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FROM :

TO :

TITLE :

TRANSCRIPT/REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS/AND EXHIBITS AS LISTED

DATE : 01/10/76

PAGES : 96

SUBJECTS :

TESTIMONY OF E. HOWARD HUNT

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION : T

RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED

CURRENT STATUS : P

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/01/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :

BOX 248-10

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

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SSCI DO.'

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State of Florida

County of Okaroosa

)

SS:

AFFIDAVIT

E. HOWARD HUNT, JR., being duly sworn, deposes and

saÿs :

1. On January 10, 1976, I was examined by Frederick D.

Baron, a counsel for the Senate Select Committee to Study

Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities.

On January 11, 1976, I was examined by both Mr. Baron and Howard

Liebengood, another counsel for the Senate Select Committee. At

both of these examinations I was accompanied by my counsel, Randall C.

Coleman, and advised of my Constitutional rights.

2. I have read the transcripts of both of the above-

mentioned examinations, and I hereby affirm that my testimony

therein is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

S. dead bushi

Howard Hunt,

Sworn to before me this

sixth

day of February, 1976.

Fat C. Elemis

Notary Public d

My Commi jon Expires Jan. 4, 1977

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ORIGINAL

Vol. 1 OF 3

Ohe Huitra Statra Srnate

SECURIT

Unauthorized Disclosure Subject

to Criminal Sanctions

R2146

TOF

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

313/22

_EC

Senate

Select Committee to Study Governmental

Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TOY

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF THIS DOGUMENT

AS SANITIZED

14-4-94

le

Saturday, January 10, 1976

Washington, D. C

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over

to the Coumittee for destruction)

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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20008*

(208) 664-8000

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might have directed me to this particular unit.

I was told that somewhere within the overall political

and psychological staff there was located a man with a small

office.

This man's name was Pash, Colonel Boris Pash, and

my understanding was that colonel Pash had been doing business,

let us say, with the Agency in west Germany for quite a while.

I sought out Colonel Pash. I was directed to his office

and found sitting with him another Agency officer named Artle

Lazarus

I'm not sure whether it isd

Mr. Baron. It's a Greek name.

18 his correct

first name, but he goes by l

Mr. Hunt. Very good. But in any case, he was known

throughout my career as

130508

And I was at that

point on, let's say, a search mission to determine whether the

alleged capability of Colonel Pash in"

wet affairs, which is

how it was referred to, that is liquidations, would have any

relevance to our particular problen of the Albanian dis-

appointments.

MI. Baron. By liquidations, you mean assassinations?

MI. Hunt. Aasassinations. Assassinations, kidaappings,

removals, let's say.

This had been alleged to me. So I spoke to Colonel Pash

in Mr.

presence. I explained the problem to him,

although at that juncture I'm quite sure that we had not

identified the Albanian suspect. So we were talking hypothetically

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earlier, that when I first inquired around for the location of

Colonel Pash and his assistant, the reaction I encountered

was a rather jesting one, and the impression I gained was

here were a couple of men who were drawing salaries and doing

very little.

And so when Colonel Pash seemed reluctant to become

involved in responding affirmatively to my questions, my

inference was that Colonel Pash and Lazarus could well not

have such a capability but for purposes of employment and

status, this was the job they had. But they didn't want

anyone to call upon them to activate their particular

abilities.

Now that was my impression, and I was a little disgusted

by it. I think I talked to the Chief of the PP staff later,

who was of course well aware of the Albanian problem and I

said I didn't get any satisfaction from Pash, but it doesn't

really make any difference because we don't have the name

of the suspected individual.

Mr. Baron. Just to stop here for a second and clear up

some of these details, were you under the impression that what

you called wet affairs, assassinations, kidnappings, or other

removals from the scene of troublesome individuals was the

primary function of this unit that Pash and lazarus

were

running?

MI. Hunt. Yes. In fact the only. As far as I knew, they

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had no other function. If they had another function, I was

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never made aware of what it was.

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Do you know anything about Colonel Pash's background?

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MI. Baron. I know a bit, but if you think that there are

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relevant details to put on the background, go ahead.

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Mr. Hunt. Well, I had not thought of Colonel Pash for

years until I began reading a book called "Lawrence

and Oppen-

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heimer," and I saw quite a few references to Colonel Pash. I

9

had known previously that he had been associated during the

10

war with the Manhattan Project and that he had a security

11

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background. And as I believe I touched on briefly before, it

was my impression that Pash had been active a couple of years

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at least before I knew him in West Germany with the sort of

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thing that we had been discussing so far today.

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Mr. Baron. What kinds of stories had you heard about

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Pash's previous activities?

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Mr. Hunt. Kidnappings mostly.

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Mr. Baron. And where were those?

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Mr. Hunt. West Germany and West Berlin.

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Mr. Baron. Do you know the names of any of the victims

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of the kidnapping or any of the people involved other than

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Pash and 6ia

2ax0S?

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Mr. Hunt. I do not.

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MI. Baron. And are you aware from whatever source of

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any assassination planning or attempts that Pash was involved

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MI. Hunt. I am not.

Mr. Baron. Does your answer include not only the period

of time before you talked with Colonel Pash but after you

talked with Colonel Pash?

Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir.

I might add that I was rather briefly at CIA headquarters

at that time and within a very short period of time after I

had had my interview with Colonel Pash, I was transferred to the

Guatemala project, the overthrow of Guatemala.

Mr. Baron. Is that the reason why you did not follow up

on the problem with this particular suspected double agent

after not receiving satisfaction from Colonel Pash?

Mr. Hunt. That carcainly could have been one reason.

On the other hand, I was chief of, I can see

I'm really going

to have to get into a lot more here. This is going to be.

dry and dull stuff for you.

the Late king

was a attent

Got mine. n

the sense that

had, brought him to

a sare, area..

we were keeping him housed

in

Egypt

i had made a trip at one time over to egypt to

try

to intercode indirectly with colonel Nasser, for, king 20g

who was very upset about the disappearance and loss of all

of his partisans in the operationa that the Agency was conducting.

And be was my coneern much less, - the the counter-

intelligence or espionage aspect, which is not my function, but

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had a alient king to worty about.

And also, we were tryingy

to loring

Tog into

this country.

So I becane interested, as

, matter

or

ring rog's digalfection in what was happening tor

his

mtainers

Why were they being parachuted to their

deaths in Albania? And that was my introduction to the whole

scene in West Germany, where the balance of his retainers

were

being held by the CIA. well, not being held, but where they

were being housed and trained for Albanian operations.

Mr. Baron. Can you explain the term "retainer"?

Mr. Hunt. Well, I understood that when he finally got

out of Albania, that he brought with him what I can best

describe as retainers. That is bodyguards, members of his

personal staff, probably some relatives. I think he had

four or five sisters with him. But the able-bodied portion

of those loyalists who came out with him we had largely taken

over

thenis to 20g. tho. li esteot, ordered then to coopesate,

with us.

And then he never saw them again. He naturally

became apprehensive.

So that was my interest in what was happening to the

Albanians that we parachuted in through Ring 80g. I had no

functional counter-espionage interest in the affair. This

would have been handled and this was handled by the Chief

of Counter-espionage for the Division.

Mr. Baron. Who would that have been at the

time?

Mr. Hunt. I can't remember at this point.

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Mr. Baron. But that would be the person primarily

responsible for taking care of this double agent problem?

Mr. Hunt. That's correct.

Mr. Baron. Are you aware of what happened with that

suspected double agent?

MI. Hunt. I have no idea because, as

I may have indicated

previously off the record, it became apparent some years later

that the unfortunate fate of our Albanian agents was linked

far more closely to the revelations of Kim Philby, the

Soviet agent who was in direct liaison with us in washington

and in Great Britain, rather than

any penetration, although

the possibility of a penetration was of course always there.

But I don't think that anybody was ever focused.

Again, I left for Latin American affairs. I left the

Division about that time and I really never heard about it

again. Doug Blaularde the Albanian chief, departed for

Southeast Asia, and the whole sort of complex of knowledgeable

people was broken up through normal transfers and special

activities like the Guatemala project.

MI. Baron. Was Dong blantarb knowledeable about your

approach to Colonel Pash?

Mr. Hunt. Very likely he was, yes. I don't think I

would have discussed anything with Colonel Pash about the

matter without talking tof ping about it.

