MEMO:1963-1964 MIAMI STATION ACTION TO AID USG INVESTIGATION OF THE MURDER OF JOHN F. KENNEDY
Originator: CIA
From: WITHHELD
To: THE RECORD
Document date: 03/22/1977
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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АЛЛЛА

1104-10423-10226

• 2022 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 F

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77-0584

22 March 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT:

1963-1964 Miami Station Action to Aid

USG Investigation of the Murder of John

F. Kennedy

Basis for My Knowledge About This Topic

I served from 29 March 1962 to 20 August 1966 in

the Foreign Intelligence Branch of the Miami Station. Duties

included handling a certain number of Cuban exiles resident

in Miami used to support FI operations into Cuba. I also kept

up loose contact with other Cuban exiles who were considered

informants on specialized aspects of Cuban affairs and Cuban

exile affairs. My duties also included workine verv closelv

with the Station Covert Action Branch and less closely with

the Counterintelligence and Paramilitary Branches. I had

irregular contact with the Station Security Office.

Locating Agency Records!of Miami Station Action to Help

Investigate the John F. Kennedy Murder

2. • During March 1962 to mid-1964 communications security

between Has. and

the Miami Station was not always good. Has.

Cuban Task Force senior and middle grade officers often used

the telephone to

communicate requests to the Miami Station or

to check on developing

operations. The feeling at Headquarters

was that the double-talked conversations were fairly safe be-

cause they were flowing by land lines and were therefore not

: to ELINT/COMINT collection.In 1964 there was a crack-

down on telecons between Hqs and the Miami Station. I believe

this was at Station Chief Theodore G. Shackley's request. One

reason for reducing telecons was security and the other reason

was that Headquarers officers were not always careful to fol-

low their telecons with a cable or dispatch for the record. I

describe this communication situation because it is quite pos-

sible that immediately following the Kennedy murder Headquarters

nay have phoned requiredments to COS, Miami and Miami Station's

Jffice of Security to conduct investigations and then failed

to follow up with cables for the record.

mid-April 1962 until shortly after Mr. Shackley's

departure PCS in the spring of 1965 the Miami Station sent Hqs.

a situation report by cable at the end of each work day. Each

operating

and administrative component of the Station contributed

to this SITREP, which was produced with specific topical sections

about developments at the Station, in Cuba, in intelligence

reporting and in operations under

way.Occasionally the SITReP

would report results of investigations conducted by Station

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operations officers through contacts in the Cuban community in

Florida. These investigations are discussed below. The SITREPS

had a Headquarters file category classification number on them;

for I saw them in 1973 in folders in the office of David McLean,

a Latin American Division historian. I believe these SITREPS can

be retrieved with

the help of document and file retrieval:

specialists

at IP/CFS, Rooom GC 52. I believe the SITREPS for

November-1963 through March 1964 will contain information about

efforts of the Miami Station to investigate Cuban links to the

murder of President Kennedy.

4. Obviously the Miami Station SITREPS would have made only

cursory mention of Station efforts to investigate a Cuban role

in the Kennedy affair. Sensitive and detailed reports by the

Station concerning the investigation may have gone to Has via

special cable channels. However, on the chance that some reports

of investigation were sent by routine cable and dispatch I would

suggest a check with Chief, Information Management and Planning

roup, Room 1D27, Phone Red 9407 about the possibility of using

the "SPIN" search

system to find record of Miami Station efforts

to investigate the Cuban role in the Kennedy affair. This system

permits querying computerised records for

textual keywords com-

bined

with area codes and other key factors to locate documents

containing complex types of information.

5. Finally, I suggest IP/CFS may be able to help locate

the archival copies of Miami Station memoranda to the Miami

field agencies of the FBI and Secret Service for the period

commencing with the President's assassination.

