallach. I think you mentioned to Mr. Smothers and

myself yesterday that you had spoken with Mr. McNamara and

possibly others about the question of whether or not

assassination was ever raised as a viable alternative.

I

don't mean to paraphrase you.

Mr. Gilpatric. I don't recall ever discussing the matter.

Mr. Wallach. I am talking about within recent months,

Mr. Gilpatric.

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MI. Gilpatric. Oh, I met with him last night. I have

talked to him recently, since this began to appear in the

press, references to the August 10, 1962 meeting. And we each

asked each other whether either of us had any recollection of

the subject having been discussed. And that is the time we had

the discussion I referred to yesterday.

Mr. Wallach. And what was Mr. McNamara's comment?

Mr. Gilpatric. He doesn't recall ever putting forward

the idea, and if it was discussed, his recollection is that

he was opposed to it. He does not recall putting forward the

idea, and I don't recall hearing him.

Mr. Wallach. Have you discussed the matter of assassin-

ations recently with anyone else?

Mr. Gilpatric. No. Only Mr. McNamara.

Mr. Wallach. I take it once again, though, prior to

your refreshing your recollection yesterday with documents,

that you really had no recollection of an August 10 meeting --

Mr. Gilpatric. No. I didn't think I was present at

that meeting. When I read about it in the paper it didn't

register as to my having been present until you showed me

the minutes of the meeting showing that I was present,

I had no recollection of it.

Mr. Wallach. Did there come a point in time in 1963

when you again recommended General Lansdale for another

promotion?

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Mr. Gilpatric. No. The only connection I had with his

promotion was in 1961 when he was made Brigadier General.

When he became Major General I don't recall, I had nothing

to do with it.

Mr. Wallach. I would like at this time to have marked

a couple of documents that we showed you yesterday and

a couple of other ones. Do you want to take a two minute

break?

(A brief recess

was

taken.)

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Mr. Wallach. Mr. Gilpatric, I would like you to just sort

of glance over these documents. I do not expect you will have

time to go through them at this time.

Some of them you saw yesterday and some you did not. In

any event, I do not expect you to know the contents.

I would like you to keep them before you. I have a couple

of questions on each of them, and I will refer you to the

appropriate document.

Looking at 1-A, sir, which is the attachment to 1, the

memorandum dated November 30, 1961, do you recall ever having

seen this particular document before?

Mr. Gilpatric. No.

Mr. Wallach. Do you recall at the outset of operation

MONGOOSE whether there was a question as to whether or not

the task force concept would be kept or just be put into a

trial period?

Mr. Gilpatric. I don't recall this two-week trial period

that is referred to in 1-A.

Mr. Wallach. Do you recall who at the Department of De-

fense was designated to assist General Lansdale in these MONGOOSE

operations?

Mr. Gilpatric. No.

There are references to several

offices in these papers, including General Craig and General

Harris, but I think they were representatives of the joint

staff.

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The only name I recall is thename you mentioned

earlier, a man named Hand.

MI. Wallach.

Is that Frank Hand, do you remember?

Mr. Gilpatric.

Yes.

Mr. Wallach.

I have no questions on two.

Will you turn to Exhibit 3 for identification. I will .

ask you whether of not you recall you have ever seen this docu-

ment before?

MI. Gilpatric. It is not familiar to me.

Mr. Wallach. As a general matter, did General Craig re-

port to you on MONGOOSE operations?

Mr. Gilpatric.. No.

Mr. Wallach.

Do you know who he reported to?

Mr. Gilpatric.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, to my

recollection.

Mr. WAllach. Would General Craig speak for the Department

of Defense?

MI. Gilpatric. No. He would speak for the joint staff

or the Joint Chiefs to the extent he was so authorized.

He was a staff officer assigned to the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

and detailed apparently to the Cuban project, as it was then

called.

Mr. Wallach. Maybe I don't understand the relationships

of the Joint Chiefs myself or not. In the first paragraph it

is stated:

"As requested in the referenced memorandum, the

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position of the Department of Defense, with respect to the

military stake and

role in the removal of the Communist regime

in Cuba, has been determined based upon the following factors."

I am not going to go through these factors. But at least

there it appears that he is

stating a position of the De-

partment of Defense and not the Joint Chiefs.

Is that common?

MI. Gilpatric. Well, what he means is that the Secretary

of Defense has proved his position, which was put up to him

by the Joint Chiefs at one of our weekly meetings. This is the

type of action that the Chiefs would ask the Secretary

to concur in, and if he did, it became the position of the

Department.

Mr. Wallach.

Mr. Gilpatric, turning your attention

to the second page, paragraph 4, do you recall that at any time

either the Joint Chiefs or anyone in Defense expressing the opin-

ion that is set forth there?

And I will read it: "In view of the factors set forth

above" -- that is above in the document - "the Department of

Defense holds that the Communist regime in Cuba is incompatible

with the minimum security requirements of the Western Hemi-

sphere.

The Department of Defense is prepared to

overtly support any popular movement inside Cuba to the extent

of ousting the Communist regime and installing a government

acceptable to the U.s.".

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Now, going back to the first part of that paragraph that

I read a portion of which states: "The Communist regime in Cuba

isn't compatible with the minimum security requirements of the

Western Hamisphere", do you recall that opinion being expressed?

Mr. Gilpatric. It was always held by the Chief, but

itwas never held by Mr. McNamara and myself, unless the Presi-

dent so ordered.

Mr: Wallach.

Would Mr. McNamara have had to approve this

memorandum?

Mr. Gilpatric. Not this particular piece of paper. He

knew how the Chiefs felt. They never shifted the ground. They

always wanted to move in on the Castro regime with military mea-

sures.

Mr. Wallach.

Turning to the fifth paragraph on the

third page which reads:

"The Department of Defense is

also prepared to covertly provide support to CIA or State or

any U.S. approved popular

movement inside Cuba, in terms of

supplies, transportation, personnel and bases", was that the

supportive role that you generally talked about before?

Mr. Gilpatric. Yes, that

is right. Any approved program

we would support implied actions within our resources.

Mr. Wallach. Mr. Gilpatric, do you recall discussions

about creating pretexts for military invasion of Cuba by the

U.s.?:

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Mr. Gilpatric. None comes to my mind right now.

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Mx. Gilpatric.

I just don't have any recollection on

the subject.

Mr. Wallach.

Calling your attention to the exhibit

which we have identified as NO. 4, the minutes öf the January

25, 1962 meeting, that indicates that you were present at that

meeting:

Do you

have any reason to believe that you were not,

Mr. Gilpatric?

Mr. Gilpatric.

NO.

Mr. Wallach.

Your diary, I

take it, is in fact in

the Kennedy Library?

Mr. Gilpatric.

Correct.

Mr. Wallach. Turning to the last paragraph on the first

page of these minutes it states:

"Mr. Johnson then pointed out that before the establish-

ment of the Lansdale Group, higher authority had directed State

and Defense to prepare a plan for military intervention in the

event of the removal of Castro from the Cuban scene. He" --

by that it means Johnson -- "said a great deal of work has al-

ready been done along these lines, and that this should now

be directed into the channel of an integrated political military

plan to cover any contingency".

Do you remember any plans for military intervention in

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the event of the removal of Castro from the Cuban scene,

or as compared to those for supporting an uprising?

Mr. Gilpatric.

No. I remember there was a series of

planning efforts, and on different hypotheses and assumptions.

And this obviously is one hypothesis, the one that is referred

to by Alexis Johnson in this paragraph on page 4.

MI. WAllach. Do you remember any specific discussions

as to how Castro was going to be removed

from the Cuban scene?

Mr. Gilpatric. No -- other than that

the general

thrust

of the whole effort was to undermine or weaken or over-

throw the Castro regime.

Mr. Wallach.

I take it by that that you are saying

that the removal of Castro from the Cuban scene, looking

back now, would mean to you removal of the Castro regime

from the Cuban scene.

Mr. Gilpatric. Right.

Mr. WAllach. Turning your attention to the second para-

graph on the second page, without my reading the entire para-

graph into the record, would you just read through it.

There it refers to the Castro regime being overthrown without

U.S. military intervention and not Castro.

Mr. Gilpatric. I don't attach any significance to that

change in phraseology. I think that the two expressions have

a common meaning, at least that is my recollection.

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Mr. Wallach.

Just looking at that paragraph -- I

don't want to paraphrase what apparently General Taylor

said, but it to the effect that more than contingency plans

were required for military intervention, and as far as possible

he wanted to get authority to undertake major moves which

might be required.

Do you know if anything further than military contin-

gency plans developed? Was there ever an actual state of readi-

ness for an invasion of Cuba?

Mr. Gilpatric. Not until the missile crisis.

Mr. Wallach. Skip over to Exhibit 6.

Exhibit 6 is a memorandum to the Deputy Secretary of De-

fense fromGeneral Craig. Would that have been to you?

Mr. Gilpatric. Yes.

Mr. Wallach.

Do you recall any discussions with General

Craig where you expressed to him a need to inject a sense of

urgency?

Mr. Gilpatric.

Not specifically with him. As we

said before, he was the officer detailed to work with this

group. And I am sure I had a lot of contacts with him. But

I don't recall giving him any specific instructions.

Mr. Wallach. I think he is identified here as the DOD

JCS representative to the Caribbean survey group.

Was that another name for the Special Group Augmented?

Mr. Gilpatric. Yes, I think that must hav been an earlier

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terminology.

Mr. Wallach.

With respect to Exhibit 7, was General

Lansdale actually in the office of the Secretary of Defense?

Mr. Gilpatric. No, not physically.

MI. Wallach. Do you know why he was writing memoran-

dums on the office of the Secretary of Defense stationery?

Mr. Gilpatric. Since he had been assigned this

project by the President, as indicated by Exhibit 1, he must

have used this stationery simply because he was not operating

either as a part of the Air Force or as a member of the Joint

Staff.

This stationery, office of the Secretary of Defense,

was used by everybody who wasn't either in one of the military

departments or in the Joint Chiefs, but it was just generally

the work, of the Department of Defense. The term covered a

great deal of ground in many individuals.

Mr. Wallach.

Do you know whether Guantanamo was

ever used as a training facility for Cuban exiles at any time?

Mr. Gilpatric. No, I don't.

There was a lot of discussion about Guantanamo and how

important it was and what could be done.

And my recollection

is that the military always felt that we shouldn't compro-

mise its position under prior arrangements for the Cuban

government by using it for CIA purposes.

Mr. WAllach. In other words, you don't know one way or the

other whether it was actually used?

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Mr. Gilpatric. No, I don't.

MI. Wallach. Going back to Exhibit 6-A for a second,

"Guidelines for operation MONGOOSE', paragraph 1-a, which

is attached to the memorandum which General Craig sent to you,

I note there that he has stricken out General Lansdale's

use of the words "Castro Government" and put in "Communist

Government of Cuba" in the sentence reading "In undertaking

to cause the overthrow of", he struck out "Castro Government"

and put in "Community Government of Cuba.

Do you recall any discussions with him as to that change

at all, as to what the difference was as between the Castro

government and the Communist Government of Cuba?

MI. Gilpatric. No. It was just a legal system employed

by the military.

Mx. Wallach.

Okay.

Exhibit 8.

I really have no questions with respect to this document

except that it reflects that you were present at the meeting

along with Mr. McNamara.

Do you have any reason to think that that is not correct?

Mr. Gilpatric.

No. I am sure it is correct.

Mr. Wallach.

Is it your recollection that once the

Special Group Augmented was formed Mr. McNamara attended as of-

ten as he could with you, or was the function divided between

you and MI. McNamara?

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Mr. Gilpatric. I certainly went regularly. And my :

recollection is that he may have been less

regular,

because of

other duties. As I indicated yesterday, my memory is blurred

as to what meetings were called Special Group Augmented and

what were just 5412.

My recollection is that whenever the Attorney General

was going to be present, Mr. McNamara came. ..

MI. Wallach. Was there an agenda that was sent out to

your prior to these meetings, do you recall?

Mr. Gilpatric. Sometimes papers during this time we.

were discussing these guidelines, as exhibit 8 shows, there were

a number of papers that had been tabled before the meeting,

and they were discussed. There ass no agenda other than the

circulation of papers beforehand that I can recall.

Mr. Wallach. Exhibit 9, the memorandum from General

Craig to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. And I want to establish

again that that was a memorandum to you.

Mr. Gilpatric. Correct.

Mr. Wallach. And that just concerns the guidelines for

operation MONGOOSE. No need to go over those here.

Mr. Gilpatric. General Craig was regarded as the proper

channel for submitting any kind of defense point of view as going

through me as the top civilian.

MI. Wallach.

Just looking at the first paragraph there

where General Crais is commenting on the CIA's proposed changes

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to paragraph 2, which in fact were eventually adopted, it

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"The immediate priority objective of U.S. efforts during

the coming three months would be the acquisition of hard intelli

gence on Cuba".

I take it the coming three months would be from March on?

Mr. Gilpatric.

YeS.

Mr. Wallach.

The memorandum was dated March 13.

In any event, do you remember that that was in fact the

case, that there was a point in time when strictly there was

an attempt to be an intelligence gathering operation, MONGOOSE.

Mr. Gilpatric. As I stated earlier, we were confronted

at the threshold of our work with Cuba by the absence of

hard intelligence. So it was natural to give the acquisition

of such intelligence top priority at the beginning.

MI. Wallach. Do you recall if the Attorney General

ever expressed any opinion on whether or not this intelligence

gathering should be terminated and actual sabotage or other

types of operation should be undertaken?

Mr. Gilpatric. No. He was frustrated, as the rest of us

were, by the fact that we didn't know enough as to what was

going on down there. He didn't regard this particular activity

as exclusive, pre-empting all efforts of other activities.

Mr. WAllach.

Looking back, Mr. Gilpatric, at the

program as a whole, would you say that it was a successful

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program against the Castro regime?

Mr. Gilpatric. No. It never really accomplished very

much.

Mr. Wallach. Do you have any thoughts as to why it

really didn't accomplish very much?

Were there certain re-

strictions on it?

Mr. Gilpatric.

I think ithad an inherent weakness.

It depended for accomplishment of its objectives on covert

activities. And under the circumstances that then confronted

this country, we didn't have the capabilities, or at least we

din't discover them, through this effort in the CIA to be

effective.

Mr. Wallach.

Did General Craig do most of the sort of,

can I say, leg work, or background work, or writing for you,

on some of these proposals?

Mr. Gilpatric. He called him the DOD representative, but

He was really the military man in the Pentagon who staffed

all these papers. and went around and got ideas from different

services and from the Joint Staff.

Mr. Wallach. Was there someone who you delegated

a certain review to?

Mr. Gilpatric. No, I didn't have any assistant.

Mr. Wallach. Calling your attention to Exhibit 11, sir,

I believe it is the next exhibit, I have skipped 10 -- I am

Sorry, it is No. 12 -- which is a one-page memorandum signed

Was 955 CIA: 3242362644e

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Mr. Gilpatric?

Mr. Gilpatric. Yes. And I am sure I dictated this myself.

Mr. Wallach. On the bottom line it is stated: "some-

time before the weekend I want to talk to you about Mr.

McCone's 'liberation plan'".

Do you recall what that liberation plan was?

MI. Gilpatric. No, I don't.

Mr. Wallach. Was it usually your duty to notify General

Lansdale of the meeting of the Special Group Augmented?

Mr. Gilpatric. No. We had executive sessions, and if he

wasn't present, I would be the one of the members of the group

who would communicate with him.

Mr. Wallach. Did Mr. McCone ever tell you that he was

either planning or undertaking activities for the CIA that

actually did not come through the Special Group Augmented?

Mr. Gilpatric. No. I understood that all his activities,

unless they related to overt activities or diplomatic activities,

if he had any ideas, would all come through the group.

Mr. Wallach. Calling your attention to 13, sir, the

third paragraph reads: "Mr. Gilpatric felt that it was neces-

sary to achieve as high a posture of readiness as possible.

For example, PT boats and other material necessary for our ac-

tive operations should be acquired. In addition, more

Cubans should be inducted into the U.S. Army. In this connec

tion he" -- and by that he: refers to Mr. Gilpatric -- "pointed

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out that the restriction on service of such Cubans outside of

this country has been lifted.. The Attorney General concurred

in Mr. Gilpatric's comments that a more imaginative approach

toward enlistment of Cubans can be devised".

Mr. Gilpatric, what did you mean there? I realize that

is only MI: Parrott's notes on what you said. But by as high

as posture of readiness as

possible, do you recall what you might

have meant?

Mr. Gilpatric. I was concerned again that the military

would be in a position to react quickly if some of these CIA

mounted efforts were in danger of aborting, or surfaced in a

way that would involve some risk or peril to U.S. property

or nationals, and they felt that the military had to be on the

alert any time that the CIA activity was going forward, in case

something might fail in

a way that we would have to do

something.

Mr. Wallach. Wouldn't the military having to come in

have created a situation similar to the Bay •of Pigs in terms

of publicity for President Kennedy, and an operation by the

CIA having failed, the military having to bail it out?

Mr. Gilpatric. Yes. But it was a question of the lesser

of two evils. And if U.S. personnel were involved, and under

service as a U.S. activity, we at least didn't want to have

the consequences that the Bay of Pigs had.

Mr. Wallach. I thought that would be of the prime emphasis

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of the Special Group Augmented was to have activities that

were not attributable to the U.s.

Mr. Gilpatric.

4

That is correct. This was purely a

contingency proposal.

5

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Mr. Wallach. Do you recall whether or not the President

had expressed a desire to have more Cubans inducted into the

U.S. Army?

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on that. I felt that the attitude of the military heretofore

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in not wanting Cubans in the services for questions of

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security or loyalty was wrong, and that we ought to include

them in the Armed Services.

13

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. Mr. Wallach. Calling your attention to Exhibit 15, the

first paragraph states:

15

16

"The Joint Chiefs of Staff and MI. Gilpatric have approvei

17

the attached plan prepared in response to your memorandum of

18

10 June 1962, subject: 'Spontaneoud Revolts in Cuba, Contin-

gency Planning'".

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That memorandum is from Benjamin Harris to the Chief of

Operations, Operation MONGOOSE, which was General Lansdale.

Did Benjamin Harris replace General Craig?

Mr. Gilpatric. That is my recollection.

Mr. Wallach. Do you recall if about this time there was

still discussion going on of a spontaneous: revolt occurring

25

in Cuba?

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Mr. Gilpatric. There certainly was planning against

that eventuality. I don't recall ever thinking it

was going to be likely to happen. But as was the case of

every otherpossibility, the military always wanted to have a

plan for it.

Mr. Wallach., Calling your attention to Exhibit 16,

which bears the date August 3, 1962, and the title DOD Task

No. 69, is this an usual format, this type of sheet?

MI. Gilpatric. No -- I don't recall. It doesn't

100k like a JCS paper, in spite of it being titled "DOD Task

No. 69". It looked to me as though this came out of Lansdale's

office.

Mr. Wallach. Calling your attention to 17, sir, which

is not only undated, but it is unsigned, do you know whether

or not you have ever seen this document before?

Mr. Gilpatric. I never saw it until you showed it to

me yesterday.

Mr. Wallach. I think you stated yesterday that this looked

like the Joint Chiefs paper, but you can't really attribute

it to anyone, I take it?

Mr. Gilpatric. That is the closest I can come to specu-

lation as to its origin.

Mr. Wallach. In any event, in the sixth line from the

bottom, which is partly wiped out, the language is "Assassinate

Castro and his handful of top men".

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I take it you don't recall that ever being promulgated?

Mr. Gilpatric.

No.

Mr. Wallach. 10.

These are the minutesof the August 10, 1962

Special Group Augmented, meeting on MONGOOSE. I take it

that this looks like, at least from the records we have, a

fairly large number of people present at compared to the other

meetings.

Do you recall if there is any special significance for

this meeting?

Mr. Gilpatric. It was unusual to have Ed Murrow and

Don Wilson present from USIA. Otherwise the conditions were

lousy because there were more people from State than usual.

Mr. Wallach. Do you recall anything about any meeting

that was really special where more people were called in to

come?

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I realize you can't pinpoint a specific date for me.

Mr. Gilpatric. No. I don't recall why Murrow and Wilson

were there. And the question of whether there were five people

or two people from State just depended on whether Mr. Rusk

and Mr. Johnson wanted in the way of assistance for a particular

session.

Goodwin is listed for State, but he was actually a presi-

dential assistant.

Mr. Wallach.

In the third paragraph - I am not

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going to read that verbatim-- it just refers to Mr. Rusk --

it brings up the blockade of Berlin. Did Mr. Rusk often talk

about Cuba and the blockade of Berlin together in terms of an

action the Soviets could take?

Mr. Gilpatric. I don't recall it coming up often.

It was generally accepted that our operations vis-a-vis Cuba

should not be such as would touch off crises or

threats in

other areas.

So that it is not surprising

that he mentioned this

here, particularly at this juncture, when

we had had one

Berlin crisis.

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Mr. Wallach. Calling your attention to the second

page, sit, the fifth paragraph, which says: "The discussion

then turned to the objectives of the MONGOOSE program. Mr.

McNamara questioned whether we can not separate the building

up of agent assets in Cuba from the actions that would hurt

the U.S. in the use of world opinion". It then states: "This

lead to the discussion by General Taylor that we should

consider changing the overall objective from one of over-

throwing the Castro regime to one of causing its visible

failure"

Do you remember as a constant theme at this meeting that

Mr. McNamara stressed the building up of agents inside Cuba?

Mr. Galpatric. No. I only recall the concern that

surfaced continually over effecting our relations adversely

with other Latin American countries. We appeared to be

intervening in the internal affairs of one of them. And I

think that is the point that Mr. MCNamara must have had in

mind here.

Mr. Wallach. Sir, I call your attention to Exhibit 19..

And I would like you to look at that in conjunction with

Exhibit 20.

That these are two documents that you saw

yesterday. Exhibit 19 is a two page memorandum from General

Taylor to his various people at State, the CIA and Defense.

And you will note that in the next to the last paragraph,

the second line of that paragraph, there is a portion that

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is whited out, is that correct?

Mr. Gilpatric.

That is correct.

Mr. Wallach. It is under Mr. Harvey.

Now, referring to Exhibit 20, sir, which is a memorandum

prepared by Mr. Harvey and dated August 14, 1962, paragraph

two states: "Reference is made to your conversation on 13

August 1962 concerning the memorandum of that date from

General Lansdale. Attached is a copy of this memorandum,

excised from which are four words in the second line of the

penultimate paragraph on page 1. These four words were,

'including liquidation of leaders'".

.::.

I believe that the penultimate paragraph that Mr. Harvey

is referring to is the four words that are excised in the

August 13 memo.

In the next paragraph Mr. Harvey states: "The question

of assassination, particularly of Fidel Castro, was brought

up by Secretary McNamara at a meeting of the Special Group

Augmented in Secretary Rusk's office on August 10".

I take it you testified before that you did not recall

Mr. McNamara's bringing that topic up, is that correct?

Mr. Gilpatric. Right.

MI. Wallach. Was the meeting of August 10 in Mr. Rusk's

office, if you recall?

Mr. Gilpatric. I believe so.

Mr. Wallach.

Could that have been the reason why so many

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people from State were

there?

Mr. Gilpatric.

It could have well have been, there

could well have been a connection.

Mr. Wallach. Was it unusual for the meeting to be held

there?

Mr. Gilpatric. Yes, because as I said before,

Secretary Rusk was the ranking officer, and we usually went

to his office. We never went to the CIA. And except for a

few meetings that were held in my office very early on, I

think all the meetings were held in State.

Mr. Wallach. Looking again at Exhibit 20, the third

paragraph, after Mr. Harvey states that the question of

assassination was brought up by Secretary McNamara, he goes

on to state: "It was the obvious consensus at the meeting,

in answer to a comment by Ed Murrow, that this is not a

subject which has been made a matter of official record".

Do you recall Mr. Murrow saying anything to that effect?

Mr. Gilpatric. No.

Mr. Wallach. I take it you wouldn't bacause you don't

recall the assassination?

Mr. Gilpatric. No. I don't recall the conversation on

the subject at all.

Mr. Wallach. The fourth paragraph reads: "Upon receipt

of the attached memorandum, I called Lansdale's office and,

in his absence, point out to Frank lland the inadmissibility

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and stupidity of putting this type of comment in writing

in such a document. I advised Frank Hand that, as far as

CIA was concerned, we would write no document pertaining

tọ this and would participate in no open meeting discussing

it. I strongly urged Hand to recommend to Lansdale that he •

excise the phrase in question from all copies of this

memorandum, including those disseminated to State, Defense

and U.S.I.A. Shortly thereafter, Lansdale called back and

left the message that he agreed and that he had done so."

My first question is, did you ever discuss with Mr.

Hand the excising of this language from the document?

Mr. Gilpatric. No. I never saw either document.

Mr. Wallach. Did you ever discuss with Mr. McNamara

the excising of certain words from this document?

Mr. Gilpatric. Not this document, no, because I never

saw it until yesterday.

Mr. Wallach. Were there references to assassination of

Castro in any other documents that Mr. McNamara had, do you

recall, just proposals?

Mr. Gilpatric. No. The only thing I have seen is a

memorandum in 1967 that Mr. McCone dictated at that time

after he was out of the government, and following some story

of Jack Anderson in which the subject of assassination came

up.

Mr. Wallach. When did you see that memorandum, MI.

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Gilpatric?

Mr. Gilpatric. I saw

it last night.

Mr. MCNamara

showed it to me.

Mr. Wallach. Did Mr. McNamara tell you how he got a

copy of the memorandum?

Mr. Gilpatric.

McCone sent it to him.

MI. Wallach. Had you discussed assassinations or planning

for assassinations at all with Mr. McCone?

Mr. Gilpatric. No.

Mr. Wallach. Did Mr. McNamara comment on Mr. McCone's

1967 memorandum?

Mr. Gilpatric. Well, he wasn't sure. He said to me

last night that the chrolology of events was quite dim, as

the McCone memorandum stated, being five years after the •

event.

Mr. Wallach. Did he tell you whether of not it was

in fact correct or incorrect?

MI. Gilpatric. He had no recollection of ever having

brought the subject up in his position then. And he says

now he was against the idea.

Mr. Wallach. Does he remember it being discussed?

Mr. Gilpatric. He doesn't remember it being discussed at

all.

Mr. Wallach.

Did he tell you that he ascerted a position

at that time that he was against the idea?

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MI. Gilpatric. He said it was his position. Whether he

expressed it he doesn't recall. But he asked McCone if

McCone had any recollection after the statement to the press

began appearing several weeks ago during early June.

MI. Wallach. Have you ever heard any discussion of

using the Mafia for any purposes in the MONGOOSE operation?

Mr. Gilpatric. No.

Mr. Wallach. Or using any hoodlums of anything like that?

Mr. Gilpatric. No.

MI. Wallach. Turning your attention to Exhibit 21,

which reflects a Special Group Augmented meeting on MONGOOSE

on October 4, that indicates that you were present also. Do

you have any reason to believe that you were not?

MI. Gilpatric. No. This is before the missile crisis.

Mr. Wallach. The first paragraph of that memo states:

"The Attorney General opened the meeting by saying that

higher authority is concerned about progress on the MONGOOSE

program and feels that more priority should be given to

trying to mount sabotage operations. The Attorney General

said that he wondered if

a new look is not required at this

time in view of the meager results, especially in the sabotage

field.

He urged that 'massive activity' be mounted within

the entire MONGOOSE

framework"

• Do you recall the Attorney

General stressing this, or is this just one time in many

that he was pushing?

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WASHINGTON

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•T.i

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NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 100

TO:

The Secretary of State

SUBJECT:

Contingency Planning for Cuba

In confirmation of oral instructions conveyed to Assistant

Secictary of State Woodward, a plan is desired for the indicated

contingency in Cuba.

McGeorge Bundy

CC:

The Sccretary of Defense

Director of Central Intelligence

Mr. Richard Goodwin

cc:

Mrs. Lincoln

MI. Bundy's Files

Mi. Bromley Sinith

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• RETYPED FROM INDISTINCT ORIGINAL

5 October 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Cuba

In accordance with General Taylor's instructions, I talked to

Assistant Secretary Woodward yesterday about the requirement for the

preparation of a contingency plan.

He told me on the telephone he

would be heaving for two weeks and, therefore, his Deputy, Wymberley

Coerr, would have to take this project on.

I then met with Mr. Coerr and outlined the requirement to him.

I said that what was wanted was a plan against the contingency that

Castro would in some way or other be removed from the Cuban scene.

I said that my understanding was the terms of reference governing

this plan should be quite broad; ve agreed, for example,

that the

presence and positions of Raul and Che Guevara must be taken into

account.

We agreed

that this was an exercise that should be under

the direction of State with

participation by Defense and CIA.

also pointed out

to Mr. Coerr that Mr. Goodwin had been aware of

this

requirement.

Mr. Coerr said he would get his people started on this right

As to timing, I said that I did

not understand that this was

a crash program but that it should proceed with reasonable speed.

He then set Monday as a target date for a first draft.

I had mentioned to Mr. Woodward the President's interest in

this matter, before General Taylor had

told me he preferred

this not

be done. Therefore, I felt it necessary to tell Mr. Coerr, on the

assumption that Mr.

Woodward would have already told him.

I asked

this aspect be kept completely out of the picture.

He under-

stood this fully and volunteered that it could be presented

as an

exercise emanating from his own office.

I said I would leave this

up to him but it was perfectly all right to attribute it to General

Taylor.

On the covert side, I talked to Tracy Barnes in CIA and asked

that an up-to-date report be furnished as soon as possible on what

is going on and what is being planned.

I asked that this be re-

lated to the broad plan that was approved by the Special Group and

by higher

authority in August. I did not tell Mr. Barnes of

Presidential interest.

However, during the time that I had been

trying to

reach him, he had seen Mr. Goodwin who had told him about

this requirement.

Thomas

A. Parrott

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9 Gradent 1961

Til arrondence ulch Couetal Joylod's Instructions, I Called to

i! Moline Cocotany toodored yesteiday about die regulicens foe cho

matrilon of a conclagency plen.

ile 101d na on the talegiore lie

Come, wild bord is idle chlo projece on.

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" onid that me uno vanted vao a plon agatrol che contingency that

Caccro would in coco way or other be sonoved frea ilo Cuten derma.

erranta tie neteed that too to en carette tri could ia:!"

tie din citen of corte with

maccar picion by loberie cul CMA. T

alno poánse oud do lic. Coora Chat Leo Coodula Mad Man tated es

chin inquirecent.

Ma, Croar cold he would cod hio people connie on chao dichi

chlo mecci, before Concmt Taylor had cold to la patried tits tri

be dom.

Ticrefose, 1 fols it naccocany do toll to Conta, do ita

enemotion that tr.

timi: illo

rance be love conlocoly out of the picture

rood chen dully med volumecosed chine de could be picronted no di

main CripPling

Can is on office.

I cold T rould leare tile

thee on up-to-date senore le fuzniched as coon no pecctole me rat

is cotra chan mac io bolug planned.

lented that clo to ter

Taked 59 die booed plan that wed arcroved by che Coocial Group did

by hated authority In doguete Idea not toll the fuckin of

made Carsont

SECT

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TOP SECRET SPECIAL WANDLING

Ex. 3

7-8-71

NOFORN 3

Faile

MEMORANDUM FOR BRIGADIER GENERAL I. G. LANSDALE,

Chief of Operations, Cuba Project

Subject: Cuba Project

16

Reference:

Memorandun from Your Office for

BrigGen vi.

USA, subj:

I. As requested in referenced merioranduri, the position of

the Department of defense, with respect to the military

stake

and role in the rémoval of the Communist regime in Cuba, has

been determined based upon

the following factors:

a. National security Policy, determined by the NSC during

the reeting

of 9 May 1961.

b. Current intelligence estimates of the situation in

Cuba.

c. Operations against the Castro regime will be covert,

at least initially.

d. Time favors the Castro government.

2. The basic military implications of Castro's Communist

government are

as follows:

ä. It exposes the western Hemisphere to an increasingly

serious threat to its

security. This increases our national

vulnerability and defense costs

as forces are developeu

or shifted

to meet this threat.

b. It provides the soviet nion with the most effective

base they have ever had for spreading Communism throughout

the western Hemisphere. This in turn greatly increases the

possibility that additional Latin American countries will

come under Communist control. Elimination of this base would

dononstrate to

the other nations of the worlu that the inited

States will not tolerate such intrusions.

Communist

control of additional countries would or coula result

in:

00325

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TOW SECRET SPECIAL MACULING

NUFOKW

(1) Increased Communist capability for attack on

other nations of the western Hemisphere.

(2) Increased Communist capability for spreading

Communism throughout Latin America.

(3) The loss of existing

and/or potential bases,

training areas, facilities

and rights,

as well as sources

of strategic materials necessary to our military

capability.

(4) An increased threat to US usage and control

of the Panama Canal through subversion and sabotage.

3. The urgency of the requirement to remove the Communist

government from Cuba 1s made apparent by Castro's constantly

increasing capabilities for attacking other nations of the

Western Hemisphere and for spreading Communism throughout the

hemisphere.

This sense of

urgency

is greatly

increased 1f

courses of

action

within the capability of the Communists

are

considered:

a. The soviets could establish land, sea and/or air

bases in Cuba.

D. The soviets could provide Castro with a nunber of

ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads; or they could

furnish the missiles and maintain joint control of the

nuclear warheads. •

4. In view of the factors set forth above, the Department of

Defense holds that the Communist regime in Cuba is incompatible

with the minimum security requirements of the Western

Hemisphere. The Department of Defense is

prepared to overtly

support any

popular movement inside Cuba to

the extent of

ousting the communist regime and installing a government

acceptable to the United States. While the possibility of

Communisi Bloc reaciions in

areas other than in cuba is

recognized, it is believed.

that this can be accomplished without

precipitating general war, and without serious effect on

world public opinion if the following conditions prevail:

01342

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a. If the impression

is created that there is

an urgent,

humanitarian requirement to restore order in Cuba and/or the

United States is

responding to an appeal

for assistance

from a government

representative of the cuban people.

b. If It is announced incident to the overt military

action that the United States and/or members of the oAS

are moving into cuba for the purpose of restoring order

and holding free elections, and that they will immediately

withdraw

as soon

as the

new government advises that they

have

the capability to maintain order without

further

assistance

from the OAS nations.

c. If the military operation is conducted as quickly

as possible and with

sufficient force

so that the Communist

Bloc's ability

to take

effective

counter-measures in

support of the castro regime is reduced to a minimum.

a. Or, if the cuban regime commits hostile acts against

Us forces or property which would serve as an incident

upon which to base overt US intervention. In this event,

applicable portions of a, b, and

c above apply.

5. The Department of Defense is also prepared to covertly

provide support to CIA or State, or any US approved popular

movenent inside Cuba, in terms of supplies, transportation,

personnel and bases.

00363

3

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4

25 January 1962

7-5-75

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 25 January 1962

PRESENT:

General Taylor; Mr. Johnson; Mr. Gilpatric, General

Lemnitzer; Mr. McCone and Mr. Bissell

Mr. Kennedy, Mr. Helms and General Lansdale were

present for Item 1.

1.

Cuba

The Group considered General Lansdale's paper "Cuba Project,"

19 January 1962; his paper "Task 33," 19 January 1962; and the CIA

paper "Cuba Project," 24 January 1962. In addition General Lansdale

circulated, but retained, copies of a paper on actions taken to gain

popular support for the U.S. position in connection with the OAS

meeting, and another outlining actions taken on the spot, in Punta

del Este.

After a lengthy discussion, all agencies currently involved

(State, Defense, Joint Staff, CIA) agreed that they accept the tasks

assigned to them. In the case of State, this is subject to con-

currence by the Secretary upon his return.

February 20th is recog-

nized as a target date to take a searching look at progress up to

that point and to recommend new lines of policy if appropriate.

General Lansdale commented that it appears that some clarifica-

tion night be in order as to exactly what is intended in the planning

papers.

He emphasized that there is agreement that external support

of internal operations should be provided for and that it is recognized

there might be an internal revolt which could lead to a Cuban group's

requesting U.S. Intervention. He also said he had met with the JCS

and that the

latter had responded strongly to the idea of preparing

for external action.

Additionally, he had met with the intelligence

estimators and it had been noted there will be some delay in the NIE

because of the need to acquire more intelligence and to digest a

sizcable input from the State Department.

Mr. Johnson then pointed out that before the establishment of

the Lansdale group, higher authority had directed State and Defense

to propare a plan for military intervention in the event of the

removal of Castro from the Cuban scene. He said a great deal of

work has been done along these lines and that this should now be

directed into the channel of an integrated politico-military plan

to cover any contingency.

PROPERLY IN

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Mr. McCone made

several points: (a) The NIE of Novenber 28,

which was coumented on in General Lansdale's paper, was based on

all

available Intelligence and dealt with certain operational aspects.

The latter had been dose at Mr. McCone's direction. (b) Clandestine

operations are not susceptible to rigid scheduling and must be

approached on a step-ti-step basis.

Therefore, schedules will have

to be reexamined periodically. (c) Sabotage, sanctions and economic

warfare can all be attributed

to the United States. The Special

Group should recognize this as

a possible consequence. (d) A popular

uprising within Cuba could be brutally suppressed in the manner of

Hungary, In such an cvent, unless the U.S. is prepared to give overt

assistance, future opportunities to unseat the Castro government

would be lost.

In conmenting on Mr. McCone's last point, General Taylor noted

that the CIA paper of the 24th appears to question the feasibility

of the baste objective of overthrowing the Castro regime without

overt U.S. military intervention, and that it suggests the need to

accept In advance of implementing the Project the definite possibility

of having to use U.S. forces.

lie said that in his view more thân

contingency plans are required and that, so far as possible, authority

should be obtained in

advance to undertake major moves which might be

icquired as circunstances develop.

He conceded that it may be im-

poisible to set such a fim determination very far in advance.

"The

Group narced, however, that every eifort should be made to line up

various situations that might arise, and to formulate recommended

policy to copilalize on these situations at the proper time. It was

agrred that no action should be taken before February 20th which

could have

possibilities of involving the U.S. in charges of overt

Concral Lemnitzer noted that military contingency plans now in

being provide enough American strength to accomplish the job without

Internal help. He snid that while these plans are up-to-date, it

wIll be necessary to build up a number of them based on varying

nanuaptiong.

He also warned that planning for operations of this

And nhould not Involve a firm conmitment to a time schedule, as

was the case do che carlier unsuccessful operation.

