Document date: 04/17/2018
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA

RECORD NUMBER

: 176-10036-10213

RECORD SERIES : National Security Files

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

ORIGINATOR :

FROM :

TO :

DATE :

PAGES: #4

SUBJECTS :

DOCUMENT TYPE :

CLASSIFICATION :

RESTRICTIONS :

CURRENT STATUS :

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000

OPENING CRITERIA

TITLE : John F. Kennedy document Control Record

COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 383: Disarmament, 7/63-10/63. Box 4.

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SECRET

SENSITIVE

TAB E

INSPECIION

Strategic Delivery Vehicles

Verification of an agreement to freeze current inventories of

strategic delivery vehicles would require first an exchange of data

on facilities currently or recently engaged in such production and

then an exchange of inspectors to monitor adherence to the agreement.

Manufacture of complete heavy or medium bomber aircraft would be

probibited. (The only aircraft in this category now being produced

1s the Soviet medium bomber "Blinder"). Manufacture of parts and

modification of aircraft would be permitted to the extent that it re-

lated to increasing the life or reliability of the aircraft and not

its military potential (speed, range, load, etc.)

If any reasonable inspection procedures were adopted,

it should

not be difficult to insure that no significant number of bomber air-

craft were being produced. Further, it is not believed that modifi-

cation of aircreft in current inventories could significantly effect

the military balance of power.

Inspection of missile production, however, should prove a more

demanding task. Since production of complete missiles would be author-

Ized for purposes of replacement, a 24-hour a day inspection would be

required to prevent, through illegal production, either an increase in

missile inventory or incorporation of new developments in propulsion

and guidance that could increase the capability of the existing missile

force in terms of range, load, or CEP. While only limited improvement

appears possible in existing rocket motores, more substantial

changes might be achieved through

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increased efficiency in the guidance system.

Manufacture of complete missiles would be permitted on the basis

of i one-for-one replacement in kind. Production of complete missiles

would be authorized as necessary to replace missiles expended in test

firing or lost through accident etc. Since limiting production to a

percentage of the inventory would require accurate data on the extent of

the inventory, it is suggested that yearly production be limited to a

specific figure, to be negotiated which would approximate the number of

missiles expended in a reasonable test and training program. The

danger of accepting a somewhat exaggerated Soviet figure is not great

if we couple such acceptence with an effective system of confirming

destration of the old missiles before new missiles leave the factory.

This would at least restrict the quantity of the inventory.

As in the case of bomber aircraft, production of parts for mainte-:

nance and modification of missiles would be authorized in so far as it

increases the life or reliability of the missile and not its military

potential (range, load, CEP, etc.). Parts production for missiles

would also require negotiation since requirements vary for the different

type of missiles (e g. solid fuel vs. liquia fuel).

Fissionable Material

Basically, the controls envisioned in relation to fissionable

materials are:

a. Exchange of lists of all plants currently or recently

engaged in producing fissionable material for weapons.

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b. Shutdown all such plarts with such action confirmed by

periodic inspection or continuous external monitoring.

c. Plants producing material for power, propulsion and

peaceful uses would be subject to resident or periodic inspection

with full access to the facility.

d. As a check against operation of clandestine facilities,

environmental sampling of the entire country would be conducted with

Follow-up intensive monitoring and on-site visits for suspected sites.

This would include a quota of six peremptory inspections in order to

accommodate unilateral intelligence leads. The entire system would

require, for monitoring of the Soviet Union, about 350 personnel.

Thsi system is estimated to be capable of detecting annual diversion

from the declared facilities amounting to 0.5 percent of the 1963 USSR

stockoile of U-235 and 1 percent of the plutonium stockpile. A

maximam

inspection effort would reduce possible annual diversion of

U-235 to 0.05 percent of stockpile and plutonium to 0.2 percent of

stockpile, but would be very costly in men and dollars and would involve

serious interference with plant operation and administration. If

only external access to the plants were allowed, possible diversions

are estimated at 2.0 percent and 4.6 percent of the U-235 and plutonium

stockpiles, respectively. As for clandestine production, it is very likely

that production of U-235 at a rate as large as 1 percent of the USSR

stockpile per year would be quickly detected, as would clandestine

plutonium -- equivalent capacity as large as 3 percent of stockpile per

year•

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The amount of cheating possible under the proposed system does not

appear strategically significant,

so long as each side retains large

stockpiles.

If significant reductions in weapons

stockpiles are made,

possible diversions should be measured, not against the 1963 stocks

as above, but against the retained levels; the diversions may then be-

come quite significant.

Also, the inspection system does not address,

nor can it be expected to alleviate, the problem of clandestine stock-

piles amassed before the cutoff.

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