Mr. Baron. Who

else would have known that you approached

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Colonel Pash with the idea in mind of seeing if an assassination

or a kidnapping couldn't be arranged?

Mr. Hunt. The then Chief of Foreign Intelligence and

Counter-Intelligence for the Division. And I think now that that

was

charley unglish, Charied saglish. I think he wore both

hats. He had both foreign intelligence responsibility and

the counter-intelligence responsibility. And I might have told

the division chief about it, although it was not, it had not

achieved

such stature at that point that I would have

necessarily talked to the Division Chief, who I believe at

that time was John Richardson

_of later Vietnam fame.

It's also possible that the Division Chief in that era

was John Baker, now deceased, who left that division to

become Chief of the PP staff, and that would have been a

normal follow through for me if I had discussed it with John

Baker, my direct Chief, and then to have discussed it with

him when he was my staff chief in the overall political and

psychological staff.

MI. Baron. Anyone else who would have known about your

approach to Colonel Pash or about --

Mr. Hunt. Or his function.

Mr. Baron. Yes, that Colonel Pash was considered to have

assassinationg as one of his functions.

Mr. Hunt. We had a Colonel Buffington who at that time

was a member of the 'PP staff, the overall PP staff, and I think

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that he would hav e been knowledgeable about it.

MI. Baron. Was that Milton Buffington?

MI. Hunt. Yes. I think he later went on and had a career

in the Office of Securit!.

Milton Buffington, ves.

Mr. Baron. Anyone else?

MI. Hunt. Yes, I have the names of three men who unfor-

tunately are dead. I could give those names, though. MI. C.

Tracy Barnes!

Mr. John Baker, |who I've already mentioned, and

Mr

outs w. thompson." These men were all at one time of another

chiefs of the Agency's PP staff.

Another man now living to the best of my knowledge who

might well have had knowledge of Pash's function was the

then-chief of the Economic Warfare staff of the PP staff and his

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name was Gates Lloyd. He later became the Deputy Director for

Support of the Agency.

There's a man named uncold Hursts Mayer a who was in the

Psychological Warfare Branch of the PP staff. I believe at

that time there was an International Organizations Branch

which later became the International Organizations Division,

then headed by Cord Myer, JI., and his Deputy at that time was

Tom Braden, the now-columnist whose wife has just ascended to

the Executive Office Building. There were members of the

Labor Branch, and I'm trying to think of that branch of office

that was down the hall.

There was a labor branch. The people in there might know.

There was a lady lawyer named Carol somebody who was very

knowledgeable about what was going on in that area.

Mr. Baron. Knowledeable about Pash's activities?

Mr. Hunt. Well, in the sense that when you have an

adjoining office, you usually pretty much know what the other

fellow is doing. Just in that sense, because her function

in the labor branch had nothing to do with Pash, to my

knowledge.

What I'm trying to do here is to give you sort of a

congeries of people alive and dead who would have had contact

knowledge, at the very least, of what Pash's function was.

Mr. Baron. Were each of these units referred to as

PB with a number following it?

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Operations and OPC,

the staff structure emerged as follows:

Reporting to the Deputy Director for Plans, i.e. Frank

Wisner, whose Chief of Operations then was Richard Helms, this

is the Clandestine Services Organization. There was .our

support staff, the PP staff, the Foreign Intelligence staff,

the Counter-Intelligence, Counter-Espionage staff, and of

course the famous staff "D".

Also reporting to the Deputy Director for Plans were all

of the geographical divisions, such as Western Europe, Southeast

Europe, Asia, Near East, and so forth.

Mr. Baron. Now at this point Frank Wisner was DDP,

Richard Helms was his deputy.

Mr. Hunt. Richard Helms was his Chief of Operations.

Mr. Baron. All right. The Chief of the PP staff was --

Mr. Hunt. Either Tracy Barnes or John Baker or Lomie

Thompaon.

MI. Baron. And you were located on the South European --

Mr. Hunt. Southern Europe Division.

Mr. Baron. Who headed that division at that point?

Mr. Hunt. Either John Baker or John Richardson.

So as you see, I had a line responsibility to the Chief

of the Southeast Europe Division, as indicated in Exhibit 3.

At the same time I had

a functional responsibility to the

Chief of the PP staff, who was Mr. Barnes of MI. Baker or

Mr o

Thompson just as the Chief of FI for the Southeast Euröpe

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Mr. Hunt. Does this satisfy your request?

Mr. Baron. It does, indeed.

Of all of the individuals that you have just mentioned,

which ones do you know to your own certainty were clearly

knowledgeable of Boris Pash's activities?

Mr. Hunt.

ele larass would be the first one, and

after that I can only speculate. I would have to assume that

Dong blanfarb acquired knowledge of it, but perhaps he acquired

knowledge through me. I'm not sure. I have made a list of

other people whom I have not mentioned who conceivably, by

virtue of personal contact or functional responsibility, might

well have been aware of Pash's true functional responsibility

within the Agency.

Mr. Baron. Before I ask you to tick off that list, let's

make it clear that all of the names, in addition to Artie!

are names that you have given as people who are

likely to have been knowledgeable of Pash's activities because

of their place in the organization structure at that time.

Mr. Hunt. That's correct, or as I have indicated in some

cases, as with the PP labor branch by virtue of physical

proximity to that office.

Mr. Baron. Okay. Why don't you now just run very briefly

through the names of other people who you think could conceivably

have been knowledgeable of Pash's function?

MI. Hunt. In some cases I'm going to have to give you their

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title designation rather than the name of the individual because.

so much time has passed, I have simply forgotten who it was

in that particular era.

"petor Sichel

who at that time was a member of the German

branch of the Western

Europe Division, he has since retired

and is running his family's wine business in New York. Certainly

the then Chief of Western Europe Division, of which Germany

was a functional part and the Chief of Operations of Western

Europe should know.

I would think that Jim Angleton, who would have had

direct knowledge and always was the Chief of the CI/CE staff.

The Chief of base in

Berlin

if in fact Pash conducted any

activities in that area, certainly the Chief of base in

Berlin

would have been knowledgeable about it.

Also, the Chief of base at hollack, which was where we

had the Cokien Operation going on. I don't know whether

Bill Harvy, that

is william Harvy, at that time was Chief of

Operations or Harlin or whether he was simply running the

tunnel, but Harvy might well

have some knowledge of Pash.

I would certainly assume that when we're talking about

liquidations and that sort of thing that the Agency's overall

Office of Security somewhere within it must have been involved,

such German Division personnel as might be available today.

West German, and I would also suggest that General Cushman might

be knowledgeable for this reason.

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It was about that time that General Cushman was still

assigned to the CIA. I could be wrong about that but I seem

to have a memory of Cushman being around in those days.

was then a Colonel. I had associated with him. In fact, we

had shared an office at one time, but that was several years

earlier. I would place it about early 1949. But I'm quite

sure that Cushman was around in that period of time and

involved with the PP staff, though what his function was I

don't know.

Now there are alive two close friends of mine who were

Mand Pials Part.

then members of the PP staff, Joseph ayen a

These are men who in effect established the PP staff for

Frank Wisner and then left to go on to other things. They

are both well known writers.

MI. Baron. Let me just return to one name that you

mentioned and that is William Harvey.

Did you -- first, generally, what was the nature of your

operational relationships to William Harvey after this period?

Did you have any?

Mr. Hunt. I never had any, no. In fact, I've only seen

him once in my life, to the best of my recollection.

MI. Baron. As you may know, William Harvey was tasked

in 1961 with setting up an executive action fapability at

the CIA, tasked originally by Richard Bissell to carry out

assassinations if required.

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because we're going to slop over into this other matter that

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Mr. Liebengood wants to talk about tomorrow.

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Mr. Baron. Well, why don't we hold off then, except

that for this one question, which is are you aware of any

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involvement that Dr. Gunn had in assassination planning?

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Mr. Hunt. No, I'm not because I'm just not familiar

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with assassination planning. And specifically, for that

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reason, I'm not aware of any involvement that De. Gunn might

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have had.

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Mr. Baron. Let's return now to the point of departure,

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which was your conversation with Colonel Pash and the events

WARD & PAUL

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that led up to it.

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Who were your supervisors that gave you the impression

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that Colonel Pash was prepared to carry out assassinations?

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Mr. Hunt. I wish I could give you a distinct name.

