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157-10005-10236

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

Date: 10/04/93

Page: 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

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DOCUMENT INFORMATION

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TO :

TITLE :

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS/ TRANSCRIPT

DATE: 07/08/75

PAGES : 257

SUBJECTS :

TESTIMONY BY LANSDALE CONCERNING ALLEGED ASSASSINATION PLOTS

EXHIBITS ATTACHED IN THE FORM OF MEMOS/NEWS ARTICLES

DOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPT/EXHIBITS

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CURRENT STATUS : P

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/04/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

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110

Mr. Schwarz. These are minutes of the Special Group which

you attanded, and it states:

"Mr. Harvey gave a rundown on

progress to date with agent teams and in the general field of

intelligence, including the Opa-locka interrogation center land-

the ladha clandestine intermogation center. He outlined

various difficulties

encountered and said that three agent teams

had been infiltrated."

Now did Mr. Harvey, at that meeting, state anything -- do

you recollect Mr. Harvey making that report?

General Lansdale. In general terms, yes.

Mr. Schwarz. Did he state anything relating to the

passage of pills to persons to accomplish the assassination of

Fidel Castro in the week prior to this meeting?

General Lansdale. No. As a matter of fact, we were very

proud that he had gotten these teams in, that they had been

infiltrated, and so forth, and collecting intelligence.

Mr. Schwarz. Were they the first teams?

General Lansdale.

Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. Did he say anything at that meeting that

you recall about the subject of assassinations?

General Lansdale. Nothing.

Mr. Schwarz. Would you give the witness the May 7th '62

memorandum of General Taylor, Subject, Report of Progress to

Higher Authority?

Now, Senators, that is supposedly slipped in your notebooks

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SENSITIVE

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FILE

N. B.

Program Review by.

Brig. Gen. F. G. Lansdale,

Chief of Operations

18 January 1962

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

AS SANITIZED

I(C)

Of mach??

(9 pooges)

NH 50955 DocId: 32202426

THE CUBA PROJECT

FILE

N. B.

I. OBJECTIVE

The U.S. objective is to help the Cubans overthrow the Communist

regime from within Cuba and institute a new government with which the

i United States can live in peace.

II. CONCEPT OF OPERATION

3asically,

people.

call revole wrover is on rie about he rogie el the Cubaute

a new government with which the United States can live in peace.

The revolt requires a strongly motivated political action movement

established within Cuba, to generate the revolt, to give it direction to-

wards the objective, and to capitalize on the climactic moment. The

political actions will be assisted by economic warfare to induce failure

of the Communist regime to supply Cuba's economic needs, psychological

operations to turn the peoples' resentment increasingly against the regime,

and military-type groups to give the popular movement an action arm for

sabotage and armed resistance in support of political objectives.

The failure of the U.S. -sponsored operation in April 1961 so shook

the faith of Cuban patriots in U.S. competence and intentions in support-

ing a revolt against Castro that a new effort to generate a revolt against

the regime in Cuba must have active support from key Latin American

countries. Further, the foreigness (Soviet Union and Bloc) of the tyranny

imposed on the Cuban people must be made clear to the people of the

Western Hemisphere to the point of their deep anger and open actiona lo

defend the Western Hemisphere against such foreign invasion. Such an

anger will be generated, in part, by appeals from the popular movement

within Cuba to other Latin Americans especially.

The preparation phase must result in a political action organization

in being in key localities inside Cuba, with its own means for internal

communications, its own voice for psychological operations, and its own

action arm (small guerrilla bands, sabotage squads, etc.). It must have

the sympathetic support of the majority of the Cuban people, and make this

fact known to the outside world. (It is reported that the majority of Cubana

are not for the present regime, but are growing apathetic towards what

appears to be a hopeless future or the futility of their status. )

The climactic moment of revolt will come from an angry reaction of

the people to a government action (sparked by an incident), or from a

fracturing of the leadership cadre within the regime, or both. (A major

goal of the Project must be so bring this about.i The popular movemer, ide

74-03-19-14

DEPARTMERT OF JUSTICE

R

MAY 15 1962.