Fillilly, Genernl Lansdale noted that task number 33 (a) has been

withornam.

The other: under 33 will not be put into execution until

futuro exalnation and approval.

08303

THE WHITE HOUSE UIFIC.

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1-8-7.1

5 March 1962;

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group (Augmented) on Project

Mongoose, 5 March 1962

PRESENT:

General Taylor and Mr. Bundy; Mr: Rusk and Mr. Johnson;

Mr. McNamara, Mr. Gilpatric, General Lemnitzer and

General Lansdale:

Mr. Kennedy;

Mr. Helms and Mr. Harvey.

1.

After considerable discussion, the following was agreed:

a .

The intelligence-collection program presented in

General Lansdale's paper of 2 March was approved. General Taylor

emphasized that this should not be interpreted as a completely rigid

plan, but should serve as a general outline at this stage.

actions which are not specifically spelled out in the plan but seem

to be desirable as the project progresses, will be brought to the

Special Group for resolution.

b.

We cannot afford to concentrate on the intelligence

aspects to the exclusion of preparations for other eventual actions,

during the next five months.

Accordingly, General Lansdale will

prepare a phased plan for circulation before the next meeting to

provide for possible actions which could lead to an internal revolt

and eventual U.S. intervention.

C.

In addition certain preliminary actions can be begun

in the very near future, involving such things as spotting, assessing

and training action-type agents. As the danger of blowing our plans

by doing this is recognized, the Special Group (Augmented) must keep

its hand tightly on these preliminary actions.

d.

The Guidelines prepared by General Taylor will be

examined by all members, with a view to concurrence at a meeting a

weck from today. These will be shown to higher authority, but in the

context of information rather than a request for specific

The Secretary of State felt that the Guidelines should make it clear

that, while Mongoose is concerned with covert operations, the U.S.

is simultancously pursuing an overt course which may contribute to

the same end. He added that the covert operators should keep in

touch with the overt programs.

PRUPENTY UT

THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

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2.

In making the above point, Mr. Rusk pointed out that if

it should be possible to prove Castro's involvement in efforts to

subvert other Latin American countries then this might present an

!!D i: excuse'to intervene either unilaterally or multilaterally. He said

that Cuba could be viewed as the "East Germany" of the Western

Hemisphere. He added that the Department is looking into the

possibility of enlisting the aid of other Hemisphere countries in

establishing mechanisms for patrolling and controlling movement of

Cuban operatives in the Caribbean area.

Mr. Johnson was asked to have a list prepared of various

situations which would, serve as a plausible pretext, for intervention.

...

3. It is recognized that many of the agents infiltrated into

Cuba would be of an all-purpose type; that is they would be trained

in paramilitary skills as well as those of exclusively intelligence

concern. It was noted that once the agents are within the country

they cannot be effectively controlled from the U.S. although every

effort will be made to attempt such control. It was noted that the

scale of this covert intelligence effort is about the maximum that

can be supported within the framework of assets available, unless

there is some dramatic change for the better.

Thomas A. Parrott

No distribution

06603

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HUNT MUNNA

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

A-31

9 March 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Comments on the Guidelines for

Operation Mongoose

-

1. In conformance with our conversation and for

such use as you may desire, I am transmitting herewith

my views concerning General Taylor's "Guidelines for

Operation Mongoose

" I have incorporated my views into

the attached revision of General Taylor's "Guidelines"

This paper has not been considered by the Joint Chiefs of

Staff.

2. Essentially, the changes recommended are designed

to clarify the command channels and responsibilities

and to inject

sense of urgency.

3. I have indicated specific deletions of General

Taylor's wording by striking through

the word(s), and

Indicated additions by underlining.

Gilles, Vi Clario

WILLIAM H. CRAIG /

Brig General, USA:

DOD/ JCS Representative

Caribbean Survey Group

Enclosure:

Guidelines

0c19a

EXCLONGD FA0% GUTOMATIC

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STTEGIAL 1A1223A3

NOFORN

GUIDELINES FOR OPERATION MONGOOSE

1. Operation Mongoose will be developed on the

following

assumptions:

.a. In undertaking to cause the overthrow of the

Gastze-goveznment Communist government of Cuba, the

United States will make maximum use of Cuban resources,

Internal and external, but recognize that final success

will require decisive US milltary intervention, and that

this should be accomplished before Soviet milttary bases

are established in Cuba.

b. Such Cuban resources as are developed will be used

to prepare for and justify this intervention, and there-

for to facilitate and support 1t.

2. The immedtate primary objective of US efforts during

the coming three months w1ll be the acquisition of hard

intelligence on the conditions inside Cuba. Concurrently,

other actions generatzy-politieal-and-eeenomfe-in-eharaedep

may be taken as necessary to develop credible intelligence

concerning: US support; leadership potential; likely areas

for the development of reststance and insurgency; and to

test the appeal of proposed political platforms; provided

that they these actions are relatively inconspicious and

consistent with an overt pollcy of 1solating Castro and of

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NOFORN

neutralizing his Influence in the Western Hemisphere. The

Jeint-Chiefsef-Staff-will-Barpy-forward-the-reeessary

planning:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff will continue the

planning and essential preliminary actions to assure a

decisive US military capability for intervention. At the

end of this first period, or earlier 1f conditions permit,

the situation will be reviewed and a decision taken as

to

the next phase of the program.

3, During this period, General Lansdale will continue as

Chief of Operations, calling direetly on the participating

departments and agencies through their respective CSG

representatives and the established working groups for

support and implementation of agreed required tasks. The

heads of departments and agencies are responsible for

performance through normal command channels to the President.

The Special Group (5412), augmented by the Attorney General

and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1s responsible

for providing policy guidance to the project, for approving

important operations and for monitoring progress. General

Lansdale is

responsible for coordinating the combined plan-

ning and execution of tasks by the Caribbean Survey Group

and reporting to the president through the Special Group

(5412 Augmented) .

TOP

SECRET

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

-17-5-75

7

A-33

12 March 1962

SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

From: Brig. Gen. LansdaleSL

Subject: Policy Questions, Operation Mongoose

As Operation Mongoose goes into the approved activities of Phase I,

a number of policy questions have started to arise. Current problems,

necding resolution, are listed below.

It is requested that the Special

Group (Augmented) provide guidance, as a matter of some urgency.

1. Use of U.S. military installations. CIA desires to train small

groups of Cuban nationals on the U.S. Air Force Bombing Range, Avon

Park, Florida, immediately. Defense reports that the proposed

area

is adequate for this training, but that such training of covert agents

who will be introduced ultimately into Cuba represents a security problem

and a departure from past security procedures, due to the fact that U.S.

Government sponsorship will be apparent to trainees. Capture and

interrogation of any of these covert agents could result in exposure

(in international news media) of U.S. official involvement in efforts to

unseat the present Communist Cuban regime. A policy determination

is needed as to whether or not agents to be infiltrated into Cuba should

be trained on U.S. Government installations.

There are other U.S. military installations and properties, in

the Southeastern U.S. and Caribbean areas, which ClA would like to use

for similar training and operational purposes in the future. The same

policy determination could cover all uses of identifiable U.S. Government

properties for training and deployment of Cuban nationals for covert

infiltration into Cuba.

2. Arming of Cuban guerrillas. CIA needs a policy determination on

the supplying of aims and equipment to deserving Cuban guerrillas, as

they are located, assessed, and Icquest help. Such requests are starting

to surlace, as the intelligence-collection cifort is increased, and it is

OC1S9

SENSITIVE

TOP SECRET

This document contains

CODy NO..

of

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logical that the number of requests will increase as the operation

proceeds. There is a need for clearly defining the limits of arming

guerrillas (for self-defense, for training, for purposes short of

open actions in revolt), to permit operational judgment to be used

by designated operations officers, in Phase I.

3. Usc of U.S. military personnel and equipment. CIA has

Icquested Defense assistance in air and sea capabilities, including

supplying equipment and supplying U.S. military crews to operate

the equipment.

Included in these requests are 2 LSD's (or similar

ships) to lie off the coast in support of CIA maritime operations, with

U.S. Navy crews of 200-300 depending upon the missions, 3 USAF

cargo aircraft with "sheep-dipped" USAF crews for air re-supply,

2 amphibious aircraft with "sheep-dipped" USAF crews, and 2 sub-

marines for black broadcast operations. (This is in addition to CLA

requests for 6 PT type boats, 3 Helio aircraft, 2 82-foot Coast

Guard cutters, and arms, communications equipment, etc.). Again,

where U.S. military personnel and equipment are involved in Phase I,

there is need for a policy determination which will permit operational

judgment to be used by designated operations officers, as well as a

need for rules of engagement.

Distribution:

Copy:

1

2

3

4

5

-

6

7

To:

General Taylor

The Attorney General

Secretary Rush/Deputy Under Secretary Johnson

Secretary McNamara/Deputy Secretary Gilpatric

General Lemnitzer (through General Craig

Mr. McCone (through MI. Helms/Mr. Harvey)

Chief of Operations

00200

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TOP SECRET

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HARVEY #ZB

it fathers

7-5-71

13 March 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group (Augmented) Meeting on

Project Mongoose, 13 March 1962

PRESENT:

General Taylor and Mr. Bundy; Mr. Johnson; Mr. McNamara,

Mr. Gilpatric, General Lemnitzer and General Lansdale;

Mr. Kennedy; Mr. McCone and Mr. Harvey

1.

The Group (with one exception) agreed to accept the

changes in paragraph 2 of General Taylor's Guidelines, which were

proposed by the DCI under date of 12 March 1962 and by DOD/JCS under

date of 13 March. Mr. Bundy expressed doubts about accepting some

of this

language.

In explaining the additional actions which would be

contemplated under the new CIA language, Mr. Harvey cited the need

to give training on survival, weapons and physical training and

to promise resupply to infiltrated agents. It was agreed that under

the Guidelines as revised, CIA would still continue to bring specific

proposals for approval tothe Special Group, which involve policy

considerations.

2.

General Lansdale's paper of

13 March, entitled "Insti-

tutional Planning Operation Mongoose," was then discussed. The

sections headed Phase I, for CIA, State and Defense, were approved.

The sections headed Phase II were deferred.

The paper from General Lansdale to the Special Group

dated 12 March 1962, entitled "Policy Question Operation Mongoose,"

was then

considered

and the following decisions made:

to survey die ples they alo understo

Use of U.S. Military Installations. CIA was asked

to survey the possibility of acquiring privately-owned sites for

the proposed training. They also undertook to reexamine the

feasibility of using facilities at Isolation.

b. Arming of Cuban Guerrillas. The proposal to

authorize arms and equipment to "deserving Cuban guerrillas" under

the circumstances stated was approved. It was specified that any

major operations of this kind would be subject to specific approval

by the Special Group, and that periodic progress reports would be

made to the Group.

(This decision did not deal with the actual means

of supply, which is covered in s below.)

marin

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Use of U.S. Military Personnel and Equipment. The

Group agrced that it would have to accept the proposition that re-

supply operations will probably require U.S. military personnel

and equipment to include aircraft and seacraft. This point will

be included in the Guidelines.

General Lansdale will arrange with

the Air Force to obtain an analysis of the risks which would be

involved in air supply operations over Cuba; this should be ready

by next week. In the meantime preparations should be begun for the

selection of personnel and aircraft for necessary preliminaries,

such a "sheep-dipping." The Air Force will be asked to come up

within two weeks with an estimate of their capability to provide

one or two aircraft for use in initial operations.

In connection with small boat operations, the secre-

tary of Defense undertook to provide anything that was avaïlable

within the Defense establishment for which a requirement might be

established. It was pointed out there are no Pl boats available

and that foreign vessels will have to be acquired. CIA will present.

a specific request for equipment other than PT boats, within the

next few days.

4. Mr. McNamara then raised the possibility that a decision

may be made which will make it impossible to use U.S. personnel.

He urged that planning, therefore, proceed on two tracks, assuming

permitted later on. The Group felt that the Guidelines should re.

be studied imnediately.

At the Attorney General's suggestion, General Lansdale

undertook to examine the possibility of sabotage or other means of

destroying the Soviet boats which have been or will be delivered

to Cuba.

6.

The proposed underwater reconnaissance of the beach east

of Havana was approved, after the statement by General Lemnitzer

that amphibious planning cannot proceed without this and that the

risk is virtually non-existent.

7.

It was agreed that the Group should give a status report

to higher authority this week, to include discussion

of general

principles and guidelines.

Thomas A. Parrott

No distribution

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SEURY ORGIAL MAGDONG NOFORN

9

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

manions, de seei

13 March 1962

4

1=37

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject:

Comments on CIA's Recommended Changes

to the Guidelines for Operation Mongoose

"GuIdelines proposed changes to paragraph 2 oê the

paper are acceptable if the following

changes are made (deletions are indicated by striking

through the word(s) and additions are identified by

underlining):

"The immediate priority objective of U.S. efforts

during the coming three months will be the acquisition

of hard intelligence on Cuba. Concurrently, all other

political, economic and covert actions will

be under-

taken short of those reasonably calculated to inspire

a revolt within Cuba, or other development which would

require U.S. armed intervention.

These actions,

insofar as possible, will be consistent with overt

policies of isolating Castro and of centralizing his

earry-forward-the-neeessary-plantng continue the

planning and essential preliminary actions to assure

a decisive U.S. military capability for intervention.

At the end of this first period, or earlier if conditions

permit, the situation will be reviewed and a decision ?

taken as to the next phase of the program.

00211

CRAIG

Brig General, USA

DOD/ JCS Representative

Caribbean Survey Group

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12.38

14 March 1962

Guidelines for Operation Mongoose

Operation Mongoose will be developed on the following

assumptions:

In undertaking to cause the overthrow of the target

government, the U.S. will make maximum use of indigenous re-

sources, internal and external, but recognizes that final

success will require decisive U.S. military intervention.

D.

Such indigenous

resources as are developed will be

used to prepare for and justify this intervention, and there-

after to facilitate and support it.

2.

The imnediate priority objective of U.S. efforts during

the coming months will be the acquisition of hard intelligence on

the target area. Concurrently, all other political, economic and

covert actions will be undertaken short of those reasonably calcu-

lated to inspire a revolt within the target area, or other development

which would require U.S. armed intervention. These actions, insofar

as possible, will be consistent with overt policies of isolating the

local leader and of neutralizing his influence in the Western

Hemisphere, and will be taken in such a way as to permit disengage-

ment with minimum loses in assets and U.S. prestigc. The JCS will

continue the planning and essential preliminary actions to assure

•

Cy

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- 2 .

a decisive U.S. military capability for intervention.

At the end

of this first period, or earlier if conditions permit, the situation

will be reviewed and

a decision taken as to the next phase of the

program.

3.. In order to get the covert phase of this program in motion,

it will be necessary at the outset to use U.S. personnel, bases and

equipment for the support of operations inside the target area.

However,

the CIA will concurrently expedite the development of non-

attributable resources in order to reduce or eliminate this

dependence should it become necessary after the initial phase.

4. During this period, General Lansdale will continue as chief

of operations, calling

directly on the participating departments and

agencies for support and implementation of agreed tasks.

The heads

of these departments and agencies are responsible for performance

through normal command channels to higher authority. General

Lansdale 1s

responsible for coordinating combined planning and

execution, reporting to higher authority through the Special Group

(5412), augmented by the Attorney General and the Chairman, JCS.

The Special Group (5412 augmented) is responsible for providing

policy guidance to the project, for approving important operations

and for monitoring

progress.

Note: Mr. Johnson has copy number 2. CIA (Helms/larvey) has copy

number 3.

General• Lansdale has(copy number_4d

All other copies,

except the ones filed herewith (1 and 5) have been destroyed.

dising. i

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• :

16 March 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

Subject:

Discussion of Operation MONGOOSE

with

the President

In the presence of the Special Group (Augmented)

the President was given a progress report on Operation

MONGOOSE.

The guidelines dated 14 March 1962 were

circulated

and

were

used

as

the basis of the discussion.

After a prolonged consideration of the visibility,

noise level

and

risks entailed, General Lansdale and

the Special Group

(Augmented) were given tacit

authorization to proceed in accordance with the

guidelines.

M. D. I.

22 March 1962

This minute was road to the Special Group (Augmented) today.

The Group was unanimous in feeling that no authorization,

either tacit or otherwise, was given by higher authority. The

menbers of the Group

asked that the minute be amended to indicate

that the Group

itself had decided to proceed in accordance with

the Guidelines.

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MaRY 122.15

17-8-15

10

13. March 1062

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT:

PRESEN'T:

Minutes of Special Group (Augmented) Meeting on

Project Mongoose, 13 March 1962

coneral Taylor and Me. Bundy; Me. Jolinson; Mr. McNamara,

Mr. Cilpatric, General Domiteer and General Tansdale;

Me. Kennedy; Mr. McCone and Mr. Harvey

The Group (with one exception) agreed

to accept the

changes in paragraph 2 of General Taylor's Guidelines, Which were

proposed by the DCI under date of 12 March 1902 and by DOD/JCS under

date of 13 March. Mr. Bundy expressed doubts about accepting

of this language.

In explaining the additional actions which would be

contemplated under the

new CIA Language, fir. Harvey

cited the need

to give linining

on suivival, weapons and physical training and

to promise resupply to infiltrated agents.

was agreed that under

the Guidelines as

revised, CIA would

still continue lo bring specific

proposals for approval loche Special Group, which involve policy

considerations.

Genreal Tansdale's paper of 13 March, entitled "Insti-

cutional planning Operation Mongoose," was then discussed.

sections headed Phase I, for CIA, State and Defense, vere approved.

The sections headed Phase II were deferred.

The paper from General Lansdale to the Special Group

dated 12 March

1962, entitled "Policy Question Operation Mongonse,"

was then considered and the folloving decisions made:

a .

Usc

0f U.S- Military Installarions. CIA vas asked

Lo survey the possibility of acquiring privately.ouned sites for

the proposed tinining.

They also undertook to reexamine the

feasibilily of using

facilities at Isolation.

Arming of Cuban Guerrillas:

The proposal to

authorize arns and equipment to "deserving Cuban guerrillas" under

the circumstances stated

was approved.

It was specified that any

major operations of this kind would be subject

to specific approval

by the Special Group, and

that periodic progress reports would be

made to the Group.

(This decision did not deal with the actual means

of supply, which is covered

in cbelow.)

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Usc of U.S. Military Personnel and Eguipment.

The

Group agreed that it would have to necept the proposition that re-

supply operations will probably require U.S. military personnel

and equipment to include aircraft and sencraft. This point will

be included in the Guidelines. General Tansdale will arrange with

lie Air Force to obtain an analysis of the risks which would be

involved in air supply opcrations over Cuba; this should be ready

by next week. In the mentime preparations should be begun for the

selection of persoonel and aircraft for necessary preliminaries,

"sheep-dipping." The Air Force will be asked to cume up

within two weeks with an estimate of their capability to provide

In connection with small boat operations, the Secic-

tary of Defense undertook to provide anything that vas available

within the Defense establishment for which a requirement might be

established.

It was pointed out there are no Pl boats available

and that foreign vessels will have to be acquired.

CIA will present

a specific request for equipment other than l'I boats, wichin the

next few days.

Mr. Mcnamara then raised the possibility that a decision

may be made which will make it impossible lo use U.S.

personnel.

He urged that planning,

therefore, procced on two tracks, assuming

that such personnel can be used in the initial phase but will not be

permitted later

The Group felt that the Guidelines

flect that, in the covert phase of this operation, U.S. personnel,

bases and equipment would be available but that the situation that

in the face of a prohibition against such use must also

be studied imnediately.

Al the Attorney General's sungestion, reneral Lansdale

undertook to examine the possibility of

sabotage or other incans

of

destroying the soviet boats which have been or will be delivered

to Cuba.

The proposed undervater

reconnaissance of the beach cast

of Havana was approved, after

the statement by General Lemnitzer

that amphibious planning cannot proceed without this and that the

risk is virtually non-existent.

7.

It was agiced

that the Group should give a status report

to higher authority this week, to include discussion of general

principles and

guidelines.

Thomas A. Parrott

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NOW DEGRE SPECIAL MANDIG NOFORN

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE;

Washington 25, D.C.

1-8-7

13 March 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

Subject:

Consolidated Status Report, DOD/JCS

Representatives,

Caribbean Survey Group,

4 January - 9 March 1962

=

35

1. On 4 January 1962, Brig. General William H. Craig, USA,

designated as DOD/JCS Representative, Caribbean Survey Group

( CSG) .

Four officers from J-5, Joint Staff, who had been working

the Cuba Project, were authorized to continue on a full-time

On 18 January, Brigadier General E. G. Lansdale, Chief of

Operations, Cuba Project, presented his program review to the

result of this review, 10 tasks were assigned which

were the primary responsibility of the Department of Defense.

In order to accomplish these tasks, General Craig's Working

of J-1, J-2,

Group was entarged by the addition of full-time representatives

Joint Staff, and the Defense Intelligence

Agency and

necessary office space and clerical personnel obtained.

full-time representatives of the Chiefs of Staff of the

Military Services were

designated to work with

the Group.

Tasks were

assigned to members of the Group.

Action, to date,

1s as follows:

position paper defining

Task 1 - On 8 Februar Stake and Role of DOD In the

the JCS forwarded a proposed

Cuba Project which

generally subscribed to full Defense

support in terms

of personnel,materiel and bases.

position was approved by DepSecDef on 8 February, and for-

to the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project.

b.

Task 29 - On 7 March, the JOS approved a planning paper

which

outlined the total Involvement of the DOD in

the Cuba

Project and indicated specific situations which would require

the use of US military force.

This document is now being

considered by the DepSecDer.

Task 29 (2) - Determine how to reduce CINCLANT'S

reaction time and

yet provide adequate force to quickly take

CINCLANT and

supporting commanders have reviewed

CINCLANT's contingency plans and made study of prepositioning

steps required ir

reaction time is to be drastically reduced.

Although three initial and separate messages pertaining to

reaction times were discussed

and cleared by the JCS

by only those personnel cleared for or a part of the CSG (Wa),

it has become necessary to place

subject

of time reduction

factors in open channels in order to cover the myriad of

recommendations, possibilities and required decisions with

adequate staffing.

d. Task 29 (3) - Be prepared to brief DOD's Immediate

capability

to respond to a request from insurgent Cubans for

military assistance.

Existing J-3 briefing on the JOS

approved CINCLANT contingency plan is considered adequate

for initial brier.

Additionally, the concept of a proposed

"Quick Reaction"

Oplan togather with an analysis of the

avallability of US forces with reactions times on an

accelerated, plecemeal basis and with regard to the calculated

risks involved is being developed.

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Task 31 - DOD Policy for Support of CIA and State -

completed and approved by the JCS on 23 February.

by the Chalrman, JCS, 27 February, and by the DepSecDef

Letters were dispatched by the

Secretary

of Defense to

on 28 rebruary, Secretary of State, the Director, Central

and the Director, US Information

Agency, stating

support fully on a high

priority basis, requests for

assistance received in writing

and containing sufficient Information to permit a determina-

the equipment best suited for accomplishment of the

1. Task 31 (1) - DOD Support for Caribbean Admission

Center, Opa Locka, Florida - completed.

DOD provided 25

military personnel as interrogators,

report writers and

supervisors in two

increments

in close

coordination with

Final increment completed CIA orientation and training

course on 3 March and began Infiltration into Miami area,

9 March.

All personnel scheduled to be

on board on 14 March

and Center fully operational, 15 March 1902.

Task 32 - Defense to submit a plan for special operation:

use of Cubans enlisted In the US Armed Forces.

Recommendation

that geographic restrictions on use of Cubans now in, or to

be taken into, US Armed Forces forwarded by JCS to the Dep

for use of these Cubans, under the assumption

that the restrictive policy would be changed was also approved

by JCS on & March and forwarded to the Chief of Operations,

Task 33 a - Prayers for Cuba by Cubans in US Armed

Forces - completed 2 February.

Task as assigned visualized

prayers being offered for Cuba by Chaplains in US Arined

Forces units having Cubans enlisted with photographs being

made of Cuban soldiers at prayers for publicity purposes.

On recommendation of the JCS, no further action was

by the Chief of Operations.

Task 33 b - Plan for Incapacitation of Sugar Workers -

completed 2 February.

Task as assigned was to develop a

plan for incapacitating large segments of the sugar workers

by the covert use of Bi

or cw agents.

Study revealed the

idea was infeasible and it was cancelled.

Task 33 c - Plan for a C&D Air-Sea exerçise in the

vicinity of Cuba.

Task 33 d - Alternate plan for C&D exercise.

Plans prepared using cover of scheduled exercises as

proposed military C&D exercises.

Both plans approved by

JCS on 16 February, however, the advantageous position of

Plan 33 c noted as opposed to the elements of risk inherent

in the less desirable alternative

Plan 33 d.

Plans for-

warded to the Chief of Operations,

Cuba Project,

February with JCS recomnendation

that only

Plan 33 c be

considered for ultimate possible execution.

3. On 12 February, General Lansdale requested a survey and

evaluation of DOD Psychological Assets in the Caribbean area

and a plan for improving their use.

By proper sanitization

of the request,

the Joint Staff was requested to prepare the

study with a

deadline date of 10 March.

The Joint Staff

response was received on 9 March and the document is now being

siudied with a view of responding to General Lansdale by

15 March 1962.

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4. Additional actions to achieve the objective of the

but not directly associated with any assigned task which have

been accomplished to date include:

a. Preparation of detailed initial Essential Elements of

Information (EDI) required for planning.

These EEI were

levied on the Intelligence Community through the Director,

Defense Intelligence Agency,

responses

on 15 february.

specifically identified with the EEI were.

received, 28 February 1962.

b. Preparation of a secure room in the JCS Restricted

area.

for use as a Special Operation Room for the

CSG.

This

room was completed on 23 February and is now available

for such use as the CSG may desire to make of It.

Avon On 22 February, raceived a request from CIA for use of

Park Bombing Range, a USAP facility in Florida,

use as an exercise area for training agents.

Request was

staffed,

approved by the JCS on 7 March, sent to the

Depsecder on 7 March Ior policy approval, signed by the

DepSecDef on 9 March, and CIA notified of approval on

9 March, provided it was National policy to train Cubans

on US military bases.

¿. This office has received and processed several other

requests from CIA involving personnel, equipment and

facilities of a minor nature.

All specific CIA requests to

date have been handled expeditiously by the Military Services.

Began preparation of a Civil Affairs/Military Govern-

ment Plan for implementation on order.

a Communications

Plan, in support of the CA/MIG Plan, based on the assumption

that

existing communication facilities would be destroyed

or inoperable.

Target date for completion, 15 March 1962.

I. Requested the Chief of Operations to levy a requirement

on CIA for preparation of an estimate

other than organica military forces which might be expected

if military operations were

conducted in Cuba and of the

results of a truly free election if such were held.

Reviewed and commented informally on the Interrogation

Cuba, a Joint CIA-DOD-State project, handled by ciA.

Purpose of this Guide is to provide interrogators at Opa

Locka with a starting point when interviewing refugees

processed through the CAC.

This Gulde will be revised

monthly or as found necessary by experience.

submitted a request to DOD on 5 March 1962 for

use of certain personnel

and bases including, but not limited to,

supplies, equipment,

aircraft,

boats,

submarines and landing ships dock (LSD's), plus

of US Armed Forces to furnish Air and Sea Cover for CIA

sponsored activities.

The National policy decisions

involved concerning the execution of

this task are as

follows:

(1) Whether a policy of non-attributability to the

Us Government will apply to all

projects in connection

with the activities of

the CSG.

(2) Whether US bases and facilities should be utilized

the training of Cuban refugees.

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1-8-75

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

April 5, 1962

11-44

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL LANSDALE

There will be a meeting of the Mongoose group next

Wednesday afternoon at 2 o'clock in the Secretary of State's

Conference Room (the hour being subject to adjustment in

case the Secretary of State has to go to the White House).

You will be asked to give a progress report at the outset of

the meeting; after which the group will go into executive

session.

The Special Group today decided to ask you to brief it

bi-weekly on Mongoose and to furnish the members with

weekly written reports in the style of the South Vietnam

reports, that is, the participating departments and agencies

would file with you separate reports and you would prepare

for the principals a highlight summary along the lines of

Secretary Harriman's reports on South Vietnam.

Sometime before the weekend, I want to talk to you

about Mr. McCone's "liberation plan".

Traile Segrethe

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EX

7-8-75

13

12 April 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of Special Group (Augmented) on

Operation Mongoose, 12 April 1962

PRESENT:

General Taylor, the Attorney General, Mr. Johnsón,

Mr. Gilpatric and Mr. McCone

Mr. Bundy joined the Group later for

the discussion.

sunmation of

The Group discussed the major points made at yesterday's

meeting, particularly the views of the Secretaries of State and

Defense.

2.

Mr. McCone reiterated his belief that the operation as

presently conceived may not accomplish the desired purpose.

He said

that activities in addition to intelligence (e.g., guerrilla warfare

operations to move in the direction of the original objectives. He

felt that if only intelligence

is to be involved, then the present

scale of CIA effort may be too large. Mr. McCone also urged that

the U.S. be prepared to accept a greater degree of attributability

than it perhaps now is.

3.

Mr. Gilpatric felt it is necessary to achieve as high a

posture of readiness as possible.

For example, PI boats and other

materiel necessary for more active operations should be acquired.

In addition, nore Cubans should be inducted into the U.S. Army.

In this connection he pointed out that the restriction on service

of such Cubans outside of this country has been lifted. The Attorney

General concurred in Me. Gilpatric's comments that a more imaginative

approach toward enlistment of Cubans can be devised.

4.

It was agreed that the guidclines do not require revision

at this time.

Instead the operation

as preschtly conceived, with the

stopping up indicated above, will be

continued until August. At that

time a review will be conducted of progress made and of the long-range

objective. It was noted that the effect of any increased training

connected with the new activities nentioned by Mr. McCone, would not

be apparent before August.

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5. Mr. Gilpatric agreed to look into the status of the under-

water reconnaissance operation which had been approved at the meeting

of 13 March 1962, and which has apparently been the subject of some

misunderstanding by the Joint Reconnaissance Center.

General Taylor

called the Group's attention to the JCS paper "Justification of U.S.

Military Intervention," which most of them had not yet received.

Mr. McCone said that he would probably make additional recommenda-

tions for action within the established time-phased schedule, and

that he would also examine the effects on the motivation of

which might result from an extended period of activity within the

current framework.

Thomas

A. Parrott

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

11 June 1962

SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR ED.IN A ARZIN, STATE

CONGRAL CLATO, DEFINGE MOS

MILLIAN: HARVES, CIA

LONALD WILSON, USIA

SUBJECT: Spontancous Ecvolto in Cuba, Contingency Planning

7-82

This confirns the oral assignment of tasks for further contingency

planning.

The Dofense opcrational reprcocntative is reponsibic for the

proparation of a contingoncy plan for U.S. actions in a situation of

open, wide-specad revolt in Cuba.

This contingency is scen is a

non-U.S. -initiatri cituation, similar to that ruinored ao being

activated for mid-June 1952.

U.S. actions are scen a3 including

the use of U.S. military forec.

The State opcrational rcproochintive is Icoponcillo for the pre-

parasion of a contingency plan for U.S, actions in a situation of open

rovolt in one of a fou localitica in Cula.

This contingency is seca

as a 2on-U.S. initiatco situation warre the prople in one Cuban

locality (ox several nciniboring locolitics) openly defy the Communict

regime, are being suppicosed with force, and U:S. Help is reqursted

(by the Cuban rovoltors or Latin American opinion).

All U.S. Dopartmento and Agencico participatina in Operation

Mongoose will ascist in the pieparation of those plans, as required.

Plans should include a icocription of the asound contingency situa-

tion, spccific actions to he teen and ly whom, timing roquired, and

an indication of posi action roquirements.

Although cuuront prorationo the princity, it is crocted that

vorking dratto of theoe eatingoney plane will to trady byle ly

1 Worlang reung of carrational arcteer matires will then roac

these plans for submiscion to lie Sprcial Croup (Are nonted).

§shausdale

00382

-c: Coneral Taylor

I'rigadior Conraal, USAT

Chief of Operations

NOT SMORE-ROFORN

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SECRET SPECIAN MANDINE • NOFORN

it fill tel

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1-5-73

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

15

110

31 JUly 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, OPERATION MONGOOSE

subject: Us Contingency Plan No. 2, Cuba (S) .:

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and Mr. Gilpatric have

approved the attached plan prepared in

memorandum of 14 June 1962, subject:

to your

"Spontaneous Revolts

In Cuba, Contingency Planning"

2. This completes our action on the specific respon-

sibility assigned.

However,

should the plan be approved

by the Speclal Group (Augmented) and disseminated to task

agencies, supporting plans will be required.

Brig General, USA

DOD/ JCS Representative

Caribbean Survey Group

Enclosure:

Plan

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SECRET SPECIAL MACOINS NOPORN

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

31 July 1962°

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, OPERATION MONGOOSE

Subject:

Questions Concerning United States

Contingency Plan No. 2, Cuba (S)

I. Pursuant to your informal notes the following 1s

submitted:

a. Pare 8 (b) Phase II - The policy referred to has

not been established as yet.

CINCLANT now has a State

Depariment Political Advisor (POLAD) permanently at-

tached to his staff.

This is the present liaison link

with State.

In developing military plans it has been

recognized

by both CINCLANT and State that an additional

POLAD will be assigned to the staff of Commander, Joint

Task Force 122 during the initial assault.

This latter

and his assistants,

shift to the

Joint Task

of Conmanerations and subsequent anticipated perlod of

during the ensuing

military occupation/ government.

It is considered that

approval of United States Contingency Plan No. 2, Cuba

S) by the Special Group and the assignment of the

tasks delineated in the coordinating instructions of

sub-paragraph 4.c. (page 15) would levy the requirement

¡or the development of political policy upon the Depart-

ment of State.

This same approval would then require

this policy to be Included in the supporting plan to be

developed

In accordance with the instructions of sub

paragraph 4.d. (page 15).

ultinately assume the responsibilliy for

the civil administration of Cuba

logically sould also

be a part of the State Department plan required in sub-

Paragraph

Recognizing the time

that was required

State Department assumption of responsibility

In Europe following World War II, the military ls

prepared to establish and maintain civil affairs through

a US Military Government.

The existing military con-

tingency plans direct that the civil affairs units be

2•2u

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pontes atan no responsety for at least

1s 1t 1s known, however

that the US mill

tary cannot indefinitely

support the indigenous Cuban

population from military supplles, military contingency

plans stipulate that State must

be ready to assume

responsibility for the humanitarian feeding of the

population within 30 days following the conmencement

of hostilities.

The question as to what Cuban govern-

nent will ultimatoly be recognized by the State

Depart-

nont cannot be predicted, however, State's intention

c. Page 10, para (5) - Again, this policy 1s depend-

It unon the development and issuanc

a Department

• State plan which Would be reuuire

under the provi-

sions of paragraph 4.d. (page 15).

d. Page l2, para (b) - The Cuban government discussed

must be assumed to be one friendly to the United States.

The

paragraph itself is considered "compatible" in that

che Department of State may or may not act as the middle-

man in the actual turnover of government.

that pending

the establishment of a new Cuban government

acceptable both to the United States and the Cubans

the US military might be required to retain

civil administration;

this civil administration, however,

to be in consonance with State Department policy and

the required coordination.

In any event the turnover

should be accomplished as

rapidly as possible consistent

with the Cuban capability to assume responsibility.

e. Page 13, para (2)(a) - Approval of the US Contin-

gency Plan No.

2 would task USIA with the provision

of the subjoct informational specialists and for in-

clusion of the planning therefor in the USIA. Agency

Plan.

Since USIA has been created subsequent to any

major combat operations involving US military forces,

there is no past experience in this field.

However,

avallabilly of these Informational specialists to

augment Defense Psywar units should not be overlooked.

f. Page 13a para (3) (a) - Again, approval of the

subject contingency plan would assign the task out-

lined in this paragraph to USIA for development and

2

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TOP SECRET SPECIA MANDRINE NOFORM.

Inclusion in the USIA supporting plan. It is antifipated

that the individual questions posed would be the subject

of coordination between USIA, Defense

CINGIANT,

participants and contributors.

Provision of the trang-

mitting equipment should be included in the agency plan

and if not available in on-hand stocks, can be obtained

on the open market.

2. Although not noted as a question the comment out-

lining the "transmittal" is considered adequate distri-

bution of the subject contingency plan.-

Oscumin. 2.910

3EIJAMIN T. HARRIS

iri& General,

USA

DOD/JCS Representative

Caribbean Survey Group

0 58.3

-3

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IÚr

Daunt.

or world mondan

3 August 1902

DOD TASK # 69

Ideas to beef-up course

of

action B.

DIPLOMATIC

1. Encourare Dom Rep to table its complaint on Cuban instigated subversion

NOW. -- to the UN later.

2. Make available to the International Narcotics Comnission limited

documented evidence of Cuban exportation/importation of narcotics.

3. Third state pressures should be enouraged - e.g., asylum.

4. State openly that Guantanamo will be used as a place.

of asylum for

bonafide political refugees.

ECONOMIC

1. Stop the tranist of Cuban sugar bir anyone through the Panama Banal.

2. Publication of contraband list of items which we will stop - remove

from ships - ff known to be going to Cuba (hara goods, war making potential).

Pressure the IlB, IlI, and CATT to restrict cuban credits (6), loans, etc.

Insist that US Allies

demand cash payment for goods - no barter.

4. Preemptive buying and dumping sugar on world markots.

5. Dump

"soft" Cuban currency at discount prices.

6. Announce prohibitive tariffs on any items (tobacco primarily)

of Cuban

manufacture.

7. Announce fines and punishment for any importations of Cuban goods.

8. Introduce cheap marijuana into Cuba. .

PSYCHOLOGICAL

1b More small joint exercises in the Latin America - Caribbean - southeastern

Us area with appropriate publicity.

2. Announce closure of Panama Calan to Cuban vessels or vessels berthing

in cuba.

3.

Arnounce sea search of all vessels (actually selective and limited to

Sino-Soviet and Cuban vessels) to stop "illegal" arms importation into

Western Hemisphere.

4. Shut-off civilian employees in Guantananc.

5. Announco a misfire of a missile in Atlantic Misile Range

"near" Cuban waters.

6. Increased naval patroling of the Windwara Passage.

7. Step-up radio broadensts - hit island from four sides

with clandescine breadeacts.

