DCI MEETINGS WITH THE PRESIDENT 01 JULY - 12 NOVEMBER 1963.
Agency: CIA
Originator: CIA
Document date: 1/1/63
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

## Page 1

. ;

Date: 11/29/99

Page:

1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CIA

RECORD NUMBER

:. 104-10306-10014

RECORD SERIES

: JFK-MISC

AGENCY FILE NUMBER

: CIA-DCI FILE

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

Released under the John

F. Kennedy

Assassination Records

Collection Act of 1992

$44 USC 2107 Note).

Case#:NW 53217 Date:

06-22-2017

ORIGINATOR

:

CIA

FROM

TO :

TITLE : DCI MEETINGS WITH THE PRESIDENT 01 JULY - 12 NOVEMBER

1963.

DATE:

00/00/63

PAGES

29

SUBJECTS

: DCI MEETINGS

PRESIDENT

DOCUMENT TYPE :

PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION

TOP SECRET

RESTRICTIONS

1B

CURRENT STATUS

:

RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/19/98

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : JFK-M-06: F15 1998.09.19.13:50:44: 373031: ARRB

REQUEST. CIA - IR-28.

"CLASSIFIED

ATTACHMENT

[R]

- ITEM IS RESTRICTED

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"I sent a copy of this

aft copy) to Helms

at DiCt's roquest, Dei said on the intercom

to Helms something to the effect that this

should be held very closely. Helms is also

preparing a memo on this meeting.

Jerry

11/12

(DATE)

FORM NO.

1 AUG 54

101

REPLACES FORM 10-101

WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

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(

12 November 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT:

Meeting on Policy Relating to Cuba - 10:30 a.m. - 12 Nov 63

IN ATTENDANCE:

The President, Secty. McNamara, Secty. Rusk,

Secty. Gilpatric, Attorney General, Secty. Vance,

General Taylor, Mr. Bundy, Secty. Johnson,

Mr. McCone, Mr. Helms, Mr. FitzGerald,

Mr. Shackley

McCone opened the meeting with a brief resume of conditions in

Cuba along these lines:

1. Cuba still belongs to Castro though his grip is weakening.

2. The military remain essentially loyal to Castro with some

evidences of dissension

and dissidents which are being exploited by CIA.

3.

The internal security forces and apparatus are effective and

show evidence of increasing efficiency.

4. The economy is bad and is deteriorating, causing increasing

hardships to the civilian population. This is due to economic sanctions

and Flora.

5. The Soviets are continuing a gradual withdrawal. No organized

Soviet unto pear a co. ne

Soviet units appear in Cuba although they apparently provide principal

manning for the SAMS. There are recent evidences of considerable

rotation with between 1, 000 and 2, 000 new arrivals, but in balance

there is

a decrease.

6. Training of Cubans continues on all Soviet equipment including

the SAMS. It is not clear whether the SAMS will be turned over to full

Cuban control; however it is clear the Cubans will supply the majority of

the operating personnel.

7. The only equipment which has been withdrawn has been the

advanced C-band radar for the SAMS and certain communication equipment.

No military equipment has been withdrawn.. There have been some recent

new arrivals of military equipment, particularly between 25 and 50 tanks.

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..=

• McCone then

stated that the program which had been followed

for the last several months, having been approved about the first

of June, was integrated and interdependent one part on the other and

therefore should be considered as a comprehensive program and

not a number of independent actions.

FitzGerald then made a presentation.

With respect to sabotage, McCone stated that no one event will

particularly affect the economy. However a continuous program will

have its effects on the economy and it will encourage internal sabotage

by dissident people within Cuba. There have been 109 events since

April which were probably internally-inspired sabotage.

The President then raised the question of the sabotage program;

whether it was worthwhile and whether it would accomplish our

purpose.

Secretary Rusk then spoke at considerable length, the thrust of

his remarks being opposed to sabotage.

He stated we should concen-

trate on obtaining information as to what Castro is doing with respect

to other countries, particularly sending arms to Latin American

countries. Rusk said we must replace Castro; we must accomplish

a reduction in Soviet troops, however sabotage might result in an

increase in troops.