Excluded from automatic

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regrading: DOD Dir.

Copy Nu.

5200.10 does not apply.

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H. IV intrusion

Status: Equipment to enable IV intrusion of Havana TV broadcasts

has been reactivated on a small vessel under CLA control. CIA plans to

attempt intrusion on 22 January during Castro's forthcoming speech and

parade demonstrations.

I. Special sabotage support

Status: State has explored, with negative results, the feasibility

of pre-emptive action with respect to tanker charters (most Bloc ship-

ments to Cuba are carried in Western bottoms). CIA has initiated

action to contaminate POL supplies for Cuba, although visible results

(stoppage of some Cuban transport) is not expected until mid-1962. CLA

i introducing out on corrosive ative elemen. comotiv

months before theirstlocomotives.breakdown.

CIA expects to be able

to have at least one agent recruited by 28 February to attempt introduc-

tion of a corrosive additive to jet fuel storage tanks in Cuba.

J. Military actions

Status: Defense has been tasked with preparing a contingency plan

for U.S. military action, in case the Cuban people request U.S. help

when their revolt starts making headway. This contingency plan will

permit obtaining a policy decision on the major point of U.S. intentions,

and is looked upon as a positive political-psychological factor in a

people's revolt, even more than as a possible military action. Defense

also has been tasked with fully assisting State and CIA, as commitments

of Defense men, money, and materiel are required.

K. Major elements of the population

Status: Both State and CIA are continuing to explore their capabilities

(with resulta largely negative to date) for mounting special group operations

inside Cuba focused upon dynamic elements of the population, particularly

operations through the Church to reach the women and families, and

through Labor contacts to reach the workers. Other elements include

enlistment of the youth and professional groupings. Special consideration

is to be given to doing this through Latin American operational contacts.

This is vital to the success of our political action nucleus when CIA can

put it into place.

I. Outlook

Status: As reported to the Special Group last week, there bas been a

period of a realistic second look at CLA capabilities to mount the required

clandestine operations against Cuba, and a subsequent start in "tooling up."

After this second look, CIA has concluded that its realistic role should be

to create at least the illusion of a popular movement, to win external support

for it, to improve CIA operational capability, and to help create a climate

which will permit provocative actions in support of a shift to overt action.

This outlook, although arrived at thoughtfully within CIA, is far short of

the Cuba project's goals. CIA must take yet another hard look at its

potential capabilities, in the light of the following tasking, to determine

if it cannot make the greater effort required.

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V. TARGET SCHEDULE

A. Intelligence

Task 1: NIE 85-62 on Cuba due 7 February (CIA).

Task 2: By 15 February, Opa Locka Interrogation Center to be made

an effective operation for collection and processing of intelligence (CIA

with support of Defense, State, I&NS, FBI).

Task 3: Intelligence collection from Cuban refugees elsewhere than

Miami area. CIA to survey other refugee points (Puerto Rico, avenezuela,

etc.) and on a priority basis to ensure maximum coverage of all such

source points. 15 February target date:

Task 4: CIA to continue its re-examination of intelligence assets,

with priority on agents inside Cuba, and report on capability by 15 Feb-

ruary. Also included is coverage of intelligence through third country

sources, particularly those having diplomatic relations with Cuba.

B. Political

Task 5: CIA to submit plan by 1 February for defection of top Cuban

government officials, to fracture the regime from within.

This effort

must be imaginative and bold enough to consider a "name" defector to

be worth at least a million U.S. dollars.

This can be the key to our

political action goal and must be mounted without delay as a major CIA

project.

Task 6: CIA to complete plans by l February for Cover and Decep-

tion actions, to help fracture the Communist regime in Cuba. Defense,

State and FBI are to collaborate on this.