03032

simultaneously

8. Diop para-dummies in selected areas.

9. Inke hich altitudo passes over ani violations of Cuban air apaca.

10. Baalt Dom Dip charger of Cuben intervontier.

11. Incrense publicity on tuban maresties trade in is, and athor cruntries.

12.

Frovide epon publicity on decection of cubone to Guanbanare,

and

harranesent of tie workers.

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dui ditin.

tandoor te

Lie pilay

1-8-11

•ireminded

17

10-B

We belleve Castro can be overthrown only by the usero!

considerable external military suppori. The objective of

Operation Mongoose Is the overthrow of the Castro regime.

Il course of action B vere pursued vigorously and the

..resistance elements in Cuba were stirred to action without

Us milltary support, then the assets presently in cuba would

probably be destroyed by Castro's effective means of

repression.

If, however, course B is followed with the intention

of providing US military support, when required, simply not

telling the Cubans, the following things could be done:

(Cubans

would do better tho, If they knew).

Greatly Increase VOA broadcasts to Cuba.

Supply more arms and equipment to Cuban guerrillas.

Exert all possible Influence on Mexico, Brazil, Chile,

Bolivia and Uruguay to severe diplomatic relations with.

Cuba.

Exert all possible influence on all friendly countries

to

stop all trade with Cuba.

Increase program of Information to Latin Anerican

countries on the evils of Castro's Communist regime

and threat to themselves.

Take all possible steps to assist other Latin

American

countries in economic progress, to increase contrast with

Cuba.

DrIft sanitized floatirs mines into Havana harbor.

Pay Cuban employees at Guantanaino Naval Base In pasos.

Disseminate Maribu seeds In agricultural areas to choke

out beneficial products.

080749

Land more resistance-trained Cubans.

Encourage irlondly nations to stop chartering ships

Intensify erforts to introduce danacing chemicals into

petzoleum shipmonto to Cali.

ME Walle Hones Witt

tense.

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HARVEY

$5

4.18

MONGOOSE

10 August 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of Special Group (Augmented) on

Operation MONGOOSE, 10 August 1962

PRESENT: State: Mi. Rusk, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Martin, Mr. Goodwin,

Mr. Hurwitch

White House:

General Taylor, Mr. Bundy

Defense/JCS: Mi. McNamara, Mr. Gilpatric, General

Lemnitzer, General Lansdale

CIA: Mr. McCone, Mr. Harvey

USIA: Mr. Murrow, Mr. Wilson

1.

Mr. McCone said that the conclusion of the Board of

National Estimates was that the Soviets will not let the Castro

regine fail because of its own inherent weaknesses. This thought

had not been contained as such in the NIE. Later in the meuting,

Mr. McCone said that he bolieves we must face the fact that Cuba

will be stronger in a year or two chan it is now; he added his pir-

sonal opinion that the Soviets might consider establishing an MRiM

base in Cuba. He noted that these two points are not necessarily

concurred in by the Loard of lational Estimates or by the USIB.

2.

Al Secretary Ruski's ruquest,

General Lansdale gave a brief

explanation of the four possible courses of action outlined in recent

papers. lie then sunmarized progress to date by saying that during

Phase I, now completed, an intensive intelligence look has been

taken at Cuba, that we have learned a great deal, but that we do not

yet have a true assessment of resistance potential.

3. Mr. Rusk suggested the possibility that in the event of a

blockade of berlin, the U.S. night wish to change its posture toward

Cuba, perhaps engaging in direct retaliation against Soviet shipping,

• CLC.

He suggested that the berlin and Cuba contingency plans should

be closely meshed. Mr. chamora was uncertain on this point, saying.

that he did not believe linited retaliation of this kind rould con-

stitute on adequate response to a Berlin blockade, whereas world-vide

• harrassment of soviet facilities would be a different matter.

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4.. Mr. Rusk emphasized the desirability of attempting to

create a split between Castro and old-line Communists. He pointed

out that such a split would be bound to bè beneficial to U.s.

interests no matter which way the balance of power swung.

In this

general connection, it was hard for him to visualize a valid pretext

for U.S. military intervention in Cuba under any circumstances

currently foreseen. However,

should reasonably viable resistance

develop to the extent for example that some provinces might oppose

the Havana Government, then the U.S. might desire to give support

to such provincial officials.

In response to the above, Mr. McCone pointed out that at

the moment the previously-cited frictions between Castro and the

old-line Communists have been resolved in Castro's favor, and no

issue currently exists. There has additionally been at least a

temporary rapprochement between Fidel and Moscow.

He indicated

that

this of course may be temporary.

Ile said that there has been some

success in recruiting Cuban officials abroad to work ior the U.s.,

and that there have been some defections.

5.

The discussion then turned to the objectives of the

MONGOOSE program.

Mr. McNamara questioned whether we cannot separate

the building up of agent assets within Cuba from actions that would

hurt the U.S. in the eyes of world opinion.

This led to the sug

gestion by General Taylor that we should consider changing the

over-all objective from one of overthrowing the Castro regime to one

of causing iis visible failure.

In this context Mi. McCone then presented an alternate

plan (called hereafter the "CIA variant") to the stepped-up Course B

described by General Lansdale, which he said had been prepared as a

result of the conclusion that

stepped-up B would not in fact result

in the overthrow of Castro. lie emphasized that the stepped-up plan

should not be undertaken unless the U.S. is prepared to accept

attributability for the necessary actions, including the eventual

use of U.S. military force. Mr. McCone said that a stepped-up I will

risk inviting an uprising, which might result in a lungary-type blood

bath if unsupported. Not only would the U.s. be blamed, but there

would also be a high noise level in the press and eventually a situation

On the other hand, the CIA variant now proposed would, in

Mr. Mccone's view, avoid all of these dangers because it would not

invite an uprising. Again lie repeated his view that the U.s. might,

however, face a stronger Cuba in the future.

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The principal members of the Spocial Group felt, after

some discussion, that the CIA variant should be developed

further

for consideration at next Thursday's meeting of the Special Group.

Mr. McCone was asked to stress economic sabotage, and to emphasize

mcasures to foment a Castro-oldline Communist split. It was

emphasized that any actions under this plan must be so designed as

to avoid major attribution to the U.S.

7.

General Lemnitzer told the Group that the Navy does not

wish Guantanamo used as a base for operational activities, as

suggested by CIA.

He said that the other Chiefs have not yet given

an opinion on this but he thought that they would agree with the

Navy, as he himself does.

The view is that this base is too important

to the U.S. and too vulnerable to Cuban pressure to take the chance

of provoking Cuban reaction. The State representatives agreed with

this view.

8.

Mr. Bundy suggested that a hard look be taken at the

possibility of support to selected Cuban exiles on a strictiy

"disengaged" basis; in other words, should they be given covert

financial and material support, with the idea of seeing what they

could generate on their own.

Mr. Rusk suggested that continued pressure should be

placed on Castro by keeping interest in the prisoner issue alive.

10. Action to be taken:

CIA to prepare a new version of its variant plan, in

accordance with the above-summarized discussion. This should be

ready by wesnesday, August 15ch.

Thomas A.. Parrott

cC: Gendatians 414fe3. mn.

Attachment - Agenda for Meeting

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TI D

TOP SECRET-MOFORN

SPECIAL HANDLING

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

*

13 August 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM HARVEY, CLA

ROBERT HURWITCH, STATE

GEN. BENJAMIN HARRIS, DEFENSE

LON WILSON, USIA

From:

Brig. Cen. Lansdale Ect

Subject: Alternate Course B

In compliance with the desires and guidance expressed in the

10 August policy meeting on Operation Mongoose, we will procuce

an'outline of an alternate Course B for submission. The CIA paper

"Operational Plan (Reduced Effort)' will be used as the starting

1/3

Since tois is to be a bare outline, to permit further policy

guidance to be coveloped, I believe the pape, need contain only

a statement of objectives and a lisi of implementing activities.

The list of activitien will be under the headings of: Intelligence,

Political, Economic, Psychological, Faramilitary, and Military.

We will hold an Operational Lepresentatives work session in

my office, at 1160 hours, Tuesday, 11 August, to complete the

outline paper for suomission.. Lach of you is to bring 5 copies of

completed assigned work to this work cession, to permit cach vi

us to work from a full set of craits.

Papers required from each of you for the luesday meeting:

1r. Harvey: Intolligence, Political (splitting the regime,

1, Economic (sabotage, limited

"deception), and Paramilitary. Also, any suggestions for inclusion

In other sectiona of the pager.

Mr. Hurwitch: Starcment of Objectives, Folitical, and

Economic.

also, any suggestions for inclusion in other soctions

of the papor.

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Gen. Harris: Economic (limited deception), Paramilitary

(limited deception), and Military. Also, any suggestions for

inclusion in other sections of the paper.

Mr. Wilson: Psychological (including covert). Also, any

suggestions for inclusion in other sections of the paper.

2

Top cente

SPECIAL A MOLDIS

03028

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it formalitin!

LYES ONLY

9-75

4 October 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT:

PRESENT:

Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) on

Operation MONGOOSE, 4 October 1962

The Attorney General; Mr. Johnson; Mr. Gilpatric, General

Taylor, General. Lansdale; Mr. McCone and General

Carter;

Mr. Wilson

1.

The Attorney General opened

the meeting by saying that

higher authority is concerned about progress on the MONGOOSE program

and feels that more priority should be given to trying to mount

sabotage operations.

The Attorney General said

that he wondered if

a new look is not required at this time in view of the meager results,

especially in the sabotage field.. He urged that "massive

activity"

be mounted within the entire MONGOOSE framework. There was

deal of discussion about this, and General Lansdale said that

attempt will be made against the major target which has been the object

of three unsuccessful missions, and that approximately six new ones

are in the planning stage.

Mr. Johnson said that

"massive activity" would have to

appear to come from within.

He also said that he hopes soon to be

able to present to the Group a plan for giving Cuban exiles. more of a

frce hand, with the full realization that this would give more visibility

to their activities. On this latter point, Mr. McCone

said that he

reserves judgment as to the feasibility. and desirability of such a

program. (Mr. Johnson agreed that he has reservations as well.)

Mr. McCone then

said that he gets the impression that high

levels of the govermment want to get on with activity but still wish

to retain a low noise level.

Ile does not believe that this will be

Any sabotage would be blamed on the United States.

connection, he cited

the enormous number of telephone calls

been directed at CIA at the time that the skin divers landed

in Eastern

and at the time Cuban exile students shot up the apartment house.

urged that

responsible officials be prepared

to accept a higher noise

level if they want to get on with opcrations.

In partial rebuttal, the Attorney General said that the

rcasons people were so concerned at the times mentioned

were: (a) the

fact that the skin divers were Americans, and (b) that the student

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activity vas irresponsible and foolish, and

if cither of these had

in fact been engineered by the U.S. it would have been a great mistake.

le went on to say responsible people do wish to get on with operations

but want to relate the possibility of attributability to the importance

of the particular undertaking.

He also questioned whether ve are

going down the right road of whether "more direct action"

He urged that alternative and imaginative plans be developed

for accomplishing the overall objective.

Returning to Mr. Johnson's point about the necessity

massive activity coming from within, Mr. McCone pointed out that

internal security missions arc now so rigid that internal uprisings

are sure to be brutally suppressed.

It was agreed that the current

guidelines do not call for inciting such an uprising.

Mr. McCone and General Carter explained the tremendous

efforts which are necessary to insure that an operation such as the

sabotage one previously authorized cannot be pinned directly on the

After considerable discussion, the Group agreed that it is not

necessary to 80 to such extreme lengths to guarantee non-attributability

and that short cuts will be acceptable.

Mr. Gilpatric reported that Defense is now worling hard on

establishing a Cuban brigade.

Recruits will be trained for four or

five months and will then be on call for any future action.

General Taylor reported that the Joint Staff is refining

various military contingency plans,

based on a variety of possivle

Such situations include:

Soviet action against berlin;

of Bloc offensive weapons in Cuba; attack against Guantanamo;

a popular uprising; armed Cuban subversion in the licmisphere; and

the establishment of a direct threat to the U.s.

7.

Cuba.

The Group then turned to the subject of reconnaissance of

(Dr. Scoville and Colonel Stcakley joined the Group for this

part of the discussion.)

It was pointed out that the Agency is now

restricted to using its high performance vehicle in the southeast

quadrant of Cuba, because of

the SAM sites.

It was questioned whether

this is a rcasonable restriction at this time, particularly when the

SAils

are almost certainly not operational.

Coloncl Stcakley and Dr. Scoville described for the Group

a spectrum of reconnaissance activitics which could be undertaken,

ranging from low-level Navy fighters through drones, up to the Agency's

capabilities, particularly equipped with new radar countermeasures.

702 S5007:

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The result of this discussion was that it was agreed that

DOD and ClA should get together on recommendations

for

targets within

Cuba that require coverage and on iccommendations as

to how to achieve

this coverage.

A meeting was set for next Tuesday, at which time DOD

and CIA should be prepared to discuss all possibilities, including

requirements, capabilities, vulnerabilities, etc.

8.

There was some discussion of the desirability of mining

Cuban waters.

It was pointed out that non-U.S.-attributable mines,

which appear to be homemade, are available and could be laid by small

craft operated by Cubans.

It lias agreed that the Attorney General should act as

Chairman of the Special Group (Augmented) at least for the time being.

10. It was agreed that four major points emerged from today's

discussion:

b.

We ought

to go all out for increased intelligence.

There should be considerably more sabotage.

Restrictions

on attributability

can be relaxed so that

training and other preparations can be subject to sone short cuts.

All efforts should be made

to develop new and imaginative

approaches

to the possibility of getting rid of the Castro regime.

Parrott

cc:.

General Lansdale

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Operation MONGOOSE

did bone wine gilled see?

T0=/

26 October 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT:

Minutcs of Meeting of the Special Group (Augmented)

on Operation NONGOOSE, 26 October 1962

PRESENT:

Mr. McNamara, Mr. Gilpatric, General Taylor, General

Lansdale, General Johnson; the Attorney General;

Mx. Johnson, Mr. Martin; Mr. Bundy; Mi. McCone, ME.

Harvey; Mr. Wilson.

-

1.

The iceting began with a discussion of the considerably-

incrcased activity in the dispatch, and preparation for dispatch,

of agent teams.

As a rcsult of this discussion, it was agreed that

all plans for dispatch should be suspended pending further examination;

instructions were

issued during the course of the meeting designed

to recall the three teams already on the way.

It was agreed that the first order of business with regaid

to these teams is to examine in detail the requircinents toward which

they could contribute.

General Lansdale will arrange to set erA:

into contact with: (a) General Carroll, to examine what military

requirements such agents could service; (b) similarly, the State

Department for political intelligence requirements; (c) USIA for

Icquirements peculiar to that Agency. After this examination, it

will then be decided what the best use of these agent assets actually

should be.

2.

Mr. McCone and Mr. Ilarvey said during the course of the

discussion on agon teams, that the action taken had represented a

unilateral decision by

CiA and was not in response to specific

military requirements.. CIA had felt that this was within its sphere

of responsibility, and particularly with respoct to the first threc

teams had considered that it was a continuation of previously-

approved opcrations.

Mr. McCone commented that internal sccurity

in Cuba is now far more stringent than it was two wecks ago, thereby

making ageni operations much more difficult; he ielt, thereiore, that

agent activity on this

scale will only be justified if the responsible

departments specifically require it for intolligence purposes.

In this connection, General Taylor brought out that tie

Chiefs had approved the use of submarines for agent dispatch but had

not been asked to review the operation in broadet context.

The

•Chiefs had concluded, however, that no revolt should be stimulated

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unless and until the U.S. is ready to support it and that the

military establishment does not wish to take over sabotage and

similar operations at this time, although it should be prepared

to do so if an invasion should be mounted. Mi. Mccone agreed that did al

it is possible that as the situation develops, CIA Cuban operations i:

might nove under military control, but that such action

is not

indicated at this time.

.

3.

Mr. Harvey made the point that the proposed agent dis- !.

patches would not use up all existing assets. He said that in the

event of invasion, a sizeable number of Cubans could be trained

quickly.

4.

The Attorney General and General Lansdale emphasized

that the Cubans are entirely prepared to make the necessary sacrifices

if they are in support of an approved plan.. The Cubans do want,

however, assurances that such activitics are in fact approved at a

high level.

5.

Mr. Bundy emphasized the importance of planning for the

use of Cubans in political and civil activities during and after

any military action.

He felt that there should be established with-

in the governnent some sort of "Office of Free Cuban Affairs," which

probably should be placed within the Department of State. The

activities of this office would be distinct from General Lansdale's

operations but would be closely related to them.

He pointed out

that top priority should be given to selecting a man to head such

an office.

Mr. Bundy also said that he thought a subcommittec of

the NSC Exccutive Committee should be established to deal with

MONGOOSE affairs.

Mr. McNamara thought that MONGOOSE in the short-term

should be considered in the context of (a) providing support for

action designed to get rid of the missiles, and (b) support for a

possible invasion.

7.

Specific discussion took place on points raised in the

paper distributed at the meeting, as follows:

a .

CIA should continue to develop the balloon propaganda

facilities, although it was recognized that by the target date of

1 December this capability might no longer be needed because of other

methods of delivery.

this time.

b.

No major acts of sabotage should be undertaken at

This decision will be rcviewed in about a weck.

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C .

General Lansdale should develop further plans to

"help the Cubans to help themselves." Mr. Morales-Carrion should

be brought into this planning.

be assigned

Political planning for the post-Castro period will

to the "Office for Free Cuban Affairs."

Establishment of USIA's new S0 KW transmitter in

the Florida

Keys should be expeditcd.

8.

It was reiterated that General Lansdale is the focal

point for all MONGOOSE activities, that he is charged with their

overall management and that he should be kept informed of all

significant plans and activities in connection with the project.

Thomas A.

dapants

Parrott

Distribution

The Attorney General

Chairman, JCS

DCI

General Lansdale - ly destroyi 419163-1km

WE COURT OLS SMS

FROPERTY"

THE Wund told mor

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Lentin is

24

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

31 October 1962

1,19

FOR THE RECORD

By Brig. Gen. LansdaleSL

Subject: Outline of Covert Operations

Last night, Deputy Secretary Gilpatric asked me to give him a

brief outline, by this morning, of Operation Mongoose in the light

of current US-USSR negotiations re Cuba. I was to cover present

status of operations, resources, and sketch in future possibilities.

I wrote the outline, based on current reports from the Mongoose

operations team and my staff. Only two copies were typed.

I showed the outline to Mr. Gilpatric this morning as he rode

out to the airport, to catch his flight to New York. I noted the

exceptional sensitivity of the information in the outline. He acknowl-

edged its sensitivity, said the outline was precisely what he had in

mind, and that I should hold the paper rather than his taking it. He

then asked me to show it to Secretary McNamara and to the Attorney

General. I did so, today.

The outline was read by Mi. Frank Hand, Mr. Bruce Cheever,

and by Lt-Col Patchell. I gave its general information toi General

Johnson. Cheever said that the figures were the same he had given

me, for. CIA operations; he noted that CIA intelligence reporting

was spotty now, due to lack of mail deliveries from Cuba!

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Til

4-5-77

25

M//7

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

31 October 1962

SEASTWE

FOR THE RECORD

By Brig. Gen. Lansdaler

Subject: Outline of Covert Operations

My other memorandum on this same subject today describes

the tasking by Deputy Secrctary Gilpatric and the handling of this

highly sensitive information. The acquisition of the information

is noted in this present memorandum.

After Deputy Secretary Gilpatric gave me the requirement

last night, I talked to Bruce Cheever (who was acting for Bill

Harvey while Harvey was out of town). I sketched in the purpose,

which was to get a fix for Gilpatric as one of the U.S. negotiators

with the Soviets on whether or not all actions (sabotage, etc.)

had come to a stop. I mentioned that this was a sensitive point

brought up by Adlai Stevenson when he talked with the U.S.

negotiators in New York; he didn't want the U.S. embarrassed

and Gilpatric wanted to be sure of this. Cheever commented that

he hoped my memorandum wasn't going to be shown to Stevenson;

I reassured him that I was writing it as an "eyes only" for Gilpatric,

but it must be correct.

I asked about covert operational assets both inside Cuba and

outside, if they had stop orders on actions. Bruce said that they

all had such orders, but pointed out that some of the Cubans were

quite emotional about stopping actions against Castro and he wasn't

certain that everyone would hold to the orders.

I then asked about assets inside Cuba, did they only have the

two action teams there? How about any psychological operations?

Bruce said he believed there were only the two teams and would

check further to be sure. He knew the teams were supposed to be

collecting intelligence. As for psychological operations, all ClA

assets had been turned over to USLA for operational use. Iasked

about the balloon operation. He said that this was not in being yet.

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This morning I talked to Bruce again, checking the points

in my memorandum. He said that there were only the two action

a teams, a small one (Central Cuba) and the big one (200-man in

Western Cuba), but they definitely were on intelligence collection.

I asked if all others were under control, no boats going out, etc.

He said yes, but again pointed out that the Cubans were restive.

I then asked if any independent groups were in motion. He said

CIA couldn't guarantee any groups not under CLA control, but that

the word had gotten around to stop actions at this time and none

were known to CIA currently, although maybe there was one not

known to CIA. I commented again that any action would embarrass

the negotiations, which

was why I was asking. Bruce said he

understood.

I then checked with Don Wilson, USIA, who confirmed that

all CIA psychological assets had been turned over to USIA for

operational use and were being used as desired by the President.

I checked with Bob Hurwitch, State, to see if he knew of any

actions in preparation or on the way; he said no, everything

appeared to be at a halt. I checked with General Johnson to see

if any U.S. military activity might have a Cuban action group.

He said no, there are firm orders holding such actions.

I then wrote the "eyes only"' memorandum to show to Mi.

Gilpatric, on "Outline of Covert Operations."

2

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2ud50

26

3 December 1962

MEDRALDU: FOR THE REOORD

SUBJECT: Talk with General Lansdale

-

I. On Friday afternoon General Lansdale came to see me at his

request. He had three matters to discuss:

A., Frank Hand, his performance, and whether or not

it was desirable for Lansdale to write a menorardum to

the Diregtor setting forth Hand's contribution to the

Office of the Secretary of Defense. I asked Lansdale to

write the remorandim by all means.

B. General Lansdale told me that he was going on

leave in Florida for a couple of reeks and tanted to be

sure that it was not necessary that he meet General

Walsh before departure. I told him that General lialsh

was still involved in some indoctrination and training

and that we could arrange the introduction after General

Lansdale's return from leave.

C. General Lansdale said that he thought Operation

out of business. He added that he had already taken

steps to relieve General Charles Johnson of any duties

in this regard and that he was simply anaiting an appro-

priate time to come over to the Agency for the purpose

of tidying up the details here.

(I don't know what he

meant by this and did not ask.) He pointed out, hovever,

that although he thought he ought to disengage from

Operation longoose, "they had not pernitted hin to disen-

gage at this time". I asked what he meant by "they", but

he simply repeated his statement with a smile.. I could

only assime from this that the hütorey General or some-

one of comoarable rank had told Lansdale that he was not

to disengage from Operation Mongoose unless and until

certain decisions were made.

2. General Lansdale during this conversation did not inform me

of what I had recently learned from the Pentagon, i.c. that he tas

due to ratire in February, that he had persuaded ir. Gilpatric to

milte a monorandum to the

Secretary of the nir force arranging for

-

Disas'

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him to be recalled to active duty following the retirement.

I gather

that this would mean that he would be made a llajor General at the

time he is recalled.

Richard Helms

Deputy Director (Plans)

Distribution:

Orig - DCI

1 cc - DDCI

CC - DD/P

23

06860

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-Sce

27

THE WHITE

- POUSE

WASHINGTON

an a pragmatio. a

= What wind work -

of the has this in abort

TOY SECRET - EYES ONLY

ryust but the escorted the

September 6, 1963 in nob to relax.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

sensele no told you chaff a

SUBJECT: Exile Raids -- Extent of Knowledge Within Executive Branch

memo

sense do

I refer to your interest in knowing the extent of knowledge within the Govern- meles

inent about the exile raids in which the U.S. was involved. The following will of

give you a pretly good, general picture of the people who knew a little or a lot

The following will pla

about the raids. A detailed list which indicates the names and numbers of all youu

I the players (including aides, secretaries, S/S types, ctc.) and which indicates fir

the extent of their knowledge, will take some time to run down. Are you in-

terested in such a list?

1. White House -- The President, you, Tom Pariott, and I knew specifics

about the raids.

2. State -- The Secretary, Goige Ball, Averill Harriman, Alexis Johnson,

Eid Martin, Stcrling Cottrell, John Crimins, and Bill Bowdler (Crimmins'

deputy) knew specifics about the raids. The head of the Miami Office, Haivey

Sum, is cleared for this sort of information but was aware of our involvement

only in the most general way.

Dick Phillips and Jim Greenfield in P, in preparation for press queries, were

told for their own background that "we were interested" in the raids.

In INR, the liaison men with CLA, Joe Scott and Al Carter, knew about the raids.

Presumably, Tom Hughes, Goige Denney (Tom's depuly) and John Plank also

kncw.

3. Defense -- Roswell Gilpatric know details about the raids and, presumably,

he told Secretary McNamara.

As a member of the Cuban Coordinating Committee, Cy Vance knew details about

the raids; he probably told one or both of his two people who work on Cuba -- Joe.

Califano and It. Col. Al llaig.

TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY

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TOP

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-2 -

*. CIA -- On the operating side, obviously, a number of people know about

the raids. Also, a few intelligence people were given gencral information so

that the events would not be over-played in the intelligence reports. For the

same reason, a few poople in DIA had general information about the raids.

Generally speaking, the intelligence people were told about the raids shortly

before they occurred.

5. Miscellancous -- The AG, Bromley, and other members of the Standing

Group, not mentioned above, knew about the raids. Coitain Navy elemants in

the operational area knew where the attack boats were going, but not the details

of operation.

A great many people knew there was something special about these raids, al-

though they did not know the details. For example, the Coast Guard, Customs,

and INS had to be told to leave the "comings and goings"' of the operation alone.

Also, a very few people in DOD who had lo procure special equipment, (e. g.

cannons and mortars) for the group knew that some "hanky-panky" was going on

somewhere. Tinally, the intelligence waich officers on duty the night of the

raids were told that we were aware of the raids; this prevented needless night-

time phone calls.

' 6. CiA says that information about the raids is given lo people who have a real

need to know"; furthermore, , a person is given only as much detail as he necds

to know. While Tom Parrott regards the above as a pretty tight contiol, I regard

the apparent security of the two attacks as slightly short of miraculous in vicw

of the extent of knowledge around the government. However, I confess

that I

don't know enough about the total security set-up to make a judgment as to whether

oi not it could be made significantly tighter.

CC

Gordon Chase

4,83

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SECRET/SENSITIVE

2

14 April 1967

TO: The Director

FROM: John A. McCone

1. No memorandum can be located covering the August 10, 1962

meeting; however, it is highly probable that one exists.

2. Meetings of August 8 or 9, 1962, in the JCS Operations Room

(Pentagon) and August 10, 1962, in

were for the purpose of considering staff proposals for Phase II of opera-

tion MONGOOSE. This operation was under the direction of General

Lansdale, with Wm. Harvey handling CIA participation (under FitzGeraid).

At one of these meetings -- probably the meeting in the JCS Room -- I

recall a suggestion being made to liquidate top people in the Castro

regime, including Castro. I took immediate exception to this suggestion,

stating that the subject was completely out of bounds as far as the USG

and CIA were concerned and the idea should not be discussed nor should

it appear in any papers, as the USG could not consider such actions on

moral or ethical grounds.

3. Immediately after the meeting, I called on

personally and re-emphasized my position, in which he heartily agreed.

I did this because operation MONCOOSE -- an inter-departmental affair --

was under the operational control of

4. At no time did the suggestion receive serious consideration

by the Special Group (augmented) nor by any individual responsible for

policy.

5. Through the years the Cuban problem was discussed in terms

such as "dispose of Castro," "remove Castro," "'knock off Castro, " etc.,

and this meant the overthrow of the Communist Government in Cuba and

the replacing of it with a democratic regime. . Terms such as the above

appear in many working papers, memoranda for the record, etc., and, as

stated, all refer to a change in the Cuban Government.

01116

abdust

John A. McCone

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LANSDALE

HARVEY

Don Nirsau

HuRwitcit

ED: MARTIN

PARROTT

GOODMIN

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TEP

SECRET

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EMES

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SIGNET

SENSING

AVES VIRY

14 August 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT

: Operation MONGOOSE

1. Action. None. This memorandum is for your information.

2. Reference is made to our conversation on 13 August 1962,

concerning the memorandum of that date from General Lansdale.

Attached is a copy of this memorandum, excised from which are

four words in the second line of the penultimate paragraph on

page 1. These four words were "including liquidation of leaders."

3. The question of assassination, particularly of Fidel Castro,

was brought up by

at the meeting of the

Special Group (Augmented) in

on 10 August.

It was the obvious consensus at that meeting, in answer to a

comment by

that this is not a subject which

has been made a matter of official record. I took careful notes on

the comments at this meeting on this point, and the Special Group

(Augmented) is not expecting any written comments or study on

this point.

4. Upon receipt of the attached memorandum, I called

Lansdale's office and, in his absence, pointed out to Frank Hand

the inadmissibility and stupidity of putting this type of comment in

writing in such a document. I advised Frank Hand that, as far

as CIA was concerned, we would write no document pertaining to

this and wold partiripate in no open meeting discussing it.

I strongly urged Hand to recommend to Lansdale that he excise

the phrase in question from all copies of this memorandum, in-

cluding those disseminated to State, Defense, and USIA. Shortly

thereafter, Lansdale called back and left the message that

he agreed and that he had done so.

0111:9

S188T

CENSTE

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SENSITIE

5. For your information also, in your absence and since

the attached memorandum already had been distributed and in

view of the possibility that this might come to the Director's

attention, I informally briefed Walt Elder on the above.

cuti

WILLIAM K. HARVEY

Chief, Task Force W

Attachment

Memo fr Gen Lansdale dtd 13 Aug 62

01120

EYS OHM

excludes

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TOP SECRET-NOFORN

SPECIAL . ADLING

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

-1401000002

Helens

Sorelilit

' TOP SECKET-NOFORN!

NH 50955

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-13 August 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM HARVEY, CIA T

ROBERT HURWITCH, STATE

GEN. BENJAMIN HARRIS, DEFENSE

DON WILSON, USIA

From:

Brig. Gen. Lansdalezd

1130

==*:

Subject: Alternate Course B

Member Ger mansace erossug be

In compliance with the desires and guidance expressed in the

10 August policy meeting on Operation Mongoose, we will produce

an outline of an alternate Course B for submission. The CIA paper

"Operational Plan (Reduced Effort)" will be used as the starting

basis.

Since this is to be a bare outline, to permit further policy

guidance to be developed, I believe the paper need contain only

a statement of objectives and a list of implementing activities.

The list of activities will be under the headings of: Intelligence,

Political, Economic, Psychological, Paramilitary, and Military.

We will hold an Operational Representatives work session in

my office, at 1400 hours, Tuesday, 14 August, to complete the

outline paper for submission. Each of you is to bring 5 copies of

completed assigned work to this work session, to permit each of

us to work from a full set of drafts.

Papers required from each of you for the Tuesday meeting:

Mr. Harvey: Intelligence, Political (splitting the regime,

!, Economic (sabotage, limited

deception), and Paramilitary.: Also, any suggestions for inclusion:

in other sections of the paper.

Mr. Hurwitch: Statement of Objectives, Political, and

Economic. Also, any suggestions for inclusion in other sections

of the paper.

01121

EXCLUDED FROW AUTO"ATIC

REGRADING: DOD DIR 5200.10

DOES NOT APPLY

This document contains • pages.

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## Page 149

TOP SECR- NOFORN

SPECIAL HANDLING

Cren.

Hartin: Feonomic (limitad decaption), Paramilitary

(limited deception), and Military. Also, any suggestions for

inclusion in other sections of the paper.

Mr. Wilson: Psychological (including covert). Also, any

suggestions for inclusion in other sections of the paper.

01122

Iranera.

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6 October 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR TUE RECORD

SUBJICT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 6 October 1961

PRESENI: General Taylor (Itcas 1-5), It- Johnson, Mr. Dulles,

General Lansdale. Mr. Gilpatric and General Lemnitzer

were present for

itens l and 2.

2.

A17 Resupply - North Vietnam

Mr. Dulles reported that the plen to make the resupply drop

into North Victnen at dusk had proved to be unduly risky. Heasaid

that it is now proposed to fly the mission in the dark of the moon.

The Group had no objection to this.

1.

JT. Cuba

For the benefit of the State and Defense members, Mr. Parrott

recounted the discussion that General Somoza had had with General

Taylor, Including the request for advice on the proposition which

had been made to Somoza for the use of Nicaraguan airfields in

connection with sabotage raids over Cuba. It was noted that a pro-

position had been made to Cii for support of these projected opcrations

and that it had been Icjected. The Group agreed with General Tayio='s

advice to Somoza to avoid Involvement at this time.

• Yr. Parrott also told the Group that two other exercises are in

progress in connection vith Cuba - the preparation of a contingency

•plan in [connection with the possible renoval ofCastro. iroa the

Cuban scene and an updating of the overall plan for covert op-ratiná

SEGRET - ENS ENLY

ne"s

PROPERTY OF

THE WHITE HOUSE DEFICI

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"ік!

P

Y

WASHINGTON

October 5, 1961

1:2

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 100

TO:

SUBJECT:

The Secretary of State

Contingency Planning for Cuba

In confirmation of oral instructions conveyed to Assistant

Secretary of State Woodward, a plan is desired for the indicated

contingency in Cuba.

McGeorge Bundy

CC:

The Secretary of Defense

Director of Central Intclligence

Mr. Richard Goodwin

CC:

Mrs. Lincoln.

Mi. Bundy's Files

MI. Bromley Smith

TOP

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RETYPED FROM INDISTINCT ORIGINAL

5 October 1961

-

• MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Cuba

In accordance with General Taylor's instructions, I talked to

Assistant Secretary Woodward yesterday about the requirement for the

preparation of a contingency plan. He told me on the telephone he

would be heaving for two weeks and

coerr, would have to take this project refore, his deputy, lymberley

I then met with Mr. Coerr and outlined the requirement to him.

I said that what was wanted was a plan against the contingency that

Castro would in some way or other be removed from the Cuban scene.

I said that my understanding was the terms of reference governing

this plan should be quite broad; we agreed, for example, that the

presence and positions of Raul

and Che Guevara must be taken into

account.

We agreed that this was an exercise that should be under

the direction of State with participation by Defense and CIA. I

also pointed out to Mr. Coerr that Mr. Goodwin had been aware of

this requirement.

Mr. Coerr said he would get his people started on this right

away.

As to timing, I said that

I did not understand that this was

a crash program but that it should proceed with reasonable speed.

He then

set Monday as a target date for a first draft.

I had mentioned to Mr. Woodward the President's interest in

this matter, before General Taylor

had told me he preferred this not

be done.

Therefore, I felt it necessary to tell Mr. Coerr,

on the

assumption that Mr.

Woodward would have already told him.

I asked

that this aspect be kept completely out of the picture.

He under-

stood this fully and volunteered that it could be presented as an

exercise emanating from his own office. I said I would leave this

up to him but it was perfectly all right to attribute it to General

Taylor.

On the covert side, I talked to Tracy Barnes in CIA and asked

that an up-to-date report

be furnished as soon as possible on what

is going on and what is being planned. I asked that this be re-

lated to the broad plan that was approved by the Special Group and

by higher authority in August. I did not tell Mr. Barnes of

Presidential interest. However, during the time that I had been

trying to

reach him, he had

seen Mr. Goodwin who had told him about

this requirement.

Thomas A. Parrott

RETYPED FROM INDISTINCT ORIGINAL

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oi!"

5 Octobee 1901

SUBJNGS: Cuba

In escondence utth Conesal Toylon's toocructiono, I tallied io

Acalobus Cocotary locaured yeneciday aloue the coquarerons for cho

mapeadalen of a contagency plane le 1old ma on the tolegione lie

Cone, weile baue io cold clido peojoce on.

Telen ime minh la. Cocar and outlinod tho migulzo ne to liin.

O unid that wat und manted vao a plan ogatnot the contingency Crat

Casiro would in cong ay or otler be sonovod frea ilo Curen serna.

thto plan thould bo wiee broad; de agrood, foi en

n1n0 boinsod ouc

co ler Cosmo Chat leo Coodala Mad Mena tutel C.

chio inquirocent.

tino Conca cald be would sec his poople scarica na chio tiche

1310 cirurg, I cald chac I, did noe mudesatend tice trio mas

sta coooma but thos de should poceced mith setcouable spood.

te iton cie tendog do a tregel daco for a ficat dend.

Clod venttoood to la booded ste Jaacidonde ircernat 1n

coomotten that ti.

curi ildo rano be lege coplocoly out of the picouro 1au1-

clood dito fully and volonscosed that te could be preconted no in

camarin ca

Con ido ou office.

I cail T vould leave thle

cp co alu los de mao poccocely all dight to reedbude de do Cocaral

Dayl0%.

is coleg en and mac is bolag plamed.

I aled that chio lesco

lated eo die baced plan that cao approved by che Epoclal Group aul

Perover, ruding the time thee t hed bern

colag in teach loth, lie had geon lixo Coodla who hit cold hin aloit

SECT

Wl1r!

4-1.

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1.

JOP SSCRET

Aprl 22, 1961

TOP SECRET

Doar desaral Taylort

•1 an dollgatoà tae you have cursenico to 89879

as my advisor on a ssiles sl amportant pacbleras, end

¡ sand this lestos to indigato tho arnga da duo maste co

which & hopo you will coos!dar.

It 1e appazons that wa noed to taka a close look

no all ous procticos and geograms in to arcas of

mitary end parullario gusicile and antl guarrulla

activity which fall abort of eutright was.

I bollars lies

no 090d to strengiben cur mose la this arcao. lu lio

counso of jore study, I hope that you sill giro epcolal

1101on to the longer much can bo loosilsa from

10=4 ab 663000 la Cuba.

rismy pecta di tha Bacco los Daarclo

31623 C94501 vil

sagoslato wits yoursel,

avalablo to you la lola dachdon Altornsy Condict

Robert Beanody focas Mg Cablnoto Adiniral Ariolen

Duska faons tho Jolus Chiela of Stall, and Diraclos

Miloa Dullaa from los Cantral Intelligaace Agaiusy &

hopo tans each of then will have an exportualty to 5071cm

and ecuarent ca gone conclusions Bugle lee and what a

prellininazy a0p0ct bp 213y 1307.