Rusk had no problem with infiltration of black

teams; furthermore internal sabotage gave him no problem and

the more of this, the better. In addition he strongly supported our

economic efforts. However he opposed the hit-and-run sabotage

tactics as being unproductive, complicating our relationships with the

Soviets and also with our friends and indicated a connection between

our sabotage activities and the autobahn problem.

McCone observed that infiltration was difficult, internal sabotage

was extremely difficult to stimulate but that external hit-and-run

sabotage had the effect of automatically stimulating internal sabotage.

McNamara could see no connection between the Cuban operations

and the Berlin autobahn incidents. He saw many advantages to going

ahead which he advocated but ordered a careful watch.

The President asked questions concerning the immediate operations,

and the next one on the schedule was approved.

FitzGerald explained the independent operations of the Artime group.

McCone emphasized that to a very considerable extent these are uncon-

trollable and forecast that once Artime was in business, we might expect

some events to take place which were not exactly to our liking.

JAM/mib (cc to Mr. Helms in draft)

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2. 1

WE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT:

Minutes of the Meeting to Review

The Cuban

Program

PRESENT:

The President

Secretary of State Rusk

Secretary of Defense McNamara

Attorney General Kennedy

Director of Central Intelligence McCone

Mr. Roswell Gilpatric

Mr. Cyrus Vance

* Vance

Mr. McGeorge Bundy

General Maxwell Taylor

Mr. U. Alexis Johnson

Mr. Richard Helms

Mr.

Desmond FitzGerald

Mr.

Bruce B. Cheever

MI.

Theodore Shackley

Mr. Paul Eckel

The meeting convened in the Cabinet Room of the

White House at 1040 on 12 November 1963.

1. The Director of Central Intelligence opened the

meeting with a brief resume of conditions in Cuba. He

highlighted the following points:

a .

Cuba still belongs to Castro though his grip

is weakening.

b. The military remain essentially loyal to Castro

with some evidences of dissension

and dissidents which

are being exploited by CIA.

The internal security forces and apparatus are

effective and

show evidence of increasing efficiency.

Excluded fein salamalie

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2

The economy is bad and is deteriorating,

causing increasing hardships to the civilian popu-

lation.

This is due to mismanagement, economic

sanctions,

and Flora.

e.

drawal.

The Soviets are continuing a gradual with-

No organized Soviet units appear in Cuba

although they apparently provide principal manning

for the SAMs.

There are recent evidences of con-

siderable rotation with between 1,000 and 2,000

new arrivals, but in balance there is a decrease.

f.

Training of Cubans continues on all Soviet

equipment including the SAMs.

It is not clear

whether the SAMs will be turned over to full Cuban

control; however, it is clear the Cubans will supply

the majority of the operating personnel.

The only equipment which has been withdrawn

has been the advanced C-band radar for the SAMs and

certain communication equipment.

No military equip-

ment has been withdrawn.

There

have been some

recent new arrivals of military equipment, particularly

between 25

and 50 tanks.

2.

Mr. McCone then stated that the program which had

been followed for the last several months, naving been

approved about the first of June, was integrated and inter-

dependent one part on the other

and therefore should be

considered as a

comprehensive program and not a number of

independent actions.

3.

Mr. FitzGerald presented a status report of the

six-point integrated program against Cuba. Following is

a

summary of his presentation.

a. Covert collection of intelligence for U.S.

strategic requirements as well as for operational

requirements.

This element of the program is progressing

satistactorily.

At the present time we have 74

singleton agents reporting directly to us.

In

addition there are 79 identified sub-agents who are

part of organized nets.

All of these agents and

sub-agents legally reside in Cuba.

There is one

Black (illegal) team successfully operating in the

12T

3933

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3

Pinar del Rio area.

It has 55 sub-agents in its

net.

The geographical distribution of agents

throughout Cuba has continued to improve.

In

addition to the above resident agents, we have 19

successful penetrations of Cuban official installa-

tions abroad.

The Cuban counterintelligence efforts

have intensified during the past months.

Our losses

have increased.

This is particularly true with

regard to the Black teams.