Task sabruary, ClA to submit operations schedule for

initiating popular movement within Cuba.

This must include localities

selected inside Cuba assessment of selected Cubans, their infiltra-

tion, activity assignments, and political platform. One section must

deal with the undergroünd, " assess its true status and plans to use it.

Task 8: State to follow up the OAS meeting by having U.S.

Embassies in Latin America exploit all opportunities to enlist local

sympathy for the Cuban people and to increase hostility towards the

Communist regime in Cuba. State to submit report on results of this

assignment by 13 February, so further planning can be programmed.

Task 9: By 15 February, State to submit an inventory of operational

assets in the Caribbean area, including capabilities of local governments

or groups to mount operations on their own, to help achieve the Project's

goals. Plans for early use of such capabilities are due by 19 February.

Task 10: CLA to submit operational schedule for using assets in the

Caribbean area to achieve the Project's political action goals. The

objective of working on dynamic elements of the Cuban population (such

as workers, farmers) is underscored. Due 19 February.

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CIA HAS NO CR

TO

DECLASS

AND/OR

RELEASE OF Thio DOCUMENT

AS SANITIZED

/CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

AS SANITIZED poS

61 mares 22

94

1 (e)

AVA. ULUILI

RECEIVED

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON 25. D.C.

JAN 29 1962

27 PEACERNEY GENERAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

FILE

N.

From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale 2d

ext,

Noting that you will be away from the country most of the

month of February, there are some matters vital to our Project

for which we should provide. Certain proposals should have

evidence of your support. Some strong decisions may have to

be made if our Project is to win its goal - and the bureaucratic

machine has too many people captive to it, one way or another.

It is my hope that you will make someone specifically

responsible to speak for your determined course and have the

role of being your "presence" as far as possible.

a personal conviction, freedom from bureaucratic instincts, and

reasonably direct access to the President. Perhaps Dick Good-

win could fulfill this role. Secretary McNamara is an alternate

suggestion; he has so many irons in the fire that I hesitated men-

tioning him. You might be considering General Taylor, but I do

not believe he can quite play this role; he is still too much a fine

military bureaucrat at heart.

FILL

Cathe

As you know, I remain convinced that our goal can be won.

Perhaps, if we can keep forcing U.S. agencies to work hard at

it, the goal can be won through their efforts. Yet, their efforts

haven't been impressive to date, and I still feel that we might

uncork the touchdown play independently of the institutional pro-

gram we are spurring.

It may be a special effort which professional labor operators

can launch to stir up workers in Latin America and Cuba. It may

be through ethnic-language groups; Spain has an untapped action

potential. It could be a warming-up of the always lively youth

element in Latin America and Cuba, through some contacts specially

used. It could be with the families through the Church, with families

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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

JUN 6 1962

EXCLUDED. FRO! AUTOETIC

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DOES NOT MPLY

RECORES BRANCH

AXTORNEX

This document

contains

2 радез..

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PAPeRI

see it.

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1.

2.

3.

4.

ACTIVITY

Sabotage Cuban supply of nickel

to Soviets.

Sabotage fuel supply.

Sabotage communications.

Sabotage power supply.

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

F. SABOTAGE SUPPORT PLAN

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

Io deny supply to Soviets and to hinder This can be an early sabotage action on th

Cuba's ability to pay for Bloc imports

Nicaro Plant by a hit-and-run team based

outside Cuba. Destruction of transformers,

coolant pumps and towers seems more

feasible than blocking the channel.

Effect

can be supported later by denial of

Canadian

spare parts.

To cripple transportation.

To dramatize and encourage the

spirit of resistance.

To increase strain on regime and

ring daily business to a standstil

y dramatic action all people wil

note.

Effects of CIA program of lubricating oil

additive is expected on locomotive stin Jure-l

Jaya" Much more can be done with fuel

contaminants, particularly on jet and diesel

fuels. Crews aboard Western tankers offer

real opportunity for more vigorous program.