DETERIORATING COPY REPLACED BY

ELECTROSTATIC COPY

O TROM

JaL 1 190

TOP SECRET

.10P SECR

ARCE, ARO

Farices

SORTER

NV 50955 / Doc1d732423626 Page 154

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## Page 155

SECRET

¿horeby authorles you to cabala dacia oil

wich you may fled portone to yous work Wille

yone apoctonacut till ba as a Consuliant to rag. on da

Walto Mouso stall, tho Dogsatmod of Dolores will

paoulda trarel, hinde and samialalaalive suzport tat

yos may regutre.

Facerebye

TOP SECRET:

DETERIORATING COPY REPLACED BY .

ELECTROSTATIC COPY

K. TENTS AND

SERVICE

GOVERNIALY

TOP SECRET

RECEIVED FROM

JUL 7 1513

DEKE

4141

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July 21, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of Special Group, July 20, 1961

PRESENT: Gencral Taylor, Messis, Johnson, Gilpatric, Dulles,

Bundy (for items l and 2, and part of 3)

Mr. Barnes was present for items 1 through 3.

#3.

Cuba - Covert Program

The DCI introduced discussion of this paper with the comment that

the covert program must be keyed into over-all U.S. policy and that an

aggressive set of clandestine actions should not be undertaken until it is

clear what the general direction of U.S. policy toward Cuba is going to

be.

The Group agreed with this. Mr. Johnson expressed his understanding

that essentially a stand-by attitude was in effect at the moment. In this

connection, reference was made to the recent meeting of top-level authority

with Dr. Miro Cardona, which evidently resulted in an understanding that.

the Revolutionary Council would continue to be supported, for the present

at least.

Under Objectives, the Group accepted Mi. Dulles' suggestion to

reword paragraph 2 a of the paper, to read as follows:

"a. The basic objective is to provide support to a U.S.

program to develop opposition to Castro and to help bring

about a regime acceptable to the U.S."

Regarding the question of propaganda, MI. Dulles said that he.

thought CIA officials should sit down with USIA to coordinate plans to the .

extent possible; General Taylor agreed that this would be useful. Mr.

Dulles cautioned, however, that USIA's appropriations for Latin America

had been deeply cut and that, therefore, its capabilities were not very

large.

Gencral Taylor then raised a basic question as to where responsibility

for approval actually lies, in the case of several possibilities cited under

the paramilitary section.

After some discussion, it was agreed that any

major operations in this field would be subject to iurther approval by the

Special Group.

02:57

SE 9 003 008

PROPERTY I

THE WHITE HOL:

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- 9.-

It was also agreed that sabotage operations, particularly, require

a close policy look.

In this connection, the second sentence on page 8

of the paper was changed to read: "Actual sabotage operationg will be

carried out only after policy approval by the Special Group. "

There was then a lengthy discussion on guerrillas, the Group

finally agreeing that over-all U.S. policy must be more sharply defined

on this point. It was the opinion of the Group, however, that supply of

existing guerrilla elements, to the extent necessary to avoid dispersion,

would be in the U.S. interest. This was interpreted to include such items

as ammunition, food and clothing. Mr. Dulles undertook to take a sharp

look at the recommendations and plans for guerrillas, with a view to

discussing this subject at next week's meeting.

The Special Group approved the budget as presented, with the

following provisos: only 50% of each major item would be drawn down

in the near future; the large item for boats, under Paramilitary, would

be eliminated for the time being, before the 50% figure was applied;

expenditures for sabotage and guerrilla operations wouid be deferrce,

and both activities wouid be subjeci io nexi wein's discussion. The DCI

said that the Agency would come back to the Special Group with a progress

report, across the board, in less than six months, at which time further

authorizations would be considered.

It was the consensus that this whole program should be discussed

with highest level authority.

по ....

Dominican Republic - Political Action

This proposal was agreed on, with certain clarifications. Mr.

Dulles and Mr. Johnson made it clear that there was no desire to over-

throw the Balaguer government at this time, and the former suggested

that the recommendation should refer to action in the Dominican

Republic rather than against it.

1.'

THE WHITE COURTERGE

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EILA OULY: D

3

It was felt that the Group should reexamine the project in not more

than three months. In the meantime, State and CIA are to coordinate

closely in its implementation.

This matter was also scheduled for decision by higher-level

authority.

62:60

it Wine trotte

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22 November 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECI: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 22 November 1961

PRESENT:

General Taylor, MI. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatten.

Mr. Dulles and Mr. Bissell

J2.

Cuba

General Taylor reported on the results of several recent

meetings with higher authority on possible changes in the U.S.

covert approach to the Cuban problem. He said it appears that all

concerned have accepted the principle that the Special Group should

serve as the main focus, of policy guidance, and that any task force

that might be established should not be so set up as to take over

actual command of component parts of any agencies or departments.

General Taylor added that he believed it had been agreed that the

task force concept should be subject to a trial period of perhaps

two weeks; this is particularly pertinent in view of demands for

General Lansiale's services in another part of the world.

The Chairman concluded that the subject would be explored in

further detail at the Special Group meeting of next week, to which

the Attorney General and General Lansdale will be invited.

4.

Covert Activities in Vietnam

At the outset of the discussion of the paper which had been

circulated on the subject of the Clandestine Action Service (CAS),

It was agreed that the abbreviation should be changed to CLAS in

order to avoia obvious confusion.

In response to cneral Taylor's query, Mr. Bissell suggested

that any reference in the paper to South Vietnam be struck out on

the ground that activity in that part of the country should not be

considered a primary mission of the CLiS or a rcason for establishing

It. The Group upproved the paper, subjoct to this change. It was

noted, however, that occasions might arise when, by mutual agrecment

among

all parties concerned, CLAS could assist in anti-Viet Cong

activities in the South.

fir. Bissell then gave a summary of other activities under way

or planned by the CLA for Vietnam. Mi. Johnson said that ie wanted

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• 3 .

to discuss with the Secretary of State the proposed use of Chinese.

Nationalists as trainers and pilots, under general CIA direction,

as well as Diem's proposal for using them in connection with the

Civil Guard.

General Taylor then raised the subject of periodic reporting

on all U.S. activities going on in Vietnam. After some discussion,

it was agreed that CIA actions should be covered in an Agency annex

to the Task Force reports.

The Chairman urged that all reports

emphasize the positive aspect rather than the negative, and Mr.

Johnson suggested they should cover also what Diem is doing in

response to our leadership.

i. i

Congo

The proposal to support Adoula and his associates was approved.

The Group noted that Adoula is not a particularly outstanding leader

pod cha but he not a pat

that he appears to be the best there is at the moment in the Congo.

It was also noted that five or six other individuals at the next

lower level are relatively competent.

The Chairman said he would

inform higher

authority.

1.

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SECRET SPECIAL MANDLIG

NOrUNW

Fill

MEMORANDUM FOR BRIGADIER GENERAL I. G. LANSDALE,

Chief of Operations, Cuba Project

Subject: Cuba Project

6

Reference:

Nenorandur from Your Office for

BrigGen w.

H. Craig,

USA,

subj:

"Special Project", dated

17 Jan 62

1. As requested in referenced menoranduri, the position of

the Department of defense, with respect to the military stake

and role in the removal of the Communist regime in Cuba,

has

been determined based upon the following factors:

a. National security Policy, determined by the NSC during

the meeting of 9 May 1961.

b. Current intelligence estimates of the situation

in

Cuba.

c. Operations against the Castro regime will be covert,

at least initially.

d. Time favors the Castro government.

2. The basic military implications of Castro's Communist

government are as follows:

a. It exposes the Western Hemisphere to an increasingly

serious threat to its security. This increases our national

vulnerability and defense costs as forces are developed

of shifted to meet this threat.

b. It provides the soviet Union with the most effective

base they have ever had for spreading Communism throughout

the Western Hemisphere.

This in turn greatly increases the

possibility that aaditional Latin American countries will

come under Communist control.

Elimination of this base would

denonstrate to the other nations of

the world

that the united

States will

not tolerate such intrusions.

Communist

control of additional countries would or could result in:

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(1) Increased Communist capability for attack on

other nations of the Western Hemisphere.

(2) Increased Communist capability for spreading

Communism throughout Latin America.

(3) The loss of existing

and/or potential bases,

training

areas,

facilities and rights, as well

as

sources

of

strategic materials necessary to our military

capability.

(4) An Increased threat to US usage ana controi

of the Panama Canal through subversion

and

sabotage.

3. The urgency of the requirement to remove the. Communist

government from Cuba is made apparent by Castro's constantly

increasing capabilities for attacking other nations of the

Western Hemisphere and for spreading Communism throughout the

' hemisphere. This sense of urgency is greatly

increased if

courses of action within the capability of the communists:

are considered:

a. The soviets could establish land, sea and/or air

bases in Cuba.

b. The suviets could provide Castro with

a number of

ballistic missiles with

nuclear warheads;

or

they

could

furnish the missiles

and maintain joint

control of the

nuclear warheads. •

4. In view

of the factors set forth above, the Department of

Defense holds that the Communist regime 1n Cuba 1s incompatible

with the minimum security requirements of the Western

Hemisphere. The Department of Defense is prepared to overtly

support any popular movement inside Cuba to the extent of

ousting the communist regime and installing a government

acceptable to the united states. While the possibility of

Communist Bloc reaculons in areas other than in Cuba is

recognized, it 1s believed that this can be accomplished without

precipitating general war, and without serious effect on

world public opinion 1f the following conditions prevail:

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SPECIAL MANDLIAR NOFORN

a. If the

Impression is created that there is an urgent,

humanitarian requirement to restore order in Cuba and/or the

United States is responding to an appeal

for

assistance

from a government representative of the Cuban people.

b. If it is announced incident

to. the overt military

action that the United States and/or members of the OAS

are moving into cuba for the purpose of restoring order

and holding free elections, and that they will immediately

withdraw as soon as the new government advises that they

have the capability to maintain order without further

assistance from the OAS nations.

c. If the military operation is conducted as quickly

as possible and with sufficient force so that the communist

• Bloc's ability to take effective counter-measures in

support of the Castro regime is reduced to

a minimum.

a. Or, if the Cuban regime commits hostile acts against

US forces

or

property which would serve

as

an incident

upon which to base

overt US intervention. In this event,

applicable portions of a, b, and c above apply.

5. The Department of Defense is

also prepared

to covertly

provide support to CIA or State, or any Us approved popular

movement inside Cuba, in terms of supplies, transportation,

personnel and bases.

00340

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416 a

16 March 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

Subject:

Discussion of Operation MONGOOSE

with the President

In the presence of

the Special Group (Augmented)

the President was

given a progress report on Operation

MONGOOSE.

The guidelines dated 14 March 1962 were

circulated and were used

as the basis of the discussion.

After a prolonged consideration of the visibility,

noise level and risks entailed, General Tansdale and

the Special Group (Augmented) wire given tacit

authorization to proceed

in accordance with the

guidelines.

M. D.I.

22 March 1962

This minute was read

to the Special Group (Augmented) Loday.

The Group was unanimous in feeling that no authorization,

either tacit or otherwise, vas given by higher authority.

members of the Group asked that the minute be amended to indicate

that the Group itself had decided lo proceed in accordance with

TAF

for casad

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14 March 1962

Guidelines for Operation Mongoose

1. Operation Mongoose will be developed on the following

assumptions:

2°

In undertaking to cause the overthrow of

the larget

government,

the U.S. will make maximun use of indigenous re-

sources,

internal and

external, but recognizes that

final

success will

require decisive U.S. military intervention.

used

2.

Such

indigenous resources as are developed will be

to prepare for and justify this intervention, and there-

after to facilitate and support it.

2.

The immediate

priority objective of U.S. efforts during

the coming months will be the acquisition of hard intelligence on

the target are?.

Concurrently, all other

political, economic and

covert

actions will be undertaken short of

those ¿casonably calcu-

lated

to

Inspire

a revolt within the Larget area, or other development

which would require U.S. armed intrivention. These actions, insofar

as possible, will be consistent with overt policies of isolating the

local leader and of neutralizing his influence in the western

Hemisphere, and will be taken in such a way as to permit disengage-

ment with minimon loses in assets and U.S. prestige.

The JCS will

continue the

Planning

and essential prolinindiy actions to assure

Cy _

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- 2-

a decisive U.S. military capability for intervention. At the end

, of this fist period, or carlier if conditions permit, the situation

will be reviewed and a decision taken as to the next phase of the

program.

3.

In oider to get the covert phase of this program

in motion,

it will be necessary at

the outset

to use U.S. personnel, bases and

equipment for the support

of opciations inside the target arca.

However, the CIA will concurrently expedite the development of non-

attributable resources in order to reduce or climinate this

dependence should

it become necessary after the initial phase.

4. During this period, General Lansdale will continue as chief

of operations, calling directly on the participating departments and

agencies for support and implementation of agreed tasks..

The heads

of these

departments and agencics are responsible fur performance

through normal command channels

to higher authority. Ceneral

Innsdale is responsible for

coordinating combined

Planning and

execucion, reporting to higher authority through the Special Group

(5412), augmented by the Attorney General and the Chairman, JOS.

The Special Group (5412 augmented) is responsible for providing

policy guidance to the project, for approving important operations

and for monitoring progress.

Mr. Johnson has copy number 2.

CIA (Helms/Harvey) has copy

choral Lansdale hasCopy nurber 4a

All other copies,

ones filed herewith (1 and 5) have been destroyed

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THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

April 5, 1962

1-44

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL LANSDALE

There will be a meeting of the Mongoose group next

Wednesday afternoon at 2 o'clock in the Secretary of State's

Conference Room (the hour being subject to adjustment in

case the Secretary of State has to go to the White House).

You will be asked to give a progress report at the outset of

the meeting, after which the group will go into executive

session.

The Special Group today decided to ask you to brief it

bi-weekly on Mongoose and to furnish the members with

weekly written reports in the style. of the South Vietnam

reports, that is, the participating departments and agencies

would file with you separate reports and you would prepare

for the principals a highlight summary along the lines of

Secretary Harriman's reports on South Vietnam.

Sometime before the weekend, I want to talk to you

about Mr. McCone's "liberation plan".

0022%

•M29 SaLi

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13 April 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Operation Mongoose

On April 13, General Taylor discussed with higher authority

the Mongoose meetings of April Il and 12, reporting the feeling

of Secretaries Rusk and McNamara that the Mongoose program should

have no target date. Taylor pointed out the probable personnel

problems which would arise if the schedule were completely

indefinite.

Taylor was informed that we would have to live with the

consequences of no date, doing the best we can to bolster motiva-

Taylor commented that we can probably carry out the first

phase as planned, with a review of the situation about August 1.

Higher authority favors a strong effort to recruit Cubans

for the U. S. Army.

He was told that a new look is being taken and

that by lowering admission standards, we can do better than in the

past.

Maxwell D. Taylor

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7 May 1962

MENORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Report of Progress

to Higher Authority

I reported to higher authority the substance

of Mr. Harvey's briefing of the Special Group (Augmented)

on 3 May 1962, pointing out the very limited progress

which has been made and the uncertainty of the ultimate

• effectivness of our program. I mentioned the Duque

incident as indicative of the morale problem. It was

agreed that we would continue along the present lines

until the terminal date of the present phase in August.

Ma:

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S26TL

SinGinl

divinia

3 August 1902

DOD TASK # 69

Ideas to beef-up course of action B.

DIPLOMATIC

Encoura e Dom Rep to table its complaint on Cuban instigated subversion

NOw - to the UN later.

2. Make available to the International Narcotics Commission limited

documented evidence

of Cuban exportation/importation of narcotics.

3. Third state pressures should be enoouraged - e.g., asylum.

4. State openly that Guantanamo will be used as

a place of asylum for

bonafide

political refugees.

ECONOMIC

1. Stop the tranist of Cuban sugar by anyone through the Fanama Canal.

2. Publication of contraband list of items which we will stop - remove

ships - If known to be going to Cuba (hard goods, war making potential).

Pressure

the ID, IT,

and GATT to restrict cuban credits (6), loans, ete.

Insist that US Allies demand cash payment for goods - no barter.

4. Preemptive buying and dumping sugar on world markets.

5. Dump "soft" Cuban currency at discount prices.

6. Announce prohibitive tariffs on any items (tobacco primarily) of Cuban

manufacture.

7.

Announce fines and punishment for any importations of Cuban goods.

8. Introduce cheap marijuana

into Cuba. .

PSYCHOLOGICAL

12 More small

joint exercises in the Latin America - Caribbean - southeastern

US area with appropriate publicity.

Announce closure of Panama Calan to Cuban vessals or vessels berthing

in Cuba.

3.

Arnounce sea

search of all vessels (actually selective and limited to

Sino-Soviet and

Cuban vessels) to stop "illegal" arms importation

into

Western Hemisphere.

4. Shut-off civilian employees in Guantananc.

5. Announce a misfire of a missile in Atlantic Missile Range "near" Cuban waters.

6. Increased naval

patroling of the Windward Passage.

Step-up radio broadc.sts- hit island from four sides

with clandestine leadeacts.

0303R

samultaneously

8. Drop paru-dummies in

selected areas.

9. lnke hich altitude passes

over and

violntions of Cuban air space.

10.

Bandt De" Pap charion of Gibed intortontion.

1.1.

Inerosse

publicity on cuban natestice trade in is, and ather

countrars.

1?.

Trovide opon pubiácity on detection of cubane to Guntanano,.

"r:

harranenent oi

worket's.

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raid

We belleve Castro can be overthrown only by the use of

considerable external military support. The objective of

Operation Mongoose Is the overthrow of the Castro regime.

If course of action B were pursued vigorously and the

resistance elements In Cuba were

stirred to action without

us milltary support, then the assets presently in Cuba would

probably be destroyed by Castro's effective means of

repression.

If, however, course B 1s followed with the intention

of providing US military support, when required, simply not

telling the Cubans, the following things could be done: (Cubans

would do better tho, If they knew).

Greatly

Increase VOA broadcasts to Cuba.

Supply more arms and equipment to Cuban guerrillas.

Exert all possible Influence on Mexico, Brazil, Chile,

Bolivia and Uruguay to severe diplomatic relations with

Cuba.

Exert all possible Influence on all friendly countries

to stop all trade with Cuba.

Increase program of Information to Latin American

countries on the evils of Castro's Communist regime

and threat to themselves.

Take all

possible steps to assist other Latin

American

countries in economic progress, to increase contrast with

Cuba.

Drift sanitized floating mines into Havana harbor.

Pay Cuban employees at Guantanano Naval Base In pesos.

Disseminate Maribu seeds in agricultural areas to choke

out beneficial products.

03073

of top mons

Land more resistance-trained Cubans.

Encourage friendly nations to stop chartering

ships

to eloc countrico foi trade inü üia..

Intensify efforts

to introduce damaging chemicals into

petroleum shipments

to Cuba.

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L02 SLCL2

Office at die Attorney Orneral

Washington, I. C.

August 9, 1962

A-118

General Maxwell Taylor

The Bocative Office Building

Room 1300

Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Max:

In accordance with my conversation with

you, I am in favor of a program on MONGOSE

of bt.

I do not feel that ve know yet what

Icaction vould be created in Cuba of an

intensifica program. Therefore, I am in favor.

of pushing alicad rather than taking any step

sackward.

Sinccicly,

Robest Kerved, (17)

Robert F. Kemely

(Dictated.over the telephone by the Actorney

General fion the State of Mashington.)

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SEEZES

-2-

!

E.

Each day CASTRO gets stronger and his removal

becomes costlier.

G. While most of the continent has broken with CASTRO,

sooner or later ties with these countries will be

re-established.

H.

Central America is "lost."

I.

Unless an action program is begun the CRC will

disappear.

4.

It was obvious during the meeting and in the statements

DI. MIRO made to the writer on the way back to his hotel that he is

under great pressure by his colleagues in the Exile Community to

launch a program of vigorous action against the Government of Cuba. .

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HARVEY # 12

16 October 1962

MENORANDUI FUR THE RECORD

SUBJECI: MONGOSE Meeting with the Attorney General

1. At 2:30 this afternoon, the Attorney: General convened in his

office a meeti, on Operation NUNGUSE consisting of General Larsdale

and Colonol Patcoell, Geroral Juhrison of the joint Staif, Robert

Hurwitch of State (vice Ed Martin who was unable to atterd), Hewson

Ryan of USIA, and the undersized.

2. The Attorney General opened the neeting by expressiro the

"general dissatisfaction of the President" with Uperation MONGOOSE.

He pointod out that the Operation had been under way for a year, thät

the results were discouraging, that there had been no acts oi sabotago,

and that evan the one which had been attempted had failed twice. He

Indicated that there had been noticeault improvenant during tue your

in the collection of intelligence but that other actions had failed

to influence significantly the course of events in Cuba. He spoke

of the reekly meetings of top officials on this problem and arin

noted the snall accomplishments despite the lact that Secretaries

Rusk and Vichanara, General Taylor, liciesige Bundy, and he personally

had all bean charged by the Frosident with finding a solution. He

traced the ristory of General lanscale's versonal appolitment by the

President a jear ago. The Attorney General then stated that in vien

of this lack of progress, he was going to give Operation MONGOOSE

more personal attention.

In order to do this, he ill hold a moot-

Ing every morning at 0930 with the NONGOOSE operational. respresenta-

tives from the various agencies (lansdale, Harvey, Hurwitch, Ryan,

and General Johnson).

3.

The Attorney General spoke favorably of the sabotago paper

which had been presented by General Carter this morning to the neet-

ing of the Spacinl Group (Augmentod). He obriously did not liko cio

carlter memorandum, since he felt it showed no "push" in getting on

with thu acts of sabotago.

4. than asked

for my conments, I stated that we were prepara

to get

on with the now action propran and that we hould axecuto 1t

aggressively. I pointod out, however, that the objective of Operation

MONGOOSE would have to bo determinod at some point since the Cuoans

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1=2.

with whom we have to work were seekine a reason for risking thoir

Lives in these operations.

I retailed my conversation with tho

young, Cuban from the dre who pointed out that they were willing to

commit their people only on operationg which they regarded as

sensible.

I definod "gansible" in Cuban terminology thuso cayo ag

meaning an action which would contrioute to the liberation of thair

country, another way of saying that the United Stales, perhaps in

conjunction with other latin countries, would ball them out mili-

tarily. My point has specifically echoed by Howson iyan.

The At-

torney General'y rejoindor kas a plea for new ideas of things that

cubans whom we thought would fight for the regime if the country were

invaded.

5. The meetine concluded with the reaffirmation by the Attomey

Gereral of his desare to hold a meeting each day, beganung tomorrow.

He said trat these martines might later be charge to

wher and it' le finds a daily eat-together is not necessay.

The

noetirigs ale to last no more than one-half bour.

it

Richard Helr.s

Deputy Director (Plans)

Distribution:

Original - Mr. Elder

1 co - Chief, IrW

1 Cc - DD/P

for the DCI and DUCI

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Pioural

Hoes for Chian.

Dis might-

filessed

antived

Ilsi

13-30

1. When the President, in his letter to Karushchev of 27 Octobar,

gave "assurancas against invasion of Cuba: in consideration of tae

Soviet removal of ofiensive weapons in Cuba under UN supervision,

Operation Mongoose was on its death bed. When the President stated

in his letter of 28 October to Khrushchev, "I conaidar my latter to

you of 27. October and your reply of today as a firm undertalling on

the part of both our governments which should be promptly carried

out" Operation Mongoose died.

2. Ií thage agreements are carried out it seems clear that

Cuba will be dealt with as another denied area in a manner differing

not greatly from that in which ClA handles other desiad areas. L

tha agreements are not carried out, military action cannot long be

delayed. In either event the liongoose structure as it has sew existed

in Government is through.

3. Looking back to tha origina of Mongoose one finds the

-

Attorney General and Mi. McNamara seexing primarily to =emove

tha political stair leit on the President by the Bay of Pigs failura..

Both the A. G. and the Secretary of Defense felt it necessary for

political reasons that some action Daitto be taken wita respect to

istpill?s

Cuba to insure the Presidant's future. In a nutsnell, they were out

to. dump Casio or to maice him cooperate.

4. During the past year, while one of the optiona of the project

was to cisata internal dissension and resistance leading to eventual

U.S. intervention, a review shows that policymaxers not only shied

ing apside

away from the military intarvention aspect but were genarally apore-

hensive of sabotage proposals. The only senior official involved,

outside the Agency, who thought in terms of military action was

Maxwell Taylor. Others like tha Attorney General, McNamara,

Gilpatric, Joanson and late: Bundy viewed the project in a atrictly

political light.

Hindsight must now reveal to others, as well as it

has to us, that a Chief of Operations (i.e. Langdala) was never

actually needed.

5. At pregent no genior U.S. Goverament official around towa

is interested in a iuture "Cuban Affairs Special Group." Bundy has

already suggestad the creation in State of an "Office of Cuban Exile

Affairs" or "Free Cuban Aifairs" which in itsali is a move outside

of the Mongoose structure.

All clandestine activitias on tha part of

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IEW continue at a stand down. Significant steps have béen taken by

the Agency together with the military for contingency planaing. USLA

has moved into the propaganda fiaid under State guidance without

relation to the Mongoose structure. Mongoosa can only live again

through "resurrection.

6. Given these circurstances and in the light of great gressures

*elsewhore in the world CIA, interzally, should move with great

rapidity to distance Task Forca W from any external accegs. This

would involve regularizing or institutionalizing TIW in order that

this unique group which has been available to Lansdale as a "whipping

boy' becomas a normal part of our monolithic Agency structuro.

By

such a move, neither Lansdale nor anyone elsa could get at these

resources without going through regular channels. Within CIA we

would return Cuba to the Western Hemisphare and treat Cuba as a

denied area and relate it to over-all iH problems. (Throughout

Project Mongoose, this is precisely the mannar in which State has

handled the problem. As a result Langdala never felt that he had

troops in Stata as he did in CLA.)

7. In accomplishing this, the only analogy I can think of is a

corporata one. We should not go through bankruptcy which would

have to be annouaced, but rather pasg TEW through an unpublicized

• recelvarship and reorganization. The need to realign manpower and

assets for demands in other areas would be sufficient reason in itseii.

The current stand down is a perfect setting for such a change in

structuro.

8. Concurrently, the DCI should endorse Bundy's suggestion

and he should encourage the immediate establishment of an Oifica of

Cubaz Exile Affairs is State. This would relieve ClA of one of the

most annoying and insoluble problems we have faced. This would

place problars of proposed Cuban Govarnment structures, provisional

governments, platforms, exile politics, and the like, right where they

balong - in the Department of State.

==9.

Absolutely no attempt on our pait should be mace to unseat

Lansdale. Ramember that the Attorney Genaral was figating Langdala's

battla as recently as two weeks ago. Secondly, Michamara and

Gilpatric still loos upon Lanadale as something of a mystic and are

2

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on the defensive by virture of his relationship with the Atiorney

General. Practically everyonu at the oparating level agrees that

Lansdals has lost his value. Bundy and Taylor ars not impressed

with hir. Bill Quian and company obviously nave bis number as do

ve. With a political solution to the Cuban problam in hand reflecting

great credit on the part of tha President, the A. G. will drop Lansdale

like a hot brick: Therefors, while awaiting the outcoma of the Cuban

talks, we must at onca deny Lansdale direct access to JEW.

Lansdala can have accegs ag to all other CIA componenta through

the DCI during tha stand down period.

10. Lanadala's reaction to any reassigament is apt to be a

violent one. He undoubtadly realizes that be never agaia will be

in toe position of a special advisor to the two most powerful men in

the country. Therefore, if we don't close ranks within ClA and put

TEY beyrnd ais reach without delay (excapt througà the DCI) he

• might be abla to inflict serious damage to ClA's standing beíors bis

eventual demise.

11. To summarize, the following action la requirod:

a. Interzally, institutionalize TFW. Graft it into WH.

(Defense will then'loo's to DIA for intelligance and DIA to ug.)

b. Push (througa the DCI and Burdy) for the immediaie

establishment of the Office of Cubas Exile Atiairs in tho

Departnent of Stata.

Gau's Ithin

0100 5.1942

3

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HARVEY # 25

13. March 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group (Augmented) Meeting on

Project Mongoose, 13 March 1962

PRESENT:

General Taylor and Mr. Bundy; Mr. Johnson; Mr. McNamara,

Mr. Gilpatric,

General Lemnitzer and Gencral Lansdale;

Mr. Kennedy; Mr. McCone and Mr. Harvey

1. • The Group (with one exception) agreed to accept the

changes in paragraph 2 of General Taylor's Guidelines, which were

proposed by the DCI under date of 12 March 1962 and by DOD/JCS under

date of 13 March. Mr. Bundy expressed doubts about accepting some

of this language.

In explaining the additional actions which would be

contemplated under the new CIA language, Mr. Harvey cited the need

to give training on survival, weapons and physical training and

to promise resupply to infiltrated agents. It was agreed that under

the Guidelines as revised, CIA would still continue to bring specific

proposals for approval tothe Special Group, which involve policy

considerations.

General Lansdale's paper of 13 March, entitled "Insti-

tutional Planning Operation Mongoose," was then discussed. The

sections headed Phase I, for CIA, State and Defense, were approved.

The sections headed Phase II were deferred.

3.

The paper from General Lansdale to the Special Group

dated 12 March 1962, entitled "Policy Question Operation Mongoose, "

was then considered and the following decisions made:

a .

Use of l.S. Military Installations. CIA was asked

to survey the possibility of acquiring privately-owned sites 'for

the proposed training. They also undertook to reexamine the

feasibility of using facilities at Isolation.

b.

Arming of Cuban Guerrillas. The proposal to

authorize arms and equipment to

"deserving Cuban guerrillas" under

the circunstances stated was approved. It was specified that any

major operations of this kind would be subject to specific approval

by the Special Group, and that periodic progress reports would be

made to

the Group.

(This decision did not deal with the actual means

of supply, which is covered in e below.)

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C .

Use of U.S. Military Personnel and Equipment. The

Group agrced that it would have to accept the proposition that ic-

supply operations will probably require U.S. military personnel

and equipment to include aircraft and seacraft. This point will

be included in the Guidelines. Gencral Lansdale will arrange with

the Air Force to obtain an analysis of the risks which would be

involved in air supply operations over Cuba; this should be rcady

by next weck. In the meantine preparations should be begun for the

selection of personnel and aircraft for necessary preliminaries,

such a "sheep-dipping."

The Air Force will be asked to come up

within two weeks with an estimate of their capability to provide

one or two aircraft for use in initial operations.

In connection with small boat operations, the secre-

tary of Defense undertook to provide anything that was availaule

within the Defense establishment for which a requirement might be

established.

It was pointed out there are no Pl boats available

and that foreign vessels will have to be acquired. CIA will present

a specific request for equipment other than IT boats, within the

next few days.

4. Mr. lichamara then raised the possibility that a decision

may be made which will make it impossible to use ü.S. personnel.

He urged that planning, therefore, procced on two tracks, assuming

that such personnel can be used in the initial phase but will not be

permitted

later on. The Group felt that the Guidelines should re-

flect that, in the covert phase of this operation, U.S. personnch,

bases and equipment would be available but that the situation that

would exist in the face of a prohibition against such use must also

be studied innediately.

At the Attorney General's suggestion, General Lansdale

undertook to examine the possibility of sabotage or other means of

destroying the soviet boats which have been or will be delivered

to Cuba.

6.

The proposed underwater reconnaissance of the beach east

of Havana was approved, after the statement by General Lemnitzer

that amphibious planning cannot proceed without this and that the

risk is virtually non-existent.

7.

It was agreed that the Group should give a status report

to higher authority this week, to include discussion of gencral

principles and guidelines.

Thomas A. Parroti

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Operation MONGOOSE

26 October 1962

SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group (dugmented)

on Operation MONGOOSE, 26 October 1962

PRESENT:

Mr. McNamara, Mr. Gilpatric, General Taylor, General

Lansdale, General Johnson; the Attorney General;

Mx. Johnson, Mr. Martin; Mr. Bundy; Mr. McCone, Mr.

Harvey; M. Wilson.

l. The mecting began with a discussion of the considerably-

increased activity in the dispatch, and preparation for dispatch,

of agent teams. As a result of this discussion, it was agreed that

all plans for dispatch should be suspended pending further examination;

instructions were issued during the course of the meeting designed

to recall the three teams already on the way.

It was agreed that the first order of business with regard

to these teams is to examine in detail the requirements toward which

they could contribute.

General Lansdale will arrange to get GIA-.

into contact with: (a) General Carroll, to examine what military

requirements such agents could service; (b) similarly, the State

Department for political intelligence requirements; (c) USIA for

requirements peculiar to that Agency. After this examination, it

will then be decided what the best use of these agent assets actually

should be.

2. Mr. McCone and Mr. Harvey said during the course of the

discussion on agent teams, that the

action taken had represented a

unilateral decision by CIA and was not in response to specific

military requirements. CIA had felt that this was within its sphere

of responsibility, and particularly with respect to the first three

teams had considered that it was a continuation of previously-

approved operations. Mr. McCone commented that internal security

in Cuba is now far more stringent than it was two weeks ago, thereby

making agent operations much more difficult; he felt, therefore, that

agent activity on this scale will only be justified

if the responsible

departments specifically require it for intelligence purposes.

In this connection, General Taylor brought out that the

Chiefs had approved the use of submarines for agent dispatch but had

not been asked to review the operation in broader context.

•Chiefs had concluded, however, that no revolt should be stimulated

c/^02

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unless and until the U.S. is ready to support it and that the

military establishment does not wish to take over sabotage and

similar operations at this time, although it should be prepared

to do so if an invasion should be mounted. MI. McCone agreed-that!':!.'

it is possible that as the situation develops, CIA Cuban operations i.

might move under military control, but that such action is not ....

indicated at this time.

all le in 1149

3.

Mí. Harvey made the point that the proposed agent dis?...

patches would not use up all existing assets. He said that in the

event of invasion, a sizeable number of Cubans could be trained

quickly.

4. The Attorney General and General Lansdale emphasized

that the Cubans are entirely prepared to make the necessary sacrifices

if they are in support of an approved plan.

The Cubans do want,

however, assurances that such activities are in fact approved at a

high level.

5. Mr. Bundy emphasized the importance of planning for the

use of Cubans in political and civil activities during and after

any military action. He felt that there should be establisned with-

in the government some sort of "Office of Free Cuban Affairs," which

probably should be placed within the Department of State.

The

activities of this office would be distinct from General Lansdale's

operations but would be closely related to them. He pointed out

that top priority should be given to selecting a man to head

such

an office. Mr. Bundy also said that he thought a subcommittee of

the NSC Executive Committee should be established to deal with

MONGOOSE affairs.

6.

Mr. McNamara thought that MONCOOSE in the short-term

should be considered in the context

of (a) providing support for

action designed to get rid of the missiles, and (b) support for a

possible invasion.

Specific discussion took place on points raised in the

paper

distributed

at the meeting, as follows:

a .

'CIA should continue to develop the balloon propaganda

facilities,

although it was recognized that by the target date of

1 December this capability might no longer be needed because of other

methods of delivery.

No major acts of sabotage should be undertaken at

this time.

This decision will be reviewed in about a week.

900CS

762 31

EYES ONLY

FROPERTY 0F

THE WHITE LORE 090C

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W: COMET CES GACY

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=*

General Lansdale should develop further plans to

"help the Cubans to help themselves." MI. Morales-Carrion siould

be brought into this planning.

d.

Political planning for the post-castro period will

be assigned to the "Office for Free Cuban Affairs."

e.

Establishment of USIA's new 50 KW transmitter in

the Florida Keys should be expedited.

8.

•It was reiterated that General Lansdale is the focal

point for all MONGOOSe activities, that he is charged with their

overall management and that he should be kept informed of all

significant plans and activities in connection with the project.

daf musti

Thomas A.

Parrott

Distribution

The Attorney General

Chairman, JCS

DCI

General Lansdale - Cy distroel 419163- inte

TEN CEROT SILS ONLY

PROPErTY

THE WANTE ROUSE CO

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for Crazie.

enoural

Disrught

ing apside

("-5-62) Mr MANUS

13-30

1. When the Presideat, in his letter to Karuahcher of 27 Octobar.

gave "assurances against invasica aí Cuba: in considuration oi tae

Soviet renoval of ofiensivo weapons in Cuba undar UN supervision,

Operation Mongoose was on ils diata bed. When the President stated

in his leiter of 28 October to Kurushccer, "I conaidor my letter to

*you of 27 October and your reply of today as a firm undertaing on

the part of both our governmeats which should be promptly carried

•oui" Operation ivongoose died.

2.. Ií thasa agreements are carried out it saemy claar inat

Cuba will be dealt with asianother denied area la a manner differing

not greatly from what in which Chinandles other denied areas. Li

tha agisements are not carried out, military action cannot long be

delayed. In either event the liongoose structure as it has new existed

in Government is througa.!

3. Looking back to tha origina of Mongoose one finds the

-

Attorney General and M=. McNamara seexing primarily to =emove

tha political stain leit on the President by the Bay of Pigs failuca.

Botb the A. G. and the Secretary of Defense felt it necessary for

political reasons that some action dallar be taken with respect to

Cuba to insure tho Presidant's future. Is a nutsbell, they were out

to. dump Castro or to maice him cooperate.

'4. During the past year, while one of the optiona of the project

was to croata isternal dissension and resistance leading to eventual

U.S. intervention, a review shows that policymakers not only shied

away from the military intorvention aspact but were genarally appre-

hensive oi sabotage proposals. Ibe only senior official involved,

outside the Agency, who thought in terms of military action was

Maxwell Taylor. Others lice the Attorney General, McNamara,

Gilparis, Johnson and later Bundy viewed the project in a strictly:

political light. Hindsight must now reveal to others, as well as it

has to us, tbat a Caiel of Operations (i.e. Lansdala) was never

actually needed.

5. At prosent no senior U.S. Goveramant official around town

is interestod in a iuture "Cuban Affairs Special Group." Buady has

already suggastad the creation in Staio of an "Ofiice of Cuban Exiio

Afisiro" or "'Free Cuban ifairs" which in itseli is a move outsida.

of the ilongoose structure.

All clandestine actinitics on the part of

01110

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IEV continuo at a stand down. Significant stepy have bien tion by

the agency together with the military for contingency planaina. USLA

has moved into the propagandi fiaid under State guidaace without

relation to the Mongoose structure. Mongoosa can only live again

through "resurrection.