The Cuban control system

and

ration system make the team's continued exist-

ence more and more precarious.

We have had to

withdraw some teams and we have lost others. In

view of this experience we expect to reduce

the

number of "Black-team' infiltration operations,

but to continue to press forward with all other

types of intelligence operations.

b. Propaganda actions to stimulate low-risk

simple sabotage and other forms of active and

passive resistance.

The program includes both mailing and radio

operations.

Approximately 30,000 - 40,000 pieces

of propaganda are mailed into

Cuba every month.

There are 32 hours daily of radio programs using

seven different radio stations.

Radio America on

Swan Island broadcasts 13 hours daily.

Separate

radio programs are keyed to all significant target

groups within Cuba, i.e., students,

teachers,

labor, military leaders, etc.

We believe the

propaganda effort aimed to stimulate simple sabo-

tage has, when combined with the other parts of

the integrated over-all program, stimulated sabo-

tage and resistance..

citing 109 instances of sabotage since 1 April 1963.

with the gate abb63-

These include

such things as derailing locomotives,

destroying high-tension poles,

burning trucks and

factories.

Many have been similar to ideas

included in our broadcasts and mailing.

There

appears to have been a slight upturn in instances

of sabotage in recent weeks.

Economic denial actions on an increased

c.

basis.

This is a Government-wide program, one

which has probably had a greater impact on Cuba

than any of the others.

A great deal has been

learned regarding Cuban sources of supply.

Some

we have successfully closed down.

The Cuban

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4

merchant fleet is so badly managed that we are

almost better off by leaving it alone.

The big

gaps in the success of the program are in Canada,

Great Britain, and possibly Spain.

Recently

Canada has refused to cooperate.

This is con-

sidered most serious.

The economic denial program

should be strengthened wherever possible.

d. Exploitation and stimulation of disaffection

in the Cuban military and power centers.

On this key part of the over-all program

slow but encouraging progress is being made.

Jointly with DIA we have just completed detailed

biographic studies of 150 key military personnel.

Further analysis of these indicate 45 are of

particular interest to us and will warrant further

close attention.

with three "Heroes of the Revolution" who are either

in Cuba or who will soon return there. One basic

problem is that individual military figures will

talk with us but will not conspire with their fellow

officers for fear of compromise.

This must ultimately

be overcome.

The leaders with whom we are in touch

have emphasized the need to be reassured that, should

they overthrow Castro, they will not be considered

in the same light as Castro himself by the U.S. In

summary, we have made some progress but we have a

long way to go before the ultimate goal can be

attained.. The effort must be continued and where

possible expanded.

e.

General sabotage and harassment.

Since the approval of the program four

successful externally mounted sabotage operations

have been mounted (Santa Lucia - Casilda - La Isabela -

Cayo Guin). Three additional were ready to go, but

at the last minute were recalled.

identifying the proposed targets through January

1964•

This included the Matanzas Electric Plant and

the Santiago de Cuba Refinery. It was pointed out

that with but few exceptions the economic results

of any single sabotage operation were only signifi-

cant for the cumulative economic effect plus the

psychological effect in stimulating internal sabo-

tage and

resistance.

Mention was again made of the

22/0-23:20059 460036

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109 internal sabotage acts previously cited.

The

favorable impact of the successful external raids

on the Cuban people was noted.

This has an impor-

tant bearing on the ultimate willingness of key

military personnel to participate in a conspiracy

and of other persons to engage in simple sabotage.

It was explained that the sabotage teams utilized

on the

raids were trained in the Miami area,

in

Agency facilities in Virginia, plus a remote

section of Eglin Air Force Base.

The use of

Nicaragua-based aircraft for strikes against key

targets such

as the refinery at Santiago de Cuba

was discussed

but no definitive decision was reached

although Higher Authority questioned the efficacy

of such raids.

The continuation of the sabotage

and general harassment was specifically recommended.

f. Support of autonomous anti-Castro groups

to supplement and assist in the execution of the

above courses of action.

Substantial progress is being made in this

part of the program.

Manuel Artime and the MRR are

being supported.