Prime targets for hit-and-run teams based

outside Cuba are CMQ TV and the Czech radio

transmitter (believed now used to jam U.S.

broadcasts). Attacks mounted only when

operationally feasible.

The G-2 micro-wave

net should be dealt with when there are suf-

ficient assets inside to make sabotage coincide

with a critical need, in August-September.

This should be a concerted attack, as feasible

in July-August, on power plants at Havana,

Santiago, Cinfuegas, Vicente, Santa Clara,

Cuatro Caminos, Matanzas.

It is of a type

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ACTIVITY

4. * Caribbean Admission Center,

Opa-Locka, Florida, fully

activated by 15 March 1962.

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

1: 15 March 1962 (cont)

PURPOSE

To collect intelligence required for the

operations, to identify and earmark in-

telligence assets as refugees arrive,

and to provide security against Com-

munist agent operations.

5. * Periodic intelligence esti-

mates, as required by progress

of operations.

To up-date NIE 85-62, so that current

estimates can be considered at national

policy levels.

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

AS SANITIZED

613/24194

1(c)

CONSIDERATIONS

This operation, in response to early recommendation

as essential by the Chief of Operations, is moving at

utmost speed to become fully active by 15 March, with

a new building completed and occupied, and with a

staff of 43 at work.

Operations commenced 15 February

and, as of 9 March, 33 people were active at the Center.

(CLA responsibility, with support by Defense, Justice,

State, USIA.)

As the operations develop, there will be both increased

intelligence collection and a need for as current an In-

telligence Estimate as the U.S. can produce meaningfully.

It is likely that a more informal method of producing an

Intelligence Estimate for use at the national level (than

now governing the issuance of NIE's) may have to be

followed. CIA is now publishing daily intelligence sum-

maries on Cuba and is planning a bi-monthly or weekly

report summing up intelligence for this purpose. (CIA

responsibility, with support of others as required. )

OTHER OPERATIONS

Continue negotiating dor

bE helpin contaminating

locomotive lubricants.

To cripple Cuba's rail transportation.

16 - 31 March 1962

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

7. * Two teams of agents dis-

patched to Cuba.

To collect intelligence.

# Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962

Beitish desigrence is required to undertake a successful

sabotage of Cuban locomotives, throtigh contaminating

lubricants. It is expected that a minimum of 3 months

is required before locomotives in Cuba start breaking

down, once the contaminant is introduced.

01 208

One team of 4 and one team of 3 agents. Both teams include

personnel who have had resistance training and some past

experience.

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(

abea

ACTIVITY

8. Establish 2 additional third-

country resident agents in

Cuba.

9. By 31 March, have 105 agents

selected and 50 agents trained.

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

16 - 31 March 1962 (cont.)

PURPOSE

To collect intelligence.

To ready agent operations.

(

CONSIDERATIONS

Possible future use in communications and support.

10. *

Develop intelligence potential

of Cuban "colonies" in U.S.

11. * Develop additional interroga-

tion centers in other areas by

31 March 1962.

To exploit the intelligence possi-

bilities of former residents of

Cuba (including U.S. citizens) now

in the United States.

•

To collect intelligence in a Latin

atmosphere, at different levels thai.

now seem possible in the continental

U.S., to spot additional intelligence

assets and to provide security

against Communist agent operations.

Effectiveness and numbers are dependent upon purpose

of recruitment, nature of training, and policy decisions

controlling these factors.

If the recruitment and train-

ing are for resistance activities, the task of recruit-

ment and training will be much less difficult than if

they are limited to intelligence-collection purposes

There are "colonies" in Washington, D.C., and other

U.S. cities which are "little Cubas." Family, Church,

and business interests

provoke unusual personal ties

inside Cuba for some of these

residents; a real potential

exists for collection of intelligence not otherwise avail-

able. (FBI support and coordination is basic in this

eifort.)