6. Given these circumstances and in the light of gecat areasures

elseynare in the world CIA, interbally, should move with great

rapidity to distance Task Forca l from any external accost. This

would involve regularizing or institutionalizing TEW in order thai

this unique grous which has been available to Lansdale as a "whipping

boy" becomas a normal pait oí our monolithic Agency structuro. By

such a move, neither Langdale nor anyone else could get ai thesa

resources without going througe regular channels. ¡itin CIA we

would retura Cuba to the Westera Hemisphere and treat Cuba as a

danied area and relate it to over-all WHI problems. (Inroughout

Project ilongooge, this is precisely the manner in which State has

handled the problem. As a result Langdala never felt that he had

troopa in Stata as de did in CLA.)

7. In accomplishing this, the only analogy I can think of i3 a

corporato one. We should not go through baskruptcy which would

have to be announced, but rather payy TEW through an unpublicized

Iecelvarship and reorganization.

The need to realiga mangomor and

assetg for demands is other areas mould be sufficient raason in itseù.

The current stand down is a períect setting for such a change in

BETUCtUIS.

8. Concurrently, the DCI should endorse Bundy's suggestion

and he should encourage the immediate establishmant of an Oifica of

Cubas Exile Affairs in State. This would relieve ClA oi one of the

most annoyiag and insoluble problems we have faced. This would

place problary of proposed Cuban Govarameni giructures, provona

governments, platforms, lexile politics, and the lice right where toey

bolong - in the Departinent of State.

==8. Absolutely no attempt on our pait should be maco to unseat

Lanadale. Remember that the Attorney General was figating Lanydala's

batta do recently as two weeklago. Secondly, ilchamara and

Gilpatric still look upon Lanadale as something oi a mystic and are

2

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on tho defensive by virture of his relationship with the Alioracy

Genoral. Practically everyon: it the oporaling lovel agrees that

Lanadals bag lost his value. Buady and Iaylor ars not impressed

with him. Bill Quina and company obviously navo his numour as do

M/C.

With a political solution to the Cuban problem in hand reflecting

¡reai credit on the part of tha President, the A.G. will drop Lansdalo

like a hot brick. Therefors, while awaiting the outcome of the Cuban

talks, we must at oaca deny Langdale direct access to TEl.

Lanscala can have access as to all othe ClA componento through

the Del during tha staad down period.

10. Lansdala's reaction to any Icassignmaat is ast to bo a

violent one. He undoubtadly realizes that be never again will be

in toe position oi a special advisor to the two most powerful men in

the country. Therefore, if we don't close ranks within CIA and put

IIl boyond his reach without delay (except througà the DCI) he

• mig'at be abla to inflict serious damago to CLA's ytanding beiors ais

eventual demise.

11. To summarize, the iollowing action 13 required:

a. Interzally, institutionalize IFlY. Grate it into WH.

(Defense will then look to DIA for intelligeace and DIA to us.)

3. Push (through the DCI and Burdy) for the immediaie

establisameut of the Office oi Cuban Exile Mairs in tho

Departneat of Stata.

1{05.1947

3

707 - 833 010

01312

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TOP SECRET

•Summary Record of NSC Standing Gioup Mecting No. 2/.63,

April 23, 1863, 5:00 PM -- Cuba

The basis of the discussion was a memorandum prepared by Mi. Bundy

entitled "A Sketch of the Cuba Altornatives."

Secretary McNamara stated that before the group discussed substance,

it should consider whether the present policy we are following would

produce a major change in Cuba. He expressed his firm viv that

Castro's position over the short term would improve if we took no

actions other than those now under way or projected. Mc made clear

his belief that the climination of the Castio regime was a require-

ment and that, if others agreed our present policy would not result

in its downfall, we should develop a program for approval which would

produce changes acceptable to us.

The program should ain at creat-

ing such a situation of dissidence within Cuba as to allow the U.S. to

use force in support of anti-Castro forces without Ieading to retalia-

lion by the USSR un the West.

Mr. McCone summarized information leading him to believe that

Castro's position in Cuba would be stronger a year or two years from

now than it is

at present. He expressed his belief that present policy

would not cause a major change in Cuba and that the Russians could

provide sufficient aid and technical assistance to permit the Cuban

economy to remain about where it is now or slightly improve.

Assistant Secretary Martin did not fully agice with the views of the

Secretary of Dofense or Mi. McConc with respoct to the effect of

existing policy on the Castro regine. He cited cvidence to indicate

that present measures are crippling the Cuban economy, leading to

shortages, lack of spare parts, and even sufficient food to permit

full rations for Cuban militia.

Mr. Martin saw no possibility of getting

Castro to defect from the USSR. He said there was no way lo finance

Cuba during the transition period until Castro, by his decds, had proved

that he had broken his ties with the USSR. He said, for cxample,

Congress would never approve the sugar quota for Cuba carly enough

to avoid a collapse of the Cuban economy cut lome fi om the USSR and

not yet aided by the U.S. Furthermore, he said Castro was the kind

of a man who might make promises and not keep them, i. e. he did not

TOP SECRET

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stay bought. The possibility of persuading Cistro to leave Cuba was

not feasible because Castro was a true revolnti nary who could not be

induced to give up his revolution.

The Attorney General proposed three studies:

a. A list of incasures we would take following contingencies

such as the death of Castio or the shooting down of a U-2.

b. A program with the objective of overthrowing Castro in

eighteen months.

C.

A program lo cause as much trouble as we can for Communist

Cuba during the next eighteen months.

Under Secretary Ball stated the view that we should not look at Cuba

from the point of view of Cuba alone. He said the Cuban problem was

a part of our relations with the USSR and with our global battle against

Communist aggression. He uryed that our policy loward Cuba always

be kopt in this perspective. The withdrawal of Soviet forces from Cuba

and the disappearance of the Soviet presence in Cuba was of major in-

portance to us.

USIA Director Murrow stated his view that we need promptly a state-

ment of what we would think was an acceptable post-Castro Cuba.

Secretary Dillon raised cortain questions as to what kind of a Cuba

we could live with if it were no longer jun by Castro or lied to Moscow.

He said that American companies had written off their expropriated

sugar properties in Cuba but the question remained as to who would

own these properties in the event Castro and Communism disappeared

in Cuba.

There was a discussion on what we would do for a non-Communist

Cuba and what we could do to get Castro to defect from the USSR. There

appeared to be some differing views as to whether economic measures

we can lake would wreck the Cuban economy or whether the only result

would be to raise the cost to the USSR of naintaining Cuba.

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Mr. Sorensen listed the

seven bjectives raised

it the moting as

follows:

•a.

Improve our present course of action by doing

some

things

that we are not now doing.

b. Agree on military responses which we should make to con-

tingencies,

such as the shooting down of a U-t plane.

c. Develop a program to get rid of Castro.

d. Measures to disrupt the economy of Cuba.

e. A program to induce Soviet withdrawal.

f. The detachment of Cuba from Moscow.

g. A program of support for dissident elements in Cuba.

Overriding all these points would be a statement of our views as to

the kind of a regime we would want to see in Cuba post-Castro.

Bromley Smith

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INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR

RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT

INTERNATIONAL

DEVELOPMENT

ASSOCIATION

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

• INTERNATIONAL FINANCE

CORPORATION::.

it.

Dumpin

trattie

Best wicker

mit dose

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June 25, 1975

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH JOHN MCCONE

I explained to John that I would probably be called to testify before

the Church Committee and that I understood the Committee would wish to question

me about a meeting on August 10, 1962, of which I had no recollection.

stated that Mr. Belin, Counsel of the Rockefeller Commission, had informed

me that:

a. A meeting had been held on August 10, 1962, attended by Messrs. Rusk,

Taylor, McCone, Bundy, Murrow, and McNamara, among others.

b. The elimination of Castro had been discussed.

c. A CIA representative, Mr. Harvey, had Indicated In a memorandum prepared

after the meeting, that during the discussion I had raised a question regarding

the elimination of Castro.

d. John McCone had discussed the elimination of Castro with me after the

meeting, expressing his strong opposition to any such action and that I had

strongly agreed with John McCone.

(Although Belin did not say so, I had the

impression that his knowledge of the conversation between McCone and myself

had come from a memorandum and I was informed by another person that such a

memorandum had been prepared in 1967.]

I asked John if he could add to my knowledge of what took place during

or after the August 10 meeting.

He replied that:

a. On August 10, 1962, a meeting of "54-12 Augmented" took place in Dean.

Rusk's Conference Room to consider reports of the movement Into Cuba of Soviet

nuclear missiles.

b. He remembers that the elimination of Castro was discussed during the

course of the meeting, but he does not recall whether or not I raised the

subject and he does not remember whether if I spoke in connection with it I

was In favor of or in opposition to such a move.

He does remember very clearly

that when the subject was raised, first Ed Murrow and then he opposed further

discussion of it.

c. Two days after the meeting, Mr. Harvey of CIA received a memorandum

from General Lansdale referring to the elimination of Castro; Harvey called

Lansdale to ask that the subject be eliminated from the Lansdale letter and

McCone called me.

(John indicated that in August 1962 Lansdale was nominally

assigned to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, although he belleves that

following the Bay of Pigs, Lansdale had been staff director for a committee

charged with considering ways to weaken the Cuban Government.)

d. When he raised the issue of the Lansdale letter with me, I had not

seen the letter and was unaware of its existence, but when he explained that

It referred to the elimination of Castro, an action which he (McCone) opposed,

John reports that I shared his strong opposition to any such move.

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e. In 1967, following a conversation with Jack Anderson held at Ted

Kennedy's request, he prepared a memorandum of conversation which referred

to some of the events

rege ate, he prepared

surrounding the August 10, 1962 meeting, but that,

contrary to the impression I had received from Belin and others, the

memorandum did not refer to me -- he will send me a copy of the memorandum

next Monday when he returns to his office In Los Angeles.

Robert S. McNamara

a pin as come.

HH

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INTERVIEW WITH RICHARD GOODWIN

Date: May 27, 1975

INTERVIEW AND MUTING SUMMARY

Page 1 0f_6

OGN CHINA

0E 30000019

FILE:

Time: 10:00 a.m.

Place:

"Goodwin's residence, 1536 32nd St. NW

Participants: Sel. Com. - David Aaron, Rick Inderfurth, Greg Treverton

Subject:

Intelligence Activities in Latin America

Submitted by: Gregory F. Treverton

During the 1960 Presidential campaign, Goodwin did foreign

policy work for John Kennedy, specializing in Latin America. After the

election he moved into the White House to handle Latin America. During

that period he spoke with the President about a Latin American matter

on the average once a day. Goodwin left the White House in the fall of

1952, becoming

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American

Affairs under, first, Robert Woodward

and then Edwin Martin. After

working for the Peace Corps, Goodwin was brought back to the White

House by President Johnson, in the spring of 1964, after the Panama

crisis. At that time, however, he did not specialize on Latin America,

instead writing speeches for Johnson. He left

the Administration late

in 1965.

1.

Assassinations:

In general, Goodwin had not heard much specific talk of as-

sassination, although it would not have surprised him if it had gone

on.

He mentioned one specific instance in which he had heard talk of

assassinating Castro. After the Bay of Pigs, a Cuba Task Force was

established,

first chaired by Paul Nitze and then by Goodwin in his

capacity as White House Staff Officer.

At a meeting of the Task Force,

held at the State Department, McNamara

suggested "getting rid of Castro,

someone from the CIA, perhaps Bissell, then asked if McNamara meant

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INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY

Parse 2

of 6

FILE:

"Executive Action." McNamara responded that he did and stressed his

interest in the idea. However, Goodwin did not bring the topic up later

in the meeting

after McNamara left.

To Goodwin, the idea was not reason-

able even apart from moral objections, for the Bay of Pigs had shown that.

Cuba was politically stable; Castro would merely have been replaced

with Raul or with Che Guevara, both

worse than Castro. Somewhat later,

Goodwin sat in on an interview Tad Szulc had with Kennedy in which the

President pledged not to kill Castro. Szulc reported that pledge in an

article in Esquire. When he finished his period as Chairman of the Cuba

Task Force, Goodwin wrote a memo recommending that the United States

let Castro alone; anything the United States did to him could only but-

tress his position in Latin America.

During his time at the State Department, Goodwin met every

week or so with E. C. King, Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division

of the CIA, and King never mentioned a plan to assassinate Castro. Nor

did Robert Kennedy ever mention such

a plan

to Goodwin when Goodwin

worked for Kennedy, in 1966 and 1967.

Goodwin did believe, however, that the United States was in-

volved, at least indirectly, in the successful plot on Irujillo's life.

During the Eisenhower Administration, the United States had severed

diplomatic relations with Irujillo and attempted to isolate the Dominican

Republic.

There were

frequent reports that Trujillo was about to be as-

sassinated, but the

assassination never

came off. In fact, the govern-

ment was surprised when it occurred. HenryDearborn, the American Consul

in Santo Domingo, had been charged

with staying in contact with anti-

Trujillo forces. Prior to the assassination, he had transferred some

weapons, presumably handguns, to those forces. Goodwin suspected that

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INTERVIEW AND METING SUMMARY

. Passe 3 01 6

FILE:

the President probably

did not know of the gun transfer, but he said

that the assassination and the U.S. role with respect to it would have

come

as no surprise to the President. He doubted that the CIA even

would have had to clear the transfer, although a general policy of that

sort might have been passed by the Special Group.

Goodwin reported no other mention of assassinations. In fact,

he said he once heard a CIA man say that assassination was a bad idea

because once

started, it never ended. However, an agent in the field

might regard killings of one sort or another as within his mission in

supporting one political faction over another.

And of course someone

might have gotten carried away. It was clear from the Bay of Pigs that

the CIA sometimes acted without, or even against, instructions (e.g.

by bringing Batista followers into the Bay of Pigs invasion team). In

general, Latin American work seemed to attract the worst personnel in

all Washington agencies including the CIA.

2. CIA Activities in Brazil:

Goodwin knew little of CIA activities in Brazil. The United

States had strongly backed Quadros and never liked Goulart. In the

period before 1964, the U.S. gave political support to anti-Goulart

factions: followers of Kubitschek and

even

to the Furtado in the

Brazilian northeast. The U.S. had been involved in Brazilian elections

for many years and presumably spent a good deal in the 1963 congres-

sional elections.On the military

side, Walters

was brought from Rome

to keep a contact with the Brazilian military. How much further .

Walters' activities might have extended Goodwin did not know.

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3. CIA Activities in Chile:

The Kennedy Administration decided that left wing democratic

forces in Latin America were the only means of combatting communist

influence and promoting development in the region. That decision was

applied to Chile, and the U.S. switched its support from the conserva-

tive Alessandri. Goodwin sat in on meetings of the Special Group only

rarely, only if Latin America were the subject of the meeting. As he

remembered it, the proposals that came

to the Special Group were general

statements, policy papers, not descriptions of recipients of support or

conduits. In line with the policy, support was given to left democratic

political elements. The U.S. certainly provided

assistance to the

Christian Democrats in the 1964 elections, but Goodwin did not know

how

much. The figure of $20 million, mentioned by Stern, did not seem

inconceivable to Goodwin. He contested, however, the assertion that

the Chilean election was the most intensely

watched election in Washing-

ton since the 1948 Italian campaign.

From his vantage point in the

White House it did not seem

SO .

4.

Changes during the Johnson Administration:

Johnson cared less about Latin America

than had Kennedy--

Johnson was interested only in Mexico--and so knew less about covert

actions in the region. Thomas Mann was left to run Latin American

policy,

although the President did become active in the two crises--

Panama and then

the Dominican Republic. Goodwin saw a sharp change

in United States

policy

under Mann. Mann supported the military and

conservative

elements in Latin American societies, and American support

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for left democratic reform ended. Goodwin professed himself puzzled

by Johnson's assertion that he had discovered a "murder incorporated"

in the Caribbean.

The only specific instance Johnson ever cited was

Trujillo, yet Johnson had known about the Trujillo assassination from

the very beginning

and so could hardly have "discovered" it after he

became President.

5. Covert Operations and Counterinsurgency:

When asked about the ethos surrounding covert actions during

the Kennedy Administration, Goodwin

responded that the major emphasis

was counterinsurgency, not covert action. There was certainly no

reluctance to use covert action, but no one believed that American

objectives could be secured through it. Counterinsurgency was some-

thing different. A good deal of money was spent training police through

AID, much

more

was spent through the Pentagon equipping Latin American

militaries, and there was as well some CIA activity.

At that point,

the U.S. really believed that the communists could not get elected to

power and that the threat was subversion.

Paramilitary operations

were considered by the Special Group (counterinsurgency). Latin

American matters were considered there, and in some ways Latin

America

was considered a kind of training ground for Southeast Asia.

Goodwin believed that in sum U.S. counterinsurgency efforts made little

difference to the course of events in Latin America. • Cuba could not

in any case provide support to guerilla movements in South America

without substantial support from the Soviet Union, and the guerilla

movements that began had little indigenous

support.

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In response to a question about NSAM's, Goodwin noted that

these came out of the Bundy shop, which had little formal staff. Good-

win often wrote

these documents.

They were both general and, on

occasion, specific,

indicating groups to be supported and the like.

Kennedy wanted to know the details of American activities in Latin

America.

6. Goodwin Suggestions:

Goodwin believed it impossible to control the activities of

intelligence organizations without becoming involved in their day-to-

day operations. What is required is an active Congressional committee,

on the model of the early Joint Atomic Energy Committee, with an active

staff.

Once the President is

permitted both to decide what is a major

operation,

and thus needs to be communicated to Congress, and who to

tell, the game is over.

Confidence in men will not do; institutional

checks are required.

With respect to people to be interviewed, Goodwin mentioned

that the Station Chief in Mexico

functioned as a kind of regional sub-

director. He also thought we might talk with the FBI person in Puerto

• Rico, with Arthur Schlesinger,

and with Tad Szulc. In response to a

question, Goodwin indicated

that Nixon had been

interested in the Bay

of Pigs through Cushman.

He thought that Douglas Dillon might know of

that.

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Mr. Schwarz.

Now, Mr. Harvey was the man who had sort

of action responsibility for Cuba in the CIA, is that correct?

HI. McCone •

He was at that time, yes sir.

Mr. Schwarz. And you had frequent contact with Mr.

Harvey during this period of time?

Mr. McCone.

Not frequent, but occasional.

Dr. Schwarz. On any of, those occasions did Mr. Harvey

tell you that he was engaged in efforts to assassinate Cuban

• leaders?

Mi. McCone.

Hot that I have any recollection of.

Mr. Schwarz. You stated that the Special Group

considered and approved a variety of means under the Mongouse

program

for implementing the efforts -- would the correct word!

be overthrow of the Castro Regine, or was there sone other

objective?

Mr. McCone.

Well, I think the ultimate objective was

the overthrowr.. But I don't think that any of the particular

operations that the Special Group Augmented considered or

approved would accomplish that objective of more harassment

and making trouble.

Senator Hart of Colorado.

Do we know who chaired the

Speciai Group Augmented?

MIr. Schwarz.

would you describe the membership of the

Special Group Augmented, who chaired it and who staifed it,

Mr. McCone?

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ilI. McCone. The Attorney General chaired it.

Mr. Schwarz.

Robert Kennedy?

Mr. McCone.

Robert Kennedy. And he attended it quite

often, but not always.

Mr. Schwarz.

Who were the other members?

Mr. McCone.

As I said, the Secretary of Defense..

Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Mcilamara?

Mr. McCone. Frequently represented by his Deputy, Mr.

Gilpatric, Rosnell Gilpatric.

The Secratary of State --

Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Rusk?

Mir. McCone.

Mr. Rusk

-- frequently represented ly his

Deputy, Alex Johnson.

ir. Schwarz.

Mas General Taylor on that group?

Mr. McCone. I think he was, if I remember, as Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs.

Mr. Schwarz. And did Mr. Parrott staff it?

Mr. McCone. Well, he participated in the staff rather

as a secretary.

Mr. Schwarz.

And was General Lansdale a member or

participant for the entire period of the Mongoose operation,

or only for some limited period of it?

MI. McCone.

For the entire period as far as I remember.

Senator ilart of colorado. Mr. Mccone, did the Special

Group Augmented keep minutes of the meetings?

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TOP SICKLI

Mr. Schwarz. Let's go back to the August 1962 meeting,

August 10. And the Committee has in their folders three

documents dated August 13, August 11, 1962 and April 14, 1967,

which deal with this subject. And the reporter has previously

marked, and I would like him to hand to you, Mr. McCone, the thr!

exhibits together. And I will just state for the record wat

they are.

McCone Exhibit No. 2 is an August 13, 1962 memorandum

from Brigadier General Lansdale to four persons, including

William Harvey, CIA, a man from State, a man from Defense, and

a Man from USIA, subject: "Alternate Courst B."

McCone Exhibit 3 is a memorandum dated August 14, 1962

from William Harvey for Deputy Director of Plans, subject:

"Operation Mongoose" •

And McCone Exhibit 1 is a memorandum dated April 14, 1967

from John A. McCone to the Director.

These memoranda, Mr. McCone -- you have had ar opportunity

to read those before this meeting, have you not?

Mr. McCone. Yes,

sir.

Mr. Schwarz.

These memoranda all concern a meeting

which took place on August 10 concerning operation Mongoose, is

that right?

Mr: McCone. That is correct.

Mr. Schwarz. Was the subject of assassination or liqui-

dation raised at that meeting?

P

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IF DEARET

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First, was that a meeting of the special group augmented?

Mr. McCone. That is correct.

MI. Schwarz.

Who was there at this particular meeting?

MI. McCone. This was

a rather large meeting. As I have

said earlier, it was called by me for the purpose of again

expressing my concern about missiles in Cuba. But since at that

time it had been decided to intensify the Mongoose program, it

turned into a 54-12 augmented committee with

several people

there. And we discussed Operation Mongoose.

And we also discussed this question of missiles in

Cuba.

Mr. Schwarz.

During the portion that wes discussing

operation Mongoose who was

present?

Mr. McCone. Well, ir. Rusk and Mr. Mclamara.

Mr. MurroW.

I was there. And two or three people of my staff were there.

Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Harvey included?

MI. McCone.

Mr. Harvey was

there.

It seems to me that there were others from State there,

but I don't recall who they were. And it was quite a large meet-

ing.

NH 50955

Mr. Schwarz.

WAs the Attorney General present at that

meeting?

MI. Mccone. I can't say that from memory, but I have

looked over the list in recent weeks. And if I recall properly,

the Attorney General was not there.

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Mr. Schwarz.

He was not there?

• Mr. McCone.

That is right.

a Mr. Schwarz:

Now, there are minutes of that meeting,

are there not?

MI. McCone.

Yes, I think there are. I think there is

something in the form of a memorandum summarizing the meeting,

yes, sir.

Mr. Schwarz. I would like to recount for the committee al

matter which is procedurally troublesome, I am told by the

White House it may not be substantively troublesome, but I would

like to recount it for the committee.

Mr. McCone and I met yesterday evening to have an

opportunity to go over these matters. And during the course

1.

of the meeting Mr. Mccone referred to the minutes of the

August 10 meeting, stating that he then believed that those

minutes showed that there was opposition at the meeting

to the subject of assassination.

Now, MI. Mccone, is it your current understanding that

the minutes show that there was opposition to the subject of

assassination?

Mr. McCone. I can't answer that. . I haven't seen those

minutes, and I don't know what is in them.

Senator Mondale.

This may be out of order, I don't

know. In the August 14 memo point 3 says: "The question of

assassination, particularly of Castro, was

brought up by

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32

Secretary McNamara at the meeting of the Special Group

Augmented in Rusk's office in August".

Do you see

that sentence?

Mr. McCone.

Yes.

Senator Mondale. Is that your recollection?

Mr. McCone. I am not sure that McNamara used the word

"assassination". He could have used another word,

elimination, or removal. And Mi. Harvey, in preparing this

memorandum for Mr. Helms, who was then Deputy of Plans Informa-

tion, used the word "assassination" rather loosely interpreting

what Mr. Mclamara

said.

I cannot say, Senator, that iir. Mclamara actually brought

up for discussion the question of assassination as such.

might have said elimination, which could mean many other

things.

I am not quite clear on that..

Mr. Schwarz.

The written record uses the words

liquidation of readers.

Senator Mondale. That is the Lansdale memo.

Mr. Schwarz. Yes. The words were blocked out in the

• Lansdale memo, but the Harvey memo, which is Exhibit 3, says

those are the words.

The Chairman. And I might say that the memo of John Mccone

to the Director -- I take that to be a memo to yourself --

or Helms had then become the Director.

It contains the following language:

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TOP

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33

"At one of these meetings, probably the meeting of the

JCS group, I recalled a suggestion being made to liquidate

top people in the Castro regime, including Castro. I tool:

immediate exception to this suggestion, stating

that the

subject was completely out of bounds as far as the U.S.

Government and the CIA were concerned, and the idea should not

be discussed, nor should it appear in any papers, as the U.s.

Government could not consider such actions on moral or ethical

grounds."

I take it, then, that according to your best recollec-

tion the subject of liquidating Castro and possibly other top

Cuban leaders did come up at this meeting, and you did take

strong exception to it.

Mr. McCone.

Yes.

I was not alone in that.

Mr. Murrow took exception. I

remember that very clearly.

Senator Mondale. Who made the suggestion to which you

refer in your memo?

MI. McCone. According to the record, it was Mr. Mcnamara,

according to Mr. Harvey's record.

Senator Mondale. Do you recall who made the suggestion?

MI. McCone. No, I can't recall from memory. I can only

reconstruct it from the record.

Senator Schweiker. And who was chairing that meeting?

Who chaired that meeting?

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Mr. McCone. I think Mr. Rusk chaired the meeting. The

Attorney General was not there.

Senator Schweiker. He normally would have chaired the

meeting?

MI. McCone. If the Attorney General had been there he

would have chaired the meeting. But he was not there.

Senator Mathias.

Mr. Chairman, the memorandum of August

14, 1963, says that the question of assassination was brought

up by Secretary McNamara. Was it brought up in the context

of disapproval, or in the context of pursuing it further, or

in the context of merely that it was something on an agenda that

was being followed in the course of the meeting.

Mr. McCone. Well, as I say, Senator, the purpose of the

meeting

was to discuss a new phase of the Mongoose operation,

an

intensified activity -- andI presume it was - in exploring

the alternatives that were available.

Senator Mathias. In other words, it was brought up in the

context. that this was one of a number of operations that the

group might consider?

Mr. McCone. I think that is right. And I immediately

said, well, that is one thing that we can't consider, and

wouldn't consider.

Senator Mathias.

If my own memory of that time is at all

accurate - it may not be - but this was

about the time that

Senator Keating was beginning to publish information about the

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absence pointad out to Frank Hand the inadmissibility and

stupidity of putting this type of comment in writing in such

document. I advised Frank Hand that as far as the CIA was

concerned, we would write no document pertaining to this,

and

would participate ir no open meeting discussing it. I strongly

urged Hand to recommend to Lansdale that he excise the phrase

in quastion from all' copies of this memorandum, including

those

disseminated to Stata, Defense and USIA. Shortly thereafter,

Lansdale called back and left the message that he agreed, and

that he had done so."

I cannot read those two paragraphs without concluding that

the principal concern expressed by Mr. Harvey runs not to the

question of whether or not assassination might form a part of

an action plan, but runs rather to making certain that ther=

is no written record that would establish that assassination

might be any consideration or such a plan might be undervay.

Do you read those two paragraphs the same way?

•MI. McCone. Yes, I don't think that -- you can't read

them any other way, Senator. My action as I have

reconstructed

it is that immediately upon receiving the Lansdale memorandum

of August 14 in which he -- there are several words deleted,

and I have forgotter. exactly what these words

äre.

Mr. Schwarz. Including liquidation of leaders.

Mr. McCone. Ircluding liquidation of leadsis.

I called Mr. McNamara and insisted that that memorandum

SEC

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39.

ba withdrawn because no dacision was made on this subject, ard

since no dacision was made, then Lansdale was quite out of

-order in taskirg the Central Intelligence Agency to consider

that matter.

Now, the wording of Mr. Harvey's memorandum is subject to

all kinds of interpretation, but you will have to ask Mr.

Harvey about that.

The Chairman. Did Mr. McNamara agree that the memorandum,

the Lansdale memorandum --

Mr. McCore.

Most certainly.

The Chairman. -- should be withdrawn?

Mr. McCons. Most certainly.

The Chairman. And it was

given him or for any other reason?

for the reason that you had

Mr. McCone. Well, I cannot answer that, except that as

I recall our conversation, he seemed highly disturbed that this

matter should be initiated by Generäl Larsdale and readily

agreed that it be removed, because it was not a matter that

was given consideration.

Senator Schweiker. Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman.

Yes, Senator Schweiker.

Senator Schweiker. Mr. McCone, in view of hindsight and

what you know now, someone obviously made a decision to go

forward and to exclude you. Who, in your judgrent. from what

you now know, made this decision and why did they exclude you?

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Mr. McCone.

I would like to explain for the record this

mamorandum of mine of April 14, 1967.

I came on here for a Committee meeting of some kind. I

arrived rather late at night at the hotel, and received a call

from Senator Kennedy who said that he had been informed that

Jack Anderson was producing a

column on this subject that

implicated that both the President and the Attorney General,

and he wondered if I would talk with Mr. Anderson. And I said

I would, and within five minutes, Mi. Anderson called me on

the telephone. I ramember the call very well, because he

engaged me for an hour and fifteen minutes and brought it to

1:00 o'clock in the morning.

But I took the position with MI. Anderson that the matter

had come up and had been promptly withdrawn, and then being

concernad about it, I went to the Director's offica and

dictated this memorandum.

Senator Mondale. Can you testify that it was not Secretary

McNamara who made the assassination suggestion?

Mr. McCone. No.

Senator Mondale. So it could have been, you just don't

know?

NW 50955

Mt. McCone. I don't know.

Senator Hart of Colorado.

Mr. Chairman?

Mr. McCone, as you are well aware, recently General

Lansdale suggested his authority to conduct these plans and/or

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he had a very fine record he seemed to be kind of a loner to

me and the CIA station in Saigon was a very big and very

sensitive station, and I thought a man who was trained in that

type of an operation should be the Chief of Station, and

certainly that man should be selected by the organization and

not by the Ambassador.

The Chairman. Mr. McCone, this Committee is going to call

General Lansdale as a witness. Can you give us your opinion

as to his credibility?

MI. McCona. I think, Mr. Chairman, that for me to

testify on the record concerning the credibility of another

man, and particularly a distinguished man who is a retired

Major General, would not be an appropriate thing for me to

do.

If you want me to go off the record, if that is permissible,

I would like to tell you --

The Chairman. Very well. He'll go off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

The Chairman. Lat's go back on the record.

Senator Schweiker. I have a question.

The Chairman. Yes, Senator Schweiker.

Senator Schweiker. Mr. McCone, in your April 14, 1967

memo, you mentioned paragraph 3, Operation Mongoose, and you

say it is an interdepartmental affair, under the operational

control of DOD through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. That is

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your wording on paragraph 3 of your April 14, '67 memo.

My question is, whenyou have an operation like this,

would this have been set up by the Special Group Augmented,

or where did the authority to se' up Mongoose come from?

Special Group Augmented?

Mr. McCone. No. I think the authority to set up Mongoose

came from the National Security Council.

Senator Schweiker. Is it unusual in

setting up an

operation like this to have DOD have operational control of it,

say as opposed to CIA or something or not?

MI. MCCone. Well, as I said earlier, Operation Mongoose

involved several departments.

Senator Schweiker. Yes.

Mr. Cone. So it would have been rather wrong to have it

a CIA operation. CIA participated and CIA people were

Secunded to General Lansdale.

This memorandum of mine is

wrong in one respect. I say "operational control of DoD through

the JCS." I was advised by General Lemnitzar when I appeared

before the Rockefeller Commission here a month or six weeks ago

that the line of authority went from the Secretary of Dafense

through an assistant and on to Lansdale. It was not through

the JCS.

..:

Senator Schweiker. So it went from McNamara, or from the

Sacretary Of Defense, to whom?

Mr. McCone. Through some assiscant to Lansdala, who was

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I don't know who

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an assistant to an assistant to McNamara.

that was.

But the reason

--

Ser-tor Schweiker. Which wis sort of an unusual sot up

in itself, I take it?

MI. McCone. Well, he was a two star General, and I guess

this was a proper way of a reasonable way to do it rather than

to disassociate him from the Department of Defense, and put him

someplace else.

The reason I had the impression it was through the JCS,

we would have these meetings in the JCS conference rooms all

the time. But General Lemnitzer corrected me,: so this was

.S

in error.

Senator Schweiker. And it was under Secretary McNamara's

direction basically then?

MI. Mccone. Quite removed, quite removed. I think he was

housed there, but except for sitting in on the 51/12 Committée

or being represented on the 54/12 Committee Augmented, I don't

think Mr. McNamara exercisad any direct control over General

Lansdale, or in fact knew what he was doing.

Senator Schweiker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Mr. Schwarz?

MI. Scwharz. I just want to pin dow a couple of points

on the Castro story and move on to Diam, and then I'm finished

with what we have planned.

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JOHN ALEX MECONE

6I2 SOUTH FLOWER STREET

LOS ANGELES 90017

Seattle, Washington

June 25, 1975

Dear Bob:

Attached is a copy of the 1967 memorandum we

discussed on the telephone this morning.

The circumstances are slightly different than I

was able to recall for it appears from this memo that I

actually called on you and we were in complete agreement

that "Subject A" was not part of any program nor was it to

be discussed in any meetings of groups directing policy.

I will be east for a meeting in New York on July 9th

and am giving consideration to spending a day in Washington -

perhaps July 10th - for the specific purpose of reviewing the

transcript of my testimony before the Church Committee and

possibly the Rockefeller Commission, if the latter is available.

The rules of the Church Committee state that a witness can

review his testimony for corrections, etc., as is usually

the custom of committees on the Hill.

I will be in my office in Los Angeles on Monday,

June 30th, and for the next several days can be reached at

the residence of Justin Dart at Pebble Beach, telephone

(408) 624-2097. Don't hesitate to call me if you wish to

talk with me.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

Enclosure

Honorable Robert S. McNamara

International Bank for Reconstruction

and Development

701 19th Street

Washington, D. C.

Los Angeles, California

June 25, 1975

bb

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14 April 1967

TO: The Director

FROM: John A. McCone

1. No memorandum can be located covering the August 10, 1962

meeting; however, it is highly probable that one exists.

2. Meetings of August 8 or 9, 1962, in the JCS Operations Room

(Pentagon) and August 10, 1962, in Secretary Rusk's Conference Room

were for the purpose of considering staff proposals for Phase Il of opera-

tion MONGOOSE. This operation was under the direction of General

Lansdale, with Wm. Harvey handling CIA participation (under FitzGerald).

At one of these meetings -- probably the meeting in the JCS Room -- I

recall a suggestion being made to liquidate top people in the Castro

regime, including Castro. I took immediate exception to this suggestion,

stating that the subject was completely out of bounds as far as the USG

and CIA were concerned and the idea should not be discussed nor should

it appear in any papers, as the USG could not consider such actions on

moral or ethical grounds.

3. Immediately after the meeting, I called on Secretary McNamara

personally and re-emphasized my position, in which he heartily agreed.

I did this because operation MONGOOSE -- an inter-departmental affair --

was under the operational control of DOD through the JCS.

4. At no time did the suggestion receive serious consideration

by the Special Group (augmented) nor by any individual responsible for

policy.

5. Through the years the Cuban problem was discussed in terms

such as "dispose of Castro," "remove Castro," "knock off Castro," etc.,

and this meant the overthrow of the Communist Government in Cuba and

the replacing of it with a democratic regime.. Terms such as the above

appear in many working papers, memoranda for the record, etc., and, as

stated, all refer to a change in the Cuban Government.

HH 50955 DocId: 32423626 Page 214-

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JOHN ALEX MECONE

612 SOUTH FLOWER STREET

LOS ANGELES 90017

Seattle, Washington

June 25, 1975

Dear Bob:

Attached is a copy of the 1967 memorandum we

discussed on the telephone this morning.

The circumstances are slightly different than I

was able to recall for it appears from this memo that I

actually called on you and we were in complete agreement

that "Subject A" was not part of any program nor was it to

be discussed in any meetings of groups directing policy.

I will be east for a meeting in New York on July 9th

and am giving consideration to spending a day in Washington -

perhaps july l0th - for the specific purpose of reviewing the

transcript of my testimony before the Church Committee and

possibly the Rockefeller Commission, if the latter is available.

The rules of the Church Committee state that a witness can

review his testimony for corrections, etc., as is usually

the custom of committees on the Hill.

I will be in my office in Los Angeles on Monday,

June 30th, and for the next several days can be reached at

the residence of Justin Dart at Pebble Beach, telephone

(408) 624-2097. Don't hesitate to call me if you wish to

talk with me.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

Enclosure

Honorable Robert S. McNamara

International Bank for Reconstruction

and Development

701 19th Street

Washington, D. C.

Los Angeles, California

June 25, 1975

bb

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14 April 1967

TO: The Director

FROM: John A. McCone

1. No memorandum can be located covering the August 10, 1962

meeting; however, it is highly probable that one exists.

2. Meetings of August 8 or 9, 1962, in the JCS Operations Room

(Pentagon) and August 10, 1962, in Secretary Rusk's Conference Room

were for the purpose of considering staff proposals for Phase Il of opera-

tion MONGOOSE. This operation was under the direction of General

Lansdale, with Wm. Harvey handling CIA participation (under FitzGerald).

At one of these meetings -- probably the meeting in the JCS Room -- I

recall a suggestion being made to liquidate top people in the Castro

regime, including Castro. I took immediate exception to this suggestion,

stating that the subject was completely out of bounds as far as the USG

and CIA were concerned and the idea should not be discussed nor should

it appear in any papers, as the USG could not consider such actions on

moral or ethical grounds.

3. Immediately after the meeting, I called on Secretary McNamara

personally and re-emphasized my position, in which he heartily agreed.

I did this because operation MONGOOSE -- an inter-departmental affair --

was under the operational control of DOD through the JCS.

4. At no time did the suggestion receive serious consideration

by the Special Group (augmented) nor by any individual responsible for

policy.