He is developing bases in Costa

Rica and in Nicaragua. He has his ships; his first

groups of men are ready to start training. We have

had to "prime the pump" and will have to give him a

Shipment of arms and ammunition.

This will be done

in a way in which even Artime will not know that it

comes from the United States. Artime expects to

mount his first operations in December.

Support to the extent of $25,000 per month

is being provided Manolo Ray; however, he has not

progressed to the extent that Artime has.

present his

major problem is to develop a foreign

base of operations.

We may recommend support of one or more

additional autonomous groups.

The activation of these groups will relieve

some of the pressure on our operations

which we

believe will be most beneficial.

4.

Throughout the presentation, a limited number of

clarifying questions were asked and answered.

At the

conclusion

H.A. asked what decisions were necessary at

this

time.

The consensus was that the over-all program

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should continue but there was some divergency of opinion

regarding the sabotage program.

H.A. raised the question

of the sabotage program; whether it was worthwhile and

whether it would accomplish our purpose. Mr. McCone

stated that no one event will particularly affect the

economy.

However, a continuous program will have its

effects on the economy and it will encourage internal

sabotage by dissident people within Cuba.

The previously

mentioned 109 sabotage acts were again mentioned.

Secretary

Rusk then spoke at considerable length.

He stated the infiltration of Black teams for intelligence

purposes

gave him

no problems. He strongly supported the

Economic

Denial Program.

Internal sabotage should be con-

"the more of this, the better." He opposed hit-

and-run sabotage raids stating that he considered them

to be unproductive

in addition to complicating our foreign

relations. Specifically, he stated that such raids could

result in the Soviet failure to remove their troops from

Cuba and could directly relate to Soviet harassment of

Autobahn traffic. He said if we could mount sabotage raids

as retaliation for specific identifiable Cuban acts in the

Hemisphere, he could go along with this.

In this

connection, he stated we should concentrate on securing

information on what Castro was planning on doing in or

against other countries, particularly

those in the Western

Hemisphere.

Mr. McCone observed that infiltration was

difficult, internal sabotage was extremely difficult to

stimulate but that external hit-and-run sabotage had the

effect of automatically stimulating internal sabotage.

Secretary McNamara stated he could see no real

connection between Berlin Autobahn incidents and Cuban

operations. He saw many advantages in going ahead with

program but agreed with the necessity of keeping a

careful watch on it.

He said that he does not believe

that the program will result in the fall of Castro but

that it serves to maintain pressures on him which would

improve chances of either a change in regime or a change

in Castro hinself.

The Attorney General commented that he believed the

program had produced a worthwhile impact on Cuba during the

past five months and that it was useful in the United States

as an indication that something was being done..

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8.

Mr. McGeorge Bundy commented that the proposed

sabotage operations could be controlled but that when

the autonomous groups started operations this might

cause some problems due to the acknowledged lack of

tight control.

Mr. McCone emphasized that to a very

considerable extent these are uncontrollable and fore-

cast

that once Artime was in business, we might expect

some events to take place which were not exactly to our

liking.

9. There was a brief general discussion of the

need to expand naval and/or air coverage of shipping in

the Caribbean area to identify possible Cuban arms ship-

ments.

10..

H.A. then specifically approved the sabotage

operations against Nazabal wharf and Canete sawmill

scheduled for the weekend of 15 November.

In addition

State was directed to do something about Canada, Great

Britain, and Spain with respect to implementing

the

Economic Denial Program.

11. The meeting ended at approximately 1115.

Bruce B. Cheever

Deputy Chief

Special Affairs Staff

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4 November 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting Saturday Morning - 9:15, 2 November 1963 -

Executive Committee, attended by all members except

the Vice President.

The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the developments

in South Vietnam as reported in the night cables. McCone distributed

the morning wrap-up which summarized all cables received up to about

7:00 a.m.

There was

a general discussion on instructing Lodge to

urge the junta to get going with the formation of a government but the

President urged that we not quarterback the operation from here

although we should give Lodge our views. Concern was expressed that

there might be a temptation to work out an amnesty with the Viet Cong.

This possibility was to be reflected to Lodge.

