MEMO RE LETTER FROM CHAIRMAN STOKES OF HSCA ON DIRECT ACCESS TO FORMER AGENT IN MEXICO.
Originator: CIA
From: BRECKINRIDGE, SCOTT D., OLC
Document date: 06/15/1978
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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2022 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

CUNFIDENTIAL

i Registry

OLC 78-2112/1

128-4209/2

15 JUN 1978

HSCA

Corsipite

MR

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM

: S. D. Breckinridge

Principal Coordinator HSCA

Office of Legislative Counsel

Letter from Chairman Stokes of HSCA on

Direct Access to Former Agent in Mexico

SUBJECT

66 JUN 1978

1. Action Requested: That you approve the reconmendation

at paragraph 8, supporting the decision of the DDCI to not

provide the HSCA with direct access to a former clandestine

agent in Mexico, and that you renew to Chairman Stokes the

DDCI's offer to obtain answers to written HSCA questions

addressed to the man.

Background: The letter from Mr. Stokes refers to

two agents; we are aware of only one at issue. Prior to the

visit of the ASCA investigators to Mexico City, they were

advised at the Headquarters Building that CIA could not

assist them in locating or contacting a former agent. The

Cuban diplomatic installations at the time of Lee Harvey Oswald's

visit there in 1963. This statement of the Agency's position

why then

was not protested at that time.

persons with whom the Agency had no direct contact, it had

been instructed to not assist in contacting the agent in

question.

When Mr. Blakey learned of this he asked for a

meeting with the DCI.

cha an the noc a print in

At the meeting, the DDCI stated the responsibility

sources and

coLlection organization. He expressed the view that making

agents available for direct questioning by congressional

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investigators would be injurious to that responsibility.

He

offered to accept questions for the agent, and stated that he

would personally vouch for the procedures by which the answers

are obtained. Fie emphasized that as a Presidential appointee,

confirmed by

the Congress, he should be trusted in this action,

especially given the nature of the problem. MI. Blakey did

not reiect that offer at that time;

the silence of Chairman

Stokes' letter on the point may indicate that it may not have

been reported to him.

The Chairman's letter discusses commitments by the

Agency, citing its agreement to arrange access to current and

former employees.

There is no explicit commitment to make

agents available to the Committee.

The letter also emphasizes

the Committee's solicitude for the Agency's sensitivities,

citing its not interviewing the agent in Mexico City after

our refusal to assist in making direct contact.

in tact, the

Committee has not adhered rigorously to its commitments in this

very area.

It falled to inform the Agency of its intention to

de? Objection voca all in care as the pince nest te, him

the plan to interview him,

failed to notify the Agency that it planned to interview a

former Agency employee in Mexico, as it has agreed to do,

and interviewed him with Station help. In any event, and

7w

contrary to Chairman Stokes' letter, the DCI did not say that.

HSCA investigators could not interview cl agents, but

expressed his strong objections to their doing so, noting that

we could not assist them in this respect.. It may be that

inability to locate the agent in Mexico was as much a consideration

for his not being interviewed as concern for the Agency's

sensitivities.

o. Conclusions: The basic problem of providing direct

access to a clandestine agent goes to the heart of CIA's

relationships with its agents.

It involves the Agency's ability

to ensure them

exposure.

of its readiness to protect them from risks of

While the record of the HSCA,

has been

one of good

I curt ye

since

its reorganization,

security, its duration is limited

continued discipline

after the

and

end of this year cannot be

considered a sure thing.

to expose this agent, however minor

a Ilgure, is to risk later publicity of the Agency's willingness

such

an

exposure.

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7. The DDCI's act involved two considerations. It served

to protect an intelligence source, and at the same time provided

a procedure whereby the information desired by the Committee

can be obtained.

the matter should be presented to Chairman

Stokes in these terms, seeking his agreement to a procedure

based on trust of the personal commitment of Mr. Carlucci to

ensure the integrity of the procedure by which the answers

are obtained.

Recommendation: That you find the occasion to

ao hat cha raat tsue notation do vet access to spandestine

agent, reassuring him of the Agency's readiness, under

procedures that you and the DDCI will vouch for,

answers to questions

prepared by the HSCA.

APPROVAL:

S. D. Breckinridge

Beef- comto

Director of Central Intelligence

Date

DISAPPROVAL:

Director of Central Intelligence

Distribution:

orig - Adse

- DCI

1 - DDCI

1 - ER

1

- OLC/Subj

1 - OLC/Chrono

OLC/SDB/ ksn

Date

3

CONSIDENTIAL

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