5. Through the years the Cuban problem was discussed in terms

such as "dispose of Castro," "remove Castro," "knock off Castro, " etc.,

and this meant the overthrow of the Communist Government in Cuba and

the replacing of it with a democratic regime.. Terms such as the above

appear in many working papers, memoranda for the record, etc., and, as

stated, all refer to a change in the Cuban Government.

amanit

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COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES

Washington, DC 20500

April 15, 1975

MEMORANDUM

TO

FROM

SUBJECT

THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

: The File

: David W. Belin

: Interview with Secretary

Robert McNamara

Belin:

Secretary McNamara, we've had a brief interview

in your ottice on - late

this afternoon - which

is April 15, 1975, and I have asked you a number of questions

and you have given me your best recollection for your answers,

and I'd like to get a summary of our discussion on this tape

and then send you a transcript for your editing, and then we

will either prepare an affidavit or perhaps we will still ask

you to come before the Commission, but I understand it is your

preference not to testify formally before the Commission,

because of the nature of your present job. Is that correct?

McNamara: That is correct. I wish to cooperate with the

commission in every way.

If necessary, of course,

I would testify before them, but I would much prefer to present

whatever information I have in the form of an affidavit.

B:

Fine. During the Administration of President

Kennedy, you were Secretary of Defense. Is that

correct?

M:

B:

M:

B:

M:

B:

M:

B:

M:

That is correct:

And were you Secretary of Defense commencing at the

tilne of the inauguration of President Kennedy?

Xes. Starting January 20, 1961.

And you were Secretary of Defense throughout the

Kennedy Administration. Is that right?

I was.

--and into the Administration of Lyndon Johnson.

until approximately March 1, 1968.

During that time you were personally close with both

the President and his brother, Robert kennedy, is

that correct?

01750

I was.

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-2-

B:

And you also were close to McGeorge Bundy?

M:

Yes.

THE WHITE HOUSE UFFICE

B:

As I understand it there was what I am going

to call a

"camaderie" in the relationship among

some of the top people in the Kennedy Administration.

M:

YeS.

That is correct.

B:

At any time during the Kennedy Administration did

you hear any person ever discuss a plan known as

an

"executive action plan" which in substance was defined

as a capability plan for possibly assassinating any foreign

leader?

M:

ever

I have no recollection of/hearing anyone discuss

such a plan.

B:

Did you ever hear anyone discuss any particular

plan concerning the possible assassination of

Castro in Cuba?

M:

No. I have no recollection of such a discussion.

B :

Did you ever serve in any group known as either

the MONGOOSE group or the Special Group Augmented?

Does that ring a bell with you?

M:

No. You mentioned, if I may refer back to our

previous conversation that I was present at least

one or more meetings of the Special Operations GrOup, I believe

you called it.

I have no recollection of being present at

the meeting.

I'm not suggesting I wasn't, but I have no

recollection of it.

I do seem to recall that there was such

a group, I doubt very much if I was a member of it.

B:

You might have been a participant

at one or more

of these meetings?

M:

I might have been a participant.

B:

At any such meetings,

did you ever hear anyone

discuss as

a possibility the question of possibly

assassinating Castro or any other foreign leader?

M:

No.

I should interject here, another point I made

earlier, as I have no notes -- 'I did not take notes of

any meetings I attended with rare exceptions,

land I have

no other basis for refreshing my memory and my memory of those

04702

NH 50955 DocId: 32423626 Paqe 218

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-3-

Trans

3

years is very bad.

I'm not saying this to in any way qualify

what I am saying

except that it is a fact that my memory is

poor in relation to the period.

B :

I asked you whether or not Robert Kennedy ever had

any such discussions with you and you indicated no,

is that correct?

M:

--indicated two things.

First that I have no re-

collection whatsoever of him ever having discussed !

assassination of anybody with me--or whatever you called it--

the executive

B:

executive action capability --

M:

such an actor avate to me

executive action capability. Moreover, it is in-

conceivable to me that he would have discussed

such an action with me because I think he would have felt

that it endangered the Presidency and I believe he would

have had moral reasons for not supporting any such action

a not se.

Pigs and the extent to which it weakened the presidency and

the ability of the President to govern and his behavior

during the Cuban missile crisis when he strongly opposed

action which he considered contrary to the moral traditions

of this society.

THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

Do you have any other comments with regard to this

whole question of possibly assassinating foreign

leaders?

M:

You told me that you understand a plan to assassinate

one or more foreign leaders was in existence for

an extended period of time, during 1961-2-3. I said (a) I

have no recollection of any

such plan, (b) I find it very

difficult to believe that if such à plan had existed its

existence wouldn't have been known to the top officials of

the CIA, and certainly if I had known of it I am positive I

would have made my knowledge known to the President, Robert

Kennedy, neither of whom obviously can testify now, but to

Mac Bundy, to my deputy, Ros Gilpatric,

Dean Rusk, and I would strongly urge that you check those

three individuals.

to Robert Kennedy at the time.

He was brought in by President

Kennedy to examine the decision-making process of the Government

that could have led to such a failure as the Bay of Pigs.

He was very-Max was very close to both Robert Kennedy and

the President at the time. He was very close to the whole

02205

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-4-

le played a major part in the

Cuban missile crisis discussions because of his association

with the Kennedys and his work with the Bay of Pigs follow-on.

So I would urge you to talk to him about this as

well.

And

it Mac didn't know about it, and Max doesn't know about it

and Dean Rusk doesn't and Ros Kilpatrick doesn't and I have

no memory of it, 1 very much doubt that any such plan was

known to the top officials of the Kennedy Administration.

B:

Well, assume for the moment that one of those people

did know about such a plan, and assume for the

moment that the CIA documents show that such a plan might

have been directed to be instituted by someone in the White

House,

who in the White House do you think would have had

the authority to institute such a plan?

M:

Well, I have said before that I felt the attacks

on the CIA -- CIA's covert operations were unjustified

insofar as they assessed the primary responsibilities for

those operations against the senior officials in CIA and

absolve the rest of the senior officials in the Government

Cha as a da prat

I said that because it was my experience

that all major CIA operations were approved by a group that

subseguently became known as the 303 Group. I don't know

what it was called during its early period, which included

representatives of the -- the highest level representatives --

of the Secretaries of State and Defense, as well as the

President's Security Adviser.

B:

That was Mr. Bundy.

PROPERTY UF

M:

That was Mr. Bundy, during the period

THE WHITE HOUSE OFELEEL aLE

talking about, so that I

an almost certain that

were an

assassination contemplated, which seems to me, as I say,

extremely unlikely, if it were contemplated or any action been

taken to move in that direction, it would have had to have

received the approval of not just Mr. Bundy but other

officials at that sane level, including my Deputy, I think, and my:

Deputy never would have approved anything like that without

B:

What you are saying--at least if it came through

the White HOuse, certainly Mr. Bundy would have

known about it.

M:

himself.

Rusk and

I think he would have both known about it,

and I

don't believe that he would have approved it by

I think it would have been discussed with Dean

me or my deputy and Dean Rusk's undersecretary.

01700

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B:

And if Mr. Bundy did not know about it, then the

only other person in the White House

that might

have known about it, I assume, would have been the President.

Is that a fair statement?

That's

a fair statement but I think that's extremely

unlikely. I can't imagine that anything relating

to the CIA operation of this kind would be known to the

President and not Mr. Bundy. I never knew of any such thing. ￾

B:

so if it would have been known to Mr. Bundv it would have

been known to the President. And vice versa?

M:

No, nono. I didn't say that. I said I couldn't

imagine anything relating to a CIA operation that was

known to the President and was not known to Mr. Bundy.

I can

imagine something with

respect to CIA known to MI. Bundy,

not known to the President either because they weren't that

important or conceivably because it

was thought desirable

to protect the President from certain knowledge.

B:

With regard to the --

M:

If I may -- add one word to that. I can't imagine

Mr. Bundy himself supporting assassination. I

can't imagine him supporting assassination of a foreign

leader, without mentioning it to the President, even though

to do

so would by that action involve the President.

I say

I can't imagine him supporting assassination of a foreign

leader without the President's

knowledge because it is the

President who would pay if that action were undertaken and it

ever became known.

Mr. Bundy recognized, more than the rest

of us, the importance of protecting the Presidency as well as

a particular president, and particularly protecting his ability

to govern.

B:

I want to correct one thing on the record. You

referred to my statement about one or more assassi-

nation plans.

The only particular plan of assassination that

you and I discussed that I said I knew anything about as to

be concrete affirmative plans involved just Castro.

I said

there might have been indirect involvement in one other area, but

the only direct involvement thus far that I know of at this

time and that I discussed with you pertained trufastro.

-

M:

yes, yes, you are quite right. THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

02797

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-:°

-6-

B:

Anything else you want to add-for the record?

M:

No, except I'm horrified by the whole discussion,

shocked by it and I just hope you will pursue ali

these leads some of which you may already have--I am saddened

by it

too.

B:

is a citizen I am horrified by it and I am saddened.

by it, that my country which at one time became the

land of the free

and the home of the brave would be involved

in situations of this kind, but we are trying to find out

what the

facts are and hopefully it will not happen again.

Thank you very much, sir.

M:

Thank you:

(END OF TAPE)

ill Wurk Huber writt

02798

1214

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- 6-

B:

Anything else you want to add for the record?

•No, except I'm horrified by the whole discussion,

shocked by it and I just hope you will pursue all

these leads some of which you may already haver funwe suddin

byst

, too.

B:

As a citizen I am horrified by it and I am saddened

by it that my country which at one time became the

land of the free and the home of the brave would be involved

in situations of this kind, but we are trying to find out

what the facts are and hopefully it will not happen again.

I a thank you very much, sir.

M:

Thank you.

B

After conpletion; of tha interview ds I was about

to

was

do everything he contady scotara salt that la verted

not aware

of this.

could to show that president Kennedy

(END OF TAPE)

PROPERTY OF

THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

04/290

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COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES

Washingron, DC 20500

Nelson A. Rockefeller,

Chairman

John T. Connor

C. Douglas Dillon

Erwin N. Griswold

Lane Kirkland

Lyman L.. Lemnitzer

Ronald Reagan

Edgar F. Shannon, Jr.

David W. Belin,

Executive Director •

May 2, 1975

L-V1-9

n....-.

Honorable Robert M. McNamara

President

The World Bank

1818 H Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C.

20433

Dear Mr. McNamara:

Enclosed is a transcript of the taping of our

April 15 interview which my secretary has double-

checked and which I have personally checked with

the tape.

Will you please review this for any

changes or corrections that you may want to make

for purposes of accuracy. I am enclosing a self-

addressed, stamped envelope to mail this back

to me with your corrections. The extra copy is

for your own personal files, should you so desire.

I would appreciate your initialing each page of

the transcript and signing the last page with

the date of your signature.

I may want to have

a short affidavit prepared for you to sign with

the copy of the transcript attached.

Thank you very much for your cooperation.

sincerely yours,

David W. Belin

Executive Director

Enclosure

01P02

PROPERTY OF

THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

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INDEX OF DOCUMENTS FOR ROBERT S. MCNAMARA

Tab K

November 30, 1961, Memorandum from President to

McNamara et al.

(Tab 4 Lans. Book)

January 18, 1962, Memorandum from Lansdale to RFK

re "Sensitive work". (Tab 8 Lans. Book)

January 27, 1962, Memorandum from Lansdale to REK

re "touchdown plays". (Tab 12 Lans. Book)

January 30, 1962, Memorandum from Gen Wm Craig

to Lansdale re "Operation Bounty". (Tab 17 Lans.

Book)

Minutes of SGA meeting of March 5, 1962, on Project

Mongoose (attended by McNamara). (Tab 21 Lans. Book)

Memorandum for SGA from Lansdale March 12, 1962,

re inter alia arming of Cuban guerrillas.

Lans. Book)

Memorandum for SGA from Lansdale March 13, 1902, re

inter alia infiltrating agents

with paramilitary

skills and problem of controlling them once they

are inside Cuba (00207). (Tab 25 Lans. Book)

Minutes of SGA meeting of March 13, 1962, with MC-

Namara attending.

March 16, 1962, Memorandum for the Record of Taylor

re SGA meeting with President on Taylor's March 14

Mongoose Guidelines. Contains March 22 amendment

re "no authorization, either tacit or otherwise..."

(Tab 27 Lans. Book)

April 11, 1962, Minutes of SGA. McNamara present.

(Tab 30 Lans. Book)

August 10, 1962, Parrott Minutes of the SGA.

McNamara present.

(Tab 38(B) Lans.

Book)

1967 IG Report re August 10, 1962, meeting (Tab 38

(C) Lans. Book)

August 13, 1962, Lansdale Memorandum to Harvey re

"liquidation of

leaders".

(Tab 38(D) Lans. Book)

August 14, 1962, Harvey Memorandum to Helms re Lans-

dale "liquidation" memorandum. (Tab 38(F) Lans.

Book)

100010=1

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Tab L

Tab M

Tab N

Tab 0

Tab P

Tab &

Tab R

Tab S

2

August 17, 1962, Gilpatric Memorandum to Lansdale

(Tab

39 Lans. Book)

August 23, 1962, National Security Action Memo

No. 181 (Tab 41 Lans Book)

September 12, 1962,

Memorandum from Lansdale to

McNamara re

Phase II OPeration Mongoose (Tab 44

Lans. Book)

October 26, 1962, Minutes of the SGA with McNamara

in attendance.

November 5, 1962, Memorandum of George McManus

referring to McNamara's view of Lansdale.

April 23, 1963, Summary Record of NSC meeting No.

2/63. McNamara

in attendance and spoke on Cuba:

"elimination of the Castro regime was a require-

ment."

April 14, 1967, Memorandum of John McCone to Helms

re the August 10, 1962, meeting. (Tab 51 Lans. Book)

April 15, 1975, interview with McNamara by David

Belin of

the Rockefeller Commission.

May 27, 1975, Select Committee Interview with Richard

Goodwin referring to McNamara's knowledge of "execu-

tive action"

June 6, 1975, testimony of John McCone before the

Select Committee. (Only the portion that relates

to McNamara.)

June 25, 1975, letter of John McCone to McNamara.

June 27, 1975, letter and memorandum of McNamara

to John

McCone.

TOP SHORST

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Chronology and Issues for Testimony of MeGEORGE BUNDY

Biographical Background

1953-61

1961-63

1963-66

1966-

Present

Faculty of Arts and Science, Harvary University

Special Assistant to President Kennedy for National Security Affairs

Special Assistant to President Johnson for National Security Affairs

President, Ford Foundation

Chronology of Events

' Summary Outline Re Castro

1. January 1961 - October 1961 -- Cuba Policy - Inauguration/Bay of Pigs to Mongoose

(NSAM 100 Plan re Removal of Castro)

2. November-January 1961 -- Conception and Approval of Mongoose

3. January - June 1962 -- Mongoose Phase One

4. June - December 1962 -- Mongoose Phase Two

(August 10, 1962 Meeting and possible Discussion of Castro Assassination)

5. January - November 1963 -- Post-Mongoose Policy

(Seeming pattern of discussion and papers on contingency of Castro death)

6. December 1963 - August 1964 -- Special Group Investigation of Mafia - Cuban Exile Castro

Assassination Plot.

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(Mcleorge Bundy)

- 2 -

Jan. 9-10,

1961

Jan. 20, 1961

Jan. 27, 1961

April 17, 1961

May 16, 1961

Oct. 5, 1961

1. Cuba Policy from Bay of Pigs up to Mongoose Origin

Bundy arrives in Washington (Source: Bundy Interview)

Bundy Appointment.

Kennedy Administration takes office.

McGeorge

Bundy appointed Assistant to the President for National Security

Bundy, Rostow and Bissell lunch at Hay Adams (Source: Bundy

Interview) Calendar note.*

Bay of Pigs. Cuban exiles land at Bay of Pigs:

New U.S. Policy on Cuba.

President Kennedy approved actions taken

the downfall of Castro and that since the measures agreed below

(CIA studies of weaknesses in Castro regime, diplomatic efforts to

isolate Castro, improve relations with Cuban exiles,!

etc.) are not

likely to achieve this end, the matter should be reviewed at inter-

vals with a view to further action."

Source: Record of Actions by

NSC on May 5, 1961. (Tab B).

NSAM 100. Bundy issues National Security Action Memorandum No. 100

The the rareta staf site, subs

subject: Contingency Planning for Cuba.

"In confirmation of oral instructions

conveyed to Assistant Secretary of State Woodward, a plan is desired

for the indicated contingency in Cuba."

There is no explanation of

the nature of the "indicated contingency." Source NSA!! No. 100, Oct. 5,

1961. (Tabc).

Issues and Questions

Was 'Executive Action" discussed?

Was Bissell instructed re "Execu-

tive Action'?

Was this basic context for later

U.S. Policy?

Was "indicated contingency" related

to "Executive Action"? Did JFK

authorize NSAM 100? What was JFK

instruction re NSAM 100? See next

entries below.

INT

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Oct. 5, 1961

Oct. 6, 1961

Nov. 30, 1961

Jan. 19, 1962

Taylor Instructions for Castro 'Removal" Contingence -- JFK interest

NOT to be Revealed. On General Taylor's instructions, Parrott outlines

to Mr. Coerr of State a requirement for a "plan against the contingency

that Castro would in some way or other be removed from the Cuban

scene." Taylor tells Parrott not to indicate the President's interest

in the plan.

Plan for Possible Removal of Castro. The Special Group (Bundy not

present) was told by Mr. Parrott "that two other exercises are in

progress in connection with Cuba -- the preparation of a contingency

plan in connection with the possible removal of Castro from the Cuban

President Kennedy Decision to Begin Mongoose. A memorandum from

President Kennedy was sent to Robert Kennedy, Rusk, McNamara, McCone,

Operation." The memo stated: "(1) We will use our available assets

to go ahead gith the discussed project in order to help Cuba over-

throw the Conmunist regime. (2) This program will be conducted under

the general guidance of General Lansdale, acting as Chief of Opera-

organizations and department by the hour eh apsouriate renolan.

dum, November 30, 1961, (0069-70). (See Lansdale, Tab 4) .

Phase One of Mongoose-- Intelligence Collection, January-June 1962

RFK Urges Action. RFK tells Special Groun (A) (Bundy not present) that

solution of Cuban problem carries "the top priority in the U.S. Govern-

Spare all else is seendan, Jaine, , , , to anoser.

effort or manpower is to be

McCone. (See Lansdale, Tab 10).

Issues and Questions

Was this the "indicated contingency"

in Bundy's NSAY 100 of October 5,

1961?

Is this plan the one referred to in

Bundy's NSAM 100? Did it relate to a

U.S. assassination plan?

JFK approval for Mongoose. What was

JFK relationship with Lansdale and JFK

interest in Mongoose?

Did RFK emphasis lead to assumption by

CIA a Castro assassination plot had

tacit authorization of higher authority?

WH

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(McGeorge Bundy)

March 5, 1962

Issues and Questions

Guidelines Outlined for Mongoose.

General Taylor's memorandum pro-

poses Operation MONGOOSE was to be developed on the following

(a) in undertaking the overthrow of the target govern-

mest /Cuba the U.S. will make maximum use of indigenous resources,

internal and external, but recognizes that final success will re-

March 5, 1962

Establishes Bundy was familiar with

Mongoose guidelines.

for Mongoose for presentation to higher authority for information.

Source: Minutes of Special Group (A) March 5, 1962, 00004. (See Lausdale, Tab 21).

March 16, 1962

President Receives Progress Briefing. "In the presence of the

Special Group (Augmented) the President was given a progress report

on Operation MONGOOSE. The guidelines dated 14 March 1962 were cir-

culated and were used as the basis of the discussion. After a pro-

longed consideration of the visibility, noise level and risks entailed,

General Lansdale and the Special Group (Augmented) were given tacit

authorization to proceed in accordance with the guidelines." The memo

is footnoted with the

following item dated March 22,

minute was read to the Special Group (Augmented) today.

inanimous in feeling that no authorization, either tacit or otherwise,

was given by higher authority.

The members of the group asked that the

minute be amended to indicate that the group itself had decided to

proceed in accordance with the guidelines.

March 16, 1962, by General Taylor, 00008. (Tas E).

of plausible denial, allowing

Special Group to deny a CIA action?

1 AN

357

NH

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April 11, 1962

August 7, 1962

August 8, 1962

August 10,1962

Bundy Cautions Against Fixed Target Date. LANSDALE gave progress re-

RUSK and MCNAMARA suggested that the current target date for

bringing covert operations to a climax should be removed.

BUNDY cautioned that this could lead to an uncontrollabel action

internally, which might come to a head at a time which would be

embarrassing or inconvenient for the U.S."

Minutes of

Special Group (A), Meeting, April 11, 1962, 00015-17. (Tax F).

Harvey submits Plan. In response to requests from the Special Group

(Source: Unsigned memo of August 7, 1962 from William K. Harvey) (Tob 6).

Lansdale Transmits Plan to SG (A).

Citing the 'major difference

from Phase I of Operation Mongoose" as "removing the restrictions

in the 14 March policy guidelines which keep our actions 'short of

those reasonably calculated to inspire a revolt within the target

been eat stales the she eque aper contra stone is

Defense, CIA, and USIA) to the SG(A).

Unsigned memo of August 8, 1962 from Gen.

Lansdale to SG(A) regarding stepped-up Course B). (See Lausdale, Tat 38).

Question of Assassination of Fidel Castro raised at SG(A) Meeting•

At anch in of the cia Come asenet an alternate i a tcalioal...

the "CIA variant") to the stepped-up Course B described by General

Lansdale," "/E/he question of assassination particularly of Fidel

Castro, was brought up by Secretary McNamara.... It was the obvious con-

sensus at that meeting, in answer to a comment by Mr. Ed Murrow, that

this isre suk care i cho has bet made ments at of s meeting en this

point, and the Special Group (Augmented) is not expecting any written

comments or study on this point.

(Sources: Memorandim of August 14,

1962, for Deputy Director (Plans) from William K. Harvey, Chief, Task

Force W, subject: Operation Mongoose; Minutes of Meeting of Special

Group (Augmented) on Operation Mongoose, 10 August 1962, prepared by

Thomas A. Parrott). (See Lausdele, Tah B, Lausdale Toh F).

171

Issues and Questions

Does advantage of having action

controlled counsel for consideration

of assassination rather than sabotage?

Why did Special Group (Augmented)

request a stepped-up plan? Note Harvey

involvement.

(In his affidavit of April 25, 1975, pre-

pared for the Rockefeller Commission,

McGeorge Bundy states: "I don't have any

recollection of where or how I heard about

the poisoning possibility....Now, as to

meetings where such things might have

beco distis of the and it is i rate shed

recollection -- I would not have known

about it a month ago -- is the one

which we discussed yesterday on August 10,

1962 and I do NOT have any recollection

of what specifically was

said in that

meeting.")

Page

231

NH

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Aug. 12, 1962

Aug. 14,1962

- 0 -

Lansdale's memo is amended, Four words, "Including liquidation of

leaders," are excised.

General Lansdale distributes to Harvey (CIA); Hurwitch (State),

Harris (Defense); and Wilson (USIA) a memorandum subject Alternate

Course B.

The original memorandum contains the following language:

"Papers required from each of you for me Tuesday meeting:

'Mr. Harvey Intelligence, Political (splitting the regime,

including liquidation of leaders), Economic (sabotage, limited

deception), and Paramilitary.

Also, any suggestions for inclusion

in other sections of the paper."

When Harvey receives his copy, he calls Lansdale's office, points

out how inadvisable the subsequently deleted language is,

the memorandum is thereupon recalled and the complained-of

language deleted by General Lansdale.

(Source: Lansdale's Memo-

candum of August 13, 1962, to Harvey, Hurwitch, Harris and Wilson,

subject: Alternate Course B; Harvey's memorandum of August 14.

1962, supra. (See Lausdale, Tot D, Lausdale Tah F).

Harvey memorializes Discussion of Assassination of Castro.

Harvey writes for Helms, then Deputy

Director of Plans, a memoran-

dum "for your information." The memorandum records how the topic

of assassinations "particularly of Fidel Castro," arose and how

Harvey thereafter vigorously and quickly objected to Lansdale's

having circulated reference to it in his memo of the preceding

day, August 13, 1962. (See Lausdale, Tob F)

Paragraph 3 reads:

"The question of assassination, particularly of Fidel Castro,

was brought up by Secretary McNamara at the meeting of the

Special Group (Augmented) in Secretary Rusk's office on 10

August. It was the obvious consensus at that meeting, in

answer to a comment by Mr. Ed Murrow, that this is not a sub-

ject which has been made a matter of official, record.

careful notes on the comments at this meeting

this point,

and the Special Group (Augmented) is not expecting any written

comments or study on this point.

(Sources: Lansdale's memo of Aug. 13, supra; Harvey's memo, Aug 14, supra)

Issues and Questions

Does Bundy recall this discussion? He

has said (at his interview with Commit-

tee staff on July 8, 1975) that he has

no recollection, refreshed, revived, or

independent of any such discussion by

McNamara.

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Aug. 23, 1962

Aug. 27, 1962

Oct. 17, 1962

Issues and Questions

What prompted this NSAY? Did NSAM 181

result from the August 10 meeting?

Bundy writes National Security Action Memorandum #181 (NSAM #181) •

Bundy distributes a memorandum advising that the President

has directed the following action be undertaken:

The line of activity projected for Operation MONGOOSE

Plan B plus should be developed with all possible speed. (Action:

General Taylor)

A study should be made of the advantages and disadvan-

tages of action to liberate Cuba by blockade or invasion or other

action beyond MONGOOSE B plus, in the context of an aggravated Berlin

crisis. (Action: Department of State, in consultation with

Department of Defense)."

(Source: NSAM, No. 181, from Mcfeorge '

Bundy, August 23, 1962) (See Lausdole, Toh 41)

CIA Reports to Bundy on Progress in Complying with NSAY #181.

Marshall S. Carter, Acting DCI, responds to NSAM #181 and informs

Mr. Bundy that 'Mr. William K. Harvey, or in his absence, Mr. Bruce

Cheever" will be responsible for the line of activity projected

for Operation Mongoose (and Plan B plus) as noted in NSAM #181.

(Source: Memo of August 27, 1962 from Lt. Gen. Marshall S. Carter,

Acting Director, DCI, to McGeorge Bundy, Subject: CIA Action in

Response to National Security Action Memorandum No. 181) (Tob H).

Bundy discusses with the President, Gen. Carter's memo for the

Special Group Augmented of Dctober 16, 1962.

After discussion with President Kennedy,

selected aspects of

Gen. Carter's memo, subject, Operation MONGOOSE sabotage proposals,

directed to the Special Group (Augmented) on Oct. 16, 1962, are approved.

(Sources: Memo of October 16, 1962, from Marshall Carter, Acting DCI

to Special Group (Augmented),

subject Operation MONGOOSE/Sabotage Proposals;

Memorandum of October 17, 1962 from Thomas A. Parrott for the Special

Group (Augmented) subject: Memorandum for the Special Group (Augmented)

from Gen. Carter, dated 16 October 1962) • (Tal II, Tabd)

Note Harvey responsibility.

Were other unwritten or unrecorded

proposals discussed by Bundy to the

President?

INH

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Armaalas cheeseca

(McGeorge Bundy)

- 8 -

January 4, 1963

January 22,1963

3,

1963

Bundy Memo to President on New Cuban Policy. Bundy reports

Instructed by JFK, he has met with an interagency

group to work out new arrangement for handling "Cuban policy

and action" in 1963. Time is ripe for this because the Bay

of Pigs prisoners are out and Mongoose is at a dead end.

Bundy proposes a Coordinator of Cuban Affairs in the State

Department to replace the Mongoose office.

On policy, Bundy

lIsts problem areas (economic pressure, refugees, communicat-

ing with dissident members of Castro regime,

"possibly in-

cluding even Fidel himself," and a reduction of CIA's role)

which require decision. (Source:

Memo, January 4, 1963,

Bundy to JFK; JFK Library file) Tob K).

JFK Remarks to NSC.

At NSC meeting, JFK points out "We must

always be in a position to threaten Cuba

as a possible riposte

to Russia pressure against us in Berlin."

(Source: Memo-

randum, no author or date, titled Remarks of President

Kennedy to NSC Meeting January 22, 1963; JFK Library file.) (TobL).

JFK Meeting on Cuban Covert Action. On April 3, 1963, the

President met with a number of advisers for a "meeting on

"The President said he does not object to /exile/

raids if they really strike worthwhile targets rather than

the "froth" which their acts to date have represented.

• President was told by Mr.

Bundy that sabotage operations are

not now underway because "the special group had decided...

that such activity is not worth the effort expended on it..."

In connection with sabotage operations, Mr. Fitzgerald "made

the point that recent exfiltrees have said that there is now

no organized resistence inside Cuba."

Robert Kennedy "asked whether it might not be useful to con-

sider commando-type raids by groups of from 100 to 500 men.

Mr. Fitzgerald pointed out that if such groups could be landed

It would probably be impossible for them to survive for any

length of time....The Attorney General urged, in any case,

that CIA survey all possibilities for aggressive action in

Cuba over the next six months, assuming that the Agency could

be given a free rein to proceed."

Issues and Questions

Base line for 1963 context,

note Rundy proposes talks

with Castro.

Role of Cuba in larger

context.

Does "All possibilities"

include assassination?

18

INT

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(ILUEUIgE DuILY)

April 11, 1963:

April II,

1963

The President summed up the meeting on Cuba by "directing the

following:

(a) The Intelligence estimate on Castro's probable

future strength should be completed as soon as possible.

(b) CIA should examine exactly what might be accomplished in

the field of sabotage during the next six months.

meeting should be held next week to review the proposed

sabotage program."

Source:

"Meeting on Cuba," (02842-43). (Talm).

President to Consider "Violent Solutions." Gordon Chase

writes memorandum to Bundy proposing

enticing Castro over

to U. S. side.

Chase states:

"I understand that, in the

near future, the President will be looking at some more

violent solutions to the Cuban problem."

to Bundy, April 11, 1963, 4-130 (ob Library rce: emorandum

Special Group Requests Destruction of Documents for Security

Reasons.

On April 11, 1963, the Special Group (Bundy present)

requested that comments by the Coordinator of Cuban affairs

dated April 1l on three papers being considered at today's

meeting be withdrawn and destroyed for security reasons.

The meeting discussed the "entire question of sabotage" and

thus the papers referred to may have dealt with sabotage

operations.

The Special Group engaged in "a lengthy discussion of the

entire question of sabotage...the group recognized that a

searching examination must be undertaken...to determine whether

we wished to change the present policy...Mr. McCone expressed

great skepticism about the

desirability of proceeding with

sabotage operations...until

an overall policy is made clear

and steps

to be taken to assure the removal of Soviet troops

and on the problem of Castro."

It was decided that on April 19 a presentation should be

made to higher authority and a

paper would be

prepared out-

Iining "a proposed broad program for sabotage"

examples of

specific operations, the scale of activity and how such

activity would fit into overall policy.

of Special Group Meeting, April 11, 1963 (02846-47) Tel 0),

Issues and Questions

What is meant by "more

violent solutions!?

Why were documents destroyer

Note unclear policy towards

Cuba.

INT

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April 23, 1963

Issues and Questions

Bundy Expresses Doubts Re Sabotage. On April 18, 1963, the

Special Group discussed papers from the Coordinator of Cuban

Affairs

dated April 16, 17, and 18.

The only reference to the

subject

matters of these papers was:

"Mr. Fitzgerald pointed

out that

the paper of April 17, on a "Maximum Covert Action

Program"'

consists basically of sabotage and of harassment,

plus support to Cuban exile groups and Individuals who may be

responsive to our advice but certainly not to our command.

"Mr. Bundy and Mr. McCone expressed some doubts as to whether

we are in a position to decide major problems of this type until

we have a clearer picture of what the overall policy toward

Cuba is likely to be for the next six months to a year and a

half."...Mr. Bundy was not sure whether "it would be possible

to embark on the activities proposed in the Coordinator's

papers,

without a drastic change in U. S. policy."

Source:

Special

group minutes dated April 18, 1963 (02848-49). (T68 P).

Chase Memorandum to Bundy Re "Short and Sweet" Action on Castro.

Prior to Standing Group meeting on April 23, Chase at Bundy's

request, comments on papers for meeting: "Assuming we are not

out for Castro's scalp for the sake of his scalp, is there a

Castro we can live with happily? If not, what is the best way

to get rid of hin- a tough, nasty approach, a sweet and sneaky

approach, or a combination of both...Iblockade would be too long,

thus/

"Generally speaking, any nasty actions we contemplate

should be of the "short and sweet" variety."

Source:

Chase

memorandum to Bundy, April 23, 1963, JFK Library file, 4-157. (ToRR)

RFK Proposes Study of U. S. Measures for Contingency of Castro

Death.

Discussion of Bundy paper titled "A Sketch of the Cuba

Alternatives," McNamara states the "elimination of the Castro

regime was

a requirement"

and a U. S. program should arm to

create

dissidence in Cuba"

to allow the U. S. to use force in

support of

anti-Castro forces...

Does such "short and sweet

action"

refer to assassi-

nation?

Does McNamara's hard view

reflect JFK policy?

NH

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## Page 237

Bardy

Interview - Dinne

Adams Hakel

Hay

711°

@nited States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO

STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH

RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 84TH CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

Brother is prudential wan,

Bolty is the parsconate".

Afk sever gave me ret

order-

order anyone. do IF'S

order

If Bobly did wout C dead

he would 'he left no doubt

in the mind of the listere

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## Page 238

7DB

July 16, 1975

Mr. McGeorge Bundy •

The Ford Foundateon

320 East 43rd Street

New York, New York 10017

Dear Mr. Bundy:

We greatly appreciate the time you have devoted to

cooperating with the Committee's inquiry.

The Chairman

has asked me to levy one additional request upon you.

To complete the record on the events under considera-

tion in your testimony of July 1l before the Committee,

would you please prepare a notarized, sworn affidavit

answering the following questions:

1. What recollections do you have concerning

the subjects discussed at your

meeting

with Walt Rostow and Richard Bissell at

the Hay-Adams Hotel on January 27, 1961?

2. Do you recall or have a record of any

other meetings, whether official or

informal, between yourself and Richard

Bissell

between November 1, 1960 and

March 1, 1961? Was there any discussion

between yourself and Richard Bissell upor

any of these occasions or in phone con-

versations during the same period that

was related in any way to the establishment

of a CIA project which included the capability

to assassinate foreign leaders?

What was the

content of any such discussions?

Thanks very much for your help in this matter.

Sincerely,

Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr.

Chief Counsel

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## Page 239

MEMORANDUM

TO

: Files

FROM : Bob Kelley

DATE

: July 8, 1975

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW WITH McGEORGE BUNDY

SUMMARY

On July 8, 1975, Mr. Bundy was Interviewed at his office at the

Ford Foundation in New York by Frederick Baron, Bob Kelley, and John

Bayly of the Select Committee staff. The interview began at approxi-

mately 9:00 a.m. and continued virtually without interruption until

1:30 p.m. The interview was conducted in three parts:

1. A review by Mr. Bundy of the principal documents in the attached

chronology.

-

2. MI. Bundy was told of the chronology of events relating to the

Executive action and ZRIFFLE program, and was asked whether he

had any knowledge or recollection of these matters.

3.

Mr. Bundy reviewed documents relating to the Trujillo matter, and

was asked whether he had any knowledge of recollection of that mat-

ter.

In summary, Mr. Bundy said: (1) He did not recall any of the docu-

ments listed on the attached chronology relating to Castro, and it was

his opinion, based on a reading of those documents at the interview,

that they did not reflect any consideration by the White House of Cabinet

level people in the Kennedy administration of a Castro assassination plan.

i.... ..

3B83S19855

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Mr. Bundy stated further that those documents relating to the contin-

gency in the event of Castro's death

and

similar language did not re

late to any Castro assassination plan, but rather to studies of what

might be the situation in Cuba should Castro die or leave office un-

related to any U. S. effort; (2) With respect to the ZRIFFLE program,

Bundy stated that he was 'astonished" that this could have been going

on without the approval by the Special Group, that he knew of no au-

thorization for such program, and that he never knew of a case where

the Special Group process for authorizing covert actions was by-passed

by Allen Dulles or Bissell to reach the President through another route.

Mr. Bundy did state that he had a recollection of someone (he does not

know whom) informing him of the "Executive action" capability, but 1t

was his understanding that this was only a study of possible assassina-

tion methods, and was not targeted against any particular individual

or country.

Set out below is a summary of Mr. Bundy's comments on the three

areas outlined above:

REVIEW OF DOCUMENTS RE CASTRO ON ATTACHED CHRONOLOGY

NSAM 100 and related documents re "removal of Castro." Bundy had

no recollection at all of NSAM 100 and did not know what the words "In-

dicated contingency in Cuba" Involved." When shown the Parrott memorandum

for the record, dated October 5, 1961, which states that Woodward was

asked by Parrott to prepare a contingency plan on General Tayler's in-

structions "against the contingency that Castro would in some way of

other be removed from the Cuban scene" and that General Tayler preferred

that "the President's interest in this matter" not be told to Mr. Woodward,

-INSAM 100 Clearly reflects JFK's desires because Bundy would never write a

NSAM without his approval, Bundy said.

However, Bundy emphasized that JFK

never asked him to

look into or develop a

plan for the assassination

of Castro.

160S3

4023.123

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Mr. Bundy still did not recall NSAM 100 or its subject. Similarly,

when shown the Special Group meeting minutes of October 6, 1961 where

MI. Parrott told the Group that there was in preparation "a contingency

plan in connection with the possible removal of Castro from the Cuban

scene," Mr. Bundy's recollection was

also not refreshed. Bundy

stated

that his reading of these documents today makes him think that what was

desired was only a plan of what might happen in a post-Castro Cuba, and

did not relate to any attempt by the United States to cause Castro's re-

moval.

Bundy said he does not recall or know of any plan that Woodward

or any other agency might have developed as a result of NSAM 100. Bundy

suggested that General Taylor would be the best source for information

as to why the Presidential interest in this plan should have been con-

cealed from Mr. Woodward. Later in the Interview, after reviewing for

Mr. Bundy the chronology relating to the ZRIFFLE program, and pointing

out that it was on November 15, 1961 that Bissell is alleged to have

instructed Harvey to arrange the assassination of Castro - some forty

days after NSAM 100 was issued - Bundy stated there was no relationship

between NSAM 100 and the Bissell-Harvey orders of November 15.

•President's memo, November 30, 1961, launching Mongoose. Bundy

had no recollection of this memo, although reading it today he thinks

he may have written it. Bundy noted that General Tayler ran the Special

Group 54/12 meetings from June 1961 through October 1962, and Bundy

merely attended to represent the Presidential interest.