McNamara advocated the announcing of recognition and

resumption of the CIP and resumption of the Special Forces. Ball

expressed some concern over hasty action and thought we should seek

improvements in control. It was the consensus of the meeting that

Lodge should be given contingency authority but that no actual action

should be taken prior to Monday and that recognition should be withheld

until Monday or Tuesday.

It was decided that we would use our influence to bring about

a detente between South Vietnam and Sihanouk in Cambodia and also the

Embassy in Thailand should keep in close touch with Sarit.

General Taylor and Secretary Ball raised the question of

the urgency of prosecuting the war. Taylor reported that Harkins has

no real trouble with the military regime although in the last few days he

has not been in close touch and was not in circuit on the coup plans.

Taylor was to communicate with Harkins urging immediate concentration

on the war effort.

The President was very emphatic that care must be

exercized in the type of political leadership installed at various levels

by the military group. He warned against installation of ultra-liberals

or quasi-Communists and giving them a free hand in the affairs of

South Viet Nam.

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Instructions were given to Hilsman to draft a series of

cables and drafting committees were organized which include CIA

representation.

At 4:30 in the afternoon

a second meeting was held.

Memorandum prepared by Colby.. At the meeting several communi-

cations to Lodge were approved. Others were held over for further

consideration.

At various times during the day discussions were held

with the President concerning his suggestion that Colby go to South

Vietnam at once. This was agreed and Colby arranged to leave on

Sunday. It was understood that he would meet with McNamara, Rusk,

and Bundy separately to get their views and receive their instructions.

At 6:00 Colby and I met with the President. The President expressed

the desire that Colby go to Vietnam as a Presidential representative

and a representative of all departments and not confine himself to

a role of CLA representative. This was an indication of his great

confidence in Colby. The President repeated briefly his comments

at the meeting, expressed concern that delays in organizing a

government properly identified as civilian would place the U.S. in

the position of supporting a military coup which would be undesirable

because of our Latin America policies. Also the President was

extremely concerned over the reported

assassination of Diem and Nhu.

JAM/ mib

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CiLO

#160

#1781

in m'e file

29 October 1963

Notes on Meeting - about 3:30 on 29 October - Situation Room:

In Attendance:

Secretary McNamara, Gen. Taylor, McGeorge Bundy,

William Bundy, Mr. McCone, Mr. Helms, Mr. Colby

1. Draft cable -- keep Lodge in place until Saturday.

2. Taylor expressed view that coup, if either successful or

unsuccessful, would have disastrous results.

3.

McGeorge Bundy insisted we cannot reconsider our position

with respect to support of a coup but can merely ask Embassy for

further assessment.

McCone raised question of why not reconsider our support

position, stating it was extremely disturbing to him, that the Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs had responsibility for military operations, and

for military advice to the President; expressed dissatisfaction that it

can not be reconsidered.

It was decided to send out a cable and get an appraisal of the

prospects of the success of the coup.

#71

Notes on Meeting at 4:00 - Cabinet Room - re South Viet Nam

In Attendance: The President, The Vice President, Secretary Rusk,

Secretary McNamara, Attorney General, Gen. Taylor,

Sal, etary

McGeorge Bundy, Gen. Krulak, Gov. Harriman,

William Bundy, MI. Forrestal, Alexis Johnson,

Mendenthal, McCone, Helms, 'Colby

Colby briefed on the attitude of the forces, using charts indicating

the disposition of forces, stating that about an equal number of key units

were in support of the coup as were in support of the Government, and

units totalling about 18, 000 personnel were neutral. Colby also briefed

on the two coup groups, the Generals and the Can Lao group, and

indicated very modest interchange between the two.

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The President raised the question of the 1960 coup attempt.

Colby stated that our principal effort was to get the two sides

negotiating and to stop the fighting. The President expressed

concern over prospect of protracted fighting - thought we should

have an evaluation from the Embassy.