I

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think I covered that in an impressionistic way by saying that

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Tracy Barnes and John Baker, who were at different times

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sequentially chiefs of the pP staff, it seems to me that Barnes

was probably the one who indicated that Pash had such a

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capability.

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I know that I did not get it from Blanfarb and I'm

quite sure that my information did not come from within the

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Southeast Europe Division. It must have come accordingly

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from the Political and Psychological staff, the contacts there,

and I would have to say Tracy Barnes or John Baker are the

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Mr. Baron. And neither of those two men are alive today?

Mr. Hunt. That's right.

MI. Baron. Did whoever gave you the information about

Boris Pash indicate to you that there were any other units

in the CIA that could take care of such problems by means of

assassination?

Mr. Hunt. No. My distinct impression and recollection is

the function, if indeed it existed, and I believed it then

to have existed as I do today, was centralized or focused in

Colonel Pash and MeteL

Mr. Baron. Now what would have been the formal title

of the unit. that Colonel Pash and A

tie

Lazarus were running?

Mr. Hunt. If it had one, I never knew it.

Mr. Baron. Can you add any other detail to the record

on your talk with Colonel Pash and his reaction to your

request that he consider on a general level the planning o

an assassination of a suspected double agent?

Mr. Hunt. Well, as I recall it, my conversation with hin

was a relatively brief one. I stepped in the door, met him,

saw

sus, who I knew briefly, or at least knew him

by sight, and I sat down and I said, we have this problem in

the Albanian branch. We may need somebody liquidated in

Western Germany. Can you handle it if that day comes, or if

it comes to that?

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And he seemed a little startled. I have already indicated

that. What I'm trying to do now is to refine my thoughts more

than I did previously when we were taking sort of a wide

swipe at the canvas.

Colonel Pash indicated or said to me that it was a matter

that would have to be approved by higher authority and as

a relatively low ranking officer in those days, I thought he

was probably referring to Frank Wisner. And indeed, he may

have. It never got pushed up to Frank Wisner's level because

there

no direct approach or a request for such approval

was ever made.

I left with the impression that Colonel Pash was glad

that he wasn't going to have any business for me or that he

had successfully deflected whatever approach I might be making

to him because it would give him andg

saruss an

opportunity to drink more coffee and to draw their salaries

from the Agency while affecting to do a job that they were

perhaps not equipped to do.

Now again, that impression I had when I left him was at

variance with what I had heard before I came in, where I heard

21

he and h

or he at least had been active in West Germany

22

in wet affairs, particularly kidnappings and that sort of

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thing.

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Mr. Baron. And you carried into his office the impression

that Colonel Pash was a man who could carry off an assassination

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Mr. Hunt.

No.

Mr. Baron. Did you ever discuss this matter with anyone

other than Colonel Pash?

MI. Hunt. In that context?

MI. Baron. In the context of assassinations or kidnapping.

MI. Hunt. Well, I wasn't involved in plotting or planning

any kidnappings. Again, I would

suggest that I might very

well have gone back to Blanfarb, who was the most interested

individual, because he was responsible at the branch level

For King Zog as an operational tool, whereas, I had an overall

political responsibility for Ring,

80g

And I have described

the background of that, the rubric under which I became

interested in the Albanian problem in the first place, and

then having talked to Pash, it would have been only natural

for me to have said to

Blantare.

look, I've talked with Pash

and he says it will have to be approved by higher authority.

Now have you gotten, we don't have a body yet, but when you

get a name to put on the target, at that point you will have

to

carry the ball and take it on up the line.

Mr. Baron. And you never heard anything further about it?

Mr. Hunt. No, probably because I went within, I think.

a comparatively few weeks off to the Guatemala operation.

Mr. Baron. Did anyone ever mention it to you, say did

ast ever mention it to you again?

Mr. Hunt. No. I next saw Antle bazars infraspel in

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it would be about '57 or '58, and I had dinner in his home in

Taipei, and I'm quite sure I said at that time, whatever

happened to Boris Pash, or what do you hear from Boris?

4

Now he was a rather unusual individual to say the least,

5

and I don't think Arties told me that he was dead. I don't

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know who told me that Boris, that Pash died, but whatever

8

he said, it was, well, he was okay the last time I saw him

and that was the last time we ever discussed it.

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10

Mr. Baron. And you didn't discuss this request?

Mr. Hunt. No.

11

Mr. Baron. Where did you receive the impression that

12

Colonel Pash was dead?

WARD &

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Mr. Hunt. I guess when, either from reading the Lawrence

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and Oppenheimer book or from the newspapers, from the Crewdson

15

story. I don't think at the first level when I began recalling

16

the story, I don't think I was aware that Boris Pash was

17

dead.

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Mr. Baron. In the Crewdson story there is an allusion

to the fact that Colonel Pash is probably dead.

20

Are you saying that that came from Crewdson's research

21

and not from yourself?

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Mr. Hunt. Oh, yes, that came from Crewdson's research, not

mine.

Mr. Baron. This is more than a minor note on the record,

Colonel Bash is not dead.

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Mr. Hunt. Oh, good, I thought he was dead.

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my assumption at that time was that authorization by Frank

Wisner would have been

all that would have been required to

proceed with the project had it ever materialized. That is

the Chief of the Clandestine Services.

Now whether Frank would have been required to go to

Allen Dulles, I rather doubt it. I think it is something that

he would have been able to authorize himself.

Mr. Baron. All right. Let me ask you now before we get

into colonel Pash's version of the story, which we will,

whether it is possible that you are confusing the time periods

here?

So as not to hold anything back from you, Colonel Pash

has said that the time period has to be off because he

retired from the Agency, or left the Agency in probably late

'51. It's possible that it went into 1952. But he wasn't

with the Agency in any capacity after '52. And in fact, his

status was that of a military officer who had been detailed

to the Agency from approximately 1948 to '52.

Now does that affect your recollection in any way of the

period '54 to '55 as the period when your conversation with

Boris Pash took place?

Mr. Hunt. Well, from 1950 to 1953, I was in Mexico as

Chiet os the orc station.

Cast

Mr. Baron. And where were you from the time that you

joined the Agency until you went to Mexico?

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Mr. Hunt. I was a member of the PP staff.

Mr. Baron. Is it possible that your conversation with

Boris Pash about the assassination of a suspected double agent

took place in that time period?

Mr. Hunt. I would have to say it's possible, yes.

Mr. Baron. Would you have been dealing with East

European problems or --

Mr. Hunt. No, I was dealing with West European problems.

Mr. Baron. I'm sorry. Would you have been dealing with

a problem like this one, a problem with a suspected Albanian

double agent in West Germany during that time period?

MI. Hunt. I can't recall having done so. The west

European Division had its own PP staff officer and he would

have been the one to take it up, whereas my recollection is

that this was generated at a later time when I was in the

Southeast European Division and had a direct reason to become

interested in the matter.

I have to say that it is possible, but I would say maybe

5 percent possible.

• Mr. Baron. And you accord so small a possibility to

the hypothesis that you actually talked to pash about this

problem in '49 or '50 because you were not involved in

operations in West Germany at that point.

MI. Hunt. No, I was not.

MI. Baron. And

Ring &og vàs not your dident.

at that

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point?

Mr. Hunt. No, no.

He was not.

Mr. Baron. Where were you in '49 and '50 physically?

MI. Hunt. Physically I was in the JRK building with the

PP staff and my direct supervisor at that time was

Joe Brown,

who I have mentioned earlier.

Mr. Baron. Did you travel to West Germany during that

period of time?

Mr. Hunt. No, I did not.

Mr. Baron. In the later period, '50, '54, and '55, that

you were discussing, did you travel often to West Germany?

Mr. Hunt. No.

Mr. Baron. You were stationed in Washington?.

Mr. Hunt. I was stationed in Washington and from the

period after I left Mexico, which was in, I think, March of '54

for about the ensuing year when I left for the Guatemala project,

I was in Washington or the SE Europe Division. So I had

that continuous almost year there.

Mr. Baron. Is there anything else that adds to your

sense of the probabilities that this conversation took place

in '54 and '55?

Mr. Hunt. No. My restructuring is as I have given it

to you, my recollections.

MI. Baron. Okay. Let me ask you the same question in

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maybe a straightforward manner.

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political affairs, and his was the 7th, which had less well

defined functions. And diste hazards was a member of that unit.

Do you recall any dealings that you had in your earliest

period of service with the CIA with PB7, now that I've refreshed:

your recollection?