Guidelines for Operation Mongoose and Special Group approval,

March 5, 1962. Bundy noted that the Mongoose guidelines "recognized

that final success will require decisive

U. S. military intervention."

ine.

120 72 6 02406 02270333673326 60005224279 5226

NH 50955 DocId: 32423626

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- 4-

It was suggested to Mr. Bundy that if an invasion was recognized as a

requirement, yet was ruled out for political or diplomatic reasons,

and it was also recognized that sabotage could not accomplish the over-

throw of the Cuban regime, policy makers might have taken up considera-

tion of a Castro assassination. Bundy said that today one could assume

that there were "two forks", an invasion by U. S. forces, or a Castro

assassination, but Bundy emphasized that the thinking in the JFK admin-

istration was focussed toward an invasion by U. S. forces. At other

points in the interview, Bundy emphasized that JFK policy makers never

considered the possibility of assassinating Castro. In positing the

"two forks," Bundy did not appear to mean that these two possibilities

were considered during the JFK years, but only that one might conceive

of the situation today in those terms.

JFK briefing on Mongoose March 16, 1962. Bundy explained, although

he had no recollection of this document, that this was the type of ef-

fort made to create plausible deniability." Thus, though the body of

the document states that the Special Group augmented was given "tacit

authorization to proceed.' The footnote corrects that and states no

authorization was given by higher authority. Bundy said this reflected

an effort to protect the President from disclosure of covert actions

and was

a usual practice. Bundy said that generally he would speak on

a one-to-one basis with President Kennedy and get a 'clear signal" from

him on a covert action proposal. The understanding

was that the paper

record would not reflect this signal. The President would give a clear

signal to the members of the Special Group

in informal conferences but

rarely at a formal group meeting.

Bundy said we wanted the President

to hear what we were doing with respect to covert actions, and then we'

continue doing it; but his approval would not be recorded.

20/003

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In response to a question, Bundy

said that there was not another

level of plausible deniability between

the Special Group and the CIA.

In other words, Bundy was asked whether with respect to assassinations,

a paper record might be created that showed

no approval by the Special

Group even though they may have given oral authorization for an assassina-

tion, so that in later years, the chain of command would not rise above

the CIA. Bundy said that there was no such lower level of deniability,

"We would be explicit with the CIA either way on covert action approvals,

and such approvals would be reflected in the paper record."

August-October 1962; August 10, 1962, Meeting

Mr. Bundy was shown selected documents pertaining to meet-

ings of the Special Group Augmented and Operation Mongoose. All were

taken from the latter half of 1962 and principally from the months of

August, September and October. Although Mr. Bundy was able to identify

most of the documents as either his own or as those he received from others

he was unable to state that any of them revived his recollection of

any discussion or proposal concerning assassinations. More directly,

Mr. Bundy stated that he had no recollection, revived, refreshed, or

independent, of any talk, proposal or discussion concerning assassina-

tions during any Special Group Augmented meeting he attended during

the months of August, September and October. Moreover, he has no recol-

lection of hearing any reference to assassination made by any one, either

seriously or jokingly, during that or any other period Mr. Bundy con-

tested that he was at a meeting on October 16, 1962, chaired by the

Attorney General at which Operation Mongoose proposals were discussed.

Review of pertinent documentation indicates that there were two meet-

ings regarding Operation Mongoose on October 16, 1962. Mr. Bundy was

apparently in attendance at the first, held in the morning; he was

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evidently not in attendance at the second, held in the afternoon in

the Attorney General's office for operational representatives. Mr.

Helms' memo for files evidently records proceedings at the second meet-

ing.)

1963 Documents re Contingency of Castro'S Death

Bundy explained that the January 4, 1963, memo from Bundy to the

President, although he did not have a clear recollection of writing this

memo, reflected .

the fact that Mongoose was not producing. Bundy

said "RFK can huff and puff all he wanted to but Castro's house would

not come down." Bundy pointed out that the whole Cuban environment had

been transformed after the missile crisis. Kennedy was in a much stronger

political position but there were still Republican critics who wanted

continued strong action against Castro. The President recognized that

he could not satisfy these critics completely but nevertheless, felt im-

pelled to take some measures against Castro to show that he was aware of

the problem and trying to do something about it. Bundy showed us an

article from the New York Times by James Reston reflecting the President's

opinions to this affect.

Gordon Chase Memo to Bundy re'Violent Solutions"

Bundy said that Chase was his personal assistant with the special

responsibility for Cuban affairs. (Chase left the White House for the

Lindsey administration in New York City and is now at the Harvard Medical

School.) Chase did not have the type of position or responsibility on

Bundy's staff that would involve him in covert action approvals or in-

volvement in anything as serious as assassination discussion. Thus,

int

Chase's references to a "short and sweet" approach have to do with actions

HW 50955 DocId:32423626 Page 244

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-7-

like sabotage, harassment or other covert actions far short of assassi-

nation.

Studies on Contingency of Castro's Death

The documents in the period April - September 1963 which discuss con-

tingencies after the death of Castro were simply the type of study often

commissioned on developments that might ensue after a foreign leader passes

away. They were not prepared in connection with any consideration or dis-

cussion of a Castro assassination. For example the paper by Sherman Kent

was "straight estimating" by CIA office of National Estimates. (It should

be noted that a Select Committee Staff member who was a very senior ONE

Officer believes that the Sherman Kent Paper was by no means a normal

estimate. His experience tells him that this was a very closely held paper

which would have been prepared by Kent personally at the request of the DCI

and not circulated within the ONE board for comments.). In response to a

question, Bundy could not recall why there was this seeming interest in

the spring and summer of 1963 in the contingency of Castro's death.

Bundy said he tried to recall now whether there were reports of a decline

in Castro's health or some other event that might have prompted these

studies.

He could not do so.

Documents on Non-Governmental Assassination Plot

Bundy commented on the Helms' memo of June 10, 1964: "a disingeneous

memorandum given their earlier connection with the Cosa Nostra". However,

Bundy said he had no affirmative recollection of these documents at all.

He does not deny that he saw them but he simply has no recollection re-

freshed or otherwise. Bundy does not recall what RFK's reaction was when"

he was asked to hav e the Justice Department look into the plot as a matter

....:

33332

22222320

NH 50955 DocId: 32423626

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- 8-

of law enforcement, or any other out come with respect to the informa-

tion received by the Special Group.

After reviewing these documents referring to assassinations, Bundy

was asked if there might have been any connection between these documents

and the developments they reflect and the October 5, 1961, NASM which asked

for an indicated contingency, which, from subsequent documents, also seem

to deal with "a removal of Castro from the Cuban scene one way or another"'.

first

As he had done when documents were reviewed, Bundy again stated that JFK

" never

asked me to l00k into an assassination of Castro." Nor was his re-

collection refreshed as to the 1961 documents--he simply does not recall

issuing NASM 100 or any discussion at that time with JFK or anyone else

with respect to these documents.

Executive Action

Bundy recalls that he arrived in Washington around January 9 or 10.

He was an old friend of Bissell. Bissell had been his teacher in college

and he had worked with Bissell in the Marshall Plan and knew him at MIT

as well. His calendar book reflects the fact that he had lunch on January

27 at the Hay Adams with Bissell and Rostow. He does not recollect this

luncheon nor any discussion with Bissell about executive action capability.

He does recall that someone informed him that there was such a capability

but that no individual was targeted and no action would be taken without

authorization. He thought it was unlikely that his lunch with Bissell re-

lated to executive action, but he has no recollection at all of that lunch.

He said Bissell and he are frank and candid with each other when they speak

min.

and there is no reason to think that Bissell interpreted any conversation

with Bundy as authorization to proceed with a Castro assassination plot.

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"No one but the President himself had authority to give such an order

in a valid way."

Bundy has no recollection of AMLASH. He does recall the reference

to "poison" but as something that would be on a larger scale than an in-

dividual assassination.

For example, if such poison would be used it

would affect an entire restaurant and not be administered to a single

individual. Bundy had heared of the ball point syringe but does not re-

call it in the context of Cuba. Nor does he recall any reference to high

powered rifles.

Lansdale-RFK-JFK Relationship

Lansdale did have a direct personal relationship with RFK, but not to

JFK. Bundy pointed out, however, that there is a great difference between

"RFK beating up on people and saying 'go get poison'." It was in RFK's

character to press the bureacracy hard and want to "act agressively" against

enemies, but out of character to discuss poison or assassination. Any in-

structions that Bissell gave Harvey was a far cry from the "gung ho" sugges-

tions that Bobby usually made.

Mongoose and Assassinations. Bundy said he cannot say there was no

connection between the Mongoose three-man teams and any three-man teams

for assassinations.

He does know that there was no "witting authorization"

of three-man assassination teams. He strongly disagrees with any suggestion

(by Helms) that the atmosphere of the Special Group Augmented made it accepta-

ble to plot Castro's assassination.

Special Group Approval and Assassination Plots. Bundy has no idea how

the reported mafia-CIA plot could have gone on without approval by the

Special Group. He is "astonished" if it did so. He said he never knew of

3:41

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a case where the Special Group approval process was bypassed like men

like Allan Dulles or Bissell or where they took a back route to the

President around the Special Group.

He said he would have to exclude

the period before the inauguration on January 20, 1961, because he was

not operating in the Special Group at that time.

Trujillo

Bundy had little to do with Dominican affairs.

He did recall of

being told of the January 12, 1961, decision to support Dominican dissi-

dents and thought this was "o.k. if the dissidents succeed." He did not

believe that support amounted to support for an assassination. Goodwin

and Ralph Dungan would know about the Dominican Republic and Trujillo.

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Memorandum

To: FAO Schwarz,

From: Robert Kelley

Smothers

-.........

SHORT SUMMARY -- CUBA

MCGEORGE BUNDY

McGeorge Bundy was Special Assistant for National Security.

Affairs to President Kennedy throughout the Kennedy Administration.

Bundy chaired the Special Group until Maxwell Taylor took over that

function in mid-1901, and Bundy resumed chairmanship of the Special

Group after Taylor became Chairman of the Joint Chiefs in late 1962.

Bundy and W. W. Rostow met Richard Bissell for lunch on

January 27, 1961, although Bundy recalls no discussion of assassi-

nation or Executive Action capability at that meeting. Bundy

attended the August 10, 1962 Mongoose meeting where a Castro assassi-

nation was reportedly suggested.

In October 1961, Bundy issued a National Security Action

Memorandum referring to an "indicated contingency" which appears

from other documents to have called for a plan in the event of

Castro's removal. And in the Spring and Summer of 1963 Bundy and

the Special Group considered papers dealing with the contingency of

Castro's death.

Mr. Bundy's examination should encompass the following

questions and areas:

A.

In meeting with Richard Bissell in January 1961 was an

Executive Action capability or a

Castro assassination plan dis-

cussed?

DENN

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!

B. Was NSAM 100 of October 5, 1961 related to a Castro

assassination plot or capability?

C. Was the emphasis placed by President Kennedy or

Robert Kennedy on the Mongoose. Program such that the CIA may

have assumed authorization, tacit or otherwise, for a Castro

assassination.

D. What accounts

for the seeming pattern of interest in

the Spring and Summer of 1963 in the contingency of Castro's

death?

E. What were the Command and Control procedures for

authorization of covert actions in the Kennedy Administration?

F.

Was an assassination of Castro ever considered by the

Kennedy Administration in the efforts to deal with the problem

of Cuba?

G.

If an

assassination was not considered or authorized,

what explanation is there for the CIA Castro assassination

efforts during the Kennedy Administration?

.....

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INDEX TO EXHIBITS RELATING

TO TESTIMONY OF MCGEORGE BUNDY

TAB A

2/14/61

TAB B

10/5/61

10/6/61

11/30/61

1/19/62

3/5/62

3/5/62

TAB C

TAB D

3/16/62

3/13/62

TAB E

TAB F

TAB G

3/16/62

4/11/62

8/7/62

Minutes, Special Group (Augmented)

Meeting

NSAM No. 100

Minutes, Special Group (Augmented)

Meeting

Memorandum by_ JFK Lf. Tab

4,

Lansdale Book/

Memorandum from Mc Manus to

McCone

[cf. Tab 10, Lansdale

Book/

Minutes,

Special Group (Augmented,

Icf. Tab

41, Lansdale Book?

Memorandum by General Taylor

[cf. Tab 22, Lansdale Book?

Memorandum by General Taylor

Minutes, Special Group (Augmented)

Meeting

Memorandum by General Taylor

Minutes, Special Group (Augmented)

Unsigned memorandum by William K.

Harvey

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8/8/62

8/10/62

8/13/62

8/14/62

8/23/62

TAB H

8/27/62

TAB I

TAB J

TAB K

TAB L

TAB M

10/16/62

10/17/62

1/4/63

1/22/63

4/3/63

TAB N

TAB 0

4/11/63

4/11/63

Unsigned memorandum from General

Lansdale

Minutes, Special Group (Augmented)

Meeting

Memorandum from General Lansdale

[see Tab D, Lansdale Book

Memorandum from Harvey to DCI

Helms /see Tab F, Lansdale Book!

NSAM No. 181 from Bundy [see

Tab 41, Lansdale Book.

Memorandum from Lt. Gen. Carter

to Bundy

Memorandum from Carter

Memorandum from Parrott

Memorandum from Bundy to JFK

Remarks of JFK to NSC Meeting

Memorandum for the Record, titled

"Meeting on Cuba"

Minutes, Special Group Meeting

Memorandum to Bundy from Gordon

Chase

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TAB P

TAB Q

4/18/63

4/22/63

TAB R

TAB S

4/23/63

4/29/63

TAB T

5/2/63

TAB U

5/13/63

TAB V

5/28/63

TAB W

TAB X

6/6/63

6/19/63

2-A

2-B

2-C

7/25/63

9/20/63

9/23/63

2-D

10/29/63

Minutes, Special Group Meeting

Summary Record of NSC Standing

Group Meeting No. 2/63 by

Bromley Smith

Memorandum from Chase to Bundy

Memorandum by Bundy ré 4/30/63

Standing Group Meeting

Memorandum from Bundy to Members

of Standing Group

Draft Memorandum from CIA Office.

of National Estimates

Memorandum from Bundy to Standing

Group Members

Minutes, Special Group Meeting

Memorandum from Parrott to Special

Group re "Sabotage Program Cuba"

Memorandum from Denney to Crimmins

Memorandum from Chase to Bundy

Memorandum from Bundy to Special

Group

Memorandum from Bundy to JFK

229659

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Z-E

2 - F

2 - G

2- I

10/29/63

10/30/63

6/10/64

6/22/64

2-J

6/22/64

2 - K

7/31/64

2-L

8/19/64

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Check-list for meeting by Bundy

Cable, Bundy to Lodge

Memorandum from Helms to McCone

Memorandum from Jessup re pre-

liminary meeting with Attorney

General 6/19/64

Memorandum for the Record, re

Minutes of the 303 Committee

Meeting, 6/18/64

Memorandum for the record re

Minutes of 303 Committee

Meeting, 7/30/64

Memorandum from McCone to Bundy

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TO :

FROM:

Fritz Sc

arz

Frederic.

Baron

PE: July 10, 1975

McGEORGE BUNDY

Testimony of Richard Bissell on EXECUTIVE ACTION

1. TABS (PP. 48-54 - - 6/9/75)

Bissell testified that when he asked HARVEY to

create the EXECUTIVE ACTION CAPABILITY it "could

have been BUNDY" (49). or ROSTOW (51) who asked him

to do this.

Bissell does not recall

any

specific

conversation (51). Bissell and Rostow are "the

names of the two people from whom it lthe request

for

such

a capability/ is most likely to come from."

(53) .

2. TAB T (PP. 58-59 - - 6/9/75)

Bissell said he assumes that BUNDY and ROSTOW would

have been the bureaucratic channel for such a request

(58) •

3. TAB U (PP. 80-83 -- 6/9/75)

Bissell testified that the "urgings" for an EXECUTIVE

ACTION CAPABILITY could have come at the weekly

luncheon meetings with BUNDY, ROSTOW, and represen-

tatives

from STATE, CIA, and

DEFENSE (81-82) •

Bissell testified that as he normally operated, he

would

have replied to ROSTOW in such cases (82).

"When I reported

to him /ROSTOW/ it would have gone

to BUNDY as well." (82).

4. TAB V (PP. 16-19 - - 6/11/75)

IG REPORT, 1967: "On November 15, 1961, HARVEY nas

a note that on

that date he discussed with Bissell

the application of these eR/kifLe programs to cuba.

HARVEY says that Bissell instructed him to take over

EDWARDS I contact with the criminal syndicate, ano

thereafter to run the operation against CASTRO."

Bissell testified that he did not recall directing

the rea diva is of the project buts responsibility

for Project

RIFLE, instruct him to take over the contact."

(19). Bissell agreed that the purpose of the contact

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127.

had been to assassinate CASTRO and said that "it is

a fair inference that there would have been no

reason

to maintain it /the contact/ unless there was some

possibility of reactivating that operation."

(19) •

5. TAB W (PP. 42-53 - - 6/11/75)

Bissell testified: "There is little doubt in my mind

that Project RIFLE was discussed with ROSTOW and

possibly BUNDY." (46).

Bissell said he discussed

"all aspects of the creation of the

CASTRO, TRUJILLO, and LUMUMBA with ROSTOW as examples

of assassination

targets. (50) .

asked a final time, by Senator Baker, whether he

recalled discussing

assassination capability with

ROSTOW and BUNDY,

Bissell replied:

"I am not sure

about BUNDY, but

I think ROSTOW, yes, sir."

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to estab EXEC ALTYo

January 20,1961-

April 17, 1961

May 16, 1961

July 21, 1961

August: 3, 1961

October, 5, 1961

1. Cuba Policy from Bay of 2igs un to Mongoose Oragti

Bum Appointment. Kennedy Aiministration takes office.

McGeorge Bundy appointed Assistant to-the President for Nar

tonal security Affairs.

Bay«OfuRags, Cuban exiles land at Bay of Pigs.

New U. S. Policy on Cuba. President Kennedy approved ac-

tions-taken by the NSC at a May 5,

1961 meeting to establish

U.S. policy toward Cuba. The NSC "agreed that Use policy.

NS

weaknesses

¡wir Castro regime, diplomatic efforts to isolate Castro, im-

prove relations with Cuban exiles, etc.) are not likely to

achieve this end, the matter should be

reviewed at intervals

with a view to further action." Source:

Record of Actions

by NSC on May 5, 1961.

Covert Action Progran Proposed by CiA, At a Special Group

meeting (Bundy not present), Mr. julies presents a paper'on

the

covert action program for Cuba.

The program's objective

is "to provide support to a U. S. program to deveiop opposi-

tion to Castro and to help bring about a regime acceptable

to the U.S.

Source: Minutes of Special Group meeting,

July

21, 1900.

Special Group Approves Cuban Covert Action Program. The

Special Group approved for consideration by higher authority

a condensed set of recommendations summing up the proposed

Cuban covert action program with certain reductions in the

pussesar gurespresented by Mi. Bisseid.

Source: Minutes

of Special Group meeting, August 3, 1960.

INSAM 100.

Bundy issues National Security Action Memorandum

No. 100 to the Secretary of State, subject: Contingency

Planning for Cuba.

•The memorandum states in full:

Planatn for Cuba memora don gade 1A Sustan Heckon=

tary Easteterwoodvardha-plans.desireditosetheingtcated

contingency nacuba."" There is no explanation of the nature

of the

"indicated contingency." Source:

october 3, 196lea contangency.

NSAM NO. 100,

Bundy Chronoiogy (draft)

RKelley 7/7/75

Late Ten Fal, Fea

JAN 25-6: Harvey

meets. with Gottliel

+ Silver

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ecotober 6, 1961

November 1961

Vi-

November 3, 1961

Plan for Possible Removal of Castro.

The Special Group (Bundy)

not present) was told by Mr. Parrott "that two other exercises

are in progress in connection with Cuba--the preparation of

a contingency plan in connection with thempossible removalr

of Castrosfrom the Cuban Scene and an updating of the overall

plan for covert operations."

Source: Minutes of Special

Group meeting, October 6, 1961.

Conception and Approval of Mongoose

New Appraisal of Cuba Situation Proposed.

Undated, untitled

memorandum states that "this group /perhaps reference to

Special GrougT has been "struck with the general feeling

that there car be oglong term living with castro as a

neighbor. His continued presence within the hemispheric

#comnunity is a dangerously effective component of Communism

and anti-Americanism constitutes a real menace capable of

eventually overthrowing the elected governments in any one

or more of weak Latin American republic.

The memorandum posited "only two ways to view this threat

the Castro Government? "either to hope the time and internal

discontent will eventually end it, or to take active measures

to force its removal."

..."neither alternative is attractive,

but no decision is, in effect, a choice of the first."

memo concluded: "it is recommended that the Cuban situation

be reappraised in the light of all presently known factors

andanewaguidance-be provided forkpolitical..militarymeconomics

andypropaganda actionsagainst Castro

Source: Undated memo-

randum, (00081-82), no author listed.

Lansdale Assessment of Cuba Situation. In a ten-page memo-

randum, Generai Lansdale reviewed: (A) Present and projected

clandestine operations against Cuba; (B) Possible future

courses of action; (C) Possible results."

2.

Now. 15, 1961

2R/RIFLE ferned

against Carto

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3.

November 30, 1961

December

1, 1961

Possible courses of action inciuded: (1) the improvement of

our maritime capability, (2) preparations for air resupply

operations when required, (3) selection or recruitment and

(ra song of es American agents fountarion 0 Supe

Regarding the proposed American agents, the memorandum noted:

"These can be men of Latin recial origin and must, of course,

be bilingual."

to "possible results:" Lansdale concluded:...there's much

less than even chance of achievinz by the means herein discussed

the overthrow of the regime.

Nevertheless there remains a

i Shenkaant posetbility that this caT be COre: THE PRESI

can be assessed only if the operations is continued at least

to the point where a real effort has been made to build and

organize resistence."

Lansdale memorandum, November 3,

1961, 00071-79.

President Kennedy Decisions to Begin Mongoosen

A memorandum

from President Kennedy was sent to Robert Kennedy, Rusk,

MCNamara, McCone, General Tayloï, General Lansdale and Mr.

Goodwin, which summarized "the majoi decisions which have

been made 1n regard to the Cuba Operation." The memo

stated:

"(1) We will use our available assets to go ahead

with the discussed project in order to help Cuba overthrow

the Communist regime.

(2) This progiam will be conducted

under the general guidance of General Lansdale, acting as

Chief of Operations. It will be conducted by him through

the appropriate regular organizations and departments of

the Government."

Source: Memorandum, November 30, 1961,

(0069-70) .

REK Informs Special GrOup of Mongoose. At a Special Group

meeting (Bundy not present), the Attorney General reported

"about a series of meetings which had been held recently

with higher authority.

Out of these had come a decision

that higher priortty Should be given to Cuba.y It was

agreed that General Lansdale should develop a long-range

program which would be reviewed by the Special Group and

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December S, 1961

January 19, 1962

January 25, 1962

4 .

presented for approval to higher authority. At that time,

formal language would be proposed to record the decision to

pursue a new or revised Cuba policy." Source: Special Group

Minutes, December 1, 1961.

At a Special Group meeting (Bundy not present), General

"Lansdate 'presented the outline of & program designed to

overthrow the Castro government.

This program is centered

around the selection and eventual introduction into Cuba of

na qucleus offanti Castro Cubans; once they are in the country

and in a position to operate, then a number of collateral

supporting actions would be undertaken."

The special group

agreed that the "immediate requirement" was to select a

group that could agree on a platform for an eventual new

government. When such a selection has been mace

program will be discussed further with higher authority."

Special Group Minutes, December S, 1961.

Phase One of Mongoose--Intelligence Collection, January-June 1962

REK Urges, Action as REK tells Special Group (A) (Bundy not

present) that solution of Cuban problem carries "thelltop

pErorityan the UnS government=-allelse is secondary--

no time, money, effort or manpower is to be sparec.."

Memorandum, January 19, 1962, from McKanus to

McCone; see also Minutes of Special Group (A) Meeting,

January 19, 1962: REK tells Special Group (A) that Presi-

dent is concerned and "It is not only General Lansdale's

job to put the tasks, but yours to carry out with every

resource at your command."

President Informed of Progress. General Taylor reports to

the President that Lansdale has developed a concept of

operations directed at the overthrow of the Castro govern-

ment by an internal revolt of the Cuban people and has as-

signed 32 Initial tasks to State, Defense, CIA, and USIA."

The President is told that this project involves the danger

of setting of a premature or inadequate revolt which might

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March 5, 1962

March 5,

1962

March 13, 1962

5.

then require U.S. military intervention to prevent a Hungary-

type repression.

The President is told a review of progress

in February would permit an assessment of the overall feasi-

bility of the Cuba project and the SG(A) ready to recommend

to the President whatever policy changes were necessary to

carry It forward.

Memorandum, January 25, 1962,

General Taylor to President Kennedy, 02806.

Guidelines OutlIned for Mongoose. General Taylor's memorandum

proposes Operation MONCOOSE was to be developed on the follow

ing assumptions: (a) in undertaking the overthrow of the

target government /Cuba/ "the U. S. will make maximum use of

indigenous resources, internal and external, but recognizes

¿that final success will require decisive use of U.S. military

Mntervention."

"The Joint Chiefs of Staff will continue the

planning and essential preliminary actions to assure a deci-

sive U. S. capability for intervention."

"General Lansdale

will continue as Chief of Operations, calling directly on

the participating departments and agencies for support and

implementation of agreed tasks. The heads of these depart-

ments and agencies are responsible for performance through.

normal command channels to higher authority." (00216)

eral Lansdale is responsible for coordinating combined planning

and execution, reporting to higher authority through the Special

Source: Memorandum by General Taylor,

March 5, 1962, 00188.

Special Group (A) Considers Taylor Guidelines.

The Special

GrOUP (A), including Mr. Bundy, agreed to examine General

Taylor's guidelines for Mongoose for presentation to higher

autority. for information.

Source: Minutes of Special

Group (A) March 5, 1962, 00004.

Special Group (A) Approves Guidelines.

The Special Group (A)

• approved Mongoose guidelines. Mr. Bundy expressed doubts

about accepting changes proposed by the DCI and DOD/JCS.

Source: Special Group (A) Minutes, March 13, 1952.

00006.

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March 16, 1962

11,

1962

6.

President Receives Progress Briefing.

"In the presence of

the Special Group (Augmented) the President was, given aj

progress reporti on Operation MONGOOSE.

The guidelines

dated 14 March 1962 were circulated and were used as the ba-

sis of the discussion.

After a prolonged consideration of

the visibility, noise level and risks entailed, General

Lansdale and the Special Groups (Augmented) werengiyen tacit

authorization to procect in accordance with the guidelines."

The memo is footnoted with the following item dated March 22,

"This minute was readi: to the Special Group (Augmented)

today. The groupewasaunantmous-infeeling that notauthorie

authority.

beatended to i merate he the soup te he hee tee

to proceed in accordance with the guidelines."

Memorandum, March 1ú, 1962, by General Taylor, 00008.

Bundy Cautions Against Fixed Target Date. LANDSDALE gave

progress report.

McCONE states reconnaissance reveals

no significant increase in military support facilities in

Cuba. McNAMARA suggests need to look for evidence of under-

ground installations. HARVEY reports on the interrogation

of recent exfiltrees.

LEMNITZER outlines Joint Chiefs view

of Cuba as threat to U. S. McCONE suggests that the current

schedule of covert action should be speeded up even though

this would entail increased dangers of attribution to the

U. S. Re RUSK's question as to the adequacy of existing

policy approvals, "GENERAL LANSDALE said it would be useful

to have approval to go further with infiltrated agents than

restricting them to intelligence missions." RUSK said at .

this time he could see no way in which an organized invasion

of Cuba could be justified.

RUSK and MCNAMARA suggested that

the current target date for bringing covert operations to a

climax should be removed. MaBUNDY cautioned,that chis

cou dedicadxtoranguncontrollabletaction.internally, which

Minutes of Special

Group (A), Meeting, April 11, 1902, 00015-17.

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Prepared by John Bayle.

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June 30 - December 31, 1962 is contained in separate chronolgoy

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7.

January 4, 1963

January 22,1963

Apr:

1963

Bundy Memo to President on New Cuban PoLicy. Bundy reports

that, as instructed by JFK, he has met with an interagency

group to work out new arrangement for handling "Cuban policy

and action' in 1963. Time 1s ripe for this because the Bay

of Pigs prisoners are out and Mongoose is at a dead end.

Bundy proposes a Coordinator of Cuban Affairs in the State

Department to replace the Mongoose office.

On policy, Bundy ta

usts.probilemnareasw(economic?pressure,refügees.r.communicat-

ng with dissident members of Castro regime,alpossibly in-

Bundy to JEK; JFK Library file)

JFK Remarks to NSC. At NSC meeting, JEK points out "We must

always be in a position to threaten Cuba as a possible riposte

to Russia pressure against us in Berlin." (Source: Memo-

randum, no author or date, titled Remarks of President

Kennedy to NSC Meeting January 22, 1963; JFK Library f1le.)

JEK. Meeting on Cuban Covert Action. On April 3, 1963, the

President met with a number of advisers for a "meeting on

Cuba":

"The President said he does not object to Lexilel

raids they really strike worthwhile targets rather than

which their acts

no date have represented.

President was told by Mr. Bundy that sabotage operations are

not now underway because "the special group had decided...

that such activity is not worth the effort expended on it...

=

In connection with sabotage operations, Mr. Fitzgerald "made

the point that recent exfiltrees have said that there is now

no organized resistence inside Cuba."

Robert Kennedy "asked whether it might not be useful to con-

sider commando-type raids by groups of from 100 to 500 men.

Mr. Fitzgerald pointed out that if such groups could be landed

It would probably be Impossible for them to survive for any

length of time....The Attorney Generallurged lin any case,

that CA survey.all possibilities for/aggressiveraction in

Cubasover theYnextestx months, assuming that the Agency could

be given a free rein to proceed."

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April 11,

1953:

April M,

:1963

8.

the ?resident summed un the meeting on Cuba by "directing the

following: (a) The Intelligence estimate on Castro's probable

Euture strength should be completed as soon as possible.

(a) CrA should examine exactly what might be accomp_ished in

the field of sabotage during the next six months.

meeting should be held next week to review the proposed

sabotage program."

Memorandum, April 3, 1963,

"Meeting on Cuba,'

" (02842-43).

President to Consider "Violent Solutions." Gordon Chase

writes memorandum to Bundy proposing enticing Castro over

to U.S. side.

Chase states:

"I understand that, inithe.

Memorandum

to Bundy; April 11, 1963, 4-130 (JVK Library file).

spectal Coup Reuests Destruction of Documents for security

On April I1, 1963,

the Special Group (Bundy present)

requested that comments by the Coordanatoriof Cuban affairs

dated@/prtinaisonathree.papers.being.considered.attödays

meeting pe withdrawn and destroyed or securty casons.

The meeting

entire question of sabotage" and

thus the papers referred to may have dealt with sabotage

operations.

The Special Group engaged In "a lengthy discussion of the

entire question of sabotage... the gioup recognized that a

searching examination must be undertaken...to determine whether

we wished to change the present policy...Mr. McCone expressed a

steat-skepticism/about.the desirability. of proceeding with

sabotage operations .suntil an overall policy. is made clear.

and steps to be taken to assure the removal of Soviet troops

and on the problem of Castro.

It was decided that on April 19 a presentation should be

nacexto higher authoraty and a paper would be prepared out;

of Special Group Meeting, April'1i, 1963 (02845-47) .

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9.

April 18, 1963

April

23, 1963

April 23, 1963

Bundy Expresses Doubts Re Sabotage. On April 18, 1963, the

Special Group discussed papers from the Coordinator of Cuban

Affairs dated April 16, 17, and 18. The only reference to the

subject matters of these papers was:

"Mr. Fitzgerald pointed

out that the paper of April 17, on a "Maximum Covert Action

Program" consists basically of sabotage and of harassment,

plus support to Cuban exile groups and individuals who may be

responsive to our advice but certainly not to our command.

"Mr. Bundy and Mr. McCone expressed some doubts as to whether

we are in a position to decide major problems of this type until

we have a clearer picture of what the overall policy toward

cuba is Ilkely to be for the next six months to a year and a

half."...Mr. Bundy was-not sure whether it would be possible a

to embark on the activittes proposed inathe Coordinator's

papers, without a drastic change in US. policy. Source:

Special gioup minutes dated April 18, 1963 (02343-49) •

Chase Memorandum to Bundy Re "Short and Sweet" Action on Castro.

Prior to Standing Group meeting on April 23, Chase at Bundy's

request, comments on papers for meeting:

"Assuming we are not

out for Castro's scalp for the sake of his scalp, is there as.

castrowe can ve wyEAhapplayit not, what is the best way

to get rid of him--a tough, nasty approach, a sweet and sneaky

thus/ach, or a combination of soth.. Lolockade would be too long,

"Generally speaking, anynasty actions.we. contemplate

should be of the short and sweetl.variety. Source:

memorandum to Bundy, April 23, 1963, JFK Library file, 4-157.

RiKe Proposes Study OfU.S.Measures,for Contingency of Castro

-Death.

Discussion of Bundy paper titled "A Sketch of the Cuba

Alternatives," McNamara states the "elimination of the Castro

regime was a requirement"

and a U. S. program should arm to

'create dissidence in Cuba" to allow the U. S. to use force in

support of anti-Castro forces..

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April 29,

1963

April

30, 1963

Nay 13, 1963

May 14, 1963

10.

Robert Kennedy proposes three studies: (1) "A list of measures

we wouldatake following.contingencies.such_as.the.death of

Castrous. (2)

"A program with the objective of overthrowing

Castro in 18 months," (3) "A program to cause as much trouble

as we can for Communist Cuba during the next 18 months."

Memroandum, by Bromley Smith, titled "Summary Record

of WSC Standing Group meeting, No. 2/63...;" JFK Library

file.)

Bundy Agenda for Standing Group Meeting. In a memo to Group mem-

bers, bundy asks for discussion of, among other subjects,

"the

possible.userof. contingencies for the achtevement.of. wIder

political objectives.

Illustrations which come to mind are:

...(b) Possible death of Castro:..

Source: Bundy Memo, April 29, 1963, 4-30, JFK Library Eile.

Bundy Assigns Study Re Castro Disappearance. Standing Group.

meeting results in assignment of "examination of the possible

developments in Cuba If Castro should disappear from the scene.

This analysis will be developed by Mr. Sherman Kent" for Group

discussion on May 14.

Other assignments are for possible use

of contingencies to achieve "wider political objectives,

economic sabotage, and use of sugar market to harm Cuba.

(Source:

memorandum, May 2, 1963, Bundy to Standing Group meeting, JFK

Library file.)

Kent Paper on Castro Death Contingency. Sherman Kent's (CIA)

draft paper discusses 'Developments in Cuba and Possible J. S.

Actions in the Event of Castro's Death."

Under a heading "The

"TEnCastro were to die by other than

natural causes, the U…S..would be widely charged with com

pliotty, even though Castro has many enemies.

Memorandum, CIA Officer of National Estimates, May 13, 1963,

(JEK Library file).

Paper on Castro Death Contingency. At the NSC Standing Group

meeting, the Sherman Kent paper

"Development in Cuba and Pos-

sible U. S. Actions in the event of Castro's Death" was not

discussed for lack of time.

Source:

Summary Record Memorandum

by Bromley Smith, of Meeting, May 14, 1963, JFK Library file.

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11.

May 28,

1963

June 6, 1963:

June 19, 1963

Bundy Sets Agenda for Discussion of Castro Death Contingency.

Bundy informs Standing Group that at meeting on May 28,

should discuss a paper on possible U.S. actions in the event

of Castro's death," and notes Sherman Kent will be present for

this purpose.

"Bundy also notes McCone will distribute "two highly sensitive

papers" dealing with "alist of possiblesactions.under.constd=

exationgat-CIAl/notespecified and Cuban oil supplies.

emorantum, May 28, 1963, Bundy to Standing Group Members; JECe:

Library File.

Possible Approach to Castro. On June 6, 1963, the Special Group

@discussed/various-possibilities.ofcestabltshing channels of..com=

munication-to-Castro. Allimembers,iof.the.group.agreetthat. this

istasuseful endeavor. Mr. Bundy cautioned that of course Castro

should not be made privy to any U.S. positions, while Mr. McCone

emphasized the necessity of keeping any such approach entirely

secret...it was agreed that proposals of this kind which are

particularly unusual would be discussed with the Special Group

in advance."

Source: Minutes of Special Group, June 6, 1963.

TJEK Approves External Sabotage Program. A meeting was held with

"higher authority" (Bundy present) at which a program for "ex-

ternal sabotage" for Cuba was approved with the understanding

that operations will not begin until mid-July.

The program was

to be directed. at four major segments of the Cuban economy:

(a) electric power (3) petroleum refineries and storage fac1l1-

ties (c) railroad and highway transportation (d) production and

manufacturing."

The purpose of this and other programs is to

"nourish a spirit of resistance and disaffection which could

lead to significant defections and other by-products of unrest

Source:

Memorandum for the Special Group Cated June 19, 1963

"Satotage Program Cuba"

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12.

August 15, 1963

September

9.63.

October 3, 1963

Special GrouD Approves Non-Violent Action Against Cuban Trade.

The Special Group approved a proposal dated August 12, 1963

apparently dealing with a "non-violent program to inhibit free

world and neutral trade with Cuba." 'Mr. Iitzgerald pointed out

that the reference in the paper to "real sabotage" applded to Cuban

shipping only.

Source: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, August 15,

• 1963.

Bundy Receives Summary of Paper on Possible Actions--Castro

Suicide Preferable to Assassination.

At Bundy's request, Chase

of Castro as a nationalist symbol makes, him the obvious opera-

tonal target; assassination, is excluded to avoid Castro's:

TheINR paper, July 25, 1963, by G. Denney, states:

"Assassina-

tron. Castrots. excluded.insorder. to avoid his martyrdom: and

of the attribution risk which might invite fanatical.

decision It is preferable te discredit Castro., and drives

him to suicide or to acts of complete irrationality.

(1) Memorandum, September 20, 1963, G. Chase to Bundy (JFK

Library. File, 4-119), and (2) Memorandum, July 25, 1963, G.

Denney, JI., of INR to Mr. Crimmins, Coordinator of Cuba Af-

Separate Minutes kept of Special Group Meeting. On October 3,

1963, the Special Group met and discussed infiltration opera-

tions and sabotage during September, as well as "the operations

plans of commancos !"'.