Rusk spoke,

stated we must assume that Diem and Nhu are

informed about the talks. Diem's talk with Lodge indicates Diem was

informed about coup talks. Rusk questioned whether we should be silent

and permit a coup to go forward and involve civil war. We should raise

the question with the coup leaders as to whether the coup could be

carried off without civil war. Lodge should pass this word on to Don;

should indicate we are not now convinced of the outcome, therefore should

demand their plans before indicating support. The President indicated

Lodge should stay on his schedule, that if his departure was delayed

and a coup would take place, it would be apparent that we were informed. --

After discussion it was decided that Lodge could leave on Saturday on

military aircraft and this was agreed to. Agreed that a cable be sent

.to Lodge and Harkins asking for a detailed assessment of all questions

relating to the coup and also outlining command arrangements after

Lodge's departure.

The Attorney General took a very positive position, questioning

the communication that was proposed and indicating grave doubts of the

wisdome of our proceeding with a program which seemed to spell defeat

because of failure of a coup or political confusion following a coup, if

successful. He thought the consequences of failure in Soth South Vietnam

would be the loss of Southeast Asia to the communists. NOTE: He in

effect was repeating my statement to him at lunch last week. General

Taylor repeated his views which were to the effect that a successful

coup was no guarantee of success.

I repeated what I had said on 25 October at my meeting with the

President, McNamara, Bundy, AG, and Taylor. A coup if attempted

might result in some form of civil war in which the Viet Cong would win

by sitting on the sidelines or, if successful, would result in an extended

period of political confusion during which time the war might be

adversely affected and possibly lost and furthermore a period of

political unrest would probably result in a second or perhaps a third coup.

JAM/mfb

(Helms or Colby to prepare full notes of the above meetings)

-2 -

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SEUTEN

29 October 1963

MEMORANDUM

1. Diem-Lodge discussions produced no movement in the direction

of political action to satlafy our wishes. Also Diem Insinuations Indicate

his knowledge of U.S. officials famillar with coup planning.

2. Knowledgo of Generals' coup planning by at least two civilians

outside of government would indicate sufficient talking in Saigon so that

at least some of the plans af are known to Diem and Nhu.

3. The security measures are an improvement.

4. Analysis of SVN forces in Saigon area indicate three groups;

neutral, pro-government, which is probably the largest and pro-coup

which is smaller but still a larger force than in August.

5. Discussion oíto assess: o" prospects of a coup. Quite probable

that action will be postponed. from time to time for favorable developments.

On the other hand a coup attempt could be na de momentarily.

6. If successful political difficulties will follow and confusion

will exist for a protracted period.

....... ..._

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20008

31

25 October 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT: Meeting with the President, McNamara, Attorney

General, Bundy, myself concerning South Viet Nam

1. The President stated the purpose of the meeting was to

within the government prior to the return of Ambassador Lodge.

2. With respect to the first item I stated that I felt we were

handling a very delicate situation in a non-professional manner and

that the reports indicated it in such statements as paragraph 3 of

SAIG 1956.

"Gen. Don stated that Gen. Harkins had reiterated the

fact that he had misunderstood a presidential directive, that

Ambassador Lodge was aware of

and controlling Conein's

contacts with Don, and that Conein was the proper person with

whom to speak. "

This placed us in a position that if General Don was being "managed"

by Diem and Nhu there was absolutely no plausible denial of U.S.

officials participating in coup plotting at the levels of the President,

General Harkins and Ambassador Lodge.

Secretary McNamara supported this position and went

much further, stating that Conein's wires were inaccurate, not checked

or verified as evidenced by General Harkins' denials of statements

attributed to him. Furthermore, the whole coup business was being

handled in an amateurish way by inexperienced people from Lodge

on down.

I stated that we were dissatisfied and pointed out that this

morning's cable (Lodge to Bundy) stated that "CAS has been punctilious

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in carrying out my instructions. I have personally approved each

meeting between General Don and Conein who has carried out my

orders in each instance explicitly. " On this basis CIA has no control

over this situation and therefore could assume little responsibility.

After an extended exchange in which all expressed concern

over the existing situation, the President asked that CIA come up

with (a) a plan for installation of a chief of station and reorganization

of the station, and (b) plan for further conduct of monitoring coup

plotting in a way that would be non-attributable and therefore deniable.

These plans should be available prior to Ambassador Lodge's return.