Miami Station Operation Procedures for Crash Investigations

6. Soon after his arrival at the Miami Station Mr. Shackley

organized several fast reaction procedures for coping with

rapid developments

in Cuba or in the Cuban exile community in

Florida which requiredspeedy and augmented reporting. The fast

reaction procedures involved alerting officers of the Station

a. Query resident agents in Cuba who had W/T

commo with our Station or a combination of W/T

to the agent and telephonic response from the

agent to a cutout in the Miami Cuban community.

b. Use of singleton Cuban exile support agents

and the AMOT intelligence service in Miami to

communicate with lists of on-island contacts by

phone or with lists of Cuban exilesin the US who

were irregular sources of information.

East real elone che at

I believe the first time I recall seeing the Station's

reaction investigative systems employed was in late

April 1962 when word was received from another US Agency

that Cuban exile paramilitary activist Rolando Masferrer

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had left his base in New Jersey and was believed to be headed

to Florida with a band of men for an operation against Cuba in

violation of the Neutrality Act. I recall that a number of of-

ficers in our Fl Branch, the Paramilitary Branch

and the CA

Branch were asked to "hit the streets" (of Miami) to query

armaments of Masterrer. The AMOl service was, ne course, the

armaments of Masferrer. The

princidal mechanism for checking on Cuban exile actions in

violation of the Neutrality Act.

8.

The late spring and early summer of 1962 saw extensive

use of the Station's fast investigation capability. Refugees

arriving at Opa-Locka Airbase refugee processing center began

in late May to report that some kind of major counterrevolutionary

action was afoot in Cuba, that an invasion of Cuba was antici-

there was

unusual military movement

inside Cuba. I recall being one of many case officers directed

by Mr. Shackley through my Branch Chief to alert my particular

string of Cuban exile informants to phone relatives inside

Cuba and try to get supportive information through double-

talk. I remember during the first two weeks of June I was

given lists.

at Opa

Locka,

told to seek

again. Other

case officers had

similar assignments.

9.

During the period following the Cuban missile crisis

(fall

1962) to the time of the Kennedy murder I believe I recall

perhaps five major incidents

where Mr. Shackley called on

officers throughout the large Station to set in motion the

procedures for checking through Cuban agents and informants on

some rapidly developing problem of national security interest.

On two occasion in late 1962 and early 1963 I believe we

scrambled to activate our sources because President Kennedy

was travelling about in the USA.a. Headquarters and internal

USG security agencies wanted to be alerted to the presence of

known dangerous Cuban exile activists in the area

the President

was to visit and wished to learn of any conspiracies being

hatched in the Cuban exile community or in Cuba to explolt

or interfere with the President's movement.During 1964-65

I recall being alerted by my Station superiors on a number

occasions

to have my sources collect fast information on

such topics as:

a.

Cuban exile or Castro Cuban conspiratorital

acts to exploit the visit of the Pope to New

York.

b.

Plans of Cuban exile groups to carry out

attacks on or infiltrations into Cuba in vio-

lation of the Neutrality Act.

Location of automatic weapons, explosives

and sea craft being assembled by Cuban exile

groups in suspected violation of the Neutrality

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Procedures Employed By Miami Station to Aid Investigation

of the Kennedy Murder

10.

At the time of the Kennedy murder I was on sus-

pension from active duty because I had let my finance ac-

countings fall behind.

I was, however, present in the fi

Branch at the Miami Station when my chief, Mr. Warren Frank,

issued

orders to all case officers (there were about 12 of

us in the Branch at that time) to contact our agents inside

Cuba and our support agents in Miami for leads possibly linking

Castro Cuba or the Cuban exile community to the murder. I do

not recall whether Mr. Shackley was on Station that day, but

I recall that Mr. Anthony Sforza, AMOT case officer, told me

later that he had received specific instructions from Shackley

about how the AMOT service was to go about aiding in the investi-

gation. I also recall quite clearly that there was communi-

cation from Hqs. to our Station about the need to query our

assets. == there was also some

communication from the FBI

and other agencies to our Station asking for information

about possible Cuban involement in the Kennedy murder.