Page 1 of these minutes has an under-

(Bundy, Johnson, Gilpatrick, and AcCone present)

Minutes of Special Group meeting, October 3, 1963.

Ask Parsat

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November 5, 1963

November 6,

1963

roventler 6,

1963

November 12, 1963

13.

Special Minutes kept of Special Group meeting - REK Present.

Note that the minutes of the Special Group meeting on Novem-

pears on page 1 under a discussion oi Cuban sabotage and In-

filtration operations.

(Bundy. not present; attending were

Robert Kennedy, Helms, Chiever, and Steakley.) Source:

Minutes of Special Group meeting dated November 6, 1963.

Approach by Castro to U.S. Mr. Bundy told the Special Group

"it has come to the attention to the White House that

rare men it have a dend to be a to age

To hear what Castro has to say and

to Inow on what basis he might wish to negotiate would be of

some use to the U. S."

After discussion, it was decided by

the Special Group members not to try to reach a firm decision

at this time (as to an emissary to talk to Castro) but to

study the problem for several. days and to consider it again.

Minutes of Special Group meeting November 5, 1963.

Junk Disapproves Cuban Actions to November 12.

On November 6,

1963, higher authority (PRESIDENT KENNEDY) "disapproved all

Cuban Operations scheduled to be run into Cuba before Novem-

disapproved "operations dated November 8 and 10 are therefore

Source: Memorandum for Special Group dated

November 5, 1963, entitled Cuban Operations.

John F. Kennedy and Robert Kennedy, Bundy; RusK, MCNamara

Briefed by CIA on Covers Actions in Cuba.

1963, a reeting on "Cuban Operations"

was held with "Higher

Authority" (President Kennedy) .

Present were. Robert Kennedy,

Rusk, Mckamara, Bundy, McCone, Johnson, Kilpatrick, Vance, Helms,

Fitzgerald, Chiever, and Steakley. McCone gave a brief summary

on un tone in a undered reported.

(2) *sabotage and harrassment, (3) propaganda, (4) military:

disaffection lands (5)neconomic denial.

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On covert collection, Fitzgerald pointed out that CIA had three

kinds of agents activities inside Cuba: (1) "Singleton"

opera

tions, (2) Collection nets, (3) ngents involved in black net

operations. Some 25 agents had been either captured or killed

in the past year.

There is increasing effectiveness of Castro's

internal security forces, accounting for the loss of agents.

On sabotage and harrassment operations in Cuba, Fitzgerald

described successful operations against four installations

and the belief that these operations have raised the moral of

syche people in Cuba and continues to keep pressure on Castro

adding to the growing economic problems

facing

the country.

On disaffections in the military in Cuba, Fitzgerald stated that

while the military is loyal, there are indications that some

Leaders might break with the regime but lack courage and

0p-

porcunity.

The principal aim of the U.S. is to

"get military

Leaders who have become disenchanted with the Castro regime to

¿are to talk and plot Castro's downfall with each other."

In response to a question as to what decisions remain to be

made, Fitzgerald stated that "we were looking for a reaffirma-

tion of the program as presented, including sabotage and har-

rassment."

Alter outlining a number of large scale sabotage

operations, "The consensus was that the CIA should proceed with

its planning for this type of activity looking toward January."

Source: Memorandum for the Record, November 12, 1963, entitled

November 15, 1963

Special Group Approves Infiltration Operations--Keeps Special

Minutes.

The Special Group approved various infiltration and

exfiltration operations in Cuba. An underscored statement in

the notes stating:

"See special minutes for additional items."

Source:

Minutes of Specia! Group meeting, November 14, 1963.

14.

AmcasH?

AmLASA?

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15.

December 5, 1963 -

"January 2, 1964

LBJ Disapproves Sabotage Operation. In the period December 5,

1963 through January 2, 1964, the Special Group approved a num

ber of infiltration, exfiltration and sabotage operations in

Cuba. However, the sabotage operation was aisapproved by higher

authority (President Johnson) on December 20, 1963.

Minutes of Special Group meetings on December 5, 6, 19, and 20,

1963, and January 2, 1954.

January 9, 1964

Sy/"

February

1964

April 2, 1964

June 10, 1964

"the views of higher

Yauthority (President Johnson) should be obtained on what is de-

sired generally in the field of sabotage activities in Cuba."

Source: Minutes of Special Group meetings on January 9, 1964.

Bundy: Sees Dilemma In Cuban Covert Actions: High Risk Actions,

Rewarding: "Low Risk Actions, Unrewarcing.

The Special Group

discussed covert action potentiai to weaken the Castro regime.

"There was a concensus that the present level of operation was

no longer effective in obtaining the basic objective of toppling

Castro but harrassment might keen the regime off balance."

Bundy summarized the dilemma by noting that the high risk, danger-

ous operations are the rewarding ones and the low noise,

innocuous

operations prove to be unrewarding."

Source: Minutes of Special

Group meeting, February 14, 1964.

Bundy to Submit Question of Cuban Covert Operations to LBJ.

sabotage proposals. "Mr. Bundy.. stated that. the time was over-

due for submitting to higher authority the entire question of

covert operations against Cuba... It was hoped that definite

policy lines could be datermined for future covert activity

against Castro."

Source: Minutes of Special Group meeting

dated April 3, 1964.

Helms Mémo to DCI On Cuban Exile Plan to Kill Castro. In a memo

to the DCI, Helms states that agency officers have reported plans

of. Cuban exiles to assassinate selected Cuban government leaders.

Agency officers told Cubans that U.S. would not condone the

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June IS,

1964

June 18, 1964

16.

Planned actions. Plans included:

Cuban exile approach on March 2,

1904 by businessman to discuss a plan which was "still in the

embryonic state to assassinate Fidel Castro."

Businessman has

uncerworld connections with Cosa Nostra.

Latter group has of-

fered to assassinate Castro for $150,000. Proposes to use 5 men.

March 3, 1964 meeting in which Byron Cameron says he met an un-

identified group which would be willing to assassinate selected

nate selected

Caban offácials for cash. Specifically, the Cameron group is

interested in assassinating Fidel Castro, Raul Castro, and Ernesto

Ghe Guevera."

"Cameron knows that he can indicted for conspiracy."

Source:. Memorandun for DCI. McCone from Nichard Helms re pians

of Cuban exiles to assassinate selected Cuban government leaders,

June 10, 1964 (03105-031110).

Bundy Receives Memorandum re Exile-Mafia Assassination Plans for

Spacial GrOup (303 Meeting) •

Peter Jessup, assistant to Me.

The memo stated the meeting "might serve to zive

us a clearer picture of what forces are at work today which might

serve to embarrass the U.S. A. in the next 120 days." The memo

"How close track is the FBI et.al, keeping track of

Frank Fiorind and persons of this ilk."

The memorandum con-

tinued:

"We also have these reports of Mafia plans to perform

Coup de Main operations. for cash.

Who is keeping track of this?

Does the grapevine among the emigres keep us well-advised of all

impencing adventures?"

A memorandum attached was described as:

•Helms memo to DCI entitled Plans of Cuban Exiles to Assassinate

Selected Cuban Leaders, 10 June 1964.

Memorandum,

18 June 1964, fron Peter Jessup to McGeorge Bundy.

Bundy and Special GrouP (303 Committee) Discuss Report of Cuban

Exile Plan to Kill Castro--bundy to Infom Robert Kennedy as Law

Enforcement Problem.

Che 303 Committee met to discuss "problems

arising from increased activity on the part of organized Cuban

Explaine

That it had been

boy tie

..."A paper was discussed on alleged plans which involved

the underworld to assassinate certain Cuban leaders.

Mr. McCone

was somewhat skeptical of the reported plot and stated that he

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June 19, 1964

July 30, 1964

August 19, 1964

17 .

would like to go into the matter further.

Others, including

Mr. Bundy, felt that the United States was being put or notice

and should do everything in its power to ascertain promptly

the veracity of the reports and then undertake prevention.

It was decided that Mr. Bundy would call the matter to the

Attorney Ceneral's attention as a matter of law enforcement."

Source: Minutes of 303 Committee meeting, 18 june 1964.

Sundy has Jessup Meet with Robert Kennedy re Castro Assassina-

tion Report-Robert lennedy told failure to prevent can de con-

trued as condoning:

On dune 19, 1964, Peter Jessup met with

/? Attorney General Robert Kennedy re: the decision at the 303

Committee meeting of June 13.

"In regard to the memorandum to

regime, it was pointed out that these reports, in effect, put the

United States government on notice that such plotting was afoot,

and failure to take preventive action could be construed as

condonation.

The Committee's belief that this was essentially

a law enforcement problem was cited. The Attorney General in-

dicated that the Department of Justice would look into the mat-

ter." Source: Memorandum for the record, June 22, 1954, by

Peter Jessup.

Special GrOuP Agrees CIA and FBI to Meet on Exile-Mafia Plot.

The 303/Special Group Committee "agreed that Mr. Fitzgerald

meet with Mr. Sam Papich of the FBI in regard to the earlier

report of an alleged plot with Matia overtones to assassinate

Castro and which the Attorney General agreed to handle as a

matter of law enforcement."

Source: Menorandum for the record

dated July 31, 1964 and Minutes of 303 Committee meeting, July 30,

1964.

Bundy Receives McCone Report on FBI Investigation of Exile-mafia

Plot.

John McCone sent a memorandom to McGeorge Bundy summarizing

the FBI's investigation of reported plans by Cuban exiles to

assassinate government leaders.

The memorandum summerized seven

reporte rendered by the FBI.

Three of the seven persons inter-

viewed by the FbI stated they had heard of the plan and two of

these persons said they had discussac or reported the plan to

the CIA.

Source: Memorandum from John McCone to McGeorge Bundy,

August 19, 1964.

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TOP SECRET

TO:

FROM:

RE :

DATE:

FILES

FREDERICK BARON

BUNDY/ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION TESTIMONY--RE ASSASSINATION ALLEGATIONS

JULY 6, 1975

MC GEORGE BUNDY: TESTIMONY BEFORE ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION

(Volume 14, Page 1991, April 7, 1975)

January, 1961: BUNDY became Special Assistant to the President For National

Security Affairs, "Principal Staff Officer" for matters under the Departments

of State, Defense, CIA, NSA, and others, relevant to national security. (1993)

February, 1966: BUNDY left position of Special Assistant to the President.

(1994)

BUNDY doesn't remember an "actual decision to go about" assassination of a

foreign leader. (1994)

BUNDY does have a "vague recollection of the existence or the possible existence

of contingency planning... and a contingency capability" for assassination

(1994-5).

BUNDY said that he knew of no authorization or involvement by anyone on the

White House staff or anyone else in assassination planning beyond the contingency

stage. (1995)

BUNDY could not recall discussion of any plan to assassinate Cuban leaders

connected with OPERATION MONGOOSE, although he could not exclude the possibility

that such discussion might have taken place. (1996)

BUNDY said that he had no recollection of the discussion or development of an

EXECUTIVE ACTION capability to carry out assassinations. (1996)

cannot exclude that I heard of that."

BUNDY "would have been surprised" if the CIA had undertaken an effort to

assassinate a foreign leader without his approval, but he "could not exclude

that there would be communication with the President by other channels." (1997)

BUNDY said that he would not have expected that, during his time in Washington,

"the Agency would have undertaken anything like an attack on the life of a

foreign leader without direct order from higher authority." (1998)

BUNDY said that he has no recollection of the meeting of August 10, 1962, other

than his calendar notation that he was present. (2000)

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2

TOP SECRET

BUNDY testified that the first time he heard of a possible CIA assassination

plot for Cuban leaders in which the MAFIA might have been involved was in the

newspapers in 1975. (2002)

BUNDY testified that he thought it "not unreasonable that there would have

been at least speculative discussions of the possibility of going after the

Cuban leadership" in the atmosphere of "all kinds of covert operations"

BUNDY said that he believes the President's authority as Commander In Chief,

rather than the statutory language of the National Security Act of 1947,

(rootles authority for covert operations even without a declaration of war.

BUNDY told the Rockefeller Commission that his "unaided memory is not very

good," but if the Commission "had time to do a documentary search and then

say here is what the documents suggest was happening in thus and such a

period, what now what do you remember, you would pr 203ly lind some

sleeping cells back here, at least in my own case.

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..t

i.!

STATE OF NEW YORK

COUNTY OF NEW YORK: SS

I, McGeorge Bundy, being first auly sworn, do upon oath

depose and state:

On April 7, 1975 I testifled

as a witness before the

Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States

(Comnission) •

As I reflected overnight about my answers

to certain questions, my recollection was refreshed and

the next morning I contacted the Executive Director of the

Commission, David W. Belin, and stated that I wished to

make some additions

to. the

record. I conferred with

Mr. Belin at the offices of the Commission

at 712 Jackson

Place, N.W., Washington, D.C., and then Mr. Belin asked

me a number of questions to which I gave answers which

were recorded on tape.

After receiving a transcript of

the tape, I made certain additional corrections.

The

Following are the questions and my answers, as I have

corrected them.

(There

is one question and answer that

I have stricken because it is a matter of pure speculation.)

Mr. Belin: This a memorandum of a conference with McGeorge

Bundy on April 8, 1975. Mr. Bundy has refreshed

his recollection following his testimony before the Commission

on April 7 and wishes to make some additions. to the record.

Mr. Bundy: You asked me yesterday whether I had any recollection

of hearing the word "poison"

something to

to that effect-whether I had

any recollection of that kind

of activity or proposal in relation to the castro regime

and I think I said I did not, and. I did not as of yesterday.

But overnight I have had a vague recollection, which I cannot

pinpoint in time, that there was discussion that I knew about

at some time of

proposal or scheme or project that did

involve poison, and the characteristic that sticks in my

memory is that it would have involved a rather large-scale

use of poison and, as I recollect it, it never came anywhere

near approval. Proposals under the HONCOOSE scheme which

did come from time to time (inostly not with respect to

assassination) were reviewed in the first instance for

practicability and only after that for wisdom or political

rightness, and I recall NO proposal for liquidation that

ever got past the first stage to the second.

010S3

PROPERTY OF

rue late water trees

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-?-

Mr. Belin: I also talked to you, Mr.. Bundy, about whether

or not there night have been any discussion in

early 1961 or any other time with regard to a request from

the White House to the CIA for the CIA to

develop what was

called an executive action

capability, which was defined

as a general stand-by capability to carry out assassinations

when required.. Do you ever remember any discussions along

those lines?

Mr. Bundy: Well, I recall the words "executive action capa-

bility" more clearly today than I did yesterday,

and I think I said yesterday that they rang some sort of

bell. But I do NOT have any recollection as to when t

knew about that or who reguested it of how much was done

under it. I don't recall having any continuing interest

in or information about

that particular activity.

Mr. Belin: Do you recall that executive action capability

was in substance discussed as a general stand-by

capability to carry out assassinations at that time--I'm

not saying there was direction to undertake a plan but at

least the development of the stand-by capability?

Mr. Bundy: I think it was something like that--a plan to

have some kind of stand-by capability for action

against individuals.

Mr. Belin: Now, I'm going to turn to the Summer of 1962.

Before we started this transcribing of your

remarks you indicated that you don't remember any specific

plan pertaining to the attempted poisoning of any Cuban

leader during 1961, but that you do remember some dis-

wussion; that may have developed into this area somele

in 1962. Is that accurate?

Mr. Bundy: Well, I think perhaps a slightly more precise

way of saying it is that you have described to

me a broad outline of plans as you understand them that

existed in January or February 1961 and I simply have no

recollection of plans that meet that description.

I believe

ny memory tells me in a more general way that my knowledge.

of a scheme or idea of using poison probably relates to

the year 1962.

Mr. Belin: Do you remember any discussions at any meeting

of the MONGOOSE group where this might have been

discussed?

Either the general plan of possible liquidation

or the particular plan of poison?

PROPERTY OF

THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

0108%

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- 3-

Mr. Bundy: I don't have any recollection of where or how

I heard about the poisoning possibility.

know that I never knew of any approval of such a plan.

My recollection is the opposite--that it ras a halebrained

scheme that did not receive approval even on

of practicability as distinct from the question of whether

you

would make a final decision to go ahead.

meetings where such things night have been discussed, the

only one I have any recollection of--and it is a refreshed

recollection--I would not have known about it a nonth ago--

is the one which we discussed yesterday on August 10, 1962

and I do NOT have any recollection of what specifically

was said in that neeting.

Mx. Belin: Do you have any recollection that there was any

direction NOT to undertake any such plans?

Mr. Bundy: I think there was a general attitude toward

this matter in which those working on covert

operations were sometimes permitted to produce proposals,

although I recall nobody encouraging them to do so.

AS

I said yesterday, I draw a sharp distinction between con-

sidering contingencies of

this sort and actually giving

them approval. 'That I think is the way in which the Kennedy

Administration approached the matter.

I do not think there

was a flat general ban on considering such possibilities.

Mr. Belin: Earlier, before we started taping, you said

that if there had been any specific discussion

of that, that you were not a party to it and that it might

have--

Mr. Bundy: A discussion of what?

Mr. Belin: -of a direction to carry out a plan, that you

certainly were not a party to such a discussion.

Is that what you said?

Mr. Bundy: I am absolutely certain that I never knew of

or believed that there was any authorization

to go ahead with an effort to liquidate Castro, or any

other Cuban leader.

Next question and answer deleted

Mr. Belin: Is there anything else that you want to add

so far as clarifying or correcting your

testimony of April 7 before the Commission?

01985

FROPERTY OF

THE WHITE WONdE MorE

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MCGEORGE BUNDY

320 EAST 4390 STREET

NEW YORK, N. Y. 10017

1975 JUL 1! PM 7: 21

SELECT COMMITTEE ON

July 8, TIENCE ACTIVIIES

Dear Mr. Baron:

You asked me today for a report of what my calendar

shows of meetings with Richard Bissell during the early

months of 1961. My calendar begins only on January 23

so I have had to start from there. I have no independent

recollection of whether I saw Mr. Bissell before that time,

though it is quite possible that I did.

We have listed both meetings where the notation shows

Mr. Bissell's name and where the meeting was one of a

group of which he was or could have been a member. The

two groups with this characteristic are the so-called Planning

Group and the Special Group, and some of the entries simply

show the names of the group without the names of the par-

ticipants. The enclosed list exactly copies the entries as they

were made in my office.

We have not included meetings called by the President, be-

cause my calendar does not show who was at such meetings

or even, usually, what the subject was. There were of

course a number of such meetings at which both Mr. Bissell

and I were present, on the subject of the Bay of Pigs.

Sincerely,

nefery Sal

McGeorge Bundy

Kong t att

Cog

Mr. Frederick Baron

Room G-308

Dirksen Senate Office Building

Washington, D. C. 20510

= Bron m Research

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1961

January

27

February

11 (lunch)

14

.15

17

22

Rostow and Bissell -- Hay Adams

11

23 (mtg. &

lunch)

Nitze, Rostow, McGhee, Bissell

Special Group -- CIA

Nitze, Wiesner, Bissell -- Rusk's Office

McGhee, Nitze, Rostow, Bissell

Planning Group -- Metropolitan Club

Nitze, Rowe, McGhee, Rostow, Hare, Amory, Bissell

Special Group -- Bowles, Gilpatric, Dulles, Bissell

Murrow, Bell (joined for lunch)

March

"

"

1

2

8 (lunch)

14 (lunch)

11

"

16 (lunch)

21 (lunch)

23 (lunch)

28 (lunch)

30 (lunch)

Planning Group

Special Group -- Gilpatric, Dulles, Bissell

Special Group

Planning Group

Bissell at CIA

Special Group

Planning Group

Special Group

Planning Group

Special Group

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April

"

"1

11

11

!!

4

6

11

15

18

20

24 (lunch)

27

Planning Group

Special Group

Planning Group

Rusk, Bissell, Bundy -- at State

Planning Group

Special Group

Planning Group

Special Group

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## Page 283

MCGEORGE BUNDY

320 EAST 43R0 STREET

NEW YORK, N. Y. 10017

1975 JUL 1! PM 7: 21

SELECT COMMITTEE ON

July 8, IE4UGENGE ACTIVITES

-

Dear Mr. Baron:

You asked me today for a report of what my calendar

shows of meetings with Richard Bissell during the early

months of 1961. My calendar begins only on January 23

so I have had to start from there. I have no independent

recollection of whether I saw Mr. Bissell before that time,

though it is quite possible that I did.

We have listed both meetings where the notation shows

Mr. Bissell's name and where the meeting was one of a

group of which he was or could have been a member. The

two groups with this characteristic are the so-called Planning

Group and the Special Group, and some of the entries simply

show the names of the group without the names of the par-

ticipants.

The enclosed list exactly copies the entries as they

were made in my office.

We have not included meetings called by the President, be-

cause my calendar does not show who was at such meetings

or even, usually, what the subject was.

There were of

course a number of such meetings at which both Mr. Bissell

and I were present, on the subject of the Bay of Pigs.

Sincerely,

befry Sunl

McGeorge Bundy

Mr. Frederick Baron

Room G-308

Dirksen Senate Office Building

Washington, D. C. 20510

÷.

.....

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1901

January

27

Rostow and Bissell -- Hay Adams

February

"

"

11 (lunch)

14

15

17

22

11 .

Nitze, Rostow, McGhee, Bissell

Special Group -- CIA

Nitze, Wiesner, Bissell -- Rusk's Office.

McGhee, Nitze, Rostow, Bissell

Planning Group - Metropolitan Club

Nitze, Rowe, McGhee, Rostow, Hare, Amory, Bissell

23 (mtg. & Special Group -- Bowles, Gilpatric, Dulles, Bissel

lunch)

Murrow, Bell (joined for lunch)

March

"

"1

"

1

2

8 (lunch)

14 (lunch)

"

16 (lunch)

21 (lunch)

23 (lunch)

28 (lunch)

30 (lunch)

Planning Group

Special Group -- Gilpatric, Dulles, Bissell

Special Group

Planning Group

Bissell at CIA

Special Group

Planning Group

Special Group

Planning Group

Special Group

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## Page 285

.=.=

April

it

4

6

11

15

18

20

24 (lunch)

27

Planning Group

Special Group

Planning Group

Rusk, Bissell, Bundy -- at State

Planning Group

Special Group

Planning Group

Special Group

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July 8, 1975

Dear Mr. Baron:

You asked me today for a report of what my calendar

shows of meetings with Richard Bissell during the early

months of 1961. My calendar begins only on January 23

so I have had to start from there. I have no independent

recollection of whether I saw Mr. Bissell before that time,

though It is quite possible that I did.

We have listed both meetings where the notation shows

Mr. Bissell's name and where the meeting was one of a

group of which he was or could have been a member. The

two groups with this characteristic are the so-called Planning

Group and the Special Group, and some of the entries simply

show the names of the group without the names of the par-

ticipants. The enclosed list exactly coples the entries as they

were made by my office.

We have not Included meetings called by the President, be-

cause my calendar does not show who was at such meetings

or even, usually, what the subject was. There were of

course a number of such meetings at which both Mr. Bissell

and I were present, on the subject of the Bay of Pigs.

Sincerely,

McGeorge Bundy

Mr. Frederick Baron

Room G-808

Dirksen Senate Office Building

Washington, D. C. 20510

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## Page 287

1.

1961

January

27

Rostow and Bissell -- Hay Adams

February

11 (lunch)

14

15

".

17

22

Nitze, Rostow, McGhee, Bissell

Special Group -- CIA

Nitze, Wiesner, Bissell -- Rusk's Office

McGhee, Nitze, Rostow, Bissell

Planning Group - Metropolitan Club

Nitze, Rowe, McGhee, Rostow, Hare, Amory, Bissell

23 (mtg. & Special Group -- Bowles, Gilpatric, Dulles, Bissell

lunch)

Murrow, Bell (joined for lunch)

March

11

11.

1

2

8 (lunch)

14 (lunch)

11

16 (lunch)

" 21 (lunch)

23 (lunch)

28 (lunch)

30 (lunch)

Planning Group

Special Group

-- Gilpatric, Dulles, Bissell

Special Group

Planning Group

Bissell at CIA

Special Group

Planning Group

Special Group

Planning Group

Special Group

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## Page 288

April

-=!!

11

"

4

6

11

15

18

20

24 (lunch)

27

Planning Group

Special Group

Planning Group

Rusk, Bissell, Bundy -- at State

Planning Group

Special Group

Planning Group

Special Group

NH

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## Page 289

(McGeorge Bundy)

April 29,

1963

April

30,

1963

May 13, 1963

- 11 -

Issues and Questions

Robert Kennedy proposes three studies: (1) "A list of measures

we would take following contingencies such as the death of

Castro", (2) "A program with the objective of overthrowing

Why interest in Castro

death?

!

Castro in 18 months," (3) "A program to cause as much trouble

as we can for Communist Cuba during the next 18 months."

(Source:

Memroandum, by Bromley Smith, titled "Summary Record

is Con meeting, No. 2163...;" JFK Labrary

Bundy Agenda for Standing Group Meeting. In a memo to Group mem- Why interest in Castro

bers, Bundy asks for discussion of, among other subjects, "the

death?

possible use of contingencies for the achievement of wider

political objectives. Illustrations which come to mind are:

... (b) Possible death of Castro....

Source: Bundy Memo, April 29, 1963, 4-30, JFK Library file. (TefS).

Bundy Assigns Study Re Castro Disappearance. Standing Group

meeting results in assignment of "examination of the possible

Does "disappearance"

refer to Castro death?

developments in Cuba if Castro should disappear from the scene:

This analysis will be developed by Mr. Sherman Kent" for Group

economic sabotage, and use of sugar market to harm Cuba.

(Source:

memorandum, May 2, 1963, Bundy to Standing Group meeting, JFK

Library file.) (Tot T).

Kent Paper on Castro Death Contingency. Sherman Kent's (CIA)

draft paper discusses "evelope san ba ded heading "e

Actions in the Event of Castro's Death."

U. S. Role" Kent states: "If Castro were to die by other than

natural causes, the U. S. would be widely charged with com-

plicity," even though Castro has many enemies. Source: Draft

Memo anduaty A 0 -(Ter Of National Estimates, May 13, 1963,

Is Kent counseling against

assassination?

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McGeorge Bundy)

- 12 -

Issues and Cuestions

May 28, 1963

June 6, 1963

June 19, 1963

Bundy Sets Agenda for Discussion of Castro Death Contingency.

Bundy informs Standing Group that at meeting on May 28, "We

should discuss a paper on possible U. S. actions in the event

of Castro's death," and notes Sherman Kent will be present for

this purpose.

*Bundy also notes McCone will distribute "two highly sensitive

papers" dealing with "a list of possible actions under consid-

geration at CIA" /not specified/ and Cuban oil supplies.

Source:

28, 1963, Bundy to Standing Group Members; JFK

Possible Approach to Castro. On June 6, 1963, the Special Group Note interest in talks wit

discussed "various possibilities of establishing channels of com- Castro while also seeming

munication to Castro. All members of the group agree that this

interest in contingency of

is a useful endeavor. Mr.. Bundy cautioned that of course Castro

his death.

should not be made privy to any U. S. positions, while Mr. McCone

emphasized the necessity of keeping any such approach entirely

secret...It was agreed that proposals of this kind which are

particularly unusual would be discussed with the Special Group

In advance." Source: Minutes of Special Group, June 6, 1963 (TobW)

JFK Approves External Sabotage Program.

A meeting was held with

"higher authority" (Bundy present) at which a program for "ex-

ternal sabotage" for Cuba was approved with the understanding

that operations will not begin until mid-July. The program was

the prosta gas

Did JFK decide against tal

and in favor of harder sat

tage approach?

to be directed at four major segments of the Cuban economy:.

(a) electric power (b) petroleum refineries and storage facili-

ties (c) railroad and highway transportation (d) production and

manufacturing." The purpose of this and other programs is to

"nourish a spirit of resistance and disaffection which could

lead to significant defections and other by-products of unrest."

Source: Memorandum for the Special Group dated June 19, 1963,

"Satotage Program Cuba". (Tob X)

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(McGeorge Bundy)

September 20%

1963

June 10, 1964

- 13 -

Issues and Questions

Bundy Receives Summary of Paper on Possible Actions--Castro

Why is it necessary to ex-

Suicide Preferable to Assassination.

At Bundy's request, Chase

clude assassination if it

summarizes State INR Paper entitled "Cuba: Possible Courses of

Action."

Chase's summary states: "...The present importance

not being considered?

Wa:

of Castro as a nationalist symbol makes him the obvious opera-• Denney asked to consider

assassination?

tional target; assassination is excluded to avoid Castro's

martyrdom."

The INR paper, July 25, 1963, by G. Denney, states: "Assassina-

tion of Castro is excluded in order to avoid his martyrdom and

because of the attribution risk which might invite fanatical

retribution.

(1) Memorandum, September 20, 1963, G. Chase to Bundy (JFK

Library File, 4-119), and (2) Memorandum, July 25, 1963, G.

penney: (Tab 2B, Jab 2A)

Denney. Jr.. of INR to Mr. Crimmins, Coordinator of Cuba Af-

Helms Memo to DCI on Cuban Exile Plan to Kill Castro. In a memo

to the DCl, Helms states that agency officers have reported plans

of Cuban exiles to assassinate selected Cuban government leaders.

Agency officers told Cubans that U. S. would not condone the

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(McGeorge Bundy)

June 18,

1964

June 18, 1964

- 14 =

planned actions. Plans included: Cuban exile approach on March 2,

1964 by businessman to discuss a plan which was "still in the

embryonic state to assassinate Fidel Castro."

Businessman has

underworld connections with Cosa Nostra. Latter group has of-

fered to assassinate Castro for $150,000. Proposes to use 5 men.

March 3, 1964 meeting in which Byron Cameron says he met an un-

identified group which would be willing to assassinate selected

•Cuban officials for cash. Specifically, the Cameron group is

Interested in assassinating Fidel Castro, Raul Castro, and Ernesto

" "Cameron knows that he can Indicted for conspiracy."

Source: Memorandum for DCI McCone from Richard Helms re plans

of Cuban exiles to assassinate selected Cuban government leaders,

June 10, 1964 (03105-031110). (Tab 2G)

Bundy Receives Memorandum re Exile-Mafia Assassination Plans for

Special Group (303 Meeting). Peter Jessup, assistant to Mr.

Bundy, wrote a memorandum to Mr. Bundy subject "303 Committee

Cuban review."

The memo stated the meeting "might serve to give

us a clearer picture of what forces are at work today which might

serve to

embarrass the U. S. A. in the next 120 days."

asked: "How close track is the FBI et.al,

keeping track of

Frank Fiorini and persons of this 1lk."

The memorandum con-

tinued:

"We also have these reports of Mafia plans to perform

Coup de Main operations for cash.

Who is keeping track of this?

Does the grapevine among the emigres keep us well-advised of all

Impending adventures?"

A memorandum attached was described as:

"Helms memo to DCI entitled Plans of Cuban Exiles to Assassinate

Selected Cuban Leaders, 10 June 1964."

Bundy and Special Group (303 Committee) Discuss Report of Cuban

Exile Plan to Kill Castro--Bundy to Inform Robert Kennedy as Law

Enforcement Problem. The 303 Committee met to discuss "problems

arising from increased activity on the part of organized Cuban

..."A paper was discussed on alleged plans which involved

the underworld to assassinate certain Cuban leaders. Mr. McCone

was somewhat skeptical of the reported plot and stated that he

Issues and Questions

Note Bundy's view below

that U.S. must prevent suc

plots.

771

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(NicGeorge Bundy)

June 19, 1964

July 30, 1964

August 19, 1964

- 15 -

Issues and Questions

would like to go into the matter further. Others, Including

• Mr. Bundy, felt that the United States was being put on notice

and should do everything in its power to ascertain promptly

the veracity of the reports and then undertake prevention.

It was decided that Mr. Bundy would call the matter to the

Attorney General's attention as a matter of law enforcement."

Source: Minutes of 303 Committee meeting, 18 June 1964. (TG1),

Bundy has Jessup Meet with Robert Kennedy re Castro Assassina-

tion Report--Robert Kennedy told failure to prevent can be con-

What was RFK's action in

response.

strued as condoning. On June 19, 1964, Peter Jessup met with

Attorney General Robert Kennedy re: the decision at the 303

Committee meeting of June 18.

"In regard to the memorandum to

the DCI concerning alleged underworld connections with Cuban exile

groups for the purpose of assassinating key figures in the Castro

regime, It was pointed out that these reports, in effect, put the

United States government on notice that such plotting was afoot,

and failure to take preventive action could be construed as

condonation.

The Committee's belief that this was essentially

a law enforcement problem was cited.

dicated that the Department of Justice would look into the mat-

ter."

Source: Memorandum for the record, June 22, 1964, by.

Peter Jessup. (Tab 2J)

Special Group Agrees CIA and FBI to Meet on Exile-Mafia Plot.

The 303/Special Group Committee "agreed that Mr. Fitzgerald

meet with Mr. Sam Papich of the FBI in regard to the earlier

report of an alleged plot with Mafia overtones to assassinate

Castro and which the Attorney General agreed to handle as a

matter of law enforcement.

". Source: Memorandum for the record

dated July 31, 1964 and Minutes of 303 Committee meeting, July 30,

Page 293

1964. (Tab 22K)

Lundy Receives McCone Report on MBI Investitanton of Exile-Maila Did Bundy feel compeller

John McCone sent a memorandum to McGeorge Bundy summarizing take any action?

42

the FBI's investigation of reported plans by Cuban exiles to

assassinate government leaders.

32

The memorandum summarized seven

reports rendered by the FBI. Three of the seven persons inter-

Id

viewed by the FBI stated they had heard of the plan and two of

00

these persons said they had discussed or reported the plan to

Source: Memorandum from John McCone to McGeorge Bundy,

August 19, 1964. (Tab aL

1.720

1.3

NH 50955

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(McGeorge Bundy)

-16 -

SEPARATE DOCUMENTS

September 23, 1963

Oct 29, 1963

Bundy points

maintenance of a high degree of security is not a

simple matter in view of the numbers of people within

the government who have to know a little

or much

about a U.S.-directed raid against Cuba."

(Source: Memo, Sept 23, 1963, Bundy to Special Group. (To 20)

Bundy informs JFk of need tor White House intormation:

on CIA communications. Bundy asks the President to

order that the White House received one copy of all

important instructions from State and CIA to the field.

Bundy states trouble has arisen from"difference of

Oct

29, •1963

Oct

30,

1963

Bundy on Lodge's movements.

Bundy in a checklist

discusses consequence for plausible denial for Amb

Lodge's movements.

(Source:" Memo Ost 29, 1963, title Checklist. )(TaR2E)

Bundy cables

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-4-

Mr. Bundy: You asked me yesterday whether I had met Mr. William

Harvey:-I think that's his name--

Mr. Belin: Yes

Mr. Bundy: -and I said I recollected the name and that

I thought I had seen him in large meetings.

I can check my appointment calendar which is the only

official document of record that I have from my Washington

days and see whether I met him in smaller meetings or alone

it that would be helpful to you.

Mr. Belin: It would. I'd like to have you do it, please.

Mr. Bundy: Fine.

Mr. Belin: OK.

Well, thank you very much.

(END OF TAPE)

Following my return to New York I checked my appointment

calendar and there is no entry of William Harvey's name.

We did not make a habit of listing all the participants

in large meetings, but the calendar would ordinarily show

11s name if he had come to see me alone or with only one

or two others.

I have no further changes or corrections io make with regard

to my

testimony before the Commission.

Dated this

25%

_day of

_ 1975

McGeorge Bundy

Subscribed,

and sworn to before me

this 15 ch

day of lepr

el 1 1915

390;

licito

"Notary: public In and for New York, New York

': My commission expires on

033SG

,19

NOTARY PROSES 1010-

"tate of tier York

No. 88 0800

Qualfied In '

Certificate Ted in New York

New CounCounty

Commission Expires March 30, 1976

PROPERTY OF

THE WHITE HOUSE CERICE

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General

- Extent to S2 CIA pichs up on lease lang

- To whatextent son was The

- Would "

ina invasion plese lene U.S.

vert sabotage / invasion as

stagzied !

- Extent.

1 expectation by G(A)

That OLIA Will rout in detail

on any comet gos against CAsTRo.

E. G. anyassas flam

o would

Ole regie Legorting?

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7 July

75

BUNDY PHONE CONVERSATION:

Bundy said that the fact that the first operational meeting

on Executive Action was placed at

Jan.25-26 by Harvey's

notes tanimatax confirms his own

feeling that he was

merely informed agaghs of the project and not a moving

force.

Bundy

than zhha

said that we should question the people

who were in before JAnuary 20 (Ike administration) about

authorization of the project.

He said

he has only two personal papers that bear on our

events:

1. a yellow sheet on NSAM-181, which he said is very

general and doesn't help supplement the memo itself.

2. calendar notations on the 10 Aug.62 meeting which

indicates who was present.

I explained that the meeting may take up to four hours,

he said fine. Hes secretary indicated

that his first appointment

*$

not until 3:00.

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'August, 16, 1962: Alternate Course B is accepted by SG(A).

BUNDY questions submarine activity, there is also question about

sabotage. (Shows that there are

reservations about vigorous plan)

-Plans

are

"accepted in principle with the understanding that

pajor actions under these general concepts would be approved

by the SG(A)...it was emphasized that such approval

should be obtained from the Group far enough in advance so

as to obviate extensive preaprations and planning

for operation which might not actually receive policy approval."

(Significance: Shows clear expectation that SG(A) should

approve all major operations far in advance.)

-New guidelines were to be approved by "higher authority".

Memo for Lansdale from Gilpatric (Aug. 17, 1982):

At McNamara's request and with Taylor's approval,

sentance

was added to proposed MONGOOSE phase II to the effect that "

"every

effort will be made to avoid attribution to the

U.S. and to hold down the damage to our international

Prestige"

• (SIGNIFICANCE: Shows that an operation like

assassination, with high danger of damage to U.S. prestige

and with reasonable chance of being attributed to the U.s.

shantixnanxhauambnenxap was contrary to the policy being

followed at the Special Group level.

The Gilpatric

change

shows great caution being exercised over operations

that

represent

no

more attributability potentian than

an

assassination plot.)

Draft Memorandum FOR THE PRESIDENT, from TAYLOR-August 16, 1962

"While we believe that this new course of action will create

a-ded difficultids for the regime and will increase the visibility

of its

the overthworest

the regime fren within, "pe that it will cause

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