3. The President then said that he felt that I was not in agreement

with policy and asked my views on the course of action we are pursuing.

I stated as follows:

a. I was dissatisfied with the present actions of the

Ambassador, General Harkins and the Station because if General Don

was being "managed" by Nhu then we would be seriously embarrassed.

b. There is a possibility, however, that General Don has

a coup in the making and will pull it off.

c. If so we in CIA felt we could expect an interregnum and

a period of political confusion because CIA does not feel that the.

Generals involved in the coup plotting are capable of providing

immediate, dynamic leadership to the country.

d. We forecast that this political confusion would then

end up, quite possibly, in another coup at some undetermined future

time and after that some form of political order would probably evolve.

However, I pointed out that the effect of all this on

the war effort was difficult to determine, and indeed it was possible

that the war might be lost during the interregnum and period of

political confusion.

e. I said that in CIA's opinion there were civilians fully

capable of running South Viet Nam, however, it is not clear to us how

these men, some of whom are in South Viet Nam and others outside of

the country in exile or on political assignments could be injected into

the government and exercise effective control.

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f. I then said that in examining the Diem-Nhu actions in

the last 60 days it is to be noted that they have taken constructive

military moves as recommended by McNamara and Taylor; have taken

a few relatively unimportant political steps; but have apparently "dug

in"' on the really important political issues.

These however have not

so much as been discussed with them because of the policy of "correct,

cool attitude. "

g. At this point I noted that the policy of "correct coolness"

had foreclosed either overt or covert contact with Diem and Nhu and

hence had shut off all intelligence concerning their thinking and plans.

Although some contacts at the lower level of foreign minister had con-

tinued, they were non-productive. Furthermore, we observed Diem

and Nhu had instituted their own policy of "correct, cool attitude" and

apparently had warned many of their subordinates, both civilian and

military, to be extremely careful in their contacts with the American

mission.

4. I stated that we.were at a crossroads. We either have to

work with Diem and Nhu or we have to take aggressive steps to remove

them and it was not clear that the succeeding government would be much

better.

However,

it was clear that the resulting political confusion

would be damaging.

I then said that I felt we should work with Diem and Nhu as

the most desirable alternative.

We should keep in contact with them

and this differed from present policy.

We should exercise persuasion,

influence and pressure to get them to institute some political reforms.

This, I felt, was in the best interest of winning the war.

I said that there was

some hope that Lodge might get started

on this course during this coming weekend when he would be with

Diem. I didn't think he should sit stony faced waiting for Diem to talk

to him but rather he should talk to Diem and get the issues out on the

table and recommended he be so instructed.

5. The President ordered Bundy to cable Lodge expressing our

concern over the situation described above and also urging free and

open talks with Diem over the coming weekend.

6. The President also asked that (1) CIA develop a plan as

outlined above promptly and (2) arrange for Dave Smith to return with

Lodge.

JAM:mcm

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19 July 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with the President - 12:15 p.m. - 19 July 1963

1. McCone reviewed the memorandum of 19 July, outlining

the answers to the four questions posed by the President on July 18 -

copy attached.

"23:

2. Dr. Wheelon and Dr. Chamberlain reviewed the status of

/ Soviet nuclear technology and weapons development versus U.S.

developments and the effects of nuclear explosions on hardened

missile sites, on cities when exploded at relatively low altitude

and on cities when exploded at about 20 miles in the air, indicating

the extent of the damage from blast and thermo effect.

3.. Dr. Wheelon discussed status of Soviet satellite photography,

the manner in which we intercepted the photography and were able

to reproduce it, examples of which were displayed.

4. Dr. McMillan and Capt. Sands reviewed recent GAMBIT

photography -- comparisons between G and M photography.

JAM/ mfb

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(

THE WHITE HOUSE

HASHISCTON

Find out:

1.

?.

3.

4.

When the French will be testing.

How muc.: it wouid cost them

to

tesi?

What significance would be the

progress

testing.

they expect from

the

If we give them assistance to make

the testing unnecessary

a) how much money would that

save

tham

b) how nuch time would that

save them.