Mr. Hunt. Not as such, no. Does Colonel Pash define

what his functions were in the PB7?

i.

Mr. Baron. Before I answer that one, let me ask you one.

Mr. Hunt. I've been trying to develop a helpful colloguy

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here.

MI. Baron. This is very helpful.

Do you recall any charters that any of those planning

branches had?

Mr. Hunt. At this juncture, no. I was only aware that,

I think mine was PB2. This is when I first went in in 1949

or 1950. I think that was

Soc Bryan's outfit.

Mr. Baron. Colonel Pash described the charter of PB7

as giving PBY responsibility for such other functions as the

six other units didn't perform.

Does that square with your recollection of what he was

doing in those early days?

Mr. Hunt. Well, you see, I don't associate Colonel Pash

with the very early days. I associate him with a later period,

24

about three years or five years later.

25

Mr. Baron. Do you have any specific recollection of Colonel

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Pash's activities in the years 1949 to 1952?

Mr. Hunt. Not at all, no. My only other collateral

3

recollection is that Colonel Pash was said to have come to us.

He was recently assigned in Germany and he had come to us

5

6

from there. That was all that I knew.

Mr. Baron. Artile lazarush

who has also testified this

7

past week on this subject, said that his recollection of the

8

charter of PB7 was that it gave PBT responsibility for

9

assassinations, kidnappings and such other functions as higher

10.

authority may assign or as were not being performed by other

11

units.

12

13

Does that square with the impression that you were given

by your supariors of the functions of Colonel Pash's unit?

14

15

MI. Hunt. Yes. I didn't even know that Antie was

still alive.

so Arties then supports my functional recollection,

16

let's say.

17

Mr. Baron. Let's introduce as Exhibit 6 an article in

18

19

the New York Times dated January 8th, 1976, headed "Retired

Colonel Denies Heading CIA Unit for Assassinations."

20

(The document referred to was

21

marked for identification as

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Hunt Exhibit No. 6)

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24

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with real certainty that no such conversation took place and

that even in terms of exploring the possibility of assassination

planning or inquiring into the capability for assassination

planning, he maintains that assassinations were never raised

with him, what do you

then have to say about his

testimony?

MI. Hunt. I would have to say that his perceptions and

mine were at variance and that we were engaged in some sort

of an Aesopian dialogue in which neither of us understood

what the other was saying.

I had no other reason to approach him. I had never heard

of the man except in that particular context.

Mr Baron. And there was no other reason for them

discussing capabilities for an assassination?

Mr. Hunt. That's correct.

Mr. Baron. Were you aware of any specific function that

Colonel Pash performed with the CIA after the date of 1952?

Mr. Hunt. Well, my recollection is that I saw him in

'54 and '55 and that's the only specific function that I can

relate him to.

Mr. Baron. Now you have drawn a chart of the PP staff,

Exhibit 4, that locates Colonel Pash and Artiest arass on the

PP staff.

Is it possible that they served on the PP staff before the

date the Colonel Pash gives as his retirement date from the

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CIA, which is sometime in '52?

Mr. Hunt. Is it possible? Yes, I beliéve it's possible

because

must was one of the original people in OPC.

Mr. Baron. At what point did OPC merge or was it

transformed?

when I was

Mr. Hunt.

well, it merged with OSO, I think, in 1953

OFC stacion in Mexico and?, becam

messed

station

in Mexico in '53, and

I came out of there in, I think, March of '54, I left Mexico.

By that time the merger had taken place.

Mr. Baron. So is it possible that this chart could have

been a chart of the PP staff as it operated under the OPC

structure, the 453?

MI. Hunt. Yes. In fact, I don't think that there was

any particular change from the PB to the PP era.

MI. Baron. The reason for my own confusion here is that

Colonel Pash and Asti

We have both said that at the

point when OPC was merged, or at some point shortly thereafter,

PB7 was abolished and they don't know what became of it.

They say the functions that these seven planning branches

performed were scrambled and reorganized and they were never

sure exactly who carried through the functions that had

previously been assigned to PB7.

Mr. Hunt. Well, I never heard any more about it.

Just for perhaps a bit more clarification, the labor

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55

unit or branch as it appeared in the PP staff following the

merger, that had the same function and the same personnel as

let's say whatever PB enumerated or numerical designations.

So it's just a question of terminology. I can see that for

chronological purposes you are interested in how I recall it,

whether I recall it by a PB numercial designation or by --

But since I never knew what the Pash-lazarus unit was designated,

whether it was designated by a word or by a number, it

doesn't help me at all. And for that reason I can't be

of more assistance to you.

Just go see Cölonel Pash. He's in such and such an office

down there.

Mr. Baron. Off the record for a second.

(Discussion off the record)

Mr. Baron. For the record now, while we were off the

record we agreed to continue this session a while to get into

one of two other areas. But I have a couple of questions to

tag on to the end of this one.

First of all, xtie Lagangs, in his testimony to the

Committee, said that he had no recollection of a conversation

with you where he was present, and you discussed assassination

of a double agent, or the planning for such a mission with

Colonel Pash and himself.

Do you, even having heard his testimony, still have a

clear recollection that

Dards was present when you

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had this conversation?

2

MI. Hunt. I do, because to the best of my knowledge and

belief, it was the first time that I had met.

Lazarus

4

That is, I had seen him in the corridors, but it was the

5

first time that I was able to append a name to the particular

6

individual who I had come to recognize visually.

My memory is further jogged in this respect, that

28amus

8

having identified me as a member of the SE division of the

9

staff, at a later time but not much later, talked to me about

10

the possibility of his being assigned to the SE division.

11

12

And my recollection of the conversation is that Artie) told

me that he was a great friend of

the netropolitan of Athens

13

and that this friendship should be put to use for the Agency's

14

benefit, and it could be best done by his being transferred

15

to SE division for ultimate assignment to Athens.

16

MI. Baron. Do you have from anything in your experience

17

in the CIA any personal animosity toward Colonel Pash or

18

Artle razacus?

19

Mr. Hunt. On the contrary. I've always regarded myself

20

as a friend of antie Lazarusks, and I only had one contact

21

22

with Boris Pash. And I have no feeling about bim one way

or the other except that in his recent book I read about his

23

24

involvement in the Manhattan Project and I certainly admired

his contribution to national security in that era.

End 2A, b. 28

Mr. Baron.

In A

Lazarusya testimony, he gave us an

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account of an incident when

he was stationed at alpel and he said

that

had written a cable to CIA headquarters outlining a propaganda

program because he was involved in propaganda operations

at

that point. And he said, unbeknownst to him, someone else

in his station with the approval of the Chief of Station

attached an extra paragraph to this cable which suggested the

assassination of Chou En Lai in preparation for the Bandoeng

Conference where Chou En Lai was supposed to be an important

spokesman on behalf of many Asian nations.

And the way that Antle Lazarust recounted the incident,

he knew nothing about the paragraph that had been attached to

his cable until the reply came back very strongly in the

negative and eventually, a high ranking CIA official came out

to ralped to reprimand everyone involved in the incident for

suggesting assassination.

Do you have any recollection of that incident?

MI. Hunt. No, I have no knowledge. What year does

"refer to because I was in headquartete at our worth

Asian cormand headguarters jin Tokyo from, oh, about '55 to

'56 or '57

And I would have seen most of the traffic that

came out of

Taipol

in that period of time. But I don't know

if - I know that!

Artier stayed on in

raipel much after my

time in the Far East.

I don't know

when the Bandoeng Conference took place. I

remember it, of course, but I don't remember the year.

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Mr. Baron. It appears to me that the Bandoeng Conference

took place, according to lAstle Lazarns"setestimony, in 1955

and that the incident he was describing was either in '55 or

late in '54.

MI. Hunt. I had no recollection of it whatever. Arties

is not suggesting that is some basis for personal animosity,

I trust.

Mr. Baron. No. He did say, though, that you might have

had knowledge of that suggestion, although he wasn't sure of

it. He said you were involved at that time in a place where

you might have seen cable traffic like that.

MI. Hunt. That's quite right, but I never saw that

traffic.

MI. Baron. Let me pick up one last general question for

the moment at least on assassinations.

Do you have any knowledge of even the consideration of

assassinations at high levels of the American governemnt?

In other words, we have been using the term higher

authority and I would like to use it for the moment now to

refer to the level of the DCI or the National Security Council,

the President, his close White House advisors, Cabinet

officials, and the DCI.