11.

Although I was not released from my finance backlog

to join the investigation until the fourth day after Kennedy's

death, I recall making phone calls to agents of mine in Miami

and I recall sending a W/T message to my chief agent, (AMWEE-I,

in Cuba with questions about possible Castro Cuban involvement

in the murder of Kennedy.When I was released to meet with my

agents in Miami I recall levying requirements on agents AMGABE-1.

and AMPAN-22 related to the Kennedy murder. Later I asked

political contact and Cuban exile leader AMING-3 and agent

AMBLEAK-1 the same questions:

a. Get me all possible data on any Cuban exile

you know who disappeared just before of right after

the Kennedy murder and has since been missing from

Miami under suspicious circumstances.

b.

(To AMING-3 and AMGABE-1) Get me data on Cuban

exiles who approached you

or your associates during

the fall of 1963 for assistance in getting sizeable

amounts of funds, weapons or cars.

c.

To AMING-3 and AMBLEAK-1: Give me a list of all

Cuban exiles or Cubano-Americans you consider to be

capable of orchestrating the murder of President

Kennedy in order to precipitate an armed conflict

between Cuba and the USA.

d. To AMBLEAK-1. AMGABE-1 and AMING-3: Give me a

list of the richest Cubans in exile, Cubans posessing

sufficient personal wealth and the possible inclination

to bankroll the murder of President Kennedy.

12. The above questions levied on my agents were not my

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invention, but were the results of talk sessions held in

the FI Branch

of my Station by our Branch Chief and my fellow

case officers. Many other "angles" and questions about Cuban

links to the murder were assigned to specific agents, but I

do not recall them all.

Some weeks after the Kennedy murder I went to Mexico

for a meeting with my chief inside Cuba agent, AMWEE-1. Before

I left Station I went to the Reports Office Requirements Offi-

cer and read through some pertinent lists of requirements for

on-island assets. I recall the questions included observations

on-island assets may have made about the activities of

leader-

ship personnel in the Cuban government in the days prior to

and immediately following thekennedy murder. I recall that in

Mexico AMWEE-l described to me talks he held the day subse-

quent to the murder with fnu MELENDEZ Bach, a protocol officer

I the Cuban Foreign Relations Ministry, about what had trans-

sired in the Ministry when the news of Kennedy's death was

received by wireless.

I recall that the night of the day

that Kennedy was murdered AMWEE-1 saw Osmani Cienfuegos, a

Cuban leader, drive up to the house across the street from

AMWEE-l's house

at about 0100 hours He stayed in that house

for several hours. The house was occupied by an American

expatriate

technician who built audio=surveillance gear for

the Cuban intelligence service.

I recall that AMWEE-1 opined

that Cienfuegos visited the American that night because he

was one of the few American sources the Cuban government could

talk to in

Cuba about what was going on in the USA as a result

of Kennedy's murder.

14.

In closing I should

point out that my involvement

in seeking Cuban leads to the Kennedy murder was slight. Other

officers would have been more involved than I. I would assume

Mr. Shackley has the clearest

recollection of tasks the Station

may have been given

to support investigation of the Kennedy

murder. One final remark about Miami Station investigation of

the Kennedy murder, violations of the Neutrality Act and

other developments: All of us were very well informed about

the limitations on CIA's right to conduct investigations of

residing in the USA, whether they were alien residents

or US citizens. I do not recall anyone ever seeking information

on security matters in the USA which was not related to Cuban

exiles and their activities with respect to Cuba. On occasion

information indicating action by US citizens

to a) aid in violating the Neutrality Act or b) conduct es-

pionage on behalf of a foreign power. In such instances I

wrote up what I discovered and sent it through Station channels

to the appropriate US Agency concerned with the

particular

type of violation that was suspected and then withdrew from

further attempts to acquire information

Dould R. Neut,

Donald R. Heath,

Rm 3D02 Red 1591

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