As Opa-Locka becomes fully activated, CIA will activate

other interrogation centers as promptly as feasible.

A

center is being activated in Spaina Negotiations with

local authorities are being undertaken to activate centers,

il possible, in Mexico City. Carecao, end

San

Juan, Puerto Rico, and Seriage: Chiley are being sur -

veyed for possible centers.

(CIA responsibility with sup-

port by others as necessary.)

01 209

OTHER OPERATIONS

None.

* Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962.

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

33

12 March 1962

SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale>L

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

Subject: Policy Questions, Operation Mongoose

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT&

683/2419

As Operation Mongoose goes into the approved activities of Phase I,

a number of policy questions have started to arise.

Current problems,

necding resolution, are listed below.

It is requested that the Special

Group (Augmented) provide guidance, as a matter of some urgency.

1. Use of U.S. military installations: CIA desires to train small

groups of Cuban nationals On thenuS Air force Bombing Range, Avon

Park ronica, immediately. Defense reports that the proposed area!

is adequate for this training, but that such training of covert agents

who will be introduced ultimately into Cuba represents a security problem.

and a departure from past security procedures, due to the fact that U.S.

Government sponsorship will be apparent to trainees.

Capture and

interrogation of any of these covert agents could result in exposure

(in international news media) of U.S. official involvement in efforts to

unseat the present Communist Cuban regime. A policy determination

is needed as to whether or not agents to be infiltrated into Cuba should

There are other U.S. military installations and properties, in

the Southeastern U.S. and Caribbean areas, which CIA would like to use

for similar training and operational purposes in the future. The same

policy determination could cover all uses of identifiable U.S. Government

properties for training and deployment of Cuban nationals for covert

infiltration into Cuba.

Armingot Cuban guerrillas:

CIA needs a policy determination on

the supplying ofarms and equipment to deserving Cuban guerrillas, as

are locatea, absessed, and request help. Such requests are starting

to surface, as the intelligence-collection effort is increased, and it is

0G199

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CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

portized

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR O

RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMEN 41 94

(e)

6f 3

3 May 1962

ExH.#13

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of Special Group (Augmented) on

Project Mongoose, 3 May 1962

PRESENT: General Taylor; Mr. Kennedy; Mr. Johnson; Mr. Gilpatric,

General Decker, General Lansdale and General Craig;

Mr. McCone, and Mr. Harvey

General Lansdale gave an

interim report on the progress

of stepping up recruitment of Cubans into the U. S. Army.

the consensus is that there are not more than a thousand suitable

individuals from whom additional recruits could be selected.

Attorney General commented that the President wishes to have a large

General Lansdale said that various alternatives for training

of such Cubans are being looked into.

that such a cadre of Cubans would be an asset

to the U.S., which might be used in a number of ways.

Lansdale, supported by General Taylor, pointed out that in this

connection the matter of holding the individuals and giving them

useful employment after they are trained is an important and a

difficult one.

2.

Mr. Harvey gave a rundown on progress to date with agent

teams and in the general field of intelligence, including the

Opa-locka interrogation center and the Waded clandestine interroga-

tion center.

outlined various difficulties encountered, and said

that three agent teams have been infiltrated and that five W/T sets

are in place.

Approximately 72 actual or potential reporting sources

are also in place. A significant development is that Major Duque has

refused to allow agents responsive to him to be dispatched on purely.

intelligence-gathering missions.

(This sort of attitude had been

forecast earlier as a possibility, but it now assumes particular im

portance in view of Duque's stature.)

30 Mid Harvey also commented on the two attempts made to intrude

The Group asked that a check be made, as

soon as possible, on how effective these operations were.

asked that a copy, of the scripts used be made available.. The Group

felts thatkit Is worthwhile to check this capability out, as is now

being done, but questioned whether once proved effective it should not

perhaps be kept in reserve for a more meaningful time.:

Thomas

Da fanatt

Parrott

Cc:

General Lansdale

destroy 119165-171

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