Do you have any knowledge of any people at that level

seriously considering assassination planning?

Mr. Hunt. No, none. I think you have to bear in mind

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to me and I was surprised when on invasion day Castro was

2

alive. I now realize from testimony that Harvey and others

5

have given that the matter had been discussed long before my

arrival on the scene and it was in hand one way or the other.

5

Mr. Baron. When was your arrival on the scene?

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Mr. Hunt. Spring of 1960. I transferred up, I actually

made my trip to Havana

the summer of 1960, and then we had

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the Bay of Pigs invasion the following April. of '61.

MI. Baron. Now it is my own recollection of our

assassination report that no action was taken to carry out

an assassination plan against Castro as early as the spring

of 1960.

Did something -

MI. Hunt. No. I've giving you, I guess, a bureaucratic

answer. I was officially transferred back to Washington in

the spring of 1960 and I took some leave en route in Spain

indit have described. a descotion attempt of the Goban military

aletache in Madrid.

Eventually I made my way back to Washington in the spring

and early summer and got on the scene within a few days of

my actually reporting into the project managers, i.e., Bissell

and Barnes, who decided I would go down to Havana for a period

of time, and I went down for about a week and came back, and

by that time we were talking maybe July or so.

MI. Baron. July of '60?

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Mr. Hunt. That's correct.

Mr. Baron. Before we move away from Cuban operations,

let me show you one cable that we have which is from Madele

and it appears to be to CIA headquarters because it is marked

IN 75100, and it is dated September 16, 1964 in handwriting

that was put on the copy that we have by the Agency.

This is not the original copy of the cable but it appears

to be a copy that was deleted and paraphrased for the purposes

of providing it to the Committee in the early days of our

inquiry.

We will mark this as Exhibit 7.

(The document referred to was

marked for identification as

Hunt Exhibit No. 71

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Mr. Hunt. That can't conceivably have been a reference to

me.

Mr. Baron. Why is that?

Mr. Hunt. Because I had not been involved in Cuban

activities for more than three years at that time. I was

¡purposely isolated from all Cuban activities after the Bay

of pigs.

Mr. Baron. You said you did operate out of Madrid for a

period of time but it was later than September of '64?

Mr. Hunt. No. Let me clarify that.

I was sent to Madrid in either '64 or '65. I can't

recall which, and I stayed there less than a year.

was ou

the outside.

MY

presence there was know. to the statio.

My

communications were handled independently between myself and

Tom Karramessines, who was then Deputy Director for Plans.

This was a project that had been laid on by Dick Helms.

E had no slation contact at all and had no, responsibilities

to the station.

and I had no Cuban activities of any kind.

MI. Baron. And did you have any knowledge of a relatiunship,

to a plan to assassinate Castro, supposedly to take place

during a university ceremony?

Mr. Hunt. No.

Mr. Baron. Let's move on now to an entirely different

area, and I will ask you to begin by describing your general

role in the middle of the 1960s on the CA staff with regard to

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press publications or press placements or any responsibilities

you may have had for media relations.

Mr. Hunt. After Allen Dulles's resignation and retirement,

I was assigned for about a period of a week to the CA staff

and I then transferred to the newly set up Domestic Operations

Division under Tracy Barnes, which was really the Commercial

Operations Division, although it was never so-called.

I was the first Chief of Covert Action for the Domestic

Operations Division and we inherited as a new division a number

of projects that had been running for a period of time, that

had been run by the commercial staff of the Agency and by a

number of the geographic divisions.

The purpose of turning these ongoing projects over to the

Domestic Operations Division was to centralize contacts with

publishers in the United States for the benefit of geographic

divisions such as the Asian or Far East Division which might

want a book published on adonesta for a particular purpose.

They would come to Tracy Barnes with a particular reguest.

And I should say that the relationship with the Frederich

sagge

Publishing Company had been in existence for quite,

a period of time and I think they were managed by Cord Myer

International Division, if I'm not mistaken, or possibly the

CA staff. But what we received were ongoing operations.

We

were sent the case files for the tredasick A.

Pragger project,

for the Fodor

Guidessproject, for the

Continental Press

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organization, which had been operating out of

Psess Building in Washington. IWe had a project in

the National

India which

I visited on one occasion called Allied Pacific which we ran

out of afleesburg. virginia office.

I had no personal media contacts with American magazines

or newspapers, if that is the thrust of your question.

Mr. Baron. Actually, I'm interested in this whole area,

both contacts with specific reporters or media people dome-

stically or contacts with publishing houses or contacts abroad

in the publishing field.

Mr. Hunt. Well, I've given you the names of the publishing

houses that we had contact with. I did on one occasion meet

and I can't recall the purpose of it, it was a very large

textbook publishing house and their main offices were in

New Jersey. If I had an annual for publishers, I could pull

it out.

But beside from that publishing house, we never did any

business with them. I don't recall of any publishing houses

beyond Frederick 4.

praeges,

that is trade publishers, that

we dealt with.

We had our own press agency, Continental

Press, which I

imagine you're quite familiar with.

Mr. Hunt. Can you describe the standard mode of

operating with these various publishing outlets?

In other words, how would you have supplied them with

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material? Would you urge them to publish a manuscript they

already had from another source? Would you give them a

manuscript that CIA personnel had written under a pseudonym?

MI. Hunt. I don't think that ever took place, to my

knowledge.

What I recall is Pred Praeger meeting with Tracy Barnes

and me or individually, either in Washington of New York during

this period and saying I have a great book I would love to

publish, but it's not economically feasible, and I think it

would be good for you people abroad for the following reasons.

And we might come up with the differential or we might not.

I don't recall any Agency-created manuscripts that were

sent to

Praeger or for that matter, any other publisher.

I recall we had a lot of accounting problems with

Praejer

and finally we got really almost bogged down in arguments

about back copies. It was a little on the nightmarish side.

We did turn out some good books, but I couldn't give you a

title at this point. But I'm sure that they are a matter of

record within the Agency.

Mr. Baron. What was the nightmarish aspect of it?

Mr. Hunt. Well, apparently, before the project came

under

DOD, it had been handled on a very freewheeling basis by the

previous project managers. Praeges got everything he wanted

from the Agency in terms of subsidy money and expense money

and publicity money and that sort of thing and when we took

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it over it was brought under -- I hesitate to use the term

professional management, but I do so in a qualified sense in

that I was the only one, I guess, who knew anything about the

publishing industry, who had ever been connected with the

project.

So I knew a little about it.

And at that time, with the help of our own commercial

people within the Division, our accountants and auditors and

so forth determined that there were a number of aspects of

our fiduciary relationship with the

Praeger company that would

bear greater investigation.

So the relationship from a freewheeling one prior to our

DOD managerial take-over, it became from a freewheeling thing,

it became sort of an unpleasant continuous argument about

dollars and cents, rather than functional matters.

Mr. Baron. Out of what funds at the CIA did these monies

come from that we were giving to praeger?.

Mr. Hunt. I wouldn't have any idea, project money.

Mr. Baron. Who signed off on the project money?

Mr. Hunt. Well, it would depend on how much it cost.

I think that Karamessines could sign off up to $50,000 and

beyond that it had to be signed off on by Helms, I think. That

my best recollection. And I don't know -- as annual review

was conducted, and of course the division chief had to approve

it.

MI. Baron. Did the operation involve companies other than

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the ones you've mentioned? In other words, supplying funds

to companies other than the ones you've already mentioned?

Mr. Hunt. I don't know of any. None that I knew of.

I would be very surprised if a memorandum showed up saying

that we were dealing with Random House, for example. I just

don't recall now.

Mr. Baron.

Was there any other aspect to your liaison

with these publishing houses other than their seeking funds

to publish books that you were interested in having published?

Mr. Hunt. Only this, that the USIA was, I think, finally

brought into a formal relationship with DOD, at least my

part of it, and the head of the book division at USIA and i

would meet from time to time and he would indicate that he had

a good one that we really ought to do rather than USIA and

vice versa. And he knew fully of the Praeger relationship.

Mr. Baron. Can you describe the process that you would

go through to ensure the publication of a book that the CIA

was interested in having published? An example that I was

given by somebody on our staff who has been looking into this

was books written by or ghosted for Chinese defectors.

