Document date: 04/17/2018
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA

RECORD NUMBER

: 176-10036-10226

RECORD SERIES : National Security Files:William H. Brubeck

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

ORIGINATOR :

FROM :

TO :

TITLE : John F. Kennedy document Control Record

DATE : 10/29/1963

PAGES: *3

SUBJECTS:

DOCUMENT TYPE :

CLASSIFICATION :

RESTRICTIONS :

CURRENT STATUS :

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 383: Disarmament, 7/63-10/63. Box 4.

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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

October 29, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE OF PRINCIPALS

SUBJECT: Chemical and Biological Weapons

The question has been raised as to whether the United

States should enter into an arrangement with the West Germans

under which we would furnish "standard" chemical munitions

to the West Germans in support of a SACEUR requirement for

a NATO CW retaliatory capability. Also the more basic issue

has been raised

as to whether we should support SACEUR's

requirement for a NATO CW retaliatory capability. Serious

political as well as military considerations are involved

in the above issues, which raise questions concerning the

desirability. of such action by the U.S.

These relate back

to the basic question of whether the transfer of chemical

weapons to West Germany is to the net advantage or to the

detriment of the United States.

The U.S. would be setting a precedent with the transfer

of chemical

weapons to West Germany in that we would be the

initial source of proliferation of weapons which have been

grouped with nuclear into the "mass destruction" category.

Also this country would be supplying the means for use of

chemical weapons to a country which has acceded to the Paris

Protocols of 1954 and declared that they "would not manu-

facture any atomic, biological or chemical weapons." The

problems related to the proliferation of chemical weapons,

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to previous international agreements regarding chemical

weapons, to possible conflict with U.S. policy regarding

nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction, should all

be assessed prior to a decision to transfer these weapons

to West Germany.

In addition to the West German question there are other

problems relating to control and reduction of C/B weapons

which are presently being studied, and which require the

reappraisal of C/B weapons and policy. For example, The

Secretary of State has asked the ACDA to study the feas-

ibility of coupling a ban on biological weapons with a

constructive international program in biology and medicine.

In a Memorandum to The Secretary of State, dated Sept. 11,

1963, I reported the conclusion that a first step should

be a major re-evaluation of U.S. policy regarding these

weapons. It would be premature to consider this ban prior

to a reappraisal of the weapons and policy. The memorandum

also pointed out the political and technical difficulties

in distinguishing between chemical and biological weapons,

and that a reappraisal should include both classes of

weapons, particularly in light of prior international

agreements.

Recommendations -

I therefore recommend that:

1. The Committee of Principals take action to

defer any decision regarding the transfer of chemical weapons

to West Germany until a reappraisal of chemical and bio-

logical weapons has been concluded.

The Committee of Principals take action to

initiate a reappraisal of the utility of chemical and

biological

weapons and the national policy which governs

their use.

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3. The Committee of Principals request the

reappraisal be conducted by a study panel reporting to

the National Security Council and comprised of repre-

sentatives from the Department of State, Department of

Defense, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Central

Intelligence Agency, Office of the Assistant to the President

for National Security Affairs, Office of the Assistant to

the President for Science and Technology, and appropriate

technical and military experts who could

be brought in as

consultants; and that the panel consider all the political,

military, and technical aspects associated with chemical

and biological weapons.

Wilia CIrtu

William C. Foster

Director

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