Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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176-10036-10170]

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA

RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10170

RECORD SERIES : National Security Files

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

ORIGINATOR : WH

FROM : Bundy

TO : Lodge

TITLE

DATE :

PAGES : 4

SUBJECTS :

DOCUMENT TYPE :

CLASSIFICATION :

RESTRICTIONS :

CURRENT STATUS :

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000

OPENING CRITERIA :

Cables. Box 2

COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 201: Vietnam, 10/29/63-10/31/63, State

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SER SANITIZEO

VERSION N44-89-230

•9

(9

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

10/30/63

VIA CAS CHANNEL

EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR LODGE

FROM: BUNDY

\ Your 2063 shows important difference in our views and we

must repeat that we cahnot accept conclusion that we have no

power to delay or discourage a coup. In your paragraph 12 you

say that lf you were convinced that the coup was going to fall

you would of course do everything you could to stop it. We believe

that on the baste you should do everything you can to stop or

delay any operation which, in your best judgment, does not give

better than even prospect of quick success.

We recognise the danger of appearing hostile to generals,

but we do not share Implication in your message that only

certain

conviction of toninent failure juatifles intervention. We believe

that your standard for intervention should be that atated above.

2 If than you should conclude that there de not a better

than even chance of guick success, you ahould communicate thia. doubt

to generals in a way calculated to persuade them to desist at least

until chances are better.

In this communication you should use the

weighi of your beat advice and explicitly reject any implication that

we oppore the effort of the generala because of preference for present pagilipa.

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We recognize need to bear in mind generals' interpretation of

U. S. role in 1960 coup attempt and you should maintain clear

distinction between atrong advice given as a fstend and choice of

sides by USG.

3. We slax continue to be deeply interested in up-lo-the-minute

assessment of proepects and are sending this before reply to

our CAS 79126. We hope for continuous exchange latest

assesments on thie topic.

4. On conmend errangemento outlien paragraph. To clarily

our latant, paragraph 1 al our 79109 lu reechaded aad we restate

our deeires as followe: While you are in Saigon you will be chief

of country team in all circumstances and our only Instruction la

that we are sure it will help to have Harine fully Informed at all

stages and to use advice from both him and Smith in framing guldance

for coup contacts and assessment.

We continue to be concerned

that neither Conein nor any other reporting source le getting the

clarity we would like with respeet to alignments of forces and

levela of determination.

(D) When you leave Saigon and before there le a coup.

Trushart will be chief of the country team, and our only modification

of esdating procedurde la that in thie eiscumetance we believe that

all Inetruction and debriefing of Conein should be conducted in immedlate

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HONES

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-3=

consultation with Harkins and Smith so that all three know what

le said to Conetn and what he reports at all stages.

military situatin develope

(e): " you have leit and a coup occurs, we believe that emerger

situation

satbafastion requires final local U. S. authority to be vested in

most experienced officer with appropriate background and that

officer in our view le Harkins. We do not repeat not intend that

thla internal switch is inal responsibility should be publicized in

any way, and Haridas will of courae be gulded in basie posture by

our inatructions, which follow in paragraph 5.

Thus we do not

believe that thie switch ean have the effect suggested in your paragraph 8.

5. Tbis paragraph containe our present standing instructions

for U. S, posture in the event of a coup.

(a) U. S. authorities will reject appeale for diree:

latervention from either side, and U,S. -controlled aircraft and

other resources will not be committed between the battle lines os in

support of esther side, without authoridation from Waablagton.

(b) in event al indecisive contess, U. So authoriales

may in their discretion agree to perform any acte agreeable to both aideo,

such as removal of key personalities or relay of laformation. In

such actions, howeves, U. S. authorides will strenuously arold

appearance of pressure on elther alde. It is not in the interest of USG

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19061

MARTAADNERE

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Restin

9 €

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to be or appear to be instrument of existing government or

Instrument of coup.

6. We have your message about return to Washiagton and

li announcement has not already been made, we suggest that it be

kept as low-key and quiet as possible, and we also urge that if

poseible you keep open the exact time of your departure.

We are

strongly sensitive to great disadvantage of having you out of Saigon

if thie should turn out to be a week of decision and 11 it can be

avoided we would prefer not to see you pinned to a fixed hour of

departure now.

whid into prede es a realt wilitary

confrontation Saigon

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