Mr. Hunt. As I recall it, the Chinese

branch sort of

ran a parallel operation. I don't recaall their coming

through us. I don't recall a defector book when I was in

that particular job. What I do recall is, I remember the

Near East Branch brining to our attention a book that they

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68B

would like to have praeges publish, and it had to do with the

Chinese-Pakistan. border

dispute, the name of which I can't

recall. So the manuscript would have been read by Praeger

or his principal assistant, and he would give an indication

of what he thought the marketability was. And at that point --

well, in this instance, we got the funds from the Near East

Division. When it came down to that, why should dod, who had

no interest in the

Pakistan bordes aispute, provide money for

that particular piece of propaganda. So the money would be

transferred somehow from the Near East Division's allocation.

It would be their project, but we would be the managers of it

when it got down to the point of dealing face to face with

Praeger

on the matter. My office would keep the division

apprised of the project, when publication could be expected,

and so forth.

MI. Baron. Were there any other CIA publishing proprietaries

than the two you have mentioned, illied Pacifle and Conttnental?!

Mr. Hunt. That I had personal knowledge of within the

Domestic Operations Division, no.

Mr. Baron. You qualified that by saying within the

Domestic Operations Division. Were there others?

Mr. Hunt. Because the international operations of Inter-

national Organizational Division under Cord Myer, ran quite a

few

things in conjunction with the Congress for Cultural Freedom,

for example. Radio Free Europe, those things that went on.

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Mr. Baron. Did CIA do ghostwriting

for non-CIA publi-

UL

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cations?

Mr. Hunt. I ghosted a couple of - I'm very reluctant

to go into this, although I have discussed it with John

Crowdson. But this is another one of those difficult areas

where it's very hard for me to prove.

There came a time in the spring of, I think it was the

spring of about 1969, when the Soviet Russia Division asked

me if I could cause to have published something on the --

by this time I was no longer with the Domestic Operation

Division. I was with Western Europe - on the increasing use

by the KGB Of

such covers as ferollat and things like that,

and Christ, I hope this doesn't get out.

And so I went to Helms. Howard Osborne was then Chief

of the Division, as I recall. He was late Director of

Security, and this had been staffed out. And I prepared the

article and it appeared in large portions unchanged under the

byline of Col. Sultrburger. And it was not a fabricated article.

It was just information which was supplied which he wrote

somewhat in his own style, and there was a second article which

appeared a month or two months later, and this was done by

Dick Helms.

Mr. Baron. Also under galesbunges! byline?

MI. Hunt. Yes. You could understand the difficulties

involved here and I don't need any more enemies. I have plenty.

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Now that is my own personal contribution to that sort of

thing. But I can't think of anything else that was done.

Mr. Baron. By other people?

Was it a general practice

to supply either prefabricated articles or the material for

articles to favorable press contacts in this country?

Mr. Hunt. Well, we know about the Reades!s Digestrbook,

f"Ken" which was largely a cooperative venture with the Agency,

and that was done by the SR Division.

You are aware of that, aren't you?

Now in that case, you see, the SR reached out on its own.

Penkoski! Papers was another example. We had nothing to do

with that in DOD. That was done, again, by SR division. And

I can understand why.

But basically, in answer to your question, I have given

you everything that I have personal knowledge of.

Mr. Baron. When you made the arrangement with

Colo

sai, ezhur gor

226-1

Mr. Hunt. I made no arrangement with him.

Mr. Baron. Who handled liaison with him?

Mr. Hunt. Dick Helms.

Mr. Baron. And was that a one-on-one arrangement or

were there other people knowledgeable?

Mr. Hunt. I believe it was a one-on-one, old school tie

arrangement.

NW 50955 DocId: 37202418 Page 43

MI. Baron. Was there any list kept at the CIA of favorable

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End Tape 2B 8

Frederick Ai Praeges organization. I felt that a strict

construction of the CIA charter made the project quite suspect

because if we were doing a book, for example, on Indonesiant

Communism,

who was the target? It would have been highly

inappropriate for United States citizens to be the target

of the particular book, and we did a hell of a good book on

Indonesian

Communism. It became about this thick. I can't

recall the title.

WARD

&PAUL

A10 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

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#PAUL

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If your targets are foreign, then where are they? They

don't all necessarily read English, and we had a

bilateral

agreement with the British that we wouldn't propagandize theis

"people. " So unless the book goes into a lot of languages or it is

published in India, for example, where Fnglish is a lingua franca.

then you have some basic problems. And I think the way this

was rationalized by the project review board that looked over

the

Praeges operation, and the fodor, thing

and Continental

and things like that was that the ultimate target was

I Press

2.a...

formed, which was true, but how much of the Praeget output

actually got abroad for any impact I think is highly arguable.

Now, in the case of contental Press, the material was

physically mailed from Washington to foreign targets, the

Turkish newspapers, I think particularly the Mideast New

Agency was a client. The mere fact that the project was

rooted in the United States gave it sort of a credibility

lustre abroad in that particular era. If it came out of

Washington then it was probably okay.

But I -f Continental Press had no domestic U.S. papers

as clients. What I'm trying to get at is that DOD handled

operations which were based domestically in the United States,

the commercial operations, and this includes proprietary

airlines and things like that, whose ultimate target was

abroad. The principal target or even a tangential target was

not the United States citizen.

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WARD

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

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Mr. Baron. But, with anything that was published in

English, the United States citizenry would become a likely

audience for the publication?

4

MI. Hunt. A likely audience, definitely.

5

Mr. Baron. Did you take some sort of steps to make sure

6

that things that were published in English were kept out of

8

9

10

or away from the American reading public?

MI. Hunt. It was impossible because Praeger was a

commercial U.S. publisher. His books had to be seen, had to

be reviewed, had to be bought here, had to be read. Again. I

11

12

say it was a matter of great difficulty. Mr. Barnes resolved

all that philosophically, and I simply carried out the dicta.

13

Mr. Baron. What was your philosophical opinion of the

14

danger of propagandizing Americans?

15

16

Mr. Hunt. Well, I knew that it was not a part of the

Agency charter, and it was a matter that the USIA looked at.

17

I talked about it occasionally. The USIA coincidentally had

18

come under some criticism at that time for subsidizing certain

19

publishers in the United States. That became known; I don't

20

recall how. I discussed with the USIA book man and with

21

Barnes the danger that we might be criticized for the same

22

reasons. I was never enchanted with the Praeges operation.

23

thought it cost far too much money and had minimal benefits

24

abroad, and further, we had the liability, the vulnerability

25

to quite reasonable critcism that we had U.S. citizens as a

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target, or an audience, I should say.

Mr. Baron. Were there any precautions taken against

dissemination in America of publications by CIA proprietaries

in English?

Mr. Hunt. Proprietaries, well, my only personal knowledge

is the Continental Press operation which I say was

simply mailed

out of Washington. That was the only precaution, rather than

our people mailing them themselves.

Mr. Baron. Were any techniques used to prevent

contamina

tion of American intelligence by picking up on things that the

CIA was actually publishing or arranging to have published?

Mr. Hunt. I would assume so, and I would guess that that

would be done in the first instance by the knowledgeability of

the reports officers in the various geographic divisions

at

headquarters who would scan newspapers, for example, or they

would receive raw reports from

Badia.

let's say, and see that

there had been a big sale of a particular book which we had

sponsored, which they knew we had sponsored but nobody else

knew. of course,

the nation in New delhi would have known about

it, too.

So I would say that it was a pretty good fail-safe. The

area of knowledgeability was high. For one thing, I traveled

some in those days. I traveled to Bombay. Ii talked to the

chief of

Base?

there. I traveled to New Delhi and talked to

the Chief of Stattoo there, who was my CA opposite number, and

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Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

1

keep them up to date as to what we were planning. I would do

2

the same in France and so forth.

3

MI. Baron. Were there any specific instances that you know!

4

of of an eventual placement in the U.S. press of a story that

5

the CIA generated of fabricated abroad somewhere? For instance,

6

a story could conceivably be picked up by the UPI or by Reuters

7

that the CIA had planted abroad.

8

Mr. Hunt. I can't recall anything significant. I would

9

guess that during the Cuban, during the days of maximum

10

Cuban operation that sort of thing happened. I would think it

11

would be unavoidable, but I can't specify.

WARD & PAUL

12

Mr. Baron. And are there any other instances than things

13

you have mentioned of direct placements of stories in the u.s.

14

press by the CIA?