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1- French Teil Quester.

wheeler

Effects Chambeelan

24c Mellan

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THe CEC

19 July 1963

MEMORANDUM

The French have detonated 8 nuclear devices at the Sahara

test site since February 13, 1960 -- 4 were atmospheric and the

last 4 underground. All were plutonium devices or weapons. Date

and yields are

as follows:

Designation

FR-1

FR-2

FR-3

FR -4

FR-5

FR-6

FR-7

FR-8

Date

13 Feb 1960

1 Apr 1960

27 Dec 1960

25 Apr 1961.

7 Nov 1961

1 May 1962

18 Mar 1963

30 Mar 1963

Cond.

Atmos.

Atmos.

Atmos.

Atmos.

Under.

Under.

Under.

Under.

Yield

60 KT

4.5

2

Low yield

50

20

0.5

The French are preparing a nuclear test site in Tuamotu

Archipelago in the South Pacific, using Tahiti as a staging base.

Preparatory work involves substantial construction of harbors,

airport runways, communications, depot facilities and

instrumentation. Reports indicate the French plan to have the

copy of this

te Sherman

sesh 1/2 3

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•

SOS CI

1 555.

WHEN WILL THE FRENCH BE TESTING?

The French can test in plutonium fission devices or weapons

underground in the Sahara at almost any time, or in the atmosphere

in the South Pacific late this year or any time through 1964. Some

of the tests scheduled this Spring in the Sahara were cancelled for

unknown reasons, but we know of no reason why the French might

not resume.

An all-out testing program in the South Pacific of thermonuclear

devices will not take place prior to 1966. Dr. Seaborg was told that

the French will not attempt to make an all-plutonium thermonuclear

device.

Therefore their TN development is controlled by initial

Pierrelatte gaseous diffusion plant which is several years away.

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II. How much would it cost them to test underground plutonium

"fission devices?

Underground plutonium devices --

They can be tested in the Sahara, up to 50-100 KT relatively

inexpensively using existing test facilities. A fair guess would be

$10-15 million per test.

Plutonium fission devices or weapons could be tested by air

drop in the South Pacific, using minimum facilities (and getting

minimum diagnostic data) for about the same figure per test.

It is impossible to estimate the cost of "minimum facilities" and it might

be as low as a few million dollars. Such tests would be categorized

as proof tests of the MIRAGE IV weapons system.

Preparations for permanent facilities for a South Pacific

testing facility involving the development of harbors, construction

of roads, water reservoirs, bridges, logistic support facilities,

etc., will be very expensive, probably costing on the order of

$200 million.

III. Of what significance would be the progress they can expect from

testing?

We believe the French have developed a 50 KT plutonium bomb

of reasonable weight. We feel they are anxious to conduct a proof

test of the MIRAGE IV nuclear weapon delivery system.

By further testing, they could increase the yield of this

weapon to 100 KT at acceptable weights.

Their next advance will be in the thermonuclear field which

we believe to be three to four years off. We would expect their

initial thermonaclear devices to yield about 500 KT at

acceptable weights.

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TOP

NHEI

IV.

If we give them assistance to make the testing

unnecessary: (a) how much money would they save?

The French would be saved the facility cost in the

South Pacific, estimated at $200 million, plus the cost of each

test conducted in the Sahara or in the Pacific which would be in

the order of $10-15 million per test for the plutonium fission weapons

and a considerably higher figure for the thermonuclear weapons.

(b) How much time would that save them?

The time saved is dependent upon the degree of our

assistance. If we gave them complete designs plus the fabricated

nuclear and non-nuclear components, the French would be saved

several years.

If, on the other hand, we gave them only general

information,

several years would be involved in assimilating this

information, translating it into acceptable designs for manufacturing,

and then the French would be concerned about the dependability of

the finished article. A vast saving would accrue to the French if we

sold them U-235.

This would eliminate the necessity of completing

the Pierrelatte plant which is estimated to cost the French between

'$1 billion and $1. 2 billion and is several years away from completion.

Furthermore, such an arrangement would release to the French

economy 6-700, 000 KWof cheap hydroelectric power in the Rhone Valley.

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