15

Mr. Hunt. I have mentioned the KGb

which was a

16

cooperative venture withpreadong Digestr the two subger

17

things. No, I can't recall.

18

Mr. Baron. I touched earlier upon the possibility of

19

disseminating derogatory information about Agency targets. These

20

were you aware of any general program of that nature to discredit

21

either a foreign political leader or a foreign political fac-

22

tion, or domestic political groups or leaders?

23

Mr. Hunt. To the latter question, no.

Domestic, I am

24

not aware of any.

25

I think the Soviet Russia division was quite active, and it

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kept a list, for example, and maintained a very good list of

KGB officers abroad, and when one would show up at Luanda, for

example, they would make sure that the local press got the

man's dossier, or at least a blind handout so that they would

know who the fellow was, much as the Butz counterspy operation

is doing today against the CIA.

MI. Baron. Did you make arrangements, of did you know

of arrangements being made for non-CIA authors to write pieces

that were favorable to the CIA?

MI. Hunt. No.

Mr. Baron. There was no funding of that kind of opera-

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ton?

Mr. Hunt. You mean sort of flackery, the favorable

publicity for the Agency, is that what you imply?

MI. Baron. Right.

Mr. Hunt. No.

MI. Baron. What about subsidizing non-CIA authors to

write stories of any sort, of books of any sort that the CIA

was interested in having published?

Mr. Hunt. I would say this in a qualified sense. Where

in the past we had given Prage a commitment to buy & copies

of his book on the Himalayas, Himalaya®

problem, obviously

we were subsidizing the author of that book because it was

our money that Preeges Tas ultimately passing to the indi-

vidual, but that was Praeges doing it rather than us. In

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other words, there was never any face to face contact.

MI. Baron. Aside from dealing through publishing houses

that you had established contact with, did you deal individually

with authors who were non-CIA employees?

Mr. Hunt. I did not. I don't think DOD did. I think that

Far East Division did.

MI. Baron. Do you know with whom?

Mr. Hunt. You mentioned /Chinese defectors for example.

well, they dealt also, the Soviet Russia division dealt with

Frank. Githney on the Penkoski case. In fact, I had lunch with

Pran

while he was doing the Penkoski,Papers. So that was.

an example.

Mr. Baron. Did they have a regular program?

Mr. Hunt. Yes, I think so.

Mr. Baron.

Both of those two divisions?

MI. Hunt. Yes.

Mr. Baron. Is there anything else that you think we would

need in order to have a fairly clear, complete picture of the

relations to the media of the publishing industry?

MI. Hunt. Well, I think you could get probably a good

deal more information from Cord Myer, who had a lot of that

directly under him when he was Chief of the International

Organizations Division, and of course, he served as Deputy

Chief of Clandestine Services for quite a while. He would

probably have as panoramic knowledge as anybody. I guess he's

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80

was that we had made the -- the President had given certain

undertakings to Cuban leadership and to our own paramilitary

people, and had failed to carry them out.

However, this fact was successfully disguised for a number

of years, but Dulles and Dick Bissell paid the price.

In any events, the Bay of Pigs cost Dulles his leadership

of the Agency, and I had the utmost respect for him. I was

associated with him as an assistant for the special Cuban

Bay of Pigs purposes, for a period of several months prior to,

perhaps six months prior to hig eventual retirement.

I had had occasional contacts with him as a

Chief of

Station and I had seen him in Japan when he came over there

and we had some discussions. Mr. Dulles brought into the

formal Central Intelligence Agency the same feeling of esprit

de corps that we had all enjoyed in the Office of Strategic

Services, and this was largely lost during the McCone director-

ship. And I think we had some admiral after that, Admiral

Radford, possibly. We got under a group of managers, and the

human element that we had enjoyed in OSS was gone with the

passage of Allen Dulles until Dick Helms came back in. You

see, I'm an unrepentent admirer of Allen Dulles and the way we

used to do business. Why do I say that? Because the way we did

business during Mr. Dulles's directorate was precisely the wav

we did it in OSs during General Donovan's creation and directioni

of that organization. In OSS, which was Allen Dulles's trainingh

ground

as much

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## Page 52

SECRET

Exhibit: 7

FROM

LADRID

ACTION: DC/WH/SA 3

INFO : DDP, VR*

SECRET 1612287

PRIORITY DIR INFO PRIORITY WAVE CITE

MADR 1705

16 SeAT 64

IN 15/00

REF

1681 18 73706

1. CIA OFFICERS MET WITH SUBJ REF 15. SEPT. ONLY "IMPORTANT"

INFO HE PROVIDED WAS VAGUE REFEREXCE TO AGENT-1 PLAN ASSASSIVATE

CASTRO ATTEMPT WOULD SUPPOSEDLY TAKE PLACE DURING UNIVERSITY

CEREMONY AT WHICH CASTRO PRESENT. AGENT-1 REPORTEDLY RESPONSIBLE

ARRANGING DELIVERY CUBA ONE BELGIAN FAL EQUIPPED WITH SILENCER.

AGENT-1 WAS TO BE TRIGGERIAN SUPPORTED BY UNIDEN ARMY OFFICERS.

ABOVE PLAN NOW APPARESILY ABANDONED.

2. SAID AGENT-1 ANXICUS LETE CUBA ON OFFICIAL VISIT ORDER

CONTACT CIA RE HIS FUTURE ROLE WITH CUB.A. SUBJ SUGGESTED REMOTE

POSSIBILITY ARRAIGE VISIT PRAGUE THRU AGENT-1 FRIEND JOSE, DELEG

TO IUS. OUR IMPRESSION IS AGENT -1 NANIS. COME OUT FOR GOOD AS

PROBABLY FEELS PERSOVAL SITUATION TENUOUS.

3. ACCORDING SUBJ, FOLL PERSONS OR INFLUENCE ON AGENT -1 TEAM.

MAJOR, MAJOR AND EX-MAJOR (FNU) .

4. SAID AGENT -2 HAS NUMEROUS CONTACTS CUBAN OFFICIAL CIRCIES

MADRID, PARIS, BUT WORKING FOR ANOTHER GOV'T. SINCE HE IN BID

STANDING WITH U.S.G. HINTED CIA SHOULD BE IN TOUCH AGENTEY HOWLVIA

STATION HAS STRONG RESERVATIONS AGAINST AGENT-2 ON SECURITY GROUNDS

** FROM

SECRET

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## Page 53

SECKLT

RE T

PAGE 2

AND FACI HE OUT FOR GOLD, FLUS LITTLE EVIDENCE CAPADILITY

PRODUCE INFO OF INTEREST.

5.

COS

WHO LEFT MEETING FIRST, CLEARLY INFERRED TO SUBS IT HAD

BEEN "GREAT HASTE OF TIME." OTHER CIA OFFICER PROCEEDED POLITELY

"CHEN OUT" SUBJ FOR GETTING US TO ABOVE MEET ON FALSE PRETENSES.

SUBJ FRASKLY ADMITTED HIS "RECRUITHENT" BY CIS HAS HANDLED IN SUCH

SLOPPY MANNER AS BE CONSTRUED A FARCE. VIEN VAGUENESS HIS MISSION

AND LACK SECURE CONTACIS, REPORTING CHANNELS, IT APPARENT CIS NOT

EXPECTING MUCH RESULTS FROM OP WHICH PROBABLY MADE ON "HIT OR MISS"

BASIS. QUITE LIKELY "EDUARDO" MILL NEVER APPEAR TO CONTACT SUBJ.

6. SEEING HIS "UTILITY"' TO US AS DUBIOUS, SUBJ BEGAN SCRATCHI

HEAD FOR LEADS AND MENTIONED FOLL "FRIENDS" HE MIGHT CONTACT: ORLAND

BLANCO CIO

RELAT 1O."

CHARGE IN BERY MIO COMING

RIG

5 SEPT: (Fru)

TRASANCO OF PAIR EMB WHO CONFIDANTE ANLASH I ALSO ANONS ALAS:

AND ENRIQUE RODRIQUE: LOECHES, B TO MOROCCO WHO COMISG MADAID

20 SEPT.

7. C/O SAID NOW UP TO SUBJ SHON BONAFIDES SUGGESTING HE HOULD

TAKE ADVANTAGE HIS "UNIQUE STATUS" AS CUBAN AGENT GAIN ENTRY

OFFICIAL CIRCLES. SUBJ FEARS WE MAY DENY VISA AND DENOUNCE MI! TO

SPANISH POLICE. ALTHOUGH HE PROMISED MANE EVERY EFFORT, INDICATIONS

TO DATE ARE HE WILL HAVE LITTLE, IF ANY, OPS UTILITY. IN ANY EVENT

WAS TOLD EXAMINE THOROUGHLY ANY LEADS HE MIGHT NAVE IN NEXT FEI

DAYS. WE WILL DECIDE IN NEXT MEETING OR TWO WHETHER HE DOES APPEAR

TO HAVE ANY UTILITY, IF NOT HE WILL BE DROPPED.

SECRET

*DISSIOMPELICABLE TO SENSITIVE CABLES

Put → 1915

SECRET

---

## Page 54

tra 210100-1012111n9ngr0..o.

Exhib

THE NEW YORK TIMES. THURSDAY, JANUARY 8. 1976

Retired Colonel Denies Heading

C.I.A. Unit for Assassinations

Sperlal lo The Set Yak I'm!!

WASHINGTON, Jan. 7 - 1, 1949 and 1951, the period in

retired Army colonel has denied which he was temporarily as-

to Senate investigators an

sertion

by

E.

Howard Hunt signed to the C.l.A., or at any

Jr. that the colonel once headed,

other time in his career.

a Central Intelligence Agency interview that during his

Mr. Hunt said in a recent;

unit set up to arrange for the

ser-,

assassinations

of

suspected

vice with the C.I.A.'s Balkans

double-agents.

division in the mid- 1950's he:

The colonci, Boris T.

had discussed

with

Colonel:

told the Senate Select Commit. ihe prospective

Pash, Pash, at his superiors' hehest.

tce

on

assassination

Intelligence yesterday. or an individual who was be-!

that during 1954 and 1955-the lieved to be a double agent.

period in

which Mr. Hunt, a

"I was

told that we

had

former C.I.A. officer, said he that capability," Mr. Hunt said!

was

told that Colonel Pash

ran such an operation-he had

in the interview, and "that the

left the

C.I.A.

and returned

guy to see about this sort of!

to military service.

things was Colonel Pash"

Mr. Hunt, who said that he

In

a statement made public had understood

that

by

the panel

Colonel

today. Colonel Pash was deccased, added that

Pash termed Mr. Hunt's asser- he did discuss the matter with

Itions "insidious and completely the

colonel.

who

seemed

false.

shocked

"that the subject has

He said he could not recalliever been brought up.

and

ever having met or spoken with that the matter consequently

Mr. Hunt,

who is serving

& was left there.

prison

term

for his role in'

Investigators for the Senatel

the Watergage case.

committee are now altempting

Nor, the

colonel said, wasito interview Mr. Hunt about

he ever "involved in any assas. this

assertion,

a committee

sination

planning*

hetween spokesman said.

SPANISH TROOPS RUN through the center of the capitali

between working-class neighbor.

SUBWAY IN MADRID hoods.

Passengers were ad.

mitted free.

MADRID, Jan. 7 (AP)- Thei

Spanish Army began running:

MADRID, Jan. * (Reuters)

the Madrid subway system to-

Striking Madrid subway work-

day as the Goverment moved, ers tonight voted to defy Gov.

gingerly to break a three-day ernment pressure and to con-

wildcat strike that set off the tinue their walk out.

Strike

worst traffic snarl in the city's leaders said they would hold

history.

jout until their wage demands

Fearing a possible labor back were met.

lash, the Government refrained!

The strikers voted not to

for the moment, however, fromiaccept an offer from the offi-

drafting the rebellious subwayicial Government run union to

workers into service.

hold talks if they returned to

About 3,000 electric company work.

workers marched into the

cen-

ter of Madrid in support of the

BARCELONA, Spain, Jan. 7

subway workers and the police (AP)-The Rev. Luis Marta Xiri.

used tear gas to disperse them. nachs.

an

outspoken

Roman

The police said they broke up Cacholic priest nominated for

similar demonstrations by fac- the Nobel Peace Prize last year.

tory

workers on the

city's was arrested today while dem-

outskirts. No arrests or injuries onstrating near the local prison

were reported.

lin support of amnesty for politi.

Army personnel trained as/cal prisoners, police sources said.

railroad engineers reopened the

main subway line, which runs!

REMEMBER THE NEEDIESTI

Cat

of Sa

MISSES

SEASC

STYLE

Find the la

single and double t

... pick from plenty i

want. We even have som

MISSES' AN

Discover dra:

single and double:

lles,

ora slips

ww S1998 hagId: 32202418

99ge 54

A printed two-piece

---

## Page 55

Exhibit 1

STATEMENT BY B. HOWARD HUNT

A year ago when Congress established the Church Committee, Senator

Baker was quoted as saying that I would be an early witness. I was then free

on Appeal and readily available to testify concerning CIA involvement in

allegedly illegal activities. Moreover, I lewed testifying before the

opportunity

Comittee as a further/to testify under oath concerning my total non -

involrement with Messrs Oswald, Bremer and Sirhan, persons with whom my

name has been alanderously and libelously linked in press and electronic

media. Although I had been interviewed previously by the FBI and the Rock-

efeller Commission with regard to these allegations a host of assassination

buffs and media advocates continued irresponsibly to associate me with the

deaths of the Kennedy brothers and the crippling of Governor wallace.

My Appeal denied, I re-entered prison in Apr1l,1975. Three weeks

later US Marshals escorted me to Washington DC for what turned out to be a

three-hour interview vith a new latergate Assistant Special Prosecutor. For

a foday period I was lodged at the Leesburg, Vas, jall, and finally returned

Via Detroit and Tallahassee where I was imprisoned in the isolation area

before being driven on May 26 to Eglin Federal Prison Camp. On May 27,

Assistant Committee Counsel Michael Madigan telephoned me to say that the

Church Comdttee wanted to interview me "within the next two weeks". I

apprised Me. Madigan of Public Law 93-209, Title 18. Sec.4082(c) Para. 1

(amended) which authorises minimum security prisoners such as myself to be

furloughed for up to 30 days for purposes of testifying. Counsel Madigan

agreed to my testifying on this furlough basis.

Over the surner, horever, I beard nothing further from Mr. Madigan

or his Condttee associates. Then in aid-September a washington POST story

alleged that I had been assigned by a lhite House superior to assassdnate

columist Jack Anderson. Senator Church was thereupon quoted as saying

that his Comdttee would investigate the charges. I walcomed this apparent

---

## Page 56

HUNT- Cant do

opportunity, for the allegations had gained vide credence while uy own

delayed response appeared only Incompletely in the press. Still, nothing

was heard from the Committee.

In December 1975 John Crewdson of the New York Times interviewed

me in prison. He asked 1f I knew anything about "CIA assassination capa-

blities", and I related to him my encounter with Col, Boris I. Pash. Mr.

Crewdson then inquired whether the Church Committee had Interviewed me.

I responded in terms of the foregoing, noting that I would have testifled

about the Pash encounter had I been given the publicized opportunities.

My interview with Mr. Crewdson was published and shortly thereafter my

attorney was contacted by a representative of the Coumdttee.

I consider it highly discrininatory that the Camdttee 18

unwilling to have me testify in washington as a furloughed witness.

Purther, the Cottoe's refusal to postpone interviewing me in prison

until one of two counsel familiar with my career and affairs 18 available

places ne in a difficult position iith regard to representation by informed

legal counsel. And, as during the Ervin Counttee hearings ( whose cost in

legal fees to ne approached $100, 000) I must again pay legal lees occasioned

by the interest of the Senate in a matter of no discernible benefit to me.

Between last January and April I could freely have traveled to

washington to testify at the pleasure of the Senate. Mom then on I could

have been furloughed for that purpose and testifled accompanied by customary

counsel who are not now available to me. Nevertheless, in demonstration of

my willingness to cooperate fully vith the Senate I agree to be Interviewed

under oath today.

Februard Shunt

S. Howard Hunt

Jaway 10,1976

---

## Page 57

Der.

Exhiba

3

C/Pp/sE

ALBANIA

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C/FISE

BULGARIA

C/sE

DC

RUMANiA (GREECE

RICHARDSAN

(VUGOSLAGIA)

TRiESTE

BASE

W. GERRAAN UNIT

---

## Page 58

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Tom ISRADBA

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---

## Page 59

uppoRT /

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Page

59

---

## Page 60

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---

## Page 61

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---

## Page 62

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---